University of Southampton

Faculty of Humanities

School of Modern Languages

Kabyles in Britain: Negotiating Identities in a Transnational Setting

by

Souhila Belabbas

Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Abstract

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This thesis examines the everyday and online practices of identity among Kabyle immigrants in the UK who are simultaneously embedded within a Kabyle transnational social field. The Kabyles are an Amazigh ethnic sub-group indigenous to northern Algeria, many Kabyles have emigrated abroad as a direct consequence of the subjugation of Kabylia by the French colonisation and the social and political instability in post-independent Algeria. While the overwhelming majority moved to France and Canada, their immigration to the UK is relatively recent and small-scale. This provides the context for this thesis. It focuses on a varied group of Kabyles who have settled in the UK over the past few years and examines their engagement with 'being Kabyle' in three key sites: The Kabyle/Amazigh Cultural Organisation in London; their everyday encounters with Kabyles and non-Kabyles in different spaces and the participants' interactions within the digital world. Based on ethnographic and interview research the thesis examines how the Kabyle/Amazigh identity and language which are currently undergoing a degree of recognition and revitalisation in Algeria, are being negotiated both at a public and personal level in a relatively new migratory setting. The study draws on the notion of a transnational social field to include the participants' orientation towards Algeria and other sites as they engage online as part of expressing and revitalising their everyday ethnicity in the UK. The analysis suggests that the formation of Kabyleness within the transnational social field involves the creation of overlapping and fluid boundaries between and within the social fields caused by the multiple understandings of Kabyle cultural capital. Therefore, by way of mapping the Kabyle immigrants' activities within the transnational social field, I show their complex, multiple and situational affiliations, where Kabyleness is entangled with gender, age, language, history and/or politics.

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List of Acronyms

ACB : Association de Culture Berbère (Berber Culture Association)

FIS : Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front)

FFS : Front de Forces Socialistes (Socialist Forces Front)

GPK: *Gouvernement Provisoire Kabyle* (Provisional Government of Kabylia)

MCB: Mouvement Culturel Berbère (Berber Cultural Movement)

MAK : Mouvement pour l'Auto-Détermination de la Kabylie (Movement for the Auto-determantion of Kabylia).

RCD : Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocracie (Rally for Culture and Democracy)

RPK: Rassemblement pour la Kabylie (Rally for Kabylia)

TSF : Transnational Social Field

UNPO: Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation

Declaration of Authorship

I, Souhila Belabbas

I declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are my own and has been generated by me as the result of my own original research.

Title of thesis: Kabyles in Britain: Negotiating Identities in a Transnational Setting

I confirm that:

1. This work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this University;
2. Where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated;
3. Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed;
4. Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work;
5. I have acknowledged all main sources of help;
6. Where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed myself;
7. None of this work has been published before submission

Signature: Souhila Belabbas Date: 19/10/2020

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I am deeply indebted to all members of my family: my parents, my siblings, my nieces and nephews for their love, caring and encouragement. I wish to acknowledge the positive feedback and support of Margaret Nicoll and thank her for proofreading the thesis. I would also like to thank Thiziri, *mama* Lamia, my friends in Southampton/UK and my former professors in Algeria notably Dr Benhattab, Dr Belmekki, Dr Ghlamallah, Dr Sebbane, Dr Djaileb and others.

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To my Mother

Chapter 1 General Introduction

1.1 Overview of the Study

This research project focuses on Kabyle individuals and families in the UK who maintain ties to and express their ethnic identity through everyday practices. I combine data I gleaned from face-to-face meetings and interviews with participant observation within a cultural organisation in London/UK and participants' online interactions. This method provides important insight into individuals' constructions and negotiations of identity within a new migratory context and acknowledges the fluidity and complexity of identity. Theoretically, this study adds to the literature of migration, transnationalism, diaspora and ethnicity as well as to scholarship in Amazigh studies.

The Kabyle people, a North African Algerian sub-Amazigh ethnic group, are the largest segment of the Amazigh population. The Kabyles come from what they believe to be a culturally diverse space, which they consider an asset—or a 'symbolic capital' in the language of Bourdieu (1986)—and this has allowed them to easily adapt to a new environment, as most of the Kabyles I worked with generally explained. The psychoanalyst Benslama (2014) examined the historically grounded cultural diversity and plurality within North African countries, notably Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia (collectively known as the Maghreb). According to Benslama, 'The Maghreb is a historically inter-semiotic space, where the Amazigh, the Roman, the Arab, the French, the Jewish, the Christian, the Muslim, the Oriental and the Occidental, etc., have met' (p. 380).[1] Because of different interpretations and the negative connotation of the term 'Berber' as it was given by the Greeks and the Romans, the Berbers decided to call themselves 'Amazigh' (plural '*Imazighen*') which literally means 'free man' (Brett & Fentress, 1997; Maddy-Weitzman, 2011; Zirem, 2016). In this thesis, I use 'Amazigh' for people and 'Tamazight language' for the Berber language. I apply the term 'Berber' when it is used by scholars or by my participants.

1.2 Rationale of the Study and Research Questions

This project developed from personal and academic motivations. My personal motivation is that I identify as a Kabyle woman, and my family comes from Bejaïa in north-eastern Algeria, but I grew up in an Algerian community with a majority of Arabic speakers. Oran, my native city, has a large population of Kabyles who left their villages to search for job opportunities and better lives. I

[1] Original text: 'Le Maghreb est un espace historiquement intersémiotique, ou le Berbère, le Romain, l'Arabe, le Français, le juif, le chrétien, le musulman, l'Oriental et l'Occidental, etc. se sont croisés'.

found it challenging to maintain my Kabyle identity in a city that is different in a number of ways, such as language, traditions, and lifestyle. My mother, who lived in a Kabyle village for 38 years, has always tried to inculcate her habits and principles in her children and transmit her education and understanding of life to them as it was not easy for her to raise five children in such a large metropolitan city as Oran. She always used Kabyle idiomatic expressions and told us Kabyle stories and myths in Arabic. She considered them to be important parts of traditional Kabyle narratives, and although she told them mostly in Arabic, she felt at least the Kabyle culture was there. Because of the political status of the Kabyle language, its prohibition after Algerian independence in 1962, and the Arabisation process (Benrabah, 2014), my mother had stopped using Kabyle except with her family when they visited us from Bejaïa. Even after Kabyle gained national recognition in 2002, my mother thought that it was better for us to learn other languages such as French and English as they would provide us better opportunities.

During my childhood we used to visit Kabylia yearly for a couple of weeks. However, as I grew up, I realised that not speaking the Kabyle language fluently was a real loss, because I believe that language is just like the label or the passport with which I identify myself with the group that I feel I belong to, and am identified by others. Thus, I decided to compensate this felt deficiency by exploring Kabyle culture. Moreover, I often asked myself why the Berber identity, language, and culture which I consider the core of the Algerian identity had been marginalised. Thus, as a Kabyle person and a researcher, I felt it was important to study the Kabyle community and contribute to the preservation of the Kabyle/Amazigh culture. I began to pursue this motivation when I completed my MA dissertation in Sociolinguistics on Language Attitudes and Variation among the Kabyles living in Oran. I have always noticed the linguistic and phonological variation that exists in the Kabyle used among my family as my paternal grandmother comes from a Kabyle village that is different from that of my paternal grandfather. Therefore, this intrigued me to know if they were aware of such linguistic differences and how they coped with and overcame them and what they represented for them.

By doing this MA research, I realised that this group was aware of those differences, but they believed that they were one community as long as there was intelligibility, which made me think about the meaning of identity and culture among the Kabyles. When I had the opportunity to do a PhD, I did not hesitate to adopt this group for my study. Initially, I wanted to examine how the Kabyles in Oran, Paris and Montreal practice their ethnicity and negotiate their Kabyle identity across national borders. However, my stay in the UK allowed me to meet some Kabyle people who were in the process of coming together as a “community” and thinking about how they could

maintain their cultural heritage within the realm of a newly founded organisation in London and at a the transnational level. This became the focus of the present thesis.

Berber studies emerged as a discipline in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly through the work of Maghrebi and French scholars based in France (Ennaji, 2014). Since then most researchers have focused on the Amazigh people in Morocco, Algeria, Canada and most significantly in France looking at how their marginalisation led to the emergence of cultural and political movements within these geographical spaces. Through close examination of the literature on the Kabyles in particular, I realised that their transnationalism and cultural practices in London and other UK cities both offline and online have not been explored, which is the contribution of this study. Moreover, most of the ethnographies and studies on Kabyle and Amazigh identity tended to portray Kabyle diaspora as 'unified', by focusing on their historical development, socio-political movements and struggle for recognition (Silverstein, 2004; Collyer, 2008; Harris, 2018). They showed little consideration for the complex everyday identifications of Kabyle individuals whose Kabyleness interplays with other forms of social identifications such as gender, religion, immigration status, socio-economic and/or educational background. This study uses a social constructivist approach to identity whilst engaging with literature on transnationalism, diaspora, ethnicity and the Bourdieusian notions of social field, habitus and capital. In the hope of contributing to a better understanding of the emergent Kabyle 'community' in a British migratory context, it raises the following questions:

1. *How is Kabyleness negotiated and constructed in a British setting and within the Kabyle TSF?*

   Kabyle and Amazigh cultural and political events and performances remain understudied and poorly documented in the context of the UK. This study focuses on Kabyle/Amazigh performances and cultural/political events, combined with Kabyle immigrants' everydayness as well as their online interactions to offer a sense of their diverse, complex and multiple identifications and contextual expressions of their Kabyleness.

2. *How do the Kabyles' lived experiences in the UK influence their perceptions towards their identities? In what ways does the British environment contribute to the formation of Kabyleness?*

   This question addresses the impact of the host society, as a relatively new environment, on the development of the Kabyles' identity/identities and how it contributes to the formation of their Kabyleness in multiple contexts.

3. *How do Kabyles in London/UK use the cultural organisation and online platforms to negotiate their ethnic identity and navigate its complexities?*

   This question addresses the role of the cultural organisation and the online platforms in managing the diversity between the members. The cultural organisation succeeded in gathering the scattered Kabyles in the UK after a long time of settlement. However, given the diversity within the cultural organisation, new gatherings spaces have been created to meet the activists' interests and ambitions.

The Kabyles have a long history of migration to other parts of Algeria as well as abroad, especially to Francophone cities such as Paris and Montreal, and their mobility is largely a result of economic, cultural, and political pressures. Despite their dispersal to different parts of the world, they have often maintained a sense of historical, cultural and linguistic distinctiveness and thus share many of the traits that are associated with diasporas. Their arrival in the UK is relatively recent and they have begun to build communal resources and invest in a shared sense of identity. Therefore, it is of great interest to examine the diasporic features of Kabyle migration and the formation of a Kabyle 'ethnic community' in a British setting. In particular, the study focuses on the process of creating what migration scholars have called a 'transnational social field' (Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004; Faist, 2010). This includes the cultural organisation, the participants' everydayness, online interactions, self-perception and understanding of both the process of identity formation and their nascent 'ethnic community'. This study sheds light on the cultural organisation as a key element that connects to the other sites explored in the Kabyle transnational field. The cultural organisation has triggered the Kabyles' motivations and ambitions to negotiate, construct and perform a diasporic cultural identity whilst building a transnational social space. It will be shown that the viability of a British-based 'community' is also dependent on becoming part of a network of transnational connections in which human, cultural, symbolic and social capital are generated and converted.

1.3 The Research Sites

1.3.1 The Kabyle/Amazigh Cultural Organisation in London

"A number of Berber associations, both in North Africa and the diaspora, have made the advocacy of the Berber cause in various international forums a central thread of their activities." (Maddy-Weitzman and Bengio, 2013: 73)

The Kabyles involved in this study have origins in different regions of Kabylia in Algeria and came together in 2015 to form a cultural organisation in London. Thus, they have become involved in a relatively recent formation of 'community' with the expressed aim to promote their Kabyleness and sense of shared identity. In other words, they have started to activate what Brubaker calls 'groupness' (Brubaker, 2005) and belonging. My participants told me that there had been many prior attempts to create a group and gather Amazighs from different regions and countries; however, they suggested that these had failed because of the social, religious and political differences among them. The Amazigh Cultural Organisation in London was the initial name given to the organisation after its creation in 2015 by a Kabyle-born woman named Nadia with the aid of her husband and another Kabyle person. However, following the unsuccessful attempts and the minimal interest of other Amazighs in the UK, the Kabyles redirected their focus towards Kabyle identity and Kabylia, starting by modifying the name of the organisation from The Amazigh Cultural Organisation in London into the Kabyle/Amazigh Cultural Organisation in London.

Nadia was a key informant and was instrumental in the foundation of the organisation I studied. In the beginning of her stay in the UK she was part of another Algerian association in London led by an Algerian woman. However, she realised that the activities and events organised did not meet her and many others' expectations. They largely felt that it put too much emphasis on religion. Hence, she decided to create her own secularised and yet decidedly non-political space. She wanted to put special emphasis on promoting the Kabyle/Amazigh culture without including the Algerian national and religious celebrations, since, as she claimed, those would not interest most of the Kabyles in London. Based on the description provided on the official Facebook page, the organisation she founded "seeks to bring together Kabyles and all the Amazigh in UK [sic]. It also aims to organise cultural events to celebrate and commemorate defining moments in Berber history and share Kabyle/Berber culture and traditions with other communities. Moreover, it asserts that the organisation is not part of any political party". Nadia's intention was to attract other Amazigh North African groups to her cultural organisation, though this turned out to be unsuccessful. Therefore, the cultural organisation was dominated by a Kabyle presence. For example, of all the events I attended I witnessed only once the presence of an Amazigh Libyan.

The organisation became one of my empirical field sites because it facilitated my access to a maximum number of Kabyles, with whom I have been able to establish good relationships by attending meetings and events. Having face to face discussions helped me to gain their trust. The people I met through the association proved to be very encouraging and supportive of my project. Besides, the organisational activities offered diverse insights into processes of negotiation, construction and representation of identity, since they brought together immigrants of the same origin but of different age, gender, political and religious affiliations, immigration status, and of different migration trajectories and family situations. Therefore, what it means to be Kabyle in

London differed from one person to another despite what they called their shared origin. Furthermore, my fieldwork in the organisation opened doors to other sites. That is to say, it is not only in the meetings and performances of the cultural organisation, its celebrations and display of Kabyle identity at major festivals in public, that questions about nature of Kabyleness arise, but also in their everyday practices and through the extended transnational networks made possible by social media. Hence, following cultural practices within British society and online offered me opportunities to explore how Kabyles seek to produce and maintain their cultural identity in different contexts.

1.3.2 The Kabyles' Everydayness

By everydayness, I refer to how the meaning of 'being Kabyle' is present, or not, in the participants' everyday world; that is the activities and practices that occur on a daily basis in different contexts and at different interactional levels (micro, meso and sometimes macro level). The Kabyles' everydayness also includes their online interactions and activities on their personal online profiles**.** Over the course of my fieldwork, I met my participants in multiple places: for instance, some women did not hesitate to invite me to their houses to spend some days with them and become involved in their everyday practices, while men settled for inviting me to cafés in London and other UK cities. Moreover, my stays with my participants and/or our ethnographic conversations and interviews also involved moving around and visiting places in London or other places to which they were happy to take me, and which were often connected to their spatial memories. Therefore, I was able to observe how my respondents acted in different spaces which often impacted on how they negotiated and performed Kabyleness, which involved both forms of being and belonging (Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004).

Frequently, participants enthusiastically accepted to meet, and some of them revealed that this research as well as the cultural organisation had brought them back to their Kabyle identity, after they had chosen to fully integrate into the host society and embrace its lifestyle (such as adopting a European name). In short, this phase of my fieldwork has permitted a simultaneous observation of the participants' interactions at different levels at home, in public, and between the cultural organisation and the online world.

1.3.3 The Online Platforms

The contemporary domestic setting now encompasses not only access to mass media through radio and television but also access to the online digital world. Technological advancement has opened the doors to a plethora of platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, and Skype, which play a

key role in transnational experiences. According to Castells (2010), Facebook for example "expanded the forms of sociability to networks of targeted relationships between identified persons of all ages" (p xxix)**.** People from different places can have access and take part in different forms of communication and activities through which they create communities of identity. The key platforms that inform this study were the official Facebook page of the cultural organisation, other Facebook pages my participants were following and interacting with their members, and finally their personal profiles. Accessing them required the consent of every participant who has agreed for their data to be used. From an ethical perspective as well as to maintain my focus, data produced by non-participants, although posted in public pages, has not been used in this study. All the online data used in this thesis was shared by my participants on their personal profiles or was content with which they interacted by adding a comment. I also used content that was publicly shared by Kabyle Facebook pages, to discuss my participants' opinions about it. Therefore, comments from other Facebook users have not been used. I have also used WhatsApp for some members who wished not to be recorded but were happy to write their thoughts and answer my questions through messages, in addition to Facebook Messenger to maintain contact with my participants through group chats for members of the organisation to which I was added.

Social media is defined as "web-based services that allow individuals to construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, articulate a list of users with whom they share a connection and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the system" (Ellison and Boyd, 2013: 151). In other words, social media platforms aid in reducing the constraints of time, distance and financial issues and allow people from different locations to share their ideas, connect with their friends and family, meet new people and discover new cultures. Notably the constant online presence and engagement of Kabyle diasporic communities contribute to the shaping of their ethnic mobilisation and help foster their overarching aims. Hence, it was necessary to follow this group of Kabyle migrants and look at the way they share their everyday activities, and their thoughts and perceptions towards others in the online environment. Besides, online platforms play a key role in the production of social networking among diasporas and 'virtual communities' (Johnston et al, 2013; Ellison and Boyd, 2013), which is enhanced through social and geopolitical mobilisation. Moreover, social networking sustains and bolsters the creation of "network capital" (Larsen and Urry, 2008) that is defined as the "capacity to engender and sustain social relations with individuals who are not necessarily proximate, which generates emotional, financial and practical benefit' (Ibid: 93). Unsurprisingly, digital forums have proven to be vital to the Kabyle/Amazigh organisation I studied, as it maintained an online presence, and circulated its interpretation of Kabyleness to its members and non-Kabyles in London and further afield.

1.4 Structure of the Thesis

The chapters are structured as follows:

Chapter 2 provides the socio-historical context of the Kabyle cultural and political movement to enable a better understanding of the community in question and to prepare the ground for the discussions in the following chapters.

Chapter 3 takes a deductive perspective to review the literature used in this thesis. Drawing on a constructivist approach, this chapter focuses first~~,~~ on the literature on identity, culture, and ethnicity. Then, it examines the transnational turn in migration studies, diaspora and the transnational social field, to which I add the online dimension. To elucidate the Kabyles' transnational ethnic continuity, cultural differentiation, and complex negotiations of their Kabyleness within the Kabyle TSF, I draw on Bourdieu's notions of field, habitus and capital.

Chapter 4 outlines the research design and explains the qualitative nature of this study, underpinned by an interpretive premise. It will explain the use of ethnographic methods and my approach to online materials. I conducted fieldwork over a period of three years, spending a considerable amount of time with my participants in the multiple sites described above. Attending the events organised by the Kabyle/Amazigh Cultural Organisation allowed me to have access to a maximum number of Kabyles both offline and online, who I observed and interviewed. We had very insightful conversations which informed the empirical chapters of this thesis and have helped to explore the research questions raised. Moreover, the fieldwork showed the impact of the participants' identity and social roles on the nature and the quality of the discussions.

Chapter 5 portrays the main participants' own individual characteristics, including their age, migration trajectory and lived experiences. By doing so, it points out the diversity within the Kabyle 'community'. This chapter explains and elucidates their diverse and multiple perspectives and interactions. It paves the way for the analysis of my empirical ethnographic data. I organised the findings in terms of three main themes that emerged from the fieldwork.

Chapter 6 is the first of three analytical and explanatory chapters, which addresses the first and third research questions. It indicates the initiatives undertaken and the efforts made by the Kabyles towards the formation and development of their identity in a new migratory setting. This involved the creation of a cultural organisation; gathering spaces; Facebook pages and online chat rooms; domestic activities, food, and object exchange. I highlight the role of these factors in the

creation of a ~~Kabyle~~ local and transnational Kabyle identity. This chapter also emphasises the individuals' desire and motivations to take part in these transnational activities.

Chapter 7 demonstrates how my participants construct and emphasise a Kabyle distinctiveness based on a secular versus religious binary. It addresses the second research question, which relates to the British environment and its impact on the process of Kabyle identity formation in the UK. This chapter also explores how and to what ends the cultural organisation and online platforms are used to assert a Kabyle status. Therefore, it shows that although my respondents showed a degree of awareness of the local approach to ethnic and religious diversity, the majority of them stress a secular inclination, echoing the French position on religion.

Chapter 8 focuses on how language was highlighted by the research subjects as a central component of their Kabyle identity. This included a set of practices, language games, online activities and interactions aiming to spread and maintain their Kabyle linguistic heritage. However, this chapter also sheds light on their actual linguistic behaviour within the Kabyle TSF, which involved mixing Kabyle with other languages that sometimes contradicted their language ideologies. In short, this chapter highlights the relevance of language in the Kabyles' transnational identity formation.

Chapter 9 offers a conclusion and summary of the main findings of the study and the topics discussed in the previous chapters, and highlights the contribution of this thesis.

Chapter 2 The Kabyle Cultural Movement

2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a brief overview on the Amazighs in North Africa and the specificity of the Kabyle case. Franz Boas (1940) points out that "to understand a phenomenon we have not only to know what it is, but also how it came into being" (p. 305). Therefore, having a clear understanding of the Kabyles' background and their lived experiences in relation to their social, linguistic and political situation and how it changed over time, will allow us to grasp the Kabyles' identity formation, negotiation and construction process in the context of migrancy and transnationalism.

The Kabyles are an Amazigh ethnic group indigenous to North Africa. Across North Africa, Amazigh groups call themselves *Imazighen*, from Amazigh which means Free man (Ruedy, 1992; Bernasek, 2008; Maddy-Weitzman, 2011). The historical Amazigh territory ranges from the Canary Islands to the oasis of Siwa in Egypt and from the Mediterranean in the north to the Sahara in the south (Brett and Fentress, 1997), and is historically known as '*Tamazgha'* (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011). With the arrival of Islam in North Africa by the mid-7th century, some Amazighs were Islamicised and Arabised, while others maintained their customs and traditions and their language (Plantade, 1993). Today the Amazighs represent 30% of the Algerian population (Belmihoub, 2018). There are six Amazigh Groups in Algeria: Chawi, Mzab, Chenoua, Touareg, Bni Snous and the Kabyle. The latter are known to be "the most politically active community of Algerian Berbers" (Ruedy, 1992: 9). Their region of origin Kabylia, a mountainous coastal region in Northern Algeria (Ibid), became an administrative territory during the Algerian war (1954-1962) (Lalmi, 2004). They speak Kabyle, which is a variety of the Tamazight language which can be written in Neo-Tifinagh script, adapted from Tifinagh, a very ancient writing system, or the Latin alphabet (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011). The figure 2-1 below is a map showing the distribution of the Kabyle people in Algeria.



Figure 2-1 The distribution of Kabyle people in Kabylie, North-Eastern Algeria (Arrami-Merabet, 2008)

During the pre-Roman era, several successive independent states existed before the king Massinissa unified the people of Numidia. Thus, according to historical and geographical accounts, the existence of the Amazighs' and the Kabyles' identity dates back to the Phoenician and Roman era (Zirem, 2014). For example, the Romans used the term **"**Quinquegentanei" to describe the five tribes of Kabylia that Jilius Honorais situates between Saldae (Bejaia) and Rusuccuru (Dellys) (Camps, 1994: 226)**.** However**,** according to Marcais, 1941 (cited in *Modéran*, 2003), the fragmentation of the Amazigh groups is generally associated with the arrival of Muslim Arab armies in North Africa in the seventh century. This was marked by the defeat of the historical and legendary Amazigh Queen Kahina (Douider, 2012). It is also linked to a number of dynasties that ruled Algeria following the Arab conquest, most notably the Almoravids and Almohads, both of whom were Amazigh in origin and whose territories included southern Spain (Suleiman, 1996; Brett and Fentress, 1976).

In antiquity, Algeria was known as Numidia after the Amazigh King, Masinissa, unified the two Amazigh kingdoms named Masaesyli and Massyli. However, after the death of Massinissa, his successors (Jughurtha, 118BCE- 105BCE; Juba I, 49BCE-46BCE) were defeated by the Romans and most of North Africa fell under their domination in 33BCE. Further waves of conquest followed, including the Vandals (430-533), the Byzantines (533-647), the Arabs (mid-7th century), the Ottomans (1515-1830) and ultimately the French who took control in 1830 (Brett and Fentress, 1997; Bernasek, 2008; Britannica, 2018). The name 'Algeria' was given to the country in 1839 by the French who derived it from the words al (def. art.) and 'dzair' the name of the city of Algiers in Arabic, which it itself stems from 'dziri' based on its founder Bologhine Ibn Ziri (Zirem, 2014).



Map 1.2 North Africa at the end of Masinissa's reign
(From G. Camps, Aux origines de la Berbérie, Masinissa ou les débuts de l'histoire, *Algiers, 1961)*

Figure 2-2 North Africa at the end of Masinissa's reign, From Brett and Fentress (1997: 28)

2.2 The French Colonial Period and the creation of the Kabyle Myth

Cultural, religious and linguistic heterogeneity reigned in Algeria as a product of the successive dynasties settled during the Amazigh-Arabic era. As a consequence, Algeria was at root a multilingual and a multicultural country. In this vein, Benrabah asserts: "One of the consequences of this long history of mixing peoples was language contact and its by-product, multilingualism-Berber-Punic-Latin, Berber-Arabic, Berber-Arabic-Spanish-Turkish, Berber-Arabic-French, and so on." (2014: 43). However, the divide-and-rule strategy adopted by the French coloniser enhanced the ethnic, racial and linguistic diversity in Algeria and also politicised it. In this sense, colonial regimes or states have participated in the formulation and construction of ethnic identities and

hierarchies among their ex-colonies, which have also become deeply anchored in the populations they ruled (Hall, 2002; Connell, 2007).

With the start of the French colonisation in 1830, the French administration created three centres for “Les Bureaux Arabes” (Arab Bureau) in 1844 in Algiers, Oran and Constantine (see Figure 2-3)

Figure 2-3 Map of Algerian cities: Oran Algiers and Constantine. From Google Maps, 2020.

These administrative structures were to organise the relations with the indigenous population. Napoleon III considered himself as the apostle of an “Arab Nation”, centred in Damascus and wanted to establish a counter-power to the Ottoman Caliphate. Therefore, the French first viewed Algeria as an ‘Arab’ nation, however, the fall of the Second Empire in 1870, marked the end of the Bureaux Arabes policy (Collot, 1988). At the time of the Bureaux Arabes, French officers and interpreters found difficulties in studying and understanding the Amazigh society and the Kabyle society in particular, due to the Kabyles’ long resistance to the colonial army. Nevertheless, when the interpreter Jaubert published a French-Berber dictionary in 1844, which reconstituted a language that was unknown (i.e. Tamazight language), the French government encouraged linguistic studies and archaeological and epigraphical investigations in the field. However, they were limited because Kabyle tradition was largely orally transmitted and Kabyle leaders were reluctant to share any available written documents. Hence, French historians started mixing with the *Marabouts* or *Imrabdhen* in order to gather ‘un savoir oral’ (oral knowledge). However, French historians did not rely on the Qur'anic and genealogical knowledge of their informants. Moreover, the French scholars and administrators were interested in the Kabyles’ customary laws, notably *Canouns*, and sought to use them for administrative control to avoid the

laws of Islam. According to Ageron (1971): “The izref [Berber customary law] is more often in accordance with the spirit of our Code than the laws of Islam; so we would rather have them continue to use, under our control, their civil customs” (Ageron [1971: 54] cited in Tilmatine, 2016: 99). Furthermore, to gain their trust, they made sure to understand the functioning of the society without interfering in its structure. For instance, in the 1860s, Colonel Hanoteau and Counselor Letourneux produced a collection of written, formalised and unified customary laws or *Canouns* intended to govern the Kabyles by means of their traditional assemblies, the *djemaâs* or *Tajmaât* (Selles-Lefranc, 1925), which is a village assembly that has political, administrative and judicial authority (Perret and Abrika, 2014).

These administrative structures were to organise the relations with the indigenous population. Napoleon III considered himself as the apostle of an “Arab Nation”, centred in Damascus and wanted to establish a counter-power to the Ottoman Caliphate. Therefore, the French first viewed Algeria as an ‘Arab’ nation, however, the fall of the Second Empire in 1870, marked the end of the Bureaux Arabes policy (Collot, 1988).

The French thereafter managed to suppress the Kabyle revolt and resistance to French invasion in 1871. Consequently, many Kabyles were exiled or jailed and their most fertile lands were seized and given to French settlers. This led to an economic upheaval that pushed many of the Kabyles to move elsewhere in order to survive (Direche, 1997).

At the same time, French military scholars sought to grasp the social and cultural functions of Kabyle society. They discerned features that characterised the Kabyle population in comparison to the Arabs by analysing Kabyle songs and poems as Colonel Adolph Hanoteau did (Brett and Fentress, 1997; Maddy-Weitzman, 2011). French colonial scientists played an important role in convincing the Kabyles of their resemblance to Europeans in terms of their physiognomy, their moral qualities and their way of thinking. They “located the Kabyles as being closer to the French than the Arabs were” (Goodman, 2005: 71). For instance, the French anthropologist, Masqueray (1983 [1986]) writes that: “Sedentary, [the Kabyles] built villages similar to our own, in which they held regular assemblies and organised small republics. All around, they created gardens, planted trees, worked the fields, and separated their lands with borders: thus, they knew the pleasures and the responsibilities” (cited in Goodman, 2005: 71). Moreover, French schools were built in the Kabyle region in the 1880s a generation earlier than elsewhere in Algeria. Through both legitimating the Kabyle political and legal institutions and instilling in them a republican education, the Kabyles would become secularised (Goodman, 2009) and loyal to ‘Frenchness’. Backed by anthropological science the French authorities believed that “the Kabyles might be receptive to French civilization, due to their lack of commitment to religion” (Lorcin, 1999: 23), while the Arabs would invoke religious ardour to resist the French occupation. For example, the

'Islamic renaissance' strand that emerged within Algerian politics drawing upon three religious scholars, notably Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani (1838-97), Mohamed Abduh (1849-1905) and Rashid Rida (1865-1935), who were determined to challenge the dominance of Western ideas (Simpson, 2007: 43) frightened the colonisers. In other words, "French colonial administrators viewed Islamic religious sociability as a potential political threat to the stability of the colony" (Motadel, 2014: 1). Moreover, Le Sueur (2005) points out: "Soustelle[2] distrusted Islam and believed it was a backward, regressive religion that had delayed historical progress and the development of reason in Algeria" (p. 26). As a response, they forged the Arab 'Muslim'/Kabyle distinction and drew on analogies that would put much emphasis on the Amazighs' historical resistance to the Arabs' invasion. For example, "the story of Kahina's resistance to Muslim invaders [that] captured the imagination of French writers who drew parallels to the martyrdom of Jeanne d'Arc and retold and elaborated on the story in ways that suited the colonial project" (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011: 40).

Mythical Kahina (lit. female priestess) or in one of her popular names, Dyhia (lit. the beautiful) was an Amazigh queen, a religious and military leader. There are a number of interpretations regarding her name, religion and age. She is believed to have taken over the leadership of Amazigh resistance to Arab forces after the Muslim Army killed the Amazigh warrior Aksel (Koceila). So useful was she to different identity movements and national projects that Kahina was adopted by French colonists, Arab nationalists, Jews, Berberists and 'North African' feminists (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011), like the Tunisian lawyer Gisele Halimi for being an inspirational female leader. She has also been viewed as a symbol of the Amazigh resistance, a symbol of power, democracy, feminism and among the rare women with such an exceptional political career[3] (Halimi, 2009; Zirem, 2016), as will be shown later in this thesis.

French historians and colonial scholars developed comparative theories about the Amazighs' origins, through which they tried to create a racialized and divided society that would make the Amazigh take sides with them against the Arabs. Consequently, the frequent outlining of the ethnic and socio-geographic dichotomies resulted in the development of what became known as the 'Kabyle Myth', a term coined by the historian Charles-Robert Ageron (Lorcin, 1999). According to Lorcin (1999) and Maddy-Weitzman (2011), the 'Kabyle Myth' or 'Vulgate' refers to the body of

[2] French anthropologist and politician who was appointed governor-general of Algeria in January 1955.
[3] Kahina, as well as other Amazigh historical figures such as Massinissa are proudly exalted by Kabyle and Amazigh activists as they are regarded to be the strength and concrete evidence of the Amazigh and Kabyle culture, upon which they build their argument whether in academic accounts, in their everyday conversations and/or online interactions

thoughts, beliefs and ideological constructs praising the Kabyles in comparison to the Arabs. Moreover, Silverstein argues that ‘‘the Kabyle Myth helped to underwrite a two-headed rape of Algeria’s resources and cultures, simultaneously underwriting both the practical mission of conquest and colonization and the ethical mission of civilization’’ (2004: 55). In other words, the Kabyle myth was of help to fulfill the French political, military and cultural mission within the colony. French colonial scholars distinguished the Kabyles from the Arabs in terms of their spatial fixity in a mountainous area and their qualities of having a ‘commercial instinct’ that showed similarities with the European colonisers (Silverstein 2004). Among the French, the Kabyles were also known for their ‘frankness, loyalty, sense of economic interests and absence of aggressive fanaticism’’ – attributes which were contrasted with being Arab (Ageron, 1971: 51 cited in Tilmatine 2016). Both French colonial literature as well as colonial policy created an imagined frontier between the Kabyles and the non-Kabyles, which was translated into real practices. For example, marriage outside Kabylia, and more precisely to Algerians who claim to have Arab descent, was prohibited (Killian, 2006) as a common practice among Kabyles with the explicit aim to maintain and preserve their ethnic identity and ‘purity’ (Fitzpatrick-McKinley, 2015; Utomo and McDonald; 2016). In short, French colonial scholars and research centres (as explained in the following section) devoted much of their literature to the Kabyle ethnic distinctiveness. This was used as a pretext to justify the French colonial efforts (Kaddache 1972, Silverstein 2004); that is, the French aimed to distinguish between the Amazighs and the Arabs in order to succeed with their strategy known as “divide and rule”.

The emphasis on distinguishing the Amazighs from the Arabs, which was “supported by anthropological accounts from the early nineteenth century onward” (Collyer, 2008: 692) is relevant to this project because it was quite successful. The Kabyle cultural movement, drawing on elements of the Kabyle Myth, has long stressed their difference from Arab culture yet the notion of ‘myth’ suggests that the differences the French exploited were constructed. Accordingly, Aggoun (2002) argues that while ‘the myth’ is false, it has nevertheless been effective in its cultural significance. This can be seen, for instance, in studies conducted among Kabyle migrants in Canada and France which have come to different conclusions. A study on Kabyle immigrants in Canada conducted by Montgomery et al. (2010), suggests that elements of the Kabyle Myth were being used by Kabyles in order to differentiate themselves from Algerian non-Kabyles, and they show how a Kabyle-Arab participant negotiated her mixed ethnic identity among the Kabyles who did not view her as ‘pure’ Kabyle. In Assam’s (2015) study on the Kabyle tribal society in Algeria, one of her participants proudly referred to how the French and French scholars, namely Hanoteau, were fascinated by the democracy and justice that reigned in Kabylia through organisations such as ‘*Tajmaât’.* Moreover, Aggoun (2002) points out that from a Maghrebi point of view, “elderly Kabyle women immigrants in France are viewed as freer than the

other Maghrebi [North African] women" (p. 211). However, Aggoun rejects this distinction and argues that even though 'the Kabyle woman' is judged as freer than 'the Arab woman', she is equally oppressed by social rules, conventions and circumstances. To illustrate, the author provides an example by questioning the difference that might exist between some Kabyle women and their diversified profiles and background. He says: "In fact, what can there be in common between a woman of a Maraboutic [*Imrabdhen*] lineage and the poor farm worker's daughter? Between a war widow receiving an allowance from the Algerian government and the wife of a farmer migrant in Marseille or Paris and who only returns to his country once a year?"[4] (p. 218). Here Aggoun demonstrates that class and ancestral background is often more important than the presumed ethnic difference. I was intrigued to see if Kabyles in the UK draw on the Kabyle Myth too and whether they construct their 'Kabyle' identity as opposed to 'others', notably the Algerian Arabs. Based on my participants' claims, notably Nadir and Anazâr, their conception of the 'Arab', is based on some Algerians' self-identification as Arabs building upon their linguistic and religious affiliation and sometimes ancestral lineages. Therefore, the 'Arab' in this study is used by participants to mainly refer to non-Kabyle/Amazigh Algerians, although it was often subject to debate. To differentiate the Algerian Arabs from the people coming from the Middle East and the Arabic peninsula and the Middle East, my participants' usually say people from the Middle East. This study's findings show that my respondents do not only draw on Algerian Arab/Kabyle distinction to emphasise their cultural distinctiveness, but also on differences within Kabylia itself such as the Kabyle/*Amrabedh* dichotomy.

2.3 Post-Colonial Algeria

In 1954, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN: National Liberation Front) began a 7-year guerrilla war against France and eventually sought diplomatic recognition at the United Nations (UN) to establish a sovereign Algerian state. This has come to be known as the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962). In July 1962, Algeria triumphed in one of the bloodiest and greatest struggles for national liberation (Clifford, 1983; Le Sueur, 2005), and proceeded to build a nation-state based on a one-nation one-language ideology (Clifford, 1983; Eriksen, 2010) with the FLN representing the dominant party in government. The ideology espoused by the FLN after 1962 was one of the major factors that provoked the Amazighs/Kabyle revolt (Vogl and Hüning, 2010).

[4] Original text : « En effet, que peut-il y avoir de commun entre une femme de lignage maraboutique et une fille de pauvre, d'ouvrier agricole ? Entre une veuve de guerre bénéficiaire d'une allocation du gouvernement algérien et l'épouse d'un paysan immigré à Marseille ou Paris et qui ne revient au pays qu'une fois par an ? »

Based on an Arabo-Islamist ideology, the Algerian government aimed at national unification following the Islamist scholar Abdelhamid Ibn Badis's slogan: one nation, one language and one religion (Hamou, 1998). This mission to rally under the banner of a unified nation state simultaneously delegitimised a plurality of opinions, and ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity. While this was also in response to the French colonial efforts to destroy any ethnic union in the country, internal conflicts between the leaders of the political parties ensued and enhanced the Arab-Amazigh divide in post- 1962 Algerian politics. Issues of identity and culture existed even during the colonial period at the time of what became known in French as *la crise berbériste* or *la crise de 1948-1949*, when nationalist movements emphasised the place of the Amazigh culture and Tamazight language within the Algerian nation (Harbi, 1984). In fact, Messali Lhadj, an Algerian nationalist politician, along with a number of Kabyle fighters and politicians (Krim Belkacem, Ferhat Abbes and others) had created the political party *L'Étoile Nord-Africaine* (The North African Star) in 1926. However, when the Kabyle intellectuals realised that Messali's ideologies were based on the creation of an explicitly 'Arab' nation, which would deny Kabyle identity, they showed their opposition by calling for the preservation and maintenance of Tamazight language and Amazigh identity. However, they endorsed the Algerian cause, as the liberation from French colonisation was prioritised (Silverstein, 2004).

After independence in 1962, Algeria was defined as an essentially Arab and Muslim nation (Harbi, 1984). According to Benrabah (2013), Algerian nationalists started to push for Arabisation as part of the post-colonial nation building process, neglecting regional and minority language varieties such as the Algerian variety of Arabic (darija) and Tamazight, and encouraging the use of Standard Arabic instead of French in governmental, administrative and school settings (McDougall, 2017; Daoudi, 2018). On the other hand, the Arabisation process and the Arab-Islamic political ideology inspired Amazigh activists to found the *Académie Berbère d'Echanges et de Recherches* (Berber Academy for Cultural Exchange and Research, later named Agraw Imazighen) in Paris in 1967 (Goodman, 2009; Kymlicka and Pföstl, 2014). Because of the Arabisation policy and its 'by-product' in Algeria, notably the prohibition of Tamazight and the Algerian dialect, such Amazigh cultural initiatives were only possible in exile in France, and often supported by French intellectuals such as Pierre Bourdieu (Goodman 2005; Silverstein, 2009). As a result of social, political and economic upheavals prior to and after Algerian independence, most Kabyle intellectuals left for France (House, 2006). The Amazigh Academy in France aimed to promote Amazigh culture and maintain the language through its standardisation. The academy was also responsible for the development of a Neo-Tifinagh writing system (Silverstein, 2004: 71). The teaching of the Tamazight language and Amazigh culture was implemented by the Berber Study Group at the *Université de Paris-VIII-Vincennes*, a collaboration of both Kabyle and non-Kabyle scholars (Silverstein, 2004: 71). The Berber Academy transformed into "*Agraw Imazighen*" in

1969, aiming to recover the Amazigh cultural and linguistic patrimony, where the "*Bulletin d'Etudes Berbères*" was first published (Tilmatine, 2017). Apart from work in linguistics, they also produced theatre, poetry and music. Music in particular helped the spread of Kabyle culture while further emphasizing the Arab-Amazigh division (Goodman, 2005). Subsequently, Kabyle protest songs became a key element that "provided the main impetus of the spread of Berberism" (Benrabah, 2014: 68) both in Algeria and France. Hence, ''the repression of Berberité in Algeria and its simultaneous rehabilitation in France served to reinforce an Arab/Berber opposition that in many ways echoed the colonial Kabyle Myth'' (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011), and led to what is known as the 'Berber Spring' in 1980. This cultural movement became important to Kabyle identity (Kiely et al, 2001) and placed itself firmly within the '*patrimoine de reférence commun*' (heritage of common reference) that symbolises unity of the Kabyle people and the Amazigh diaspora (Tilmatine, 2017). This will be explained in more detail in the next section.

2.4 The Berber Spring and the Black Spring

Post-1962 entities that were involved in the nation-building process in Algeria, such as the FLN, banned all cultural activities in Tamazight, including the use of the language, whilst aiming to produce a monolingual nation-state (Lorcin and Thomemeret, 2005) and make Algeria a single party state under the rule of the FLN (Seddon and Seddon-Daines, 2005). In 1980, the prohibition of the conference presented by the poet Mouloud Maameri on 'poèmes Kabyles anciens' at the University of Tizi Ouzou triggered a wave of demonstrations, involving the participation of both students and people from different social classes. The demonstrators demanded linguistic and cultural rights, calling into question the definition of the Algerian nation as fundamentally Arab, and what they saw as the denial of linguistic difference and cultural diversity (Chaker, 1989, in Amrouche, 2009). In other words, they claimed the official recognition of Amazigh culture. Moreover, Chaker (2003) argues that the Amazigh claim is and will remain linguistic and cultural: in Kabylia, from 1980, the slogan *Berbère, langue nationale et officielle* unified all actors working for the legitimisation of cultural rights. The 1980 event became known as the Berber Spring (*Tafsut Imaziɣen*) in Algeria. It was followed by the October 1988 riots, also known as the Black October (Ruedy, 1992), where many people were killed by police before the state agreed to constitutional reforms (Mouhleb, 2005; Assam, 2014). At this time, Matoub Lounes, a Kabyle singer, was shot in Kabylia. He eventually became the most important figure and legitimate representative of the Kabyle cause and the Kabyle cultural movement. In 1998, he was "kidnapped for fifteen days by the 'Armed Islamic Group' (GIA)" (Maas, 2014: 250), and assassinated in Kabylia in unclear circumstances.

The political reforms which followed the October 1988 demonstrations allowed for a multi-party system in 1989 (Roberts, 2003). This democratic openness enabled the creation of the *Mouvement Culturel Berbère* (MCB: Berber Cultural Movement), the *Front des Forces Socialistes* (FFS: Socialist Forces Front) and the *Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocracie* (RCD: The Rally for Culture and Democracy), which are known as Kabyle political parties (Maddy-Weitzman, 2004). Another political crisis hit the country in the early 1990s. The fundamentalists of the Islamic Salvation Front (F.I.S) won the parliamentary elections. However, the army launched a Coup d'état, effectively depriving the FIS of their election victory (Silverstein, 2015). This gave rise to an armed conflict between the FIS on one hand and the secular group~~,~~ on the other, which lasted for 10 years (1990-2002). It "left as many as 200,000 mostly civilian casualties– a conflict referred to by many as the second Algerian war" (Provost, 1998; Samraoui, 2003 in Silverstein, 2015: 89). During this intense political conflict, also known as 'la décennie noire' (Black Decade), a number of Algerians left the country while others were assassinated, including the intellectuals Said Mekbel, Mahfoud Boucebci and Tahar Djaout. The latter was one of "Algeria's leading intellectual voices in 1993" (Le Sueur, 2005: 311).

During this time, the assassination of the Kabyle high-school student Massinissa Ghermah in Béni-Douala, Tizi Ouzou in 2001, followed by the declaration of the Minister of the Interior, Yazid Zerhouni, claiming the student was a "thug", lit the fuse and incited bloody riots in Kabylia (Tilleli, 2003). This event came to be known as the Black Spring (*Tafsut Taverkant*), that resulted in the death of 129 Kabyle individuals who became known among the Kabyles as the "martyrs of the Black Spring" (Assam, 2015: 301). One of the outcomes of the Black Spring was the significant re-emergence of a traditional popular Kabyle form of democratic secular political tribal assembly, named *Arouch* (*leɛruc*)**.** *Arouch* (plural of "*Arch*"/ "*ɛerc*") refers to historical tribal gatherings which had the aim to defend and protect the territory from any social and military disturbances. In the past and among villages, each big family sent one representative to the village assembly where each delegate had the right to vote. It was a secular organisation (Direche, 2006), since the Cheikh of the Zaouia or Imam of the village was invited to give their opinion on raised issues, but they did not have the right to vote. Furthermore, the social and political movement of "*Arouch"* shows "an attempt to an ethnicisation, a regionalisation and a will to maintain an illusion of a Kabyle specificity" (Direche, 2006: 185)[5]. It sought to mitigate the violence that took place in 2001 by operating at a communal (APC: *Rassemblement Populaire Communal*) and Wilayal[6] level (APW

[5] « *On y a tout vu : une tentative d'éthnicisation et de régionalisation, une volonté de maintenir l'illusion d'une spécificité kabyle, une organisation séculaire et archaïque, une réémergence du tribalisme...* » (Dirèche, 2006 : 185).

[6] "Communes are the smallest administrative unit in Algeria, daïras are made up of several communes. In turn, a number of daïras make up a wilaya (pl. wilayat) the largest administrative sub-division of Algeria" (Collyer, 2008: 696)

Rassemblement Populaire Wilayal). The *Arouch* established political goals in a document known as "El Kseur" platform, under the name of 'Mouvement Citoyens', which gathered between one and two million people on 14th June 2001 in Algiers. They carried the Amazigh identity claims but also claimed political and socio-economic rights (Direche, 2006). They called for the nationalisation and the officialisation of Tamazight, and the withdrawal of Algerian security forces (gendarmerie) from Kabylia.

Historically, the *Arouch* attracted many French colonial scholars and ethnographers who regularly described them as a genuine Kabyle democratic organisation. Thus, its revival illustrates the process of Kabyle identity (re)construction and negotiation as an ethnic identity movement. Its aim was "to gather the Kabyle population another time as they used to do in the past" (Saighi, 2004: 59, cited in Assam, 2015). However, a wave of targeted arrests, harassment of delegates and disagreement among the members of *Arouch* paved the way for Ferhet Mehenni, a Kabyle singer and a political activist, to create the MAK (Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylia). The movement has received much attention from the press and managed to gradually garner support within Kabylia. The leader of the MAK, Ferhat Mehenni, is a former member of the RCD and a former President of the MCB (Berber Cultural Movement) (Mouhleb, 2005). The non-violent political autonomist movement was created as a response to the marginalisation of Amazigh culture and language in Algeria. The idea of the Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylia (MAK) emerged during the Black Spring disturbances in 2001 (Dombret, 2010). However, the movement was banned in Algeria, which forced its founder to move to France, where he pursued his political activity, by recruiting Kabyle immigrants interested in the same cause. Their demands and objectives shifted from the 'autonomy' of Kabylia to the 'auto-determination' of Kabylia (Tilmatine, 2017). This was accelerated by the MAK congress in 2010, which proclaimed to "give the word to the Kabyle people at the right moment so that they can freely choose the political statute that suits them" (Tilmatine, 2017: 367), and subsequently appealed to the necessity of creating the *Gouvernement Provisoire Kabyle (GPK* or alternatively called *L'ANAVAD).* while some members of the MAK/GPK supported the project of independence, others opposed it. For example, *Agraw I Tmurt Iqbayliyen* or the *Rassemblement pour la Kabylie* (RPK) (The Rally for Kabylia), called for the autonomy of Kabylia in a democratic and plural Algeria.

These landmark events and their consequences, including the creation of political parties and the re-birth of ancient tribal systems, have played a crucial role in the Kabyles' political orientations, the trajectory of the Kabyle cause and the development of the Kabyle and Amazigh identity status in Algeria. For example, in 2016, Tamazight was recognised as an official language and more recent efforts have been devoted to its promotion. Moreover, the effect of the MAK and its

different branches started to reach not only Kabyles in France, but also in Kabylia and Britain. For example, a MAK coordination[7] was officially established in London in 2017. Among my participants there were two different but intermingling orientations. While some of them fully embraced the separatist ideology, others sympathised with the MAK for being a movement that has succeeded in expressing important political and cultural convictions. The significance of the MAK movement only gradually emerged among my participants, as they were reluctant to share their thoughts. However, the 2019 Algerian protests, known as *El-Hirak*[8], has unearthed my respondents' perceptions towards both their Algerianity in general and Kabyleness in particular. This will be addressed in section 2-6 in this chapter and in the later ethnographic chapters**.**

2.5 Academic Studies on the Kabyle/Amazigh Situation

Both political pressure and the Amazigh cultural movement in Algeria and Kabylia led to the production of many academic works on Kabyle language and culture and provoked the transnationalisation of the Kabyle/Amazigh cultural and political cause. Studies on the Amazighs and the Kabyles started with nineteenth-century French colonial scholars, mainly~~,~~ de Tocqueville (1847), Hanoteau (1814-1847), and others. From myriad colonial debates, comparative theories were developed over the Amazighs' origins. It was through the remarkable contribution of the French archaeologist Gabriel Camps~~,~~ that the Amazighs and Amazigh culture became known more widely in Europe. As historian Brett and ~~the~~ archaeologist Fentress (1997) put it in their collaborative work, he was "one of the fathers of modern North African prehistory, by founding the Institut d'Etudes Berbères, at the University of Aix-en-Provence and the Encyclopédie berbère, a patron of the Modern Berber cultural movement" (p. 7). Brett and Fentress argue that modern social anthropologists and other scholars focused only on one Amazigh region/society, such as Kabylia. They sought to explain the political organisation of pre-colonial Kabylia, notably the '*Taajmaât'* (Roberts, 2014), because it showed similarities to what was called an assembly or council in Europe. Moreover, the French sociologist and social theorist, Pierre Bourdieu, devoted much of his writing to analysing Kabyle society, in particular the Kabyle House from which he developed the theory of 'habitus' (Bourdieu, 1979). Bourdieu's prominence as an internationally renowned social theorist gave further legitimacy to post-independence scholarship on Amazigh/Kabyle identity that developed among Algerian researchers, while the studies of ethnographers, sociologists, and historians such as Boulifa (1897), Chaker (2001; 2003; 2004),

[7] MAK coordination refers to a group of Kabyle militants affiliated within the Movement for the Auto-determination of Kabylia in exile (Paris), who officialised their meetings in London in November 2017.
[8] Also known as the Revolution of Smiles, which started following Algeria's Ex-President Abdelaziz Bouteflika announced his candidacy for a fifth presidential mandate. For more details see Ouaras (2020).

Silverstein (2004) and Roberts (2014) explored the Kabyles' resistance before, during and after French colonialism, their activism and claims for the recognition of their culture and language.

Other ethnographic studies of Kabyle cultural production lend support to the idea that art, music and culture are fundamental in negotiating, maintaining and transmitting identity (Goodman, 2005; Becker, 2006). Music, poems, and other symbolically important cultural creations have helped in the spread of Kabyle identity (Goodman, 2005; Kitchell, 1998). Moreover, linguistic and sociolinguistic studies have been conducted on Tamazight in general and the use of Kabyle in particular with reference to other linguistic phenomena, such as code switching and variation (Benali, 2007; Benhattab, 2011). Thus, a number of Kabyle/Amazigh authors such as Mouloud Mammeri, Kateb Yacine, Jean Amrouch, Mouloud Feraoun "have become increasingly interested in the whole field of Amazigh history and culture, from prehistory and anthropology to literature and linguistics" (Brett and Fentress, 1997: 9). These authors also wanted their research to contribute to the revival of Amazigh culture from an Amazigh perspective (ibid. 9). In other words, the increase of ethnographic studies carried out on the Amazighs made many Kabyle and Algerian scholars and novelists themselves re-appropriate Amazigh studies and infuse them with an emic understanding. Furthermore, although Kabyle novelists overwhelmingly write in French, many strive to offer an insight into Kabyle culture through their works and depict instances linked to processes of identity (re)construction and negotiation. Accordingly, a number of Kabyle words and personal names are found in novels written by Kabyle francophone writers such as Mouloud Feraoun's "*Les Chemins qui Montent*" (1957) and "*Le Fils du Pauvre*" (1997) and Malek Ouary's "*La Robe Kabyle de Baya"* (2002). These novels, like many others, are set in Algeria and deal with the French occupation, colonial legacy, poverty and emigration, love, mixed marriages, and religion. Moreover, recent ethnographic studies conducted by international scholars have added to the literature on the Kabyles in a local and a transnational space, touching upon Kabyle regional, national and transnational identity, emphasising transpolitics[9], race, art, and community issues. Among the key studies are those by Silverstein (2004); Goodman (2005); Collyer (2008); Scheele (2009); Maddy-Weitzman (2011; 2013); Maas (2014) and Harris (2018). Kabyleness as a distinct identity has also become a reality through these combined practices of research and activism.

