THE GOTHIC SUBLIME: A STUDY OF THE CHANGING FUNCTION OF SUBLIMITY IN REPRESENTATIONS OF SUBJECTIVITY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY FANTASY FICTION.

By Andrew Smith.

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

June 1994.

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON.

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis examines how certain Gothic fictions of the nineteenth century draw upon and critique philosophical versions of the sublime. My argument is that sublimity is transformed into a nascent psychology in Gothic fiction which is similar to, but can be used to criticise, a Freudian psychoanalytical account. I view Freud's version of the subject as dependent upon some of the features of the sublime such as self/object distinctions, and the significance which is attached to non-rational moments. It is because the Gothic critiques sublimity that it also critically reads Freudian psychoanalysis *avant la lettre*; it therefore has a distinct theoretical space similar to, but different from, philosophical notions of the sublime and Freud's formulation of the psyche. This thesis explores the development of the Gothic's handling of the sublime from early naturalistic to later urban versions, culminating in this reassessment of Freud.

Theorists of the sublime examined are, Longinus, Addison, Burke, Schiller, and Kant, with the principal focus being upon the work of Burke and Kant. The Gothic writers explored are, Mary Shelley, Edgar Allan Poe, Robert Louis Stevenson, and Bram Stoker.

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ILLUSTRATIONS.

PREFACE.

Current work on nineteenth century sublimity falls within three main critical perspectives. One is the psychoanalytical, as in the work of Thomas Weiskel[1] or David Punter[2]. These accounts correlate the Romantic mind with the emergence of a form of unconscious championed by Freudian psychoanalysis. Another perspective focuses upon the discursive nature of Romanticism, as in the work of Clifford Siskin[3], and Peter De Bolla[4]. These works attempt to identify the discrete, seemingly anomalous elements which inform Romantic thought. The third main perspective is that of feminism, exemplified by the work of Anne Mellor[5], Mary Poovey[6] and Meena Alexander[7] who explore the relatively neglected writings of Dorothy Wordsworth and Mary Shelley.

In current accounts of Romanticism there has yet to emerge a comprehensive study of sublimity in the Gothic. While Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's[8] work has led the way in theorising the Gothic, her coverage of the range of Gothic texts is fairly limited. Consequently there is very little work on how the Gothic handles notions of sublimity and subjectivity. In terms of psychoanalytical approaches, Weiskel fails to mention the Gothic, and Punter's *The Romantic Unconscious* does so only briefly. The Gothic deals in notions of 'otherness' and fragmentation; it is thus appropriate to explore how the Gothic sublime prefigures a formulation of the unconscious. Anne Mellor discusses *Frankenstein*[9] as a birth narrative; other accounts relate the novel to period politics, like Chris Baldick's[10], or to notions of science, as in the work of David Ketterer[11]. What however is omitted from these accounts is how the novel handles the concept of the sublime. It is also Meena Alexander's contention that women writers of the period have little or no interest in

the sublime (a claim she can only make by omitting Ann Radcliffe from her account). There is thus a space for an in-depth analysis of the notion of sublimity as it is handled in nineteenth century fantasy fiction. This would offer an alternative reworking of how the Romantic unconscious prefigures other conceptions of the unconscious.

This thesis explores how sublimity is closely tied to an understanding of subjectivity. This relationship changes in the eighteenth-century as the sublime begins to alter in a movement in which there is a development from a natural or pantheistic form of the sublime to a secular or psychological account of it (e.g. as in Kant[12]). There is also a literary movement away from representations of individual experience to an idea of public, communal, discourse, which in part coincides with the emergence of the metropolis. Such a move can be traced by examining how various binary oppositions, in particular those of Nature/Culture and Individual/Community, transform a notion of the sublime. Foucault is particularly helpful here in his account of how the human subject becomes constituted as an object of knowledge[13]. This thesis explores how the Gothic constructs versions of the sublime and subjectivity, and how it critiques prevailing ideas of how those categories operate. Another aim is to explore how it is that the sublime becomes internalised and prefigures other notions of the unconscious, e.g. as in Freud's 'The Uncanny'[14]. Such an account will draw upon the work of Foucault, Kristeva[15], Neil Hertz[16], Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Rosemary Jackson[17] which helps to chart the development of the Gothic from the mysteries of the 'real' to the forensic fictions of Edgar Allan Poe[18]. In this there can be identified a manifestation of the sublime which is independent of philosophical and psychoanalytical interpretations of it.

This will also entail exploring a development from individual to communal forms of experience; the development in theories of sublimity corresponding to a social emergence of communal, metropolitan, experience. Other fiction referred to includes *Dracula*[19] and *The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde*[20].

This thesis also suggests that the relationship between Romantic and Victorian literature is not marked by the strict demarcation which is normally supposed. Rather the Gothic suggests that there is a philosophical continuity between these periods, so that a reading of Romanticism gives a new understanding of the theoretical foundational influences of the Victorian Gothic.

Chapter One is an introduction to the philosophical field of the sublime and an examination of its applicability to a theory of the fantastic.

Chapter Two is a reading of *Frankenstein* which explores the novel's Gothicised version of sublimity

Chapter Three is an examination of how representations of the past challenge the veracity of the sublime in selected tales from Mary Shelley.

Chapter Four is a discussion of how the sublime is relocated from a natural to an urban context in the work of Edgar Allan Poe. It is also an exploration of the move from private to public disclosure in Freud.

Chapter Five is an examination of Poe's detective tales, this emphasises their relationship to Kant's account of the sublime.

Chapter Six offers two readings of *Dracula*, one is contextualised by contemporary ideas of science and the other reads the novel through the sublime. The conclusion reached is that science cannot contain the Gothic sublime, because the sublime is generated out of the scientific practice

as it is represented in the novel.

Chapter Seven is a reading of Freud's 'The Uncanny' and associated writings. The argument is that the Gothic sublime as it is structured in a text such as R. L. Stevenson's *The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde*, can decode the Freudian uncanny and therefore reverses the traditional relationship between psychoanalysis and the Gothic text.

The Conclusion is a brief summary of the main arguments and also points out the way forward in this area of research.

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ABBREVIATIONS.

References to Freud's *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* are abbreviated as *Pyschopathology* after first reference in each chapter. Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams* is abbreviated to *Dreams*, and *Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious* is referred to as *Jokes*. Similarly Stevenson's *The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* is shortened to *Jekyll and Hyde*, Burke's *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origins of our Ideas of The Sublime and the Beautiful* is abbreviated as *Enquiry*.

CHAPTER ONE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SUBLIME.

In this account of the sublime there is one specific aim, to explore to what extent a theory of sublimity can be utilised by a theory of the fantastic. The primary theorists who are explored here are Longinus, Addison, Burke, Kant and Schiller. I have selected these specific theorists because of their influence over Romantic thought. In going through their accounts I make no direct correlation between what they say and how it links to the fantastic, but rather I parallel their arguments to Rosemary Jackson's in *Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion*[1]. I have chosen Jackson's text because it offers an extensive overview of existing theories of fantasy, and is therefore to some degree authoritative. When I examine, sequentially, these theorists of the sublime, I do so in order to highlight various inconsistencies in their accounts. The purpose of this is to give an extended account of the sublime and to suggest that these inconsistencies (areas of dilemma) are similar to an account of fantasy.

It is these problems, in particular to do with language and the relationship the subject has to nature in the sublime, which have applications for a theory of the fantastic. In the fantastic these problems become restated in a similar, although different, way. The fantastic, broadly speaking, deals with the same problems of interpretation and poses the same difficulty in analysing states of mind. What I value in Jackson's account is the emphasis she gives to the way that the Gothic hero/protagonist is confronted with problems of what constitutes I/not-I; meaning that the theory of the sublime and a theory of the fantastic share the problem of locating and defining identity. The role of language is also linked in both to this problem of securing identity, which is apparent in the way that the representative efficacy of language is questioned.

Thomas Weiskel[2], Neil Hertz[3] and Eve Kosofsky-Sedgwick[4] are discussed because in their accounts of the sublime (or in Sedgwick's case, the Gothic) similar problems of identity and representation are explored. I argue that the problems suggested in accounts of the sublime and in Jackson's reading of fantasy can be applied to *Frankenstein*. At the end of my reading of her thesis I briefly give an outline of what such a reading would encompass which is also a sketch for a further chapter.

LONGINUS, THE PROBLEM WITH RHETORIC.

Neil Hertz writes of Longinus' treatise On The Sublime[5] that: '[...]reading along one has the sense of moving through a verbal medium increasingly rich in repetitions and glancing analogies' (p.4). Hertz discusses this 'verbal medium' in terms of figurative language; and in this section I examine the fashion in which Longinus' mandate for sublimity is linked to figurative language. I argue that his account of the sublime suggests a relationship between what he loosely defines as 'Art' and Nature, whereby the latter becomes anchored through a 'credible God-term' (Wieskel, p.36). However, I further argue that whereas this relationship between Art and Nature appears to imply a plenitude of experience for the subject, this experience becomes undermined in Longinus' account of language. It is his discussion on language which ultimately suggests that the subject 'feels' the sublime as an alienating experience.

For Longinus, it is the function of certain types of rhetoric to 'transport' the reader/listener into sublime experience. He achieves this by suggesting a relationship between Art and Nature: 'For art is[...]perfect when it seems to be nature, and nature, again, is most

effective when pervaded by the unseen presence of art '(p.46). This symbiotic relationship between Art and Nature encapsulates sublimity because Nature is validated by God, so that for the reader/listener: '[...]the Sublime lifts him near to the great spirit of the Deity '(p.69). This inter-connected three way relationship between Art, Nature and 'the Deity' implies that the sublime is a totalising experience for the subject. However, earlier in the treatise he problematises the possibility of this experience by separating poetic language from oratory. In so doing it questions the validity of deploying 'Art' as a unified concept at all. He writes that: '[...]in poetry, as I observed, a certain mythical exaggeration is allowable, transcending altogether mere logical credence. But the chief beauties of an oratorical image are its energy and reality '(p.35). This referencing is ambiguous. In oratorical writing is it the 'reality' of the image which gives discourse its 'energy', or is it the case that oratory should be concerned with the 'real', i.e. with real practical concerns? The problem for Longinus is whether the image is figurative or representative. Either way, the use of the 'real' in relation to oratory becomes problematic due to what Longinus sees as the nature of rhetoric. In this, '[...]an image lures us away from an argument: judgement is paralysed, matters of fact disappear from view, eclipsed by the superior blaze '(p.36). Again, '[...]the use of figures has a peculiar tendency to rouse a suspicion of dishonesty '(p.40). This concentration on 'figures' and images and their relationship to oratory fails to properly separate oratory from poetic language; both are subsumed under the category of 'Art'. This is apparent when he attempts to resolve the problem of 'deception', which he sees as inherent in the use of figurative language. This is a problem he links to oratory, rather than poetry, but here the two

become confused, and the problem restated rather than resolved:-

> To allay[...]this distrust which attaches to the use of figures we must call in the powerful aid of sublimity and passion. For art, once associated with these great allies, will be overshadowed by their grandeur and beauty, and pass beyond the reach of suspicion. (p. 41)

Art, or artifice, thus becomes lost in the higher realm of the sublime. However, this implies that the possibilities for deception in artifice have again been disguised, 'overshadowed', meaning that the potential for deception in figurative language is left in place. This problem is unresolved by Longinus, who evokes a crude psychological theory in an attempt to account for it:-

> [...]passion and grandeur of language, lying nearer to our souls by reason both of a certain natural affinity and of their radiance, always strike our mental eye before we become conscious of the figure, throwing its artificial character into the shade and hiding it as it were in a veil. (p. 4)

The ironic implication is that sublimity does not equate with 'truth'. Longinus attempts to account for this discontinuity by constructing a theory of subjectivity in which the inner 'depths' of the subject are matched by the limits of representation. That is, the 'passion and grandeur of language' equate with the deep 'truth' of the subject.

Longinus accounts for this process in two ways. Firstly in terms of the soul: '[...]passion requires a certain disorder of language, imitating the agitation and commotion of the soul..' (p. 44). Secondly with mind: 'Indeed, we may say that with strict truth that beautiful words are the very light of thought ' (p. 57). However, the problem of figurative language and its potential for deception has not been fully accounted for. This problem resurfaces when Longinus writes about 'excess' in a fashion which denies language the ability to portray sublime 'reality': 'That the use of figurative language, as of all other beauties of style, has a constant

tendency towards excess, is an obvious truth which I need not dwell upon '(p.61). Here there is an unacknowledged paradox. Weiskel writes of excess in the sublime that: 'Any excess on the part of the object cancels the representational efficacy of the mind which can only turn, for its new object, to itself '(p.24). Applied to Longinus, this means that where he sees an excess of 'style' in figurative language, he also, logically, has to see this as matched by an excess in the subject. Thus the sublime indicates the displacement of nature by the subject.

This is because, as stated earlier, he sees a correlation between figurative language, the soul, and the mind. Therefore, although this figurative excess could be seen as the mind representing itself, it is in terms of a form of representation which is burdened with the possibility that it is essentially deceptive. This forces Longinus to recant on his previous position on language in his discussion of 'passionate frenzy'. Couched in revisionist terms he writes that: 'For, as I am never tired of explaining, in actions and passions verging on frenzy there lies a kind of remission and palliation of any licence of language '(p.73). Here, although the licence of language is permitted to the subject, it is through the process of 'remission' and 'palliation' that this 'licence' becomes effaced. The subject is therefore placed outside of language and nature; as Longinus has said, '[...]it is from nature that man derives the faculty of speech '(p.70). The subject is thus finally alienated from the possibility of expressing plenitude, a plenitude which Longinus had seen as characterising sublimity. In Longinus then, the subject can experience the sublime but is unable to express it.

To conclude on Longinus; he places the subject in an unproblematical relationship to nature, a nature which expresses 'the Diety'. The subject

has access to this through sublimity. However, this relationship of the subject to the sublime is problematised by the form which manifests it, figurative language. It is the possibility this language has to deceive the subject, which ultimately leaves the subject alienated from the sublime.

ADDISON AND THE ABSENT PRESENCE.

In this section I examine the essays of Joseph Addison from *The Spectator*[6]. I explore his separation of an inauthentic form of sublimity in 'Ambition', from a genuine form of sublimity in a pantheistic natural sublime. I argue that in this separation Addison elevates metaphysical speculation above social practice. He thus gestures towards a universalist notion of a subject confirmed of God's existence in the sublime moment. This opposes his notion of social ambition as being self-referential; or, to use Peter De Bolla's[7] terms, the latter exemplifies a discourse *of* the sublime, the former *on* the sublime. The conclusion is that for Addison, the subject has to be ratified by an extrinsic presence, which is paradoxically revealed through an 'awesome' absence.

Addison, in the 'Immateriality of the Soul' (pp. 132-134), promotes a theory of perfectibility which has implications for his conception of Ambition. He writes, '[...]among[...]arguments for the immortality of the soul, there is one drawn from perpetual progress of the soul to its perfection, without the possibility of ever arriving at it' (p. 132). This is similar to Lacan's theory of desire in the subject. The Lacanian subject is caught-up in a perpetual attempt to satiate desire, without the possibility of attaining it. Also, for Lacan this is a function (product, effect) of the nature of language, as if, in Longinus' sense, it were

entirely fictive[8]. Addison genders the soul and locates the male subject as the problem of this excess; 'Male souls are diversified with so many characters, that the world has not variety of materials sufficent to furnish out their different tempers and inclination '('Transmigration of Souls' pp. 267-270, p. 267). The subject is set adrift from the world because of unsatiated (and unsatiable) desire. This notion of the unattainable is linked to a theory of ambition. Paradoxically the soul is now re-gendered, he writes:-

> To look upon the soul as going from strength to strength, to consider that she is to shine for ever with new accessions of glory, and brighten to all eternity; that she will be still adding virtue to virtue, and knowledge to knowledge; carries in it something wonderfully agreeable to that *ambition* which is natural to the mind of man. Nay, it must be a prospect pleasing to God himself, to see His creation for ever beautifying in His eyes, and drawing nearer to Him, by greater degrees of resemblance. ('Immateriality of the Soul' P. 134. my italics)

This position on the subject revises his extended account of Ambition. Initially, like Burke after him, he sees Ambition as ensuring progress. Also, like Burke, this is a universal principle (and is re-gendered as male[9]). He writes of Ambition in terms of necessity, because, '[...]there would be but small improvements in the world were there not some common principle of action working equally with all men: and such a principle is ambition, or a desire of fame '(p. 308).

Addison thus links the soul's progress with Ambition. He unites metaphysical considerations to social aspirations. Here, the subject is 'for ever beautifying' as it draws 'nearer to Him, by greater degrees of resemblance '(p. 134). However, he has earlier stated that the subject is confounded in this attempt to gain perfectibility; this is restated in the 'Disadvantages of Ambition' (pp. 310-315). Here Addison separates the metaphysical from the social, because the latter is seen as a blasphemous

imitation of the former. Now, in Ambition, subjects '[...]are apt to be transported with a secret kind of vanity to see themselves superior in some respects to one of a sublime and celebrated reputation '(p.311). This restates his account of the soul, but because the soul is sublime it is no longer ratified by the wider discourse of pantheism. Rather it is irrationality which defines the subject as it attempts to appropriate that which eludes it:-

> Ambition raises a secret tumult in the soul; it inflames the mind, and puts it into a violent hurry of thought. It is still reaching after an empty imaginary good, that has not in it the power to abate or satisfy it. (p.313)

This again is a narrative of thwarted desire. Addison characterises this account of Ambition with an absence. Ambition becomes a false (mimicked) form of sublimity. He writes, '[...]it is impossible for outward actions to represent the perfections of the soul, because they can never show the strength of those principles from whence they proceed '('Ambition and Futurity' pp.315-318, p.317). Outward actions, such as social Ambition can only imitate some grander, Platonic, design; 'They are at best but weak resemblances of our intentions, faint and imperfect copies, that may acquaint us with the general design, but can never express the beauty and life of the original '(p.317). Ambition is thus a discourse *of* the sublime because it is a false, imitative, form of sublimity, it is 'faint and imperfect', and ultimately unattainable.

If it is Ambition which 'raises a secret tumult in the soul;'(p313); it is a belief in God (for Addison, the authentic sublime) which stabilises the subject. He writes in 'Reliance on The Supreme Being'(pp.413-415), '[...]a trust in the assistance of an Almighty Being naturally produces patience, hope, cheerfulness, and all other dispositions of the mind that

alleviate those calamities which we are not able to remove '(p.415). This calming effect of religious doctrine is due to ethical certainty. This propensity to moralise is elevated above local religious practices, with faith imitating this western morality. He writes in 'On Faith and Practice' pp.434-436; '[...]the rule of morality is much more certain than that of faith, all the civilized nations of the world agreeing in the great points of morality, as much as they differ in those of faith '(p.434). The sublime is seen by Addison as articulating God's existence. This was echoed by Burke on natural sublimity. Addison in 'On the Wonders of the Deep' (pp.459-462) writes of an ocean that:-

> Such an object naturally raises in my thoughts the idea of an Almighty Being, and convinces me of His existence as much as a metaphysical demonstration. The imagination prompts the understanding; and, by the greatness of the sensible object, produces in it the idea of a Being who is neither circumscribed by time nor space. (p.460).

Whereas in his account of Ambition the subject's desires are self-referential (and unattainable), here the subject is united with God in an authentic sublime moment. The subject attains some higher existence ratified extrinsically and producing a discourse *on* the sublime; so that, '[...]what is a faculty in a human soul becomes an attribute in God '(p.495).

For Addison there is a separation between social discourse and metaphysical experience (although earlier he had combined the two). The former is characterised by an inauthentic (pseudo-authentic) sublimity, the latter is characterised by its ratification in pantheism. His formulation of Ambition was later re-modelled in Burke's *Enquiry*[10]. For Burke, Ambition is removed from sublime experience and is ratified through a notion of social esteem. For Addison, the experience of the authentic sublime is

totalising, but is paradoxically defined by an absent presence;

'[...]reason as well as revelation assures us that he [God] cannot be absent from us, notwithstanding he is undiscovered by us '('The Immensity of the Supreme Being' pp.524-527, p.527). God is equated to the material universe, which accounts for the mind's failure to comprehend excess:-

> There is no question but the universe has certain bounds set to it; but when we consider that it is the work of infinite power, prompted by infinite goodness, with an infinite space to exert itself in, how can our imagination set any bounds to it?(p.525)

To conclude on Addison, it can be seen that he moves away from an earlier account of the soul's relation to social progress and to God. Ultimately he separates social progress from metaphysical revelation. In this, the soul is relocated. Previously the soul was defined by its thwarted desires, a striving after perfectibility. This thwarted striving locates the subject in the social experience of Ambition. The soul has been taken out of the equation and is associated with a universal propensity to moralise. God is revealed in the authentic sublime moment, which both annihilates and ratifies the subject; 'We should often refresh our minds with the thoughts of Him, and annihilate ourselves before Him, in the contemplation of our own worthlessness, and of His transcendent excellency and perfection '(p.497),

BURKE, THE UNIVERSAL SUBJECT AND THE PROBLEM WITH LANGUAGE.

The deceptive quality of figurative language in Longinus's account of the sublime, is relocated in Burke's account of language. In this section Burke's *A Philosophical Enquiry into our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful* will be examined. This entails exploring Burke's notion of a

universal subject in his account of Taste and the Sublime. I argue that there are unresolved paradoxes in his account of Taste which undermine his conception of a totalising universal experience. I then examine the account of sublimity in Section Two of the *Enquiry* arguing that underlying his account of Taste and the Sublime is a theory of resemblances. In section 5 he explores more fully this notion of resemblances through an account of representation. In particular, he examines the function of language in the sublime moment. At this point I argue that he re-states a problem with language left unresolved by Longinus. From this I conclude that Burke's account of language renders his concept of the sublime, (as it is stated in Section Two), problematic.

For Burke, nature, although submerged is available for interpretation; he adds to this a proviso concerning procedure: 'The characters of nature are legible it is true; but they are not plain enough to enable those who run, to read them. We must make use of a cautious, I had almost said, a timorous method of proceeding' (p. 4). Burke thus sees an examination of nature as being a problem of interpretation; he writes:-

> For when we define, we seem in danger of circumscribing nature within the bounds of our own notions, which we often take up by hazard, or embrace on trust, or form out of a limited and partial consideration of the object before us, instead of extending our ideas to take in all that nature comprehends, according to her manner of combining. (p. 12)

Burke discovers in this a theory of a universal subject. He formulates a theory of the subject ('our own notions') applicable to an understanding of nature because it is a general law of interpretation.

The first area which he discusses is Taste. In this analysis he identifies a moment when the subject is pre-lapsarian, when; '[...]the pleasure of all the senses, of the sight, and even of the Taste, that most

ambiguous of the senses, is the same in all, high and low, learned and unlearned '(p. 16). This can be altered by custom and national characteristics, so that '[...]opium is pleasing to Turks, on account of the agreeable delirium it produces. Tobacco is the delight of Dutchmen, as it diffuses a torpor and pleasing stupefaction '(p. 15). However, this universalism is problematic. As stated, Burke has emphasised that Taste is universal '[...]in all, high and low, learned and unlearned ' implying that an appreciation of Taste is separate from knowledge, is a 'felt' reaction. This is undermined by Burke when he writes; '[...]the critical Taste does not depend upon a superior principle in men, but upon superior knowledge '(p. 19).

The attempt to separate 'critical Taste' from Taste as sense perception leads him into making a false opposition between the two. This is because taste as sense perception has already been defined by Burke as extrinsically ratified, and so implies that taste is not the 'pure' sense perception which Burke had been suggesting. His account of national characteristics, for example, implies that a position is taken up on Taste which mediates a critical response. It is because Burke now introduces 'critical Taste' into the argument that he can account for a theory of variance denied in the universal claims he makes for Taste as sense perception. This principle of variance is located in the subject's mind; 'There is nothing which I can distinguish in my mind with more clearness than the three states, of indifference, of pleasure, and of pain '(p. 33). For Burke, sensibility and judgement are bound up with the interpretation of Taste. Paradoxically, he mourns the undifferentiated pre-lapsarian state, writing that:-

> In the morning of our days, when the senses are unworn and tender, when the whole man is awake in every part, and the gloss of

> novelty fresh upon all the objects that surround us, how lively at that time are our sensations, but how false and inaccurate the judgments we form of things?(p.25)

He had previously seen this state as lying behind the appreciation of Taste, because Taste was positioned as transcending class and knowledge. Burke has elevated 'critical Taste' above Taste and it leads him into a discussion of society and an analysis of the way knowledge (education) informs critical Taste.

For Burke, the subject fully achieves its potential in the social sphere. He attacks solitude; '[...]we may discern, that an entire life of solitude contradicts the purposes of our being, since death itself is scarcely an idea of more terror'(p.43). This is an idea I discuss at greater length in Chapter Five, when the social isolation of Poe's detective is explored in relation to the Kantian sublime. In Burke's account of the sociable subject there is relocated his theory of the universal subject, 'the purposes of our being' pre-supposing that the subject is innately (universally) socially ordained. Solitude becomes a fate almost worse than death. However, because this new form of social subject is universal, there is a danger that the social would remain undifferentiated and defined as static. In order to overcome this Burke introduces Ambition into the argument to account for change.

Stephen Knapp in *Personification and the Sublime*[1], sees a problem with Burke's account of Ambition; 'The difficulty arises when we remember that ambition, treated here as a source of the sublime, is expressly classed among the social, not the self-preservative, passions'(p.70). However, when Burke writes about 'the self-preservative passions', he relates it to pain and danger. He writes; 'The passions[...]which are conversant about the preservation of the individual, turn chiefly on *pain*

and *danger*, and they are the most powerful of all the passions.' (p.38). Ambition is thus not related to the passions (and Burke has not here fully formulated the sublime), rather it preserves the progress of the social, so that the subject is socially defined (and ratified by God); '[...]God has planted in man a sense of ambition, and a satisfaction arising from the contemplation of his excelling his fellows in something deemed as valuable amongst them' (p.50).

In Section Two of his *Enquiry* Burke defines the sublime. He writes about the mind being overwhelmed by an object which destroys the mind's claims to reason; '[...]the mind is so entirely filled with its object, that it cannot entertain any other, nor by consequence reason on that object which employs it' (p.57). Burke then itemises various sources of the sublime, such as power and obscurity, but underlying this he places terror as the principal feature of sublimity. He writes; '[...]I know of nothing sublime which is not some modification of power. And this rises[...]from terror, the common stock of every thing that is sublime' (p.64). He suggests that this 'terror' is tied to the 'awful' and awesome power of an implied pantheism, so that the 'human' is reduced to insignificance:-

> [...]whilst we contemplate so vast an object, under the arm, as it were, of almighty power, and invested upon every side with omnipresence, we shrink into the minuteness of our own nature, and are, in a manner, annihilated before him. (p.68)

In the *Enquiry*, Burke attempts to categorise the different responses that the subject has to the object in the feelings of Taste, beauty and the sublime. He draws up a particular dictionary of what are the causes of the subject's response in each category. However, underlying these categories is a notion of resemblances which ultimately problematises his closing section on language. In this theory of resemblances Burke posits the

existence of a full sign (things mean what they say). On painting, for example, he writes that it can represent the sublime for: '[...]a judicious obscurity in some things contributes to the effect of the picture; because the images in painting are exactly similar to those in nature '(p.62). In painting there is thus the possibility of a one to one representation of nature. Although Burke is here writing about re-presentation, he then discusses the possibility of reading an outer form in terms of its inner 'reality'. In the section on physiognomy, for example, he argues that it is possible to read character from a person's face. This is something more fully discussed in Chapter Five in relation to Dupin's ability to read character through physiognomy, which echoes Kant's philosophy of morals. This notion of the possession of a full sign leads Burke into a discussion on language. Here problems about representation and language emerge which confuse his earlier view on how the sublime can be portrayed.

For Burke, language breaks down into three types of words, '*aggregate words*', which equate to simple ideas, 'man, horse, tree, castle & c', simple abstract words, such as 'red, blue, round, square ' and compounded abstract, which combine the first two and is 'an *arbitrary* union of both the others', and consist of words such as 'virtue, honour, persuasion, magistrate '(p.164). Further, language is empty as a form of representation; 'Nothing is an imitation further than as it resembles some other thing; and words undoubtedly have no sort of resemblance to the ideas for which they stand '(p.173). Thus Burke re-states the same type of problematic inherent in Longinus' account of figurative language. Because language does not represent it possibly deceives; it also lacks representational efficacy in the sublime moment (despite the allowances that Longinus thinks should be made for figurative licence in the special

case of sublimity). Burke juxtaposes this with painting:-

> In reality poetry and rhetoric do not succeed in exact description so well as painting does; their business is to affect rather by sympathy than imitation; to display rather the effect of things on the mind of the speaker, or of others, than to present a clear idea of the things themselves. (p. 172)

This contradicts what Burke had said about painting's ability to represent the sublime because it can deal in obscurity. In the account of painting he had said that, 'A clear idea is[...]another name for a little idea' (p. 63). Here he reverses the tendency, suggesting that painting is able, '[...]to present a clear idea of the things themselves'. This reversal confuses the status given to painting and leads Burke into elevating rhetoric over painting:-

> To represent an angel in a picture, you can only draw a beautiful young man winged; but what painting can furnish out any thing so grand as the addition of one word, "The angel of the *Lord?*" It is true, I have here no clear idea, but these words affect the mind more than the sensible image did. (p. 174)

Because language does not represent it becomes sublime, it gives 'no clear idea' of what it means. Paradoxically this implies that language does have a representative capacity because it can capture the sublime moment. Words are equated with the unimaginable and are more effective in representing the sublime than painting, 'these words affect the mind more than the sensible image did'. Language, which was previously empty has now been given a full, wider, meaning. This doubling of language, it is unrepresentative, but because of this is able to represent the unrepresentable, the sublime, is discussed by Burke in his analysis of a section of Paradise Lost (II, 618-22)[12]. He writes:-

> This idea or this affection caused by a word, which nothing but a word could annex to the others, raises a very great degree of the sublime; and this sublime is raised yet higher by what follows, a "*universe of Death*". (p. 175)

Burke, having now secured language as representative, then removes its representative power through a notion of excess. He writes of his project on language that:-

> Words were only so far to be considered, as to shew upon what principle they were capable of being the representatives of these natural things, and by what powers they were able to affect us often as strongly as the things they represent, and sometimes much more strongly. (pp. 176-177)

This 'sometimes much more strongly' releases words from describing 'the things they represent', and returns language to the realms of un-representability.

In Burke, language oscillates between representation and non-representation. This makes sense when it is linked to his theory of sublimity. Language if it is unrepresentational can, paradoxically, represent the sublime, as it becomes a source of sublimity ("The angel of the *Lord?*"), by 'playing' upon the excess in the sublime moment. Language, in particular poetic figurative language, manifests this. However, in this account there is an unspoken inheritance of Longinus' problem with figurative language. If language does not represent, then it opens up the possibility that it deceives the subject; so again, the subject may have been deceived in the apprehension of sublimity. Therefore Burke restates a problem about figurative language and its relationship to the sublime which is inherited from Longinus. There is a similarity between the two in Burke's suggestion that language can affect the subject as strongly as the thing it represents; the implication is that sublime meaning bypasses the logic of representation. Where the two differ is that Burke opposes the sublime (contrary to what Knapp says) against the social, whereas for Longinus the social and the sublime become linked due to the persuasiveness of oratory.

In these concluding remarks I will discuss Burke's separation of the social from the sublime. For Burke, social experience and the sublime share the common trait of universalism. As discussed earlier, there is a confusion about this universalism (particularly in the account of Taste) when education is introduced as controlling critical Taste; although Taste as sense perception has not been adequately separated from it. However, Burke can now discuss society, in society the subject is defined as inherently sociable (and ambitious). Burke cites solitude as like a near death experience, rather the subject naturally seeks (qua subject) plaudits from those around him/her 'something deemed valuable amongst them' (p. 50). If solitude is unnatural because it is death-like, it is because the understanding of death has its proper place in the sublime and not in the social. Burke discusses the power of the words "*universe of death*" (p. 175) in 'Paradise Lost' as effecting sublimity. The social is characterised as development (Ambition, procreation) and presence, whereas the sublime is defined by death and absence. In the sublime the subject loses its sense of social unity; as Weiskel puts it 'As the Romantic ego approaches godhead, the minute particulars which are the world fade out ' (p. 62). The sublime then, for Burke, is characterised by absence, even the representational efficacy of language is unstable, i.e. sometimes it does not represent, at other times it does, and yet on other occasions it exceeds the object. The sublime becomes posited in its essential unknowability. To finish on a connection which I expand upon at the end of this chapter, there is a similarity between Burke's *Enquiry*, and what Rosemary Jackson sees as characterising the 'fantastic' text, in which; 'Uncertainty and impossibility are inscribed on a structural level through hesitation and

equivocation, and on a thematic level through images of formlessness, emptiness and invisibility.' (p. 49)

KANT AND THE ENCROACHMENT OF REASON.

In this section I discuss Kant's 'Analytic of The Sublime'[13] I examine the way he separates the sublime from the beautiful. His division of the sublime into mathematical and dynamical is also explored, as is his theory of aesthetic judgement (in relation to the beautiful) and artistic practice.

In Kant's explanation of the sublime he formulates a theory of an apprehending mind, because for Kant the sublime reveals the full structure of the mind. He compares the beautiful with the sublime, placing the former in the object and the latter in the subject. In doing this he separates a notion of understanding from a notion of reason. He writes:-

> The beautiful in nature is a question of the form of the object, and this consists in limitation, whereas the sublime is to be found in an object even devoid of form, so far as it immediately involves, or else by its presence provokes, a representation of *limitlessness*, yet with a super-added thought of its totality. Accordingly the beautiful seems to be regarded as a presentation of an indeterminate concept of understanding, the sublime as a presentation of an indeterminate concept of reason. (pp. 90-91)

This 'indeterminate concept of reason' informs Kant's view of the sublime.

At this point Kant defines what type of pleasure is involved in the sublime experience. In this experience; '[...]the mind is not simply attracted by the object, but is also alternatively repelled thereby, the delight in the sublime does not so much involve positive pleasure as admiration or respect, i.e. merits the name of a negative pleasure ' (p. 91). This negative aspect is caused by the imagination's inability to comprehend the object.

However, this is compensated through the way reason (or 'ideas of reason') reaches a paradoxical (incomplete) state of self-awareness. Kant writes:-

> [...]the sublime, in the strict sense of the word, cannot be contained in any sensuous form, but rather concerns ideas of reason, which, although no adequate presentation of them is possible, may be excited and called into the mind by that very inadequacy itself which does not admit of sensuous presentation. (p. 92)

The very inadequacy of the imagination makes this possible. Ideas of reason, although imperfectly revealed (un-presentable) imply that the mind has an inner (higher) faculty working within it. This understanding of the sublime structures Kant's division of the sublime into the mathematical and the dynamical.

In the mathematical sublime vastness becomes sublimity when numerical concepts fail to account for it, thus the sublime occurs when there is a failure of standards. Again, Kant locates this as in the mind of the subject; 'It is a greatness comparable to itself alone. Hence it comes that the sublime is not to be looked for in the things of nature, but in our own ideas '(p. 97). Because this experience is internal to the mind Kant re-states his position on the possibility of reason. This realm of reason, the supersensible, is reached through this failure of the imagination in relation to the demands of reason:-

> [...]because there is a striving in our imagination towards progress *ad infinitum*, while reason demands absolute totality, as a real idea, that same inability on the part of our faculty for the estimation of the magnitude of things of the world of sense to attain to this idea, is the awakening of a feeling of a supersensible faculty within us. (p. 97)

Kant's notion of the mathematical sublime is summed-up by; 'An object is *monstrous* where by its size it defeats the end that forms its concept '(p. 100). Kant then says that as the object in the sublime cannot be grasped numerically it must be interpreted aesthetically because;

'[...]it must be the *aesthetic* estimation of magnitude in which we get at once a feeling of the effort towards a comprehension that exceeds the faculty of imagination[...]' (p. 103).

