The limits of morality in strategic games
The limits of morality in strategic games
An agent, or a coalition of agents, is blameable for an outcome if she had a strategy to prevent it. In this paper we introduce a notion of limited blameworthiness, with a constraint on the amount of sacrifice required to prevent the outcome. The main technical contribution is a sound and complete logical system for reasoning about limited blameworthiness in the strategic game setting.
Cao, Rui
a3d4f144-2a36-48e7-8b7c-aeb2a3d6e8db
Naumov, Pavel
8b6c40fb-b199-44d5-a8e2-0ebd021566b0
Cao, Rui
a3d4f144-2a36-48e7-8b7c-aeb2a3d6e8db
Naumov, Pavel
8b6c40fb-b199-44d5-a8e2-0ebd021566b0
Cao, Rui and Naumov, Pavel
(2022)
The limits of morality in strategic games.
In 31st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-22).
(In Press)
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Abstract
An agent, or a coalition of agents, is blameable for an outcome if she had a strategy to prevent it. In this paper we introduce a notion of limited blameworthiness, with a constraint on the amount of sacrifice required to prevent the outcome. The main technical contribution is a sound and complete logical system for reasoning about limited blameworthiness in the strategic game setting.
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2022-ijcai-cn
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Accepted/In Press date: 20 April 2022
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Local EPrints ID: 457146
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/457146
PURE UUID: eeb9a7ef-44f4-4848-aa84-157cb5adb9cf
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Date deposited: 24 May 2022 17:02
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 04:10
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Contributors
Author:
Rui Cao
Author:
Pavel Naumov
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