Different kinds of willing in Schopenhauer
Different kinds of willing in Schopenhauer
Chris Janaway argues that Schopenhauer's theory of negation of the will is problematic: How can you will not to will? If will is the basis of all reality, who would remain to experience the satisfaction that negation of the will supposedly generates? Janaway argues that negation of the will is best thought of as negation specifically of the will to life, and that this is compatible with the existence of other kinds of willing. Will to life is egoistic willing; and the negation of this kind of willing is consistent with nonegoistic willing and, in particular, moral action. This more constrained interpretation of the doctrine of negation of the will not only makes more sense of the text when Schopenhauer distinguishes between self- and other-directed willing; it helps clarify Schopenhauer’s account of the relation between virtue and holiness. The morally righteous person has other-directed desires at least some of the time, but not necessarily all of the time, while the saint no longer has any self-directed desires at all. Finally, Janaway shows that this interpretation of negation of the will has the virtue of bringing Schopenhauer closer to the Buddhist models he cites in support of his theory.
11-25
Cambridge University Press
Janaway, Christopher
61c48538-365f-416f-b6f7-dfa4d4663475
8 December 2022
Janaway, Christopher
61c48538-365f-416f-b6f7-dfa4d4663475
Janaway, Christopher
(2022)
Different kinds of willing in Schopenhauer.
In,
Norman, Judith and Welchman, Alistair
(eds.)
Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Representation: A critical guide.
(Cambridge Critical Guides)
Cambridge University Press, .
(doi:10.1017/9781108763813).
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Abstract
Chris Janaway argues that Schopenhauer's theory of negation of the will is problematic: How can you will not to will? If will is the basis of all reality, who would remain to experience the satisfaction that negation of the will supposedly generates? Janaway argues that negation of the will is best thought of as negation specifically of the will to life, and that this is compatible with the existence of other kinds of willing. Will to life is egoistic willing; and the negation of this kind of willing is consistent with nonegoistic willing and, in particular, moral action. This more constrained interpretation of the doctrine of negation of the will not only makes more sense of the text when Schopenhauer distinguishes between self- and other-directed willing; it helps clarify Schopenhauer’s account of the relation between virtue and holiness. The morally righteous person has other-directed desires at least some of the time, but not necessarily all of the time, while the saint no longer has any self-directed desires at all. Finally, Janaway shows that this interpretation of negation of the will has the virtue of bringing Schopenhauer closer to the Buddhist models he cites in support of his theory.
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Accepted/In Press date: 11 June 2020
Published date: 8 December 2022
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Local EPrints ID: 446369
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/446369
PURE UUID: d861cfbe-691e-47cd-9036-fc596462a08e
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Date deposited: 05 Feb 2021 17:31
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 02:54
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Contributors
Editor:
Judith Norman
Editor:
Alistair Welchman
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