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
School of Economic, Social and Political Sciences
Department of Politics and International Relations

THE POLITICS OF CONSTRAINT

How European Integration Shapes the Governed and the Governing

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Thesis for the degree of MPhil/PhD Politics

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ABSTRACT

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The Politics of Constraint: How European Integration Shapes the Governed and the Governing

By

Daniel Devine

Does European integration affect public support for political institutions and, if so, how? This is the broad research question this thesis poses. The central theme of this thesis is whether the long-term constraints entailed by European integration have had an impact on domestic mass politics in the European Union, and specifically on political support. That integration, European or otherwise, leads to the loss of political support has been claimed extensively within the literatures on Europeanisation, globalisation and political support, with little empirical examination. This academic interest has become more relevant as political elites and the public alike call for greater control over national decision-making and a reinvigoration of democratic participation.

Building on the literatures on political support, Europeanisation and globalisation, the thesis tests the theoretical claim that European integration has had a negative impact on political support. Using a number of advanced quantitative methods which combines data from individual and aggregate level public opinion, political parties and countries, the thesis provides a rigorous empirical examination of how the purported 'politics of constraint' shapes public opinion and the linkages between elites and their publics within the EU.

The four empirical chapters provide a rebuttal to the 'constraint' hypothesis. On the contrary, the linkages between domestic institutional changes, such as integration, and political attitudes are highly mediated by their domestic contexts. The chapters show that whilst there is some evidence of a negative effect in the nine longest-serving countries, this is heavily mediated by economic conditions. However, there is clear evidence of a growing 'support gap': that integration is embedding a domestic cleavage between those with high and those with low education. The thesis also shows that this does not operate in a clear way through direct perceptions of constraint or through integration's impact on public-elite congruence. On the contrary, integration has no identifiable impact on the congruence between parties, parliaments and governments on one hand

and mass public opinion on the other; and, if anything, perceived constraint boosts political support. A key conclusion of the thesis therefore is that more fundamental determinants are at the domestic level, and that the core determinants of political support are how our institutions perform in producing policy. Whilst processes like integration are independently important, it is how they are refracted through domestic politics that leads to change amongst the public.

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PUBLICATIONS

Numerous aspects of this thesis have been presented at national and international conferences and published in peer-reviewed journals. I have also published papers during my PhD candidature that are not contained in this thesis.

Academic publications from and during the PhD candidature:

- **Devine, Daniel**. 'Perceived Government Autonomy, Economic Evaluations, and Political Support During the Eurozone Crisis', *West European Politics*. Available at <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2019.1675130>. (based on chapter 6)

- Murphy, Justin and **Daniel Devine**. 2019. 'Does Media Coverage Drive Public Support for UKIP or Does Public Support for UKIP Drive Media Coverage?', *British Journal of Political Science*, Forthcoming.

- Denham, John and **Daniel Devine**. 2019. 'England, Englishness and the Labour Party', *The Political Quarterly* 89(4): 621-630.

Papers under review at the point of submission:

- **Devine, Daniel**. 'Political Trust in Multilevel Systems: The 'Cross-level' Effect of Partisanship and Incumbency', under review, *Political Studies*

- **Devine, Daniel**. 'The Room to Manoeuvre and Political Trust: Experimental Evidence from Brexit Britain', under review, *Research and Politics*

Aspects of the PhD have also been accepted and presented at national and international conferences or invited talks. These are noted below:

- Chapter 4: EPOP General Conference, Strathclyde.

- Chapters 5 and 6: Invited Talk, GESIS Cologne; EPSA, Belfast; ECPR Joint Sessions, Mons; EPSA, Prague; ECPR Standing Group on the EU.

- Chapter 7: Politicologenetmaal, Leiden; ECPR, Hamburg.

- Chapter 8: EPSA, Prague.

RESEARCH THESIS: DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP

Print name: Daniel John Devine

Title of Thesis: The Politics of Constraint: How European Integration Shapes the Governed and the Governing

I declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are my own and has been generated by me as the result of my own original research.

I confirm that:

1. This work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this University;

2. Where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated;

3. Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed;

4. Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work;

5. I have acknowledged all main sources of help;

6. Where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed myself;

7. Parts of this have been published as: Devine, D. (2019). Perceived government autonomy, economic evaluations, and political support during the Eurozone crisis. *West European Politics*, *EarlyView*, 1–24

Signature:

Date:

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I think it was quite an exaggeration by Tony Benn when he said that 'the real heroes are those few who try to explain the world in order to help us to understand what we can best do to improve our lot'. Writing a PhD has not been easy, and often not enjoyable, but I hope it helps just a bit to explain the world and improve our lot. It is a privilege to be able to spend my time doing this sort of work, and I would never have imagined it for myself even five years ago. People from low income backgrounds, especially white men, are one of the least likely demographics to go to University. It is not lost on me how unbelievably fortunate that is, and I've accumulated a lot of gratitude and debt to too many people in the process.

First are my supervisors. Will Jennings was always, somehow, remarkably available for meetings. As the PhD developed, I became quite convinced that challenging issues of trust in politics is important, and I'm grateful for the opportunity to carry on working on these topics with *TrustGov*. Raimondas was also the supervisor of my MSc dissertation, and so has had to put up with me for a remarkable amount of time. I hope he'll agree that over the years both he and Adriana Bunea have become as much friends as colleagues. His advice and calm demeanour throughout were invaluable. We co-wrote the final chapter of this thesis, and it was both the quickest and most enjoyable to write, and I think also the best. John Boswell joined us late, and I'm grateful for the calming words, quick reading, and interdisciplinary perspective he bought with him (often telling me that what I was saying was nonsense to everyone but me).

The Politics and IR department at Southampton, and the Faculty as a whole, have been a great support. There are likely few departments where I would never feel like 'just' a student, but a valued member of the department. It wasn't all plain sailing, and it has been great over the last 18 months to see the department develop under Professor Pía Riggirozzi, who has been a fantastic Head.

The research was made possible by the Southampton Doctoral Training Centre and, later, the Doctoral Training Partnership; and their representatives on Earth, Gemma Harris and Glenn Miller. The DTC/DTP not only paid my salary but enhanced the doctoral experience beyond what I could have expected. I was able to go abroad to KU Leuven for three months, to be seconded to the Institute for Government for a further three months, and go to South Africa and Iceland. It paid for a number of methods courses, books and conferences. The content would have been worse, but most importantly, the entire experience of writing a PhD would have

been much more difficult and much less rewarding.

Although I feel like I could go back as far as my politics teachers at College (Neil and Ian), it's probably best to keep it to a few people at Essex, where I did my undergraduate degree. I highly doubt I would be doing a PhD without the support, teaching, encouragement and much else of Rob Johns, Anthony King, Daniel Berger, Jeff Howard, and many more. These four in particular were pivotal during my undergraduate and applying for PhD funding. Daniel Berger taught me how to do research. Anthony King was an inspiring intellectual who told me that, indeed, I was not an idiot. Jeff Howard was a great undergraduate supervisor, who helped me with all my applications. And Rob Johns provided a number of opportunities, my first experience of research methods, and to this day (hopefully positive) reference letters.

A PhD is in part about this document, but in a larger part about the opportunities it offers. I would like to thank Marc Hooghe, who hosted me on a research visit in KU Leuven, and Silke Goubin, who was my office mate there. I really enjoyed the stay, and it was a very productive time. During much of the PhD, I was also a Consultant at the Open Society European Policy Institute. I'd like to extend my gratitude to Ellen Riotte and Heather Grabbe for the opportunity; it was a great experience, and I'm a better researcher because for it. I also visited GESIS in Cologne for a month to collect the data used in this thesis, funded by GESIS. This saved me months of time and was another great learning opportunity. I thank in particular Marlene Mauk. Finally, for my secondment at the Institute for Government, I'd like to thank the whole team there, but particularly Gavin Freeguard and Catherine Haddon, who facilitated my return (having worked there four years previously!). They proved once again great colleagues, and hope we can work together in the future.

I sincerely thank everyone who I shared a beer, karaoke, dinner or coffee with. There're genuinely too many to thank individually. In Southampton, my time would have been much worse without those I shared an office with: Burak, Olly, Gabi, Kibuchi, Martina, Mia and many more. You were ever-presents and much appreciated. The first time I met Chloe, Jamie and Haley we bonded. Since then there's been a lot of Linda's, Fifa, wine, beer, time spent at the Shooting Star, and setting the world to rights. I may not have finished on time, or even this year, without the incentive of graduating together. The incentive of a jacket potato and coffee helped me get in to the office for much of the early days of the PhD as well.

When they left, it was a sad time in our (formerly) shared office. Fortunately, Katie, Ella and Ben brightened the place up. I highly doubt that final year would have been half as enjoyable, and as eventful, without you

all. Knowing me it didn't come across, but I appreciate every lunch, felted animal, Susie Dent word, Sims screenshots and extremely late nights. I also thank Viktor, who began the PhD times with me, and is responsible for much of the karaoke-going. The experience would have been a less eventful one, and I would think the PhD much worse, without his input.

There are many people who have helped me this last year, which has probably been one of the toughest of my life. To one of my dearest friends, Emily, I also say thank you, for not only putting up with me throughout the PhD but, unbelievably, for the last nine years. I also wish to thank Polly, my housemate, and Dodger, my other, much fatter, ginger, hairier and feline housemate, who have, quite literally, kept me sane over the last year. Rich and Lou, fellow guardians of the People's Republic of Portswood, have been invaluable friends. Finally, I thank Jess, who has, along with Dodger, dragged me often almost literally kicking and screaming over the finish line.

I highly suspect this thesis would not have materialised at all without Nicole Watson, who supported me throughout the PhD and the MSc thesis before it. There have been numerous times where it seemed like I would leave for various reasons, but she kept me sane and at it. She's read more of this PhD, in so many forms, than any circle of hell would submit her to, and much more besides. Despite this off-putting experience, she stuck both with me and with academia, in the process becoming a much better researcher than I will ever be. She is as responsible for this PhD as I am (though all errors are solely attributable to me).

I fear I have missed many others, but I will finish with saying thanks to my family, who I moved to Southampton for and so have shaped the entire experience. It's not a decision I regret, and I have valued the time we've managed to have. They have kept me grounded, and I can imagine will inform much of my future work on anti-politics. I hope this document is proof that I do actually do something, and that it's not all nonsense. I promise I'll get a 'proper job' now.

Daniel Devine

Southampton
15th July 2020

Part I

Literature and Theory

CHAPTER 1

THE mass protests following the economic crisis in 2008, particularly, but not only, in Southern Europe, were concerned not just with the dire economic situation facing the majority of Europe, but how and where decisions were made. This is captured in an interview with an activist for the Barcelona-based *Real Democracy Now*, who said: 'We believe that real democracy is no longer possible in one country, but on a European level [...] The Commission, the European Central Bank - they are imposing austerity on us, yet they are not democratic institutions' (Phillips, 2011). In the same tone, a call-to-arms pamphlet, *Indignez-Vous*, which sold over a million copies and united the European protest movements, decried the power that financial capital had to undermine European democracies (Hessel, 2011). The movements were, of course, about the economic and social impacts of austerity, but also how and from where the policy was implemented. The implications were that European integration, and economic integration more generally, had undermined democratic governance in European states.

Disenchantment with the status quo following the economic crisis fuelled a reconfiguration of politics. Particularly those hardest hit by the recession questioned the 'increasingly limited power of national governments' and the 'constraints that European integration imposed' which loomed over the crisis (Hobolt & Tilley, 2016b, p. 973). Not only did the economic crisis pull at the seams of European governance, but it also extended the already-creeping external influence into core functions of the state (Laffan, 2014; Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2016, 2011). The result was to put democratic politics in the European Union under stress (Cramme & Hobolt, 2014).

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Whilst the economic crisis tugged at them, these threads were built into the fabric of European governance. The constraints on member states existed long before the crisis politicised them. The central theme of this thesis is whether these long-term constraints had an impact on domestic mass politics.[1] In particular, the thesis focuses on political support, which I define as citizen support for governing, political institutions. Has Europeanisation as 'a process of domestic adaptation to the impact of the EU within member states' (Ladrech, 2010)[2] filtered down to altering the fundamental links between individual and state?

The normative concerns in the academic literature existed long before the onset and aftermath of the Eurozone crisis. One of the most prominent streams was the 'democratic deficit' literature, which stressed the weakness of the second-order European Parliament, strength of the executive, and the lack of a European demos (Schmitter, 2004; Follesdal & Hix, 2006; Moravcsik, 2008). The democratic deficit debate revolved around the existence (or lack thereof) democratic legitimation at the European level, though there are plausibly two additional democratic deficits: the resulting deficits at the national level, and the interactions between the European and national (Curtin, Mair & Papadopoulos, 2010; Schmidt, 2006). Instead of exploring the democratic deficits at the European level, I address the national level and the interactions between the two. The democratic deficit debate is usually concerned with the lack of democracy at the European level whereas, in this case, the concern is on the role of integration in shaping political support for domestic institutions.

A second stream comes from the depoliticisation literature which stresses the 'denial of political contingency and the transfer of functions away from elected politicians' and placing 'complete areas of policy beyond the reach of the state' (Flinders & Wood, 2014, pp. 135-136). In other words, that some policy areas were outside of the sphere of democratic contestation (for instance, the removal of some fiscal controls to the Bank of England under Tony Blair). Indeed, it was even argued that this kind of transnational depoliticisation found its 'crucible' in the European Union's apolitical governance (Chalmers, 2005; Hix, 1998). The friction between two roles of domestic government - to be responsive and responsible - thus seemed to be causing the responsive end to wear thin (Mair, 2009; Mair & Thomassen, 2010).

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[1]By mass politics, I mean the aspects of 'politics' that relate to the public, elites, and the 'democratic linkages' between them (Hellwig, 2015; Kayser, 2007).

[2]I also refer to European integration. I recognise that European integration - the building of European institutions and process of economic and political interdependence building, or the uploading of policies from the domestic level - is distinct, but use the terms interchangeably for stylistic reasons

A third strand, and the one this thesis draws on, comes from the broader literature on globalisation. This perspective is expressed well by Scharpf (2000, p. 115): 'as interdependence increases, the nation-state finds its range of policy options exogenously constrained [. . .] which must be counted as a loss of democratic self-determination even if new options are added'. In the empirical literature, it has been argued that the reduced 'room to manoeuvre' of national governments vis-a-vis the global economy or other external constraints leads to a range of consequences for domestic politics (Hellwig, 2015; Gall, 2017).

That integration, European or otherwise, leads to the loss of political support has been claimed extensively within the literatures on Europeanisation, globalisation and political support (Scharpf, 1996; Mair, 2013; DeBardeleben & Hurrelmann, 2007; Vowles & Xezonakis, 2016; van Ham, Thomassen, Aarts & Andeweg, 2017). Despite these claims, the empirical evidence on the relationship between integration and political support is weak, with few studies addressing the direct relationship or doing so outside of cross-sectional settings. In this thesis, I combine the literatures on Europeanisation, globalisation and political support to build and test a theory that links Europeanisation to political support. In the remainder of this introduction, I introduce the core literatures, concepts and themes used throughout the thesis.

The Importance of Political Support

Understanding the support citizens have for their political system has been a staple of political science. Particularly since the mid-1960s and the 'overload' of governments in the 1970s (King, 1975), the focus of this literature has been on understanding a lack of political trust, democratic satisfaction, increasing discontent, apathy, and a number of related concepts (Easton, 1965; Finifter, 1970; Cole, 1973; Miller, 1974; Citrin, McClosky, Shanks & Sniderman, 1975). Indeed, three of the top ten most cited political scientists[3] - Ronald Inglehart, Pippa Norris and Russell Dalton - are those that have worked predominantly on how, and whether, citizens' attitudes to the state are changing.

Whilst the doomsday scenarios of complete system breakdown that concerned these authors has not come to pass (Easton, 1965; Crozier, Huntington & Watanuki, 1975), the continued interest in these concepts is warranted. Although scientific research into the consequences of political support is relatively recent, it so far suggests far-reaching consequences ranging from policy preferences, voting behaviour, changing modes of participation, law compli-

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[3]These are the most cited on Google Scholar.

ance, short-term policy-making, and more.[4] These consequences stretch into the core of effective democratic governance: policy outcomes, the formation and mobilisation of preferences, and the implementation and evaluation of policy (for this model of representative democracy, see Kriesi et al., 2013, p. 58).

For sure, unwavering political support is also normatively problematic; a lack of trust, a certain number of apathetic citizens, and discontentment is also a positive. But as a number of scholars highlight, a degree of support seems necessary for democratic governance to function well. Stoker (2006, pp. 45-46), for instance, argues that a loss of political support will 'in the end undermine support for both democracy and democratic decision-making'. Similarly, Dalton (2004, p. 10) highlights that democracy entails public endorsement of the decision-making process. Although there is no evidence that a loss of support leads to the collapse of democracy, one long-term implication may be a loss of support for democracy as a regime principle (Claassen, 2019; Van Der Meer & Zmerli, 2017). Whilst there was initially hope that 'critical citizens' would seek political expression through other means, it seems that they remain interested but nonetheless alienated from politics (Norris, 2011; Valgarðsson, 2019).

Political support is a key linkage between citizens and state, and is related to other democratic linkages such as voting, other forms of participation, and social trust. Ultimately, this thesis is interested in whether integration, the largest institutional transformation in Europe since the Second World War, influences political support.

European Integration and Domestic Mass Politics

The question of whether and how European integration affects political support is not a new one. Twenty years ago, Fritz Scharpf (1999, pp. 1-2) considered the possibility that 'the weakening of political legitimacy in Western Europe is a consequence of the loss of problem-solving capacities of political systems' due to European integration and economic integration more generally. DeBardeleben and Hurrelmann (2007) likewise linked the loss of autonomy in the context of European integration to a profound disaffection with democratic institutions at the domestic level.

Peter Mair was concerned about integration's role in generating a domestic democratic deficit: since much decision-making was removed from the domestic arena, his fear was that citizens would become accustomed to an 'ab-

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[4]I address the consequences at length in chapter 2.

sence of effective participatory democracy' (Mair, 2013, p. 117). These concerns about the EU's challenge to democratic choice in the member states are also the subject of recent practical policy concerns to alleviate such a challenge (Chalmers, 2013; Laffan, 2014), and were the subject of concern about democratic backsliding and disenchantment in accession countries (Krastev, 2002). The developments in governance of the Eurozone following 2008 has provided new fuel to these concerns.

How the European Union[5] shapes domestic politics has been studied in a number of fields in political science, which I discuss extensively in chapters 2 and 3. Predominantly, these have focused on the electoral mechanism and party politics. For instance, the most substantial literature to emerge is that of EU issue voting, or whether the EU as an issue influences national vote choices (Gabel, 2000; de Vries, 2007). Since the EU has become an issue, the early literature considered whether this could be mobilised by political entrepreneurs (van der Eijk & Franklin, 2004). The research that emerged from this sought to understand both the aggregate and voter-level conditions that facilitated EU issue voting and which parties were more likely to benefit (Tillman, 2004; de Vries, 2007; de Vries, van der Brug, van Egmond & van der Eijk, 2011; de Vries, 2010; Evans, 1998).

Related work has studied how European integration impacts domestic electoral politics more broadly, particularly focusing on elections to the European parliament. This was overlooked due to European elections being seen as second-order to domestic elections (Reif & Schmitt, 1980)[6], but research has found such elections can have potent effects on the domestic arena. For instance, van der Eijk, Franklin and Marsh (1996) have shown how early European elections strengthened minor parties and put stress on national governments by acting as (usually negative) mid-term assessments (see also Schulte-Cloos, 2018). Similarly, it has been shown how European elections can change national party tactics and boost their results in subsequent elections at the domestic level (Gabel, 2000; Somer-Topcu & Zar, 2014). Over time, European elections also lead to a growth in size of the national party system (Prosser, 2016). In terms of voting behaviour, there is also evidence that European elections depress turnout in the subsequent domestic election (Franklin & Hobolt, 2011) and that the EU depresses economic voting due to voters holding the EU, rather than the domestic state, responsible (Lobo & Lewis-Beck, 2012), though positive effects are also to increase political interest (Schulte-Cloos, 2019).

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[5]I use the 'European Union' colloquially to refer to both the existing EU and its predecessors the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC).

[6]This is being challenged in recent years, (for instance Schmitt, Hobolt & Popa, 2015)

However, the study of European integration's effect on political support or related attitudes is undeveloped, despite the extensive theoretical concerns. The political support literature has typically focused on economic 'outputs', procedural 'inputs'[7], or larger cultural changes as explanations (Stimson, 2004; Inglehart, 1997; Dalton, 2004; Evans & Whitefield, 1995; Schmidt, 2013; Dahlberg, Linde & Holmberg, 2015). At the same time, the traditional consensus has followed the first- and second-order model, whereby political support is developed largely without regard to politics beyond (or below) the nation state (Reif & Schmitt, 1980; van der Eijk et al., 1996; Harteveld, van der Meer & de Vries, 2013; Muñoz, 2017).

Despite the decades-long theoretical concern, the empirical literature on political support has not yet turned to addressing European integration itself as an independent variable in explaining support for the domestic political system. Instead, scholarship typically focuses on what determines support for the EU (Anderson, 1998; Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000; Kritzinger, 2003), how support for the domestic and European levels interact (Harteveld et al., 2013; Armingeon & Ceka, 2013), and the factors which determine this trade-off, such as politicisation or identity (Ares, Ceka & Kriesi, 2017; Hooghe & Marks, 2007; Polyakova & Fligstein, 2016). This thesis addresses this gap directly, drawing on a novel theoretical framework presented in chapter 3.

International Integration and Domestic Mass Politics

The framework draws on the literature concerning international integration more broadly. That this literature has yet to be applied to understanding the European Union's impact (or not) on political behaviour is surprising (with some exceptions, e.g Gall, 2017; Streeck & Schäfer, 2013). Numerous authors have noted the similarity between globalisation and Europeanisation and theorise equivalent effects. Zürn, for instance, labels both as 'denationalisation' or European integration as 'a more intense form of globalization' (Zürn, 2000, 2003). Scholars of European Union politics note the similarities in terms of its effects on policy (Ladrech, 2010; Kriesi et al., 2008). This has of course been challenged, with some arguing that Europeanisation is precisely a reaction against globalisation, and that they entail different logics of institutional trans-

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[7]Elaborated in Scharpf (1999), input legitimacy refers to government by the people, such that collective decisions are made by the people through representatives or some variation of that principle. Output legitimacy 'refers to effectiveness, that is, the capacity of the rulers to solve problems and to improve the welfare of their citizens' (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2017, p. 360)

formation (e.g Wallace, 2000; Verdier & Breen, 2001; Graziano, 2003; Tsarouhas & Ladi, 2013; Lynggaard, 2015, 2011). Although regional integration may be a defence against global integration, I pursue the assumption that they should entail similar consequences for domestic politics.

That integration matters for mass politics has been most formalised and tested by Hellwig (2015) and in a number of other articles by the author (e.g Hellwig, 2001; Hellwig & Samuels, 2007; Hellwig, 2008). Although also used elsewhere, this theory is called the 'room to manoeuvre' theory. He argues that globalisation affects domestic mass politics through two channels: issue politics and policy control (Hellwig, 2015, pp. 20-24). In the former, the argument is that global integration leads to some issues being depoliticised and others politicised, most obviously the issue of globalisation itself. In the latter, elites have less ability to shape outcomes and citizens perceive this (Sattler, Freeman & Brandt, 2008), reducing the accountability mechanism of democratic politics. This perspective runs parallel to the EU-focused literature: though not united, they posit similar causal mechanisms linking greater integration with domestic mass politics.

This framework has been used to study voter turnout (Marshall & Fisher, 2015; Steiner, 2016), party competition (Ward, Kim, Graham & Tavits, 2015), political accountability (Sattler et al., 2008), and a number of other issues in mass politics (for a review, see Gall, 2017). However, much like studies on the European Union, how this relates to political support has generally gone unstudied (Vowles & Xezonakis, 2016). In one of the few book-length studies on the effects of globalisation and mass politics, Vowles and Xezonakis (2016, p. 13) say how their work on support is 'potentially most significant' given that 'the extant literature is much thinner'. The existing empirical work is based on cross-sectional or otherwise limited data, meaning few firm conclusions can be drawn (for an exception, see Fischer, 2012).

This thesis draws on this framework and the empirical evidence that has been garnered for it, and agrees that the theoretical framework would imply the same observable implications for Europeanisation as globalisation (Zürn, 2000; Ladrech, 2010; Gall, 2017). In other words, that European integration is an appropriate place to apply the 'room to manoeuvre' theory typically used to study the effects of globalisation.

Theorising the Impact of European Integration on Political Support

Despite these similarities, European integration clearly entails a number of differences in both degree and kind. Alongside the integration of national economies is also institution building at the supranational level, the reshaping of party systems through anti-EU parties, the effect of elections to the European Parliament, and harmonisation of policy beyond just economic policy, arguably to core state powers (Herschinger, Jachtenfuchs & Kraft-Kasack, 2011; Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2013).

In addition, existing work has not theorised how global or European integration, the room to manoeuvre theory, or more general concerns about Europeanisation, can influence political support. This is typically since researchers approach the question from either theoretical, international political economy, or Europeanisation perspectives, rather than from the political support literatures. Equally, researchers of political support have typically ignored the specifics of the larger macro processes (e.g van Ham et al., 2017). Whilst, for instance, Scharpf (2000) argues that integration increases 'output' legitimacy but limits 'input' legitimacy, this is not then connected to the relative merits of input/output determinants of political support. Similarly, whilst Schmidt (2006) argues that integration reduces trust, there is no clear mechanism for why that might be the case. A convincing theory requires such a mechanism.

A key contribution of this thesis is to provide a coherent theoretical framework for understanding the potential mechanisms linking European integration with political support. I argue that the EU has both direct and indirect effects (Mair, 2007a, 2007b; Schmidt, 2006). Whilst the former refers to contestation over policies, events or integration, the latter refers to the consequences of Europeanisation of policies and the removal of democratic contestation at the domestic level (equivalent to a loss of 'policy control' in the room to manoeuvre theory). Thus, direct mechanisms such as elections to the EP and development of anti-EU parties as well as indirect mechanisms like changes in issue saliency, a strengthening of domestic cleavages, and the convergence of policy positions all provide plausible mechanisms linking integration with support. Whilst I develop the theoretical arguments more in chapter 3, I focus more on the indirect mechanisms throughout the thesis. Whilst a number of these have been studied in isolation, it is important, as I do in chapter 3, to see them as part of the same process of integration.

This theoretical framework provides a coherent structure of studying the effect of European integration on political support, highlighting key features

of the interplay between domestic and European politics. In the four empirical chapters of the thesis, I derive and test the observable implications of this framework to answer the overall research question of the thesis: does European integration affect public support for political institutions and, if so, how?

Analytical Approach

This thesis is quantitative and comparative in nature. It draws on the largest available dataset of public opinion, extending from 1973 to 2017 and encompassing over two million respondents. These are combined with country-level data encompassing economic performance, integration, elite-public congruence and more. I draw on other public opinion data where necessary and for replication. Full details are provided in chapter 4 and in the individual chapters. Given the area focus of the thesis, the data is limited to the European Union. Some analyses focus on particular regions and particular case studies in order to delve further into the mechanisms or due to data availability, but the intention is to draw larger lessons about the effect of European integration. As the thesis progressed, however, it became clear that a fuller account requires deeper, qualitative analyses. Understanding the work of Parliamentarians, focusing on elite political actors, and how discourses of European integration differ cross-nationally are all important avenues to pursue (Gall, 2017; Hay & Rosamond, 2002).

It has never been more important to provide careful, reasoned and evidence-based claims on what we think is happening and what will happen. Rigorous social science has an unparalleled role to play in informing the public about what is going on, explaining what we can do about it, and offering where relevant solutions to political problems. This involves both theory and empirics. In this thesis, I lay out a broad theoretical framework in chapter 3 which aims to understand the mechanisms that link European integration to political support. This draws on the literatures of European integration, globalisation, and political support to offer a theoretically grounded and plausible account of the link between integration and attitudinal change.

The empirical chapters which follow provide a rigorous analysis of this relationship at different stages of the causal chain. During the writing of this thesis, social science has undergone somewhat of a shift, and the focus is now much more on causal identification (e.g Wuttke, 2019; Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, van der Maas & Kievit, 2012), though of course the debate existed long before (Gerring, 2010). I believe this is overwhelmingly a positive move,

but it often comes at the expense of exploratory work, which is a negative. In parallel, there has also been a move to opening up the research process; in other words, to transparent, reproducible and rigorous research. This is a positive without caveats. The analytical approach in this thesis has been heavily influenced by both of these trends in the social science profession, presenting significant robustness tests, transparency in methods, and avoiding overly 'clean' narratives of the research process (Editorial, 2020). As such, in chapters 5 and 6 I do not provide hypotheses, since these chapters were the product of more exploratory research rather than direct hypothesis testing, unlike chapters 7 and 8.

This thesis, both the theoretical and empirical chapters, aims to build a 'multifaceted pattern of evidence' (Keele, 2015, p. 327). The theoretical framework guides not just the thesis but posits claims that are not examined in these chapters. The chapters themselves extend from the more exploratory in chapters 5 and 6, to specific instances of political upheaval like the Eurozone crisis in chapter 7. Different aspects of the causal chain are studied, from the broadest to the micro-level mechanisms. The thesis draws its explanatory power from developing a pattern of evidence about the veracity of the theoretical claims discussed in the opening section of this chapter and in greater depth throughout the thesis. This combination of broad theoretical claims and rigorous empirical examination of their observable implications forms the backbone of the analytical approach adopted.

Future work, both from myself and others, should nonetheless work towards causally identifying specific claims made here and studying the issue qualitatively. This thesis, as I discuss next, has helped by formalising the theoretical pathways and providing evidence on the plausibility of three of them. The next step in this research agenda, beyond exploring the other pathways, is to narrow down the causal evidence of them.

Thesis outline

The thesis constitutes nine substantive chapters, including this introduction, separated into four sections. The first section addresses literature and theory. In chapter 2, I review the literature on political support, the primary concept the thesis aims to explain. This chapter addresses the definition of the concept and its causes and consequences. It concludes by discussing the political support literature which addresses the dynamics of support in the European Union, and how this thesis approaches this literature differently. In chapter 3, I outline this approach. I develop the literature which is relevant for

understanding the domestic effects of European integration and link this with the political support literature, culminating in a theoretical framework which the empirical chapters of the thesis address.

Section two consists of the data and methods in chapter 4. This chapter discusses key issues with the measurement of the dependent and independent variables, provides descriptive data, and the methods of inference used throughout. This chapter makes two contributions. First, it provides the largest study of the trends and relationships between democratic satisfaction and political trust, drawing on most major cross-national surveys. Second, the chapter provides a typology for measuring European integration and the implications this choice has for similar research.

Section three presents the key empirical chapters, which are summarised in table 1.1. The first chapter (chapter 5) assesses the long-run effect of European integration in the nine countries in the EU since 1973. Applying a range of panel data methods to Eurobarometer data, the chapter shows that European integration had a negative effect on aggregate political support. However, the chapter applies a new method (sequential g-estimation) to show that this effect is highly mediated by a range of other variables, not least economic factors. Overall, this shows that whilst the effect is negative, this is refracted through domestic conditions.

Chapter 6 follows this analysis but moves to the individual level, expands the sample to all countries in the European Union, and tests a key mechanism in the theoretical framework. The chapter aims to understand whether integration has a heterogeneous impact on different demographics, specifically education. It also aims to understand whether integration has an overall effect at the individual level. Applying fixed effects models to the largest available dataset, with a combined sample size of over two million, the analysis finds that there is no consistent effect across Europe, and if anything the effect of integration is positive. However, the analysis also finds that integration is serving to deepen the 'support gap' in Europe between different regions (namely, Southern Europe and the rest of the EU) *and* between people. Crucially, it finds that integration, and particularly the economic dimension, has a large negative effect on those with lower (pre-University) education but with a smaller or insignificant effect on those with high (University or above) education.

In chapter 7, I test the mechanism that integration reduces support through a cognitive mechanism whereby individuals recognise that their domestic politics has been devalued. I test this in the most-likely circumstances of the economic crisis. First, I show using a quasi-experimental design that the economic

interventions in the EU during the Eurozone crisis (2008-2012) have a negative, causal effect on political support. Second, I draw on European Election Study data in 2009 and 2014 and a replication in Portugal (2012) to test whether this was through the constraint individuals perceived was on their domestic states. Contrary to expectations, the analysis shows that those who perceived greater constraint had higher levels of support, perhaps because it was seen as exonerating national elites or that it was constraining a corrupt and failing government.

The final empirical chapter 8 tests the argument that integration constrains the range of potential policy options, thus restricting the ability of parties to be congruent with their domestic electorates. The analysis draws on public opinion data and expert surveys, and analyses a number of specific policy areas as well as the left-right ideological scale. It measures incongruence at the level of the party system, legislature and government. Once again, the analysis provides little evidence of integration's hypothesised negative impact on congruence, with almost no statistically significant effects. The analysis shows some negative effects with regard to *between* country variation in integration rather than within, meaning that more integrated countries are more incongruent than less integrated countries. An overview of the chapters, their research questions, gaps in knowledge and key findings is available in the concluding chapter, table 9.1.

The final section, and chapter, provides a summary of the findings, the key contributions, and the importance of these findings for the literature on European (and global) integration and political support. I describe the future research agenda for the field as well as the next steps for my research specifically. I conclude by discussing the implications for how we can influence political support and in which ways.

Table 1.1: Thesis Overview

	The Long-run Effects of European Integration (Chapter 5)	Embedding of Domestic Cleavages (Chapter 6)	Perceived Constraint and Political Support (Chapter 7)	From Convergence to Congruence (Chapter 8)
Dependent variable	SWD	Political Trust/SWD	Political Trust/SWD	Incongruence
Independent variable(s)	Measures of European integration	Individual perceived constraint	Measures of European integration	Measures of European integration
Mechanism	Overall	Reinforcing domestic cleavages	Devaluing domestic politics	Policy convergence
Contribution	European integration has led to lower SWD in nine European countries	Integration has a heterogeneous effect across educational levels, but evidence of wide-spread effect is weak	Those who perceived higher constraint had higher political support, even though economic interventions reduced support overall	There is limited evidence that integration has reduced public-elite congruence

POLITICAL SUPPORT

POLITICAL support is what this thesis seeks to explain, and is the primary concept used in the literature which examines citizens' attitudes towards their state; but, like many concepts, it is contested and used loosely (Ferrin & Kriesi, 2016; Dalton, 2004; Norris, 2011). It is, for instance, used almost interchangeably with similar concepts such as democratic legitimacy (Norris, 2011), democratic support (Armingeon & Guthmann, 2014; Armingeon, Guthmann & Weisstanner, 2016), political trust and satisfaction with democracy (Ferrin & Kriesi, 2016). A lack of accuracy and consistency in use of terms is inhibitive to accumulation of knowledge on any given topic, and makes operationalisation and comprehensive reviews difficult (Sartori, 1970). Due to this and the centrality of this concept to the thesis, this chapter aims to 1) track the conceptualisation of political support and how it relates to similar concepts 2) provide the definition this thesis will use 3) review the literature on the consequences and determinants of political support and 4) to review the literature on political support in the European Union.

Conceptualisation and Definition

In this section, I discuss the conceptualisation of political support, and argue that the chosen conceptualisation is the most apt for understanding *institutional* support. Almost all conceptualisations begin at Easton (1965), who later defined support as 'an attitude by which a person orients himself to an object either favourably or unfavourably' (Easton, 1975, p. 436). Within this defin-

ition, he differentiated between diffuse and specific support. The distinction between them is that specific support relates to what a system does, in other words, satisfaction with outputs and performance, whilst diffuse support is a rather general, abstract feeling toward the state and its constituent parts. Whilst both are important to a political system, diffuse support is seen to be the bedrock for which a system draws its legitimacy from (and, indeed, is sometimes equated with legitimacy (Norris, 2011)), whilst specific support is more moveable and can be improved (or negated) by policy outputs, change in governments, and so on. As a result, this conception expects that in most cases diffuse support is largely stable, whilst specific support fluctuates with the ebb and flow of political performance.

Numerous authors have since updated Easton's terminology for two primary reasons (Ferrin & Kriesi, 2016; Dalton, 2004; Norris, 2011). The first is that Easton conflated the type of support (diffuse or specific) with objects of support, such as the national community or a specific incumbent. His framework posited that the national community and regime values were given diffuse support whilst incumbents were only provided with specific support Easton (1975, p. 445). Yet, different objects can have both diffuse support - a general, abstract and positive disposition - and specific support, driven by day to day experience (Torcal & Montero, 2006). The second issue is a more prosaic one with confusion about what political support is and what its determinants are; often, for instance, political trust has been used both as an indicator and determinant of political support (Ferrin & Kriesi, 2016). A recent example is Christmann and Torcal (2017), who use trust as an explanatory variable for variation in satisfaction with democracy. This is significant, not just conceptually but empirically: if they are indeed the same concept (as I will argue later), they share the same explanatory factors, and the inclusion of one as an explanatory variable can 'drown out' other explanatory factors and inflate the variance explained.

Dalton (2004) and Norris (2011) have dedicated most time to conceptual house-keeping. Both authors drew heavily on Easton's framework but rather conceived of support as a multidimensional concept with five broad categories positioned on a continuum from most specific to most diffuse. This is illustrated in figure 2.1. In this, the most specific type of support for a political system is approval for incumbents and individual politicians, which would easily be moved by scandal, and the ebbs and flows of which are positive for a democracy. At the most diffuse end is national identity, the breakdown of which, it is argued, could lead to the collapse of a nation-state. This is the general framework that is currently used within the literature, and the one that this thesis follows at its broadest.

Figure 2.1: Conceptualisation of System Support

Yet, some authors rejected this conceptualisation, and instead moved away from the Eastonian approach. Torcal and Montero (2006) rather separate out the concept into two parts: political disaffection and political discontent. They define political disaffection as powerlessness, cynicism, and lack of confidence in process, politicians and democratic institutions, but without questioning the wider political regime; and political discontent as a more general dissatisfaction resulting from governmental performance (Torcal & Montero, 2006, p. 6). They also include political disengagement, which refers to the qualities of individuals, such as (a lack of) political interest. However, this blurring of institutional views and individual traits does little to add to the concept of support, and rather muddies the water, at least in terms of building an explanatory framework for support. In addition, the particular definition of disaffection seems too broad to be workable, conflating both powerlessness and lack of confidence, as well as different objects of support. For these reasons, I build from Dalton (2004) and Norris (2011) with the general framework as presented in figure 2.1.

However, I diverge from them slightly for the purpose of conceptual (and, as a result, empirical) clarity. It begins from the position that Norris does not

distinguish between *political* and *system* support, but rather uses them interchangeably. However, I argue that political support is simply a component of wider system support. Whilst accepting Norris' definition of *system* support as *orientations towards the nation-state, its agencies, and actors* (Norris, 2011, p. 20), I define *political* support as *support for the governing, political institutions*. At its least abstract, it is about support for political *institutions* rather than the agents and actors that occupy them or non-political institutions. This definition excludes more diffuse attitudes such as national identity or support for democracy as a principle (or conversely, acceptance of authoritarianism) since it limits the scope of the concept to governing political institutions. In addition, it excludes the most specific, which refers to the support of politicians or incumbents more broadly. Political support, in this view, is simply a component of broader system support; it is also a mid-range type of support, situated between specific and diffuse. This follows current ideas closely as to not reinvent the wheel - indeed, it essentially replicates Easton's original framework but focuses on the state institutions - but also allows for greater precision in identifying the scope for the thesis and the empirical measures. A critique may be that it seems arbitrary to exclude politicians as a whole, for instance, since these are expressly political. However, the focus here is on support for a range of political institutions (rather than the broad class of politicians). It is also possible, however, to extend this to include sub-national or international institutions. This conceptualisation is consistent with other recent analyses (e.g Martini & Quaranta, 2020).

Whilst I will develop and make a case for specific measures of the concept in chapter 4, figure 2.2 summarises this conceptual argument and includes the type of measures that will be used.

Figure 2.2: Conceptualisation of Political Support

There are a few normative points to address here. The focus on trust in institutions carries an inherently normative weight that aligns it with the liberal tradition of thought (Johnson, 1993). This is because it 'is directed towards the rules governing political agents rather than toward their character and actions. Our attention moves to the safeguards that are supposed to protect us' (Johnson, 1993, p. 18). This way of thinking about support or trust in institutions is relatively new, rooted in the 17th century political thought and processes of state building (Johnstone, 2017; Schröder, 2017). Some may argue that support for institutions - at least conceptualised as trust as in figure 2.2 - is not possible in practice, since this requires more knowledge about the intentions and interests of government agents than is reasonable for the average person (Hardin, 2002). I assume that support is possible and, on the contrary, it is a rational response to complexity. Instead of analysing all aspects of government, all agents of government, individuals develop an overall summary of general support (or not) which sustains their cooperation (Johnson, 1993, p. 72). It is this latter result, that it sustains cooperation, that makes support normatively consequential (Faulkner & Simpson, 2017). This implies that support is evaluative, which implies that it originates from an individual evaluating the objects (institutions) based on some features (Martini & Quaranta, 2020).

Consequences of Political Support

One aim of this thesis is to contribute to the literature explaining the determinants of political support. With this in mind, it is important to consider the consequences of political support to motivate its practical importance and, ultimately, why it is worth studying. Despite this, empirical evidence on the consequences of political support is the largest gap in the political support literature (Van Der Meer & Zmerli, 2017). This is in stark contrast to the somewhat hyperbolic concerns that dominate the early literature. For instance, Easton (1965, p. 158) argued that a lack of political support 'must lead to a complete collapse of the system'. In a similar yet even more pessimistic tone, Crozier et al. (1975, p. 2) suggest it could lead to 'disintegration of civil order, the breakdown of social discipline, the debility of leaders, and the alienation of citizens' and that Europe would soon 'slip engineless and rudderless' into dictatorship. Whilst there is little evidence for these apocalyptic concerns - at least until the last few years - there is evidence that political support has significant consequences for policy making, implementation and compliance; voting; and wider political participation.

The early literature on the consequences of political support (specifically,

of political trust) addressed the consequences for compliance and the scope of government action. The basis of this is the assumption that citizens will endeavour to meet obligations if they expect (trust) the governing institutions to do likewise, and won't object to government expansion if they view it as benign. For instance, Scholz and Lubell (1998) found that trust in government significantly influenced the probability of an individual complying with tax law. Similarly, Russell Dalton (2004) showed that at the aggregate level, higher political trust is related to higher rates of return on census forms (which is legally necessary in the US). More recently, Marien and Hooghe (2011) explored the relationship between political trust and support for law compliance in the European context. They find in a sample of 33 European countries that those with low political trust are likely to find illegal behaviour, like tax fraud, more acceptable. These studies provide evidence that low political support (operationalised in these as political trust) is related to both increased likelihood of illegal behaviour and also increased perceptions that illegal behaviour is acceptable.

As noted, this extends to support for types of policy and policy preferences more broadly. There is evidence that support is, as it were, 'the oil that lubricates the policy machine' (Van Der Meer & Zmerli, 2017, p. 1), and typically increases support for policy that extends government activity. In the US, Rudolph and Evans (2005) find that political support influences preferences for both distributive and redistributive policy, but that the effect of trust is higher amongst conservatives, who are less likely ideologically to advocate redistributive policy. This finding supports earlier literature that explores general policy preferences and, again in the US, shows that this has particular effects for expansion of government activity (Citrin, 1974; Chanley, Rudolph & Rahn, 2000; Hetherington & Globetti, 2002). More recently, Hetherington and Husser (2012) show that whilst political support matters, it is conditional on the salience of the policy area. This is because people do not hold a holistic view of government, but rather when asked about government, they consider the aspect of government that is most salient to them. As evidence, they show that when defense and welfare spending are salient, support has a more significant impact on preferences in those areas than when they are not. To approach causality, they show how support increased markedly over 9/11, but preferences for redistributive policies did not - the increased support was 'funnelled' into preferences on foreign policy. The evidence thus suggests that political support plays a significant role in policy preferences, in particular for policy that aims to expand government behaviour or requires material costs (Scholz & Lubell, 1998; Fairbrother, 2019; Rhodes, Axsen & Jaccard, 2017). A point worth men-

tioning, which is often overlooked, is not just the consequences of individuals' level of support, but how this is distributed across the population: although limited to the United States, Hetherington and Rudolph (2015) show how the polarisation of trust is the real cause of gridlocking the US rather than levels of trust per sé.

Considering these effects on policy preferences, it is unsurprising that political support has ramifications for voter behaviour and political participation in general. In terms of whether individuals vote, political support is related to abstention (Bélanger & Nadeau, 2005) or, in the case of compulsory voting, spoiled ballots (Hooghe, Marien & Pauwels, 2011). When individuals with low support do vote, they have a higher likelihood of opting for opposition or radical-right parties (Citrin, 1974; Arzheimer, 2009; Hooghe et al., 2011; Hooghe & Dassonneville, 2018b; Rooduijn, van der Brug & de Lange, 2016). There is also evidence that this switch to a populist or radical-right party can fuel a 'spiral of distrust', where voting and allegiance to an anti-establishment party plays a causal role in decreasing political support (Hooghe & Dassonneville, 2018b; Rooduijn et al., 2016). It has also been suggested that political support plays a role in moving individuals away from liberal policies which can harm social democratic parties (Chanley et al., 2000).

Evidence is less clear for participation outside of the ballot box. Whilst even the earliest literature was pretty unequivocal about the harmful effects of low support on voting (Citrin, 1974; Almond & Verba, 1963), it has also been argued that this might be offset by increased informal participation (Barnes & Kaase, 1979), and that this might overall be a positive development (Theiss-Morse & Hibbing, 2009; Norris, 2011). Overall, the literature suggests that low political support is certainly related to either abstention or anti-establishment voting, but that this could be offset by participation elsewhere. However, this seems conditional on an individual's belief that they can influence politics (Hooghe & Marien, 2013). In other words, this offsetting of participation may occur only for those that have low political support but high efficacy, whereas low forms of both attributes could result in exit from the political system as a whole.

It is unsurprising then that political support is generally seen as necessary for democratic government: it facilitates policy compliance, the ease of policy implementation (particularly for left-of-centre policy), and the stability of a liberal democratic party system. Whilst it is acknowledged that a degree of cynicism is entirely necessary, as one would not want blind devotion to a government, there is a clear normative case that very low support has negative implications for democratic government and this motivates our explaining of

it.

Determinants of Political Support

Perhaps due to these broad consequences and its relevance to multiple fields of social science, the literature studying the determinants of political support is extensive, and has been the topic of many of the seminal books in political science. Research has identified causes and correlates of political support in almost every aspect of the political and social system. Since no empirical model can control for all plausible avenues of causality, it is difficult to study it in its entirety. The result is a necessity for tight theoretical categorisation and to be clear about which specific literature is being addressed and, perhaps more importantly, those that are being put to the side. This is not only important theoretically, but also when building explanatory empirical models.

Whilst a common separation in the literature is between macro and micro processes (Muñoz, 2017), I present the literature here by distinguishing between 1) sociological 2) institutional 3) intermediary and 4) individual explanations (Norris, 2011; Foster & Frieden, 2017). These clusters differ on where the primary causal mechanism for the generation and deterioration of political support lies. Ultimately, this thesis focuses on institutional determinants of political support. I argue that the other determinants cannot reasonably account for the type of changes we are interested in, nor can they plausibly link European integration with political support.