There is a seeming problematic here with Kant's use of '*aesthetic* estimation', which I discuss more fully when exploring the relationship between aesthetic judgement and religious contemplation. The problem is that Kant has tied aesthetic apprehension to a judgement upon the beautiful, as such it '[...]refers the imagination in its free play to the *understanding* ' (p. 104), i.e. it accords with the latter, whereas in the sublime moment the faculty of reason is placed in accord '[...]with *ideas* of reason[...]' (p. 104). So the effect is; '[...]to induce a temper of mind conformable to that which the influence of definite (practical) ideas would produce upon feeling, and in common accord with it ' (p. 104). Therefore the experience is in the subject and not the object, and because of this it is not linked to aesthetic apprehension (of beauty) at all. There is thus a division between aesthetic judgement in relation to the beautiful, and aesthetic judgement as a potentially universal form of judgement. The latter is linked to the sublime because there are similar universalising tendencies. Tendencies which, here, express a universal accord concerning what the rules for making an aesthetic judgement could be.

The difference between aesthetic judgement of the beautiful and of sublimity is because; 'The mind feels itself *set in motion* in the representation of the sublime in nature; whereas in the aesthetic judgement upon what is beautiful therein it is in *restful* contemplation ' (p. 107). Kant breaks with the idea that the sublime experience is quasi-religious in his account of the dynamical sublime. There he introduces nature as a possible source of sublimity (although again, the sublime is a state of

mind rather than an imposing external force). He writes; 'If we are to estimate nature as dynamically sublime, it must be represented as a source of fear[...]' (p. 109). Kant points out that not every fearful state is necessarily a source of sublimity. However, like Burke, he sees the sublime as characterised by terror. For Kant, the subject becomes an object of admiration when this terror is overcome by moral (mental) superiority:-

> For what is it that, even to the savage, is the object of the greatest admiration? It is a man who is undaunted, who knows no fear, and who, therefore, does not give way to danger, but sets manfully to work with full deliberation. (p. 112)

There is a paradox in this, which is not clarified by Kant, because if the subject does not recognise terror then it is difficult to ascribe moral worth to their behaviour (i.e. there should be a notion of overcoming fear). At this point Kant discusses the relationship between religious contemplation and the sublime. He writes:-

> The man that is actually in a state of fear, finding in himself good reason to be so, because he is conscious of offending with his evil disposition against a might directed by a will at once irresistible and just, is far from being in the frame of mind for admiring divine greatness, for which a temper of calm reflection and a quite free judgement are required. (p. 113)

Although Kant does not here deny 'divine greatness', he does separate it from the sublime. The sublime is thus placed in the same relation to religion as it is to aesthetic judgement in relation to the beautiful. I will turn to this problem of aesthetic apprehension in the mathematical sublime.

Kant has said that in the mathematical sublime the object is perceived (or interpreted) aesthetically. In order to maintain this as a sublime moment, it is necessary to remove aesthetic apprehension from aesthetic judgement. In some way Kant has achieved this by placing aesthetic apprehension outside of the realms of the imagination, thus

allying it to reason. The subject receiving '[...]a comprehension that exceeds the faculty of imagination[...]' (p.103). Aesthetic judgement of the beautiful and religious contemplation are related to the mind's understanding. This is opposed to sublime apprehension situated within the domain of reason. Kant identifies this domain with moral behaviour in the dynamical sublime. He writes; '[...]without the development of moral ideas, that which thanks to preparatory culture, we call sublime, merely strikes the untutored man as terrifying '(p.115). Kant is, however, careful not to situate this moral integrity as external (cultural) to the subject. Instead morality can be discerned in culture because it has been placed there by an inherent faculty within the subject. He writes of morality:-

> [...]it is in human nature that its foundations are laid, and, in fact, in that which, at once with common understanding, we may expect every one to possess and may require of him, namely, a native capacity for the feeling for (practical) ideas, i.e for moral feeling. (p.116).

This universal moral feeling again exemplifies what De Bolla terms a discourse *of* the sublime, i.e. it does not refer to an extrinsic ratifying discourse; 'The moral law[...]is a sufficient and original source of determination within us: so it does not for a moment permit us to cast about for a ground of determination external to itself.' (p.128). In the sublime moment then, the mind has the possibility of reaching a supersensible state; where there is the unattainable possibility that reason and the mind's idea of reason will coincide. Also revealed in this sublime experience (in the account of the dynamical sublime) is a universalising moral tendency, moral strength winning out against fear.

Kant having completed his definition of the sublime, spends the rest of the analytic exploring representation. Unlike Burke, who sees Art as being able to represent nature, Kant is careful to distinguish between the

two; '[...]fine art must be clothed *with the aspect* of nature, although we recognize it to be art '(p. 167). However, like Burke, he sees that the 'rules' for Art have to be tied to something external to it because; '[...]fine art cannot of itself excogitate the rule according to which it is to effectuate its product '(p. 168). Rather, for Kant, it is how the artistic product is used (or understood) which determines the rules for artistic products; '[...]the rule (must) be gathered from the performance, i.e. from the product, which others may use to put their own talent to the test, so as to let it serve as a model, not for *imitation*, but for *following* '(p. 171). Also, like Burke, he locates representation within a theory of resemblances. In effect the Artist brings the object to life through employing 'appropriate' imagery:-

> [...]the soul of the artist furnishes a bodily expression for the substance and character of his thoughts, and makes the thing itself speak, as it were, in *mimic language* - a very common play of our fancy, that attributes to lifeless things a soul *suitable* to their form, and that uses them as its mouthpiece. (p. 188 my italics)

However, Kant also inherits the problem of representation from Longinus' account of figurative language. Kant attempts to separate poetic language from oratory, by suggesting that the latter appropriates its manipulative tropes from the former. He writes that:-

> -Rhetoric, so far as this is taken to mean the art of persuasion, i.e. the art of *deluding by means of a fair semblance* (my italics) (as *ars oratoria*) and not merely excellence of speech (eloquence and style), is a dialectic, which borrows from poetry only so much as is necessary to win over men's minds to the side of the speaker before they have weighed the matter, and to rob their verdict of its freedom. (p. 192)

This account of the delusive aspects of oratory undermines his theory of resemblances, previously discussed in relation to 'the soul of the artist'. Now, it is poetry which can furnish oratory with its deceptive possibilities. Resemblance has become a form of mis-leading.

As if this theme of being mis-lead has become unconscious, Kant finishes his analytic with an account of jokes. For Kant, it is the deceptive element in jokes which creates their effect; 'It is observable that in all such cases the joke must have something in it capable of momentarily deceiving us '(p.201). For Kant, this works through a surprise element appearing within the constraints of what could loosely be termed a realist narrative. Jokes are thus discussed by Kant as displacements of his theory of deceptive oratory, they offer; '(a topsy-turvy view of things,)' (p.203).

To conclude, in the 'Analytic of the sublime' Kant focuses on the mind's responses. The sublime is split into mathematical and dynamical modes, with the latter determined by a universal morality (this is similar to Addison's contention that morality is greater than faith). Religious contemplation is placed on the side of aesthetic judgement and is thus opposed to the sublime moment; reason accords to 'ideas of reason' which (over)compensates for the failure of the imagination to grasp the sublime. Finally, rhetoric is characterised by its ability to delude the subject, and this is achieved by borrowing the suggestive imagery of poetic language. Poetic language offers a deceptive rather than 'accurate' representation (although Kant had previously defined it as such). This theory of deception is finally relocated in Kant's discussion of jokes. The joke exemplifies the highest form of deception by undermining the subject's 'sensible' expectations.

KANT RE-VISITED, SCHILLER'S SUBJECTIVITY.

In this section I examine Schiller's *On The Sublime*'[4], exploring the way that he builds upon Kant's philosophy of mind. Schiller sees the subject as distanced from nature and social circumstance, and this separation becomes equated to moral freedom.

For Schiller, although the subject is distanced from nature, this is not because the sublime is alienating. Rather, this is the necessary position of the subject because; '[...]the forces of nature can be controlled or diverted only up to a certain point; beyond this point they elude man's power and subordinate him to themselves '(p. 194). For Schiller, subordination to nature implies a loss of moral freedom. Schiller, like Kant, sees this morality as integral to the subject. He writes:-

> The morally cultivated man, and only he, is wholly free. Either he is superior to nature as force, or he is at one with her. Nothing that she can do to him is violence because before it reaches *him* it has already become *his own action*, and dynamic nature never reaches him, because he has by his own free act separated himself from everything that she can reach. (p. 195)

Because nature cannot be circumscribed, the subject is lead into the realm of Ideas; '[...]the mind is irresistably driven out of the world of phenomena into the world of ideas, out of the conditioned into the unconditioned '(p. 208). Thus for Schiller, the subject is distanced from nature by being radically different from it. Freedom from nature equates to moral freedom. The subject is distanced from nature through the exercise of the will; 'all nature proceeds rationally; man's prerogative is merely that he proceeds rationally with consciousness and intent. All other things "must"; man is the being that wills '(p. 193). This notion of the 'will' is discussed by Schiller in relation to the beautiful and the sublime. Again,

this is couched in terms of a mastery over nature:-

> [...]it makes a great difference whether we feel a need for beautiful and good objects, or whether we merely demand that these objects that are existent be beautiful and good. The latter is consonant with the highest freedom of the spirit, but the former is not. (p. 196)

Mastery is again assured through the demands of the subject. For Schiller, the beautiful and the sublime are different, but inseparable. They are the two 'genii' granted by nature; 'Without the sublime, beauty would make us forget our dignity '(P. 211). He draws a distinction between them, writing of the beautiful that; 'In the beautiful, reason and sensuousness are in unison, and only for the sake of harmony does it possess any charm for us '(p. 199). This contrasts with the sublime; 'But in the sublime, however, reason and sensuousness do *not* accord, and precisely in this contradiction between the two lies the magic with which it captures our minds '(pp. 199-200). The sublime is not conditioned by a specific object. Schiller attempts to prove the mind's efficacy in the sublime moment, by stating that the sublime encompasses contradictory responses. He refers to a clash between melancholy and joyousness which proves that the mind sublimates sublime effects; '[...]since it is absolutely impossible for the very same object to be related to us in two different ways, it therefore follows that *we ourselves* are related to the object in two different ways '. This idea of a split subject is discussed at greater length in Chapter Seven in relation to Freud's 'The Uncanny'[15] and Stevenson's *The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* (p. 198).

So far then, Schiller has stressed the unresolvable separation between the subject and nature. His account of the sublime echoes Kant on the failure of the imagination. For Kant, it is the failure of the imagination to grasp the totality of the sublime moment which indicates that the

dictates of reason can account for it. Schiller writes that; 'We delight in the sensuously infinite because we are able to think what the senses can no longer apprehend and the understanding can no longer comprehend '(p. 199).

Schiller's formulation of the subject thus re-works Kant's philosophy of mind. Also re-worked is Kant's formulation of the moral subject in the dynamical sublime. Schiller discusses this in relation to culture, seeing it as another example of the subject's moral freedom. This time it is freedom from social circumstance which concerns him. The example he gives of this is of a subject's moral character remaining the same although the subject may now live in (depressed) different circumstances. He writes; '[...]for nothing can be more contradictory than that the effect should remain the same when the cause has changed to its opposite '(p. 201). He again sees in this proof of the subject's pre-existent moral freedom; '[...]no explanation can suffice that depends on a *natural concept*[...]' (p. 201).

Finally, then, he is lead to the same conclusion as Kant, which is that culture expresses moral integrity, and this validates what he had written earlier about the 'will'; 'Culture is to set man free and to help him to be equal to his concept. It should therefore enable him to assert his will, for man is the being that wills '(p. 194).

PSYCHOANALYSING THE SUBLIME: THOMAS WEISKEL.

In this section I examine Thomas Weiskel's study of the sublime, *The Romantic Sublime: Studies in the Structure and Psychology of Transcendence.* I argue that Weiskel's psychoanalytic reading of Kant is riven with problems, which ultimately leads him to question whether the structure of

Oedipal anxiety is appropriate to the analysis of the 'negative' sublime. I further argue that the attempt to apply psychoanalysis to the sublime poses interpretative problems, because the sublime can only be read psychoanalytically if the sublime is drastically re-ordered through a programmatic reading of it. I return to Weiskel's reading of the sublime in Chapter Seven where I argue that it is the Kantian elements within psychoanalytical discourse which disables a Freudian reading of sublimity. Here I will discuss Weiskel's opening remarks on the sublime as there Weiskel promotes a reading of sublimity which illuminates the difficulty of defining the negative sublime within a psychoanalytical context.

Weiskel writes of the Romantic sublime that; 'It provided a language for urgent and apparently novel experiences of anxiety and excitement which were in need of legitimation.'(p.4). This urgency is related to the discovery of a vacancy in the 'soul'. Weiskel sees absence as characteristic of the sublime. In this; 'The soul is a vacancy, whose extent is discovered as it is filled. Inner space, the infinitude of the Romantic mind, is born as a massive and more or less unconscious emptiness, an absence'(p.15). In these opening remarks Weiskel discusses the possible conflation of the rhetorical and natural forms of the sublime. Absence is associated with the two; words themselves are posited as empty. In Romanticism there is, for Weiskel; '[...]an unexamined convention that the meaning of words lies solely in the way they are used, for in principle an appeal beyond language to Nature has no logical ground'(p.15). However, in doing this Weiskel side-steps a problem that theorists of the sublime have with language. In Longinus, Burke and Kant, for example, there is an attempt, (no matter how problematical) to link language to nature. Language is granted representational efficacy in relation to nature at some moment

(not withstanding a wavering between language as non-representational to being representational). Weiskel's explanation for conflating the rhetorical with the natural is that; 'A general semiotic of the sublime would find, I think, the same discontinuity between sensation and idea as between idea and word - this is, at any rate, the substance of my hypothesis in fusing the natural and rhetorical sublimes '(p. 17). This fusing of the natural with the rhetorical is a problematic produced by Weiskel's generalised reading of the sublime. I shall clarify this through a brief account of the rhetorical sublime in Longinus, Burke and Kant which suggests that it is unfeasable to refer to a 'semiotic of the sublime', because there is no structure in place which could be examined in a semiotic fashion.

Longinus' account of the sublime lacks a comprehensive formulation of the natural sublime; rather a problematic account of the effects of rhetoric is given. Language (or more precisely, figurative language) is a problem here because it possesses the capacity for a 'full' resemblance, and yet can deceive (and therefore is opposed to resemblance as truth). This problem is never fully resolved in Longinus because there is no consistent position taken towards language, therefore it is difficult to argue that his account is open to a semiotic reading.

In Burke's final section of his *Enquiry* there is an inconsistent account of the representational efficacy of language. Sometimes language represents in a one to one way, at others it is either 'empty', or is re-emptied through excess.

In Kant there is no appeal to an 'objective' nature. The sublime is linked to a philosophy of mind. Language is again defined by deception, thus undermining Kant's previous privileging of poetic language as a 'full'

(re)presentation.

Weiskel, paradoxically, goes on, not to imply a relationship between rhetoric and the natural sublime, but to suggest that the sublime has been occasioned by the collapse of the former. He writes:-

> The sublime dramatized the rhythm of transcendence in its extreme and purest form, for the sublime began where the conventional systems, readings of landscape or text, broke down and, it found in that very collapse the foundation for another order of meaning. (p. 22)

If there is a breakdown here, it is only a partial one. This new 'order of meaning' becomes a problem of exegesis and suggests that theorists rely on a mode of interpretation which is defined by that which preceded it. This is to say that rhetoric is still examined in relation to resemblance, i.e. is not banished from the debate completely, but rather problematically informs it. However, Weiskel now proceeds to examine a theory of the natural sublime, having dismissed the rhetorical from the problem.

In Chapter Two Weiskel discusses Kant's theory of the sublime in relation to alienation. He writes that; 'The affective ambivalence of the sublime, which opposes the imagination's feeling of defeat to the reason's awe of itself, points to a cognitive alienation within the mind as a whole and invites a dialectical interpretation.' (p. 41). He then discusses this in terms of its relation to repression; 'The imagination's feeling of sacrifice or deprivation, the relation of concealment between it and reason - these suggest the role of repression in the sublime' (p. 41). He sees this as implicit in Kant's separation of the beautiful from the sublime; 'In the sublime moment, dualism is legitimated and intensified. The beautiful intimates reconciliation, however precariously and ambiguously; the sublime splits consciousness into alienated halves.' (p. 48). Weiskel then discusses the sublime in terms of how Kant relates it to negative pleasure, which

Weiskel relates to 'superego anxiety':-

> The negative sublime apparently exhibits some features of a response to superego anxiety, for in the suddenness of the sublime moment the conscious ego rejects its attachment to sensible objects and turns rather fearfully toward an ideal of totality and power which it participates or internalises. (p. 83)

Weiskel then outlines the rationale for a psychoanalytic re-evaluation of Kant. Briefly, Weiskel sees in the sublime a superego anxiety caused by the failure of the imagination to define the object. This, however, is compensated by an elevation of the ego (of reason). Weiskel sees this as a re-stating of the oedipus complex; 'The sublime moment recapitulates and thereby re-establishes the oedipus complex, whose positive resolution is the basis of culture itself '(p. 94). However, Weiskel discovers a problem in the application of this to the negative sublime (as distinct from the egotistical sublime which he discusses in relation to Wordsworth). Here the Oedipus complex is reduced to the level of structural play; 'Since the defense is directed primarily against the dangerous passivity, the other component of the oedipus complex - the aggressive wish against the father - is only structurally motivated and fails to impress us as authentic.' (p. 105). I will now raise some objections to the employment of psychoanalytic theory (specifically Freudian) to the sublime. Also, in Chapter Seven when I discuss Freud in relation to the sublime, I extend this critique via an analysis of the relation between Freud and Kant. This is also, by implication, a critique of Weiskel as well.

These objections can be briefly stated. Firstly, there is no easy consensus between theoreticians on the sublime. Weiskel, for example, tends to see (principally in his introduction) theories of the sublime as an homogeneous group. In particular he makes general statements about the Kantian sublime which imply that this reading holds true to all such

theories of the sublime.

Secondly, at some point Weiskel has dropped the problem of representation. This is a significant omission because these tracts on the sublime are primarily influenced by a concern with the status, and uses, of representation. He has left this behind in his discussion of the breakdown in traditional ways of reading nature, landscape and so on, and thus fails to focus on the debates concerning the relationship between Art and nature, and whether it is possible for the former to become a sublime artifact in its own right.

Thirdly, and linked to the previous point, how would such an interpretation account for areas which are considered important (universal) by theorists on the sublime, but which are not linked to sublimity; as in Ambition and Taste in Burke, for example, or as in Kant's 'moral' subject.

Fourthly, he sees a similarity between the sublime experience and superego anxiety, but whereas the latter is seen as a necessary stage in the Oedipus complex, the sublime is characterised for him by its arbitrary nature; 'What happens to you standing at the edge of the infinite spaces can be made, theoretically, to "mean" just about anything '(p.28). The problem Weiskel has with psychoanalytically interpreting the negative sublime is because, for Weiskel, the negative sublime only structurally mimics Oedipal anxiety. It is 'empty', as the sublime is characterised by Weiskel as empty, i.e. '[...]the infinitude of the Romantic mind, is born as a massive and more or less unconscious emptiness, an absence '(p.15).

To conclude, Weiskel attempts to link the sublime to the Oedipus complex, but he recognises that this becomes problematic when it is used to discuss the negative sublime. It is a selective example of the sublime that he examines. Psychoanalytic theory is ultimately seen as being inadequate

to analyse the sublime moment, and what can be concluded from this is that the sublime has an independence from such a theory. Ironically, psychoanalysis is unable, like the subject, to grasp fully the import of sublime experience. Again, this is an idea returned to in Chapter Seven where the argument is that psychoanalysis, in the idea of the uncanny, has created a concept which it cannot adequately contain, precisely because that concept is derived from the sublime..

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE RETURN OF THE FIGURATIVE.

In the previous section, Weiskel's problematic application of psychoanalytic theory was explored. In this section I look at how Neil Hertz in *The End of The Line, Essays on Psychoanalysis and the Sublime* examines the relationship between the sublime and the figurative language of psychoanalytical discourse. In particular, Hertz's account of 'blockage' in the sublime moment is of use here. This notion of blockage and figurative language is then re-read through Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's reworking of these themes in her *The Coherence of Gothic Conventions*[16]. There she gives a problematic account of psychological interpretations which is open to the same criticism that Hertz applies to Freud's theory of the repetition compulsion.

In Hertz's account of Longinus, he comments on the passage where the 'hidden' of the sublime is linked to the discrete placement by nature of the genitals. Longinus writes; 'We should take a lesson from nature, who when she planned the human frame did not set our grosser parts, or the ducts for purging the body, in our face, but as far as she could concealed them '(p.81). Psychoanalysis thus seems appropriate to account for this

link between sexuality and the sublime. For Hertz, however, this is merely the operation of the figurative; what is concealed is not the sublime moment (Longinus is discussing the possibility of deception) but the submerged tactics of figurative speech. Hertz writes:-

> [...]if my analogy holds - the analogy between the concealed genital crevices and the concealed figures of speech - what is literally "unspeakable" is not the shame of sexuality or of Oedipal desire but the figurativeness of that shame; that is, the figurativeness of every instance of the figurative, including those figures that inform our sexual imaginings. (p. 18)

What is revealed is not 'the shame' of 'Oedipal desire' but the 'figurativeness of that shame'. Hertz than discusses this in relation to Freud's reading of Hoffman's 'The Sandman'[7]. Hertz sees that Freud has to concede a problem with his theory of the repetition compulsion because; '[...]evidence for such an instinctive force was hard to find: the drive was, in his words, never "visible," it "eluded perception "(p. 100). This becomes posed as a problem of figuration. If the compulsion is never visible in itself, it has to be manifested in some way for it to become an object of interpretation. However, there is a paradox here because what is uncanny is not what is repeated, but the process of repetition itself. Hertz writes:-

> [...]repetition becomes "visible" when it is colored by something being repeated, which itself functions like vivid or heightened language, lending a kind of rhetorical consistency to what is otherwise quite literally unspeakable. Whatever it is that is repeated - an obsessive ritual, perhaps, or a bit of acting-out in relation to one's analyst - will, then, feel most compellingly uncanny when it is seen as *merely* coloring, that is, when it comes to seem most gratuitously rhetorical. (p. 102)

Thus what is uncanny is the way the compulsion obsession is manifested at the level of figuration, when it is 'most gratuitously rhetorical'.

Figurative language is essentially empty. It is put into play, argues Hertz, by a drive which remains undetermined except by a form of figuration

which is unable to represent it. He goes on to re-read 'The Sandman' in light of Freud's interpretation, contrasting the effects of literary interpretation and psychological exegesis. A new form of the uncanny emerges. He writes of 'The Sandman':-

> [...]what makes it an instance of Romantic irony at its most unsettling or, if you like, of the uncanny - is its availability to both these schemes, its shifting between the registers of the psychological/demonic and the literary, thereby dramatizing the differences as well as the complicities between the two. (p. 113)

Revealed here, is the figurative language of both interpretations. That which is pre-figured, the repetition compulsion, can only be interpreted as a figure, an image. What Hertz sees as a problem with Freud's account is accepting that an invisible drive is necessarily manifested through a figurative language which is not precisely related to that drive. The repetition compulsion:-

> [...]depends upon the notion of a real preexistent force (call it sheer repetition, the death instinct, or whatever) that is merely rendered more *discernable* by that-which-is-repeated, or by the lurid colours of the erotic, or by some helpful figure of speech; and, it suggests that the workings of figurative language (like acting-out or coloring-in) do indeed have the effect of rendering that force "visible". (p. 120)

This has applications for the sublime. The sublime is never fully articulated, and here there is a return of the 'death instinct' as a form of Burkean sublime. In Kant's terms, it is an experience in which reason fails to coincide with itself, but rather with *ideas* of itself. In this sense it relates to an approximate figuration. This is an implicit critique of Weiskel's attempt to define the sublime in terms of Oedipal experience. In the sublime, what is figured is not necessarily related to what has caused it (*ideas* of reason, but not reason), as rhetoric is for Longinus. Figuration becomes empty (it is not what it seems to be). Thus, when Weiskel attempts to apply psychoanalytic theory to the negative sublime,

what he finds is a structural manifestation, which 'strikes us as inauthentic'. Nothing can be discerned behind this act of figuration, revealing it to be a rhetorical trope rather than a 'deep' psychological desire. For Hertz, there is no way out of this figurative language; he writes of Freud's theory of the repetition compulsion that; 'The wishfulness inherent in the model is not simply in its isolating the *forces* of repetition from their representations, but in its seeking to isolate the *question* of repetition from the question of figurative language itself' (p. 121). Thus the psycho-neurosis of repression is reversible, because it is the 'question of figurative language' which is repressed, not a compulsion to repeat. This is similar to the way that Longinus' argument reverses the relation that figurative language has to nature, and thus the sublime. There it was the case that the sublime was mediated through nature and then mediated through a language defined as non-sublime. The subject can gain access to the sublime when the sublime is seen to side-step the logic of representation. In this way the sublime can be returned to a 'natural' pantheism over and against the 'inauthentic' rhetorical sublime.

The subject is either blocked-off from some potentially authentic self-knowledge, or else it becomes the case that authentic self-knowledge becomes the displacement of the fact that all it is about is ineluctable figures. To return to Kant, the subject can have an intimation of the existence of reason in the mind during the sublime moment. However, it is only an intimation (it is not however, pure indeterminacy), and does not become fully defined in any figurative way. Hertz gets around this problem of non-figuration by introducing emblems into the discussion; this functions as a figurative bridging term between the subject and produced object:-

> The power of the emblem is that it reestablishes boundaries between representer and represented and, while minimizing the differences between them, keeps the poet-impresario from tumbling into his text. I would suggest that this is the common function of the moment of blockage in sublime scenarios. (p. 60).

Hertz here positions the sublime in terms of artistic (figurative) production. The subject becomes a spectator and is not conflated with some object which would undermine representation (i.e. the two become indistinguishable from each other, and therefore cannot be read). However, one query which can be raised is the extent to which Hertz has re-written the sublime in elevating the importance of the emblem. It could be argued, in Kantian fashion, that because the emblem is figuration, it cannot be linked to the sublime, because the sublime does not strictly 'represent' at all. Rather what Hertz is writing about is aesthetic judgement (as Kant defines it in relation to an apprehension of beauty, of 'boundaries between representer and represented') and not sublimity, which involves the collapsing of boundaries.

To conclude on Hertz, he discusses the way that figurative language is open to interpretation. Figuration, as something which stands in for something else (such as the repetition compulsion) can only be problematically explained because it posits the existence of something (a drive) represented by that (a figure) which does not effectively represent it. In the sublime, figuration bridges the subject and object. For Hertz there is no 'outside' to figuration, and this appears to have led him into banishing the sublime moment by replacing it with a formulation of a mediating emblem.

It is this notion of attempting to represent the uncanny which I will now discuss in relation to Sedgwick's *The Coherence of Gothic Conventions*. She discusses the uncanny in relation to *Frankenstein*, seeing the novel as;

'[...]a male paranoid *reading of* maternity, a reading that persistently renders uncanny, renders as violence of a particular kind, the coming-to-body of the (male) individual subject '(p.ix). This rendering of uncanniness is characteristic of the Gothic's focus on paranoia and anxiety. Within the Gothic the subject is defined as split. Like the subject in the sublime moment, the subject is blocked-off from the experience of 'true' self-recognition. Sedgwick writes of the 'self' in Gothic fiction; 'It is the position of the self to be massively blocked off from something to which it ought normally to have access '(p.12). In the Gothic this may occur as a metaphysical state (as in the subject contemplating the sublime) or as a structural motif, such as, for example, imprisonment or live burial. Sedgwick's account is anti-psychoanalytical. She sees a problem with psychological readings because; '[...]psychological criticism has been able to pair two characters who are "doubles" into one self; but when the same formal structure divides non-personified spaces or units of the narrative, it seems to fall away from interpretation '(p.35). Sedgwick implies that such criticism misses out on the literariness of the literary text.

Sedgwick takes this partial dismissal a step further when defining the Gothic subject as socially, rather than psychologically determined; 'In the Gothic view[...]individual identity, including sexual identity, is social and relational rather than original or private; it is established only ex post facto, by recognition '(p.142). Sedgwick relates this to the way that character is inscribed (literally) on a person's face, which is similar to Burke's idea of physiognomy; she writes; 'The human face seems[...]to tyrannize over the Gothic novel '(p.158). Because of this, character is defined socially. She writes; 'This self is at least

potentially social, since its "character" seems to be impressed on it from outside and to be displayed facing outward ' (p. 155).

Sedgwick's aversion to psychological readings of the Gothic is due to how she sees the self as represented. For her the subject is split, and blocked off from certain experiences. There is however, a paradox in her account. She dismisses psychology as a form of interpretation and yet gives just such an interpretation of the 'hysteric'. She writes:-

> The immobilising and costly struggle, in the hysteric, to express graphically through her bodily hieroglyphic what cannot come into existence as narrative, resembles in this the labour of the paranoid subject to forestall being overtaken by the feared/desired other, by himself mimetically reproducing the perceived or projected desire/ threat of the other on a temporally paralysed form. (p. vi)

I take it that here Sedgwick is writing about a problem with representation: the hysteric who cannot represent through narrative, the paranoid subject projecting desires into another form. In this sense, she seems to promote a theory of the Gothic text which is just such a representation, i.e. as a form dealing in the representation of hysteria, paranoia and so on. What, however, can also be seen in this is a link to Hertz's notion of figurative speech, and in particular, the importance he places on the emblem. For Sedgwick, the desire of the hysteric and the paranoid subject is represented in a projected way. For Hertz, the emblem offers a link (but also a blocking off) between representer and represented. As suggested earlier, this is problematic in Hertz's account which purports (at that point) to be discussing the sublime, when in fact it is more allied to a Kantian theory of aesthetic contemplation (as distinct from judgement). For Hertz there is no position outside of the figurative, whereas here Sedgwick recuperates a theory of the subject which for Hertz is impossible. In his account of the repetition impulse, for

example, Hertz questions the assumption that it is a basic drive, when it is forced to manifest itself in something which is arbitrary to it. Sedgwick expresses the contrary position that the subject is forced into expression via some other medium, a gendered 'bodily hieroglyphic', or a 'projected desire/threat', because desire is in itself inexpressible.

This 'urge' to project, or to represent, has a similarity to accounts of sublimity. Burke, for example, sees the sublime as universal, as God manifesting himself. Therefore the sublime is ratified by something both integral, and external, to it. In a similar way, the hysteric and the paranoid are confirmed in their desires through external ratification, through an urge to represent which reveals such a desire to be a metaphorical displacement of their 'illness'. For Kant, the sublime moment is characterised by the mind attaining to ideas of reason, but this is left undefined; it becomes an intimation of reason, rather than a fully articulated version of it. Kant emphasises 'feeling' over the possibility of representing that feeling. In this is a desire for an authentic state of mind. Authenticity is a problem in Longinus; there, representation is suspect, rhetoric persuades but may delude, meaning that the subject's response to rhetoric is 'authentic' but not necessarily logical. What unites the disparate interpretations of Hertz, Sedgwick, Weiskel, Longinus, Addison, Burke, Kant and Schiller, is the view that representation is problematic.

This is something which characterises the Gothic (for example its use of 'nameless' horrors and monsters). Jackson in *Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion* writes that; 'Fantastic narratives are littered with far less [then Realist narratives] substantial bodies, with unstable forms, whose identities are never definitively established '(p.83).

It is this issue of representation which I discuss in the following section on Jackson's reading of fantasy.

FANTASY: MACABRE VERSIONS OF THE SUBLIME.

In examining Jackson's *Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion* I argue that although her analysis is largely confined to post-Romantic texts, it does have applications for a reading of sublimity. Jackson sees post-Romantic fantasy as predicated on an absence which is defined as 'evil'; this idea will be juxtaposed with the way absence in the sublime (specifically in Kant) is determined by moral worth.

Jackson writes of the fantastic text that; 'The fantastic opens on to a region which has no name and no rational explanation for its existence. It suggests events beyond interpretation ' (p. 25). This is similar to Kant's formulation of the supersensible. In the sublime, ideas of reason approximate to reason itself. However, Kant's theory does not 'suggest events beyond interpretation', but rather sees in the sublime an intimation of the existence of reason and a revelation of moral worth. Thus, for Kant, the sublime is not left in a state of indeterminacy. Therefore, although there is a similarity in Kant's formulation of the sublime and Jackson's account of fantasy, there are essential differences. Another similarity is that the sublime poses a problem of interpretation, and this problem of interpretation is seen by Jackson as integral to the fantastic text, in which; 'The narrator is no clearer than the protagonist about what is going on, nor about interpretation; the status of what is being seen and recorded as 'real' is constantly in question ' (p. 34). Jackson here ties the problem of interpretation to anxiety. Thus, although there is a similar problem of

interpretation in accounts of the sublime, this process is one of 'difficulty' rather than anxiety. She does however, produce a theory of the fantastic which can be read as a prototypical account of the sublime:-

> It could be suggested that the movement of fantastic narrative is one of *metonymical* rather than of *metaphorical* process: one object does not *stand for* another, but literally becomes that other, slides into it, metamorphosing from one shape to another in a permanent flux and instability. (pp. 41-42)

The problem stated here is related to the subject recognising the difference between I and not-I, and the implication is that uncertainty is the cause of anxiety in the fantastic. There is uncertainty about knowledge and a secure(d) identity. Here again there is a similarity to a theory of sublimity, and a rupture with it. As stated earlier, versions of sublimity account for indeterminacy by resolving uncertainty and so reveal the existence of some higher 'truth'. This is distinct from Jackson's fantastic which is characterised by incoherence and overwhelming objectivity; 'Other persons and objects are no longer distinctly other: the limit between subject and object is effaced, things slide into one another, in a metonymical action of replacement '(p. 50).

Thus, incoherency and how it is to be resolved (stabilised) have, for Jackson, become a central theme of the fantastic. One difference between the sublime and this fantastic, is that in the former the 'other' returns as the 'same' (in Kant), whereas in the latter the 'other' is posited as a threatening absence. She writes that; 'Any social structure tends to exclude as 'evil' anything radically different from itself or which threatens it with destruction, and this conceptualization, this naming of difference as evil, is a significant ideological gesture '(p. 52). Although Jackson's account is principally a study of the post-Romantic fantastic, she does at one point discuss Romantic fantasy. She writes that; 'During

the Romantic period, the sense of the 'demonic' was slowly modified from a supernatural meaning into something more disturbing, something less definable '(p.56). She sees it as becoming an obverse version of the sublime, in which; '[...]the demonic pact comes to be synonymous with an impossible desire to break human limits, it becomes a *negative version* of desire for the infinite '(p.57). I take it that here the sublime can be associated with a positive version of the same desire.

In Burke's account of the sublime (as it is in Ann Radcliffe) the sublime is pantheistic; it is tied to the ratifying discourse of religion. In M.G. Lewis' *The Monk*[18], an example of what Jackson sees as a 'demonic pact' occurs, here a '*negative version* of desire for the infinite.' is equated with Devil worship. Jackson defines the Romantic text as reliant upon religious, ethical, categories; in contrast to the post-Romantic text which is characterised by its secular nature. In this, Jackson sees a re-working of the sublime taking place; 'Through secularization, a religious sense of the numinous is transformed and reappears as a sense of the uncanny, but the psychological origins of both are identical '(p.66). This idea of the psychological origins of the uncanny echoing the sublime, is an idea I take issue with in Chapter Seven. This appears in a critique of Weiskel which argues that the origins of Freud's uncanny share the same *philosophical* origins of the sublime, and that this accounts for Weiskel's 'failure' to analyse the negative sublime. Jackson goes on; 'The formal and thematic features of fantastic literature are similarly determined by this (impossible) attempt to find a language for desire '(p.62). Therefore, the secular fantasy becomes defined by its existential anxiety:-

> [...]whereas a religious subject has faith that a sense of unbeing, a dissolution of the ego, will lead to ultimate unity with a divine beloved, a sceptical, atheistic subject has no such faith. In the place of transcendent ideals, there is discovered a zero

point, a space of non-being, an absence. (p. 78)

There is a development then from religious to secular fantasy which follows the movement from Romantic to post-Romantic experience. In this, the sublime has lost its ethical resonance which is replaced by a potentially threatening ontological absence. This absence is threatening to the 'order' of a secularised society because society is characterised here by positivism, rather than faith. One question which can be raised at this juncture is, how is the definition of 'evil' (crucial to her argument) introduced in a way which alters the sublime and so functions to revise the form of transcendental idealism?

