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Joint oligopoly-oligopsony model with wage markdown power

Joint oligopoly-oligopsony model with wage markdown power
Joint oligopoly-oligopsony model with wage markdown power
In imperfectly competitive markets, a producer-employer firm can be considered monopolist-monopsonist, facing downward sloping residual demand for product and upward sloping residual supply for labour. Firms can thereby exercise both product price markup and wage markdown powers. To study market outcomes in this setting, we define a Joint Oligopoly-Oligopsony Model -- an extended Cournot oligopoly model with imperfectly competitive labour market -- and investigate its welfare implications. We show that wage markdown power affects both firms' input mix -- driving substitution of labour with non-labour variable inputs -- and the scales of inputs (including employment) and output. By introducing Worker Surplus into our welfare analysis, our model clarifies the potentially efficiency-enhancing function of labour union and minimum wage regulation, aimed at curbing oligopsony wage markdown power. Furthermore, we show that competition policy and minimum wage regulation are complements, not substitutes: a lax merger control, which permits consolidation of market structure, can weaken worker power by way of reducing efficient minimum wage, as well as employment. Finally, we investigate the effects of "superstar firms" on market outcomes, allowing the superior efficiency of superstar firms to be a common cause of market concentration and pricing power. Our theory explains the rise of average labour productivity, the fall of labour income share and wage stagnation at industry level. It also shows that the superstar firm phenomenon produces an ambiguous welfare effect once worker welfare is taken into consideration.
Keywords: market power, monopsony, oligopsony, markdown, market structure, worker welfare, worker surplus, labor market, minimum wage
JEL Classification: D21, D33, D43, D6, E24, J2, J3, L13, L4
market power, monopsony, oligopsony, markup, markdown, market structure, worker welfare, worker surplus, labor market,declining labor share, wage stagnation, superstar firm
0966-4246
2101
1-57
University of Southampton
Tong, Jian
8109179b-ff1d-483e-9ee0-bf3f96cda71b
Ornaghi, Carmine
33275e47-4642-4023-a195-39c91d0146b0
Tong, Jian
8109179b-ff1d-483e-9ee0-bf3f96cda71b
Ornaghi, Carmine
33275e47-4642-4023-a195-39c91d0146b0

Tong, Jian and Ornaghi, Carmine (2021) Joint oligopoly-oligopsony model with wage markdown power (Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics, 2101) Southampton, UK. University of Southampton 57pp.

Record type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)

Abstract

In imperfectly competitive markets, a producer-employer firm can be considered monopolist-monopsonist, facing downward sloping residual demand for product and upward sloping residual supply for labour. Firms can thereby exercise both product price markup and wage markdown powers. To study market outcomes in this setting, we define a Joint Oligopoly-Oligopsony Model -- an extended Cournot oligopoly model with imperfectly competitive labour market -- and investigate its welfare implications. We show that wage markdown power affects both firms' input mix -- driving substitution of labour with non-labour variable inputs -- and the scales of inputs (including employment) and output. By introducing Worker Surplus into our welfare analysis, our model clarifies the potentially efficiency-enhancing function of labour union and minimum wage regulation, aimed at curbing oligopsony wage markdown power. Furthermore, we show that competition policy and minimum wage regulation are complements, not substitutes: a lax merger control, which permits consolidation of market structure, can weaken worker power by way of reducing efficient minimum wage, as well as employment. Finally, we investigate the effects of "superstar firms" on market outcomes, allowing the superior efficiency of superstar firms to be a common cause of market concentration and pricing power. Our theory explains the rise of average labour productivity, the fall of labour income share and wage stagnation at industry level. It also shows that the superstar firm phenomenon produces an ambiguous welfare effect once worker welfare is taken into consideration.
Keywords: market power, monopsony, oligopsony, markdown, market structure, worker welfare, worker surplus, labor market, minimum wage
JEL Classification: D21, D33, D43, D6, E24, J2, J3, L13, L4

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More information

Published date: 28 October 2021
Keywords: market power, monopsony, oligopsony, markup, markdown, market structure, worker welfare, worker surplus, labor market,declining labor share, wage stagnation, superstar firm

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 452614
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/452614
ISSN: 0966-4246
PURE UUID: 8775b019-cacf-4214-bfc8-b04418703ae3
ORCID for Jian Tong: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0001-9367-4853
ORCID for Carmine Ornaghi: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0003-2704-2537

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 11 Dec 2021 11:29
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 03:00

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