Blameworthiness in Security Games
Blameworthiness in Security Games
Security games are an example of a successful real-world ap- plication of game theory. The paper defines blameworthiness of the defender and the attacker in security games using the principle of alternative possibilities and provides a sound and complete logical system for reasoning about blameworthiness in such games. Two of the axioms of this system capture the asymmetry of information in security games.
Naumov, Pavel
8b6c40fb-b199-44d5-a8e2-0ebd021566b0
Tao, Jia
008c0748-696c-4069-a351-551d311e8056
February 2020
Naumov, Pavel
8b6c40fb-b199-44d5-a8e2-0ebd021566b0
Tao, Jia
008c0748-696c-4069-a351-551d311e8056
Naumov, Pavel and Tao, Jia
(2020)
Blameworthiness in Security Games.
In 34th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 20).
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Conference or Workshop Item
(Paper)
Abstract
Security games are an example of a successful real-world ap- plication of game theory. The paper defines blameworthiness of the defender and the attacker in security games using the principle of alternative possibilities and provides a sound and complete logical system for reasoning about blameworthiness in such games. Two of the axioms of this system capture the asymmetry of information in security games.
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2020-aaai
- Accepted Manuscript
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Published date: February 2020
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Local EPrints ID: 457223
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/457223
PURE UUID: 999f992a-a307-45b7-8e9d-8bf146fc5247
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Date deposited: 26 May 2022 16:54
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 04:10
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Contributors
Author:
Pavel Naumov
Author:
Jia Tao
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