For her, 'this naming of difference as evil, is a significant ideological gesture '(p. 52). She argues that the norm (defined in terms of middle-class trappings) defends itself against its 'other'. This 'other' is not merely different, it is inimical to this norm, which defines it as evil and seeks to expel it. It is this evil 'other' which threatens to undo certain cultural structures, it is capable of; 'Un-doing those unifying structures and significations upon which social order depends, fantasy functions to subvert and undermine cultural stability '(p. 69). This (secularised) notion of the fantastic differs from Kant's formulation of sublimity. For Kant the moral nature of the cultural order is non-linguistic. The subject's innate morality becomes expressed through cultural behaviour. Although this morality is in some way unconscious (a priori) it does not undermine social order, or cultural stability, but rather ratifies both. Thus for Kant the 'law' (of culture, of ideas of reason in the mind) is upheld and expressed through its unknowability.

What is represented by the sublime, and Jackson's theory of secularised fantasy, is the reliance upon similar, but essentially

different knowledge claims. The sublime experience, particularly in Kant, appears to be grounded in indeterminacy. However, Kant stresses that the subject is determined in a two-fold manner, one social, the other metaphysical. The subject displays moral worth by overcoming danger, and this moral integrity informs the structure of culture. The subject also receives an intimation of the possibility of the mind's propensity to reason in the collapse of the imagination. Thus the sublime poses a 'difficulty' for interpretion, rather than an existential anxiety (a worrying absence in a cultural order) as Jackson sees it in post-Romantic fantasy.

As stated earlier, what Jackson sees as characterising the Romantic fantastic is the demonic pact. In this she observes a move to 'something less definable' (p.56), a negative version of the pantheistic sublime, in a 'desire for the infinite' (p.57). Although here 'evil' is defined religiously, Jackson sees it as lingering within secularised fantasy. The secularised text inherits the sublime as a 'worrying absence', but even within this, '[...]without God, transgression is empty, a kind of profanation without an object '(p.79). However, this is precisely what the sublime is reduced to, a 'profanation without an object'; because it is no longer ratified by some external discourse (supplied by the secularised norm), it means that signification is threatened with absence. Thus the 'space' created by an empty sublimity threatens a cultural order based on new ways of seeing.

A novel which characterises this movement is *Frankenstein*. The novel will be discussed more fully in the following chapter. However, I will here point out some of the ways that link it to the sublime. Victor Frankenstein's project bears a similarity to that of the sublime theorist.

In particular he paraphrases Burke on the necessity for the theorist (scientist) to go beyond the surface of things in order to discover the true nature of how the world operates'[3]. For Frankenstein, the procedure which achieves this is natural science (it is interesting to note that Burke also discusses the importance of 'correct' procedure when analysing the sublime). This procedure enables Frankenstein to 'discover' the basic rules of metaphysics, and so the 'meaning of life' becomes equated with the ability to produce life. So far then, his project mimics that of the sublime theorist; but by translating it into a practical medium it creates a 'new' product (the monster). This object, created through a parody of sublime endeavour, becomes an object and a subject of the sublime. An object because he resembles Burke's idea of the massive and the monstrous, a subject because he resembles Burke's account of original innocence in which the subject is awed by nature. However, the subject does not find in nature God-as-Creator, because as an object of the sublime he becomes a profanation against nature. The creature searches for his real creator in order to have his safety assured, in order to seek the mental stability granted to the non-monstrous subject in divine rapport during the sublime moment.

The monster, like the Burkean subject, loses his pre-lapsarian status through 'education'. Yet it is his speech which reveals his 'true' nature, which does not accord with his appearance. He is a nameless subject, whose use of language does not appear to signify what he is seen as. In this sense the novel satirises a culture for the way it sees. The defining of 'evil' in the novel becomes a problematic due to this ambiguity.

The role of the narrator, Robert Walton, is also of significance. Walton's project mirrors Frankenstein's. Walton expects to find at the

North Pole a new paradise, a pre-lapsarian state. In the novel the notion of the sublime is predicated upon a way of seeing. The monster reveals this way of seeing, this ethical gazing, to be a mis-interpretation. The sublime is seen as essentially 'empty'; as something which blocks the subject off from accurate interpretation. *Frankenstein* thus parodies the sublime; in it is a form of sublimity which is secularised by the use of science (although an occult science at that). It combines Romantic and post-Romantic thought and achieves this by moving the interpretation of sublimity away from the religious to the secular, thus revealing the sublime to be an absence, which is paradoxically defined through the (parodic) use of religious iconography.

CONCLUSION: THE WAY FORWARD.

In the primary accounts of the sublime discussed here, there is a consistent re-stating of similar problems. In particular, Longinus' account of the delusive possibilities of the rhetorical sublime have been inherited by both Burke and Kant. This problem with language has applications for a theory of the Gothic. Here, though, the problem changes; the possibility of non-signification *now* challenges secure cultural identity. A telling similarity, however, which could be termed as out-of-placeness, applies to both. In the sublime, language has the status of being out of place in relation to what is considered authentic experience. This rhetorical sublime is implicitly placed in opposition to the natural sublime. In the Gothic the possibility of a non-referential language posits a threatening absence, posing a similar dilemma over representational efficacy.

In the early accounts of the sublime, by Longinus, Addison and Burke,

the sublime is bound-up with what Weiskel sees as 'a credible God-term'. In the sublime the subject is made aware of the Deity's power. In Kant and Schiller, the sublime space is re-worked in a secular fashion. Here the mind reveals its capacity to reason which elevates the subject above pantheism. This is not to say that religion is completely rejected, in Kant, rather, it is the case that religious contemplation is separated from sublime experience. There is thus a movement (historical) from a religious form of the sublime, to a psychological, secular one.

For Jackson the Romantic fantasy is dominated by religious faith, so that definitions of evil are related to demonic pacts. This, as suggested earlier, characterises *The Monk*, but it is in the work of Ann Radcliffe that the sublime is more obviously encountered. There 'evil' is defined as social; a failure to be receptive to sublimity divorces the subject from religious ethics[20]. Although Kant and Schiller have secularised the sublime, it is still defined in terms of moral worth, and again this is defined by a nature/culture dichotomy; or as Schiller puts it; 'Who does not prefer to tarry among the spiritual disorder of a natural landscape rather than in the spiritless regularity of a French garden?' (p. 204). Thus, in the sublime there is a moralising principle at stake. Either external to the subject, God's 'awesome' power, or internal, the mind's innate moral integrity.

What these accounts of the sublime promote is a 'law' of the subject. It is in fantasy that 'laws' are transgressed (laws of possibility, class, sexuality and so on), and this sublime 'law' of the subject is violated either by the demonic pact (Lewis) or by adherence to social artifice (Radcliffe). Thus in these novels there is an attack upon and a defense of sublimity.

In the post-Romantic text, Jackson sees absence as threatening the law. This absence is an inherited form of the numinous shorn of religious dictates. However, with the sublime there is also a move towards a secular version of it. What is implicit in Jackson's account, is the view that the secular text elevates the social above any other experience; whereas in the sublime, it is the social which is a source of evil. Thus, in the post-Romantic text what is questioned is the social 'laws' of class, community, sexuality and ideas of identity.

As suggested earlier, in *Frankenstein* there is a play upon, and dilemma with, the notion of sublimity. Schiller questions the notion that the subject has a meaningful relationship with nature, and *Frankenstein* exemplifies this questioning. The monster is a natural, un-natural, form; he is made up from nature but defies it by transgressing its laws. He is therefore of, and simultaneously opposed to, nature. His reception is dependent upon a false moral gazing. This type of gazing is exemplified by Burke in his account of the natural sublime; he becomes a monstrous object of sublimity. It is in the space between seeing and hearing that Longinus enters into the discussion. Frankenstein is seduced by the monster's words, but sees them as belied by his looks. The novel suggests that Frankenstein has got this the wrong way around, the monster is as he speaks, not how he appears.

In the following chapter I read *Frankenstein* through the work of Julia Kristeva and Michel Foucault. This is because the novel exemplifies many of the features which Kristeva sees as defining language, such as narcissism and death, and links up with her identification of a menippean, secular, form of writing[21]. I then link these ideas to what Foucault sees as the emergence of 'man' in the modern episteme[22]. The effect of this is to

expose the fashion in which *Frankenstein* challenges the claims made for a pantheistic version of sublimity. Such a reading of the Gothic sublime is supported later in this thesis by the problematical interpretations of the sublime by Weiskel and Hertz. This helps to illuminate their theories, seeing them within the context of a particular grouping of Gothic texts.

Finally, *Frankenstein* can be read as offering a 'troubled' account of sublimity. It deals in the creation of an unnatural form of the sublime, and thus questions the authenticity of a moral sublime experience. It suggests that the sublime is as much an artificial (culturally arbitrary) experience, as the forms of experience to which it is opposed. The novel thus typifies that moment when the sublime is separated from moral (pantheistic) concerns and becomes what Jackson sees as a dangerous absence.

CHAPTER TWO: *FRANKENSTEIN* AND THE DOCTORING OF THE SUBLIME.

INTRODUCTION.

This chapter is an exploration of how the sublime is represented in *Frankenstein*. I read the novel principally through the work of Michel Foucault and Julia Kristeva and suggest that there is an analogous relationship between the novel and what Foucault sees as the creation of 'man' in the modern episteme. The novel is then read through Kristeva's account of the semiotic and the symbolic in *Revolution in poetic language*[1]. In this reading the monster's sublimity equates to Kristeva's semiotic. The monster is perceived by all other characters in the novel (except, significantly, by the blind De Lacey) as a source of sublime terror. Through Kristeva's thesis the monster is perceived as semiotic (as metaphysical) but also as part of the linguistic, symbolic order. In this way the sublime way of seeing, mapped out through the other characters in the novel, is revealed to be cultural, rather than grounded in a transcendental metaphysics. To use Kristeva's terminology, it is because the monster speaks that he is an object of the symbolic (culture) rather than an example of a semiotic (the implied universalism in sublime apprehension). The monster latterly becomes perceived as a part of the symbolic which implies the cultural status of the sublime gazing he provokes. This chapter thus explores how *Frankenstein* satirises the metaphysical speculation of sublimity by replacing the sublime with a problematical, emerging, cultural and linguistic identity.

Before discussing Foucault I examine how menippean writing is linked to Kristeva's speculations concerning language and also how it articulates an

implicit account of Fantasy fiction. This is a somewhat cursory reading of Kristeva, but my aim is to establish some points of reference more fully worked out later in the chapter.

DEFINING THE MENIPPEAN - JULIA KRISTEVA.

In *Word, Dialogue and Novel*[2] Kristeva parallels Bakhtin's notion of the carnivalesque with menippean discourse. For her, their common characteristic is anti-theologism. In the former it is, 'The cynicism of this carnivalesque scene, which destroys a god in order to impose its own dialogical laws[...]' (p.49). The carnivalesque attempts to replace religious doctrine, whereas the menippean is defined by an antagonistic struggle with it. She writes of the menippean that; 'Its history is the history of the struggle against Christianity and its representation; this means an exploration of language (of sexuality and death), a consecration of ambivalence and of 'vice'' (p.50).

For Kristeva the menippean is opposed to socratic dialogue. The latter is associated with the establishment of argument built around 'autonomous points of view' (p.51) in debate. She identifies this as a prototypical form of realism which she sees as a major characteristic of the European (Realist) novel.

The menippean is opposed to this as fantasy is to realism. Socratic dialogue implies a 'natural' unity of subject positions; because of this, debate, or dialogue, can take place. The socratic dialogue is concerned with the construction of 'truth' through a reasoned process of argumentation. In the menippean no such argumentation is possible due to the fragmentary nature of subject positions, so that 'reasoned' debate

(Realist reasoning) is precluded.

It is possible to regard the menippean as a prototypical form of fantasy, which bears a similarity to Jackson's conception of fantasy as being the site where unifying strategies break down. It does not though encompass Jackson's other contention that fantasy is the site where 'unreasoned' elements are expelled through ideological marginalisation (the triumph of Realism).

I employ Kristeva's account of fantasy here (rather than Jackson's or Punter's) because it links with Foucault's notion of modernity as characterised by the emergence of 'man' as an object (and a subject) of knowledge. This becomes clearer towards the end of this section when I discuss the monster as a pseudo-scientifically produced subject.

It is a problem of identity, of language and of power which characterise the menippean, and these sites of fragmentation are also present in *Frankenstein*. The monster is literally (physically) fragmented, and this physicality 'plays' upon the split in the novel between what things are and what they appear to be. The monster 'reflects' on this after the scene which parodies the myth of Narcissus, '"My person was hideous and my stature gigantic. What did this mean? Who was I? What was I? Whence did I come? What was my destination?"' (p. 174).

This scene implies that the split in a unified (sublime) way of seeing 'naturally' leads into other sites of fragmentation, i.e. a series of rhetorical questions concerning identity. Again, this links to what Kristeva identifies (via Bakhtin) in the menippean; there, there are various forms that, '[...]destroy man's epic and tragic unity as well as his belief in identity and causality; they indicate that he has lost his totality and no longer coincides with himself' (p. 53).

Fragmentation occurs when previously controlling structures have broken down. In *Frankenstein*, fragmentation occurs because the (pantheistic) sublime way of seeing is undermined. To return to Kristeva's account of the menippean; it is possible to see the menippean as influenced by an idea of language which links it to an implicit analyser/analysed relationship which bears relevance to a reading of *Frankenstein*. She writes that, 'Menippean ambivalence consists of communication between two spaces: that of the scene and that of the hieroglyph, that of representation *by* language, and that of experience *in* language, system and phrase, metaphor and metonymy '(p.55). Frankenstein as the analyser (the listener) is concerned with representation '*by* language'; oppositionally the novel's focus upon the monster's language acquisition exemplifies 'experience *in* langauge.'. Kristeva discusses the relationship between analyser and analysed overtly in *Freud and Love: Treatment and its Discontents*. There she writes of the analyst that:-

> By ensuring a loving Other to the patient, the analyst (temporarily) allows the Ego in the throes of drive to take shelter in the following fantasy: the analyst is not a dead Father but a living Father; this non-desiring but loving father reconciles the Ideal Ego with the Ego Ideal and elaborates the psychic space where, possibly and subsequently, an analysis can take place. (p.248)[3]

This idea of fatherhood in the analytic situation is of relevance to *Frankenstein* to the degree that the monster is a 'produced' subject, is in a sense given birth to.

To summarise, the menippean is characterised by a fragmentation of unifying structures. This fragmentation also occurs in *Frankenstein* when the strategies of the sublime cannot effectively describe the monster. The monster exemplifies this to the extent that he recognises himself as a non-unified (marginalised) subject, i.e. he is an outcast from the structures

of the family, society, and sublime forms of apprehension. His relation to Victor is as both son to father and as analysed to analyser, and this relationship links to Foucault's idea of the arrival of 'man' in the modern episteme.

I will now briefly turn to Foucault's account of the modern episteme. He writes that:-

> [...]the philosophy of life denounces metaphysics as a veil of illusion, that of labour denounces it as an alienated form of thought and an ideology, that of language as a cultural episode.
> But the end of metaphysics is only the negative side of a much more complex event in western thought. This event is the appearance of man. (p.317).[4]

The monster, like Foucault's formulation of 'man', '[...]can uncover his own beginning only against the background of a life which itself began long before him '(p.330). This is because 'man, as opposed to the things whose glittering birth time allows to show in all its density, is the being without origin, who has 'neither country nor date', whose birth is never accessible because it never took 'place'.'(pp.331-332). It is the menippean which opposes what Foucault identifies as metaphysical speculation, because speculation is correlated with religious doctrine, whereas 'Only modernity - when freed of 'God' - releases the Menippean force of the novel '(p.55).

As suggested earlier, the relationship between the monster and Frankenstein is an expression of the analyser to the analysed. It is a secular relationship replacing what Foucault in *The History of Sexuality* vol I[5] sees as the relationship between 'sinner' and Priest. In Chapters Eleven to Sixteen the monster tells his story, a tale of rejection and anxiety which positions Frankenstein as the analyst who decides whether the monster's desires (demands) are reasonable or not. These desires (demands) are social and secular, rather than metaphysical or theological. They

equate to what Foucault sees as the breaking up of an old metaphysical order and to what Kristeva identifies as the menippean. Foucault's concept of 'man' does not necessarily replace metaphysical doctrine (as the Carnivalesque does for Kristeva) but is, in its emergent state, challenged by it; defined by its struggle to be 'born' as a struggle with metaphysics.

Frankenstein is an example of menippean discourse, it is anti-theological and expresses anxiety about metaphysical speculation. It re-works what Foucault sees as the emergence of 'man' as an object of knowledge. In this framework exists an implicit analyser/analysed (or more obviously, Doctor/patient) scenario which secularises experience. This type of structure is present at the level of language in menippean discourse. To contextualise some of these oppositions and ideas, it is necessary to examine how sublimity is situated in the novel, and how the novel critiques metaphysical speculation by attacking the concept of the sublime.

PURSUING THE SUBLIME.

In this section the sublime is discussed in relation to Victor Frankenstein, in particular with reference to his relationship with Henry Clerval, it is this relationship which reveals a clash between science and sentimentality and it reintroduces Frankenstein to the sublime. My suggestion is that Frankenstein loses a notion of sublimity due to his engagement with scientific practice. This practice, ironically, creates an unnatural form of sublimity (the monster). It is this creation of unnatural man which dissipates the effects of the sublime for Frankenstein.

Frankenstein says of his scientific project:-

> I knew well[...]what would be my father's feelings, but I could not tear my thoughts from my employment, loathsome in itself, but which had

> taken an irresistible hold of my imagination. I wished, as it were, to procrastinate all that related to my feelings of affection until the great object, which swallowed up every habit of my nature, should be completed. (p. 103)

Here Frankenstein's experimenting bears a relationship to the sublime. His project 'swallowed up every bit of my nature ', he 'could not tear my thoughts from my employment '. As discussed in the previous chapter, the sublime (for Burke) overwhelms the subject, consumes it. Whereas for Burke the basis of the sublime is Terror, here it becomes relocated in terms of repulsion: Frankenstein's employment is 'loathsome in itself', yet it 'has taken an irresistible hold of my imagination'. Also, like the sublime, it is inherently anti-social, seen here as a guilty lack of filial duty, 'I knew well[...]what would be my father's feelings '. What Frankenstein loses here is a sense of the sublime as a possible source of transcendence, rather it is labour which supplies a false sense of the sublime. However, this new form of sublimity (literally replacing the 'Natural' sublime) immunises Frankenstein to the older sense of the sublime. The new experience (natural science) supplants the older (metaphysical speculation).

This process becomes reversed in the relationship between Frankenstein and Clerval. The latter re-educates him into appreciating the sublime; '[...]Clerval called forth the better feelings of my heart; he again taught me to love the aspect of nature and the cheerful faces of children ' (p. 117). However, this reveals that the sublime is not Burke's innate, lived, experience, but something learned, and paradoxically the possession of the cultural dimension adds to the sublime without prejudice to its a priori existence. Frankenstein's re-education into the sublime enables him to reclaim his past, which had been characterised by sublime

empathy:-

> I became the same happy creature who, a few years ago, loved and beloved by all, had no sorrow or care. When happy, inanimate nature had the power of bestowing on me the most delightful sensations. A serene sky and verdant fields filled me with ecstasy. (p. 117)

Later this contemplation of nature becomes explicitly linked to pantheism:-

> [...]the dashing of the waterfalls around, spoke of a power mighty as Omnipotence - and I ceased to fear or to bend before any being less almighty than that which had created and ruled the elements, here displayed in their most terrific guise. (p. 140)

Frankenstein would appear to have regained his pre-lapsarian state. Science is now represented as an inauthentic form of sublimity in comparison to the natural sublime. However, this appreciation of the sublime is cultural ('he again taught me') rather than natural. Frankenstein thus recognises that any reclamation of the past is only provisional and this is expressed through a doubling of Frankenstein with Clerval. He says, '[...]in Clerval I saw the image of my former self; he was inquisitive and anxious to gain experience and instruction '(p. 203). Earlier he had said of Clerval that, 'He was a being formed in the 'very poetry of nature.'. His wild and enthusiastic imagination was chastened by the sensibility of his heart '(p. 201); it is Frankenstein (to hold the analogy) who is ruled by his head. Clerval thus functions in the narrative as a reminder of a younger Frankenstein with whom he is contrasted; science and sentimentality clash. Clerval can only give Frankenstein a precarious re-education into the sublime because this sublime is repeatedly transgressed through the appearance of the monster. The monster seems to exemplify a failure on the part of the natural sublime, significantly appearing most frequently when Frankenstein is contemplating nature. After William's murder and Justine's execution, and immediately prior to his meeting with the monster, Frankenstein attempts to dispel his grief in just such a contemplation. He

says of the landscape, 'These sublime and magnificent scenes afforded me the greatest consolation that I was capable of receiving. They elevated me from all littleness of feeling, and although they did not remove my grief, they subdued and tranquillized it '(p.142). On first seeing the monster, 'I was troubled; a mist came over my eyes, and I felt a faintness seize me; but I was quickly restored by the cold gale of the mountains '(p.144). In contrast to the mountain scenery, Frankenstein sees that the monster's 'unearthly ugliness rendered it almost too horrible for human eyes '(pp.144-145). The monster disrupts the notion of serenity in the contemplation of nature.

The monster also comes to represent death; he is the sublime made flesh. Frances Ferguson writes of the sublime that:-

> The trick with the sublime, of course, is that we live to tell the tale of our encounters with it - which is of course one good reason why even Burke cannot sustain a thorough-going empiricism about the sublime - because it never proves to be quite as deadly in experience as it had in thought.[6]

This introduction of death (i.e. the monster's physical make up) undermines natural sublimity by disturbing its theoretical efficacy. Although Frankenstein has been re-educated into sublime transcendence, he is now confronted with the physicality of that 'awesome' power. Clerval's murder implies the impossibility of recuperating sublime apprehension, after this:-

> The cup of life was poisoned forever, and although the sun shone upon me, as upon the happy and gay of heart, I saw around me nothing but a dense and frightful darkness, penetrated by no light but the glimmer of two eyes that glared upon me. (p.226)

Frankenstein, the observer of nature, becomes the observed object. This gaze has a revealing oscillation; in it there is a displacement of the sublime (as near death experience) with its physical actuality. He says of

the eyes, 'Sometimes they were the expressive eyes of Henry,' but '[...]sometimes it was the watery, clouded eyes of the monster '(p.226). Here, there is a reversal with the 'live' eyes of the dead Clerval and the 'dead' eyes of the live monster. At this point opposites become conflated, and Frankenstein relinquishes the natural sublime.

In conclusion, the character of Frankenstein exemplifies an attempted return to a pre-lapsarian state of sublimity. However, the structure of sublimity ceases to control the way nature seems to be working for Frankenstein. His project has been couched in the language of sublime apprehension which results in the creation of the monster, meaning that the sublime is to be engaged physically rather than mentally. In this sense the novel critiques the idealism of sublime theorising by introducing a material element which personifies it. Frankenstein has to deal with a created 'man' who resists his attempts to locate him visually (in the structure of sublime gazing) in order to attempt an aural engagement. This emphasis on speech over sight creates a potential therapuetic situation. However, also suggested is that this menippean 'festival of cruelty' (Kristeva, p.54) has occurred because the implied virtue inherent in the sublime moment is undermined: its way of seeing involved a basic misunderstanding. Thus the sublime is revealed to be cultural, rather than spiritual (Longinus[7], Addison[8], Burke[9]) or psychological (Kant[10], Schiller[11]). In the following section I trace the culture's framing of this way of seeing, and expand on its ramifications for a theory of sublimity.

CULTURE AND EXPERIENCE, SUBLIME (RE)CONSIDERATIONS.

In this section my contention is that the sublime's ethical gazing forms disabling misunderstandings. These misunderstandings of the physical world are introduced in the novel at an early stage with Walton's letters. I will first discuss his narrative before giving a more comprehensive account of the sublime and its cultural generation.

In a letter to his sister, Walton writes of his expedition to the North Pole that he hopes that, 'I may there discover the wondrous power which attracts the needle and may regulate a thousand celestial observations that require only this voyage to render their seeming eccentricities consistent forever '(pp.63-64). This unconsciously mimics the quest of Frankenstein; but where Frankenstein attempts to create life out of death, Walton hopes to discover a tropical paradise in the Arctic circle. He writes, 'I try in vain to be persuaded that the pole is the seat of frost and desolation; it ever presents itself to my imagination as the region of beauty and delight '(p.63). Again, ' - there snow and frost are banished; and, sailing over a calm sea, we may be wafted to a land surpassing in wonders and in beauty every region hitherto discovered on the habitable globe '(p.63). His project, like that of Frankenstein's, is described as a sublime endeavour. Walton writes to his sister 'It is impossible to communicate to you a conception of the trembling sensation, half pleasurable and half fearful, with which I am preparing to depart. I am going to unexplored regions, to 'the Land of mist and snow ''(p.69). The meeting between Frankenstein and Walton becomes a clash between innocence and experience. If Clerval has attempted to re-educate Frankenstein into an appreciation of the sublime, then Frankenstein attempts to enlighten Walton as to the consequences of

such an endeavour. He says to Walton, '"Unhappy man! Do you share my madness? Have you drunk also of the intoxicating draught? Hear me; let me reveal my tale, and you will dash the cup from your lips!"' (p. 77). In Walton, as with Clerval, Frankenstein confronts his pre-lapsarian self. The novel uses this to exaggerate the idealism of Frankenstein; it is Walton's project which appears so implausable (the belief in a tropical climate at the North Pole), which is a parodic play on Frankenstein's own aspirations. As he says of his experimentation, '[...]I will pioneer a new way, explore unknown powers, and unfold to the world the deepest mysteries of creation ' (p. 96). This is the idealism satirised in the novel .

As suggested earlier, this satire works through the introduction of cultural, arbitrary features into what is supposed to be innate and authentic. Frankenstein is prompted by his loss of idealism to enlighten Walton about the nature of experience, specifically experience governed by some version of sublime endeavour.

The novel defines the sublime as a cultural experience when the monster meets the De Laceys. In this moment the monster exemplifies Burke's category of 'natural' objects in part Five of his *Enquiry*, where; 'Natural objects affect us, by the laws of that connexion, which Providence has established between certain motions and configurations of bodies, and certain consequent feelings in our minds ' (p. 163). This is something the monster also realises when seeing his reflection in a pool. He tells Frankenstein:-

> [...]how was I terrified when I viewed myself in a transparent pool! At first I started back, unable to believe that it was indeed I who was reflected in the mirror; and when I became fully convinced that I was in reality the monster that I am, I was filled with the bitterest sensations of despondence and mortification. (p. 159)

This recognition coincides with his introduction to language; it thus

becomes unclear as to whether the monster is expressing a notion of an essentialist subject (as Burke is), or a cultural recognition. This, however, becomes clarified when he is spurned by the De Laceys. Where Frankenstein loses a notion of the sublime, the monster loses any sense of society. He tells Frankenstein of his rejection, '"The mildness of my nature had fled, and all within me was turned to gall and bitterness"' (p. 185). The fact that the monster speaks, has acquired the symbolic, turns him into a cultural artefact.

Chris Baldick in *In Frankenstein's Shadow, Myth, Monstrosity and Nineteenth Century Writing*[12], briefly outlines the history of the representation of monstrosity concluding that, '[...]monsters were understood primarily as exhibitions of moral vices: they were to be seen and not heard' (p. 45). Because the monster speaks he problematises the attempt to define him in terms of these 'moral vices', and although he ultimately becomes a 'murderer' (although in a legal sense he is outside of the law because he is not recognised as a 'real' man), this is seen as a product of circumstance and not due to 'natural' disposition. As he puts it, 'I am malicious because I am miserable' (p. 190). Frankenstein finds the monster's speech seductive, but cannot but perceive the monster in terms of moral decrepitude:-

> His words had a strange effect upon me. I compassionated him and sometimes felt a wish to console him, but when I looked upon him, when I saw the filthy mass that moved and talked, my heart sickened and my feelings were altered to those of horror and hatred.' (p. 192)

The monster becomes a source of ambivalence. Sublimity as recognition is problematised.

Stephen Knapp[13] sees this problem of sublimity in Kantian terms of a move from a focus on the object to a focus on the self, so that the sublime

becomes an internal response rather than an external identification. The monster's speech does not accord with his 'sublime' monstrosity, so rendering him active rather than passive. Because the response towards the monster is not ratified externally (his speech does not coincide with his looks) Frankenstein becomes faced with the possibility that the sublime is pure subjectivity. Knapp writes of this potential slippage in the sublime that:-

> [...]the sublime itself now depends on an act of reference: the terrible object must be taken to signify a power in the self. The sublime experience, no longer an instinctive reflex, turns out to be doubly inauthentic: first, because the power thus internalised is no real property of the self: second, because even this illusory aggrandizement is in the service not of the self but of Providence, which conforms even the vice of pride to social ends. (p.73)

The monster thus eludes Frankenstein in two ways. Firstly because he does not exist as an easy natural object. Secondly because his speech, although seductive, is not in itself a form of sublimity which can be given any autheticity. *Frankenstein* implies Longinus' view that rhetoric although convincing, can be fraudulent. The subject is also ratified externally in this sublime moment so that the experience 'is in the service not of the self but of Providence'. It is inauthentic in relation to an internal, 'felt', construct of subjectivity. This ambivalence of the sublime moment, of the impossibility of capturing it (or of being transfixed by it) is repeated thematically in the way that the monster eludes Frankenstein in the chase. As David E Musselwhite[14] puts it, 'The monster is always ahead or behind, always elsewhere, ever in a condition of migratory adjacency '(p.69). The implication is that the monster represents the unknown because he resists classification. However, this resistance, as suggested earlier, does not transform the monster into a source of sublimity. He is not merely a potentially sublime object but also a

linguistic subject. The monster prefigures Foucault's creation of 'man' as an object of knowledge, as Musselwhite writes, ' - what has been Mary Shelley's most remarkable achievement, even though it is thrust before us on almost every page of the novel[...]is the invention of 'man' '(p.71). The monster's resistance to classification means that, 'Anomalous and exorbitant with respect to all that would define it the Monster is the very figure of the unknown that haunts modern thought '(Musselwhite, p.73).

In conclusion, the relationship between Frankenstein and Walton becomes an opportunity for the former to critique the idealism of the latter. Frankenstein has a problematical understanding of the monster because he embodies a clash between seeing and hearing. The monster is constructed from nature, and yet is an unnatural object (i.e. he is seen by Frankenstein to be a contradiction, a contradiction between his symbolic make-up and the version of identity furnished by the sublime). He resists the classification of natural monstrosity and so suggests that such classifications do not accord with nature. Instead, these classifications are cultural and arbitrary, but masquerade as fixed laws. Nature is expressed as the manifestation of God's omnipotence, but if the monster has put the assumed definition of nature into question, then pantheism is itself put into doubt. As Baldick points out *Frankenstein* is characterised by its secular outlook'[5]. However, the notion of the monster as sublime object is one supported by Ketterer when he writes, 'The monster is at least as much the creation of the mountainous setting as Frankenstein's more constrained laboratory. To this extent it might be argued that the monster is a personification of Burke's natural sublime.'(p.70). My view is that it is not possible to argue this because the monster reveals that the natural sublime is an inadequate model for explaining his existence. He is

the 'figure of the unknown' in 'modern thought'. The next section discusses this idea of the modern by looking at the relationship between the monster and Foucault's notion of emergent 'man'.

FOUCAULT'S MAN.

Foucault in *The Order of Things*, accounts for the emergence of 'man' as an object of knowledge. He sets this emergence against the background of the decline of Classicism. Initially he sees this break between Classicism and modernity as characterised by a problematisation of language. He writes, 'The threshold between Classicism and modernity[...]had been definitively crossed when words ceased to intersect with representations and to provide a spontaneous grid for the knowledge of things' (p.304). If words cease to coincide with what they represent, then, argues Foucault, the notion of self-reflexive thought is challenged, because the thinking subject can only think in words which have lost their representational efficacy. This means that the subject poses a problem for external representation (of how to classify). It is because this subject becomes an object of investigation, a new category to understand, that self-reflexive thought disappears; or as Foucault puts it, 'It seems obvious enough that, from the moment when man(sic) first constituted himself as a positive figure in the field of knowledge, the old privilege of reflexive knowledge, of thought thinking itself, could not but disappear' (p.326).

In the replacement of this reflexive knowledge, the subject becomes an object of knowledge, as something to be ratified externally. There is thus a movement away from the internal (self-reflexion) to external classification (a provisonally 'scientific' knowledge). The cause of this

movement, from inner ratification to external ratification, is not only due to a lack of representational accuracy in language, but also to a recognition that language is seen to lack an origin. In this way, grounding language has a double problem; it does not accord with what it represents and its origin has become occluded. Foucault writes of the subject that, '...all he ever finds is the previously unfolded possibility of language, and not the stumbling sound, the first word upon the basis of which all languages and even language itself becomes possible '(p.330). This means, for Foucault, that the subject now has no origin. He writes, '[...]things began long before him, and that for this very reason, and since his experience is wholly constituted and limited by things, no one can ever assign him an origin '(p.331). This idea of origins is discussed at greater length in Chapter Seven in an examination of how original moments are effaced in 'the Uncanny'[6], and of how this denies the possibility of attaining 'absolute' meaning. Here, however, I take it that where Foucault writes 'things', he is in part referring to language. The subject formed through language is displaced historically and representationally, so that the subject is likewise displaced. The idea is that the subject is produced through language rather than coincides with it, and this idea of production explains secularisation.

Thus, for Foucault, the modern is defined in part by the break up of language. The subject shares this displacement and becomes a problematical object of knowledge. To see how this relates to *Frankenstein* it is necessary to examine the way that the monster is inserted into the symbolic.

The monster overhears the speech of the De Laceys and attempts to build up a rudimentary grammar. He says of the De Laceys, 'Their pronunciation

was quick, and the words uttered, not having any apparent connection with visible objects, I was unable to discover any clue by which I could unravel the mystery of their reference '(p. 158). Words confuse the monster, and the examples of this confusion are, as Musselwhite points out, related tp words which designate subject positions; 'The youth and his companion had each of them several names, but the old man had only one, which was "father.". The girl was called "sister" or "Agatha," and the youth "Felix," "brother," or "son." '(p. 158).

The monster's introduction to language again illustrates what Foucault sees as the emergence of 'man'. Words no longer (as they did in Classicism) coincide with what they represent. Subject positions are potentially multi-vocal, suggesting that linguistic meaning is dependent upon the position of the speaking (designating) subject within a social context (here, the family). By extension, because the monster has no family he remains unnamed and unnameable.

This aquisition of language can be juxtaposed with that of Frankenstein's. Frankenstein tells Walton of his childhood, mentioning his early search for deep meaning in contrast to Elizabeth's engagement with the surface of things; 'While my companion contemplated with a serious and satisfied spirit the magnificent appearances of things, I delighted in investigating their causes.' (p. 85). This search for origins, is ultimately translated into his search for the origin of life. Frankenstein discusses his early education, and like Walton, '[...]I was, to a great degree, self-taught with regard to my favourite studies.' (p. 88). If the monster acquires language (and knowledge, such as from Plutarch, Goethe and Milton) through hearing, Frankenstein acquires knowledge through reading. This is the hearing/seeing paradox which Frankenstein will later have towards the

monster, where language is problematised because the monster does not objectively (as 'thing') represent what he appears to be.

