

**Cross-pressures and the European lavender vote: testing the
conditionality of the sexuality gap**

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Abstract

Emerging evidence points towards the existence of a “sexuality gap” in the political preferences and behaviour of lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) voters and that of heterosexuals in Western Europe. Very little is known, however, about how this gap is moderated by socio-economic status. This paper tests the conditionality of the sexuality gap by analysing how the effect of LGB status is conditioned by income and education. Empirically, we rely on data from the European Social Survey (2002-2017) to analyse the marginal effect of sexuality in determining ideological placement, vote choice and support for economic redistribution across different income and education levels. The results demonstrate that the divergence between LGBs’ and heterosexuals’ preferences only emerges amongst those with higher income and education. The findings also suggest that the sexuality gap may be the result of the asymmetric effect of these socio-economic variables for LGBs and heterosexuals.

Keywords: gay vote, voting behaviour, Western Europe, cross-pressures, LGBT+, sexuality

Introduction

Lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB)¹ voters' political behaviour in contemporary Western Europe is distinct from that of heterosexuals. Over and above what can be explained by socio-economic determinants that may explain differences between LGB and non-LGB voters, a “sexuality gap” has been established with LGBs across Western Europe tending to identify with the left, favour leftist political parties and support core leftist policy positions such as state-sponsored efforts at economic redistribution more than heterosexual voters (Turnbull-Dugarte, 2020). We know very little, however, regarding the conditionality of this effect.

LGBs are theorised to be mobilised towards leftist parties because these parties have catered the policy offering to match the demands of the LGB(T+) community (see, Bailey, 1999; Egan, 2012; Hertzog, 1996; Sherrill and Flores, 2014; Turnbull-Dugarte, 2019). The socio-economic makeup of the LGB community, however, is not monolithic and there are likely to be within-group asymmetric pressures based on economic incentives or other socio-economic concerns that may moderate the persistence of the sexuality gap. This research note analyses in what way the sexuality gap is conditioned by socio-economic status. Specifically, it assesses the moderating effect of income and education in explaining the divergence in political preferences and behaviour between heterosexuals and LGBs voters in Western Europe. The results show that the sexuality gap is conditional among those who fall on the higher end of the income and education

¹ Transsexual individuals (T) and other sexuality-based identities (+) are, of course, a core group with the LGB(T+) community but they are, regrettably, not included as an identifiable stratum in the study population given the data constraints. I refer to LGB voters and homosexual individuals interchangeably. Conceptually homosexuality is defined as having a sexual partner of the same sex and indicates LGBs using the partner-inferred approach (Kühne, Kroh and Richter, 2019). Note that whilst we refer to individuals as homosexual, this may not be a social label that individuals in the sample would adopt themselves. Homosexuality is assumed to be an ascriptive trait randomly distributed across the population, but identifying as LGB(T+) is not random (Egan, 2012, 2019).

distributions, with the sexuality gap emerging as a result of the asymmetric effect of both income and education on LGB and heterosexual voters.

The contributions of this short paper are twofold. Firstly, it expands the very limited empirical analysis and understanding of the divergence behaviour of a sizeable minority² within the electoral population. The results, showing an asymmetric effect of income and education for LGB and heterosexual voters, aids our understanding of the conditions under which the sexuality gap emerges. Second, the research note speaks to the wider literature on the motivating effect of identity-based voting and within-group cohesion. Studies that seek to assess the effect of identity-induced divergence in political behaviour demonstrate that within-group loyalty tends to override conflicting preferences at the ballot box (Ansolabehere and Puy, 2016; Huddy, 2001; Jackson, 2011; Stokes-Brown, 2003). The findings presented here show that LGBs behave in a similar fashion, with LGBs opting to retain their increased support for the left even when their economic status might incentive them to do otherwise.

State of the art

The academic literature dedicated to assessing the role of sexuality on voting behaviour and political preferences is very much in its infancy (Cook, 1999) and largely US-centric (Bailey, 1999; Edelman, 1992; Egan, 2012, 2019; Hertzog, 1996; Swank, 2018; Worthen, 2020). In the first assessment of the sexuality gap in political behaviour among European electorates, Turnbull-Dugarte (2020) relies on a novel means of identifying LGB individuals using data on the makeup of households from the

² Whilst the Kinsey report (Kinsey et al., 1948) famously claimed around 10% of the population was not heterosexual, ascertaining the real number of sexual minorities within the population is challenging given the need for individuals to self-report their sexual orientation (Cook, 1999; Kühne et al., 2019). The UK Office of National Statistics 2018 Annual Population Survey estimates that the LGB(T+) population in the UK is 2.9% but other estimates place it at closer to 7% (Lam, 2016).

