A legal analysis of the Gauweiler case: between monetary policy and constitutional conflict
A legal analysis of the Gauweiler case: between monetary policy and constitutional conflict
In Gauweiler, in response to the first ever preliminary reference made by the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht; FCC), the Court of Justice gave the green light to the ECB's power to selectively purchase Eurozone government bonds in secondary markets (OMT programme). Whilst the Court of Justice sets some limits to European Central Bank's (ECB) authority relying on the golden standard of proportionality, it is a judgment of institutional empowerment. The tensions and instability arising from the separation of competences in monetary and economic policy gravitate to the advantage of the Union. By placing emphasis on the objectives rather than the effects of the programme and linking OMT power to conditionality, Gauweiler builds on Pringle providing normative legitimization to the austerity model whilst granting the ECB a distinct role not only in monetary policy but also in shaping the general economic policy of the Union. The Court of Justice's ruling also indicates a measured but firm response to the dialogue of conflict initiated by the FCC.
17-39
Tridimas, Takis
6acd9a07-97ae-40d9-811d-f033f714ffe6
Xanthoulis, Napoleon
653ad673-f0ec-42e4-9fdf-0ea87d49779e
1 February 2016
Tridimas, Takis
6acd9a07-97ae-40d9-811d-f033f714ffe6
Xanthoulis, Napoleon
653ad673-f0ec-42e4-9fdf-0ea87d49779e
Tridimas, Takis and Xanthoulis, Napoleon
(2016)
A legal analysis of the Gauweiler case: between monetary policy and constitutional conflict.
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 23 (1), .
(doi:10.1177/1023263X1602300102).
Abstract
In Gauweiler, in response to the first ever preliminary reference made by the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht; FCC), the Court of Justice gave the green light to the ECB's power to selectively purchase Eurozone government bonds in secondary markets (OMT programme). Whilst the Court of Justice sets some limits to European Central Bank's (ECB) authority relying on the golden standard of proportionality, it is a judgment of institutional empowerment. The tensions and instability arising from the separation of competences in monetary and economic policy gravitate to the advantage of the Union. By placing emphasis on the objectives rather than the effects of the programme and linking OMT power to conditionality, Gauweiler builds on Pringle providing normative legitimization to the austerity model whilst granting the ECB a distinct role not only in monetary policy but also in shaping the general economic policy of the Union. The Court of Justice's ruling also indicates a measured but firm response to the dialogue of conflict initiated by the FCC.
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Published date: 1 February 2016
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Local EPrints ID: 453919
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/453919
PURE UUID: a2c239ae-8601-4928-bca6-d9d18b90553e
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Date deposited: 25 Jan 2022 18:10
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 04:08
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Author:
Takis Tridimas
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