The monster sees language as a problem of understanding representation. In contrast, the early Frankenstein is characterised by his studious endeavours, his reading of the Ancients implying that language is transparent. It is thus appropriate that Frankenstein's early reading is confined to the Classics.

The novel poses the question which Foucault sees as characterising the emergence of the modern; 'The whole curiosity of our thought now resides in the question: What is language, how can we find a way round it in order to make it appear in itself, in all its plenitude?' (p.306). As stated in the previous chapter on the sublime, representation becomes a problematic. In Burke, language sometimes represents its object, at other times it either underwrites or over writes it, and in the latter case becomes equated with sublime 'excess'. In Longinus, the possibility that rhetoric may delude is explored. Language in these accounts is the focus for a debate concerning the nature of representation. What Foucault identifies here is a search for plenitude similar to Frankenstein's quest. Frankenstein searches for a totalising knowledge of the human. The irony is that he creates a monster who throws the attempt into question. As Musselwhite has pointed out, the monster is adjacent to Frankenstein, always out of his reach, never fully grasped in a way which could equate to some form of plenitude.

For Foucault, this search for plenitude in representation links to a notion of ratifying human nature. He writes that:-

> [...]the great, endless, continuous surface is printed with distinct characters, in more or less general features, in marks of identification - and, consequently, in words. The chain of being becomes discourse, thereby linking itself to human nature and to the sequence of representations. (p.310)

This is a pre-modern characteristic for Foucault because it implies that coincidence is tied to the linguistic; this is a position linked to an enabling formulation of the sublime. In *Frankenstein* these 'marks of identification' are distinguished from a position on sublimity which characterises the monster physically, whereby the outer form is deemed to equate to some inner, moral, mutilation. Also, this is linked to an idea of 'human nature' because the sublime is posited in universalist, essentialist, ways. However, the monster resists this categorisation because of what Foucault sees as a change in the conception of representation; 'It is no longer their identity that beings manifest in representation, but the external relation they establish with the human being '(p.313). On the part of the monster the desire to represent is related to a language which would reveal his 'humanity'. Also it is the monster who craves social (and sexual) intercourse, which contrasts with Frankenstein's desire for seclusion from his friends, family and fiancee. Both the monster and Frankenstein live in solitude; one enforced, the other desired. Frankenstein holds on to the older notion of representation, refusing to accept the 'humanity' of the monster. This equates to what Foucault sees as the arrival of an 'analytic of finitude' which characterises modern thought. However, this analytic is questioned by the older, Classical, discourse:-

> Where there had formerly been a correlation between a *metaphysics* of representation and of the infinite and an *analysis* of living beings, of man's desires, and of the words of his language, we find being constituted an *analytic* of finitude and human existence, and in opposition to it...a perpetual tendency to constitute a *metaphysics* of life, labour, and language. (p.317)

Frankenstein exemplifies the position of 'a *metaphysics* of representation and of the infinite', which relates to the sublime, opposing an '*analytic*

of finitude' which Foucault sees as exemplified by death. It is the latter position which the monster fills, being literally made out of death, and as a creature that kills, and this in part explains why he seems to fulfil Burke's understanding of the idea of death as a source of the sublime. Also, in Frankenstein it is possible to see 'a *metaphysics* of life, labour, and language.'. His positioning in the novel suggests that the creation of life, the labour required to attain it, and language itself, should be tied to a metaphysics. The monster's language problematises this for Frankenstein. His signifier (language) does not equate to his signified (his appearance).

This idea of appearance and representation becomes for Foucault, the object of analysis in the modern episteme:-

> [...]analysis seeks to articulate the possible objectivity of a knowledge of nature upon the original experience of which the body provides an outline; and to articulate the possible history of a culture upon the semantic density which is both hidden and revealed in actual experience. (p.321)

In *Frankenstein* the body and semantics, are conflated. What is revealed in the 'experience[...]of the body', is that it links to a 'history of a culture' which 'sees' in a certain way.

In this way the novel can be read through Foucault's account of the emergence of 'man' as an object of knowledge in modern thought. In the clash between Frankenstein and the monster there is a parallel clash between Classicism and modernity. In this, the monster is the new created 'man' who is unassimilable to older concepts of understanding. Because of this there appears to be the possibility of the monster becoming a new object of sublimity, i.e. the monster, ironically, because he defies coherent comprehension could become the new sublime object. However, whereas previously the sublime was defined by an overwhelming pantheism, as

external to the subject, its new experience is internal, one of the arrival of the unconcious. Foucault writes about this in ways which apply to a problematisation of the subject in the old sublime moment, 'How can man think what he does not think, inhabit as though by a mute occupation something that eludes him, animate with a kind of frozen movement that figure of himself that takes the form of a stubborn exteriority?' (p. 323).

For Foucault, this dilemma results in the creation of the Other, who opposes the subject:-

> [...]the *cogito* will not therefore be the sudden and illuminating discovery that all thought is thought, but the constantly renewed interrogation as to how thought can reside elsewhere than here, and yet so very close to itself; how it can *be* in the forms of non-thinking. (p. 324)

Again, in this experience, analogous to the sublime, the subject perceives an external thought (pantheism) which overpowers the mind of the subject.

This also applies to the monster in *Frankenstein*. The monster has a provisional status as a sublime object, this status implies that he is non-thinking. As stated earlier, the monster as object is supposed to exemplify moral mutilation. However, because the monster is not just an object but also a speaking subject, he therefore resists this categorisation. The monster becomes Other to Frankenstein, he becomes what Foucault sees as thought residing in the inanimate, 'of non-thinking'. Thus it is possible to see the relationship between Frankenstein and the monster as a dynamic between subject and Other. Foucault's idea of the emergence of the Other suggests a parallel with the creation of the monster. He writes of:-

> [...]the Other that is not only a brother but a twin, born, not of man, nor in man, but beside him and at the same time, in an identical newness, in an unavoidable duality. This obscure space so readily interpreted as an abyssal region in man's nature, or as a uniquely impregnable fortress in his history, is linked to him in an entirely different way; it is both exterior to him and indispensible to him: in one sense, the shadow cast by man as he emerged in the field of knowledge; in another, the blind stain by which it is possible to know

him. (p. 326)

The monster mirrors this 'birth', parallels the fashion in which, as sublime object of terror, he is 'so readily interpreted as an abyssal region in man's nature '. He can be identified as Frankenstein's 'shadow', as Other to Frankenstein, but paradoxically there is also a series of parallels and recognitions. Mary Poovey, for example, argues that:-

> In *Frankenstein*, the monster simply acts out the implicit content of Frankenstein's desire: just as Frankenstein figuratively murdered his family, so the monster literally murders Frankenstein's domestic relationships, blighting both the memory and the hope of domestic harmony with the 'black mark' of its deadly hand. (p. 126) [17]

As stated earlier, there is an inverse relationship between Frankenstein and the monster because the latter desires the domestic security spurned by the former. Thus the monster is both other and same to Frankenstein, for in killing his family, for example, the monster, at some level, becomes the same as Frankenstein. This idea of doubling is further examined in Chapter Seven, where I discuss Freud's 'The Uncanny' in relation to how an implicit doubling between heimlich and unheimlich collapses theoretical distinctions.

The expression of Frankenstein's desires identified by Poovey, would have to be unconscious, (i.e. he does not have an overt hatred for his family). This idea of the unconscious also distances the novel from the sublime. In Kant, for example, 'Reason' is intimated by the supersensible and not a formulation of the unconscious. This relates to what Foucault sees as occurring in the 'unthought' whereby, '[...]it is always concerned with showing how the Other, the Distant, is also the Near and the Same '(p. 339). It is because of this implicit identification in the Frankenstein/monster relationship that the former can only with difficulty see the latter as object. In this way the idea of exteriority in the

sublime is retranslated as an interior identification via the emergence of a discourse of the unconscious. This emergence brings back into focus the notion of representation in the sublime. The existence of the monster reveals that sublimity can only be ascribed to him if he is seen from a certain cultural position. The novel thus undermines forms of representation which appear as sublime, but which are in fact inimical to it. Foucault identifies this process when he discusses representation and perception:-

> [...]the analysis of man's mode of being as it has developed since the nineteenth century does not reside within a theory of representation; its task, on the contrary, is to show how things in general can be given to representation, in what conditions, upon what ground, within what limits they can appear in a positivity more profound than the various modes of perception. (p. 337)

The semiotic was retrospectively produced, allying *Frankenstein* to Foucault's emergence of 'man'. Sublime speculations are replaced by questions concerning representation, which is now problematised by the emergence of the unconscious. This notion of the unconscious, its self-representation, will be discussed in the next section, which entails re-reading *Frankenstein* through Julia Kristeva.

SEMIOTIC SUBLIMITY.

The concluding remarks of the previous section highlighted the role the unconscious has in shaping experience. In this section I will explore language and the unconscious in relation to Kristeva, suggesting that many of the processes which she identifies as integral to the subject, are applicable to *Frankenstein*.

In *Revolution in Poetic Language* Kristeva discusses the different

functions of the semiotic and the symbolic. The symbolic, for her, equates to language, and the semiotic to an ordering principle which is unconscious and non-linguistic; both are present in the subject, and cannot be separated. She writes, '[...]the subject is always *both* semiotic *and* symbolic, no signifying system he(sic) produces can be either 'exclusively' semiotic or 'exclusively' symbolic, and is instead necessarily marked by an indebtedness to both '(p.93). Controlling this is a theory of drives. In her account of the 'chora' it is possible to see a relation between the chora and the creation of the monster in *Frankenstein*. She writes that:-

> Discrete quantities of energy move through the body of the subject who is not yet constituted as such and, in the course of his development, they are arranged according to the various constraints imposed on this body - always already involved in a semiotic process - by family and social structures. In this way the drives, which are 'energy' charges as well as 'psychical' marks, articulate what we call a *chora*: a non-expressive totality formed by the drives and their stases in a motility that is as full of movement as it is regulated. (p.93)

The subject is both essential (motivated by drives) and nurtured (formed by 'social structures'). To identify the chora is problematic because it is non-figurative. Kristeva sees the chora as manifested by 'vocal or Kinetic rhythm '(p.94), it would thus appear to have more to do with form than content; '[...]the semiotic *chora* is no more than the place where the subject is both generated and negated, the place where his unity succumbs before the process of charges and stases that produce him.'(p.95). The chora is that which is hidden (like the Freudian Uncanny).

Thus, in Kristeva's formulation of subjectivity the subject is produced through social structures which highlight the subject's initiation into the symbolic (language). Underlying this language is an unconscious, unspoken, semiotic controlled by energy charges in the drive of the chora. The subject is simultaneously symbolic and semiotic, and the chora is

manifested as a nuance or rhythm, as a certain style (for Kristeva, principally in poetry).

This lack of unity in the semiotic chora is of relevance in relation to the monster. The monster lacks corporal unity, he is an amalgam of other bodies. Also, Frankenstein perceives this lack when he writes of his attempt to cover the body with skin: 'His yellow skin scarcely covered the work of muscles and arteries beneath ' (p. 105). Beneath the surface (the level of appearance) there is an excess which undermines appearance. That is to say, the surface is an insufficient form to adequately represent the monster, because the monster exceeds this surface.

This parallels with what Kristeva sees in the construction of the subject. What is left exposed in the monster is the 'muscles and arteries' or the life and energy of the monster; as stated earlier Kristeva has written that; 'Discrete quantities of energy move through the body of the subject who is not yet constituted as such[...]' (p. 93). It is later, when the semiotic chora is arranged 'by family and social structures' (p. 93), that the subject enters the symbolic. The monster early in the novel, parallels the energy that Kristeva sees as typified by the drive in the chora. It is pre-linguistic and resists the bodily figuration which the attempt to stretch the skin over the body's component parts represents. The monster retains this status until the sublime is exposed as a cultural (symbolic) form of perception.

When Frankenstein first sees the monster it retains the status of unnameable sublime object, 'A flash of lightening illuminated the object and discovered its shape plainly to me; its gigantic stature, and the deformity of its aspect, more hideous than belongs to humanity[...]' (p. 123). The monster has this status because he is identified

The monster is initially identified as sublime, and he thus equates to the semiotic. When the sublime is revealed to be a culturally positioned form of perception, then that form of perception is exposed as symbolic (cultural) rather than semiotic (sublime). However, the monster does partially retain a semiotic status (gestured to in his unnaming) which confounds attempts to classify him; he remains an 'impossible' body. Thus the monster (and the sublime) is revealed to be simultaneously symbolic and semiotic. This is apparent, for example, in Frankenstein's reaction to the monster's taunt that he would be with him on his wedding night; '[...]still the words of the fiend rang in my ears like a death-knell; they appeared like a dream, yet distinct and oppressive as a reality '(p.214). His words are both real and unreal, they are dream like and 'oppressive as a reality'. Here the semiotic and the symbolic over-lap, and this spills over into Frankenstein's confusion on his destruction of the monster's mate; 'The remains of the half-finished creature, whom I had destroyed, lay scattered on the floor, and I almost felt as if I had mangled the living flesh of a human being '(p.215). When of course, it is the dead flesh of several human beings. As stated earlier, what characterises the modern (in Foucault's view) is the emergence of 'man' as object/subject of knowledge, whereby the unconscious becomes the locus of 'truth'. This is also apparent in Kristeva's formulation of the subject, and is at work in *Frankenstein* itself.

In the following section I elaborate on this by introducing Kristeva's conception of the 'thetic', and her notion of creativity, both of which extend the argument that *Frankenstein* is principally concerned with the secularisation of sublimity.

DEATH, CREATION, AND THE THETIC.

David Ketterer in *Frankenstein's Creation: The Book, The Monster and Human Reality*[8], argues that in the novel there is a relationship between the scientist and the artist. He writes, 'The writer, like the scientist, works best in isolation '(p. 12). He goes on to collapse any distinction between the two, 'In many respects[...]scientific and artistic creation are understood as indistinguishable '(p. 12). This is a point exemplified by the way Frankenstein (not Walton) controls the narrative. Walton writes to his sister, 'Frankenstein discovered that I made notes concerning his history; he asked to see them and then himself corrected and augmented them in many places,' (p. 253). Frankenstein is thus a creator in two ways: of the monster and of the narrative, and they bear a similarity to each other because both are potential forms of mutilation. Frankenstein says to Walton, '"Since you have preserved my narration[...]I would not that a mutilated one should go down to posterity "' (p. 253). This notion of Frankenstein as creator (either scientifically or artistically) Ketterer links to masturbation anxiety. He writes that, 'To the extent that creativity calls for isolation and self-absorption, it might be regarded as a perversion of sexuality, specifically a form of masturbation or incest '(p. 47)

Aspects of self-love in the novel articulate this desire for isolation, but are also apparent in narcissism. The monster, for example, parodies the myth of Narcissus, catching his reflection in a pool. Frankenstein's project expresses self-love through the adoration by others, 'A new species would bless me as its creator and source; many happy and excellent natures would owe their being to me. No father could claim the gratitude of his child so completely as I should deserve theirs '(pp101-102). However, the

monster becomes, instead of a doting child '[...]an abortion, to be spurned at, and kicked, and trampled on '(p.263). Walton also reflects this narcissism, he had 'lived in a paradise' (p.64) of his own when attempting to become a poet. Both Frankenstein and Walton are self-taught and they share a similar craving for adoration as self-aggrandisement; Walton, for example, writes to his sister:-

> [...]you cannot contest the inestimable benefit which I shall confer on all mankind to the last generation, by discovering a passage near the pole to those countries, to reach which at present so many months are requisite; or by ascertaining the secret of the magnet, which, if at all possible, can only be effected by an undertaking such as mine. (p.64)

He mimics Frankenstein as blessed parent when he writes of the 'benefit' he will 'confer on all mankind to the last generation'.

Thus, in *Frankenstein* there are various moments of self-love, often disguised as self-aggrandisement. Kristeva writes of narcissism in *Freud and Love: Treatment and its Discontents* that, 'Narcissism and its lining, emptiness, are[...]our most intimate, brittle and archaic elaborations of death drive. The most advanced, courageous and threatened sentries of primal repression '(259). For Kristeva, narcissism is regulated by the death drive because it expresses desire for isolation. It becomes a social death which is overcome by eros, whereby eros leads to an identification with, and a necessary separation from, another subject. She writes that, 'In being able to receive the other's words, to assimilate, repeat and reproduce them, I become like him: One. A subject of enunciation. Through psychic osmosis/identification. Through love '(p.244). Narcissism, however, is for Kristeva, as it is for Ketterer and Musselwhite, linked to creativity. It is still, however, controlled by the death drive. In *Revolution in Poetic Language*, this is defined as a rupture in the thetic;

'Though absolutely necessary, the thetic is not exclusive: the semiotic, which also precedes it, constantly tears it open, and this transgression brings about all the various transformations of the signifying practice that are called 'creation' '(p. 113). Kristeva defines the thetic as, '[...]thetic signification is a stage attained under certain precise conditions during the signifying process,[...]it constitutes the subject without being reduced to his process precisely because it is the threshold of language '(pp. 99-100).

Again, it is through language acquisition that the subject learns identification and separation. The thetic is this 'threshold of language'; it is the primary stage that enables language acquisition to occur. It is also the stage which potentially pulls the subject away from narcissism. However, language can be susceptible, for Kristeva, to disruption through the existence of a fragmented other; here there is an irruption of the semiotic whereby, '[...]the Other has become heterogeneous and will not remain fixed in place: it negativizes all terms, all posited elements and thus syntax, threatening them with possible dissolution '(p. 108). This in turn is analogous to Jackson's version of the Fantastic. For Jackson, fantasy posits the existence of impossibility; it questions a culture's signifying practice, even so far as threatening it with 'dissolution' (p. 48). Thus Kristeva reworks her account of the menippean at the level of language. In the menippean a fragmentation of language takes place, there the subject '[...]has lost his totality and no longer coincides with himself '(p. 53). This breakdown of language is transgressive and disrupts the stability of true/false propositions. She writes that, '[...]all transgressions of the thetic are a crossing of the boundary between true and false - maintained, inevitably, whenever signification is

maintained, and shaken, irredeemably, by the flow of the semiotic into the symbolic '(p.110). As suggested in the previous section, this is exemplified in *Frankenstein* in the wavering between the monster's status as semiotic, then symbolic, then semiotic-symbolic. It is at the point in the novel (when the monster speaks) that the boundaries 'between true and false' are 'shaken, irredeemably'.

This account by Kristeva of symbolic disruption is not negative; as stated earlier it is linked to creativity. As she has said '[...]this transgression brings about all the various transformations of the signifying practice that are called 'creation' '(p.113). She goes on to link this with the expression of the death drive. She writes, 'In all known archaic societies, this founding break of the symbolic order is represented by murder - the killing of a man, a slave, a prisoner, an animal '(p.119).

It is the monster who represents the 'founding break of the symbolic order' through murder. The symbolic order in *Frankenstein* being socially defined in terms of family, friends, servants and lovers. Kristeva has said that this is true for 'archaic societies', and it is possible to see this as represented by the 'archaic' way that the monster is perceived. That is to say, that the appearance of the monster exemplifies what Foucault sees as the emergence of modernity; this is then juxtaposed with an older, residual, form of understanding which is confounded by the monster's existence. Frankenstein studies the arcane knowledge of Albertus Magnus, Paracelus and Cornelius Agrippa; he reads a 'dead' language which is metaphorically brought to life through the creation of the monster (who has a death-in-life status). In the novel the death drive is manifested through different guises. For Kristeva it surfaces through narcissism and through creativity. It becomes possible to see the creation of the monster as

exemplifying this death drive; exemplifying (metaphorically) an emergent modernity usurping that which has preceded it. The monster disrupts the 'older' way of seeing, and this disruption (or death) is repeated in the action of the novel through the way the monster literally kills the symbolic structure of the old order.

CONCLUSION.

Frankenstein can be read as challenging the sublime. Foucault has been used to suggest a parallel between the creation of the monster in the novel, and the emergence of 'man'. The novel thus exemplifies the break-up of Classicism and the arrival of modernity. In this process Victor Frankenstein relates to the former, the monster to the latter. The existence of the monster as speaking subject undermines the claims of the sublime to be a permanent metaphysics. The monster disrupts this old order by implicitly suggesting the cultural partisanship of 'ethical' gazing in the sublime moment. This charts a move to the secular away from the spiritual; a move to the fragmentation of the modern from the structure of the Classical.

The dynamics of the sublime in the novel can be read through Kristeva's account of the semiotic and the symbolic. The sublime bears an analogous relationship to the semiotic, whereas the monster's speech implies his entry into the symbolic, so that Frankenstein is forced to recognise (although always attempting to resist) that the monster is both semiotic and symbolic. In this, the sublime is revealed to be both semiotic and symbolic but its cultural determination is highlighted because the semiotic remains unarticulated. This links to Foucault's notion of emergent

modernity to the extent that Kristeva sees this process as imbedded in menippean forms. It is the menippean which prefigures the modern, and stands in opposition to religious doctrine and deals in the fragmentation of identity. *Frankenstein* can thus be read as an account of the break between the Classical and the modern or between a potential plenitude and a threatened absence. As the monster says at the end of the novel, '[...]I cannot believe that I am the same creature whose thoughts were once filled with sublime and transcendent visions of the beauty and the majesty of goodness '(p.263).

CHAPTER THREE: THE SUBLIME ON AUTO-DESTRUCT, THE RETURN OF THE PAST IN MARY SHELLEY.

INTRODUCTION.

In the discussion of *Frankenstein* in the previous chapter, the role of Albertus Magnus, Paracelsus and Cornelius Agrippa was briefly discussed. I suggested that their role was to exemplify a 'dead' language brought to life, manifested through the monster's death-in-life status. It is this return to the past in order to define, or influence, the present which I re-explore here. This entails a detailed reading of two Mary Shelley short stories, 'Valerius: The Reanimated Roman.' and 'The Mortal Immortal: A Tale.'[1]. I also briefly discuss Freud's 'The Uncanny'[2] in relation to a return of the past and the repetition compulsion. Initially I examine W. Jackson Bate's *The Burden of the Past and the English* Poet.[3], because it helps focus the major claim of this chapter which is that the return of the past (a Classical past) troubles the notion of sublimity.

For Bate, Classicism is defined as Roman. His argument is that the end of Classicism was due to its own apparent perfection. The guidelines for Art, as in the Epic for example, had become formulaic in Classicism so that the only artistic procedure available was that of imitation. According to Bate, a new artistic practice was required because the Classical system precluded ideas of creativity. It is for this reason that Romanticism was concerned with the idea of creativity and with how that creativity was to free itself from the burden of Classicism. This can be linked to what Foucault sees as the breakdown of coincidence in modernity. Language (or a creative use of it) can now be repositioned in new ways. Bate sees in this

breakdown (or break away) an emphasis placed upon originality; an engagement of the natural world becomes valorised over the perceived contrivance of Classical method. This move towards nature is never fully accounted for by Bate, but in this there is the genesis of the possibility of the sublime ('natural') moment.

The emergence of Romanticism is thus characterised, for Bate, by the evolving concept of the sublime and by the emergence of a new aesthetics to try and represent that experience. However, there remains a link with the Roman, a link employed in Romantic thought as a modern precept; this becomes apparent in Bate's account of Hume. Bate discusses Hume at length, emphasising his interest in the Roman historian Velleius Paterculus. At this point in his argument Bate is still accounting for imitation in poetry; he writes that, 'In bringing up this directly human problem of emulation, Hume resurrects some remarks by Velleius Paterculus (I.XVii), written about the year A.D.30 '(p.82). Bate places this at the end of Hume's essay 'Of the Rise and the progress of The Arts and Sciences.'[4].

Bate proceeds to quote Paterculus:-

> Genius is fostered by emulation[...]As in the begining we are fired with the ambition to overtake those whom we regard as leaders, so, when we have despaired of being able either to surpass or even equal them, our zeal wanes with our hope. It ceases to follow what it cannot overtake, and abandoning the old field as pre-empted, seeks a new one. (p.83)

However, Hume does not quote Paterculus directly, rather he writes that:-

> Had Waller been born in Rome, during the reign of Tiberius, his first productions had been despised, when compared to the finished odes of Horace. But in this island the superiority of the Roman poet diminished nothing from the fame of the English. We esteemed ourselves sufficiently happy that our climate and language could produce but a faint copy of so excellent an original.
>
> In short, the arts and sciences, like some plants, require a fresh soil; and however rich the land may be, and however you may recruit it by art or care, it will never, when once exhausted, produce anything

that is perfect or finished in the kind. (p. 70)

For Bate, the implication is that Hume has paraphrased Paterculus. There are obvious differences, notably the nationalism and the metaphor of Nature as Nurture. There remains however (if this can be seen as an unacknowledged paraphrase of Paterculus) the irony of Hume emulating Paterculus on emulation. This lack of acknowledgement is due to the problem that it poses for Romantic thought. Bate writes that Paterculus was variously used by '[...]Lord Kames, Alexander Gerard, Joseph Priestley' and 'Archibald Alison ' (P. 83). However, 'Their speculations tend to be limited and indirect, revealing a general, unlocalized suspicion that they seem unwilling to apply to literature in detail ' (p. 83). This suspicion, in the case of Hume, is due to the paradox of using the arguments of the ancients in order to dismiss the ancients as a thing of the past. There is thus a battle against Classicism in Romantic thought which is in danger of re-stating some of Classicism's premises.

To return to *Frankenstein*, there the persistence of Classicism has produced an anomalous object for Romantic thought. The monster is that past brought into the present. It is the dead discourse of Albertus Magnus, Paracelsus and Cornelius Agrippa brought to life. This notion of a physical resurrection is one which is punned on (unconsciously) by Bate when he writes that, 'Hume resurrects some remarks by Velleius Paterculus...' (p. 82). Also, in the Introduction to Paterculus' *The History of Rome.*[5], Frederich W. Shipley writes of this brief account that:-

> Abridgements are usually little more than skeletons; but Velleius has succeeded, in spite of the brief compass of his work, in clothing the bones with real flesh, and in endowing his compendium with a mere shadow of vitality[...]', (p. ix)

Historical accounts are thus perceived via a metaphor of resurrection.

However, as exemplified by *Frankenstein*, resurrection disrupts a culture's sense of its natural order. It is the monster, its mere existence, which troubles a notion of natural sublimity. What is left submerged in this is the part that Classicism (Magnus, Paracelsus, Agrippa) has played in the monster's existence. It is not solely the physical presence of the monster which challenges the structure of the sublime, but also its metaphor as a return of a certain history which has no formulation of the sublime within it. In this sense the monster is the product of a rule-governed form of artistic practice which for the Romantics brought Classicism to an end. However he is not a fully integrated Classical subject; he is as Ketterer points out 'a botched job' (p. 12), open to interpretation. This idea, of the past coming back to undermine the present, will be more fully explored in the next section which is a reading of Mary Shelley's 'Valerius: The Reanimated Roman.'.

ROMAN(TIC) DISPLACEMENTS.

Initially I will discuss the structure of Shelley's short story because the clash of past and present is represented by who has narrative control. The structure of the story consists of Valerius' account to an unnamed Englishman, and an account of Valerius by Isabell who guides him around Rome. The narrator is unidentified and is outside of the action. This enables Valerius to describe modern Rome in first person narration. The preliminary comment by the outside narrator is revealing. He writes of Valerius that, '-I can compare him to nothing that now exists - his appearance resembled that of the statue of Marcus Aurelius in the Square of the Capitol at Rome.' (p. 332). The comparison of Valerius to Marcus Aurelius

has significance in relation to Aurelius' *Meditations* [6]. There Aurelius writes:-

> Consider for example the times of Vespasian, and you will see all these things: people marrying, rearing children, falling ill, dying, making war, holding festivals, trading, farming, flattering, asserting themselves, suspecting, plotting, praying for other people's death, muttering about present conditions, making love, hoarding money, wanting the consulship, wanting the throne. Now that life of theirs exists no more anywhere. Pass on, again, to the times of Trojan. Again, all the same. That life is dead too. (pp. 292-293)

It becomes possible to see Shelley's story as a reply to Aurelius, Isabell takes Valerius to the Coliseum built in the time of Vespasian. The building inspires Valerius to a sublime-like state, 'The moon shone through the broken arches and shed a glory around the fallen walls, crowned as they are by weeds and brambles. I looked around, and a holy awe seized me '(p. 335). Valerius decides to live in the Coliseum because, '"If Rome be dead, I fly from her remains, loathsome as those of human life. It is in the Coliseum alone that I recognise the grandeur of my country - that is the only worthy asylum for an antient Roman "' (p. 336).

The recognition that he is the only 'antient Roman', is a recognition that his historical transcendence is alienated historical displacement; it changes his way of thinking; '"Yet suddenly, the feeling so dreadful to the human mind, the feeling of utter solitude, operated a new change on my heart. I remembered as it were but of yesterday all the shews which antient Rome had presented "' (p. 336). The collapse of Rome is associated with the demise of Classical thought. This is represented in the narrative as a moral fall, whereby morality is connected to a broader ethical structure; so that for Valerius:-

> When I died, I was possessed by the strong impression that, since philosophy and letters were now joined to a virtue unparalleled upon earth, Rome was approaching that perfection from which there was no fall; and that, although men still feared, it was a wholesome fear which awoke them to action and the better secured the triumph of the

Good. (p. 336)

Kant has a similar view of 'wholesome fear' when discussing men's display of moral virtue in an act of overcoming. However, whereas for Kant this is connected to the sublime, here it is left undetermined and 'open'. Ancient Rome is revealed to be pre-lapsarian. Valerius thus comes to recognise the ruin of ancient Rome as a testament to moral failure, and this becomes couched in religious terms. He says, '"Modern Rome is the Capital of Christianity, and that title is that which is crown and top of my despair "' (p. 337). As discussed in the previous chapter, Kristeva defines the menippean as a secular form. In this 'fantastic' narrative it is Catholicism which is vilified. Valerius says of the Catholic priest who was his protector during his first years back that, '"During my very short residence since my return to earth I had conceived a great aversion to the class of men to which he belonged "' (p. 337). However, at this point there is a two-fold process of redemption. Valerius adjusts to the times through an act of projection which comes out of a religious sense of salvation. He says of his difficulty in adjusting that, '"It was then that a kind diety interfered and, sending my good genius to watch over me, extricated me from any difficulties "' (p. 338). This sense of salvation is something also projected onto Isabell:-

> She is so frank-hearted, and yet so tender, that she wins my soul and binds it up in hers in a manner that I never experienced in my former life. She is Country, Friends - all, all, that I had lost is she to me. (p. 339).

Isabell is thus caught between two movements; one modern, her lifting his soul '"in a manner that I never experienced in my former life."', and the other ancient '"She is[...]all, all, that I had lost[...]"'.

If Valerius is alienated historical displacement, Isabell mirrors

this, and becomes historically placed as both ancient and modern. There are thus two movements in the narrative, one of the return of the past (Valerius) and the other a problematic attempt to inscribe the modern back into the past (Isabell). In the clash between these two the sublime becomes undermined. Also at this point Isabell takes control of the narrative. The anonymous narrator informs the reader that, '[The story ends at this point, but another and fragmentary version, told from Isabell Horley's point of view, follows in the manuscript]' (p.339). The effect is to suggest that the narrative is historical evidence, textual authority becoming historical verification. It is this notion of historical displacement which Isabell first addresses. She writes of Valerius that, 'He appeared to regard every thing around him as a spectacle in which he had no concern. He was indeed a being cut off from our world ' (pp.339-340). Isabell takes Valerius to a tower which overlooks Rome; it becomes a scene where the veracity of the sublime is questioned, Isabell tells Valerius:-

> This is of all others the place I delight most in Rome to visit: it joins the beauty and fragrance of Nature to the sublimest idea of human power; and when so united, they have an interest and feeling that sinks deep into my heart.' (p.341)

However, for Valerius:-

> 'You bring me here,' he said, 'to view the works of the Romans, and behold nothing but destruction. What crowds of beautiful temples are fallen to the dust. My eyes wander over the seven hills, and all their glories are faded.' (p.341)

This perspective challenges the claims of the sublime, revealing it to be positioned historically rather than ontologically.

Valerius is placed in the narrative as the ancient within the modern, as a pre-lapsarian subject; '"[...]the modern city is filled with the ruins of the antient. Strangers flock to it and wonder at the immensity of the remains. But to me it all appears void "' (p.341). This echoes Weiskel's

contention that there is a point when '[...]standing at the edge of the infinite spaces can be made, theoretically, to "mean" just about anything '[7]. Isabell attempts to reinsert Valerius into the modern world so as to show him how he is linked to it. The sublime object which she selects as an example of pantheism, is punned upon in Pantheon. She writes of the Pantheon that:-

> It is at such a time when one feels the existence of that Pantheic Love with which Nature is penetrated - and when a strong sympathy with beauty, if such an expression may be allowed, is the only feeling which animates the soul. (p. 342)[8]

Valerius identifies with this, but only partially, as the pantheism of the modern is different to the ancient God(s). Again it is historical displacement which challenges the sublime. Valerius sees the crucifix in the temple, while for Isabell:-

> The cross did not alter my feeling, but those of my companion were embittered. The apple so fair to look at had turned to brackish dust. The cross told to him of change so great, so intolerable, that that one circumstance destroyed all that had arisen of love and pleasure in his heart. (p. 343)

After this Valerius becomes increasingly defined as alien.

In 'Valerius: The Reanimated Roman', there is a critique of pantheistic sublimity. Isabell exemplifies the position of the pantheistic sublime, through her it is located as awe-inspiring, and is identified as a universal, trans-historical ontology. Isabell's position on the sublime seemingly survives Valerius' alternative version because he becomes defined as irretrievably alien. She writes that:-

> With my other feeling towards him, I had joined to them an inexplicable one that my companion was not a being of the earth. I often paused anxiously to know whether he respired the air, as I did, or if his form cast a shadow at his feet. His semblance was that of life, yet he belonged to the dead. I did not feel fear or terror; I loved and revered him. (p. 343)

It is possible to see in this revulsion an ambivalence towards the

historical. Valerius is a 'semblance[...]of life ' but 'he belonged to the dead '. He is attractive whilst simultaneously repulsive, '[...]there was mingled with these commoner sensations an awe - I cannot call it dread, yet it had something slightly allied to that repulsive feeling - a sentiment for which I can find no name,' (pp.343-344)

The repulsion is directed towards a fear of a return of the 'physically' dead. Valerius is described in such a way which reinforces a corpse-like status (his reaction to the sublime, for example, is one which literally leaves him cold). His historical displacement is not entirely forgotten. The story implies a possible romantic connection between Valerius and Isabell. However, again this is used as a vehicle to emphasise Valerius' alien(ated) status. For Isabell, 'If he put his hand upon mine, I did not shudder, but, as it were, my thoughts paused in their course and my heart heaved with something of an involuntary uneasiness until it was removed '(p.344). The physical and the historical collapse into each other. Valerius is out of date, and yet exists, for Isabell, in the modern as an ambivalent object of desire/repulsion. The implication for the historical is that its existence is attractive precisely because it is dead. The ruins of Rome, for example, are a sublime, pantheistic, object, a triumph of modern religion over the now decayed Roman myths. Valerius is thus an object of reverence because he represents the past which makes him in turn an object of attraction; this is tinged with a physical repulsion, implicitly expressed as a fear of necrophilia.

