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Partial unemployment insurance and hour decisions

Partial unemployment insurance and hour decisions
Partial unemployment insurance and hour decisions
How do financial incentives embedded in unemployment programs affect job uptake? Partial Unemployment Insurance (PUI) programs allow jobseekers to keep their benefits when working, if the job abides by eligibility conditions. PUI programs operate as an in-work benefit scheme that aims towards labor market reintegration: allowing benefits as a top-up on earnings increases the value of employment relative to unemployment’s. We exploit a reform of the French PUI scheme introduced in 2006: the benefit eligibility hour threshold was decreased by 20%, offering a quasi-experimental setting. This paper studies labor supply responses when benefit availability is restricted. Using unique administrative data on unemployment spells and employment episodes, we estimate competing risks models with correlated risks to determine the propensity to exit towards PUI job intensities depending on whether they allow for benefits. We show the reform significantly increased the conditional probability to take up a PUI job below the new hour threshold. Hence, narrowed benefit availability contributes to a substantial decline in worked hours for PUI claimants. We use our parameter estimates to compute the hour elasticity to PUI earnings, which equals .142. Its small magnitude stems from labor market rigidities; yet, it is consistent with the bunching literature.
Ait Bihi Ouali, Laila
7b10e1b1-25e7-4629-b96e-d5bf8de362a7
Bargain, Olivier
77f13632-e9a5-452a-b390-0936dcc3fb1b
Joutard, Xavier
24da1747-9927-4797-9816-c6e4ab162a91
Ait Bihi Ouali, Laila
7b10e1b1-25e7-4629-b96e-d5bf8de362a7
Bargain, Olivier
77f13632-e9a5-452a-b390-0936dcc3fb1b
Joutard, Xavier
24da1747-9927-4797-9816-c6e4ab162a91

Ait Bihi Ouali, Laila, Bargain, Olivier and Joutard, Xavier (2017) Partial unemployment insurance and hour decisions. In IZA Conference. 31 pp .

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

How do financial incentives embedded in unemployment programs affect job uptake? Partial Unemployment Insurance (PUI) programs allow jobseekers to keep their benefits when working, if the job abides by eligibility conditions. PUI programs operate as an in-work benefit scheme that aims towards labor market reintegration: allowing benefits as a top-up on earnings increases the value of employment relative to unemployment’s. We exploit a reform of the French PUI scheme introduced in 2006: the benefit eligibility hour threshold was decreased by 20%, offering a quasi-experimental setting. This paper studies labor supply responses when benefit availability is restricted. Using unique administrative data on unemployment spells and employment episodes, we estimate competing risks models with correlated risks to determine the propensity to exit towards PUI job intensities depending on whether they allow for benefits. We show the reform significantly increased the conditional probability to take up a PUI job below the new hour threshold. Hence, narrowed benefit availability contributes to a substantial decline in worked hours for PUI claimants. We use our parameter estimates to compute the hour elasticity to PUI earnings, which equals .142. Its small magnitude stems from labor market rigidities; yet, it is consistent with the bunching literature.

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Published date: 15 February 2017

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 452680
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/452680
PURE UUID: 93c85be5-3312-4add-9617-b99c7d7c7e82

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Date deposited: 11 Dec 2021 11:36
Last modified: 12 Dec 2021 16:25

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Contributors

Author: Olivier Bargain
Author: Xavier Joutard

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