The sociological literature stresses long-term cultural developments, following the belief that political support is a general assessment of a community's political culture (Zmerli & Hooghe, 2011). This literature can take two forms. The first is rooted in modernisation theory and stresses attitudinal change generated by cultural change (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Dalton, 2004). Due to literary, educational and technological change, material values, such as economic security, have been replaced by postmaterialist values, such as quality of life and individual freedom, and values shifts such as in gender roles and sexuality. This change from materialist to postmaterialist is then related to the decline in political support of all kinds, from the parliament, to police, and nation-state itself. The evidence is drawn from observations that those who are younger, educated, and wealthier, tend to have less support for the system, despite being the notable beneficiaries. Both Inglehart (1997) and Dalton (2004) relate this to the scepticism towards hierarchy, bureaucracy and conservatism, which is prevalent amongst these individuals. Dalton (2004) in particular stresses that cultural change has led to new and disparate demands

on government that cannot easily be met, and this gap between expectations and reality is what drives the decline in political support. Interestingly, this argument is not dissimilar to the initial studies during the 1970s on political support which derided the 'oppositionist intellectuals and privatistic youth' (Crozier et al., 1975).

Another strand of the sociological literature stresses the importance of individual experiences, such as interpersonal or social trust (Almond & Verba, 1963; Putnam, 2000, 1995a). The principal notion is that 'beliefs, feelings and values significantly influence political behaviour, and that these beliefs, feelings and values are the product of socialization' (Almond & Verba, 1989, p. 29); in other words, how (positive) social connections foster positive feelings towards the political system (Putnam, 1995b). The causal mechanism within this explanation is in early-life socialisation which is elevated to political institutions. However, it should be noted that the empirical relationship between social trust and political support is generally quite low, and that recent research has indicated that institutional trust actually leads to social trust rather than the reverse causal relationship (Sønderskov & Dinesen, 2016).

Institutional accounts, on the other hand, focus on the performance of governing institutions.[1] These can similarly be separated into two strands which generally follow the distinction between input and output legitimacy (Scharpf, 1997). The strand which takes the output side of the equation suggest that political support is generated by the performance and evaluation of performance of political institutions in improving economic conditions and policy performance more generally (Hetherington, 1998; Torcal, 2014). For instance, Stimson (2004) claims that political support in the US is accounted for almost entirely by economic performance, whilst Van Erkel and Van Der Meer (2016) argue that citizens benchmarking current economic performance to past performance explains the decline in support from 1999 to 2011. Exploiting the East-West Germany divide, Ross (2004) explains how economic performance explains political support in this context rather than cultural factors. This remains the dominant argument within the political support literature, particularly with regard to the significant decline in political support since the 2008 recession (Foster & Frieden, 2017).

The 'input' side of the institutional argument rather turns to the impact of

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[1]Recently, some scholars have addressed 'throughput legitimacy', qualities such as efficacy, accountability and inclusiveness (Schmidt, 2013; Iusmen & Boswell, 2017; Strebel, Kübler & Marcinkowski, 2018). However, these have not made it clearly into the mainstream of political support research, and some of these qualities have been blurred with institutional performance, such as corruption and quality of government (Meer & Hakhverdian, 2016; Martini & Quaranta, 2018; Dahlberg & Holmberg, 2014). Therefore, I restrict the focus to the two more common strands.

the procedural aspects of governance. As Norris (2011, p. 190) puts it, 'rational citizens who expect regimes to meet certain democratic standards [...] should have little reason for satisfaction if the regime is perceived as failing'. Thus, whilst economic (output) explanations dominated the early literature, there was still evidence that procedural evaluations, such as responsiveness, played a crucial role in fostering political support, with some even arguing that there was very little evidence for the output explanation (Evans & Whitefield, 1995). This debate is still ongoing. For instance, Torcal (2014) argues using panel data that the decline in political support in Spain and Portugal during the economic crisis was largely due to the perception of responsiveness of the state, rather than just economic decline (see also Christmann & Torcal, 2017). However, it has also been argued that input factors moderate the impact of output factors, showing that the binary separation of them can be problematic (Magalhães, 2016).

Whilst these studies relate to perceptions, research has also considered whether actual institutional arrangements matter. Institutions can matter through linking citizens with decision making or shaping the output citizens receive from policy (Dahlberg & Holmberg, 2014). The dominant focus in this regard has been differentiating between consensual and majoritarian systems (Lijphart, 1999). There are competing hypotheses for these systems: it may be that in consensual systems, political support is higher since they a) produce greater representation in parliament and b) since they tend to produce multiparty systems, citizens have more options to choose from (Lijphart, 1999; Dahlberg & Holmberg, 2014; Hoerner & Hobolt, 2019). Majoritarian systems, however, may produce greater political support because of the greater clarity of responsibility and ease of accountability (Powell, 2000). Empirical evidence for either of these is mixed, but the existing conclusion is that if effects exist, they are relatively weak (van Ham et al., 2017; Dahlberg & Holmberg, 2014; Christmann & Torcal, 2017; André & Depauw, 2017).

Whilst those discussed are the primary competing explanations, there are two other groups of explanations. The first of these approaches is an intermediary category whose explanations are situated within civil society. These point to negative media coverage (e.g Norris, 2011), political scandal (Pharr & Putnam, 2000), or defining events, such as 9/11, which can either increase or decrease political support (Stimson, 2004). The second, smaller and somewhat neglected group is the role of individual emotions and cognition in developing political support (for a review, see Van Der Meer & Zmerli, 2017). Whilst these explanations have not made it into the mainstream of the political support literature, many authors now control for a 'satisfaction' or 'trust' syndrome,

where some individuals are simply more trusting or satisfied independent of exogenous political events (Ares et al., 2017; Harteveld et al., 2013).

This thesis is situated within the institutionalist group of explanations, and specifically in that which studies the role of objective and perceived input performance. Whilst the sociological literature has a lot to offer understanding the long-term trends, and may interact in interesting ways with contemporary events, this lens would not be suitable at understanding the effect of integration[2] nor the sudden changes (or stability) around a country's baseline average; for instance, it could not well explain the sudden collapse in Southern Europe during the crisis period. The interest in this thesis is on the effect of European integration, which is at its core a monumental institutional transformation, and therefore the thesis takes up the institutional determinants of political support and how this transformation impacts domestic institutions.

To be clear, this entails two routes to political support: the input side, focusing on the procedural aspects of government; and the output side, focusing on the quality of policy output. As I will argue in the following chapter, the main theoretical argument is that integration intervenes intervenes through the *input* mechanisms.

Political Support in the European Union

In this section I focus on the literature that studies the dynamics of support in the European context. This literature aims at explaining both support for the European Union and the dynamics between support for the European and domestic institutions. The previous literature was developed with reference to factors in the domestic arena only, and did not account for these latter dynamics. Overall, I argue that in general the literature on multilevel governance and political support is undeveloped. With regard to the dynamics of support between the two levels, I argue that the literature has on one hand privileged the domestic level in explaining support for the EU, and on the other has not adequately considered the effects of integration on support for domestic political institutions. I conclude by briefly outlining the contribution this thesis makes to the literature on political support and the dynamics in the EU specifically, which I elaborate in the following chapter.

There is very little research on what the effect of multiple layers of governance on political support is, and the field has only recently considered it (Muñoz, 2017), which is representative of most literatures on domestic polit-

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[2]Of course, it is possible, and I address this in relevant chapters, that integration augments the process of modernisation or postmaterialism.

ical behaviour (Rossteutscher & Faas, 2015; Braun, Gross & Rittberger, 2020a; Braun & Tausendpfund, 2020b). Whilst research has addressed support in non-national institutions such as the EU and subnational institutions (e.g Hobolt, 2012; Wolak & Palus, 2010; Fitzgerald & Wolak, 2016), it has rarely addressed the effects of multilevel governance arrangements directly, unlike some research in voting behaviour (e.g Schakel, 2018; Rodden & Wibbels, 2011).

The majority of the early literature on political support in the EU was therefore couched in the same first- and second-order framework where the domestic, national arena held privileged explanatory power above the European political arena (Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Muñoz, 2017). This is understandable given the early 'permissive consensus' of European integration as driven by elite interests, and the lack of interest or knowledge of European matters amongst the public. In this literature the fundamental question was how support for the EU - or, conversely, its opposition, in the form of Euroscepticism - was developed. This literature broadly addresses four factors: objective socio-economic position; issues of identity; and benchmarking their support to levels of support for domestic institutions and the national political context (see also Hobolt & de Vries, 2016a).

The initial literature emphasised an individual's objective socio-economic position (Gabel & Whitten, 1997; Gabel, 1998). The more privileged an individual was with regard to their income or education, the more they supported European integration; this was seen as a rational calculation on the basis that those with higher levels of social and economic capital would stand to gain more from greater integration. This has also been studied at the country level, for instance, finding that integration is driven both by economic conditions and issues surrounding distribution, with the expectation that 'net beneficiaries' will be more supportive of integration (Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993, 2007).

The second wave of literature argued that, as European integration became more greatly concerned with issues of national communities and sovereignty, the importance of identity came to the fore. As Hooghe and Marks (2009, p. 2) wrote, 'citizens care - passionately - about who exercises authority'. This, on the one hand, concerned both the commitment to the national polity in terms of (intensity of) attachment as well as the perceived threat from encroachment on these by other cultures (Carey, 2002; McLaren, 2002). This was seen to run alongside, and potentially interact with, socio-economic determinants.

It was argued, however, that these studies over-estimated the ability of individuals to come to judgements of support based on these factors; the European project was still an elite project, public information and interest was low, and it was a complex judgement to make. What came to dominate the literature

was the claim that attitudes were largely reflective of domestic conditions and attitudes towards the domestic state (Anderson, 1998; Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000; Kritzinger, 2003; Hobolt, 2012). Although this was at least in part dependent on political knowledge (Karp, Banducci & Bowler, 2003), this work suggests that those who are more supportive of their domestic state were more positive towards the EU or integration, but this varied across labour market potential and political knowledge.

The simplicity of this relationship was soon questioned. Whilst some authors agreed that it was a direct spillover from domestic support to support for the EU, others argued that those who were positive towards their member state and lived under well-functioning governments were less likely to be positive towards the EU, whilst those in economically and politically poorer states would be more supportive of the EU (Rohrschneider, 2002; Kritzinger, 2003; Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000; Hobolt, 2012). The mechanism behind these arguments is that citizens in well-functioning countries saw a transfer of sovereignty as costlier and had higher expectations from government, whilst those in less well-functioning countries saw the EU as a way of overcoming domestic problems. The contradiction between these findings - essentially whether it was a positive or negative correlation - was convincingly found to be a statistical artefact: individuals who trusted their domestic state were more likely to trust the EU, but the relationship at the *aggregate* level was the reverse (Muñoz, Torcal & Bonet, 2011). A more critical analysis also suggests that one cannot generalise across Europe, as the dynamics between member states and supranational government vary, and this affects the perceptions of support (Boomgaarden, Schuck, Elenbaas & Vreese, 2011).

Recent scholarship has largely supported the spillover approach to support within the European Union. In a direct comparison of the competing models, it was found that political support was extrapolated from the state to the EU (Harteveld et al., 2013; Armingeon & Ceka, 2013). The extent of this extrapolation was found to depend on the degree of politicisation of EU issues (Ares et al., 2017). Thus, whilst some work argued for a rational evaluation of support that separated domestic and European, or that support was determined by identity (Hooghe & Marks, 2007; Polyakova & Fligstein, 2016), an alternative perspective is that political support is formed in the context of the member state, and is extrapolated upwards. The most recent work in the area suggests that the relationship is ultimately more complex, and that trust in different institutions support each other in a dynamic, time-varying process (Dominioni, Quintavalla & Romano, 2020).

This has led some to argue that the political support is beyond the control

of the EU - in other words, that support is independent of European activity (Harteveld et al., 2013). This has been strengthened recently by De Vries (2018), who deals with this topic head on and argues that individuals benchmark their support for the EU relative to their perception of their state outside the EU. The judgement between these two is called the 'EU differential'. Support for the EU increases if the EU differential is positive (i.e, they judge the status quo of membership better than the alternative of being outside of it).

A key implication to draw from this discussion is that the national context has been understandably privileged in explaining support for the EU and the dynamics between support for the EU and domestic institutions. For instance, that support for EU institutions is conditional on already-existing support for domestic institutions either positively or negatively, depending on the level of analysis. What has been missing, at least at great length, from this analysis is the possibility that integration *itself* affects support for domestic political institutions. This is not an implausible argument, especially in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis. Indeed, a vein of research argues that a fundamental factor in the decline in political support since 2008 has been the involvement of external actors in democratic domestic political systems (Ruiz-Rufino & Alonso, 2017; Armingeon & Guthmann, 2014; Armingeon et al., 2016; Torcal, 2014; Polavieja, 2013; Häusermann, Kurer & Wüest, 2018). This is in addition to the theoretical concerns outlined in the introduction about the potentially problematic consequences of integration for political support (e.g Mair, 2013).

This thesis presents an alternative explanation for the dynamics of support for domestic institutions. It turns away from these frameworks which explain political support at the different levels as a function of support at another (Dominioni et al., 2020) or a rational judgement of the benefits of integration (De Vries, 2018). Instead, I test a framework used within the globalisation literature (which is occasionally applied to the processes of European integration) which argues that the process of removing competencies or influence of the domestic level produces a range of consequences at the domestic level. In the following chapter, I combine this framework with the Europeanisation literature to present direct and indirect effects, which may have plausible consequences for domestic mass politics. In terms of the political support literature, this is a new framework for studying the effects of European and global integration.

European Integration and Constraint on the Room to Manoeuvre

How does European integration affect domestic political support? Different literatures have approached the question from different perspectives. Whilst the political support literature has been interested in the relationship between support at domestic and European levels, scholars of the European Union were concerned with the potentially deleterious effect of European integration on political support at the domestic but primarily European level. Tangentially, the broader literature on global integration has seen European integration as an example of an intense form of globalisation, entailing the same processes and effects on mass politics (Gall, 2017). In this chapter, I bring together these literatures to form a theoretical model which guides the empirical chapters of the thesis.

Unlike previous work, the theoretical model posits mechanisms through which European integration affects domestic mass politics in general, but political support in particular. These mechanisms largely reflect the 'direct' and 'indirect' pathways that have been presented by authors such as Mair (2007b, 2013) and Schmidt (2006). However, the chapter makes two substantial contributions to this framework.

Firstly, scholars of both European and global integration have not developed *why* integration would lead to changes in political support; in other words, they have neglected the political support literature discussed in chapter 2. This chapter merges these two literatures building on the previous chapter, bringing in the 'chain of responsiveness' (Powell, 2004) to make explicit the

causal chain at which European integration may influence political support. Secondly, there has been a divide between research on European and global integration despite, as I will argue, positing identical causal mechanisms. By merging these two literatures, I broaden the evidence base on which the integration-political support causal chain lies.

This theoretical model not only guides the thesis but, I argue, provides an exciting research agenda for the effect of international integration on domestic mass politics. By building on these three literatures, I provide theoretically and empirically grounded research questions for future work to explore, and which the following three empirical chapters are dedicated to.

The chapter will first address the literature on Europeanisation and how integration creates change at the domestic level. I then discuss in turn the 'direct' and 'indirect' effects of integration. It will then briefly develop the literature on global integration, and argue that both literatures expect similar effects at the domestic level. I link this to the political support literature, showing how and where these frameworks fit into the causal drivers of political support. Finally, I present the theoretical framework and discuss mediating factors at the domestic level.

Europeanisation

The initial interest in European integration was how nation-states began to co-operate and build institutions beyond the state, spawning the 'grand theories' of European integration. It is worth briefly touching on them here. Integration in the early literature aimed to understand how and why 'political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre- existing national states' (Haas, 1958, p. 17). One of the earliest grand theories, neo-functionalism, explained the process of European integration as one of 'spillover', where a specific action in one area requires further action in other areas to achieve the original goal (Lindberg, 1963). Integration was seen to be driven by non-state, societal actors rather than nation-states.

Intergovernmentalism instead privileged nation-states, in which integration is driven by the interests of states and decision-making is a zero-sum game. In this perspective, integration is only an expression of state interests, a pooling of sovereignty rather than a transfer of sovereignty (Hoffman, 1966). Indeed, it has been argued that integration 'saved' instead of undermined the nation state (Milward, 1999). Liberal-intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, 1993)

instead saw integration as an outcome of a two-level game, where domestic actors vied for power at the domestic level and projected these onto the international stage (Putnam, 1988). Whilst interest in these 'grand theories' of integration have waned somewhat, new efforts are still made to explain integration (e.g Bickerton, Hodson & Puetter, 2015).

At a theoretical level, these theories can shed some light on the research question posed in this thesis. For instance, those who argue that states are the primary agents of integration may dismiss out of hand the claim that integration has any (independent) impact on domestic politics at all, since states still maintain control over the process. However, that domestic actors have a role to play on policy decided at the EU level is not discounted, but the interest is whether these have any subsequent impact on political support at the domestic level (Ladrech, 2010).

I therefore turn to the Europeanisation literature. The Europeanisation literature aims to understand integration as an explanatory factor in domestic political change (Hix & Goetz, 2000). This has concerned whether Europeanisation is a top-down, bottom-up or mixed process and has typically focused on the effect on the policy and institutions of member states (Schmidt, 2006, p. 219). The precise working definitions of 'Europeanisation' are diverse. Even 17 years ago, Olsen (2002) identified at least five possible uses of Europeanisation (see also Buller & Gamble, 2002), and there has been concern that the concept has become 'over-stretched' (Radaelli, 2000). Whilst some define Europeanisation as the development of European structures of governance (Cowles, Caporaso & Risse, 2001), or even as a 'smokescreen for domestic policy manoeuvres' (Buller & Gamble, 2002), most have settled on a definition that focuses on the influence of European governance on the domestic state: such as the 'process of domestic adaptation to the impact of the EU within member states' (Ladrech, 2010, p. 1) or 'a situation where distinct modes of European governance have transformed aspects of domestic politics' (Buller & Gamble, 2002, p. 17). At its core, the conceptual value of the Europeanisation literature (rather than the European integration literature) is to shift the focus from the processes and causes of European integration to how this process influences domestic politics. The definition of Europeanisation used here follows the definition by Ladrech (2010) as 'a process of domestic adaptation to the impact of the EU within member states'.

Building from this position, numerous authors have sought to clarify the extent, nature and mediating factors of the EU's impact on domestic politics (Sedelmeier, 2011). The approaches to these questions can be separated into two theoretical streams: rationalist institutionalism and constructivist insti-

tutionalisation (Cowles et al., 2001). The former focuses on adaptation pressure from the EU which interacts with domestic actors and institutions, whilst the latter focuses on the internalisation of European norms at the domestic level (Sedelmeier, 2011). In what follows, I restrict myself to the rationalist approach. The argument here does not depend on this decision: the two approaches are different ways of viewing domestic adaptation, not whether or not it occurs, although it may effect *when* (at least, under which conditions) it occurs.

The key mechanism behind this adaptive process - and the extent to which states adapt - is the 'goodness of fit' between European and domestic policy (Cowles et al., 2001; Börzel & Risse, 2000; Schmidt, 2006). The starting point for this process is that competencies for policy-making have been elevated to the supranational level. It is at this point that the adaptive pressure begins under the condition that there is a mismatch between the European and domestic policy, since member states are obliged to implement the given policy depending on the level of competence of the EU (notwithstanding issues of compliance) (Ladrech, 2010; Héritier, 2001). However, whilst misfit is a necessary condition for domestic change, it is by no means sufficient: there are a range of mediating factors at the domestic and European levels which contribute to the heterogeneity of domestic responses to European-level policy. The most fundamental is the existing policy of the member state: the more similar the policies of the member state and European Union, the less adaptive pressure there will be.

Even given this, there are domestic mediating factors that refract the impact of these adjustment pressures and determine the overall amount of adjustment. These factors significantly depend on the policy area and country, which accounts for the diversity of responses to Europeanisation. As a starting point, the authors introducing the misfit argument presented five mediating factors: veto points; facilitating formal institutions; political and organisational cultures; differential empowerment of actors; and the degree of learning (Cowles et al., 2001). However, there have been numerous adjustments to this, including the addition of, for example, political contestation over any given issue (Bache, 2007). Whilst the strength of influence of the EU over its member states begins at the level of policy misfit, this is not deterministic and is determined by pre-existing domestic factors.

The level of domestic adaptation to European policy can be considered of three forms: absorption (low), accommodation (modest) and transformation (high). Since transformation entails a complete change in governing style or policy, most adaptation is either absorption or accommodation. Nonetheless,

scholarly research into measuring the degree of Europeanisation tend to agree that the degree of domestic change is approximately related to the degree of pressure (Bache, 2007; Börzel & Risse, 2000; Ladrech, 2010). In other words, whilst the domestic mediating variables do impact the way in which European policy impacts domestic states, the fundamental factor is the degree of pressure emanating from the misfit between European and domestic policy.

This brief discussion can be summarised in figure 3.1, drawing from Ladrech (2010) and Cowles et al. (2001). The solid arrows highlight the process discussed, whilst the dashed lines indicate the feedback cycle from domestic to European levels. Whilst I fully acknowledge these feedback loops, and that the domestic level certainly plays a role in shaping European policies (Börzel, 2002), accounting for this is beyond the scope of this section, and I follow most literature in focusing on either 'top-down' or 'bottom-up' influences; a reason for this relative narrowness is given by Olsen (2002, p. 942) who says that 'no coherent empirical research programme is possible if everything is seen as endogenous and in flux'.

Figure 3.1: The Process of Europeanisation

The Domestic Effects of European Integration

Although this literature was initially focused on how the process of Europeanisation influenced policy and institutions, it can also be used to understanding how integration affects domestic mass politics. Mair (2007a, 2007b) initially outlined these effects with regard to political parties and the party system, dividing the effects into 'direct' and 'indirect'. The *direct effects* refers to contestation over Union-specific policies or events (such as European elections) or over integration itself. *Indirect effects* refers to the consequences of the Europeanisation of policies - the removal to varying degrees of democratic contestation at the domestic level to the European level (Schmidt, 2006). So far, I have discussed how the Europeanisation literature has conceptualised the effects on domestic states. This section advances existing work to theorise how these direct and indirect effects matter for political support. Whilst the strong theoret-

ical claims, encapsulated in numerous texts[1] and most polemically Mair (2013), document or assert the deleterious claims of integration on support, they have not embedded this in the political support literature to explain through which mechanisms. Therefore, in this section I describe the 'direct' and 'indirect' effects and link them to the political support literature discussed in chapter 2. I then argue that the more likely effects are via the *indirect* route, and that they relate to the *input* side of the political support literature. I discuss this with reference to the 'chain of responsiveness' in figure 3.2 (Powell, 2004).

Direct Effects

European Parliament Elections

The most well-researched direct effect is through elections to the European Parliament. There are two features of European elections that are relevant here which originate in them being second-order elections (Reif & Schmitt, 1980), although this perspective is being challenged with the politicisation of European governance and the introduction of *Spitzenkandidaten* (Schmitt et al., 2015; Braun, Popa & Schmitt, 2019). The first is that they are of relatively low salience and low interest with less media coverage. The second is that the elections tend to favour minor or challenger parties, giving these parties both new partisans and a platform for their policy programmes (Hix & Marsh, 2007). However, do these elections also have repercussions on national politics beyond the formation of the European Parliament? Do European elections have direct effects on changing national politics? Do they change people's political opinions and for how long?

In the early literature, van der Eijk et al. (1996) has shown how early European elections strengthened minor parties and put stress on national governments by acting as (usually negative) mid-term assessments. Similarly, European elections can change national party tactics and improve performance at subsequent elections at the domestic level (Gabel, 2000; Somer-Topcu & Zar, 2014). Adopting a creative quasi-experimental research design, Schulte-Cloos (2018) shows how populist radical-right parties (notably, *not* other parties) gain momentum in European elections: when national elections follow closely to European elections, they perform better. This may well be why European elections have been found to lead to a growth in size of national party systems (Prosser, 2016). The collective status of existing research is that European elections, somewhat ironically, lead to a platform and the domestic assimilation of populist radical-right parties.

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[1]See, for instance, Scharpf (1999), Laffan (2014), Vowles and Xezonakis (2016)

Research is a little less clear on the repercussions for individual citizens. The concern is that European elections inculcate habits of non-voting, lead to reduced political interest, and strengthen partisan attachment to the emboldened challenger parties. Franklin and Hobolt (2011) for instance find that European elections depress turnout at national elections as voters form habits of abstaining at elections of any kind. It may also impede the quality of accountability, as voters are less sure of who is responsible for policy and so do not vote based on past policy performance (Lobo & Lewis-Beck, 2012). Dinas and Riera (2018) find that the success of populist radical right parties at the European level foster their subsequent success at the national level; Schulte-Cloos (2019), on the other hand, finds no evidence that the European elections lead to greater closeness to radical-right parties, and some evidence that it does lead to closeness to Green parties. However, both of these are limited to their respective time-periods. She similarly finds that, if anything, EP elections lead to increased political interest which is persistent for at least five years.

The conclusions from this discussions are broad. Firstly, European elections have spillover effects to national elections. Secondly, this spillover tends to favour smaller, usually populist radical-right, parties through providing them with a platform and mobilisation potential, leading to the fragmentation of national party systems. Thirdly, the individual-level dynamics are less certain, with a lack of clarity over whether it inculcates political disinterest or closeness to challenger parties.

This area is ripe for research on political support. For instance, many of these parties are anti-establishment, both towards the EU and their domestic systems. Does voting for them lead to reduced support? If a voter supports them at the European election, are they then less satisfied at the following domestic election when their performance is worse? Do voters align their ideology with their vote, therefore moving to the (Eurosceptic) right (or, perhaps, left)? Alternatively, does the additional experience of political engagement increase support for the political system?

The EU issue

It is almost redundant to say that another result of European integration is the fact that the European Union has become an issue in domestic politics. Although this was not always the case (i.e during the era of 'permissive consensus' (Hooghe & Marks, 2009)), the issue of Europe is to a greater or lesser extent evident in all EU member states. Since Gabel (2000) set out his research agenda on the effect of European integration on national politics, the

area of 'EU issue voting', or whether the EU as an issue influences national vote choices (de Vries, 2007), has led to a considerable amount of academic research on how the EU can be mobilised by political entrepreneurs (van der Eijk & Franklin, 2004).

The research that emerged from this sought to understand both the aggregate and voter-level conditions that facilitated EU issue voting and which parties were more likely to benefit (Tillman, 2004; de Vries, 2007; de Vries et al., 2011; de Vries, 2010; Evans, 1998; Scherer, 2019). This research found that EU issue voting varied cross-nationally and across individual characteristics, such as political information, and was influenced by party characteristics, such as their position on integration as well as strategic considerations. On average, EU issue voting benefited parties at the extremes. As van der Eijk and Franklin (2004) put it, EU issue voting served to undercut the left-right dimension of party competition in almost all European countries.

Alongside the determinants of EU issue voting, research has also studied the resulting effects on party politics. For instance, recent research studying the German federal elections in 2017 found that neither party positions on European integration or attitudes towards member state aid affected the election results, despite the politicisation of Europe since the economic crisis (Schoen, 2019). Schneider (2019) has also studied how the European issue has affected government accountability, showing using a conjoint experiment in Germany that Eurosceptic voters hold parties accountable for their general position on EU integration, whilst pro-EU voters hold parties accountable for attitudes to particular policies. The extent to which parties were affected by issue voting depends on the position they take, whether it's prominent, and the party's left-right position (de Vries, 2010).

The link with political support can be through multiple pathways. First, it adds a second issue area on which parties must be responsive to the electorate. If voters care about the congruence of issue priorities or positions (e.g Reher, 2016; Brandenburg & Johns, 2014), it may be that this is another issue on which parties (or governments, legislatures, etc) fail to adequately reflect the public; this is particularly likely since mainstream parties are typically more pro-integration than the public. Second, the development of the EU issue facilitates two other mechanisms: the development of anti-EU parties and the embedding of domestic cleavages. For the former, clearly it provides the issue on which parties mobilise; for the latter, it is one part of a potential cleavage around the cosmopolitan or communitarian axis.

Development of anti-EU parties

A related issue is the development of anti-European Union parties. Whilst Mair (2000) argued that European integration had little impact on national party systems, he argued that the adoption of Eurosceptic party positions could do so. The main issue to be raised at this point is not whether integration has changed party systems - a debate which now seems outdated - but rather the extent of anti-EU parties and its potential effects on political support.

The dynamics of 'Euroscepticism'[2] are more complicated than made out in the public sphere, and exist across the political spectrum (De Vries, 2018). The Euroscepticism of party types is similarly diverse, from the soft, left-wing Euroscepticism more common in the South of Europe[3] to the hard, right-wing Euroscepticism elsewhere in Europe, and particularly in the West. What is of interest here, I argue, is how Euroscepticism can be a 'touchstone of dissent', leading people from a quite possibly centrist position on Europe to anti-establishment or populist parties (Taggart, 1998). For instance, De Vries and Edwards (2009) show how extremist parties on the right combine Euroscepticism with a cry of national sovereignty and exclusive national identity. By drawing these two issues together - the EU issue voting, and the formation of political parties on the extremes as issue entrepreneurs - there is danger of 'polity scepticism': citizens being pulled to being sceptical of government as a whole (Mair, 2013).

Voting for populist parties is associated with low political support in the first place, but voting for them could also lead to lower political support as a result (Hooghe & Dassonneville, 2018b). Rooduijn et al. (2016) develop this argument nicely, showing how people may be attracted to populist or extremist parties through certain issues (such as immigraton or Europe), but are then prone to the cues of such a party, particularly on deriding the establishment (see also van der Brug, 2003). This leads to greater levels of discontent overall, rather than acting as a safety valve for protest voting. Aside from a spiral of distrust, recent research has shown that greater success of anti-establishment parties also lead to reduced levels of liberal democracy (as measured through various indices), potentially leading to a 'spiral of deconsolidation' (Caamaño & Bértoa, 2019).

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[2]Whilst accepting that this is not precisely the same as 'anti-EU', as discussed in this paragraph, I use the two phrases interchangeably

[3]Though this has been challenged in recent years with the rise of Vox in Spain and Lega in Italy, for instance.

Indirect Effects

Policy Convergence

The most well-developed literature that concerns European constraints and domestic political change is on political party programmes. Through the European-isation of policies and the removal of them from national control, parties converge on a similar platform as doing otherwise is not a credible electoral platform. As Nanou and Dorussen (2013, p. 72) put it, 'the more responsibility assigned to the EU, the less room there is for parties to offer credible policy alternatives that differ markedly from EU legislation'.

There is considerable empirical support for this assertion. Hix (2003) finds that party competition has declined since the 1970s, and the key factor behind the decline is the constraint imposed by the single market and Economic and Monetary Union. More recently, Nanou and Dorussen (2013) finds that parties have converged more in the areas where the European Union has more competence, concluding that EU policy commitments define the spectrum of feasible alternatives (see also Nanou, 2013). Comparing non-EU countries with EU member states, Dorussen and Nanou (2006) find that whilst there is convergence in neighbouring but not member countries, this is even stronger in member states, providing evidence that it is the effect of the EU. In a similar vein, Ward, Ezrow and Dorussen (2011) find that integration reduces party polarisation on economic issues, although they find that this is supplemented by the politicisation of non-economic issues. Exploiting the 2004 enlargement, the authors find that joining the EU led to more space in party manifestos being dedicated to non-economic issues, suggesting that economic policy was essentially depoliticised at the domestic level.

Konstantinidis, Matakos and Mutlu-Eren (2019) develop this argument. They argue that European integration, and international integration in general, leads to an initial convergence of party platforms, but at very high levels of integration it leads to polarisation to extreme positions. Their empirical examination finds support for this non-monotonic relationship, including a stronger test of causality through using a synthetic control method. This study aside, the majority of studies to date using different measures of integration as well as approaching causality from different angles converge on the conclusion that the European Union constrains the range of plausible policy options at the level of political parties. The caveat being that, at extreme levels, this can lead to polarisation.

This may have repercussions for political support. Normatively, choice is fundamental to democracy. Even the most minimalist conceptions of demo-

cracy (Schumpeter, 2010) entail choice; the act of voting is only democratic if it facilitates choice (Riker, 1982, p. 5) and, if there are no programmatic alternatives in terms of parties or politicians, voting is just rubber-stamping decisions that are made elsewhere (Przeworski, 2010, 2003). In other words, the very logic of voting and party competition presupposes the existence of democratic choice. This does not just involve parties and citizens at election time but governments as well. It is of crucial importance that governments can be responsive to public opinion between elections. Although it is arguable about the degree of responsiveness to public opinion that is normatively desirable, few would argue that responsiveness is not important to democracy. However, international integration, and especially European integration, provides a dilemma between responsiveness and responsibility, such that governments, parties and elites more generally are constrained by obligations from outside of the domestic democratic arena (Mair, 2013). I develop later in the chapter the serious theoretical implications of this.

Reinforcing domestic cleavages

A key argument emanating from the 'denationalisation' literature is that European integration has served to embed and reinforce a cleavage in domestic politics. This entails both border permeability (for capital and labour) as well as a shift of political authority away from the nation state (Koopmans & Zürn, 2019), both of which can become areas of contention. Therefore, one indirect effect of European integration has been to strengthen rather than weaken societal divides (Kriesi et al., 2008).

Scholars' interpretations of the nature of the cleavage vary, with binaries such as cosmopolitanism and communitarianism (Koopmans & Zürn, 2019), demarcationists and integrationists (Kriesi et al., 2006, 2008), or the popularised 'somewheres' and 'anywheres' (Goodhart, 2017). However, at the core of all of these analyses is that there are certain groups of citizens that are 'winners' and others that are 'losers' of the process of denationalisation. On the one hand are those with high education or otherwise highly qualified and those with cosmopolitan views; and on the other are those in traditionally closed or protected sectors, those who are unqualified, and those with strong attachments to the national community (Kriesi et al., 2008, p. 8).

This cleavage takes on two forms. The first is related to the economic dimensions of integration that privileges those who are mobile, highly educated or skilled, and harming those who rely on protected and low-skilled sectors. The second but closely related aspect is attitudinal, who challenge the weaken-

ing of state borders and national identity, adopting a 'communitarian' ideology less comfortable with the 'cosmopolitan' political reality.

Whether this really constitutes a new cleavage in society is debated (Hooghe & Marks, 2018a; Langsæther & Stubager, 2019; Koopmans & Zürn, 2019). In particular, Langsæther and Stubager (2019) argue that the 'globalisation cleavage' is 'old wine in new bottles': that it is the continued existence of the education and class voting that has dominated in European nation states. Nonetheless, numerous analyses have found that the strength of the education divide has been growing (van Ham et al., 2017; Bovens & Wille, 2017). For the purposes of this argument, it is not relevant whether European integration really represents a *new* cleavage as such, but whether it is serving to reinforce domestic cleavages - in particular, along lines of education.

The mechanisms through to political support are complex, but can be outlined through the two different aspects of integration outlined above: greater permeability for capital and labour and shift of power from the state. The former relates to the subjective and objective position of the individual within the labour market, as well as the increase of immigration that comes from greater movement of labour. The second relates to the importance of national identity and where decisions are made: as Hooghe and Marks (2009, p. 2) noted, 'citizens care - passionately - about who exercises authority'. Therefore, the reduced importance of the nation state as a locus of authority may also challenge people's perception of national identity. The movement of capital and labour will serve to reduce political support amongst those who are less qualified or less mobile, operating on a class cleavage. Meanwhile, the relevance of the shift of power from the state will in part depend on which policy areas are Europeanised and the importance individuals attach to national sovereignty.

This is not detached from some of the mechanisms already discussed. Cleavages involve three parts. The first is that cleavages must involve large social groups with conflicting interests (in this case, the economic dimension which integration exaerbates). Second, a psychological dimension with group identities and conflicting ideologies (the cosmopolitan versus communitarian ideology). Third, the mobilisation of these ideologies and social groups, usually in the form of political parties which institutionalise the cleavage (Ford & Jennings, 2020). The development of anti-EU or Eurosceptic parties and the EU is an issue cannot therefore be separated from this mechanism. The added value this provides, however, is to separate these into distinct pathways that may vary in their effects, and to be able to account for integration having an influence through the very real effect on changing the labour market potential of

less qualified citizens.

Issue saliency

European integration may shift the attention that certain issues are given. If national governments, and by extension political parties, are not able to directly influence policy, such as the economy, they may be tempted to instead focus on issues that they can directly affect (Hellwig, 2015, pp. 118-121). This is theorised to occur on both the supply and demand sides. Hellwig (2014) shows how the public demand less from governments in areas where the government is (seen to be) constrained - in this case, economic issues. On the other hand, they 'balance' these preferences with demands for more action in areas where the governments are seen to have a larger room to manoeuvre. Studying this at the party-level, Ward et al. (2015) show how European integration leads to the emphasis and politicisation of non-economic issues, and address issues of causality by exploiting the 2004 enlargement where parties in accession countries systematically reduced emphasis on now-constrained economic issues.

This has considerable repercussions for domestic politics insofar as it turns domestic attention from a cleavage which has typically structured the left-right divide to non-economic issues, potentially leading to the growing concern around social issues. This change in focus around traditional structuring issues may help the rise of extremist parties more focused on social concerns like immigration or culture, and force parties to compete on these grounds as well.

Devaluing domestic politics

A related effect, relying on the perceptions of individuals, is that domestic politics becomes devalued. As the locus of power shifts from the nation state to international (or supranational) organisations, the relative importance of political action at the domestic level is reduced. This is close to what Hellwig (2015) refers to as 'policy control': since states arguably have less (direct) control over certain policy areas, what happens with state politics is less important. In the words of Hellwig (2015, p. 23), 'if [. . .] voters perceive national governments as incapable of autonomous action, then preferences over policy ought to be of little consequence'.

Interest in this research agenda peaked following the European financial crisis and, more specifically, the economic interventions that followed in Southern Europe and Ireland. Numerous authors posited the possibility that the

economic interventions and subsequent policy programmes hollowed out domestic politics to the extent that citizens questioned the relevance of their domestic system (Teixeira, Tsatsanis & Belchior, 2014). This garnered considerable empirical support at the aggregate level (e.g Polavieja, 2013; Armingeon & Guthmann, 2014; Ruiz-Rufino & Alonso, 2017). Whilst this is clearly not times of 'normal' integration, it nonetheless provides a most-likely test case of the mechanisms.

The evidence is a little more widespread when integration is defined more generally. Vowles (2008) for instance finds that economic globalisation has little effect on perceptions of the efficacy of national governments, as would be expected, and a broader investigation finds that overall economic interdependence is positive for perceptions of accountability (Vowles & Xezonakis, 2016). However, the same study finds two consistent effects on perceived citizen efficacy and government agency: the level of government debt and being in the European Union. There is therefore mixed findings regarding objective levels of integration, though the authors conclude that there may be effects of the discourses surrounding integration rather than the objective measures themselves.

This mechanism has also been explored with regards to voting, on the same assumption that the reduced importance of domestic politics will reduce the relevance of voting and therefore the propensity to do so. With regards to the act of voting, there are very few studies that examine the EU as a (perceived) constraining force rather than, for instance, an issue that determines vote choice (Gall, 2017). Lobo and Lewis-Beck (2012) argue, however, that the European Union shapes economic voting (i.e, voting based on an incumbent's economic performance) by reducing responsibility attributed to the member state vis-a-vis the European Union in four Southern European countries (Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal). In a similar vein, Turnbull-Dugarte (2020) shows how voters in countries which experienced economic interventions during the Eurozone crisis are less likely to turn out to vote, particularly if they are on the left of the political spectrum.

However, considered more broadly, the issue of international integration does seem to alter voter turnout by reducing it at both aggregate and individual levels (i.e, the probability an individual turns out to vote) (Steiner, 2016; Steiner & Martin, 2012; Steiner, 2010; Marshall & Fisher, 2015; Hellwig & Samuels, 2007). Exploiting a question fielded during the 2001 General Election in the UK, Steiner (2016) provides one of the only studies assessing the micro-level relationship of the integration/voting link, and shows that people who report thinking the government has less influence on the economy are less

likely to vote, and that a perceived lack of influence is related to the relative importance of elections.

Despite the theoretical claims that European integration devalues domestic politics - politics without policy, as Schmidt (2006) calls it - there is little empirical evidence that it matters for political support *or* the act of voting. Although it's a plausible hypothesis, it requires further empirical examination, and particularly at the individual level. I return to this in chapter 6.

In the remainder of the thesis, I focus on the indirect effects pathway. This is for multiple reasons. Firstly, the literature is less developed here, and so the research stands to make a larger contribution. Secondly, as I discuss in the following section, the indirect effects pathway is much broader than the European Union; it is also a feature of globalisation. Therefore, the theoretical and empirical significance extends beyond the European context. Finally, I highlight in section 3 how these different effects relate to political support, and why the indirect effects are a more theoretically grounded pathway.

Globalisation and the Room to Manoeuvre

In this section, I briefly outline the globalisation literature, which makes similar claims about the effect of global integration on domestic mass politics. Globalisation and Europeanisation are linked as they both entail the permeability of the nation-state, and a shift away from the state as the locus of governmental power (Ladrech, 2010). They are both instances, therefore, of 'denationalisation' - a 'weakening link between territorial states and their corresponding national societies' (Zürn, 2000, p. 187). Approximately in parallel to the turn towards the effect of European integration on domestic mass politics (Hix & Goetz, 2000), scholars of globalisation similarly began to turn their attention to the effect of global economic integration on voters and parties (Hellwig, 2001; Kayser, 2007). Indeed, in some cases, the literatures on Europeanisation and integration are hardly separable (e.g Kriesi et al., 2008).[4]

The empirical work in these areas has developed largely separately. From a scientific perspective, this has limited the accumulation of knowledge on the effects of international integration more broadly. In this section, I want to bring together these two literatures through a brief review of the effects of globalisation on mass politics and their relationship to the concomitant literature on

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[4]As noted in the introduction, this is contestable, with many instead arguing that regional integration is a bulwark against globalisation or entail different consequences (e.g Graziano, 2003; Lynggaard, 2015). Nonetheless, I follow the literature here in assuming, for the given reasons, that they entail the same logics even if they are responses to each other.

the European Union. On the one hand, this broadens the evidence base on the effects of European integration. On the other, it also provides a parallel theoretical framework through which to understand the effect of European integration. I do not address the entirety of the literature linking globalisation and mass politics but highlight the dominant strands of research to draw parallels between the Europeanisation and globalisation work (for full reviews, see Vowles & Xezonakis, 2016; Gall, 2017).

Similar to the effects of Europeanisation already discussed, Hellwig (2015) argues that globalisation influences mass politics through two channels: globalisation becoming an issue and policy-maker control over policy. He argues from this that globalisation serves to undercut the basis of mass politics by severing the links between elites and citizens, and draws out several observable implications of this theory. He calls this set of expectations the 'room to manoeuvre' theory, assuming that the core of the theory is (limited) government room to manoeuvre on policy. Whilst most work on globalisation and mass politics starts from this assumption, an alternative framework more consistent with the political economic roots of the globalisation literature posits competing 'constraint' and 'compensation' hypotheses (e.g Vowles & Xezonakis, 2016). For instance, in one of the few published studies on the link between globalisation and political support, Thomas (2016) argues that governments seek to compensate for the negative effects of globalisation through an improved distribution of resources, thereby increasing general standards of living. It is also possible that parties do not converge on a particular policy set, but take different positions leading to greater representation.

Whichever analytical lens is chosen, the observable implications on domestic mass politics are the same and, I argue, the same as the indirect effects of Europeanisation. What unites the two is that the links between citizen preferences, electoral outcomes (i.e the selection of the governing) and the outcomes of public policy are weakened. This has implications for the behaviour the governing and the governed.

These frameworks have been applied, as in the case of Europeanisation, primarily to understanding the behaviour of political parties. Consistent with the work specifically on the European Union, the majority of research has found that economic integration has led to a convergence of economic policy. For instance, Steiner and Martin (2012) and Haupt (2010) both find that economic integration induces programmatic shifts, but the latter finds that this is not necessarily towards the (economic) right: left-wing parties actually shift leftwards as a result of capital mobility. In a similar vein, Ward et al. (2011) find that whilst economic integration does induce programmatic shifts, this is con-

ditional on the median voter: if the median voter is already at the right, there is no convergence since parties would already have positioned themselves to the right. However, if the median voter is to the left, left-wing parties are still compelled to converge on the right (see also Ezrow & Hellwig, 2014).

Convergence on the economic dimension, it is theorised, leads parties to emphasise other (non-economic) issue areas. This is firstly to differentiate themselves from each other, but is also a response to voters being less likely to reward (or punish) governments for economic outcomes (Alcañiz & Hellwig, 2011; Hellwig, 2014, 2001). In the most extensive test of this to date, Ward et al. (2015) show how integration (both European and global) leads to parties emphasising non-economic issues. They leverage the EU enlargement of 2004 to show how parties quickly turned away from economic issues after accession: emphasis on non-economic issues increased by between seven and ten percentage points.

On the side of citizens, work has largely focused on whether globalisation has influenced voter turnout. This is one end of a long causal chain: since citizens see their government as having less control over policy, the value of voting is weakened (though often not addressed, this is also related to parties converging on similar policy platforms). Whilst there are still relatively few studies on this topic, no existing work has found that globalisation increases turnout and most has concluded that it serves to reduce turnout (Steiner & Martin, 2012; Steiner, 2010, 2016; Marshall & Fisher, 2015). Steiner (2016) studies this in the context of the 2001 British election in which a question regarding the room to manoeuvre of the UK government was fielded in the British Election Study, and finds that those who felt the government had less room to manoeuvre were less likely to turn out (see also Vowles & Xezonakis, 2016, pp. 190-208). Research on other attitudes, such as views towards accountability and responsiveness, are largely inconclusive (Vowles, 2008; Vowles & Xezonakis, 2016).

Thus, both the globalisation and Europeanisation literatures have struggled with the question of how, and whether, these macro processes influence political support and domestic mass politics more broadly. They both argue that these processes serve to undermine the links between citizen preferences, electoral outcomes and the outcomes of public policy as the domestic state's relative influence is reduced. In the next section, I link these hypothesised mechanisms to the political support literature and explain why they may reduce political support.

Linking Integration with Political Support

Therefore, this section turns to linking these consequences of European (and global) integration to the political support literature. To my knowledge, this has not been done systematically.[5] Whilst numerous scholars have posed the logic, this has not been well integrated with the political support literature I place particular emphasis on aspects of the 'indirect effects', which this thesis will pursue in the empirical chapters. This is the dominant concern in the literature so far. However, I touch on the potential problems that other effects may cause.

As noted in chapter 2, the focus of this thesis is on the institutional determinants of political support which turn to 'input' performance. This is compared with the 'output' determinants related to policy performance, mainly but not exclusively economic performance. Input determinants, to recap, refer to the ability for citizens to participate in decision-making either directly or indirectly through representatives (Scharpf, 1999; Strebel et al., 2018). One way of thinking about how integration matters for input determinants is to visualise the 'chain of responsiveness', which links citizens' preferences at one end to policy outcomes at the other (Powell, 2004; Kriesi, 2013). This is presented in figure 3.2. This is a useful heuristic for understanding at which points integration becomes problematic for input determinants of political support.