European Social Survey (ESS) to show that LGBs are i) more likely to spatially position themselves on the left, ii) support typically leftist policy issues such as redistribution, and iii) vote for left-leaning political parties.

Theoretically, the preference of the lavender vote can be explained by viewing LGB voters as a conscious social stratum that behaves in a way that seeks to maximise the welfare of their shared in-group (Sherrill, 1996; Sherrill and Flores, 2014). Social democratic and other leftist parties in Western Europe have served as the entrepreneurial advocates of pro-LGB(T+) legislation such as same-sex marriage laws (Siegel and Wang, 2018), which has tended to coincide with strong opposition from conservative and other right-wing parties. LGBs are, therefore, understood to be drawn to the left because the political supply of these parties is congruent with these voters' demands to expand their in-group welfare and the left's issue ownership of the pro-LGB(T+) space (Turnbull-Dugarte, 2020). But how might LGB voters react when the party(ies) that promote positions that expand the welfare of their shared in-group are potentially at odds with own economic interests?

Cross-pressures and divergent interests

Voters are often subjected to cross-pressures which means that their political concerns and preferences cannot always be neatly coalesced into a single ideological space or political offering (Endres and Panagopoulos, 2019; Lefkofridi et al., 2014; Lipset, 1983; Mutz, 2002). Individuals are considered to be cross-pressured when their demographic position places them within multiple cleavage positions, reducing their common identification with a sole social strata, ideological space, or political party (Powell, 1976). This evidenced in cases where economic incentives and social values pull voters towards different political alternatives (Mutz, 2002; Rueda, 2018). Lipset (1983) argues, for example, that conflicting cross-pressures explains the support of right-wing

conservative parties among working class women during the twentieth century. Whilst working class men cared more about economic concerns, working class women were more likely to vote for conservative parties whose policy offering may have gone against their own economic interests, but whose appeal lay in their religious conservatism and concerns regarding social morality (Lipset 1983: 217). In contemporary Europe, there is evidence that preferences on the cultural cleavage, such as concerns over immigration, explains voter support amongst the working class for parties which advocate policies that go against their economic interests (but see, Lefkofridi et al., 2014) but who take a tougher position on authoritarian and cultural (Oesch, 2008a, 2008b). The reverse relationship is also present, with many voters adopting policy preferences that favour fiscal prudence and economic conservatism whilst at the same time being supportive of socially liberal positions in relation to LGB(T+) rights or immigration (Caughey et al., 2019).

We know that, on average, LGBs are more likely to vote for left-leaning political parties vis-à-vis heterosexuals (Turnbull-Dugarte, 2020), and that the left has been associated with the advancement of LGB(T+) rights issues in Western Europe (Siegel and Wang, 2018). What is not clear, however, is how the sexuality gap between LGB and non-LGB voters in Western Europe is affected by cross-pressures related to socio-economic status. Income for example has traditionally exhibited a notable explanatory role in voter preferences in Western Europe, with those on the higher end of the income distribution tending to support economically conservative parties.³ Whilst class-based divisions between the left-leaning *have-nots* and the right-leaning *haves*, has been on

³ Contemporary analysis, however, including that centred on explaining the rise of populist parties brings this into doubt. Notably, evidence shows that those who face economic hardship and belong in the lower end of the income distribution are increasingly likely to vote for populist parties (Im et al., 2019; Oesch, 2008a; Rama and Cordero, 2018), although there are exceptions (see the case of Vox in Spain whose supporters are more bourgeois (Turnbull-Dugarte et al., 2020)).

the decline, income is still a strong predictor of vote choice (Evans and Tilley, 2012; Oesch, 2008b), although the magnitude of the effect is often conditioned by the divergence of parties' economic policies (Evans and Tilley, 2012; Jansen et al., 2013). Social democratic parties and other parties on the left tend to advocate policies that will lead to increased costs for wealthier citizens in the form of progressive taxation measures (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Romer, 1975) and provide equality-driving outcomes for the economically vulnerable (Bobbio, 1994; Hasenfeld and Rafferty, 1989). Empirical evidence from across the EU suggests that high-income citizens are conscious of this with those on the higher end of the income ladder and with a more advantageous socio-economic position being less supportive of redistribution (Blekesaune, 2013) .

