Modelling some equality and social welfare impacts of road tolling under conditions of traffic uncertainty
Modelling some equality and social welfare impacts of road tolling under conditions of traffic uncertainty
This paper studies the combination of tolls that maximises equality in an interurban network with a toll highway and a free parallel single road which could be tolled as well. Equality is defined by a novel indicator which reflexes earlier equality definitions; it measures the proportion of travellers’ willingness to pay not consumed by the monetary transport costs with respect to their willingness to pay. Users are heterogeneous as their values of travel time (VTT) are different. The research also analyses how the VTT distribution affects this optimal combination. The authors conduct several numerical analyses and compare results under two cases: welfare maximization and equality maximization. For the type of network and users selected the results show that the higher the average VTT, the higher the optimal price, and the higher the dispersion (variance) of VTT, the lower the optimal price. Moreover, to optimize equality, the road should remain free. The most equitable scenario worsen high-income users whereas middle-income users benefit from it. More users are better off under the welfare scenario, which also leads to a higher overall surplus. Finally, welfare pricing and equality pricing schemes work oppositely but match for high traffic levels.
Equality, Fully charged corridor, Income distribution, Optimal price, Social welfare
Ortega, Alejandro
a950aa2d-c35a-47d3-8219-12446fc7eaf3
Vassallo, José Manuel
bd790874-3e13-446e-b791-d54a11638898
Pérez, Juan Ignacio
19b00f0e-1f8d-41d3-bb7f-9fdb8b73cd1d
September 2021
Ortega, Alejandro
a950aa2d-c35a-47d3-8219-12446fc7eaf3
Vassallo, José Manuel
bd790874-3e13-446e-b791-d54a11638898
Pérez, Juan Ignacio
19b00f0e-1f8d-41d3-bb7f-9fdb8b73cd1d
Ortega, Alejandro, Vassallo, José Manuel and Pérez, Juan Ignacio
(2021)
Modelling some equality and social welfare impacts of road tolling under conditions of traffic uncertainty.
Research in Transportation Economics, 88, [101110].
(doi:10.1016/j.retrec.2021.101110).
Abstract
This paper studies the combination of tolls that maximises equality in an interurban network with a toll highway and a free parallel single road which could be tolled as well. Equality is defined by a novel indicator which reflexes earlier equality definitions; it measures the proportion of travellers’ willingness to pay not consumed by the monetary transport costs with respect to their willingness to pay. Users are heterogeneous as their values of travel time (VTT) are different. The research also analyses how the VTT distribution affects this optimal combination. The authors conduct several numerical analyses and compare results under two cases: welfare maximization and equality maximization. For the type of network and users selected the results show that the higher the average VTT, the higher the optimal price, and the higher the dispersion (variance) of VTT, the lower the optimal price. Moreover, to optimize equality, the road should remain free. The most equitable scenario worsen high-income users whereas middle-income users benefit from it. More users are better off under the welfare scenario, which also leads to a higher overall surplus. Finally, welfare pricing and equality pricing schemes work oppositely but match for high traffic levels.
This record has no associated files available for download.
More information
Accepted/In Press date: 18 June 2021
e-pub ahead of print date: 1 July 2021
Published date: September 2021
Additional Information:
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 The Authors
Keywords:
Equality, Fully charged corridor, Income distribution, Optimal price, Social welfare
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 450053
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/450053
ISSN: 0739-8859
PURE UUID: 976c8e8b-fd59-498e-812b-7b4071d51dba
Catalogue record
Date deposited: 07 Jul 2021 16:30
Last modified: 16 Mar 2024 12:53
Export record
Altmetrics
Contributors
Author:
José Manuel Vassallo
Author:
Juan Ignacio Pérez
Download statistics
Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.
View more statistics