Which choices merit deference? A comparison of three behavioural proxies of subjective welfare
Which choices merit deference? A comparison of three behavioural proxies of subjective welfare
Recently several authors have proposed proxies of welfare that equate some (as opposed to all) choices with welfare. In this paper, I first distinguish between two prominent proxies: one based on context- independent choices and the other based on reason-based choices. I then propose an original proxy based on choices that individuals state they would want themselves to repeat at the time of the welfare/policy evaluation (confirmed choices). I articulate three complementary arguments that, I claim, support confirmed choices as a more reliable proxy of welfare than context-independent and reason-based choices. Finally, I discuss the implications of these arguments for nudges and boosts.
Behavioural welfare economics, boosts, confirmed choices, nudges, stated meta-choices
124-151
Ferreira, João V.
0aad606a-eab0-473c-a230-9b3dfa2d7d93
March 2023
Ferreira, João V.
0aad606a-eab0-473c-a230-9b3dfa2d7d93
Ferreira, João V.
(2023)
Which choices merit deference? A comparison of three behavioural proxies of subjective welfare.
Economics and Philosophy, 39 (1), .
(doi:10.1017/S0266267121000365).
Abstract
Recently several authors have proposed proxies of welfare that equate some (as opposed to all) choices with welfare. In this paper, I first distinguish between two prominent proxies: one based on context- independent choices and the other based on reason-based choices. I then propose an original proxy based on choices that individuals state they would want themselves to repeat at the time of the welfare/policy evaluation (confirmed choices). I articulate three complementary arguments that, I claim, support confirmed choices as a more reliable proxy of welfare than context-independent and reason-based choices. Finally, I discuss the implications of these arguments for nudges and boosts.
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Ferreira - Which choices merit deference
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which-choices-merit-deference-a-comparison-of-three-behavioural-proxies-of-subjective-welfare
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Accepted/In Press date: 1 December 2021
e-pub ahead of print date: 11 April 2022
Published date: March 2023
Additional Information:
Funding Information:
I am grateful to the editor and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments and suggestions that greatly improved the last version of this paper. I am also grateful to Jose Apesteguia, Salvador Barberà, Antoinette Baujard, Koen Decancq, Nicolas Gravel, Fabrice Le Lec, Stephane Lemaire, Olivier L’Harridon, Stephane Luchini, Marco Mariotti, Serena Olsaretti, Erik Schokkaert, Arthur Schram, Robert Sugden, Benoît Tarroux, Miriam Teschl, Alain Trannoy, Andrew Williams and the participants at the ASSET’s Annual Meeting 2017, at the Workshop in Individual Choice and Freedom, and at the Journées LAGV 2018 for valuable discussions, comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper. Finally, the financial support of the research project ‘ValFree’ (The Value of Choice, grant No. ANR-16-CE41-0002-01) of the French National Agency for Research is gratefully acknowledged.
Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press.
Keywords:
Behavioural welfare economics, boosts, confirmed choices, nudges, stated meta-choices
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 455146
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/455146
ISSN: 0266-2671
PURE UUID: 84f9fdd3-6b57-43a6-bcf7-cb7889882de2
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Date deposited: 10 Mar 2022 18:55
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 03:57
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