Recently, scholars have sought to understand the historical dynamics and the local and national political transformations of Kabyle culture and art, as well as the influence of globalisation upon

[9] A concept introduced by Silverstein (2004) to describe how Algerians in France "simultaneously identify with and participate in the public life of a number of distinct localities (of national, infranational and transnational dimensions)" (Silverstein, 2004: 33)

them (Monaghan et al. 2012). Research on Kabyle cultural identity and its transmission and reproduction has been carried out in Kabylia as well as in communities outside Algeria. Most of these studies have focused on North African migration to France and, to some degree, Canada (Chabah, 2006; Biichlé, 2012). However, little attention has been paid to Kabyle migrants in Britain and the way they negotiate and construct their identity, which is the aim of this study.

2.6 Kabyle Migration to the UK

Further to the subjugation of Kabylia by the French Army and the social and political instability in post-colonial Algeria (Bourdieu and Sayad, 1964 in Collyer, 2008: 692), the Kabyles "became likely candidates for emigration" (Collyer 2008: 692) and the number of Kabyle migrants outweighed the number of migrants from other areas of Algeria (Sayad, 1999). As I have shown in previous sections, the French perceived the Kabyles as the paradigmatic figure of Algerian migration to France, as they were seen as more hard-working, pragmatist, less fanatic and more willing to assimilate than the Arab (Sayad, 1994). According to Khellil (2002), "in the first half of the 20th century, as much as 80% of migration from Algeria to France was from Kabylia" (cited in Collyer, 2008: 692).

Algerian migration to the UK started around the 1990s, due to the unstable political situation and civil disturbances in Algeria during the Black Decade. The decision made by many Algerians to seek asylum in various destinations is generally associated with the events of this time (Collyer, 2003). Early Algerian migration to the UK included both Kabyles and other Algerians, so the Algerian community currently in London includes both Arabs and Amazighs (Change Institute, 2009: 35). However, "on the whole, the Amazigh/Arab delineation is said to be not as apparent in the UK as it is in France" (Ibid: 35). Therefore, when the profile of Algerian migration in the UK is compared to that of France, Kabyle migration is more visible in France in terms of organisations and activities, because it began much earlier and corresponded with the rise of the Amazigh cultural movement (Sayad, 1999).

Beyond political reasons, travel facilities and linguistic resources have become central factors in the migration decision-making and destination choices for Algerians. They now travel to a wide variety of destinations (Collyer, 2003), including anglophone countries, or countries where English is required to find employment such as the United Arab Emirates (Crystal, 2012; Burnley, 2014). Considerable effort is being made by the Algerian government to substitute the use of French with English as a medium of instruction in Higher Education. Accordingly, private institutions are making an effort to promote the English language within the Algerian sphere and to facilitate visa applications through "séjour linguistique" programs, scholarships to the UK and the USA, organised leisure trips to London, and learning opportunities offered by the British council in

partnership with Algeria (Belmihoub, 2018)[10]. Therefore, such initiatives encourage Algerians to opt for destinations other than France, despite their limited linguistic resources.

Citing Khandriche et al (1999), Collyer noted that while the Algerian community in Britain numbered 3,453 people in 1991, the Algerian community in France was estimated to exceed one million by 1990 (2004: 391). Nonetheless, the number of Algerian migrants in the UK has increased significantly to reach 22,000 migrants in 2012 (Migration Policy Centre, 2013), although exact statistics on Kabyle migration to the UK are not available. However, the diversity of the participants involved in this study suggests that the driving forces behind the Kabyle migration in the last few years are not limited to asylum but are heterogeneous and vary from one individual to another. Some move for the purposes of marriage or reuniting with family; others immigrate on family visit applications while the majority enter the country individually with a tourist or study visa. In addition, several research participants in this study claimed that they came because they were refused a French visa and tried the UK simply because their documents were ready, and the UK consulate was next door. This revelation emphasises the spontaneity of many major decisions made in life, despite the attempts to rationalise and theorise them. Furthermore, it is important to consider that the ambition to migrate may be primarily driven by the desire to leave a country for better opportunities in an economically more affluent region, and to leave as many destination options open as possible. In other words, successful migration experiences are conducive to migration. Most Algerians complain about life in France where they feel discriminated against as Muslims or because of their ethnicity and expect the UK to be a more tolerant society (Collyer, 2008), where they can start from scratch promoting their own image to the receiving society who knows little about them if not nothing at all. For example, in Collyer's (2004) study on the factors influencing asylum seekers' choice of destinations, one of his Algerian participants, an engineer who lived in France for several years and moved to London, believed that British society was more accepting of Muslims. In my own study, I found this opinion also.

2.6.1 The British Environment and Immigration

According to Migration Watch (2014), significant migration to Britain started roughly around the end of World War II. However, prior to this period, Britain was a country of immigration and emigration for centuries as a result of social, political or/and economic upheavals. This has

[10] Formerly the UK visa application centre was in Algiers, and thus all Algerians had to go to Algiers to apply for a visa. However, recently, a UK visa application centre has opened in Oran, which may facilitate the visa application process for the people in the West of Algeria, although this is not a Kabyle region, but densely inhabited by Kabyles

produced sizable and distinct diasporic communities, notably Africans, Turkish, Kurds, Cypriots, Jews, Europeans/Eastern Europeans, Indians/Asians, and Americans. Following World War II and the subsequent economic hardship and job shortages, Britain brought workers particularly from the Caribbean and Commonwealth countries and Europe (Castles and Kosak, 1973; Connolly et al, 2013). After the increasing number of immigrants, particularly from Britain's ex-colonies, new regulations and restrictions on migration were applied. For example, the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act outlined that all people living in Commonwealth countries would be subject to immigration controls.

By the 1990s, the UK adopted a multicultural and securitisation policy with the aim to bring ethnic groups together mitigate racism and include minorities within the larger British society (Modood, 2005; Connolly et al, 2013). However, following the events of 11th September 2001 and the 2005 bombing attack in London, "a feeling of frustration from some parts of the Muslim community" (Bolognani, 2007: 280) emerged, such as the Pakistani and Indonesian Muslim communities (Bolognani, 2005; Wardana, 2013). Nevertheless, British governments and local authorities have emphasised multiculturalism and tolerated diverse religious practices and pluralism within British society (Modood, 2005). Britain's approach to secularism is further explained and contextualised in chapter 7. In the context of this study, the rise of anti-Muslim sentiment in relation to terrorism, largely boosted by media representations (Bolognani, 2007; Mills and Miller, 2017) may be one of the factors that influence the Kabyles' decisions to adopt a generally more secularised understanding and attitude in the UK.

The British environment offered an opportunity for different ethno-religious communities and groups to coexist and reinvent themselves on British soil, showing a growth of interest in cultural diversity. In some cases, ethnic groups with certain points in common collaborate and organise multi-ethnic cultural events and/or political mobilisations, such the Kabyle-Catalan or Kabyle-Tibetan mobilisation in London to claim the right to self-determination. A number of ethnographic studies conducted have shown that certain communities have a tendency to concentrate in specific places in and around London, to the extent that these places became associated to these communities. For example, on a London map, the Black Caribbean community is largely located in Lambeth, the Kurds in Hackney, the Indian community in Ealing (Holgate et al, 2008), the Spanish-speaking Latin Americans (SsLA) in South East (14%), East (7%), South West (6%) and North West London (4%) (McIlwaine and Bunge, 2016), as well as areas like Elephant & Castle, Southwark, Greater London (Patiño-Santos and Marquez Reiter, 2018), amongst others. Based on previous studies and my participants' claims, North-Africans and other Arabs tend to live in West London (Watts, 2012). However, partly due to its small size, the Kabyle 'community' is scattered in and around London, which is why I chose the organisation as a key site as it is a place for them to gather together.

The relatively recent arrival and current growth of the Kabyle community in London means that, apart from Collyer's work (2008), there has been little analysis of Kabyle responses to their new environment in the UK. This is what this study aims to contribute. It will look at the situation of the Kabyle migrants in the UK and at the relationships they form between living locally and engaging transnationally in an attempt to create Kabyle transnational communities and social spaces (Faist, 2002). In short, this research will address a newly emerging immigrant community in the UK about whom we know little. The following section will locate the Kabyle cultural movement, in all its dimensions, at a transnational level.

2.7 Placing the Kabyle Community in a Transnational Setting

As mentioned earlier, due to the rural features of Kabylia, along with the deterioration of the Kabyles' life conditions and their displacement to other regions of Algeria as a result of colonisation, the region became a significant supplier of migrants firstly to other parts of Algeria and then to France and to other destinations more recently. The Kabyles' settlement in non-Kabyle spaces in Algeria and France was marked by both the transportation of skilled-individuals and the transferability of their distinct cultural identity (Eriksen, 2010). This was supported by the creation of cultural and political organisations that operate simultaneously at local and global levels.

2.7.1 Kabylo-Amazigh Associative Movement

The Kabyles' settlement in France, Canada and other places led to the creation of a large number of organisations, promoting the preservation of Kabyle culture among people of a Kabyle background. In Algeria, between 1988 and 1994, 528 cultural associations were created in the wilayas of Bejaïa and Tizi Ouzou. This sharp increase in number of cultural associations accelerated the consolidation of an Amazigh identity and brought change within Kabyle society (Kourdache, 2001). At an international level, the largest number of associations is registered in France. For example, there are 25 in Paris, each with different objectives. However, they all centre around the same goal, which is to maintain the Kabyle ethnic identity and its markers, including language, traditions and history (Eriksen, 2010). According to Chikha (2005), the ACB, or *Association de Culture Berbère* (Berber Cultural Association) enjoys a special place in France. It is considered to be the most dynamic association in terms of the activities and cultural production it offers, as well as its political demonstrations. Other associations are either what migration scholars call 'hometown associations' like the *Agraw-B-W-Adrar Amellal Di Paris* (comite Adrar Amellal de Paris), associations with a linguistic focus such as *the Institut pour la revitalisation de*

Tamazight, associations with a general cultural outlook like *Tamazgha*, or religious organisations such as the *Association Chrétienne d'expression Berbère (ACEB)*. However, there are no records on associations for Kabyle Muslims. Similar associative activities take place among the Kabyle people in Canada, particularly in Montreal and Quebec. For example, the *Réseau des Femmes Kabyles et Amazighes* organised the 4th edition of the Day of the Kabyle dress (La Journee de la robe Kabyle) on 14th April 2018 in Montreal to coincide with the commemoration of the Berber Spring. In Spain, the Forum for the Euro-Amazigh Research aims to bring Amazigh and international intellectuals together in order to discuss Amazigh matters in North Africa, Spain and other parts of the world. Moreover, the associations with a Kabyle dominance usually interact with other local cultural associations such as the *Amazigh Breizh*, which brings Kabyle and Breton culture together. As the picture below shows, these organisational activities frequently include the hosting or support of a multitude of communal events. See figure (2-4). This thesis will explore the Kabyle/Amazigh cultural organisation in the UK, and the extent to which it has come to express new practices of transnational networking**.**



Figure 2-4 Intercultural event between the Kabyles and the Bretons.

2.7.2 **Political Movement**

The creation of associations in a local and ~~a~~ transnational space allows for a culturally and politically oriented Kabyle/Amazigh network. Several transnational associations, notably '*Le Congres Mondial Amazigh*' (CMA) and *Coordination of Berbers in France* (CBF), consider European societies to be a favourable field to exercise their freedom of expression and overcome the obstacles they used to face in their countries of origin (Tilmatine, 2017). However, some associations are even more politically engaged. They are led by people who have invested their time, money and energy into their ethnic cause, drawing upon strategies to strengthen their movement and reach their goals such as the production of literary and artistic works, creation of associations and politicising cultural symbols (Erikson, 2010). For example, the MAK is chaired by its founder Ferhat Mehenni and monitored by a news agency that keeps the Kabyle diaspora updated with news on and about Kabylia, the Kabyles and the Amazighs in multiple locations. 'Siwel Agency', as it is called, allows for a transnational network~~ing~~ by connecting Kabylia, France and the international space. The agency is based on fundamental political ideals such as liberty, democracy and secularism with the aim to serve the Kabyle people. To gain popularity and credibility, the MAK organisation has launched many programmes. It even facilitated the first research project to address the census and the study of medicinal plants in Kabylia (Siwel, 2018). In addition, they supported the Kabyle football team in their participation in the 2018 CONIFA World Football Cup. This competition includes states, partially recognised states, regions, minority groups and isolated territories that are generally excluded or rejected from their country and labelled as 'minorities'.

The recent participation of the Kabyle team was in March 2018 in London against teams from Tibet, Western Armenia, Panjab, and other minorities claiming similar rights in their countries of origin. Furthermore, the founder of the MAK movement and the GPK, Ferhat Mehenni, works to create a network between Kabylia and the Kabyle diaspora through frequent travel across the diasporic landscape where he meets people, delivers speeches and lectures on his writings. This has largely influenced the Kabyles' position and led to their reorientation from Algerianness towards Kabyleness. Mehenni's activism (which includes writing letters to international organisations such as the UN), along with the installation of Kabyle institutions in France, some European countries and in North America, inscribe the Kabyle question and the Kabyles' identity claims in a local and a transnational space. According to one of my participants, Ricky, such initiatives are "undertaken by the MAK in order to attract more attention and provoke the Algerians to push their plans [better recognition of Kabyle identity in Algeria] further, particularly among the non-Kabyles". For example, they drew on cultural symbols (such as the Kabyle flag),

historical facts and Kabyle political figures. Effectively, as it was long silenced in Algeria, the MAK has now become more visible during the *Hirak*, to the extent that Mehenni organised a virtual audio-conference in a Kabyle University. This has created a strong polemic among the Algerian public as well as political figures on TV shows and online platforms, which offered an open space for internet users to express their diverse positions regarding the MAK and its founder.

2.7.3 Online Platforms and Outside Supporters

The consequences of globalisation and technology have played a crucial role in ensuring the continuity of migrants' connections across borders. The communication between people regardless of their locations creates an environment conducive to binding and strengthening the social networks between them. The virtual space has become a supportive environment for the Kabyles who seek to maintain links across borders and share political opinions and personal interests through "networked communication platforms" (Ellison and Boyd, 2013: 158) such as Facebook, Skype, Twitter, YouTube channels, and so on. Facebook pages such as '*les Kabyles de Londres'* or 'The Kabyle/Amazigh Cultural Organisation in London' and websites such as the Amazigh World News, provide information and news for and about the Amazigh people which many of my respondents regularly use. Promoting 'Kabyle' matters does not only include people of Kabyle origin, but also the involvement of individuals and artists of different nationalities. For instance, Stina and Uli Rhode, two European singers, show their love of Kabyle culture through their re-interpretation of Kabyle protest or storytelling songs by great and highly appreciated Kabyle singers, their participation in Kabyle demonstrations in France, their frequent visits to Kabylia, and their adoption of Kabyle clothing and accessories. Furthermore, their activities extend to the online world, where they post all related performances~~,~~ without missing any Kabyle occasion. Their efforts and their actual and virtual presence are often viewed as a great support to the Kabyle people's identity claims. German Uli Rhode has been particularly active, performing music and taking part in political activities. She continuously shares her participation in demonstrations in Paris and online (See figure 2-6). In 2016, Uli Rhode was elected by the Amazigh Ambassadors Club in Morocco as an

Figure 2-5 Stina, wearing a Kabyle dress and singing in Kabylia with a famous Kabyle singer, Djamal Allam.

Figure 2-6 Participation of Uli in the political mobilisations of Kabyle diaspora.

ambassador of Amazigh Culture[11] (See Figure 2-7). She does not only engage in a plethora of activities organised in Kabylia, Morocco and in Europe (mainly France and Germany), but also takes other initiatives as shown in Figure 2-8.

Figure 2-7 Ambassador of the Amazigh Culture.

Figure 2-8 Uli protests against the instrumentalisation of Matoub Lounes.

Following the recognition of the Amazigh New Year, Yennayer, as an official national holiday in 2018, foreign ambassadors in Algeria did not wait long to congratulate Algerians (See Figures 2-9 and 2-10 below). The event was celebrated in Algeria as well as in France and it was broadcast by local and international channels. The video of the ambassador of the UK and the tweet of the US ambassador wishing a happy Amazigh New Year in Tamazight, were widely circulated on social media and appreciated by Algerians, particularly Kabyles. Although the Amazigh New Year did not have an official status in the past, Algerians celebrated it almost all over the country. The Kabyles' reaction to the ambassadors' posts is interesting because they often viewed them as evidence of support that could be used for the internationalisation and transnationalisation of the Kabyle cause. These posts were widely shared on Facebook pages, Twitter and in electronic newspapers. They received comments from the Kabyles, thanking the ambassadors for their respect and valorisation of Amazigh culture.

[11] *Le magazine des Hommes Libres* (magazine of Free Men): http://Amazigh24.ma/amazigh-ambassadors/

Figure 2-9 The Ambassador of Great Britain wishes to Algerians a Happy Amazigh New Year in Tamazight.

Figure 2-10 The ambassador of the US and his wife, wearing Amazigh clothing; wish a happy Amazigh New Year to the Algerians in Tamazight with Tifinagh, Latin and Arabic script.

Social media platforms provide their users with a wide array of choices according to their needs and preferences. They give the opportunity to reduce the distances between people from the same or different background, whether the differences be cultural, national, ethnic, and/or social. The term 'outside supporter' here is used to refer to people who do not have a Kabyle/Amazigh background, yet they are involved in the Kabyle cultural and political movements. Or, as Stina and Uli Rhode have named themselves: 'Kabylised German' or Kabylised Swedish'. In this sense, non-Kabyles' positions in favour of the Kabyle question pleases and empowers the Kabyles locally and globally. Therefore, building relationships with non-Kabyles is important to sustain their Kabyleness.

2.8 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have reviewed major historical events and their devastating outcomes in Algerian and Kabyle history. These events became deeply entrenched in Kabyle individuals' memories, fostered by French colonial politics. Divisive debates have led to the formulation of ideologies based on which Kabyles created hierarchies and developed feelings of indigeneity, authenticity, and difference. Today, they trace their ancestral ethnic identity back to the pre-Islamic era and its development across the North African region. This has been translated into complex political, social, and secular positions, some of which will be analysed in the following chapters. Moreover, this chapter has explored the factors that shaped Kabyle ethnic and political identities in the Kabyle diaspora: The Kabyles' shared narratives based on historical accounts; the creation of cultural organisations in urban centres of Kabyle immigration (mainly Paris, Montreal and recently London); the multiplication of gathering spaces and online platforms; and Algerian political and social development such as the *Hirak* and the individuals' immigration and socio-economic status in the receiving society.

Kabyle/Amazigh resistance to the policies that aimed at the homogenisation of Algeria, mainly the Arabisation process, has been expressed through protest since the 1980s. The Amazighs' claims, with a Kabyle predominance, started in the beginning of the twentieth century. The principal players were Kabyle elites who graduated from French colonial schools, such as the anthropologist Boulifa, the linguist Chaker, writers and novelists such as Amrouche, Feraoun, Mammeri, Kateb Yacine, as well as political militants and acitivists (Assam, 2015). The latter participated in the spread and the transnationalisation of the Kabyle political and cultural movement. Cultural/political and transnational organisations and outside supporters have made a significant contribution to the flourishing of Kabyle culture, by joining social, political, cultural, and economic forces.

This chapter has shown how both the Berber Spring and the Black spring, organised by institutionalised political parties and ancestral tribal systems such as *Arouch*, contributed to unprecedented development in the history of the Kabyles' struggle for recognition (Maddy-Weitzman, 1999). Although Tamazight became a national and official language in Algeria in 2016, there is still some work to be done for it to have more than just a formal status within Algerian society (Arezki, 2016), such as the production of textbooks in the Tamazight language, and organisation of seminars and conferences on Tamazight all over the country. On the other hand, the recognition of the Amazigh New Year (Yennayer) as a public holiday, celebrated on 12 January of every year (Huffpost Algeria, 2017; Daily Mail, 2018) came to appease some of the Algerian

Amazighs' demands locally and internationally. However, the extent to which the recognition of Yennayer is sufficient or will serve in the promotion of Tamazight language and culture remains to be seen.

As Goodman (2005) puts it, "culture is, after all, only one possible rubric through which a social group achieve visibility." (p. 4). As I have indicated, the Kabyles' engagement in political and cultural activities, whether in or outside of Kabylia, has played an essential role in the public recognition and transnationalisation of their desire to achieve cultural community. Furthermore, the creation of Kabyle communities within Algeria in non-Kabyle regions such as Oran, or in France, Canada and recently the UK within cultural organisations has opened new possibilities to maintain Kabyle culture. This also includes how they re-construct and negotiate their Kabyle cultural identity through the re-invention of Kabyle/Amazigh traditions in the host societies, such as the commemoration and celebration of Kabyle/Amazigh events, as will be shown in chapter 6. The strength and visibility of the Kabyle cultural movement also lies in the cultural organisations' activities in various countries and cities and their openness and engagement with other groups, such as the case of the Kabyle-Bretons events organised annually in Paris, or the Kabyle involvement in Kurdish (December 2018) or Catalan (October 2019) protests that happened in London in 2018. This can also be a source of capital production, as they participate in similar events to build relationships with others who share the same thirst for ethnic, cultural, and political rights, and seek public legitimisation in a global space.

Chapter 3 Literature Review

3.1 Introduction

As highlighted in Chapter 2 Kabyle migration to France and the formation of an educated community of Kabyles outside Algeria, mainly in France and Canada, and their social and political mobilisation played a central role in the development of a cultural identity (Sayad, 1999; Belaïdi, 2003; Collyer, 2008). This study's main focus is the Kabyles' conception of their Kabyleness in a new migratory context and in a globalised age, intersecting with a set of social categories such as ethnicity, social class, religious/secular affiliation and language (Pavlenko & Blackledge, 2004; Schwartz et al, 2010; Rampton et al, 2014). Conceptualisations of identity in relation to migration will be used to open up insights into the way in which Kabyle migrants perform, negotiate and (re)construct their sense of self and belonging in 'super-diverse' London and multicultural Britain (Vertovec, 2007).

The section on Kabyle migration to the UK discussed in chapter 2 has given us a window onto the driving forces that have led the Kabyles to migrate to Britain and the opportunities the receiving country and society provide. This chapter provides literature on transnationalism that will allow us to map out and better understand the Kabyle migration processes to the UK and the transnational activities that mark them, as it has been apparent in my fieldwork that individuals create multiple social, cultural and political ties within the country of settlement, the country of origin and further afield through online platforms.

Empirical studies on Kabyle migration and transnationalism in the UK are almost non-existent. However, Michael Collyer (2004; 2006; 2008; 2012) studied the Algerian migration to France and the UK. His multisited study (2008), entitled "The reinvention of political community in a transnational setting: framing the Kabyle citizens' movement", focuses on their political engagement and social movement in Marseilles, Paris and London. He argues that Kabyle citizens formed transnational political organisations as a response to rejected institutional forms of political engagement in Algeria. Building on Collyer's work this study shows how Kabyle migrants are transnationally engaged in social, cultural, secularised and political activities and create links with other Kabyles and non-Kabyles in the UK, in Kabylia, France, Canada and through online platforms with the wider Kabyle diaspora. This has involved the generation of different forms of capital (Bourdieu, 1986) that were crucial to the Kabyles for securing their socio-economic situation in the UK as newcomers and ensuring a sense of cultural continuity that could span national borders.

This study draws on a constructivist approach to identity, culture and ethnicity. It is inspired by literature on transnationalism, diaspora and transnational social field introduced by scholars such as Levitt and Glick Schiller (1999; 2004), Faist (2000; 2010), Pries (2003) Plastic (2007) and others. This has the potential to help organise and elucidate the individuals' diverse interactions, connections and their multiple identifications in different sites. This study acknowledges the dynamicity and the fluidity of diaspora and transnational communities. The online dimension is one of the three key sites in this thesis through which I offer a comprehensive view of transnational/diaspora identity formation in a new migratory setting. Moreover, this research looks at the transnational social field in Bourdieusian terms, where every site is viewed as a 'field' that involves social actors' habitus and the production of capitals. Bourdieu's notions help to understand the functioning of every sites and explain the different complex positions the members take within the Kabyle transnational social space. In short, the literature reviewed in this chapter is useful to understanding not only the socio-cultural adaptation of migrants in a relatively new environment, but also their desire for transnational ethnic and cultural continuity, and their active transnational networks straddling national borders.

3.2 Community, Identity, Culture and Ethnicity

The social constructivist perspective advocates the constructed nature of 'group' identities in relation to mobility and globalisation. The latter have contributed to the rethinking of many classic and essentialist definitions of identity and culture and conceptualising "community" is no exception. Famously Benedict Anderson (1983) argued that the rise of more advanced technology and print capitalism, changed the notion of community to include an imagined world. This imagined world transcended local boundaries to include members who did not necessarily "know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (Anderson, 1983: 6). This means that community is not something predefined and limited in space but rather actively produced (Mitchell, 1997). Moreover, Djelic and Quack (2010) argue that communities are "fluid, relational constructs, constantly on the move and in process [and that] we should consider, rather than communities, processes of community formation, maintenance, decline, and even disintegration" (p. 7). In this sense, whether the communities are old, novice, with a successful experience or not are worth describing. Moreover, Cohen (1985) claims that:

> Communities are units of belonging whose members perceive that they share moral, aesthetic/expressive or cognitive meanings, thereby gaining a sense of personal as well as group identity. In turn, this identity demarcates the

> boundary between members and non-members. Communities therefore are constructed symbolically through an engagement with rituals, signs and meanings; they provide a container within which individual members negotiate meanings and construct and re-construct different kinds of social relationships over time. (p. 15-20)

In this sense, communities are formed out of networks (Delanty, 2003). Different kinds of interactions and social ties are generally driven by emotions and sentiments (Tönnies, 2002) and by a sense of obligation and allegiance to others or to a particular cause. Following Wellman (2001), I use the notion of communities as "networks of interpersonal ties that provide sociability, support, information, a sense of belonging, and social identity" (p. 227). Therefore, social, cultural and political mobilisation of community members and their involvement both face to face and on-line maximise the generation of different forms of capital to alter their socio-economic status and sustain the participants' Kabyleness in the UK and transnationally as will be discussed in the coming chapters.

Identities, according to Hall (1996) are "increasingly fragmented and fractured, never singular but multiply constructed across different, often intersecting and antagonistic discourses, practices and positions … and are constantly in the process of change and transformation" (p. 4). In this sense, the formation of identity is a process that is never completed. Identities encompass multiple and intersecting strands of identification along the lines of social categories such as gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, age (Hopkins, 2010), and language (Rampton et al, 2014). They are viewed as constructed in discourse, narratives and interaction (Pavlenko & Blackledge, 2004).

Similarly, culture is no longer viewed as something fixed, but subject to influence and change. Drawing on UNESCO (2001), Eng Kee (2016) defines culture as "set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual, and emotional features of a society or a social group. Culture encompasses art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions, behaviours, and beliefs" (p. 250). These material and non-material dimensions of culture form the individual's cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986). According to Larrain (2002) "culture is one of the determinants of personal identity… [and] this is how the idea of cultural identities emerges" (p. 24). Hall (1990) explains that there are two ways of thinking about cultural identity. The first position reflects the common historical experiences and shared cultural codes which result in a sort of collective "'one true self'" (p.223). The second position explains that "as well as the many points of similarity, there are also critical points of deep and significant *difference* which constitute … 'what we have become'" (p. 225). Thus, he defines cultural identity as

> "a matter of 'becoming' as well as of 'being'. It belongs to the future as much as to the past. It is not something which already exists, transcending place, time, history and culture. Cultural identities come from somewhere, have histories. But, like everything which is historical, they undergo constant transformation (p.225).

Individuals construct their identities with reference to some features that are shared such as class, history, language, ethnicity, geographical spaces, religion, that are culturally determined and are conceived as cultural identities (Hall, 1996; Larrain, 2002). Hence, there is a kind of interplay between identity, culture and ethnicity, making their relationship reciprocal and not straightforward or linear. That is, while culture shapes society, individuals shape the culture they belong to.

Scholars interested in ethnic and racial studies have grappled with questions of primordialism and constructivism. Racial and ethnic identifications are interconnected and they are both conceived as contextual, unstable and fragmentary (Wade, 1997). The concept of race has developed over time. Initially, it referred to the visible physical differences based on genetic constitutions that separate the human species into different groups (Wade, 1997; Bonilla-Silva, 2003). Ethnic minorities are often racialised. Hence, experiences of racism and discrimination also influence the individual's interaction with other groups and their acculturation process. Acculturation refers to "the adaptation of behaviours and attitudes that enable a culturally diverse individual to function within a culture different from his or her origin" (Suzuki and Ponterotto, 2007: 82). For example, immigrants may adopt secular habits and/or choose European names, as is the case with the Kabyles involved in this study.

Wimmer (2008) defines "ethnicity as a subjectively felt sense of belonging based on the belief in shared culture and common ancestry. This belie[f] refers to cultural practices perceived as "typical" for the community, to myths of a common historical origin, or to phenotypical similarities" (273-74). The Kabyle people identify with the Amazigh origin (Silverstein, 2004; Harris, 2018), which is an ethnic racial group, emphasising their distinctiveness from other groups, notably the Arabs: Algerians who stress their Arab ancestry (Kaplan, 1982; Fitzgerald, 2008). In other words, the Kabyles claim their difference from non-Amazigh Algerians based on their observed cultural, linguistic and physical differences, that to some extent, reflect the characteristics listed in the colonial accounts known as the Kabyle Myth discussed in chapter 2.

Two main theoretical approaches underpin the study of ethnicity: primordialist and constructivist. First, primordialist approach explains ethnicity as something inherited, natural to an individual,

and therefore permanent and non-negotiable (Geertz, 1963). Nevertheless, in 1969, the anthropologist Fredrik Barth introduced a new understanding to the concept of ethnicity, that is called the instrumentalist approach. This second approach came to challenge the boundedness feature suggested by the primordialist advocates, by arguing that ethnicity is socially constructed. It stresses the heterogeneity of meanings and identities, that are often the product of social change. Barth (1969; 1998) emphasises that ethnic groups "are categories of ascription and identification by the actors themselves, and thus have the characteristic of organising interaction between people" (Barth, 1969: 10). In this sense, Barth as well as other prominent scholars notably Cohen (1969) from the Manchester School suggest an instrumental use of ethnicity, where individuals employ it to manoeuvre through social positions. Moreover, they believe that both the individual's self-identification and the outsiders' ethnic designation delimit group boundaries. This can be real or imagined (Anderson, 1983). Further to Barth's "vessel" imagery metaphor, Nagel (1994) suggest a shopping cart as a device to examine the construction of ethnic culture. He argues that we "can think of ethnic boundary construction as determining the shape of the shopping cart (size, number of wheels, composition, etc.); ethnic culture, then, is composed of the things we put into the cart-art, music, dress, religion, norms, beliefs, symbols, myths, customs" (p. 162). However, he reminds us that "culture is not a shopping cart that comes to us already loaded with a set of historical cultural goods. Rather we construct culture by picking and choosing items from the shelves of the past and the present." (Ibid: 162). This thesis follows these constructivist notions of ethnicity, to analyse the multiplicity and fluidity of the participants' Kabyleness, and their ways of creating, negotiating and performing belonging in situational and ongoing interactions.

3.3 Transnational Everyday Ethnicity

Exploring the workings of nationalism and ethnicity in the Transylvanian city of Cluj, Brubaker and his co-authors (2006) (2004) argue against 'groupism'. This states that ethnicity, race and nation

> "should be conceptualized not as substances or things or entities or organisms or collective individuals – as the imaginary of discrete, concrete, tangible, bounded and enduring 'groups' encourage us to do – but rather in relational, processual, dynamic, eventful, and disaggregated terms" (p. 11).

Hence, Brubaker's approach enables us to rethink ethnicity, and pay more attention to identifications, categorisations and the process of re-making groups, considering the impact of political, social, cultural, psychological (Brubaker, 2004: 167) and historical contexts on these processes. Moreover, in their collaborative work, the authors explain that ethnicity and nationhood ""happen" every day in Cluj… They are embodied and expressed not only in political

claims and nationalist rhetoric but in everyday encounters, practical categories, commonsense knowledge, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, mental maps, interactional cues, discursive frames, organizational routines, social networks, … institutional forms" (p. 7) and, one might add, in claims to history and language. In the context of this study, everyday ethnicity refers to the situations, contexts, mundane conversations and activities be face-to-face and/or online within the Kabyle TSF, where ethnicity is experienced and understood as part of the research subjects' everyday life and influenced by historical, political, social, cultural, and psychological factors (Brubaker, 2004).

Historical Context

Eriksen (2002) argues "notions of shared origins are usually crucial for ethnic identity, and interpretations of history are therefore important to ideologies seeking to justify, strengthen and maintain particular ethnic identities" (p, 59). Moreover, Nagel (1994) asserts that "culture and history are the substance of ethnicity. They are also the basic materials used to construct ethnic meaning" (p. 161). In the context of this study, storytelling about the Algerian revolution or Kabyle and Amazigh ancient kingdoms have been considered as part of the Amazigh cultural and linguistic patrimony (Tilmatine, 2017) or termed as "Kabyle national narrative" (Harris, 2018: 85). These have been useful for Kabyle activists "to create common meanings, to build solidarity, and to launch social movements" (Nagel, 1994: 161). Kabyle and Amazigh intellectuals, singers and politicians, or to borrow Brubaker's (2002) terms, ethno-political entrepreneurs, have used their pens, voices, speeches, music and art to promote a collective Kabyle identity relying on past events not only to recount them but also to virtually 'invent traditions'. The compelling concept of invention of tradition introduced by the historian Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) is useful in this study to consider the importance of past history as a resource used by individuals or groups to consolidate an impression of ethnic and/or national distinctiveness and continuity. Hobsbawm (1983) defines the invented tradition as a

> "set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past" (p. 1).

Relatedly, Kabyle national narratives are based upon the use of a suitable historical past which becomes explicit in the creation of the Amazigh calendar or the Neo-Tifinagh writing system; the celebration of cultural festivals and commemorations of relevant historical events. This will be

discussed thoroughly in the following chapters. Moreover, by 'national narrative', Kabyle activists refer to the 'Kabyle imagined nation'. Looking through the lens of Giddens' (1985) Anderson's (1991) and Brubaker's (1996) scholarship, Kabyle nationhood can be conceived as an imagined political community that has been created, based on a cultural, linguistic and historical context, with the help of social practices, print capitalism, books, and other types of "institutionalisation" (Brubaker, 1996). This can be exemplified with the huge efforts and the torrent of academic work conducted by Kabyle as well as international intellectuals and individuals as explained in chapter 2. This has entailed the creation of the *Académie Berbère* in Paris, the production of journals, books, songs and artistic works that treat Kabyle issues in French language, the codification of Tamazight language, the creation of political parties and the restoration of the ancestral tribal organisations and structures, notably the *Tajmaât* and *Arouch* as explained in chapter 2. Brubaker et al (2006) analysis of ethnicity focussed on its historical dimension as a mode of identification resulting from "the interplay of national claims and counter-claims, on the shifting discursive and political fields within which such claims and counterclaims are embedded" (p. 10-11). Put differently, the construction of ethnic identity and culture is the result of "both structure and agency" (Nagel, 1994: 152). This involves the politicisation of ethnicity in order to self-organise, as well as to organise the 'other' particularly in nation-building projects. For example, at a macro level, borders and visa procedures are set, whereas at a micro level stereotypes are created such as the Arab/Berber distinction or Kabyle/*Amrabedh* difference as will be shown in chapter 7.

Socio-Political Context: Secularism versus Religion

Political structuring and organisation of national/ethnic identity often involves secularised policies and thoughts that become instilled among the citizens in modern states. Secularism plays the role of transcendent mediation between differentiating practices and different identities built on class, gender, ethnicity, and religion (Asad, 2003: 5). Among the majority of my research subjects, adopting secular habits as part of their everydayness of being Kabyle was more common.

Asad (2003) paid a special attention to the idea of the secular (the individual) that has been scarcely treated in earlier anthropological studies and debates, where the focus was largely on understanding the political dimension of secularism. The secular, Asad argues, is

> "neither continuous with the religious that supposedly preceded it (that is, it is not the latest phase of a sacred origin) nor a simple break from it (that is, it is not the opposite, an essence that excludes the sacred) …. brings together certain behaviours, knowledges, and sensibilities in modern life". (p. 25).

He believes that “the secular” is not the obverse of “the religious”, but it overlaps with “the religious”, where the former “works through a series of particular oppositions” (Ibid). He points out that the place of religion in modern secular countries varies,

> “[A]lthough in France both the highly centralized state and its citizens are secular, in Britain the state is linked to the established Church and its inhabitants are largely non-religious, and in America the population is largely religious but the federal state is secular. “Religion” has always publicly been publicly present in both Britain and America.” (p. 5)

In this sense, there is a difference in practice of secularism in western societies. While religion can be publicly practised in some countries such as Britain, in other secular countries it is more restricted, such as France or the Netherlands. Hence, the receiving country’s structures and mechanisms for recognising religious diversity are important in shaping how Muslims are or are not integrated into the dominant society (Cesari, 2004). However, this is not always the case. This study shows that despite the UK’s measurements to recognise religious diversity, the research subjects still prefer not to be singled out publicly as Muslims.

Moreover, both at a state as well as at a societal level, immigrants from Muslim majority countries are identified as Muslims, which may create a mismatch between what the receiving country and society may perceive them and between the immigrants’ self-identifications. For example, the study’s subjects’ ‘national’ (Algerian/North African) identity may be understood in religious terms in the UK. However, even though most of my respondents did not deny their Muslim affiliation, their everyday practices did not publicly involve religious practices, where some preferred to keep religion private. This shows a more complex entanglement of Kabyleness and the secular/religious binary as will be explained in chapter 7.

Cultural Context: Performance and Materiality

The creation of the cultural organisation in London and its ramifications with other organisations in France and Canada, the creation of online platforms and the maintenance of social networks have entailed an everyday transnational negotiation, construction and performance of Kabyleness. Through cultural secular events, newly invented events; consumption of cultural, political and symbolic objects; political activities, marches and mobilisations in the host society’s capitals, online posts, pictures, comments and mobilisations with other ethnic communities/stateless minorities sharing similar aims as will be discussed in the coming chapters.

The notions of performance and performativity are also located within the broader constructivist approach, where key concepts are considered notably gender, race, ethnicity, and identity. Myriad scholars such as the linguist/philosopher Austin (1975); the sociologist Goffman, (1867); the anthropologist Clifford (1988); the philosopher and gender theorist Butler (1988; 1993); the scholar of performance Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (1999); Schechner and Brady (2013) and others have significantly contributed to studies on performance. They draw on approaches from a wide variety of disciplines such as performing arts, social sciences, feminist studies, gender studies, history, semiotics, popular culture theory, and cultural studies (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, 1999 in Schechner and Brady, 2013). Moreover, performativity suggests "every social activity can be understood as a showing of a doing" (Schechner and Brady, 2013: 168). This means that performances such as events, rituals, dancing, art, storytelling, political demonstrations can become central in the individuals' everyday lives and transform their social lives. In other words, people talk, walk, express themselves in ways that consolidate an impression of being of specific age, gender, ethnicity, race, social class, religion and/or political orientation. Performative theories are, thus, also integrated in cultural and ethnic studies, where cultural identities are understood as performed and performative through both being and doing (Hall, 1990). This study understands the performance/performativity of Kabyleness in London/UK and online as complex, fluid, and hybrid. For example, studies on African diasporas (Tulloch, 1999); Pakistani Diaspora in Manchester, Britain (Werbner, 2002); Amazigh diaspora in France (Harris, 2018) have emphasised the centrality of cultural performances in the sustainability and the formation of the community's ethnic/racial and cultural identifications, which also involved the use of objects.

Performing identity and ethnicity often involves the use of objects. The latter constitute a large part of our life, permeating our daily interactions and practices. The importance of artefacts in human lives has remarkably increased, involving forms of communication behaviour. As Schiffer (2002) observes "human life consists of ceaseless and varied interactions among people and myriad kinds of things. These things are called 'material culture' or, better, artefacts" (p. 2). Key theories of "material culture developed in the 1980s demonstrated that social worlds were as much constituted by materiality as the other way round" (Miller, 1998: 3). In other words, the reciprocal relationship and impact between objects and the social world and their significance have been recognised in various studies. For example, according to Sahlins (1976), individuals often convey specific messages through consumption. Therefore, symbols (cultural, political) are "manipulated in the creation of ethnic identities and organisations. Such a focus implies that ethnic identity is an important sense constructed" (Eriksen, 2002: 69). In the context of this study, Kabyle transnational identity and everyday ethnicity is also negotiated and shaped through the creation and display of Kabyle and Amazigh symbols as forms of *being* and *becoming,* which will be explained and theorised in the next section.

3.4 The Transnational Turn in Migration Studies

Literature on migration has considerably evolved since the earliest assumptions and approaches that many authors attribute to the geographer Ernest Ravenstein (de Haas, 2007; Piché, 2013; Castles et al, 2014). Early contributions to migration studies tended to prioritise economic explanations regarding the flows of individual workers (Bauer and Zimmermann, 1999) and ignored the historical factors that can propel migration (Castle & Miller, 1993). Furthermore, scholars from a wide range of disciplinary orientations notably geography, economics, demography, sociology and other social sciences (Castles & Miller, 1993; Lee, 2006) have elaborated myriad theories using different conceptions and assumptions in order to explain migration causes and impacts. This multidisciplinarity explains the significant differences in approach and lack of theoretical coherence (Portes et al., 2004; de Haas, 2007; Castles and Miller, 1993). Researchers in modern migration studies (Faist, 2000; Portes, 1999; Brettell et al., 2015) argue that these differences could be combined and viewed as complementary, affording the possibility of elaborating a "unifying theory". According to migration scholar Portes (1992), the four main research areas revolve around the origins of migration, the directionality and continuity of migrant flows, the utilisation of migrant labour and finally the socio-cultural adaptation of migrants.

By the late 1980s and early 1990s a significant body of work emerged that focussed on migration as part of global processes and social change (de Haas, 2007). Anthropologists Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc (1992, 1994), Smith and Guarnizo (1998) and Vertovec (1999) in particular contributed to the evolution of theories of transnationalism. These promoted the understanding that transnationalism is "primarily concerned with the social, economic, political links between migrants and their home communities and with the interdependence of these links with the globalization of capital" (Armbruster, 2002: 18). While critics questioned the novelty of the transnational lens and argued that migrants had always retained ties to their places of origin (Kennedy & Roudometof, 2001; Kivisto, 2001; Al-Ali and Koser, 2002; Glick Schiller and Levitt, 2006), the concept has now become firmly established in migration studies. Indeed, historical accounts have demonstrated that earlier migrants also maintained links with their families and home countries. However, scholars of transnationalism focus on the processes by which individual immigrants forge and maintain ties that are facilitated by modern technologies such as transport and digital communication, which offers a different experience that consists of the individuals' own lived experiences, thoughts and emotions. Hence, the transnational turn has come to bring "migrants 'back in' as important social agents" (Faist, 2010: 11) as they were often treated as the anonymous object of larger political organisations, economic interests or policy making.

Consequently, a new literature came to differentiate between transnationalism from above and transnationalism from below (Smith and Guarnizo, 1998). While the former refers to macro-level structures such as government, nation states and the global economy, the latter refers to the ties and social networks people build across boundaries through their everyday practices and experiences (Smith and Guarnizo, 1998; Brettell, 2003; Lee, 2008). Building on this literature, I focus on Kabyles' transnational experiences within the Kabyle TSF involving the creation of and participation in events within the cultural organisation, their online interactions with each other and everyday encounters that consist of retaining links with their families in Kabylia, in the UK and with the diaspora online, political activities, content-based sharing on Facebook, art and food consumption. I also focus on how the different fields inform and shape their conceptions of Kabyleness and actual practices, taking into account their diverse profiles shaped by age, gender, educational background, migration trajectories and socio-cultural background.

Migrants involved in the maintenance of cross-border ties are often 'pluri-local', that is they live "dual lives" (Portes, 1997: 812). This is often said to have allowed migrants to live 'here' and 'there' and maintain social, economic and cultural ties with their families in their countries of origin as well as the receiving countries (Guarinzo et al., 2003; Grillo and Mazzucato, 2008). However, Amit (2012) argues that "not every immigrant maintains these ties" (p. 505), acknowledging rupture as well as the social labour of maintaining ties as also a feature of immigration. Nevertheless, the proliferation in use of online platforms, the multiplication of Facebook pages and the current political movements and protests have facilitated and enhanced many Kabyle immigrants' transnational lives. Even though many of my respondents chose to distance themselves from other Kabyles in the UK and in Kabylia whilst they tried to "become well established in their new locales" (Portes and Dewind 2007, p. 10 cited in Amit, 2012: 505), they often told me that they still maintained ties with their cultural heritage through everyday consumption of Kabyle products such as olive oil, couscous as well as music and Kabyle programmes on YouTube or Facebook. This thesis will show that transnational ties are also maintained in domestic spaces through the use of material objects.

The concept of transnationalism provides both a theoretical and an analytical lens to explore how immigrants "forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement" (Basch et al, 1994: 7). Moreover, the transnational relations allow them "to exploit the economic and political opportunities created by such dual lives" (Portes, et al, 2004: 834). Therefore, transnationalism sheds light on persons who are doubly engaged in living simultaneously in a continuous space: speaking two or more languages, having homes in two countries or more, and making a living through regular contact across national borders (Grillo and Muzzucato, 2008; Portes et al. 1999). This suggests the hybridity, multiplicity and cultural fluidity of the members' identities (Hall, 1990), as chapter 5 will demonstrate.

Furthermore, Pries (2001) suggests that transmigrants[12] "are moving in new pluri-local transnational social spaces where individual and collective biographical life projects, everyday life as well as the real "objective" sequence of life stations span between different geographical-spatial extensions" (p. 67). Furthermore, Faist (2004) notes that these ties can be social or symbolic. He explains that social ties "represent a continuing series of personal transactions - communication between at least three actors - to which the people involved ascribe common interests, obligations, expectations and norms" (p. 4). This can be exemplified with efforts invested by a group of people/ethnic communities to create cultural events aiming at the preservation of a national, cultural, religious and/or ethnic identity and continuity, such as the celebration of Yennayer by the Amazigh community across Tamazgha/North Africa and among the Amazigh diaspora in Paris and London as shown in this thesis (chapter 2 and 6). Symbolic ties are "continuing transactions with which the people involved link common meanings, memories, expectations for the future, and collective representations" (Ibid: 4). For example, Francophones can symbolically link to speakers of French language and even culture without necessarily being French. Another example could be that of Muslims who can be symbolically linked through religious occasions such as Ramadan. Here Muslims can also socially connect with other Muslim communities through the organisation of, for example, a collective Iftar[13]. Symbolic and social ties suggest an extension of the geographic coverage of the people's transnational ties.

Sociological literature has shown that immigrants' willingness to transnationally engage in social, economic, and political practices tends to decline over time (Waldinger, 2015; Chaudhary, 2017). In the case of Kabyle immigrants, despite their early arrival in the UK, and their many attempts to create an Amazigh/North African 'community', their work was limited toto mobilising Kabyles in and around London. However, to manage the diversity among the Kabyle community, alongside the Kabyle/Amazigh Cultural Organisation and its corresponding Facebook page, they resorted to other forms of gatherings and other Facebook pages to practice their political and secular activities to ensure continuity, as will be explained in the last four chapters. Besides, "their connections with the homeland and the receiving society occur simultaneously" (Mügge, 2016: 113), in addition to their actual and virtual connections with Kabyless settled mainly in France and Canada.

[12] The term transmigrants refer to immigrants who maintain ties with their home country through, for example, home country visits, remittances, political participation and self-described identity (Waldinger, 2008).

[13] Iftar (in Arabic) is the daily evening meal during Ramadan with which Muslims break their fast at sunset.

Furthermore, Chaudhary (2017), with reference to Godin et al. (2015) and Lacroix (2015), argues that "post-colonial bilateral relations between an immigrant's receiving and origin country may generate a more conducive environment for transnational organizing than a non-colonial immigrant group lacking a post-colonial contextual environment" (p. 425). The Kabyle immigrant group in the UK lacks a post-colonial link with the host society. However, the British environment seems to offer them a ground to engage in economic, cultural and political practices that have a transnational reach. For example, the coordination of the Movement for the Auto-determination of Kabylia (MAK) has been installed in London, the football game between stateless minorities took place in London, where 'MAKabyle' football team participated, in 2017 the Kabyle cause has been inserted in the UNPO (Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation) by a Kabyle activist living in the UK, and recently, the same individual, appointed as the ambassador of 'MAKabylia' succeeded the inclusion of the Kabyle question in the Scottish parliament. In addition to their plans for moving their 'siege' from France to the UK**.** Therefore, lacking a historical and/or post-colonial link with the receiving society can sometimes favourably play on immigrants' side, as they might wish to either live anonymously in a new environment with a new identity, or live a dual life. However, despite the lack of colonial-era links between Britain and Algeria, migration to the UK from Algeria is still taking place in a post-colonial context. In fact, the UK's relationships with its post-colonial subjects shape its relationships to other migrants.

Figure 3-1 The insertion of the Kabyle cause in the UNPO by Anazâr, the representative of 'MAKabylia' in the UK.

Most of the literature in migration studies focus on the immigrants' transnationalism between their country of origin and the host society. However, cross-border transnational ties can be geographically stretched. In this sense, Faist (2010) explains that "transnationalist literature seeks to incorporate issues raised by diaspora approaches, such as incorporation or the lack thereof, but also tries to speak to concerns raised by time-space compressions, such as distinct forms of geographic mobility" (18). This makes the definition of diaspora and transnationalism and their separation difficult and challenging.

3.5 Diaspora

In contrast to transnationalism, diaspora is an old concept. It has been used to refer to cross-border processes, and it overlaps with transnationalism approaches. Although diaspora and transnationalism are often used interchangeably, they also contrast (Bauböck and Faist, 2010). While diaspora is used to discuss issues of cultural and racial distinctiveness and their relevance for religious or national communities, transnationalism refers to migrants' links across borders. However, diasporic phenomena can be conceived as a subset of transnational social formations (Bauböck and Faist, 2010: 33), noting that diaspora may also involve transnational relations. Therefore, the two theoretical concepts are related.

The use of the term diaspora, a Greek word (*diasporá)* for scattering found in translations of the Hebrew Bible, has proliferated and its meaning has evolved through time, starting with its classical use attributed to the Jewish experience to "a more sophisticated listing of key features and grouping into subtypes" (Cohen, 2008: 8). The latter includes categories of people such as expatriates, expellees, political refugees, immigrants and ethnic and racial minorities (Safran, 1991). According to Armbruster (2013), the concept "became successively reinterpreted to describe and theorize mobile societies more broadly and the new cultural forms, political strategies and identities they were producing" (p. 13).

Brubaker (2005) identifies three core elements of diaspora, notably dispersion, homeland orientation and boundary maintenance. In discussing the last element, Brubaker acknowledges the dynamic nature of the environment the 'community' in question lives in, by referring to Stuart Hall's remark. Hence, "the diaspora experience… is defined, not by essence or purity, but by the recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity: by a conception of 'identity' which lives with and through, not despite, difference; by hybridity" (Hall, 1990: 235). Moreover, Brubaker (2005) suggests that diaspora should be treated "as a category of practice, project, claim and stance, rather than as a bounded group. The 'groupness' of putative diasporas, like that of putative 'nations' is precisely what is at stake in [political, social and cultural] struggles" (p. 13). In this sense, Brubaker's conceptualisation of diaspora counters the essentialist approaches that substantialise diasporas, view them as single entities and reify notions of nation, ethnicity and race, in addition to reification of notions of "belonging and the 'roots' of migrants in places of origin" (Sökefeld, 2006: 265). In this sense, Barth's (1969; 1998) constructivist approach to boundaries is useful to understand and explain the complexity and the dynamicity of diasporic experiences that are made and unmade (Wimmer, 2008) by states' policies or by actors themselves who wish to maintain a diasporic ethnic and cultural identity such as the Italian

diaspora in the United States (Sanders, 2002), or the Amazigh diaspora in France (Silverstein, 2004; Harris, 2018).

