Corporate governance and capital structure in developing countries: a case study of Bangladesh
Corporate governance and capital structure in developing countries: a case study of Bangladesh
This paper investigates the influence of firm-level corporate governance on the capital structure pattern of non-financial listed firms, using a case study of Bangladesh. The agency theory suggests that better corporate governance will reduce agency costs and improve investor confidence, which in turn will enhance the ability of a firm to gain access to equity finance, reducing dependence on debt finance. Conversely, the controlling shareholders of poorly governed firms are likely to prefer debt, in order to retain absolute ownership and control rights. The OLS regression framework uses a questionnaire-survey based Corporate Governance Index (CGI). The study results seem to support agency theory, with a statistically significant inverse relationship between corporate governance quality and the total as well as long-term debt ratios.
673-681
Haque, Faizul
8153d83c-427a-4f73-860d-dd7e9460533d
Arun, Thankom Gopinath
b2cc6cb9-9cfb-4f44-acba-1ee8270398bf
Kirkpatrick, Colin
770c13ce-54d6-404c-868a-7dfa23cea898
1 March 2011
Haque, Faizul
8153d83c-427a-4f73-860d-dd7e9460533d
Arun, Thankom Gopinath
b2cc6cb9-9cfb-4f44-acba-1ee8270398bf
Kirkpatrick, Colin
770c13ce-54d6-404c-868a-7dfa23cea898
Haque, Faizul, Arun, Thankom Gopinath and Kirkpatrick, Colin
(2011)
Corporate governance and capital structure in developing countries: a case study of Bangladesh.
Applied Economics, 43 (6), .
(doi:10.1080/00036840802599909).
Abstract
This paper investigates the influence of firm-level corporate governance on the capital structure pattern of non-financial listed firms, using a case study of Bangladesh. The agency theory suggests that better corporate governance will reduce agency costs and improve investor confidence, which in turn will enhance the ability of a firm to gain access to equity finance, reducing dependence on debt finance. Conversely, the controlling shareholders of poorly governed firms are likely to prefer debt, in order to retain absolute ownership and control rights. The OLS regression framework uses a questionnaire-survey based Corporate Governance Index (CGI). The study results seem to support agency theory, with a statistically significant inverse relationship between corporate governance quality and the total as well as long-term debt ratios.
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e-pub ahead of print date: 16 June 2009
Published date: 1 March 2011
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 446495
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/446495
ISSN: 0003-6846
PURE UUID: baccab19-8256-4b1d-8a38-d4377f741f62
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Date deposited: 11 Feb 2021 17:33
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 04:06
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Author:
Thankom Gopinath Arun
Author:
Colin Kirkpatrick
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