The story is a fictional reworking of philosophy's attempt to banish Classical thought (or to lay it to rest). It also encounters the same paradox, in that the attempt to break with Classicism makes it necessary to revive it in order to conduct a dialogue with it. Although Valerius is

'other' in relation to the modern, he is not fully marginalised by the modern. The first part of the story is his own dialogue, and although it is a voice which is superseded by Isabell's (the triumph of the modern), his arguments are never fully refuted. Rather, Valerius and Isabell talk past each other; any attempt to unite the ancient with the modern becomes impossible because the past is couched in a metaphor of a tabooed necrophilia. The introduction of the past into the modern has involved the formulation of a different view of sublimity. The significance of this is that although Romantic thought expresses innovation by distancing itself from the Classical, that distance is not very far and does not involve an effective dialogue with it. To introduce what preceded the Romantic does not undermine the Classical, but rather upsets the supposed ontological verity of the sublime. This means that even at its inception the sublime is a necessarily troubled experience. It could be suggested that with the pantheistic sublime there is the Classical engagement with structure applied to metaphysics. The sublime becomes a strict mode of belief, as later in Burke's *Enquiry*[9] where it is categorised by specific features, so that Burke's treatise reads as a catalogue of what is (and what is not) sublime, a handbook to regulate experience (ontology).

As suggested in the previous chapter, when the sublime becomes internalised, as for example in Kant[10] and Schiller[11], pantheism is negated. At that point modern thought becomes characterised by, to use Foucault's terminology, the emergence of 'man' as an object of knowledge[12]. However, there is also a movement that suggests that the pantheistic sublime is inevitably a precarious category. In the sublime an empathy with nature is posited as a 'natural' condition in the subject; that experience, however, is heavily codified, nature taking on the status of cipher for

God's revelation. It is not the disappearance of God from this experience which solely undermines the sublime, it is also the engagement with the past which cuts against it. This strict codification in the pantheistic sublime thus mirrors the engagement with structure in Classicism. However, when this is transposed into the modern in an overt way, the sublime falls away because the historical relativism undermines the trans-historical claims made for the sublime. Thus the pantheistic sublime is never far enough away from Classicism for it to become a fully self-sufficient experience. In the next section I briefly discuss this in relation to Henry Fuseli's sketch, 'The Artist in Despair over the Magnitude of Antique Fragments.' because it works through many of the problems encountered in Shelley's tale and because it highlights the fashion in which those problems are linked to a problematic creativity.

FUSELI AND THE PROBLEM OF ARTISTIC DIRECTION.

According to Bate the Fuseli sketch (see Fig. One) epitomises the position of the artist burdened by the past, and struggling with the 'new'. He writes that:-

> What is shown of the "grandeur" of the past is only the gigantic foot of some classical colossus and, above it, a great hand pointing upward. The modern artist cannot touch the hand. He is seated at the pedestal, half-bowed, with his left hand to his forehead, as if in despair.
>
> (p. 90)

Bate thus implies that the break with Classicism also involves a mourning for Classicism. The drawing can be read as an anxious search for a new artistic direction. Classicism is shown to be in ruins, whereby Classicism is defined as magnitude, that is, the artist's 'despair' is due to 'the Magnitude of [the] Antique Fragments.'. The drawing relies on organicist

FIGURE ONE.

The Artist in Despair over the Magnitude of Antique Fragments (Right Hand and Left Foot of the Colossus of Constantine). 1778-80.

Henry Fuseli.

imagery; it is not a fully integrated body that is in place, only a severed foot and hand. To put it simplistically, the hand gestures towards a higher authority, an older inspiration, whereas the artist reclines across the foot representative of earthly, secular, considerations. Within this is a juxtaposition of bodies, the broken body of the colossus and the human (complete) body of the artist. There is also a juxtaposition between the live and the dead, the real and the image. Foucault in *The Order of Things* writes that; 'No doubt, on the level of appearances, modernity begins when the human being begins to exist within his organism, inside the shell of his head, inside the armature of his limbs, and in the whole structure of his physiology ' (p. 318).

In Fuseli's sketch this process is worked out with the human figure of the artist contrasted with the Classical representation of the human, a 'human' with an essential excess. The 'full' representation of the colossus surpasses the human and elevates art above the subject. Here the artist has to seek new rules for art because the structure of Classicism is in ruins. Although the artist mourns the passing of this era, the past, as in 'Valerius', haunts the present in a way suggesting that the present is an empty experience. As for Valerius it may be the case that '"[...]to me it all appears void "' (p. 341). Again the past has been evoked in order to suggest that there has not been a radical break with it. It becomes something to grieve over rather than to celebrate.

Also, in the sketch of the ruin there is an obvious similarity to what Isabell takes as a source of the sublime. The ruins are described in terms of their 'Magnitude', and it is over this that the artist is grieving. The magnitude of the ruins does not constitute sublimity because it is an experience couched in terms of loss (grief), rather than pantheistic

plenitude. In this sense the giant hand pointing upwards mocks the notion that the 'splendour' of the ruin is pantheistic. Again the past is evoked in order to undermine the present. This notion of historicity will be explored in the next section through a reading of another Mary Shelley short story 'The Mortal Immortal. A Tale.'.

THE PERSISTENCE OF THE PAST.

Shelley makes reference in *Frankenstein* to Victor's indebtedness to Cornelius Agrippa, who reappears in 'The Mortal Immortal'. The narrator of the story is a pupil of Agrippa, and this arrangement is described as being a demonic pact. So that for the narrator, Winzy, '[...]when Cornelius came and offered me a purse of gold if I would remain under his roof, I felt as if Satan himself tempted me ' (p. 90). Winzy drinks Agrippa's formula for the elixir of life believing it to be a potion which would cure him of his seemingly unrequited love for Bertha. After taking this elixir he is transported in a way which suggests sublime transcendence.

> Words would be faint and shallow types of my enjoyment, or of the gladness that possessed my bosom when I woke. I trod air - my thoughts were in heaven. Earth appeared heaven, and my inheritance upon it was to be one trance of delight. (p. 223)

This state of sublime transcendence is only slightly weakened as the years pass and Winzy ceases to age:-

> I often called to mind that period of trance-like inebriation with wonder. The drink of Cornelius had not fulfilled the task for which he affirmed that it had been prepared, but its effects were more potent and blissful than words can express. (p. 224).

Winzy represents the sublime by becoming a trans-historical subject imbued with a feeling for sublimity. Whereas in 'Valerius' it was the dead being brought to life, here it is a case of a life which cannot die. In

'Valerius' there is a hint at a possible romance between Valerius and Isabell which is tabooed as necrophilia, here romance takes on the form of a suggested incest taboo between son and mother. Winzy says of Bertha after several years together that, 'We sat by our lone fireside - the old-hearted youth and his antiquated wife '(p.227).

However, this sublime immortality becomes burdensome, because although Winzy apprehends pantheism in the sublime moment, it is at the cost of being able to join with God. Thus at the end of the story he talks of returning his body to nature by leaving it open 'to the destructive elements of air and water-'(p.230). If this fails then:-

> [...]I shall adopt more resolute means, and, by scattering and annihilating the atoms that compose my frame, set at liberty the life imprisoned within, and so cruelly prevented from soaring from this dim earth to a sphere more congenial to its immortal essence. (p.230)

Here, unlike in 'Valerius' there is no collapsing of the physical into the historical. Rather Winzy's transcendence of the historical means that the physical stays the same; for this reason his soul is imprisoned 'for ever within its carnal habitation'(p.226). Winzy's appeal to 'annihilating the atoms that compose my frame' echoes the final words of the monster in *Frankenstein*; he tells Walton, 'I shall ascend my funeral pile triumphantly and exult in the agony of the torturing flames. The light of that conflagration will fade away; my ashes will be swept into the sea by the winds '(p.265). This cuts through Burke's notion of fear of death as a sublime state because it is the logical extension of Terror. Here a desire for death motivates in both 'The Mortal Immortal' and in *Frankenstein*.

In 'The Mortal Immortal' the present is historically transcendent, so that Winzy is condemned to repeat himself endlessly. In 'Valerius' the past returns and undermines the present. In 'The Mortal Immortal' the sublime

gets omitted because death and the 'real' ascendency to heaven becomes impossible. This idea of repetition in 'The Mortal Immortal' will be discussed in the next section in relation to Freud's idea of the 'Uncanny'. It is here that the emergence of 'man' is more fully articulated in relation to the arrival of the unconscious.

THE RETURN OF THE PAST: FREUD AND SHELLEY.

I will now look at how these tales can be read through Freud's 'The Uncanny'. This is a subject to which I return in much greater depth in Chapter Seven.

In Freud's essay 'The Uncanny' he writes that '[...]the uncanny is that class of the frightening which leads back to what is known of old and long familiar '(p.340). In 'The Mortal Immortal' life takes on this status because life has become endless, is 'known of old and long familiar' making it uncanny. In 'Valerius' there is no historical repetition but rather it is the metaphorical persistence of the past as historical displacement which becomes 'frightening' for Isabell.

Freud then discusses the etymological origins of the term 'uncanny' only to find that '[...]we get an impression that many languages are without a word for this particular shade of what is frightening '(p.341). This wordlessness equates with how the sublime escapes linguistic articulation and also links to Burke's notion of the sublime as grounded in Terror'[3]. In 'Valerius' the sublime is located as a sub-linguistic pleasure, for Isabell:-

> Why cannot human language express human thoughts? And how is it that there is a feeling inspired by the excess of beauty, which laps the heart in a gentle but eager flame, which may inspire virtue and love,

but the feeling is far too intense for expression?(p.342)

Freud defines the uncanny in relation to the unheimlich or unhomely. He refers to Schelling on this, 'Everything is *unheimlich* that ought to have remained secret and hidden but has come to light '(p.345). For Freud, this is the rupturing of consciousness. In relation to 'Valerius', this "unheimlich" is the persistence of the past, whereby that past is literally homeless; for example, Valerius' contemplation of the ruins of Rome. Freud notes a slippage between heimlich and unheimlich whereby they collapse into each other, because both become blocking agents in relation to knowledge. He quotes the dictionary, '*Heimlich* in a different sense, as withdrawn from knowledge, unconscious...*Heimlich* also has the meaning of that which is obscure, inaccessible to knowledge...'(p.346).

Again it is 'inaccessible' because it is unspoken, like Isabell's revulsion towards Valerius. What Freud identifies in this blocking off, is the subject's awareness of a potential recognition of what seems to be separate from it. For Freud this results in a psychological dilemma which is unresolved, historically, in the subject, as the return of the past is a return of the same; this is similar to how heimlich and unheimlich become a return of the same via repetition. Freud writes that:-

> The fact that an agency of this kind exists, which is able to treat the rest of the ego like an object - the fact, that is, that man is capable of self-observation - renders it possible to invest the old idea of a 'double' with a new meaning and to ascribe a number of things to it - above all, those things which seem to self-criticism to belong to the old surmounted narcissism of earliest times.(p.357)

Freud is writing about Hoffman's 'The Sandman', but it also applies to 'Valerius'. Valerius personifies this early narcissism; he is described in imperial terms as Marcus Aurelius. He mourns his own history, seeing it as corrupted perfection, and he offers a threat to the present represented by

Isabell. Also, in 'Valerius' there is no explanation for his historical displacement. He is the past in the present, history repeated. The other characters' acceptance of Valerius, their lack of surprise, suggests the inevitability of Valerius. Freud writes about repetition that, '[...]it is[...]this factor of involuntary repetition which surrounds what would otherwise be innocent enough with an uncanny atmosphere, and forces upon us the idea of something fateful and inescapable when otherwise we should have spoken only of 'chance' '(pp.359-60). Therefore, '[...]these considerations prepare us for the discovery that whatever reminds us of this inner 'compulsion to repeat' is perceived as uncanny '(p.361).

Freud is careful to separate the clinical practice of resolving the repetition compulsion from its literary manifestation. Thus, although he reads 'The Sandman' as exemplifying the uncanny, Freud stresses that literary representations of the uncanny differ from the 'real'; but in a way which renders literature doubly uncanny. I discuss this relation between the uncanny and literature at greater length in chapter 7, when I explore Neil Hertz's[14] reading of Freud. For the purposes of this argument I will quote what Freud writes of the uncanny's relation to the literary:-

> The uncanny as it is depicted in *literature*, in stories and imaginative productions, merits in truth a separate discussion. Above all, it is a much more fertile province than the uncanny in real life, for it contains the whole of the latter and something more besides, something that cannot be found in real life. (p.249)

This 'something more besides' is the fantastic; the fantastic becomes another source of the unspeakable here which Freud, in avoiding a discussion of creativity, leaves unanalysed. Freud, problematically, has used a literary text as an example of the uncanny, only to then separate the literary from the 'real' so as to destabilise that account of the real. Freud implicitly says that the literary is itself a form of the uncanny,

when it is the literary which provides the model for some of his analytical concepts; for example, Oedipus and here 'The Sandman'. Freud thus seeks to appropriate the content of 'The Sandman' whilst taking away that text's authority to represent the 'authentic'. My suggestion is that the literary has represented the emergence of 'man' as a category of knowledge, and has thus made possible in a figurative way, the possibility for the emergence of a study of the unconscious. Valerius is a subject who is an historical relic. In 'The Mortal Immortal' the elixir creates a pre-Nietzchean biological *ubermensch*. This 'emergence' of 'man' is for Foucault prefigured by the arrival of the unconscious, of the internalisation of an approximation of the sublime. Foucault writes about this emergence in ways that echo the arrival of Valerius into the present. There is an historical inevitability which appears to be strangely modern. He writes of 'man' that:-

> He is a quite recent creature, which demiurge of knowledge fabricated with its own hands less than two hundred years ago: but he has grown old so quickly that it has been only too easy to imagine that he had been waiting for thousands of years in the darkness for that moment of illumination in which he would finally be known. (p.308)

This process is manifested in the character of Valerius; in this there is a move from Classicism to modernity in which; '[...]in the profound upheaval of such an archaeological mutation, man appears in his ambiguous position as an object of knowledge and as a subject that knows' (p.312). However, as stated earlier, this movement is the return of the same. Romanticism, in attempting to free itself from what Bate terms 'the burden of the past', ultimately reinscribes that past into the present which undermines its sublime way of seeing. In this way 'The Mortal Immortal' is a (paradoxically) transcendental reworking of what Foucault sees as the 'Analytic of finitude'. This analytic is rule-governed, determined by

external features such as 'Labour, life, and language '(p.313). In this, '[...]the first characteristic with which this analytic will mark man's mode of being, or rather space in which that mode of being will be deployed in its entirety, will be that of repetition –' (p.315). Here Foucault discusses the technology of repetition, which is positioned as a transcendent ontology in 'The Mortal Immortal'. What is also apparent is a formulation of alienation, with the subject becoming estranged through repetition. This is similar to Freud's notion of the repetition compulsion when the subject is estranged from the primary cause of the urge to repeat. Also, in 'The Mortal Immortal', the subject is alienated from 'real' pantheism by being condemned only to repeat the weaker vision of the natural sublime. This is in contrast to 'real' integration with God in the soul's ascendency to heaven.

Alienation occurs in reverse in 'Valerius' in invoking the past in order to pose troubling questions about the authenticity of the present. There is a clash taking place which Foucault identifies as a characteristic of the emergence of modern thought, he writes that:-

> [...]there is a *nature* of human knowledge that determines its forms and that can at the same time be made manifest to it in its own empirical contents. There were also analyses that - by studying humanity's more or less ancient, more or less easily vanquished illusions - functioned as a sort of transcendental dialectic.(p.319)

The '*nature* of human knowledge' in the Romantic texts discussed here, is the sublime. The sublime is 'made manifest' through an act of seeing which is already determined. This is at its most overt in, for example, Burke's catalogue of the sublime, his itemisation of cause and effect. What becomes problematic is the notion of 'empirical contents' because there is a clash between the empiricism of Locke and Hume for example, and Romanticism's use of certain poetic, fictional tropes. This is particularly relevant in the

case of Percy Shelley. As Leighton[15] points out, there is a clash between a philosophy grounded in sense perception and the attempt to repeat that world in poetic discourse. This is because what is omitted from poetic discourse is, as experience is non-linguistic, the very experience which it is attempting to describe. However, the attempt to account for sublimity, as in the work of Burke, is the setting up of a new empiricism. Nevertheless, as identified by Foucault, and discussed in relation to the two Mary Shelley stories, there persists in Romantic thought an interest in '[...]studying humanity's more or less easily vanquished illusions -'. It is in this interest that the model of the sublime is problematised, not by something external to it, but by an internalisation which undermines its attempt to break with the strictures of Classicism. In the concluding section I briefly clarify and re-state the problem that the past represents to Romantic thought.

CONCLUSION.

This chapter has analysed how the past undermines the arguments of the present. In 'Valerius' and 'The Mortal Immortal' Mary Shelley challenges the premises of sublimity. In the former the past returns as 'other'; revealing that the sublime is historically contingent rather than trans-historical. In 'The Mortal Immortal' the subject transcends the historical, but is condemned to a potentially endless repetition. In this case the sublime moment mimics the meeting of the soul with God, so that the subject is blocked off from the ultimate form of Burkean sublimity (death).

It has been suggested here, following on from Bate, that the Romantic subject has a problematical relationship with the past, in particular with

Classicism. This informs the Fuseli sketch discussed earlier, which represents the artist mourning the lack of direction for artistic practice after the demise of Classical structure. Here there is the irony of Romantic thought's wish to break with Classicism in a fashion so that the ruins of Classicism (or of Rome in 'Valerius') become objects of the sublime. Again there is an equation between death and the sublime. Valerius is brought back from the dead, the monster in *Frankenstein* is created from the dead, with Victor inspired by the dead language of Albertus Magnus, Paracelsus and Cornelius Agrippa; in 'The Mortal Immortal' Winzy sees his wife grow old and die. The past is brought to life in 'Valerius' and *Frankenstein* through a metaphor of resurrection, a metaphor used by both Bate in his account of Hume and by Shipley in his introduction to Velleius Paterculus' *History of Rome*.

To conclude: the pantheistic form of sublimity occupies a troubling position in Romantic thought. Ultimately the major philosophical threat to sublimity comes from its internalisation as in Kant and Schiller. However the pantheistic form of the sublime is immediately put under threat by that which has preceded it, rather than by what emerged afterwards. Indeed, in drawing on a similarity between the Shelley stories, Freud and the observations of Foucault, it is possible to suggest that this refusal to break with the past makes possible the internalisation of the sublime: an internalisation which leads to Freud. In this sense the pantheistic sublime incorporates its own critique within it when it resurrects the past because the return of an historically pre-sublime past challenges the sublime. This means that the pantheistic sublime subverts itself from within rather than is marginalised by an external radical critique. Thus the return of the past can, paradoxically, be seen as prefiguring the work of Kant and

Schiller. As the narrator Winzy puts it in 'The Mortal Immortal':-

> All the world has heard of Cornelius Agrippa. His memory is as immortal as his arts have made me. All the world has also learned of his scholar, who, unawares, raised the foul fiend during his master's absence, and was destroyed by him. (p. 219)

The scholar is here emblematic of the self-subverting Romantic subject.

CHAPTER FOUR: PRIVATE LIVES AND PUBLIC WORLDS: FROM MORAL PARABLES TO DETECTIVE FICTION.

INTRODUCTION.

In this chapter I explore a progression in fantasy literature from the private to public experiences. My premise is that there is a development from experience gained in isolation, as in *Frankenstein* and 'The Rime of the Ancient Mariner'[1], to a point where the act of telling takes on importance. The significance of this is that the sublime is appropriated for interpretive purposes within an urban context. Therefore a central theme of this chapter is an analysis of the greater emphasis placed upon the community over the individual.

Another premise is that telling implies a community; of readers and listeners, which is a prototype of a 'lived' community. There is an argument to be made, for example, that certain aspects of Romantic literature prefigure the work of Freud. I discuss this in relation to the form of *Frankenstein* and the plot of 'The Rime of the Ancient Mariner', arguing that they prefigure Freud's account of jokes. In Freud's *Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious*[2] this same type of form is worked out, a joke requiring an implied community of listeners. This move away from isolated experience to public proclamation creates the possibility of reading the sublime into the public experience of the polyglot urban space. This accounts for the way that Poe's detective, C. Auguste Dupin, employs techniques which equate to Kant's[3] conception of the subject in the moment of sublime contemplation. The sublime is thus relocated in a fashion which alters it by making it applicable to interpret the communal discourse of

public life. There can be discerned in this a move away from the Gothic's reliance on silences, absences and implications to the more loquacious form of the detective narrative.

I explore these themes in *Frankenstein* and then discuss 'The Rime of the Ancient Mariner' examining the critical responses to the 1817 version. I have chosen this version because the gloss functions as an implied reader and suggests a community of readers. I then explore one of Mary Shelley's letters, where she refers to Coleridge's poem and which also contains an ambivalent response towards community. I go on to discuss Karl Kroeber's *Romantic Fantasy and Science Fiction*[4], paying particular attention to the respective emphasis that he places upon scepticism and reiterability within Romantic fantasy. These two ideas are also discussed in Freud's work on jokes, after giving a reading of which, I examine Poe's *Narrative of A. Gordon Pym*[5]; highlighting how community is represented and how this leaks into the strategies of detective fiction, when a community becomes defined as disorder. Finally, I explore Kant's 'Analytic of the Sublime' suggesting ways in which the notion of sublimity can be applied to community. This is something more fully worked out in the following chapter when I give a detailed neo-Kantian reading to Poe's detective stories.

TELLING MONSTROSITY.

In *Frankenstein* Victor tells Walton why he wishes to relay his story. This reason in a wider sense (audience addressed) is controlled by a compulsive moral imperative. He tells Walton:-

> Learn from me, if not by my precepts, at least by my example, how dangerous is the acquirement of knowledge and how much happier that man is who believes his native town to be the world, than he who

aspires to become greater than his nature will allow. (p. 101)

Victor here adopts a moralistic pedagogy which 'plays' upon Walton's own search for knowledge. Victor's moralising informs, as a warning, Walton's scientific project. Again, Walton says of his journey to the North Pole, 'I may there discover the wondrous power which attracts the needle and may regulate a thousand celestial observations that require only this voyage to render their seeming eccentricities consistent forever ' (pp. 63-64). It is this quest for scientific certainty which Victor problematises. However, bound up with this debate between ethics and scientific endeavour is an idea of public discourse.

This chapter examines a movement away from the private, as for example in Victor's solitary studies, to the public, as in Victor's public commentary on his private studies. The idea is that there can be discerned a development away from Romantic notions of solitude (as in Shelley's 'Alastor; or, the spirit of solitude.'[6] for example), to another (in some cases already prior) form which emphasises the importance of telling as public moral parable, as in 'The Rime of the Ancient Mariner'.

As stated in Chapter Two, there is an implied oppositional relationship between Victor and the monster. The former is characterised by his shunning of society, the latter by the way society shuns him. Victor wilfully avoids society, whereas the monster craves community. Victor not only works in solitude, but his early acquistion of knowledge is received in isolation. He tells Walton that, '[...]I was, to a great degree, self-taught with regard to my favourite studies ' (p. 88). Victor works in secret creating in the monster a secret which has to be explained; first to the Judge shortly after Clerval's murder, and latterly to Walton when the story is retranslated as a moral discourse. The novel links Victor's desire for

isolation to the desire of the monster. The latter, in killing members of Victor's family, enacts out Victor's desire for isolation. He recognises this after the death of William, where the monster is described as 'my own vampire'. He tells Walton, '[...]such as the deed which he had now done, nearly in the light of my own vampire, my own spirit let loose from the grave and forced to destroy all that was dear to me '(p.124).

Victor belatedly recognises the sense of community which he is losing. In this recognition is an idea of destruction as self-destruction, of loss of community as a loss of self; as he had said to Walton; '"[...]happier that man is who believes his native town to be the world "'(p.101). This loss of community is acknowledged by Victor after his destruction of the monster's 'mate', '"I walked about the isle like a restless spectre, separated from all it loved and miserable in the separation "'(p.214). In this loss of community Victor becomes ghost-like, 'a restless spectre', an unreal, because not socially integrated, subject. This is something which Victor's narrative readdresses when it effects an entrance into the public domain. This is a point discussed towards the end of this section, but it is useful at this juncture to explore the monster's relationship to a notion of community.

The monster says to Victor during their first meeting, '"Everywhere I see bliss, from which I alone am irrevocably excluded "'(p.146). Later the monster describes his relationship to the De Laceys. The important scene here is Safie's French lesson. Peter Brooks writes of this scene that:-

> [...]with the arrival of Safie, we have a lesson in French being offered to a Turkish Arab, in a German-speaking region, the whole rendered for the reader in English. This well-ordered Babel calls attention to the fact and problem of transmission and communication, the motive for language, and reminds us that the framing structure of the novel - Walton's letters to his sister...evokes the same concerns. (p.210)[7]

What is also discernable in this 'well-ordered Babel' is a prototype of a metropolitan community. I will quote Raymond Williams on Modernism here, because although he is discussing a period with different concerns and pressures, there is a way in which it makes sense of the Safie-De Lacey scene. Williams in 'The Metropolis and the emergence of Modernism' writes that:-

> [...]language was perceived quite differently. It was no longer, in the old sense, customary and naturalised, but in many ways arbitrary and conventional. To the immigrants especially, with their new second common language, language was evident as a medium - a medium that could be shaped and reshaped - than as a social custom. (p. 22)[8]

This is a point to which I return in a later chapter on Poe's detective stories, exploring how this urban Babel becomes located as a mystery. It is possible to see in the Safie-De Lacey scene an idea of emergent community, a community which the monster wishes to join. What is also revealed in the monster's language acquisition is his recognition of the importance that culture plays in relation to nature. I discussed this at length in Chapter Two when examining the sublime as a cultural rather than natural way of seeing. My suggestion was that because the monster is on the side of culture he critiques (through even mere existence) the notion of the sublime as a natural (ontological) way of seeing. Language acquisition places the monster on the side of culture, and this is linked to the (ultimately unrealisable) possibilities he has for insertion into the cultural order of a community. However, the cottagers perceive the monster as a natural artefact, and are thus unaware that their way of seeing is culturally informed. They reject the monster who, in a displaced way, rejects them by burning down their now empty cottage. This symbolically represents a rejection of community. The monster tells Victor of the burning of the cottage that:-

> As the night advanced, a fierce wind arose from the woods and quickly dispersed the clouds that had loitered in the heavens; the blast tore along like a mighty avalanche and produced a kind of insanity in my spirits that burst all bounds of reason and reflection. (P. 183)

The monster is here on the side of nature, a position opposed to the 'bounds of reason and reflection'. This is however, seemingly temporary, because with his request for a mate to Victor, he seeks to re-enter the cultural. He tells Victor:-

> My vices are the children of a forced solitude that I abhor, and my virtues will necessarily arise when I live in communion with an equal. I shall feel the affections of a sensitive being and become linked to the chain of existence and events from which I am now excluded. (pp. 192-193)

Victor's destruction of his mate, leads to the monster destroying Victor's own community when he becomes Victor's 'vampire'. Towards the end of the novel the monster leads Victor towards the North Pole, away from community; a community rejected in preference for solitude by Victor and an enforced solitude for the monster. The monster leaves Victor a message:-

> Follow me; I seek the everlasting ices of the north, where you will feel misery of cold and frost, to which I am impassive. You will find near this place, if you follow not too tardily, a dead hare; eat and be refreshed. Come on, my enemy; we have yet to wrestle for our lives, but many hard and miserable hours must you endure until that period shall arrive. (p. 248)

The North Pole as a symbol of solitude is thus equated with struggle and death.

Thus, in *Frankenstein* there is a clash between the desire for solitude and desire for community. The monster mirrors Victor's desire for solitude by enacting out that desire by killing his brother, William, his friend, Clerval, and his bride, Elizabeth. Victor then repeats this story as a moral, instructive, narrative for Walton's benefit. I shall now briefly explore how this process of telling exemplifies a move from the private to

the domain of the public.

Walton's narrative is in the form of a letter to his sister. It is sent from comparative isolation, the journey to the Pole, to civilisation. In a similar way, Victor makes public the experiences he has either had in private, or kept secret. He gains knowledge in solitude and then passes that knowledge on as a public proclamation of what science distanced from ethical codes can produce. Thus in the character of Victor there is a movement away from civilisation (his family) to solitude (his creation of, and subsequent pursuit of the monster) and a return to civilisation with the explanation which becomes Walton's narrative. Thus what has been learned in isolation, for Victor a troubling knowledge about the validity of a 'natural' way of seeing, is repeated in a moral pedagogical structure. It is these themes of isolation, experience and repetition which I will now explore through the critical responses to Coleridge's 'The Rime of the Ancient Mariner'. This is because the poem deals with similar themes as *Frankenstein*, but also because *Frankenstein* self-consciously refers to the poem. Walton writes to his sister that, 'I am going to unexplored regions, to 'the land of mist and snow,' but I shall kill no albatross '(p.69).

THE LOQUACIOUS MARINER.

The answer to parched isolation is community. (Woodring 1972)[9].

Here I principally focus upon other critical readings of 'The Rime of the Ancient Mariner'. The reason for this is that the critical responses bear an analogy with the relation that the poem has to the gloss (I refer throughout to the 1817 version) and the mariner has to experience. One of my claims is that in the poem there is an idea of an isolated experience

which is interpreted via an acknowledgement that interpretation mediates that experience. This is something I discuss in greater detail in Chapter Five, in relation to how Poe's detective explains the way that his solitary deductions are reached; the events of the 'crime' being mediated through a retrospective act of telling.

The 'Ancient Mariner' both moves from isolation to community through a physical relocation of the mariner at the end, and through the act of telling as a form of compulsion. As he tells the wedding-guest:-

Since then, at an uncertain hour,

That agony returns:

And till my ghastly tale is told,

This heart within me burns. (576-579)

This is mirrored in the heritage of critical responses to the poem because the poem is defined as a problem for interpretation. This is particularly apparent in relation to the gloss version, where the gloss is seen to control an understanding of an isolated sublime experience 'felt' by the mariner. For Lockhart writing in 'Blackwood's' in 1819, the poem is implicitly itself a form of sublimity; he writes that; '[...]the very music of its words is like the melancholy mysterious breath of something sung to the sleeping ear, its images have the beauty, the grandeur, the incoherences of some mighty vision '(p.368)'[9]. Richard Haven sees in the poem the themes of isolation and community as bridged via the use of objective correlative; '[...]the poem is the final and successful culmination of a series of efforts to create in a poetic object an 'objective correlative' for 'inner' phenomena which the philosophy tries to account for in abstract theoretical terms '(p.18)''. In this way the poem dramatises a move towards the communal; it becomes a figurative working out

of philosophical dictates, dictates which for Lockhart are linked to the sublime. In this way an objective correlative mediates the private into the public; or as Haven puts it, '[...]the Mariner stands as a bridge between the familiar and the unfamiliar, between the commonplace reality of the outer, public world and the extraordinary reality of the inner world of consciousness' (p. 20).

The gloss seems to problematise this. Jean-Pierre Mileur sees the gloss' relation to the 'poem' as exemplifying the failure of Rationalism. So that:-

> The inadequacy of the gloss's attempts at allegorisation to enclose the action of the poem or to disclose the order conditioning the apparent contingency governing the world in which the mariner finds himself reveals that coincidence is not a sufficient ground of meaning. (p. 68)[12]

It can therefore be suggested that the sublimity in the poem cannot be adequately contained by the gloss's account of sublimity. Katherine Wheeler sees the gloss as a relocation of a threshold philosophy (a philosophy which implies sublime apprehension). Thus, 'The gloss[...]would be a caricature of the irony of conventional perception, where the threshold experiences are constantly resolved into certainties' (p. 46)[13]. This is a caricature because the apparent certainties in the gloss are challenged. Jerome McGann links this to the critical history of the poem. He also sees this as implicit in the poem as the gloss functions as a prototypical form of interpretation which invites further interpretation (p. 151)[14]. In this way a community of critics enact the mariner's compulsion to tell; so that other readings become a meta-gloss on the poem. This is typified by Edward Bostetter's account of Robert Warren's 'A Poem of Pure Imagination: An Experiment in Reading.'. Bostetter writes that, 'It superimposes upon the poem a rigid and consistent pattern of meaning which can only be maintained

by forcing certain key episodes into conformity with the pattern and ignoring others '(p. 184)'[5]. The 'pattern' being Warren's referencing between a 'sacramental' vision and 'the One Life'. Here however, via McGann, there is a fashion in which the critical history of the poem highlights a problematic identified by Aers et al within the poem; '[...]this vision of obedient community [the mariner at the Kirk] is, literally, no resting place for the Mariner '(p. 95)'[6]. So that:-

> Since the verse text as a whole is explicitly about both the tale and the telling, it becomes itself tainted by the never-ending repetition: the telling is never finished, and, as a result, neither is the verse text. The end of the verse is practically the begining of the search for a new listener. The gloss writer may act as an example of such a continuation. (Wheeler, p. 45)

The poem thus internally suggests a critical response; also the poem implies that the move to community requires interpretation. There is a relocation within the poem of isolated experience taken back to a community, so that what appears to be a non-linguistic experience (the sublime) can be communicated. Therefore the poem both prefigures the heritage of critical responses to it; and makes a similar shift apparent in *Frankenstein*, because the emphasis is now on the act of telling rather than on the 'felt' isolated experience of the subject. An act of telling which, as in *Frankenstein*, is a moralistic pedagogy so that the wedding-guest:-

> A sadder and a wiser man,
> He rose the morrow morn. (614-615)

The poem dramatises internally what was to be echoed externally via critical commentary. This is a dramatisation from the specific to the paradigmatic (a series of critical moves) and a dramatisation of the local to the communal.

A similarity therefore, between the poem and *Frankenstein* is the

importance of dialogue; of language as possible community. An experience felt in isolation is transmitted as public discourse. There is thus a relationship between experience and explanation whereby experience is private but explanation is public. It is thus significant that Victor's experience is expressed in a letter, a narrative which highlights an implied reader/listener. This is an idea to which I return when discussing Freud's account of the structure of jokes. This will have a particular relevance for the Gothic by explaining how displaced social taboos are made socially acceptable. I will now turn to a letter of Mary Shelley's which is informed by these themes of culture, language and community.

COMMUNITY AS AMBIGUITY.

On the 22 January 1819 in Naples, Mary Shelley wrote a letter to Maria Gisborne which includes the passage:-

> The Italians are so very disagreeable, and you live in the same kind of solitude that we do - There is no life here - They seem to act as if they had all died fifty years ago, and now went about their work like the ghostly sailors of Coleridge's enchanted ship - except indeed when they cheat. Yet no doubt, there would be many things to teize(sic) one in England, and I remember when I set my foot on the shore in Calais, I seemed to break the thread of my annoyances. but I find care to be the thing that Horace describes it to be - and yet mine came from outward circumstances in a great part, and not from my self. The reports, you mention, have nothing to do with these - I seldom suffer them to torment me. When we see you again, we can talk them over, if you have any curiosity on the subject - but it was a kind of treat when we came to Italy to be aquainted with friends who knew nothing of us, as it were, in a public light - and that kept me silent.[17]

Shelley's reference to 'The Rime of the Ancient Mariner' is linked to the idea of solitude outlined in the previous sections. Her xenophobia: 'The Italians are so very disagreeable', defines them as an alien cultural community which leaves the writer/reader in a position of isolation, 'you

live in the same kind of solitude that we do'. The community is jokingly referred to as a dead one, as a ghostly animated community. Shelley is quick to counter the view that this could be extended to all foreign communities, but this is described in terms of a bridge of geographical rather then cultural boundaries, as in 'when I set my foot on the shore of Calais'. Shelley then sets another boundary distinction through an internal/external dichotomy. She writes of anxiety ('care'), 'mine came from outward circumstances in a great part, and not from my self'. The cumulative effect of this is to place community as external, as standing in opposition to the subject; this is linked to an idea of anxiety which is placed in that community. As in, for example, the perceived solitude due to cultural difference, or an enforced solitude caused by 'mass' opinion, 'it was a kind of treat when we came to Italy to be aquainted with friends who knew nothing of us, as it were, in a public light'. This letter is informed by various ambiguities. On one hand the community is opposed to the subject and anxiety is placed in the community of 'mass' opinion. In contrast to this there is another, rebellious, movement which resists this external pressure. As in, for example, 'The reports you mention, have nothing to do with these (external pressures) - I seldom suffer them to torment me.'. Also, in this alienated cultural experience of Italian society, Shelley discovers a form of friendship which she sees as working because it is ignorant of the 'mass' external opinion which has led to isolation. Thus in Italy Shelley finds both isolation and community, because neither has been unambiguously defined. Her final comments add to this confusion; she writes of having found a community of friends unacquainted with this mass opinion 'and that kept me silent '.

