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A Polynomial-time, truthful, individually rational and budget balanced ridesharing mechanism

A Polynomial-time, truthful, individually rational and budget balanced ridesharing mechanism
A Polynomial-time, truthful, individually rational and budget balanced ridesharing mechanism
Ridesharing has great potential to improve transportation efficiency while reducing congestion and pollution. To realize this potential, mechanisms are needed that allocate vehicles optimally and provide the right incentives to riders. However, many existing approaches consider restricted settings (e.g., only one rider per vehicle or a common origin for all riders). Moreover, naive applications of standard approaches, such as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves or greedy mechanisms, cannot achieve a polynomial-time, truthful, individually rational and budget balanced mechanism. To address this, we formulate a general ridesharing problem and apply mechanism design to develop a novel mechanism which satisfies all four properties and whose social cost is within 8.6% of the optimal on average.
Iwase, Tatsuya
ebdf57ab-4228-4a73-83a0-eabe46ae6ba9
Stein, Sebastian
cb2325e7-5e63-475e-8a69-9db2dfbdb00b
Gerding, Enrico
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Iwase, Tatsuya
ebdf57ab-4228-4a73-83a0-eabe46ae6ba9
Stein, Sebastian
cb2325e7-5e63-475e-8a69-9db2dfbdb00b
Gerding, Enrico
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362

Iwase, Tatsuya, Stein, Sebastian and Gerding, Enrico (2021) A Polynomial-time, truthful, individually rational and budget balanced ridesharing mechanism. International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Virtual, Montreal, Canada. 21 - 26 Aug 2021. (In Press)

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

Ridesharing has great potential to improve transportation efficiency while reducing congestion and pollution. To realize this potential, mechanisms are needed that allocate vehicles optimally and provide the right incentives to riders. However, many existing approaches consider restricted settings (e.g., only one rider per vehicle or a common origin for all riders). Moreover, naive applications of standard approaches, such as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves or greedy mechanisms, cannot achieve a polynomial-time, truthful, individually rational and budget balanced mechanism. To address this, we formulate a general ridesharing problem and apply mechanism design to develop a novel mechanism which satisfies all four properties and whose social cost is within 8.6% of the optimal on average.

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Accepted/In Press date: 29 April 2021
Venue - Dates: International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Virtual, Montreal, Canada, 2021-08-21 - 2021-08-26

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 449567
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/449567
PURE UUID: 98c022f8-85d0-4e8b-a648-540e391f1055
ORCID for Sebastian Stein: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0003-2858-8857
ORCID for Enrico Gerding: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0001-7200-552X

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 08 Jun 2021 16:30
Last modified: 09 Jun 2021 01:41

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Contributors

Author: Tatsuya Iwase
Author: Sebastian Stein ORCID iD
Author: Enrico Gerding ORCID iD

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