Mechanism design for efficient allocation of electric vehicles to charging stations
Mechanism design for efficient allocation of electric vehicles to charging stations
The electrification of transport can significantly reduce CO2 emissions and their negative impact on the environment. In this paper, we study the problem of allocating Electric Vehicles (EVs) to charging stations and scheduling their charging. We develop an offline solution that treats EV users as self-interested agents that aim to maximise their profit and minimise the impact on their schedule. We formulate the problem of the optimal EV to charging station allocation as a Mixed Integer Programming (MIP) one and we propose two pricing mechanisms: A fixed-price one, and another that is based on the well known Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanism. We observe that the VCG mechanism services on average 1.5% more EVs than the fixed-price one. In addition, when the stations get congested, VCG leads to higher prices for the EVs and higher profit for the stations, but lower utility for the EVs. However, the VCG mechanism guarantees truthful reporting of the EVs’ preferences.
10-15
Rigas, Emmanouil S.
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Gerding, Enrico
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Stein, Sebastian
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Ramchurn, Sarvapali D.
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Bassiliades, Nick
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September 2020
Rigas, Emmanouil S.
6f42da4c-ffea-41c0-8302-5a98c1d06a6d
Gerding, Enrico
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362
Stein, Sebastian
cb2325e7-5e63-475e-8a69-9db2dfbdb00b
Ramchurn, Sarvapali D.
1d62ae2a-a498-444e-912d-a6082d3aaea3
Bassiliades, Nick
46e70a8f-015c-4888-890a-de879c9bff61
Rigas, Emmanouil S., Gerding, Enrico, Stein, Sebastian, Ramchurn, Sarvapali D. and Bassiliades, Nick
(2020)
Mechanism design for efficient allocation of electric vehicles to charging stations.
In SETN 2020: 11th Hellenic Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
.
(doi:10.1145/3411408.3411434).
Record type:
Conference or Workshop Item
(Paper)
Abstract
The electrification of transport can significantly reduce CO2 emissions and their negative impact on the environment. In this paper, we study the problem of allocating Electric Vehicles (EVs) to charging stations and scheduling their charging. We develop an offline solution that treats EV users as self-interested agents that aim to maximise their profit and minimise the impact on their schedule. We formulate the problem of the optimal EV to charging station allocation as a Mixed Integer Programming (MIP) one and we propose two pricing mechanisms: A fixed-price one, and another that is based on the well known Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanism. We observe that the VCG mechanism services on average 1.5% more EVs than the fixed-price one. In addition, when the stations get congested, VCG leads to higher prices for the EVs and higher profit for the stations, but lower utility for the EVs. However, the VCG mechanism guarantees truthful reporting of the EVs’ preferences.
Text
SETN_Mechanism_Final4
- Accepted Manuscript
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Published date: September 2020
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 446412
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/446412
PURE UUID: 3c77bee8-7c2a-494b-8d47-e760cd93a4c5
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Date deposited: 08 Feb 2021 17:31
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 03:13
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Contributors
Author:
Emmanouil S. Rigas
Author:
Enrico Gerding
Author:
Sebastian Stein
Author:
Sarvapali D. Ramchurn
Author:
Nick Bassiliades
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