There are three linkages. The first linkage ('structuring choices') connects the preferences or citizens to behaviour in elections, which is a product of both the citizens and their range of options. The second link ('institutional aggregation') is how these election outcomes select policy-makers, which is the realm of the political system more broadly (e.g presidential and parliamentary systems). Finally, the third linkage ('policy making') connects the policy-makers to fulfilling the preferences of the citizens to policy implementation and outcomes (Powell, 2004). Although not a feature of the original formulation of the chain of responsiveness in Powell (2004), I also include the feedback processes from these policy outcomes that influence subsequent preferences and voting behaviour. This is to recognise that there are policy feedback loops, insofar that 'public policies [are] not only outputs but of important inputs' (Pierson, 1993, p. 595).[6]

Those who are worried about the detrimental effects of European integration are implicitly making an argument that the process interferes with this

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[5]Hellwig (2015, pp. 124-146) does so to some extent regarding globalisation and 'representational linkages', but empirically rather than with a theoretical basis

[6]It's also worth noting that systems analysts, such as Easton (1965), also recognised 'feedback', but not explicitly 'policy feedback'.

Figure 3.2: Chain of Responsiveness (Powell, 2004)

chain of either responsiveness or the feedback from policy output to structuring citizens' preferences and behaviour.[7] Yet this hasn't been made clear. The question posed here, then, is at what point along the chain of responsiveness does European integration affect the input side of political support?

Integration could affect the chain of responsiveness at any given stage (or linkage) except for the linkage of institutional aggregation. The only way this could be the case is where the diffusion of practices in the European Union could influence the adoption of a particular electoral system over another, such as the experience of proportional voting in European Parliament elections, but this seems like a relatively low possibility and not one in any case that can be easily empirically identified. This is therefore set aside. But the influence of integration could occur at any other point in the chain. In the parlance of Powell (2004), I call the potential detrimental effects 'subversions' and the potential positive effects 'facilitators' of the chain.

There are considerable opportunities for European integration to impact citizens' preferences and how they vote, as well as both the ability and incentives for elites to implement particular policies and their likely outcomes; this can be seen as a more holistic, fine-grained model of how globalisation influences domestic mass politics (Hellwig, 2015, pp. 20-22). When shown in this light, none of these are inherently subversions of the chain of responsiveness. For instance, convergence may lead to a lack of choice, this may be counterbalanced by the platform given to new parties through European elections or through the mere existence of a new channel of political representation. It is also not clear that convergence is an issue if parties are still congruent with mass opinion. Anti-EU parties may offer a safety valve for political represent-

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[7]A wider argument could be made with a more complex model of representative democracy, such as in Kriesi et al. (2013, p. 58); the main argument can be made on the basis of Powell's simpler model.

ation, overall increasing people's political support; on the other hand, it may serve to deepen polity scepticism and lead to a 'spiral of distrust' or the polarisation of political discourse (Bischof & Wagner, 2019). In other words, almost all of the factors discussed are plausibly facilitators *and* subversions, depending on their 'knock-on' effects or how they refract through domestic political structures and discourses.

The devaluation of domestic politics, which may play a role in the first and third linkages, is the only one that seems inherently normatively and empirically problematic. If domestic politics is devalued to the extent that policy makers are not able to implement their programmes or influence outcomes to the extent they otherwise would (linkage three), citizen preferences may alter to disengagement from voting and towards general political apathy (linkage one) (Steiner, 2016). It is hard to see how this may increase political support at any point along the chain of responsiveness.

Additionally, pessimistic accounts of the effect of European integration overlook multiple aspects. Firstly, if the political support literature is considered, it is not just a product of input factors (indeed, evidence suggest output factors are equally if not more important). The EU's role in enhancing the output legitimacy of its member states, at least up until the Eurozone crisis, may have buoyed political support. Secondly, the criticisms often come from the perspective of Western Europe (though see Krastev, 2002) in which input factors not only likely matter more, but also where institutions are both representative, accountable and largely free of explicit corruption. This may increase the perceived cost of integration (De Vries, 2018). This is, unfortunately, not the case across Europe, and the European Union has played a significant role in democratisation. Indeed, the relationship between trust in the European Union and member state institutions is reversed in Eastern Europe precisely because the European Union is seen as a way of *strengthening* the member state institutions. This is not only in Eastern Europe, but also in Ireland, where the EU has been seen as a way of *obtaining* independence.

As I discuss in the following section, this requires being aware of and factoring in the role of domestic mediating factors which are not easily quantifiable, such as discourses surrounding integration (Scharpf, 2000). Though these effects have been framed as a negative, it is also quite possible that they can lead to positive effects on political support. As a result, I do not posit specific hypotheses until the empirical chapters themselves, where I develop the literature on each mechanism.

Theoretical Framework

Following this discussion, the overall theoretical framework for the thesis is presented in figure 3.3. European integration has direct and indirect consequences for domestic political systems; the former a direct result of manifestations of integration like European elections and politicisation of the Union, the latter the result of the Europeanisation of policy. Drawing on the political support literature already discussed in chapter 2, I have argued that this has plausible consequences for political support through the 'input' side of the equation. Namely, it limits the ability of parties to be responsive and for governments to translate public preferences into policy. At the same time, it structures citizens' preferences and voting behaviour through reinforcing domestic cleavages, introducing the EU as an issue, and facilitating the rise of minor and anti-EU parties. I did, however, argue that this account is overly-pessimistic, and may have heterogeneous effects depending on domestic factors and the relevance of output factors in determining support.

Figure 3.3: Overview of the theoretical framework for the thesis.

This is not meant to be an exhaustive framework of the determinants of political support, but is meant to outline the specific relationship between integration and support which have so far been discussed in the literature. Considering the range of possible determinants of support, it would be unwieldy to map out their various relationships, which is the purpose chapter 2 serves. I address, throughout the thesis, alternative explanations in the form of control variables or competing hypotheses.

An additional factor not yet discussed is the role of domestic factors which mediate these relationships. The variety and importance of these relationships varies depending on the specific mechanism under investigation. For instance, the relative importance of the development of anti-EU parties may depend on the electoral system in a given polity, since proportional systems with a low entry threshold may facilitate the emergence of anti-EU parties in the national political system. Similarly, a state's welfare system may mitigate the exacerbation of social divides (particularly economic) through effective redistribution. These are studied throughout the thesis when relevant.

Conclusion and Looking Forward

This chapter has laid out the broad theoretical framework that this thesis builds from. The thesis aims to understand the effect of European integration domestic mass politics. The proposed theoretical framework systematically outlines for the first time the *direct* and *indirect* pathways through which European integration can influence political support. Whilst some of these (such as EU issue voting) have been examined extensively in isolation, this thesis sees these factors as one component of a broader phenomenon.

Whilst numerous theoretical studies have highlighted the potential effects of European integration on political support for domestic political systems, they have not explained through which mechanisms this may operate - at least not systematically. This chapter firstly leveraged the Europeanisation literature to describe *how* European integration influences domestic politics, and then built on the political support literature developed in chapter 2 to explain why these pathways can influence political support. I explained that these can be mediated by domestic political factors, in particular dominant discourses surrounding processes of (European and global) integration. Moreover, I argued that scholars have previously been overly pessimistic regarding the effects of integration, and that the mechanisms may also *increase* political support - a factor seemingly not considered by previous accounts.

The analytical chapters which follow do not grapple with all of these potential pathways. In the first empirical chapter, I study the broad relationship between integration and political support. The intention of this chapter is to understand whether there is any statistical relationship between the two variables and how this varies across Europe. This offers the broadest possible test of the classic arguments about integration leading to a loss of political support. The next three chapters engage with three specific mechanisms: the embedding of domestic cleavages, the devaluing of domestic politics and policy con-

vergence. These have the broadest empirical support and academic interest in both the globalisation and European integration literatures. The chapters are described again in table 3.1.

It is important to be clear about the key assumptions this thesis makes. As noted in chapter 2, it assumes that political support is formed of both input and output factors, which individuals are aware of and evaluate rationally. Secondly, it understands that European integration has led to the Europeanisation of domestic politics, and that this has predictable effects on mass politics as outlined in this chapter. Finally, it works on the assumption that Europeanisation and globalisation are similar processes of denationalisation, and therefore work through similar mechanisms. In this respect, the thesis adopts the 'room to manoeuvre' theory from the globalisation literature and marries it with the Europeanisation and political support literatures.

Table 3.1: Thesis Overview

	Chapter 5: The Long-run Effects of European Integration	Chapter 6: Embedding of Domestic Cleavages	Chapter 7: Perceived Constraint and Political Support	Chapter 8: From Convergence to Congruence
Dependent variable	SWD	Political Trust/SWD	Political Trust/SWD	Incongruence
Independent variable(s)	Measures of European integration	Individual perceived European integration constraint	Measures of European integration	Measures of European integration
Mechanism	Overall	Reinforcing domestic cleavages	Devaluing domestic politics	Policy convergence
Contribution	European integration has led to lower SWD in nine European countries	Integration has a heterogeneous effect across educational levels, but evidence of wide-spread effect is weak	Those who perceived higher constraint had higher political support, even though economic interventions reduced support overall	There is limited evidence that integration has reduced public-elite congruence

Part II

Data and Methods

DATA, MEASUREMENT AND METHODS

ALL of the original research presented in this thesis is quantitative, combining individual-level survey data with country-level data encompassing economic performance, integration, elite-public congruence. The dominant methods of inference are regression-based, though I use a range of models and robustness tests. In this chapter, I address key issues regarding data, measurement, and methods that are central to the thesis. I start by discussing the measurement of political support and the data source and present time series data for the key variables. I then turn to two of the variables of interest: European integration, and how individuals perceive the degree of constraint between their domestic government and the EU. Finally, I discuss in broad terms the methods of inference used throughout. I go into more detail in the individual chapters regarding modelling and variable choice.

Measuring Political Support

In chapter 2, I conceptualised the key dependent variable of political support and defined it as support for the governing, political institutions. This is measured through largely cross-national surveys collected by respected survey companies. Although the use of surveys to measure citizen preferences is not uncontroversial, it is hard to imagine a more reliable source of information on citizens' preferences that could be generalised to populations, across countries and for a suitable amount of time. Moreover, as I will discuss, considerable research has explored the consistency of the measures of political

support which proves, perhaps surprisingly, positive.

One measure of support is political trust, as shown in figure 2.2. The measurement has been inconsistent. This is largely due to a theoretical debate about whether different institutions of the state are trusted independently of each other (Fisher, Van Heerde & Tucker, 2010) *or* whether political trust is reflective of a single view of the state (Almond & Verba, 1963; Marien, 2011; Hooghe, 2011; Zmerli & Hooghe, 2011). However, Marien (2011) provides strong evidence using the European Social Survey that political trust is a coherent attitude which is endowed upon all representative institutions of the state, whilst non-representative, law-enforcing institutions such as the police and courts are viewed at least partly separately (see also Schneider, 2016). Moreover, Marien shows how the concept has the same understanding across Europe, with the only difference being that those in new democracies do not distinguish between representative and law-enforcing institutions, consistent with Schneider (2016) who uses an alternative dataset. Notwithstanding the more general concerns about survey research, the concept is understood similarly across countries and different time periods. Because of the difference between representative and other institutions, I use only trust in a respondent's parliament.

The specific items used to measure political trust vary across surveys. The original, asked in the American National Election Study, is presented as: *'do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right?'*, although this was contested even in 1974 (Citrin, 1974). The Eurobarometer survey series provides a binary response to the question *'I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it'*. The European Social Survey asks: *'Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust'*. Although minor changes in questions and response categories can have significant effects on response patterns, recent evidence using all major cross-national surveys indicates that the they all detect similar trends, if not levels, in most countries (Valgarðsson & Devine, 2019).

The second indicator of political support I use is 'satisfaction with democracy' (SWD). Whilst the conceptual understanding of political trust is largely agreed upon and measurement differs, SWD suffers from the opposite problem: whilst the measurement is largely uniform in its formulation, there is warranted criticism over its use and what it is really measuring. One of the early contributions showed how the question was understood differently not

only across countries and time but also individuals (Canache, Mondak & Seligson, 2001). They also highlighted how it had been used to refer to incumbent authorities, as system support, or a summary measure of overall democratic performance, leading to problems with both construct and measurement validity. In the most recent large-scale contribution to the debate, Ferrin and Kriesi (2016) use European Social Survey 2012 data to study the reliability of the SWD measure. The ESS 2012 contains a significant range of questions relating to democratic beliefs which allows the authors to understand what people are considering when they respond to the SWD question. What they find is that respondents consider the 'liberal' elements of democracy when answering this question, which they operationalise as: equality before the law, checks and balances, media reliability, press freedom and protection of minorities. However, they find that it is nonetheless conditional on people's conceptions of democracy: those who have a 'thicker' conception of democracy are systematically less satisfied with how democracy works. This is encouraging insofar as it supports the conclusions of other research in the area which shows that those most demanding of democracy are least satisfied (Norris, 2011).

However, much of the quantitative literature is limited to either few data sources or small time periods. For instance, Ariely (2015) only use the World Values Study from 2000. In the most recent contribution to the literature, Valgarðsson and Devine (2019) assess the consistency of the SWD measure using a dataset of 86 countries and 992 country-years between 1973-2018, culminating in 2,208,734 respondents. They find that there is remarkably similar results across different datasets and time in trends, but that different surveys show different levels of SWD. There are also six countries in which trends differ to varying degrees: Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and the UK. However, they also show that these differences are decreasing over time.

Trends in Satisfaction with Democracy and Political Trust

Turning to the trends in these two items, I first use the Eurobarometer dataset as this is the dataset used in all chapters with the exception of chapter 7. The sample size, by country and year, is presented in figure 4.1, with the colour density indicating the sample size. First to note is the staggered adoption of the across countries, with a significant widening of the EB in 2004. Second is the over-representation of Germany, since I combine the samples for East and West Germany. Finally of note is the greater density of samples in the early 2000s, presumably due to the relatively close adoption of the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice.

Figure 4.1: Sample size by country-year

I aggregate these surveys into country-year observations and present the trends for satisfaction with democracy in figure 4.2 and trust in parliament in figure 4.3.

Trends for both vary between countries. The scenario of a declining level of trust or satisfaction is not borne out in either, supporting the argument that the 'legitimacy crisis' is not evidenced in survey data (van Ham et al., 2017). Nor is there evidence for the common alternative argument of 'trendless fluctuation' (Norris, 2011). Whilst some (France, Belgium) do display trendless fluctuations, others (Netherlands, Sweden) increase over time. The countries with declines are those heavily affected by the economic crisis from 2008 onwards, such as Cyprus, Greece and Spain.

Relationship between Satisfaction with Democracy and Trust

However, due to different time periods for trust and democratic satisfaction (since the former only begins in the late 1990s), it is difficult to visually ascertain how similar the trends are. Additionally, although many studies use democratic satisfaction and political trust as similar or interchangeable concepts, no studies have explored the veracity of these claims with the exception of Valgarðsson and Devine (2019), which is drawn from some of the research presented in this section. To determine the veracity of this argument, the analysis in this section combines most major national and cross-national datasets

Figure 4.2: Trends in Satisfaction with Democracy (Eurobarometer dataset)

which ask both 'satisfaction with democracy' and 'trust in parliament': the World Values Study, the European Values Study, the European Social Survey, the Eurobarometer, and 12 national election studies. I limit these to European Union countries.

In figure 4.4, I graph the average percentage of respondents satisfied with democracy (solid line) and trusting in their respective parliaments (dashed line) in each year across all datasets (i.e country-years). This is a more robust inspection of the trends and levels of the two measures and also guards against the possibility that the Eurobarometer is biased in some way. The figure highlights two features of the measures. Firstly, the overall levels of the measures are different, with trust being lower than satisfaction: in general, the data is consistent with a conceptual model in which trust is a more specific form of support and satisfaction is a more diffuse form of support, as argued in chapter 2. Secondly, however, the trends are very similar; in other words, the two time series trend together. There are some exceptions. During the 1990s and mid 2000s in Ireland, for instance, the two diverge, whilst in the UK they diverge from the 1990s onwards. In Denmark, the two begin to diverge in 2010, with trust falling but satisfaction rising. It is not entirely clear why this is

Graphs by country

Figure 4.3: Trends in Trust in Parliament (Eurobarometer dataset)

the case, and deserves to be the topic of future research.[1] These idiosyncratic differences aside, it is consistent with the Eurobarometer trends pointing to between-country variation and no clear overall pattern of decline.

To quantify this, I provide simple correlations between the two measures in table 4.1. These are separated by surveys and also pooled, and include the years available and numbers of observations. In total, there are 823,150 observations which contain both SWD and trust. There is variation in the correlation coefficient across the datasets, with the pooled correlation at 45%. The lowest is the WVS/EVS at 32% and the combined national election studies at 35%. The highest is the European Social Survey at 55%.

This variation is likely due to difference in question wordings and/or response categories. The WVS/EVS ask respondents how democracy 'is developing' in their country, whereas the others ask how democracy 'works'. At the very least, the former suggests an evaluation of the future rather than the present. Meanwhile, the European Social Survey asks respondents to indicate their satisfaction on an 11-point scale (from 0-10) ranging from 'extremely

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[1]I am exploring this topic in the working paper already cited, which has been presented at Elections, Public Opinion and Parties (EPOP) conference 2019 (Valgarðsson & Devine, 2019)

Figure 4.4: Trends in Trust in Parliament and Satisfaction with Democracy
(WVS, EVS, ESS, EB, NES, averaged)

dissatisfied' to 'extremely satisfied', rather than the more standard binary or
ordinal scale.

Echoing the conclusions from Valgarðsson and Devine (2019), using polit-
ical trust and satisfaction with democracy as indicators of a similar underly-
ing concept, at least empirically, is valid, with a few caveats. First, it should
be noted that if the interest is in cross-national *levels* then they are not direct
equivalents as trust is systematically lower than satisfaction, though this may
come out in the wash when going beyond descriptive analyses. The analyses
of trends, however, is viable. Second, some caution should be exercised around
individual countries, in this case Denmark, Ireland and the UK. However, the
relatively high correlation, predictive power of one on the other, and similar
descriptive trends provide confidence that in most circumstances in this thesis
they are measuring a similar underlying concept.

Table 4.1: Correlations for Political Trust and Satisfaction with Democracy across different datasets

Survey	Years	Obs	Correlation
WVS	1996-2000	5,889	32%
EVS	1999-2009	65,502	32%
ESS	2002-2016	206,428	55%
EB	2002-2017	527,880	40%
NES	1995-2015	17,451	35%
Pooled	1996-2017	823,150	43%

Measuring European Integration

In all chapters in this thesis, I use some measure aiming to capture levels of European integration. Measuring European integration is not straightforward nor easy. There are multiple issues. Substantively, one problem is that different measures of integration may warrant different interpretations. For instance, the growth of EU legislative output may differ from the growth in intra-EU trading. Similarly, what one means by European integration may differ: whether it is the Europeanisation of a particular policy area, the overall growth of supranational competences, the reliance on EU members for trade, and so on. Another issue from a more applied perspective is that different measures come with different time periods and country samples, which may lead to different conclusions. Although it is prosaic to say, the choice of measures has to come from the research question and with a robust justification.

To do so, I have organised different potential measures of European integration into a typology, presented in table 4.2. Inspired by the typology of measures of economic openness proposed by Gräbner, Heimberger, Kapeller and Springholz (2018), I have ordered these into *de jure*, *de facto*, and *proxy* measures. De jure measures refer to legal and institutional integration, what I also term *political* integration, whilst de facto refers to the actual economic or social integration of EU member states, which I term *economic* integration. Proxy measures are those which do not measure integration directly by quantifying legal, institutional or economic integration, but through some other means (such as length of time since joining the EU, which acts as a proxy for level of political and economic integration).

These are not mutually exclusive measures and political and economic integration reinforce each other, but I argue that this typology is a useful way of thinking about different measures of European integration. To my knowledge,

this is the first effort to categorise different measures of European integration and think systematically about their pros and cons; this is likely because of the only relatively recent appearance of many of these measures and the academic literature concerned with isolating the effect of European integration on mass politics.

Two caveats apply to this. The first is that I exclude some measures that are more concerned with specific policy areas (e.g Pollack, 1994; Thomson, 2011). I am interested here in overall measures of the Europeanisation of member states rather than the measurement of the Europeanisation of particular policy areas, and acknowledge that there are many more of the former. The second is that I do not consider measures that may act as instrumental variables (Gräbner et al., 2018). There are other factors to be considered in that case, such as exclusion criteria, that make a comprehensive coverage of potential instrumental variables unwieldy.

Table 4.2: A typology of different measures of European Integration

Type	Example	Source
De Jure	EU treaties; Expert surveys; Legislative output	Börzel (2005), Hooghe and Marks (2003), Schimmelfennig, Leuffen and Rittberger (2015), Nanou, Zapryanova and Toth (2017), Toshkov (2013)
De Facto	Trade flows	König and Ohr (2013)
Proxy	Time in EU; Eurozone membership; Schengen zone	Hix (2003), Quaranta and Martini (2016), Dluhosch, Horgos and Zimmermann (2016), Armingeon and Ceka (2013), Vowles and Xezonakis (2016)

Throughout the thesis I take advantage of the range of measures depending on data suitability. In chapters 5, 6 and 8 I use the measure from Nanou, Zapryanova and Toth (2017). This is based on an expert survey on the Europeanisation of certain policy areas which the authors combine into an overall measure of the level of Europeanisation of domestic policy. This new dataset has numerous benefits over its predecessors. The first is that other similar measures rely on analysis of existing (or expected) treaties which limit the over-time variation. The dataset provided by Nanou et al. (2017) is in five year intervals, providing more over-time variation. Secondly, because previous analyses have

relied on treaties, they can not include anything which occurs beyond treaty legislation despite the EU regulation beyond explicit treaty powers (e.g Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2011). Thirdly, Nanou et al. (2017) provide extensive validity checks of the measure and show that it is correlated with other existing measures. Thus, the combination of variation over time, taking into account both treaty and secondary legislation, and consistency with previous measures make this measure preferable to the others. The limitation, aside from the issue with expert surveys in general, is that it does not vary between countries.

Table 4.3: Summary statistics for measures of European integration

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	Years
EU Index (14)	55.721	7.864	33.095	77.325	1999-2012
EU Index (24)	56.758	7.506	36.202	75.298	2004-2012
Integration (Expert)	4.8	1.289	2.64	6.44	1970-2014
Regulations	1610.738	630.093	281	3086	1970-2012
Directives	83.604	26.651	14	151	1970-2012
Decisions	586.883	164.355	148	858	1970-2012

In chapters 6, 7 and 8, I also use a measure of economic integration. The EU Index (König & Ohr, 2013) consists of numerous sub indicators relating to trade, labour migration, the importance of the EU to the national economy, how homogeneous the EU is, and how closely related the country is to European trends. It also has some political and legal indicators for EMU and Schengen membership and infringement proceedings, but the bulk of the measure is economic (the political-legal aspects are weighted 22% in the measure). The measure comes in two forms: one for the old EU-15, and one for the EU-25. There are no alternative measures for economic integration. Whilst this measure does vary between countries, the time period is limited to between 1999 and 2012 (for the EU15), or 2004 and 2012 (for EU25). I make more use of the former measure than the latter due to the extra available years. Although they are called the EU15/25 indices, they contain 14/24 countries; the index excludes Switzerland.

In chapters 6 and 8, I also provide additional analysis using a measure of the EU's legislative output which I draw from Toshkov (2013). This consists of regulations, directives and decisions which are scraped from EURLEX, the complete dataset containing over 100,000 legal acts.[2] The time period extends from 1970 to 2012. The reason this is not adopted throughout is that the other measures are cumulative within each year, whereas this measure only measures legislative output in a given year which, whilst useful, may not capture

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[2]Full details are available on Dr Toshkov's website, <http://www.dimiter.eu/Data.html>

the cumulative effects of integration.

In chapter 7 I use two proxy measures. This is due to the analysis being based on two cross-sectional survey waves and also to maintain comparability with previous research. For these, I use the length of time a country has been in the EU and a dummy variable capturing whether the EU is a member of the Eurozone. Summary statistics are presented in table 4.3 for the main independent variables discussed, not including the proxy variables.[3]

Descriptive graphs for the time series are presented in figures 4.5 to 4.8. The EU Index is presented in figures 4.5 and 4.6 and are separated by country to show their between country variation; the expert survey of integration is presented in figure 4.7; and a measure of legislative output is presented in figure 4.8 which does not vary between country but only over time. All measures show a general increase in integration, though the number of regulations peaked in the late 1990s and have been decreasing since. On average, directives and decisions have been increasing over time with fewer directives at the end of the time series. Whilst collectively they show that economic and political integration has been increasing, legislative output presents more variation and no clear trend.

Worth emphasising is that like measures of economic openness in general, there is no substantive or statistical reason to expect that these will lead to the same conclusions or warrant the same interpretations (Gräbner et al., 2018). Conclusions may be different due to the different sources of variation (time and country), the substantively different measurements (economic versus legal or political), and the different trends. Most importantly, finding that economic integration has different effects to political integration suggests different mechanisms at work.

As described in the final row of table 4.2, numerous proxy measures have been used in the literature and which are more common than direct measure of integration. Whilst these are all well-justified in their contexts, the problem is that many of them cannot really claim to measure integration per se. For instance, Hix (2003) includes multiple measures such as how long the single market has existed, a dummy variable for whether a state is an EU member, and a trend beginning at the founding of the EU. Dluhosch, Horgos and Zimmermann (2016) include variables such as size of the EU population, how many kilometres it covers, and its GDP. But these are less precise measures of integration which may also be measuring other phenomena.

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[3]The descriptive statistics for these are presented in the chapter.

Figure 4.5: EU Index 24 by Country

Measuring Perceived Constraint

In chapter 7, I test the mechanism that integration reduces political support through devaluing domestic politics. I do this by using a measure for the first time of 'perceived constraint' - the extent to which an individual believes the EU constrains the range of policy room to manoeuvre. There has, to my knowledge, been no methodological discussion on what measuring perceived constraint entails, despite its relatively widespread usage within public opinion research over the last five years, and in the two decades before that within work on globalisation (Hellwig, 2015). One reason for this is that little literature actually addresses the problem on an individual level. The primary aim of this section is to outline the attempts made so far and then defend the way it is measured within this thesis.

Unsurprisingly considering the little general academic attention, few attempts have been made to measure it with specific regard to the European Union and its member states, and those which have are recent. Multiple attempts have been made, however, to measure the perceived constraint with regard to globalisation through public opinion surveys in the US and West-

Figure 4.6: EU Index 14 by Country

ern Europe, as well as Australia and New Zealand. These have been commissioned by individual researchers as well as embedded in national election studies. The first attempt was the French election of 1997, in which the following question was asked:

> 'in your opinion, does globalization still leave the French government with a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or hardly any room to maneuver in the economy?'

Whilst this question is perhaps the most direct, it is problematic. The first is that the question wording is likely quite hard to understand; there is evidence, at the very least, that people do not really understand what globalisation means (Hellwig, 2015), and it is unlikely that 'room to manoeuvre' is going to be understood the same way by everyone, if at all. Perhaps due to this, a question fielded soon after in the UK 2001 General Election to get at the problem was considerably different, rather asking about the 'influence' governments have:

> 'In today's worldwide economy, how much influence do you think the British have on Britain's economy?'

Figure 4.7: Integration Expert Survey

This question aims to understand the degree of influence that respondents think their government has in the face of the 'worldwide economy', thereby sidestepping the problematic and confusing language fielded in the French elections. However, it is not clear whether the problem of influence is similar to being *constrained* by any given phenomenon; in other words, it is quite possible to believe that there is little influence yet this is not a matter of being constrained. A survey was commissioned in ten countries to gauge the impact of globalisation on voting with the following question wording:

> 'In your opinion, does globalization leave [country's] government with a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or hardly any ability to choose its own economic policies?'

Unfortunately, this does not solve the problem of potential confusion over the meaning of globalisation, yet it is the closest to an appropriate measure. Following a different route, Kosmidis (2018) designed a survey experiment to gauge the effect of the room to manoeuvre on the economic vote in Greece. The respondents which were given the 'no room to manoeuvre' scenario were primed with the question wording:

70

Figure 4.8: European Union Legislative Output

'Four years after the bail-out agreement, the elected Greek govern-
ment cannot design or implement policy without consent from the
lenders. What do you think about the future of the national eco-
nomy?'

This question excellently primes the room to manoeuvre for respondents
as well as providing the source of the constraint. Unfortunately for this partic-
ular project, it is limited to lenders, which includes the EU but also potentially
other bodies, such as the IMF. Indeed, in the case of the current study, this
formulation would approximate the most appropriate, direct measure of the
concept this thesis is addressing. This is because it addresses the phenomenon
and causally links that phenomenon to more or less ability to choose amongst
policy options.

In recent years, similar questions have been run with respect to the European
Union in the Belgian Election Study (2019) and Comparative Electoral Dynam-
ics survey (2014). In the Comparative Electoral Dynamics survey, the following
question was fielded in seven countries:

Most of the important decisions in [country] are imposed by the

European Union.

In which respondents could answer on a scale from 0 (fully disagree) to 10 (fully agree). However, the survey does not ask about trust, satisfaction with democracy, or confidence, so cannot be used for this thesis. In addition, the word 'imposed' is potentially problematic given the negative connotations.

The Belgian Election Study (2019) contains multiple questions on this topic.[4] Most relevantly, the survey fielded the question:

> To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? "The European Union gives enough leeway to the Belgian Government in the economic field"

With an ordinal response scale of five categories from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree) including a middle category of neither agree nor disagree (3). Whilst not being free of problems of interpretation - such as 'leeway', or the 'economic field', or being open to acquiescence bias - it is the most direct way of probing this attitude that is currently being fielded, but is limited to just one country.

In the absence of such a direct measure cross-nationally, this thesis will use relative responsibility attributions for policy between the EU and its member states as the explanatory variable at the individual level. As Hellwig, Ringsmuth and Freeman (2008, p. 857) argue, 'causal attribution is the key to understanding how citizens perceive their government's room to manoeuvre'. Following this, responsibility attributions are at least plausibly linked to government capacity to act (Powell & Whitten, 1993; Larsen, 2018). In other words, it is plausible and intuitive that people may hold the respective level of government accountable whom they perceive to have most capacity in that given area. In which case, the relative responsibility attribution - whether people hold the EU or domestic government more responsible - is currently the most appropriate measure for the concept of political autonomy vis-a-vis the European Union.

This is consistent with similar research. As the argument goes, if citizens perceive the reduced room to manoeuvre due to international or supranational forces, they therefore shift blame from domestic forces to international ones (Alcañiz & Hellwig, 2011; Hellwig, 2014; Murphy, 2017; Duch & Stevenson, 2008). As Kosmidis (2014, p. 1339) argues directly, 'voters are less likely to hold a government accountable when they think that governments have limited room to manoeuvre the national economy'. Similarly, in countries with

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[4]I sincerely thank Dr Cal Le Gall at UC Louvain for providing me with access to the data and for fielding the questions.

weaker state capacity and where the private sector or IMF have larger degrees of control over policy, responsibility is likewise shifted to them, exonerating domestic politicians (Alcañiz & Hellwig, 2011). In other words, situations in which the government has less capacity they are also provided with less responsibility.

This relationship has been shown experimentally by Kosmidis (2018, p. 7), who assigned respondents to scenarios where the Greek government had room to manoeuvre and did not, and this altered their responsibility attributions from the national government to financial lenders, significant at the 1% level, controlling for demographics and political preferences. Additionally, the Belgian Election Study 2019 contains both a direct question as described above and responsibility attributions, with the direct question directly preceding the question on responsibility attributions. This therefore mirrors closely the experimental set up of Kosmidis (2018). The correlation coefficient between responsibility attributions and whether the respondent (dis)agrees that the EU gives the Belgian government 'enough leeway' is -0.33, indicating that as national responsibility increases, perceived leeway decreases. This is significant at the p < 0.000 level.

The use of relative responsibility is therefore conceptually close and empirically related to constraint and moreover, it avoids the problem of potentially confusing language which is prevalent in the direct questions covered. It is important to note that this means that it does not need to be related to objective integration, but rather can be constructed by elites in order to shift the costs of governing to unaccountable actors, as noted in the previous chapter (Hay & Rosamond, 2002; Hay & Smith, 2005; Schlipphak & Treib, 2017).

The specific measure used is found in the European Election Studies 2009 and 2014 (van Egmond, Brug, Hobolt, Franklin & Sapir, 2013; Schmitt, Hobolt, Popa & Teperoglou, 2016). Whilst there are differences between the two datasets which will be developed within the empirical chapter, the basic structure of the question is as below, which is how the question was presented to British respondents:

> Now I would like to ask you some questions about how much responsibility the British government and the European Union have for some of the things going on in Britain. Of course, you may think that neither is responsible.
>
> First, thinking about the economy, how responsible is the British government for economic conditions in Britain? Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0

means "no responsibility" and 10 means "full responsibility".

> And what about the European Union, how responsible is the EU for economic conditions in Britain?

As indicated in the question, respondents can rank their responsibility attribution on a 0-10 scale. In 2009, respondents answer this question for five policy areas: the economy, interest rates, health care, immigration and climate change. In 2014, it is restricted just to the economy. In 2009, this results in responsibility attributions for the EU and the domestic government in five different policy areas for a total of ten variables, distributed on a response scale of 0-10, whilst in 2014 there is just two variables from one policy area on a 1-11 scale.

It is important to also obtain the relative responsibility attribution. In other words, what matters is not the absolute degree of responsibility but whether an individual believes that the European Union is more or less responsible than their domestic government (Hobolt & Tilley, 2014b; Wilson & Hobolt, 2015). To obtain this relative responsibility, the European and domestic responsibility variables are subtracted from each other in each policy area, which results in a variable on a continuum from the entirely domestic responsibility (a value of -10) to entirely European responsibility (a value of 10). In reality, in 2009 72% of observations fall within +/- 3 of the mean value.[5] At the upper end of the scale (5+), there are just 1.3% of observations. Because of this, I follow Lobo and Lewis-Beck (2012) and dichotomise the variable to equal 1 if the EU is seen as more responsible than the domestic state and 0 if the domestic state is equal or more responsible than the EU.[6] This leads to 82% of respondents answering 0 (domestic government more or equally responsible) and 18% answering 1 (EU more responsible) in both 2009 and 2014. This division - where 0 includes *equally* responsible - is also a conservative test for the hypothesis.

Despite the conceptual closeness of responsibility attributions to autonomy, their use poses theoretical and empirical problems. For one, responsibility attributions are in part a product of the real distribution of responsibility but also perceptual screens (Hobolt & Tilley, 2014a). This can be a result of, for instance, one's position on the European Union, evaluations of the given policy area, and partisanship. For instance, if an individual believes performance in the economy has been poor, they are likely to blame this on the European

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[5]The mean value is interesting in itself, since it is 0. This means that most people see the domestic and EU levels as equally responsible - or more likely don't know or simply have one level of responsibility

[6]This is largely a statistical reason, namely, there were many empty cells otherwise. However, it made little difference to results.

Union if they are already negative towards it (and vice versa for the domestic government). Whilst the initial position of this thesis is that the distribution of responsibility attribution is important for political support independent of this, I address this empirically in chapter 7. The results show that the measure is conceptually and empirically robust to these potential confounders.

Control Variables

I discuss in greater length in each chapter the motivation for the control variables. In this section, however, I provide brief details for the control variables used at the country level. In chapters 5, 6 and 8 I rely on the same control variables at the country level. In table 4.4 I present a description and source of the variables. As far as the political science literature goes, these are un-controversial controls aimed to capture economic conditions and, in the case of chapter 8, other qualities of government (effective number of parties and corruption). Chapter 7 departs again from this to maintain consistency with previous research and because the analysis is cross-sectional.

Table 4.4: Country control variables used in the thesis

Variable	Description	Source (link)	Thesis Chapter
GDP	Gross domestic product year-on-year growth (%)	OECD	5, 6, 8
Inflation	Consumer price index year-on-year change (%)	OECD and IMF	5, 6, 8
Unemployment	Unemployed people share of the labour force (%)	European Commission	5, 6, 8
KOF Index	An index of social, political and economic globalisation	Dreher (2006)	5, 6, 8
ENEP	Effective number of electoral parties; the 'hypothetical equal size parties'	Laakso and Taagepera (1979), sourced from Election Indices Dataset	8
Corruption	VDem's political corruption index (v2x$_c$orr)	Codebook available here	8
Interest rates	Long-term interest rates on 10-year government debt securities	ECB	7
Time as democracy	Count of years until 2007 and after 1945 when the Polity IV autocracy/democracy index [polity2] was > 0 for an uninterrupted period.	Polity IV Project	7
Time in EU	Continuous variable indicating the years a country has been a member of the EU	Author's own	7
Eurozone	Whether country is a EZ member (1) or not (0)	Author's own	7

Methods and Inference

All of the analyses in this thesis are based on a frequentist regression approach. The core assumption behind this approach is that, controlling for some theoretically related covariates z, we can identify the causal effect of our effect of interest x on our outcome y. This is difficult even with rather straightforward questions, let alone phenomena which have complex causes and are over a long period of time like the one posed in this thesis. This theoretical problem - of controlling for all potential confounders z between x and y - is compounded by identifying and conducting the correct statistical estimation to isolate the parameter.

Although there are creative research designs which, for instance, take advantage of the expansion of the European Union to isolate the effect of integration (e.g Ward et al., 2015), these do not entirely overcome the problems of omitted variables nor do they provide evidence for a particular mechanism. In this thesis, I am careful to make claims consistent with the strength of the evidence, and adopt multiple strategies to assess the robustness of the analyses. Taken altogether, the thesis builds a 'multifaceted pattern of evidence' (Keele, 2015, p. 327) about the broader research question and underlying mechanisms.[7]

The first and most basic strategy follows the core assumption of regression approaches by carefully controlling for confounders z, either through explicitly including variables (for instance, measures of unemployment) or statistical procedures (like estimating a random slope). These are selected based on previous literature and my own testing of interaction effects, model fit and so on. A related but under-utilised strategy is the inspection of post-estimation residuals. This helps identify poor model fit, potentially influential observations which skew the coefficients, and other often hidden problems with regression-based methods.

Secondly, in addition to the 'vanilla' regressions which involve controlling for z in observational settings, where possible I draw on original quasi-experimental methods. These isolate particular effects which the theory and literature has a clear prediction for and which, if disproved, would weaken the argument. For instance, in chapter 7 I take advantage of an unexpected event during survey fieldwork to study the effect of economic interventions on political trust.

Throughout the thesis, I conduct a large range of auxiliary analyses. These involve robustness checks, sub-group analysis and placebo tests. Collectively,

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[7]Much of the language used in this section is drawn from a class on causal inference taught by Dr Andrew Eggers at the Oxford Spring School in Advanced Research Methods. Aspects of this are available on his website, <http://andy.egge.rs/teaching.html>

these inform us about the robustness of the core results to a range of decisions, the mechanisms underlying the effect, and broader implications. More specifically, robustness tests repeat the core analysis with various aspects altered to satisfy concerns about the core analysis. These include alternating measures, changing the regression specifications, and including or excluding control variables. As will be discussed, this is particularly important in chapter 5 and 6, where I present coefficients across dozens of models for the analyses and show how they vary in important and interesting ways.

Sub-group analysis is another form of auxiliary analysis. This involves testing for heterogeneous effects of the main variable of interest on particular sections of the sample (for instance, countries or demographics). This has two benefits: first, we learn more about the effect of interest, since there may be interesting variation across demographics; second, if theory predicts different effects amongst different sub-groups, it helps ascertain how accurate the theory is. This is used directly in chapter 6 for substantive and theoretical reasons.

Finally, placebo tests are a type of analysis which varies the main analysis but changes the outcome, treatment or sample which should nullify the core finding. For instance, in chapter 7 I specify the date of economic intervention to parts of the sample which could not in reality be affected by the intervention to show that it is only the date on which the intervention actually occurred for which there was an effect. I also change the dependent variable in the same analysis to one which there is no theoretical link to the intervention.

Altogether, these tests probe the plausibility of the hypotheses and theoretical predictions but cannot conclusively prove it. It adds to the evidence in favour or against the theoretical arguments already outlined in the thesis, and aims to do so as rigorously and transparently as possible.

Part III

Political Support in the European Union

THE LONG-RUN EFFECTS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: A PANEL ANALYSIS

"The conclusion seems inevitable, therefore, that the democratic autonomy of political decisions is progressively weakened as more and more decisional powers are transferred from national to European level [. . .] The result would [. . .] be general political disaffection and alienation" (Scharpf, 1996)

Introduction

Throughout the theoretical literature, there are bold claims about the effect of European integration on political support. It has been argued that the loss of autonomy incurred through integration has led to a reduced capacity of government and 'profound disaffection with democratic institutions' (DeBardeleben & Hurrelmann, 2007); that as decision-making powers have shifted from national to supranational levels, 'general political disaffection and alienation' ensues (Scharpf, 1996, 1999); and that it forces people to question the 'centrality, relevance and sheer necessity' of democratic institutions (Mair, 2013). Thus, the theoretical argument stipulated is that European integration is causally linked to a loss of support for domestic, governing, democratic institutions. In the theoretical framework, I fleshed out the mechanisms linking greater integration with political support. This chapter, however, asks whether these statements are empirically supported at the broadest level with a rigorous empirical analysis.

To do so, this chapter conducts a panel analysis on the nine countries which have been in the European Union the longest, with data beginning in 1973 when consistent data collection begins. This captures the countries most exposed to the effects of the institutional development of the EU overtime.

The results indicate that there is some support for these concerns: integration has a negative impact on democratic satisfaction, controlling for economic conditions and the passage of time. However, further analysis using a new method designed for inference in panel settings - sequential g-estimation (Acharya, Blackwell & Sen, 2016) - shows that this effect is highly mediated by domestic (economic) conditions. In other words, whilst there is an overall negative effect, this may work through a number of mediating factors which make this negative effect highly conditional. Needless to say, the relationship is more contingent than the direct, inevitable relationship that is suggested by the literature.

This analysis provides a number of significant substantive and methodological contributions to the literature. Substantively, it addresses long-standing theoretical concerns with a robust and rigorous empirical analysis. Whilst there have been a number of theoretical claims, they have until now been without clear empirical basis. This chapter provides such a basis. It also contributes to the debate on the domestic effects of globalisation. Whilst the theoretical framework often used expects similar effects as European integration, the results show that globalisation has the *opposite* effect.

The chapter makes methodological improvements on previous literature. All but one previous analysis relies on cross-sectional data, which is insufficient to draw confident conclusions. By improving the quality of the data, the analysis is able to use a range of panel methods uniquely placed to yield insights into the long-term, complex relationships the chapter is interested in, including some methods recently developed and not used before.

This chapter first discusses the existing literature that addresses this question. It then moves onto the data and methods, before presenting the results and robustness tests. In the concluding section, I discuss at greater length the relevance and contributions of the chapter and the future intended research on the topic.

Existing Literature

The impact of international and supranational governance on domestic politics has long garnered scholarly interest. Gourevitch (1978) described this as the 'second-image reversed', but even before that, the seminal Easton (1965,

p. 110) noted the role of the 'extra-societal environment' (i.e, international) in shaping the inputs of a domestic political system. Despite this, there is still little empirical work relating to the influence of the international system on mass political attitudes and in particular regarding European integration (Gall, 2017; Vowles & Xezonakis, 2016), with most focusing on institutions and policy outputs rather than citizens (Hellwig, 2015; Anderson, 2002). Central to the theoretical story and key research question outlined in the theory chapter and the introduction, however, are two questions. First, *whether* European integration has led to a decline in political support; and secondly, *through which mechanisms* has it (not) done so?

This chapter addresses the first question directly: has European integration led to a decline in political support? Existing empirical evidence is sparse. Vowles and Xezonakis (2016) find that one of the few stable findings regarding the effects of integration - either global or European - is that being in the European Union depresses citizen efficacy, perceptions of government agency, and satisfaction with democracy. Dluhosch et al. (2016) provide a panel analysis of the six founding countries from 1978 to 2004 using Eurobarometer data. As an indicator of European integration, they rely on multiple proxies: the overall population of the EU, the space (in kilometres) it occupies, the number of countries, the GDP, and GDP per capita. Controlling for economic conditions and the reunification of Germany, they find that integration exerts a statistically significant negative impact on satisfaction with democracy in the six founding countries.

Other studies use European membership, in a variety of forms, as control variables in analyses primarily interested in other relationships. Armingeon and Ceka (2013), for instance, show that the length of time in the EU (in other words, a continuous variable for the years in which a country was a member) reduces political trust, even controlling for time. This means that the more established, founding members, have experienced a reduction in trust compared to newer members; it does not necessarily mean that integration has led to a reduction in political support. Other research confined to the economic crisis has found that more closely integrated members experienced a greater reduction in support than less integrated members, which provides tangential support (Polavieja, 2013; Ruiz-Rufino & Alonso, 2017).

A range of data and methods have been used to study the topic. However, all except one do not use data or methods suitable for the type of inferences we are interested in. For instance, of the above studies, only one uses panel data or methods to understand the effects over time (Dluhosch et al., 2016). The remaining papers rely on cross-sectional data. The problem with this approach is

that it compares the existing situation of one country to another. For instance, Vowles and Xezonakis (2016) use a binary variable for whether a country is in the European Union or not as a measure of European integration. This means that the coefficients indicates that, holding other variables constant, political support is lower in the EU than outside of it. Whilst potentially highlighting the depressing effect of integration, such a conclusion would be premature. Whilst the book is an excellent contribution, it is necessarily limited by data and methods.

Whilst Dluhosch et al. (2016) provide a solution to this through the use of panel methods, their analysis comes with some concerns. Substantively, it is not clear whether their proxies adequately capture European integration (as opposed to enlargement or time), and there is no depiction or interpretation of the effect size of their coefficients. Statistically, there is little in the way of sensitivity analysis, which is crucial for time-series-cross-sectional or panel methods. Their analysis therefore provides a useful starting point rather than a robust conclusion. As a result, there are no existing analyses which appropriately identify variables for European integration nor apply appropriate methods rigorously.

This leaves the theoretical claims that European integration has an effect on political support without robust evidence. This is not a minor problem. As noted, these concerns extend from at least Gourevitch (1978). In contemporary Europe, it has become commonplace to hear 'Europe' mentioned in discussions of the rise of populism, of a democratic malaise, or of the failure of domestic governments to live up to election mandates (Clifton, 2014; Laffan, 2014; Mair, 2013; Sánchez-Cuenca, 2017). This has been in a void of clear, long-term evidence. In the remainder of this chapter, I aim to fill this void.

Data and Methods

As outlined in chapter 4, I use the Eurobarometer survey data set, which contains data from 1973 to 2017, and is the longest-running survey data available in Europe. In this chapter, I use only satisfaction with democracy (SWD) as a measure of political support. This is because SWD and trust are not available for the same length of time. Whilst SWD is available from 1973 to 2017, trust is only available 1997-2017. An overview of the availability of these variables is presented in table 5.1. The extensiveness of this dataset - with a combined sample size of over two million - is the largest data set used to study political support to date (see also Martini & Quaranta, 2020; van Ham et al., 2017)

.[1] However, for the panel analysis, these are aggregated to the mean value by country-year.[2] In other words, the dependent variable is the percentage of respondents satisfied with democracy in each given country and year.