In this paragraph there can be seen a similar concern expressed in

Frankenstein and 'the Rime of the Ancient Mariner'. What is interesting in this letter is that community becomes a problematic area to define. It is defined as alienated along national lines, which results in solitude, and as alienated along knowledge lines, the new network of friendships which result in silence. What, however, is revealed is the position of an isolated subject making public the experience of their isolation. Also, Shelley is writing to what she sees as a sympathetic reader who occupies a similar position as herself, 'you live in the same kind of solitude'. This is similar to the positions occupied by Victor and Walton; the former reveals his secret knowledge in order to determine the position of the latter in a movement whereby the other becomes the return of the same. Also, the epistolary nature of this type of narrative implies the importance of making the private public. Experience is not confined within a diary format which would imply self-isolation, but self-isolation itself becomes the subject matter for communication.

There are obvious differences between this letter and *Frankenstein* and Coleridge's poem; the fictional works express a moral parable, whereas the letter is a confused series of observations. The effect, and the structure, are similar because all three construct an implied reader. This idea of the structuring of readership will be discussed in a later section on Freud's work on jokes. As in the previous chapter the suggestion is that the work of Freud is prefigured by these texts, in such a way that Freud unconsciously makes an ironic commentary on some of the themes within Romantic discourse. Before exploring Freud's account of jokes, I discuss Karl Kroeber's *Romantic Fantasy and Science Fiction*, because he deals with two themes which surface in the work of Freud. One is the role of

scepticism as social critique and the other is the reiterability of experience.

THE SCEPTIC AND THE SCIENTIST.

Karl Kroeber writes of Romantic fantasy that, '[...]the Romantic fantastic is a mode of turning critical skepticism against itself. Romantic fantasy in so doing seeks not to destroy skepticism but to define its limits '(p.7). In *Frankenstein* scepticism is related to a scientific knowledge produced in isolation. It is a form of knowledge defined as dangerously uninformed by (some unspecified) moral constraints. This idea of moral constraint is linked to external ratification; it is a morality articulated in the practices of the community of family and friends rejected by Victor. Thus political points (such as patriarchy and marriage) are disguised as moral imperatives. Therefore it is not Victor's endeavour which is criticised so much as his procedure. Towards the end of the novel Victor tells Walton:-

> [...]Seek happiness in tranquillity and avoid ambition, even if it be only the apparently innocent one of distinguishing yourself in science and discoveries. Yet why do I say this? I have myself been blasted in these hopes, yet another may succeed. (p.260)

This success depends upon Walton learning from Victor that 'the apparently innocent' pursuit of knowledge has certain cultural ramifications. In this sense *Frankenstein* critiques the idea of an obtainable absolute knowledge.

Kroeber writes:-

> Romantic fantasy does not defamiliarize the commonplace so that we may perceive the usual with its veil of familiarity torn off. It attempts, rather, the highly peculiar task of creating awareness that what we have come to accept as the only possible reality may not be as absolute, complete, or comprehensive as we think, and of urging us to imagine what in a progressive and enlightened and incredulous world

must seem inconceivable. (p. 71)

Scepticism about knowledge challenges the structure of experience but leads to a re-negotiation of these structures rather than their destruction. This is apparent, for example, in Victor's speech quoted above.

Kroeber thus identifies scepticism as one of the defining features of Romantic fantasy; the other, which he links specifically to science fiction, is the idea of reiterability. This is linked to science fiction because of a mirroring between the procedure of scientific experimentation and the subject matter of science fiction. The example which Kroeber gives of this is H. G. Wells' *The Time Machine*[18]. He writes about the possibility of moving backwards and forwards in time, so that experience is repeated. In this:-

> Without a potential of reiterability the experience of a distant place or time could not to a scientific mind seem entirely authentic. Extrapolation of scientific attitudes implies emphasis on replicability, and the work of art of an age of mechanical reproduction appropriately diminishes the importance of uniqueness. (p. 25)

To repeat an experience is to give it accuracy, but *Frankenstein* expresses a morality which ensures that Victor's experimentation is not repeated. In an extended sense, the idea of reiterability informs 'The Rime of the Ancient Mariner', where the Mariner is condemned to an endless repetition of a moral instruction. In this poem Kroeber identifies a lack of coherence which I have suggested can be seen in Mary Shelley's letter. He writes that in 'The Rime of the Ancient Mariner' there is, 'The refusal of fantasy to cohere with ordinary systems of order, so that in the very mode of its telling it casts doubt on the meaning of what it tells '(p. 35). This is something I outlined in the brief account of some of the problematic readings of the poem. Kroeber links this lack of coherence to the idea of communication disorder, 'Most simply, the story is of a conversation, the

intersecting of two utterances, which means that for either speaker the speech of the other is unpredictable '(p.75). It is possible to link, where Kroeber does not, this problem of dialogue with scepticism. It is an act of telling, as public discourse, which gives an ironic sceptical account of private experience. I will expand upon this idea in relation to Freud's account of sceptical jokes, seeing how jokes offer an acceptable public account of anti-social (or potentially private) experiences. This is because what such speech offers is an idea of moderation. As Kroeber, perhaps ironically in relation to the above quote, writes, 'The Mariner undergoes radical shifts in his physical circumstances, travelling through tumultuous arctic seas to oppressive tropic calm back to his pleasantly temperate home port '(p.75). The Mariner goes through an 'excess' of experience, which is non-linguistic. It is in the middle, between the 'tumultuous arctic' and the 'oppressive tropic calm' that speech becomes possible, when the Mariner is returned to 'his pleasantly temperate *home* port', to a community which enables communication.

Scepticism and replicability thus influence Romantic fantasy. Kroeber identifies the role of scepticism with the linguistic, or conversational, level. What, however, is also required is an implied reader/listener, a position which may be occupied within the narrative itself, as in, for example, Walton's letter to his sister. Also, the hypothetical reader/listener implies a reading community, and there is a link that can be made between language as cultural product, and the cultural as implied community. I now explore this in relation to Freud on jokes. This is because there is a similarity between the narrative structures discussed so far, and the controlling structure of the joke.

HAVE YOU HEARD THE ONE ABOUT...?

One of the categories of jokes that Freud examines is that of the sceptical joke. In this, as in Kroeber's account of scepticism within Romantic fantasy, knowledge is problematised. Freud formulates this troubling as a series of questions:-

> Is it the truth if we describe things as they are without troubling to consider how our hearer will understand what we say? Or is this only jesuitical truth, and does not genuine truth consist in taking the hearer into account and giving him a faithful picture of our knowledge? (p. 115).

Here Freud highlights the social nature of jokes, because they work in ways which make them amenable for public consumption. This is doubled in Freud's use of questions, they are not purely rhetorical but are addressed to an implied reader (hearer). In this way Freud promotes the idea that jokes function externally to the subject. Jokes only work when addressed to another, so that they are understood on that other's own terms. In one way this replies to Kroeber's concern with the breakdown in coherence between the voices of the Mariner and the wedding-guest; a breakdown which is resolved through the Mariner's celebration of the wedding ceremony that the guest is about to attend. Freud sees jokes as expressing altruism, and prior to his discussion of sceptical jokes he defines altruism as that which binds society together as a community. This is expressed as a philosophical aside (an interruption into his account of jokes); he writes that:-

> One must bind one's own life to that of others so closely and be able to identify oneself with others so intimately that the brevity of one's own life can be overcome; and one must not fulfil the demands of one's own needs illegitimately, but must leave them unfulfilled, because only the continuance of so many unfulfilled demands can develop the power to change the order of society. (p. 110)

It is scepticism which aids this process of social change, because for Freud the critique of knowledge implicit in sceptical jokes makes this possible. Again it is the case that these jokes are opposed to the external rather than opposed to the subject; 'What they are attacking is not a person or an institution but the certainty of our knowledge itself, one of our speculative possessions '(p. 115). Thus the critique of knowledge benefits the community; this social altruism of jokes is marked for Freud by an internal-external relationship. He writes that, 'The external obstacle which is to be overcome in the hearer corresponds to an internal inhibition in the maker of the joke '(p. 134). In this way Freud accounts for jokes via an implicit metaphor of balance and loss. Freud sees this as an economy, when (in the tendentious joke), '[...] *this yield of pleasure corresponds to the psychical expenditure that is saved* '(p. 118).

This metaphor of balance and loss is restated by Freud when he writes that, 'Relief from psychical expenditure that is already there and economizing in psychical expenditure that is only about to be called for - from these two principles all the techniques of jokes, and accordingly all pleasure from these techniques, are derived '(p. 127). The subject is psychically integrated into the experience of the joke work, which is placed within a social, communal, context that implicitly exerts a pressure for change.

It is the external, communal, aspects of the joke which Freud attempts to integrate with the unconscious. He regards jokes as making acceptable what has been tabooed; in this way they function as a rebellious form against socially sanctioned structures. Freud, however, recognises that the relationship between the joke and the unconscious (as that area which deals in the taboo) is problematic. This is because of the intrinsically

external, social nature of jokes. He writes of the difference between jokes and dreams that:-

> The most important difference lies in their social behaviour. A dream is a completely asocial mental product; it has nothing to communicate to anyone else; it arises within the subject as a compromise between the mental forces struggling in him(sic), it remains unintelligible to the subject himself and is for that reason totally uninteresting to other people. (p. 179)

I take it that here when Freud refers 'to other people' he means in a general social sense rather than to the psychoanalytical scene.

Dreams are thus defined by their asocial nature in opposition to the social, outward rather than inward, work of the joke. In this way a joke works through its reception to an addressee, so that Freud sets up the question of; 'Why is it[...]that I do not laugh at a joke of my own? And what part is played in this by the other person?' (p. 144). For Freud the least tendentious form of a joke, one which does not deal in a displaced taboo, is the 'innocent' joke; even here, 'Innocent jokes, too, jokes that serve to reinforce a thought, require another person to test whether they have attained their aim ' (p. 144). The joke is thus socially articulated. Also, Freud extends this by defining the joke as binding a community together. Early on in his treatise he writes that:-

> We may...bear in mind the peculiar and even fascinating charm exercised by jokes in our society. A new joke acts almost like an event of universal interest; it is passed from one person to another like the news of the latest victory. (p. 15)

There is a connection which can be made between this comment and 'The Rime of The Ancient Mariner ' where the Mariner passes on his information, his scepticism, for the benefit of the community. This also relates to the other theme which Kroeber identifies within Romantic fantasy, that of reiterability. For Kroeber scientific method is characterised by the possibility of repetition, scientific verification becoming established

through experimental replicability. Similarly both Victor and the Mariner tell their tales by reconstructing the events, by repeating them as a moral discourse. Their narratives reveal a scepticism concerning experience 'learned' in isolation, and repeat that experience (as telling) for the benefit of the community. Likewise for Freud sceptical jokes are beneficial to the community because they critique established institutions. In this way these types of jokes imply the possibility of progress in the diachronic above stasis in the synchronic. Freud proceeds to account for the function of repetition in relation to its effect on the joke-work. He writes that:-

> When a joke is repeated, the attention is led back to the first occasion of hearing it as the memory of it arises. And from this we are carried on to an understanding of the urge to tell a joke one has heard to other people who have not yet heard it. (p. 154)

The subject is here united in a psychical and social unity through a reinforcing dichotomy between remembrance and desire. The subject remembers the first time of hearing, and is subsequently transformed form listener to teller. If one controlling metaphor in Freud's treatise is balance and loss, here it is one of contagion. A joke only works if it is told 'to other people who have not yet heard it', who would, to follow Freud, have a similar 'urge' to repeat the joke in the same way. This is paralleled in the enlightening narratives of Victor and the Mariner. Freud also locates this urge to repeat as part of the joke-work *itself* because, 'It is[...]generally acknowledged that rhymes, alliterations, refrains, and other forms of repeating similar verbal sounds which occur in verse, make use of the same source of pleasure - the rediscovery of something familiar' (p. 122). Here, this 'rediscovery of something familiar' is linked to the stress placed upon memory. There is a similar stress placed on

memory in both *Frankenstein* and 'The Rime of the Ancient Mariner'. Both Victor and the Mariner recreate the past through an act of remembrance, transforming their stories into moral instruction. This links to what Kroeber has written about Romantic fantasy not so much 'defamiliarize[ing] the commonplace' as critiquing notions of the 'absolute' (p. 71).

As stated earlier, jokes stand in a different relationship to the subject from dreams; this leads Freud to place the joke-work in the preconscious rather than the unconscious. Jokes are different from dreams because, '[...]as a result of the part played by the third person, jokes are bound by a certain condition which does not apply to dreams ' (p. 173).

In conclusion, in *Frankenstein* and 'The Rime of the Ancient Mariner', there is a mapping out of what Freud would discuss in his treatise on jokes. They anticipate Freud because they deal in similar themes of communal experience being placed above isolated experience. Here the act of telling is a morally informed one, becoming a form of compulsion, similar to the Freudian subject's urge to repeat a joke. In all of this there is a move towards a celebration of communal discourse. Freud has been discussed here because his account reveals the insidious way in which this theme of the communal has entered a discourse (psychoanalysis), which seems to eschew the social. This is something which Freud only reconciles by placing the joke-work in opposition to the dream-work.

This theme of a move away from isolated experience to communal integration can be identified in the work of Freud on jokes. Romanticism has anticipated this possibility, and thus creates a space for an interpretation of emergent metropolitan experience. So far the two fictional texts that I have focused on share a similar concern about the importance of communal discourse; another aspect which they share is that

they are both voyage narratives. This form suggests that the move from solitude to the communal involves an idea of the quest. I now give a reading to Edgar Allan Poe's voyage narrative, the *Narrative of A. Gordon Pym*; here I show that there is a change taking place in this form, which reintroduces both a notion of sublimity and secular mystery. It is out of these two themes that the detective story is generated, and this idea is discussed at length in the following chapter. Initially I explore the novel's themes of the communal, discussing what they are opposed to.

MYSTERIOUS COMMUNITIES AND HYBRID BEINGS.

Poe's novel sets up an opposition between isolation and the community. In *Frankenstein* Walton writes of his quest that he hopes to find a tropical paradise at the North Pole; 'I try in vain to be persuaded that the pole is the seat of frost and desolation; it ever presents itself to my imagination as the region of beauty and delight '(p.63). For Pym, however, his visions of the voyage:-

> [...]were of shipwreck and famine; of death or captivity among barbarian hordes; of a lifetime dragged out in sorrow and tears, upon some gray and desolute rock, in an ocean unapproachable and unknown. Such visions or desires - for they amounted to desires - are common, I have since been assured, to the whole numerous race of the melancholy among men - (p.757).

Walton's quest is informed by Eros, his '[...]trembling sensation, half pleasurable and half fearful, with which I am preparing to depart '(p.69), whereas here Pym's narrative is informed by Thanatos, and it is death, or fear of death, which plays a major role in the novel. There is a mutiny on the ship and the survivors quickly run out of provisions; at this point they face a similar situation to that of the Mariner in Coleridge's poem. A

ship seems to offer salvation approaching Pym's ship, the Grampus, when:-

> Of a sudden, and all at once, there came wafted over the ocean from the strange vessel (which was now close upon us) a smell, a stench, such as the whole world has no name for - no conception of - hellish - utterly suffocating - insufferable, inconceivable. (p. 809)

This resembles the Mariner's response (although here non-olfactory) when he spots the ship of death:-

> *Her* lips were red, *her* looks were free,
>
> Her locks were yellow as gold:
>
> Her skin was as white as leprosy,
>
> The Night-mare LIFE-IN-DEATH was she,
>
> Who thicks man's blood with cold. (190-194)

Here death is described as a vampire, in *Pym* it is the corporeal death of community:-

> Twenty-five or thirty human bodies, among whom were several females, lay scattered about between the counter and the galley in the last and most loathsome state of putrefaction. We plainly saw that not a soul lived in that fated vessel! (p. 809).

Eventually the survivors are picked up. It is when Pym lands on Tristan da Cunha that an image of a harmonious community is evoked. Significantly, in relation to a voyage narrative, it is the albatross which is discussed. This discussion is couched in a pseudo-natural, scientific discourse, which would later be echoed in *Moby-Dick*[19] (see the chapter 'On Cetology'). Pym writes that:-

> The albatross is one of the largest and fiercest of the South Sea birds. It is of the gull species, and takes its prey on the wing, never coming on land except for the purpose of breeding. Between this bird and the penguin the most singular friendship exists. Their nests are constructed with great uniformity upon a plan concerted between the two species - that of the albatross being placed in the centre of a little square formed by the nest of four penguins. Navigators have agreed in calling an assemblage of such encampments *a rookery*. These rookeries have been often described, but as my readers may not all have seen these descriptions, and as I shall have occasion hereafter to speak of the penguin and the albatross, it will not be amiss to say something

here of their mode of building and living. (p. 834)

This naturalises the idea of community. The narrator then describes how this bi-partite community operates through a reciprocal altruism. The metaphor which predominates here is of an idealised version of the metropolis. Pym recounts that:-

> Having defined the limits of the rookery, the colony now begin to clear it of every species of rubbish, picking up stone by stone, and carrying them outside of the lines, and close by them, so as to form a wall on the three inland sides. Just within this wall a perfectly level and smooth walk is formed, from six to eight feet wide, and extending around the encampment - thus serving the purpose of a general promenade. (p. 835)

Community is here defined by an image of town planning. This altruism is extended into the description of the rookery as a fully integrated community. It is also a community in which no clear hierarchy exists. Pym writes of the paths that run through the rookery that:-

> At each intersection of these paths the nest of an albatross is constructed, and a penguin's nest in the centre of each square - thus every penguin is surrounded by four albatrosses, and each albatross by a like number of penguins. (p. 835)

This utopian idea of community is also an open one, Pym again; 'Although there are some rookeries in which the penguin and albatross are the sole population, yet in most of them a variety of oceanic birds are to be met with, enjoying all the privileges of citizenship[...]' (p. 835).

This model of community is implicitly juxtaposed with the events preceding Pym's arrival on the island. In the mutiny (and the counter-mutiny), hierarchy collapses. Pym thus describes an image of an integrated, naturalised, communism. What this digression on this utopian community anticipates is the island, Tsalsa, they subsequently encounter and which is hierarchically organised, a social organisation which becomes equated with barbarism. What is revealed in the account of the island is the way that it

is defined as unnatural; by extension, the novel suggests, the inhabitants are themselves unnatural. They are a community but not a civilisation, meaning that the novel suggests (as it does with the rookery) a relationship between geography and community. Pym writes of the island that:-

> At every step we took inland the conviction forced itself upon us that we were in a country differing essentially from any hitherto visited by civilised men. We saw nothing with which we had been formerly conversant. The trees resembled no growth of either the torrid, the temperate, or the northern frigid zones, and were altogether unlike those of the lower southern latitudes we had already traversed. The very rocks were novel in their mass, their color, and their stratification; and the streams themselves, utterly incredible as it may appear, had so little in common with those of other climates, that we were scrupulous of tasting them, and, indeed, had difficulty in bringing ourselves to believe that their qualities were purely those of nature. (pp. 851-852)

The community of sailors are thus confronted with an alien community which is defined as mysterious. It is opposed to the regulated natural communism exemplified by the rookery. The narrator describes a village which they encounter, where some shelters are tent-like whilst:-

> Others were formed by means of rough limbs of trees, with the withered foliage upon them, made to recline, at an angle of forty-five degrees, against a bank of clay, heaped up, without regular form, to the height of five or six feet. Others, again, were mere holes dug in the earth perpendicularly, and covered over with similar branches, these being removed when the tenant was about to enter, and pulled on again when he had entered. (p. 853)

This haphazard structure of the village refers to the community that live there. The implication is that they are untrustworthy because they are themselves ill-formed. The suggestion is that the state of the village represents some moral degradation, whereas the representation of the rookery implies harmony. The villagers kill the crew of the ship (with the exception of Pym and an original sailor from the Grampus, Peters), leaving the two survivors to hide on the island. At this point the peculiar nature

of the island is highlighted, a peculiarity which is posited as a mystery which comes to suggest the possibility for interpretation. Pym and Peters discover a chasm of black granite, again this is defined by its 'unnatural' qualities; 'It was, indeed, one of the most singular-looking places imaginable, and we could scarcely bring ourselves to believe it altogether the work of nature '(p.870). They discover some marks on the walls, and Pym says they '[...]bore also some little resemblance to alphabetical characters '(p.873). Pym at this moment becomes a prototypical detective. He seems to decode these mysteries. In the case of the 'writing', the marks, '[...]had evidently been broken off by some convulsion from the surface where the indentures were found, and which had projecting points exactly fitting the indentures; thus proving them to have been the work of nature '(p.873).

This notion of detection links to the way that the narrative suggests the elevation of the rookery above that of the village. What is apparent is an opposition between art and nature; the marks are 'the work of nature', as in the rookery. On the island however, Pym struggles to separate the two, meaning that a mystery remains mysterious. Later, on their journey, Pym writes that, '[...]the surface of the ground in every other direction was strewn with huge tumuli, apparently the wreck of some gigantic structures of art; although, in detail, no semblance of art could be detected '(p.876). Mystery also informs the closing lines, at the end of the quest; '[...]there arose in our pathway a shrouded human figure, very far larger in its proportions than any dweller among men. And the hue of the skin of the figure was of the perfect whiteness of the snow '(p.882).

The novel, as a voyage narrative, thus bears some similarity to *Frankenstein*. The narrative is controlled through the act of telling,

(also, like *Frankenstein* the duration of the story covers nine months). The novel, in part, sets up an opposition between an ideal and a lived community. This is located as an opposition between a natural and an unnatural community. Poe uses a motif of 'The Rime of the Ancient Mariner', the albatross, to exemplify this ideal community, an anti-hierarchical community integrated through reciprocity. It is towards the end of the novel that the idea of mystery takes control. The narrator confronts an 'unnatural' nature on the island, which is conflated with the 'nature' of its inhabitants. He thus becomes a reader/interpreter in relation to these mysteries, although an imperfect one, because the tale closes on the mysterious figure, which defies interpretation. Therefore, although Coleridge's poem and *Frankenstein* become moral narratives, Poe's novel develops into a mystery story. For this reason the closing remarks are outside of Pym's narrative and are an interpretation of it; unlike the gloss in the 'Ancient Mariner' which fails to contain the 'irrational' elements of the mariner's tale. These closing remarks carry over the idea of the detective story which the novel gestures towards at the end.

This closing account sets up an opposition between black and white. In Pym's narrative there are a series of sketches of the various chasms which he has explored. In the 'Note' at the end these are interpreted and reveal 'an Ethiopian verbal root' which is '"To be shady"' (p.883). The Note also interprets the marks Pym finds on one of the walls of the chasm, this is translated as 'the Arabic verbal root[...]"To be white "' (p.883). The Note also interprets one of the native refrains 'Tekeli-li'. The Note goes on:-

> Tekeli-li! was the cry of the affrighted natives of Tsalal upon discovering the carcass of the *white* animal picked up at sea. This also was the shuddering exclamation of the captive Tsalalian upon encountering the *white* materials in possession of Mr Pym. This also was the shriek of the swift-flying, *white*, and gigantic birds which issued from the vapory *white* curtain of the South. Nothing *white* was to be

found at Tsalal, and nothing otherwise in the subsequent voyage to the region beyond. (p. 883)

The suggestion is that the narrative becomes one of purification through purgation. It is the Note however, which explains the mysterious; Pym is caught up within the working out of these mysteries, and is thus not granted a privileged external position at which an analysis can occur. He is an as yet unformulated detective. It is also this Black/White opposition which suggests that it is writing which is to be deciphered. I return to this idea in the following chapter in an exploration of Poe's 'The Man of The Crowd'.

At one level the novel ironises this process of detection and this relates to the way it either celebrates or denigrates communities. The inhabitants of Tsalal are defined as unnatural. They have in turn, the suggestion is, been created by their unnatural environment, so that there is a collapse between geography and psychology, or between habitat and inhabitant. This is consistent in the novel and is first, overtly, formulated in the example of the rookery. In the rookery the community is an open one where all can enjoy '[...]the privileges of citizenship '(p. 835). Whereas in the community of Tsalal, the other has to be eradicated, because there exists a notion of racial purity. This is juxtaposed with the polyglot community of sailors, which would be echoed in *Moby Dick*. This idea of purity is expounded early on in the novel in Pym's description of the mutineer, and his later companion, Dirk Peters:-

> This man was the son of an Indian woman of the tribe of Upsarokas, who live among the fastnesses of the Black Hills, near the Missouri. His father was a fur-trader, I believe, or at least connected in some manner with the Indian trading-posts on Lewis river. Peters himself was one of the most ferocious-looking men I ever beheld. (p. 776)

It is the hybrid nature of Peters which initially makes him an object of

terror. The description goes on that his:-

> [...]ruling expression may be conceived when it is considered that the teeth were exceedingly long and protruding, and never even partially covered, in any instance, by the lips. To pass this man with a casual glance, one might imagine him to be convulsed with laughter; but a second look would induce a shuddering acknowledgement, that if such an expression were indicative of merriment, the merriment must be that of a demon. (p. 777)

The description itself lapses into a hybrid account, defining Peters as part animal, part demon, as both warped nature and supernatural subject. He is also anecdotally described, and, 'These anecdotes went to prove his prodigious strength when under excitement, and some of them had given rise to a doubt of his sanity' (p. 777). Here unnatural physicality and madness describe him.

Peters is defined in a discourse which is itself hybrid; so that Peters becomes part animal, part demon, part strong man (although described as being '[...]not more then four feet eight inches high,' (p. 776)) and part lunatic. There is an obvious parallel to be made here to the monster in *Frankenstein* who is also a hybrid being; 'His yellow skin scarcely covered the work of muscles and arteries beneath' (p. 105). Although this can be read as revealing the labour at work behind appearances, it also exposes the inability of language to account for, as a whole, a composite being. In the same way Peters is subject to anecdote, and is mythologised as barbarian. Both novels come to repeal this position in the realisation that appearances do not have a 'natural' signifier to signified relationship. In this sense Peters becomes a metaphor for the polyglot community of sailors.

What however, is also revealed in this is Peters' status as part clue. His hybridity (both black and white) is opposed to the idea of racial purity on Tsala. In this way racial purity (or ideas of it) has already been positioned in the narrative as the 'real' source of disorder, and not

Peters' 'disordered' physicality. Therefore the islanders' subsequent policy of genocide towards the white sailors is not solely motivated by pecuniary gain, but also eugenics. It is a community purifying itself through the removal of a threatening, white, (or in Peters' case, mixed race) other.

In conclusion, the ideal of an integrated community, as celebrated in the account of the rookery, is opposed to the mono-racial one of the islanders, and this has been highlighted through the initial misrepresentation of Peters. The implication is that Peters represents in a corporeal fashion, the ideal of a polyglot community; he functions as a clue in relation to the uniformity (expressed as disorder, for example as in the village) of the Tsalalians. This also surfaces in Pym's response to Augustus' warning about the mutiny on the Grampus. Pym only catches part of the last sentence, '*blood - your life depends upon lying close* '(p.770), '[...]I was inspired by the fragmentary warning thus received. And "blood," too, that word of all words - so rife at all times with mystery, and suffering, and terror -' (p.770). Blood is here described in a hybrid fashion, as mystery, suffering, terror. Blood as mystery, as a basis of racial purity, becomes an object of terror in the demonisation of Peters because it is linked to his hybridity (of being of mixed blood).

The novel idealises community in the pseudo-natural scientific account of the rookery. Peters is initially defined by his appearance, a sense of biology as destiny, and is further defined by an anecdotal discourse which highlights his hybrid 'nature'. This is subsequently, as it is with the monster in *Frankenstein*, expressed as a culturally positioned way of seeing. The ideal integrated community of the rookery is bodily expressed in Peters. These submerged clues (in a way, pre-visions) implicate the Tsalalians in a potential act of genocide. What has become mysterious, is

not the difficult knowledge of either the Mariner in Coleridge's poem, or of Victor's scientific researches, it is the community itself. In this clash between a polyglot and a eugenically controlled community, there emerges the possibility for an account of Modernist, metropolitan experience; of the varied cultural practices and linguistic differences which characterise the urban, and which become posed as mysteries themselves.

SUMMING-UP, LANGUAGE AND COMMUNITY.

At this point it becomes necessary to return to the sublime and see how it is redefined in an urban context as an interpretive tool. My premise is that in Poe's detective fiction (discussed fully in the following chapter), the detective C. Auguste Dupin, is positioned in the same relationship to a mystery as the subject has to the Kantian sublime.

This chapter has so far explored a development of experience felt in isolation which is later turned into public discourse. This is implicitly displaced in these texts along a culture/nature axis. In *Frankenstein* for example, Victor recognises that the monster is not an object of nature but is a subject of culture. The monster is a linguistic subject which opens up the possibility for his insertion into a cultural order (a community). This clash between nature and culture thus removes the subject from isolation into a potential community. For this reason the novel's form is so loquacious; it is reported speech sent in the form of a letter. There is also a near continuous process of talking about talk, apparent, for example, in the monster's account of how he acquired language by listening to the speech of the De Lacey's. In Victor's account of the monster words

define the peculiarity of the scene. Victor writes, 'His words had a strange effect upon me. I compassionated him[...]' yet '[...]when I looked upon him...my heart sickened and my feelings were altered to those of horror and hatred '(p. 192). The possibility that the monster may be cultural rather than natural adds to Victor's revulsion.

This loquacity is apparent in 'The Rime of the Ancient Mariner', with the Mariner compelled to repeat his tale, a compulsion which leads to his affirmation of community (his 'celebration' of the impending wedding, and the extended family that it implies). The parallel between these two texts is that telling implies community, whereas isolation is a form of insanity, of monomania[20]. What is also apparent, and which will be discussed in relation to detective fiction, is the way that telling reconstructs the events; so that those events are already mediated, or worked out as a narrative.

These ideas were discussed in relation to Freud's work on jokes, seeing how they prefigure his account in the importance he places on the positions of teller and listener. If in *Frankenstein* and Coleridge's poem there is an opposition between nature/culture, in Freud there is an opposition between private/public, or between dream and joke. The former is caught up within the desires of an individual unconscious, whereas the latter is specifically designed for public transmission.

It has been stressed throughout this chapter that the move towards the cultural implies a community of readers and listeners, through an act of telling which is a communal discourse.

Carlo Ginzberg's 'Clues: Morelli, Freud, and Sherlock Holmes.'[21], is helpful in clarifying the relationship between the detective story and psychoanalytical deduction. After exploring this, I discuss how the sublime

has been relocated by this move towards a public discourse, and the implications that it has for a reading of Poe's detective stories.

CLUES: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MARGINALIA.

Ginzberg outlines the work of the nineteenth-century art historian Giovanni Morelli, discussing the way Morelli examined the minutiae of paintings, such as hands and feet, and then drew up a list of similar characteristics between artists. This enabled Morelli to identify unknown paintings by the common characteristics shown by how these minutiae were painted by a particular artist. Ginzberg links this process of deduction to Freud and A. Conan-Doyle, so that; 'In all three cases tiny details provide the key to a deeper reality, inaccessible by other methods. These details may be symptoms, for Freud, or clues, for Holmes, or features of paintings, for Morelli' (p.87). There is thus a similarity between symptom, clue and feature. The marginalia expresses a greater reality; so that the analyser deduces through an examination of metonymy. The relation of Morelli to Freud is one which Ginzberg sees as prefiguring psychoanalysis. He quotes Freud on Morelli in 'The Moses of Michelangelo'[22], 'It seems to me that his method of enquiry is closely related to the technique of psychoanalysis' (p.85). Ginzberg speculates on the origin of such logic, creating an argument about early hunting, so that; 'The hunter could have been the first "to tell a story" because only hunters knew how to read a coherent sequence of events from the silent (even imperceptible) signs left by their prey' (p.89). Ginzberg's account of the emergence of the detective story is thus couched in the metaphors which he is attempting to analyse, i.e. his speculation on the first 'clue' as to where such fictions have

originated.

Ginzberg then outlines the history of modern criminality, with the rise of finger-printing as a marking of an individual's identity. What is apparent in the figures he discusses, - Freud, Holmes, and Morelli, is what they are opposed to - 'illness', crime, and ignorance. They attempt to explain the mysterious by finding an absolute answer. It is a problematic search for an absolute answer which characterises Kant's speculations, which I will now discuss in relation to Poe's peculiar form of detective fiction.

THE KANTIAN SUBLIME.

Here I reassess Kant's idea of the sublime, making parallels between it and detective fiction. Kant's 'Analytic of the Sublime' closes with an account of jokes. It is significant that Kant discusses jokes, because they supply a social structure (developed in the work of Freud) to his speculations concerning the role of the subject in sublime contemplation.

Kant makes an early distinction between beauty and sublimity. The former is controlled by a limit placed upon it, whereas in the latter; - '[...]the sublime is to be found in an object even devoid of form, so far as it immediately involves, or else by its presence provokes, a representation of *limitlessness*, yet with a super-added thought of its totality' (p.90). The 'formless' object implies an apprehension couched in metonymy (as in symptomology). A part implies 'a super-added thought of its totality'. However, the object has a particular application for Kant; it implies something external to the subject and therefore has no place in sublime contemplation; '[...]the sublime is not to be looked for in the

things of nature, but only in our own ideas '(p.97). And this is because '[...]the sublime [is][...]a presentation of an indeterminate concept of reason '(p.91). Therefore the sublime maps out the mental structure of reason; it is a failed attempt to encompass the object. However, in this failure the potential of reason is apprehended. Kant thus defines thought as revealing the presence of the supersensible realm in which a 'totalising' reasoning is suggested. He writes that, 'the *mere ability even to think* the given infinite without contradiction, is something that requires the presence in the human mind of a faculty that is itself supersensible '(p.103). This appears to imply a totality; however, this totality is potentially knowable so that reasoning is left 'open'.

With the mathematical sublime the subject has to grasp the object aesthetically because mathematical concepts are unable to define 'vastness'. This failure of reason, this 'openness' appears to imply an incapacity in the subject, but gestures towards the potential reason it suggests; '[...]the Subject's very incapacity betrays the consciousness of an unlimited faculty of the same Subject, and the mind can only form an aesthetic estimate of the latter faculty by means of that incapacity '(p.108). This seems to suggest the opposite of detective fiction. In Poe's stories there can be only one possible, absolute, answer to the mystery. A totality is therefore apprehended in its completeness. Nevertheless these stories relate to Kant, because they can be read as a fully worked out version of what an attainment of the supersensible may be. In this way Poe's detective is positioned in a similar relationship to a mystery as Kant's subject is in the act of sublime contemplation. It is Poe's detective who can be seen as 'mind', Kant again; '[...]instead of the object, it is rather the cast of the mind in appreciating it that we have

to estimate as *sublime* '(p. 104).