LGBs at the higher end of the socio-economic distribution may experience cross-pressures, with their economic interests incentivising a move away from pro-LGB(T+) leftist parties. If LGB individuals vote for leftist parties and identify spatially with the left simply because these parties promote policies that are congruent with their own socio-economic status, we might expect the sexuality gap to disappear amongst those with higher incomes or education (economic interest thesis). Should, however, LGB voters be drawn to parties on the left because of their ownership of the pro-LGB(T+) political space (Turnbull-Dugarte, 2020), we should expect the sexuality gap to be consistent despite potential conflicting economic incentives (group interest thesis). This expectation, in line with empirical examples observed in the case of race (Jackson, 2011) and regional identities (Ansolabehere and Puy, 2016), assumes that political identities dominate when it comes to making political choices at the ballot box (Huddy, 2001).

Data and method

Empirically, I test the conditionality of the sexuality gap in voting behaviour and political preferences on income and education, two well-established measures of socio-economic status. The analysis below uses data on individuals from twelve Western European⁴ counties ($N = 90,812$) from a cumulative dataset of the ESS (2002-2017).

There are three dependent variables. First, *ideology* is a dichotomous variable that indicates those individuals who identify on the left of the primary socio-economic left-right axis. The left-right axis is, of course, not the sole cleavage structure that shapes political conflict in Western Europe and its use is not without critique (see Caughey et al., 2019). In addition to the dominant socioeconomic left-right cleavage, the political space in Europe is also shaped by the green-alternative-libertarian vs traditional-authoritarian-national (GAL-TAN) dimension. This axis includes preferences on non-redistributive post-material issues – the salience of which has been on the rise in Western democracies (Inglehart, 2008; Kitschelt, 1995) – such as environmental concerns, morality issues (e.g. LGB(T+) rights or abortion) or debates over immigration.

Ideological positions on the left-right axis remain, however, the main “super issue” (Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976) that structures voters and parties with the Western bloc of European states into a (largely) coalesced liberal/left-authoritarian-right space (Bakker et al., 2012)⁵ and is the primary spatial proxy which voters are familiar with

⁴ Countries included: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK, the twelve Western European countries with uninterrupted participation in the ESS across the eight waves.

⁵ Bobbio (1994) suggests that this left-liberal link may be because the left is more prone to seek to correct inequalities (economic or social) whereas the right is more susceptible to view inequalities as organically occurring and not in need of correcting. Whilst there is variation between states amongst Western Europe there is a strong correlation between socioeconomic and GAL-TAN positions of parties

(Mair, 2007). The ESS asks voters to place themselves on the left-right ideological space on a scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right). Respondents who have an ideological position less than 5 are coded as being on the left, whilst voters who spatially place themselves with an ideological value of 5 or more are identified as being on the right.⁶

Second, I create a measure that captures those survey respondents who voted for a left-leaning political party (1) in the most recent general election and those who voted for any other alternative (0), as measured by individuals' retrospective voting claims. The identification of parties as being on the left relies on party family data from the Manifesto Project: parties coded as green/ecological, socialist or social democratic. Alternative specifications, including a test of i) only mainstream left (social democratic) parties, ii) liberal (GAL-TAN) parties, are reported in the appendix.

Finally, I measure individuals' support for a core traditional leftist policy: redistribution of income. Support for redistribution is indicated via a dichotomous indicator: voters who strongly agree/agree that governments should take steps to reduce income inequality.

The main independent variable relies on a measure of LGB status using the composition of individual households (Turnbull-Dugarte, 2020). This approach involves matching the gender of individuals who are in a cohabiting relationship with their partner to infer the sexuality of respondents. This measurement strategy has the benefit of allowing us to infer sexuality based on same-sex relationship status which gives us data on LGB individuals in a context where no cross-national survey provides

(see Bakker et al. (2012)). Figure A8 illustrates the correlations of party positions across dimensions for each country.

⁶ Ideology is dichotomised in this way to ensure parity with the other dependent variables which are also binary indicators. Non-dichotomised models of ideology are reported in the appendix.

us with a direct measure of sexuality. It does mean, however, that single individuals need to be excluded from the analysis to ensure a like-for-like comparison between coupled individuals, which limits the inferences that can be drawn regarding the divergence between single LGBs and non-LGBs in the wider population (Kühne et al., 2019). One assumption applied to the data, is that the potential confounding effect of partnered cohabitation on the three dependent variables is equally distributed across same-sex and opposite-sex couples.

The two moderating variables of interest are income and education. Income is operationalised in the ESS via a ten-point indicator that signals the income percentile to which each respondent identified from the population of each country in a particular year. Education is measured in the total number of years in full-time education. For robustness, an alternative means of operationalising education based on a categorical indicator is included in the appendix. The core findings remain unchanged.