In his recent ethnographic work on the Amazigh diaspora in France, Harris (2018) takes up these ideas to argue that:

> "ideas of Amazigh nationhood have developed and continue to develop in the process of diaspora, rather than emerging only in the Berberophone regions of 'Tamazgha'. Through knowledge production and cultural activism related to the Tamazight language and drawing on Amazigh cultural and political institutions, scholars and activists located in France developed an ideology of a single Amazigh nation, which in the 1970s, 80s and 90s framed the groupness of the diasporic Amazigh movement. This framing enlarged the Amazigh movement, strengthening the case for promoting and preserving Amazigh culture in France and in North Africa." (p. 88-89)

Within the light of this study, it is interesting to point out how the Amazigh movement is being expanded to reach British soil based on what activists and engaged individuals call their shared culture and origin, but taking a more narrowed form of Amazighity which is 'Kabyleness' or 'Kabyle nationhood' as explained in chapter 2. According to Sökefeld diaspora is a "social form…that is contingent on the imagination of a transnational community and upon the self-identification of actors as members" (p. 271). The Amazigh ethnic solidarity or imagination expressed historically among Amazigh people in Algeria and among the Amazigh diaspora in France and elsewhere appears to be significantly reduced in the UK, due to the absence of other Amazigh groups and political activities and/or social and cultural performances that have been/are being taking place in France. Moreover, the spread of the MAK ideologies has had a great impact on the UK Kabyles' reconceptualisation and re-thinking of their sense of Amazigh belonging. Although the MAK movement emerged in France, its influence seems to be stronger in the UK because of their small scale as well as the other factors such as the Algerian *Hirak***.** However, this does not mean that the Kabyle 'community' in the UK is homogenous and void of differences and tensions. Their own individual characteristics (see chapter 5) notably their diverse social, cultural and political affiliations have had an impact on their articulation of Kabyleness within the Kabyle TSF. This echoes the findings in Pnina Werbner's (2002) study on Pakistani Muslims in Manchester. It reveals the transnational dimension of the community that involved the members' multiple, complex and hybrid identities they inhabited, including the dyadic encounter between Pakistani national identity and Punjabi regional identity, religious (Muslim) identity and diasporic South Asian and Muslim identities. These were shared in their narratives, political discourses and cultural performances.

Although the concept of diaspora and transnationalism can be used interchangeably in this research, I chose transnationalism as a theoretical and an analytical framework to explore how the experience of maintaining ties has led to the creation of transnational identities and the formation of Kabyleness within the diaspora from a grassroot level. This involves both offline as well as online interactions such as family links in other nation states and daily activities such as regularly meeting fellows in cafés in London and/or joining the online chatting groups; transnational relations between Kabyles in the UK, and between the wider Kabyle digital diaspora. Moreover, this also includes links with non-Kabyle social actors who are transnationally engaged with the Kabyle culture and cause. Drawing on a transnational approach, this study aims to give some agency to the participants involved in this study, taking into account their own individual characteristics, multiple affiliations (social, cultural, political, secular, and/or religious) and transnational practices.

3.6 Digital Diaspora and Transnational Communities

In the Information Age, to borrow Castells (2010) language, networks constitute "the new social morphology of our societies" (Castells, 2010: 500). He notes that "global networks of instrumental exchanges selectively switch on and off individuals, groups, regions, and even countries, according to their relevance in fulfilling the goals processed in the network" (Ibid: 3). Here Castells suggests the ubiquity and the predominance of networked social relationships. Moreover, information communication technologies (ICT) are also useful to produce social, economic and cultural capital. The goal of the Kabyles involved in this study is to sustain an online presence and continuity of their ethnic identity, building a bridge between remote networks and face-to-face interactions. Therefore, following them closely in these sites offers a fine-grained understanding of their complex and sometimes contradictory identifications.

In his theorisation of the network society, Castells (2004) defines it as a global society "whose social structure is made of networks powered by micro-electronics-based information and communication technologies" (p. 3). The network society is characterised by two social forms: Spaces of flows and timeless time. The space of flows refers to "the technological organisational possibility of practising simultaneity (or chosen time in time-sharing) without contiguity… it is made of places connected by electronically powered communication networks" (p. 36). In this sense, the concept of space of flows interact with space of places (geographic countries and communities of everyday life made of networks) which are both the key themes of this research.

The growing ease of communication and the proliferation of social media platforms played a preponderant role in maintaining transnational and diasporic identities beyond the boundaries of nation-states. This thesis draws on theories on transnationalism and diaspora in light of digital communication and global connectivity. Accordingly, Vertovec (2004) argues that digital communication is the "social glue of transnationalism" (p. 219). In other words, ICT increased the possibilities for people to maintain transnational ties and extend their lived experiences beyond nation-states' borders. Academically, a plethora of studies has addressed the phenomenon of digital diasporas and ICT and their role in sustaining diasporic identities. For example, Brinkerhoff (2009), analysed nine digital diaspora organisations from US-based diasporas studies. She argued that digital diasporas can ease security concerns in both the homeland and the host society, improve diaspora members' quality of life in the host society and contribute to socio-economic development in the homeland.

By focusing on the digital dimension, I seek to offer a snapshot of Kabyle transnational/diasporic online presence and examine the role of these networks in facilitating and creating the link between online and offline spaces, showing how the world of the internet came to offer individuals the freedom to express themselves and assert a chosen identity. I will analyse how online-content sharing contributes to the development of Kabyleness as being negotiated, performed and redefined within a specific transnational social field, whose significance will be discussed in the next section.

3.7 Transnational Social Field and Bourdieu's Notions

This section draws on the transnational social field theory and explains how the social field in this thesis is viewed through the lens of a Bourdieusian framework. The combination of the two approaches is useful because it provides both the researcher and the reader with the ability to understand the tensions and struggles within the Kabyle community as part of the formation of a shared ethno-national identity in the UK. The meaning of Kabyleness to those who participated in my research varied based on their lived experiences and social characteristics that reflected to some extent their 'habitus'. The latter helped them to acquire cultural, social, economic and symbolic capital. In his study on a young Maranao woman called Soraya, Bentley (1987) applied Bourdieu's practice approach to ethnic-identity formation. His analysis revealed that Soraya "has struggled with a sense of ambivalent ethnicity, a feeling that she is neither here nor there but is instead liminal in a system of categorical identities" (p. 29). Further to Bentley's suggestion, I aim to engage Bourdieu's notions to explore Kabyle ethnic identity formation locally as new environment and transnationally involving both offline and online presence. In what follows, I will

first start with defining the transnational social field and then I will explain how I link it to Bourdieu's framework.

Scholars viewed border-crossing networking practices as constitutive of 'transnational social fields'. Basch, Glick-Schiller and Blanc (1994) conceptualised the term 'transnational social fields' to refer to "multi-stranded social relations that link places of origin and settlement" (p. 8). By heeding Bourdieu's notion of social field in transnational migration research and building on the suggestion of Basch, Glick-Schiller and Blanc, Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004) first define social field as "a set of multiple interlocking networks of social relationships through which ideas, practices, and resources are unequally exchanged, organized, and transformed" (p. 1009). According to Pries (2003), these spaces could be defined as "dense, stable, pluri-local and institutionalized frameworks composed of material artefacts, the social practices of everyday life, as well as systems of symbolic representation that are structured by and structure human life" (p.8). Faist (2000) notes that such spatial concepts "help to broaden the scope of migration studies to include the circulation of ideas, symbols, and material culture, not only the movement of people" (p. 13). Following Levitt and Schiller (2004:11) social field perspectives also reveal that there is a difference between what they call 'ways of being' as opposed to 'ways of belonging' in these spatialised configurations. While ways of *being* denote "actual social relations and practices that individuals engage in rather than identities associated with their actions", ways of belonging refer to "the practices that signal or enact an identity which demonstrates a conscious connection to a particular group" (Levitt and Shiller, 2004: 11). This latter encompasses concrete and deliberate actions such as wearing religious or ethnic symbols, eating a particular food, listening to certain music as signs of "identification with a particular ethnicity or with their ancestral homes" (ibid). However, following such practices does not always indicate the individual's conscious connection to a particular group as will be shown in chapter 5. Moreover, using online platforms shows how individuals are adopting new ways of *being* and *becoming*. For instance, they maintain strong family connections spanning sending and the receiving country; they are connected through frequent visits, sending remittances and British products to relatives in Algeria/Kabylia (clothing, sweets, electricals), sharing pictures, videos and articles with their fellow Kabyles in the UK, Algeria, France and elsewhere, engage online conversations and goods exchange. Building on this theoretical and analytical framework I relate to the Kabyle TSF as composed of both face-to-face and online interactions which give shape to a social formation akin to the model shown below.

Many of my research participants told me that soon after their arrival in Britain, they started to look for other Kabyles through social media or the grapevine. Such efforts may show their interest in seeking and maintaining ties with other Kabyles with whom they feel a shared sense of belonging. Many used Facebook to search for Kabyle organisations or communities, others said they went to areas in London where they expected to meet Algerians, such as Finsbury Park and Edgware Road which are known as popular with Algerian, North-African and Arab immigrants. Plastik (2007), suggested a model that he labelled: Transnational Immigrant Activities and Social Fields (See figure below). He claims that as immigrants engage in transnational activities, they build social fields that link together their country of origin and their country(ies) of settlement. He believes that the transnational social field can be conceived as the outcome of a series of interconnected and overlapping transnational economic, political and socio-cultural activities.



Figure 3-2 Plastik's (2007) model on Transnational Immigrant Activities

Based on Plastik's (2007) model of Transnational Social Field, I intend to extend the social field to the online dimension as Figure (3-3) shows:



Figure 3-3 The Kabyle TSF, adapted from Plastik's (2007) model

Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004) and Glick Schiller (2005) were the main scholars who extended Bourdieu's framework to engage with transnational fields. Social field, according to Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004), is "a powerful tool for conceptualizing the potential array of social relations linking those who move and those who stay behind" (p. 1009). Bourdieu (1986) indicates that the analysis of social field entails the ways in which an individual comes to establish a particular position in the social field that is constituted by their habitus, and where social relationships are structured by power. Based on Bourdieu's theory, Maton (2014) explicitly defines habitus

> "as a property of actors (whether individuals, groups or institutions) that comprises a "structured and structuring structure" (ibid.: 170). It is "structured" by one's past and present circumstances, such as family upbringing and educational experiences. It is "structuring" in that one's habitus helps to shape one's present and future practices. It is a "structure" in that it is systematically ordered rather than random or unpatterned. This "structure" comprises a system of dispositions which generate perceptions, appreciations and practices (Bourdieu 1990c: 53). (p. 50)

Therefore, individuals within the specific social field negotiate, adjust and navigate their positions through practices that they embody (habitus), that are "both individualistic and yet typical of one's social groups, communities, family, and historical position" (Oliver and O'Reilly, 2010: 14), according to their current circumstances. This helps us understand the dynamicity within the Kabyle TSF where there is a tension between an idealisation of Kabyleness on the one hand and conflicts and struggles to cohere and unify on the other.

The concept of field according to Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) involves "a set of objective, historical relations between positions anchored in certain form of power (or capital)" (p. 16). It is a dynamic space where social agents strategically compete to establish "monopoly over the capital effective in it" (Ibid: 17). Therefore, the positions of the individuals within the social field tend to depend on the possession of capital. This study acknowledges the hierarchy within the Kabyle TSF caused by the members' different socio-economic situation, immigration status and educational background. However, 'capital' in this thesis revolves mainly around Kabyleness and refers to what Kabyle participants consider as crucial resources to Kabyleness notably language, place of birth, genealogical affiliation, choice of clothing and jewellery, knowledge about Kabyle history, cooking skills, social conventions and traditions. Therefore, noting that Bourdieu did not engage directly with ethnicity, I look at the relevance of Bourdieu's notions to ethnic identity formation (Bently, 1987) in a transnational setting and in a relatively new migratory context, which is one of the contributions of this study. Using the notion of transnational social field and Bourdieu's concepts of field, habitus and capital help grasp and appreciate the diversity among the Kabyle community and their situationally different and interactive productions of Kabyleness.

3.7.1 Forms of Capital within the Social Field

Although the transnational phenomenon is not new, globalisation and technology have played a seminal role in the strengthening and maintenance of ties and connections between people and families across borders. Their multiple ties and practices contribute to the formation of transnational spaces and transnational experiences (Faist, 2000; Czaika and de Haas, 2015). According to Faist, "small household and family groups have a strong sense of belonging to a common home. A classic example for such relations is transnational families, who conceive themselves as both an economic unit and a unit of solidarity" (2006: 4). Therefore, Transnational families as well as transmigrants develop social fields which involve the exchange of capital (Levitt and Schiller, 2004) notably material, cultural and social and symbolic resources (Bourdieu, 1986).

In the context of this study, the transnational links between individuals involve economic, cultural, political, and symbolic resources (Van Amersfoort, 2007; Mügge, 2016). Bourdieu (1986) distinguishes three main forms of capital, where each one can be converted into another: cultural

capital, economic capital, and social capital through which individuals acquire power. Transnational social spaces can be great producers of social networks and social action in the context of migration facilitated by technological tools. The social actions are the product of the complex relationship between capital and habitus within specific fields. In short, the concept of Field, habitus and capital are useful to highlight the Kabyles' complex interactions and negotiations, multiple positions and navigations within multiple sites at different levels (micro, meso and macro).

Bourdieu migrated the term capital from economics to a "wider anthropology of cultural exchanges" and employed it in "a wider system of exchanges where assets of different kinds are transformed and exchanged within complex networks or circuits within and across different fields" (Moore, 2014: 99). As mentioned earlier, there are three forms of capital that I will introduce and explain how they are used in this research. First, cultural capital according to Bourdieu (1997) exists in three forms: institutional, objectified and embodied. Institutionalised cultural capital refers to educational qualifications and formal credentials. The second form refers to objects such as books, art works "that require specialised cultural abilities to use" (Swartz, 1997: 76). Finally, embodied cultural capital comes in the form of long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body. In other words, it refers to the habits of mind and body through which an individual succeeds and secures a position in different social fields. Cultural capital in this research focuses on the Kabyle cultural capital within the Kabyle TSF. This implies Kabyle origins, knowledge on history, traditions, geography, musical taste, food consumption (olive oil, couscous and vegetables), political and religious orientation. However, cultural capital in this research also encompasses the participants' cultural goods, lifestyle, taste, qualifications that themselves emphasised, and referred to as essential resources that helped them access social, cultural and economic fields in the new environment. Bourdieu indicates the interplay between forms, where for example cultural capital can be converted into economic capital. For instance, the Kabyles' mastery of foreign languages, musical instruments or even their cooking skills may allow them to access an economic market. Economic capital in Bourdieusian terms denotes money wealth. Before discussing the third form of capital, I want to indicate that

> "all three forms of capital are, for Bourdieu, symbolic: Every kind of capital (economic, cultural, social) tends (to different degrees) to function as symbolic capital (so that it might be better to speak in rigorous terms, of the symbolic effect of capital) when it obtains explicit or practical recognition. (Bourdieu 2000/1997, 242, cited in Grenfell, 2009: 20).

In other words, symbolic capital shows the degree of social recognition which results from one's possession of specific (or all) forms of capital in specific social field. For example, the possession of Kabyle objects and knowledge during Kabyle events organised in London can be regarded as the symbolic capital that one uses to assert and position oneself within the cultural organisation or any other social field as a 'proper' Kabyle individual. Finally, Bourdieu (1986) introduced the concept of social capital and defined it as "the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition" (p. 249). In other words, social capital refers to the privileges that arise from social relationships.

Coleman (1988) and Putnam (1993) have expanded the concept to include the relationships within families and communities, while emphasising the importance of trust and reciprocity in some social structures. Putnam (1993) suggests that social capital refers to "features of social organisations, such as networks, norms and trust that facilitate action and cooperation for mutual benefit. Social capital enhances the benefits of investment in physical and human capital" (p. 35). Moreover, Portes (1998) notes that social capital "… stands for the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures" (p. 6), where elements such as reciprocity and trustworthiness (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993) are included, and which are inherent in social and symbolic ties (Faist, 2004) explained above.

Three types of social capital are identified in the literature, notably bonding, bridging (Putnam, 1993) and linking capital (Woolcock, 2000). First, bonding capital refers to the ties between family members, close friends, and neighbours sharing similarities. Second, bridging capital refers to relationships between community based and external actors, "implying connections between people who share broadly similar demographic characteristic" (Woolcock, 2000: 10). Finally, linking capital refers to the relationships between individuals and institutions or other members outside their community that give them access to a wider range of resources, jobs, and other opportunities (Woolcock, 2000; Putnam, 2002; Hawkins and Maurer, 2010). For the purpose of this study, I draw on bonding and bridging and linking social capital to examine how these forms allow for the Kabyles' engenderment of their in-group identity (bonding); their own settlement and adaptation to the host society (bridging) and finally the relationship they maintain with externals and institutions such as the United Nation and the UNPO (Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation) to support their cause (linking). However, it is important to note the three forms of social capital overlap. For example, both bonding and bridging capital may serve immigrants to integrate to the receiving society, and the three forms can support the immigrants' in-group identities, as chapter 5 will show.

3.8 Conclusion

This chapter has laid out a range of conceptual frameworks which highlight the social constructivist approach that underpin this research. It will be used in the following chapters to show that these ethnic/national identities as well as ethnic/diasporic boundaries are constructed in social interactions and discourse, and in an ongoing process. While identities are multiple, complex and dynamic, they are also historically embedded and depend on context, time, space and circumstances. Moreover, this chapter sought to make a link between ethnicity, transnationalism, diaspora and Bourdieusian theoretical frameworks to help explore and analyse the Kabyles' ambivalent and complex negotiations of Kabyleness on different contexts and sites.

This chapter started by providing a general review of theories on transnationalism, diaspora, by focusing on the transnational social field, and the diasporic features that characterise the Kabyles involved in this study. It has shown that the Kabyle community in London/UK is transnationally connected through interactions and exchange within the realm of the cultural organisation, and through online platforms. This has allowed them to build a transnational social field, which involved various social positioning, contradictory perceptions and practices. This is related to the contextual background of the Kabyles' socio-historical circumstances and their migratory trajectories. Moreover, different forms of capital are generated through the establishment of new links and relationships with people of the same origin (Mügge, 2016), people of a shared sense of identification (Axel, 2002) and/or non-Kabyle social actors and institutions. This has allowed for the creation of a heterogeneous and diverse community in London and the UK. Their negotiations of their Kabyleness are contextual, with reference to social, cultural, political, religious/secular, linguistic and/or economic dimensions. In other words, Kabyles' ethnic identity is being situationally enacted according to the different sub-fields within the transnational social field. Therefore, this thesis assumes that a constructivist approach to ethnicity is useful to examine the Kabyles' negotiations of Kabyleness based on their habitus which Kabyle individuals exploit to manoeuvre through and navigate their complex and dynamic identifications and positions at a daily basis. This thesis, thus, argues that social capital, operating both offline and online, can be manipulated by immigrants to maintain in-group diasporic/transnational identity and secure a socio-economic adaptation to the host society, through their habitus. Moreover, this process is extended to reach the wider Kabyle diaspora in the online sphere through the creation of Facebook pages under labels such as The Kabyle community in London/UK, and by joining other pages belonging to Kabyles in Paris, Lyon, Montreal and New York.

In light of the theoretical framework discussed in this chapter, I will next explain the methodological approach adopted in this study.

Chapter 4 Methodology

Kabyle/Amazigh identity and language, currently experiencing a degree of recognition and revitalisation in Algeria, are being negotiated both as a public presence and at personal and domestic one in a relatively new migratory transnational setting. This has involved efforts to establish a cultural organisation in London. Therefore, the primary aim of this thesis is to explore and develop an ethnographic account of the Kabyle migrants complex, dynamic and situated negotiations of their Kabyleness in the UK within the transnational social field. To this end, this study selects the most appropriate methodological approach situated within the field of anthropology in order to address the research questions. I have employed ethnographic research methods notably participant observation, fieldnotes, (ethnographic) interviews, accompanied by digital ethnography as will be explained in this chapter.

4.1 Ethnography: within & among the Kabyle Transnational Community

This study relies on ethnographic research with the Kabyle community in a transnational setting. The fieldwork involved participant observation, production of fieldnotes (Bodgan and Biklen, 2003), interviews (Nyiri, 2002; Fitzgerald, 2004), ethnographic conversations (Rhodes, 2018), and visual methods (Marshall, 2006; Pink, 2015), for a period between 2016 and 2019. The combination of qualitative research methods has permitted a degree of triangulation of results and greater confidence in their validity (Kirk & Miller 1986; Turner et. al, 2015). Qualitative researchers study things in their ‘‘natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them’’ (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005: 3). Qualitative research methods have become popular in the last few decades in different disciplines within the social sciences (Bryman, 1994; Hoepfl; 1997; Denzin &Lincoln, 2011; Marshall, 2006). As opposed to quantitative methodology which refers to the use of ‘‘experimental methods and quantitative measures to test hypothetical generalizations’’ (Hoepfl, 1997), qualitative research is viewed as ‘‘any kind of research that produces findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other means of quantification’’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 17). The qualitative interpretive approach is suitable for this study because it has helped me to build a clear understanding about how my participants make sense of their ‘Kabyle’ identity alongside other identities during the organisation of events, in their everyday life and online. Furthermore, this study does not intend to make generalisations because any particular phenomenon will be interpreted and understood according to the meaning the participants assign to it, based on their past experiences and the context in which they live.

Having its roots in anthropology, ethnography is considered as the study of social interactions, behaviors, the group's perceptions, and assessing how people negotiate their place in the everyday (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007; Shah, 2017). Ethnography is defined as "an eclectic methodological choice that privileges an engaged, contextually rich, and nuanced type of qualitative social research, in which fine-grained daily interactions constitute the lifeblood of the data produced" (Falzon, 2015: 103). Moreover, according to Agar (2000) "ethnography is neither subjective nor objective but interpretive, mediating two worlds through a third" (p. 19). Hence, ethnographers are involved in direct and close engagement (Shah, 2017), with the people they are studying, to capture the dynamic nature of their experiences and responses to change through "a combination of field techniques" (Falzon, 2015: 103), notably, participation, observation, fieldnotes, interviews and ethnographic conversations (Rhodes, 2018). Furthermore, constant reflexivity and self-consciousness are required in ethnographic research (Davies, 1999; Luna, 2011; Wells et al, 2019), in addition to the cultural knowledge of those studied (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007).

4.2 Gaining Access

It was during the celebration of the Amazigh New Year (Yennayer) on 14th January 2017 that I first met the Kabyles of London formally. My access to the Kabyle 'community' was first through Facebook, via the page ''Les Kabyles de Londres''. I sought the approval from Nadia, the administrator of this group and a key gatekeeper (Creswell, 2014). I explained to her the aims of the research and she believed in my project and expressed her readiness to help me. She added me to the official page of the organisation called The Kabyle/Amazigh cultural organisation in London and invited me to their activities. Nadia helped me to gain access to the organisation by referring me to most of the members, who showed great respect to her**.** After she had introduced me to the audience as a researcher, I started approaching each one individually, trying to briefly explain my research topic. When they accepted to take part in my study, I took their contact details (Facebook accounts and emails), as I did not want to disturb their enjoyment. The next day, I started looking for their profiles on Facebook and sending them formal messages/emails though which I explained in more details the aim of the study and highlighted the ethics of the research, ensuring their anonymity and confidentiality and then asked for a possibility to meet for an interview. For those whom I did not have the chance to approach during the event, I contacted them via email and I attached the consent form and the participant information sheet before meeting them.

Being of Kabyle descent and having contacted the key gatekeeper, this saved me a lot of time, to the extent that I started the fieldwork right after obtaining the ethical approval from my university. I spent the period of my PhD journey continuously doing fieldwork, as a lot of events were taking place whether in the UK, France, or back in Algeria, which were important to my participants. I attended a total of eight events. They were organised to celebrate or commemorate Amazigh and Kabyle events such as Yennayer and the Berber Spring as well as the International Day of the Kabyle Dress and other informal gatherings in Kabyle cafés in London. The events often included Kabyles and Amazighs from North Africa as well as Europeans, involving a remarkable display of Kabyle objects such as the flag, pottery, literary books, musical instruments, food and Kabyle jewellery, dresses, and men's Burnus (a man's camel-hair cloak with hood, it is a popular piece of the Algerian clothing. See Figure 4-1). Because some events were male dominated and/or politically oriented, I could not attend them in person, but I was able, as well as other Kabyles and spectators, to watch them through shared live streaming on Facebook pages. I was following and observing the attendees' interactions, their reactions and comments. The organisation was my focal point, as it ensured my access to a maximum number of Kabyle members during the events organised. I made sure to keep contact with them to follow up conversations and interviews in separate meetings in London or other cities where they are based. In addition, I also maintained contact with them through online platforms, notably Facebook, Messenger and WhatsApp, where we often continued our conversations around current debates on Kabylia, the Kabyle people and language and identity.

Figure 4-1 Celebration of Yennayer. the men on the right is wearing a white *Burnous.*

4.3 Research Methods

4.3.1 Participant Observation

Observation is a highly important method in all qualitative inquiry (Marshall: 2006: 99) and fundamental to ethnographic methods as "it enables us to discover new ways of thinking about, seeing, and acting in the world… it ensures that we explore all aspects of the lives of the people we are working with, [and] recognize their interconnections" (Shah, 2017: 47). According to Shah, participant observation involves four basic aspects, including "long duration (long-term engagement), revealing social relations of a group of people (understanding a group of people and their social processes), holism (studying all aspects of social life[…]), and the dialectical

relationship between intimacy and estrangement (befriending strangers)" (p. 51). I formally started collecting data and conducting observation after the first event I attended in London. I started attending the events as a guest and later on as a guest and a participant, where I became more involved within the organisation and closer to its members. I started to feel more comfortable and welcome among them as I was able to participate in frequent, regular meetings and long rich conversations. The more time I spent with them, the more natural and richer our conversations became.

This first event within the Amazigh cultural organisation marked the beginning of my journey towards the exploration of the Kabyle 'community' in the UK. I found myself surrounded by people who claimed to share the same culture and to some extent the same origin (with reference to tribal ancestry), swaying between their Kabyle identity and other cultural identities. The observed diversity and sociocultural atmosphere created a fertile space for any anthropologist, sociologist or linguist to explore. Increasingly I thought about my own identity/ties and how I would be perceived before every meeting. I first wore casual outfits with Kabyle jewellery. However, I saw that most of the Kabyle women came to meetings wearing their Kabyle dresses, and realised how important this was for the president of the organisation who actually expressed her wish to see all of us wearing it. So, I started wearing my Kabyle dress that I had brought with me from Algeria. In most cases I went to meetings in the company of some Algerian Kabyle and non-Kabyle friends, who were also PhD researchers. This was partly because I was complying with gendered norms of propriety as a young single woman and partly because the events often finished late, and we could go back home together. Moreover, this also allowed for a discussion of the event afterwards, which helped me construct meaning, make sense of what I observed and also raised my awareness to particular instances that I might not have noticed on my own. Moreover, being an insider required more reflexivity and constant concentration to avoid taking anything for granted.

Participant observation was not only limited to moments shared among the Kabyles with the cultural organisation and during events. This method was also used when conducting interviews, and when tracking the participants online. As a participant observer, I have observed the participants' verbal and non-verbal behaviours in homes, in their domestic, everyday lives and during the events looking at their facial expressions, their reactions, interactions, and their attitudes towards the event and people present there. I was also interested in their clothing, jewellery and accessories, the music played, the instruments used and the type of food prepared, the way it was served and eaten. I made sure to keep every detail in my research fieldnotes.

4.3.2 **Fieldnotes**

Indispensable, complementary and crucial to observation, fieldnotes are viewed as "the written account of what the researcher hears, sees, experiences, and thinks in the course of collecting and reflecting on the data in qualitative study." (Bogdan and Biklen, 1982: 110-111). During the fieldwork, I was taking short notes while observing a phenomenon offline and on-line, while recording, or while listening to the recordings. This has helped me remember details or observations that were crucial to my research project. However, after leaving the fieldwork setting, it was important that I write a description of what I observed. In this respect, Lofland and Lofland (1999: 9) believe that notes "should be written no later than the morning after" (cited in Groenewald, 2004: 48). I first started taking notes during the first event, with my immense notebook. However, I realised that this denaturalised the setting and distracted the audience.

In the following event, I decided not take notes, but make a video of the whole event instead. Because everyone was holding a camera, my presence as a researcher with a camera did not disturb or distract them, knowing that I was introduced from the beginning of the event by Nadia seeking their consent. When I arrived there, I selected an angle from where I could capture everyone and everything. I was also using my phone from time to time, to keep some important notes. I was writing down my observations right after leaving the fieldwork. The latter included notes on the place, the guests, their behaviour, clothing, the objects available that were shared between them, and the language used. I wrote down an approximate number of the people present there, including children. Because the cafés were owned by Kabyle people, I was also making notes on the food on display in the shop windows. Observations and note taking were important during interviews as well, although, in most of the times, this was not very appropriate. It was important that I show my physical and emotional involvement to avoid any act that would interrupt the conversation and their flow of ideas. Ethnographers have pointed out the different forms of fieldnotes, such as headnotes. The latter refer to "the mental note of certain details and impressions… [which] remain "headnotes" until the researcher sits down at some later point to write full fieldnotes about these scenes and events" (Emerson, Fretz and Shaw, 2011:24). In addition to the notes that I was taking, there were also some notes that remained in my head. I was converting these headnotes, as they became more meaningful when I was discussing my topic with friends, my supervisors, or when I was taking audio notes and coding the data.

4.3.3 **Digital Ethnography**

> **"**As ethnography goes online, it is clear that [the] sociological fascination continues"
>
> (Murthy, 2008: 839)

Understanding this specific group of people also involved digital methods of collecting data, which became an important and an enriching source of data. Collecting digital data goes back to the early practice of ethnography, with Bronislaw Malinowski suggesting the importance of "collecting artefacts, taking photographs, making lists, documenting habits, drawing maps and much more besides" (O'Reilly 2005: 157). According to Marshall (2006) ''visual anthropology or film ethnography…relies on visual representations of the daily life of the group under study'' (p. 120). These visual aspects include pictures, photographs, videos, flags, maps, or media production (websites, signs, pamphlets) (Pink, 2013). For the purpose of this study, pictures, photographs and videos are essential because they reflect the participants' everyday interactions and practices on identity-related issues. Moreover, Pink et al (2015) believe that "digital ethnographers will sometimes find that the social worlds they are researching will experience dramatic changes over a short period of time. In some cases, they may even witness the birth of a new social world while in the field" (p. 111). Indeed, the protests that took place in Algeria (22 February 2019 and onward, see chapter 2) were shared on Facebook, creating an open space for debates and interactions. Therefore, those events served as great stimulus topic for conversations about identity.

Furthermore, my participants' representation is portrayed through their use of objects and photographs shared whether during events, at home or online. However, visual data would not ensure anonymity (O'Reilly, 2005). In terms of the videos or pictures I took during the events, or my participants have shared with me, I made sure to have their consent. In cases where I could not contact those in the pictures, I made sure to blur or hide their faces and names on the screenshots I used in my research. For the Facebook posts most of them are available in public pages which means the researcher has access to them without obtaining express permission. However, this has become subject to different discussions and introduced as problematic. Many scholars have raised the issue of the ethicality of collecting data from the public online platforms, because of the 'invisibility' of the ethnographer or observer, where their presence is viewed as not neutral (Dicks et al., 2005) and passive, especially if they do not interact overtly with them (Murthy, 2008). Hence, I made sure to mark my presence and involvement in the Messenger group chats and Facebook pages to remind participants of my presence and research.

4.3.4 **Online Participant Observation**

My participant observation continued on social media channels, where I remained in constant contact with participants, and observed their cultural practices and productions over the course of my ethnographic fieldwork. Many of the videos or pictures shared online served as great

introductory or stimulus topics for very interesting ethnographic face-to-face and online conversations with my participants. Therefore, this study's research design also relied on online ethnographic fieldwork to answer the question that relates to how participants involved in this research negotiate their identities within the transnational social field, and how they use online platforms to navigate the complexities in the process of sustaining their Kabyleness.

I kept an eye on my participants' practices, by joining the different group/community Facebook pages they were following. Because the online world is unlimited and because of the ethical issues around it, I decided to restrict my observations to my participants' practices and interactions during the events, where I was taking pictures and videos with the consent of the audience. I used also the pictures my participants were sharing with me and sending to me via WhatsApp or Facebook. Though, many of them were concerned about not sharing them on Facebook, but happy to be used for research purposes.

As cited earlier in this thesis, the online space encompassed pages of different and varied aims notably the Facebook official page of the Amazigh/Kabyle cultural organisation, Kabylia News, *Les Kabyle de Paris* (which is very actively used by Kabyle community in France and globally), *Sais-tu*? *Version Kabyle*, and National Geography Kabyle, and many other pages and other politically oriented pages such as *Siwel agence d'information* and the official page of the MAK- Anavad coordination in London, to which I was added by one of my participants. In these pages, I usually found my participants interacting by either liking, commenting or sharing posts, where I was myself taking part as both a personal user and a researcher. The rich data collected from social media has offered a broader image of community engagement and provided evidence of how identity issues are discussed and negotiated online and shared between the Amazigh or rather the Kabyle diaspora.

Therefore, I constantly collected secondary sources, notably, images and screenshots of the Kabyles' reactions to posts in relation to the study's aim, that is identity negotiation and (re)construction. The screenshots were saved in my phone. During the conversion of the fieldnotes into texts and the thematic analysis process, I referred to those notes and pictures either by printing them out or sending them to my university email, and saved them in a folder. When analysing the screenshots, it was important to look for explanations from my participants' own perspectives, that were found in interviews and vice versa. That is, sometimes explanations to the themes that emerged in interviews were discussed further online through posts, comments and pictures. However, this is not a linear process, as sometimes online-related matters were naturally brought up in interviews by my participants because they were 'hot topics' and part of their daily conversations. Online platforms in this study have allowed me to engage closer with the Kabyle virtual 'community' in their everyday online activities. However, this required that I

become more careful about my online behaviour for being a personal user and a follower of those pages. That is, I was paying more attention to my comments and my interactions in different pages.

4.3.5 Interviews and Conversations

In order to understand my participants' stakes in identity issues, I conducted regular conversations and a series of interviews with many of them. Moreover, one special aim, which I felt I was committed to, was to understand their feeling of 'rejection' or "contempt" (Collyer, 2008) that has been claimed repeatedly by many participants, and that I have observed in many of the Kabyles' posts and comments online, especially on Facebook pages and YouTube. I have dealt with the interviews as a source of information as well as topics of enquiry themselves, through which meaning was constructed and negotiated (Denzin, 2001).

According to Márquez Reiter (2018), interviews are "interactionally achieved social occasions where participants position themselves with respect to the interactional roles they assume throughout the encounter and the stances they take relative to one another" (in Patiño-Santos and Márquez Reiter, 2018: 6-7). Qualitative interviewing allows researchers to investigate 'the way in which people being studied understand and interpret their social reality' (Bryman, 1998: 8). The informants' personal experiences and life stories were tape-recorded, using biographical interviews and ethnographic conversations. During the interviews, I made sure not to interrupt my participants when discussing topics and/or developing the story they were telling me (Berger, 2013). However, I tried to guide the conversation to avoid any diversion irrelevant to the topic while recording. Sometimes, they asked me not to record when they thought they were telling me something too personal, such as their opinions toward current and politically divisive issues. Moreover, the majority, if not all, of my participants are multilinguals (Tamazight, Arabic, French and English). Hence, they were free to speak the language they wanted to express themselves with, where in some cases, all the languages were mixed in a single conversation. This gave an original and special flavour to their discourse, sometimes determined and sometimes contradictory, which subsequently implied new dimensions and themes to the research. The place and the duration of the interviews varied from one participant to another, depending on their profiles and availability. I went to their place of settlement mainly in London and in other cities such as Portsmouth, Northampton, and Canterbury. London and specifically the cultural organisation are important sites in this research, through which I could know and meet my participants. Not all my interviews were recorded. In some cases, it was the participants' will, and in other cases it was the settings' constraints. Hence, I was conducting ethnographic

conversations, trying to take short notes on my phone from time to time, and then relying on my memory to take notes after our meeting, usually on the coach on my way home.

My first recorded meeting was at Lyly's home. She invited me to lunch and insisted on preparing a 'Kabyle Couscous', which seemed to be very meaningful to her. The other tape-recorded meetings were in cafés, London streets and in a university café. My first meetings were meant to break the ice and make my participants feel comfortable by initiating introductory conversations. I also took the initiative to prepare Kabyle bread for some of them to express my thankfulness. Thereafter, I organised other meetings with them during which I developed the questions and discussions further in order to meet the research aim. When I started with the process of coding and generating themes, I still met and conducted interviews and conversations, whether face to face or through messages on Messenger and WhatsApp. Hence, my questions were sometimes shaped by those themes, as I needed more explanations and clarifications on topics that we did not have the time to elaborate in our previous meetings.

4.4 The Participants

According to Dörnyei, the main aim of sampling in qualitative research is "to find individuals who can provide rich and varied insights into the phenomenon under investigation so as to maximize what we can learn" (2007: 126). To reach the aim of the study, I used purposive sampling, which consisted of selecting participants with specific and diverse profiles, such as their migration trajectories and their socio-economic status. This has offered a rich data with varied perspectives and understandings. The participants involved in this study are of different ages, immigration status, educational, social and economic backgrounds but they share what they call a common origin and a shared culture. I had access to Kabyle events' organisers, singers, and guests, with whom I discussed topics around Algeria, Kabylia, identity, language, politics, and religion. The majority of those whom I contacted were very responsive and accepted enthusiastically to take part in the study. However, it is necessary to note that while some of the participants did not accept to participate without giving any motives, others just disappeared. I managed to meet approximately twenty participants. A total of ten remained active and responsive to my research and I spent more time with them based on their availability and enthusiasm. In other words, this allows an approach to the notion of identity that draws on varied elements and social categories, notably gender, age, ethnicity, language, educational background and others. The participants involved here came to know each other through the cultural organisation and the virtual environment. They created a Facebook group chat and they added the organisation members, to which I was added and where I was also interacting with them. There, they raised issues about Kabylia and Kabyles either living in Kabylia or in the UK and who needed help, they planned for

events, as well as informal gatherings. For ethical purposes, the names provided in this study are pseudonyms. The latter were chosen by either my participants or I intentionally chose them to reflect upon their attitudes (their degree of attachment to and involvement in politics and history). I made sure to check the chosen names with my participants. The following profiles are the main participants on which the analysis presented in this thesis is based.

Table 1 Research participants

Name	Age	Migration trajectory and length of stay in the UK	Status	Length of stay in the UK
Nadia	44	Kabylia—UK	Self-employed	28 years
Uncle Saïd	elderly	Kabylia-Algiers-UK	Self-employed	More than 30 years
Numidia	22	UK	Student	UK-born
Lyly	36	Kabylia—UK	Employed	12 years
Tamazight	24	France—UK	Student	7 years
Nadir	32	Kabylia-Algeria-Turkey-UK	Employed	6 years
Mr. Mohand	elderly	Kabylia-Algiers-UK	Professor	More than 30 years
Ricky	elderly	Kabylia—UK	Self-employed	More than 30 years

Anazâr	50	Kabylia-UK-France-UK	Employed/political fervent/musician in his free time	21 years
Leïla	33	Kabylia-Algiers-UK	employed	2 years
Ramy	27	Kabylia-UK	Employed	3 year
Amazigh	Middle-aged	Kabylia-UK	Employed/Musician in his free time	More than 20 years
Adam	27	Kabylia-UK	Student	2 year
Melissa	27	Kabylia-France-UK	Student	4 years
Sila	29	Kabylia-UK	Student	4 years
Jughurtha	35	Kabylia-Algiers-Spain-London-Spain	Musician	3 years

4.5 Reflexivity and Positionality

Reflexivity "urges us to explore the ways in which a researcher's involvement with a particular study influences, acts upon and informs such research" (Nightingale and Cromby, 1999: 228). After the 20th century onward, researchers in anthropology and sociology shifted their interest and focus from the strange to familiar settings, by conducting their research 'at home', looking at "their own culture, gender, religions, residential and ethnic backgrounds' (Hockey, 1993: 201). Moreover, Shaw (2018) believes that being an insider involves being "simultaneously an onlooker in the stalls and a member of the cast" (p. 10). Anthropological studies have often raised the question of the role of the researcher, where the latter negotiate their position as an insider, outsider or both, pointing out the challenges encountered.

Myriad field researchers' accounts have demonstrated the advantage of the insider and how this has allowed them to conduct their study (Abu-Lughod, 1988; Hill Collins, 1990; Fonow and Cook, 1991; Berger, 2013). For example, Abu-Lughod (1991) believes that "the outsider self never simply stands outside. He or she stands in a definite relation with the Other of the study" (p. 468). However, studying one's own society requires reflexivity, as it involves some restrictions, challenges and ambiguities as described by Abu-Lughod. She has pointed out the challenges that an insider faces in relation to the "feeling of betrayal", where a researcher thinks that they are using "the knowledge of the individual for purposes beyond friendship" (Ibid). In my case, I felt concerned about my participants' confidentiality. I was also worried about writing down all the contradictions I observed among my participants and how to translate them into text without having the impression of gossiping about them, and to some extent disappointing them when they read my work.

After having first met Nadia and attended the first event on the commemoration of the Berber Spring in April 20th, 2016, I became emotionally close to her and other members because I myself identify as an Algerian Kabyle woman and understand their desire to maintain their Kabyle identity. In addition, whenever I saw those Kabyle faces, the atmosphere that was full of nostalgic moments as they reminded me both of my family in Oran and my yearly summers spent in Kabylia, when I used to visit my family there and attended the different wedding parties. I considered it useful to be part of the community I was studying because this helped me to understand and interpret the attendees' behaviour and also place it in the social conventions that govern the Kabyle community. Using my cultural knowledge and intuition (Berger, 2013) was useful in understanding and reacting to their behaviour.

However, my position is also a challenge. The researcher's position has a great impact on the research outcome and result. Being a Kabyle person gave me an easy entry to the Kabyle community in London, to the extent that some of the Kabyle women invited me to their houses for lunch, tea and even to spend some time with them. During interviews, I realised that many were asking me about myself, and my interest in the Kabyles in the UK, especially that I was born and raised in a place which is 700 km far from Kabylia. They kept telling me that it was a pleasure to meet a Kabyle person, and a woman, who was 'preserving her identity'. They often compared me to their cousins or people they know who moved to Algiers, but decided to become 'Arabised'. Building trust in an ethnographic study is very important. Because the researcher spends time with their participants, it is important to build real relationships with them, where mutual trust is essential. Nonetheless, my ethnicity did not ensure an unrestricted access to everyone because of

different factors related to my age, gender, student status, birthplace in a non-Kabyle-speaking community, and my physical appearance as a veiled woman, that was often highlighted. While some of them viewed the hadscarf as a personal choice, others emphasised that it did not suit their Kabyle identity and culture. In addition to my personal character, as sometimes I could not hide or avoid my personal opinion on particular 'political or religious' question, where I found it necessary that I show my position from the beginning. Those elements have an impact on the process of sharing, constructing and producing knowledge. Therefore, I found myself between two poles: my 'insiderness' and my outsider perspective sometimes moved back and forth.

For instance, the part that I was seen as an insider could facilitate and complicate things. I could save time in gaining access and having longer conversation with participants, because they assumed that I could understand some details without going deeper. For example, when talking about matters of family issues and traditions, they usually said: "you know how it works in Kabylia; you know how the situation is; you know how we think and see things". At the same time, it was apparent that participants occasionally preferred to avoid talking about some details to manage the impression they wanted me to have of them. For example, in some cases, I met participants who had distanced themselves from the Kabyle world and preferred to adopt the host society's lifestyle. In consequence, the latter were frequently unwilling to talk about their new perceptions to me 'as an insider' and a veiled woman, especially when their new practices would not match with their community's conventions, rules and principles and more specifically when such practices violated or did not conform with cultural or religious traditions. Thus, they were more selective and tried to say what they think I was expecting to hear, for fear of judgement and misunderstanding. Those participants might have felt freer to talk about their beliefs, perceptions and convictions with an outsider. On the other hand, there were others who meant to talk about their new practices and how important this was for their integration to the host society, in addition to their enjoyment of the comfortable circumstances the host society was providing. Moreover, the educational background, gender, age, the immigration and socio-economic status of a number of my participants had an impact on or shaped in a way the first meetings and conversations I had with them. In one of my meetings with a professor, he asked me about my research aims and objectives, my research questions and gave me instructions as to how I should approach my participants and deal with the data. Many of them were highly educated, and even those who have not completed a university degree, knew history by heart, with relevant dates and names especially the Algerian revolution. Sometimes, it was important to position myself as a researcher and find a way in order to lead the interview and not the other way round.

Finally, there was a distinction in terms of the feelings that I have when I interview participants who have an illegal immigration status. Kabyle British citizens tended to talk with confidence and

ease. Whereas the undocumented Kabyles lacked something (maybe family, power), which was noticeable in their watery eyes, gestures and intonation, often leaving a complex emotional mixture of fragility, nostalgia, love, regrets and remorse. My presence was useful, because they started telling me everything about themselves. I felt that they found someone to talk to, confide in and say things that they could not share with others.

4.6 Analytical Framework

Qualitative analysis is used by researchers to develop theories, code the data and identify themes by studying documents, recordings and other printed and verbal material (Attride Stirling, 2001; Corbin and Strauss, 1990). Bogdan and Biklen define qualitative data analysis as "working with data, organizing it, breaking it into manageable units, synthesizing it, searching for patterns, discovering what is important and what is to be learned, and deciding what you will tell others" (1982: 145, cited in Hoepfl: 1997). Merriam (2009) defines data analysis as “the process of making sense out of the data. And making sense out of the data involves consolidating, reducing, and interpreting what people have said and what the researcher has seen and read-it is the process of making meaning” (p. 175-176). The raw material for qualitative data may be any form of fieldnotes, interview scripts, photographs (Denscombe, 2007), communication which can usually be written materials (textbooks, novels, newspapers, e-mail messages); in addition to other forms of communication such as music, pictures, or political speeches that may also be included (Marshall, 2006: 108).

During the analysis of data, there are different possible reasoning to be adopted. There is an inductive reasoning, a deductive reasoning or an abductive reasoning (Braun & Clark, 2006; Sappleton, 2013). Deductive approach begins with theories that are tested against new data. Inductive approach generates theory out of data (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011: 5). Finally, the abductive reasoning refers to the back-and-forth movement between different stages of analysis (Sappleton, 2013). For the purpose of this study, a combination of inductive- deductive reasoning was adopted throughout the analysis process (Fereday & Muir Cochrane, 2006). Marriam argues that “data analysis is a complex process that involves moving back and forth between concrete bits of data and abstract concepts, between inductive and deductive reasoning, between description and interpretation (p. 175-176). For example, I attended a talk organised in our faculty, and while listening to the speaker, I was thinking of my data. Based on the references the presenter was sharing, I realised that I could analyse one aspect of my data accordingly.

Furthermore, in order to analyse the qualitative data collected, it is necessary to consider some tools that might be of help in addition to the theoretical models, this why thematic analysis is used in conjunction with narrative analysis (Riessman, 2008). It is important to note that this process is preceded by the act of transcription, translation and organisation, of the data.

4.6.1 Transcription, Translation, Organisation of Data and Coding

Transcribing the data refers to the process of converting audiotape recordings into text data, including notes taken during observation (Creswell, 2012). For the purpose of this study, I used what Elliott (2005) called 'cleaned transcripts'. The latter focus on the "content of what was said…[and] makes the material easy to read" (p. 52), by excluding any pauses, laughter, etc. For example, I removed fillers like: overuse of you know, emm, like. Moreover, according to Taylor (2001): "a transcript…constructs a certain version of the talk or interaction which is to be analysed. This does not, of course, mean that it is false or misleading but simply that it is not neutral. The process of transcription selects out the features which the analyst has decided are relevant, that is what the analyst counts as data" (p. 38). Knowing that 'the 'same' stretch of talk can be transcribed very differently, depending on the investigator's theoretical perspective, methodological orientation, and substantive interest' (Riessman, 2008: 29).

The interviews were conducted in Kabyle, English, French, and most of the time a mixture of the three languages with some Arabic. I transcribed the entire interviews right after each meeting with my participants. Then, I translated them to English. Occasionally, I asked my mum or Kabyle friends to help with the understanding of Kabyle words I did not know. Sometimes I asked my participants for synonyms in French or Arabic and then translated them to English.

I have printed and organised the data collected from the different sources in three different coloured plastic folders labelled as follows:



Figure 4-2 Illustration of how I organised the data collected.

For the analysis, and during the process of coding and identification of themes, I took both the original and the translated version into consideration. During this process, I paid attention to what my participants said and the way they used languages, and how this matched or contradicted with their claims, their views and attitudes towards particular issues. Sometimes their claims on the recorded versions contradicted with what they did, or shared on their online space. Our contradictory behaviour does not necessarily reflect what we really think, because sometimes external forces have great impact on the way we act. In the meantime, while transcribing I had my notebook next to me, which reminded me of instances on non-verbal cues such as facial expressions performed by my participants that were relevant for the understanding, the analysis and the interpretation of a given phenomenon. I always kept notes on the contradictions and the complexities I observed and elaborated what Geertz (1973) called 'thick description'.

Technology has made myriad software packages available to qualitative researchers, allowing them to manipulate the data (Weitzman, 2000). Though, many ethnographers still use 'traditional' analytical strategies (Delamont, 2007). I first used the software Nvivo, as it seemed very useful to me. I started uploading all my transcribed interviews and even my theoretical chapters, creating memos within which I copied my fieldnotes. It was useful as it saved me time when looking for similar codes among different participants and creating queries. However, I felt more comfortable in doing them manually to better familiarise myself with the data (Braun& Clarke, 2012). I read the interviews, both versions, line by line and I was underlining and highlighting interesting and relevant sentences and single words. On the right-hand side of the paper, I wrote succinct and short codes. Then, I looked for similar codes in the interviews and

grouped them together in order to generate a theme. At the same time, I triangulated this with the data obtained from my fieldnotes. For the online data, I constantly kept an eye on my participants' online practices and took screenshots whenever I came across relevant posts to my research aim and sometimes to the theme that emerged from my analysis of interviews and fieldnotes. Similarly, when I was writing the section on the Kabyle cultural movement and while reading the interviews through, I took into account the different sources from which I retrieved data.

4.6.2 Thematic Analysis

Thematic analysis is an analytic tool for qualitative research that "seeks to unearth the themes salient in a text at different levels" (Attride-Stirling, 2001: 387). Thematic analysis involves the identification of patterns or themes in the data (Braun and Clarke, 2006), followed with "rich and logical explanation[s]" (Sappleton, 2013: 175). Thematic analysis should not be viewed as a linear process, where a hybrid inductive-deductive (or abductive) reasoning is necessary at this stage (Fereday & Muir Cochrane, 2006). Moreover, the process encompasses a number of steps. I began with reading through and familiarising myself with the textual data, to generating codes, to identifying themes and finally to revealing the themes, interpreting them and coming up with the report (Guest, Mac Queen & Namey, 2012; Braun& Clarke 2012). As mentioned earlier, transcription consists of some conventions that researchers should carefully take into account during the process. For example, the respondents "emotional overtones can be crucial with regard to the real meaning of the message, and for this reason relevant international contours and emphases are often indicated in the script by using punctuation marks, upper case lettering, underlining, or emboldening" (Zoltan Dörnyei 2007: 247). However, for the purpose of this study, only some elements were taken into account such as the participants' emotional reaction.

4.6.3 Narrative Analysis

As complementary to thematic analysis, narrative analysis was used to analyse the small stories that emerged in the interviews in order to understand how the Kabyle communicated and sometimes contextually made sense of themselves, their lives, their identity and migration (Bochner and Riggs: 2014). According to De Fina (2013), "Narratives are texts that recount events in sequential order" De Fina (p. 11). They can emerge during the data collection process in interviews and casual conversations. In addition, they can be found in written forms, such as diaries, letters, or textual data. In the case of this study, the Kabyles' narratives were shared during interviews and informal conversations, online chatting spaces such as Messenger and WhatsApp and through their short posts on Facebook pages.

Narrative analysis is an interpretive method emerging as a rejection of positivist and post-positivist social science (Andrews, Squire and Tamboukou, 2013). De Fina argues that narrative analysis "has focused more and more on the processes of negotiation of identities, on the strategies used by narrators to engage and influence their audiences" (cited in Hua, 2016: 333). Moreover, narratives are used to understand social and historical phenomena. Hence, by using narrative analysis, I identified common stories around similar themes and looked for similarities and differences within the same theme. In other words, by conducting narrative analysis mixed with thematic analysis, the focus is on the form and the content, on the 'what' is said and the 'how' of the conversation (Presser, 2005).