Table 5.1: Overview of dependent variable availability

Variable	Years	Waves	N
Democratic satisfaction	1973-2017	75	1,198,252
Trust in Parliament	1997-2017	38	870,614

The main independent variable is the expert survey measure of integration graphed in figure 4.7 (Nanou et al., 2017). As discussed in chapter 4, this has numerous benefits over measures used in existing research. The first is that it is intended to directly measure integration rather than act as a proxy that potentially picks up other trends (such as GDP growth). The second is that it contains variation between treaties, which previously used measures based on treaty readings do not (Nanou & Dorussen, 2013; Börzel, 2005). Finally, it also exists over a long period of time, unlike the EU Index that is used elsewhere in this thesis. Nonetheless, I also test the models on the measures of legal output (Toshkov, 2013), which represent the number of European regulations, directives and decisions. The downside of this measure is that it is not cumulative, and thus really measures the effect of a given level of output in each year rather than the cumulated effect.

I use a number of control variables to capture economic changes over time, as well as a measure of globalisation. The economic variables (GDP, unemployment and inflation) are used in order to assess the argument that support is driven by economic performance (output legitimacy), whilst the globalisation indicator (KOF index) is used to enable me to draw comparisons between the effects of European and global integration. Summary statistics for these variables are shown in table 5.2. This presentation separates the variance of the variables to overall, the variance between the countries, and the variance within countries. It also shows the number of country-years (N), panels (n) and years (T). This is to show that the independent variable - integration - has no between variation (i.e, all countries have the same values in each year). It also shows that across all variables, there is more variation within countries than there are between them, except for satisfaction with democracy.

The analysis uses panel methods. Panel analysis is a method in which each country (panel) is treated as a time series, and is used to study variables over time. The data structure is described in table 5.3. One important aspect is that

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[1] I thank the team at GESIS, Cologne, for making the assembling of this data much quicker.
[2] I do not apply weights at any stage of the process.

Table 5.2: Panel summary statistics

Variable	Panel	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs
SWD	Overall	0.62	0.17	0.12	0.94	N = 369
	Between		0.15	0.30	0.80	n = 9
	Within		0.09	0.27	0.88	T = 41
Integration	Overall	4.92	1.22	2.86	6.44	N = 378
	Between		0.00	4.92	4.92	n = 9
	Within		1.22	2.86	6.44	T = 42
GDP	Overall	2.54	2.77	-6.57	25.56	N = 405
	Between		1.12	1.70	5.06	n = 9
	Within		2.56	-7.75	23.04	T = 45
Unemployment	Overall	7.13	3.06	0.00	16.80	N = 405
	Between		2.08	3.08	10.48	n = 9
	Within		2.35	0.85	13.45	T = 45
Inflation	Overall	4.32	4.42	-4.48	24.21	N = 405
	Between		1.31	2.56	6.53	n = 9
	Within		4.25	-5.80	23.14	T = 45
Globalisation	Overall	79.68	6.39	63.02	90.67	N = 387
	Between		3.37	73.40	84.30	n = 9
	Within		5.54	66.19	88.87	T = 43

each country has an observation for each year. For this analysis, I also keep a 'balanced' dataset, in which there are the same number of time periods for each panel, thus restricting the analysis to the nine countries in the dataset from the start of the time series. By doing this, the analysis also provides estimates for the countries in the EU longest, and therefore most likely to experience the type of effects the theory posits.

Over the last two years, there has been a proliferation of methodological innovations in political science on dealing with this type of data (e.g Athey, Bayati, Imbens & Qu, 2019; Athey & Imbens, 2018; Imai & Kim, 2019; Plümper & Troeger, 2019; Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo & Robinson, 2019; Blackwell & Glynn, 2017; Xu, 2017). This is an acknowledgement of the usefulness of the data structure in yielding new insights, but also that it is a type of analysis plagued by statistical pitfalls. As Wilson and Butler (2007) write, 'findings from the TSCS [time series cross sectional studies] [...] can only be regarded as frail [...] Findings that we designate as nonrobust may prove to be correct, and findings that appear solid my, in fact, be all wrong [...] [A]nalysts [should be] wary of many of the published works in this area'.

The problems arise from two main camps: the first is the specification of the dynamics and difficulties of time; the second is dealing with the problem of

Table 5.3: Format of time-series-cross-sectional data

Country	Year
…	…
UK	2002
UK	2003
UK	2004
…	…
Germany	2002
Germany	2003
Germany	2004
…	…

causal inference. These have tended to attract different solutions and scholars with different focuses. For instance, Acemoglu et al. (2019) rely on solutions for the issue of causal inference but in doing so opts for a method which is problematic from a time series perspective. But the core of the problem is a common one: the struggle between omitted variable bias (leaving out a necessary control) and post-treatment bias (including a control that causally follows the independent variable) (Acharya et al., 2016).[3]

In the analysis that follows, I focus on dealing with issue of time. This is because my main interest is in understanding the over-time effect of integration rather than isolating a particular causal quantity. This is not say that this is not important - clearly, one would ideally like both - but only that, at the current state of scholarship, one must also side with one of the methods. To provide confidence in the results, I conduct a range of robustness tests, including a recent method which deals with post-treatment bias (Acharya et al., 2016). In future research, I hope to extend these models to include recent innovations in the causal inference of panel methods previously cited.

Overall, the chosen models reflect the suggestions of Plümper, Troeger and Manow (2005). These models are essentially distributed lag models (DL1).[4] I deal with the serial correlation of errors through a Prais-Winsten transformation, and include lagged values of the control variables.[5] The lag lengths of the independent variables are determined empirically through the AIC and BIC criteria using the *varsoc* Stata command. The dynamics are different for each country. The optimal lag length chosen is the one which is applicable to

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[3]See Imai and Kim (2019) for a full discussion of the issues of panel data and a proposal for a new method.

[4]The general formula for a DL(1) model is $Y_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_t + \beta_2 X_{t-1} + \epsilon_{j,t}$, which makes the model presented identical to this formulation with corrections on the error term

[5]Essentially applying an AR(1) trend to the errors and modelling through generalised least squares or maximum likelihood rather than OLS.

most countries. However, conveniently, the majority for all variables is a lag of one (i.e x_{t-1}) except for unemployment, which is a lag of two (x_{t-2}). Collectively, these deal with the correlation of errors and the effect of prior economic conditions and globalisation.

There are two common alternative choices: fixed-effects models and lagged dependent variable (LDV) models. Two-way fixed effects models (i.e fixed country and year effects) are the most common method, but these are problematic in the presence of dynamic misspecification and increase bias if there are long-run effects (Plümper & Troeger, 2019). In addition, they are also problematic if explanatory variables are slow-changing (Beck & Katz, 2001). To deal with dynamics, others may use lagged dependent variables (e.g Acemoglu et al., 2019). But with serially correlated errors, this provides inconsistent estimates (Beck & Katz, 2011) and substantively, as Plümper et al. (2005) put it, 'absorb[s] large parts of the trend without explaining it'. There is also a debate about the application of lagged dependent variable (LDV) models with stationary data (e.g De Boef & Keele, 2008; Lebo & Kraft, 2017). This discussion also highlights the trade-off between dealing with time and approaching causal estimates.

Given the empirical problems posed by panel methods and the theoretical uncertainty behind the aggregate dynamics of political support, I carry out a significant range of robustness tests. These include models from a standard pooled OLS model through to multilevel models with a random slope on integration to allow the effect to vary between countries rather than imposing a standardised coefficient. The presented model is chosen since it does not deviate significantly from the more advanced models but is easier to interpret, and imposes more conservative and realistic empirical assumptions than the simpler models. Alongside different model specifications in appendix A, I also show the effect of removing each country individually (essentially running a regression with each country combination, minus one) and residual analysis.

The general model fitted is thus:

$$SWD_{j,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 integration_{j,t} + \beta_2 integration_{j,t-1} + \beta_3 X_{j,t} + \beta_4 X_{j,t-n} + \epsilon_{j,t}$$

Results

The results of this analysis are reported in table 5.4 in three models. The first column shows the model with just the integration variable as a predictor. The second introduces the economic variables of GDP, unemployment and infla-

tion along with the globalisation indicator and a year trend, without any lags. Finally, the third column includes the lags of these variables with year included as a trend. To recap, the dependent variable is the percentage of respondents satisfied with democracy in each given country and year, bounded between 0 (0%) and 1 (100%).

Starting with the main variable of interest, integration is only a significant predictor ($< p=0.05$) at a lag of one year and when other controls are included. Both in the model without any controls or year trend and with no lags, it is negative but not significant. The interpretation of this is that holding constant key economic effects and the linear trend of time, European integration in the previous year leads to a reduction in satisfaction with democracy within the nine Western European countries included in the analysis. The important factor to consider here is that this means integration may only matter with a particular time dynamic, impacting future values of democratic satisfaction. Moreover, that it only becomes significant when including controls raises concerns about post-treatment bias. I return to this later.

The economic variables behave as expected. GDP displays either a non-significant positive or significant positive effect on satisfaction with democracy, depending on whether a lag is included. Inflation shows a significant negative and instantaneous effect. Unemployment, meanwhile, is negative and significant both instantaneously and with a two year lag (though not one year lag). Globalisation exerts a positive effect at a lag of one year. Finally, the year variable is interpreted as showing that over time, average levels of democratic satisfaction are increasing. In terms of effect sizes, unemployment (at $T-2$) is associated with a one percentage-point decrease in satisfaction with each unit change, whilst inflation and GDP are associated with an approximately 0.5 percentage-point change. These are quite large. Considering, for instance, that the mean value of unemployment is 7%, an average year contributes to a 7 percentage point decrease in democratic satisfaction.

In figure 5.1 I present the predicted margins for the effect of integration at its one-year lag. The difference between low and middle levels of integration are not statistically different, though the point estimates are visually different. It is only at the higher levels of integration that there is a statistically significant negative effect on SWD.[6] These results, that it is the greater levels of integration that exert an effect, are remarkably consistent with research on the effects of European integration on polarisation (Konstantinidis et al., 2019),

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[6] As an additional robustness check, I limited the regression analysis to the years before 2008 - the time of the economic crisis and also an increase in integration. The results remain robust, though fall slightly below the levels of conventional significance (p=0.052).

Table 5.4: Panel analysis: integration and satisfaction with democracy

	(1) Bivariate	(2) No lags	(3) Full model
Integration	0.0261	-0.0115	-0.0113
	(0.0168)	(0.0204)	(0.0181)
Integration$_{T-1}$	-0.00981		-0.0355*
	(0.0166)		(0.0180)
GDP		0.00191	0.00557**
		(0.00166)	(0.00184)
Unemployment		-0.0162***	-0.00849$^+$
		(0.00297)	(0.00491)
Inflation		-0.00566**	-0.00786***
		(0.00212)	(0.00205)
Globalisation		0.00170	-0.00615
		(0.00236)	(0.00374)
GDP$_{T-1}$			0.00539***
			(0.00162)
Unemployment$_{T-1}$			-0.00235
			(0.00567)
Unemployment$_{T-2}$			-0.0121**
			(0.00432)
Inflation$_{T-1}$			0.000323
			(0.00193)
Globalisation$_{T-1}$			0.00888*
			(0.00372)
Year		0.00395$^+$	0.00658*
		(0.00229)	(0.00267)
N	333	342	333

Standard errors in parentheses
$^+$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

the related literature on political party convergence (Nanou & Dorussen, 2013; Dorussen & Nanou, 2006; Hix, 2003), and political support more generally (Thomas, 2016; Dluhosch et al., 2016). This indicates that it is only at the later periods of integration where effects on domestic mass politics (either parties or individuals) begin to matter.

Figure 5.1: Predicted Margins of the effect of European Integration

The finding that globalisation exerts a positive effect (at a year lag) deserves expanding on. As discussed, numerous scholars claim both theoretically and empirically that they should exhibit the same effects on domestic politics (e.g Gall, 2017; Zürn, 2003; Ward et al., 2015; Vowles & Xezonakis, 2016). Clearly, this is not borne out in this analysis. Figure 5.2 presents the predicted margins of globalisation. This shows that the difference is not trivial: at the lowest levels of integration the point estimate is 46%; at the higher levels, it is 20 percentage points higher. From this analysis, it is unlikely that the true effect of globalisation and integration is similar.

Overall, the results provide mixed evidence regarding the theoretical expectation. Whilst there is evidence that, at least in the longest serving members of the European Union, greater integration leads to lower levels of democratic satisfaction, the effect size is relatively low.[7] That the effect of globalisation is

[7]Although there are also large confidence intervals, this is a function of the sample size of

Figure 5.2: Predicted Margins of the effect of Globalisation

observed in the opposite direction also challenges the theoretical claim, which would predict the two would be in sync. I return to the consequences of this in the conclusion.

Exploring Mediators

One concern with this analysis is that all of the 'control' variables are plausibly post-treatment: variables which are on the causal path between the independent and dependent variables. Toshkov (2011), for instance, shows that unemployment and integration (measured as legislative output) are linked; more generally, it is a highly unlikely that integration has not had an impact on economic conditions over the last fifty years or had a positive or negative effect on levels of globalisation. Conditioning on these variables may lead to biases, introducing spurious correlations between the variable of interest and the outcome (Acharya et al., 2016, p. 514).

I explore how integration's effect on political support is mediated by these factors by using a method developed by Acharya et al. (2016): sequential *g*-estimation. This method removes the effect of the mediator (such as unemployment, in the example given above) from the dependent variable, and then

country-years at lower levels of integration.

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estimates the 'average controlled direct' effect (ACDE) of the 'treatment' (integration) on the dependent variable (Acharya et al., 2016, p. 513). It also explicitly models the intermediate confounders. This analysis aims to understand whether integration has a direct effect on political support even when intermediate and mediated factors are accounted for. Indeed, the exact case that Acharya et al. (2016) discuss is when there are long-term or historical factors that are of interest. The benefit of *g*-estimation is that it does not rely on perfect baseline randomisation assumptions like regression, but explicitly allows for sequential randomisation based on past values of the treatment and covariates (Blackwell & Glynn, 2017). In some ways, this sequential estimation draws comparisons with methods such as structural equation modelling and vector auto-regression.

This can be elaborated through discussing implementation in their R package, *DirectEffects*. In this package, the user specifies the pre-treatment variables (in this case, just country fixed effects); intermediate confounders (for instance, all other variables rather than the hypothesised mediator); and the mediator (for instance, unemployment). In this example, we can then be more confident about the effect of integration removing the effect of unemployment. This overcomes issues of post-treatment bias and whether integration works through some of the control variables.

In figure 5.3, I present the coefficients obtained via this analysis, with each variable acting in turn as a mediator. A baseline is also included, which is the estimate of a regular OLS model with country fixed-effects.[8] The left hand panel is a model without lags (similar to column 2 in table 5.4), the right hand panel is a model with lags (similar to column 3 in table 5.4). Year is centred, but other variables are not.[9]

As is clear, the coefficients differ significantly, particularly on the variable without lags. Indeed, some of the coefficients reverse in direction. How to interpret this? Firstly, this means, unsurprisingly, that there are important mediators on the causal pathway between integration and democratic satisfaction. Secondly, this suggests that integration has a negative effect through the economic variables or that there is some interaction in which integration has different effects at different levels of the variables. Given figure 5.1, one might hypothesise that this is due to the stronger effect of integration over time. Im-

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[8]The coefficients are in the same direction as the analysis presented in table 5.4, but significance differs. This is due to the various corrections in the error term and so on in the core analysis not replicated in this analysis due to these not being able to be extended to sequential *g*-estimation.

[9]Centering on the mean does not change the effects, but centering on different values may show interesting variation.

Figure 5.3: Averaged Controlled Direct Effects of Integration

portantly, the direct effect of integration once time is mediated out is much the same as the baseline, which provides evidence that the finding is not simply a product of the progress of time. Indeed, it becomes more strongly negative (in the lagged version) once time is mediated out.

These results do not differ much from the primary analysis: integration has a small negative effect on democratic satisfaction. But it does raise questions. There are clearly interactive effects with a whole host of other macroeconomic variables. This is encouragement, however, to explore the issue further. It seems like there is some underlying effect, that is understandably noisy and is mediated along the causal chain. Thus in this case, we find conflicting results for the lagged and contemporary effects of integration, but generally find that there is a significant effect equivalent in size to the results in table 5.4; a result that is mediated both by its effect on (or co-variation with) economic conditions and the passage of time.

Robustness Tests

As discussed, panel analysis is plagued by potential problems. Aside from issues common to all types of regression analysis, these relate to the specification of time, the dynamics of the variables, and causal inference. I address

these concerns in a number of ways. To address concerns about the dynamics of time and the robustness of the results depending on model choices, I present multiple different models in figure 5.4. These models extend from a simple pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model to random effects models. In the first row, I also include the coefficient of the presented model in figure 5.1 for comparison. This indicates that the presented model is representative of the other model fits. The coefficient becomes insignificant under three specifications: when a random coefficient is applied to country and year; when there is a random coefficient on the country level but with year fixed effects; and where there is a random slope on the variable and fixed year effects. The full tables for this are in appendix A.

These results are not surprising. Considering that the integration variable is also a function of time, when time is completely controlled for through fixed effects or random coefficients, there is very little left to explain. Whether this matters for the substantive interpretation depends on whether one believes that integration as a phenomenon is distinct from the shocks that each year presents individually. For instance, is the signing of the Lisbon Treaty - a significant expansion of Union powers - interpretable as a phenomenon distinct from the year it happened? Although I leave that open to debate, it would seem unreasonable to suggest it is not. Moreover, the coefficients presented in figure 5.3 show that, to the extent it is possible, there is still an effect to explain if we demediate the link between integration, democratic satisfaction and time.

Concerns about causal inference are more problematic. The above analysis and robustness tests rely on 'controlling for' alternative explanations of democratic satisfaction; for instance, economic conditions. Yet this is not an ideal setting. Assuming model assumptions are met, there are at least two other issues. The first is that there is no counterfactual of the same country, in the same period, without integration. The effect identified is the effect on the country of moving to a new level of integration. Second is the issue of post-treatment bias that I have addressed directly in the previous section. Unfortunately, addressing the more thorny issue of causal inference head on is a fundamental issue which warrants future study and research beyond the scope of this thesis. I provide an agenda to do so in the conclusion.

In appendix A, I present residual diagnostics and country removal robustness tests. Results are robust in terms of coefficient direction and effect size and broadly robust in terms of significance: it loses significance if Italy is excluded, but becomes much more significant (at the 0.01% level) excluding Ireland. Excluding both approximates the original result. Thus, it seems like the two outlier countries serve to balance each other out.

Figure 5.4: Model comparisons for lagged integration variable

Conclusion

This chapter has investigated the effect of European integration on the nine countries that have been in the European Union the longest. I have shown how there appears to be a non-trivial negative effect of European integration, measured as political integration through an expert survey, on aggregate levels of satisfaction with democracy. This seems to operate at a lag of at least one year; in other words, it takes at least a year for public opinion to react to integration. The analysis also showed that there is considerable noise to pick up on the causal pathway between integration and its eventual effect on democratic satisfaction and likely public opinion more generally. The 'direct effect', once economic factors and the passing of time is mediated out, varies substantially, and even reverses direction. This indicates not only that integration works through economic factors, but that they do not entirely explain away the effects. The analysis also called into question the theoretical assertion that globalisation and integration should have similar effects by showing that, on the contrary, the effects are opposite, with globalisation having a positive overall effect.

This contributes to our understanding of the effects of European integration on political support. Existing theoretical studies, as highlighted by the opening quote by Fritz Scharpf, make bold claims about the effect of integration on sup-

port for (domestic) political institutions. Moreover, some scholars generalise this effect to all forms of international integration, whether European, global, or otherwise (e.g Vowles & Xezonakis, 2016; Zürn, 2000; Gall, 2017). The empirical literature has not tackled this question adequately, either through a lack of data or suitable methods (Vowles & Xezonakis, 2016; Dluhosch et al., 2016). Considering that it is becoming a commonly-stated fact that integration has a role to play in the decline of support for political institutions, an answer to this question is important.

To some extent, the analyses support these concerns, at least in Western Europe. There does appear to be a non-trivial negative effect of integration, notably at the highest levels of integration. But these claims should be nuanced. Further analysis showed that any effect is likely to be heavily mediated, either by economic factors, simply by time, or by some other factor. This study has shown that there are likely to be complex interactions not just through these variables but also within them - for instance, integration impacting political support through GDP, but also at different levels of GDP. Recent advances in panel methods may allow us to tackle these questions, to which I turn to at the end.

This contributes to our understanding of the domestic effects of European integration and public opinion more generally: the former has for much of the time been limited to the 'high politics' of policy and institutions (Hix & Goetz, 2000) or direct effects such as the salience of the issue of integration; the latter has for good reason not often addressed external influences like international integration. At its simplest, it indicates that integration has an impact on public opinion, whether that is direct or through its influence on some other factor.

Potentially of most value are the methodological contributions. The chapter has harnessed the largest available dataset on public attitudes in Europe, which has rarely been combined except in much broader studies (e.g van Ham et al., 2017). With this dataset, I have used panel methods rarely used in the study of public opinion and, to my knowledge, almost never used within studies on democratic satisfaction or related studies at the country level.[10] In doing so, I have also applied new methods in the field of panel analysis in general to explore the mediation effects at work. In this regard, it is hoped that the application of these methods opens a new methodological avenue to explore the dynamics of public opinion.

In future work, more could be done substantively and methodologically. Firstly, the interesting mediation effects in figure 5.3 could be explored: does the impact of integration vary over these values? Through which other mech-

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[10]For an individual analysis, see, for instance, Hetherington and Rudolph (2008)

anisms might it work? Secondly, the sample of countries could be extended. This adds to the complexity, but may also shed light on these mediation effects. Thirdly, there are many new and increasingly accessible methods for studies such as these which will help to address concerns of causality. A likely candidate in this case is to use weighted fixed-effects regression (Imai & Kim, 2019). This uses matching methods to estimate the counterfactual. To do so, and the reason it is out of the bounds of this thesis, would require considerably expanding the sample size to non-European countries or European countries that have data before accession; in addition, since the method relies on lagged values, the small amounts of missing data here must be imputed, which complicates additional analysis.[11]

This chapter has shown an overall effect of integration in the longest-serving West European countries, but that the signal is noisy and mediated. In the remaining three chapters of this thesis, I explore three of the mechanisms discussed in the theoretical framework. This chapter has told the broad story of the hypothesised relationship; in the remainder of the thesis we will address specific parts of that story.

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[11]Indeed, it is not clear that the R package wfe can handle multiply imputed data.

THE LONG-RUN EFFECTS OF EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION: INTEGRATION AND THE EMBEDDING
OF DOMESTIC CLEAVAGES

"In many Western democracies, all branches of government are dominated by the well-educated. This holds true for almost every other political arena [...] Modern parliamentary democracy is a Platonic meritocracy, a state run by university graduates and former academics. Plato's dream has come true." (Bovens & Wille, 2017, p. 4)

Introduction

The previous chapter presented evidence that integration serves to reduce political support in the nine countries that have been in the European Union for longest, but that this is a heavily mediated relationship. In this chapter, I turn to testing one of the mechanisms posited in the theoretical framework: whether integration serves to embed domestic cleavages. In addition, the chapter also tests the effect of integration at the individual level, expanding the sample to all European Union countries and the full Eurobarometer dataset.

The starting point for this analysis is the common assertion that integration, particularly in Europe, has heterogeneous effects on individuals, and that this differential impact serves to reinforce societal cleavages. It is argued that this possibility stems from two implications of greater openness. The first is the

effect of border permeability of capital and labour and an individual's exposure to this competition; the second is the role of political attitudes and identity, where 'losers' of globalisation are seen to identify with the nation rather than the cosmopolitan identity of the supposed elites. If one event were to encapsulate these concerns, it is the UK's vote to leave the European Union. Those who voted leave were seen as individuals who were older, with less formal education, and often poorer; but also had stronger senses of national (particularly English) identity, resistance to cultural change through immigration, and distrust of political elites (Hobolt, 2016; Henderson, Jeffery, Wincott & Wyn Jones, 2017; Mckenzie, 2017; Denham & Devine, 2017).

Previous scholarship has argued that European integration can be seen as a 'shock' to a domestic political system that can result in change to national patterns of political competition, embedding new cleavages within society (Hooghe & Marks, 2018a). This is one posited mechanism in the theoretical framework presented in figure 3.3. Whilst this cleavage could take many forms, one of the key expressions of contemporary societal divides is education. In a book length treatment of this cleavage, Bovens and Wille (2017) argue that the supporters of further Europeanisation are those that are more educated than the opponents. They vignette a chapter with a sign from a lone protester in the Netherlands in 2005 which read 'national politicians before Euro-academics' (Bovens & Wille, 2017, p. 164), and discuss at length the implications this has for political trust, democratic satisfaction, and other measures of political cynicism (Bovens & Wille, 2017, pp. 155-161).

In this chapter, I study the impact of integration and its effects across educational groups. I use data from the Eurobarometer dataset, encompassing over two million respondents from all EU countries.[1] I apply fixed effects models to study the effect of integration - measured as both political, as in the previous chapter, and economic - on democratic satisfaction and political trust, which isolates the effect of integration within a country. After establishing the overall effect, I explore whether integration has a differential impact on individuals with different levels of education. Regarding the overall effect of integration, the results are somewhat ambiguous: there appears to be a negligible or even positive effect on political support at the individual level and across different regions of Europe. However, there does appear to be a growing divide between Southern Europe and other regions, with Southern Europe being relatively negatively affected by economic integration.

The results also show that integration - whether measured as political or

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[1]Countries join the data when they join the EU, as shown in figure 4.1 As noted previously, I include the UK as part of the EU.

economic - is associated with a considerable *divergence* of political support between educational levels, consistent with previous large-scale analyses (van Ham et al., 2017; Vowles & Xezonakis, 2016). Whilst political integration has a positive effect for all educational groups, the gap between the highest educated and the lowest educated has widened, and reversed: previously, the lowest educated were the most satisfied with democracy, but at the higher levels of integration it is the most educated. The results are starker for economic integration. For democratic satisfaction, there is a negative trend for both with a significant widening of the gap between the most and least educated. For political trust, there is no change amongst the highest educated but the lowest educated experience a sharp decrease. In other words, as integration deepens, the 'support gap' between educational groups grows, embedding this domestic cleavage. The results also show similar effects of globalisation across educational groups, and a negative effect overall.

This analysis provides a number of significant substantive and methodological contributions to the literature. Firstly, the top line results provide a rebuttal to existing theoretical concerns. The 'Doomsday scenario', as described by Laffan (2014), of 'democracy without choices' (Krastev, 2002), does not seem to filter down to the public uniformly or in ways that are expected. We cannot make generalisations about the effect of integration on domestic mass politics without taking into account domestic politics (Schmidt, 2006). Secondly, if any aspect of integration matters for public opinion, it is likely to be the economic. Although this is, of course, intricately linked to political integration, the effects are likely to be felt via the economic route rather than the political or policy route. Thirdly, there is important variation amongst demographics. Education, as a key cleavage in Europe (Bovens & Wille, 2017) has been studied here, but alternative demographics may provide similar patterns. The analysis presented suggests that a key effect of integration on political attitudes is its part in reinforcing the 'support gap' between educational levels, consistent with research on globalisation in Western Europe (Kriesi et al., 2006, 2008). When considering the effects of integration, therefore, its heterogeneous effects across social groups is a necessary factor. Finally, for the political support literature in general, the analysis is consistent with a model in which support is driven by the 'output' factors rather than 'input' factors, considering that 'political' integration has a limited effect relative to the economic dimension. Nonetheless, domestic institutions are likely mediators of these output effects (Strebel et al., 2018).

The chapter also makes methodological contributions. Firstly, the chapter shows the importance of model specification when there are numerous sources

of variation (such as time, country, individuals). The analysis is transparent about the differences in coefficient values across model specifications. Secondly, it shows the value of adopting numerous analytical techniques which draws a more holistic picture, considering the different results for this and the previous chapter. Finally, but perhaps more importantly for applied researchers, it shows the importance of not relying on one indicator for a multifaceted process like European integration (similarly for globalisation, conflict, or any other type of complex phenomenon). Indicators can emphasise different aspects, be drawn from different time periods and countries, and therefore lead to different results which are not inherently incorrect or contradictory.

In the following section, I discuss the existing literature regarding integration and domestic cleavages. I focus specifically on the role of education. I then describe the data and methods and present the results. In the final section, I draw out the wider implications and chart the next steps for the thesis.

Integration and Domestic Cleavages

Cleavage politics, in the original formulation, argued that social conflicts structure political competition. The long-standing conflicts which predated mass franchise were the center-periphery, religious-secular, urban-rural and labour-capital, with the last forming the major cleavage in Western Europe of workers and owners (or capitalists) (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Ford & Jennings, 2020). It was argued that these patterns structured political competition as organisations - political parties - formed around them, essentially 'freezing' these patterns of competition.

There is widespread belief that these patterns have now thawed, either to be replaced by unprecedented volatility or realigned along new cleavage structures in which 'volatility' is just the process of realignment. A number of scholars have argued that the permeability of national borders either within Europe or globally is creating, or at least reinforcing, a new cleavage. Kriesi et al. (2006, 2008) for instance argue that globalisation (which they blur with European integration) is a process creating a new cleavage between the winners and losers, although these categories are loosely defined. Broadly, the winners are those who are mobile, highly qualified and broadly cosmopolitan in outlook; whilst the losers are those with few formal qualifications, those working in formerly protected sectors, and who are more nationalist in orientation.

In a similar vein, Hooghe and Marks (2018a, p. 109) propose a 'transnational' cleavage, 'which has as its core a political reaction against European integration and immigration'. The 'perforation', they argue, of previously less

permeable national borders is bound to create a new cleavage between those who seek to defend national borders versus those who are more comfortable with such permeability. They cite European integration as a credible shock to party systems 'because it introduces rule by those who are regarded as foreigners, diminishes the authority exercised by national states over their own populations, produces economic insecurity among those who lack mobile assets, and facilitates immigration' (Hooghe & Marks, 2018a, p. 109).

There is no shortage of terms for this proposed cleavage. Whether it is cosmopolitanism versus communitarianism (Koopmans & Zürn, 2019), demarcationist versus integrationist (Kriesi et al., 2006) or GAL-TAN (green/alternative/libertarian - traditional/authoritarian/nationalist) (Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, 2002) at the core of it is that the process of greater integration of a nation-state has created the potential for political conflict between those who benefit and those who do not, either culturally or economically.

There is a question over whether this truly represents a new cleavage or is just a new or revived expression of the long-standing cleavages, particularly those of class and education. Langsæther and Stubager (2019) argue that most empirical tests of the 'globalisation' cleavage do not really test what they purport to do, but instead use education, occupation, or some other proxy for relative socio-economic standing as the independent variable. This, they argue, blurs the old and new cleavages. Using specific measures of identity (cosmopolitan versus national) and measures of exposure to globalisation, they argue that 'the winners and losers of globalisation seem, to a very considerable degree, to be the traditional winners and losers with respect to material positions and political influence' (Langsæther & Stubager, 2019, p. 2).

I don't take a position on whether integration is a form of new cleavage. The argument is instead that, as Langsæther and Stubager (2019, p. 17) already note, 'trends related to globalisation [...] are likely to affect the interests and attitudes of different classes and/or educational groups in different ways'. This means that integration may have a heterogeneous impact across demographics. Ultimately, whether one considers denationalisation a new cleavage or 'old wine in new bottles', the expectation is that it will impact individuals differently depending on their relative socio-economic position.

The Role of Education

In this chapter, I focus on the role of education. Education is so closely related to the process of integration that Hooghe and Marks (2018a, p. 127) argue their 'transnational' cleavage is 'grounded in educational opportunities that have

persistent effects over a person's life'. As integration deepens and education, by which is meant either implicitly or explicitly whether an individual is a University graduate, expands, the cleavage could be embedded in two ways (Stubager, 2008). Firstly, education imparts a rational self-interest in terms of greater economic well-being which is not directly harmed, and may directly benefit, from greater integration. The deepening of integration, particularly economic, expands the opportunities for those with greater levels of education whilst potentially limiting them for those that depend on welfare support or those in protected sectors (Jensen, 2011; Zohlnhöfer, Engler & Dümig, 2018). Therefore, we would expect that those with higher levels of education are more supportive of the political institutions due to expanding opportunities, whilst the reverse would be the case for those with lower levels of education.

Secondly, education is seen as a socialisation process into more liberal attitudes attitudes consistent with greater openness and a reduced commitment to the supremacy of national borders. This is associated with integration in terms of growing levels of immigration as well as the sharing or pooling of sovereignty. As Hooghe and Marks (2009, p. 2) write, 'citizens care - passionately - about who exercises authority'. As integration deepens, those with less cosmopolitan attitudes may react to one or both of these phenomena, whilst those with higher education may embrace them. Thirdly, integration may also lead to a division along geographic lines either through self-selection or contextual effects (Gallego, Buscha, Sturgis & Oberski, 2016). Although not deterministic, greater openness of borders leads to greater agglomeration - the centralising of economic power. This can create a divide between those that live, and choose to live, in larger urban areas and those that do not; essentially, it exacerbates the centre-periphery divide that, ironically, the formation of the nation-state served to entrench (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). There is evidence of this across Europe and beyond, but particularly in the UK context (Jennings & Stoker, 2017; McKay, 2019; Rodríguez-Pose, 2018).

Aside from the large literature which identifies that those with high formal education have different attitudes to those without high formal education, there is also descriptive evidence that the 'support gap' between those with education and those without has increased over time (van Ham et al., 2017, p. 54). This suggests that there is something occurring that is driving this change. Recent work suggests that greater levels of globalisation may be such a force (Thomas, 2016, p. 228). I follow this analysis by investigating whether both European integration and globalisation can be contributing to the growing gap.

Data and Methods

The data used for this analysis is drawn, as in the previous chapter, from the Eurobarometer dataset. I also use identical variables at the country level.[2] Descriptive statistics for the individual level variables which are added to the country variables are presented in table 6.1. I use two dependent variables in turn: satisfaction with democracy (SWD) and trust in a country's parliament, indicated in the first two rows of the table. As shown in table 5.1 in the previous chapter, these are not available for the same amount of time: SWD is available from 1973 to 2017 (75 waves) whilst trust in parliament is available from 1997 to 2017 (38 waves).

Ideally, one would control for a greater number of individual-level factors. However, the challenge of merging such a large dataset is considerable, particularly on items that do not necessarily have cross-national comparability (for instance, occupations). In addition, controlling for other attitudinal variables could in any case lead to post-treatment bias. The extensiveness of this dataset - with a combined sample size of over two million - is the largest data set used to study political support to date (see also Martini & Quaranta, 2020; van Ham et al., 2017).

Education is a categorical variable, which is separated into four categories: under 14 years of education; 15-19 years of education; 22 or more; and still studying. Age is also a categorical variable, separated into 35 and under years of age; 36-60; and over 60. This is to maintain consistency with previous research using the Eurobarometer dataset over a similar length of time (e.g Quaranta & Martini, 2016).

Table 6.1: Summary Statistics: Individual Level

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
SWD	0.543	0.498	0	1	1198252
Trust	0.372	0.483	0	1	870614
Education	2.133	0.827	1	4	1951656
Age	1.944	0.756	1	3	1990814
Gender	0.528	0.499	0	1	2127512

For the independent variables, I measure integration two ways. The first is the expert survey by Nanou et al. (2017) used in the previous chapter. The second is the EU Index, developed by König and Ohr (2013), which broadly measures economic integration. Summary statistics for these are shown in table 4.3. These are both described at length, with descriptive graphs, in chapter

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[2]See table 5.2 for descriptive statistics.

Table 6.2: Countries included in country clusters

Country Area	Countries
Continental	Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Netherlands.
Anglo-Saxon	Great Britain and Ireland.
Scandinavian	Denmark, Finland and Sweden.
Southern	Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Greece.
Post-Communist	Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

4. The EU Index, whilst reducing the time period, has the benefit of having between-country variation and capturing the economic dimension of integration

In addition to country fixed effects, as described below, I also control for regions (e.g Quaranta & Martini, 2016). This is because particular regions may have particular unique historical and cultural trajectories. Moreover, this allows me to look at the effect of integration across different regions without creating cumbersome amounts of interactions with each country. These regions are noted in table 6.2 with their respective countries. These are also all the countries included in the analysis.

To model these relationships, I use two-way fixed-effects logistic models with cluster robust standard errors. The logistic is because the two dependent variables have binary outcomes, satisfied with democracy (1) or not (0); and whether respondents trust parliament (1) or do not (0). Regarding the two-way fixed-effects models, there is considerable debate about the benefits of different types of multilevel modelling, which varies by field and sub-field (Schmidt-Catran & Fairbrother, 2016; Bell & Jones, 2015; Bell, Fairbrother & Jones, 2019). The basic trade-off is as follows. The broad class of 'random effects' models - where the variation between and within countries can be modelled - allows the researcher to specify variables to explain this variation, extracting useful information about both the within and between effects (Bell et al., 2019). However, fixed effects models specify the higher level units as dummy variables, therefore removing all time-invariant variation. In other words, all of the qualities that make, in this case, a country unique, are 'absorbed' by the country coefficient. This loses information vis-a-vis the random effects model.

The reasons I use fixed effects models despite their loss of information are numerous. Firstly, when using random effects models, it is advisable to include a random effect at each relevant level (Schmidt-Catran & Fairbrother,

[2016](#)). In this case, this is likely to be at least country-year, country, and year (e.g Quaranta & Martini, [2016](#)). Considering the number of observations and the number of models necessary, this was extremely computationally intensive to the point of implausibility. Secondly, random effects models assume that there are no omitted variables at the higher levels. For a complex phenomenon like European integration, it is extremely unlikely that this is the case (indeed, the analysis in the previous chapter suggests this is the case). Since the specific intention here is to understand the association of one particular variable (rather than attempt to model all country-level effects), fixed effects are preferable. At any rate, with large sample sizes and few clusters (i.e, countries), fixed effects approximate random effects in their estimation of the individual-level effects (Snijders & Bosker, [2012](#), p. 47). Whilst the same issues regarding fixed effects in the panel analysis apply here - such as crowding out potential dynamics and being problematic with a slow-changing variable - the intention in this analysis is not to model time dynamics and an additional variable for integration, which is not slow changing, is also tested. Finally, much like the panel analysis, I present a significant range of robustness tests and alternative model specifications.

Results

In the first analysis, I test the unmoderated effect of integration on SWD and trust. The results of the models are presented in tables [6.3](#) (for political integration) and [6.4](#) (for economic integration). SWD is the dependent variable in the first three columns, and trust is the dependent variable in the last three. Since the model is a logistic regression, the coefficients are not directly interpretable. To elucidate the coefficients of the control variables, I present them in the form of marginal effects. This shows the expected change in probability of being satisfied or trusting for every unit change - or change between categories - in the independent variables. Figure [6.1](#) presents the marginal effects for both trust and SWD using political integration as the measure of integration. Figure [6.2](#) presents the same when the EU Index - economic integration - is used instead.

The coefficients on the control variables are largely identical regardless of which measure of integration is used, which is comforting considering the vast differences in sample size and time period between the two models. There are some differences regarding the relative effect sizes whether satisfaction or trust is used. For instance, having University education (22+ years or still studying) or 15-19 years of education is associated with a significant increase in satisfaction and trust; for satisfaction, it is approximately a 6 percentage point increase,

whilst for trust it is approximately an 11 percentage point increase.

There are slight differences with regard to age: those who are aged 36-60 are less likely to be satisfied with democracy than those under 36, but *more* likely to be trusting; those who are over 60 are more likely to be satisfied and trusting than those up to 35. The effect size is large: being over 60 is associated with a 7 percentage point increase in trust, but either an insiginificant or small effect size for satisfaction (approximately 2 percentage point increase). It is not clear why the 'middle-aged' category are less satisfied but more trusting. It might well be that satisfaction is more closely tied to overall life satisfaction, which dips in the middle of the life-course, than trust. Women are less likely to be satisfied and trusting across the board, with effect sizes of around two percentage points.

The country-level variables behave as expected and as in the panel analysis. GDP increases are significantly associated with higher probabilities of satisfaction and trust. The estimated change in probability is 1 to 2 percentage points for a 1% growth in GDP, which is quite large considering that the mean value is 2.4% growth in a year. This suggests that an average growth rate is associated with a roughly 5 percentage point increase in support. Inflation and unemployment are associated with similar changes in the opposite direction. This is even more substantial considering that the mean value for unemployment is 8.5%. An average unemployment rate is therefore associated with a 16% drop in political support. Globalisation has the opposite effect as in the panel analysis; it is negatively associated with satisfaction and trust, with similar effect sizes to those just described. This points in the same direction as the EU Index, but in the opposite direction to the measure used in the panel analysis. One interpretation, which becomes clearer throughout the chapter, is that this is related to the economic effects of integration, which the EU Index captures better, rather than the 'political' effects.

Since the main effects of interest are products of interactions, I present them as predicted values in figures 6.3 and 6.4.[3] These figures show the predicted values of the dependent variable (left Y axis) for different values of the integration variables (X axis). The distribution of the integration variables are in the background. Turning first to figure 6.3, which shows the predicted values using political integration as the variable of interest. One interpretation is that, over time, integration is associated with an increase in democratic satisfaction. However, the gap between regions has increased. For instance, at the lowest level of integration, there was a 20 percentage point difference between the

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[3]Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006) suggest that these types of figures are the main way - if not the only way - of presenting interactive effects.

Table 6.3: Results from a fixed effects multilevel regression: Political Integration

	(1) SWD	(2) SWD	(3) SWD	(4) Trust	(5) Trust	(6) Trust
Integration	0.0336***	0.0861***	0.616***	0.108***	0.131***	0.0910[+]
	(0.00323)	(0.00636)	(0.0112)	(0.0221)	(0.0340)	(0.0475)
Integration × Anglo-Saxon	0.104***	0.0972***	-0.135***	-1.104***	-1.119***	-0.441***
	(0.00563)	(0.00588)	(0.00670)	(0.0423)	(0.0458)	(0.0486)
Integration × Scandinavian	0.498***	0.461***	0.305***	0.425***	0.328***	0.397***
	(0.00857)	(0.00914)	(0.00959)	(0.0419)	(0.0436)	(0.0449)
Integration × Southern	-0.202***	-0.206***	-0.0107	-2.424***	-2.425***	-1.255***
	(0.00562)	(0.00599)	(0.00873)	(0.0360)	(0.0386)	(0.0428)
Integration × Post-Comm.	-0.0651*	0.613***	0.0202	-0.790***	-0.358***	-0.303***
	(0.0285)	(0.0371)	(0.0429)	(0.0374)	(0.0433)	(0.0504)
Years of Education (r.c under 14)						
15-19		0.0616***	0.0706***		0.0803***	0.0888***
		(0.00619)	(0.00625)		(0.00889)	(0.00896)
22 or more		0.272***	0.278***		0.502***	0.518***
		(0.00809)	(0.00820)		(0.0103)	(0.0104)
Still studying		0.299***	0.300***		0.512***	0.519***
		(0.0116)	(0.0117)		(0.0152)	(0.0154)
Age (r.c up to 35)						
36-60		-0.0481***	-0.0436***		0.0765***	0.0823***
		(0.00542)	(0.00549)		(0.00716)	(0.00725)
Over 60		0.0566***	0.0570***		0.321***	0.318***
		(0.00649)	(0.00658)		(0.00811)	(0.00821)
Female		-0.0201***	-0.0217***		-0.0750***	-0.0809***
		(0.00437)	(0.00443)		(0.00539)	(0.00546)
GDP			0.0300***			0.0199***
			(0.00143)			(0.00137)
Inflation			-0.0632***			-0.0488***
			(0.00146)			(0.00256)
Unemployment			-0.102***			-0.0831***
			(0.00114)			(0.00147)
Globalisation			-0.0832***			-0.0491***
			(0.00188)			(0.00396)
Year FE		✓	✓		✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1062154	958758	944181	740736	690570	668112

Standard errors in parentheses
[+] $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 6.4: Results from a fixed effects multilevel regression: EU Index

	(1) SWD	(2) SWD	(3) SWD	(4) Trust	(5) Trust	(6) Trust
EU Index	0.0243***	0.0428***	-0.0127***	0.00685***	0.0371***	-0.00727**
	(0.00200)	(0.00310)	(0.00334)	(0.00181)	(0.00266)	(0.00278)
EU Index × Anglo-Saxon	-0.0654***	-0.0617***	0.00418	-0.0654***	-0.0691***	-0.00797*
	(0.00337)	(0.00346)	(0.00380)	(0.00282)	(0.00299)	(0.00323)
EU Index × Scandinavian	-0.00774	0.00119	0.0172**	-0.0132***	-0.00891*	0.0107**
	(0.00531)	(0.00550)	(0.00563)	(0.00367)	(0.00380)	(0.00387)
EU Index × Southern	-0.0820***	-0.0770***	-0.0169***	-0.0830***	-0.0845***	-0.0343***
	(0.00310)	(0.00321)	(0.00354)	(0.00268)	(0.00280)	(0.00306)
EU Index × Post-Comm.	-0.0358***	-0.0385***	0.000166	-0.0366***	-0.0428***	0.00430
	(0.00241)	(0.00254)	(0.00297)	(0.00222)	(0.00240)	(0.00272)
Years of Education (r.c under 14)						
15-19		0.0666***	0.0793***		0.0836***	0.0935***
		(0.0145)	(0.0148)		(0.0111)	(0.0112)
22 or more		0.399***	0.410***		0.533***	0.548***
		(0.0173)	(0.0177)		(0.0129)	(0.0131)
Still studying		0.441***	0.448***		0.542***	0.550***
		(0.0251)	(0.0258)		(0.0190)	(0.0193)
Age (r.c up to 35)						
36-60		-0.0903***	-0.0791***		0.0578***	0.0632***
		(0.0117)	(0.0119)		(0.00903)	(0.00916)
Over 60		0.00750	0.00568		0.314***	0.307***
		(0.0134)	(0.0137)		(0.0103)	(0.0104)
Female		-0.0568***	-0.0591***		-0.0906***	-0.0978***
		(0.00893)	(0.00913)		(0.00678)	(0.00689)
GDP			0.0424***			0.0315***
			(0.00289)			(0.00185)
Inflation			-0.0675***			-0.0369***
			(0.00510)			(0.00344)
Unemployment			-0.0823***			-0.0797***
			(0.00260)			(0.00217)
Globalisation			-0.0334***			-0.0433***
			(0.00730)			(0.00604)
Year FE		✓	✓		✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	247853	237583	228530	442204	423514	406503

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 6.1: Marginal effects of the control variables from table 6.3

Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon countries; at the highest level of integration, this had doubled. The other country clusters are linear and do not change, but are to be treated with caution, as many only join the data set in 2004 and so the margins are predicted out of sample.

Moreover, there is no effect on trust over the time period. This is likely due to the limited over-time variation of the independent variable or, conversely, that measuring trust only begins in 1997. Whilst the results are significant - due to the large sample size - the effect sizes are trivial.

I present the same graphs for the EU Index in figure 6.4. For satisfaction with democracy, they show a similar picture, namely: a growing gap between different areas of the Union. Except this time, it is the Southern countries which are diverging from the rest of the Union, with the Scandinavian countries still at the top. Unlike in the previous analysis, this is true for both democratic satisfaction and trust, though is more distinct for democratic satisfaction.

Altogether, the multilevel results provide some support for the claim that integration matters for political support, but not in obvious ways. With regard to the political integration of the EU, if anything it has a positive effect at the individual level, though it may also have some part to play in the growing divergence within the Union, as in figure 6.3. The claim seems to hold much more water with respect to economic integration. Although not provid-

Figure 6.2: Marginal effects of the control variables from table 6.4

ing much of an effect within the majority of countries, economic integration exerts a negative effect on both democratic satisfaction and trust in Southern Europe. However, conclusions here must be tentative considering that this is a period of economic distress, particularly in Southern Europe.