The model includes a vector of control variables that are considered important determinants of ideological identification and support for the left in Western Europe. These include sex, age, religiosity, urban/rural residency, subjective economic evaluations and satisfaction with democracy. Given the pooled nature of the cross-sectional time-series, election (country-year) fixed effects are included and country-clustered standard errors are applied. The inclusion of these fixed effects ensures that country-specific systematic differences and longitudinal trends over time, such as increasing popular acceptance of homosexuality and changes in same-sex marriage laws⁷ (Abou-Chadi and Finnigan, 2019) are captured.

⁷ Sensitivity tests controlling for same-sex marriage laws and domestic support for homosexuality are reported in Table A6. The results remain unchanged.

As each of the three dependent variables is structured as a binary indicator, I rely on logistic regression. Given the focus here is on assessing multiplicative interaction terms, I present these in graphical form (full regression output reported in Table A2 and Table A3 in appendix) and display the predictive margins of sexuality for different values of income and education (Brambor et al., 2006). Note that the empirical focus here is not on whether the effect of sexuality is incremented or restricted by the socioeconomic indicators, but rather whether the sexuality gap between LGB and non-LGB individuals is conditioned by concrete values of the moderating parameter. The illustrations include overlaid histograms which show the distribution of the moderating variables to ensure that the interpretation of the interaction is presented for meaningful and observed values of the moderator. The distribution of LGB and non-LGB individuals across the two moderating variables is near-symmetrical (Figure A1 in appendix). There is no difference of substance or significance in income levels based on sexuality in the data. In the case of education, LGB respondents are likely to have experienced one year more of education than their heterosexual counterparts.

Analysis

Ideological placement

I begin by analysing the conditionality of the sexuality gap in ideological preferences as moderated by income. Figure 1 displays the probability of identifying on the left for different income percentiles. In the case of heterosexual voters, income does not appear to exhibit any predictive role in their ideological positions. There is a minimal decrease in the probability of their identifying with the left, but the line is near horizontal.

The same is not true in the case of LGB voters. These voters become increasingly more prone to identify with the left on the upper end of the income distribution vis-à-vis LGB (and heterosexual) voters on the lower end. For every one-unit increase in income, there is an average 1.6 percentage-point increase in the probability of identifying with the left among LGB citizens. Crucially, there is no sexuality gap observable when income levels are low.




Figure 1: Identification with the left conditioned by income




Figure 2: Identification with the left conditioned by education

The moderating effect of education on ideological placement among LGBs and heterosexuals is reported in Figure 2. At the lower end of the distribution, there is no statistically discernible difference based on sexuality. Whilst both LGBs and their heterosexual counterparts become more likely to place themselves on the left as education increases, the effect is notably greater amongst the LGB population. A one-year increment in education for LGBs is associated with an average increase of 2.5 percentage-points in the probability of spatially identifying with the left. Among heterosexuals, the same increment only corresponds with a 1.1 percentage-point increase (see also Figure 8). The asymmetric effect of education leads to a substantive gap in preferences amongst those with above-average education.

Voting for the left

I now turn to how income and education moderate the effect of sexuality on actual voting behaviour. Looking at the moderating effect of income (Figure 3), as expected, and congruent with empirical observations of income and voting in Western Europe (Evans and Tilley, 2012), income is negatively associated with voting for left-leaning political parties among heterosexuals. A one-unit increase in income is associated with a 1.1 percentage-point *decrease* in the probability of voting for the left - the difference between the lowest and highest values of income is in excess of 10 percentage-points. In other words, heterosexual individuals' electoral support for the left at the ballot box is substantively and significantly influenced by their level of income: those with more are less likely to support parties on the left than those with less.




Figure 3: Voting for the left conditioned by income

This negative relationship between income and left-wing voting is *not* observed in the LGB population. As shown in Figure 3 (and below in Figure 7), there is no significant association between income and left-wing vote choice among LGB voters. The divergence in voting between LGB and non-LGB voters for leftist parties is conditioned by income. Whilst heterosexuals become less prone to support leftist parties when they belong to a high-income group - likely because revenue-maximising incentives reduce the appeal of leftist parties who are inclined to promote progressive taxation measures that may be viewed negatively by higher earners (Blekesaune, 2013) - LGB voters do not.

This suggests that the sexuality gap can be explained by non-LGB voters electing to vote for parties that promote policies that are congruent with their economic interests whilst LGB voters elect to side with parties associated with the favourable LGB(T+) rights positions. In other words, the sexuality gap in voting for the left occurs because heterosexual individuals prioritise their economic interests while LGB voters appear to be influenced by their identity concerns, which is consistent with identity-based determinants of electoral choices observed in case of race and ethnicity (Jackson, 2011; Stokes-Brown, 2003, 2006). The magnitude of the sexuality gap across income levels is sizeable. For example, amongst those with an income value of 9, where a plurality of voters place themselves, the effect of LGB status is equal to 11.5 percentage-points, which translates into an increase of 29.5% vis-à-vis non-LGBs.