4.7 Trustworthiness

Trustworthiness is very important in qualitative research. Credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability have been described as key criteria that ensure the rigour of qualitative findings (Guba, 1981; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Moreover, multiple strategies can be adopted in order to ensure each of the trustworthiness criterion. First of all, credibility is defined as the confidence that can be put in the truth of the research findings (Holloway and Wheeler, 2013). According to the research needs, credibility can be obtained through prolonged engagement and triangulation. The prolonged engagement in field of research, which is also viewed as a strategy to maintain reflexivity (Berger, 2013), involves full immersion into the community in order to understand the others experiences (Bitsch, 2005). I invested most of my PhD period in seeing my participants, by attending their events, meeting them for formal and informal conversations, in addition to my continuous interaction with them online. Triangulation, on the other hand, includes different types, notably, investigator triangulation, theoretical triangulation, methodological triangulation and data triangulation (Denzin & Giardina, 2016). Triangulation of data was the most suitable for this study. During the process of analysis, I combined the data obtained through different method tools to provide a holistic and a comprehensive image of the Kabyles in the UK. Second, transferability is analogous to generalisability in quantitative research. In contrast, transferability, in qualitative research, aims to provide enough description of the research and the participants elucidating the whole process from the start to the end. This gives the reader a more detailed picture of the study that helps them understand the context and may find some similar situations to theirs or identify themselves with and/or fit it within other contexts (Guba, 1981). This what Geertz (1973) has termed 'thick description', claiming that:

> "The point for now is only that ethnography is thick description. What the ethnographer is in fact faced with —except when (as, of course, he must do) he

> is pursuing the more automatized routines of data collection— is a multiplicity of complex conceptual structures, many of them superimposed upon or knotted into one another, which are at once strange, irregular, and inexplicit, and which he must contrive somehow first to grasp and then to render" (p. 6)

Geertz here refers to thick description as the product that comes from the observing participants and taking notes process and recorded interviews. He refers to the responsibility of the ethnographer in objectively reporting any complexities and contradictions. While conducting my fieldwork, I made sure to keep notes on every detail. My notebooks were accompanying me in every stage and every time. I felt as if I was continuously conducting fieldwork. Next, dependability refers to the consistency of results. It is viewed as "the stability of findings over time" (Bitsch, 2005: 86) and involves the discussion or the research process and the findings with other members in order to ensure that they are supported by data obtained from the participants of the study (Cohen et al, 2011). Given the fact that my participants lived busy lives, I thought that it would not be appropriate to give them the transcripts to read. Though, in our frequent meetings, I showed them some passages or mentioned what they had said before in order to elaborate more on it. In addition, it is essential to keep consistency in the philosophical assumptions across the whole research and maintain reflexivity. Finally, confirmability is a criterion through which the researcher makes sure that the results are reflections of the participants themselves and that this can be confirmed by other researchers. In other words, confirmability can be achieved through audit trail, reflexive journal and triangulation (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).

This step consisted of my discussions with other PhD students in the same department, during seminars, workshops and colloquiums. I also discussed my work with my flatmates who were from other disciplines, but were keen to listen and provide feedback. Besides, I presented parts of my research in conferences in the UK and outside the UK, aiming to gain more confidence, and feedback from other scholars and PhD students in similar area of research and interest. In addition, as Merriam and Tisdell (2016), argue "to a large extent, the validity and reliability of a study depend upon the ethics of the investigator" (p, 260). This will be discussed in the next section.

4.8 Ethical Considerations

According to Cohen et al (2007), "the researcher is a member of a research community, and this brings ethical responsibilities" (p. 75). My access to the Kabyle community as well as the methods used for collecting data, notably interviews; observation and visual methods have followed the University of Southampton's ethical guidelines. After having the approval, the participants

involved were provided with a consent form to sign before getting involved in the interview, and in some cases I had a verbal consent (see Appendix A for the Consent Form). I also asked my participants' consent to use their online data. Orton-Johnson (2010) believes that for "some online research settings informed consent poses an ongoing ethical challenge which demands reflexive attention to the role and identity of the researcher and to the relationships with research participants and other users of the online space(s)". Hence, taking into account those ethical issues, I decided to narrow down my focus to the activities produced by my participants, either on their personal profiles and spaces and/or on other Kabyle pages. Because I was following them, their comments and activities were coming up on my page. In addition to this, I sought their consent for the use of their personal data when it was related to particular topics such as religion. Moreover, during the transcription process I made sure to anonymise personal information, although some of them preferred to keep their real names.

4.9 Conclusion

This chapter has located this ethnographic study within its methodological framework. It justified the choice of a qualitative and interpretive approaches, the methodology and the methods used. This study has relied on different tools for the collection of data, notably observations, notes-taking, digital ethnography and interviews, taking into accounts their narratives and lived experiences. The latter were very important to understand their transnational lives and identity formation processes. Moreover, the triangulation of data has allowed for an openness to the different identity facets displayed by my Kabyle participants across the different spaces I have been interacting in. My research participants have been anonymised through the use of chosen pseudonyms, that for most of the cases represented their cultural and/or political activism and attitudes towards their Kabyleness as will be shown in the next chapter on the participants' biographical narratives.

It has been crucial to make my position clear from the start, by highlighting the advantages and challenges encountered as an insider and an outsider. Furthermore, this chapter has discussed the analytical framework adopted in this study which combines thematic and narrative analysis. I considered the trustworthiness criterion of qualitative research and finally explained my approach to research ethics.

Chapter 5 Kabyles' Biographical Narratives

5.1 Introduction

In a globalised world, the diversity and multiplicity of identities have increased in societies everywhere, referencing the involvement of individuals and their agency in different contexts and settings, the increase of personal and communal mobility, or the growth of transnational linkages and networks. Individuals seek to navigate their multiple identities through their choices, everyday experiences and interactions with others, whether of the same or different cultural, social and/or economic status. This chapter offers an insight into my main 10 participants' lived experiences based on their narratives and my ethnographic notes. In doing so, I will provide a description of the informants' perceptions, and positions vis-à-vis different issues they have raised, showing the entanglement of ethnicity, gender, religion and language among Kabyle transnational migrants.

The participants involved in this study all share a common feature which is their Kabyle activism. As will be seen, they nevertheless express this differently, foregrounding either cultural, social, political and/or economic symbols and practices. These differences are related to their North-African socio-economic and cultural background, lived experiences, linguistic repertoire, gender, religious and/or political affiliation, in addition to their different migratory trajectories. Riessman (2003) believes that the "truths" of narrative accounts are [...] in the shifting connections [storytellers] forge among past, present, and future. They offer storytellers a way to re-imagine lives" (p. 6). Every participant's story and experience are different—although they may converge at some point—regarding their viewpoints and their circumstances. I had the opportunity to meet more than 20 participants, 10 of whom remained actively involved, with a varied frequency of interaction suited to their availability. I purposely selected individuals with different profiles in order to show the diversity within the Kabyle community. Additionally, I include voices from other participants who have been less engaged because of the nature of their jobs and other commitments but whose viewpoints, comments and online activities were still relevant to this research project. As I have not collected sufficient information about them, I will briefly introduce them in the next chapters.

The Kabyle participants' own biographical narratives, individual characteristics, and lived experiences (both in Algeria and, more importantly, in the UK and online) point towards the factors that shape their ethnic, cultural, political, and professional identities in the UK and at a transnational level. Prior to the creation of the cultural organisation, maintaining ties with the Kabyles in the UK as well as the wider Kabyle diaspora was crucial to my participants' socio-

economic status as newcomers, given the newness of the British environment and the reduced number of Kabyle and Algerian immigrants in this country. However, creating and joining the Kabyle cultural organisation and a corresponding online page, was important in producing and then converting different forms of capital (Bourdieu, 1986), to not only alter their economic situations but also to sustain their Kabyleness transnationally. Below is a diagram (5-1) describing my respondents' local and transnational social fields, involving multiple interwoven networks/fields of social relationships. Here, individuals are connected through ideas and practices to negotiate meanings, stances and positions as Kabyle transmigrants. These networks also facilitate the production of different forms of capital, as this thesis will further show.



Figure 5-1 Kabyle Transnational Social Field.

Based on the key participants' narratives, their different interests, position and their actual practices within multiple fields, the three following ethnographic chapters will aim to answer the following questions:

1. How is Kabyleness negotiated and constructed in a British setting and within the Kabyle TSF?

2. How do the Kabyles' lived experiences in the UK influence their perceptions towards their identities? In what ways does the British environment contribute in the formation of Kabyleness?
3. How do Kabyles in London/UK use the cultural organisation and online platforms to negotiate their ethnic identity and navigate its complexities?

My participants expressed satisfaction regarding their comfortable life and economic success in the UK after a long time of hard work and dedication. Coming to the UK allowed them to build a new identity and influence perceptions of the place they come from. This also enabled them escape the prejudices and stereotypes Algerian migrants suffered in France, including their stereotyping as "l'Arabe": The Arab who is perceived within the French society as "inferior" or "lazy" in addition to the worldwide post-2001 stereotype that associate the Arab/Muslim with international terrorism (Rosello, 1994; Leal, 2012).

The arrival of my Kabyle participants and their journey to the UK differs from one participant to another. Although access to the UK was not administratively complicated in the past, Algerians still preferred to go to France as their primary destination choice, supported by work opportunities and family ties (Sayad, 1999). Moving primarily to London a 'superdiverse' (Vertovec, 2007) city and then to other UK cities, has opened up new opportunities to the Kabyles, where their Kabyle identity was not their primary concern. First, finding a job and managing their living costs were paramount, which explains why the cultural organisation was not formed until 2015, despite the fact that most of the founding members came to the UK in the 1980s and 1990s. Crucially, the previous unsuccessful attempts to create a larger North African Amazigh community were due to their different political and religious orientations. This pushed the Kabyles in the UK to re-think their definition of the Amazighity and change the name of the organisation from 'The Amazigh Cultural Organisation in London' to 'The Kabyle/Amazigh Cultural Organisation in London'. In what follows, I will present the key participants of this study in ways that reflect how they presented their sense of Kabyleness to me over the course of this research. Whilst for some participants this revolved around cultures of food, style and celebratory domesticity, for others it was more explicitly political.

5.2 The participants' narratives

Nadia's family: Arrival in the UK, motivations and challenges

In this part, I will introduce Nadia, my key gatekeeper, her husband and her daughter who have significantly contributed to the development of this study through their diverse expressions of their Kabyle identity in the UK and transnationally. Nadia and her family hosted me several times

in their home, in northern England, including during the events they organised in London. My first formal recorded interview with Nadia was in the city where she currently lives. I stayed in a hotel, which made her feel upset; afterwards she told my mother that she would be angry next time if I did not stay at her home. Our interview lasted for more than two hours, where she took her time to chronologically tell me about herself, her arrival and experience in the UK and how she had come to create the Kabyle/Amazigh cultural organisation in London. Nadia viewed this research project as an opportunity for her to do some homework and think deeply about her position and the cultural organisation. In my following visits to her house, our discussions focused mostly around Algeria, Kabylia, Tamazight, and the Kabyles in the UK and elsewhere, fostered by the Kabyles' diasporic online interactions and later on the February 2019 Algerian protests, also known as *Hirak* that shaped many of my participants' stances. Put differently, the positions and practices of my participants in multiple fields were, in some cases, the result of not only the nature of the participants' habitus or the field they were interacting in, but also the prevailing circumstances. This has involved an ambivalent and complex entanglement of ethnicity, religion, political stances and language.

Nadia is a 43-year-old married woman and she has two children. She came to the UK in 1993, to join her husband, and describes her journey to the UK as 'a big immigration'. She said that "at that time not many girls travelled. We had girls who were married but generally they went to France". People in her village and neighbouring areas used to link the act of travelling with going to France, due to historical links with the country. When some heard that she was coming to the UK, they confused it with the United States. She stayed with her family-in-law for some time, waiting for her UK documents to be ready. Her mother-in-law was attached to her as Nadia was too. Nadia came to the UK "without knowing a word of English, only Kabyle, French and Arabic […] as we were arabised in schools". When discussing Kabyle historical and cultural accounts or political issues, it was very common that my participants acted as spokespersons "seeking to monopolise the legitimate representation of the group" (Brubaker, 1996: 61), as will be seen across the different profiles and the coming chapters.

The couple first settled in London and then moved to other UK cities, as they mentioned, looking for a stable and quiet life. Nadia told me about her journey after marriage and how her life has changed. At first, she relied on her husband, until he pushed her to learn English, when he let her go to her doctor by herself. During her appointment, the doctor told her "maybe you don't speak English, but you are intelligent, you understand". From there, she started to look for a job until she found one in a charity shop. She worked in the stock room at first, until the manager asked her to take care of the customers. Step by step, Nadia has improved her English. Her husband's

encouragement and insistence that she relies on herself was one of Nadia's motivations to get accustomed to the UK lifestyle. The role of the husband, Uncle Saïd, appears to be central in empowering his wife by introducing her to the new life in the host society and his insistence on her personal development. His experience in the UK has shaped his understanding of the importance of education for women, particularly that at the time he came to the UK, women in mountainous Kabylia and Algeria did not have that easy access to schools (Killian, 2006) However, it is also important to note the social role of women in Kabylia is as important as the men's role. This topic was also raised by others. For example, Ramy, a newly arrived young Kabyle man in London, told me how his sisters' educational and professional careers have been unfairly hindered by his older brother who is now "comfortably" settled in the USA. He said: "When I see young women here and their educational level I realised how oppressed my sisters were and my anger towards my brother only increases…I will work hard so that my children will have equal access to education". Here, Ramy demonstrates he believes that education is the symbolic capital and the "currency" (Bourdieu, 1986) that allows people to acquire or establish a position in a social hierarchy.

Nadia wore Kabyle dresses most of the time; at home, outside and during the Kabyle cultural events in the UK. Even when not wearing Kabyle clothes, she always had Kabyle accessories on her, such as rings and a glamourous ornamented silver brooch pinned on her dresses. Nadia also wore casual outfits, for example, T-shirts and jeans when she went to work, with sometimes a Kabyle touch. She showed me a simple black t-shirt that she modified by sewing on some colourful buttons in the shape of the Tifanagh letter ⵣ (*Aza*). Here, Nadia looked for ways to make her casual outfits indicators of her ethnic identity. It was also a way to confirm a Kabyle status and connect with the community in Kabylia and the diaspora. On my third visit, she came with her daughter to pick me up at the train station. While her daughter wore a casual outfit, Nadia had put on a black satin Kabyle dress embroidered with colourful ribbons, called *Zigga*, along with a casual *Fudha*. The latter is a small multicoloured (usually orange, black, red and yellow) striped piece of soft cloth that is worn around the waist with a Kabyle dress. The more formal the event is, the more accessories are added to the dress, such as a matching belt and a matching *Fudha*. Nadia's knowledge and awareness about my cultural background and academic aim had strengthened her desire to demonstrate her Kabyle identity. At the same time, this can likely be part of her daily routines which reflect her multiple identifications through not only transnational connections with the Kabyle diaspora but also through objects.

In public spaces, Nadia's ethnic identity was more visible compared to that of her daughter. Although this difference can be interpreted as intentional or unintentional, by observing her daughters' behaviour, her public ethnic identification was contextual. In other words, Numidia only wore her Kabyle dresses and accessories when attending the cultural events and dressed

casually when cooking in the kitchen at home. This can also show both Nadia and her daughter's practices are adjusted to befit the field or the space's culture. Her use of dress styles is dynamic and contextual that signifies ethnic heritage. Chapter 6 will illustrate the Kabyles' embodied experiences and negotiations of their identities through materiality and events, mainly within the cultural organisation and online.

Meeting uncle Saïd

Respecting Kabyle cultural codes, I did not address Nadia's husband by his first name but called him 'uncle' to show respect. Uncle Saïd is a Kabyle man who moved to the UK in 1982. The reason he came to the UK was a mere coincidence. He decided to leave Algeria/Kabylia because as he said, "I could not work in a corrupted environment and when I tried to denounce suspicious and corrupt behaviour, I was dismissed, and I received a final paycheque". According to his story he decided spontaneously to leave the country. Upon leaving the bank where he cashed his cheque, a travel agency that was called British Caledonian was just opposite on the street. So, he went there, looked around the flyers on the wall and asked for the next flight to London. He asked for the price and he used the money he received from the company he was working with. The flight was in two days' time. Because England was not a popular destination among Algerians at that time, he chose to tell his mother that he was going to France to join his brother. At the time, "Algerians didn't need to apply for a visa to enter the UK", as most of them chose France as their first destination (Sayad, 1999). Uncle Saïd's passport was stamped at the British borders for a period of six months. When he first came to the UK, he met a Kabyle person who helped him to find a job and a place to stay. When he gained experience and, as he said, in his own town, because of his honesty, he was promoted. After achieving economic stability, he decided to establish a family. He married Nadia and after spending one year in London and having their first child, they moved from London to a smaller city, where they had their second child, Numidia. According to Nadia, the family visited their native village in Algeria whenever possible, because Nadia and her husband were "attached to our land" and "wanted our children to know their family and the land of their ancestors". One of the reasons they insisted on speaking Kabyle with their children, was so that they can communicate with their grandparents and the other members of the family. Bonding relationships (Woolcock, 2002; Putnam, 2002; Hawkins and Maurer, 2010) have served the family not only to maintain ties with their families and the land, but also to transfer their home culture to their children and raise their awareness. For example, Numidia told me how she explained to her brother, who often complained about the precarious conditions in Kabylian houses and the unavailability of water. She said: "I told him that they don't have the same privilege you have because your father had this opportunity to leave and he worked hard so

you could become what you are now". Therefore, both the parents' efforts in the UK and the bonding relationships with family in Algeria have contributed to Numidia's embrace of her Kabyle cultural identity. As I will show this was directly involved in creating forms of cultural and symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1986) in new social fields.

Getting to know Numidia

Numidia is a young 21-year-old woman. I met her when I had my first formal interview with her mother and then I asked her if she would accept to take part in my study. She was positive about it and kindly accepted to participate. At the time we met, Numidia was a student in Media Studies, and was working on the aftermath of the Black Spring as a theme for her final project. She speaks English, Kabyle and French. I was amazed to see her moving effortlessly from one language to another. Besides, she was the one who cooked Algerian and Kabyle traditional food for us, while wearing casual Kabyle dresses. She expressed pride in speaking Kabyle and knowing Kabyle culture. Numidia's case suggests how children of immigrants are often more engaged in their parents' ethnic and cultural practices and find themselves increasingly entangled in larger political and ethnic debates.

Numidia's experience at school with children of different background knowing other languages other than English, made her feel compelled to learn Kabyle, which indicates the role of multi-ethnic experiences in emphasising self-ethnicity. When she was young, she used to understand Kabyle and was able to say some words. Later, when she met her current husband, she started practicing with him until she became fluent. Her brother; however, was less enthusiastic about his cultural heritage. In one of our conversations, she mentioned that he had not been to Kabylia for a long time, and he did not have any intentions to go back there.

I also spoke with Nadia on the phone, either via Facebook Messenger or on my phone, where Numidia joined us from time to time. In one of our interesting conversations, we raised the issue of learning and speaking Kabyle, Arabic and other languages. Nadia emphasised the importance of learning and speaking Kabyle especially with Kabyles. She said that she knew Arabic and she tended to speak it when necessary but not with Kabyles, emphasising her openness to all cultures and languages. She said "I am an immigrant, I have immigrated and I have to be part of it […] We have to learn our culture and their culture and making (sic) it one. We never forget our culture but learning theirs is never hurting (sic)". Nadia was working for a local company alongside other European colleagues. They created a Messenger group chat and started sharing pictures of their everyday nutrition routine. Nadia was sharing both Kabyle/Algerian and European/international food. In one of the online conversations, while Nadia shared a British Breakfast, her British friend

shared the couscous she prepared, thanking Nadia for the recipe, which shows the other side of Nadia's life in the UK.

Family Dinners: let's bring the Kabyle set for the Couscous

Because the couple were working during the day, dinner time at Nadia's house was very special. Generally, during my multiple stays, the main course was prepared by Numidia and her mum and I helped to prepare the salads and set the table. During this time, we were chatting about this and that. The dishes were typically Algerian/Kabyle with, sometimes, a British touch such as a cup of tea in the morning with Algerian cookies and pastries. During the initial days of my first visit, the serving dishes we used was bought from a British supermarket. However, Nadia told me that she chose it because it has a mosaic design that is quite similar to Kabyle and Amazigh styles. Nadia's dual or simultaneous attachment to and maintenance of both the UK's culture and the Kabyle culture is demonstrated through her choice of furniture. Then, she added that because she just had moved to her new house, all the dishes she brought from Kabylia were packed and stored in the attic. On the second day of my next stay, when we prepared couscous, Nadia went upstairs and called us to help her take them out from there. Particularly because couscous is often served in specific kind of cookware sets, that are made of clay and often decorated with Amazigh symbols. Nadia's emphasis on specific Kabyles serving sets to be used for Kabyle dishes is remarkable. Despite her proclaimed flexibility and observed transcultural practices, some activities are still reified, such as the use of olive oil and other ingredients as I will show in the coming chapter.

My second stay with them lasted for 4 days. We would go outside during the day or sometimes I would stay home with Numidia while Nadia and her husband went to work. In the evening, Numidia put on her Kabyle casual dress and thought about what to cook for dinner. She cooked a variety of dishes, in addition to Algerian cookies that we were having with tea. By the time we were in the kitchen preparing dinner, Uncle Saïd was sitting in the living room either watching British channel on TV or using his computer, playing Kabyle music and watching news from Algeria and Kabylia. However, Uncle Saïd was also involved in the household, as he helped Nadia do the washing-up, or turn on the washing machine. In the morning, because he was the first to wake up, he often prepared breakfast for us. In one of the instances Nadia's gazes invited me to look at her husband while he was doing the washing-up. Nadia proudly sees her husband as an ideal Kabyle partner, the way she looks at him caught my attention. Men's involvement in the domestic chores in Algeria/Kabylia is not very common. At the same time, cooking and doing the household chores was common among male participants involved in this study, because most of them have lived in

the UK on their own for some time or have worked in hotels and restaurants, which encouraged them to rely on themselves.

During mealtime, we were discussing different topics. Sometimes they would ask me about my studies and progress, but we mostly spoke about life in Kabylia, Oran, and Algeria in general and life in the UK. After finishing eating and cleaning the kitchen, we moved to the living room for some tea and carried on with the conversations. Sometimes we would play a language game where Nadia would ask us to find the feminine or plural form of a given Kabyle word, which could be tricky as we would follow the general rule which was sometimes misleading. She told me they had similar activities with their other guests. Language games were part of the family's *ways of being*. Moreover, British TV shows were also among the topics discussed. The type of conversations and activities within this family and among my participants are very insightful as they show how diverse they were and the degree of their openness and engagement to not only Kabylia-related issues, but also to the receiving society's mechanism.

For my third visit, I accompanied the family to the Berber Spring event that one of the Kabyles had organised in Birmingham. Nadia was invited as a special guest and an activity leader. Most of the audience and the singers present there were also members of the Kabyle/Amazigh Cultural Organisation in London. At the same time, a more politically engaged event was organised in London by MAK representatives and sympathisers. The multiplicity of events has marked the development and the burgeoning of new and diverse expressions of Kabyleness engendered by political, cultural, secular and/or linguistic ambitions.

My stay with Nadia and her family was an opportunity to become closer to them and gain their trust. This has also created some spaces for discussions and debates as well as some performative activities. Uncle Saïd's decision to migrate is evidence of a "random decision" (Klabunde and Willekens, 2016) we might make in our lives. Qualifying and describing the act of moving to the UK as a 'big immigration', indicates how new the UK environment was to Nadia and Algerians in the past, despite the easy access compared to today's visas and borders restrictions. Their connections with Kabyles in London, and their moral values and knowledge, i.e. symbolic capital, predispositions (Bourdieu, 1984) facilitated their settlement in the UK (such as their educational background, mastery of languages, respect to local rules). Where later on, he and his wife became a source of capital for many Kabyle newcomers. For example, Ramy told me that before coming to the UK, he was in contact with Nadia, who gave him useful guidance to visa applications and life in the UK. Therefore, maintaining transnational ties with Kabyles does not only emphasise and assert one's Kabyle cultural capital and identity, but also one's social and economic capital.

My conversations with the family also revealed the impact of the children of migrants on their parents' perceptions vis-à-vis the diversity around them in the receiving society. Nadia was repeatedly telling me about the huge amount of money she and her husband spent on the organisation, that she could have bought a house for her son. However, her daughter picked up on this point that irritated her and said: "to my son; to my son". Nadia looked at me looking for a convincing explanation, as she assumed that being from Algeria and having lived there, I would have had a suitable response. Indeed, I echoed my mother's point of view (that women do not inherit or Kabyles are more concerned about bequeathing their properties to their sons rather than their daughters because the latter would marry and will have another source to live on) and then Nadia vividly reinforced my argument. Therefore, the children, in their turn, play an important role in their parents' acquisition of cultural and symbolic capital. Raising their awareness about, for example, language and gender practices, contributes to the construction of my participants' identities in a migratory context.

Lyly: between a new life and inherited activism

Lyly is 37 and came to the UK to join her husband. She studied law in Algeria and had her master's degree with honours. She was very motivated to finish her studies and become a lawyer in Algeria. By coming to the UK, her life has changed. She became more absorbed by her new life which led her take some distance from the political world. She talked about her working experiences and volunteering jobs she took in order to improve her English as "it's the key to succeed in the country". She watched English channels and had conversations with English friends. Lyly attributed her ability to learn English and 'integrate' within the British 'multicultural' society to her 'predispositions'. She believes that she has the human and cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986) that allow her to 'integrate' within the receiving society. She was first feeling uncomfortable for not being able to speak 'proper' English. Though, when she met people of different nationalities, each speaking their own English, she felt more confident, especially that "English native' speakers did not pay attention to her language but to the message transmitted". Similar to Uncle Saïd and other early newcomers, Lyly's first experience in the UK was characterised by ways of adaptation to her new life and developing communication skills. However, her contact with friends and colleagues of different cultural background has encouraged her to embrace her cultural heritage as a distinctive feature instead of being an obstacle**.** This shows the role of Britain's multicultural approach and superdiverse society in the maintenance of minorities' ethnic and home identities. In fact, Lyly's involvement in the Kabyle cause was as important as my other Kabyle participants'. In contrast to the other respondents, her Kabyleness was rather individualised and privatised.

"We feel rejected"

I met Lyly several times for formal and informal meetings. We also kept in touch on WhatsApp through texting and sharing news and pictures. I knew Lyly through a friend of mine, who talked to her about me and my research. She invited us to her house for lunch. The choice of the menu, couscous with vegetables, was a fascinating introduction to my research project.

Lyly was very welcoming and friendly. At 3pm, we accompanied her to pick up her child from school, while continuing our conversation. She expressed pleasure at meeting women from her country studying overseas. Lyly talked about her early life in Algeria where she grew up as an ambitious girl willing to study and work and take great responsibilities. She expressed much admiration for her father who was a politician and instilled an interest in politics and political activism in her. They lived outside of Kabylia because of her father's job and they had to go back to Kabylia in 1995 to take part in the 'l'année blanche' [14] in order to support the Amazigh cause and Tamazight language. She is well and highly informed about the Algerian and Kabyle history. She admires Kabyle historical characters, such as Krim Belkacem and Hocine Ait H'med, who have had a big impact on her perceptions and formation of her Kabyle identity, that will be explained in chapter 6 and 8.

When I asked Lyly about how she feels about her 'Kabylité' in Algeria, she replied: "we feel rejected", she then sighed and said: "We used to go to Algiers to visit my cousins who were born and raised there. They always viewed us as "backward and aggressive". "But what do you expect from somebody born in a mountainous area! Our harsh character is because of the environment we are in". After she had narrated her experience in Algeria, she referred to how comfortable people were making her feel in the UK despite her weakness in English when she first came and then reflected upon how successful she is in her new environment and how determined she is to do better. The feeling of rejection Lyly, and a number of my Kabyle participants, have experienced in Kabylia and Algeria because of their Kabyleness was one of the factors that pushed them to leave the country. This has been expressed throughout their narratives and anecdotes, which according to them increased their determination to succeed in the UK. Moreover, retelling their past experience in Algeria to their fellow Kabyles, children and/or friends in the UK leads to the perpetuation and the creation of shared narrative and a collective memory.

Lyly's relationship to Kabyle is complex. Ideologically, she considers it as an identity marker. However, she does not mind speaking other languages. She said that her husband is more of an

[14] L'année blanche is a school strike throughout Kabylia for the official recognition of Tamazight and Amazigh culture, involving 700,000 students between September 1994 and March 1995 (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011)

activist than her, especially when it comes to language. In one of our meetings, her husband called her, and she told him that she was with a Kabyle person, and his first question was whether I knew Kabyle or not. She told him "yes, she is Kabyle". Then, she said "as you can see, he reacts sometimes even to the type of music I listen to. I have a diverse playlist. I listen to Kabyle, Rai music, Jazz... Everything". From Lyly's narratives, her husband was also socialising her to identity-relevant issues

Furthermore, during our conversations, Lyly has shown some very interesting instances of language mixing. In our meetings, she employed Kabyle, English, French and Arabic, as I shall discuss in chapter 8. She said that she desperately wanted her son to speak Kabyle, but because he was exposed to many languages, notably Kabyle, French and English, he stopped speaking it. She took him to the doctor, who suggested that it was better to use one language in order not to confuse him. Throughout our meetings Lyly repeatedly expressed her will to maintain her Kabyle identity and transmit it to her son. However, Lyly's relationship to the cultural organisation is limited. She could not agree with the type of events that were organised within the organisation. She expressed her disappointment about the fact that "the Kabyle culture has been reduced to music and dancing", while adopting a more political educated, and politicised approach to Kabyle heritage.

Tamazight: "I'm a little bit divided into three": Multiple identities

"I have two parents of two different nationalities, and I was born in a third country and then I emigrated, so I begin here to absorb the British culture."

When I interviewed Tamazight, a pseudonym that she chose for this study, in 2017, she was 21. She is a young migrant of French, Kabyle and Lebanese origin. She was born in France, to a Lebanese father and an Algerian Kabyle mother. I first saw her in the first event I attended in London where we celebrated the Amazigh New Year. She was sitting in a corner with Numidia, wearing a blue modern Kabyle dress and some fine Kabyle jewellery that attracted my attention. I did not have the opportunity to talk to her that evening. During the second event on the commemoration of the Berber Spring and because she was in charge of cutting the tickets at the entry, I seized the opportunity to chat with her, tell her about my project and ask her if she would accept to take part in it. She immediately accepted and gave me her phone number to contact her on WhatsApp.

Tamazight came to London in 2015, to do her master's degree in English literature. Once she settled in London, she started looking online for any Kabyle community or association in London

when she finally found the Kabyle/Amazigh cultural organisation, and then joined them. She has become an active member of the organisation. Coming to London set in motion a discovery of her Kabyle roots. Tamazight told me also about her recent summer holiday in Kabylia and her trip to Algiers and how she felt when she walked down the streets of Algiers. For her "this city does not leave her indifferent", because her mum was born there, she lived and studied there. In 2015, Tamazight and her family took a trip to Kabylia, a place that she has always dreamed of. She told me about their Kabyle traditional house with the terrace, and how she used to play with the water with her sister. Tamazight was seduced by the Kabyle culture, nature and material objects. During that trip, she visited the House of the Kabyle singer Matoub in Tizi Ouzou. The latter's house was loaded by historical, cultural and political evidence (such as pictures on the wall, journal articles and Matoub's bullet-riddled car). This prioritised Tamazight's focus towards a more political engagement. When "she learnt what happened to him, she started asking [her]self-questions, why did they do this to him". Thus, she started reading articles online, which pushed her to become interested in the Kabyle culture, and to become a big fan of it and its components.

> "I made connections with the books that I used to see at home, with his [Matoub] songs and what my mother had told me that the Kabyles were not Arabs, they were Berbers. So here you see I realised with this interview. I say in fact that there are two parts of myself that I discovered at the same time. You see I told myself maybe, I was 18 maybe 18/19 years old! I've lived 19 years without doubting that in fact I am of a Berber origin you see. You see! It traumatised me, it's a big word you see but I told myself that I must make up for lost time. Since then, I started to read a little bit about the Berber culture, about the Kabyles, the jewellery, Oh the jewellery! I started telling my mother that she should have bought some Kabyle jewellery for us".

Yuval Davis (2006) argues that "identities are narratives, stories people tell themselves and others about who they are (and who they are not)" (p. 202). Tamazight was trying to answer my questions and at the same time finding or understanding herself. She was negotiating her identities while telling her story and the different situations she went through. Tamazight connected herself to Kabyle identity through kinship, her mother's homeland, iconic figures in the Kabyle history, music, and Kabyle jewellery, and language. Tamazight said she did not speak about her multiple identities to everyone; therefore, she said the cultural organisation was an ideal space for Tamazight to exercise her Kabyleness as will be illustrated in chapter 6. In our meetings she said:

> "I care about my Kabyle identity and about my Lebanese identity, too. When I see that the person is open minded, you see there are people I cannot tell them

> I am Lebanese and Kabyle as well: Good but how is that? You see there are people who can understand, because they have parents who are like me and so I feel French but Kabylie is something else, it is a very important part for me and the same for Lebanon".

Tamazight enacted the different identity positions she assumed according to the people she interacts with and the context she finds herself in. However, her interest in Kabylia had also been demonstrated through her efforts to keep the Kabyle/Amazigh cultural organisation active, particularly after the emergence of different forms of gatherings (or sub-fields) and attempts to create other organisations. Moreover, her engagement was more highlighted online, through her expressive posts, messages, comments and pictures about Kabylia, Kabyles and symbolic Kabyle figures. Her visit to Kabylia and more particularly to Matoub's house sparked her curiosity and awakened her activism. Tamazight showed similar interest in her Lebanese identity alongside, as she explained, her predominant and omnipresent French identity. For example, she also asked me whether there were Lebanese communities or societies in Southampton**.**

Mr Mohand: Academically and religiously oriented

When I told Nadia that I needed some participants to take part in my research, she tried to put me in contact with a number of Kabyle people living in the UK and who were involved in the Kabyle organisation. Nadia was selective in the profiles she suggested as she clearly wanted me to meet more successful and well-educated people who she meets would better represent the Kabyles. However, as mentioned in chapter 4, I made sure to recruit different participants to achieve some diversity. Therefore, she gave me the email address of Mr. Mohand. I sent him an email explaining my research project and asking him for a meeting. Whilst he was very welcoming and positive, despite his busy schedule, our first interview took place a year later and it was via a phone call. He immediately asked me some detailed questions about my topic: The research aims and objectives, the methods used. After I answered his questions, he allowed me to ask him some questions and was happy to provide me with some background information about himself. Then we arranged a meeting in London at his workplace. Because I arrived during lunch time, we went to the canteen and had about a one-hour interview there. When we were choosing food, I was worried about the type of food I should take, as I was not sure about the meat served. On the one hand, I could not order it without asking whether the meat was halal, and on the other hand I was considering M. Mohand's reaction about my concern. My hesitation was due to the previous irritated reactions I had from other Kabyle participants to my headscarf and other religion-related issues, as I will show in Chapter 7. Then he said quietly "There are vegetables and fish, this is what

I usually take", which made me feel more comfortable. When we sat, he put his keys on the table and then showed me a keyring and said, "This is the key ring I told you about last time". The anecdote was about a keyring with an Amazigh symbol (*Aza*) that he lost but then bought a similar one from Morocco during a holiday. However, he emphasised that it had no particular significance. This shows how wearing cultural symbols does not necessarily reflect one's ways of *being* nor *becoming*. Moreover, the anecdote served as a good introduction to our conversation around Kabylia and the Kabyles.

Mr Mohand, a calm and down to earth person, was born in a small Kabyle village, he studied in Kabylia and then moved to Algiers for his higher education. He was granted a scholarship towards a master's degree and followed this up with a PhD. His funding was cut, so he had to take a loan from a bank and carry on his studies. He worked in different places. When we were in the canteen, one of the waiters walked past us and then he told me "I used to do this job, I worked in the kitchen, I did the cleaning and worked as a waiter". After graduation, he went back to Algeria in 1987 where he completed his army service, despite the discouragement of his friends and people around him, who thought he was "crazy". However, he believed that was the right decision, because he told me that his parents were still in Kabylia and he needed to visit them while abroad.

After four months Mr. Mohand went back to London and started looking for a job. He joined the Business School in 1990 at a London-based university as a Professor. He used to be very active within the Kabyle/Amazigh cultural organisation, but because of work and other commitments, his involvement decreased. He said:

> "I go to the mosque near where I live, and we have a very very nice Cheikh, he is Egyptian and talks in English. He says when you go to buy things buy meat for instance, and you ask whether it is halal or not, you should also know whether your money is halal or not. So, it's the same. If you are really earning money in a non-halal way, there is non-sense if you ask whether the product is halal or not. So even the money that you use for that product, if you really earn it. Or did you just relax, and not doing anything and you don't deserve it. For instance, the class I am doing tonight, I am giving an extra class for the students, and I spent a lot of time this morning trying, because there are different students. Those who are in London can come, but those who are in Europe, in the US and they will not be able to attend the class, so that will be unfair for them, they will be disadvantaged".

Mr Mohand's everyday activities centre around working, taking care of his family and going to the mosque. Although our meeting did not last for a long time compared to my meetings with other Kabyle participants, Mr Mohand took time to tell me about his early life in Kabylia and his adventurous experiences as a young man with his friends. He described how he successfully used Aït Menguellet's song as a reference in one of his exams and how he talked about this singer to his English colleague Nevertheless, his tone changed and his voice lowered when he disappointedly spoke about his participation in the Berber Spring march on 14th June, 1980 from Kabylia to Algiers. He said that he was fortunate, because he was marching next to his friend when the latter was arrested. It was an uncomfortable and painful moment as he remained silent for a while and then changed the topic to speak about the cultural organisation which was more joyful. Mr. Mohand was re-imagining his Kabyle identity through memories**.** Moreover, Josselson and Harway (2012) believe that "there are more complex ways to be an individual and still belong to a collective identity" (p. 3). In the case of Mr. Mohand, although he clearly expressed the non-significant place of Kabyle identity in his life, he did not deny his involvement within the cultural organisation, or in his everyday practices that related to Kabylia and Algeria For example, he seemed more focused on his professional life in the UK. After having a loan from the bank for his studies, he said he started responsibly counting the price of each minute he spent. His professional and religious identity whether on the phone or during the meeting were emphasised and were visible, as I shall explain in Chapter 7, especially for his choice of our meeting point. Mr Mohand's environment and circumstances and the pathway he followed in the UK narrowed down his focus, making of his professional and academic success his primary objective. Nevertheless, he also indicated his consumption of Algerian and Kabyle products, including food, music, and listening to "la chaine 3" (Radio channel 3), with which he seemed very engaged. For example, he enthusiastically discussed the question of inheritance in Kabylia based on a Kabyle TV show he recently watched as follows:

> "I was listening to Jamal Allam [a Kabyle singer], and after that when it finished, there was another one, it was a debate with Noreddine ait hamouda[15] (le fils de Amirouche), il parlait, il disait beli, on Algerie meme on a différent systemes d'héritage, en Kabylie la femme n'a pas le droit d'hériter le champ, un champ. I think this was the same, I mean, it's the same, when somebody dies I mean they give equally to the boys and girls, but maybe this only in his area, and his village [X] which is very near to [village Y], I used to go on foot there, it's less than 10km.

[15] Noreddine Ait Hamouda an Algerian Kabyle political man, son of Colonel Amirouche, one of the key political leaders during the Algerian War of Independence.

> how can he say that this is the case. For me, it's …I don't know. I don't think that we use this. I think that women in Algeria in Kabylia, women in my village, I think they inherit the same as men. I think, I really do not know, but women when they get married, when they settle obviously they don't get anything, but if they stay home they get the inheritance. So, it's the person who stays home who get the inheritance. Because when they get married, they say probably her husband is very rich etc., because she is the only one benefiting from that wealth of her husband. So her brothers and sisters are not benefiting from that so how is she going to… I think it's kind of complex".

Mr. Mohand stated his argument by refuting the TV show host. This might be the influence of the new environment on his perception, or the fact that he was observing this practice in distance. However, once he started explaining the point in detail, he ended up repeating the same idea Nadia and I were trying to explain to Numidia. That is why Kabyle parents bequeath their wealth to boys. Moreover, in the above quote, I left the bit in French on purpose to show how Mr. Mohand switched to French when he felt he spoke about everyday society-related issues. This will be explored further in chapter 8.

Ricky: A Kabyle man in London

Ricky arrived in London at a young age, coming directly from Kabylia. I first contacted him through Facebook, after I noticed his posts and engagement within the Facebook official page of the Kabyle/Amazigh cultural organisation. I explained to him my project as I did with my other participants. He asked me a couple of questions and then expressed his interest in the topic and willingness to help. Then, we organised a meeting in a café in London.

Ricky did not accept that our conversations be recorded, but he suggested to answer any question I had on WhatsApp. Our 'ethnographic' conversations were not limited to Kabyles and Kabylia, but about general topics form culture to politics and the economy. Ricky suggested that he wrote a biographical text himself in English for me to use

He sent me the text as follows:

> "Basically, if you come to London to study, or work you will expect some difficulties in adapting to the Anglo-Saxon life, I wouldn't say about its culture because they don't have it. As a foreigner in London you will often be asked about your country of origin and you get teased occasionally about your vocabulary/pronunciation of certain words. You meet lots of amazing people and countless incredible experiences. I settled down quickly, squatting in an old

> room until I could make arrangements. But I had severely underestimated the expense of London. Yet, in my experience, as a Kabylian, I had to work twice as much to succeed. The first thing I did was to find a casual job, my visa allowing me to work 20 hours a week. I worked at a hotel near Victoria, using an A to Z to find my way around and I went to Westminster College and at night I tried to socialise. It took me less than 6 months to get my first exam (Cambridge certificate) after I took other courses in business studies. Then, as part of my first full time job, I worked for 2 years at the London Business School (LBS), for 2 years at the Institute of Directors (IOD) for 1 year at the Daily Mirror, it was great, I shared an office with a colleague passionate about state policy and national politics. Five years later, my financial situation was better and, finally, it was the real revelation for me when I left my last job and became self-employed. I created and managed my own import /export business and working part time as a graphic designer. I've been passionate about hobbies my whole life. I love learning, collecting, researching and developing new skills. Some of these skills have proven useful in my career, and some are just for me to enjoy. I like politics and I follow people such as Andrew Marr, Andrew Neil and various other political commentators. This gives me a broad knowledge of what is going on and the ability to comment thereon."

Ricky distanced himself from his Kabyle identity, changing his name to a European one and worked on his economic and social adaptation into the British society. In our first meeting, Ricky told me that "I was the first Kabyle woman he has met in London". He said that he was more focused on the development of his personal and professional life. He told me that his Kabyle was not very good, because he did have anyone to practise it with, so all our conversations were in English. He was married to a British woman, who accompanied him once to Bejaïa. His experience with her in that city was not positive as she expressed her 'disgust' at the city, although he sees it as a "clean and a beautiful coastal city". After he divorced, he decided to isolate himself for a long time, until he discovered the Kabyle/Amazigh cultural organisation and became virtually part of it.

Every time we met, we agreed on a meeting point and then walked around London. He took me to different places he liked going to. this included a famous Algerian coffee store that opened in the 70s. On our way there, he told me that the Algerian culture is buried. He believes that "unlike Moroccans, for example, Algerians do not promote their culture in the receiving society". Hence, he suggested that we create an event or a competition on the best Couscous, where he would talk to people that he knew and Algerian chefs in different restaurants. He was very ambitious about

it. Although Ricky strongly criticised the Algerians, most of our conversation was about them. Ricky's position regarding Kabyle 'independence' was not as clear during interviews as it was in his online posts. Discussions on the MAK movement were not brought up until our third meeting. I could not clearly identify Ricky's position as he was very 'diplomatic' in his answers and the way he approached issues around Algeria, Kabyles, and governmental decisions. For example, in discussing Brexit, Ricky was the only one among my participants who said he "voted remain", as most of my British-Kabyle participants believed that "leave was the best option". They saw Brexit as an independence movement akin to Kabyle/Kurdish and Catalan struggles for recognition. In other words, these were the same people who believed in the MAK's project, and the other minorities' independence, showing support to stateless minorities.

Ricky was not only disappointed by the Algerians in general, but also by the "mis-organisation of the Kabyles" he knew in the UK. He said that he did all the tasks during the organisation of particular Kabyle events or gatherings in London based on his skills as a graphic designer and caricaturist. He was expressing his dissatisfaction through comic strips sometimes in French and sometimes in English, that he posted online. In Figure 5-3, he sought to depict the Kabyles' lack of response to his suggested gatherings in London. Here Ricky's drawing also limits the political activity to males only by not including Kabyle women in his caricature.



Figure 5-2 Ricky's depiction of the Kabyles with the MAK movement in London/UK

To compensate the 'lost time' he spent away from his family and Kabyle identity in London, Ricky put both efforts and money into the Kabyle organisation. The cultural organisation played a crucial role in bringing him back to the Kabyle atmosphere/social field in the UK and online. However, I noticed that he never attended the organisation's events, while participating and contributing on the organisation Facebook page only. He started building social networks with Kabyles in London and gradually with the Kabyle diaspora through his knowledgeable posts and engagement within the Kabyle/Amazigh cultural organisation online page. After gaining some trust among the UK Kabyles internet users, he started steadily developing political ambitions and sharing them online. Afterwards, he joined another Kabyle page designated for political purposes, and started organising events and gatherings in London in connection to other Kabyles in France. This shows Ricky's strategy of using the cultural organisation to create a social capital (Bourdieu, 1996; Putnam, 1993; Woolcock, 2000); which would allow him thereafter to reach his target.

In comparison with the strong involvement and commitment of the Kabyles of MAK orientation in France, the engagement of the Kabyles in the UK is relatively weak. This could be related to the limited number of Kabyles in London and particularly in other UK cities. Being in contact with people of different cultural backgrounds may shape the Kabyles' perspectives about their ways of being and ways of belonging. Many of my participants have expressed their openness to others during interviews and conversations, including Ricky, Anazâr and Leïla. However, their attitudes were different in other fields notably the online platforms which included the Kabyle diaspora.

Let's be 'solidaire'

Ricky has shown a significant interest in other groups leading cultural and/or political movements, such as the Catalans, the Tibetans and the Scottish. He was telling me about his discussions with important political figures and participations in "protests in London with his Kabyle flag". He was also spreading the information on Facebook and calling the Kabyles to take part in similar events to show their solidarity. Ricky believed that such initiatives can serve as an important source of social capital and help the Kabyles, and more particularly MAK supporters to gain visibility and legitimacy in a global space.

Throughout our meetings or our written conversations on WhatsApp, his religious feelings, and political and social positions were not very explicit, I was always trying to understand him and his expressed thoughts. I was always discovering something new about his personality. He mostly spoke about his openness to different cultures, echoing the British environment and its multiculturality. When he invited me to the event, he had organised with other Kabyles, I told him that I was worried about how they would react to my physical appearance as a veiled woman. He

replied, “We are in a liberal and multicultural country, and everyone should respect the other’s differences”. I felt reassured to go, especially that I thought that the event would add to my research. However, I also started noticing the contradictory stances and position Ricky expressed online. His long texts, usually written in English and then in French, insinuated division and reproduced some of the Kabyle Myth stereotypes (See Chapter 2). For example, he criticised the Algerian protesters in London, who supported the 2019 Algerian *Hirak* in Algeria, every Saturday. He also criticised the Kabyles for taking part in those gatherings instead of supporting the MAK claims. However, Ricky’s description of the protests was very subjective. Although Ricky has shown a degree of awareness about the others’ differences, he did not accept the Kabyles’ different political and religious opinions. Ricky has referred to notions of liberalism and freedom of expression, however, his actual claims and online practices reflected the opposite. For example, he depicted the veiled Algerian woman at the weekly London protests in a demeaning manner, whereas the reason for protest was much more important than the physical appearance of the protestors. Ricky’s complex and contradictory positions were determined by the space, the people and the current circumstances.

Anazâr: When politics takes over

Anazâr came to settle in the UK in 2002, after spending 2 years in France. He told me about his early motivations when he arrived and how he created a North African Organisation, with the help of other North African activist members. The organisation aimed at eliminating the borders and bringing North Africans together despite their multiple faiths and cultural differences. The organisation brought people from Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, and Libya together. However, it did not last because of the religious differences and conflicts among the members. According to Anazâr, they organised a meeting in the New Forest, but the members organised themselves into groups according to their religious and cultural affiliation, something that led to the dismantling of the organisation and ultimately to its decline. A few years later, Nadia invited him to join her efforts to create an organisation and he positively agreed to take part. However, his growing interest in the political situation of Kabylia pushed him to withdraw from the organisation and pursue his political ambition through his position within the MAK.

My first meeting with Anazâr was not planned and I did not expect our conversation to turn out as it did. It was Ricky who put me in contact with him. When we first met, he talked about his early life in Algeria, his experience in the different cities in Algeria and particularly in Oran, as I told him that I was born and lived in that city. He was an active member in the RCD political party, one of the main Kabyle political parties and key organisers of the Black Spring event (See Chapter 2), and explained to me how hard he worked, putting his life at risk, alongside others in order to improve the Amazigh/Kabyle situation. However, he said: “before, I used to think of all Algeria, of plural

Algeria, but not anymore. now, my unique hope is in Kabylia". Because Anazâr found himself not supported by other Amazigh groups and other Algerians, he decided to invest his time and energy in Kabylia.

Anazâr's efforts dedicated to the unification of the Kabyles in the UK, Kabylia, in France and in different parts of the world is the result of the popularity the MAK movement has gained in the last few years. This may partially explain why Anazâr and a number of my Kabyle participants in the UK, have started reviewing the meaning of their Amazighity and shifting their focus towards the Kabyle cause**.** This shows the strong influence of political parties in shaping the public's opinion, engendered by other factors, notably social, political and economic upheavals. For example, the majority of the Kabyle/Amazigh cultural organisation members were young undocumented Kabyles, who besides enjoying music and food, they sought solutions to their situation by attending the events organised in London. However, after two years of involvement, they became dissatisfied with the organisation's "folkloric" and cultural form that neither "fully" represented their Kabyle identity nor solved their problems. Eventually, this emphasis led to the fragmentation of the Kabyle community in the UK, causing a kind of instability within the cultural organisation, and the emergence of other groupings formulating their own political, economic and/or cultural aims.

When we arrived at the event organised by MAK activists in January, 2019, Anazâr seemed to know everyone in the café. He gave a welcoming speech to everyone, announcing that "the strength of the Kabyles lies in their solidarity and their well-organised attitudes". He also stated that "the betrayal of one Kabyle has severe consequences on all the Kabyles". Such declarations that emphasise a moral order and solidarity (or symbolic capital to borrow Bourdieu's notion) are important in the creation of a collective sense of belonging.

During that event, a non-Kabyle Algerian friend had accompanied me and had stayed with me during the whole time I spent with Anazâr. My friend, who identifies as an Arab, told him that she was from Constantine, which is an Arabic majority speaking community, although historically it is an Amazigh city. He welcomed her and told her that he had a lot of friends from that city and from Middle Eastern countries. Here again, Anazâr's attitudes towards Algerians from other cities show how he separates between his political aims and his social network. However, while telling me about his Algerian non-Kabyle friends, he ended up explaining that even his friends agreed with his political stances. Moreover, on our way to London, he started sharing his work experience in the Middle East. However, he said "but I have to mention the unequal treatment I received when I worked there as an Algerian and as British… they differentiate between nationalities…". In order to justify his current political positions, Anazâr emphasised his efforts to create change in Algerian society, to unify the North African Amazighs in the UK or his work experience in the Middle East, where each attempt was disappointedly blocked.



Figure 5-3 Anazâr's music playlist in his car

During our conversation, he did not use a single word in Arabic, and he was speaking in French and English. My friend told me that when I went to the bathroom and left them, he said two words in Arabic. As if by speaking in Arabic, he would betray the Kabyle cause that he had spent almost 10 hours telling us about his sacrifices and struggle, showing a moral involvement and allegiance to the Kabyle group. When he turned the car's CD player on, Ferhat Mhenni's (the President of the MAK) song was already on pause as shown in Figure 5-4. When I went back home, I added him on Facebook the following day. I was curious to see his profile. His activities and posts were mainly on Kabylia, Kabyle politicians and his efforts for the Kabyle cause. Anazâr's political position was continuously negotiated and challenged in daily encounters and through speaking practices such as the use of 'pure' Kabyle as will be shown in chapter 8.

"Algeria needs her sons"

"A house needs its owner". Anazar used a metaphor to claim the right for the *Imazighen* in ruling the whole country. He said that "it is only the owner who takes care of their house". In this sense, according to Leuthold (1998), indigeneity "refers to people who are minorities in their own

homeland, who have suffered oppression in the context of colonial conquest, and who view their political situation in the context of neocolonialism". Therefore, according to Anazâr, the re-emergence of the *Arouch* (see chapter 2); the reinvention of ancient Kabyle traditions; the revitalisation of Tamazight language are all forms of ethnicisation through which they claimed authenticity. Although Anazâr showed an arduous expression of Kabyleness and strongly believed in the independence of Kabylia, he showed a degree of attachment to Algeria.

Anazâr told me about the many projects, such as factories that have been rejected or blocked from realisation in Kabylia. When speaking about his work experience in Algeria, Anazâr said that "most of the highly placed people in Algeria are from Kabylia. When I used to work in the biggest oil company in the country, most of the heads were from Kabylia". However, he believes, like Ricky, that "once those Kabyles reach higher positions, they forget about their Kabyle identity…". Then he added, arguing that "the French are afraid of us; they are afraid of the Kabyles because they know that if we take control, they [the French] will no longer have those 'privileges'…". He said: "A lot of people think that we are funded by Morocco, France …, but let me tell you that this is wrong. We are self-funded through donations. I had to travel with my own money to Canada for a political mission. I added the Kabyle cause to the UNPO in Scotland (Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation)". Anâzar's political orientation was clearly expressed from the first second we met. His relationship with France seems to take two directions. Politically, he believes that France is a threat to Kabyle as well as Algerian projects of development. However, at a social level, his language practices whether during interview or online were mixed with French, like all my participants as will be explained in chapter 8. Moreover, he spoke about his frequent trips to France, where he bought cheese and some other French products.

