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Plug-in electric vehicle charging with multiple charging options: A systematic analysis of service providers’ pricing strategies

Plug-in electric vehicle charging with multiple charging options: A systematic analysis of service providers’ pricing strategies
Plug-in electric vehicle charging with multiple charging options: A systematic analysis of service providers’ pricing strategies
In this article, we present the optimal strategy for public plug-in electric vehicle (PEV) charging services with multiple charging options: fast charging service and slow charging service. The PEV user make decisions by firstly considering the remaining energy, travel distance to charging station, then about the charging prices, charging rates and estimated charging time. To obtain insights of such a highly coupled system, we consider both monopoly and duopoly markets, where the two services are operated by a single service provider (SP) and two different SPs, respectively. For the monopoly market, we propose a three-stage Stackelberg game model. For the duopoly market,
we propose a two-stage Bertrand competition and Cournot competition. We provided the SP’s optimal pricing strategies and decisions in the monopoly market, and the optimal pricing contract and quantity contract for SPs in the duopoly market with
Bertrand competition and Cournot competition. Both the analytical and simulation results show that, in the monopoly market,
offering two charging options can potentially improve the SP’s
profit compared with offering one option only in the monopoly
market; while in the duopoly market, it is optimal for SPs to offer
the quantity contract rather than the price contract to maximize
profits.
PEV charging,, Stackelberg game,, bertrand and cournot competition
1949-3053
524 - 537
Zhang, Yanru
727c18d5-e91e-4640-95ce-e6710ca3e785
Zhou, Yingjie
ba2e8e5a-4e78-4f90-9db8-5685d899a0b7
Jiang, Changkun
5482b8e2-3dae-4f0e-bdb0-5bda01d45735
Wang, Yan
7fea6e3d-c5f8-492a-b3c1-72c38b643edb
Zhang, Ruichang
cd87fec4-09f7-4e5b-bae7-38a66a97395b
Chen, George
3de45a9c-6c9a-4bcb-90c3-d7e26be21819
Zhang, Yanru
727c18d5-e91e-4640-95ce-e6710ca3e785
Zhou, Yingjie
ba2e8e5a-4e78-4f90-9db8-5685d899a0b7
Jiang, Changkun
5482b8e2-3dae-4f0e-bdb0-5bda01d45735
Wang, Yan
7fea6e3d-c5f8-492a-b3c1-72c38b643edb
Zhang, Ruichang
cd87fec4-09f7-4e5b-bae7-38a66a97395b
Chen, George
3de45a9c-6c9a-4bcb-90c3-d7e26be21819

Zhang, Yanru, Zhou, Yingjie, Jiang, Changkun, Wang, Yan, Zhang, Ruichang and Chen, George (2021) Plug-in electric vehicle charging with multiple charging options: A systematic analysis of service providers’ pricing strategies. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 12 (1), 524 - 537, [9179771]. (doi:10.1109/TSG.2020.3020044).

Record type: Article

Abstract

In this article, we present the optimal strategy for public plug-in electric vehicle (PEV) charging services with multiple charging options: fast charging service and slow charging service. The PEV user make decisions by firstly considering the remaining energy, travel distance to charging station, then about the charging prices, charging rates and estimated charging time. To obtain insights of such a highly coupled system, we consider both monopoly and duopoly markets, where the two services are operated by a single service provider (SP) and two different SPs, respectively. For the monopoly market, we propose a three-stage Stackelberg game model. For the duopoly market,
we propose a two-stage Bertrand competition and Cournot competition. We provided the SP’s optimal pricing strategies and decisions in the monopoly market, and the optimal pricing contract and quantity contract for SPs in the duopoly market with
Bertrand competition and Cournot competition. Both the analytical and simulation results show that, in the monopoly market,
offering two charging options can potentially improve the SP’s
profit compared with offering one option only in the monopoly
market; while in the duopoly market, it is optimal for SPs to offer
the quantity contract rather than the price contract to maximize
profits.

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More information

e-pub ahead of print date: 28 August 2020
Published date: 1 January 2021
Keywords: PEV charging,, Stackelberg game,, bertrand and cournot competition

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 446214
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/446214
ISSN: 1949-3053
PURE UUID: 07c11dee-b4ce-4131-8c13-9302ed43f5ab

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Date deposited: 28 Jan 2021 17:32
Last modified: 28 Jan 2021 17:32

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Contributors

Author: Yanru Zhang
Author: Yingjie Zhou
Author: Changkun Jiang
Author: Yan Wang
Author: Ruichang Zhang
Author: George Chen

University divisions

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