Figure 4: Voting for the left conditioned by education

Figure 4 illustrates the moderating effect of education in the sexuality gap of vote choice. Note, that in the case of heterosexual individuals, the predictive power of education on voting for the left is close to null (0.22) with the line being near-horizontal. The same is not true of LGB voters: the association between education and voting for the left is positive and significant. One additional year of education increases the probability of voting for the left by 1.3 percentage-points (see Figure 8). Whereas LGB and heterosexual voters with similar and low levels of education vote for left-leaning parties with the same probability, when these individuals have the median (twelve) years in education or higher, their political behaviour diverges with LGBs being significantly more likely to cast their vote for a left-of-centre party. The magnitude of the effect is far from trivial. Taking the median level of education as an

illustrative example, the sexuality gap is 5.5 percentage-points (13.3% increase) and this gap grows substantially to 19.7 percentage-points (44.5% increase) amongst those at the upper limit of the education moderator.

Support for redistribution

Finally, I turn towards support for redistribution. Policies that advocate state-driven solutions to inequality are a core ideal of social democrats and other leftist parties in Western Europe (Bobbio, 1994). Redistributive measures to tackle income inequality are also, however, likely to lead to increased costs for voters with higher incomes. We know that LGB voters in Europe are, on average, more likely to be supportive of these measures (Turnbull-Dugarte, 2020) but it is not clear whether this increased support vis-à-vis heterosexuals will remain constant amongst wealthier citizens. Figure 5 plots the support for economic distribution among LGBs and heterosexuals for different values of income.




Figure 5: Support for redistribution conditioned by income

The results from Figure 5 are noteworthy for two main reasons. Firstly, the interaction effect between LGB status and income shows that LGBs and their heterosexual counterparts behave in a similar way and as economic incentives would expect them to. Those who fall on the higher end of the income distribution are far less likely to support government policy measures that seek to redistribute wealth and tackle income inequality. For heterosexuals (LGBs), a one-unit income increase reduces the probability of supporting redistribution by 2.7 (1.8) percentage-points. This coincides with rational expectations regarding voter preferences relating to their own economic incentives (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Romer, 1975) and empirical findings made elsewhere regarding the link between income and redistribution support (Blekesaune, 2013). In other words, poorer citizens want wealth to be spread whereas richer citizens, on average, appear to prefer protecting as much as their own wealth as possible. As incomes increase, the divergence between LGBs and non-LGBs also becomes greater. For example, there is no sexuality gap between voters who have very low incomes, but the gap emerges and increases to 7.7 percentage-points at the upper bounds of income values.

Recall, that heterosexual individuals also became less likely to vote for leftist parties as their income increased, whereas LGB voters' propensity to vote for the left is unaffected by income. Heterosexual individuals' lower level of electoral support for leftist parties coincides with their economic preferences related to redistribution, whereas the same is not true for LGB individuals, who, despite becoming less supportive of redistributive efforts, continue voting for left-leaning parties. This suggests that economic incentives do not explain LGBs' support for left-leaning parties which is congruent with the theoretical argument that the electoral preferences of these

voters is be driven by left-leaning parties' issue ownership of LGB(T+) rights issues (Turnbull-Dugarte, 2020) .




Figure 6: Support for redistribution conditioned by education

Finally, I model the conditionality of the sexuality gap in support for redistribution on education. As in the case of income for heterosexual voters, education is negatively associated with support for redistribution. The greater the number of years in education, the lower the probability that a heterosexual citizen supports redistribution. The relationship is less clear in the case of LGB voters. There appears to be a negative trend between education and redistribution but there is no identifiable relationship of significance (see Figure 8).

Across all values of education, the predicted probabilities are greater for LGBs vis-à-vis heterosexuals. Again, however, the majority of the predicted values for each group

are statistically indistinguishable from one other with the exception of observations centred around the median value of the moderator. In the case, for example, of those who have experienced twelve years in education, LGB voters are around 4 percentage-points more likely to support redistribution than their heterosexual peers. Crucially, whilst higher levels of education are associated with increased spatial identification with the left and a higher probability of casting a ballot for a leftist party among LGBs, the relationship between education and government efforts to tackle income inequality are less clear.

