An epistemic logic of blameworthiness
An epistemic logic of blameworthiness
Blameworthiness of an agent or a coalition of agents can be defined in terms of the principle of alternative possibilities: for the coalition to be responsible for an outcome, the outcome must take place and the coalition should be a minimal one that had a strategy to prevent the outcome. In this article we argue that in the settings with imperfect information, not only should the coalition have had a strategy, but it also should be the minimal one that knew that it had a strategy and what the strategy was. The main technical result of the article is a sound and complete bimodal logic that describes the interplay between knowledge and blameworthiness in strategic games with imperfect information.
Naumov, Pavel
8b6c40fb-b199-44d5-a8e2-0ebd021566b0
Tao, Jia
008c0748-696c-4069-a351-551d311e8056
1 June 2020
Naumov, Pavel
8b6c40fb-b199-44d5-a8e2-0ebd021566b0
Tao, Jia
008c0748-696c-4069-a351-551d311e8056
Naumov, Pavel and Tao, Jia
(2020)
An epistemic logic of blameworthiness.
Artificial Intelligence, 283 (6), [103269].
Abstract
Blameworthiness of an agent or a coalition of agents can be defined in terms of the principle of alternative possibilities: for the coalition to be responsible for an outcome, the outcome must take place and the coalition should be a minimal one that had a strategy to prevent the outcome. In this article we argue that in the settings with imperfect information, not only should the coalition have had a strategy, but it also should be the minimal one that knew that it had a strategy and what the strategy was. The main technical result of the article is a sound and complete bimodal logic that describes the interplay between knowledge and blameworthiness in strategic games with imperfect information.
Text
2020-ai
- Accepted Manuscript
More information
Accepted/In Press date: 21 March 2020
e-pub ahead of print date: 26 March 2020
Published date: 1 June 2020
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 457228
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/457228
ISSN: 0004-3702
PURE UUID: abdf849c-382e-418a-9200-0b42f76b89c5
Catalogue record
Date deposited: 26 May 2022 16:54
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 04:10
Export record
Contributors
Author:
Pavel Naumov
Author:
Jia Tao
Download statistics
Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.
View more statistics