Political Psychology

Political Psychology, Vol. 0, No. 0, 2022
doi: 10.1111/pops.12817

Populist Attitudes and Threat Perceptions of Global Transformations and Governance: Experimental Evidence from India and the United Kingdom

James Dennison
University of Stockholm
European University Institute
University of East Anglia

Stuart J. Turnbull-Dugarte
University of Southampton

Contemporary global crises and transformations—including climate change, migration, digitalization, pandemics, financial and economic integration, and terrorism—increasingly determine democratic politics and policymaking. We examine how populist attitudes are associated with perceptions of the threats posed by these six global crises and transformations. Using original survey data in India and the United Kingdom alongside secondary data in the United Kingdom, we robustly show that stronger populist attitudes are positively associated with the perception of threat posed by all six crises and transformations—particularly to the economy and national way of life, but also, of theoretical note, to humanitarian concerns. Furthermore, experimentally priming populist individuals on global governance solutions to each transformation has no effect on their perception of threat, suggesting that such threat perceptions are not driven by political concerns but by the societal crises and transformations themselves. Overall, our findings theoretically support the ideational conceptualization of populism as a thin ideology, distinct from nationalism or left-right attitudes, which acts as a broad, if thin, political psychological predisposition. Substantially, we cautiously argue that our findings may give cause for optimism about the potential to rally popular support for global governance solutions to global challenges.

KEY WORDS: populism, global crises, global transformations, threat perception, survey experiment, global governance

This article investigates whether, among individuals, populist attitudes are associated with threat perceptions of global transformations. Furthermore, it considers, first, whether populist attitudes are associated with only the threat perceived *by* some global transformations and not others and, second, whether populist attitudes are associated with only perceived threats *towards* some objects of threat and not others. Specifically considered are the relationships between populist attitudes and levels of perceived threat posed by six global transformations—climate change, migration, digitalization, pandemics, financial and economic integration, and terrorism—and to three objects of threat—national

way of life, national economy, and humanitarian concerns. Finally, we investigate whether the higher threat perceived by those with more populist attitudes reflects concern about the threat of the global transformations themselves or the potential for a global governance response to them.

Understanding the relationship between populist attitudes and threat perceptions of global transformations is of both substantive importance and scientific interest. Substantively, societal transformations have always transcended state borders, with the transnational consequences of pandemics, climate change, technological revolutions, migrations, trade patterns, piracy, and warfare all dominating the earliest human records and are abundantly evident in prehistory. However, the recent liberalization and globalization of economic, social, and migratory activity, ideological imperatives, the rise of globally focused university education, media, and communications via the Internet, as well as supranational political integration, have contributed to a world in which societal crises and transformations are increasingly global in both reality and perception, with their solutions argued by some to be found in transnational, if not global, governance. As the global nature and scale of societal transformations has increased, both the inability of the nation state to unilaterally solve societal challenges and the difficulties in creating effective transnational and global solutions and governance mechanisms have been exposed (Held et al., 1999). The inability of the nation state, still widely seen as the legitimate and natural tool for solving societal problems, to deal with global transformations has lent credence to the views of some citizens that political "elites" (and their use of global institutions) are corrupt, treacherous, or incompetent (Voeten, 2020). Indeed, numerous national party systems have been transformed as voters have coalesced around parties increasingly according to their perceptions of and social standing regarding global transformations (Inglehart & Norris, 2019), with so-called populist parties often gaining the most by highlighting the threats posed by global transformations and major policy consequences (Wodak, 2015).

However, whereas populist parties have been well-studied, relatively less is known about the determinants and effects of populist attitudes among the public (Huber et al., 2021, although this literature is itself growing), which for reasons expanded on below are likely to relate to threat perceptions of global transformations. Similarly, perceptions of the threats posed by global transformations remain relatively understudied, compared to domestic policy preferences, despite their global nature putting them beyond the control of domestic policy. Indeed, issues related to globalization have been shown to constitute a new and increasingly important political cleavage (Kriesi et al., 2006) and result from distinct social determinants that make them, collectively, interlinked. This, as well as their relative novelty, also makes them likely to be subject to weaker party cue and early-life socialization determinants, and therefore of particular scientific interest. Moreover, as public perceptions of global transformations increasingly represent a major parameter to policymakers working on such issues, understanding how they are formed and relate to other attitudes is of overwhelming practical importance for attempts to create sustainable policy responses.

We make four contributions. First, we provide original, novel empirical evidence of the perceptions of threats posed by climate change, migration, digitalization, pandemics, financial and economic integration, and terrorism—to one's national way of life, their country's economy, *and* humanitarian concerns—across two distinct national contexts, one of which is relatively understudied in political psychology. Second, theoretically, given our finding that populist attitudes are positively associated with the perceived threat of *all* six types of transformations, they support the ideational conceptualization of populism as a thin ideology that is distinct from nationalism and neither inherently left- nor right-wing *and* its psychological conceptualization as a political predisposition that affects more context-specific attitudes and behaviors. Moreover, our findings highlight the distinction between the demand- and supply-sides of populism, with the latter typically inseparable from a host ideology. Third, conversely, we offer an original explanation for why individuals vary in the level and type of threat that they perceive to be posed by global transformations, which, being global and foreign, are likely to usher in unwanted disruptions and challenges for "the people," which remains

fixed, untainted, and monolithic in the populist mindset. However, we suggest that our observed relationships reflect the effects of deeper psychological predispositions. Fourth, substantially, because our experimental findings show that the possibility of global governance solutions to global transformations do not increase the level of threat felt by more populistic individuals (or anyone), we suggest that these individuals' sense of threat is rooted in the societal change itself, rather than potential political consequences such as loss of sovereignty.

We answer the above questions in three independent studies. Study 1 leverages original survey data from the United Kingdom to demonstrate that populist attitudes are strongly correlated with heightened levels of threat perception towards a large catalogue of global transformation. Testing whether increased threat perception is the result of the transformations themselves or the global policy response to them, we execute an experimental research design, with individuals randomly assigned to treatments outlining global transformations (control), as well as the transformations' respective policy responses (treatment). Study 2 presents observational evidence on populist attitudes and the concrete case of the Covid-19 pandemic using data from the British Election Study (BES) that provides further support for our thesis regarding the positive association between populist attitudes and perceived threats. Finally, Study 3 seeks to provide comparative data in a most-different systems context by replicating the experimental design leveraged in Study 1, using data from India. Our cross-national analysis demonstrates consistent evidence that individuals harboring increased populist predispositions are significantly more inclined to perceive global transformations as threatening. In contrast to our hypothesis, however, our experimental manipulation does *not* provide evidence that populists' perceived threat is the result of the potential response to these transformations (such as increased global governance and interstate regulation).