Dupin's typical pre-mystery state is one of inertia; like the subject in the sublime, he is only animated by mystery. Kant writes of the distinction between sublimity and aesthetic judgement that, 'The mind feels itself *set in motion* in the representation of the sublime in nature; whereas in the aesthetic judgement upon what is beautiful therein it is in *restful* contemplation '(p. 107). Dupin approximates to Kant's idea of the morally correct subject. He writes of this subject that they inspire the greatest admiration; he writes of this 'admirable' subject that; 'It is a man who is undaunted, who knows no fear, and who, therefore, does not give way to danger, but sets manfully to work with full deliberation '(p. 112). This is of significance in relation to culture, which Kant sees as being structured for the moral benefit of the community. Therefore there is a return of the importance placed on the communal over the individual. Thus although Kant discusses the subject in isolation, this is transformed into a communal accord via the suggestion of a universal psychological theory of mind. There is thus a certain sociability via a shared sensibility. Again there is the moralising aspect here which was apparent (although differently) in *Frankenstein* and 'The Rime of the Ancient Mariner', whereby community articulates an intrinsic moral worth. Kant writes that:-

> [...]the fact that culture is requisite for the judgement upon the sublime in nature...does not involve its being an original product of culture and something introduced in a more or less conventional way into society. Rather it is in human nature that its foundations are laid, and, in fact, in that which, at once with common understanding, we may expect every one to possess and may require of him, namely, a native capacity for the feeling for (practical) ideas, i.e. for moral feeling. (p. 116)

Community is constructed of moral subjects, a harmonious community which is echoed in Pym's account of the rookery. Because this moral law is internal

to the subject, culture (as it would for Freud) does not place constraints upon the altruistic subject; 'The moral law[...]is a sufficient and original source of determination within us: so it does not for a moment permit us to cast about for a ground of determination external to itself '(p.128). If there is any notion of constraint here it is that of 'human nature' which does not 'permit us' to be externally ratified.

Kant thus defines the subject as possessing a universalist mode of understanding, and at the base of this is a defining morality, and it is this idea of morality which is culturally expressed as a communal discourse.

In the previous section on Freud I described an opposition between dream-work and joke-work, which is a clash between individual and public realms. Here, because Kant has been discussing the public realm he examines certain cultural artefacts, in particular the Arts. At the end of this account he discusses the role of jokes. He writes of jokes as articulating a potential disorder, 'It is observable that in all such cases the joke must have something in it capable of momentarily deceiving us '(p.201). And this is because there is an opposition between the social practice of the joke and a rigorous critical analysis of it. Or as Freud puts it, 'If one laughs at a joke really heartily, one is not in precisely the best mood for investigating its technique '(p.49). So that, '[...]it remains an uncontradicted fact if we undo the technique of a joke it disappears '(p.73). For Kant, the joke offers '(a topsy-turvy view of things.)' (p.203).

Kant and Freud differ in emphasis, as Kant does not rigorously critique the joke. There is however a point of similarity which relates to fantasy fiction. In fantasy a 'topsy-turvy view of things' occurs. Also, this is

relevant to detective fiction, in that it is a disordering (a mystery) which has to be solved. Likewise in Freud's account of jokes, there is the idea that jokes make socially acceptable tabooed forms of desire or language. Similarly fantasy can be read as dealing with the 'ethical' triumph over the anti-social; it is a socially acceptable representation of the anti-social because the latter is marginalised by the former. Also, this idea of the anti-social is developed in detective fiction via a discourse of criminality.

In Kant then, community is elevated above isolation. This is worked out by Freud in relation to the public domain of jokes. It is the movement from the private to the public which is apparent in both *Frankenstein* and 'The Rime of the Ancient Mariner'. In Poe's *The Narrative of A. Gordon Pym* the tale ends with a mystery which is partially unravelled by the appended Note. It climaxes with the possibility of detective work; public loquacity has now taken over from private silence.

CHAPTER FIVE: REPRESENTATION OF THE SUBLIME IN WORDSWORTH, REPRESENTATION OF KANT IN POE.

INTRODUCTION.

In this chapter I explore the way that Poe's detective tales implicitly rely upon neo-Kantian ideas; this exemplifies the transformation of the sublime from the Natural into the urban (or cultural). Initially I discuss Book VII of *The Prelude* (1805)[1], where Wordsworth judges the urban in terms of the sublime, reaching the conclusion that the urban excludes sublimity. I then juxtapose this part of *The Prelude* with Samuel Johnson's poem 'London'[2]. This highlights the differences between an urban space examined via the sublime and the same space examined through ideas of nationalism (that is, nationalism as a prescriptive form of control). This also helps to reveal Johnson's allegiance to the tenets of Classicism and clarifies the different preoccupations of Classicism and Romanticism.

I then discuss Poe's tale 'The Man of the Crowd'[3], exploring how urban mysteries are handled; I extend this discussion to his detective tales. In looking at Poe's detective tales I focus on 'The Murders in the Rue Morgue' and 'The Purloined Letter'[4], because it is there that Dupin outlines the 'laws' which he sees as governing the subject. When looking at these tales I principally focus on the accounts of reasoning which each tale sets up, rather than with an analysis of the action itself. This is because it is in Dupin's theorising, rather than in his actions that neo-Kantian ideas are constructed. Finally, I examine Poe's tale 'Mesmeric Revelation'[5] because it offers an alternative re-working of neo-Kantian ideas and anticipates a formulation of the unconscious. This latter point will become the subject

for a later chapter.

This chapter thus explores the possibility of employing the sublime to interpret an urban context. The argument is that Poe makes just such an employment whereby the sublime becomes equated with a mystery which requires solving. This use of the sublime is precluded by Wordsworth because the poet regards the urban as inimical to sublimity. It is to Wordsworth's account of the urban which I will now turn; after making some prefatory comments concerning Poe's 'The Man of the Crowd'.

WORDSWORTH AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CITY.

> How often in the overflowing Streets,
> Have I gone forward with the Crowd, and said
> Unto myself, the face of every one
> That passes by me is a mystery. (*The Prelude*, 595-598)

> With my brow to the glass, I was thus occupied in scrutinizing the mob, when suddenly there came into view a countenance (that of a decrepid old man, some sixty-five or seventy years of age) - a countenance which at once arrested and absorbed my whole attention, on account of the absolute idiosyncrasy of its expression. Any thing even remotely resembling that expression I had never seen before.
>
> 'The Man of the Crowd', p. 478.

Wordsworth and Poe's narrator share a sense of urban perplexity. For the narrator of 'The Man of the Crowd' there is an implicit logic, expressed as a social hierarchy, which enables the city to be read. The anomalous character that the narrator follows defies this logic because he belongs fully within the crowd. This position is in opposition to the inscription within a certain social position which secures identity in a hierarchy imposed on that crowd. This idea of inscription, or of an inscription which can be 'read' in a cogent way, is expressed in the opening of the tale. The narrator begins with, 'It was well said of a

certain German book that "*er lasst sich nicht lesen*" - it does not permit itself to be read' (p. 475). There is thus set up at the beginning an idea of interpreting that which does not reveal a 'closed' interpretation; the German is translated (re-interpreted) into English, only for that message to spell out the impossibility of a particular act of interpretation. This is echoed in the tale with the man of the crowd, who is of the crowd, but does not properly belong to it; who is interpreted in relation to the crowd and deemed to be anomalous. These ideas are examined later when Poe's detective tales are explored. There can however be seen at this stage an important difference between Poe's narrator's view of the city and Wordsworth's. For the latter the city is in its totality a mystery, a mystery which Wordsworth attempts to place within the parameters of the natural sublime[6].

At this point I discuss Book VII of *The Prelude*, seeing how Wordsworth represents the city. The contention is that Wordsworth sees the city through a Culture/Nature opposition which precludes the possibility of sublimity; whereas in Poe's detective tales the sublime is re-inscribed at the level of urban mystery. As in 'The Man of the Crowd', a mystery is a specific anomaly which takes on the guise of the sublime by virtue of being posed as a problem of interpretation. This point is explored in a later section.

In *The Prelude* Wordsworth contrasts his conception of London and his experience of it as lived reality. He writes that:-

> My fancy had shap'd forth, of sights and shows,
> Processions, Equipages, Lords and Dukes,
> The King, and the King's Palace, and not last
> Or least, heaven bless him! the renown'd Lord Mayor. (109-112)

This preconceived social grandeur contrasts with the babel-like

mercantilism and crude representation of grandeur that confronts the poet in the city:-

> Here there and everywhere a weary throng
> The Comers and the Goers face to face,
> Face after face; the string of dazzling wares,
> Shop after shop, with Symbols, blazon'd Names,
> And all the Tradesman's honours overhead;
> Here, fronts of houses, like a title-page
> With letters huge inscribed from top to toe;
> Station'd above the door, like guardian Saints,
> There, allegoric shapes, female or male;
> Or physiognomies of real men,
> Lord-Warriors, Kings, or Admirals of the Sea,
> Boyle, Shakespear, Newton, or the attractive head
> Of some Scotch doctor, famous in his day. (171-183)

It is the 'symbols' and 'blazon'd Names' which Wordsworth comes to identify as falsehoods. The experience of the city is at one remove from his preconception of it. Instead of finding 'Lords and Dukes,/The King,' there are 'allegoric shapes', 'physiognomies of real men'. He thus focuses upon forms of false representation. As in, for example, the shops which are represented as text, 'Here, fronts of houses, like a title-page/with letters huge inscribed from top to toe', in this sense the city is too open to reading. As in 'The Man of the Crowd' the text becomes cited as that which problematises interpretation. This is more fully articulated in the poem when he writes of the 'mechanic Artist' who represents:-

> By scale exact, in Model, wood or clay,
> From shading colours also borrowing help.
> Some miniature of famous spots and things
> Domestic, or the boast of foreign Realms; (266-269)

The poet's travel into the city is prefigured by a preconception of the city as the location of social grandeur. The actual experience of that city is 'felt' as a play of representation, an idea of the city as aping that from which it is excluded, i.e. nature. At these moments Wordsworth introduces a nature/culture divide, which separates the city from a

natural, pantheistic conception of what constitutes the 'real':-

> At leisure let us view, from day to day,
> As they present themselves, the Spectacles
> Within doors, troops of wild Beasts, birds and beasts
> Of every nature, from all climes convened;
> And, next to these, those mimic sights that ape
> The absolute presence of reality,
> Expressing, as in mirror, sea and land,
> And what earth is, and what she has to shew; (244-251)

This 'absolute presence of reality' contrasts with the experience of the city which is a play upon purported representation:-

> Though rear'd upon the base of outward things,
> These, chiefly, are such structures as the mind
> Builds for itself. (624-626)

The urban experience is not suited to sublimity, it has a false logic of its own. As Max Byrd puts it: '[...]the construction remains incomplete, and Wordsworth fails to grasp some essential element of what he is describing, fails to compress his perceptions into a metaphor of sublimity: no face appears '(p. 139)[7]. It is however the absence of sublimity which ironically conjures up the 'true' formulation of the sublime. The city therefore negatively refers the poet to the natural sublime. Wordsworth writes of the city that:-

> If aught there were of real grandeur here
> 'Twas only then when gross realities,
> The incarnation of the Spirits that mov'd
> Amid the Poet's beauteous world, call'd forth,
> With that distinctness which a contrast gives
> Or opposition, made me recognise
> As by a glimpse, the things which I had shaped
> And yet not shaped, had seen, and scarcely seen,
> Had felt, and thought of in my solitude. (508-516)

The closing lines gesture towards the poet's authentic feel for the sublime, and his authentic representation of it. The urban is seen as the domain of mimicry, nature the domain of 'truth'. This connection between artifice and culture is established earlier in Book VII, in the

representation of mother and child. Here Wordsworth writes of:-

> A rosy Babe, who, for a twelvemonth's space
> Perhaps, had been of age to deal about
> Articulate prattle, Child as beautiful
> As ever sate upon a Mother's knee;
> The other was the Parent of that Babe;
> But on the Mother's cheek the tints were false,
> A painted bloom. (368-374)

Here culture is post-lapsarian. Mary Jacobus writes of this scene that:-

> I want to emphasize the displacement from mother to child, since it will help to refine one common reading of the episode: namely, that it allows Wordsworth to depict himself as ultimately uncontaminated by the fall into writing or representation which London symbolises in Book VII of *The Prelude*. (p. 211)[8]

The implication is that the sublime cannot be represented because it cannot be contained by representative structures such as Art or language.

The significance of this is the way that sublimity in *The Prelude* is used as a device to establish moral judgements. This is particularly apparent in the account of Bartholomew Fair, where Wordsworth writes of:-

> All out-o'-the'-way, far-fetch'd, perverted things,
> All freaks of Nature, all Promethean thoughts
> Of man; his dulness, madness, and their feats,
> All jumbled up together to make up
> This Parliament of monsters. (688-692)

Earlier in the poem the mass is defined as an enemy to escape from:-

> Meanwhile the roar continues, till at length,
> Escaped as from an enemy, we turn
> Abruptly into some sequester'd nook. (184-186)

This means that added to the nature/culture (or True/False) opposition is an Individual/Collective one. This is echoed in the passage quoted previously, when the poet writes of his isolated experiences of the sublime which he 'Had felt, and thought of in my solitude '. Isolationism thus articulates an ethical position. This stance repeats Ann Radcliffe's in *The Mysteries of Udolpho*[9], which espoused the moral that '[...]natural graces

and innocent pleasures flourished in the wilds of solitude ' (p.597).

I will now juxtapose Wordsworth's account of the city with Samuel Johnson's 'London' (1738). This highlights the way the sublime operates in Wordsworth's poem as the controlling moral principle. It also reveals how a Classical conception of Art differs from the Romantic. After discussing Johnson's poem and its relation to Juvenal's third *Satire*[10], I link Book VII of *The Prelude*, to Weiskel's account of the negative sublime. The contention will be that Weiskel's conclusion that the sublime is only structurally motivated in its negative form finds its direct correlation in Wordsworth's account of the city.

JOHNSON'S NATIONALISM AND WORDSWORTH'S STRUCTURAL MOTIVATION.

Where Wordsworth sees the city in terms of ethical monstrosity, Johnson sets up the city as a place of disease:-

> I praise the Hermit, but regret the Friend,
> Resolved at length, from vice and LONDON far,
> To breathe in distant Fields a purer Air, (4-6)

However, whereas Wordsworth uses the sublime as the controlling vision, Johnson uses an historically antecedent nationalism, which is a mandate for patriotism:-

> Where GREENWICH smiles upon the silver flood:
> Struck with the seat that gave ELIZA Birth,
> We kneel, and kiss the consecrated Earth;
> In pleasing Dreams the blissful Age renew,
> And call BRITANNIA'S Glories back to view. (22-26)

Johnson refers to a proto-Elizabethan Golden Age which would obviate the present urban/national 'crisis'. Johnson's nationalism specifically stands in opposition to Spain and France, and to a perceived growing liberalism towards them, because for Johnson this liberalism is political

sophistry:-

> Here let those reign, whom pensions can incite
> To vote a Patriot black, a Courtier white;
> Explain their Country's dear - bought Rights away,
> And plead for Pirates in the Face of Day. (51-54)

Here London is being destroyed by political mismanagement, whereby London becomes an implicit metonymical displacement for Britain. For this reason Johnson situates his nationalistic utopia in the past, not just to Elizabeth, but also to King Alfred's 'Blest Age! But ah! how diff'rent from our own! (253). This is a message further underlined by:-

> Ah! What avails it, that, from Slav'ry far,
> I drew the Breath of life in *English* Air,
> Was early taught a *Britain's* Right to prize,
> And lisp the Tale of HENRY's victories; (117-120)

Johnson sees the city as corrupted by a new political liberalism and greed. This introduces an idea of economics which is absent from Book VII of *The Prelude*:-

> But here more slow, where all are Slaves to Gold,
> Where Looks are Merchandise, and Smiles are sold,
> Where man by Bribes, by Flatteries implor'd,
> The Groom retails the Favours of his Lord. (178-181)

Although there is no extended understanding of economic control, of the centralisation of wealth into cities, this cynicism concerning games of political intrigue reveals a social awareness which contrasts with Wordsworth. For Wordsworth, the city dramatises an ontological fall which is represented by a lower-class urban mass, as by Bartholomew Fair and the 'painted' lady. This is also because the economic interpretation is already an interpretation, whereas the sublime leaves it all for the poet to do. He thus fails to grasp the economic construction of the city space because his controlling vision, the sublime, is a metaphysical rather than an economic form of interpretation.

Johnson's controlling aesthetic is that of nationalism, which gestures towards an Augustan Golden Age in relation to which the current city space has a corrupt post-lapsarian feel. Also separating Johnson from Wordsworth is that the former is informed by an idea of Art as imitation, which is inimical to Wordsworth's aesthetics. The full title of Johnson's poem is 'London. A Poem In Imitation of the Third SATIRE OF JUVENAL'. Johnson inherits from this Satire a sense of nationalism and a nature/culture divide. Juvenal, for example, writes that:-

> For as every tree nowadays has to pay toll to the people, the muses have been ejected, and the wood has to go a-begging. We go down to the valley of Egeria, and into the caves so unlike to nature: how much more near to us fringed by a green border of grass, and there were no marble to outrage the native turf! (p.33).

The nationalism is exemplified by:-

> The Syrian Orantes has long since poured into the Tiber, bringing with it its lingo and its manners, its flutes and its slanting harp-strings; bringing too the timbrels of the breed, and the trulls who are bidden ply their trade at the circus. (p.37)

If this appears to be a disinterested chronicle, this is later belied by Juvenal's championing of Athens.

Johnson's poem is therefore a non-sublime reading of the city-scape and its imitative references reveal an allegiance to Classicism. The only consistent theme inherited by Wordsworth is the nature/culture opposition. Indeed, Wordsworth attempts a description of the city in internationalist terms which seems divorced from nationalistic overtones:-

> As we proceed, all specimens of man
> Through all the colours which the sun bestows,
> And every character of form and face,
> The Swede, the Russian; from the genial South,
> The Frenchman and the Spaniard; from remote
> America, the Hunter-Indian; Moors,
> Malays, Lascars, the Tartar and Chinese,
> And Negro Ladies in white muslin gowns. (236-243)

Within this there is a plurality of national identities which

construct the city. What Wordsworth identifies in the city is a moral corruption which is opposed to a moral certainty gleaned in solitude.

My contention is that the sublime organises experience in Book VII of *The Prelude*. The city fails to coincide with the sublime, but the poet initially deploys the sublime in an optimistic way only to discover a false sense of grandeur. The dilemma the poet finds himself in is similar to the one that Weiskel'' sees in Schiller, 'How is one to distinguish between what is intrinsically incomprehensible and what one merely fails to understand?' (p. 35). In one way this is a question which Weiskel answers when he writes that, 'All versions of the sublime require a credible god-term, a meaningful jargon of ultimacy, if the discourse is not to collapse into "mere" rhetoric ' (p. 36).

In Wordsworth's representation of the crowd as a polyglot entity there is a break-up of any unifying national principle, a break-up Johnson had referred to earlier in the century. This is not to suggest that nationalism offers a 'credible god-term', but rather it offers a unifying system akin to a belief system. The danger of a rhetorical displacement referred to by Weiskel is apparent in Wordsworth's definition of the city through its empty forms of representation. Also, at one point Wordsworth overtly mentions the use of rhetoric in his account of the legislature. This echoes Longinus' account of 'delusive' rhetoric:-

> Marvellous!
> The enchantment spreads and rises; all are rapt
> Astonish'd; like a Hero in Romance
> He winds away his never-ending horn,
> Words follow words, sense seems to follow sense;
> What memory and what logic! till the Strain
> Transcendent, superhuman as it is,
> Grows tedious even in a young man's ear. (536-543)

Wordsworth couches this speech in the discourse of the Romantic hero,

of a false experience defined by rhetoric. This idea of the Romance hero encompassing a false experience is something I will discuss shortly in an alternative use of the Romance narrative in Sade's *Florville and Courval*[12]. However, at this moment in *The Prelude* there are comparisons with Weiskel's characterisation of the Romantic sublime.

The poet does not fully understand how the city can appear sublime, as from a distance it has a visual prospect of sublimity and yet fails to equate to it. What the poet finds as representing this seeming sublimity is merely a series of rhetorical strategies; signs, symbols, allegories and a legislative oratory linked to the oratory of the Romantic hero.

Weiskel's analysis attempts to place the sublime within the ambit of Freudian psychoanalysis; he writes that, 'The sublime moment recapitulates and thereby re-establishes the oedipus complex, whose positive resolution is the basis of culture itself' (p. 94). For him, Wordsworth's poetry is characterised by an egotistical sublime, because experience is mediated through an understanding consciousness. There is an apparent rapport between nature and subject, or between object and the consciousness which apprehends it. However in Book VII of *The Prelude*, there is a formulation of a potential sublime experience (the urban) which more properly falls within Weiskel's categorisation of the negative sublime. He writes that, 'Our line of thought postulates a wish to be inundated and a simultaneous anxiety of annihilation: to survive, as it were, the ego must go on the offensive and cease to be passive' (p. 105). Wordsworth seems to pose a practical, passive, solution to this; as quoted earlier, he writes of seeking solitude from 'the roar' of the mass:-

> Escaped as from an enemy, we turn
> Abruptly into some sequester'd nook. (185-186)

Yet there is an emotional resistance to the mass at play; he writes of Bartholomew Fair that:-

> Above the press and danger of the Crowd,
> Upon some showman's platform: what a hell
> For eyes and ears! what anarchy and din
> Barbarian and infernal! 'tis a dream,
> Monstrous in colour, motion, shape, sight, sound. (658-662)

This emotional response is a morally informed one, and this becomes codified into an intellectual resistance which sees through the 'false' logic of urban existence:-

> Nothing is listen'd to. But these, I fear,
> Are falsely catalogu'd, things that are, are not,
> Even as we give them welcome, or assist,
> Are prompt, or are remiss. (642-645)

These 'things that are, are not ' highlights the apparently fabricated experience of urban life (whereby the activities of one class are used to suggest the ubiquity of all such activity).

The idea of a fabricated experience is seen by Wordsworth to lie behind the split between nature and culture. The effect of this is that (and here Wordworth is discussing love):-

> Absorb'd and buried in the immensity
> Of the effect: a barrier seemed at once
> Thrown in, that from humanity divorced
> The human Form, splitting the race of Man
> In twain, yet leaving the same outward shape. (423-427)

The poet resists this possibility through championing a moral certainty gained in solitude, which is an active response to the threat of becoming 'Absorb'd and buried' within a false experiential structure. Thus the poet's response to the city is similar to the Oedipal drama mapped out by Weiskel:-

> The negative sublime apparently exhibits some features of a response to superego anxiety, for in the suddenness of the sublime moment the conscious ego rejects its attachment to sensible objects and turns rather fearfully toward an ideal of totality and power in which it

participates or internalizes. (p.83)

Wordsworth rejects the city-scape in favour of a totalising, ıthentic, sublime moment which is suggested by its very absence; because ıe 'gross realities' of the city reveal 'The incarnation of the Spirits ıat mov'd/Amid the Poet's beauteous world, call'd forth,/With that .stinctness which a contrast gives' (510-512). The sublime experience here ; truly negatively defined because it is seen as an absent presence.

For Wordsworth then, the city initially offers a prospect of ıblimity. Once, however, it is seen as controlled by the 'false' logic of ;presentation, rather than by the authentic vision of the sublime, the .ty fails to participate in an overall picture of sublime grandeur. This ; similar to Weiskel's failure to appropriate the negative sublime for the ıdipus Complex. He writes of the subject's resistance to passivity in the ;gative sublime that; 'Since the defense is directed primarily against the ıngerous passivity, the other component of the oedipus complex - the ;gressive wish against the father - is only structurally motivated and ıils to impress us as authentic '(p.105). In this way, the negative ıblime mimics a structural version of the Oedipal drama; it is mimicry ;cause filial anxiety is absent from the schema. Likewise in *The Prelude* ıe poet encounters a similarly 'structurally motivated' form of sublimity. ;wever, it is mimicry because it 'plays' upon the sublime but lacks the ;cessary emotional ratification. There is also a sense of overcoming a langerous passivity' when the poet resists the inauthentic urban sublime, ' a retreat into personal experience and by an artistic rebellion which ;fines the urban in terms of a 'fallen' aesthetic.

In this sense, of experience controlled by a moralising creative aesthetic, as opposed to a homogenising false aesthetic, there is an idea

of form which controls content. In *The Prelude* the sublime shapes what an authentic aesthetic experience is. In this what is fundamentally fictive (i.e. the sublime) defines 'true' experience. Johnson's trope of nationalism similarly defines a different sense of the urban, whereby aesthetic experience defines 'lived' experience. This will now be explored in greater depth.

LIVING THE TEXT, THE CASE OF DE SADE.

Earlier in this chapter Wordsworth's link between legal oratory and Romance was touched upon; where the barrister is 'Astonish'd; like a Hero in Romance/He winds away his never-ending horn '(538-539). Experience is fictionally constructed, and a false aesthetic controls the 'real'. This is also worked-out in the work of Radcliffe, particularly her 'villains' who have a false position upon nature contrasted with the hero/heroine. In *The Italian*[13], for example, the villain Schedoni 'cared not for the truth, nor sought it by bold and broad argument, but loved to exert the wily cunning of his nature in hunting it through artificial perplexities '(p.34). Although this is a Romance villain rather than hero, the Romance controls in an experiential fashion. This process is satirised in *Northanger Abbey*[14], but is also apparent at a more implicitly satiric level in Sade's *Florville and Courval, or The Works of Fate*. In this story which is a part parody of the Romance, there is the character Madame Courval, nee Florville, who has, through no fault of her own, slept with her brother, killed their child, condemned her mother to death and then married her father. All of this works through a series of misrecognitions. Fate is portrayed as morally blind, and the denouement reveals the true identities

of the characters who have died in the course of the action. Madame Courval, however, was justified in her previous actions. She was unaware of the true identities of any of the characters; her son had attempted to rape her, and she had unwittingly testified against her mother who had murdered a love rival. It is however in the fictive sense of the Romance that experience becomes self-consciously defined. Towards the end of the story the 'heroine's' trials appear to be at an end. It is however the act of reading which prefigures the revelations and which disturbs this tranquillity:-

> One evening, this tender and loving wife was sitting next to her husband reading an unbelievably gloomy English novel which at the time was being much discussed.
>
> "I must confess," she said, dropping her book, "here is a creature almost as miserable as I." (p.173)

Her husband takes the view that some past memory provoked by the novel has caused this distress. However, the process of fictive interpellation is more complete than this; she tells him:-

> '"Tis not memory that alarms me, but forebodings which terrify me... I see myself happy with you, Monsieur...yes, very happy...and I was not born to be happy. 'Tis impossible that I remain so very long, for it is ordained that the dawn of my happiness will never be aught but the lightning which precedes the thunderbolt." (p.173)

This immediately precedes the arrival of Monsieur Courval's son who makes the revelations. A fictional experience, the 'gloomy English novel' comes, in a concrete way, to inform experience. The implication is that life runs true to fiction because there is no exterior totality, as in the sublime, which can effectively anchor moral behaviour. There is merely a fatalistic moral relativity. However, this is only a position which the 'heroine' can arrive at through a reading of a particular type of Romantic text. What Wordsworth associates with false experience in *The Prelude*, is used here to explain experience; the Romantic novel becomes a rhetorical paradigm for

e' understanding.

One theme which unites Wordsworth, Johnson and now Sade, is that -ience (whether it be urban or familial) is relationally defined. For son nationalism controls the 'true' understanding of the urban, for sworth sublimity controls experience, and for Sade it is a notion of lonal efficacy. Consequently experience is always already defined and ated, with Wordsworth and Sade employing an aesthetic mediation. sworth's 'true' aesthetic is represented by the creative poet in sition to the false aesthetic of the urban. It becomes a more 'natural' of aesthetics because it is grounded in an idea of moral apprehension. collapses moral distinctions and in privileging 'fate' makes them trary; but both understand the world through fictive strategies. efore it means that some strategies are more 'honest' than others; 'As glimpse, the things which I had shaped/And yet not shaped '(514-515). poet has given shape to 'nature' through an act of aesthetic truction.

Memory also plays a part in this act of aesthetic construction and tes Book VII as essentially being an act of aesthetic reconstruction. poet writes early on in Book VII:-

> A thing that ought to be. Shall I give way,
> Copying the impression of memory,
> Though things remembered idly do half seem
> The work of Fancy, shall I, as the mood
> Inclines me, here describe, for pastime's sake
> Some portion of that motley imagery, (145-150)

ion, then, is not solely an aesthetic reconstruction, but a temporal 'Copying the impression of memory', which highlights the mediation of erience in the act of telling. The poet in this account of London is both reader, interpretor of signs, symbols and false allegories, and

writer/teller whereby the city is reconstructed through an act of telling. It disturbs Wordsworth's aesthetic sensibility because it lacks the moral certainty inherent within his own aesthetic of the sublime.

At this juncture I return to Poe's 'The Man of the Crowd', seeing how its handling of aesthetic demarcation is illuminated by Wordsworth's reading of the urban.

MYSTERIOUS DOUBLINGS AND THE BREAKDOWN OF NARRATIVE IN POE'S 'THE MAN OF THE CROWD'

As suggested earlier, Poe's 'The Man of the Crowd' by opening with a reference to textual interpretation, sets up the city as that which has to be deciphered through a particular act of reading.

The nameless narrator of Poe's tale initially introduces a programmatic conception of crime which substantiates the subsequent attempts to account for the nature of the 'villain':-

> There are some secrets which do not permit themselves to be told. Men die nightly in their beds, wringing the hands of ghostly confessors, and looking them piteously in the eyes - die with despair of heart and convulsion of throat, on account of the hideousness of mysteries which will not *suffer themselves* to be revealed. Now and then, alas, the conscience of man takes up a burden so heavy in horror that it can be thrown down only into the grave. And thus the essence of all crime is undivulged. (p. 475)

Here secrecy is equated with mystery, which is then defined in terms of criminal behaviour. What is mysterious has thus already been put in a position of criminality. The last sentence suggests that it is not crime which remains hidden, but rather the 'essence' of crime is elided. As mentioned earlier, the narrator identifies the mass via a strict social hierarchy, starting from the top and working down. Towards the bottom of

this hierarchy there are the pick-pockets. The narrator writes that; 'There were many individuals of dashing appearance, whom I easily understood as belonging to the race of swell pick-pockets, with which all great cities are infested ' (p. 476). The striking thing about this observation is that the pick-pockets are here portrayed as visible, when to function effectively they would need to be invisible. The pick-pockets have a provisional position within this social hierarchy because they ape 'gentlemanly' behaviour. The narrator writes; 'I watched these gentry with much inquisitiveness, and found it difficult to imagine how they should ever be mistaken for gentlemen by gentlemen themselves. Their voluminousness of wristband, with an air of excessive frankness, should betray them at once ' (pp. 476-477). What is seemingly anomalous in this observation is the observation itself: the narrator seems to be outside of a hierarchy upon which he is commentating. As in Wordsworth's account of London, the narrator has a certain distance (at this point a spatial one as well) which enables a critique to occur. The pick-pockets become identifiable as criminal because they are not fully a part of the hierarchy which they attempt to mimic.

This idea of hierarchy articulates (downwards) an increasing propensity for moral corruptability. At the bottom of this hierarchy there is a group somewhat similar to Wordsworth's 'Parliament of monsters', here there are; '[...]drunkards innumerable and indescribable - some in shreds and patches, reeling, inarticulate, with bruised visage and lack-lustre eyes - some in whole although filthy garments, with a slightly unsteady swagger, thick sensual lips, and hearty-looking rubicund faces -' (p. 477). The point is that specific groups within this hierarchy are homogeneous. They are rendered safe through definition. In *The Prelude* the sublime

controls what constitutes authentic experience. In this way Wordsworth employs an anti-social form in order to define what constitutes the social. For this reason the argument lapses into an account of genuine/inauthentic aesthetic experience, rather than becoming a socially orientated discussion concerning the political make-up of the mass. In 'The Man of the Crowd' the narrator employs a strict, seemingly all-encompassing, notion of the mass, and here employs a crude class analysis.

Poe's tale is relevant to Rosemary Jackson's[15] formulation of fantasy because it deals in a similar concern with the questioning of boundary distinctions. She writes, for example, that, 'Presenting that which cannot be, but *is*, fantasy exposes a culture's definitions of that which can be: it traces the limits of its epistemological and ontological frame.' (p. 23). Although Jackson defines the fantastic as opposed to the apparently unifying stategies of Realism, this idea is thematically and categorically present in Poe's tale. It is possible to see the narrator as on the side of realism, as his concern with hierarchy suggests he is on the side of order (of a kind of social realism). Opposed to this is the mysterious 'villain', who appears within the crowd but is not of its order (and therefore on the side of 'fantasy'). As Jackson puts it, 'Fantasy is preoccupied with limits, with limiting categories, and with their projected dissolution ' (p. 48).

The man of the crowd poses a problem for interpretation because the narrator cannot inscribe him within his constructed class hierarchy. He attempts, as Dupin does repeatedly, to gain knowledge of this character by analysing his facial expression, only to find that he resists a coherent reading[16]:-

> As I endeavoured, during the brief minute of my original survey, to form some analysis of the meaning conveyed, there arose confusedly

> and paradoxically within my mind, the ideas of vast mental power, of caution, of penuriousness, of avarice, of coolness, of malice, of blood-thirstiness, of triumph, of merriment, of excessive terror, of intense-supreme despair. (p. 478)

This apparent incoherence places the man of the crowd outside of a rationalistic order. This character also echoes a more coherent picture of suggested evil that can be found in earlier Gothic texts. In *The Italian* for example, the 'evil' monk Schedoni is seen by the virtuous Vivaldi:-

> [...]Vivaldi thought he beheld a man, who passions might impel him to the penetration of almost any crime, how hideous soever. He recoiled from him, as if he had suddenly seen a serpent in his path, and stood gazing on his face, with an attention so wholly occupied as to be unconscious that he did so. (p. 51)

Here the emphasis upon potential criminal expectation defines Schedoni as a form of seducer. In Poe's tale an idea of criminality defines the man of the crowd, but there is a strange doubling between that man and the narrator. For the narrator, as said earlier, there are certain criminal elements which are discernable within the social hierarchy (the pick-pockets) but who do not properly belong to it (are in fact an antagonistic element). The narrator, however, has a privileged position as an observer of the hierarchy rather than a participant within it, a position somewhat similar to that of Wordsworth, as when he writes, 'With my brow to the glass, I was occupied in scrutinizing the mob ' (p. 478), when the man of the crowd appears. Implicit in this scene is an idea of mirroring, with his 'brow to the glass' suggesting a reflection of the narrator (as he reflects on the nature of 'the mob'), and therefore an implied relationship between himself and the man of the crowd. I discuss this idea of doubling in later chapters concerning the relations between Van Helsing and Dracula, and Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, exploring how they (explicitly the latter pair) prefigure the collapse of doublings in the work of Freud. Here in Poe's

tale the crowd does not recognise the criminal pick-pocket element within it, nor do they recognise the alleged criminality of the man of the crowd, which suggests the privileged, detached status of the narrator. In following the man of the crowd he doubles him by occupying the same position.

In tracking the man of the crowd, the narrator attempts an interpretation of his behaviour by constructing an explanatory narrative around the 'villain's' actions. This however becomes impossible because there is no linear development in the man of the crowd's reversals and repetitions, they do not tell a story; 'I was surprised, however, to find, upon his having made the circuit of the square, that he turned and retraced his steps. Still more was I astonished to see him repeat the same walk several times - '(p.479). The narrator concludes that exegesis is impossible, and couches this in the language of textual referencing. He concludes:-

> "This old man," I said at length, "is the type and the genius of deep crime. He refuses to be alone. *He is the man of the crowd.* It will be in vain to follow; for I shall learn no more of him, nor of his deeds. The worst heart of the world is a grosser book than the 'Hotulus Animae' and perhaps it is but one of the great mercies of God that *'er lasst sich nicht lesen'*."(p.481)

The last line is echoed in the first line of the story, suggesting a circularity made physical in the retracing of the route around the square. This idea of circularity is inimical to the linear structure of hierarchy employed by the narrator as an interpretive tool.

THE LINK BETWEEN *THE PRELUDE* AND 'THE MAN OF THE CROWD'.