Subgroup Analysis: The Embedding of Education as a Cleavage

The preceding analysis has shown only that integration has had a minor effect on political support. Using either indicator of integration shows a negligible effect at the individual level, but does show that, over time, there is a greater gap between regions in Europe. As described in the introduction and theory section, however, it is not expected that the effects of European integration are stable across demographics. If there is an improvement in political support amongst some demographic but a decrease amongst some other demographic, the coefficient may display stability when there is actually significant change.

Following the previous analysis, this section explores the interaction of integration and education. As well as being theoretically interesting, subgroup analysis is an important element of establishing whether a given relationship is plausible. Keele (2015, p. 327) describes this as such: 'analysts demonstrate

Figure 6.3: Predicted values for the integration variable

causal relationships by building a multifaceted pattern of evidence [...] one should test as many relevant implications of a causal theory as possible'. As described, one implication of the theoretical argument is that integration has differential effects across educational groups.

This second analysis repeats the previous but with one change. I do not include an interaction between the integration variables and areas, but instead with the education variable. This maximises the number of observations available for the interaction and reduces the complexity of interpreting a three-way interaction; it is also substantively driven as there is no clear reason to think that integration would effect different educational groups differently across countries.

The results for this analysis are presented in table 6.5. I exclude the controls in the presentation for brevity as they do not vary from those previously discussed. To interpret these effects, I produce marginal plots in figures 6.5-6.7. Note that here I exclude a marginal plot for the second column. This is because marginal plots require no combinations of variables where there are few or no observations. In this case, there are too many of these empty cells to produce the plot with much confidence.

Beginning with satisfaction with democracy and political integration in figure 6.5, this shows an interesting dynamic. Whilst the plot shows that integra-

Table 6.5: Education Interaction Models

	(1) SWD	(2) Trust	(3) SWD	(4) Trust
Integration	0.542***	-0.412***		
	(0.0106)	(0.0510)		
Integration × 15-19 Years	0.0170**	0.427***		
	(0.00518)	(0.0396)		
Integration × 22 or More Years	0.209***	0.566***		
	(0.00754)	(0.0476)		
Integration × Still Studying	0.229***	0.273***		
	(0.0100)	(0.0672)		
EU Index			-0.0177***	-0.0216***
			(0.00292)	(0.00222)
EU Index × 15-19 Years			0.00344$^+$	0.0108***
			(0.00183)	(0.00143)
EU Index × 22 or More Years			0.0120***	0.0182***
			(0.00220)	(0.00170)
EU Index × Still Studying			0.00602*	0.0194***
			(0.00300)	(0.00234)
Country FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	944181	668112	228530	406503

Standard errors in parentheses

$^+$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 6.4: Predicted values for the EU Index

tion is associated with a significant increase in democratic satisfaction, it also has a considerable heterogeneous impact on the educational groups. Indeed, they actually reverse, with the higher educated (or still studying) being more satisfied than the lowest educated at the highest value of integration but less at the lowest value of integration. This is not necessarily a bad phenomenon: at least relative to previous years, everyone is more satisfied with democracy, even if the positive effect is stronger amongst the higher educated.

Figures 6.6 and 6.7 present the results for economic integration, as measured by the EU Index. These plots show a negative trend for democratic satisfaction for all educational groups. For political trust, integration seems to have no effect on the most highly educated but a strong negative effect for the least educated. Similar to political integration, this means that the differential impact across educational groups is large. Economic integration, unlike political integration, therefore seems to be related to an overall negative effect on political support, and is much more negative for those with lower educational attainment.

I repeat the analysis with the globalisation indicator, with the results presented in figures 6.8 and 6.9. The tables are omitted. The results are broadly con-

Figure 6.5: Predicted values of integration on SWD, by education

sistent with the effect of economic integration; unlike integration, however, there is a negative effect across the higher educated as well as the lower educated. What is similar is the disproportionately negative impact amongst the least educated, to the extent that whilst there was no 'support gap' due to education, it is now significantly large.

The summary for the subgroup analysis is more positive for the overall claim than the previous analysis. A key aspect of the theory seems to be valid: that integration has a disproportionately negative effect on those with lower educational attainment. Yet this is caveated that it is specifically the economic aspect of integration; political integration overall seems positive or, at worst, irrelevant, though its magnitude varies across education.

Robustness Tests

A number of robustness tests have been conducted and are presented in appendix B. The first is to test, as in the previous chapter, the susceptibility of the

Figure 6.6: Predicted values of the EU Index on SWD, by education

results to model specification. In figures B.1 and B.2 I present the coefficients for the two measures of integration across the European regions. The coefficients display some variation, particularly for the expert survey measure, but are largely robust. Secondly, I rerun the models with the nine countries that formed the sample of the panel analysis in the previous chapter to make the results more comparable. The results show the opposite to the panel analysis, insofar as integration, as measured by the expert survey, increases democratic satisfaction; however, it has a negative effect on trust. This suggests that there is either a different dynamic between aggregate and individual levels occurring, or that the effort spent on dealing with time in the panel analysis was well spent. Using the EU Index as the measure shows a negative effect on democratic satisfaction and a negative, but insignificant, effect on trust.

I also conduct residual analysis on the final models. The residuals are normally and randomly distributed. The only residuals which exert leverage are from Belgium; excluding Belgium from the analysis does not alter the results.

Figure 6.7: Predicted values of the EU Index on Trust, by education

Conclusion

Has European integration led to a decline in political support; and through which mechanisms has it (not) done so? These are the overarching questions of this thesis. This chapter has addressed them both, asking whether there is evidence that integration has led to a decline in support at the individual level, and whether a plausible mechanism is the reinforcement of domestic cleavages.

The chapter has shown that integration does not seem to have a generalised substantial direct impact; in some regions, it has a consistent and negative impact (Anglo-Saxon, Southern), and in others a mixed impact (post-Communist, Scandinavian). There is some evidence that increasing economic integration is leading to a divergence between the regions of Europe, with Southern Europe growing away from other regions. But the key result is that there is a significant differential impact across educational levels; consistent with the cleavage literature (e.g Hooghe & Marks, 2018a), integration has a stronger effect

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
Figure 6.8: Predicted values of SWD, by education

Figure 6.9: Predicted values of trust, by education

amongst those with lower levels of education. Whilst political integration in general seems to increase democratic satisfaction, it nonetheless has a stronger positive impact on the highly educated; meanwhile, economic integration has a slightly negative or insignificant impact on the highly educated, but a substantial impact on those with lower levels of education. These results are similar to those of globalisation.

These results, especially seen in light of the previous chapter, suggest that the effects of integration operate through the economic dimension. Whilst this cannot be divorced from the political, we see again the rather muted effects of 'political' integration vis-a-vis the economic. This supports the conclusions from the previous chapter, and the overall theoretical argument outlined at the start of this chapter, regarding the role integration plays in embedding existing cleavages in domestic politics.

Whilst this broadly contributes to the goal of this thesis in understanding the domestic effects of European integration, it adds nuance to the literature and the previous chapter. The *overall* effects are muted and ambiguous. Yet there may be important underlying factors; in the previous chapter, it was shown that the effect of integration is mediated by economic factors, whilst in this chapter it has been shown that these same economic factors may well be deepening the divide between the citizens of member states. Indeed, the deepening of division is the message of the chapter. In the wake of the Eurozone crisis, Armingeon et al. (2016) showed how the Euro divided the Union by providing an economic straitjacket to countries in crisis, whilst benefiting those that were not. Thus, some citizens became detached from their political systems whilst others did not. This chapter supports that assertion. Over time, both political and economic European integration has led to a widening gap between individuals in terms of educational attainment; it has also led to divergence between countries, with the Anglo-Saxon countries more affected by political integration and Southern European countries more affected by economic integration. Although it would be far too ambitious to conclude about the long-term, overall effects of integration, the research suggests that on balance integration is cementing or exacerbating long-term gaps between countries and the individuals within them.

In doing so, it contributes to the literature on the long-term trends of political support, which identify a growing gap across educational attainment. This chapter confirms that trend again, but suggests that European and global integration may be playing a fundamental role in these trends (van Ham et al., 2017; Thomas, 2016). This contradicts somewhat previous research which has suggested that it is the highly educated which are more aware of the inter-

national constraints their government faces (Häusermann et al., 2018), which suggests the mechanism may be more to do with the real or perceived position in the labour market. This finding speaks to the wider

The chapter also contributes methodologically. Firstly, it has been shown that the chosen indicator of integration is important. When studies, with any dependent variable, use integration as an explanatory factor, they must carefully consider what aspect of integration that are interested in. Secondly, the analysis has been very open about both its exploratory component (relative to a precise causal estimate) and model specification decisions, presenting many in the appendix. Future research should be open about these decisions to show the uncertainty - or otherwise - of their conclusions.

For future work, it is important to understand the domestic mechanisms behind these trends. *Why* is education so strongly related to political support and integration? Is it a purely economic model in which the fortunes of the lower educated are not benefited by these processes? Or is it about cultural concerns? Langsæther and Stubager (2019) suggest the former. Is it potentially about descriptive representation, and the dominance of the educated in political institutions, as the opening quote to this chapter suggests? These seem like key issues facing Europe today.

This and the previous chapter have established the broader, long-term relationships between integration and political support. It has touched upon one mechanism in the theoretical framework. The following two chapters move from this broader perspective to studying two precise mechanisms. In the next chapter, I study whether individuals *perceiving* that their state is *constrained* vis-a-vis the EU leads to lower levels of political support. In the final empirical chapter, I study whether the effect is rather through the party system and how European integration affects the congruence of public and elites.

The Devaluation of Domestic Politics:
Economic Interventions, Perceived
Constraint and Political Support[1]

Introduction

In this chapter, I turn to another of the potential mechanisms linking the process of integration with individual attitude change: the devaluation of domestic politics. The chapter picks up the literature which explores the 2008 economic crisis and subsequent economic interventions by international and supranational bodies as a unique example of integration and the undermining of the domestic political arena.

In the broader literature, the devaluation of the importance of domestic politics has been one of the dominant mechanisms that have linked international integration with public opinion and political behaviour. As Hellwig (2015, p. 23) put it, 'if [...] voters perceive national governments as incapable of autonomous action, then preferences over policy ought to be of little consequence'. The argument is that as there is 'politics without policy' (Schmidt, 2006), individuals are likely to vote less (or abstain), perceive that the democratic process matters less, and participate less in general. A key component of this explanation is that individuals perceive their governments have a reduced

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[1]A version of this chapter, with the second half of the analysis, is published as: Devine, D. (2019). Perceived government autonomy, economic evaluations, and political support during the Eurozone crisis. *West European Politics*, *EarlyView*, 1–24. The first half of the analysis is in a working paper with Stuart J. Turnbull-Dugarte. All work is my own.

room to manoeuvre: that it is less efficacious due to some external constraint (such as the global economy or other integration (Steiner, 2016)).

A number of authors have drawn on this argument, often unknowingly, to explain the decline in political support during the economic crisis. Economic interventions were linked to the devaluing of domestic politics: as Armingeon and Guthmann (2014, p. 425) argued, 'external actors define[d] the room for manoeuvre of national politics in many European countries to an unprecedented extent'. This vein of literature argues that the reason political support declined in countries that experienced intervention was not just the experiences of economic turmoil but also the intrusion on democratic politics. Despite this body of research, the literature still contains 'uncharted territory on the micro-level mechanisms' of the link between interventions and political support (Schraff & Schimmelfennig, 2019, p. 19); all literature remains at the aggregate level, unable to draw inferences at the individual level.

This chapter explores this uncharted territory. I firstly provide quasi-experimental evidence using an Unexpected Event During Survey design (Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno & Hernández, 2019) that the interventions played a causal role in decreasing political support. This builds on previous research conducted at the aggregate level (e.g Ruiz-Rufino & Alonso, 2017). Collectively, the evidence base is therefore largely conclusive at both aggregate and individual levels and across multiple research designs. I then turn to the mechanism linking the interventions and political support. Contradicting previous research, I show that there is no evidence at the individual level that the mechanism was through devaluing domestic politics. Instead, evaluations of the economic system provided the strongest predictor of political support. I argue that interventions instead updated individuals' (negative) economic perceptions, leading to a loss of political support.

Clearly, the period under study in these papers and this chapter marks a shift from 'normal' European integration that scholars had previously raised concerns about and which the thesis addresses. The period since 2008 has been seen as a 'step-change in the possibility of intrusion by external actors in domestic government and politics' (Laffan, 2014, p. 273). As such, this period should be treated as a 'most likely' case: it is the most likely period to uncover effects of perceived constraint, the lack of which would indicate that it is unlikely an effect is present under conditions of 'normal' integration. Similarly, the period was also characterised not by unilateral action by the EU but in coordination with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Whilst this provides an additional obstacle to inference, I show how the results do not change between causal attribution to either the IMF or the EU.

This chapter has three main contributions. The first and primary is to provide evidence that the commonly specified link between economic interventions and a decline in political support - perceived constraint - is incorrect. Whilst I show descriptively and through a quasi-experimental design that interventions did lead to reduced political support, I argue that perceived constraint actually increases political support. This suggests that there is an alternative mechanism underlying the relationship between interventions and the observed decline in political support. This, as the second and third contribution, has implications for the room to manoeuvre and political support literatures. For the room to manoeuvre literature, it suggests the relationship between perceived constraint and political support is more complicated than presumed in recent work. Citizens do not seem to link this lack of room to manoeuvre with political support, and if they do, it is opposite to what is expected. If increased integration to the point where national actors lack policy control matters for political support, it is unlikely to be through this explicitly cognitive mechanism whereby citizens recognise this lack of manoeuvre and update accordingly. Thus, the concerns outlined at the start of the chapter are at least partly assuaged. Finally, for the political support literature, it rejects one part of the 'input' story on political support since the crisis. Focus should therefore be turned on the economic determinants and the more traditional forms of input legitimacy such as responsiveness (Foster & Frieden, 2017; Torcal, 2014).

In the following section, I provide a review of the core literature this chapter is addressing which argues that political support declined as a result of perceived constraint during the crisis. I then address competing arguments and develop competing hypotheses in relation to this work. The second section provides descriptive trends in political support as well as a quasi-experimental analysis from Portugal which confirms the potent effect interventions have on political support. I then describe the data and methods, results, and conclude with a discussion on the results and the wider relevance for the thesis.

Economic Interventions and Political Support

Since 2008, numerous authors have raised the possibility of the effects of the influence of external actors on public opinion in their analyses of the decline in political support in Southern Europe and, to a lesser extent, Ireland (e.g Teixeira et al., 2014; Freire, Lisi, Andreadis & Viegas, 2014; Cordero & Simón, 2016). But this was more often than not assumed rather than tested. For instance, Teixeira et al. (2014, p. 506), in studying political support in Portugal

and Greece, argue that the 'hollowing out of democratic procedures may have far reaching consequences' on how citizens view the relevance of democratic regimes: 'If national democratic systems are viewed as constrained by external forces', citizens may have no reason to support such a system. Whilst the authors compare Portugal and Greece before and after the crisis, it is not possible to attribute this decline to any particular factor.

A number of articles test the impact of external economic interventions on democratic satisfaction and political trust. Ruiz-Rufino and Alonso (2017), for instance, rely on a difference-in-difference analysis to show that those countries that experienced intervention had significantly lower satisfaction with democracy than those that did not. In a similar vein, both Schraff and Schimmelfennig (2019) and Armingeon et al. (2016) use the synthetic control method to provide a counterfactual for those countries which experienced intervention, showing that had the trends continued without intervention, democratic satisfaction would have been higher. At the same time, qualitative and policy-oriented research identifies the interventions as a step-change in the governance of the Eurozone and EU more generally (e.g Laffan, 2014; Crum, 2013).

Whilst the existing literature utilises the most rigorous methods available, it is limited by the use of aggregate or infrequent data. All existing research uses survey datasets such as the Eurobarometer, which are six-monthly, and either conduct multilevel analyses or aggregate trend analysis. Two issues remain with this inference. First is whether the aggregate relationships are consistent at the individual level, which is not a given. Second is the common issue of whether there are some omitted variables, either through a missing control variable or some event that occurred in between survey periods. Due to these limitations, existing literature cannot be sure about the effect of economic interventions.

This chapter overcomes these issues and tests the following hypothesis on the effects of economic interventions:

H$_1$: Economic interventions reduce political support.

In addition, existing contributions do not, and cannot, test the mechanism linking interventions with political support which are outlined in figure 7.1 due to their reliance on aggregated survey measures. Schraff and Schimmelfennig (2019) explicitly acknowledge that the individual-level mechanisms are 'uncharted territory' (though see Torcal, 2014).

As figure 7.1 depicts, there are three causal pathways in the existing literature. The primary interest in this chapter is on the mechanism of perceived constraint depicted by the solid arrow, and which is the dominant explanation

Economic Intervention

Aggregate Citizen Support

Macro level

Micro level

Perceived Responsiveness

Economic Evaluations

Perceived Constraint

Individual Citizen Support

Figure 7.1: Causal pathways from intervention to political support

in recent work. The mainstream empirical academic interest which explicitly tests this mechanism began largely with Polavieja (2013), who argued that citizens perceived the incapacity of their member state to deal with economic recession *if they were in the Eurozone*, which explains the divergence between Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries with regard to political support. Studies since have built on Polavieja's general assertion, deepening the case for such a relationship. In particular, Armingeon and Guthmann (2014, p. 425) studied political support over the period 2007-2011 and argued that the limited room to manoeuvre, reflected in policy imposition from the International Monetary Fund, the EU and the European Central Bank - the *troika* - reduced political support as a result of citizens attributing 'the loss of political manoeuvrability to these external actors'. In other words, since citizens believe that national democracy has stopped working, they would revoke support for it. The authors provide some support for these hypotheses across 26 European countries at both the individual and aggregate levels. In a similar vein, Armingeon et al. (2016) show using both survey data and a quasi-experimental synthetic control method how the effect of economic decline is stronger in EMU countries, which they attribute to the fact that these have not had the ability to independently decide economic policy.

However, Ruiz-Rufino and Alonso (2017) show how, whilst this can explain the uneven development of political support between EMU and non-EMU countries, it can tell us nothing about the divergence *within* the Eurozone - for instance, between Germany and Greece. Ultimately, they argue that EMU membership cannot capture the actual loss of governmental autonomy.

They therefore operationalise the loss of governmental autonomy more narrowly as direct interventions by the *troika*. Their excellent analysis, based on difference-in-difference estimates, shows that troika interventions had a significant effect on political support even controlling for economic conditions. The authors go as far to say that this is the main mechanism explaining the decline in political support. In a similar analysis, Schraff and Schimmelfennig (2019) use the synthetic control method to show that bailouts significantly negatively impacted satisfaction with democracy, but with considerable variation in effect sizes across countries; moreover, effects disappeared after a few years. They conclude on the contrary to Ruiz-Rufino and Alonso (2017) that economic evaluations matter more than input factors.

Meanwhile, Cordero and Simón (2016) find competing results. Specifically, they find that satisfaction with democracy is not affected by being bailed out, but being bailed out does increase support for democracy as a regime in general. They similarly find that GDP decline is insignificant; rather, perceptions of economic change and the age of a democracy are the main determinants of democratic satisfaction. This is nonetheless an anomaly; most research either finds empirically that bailouts negatively impact political support or highlight its role in domestic politics and its potential for a negative impact on public opinion (e.g Katsourides, 2014).

Despite this recent empirical work, there is little discussion on *why* perceived constraint leads to a change in political support. The theoretical argument is that a lack of autonomy signals a lack of democratic choice, both for a government to respond to a mandate and for citizens to choose amongst a legitimate set of choices. That citizens have some democratic choice over policies is a bedrock of even the most minimalist conceptions of democracy (Riker, 1982; Przeworski, 2010; Downs, 1957). Without choice between policy, the democratic process is reduced to 'ratify[ing] choices made elsewhere' (Przeworski, 2010, p. 117). The context under study here is an example of this 'democracy without choice' (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2017). Since political support is concerned with 'the level of support for how the democratic regime works in practice' the undermining of a core prerequisite for democratic governance may logically lead to a reduction in this support (Linde & Ekman, 2003). A contention is that voters did indeed have choice over policy: in the wake of the Eurozone crisis, numerous parties offered a rejection of the bailout policy programmes which voters could choose from and mobilise around. However, there are two arguments against this. Firstly, it needs to be a meaningful and effective choice which could be enacted when in government; it is important that governments can act on this mandate, not just for citizens to choose

amongst a set of nominal choices. Greece's Syriza is a clear example of this. Secondly, academic work has shown that countries that experienced intervention actually had lower levels of citizen-party congruence (Traber, Giger & Häusermann, 2018) and that many parties depoliticised the European issue (Turnbull-Dugarte, 2019).

Following this discussion, this chapter tests this argument and posits the following hypothesis:

H$_2$: Increased perceptions of constraint reduce political support

Perceptions of economic conditions are the dominant explanation for variation in political support in general, and are one of the primary explanations for the decline in support over the economic crisis (Morlino & Quaranta, 2016; Foster & Frieden, 2017; Drakos, Kallandranis & Karidis, 2019). In this pathway, what matters is the role that interventions play in individuals updating their economic beliefs; the intervention signals that economic conditions are extremely poor, and people update their (negative) beliefs about domestic economic performance, which has repercussions for political support. Whilst the specific role of interventions in impacting economic evaluations has not been explored, the role of economic evaluations in forming system support is widely documented across countries (van Ham et al., 2017; Martini & Quaranta, 2020). An important qualification to this is that existing research shows that subjective economic evaluations exert a larger and more robust effect than objective economic conditions (Van Der Meer, 2018).

The chapter tests the following hypothesis as an alternative explanation to *H$_2$*:

H$_3$: Worse economic evaluations reduce political support

An additional potential pathway in the literature, which has received less attention, is that interventions limit the responsiveness of domestic governments, which reduces citizen support (Torcal, 2014). In this case, citizens do not perceive their government as constrained by international actors, but rather only that it is no longer responsive to their needs. The mechanism of responsiveness is one that is common within the literature on explaining political support, tapping into the 'input' determinants of political support rather than the economic-driven 'output' determinants (Torcal, 2014; Brandenburg & Johns, 2014; Reher, 2015; André & Depauw, 2017; Linde & Peters, 2018). An important clarification to stress here is that external interventions may have been the causal mechanism leading to a lack of responsiveness, but that it is the lack of domestic responsiveness that matters for citizens and not the lack of autonomy

vis-a-vis an external actor. Whilst this and perceived constraint are closely related, the key mechanism is different. Citizens can recognise that political actors are not responsive to their demands, without recognising that they are constrained by external actors. In other words, the mechanism is not through perceived constraints on autonomy. Unfortunately, the data is not available to test this mechanism alongside the previous two.

Data and Methods

Before developing the analysis, I will explain the data and modelling used in the analysis. To test the first hypothesis, I rely on aggregate descriptive trends drawn from the Eurobarometer data set (2001-2017) as well as a quasi-experimental 'Unexpected Event During Survey Design' (UESD) analysis from Portugal (Muñoz et al., 2019). For the quasi-experimental analysis, I use Eurobarometer 75.3 in May 2011 which occurs during the period in which Portugal was requesting and being granted a bailout loan. Whilst Portugal requested a loan on the 7th of April, this was approved by the Eurogroup and ECO-FIN ministers on the 16th May. The fieldwork in Portugal occurs between 7th May and 22nd May, providing a sample both before and after the press release for the official approving of a bailout which came with stipulations on Portugal's budget deficit. I therefore separate the sample into those interviewed before the press release (the control group) and those interviewed on or after the 17th of May, after the press release (the treated group). 77% of the sample are untreated with the remaining 23% treated, equalling 803 and 245 respondents respectively. This design, whilst coming with its own limitations and assumptions, provides a considerable contribution to the evidence on the effect of interventions on political support (Muñoz et al., 2019). I control for basic demographics of gender, education, age and occupation.

For the second and third hypotheses, I use the European Election Study data sets in 2009 and 2014. To measure perceived constraint, I use relative responsibility attribution between the EU and domestic governments as described in chapter 4 (Wilson & Hobolt, 2015; Hobolt & Tilley, 2014b). To recap, this takes the value of 0 if the respondent attributes responsibility for economic conditions to the domestic government or equally to the domestic and EU levels and 1 if they attribute more responsibility to the EU. The aim of this variable is to capture the relative autonomy the domestic government has for the given policy area vis-a-vis the European Union. This interpretation of relative responsibility is consistent with other uses of responsibility attribution in domestic politics, such as economic voting (e.g Lobo & Lewis-Beck, 2012).

To measure economic evaluations, I use both prospective and retrospective economic evaluations. The questions ask the respondent, respectively, how they think the economy is compared to 12 months ago, and how it will be over the next 12 months. The respondents can choose between five categories (excluding don't know), from the economy is/will be 'a lot better' through to 'a lot worse'. This too is not without problems. Subjective economic perceptions are not always related to objective economic conditions, and are prone to voter rationalisation and endogeneity with other attitudes, like trust (e.g Hobolt & Tilley, 2014b). It should be made clear that this is therefore not measuring necessarily accurate perceptions of what the economy is like, but perceptions nonetheless.

There are two dependent variables. These are the dependent variables used throughout the thesis and the primary indicators used to study political support (e.g Armingeon & Guthmann, 2014; Armingeon et al., 2016; Ares et al., 2017; Norris, 2011). The specific question used for satisfaction with democracy (SWD) is *'On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]? Are you: very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied'*. However, I collapse the measure to a binary variable where 1 = very satisfied and fairly satisfied and 0 = not very satisfied or not at all satisfied. This is done because under the ordinal model approximately half the countries failed the assumption of parallel lines. The results were the same between the ordinal and binary models and are presented in appendix C.

However, this is only used in 2009 and is not available in the 2014 data. In 2014, I use political trust. Whilst this is very useful at approaching a holistic understanding of political support, this means that the results are not directly comparable, despite being similar concepts as outlined in chapter 4. The precise question used is *'For each of the following statements, please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your attitude or opinion. You trust the [country's parliament]'* with the responses *'Yes, definitely, Yes, to some extent, No, not really, No, not at all'*. For the reasons outlined in the previous paragraph, I similarly collapse this to a binary variable where 0 = not really or not at all and 1 = definitely and to some extent.

I use controls at the individual and country levels. At the individual level, I control for common variables known to be related to political support more generally: gender, age, social class, education, political interest, political knowledge and left-right position. I also include potentially confounding factors between responsibility attribution and political support. Citizens use perceptual screens in apportioning responsibility, and at the EU level this may be views on EU enlargement (Hobolt & Tilley, 2014a); I therefore include views

on EU unification. I also use national identity in 2009, but this is not available in the 2014 data. In addition, I control for whether the respondent is a partisan of the incumbent party. Descriptions of question wordings and other data transformations are in appendix C.

I also control for four key country-level variables, as noted in table 4.4. The thesis in general is interested in the constraint entailed by being in the European Union. I thus include two key measures of this. The first is being in the Eurozone, which previous research has provided varying results and yet is the strongest form of economic constraint (Polavieja, 2013; Armingeon et al., 2016). In a similar vein, I also control for the length of EU membership (Armingeon & Ceka, 2013; Hix, 2003). This variable is shown to be important, but the expectations differ. On the one hand, those who are newer members of the EU are shown to have lower overall political support; on the other, as the room to manoeuvre theory suggests, longer in the EU may result in lower political support since they have had longer periods of 'diminished democracy'. In this analysis I make no expectations on the expected direction of this variable.

Research has similarly shown how the age of democracy matters in forming political support and particularly with regards to the EU, and so I control for the age of democracy, measured as the uninterrupted time that a country is a democracy as determined by the Polity IV data set (Armingeon & Guthmann, 2014; Dahlberg et al., 2015; Cordero & Simón, 2016; De Vries, 2018). Finally, I control for the 10-year interest rates of each country as obtained from the European Central Bank. This is an ideal measure for economic conditions as well as the amount of external economic pressure, as it is correlated so highly with IMF conditionality (Armingeon & Guthmann, 2014; Armingeon et al., 2016). Note that Estonia is not included in these interest rate figures and so is excluded from the final model. I do not control for other country-level factors such as general quality of governance or other economic conditions as I expect these variables to be so highly correlated with these that additional analysis would potentially mask the effects of interest.[2] Summary statistics for both of these analyses are presented in table 7.1. Note that due to missing individual-level variables, 2014 is a more parsimonious model. The primary variables under consideration are unchanged.

The modelling approach for the second and third hypotheses estimates the probability of the outcome equalling 1 (i.e being satisfied with democracy or trusting the parliament) via multilevel logistic regression with a random slope on the independent variable of interest. As noted previously, the logistic ap-

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[2]To guard against this, I conduct fixed effects analysis in appendix C.

Table 7.1: Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
2009 Analysis					
Satisfaction with Democracy	0.532	0.499	0	1	26457
EU Responsibility	0.18	0.384	0	1	24604
Gender	0.559	0.497	0	1	27068
Age	50.291	16.911	18	99	26763
Class	2.472	1.019	1	5	26128
Education	2.274	0.71	1	3	25063
Interest	1.561	0.901	0	3	26978
EU Unification	5.261	3.102	0	10	24693
Left-right	5.332	2.724	0	10	23647
Knowledge	3.919	1.868	0	7	26517
Retro. Economy	4.153	0.946	1	5	26789
Prosp. Economy	3.214	1.127	1	5	25785
Identity	1.703	0.716	1	4	26535
Incumbent Party ID	0.249	0.433	0	1	27069
Eurozone	0.703	0.457	0	1	27069
EU Membership	22.09	19.13	2	52	27069
Interest Rates	5.797	2.916	3.47	14.5	26062
Time as Democracy	42.036	20.852	16	64	27069
2014 Analysis					
Political Trust	0.46	0.498	0	1	29377
EU Responsibility	0.186	0.389	0	1	28247
Gender	0.549	0.498	0	1	30064
Age	51.057	17.92	16	99	30064
Education	2.27	0.812	1	4	29511
Interest	2.594	0.983	1	4	29859
EU Unification	5.659	3.106	1	11	27362
Left-right	6.077	2.628	1	11	24388
Knowledge	2.733	1.14	0	4	30064
Retro. Economy	3.207	1.007	1	5	29449
Prosp. Economy	2.995	0.934	1	5	28349
Incumbent Party ID	0.309	0.462	0	1	30064
Eurozone	0.652	0.476	0	1	30064
EU Membership	26.598	19.399	1	57	30064
Interest Rates	2.719	1.213	1.26	6	28977
Time as Democracy	45.912	21.793	14	69	30064

proach is more robust than the ordinal model. The ordinal model's assumption of parallel lines, that the effect of each category is the same, was failed in approximately half the countries in the sample, whilst the diagnostics from the logistic model are much more promising. This also has the benefit of being easier to interpret. I present residual diagnostics in appendix C.[3] The multi-level structure is necessary primarily because of the interest in aggregate-level factors as well as individual level, but also there is a considerable amount of cross-national variation in the dependent variables; the intra-cluster correlation for satisfaction with democracy is 24% and for trust 21%, as estimated using Stata's *estat icc* command. I impose a random slope on the independent variable since I expect the slope to vary across countries; the theoretical framework argues that the effect of subjective constraint may be influenced by elites within each country. This also allows a coefficient to be extracted for each country, rather than one fixed coefficient. To be clear, the general equation for the estimation in both cross-sectional analyses is:

$$pr(Y = 1)_{i,j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}X_{i,j} + \gamma_{10}Resp_{i,j} + \gamma_{01}Z_j + U_{0,j} + U_{1,j}Resp_{i,j} + R_{i,j}$$

Where $\gamma_{10}Resp_{i,j}$ represents the relative responsibility attribution for individual i in country j. $\gamma_{10}X_{i,j}$ and $\gamma_{01}Z_j$ represent a vector of control variables at the individual and country levels respectively, whilst $U_{0,j}$ and $R_{i,j}$ are the error for individual and country levels. γ_{00} is of course the intercept which, in this case, represents the value for the average group (country). $U_{1,j}Resp_{i,j}$ is the random slope on the responsibility variable, which can be seen as a random interaction between the variable and country (Snijders & Bosker, 2012).

Results

The Effect of Economic Intervention on Political Support

To test the first hypothesis, this section firstly presents descriptive trends on political support in the European Union from 2001 to 2017, both for the EU as a whole and for the countries which experienced explicit economic interventions. Ultimately, it remains unclear from these aggregate trends whether interventions resulted in a reduction of political support or whether it was simply a continuation of economic distress. However, I then provide a quasi-

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[3]Note that residual diagnostics, and model fit overall, are much less developed for generalised linear models than their linear counterparts.

experimental analysis from Portugal which suggests that there was indeed a causal effect of economic intervention, at least in the specific case of Portugal. These provide support for the initial proposition to motivate further analysis of the underlying mechanism.

Firstly, figure 7.2 presents aggregate Eurobarometer data on both trust and satisfaction with democracy from 2001 to 2017 for all EU countries, with trust being the percentage of those who answered 'tend to trust' and satisfaction the percentage of those who answered 'very' or 'completely' satisfied. Worth noting is how the two variables trend together (with a correlation of 84%). Similarly, whilst the trends are the same, trust is far lower and more erratic, supporting the argument that satisfaction represents a more diffuse (and stable) aspect of political support. The trends are also as we would expect: decreasing trust and satisfaction over the period of the recession (2008-2013) and increasing after.

Figure 7.2: Trends in Political Support

As not to clutter the graphs, figure 7.3 presents the aggregate trend of satisfaction with democracy but only for countries that experienced the worst of the recession as well as interventions. The patterns for trust are much the same, with variation in country rankings, so are not presented. The interventions are marked on the graphs by the vertical dashed lines: Greece and Ireland in 2010;

Portugal, Spain and Italy in 2011; Spain (partial signature) in 2012; and Cyprus in 2013. This paints a more complex picture. For instance, Ireland seems to become marginally more satisfied in the year of the intervention, and Greece continues an essentially linear decrease in dissatisfaction that began in 2007. The year 2011 in Portugal signals an increase in dissatisfaction, whilst Cyprus, Spain and Italy, like Greece, simply continue a linear increase. From these descriptive aggregate figures, it is difficult to discern a notable pattern. All except Ireland fit a theoretical model in which interventions lead to reduced political support, but an equally plausible explanation is the continued economic crisis, both real and perceived. This reinforces the problems with existing literature discussed in the previous section.

Figure 7.3: Trends in Satisfaction with Democracy, Intervened Countries

The data used in these graphs is the best available, but is not ideal. Eurobarometer data is collected on a six-monthly basis, so any potential change could be due to some other intervening factor. Whilst numerous authors, particularly Ruiz-Rufino and Alonso (2017), have provided evidence that economic interventions impact political support, they similarly suffer from the problem that time between observations makes causal inference difficult. In addition, the explanatory analyses in this literature have focused entirely on combining binary aggregate indicators of a loss of autonomy, such as being under inter-

vention, with individual-level observational data, which poses its own problems to causal inference. Before continuing, I provide further evidence that interventions impacted political support using the UEDS design and Eurobarometer 75.3.

I regress a binary indicator for whether the respondent was interviewed before or after the intervention, along with gender, education, age and occupation, on a binary indicator for whether the respondent trusts the Parliament. Figure 7.4 presents a marginal effects plot from this regression. The full output is presented in appendix C

Figure 7.4: Marginal Effect of the Intervention on Political Trust in Portugal

The results show that those interviewed after the bailout are statistically significantly less likely to express trust in their national parliament by 6.8 percentage points. Although with a large confidence interval, this also suggests that the effect is detectable even with relatively few observations. Gender exerts a similar effect[4], whilst education, age and occupation are not statistically different from zero. This analysis provides significant evidence in support of the first hypothesis that economic interventions did lead to a reduced level

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[4]It's not clear why this is the case. The evidence regarding gender's effect on support is ambiguous, but it may simply be that women are on average more trusting in this case.

of political support, especially when seen in light of the existing academic research. The drawback here is that this is limited to Portugal. Except in Ireland, however, all countries decrease in political support (in both indicators) following the year of economic interventions, so it is at least plausible that this effect is consistent across countries. The weight of evidence, however, from existing research is that it had a causal impact in all Southern European countries.

Following the guidance of Muñoz et al. (2019), I conduct a number of robustness tests. I create a placebo test, using the median of the control group as the date of intervention (in this case, the 12th of May, four days before the actual date of intervention). I run this placebo test with the same model as above, both including and excluding those interviewed after the actual intervention date. I also limit the bandwidth to three days before and after the intervention to test whether the result is robust to both a smaller sample size and to exclude the possibility that people became gradually less trusting over time regardless of the intervention. The result is consistent across all specifications.

Finally, I change the dependent variable to trust in the EU and trust in government (rather than Parliament). It is notable that the intervention was not significant for trust in the EU nor trust in the government, with the coefficient trivial in size, suggesting it mattered uniquely for the more diffuse level of national support this thesis aims to understand. This also indicates that those who were interviewed after the intervention were not just more distrusting generally. Gender is still a significant determinant of trust in both of these cases, suggesting that the significant coefficient for the treated group is not an artefact of gender (see appendix table C.4.

The Mechanisms Linking Interventions to Political Support

Descriptive Analysis

Tables 7.2 and 7.3 present descriptive data which indicates whether individuals who live in countries that had been, or were to be, under intervention would be more likely to hold the EU responsible. This is an important consideration. If it was indeed the case that perceptions about how much autonomy governments have formed political support, it is expected that this should be reflected in relatively more people recognising this. Of course, this is not a precondition: it is possible that on the aggregate most do not notice, but those who do update their political support. It should also be noted that the years of data collection are not ideal: 2009 was before the bailouts, and 2014 is towards the end of the conditionality. But it is assumed here that the public were becoming well aware of the potential for bailouts and of the role of international

organisations in the development of the economic crisis.

Table 7.2: EU Responsibility and SWD in selected countries (2009)

Country	EU Responsible (%)	Diff. to mean (%)	SWD diff. to mean (%)
IMF Only			
Hungary	8	-10	-33
Latvia	8	-10	-37
Romania	26	+8	-28
EU/IMF			
Greece	26	+8	-25
Italy	24	+6	-6
Portugal	24	+6	+9
Cyprus	34	+16	+7
Spain	24	+6	+7
Ireland	13	-5	+14
EU Average	**18**	**0**	**0**

The results in 2009 largely support the argument that individuals noticed the growing presence of supranational institutions. In the countries that were to be under EU and IMF conditionality, people hold the EU far more responsible than the EU average. Yet those who were only under IMF conditionality hold the EU much less responsible than average, suggesting that individuals were quite good at separating out those responsible for the external imposition, even if the EU was involved to a lesser degree. The two outliers are Romania and Ireland. The pattern for Ireland fits with the descriptive trends presented in figure 7.2, where they have higher levels of satisfaction despite being under intervention. However, problematically for the theory at hand, there is no clear pattern with regard to satisfaction with democracy. Whilst Romania, Greece and Italy have lower satisfaction and hold the EU more responsible, Portugal, Cyprus and Spain have higher satisfaction than average whilst holding the EU more responsible.

These problems become more pertinent when considering the data from 2014 in table 7.3. Unlike would be predicted from current work, during the period where satisfaction was still significantly lower in the 'intervened' countries relative to the 'non-intervened' countries (Ruiz-Rufino & Alonso, 2017), they were actually less likely to hold the EU responsible than the EU average. Ireland bucks the trend in this regard, but only by 1%. Meanwhile, as would be expected, political trust is considerably lower than average. At first blush, this descriptive data challenges the underlying mechanism posited by recent literature. It seems only in 2009, at the very start of the recession (but before bail-outs), do citizens recognise the relative lack of manoeuvre. By 2014, this is no longer the case, and indeed quite the opposite. It also suggests that if there

Table 7.3: EU Responsibility and Trust in selected countries (2014)

Country	EU Responsible (%)	Diff. to mean (%)	Trust diff. to mean (%)
IMF Only			
Hungary	18	-1	+5
Latvia	11	-18	-17
Romania	36	+17	-17
EU/IMF			
Greece	13	-6	-24
Italy	18	-1	-22
Portugal	13	-6	-15
Cyprus	17	-2	-2
Spain	16	-3	-18
Ireland	20	+1	-5
EU Average	**19**	**0**	**0**

is any effect, it is likely to be temporary. Meanwhile, there is no discernible relationship with regard to political support.

Explanatory Analysis

It may be the case that whilst the aggregate figures suggest little relationship between support and relative responsibility, the individual relationship differs. To explore this further, I carry out logistic multilevel regressions in both time periods. This includes a random slope on the key independent variable. Table 7.4 presents the results from the analysis of the 2009 data. For clarity, I include only the coefficients for theoretically relevant variables. Full models, including step-wise inclusion of demographic and attitudinal controls, are in appendix C. I include an interaction between EU responsibility and views on EU unification, as this was indicated to be a superior model fit[5] as well as being theoretically linked to both responsibility and political support (Hobolt & Tilley, 2014a). Country-level variables are included step-wise.

The results show no significant effect for perceived constraint, and this does not change across models. All other theoretically interesting variables are significant and signed in the expected direction. Economic evaluations, both prospective and retrospective, which exert a potent effect on SWD: as evaluations worsen, so do people's satisfaction, supporting H_3. By far the greatest impact is whether one is a partisan of the incumbent government. Of more interest in this case are the country variables. These provide a strong rebuttal to current findings, insofar as the variables used to identify constraint in the existing literature are insignificant. On the contrary, there are positive effects in

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[5]I provide details of this and other specifications in the robustness tests section

the most-likely countries. Even interest rates, the variable used to identify effects of external economic pressure, is rendered insignificant once institutional consolidation is controlled for. This contradicts previous work (Armingeon & Guthmann, 2014), and some work that focuses on the effects of interest rates as a key variable exclude institutional consolidation (Armingeon et al., 2016). At the very least, it highlights again the importance of including democratic legacies in studying political support, the exclusion of which may have led to incorrect inferences.

However, it may also be the case that the coefficient on EU responsibility masks between-country variation, since the coefficient is the group average. The significant random slope would suggest so. To reveal these effects, figure 7.5 extracts the random effects and their standard errors for each country and graphs them according to their odds ratio (i.e, the exponent of the logit coefficient). Indeed, the figure shows interesting country patterns. In direct contradiction to H_2, the results show that citizens residing in Portugal, Italy and to a lesser extent Cyprus (significant at the 10% level) that hold the EU more responsible are more likely to be satisfied with democracy than those who do not. There are no countries for which the effect is negative, and in all others the effect is not significant. This is of crucial importance to the argument that perceived lack of room to manoeuvre explains the decline in political support: a year after the start of the crisis, at a point when the role of international constraints is prominent in national political discourse, there is no evidence that this is the case. Even country level variables do not show any significant effects, at least once institutional consolidation is controlled for.

However, it is also possible that notable effects did not begin until after 2010 - the year of the start of interventions, beginning in Greece and Ireland. Whilst previous research indicates such changes were occurring in 2009 (Ruiz-Rufino & Alonso, 2017) and the trends presented in figure 7.2 are also consistent with this, it has been shown that there were also independent effects following direct interventions, as shown in figure 7.4 in the case of Portugal.

There is no cross-national data available close to interventions. However, table 7.6 shows the coefficients for the same analysis on 2014 data; this is just a year after Cyprus signed a Memorandum of Understanding, and two years after Spain. Here, the interaction is removed as it does not provide a better model fit. The results are remarkably consistent, with a coefficient in the final model almost identical to the 2009 model (0.0529 compared to 0.0570). Economic evaluations and incumbent party ID exert similar powerful effects. There are, however, interesting changes with regard to the country variables. As previously, institutional consolidation is highly significant and positive. Yet

Table 7.4: Multilevel Regression Results with Country-Level Variables (2009)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Individual-level Variables				
EU Responsibility	0.0449	0.0452	0.0555	0.0570
	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.108)	(0.108)
EU Unification	0.0760***	0.0761***	0.0749***	0.0752***
	(0.00678)	(0.00678)	(0.00692)	(0.00692)
Retrospective Economy	-0.235***	-0.235***	-0.236***	-0.237***
	(0.0207)	(0.0207)	(0.0210)	(0.0210)
Prospective Economy	-0.297***	-0.296***	-0.288***	-0.287***
	(0.0172)	(0.0172)	(0.0176)	(0.0176)
Incumbent Party ID	0.579***	0.578***	0.583***	0.583***
	(0.0423)	(0.0423)	(0.0429)	(0.0429)
EU Resp× EU Unification	-0.0297*	-0.0298*	-0.0313*	-0.0316*
	(0.0144)	(0.0144)	(0.0146)	(0.0146)
Demographic Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Attitudinal Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country-level Variables				
Eurozone	0.00470	-0.330	-0.362	-0.333
	(0.413)	(0.376)	(0.343)	(0.286)
Time in EU		0.0266**	0.0158	-0.00833
		(0.00898)	(0.00951)	(0.0107)
Interest Rates			-0.157**	-0.0753
			(0.0597)	(0.0553)
Time as Democracy				0.0360***
				(0.0106)
Random Variation				
EU Responsible	0.0779*	0.0768*	0.0790*	0.0787*
	(0.0364)	(0.0361)	(0.0375)	(0.0374)
Intercept	0.949***	0.713***	0.568***	0.391***
	(0.262)	(0.198)	(0.161)	(0.112)
Observations	17701	17701	17155	17155
LogLik	-9663.1	-9659.3	-9309.3	-9304.6
AIC	19372.2	19366.6	18668.7	18661.2

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 7.5: Random Effects Parameter Estimates by Country (2009)

in this model, the length of time a country has been in the EU is significant at the 5% level and negatively signed. In other words, the probability of trusting the national parliament decreases the longer a country is a member of the EU. This provides initial, suggestive support for the constraint argument more broadly. It is also worth noting the random slope is less significant (now at the 10% level, not shown on the table), suggesting there is less between country variation.

As in the analysis of the 2009 data, the random effects from the model are graphed in figure 7.6. The pattern stays much the same, but the relationship weakens. Only Greece is now significant beyond the 10% level. Meanwhile, the previously significant countries have become null effects. Those countries one would expect an effect - namely Cyprus and Spain - are not significant. Collectively, these results entirely reject H_2 and the dominant argument from the recent literature. Although the results are limited by the nature of the underlying data, such as being cross-sectional and from time periods slightly before and too long after the direct interventions, it would be surprising to see the results change direction. For the argument outlined at the beginning of the chapter and formalised in H_2 to be valid would require a reversal of the relationship in all of the likely cases. These results then are important because they go against the dominant causal mechanism within the literature and, indeed, suggest that the EU intervention is actually a life buoy for political support in Southern Europe.

The results are consistent with H_3: in both models, retrospective and prospective economic evaluations are significant and substantively important. With economic evaluations playing a pivotal role in the formation of political support over the crisis and perceived constraint being insignificant or in the opposite direction, these results echo the claim that economic factors are more important 'than the quality of the democratic process' (Schraff & Schimmelfennig, 2019, p. 1).

