Subsidiarity and the allocation of governmental powers
Subsidiarity and the allocation of governmental powers
Every country must allocate final decision-making authority over different issues/subjects within its boundaries. Historically, many scholars working on this topic implicitly assumed that identifying the features providing entities with justified claims for authority and the entities possessing those features would also identify which groups should have which powers (or vice versa). However, many candidate allocative principles select multiple entities as candidates for some sub-state authority and yet fail to explain which powers each should possess. Further work must explain which groups should possess which powers when and what to do when two groups can make equally-valid authority claims using the same principle. Subsidiarity, the principle under which authority should presumptively belong to the entity representing those ‘most affected’ by its exercise and capable of addressing underlying problems, is one of the few principles focused on identifying which groups should have which powers. Unfortunately, subsidiarity alone does not provide guidance on many issues/subjects. Useful subsidiarity-related guidance relies on balancing underlying justificatory interests, which do the real allocative work. Another allocative principle remains necessary. A deflationary account of subsidiarity’s allocative potential nonetheless provides insights into how to articulate a new principle and accounts of subsidiarity that can fulfill other moral roles.
Authority, Division of Powers, Federalism, Political Philosophy, Subsidiarity
83-111
Da Silva, Michael
05ad649f-8409-4012-8edc-88709b1a3182
8 November 2022
Da Silva, Michael
05ad649f-8409-4012-8edc-88709b1a3182
Da Silva, Michael
(2022)
Subsidiarity and the allocation of governmental powers.
Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, 36 (1), .
(doi:10.1017/cjlj.2022.26).
Abstract
Every country must allocate final decision-making authority over different issues/subjects within its boundaries. Historically, many scholars working on this topic implicitly assumed that identifying the features providing entities with justified claims for authority and the entities possessing those features would also identify which groups should have which powers (or vice versa). However, many candidate allocative principles select multiple entities as candidates for some sub-state authority and yet fail to explain which powers each should possess. Further work must explain which groups should possess which powers when and what to do when two groups can make equally-valid authority claims using the same principle. Subsidiarity, the principle under which authority should presumptively belong to the entity representing those ‘most affected’ by its exercise and capable of addressing underlying problems, is one of the few principles focused on identifying which groups should have which powers. Unfortunately, subsidiarity alone does not provide guidance on many issues/subjects. Useful subsidiarity-related guidance relies on balancing underlying justificatory interests, which do the real allocative work. Another allocative principle remains necessary. A deflationary account of subsidiarity’s allocative potential nonetheless provides insights into how to articulate a new principle and accounts of subsidiarity that can fulfill other moral roles.
Text
Subsidiarity Author's Manuscript
- Accepted Manuscript
More information
Accepted/In Press date: 3 February 2022
e-pub ahead of print date: 8 November 2022
Published date: 8 November 2022
Additional Information:
Funding Information:
I would like to thank Geoffrey Sigalet and Daniel Weinstock for comments on previous versions of this paper; the Research Group on Constitutional Studies at McGill University for comments on a predecessor paper that inspired this one; and Hannah Da Silva for discussions on the issues. I would also like to thank my anonymous reviewers and Andrew Botterell for helpful guidance.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 The Author(s).
Keywords:
Authority, Division of Powers, Federalism, Political Philosophy, Subsidiarity
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Local EPrints ID: 457207
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/457207
ISSN: 0841-8209
PURE UUID: 5ef059d7-ea7a-4525-8165-191eb3625d2d
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Date deposited: 26 May 2022 16:42
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 04:12
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Michael Da Silva
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