As a means of summarising the main findings, Figures 7 and 8 below report the average marginal effects of both income and education for heterosexual and LGB individuals on all three of the dependent variables.




Figure 7: Average marginal effects of income (percentage-points)




Figure 8: Average marginal effects of education (percentage-points)

The findings show that these socio-economic variables do not shape the political preferences of heterosexual and LGB voters in symmetrical ways. Whilst heterosexuals’ behaviour would follow what might be viewed as economically interested incentives with identification with the left, voting for the left and support for economic redistribution all negatively associated with income, the link is far less clear in the case of LGBs. For LGB citizens, income is positively associated with identifying with the left, exhibits no effect on vote choice and is negatively associated with support for redistribution. These results reject the economic-interest thesis and lend support to the group-interest thesis (Sherrill and Flores, 2014).

Conclusion

In this research note, I demonstrate that income and education have a notable moderating effect on sexuality which affects the persistence of the sexuality gap

between lavender and heterosexual voters. Heterosexuals' political behaviour follows their money but LGBs do not behave in the same way. Even though LGBs - like heterosexuals - are less likely to support redistribution when they fall on the higher end of the income distribution, the probability of their voting for the left remains unchanged. This signals that some other motivating force, which is notably absent amongst non-LGBs, is driving their support for the left in spite of the potential economic costs voting for the left might imply. This finding is consistent with the theoretical arguments posited by Turnbull-Dugarte (2020) who argues that the sexuality gap can be explained, in part, by left-wing parties' attempts to bank the support of lavender voters.

Education shows less of a clear-cut picture. In terms of ideological identification, there is a conditional effect brought about by the swollen influence of education on the probability of identifying with the left amongst LGBs. This means that education increases the likelihood of being liberal at an augmented rate for LGBs compared to heterosexuals and this is repeated when it comes to voting for leftist parties. Education has no effect on voting for the left for non-LGBs whereas it does for LGB voters which then leads to the emergence of a gap between the different sexuality groups amongst the more educated that is absent amongst the lower education population. It is not entirely clear why education exhibits this heterogeneous effect. Although it is clear that education is likely capturing more than just socio-economic status as it moderates the sexuality gap that is notably distinct from the economic interests demonstrated by income. One explanation may be that LGB individuals with higher levels of education are more informed regarding that the historical process of discrimination against their sexuality-formed in-group. Unfortunately, given the very narrow data available, we are limited in our ability to test the mechanisms that might drive this divergence.

The findings presented in the case of income are consistent with the European lavender vote, yet they are unable to provide conclusive evidence regarding what *causes* LGB voters to diverge from heterosexuals in their support for the left. Future work may seek to leverage tests that can do just that.

The contribution in this note are largely empirical, demonstrating that the socio-economic status, as measured by income and education, of individuals plays in role in explaining the emergence of the sexuality gap. From a theoretical perspective, the findings also add the growing body of work on the influential role of group-based identity politics in shaping political behaviour (Huddy, 2013). A limitation in this study, however, is that whilst we can identify individuals that belong to the LGB(T+) in-group, the data does not facilitate any measurement of the level of attachment to the identity. Additional investigative efforts are required to assess under what conditions LGB voters' behaviour divergences from that of their heterosexual peers. Doing so, however, will require solutions to the persistent problems regarding a lack of data that allows us to measure sexuality

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
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
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Online Appendix Material



Graphs by LGB status

Figure A 1: Distribution of moderator variable (education) for LGBs and non-LGBs



Graphs by LGB status

Figure A 2: Distribution of moderator variable (income) for LGBs and non-LGBs

Main models:

Table A 1: Modelling ideology, vote choice and support for redistribution with income conditionality

	(1) Ideology	(2) Vote left	(3) Support Redistribution
LGB status	-0.20 (0.14)	-0.19 (0.36)	-0.03 (0.24)
Income	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.05*** (0.02)	-0.14*** (0.01)
LGB*Income	0.08*** (0.01)	0.08* (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
Sex (1 male)	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.23*** (0.02)
Age	0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Education	0.05*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)
Religiosity	-0.11*** (0.01)	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.03** (0.01)
Domicile (base: City/urban)			
City suburbs	-0.18*** (0.03)	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.08 (0.06)
Town/small city	-0.26*** (0.04)	-0.30*** (0.08)	-0.09 (0.08)
Village	-0.38*** (0.07)	-0.51*** (0.10)	-0.12 (0.08)
Country/Farm	-0.53*** (0.05)	-0.87*** (0.23)	-0.14* (0.07)
View of economy	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)
Satisfaction with democracy	0.00 (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)
Election FE (Country*Year)	✓	✓	✓
Constant	-0.51** (0.25)	0.36 (0.32)	3.09*** (0.15)
Observations	90,812	73,637	90,812