Populism, Threat Perceptions, and Global Crises and Transformations

We propose that the extent to which an individual perceives various global transformations to pose a threat is likely to be associated with the extent to which they hold "populist" attitudes. By populist attitudes, we refer to the understanding developed in the "ideational approach" of populism (Hawkins et al., 2012, 2020) and most notably by Mudde's (2004) minimal definition of populism as "a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic camps, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite,' and which argues that politics should be the expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people" (p. 543). According to the ideational approach, populism's "thin-centre" precludes it from offering a comprehensive, universal vision of how society should be ordered but instead allows it to be combined with more substantive "host ideologies" such as socialism or nationalism (Stanley, 2008). Furthermore, Taggart (2004) identified feeling attached to an idealized and lost or threatened "heartland" from which "the people" are constructed, as well as hostility to representative politics, a lack of core values, a sense of crisis as the primary motivation for political mobilization as the five features of populism. Finally, Rooduijn (2014) identified people-centrism, antielitism, and homogeneity of the people as consistent components of the populist actor's rhetoric. This has also meant that numerous studies have muddled the concept of populism and its most often attached ideologies, notably far right nationalism, with which populism is often popularly and even academically conflated, leading to its "analytical neglect" as a distinct psycho-political concept and a need to distinguish between it and "what it travels with" (Hunger & Paxton, 2021, p. 1).

Threat perceptions represent a time- and context-specific form of political attitude, related to but distinct from more fundamental and less context-specific attitudes such as ideologies, identities, values, or broad policy preferences (Merolla & Zechmeister, 2009; Miller & Krosnick, 2004). As such, we can expect perceptions of threats posed by global crises and transformations (henceforth, "global transformations") to have some similar determinants to more longstanding political attitudes,

such as early-life socialization, nonpolitical psychological factors, and contextual and political factors. However, as perceptions, they are also likely to vary from more deep-seated psychological predispositions and attitudes, which they are partially formed by, in that they are more volatile, being potentially responsive to shocks, information, or cues (Brader, 2002; Miller & Krosnick, 2004). Indeed, political psychologists have utilized evolutionary theories of threat perceptions based on the need to identify and react to threats quickly, with the human brain's amygdala specifically devoted to detecting and automatically responding to threatening stimuli (Gray, 1990), and studies showing that anti-immigration attitudes predict physiological signs of threat sensitivity (Mustafaj et al., 2021). Politically, threats have been shown to lead to political action or in some cases to disengagement, depending on the level of control and preventability of the threat (Smith, 2021). However, whereas the determinants of perceptions of threats posed by politicians or policy changes have been studied (e.g., Miller & Krosnick, 2004), there have been fewer studies of the political determinants or effects of societal threat perceptions.

Moreover, there are good theoretical reasons to suspect that the determinants of the perceptions of threats posed by *global* transformations differ from the determinants of domestic policy preferences. Most foundational theories of public opinion derive from the decades following the Second World War when social, economic, and political life revolved around the nation relatively more than today. Furthermore, scholars have increasingly identified the rise of a new, globalization-based sociopolitical cleavage (e.g., Kriesi et al., 2006), rather than the previously dominant class-based cleavage, suggesting that: first, the social determinants of attitudes to global issues are different to those of attitudes to domestic issues, with some evidence suggesting that they are entirely unrelated (Mader et al., 2020) or represent a third axis of political attitudes (de Vries, 2018); second, that attitudes to different global issues are consistent with each other (see de Wilde et al., 2019; Zürn & de Wilde, 2016, p. 281); and, third, that "globalization" has sufficiently entered public discourse for global issues to be understood as linked and distinct from "domestic" issues (Mader et al., 2020). Furthermore, whereas the positions of *mainstream* or *established* parties typically remain distinct on "traditional" issues such as redistribution, they are often more convergent on globalized issues making cues by these parties potentially less powerful as determinants of attitudes whereas "challenger" parties have bundled their divergent positions on globalization issues into ideologically coherent packages (Betz & Meret, 2012). The relative novelty of some global transformations, such as digitalization, means that perceptions of them may be less determined by socialization, such as one's parents' beliefs, and more so by psychological forces, such as anxiety or trust, or media exposure.

Indeed, in terms of threat perceptions regarding specific global transformations, perceptions of climate change have been shown to differ from those to other, domestic environmental issues because the former's global nature makes them more abstract (Smith et al., 2017). Huber et al. (2021) demonstrate that climate skepticism is rife among populists on the both the left and the right because of populist citizens harboring lower trust in both public institutions and "self-serving" elite scientists. The "global refugee crisis" has been shown to invoke feelings of threat for both identitarian and economic reasons (Esses et al., 2017). Regarding pandemics, political ideology has been shown to predict perception of threat by COVID-19 (Calvillo et al., 2020) with conservatives less likely to view it as a threat despite typically being generally more sensitive to threats than liberals (van Leeuwen & Park, 2009). Finally, perceptions of the level of threat posed by terrorism have been shown to result from basic human values as well as sociodemographics (Goodwin et al., 2005).

Populist Attitudes and Threat Perceptions

Although scholars have for some time measured populism in parties (see, e.g., Meijers & Zaslove, 2021). it is only more recently that they (Akkerman et al., 2014; Hawkins et al., 2012) have begun to measure populist attitudes in individuals, typically according to their level of agreement

with a six-statement battery in line with Mudde's definition (although see Castanho Silva et al., 2020; Schulz et al., 2018; Wuttke et al., 2020). A populist conception of democracy has been shown to constitute a singular attitudinal dimension, distinct from other political attitudinal dispositions such as antielitism, pluralism, trust, or efficacy (Geurkink et al., 2020). Doing so has allowed researchers to identify predictors of populist attitudes such as age, gender, income, occupation, education, as well as the effects and correlates of populist attitudes, such as attitudes to immigration and the EU, climate change skepticism and support for environmental protection, media preferences, support for referenda, support for direct democracy, ideological self-placement, political interest, and partisanship (for reviews, see Erisen et al., 2021; Huber, 2020; Santana-Pereira & Cancela, 2020; Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2018).

