Regulations on the corporate social irresponsibility in the supply chain under the multiparty game: Taking China's organic food supply chain as an example
Regulations on the corporate social irresponsibility in the supply chain under the multiparty game: Taking China's organic food supply chain as an example
This paper considers the lack of corporate social responsibility in the organic food supply chain in a new context, that is, the fraudulent subsidies claiming behavior of the manufacturers and the lack of organic food supervision of the fast-growing e-commerce retailers in China. We construct a three-party evolutionary game model among government regulatory departments, manufacturers and e-commerce retailers to analyze the evolution process of the behaviors of manufacturers and e-commerce retailers under government's changing regulation. The results show that: (1) The government can promote the production of organic food by the moderate supervision of manufacturers; Low intensity supervision cannot restrain fraudulent subsidies claiming behavior, while high intensity supervision will restrain the orderly development of organic food industry. (2) The greater the government subsidies on technology and R & D of manufacturers, the more conducive the manufacturerss will be to overcome technical problems and realize the scale of the organic food industry, so that it will eventually evolve towards the direction of active production of organic food. (3) The government's low-intensity fine on e-commerce retailers when they fail to fulfill their responsibilities is not enough to prompt them to choose the strategy of responsibility fulfillment, and the greater the fine is, the more conducive it is for them to evolve towards fulfilling their social responsibilities. (4) Appropriate government funding for e-commerce retailers will encourage them to fulfill their responsibility, but excessive funding will make e-commerce retailers over rely on government funding. Our research provides a better understanding of the irresponsible behavior of organic food supply chain enterprises, our management insights can help improve the government's regulation performance of such behavior, and can also provide a reference for other countries facing similar challenges.
Corporate social irresponsibility, Evolutionary game, Government regulation, Organic food
Ma, Zhiqiang
8060229f-e133-47a8-b41a-4a254f6a5693
Chen, Jiajia
37af39cb-39ab-4070-a6a6-cc42931c365b
Tian, Gang
55666741-fb82-4865-8410-633915027edd
Gong, Yu
86c8d37a-744d-46ab-8b43-18447ccaf39c
Guo, Benhai
2bf272e8-ba40-4634-9620-c0f30ee35fa8
Cheng, Faxin
8825a1a2-b033-4a26-8f53-ec3c769d1b54
1 October 2021
Ma, Zhiqiang
8060229f-e133-47a8-b41a-4a254f6a5693
Chen, Jiajia
37af39cb-39ab-4070-a6a6-cc42931c365b
Tian, Gang
55666741-fb82-4865-8410-633915027edd
Gong, Yu
86c8d37a-744d-46ab-8b43-18447ccaf39c
Guo, Benhai
2bf272e8-ba40-4634-9620-c0f30ee35fa8
Cheng, Faxin
8825a1a2-b033-4a26-8f53-ec3c769d1b54
Ma, Zhiqiang, Chen, Jiajia, Tian, Gang, Gong, Yu, Guo, Benhai and Cheng, Faxin
(2021)
Regulations on the corporate social irresponsibility in the supply chain under the multiparty game: Taking China's organic food supply chain as an example.
Journal of Cleaner Production, 317, [128459].
(doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2021.128459).
Abstract
This paper considers the lack of corporate social responsibility in the organic food supply chain in a new context, that is, the fraudulent subsidies claiming behavior of the manufacturers and the lack of organic food supervision of the fast-growing e-commerce retailers in China. We construct a three-party evolutionary game model among government regulatory departments, manufacturers and e-commerce retailers to analyze the evolution process of the behaviors of manufacturers and e-commerce retailers under government's changing regulation. The results show that: (1) The government can promote the production of organic food by the moderate supervision of manufacturers; Low intensity supervision cannot restrain fraudulent subsidies claiming behavior, while high intensity supervision will restrain the orderly development of organic food industry. (2) The greater the government subsidies on technology and R & D of manufacturers, the more conducive the manufacturerss will be to overcome technical problems and realize the scale of the organic food industry, so that it will eventually evolve towards the direction of active production of organic food. (3) The government's low-intensity fine on e-commerce retailers when they fail to fulfill their responsibilities is not enough to prompt them to choose the strategy of responsibility fulfillment, and the greater the fine is, the more conducive it is for them to evolve towards fulfilling their social responsibilities. (4) Appropriate government funding for e-commerce retailers will encourage them to fulfill their responsibility, but excessive funding will make e-commerce retailers over rely on government funding. Our research provides a better understanding of the irresponsible behavior of organic food supply chain enterprises, our management insights can help improve the government's regulation performance of such behavior, and can also provide a reference for other countries facing similar challenges.
Text
Tian et al. (2021) Revised Manuscript-Clean Version 20210827
- Author's Original
More information
Accepted/In Press date: 25 July 2021
e-pub ahead of print date: 27 July 2021
Published date: 1 October 2021
Additional Information:
Funding Information:
This research is supported by the National Philosophy and Social Science Foundation of China ( 20BGL113 ), and the National Natural Science Foundation of China ( 71974082 , 71673119 , 71673118 , and 71874071 ).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 Elsevier Ltd
Copyright:
Copyright 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
Keywords:
Corporate social irresponsibility, Evolutionary game, Government regulation, Organic food
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 450957
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/450957
ISSN: 0959-6526
PURE UUID: c4b3be2f-6eff-4e76-b7cf-3763a6c64381
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Date deposited: 26 Aug 2021 16:32
Last modified: 06 Jun 2024 01:58
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Contributors
Author:
Zhiqiang Ma
Author:
Jiajia Chen
Author:
Gang Tian
Author:
Benhai Guo
Author:
Faxin Cheng
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