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Please Stay vs Let’s Play: Social pressure incentives in paid collaborative crowdsourcing

Please Stay vs Let’s Play: Social pressure incentives in paid collaborative crowdsourcing
Please Stay vs Let’s Play: Social pressure incentives in paid collaborative crowdsourcing
Crowdsourcing via paid microtasks has traditionally been approached as an individual activity with units of work created and completed independently. Other forms of crowdsourcing have however, embraced a mixed model that further allows for interaction and collaboration. In this paper, we expand the model of collaborative crowdsourcing to explore the role of social pressure and social flow generated by partners, as sources of incentives for improved output. We designed experiments wherein a worker could request their partner to collaboratively complete more tasks than required, either not to be abandoned and lose money (social pressure), or for fun (social flow). Our experiments reveal that these socially motivated incentives can act as furtherance mechanisms improving output by over 30 % and accuracy by about 5 %.
0302-9743
405-412
Springer
Feyisetan, Oluwaseyi
f6578550-20be-4f8e-85b0-92209d959caa
Simperl, Elena
40261ae4-c58c-48e4-b78b-5187b10e4f67
Feyisetan, Oluwaseyi
f6578550-20be-4f8e-85b0-92209d959caa
Simperl, Elena
40261ae4-c58c-48e4-b78b-5187b10e4f67

Feyisetan, Oluwaseyi and Simperl, Elena (2016) Please Stay vs Let’s Play: Social pressure incentives in paid collaborative crowdsourcing. In, International Conference on Web Engineering: ICWE 2016: Web Engineering pp 405-412. (Web Engineering, 9671) Springer, pp. 405-412. (doi:10.1007/978-3-319-38791-8_26).

Record type: Book Section

Abstract

Crowdsourcing via paid microtasks has traditionally been approached as an individual activity with units of work created and completed independently. Other forms of crowdsourcing have however, embraced a mixed model that further allows for interaction and collaboration. In this paper, we expand the model of collaborative crowdsourcing to explore the role of social pressure and social flow generated by partners, as sources of incentives for improved output. We designed experiments wherein a worker could request their partner to collaboratively complete more tasks than required, either not to be abandoned and lose money (social pressure), or for fun (social flow). Our experiments reveal that these socially motivated incentives can act as furtherance mechanisms improving output by over 30 % and accuracy by about 5 %.

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More information

Published date: 25 May 2016

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 455902
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/455902
ISSN: 0302-9743
PURE UUID: eb624b94-dc90-4712-a9de-5933b14c0643
ORCID for Elena Simperl: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0003-1722-947X

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Date deposited: 07 Apr 2022 16:55
Last modified: 16 Mar 2024 16:58

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Contributors

Author: Oluwaseyi Feyisetan
Author: Elena Simperl ORCID iD

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