Replications: Portugal (2012) and Belgium (2019)

A key critique of cross-sectional data is that the results may not replicate in different samples, whether due to the actual sampling of the survey or the period and place. To ascertain the robustness of the core analysis, I conduct two replications in new datasets and in different time periods. The first is a data set from Portugal.[6] The data was collected in 2012 and consists of 1209 face-to-face

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[6]The data is available from: http://er.cies.iscte-iul.pt/en/node/23. A full description of the sampling is available at: http://er.cies.iscte-iul.pt/sites/default/dfiles/Mass%20Survey%20Report%20-%20FINAL.pdf

Table 7.5: Multilevel Regression Results with Country-Level Variables (2014)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Individual-level Variables				
EU Responsibility	0.0312	0.0314	0.0526	0.0529
	(0.0594)	(0.0595)	(0.0584)	(0.0574)
EU Unification	0.0928***	0.0930***	0.0930***	0.0933***
	(0.00579)	(0.00579)	(0.00591)	(0.00591)
Retrospective Economy	-0.324***	-0.324***	-0.324***	-0.323***
	(0.0223)	(0.0223)	(0.0227)	(0.0227)
Prospective Economy	-0.423***	-0.423***	-0.410***	-0.409***
	(0.0236)	(0.0236)	(0.0239)	(0.0239)
Incumbent Party ID	0.609***	0.610***	0.624***	0.625***
	(0.0357)	(0.0357)	(0.0364)	(0.0364)
Demographic Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Attitudinal Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country-level Variables				
Eurozone	0.212	-0.0275	-0.0231	-0.0590
	(0.350)	(0.349)	(0.340)	(0.249)
Time in EU		0.0167*	0.0101	-0.0228*
		(0.00843)	(0.00931)	(0.00960)
Interest Rates			-0.243	-0.0887
			(0.132)	(0.102)
Time as Democracy				0.0432***
				(0.00891)
Random Variation				
EU Responsibility	0.0465	0.0467	0.0397	0.0367
	(0.0272)	(0.0273)	(0.0261)	(0.0252)
Intercept	0.740***	0.647***	0.582***	0.306***
	(0.201)	(0.176)	(0.162)	(0.0861)
Observations	20842	20842	20208	20208
LogLik	-11175.6	-11173.8	-10813.5	-10805.0
AIC	22389.3	22387.6	21669.1	21654.1

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 7.6: Random Effects Parameter Estimates by Country (2014)

interviews, selected through multi-stage probability sampling. The timing is excellent, providing a midway point between the 2009 and 2014 data analysis and just a year after Portugal experienced the economic intervention. The data also contains an approximation of the key independent variable, since it asks respondents to rank how much responsibility the Portugese government and the EU have for the recent economic conditions on a scale of 1-5.[7]. It also asks an identical question on satisfaction with democracy with the same response categories.[8]

Following the main analysis, I create a measure of relative responsibility by subtracting the responsibility from the EU and domestic government and dichotomise the democratic satisfaction indicator. I also control for demographics (sex, age, education, employment status), political interest, views on EU unification, left-right self positioning, retrospective economic views and whether the respondent is a partisan of the incumbent government. The results from the model, including both a continuous and binary version of the independent variable, are presented in table 7.6.

The results are consistent with the 2014 analysis, but not the 2009 analysis. Whilst the coefficient is signed differently, it is within the margin of error as predicted by the multilevel analysis and the country-level analysis in the Appendix. This provides additional evidence closer to the intervention that autonomy was not the causal mechanism. In this analysis, as in the preceding ones, economic evaluations provide the greatest predictor.

The second replication is drawn from the Belgian Election Study 2019.[9] This data set is a unique opportunity for a replication study for two reasons. Firstly, the dataset contains a direct measure of perceived constraint due to European integration.[10] It also contains responsibility attributions between the EU and domestic government identical in response scale to the core analysis.[11] Therefore, it can act as both a replication of the original measure as in the previous example and as a comparison to a more direct measure. The correlation between the direct measure and relative responsibility attribution

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[7]The exact question wording is: *'In the past few years the economy has been in recession. How responsible, if at all, are each of the following for the poor economic conditions of the past two years? Extremely responsible, Very responsible, moderately responsible, A little responsible, Not at all responsible'*

[8]The exact wording is *'On the whole are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in Portugal?'*

[9]I thank Dr Cal Le Gall (UC Louvain) for providing me with access to the data

[10]The specific question is: 'To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? "The European Union gives enough leeway to the Belgian Government in the economic field"', with a five category response scale

[11]The specific questions are: 'To what extent is the [European Union/Belgian Government] responsible for the economic conditions of Belgium?'

Table 7.6: Robustness Test: Portugal (2012)

	(1) Continuous IV	(2) Binary IV
EU Responsibility	-0.0937 (0.108)	
EU Responsibility		-0.223 (0.439)
Gender	0.0166 (0.230)	0.0187 (0.231)
Age	-0.000000221 (0.00894)	-0.000487 (0.00893)
Education	0.237** (0.0772)	0.235** (0.0771)
Interest	0.417** (0.143)	0.415** (0.143)
EU Unification	0.0414 (0.0370)	0.0438 (0.0369)
Left-Right	0.106 (0.0631)	0.104 (0.0630)
Ret. Economy	0.357** (0.128)	0.360** (0.129)
Incumbent Party ID	0.208 (0.327)	0.225 (0.325)
Employment Status	-0.0507 (0.0439)	-0.0524 (0.0438)
Constant	-5.053*** (0.892)	-5.321*** (0.835)
Observations	803	803

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

is 33%, indicating a relatively high modest correlation. Finally, the dependent variable is satisfaction with democracy, consistent with the Portuguese analysis. The exact question is 'Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy is working in Belgium?', with five responses from very satisfied (1) to very unsatisfied (5). A negative coefficient on predictor variables would mean an increase in satisfaction.

Control variables are kept as consistent as possible, but does not include economic perceptions, incumbent party identification and employment status. Particularly the former two are important, and so these results should be seen with some reservation.

The results are presented in table 7.7. Turning first to the second two columns which use the responsibility measure identical to the one in the core analysis, the results are consistent with both the previous robustness test and the core analysis, showing no significant effect of relative responsibility attribution on democratic satisfaction. However, the direct measure is significant at the 1% level and negatively signed. This means that as people agree more with the statement 'The European Union gives enough leeway to the Belgian Government in the economic field', they are more satisfied with the way democracy works in Belgium. In other words, the less they perceive their government is constrained by the EU, the more satisfied they are with democracy. Whilst the effect is not extremely large, it is not trivial: going from perceiving the maximum to minimum leeway decreases the predicted level of democratic satisfaction by a fifth.

This provides some uncertainty over the results presented so far. On the one hand, it is a close and successful replication of the core analysis, with the relative responsibility attribution being consistent. On the other hand, the direct measure of the relative influence of the EU and domestic government supports H_2 and the arguments in recent literature, although there remains the issue of key omitted variables, such as incumbent party identification.

This has two implications. The first is whether the direct measure also really picks up the concept of perceived constraint, or is also prone to attribution biases. Economic evaluations are not available in this survey to test this properly. The second is whether the chosen proxy for this in previous analyses is appropriate. Despite them being quite well correlated (33%), the results differ. This requires further methodological testing of different questions before a clear conclusion can be reached.

Table 7.7: Robustness Test: Belgium (2019)

	(1) Direct Measure	(2) Continuous IV	(3) Binary IV
Direct Measure	-0.211***		
	(0.0251)		
EU Responsibility		-0.00647	
		(0.00877)	
EU Responsibility			0.0217
			(0.0575)
Gender (r.c Male)			
Woman	0.000311	-0.00665	-0.00829
	(0.0436)	(0.0444)	(0.0444)
Other	-0.296	-0.496	-0.483
	(0.546)	(0.555)	(0.555)
Age	0.00499***	0.00559***	0.00563***
	(0.00122)	(0.00124)	(0.00124)
Education	-0.0405	-0.0647**	-0.0625**
	(0.0224)	(0.0227)	(0.0226)
Interest	-0.0423***	-0.0437***	-0.0438***
	(0.00809)	(0.00825)	(0.00826)
EU Unification	-0.0667***	-0.100***	-0.0991***
	(0.00840)	(0.00774)	(0.00768)
Left-Right	-0.00958	-0.0139	-0.0141
	(0.00840)	(0.00854)	(0.00854)
Constant	4.592***	4.198***	4.191***
	(0.126)	(0.118)	(0.120)
Observations	2015	2008	2008

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Robustness Tests

However, there are numerous empirical barriers to inference. Aside from the unavoidable issues that cross-sectional analysis brings, the primary issue concerns the use of responsibility attributions as the explanatory variable. Although this has been theoretically and empirically defended in chapter 4, I have conducted multiple robustness tests. In this section, I present two. First, I present a range of alternative models that test for 'selective attribution', or whether the findings presented are purely the result of individuals apportioning blame (credit) for poor (good) economic conditions in line with their pre-existing attitudes. I then show how the results are identical if the IMF is considered rather than the European Union. In appendix C, I also present regressions from each country (instead of multilevel modelling), fixed effects models, and models testing the interaction with economic evaluations, alongside numerous statistical robustness tests. The results are consistent across all of the tests.

Selective Attribution

To test whether the results in the core analysis, and the measure used more generally, are prone to attribution biases, tables 7.8 and 7.9 present model fit statistics and likelihood ratio tests of various interactions of the main independent variable with important sources of attribution bias: views on European unification, economic evaluations, incumbent party identification, and a three-way interaction between retrospective economic evaluations and views on EU integration. The likelihood ratio test compares these models with the base model, which contains no interactions but is otherwise the same. A significant test here indicates that the model is a better fit than the base model. For the 2009 data, the model comparisons show that only an interaction between the main explanatory variable and views on EU unification is significantly better than the base model. Interactions between economic evaluations and incumbent party ID are not. Whilst the three-way interaction between retrospective economic evaluations, EU views and responsibility is significantly different, another test (not shown) between this and the model with the EU unification interaction shows no significant difference, suggesting that it is view on European unification that are doing the work in the three-way interaction. For this reason, the interaction was included in the main models presented above.

The pattern is much the same for the 2014 data. In this case, the three-way interaction is the only significantly different model. However, it is significant

Table 7.8: Model Diagnostic Comparisons (2009)

Model	AIC/BIC	Loglik	LR-test with base
Base Model	18663/18857	-9306.93	N/A
Resp×Unif	18661/18862	-9304.61	p=0.0311
Resp×Retro	18665/18866	-9306.61	p=0.4205
Resp×Prosp	18665/18867	-9306.75	p=0.5447
Resp×Incumbent	18665/18866	-9306.57	p=0.3972
Resp×Retro×EU	18663/18888	-9302.87	p=0.0869

at the 10% level, and given the loss of parsimony in interpreting such a model, it was decided that the base model was more appropriate. It is not clear why the two different models (2009 and 2014) differ; it may reflect actual changes in the formation of political attitudes, but it may also reflect the different dependent variables.

Table 7.9: Model Diagnostic Comparisons (2014)

Model	AIC/BIC	Loglik	LR-test with base
Base Model	22387/22530	-11175.82	N/A
Resp×Unif	22389/22540	-11175.81	p=0.8992
Resp×Retro	22389/22539	-11175.52	p=0.4370
Resp×Prosp	22389/22540	-11175.71	p=0.6498
Resp×Incumbent	22389/22540	-11175.58	p=0.4892
Resp×Retro×Unif	22387/22562	-11171.81	p=0.0913

It should be addressed why these results contradict other research using the same data. The most likely answer is that previous research has used the raw variables - in other words, the 11-point ranking of responsibility for each object (in this case, the EU and respective member state) - whilst this analysis has used relative attribution. Only more research using a similar approach can confirm that this is the case. However, for this particular research question, the relative responsibility is a more theoretically justifiable measure than the raw measures, precisely because it is quite possible that, in areas harder hit by the recession and under intervention, people may attribute higher responsibility to both objects - to put it another way, there is more responsibility to go round.

Attribution to the International Monetary Fund

The bailout was conducted alongside the International Monetary Fund. It may be that this 'dual responsibility' poses a problem for inferences resulting from responsibility attribution to the EU. Figure 5.6 presents the random effect parameters for those who attribute more responsibility for economic conditions to the IMF than their government, coded in the same way as the previous analyses and being otherwise the same model. The results show precisely the same pattern as the previous analyses. The only difference is a substantively larger coefficient, and the effect reducing political trust in Germany - potentially due to the relatively good economic conditions in Germany at the time.

These results provide confidence that the analysis presented above is, firstly, not just an outcome of citizens preferring the EU to their member state and secondly that it is more broadly generalisable to constraint in general and not specific to the European Union. It thus feeds into similar findings by Alcañiz and Hellwig (2011) in the context of Latin America, who find that IMF involvement exonerates domestic governments.

Discussion

The primary objective of this chapter is to understand whether citizens who perceive their government as constrained by the European Union reduced their political support, as recent research suggests (e.g Ruiz-Rufino & Alonso, 2017; Armingeon & Guthmann, 2014). This is a key mechanism described in the wider literature and outlined in the theoretical framework in chapter 3. In line with this literature, the hypothesis was tested in the most likely of circumstances: the direct economic interventions in the context of the 2008 recession. Such a context provides an ideal testing ground, given the politicisation and dominance within national discourse of the limitations of the state's policy room to manoeuvre in light of external constraints (Katsourides, 2014; Giorgi, Moury & Ruivo, 2015). This is the first attempt to address the link between interventions, the room to manoeuvre and political support at the individual level. The results provide significant evidence against the hypothesis, instead showing that perceived constraint increases political support in the most likely cases - Greece, Portugal, Cyprus, Spain and Italy. Ireland, which received a bailout condition, is not significant in any of the models, but the coefficient is positively signed. There are no significant effects elsewhere. On the contrary, economic evaluations are central to understanding political support during the crisis (Schraff & Schimmelfennig, 2019; Foster & Frieden, 2017).

Figure 7.7.: Random Effects Parameter Estimates for the IMF by Country (2014)

Thus the main contribution is to understanding the decline in political support after the crisis, which some authors had attributed to citizens recognising the lack of room to manoeuvre. Whilst the chapter cannot say anything about decline specifically, limited as it is to cross-sectional data, the evidence at least does not support the possibility. Once more, this does not rule out other 'input' factors, such as reduced responsiveness, only that this cannot be attributed to a perceived lack of room to manoeuvre. It is only more generally about politicians and parties not responding to the policy desires of their constituents, independent of its source. More research using panel data over the period under question could explore this possibility.

This has broader implications for broader theories around international integration. These have only recently turned to questions of political support (Vowles & Xezonakis, 2016) and has found mixed results. Whilst most authors, such as Thomas (2016), focus on the winner-loser divide created by globalisation, others focus on individuals perceiving the lack of room to manoeuvre (e.g Steiner, 2016; Vowles, 2008; Häusermann et al., 2018). This chapter rather supports the conclusion that increased constraint can lead to higher levels of support rather than reducing political support (cf Fischer, 2012). It therefore encourages further consideration about the specific reasons behind this as, once again, citizens do not react as political theorists would expect them to.

The broader relevance for the thesis and the theoretical literature cited in the opening paragraph is that, contrary to the second hypothesis posited in the theoretical framework as presented in chapter 3 and the concerns about the 'shrinking capacities' of member states and disaffection (DeBardeleben & Hurrelmann, 2007), this does not seem to matter directly. It may well be important in the sense that the change in policy manoeuvre limits the ability of states to act in certain areas and in certain ways, which restructures attitudinal preferences at a societal 'cleavage' level (Kriesi et al., 2006, 2008), but not through a cognitively aware and direct sense as studied here. The latent normative expectation - that the progressive weakening of 'democratic autonomy of political decisions' leads to 'general disaffection' (Scharpf, 1996) - does not seem to be the case here.

Why might this be the case? The input theories of political support argue that citizens do indeed care about democratic processes (Strebel et al., 2018) and democratic choice (Harding, 2011). Why is it then that the most significant undermining of democratic processes did not reduce political support, but actually increased it? There are multiple potential reasons, but here I suggest three. The first is that people may have reacted to the lack of policy choice, but simply did not attribute this to some external constraint - rather, they blamed

their own government's failure. Thus, the interventions signalled the failure of the domestic political elite rather than some external constraint on democratic choice. The second is that those that did actually exonerated their own elite (Alcañiz & Hellwig, 2011). Whilst they may have perceived this constraint, rather than reacting by withdrawing their support, they rather reacted by shifting blame for economic conditions. A final potential reason is that citizens noticed the constraint, but saw it as a positive: the EU may have been seen as a life buoy for constraining a corrupt and failing government (Muñoz et al., 2011). Therefore, even if it was seen as 'constraining', this was actually seen as a positive.

There are multiple limitations to address, however, mostly concerning the underlying data. Firstly, this is cross-sectional and not at ideal times. Whilst the survey times are close to the bailout proceedings and conveniently located either side of the recession, this is still not ideal. Secondly is the use of responsibility attribution which poses its own problems covered in this chapter and in chapter 4. Whilst I have shown why they are theoretically and empirically justifiable and controlled for potential problems statistically, it also provides additional barriers to correct inference. Specific questions on room to manoeuvre perceptions - particularly in an experimental set up - would provide stronger evidence in the future. These speculations aside, the chapter overall provides no evidence in favour of the primary hypothesis posited in the theoretical framework or in favour for the current vein of literature this chapter is addressing.

FROM CONVERGENCE TO CONGRUENCE:
INTEGRATION, CONGRUENCE AND POLITICAL
SUPPORT[1]

Introduction

THIS chapter aims to understand whether European integration influences political support through its influence on domestic party systems. How integration impacts political parties and party systems is one of the more long-standing areas of research in this field (Mair, 2000; Hix & Goetz, 2000). It is also one of the more likely aspects of how European integration shapes domestic politics, given that parties compete in a multilevel policy space and the evidence that European elections influence party strategy at domestic elections (Somer-Topcu & Zar, 2014; Senninger & Bischof, 2018).

Political parties are normatively and instrumentally important in European democracies. Returning to the chain of responsiveness (Powell, 2004) depicted in figure 3.2, political parties play a key role in each democratic linkage: structuring citizens' choices, how these are aggregated into the selection of policy makers, and in policy making. Without parties responding to and structuring public opinion, engaging in policy making, and enabling candidates to stand, it is hard to imagine contemporary politics. Therefore, addressing the impact

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[1]This chapter is co-written with Dr Raimondas Ibenskas (University of Bergen). I confirm that Dr. Ibenskas created the (in)congruence measures and wrote the description of this process in the data and methods section. I created the public opinion data, merged the two with country statistics, performed all analyses, created the figures and tables, and wrote all text excluding that just mentioned. All errors are my own.

of integration on political parties is normatively desirable but also perhaps the most likely route from the macro process of integration to individual-level attitudes.

Existing literature argues that European integration leads to the convergence of party positions (Hix, 2003; Dorussen & Nanou, 2006; Nanou & Dorussen, 2013; Ward et al., 2015; Konstantinidis et al., 2019). To quote Nanou and Dorussen (2013), the main result from this literature 'is that in policy domains where the involvement of the EU has increased, the distance between parties' positions tends to decrease'.

This is seen as normatively problematic. On the one hand, it is used as evidence for the EU's democratic deficit. As integration deepens, political parties can offer fewer options to their domestic electorate without any balancing of competition at the European level. On the other, it is seen to undermine the responsiveness of political parties to domestic public opinion. To quote Nanou and Dorussen (2013, p. 90) again, 'It is therefore worrisome that our findings suggest that as EU authority increases, parties become less responsive to their electorate'. This may be true.Brandenburg and Johns (2014), for instance, show how convergence has reduced congruence between elites and the public in the UK.

This chapter argues that this conclusion is too hasty, however, for a number of reasons. The main reason is that convergence does not necessarily lead to a reduction in responsiveness; it may be that public opinion has also converged, in which case, parties converging is what would be expected from a responsive party system. Responsiveness of parties to public opinion is about a given party (or party system) *adapting* their position to be *congruent* to the public's position. Therefore, observing convergence does not necessarily tell us about responsiveness; it can only be the case if public opinion has not also converged. This makes the normative concerns about integration weak.

To remedy this issue, this chapter analyses whether European integration has had an impact on the congruence of parties, parliaments, governments and their domestic public. We study this using the standard left-right ideological scale as well as, uniquely, five issue areas (European integration, redistribution, social lifestyle, immigration and the environment). We combine public opinion data and expert surveys and apply a new measure of congruence - the Earth Mover's Distance (EMD) - which improves on previous studies (Lupu, Selios & Warner, 2017). We utilise multiple measures of European integration and two different data sources, the Eurobarometer and European Social Survey.

We find almost no evidence in any analyses that greater levels of integra-

tion within a country lead to greater incongruence between elites and their public. There is some evidence that greater levels of integration, if measured by legal output, leads to incongruence between parliaments and the public with regard to redistribution preferences. But this is only borne out in one analysis. Moreover, additional analyses show that there is some evidence that more highly integrated countries have a less congruent party system and parliament than less integrated countries, but this is between-country variation rather than within. This indicates that any effect of integration is going to be between more and less integrated countries than within-country differences.

The chapter makes a number of contributions. In terms of the thesis, whilst the previous two chapters explored potential links connecting integration with political support in the most-likely situation and found the theory to be wanting, this chapter turns to another most-likely route: through the party system. It therefore tests a mediating factor in the theoretical framework, whereas the previous chapters tested the broader relationships (chapter 5) and individual level mechanisms (chapters 6 and 7).

For the literature in general, it makes both substantive and methodological contributions. Firstly, we disagree with the conclusions of previous research that observing convergence means a lack of responsiveness, and do so by testing a necessary but not sufficient *element* of representation: congruence. We find the argument to be wanting. Unlike previous research testing this link, we expand this to issue areas (such as redistribution) as well as the left-right dimension. We also test three types of elite-citizen congruence: party system, government and legislature. Methodologically, we also build on previous work by using an improved measure of congruence.

The chapter first covers existing literature relating to integration, convergence and congruence, and then linking congruence and political support. It then turns to the data and methods before presenting the results.

Theory

Representation of the public in decision-making and amongst decision-makers is central to democratic governance. In terms of how elites represent public opinion, 'congruence is the ultimate goal' (Golder & Ferland, 2018, p. 215). Whilst congruence is necessary, it is not sufficient; elites must also be responsive to the electorate (though see Mansbridge, 2003). Golder and Ferland (2018) argue that congruence is a static component of representation whilst responsiveness is the dynamic component, where responsiveness is needed when the interests of the elite and public are not already congruent. In this chapter, we

focus on the static component of representation rather than the dynamic component, on congruence rather than responsiveness.

Whilst ideological and policy congruence matter for representation, it is not immediately obvious that we should care normatively or empirically about ideological congruence above other types of choices an electorate can be presented with. Przeworski (2003), for instance, argues that what should be valued is the public being able to express their preferences, not necessarily having the 'best' (i.e, congruent) choices (Harding, 2011). Highlighting the distinction between 'cardinality' (range of options) and 'effective freedom' (having a congruent option), Harding (2011) discusses whether what matters normatively is having a range of options, such as having the choice set y, z, or having the option you desire, choice set x. In the former, you have *more choice*, but in the latter you have only one 'choice', but it happens to be congruent with your own preference. Thus, he argues that there is a case to be made that 'having a sufficiently broad range of electoral alternatives' is as valuable as having a congruent one (Harding, 2011, p. 226).

Here, we are not overly concerned with this distinction and follow the empirical literature in assuming that voters do care about ideological congruence (Harding, 2011; Mayne & Hakhverdian, 2017; Hobolt & Hoerner, 2019). This is not to say that the range of options is not also important, but that our focus is on congruence rather than the spread of ideological preferences.

Congruence and Political Support

Why would this matter for political support, the main interest in this thesis? Aside from the normative value of ideological congruence, existing research has established that ideological congruence has important implications for political support and political behaviour more generally. Mayne and Hakhverdian (2017) test the link between ideological congruence and political support across different dimensions: government and legislature congruence, egocentric and sociotropic congruence, and using point estimates and distributions of ideology within publics. They find that egocentric congruence - that is, the perceived closeness of parties to individual voters - exerts a large and significant impact on satisfaction with democracy. This is true for both proximity to the legislature and to the government, though the former has a slightly larger effect size. However, they find no relationship between sociotropic congruence - that is, congruence between the median citizen and government or legislature - and democratic satisfaction. This is robust to both point estimates and ideological distributions. This is in contrast to recent evidence which shows that

party-citizen incongruence reduces satisfaction with democracy (Bakker, Jolly & Polk, 2020). This latter study is important for this chapter since it uses similar data and studies multiple issue areas, as we do here.

This supports previous studies. Brandenburg and Johns (2014), for instance, study congruence between the party system and the public in the UK. They argue that whilst convergence has led to a greater congruence between the median voter and government, it has reduced *egocentric* congruence, and this has reduced democratic satisfaction. Similarly, Dahlberg and Holmberg (2014) directly echo these findings, showing how subjective congruence (i.e, egocentric) explains democratic satisfaction, but its aggregated equivalent does not. However, others have shown how this relationship may be conditional, for instance, on whether the respondent voted for the winning government (Curini, Jou & Memoli, 2012).

Ideological congruence on policy positions - usually measured as on the left-right scale - is not the only reason ideological congruence may matter. Congruence in terms of policy priorities has also been shown to influence democratic satisfaction throughout Europe (Reher, 2015, 2016). There are therefore good reasons for suspecting ideological congruence will have an effect on political support.

Integration, Convergence and Congruence

Existing work on the effects of integration does not focus on congruence, but rather convergence - on the cardinality aspect of representation. The logic of this hypothesised relationship is simple: as integration increases, domestic political parties, as well as governments and legislatures, must conform to the European policy position in order to be credible, and therefore converge on the same (European) position; alternatively, parties remove policy areas which they have no influence over. Although the argument is usually made using 'hard' policy, such as treaty legislation, there is no reason 'soft' influences such as the informal diffusion of policy practice or market logic may not also have an effect(Konstantinidis et al., 2019). At any rate, the empirical argument is that greater integration leads to greater convergence of party systems, which will ultimately be reflected in legislature and government formation.

This is depicted in figure 8.1. The Y axis indicates the level of decision-making on the policy, whilst the X axis indicates the relative position. As integration increases (moving up the Y axis), parties converge on the 'EU position', which may or may not be in the direction of domestic public opinion.

This theoretical conjecture has been validated in a number of empirical

Figure 8.1: European integration and policy convergence (adapted from Nanou & Dorussen, 2013)

studies. Most recently, Konstantinidis et al. (2019) have shown using a number of empirical tests how greater integration leads to convergence at both party and party-system levels, but at extreme levels of integration, polarisation occurs. This non-monotonic relationship therefore suggests a certain degree of convergence which may have been reversed in recent years as integration deepened. Research prior to this has provided evidence of the convergence-inducing effect of European integration. Nanou and Dorussen (2013) show how greater integration leads to convergence across all party families, though a stronger effect for mainstream parties. They also show how the effect is stronger within EU member states, providing more robust evidence of the causal effect, since non-EU member states provide a clear placebo. Earlier research by the same authors finds the same effect (Dorussen & Nanou, 2006).

Consistent with both of these, Ward et al. (2015) present results which show that European integration is associated with a convergence of all parties, not just mainstream parties, on economic policy, but that they compensate by emphasising non-economic policy areas. Moreover, like Nanou and Dorussen (2013), they provide additional evidence of the effect by showing that countries that recently join the EU have an almost immediate convergence of party positions.

This is presumed to have a number of consequences for the functioning of European democracies. The main issue these authors raise is of responsiveness or representation, in which the convergence of policy platforms is limiting one

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or both of these. As implied in the opening section, this is not a straightforward claim. Representation concerns responsiveness - the ability of parties to respond to public opinion - and congruence - that parties reflect public opinion. Establishing the link between integration and convergence does not necessarily tell us about either of these because it does not tell us about the other end of the chain of representation: the domestic public. Indeed, that integration is associated with convergence (or polarisation) may be entirely consistent with responsiveness and congruence if the public have also converged (or polarised). There is reason to suspect this may be the case if we assume that public opinion is not entirely exogenous from elite influence. It does, however, tell us about the range of options ('cardinality'). As parties have converged, voters have fewer options. But it's not clear whether this is normatively important and the empirical evidence that voters care is limited (Harding, 2011).

A more direct test is whether integration is associated with more or less congruence. Instead of asking whether integration has led to convergence, as previous theoretical and empirical research has done (Mair, 2013), which has uncertain relevance for democratic legitimacy, we turn to asking whether integration changes congruence - a key element of (static) democratic representation.

To be clear, we nonetheless expect that the effect of integration on congruence is consistent with the existing evidence on convergence, and therefore test the following hypothesis:

H$_1$: European integration leads to less policy congruence.

However, the theoretical argument can be extended. If the mechanism at play is that a higher degree of policy constraint by the European Union leads to greater external pressure on domestic politics to conform to the European policy position, we would also expect that there is variation *between* policy areas. Namely, those areas which are highly integrated, such as on immigration policy, should be more likely to be affected than those which are not, such as policy on social welfare. Nanou and Dorussen (2013) finds this with respect to the convergence of party programmes. Therefore, we test the following hypothesis:

H$_2$: European integration leads to less policy congruence in more highly integrated policy areas.

Data and Methods

In this chapter, we build on recent research on measuring congruence. Inspired by Mayne and Hakhverdian (2017), we opt for a number of measures. Our first of interest is a distributional measure of congruence rather than the traditionally used point estimates. However, going beyond Mayne and Hakhverdian (2017), we opt for an improved measure of congruence, the Earth Mover's Distance (Lupu et al., 2017). The intuition behind this is that it minimises the 'cost' of transforming one statistical distribution into another (Lupu et al., 2017, p. 102). This relatively new measure makes three improvements over more traditional measures: it does not lose information as in the point-estimate variety of measures; it does not assume any form of 'overlapping' or distribution as in alternative distributional measures; it is available beyond the commonly-used left-right dimension (Lupu et al., 2017, p. 96). However, we are also interested in congruence with government and the national legislature. For these two, we use the congruence between the median voter position and the mean position of the government and legislature. For all measures, higher values mean greater incongruence or, conversely, lower levels of congruence.

The independent variables are the measures of European integration as discussed in chapter 4. This also makes a number of improvements on previous research which has used a single measure of integration and often one that displays little variation over the time period analysed. For instance, Dorussen and Nanou (2006) and Nanou and Dorussen (2013) use a simple measure of integration drawn from analysis of treaties, that only varies with a new treaty. By using new measures of integration, both economic, political and legal, we gain a more holistic understanding of the multifaceted effect of integration on congruence.

A number of control variables are included. These are the same controls used in chapters 5 and 6. Economic control variables include GDP, unemployment and inflation. To this we add the effective number of parties and corruption, since both influence congruence.

We conduct two analyses. The first draws the measures of public opinion from Eurobarometer data, the same as used in chapters 5 and 6. This uses the traditional left-right self-placement of political ideology on a 1-10 scale following the question *'In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". How would you place your views on this scale?'*. We combine this with several expert surveys: six waves of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) conducted between 1999 and 2017 (Bakker, Jolly, Polk & Poole, 2014; Polk et al., 2017) complemented with two surveys from the early and late 1980s (Castles &

Table 8.1: Summary statistics for first analysis

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Integration	5.781	0.823	3.56	6.44	149
EU Index	55.839	8.186	33.095	77.325	56
Regulations	1784.76	544.768	1251	2782	121
Directives	102.909	18.407	62	127	121
Decisions	679.413	71.412	541	766	121
Incongruence	1.2	0.351	0.542	2.318	149
Gov. Incongruence	1.395	0.98	0.01	4.283	149
Parl. Incongruence	0.852	0.506	0.003	2.947	149
KOF	80.402	6.071	57.762	90.667	146
GDP	2.826	2.653	-5.479	11.889	177
Unemployment	8.612	4.11	1.8	26.5	177
Inflation	2.845	3.565	-1.6	24.506	177
ENEP	3.965	1.525	1.96	9.050	177
Corruption	0.155	0.143	0.009	0.627	163

Mair, 1984; Laver & Hunt, 1992) and another one from the early 1990s (Huber & Inglehart, 1995). All but one of these surveys asked country experts to place main parties in individual countries on the general left-right scale. To assure comparability across expert surveys and Eurobarometer data, we recode, wherever necessary, original scales to the 0-10 scale. We use the Eurobarometer surveys conducted in the same years as the expert surveys. Whilst the left-right measure is understandably criticised (e.g Caughey, O'Grady & Warshaw, 2019), it is also useful at capturing the main cleavage structure in European politics, an issue dimension on which most people and parties are placed along, and is one of the few constants in survey and political research.

The use of expert surveys for measuring parties' positions has several advantages in the context of this analysis compared with alternative sources of information. The widely used manifesto project data provides left-right scales that are hard to compare with the scale used in the voter survey data (Klingemann, Volkens, Budge, Bara & McDonald, 2006). Further, there is no clear agreement on the best way to derive left-right positions from the manifesto project data (Lowe, Benoit, Mikhaylov & Laver, 2011; Budge & Meyer, 2013). Parties' positions derived from voter surveys do not have these problems, but are not available for many countries and time periods due to the existence of long time-series election survey data in only a few countries. The same problem characterises the elite survey data (e.g. conducted in combination with some European Election Studies). Expert surveys on the other hand have been used to measure party-voter congruence on both ideological and more specific issue dimensions in combination with several voter surveys (e.g Stecker

& Tausendpfund, 2016; Rosset & Stecker, 2019). When using several surveys in the same dataset, we build on studies that show high levels of comparability between different expert surveys (McDonald & Mendes, 2001; Whitefield et al., 2007).

Table 8.2: Summary statistics for issue-specific analysis

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
EMD Congruence					
Left-Right	1.104	0.29	0.554	1.895	104
Redistribution	2.376	0.830	0.937	4.781	71
Social	2.126	0.679	0.786	3.826	93
EU Integration	2.464	0.954	0.655	4.249	101
Environment	3.657	0.733	2.211	5.59	67
Immigration	1.592	0.512	0.578	2.912	98
Parliament Congruence					
Left-Right	0.902	0.512	0.017	2.528	104
Redistribution	1.901	1.303	0.117	4.755	71
Social	1.583	1.258	0.019	6.091	93
EU Integration	2.423	1.104	0.023	4.928	101
Environment	3.601	1.011	1.699	7.874	67
Immigration	1.344	0.976	0.007	3.997	98
Government Congruence					
Left-Right	1.415	0.690	0.077	3.286	104
Redistribution	2.463	1.716	0.143	6.733	71
Social	1.944	1.579	0.013	7	93
EU Integration	2.713	1.223	0.119	5.333	101
Environment	3.628	1.244	0.137	8.343	67
Immigration	1.632	1.228	0	4.917	98

In the second analysis, we turn to the European Social Survey, which contains the required variables to construct the issue-specific congruence measures. Parties' positions almost exclusively come from the CHES waves conducted between 2006 and 2017. Our approach in selecting survey questions from ESS and CHES follows Stecker and Tausendpfund (2016), thus allowing us to match the two datasets at multiple points in time to construct incongruence measures on five issue dimensions and the general left-right ideological scale. Since the 2002 CHES survey did not include questions on these issue dimensions, for three issue dimensions (social lifestyle, environment and immigration) where the wording of the questions in the CHES survey is almost identical to the expert survey conducted in 2003-2004 by Benoit and Laver (2006), we use the data from the latter survey. Further extensions back in time are however not possible because the first wave of ESS was conducted in 2002. Full question wordings for the ESS and CHES are in appendix D table D.1. Briefly, however, redistribution refers to efforts to reduce income differences

between rich and poor; 'social lifestyle' refers to preferences over gay rights; integration refers to preferences on further integration; environment refers to how important environment is to the respondent/party; and immigration is an index of three items addressing preferences on immigration from the same ethnic group as the host country; a different ethnic group; and from poorer countries outside Europe.

The summary statistics for these measures are in table 8.2. The control variables are identical to those in table 8.1. Our primary models are linear OLS regressions with two-way (country and year) fixed effects. We also cluster the standard errors by country. This modelling technique controls for country-specific factors, changing the interpretation of the coefficients to the effect of a one-unit change *within* a country, rather than a pooled estimate of within- and between-effects. All but one of the measures of integration do not vary between countries, so this does not lose information relative to a pooled or random effects model. Since there is, across most measures, a trending increase in integration, year fixed-effects attempt to control for this trend. This method uses a similar logic to a difference-in-difference estimation within each country unit, with the coefficient the averaged estimate.

The equation can be seen below. The first two coefficients indicate the constant and coefficient of interest respectively, whilst $\beta_2 X_{i,t}$ indicates control variables, γ_t the year fixed-effects, v_i country fixed-effects and $\epsilon_{i,t}$ the error term. As indicated by the i, t subscripts, our unit of analysis is country-years.

$$Congruence_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Integration_{i,t} + \beta_2 X_{i,t} + \gamma_t + v_i + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

To provide an example of the type of data we are working with, figure 8.2 shows the incongruence between the public and government on the left-right scale over time in each country. This is using the Eurobarometer and CHES data described previously and shown in table 8.1. There is considerable variation in the patterns across countries and the correlation between party, parliament and government incongruence.[2] For instance, there is a clear growth in incongruence across all dimensions in Hungary and Bulgaria, but growing congruence in the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Austria. The UK shows significant incongruence in the 1980s and 1990s, a shift towards greater congruence in the 2000s to 2010, and then greater incongruence following 2010 - a clear indicator of the move between governments. Others, like Belgium, Italy and Germany, are largely stable. From this inspection, there is little to suggest a clear pattern across European member states.

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[2]The overall party incongruence is correlation 67% with parliament and 43% with govern-

Figure 8.2: Left-right Incongruence by year and country

Similar graphs for the specific issue areas in the second analysis are shown in appendix D figures D.2 to D.6.

Results

Table 8.3 presents results from the first analysis using the Earth Mover's Distance on the left-right scale as the dependent variable. Each column uses a different measure of integration as the independent variable. All models use two-way fixed effects (country and year) and a full battery of controls as explained in the previous section. Full tables are available in Appendix D.

The results provide no evidence of the effect of European integration on (in)congruence of the party system on the left-right scale. Whether integration is measured using economic, political or legal variables, the coefficients remain insignificant. Whilst the coefficients are positive (implying an increase in incongruence), they are far from statistically significant at the 10% level. The table also includes a measure of globalisation, present in all models. A key argument of the theory is that European and global integration should exert

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ment. Meanwhile, government and parliament incongruence are correlated at 43%.

similar effects as they both serve to constrain domestic policy choices. This is true insofar as neither have a significant effect. But in models 1, 2 and 4, the coefficients are also in different directions. Like previous analyses in this thesis, this calls into question the argument that they exert similar effects on domestic politics.

Table 8.3: European integration and (in)congruence using the Earth Mover's Distance

	(1) Integration	(2) EU Index	(3) Directives	(4) Regulations	(5) Decisions
Integration	0.0749 (0.0921)				
EU Index		0.00958 (0.0128)			
Directives			0.00632 (0.0104)		
Regulations				-0.00291 (0.00477)	
Decisions					0.00572 (0.00940)
KOF Index	-0.00643 (0.0217)	-0.0589 (0.0559)	0.00538 (0.0229)	0.00538 (0.0229)	0.00538 (0.0229)
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Economic Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Political Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Countries	25	14	23	23	23
Country-Years	129	56	104	104	104

Standard errors in parentheses
[+] $p < 0.10$, [*] $p < 0.05$, [**] $p < 0.01$, [***] $p < 0.001$

Table 8.4 turns from the party system to congruence between government, parliament and public opinion. Much like the previous analysis, the congruence of government is not significantly affected by any measure of integration, European or global. However, there are conflicting results for congruence with parliament. Using measures of legal output as a proxy for European integration indicates that directives and decisions increase incongruence, but regulations decrease incongruence, with similar effect sizes and all significant at the 5% level. It is not clear why this difference might be. Looking descriptively at the trends in legal output in figure 4.8 shows that there was a sharp increase

in regulations in the early 1990s following the Maastrict Treaty, with a slow decline afterwards, whilst directives and decisions have increased over time. This may explain the differences in coefficients.

Meanwhile, the claim that globalisation and integration entail similar forces on domestic politics is once again not provided with support. Indeed, across all but one models (model 7), the coefficient on globalisation is negative, indicating that it actually reduces incongruence. For parliamentary congruence, this is significant at the 10% level except in model 7. However, this model is based on a much shorter time period and less than half the country-years. If anything, global integration serves to reduce the incongruence of parliament and domestic publics, in contrast to European integration.

Overall, there is limited evidence that European integration leads to a lack of congruence between elite actors and their domestic public. With respect to the party system (table 8.3) or government (columns 1-5 of table 8.4) there are no significant effects. There is some evidence of integration increasing incongruence between parliament and public, however (columns 8 and 10 of table 8.4), if integration is measured as legal output. Therefore, H_1 receives limited support.

As highlighted by H_2, however, there may be meaningful variation across policy areas; it is also possible that the left-right dimension does not capture meaningful congruence as interpretation can change over time and cross-nationally. We therefore repeat the analysis on specific issue areas using European Social Survey data: redistribution, social lifestyle, EU integration, environment and immigration. We also repeat the analysis on the left-right dimension using this new data. The expectation in this case is that policy areas more highly integrated (immigration, the issue of EU integration itself) will be more affected by integration than areas that are less directly integrated (such as redistribution). As before, we use multiple measures of European integration and congruence.

Because of the multiple dependent variables (EMD, government and parliament congruence in the issue areas) and independent variables (integration measures), the number of models is large ($5 \times 6 \times 3 = 90$). To avoid cumbersome tables, the results are presented in coefficient plots in figures 8.3 to 8.5.

Turning first to figure 8.3 which plots the effect of integration on party system EMD congruence, the results are consistent with the previous analysis: there is no observable effect of integration across any of the issue areas on any of the measures. In addition, the coefficients are not clear in the potential direction of the effect if there were one.

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Table 8.4: The effect of integration on government and parliament (in)congruence

	Government					Parliament				
	(1) Integration	(2) EU Index	(3) Directives	(4) Regulations	(5) Decisions	(6) Integration	(7) EU Index	(8) Directives	(9) Regulations	(10) Decisions
Integration	-0.0963 (0.457)					0.244 (0.169)				
EU Index		-0.0330 (0.0891)					0.00195 (0.0324)			
Directives			0.00722 (0.0621)					0.0321* (0.0151)		
Regulations				-0.00332 (0.0286)					-0.0148* (0.00694)	
Decisions					0.00654 (0.0562)					0.0291* (0.0137)
KOF Index	-0.0856 (0.0882)	-0.0532 (0.370)	-0.0526 (0.131)	-0.0526 (0.131)	-0.0526 (0.131)	-0.0564+ (0.0289)	0.0423 (0.148)	-0.0538+ (0.0284)	-0.0538+ (0.0284)	-0.0538+ (0.0284)
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Economic Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Political Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Countries	25	14	23	23	23	25	14	23	23	23
Country-Years	129	56	104	104	104	129	56	104	104	104

Standard errors in parentheses
$+ p < 0.10$, $* p < 0.05$, $** p < 0.01$, $*** p < 0.001$

Figure 8.3: Effect of EU integration on Earth Mover's Distance congruence

Figures 8.4 and 8.5 show congruence between the public and government and parliament, respectively. Unlike party system congruence, this shows that one area does seem to be affected by European integration as measured by legal output: parliamentary congruence on the redistribution dimension. This is significant at the 10% level. This suggests, contrary to expectations, that if anything there is greater congruence between domestic parliaments and their publics with higher levels of integration.

The effect size for this is quite large, with a coefficient of -0.0069. This means that to increase incongruence by its mean (1.9) approximately 280 'decisions' are required. Considering the mean is 586 decisions (per year), this amounts to a significant, and perhaps unrealistic, increase. However, the results provide

Figure 8.4: Effect of EU integration on government congruence

no support with regard to H_2. Whilst there are no significant effects on the most likely issue areas, the one which is perhaps least likely (redistribution) is significant in the opposite direction to what would be expected from the theoretical argument. However, it may be that the ideological agenda of the EU, shifting towards economic liberalism, may be dragging elites away from a more protectionist public (Nanou et al., 2017).

Collectively, these results reject both hypotheses H_1 and H_2; and with it, assuages the normative concerns raised by previous research. Whilst it may well be true that integration has led to a convergence of party positions, it is not necessarily problematic if a key aspect of representation remains - congruence. The results presented here indeed show that there is limited effect on the con-

Figure 8.5: Effect of EU integration on Parliamentary congruence

gruence of parties either through the party system, government or legislature; on a uni-dimensional left-right scale or specific policy areas. Where there is an effect (on redistribution), it is not clear that this is related to a growth of competencies at the European level vis-a-vis the domestic level.

Robustness Tests

We conduct a number of robustness tests. The first and most substantively interesting is the removal of country fixed-effects from the models. In addition, we decompose the EU Index measure into two variables: one which reflects the effect of between-country variation, and one which reflects the effect of within-country variation (Fairbrother, 2014). Not doing so renders the coefficient as a

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pooled average of both within and between effects. Figure 8.6 presents this for the issue-specific areas. The between and within effects are presented on the left and right panels respectively. The types of congruence are indicated on the Y axes.

The results of the within effects are of course consistent with the presented analysis, since they are the demeaned coefficients. However, the between effects are consistent with expectations. It shows that countries that are more integrated with the EU are more incongruent on the left-right, redistributive, social lifestyle and, at the 10% level, the issue of EU integration. For parliamentary congruence, it increases incongruence on redistribution and immigration, but has no significant effects on government congruence.

Figure 8.6: Within- and between-country effects of the EU Index

In light of the main analysis, these results indicate that any effect of integration will be about relative levels rather than effects over time. Most variables of EU integration do not use between-country variation, so our potential analysis is limited. There should be some caution of these, however, since the omission of country fixed-effects means that any idiosyncratic factors related to integration or (in)congruence is not controlled for beyond the control variables, which are unlikely to capture all potential variation.

We also, as in previous chapters, omit one country from the models in turn.

This makes the overall number of countries in the analysis $N - 1$. Given the large number of models already, particularly for the issue analysis, we do not present tables or graphs here or in the appendix, but describe them.

For the first analysis, we find that when removing the UK, the coefficients for the effect of integration on left-right incongruence become significant and positive for the expert survey measure on party system (EMD) incongruence and parliamentary incongruence, but not government incongruence. The same applies to the measures of directives and decisions output. But, on the contrary, regulations have a negative and significant effect.

Moreover, we also find that for parliamentary incongruence, the coefficients for directives becomes positive except when excluding key countries: France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark. The same happens with the coefficient on regulations, but instead the coefficient is negative. This suggests that legislative output with regard to directives increases incongruence except in some countries central to the European project; but the relationship is reversed for regulations.

These raise a number of points. The first is that the results are robust for government incongruence: there is no evidence for the impact of integration. For the expert survey measure of integration, the results are robust except when we exclude the UK from the analysis, suggesting that the UK is an outlier, potentially due to its unique deal with the EU (at least at the time of writing) which omits it from many of the conditions that greater integration entails. Another point is that integration may increase parliamentary incongruence when measured as legal output, but this is contrasted with regulations output which seems to reduce incongruence.

The same tests repeated on the European Social Survey data - for the three types of (in)congruence and all measures of integration - show almost no changes. Some changes occur with the EU Index, in which the exclusion of Sweden (lifestyle and the EU) or Greece (immigration) results in a significant coefficient for both parliament and government incongruence for the former, and parliament incongruence for the latter. Otherwise, results are consistent. Again, this suggests some evidence that integration leads to incongruence on specific issues, but this is based on limited country-years.

