The Three Existence Spheres as Portrayed by Kierkegaard: A Challenge to the Tiered Interpretation

Abstract

In Søren Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works, readers are presented with the illustration of three ‘spheres of existence’: an aesthetic sphere of existence; an ethical sphere; and a religious sphere.
As it stands, the most common and dominant interpretation of Kierkegaard’s existence spheres is generally the following: the aesthetic sphere is portrayed as the lowest sphere of existence; the religious is the highest (the true goal or telos of human existence); with the ethical acting as a kind of ‘transitory’ stage between the two (an improvement on the aesthetic, but ultimately still falling short). Those that advance these views will also typically argue that it was Kierkegaard’s intention to depict the existence spheres in this way, in order to push readers towards the religious sphere (and conversely, away from the aesthetic sphere). The aim of my thesis is to challenge this interpretation often found within the secondary literature – an interpretation which I label as the ‘tiered interpretation’ (TI), due to the hierarchal structure which it assumes.

The challenge which I present to the tiered interpretations has three core aspects.
Firstly, I explore the literary devices which Kierkegaard employed when discussing the existence spheres, and the nature of his pseudonymity. I demonstrate how the very devices which Kierkegaard deployed to discuss the existence spheres, and the motivations behind their deployment, are fundamentally in conflict with the views that TI advances. Secondly, I present and defend a more positive interpretation of the aesthetic sphere – this will be a core part of the challenge which I present to TI. The main argument I espouse is that the aesthetic sphere can be understood as a sophisticated response to a nihilistic crisis, a crisis of values. In other words, the aesthetic can be understood as the attempt to turn life into a work of art, and to provide life with meaning, value, and a narrative through doing so – becoming the
‘artist’ of one’s own life in such a way is able to help define and give meaning to the individual’s life once they no longer believe in God or an objective moral code. Thus, I argue that there is something of existential value to be found within Kierkegaard’s portrayal of the aesthetic existence sphere – a truth which the secondary literature largely neglects, and in the case of TI, actively denies. The third part of my challenge to TI further dismantles the ‘hierarchy’ of the existence spheres by considering the overlap which exists between Kierkegaard’s depiction of the aesthetic sphere and
his depiction of the religious sphere. Through doing this, I build upon my argument concerning Kierkegaard’s portrayal of the aesthetic existence sphere, and explore Kierkegaard’s messages in relation to themes such as honesty and authenticity in connection with genuine religiosity/faith.

Overall, my aim with the thesis is to show that TI depicts Kierkegaard’s presentation of the existence spheres as much too simplistic and linear; existential matters cannot be approached in such a defined, and structural manner, and Kierkegaard’s portrayal of the existence spheres shows exactly that – it demonstrates just how tricky and personal existential decisions can be, and there are a number of messages to take away from his pseudonymous works.

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