We build on the above literatures by proposing that the extent to which an individual holds populist attitudes is associated with *whether* and *how* they perceive global transformations as inimical threats. Overall, we suggest that individuals with more populist attitudes are likely to be *more* threatened by global transformations for both direct and indirect reasons. Directly, global transformations are likely to represent a higher threat to those with populist attitudes because (1) their global nature and foreign origin puts them beyond the control of "the people" or "heartland" and makes them likely to be a source of change, disturbance, anxiety, and, thus, threat (Taggart, 2004; see also Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, on the motivating force of the threat of loss); and (2) their global nature may usher in global governance, such as binding treaties or cession of powers to supranational institutions, at odds with governance via the will of the people and dependent on deliberation, compromises, and technocracy. Indirectly, the perceived threats of global transformations may result from deeper psychological predispositions, which populist attitudes mediate, such as greater parochialism, threat sensitivity, personality traits, or general anxiety (Bakker et al., 2016; Rhodes-Purdy et al., 2021). Alternatively, the supply-side effects of populist-party cueing may confound the relationship—however, in this case we would expect to see threat perceptions of global transformations vary according to host ideology, with inverse levels of threat perception regarding climate change and migration, for example. More specifically, we suggest that populist attitudes do not only affect the extent to which global transformations are perceived to be threats, but also what is perceived to be threatened. Those with highly populist attitudes may view global transformations as most threatening to the national way of life or national economy, but less so to other issues such as humanitarian concerns.

Overall, our primary hypothesis is the following:

> *H1*: Higher populist attitudes are positively associated with the level of perceived threats posed by global transformations.

However, we also recognize that there may be important differences in the relationships between populist attitudes and threat perception according to what is being threatened. Namely, those with higher populist attitudes are more likely to be concerned about their own country than either global or foreign effects. As such,

> *H2*: Higher populist attitudes are positively associated with the perceived threat that global transformations pose to one's national way of life and the national economy more so than to humanitarian concerns.

The positive association between populist attitudes and threat perceptions of global transformations may reflect, on the one hand, the heightened sense of threat that populists feel from the global transformation itself or, on the other, additional antipathy towards ongoing or potential future global governance responses to the transformation. In the former case, the nature of the global

Table 1. Survey Items Measuring Populism in Three Studies

	Study 1 United Kingdom		Study 2 United Kingdom (BES)		Study 3 India	
Populism Measure	Mean	*SD*	Mean	*SD*	Mean	*SD*
Politicians in the United Kingdom/Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha) should follow the will of the people.	4.19	0.92	3.89	0.89	4.39	0.86
The people, not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.	3.35	1.21	3.04	1.07	4.09	0.99
I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician.	3.41	1.19	3.14	1.00	4.16	1.02
Elected officials talk too much and take too little action.	4.31	0.89	3.93	0.85	4.29	0.98
Compromise in politics is really selling out principles.	3.36	1.13	3.29	0.99	4.15	0.92
Populism index	3.73	0.76	3.48	0.70	4.23	0.61
Cronbach's α	*.74*		*.76*		*.64*	

transformation's threat would be direct and social, whereas in the latter it would be indirect and political. To test which of these is the case, we propose a third, experimental hypothesis:

> *H3*: Priming individuals about global, transnational governance in response to global transformations increases the perception of threat posed by global transformations for those with populist attitudes.

Empirical Approach

Our empirical approach relies on the combination of three independent studies. Study 1 relies on data compiled from an original survey with an embedded experiment fielded among U.K. Qualtrics respondents in August 2021 (N = 2,000). Study 2 leverages data provided by wave 20 the British Election Study's (BES) online panel which was fielded in June 2020 at the height of the Covid-19 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic (N = 7,558). Study 3 replicates the original survey and experimental design applied in Study 1 among Mechanical Turk (MTurk) respondents in India (N = 1,000).

We choose India and the United Kingdom as our cases due to the substantive differences between them geographically, culturally, historically, and economically, all of which result in divergent experiences of global transformations (be it climate change, pandemics, economic and financial globalization, terrorism, migration, digitalization, or otherwise) but also their recent experiences of populism as a political force in Muddian terms of a corrupt elite and pure people (Chacko, 2018; Chacko & Jayasuriya, 2018; Jaffrelot & Tillin, 2017, p. 180; Sud, 2022). Overall, our case selection is based on Mill's "method of agreement" (Seawright & Gerring, 2008) which leverages cases with substantive asymmetries. Our motivations to include India are also because, despite being the world's largest democracy, it remains a systematically understudied case in the comparative study of political psychology and populism.

Across our three studies, the central explanatory variable is individual-level populism. We measure populism consistently via a 5-point index compiled of five different survey items that seek to measure different aspects of latent populist dispositions. The battery of items we adopt, summarized in Table 1, replicates the populism items established and robustly tested by Akkerman et al. (2014)

on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (*Strongly disagree*) to 5 (*Strongly agree*). These five items load onto a single dimension that provides a reliable index of individual populism. In a comparative cross-national test of the psychometric properties of competing approaches to measuring individual populism, Castanho Silva et al. (2020, p. 241) confirm that the Akkerman et al. (2014) battery, which is "the most used option," is also one of the available measures that provides strong internal coherence and cross-national validity.

Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the populism battery among respondents from our original surveys fielded in the United Kingdom (Study 1) and India (Study 3) as well as among respondents of the BES (Study 2). Across all studies, the populism index compiled via principal-component factor analysis provides a reliable measure (Cronbach's $\alpha > .6$) of underlying populist attitudes.

STUDY 1

Experimental Analyses From the United Kingdom

To test our hypotheses, we first fielded an original survey among a sample of U.K. survey respondents facilitated by Qualtrics. We asked survey respondents to identify the extent to which they view a battery of six different transformations—climate change, pandemics, global financial integration, terrorism, migration, and digitization—as threatening to: (1) their country's economy, (2) the national way of life, and (3) humanitarian concerns, such as loss of life. We chose these six transformations because (1) they represent different issue dimensions (e.g., economic or noneconomic), (2) some are typically left-wing concerns and some are right-wing, and (3) all six are regularly described as "global transformations" (e.g., Held et al., 1999). We asked respondents to identify each perceived threat on a 6-point scale from 1 (*not at all a threat*) to 6 (*a very big threat*).