Conclusion

One of the key mechanisms linking the effect of European integration to domestic politics is through its effect on policy, whether that offered by parties or enacted by governments. This was the primary interest of the early re-

search into the domestic effects of European integration, and existing research has indicated that integration leads to the convergence of party positions. A more normatively interesting question, however, is whether this matters for the representation of domestic public opinion; convergence is arguably most normatively problematic if it also impedes congruence with domestic publics. In this chapter we have asked that question, to which we have answered that European integration seems to have very little impact on the congruence between the party system, parliament or government and the public. There is some evidence that there is greater incongruence between the parliament and the public, and parties and the public, with respect to redistribution if integration is measured as legal output. In addition, there is also evidence that the within-country analysis, necessitated partly by independent variables that do not vary between countries, masks the effect of different levels of integration between countries. Perhaps more substantively, robustness tests indicate that removing the UK shows evidence of integration leading to greater incongruence on the left-right scale. Aside from these exceptions, the bulk of the evidence presented suggests no effect of integration on congruence at the domestic level. It does nonetheless provide an example of the importance of cross-national variation.

This chapter makes both substantive and methodological contributions. Substantively, we contribute to the literature studying the effect of European integration generally, but specifically on its effect on the relationship between domestic political actors (parties, parliaments and governments) and the public. Whilst previous research has shown that integration leads to a convergence of party positions, we have shown that this does not translate to a lack of *congruence* between parties, parliaments, governments and the public. In other words, convergence does not translate to a lack of representation, which seems more normatively important.

Methodologically, we have expanded on existing literature by using a number of different measures of both congruence and integration. For congruence, we have used both a new measure of party system congruence, as well as using the positions of both parliaments and governments. For integration, we have for the first time used multiple measures of integration rather than one measure, usually drawn from treaty readings which vary little over time. A benefit of this is that we have been able to separate out the potential differences in the effects of integration over time and between countries (e.g figure 8.6).

For the thesis as a whole, the chapter solidifies the conclusions of the previous chapters: domestic politics is still, primarily, about domestic politics. In the most likely of situations - in this case, policy positions of elites and previ-

ously, economic interventions - the impact of integration seems minimal. This is not to downplay its potential effects. As will be expanded in the concluding chapter, it may be that the impacts of integration are so diffuse that it is hard for research to 'isolate'. For instance, future research on this topic could explore whether integration shifts domestic public opinion on these topics; whilst an influence on (in)congruence is not observed, this could be because the EU shifts elite (or public) opinion, which the public (or elites) follow. Thus, there is an impact, but it is not one that can be identified through issues of incongruence.

In addition, some of our results for the first analysis may be driven by lower compatibility of the expert surveys to each other; the second analysis does not suffer from this, since the party data is from the CHES. If possible, the first analysis should be replicated on data which removes this issue. The robustness tests which indicate that excluding the UK leads to a significant and positive (incongruence-inducing) effect should also be explored in further work.

Part IV

Conclusion: How European Integration Shapes the Governed and Governing

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

The basis of politics is domestic; all else is embellishment and detail.

THE overarching research question guiding this thesis was: Does European integration affect public support for political institutions and, if so, how? The above paraphrasing of one of the most famous - and surely most quoted - lines in political science is an apt start to the concluding chapter to this answer. The original, that *class* was the basis of British party politics, expressed that whilst many other factors were at play in British politics, the defining factor was class (Pulzer, 1967). In line with this original intent, the four empirical chapters in this thesis have indicated that whilst the relevance and importance of European integration is not in doubt, the dominant lens is still a domestic one. At the time of writing this conclusion, in the week the United Kingdom is set to leave the Union, this may seem like an odd claim. Over the last decade, the discussion about the role of national borders, an elite out of step with its less integrationist public, the rise of challenger parties across Europe, and the architects of the current global system turning inward, have shaped our political system.

One aim of this conclusion is to highlight how this sits with the evidence presented in the thesis. To do so, I first provide an overview of the thesis, the research questions, the gaps in knowledge which the individual chapters address, and the key findings. I then develop the conceptual aspects of the contribution to knowledge about political support, European integration, and the room to manoeuvre theory. I propose an updating of the theory in light of the results, and reflect on what this tells us about international integration in

general. Building on these, I point the way forward for future research both for myself and the field. I conclude by asking what we can do about changing support for governing institutions - one of the most overlooked areas of research in the political support literature.

Overview

I addressed the overarching research question using a range of methods and data over four empirical chapters. Each chapter had its own research questions to answer the broader question. The questions, gaps in knowledge and key findings of each chapter are detailed in table 9.1.

Table 9.1: Thesis Overview: Questions, Gaps and Findings

Chapter	Research questions	Gaps in knowledge	Key findings
The long-run effects of European integration	Does integration reduce political support in the most established European member states?	There has been few rigorous studies about the effect of integration over time. The many theoretical claims are without empirical evidence.	There seems to be a small negative effect, but these are heavily mediated, particularly by economic factors.
Integration and the embedding of domestic cleavages	Does integration serve to embed domestic cleavages, particularly along the lines of education? Do the effects vary across regions and measures of integration?	There has been few rigorous studies about the effect of integration over time. The many theoretical claims are without empirical evidence. Moreover, we do not know if integration has a role to play in the deepening education support gap.	Integration, particularly economic, creates a 'support gap' between low and high educated people. There is also a growing gap between regions of Europe, particularly Southern and Anglo-Saxon regions and the rest of the Union. The effects of economic versus political integration are different.
The devaluation of domestic politics	Did the economic interventions during the Eurozone crisis reduce support? Does perceived constraint explain the link between economic interventions and political support?	All existing evidence is at the aggregate level, so cannot claim the individual level link. Studies also cannot claim the causal link between interventions and support, even though it seems to have an effect	I provide causal evidence using a UEDS design that interventions reduce political support. There is no evidence that perceived constraint decreases support; on the contrary, it increases it. Economic perceptions are a powerful predictor of support, and are the likely link between interventions and support.
From convergence to congruence	Does integration impact the congruence between parties, government and legislature on one hand and public opinion on the other?	Existing research only looks at convergence, but this is not normatively problematic. In addition, existing studies almost exclusively study the left-right scale.	We find little evidence of the effect of integration on congruence. There is some evidence of more integrated countries being less congruent, but this is between rather than within countries.

Before connecting these findings to our wider understanding, I will briefly recap each of these chapters. Chapters 5 offers the broadest analysis, in which I study the relationship between integration and political support at the aggregate level. Employing panel methods and data since 1973 in nine established member states, I show that there is evidence that integration reduces political support. However, using recently developed methods for mediation analysis, I also show that this relationship is likely to be highly mediated by a range of domestic factors, particularly economic conditions. This chapter aimed to address the general proposition that integration leads to reduced political support, ultimately arguing that these relatively deterministic claims are too simplistic.

In chapter 6, I move to the individual level and all EU countries, examining whether integration may affect political support through embedding domestic cleavages, in particular, along the lines of education. This also extends the previous chapter in studying the overall relationship between integration and support. I show that whilst there is little evidence of a consistent *average* effect across European regions, there is an effect of integration embedding a 'support gap' between regions and domestic publics. There is a clear heterogeneous effect which is reducing support amongst the least educated but increasing it, or at least having no effect, on the most educated. This is only the case for economic integration. Whilst political integration does lead to a support gap, it overall has a positive impact.

Chapter 7 studies the causal effect of economic interventions and whether perceived constraint influences political support. Whilst providing causal evidence for the negative effect of economic interventions, I find that perceived constraint, on the contrary, increases political support. Thus, what links economic interventions with political support is more likely to be an updating of economic perceptions. This fills a large gap in our understanding of the dynamics of interventions and support during the Eurozone crisis, which until now had 'uncharted territory on the micro-level mechanisms' (Schraff & Schimmelfennig, 2019).

Finally, chapter 8 asks whether integration reduces congruence between parties, government and legislature on one hand and public opinion on the other. Using a new measure of congruence for the party system, as well as traditional measures for the government and legislature, the chapter provides evidence that neither political, economic or legal integration affects congruence over time; put another way, as integration deepens within a country, congruence does not change. However, there is some evidence that levels of integration between countries is associated with less congruence. This is distinct

from the overall analysis because it examines the effect of integration between rather than within countries. However, measures were not available to explore this in greater depth. This chapter contributes to the literature which has examined the effect of integration on party policy convergence by moving the debate to congruence, a more normatively desirable yet problematic concept. In addition, it moved beyond reliance on the left-right dimension.

These conclusions contribute to the wider literatures on political support, integration and the room to manoeuvre theory. Moreover, they suggest an updating of theory to account for these results. A clear avenue for future work emerges from this updating.

What have we learned?

About political support

Political support - support for governing, political institutions - was the concept this thesis aimed to explain. What has this thesis taught us about it? Taking the literature review in chapter 2 as the basis, I aim to highlight what the thesis has shown about the dynamics of political support.

1 Outputs matter more than inputs

As discussed in the literature review, there are numerous determinants of political support. One key perspective in the 'institutionalist' stream of literature is to differentiate between inputs (such as modes of decision-making and types of institutions) and outputs (such as policy performance, performance of institutions), although this dichotomy is, as always, not water-tight and they interact in complex ways (e.g Strebel et al., 2018; Dahlberg et al., 2015).

The explanatory framework that this thesis proceeded from, and which theoretical concerns about the effect of integration draw on, prize the input side of the equation. I visualised this through the chain of responsiveness (Powell, 2004), arguing that integration could intervene at the key linkages of the democratic system: in structuring choices, policymaking, and the feedback loops between outcomes, preferences and behaviour. Overall, the thesis found this perspective to be wanting. In no analyses, with the possible exception of chapter 5, did we find a strong, unmediated or otherwise unambiguous effect. This is particularly important when considering that two of the most likely linkages were analysed: the effect of economic interventions (chapter 7) and the effect of integration on public-elite congruence (chapter 8). In the case of the former, whilst interventions had a causal influence on political support,

it is unlikely that this was channelled through the input side of the equation. Chapter 6 does suggest, however, that integration may matter for structuring citizen's preferences through its heterogeneous impact on those with different educational levels.

Throughout the thesis, the effects of policy output, predominantly in the form of economic performance, were powerful explanations for political support. In chapter 5, the effects of integration were heavily mediated by economic performance. Where integration has had a large impact on support was when it was measured in largely economic terms and when it interacted with factors that determine an individual's relative position in the labour market (chapter 6). In chapter 7, whilst objective economic conditions clearly had a substantial impact, it seems likely that it was the updating of economic perceptions that linked interventions with changes in political support, although showing this remains a subject of future research.

Whilst political integration or legal integration had a muted effect, economic integration has had a broadly negative effect. This again points to the important role of economics and an individual's position in the labour market rather than Europeanisation itself. This has important consequences for the theoretical claims extant in the literature which usually focused on the political consequences of integration. Overall, these point to the conclusion that political support is largely driven by outputs. This does not mean integration does not matter. Its role in shaping economic conditions, improving institutions, shaping responsibility for outputs, and so on, is likely to be key. However, this means the input side plays a role only through its effect on policy output, rather than a primary, direct role; these conclusions support recent research (Strebel et al., 2018; Foa, Slade, Klassen, Rand & Williams, 2020; Martini & Quaranta, 2020). The theoretical framework posited did not account for these interactions, which I return to in reformulating the theory.

2 Effect of institutions

A related finding worth expanding on is the relative importance of institutions. Many remedies for 'democratic malaise' point to institutional transformation, such as democratic innovations (Pogrebinschi & Ryan, 2018). Even those that conclude that output performance is key to political support instead return to institutional reforms aimed at increasing representation, participation, and so on (Foa et al., 2020). The evidence so far suggests these are unlikely to be successful at changing political support in the short to medium term.

Whilst results show that institutions matter for between-country variation (e.g in chapter 7), there is little evidence that it matters for *changing* political

support *within a country*. The thesis has in most of the analyses used methods which reduce coefficients to explaining change within a country. In other words, institutions may form (or be a consequence of) long-term political cultures, but simply changing them is unlikely to have an effect in the short term (see also Martini & Quaranta, 2020).

European integration is an institutional transformation. Throughout this thesis, the same conclusion stands. Measured as purely institutional, there are negligible effects within countries, although different levels of integration between countries may provide some explanation for political support (for instance, in chapter 8). As noted above, however, there may be relevant interactions between input and output determinants, or integration supporting other relevant institutional transformations (such as levels of corruption). To put it more formally, institutions are causally prior, but inferior to, outputs.

3 **It is polarising**

A key finding which emerges from chapter 6 is the polarising of political support, in that particular case, along the lines of education. This supports previous descriptive studies over similar periods of time though, as a note of caution, using the same dataset (van Ham et al., 2017; Bovens & Wille, 2017; Martini & Quaranta, 2020). This is a serious development. Hetherington and Rudolph (2015) have shown that the development of polarisation with respect to political trust is a key reason why 'Washington won't work'. This may also be what is contributing to the development of challenger parties or the perception of gridlocked politics even when absolute levels of political support are remaining stable in most countries.

The chapter showed that the 'support gap' between citizens of high and low education levels has grown whether integration is measured as political or economic, though the effect is much starker for economic integration. The same effect exists for globalisation. Again, this supports the argument that integration, whether European or global, is creating different opportunities for those at different levels of the labour market. Given the previous two points, one could hypothesise that this is a rational response to a policy output or agenda that rewards those with greater social or financial capital.

A cautious conclusion from this chapter is also that integration seems to be creating a support gap between regions of the Union; in particular, the gap between Southern Europe and the rest of the Union with respect to economic integration; and the Anglo-Saxon countries (UK and Ireland) and the rest of the Union. It seems the UK has found its own solution to the latter problem. Whilst the conclusion is cautious since the data is predominantly around the

economic crisis, it is critical that the benefits of integration are more evenly dispersed; failing to do so may provide a significant problem for the future of integration.

4 Our data is (mostly) fine

For the data and methods chapter, I compiled one of the largest existing datasets containing trust and satisfaction with democracy, which used most major cross-national datasets and 12 national election studies.[1] I used this dataset to study the trends across surveys and the relationships between the two concepts. What this revealed is that, despite plenty of concern about the measurement of the concept and some variation between surveys (e/g Canache et al., 2001; Schneider, 2016), the measures are broadly consistent across surveys and becoming more accurate. Whilst some countries are more problematic, such as Britain and Italy, even these discrepancies are weakening over time. Moreover, by and large trust in parliament and democratic satisfaction are consistent with our conceptual models in which democratic satisfaction is more diffuse than trust, even though they trend together and respond to similar signals. Overall, this is positive for researchers using these data.

About European integration

1 The normative concerns

A founding motivation for this thesis topic were the theoretical and normative concerns about European integration and democracy. These are not hard to find, particularly in public commentary. In the academic literature, it exists within empirical studies (Nanou & Dorussen, 2013), has been expressed as 'politics without policy' (Schmidt, 2006), as democracy in a 'void', where elites are focused on being responsible rather than responsive (Mair, 2013). Has this filtered down to citizens? The answer this thesis provides is a rather resounding 'probably not'; with the large caveat that there are a whole host of potential other avenues, and it is unlikely to have had no impact. For instance, political support has collapsed in the last few years (outside of the data used in this thesis) as the 'Brexit' deadlock has progressed (Foa et al., 2020). But this is not the direct effect of integration, rather the domestic handling of such an issue in a polarised public.

The normative concerns will not, and should not, go away. They are still relevant, particularly from a theoretical point of view. But these concerns are

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[1]This is currently also in a working paper (Valgarðsson & Devine, 2019).

not being borne out at the individual level. As such, the deterministic concerns about integration leading to 'general political disaffection and alienation' can be heavily disputed (Scharpf, 1996). This is a positive, not just for the European project but for those interested in improving political support.

2 The democratic deficit

Lurking on the sidelines of this thesis has been the democratic deficit debate. This has been at the sidelines since it is usually concerned with the lack of democracy at the European level whereas, in this case, the concern was the role of integration in shaping political support for domestic institutions (though it is accepted that these may also be related). The democratic deficit debate, or the standard version, consists of claims of executive dominance, a weak European Parliament, second-order elections, and the EU drifting from public policy preferences (Follesdal & Hix, 2006). However, it has also been argued that this generates a democratic deficit at the national level as well as in the interactions between the two levels (Curtin et al., 2010).

On the one hand, we cannot claim based on this thesis that there is no democratic deficit. With the exception of chapter 8, which shows that there is a limited or non-existent effect of integration on congruence between domestic elites and their publics, the chapters do not speak to the absence, or otherwise, of democracy-restricting processes. But what it can say is that if this deficit does indeed exist, it is not perceived by the public in a uniform way, either within or between countries.

The democratic deficit that is forming, however, is amongst those least able to take advantage of the benefits of European governance. Whether this is a rational response to a real or perceived loss of policy influence, an effect of the unequal distribution of resources, or some other mechanism, remains for future research.

About the room to manoeuvre theory

The thesis framework was built around three literatures: political support, Europeanisation, and globalisation. In chapter 3, and specifically figure 3.3, I combined these literatures to consider a theoretical framework which largely drew on the 'room to manoeuvre' theory that is prevalent within studies on global integration (Hellwig, 2015; Vowles & Xezonakis, 2016). Framing these were domestic mediating effects, such as discourses surrounding integration. The thesis focusedon the 'input' side of the support equation and explored the overall effect of integration and three indirect effects. In this section, I want to

highlight what we have learned about the room to manoeuvre theory, and then propose a number of updates to the theoretical argument presented in chapter 3. It is important to note that these, by and large, also apply to the cognate literatures on depoliticisation and (domestic) democratic deficits.

1. **Domestic politics cannot be ignored**

Much of the room to manoeuvre literature omits domestic politics from its explanations. For instance, the effect of higher levels of integration is expected to have similar effects across countries and time. In some ways, this is inherent to the analysis, which often presents a single coefficient for the effect of integration, even though this would pool the effects from all countries. Each analysis in this thesis suggests this is erroneous. This is explicitly modelled in chapter 7 with a random slope and in chapter 6 with regional interactions. The room to manoeuvre theory must account for different national conditions, national discourses surrounding integration, and economic conditions far more than it currently does. A place to begin is with benchmarking arguments in which citizens benchmark national conditions to international conditions or some alternative counterfactual (De Vries, 2018; Kayser & Peress, 2012).

2 **Inputs are not enough**

A key mechanism in the room to manoeuvre theory is the restriction of democratic choice and its effects on representation. However, the theory is therefore limited to the input determinants of political support (or other political attitudes) which, as argued above and evidenced in the literature, are weaker explanations than the output factors. This omission may explain the ambiguous findings with regard to the effects of globalisation on domestic mass politics (Vowles, 2008, 2016). However, the effects with regard to voting and party positioning seem far more robust (Ward et al., 2015; Steiner, 2016). A consideration is whether the effects of integration are indeed predictable and uniform, but the mediating variables that link them to public opinion differ. An updated theory of elite-mass communication under conditions of integration may be an important next step rather than an overhaul of the theory writ large.

3 **Integration is not made equal**

A key argument of the room to manoeuvre theory, and some of the accounts of Europeanisation and mass politics (Kriesi et al., 2008; Scharpf, 1999; Zürn, 2000), is that globalisation and Europeanisation exhibit the same forces on domestic political systems (Gall, 2017). This has not been borne out in this thesis.

In some cases, effects are in the opposite direction. Where they are in the same direction is in the uneven distribution of political support across educational levels. This can be interpreted in two ways. The first is that the effects are similar with respect to the uneven distribution of resources and the different opportunities afforded to different sections of society. The second is that whilst the objective effects may be similar, how these are filtered through national politics may be different. For instance, conflicting discourses surrounding integration and globalisation may lead to different subjective experiences of the phenomena.

Updating the theory

How should the theory about the role of governments' room to manoeuvre, and thereby the theory presented in chapter 3, be updated in light of these results? The theory's focus on input determinants of political support, its neglect of domestic factors, and the blurring of different integration effects necessitate its updating. Following the previous discussion on what the thesis has contributed to these fields, the initial theory could be improved in the following ways.

1 Incorporate output effects

As suggested towards the end of chapter 3, the theory ignores the output mechanisms, which the thesis and broader literature shows are more important than input mechanisms. One way to do so is to move the institutional effects causally prior to the policy effects. In which ways does integration impact output legitimacy? How does greater integration mediate the (direct) effects of the economy? Is this mediated through attribution biases (Hobolt & Tilley, 2014a), or does greater integration lead to a greater focus on output legitimacy? Put more formally, does the effect size of the quality of policy outputs (economic or otherwise) depend on integration?

2 Discourses rather than objective measures as the explanatory variable

One avenue that may reconcile the evidence and the theory is by switching to discourses of integration as the independent variable. European integration is articulated in different ways in different national systems. Whilst the objective levels of integration may be the same, these can be interpreted differently by different publics (e.g Strange, 1996; Rodrik, 2011). This literature moved away from the debates about whether economic integration led to constrained government policy choice but how it was presented in the public and how

this impacted on government behaviour (Hay & Rosamond, 2002; Rosamond, 1999; Hay & Smith, 2010; Bolukbasi, 2009). Whilst the theory may indeed be correct, it may not be best captured by 'objective' measures that are used in existing work but rather by these types of discourses.

A starting point for this could be Hay and Smith (2005), who outlined potential discourses of European integration. These are presented in table 9.2. They argue that how European integration is presented can vary considerably, from discourses that argue that not only is it unambiguously positive but also amenable to state action (bottom left cell) to those that argue it is inevitable and a threat to state sovereignty (top right cell).

Table 9.2: Discourses of European Integration

	Unambiguously Positive	Character is Contingent	Unambiguously Negative
Inevitable	External economic constraint	Inevitable but amenable	Inherent threat to sovereignty
Contingent	Project to be defended	Must be made defensible	May undermine sovereignty

These discourses may shape how the realities of integration are perceived by the public. But they can also be used by elites strategically to shift blame or credit. For instance, Schlipphak and Treib (2017) show how European intervention in Hungary and Austria were framed in terms of an external intervention. In the case of Austria, the government framed the intervention as 'illegitimate meddling with domestic affairs'. This seems to have mattered to voters, who boosted their support for the domestic governments. There is also evidence, however, that neither politicians nor media particularly blame the European Union (Hobolt & Tilley, 2014a). Rather, politicians blame rival politicians and parties or previous governments, given that they have more to gain from the blame being on electoral competitors.

Although discourses are sometimes integrated with the room to manoeuvre theory (e.g Hellwig & Coffey, 2011), an explicit focus on these in the empirical literature would be a worthwhile research agenda.

3 **Explore the consequences of other mechanisms**

In the theoretical framework, three 'direct effects' were outlined: European Parliament elections, the saliency of the EU issue, and the development of anti-EU parties. These could equally be generalised to issues of integration more

generally. Do these have consequences for political support? For instance, the effect of European elections is to arguably improve the (national) performance of challenger parties, draw voters to a new partisanship and away from mainstream parties, increase political interest, and potentially subdue future turnout. Do these flow through to political support? There are equally plausible mechanisms that suggest they might. It is quite possible that the development of anti-EU parties that effectively mobilise around the EU issue, combining immigration with anti-system positions, instils low levels of political support amongst its partisans that might not otherwise have existed.

4 Accounting for individual biases

The room to manoeuvre theory and the theory presented at the start of this thesis do not account for individual biases, though some attempt is made to do so in the individual chapters. A broader theory, encapsulating individual processes as well as the macro processes, is a significant undertaking, but one that seems crucial for any theory that aims to understand political support. Of course, this also requires careful selection about which individual biases one wishes to include. Which of these has to some extent depend on the field and relationship under study. But for political support, it is necessary to consider factors such as whether one supports the incumbent or is a partisan in general. Although this is commonplace and widely studied in the political support literature (e.g Blais & Gélineau, 2007; Carlin, Love & Young, 2019), it is not well integrated into the wider room to manoeuvre literature.

Limitations and Future Research

There are a number of limitations to the thesis which also provide areas of future research. The first major limitation in the analysis is its broad focus, with the exception of chapter 7. This, however, was motivated by the theoretical expectations which do not, as discussed, adequately account for domestic variation; and, in part, by the necessity for a broad focus to address the broader research questions. If the focus was more narrow, an equally powerful limitation would be that the results could not generalise. This trade-off is somewhat inevitable in such studies. The logical next step to account for this would be to focus on country case studies. For instance, comparing the discourses of integration and its effects on political support in a small sample of countries either qualitatively or quantitatively, such as through survey experiments.

A second limitation concerns the data sources and some methods. Although the thesis has replicated results, where possible, on alternative data-

sets, it has still been reliant on the Eurobarometer. Ideally, it would have replicated some of the results, particularly in the first two empirical chapters, on alternative data to make sure that the results are not the result of some feature of the survey. The Eurobarometer, however, is uniquely placed for the study, mostly due to its regular implementation and long time series. Moreover, replicating all of the models on new data would have been time intensive. Considering the effort to merge the Eurobarometer, this was out of the scope of the thesis. In a similar vein, the thesis has attempted many different modelling strategies in all chapters, and reported these in the appendices. But there will, as always, be methods which other researchers would have adopted. This is particularly the case for chapter 5. Nonetheless, it is the case for all studies that at the end, one cannot try all potential models.

A third limitation lies in the theory applied to the research question, which was found to be wanting. However, it is an appropriate endeavour to test an existing theory in a new domain and to find that its expectations do not hold up: this is an important step in developing new knowledge. In doing so, it also dispels some concerns about the effects of European (international) integration. Nonetheless, a number of alterations to the theory have been suggested in this concluding chapter, which should be explored in future research. A logical next step is to test the mechanisms that this thesis has not tested, particularly the 'direct effects', such as the knock-on effects of European elections or alignment with anti-EU parties.

My future research agenda, aside from addressing the above limitations, is to focus in on two core gaps in political support research: the consequences and solutions. Despite political support being one of the most written about concepts in political science, these two significant aspects remain almost unblemished by research.

We know very little about the consequences of different levels of support. All of our work may be unnecessary if we find that support has marginal or no consequences of interest. Further research can build on existing limited observational studies on, for instance, attitudes to law compliance (Marien & Hooghe, 2011) and political participation (Hooghe & Marien, 2013), either using survey data greater in time and country coverage or in experimental settings. Other avenues are to study how and whether support affects the types of attributes voters prefer in politicians (Clarke, Jennings, Moss & Stoker, 2018) or whether it alters policy preferences (Hetherington & Globetti, 2002; Fairbrother, 2019; Jacobs & Matthews, 2012). A working hypothesis from existing studies, for instance, would be that low support leads to less preference for redistributive policies or policies that will not provide returns for a long

time. A combination of these may help to explain the declining support for social democratic parties and a move towards more conservative or individualist policy programmes.

There are many contemporary efforts to 'revitalise democracy' and 'rebuild trust', but we know very little about what works with regard to building support for political institutions. One of the more popular suggestions is to increase citizen participation in decision-making, or at least the opportunity to do so, through direct democracy or citizen assembly type reforms. However, it is unlikely that these would work. Existing research is scant but provides little evidence to suggest it would (Marien & Kern, 2017; Marien & Werner, 2019; Ladam, 2019; Pedersen & Pedersen, 2019). Meanwhile, this thesis also suggests that institutional changes will not be successful, at least in the short to medium term (Martini & Quaranta, 2020), though there are, of course, many other good reasons to do so. Focusing on improving policy performance is more likely to be the route to increasing political support, if not the more diffuse attitudes of regime support.

A plausible and practical avenue is to reduce the uneven benefits of policy. For instance, evidence from Britain shows that local economic conditions shape how people feel their community is represented; when there is a perceived imbalance between local and national performance perceived levels of representation are reduced (McKay, 2019). However, this may be difficult when trust is required to support redistributive efforts (Macdonald, 2019).

Concluding Remarks

Political support is fundamental to good governance. Aside from being related to other behaviours and attitudes we associate with a healthy democracy, like electoral participation, it also facilitates good policy making and buttresses support for democratic decision-making (Stoker, 2006; van der Meer, 2017; Hetherington & Husser, 2012). Whilst we would of course not want blind trust in political institutions, it at least seems important to understand what determines support for political institutions if we are interested in maintaining support - or at least avoiding the erosion of it. The attention to political support has increased over the last decade, with pundits and academics alike putting political phenomena like the rise of challenger parties at the doorstep of (perceived) declining support for 'status quo' institutions.

At the same time, one explanation for declining support has been the interdependence of national polities. This has long been the case in academic work, with concerns about the effect of European integration in particular (Scharpf,

1999; Schmidt, 2006; Mair, 2013). The integration of 28 nation-states and building of intergovernmental and supranational institutions is a monumental institutional transformation for member states to deal with. One consequence, it was theorised, was that the Europeanisation of national polities would intervene with democratic representation, and reduce support for political institutions. However, this was theorised without much empirical investigation.

In this thesis, I set out to consider the potential effects of integration and through which pathways that might operate in the hope of understanding a bit more about political support and the institutions which govern us. In doing so, this contributes to academic knowledge which had explicitly called for a greater understanding of the effects of European and global integration on political support (e.g Martini & Quaranta, 2020; van Ham et al., 2017; Vowles & Xezonakis, 2016). Whilst the arguments linking integration with changing political support point to the institutional transformation and limitations to democratic input at the domestic level, it seems that Europe's citizens disagree.

Rather, support for political institutions leans heavily on people's welfare. This type of support is intricately tied to performance. Consistent with previous research, improving the quality of government and its outputs is essential to bolstering support (Martini & Quaranta, 2020). The concerns about the consequences of integration have under-played the possibility that integration has been essential in doing just that.

Part V

Appendix

Chapter 5

Additional Models

Panel data analysis, especially of relatively slow-moving variables, is susceptible to changing on model specification (Wilson & Butler, 2007). As a result I report an additional ten models below. The first table reports models that are akin to the final model presented in text, and are more in line with the 'Beck-Katz' norm that is prevalent in political science. In these models, the effect is largely consistent across all specifications, both in significance and effect size. In model 3, the coefficient is significant at the 10% level rather than the 5% level, but otherwise the models are consistent. The globalisation variable is less robust, with the lagged variable falling out of significance in models 3 and 4, and the instantaneous variable only significant in model 5.

The models differ in the following ways. Model 1 is a pooled OLS model that ignores the panel structure (i.e both countries and time) and is therefore the most simple model available. Model 2 extends this by including panel-corrected standard errors to deal with heteroskedasticity and a correction on the error term to account for autocorrelation (AR1). Model 3 is a fixed-effects model with panel corrected standard errors. The interpretation of the other variables is now a *within* interpretation rather than *within and between*; the interpretation of the primary variable of interest remains the same due to there being no between-country variation to start with. This explains the change in coefficients. Model 4 allows the panels to be correlated and adjusts for panel-specific autocorrelation (AR1). Finally, model 5 is similar to Model 4 but does not allow the panels to be correlated.

Table A.1: Panel Regression Robustness Tests

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Integration	-0.0498	-0.0188	-0.0237	-0.00551	-0.0155
	(0.0418)	(0.0203)	(0.0374)	(0.0141)	(0.0168)
Integration$_{t-1}$	-0.0764*	-0.0437*	-0.0340$^+$	-0.0320*	-0.0409*
	(0.0243)	(0.0201)	(0.0180)	(0.0140)	(0.0167)
GDP	0.0152	0.00641**	0.00141	0.00253$^+$	0.00419*
	(0.00826)	(0.00206)	(0.00356)	(0.00136)	(0.00175)
Unemployment	0.00320	-0.00579	-0.0204*	-0.0125***	-0.0113*
	(0.0183)	(0.00569)	(0.00780)	(0.00350)	(0.00490)
Inflation	-0.0150*	-0.00879***	-0.0107*	-0.00557***	-0.00810***
	(0.00555)	(0.00230)	(0.00435)	(0.00164)	(0.00208)
Globalisation	-0.00284	-0.00174	-0.0120	-0.00241	-0.00844*
	(0.00822)	(0.00415)	(0.00767)	(0.00294)	(0.00373)
Year	0.00775	0.00372	0.00977	0.00591**	0.00658**
	(0.00494)	(0.00285)	(0.00556)	(0.00207)	(0.00246)
GDP$_{t-1}$	0.0147*	0.00660***	0.00368	0.00252*	0.00525**
	(0.00583)	(0.00187)	(0.00249)	(0.00123)	(0.00163)
Unemployment$_{t-1}$	-0.00164	-0.00340	0.0109	0.00350	0.00236
	(0.0120)	(0.00661)	(0.00695)	(0.00415)	(0.00577)
Unemployment$_{t-2}$	-0.0241**	-0.0122*	-0.00898$^+$	-0.00590$^+$	-0.0133**
	(0.00564)	(0.00497)	(0.00406)	(0.00325)	(0.00440)
Inflation$_{t-1}$	-0.00128	-0.00000820	0.000504	0.000814	0.000181
	(0.00419)	(0.00219)	(0.00297)	(0.00157)	(0.00203)
Globalisation$_{t-1}$	0.0164$^+$	0.0127**	0.00514	0.00471	0.0121**
	(0.00714)	(0.00413)	(0.00343)	(0.00297)	(0.00376)
Observations	333	333	333	333	333

Standard errors in parentheses
$^+$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Instead of modelling the data as time-series-cross-sectional data using panel methods, the table below adopts a multilevel modelling approach. Only the fixed part of the models are presented. These models are less optimistic about the robustness of the results presented in the main text. Only in models 2 and 4 is the main result significant, though the coefficients are not dissimilar. Model 1 is a cross-nested multilevel model, with country and time as non-hierarchical models. Model 2 includes country as a level (with year as a trend), and clusters standard errors by country. Model 3 replicates this but with country fixed effects. Models 4 and 5 are identical to modes 2 and 3, respectively, except they allow the effect of integration to vary between countries rather than constraining the coefficient to be equal.

Because of this random slope, additional analysis is required. In model 5, extracting the coefficients shows that whilst in some countries the effect is positive (Luxembourg, Denmark), and others it makes no difference (Italy), most display a negative effect (UK, Belgium, Germany). Therefore, the lack of significance on the coefficient is misleading, and is a product of the averaging across countries.

Comparing these models is encouraging for the main analysis. The model fit improves across all models (i.e, model 1 is the worst fit and model 5 is the best) as indicated by both the loglikelihood and AIC tests. Whilst this means that the models which show significance (either on the main coefficient or when analysed by country) are better fits overall, the results nonetheless show that the results are not completely robust.

Residual and Other Analysis

The panel of graphs below show the residual analysis of the final model presented in the main text. Overall, the model provides good fit. The residuals are largely normally distributed. The (not shown) correlation between the predicted values and observed values is 67%, also indicating moderate predictive power. There are two areas of concern: the first is the 'hump' displayed on the kernel density graph, and the two clusters of residuals on the residuals vs fitted values graph. These two clusters are Ireland - which is over-predicted - and Italy - which is under predicted. These also account for the countries which exceed the -2/+2 cut off, along with Belgium and Germany.

To deal with this, I run an identical regression but excluding each country in turn. In other words, I estimate an additional nine regressions, with each one excluding one country (the ninth regression, for instance, estimates the model

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)

Table A.2: Random Effects Robustness Tests

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Integration	0.0208	-0.0241	0.113	-0.0132	0.0214
	(0.0251)	(0.0369)	(0.0942)	(0.0307)	(0.133)
Integration$_{t-1}$	-0.00162	-0.0353$^+$	-0.0724	-0.0369*	-0.0232
	(0.0249)	(0.0182)	(0.0967)	(0.0163)	(0.135)
GDP	0.000322	0.00162	0.00108	0.00292	0.00412$^+$
	(0.00258)	(0.00345)	(0.00392)	(0.00351)	(0.00244)
Unemployment	-0.0225**	-0.0201**	-0.0243***	-0.0227*	-0.0263***
	(0.00684)	(0.00753)	(0.00583)	(0.00946)	(0.00563)
Inflation	-0.00987***	-0.0107*	-0.0151*	-0.00779***	-0.00879**
	(0.00283)	(0.00431)	(0.00664)	(0.00232)	(0.00312)
Globalisation	-0.0146**	-0.0117	-0.0152	-0.0101	-0.00635
	(0.00538)	(0.00761)	(0.0120)	(0.00630)	(0.00521)
GDP$_{t-1}$	0.00295	0.00384	0.00558	0.00351	0.00595**
	(0.00236)	(0.00237)	(0.00342)	(0.00220)	(0.00229)
Unemployment$_{t-1}$	0.0158	0.0107	0.0126*	0.0116	0.0162$^+$
	(0.0100)	(0.00680)	(0.00515)	(0.00775)	(0.00837)
Unemployment$_{t-2}$	-0.0110$^+$	-0.00930*	-0.00320	-0.00580	-0.00525
	(0.00602)	(0.00398)	(0.00354)	(0.00379)	(0.00526)
Inflation$_{t-1}$	0.000187	0.000427	0.000365	0.00234	0.00135
	(0.00270)	(0.00295)	(0.00277)	(0.00182)	(0.00287)
Globalisation$_{t-1}$	0.0120*	0.00552	0.00451	0.00906*	0.0108*
	(0.00523)	(0.00339)	(0.00455)	(0.00415)	(0.00518)
Year FEs			✓		✓
Observations	333	333	333	333	333
LogLik	373	386	406	434	459
AIC	-716	-756	-797	-853	-818

Standard errors in parentheses

$^+$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure A.1: Alternative variables

without the UK). This tests for the robustness of the estimates from potentially problematic countries (like Ireland or Italy). The results presented below show the results are robust to country exclusion, except excluding Italy. However, excluding both Italy and Ireland - countries which are problematic in the residuals - provides a coefficient consistent with the others. Whilst the results are robust, they are nonetheless sensitive to Ireland and Italy. The coefficient excluding them both is, however, consistent with the main analysis presented in the chapter.

Figure A.2: Pearson residual analysis

Table A.3: Model Comparison with Country Exclusion

Model Excluding	Integration$_{t-1}$
France	-.037*
Belgium	-.032+
Netherlands	-.038*
Germany	-.038*
Italy	-.030
Luxembourg	-.032+
Denmark	-.033+
Ireland	-.048**
UK	-.035+
Ireland and Italy	-.044*

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Chapter 6

Additional Models

Similar to the panel analysis, there is potential that the results are sensitive to model specification. In addition, as the data and methods chapter described, results may vary depending on the indicators we use for integration. Table B.1 presents a range of models which vary how time (year) and country are controlled for, indicated by the tick marks at the bottom of the table. Columns 9 and 10 also include results for another indicator of European integration, the number of directives and regulations (norms) that come from the EU (Konstantinidis et al., 2019; Toshkov, 2013)

To better and more readily interpret these, figures B.1 and B.2 present coefficient plots for the EU Index and political integration. Coefficients are grouped by country area on the Y axis, and the legend displays which marker is for which model specification. The first row of the legend is for democratic satisfaction whilst the second row is for trust. Year and Country FE are the coefficients presented in the main text. As can be seen, there is important variation between coefficients. This is particularly true for Continental (first row) and Anglo-Saxon country areas. Meanwhile, Scandinavian, Southern and to a lesser extent post-Communist are largely stable. Results are more robust for the EU Index, where it is only the first row which exhibits significant variation.

Figure B.3 plots the main models but restricted to the nine countries used in the panel analysis. This actually shows the opposite to the panel analysis, insofar as integration increases SWD. However, it also shows that it has a negative effect on trust. The EU Index has a negative effect on SWD and a negative

Table B.1: Robustness Test Models

	(1) SWD	(2) Trust	(3) SWD	(4) Trust	(5) SWD	(6) Trust	(7) SWD	(8) Trust	(9) SWD	(10) Trust
Integration	-0.195*** (0.00879)	0.553*** (0.0480)			0.413*** (0.00752)	-0.220*** (0.0348)				
Integration × Anglo-Saxon	-0.0771*** (0.00648)	-0.292*** (0.0471)			-0.0259*** (0.00627)	-0.461*** (0.0458)				
Integration × Scandinavian	0.340*** (0.00959)	0.472*** (0.0446)			0.140*** (0.00733)	0.508*** (0.0425)				
Integration × Southern	-0.0387*** (0.00762)	-1.233*** (0.0425)			0.0898*** (0.00678)	-1.287*** (0.0392)				
Integration × Post-Comm.	-0.394*** (0.0330)	-0.609*** (0.0439)			0.550*** (0.0394)	-0.219*** (0.0459)				
EU Index			-0.00607+ (0.00319)	-0.000321 (0.00260)			0.0136*** (0.00188)	0.0171*** (0.00153)		
EU Index × Post-Comm.			0.00685+ (0.00377)	-0.00535+ (0.00320)			-0.00545* (0.00260)	0.00900*** (0.00216)		
EU Index × Southern			0.0236*** (0.00559)	0.0192*** (0.00384)			-0.0503*** (0.00406)	-0.00994*** (0.00284)		
EU Index × Scandinavian			-0.0141*** (0.00348)	-0.0317*** (0.00300)			-0.0100*** (0.00230)	-0.0149*** (0.00188)		
EU Index × Anglo-Saxon			-0.00851** (0.00282)	-0.00652* (0.00259)			-0.0139*** (0.00214)	0.00491** (0.00185)		
Norms									0.00768*** (0.000120)	-0.0000675** (0.0000248)
Norms × Post-Comm.									0.0000550*** (0.0000149)	0.000239*** (0.0000236)
Norms × Southern									0.000134*** (0.0000156)	-0.000269*** (0.0000219)
Norms × Scandinavian									0.000305*** (0.0000137)	0.000401*** (0.0000194)
Norms × Anglo-Saxon									-0.0000307 (0.0000234)	0.0000168 (0.0000249)
Observations	944181	668112	228530	406503	944181	668112	228530	406503	792668	521433
Year trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Standard errors in parentheses

$^+$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure B.1: Coefficient plots of the EU Index on different model types

Figure B.2: Coefficient plots of the Integration variable on different model types

but not statistically significant on trust.

Figure B.3: Main analyses presented, nine countries only

Residual Analysis

Unlike usual, it is not possible to use a goodness-of-fit statistic (such as the common Hosmer-Lemeshow test, which I use in the next chapter) to test whether the model fits the data properly, as these are susceptible to large samples. Hosmer-Lemeshow statistics will show as significant (i.e, $P < 0.05$) if the model fits the data poorly. But under large samples, small deviations will provide a statistically significant result independent of how well the model fits (Paul, Pennell & Lemeshow, 2013; Yu, Xu & Zhu, 2017). I provide graphs of the residuals, similar to the panel analysis, which indicate how well the model fits and, more importantly in this case, if any residuals are influential on the overall estimates.

I show three types of residuals. The Pearson residual is the (standardised) difference between what is observed and what is predicted. The deviance residual is similar to the 'raw' residual in OLS regression, since logistic regression aims to minimise the sum of the deviance residuals. I also show the leverage statistic, which indicates how influential a given residual is on the regression coefficients. I display these values over the predicted values as well

as the distribution of the Pearson residuals (which should be normally distrib-
uted in large samples). Collectively, these can indicate whether the model is
problematic or pragmatically which observations may skew the results.

The sixteen graphs (four for each model) below do not show any serious
issues. The Pearson residuals (top left in each) are normally distributed, and
there is no evidence of heterogeneity in the residuals (top right and bottom left)
across the predicted values. There do not seem to be any observations which
exert a significant leverage on the regression (bottom right). The exception is
the first panel, where there are multiple observations that differ. Investigating
further, these are predominantly Belgium across different years. Excluding
Belgium does not alter the results (not shown); the only change is that some
year dummies become insignificant (particularly 2002).

Figure B.4: Residual analysis from model in column 3, table 5.8

Figure B.5: Residual analysis from model in column 6, table 5.8

Figure B.6: Residual analysis from model in column 3, table 5.9

Figure B.7: Residual analysis from model in column 3, table 5.9

APPENDIX C

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Chapter 7

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Portugal Intervention

Table C.1 presents the full regression results for figure 7.4 in the first column. From these coefficients the marginal effects were plotted using Stata's *margins, dydx(*)* command. In addition to this, columns 2 and 3 present additional regressions on trust in government (rather than Parliament) and trust in the EU. The results show that the 'treatment' of the intervention had a statistically significant effect on reducing trust in Parliament, but not for government or the EU. This shows two things. Firstly, it suggests that the effect is not merely an artefact of the effect of gender, since that is also significant, and more substantively so, in the other two models. Secondly, it shows that the intervention had an impact uniquely on the more diffuse trust in Parliament than government and was limited to the national arena.

In addition, I conduct a number of placebo tests presented in table C.2. These include setting the intervention date to different dates, excluding all of those interviewed after the actual intervention date, and reducing the bandwidth to three days either side of the intervention date. These ensure that the coefficient is not just an artefact of sampling, an arbitrary selection date, or that people became more distrusting over time in general.

All of the models show the result to be robust. None of the placebo tests are significant even at the 10% level (models 1-4). Meanwhile the treated coefficient with the reduced bandwidth is double the effect size presented in the main text.

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Table C.1: Regression Table for figure 7.4

	(1) Trust Parliament	(2) Trust Government	(3) Trust EU
Post-Intervention	-0.368*	0.0145	-0.0839
	(0.183)	(0.193)	(0.162)
Education	0.00982	0.00165	0.0411
	(0.0234)	(0.0257)	(0.0222)
Age	-0.00328	0.00325	-0.00963*
	(0.00459)	(0.00501)	(0.00444)
Occupation	0.00770	0.0103	-0.0119
	(0.0379)	(0.0421)	(0.0348)
Gender	-0.477**	-0.515**	-0.527***
	(0.146)	(0.161)	(0.135)
Constant	-0.108	-0.804*	1.112**
	(0.371)	(0.405)	(0.360)
Observations	980	986	924
BIC	1173.2	1030.0	1290.4

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

2009 Analysis

This section presents additional analyses and full tables for the 2009 analyses presented in table 7.4. Firstly, I show the step-wise inclusion of individual level variables, holding all country variables constant. The models show consistency across country variables as more individual variables are included. Political interest is initially highly significant but loses significance with additional attitudinal variables. The main variable of interest is insignificant throughout, but the coefficient changes direction when an interaction is included between the variable and views on European unification. Until then, it is stable.

I secondly present two different forms of model in table C.4. The first, in the first column, is using a continuous independent variable with the binary dependent variable. The continuous variable is the original values from subtracting EU responsibility from member state responsibility, whereas the main analysis dichotomises this. The coefficient is much the same, but in this instance is significant at the 5% level. Despite this, the effect size is very small. This suggests that the continuous variable somewhat inflates significance due to the extreme values at the tail ends.

The second column uses the original, 4-category dependent variable, but with the binary independent variable, and is therefore also specified as an or-

Table C.2: Placebo Tests for Portugal Intervention

	(1) Median (with Treated)	(2) Median (without treated)	(3) 6th Day	(4) 5th day	(5) Reduced bandwidth
Placebo 1	-0.0393 (0.163)				
Placebo 2		0.0832 (0.172)			
Placebo 3			0.165 (0.190)		
Placebo 4				0.180 (0.245)	
Treated					-0.635* (0.267)
Gender	-0.443** (0.145)	-0.566*** (0.164)	-0.564*** (0.164)	-0.564*** (0.164)	-0.154 (0.207)
Education	0.0116 (0.0233)	-0.0146 (0.0268)	-0.0138 (0.0268)	-0.0127 (0.0269)	0.0400 (0.0352)
Age	-0.00105 (0.00448)	-0.00382 (0.00520)	-0.00371 (0.00520)	-0.00387 (0.00520)	0.0000676 (0.00688)
Occupation	0.00235 (0.0377)	0.0235 (0.0449)	0.0236 (0.0449)	0.0229 (0.0449)	-0.0545 (0.0535)
Observations	980	745	745	745	463

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

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Table C.3: Full Regression Table for Table 5.5. Stepwise Variable Inclusion.