Robust country-clustered standard errors (two-tailed) in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A 2: Modelling ideology, vote choice and support for redistribution with education conditionality

	(1) Ideology	(2) Vote left	(3) Support Redistribution
LGB status	-0.56* (0.29)	-0.33* (0.18)	0.04 (0.24)
Education	0.05*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)
LGB*Education	0.06*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)
Sex (1 male)	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.23*** (0.02)
Age	0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Income	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.05*** (0.02)	-0.14*** (0.01)
Religiosity	-0.11*** (0.01)	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.03** (0.01)
Domicile (base: City/urban)			
City suburbs	-0.18*** (0.03)	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.08 (0.05)
Town/small city	-0.26*** (0.04)	-0.30*** (0.08)	-0.09 (0.08)
Village	-0.38*** (0.07)	-0.51*** (0.10)	-0.12 (0.08)
Country/Farm	-0.54*** (0.05)	-0.87*** (0.23)	-0.14* (0.07)
View of economy	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)
Satisfaction with democracy	0.00 (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)
Election FE (Country*Year)	✓	✓	✓
Constant	-0.51** (0.25)	0.36 (0.32)	3.09*** (0.15)
Observations	90,812	73,637	90,812

Robust country-clustered standard errors (two-tailed) in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A 3: Income conditional models with alternative FE

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Liberal	Voted left	Supports redistribution
LGB status	-0.18	-0.15	0.04
	(0.14)	(0.36)	(0.27)
Income	-0.01	-0.05***	-0.14***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
LGB*Income	0.08***	0.07	0.03
	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Sex (1 male)	-0.08*	-0.13***	-0.24***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Age	0.00*	-0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.05***	0.01	-0.03***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Religiosity	-0.11***	-0.09***	-0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Domicile (base: City/urban)			
City suburbs	-0.18***	-0.16***	-0.06
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Town/small city	-0.25***	-0.29***	-0.07
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Village	-0.37***	-0.50***	-0.09
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.07)
Country/Farm	-0.53***	-0.87***	-0.12
	(0.05)	(0.23)	(0.08)
View of economy	-0.04***	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Satisfaction with democracy	0.00	0.03**	-0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Country fixed effects	✓	✓	✓
Year effects	✓	✓	✓
Constant	-0.60**	0.35	2.62***
	(0.29)	(0.36)	(0.27)
Observations	90,812	73,637	90,812

Robust country-clustered standard errors (two-tailed) in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A 4: Modelling ideology, vote choice and support for redistribution with education conditionality

	(1) Liberal	(2) Voted Left	(3) Support Redistribution
LGB status	-0.51* (0.29)	-0.35* (0.18)	0.11 (0.26)
Education	0.05*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.00)
LGB*Education	0.06*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)
Sex (1 male)	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.13*** (0.03)	-0.23*** (0.02)
Age	0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Income	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.05*** (0.02)	-0.13*** (0.01)
Religiosity	-0.11*** (0.01)	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.03* (0.01)
Domicile (base: City/urban)			
City suburbs	-0.18*** (0.03)	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.06 (0.05)
Town/small city	-0.25*** (0.04)	-0.29*** (0.08)	-0.07 (0.07)
Village	-0.37*** (0.07)	-0.50*** (0.09)	-0.09 (0.07)
Country/Farm	-0.53*** (0.05)	-0.87*** (0.23)	-0.12 (0.08)
View of economy	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Satisfaction with democracy	0.00 (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)
Country fixed effects	✓	✓	✓
Year effects	✓	✓	✓
Constant	-0.59** (0.29)	0.35 (0.36)	2.62*** (0.27)
Observations	90,812	73,637	90,812

Robust country-clustered standard errors (two-tailed) in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Robustness checks:

i) OLS estimation of ideology

Table A 5: Modelling ideology with OLS

	Ideology	
	Income interaction	Education interaction
LGB	-0.20 (0.14)	-0.31 (0.27)
Income	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)
LGB*Income	0.07*** (0.02)	
Sex	-0.22*** (0.03)	-0.22*** (0.03)
Age	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Education	0.03** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)
LGB*Education		0.04** (0.02)
Religiosity	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.02)
Domicile (base: City/urban)		
City suburbs	-0.15*** (0.04)	-0.15*** (0.04)
Town/small city	-0.22*** (0.05)	-0.22*** (0.05)
Village	-0.34*** (0.07)	-0.34*** (0.07)
Country/Farm	-0.45*** (0.07)	-0.45*** (0.07)
View of economy	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)
Satisfaction with democracy	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)
Country fixed effects	✓	✓
Year effects	✓	✓
Constant	6.54*** (0.36)	6.55*** (0.36)
Observations	86,474	86,474
R-squared	0.07	0.07

