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Strong implementation with partially honest individuals

Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for a social choice rule to be implementable in strong Nash equilibrium in the presence of partially honest agents, that is, agents who break ties in favour of a truthful message when they face indifference between outcomes. In this way, we achieve a relaxation in the condition of Korpela (2013), namely the Axiom of Sufficient Reason. Our new condition, Weak Pareto Dominance, is shown to be sufficient along with Weak Pareto Optimality and Universally Worst Alternative. We finally provide applications of our result in pure matching and bargaining environments.
0304-4068
27-34
Savva, Foivos
8af4d90b-c08d-4133-93a1-3a8b3c2da24b
Savva, Foivos
8af4d90b-c08d-4133-93a1-3a8b3c2da24b

Savva, Foivos (2018) Strong implementation with partially honest individuals. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 78, 27-34. (doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.07.002).

Record type: Article

Abstract

In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for a social choice rule to be implementable in strong Nash equilibrium in the presence of partially honest agents, that is, agents who break ties in favour of a truthful message when they face indifference between outcomes. In this way, we achieve a relaxation in the condition of Korpela (2013), namely the Axiom of Sufficient Reason. Our new condition, Weak Pareto Dominance, is shown to be sufficient along with Weak Pareto Optimality and Universally Worst Alternative. We finally provide applications of our result in pure matching and bargaining environments.

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Accepted/In Press date: 5 July 2018
e-pub ahead of print date: 17 July 2018

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 451958
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/451958
DOI: doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.07.002
ISSN: 0304-4068
PURE UUID: 77944c26-0bd0-488e-b6d8-af92114710df
ORCID for Foivos Savva: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0001-6613-8721

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Date deposited: 04 Nov 2021 17:33
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 04:09

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Author: Foivos Savva ORCID iD

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