	(1) Base Model	(2) Demographics	(3) Attitudes	(4) Interaction
EU Responsibility	-0.0311 (0.0706)	-0.0323 (0.0707)	-0.111 (0.0756)	0.0570 (0.108)
Gender		-0.101** (0.0318)	-0.0349 (0.0373)	-0.0348 (0.0373)
Age		0.00287** (0.00107)	0.000218 (0.00127)	0.000230 (0.00127)
Class		0.203*** (0.0170)	0.132*** (0.0199)	0.131*** (0.0199)
Mid Education		0.0767 (0.0511)	0.0458 (0.0616)	0.0461 (0.0616)
High Education		0.169** (0.0542)	0.104 (0.0649)	0.106 (0.0649)
A Little Interested		0.344*** (0.0549)	0.177* (0.0696)	0.177* (0.0696)
Somewhat Interested		0.461*** (0.0553)	0.168* (0.0702)	0.168* (0.0702)
Very Interested		0.232*** (0.0643)	-0.0880 (0.0800)	-0.0898 (0.0800)
EU Unification			0.0686*** (0.00620)	0.0752*** (0.00692)
Leftright			0.0282*** (0.00677)	0.0283*** (0.00677)
Knowledge			0.0397*** (0.0118)	0.0399*** (0.0118)
Retrospective Economy			-0.237*** (0.0210)	-0.237*** (0.0210)
Prospective Economy			-0.287*** (0.0176)	-0.287*** (0.0176)
Nationality and European			0.355*** (0.0412)	0.353*** (0.0412)
European and Nationality			0.241** (0.0789)	0.242** (0.0789)
European Only			-0.0337 (0.105)	-0.0340 (0.105)
Incumbent Party ID			0.584*** (0.0429)	0.583*** (0.0429)
EU Resp×EU Unification				-0.0316* (0.0146)
Eurozone	-0.330 (0.298)	-0.354 (0.287)	-0.334 (0.286)	-0.333 (0.286)
Time in EU	-0.00792 (0.0111)	-0.00805 (0.0107)	-0.00828 (0.0107)	-0.00833 (0.0107)
Interest Rates	-0.114* (0.0576)	-0.114* (0.0554)	-0.0756 (0.0553)	-0.0753 (0.0553)
Time as Democracy	0.0341** (0.0111)	0.0327** (0.0107)	0.0358*** (0.0107)	0.0360*** (0.0106)
Constant	-0.221 (0.652)	-1.187 (0.633)	-0.0900 (0.643)	-0.131 (0.643)
EU Responsibility	0.0868* (0.0338)	0.0807* (0.0340)	0.0829* (0.0386)	0.0787* (0.0374)
Intercept	0.430*** (0.122)	0.396*** (0.112)	0.391*** (0.112)	0.391*** (0.112)
Observations	23393	20973	17155	17155
LogLik	-13768.4	-12146.0	-9306.9	-9304.6
AIC	27552.7	24324.0	18663.9	18661.2

Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: $* \ p < 0.05$, $** \ p < 0.01$, $*** \ p < 0.001$

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dinal logistic model. The results are consistent here as well. Overall, these additional models show that the results are not simply an outcome of data manipulation, but are largely consistent across different specifications.

Figure C.1 shows the same models but within each country (instead of the pooled models). The results are largely consistent, particularly in Portugal.

Figure C.1: Country-level regression models (2009)

Figure C.2 shows the same model but with the main variable of interest interacted with economic evaluations. It shows that whilst support reduces as economic evaluations get worse, this does not change between EU or domestic responsibility.

In table C.5 I present fixed effects models for all countries in the sample (column 1) and restricted to the countries which experienced intervention (column 2). The results do not change.

Table C.5: Fixed effects models (2009)

	(1) All countries	(2) Selected countries
EU Responsibility	-0.0643	0.157
	(0.0460)	(0.165)
Female	-0.0440	-0.141
	(0.0365)	(0.117)
Age	-0.000486	0.00826[+]

	(0.00124)	(0.00478)
Self-identified class	0.129***	0.0804*
	(0.0195)	(0.0396)
Mid education	0.0401	0.0681
	(0.0608)	(0.0416)
High education	0.0912	0.0820
	(0.0641)	(0.0689)
Somewhat interested	0.166*	0.184
	(0.0681)	(0.168)
A little interested	0.159*	0.320+
	(0.0687)	(0.165)
Not at all interested	-0.0861	0.147
	(0.0785)	(0.194)
EU Unification	0.0692***	0.0168
	(0.00606)	(0.0108)
Left-right	0.0318***	0.000749
	(0.00666)	(0.0327)
Knowledge	0.0421***	0.0431
	(0.0115)	(0.0311)
Retrospective Economy	-0.236***	-0.205*
	(0.0207)	(0.0902)
Prospective economy	-0.295***	-0.322***
	(0.0172)	(0.0117)
Nationality & European	0.343***	0.413***
	(0.0402)	(0.0477)
European & Nationality	0.219**	0.338*
	(0.0775)	(0.157)
European	-0.0471	-0.272*
	(0.104)	(0.125)
Incumbent party ID	0.581***	0.572*
	(0.0422)	(0.261)
Country FE	✓	✓
Observations	17701	4099

Finally, I also present the Pearson residuals over the predicted values from the final model (column 4 in Table 5.5). The horizontal dashed lines represent those residuals which are +/- 2. Whilst this looks a lot on the graph, this is a total of 694 observations, which is 3.8% of the sample (694/17155 observations). Excluding these observations and rerunning the model shows statistical significance, as in the model with the continuous variable, but the substantive results do not change.

I also run a Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit statistic using Stata's *estat gof* command. However, to do so requires dropping the random parameters and fitting a one-level logistic regression with country fixed effects. The results show that there is a good model fit (p=0.56), including when collapsed into quantiles of estimated probabilities.

2014 Analysis

This section presents the same format for the 2014 analysis. Firstly, the stepwise inclusion of the individual-level variables shows even largely levels of consistency than the 2009 analysis, with the coefficient on the main independent variable not significantly changed from the base model to the final model (0.0592 to 0.0529). Unfortunately, as noted in the chapter, the models contains fewer variables, some that were significant in the 2009 model (such as class and identity).

As before, I also present the results when using alternative dependent and independent variable forms. Results are consistent across both.

Figure C.4 shows the same models but within each country (instead of the pooled models). The results are largely consistent, particularly in Portugal.

Figure C.5 shows the same model but with the main variable of interest interacted with economic evaluations. It shows that whilst support reduces as economic evaluations get worse, this does not change between EU or domestic responsibility.

Table C.8: Fixed effects models (2014)

	(1) All countries	(2) Selected countries
EU Responsibility	0.0280	0.343***
	(0.0421)	(0.0942)

Female	0.0717*	0.165*
	(0.0336)	(0.0749)
Age	0.0102***	0.0138***
	(0.00112)	(0.00270)
Mid education	0.0617	0.282**
	(0.0525)	(0.103)
High education	0.254***	0.265*
	(0.0559)	(0.113)
Still studying	0.408***	-0.0177
	(0.0962)	(0.223)
To some extent (interest)	0.00930	-0.230^{+}
	(0.0496)	(0.120)
Not really (interest)	-0.344***	-0.836***
	(0.0536)	(0.127)
Not at all (interest)	-0.698***	-1.031***
	(0.0623)	(0.145)
EU Unification	0.0934***	0.0751***
	(0.00578)	(0.0132)
Left-right	0.0249***	0.0255
	(0.00639)	(0.0160)
Knowledge	-0.00325	-0.0315
	(0.0176)	(0.0393)
Retrospective Economy	-0.324***	-0.262***
	(0.0223)	(0.0488)
Prospective economy	-0.424***	-0.433***
	(0.0236)	(0.0519)
Incumbent party ID	0.613***	0.622***
	(0.0357)	(0.0804)
Country FE	✓	✓

Standard errors in parentheses

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The final figure shows the Pearson residuals over predicted values, with horizontal dashed lines showing the +/- 2 mark. The number of observations above/below that limit is 913, representing 4.5% of the sample (913/20208).

Table C.4: Regression Table for Different Forms of (In)dependent Variables (2009)

	(1) Continuous IV		(2) Ordinal DV	
EU Responsibility (cont)	0.0291*	(0.0117)		
EU Responsibility (binary)			0.163	(0.0884)
Gender	-0.0340	(0.0370)	-0.0290	(0.0307)
Age	0.000339	(0.00126)	-0.00109	(0.00104)
Class	0.130***	(0.0198)	0.135***	(0.0166)
Mid Education	0.0497	(0.0610)	0.00893	(0.0515)
High Education	0.120	(0.0644)	0.0427	(0.0542)
A Little Interested	0.163*	(0.0689)	0.279***	(0.0583)
Somewhat Interested	0.153*	(0.0695)	0.226***	(0.0587)
Very Interested	-0.107	(0.0792)	0.117	(0.0672)
EU Unification	0.104***	(0.0165)	0.0728***	(0.00577)
Leftright	0.0285***	(0.00670)	0.0230***	(0.00565)
Knowledge	0.0417***	(0.0117)	0.0408***	(0.00973)
Retrospective Economy	-0.236***	(0.0208)	-0.224***	(0.0172)
Prospective Economy	-0.290***	(0.0174)	-0.288***	(0.0148)
Nationality and European	0.349***	(0.0408)	0.332***	(0.0343)
European and Nationality	0.231**	(0.0782)	0.206**	(0.0643)
European Only	-0.0556	(0.104)	-0.0404	(0.0895)
Incumbent Party ID	0.584***	(0.0426)	0.556***	(0.0350)
EU Responsibility (c)×EU Unif	-0.00409*	(0.00176)		
EU Responsibility (b)× EU Unif			-0.0351**	(0.0124)
Eurozone	-0.345	(0.303)	-0.218	(0.287)
Time in EU	-0.0117	(0.0115)	-0.00895	(0.0107)
Interest Rates	-0.0597	(0.0590)	-0.0676	(0.0555)
Time as Democracy	0.0403***	(0.0115)	0.0321**	(0.0107)
EU Responsibility (cont)	0.000519	(0.000382)		
EU Responsibility (binary)			0.0453	(0.0234)
Intercept	0.418**	(0.128)	0.398***	(0.112)
Observations	17432		17155	
LogLik	-9445.4		-18032.1	
AIC	18942.8		36120.3	

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure C.2: Marginal effect of domestic and European responsibility interacted with economic evaluations (2009)

Figure C.3: Pearson residuals over predicted values (2009)

Table C.6: Full Regression Table for Table 5.6. Stepwise Variable Inclusion.

	(1) Base Model		(2) Demographics		(3) Attitudes	
EU Responsibility	0.0592	(0.0719)	0.0542	(0.0665)	0.0529	(0.0574)
Gender			0.0411	(0.0286)	0.0753*	(0.0342)
Age			0.0110***	(0.000951)	0.0103***	(0.00115)
Mid Education			0.130**	(0.0433)	0.0626	(0.0529)
High Education			0.426***	(0.0463)	0.249***	(0.0565)
Still Studying			0.607***	(0.0809)	0.407***	(0.0977)
To Some Extent (Interest)			0.0193	(0.0440)	0.00912	(0.0506)
Not Really (Interest)			-0.464***	(0.0466)	-0.345***	(0.0546)
Not At All (Interest)			-1.050***	(0.0519)	-0.690***	(0.0632)
EU Unification					0.0933***	(0.00591)
Leftright					0.0214***	(0.00646)
Knowledge					0.00410	(0.0179)
Retrospective Economy					-0.323***	(0.0227)
Prospective Economy					-0.409***	(0.0239)
Incumbent Party ID					0.625***	(0.0364)
Eurozone	-0.0899	(0.274)	-0.0797	(0.259)	-0.0590	(0.249)
Time in EU	-0.0288**	(0.0106)	-0.0277**	(0.00999)	-0.0228*	(0.00960)
Interest Rates	-0.203	(0.112)	-0.164	(0.106)	-0.0887	(0.102)
Time as Democracy	0.0464***	(0.00980)	0.0434***	(0.00928)	0.0432***	(0.00891)
Constant	-0.906	(0.563)	-1.389*	(0.541)	-0.324	(0.533)
EU Responsibility	0.104**	(0.0393)	0.0812*	(0.0337)	0.0367	(0.0252)
Constant	0.377***	(0.105)	0.337***	(0.0939)	0.306***	(0.0861)
Observations	26793		26235		20208	
LogLik	-15977.9		-15043.8		-10805.0	
AIC	31971.8		30119.5		21654.1	

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

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Table C.7: Regression Table for Different Forms of (In)dependent Variables (2014)

	(1) Continuous IV		(2) Ordinal DV	
EU Responsibility (cont)			0.0171	(0.0100)
EU Responsibility (binary)	0.0852	(0.0491)		
Gender	0.0308	(0.0276)	0.0755*	(0.0342)
Age	0.00889***	(0.000931)	0.0104***	(0.00115)
Mid Education	0.0195	(0.0436)	0.0623	(0.0529)
High Education	0.182***	(0.0465)	0.251***	(0.0565)
Still Studying	0.315***	(0.0793)	0.410***	(0.0978)
To Some Extent (Interest)	-0.0954*	(0.0414)	0.0106	(0.0507)
Not Really (Interest)	-0.295***	(0.0451)	-0.348***	(0.0547)
Not At All (Interest)	-0.837***	(0.0522)	-0.691***	(0.0633)
EU Unification	0.0833***	(0.00483)	0.0945***	(0.00592)
Leftright	0.0231***	(0.00533)	0.0217***	(0.00647)
Knowledge	-0.0186	(0.0146)	0.00435	(0.0179)
Retrospective Economy	-0.325***	(0.0188)	-0.322***	(0.0227)
Prospective Economy	-0.403***	(0.0194)	-0.410***	(0.0240)
Incumbent Party ID	0.591***	(0.0299)	0.624***	(0.0364)
Eurozone	-0.0578	(0.248)	-0.0562	(0.245)
Time in EU	-0.0234*	(0.00956)	-0.0226*	(0.00946)
Interest Rates	-0.0861	(0.102)	-0.0659	(0.100)
Time as Democracy	0.0424***	(0.00888)	0.0429***	(0.00879)
EU Responsibility (binary)	0.0293	(0.0188)		
EU Responsibility (cont)			0.00158*	(0.000781)
Intercept	0.308***	(0.0858)	0.297***	(0.0834)
Observations	20208		20208	
LogLik	-21758.3		-10796.3	
AIC	43564.6		21636.5	

Standard errors in parentheses

$^{*} p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$

Figure C.4: Country-level regression models (2014)

Figure C.5: Marginal effect of domestic and European responsibility interacted with economic evaluations (2014)

Excluding these makes no change to the substantive results as presented in Figure 5.5. I similarly run a Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit statistic, which shows a good model fit (p=0.34), including when group collapsed into ten quantiles of estimated probabilities (p=0.26).

Figure C.6: Pearson residuals over predicted values (2014)

Overall, these additional analyses show that the analyses presented in chapter 7 are a) robust to difference specifications of the key (in)dependent variables b) are consistent when including varying degrees of control variables and c) fit well statistically, at least as far as can be told from the limited diagnostics available. In addition, I first showed that the founding premise of the chapter - that interventions matter for political support - is robust and unique to the type of political support this thesis addresses.

Experimental Evidence from Greece

As noted, the use of responsibility attributions, whilst being close to the concept of the room to manoeuvre, are prone to voter rationalisation. Whilst I have shown statistically that the relative attribution is robust to these, statistical tests can only go so far in controlling for potential biases to inference, particularly ones that may be post-treatment. However, as discussed in the data and methods section, there are, to my knowledge, no appropriate and repeated survey questions used cross-nationally that also incorporate measures of political support with regard to the European Union (rather than, for instance, 'globalisation' or the 'world economy').

This robustness section, however, exploits a survey experiment carried out by Kosmidis (2018) in Greece in June 2014, precisely at the time of the European Election Study data used in the primary analyses, to show how responsibility attributions reflect room to manoeuvre perceptions rather than purely voter rationalisation. This is essentially a replication of Kosmidis' treatment check. Unfortunately, whilst the study does include a question on democratic satisfaction identical to the 2009 question, this was included pre-treatment.[1]

Whilst a full description of the study is in Kosmidis (2018), here I provide a brief overview. The intention of the original study is to explore the effect of manoeuvrability on economic voting. Kosmidis randomly assigns respondents to one of two treatment groups: one the 'full room to manoeuvre' group and one the 'no room to manoeuvre group'. There is a control group which receives no scenario, and essentially replicates the no room to manoeuvre group, which states the status quo. The differing question wordings are:

> "According the bail–out agreement, the IMF will leave Greece by the end of this year. This will enable the elected government to design and implement the policies they prefer."

> "Four years after the bail–out agreement, the elected Greek government cannot design or implement policy without consent from the lenders."

The survey then goes on to ask about economic perceptions and vote intention. Kosmidis shows that economic perceptions do not vary between assignment groups, and ultimately shows that room to manoeuvre primes do not influence economic voting. The important test here, however, is whether this ideal experimental setting influences responsibility attributions. Table 5.9 shows the results of a regression on the responsibility variable, which ranges from 0 (responsibility of the lenders) to 10 (responsibility of the Greek government).

What the results show, even controlling for demographic and attitudinal variables (which are recorded pre-treatment), is that the room to manoeuvre assignment increases responsibility attributions to the national government. In other words, and the important part for this chapter, is that responsibility attributions are in part voter rationalisation, and in part a reflection of room to manoeuvre perceptions - even in a setting six years after the onset of the economic crisis, and four years after the bailout.

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[1]Although the survey is not public, this information was obtained in an email exchange with Dr. Kosmidis. I appreciate his efforts in keeping data open and available. Replication code for his paper is available at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/K7OCDX.

Table C.9: Robustness test from Kosmidis (2018)

	(1) Responsibility	(2) Responsibility
Full Room	0.774**	0.787**
	(0.293)	(0.297)
No Room	0.115	0.0840
	(0.287)	(0.289)
Demographics		✓
Attitudes		✓
Constant	4.754***	7.366***
	(0.209)	(0.864)
Observations	1023	994

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Question item wording, ESS and CHES

Table D.1: Question wordings for issue areas

Issues	European Social Survey (ESS)	Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES)
Left-right	In politics people sometimes talk of "left" and "right". Using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?	Please tick the box that best describes each party's overall ideology on a scale ranging from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right)
Redistribution	The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels. Answer categories range from 1 (agree strongly) to 5 (disagree strongly)	Position on redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor ranging from 0 (strongly favors redistribution) to 10 (strongly opposes redistribution)
Social lifestyle	Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish. Answer categories range from 1 (agree strongly) to 5 (disagree strongly)	Position on social lifestyle (e.g. homosexuality) ranging from 0 (strongly supports liberal policies) to 10 (strongly opposes liberal policies)
EU Integration	Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number on the scale best describes your position? Answer categories range from 0 (Unification has already gone too far) to 10 (Unification should go further)	How would you describe the general position on European integration that the party leadership took ranging from 1 (strongly opposed) to 7 (strongly in favor)
Environment	She/he strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment is important to her/him. Answer categories range from 1 (Very much like me) to 6 (Not like me at all)	Position towards the environment ranging from 0 (Strongly supports environmental protection even at the cost of economic growth) to 10 (strongly supports economic growth even at the cost of environmental protection)
Immigration	Index of three items: 1) Now, using this card, to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country] people to come and live here? 2) How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people? 3) How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe? Answer categories range in each case from 1 (Allow many to come and live here) to 4 (Allow none)	Position on immigration policy ranging from 0 (strongly opposes tough policy) to 10 (strongly favors tough policy)

Sourced from ESS, CHES and Stecker and Tausendpfund (2016)

Incongruence over time (ESS)

Figure D.1: Incongruence over time - Left-right scale using the ESS

Figure D.2: Incongruence over time - Redistribution using the ESS

Figure D.3: Incongruence over time - Social lifestyle using the ESS

Figure D.4: Incongruence over time - European integration using the ESS

Figure D.5: Incongruence over time - Environment using the ESS

Figure D.6: Incongruence over time - Immigration using the ESS

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Full tables for Eurobarometer analysis

Table D.2: The effect of integration on party system (in)congruence

	(1) Integration	(2) EU Index	(3) Directives	(4) Regulations	(5) Decisions
Integration	0.0749 (0.0921)				
EU Index		0.00958 (0.0128)			
Directives			0.00632 (0.0104)		
Regulations				-0.00291 (0.00477)	
Decisions					0.00572 (0.00940)
KOF Index	-0.00643 (0.0217)	-0.0589 (0.0559)	0.00538 (0.0229)	0.00538 (0.0229)	0.00538 (0.0229)
GDP	0.0000516 (0.0136)	0.0196 (0.0209)	0.00127 (0.0229)	0.00127 (0.0229)	0.00127 (0.0229)
Inflation	-0.0146 (0.0113)	-0.103 (0.0766)	0.00257 (0.0107)	0.00257 (0.0107)	0.00257 (0.0107)
Unemployment	0.00589 (0.00565)	0.0144 (0.0261)	-0.000119 (0.0152)	-0.000119 (0.0152)	-0.000119 (0.0152)
Corruption	0.481 (0.942)	0.671 (5.245)	-2.442 (2.135)	-2.442 (2.135)	-2.442 (2.135)
ENEP	-0.0508 (0.0380)	-0.0806 (0.0854)	-0.0538 (0.0530)	-0.0538 (0.0530)	-0.0538 (0.0530)
Year & Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Countries	25	14	23	23	23
Country-Years	129	56	104	104	104

Standard errors in parentheses

[+] $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D.3: The effect of integration on government (in)congruence

	(1) Integration	(2) EU Index	(3) Directives	(4) Regulations	(5) Decisions
Integration	-0.0963 (0.457)				
EU Index		-0.0330 (0.0891)			
Directives			0.00722 (0.0621)		
Regulations				-0.00332 (0.0286)	
Decisions					0.00654 (0.0562)
KOF Index	-0.0856 (0.0882)	-0.0532 (0.370)	-0.0526 (0.131)	-0.0526 (0.131)	-0.0526 (0.131)
GDP	0.0699 (0.0438)	0.0956 (0.0790)	0.0771 (0.0687)	0.0771 (0.0687)	0.0771 (0.0687)
Inflation	-0.120* (0.0529)	-0.218 (0.268)	-0.0612 (0.0709)	-0.0612 (0.0709)	-0.0612 (0.0709)
Unemployment	0.0344 (0.0364)	-0.0188 (0.0734)	0.000264 (0.0543)	0.000264 (0.0543)	0.000264 (0.0543)
Corruption	2.650 (4.953)	16.48 (19.75)	-9.329 (11.34)	-9.329 (11.34)	-9.329 (11.34)
ENEP	-0.0379 (0.180)	-0.172 (0.275)	-0.0176 (0.226)	-0.0176 (0.226)	-0.0176 (0.226)
Year & Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Countries	25	14	23	23	23
Country-Years	129	56	104	104	104

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D.4: The effect of integration on Parliament (in)congruence

	(1) Integration	(2) EU Index	(3) Directives	(4) Regulations	(5) Decisions
Integration	0.244				
	(0.169)				
EU Index		0.00195			
		(0.0324)			
Directives			0.0321*		
			(0.0151)		
Regulations				-0.0148*	
				(0.00694)	
Decisions					0.0291*
					(0.0137)
KOF Index	-0.0564^{+}	0.0423	-0.0538^{+}	-0.0538^{+}	-0.0538^{+}
	(0.0289)	(0.148)	(0.0284)	(0.0284)	(0.0284)
GDP	0.00365	-0.0214	0.00586	0.00586	0.00586
	(0.0201)	(0.0306)	(0.0319)	(0.0319)	(0.0319)
Inflation	-0.0426	-0.182	-0.0142	-0.0142	-0.0142
	(0.0272)	(0.134)	(0.0204)	(0.0204)	(0.0204)
Unemployment	0.000169	0.00419	-0.000384	-0.000384	-0.000384
	(0.0194)	(0.0477)	(0.0272)	(0.0272)	(0.0272)
Corruption	1.089	3.897	-1.728	-1.728	-1.728
	(3.157)	(10.65)	(3.060)	(3.060)	(3.060)
ENEP	0.0530	0.0525	0.0118	0.0118	0.0118
	(0.0770)	(0.146)	(0.0949)	(0.0949)	(0.0949)
Year & Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Countries	25	14	23	23	23
Country-Years	129	56	104	104	104

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Full tables for ESS analysis

Table D.5: The effect of integration on party system (in)congruence (ESS)

	(1) LR Scale	(2) Redistribution	(3) Lifestyle	(4) EU	(5) Environment	(6) Immigration
Integration	-0.166	2.027	-0.347	-0.670	-0.800	0.352
	(0.255)	(1.649)	(0.642)	(0.847)	(0.729)	(0.552)
KOF Index	-0.0209	0.126	0.0612	0.140	0.0749	0.0422
	(0.0285)	(0.189)	(0.0692)	(0.0982)	(0.118)	(0.0832)
GDP	0.0134	0.0647	0.0113	-0.00978	0.00588	0.0222
	(0.0181)	(0.0582)	(0.0372)	(0.0670)	(0.0582)	(0.0290)
Inflation	-0.0593*	-0.00960	-0.0334	0.0579	-0.0565	0.0135
	(0.0286)	(0.0857)	(0.0493)	(0.103)	(0.105)	(0.0383)
Unemployment	0.00951	-0.0258	-0.0174	0.0161	-0.00884	0.0144
	(0.0116)	(0.0392)	(0.0350)	(0.0261)	(0.0426)	(0.0244)
Corruption	1.316	6.288^{+}	5.210*	-1.890	4.066	-0.606
	(0.777)	(3.644)	(2.394)	(5.182)	(3.590)	(1.971)
ENEP	-0.0647	-0.168	-0.0491	-0.0814	0.155	-0.173*
	(0.0491)	(0.149)	(0.0958)	(0.161)	(0.191)	(0.0827)
Year & Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Countries	24	24	24	24	24	24
Country-Years	86	66	86	84	62	80

Standard errors in parentheses

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D.6: The effect of integration on government (in)congruence (ESS)

	(1) LR Scale	(2) Redistribution	(3) Lifestyle	(4) EU	(5) Environment	(6) Immigration
Integration	-0.685	-0.877	-2.024	0.935	-1.660	-1.392
	(0.691)	(3.919)	(1.412)	(1.521)	(2.371)	(1.568)
KOF Index	-0.00476	0.226	0.115	0.0357	0.187	0.148
	(0.0865)	(0.468)	(0.113)	(0.168)	(0.350)	(0.303)
GDP	0.0145	0.274$^+$	0.186$^+$	0.0328	0.297*	0.0721
	(0.0455)	(0.160)	(0.0981)	(0.105)	(0.120)	(0.0875)
Inflation	-0.00941	-0.195	-0.186	0.0116	0.120	-0.0857
	(0.0637)	(0.293)	(0.134)	(0.160)	(0.341)	(0.0875)
Unemployment	0.0341	0.0383	0.0827	0.00211	0.0241	0.0617
	(0.0248)	(0.156)	(0.141)	(0.0543)	(0.184)	(0.120)
Corruption	6.394$^+$	6.378	12.54	-19.77**	13.12	5.299
	(3.126)	(11.96)	(9.255)	(6.552)	(8.968)	(6.788)
ENEP	0.00599	-0.550	-0.422	0.0798	0.139	0.248
	(0.107)	(0.388)	(0.310)	(0.252)	(0.359)	(0.307)
Year & Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Countries	24	24	24	24	24	24
Country-Years	86	66	86	84	62	80

Standard errors in parentheses

$^+$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D.7: The effect of integration on parliament (in)congruence (ESS)

	(1) LR Scale	(2) Redistribution	(3) Lifestyle	(4) EU	(5) Environment	(6) Immigration
Integration	-0.564 (0.462)	1.056 (2.398)	0.218 (1.550)	0.792 (1.141)	-1.539 (1.118)	-1.018 (1.092)
KOF Index	0.0338 (0.0526)	0.179 (0.367)	-0.0145 (0.119)	0.0809 (0.124)	0.166 (0.191)	0.182 (0.197)
GDP	0.0372 (0.0385)	0.126 (0.141)	0.0458 (0.0893)	0.0483 (0.101)	0.0850 (0.110)	0.0977 (0.0655)
Inflation	-0.0183 (0.0615)	-0.0231 (0.204)	-0.156 (0.112)	0.0698 (0.129)	0.00800 (0.191)	-0.0161 (0.113)
Unemployment	0.0135 (0.0169)	0.0261 (0.103)	0.0319 (0.108)	0.0447 (0.0310)	0.0329 (0.123)	-0.00884 (0.101)
Corruption	-0.455 (2.098)	0.557 (11.90)	6.458 (10.20)	-1.189 (3.635)	7.995 (6.222)	0.717 (4.189)
ENEP	0.0173 (0.124)	0.0544 (0.249)	0.0479 (0.201)	-0.0973 (0.185)	0.278 (0.226)	-0.172 (0.244)
Year & Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Countries	24	24	24	24	24	24
Country-Years	86	66	86	84	62	80

Standard errors in parentheses
$+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$

Table D.8: The effect of EU Index on party system (in)congruence (ESS)

	(1) LR Scale	(2) Redistribution	(3) Lifestyle	(4) EU	(5) Environment	(6) Immigration
EU Index	-0.0265 (0.0408)	0.0408 (0.242)	-0.111 (0.102)	0.0156 (0.107)	-0.0772 (0.103)	-0.119 (0.100)
KOF Index	-0.0421 (0.0853)	0.183 (0.871)	-0.123 (0.292)	-0.103 (0.291)	-0.0789 (0.226)	0.184 (0.288)
GDP	0.0305 (0.0287)	0.00735 (0.161)	0.0342 (0.0577)	-0.144 (0.291)	0.0267 (0.0946)	-0.0489 (0.0425)
Inflation	-0.0979 (0.107)	-0.251 (0.460)	-0.189 (0.130)	-0.203 (0.195)	-0.223 (0.144)	0.120* (0.288)
Unemployment	0.00857 (0.0449)	-0.0871 (0.200)	-0.0527 (0.0524)	0.00337 (0.0872)	-0.0249 (0.0665)	0.0137 (0.0603)
Corruption	3.642 (11.91)	-15.10 (105.9)	17.30 (17.47)	-10.17 (22.84)	78.30* (34.01)	9.608 (16.69)
ENEP	-0.223 (0.182)	-0.239 (0.970)	-0.494 (0.352)	0.139 (0.258)	-0.0885 (0.252)	-0.336 (0.344)
Year & Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Countries	14	14	14	14	14	14
Country-Years	41	27	41	40	26	41

Standard errors in parentheses
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D.9: The effect of EU Index on government system (in)congruence (ESS)

	(1) LR Scale	(2) Redistribution	(3) Lifestyle	(4) EU	(5) Environment	(6) Immigration
EU Index	-0.114	-0.366	-0.615	0.310	-0.171	-0.0906
	(0.101)	(0.764)	(0.360)	(0.293)	(0.493)	(0.258)
KOF Index	-0.0148	0.585	-0.0429	0.190	0.149	0.762
	(0.202)	(1.895)	(1.043)	(0.552)	(0.966)	(0.515)
GDP	0.105*	0.544	0.396^{+}	-0.298	0.231	0.142
	(0.0373)	(0.510)	(0.194)	(0.431)	(0.267)	(0.154)
Inflation	0.0511	-0.217	-0.453	0.372	-0.267	0.229
	(0.145)	(1.110)	(0.418)	(0.249)	(0.585)	(0.519)
Unemployment	0.0347	-0.178	-0.159	0.0516	-0.348	-0.0243
	(0.0690)	(0.445)	(0.222)	(0.186)	(0.452)	(0.203)
Corruption	-9.927	54.51	76.99	-80.28^{+}	116.4	-20.38
	(15.99)	(229.3)	(48.36)	(42.36)	(142.0)	(63.45)
ENEP	-0.207	-2.036	-2.188^{+}	1.309	-0.381	0.0175
	(0.184)	(2.587)	(1.089)	(0.904)	(1.982)	(1.261)
Year & Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Countries	14	14	14	14	14	14
Country-Years	41	27	41	40	26	41

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D.10: The effect of EU Index on Parliament (in)congruence (ESS)

	(1) LR Scale	(2) Redistribution	(3) Lifestyle	(4) EU	(5) Environment	(6) Immigration
EU Index	0.000408	-0.0719	-0.248	0.104	-0.00489	0.0802
	(0.0690)	(0.306)	(0.311)	(0.266)	(0.233)	(0.263)
KOF Index	0.342	0.324	-0.0307	-0.217	0.112	0.275
	(0.195)	(0.729)	(0.842)	(0.595)	(0.451)	(0.724)
GDP	-0.0250	0.411^{+}	0.182	-0.125	0.0966	0.0794
	(0.0333)	(0.201)	(0.137)	(0.383)	(0.208)	(0.131)
Inflation	0.00746	-0.00783	-0.206	0.0605	-0.266	0.0736
	(0.118)	(0.612)	(0.338)	(0.368)	(0.217)	(0.379)
Unemployment	-0.00833	0.101	-0.0600	0.114	-0.107	-0.127
	(0.0515)	(0.185)	(0.189)	(0.165)	(0.131)	(0.179)
Corruption	-10.30	-72.30	46.74	-34.47	92.58*	-3.037
	(9.427)	(117.3)	(36.97)	(34.03)	(36.22)	(35.77)
ENEP	0.0304	-0.00468	-0.579	0.655	-0.454	-0.509
	(0.201)	(1.211)	(0.662)	(0.754)	(0.566)	(0.696)
Year & Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Countries	14	14	14	14	14	14
Country-Years	41	27	41	40	26	41

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D.11: The effect of Decisions on party system (in)congruence (ESS)

	(1) LR Scale	(2) Redistribution	(3) Lifestyle	(4) EU	(5) Environment	(6) Immigration
Decisions	0.0000226	-0.00415	-0.000780	0.00324	0.00867	-0.00316
	(0.00199)	(0.00316)	(0.00390)	(0.00677)	(0.00861)	(0.00481)
KOF Index	-0.0157	0.611^{+}	0.0398	0.116	0.181	0.144
	(0.0299)	(0.310)	(0.0730)	(0.108)	(0.145)	(0.148)
GDP	0.0113	0.120	0.00427	-0.0141	0.0242	0.0436
	(0.0221)	(0.108)	(0.0402)	(0.0544)	(0.109)	(0.0336)
Inflation	-0.0522	0.0379	-0.0662	0.0590	0.0671	0.00221
	(0.0439)	(0.240)	(0.0665)	(0.171)	(0.106)	(0.0711)
Unemployment	0.00307	-0.0390	-0.0543	0.0331	0.0135	0.00767
	(0.0194)	(0.0535)	(0.0433)	(0.0621)	(0.0892)	(0.0311)
Corruption	0.511	5.769	6.058	-4.224	12.97	-4.556
	(1.910)	(23.36)	(3.810)	(11.49)	(9.510)	(6.221)
ENEP	-0.0818	-0.103	-0.113	0.0223	0.288	-0.115
	(0.0804)	(0.377)	(0.182)	(0.159)	(0.389)	(0.147)
Year & Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Countries	23	23	23	23	23	23
Country-Years	65	45	65	63	41	59

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D.12: The effect of Decisions on parliament (in)congruence (ESS)

	(1) LR Scale	(2) Redistribution	(3) Lifestyle	(4) EU	(5) Environment	(6) Immigration
Decisions	0.00140 (0.00329)	-0.00695+ (0.00377)	-0.00988 (0.0108)	0.00415 (0.0100)	0.0112 (0.0174)	-0.00134 (0.0122)
KOF Index	0.0117 (0.0519)	1.388+ (0.697)	-0.144 (0.120)	0.137 (0.162)	0.284 (0.324)	0.200 (0.349)
GDP	0.00113 (0.0377)	0.355* (0.142)	0.0850 (0.0636)	0.0497 (0.162)	0.120 (0.324)	0.168 (0.109)
Inflation	-0.00170 (0.0667)	0.132 (0.288)	-0.305** (0.0968)	0.0906 (0.239)	0.180 (0.184)	0.108 (0.193)
Unemployment	0.00457 (0.0279)	-0.0426 (0.0931)	-0.0379 (0.0770)	0.0744 (0.0953)	0.0593 (0.124)	-0.0308 (0.0665)
Corruption	10.35 (7.238)	-29.80 (28.39)	11.25 (8.516)	-6.416 (14.44)	17.72 (22.90)	-22.28 (15.43)
ENEP	-0.101 (0.200)	0.0369 (0.406)	-0.0308 (0.292)	0.153 (0.334)	0.499 (0.976)	-0.386 (0.339)
Year & Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Countries	23	23	23	23	23	23
Country-Years	65	45	65	63	41	59

Standard errors in parentheses
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D.13: The effect of Decisions on government (in)congruence (ESS)

	(1) LR Scale	(2) Redistribution	(3) Lifestyle	(4) EU	(5) Environment	(6) Immigration
Decisions	0.000390 (0.00489)	-0.00996 (0.00604)	-0.000881 (0.0141)	0.00595 (0.00960)	0.00744 (0.0243)	-0.00156 (0.0153)
KOF Index	-0.0228 (0.0940)	0.952 (0.979)	-0.0440 (0.146)	0.0421 (0.202)	0.296 (0.469)	0.235 (0.441)
GDP	0.00945 (0.0601)	0.437^{+} (0.248)	0.198 (0.125)	0.133 (0.129)	0.238 (0.217)	0.142 (0.153)
Inflation	0.0407 (0.0795)	0.169 (0.619)	-0.263^{+} (0.143)	0.00657 (0.255)	0.318 (0.281)	0.0178 (0.342)
Unemployment	0.0103 (0.0452)	-0.0119 (0.200)	-0.0236 (0.143)	0.0817 (0.117)	-0.0306 (0.200)	-0.00776 (0.106)
Corruption	-0.0779 (5.467)	-15.78 (43.24)	2.755 (14.12)	-36.98^{+} (19.14)	31.59 (23.44)	-19.23 (21.57)
ENEP	-0.0294 (0.148)	-0.958 (0.611)	-0.359 (0.651)	0.184 (0.441)	1.025 (1.321)	0.170 (0.527)
Year & Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Countries	23	23	23	23	23	23
Country-Years	65	45	65	63	41	59

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D.14: The effect of Directives on government (in)congruence (ESS)

	(1) LR Scale	(2) Redistribution	(3) Lifestyle	(4) EU	(5) Environment	(6) Immigration
Directives	0.00475 (0.0597)	-0.0351 (0.0213)	-0.0107 (0.173)	0.0726 (0.117)	0.0908 (0.297)	-0.0191 (0.186)
KOF Index	-0.0228 (0.0940)	0.952 (0.979)	-0.0440 (0.146)	0.0421 (0.202)	0.296 (0.441)	0.235 (0.441)
GDP	0.00945 (0.0601)	0.437$^+$ (0.248)	0.198 (0.146)	0.133 (0.129)	0.238 (0.469)	0.142 (0.153)
Inflation	0.0407 (0.0795)	0.169 (0.619)	-0.263$^+$ (0.125)	0.00657 (0.255)	0.318 (0.281)	0.0178 (0.342)
Unemployment	0.0103 (0.0452)	-0.0119 (0.200)	-0.0236 (0.143)	0.0817 (0.117)	-0.0306 (0.200)	-0.00776 (0.106)
Corruption	-0.0779 (5.467)	-15.78 (43.24)	2.755 (14.12)	-36.98$^+$ (19.14)	31.59 (23.44)	-19.23 (21.57)
ENEP	-0.0294 (0.148)	-0.958 (0.611)	-0.359 (0.651)	0.184 (0.441)	1.025 (1.321)	0.170 (0.527)
Year & Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Countries	23	23	23	23	23	23
Country-Years	65	45	65	63	41	59

Standard errors in parentheses
$^+$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D.15: The effect of Directives on parliament (in)congruence (ESS)

	(1) LR Scale	(2) Redistribution	(3) Lifestyle	(4) EU	(5) Environment	(6) Immigration
Directives	0.0171	-0.0245[+]	-0.121	0.0507	0.137	-0.0164
	(0.0401)	(0.0133)	(0.132)	(0.122)	(0.213)	(0.148)
KOF Index	0.0117	1.388[+]	-0.144	0.137	0.284	0.200
	(0.0519)	(0.697)	(0.120)	(0.162)	(0.324)	(0.349)
GDP	0.00113	0.355*	0.0850	0.0497	0.120	0.168
	(0.0377)	(0.142)	(0.0636)	(0.0968)	(0.194)	(0.109)
Inflation	-0.00170	0.132	-0.305**	0.0906	0.180	0.108
	(0.0667)	(0.288)	(0.0968)	(0.239)	(0.184)	(0.193)
Unemployment	0.00457	-0.0426	-0.0379	0.0744	0.0593	-0.0308
	(0.0279)	(0.0931)	(0.0770)	(0.0953)	(0.124)	(0.0665)
Corruption	10.35	-29.80	11.25	-6.416	17.72	-22.28
	(7.238)	(28.39)	(8.516)	(14.44)	(22.90)	(15.43)
ENEP	-0.101	0.0369	-0.0308	0.153	0.499	-0.386
	(0.200)	(0.406)	(0.292)	(0.334)	(0.976)	(0.339)
Year & Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Countries	23	23	23	23	23	23
Country-Years	65	45	65	63	41	59

Standard errors in parentheses

[+] $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D.16: The effect of Directives on party system (in)congruence (ESS)

	(1) LR Scale	(2) Redistribution	(3) Lifestyle	(4) EU	(5) Environment	(6) Immigration
Directives	0.000276 (0.0243)	-0.0146 (0.0111)	-0.00951 (0.0476)	0.0395 (0.0826)	0.106 (0.105)	-0.0385 (0.0587)
KOF Index	-0.0157 (0.0299)	0.611^{+} (0.310)	0.0398 (0.0730)	0.116 (0.108)	0.181 (0.145)	0.144 (0.148)
GDP	0.0113 (0.0221)	0.120 (0.108)	0.00427 (0.0402)	-0.0141 (0.0544)	0.0242 (0.109)	0.0436 (0.0336)
Inflation	-0.0522 (0.0439)	0.0379 (0.240)	-0.0662 (0.0665)	0.0590 (0.171)	0.0671 (0.106)	0.00221 (0.0711)
Unemployment	0.00307 (0.0194)	-0.0390 (0.0535)	-0.0543 (0.0433)	0.0331 (0.0621)	0.0135 (0.0892)	0.00767 (0.0311)
Corruption	0.511 (1.910)	5.769 (23.36)	6.058 (3.810)	-4.224 (11.49)	12.97 (9.510)	-4.556 (6.221)
ENEP	-0.0818 (0.0804)	-0.103 (0.377)	-0.113 (0.182)	0.0223 (0.159)	0.288 (0.389)	-0.115 (0.147)
Year & Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Countries	23	23	23	23	23	23
Country-Years	65	45	65	63	41	59

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D.17: The effect of Regulations on government (in)congruence (ESS)

	(1) LR Scale	(2) Redistribution	(3) Lifestyle	(4) EU	(5) Environment	(6) Immigration
Regulations	0.0000213 (0.000267)	-0.00169 (0.00102)	-0.0000481 (0.000773)	0.000325 (0.000525)	0.000406 (0.00133)	-0.0000854 (0.000833)
KOF Index	-0.0228 (0.0940)	0.952 (0.979)	-0.0440 (0.146)	0.0421 (0.202)	0.296 (0.469)	0.235 (0.441)
GDP	0.00945 (0.0601)	0.437^{+} (0.248)	0.198 (0.125)	0.133 (0.129)	0.238 (0.217)	0.142 (0.153)
Inflation	0.0407 (0.0795)	0.169 (0.619)	-0.263^{+} (0.143)	0.00657 (0.255)	0.318 (0.281)	0.0178 (0.342)
Unemployment	0.0103 (0.0452)	-0.0119 (0.200)	-0.0236 (0.143)	0.0817 (0.117)	-0.0306 (0.200)	-0.00776 (0.106)
Corruption	-0.0779 (5.467)	-15.78 (43.24)	2.755 (14.12)	-36.98^{+} (19.14)	31.59 (23.44)	-19.23 (21.57)
ENEP	-0.0294 (0.148)	-0.958 (0.611)	-0.359 (0.651)	0.184 (0.441)	1.025 (1.321)	0.170 (0.527)
Year & Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Countries	23	23	23	23	23	23
Country-Years	65	45	65	63	41	59

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D.18: The effect of Regulations on parliament (in)congruence (ESS)

	(1) LR Scale	(2) Redistribution	(3) Lifestyle	(4) EU	(5) Environment	(6) Immigration
Regulations	0.0000765	-0.00118$^+$	-0.000540	0.000227	0.000612	-0.0000733
	(0.000179)	(0.000639)	(0.000589)	(0.000548)	(0.000953)	(0.000664)
KOF Index	0.0117	1.388$^+$	-0.144	0.137	0.284	0.200
	(0.0519)	(0.697)	(0.120)	(0.162)	(0.324)	(0.349)
GDP	0.00113	0.355*	0.0850	0.0497	0.120	0.168
	(0.0377)	(0.142)	(0.0636)	(0.0968)	(0.194)	(0.109)
Inflation	-0.00170	0.132	-0.305**	0.0906	0.180	0.108
	(0.0667)	(0.288)	(0.0968)	(0.239)	(0.184)	(0.193)
Unemployment	0.00457	-0.0426	-0.0379	0.0744	0.0593	-0.0308
	(0.0279)	(0.0931)	(0.0770)	(0.0953)	(0.124)	(0.0665)
Corruption	10.35	-29.80	11.25	-6.416	17.72	-22.28
	(7.238)	(28.39)	(8.516)	(14.44)	(22.90)	(15.43)
ENEP	-0.101	0.0369	-0.0308	0.153	0.499	-0.386
	(0.200)	(0.406)	(0.292)	(0.334)	(0.976)	(0.339)
Year & Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Countries	23	23	23	23	23	23
Country-Years	65	45	65	63	41	59

Standard errors in parentheses

$^+$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D.19: The effect of Regulations on party system (in)congruence (ESS)

	(1) LR Scale	(2) Redistribution	(3) Lifestyle	(4) EU	(5) Environment	(6) Immigration
Regulations	0.00000124	-0.000703	-0.0000426	0.000177	0.000474	-0.000172
	(0.000000109)	(0.000535)	(0.000213)	(0.000370)	(0.000470)	(0.000263)
KOF Index	-0.0157	0.611^{+}	0.0398	0.116	0.181	0.144
	(0.0299)	(0.310)	(0.0730)	(0.108)	(0.145)	(0.148)
GDP	0.0113	0.120	0.00427	-0.0141	0.0242	0.0436
	(0.0221)	(0.108)	(0.0402)	(0.0544)	(0.109)	(0.0336)
Inflation	-0.0522	0.0379	-0.0662	0.0590	0.0671	0.00221
	(0.0439)	(0.240)	(0.0665)	(0.171)	(0.106)	(0.0711)
Unemployment	0.00307	-0.0390	-0.0543	0.0331	0.0135	0.00767
	(0.0194)	(0.0535)	(0.0433)	(0.0621)	(0.0892)	(0.0311)
Corruption	0.511	5.769	6.058	-4.224	12.97	-4.556
	(1.910)	(23.36)	(3.810)	(11.49)	(9.510)	(6.221)
ENEP	-0.0818	-0.103	-0.113	0.0223	0.288	-0.115
	(0.0804)	(0.377)	(0.182)	(0.159)	(0.389)	(0.147)
Year & Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Countries	23	23	23	23	23	23
Country-Years	65	45	65	63	41	59

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

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