Leïla: politically engaged but,

Leïla is 33-year-old Kabyle woman. She was born in Kabylia and lived there until her graduation. Afterwards, she moved to Algiers to start work in a company. The company offered her training for two weeks in either Paris or London and she chose London. She said that she preferred a new place, as Paris was a common destination for Algerians. My participants' position regarding the UK was often influenced by what they had heard or seen among Kabyle/Algerian migrants in France, particularly for those who have never been to France, and Leïla's choice was influenced by reports from French Algerians too, even though she had never been to the country herself**.** This shows the impact of the transnational ties on the imagination of the non-migrants.

I met Leïla during the event organised by the MAK activists. When I entered the café with my friend, I started first by greeting those who I already knew. While Ricky was trying to find a place

for us, by looking for spare chairs, I saw a girl with fair hair sitting in a square table in the corner. I headed to the table where she was sitting and put my bag on the table. It was a way to secure a place next to a female. Then I asked my friend to sit down and I waited for somebody to bring me a chair. When a Kabyle man gave it to me he said: "just pray for us". I thought that his comment was linked to my headscarf. This left me feeling uncomfortable for more than an hour until the musicians started singing, and he was one of them. When I took my phone to take some pictures and videos, he came towards me and asked me not to film him because he is 'Hadj', which means he went to Mecca and later on he explained to me he helps in Muslim Funerals in London. Then, the girl sitting next to me (Leïla) intervened and told me that he was afraid that I share them on Facebook. From there, our conversations started. When she was about to leave the place, I asked her if we could keep in contact and she accepted. She gave me her phone number and so did I. The next day, I texted her and we had a nice conversation, where I asked her whether she would accept to take part in my project, and she immediately showed her interest, and I invited her to come to Southampton. A few days later, Leïla texted me, to tell me that she was coming the next day and asked me to prepare couscous for her with a rooster or as she called it in Kabyle "tayazitt tazugaɣt" (lit. red chicken). The latter is cooked for special occasions, mainly in Yennayer, and it is usually raised at home as I shall explain in the next chapter.

I prepared dinner for her, but with 'white' chicken. The first thing I noticed when I saw her was the small Kabyle lapel flag fixed on her jacket. The same pin I have noticed on the jacket of some Kabyles present at the event where I met her, which indicated their political positioning. Therefore, this shows that similar to Anazâr and other MAK supporters, Leïla's political identification was made visible to all through symbols. This also indicates the entrenchment of the MAK movement in the Kabyles' everyday practices.

During her stay, Leïla asked me to cook specific Kabyle traditional dishes because she did not know how to make them. However, as part of her online practices, she occasionally shared videos of her cooking. I had the impression that Leïla's request was to test my Kabyleness through cooking. For example, while cooking, she was telling me anecdotes about different dishes and the rituals people do in her village and in Kabylia in general. Leïla thought that only my mum was Kabyle, she said that I was not 100% Kabyle, and she felt the responsibility of teaching me about Kabyle life. I did not want to interrupt her in the beginning and tell her that both my parents were Kabyle, because she provided me with information that I otherwise would not know. She told me about Kabyle traditions in different occasions, notably Yennayer, and the celebration of the beginning of Spring, as I shall explain in Chapter 6. Once, I was talking to my mother on the phone, and my mother wanted to talk to her. My mother's desire to speak to most of my participants whom I visited at home or they visited me was to make sure that I was safe. At the same time, I was happy with my mother's conversations with my participants in Kabyle, as I felt this would

confirm my 'Kabyle identity'. There Leïla discovered that both my parents were Kabyle, and she apologised. After that 'reassuring' phone call, Leïla became more open and started to share with me her political opinion regarding the MAK claims. She was always quoting people she had come to know in London, who were fervent defenders of the Kabyle cause, and representatives of the MAK movement in London. She was convinced that I needed to meet one of them, notably 'uncle Lamine', as she had suggested several times. Because my political opinions differed, it was important for me to make them clear from the beginning, although I was afraid to lose my participant. However, this did not impact our relationship, nor our conversations and she respected my position. Nevertheless, our conversations were not only limited to culture and rituals but were also about politics.

Her long stay with me in Southampton during the last week of January and beginning of February 2019, coincided with the beginning of the protests in Algeria against the fifth mandate of the Ex-President. as it happened, most of our debates were around the situation in Algeria, sharing different thoughts and predictions. In the beginning she showed less interest in what was happening in Algeria. However, she attributed the reasons for her emigration to the "miserable situation in Kabylia because of the government's lack of investment". She said: "If my country provided me a decent life, I would have never left it [...] I like Kabylia and I miss it". However, after some days, I asked her whether she would still claim the independence of Kabylia if things change in the country. I was surprised by her response: "Yes, we are not claiming our independence because we hate Algeria, we are doing this because we want to save at least Kabylia from the government's poor stewardship". However, I observed her activities on Facebook, and I noticed a change in the type of posts she was sharing. In the beginning most of her shared pictures or texts were on Kabylia and Kabyle activists. Then, her political engagement faded, and replaced by her own pictures and her daily activities, such as cooking routines, with a new person that she met in London. Interestingly, she started re-sharing videos posted by Algerian Facebook groups and pages denouncing social injustice. This shows how one's taste or social orientation (Bourdieu, 1986) may change as a result of new circumstances and new spaces of interaction involving different social actors.

Nadir: My grand-father and my father were migrants, so I am

Nadir is a 32-year old Kabyle man from Tizi Ouzou. He said he spent all his life in Kabylia and started visiting other cities of Algeria at a later stage of his life. After he graduated, he moved to the UK in 2016 to take an English language course and has not gone back since. I was surprised when he told me that he was planning to visit Edinburgh because he needed "to see the

mountains and find some security". I asked him how important this was for him and then he defensively replied: "don't forget that I am a son of mountains, I breathe mountains, I spent my whole life there!". However, he said that "his grandfather and his father migrated, so [he] had to migrate too". He believed that Kabyles were "candidates for migration" (Collyer, 2008: 692), including his family: "In Kabylia, migration has always existed! The way they live, there is nothing in Kabylia. Kabylia: it's only mountains, it's only mountains! There's nothing, so people, in order to survive they have to move". Despite the harshness of the mountainous life, it constitutes a large part of Nadir's memory and life, that has been expressed in the UK through re-imagining Kabylia in the UK's countryside. Similar to Anazâr, he told me that he organised several trips to Edinburgh to see the mountains and revive some old memories. This shows how people create meaning through spaces and objects as will be argued in the following chapter.

Restricted activism and unknown future

When I met Nadir, he was sharing his accommodation with a young Kabyle man who was in the process of moving out and Nadir was looking for another Kabyle housemate. Nadir's emphasis on having Kabyle company shows how he limited the circle of his network. However, when we met during the commemoration of the Berber Spring in London in 2017, he said that he came to drop a Kabyle friend off and then he changed his mind and stayed. Nadir's interest in the historical, political and economic side of Kabylia outweighed his enjoyment of the Kabyle music and food. When Nadir was attending the events organised within the Kabyle/Amazigh Cultural Organisation in London, similar to Lyly and Tamazight, he did not fully approve of the 'folkloric' aspect of it, he said that it was "good to meet up, play some music and have some food". However, he viewed that the organisation members "put much emphasis on music and dancing rather than historical and political figures who marked the Kabyle political and cultural movement and contributed to its development". He told me that France "was not far, and it was full of Kabyle intellectuals" that they could invite and make the Kabyle cause wider. At this level, Tamazight also told me that her suggestions to organise conferences in relation to Kabyle history were not warmly welcomed.

We met several times in London and he paid me a visit in Southampton as well. We met first at specific public spaces, usually cafés, and then walked around London, visiting places he knew whilst discussing different issues. Like many of my Kabyle participants, Nadir knows history by heart and showed a lot of interest in the Algerian history and more particularly the Algerian War of Independence. Besides, he put much emphasis on the Amazigh and the Kabyle involvement during colonial Algeria. He discussed with me a book he read as follows:

> "The author speaks about the construction of identity of another world. This is the general idea of the novel. He says for instance that identity is not fixed, the

> component of identity, the feeling that we have to our identity is not fixed. It's not an idea that… it's an idea that transforms... For example, I'll give you the example on myself, of a Kabyle. When we were colonized, for instance, our objective was to be free, you understand! So, people were claiming their Algerian identity, but once decolonised, once we had access to our independence, so this identity has changed, people started demanding more, beyond their "Algerianity", since it was gained after independence, thus, the definition of identity has changed, we claimed more liberty with respect to the Amazigh culture and so on. Do you understand?"

Similarly to Anazâr, Nadir explains how the process of their struggle for identity recognition changed from Algerianity to Amazighity. Nadir talked about how Kabyle investors' projects are either rejected or blocked in Kabylia. He said: "If you are a Kabyle investor, you need to invest in Algiers or other cities, you don't have any chances to create your business in Kabylia". "Excuse me, but you know what Israel is doing to Palestinians in Gaza, Algeria is doing to Kabyles in Kabylia". Nadir's activism motivated by what he described as 'colonialism' in his country. Historical accounts of corruption and regional inequality were common arguments used by many of my participants notably Nadir, Leïla, Anazâr, and others in order to justify their political positions and these factors shaped my participants' political identities.

Nadir highlighted his interest in history from our very first conversation; however, his political opinion was revealed after our third meeting and our texting via WhatsApp. he did not criticise the MAK movement nor its President. He believed that "Ferhat was not corrupted and did not destroy the country as some other politicians did. He was somebody who fought for the recognition of the identity of his ancestors". However, Nadir's position was not clear. Nadir's status in the UK was illegal; he felt more restricted when expressing and sharing his ideas. Moreover, his stances sometimes changed from one meeting to another, and his instability was largely influenced by his mood, the pages he was following online and the type of their posts, and finally the dominant situation and the protests that were taking place in Algeria. Nadir's unstable situation made of him a bundle of emotions, conflicting thoughts, and diverse positions and stakes. His changing behavior was also manifested through language, as I will demonstrate in chapter 8. Sometimes he naturally switched between Kabyle, French, Arabic and English, and sometimes he made sure to speak in Kabyle only and encourage me to speak in Kabyle also.

5.3 Discussion and Conclusion

Throughout the different cases, most of the participants started revealing their thoughts and viewpoints clearly only after our second or third meeting. Building trust was an important step for the participants to feel free in narrating their lives and expressing their stances and viewpoints. This chapter has shown the diverse profiles of my participants in relation to their construction and negotiation of their identities. Therefore, spending some time with the participants, observing and analysing their narratives has allowed for a leap into the world of their imaginations and multiple identifications. Throughout their storytelling, they tried to make sense of themselves and their multiple identities, by forging their past and present experiences, and their future (Riessman, 2003). Therefore, giving a voice to my participants has offered grounds to think about their ambivalent negotiations of their identities, notably, ethnic, political, cultural, secular, professional or sometimes a mixture of all of them with different dosage.

Jackson (2013) argues that "storytelling transforms our lives by enabling us to reshape diffuse, diverse and difficult personal experiences in ways that can be shared" (p. 259). Most of the participants shared their stories, starting from the beginning of their journey in the UK to their present achievements and often their future plans, or in some cases they shared their dreams. Nadia, for example, has proved to be the incarnation or a combination of two cultures or more. While maintaining her Kabyle culture, she was willing, through her openness, to take different cultural practices alongside. Similarly, Lyly had the energy of a young ambitious woman in a foreign country, looking to succeed and achieve her freedom and independence.

Lyly's ambitions and new lifestyle limit her political and cultural activism and her wishes to maintain her Kabyle identity. Nevertheless, she still keeps her dresses and jewellery that she brought from Kabylia in her British house and speaks Kabyle with her husband. The presence of Kabyle objects was of great significance and specific meaning for most of the Kabyles within or outside the organisation, notably dresses, jewellery, flags and musical instruments, as will be highlighted in chapter 6. It was also shown above how these objects are also part of the transnational process. They have been transported from Kabylia to the UK and from their houses to the cultural organisation to be either worn during the events or displayed in exhibitions and shared online.

Moreover, the explosion of national identities and the rise of political awareness (Laclau, 1994) in recent years had a great impact on most minorities' movements led in their country of origin or at a transnational level. Their awareness has strongly increased to maintain the cultural and linguistic heritage. Hence, they started organising meetings in the host country, multiplying the creation of organisations according to the majority's aims, and creating online group chat and

Facebook pages. Furthermore, political activists and activist singers play an important role in the construction of political ethnic identities among individuals such as the case of Lyly and Tamazight who both consider their father and Matoub Lounes respectively as their idols and their key influencers.

Negotiating and creating 'home' in the UK

The post-colonial and historical link between the sending and the receiving countries facilitates the integration and the adaptation of the immigrants to the receiving society as many scholars have pointed out (Godin et al., 2015; Lacroix, 2015; Chaudhary, 2017). However, the personal narrative accounts provided by Algerian immigrants in France have shown the opposite. Their integration into their receiving society has often been at the expense of their psychological wellbeing. The Sociologist Abdelmalek Sayad (1999) described their immigration as a 'double absence' (from emigrant's illusions to immigrant's suffering). In contrast, the Kabyle experience in the UK is where my participants have shown on the one hand their attachment to the homeland: the olive trees, nature, people, gatherings, summer ambiance, and on the other hand their attachment to their new home where they constructed a new economic, social and cultural life. Thanks to technological facilities and the different travel options available, as Nadia has pointed out, the meaning of 'el ghorba'[16] has been mitigated. None of my participants have explicitly expressed a feeling of exclusion in the UK, despite their lack of linguistic and economic resources when they first arrived, in addition to the reduced number of Kabyles and Algerians in the UK involved in transnational lives.

Although most of my Kabyle participants have expressed a strong sense of belonging to a Kabyle identity and Kabylia, they have also shown a degree of unwillingness to move back, since they have already established a new life in the UK which they consider as home. This shows my participants' attachment to both their country of origin and the host county (Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004). This has been expressed through their clothing, cooking, and involvement in discussions about both places' matters such as Brexit and the Algerian protests as mentioned earlier. Apart from Tamazight, who has enthusiastically and delightfully expressed her attachment to Kabylia and Algiers based on her and her mother's memories. Despite her stay in London, she considers France, her native country, as her home, since it is her place of birth**.**

[16] El Ghorba is an emotional notion (often sad) used among Maghrebi people which means being away from one's homeland, due to the lack of communications and weak ties between the migrants and their families.

One of the outcomes of maintaining transnational ties, is the influence of the transnational immigrants' experiences on non-migrants' decisions to emigrate. In other words, the earlier experiences and narratives of Kabyle immigrants in France shared with the Kabyles in Kabyle villages has had an impact on the construction of their imaginations about migration, the receiving society and their subsequent attitudes towards language, political issues, religion and gender. This explains some of my Kabyle participants' secularised behaviour, adoption of European names, and rejection of Arabic and the headscarf in the UK.

Across the cases present in this research, most of my participants' journeys to the UK were marked by three main phases. First, upon their arrival to the UK, most of them were keen to establish an Algerian or Kabyle social network that would help them to find a job and settle. Here, their Kabyle identity is not their primary concern, or at least is more a private practice, as they seek to find stability and integrate into the host country. The second phase is when they seek to further improve their financial situation and help their family back in Kabylia. This involved, for some cases, moving out from London to a smaller area and establishing a new identity in a new anonymous neighbourhood. The third phase is when they reach a degree of stability and here they look for their fellow Kabyles to fulfil political, social and/or cultural aims/ambitions fostered by technological advance.

Finally, the diverse cases presented in this chapter have significantly contributed to the production of the following chapters, where their background will be put in context. Their biographies and practices have shown the complexity of their multiple and contextual identifications and the different stakes they have within and outside of the cultural organisation, seeking to build a 'pure' representative image (Brubaker, 1996) of Kabyleness. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, all the respondents of this study are activists, they share the desire to preserve a Kabyle heritage. However, their diverse social characteristics, different perceptions and lived experiences, made of their activism vary from person to another. In this sense, Kabyleness was entangled with performative acts, religion, secularism and language, which will be our key analytical categories in the next chapters.

Chapter 6 Articulation of Kabyleness through Materiality and Amazigh/Kabyle Events

6.1 Introduction

The diversity of the individuals involved in this research offers a richer account of the layered, complex and ambivalent constructions and negotiations of Kabyleness in multiple fields. In an effort to elucidate this process and address the first and third research questions, asking: *How is Kabyleness negotiated and constructed in a British setting and within the Kabyle TSF? How do Kabyles in London/UK use the cultural organisation and online platforms to negotiate their ethnic identity and navigate its complexities?* Negotiating Kabyleness in London/UK has implied the formation of a Kabyle TSF, within which a wide range of social, cultural and/or political events and online activities took place. The latter involved performative interactions, meaning performances (Butler, 1993) of cultural and political events, rituals, invented traditions (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983), meetings, and everyday practices. This has also included food and the participants' use of objects to which they attribute a range of situational social, economic, cultural and political meanings and values (Appadurai, 1986; Miller, 1998; 2005; 2010).

As explained in chapter 5, my Kabyle participants' proclaimed wish to rekindle and visibly express their ethnic identity emerged after their full social and economic establishment in the UK, through the creation of the cultural organisation, fostered by online platforms. This has also included Kabyle newcomers with different immigration status (students, visa tourists and undocumented). The community activities were marked by a variety of cultural and political events, newly invented re-invented traditions such as 'The Day of the Kabyle Dress' in London, and the specific use of food, jewellery and clothing. As part of my fieldwork, I have observed the creation of relationships not only among people and the Kabyles but also between people and objects, food and music through which research participants have been actively articulating and contextually emphasising their Kabyleness in different sites. Furthermore, my participants' interactions at the events in London and online showed how they constructed and negotiated meanings of Kabyleness. The focus of this chapter, therefore, is on the centrality of events and materiality in the formation and negotiation of Kabyleness in London and transnationally. This also entails their political stances and varying their interpretations associated with culturally significant everyday objects used among the Kabyles as part of their everyday practices, and/or during the events and online.

The salience and significance of objects among my Kabyle participants was to be found in their "narrative accounts" to borrow De Fina and Georgagopolou's phrase (2015: 67). They typically involved stories and personal anecdotes about their historical use in Kabylia and subsequent

transfer to the UK and among the diaspora online, invoking emotional attachment to their memories. Dijck (2007) argues that "[m]ediated memories […] can be located neither strictly in the brain nor wholly outside in (material) culture but exist in both concurrently, for they are complex manifestations of a complex interaction between brain, material objects, and the cultural matrix from which they arise" (p. 28). Relatedly, my participants often communicated their memories as memories of materiality centred on specific objects and items of clothing.

Woodward (2005) argues that "clothing is not seen as simply reflecting given aspects of the self but, through its particular material propensities, is co-constitutive of facets such as identity, sexuality and social role" (p. 21). Clothing and objects can be strong indicators of one's social orientations and identity choices. In other words, objects played an integral part in the Kabyles' ritualised practices and everyday identifications and activities. Moreover, it is important to note that clothing in Kabyle usage "el qosh" is often recognised as historical and contemporary marker of identity and not restricted to "daytime items of clothing but also to various garments people wear at night… [c]lothes also includes blankets used for babies or those found in young women's trousseaus" (Makilam, 2007:77).

Many ethnic or stateless minorities striving for the recognition of their identity make use of opportunities available to them within the receiving society, such as through the creation of community spaces, the production of events, the use of freedom of expression in journalism or in diverse forms of minority politics or public festivals. The Kurdish minority in Europe particularly, in Germany, for example, has sought to "raise public awareness of the Kurd's struggle" (Bengio and Maddy-Weitzman, 2013: 78) through the creation of organisations within which different events take place such as the Newroz festivals (Ibid). Newroz, according to Aykan (2014), contributed significantly "in mobilizing Kurds for national causes ever since, providing an occasion for them to demand recognition of their distinct identity" (p. 2) both in their countries of origin and host states. Similarly, Yennayer, commemorations of Berber Spring, Black Spring and other related Amazigh and Kabyle events have been organised annually among Kabyle/Amazigh communities across North Africa and abroad particularly, in France and Canada. The creation of the cultural organisations as a way of forming a cultural-political movement among diaspora communities has allowed the migrants and their children to develop and express cultural, ethnic, political and linguistic identities. It has also been part of the attempt to create public awareness of their situation and to project group identities to the outside world.

6.2 Celebrating Yennayer in London/UK

Many Algerian associations have been created in the UK with a predominant religious affiliation and some of which no longer exist, such as The Algerian British Association; Al Manaar (Muslim Cultural Heritage Centre, Westbourne Park); The Algerian Refugee Council; and The National Algerian Centre (Hopkins and Fiaz, 2009). However, Nadia alongside other Kabyles viewed that the events and the activities the organisation they were part of, which they did not reveal its name, organised did not satisfy their needs. In 2015, they decided to leave and create their own space that better represents them and allows them to sustain the Amazigh/Kabyle culture in the UK, which led to the foundation of the first Amazigh/Kabyle cultural organisation in the UK.

The creation of organisations and digital platforms in the UK were important initiatives for the Kabyles in the UK who sought to expand their transnational relationships to reach not only their families back in Kabylia, but also other Kabyles in the UK and international individuals as shown in the previous chapter (Figure 5-1). This has also produced opportunities for the development of the Kabyle cultural capital in the UK as well as other forms of capital (Bourdieu, 1984), notably cultural, symbolic, economic and political.

My participants have expressed common narratives that they link to Kabylia, such as their selection of objects, colour choices, music, food, 'traditional' celebrations, and art preferences. As Parasecoli (2014) argues, "the establishment of food heritage and traditions plays an important role for the imagination and the cultural capital of migrants" (p. 424). Moreover, the context within which those practices emerged is important in the understanding of my Kabyle participants' shared realities, experiences, and their complex affiliations to Kabyleness.

The first event I attended during my fieldwork was the Amazigh New Year, called Yennayer. Announced on the official Facebook page of the cultural organisation and other online Kabyle pages (see Figure 6-1), a number of Kabyle and European singers were to perform, many of whom travelled to London for the occasion, responding to Nadia's invitation. The following year (Yennayer 2966), the organisation members tried to revive this tradition in the UK, especially attracting those who have not been to Kabylia for a long time.

Figure 6-1 Celebration of Yennayer, January 2016

Locating authenticity through traditions

"We don't need a Gregorian nor a Hijri calendar to structure our life, we have our own… We don't need Christmas to gather we have Yennayer" (Leïla)

The quote above refers to how Leïla, but also other participants and Kabyle activists, try to locate authenticity through the revival and celebration of events that allow them to track their ancestral lineages. Hobsbawm and Ranger's (1983) notion of invention of tradition will be used in this thesis as a guiding concept in order to grasp and show how a group of individuals (intellectuals, political leaders) who share a desire to forge a distinct cultural identity have agreed to invent and re-invent traditions in order to enhance their position. Traditions, according to Hobsbawm and Ranger are invented as "responses to novel situations which take the form of reference to old situations, or which establish their own past by quasi-obligatory repetition" (p. 9). Moreover, within the global era and the age of migration, people 'transnationalise' those events and traditions online.

Based on the general knowledge among the Kabyles and the Amazigh, a number of participants explained during our interviews and conversations that Yennayer is considered to be rooted in an agrarian tradition that has been celebrated for centuries as it gives an ordered structure to life, based on seasons and agricultural tasks. The word Yennayer is composed of two words 'Yen' that means first and 'Ayer' which means month, stemming from the Latin word 'Ianiarius' (January). It is also known among the Kabyles as '*ixf u suggas' or 'amenzu u suggas'* (lit. beginning of the year), in other words, Yennayer introduces the New Year. Following up on the work of Andalusian scholars, Kabyle activists and intellectuals within the Académie Berbère in the 1960s in Paris re-established the event to become a popular, secular and a cultural celebration among North-African Berbers (Plantade, 2010) and among the Amazigh diaspora (Harris, 2018). Inspired by the Julian Solar Calendar, they set the Amazigh calendar as part of the process of constructing an Amazigh identity, alongside other activities such as the creation of the Amazigh flag by Mohand Arab Bessaoud or the revitalisation of the writing system 'Tifinagh'. They sought to link this agrarian tradition to a glorious, historical and prestigious event. The Amazigh Calendar did not exist until Kabyle and Amazigh historians established the first year of the calendar. They linked it to the history of the Berber king 'Shashnaq' or 'sheshaq' and his succession to the Pharaonic throne to become the 13th Pharaoh of Egypt after defeating the Egyptian pharaoh Ramses III in 950BC and who founded the 23rd dynasty (Plantade, 2010). The Amazigh calendar is shifted by thirteen days compared to the Gregorian calendar, which makes the first day of the calendar (normally) the 14th of January of every year. Hence, Yennayer is celebrated among the Amazighs in North Africa between 12th and 14th January. In Algeria, it has been celebrated on 12 January as a national holiday since December 2017.

The event has long existed and has been celebrated across Algeria, especially among the other Amazigh groups of the country such as Beni Snous, in Tlemcen, in Western Algeria, where a traditional Amazigh Carnival is organised for the occasion, known as 'Ayred' (lit. lion). People from this area organise a parade where they are disguised, using animal masks such as a Horse, Lion, or Donkey, and walk throughout the village streets. Jarman (1998), argues that "ceremonial, commemorative and recreational parading through city, town and village streets is one of the principal means of expressing and consolidating a sense of communal identity …" (p. 121). This festivity is sometimes hosted by other Amazigh regions, most commonly, Tizi Ouzou, where organisers invite theatre actors from the area to perform and parade with the Kabyles. Similar events are usually run by cultural organisations and theatre actors. They allow for a variety of ways of collective or individual, real and/or imagined identifications with the Amazigh identity. Beni Snous is an area in the city of Tlemcen which is nearly 750 km away from Kabylia. Despite this distance, an imagined and real connection is created between the two Amazigh groups through symbolic events and carnivals. However, similar Amazigh connections and solidarity in London/UK are weaker.

Among the Kabyle community in the UK, Yennayer is celebrated according to their availability, due to their dispersal within the country. Although the Kabyles of the UK are constrained by time and space, I observed that they energetically invest a lot of effort in the organisation of Yennayer, which usually takes place at the weekends of the beginning of January. This indicates the significance of the event and its history among my participants in the UK, and among North African Amazighs and the Amazigh diaspora (Harris, 2018). The event offers the revitalisation of a shared belief in a group membership and shared history is an important part of establishing an ethnic/cultural identity for the individual (Payne and Nassar, 2008). Hence, Yennayer is a central 'performance/performative event' through which the imagined Amazigh community/nation (Silverstein, 2004) creates a sense of Amazighity, or Kabyleness. The creation of the calendar based on historical events was a remarkable initiative undertaken by Kabyle and Amazigh educated elites and employed by Kabyles to assert and sustain what they call their 'authentic' Amazighity and Kabyleness.

Unlike larger ethnic communities, the Kabyle immigrants are scattered around the UK, considering their small number. Celebrating Yennayer and other events within the Amazigh/Kabyle cultural organisation allows them to form a sense of groupness and develop a sentiment of belonging (Brubaker, 2002; Gazzah, 2008). One of my participants, Ramy, in describing Yennayer, believes that it is "one of the most beautiful gifts that the Amazigh civilisation has offered to humanity". He referred to the importance of keeping those traditions alive and "correct history that has been long falsified". Ramy believes that "a medical mistake can kill a person; a cultural mistake can kill generations".

Ramy's insistence on the maintenance of Kabyle and Amazigh ancestral heritage and cultural practices is also a way to preserve the Kabyle identity. Holliday (2013) views cultural practices "as ways of doing something which relate to particular cultural environments" (p. 6). This involves "everyday behaviour such as eating, washing and communicating, and they are the central part of cultural identity" (Baker, 2015: 57)**.** In addition to cultural practices, there are also social practices, consisting of symbolic capital, that are inscribed as central elements of cultural identity, as will be shown in the next section.

In Kabylia or in the UK, "Yennayer is all about family gathering and sharing values"

"Yennayer is family oriented. The whole family reunite together to celebrate the new year, it's especially fun for the kids, especially for the ones who are celebrating the first Yennayer" Numidia

As an anchored tradition in the Kabyle, Algerian and Amazigh-North African cultures is a time when the whole family celebrates together. It is a "mode of cultural production in the present that has recourse to the past" (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, 1995: 369). The event is preceded and followed by rituals and traditions undertaken by members of the family which formed a larger part of my participants' narratives. These narratives were transmitted in a form of stories or activities to the next generations from parents to children such as the case of Nadia and from famous Kabyle writers and singers. Because of the new environments' constraints such as the non-availability of some ingredients in the UK and the small number of Kabyles, Leïla for example during her visit to me in Southampton and observing my cooking ways and techniques, focused on explaining how the event is 'properly' celebrated in Kabylia, believing that this what should go into my research. This explains why most of the narratives were on Kabylia and sometimes on Kabyles in France and their activities.

According to Leïla, the yearly 'symbolic' celebration of Yennayer is highlighted through the preparation of *immensi n Yennayer* (lit. dinner of Yennayer), which might differ from one region to another or from one family to another. In general, the dinner is prepared with ingredients based on vegetables, mostly seven beans and meat of a sacrificed chicken called *Asfel*, and most of the time dried salted meat known as '*ashedhluh'* or '*aqeddid'*. The latter is commonly used in Amazigh cuisine.

The Ubiquity of food

Food, particularly couscous and olive oil, is by far one of the most indispensable elements in the Kabyles' everyday cooking practices and social performative occasions. It is important in the

transmission, revival and maintenance of Kabyle and Amazigh traditions in Kabylia and in migratory settings. My participants indicated the centrality of Couscous and chicken in the celebration of Yennayer as well as the ingredients. These ingredients, according to Leïla, carry a lot of significance among the Kabyles, where each one is used for a reason. For example, the vegetables and the beans refer to the fertility of the land. This is served with couscous or *berkoukes*[17], which are produced by women using wheat. Hence, Adam asserted that each ingredient refers to the agricultural feature of the event. Moreover, when discussing Kabyle traditions, Numidia added that Kabyle families who have a newborn, or a child that has not been circumcised, they seize the opportunity to do so, and put the child in a large carved wooden or metal bowl, filled with nuts, boiled eggs, and sweets. I spent a lot of time with Numidia, particularly in the kitchen, as she also visited me in Southampton and in Algeria. This time, she joined me in my Algerian kitchen. There, she brought back some earlier discussions we had in the UK about Kabyle traditions, rituals and everyday utensils to validate her cultural knowledge. Moreover, Numidia also used her symbolic capital and knowledge to gain access and create social bonds with my mother, my family and her in-laws in Kabylia**.**

Moreover, Kabyles often recall the efforts dedicated, generally by women, into the production and the realisation of different practical tasks. Makilam (2007) describes how "Couscous "rolling" is a task that takes all morning and requires great thoroughness" (p. 73). When I was at Nadia's house, as part of her daily activities, I have observed the way she was cooking and communicating with the ingredients. I saw how she created a dialogue with the couscous grains, olive oil, Kabyle bread '*aghroum'* through her expressive gazes and caresses through the couscous with great affection and nostalgia. For Ramy, the final touch or "caress of his mother and Kabyle mothers on couscous refers to the amount of love, tenderness and '*el-baraka'* (blessing) they transmit through their cooking skills". Couscous symbolises, according to Makilam, "abundance and prosperity" (Ibid: 73).

[17] Berkoukes (Avazin in Kabyle) is an Algerian traditional dish, also called *berkoukech* or *aïch* in other Algerian regions. It is a hand-rolled semolina based pasta that is shaped like a little ball. It goes through the same process of couscous-making, but with longer steps.

Moreover, based on my observations and my participants' stories on couscous negotiations and the pictures they deliberately shared with me, one can understand that despite the various dishes cooked in Kabylia, couscous seems to be one of the most important markers of Kabyle identity. Through which they express their authentic North-Africanness, their Amazighity and more precisely their Kabyleness. Unlike the couscous prepared in the other regions of the country or in the Maghreb, my participants emphasised that the couscous prepared in Kabylia is unique to the region due to the addition of olive oil, the type of vegetables used (See Figures 6-2) and the serving dishes made of clay with Kabyle designs, which are not available in the UK, unless they bring them from Kabylia. Couscous became linked to several Kabyle traditional occasions such as weddings, ceremonies of circumcisions and historical events such as Yennayer. This indicates the link people build between food, events, material objects and who they are, or who they want to be.

Figure 6-2 Leïla's Couscous

Furthermore, most male participants involved in this research have proudly shared their Kabyle cooked dishes with me, specifying the key ingredients and spices used in Kabylia and Algeria (Figure 6-3), exhibiting ways of *being* and *belonging*. Nadir said that sometimes he relied on his memory to make a dish by adding extra ingredients, and sometimes he needed to call his mother to dictate the exact recipe. He said that it was important to him to have "couscous with Kabyle flavours from time to time as it brings back old memories of childhood and celebrations, while at the same time try something new". Similarly, Ricky sent me a picture of his Couscous with cooked vegetables in a sauce with olive oil that he received from Kabylia. The significance of my participants' practices increases once shared with other Kabyles within the cultural organisation

Figure 6-3 Ricky's Couscous

and online. They negotiate and articulate their sense of belonging and Kabyleness through similar activities, seeking a validation of Kabyle status.

Food preparation has been nostalgically and proudly reported and described by my participants. Although some of them expressed their inability to exactly reproduce them in the UK, they make alternative efforts within the organisation and online. During my last year of fieldwork, Nadia told me about the organisation individuals' intentions to celebrate Yennayer in her house where, as she put it, "its real meaning would be preserved'. Accordingly, Klosinski (1988) believes that "eating together is far more than the ingestion of comestibles. It can also symbolize a complex number of feelings and relationships, mediate social status and power, and be a means of expressing the boundaries of group identity" (p. 56). Therefore, creating a Yennayer atmosphere seems to be very important for the Kabyles in the UK. Many of them told me that they 'almost lost hope' in living the old times again. Despite the fact that they have been celebrating it within the organisation over the last five years, they were still missing the family gathering and the 'home meaning' of Yennayer.

Kabyles created a collective sense of belonging, solidarity and Amazighity/Kabylness through events. The celebration of Yennayer was key here, as most of my participants emphasised its importance for Kabyles and Amazigh people across North Africa as it offered an opportunity to revive the anchored values that were transmitted to them over generations. The interviews and ethnographic conversations demonstrated that Yennayer was not only seen as a festival but also a 'reservoir' of fundamental cultural, social and moral principles. Nadia, Leïla, Anazâr and others passionately described the different rituals and practices that governed the tradition and emphasised that it predated the Islamic era. They argued that Yennayer encompassed human values and a moral order. For Leïla, Yennayer "is all about family gathering and sharing values". The majority of the participants involved in this study referred to the way they prepare for the dinner of Yennayer and the practices around it. Because Leïla considered me as merely 'half' Kabyle, she felt the responsibility of teaching me the different traditional practices and rituals during Yennayer and the cultural differences between Kabyle villages, indicating the richness of Kabyle culture. For example, when we were in the kitchen cooking, she eagerly explained that the tradition prescribed that all members of the family were counted when dressing the dinner table, even those who were absent for work, or travel. Hence, their place is prepared, with a set of plates, cutlery and glasses on the table. Moreover, they also pointed out a set of subjective values that are central to their Kabyle identity, such as thinking about sharing food among the family and among the needy people in the neighbourhood. As Leïla explained, they also take into account the animals' share, notably, the ant, which represents the smallest living creature, in addition to the birds and so on. Although some traditions are very ancient and are no longer used in Kabylia, Leïla insisted on respecting them, such as the type of chicken used for the occasion and that it has to

be raised at home. By doing so, Leïla emphasised the rules and values that underlie Yennayer and therefore were an expression of authentic Kabyleness.

The meetings and celebrations within the Kabyle/Amazigh Cultural organisation were often dominated by Nadia and other Kabyle cooks who helped her in the preparation of the meal. Food, and more particularly Couscous, was part of the event advertisement. Weller and Turkon's (2015) study on the Latino community in New York shows that "food provides a physical link that connects individuals to their heritage culture and local communities" (p. 57). Although the celebration of Yennayer and other events in the UK is relatively different from the one celebrated in Kabyle villages, food seems to be the common feature in both places. Couscous, olive oil, chicken, a selection of vegetables, Algerian Kabyle dishes, as well as European cookies were essential components of the events organised in London or the one organised in Birmingham. They were part of the advertising leaflets for the events, that were also posted online.

Parasecoli (2014) believes that "ingredients, dishes, and practices have the potential to become cultural markers that identify and rally individuals and communities, who frequently display fierce attachment to their food traditions" (p. 423). In the case of the Kabyles, both Kabyle traditional food and the use of their matching serving dishes are considered as symbols and central markers of the Kabyle identity. Within the same vein, cooking skills among Kabyle women is part of their cultural and symbolic capital that can be converted into an economic one. For example, Nadia and her husband run a small business, selling Kabyle food. Also, the Kabyle cafés where the events were organised often displayed Kabyle and Algerian cookies that were part of the café menu, in addition to Kabyle decorative artefacts. Leïla often commented on my cooking skills which she considered sufficiently successful to compensate for the fact that I was only 'half Kabyle'. When introducing me to other Kabyles, she often proudly announced that I could cook Kabyle dishes. At the same time 'traditional' dishes were adapted to the receiving society's culture, in terms of either ingredients' availability and/or serving manners, indicating that variations of the 'original' here are legitimate. For example, in one of my visits to Nadia, she prepared a Kabyle bread with herbs that she picked along the street edges, in combination with some other frozen herbs she had from Kabylia. This bread *aghrum lahwal* (herb bread) usually cooked with wild herbs that they used to collect from Kabyle fields and forests. However, the herbs were not the same. The salad Nadia was preparing was also somehow different to the common one prepared in Kabylia. For example, she added raw peppers and radish, ingredients that are usually cooked in Kabylia. This indicates how Nadia was adopting and adapting her Kabyle cultural and culinary practices according to the British environment.

Couscous and other Kabyle/Algerian food usually had a central role in the events organised in London, notably Yennayer and Berber/Black Sprig in January and April respectively of the years 2016-2019. A traditional Kabyle couscous was often served with carrots, courgettes, green beans, turnip and chickpeas in a red sauce, accompanied with chicken, in addition to some Algerian and European cookies. In his seminal novel "Les chercheurs d'os", Tahar Djaout (1984) indicates the importance of food, and couscous in particular, in the gatherings of the village inhabitants and other festivities, as it "feeds the discussions" (p. 66). Among my participants, Lyly was particularly keen to mention the importance of Couscous and vegetables in Kabyle gastronomy or everyday cooking and more particularly during celebrations. She said, "If guests of older age do not find couscous, they won't enjoy the wedding party or the occasion they are gathered for". As for the events organised in London, Nadir said that he and other Kabyles "came to meet others and eat some food, something that was not available and common every day in London/UK". However, he told me enthusiastically about his cooking talent and how he picks the necessary vegetables to prepare couscous with steamed vegetables, that they call in his region "*aforo*", and other Algerian dishes. Challenging his knowledge about the particular spices used in every dish created a friendly atmosphere and allowed for relaxed conversations.

Reproducing traditions and food in a migratory context, can also be conceived as a transnational act, since people try to create tangible links with their homeland not only through people but also through cooking and sharing the food 'from home'. I often observed that this enables people to bring back nostalgic moments, stories and narratives around a particular dish. When Lyly and Nadia invited me to their house, they made sure to prepare couscous, Algerian and Kabyle traditional dishes. Anecdotes around food preparation were shared continuously and also tangibly expressed Leïla, Lyly, Nadia and Numidia's attachment to their homeland communities. Even when I received Leïla as my guest, I made sure to prepare something Kabyle, maybe to assert my Kabyle identity and seek her acceptance. I prepared Kabyle bread and offered it to my participants at every meeting to thank their participation. This inevitably stimulated conversations about food and objects as part of their understanding of their cultural identity. To sum up, my participants' interactions with food and specific ingredients indicate an important site for their everyday ethnicity. Food acts as a powerful message through which my participants communicate their emotions, negotiate and perform not only their Kabyleness but also to some extent in-betweenness: through occasional and/or everyday cooking and consumption of both Kabyle and British-International products.

6.3 The Kabyle/Amazigh Cultural Organisation and Online Platforms: Objects in Dialogue

The aim of this section is to shed some light on the different practices of the organisation individuals and activists, through which aspects of their Kabyle identity are invoked. A number of factors have allowed a complex interaction of my Kabyle participants with different objects, clothing, food, and language choice such as the process of organising the events, their experience in the receiving society with its lifestyle and constraints and their online presence. The events and meetings I attended were mostly organised in Kabyle-owned cafés in London or through venues booked in London and other UK cities. The events were attended by an interesting diversity of men, women, and their children. Non-Kabyles of different nationalities also came, often displaying a specific interest in the Kabyle/Amazigh culture whilst accompanying their Kabyle friends or partners. Although there was a good number of females during the Yennayer and the Black/Berber Spring events described above, male presence dominated.

The first event I attended in January 2016 started at 4pm. The café was almost full when I arrived, with two of my Algerian friends, one of whom was Kabyle. Kabyle singers and musicians had already prepared the scene with (Algerian) instruments, notably the Algerian *Mandole*, *Derbouka*, *Abendayer* (North African frame drum), the guitar and others. Before starting, Kamel Amazigh, singer and musician, delivered a short speech in Kabyle welcoming the guests and expressing his high esteem to the *Imazighen* (Amazighs) in the UK and all over the world. The band was composed of approximately 5 to 8 musicians. The audience also interacted with them by singing and dancing to the music. The singers brought the gala to life by recreating some famous Kabyle songs.

The event was also marked by the presence of an Algerian journalist living in London, who wrote about the event and posted it on the electronic magazine she works for. In the middle of the celebration in order to gain the attention of everyone, Nadia, the president of the organisation (see Figure 6-4), started her speech in a funny way to attract everyone's attention, where everyone laughed. She said, in Kabyle: "For those who don't know, I am the singer Nadia". She spoke in Kabyle and then continued in English. Her tone of voice changed when she seriously began her speech. She emphasised the importance of keeping together hand in hand in order to preserve this culture, and reminded the audience that many Kabyles had died for its development, continuity and perpetuation. Nadia was still finishing her speech when the musicians stated delicately playing on their instruments' strings, introducing the next part of the event.

Figure 6-4 Nadia during the commemoration of the Black and Berber Spring in London, 2016.

Setting the scene: Rituals before, during and after the events

Kamel Amazigh is the musician and the singer who performed most of the events organised in London. He plays the *Mandole* which is an Algerian instrument, mostly used in *Chaâbi*[18] and Kabyle music. The instrument, according to Tamazight, was invented by the Algerian *Kabyle* singer El Hadj M'Hamed El Anka. When I attended the first Yennayer celebration in 2016, the musicians had already put everything in place. Hence, I made sure to arrive at the following events before they started, so that I could watch how they prepare the scene and the space. For Amazigh, his ritual was to make sure to hang the flag of one of the most popular football teams in Algeria and Africa called JSK (Jeunesse Sportive de Kabylie), one of the most popular symbols of Kabylia and Kabyle culture (Silverstein, 2004). He always selected songs and his performance and speeches. Although the latter were in Kabyle but very brief that I did not understand until the fourth event when I met Leïla. According to her, Amazigh was not fluent in Kabyle. Therefore, his emphasis and behaviour can be explained through how Brubaker et al (2006) defined ethnicity as a "discursive

[18] *Chaâbi, meaning 'popular' in Arabic, is an Algerian musical style.*

resource that can be used for specific interactional purposes" (p. 110). Amazigh here used particular popular Kabyle songs (classics) and the JSK as performative ethnic units to strengthen his position as a Kabyle man within the cultural organisation. He makes sure that he sings about the JSK, and he told us an anecdote about his son, that when he was one-year-old, he bought him a t-shirt of the JSK and told him, "look never forget it and one day you will play in this club". Amazigh's anecdote reflects his attachment to his culture and history through the memories he holds with his favourite Kabyle football club. During the event of the commemoration of the Berber/Black Spring in 2017, one of the ladies in a fancy outfit wanted to borrow his flag, he hesitantly gave it to her and said: "You can see how long I have had it… since the 19…[inaudible][19]". Then the lady happily wrapped it around her waist and joined other Kabyles the dancefloor. This suggests that the JSK is more than a football team not only for men, but also for women, showing how football teams can serve as ethnic and cultural identity markers.

Kabyles' identifications through Kabyle songs and Amazigh poems

The dancefloor is the space where material objects come into contact and dialogue. It is there where I observed the different styles of Kabyle dresses and accompanying accessories, where I saw the flag and the musical instruments. It was also a moment of joy for the dancers, men, women and even children, I could see their happy, funny moves, moving mouths, and randomly shaking hands, either empty or holding Amazigh symbols such as the Amazigh/ Kabyle flag, Kabyle football team flag or 'amendil' (Kabyle scarf) for women as shown Figure 6-5 below.

Figure 6-5 Commemoration of the Black and Berber Spring in London, 2018

[19] Because of the noise, I could not hear the exact date.

Lidskog (2017) has acknowledged the role of music in identity formation processes among diaspora communities. He believes that it "involves a variety of social meanings and operates at all levels of society, from the individual to the global, and plays a key role in many people's lives (p. 24). This includes different diasporic communities such as the Assyrian diasporic communities (Bakker and Aaltje, 2013). Music has played a significant role in the translation and transformation of Kabyle cultural, social and political expressions into musical texts. Most Kabyle singers are viewed as important symbolic figures who do not only represent the best of Kabyle art and culture but who also transmit the authenticity of the Kabyle' stories (Goodman, 2005) and objects through their music. Many Kabyles look at the musical lyrics of their favourite singers as expressive of lyrical and political wisdom, giving voice to both artistic ingenuity and Kabyle colonial and post-colonial suffering. Amazigh believes that "those songs are a kind of school through which they learnt the principles of living …there is always something to learn through this music". According to Courteny-Clarke (1996), "music is an integral part of Berber ceremonies" (p. 187). Kabyle music, in particular, has been fundamental in the maintenance and the transmission of Kabyle/Amazigh ancestral heritage and its internationalisation.

Many of my participants expressed the duty of the Kabyle singer towards their followers/audience and what is expected from them. For instance, Anazâr expressed his opinion as follows: "I like Aït Menguellet, he is a great singer. But I blame him for not getting involved in politics earlier. At the moment when we needed him to raise awareness among the Kabyle population, he was more in romance. He did sing political songs but I wish he did it before". For his part, Mr. Mohand referred to the wisdom of the same singer (i.e., Aït Mengellet) and that he was inspired from his songs while writing essays for his academic exams. This shows how Kabyle 'political' songs/singers have had a huge impact not only on the political consciousness raising among the Kabyle youth, but also influencing and emotionally supporting their social, cultural and intellectual formation.

In silent moments during interviews with my participants or during my stay at Nadia's house, I noticed a common reflex, which was singing in Kabyle. The songs and their lyrics were used in some cases to fill some gaps during our conversations, and at other times as supporting evidence for their claims. For example, when Nadir was describing historical events, he used some musical political lyrics/songs from Matoub. Similarly, M. Mohand used Matoub's lyric "you should judge fairly" when discussing the Black Spring event. The selection of songs was different as it depended on context and topic. For instance, Nadir occasionally broke into songs by Aït Mengellet's or Matoub's as most of our conversations were centred around the social and political situation of Kabylia. Nadia sang some rhythmic songs, through which she brought some joy to the silent atmosphere and made me feel comfortable and forget about my shyness. Similarly, the selection of songs during the events followed the theme upon which they were gathered for. The songs used in Yennayer were more rhythmic and convivial. During the Berber/Black spring events,

related songs were more dominant. However, this did not prevent the audience from joining the dance floor. There was a whole ritual in dancing, as dancing and inviting others to dance was an important part of the events and the celebrations organised in London or in Birmingham that I attended. Overall, there were a couple of pairs either dancing separately or mixing with a group of Kabyles dancing all together and singing at the same time with the singer. On the other hand, those who were watching were the same who were dancing a few minutes before they got tired. Though, there was always somebody standing in the corner as if he was in charge of watching, taking pictures and videos and inviting those who were sitting to dance.

Did you bring your Kabyle dress?

When I arrived at the first event in January 2016, I was wearing a casual outfit. Promptly Nadia came up to me and asked whether I had brought a Kabyle dress with me. I noticed that she asked the same question to any Kabyle woman who did not wear a Kabyle dress. Because the room was small and it was a cold day in January, most women were in casual outfits, adding some Kabyle jewellery on the top. Whether this had been Nadia's direct influence I am not sure but a year later, during the commemoration of the Berber/Black spring in April, 2017, most Kabyle women as well as non-Kabyle women married to Kabyle individuals appeared in different handmade Kabyle dresses, varying from fully embroidered traditional to more simple modernised styles. However, during these events, the attendees were instructed not to share any pictures or videos taken at the events, because there were a lot of families and women who did not want to show up on Facebook or any kind of social media. Therefore, only pictures and videos of the singers were posted. The rejection of expressing their Kabyle identity online was mainly due to the presence of some of Kabyle men's wives, who refused to be exposed on Facebook. They are aware, according to Nadia, that their pictures or videos will be circulating across the different Kabyle and non-Kabyle pages.

During the event of April 2017, I was sitting behind a group of Kabyle women, who were complimenting each other's dresses. They each enthusiastically described their own dress, indicating where they bought it and the ways the tailor sewed it according to their wishes. While some preferred the dress to be loaded with glitter and brightly coloured ribbons, others showed more interest in simple light colours. They were confidently and comfortably showcasing their jewellery, make-up and dresses assorted with stunning and branded sandals. They were different from the Kabyle women I usually see in Kabylia, during social occasions such as weddings and circumcisions. They looked more confident which they gained from their cultural and economic

capital. They showed an ability to embrace the host society's lifestyle while at the same time maintaining their own cultural heritage.

Interestingly, there were a handful of women with jeans or trousers, who simply added the *Fudha* or the JSK flag on the top. In Kabylia, such behaviour would be criticised by the guests because it does not befit the group's agreed behaviour. However, being in the UK, this can be open to multiple interpretations. First, they might have been constrained by time, the weather, public transport and/or the unavailability of Kabyle dresses in the UK market. Or, they felt more comfortable combining their modern outfits with a traditional piece as a form of participation in the collective practice, indicating a dual attachment to both cultures. Even amongst women who were wearing Kabyle dresses, the choice of the dress material, colour and style looked more sophisticated and 'Britishicised'.

The dress is used as a sign of belonging to a national and cultural identity. Edensor (2002) indicates that "clothing is, of course, highly symbolic as an expression of national identity'' (108). The Kabyles' dress is ornamented with colourful ribbons. Edensor, on his work on Material Culture and National identity, believes (2002) that "a further symbolic function occurs in the world of fashion where *haute couture* and design is a badge of innovative modernity and prestige-and often retains a specifically national character where 'traditional' elements are fused with modern designs'' (p. 108). Accordingly, the Kabyle dress has undergone modifications to meet the modern lifestyle. Many Kabyle fashion collections have been created in Kabylia and more importantly in France by Kabyle and/or Franco-Kabyle designers, being inspired from both the traditional Kabyle dress and contemporary fashion to meet the younger generations' taste. In recent years, the Kabyles have organised a special 'Kabyle Dress Day' in Algeria, Paris and Montreal, where Kabyle women parade in the street wearing their dresses along with jewellery. Men also take part, wearing their traditional *Burnous*. Such initiatives are shared on Facebook pages and websites, as shown in the Figures 6-6 and 6-7 below:

Figure 6-7 Kabyle Nationa Day in Nancy, France.

Figure 6-6 Kabyle National Day, in Bejaia, Algeria.

However, in contrast to France for example, the event did not receive the same popularity in the UK because of the reduced number of Kabyles and their distribution around the country. Nadia has also attempted to reproduce similar activities in London. She told me she "launched a challenge for Kabyle women in the UK to come dressed up in Kabyle dresses, by setting a date and a meeting point". However, she was disappointed to find herself alone with her daughter in the heart of Trafalgar Square. She said "I did not give up, but I met few people there who were interested in knowing more about my culture… I took a picture with a Policeman and then came back home". Afterwards, she wrote a post on Facebook reproaching the other Kabyles' lack of interest. As a response, many women commented on her post apologising, each of them justifying their absence and suggesting the re-organisation of the same event.

Cultural consciousness does not only emerge from local practices, but also through transnational activities initiated by immigrants and children of immigrants and then reproduced in the homeland, such as the Day of the Kabyle Dress. Edensor believes (2002) that ''people collectively come to (temporary) arrangements about the value of particular things, what they symbolically mean, how they should be used, and about who should own them and why'' (p. 104). This can be clearly exemplified with Kabyle cultural, political, linguistic symbols, such as the flag, the Kabyle dress, and their jewellery to reflect a sense of belonging to what they call one unified group and to be identified by outsiders. Jarman (1998) has shown that "material culture has been central to

the creation, expression, and distribution of the developing Ulster Protestant sense of collective identity and their allegiance to Great Britain" (p. 121-122). Similarly, the symbol ⵣ (aza) that has been printed on the Amazigh flag, t-shirts, used as pendant and carved onto rings, keyrings, etc. has been used by not only Kabyles, but also Berbers/Amazigh from North African countries, such as the case of the Amazigh Libyan who participated in the events with poems in Tamazight that he wrote, wearing a T-shirt with a ⵣ. Similar symbols participate in the creation of social relationships as indicated by Edensor (2002: 104) and strengthen the transnational link between Amazigh and Kabyle diasporic communities, supported by the involvement of international actors such as Uli Rhode (see chapters 2). Unlike the strong engagement the different Amazigh groups from North African countries in France as highlighted by Harris (2018) in his recent study on the Amazigh diaspora in France, their presence in the UK within the cultural organisation is weaker as shown in earlier chapters. Although material object seem to be a less contentious site for Kabyles to appreciate their gatherings, emphasise their Kabyle identity and support their claims, it also required hard work, reminders and insistence from the events' organisers to encourage the other members to participate in their project.

