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“It is quite conceivable that judgment is a very complicated phenomenon”: Dorothy Wrinch, nonsense and the multiple relation theory of judgement

“It is quite conceivable that judgment is a very complicated phenomenon”: Dorothy Wrinch, nonsense and the multiple relation theory of judgement
“It is quite conceivable that judgment is a very complicated phenomenon”: Dorothy Wrinch, nonsense and the multiple relation theory of judgement

In her paper “On the Nature of Judgment”, published in 1919 in Mind, Dorothy Wrinch aimed at understanding how Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgement might be made to work. In this paper we will focus on Wrinch’s claim that on the theory it is impossible, as it should be, to judge nonsense. After having presented the prima facie objection to the theory created by nonsense and what we can take her solution to such a problem to imply (§1), we will show how Wrinch can resist the two main objections that have been moved to such a solution, whether as explicitly attributed to Wrinch or discussed without mentioning her. The conclusion will be, contrary to what one might be tempted to think, that even if there might be reasons to take the multiple relation theory as doomed, Wrinch was the first to show us that nonsense is not one of those reasons.

Russell, Wrinch, nonsense, the multiple relation theory of judgement, type restrictions
0960-8788
250-266
Felappi, Giulia
9c0bc4c5-5547-434e-8bbd-0c785bece1bc
Felappi, Giulia
9c0bc4c5-5547-434e-8bbd-0c785bece1bc

Felappi, Giulia (2021) “It is quite conceivable that judgment is a very complicated phenomenon”: Dorothy Wrinch, nonsense and the multiple relation theory of judgement. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 30 (2), 250-266. (doi:10.1080/09608788.2021.1888694).

Record type: Article

Abstract

In her paper “On the Nature of Judgment”, published in 1919 in Mind, Dorothy Wrinch aimed at understanding how Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgement might be made to work. In this paper we will focus on Wrinch’s claim that on the theory it is impossible, as it should be, to judge nonsense. After having presented the prima facie objection to the theory created by nonsense and what we can take her solution to such a problem to imply (§1), we will show how Wrinch can resist the two main objections that have been moved to such a solution, whether as explicitly attributed to Wrinch or discussed without mentioning her. The conclusion will be, contrary to what one might be tempted to think, that even if there might be reasons to take the multiple relation theory as doomed, Wrinch was the first to show us that nonsense is not one of those reasons.

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Wrinch nonsense and the multiple relation theory of judgment - Accepted Manuscript
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More information

Accepted/In Press date: 18 January 2021
e-pub ahead of print date: 11 March 2021
Published date: 11 March 2021
Additional Information: Publisher Copyright: © 2021 BSHP. Copyright: Copyright 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
Keywords: Russell, Wrinch, nonsense, the multiple relation theory of judgement, type restrictions

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 447042
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/447042
ISSN: 0960-8788
PURE UUID: 3fbeb551-99cf-4d83-8bbc-e3edc7744a50
ORCID for Giulia Felappi: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0002-0110-6371

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 02 Mar 2021 17:31
Last modified: 28 Apr 2022 02:14

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