Introspective distinguishability - Who needs it?
Introspective distinguishability - Who needs it?
It is generally thought that if introspective distinguishability (ID) were available, it would provide an answer to scepticism about perceptual knowledge by enabling us to tell the difference between a good case perceptual experience and a bad kind. This paper challenges this common assumption by showing that even if ID were available, it would not advance our case against scepticism. The conclusion to draw from this result is not to concede to scepticism, however, but rather to give up on the idea that ID is required for knowledge. For if perception with ID turns out to get us no further than perception without ID, then the rational thing to do is to realize that the putative presence (or absence) of ID is a red herring in the debate about scepticism and can make no difference to the question of whether or not perceptual knowledge is possible.
241-256
Schönbaumsfeld, Genia
586652b5-20da-47cf-9719-4fc587dfa4e8
31 December 2021
Schönbaumsfeld, Genia
586652b5-20da-47cf-9719-4fc587dfa4e8
Schönbaumsfeld, Genia
(2021)
Introspective distinguishability - Who needs it?
Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 45, .
(doi:10.5840/msp202110712).
Abstract
It is generally thought that if introspective distinguishability (ID) were available, it would provide an answer to scepticism about perceptual knowledge by enabling us to tell the difference between a good case perceptual experience and a bad kind. This paper challenges this common assumption by showing that even if ID were available, it would not advance our case against scepticism. The conclusion to draw from this result is not to concede to scepticism, however, but rather to give up on the idea that ID is required for knowledge. For if perception with ID turns out to get us no further than perception without ID, then the rational thing to do is to realize that the putative presence (or absence) of ID is a red herring in the debate about scepticism and can make no difference to the question of whether or not perceptual knowledge is possible.
Text
msp_2021_0045_0000_0245_0260
- Version of Record
Restricted to Repository staff only
Request a copy
More information
Published date: 31 December 2021
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 456506
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/456506
ISSN: 0363-6550
PURE UUID: a5e44d35-6ebf-46e2-a941-9de61968a8c6
Catalogue record
Date deposited: 04 May 2022 16:47
Last modified: 16 Mar 2024 16:46
Export record
Altmetrics
Download statistics
Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.
View more statistics