6.4 The Berber/Black Spring: Creating Shared Narratives

The commemoration of the Berber and Black Spring events "form one of the essential founding elements of a transnational Berber consciousness and instigated the contemporary activist movement" (Collyer, 2008: 694). By juxtaposing the socio-cultural and socio-political history of the Kabyles and their contemporary migration/transnationalism, this part will examine the participants' negotiations and performativity of their Kabyleness within the cultural organisation and online**.**

After the success of the first event, the organisation members started to follow up their activities by organising other events including the Berber Spring and the Black Spring that were commemorated together. These events are central to the Kabyle calendar and to their main national narratives (Tilmatine, 2017). Unlike the celebration of Yennayer which falls within a secular cultural event category, the annual commemoration of the double anniversary of the Berber Spring and the Black Spring, with great focus on the second, is more political. 128 Kabyles died for the Kabyle and the Amazigh cause during the 2001 riots, called the Black Spring (as portrayed in the Figures 6-8 and 6-9 below). Every year, this event is commemorated among the Kabyle diaspora within Kabyles organisations in Algeria, France, Canada, and now the UK and online. It is considered as a traumatic event through which Kabyle people construct a shared narrative of Kabyle history, emphasise their secularism and rejection of the Arabic language. The annual commemoration of the Black Spring offers an opportunity of remembrance; memories and

values. These commemorative events also illustrate many Kabyles' desire to bond with other Kabyles and associate themselves with Kabyle history.



Figure 6-9 portrait of Bouteflika, ex-president of Algeria, made up with photos of Kabyle martyrs who were killed during the Black Spring, 2001. reposted on Facebook during the 2019 Algerian protests.

Figure 6-8 Kabyle march from Kabylia to Algiers in 2001, known as the Black Spring.

This event has long bloomed among cultural organisations in French and Canadian cities playing a crucial role in the universality of the Kabyle and Amazigh identity (Goodman, 2005). Since the creation of the Kabyle/Amazigh Cultural Organisation in 2015, the Kabyle activists have taken the initiative to reproduce it in London. The event in April 2018, was the biggest event I have attended. It was organised in a spacious hall in London and featured performances from famous Kabyle singers residing in France, poetry recitals from a Libyan Amazigh poet and singers based in London/UK. The space was bigger compared to the café where we celebrated Yennayer earlier in January, and a large number of individuals, including families attended. The atmosphere was joyful and many attendees joined in the dancing and singing. However, many of the members did not fully agree with the event's content. Tamazight, Nadir, Leïla, Ramy and others expressed their disagreement, but preferred to attend as it was the only option or space available for them to

express and perform their Kabyleness, and/or expand the Kabyle social network. Lyly decided not to take part, but keep herself updated with what was going on there by following the online.

The following year marked the creation of new gathering spaces. These were meant to meet the members' political inclinations, while at the same time maintain, explicitly or implicitly, links with the Kabyle/Amazigh Cultural Organisation. In April 2019 during my last year of fieldwork, two commemorations took place in the UK for the Berber Spring and Black Spring. While the former was organised by Kabyle politicians in London, under the section of the political movement MAK, the latter was organised by members of the Amazigh/Kabyle cultural organisation. However, the latter was also the singer Hamid Tifrani's initiative, where this time Nadia was invited to host the event, held in Birmingham, suggesting a change in positions within the field.

As similar to the other events, at the April 2019 event the Berber/Black Spring was introduced with a speech by Nadia and followed by 1-minute silence for those who died during the Black Spring, and for all Kabyles who, Nadia said, "were victims of marginalisation and were either assassinated for their ideas in Algeria, or exiled". During this event, there were new faces that I had not seen in former events. Another key contributor, Farid, a Kabyle man living in the UK, delivered a powerful speech in Kabyle, through which he reminded the audience about their gathering and insisted on the importance of similar events in the maintenance of their ties and their identity. In her study on the Syriac Christian diaspora's experiences based on ethnicity, religion, memory and language, Armbruster (2013) explained their concerns about their language as well as their community endangerment. Here, Farid's insistence implies his fear of community endangerment. He, for example, repeatedly said: "now our children are marrying Europeans, I want my daughter to know X' children [pointing to a Kabyle friend]". This shows his belief in the importance of intra-ethnic marriage among (Kabyle) minorities in maintaining (Kabyle) cultural and ethnic identity and subsequently, keeping the links with the homeland [Kabylia] and its local communities, noting that many of my participants are in a mixed marriage case or have been through intermarriage experiences, including Farid himself.

Nevertheless, the event did not go as Nadia's family or I expected, which occupied a large part of our discussion on our way back home and the next few days as well. Farid's speech revolved around the creation of a new space for the Kabyles' gathering, while Nadia expected the event organisers to acknowledge her efforts. However, she said that at some point "everyone brought forward their well-reputed village for being the village of a famous Kabyle warrior, martyr, political leader and/or artist". Nadia indicated that they preferred to create a *Tajmaât* or tribal system in the UK, where each individual becomes a member of their related committee. However, according to Nadia, this is impossible: "The UK is not France, every committee in France has more than 30 members and they are all active, the rules are very strict there… the *Tajmaât* system

created in France is not to divide the Kabyles, it is meant to manage their big number". The Kabyle/Amazigh Cultural Organisation was a successful attempt to bring the Kabyles of the UK together, for cultural ends. However, despite its effort to unify the Kabyles in and around London, the individuals' political, socio-cultural and socio-economic statuses opened up space for new tensions, conflicts, but also the re-emergence of old dichotomies, notably the Kabyle/*Ambrabedh* distinction, as I will show in chapter 7. This example illustrates the hierarchy among the Kabyles their social characteristics created despite their proclaimed belonging to a shared origin, which is the result of their different conceptions of the Kabyle cultural capital, and what this should consist of.

Remembering our late heroes

As shown earlier, different events have been organised in London and other UK cities since the establishment of the Kabyle/Amazigh cultural organisation. This involved gatherings in Birmingham and in London, either to commemorate past events or to create spaces for Kabyles to meet, maintain links, exchange ideas and socialise.

In late January 2019, a group of Kabyles with a majority of a MAK political adherence gathered in London, in a Kabyle café to pay tribute to a famous Kabyle singer called Djamel Allam. This event and its atmosphere were different from the previous ones I attended. The space was male dominated with a presence of a handful women, notably one of the singer's British wife, Leïla, my Algerian non-Kabyle friend and me. Spaces with a loaded political atmosphere involved a rarer participation of females. Female presence depended mostly on Nadia's presence, as if Nadia was the gatekeeper of all the organisation members. In this sense, while Kabyle men's Kabyle identity was mainly expressed through political stances, women opted for a more cultural aspect of their Kabyleness in the UK. Although Kabyle and Algerian women have significantly contributed in the Algerian War of Independence socially as well as politically, their presence in the political domain decreased after independence due to the Black decade and its outcomes.

As usual, the singers delivered a welcoming speech in Kabyle and a brief text on the reason for our gathering. The first singer, Amazigh, as is customary, hung his JSK flag on the wall, that became almost the hallmark of all the events, he took out his Algerian *Mandole*, his musical book and he started singing the same songs from the previous events, with the participation of the band and the audience. Leïla was showing her dissatisfaction with Amazigh's performance from time to

Figure 6-10 Festive ambience during a Kabyle event in London

time through her facial expression. While Amazigh was singing his last lines of the chorus, the singer Cherif started preparing himself to replace him. He took out his Kabyle accessories and put on a tie and a jacket that were made of colourful striped *fudha*-like material (See Figure 6-10), he then put a hat made with the same material printed with the symbol (ⵣ) on one of the musician's heads. He moved to the microphone and started then with a speech about Djamal Allam, how important he was and how he contributed to the continuity of Kabyle culture through his meaningful songs. In addition to Allam's songs, Cherif revived some other Kabyle traditional songs such as Idir's Masterpiece *a vava inouva* (released in 1976). It appeared that Leïla fully enjoyed Cherif's performance, she repeated from time to time: "Ahh, he's very good… he's very good". When she came to Southampton, we had a brief discussion about the event, the singers and the audience and she repeated the same claim, and that Amazigh's language "was not at a native level, and his pronunciation was not clear". In another discussion with Nadia on Kabyle Language, she told me that Amazigh was "like you, he is Kabyle, but he was born and raised in Algiers… he makes huge efforts to speak in Kabyle". Therefore, as mentioned earlier, Leïla's understanding of Kabyleness implies the ability to speak Kabyle perfectly. Therefore, according to Leïla, language is the symbolic capital that allows other members to access the Kabyle TSF, or in other words, the Kabyle native space.

During the event, Cherif's wife came to talk to me and my friend, expressing her pleasure to see us around and her appreciation of Kabyle culture and music. She said she liked Kabylia and Algiers and she often flew there. She said that she organised an exhibition on the Kabyles' material culture in London, because she felt sorry about how this is not well-exploited by the Kabyles themselves to promote their culture in the UK. As for the audience, they did not fully interact with the singers. They were chatting and at the same time nodding their heads following the music rhythm. From time to time, they engaged with the singer by loudly singing and clapping all together.

The members' social positions and political differences were more visible at that event. The layout of the room and the table made them sit in a group of 4-6 around one table. At the entrance, the first chairs were occupied by old Kabyle men emphasising a visible political orientation through the MAK pin they had attached to their jackets. Further in the room there was a group of well-dressed men in their 30s and 40s sitting together and chatting with confidence. These belonged to a category with stable socio-economic status. Next to the musicians, there was a group of younger Kabyle men, who as I was told later, were 'undocumented'. Noting that the majority came through language or university courses programmes. From a Bourdieusian perspective, education **"**as symbolic capital worked together with other capitals to advantage and disadvantage, and to position agents in multiple fields" (Thomson, 2012: 74). In this context, although education has advantageously positioned some Kabyle educated migrants in London/UK

within the Kabyle TSF and elsewhere, immigration status, on the other hand, disadvantaged others, despite their educational level. For example, Nadia purposefully suggested well socially positioned people with successful migration experience to be the best representatives of the Kabyles in the UK**.** To conclude, these events revealed differences, hierarchies, multiple identifications, stances and positions among the Kabyles within the different fields, making the cultural organisation as well as the online platforms a contentious site for identity-relevant issues.

6.5 Kabyles' Everyday Interactions with Objects

In this section, I will show four of my participants' different and complex perceptions towards their Kabyle clothing, jewellery and objects and their actual offline and online practices. Unlike the cultural and social significance of objects for women**.**

Nadia's precious dresses, jewellery and pots…

The manufacturers of Kabyle dress have embroidered the ⵣ symbol on it. This has increased its symbolic value and popularity among the customers. When I told Nadia that I was travelling to France, she told me that "the best fabric for Kabyle dresses is sold in France", and then said that she would give me the exact address to bring her two pieces. When I asked her whether they were produced by Kabyles, she said that there is a factory created by a Kabyle man a long time ago, where most Kabyles buy fabrics, as they were not affordable in Kabylia.

Kabyle fabrics, textile and handmade objects, such as carpets, dresses, and pottery did not have a big market in Kabylia because of the mountainous and rocky nature of the region, in addition to the chaotic situation after independence in 1962. Hence, Kabyle women sought to be self-sufficient. They made and used their own products, since the craft was mastered by the majority of women. Besides, according to Nadia, in Kabylia, people would gossip if a woman would buy couscous, or any kind of handicrafts because they were expected to make them themselves. In the UK, my Kabyle women participants often proudly shared their hand-made Kabyle cookies or dishes. This is to show, on the one hand, their cooking skills that assert their Kabyleness, and on the other hand, their attachment and revival of Kabyle traditions abroad, through cooking, by sharing these practices with their fellow Kabyles through phone calls or online. When I spoke to Nadia, or other participants, on the phone they usually mentioned what Kabyle dish they cooked for lunch or dinner. Nadia shared a livestream video on her cooking of *Tighrifin*, an Amazigh pancake, from her restaurant. I have followed her live with a number of her friends from her

contact list. She received very positive interactions and comments from them, particularly Kabyle ones, who started ironically and jokingly ordering *Tighrifin* according to their preferences.

In the British context, despite the availability and the adoption of industrial cookware, textiles, trendy and branded dresses and clothes, my Kabyle women participants continue to express their closeness and their unreadiness to abandon their Kabyle objects. However, their behaviours also indicate their attachment to the receiving society's taste. Therefore, their perceptions were embedded in a situational and contextual embodiment of both cultures, where they have adopted a British-European-Kabyle style. For example, during the events, while some of them came dressed up from home, others brought their clothes and changed in the café's fitting room. Some mixed the style together like Nadia's T-shirt on which she sewed the Amazigh sign, or the ladies who attended the event with their casual outfits with a Kabyle *fudha* or other Kabyle signifiers.

Another relevant example is that of my participants' inside and outside house decoration through which they may create a cultural landscape to mark cultural distinctiveness. For example, as part of my fieldwork, I also observed the spaces where the events took place, including their names, the decoration and the menu. While some cafés chose a Kabyle decorative façade, with a Kabyle name and Kabyle symbols (see Figure 6-11), others used French and English names, but often with an Algerian menu and decor inside.

Figure 6-11 Kabyle Café in London.

Nadia, like many other participants, brought a set of pottery from Kabylia to her UK home. They all indicate "a lot of memories" and significance in her life. When she prepared couscous for dinner, she made sure to bring the Kabyle set that was packed in the loft, as she had just moved to that house. For her, some traditional dishes that should be served in Kabyle clay sets and not the ceramic ones, such as couscous. Some objects are of different value and it is generally both the owners and the objects who give them and preserve their meritorious value. For instance, based on Nadia and Leïla's narratives, the jar is viewed as a craft manufactured with clay and ornamented with Kabyle designs and jewellery and sold nowadays as a handmade symbolic object of the Kabyle culture and identity. However, its value means more than that. For the Kabyle women the jar reflects, on the one hand, the miserable experience they lived in the past as they needed to carry heavy jerricans, and on the other hand, those nostalgic times, when all the women of *Taddart* -the village- would gather around the spring. There, women and their young

daughters would speak about their daily practices, gossip and sing popular songs while washing their clothes.

Numidia's experience with Kabyle objects

Nadia's daughter was newly married to a Kabyle man in Kabylia. She expressed her love of Kabyle jewellery and the social significance they carry, that she learnt from her mother and through frequent visits to Kabylia. The traditions, she said, vary from one area to another; hence, the meaning of similar jewellery pieces might have different interpretations. Numidia's jewellery was part of her dowry (See picture Figure 6-12). They refer to her closeness to her husband, which also became part of her narrative. That is, she always mentions that the jewellery she is wearing was from her husband. For example, when she came to my house, we watched her wedding party with my Algerian friend, who commented on the beauty of her jewellery and Numidia proudly and cheerfully told her that she received them from her husband and carried on with the Kabyle wedding rituals. The pieces of jewellery, as Numidia emphasised, invoke not only a personal attachment to the husband, but also to the family and the community in general. Numidia received the whole set from her husband and family in Law and explained the function of every piece of jewellery such as: *thabzimt*: Kabyle round brooche; *azrar*: necklace; *ameshloukh*: bracelet; *thimengouchin*: earrings; *thikhwathem*: rings; *amendil*: Kabyle small satin scarf. She referred to the complicity of objects in the Kabyles' understanding of their family ties, husband-wife emotionality and togetherness.



Figure-6-12 Numidia's Jewellery

Numidia told me once about the rituals and practices that have taken place. For example, she said her mother-in-law and sister-in-law put the *thabzimt* in some water in a clayed bowl as a sign of a new beginning, as shown in Figure 6-13. She has indicated the centrality of Kabyle jewellery, as other artefacts, notably the dress and its *fudha*, the hand-woven carpets, in the Kabyles' cultural and social life. She argued:

Figure 6-13 Soaking the mother's in law *thabzimt* in water as a sign of new clear beginning for the new couple.

> "… and also did you know a l'ancienne [in the old-fashioned way/in the past] les filles [girls] when they got married, they didn't used to speak to their families freely if they had problems with their in-laws, so when their families came to visit, the bride would show their parents if they were happy or sad through jewellery, clothes and bed covers. For example, if they are happy then they would wear all of their feta ed'chebhat [beautiful silver jewellery] but if they are sad or having problems, they won't wear their jewellery and when they wear a Kabyle dress, they turn their *Fudha* inside out. The same with bed covers".

Items of Jewellery are not only accessories, but people also assign them roles and meanings through their practices. Jewellery becomes the language through which they express their joys, struggles, emotions and allegiance to a group. Therefore, it has become indispensable to its owners and part of their cultural identities that travels with them to their new destinations. Miller (2010) argues that "a particular society [group of people] elaborates its cultural practices through an underlying pattern which is manifested in a multitude of diverse forms … by learning to interact with a whole slew of different material culture, an individual grows up assuming the norms that we call culture" (p. 53). Kabyle clothing, crafts and pottery, as well as food, are bound up with the process of their communication and everyday social interactions. Moreover, they are also used to establish boundaries around their cultural and ethnic belonging**.**

Drawing on Bourdieu's Theory of Practice and Habitus, Miller (2010) argues that "the child doesn't learn things as a passive set of categories, but through everyday routines that lead to consistent interaction with things" (p. 53). For Bourdieu, "what, in industrial societies, we now tend to inculcate through formal education happens to children born into Kabyle society through a process of habituation with the order of things around them" (Miller, 2010: 52-53). However, I would argue that there is an intentional and delibrate effort, often led by women/mothers, contributing to the process of routinisation of a given practice. We might "unconsciously acquire the principles of art and the art of living" (ibid: 53), but there is a conscious transmission and subsequent negotiation of those principles.

For example, during my first visit to Lyly, while she delightfully and proudly served us couscous, she indicated how important it was for her mother to teach her and her sisters how to prepare couscous and other Kabyle traditional dishes, particularly because they were born and raised in a non-Kabyle Algerian region. She said: "you know, they [Kabyle mothers] always think about what our future husband and in-laws would think about us". Lyly has referred to her beauty, cooking skills, linguistic skills, educational background as a "baggage and predispositions" that appeared

to empower and strengthen her position in front of her husband, her family in-law and the new environment.

Moreover, such practices are also maintained in migratory contexts, such as the case of Nadia with her daughter as ways of *being and becoming*. Nadia was dictating to Numidia and showing her the 'right' way of making Kabyle bread, the spices to be used in every type of dish she made during my stay with them. Although Numidia was born in the UK, she has shown great awareness of the cultural as well as the social and political use of the different Kabyle objects.

Tamazight's discovery of Kabyle artefacts

As introduced in chapter 5, Tamazight is a young Franco-Kabyle-Lebanese young woman living in London. Unlike the other participants who have chronologically narrated their biographies and then referred back and forth to their past and present experiences, Tamazight told me her story in an unstructured manner. Her recent discovery of her Kabyle origin and the Amazigh culture has triggered her curiosity to know more. She said: "I started to read a little bit about the Berber culture, about the Kabyles, the jewellery, Oh the jewellery! I started telling my mother that she should have bought some Kabyle jewellery for us". Kabyle jewellery, objects and/or village folks' rituals were among the various Kabyle elements that caught her attention. In order to show her cultural knowledge about the Kabyle social structure, Tamazight referred to a novel she read recently and described meticulously the Kabyle rituals in ancient Kabyle villages. She said:

> "There is a novel I read recently about all these rituals that they used to practise: children at weddings, in cases of infertility for example. I formulate my own euuh, because I don't remember the details: When a woman is infertile, she goes with her husband to see the Sheikh you see, they will pray. Then, the woman must go to the river, she must practise a ritual, if she has menstruation, she has to wash her clothes in the sea. You see, there is all this culture… all these rituals there and in addition to this, in the book he tells you about the children, the rituals that Kabyles Muslims have incorporated within their own. Before they were praying, they were calling Allah! Mohamed! They managed to keep their culture even after integrating Islam whereas the other Algerians n! Well I don't know them all but in Algiers. Even the Kabyles who are in Algiers didn't maintain it! That's what I regret a little bit" Tamazight

Tamazight was present at all the cultural events and meetings organised within the cultural organisation in London. According to Nadia, Tamazight has contributed to its growth and development with dedication. However, she did not take part of the other events organised outside of the organisation, despite the fact that she wished the organisation gave more importance to the historical and political development of the Kabyle cultural movement. Tamazight's insistence on maintaining these details indicates her fear of the culture and community endangerment.

Figure 6-14 Tamazight with another Kabyle woman in London.

Tamazight often wore her beautiful traditional or modernised Kabyle dresses with fine Kabyle silver rings or earrings during the events I have been to. She happily came to the event dressed in her Kabyle outfit as shown in Figure 6-14.

Lyly's dresses and Jewellery

Lyly did not attend any of the events I went to. She preferred to follow and interact with the cultural organisation through online platforms. She believed that the cultural organisation should focus more on Kabyle history and its prominent figures.

> "It's not I don't like or I'm criticising it but the most of this association it's like they are taking it easy. It's not about our culture even, keeping singing things dancing…no, we are not gypsies! It's not part of our culture…They should do expositions about Krim Belkacem[20], personality like… historical personality or people who are really fighting for our cause, identity but not in this way. I'm sorry! I don't want to be part of the… anyway! I can be there just to meet up other kabyles but not to take part of it. C'est bas! Comment dire! C'est bas! That's low, how to say it! That's low!"

On the other hand, Lyly has expressed her perpetual and strong attachment to Kabyle textiles and jewellery wherever she was as follows:

[20] Krim Belkacem is one of the Algerian political leaders during the Algerian War of Independence.

> "I kept my Kabyle language, and I like the Kabyle dress. In my wardrobe, I have a shelf only for Kabyle dresses, I have Kabyle accessories, and I like Kabyle Jewellery a lot. Always useful, I am not interested in Gold, but Kabyle Jewellery, Berber jewellery; I have a lot, anyway, when you come next time we will take pictures of Kabyle accessories and Kabyle dresses and everything."

In addition to language that Lyly considers as a marker of her Kabyle identity as I shall discuss in chapter 8, she has referred to material objects. On one of my visits to her house, she showed me her Kabyle jewellery, and enthusiastically and meticulously explained its significance, especially with the presence of my non-Kabyle Algerian friend. She took us to her bedroom, and with confidence opened her wardrobe and showed us a pile of Kabyle dresses, although she does not wear them every day in her new life. The following day, Lyly sent me some pictures of herself wearing the Kabyle dress in London and putting the Amazigh flag on her child. By sending me the pictures, Lyly wanted to show her attachment to Kabyle jewellery and dresses, and thereafter her maintenance of her Kabyle identity in the UK.

The jewellery she has is a wedding gift from her mother, something that is common in the Kabyle tradition. Nevertheless, the Kabyle silver jewellery is often offered by the family in-laws. According to Tulloch (1999), "accessories which dress the head, hands and feet can, in their right, supply a cultural and social narrative" (p. 63), narratives that usually reflect their routines and everyday practices. The jewellery-set Lyly showed me was composed of purely authentic mid-grey silver-handmade *thaasabt* decorated with corals. This is a Kabyle large piece of forehead jewellery. As she explained, it symbolises the ties between the two families (her family and her in-laws). There was a large heavy colourful necklace, notably painted with green, yellow, blue and red, and embellished with corals. According to Leïla, these colours come from the Kabyle nature. In addition to a *meqyas* or as she called it, *ameshloukh*. The latter is a big bracelet that she bought after receiving her first salary. Moreover, a large brooch commonly pinned on the women's dresses, which usually comes in the shape of a circle, called *thabzimt*. This one is often offered by the husband and usually belonged to his mother. For Lyly, her mum offered her this piece when she had her first child. In Kabyle culture, Lyly said, the mother should give her daughter a present when giving birth. There are other pins with different shapes and different names.

In short, owning jewellery pieces, according to Lyly was very important in the Kabyle society, despite the price. This also indicates how individuals negotiate the priority of spending their money. Interestingly, although I met Lyly several times, she never wore any of her jewellery, even the small and thin pieces. These pieces are worn for special occasions only. The same for Numidia who was wearing her Kabyle jewellery and dresses in celebrations and Kabyle gatherings. Compared to the German singer Uli Rodhe for example who adopted the Kabyle and Amazigh style in her everyday clothing and accessories (See Figure 6-15). Therefore, the relationship between my participants and their Kabyle objects is complex, dynamic and contextual. On the one hand, the significance of such practices, through which women seek identity assertion and pride, is still relevant among immigrants to the extent that they travel with them. On the other hand, the relationship is more symbolic, where keeping Kabyle objects and jewellery seem to be important but for their personal records and displayed during social occasions such as wedding parties in Kabylia and during the events I attended in London and Birmingham.

Figure 6-15 Uli Rhode wearing her casual Kabylised outfit.

Gendered practices: We take care of politics and you take care of the cultural representation and preservation

Over the course of my ethnographic fieldwork, the notion of Kabyleness appeared to be entangled with gendered practices. Bodies are gendered, racialised and ethnicised (Butler, 1993; Harjunen, 2017). They inhabit a specific field with specific habitus constituting of symbolic capital, which is embodied in practice (Bourdieu, 1984; 1986). For example, Numidia often wore her casual Kabyle dress in the kitchen, when preparing dinner. Artefacts and the dress here form an important part of the field. Therefore**,** the events, artefacts, as well as my participants' everydayness offer a window into the construction and distribution of gendered roles and how these are bound up with the negotiations and performances of Kabyleness in the transnational social field.

Both Uncle Saïd and Lyly's husband have lived in the UK for more than 20 years. It has been shown that Uncle Saïd's desire is not to confine his wife within domestic field. He encouraged her to learn English, work and boost her social and professional status in the UK. Nadia's husband naturally helped with the household, as did other participants who shared happily their cooking skills. However, Lyly explained on many occasions that her husband preferred her to stay at home. However, she said: "I persisted, I emphasised that I did not study and come to the UK to stay at home… I told him you could have married an uneducated woman". Lyly had a strong

character which permitted her to follow her ambitions. For Lyly, a Kabyle woman is the one who "is well-educated, cooks well, dresses well and intelligent", forming her cultural and symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1986).

Moreover, my participants' online practices involved sharing or re-sharing posts and/or pictures that aim to portray the Kabyle woman as the indigenous woman that represents authenticity, strength and modernity. They were happy to see them involved in different social positions and domains, while maintaining their identity markers notably the dress, jewellery, cooking skills, and language. Makilam (2007) believes in the Kabyle "women's magic [that] was expressed in every domain of their daily lives: pottery making, food provision/preparation, and weaving. In fact, the traditional Kabyle society was incapable of functioning without women, who ensured its material and spiritual unity" (Back of the book). In this sense, their perceptions allegorise the woman as the 'pure' and 'authentic' representative of the Kabyle culture, tradition and indigeneity, referencing their embodied practices.

Figure 6-16 An online-shared picture portraying a little Kabyle girl as the symbol of Kabyle women's power and determination.

On the other hand, it is important to note that even women have significantly emphasised the centrality of artefacts, as strong ethnic identity markers, in their contemporaneity. As argued in the earlier section, the relationship between Kabyle women and artefact goes beyond the ethnic representation. Nadia, Lyly, Tamazight and Numidia have indicated how objects act as a 'performative' language that allows them to communicate their unspoken feelings and emotions with regards to their circumstances.

Men, in turn, have also expressed their interests towards Kabyle objects with lesser visibility than the female, and took part in their valorisation. The musicians for example were equipped with necessary Kabyle and Algerian instruments. Kabyle symbols were printed on some of their instruments and/or outfits. Among the members, a white traditional *Burnous,* the Amazigh and the JSK flags were predominantly present in all the events I have been to. However, in addition to their cultural meanings, they indicate a political affiliation, as will be shown in the next chapter.

Figure 6-17 The Singer and musicians wearing costumes based on *Fudha*-like material and design.

6.6 Discussion and Conclusion

The primary aim of the cultural organisation and its members was to signal and enhance an ethnic and cultural distinctiveness in a new migratory setting. This was achieved through the creation of events, purchase, use, display and trajectory of objects, online posts and interactions, music and dances, recipe exchanges, and language practices. This chapter has explored how negotiations of Kabyleness vacillated between performances, embodiment of hybridity, political secular organisations, complex everyday practices and online interactions. The diversity of its members, as described in chapter 5, delineates the complexity and dynamism of their ethnic practices in the multiple interlinked fields. Recently, another Kabyle café in London has opened its doors to Kabyles to expand their field and organise their meetings, while enjoying Kabyle food. Creating spaces does not only involve the celebration of events but also the production of capital (social, cultural, political and symbolic), emphasising ethnic belonging and allegiance to the group.

Amazigh/Kabyle cultural forms and symbols have been exploited and exposed within the organisation and throughout online platforms. This involved clothing (Kabyle dresses, men's costumes, *burnous*), flags, jewellery, language symbols (neo-Tifinagh), Kabyle/Algerian instruments, food and pottery, as well as music and its symbolic and meaningful lyrics. Moreover, participants have shown their preferences towards particular objects over others, to which they attach cultural, social, economic and political meanings. For example, Tamazight, Lyly and Numidia have expressed their leaning to Kabyle silver jewellery more than gold despite its high economic value. For them, owning Kabyle jewellery and the dress do not only reflect the beauty of a Kabyle woman, but also reflect the efforts of its artisans in giving a soul to those objects and translating the Kabyle culture into significant expressive pieces. Moreover, they act as a language that gives voice to women to express their struggles, worries and joys.

Key scholars within the social sciences, such as Baudrillard (1981), Bourdieu (1984), Appadurai (1986), and Douglas and Isherwood (2002) have taken into account cultural, political and economic perspectives in their analyses of objects/commodities, acknowledging the relationship between the object and its value. Certain things or commodities are altogether more symbolic of national and/or ethnic identity/identities, and using or buying them, might constitute a patriotic duty such as owning the Amazigh or Kabyle flag. Kabyles in the UK order them from websites and have them delivered from France. This shows the trajectory of goods as well as the value and symbolic meaning individuals are engaged in making through them. As Appadurai (1986) argues, "it is the things-in-motion that illuminate the human and social context" (p. 5) of human actors. This chapter has shown not only the migration and the establishment of a group of people, but also the transfer of their objects including their uses and trajectories and the meaning they carry

with them. People not only maintain ties with their homeland through families and friends, but also through objects, food and music.

The songs selected during the events were mostly songs with particular romantic, cultural or political message. Most songs are inspired from Kabyles' ancestors' anecdotes and Amazigh legends and myths. These are material accounts through which activists engage in communicating certain messages (Goodman, 2005). Moreover, among the Kabyles, the choice of names, books, poems, songs, literary works and musical instruments are perceived as important tools in the development of the self, and the construction of Kabyleness. According to Bourdieu and Nice (2010), "objectively or subjectively aesthetic stances adopted in matters like cosmetics, clothing or home decoration are opportunities to experience or assert one's position in social space" (p. 50). Therefore, the Kabyles' expression of collectivity was in the form of creation of organisations and gathering spaces, ritual performances, celebratory and commemorative events, personalised Kabyle dresses and costumes and food preparations. However, their diverse perceptions of what 'being Kabyle' meant and their individual characteristics unravel the tensions and conflicts that run through the Kabyle community, which has involved political disagreement and events negotiations. Furthermore, it has also entailed diverse debates and complex practices surrounding 'the religious' and 'the secular' that were brought to bear on Kabyles' everyday ethnic and non-ethnic activities. This will be addressed in the following chapter.

Chapter 7 Creation of Boundaries: A Secularised Ethnic Identity in the UK

Since my stay in the UK my headscarf has never been as commented on as it was by some Kabyle participants who made their attitudes to it known to me on many occasions. Expecting this to happen I often checked participant profiles on Facebook before contacting them. My personal experience with Kabyles in Algeria and France, within my family and circle of acquaintances, as well as with the Kabyle social media landscape where critical comments on Islamic practices and styles of dress abounded, made me highly conscious that wearing hijab could challenge people's secular beliefs. Frequently I felt uncomfortable before meeting Kabyle people in the UK for the first time because I expected my Muslim identity to be controversial. When I first visited Lyly, for example, my friend and I went directly to her house. She did not notice that I was wearing a headscarf because I left it on my shoulders when I entered her house behind my friend. When we accompanied her to pick up her child, she saw me putting it on my head and said: "Ah you wear the headscarf! Fair enough, I respect you and it's your choice!". Similarly, while waiting for our turn in a café, Anazâr came closer to me, lowered his voice and said: "I am sure that your parents did not agree on the fact that you wear the hijab". I smiled neither confirming nor denying what he had said. However, later in the conversation I told him that wearing the headscarf was my personal choice, and added that my sister, who was older than me, did not wear it. I found myself repeating the same sentence on many occasions. Anazâr's reaction to my headscarf and thinking that my parents would not accept that I wore it, indicates how certain religious practices are assumed to be 'collectively perceived'. Moreover, these are also used by individuals to draw "ethnic boundaries" (Barth, 1996) in a migratory setting. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the ways in which my participants develop a sense of Kabyleness drawing on secularist versus religious claims and habits.

7.1 Introduction

The creation of the Kabyle TSF has involved the establishment of symbolic boundaries among the participants' in-group. The Kabyle/Amazigh Cultural Organisation in the UK is explicitly defined as a secular ethnic community, where religion is not the unifying element, unlike what has been described for Muslim Maghrebi in France (Cesari, 2004). My participants' Kabyleness appears to reside ambiguously between two dichotomies: the 'religious' and the 'secular', where the two notions overlap (Asad, 2003). Put differently, the participants' self-conception and understanding of their Kabyleness as distinguished from 'Arabness' has been largely backed up by their

secularism and secularised embodied behaviours. According to Ulloa (2019), religion "lies at the crossroads of various political, cultural, ethnic, national, supra-national" (p. 299) and historical spheres. Following from this, I examine how and to what ends the ethnicisation and politicisation of debates on religion (particularly Islam) inform the secular orientation of many UK Kabyles.

This chapter explores the study's first and second research questions. First, it addresses the ways in which Kabyleness is negotiated in a British setting within the Kabyle TSF, putting forward secularism as the basic feature of Kabyle identity. Addressing sex and gender, Brubaker (2018) asks the following questions:

> "Who has access to what categories and to the social spaces reserved for their members? Who controls- and patrols – the boundaries of categories? How do new categories – and new kinds of people named by those categories – come into being? Can one choose to become a member of a category that is generally understood as biologically based and fixed at birth? In a world crisscrossed by dense classificatory grids, is it possible to live between or beyond categories?" (p.5).

Brubaker's questions also resonate with the case of the Kabyles involved in this study, and the theme presented in this chapter. I will show how the individuals' interactions, connections and boundaries within the transnational social field are defined in terms of categories that emphasise a Kabyle status in a migratory context. Further, this chapter explores the second research question that examines the impact of the British environment on the Kabyles and how it manages their perceptions towards the differences among them. In short, it shows that despite the UK's approach to secularism, my participants' response to religion echoed the French position that bans all religious signs from public spheres. Moreover, the third research question is also addressed in this chapter, by showing how the cultural organisation and online platforms are used to disseminate a secular understanding of Kabyle identity, through the type of events organised in London/UK and the online posts and interactions**.**

Therefore, this chapter throws light on the binary religion and secularism within the cultural organisation, online platforms and the Kabyles' everydayness, including daily interactions and activities at home and/or shared online. This has involved, for example, religion-related dietary routines, fashion choices and going to places of worship, that according to Coutinho (2016), can indicate the individuals' religiosity. Nevertheless, in some cases relying on similar visible practices to identify or assume one's religiosity might be misleading. People sometimes can be spiritually and privately religious without making it visible to everyone, as this chapter will show. In short,

this chapter seeks to examine the meanings that Kabyle participants construct about their Kabyle cultural capital within different sites to consolidate an impression of who they are and of their Kabyleness, through their auto-biographical narratives and subjective lived experiences. These were communicated during interviews, shared through their posts on Kabyle online pages, online chatting spaces and/or performed within the cultural organisation. This chapter looks at the different positions and paths taken by the Kabyles in the UK in terms of their secularised and/or religious trajectories. It explores how they articulate their relationship to Islam and to 'secularism', and how this jointly informs ideas about the preservation of ethnic and linguistic identity.

In what follows, I will start a discussion on the relationship between religion, secularism, modernity and Kabyleness from the research subjects' perspectives. To do so, I will explore my respondents' attitudes toward gender. I will explain how women position themselves and are positioned by my Kabyle male participants (during interviews or online), mainly because Kabyle women often view themselves and/or are viewed as 'pure' representatives of Kabyle secular ethnicity, as demonstrated in chapter 6. This notion has also shaped my analysis as it reveals a sort of idealisation of the image of Kabyle women. This discussion directs us to argue for the formation of a Kabyle secular identity within the Kabyle TSF. This formation could be explained by historical and socio-political accounts, with particular reference to the Kabyle Myth and what could be described as the Kabyle/*Amrabedh* Myth in this thesis.

7.2 Kabyles in the UK: Between Religiosity, Secularism and modernity

Discourses of modernity and modern nationhood suggest that religion would be superseded by secularism (Wallace 1966; Woodhead and Heelas, 2000). In this sense, Asad (2003) believes that "representations of 'the secular' and 'the religious' in modern and modernizing states mediate people's identities, help shape their adequacy, and guarantee their experiences" (p. 8). Modernity is understood in a sense that "science, rather than God [is] central to society and at best relegates religious beliefs to the inner realm of private life" (Touraine, 1995: 9). In the 20th century, a new understanding of modernity emerged. It is now viewed as "a sense or the idea that the present is discontinuous with the past, that through a process of social and cultural change life in the present is fundamentally different from life in the past" (Hooker cited in Gillen and Ghosh, 2007: 53). This has prompted political, social and cultural changes in both Western and to some extent non-Western societies; such as the right to convert and practice one's faith freely without being subjected to social stigma. These are practices and decisions, for example, that might not be banned by the law, but they are unaccepted by many immigrants' sending societies. Kahina, a Kabyle woman living in the UK, shared one of her relative's conversion as follows: "We have a

cousin, well not a close cousin, who converted to Christianity. She lives in France and she posted it on Facebook. Everyone in Kabylia was shocked. She gave her reasons but… at the end of the day, she is free". The first part of the quote suggests that Kahina looked unconvinced with her 'distant' cousin's reasons to convert just like the people in Kabylia she mentioned and wanted to distance herself from the conversion. However, the second part insinuates a more tolerant reaction which might be the result of Kahina's experience in overtly secular, multicultural Britain. Another example was that of Baya. We were talking when her friend texted her asking for a song about Algiers. She went on YouTube and started reading out loud some titles. Arriving at a particular song, she said:

> "This one is racist. You know when I was in Algiers, that was the common practice as we used to think we were the best whereas people coming from other cities were ignorant. Coming to the UK made me look at those practices from a very different angle. But you see, we might have hurt one girl or two at that time, but this singer has influenced the whole community if not the whole country. At that time, we had one national channel and he was often invited to sing this particular song".

Even though this example is not directly related to secularism, it shows the impact of migration experience in a multicultural environment on the individuals' self-perceptions and their perceptions towards others. Moreover, the feeling of superiority the "algeroises" had was because, for example, they spoke French, they were 'modern' and they dressed up in a fashionable way.

In the global age, debates on modernity, religion and secularism have become increasingly ubiquitous, leading to the emergence of several overlapping and contentious theories and understandings. Religion, for Bellah (1964), is "a set of symbolic forms and acts which relates man to the ultimate condition of his existence" (p. 358). This refers to a functional understanding of religion, emphasising its role within society. Yet, in industrial societies, such as Western Europe, New Zealand, and Japan, "there has been a trend toward secularization, partly masked by large-scale immigration of people with traditional worldviews" (Norris and Inglehart, 2010: 2). Politically, secularism refers to the separation between the religious and the political sphere (M. Arkoun, 2003[21]; Cesari, 2004; Casanova, 2009). However, in post-modern societies, being secular has meant "to leave religion behind, to emancipate oneself from religion, overcoming the

[21] Arkoun Mohamed was one of the most prominent and influential figures in Islamic Studies.

nonrational forms of being" (Casanova, 2009: 1057). Secularism is "understood as a key dimension of the moral, social, and political transformations that have shaped global modernity" (Hirschkind, 2011: 644). In other words, there has been a strong association of modern values such as rationality, progress and individualism with secularism. However, understanding what secularism, or what a secular society is, is not as simple as it seems to be (Hirschkind, 2011), it is rather complex and ambiguous. Cesari (2004) argues that secularism "stands for the diminished social influence of religion and its institutions in public life" (p. 44) suggesting that, the separation of religion from the political sphere extends to the social one (Norris and Inglehart, 2010). In one of his influential contributions on concepts, practices and political formations of secularism, the anthropologist Talal Asad (2003) states that the distinction between the religious and the secular emerged within a modern era. He rejects the idea that the secular is neutral and involves religious dis-embedding. Instead, he emphasises the relational and fluid nature of both the secular and the religious and their dependence on time and space**.** Drawing on Asad's insights, this study addresses the ways in which my participants contextually and situationally draw symbolic boundaries between Kabyleness and what they consider as religious or secular within the Kabyle TSF.

When describing modern secular democracies in the West, Cesari (2004) argues that "the multiplicity of possible - sometimes contradictory - choices is not only more noticeable but also more accepted," (p. 45). In other words, an emphasis on individuals' choice of their religious, sexual, and/or ethnic orientation is likely to be found in Western liberal societies. However, Cesari's (2004) claim echoes a Western-centric view. Many of my participants pointed out that both secular and religious Kabyles showed respect to each other in and outside of Kabylia. When discussing the dynamic relationship between modernity, religion, and secularism, Nadir depicted Kabylia as follows: "You have mosques, and you have bars, and you choose where to go, you are free and responsible for your choice." He said: "One day, there was a drunk person next to the Mosque, and somebody nicely asked him to leave the place. He did so, not because he was against him, but in respect to the place of worship." Here Nadir wanted, on the one hand, to bring out the modern and tolerant side of Kabyles and Kabylia, and, on the other hand, to emphasise that he 'befits quite well' in the receiving society. For example, Leïla said: "At first glance, you think that they [British/European women] are very different from us and modern, but when you meet them and live with them, you realise that '*nukni nɣalbithen atas'* ['we are better than them in many ways']." In the same vein, Ramy insisted on showing me some pictures from a football match in Tizi Ouzou stadium (Kabylia) (see Figure 7-1). He wished to highlight the 'harmonious' religious and non-religious practices during a Ramadan day. Nevertheless, this does not keep people from privately 'gossiping' on others' digressions from unspoken rules, as shown in Kahina's example above.

Online, a message was posted in French alongside the pictures (see below 7-1), which says: “These images that made a ‘buzz’ in other arabophone pages. I will summarise these pictures in one sentence: Kabylia is a land of liberty and laïcité (secularism)”. Furthermore, one of the page’s public followers replied: “Long life to Kabylia, secular and tolerant. Freedom of worship and self-respect and respect towards others”. This tendency of portraying Kabylia and Kabyles as modern, secular/*laïc* could be a rejection of a non-Arab identity that has been lately synonymous to terrorism, violence and threat.



Figure 7-1 Pictures from a Stadium in Kabylia, showing different practices during Ramadan.

In what follows, I will demonstrate the different meanings of secularism and its historical development in Algeria, France and the UK and how this impacted on my respondents' understanding of the term. Moreover, the following sections will also help us understand the reasons behind the creation of a secular ethnic identity and how it is significant in the UK environment where religious diversity is approached differently.

Secularisation of Kabyle identity

Most research participants involved in this study see themselves as secular or '*laïc'*. Their multiple understandings of the 'secular' versus the 'religious' might be a by-product of their past experiences, historical events like the Arab invasion of Algeria or the colonial construction of the Kabyle Myth, political affiliation (such as the MAK), migration trajectories, the rise of Islamophobia, and/or the influence of the French archetypical laïcité.

Most of the participants in this study expressed either a direct or indirect link with France. However, most of them were born and raised in Kabylia. While this is a Muslim majority area, many of my interlocutors stressed the region's 'liberal' and 'open-minded' thinking. As Tamazight put it:

> "In Bougie, I can go out with my cousins, I can go out without wearing a head scarf, I can put on tight jeans […] in Bougie, when you walk down the street, you see girls who are in skirts, you see girls with necklines and you don't see this in Algiers. When I look at the pictures of Algiers during the 60s, you see and that was at the European style, I do not know if you have seen these pictures […] but after that everything has changed".

Tamazight emphasised the 'modern' attitude and the open-mindedness of Kabyles in Bougie, and compared it favourably to the capital, foregrounding women's position and freedom in society. Bougie[22] (lit, candle, in Kabyle Vgayet) is the French name of the Algerian city Bejaïa, situated in North-East Algeria. It is of interest to note Tamazight's use of Bougie instead of the common Arabic name Bejaïa, that has been changed again after independence, following the campaigns of Arabisation in Algeria. In order to explain the abrupt change in Algiers after the 1960s, Tamazight referred to the Black Decade dominated by the religious fundamentalists "Islamist Salvation Front (FIS)" political party (See Chapter 2). She believes that this marked a transition from a period of liberal modernity to religious fanaticism and deterioration. Nevertheless, she argued that unlike in

[22] Bougie, (candle) named by the French because it traded with Europe and introduced the wax candle (Britannica)

other Algerian cities, people in Kabylia adopted a more modern and secular understanding while preserving their ethnic identity. Such attitudes resulted in the construction of Kabyle ethnic secular identities, that was the main plank of Kabyle political parties such as the RCD. The latter's concerns involved "a commitment to a modernist and egalitarian attitude to the position of women in Algerian society, and a commitment to what is called '*la laïcité*'" (Roberts, 2001: 14). Moreover, in his study on the secular-religious ideologies among Moroccan Amazighs, Almasud (2014), has shown how the latter draw on "indigenous values rather than religion in order to develop a secular Amazigh identity within modernity" (p. 146). Relatedly, Sharma suggests (1990) "modernization does not necessarily lead to de-ethnicization […] it may crystalize ethnic consciousness" (p. 33). This resonates with one of my participants, Ricky, who was married to a British woman, and explained that he took her to Bejaïa to show her its nature and clean streets, a secular place where people adopted "a more modernised life, while preserving the salience of their Amazigh/Kabyle ethnic cultural identity". Moreover, another participant living in London, Jughurtha, who "feels profoundly Kabyle", said: "The Kabyle culture accepts all languages, all religions and other cultures". Here again, my participants tried to indicate how modern Kabylia was, and how this has helped in the formation and the shaping of their identity, which has enabled their smooth integration into the modern European societies.

Cesari (2004) suggests that in migratory contexts, the "dominant social and cultural environment exert a decisive influence over the formation of Muslim identities and behaviors" (p. 21). Put differently, the construction of one's perceptions and attitudes towards their religious orientations is largely influenced by the culture and society in which they live. Over the course of my fieldwork, I realised that the expression of Kabyles' viewpoints vis-à-vis religion, was often contradictory and depended on the situation, time and the audience. My meetings and conversations with participants showed how the dominant culture had influenced the ways in which they viewed their own 'difference' as migrants in the UK and thought about other people's differences, such as in terms of skin colour or religious beliefs. Ricky, for example, made me feel comfortable with my headscarf. When we met, as we usually did, in public spaces, my impression was that he did not feel embarrassed being seen with a veiled woman. When he invited me to an event that he was organising with other MAK activists and representatives in London I was unsure about how I would be received by MAK adherents who were known for their staunchly secularist attitudes. After I expressed my worries and hesitation to Ricky, he reassured me, by saying that I was "in a liberal country and a tolerant society, where everyone should respect the others' personal decisions".

In contrast to France, in Great Britain the Church of England is recognised as an official State religion led by the Queen, yet the state grants rights to other religions as religious bodies. This has encouraged them, for example, to establish private schools (Cesari, 2004: 73). Unlike the UK, the conception of secularism in France is "an extremely rigid one, in which all signs of religion must be eradicated from public space" (Ibid: 76), including the headscarf, which does not create as much controversy within British society. However, ultimately, I was not sure how 'situational' Ricky's liberal attitude to my headscarf was. When I was added to the Kabyle online group, where Ricky was unaware of my presence, I started noticing a different side to him. Muslims wearing headscarves, he opined, were displaying a sign of "religious fundamentalism" (Ricky: from online observation; Cesari, 2004: 47). Ricky was aware that our discussions and the notes I took were for the purposes of the study that he accepted to be part of, which will be addressing western and international readers. Hence, he might have been keen to draw an acceptable image as a successful migrant in the UK in his discussions with me but expressed different opinions in the online space.

The question of the 'hijab' clearly sparked a wider polemic among Kabyle internet users. As I was observing my participants' online activities over three years, I noticed recurrent topics suggested to the group members that aimed to raise awareness towards specific 'social' issues. Most prominent among these were Kabyle clothing versus the hijab; language: Tamazight versus Arabic; and, importantly, the position and role of Kabyle women in maintaining Kabyle identity. Although the subjects' secular attitudes implied the use of Kabyle language as will be shown in chapter 8, the adoption as well as showing respect to non-religious practices, they were consistently gendered. In other words, Kabyle women were called upon to preserve this vision of free, modern, tolerant, and enlightened Kabylia through the preservation of the Kabyle dress.

A profile picture (see figure 1) has been circulating across Kabyle created Facebook pages, with a caption: '*thyhurriyin*, *tillilyin'*, which literally means the pure/genuine and the free women. This picture was also exchanged among my participants, which created a space for an open debate, between supporters and opponents. Another post showed a Kabyle cook on TV wearing a Kabyle dress with a headscarf (see figure 7-2 and 7-3). The poster called on Kabyle girls to "be careful of those 'Baathist' [23] TV channels and programmes that encourage the wearing of headscarves and aim to Arabise their dress identity" as shown in the pictures below:

[23] Baathist doctrine is based on a nationalist political ideology, advocating the unification of the Arab world (Brahimi, 1989). Founded in Syria in 1947 via the political party Baath (Hizb al-Ba'ath al Arabi al Ishtiraki: party of Arab and Socialist resurrection), and its sections have been created in some Middle Eastern and North African countries, notably Algeria (Best and Higley, 2017).

Figure 7-2 "For nothing in the world I would change the dress of my ancestors for a hijab".

Figure 7-3 Raising awareness among Kabyle girls, to not to be influenced.

Baya, a Kabyle woman in the UK, believed that "the hijab, niqab or burqa […] are not our traditions, they have been imported. The Kabyle dress is already decent, and Kabyle women also have their amendil, [a small satin scarf]". Similarly, another declaration by a politician has been reposted by one of my participant's online profile. The politician described the act of wearing the hijab as "a retrograde act of submission and destruction of North African (Amazigh) dress identity". This also depicts the general idea on the headscarf in European societies, where it is "interpreted as a symbol of the rejection of progress and women's emancipation" (Cesari: 2004: 76). For example, during the event in Birmingham, I went to Nadia's house and got dressed there. When I wore my Kabyle dress and Jewellery, as Nadia and her daughter did, Nadia suggested that I wear a Kabyle scarf in a Kabyle way, that is wrapped around my head and tied on the top instead of the usual way of wearing it, which involves covering my neck. This is associated with Muslim identity and the 'traditional' way of wearing the headscarf, as new forms of head covering emerged such as the 'turban', which does not necessarily involve covering the neck (Özcan, 2019). I replied with a 'hesitant yes', but she felt my discomfort and brought me a rolled-up top saying that this would cover my neck. This shows how concerned she was about my appearance and how people in the event would perceive me, particularly that I was going with her to the event.

According to Anazâr, the main reason for the unsuccessful organisations created before by North Africans in the UK and the destabilisation of the Kabyle/Amazigh cultural organisation "were related to the disagreement of most of the members on the type of events and gatherings organised". Many of them, according to Anazâr and Nadia, rejected the idea that Islamic celebrations such as Eid[24] or Ashura[25] should be celebrated within the organisation. Though, Nadia added, "they call their family back in Kabylia to wish them well for the occasion". However, this can be inscribed within a more culturally oriented practice (Cesari, 2004; Ulloa, 2019). Besides, by doing so, "they care about their parents' feelings and to avoid their family and friends' prejudices", Numidia, said. Furthermore, many were expressing their disagreement with Nadia's guest invitation practices. They criticised her for inviting Kabyle men married to Algerian non-Kabyles; or Kabyle women with headscarves. Yet, as Numidia added, they were welcoming Kabyles' wives of British or other European descent.

