No spindly brown grass: knowledge, closure and subjective distinguishability

Abstract

Conceptions of perceptual reasons in contemporary epistemology tend to be scepticism-driven. That is to say, epistemologists implicitly (or explicitly) take the sceptical problem as a point of departure and then formulate a notion of perceptual grounds that, right from the start, makes serious concessions to scepticism. This constitutes, in effect, a ‘lowest common denominator’ approach – the resulting view is whatever one might be left with after the sceptic (or our sceptical alter ego) has done her work. But if that is the strategy, then it is not surprising that the outcome, to put it in Dretske’s memorable words, is that ‘philosophy is a business where one learns to live with spindly brown grass in one’s own yard because neighbouring yards are in even worse shape'. In this paper, I want to argue that to take such an approach is a mistake. We should rather proceed the opposite way. In other words, we should begin with a conception of perceptual reasons that fits the facts and our ordinary intuitions, and then explore what the ramifications for scepticism might be. We should not, ab initio, cede the high-ground to the sceptic and let her dictate the terms of engagement.

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