Before asking respondents to identify their perception of threats posed by each transformation, respondents were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions: treatment or control (see Table S8 in the online supporting information for postrandomization balance tests). Those randomly assigned to the control group were given a short text introducing the transformation in question. Individuals randomly assigned to the treatment group were exposed to the same summary text *and* received additional information regarding potential global governance responses to the transformation. Control and treatment texts are replicated in Table 2 alongside the survey instrument measuring threat perceptions.

To ensure that exposure to information regarding a given transformation—regardless of treatment or control condition—does not influence responses to adjacent transformations, we included advanced modular randomization into our survey. *Within* treatment conditions, respondents were (1) presented only with a random subset of three of the six possible transformations considered, and (2) the transformation descriptions and their corresponding threat perception measures were presented in random order. As we demonstrate in Table S7 in the online supporting information, exposure to one transformation is independent of exposure to any other transformation. Of note is that survey instruments on transformations and their corresponding control/treatment text were presented to respondents *after* populism and other covariate measures were recorded, so we can be confident that populism scores are not influenced by treatment condition and/or transformation exposure.

In Table 3, we report the descriptive statistics for each of the response measures from respondents in Study 1 as well as those from Study 3 (detailed below). See Table S1 in the online supporting information for full summary statistics and Table S5 for operationalizations.

To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, we specify the estimation detailed in Equation 1 where Y is the perceived threat of a given transformation for an individual (i), *populism* is the 5-point populism index, and γ is a vector of control variables.

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{populism}_i + \gamma X_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

Table 2. Experimental Text and Survey Instrument Measuring Threat Perceptions

Transformation	Control and Treatment Texts
Climate change	Humans have had a large impact on Earth's climate system and weather patterns. This climate change includes an increase in global temperatures of around 1.2º Celsius between 1960 and 2020 contributing to more extreme weather and rising sea levels.
	In response to rising climate change, some say that countries should agree to binding international agreements, such as the 2015 Paris Agreement, which places limits on each country's contribution to climate change by obliging states to comply with experts' recommendations to reduce greenhouse emissions and limit the production and sale of petrol cars.
Pandemic	The global spread of infectious diseases, such as COVID-19, avian flu, Ebola, and HIV/AIDS has resulted in deaths and disruption to people's lives across the world. Experts argue that global pandemics are likely to become more common and deadly.
	In response, some say that countries and international organizations should agree to ensure that vaccines are shared across the world and that countries are accountable to the United Nations (UN) and other expert-led institutions like the World Health Organization (WHO).
Financial integration	Since the mid-20th century, national economic and financial systems have increasingly integrated into a single and integrated global marketplace.
	In response, some say that countries should agree to signing up to minimum corporate tax rates, agree to the automatic exchange of financial information, participate in international organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or World Bank, and engage other measures that bind countries to counteract potentially negative aspects of economic and financial globalization.
Terrorism	Terrorism, the use of violence and intimidation in the pursuit of political aims, has significantly increased in the last decades and has become more international. Whereas in the 1970s the number of annual terrorist incidents globally was a few hundred, by 2014, it was over 17,000, resulting in 45,000 deaths.
	In response, some say that countries should agree to global agreements committing them to standards and cooperation on counterterrorist activity, including establishing international arrest warrants, exchanging sensitive information, and turning the International Criminal Police Organization to focus more on terrorist activities.
Migration	International migration has increased over time, from around 84 million international migrants in 1970 to 272 million in 2019. The global population of refugees—individuals forced to leave their country—has risen from around 2 million in 1960 to around 30 million in 2020.
	In response to rising global migration, some say that countries should agree to international agreements, such as the Global Compact for Migration, that agrees how migration should be governed and what states must do to ensure the well-being of migrants.
Digitization	Most forms of technology have "digitalized" with the growth of computers, cellular phones, and the world wide web. Internet use has increased from 2.8 million global users in 1990 to 4.6 billion users in 2020.
	In response to increasing digitization, some countries have sought to better govern and secure the internet globally, for example, via the Internet Governance Forum and binding treaties like the Convention on Cybercrime.
Question: To what extent do you see (increasing global) [*transformation*] as a threat to	
1. The United Kingdom/Indian economy?	
2. The national way of life?	
3. Humanitarian concerns, such as loss of life?	

Note Text in italics indicates additional treatment-group text.

To isolate the independent association of populism, we apply a vector of controls that includes gender, age, race, education, employment status, civil status, left-right self-placement, nationalism, support for inclusive LGBT+ policies (a proxy for liberal-authoritarian attitudes), and political trust. Covariate operationalization is detailed in the online supporting information (Table S5).

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Threat Outcomes—Study 1 (United Kingdom) and Study 3 (India)

	United Kingdom		India	
Transformation Threat to…	Mean	*SD*	Mean	*SD*
Climate change				
Economy	4.66	1.24	4.79	1.16
National way of life	4.80	1.28	4.77	1.14
Humanitarian concerns	5.05	1.26	4.81	1.15
Pandemic				
Economy	5.17	0.93	5.0	1.13
National way of life	4.85	1.16	4.84	1.18
Humanitarian concerns	5.32	0.96	4.98	1.11
Financial integration				
Economy	3.95	1.32	4.42	1.40
National way of life	3.73	1.40	4.41	1.32
Humanitarian concerns	3.75	1.46	4.36	1.41
Terrorism				
Economy	4.21	1.30	4.86	1.22
National way of life	4.42	1.37	4.86	1.17
Humanitarian concerns	5.19	0.99	5.02	1.09
Migration				
Economy	3.59	1.59	4.67	1.30
National way of life	3.64	1.60	4.61	1.29
Humanitarian concerns	4.03	1.55	4.46	1.37
Digitization				
Economy	3.15	1.43	4.16	1.63
National way of life	3.49	1.46	4.25	1.48
Humanitarian concerns	3.18	1.42	4.21	1.51

Figure 1 illustrates the populism coefficient on different global transformations while conditioning on our full vector of covariates[1] (full regression output in Table S10 in the online supporting information). Across all six transformations considered and the three distinct subjects of threat—the United Kingdom's economy, the national way of life, or humanitarian concerns—the effect of populism is positively signed and, with the exception of pandemics, significant across all transformations. In line with Hypothesis 1, we find that populism serves as a substantive and significant correlate of most threat perceptions. Hypothesis 2 posits that the association between populism and threats to the national way of life and the economy would be greater than the perceived threat to humanitarian concerns. We find mixed evidence of this: there is no difference in threat types in relation to climate change, pandemics, financial integration, and digitization, but we do observe significantly lower correlations in the case of terrorism and migration.

