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Representation and epistemic violence

Representation and epistemic violence
Representation and epistemic violence
Sometimes an individual gets taken as speaking for a wider group without laying claim to any such authority – they are thrust unwillingly, and sometimes even unknowingly, into the role of that group’s representative. Especially for members of subordinated social groups in certain contexts, this can be hard to shake: despite their best efforts to disavow any authority to speak in the name of others, their voice might be taken as the voice of their group. In this paper we explore the intuitive injustice involved in such cases. After establishing the felicity conditions of speaking for a group, we argue that certain forms of pernicious ignorance often stand in the way of the fulfilment of these conditions. The result is a distinctive kind of ‘epistemic violence’, which can result in the silencing of both the group that is taken to be spoken for, and the spokesperson who is taken to speak for them.
0967-2559
577 - 594
Townsend, Leo
237e8b4b-4cdd-4c54-af13-0ae93856d8a4
Townsend, Dina
526ee2bc-7f3d-4a01-9d21-358a8999e364
Townsend, Leo
237e8b4b-4cdd-4c54-af13-0ae93856d8a4
Townsend, Dina
526ee2bc-7f3d-4a01-9d21-358a8999e364

Townsend, Leo and Townsend, Dina (2021) Representation and epistemic violence. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 29 (4), 577 - 594. (doi:10.1080/09672559.2021.1997398).

Record type: Article

Abstract

Sometimes an individual gets taken as speaking for a wider group without laying claim to any such authority – they are thrust unwillingly, and sometimes even unknowingly, into the role of that group’s representative. Especially for members of subordinated social groups in certain contexts, this can be hard to shake: despite their best efforts to disavow any authority to speak in the name of others, their voice might be taken as the voice of their group. In this paper we explore the intuitive injustice involved in such cases. After establishing the felicity conditions of speaking for a group, we argue that certain forms of pernicious ignorance often stand in the way of the fulfilment of these conditions. The result is a distinctive kind of ‘epistemic violence’, which can result in the silencing of both the group that is taken to be spoken for, and the spokesperson who is taken to speak for them.

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e-pub ahead of print date: 12 December 2021

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 455698
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/455698
ISSN: 0967-2559
PURE UUID: f0bf2623-5b96-4171-bcab-3126d7c6d847
ORCID for Dina Townsend: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6531-8066

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Date deposited: 30 Mar 2022 17:02
Last modified: 23 Jul 2022 02:32

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Contributors

Author: Leo Townsend
Author: Dina Townsend ORCID iD

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