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Transcendental knowability and a priori luminosity

Transcendental knowability and a priori luminosity
Transcendental knowability and a priori luminosity
This paper draws out and connects two neglected issues in Kant’s conception of a priori knowledge. Both concern topics that have been central to contemporary epistemology and to formal epistemology in particular: knowability and luminosity. Does Kant commit to some form of knowability principle according to which certain necessary truths are in principle knowable to beings like us? Does Kant commit to some form of luminosity principle according to which, if a subject knows a priori, then they can know that they know a priori? I defend affirmative answers to both of these questions. And by considering the special kind of modality involved in Kant’s conceptions of possible experience and the essential completability of metaphysics, I argue that the combination of knowability and luminosity principles leads Kant into difficulty.
Kant, anti-realsim, knowability, luminosity, KK principle, a priori knowledge
2666-4283
1-29
Stephenson, Andrew
b8c80516-d835-4479-bee0-869d771af0cf
Stephenson, Andrew
b8c80516-d835-4479-bee0-869d771af0cf

Stephenson, Andrew (2021) Transcendental knowability and a priori luminosity. History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis, 23, 1-29.

Record type: Article

Abstract

This paper draws out and connects two neglected issues in Kant’s conception of a priori knowledge. Both concern topics that have been central to contemporary epistemology and to formal epistemology in particular: knowability and luminosity. Does Kant commit to some form of knowability principle according to which certain necessary truths are in principle knowable to beings like us? Does Kant commit to some form of luminosity principle according to which, if a subject knows a priori, then they can know that they know a priori? I defend affirmative answers to both of these questions. And by considering the special kind of modality involved in Kant’s conceptions of possible experience and the essential completability of metaphysics, I argue that the combination of knowability and luminosity principles leads Kant into difficulty.

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Stephenson, A. (2020) - Transcendental Knowability and A Priori Luminosity - Accepted Manuscript
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Stephenson, A. (2021) - Transcendental Knowability and A Priori Luminosity - Version of Record
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More information

Accepted/In Press date: 5 November 2020
Published date: 28 May 2021
Keywords: Kant, anti-realsim, knowability, luminosity, KK principle, a priori knowledge

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 445762
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/445762
ISSN: 2666-4283
PURE UUID: 3326b5bb-c730-4d2c-9cf8-7e2a2e6324cb
ORCID for Andrew Stephenson: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0003-4590-1307

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Date deposited: 07 Jan 2021 17:32
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 03:48

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