Given that the independent variables and the corresponding outcomes are scaled symmetrically, we can directly compare the magnitude of populism's determining effect across the different measures. The point estimate of populism on the threat of financial integration, migration, and digitization are near symmetrical across the board for the perceived threat to the economy and national way of life. A one-unit increase on the 5-point populism scale *significantly* correlates with around a 0.3 increase in perceived threat across these items. This association represents a

[1]Recall that our vector of covariates includes measures of left-right placement, a liberal-authoritarian policy concern, and retrospective vote recall. As a result, the modeled association between populism and the individual outcomes is independent of these adjacent political determinants. We also show, however, that the correlation between populism and threat perceptions is not, on average, systematically conditioned by left-right positions. In Figure S2 in the online supporting information, we report the results of a multiplicative interaction term between populism and left-right placement showing that, with the exception of threats of financial integration, migration, and digitization to humanitarian concerns, there is no significant moderation effect. In other words, both left- and right-wing populists perceive our battery of transformations as threatening.



Figure 1. Modeling effect of populism on perceived threat of transformation to the United Kingdom's economy, national way of life, and humanitarianism (Study 1: United Kingdom).

substantive change in measured dependent-variable outcomes. Taking the threat of the financial integration to the national way of life as an illustrative example, the sample mean value is 3.72 ($\sigma = 1.4$). A $\beta = .35$ change, therefore, equates to a 9.4% change in the mean (25% in the standard deviation). The magnitude is even greater in the case of digitization: A one-unit increase in populism is associated with a $\beta = .43$ change in the perception that digitization represents a threat to the national way of life ($\mu = 3.5 \mid \sigma = 1.46$) equitable to a 12.3% change in the mean (29.5% in the standard deviation).

Theoretically, we might expect populists' view of global transformations to be influenced by inferred information regarding global governance responses to these transformations rather than the transformations themselves. To give an illustrate an example: Does a person view climate change to be a threat to the national way of life because of the environmental damage climate change itself may cause, or are they concerned with global CO_2 emissions targets coercing them to change their driving habits? To test this, our experimental design randomly exposed half of our survey sample to messages that explicitly detailed global governance responses (Table 2). We hypothesize that populist individuals would view transformations as significantly more threatening when they were presented with global governance responses to these transformations (H3). Equations 2 and 3 present the model specifications applied to test Hypothesis 3. For parsimony, we dichotomize the sample into populists and nonpopulists (δ_1), with populists operationalized as those individuals who have a populism index value greater than the sample mean.

$$Y_i = \alpha + \delta_1 \text{populist}_i + \delta_2 \text{treatment} \; + \gamma X_i + \varepsilon_i \tag{2}$$

$$Y_i = \alpha + \delta_1 \text{populist}_i + \delta_2 \text{treatment} + \delta_1 \text{populist}_i * \delta_2 \text{treatment} + \gamma X_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (3)$$

Figure 2 reports the average effect of exposure to government responses to the transformations among the full sample (upper panel) and by the populist versus nonpopulist subsamples (lower panel). The effect of exposing respondents to additional information regarding government response to different transformations has varied effects on the full sample. While for some transformations, response cues significantly ($\alpha < .05$) reduce the perceived threat (e.g., pandemics) for others, the effect is positive (digitization). Of theoretical importance to us is the difference between populist and nonpopulists (H3).[2] As visualized by the lower panel in Figure 2, and in direct opposition to Hypothesis 3, we find *no* systematic evidence to support the idea that populists' increased threat perception toward global transformations is a result of their (potentially inferred) fear of the government response.

STUDY 2

Complementary Evidence From the British Election Study (BES)

In Wave 20 of the BES, a representative sample of the U.K. population was surveyed on the threat they perceived from Covid-19 to (1) the U.K. economy and (2) the United Kingdom's national way of life. These outcomes—measured on 0–10 scale with higher values indicative of greater levels of perceived threat—allow us to replicate our analysis on the perceived threat of global pandemics. As detailed above in Table 1, the levels of populism observed in each of the two samples presented in Study 1 and Study 2 are very similar (3.43 and 3.70, respectively). See Table S2 in the online supporting information for full summary statistics.

The results of Study 1 demonstrated that, although populist attitudes are positively associated with the perceived threat of pandemics, the effect was not statistically significant. The results of Study 2, which leverage BES data, provide evidence that this relationship is, in fact, of significance. Among BES respondents, we observe that, in the case of perceived threats to the national way of life, increased populism correlates strongly and significantly with an increased view of pandemics (specifically Covid-19) as threatening.

In Figure 3, we report the effect of our populism index on the perceived threat of Covid-19 to the national way of life (upper panel) and the economy (lower panel). A bivariate model signals that populism plays an important role in the perceived threat to the national way of life ($\beta = .29$) but plays no significant role when it comes to the perceived threat of the crisis on the economy ($\beta = -.07$). When we consider the explanatory role of sociodemographic variables including gender, sexuality, age, education, and income, our results remain unchanged, with populism coefficient retaining its substantive size ($\beta = .31$). Finally, in a more robust model that includes controls for both ideological placement and retrospective vote recall in the most recent general election, we find that populism exhibits a significant independent effect ($\beta = .19$). Across all our model specifications of perceived threat to the economy, we find no effect of populism. Overall, Study 2 finds, consistent with Study 1, evidence to support Hypothesis 1.

STUDY 3

External Validity From a Replication in India

Our final study relies on original survey data from India sourced via MTurk. Indian respondents were recruited via MTurk and represent a nonrandom online-recruited convenience

[2]An alternative test of Hypothesis 3 which models the interaction effect between treatment and populism measured via the one to five continuous variables is reported in Figure S3 in the online supporting information.



Figure 2. Treatment effects (United Kingdom).



Figure 3. Effect of populist attitudes on threat perception.

sample. Given the, relative, novelty of MTurk as a platform for recruiting survey respondents for empirical research, a wide body of work has sought to assess the reliability and validity of these samples. In a comprehensive assessment of the internal and external validity of MTurk samples, Berinsky et al. (2012) compare MTurk-sourced samples to representative online panels and face-to-face probability samples and conclude that they do not significantly differ on several core demographic and political variables. Work has also demonstrated that experimental analyses replicate without significant variation in estimated treatment effects, (Coppock, 2019; Mullinix et al., 2015) and subject attentiveness tends to be high, indicating the platform's utility when relying on subtly worded experimental variation in text (Christenson & Glick, 2013). In the concrete case of India, Boas et al. (2020) find that attention rates among MTurk users are high (p. 245) and that experimental tests using Indian MTurk respondents provide symmetrical treatment effects to those observed among samples sourced from Qualtrics or Facebook (p. 246). Summary statistics of our sample are provided in Table S3 in the online supporting information, operationalization in Table S6, and balance tests in Table S9.