Robust country-clustered standard errors (two-tailed) in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1




Figure A 3: Income conditionality on ideology with OLS model




Figure A 4: Education conditionality on ideology with OLS model

ii) Alternative means of operationalising education




Figure A 5: Education alternative and ideology




Figure A 6: Education alternative and voting for the left






Figure A 7: Education alternative and support for redistribution



NB: Data from Norway and Switzerland not provided in the CHES 1999-2014 dataset

Figure A 8: Coalesced nature of party positions in multidimensional space

Modelling support for liberal parties



Parties identified as liberal via the CHES (Polk et al.) coding on the GAL-TAN dimension

Figure A 9: Robustness (i) including liberal parties

Models using traditional left (social democratic) parties only




Figure A 10: Robustness (ii) using social democrats only

Influential country test




Figure A 11: Robustness (iii) - Country test with income

Influential country test




Figure A 12: Robustness (iv) - Country test with education

Table A 6: Additional country-level controls

	Income models			Education models		
	Main model	+ SSM control	+ public homophobia control	Main model	+ SSM control	+ public homophobia control
LGB status	-0.19 (0.36)	-0.19 (0.36)	-0.19 (0.36)	-0.33* (0.18)	-0.33* (0.18)	-0.33* (0.18)
Income	-0.05*** (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.02)
LGB*Income	0.08* (0.04)	0.08* (0.04)	0.08* (0.04)			
Sex (1 male)	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.14*** (0.03)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Education	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
LGB*Education				0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
Religiosity	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.10*** (0.02)
Domicile (base: City/urban)						
City suburbs	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.16*** (0.04)
Town/small city	-0.30*** (0.08)	-0.30*** (0.08)	-0.30*** (0.08)	-0.30*** (0.08)	-0.30*** (0.08)	-0.30*** (0.08)
Village	-0.51*** (0.10)	-0.51*** (0.10)	-0.51*** (0.10)	-0.51*** (0.10)	-0.51*** (0.10)	-0.51*** (0.10)
Country/Farm	-0.87*** (0.23)	-0.87*** (0.23)	-0.87*** (0.23)	-0.87*** (0.23)	-0.87*** (0.23)	-0.87*** (0.23)
View of economy	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)
Satisfaction with democracy	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
Country has SSM		0.30*** (0.06)	-0.16*** (0.04)		0.30*** (0.06)	-0.16*** (0.04)
Domestic homophobia			-0.94*** (0.16)			-0.93*** (0.16)
Election FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	0.36 (0.32)	0.36 (0.32)	2.20*** (0.57)	0.36 (0.32)	0.36 (0.32)	2.18*** (0.58)
Observations	73,637	73,637	73,637	73,637	73,637	73,637

Robust country-clustered standard errors (two-tailed) in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A 7: Model of vote-choice including post-treatment variables (ideology & support for distribution)

	(1) Main model	(2) + ideology & redistribution	(3) + income interaction	(4) + education interaction
LGB	0.33*** (0.07)	0.24** (0.11)	-0.19 (0.47)	-0.20 (0.21)
Income	-0.05*** (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)
LGB*Income			0.06 (0.06)	
Education	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
LGB*Education				0.03** (0.01)
Gender	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.03)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Religiosity	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)
Domicile (base: City/urban)				
City suburbs	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.08** (0.03)
Town/small city	-0.30*** (0.08)	-0.21*** (0.07)	-0.21*** (0.07)	-0.21*** (0.07)
Village	-0.51*** (0.10)	-0.41*** (0.08)	-0.41*** (0.08)	-0.41*** (0.08)
Country/Farm	-0.87*** (0.23)	-0.79*** (0.25)	-0.79*** (0.25)	-0.79*** (0.25)
Redistribution		0.54*** (0.04)	0.54*** (0.04)	0.54*** (0.04)
Left leaning		2.11*** (0.19)	2.11*** (0.19)	2.11*** (0.19)
Economic evaluations	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
SWD	0.03*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
Election FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	0.36 (0.33)	-1.07*** (0.41)	-1.07*** (0.40)	-1.07*** (0.41)
Observations	73,637	73,637	73,637	73,637

Robust country-clustered standard errors (two-tailed) in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Predictive margins of sexuality over age with 95% CIs




Figure A 13: Sexuality moderated by age

