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Information seeking as an evolutionary game

Information seeking as an evolutionary game
Information seeking as an evolutionary game
In this paper we present a game-theoretical model of rumour propagation on social networks. Agents face a choice between making investments at some cost to establish the truth about some underlying fact or copy the views of their network neighbours at no cost. Agents are also assumed to derive a benefit from knowledge about the truth. Considering rumour propagation at a fast time-scale and strategy adaptation at a slower time-scale, we present analysis of outcomes of the resulting evolutionary game. Depending on network structure and cost-benefit ratios, transitions between one and two-cluster solutions, either marked by the existence of only one type of strategy or coexistence of two strategies with low and high investments are found. We establish that clustering in the social network typically suppress the two-cluster solution, thus inhibiting the spread of high-investment strategies and leading to lower population-level awareness of the truth. Moreover, we also investigate the influence of free provision of additional high-quality information by stubborn agents. Counter-intuitively, we find that the presence of such
agents encourages free riding -- an effect that over-compensates the increased presence of higher quality information and has overall detrimental
effects on the population.
Springer
Brede, Markus
bbd03865-8e0b-4372-b9d7-cd549631f3f7
Brede, Markus
bbd03865-8e0b-4372-b9d7-cd549631f3f7

Brede, Markus (2021) Information seeking as an evolutionary game. In Complex Networks XII - Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Complex Networks CompleNet 2021. Springer. 12 pp . (In Press)

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

In this paper we present a game-theoretical model of rumour propagation on social networks. Agents face a choice between making investments at some cost to establish the truth about some underlying fact or copy the views of their network neighbours at no cost. Agents are also assumed to derive a benefit from knowledge about the truth. Considering rumour propagation at a fast time-scale and strategy adaptation at a slower time-scale, we present analysis of outcomes of the resulting evolutionary game. Depending on network structure and cost-benefit ratios, transitions between one and two-cluster solutions, either marked by the existence of only one type of strategy or coexistence of two strategies with low and high investments are found. We establish that clustering in the social network typically suppress the two-cluster solution, thus inhibiting the spread of high-investment strategies and leading to lower population-level awareness of the truth. Moreover, we also investigate the influence of free provision of additional high-quality information by stubborn agents. Counter-intuitively, we find that the presence of such
agents encourages free riding -- an effect that over-compensates the increased presence of higher quality information and has overall detrimental
effects on the population.

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Accepted/In Press date: 10 May 2021

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 449316
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/449316
PURE UUID: e89a9d06-0378-4a62-8492-6b22499a513e

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Date deposited: 24 May 2021 16:31
Last modified: 24 May 2021 16:31

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Contributors

Author: Markus Brede

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