Figure 4. Modeling effect of populism on perceived threat of transformation to India's economy, national way of life, and humanitarian concerns (Study 3: India).

As in case of Study 1 in the United Kingdom, our comparative evidence from India provides strong empirical support for Hypothesis 1 (see Figure 4 and Table S14 in the online supporting information for full models). Across the six independent transformations that we consider, increased populism is positively and significantly associated with increased threat perception. Only in the case of digitization are two of the positive effects of populist attitudes nonsignificant, while this is true once of migration. Of note is that unlike in the United Kingdom, the effects of populism on perceived threats are symmetrical across the three objects of threat, that is, the effect of populist attitudes on humanitarian threat is just as high as that observed in the case of the economy and the national way of life.

Finally, we turn to assess the effects of treatment assignment. Figure 5 (and Table S15 in the online supporting information for full models) reports the average treatment effect of exposing respondents to information regarding global governance responses. Among the full sample of Indian respondents (upper panel), the results suggest that individuals tend to view ongoing transformations as *less* threatening when they are informed of the potential response. The results are, however, of varying levels of significance although they are, with an exception in the case of terrorism, of a comparable magnitude. Of theoretical interest to Hypothesis 3, we do not observe any divergence in the effects of treatment between populists and nonpopulists (lower panel). In other words—and consistent with the data observed in the case of the United Kingdom—there is no evidence to support the notion that those with populist attitudes feel addition threat because of an inferred global or supranational policy response.



Figure 5. Treatment effects (India).

Discussion

In this article, we provide strong cross-national evidence that, across global crises and transformations that belong to different issue dimensions, populism is strongly and significantly correlated with the increased perception that global transformations are threatening. Not only do populists view global crises and transformations as more inimical to the national economy and national way of life, but they also view them to be inimical to humanitarian concerns, albeit to a lesser extent in the United Kingdom than India. We take these findings—consistent across six transformations and two countries while controlling for sociodemographics, left-right positioning, nationalism, social liberalism, and political trust—as indicative of the heightened underlying anxieties that populists are likely to perceive when they view ongoing changes beyond the control of the nation state and the imagined homogenous people that the state is supposed to protect. Moreover, our experimental findings show that the possibility of global governance solutions to global transformations do not increase the level of threat felt by more populistic individuals (or anyone), suggesting that the perceived threat is directly posed by the global, societal transformation rather than a potential global governance response. We do not argue by any means that this suggests that populists are not opposed to global governance. Instead, we argue that it is not their (real) fear of global governance that is driving their higher sense of threat about a large range of global transformations. As such, political actors have considerable agency in what they prescribe to deal with global transformations: if global governance, which is likely to be necessary to deal with many of these transformations, can reduce the perceived threat of these changes, the ability of actors campaigning against global governance to mobilize citizens with populist attitudes would likely be reduced. We see our findings as having broader theoretical consequences: supporting the ideational conceptualization of populism as a thin ideology that is distinct from nationalism and neither inherently left- nor right-wing *and* its psychological conceptualization as an attitudinal predisposition.

Our findings are also suggestive of a disconnect between the populist demand side and supply side, the latter of which is inseparable from its more comprehensive host ideology. Indeed, our data from Studies 1 and 3 (see Table S18 in the online supporting information) shows that, unlike for populist attitudes, the mean differences in respective threat perceptions between voters of populist and nonpopulist parties[3]—at the United Kingdom's 2019 General Election, the United Kingdom's 2016 EU referendum, and India's 2019 General Election—vary in direction, magnitude, and significance considerably. Notably, voters of the populist choices consistently perceived climate change to pose *less* threat than voters of nonpopulist choices, highlighting the effects of the host ideology to rally voters in addition to populism's thin offering. Moreover, although voters in the United Kingdom's 2016 EU referendum of the—widely viewed as populist—Leave scored higher in populism than other voters, there was *no* difference in the 2019 Indian general election, and the relationship was reversed in the 2019 U.K. General Election, emphasizing the disconnect between the populist demand side and its supply side. Moreover, the same data (see Figure S1 in the online supporting information) shows that, when respondents are asked "Do you think your government should agree to binding global agreements and delegate power to global supranational organizations (like the UN) to better deal with global transformations?" in the United Kingdom populism has a strong, significant *negative* effect, when controlling for sociodemographic and political variables. However, in India it has a strong, significant *positive* effect, highlighting also how populist attitudes interact with national context.

[3]Defined as the Conservative Party and Brexit Party at the United Kingdom's 2019 General Election (Rooduijn et al., 2019); Leave as opposed to Remain at the United Kingdom's 2016 referendum on EU membership (Richardson, 2018); and the Bharatiya Janata Party in India's 2019 General Election (see above; Jaffrelot & Tillin, 2017).

Despite our robust evidence on the relationship between populist attitudes and the perceived threats of global transformations, our study is not without its limitations. We cannot exclude the possibility of reverse causality in which individuals assume populist attitudes because of perceived threats or confounding variables in the form of cueing or deeper psychological predispositions. We consider reverse causality relatively unlikely (or at least likely to be smaller in magnitude) for four reasons. First, the broader, predispositional nature of populist attitudes as a conception of democracy suggests that they will have greater stability over time, in line with other ideological dispositions (Kustov et al., 2021; O'Grady, 2019), unlike threat perceptions, which are far more volatile and context specific (Miller & Krosnick, 2004). Second, empirically we show that the relationship is consistently positive across all six global transformations in both the United Kingdom and India; if perceiving a global transformation as threatening lead to populist attitudes (or indeed cueing from populist actors confounded the relationship), we would likely only see a positive relationship with the global transformation in question rather than all of them, some of which (such as digitalization) have seen relatively little politicization from either the demand side (precluding reverse causality as an alternative explanation) or supply side (precluding cueing). Third, our primary direct causal mechanism—regarding the global nature and foreign origin of global transformations putting them beyond the control of "the people"—is supported by the finding that, in the United Kingdom, the effect of populism has a greater effect on perceived threats towards the *national* way of life and the *national* economy, than humanitarian concerns, which are relatively unlikely to affect British nationals or "the people," suggesting that the relationships do not simply reflect higher threat sensitivity. That said, the finding that there is still a positive effect on humanitarian concerns is noteworthy and supportive of the idea that the observed relationships may reflect additional, deeper psychological predispositions. Fourth, the consistently positive relationships are not the case for perceived threats of global transformations and voting for populist parties, suggesting that the relationships that we observe genuinely isolate the concepts of and relationships between populist attitudes and perceived threats, further underscored by our attitudinal controls.

