A New Theory of Intuition: How Metacognitive Experiences Shape Epistemology

Abstract

It’s widely assumed that intuitions are central to the methods of contemporary analytic philosophy. In particular, it’s thought that philosophers appeal to intuitions as evidence, or as a source of evidence, for their claims. Indeed, this view, which has become known as ‘centrality’, has been put forward explicitly by, for example, Chalmers, Kornblith, Bealer, Baz, Richard, and Liao, to name but a few. Recently, however, this interpretation of philosophical practice has been challenged, most notably by Williamson, Deutsch, Ichikawa, and Cappelen (the ‘anti-centralists’), who argue that intuitions aren’t, after all, central to our arguments. Alongside this debate has come a resurgence of interest in the related question of how philosophers use ‘intuition-talk’, namely words like ‘intuition’ and ‘intuitive’; if this language isn’t citing evidence, then what is its purpose, if anything, and, if it is, then what exactly is being referenced in support of our theories, or, what are intuitions?
In this thesis, I make two, primary claims. First, I argue that intuitions do, indeed, play a central role in analytic philosophy (contra the anti-centralists), and help to clarify that role. Specifically, I make the case for a centralist interpretation of the primary argument for epistemic contextualism, identifying, through a conscientious analysis of the most seminal literature, not one but several, specific ways in which contextualists appeal to intuitions in an evidential capacity. Since contextualism is chiefly motivated by said argument, and is having a burgeoning influence on modern epistemology, and considering that epistemology is of ubiquitous philosophical significance, with ties to arguably all other core philosophical topics, such as ethics and metaphysics, I thereby demonstrate that treating intuitions as evidence is profoundly shaping the discipline at large.
Second, I develop a novel account of what the relevant philosophical intuitions are. I argue against extant ‘minimalist’ theories, showing that they aren’t reducible to beliefs or credences of any kind (contra Lewis, Parsons, and Kornblith, for example), dispositions to believe (contra Sosa and Lycan, for example), temptations to believe (contra Williamson and Van Inwagen, for example), or facts about ordinary language. Moreover, I argue that existing accounts of intuitions as ‘intellectual seemings’ – advocated by, for instance, Brogaard, Huemer, and Bealer – are too conservative to capture the intuitions in question. In place of these alternatives, I propose a more liberal version of the intellectual seemings thesis. Then, I argue that such seemings, and thus the relevant philosophical intuitions, aren’t sui generis, as many are wont to assume, but are, rather, a sub-category of mental states known in psychology as ‘epistemic feelings’. Epistemic feelings are experiences triggered by metacognitive monitoring and control subsystems, in response to features of a first-order cognitive process and/or its outputs, such as its fluency. This interdisciplinary thesis revolutionises our understanding of philosophical intuitions, and bridges two, hitherto largely segregated academic sub-disciplines.
I conclude, overall, that metacognitive experiences profoundly shape philosophy, and briefly consider some of the possible implications of my discovery. In particular, I suggest that we should treat intuitions as higher-, not first-order evidence for their content.

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