I'm Kabyle: I'm 'laïc'/secular

The French term laïcité/laïc is commonly used among my participants more than the English word 'secularism'/secular, as it relates to the Kabyles 'francophonism'. Both Kahina and Baya argued that particularly the Kabyles in France involved in the MAK movement understood 'laïcité' as a religion (see also Kastorayano, 2006) and that this understanding was common among Kabyles in the UK. In France, *laïcite* was introduced in 1905 to refer to the separation of religion from the state, involving the ban of religious signs from public institutions. However, the compatibility of Islam with French society's values became a political issue, leading the right-wing Minister of Education François Bayrou to forbid any ostentatious religious signs in public schools (Kastoryano, 2006), including the headscarf during 2003-2004 (Cesari, 2004; Bowen, 2008). The law aimed to respect the public order and preserve the Republican values and principles, considering secularism "to be the pillar of social cohesion that had to be maintained as a constitutive value of the nation-state (Devine and Waters, 2008: 80). Amazighs in France and North Africa have supported the ban of the hijab and other religious symbols from French schools "presenting Berber culture as consonant with secularism" (Silverstein, 2011: 74). Unlike France's separation between religion and the state, where religious identity cannot be publicly expressed, Britain opted for a "pluralization of government involvement in religion: in other words, State intervention and protection not merely for Anglicanism but also for all other religious represented

[24] Eid: there are two Eids: ***Eid al-Fitr*** also called the "Festival of Breaking the Fast", is a religious holiday celebrated by Muslims worldwide that marks the end of Ramadan. ***Eid al-Adha****:* "feat of the sacrifice", it is celebrated after Eid al-Fitr of two months, at the same time when Muslims perform the pilgrimage 'Hajj'

[25] Ashura: A Muslim religious event celebrated on the 10th of Muharram, the first month of the Hijri Calendar.

in the United Kingdom" (Cesari, 2004: 74). Nevertheless, as I will show below, some of my participants' perspectives towards the headscarf still echoed the French position.

In Algeria, the meaning of being secular or more commonly '*laïc'* has become confusing, as some explain or understand it as 'atheism' (Daoud, 2019). Among my participants, the views of secularism varied from one person to another, and it changed in discourse**.** For example, Matt, a young Kabyle man living in London, viewed secularism as to "not have any religious involvement or spiritual activity at all, but not an atheist", he believed in the separation of religion from politics. According to Tamazight and Adam, the Kabyles' religious orientation had historically been articulated with their ethnicity. They referred to how the Kabyles embraced Islam while preserving their social and cultural structures, notably, the 'secularised' political organization of pre-colonial Kabylia, the '*Tajmaât'* that according to French colonial, scholars showed similarities to what in Europe they called a parliament (See chapter 2). Moreover, Amazigh activists "made concerted efforts to recover their pre-Islamic, Judeo-Christian heritage" (Silverstein, 2011: 74). For example, Nadia hinted at this view when talking about the religion of ancient North African Amazighs. During one of our discussions, she drew an imaginary *Aza* sign (see Figure 7-4) on the table and said: "look, it looks like a Christian Cross". Similarly, I observed other Kabyles' online attempts to identify the religion of the Amazighs within the pre-Islamic period and to investigate their ancestors' religious affiliation. While some believed they were Christians, using as evidence the Amazigh pendant that symbolises their indigeneity, called La Croix du Sud, as shown in the picture below (Figure 7-5), others referred to Queen Dyhia, who the Arabs in the 7th century called 'Kahina'. Her name suggested two interpretations. The first one refers to somebody who can foresee. According to the legend, Dyhia (Kahina) had supernatural powers that allowed her to anticipate certain events before their happening. The other interpretation is based on Arabic language which means a female priest. On the basis of the second meaning some Kabyles claim the Christianity of their ancestors.

Figure 7-5 Tifinagh letter, and a Symbol of Amazigh identity.

Figure 7-4 Croix du Sud, used among the Algerian Amazighs: Touareg.

This commitment to their ethnic ancestral identity and at the same time to notions of modernity involved in some cases following explicit 'non-religious' habits, such as rejecting specific dietary prohibitions, clothing, and supporting feminist and animal rights movements which are not common, banned and/or persecuted in Algeria and in the North African region (Ulloa, 2019).

According to my interviews and online observations, the Kabyles' secularism and attempts to attract the 'Arab' Algerians' attention were translated into a number of anti-Islamic practices in Kabylia and among the Kabyle diaspora in France and the UK that were shared online, such as eating during Ramadan in public; or the demonstrative eating of pork and drinking of alcohol. Although drinking alcohol is common in different parts of Algeria and among non-Kabyles, Adam, a Kabyle student in the UK, suggested that among Algerians, this practice "was more highlighted when practised by the Kabyles who already had this (non-conformist, rule-breaking) reputation across the country". Moreover, Algerian Facebook pages heavily criticised a group of Kabyles after their participation in an LGBT Pride protest in Paris, by waving the Amazigh flag. This incident was significantly debated among my respondents during interviews and online conversations.

The Kabyles' conversion to Christianity or their adoption of more secular views after arriving in the UK, which many of the people I met expressed by distancing religion from their everyday practices, can be interpreted differently. On the one hand, their conversion may help them to escape general stereotypes around Muslims and gain access to their host societies, as demonstrated in Chapter 5. On the other hand, according to Ricky, their choice of this pathway is a way to express their opposition to the Algerian Arabs' one-nation-one-language-one-religion ideology, presenting "a serious challenge to the current Islamist political sphere" (Almasud, 2014: 133).

Secularism has been a key question among Kabyle political figures, and activist singers, many of whom believed that religion was being used for personal ends in Algeria. Amine Zaoui (2016), an Algerian writer, argues: "In a society like ours, the cultural poverty, the obscurantism in school, isolated university …., the absence of critical and rational thinking, all this environment favours the religious hegemony and repression of the free imagination of a citizen"[26]. The political leader Ait Ahmed, poet and …. Mouloud Maammeri (poet and linguist); Tahar Djaout (journalist and writer), and many others have strongly advocated the separation of politics from religion during post-colonial Algeria. These well-known activists were either assassinated, exiled or they died in unknown circumstances. These events created more boundaries between the Kabyles and the other 'Algerians' and subsequently the birth of new 'Maammeris', 'Djaouts', 'Matoubs', and others. The psychoanalyst Bensalama (2014)[27] argues that "[…] the assassination of a man of peace, a bearer of the word of justice, does not annihilate him, though, it multiplies his presence and increases the strength of his word, even in his absence" (p. 158).

Managing ethnic differences in nation-building processes and nation-state ideologies was frequently based on the unification of the country under the banner of one-nation, one-language and one-religion. This is also the case in post-independent Algeria (See Chapter 2). This is similar to France's approach that "has consistently wavered between the acceptance and erasure of social (which variously includes ethnic, racial, class, and religious) differences within their populations throughout their histories" (Silverstein, 2004: 38).[28] Race, according to Silverstein (2005), "remains salient in the everyday lives of immigrants in Europe, as an inescapable social fact whose vitality and volatility only appear to be increasing" (p. 365). The general knowledge about the 'other' or the stereotypes people create based on categories, such as race, ethnicity, and religion, often emphasise the individuals' social differences. For example, Ulloa (2019) has shown how North Africans (Maghrebi) in California have experienced surprising reactions from Californians for being Africans but not Black, or for being Jewish but coming from an Arabic speaking community and a Muslim environment. Comparably, my respondents adopted some

[26] Original text: "Dans une société, comme la nôtre, la pauvreté culturelle, l'obscurantisme dans l'école, l'université isolée recroquevillée sur elle-même, l'absence de la pensée critique et rationnelle tout cet environnement favorise l'hégémonie et la répression religieuses sur l'imaginaire libre du citoyen". (From Amine Zaoui's Facebook Page)

[27] Benslama (2014 : 158) Original citation : " … le meurtre d'un homme pacifique, porteur de parole de justice, ne l'anéantit pas, mais au contraire multiple sa présence et accroît la force de sa parole, en absence même ».

[28] Whereas within colonial Algeria, France has rather emphasised the social and ethnic differences between the Algerian Arabs and the Berbers (Silverstein, 2004; Goodman, 2005), and deeper between the Kabyles and the *Imrabdhen* (as will be shown in the coming sections).

strategies to avoid similar reactions in the UK and escape the prevalent stereotypes about Muslims and 'Arabs'. I observed, for instance, that most of Kabyles in the UK live outside of London in non-Algerian/Arab neighbourhood and sometimes even from Kabyles; elimination of religious identifiers, adoption of new European names heeding their physical appearance and mastery of French language.

However, secular positions were often explained with reference to Algeria and France rather than the UK, and its partially violent policy of repression (Lorcin and Thomemeret, 2005). This included the prohibition of the conference presented by the poet Mouloud Maameri and the assassination of Kabyle prominent figures, notably Tahar Djaout and Matoub Lounes. Both Djaout and Matoub are considered as two figures who had long supported a secular/laïc perspective. Their assassination fostered feelings of 'deception', 'hatred' and 'rejection' among the Kabyles: Anazâr talked about how he felt "deceived in 2001", the period of the Black Spring (See chapter 2), he said: "I went to an [Amazigh] region in Algeria seeking solidarity and their participation in the march[29] for the recognition of Amazigh rights in Algeria, but I didn't receive the support I needed"; Nadir described the feeling of hatred felt by non-Kabyles towards the Kabyles "because of stereotypes mostly related to the Kabyles' non-religious practices", such as the act of eating during Ramadan, claiming: "This why they hate us for, but also for our positive values that they lack such as being hard-working people and we have '*nnif* [honour]'". The feeling of rejection was expressed by most of my participants. "We feel rejected in Algeria" was a common expression I came across throughout my readings of the transcripts and notes from my fieldwork. This feeling emerged when they moved out of Kabylia. For instance, Lyly, Anazâr, Leïla and Nadir spoke about the flagrant difference between Kabylia and other cities, notably Algiers and Oran that were supplied with better infrastructure. Leïla said that she had to move to Algiers to find better job opportunities. Similar sentiments have been expressed among Kabyles and M'zab (Amazigh group from Southern-Algeria) living in California, according to Ulloa (2019: 142-145). The rise of Islamism in Algeria, the detrimental consequences of the Arabisation process on the Amazigh linguistic and cultural heritage, and my participants' past experience in Kabylia and other Algerian cities, lies behind their present stances and critiques of Algeria. They suggested that being in the UK has put the Kabyles in a more powerful position, offering them more confidence and freedom of expression.

Ricky explained the Kabyles' conceptions of religion as follows: "Do you think that the Kabyles who convert to Christianity, are doing it by conviction? Of course not, they don't even go to churches. They did so because they were forced to learn Arabic. They do this to attract the Arabs'

[29] Here Anazâr refers to the event of the Black Spring 2001.

attention". Haisell (2017) argues that "if migration offers one route to modernity, religious conversion offers another" (p. 172). Working on indigenous engagement with modernity in highland Ecuador, Haisell concluded: "[B]y converting to a religion identified with the civilised and white 173 countries of the North Atlantic, evangelicals redefine themselves as more modern than even the Ecuadorian elite". Haisell's findings resonate with my observations about the Kabyles in the UK, where secularism appears to be a better option to seek acceptance within what is described as a 'modern environment'. Some of my participants openly shared with me their secular practices or took care to emphasise their 'modern, westernised' attitudes. While Ramy and Nadir shared their experiences in British pubs as two young men, Matt, for instance, sent me a picture with his British/European friends in a pub holding a glass of beer. Overall, many of my research participants' negotiations of their Kabyleness revolved around contesting or confirming the boundaries between the religious and secular, while at the same time "present[ing] themselves as the 'good (secular) Muslims'" (Silverstein, 2011: 74) without Islam being "their primary mode of identification" (Ibid)**.** They often referred to their moral values such as working hard, being honest and truthful.

Subjective Islam and Secularisation: I'm Muslim but …

My participants' transnational orientation was often highlighted by the geographical journeys in their narratives, often drawing on Algeria when explaining their positions in Britain. They, for example, explained that breaking fast during Ramadan and eating pork is strictly rejected by the Algerian people, whereas drinking alcohol is viewed as a more personal practice. Nadir, Lyly and Matt believe that the act of drinking is not overtly shared in other Algerian cities, where people drink secretly, compared to Kabylia. Numidia explained the Kabyles' 'anti-Islamist' attitudes in the UK as follows:

> "There have definitely been some occasions where Kabyles have reacted negatively towards Muslims I think it's because there are a lot of Muslims who try to impose their beliefs on others which can be tiring because there are a lot of Muslims who say everything is haram [forbidden according to religion] anything they'll do they say that's haram which can get very annoying, which I personally don't like either as I said before everyone practices Islam differently so no one should have the authority to tell you what is or isn't haram because at the end of the day the choices you make are between you and Allah no one else."

Kabyles overseas are faced with anti-Muslim sentiment fostered by associations with terrorism and intolerance perpetuated in Western media representations and policies (Silverstein, 2004; Ulloa, 2019). It was apparent that these sentiments impacted on the Kabyles' perspectives of ethnicity and religion and they often more readily identified themselves as North-African-Berber-Kabyle individuals and secular rather than Muslim. In the UK, this would facilitate the process of a 'successful integration' and the creation of job opportunities in the receiving society such as the case of Lyly, Nadir and Matt. In France this has meant they are viewed as an example of successful integration, echoing the influence of French opposition to Islam (Lorcin, 1999), and they have been praised by a number of French politicians, such as Sarkozy, for being "In many ways…exemplary in [their] integration but also in [their] courageous resistance to the coming totalitarianism" (Rioufol 2015, cited in Harris, 2018: 186). These attitudes may seem to be irrelevant to British society, where conceptions of the relationship between religious practice and the state are different, and in the context of the religiously diverse setting of London, with its large Muslim and immigrant communities. Baya, described her own experience, observations and understanding of Kabyleness and Muslim identity in the UK as follows:

> "Furthermore, I think the negative behaviour towards Muslims [Kabyles display] mainly happens here in England though as I have seen it with my own eyes where they are completely against Muslims and Islam even if you say 'hamdoullah' or 'inshallah', for example, you're automatically an Islamist. However, they claim to be laic [secular] which they think is a religion not that it means to be equal and accept all religions, and another thing I don't think the Kabyles who come to England have the same mentality as the Kabyles in Algeria, they give a false and bad image of us all… I think everyone practices Islam differently, however if someone was to say to me that Kabyles are less committed to religion I would have to argue that it isn't true, I'm not going to say that all Kabyles are Muslim because they are not but they're only the minority I know a lot of people who are even in the MAK political party and they are Muslims who fast and pray, and take me for example I am Kabyle and I fast and pray as well."

Baya was an active member of the Kabyle/Amazigh organisation and helped planning events, which allowed her to communicate with Kabyles of different opinions in London and across the UK. Baya's reflection suggested that the contestation around secularism versus religion played a significant role in how Kabyles saw and judged each other, where the meaning of secularity as "being without religion, […] tends to become increasingly the default option" (Casanova, 2009:1053) among the Kabyles in the UK. She believed that many of the people she knew in the

UK were “more extremist [anti-faith] than elsewhere”, particularly in France and Kabylia. Baya also reported that one of the Kabyles had said: “you have to stop saying ‘Nshallah’ and ‘l’hamdoullah’” in her everyday conversations and more precisely with them. She told me that “if the MAK would stop [her] from practicing [her] religion, [she] would quit from the political party”. On the other hand, she conceded, that a general stereotype about the MAK adherents is that they are anti-Islam, drink alcohol and eat pork, which is also, according to Adam, the classical stereotype about the Kabyles. Nonetheless, Nadia argued that being part of the MAK did not define one’s beliefs but more importantly one’s political affiliation and social and cultural claims. Uncle Saïd believed that the MAK movement was represented by a minority of ‘uneducated young Kabyles’ who were deviating the real aim of the political movement, which is the recognition of the Kabyles/Amazigh rights based on secular claims.

In her study on the Maghrebi diaspora in California, Ulloa (2019) argues that there is “a plurality of interpretations of Islam”[30] (p. 301). Similar observations can be applied to the Kabyles in the UK. This multiplicity of understandings was attributed, by Ricky and Tamazight, to the fact that when Islam came to North Africa, the Amazigh already had their religions and their social and moral order. Accordingly, Bensalama (2014) in his study on subjectivities in Islam, suggests that the multicultural and multi-ethnic environment in North African countries is mainly due to the settlement of people of different cultural, ethnic and religious backgrounds**.** Therefore, Islam has been adopted by North Africans and adapted to their socio-cultural life and vice-versa, that is they have also adapted, to some extent, their socio-cultural principles to Islamic values and practices. Cesari (2004) identified three types of Muslims in what she calls the post-modern West: “those who practice a private version of their faith, nonpracticing Muslims who nonetheless identify on an ethical or emotional basis, and fundamentalists who embrace a totalizing version of communal Islam.” (p. 46). However, these types can overlap, and they are not only limited to Western societies as we will see throughout the cases in the following section. In Algeria, a number of stereotypes have been built on the Kabyles’ religiosity and secularism, for being ‘francized[31]’ and less attached to religion (Mc Dougall, 2017; Daoudi, 2018). Yet, most of my participants repudiated them by referring to “the massive number of mosques built in the Kabylia region and the Kabyles’ social practices, which have religious values” (Nadir), such as fundraising for the poor and charity, as Ramy added.

[30] Original citation : “il n’existe pas ‘un’ Islam…”
[31] Canadian. To force to adopt French customs and the French language.

Nadir, Ramy, Matt and others shared with me their experience as young men in London, who enjoyed going to pubs, and drinking from time to time and did not bother to look for halal food; though as they emphasised, they "never eat pork". Uncle Saïd, as many of the Kabyles, said: "I don't do the prayer, but I am honest, in contrast to the hypocrites who go to the mosques but they lie and flout the basic values that religion calls for". At the same time, Mohand, whose Kabyle identity "doesn't cause a major issue in [his] life" said: "what is important for me is to gain my life in a halal way. I go to a mosque, where we have an Egyptian Imam. He told us that before checking whether the food is halal or not, we need to check whether the money we are paying with is halal". He referred to his honesty and seriousness at work and made a point stressing that the Islamic moral order guided his professional and social life (Casanova, 2009). Nadir, Saïd and Mohand's experiences, their identifications, and their positioning vis-à-vis religion indicate the fluidity, the dynamicity and the complexity that exists within the 'community'. In this vein, Ulloa (2019) argues that Maghrebi's religiosity in California remains linked to certain cultural markers of their land of origin" (p. 301). She observed a more cultural and ethnic use of Islam than a religious one. For example, she found out that many of her Maghrebi participants in California were attached to their homeland cultural markers that are manifested during Ramadan, through food rituals and practices of the Ramadan menu, that is typical to the Maghreb. In this sense, the festive character of the occasion overshadowed the religious one.

Matt liked to talk about Islam in comparison to Christianity in particular. The young Kabyle man living in Britain, "a random destination" as he described it, sent me a friend request on Facebook just after Nadia had added me to the organisation's official online page. Then, I seized the opportunity to add him to my participants' list. This turned out to be more difficult than expected, as Matt's behaviour clearly suggested that a female researcher wearing a headscarf provoked his secular identity. He often asked me whether I included "Mouloud Mammeri and Matoub Lounes in my study, and whether [I] revealed how they were assassinated". He made a point of sending me 'provocative' pictures, videos and vocals on Messenger, which were openly critical of Islam and attacking Muslims, and he always steered our debates towards religion, faith and beliefs. However, I was from time to time reminding him that he was my participant, by generally asking him his consent to include that part of conversation in my writing. He once replied with a question: "and what did you understand, conclude?". I purposely told him that I saw him as a respectful person accepting the others' differences, even though he was not a Muslim believer. He replied with "partially right…I do sometimes involve my beliefs in my life". He also asked me whether I saw a difference between 'faith' and 'belief'. I said that I thought 'faith' was more abstract, and then he agreed to what I said. Because our conversation was intense, and challenging my beliefs, I preferred to leave it there without asking more questions. I often found his remarks objectionable as he was openly disrespecting my faith, while I could not say anything.

He kept forwarding pictures and videos that I left uncommented. At some point, he sent me an audio message of a Kabyle person reciting a verse from the Quran but modifying it as follows: "Thank God who created the Amazigh, they eat pork and drink alcohol and disobey the government". I expressed my objection to such a behaviour, and he responded that "they were merely a group of teenagers having some fun", and he carried on with similar videos and pictures. Unlike the other participants who were not so direct in their claims, Matt explicitly demonstrated his intolerance towards Islam and Muslims, although he did not deny his beliefs, and said that they constituted part of his everyday life.

Nadia and her husband Uncle Saïd referred to the values and the ethics Muslims should bear in mind in their interactions with others. Uncle Saïd left his workplace and Algeria because of the dis-honesty of some employees. He said that he could not understand "how they go to mosques, but on the other hand behave paradoxically". Similarly, for Nadia, wearing the headscarf involves practicing Islam and applying its rules. She could not accept the contradictory behaviours of certain veiled women. She believed that "veiled woman should represent Islam 'properly' as they have more responsibility than non-veiled Muslim women" because of their visible religiosity. Both Nadia and her husband were 'practicing' Muslims, and identified ethically and emotionally (Cesari, 2004) with Islam, claiming that religion was in their 'hearts'. Their daughter Numidia believed in the 'private aspect of religiosity'. As a practicing Muslim, she assiduously followed the prayer. While she did not wear the headscarf, she said it was part of her "future plans". She said that her husband, who was still in Algeria, thought that "it would be better to wait until she had found a job", assuming that wearing a headscarf would make job search difficult. However, when I planned to visit her in September 2020, she sent me her picture with the headscarf.

Therefore, Classifying Muslims into neat categories can lure us into the trap of generalisation and essentialisation, such as the types of Muslims suggested by Cesari. Here the example of Nadia, a Kabyle Muslim woman who does not wear the headscarf and does not do the prayers, but follows dietary prohibitions, celebrates Muslim fasts and feasts, and identifies as a Muslim person, can reflect the combination of what Cesari classified into types: those who practise a private version of their faith, and nonpracticing Muslims who nonetheless identify on an ethical or emotional basis. Her example shows that the definition of a 'practicing Muslim' also varies from one person to another depending on their understanding of themselves, Islam and its practices. In short, for my respondents, religion and religious practices remain private and personal such as praying and fasting, while at the same time breaking religious rules, such as drinking alcohol and eating pork should not exclude individuals from the religion they associate themselves with.

7.3 Retracing the Kabyle Myth: Historical and Political Context of Kabyles' Secularisation and Identity Construction

Emerging from colonial perceptions and stereotypes, the Kabyle Myth contrasts the 'hard-working secular' Kabyle with the 'fanatic and lazy' Arab. This suggests that debates on religion versus secularism are ethnicised and mapped onto the Arab/Kabyle distinction. This type of stereotyping emerged in several conversations with Kabyles involved in this study. For example, I was talking to one of my participants when his brother called him and told him that he was heading to work. I was surprised and asked him why his brother was working at night. Then he said: "yes, it's not like you in Oran you like sleeping. In Kabylia we work on the German system… we are committed to work… you sleep a lot in Oran". In another discussion on Matoub Lounes, the same friend started comparing him to one of the Algerian international singers, Cheb Khaled, known as The King of Rai, which is an Algerian music genre, originally from Oran. He said: "look at your singers and ours. Look at Matoub, he is an accomplished singer, he writes his songs, he sings and plays musical instruments". However, I knew that Cheb Khaled, a non-Kabyle/Amazigh Algerian, who is a musician, a singer and a songwriter. Throughout my research, I heard Kabyles in different settings claiming characteristics that supposedly differentiated them from 'Arabs'. In what follows, I will show how the Kabyle Myth, involving secularism, specific socio-political structures, physical appearances, personal names, and moral values was used among my participants of different generations.

As explained in Chapter 2, during the French colonial period, French scholars forged the Arab 'Muslim'/Kabyle 'secular' distinction and drew on analogies that would put much emphasis on the Amazighs' resistance to the Arabs' Islamic conquest. These were adopted or used for social and political ends that had exacerbated the Kabyle-Arab tensions and conflicts. The Kabyles, thus, have become largely stereotyped as secular, a stereotype which they partially adopt themselves. However, the interpretation of secularism in Algeria by non-Kabyles generally refers to being non-Muslim or non-believers. For example, Tamazight and Adam, two young students of Kabyle origin living in the UK, expressed their perceptions and observations vis-à-vis the Kabyles' religiosity. Tamazight said:

> "I think the Kabyles have always - more than other Algerians - resisted any form of oppression. And Islam came to them whereas they already had their own beliefs and values. They had to give up their ancestral beliefs because something they did not know or understand was imposed with violence. So, I think this is the historic reason. However nowadays I feel some people Kabyles still feel this way, but I believe that the Kabylian society as it is today has integrated the

> values of Islam and has let down its own ancestral culture. This is the product of time, politics and invasion. Although I would add that secularism is more important for [Kabyles] than other Algerians because, in the ancestral culture that is now disappearing, the Imazighen of Kabylie had pagan beliefs and were not monotheists. They did not mix politics of the village with a religion - they mixed it with their cultural beliefs. Therefore, it is logical they would not want to mix their religion with politics nowadays."

The Kabyle/Algerian non-Kabyle dichotomy was part of Tamazight's discussion of Kabyle identity and religiosity. She believes that the political and social role of religion in Kabyle life had influenced the Kabyles' culture and maintenance of their heritage and tribal system, i.e. *Tajmaât*. Adopting a secular understanding would preserve the Kabyles' culture and give them the freedom to choose their religious and political orientation. The *Tajmaât* emerged repeatedly in interviews and conversations. Individuals often claimed that decisions were still taken within the village committee despite the existence of Algerian law. For example, Anazâr pointed out that according to the Tajmaât, "robbers or anyone who behaves against the local law, would not be sent to prison, but this person would be rejected by the vast majority of the village. Hence, he would not find a job, or any of the village families would accept to marry him their daughter". Both Tamazight and Anazâr claimed that the socio-political system within Kabylia was based on rules to reflect upon the positive attributes and the common legal right and duties for all members, available among them in comparison to the other Algerian regions. Here my respondents wanted to emphasise a Kabyle secular democracy and distinguish it from other Algerian regions.

Similarly to Tamazight, Adam, a Kabyle student expressed his thoughts as follows:

> "It is indeed an assumption [that the Kabyles are less committed to Islam] that many people [Algerian non-Kabyles] make on Kabyles. It is quite offensive and hurtful since I am a Kabyle. But based on what I know, what I observed and what I have been taught I know that the Kabyle people are as attached to Islam as they are to their cultural and linguistic identity. Those assumptions made are based upon the exceptions those people see but as you know exceptions exist everywhere and for CERTAIN they don't make the rule. As the famous saying claims "alghum yettwali Kan tha3rurth n gmas " [the camel can only see his brother's hump]. I believe that 'those people' won't stop judging US thinking that this way they would lose the inferiority complex they have […] It is not all the Algerians who distorted the meaning of secularism. It's mainly the dictator ruling party and the what I will call extremists because the way I see it, in a

> nation that qualifies itself as democratic, secularism should be perceived as the individual's total [freedom] to believe or not to believe."

Adam expressed his discomfort with the stereotypes that 'condemn' Kabyles for being 'secular'. He claimed that Kabyles have been more tolerant of the differences within the Kabyle society. He attributes the Algerian non-Kabyles' reactions and stereotyping to what he described as 'the inferiority complex'. Again, Adam's claims echo, to some extent, the Kabyle Myth that puts the Kabyle individual in a well-educated, hard-working and secular category (Silverstein, 2004). Moreover, Matt claimed that "non-Muslim Kabyles or Muslim Kabyles who do not stick to dietary prohibitions such as drinking alcohol and eating pork are not judged within Kabylia. Though, they are severely attacked by Algerian 'extremists', which is due to the latter's misconception of 'secularism". He asked my opinion about what happened in one of the Algerian universities in Algiers, where a Kabyle person was eating in public during Ramadan. The university student was attacked by other students for not respecting the holy month (Al-Bawaba, 2019)[32]. This created a polemic in Algeria, and among the Kabyle diaspora who have expressed their discontent through online posts and caricatures, painting a more tolerant picture of Kabylia and Kabyles.

Therefore, for Anazâr, Nadir, Baya, Lyly, and many other participants, the representation of the Kabyles was through the aforementioned iconic figures who are considered as symbols of Kabyle history and culture, but also as symbols of political, social, and cultural consciousness (See Chapter 2). These figures are mentioned by Kabyle participants to show their cultural, social, and political input and its contribution to the formation of Kabyle identity, and, according to Anazâr, a "secular Kabylia over the generations" in comparison to Algerian non-Kabyle singers, and regions. As shown in the pictures below, this comparative picture is portrayed in a stadium during a football match, alongside a post in French: "The only stadium in Algeria where a disabled can attend a football match without being run over or despised. The woman can watch a match without being harassed or insulted. Kabylia is the bastion of tolerance and living together". As similar to figures (7-6), Kabyle internet users try to depict the 'tolerant' 'modern' and 'accepting' image of Kabylia, through their observations of public, gendered-mixed, and crowded spaces. This is another opportunity for the Kabyles to show their difference from the other Arabophone cities, and drawing similarities with western countries, reiterating the Kabyle Myth.

[32] https://www.albawaba.com/node/fight-algerian-university-over-public-eating-ramadan-1285600



Figure 7-6 Pictures from stadium in Tizi Ouzou, Kabylia.

Constructing Transnational Ethnic Identities through Identification and Distancing: Between Myths and Realities

My research participants constructed the meanings of the Kabyle cultural capital on the basis of different criteria, where the relationship between secularism and religion was never far from their considerations. For example, in one of our discussions, Leïla said, 'If Kabylia gained its independence, I would stand at the borders and be very selective in terms of who could enter.' Jokingly, I asked, 'Would you let me in, since my parents are Kabyle?' She firmly replied, 'NO!' Her negative answer related not only to my Kabyle language, but also to my headscarf, as in her view this did not represent a 'proper' Kabyle woman. She tried to soften the atmosphere by saying, 'My mother also prays, but I don't. I know that this is healthy and there is even a scientific explanation of why women do not pray during their period…and fasting is also healthy.' Here Leïla could not explicitly reject nor admit her 'Muslim' identity. Hence, she brought her mother's religious practices into our discussion. Moreover, she looked for scientific explanations to justify the Muslim prayer and fasting.

Nevertheless, when Anazâr learnt that both my parents were Kabyle he sent me a message saying: "Yes, 100% Kabyle" with a flexed biceps emoji, despite his position regarding the headscarf revealed on Facebook. Leïla told me that Anazâr advised her to encourage me to speak Kabyle even when I made mistakes, so that they would not lose a

Kabyle person. Being aware of the decreasing number of Kabyles, Anazâr's aim here is to recruit the biggest number of Kabyles to save the community from an endangerment.

Different parameters are taken into account to identify one's Kabyleness, such as one's willingness to be part of the Kabyle and Amazigh 'nation', their self-identification with the Kabyle 'group', language competence, and their genealogical affiliation, which is the idea and the argument of this section. The notion of 'otherness' (Norton, 2013) is not only limited to Algerian 'Arabs', but it is also taking place within the Kabyle society, where another form of distinction seems to emerge among the Kabyles of the UK, that I will call Kabyle/*Imbrabdhen* Myth.

Towards an 'Imrabdhen Myth'?

French colonial scholars, sociologists, and anthropologists conducted myriad studies covering the Kabyle/*Amrabedh* distinction. However, the distinction has never been an issue of debate outside of Kabylia, or among Kabyle writers who tended to describe the cultural and social life in Kabylia. Available research projects on the *Imbrabdhen* are related to their religious input/contribution and its impact on the Kabyle societal structure, such as the work of Assam (2015) on Kabyle tribal society; Chachoua (2011) on Islam and Kabylia, and Doutté (1900) on the marabouts in Maghrebi Islam. The actual perceptions of the Kabyles towards the *Imrabdhen* or the *Imrabdhen's* perceptions towards the Kabyles have not been ethnographically captured. This emerged during my fieldwork with the Kabyles in the UK.

Ramy, Anazâr and Leïla commonly believed that the "*Imrabdhen* prefer to be isolated and they do not mix with the Kabyles, because they think that they are more intellectuals and because they know the Quran". I was surprised to see three Kabyle participants from three geographically distant Kabyle regions sharing exactly similar thoughts. Their common understanding is sometimes shaped by the predominant rhetoric in Kabyle associations, political parties and/or prominent Kabyle figures' songs or writings. Baya, who is from an *Imrabdhen* descent denied this and attributed their isolation to the fact that the Kabyles are:

> "rude and vulgaire in comparison to us. For example, if there is a wedding party, *Imrabdhen* would celebrate at home, while Kabyles would celebrate it in the street, that is open to everyone, where they dance and sing. We can be friend with them but we don't marry them"

The above quote indicates that although Baya negated Ramy's, Anazar's and Leïla's claims about the reason for the *Imrabdhen* behind distancing themselves from the Kabyles, she used arguments again that put the former in a higher position. Interestingly, Baya and her family have been identifying as 'Kabyles' within the cultural organisation and online. However, their

Imbrabdhen descent operates or is revealed at a family scale. Moreover, if one of the outcomes of the Kabyle Myth and the Arabisation process was the drawing of boundaries between the Kabyles and the Arabs, the Kabyle/*Imrabdhen* distinction seems to take a similar pathway. As mentioned in Chapter 2, negotiations of Kabyleness involved the avoidance of Kabyle/Arab intermarriage (Killian, 2006; Fitzpatrick-McKinley, 2015; Utomo and McDonald; 2016). In her turn, Baya, even though she was born and raised in the UK, she also rejected the Kabyles-*Imrabdhen* intermarriage. Similarly, in one interview, I met Adam, Sila and Melissa, three young Kabyle students in the UK. Because they were all Kabyle, I suggested that I record them as we were discussing topics related to the questions I am addressing in this study. Among the stories Melissa told us, was how her uncle was refused by the family of the one he loved as they were of an *Imrabdhen* descent. However, Nadia indicated that this distinction is not as important as it was in the past.

As mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, the Kabyle term *Amrabedh*, 'marabout' as named by the French, derives from the Arabic word '*Almourabitoun'*, which literally means, "people who are tied to God" (Assam, 2015: 61, citing Daumas and Fabar, 1847: 54). According to colonial accounts, the *Imrabdhen* (plural of *Amrabedh*) were "generally men [who] were more educated than the others, but their descents [come] from a hereditary noblesse" [33] (Assam, 2015: 61, citing Lapène, 1839: 97). The *Amrabedh*; thus, had a social, religious and economic influence within the Kabyle society. They were part of the *Tajmaât* meetings and involved in civil justice, peaceful decisions and tribal structure. They were also perceived as 'military leaders' (Assam, 2015) for their key participation in fighting against the French colonials.

Who are the *Imbradhen*? A simple question with complex answers and multiple versions. While some scholars believed that the *Imbradhen* were not Kabyles and argued that they were of different origins notably Arab, Turkish and/or Kabyle, others emphasised their Kabyle and Amazigh genealogical lineage and their seminal contribution in the Kabyle society (Assam, 2015). Among the different versions, Nadia has shared hers. She indicated that the *Imrabdhen* are not a sub-category of the Kabyles. They are Kabyles, "with strong religious feelings, who have moved from their native Kabyle village to another Kabyle village and established their own micro-society based on their religious feelings, beliefs, values and principals", called themselves *Imrabdhen* and established their boundaries. One of the evidence of their Kabyleness, Ramy argued, is "language. They know Kabyle… Arabs did not learn Kabyle". Here Ramy believes that language is a significant

[33] Original text: "des hommes plus instruits que les autres », mais leurs descendants forment une « noblesse héréditaire"

indicator of one's origin, as will be discussed in chapter 8. However, for Anazâr and Leïla, the *Imrabdhen*'s strong religious inclination was another way to highlight their difference from Kabyles, and therefore emphasise a secular Kabyle identity in the context of the UK.

I was at Nadia's house one day, preparing ourselves to attend the commemoration of the Berber Spring event in April 2019. Nadia related the creation of the events outside of the Cultural Organisation to the fact that she invited Kabyles married to Arabs (Algerian non-Kabyles) and Kabyles of *Imrabdhen* descent. Reporting their argument, Nadia said that the latter suggested religious celebrations such as Eid and Ashura, which was not approved by some Kabyle individuals, or in other words, dimly befitted the members involved in the social field. Then Nadia said: "After that we came to agree on the Kabyles who were bringing their Arab wives, now we have the story of the *Imbrabdhen*". The question of the *Imrabdhen* also emerged during the many meetings and conversations I had with my participants both offline and online. During one of the discussions I had with Nadir about the singer Matoub Lounes, I asked him about Matoub's old interviews on a French TV programme. Matoub said: "My parents are Muslim, but I am necessarily not". I then told him, that throughout his songs, he insinuates a lot of Islamic beliefs and practices, especially romantic ones. My participant replied: "do not forget that he was born and raised in a '*maraboutic*' [*Imrabdhen*] village"**, w**hich, according to him, influenced Matoub's understandings and the meanings Matoub conveyed. Therefore, the environment or social field as well as the circumstances play a considerable role in the formation of the cultural capital, shaping the individual's habitus and their subsequent practices.

The formation of Kabyle indigenous identity (Kabyle cultural capital) in the UK takes, apparently, a funnel-like form, undergoing different levels of practices and understandings. On the one hand, the Kabyles' misalignment from the Algerian 'Arab' and the Middle Eastern category was through their emphasis on their Kabyleness, and their belonging to an Amazigh North African Identity, by underlining their differences between them. On the other hand, within the Kabyle society, both forms of identity construction: relatedness and alterity are relevant. While they identify with all Kabyle as long as they speak Kabyle and identify as Kabyle, they also draw some 'unclear' boundaries vis-à-vis the *Imrabdhen*, such as the case of marriages. However, the issue of the Kabyle/*Imrabdhen* is barely mentioned outside of Kabylia, as Nadia has emphasised. She said that "things have changed now, the differences that existed between the Kabyles and the notion of *Imrabdhen* partially disappeared. For example, you can find now Kabyles as attached to religion as the *Imrabdhen*". However, although Nadia repeatedly emphasised the idea that those distinctions are no longer significant in Kabylia. They are part of ancient or "archaic" beliefs, where some Kabyles in the UK seem to reproduce and emphasise them on the British soil. This is another example that shows my respondents' emphasis on a secular Kabyle identity in the context of the UK.

7.4 Discussion and Conclusion

The question of the secular versus the religious is at the crossroad of the Kabyles' ethnicity, cultural, political and social identities. The main aim of this chapter was to unpack the complexities and the tensions around the Kabyles' negotiations of ethnicity with respect to their religiosity/secularism within the Kabyle local and transnational social field. This chapter has highlighted the Kabyles' diverse interpretations of Islam and secularism, taking into account the historical, social, political and cultural construction of every participant. One can conclude that their experience in Kabylia/Algeria, settlement in the UK, their online interactions and their connection with their fellow Kabyles in France have an impact on their conception of religion and their attitudes towards those embracing Islamic thoughts and practices. Though, their relationship with Islam is individualistic, special, situational and contradictory.

Islam, according to Kastoryano (2006), "represents a unifying force among Muslim immigrants in so far as collective interests are concerned" (p. 65). However, this chapter has shown that the Kabyles' 'secular' ethnic identity in the UK is considered as the key element of their reunification, which also appeared to be very complex. For example, they do not live in areas with a Muslim concentration, nor in Kabyle neighbourhoods; they are scattered and do not live in groups. However, as I tried to show, their efforts to create the cultural organisation in London, their creation of occasional events, virtual meetings and interactions indicate their willingness to sustain and reproduce a Kabyle identity in the UK. Nevertheless, despite the initial success of the Kabyle/Amazigh cultural organisation in bringing together this very scattered community in the UK, it failed to navigate and overcome its members' individualistic differences, which led to its fragmentation.

The British environment and its multicultural approach structure and limit the Kabyles' rejection of Islamic practices overtly. Anazâr, Ricky and Matt who were acutely aware that their claims would not be accepted in British society. However, they opted for Social Media and other forms of gatherings as open and accessible spaces, where they could find more freedom to share their thoughts. Therefore, unlike the multiplication of the cultural associations across North Africa and France that sought an Amazigh identity affirmation (Kourdache, 2001), the proliferation of gathering forms in the UK was more invested and focused on the question of Kabyleness. Consequently, further to the Arab/Amazigh dichotomy, the Kabyle/*Amrabedh* distinction has been reproduced in Britain, building on religious, linguistic, cultural and social differentiations**.** Furthermore, the headscarf as well as Arabic language are viewed as a 'threat' to the perpetuation and sustainability of Kabyle culture and traditions**.** This has also implied the

interference of male's opinion in the construction of 'modern' feminin Kabyle identity through clothing. However, the question of the Kabyle/*Amrabedh* is situationally negotiated and constructed. In other words, it emerges in discourses brought up at a family level, or among people of the same 'family tree' only as explained through the case of Baya.

According to Cesari (2004): "it is common to meet young people of both sexes who perform "Shahada": they follow dietary prohibitions, pray occasionally, and fast during the month of Ramadan, but refused to be singled out as Muslims in social relations" (p. 46). However, for the case of the Kabyles, this chapter has shown how some Kabyles who did not necessarily follow Islamic practices, refused to be excluded from Islam, the religion. They did not deny their religious orientations, (i.e., Islamity), nor their ability to speak Arabic as I will explain in the next chapter, while at the same time emphasising their Amazighity and Kabyleness in particular. Therefore, the negotiation of their identity to their ethnicity, Islamity/religiosity and secularisation within the UK, lead to the creation of boundaries around Kabyle identity, and subsequently the shifting in focus, i.e., from Algerian to Amazigh, then to Kabyle.

Chapter 8 Language Ideologies and Practices

8.1 Introduction

The Kabyles' negotiations of their ethnic belonging in the UK and transnationally were fraught with tensions, contestations and ambiguities. Aiming to address the study's research questions, the present chapter will explore how 'being Kabyle' has also involved the ability of speaking and learning the Kabyle language. Moreover, it will explore the impact of the British environment on the individuals' language practices and finally the role of the different sites in orienting and shaping my respondents' multiple identifications based on their ambitions, targets and needs. This chapter will examine the symbolic, social and/or political meanings my participants attach to Kabyle and other languages. It will also demonstrate the role of language in these everyday negotiations and its place in my participants' discourses of 'authenticity' and indigeneity**.**

Brubaker (2006) and his co-authors argue that "[l]anguage *is* an important vehicle for everyday ethnicity" (p. 239). Over the course of my fieldwork, the linguistic dimension was strongly present in my participants' narrative accounts and discussions of their Kabyle identity. whether during events within the cultural organisation, interviews as a more formal speech genre or through their online interactions, their language practices involved a hierarchical use of language. This included not only the use of Kabyle language, but also of other languages, such as French, English and to some extent Arabic. Therefore, the main intention of this chapter is to show the overlap between the participants' language ideologies and their actual language practices, which gives insights into the complexity of identity and the tensions that this thesis is exploring.

The Kabyle participants involved in this study are multilinguals. Most of them speak their mother tongue Kabyle, which is one of the Tamazight language varieties that they acquired at an earlier age as children. They also speak Arabic, which is the language they learned at schools and use in Arabic-speaking regions, in addition to French and English that they learned from primary and secondary schools respectively. All my participants were fluent in Kabyle except Tamazight who does not speak it. There are a lot of Arabic, French and Turkish words that are adapted to Kabyle phonetics and grammar, which made Kabyle remain mostly an oral language within the limited geographical area of Kabylia, and among the diaspora in Algeria and overseas. Modern Standard Arabic has a powerful status in Algeria since independence, as a national, official and a religious language. In this respect, Bentahila argues: "[T]he Berbers admitted the superiority of Arabic over their own language, probably because of this link between Arabic and religion, and maybe also because of the respect they felt for the written forms which their own language did not possess" (Bentahila, 1983: 2 cited in Benrabah, 2014: 43). However, the most politically active Kabyles

(Collyer, 2008), devoted much effort to upgrade the status of Tamazight language. This has involved focussing strong efforts on revitalising their language variety, Kabyle, and the inclusion of Kabyle in a multilingual online dictionary called Glosbe[34]. Moreover, language activists have sought to replace Arabic words that have been penetrating the Kabyle society and their linguistic routine in order to the preserve and codify Kabyle and demarcate their distinctiveness from/within Algeria as an 'Arab nation', as will be shown in this chapter.

In the UK, more specifically in London, the multiplicity of ethnic minorities and the growing importance of multilingualism have been addressed by social scientist. Moreover, different approaches and measures have been taken by policy makers to acknowledge this diversity, where people view cultural diversity as "a normal part of social life" (Wessendorf, 2013), referring to what Vertovec (2007) called 'super-diversity'. This is the feature that he used to describe Britain's "contemporary social condition aris[ing] from the differential convergence of factors surrounding patterns of immigration since the early 1990s" (p. 149). This has entailed different language phenomena such as language shift, language maintenance, code-switching and language mixing, specifically in London, which is "by far the most linguistically diverse part of the UK" (Ahn et al, 2010:1). This chapter argues that in addition to the complex language repertoire of the Kabyles, their language behaviour and ideologies have been influenced and shaped by this cultural diversity and multilingualism.

Based on my ethnographic fieldwork with my participants and my observations of their multilingual practices, I apply Bourdieu's notion of Field, Habitus and Capital, and the notion of language ideology (Woolard, 1998; Irvine and Gal 2000; Woolard, 2010) to the Kabyles in the UK. By doing so, this chapter will consider the cultural organisation, the online platforms and the participants' domestic environment as social fields that could be divided into subfields. This will help us to understand and elucidate their diverse but converging viewpoints vis-à-vis language use, their actual language practices and the relationship between language and ethnicity/identity

8.2 Languages in Contact: Politicised Ideologies to Language

An ideology, as a general concept, is viewed as the "systems of thought that are socially situated and collectively shared" (Mannheim: [1936] 1985 in Woolard, 1998: 8). This indicates that cultural forms including identity, language, affiliations with politics, religion are socially positioned. In this sense, ideologies are central in the understanding of the link between language use and the social

[34] https://fr.glosbe.com/

world. Language ideologies have been described as "any sets of beliefs about language articulated by users as a rationalization or justification of perceived language structure and use" (Silverstein, 1979: 193). Following Silverstein's seminal definition, scholars have further refined the idea, suggesting that language ideologies are not always explicit and fixed (Gal, 1989; Creese and Blackledge, 2011). Moreover, sociolinguists (Labov 1972; Gumperz 1982), linguistic anthropologists (Gumperz and Hymes, 1972; Silverstein 1976; Irvine and Gal 2000) linguistic ethnographers (Rampton *et al.*, 2004) and social theorists (Bourdieu, 1972; 1982; 1991) have highlighted the interdependence of language and social structure. As Woolard (1998) has argued, in "multilingual communities where there have been self-conscious struggles over language, researchers have long treated language ideologies … as socially, politically, and even linguistically significant" (p. 16). In other words, the different social variables and language are reciprocally shaping. Therefore, language ideologies are "the mediating link between social structures and forms of talk" (Woolard, 2010: 235). Following Labov's (1972) seminal work on language variation, the social, cultural, economic, and political forces have become increasingly significant in sociolinguistic studies.

The arrival of the different dynasties to Algeria (See Chapter 2), has led to the contact of people from different cultural and linguistic backgrounds, which led to the development of a variety of spoken Arabic known as *darija*. Benrabah asserts: "One of the consequences of this long history of mixing peoples was language contact and its by-product, multilingualism-Berber-Punic-Latin, Berber-Arabic, Berber-Arabic-Spanish-Turkish, Berber-Arabic-French, and so on." (2014: 43). The *darija* differs from one Algerian area to another depending on the colonial influences in the region. For example, in the west of the country, the Orani dialect/*darija* is constituted of Tamazight, Arabic, Turkish, Spanish and French language, whereas in the east of the country Italian words are more likely to be found. Belmihoub (2018) argues that "code-switching using a Berber variety, *darija*, and French is common among Berber speakers" (p. 2). Although French is taught in primary school, children are exposed to the language at an earlier age as it is pervasively mixed with Arabic and Tamazight in Algerian society (Benrabah, 2014), in addition to words from former colonial languages notably Spanish, Turkish and Italian.

The discussion of the Algerian dialects was part of my conversations with Nadir, who argued that "what Algerian people think is Arabic, in fact it is not … they think they are Arabs, but look at the language they speak". In many conversations I had with Nadir, he clearly viewed language as "the prime indicator and expression of [his] own and another's ethnicity" (Fishman, 1997: 330). He often emphasised the importance of speaking Kabyle and transmitting it to the next generations. For him, it was important to marry a Kabyle woman because he wanted his children to speak the language. This indicates how he embraced the idea of endogamy to ensure language and cultural continuity. Moreover, on multiple occasions, Nadir and Nadia, for example, kindly interrupted me

when I used *darija* and reminded me to speak the Kabyle language to preserve it from endangerment. This shows, as argued in earlier chapter, how Kabyle women are often assigned the role of educators and the conservators of Kabyle cultural heritage.

After Algerian independence, politicians who promoted the Arabic language believed that "[t]amazight meant backwardness, rurality, ignorance and neo-colonialism, while darija was merely 'bad Arabic' to be overcome by Arabic speakers themselves who needed to work towards a universal spoken language" (McDougall, 2017: 268). They attempted to replace French, Tamazight and darija by Modern Standard Arabic in Algeria in different domains such as education, media and workplace. Relating to this ideological promotion of standard Arabic as a 'purified' expression of the new national identity, McDougall (2017) argues that

> "the regime's rhetoric contributed to this framing of the language question as one of conflict between "authentic" and "inauthentic" culture, when in fact socalled francisants[35] also – of course – spoke (dialectal) Arabic or Tamazight, and many Arabic speakers, most of whom were entirely monolingual, themselves had very ambivalent attitudes towards the French language and to norms deriving from French culture" (p. 269-70)

As part of this ideological drive to create a mono-lingual nation, many Algerian francophones, and particularly Kabyles/Amazighs (Goodman, 2005), were viewed as traitors, inauthentic, francized or stereotyped as "'non-believers and hizb fransa (allies of France)" (Daoudi, 2018: 466), for their use of French language and their frequent travel to France, as explained in chapters 3, 5 and 7. As a direct response to this, Kabyles and "Berber advocates contended that only the Berber language was truly native to North Africa; Arabic, like French, had been imposed by a conquering population" (Goodman, 2005: 56). However, unlike Arabic, French acquired more legitimacy among the Kabyles because of the French strategy to help the Kabyles maintain their cultural heritage (see chapter 2), as well as the power of French language. Bourdieu (1991) argues:
" Linguistic exchange […] is also an economic exchange which is established within a particular symbolic relation of power between a producer, endowed with a certain linguistic capital, and a consumer (or a market), and which is capable of procuring a certain material profit" (p. 502). In other words, language is a form of capital that can be converted. Drawing on this idea of linguistic marketplace, Irvine (1989) addressed the notion of legitimacy in the Senegalese context. For instance, she observed that "members of other ethnic groups often favored French as the

[35] Francized (see chapter 7).

alternative to Wolof domination" (p. 256). I also found this view among my participants, where some of them chose French to avoid the hegemony of Arabic. For example, Nadir stated that he "preferred to speak French rather than Arabic, although both were ex-colonial languages, but at least the French did not attempt to bury the Kabyle culture as Arabs did". Nadir sees Kabyle and Tamazight as more authentically North African, and its use is more legitimate in the country, whereas French is less harmful to the flourishing of their language. Therefore, by dis-authenticating the Algerian dialect, i.e. *darija*, my participants emphasised their own authenticity.

8.3 Kabyle Multilingual Practices in Different Fields

"To understand practices, we need to understand *both* the evolving fields within which actors are situated *and* the evolving habituses which actors bring to their social fields of practice" (Maton, 2014: 52)

Political, cultural, economic and social variables have had a big impact on my participants' conceptions of Kabyle language and other languages, and on their diverse language practices in multiple fields. This has involved either resistance to the use of particular languages and maintenance of 'Kabyle' or a contextual and situational use of different languages available in their multilingual repertoire. In what follows, I will introduce my participants' language ideologies and actual language practices in their everyday interactions, which involve interviews and ethnographic conversations, within the cultural organisation, and in the online world.

The sociocultural space is important in identifying the individual's identity as Kroskrity (1998) has put it "speech behaviour in general expresses important information about the speaker's identity" (112). This indicates the relationship between linguistic forms and the social differentiation such as class, as shown in Irvine's (1989) ethnographic study on the Senegalese Wolof. However, in the context of this study, my participants' forms of talk were contextual and situational, indexing their fluid and dynamic social identifications. Their language practices have been often shaped by the field (such as the cultural organisation, our formal interviews and/or the different Facebook pages), its logic and rules, the people they were interacting with, and, in some cases, their language ideologies. In other words, my participants' use of languages was not as systematic and controlled as many of them would have preferred it to be. Their multiple and dynamic language practices facilitate their access to different intersected spaces within the Kabyle transnational field, and thereafter allowing for the production of various forms of capital.

For example, participants with an academic/ professional background, held the whole interview conversation in English, which is considered in this study as a field in the Bourdieusian sense (see chapters 3). In other words, their habitus here is adapted to the nature of the field and its logic

(Bourdieu, 1986). Ricky was speaking the whole time in English telling me that he "forgot his Kabyle language for lack of practice". Whilst emphasising the symbolic significance of Kabyle his online linguistic practices included both English and French. Ricky, and others, also displayed through their use of English their successful journey in the UK, a context in which the ability of speaking English was itself a big achievement, as Lyly and Nadia pointed out. Mr. Mohand spoke only in English and only used Kabyle in idiomatic expressions as shown in chapter 5. By the end of the meeting, he told me "you see we are both Kabyle, but we were speaking English only". Similarly, during a recorded interview Uncle Saïd, conducted the whole conversation in English. However, during our casual conversations with the whole family, he was alternating between Kabyle, French and English. During community events, though, he was speaking in Kabyle with other Kabyles as if to make a point about his commitment to Kabyle language and Kabyle cultural capital.