However, future studies with experimental designs or panel data should investigate the causal relationship and its direction. Notably, more research is needed to investigate the stability of populist attitudes as a predisposition; their relationship with political trust and efficacy—and the latter's volatility according to partisanship and the incumbent governing party of the day—give some cause for doubt about their absolute stability, even if individuals still vary in terms of populist attitudinal predispositions. Similarly, such studies could incorporate the concept of general threat sensitivity—likely to be more fundamental—and perceptions of threat beyond global transformations. For now, we can confidently conclude that populist attitudes are positively associated with the level of perceived threats posed by global transformations across multiple issue dimensions, national contexts, and objects of threat, and that this is likely to be primarily, but not only, because their global nature and foreign origin puts them beyond the control of "the people."

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to James Dennison, European University Institute, Via delle Fontanelle, 19, 50014 Fiesole FI, Italy. E-mail: james.dennison@eui.eu

REFERENCES

Akkerman, A., Mudde, C., & Zaslove, A. (2014). How populist are the people? Measuring populist attitudes in voters. *Comparative Political Studies, 47*(9), 1324–1353.

Bakker, B. N., Rooduijn, M., & Schumacher, G. (2016). The psychological roots of populist voting: Evidence from the United States, the Netherlands and Germany. *European Journal of Political Research, 55,* 302–320.

Berinsky, A. J., Huber, G. A., & Lenz, G. S. (2012). Evaluating online labor markets for experimental research: Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk. *Political Analysis, 20*(3), 351–368.

Betz, H.-G., & Meret, S. (2012). Right-wing populist parties and the working class vote: What have you done for us lately? In J. Rydgren (Ed.), *Class politics and the radical right* (pp. 107–121). Routledge. Extremism and Democracy.

Boas, T., Christenson, D., & Glick, D. (2020). Recruiting large online samples in the United States and India: Facebook, Mechanical Turk, and Qualtrics. *Political Science Research and Methods, 8*(2), 232–250.

Brader, T. (2002, August). *Rallies or retreats, brainwash or backlash? The political psychology of threat and fear*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston.

Calvillo, D. P., Ross, B. J., Garcia, R. J. B., Smelter, T. J., & Rutchick, A. M. (2020). Political ideology predicts perceptions of the threat of COVID-19 (and susceptibility to fake news about it). *Social Psychological and Personality Science, 11*(8), 1119–1128.

Castanho Silva, B., Jungkunz, S., Helbling, M., & Littvay, L. (2020). An empirical comparison of seven populist attitudes scales. *Political Research Quarterly, 73*(2), 409–424. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912919833176

Chacko, P. (2018). The right turn in India: Authoritarian populism and neoliberalisation. *Journal of Contemporary Asia, 48*(4), 541–565.

Chacko, P., & Jayasuriya, K. (2018). Asia's conservative moment: Understanding the rise of the right. *Journal of Contemporary Asia, 48*(4), 529–540.

Christenson, D. P., & Glick, D. M. (2013). Crowdsourcing panel studies and real-time experiments in MTurk. *The Political Methodologist, 20*(2), 27–33.

Coppock, A. (2019). Generalizing from survey experiments conducted on Mechanical Turk: A replication approach. *Political Science Research and Methods, 7*(3), 613–628.

de Vries, C. E. (2018). The cosmopolitan-parochial divide: Changing patterns of party and electoral competition in the Netherlands and beyond. *Journal of European Public Policy, 25*(11), 1541–1565.

de Wilde, P., Koopmans, R., Merkel, W., Strijbis, O., & Zürn, M. (2019). *The struggle over borders: Communitarianism and cosmopolitanism*. Cambridge University Press.

Erisen, C., Guidi, M., Martini, S., Toprakkiran, S., Isernia, P., & Littvay, L. (2021). Psychological correlates of populist attitudes. *Political Psychology, 42*(S1), 149–171. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12768

Esses, V. M., Hamilton, L. K., & Gaucher, D. (2017). The global refugee crisis: Empirical evidence and policy implications for improving public attitudes and facilitating refugee resettlement. *Social Issues and Policy Review, 11,* 78–123.

Geurkink, B., Zaslove, A., Sluiter, R., & Jacobs, K. (2020). Populist attitudes, political trust, and external political efficacy: Old wine in new bottles? *Political Studies, 68*(1), 247–267.

Goodwin, R., Willson, M., & Gaines, S. Jr. (2005). Terror threat perception and its consequences in contemporary Britain. *British Journal of Psychology, 96*(Pt 4), 389–406.

Gray, J. A. (1990). Brain systems that mediate both emotion and cognition. *Cognition and Emotion, 4,* 269–288.

Hawkins, K. A., Kaltwasser, C. R., & Andreadis, I. (2020). The activation of populist attitudes. *Government and Opposition, 55*(2), 283–307. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2018.23

Hawkins, K. A., Riding, S., & Mudde, C. (2012). 'Measuring populist attitudes', Committee on Concepts and Methods Working Paper Series, University of Georgia.

Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D., & Perraton, J. (1999). *Global transformations: Politics, economics and culture*. Stanford University Press.

Huber, R. A. (2020). The role of populist attitudes in explaining climate change scepticism and support for environmental protection. *Environmental Politics, 29*(6), 959–982. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2019.1708186

Huber, R. A., Greussing, E., & Eberl, J. M. (2021). From populism to climate scepticism: The role of institutional trust and attitudes towards science. *Environmental Politics*, 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2021.1978200

Hunger, S., & Paxton, F. (2021). What's in a buzzword? A systematic review of the state of populism research in political science. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2021.44

Inglehart, R. F., & Norris, P. (2019). *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit and the Rise of Authoritarian Populism*. Cambridge University Press.

Jaffrelot, C., & Tillin, L. (2017). Populism in India. In C. R. Kaltwasser (Ed.), *The Oxford handbook of populism* (pp. 179–194). Oxford University Press.

Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. *Econometrica, 47,* 263–291.

Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S., & Frey, T. (2006). Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: Six European countries compared. *European Journal of Political Research, 45*(6), 921–956.

Kustov, A., Laaker, D., & Reller, C. (2021). The stability of immigration attitudes: Evidence and implications. *Journal of Politics, 83*(4), 1478–1494.

Mader, M., Steiner, N., & Schoen, H. (2020). The globalisation divide in the public mind: Belief systems on globalisation and their electoral consequences. *Journal of European Public Policy, 27*(10), 1526–1545.

Meijers, M. J., & Zaslove, A. (2021). Measuring Populism in Political Parties: Appraisal of a New Approach. *Comparative Political Studies, 54*(2), 372–407.

Merolla, J. L., & Zechmeister, E. J. (2009). *Democracy at risk: How terrorist threats affect the public*. University of Chicago Press.

Miller, J. M., & Krosnick, J. A. (2004). Threat as a motivator of political activism: A field experiment. *Political Psychology, 25*(4), 507–523.

Mudde, C. (2004). The populist zeitgeist. *Government and Opposition, 39*(4), 541–563.

Mullinix, K. J., Leeper, T. J., Druckman, J. N., & Freese, J. (2015). The generalizability of survey experiments. *Journal of Experimental Political Science, 2,* 109–138.

Mustafaj, M., Madrigal, G., Roden, J., & Ploger, G. (2021). Physiological threat sensitivity predicts anti-immigrant attitudes. *Politics and the Life Sciences*, 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1017/pls.2021.11

O'Grady, T. (2019). How do economic circumstances determine preferences? Evidence from long-run panel data. *British Journal of Political Science, 49*(4), 1381–1406.

Rhodes-Purdy, M., Navarre, R., & Utych, S. M. (2021). Populist psychology: Economics, culture, and emotions. *Journal of Politics, 83*(4), 1559–1572.

Richardson, J. (2018). Brexit: The EU policy-making state hits the populist buffers. *Political Quarterly, 89,* 118–126.

Rooduijn, M. (2014). The nucleus of populism: In search of the lowest common denominator. *Government and Opposition, 4*(4), 573–599.

Rooduijn, M., Van Kessel, S., Froio, C., Pirro, A., De Lange, S., Halikiopoulou, D., Lewis, P., Mudde, C., & Taggart, P. (2019). *The PopuList: An overview of populist, far right, far left and Eurosceptic parties in Europe*. www.popu-list.org

Santana-Pereira, J., & Cancela, J. (2020). Demand without supply? Populist attitudes and voting behaviour in post-bailout Portugal. *South European Society and Politics, 25*(2), 205–228.

Schulz, A., Müller, P., Schemer, C., Wirz, D. S., Wettstein, M., & Wirth, W. (2018). Measuring populist attitudes on three dimensions. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 30*(2), 316–326. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edw037

Seawright, J., & Gerring, J. (2008). Case selection techniques in case study research: A menu of qualitative and quantitative options. *Political Research Quarterly, 61*(2), 294–308.

Smith, B. A. (2021). It's all under control: Threat, perceived control, and political engagement. *Political Psychology*. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12769

Smith, T. W., Kim, J., & Son, J. (2017). Public attitudes toward climate change and other environmental issues across countries. *International Journal of Sociology, 47*(1), 62–80.

Stanley, B. (2008). The thin ideology of populism. *Journal of Political Ideologies, 13*(1), 95–110.

Sud, N. (2022). The actual Gujarat model: Authoritarianism, capitalism, Hindu nationalism and populism in the time of Modi. *Journal of Contemporary Asia, 52*(1), 102–126. https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2020.1846205

Taggart, P. (2004). Populism and representative politics in contemporary Europe. *Journal of Political Ideologies, 9*(3), 269–288.

Van Hauwaert, S. M., & Van Kessel, S. (2018). Beyond protest and discontent: A cross-national analysis of the effect of populist attitudes and issue positions on populist party support. *European Journal of Political Research, 57,* 68–92. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12216

van Leeuwen, F., & Park, J. H. (2009). Perceptions of social dangers, moral foundations, and political orientation. *Personality and Individual Differences, 47*(3), 169–173.

Voeten, E. (2020). Populism and backlashes against international courts. *Perspectives on Politics, 18*(2), 407–422. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719000975

Wodak, R. (2015). *The politics of fear*. Sage.

Wuttke, A., Schimpf, C., & Schoen, H. (2020). When the whole is greater than the sum of its parts: On the conceptualization and measurement of populist attitudes and other multidimensional constructs. *American Political Science Review, 114*(2), 356–374. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055419000807

Zürn, M., & de Wilde, P. (2016). Debating globalization: cosmopolitanism and communitarianism as political ideologies. *Journal of Political Ideologies, 21*(3), 280–301.

Supporting Information

Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher's web site:

Table S1. Summary Statistics (Study 1)
Table S2. Summary Statistics (Study 2)
Table S3. Summary Statistics (Study 3)
Table S4. Quota Balance Comparison between Study 1 Original Survey Data and BES
Table S5. Study 1 Covariate Operationalisation
Table S6. Study 3 (India) Covariate Operationalisation
Table S7. Proportion & Correlation of Transformations Solicited in UK Survey (Study 1)
Table S8. Covariate Balance between Treatment Groups (Study 1)
Table S9. Covariate Balance between Treatment Groups (Study 3)
Table S10. Modelling Effect of Populism on Threat Perceptions in the UK
Table S11. Regression Modelling Treatment Effects on Threat Perceptions (Full Sample) in the UK
Table S12. Regression Modelling Treatment Effects on Threat Perceptions (Populist Respondents) in the UK
Table S13. Regression Modelling Treatment Effects on Threat Perceptions (Non-populist Respondents) in the UK
Table S14. Modelling Effect of Populism on Threat Perceptions in India
Table S15. Regression Modelling Treatment Effects on Threat Perceptions (Full Sample) in India
Table S16. Regression Modelling Treatment Effects on Threat Perceptions (Populist Respondents) in India
Table S17. Regression Modelling Treatment Effects on Threat Perceptions (Non-populist Respondents) in India
Table S18. Mean Threat Perceptions of Global Transformations by Voting Behaviour
Figure S1. Effect of populist attitudes on support for global governance.
Figure S2. Moderation effects of populism*left-right position.
Figure S3. Moderation effect of treatment* populism (H3).