8.3.1 Everyday Multilingualism

"Anemeslay taqvaylit, nernu taƐravt, tarumit, awid kan anɣar"

"Anemeslay tatergit, tacenwat, d taglizit … awid kan anɣar" (Brahim Izri)

We speak Kabyle, we add Arabic, French, all what is important is learning

We speak Tergui, Shenwa[36], English, all what is important is learning

This part will address my participants' everyday multilingual practices that I observed over the course of my ethnographic fieldwork with them at home, and in our different meeting points in London/UK. It also covers their ideologies to Kabyle and other languages. The quote above is extracted from a song by Brahim Izri through which he tried to encapsulate the multilingualism in Kabylia and the Kabyle's openness to all languages. I did not know the song, until Leïla played it while we were discussing languages. It was a way to summarise her viewpoints towards speaking different languages. Below is an example of what I will call 'mixed Kabyle'. By 'mixed Kabyle', I refer to the Kabyle that is mixed with French, Kabylised Arabic words and English. These are excerpts from interviews with Nadir, Lyly and Anâzar.

Example 1: Nadir usually repeated the same sentences in French, knowing that I understood both Kabyle and *darija*. However, it is important to note that my position as a Kabyle researcher with a limited linguistic competence in Kabyle may have influenced their language behaviour. For example, when Leïla spoke to my mother, I noticed that she did not mix Kabyle with French as she

[36] Tergui and Shenwa are two other Tamazight varieties. See Chapter 2.

did with me. There, I realised that she adapted her speaking behaviour according to my Kabyle language capacities.

Nadir	c'est ça l'idée te3 lektab heda … c'est ça l'idée de ce roman-là! [here Nadir's first sentence is the Algerian *darija*: Arabic + French, then he translated it into French] **Translation: This is the idea of that book**
Nadir	Oui Ighil Ali, tes3iδ Ath Yenni c'est deux tribus, asmi tekhδem fransa les écoles … lorsque la France a implanté des écoles en Kabylie, c'était les premières places oú y avait les écoles françaises … [he started in French then spoke in Kabyle, switched into French another time and then to Kabyle, but later decided to say his full idea in French] **Translation: Ighil Ali and Ath Yenni were the first two places where the French constructed French schools…**

Nadir	Donc l'émigration c'est zik qu'émigr**an** l'ghashi [Here Nadir used both French and Kabyle in the same sentence, where he even conjugated the French verb 'emigrate' in Kabyle, 3rd person plural in the past tense] **Translation: So human migration started years ago**
Nadir	**loukan tejma3 thwasand** [here Nadir used Arabic, and put the English word 'thousand' in plural, but in Kabyle way] **Translation: if you collect thousands**

Example 2: Next is the example of Lyly who included even English within her own dialect

Lyly	que vava **n'a jamais noticed**, remarqui [Here Lyly has combined all of Kabyle, French and English, and then corrected herself by changing the word 'noticed' for the kabylised French word 'remarqui', as the French word would be "remarque" **Translation; that my father has never noticed**

Example 3: Anazâr: As his first part of the message may suggest, his Kabyle was 'purely' Kabyle that even the word London was integrated into Kabyle as shown in the figure below**:**



Figure 8-1 Nadir, Lyly and Anâzar's language practices.

The above examples show that English is also undergoing grammatical and phonological changes to meet the Kabyle language. Gumperz (1982) argues "what we perceive and retain in our mind is a function of our culturally determined predisposition to perceive and assimilate." (p. 13). In other words, our linguistic practices are open to social and cultural influences. Nadir and Lyly's examples show the reciprocal influence of both English and Kabyle on their linguistic behaviour. Similar language mixing was very common among many participants as will be shown in this chapter. Even though Tamazight and Ricky did not speak Kabyle, they both situationally and contextually mixed French, English and some basic Kabyle words, such as names of Kabyle dishes or symbols.

The relationship of Kabyles in the UK and French is strong and complex. As many Kabyles prefer to take refuge in French language in order to avoid the use of Arabic. In my meeting with Anazâr, my Algerian non-Kabyle friend accompanied me. We spent more than 10 hours together, where Anazâr did not use a single word in Arabic, he was speaking French and sometimes English, although he knew English. Anazâr's perspectives towards France/French are not different from his attitudes towards Arabs. He believes that "France is the enemy of the Kabyles… I am very sure that they are afraid of the Kabyles, because they know that if 'true' Kabyles will take control in Algeria, the French will not have the same privileges they have been enjoying since independence". When I met him, he "was working on the transfer of the Kabyle political movement and fights for the Kabyle cause into the British soil". This shows that the actual use of my participants' linguistic resources did not always indicate their positioning vis-à-vis languages, ethnicity, religion in contrast to what De Fina (2006) has argued. She (2006) set forth how "linguistic resources are used by narrators to index their positioning with respect to social categories such as gender, ethnicity, or race" (p. 102). My participants' use of different languages indexed their multicultural and intersecting identities, as individuals with different cultural, educational and socio-economic backgrounds, in addition to their different religious, political and immigration status.

Kabyle Language: an expression of an ethnic identity

Many researchers have discussed the significant relationship between ethnic identity and language (Fishman, 1997; Tilmatine and Suleiman, 1996; De Fina, 2007; Aboh, 2018). However, Fishman (1997) acknowledged the perspectival and situational nature of ethnicity and therefore "the link between language and ethnicity is also variable" (p. 330). While some people may believe in the salience of language in stressing their own and the others' ethnic identity; "for others, language is both merely marginal and optional" (Ibid). The Kabyles involved in this study have strongly emphasised the link between Kabyle language and their Kabyle identity. However, in practice, their ideologies often changed.

As mentioned in earlier sections, the implementation of Arabic as the only official and national language after independence to the detriment of Tamazight has created adverse consequences, such as the emergence of divisive stereotypes within the Algerian 'nation'. In the meantime, this has enhanced the emancipation of the Tamazight language, with national and official status, through the Kabyles' willingness and efforts devoted by Kabyle intellectuals and elites to preserve their language and subsequently their Kabyle and Amazigh cultural heritage. Fruitfully, Tamazight has been recognised as a national language in 2002 following the Berber Spring event and as an official language in 2016 (see chapter 2). Recently, the new President of Algeria, Abdelmadjid Tebboun, agreed to sponsor the launch of an award for Amazigh literature and language (January

2020)[37]. The initiative was a step forward to encourage scientific research to enrich Tamazight language, contributing to its promotion and dissemination. However, it is important to note that this initiative created a strong polemic among Algerians on Social Media, in response to the President's post on Twitter. While some supported the idea, others rejected it as they rejected the inclusion of Tamazight in the constitution (Hadji, 2020). As a reaction, the construction of Kabyle secular identity among my research participants has involved, in some cases, opposition to 'the other', more particularly Algerian 'Arabs' and Arabic language as will be shown in the next section.

Language as a site of contestations and frictions

Discussions on language in the UK often revolved around language debates and conflicts in Algeria, as they are part of my respondents' everyday offline and digital connectivity. Put differently, the commemoration of Kabyle shared narratives in a form of performative events, the remarkable expansion of the MAK movement and the Algerian *Hirak* and its outcome became embedded in the Kabyles' everyday discussions and activities in the UK and transnationally.

The participants' ideologies and actual speaking behaviour refer to their rejection of the fact that being Muslim is synonymous with Arabness. As Nadir ironically put it: "The one-language-one-nation-one-religion ideology had made of Arabic a divine language that ensures access to heaven and subsequently requires a good Muslim to use it". For example, most of my Kabyle participants responded to my greetings in Arabic, such as Salam, with an emphasised Kabyle greeting '*Azul*', in a way that expresses their disapproval and dissatisfaction. This is, sometimes, because of the religious connotation of the Arabic greeting "Salam alaykoum". Speaking about the link between the Arabic language and Islam, Daoudi (2018) points out "the religiousness of Arabic and the traditional relationship between the language and Islam have always been a form of power, perpetuated and indoctrinated over the years" (Daoudi, 2018: 461). This meaning of Arabic was what which my participants resisted. Nadir and Nadia in particular often reminded and inviting me to speak Kabyle when I spoke *darija*. However, I noticed that even the Kabyle we spoke was not the 'pure' Kabyle they 'imagined'.

Thus, Kabyles' self-identification was translated through their language use and their efforts to develop Tamazight language. During fieldwork I learnt that after the nationalisation and the officialisation of Tamazight language in Algeria, a polemic around which alphabet Tamazight

[37] WWW.HCAMAZIGHITE.DZ

language should be written has emerged. As mentioned earlier, in addition to the ancient writing system, Tifinagh, Kabyle and Amazigh elites and intellectuals have developed a modern script for transcribing Tamazight that used either Tifinagh, Arabic or the Latin alphabet. In Morocco, similar debates have arisen around which alphabet should be used to write Tamazight. In 2003, the government committee decided to adopt Tifinagh "as a medium solution" (Ennaji, 2005: 92).

In Algeria, advocates of the Arabic alphabet, according to Leïla, argued that Tamazight language "should be written in the language of the Quran and the language of the Algerian's identity", rejecting the "French alphabet". This category calls the Latin alphabet 'French' and their attitude refer to the regime's rhetoric on non-Arabic speakers because of their French. On the other hand, others, such as Ricky, have supported the idea that Tamazight "should be written with Latin alphabet, as it offers access to technology and international market". However, there was a group of conservatives, notably Numidia, Ramy, Nadir and Leïla who believed in the "authenticity" of Tamazight language and insisted that it had to be written in its original Tifinagh symbols. Numidia clearly stated that "it definitely should not be written in Arabic, how can a language be officialised but it be written in a complete other language… most shops now are written with Tifinagh now anyway, so then they should write it in Tifinagh". Numidia has referred to her observations of the linguistic landscape in Kabylia and how signs on shops have adopted the Tifinagh alphabet, which in a way represents their choice of which script Tamazight should be written with.

Anazâr believes that "our language is already in danger, it is of an oral tradition, I mean what we speak now is what is left from our ancestors and we have to maintain it. We have to write down and transmit it over the generations". Similarly, Leïla believes that "Amazigh heritage is mostly oral, that should be maintained through language". Both Anazâr and Leïla felt committed to the preservation of the Kabyle language. Interestingly, during our conversations, their Kabyle was mixed with French and English, what I call in this thesis 'mixed Kabyle'. The Kabyles I met in the UK used different languages within the same conversation, showing some very interesting instances of code mixing. However, the focus of this chapter is not on the linguistic structure, but on my participants' language practices, their ideologies and conceptualisations of languages with respect to their identities.

Although Numidia is a British-born woman, she spoke most of the time in Kabyle and French, and rarely in English. She said she felt "more comfortable when speaking Kabyle" at home and with her family in-law. Her ability to speak Kabyle strengthened and boosted her Kabyle status in front of her husband and her acquaintances in Kabylia. She even told me that "she sometimes felt that she forgot her English," suggesting her frequent use of Kabyle. Throughout the long period I spent with Numidia, I observed and noticed her comfort in speaking Mixed Kabyle, noting that she does not speak Arabic nor understand it. When she asked me how to say some Kabyle words in

Algerian Arabic, she realised that they were similar to Kabyle, but with a different pronunciation. Numidia felt “proud” when she spoke Kabyle. She said that she “was jealous to see other pupils at school with the ability to speak other languages than English”. She believed that learning a language was part of her ethnolinguistic identity.

On the other hand, we have Tamazight, a French-born Kabyle woman. She does not speak Kabyle, as she ‘discovered’ her Kabyle identity at the age of 19. She “blamed” her mother for not teaching her Kabyle, as she “blamed” her father for not teaching her Lebanese Arabic, especially that her “French-born Lebanese friends spoke their language”. She said:

> “I blame my mother a little bit, I tell her why when we were little with my sister you didn't tell us about the Kabylie, you didn't talk to us in Kabyle language, you didn't tell us about the Kabyle culture…I tell her you have no excuse! You see, my father is Lebanese, I understand Lebanese Arabic but I speak it a little bit but with someone who speaks Lebanese I will force myself but it is not natural … You see, my two parents like that! How come when you didn't talk to us, all our Lebanese friends who are in France they speak Lebanese”.

This indicates Tamazight’s openness to both Kabyle and Lebanese Arabic, as both her parents’ ethnic languages constitute her identity, alongside French. In the beginning I selected the name Melissa for her as a pseudonym and when I discussed it with her, she asked me whether it “was possible to replace it by Tamazight”. Her choice of name indicates her attachment to Kabyle language and her regret for not speaking it. At the same time, Tamazight expressed her understanding of her mother’s reasons. She said: “This is what happened with my mother, I blame her, but I still try not to grieve her too much, I think because she too has been disconnected for a few years that is with the events of the 98. She knew there was all this but you see she wasn't really into it”. Understanding the historical development of governmental and/or micro decisions in relation to language is important in understanding the participants’ stances vis-à-vis the use of Kabyle and other languages particularly French and Arabic (see also chapter 2).

Gal (1989) believes that “hegemonic linguistic practices are not simply forms; they also carry cultural definitions of social life that serve the interests of dominant classes. Indeed, dominant groups are themselves shaped and constrained by such conceptions” (p. 348). The role assigned to particular languages and their powerful positions in the world shape correspondingly the ideologies and people’s beliefs towards them. Therefore, the choice of what to speak, with whom and in what circumstances is constrained by the social, cultural, economic and political positions and the value attributed to the language(s) in question. This can be exemplified with the debate

running in Algeria over which alphabet Tamazight should be written with. Moreover, other linguistic forms and strategies are used among the Kabyles to either discern their Kabyleness or hide it. In what follows, I will show how Kabyle participants situationally use names to emphasise or not an ethnic affiliation.

Kabyle/Amazigh names and ethnicity

Aboh (2018) argues that "in most African communities, the proper or personal name which a person bears sums up not only their individuality, but significantly their ethnic affiliation" (p. 26). Similarly, Kabyles in Algeria are usually recognised and distinguished through their ethnic personal and/or family names. For example, ancient names of Amazigh places such as Numidia, or warriors like Siphax, Massinissa, Takfarinas, Kahina. Another example could be the word '*Aït'* or '*Naït'*[38] that precedes most of Kabyle surnames. As explained in chapter 4, the participants' pseudonyms have been purposively selected in this study by the participants or the researcher. Many of them suggest a Kabyle or an Amazigh ethnic belonging, attachment and activism. Names, according to Joseph (2004) "play this role of linguistic enactment of ideological leaning and the construction of ethnic as well as national identities" (p.26). While some of the Kabyle names carry social meanings, others carry a more historical and political one, such as Anazâr, which means 'warrior/challenge'. Anazâr is also a pseudonym my participant has adopted in his everyday life, to emphasise his 'dedication' and 'faithfulness' to the Kabyle cause. Tamazight and Numidia, two respectively French and British born women, happily and enthusiastically chose their pseudonyms with clear connections to Amazigh language and history. They saw the research as an opportunity to deliberately choose highly symbolic names for themselves. While others were not interested in the choice of names. In this case, I decided to select pseudonyms for them based on their profiles. For example, I chose Lyly, because my participant was full of energy and ambition.

Some participants also indicated that they changed their ethnic names for new European names in the UK context in order to assure a better integration into the receiving society. On multiple occasions, I heard my participants calling each other by their online pseudonyms, that were often European or short forms of their real names. However, over the course of my online ethnographic fieldwork, I observed, while some of them used their European names, others either kept their real names, or have chosen a different one.

[38] These are the Arabised form of the Kabyle and Amazigh word *Ath*, which means 'son of'.

"Taqvaylit is more than a Language"

Language "assumes the character of a clear identity marker" (Blommaert and Verschueren, 1998: 192). But it is "only one identity marker among others" (Ibid: 189). For example, Catalan is "widely accepted as the basic element of distinctive Catalan identity" Kleiner-Liebau (2009: 205). Ideologically my Kabyle participants referred to the important and the urgent use of Kabyle language in order to preserve it from any kind of endangerment. Here my participants refer to Kabyle and not Tamazight. They believe that their Kabyle language is still under threat. Lyly has expressed her Kabyleness with respect to language as follows:

> "So this is how we grew up, even the way my father raised us. It's true, we were raised in Algeria, where we have different cultures: This means that there are Arabs and Kabyles, but I always lean to my origin, I lean to…this means that I cannot image myself marrying an Arab [Algerian non-Kabyle] … It's my choice, but it is also the choice of my father, it's part of his decision. I don't denigrate, I don't judge. As we say, good people are everywhere, like our friend [my Algerian non-Kabyle friend] that I welcomed today. I would lie if I say this person is bad. My husband's best friend is from Setif [Algerian city]. He is so friend with him to the extent that he speaks Kabyle, He became Kabylophone. So yes, I don't judge".

Lyly argued that the place of residence does not always define one's Kabyleness as language does. Lyly told me how her husband was "amazed and proud to see her speaking Kabyle, despite the fact that she was born and raised in a non-Kabyle area". She acknowledged her father's resistance to the dominant culture and insistence on the fact that his children learn to be Kabyle, extending to marriage decisions. Moreover, Lyly has expressed her openness, as well as her husband's, to Algerian Arabs to the extent that they converted their friend to 'Kabylity'.

At a micro/family level, as shown with the example of Lyly, her father took over the agency not only to construct his Kabyle identity, but also in determining a sense of Kabyle identity among his children. Lyly's father's profile as a "fervent activist for the Kabyle cause and a retired MP" (Lyly), played an important role in the construction and the transmission of a Kabyle identity to his children in spite of their residence in a non-Kabyle area. This has involved the creation of imagined boundaries with non-Kabyle residents. Similarly, both Nadia and Uncle Saïd emphasised their efforts to transmit their cultural and linguistic heritage to their British-born children, so that they can communicate with their grandparents and family in Kabylia.

Moreover, Lyly told me how her father decided to move back to his place of birth in Kabylia to support the Kabyle cause and Tamazight in 1995. The year where all the Kabyles decided not to take the Baccalaureate exam because they claimed the recognition of Tamazight as a national and an official language. This year is known as 'l'Année Blanche' (Blanc Year). In the UK, Lyly wishfully aimed to follow her father's path. She said:

> I'm more than happy að'heðragh s'taqvayliθ, parceque la langue ninou, s'tagui id loulaɣ, id ekraɣ. C'est toute ma vie, ðe'duniθiw tagui. Taqvayliθ mashi kan اللغة. It's all my life, my life. C'est mon identité. C'est dans mes veine…et je tiens à transmettre ça à mes enfants, mon premier enfant"
>
> ***Translation**: "I am more than happy to speak in Kabyle, because it is my language, I was born with, I grew up with it. It is all my life (in French), it is all my life. Kabyle is not only a language. Kabyle is not only a language. It is all my life. It is my identity, it is in my veins… and I would like to transmit it to my children, to my first child"*

Lyly expressed her will to transmit her cultural and linguistic heritage to her son "despite the non-supportive environment". She told me how her child was struggling with speaking because of the different languages he was exposed to, notably Kabyle, French and English, as shown in the above quote. Lyly used different languages with the dominance of French language, showing a degree of fluidity in language use, despite her determined desire to maintain Kabyle language. Likewise, Nadia said that she made sure her culture and language remain alive. She proudly introduced her daughter during the events because of her fluency in Kabyle. For example, during the commemoration of the Berber/Black Spring in 2018, Numidia delivered a poem in Kabyle that she wrote.

Nevertheless, the Kabyles' linguistic practices did not always reflect their ideologies in practice, either during our conversations and interviews or their online written posts. For instance, their use of mixed Kabyle was to some extent constrained by the fact that I am not fluent in Kabyle. This shows how speaking behaviour can be shaped by the people we interact with. Moreover, my respondents' speaking practices varied according to the audience, the field, the situation and the context the Kabyles were engaged in. For example, language use was often strategic to gain a particular position and subsequently capital, be social, cultural or specifically economic as will be shown in the next section.

Accessing the Linguistic Market in the UK

Breton (1998) argues that language is an essential capital asset for humans, and participants were very aware of this. They used their linguistic capital and linguistic competence, which included French and Arabic, to increase their chances of entering the job market in the UK (Bourdieu, 1986). A study conducted by Ulloa (2019) shows that the area of teaching and promoting French was often related to French-Algerian war. The present research has reached a similar conclusion. For example, Nadir believes that French is "*un butin de guerre"* or 'a spoil of war'. Because of the newness of the British environment he found himself in, Nadir made use of his fluency in French, and his "European-like physical appearance" as he called it in one of our conversations, to gain access to the job market. This indicates the importance of both the habitus and the environment that people are active in, understanding their customs. Nadir worked in a francophone restaurant, which required the use of linguistic and cultural capitals to fit into the position he occupied. Nadir seemed to understand the field's logic as he indicated that he paid close attention to his physical appearance, choice of clothing, perfume and use of language. Given his circumstances, his fluency in French and European likeness facilitated the process of finding a job.

Leïla insisted on using the Kabyle or Tamazight language for maintaining her Kabyle identity. When she visited me, we went out with my Kabyle flatmate and another non-Kabyle Algerian friend. Leïla had already met her at an event in January 2019. We were sitting in the bus when the non-Kabyle friend kindly reminded Leïla to speak in Arabic because she did not understand. Leïla then said: "It's your fault we learnt Arabic, but you resisted to learn Kabyle" and continued on speaking in Arabic. However, Leïla told me that she was using her linguistic capital or competence, as an arabophone in London. She was teaching Arabic to the children of her landlord, who subsequently recommended her to friends, increasing her chances of altering her economic situation in the London metropolitan area. This is what Bourdieu (1986, p. 242) called the 'the economy of practice'. Here Bourdieu argues that individuals exchange their forms of capital for economic purposes. They "recognize the resources that their linguistic repertoires provide in permitting them to perform multiple social identities" (Kroskrity, 1998, p. 113). Therefore, Leïla's position and practices changed because her environment changed. She said that she 'didn't hate Arabic, but [she] hated the way it was imposed on them'. In this sense, the circumstances of an individual play a crucial role in determining their behaviour.

8.3.2 Language Policing within the Cultural Organisation and Kabyle Gatherings

According to Bourdieu (1990), every field has its logic and rules. If we look at the Kabyle/Amazigh Cultural Organisation in this sense certain rules and rule makers stood out. At every event, Nadia

announced the organisation's aim by giving a succinct speech. She emphatically invited the Kabyles to preserve their ethnic identity through regular attendance and presence at events and in the online space, speaking the language, and using the Kabyle symbols. For example, she insisted that women wore Kabyle dresses. On Facebook, the organisation also outlined the overarching aim of the organisation in a short post (see chapter 1). Moreover, the ritual of delivering a speech appealing to everyone's Kabyleness before the start of every event was common on other occasions.

In the context of this study, the acceptable definition of Kabyleness within the cultural organisation as a gathering space and a social field involved, among other features, speaking the language. According to Heller (1987)

> The first principle of ethnic identity formation is ethnic social networks, and therefore in activities controlled by ethnic group members. Language is important here as a means by which access to network is regulated: If you do not speak the right language, you do not have access to forming relationships with certain people, or to participating in certain activities" (p. 181 in Norton, 2013: 52)

The Kabyle language is important to Kabyle participants, although, for some participants, it was not the only standard required to be Kabyle or to become part of the Kabyle community. According to my participants, the Kabyle language is a whole package that includes history, tradition, identity, heritage, culture, and location. This shows how "culture did not stand outside talk but was constituted in and through situated speaking practices" (Auer & Roberts 2011:385; Gumperz & Cook Gumperz 2008:536 in Rampton, 2017: 7).

As mentioned earlier, the environment and the socio-political background plays an important role in the language practices processes. When I arrived at the event for the Berber Spring in April 2017, I had a quick discussion with one of the ticket cutters, who welcomed me in Tamazight. When I replied with an arabised Kabyle greeting, she said: "it's better to say ansuf yeswen than merhva yeswan", as the former was purely Amazigh. My participants made sure to speak 'Kabyle' and not a single word in Arabic, but mixed with French and English. Nadia said she "could not allow singers to sing in Arabic, for the memory of the Kabyles who died for the Amazigh/Kabyle cause". This was on the one hand to pay tribute to the Kabyle martyrs who fought for the Kabyle cause, and on the other hand to assert their Kabyleness and to avoid the others' judgments. By speaking Kabyle, my participants were showing their maintenance and preservation of their Kabyle identity through language, especially when their British-born children speak it, such as the case of Nadia. Language is an important element for the formation of their Kabyleness, as

demonstrated above and in previous chapters, and for the sustainability of their groupness (Brubaker, 2002). In this sense, visible efforts were performed by my Kabyle participants during the events they organised or attended in London and by the Kabyle diaspora online, that also involved semiotic forms. Through the selection of Kabyle songs, the printing of Neo-Tifinagh alphabet on the attendees' T-shirts, the presentation of poems in Kabyle and Tamazight. The commemoration of the Berber/Black Spring event helped in raising awareness among the members, as it was a politicised cultural event.

Nevertheless, Ramy, a young Kabyle man in London, said: "I went last time to one of the MAK meetings to have an idea and step back from the stereotypes, but I noticed that most of the militants there were not speaking Kabyle actually. None of them was speaking Tamazight, but French with some Kabyle words". Ramy is not only rejecting Arabic but also any language that threatens Kabyle. For him, "speaking other languages is not a problem, it becomes a problem when it is spoken on the detriment of Kabyle/Tamazight". Ramy feels a protective duty towards Kabyle, as other languages whether Arabic or French are a real threat to the decline of the 'pure' Tamazight and Kabyle language. He said that he started intentionally speaking in 'pure' Tamazight, to show, on the one hand his linguistic capacities, his Kabyleness and on the other hand to indirectly raise awareness among the Kabyles present "to mind their language". Based on my conversations with other Kabyles, language choice among them becomes problematic when Arabic interferes. However, in the case of Ramy, his attitude is more exclusive where he believes in the purification of Kabyle from other languages, especially in political contexts, and taking stances (Lafkioui, 2013). Though, he was himself speaking Mixed Kabyle in his everyday interactions.

For the purpose of this chapter, I listened to the organisation members' speeches again and these were in what my participants call 'pure' Kabyle. The speeches aimed to unify the Kabyles in London/UK and strengthen their ties. The speech was framed by the setting, the nature of the speaker's position as an organiser and fervent activist and the message they wished to convey. Nevertheless, despite the concerted efforts in creating and maintaining a Kabyle identity in the UK based on cultural and linguistic variables, their actual language practices within the cultural organisation and more importantly online has proved to be more fluid and dynamic and beyond their rules and own expectations.

8.3.3 **Online Multilingual Practices**

The online platform as a field, can, in its turn, be divided into subfields. On the one hand, we have the official page of the Kabyle/Amazigh Cultural Organisation and other Kabyle pages created by

the Kabyle diaspora online, and my participants' personal profiles on the other hand. The participants' interactions and reflections in the different platforms (fields) was sometimes conditioned by the social, cultural and/or political orientation of the page, as well as the participants' list of friends.

A plethora of language activities are further documented online, such as the creation of websites and Facebook pages, such as Amazigh Sports Association in the UK, Amazigh Aid UK, the Kabyle/Amazigh cultural organisation in London and other pages like: Sais-tu? Version Kabyle; National Geographic Kabyle. As part of their aim was the promotion of Kabyle and Tamazight language (Harris, 2018). They have dedicated much effort to the development, revitalisation and the 'purification' of Tamazight/Kabyle Language, as shown before. Therefore, a number of workshops aiming for the teaching of Kabyle have taken place in France and Canada and then shared online. My participants actively took part by either re-sharing those posts for promotion or providing some useful knowledge about words meanings.

In the UK, Nadia has revealed her project of opening an online space for teaching Kabyle to children of Kabyle migrants who wish to learn it. In one of my discussions with Anazâr, he asked me whether I knew anyone with high Kabyle fluency and writing capacity in Tifinagh for their MAK coordination in London, which was also online based. Moreover, a Kabyle website has launched the new android application for the channel 'Taqvaylit. TV'. The channel is free for users in Kabylia, and for the diaspora in the world, it is available by annual subscription. To promote this channel, its Kabyle founder has agreed with Nadia and her husband to organise a conference in London, after he visited France. He wanted to introduce the channel and collect donations. Such initiatives also indicate the bridging relationships, mobilisation and collaboration between Kabyle diasporas. Such initiatives have been shared, circulated and mediated by my participants and the Kabyle diaspora online. (See figures 8-2 and 8-3).

Figure 8-3 Taqvaylit TV: A channel that cover Kabylia's news.

Figure 8-2 Workshop in France for teaching Kabyle orthography.

As mentioned in earlier chapters, I was added to a chat group designed for the organisation members. I took part in different discussions they had around the organisation of events or gatherings. However, their use of languages caught my attention. Although all the participants speak Kabyle, mixed Kabyle with a French dominance was the main mode of communication. Below is an example of my participants' online conversation that included a dynamic switching between French, English and Kabyle (Figure 8-4).



Figure 8-4 Multilingual conversation between members of the Kabyle/Amazigh Cultural Organisation.

Therefore, despite the long settlement of most of my participants in the UK, French still occupies a significant place in their speech, whether when speaking mixed Kabyle or *darija*, which they sometimes avoid and resist. For example, Ulloa (2019) has pointed out how an Algerian participant shared her experience with languages, and how the latter's ideas in Arabic were unconsciously and involuntarily uttered in French. To conclude, the participants' different use of language during informal face-to-face or online meetings and the events, especially the political ones show how the field and the changing circumstances often determine the individuals' positions and choices.

8.4 Conclusion and Discussion

Analysing the Kabyles' ideologies concerning Kabyle language, Arabic, French, English and other languages denoted a significant step to facilitate a better understanding of their language choices and practices, as well as their relationship with their ethnic identity. Therefore, this chapter has treated language as a social practice, by wresting it from the essentialised discourses. Put

succinctly, by examining the Kabyles' language practices within diverse fields, their intricate and situational use of languages appeared to be dominant.

Paying attention to the historical and cultural background of their ideologies' construction also played an instrumental role. More specifically, it has enabled the unpacking of the myriad complexities and contradictory linguistic practices performed by my participants. The Kabyles' efforts towards resizing Arabic manifested through their decision to converse in French, which seems to be the second-best option to avoid acquiescing to the hegemony of the Arabic language imposed after independence. At the same time, they are acutely aware of both the social and economic capital (Bourdieu, 1986) Arabic language may offer in a migratory setting. The choice of French is often natural but also strategic owing to their migratory trajectories that were mainly to Francophone regions, besides the power of French. This, in turn, affords them a prestigious position and changes their economic/social status in the receiving society.

Notwithstanding the political context and the palpable marginalisation of Tamazight language by imposing Arabic language, my participants denied harbouring hatred to Arabic language, contending that their resistance to speaking Arabic was because of the brazen manner in which it has been imposed on them. However, they do acknowledge that Arabic, as similar to French and other languages, are different forms of their linguistic competences and capitals that allow them to gain access to divergent socio-cultural environments. Hence, ideologies to language cannot always control the individuals' linguistic behaviour due to the social environment, the changing circumstances, their own beliefs, and the economic dimension.

It is worth noting that Kabyle language is perceived as the language that represents my participants' authenticity, history and ancestral cultural heritage. At the same time, Arabic, French, English and other languages are viewed as a medium of communication and important linguistic competences that help them adapt to their social, cultural and economic circumstance. Thus, Kabyle Language for my participants is not only a tool for communication but also a way to preserve and transmit their cultural heritage from endangerment. For his purpose, concerted efforts were made through the organisation of gatherings in Kabyle cafés in London, joining Kabyle online chatting spaces, online language workshops, plans for teaching the language to Kabyle children in the UK, the creation of creative and artistic activities, poetry, and music within the cultural organisation that were inspired by ancient Kabyle and Amazigh history, traditions, and mythology. Furthermore, language games were also part of my respondents' family gatherings.

Therefore, in addition to the significance of objects in recalling the individuals' old memories as explained in chapter 6, languages also fulfil a similar role. They connect people to their homeland,

ancestral heritage, childhood experiences and the wider diaspora online and offline. Moreover, my respondents indicated the central role of Kabyle activists in France and writers of French expression in the internationalisation of the Algerian cause during colonisation (Daoudi, 2018), and the transnationalisation of the Kabyle cause after independence. Finally, one can conclude that the place of the Kabyle language occupies an important place among the Kabyles' everyday lives in the UK, within the cultural organisation and online. However, its use, or in other words the individuals' habitus was clearly informed by the circumstances and a specific field they were engaged in.

Chapter 9 General Conclusion

Spending the period between 2016-2019 exploring the Kabyle community in the UK and online was a unique experience. My research participants were exceptionally supportive, and many were enthusiastic about taking part in this ethnographic study. They allowed me to be part of their lives and experiences albeit for a limited period, through their narratives, offline practices in the UK and their online interactions. Their generosity and involvement have enriched and illuminated this study. They facilitated quick and direct access to each other, and their online activities allowed me to observe and understand the ways in which they enacted and assumed situated and contextual ethnic, religious, secular, cultural, and political identities.

The central aim of this study was to ethnographically investigate the Kabyles within multiple interconnected sites. The fieldwork has offered a glimpse into my participants' everyday lives and practices in the UK, within the Kabyle/Amazigh Cultural Organisation, in different gathering spaces, and on online platforms. By using the notion of, the Kabyle transnational social field I have shown that the Kabyles' network operates in three main fields, as well as sub-fields. In these social spaces, individuals inhabit a specific habitus that is often informed by their Kabyle/cultural capital. In other words, their habitus is informed by their cultural background, socio-economic status and family upbringing. This thesis has shown that their social field involved both ways of being and belonging (Levitt and Schiller, 2004), construed through their everyday online/offline interactions and secularised cultural activities. The latter involved ritual performances, the organisation of events to celebrate and commemorate cultural, political and historical events, re-invented traditions, language use, literary works, poems, material culture, food and music consumption. In this chapter, I outline the main themes introduced in this thesis, and review the main arguments presented in each analytical chapter.

9.1 Research Objectives

The fieldwork outcome had a big impact on the formulation and the development of the study's research questions. Answering them has required the juxtaposition of a historical and socio-political account of the Kabyles, the fieldwork data and a solid theoretical and conceptual framework. First, chapter 2 sought to provide the reader with a rich context about the participants' home region and a related historical and political background. It argued that since the Roman times, the various people groups passing through present-day Algeria created a space for different cultures and languages to interact, impacting largely the formation of the North African individual's identity/identities. Hence, understanding the cultural and political

development of the Kabyle/Amazigh identity over time, including the different waves that landed in North Africa seeking to take control over the area, was central to understanding the Kabyles' current and persistent negotiations and constructions of their identities in the UK and at a transnational level. This chapter showed the impact of political parties, mainly the MAK movement, in the development of Kabyle public political identities and preferences. It also revealed the role of the socio-political environment on shaping political attitudes among the people, notably the 2019 Algerian protests that on the one hand fostered a Kabyle independentist trend, and on the other hand encouraged a more inclusive nationalistic attitude among the Kabyles who preferred to support the Algerian movement.

The Kabyles' transnational connections played an important role in raising cultural and political awareness among the Kabyles, particularly after the Arabisation process, which resulted in a series of strikes, protests, and events structured by either intellectuals, political parties and/or ancestral tribal organisations. In other words, they were operating from above and below in order to make sense of their Kabyle identity in Algeria and transnationally. In London, the creation of transnational secular cultural and/or political organisations and spaces was geared towards the spread and the perpetuation of the Kabyle cause and identity. Furthermore, the Kabyle cultural and political organisations were strengthened through online and in-person connections to Kabyle/Amazigh organisations in Algeria, France and Quebec, but also through contact with other ethnic minority groups in London claiming similar rights for recognition, such as the Catalans, Kurds, or Tibetans. This might inform future Amazigh studies and research on stateless minorities.

Kabyle nationhood and Kabyleness were key notions debated among my participants, whether during interviews, or through their online and offline practices. They negotiated and problematised the attributes of a 'true' Kabyle person and what makes up the Kabyle cultural capital. In some cases this involved drawing essentialist boundaries around their Kabyleness, even within the Kabyle transnational social field, by emphasising what should constitute the authentic Kabyle cultural capital such as language, place of birth, genealogical affiliation, use of objects, musical taste, political and religious orientation. Chapter 3 examined the literature on identity, ethnicity and migration studies for a better understanding of the Kabyles' formation of 'groupness' or Kabyleness in a new migratory setting, and the creation of transnational identity(ies) within multiple social fields. Put succinctly, it argued that the creation of a transnational social field, involving offline and online spaces, and the maintenance of ties across the borders is a form of identity construction. At the same time, it also acknowledged the subjects' ambivalent, contextual and situated social positionings in different social fields and their multiple interpretations of Kabyle cultural heritage, due to social, economic and political factors. In order to elucidate this complex process of identity formation in a new migratory setting and in a globalised age, chapter 3 engaged Bourdieu's theoretical framework on field, habitus and

capital. Finally, the social constructivist approach to identity, culture and ethnicity has allowed us "to appreciate how in transnational contexts, migrants negotiate many heterogeneous, diverse identities across multiple localities and across the perceptual and physical boundaries" (Beswick, 2020: 31).

As shown in chapter 4, this study has combined data obtained from my continuous online and offline observations, face-to-face interviews, conversations with my participants, and their online interactions, aiming to unpack the diverse, ambivalent and contradictory views expressed among my participants. This showed, quite centrally, that, the individuals' ideologies towards language, ethnicity and religion were not always apparent in their actual linguistic and/or cultural behaviour. Therefore, this mismatch and at the same time relationship between what the respondents said and what they did has shaped the analysis. It raised the researcher's awareness towards the situated and context-based nature of their complex cultural, social and political positioning within the Kabyle TSF.

Combining both offline and online arenas, the thesis has explored the complex and situational negotiations, and constructions of Kabyleness in a British setting within the Kabyle transnational social field. Therefore, addressing the research questions implied a close examination of the following themes throughout the final three chapters.

9.2 Contribution to Knowledge

This multi-faceted study has traced the formation of a new Kabyle transnational community in a new migratory context, through the establishment of a cultural organisation, online platforms, everyday online and offline practices. This has allowed for a theoretical as well as a methodological contribution. Theoretically, this research extends the transnational social field to the online world, where offline and online spaces are not treated separately, but as two arenas mutually shaping and informing the immigrants' perspectives, behaviours and everyday practices. This can inform future anthropological as well as sociological studies. Moreover, the social field in this research is understood in Bourdieusian terms, offering the opportunity to researchers and readers to better understand, explain and appreciate the complex and multiple identifications in super-diverse settings. Methodologically, this research has combined digital ethnography with other ethnographic methods to fully engage with the people in question to obtain a fine-grained analysis of their individual interactions within different fields. In short, the choice to look at physical and online spaces, the researcher's full reflexive engagement, spending considerable time with and befriending participants could constructively inform future works, especially multidisciplinary studies.

The Kabyle/Amazigh Cultural Organisation in London has brought people of different socio-cultural and economic backgrounds together, united by their shared origins. Their different positions with respect to language, religion, ethnicity, and political viewpoints lead to a partial fragmentation of the community and the proliferation of new gathering spaces according to their activism and political focus. Nevertheless, they remained connected to the Kabyle/Amazigh Cultural Organisation, its events and online interactions. Their sense of Amazighness took a more nuanced direction and meaning. While some remained faithful to their Amazigh cause, believing in the imagined North African Tamazgha, others reduced their focus to Kabyleness, by drawing boundaries around what constitutes Kabyle nationhood.

This research project includes a significant theoretical and empirical contribution to the ethnography and anthropology of Kabyles/Amazigh people. It brings to light discourses on ethnicity, religion/secularism, transnational experiences, politics, gender, and language, through which connections have been built among Kabyles and international actors. These processes allowed for an imagination and a subjective formation of a Kabyle identity in the UK alongside other social categories. By combining the transmigrants' face-to-face and online interactions, this study contributes to anthropological scholarship on transnationalism, migration, ethnicity, secularism, material culture and ideologies to language.

9.3 Key Findings

My Key participants, who have been actively involved in this study, were thoroughly introduced in Chapter 5. The profiles selected were based on one common feature, which was their activism. Their narratives and lived experiences justified the complex entanglement of their cultural, political, secular and/or religious positioning and activism. This also showed the diversity among the community and how their differences have been respected. Moreover, this chapter revealed how interviews and conversations offered my participants a space to rediscover who they were by revealing and talking about issues they have never talked or thought about, such as what it meant to be Kabyle in general, and how they perceived themselves in multicultural London/UK.

Settling in the UK was a huge step, a big change and a challenge for the Kabyles. However, in all cases my respondents declared that it was a preferable alternative to France and an escape from familiar destinations where they are generally categorised as Arabs, and subsequently find themselves in constant negotiation and affirmation of their Kabyle identity, distinguishing themselves from the Other, particularly the Arab. However, maintaining ties with Kabyles in London/UK upon their arrival was instrumental for their settlement in a new environment. Once they had settled in In the UK after several years of isolation from their fellows, the Kabyles involved in this study started creating their own space for interaction. It implied the use of

language, organisation of cultural secular events, listening to music, food and eating routines and display of artefacts (such as keys rings, pottery, clothing, domestic objects). The impact of the socio-economic order played a central role in the participants' selection of which identity to inhabit, when and in which context/field. This, in some cases, involved distancing themselves from their local identity through the choice of European names, use of language (mostly English and French) and an adoption of a more secularised attitude.

Exploring the notion of home among people in a completely new environment, who had poor knowledge about the receiving society and a lack of linguistic resources on their arrival is one of the contributions to the study of migration and transnationalism. My participants went through different cultural, social and economic challenges and phases upon their arrival which explains their late involvement in the creation of a cultural organisation. Therefore, the different tensions that sometimes emerged within the organisation, mostly because of political and religious disagreement, were due to their 'noviceness' and inexperience, which was later managed through the secularisation and the apoliticisation of the cultural organisation, and the creation of new gathering spaces for political activities. Moreover, my participants' dual or multiple lives and sense of belonging to both the UK, Kabylia, and in some cases Algeria, Lebanon and France was expressed through their narratives, their frequent travels or through an online presence on most of the Kabyle pages. At the same time, they also expressed their attachment to their new home, indicating how comfortable they felt in the UK and that they have no intention to leave. Moreover, this chapter also touched on the impact of the immigrants' transnational experiences on the non-immigrants' imagination and perspective of a 'potential' host country, which can be recommended for future studies.

Chapter 6 empirically demonstrated the Kabyles' articulation of their Kabyle identity through performances and material objects. Their relationship to Kabyle and Amazigh objects, including clothing, flags and accessories proved to denote social, symbolic, cultural, political and/or secularised attitudes and preferences. In this sense, this study has argued that transnational links are not only maintained with people or restricted to humans, but also to objects. The case of Ricky, for example, who has long cut any ties to Kabyles and Kabylia, including his family to the extent that he lost his Kabyle language, he still bought and prepared couscous with olive oil, according to the Kabyle tradition as he mentioned. He also went to places in London where he could see Algerian people, Algerian and Kabyle shops from afar, where he took me during our meetings. This shows the extent to which objects and places can serve as great links between people and their past, invoking old memories.

Although Bourdieu has faithfully depicted the Kabyles' lifestyle, he did not acknowledge their cognitive effort in producing what later became described as habituated practices. This thesis argues that Kabyle habitus(es) is the result of conscious recommendations and acts that throughout time became part of the individuals' routine. Moreover, this study also refuted the common euro-centric attitude scholars tended to depict in their writings, as shown with Bourdieu's theorisation of Kabyle habitus and Cesari (2004) who limited the civil behaviour and acceptance of difference to European countries.

This study contributes valuably to recent debates on Islam, secularisation, and the place of religion in a post-modern era. Chapter 7 discussed the participants' articulation of their ethnic identity in relation to their secularised practices and attitudes. It examined the respondents' desire to portray themselves and their homeland as secular and modern through non-religious habits. At the same time, although most of my participants assert their belonging to Islam, despite their non-religious practices, it does not represent the unifying unit of the members. Their Kabyleness, in its plural form, is the common feature that brings a growing number of Kabyles of the UK together under the roof of a cultural organisation. At the same time, problematising the Kabyle cultural capital and the internal relationship between them led to the identification of an old existing dichotomy in Kabylia, largely related to religious versus secular stances. Hence, this study sheds light on the emergence of an ancient dichotomy on the British soil that I called the Kabyle/Amrabedh Myth. This has become thinly problematised in Kabylia and has not been ethnographically interrogated in previous sociological and anthropological accounts of the Kabyles. This can be recommended for future research.

Some ideologies, experiences and beliefs are anchored and hard to change. Despite the multicultural and secular approach embraced by British society, religion still represents a major issue among the Kabyles in the UK. Muslim people can visibly exercise their religion in the UK, where women, for example, are allowed to wear their headscarves and be employed in the public sphere. However, the Kabyles in Britain still implicitly problematise the wearing of the headscarf, advancing the argument of preserving the Kabyle dress and culture from collapse. In short, their Muslim identity is personal, situational and contradictory.

My participants' ideologies regarding the Arabic or French languages, both considered as colonial legacies, did not reflect their language practices. In other words, their linguistic behaviours have not always been informed by their discourses on politics, gender, language and religion, as argued in Chapter 8. Individuals use language to affiliate linguistically, culturally, religiously and politically with a given group to share their sense of belongingness and solidarity. However, my participants' negotiations of their ethnic identity were not straightforward, whether through events, gatherings, celebrations, music, food, forms of religiosity or secularism and language. These were

constantly grappled with tensions, contradictions, and complexities, without explicitly and clearly reaching a conclusion. The fieldwork has also shown how the socio-cultural environment can shape and impact the individuals' linguistic practices. Language and culture endangerment made of Kabyle language a culturally productive medium, that in some cases involved an insistence on endogamy.

Finally, this thesis concludes that ethnic identities may keep their relevance despite the new understandings within the era of modernisation and globalisation; within the age of fluidity, multiplicity, dynamicity and complexity of identities. Kabyle identity, in its plural form, still occupies a significant place among the Kabyles in the UK, whether they express it fervently through their political stances and positioning, cultural activities, or privately and contextually through the use of artefacts, language and food. Moreover, despite the cultural, political and religious differences among the Kabyle transnational community in London/UK that insinuate to some extent their fragmentation, their consciousness about the importance of keeping the Kabyle identity alive supersedes everything. In other words, they still connect with other Kabyles in the Kabyle TSF with and despite their diversity, such as music taste, food consumption and preparation, choice of clothing, immigration status, mixed marriage cases, political affiliation. To conclude, the UK Kabyle transnational community/diaspora is unbounded, multicultural and hybrid. It is politically, culturally, linguistically and religiously diverse.

Appendix A **Participant Information Sheet**

Study Title: Kabyles in Britain: Negotiating Identities in a Transnational Setting.

Researcher: Souhila Belabbas

ERGO number: 26582

Please read this information carefully before deciding to take part in this research. It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you are happy to participate you will be asked to sign a consent form.

What is the research about?

I am doctoral student at the University of Southampton. I am Souhila Belabbas, and I am doing this research in order to explore the Kabyles in a new environment where they represent themselves as a group who share the same culture through their cultural practices and events in a transnational setting and online. I will be interested in answering the question of What kind of cultural practices are taking place, being revived and performed in the UK through the 'milieu associatif' and on Social Media by a cyber/transnational Kabyle community? How is material culture, such as food and symbolic objects, used to reflect, advertise and maintain the Kabyle cultural identity? And how is Kabyle language used and practiced among the transnational community, at home and among the Kabyle diaspora connected online? The research is funded by the Algerian Government.

Why have I been asked to participate?

You have been chosen to participate in this study because you are member of the Kabyle community and you are taking part of the events organised by the Kabyle cultural association in London which is useful to my study.

What will happen to me if I take part?

You will answer some questions in relation to the study and will be invited to share some of your experiences and small stories that may be relevant to my topic. For the members of the association, they will be interviewed once, and they may be contacted again in case I need more information or clarification. As for families, the interviews may take a longer time. I will be visiting families in their home and ask them questions as staying with them during weekends, for instance, for almost five months. Therefore, participant should know that they will devote some

of their time to participate in this study. The participant will be audio-recorded during interviews and video –recorded during the events.

Are there any benefits in my taking part?

There is no individual benefit but rather a collective benefit because this study will be read by academics and maybe non-academic individuals in the UK and outside the country who might not have a previous knowledge about the existence of the Kabyles and their case.

Are there any risks involved?

The participation in this study does not involve any potential risk. A possibility of emotional discomfort or distress may occur when talking about family history, migration, political repression etc.

Will my participation be confidential?

Your participation will be confidential and anonymised. This form is available in Arabic, French as well as English where your confidentiality is clearly stated. My study is in compliance with the Data Protection Act/University policy. The data received from you will be stored in my personal devices that are secured in a ICloud storage space with a confidential password in addition to my university computer which is locked. The information will be accessed by my supervisors and some teachers in the university of Southampton. The data will be destroyed and deleted after I finish the study. Contact details of the participants will not be retained after I finish the study

What should I do if I want to take part?

If you accept to take part of this study, there is a separate consent conform that you need to sign.

What happens if I change my mind?

If, for any reason, you decide not to be part of the study, you can withdraw at any time without being affected. The participant's Data can be withdrawn at any time the latter changes his/her mind about their participation. However, the data collected up to the point of withdrawal will be used unless the participant wants it to be destroyed. In this case his or her information will be completely destroyed.

What will happen to the results of the research?

The project be written up and submitted for the PhD degree. It may be published and the participant will receive a copy of the results if he or she is interested to read it. The anonymised research data can be made available for future research projects. research data be stored for a

minimum of 10 years for staff and postgraduate research students, as per University of Southampton policy, but can be longer if required by funder or statutory obligation. Staff and postgraduate students should remember that publications and anonymised data relating to the research should be made available through the institutional repository.

Where can I get more information?

If you need more information about the conduct of this research project or have further questions please contact Jennifer Burnell, the Administrator of the Ethics Committee, Faculty of Humanities, University of Southampton, SO17 1BJ, UK. Email: J.C.Burnell@soton.ac.uk

What happens if something goes wrong?

In the unlikely case of concern or complaint, you may refer to the Research Integrity and Governance Manager (023 8059 5058, rgoinfo@soton.ac.uk). The contact should not be the researcher, supervisor, or any other person involved in the study. The University has insurance in place to cover its legal liabilities in respect of this study.

Thank you.

Thank you for taking the time to read the information sheet and considering taking part in the research.

Appendix B **Consent Form**

Study title: Kabyles in Britain: Negotiating Identities in a Transnational Setting.

Researcher name: Souhila Belabbas

ERGO number: 26582

Please initial the box(es) if you agree with the statement(s):

I have read and understood the information sheet and have had the opportunity to ask questions about the study.	
I agree to take part in this research project and agree for my data to be used for the purpose of this study.	
I understand my participation is voluntary and I may withdraw at any time for any reason without my rights being affected.	
I agree for my online profile (photographs) to take part in this research project and agree for my data to be used for the purpose of this study.	

Name of participant (print name) ……

Signature of participant …….

Date…….. ……..

Name of researcher ……Souhila Belabbas

Signature of researcher …… Souhila Belabbas

Date……..

Optional - please only initial the box(es) you wish to agree to:

This should be used for any statements that are not mandatory for the participant to take part in the research.	
Add as required	

Appendix C **Political Chronology**[39]

1948–9 'Berberist Crisis'. Members of the French wing of the MTLD–PPA react against Messali Hadj's influence on Arabism with defections and calls for an *Algérie algérienne*.

1954 1 November: a wave of concerted FLN attacks opens war of independence.

1962 5 July: Algerian independence declared.

1963–5 Hocine Aït Ahmed leaves National Assembly, founds dissident FFS party, and heads rebellion in Kabylia against the rule of President Ahmed Ben Bella.

1974 Army violence against demonstrators protesting at the removal of several Kabyle singers from the programme of the Larbaa n'At Iraten Cherry Festival.

1980 March–April: *Tafsut* or the 'Berber Spring'. Mass riots in Kabylia follow the cancellation of a lecture to be given by the linguist and novelist Mouloud Mammeri in Tizi Ouzou. Now commemorated on 20 April, *Tafsut* has been constituted as a foundational moment of 'modern' Kabyle activism.

1988 October: large-scale riots, starting in Algiers, spread across Algerian cities.

1989 23 February: new constitution formally abolishes single-party FLN rule and legalizes formation of political associations, provided they do not threaten 'national unity [or] territorial integrity'. Creation of FIS.

1990–1 12 June 1990: FIS landslide in Algeria's first independent municipal elections. 26 December 1991: FIS victory in first round of legislative elections.

1992 11–16 January: army coup. President Chadli Benjedid resigns; second round of legislative elections cancelled. 29 June: Mohamed Boudiaf assassinated.

1998 25 June: singer Lounès Matoub killed by gunfire while driving near his home village in Greater Kabylia. The murder is officially attributed to the GIA, but there is widespread suspicion that members of the military regime and the Kabyle RCD were involved. Mass rioting follows in Kabylia.

2001 'Black Spring'. Riots in Kabylia following the suspicious death of 18-year-old Massinissah Guermah inside Beni Douala gendarmerie post.

2010 Ferhat Mehenni, leader of MAK, declares Provisional Kabyle Government in Exile.

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[39] Adapted from Maas (2014: X)

2016 Officialisation of the Tamazight language in Algeria.

2018 December: The recognition of the Amazigh New Year, Yennayer, as an official national holiday.

2019 February: The Algerian *Hirak.*

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