A notion of rationale links Wordsworth's account of the city and Poe's tale. For Wordsworth, the city fails to impress as sublime. The city does not remain mysterious but is accounted for in a fictive way. The city articulates an aesthetic lapse, being a false, gaudy representation, of a 'true' aesthetic found in nature. The positive side to the city is that the sublime is brought into focus by its very exclusion. This again, has implications for Jackson's theory of fantasy, 'The fantastic gives utterance to precisely those elements which are known only through their absence within a dominant 'realistic' order '(p.25). Although here Jackson is referring to the Fantastic's reliance on such absent presences as, for example, ghosts, this is similar to Wordsworth's deployment of the sublime. For Wordsworth, 'realism' is equated with a 'truth' present in sublimity. The city potentially threatens this moralistic way of seeing, it questions its boundaries. In doing so the sublime is strengthened by appearing as an absent presence; it becomes defined and strengthened in relation to what it is not. This is because the sublime offers safety; it enables the poet to escape from the threatening mass and retire to a moralising solitude. In contrast, the structure of hierarchy in Poe's tale is challenged by the presence of an anomalous element which undermines the narrator's totalising claims to understand the 'real'. This however, becomes an inverted form of sublimity. The rationale of the narrator is questioned and this opens up the possibility of mystery appearing within what seemed to be a closed, or full, reality. Jackson on fantasy again, 'It is an inverted form of myth. It focuses upon the unknown within the present, discovering emptiness inside an apparently full reality '(p.158).

The man of the crowd represents a gap in interpretation, and his mysterious status is defined by location within a closed (circular) system. For the narrator this man is the 'essence' of crime. What the narrator also attempts to do at the end is place this man within a system of social types which would reinforce his idea of hierarchy. He '"is the type and the genius of deep crime "' (p. 481); when in fact the problem of the man of the crowd is that, 'He refuses to be alone,'; he resists (through mere existence), the attempt to place him within an effective categorisation. In this way the sublime emerges within a context which appears to be inimical to it.

In Book VII of *The Prelude*, it is not that the city is inimical to the sublime, so much as in direct opposition to it; as such there is a dialectical pull between the city and the sublime. In Poe's tale, the mystery represented by the man of the crowd disturbs the narrator's interpretation, it attacks his system from within, in spatial terms, literally. It is epistemology which is questioned. For Wordsworth, epistemology in the form of the sublime remains intact, because it is founded on a 'truth' verified by the lapsed condition of the urban.

The fundamental difference is that whereas for Wordsworth the sublime is strengthened by exclusion, for Poe's narrator order is undermined by the inexplicable. In one position there is a refutation and on the other the impossibility of a refutation which suggests potential collapse. The man of the crowd is also opposed to Wordsworth's representation of solitariness within the urban condition, as in, for example, Wordsworth's account of the blind beggar. In Poe's tale the man of the crowd appears to be unnatural because he does not coherently belong to a class structure. He is unnatural because he is *too* social, '*He is the man of the crowd* '(p. 481). At this

point I will raise the issue of whether it is better to see this presence of mystery as a new formulation of the sublime or as one reliant upon older Romantic notions of it. Or indeed whether this use of mystery is merely a structural play on sublime mystery. In this way an explanation is required for the possibility that Poe's 'The Man of the Crowd' creates a 'super-reading' of Kant's aesthetic.

WORDSWORTH VERSUS POE.

An obvious contrast is that whereas in Wordsworth the natural sublime is experienced as plenitude, in Poe's tale the mystery is experienced as loss. In Kant's 'Analytic of the Sublime'[17] there appears a more approximate formulation of the sublime:-

> [...]the sublime, in the strict sense of the word, cannot be contained in any sensuous form, but rather concerns ideas of reason, which, although no adequate presentation of them is possible, may be excited and called into the mind by that very inadequacy itself which does not admit of sensuous presentation. (p.92)

Although in Poe's tale sight controls the interpretation of the action (with the narrator as social observer) this can be questioned. As suggested earlier, there is a mirroring between the narrator and the man of the crowd. Towards the end the narrator attempts to force a confrontation, but instead of this becoming a form of recognition (or self-recognition), the mystery is maintained.

> [...]as the shades of the second evening came on, I grew wearied unto death, and, stopping fully in front of the wanderer, gazed at him steadfastly in the face. He noticed me not, but resumed his solemn walk, while I, ceasing to follow, remained absorbed in contemplation. (p.481)

There is however one form of mirroring. What the narrator notices in the man is the way he resists his particular type of classification. He does

not recognise what position he has within a social, or class, hierarchy. The man of the crowd is the man of the mass, whereas the narrator is positioned in the narrative as having a critical distance from the mass. The man of the crowd recognises mass and not specific individuals, for this reason his following of the crowd takes on the form of a compulsion. For a brief time the crowd disperses until they come across a theatre:-

> It was about being closed, and the audience were thronging from the doors. I saw the old man gasp as if for breath while he threw himself amid the crowd; but I thought that the intense agony of his countenance had, in some measure, abated. (p. 480)

Here the man's entrance into the crowd takes on the form of a drug addiction. What I am suggesting in this examination of non-recognition (but a strange mirroring), is that sight has been undermined. 'Pure' sight does not control the gaze, but is a form of social seeing which describes the action. In Kantian terms there is no real, sensuous, experience taking place; rather it is reason which has failed. To return to Kant, he writes that:-

> The sublime may be described in this way: It is an object (of nature) the *representation of which determines the mind to regard the elevation of nature beyond our reach as equivalent to a presentation of ideas.* (p. 119)

In Poe's tale, the man of the crowd is on the side of nature because he is not assimilable to a cultural, or class based, way of seeing. Therefore there is an equivalence to the Kantian idea that in the sublime moment there is an apprehension of a 'nature' which exists beyond the realm of a determinant reason. Also, for Kant the apparent triumph of a potential reason is turned into a broader triumph. This is because in the sublime it is imagination which appears to lose out, but in compensation the faculty of reason is placed in accord 'with *ideas* of reason[...]' (p. 104). Here the supersensible realm is potentially opened and refers to a power within the

subject. The failure of rational apprehension 'induce(s) a temper of mind conformable to that which the influence of definite (practical) ideas would produce upon feeling, and in common accord with it '(p. 104). There is thus a seeming synthesis between subject and object. In Poe's tale the failure of reason appears to threaten the narrator's system with collapse, but this is something he attempts to divert by defining the man of the crowd as the 'essence' of crime. In this, 'pure' crime is defined as ineffable, a secret which cannot be cogently unravelled, a closed book. Within this metaphor of reading as interpretation set up in the tale, there resides the possibility of an interpretation which has not yet arrived. In Derridean terms, meaning has been deferred. Also in terms of a metaphor of reading, the narrator cannot fully grasp the significance of the man of the crowd because there is no idea of progression. That is to say that instead of there being, as suggested earlier, a forward moving linear narrative, there is merely repetition in the guise of a compulsion. At this point the metaphor for reading, as a controlling idea for interpretation (alongside the use of hierarchy), becomes redundant. Rather the man of the crowd remains an as yet unknowable element and this is the conclusion, the 'answer', which the narrator arrives at.

As suggested earlier, the man of the crowd appears to be a 'natural' subject at odds with a culturally determined structure. He is an 'essence' and (to use Sartreian terms) not yet an existence. This position on nature relates to Kant's formulation of the Dynamical sublime. He writes that, 'If we are to estimate nature as dynamically sublime, it must be represented as a source of fear...'(p. 109). At this point an idea of morality is introduced into Kant's argument which is echoed in Poe's tale. Kant writes, '[...]without the development of moral ideas, that which, thanks to

preparatory culture, we call sublime, merely strikes the untutored man as terrifying ' (p. 115). For this reason overcoming what appears to be terrifying results in a moral attitude. In this sense the narrator morally overcomes the man of the crowd by deeming him to possess a criminal nature (by taking up a 'superior' position).

Poe's tale works through aspects similar to the Kantian sublime. The man of the crowd appears as a mystery because he cannot be accommodated by reason. This failure of reason is compensated by the suggestion that the man has an essence which is as yet unknowable but which has the status of a potential subject for knowledge. The man is too social, an individual becoming the concept (the crowd) making it problematic to define conceptually his individuality. Sensuous perception is put into doubt in this because the narrator's way of seeing is, as is Victor Frankenstein's, culturally positioned.

POE'S NEO-KANTIANISM, THE CASE OF THE DETECTIVE TALES.

In the 'Critique of Aesthetic Judgement''[8] Kant writes that:-

> *Concepts of the understanding* must, as such, always be demonstrable (if, as in anatomy, demonstration is understood in the sense merely of *presentation*). In other words, the object answering to such concepts must always be capable of being given in intuition (pure or empirical); for only in this way can they become cognitions. (p. 210)

It is necessary for intuitions to take on the form of cognitions, and this is achieved through demonstration. Kant again refers to the anatomist:-

> Where the intuition is *a priori* this is called its construction, but when even the intuition is empirical, we have still got the illustration of the object, by which means objective reality is assured to the concept. Thus an anatomist is said to demonstrate the human eye when he renders the concept, of which he has previously given a discursive exposition, intuitable by means of the dissection

of that again. (p.211)

Here the intuition is granted a physical form and is used to explain an already worked out narrative (a medical understanding of optics). The connection between this and Poe's detective tales is that they too are based on a recounting of events. Dupin reconstructs the events to give them a logic. For example, in 'The Murders in the Rue Morgue' the witness' confusion over the nationality of the 'murderer' explains other mysteries. The size of the grip on Mademoiselle L'Espanye's neck and the extreme strength and agility of the 'murderer' leads Dupin to deduce that the culprit is an orang-outang; a conclusion verified in the confused understanding of the orang-outang's 'accent'. Like the anatomist, Dupin reconstructs the events in a narrative which he has already worked out. This again happens in 'The Purloined Letter' when Dupin recounts his retrieval of the letter from the Minister D.

What is also of interest in relation of this to Kant, is the idea of intuitive experiences being turned into cognitions. In 'The Murders in the Rue Morgue' the narrator writes that, 'His results, brought about by the very soul and essence of method, have, in truth, the whole air of intuition '(p.141). A further similarity between Dupin and Kant's subject is in the function of Reason. This can be linked to Dupin's 'higher' mental faculties, his superior reasoning. Kant writes that:-

> But an adequate reason only exists where their principle, being in no way borrowed from the concept of nature, which is always sensibly conditioned, rest consequently on the supersensible, which the concept of freedom alone makes cognizable by means of its formal laws, and where, therefore, they are morally-practical, i.e. not merely precepts and rules in this or that interest, but laws independent of all antecedent reference to ends or aims. (p.11)

In this way, a form of reasoning unconfined to the sensuous world can become a form of moral reasoning, for this to occur it requires an idea of

freedom so that reason is free from determinate ends. This idea of different forms of reasoning, as in that between understanding and reason; or in a reasoning which is concerned with the object rather than with the supersensible, is echoed in Poe's tales as a clash between Dupin's reasoning and the police's methodology.

Dupin in 'The Purloined Letter' tells the narrator that the police '[...]have no variation of principle in their investigations; at best, when urged by some unusual emergency - by some extraordinary reward - they extend or exaggerate their old modes of *practice*, without touching their principles '(p.216). In 'the Murders in the Rue Morgue' a systematic account of logic is given, a logic which differs from the abstract logic of mathematics. Dupin tells the narrator that:-

> The faculty of re-solution is possibly much invigorated by mathematical study, especially by that highest branch of it which, unjustly, and merely on account of its retrograde operations, has been called, as if *par excellence*, analysis. Yet to calculate is not in itself to analyse. (p.141)

In 'The Critique of Teleological Judgement'[19] Kant, in a footnote, discusses mathematics:-

> Pure mathematics can never deal with the real existence of things, but only with their possiblity, that is to say, with the possibility of an intuition answering to the conceptions of the things. Hence it cannot touch the question of cause and effect, and, consequently, all the finality there observed must always be regarded simply as formal, and never as a physical end. (pp.12-13)

Dupin's reasoning fulfils the Kantian dictate on freedom as it is non-rule based. It does not follow the formal procedures evidenced by an abstract logic such as mathematics. Also, it does not copy the formal calculative logic of police methodology. Dupin tells the narrator that, in a game of draughts:-

> [...]to have a retentive memory, and proceed by "the book" are points commonly regarded as the sum total of good playing. But it is in matters beyond the limits of mere rule that the skill of the analyst

is evinced. (p. 142)

Dupin's logic has an 'air of intuition' (p. 141) about it, and is located within an idea of a universal subject. To return to the game of draughts, Dupin advocates winning in the following way:-

> Deprived of ordinary resources, the analyst throws himself into the spirit of his opponent, identifies himself therewith, and not infrequently sees thus, at a glance, the sole methods (sometimes indeed absurdly simple ones) by which he may seduce into error or hurry into miscalculation. (p. 142)

Kant also writes about 'universal laws of nature' that:-

> [...]judgement is compelled, for its own guidance, to adopt it as an *a priori* principle, that what is for human insight contingent in the particular (empirical) laws of nature contains nevertheless unity of law in the synthesis of its manifold in an intrinsically possible experience - unfathomable though still thinkable, as such unity may, no doubt, be for us. (p. 23)

This is necessary for thought to be turned into an object of cognition for another, in the same way that the anatomist works, or how the detective recounts his deduction.

Poe's tales work within the parameters of some aspects of Kant's philosophy. The detective's form of reasoning is a priori worked out, and is also a theory of morals. Its results lead to the closure of troubling gaps in knowledge which the mysteries create. It is a universal way of understanding which has the guise of a moral imperative, rather than being an axiomatic truth as in mathematics. In its attainment of solutions through pure reasoning it implies successful incorporation with a possible supersensible realm. This is something I discuss below, because this is where a difference between Kant and Poe emerges; because in the former the supersensible is only apprehended as an idea of reason which is not attainable.

As suggested earlier, if reasoning is linked to freedom then, for

Kant, it is also linked to morals. He discriminates between nature and freedom; '[...]let the concept determining the causality be a concept of nature, and then the principles are *technically-practical*; but, let it be a concept of freedom,' and they are *morally-practical* '(p.9). This is similar to Dupin's theorising on mathematics which approximates to Kant's discussion in 'The Critique of Teleological Judgement' quoted above. In 'The Murders in the Rue Morgue' he tells the narrator that:-

> "I dispute the availability, and thus the value, of that reason which is cultivated in any especial form other than the abstractly logical I dispute, in particular, the reason educed by mathematical study. The mathematics are the science of form and quantity; mathematical reasoning is merely logic applied to observation upon form and quantity. The great error lies in supposing that even the truths of what is called *pure* algebra are abstract or general truths. And this error is so egregious that I am confounded at the universality with which it has been received. Mathematical axioms are *not axioms of general truth. What is true of relation* - of form and quantity - is often grossly false in regard to morals, for example." (pp.217-218)

This axiomatic quality of mathematics is similar to Kant's account of maxims in 'The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason'[20]. He begins Book I with:-

> Practical *principles* are propositions which contain a general determination of the will, having under it several practical rules. They are subjective, or *maxims*, when the condition is regarded by the subject as valid only for his(sic) own will, but are objective, or practical *laws*, when the condition is recognised as objective, that is, valid for the will of every rational being. (p.105)

Mathematical propositions are thus maxims which only apply to particular cases. Similarly in Poe's tales the police's methodology only applies to particular cases. One question which can be posed at this point is, what is it that the subject gains from such a means of deduction? The answer for Kant is not merely one of a felt moral worth, but is linked to an idea of pleasure (or desire). He writes of the pleasure in making judgements that:-

> [...]the ground of this pleasure is found in the universal, though subjective, condition of reflective judgements, namely the final

> harmony of an object (be it a product of nature or of art) with the mutual relation of the faculties of cognition, (imagination and understanding,) which are requisite for every empirical cognition. (*The Critique of Judgement* p. 32)

This form of deduction is at odds with an apprehension of the supersensible because it requires an object; however there is a sense that it is the process of calculation itself which gives pleasure. This is explicitly stated in Poe's tales. In 'The Murders in the Rue Morgue' the narrator writes that:-

> The mental features discoursed of as the analytical, are, in themselves, but little susceptible of analysis. We appreciate them only in their effects. We know of them, among other things, that they are always to their possessor, when inordinately possessed, a source of the liveliest enjoyment. (p. 141)

This is also linked to morals '...glories the analyst in that moral activity which *disentangles* ' (p. 141). It is this pleasure which motivates Dupin; he tells the narrator:-

> "As for these murders, let us enter into some examinations for ourselves, before we make up an opinion respecting them. An inquiry will afford us amusement," [I thought this an odd term, so applied, but said nothing] "and besides, Le Bon once rendered me a service for which I am not ungrateful." (p. 153)

Le Bon is the Bank cashier arrested for the 'murders'. Apparent in this idea of pleasure, is an idea of a disinterested pleasure which appears to unite the realms of the sensible and the supersensible. Initially, in *The Critique of Judgement*, Kant wishes to separate the two:-

> [...]between the realm of the natural concept, as the sensible, and the realm of the concept of freedom, as the supersensible, there is a great gulf fixed, so that it is not possible to pass from the former to the latter (by means of the theoretical employment of reason), (p. 14)

However, the supersensible lies behind both and therefore supplies a form of unity:-

> -There must[...]be a ground of the *unity* of the supersensible that lies at the basis of nature, with what the concept of freedom contains in a practical way, and although the concept of this ground neither

> theoretically nor practically attains to a knowledge of it, and so has no peculiar realm of its own, still it renders possible the transition from the mode of thought according to the principles of the one to that according to the principles of the other. (p. 14)

The disinterested pleasure is a moral one, and it seems to unite the two,

meaning that the supersensible comes to be equated with desire:-

> [...]judgement[...]contains an *a priori* principle of its own, and that, since pleasure or displeasure is necessarily combined with the faculty of desire (be it antecedent to its principle, as with the lower desires, or, as with the higher, only supervening upon its determination by the moral law), it will effect a transition from the faculty of pure knowledge, i.e. from the realm of concepts of nature, to that of the concept of freedom, just as in its logical employment it makes possible the transition from understanding to reason. (p. 17)

This is a dialectical unity, rather than one formed by a coincidence, and this is manifested in Kant's separation of understanding from reason; 'Understanding and reason,[...]have two distinct jurisdictions over one and the same territory of experience. But neither can interfere with the other '(p. 13). However, both these faculties can be seen 'as coexisting in the same Subject ', they have a 'dialectical unity' (p. 13).

This process is also worked out in Poe's tales and is linked to his critique of mathematics. In 'The Purloined Letter' for example, the prefect of police, G, says of the Minister D that he is, '"Not *altogether* a fool[...]but then he is a poet, which I take to be only one remove from a fool "' (p. 211). The narrator believes the Minister D to be a mathematician rather than a poet, but Dupin enlightens him;'"You are mistaken; I know him well; he is both. As poet *and* mathematician, he would reason well; as mere mathematican, he could not have reasoned at all, and thus would have been at the mercy of the Prefect "' (p. 217). Here poetry and mathematics occupy an analogous position to that of reason and understanding in Kant's schema. This idea of reason is linked to the supersensible; here it is the mind's failure at the level of cognition which reveals the possibility of all

reason rather than its attainment. In the 'Analytic of the Sublime' Kant writes that in the sublime; '[...]the mind is not simply attracted by the object, but is also alternatively repelled thereby, the delight in the sublime does not so much involve positive pleasure as admiration or respect, i.e. merits the name of a negative pleasure '(p.91). This is similar to the way the detective is faced with repulsive 'crimes', as in the mutilated corpses in 'The Murders in the Rue Morgue'. In this sense what the detective confronts is a mystery which exists at an epistemological level. It highlights the gaps in the police's knowledge, whereby that knowledge equates to, in Kantian terms, a formulation of the understanding, whereas the detective's equates to that of reason. However, in one important sense, the supersensible fails to signify at the level of cognition; it is not an object but is an idea of reason.

This idea of the sublime was discussed in Chapter One. Kant contrasts the sublime with the beautiful; 'The mind feels itself *set in motion* in the representation of the sublime in nature; whereas in the aesthetic judgement upon what is beautiful therein it is in *restful* contemplation '(p.107). It is this being *'set in motion'*, which is echoed in the character of Dupin. Dupin's typical state, before the commencement of an investigation, is one of inertia. In 'The Murders in the Rue Morgue' the narrator writes:-

> Our seclusion was perfect. We admitted no visitors. Indeed the locality of our retirement had been carefully kept a secret from my own former associates; and it had been many years since Dupin had ceased to know or be known in Paris. We existed within ourselves alone. (p.144)

Seclusion is equated to social inertia. Dupin is inert until 'activated' by the mystery. This position is similarly set up at the beginning of 'The Purloined Letter'. The narrator writes that, 'For one hour at least we had maintained a profound silence; while each, to any casual observer, might

have seemed intently and exclusively occupied with the curling eddies of smoke that oppressed the atmosphere of the chamber '(p.208).

I am making the suggestion that what typifies Dupin is inertia, an inertia transcended in the advent of a mystery which animates him. This state is analagous to the Kantian subject set in motion in the sublime; there are however, important differences. In one sense Poe's tales differ from Kant's theorising because a total understanding is reached in Poe, whereas for Kant this is not possible with the supersensible; in Poe the supersensible is 'solved'. However, to sum up, the points of similarity between Poe's tales and Kant's *Critique of Judgement* are five-fold.

The first is that the mystery, the 'crime' to be solved, stimulates reason. In a similar way the sublime stimulates an idea of reason, and gestures towards the possibility of a totalising reason made manifest in Poe's tales.

Secondly, this reasoning is grounded in an idea of morals. It is a form of reason which helps the community when it becomes a moral imperative; i.e. Dupin exemplifies a desire to return to the epistemological status quo. He disposes of threatening absences within an order which posits all things in their knowability.

Thirdly, what is bound-up in all of this is a theory of disinterested pleasure. Disinterested because this calculative approach is not employed selfishly by either the Kantian subject or Poe's detective.

Fourthly, there is a similar reliance on an a priori idea of universal laws governing experience. There are two ironies concerning this idea in Poe. One is that Dupin posits a structure of thought (his 'reading' of character) which suggests the knowability of all subjects, only to deny that all subjects have the same knowledge. The other irony is that his

theory of the subject, set up at great length in 'The Murders in the Rue Morgue', is one not used in solving the mystery.

Lastly, another similarity is that Dupin is not concerned with the sense realm at the level of logic. This links to the above point, for Dupin deploys invisible laws pertaining to the subject which are then worked out in an exemplary form (like the example of the anatomist in Kant).

The detective tales of Poe thus work through the Kantian categories of Reason, Morals and Sublimity. This is not to say that they are directly the same, because there are some obvious differences. One is that for Kant the sublime is unknowable, and is not understood through a calculative methodology, whereas Dupin supplies just such an intelligible structure. Another is that Dupin can be read as a crude social psychologist, whereas Kant is a philosopher of aesthetics and morals. Another would be that Dupin's validation of the social world differs from Kant's stress on the importance of the subject's relation to reason.

Poe's detective tales employ an idea of the sublime within the urban context, which Wordsworth characterised as opposed to the sublime. The sublime has thus been used to interpret urban life (or urban mysteries) in the same way that it had earlier been used to understand nature.

RE-WORKING THE SUPERSENSIBLE IN POE, THE CASE OF 'MESMERIC REVELATION'.

I will now give a close reading of Poe's 'Mesmeric Revelation' which suggests that it too mirrors Kantian categories, but in a different manner from the detective tales. 'Mesmeric Revelation' is a story of a dying man, Van Kirk, who when put into a mesmeric trance enters another, unworldly,

realm. The trance is described as being a near death experience, equating to Van Kirk's own precarious physical state. This trance-like state bears a similarity to non-sensuous perception, which in Kant is discovered in the intimation of the supersensible. Van Kirk tells the narrator that in the trance, '"[...]while in this state, the person so impressed employs only with effort, and then feebly, the external organs of sense, yet perceives, with keenly refined perception, and through channels supposed unknown, matters beyond the scope of the physical organs"' (p.88). Van Kirk sets up a strict opposition between mind and matter, so that the 'true' form of seeing is inward rather than outward looking. As he says to the narrator, '"I sent for you tonight...not so much to administer to my bodily ailment, as to satisfy me concerning certain psychical impressions which, of late, have occasioned me much anxiety and surprise"' (pp.88-89). Van Kirk attempts to formulate a logic of the non-sensuous, as a universal law, but this idea of a law differs from Dupin's. It is not socially deployed, or ratified, but is inward looking, and grounded in an idea of solipsistic intuition; as Van Kirk tells the narrator, '"I cannot deny that there has always existed, as if in that very soul which I have been denying, a vague half-sentiment of its own existence"' (p.89). Although this way of seeing seeks internal ratification, there is still an idea of the fallibility of abstract theorising which can be found in both Kant and Dupin. Van Kirk does this, ironically, by questioning the precepts of European philosophy. He tells the narrator that:-

> "[...]I was not long in perceiving that if man is to be intellectually convinced of his own immortality, he will never be so convinced by the mere abstractions which have been so long the fashion of the moralists of England, of France, and of Germany. Abstractions may amuse and exercise, but take no hold on the mind. Here upon earth, at least, philosophy, I am persuaded, will always in vain call upon us to look upon qualities as things. The will may assent - the soul -

the intellect, never."(p.89)

Rather the logic (a felt and here only semi-lived experience) reveals 'immortality'. This becomes so when the mind and world appear to co-exist. This is linked to Kant's discussion of the pleasure derived from making a judgement, where there is '[...]the final harmony of an object...with the mutual relation of the faculties of cognition '(p.32). This is something Van Kirk is given access to in the mesmeric trance; '"[...]latterly there has been a certain deepening of the feeling, until it has come so nearly to resemble the acquiescence of reason, that I find it difficult to distinguish between the two "' (p.89). Here mind and matter fuse, and it is from this fusion that reasoning becomes all encompassing because it combines cause and effect. Van Kirk tells the narrator, '"In sleep-waking, the reasoning and its conclusion - the cause and its effect - are present together. In my natural state, the cause vanishing, the effect only, and perhaps only partially, remains "' (p.89).

Various binary oppositions become collapsed in the trance, mind/matter (as inner/outer), and cause/effect and these are supplemented by a further opposition along a nature/culture axis. This becomes expressed as a distrust of the representational efficacy of words (a distrust apparent in accounts of the sublime by Longinus and Burke). Van Kirk and the narrator have a question and answer session whilst Van Kirk is in the trance. The narrator asks a question concerning 'spirit', and the following dialogue takes place:-

V. While I was awake I knew what you meant by "spirit", but now it seems only a word - such, for instance, as truth, beauty - a quality, I mean.
P. Is not God immaterial?
V. There is no immateriality: it is a mere word. That which is not matter, is not at all - unless qualities are things. (p.90)

Here there is a realm of experience (like the sublime) which exists outside of the attempts to represent it. As Van Kirk says 'qualities' cannot become things (nouns). What is also apparent is a pantheism omitted by both Kant and Poe's detective. What it does however posit, is the existence of an ontological signified which is similar to that of the supersensible. Here a universal spirit is equated with God, and this undermines the mind/body dualism which is collapsed through an act of mental perception. Van Kirk tells the narrator, '"All created things are but the thoughts of God "' (p.92). Physical beings are thus mental projections. God is also placed on the side of matter, but matter has now been collapsed with an idea of mind, so that; '"God, with all the powers attributed to spirit, is but the perfection of matter "' (p.92). It is when an idea of the body is suspended that the subject is open to this universal understanding. With an idea of physicality '"Thus man is individualised."', however, '"Divested of corporate investiture, he were God. Now the particular motion of the incarnated portions of the unparticled matter is the thought of man; as the motion of the whole is that of God "' (p.93).

Van Kirk is positioned as having experienced the organisational structure of a universal ontological reality. As with Kant on judgement, objects and understanding coincide because, for Van Kirk, those objects have been dematerialised as thoughts (of God). He tells the narrator that; '"We must not regard it as a quality, but as a sentiment: - it is the perception, in thinking beings, of the adaptation of matter to their organization "' (p.95).

CONCLUSION.

Poe employs the sublime in an urban context. This is apparent in his detective tales, which use an implicit neo-Kantian form of the sublime as an interpretive tool. The idea of sublimity has not fallen out of favour in representations of the city, but has been used in this instance to understand the city. This is opposed to Wordsworth's understanding of the city in Book VII of *The Prelude*, where the urban fails to match-up to sublime expectations in a manner suggesting that the city-scape precludes all possibility of the sublime.

In 'Mesmeric Revelation' a different form of neo-Kantianism is worked out; there the sublime is an internalised ontological category (at odds with an external placing of it in the detective tales). In this tale, between Van Kirk and the narrator there exists an implied analyser/analysed relationship. This is something which prefigures an understanding of the unconscious (as something 'immaterial') and suggests the Freudian 'Uncanny'[21] which will be explored in Chapter Seven.

CHAPTER SIX: TEXTUALITY AND SUBLIMITY IN *DRACULA*.

INTRODUCTION.

In this chapter I will offer two different readings of Bram Stoker's *Dracula*. The first reading is indebted to Foucault's work on Victorian sexuality. This explores how science appears to 'contain' the Count; of how the Count's power is negated once he becomes a legible object for scientific interpretation.

The second reading involves introducing the sublime. By doing this the apparent certainties mapped out in the first reading are problematised. My conclusion is that the Count is never fully understood by a scientific discourse because he is partly a production of that discourse. This becomes clearer in the main body of the argument, which involves reversing De Bolla's two forms of discourse concerning the sublime.

In the previous chapter my premise was that Poe's detective, C. Auguste Dupin, occupies a neo-Kantian position towards a mystery. In this reading of *Dracula* I focus upon a similar process of detection, arguing that the Count poses a seemingly threatening absence for the opposing bourgeois group, and that this is related to an apparent clash between feudal and bourgeois knowledge claims.

FROM SEXUALITY TO TEXTUALITY: THE PROBLEM OF 'TRUTH' IN *DRACULA*.

> [...]not only could sex be affected by its own diseases, it could also, if it was not controlled, transmit diseases or create others that would afflict future generations.[1]

> [...]we belong to a society which has ordered sex's difficult knowledge, not according to the transmission of secrets, but around the slow surfacing of confidential statements.[2]

Foucault's formulation of a 'Scientia Sexualis' describes bodies as invested with a sexuality which equates to a notion of 'truth'. That is a 'truth' of the subject's position within a symbolic order which, for Foucault, has to be encouraged to speak in order for it to be translated by a medico-psychological discourse which gauges the 'health' of that sexuality. This is opposed to an 'Ars Erotica' characterised by a symbolics of blood, at a time when the notion of possessing a certain type of blood was of social and economic importance. The aristocrat ensured descent by virtue of noble blood, and as such blood lines were related to sexuality. For the emerging bourgeoisie the symbolics of blood became translated into theories of sexuality; being of a certain kind of blood no longer ensured descent, rather it was health and the possibilities of inherited family wealth which assured economic success.

However, as Foucault points out, the bourgeoisie's sexuality was precarious, subject to infection, susceptible to disease, and thus it was through 'the slow surfacing of confidential statements', that access to this vulnerable sexuality was achieved. The bourgeoisie considered its sexuality '[...]a fragile treasure, a secret that had to be discovered at all costs '(pp. 120), and as such the bourgeoisie were encouraged to disclose their secret desires. The problem of sexuality was conflated with a problem of truth, of its status and function and of how it was to disclose itself.

This process of disclosure, this problem of sexuality, is exemplified by a reading of *Dracula* which reveals an antagonism between a symbolics of blood (the Count) and a theory of sexuality (the opposing bourgeois group).

My argument is that the Count absorbs members of this group by infecting their blood. This infection displaces them from their prescribed subject positions within discourse; I examine this through the way the group's unity is divided between self-referential forms of writing (diary entries). The notion of the subject is thus one of a bourgeois individualism which perceives the world in a reified (already given) fashion. Through the circulation of these texts (i.e. diaries) the subject overcomes this reification by adopting subject positions in narration from which they have been excluded.

I initially examine Jonathan Harker's account as it is this account whose 'truth' the other texts verify through implying a relationship to a 'truth' of sexuality; this leads into a discussion on the relationship between sexuality and textuality in the novel. In terms of bodily absorption by a symbolics of blood, the 'seduction' of Lucy Westenra is discussed as the most cogent example in the novel where the possession of blood (as lineage) is equated to possessing the body and its sexuality. I follow this with an examination of the Count's body, seeing how it becomes defined through contemporary notions of criminality which makes the Count paradoxically legible in his absence. Also, bound up with this is a debate concerning what meaning the Count's blood has.

THE RETURN OF THE DEAD AND THE THREAT TO MODERNITY.

Jonathan Harker's journal represents him as subject to problems of sexuality and textuality which take the form of a return of the repressed. He writes of his predicament that, 'It is nineteenth century up-to-date with a vengeance. And yet, unless my senses deceive me, the old centuries

had, and have, powers of their own which mere 'modernity' cannot kill'(p.49). Dead history is brought to life. The Count is 'other' to Harker; it is Dracula's historicising which resurrects dead history (the history of the Wallachians and Saxons) and gives status to his aristocracy by transforming this past into the present; '"[...]in our veins flows the blood of many brave races who fought as the lion fights, for lordship"'(p.41). The Count is thus situated at the point where the bourgeoisie emerge (he is an aristocrat in decline). The Count represents a feudal history from which the modern class system is excluded; it is the background to their possibility and a decisive rupture with it. As Chris Baldick writes in *In Frankenstein's Shadow: Myth, Monstrosity and Nineteenth Century Writing*[3], 'Dracula is feudalism's death warmed up'(p.148).

This historical displacement of the Count and his subsequent clash with the opposing bourgeois group is closely identified as a clash between bodies, and a conflict between textuality and non-textuality. The Count's body is an impossibility and this is revealed through its precarious immortality and in his physical actions. Harker seeing the Count leave his room, scaling head downwards down the wall comments, 'What manner of man is this, or what manner of creature is it in the semblance of man?'(p.47). The Count is thin yet possesses 'the strength of twenty men'(p.283). His body transgresses these laws of possibility, but is subject to other laws. The crucifix, an inability to cross water unaided, and garlic function as alternative prohibitions upon the vampire's body. These restraints do not reveal, however, the greatest clash between the Count and the bourgeois group, which is in a sexual definition of the body in a symbolics of blood versus a theory of sexuality, or by an ars erotica versus a scientia

sexualis. Foucault writes that ars erotica functioned through a process in which:-

> [...]the relationship to the master who holds the secrets, is of paramount importance; and only he, working alone, can transmit this art in an esoteric manner and as the culmination of an initiation in which he guides the disciple's progress with unfailing skill and severity. (p.32)

The Count creates disciples, he propagates his system, not through a law of descent tied to notions of sexuality, but by infecting their blood; as Mina recounts her 'seduction' in which the Count says to her, '[...]you, their best beloved one, are now to me flesh of my flesh; blood of my blood; kin of my kin '(p.343). This use of blood is tied to a symbolics of blood as a politically structuring principle. According to Foucault, in feudalism aristocratic descent was assured by possession of a certain kind of blood, of having noble blood, whilst with the bourgeoisie descent is explained through a theory of sexuality that defines what constitutes a 'healthy' sexuality. The Count in thus displaying an archaic sexuality questions the way a capitalist culture is organised, and threatens that culture with extinction through absorption; as Van Helsing defines the struggle, '[...]to fail here is not mere life or death. It is that we become as him[...]' (p.284).

The Count then, becomes irrecovably defined as other by an historicising of his own body, '"What devil or what witch was ever so great as Attila, whose blood is in these veins?"' (p.41). His body is historically and physically impossible; his strength, his ability to metamorphose into a wolf or bat shows his 'unnatural' use of nature, or more radically the challenge he presents to Jonathan Harker's assumptions about nature. His sexuality threatens absorption, transforming bourgeois sexuality to an endless repetition. Sexuality is therefore directly related in *Dracula* to a

notion of the subject; the 'truth' of the subject becomes the truth of its sexuality. The Count becomes a problem of truth for the bourgeois group because '[...]sex was constituted as a problem of truth.'(Foucault, p.56), in scientia sexualis. The Count's subjectivity (sexuality) differs from the bourgeois group's through its methodology and through its non-textuality.

The bourgeois group are represented in diary accounts, so that they appear self-present; but by virtue of being diary entries it means that the world is perceived as already given (reified), and that they are passive observers of it. Also, their accounts are personal, secret, texts. Francis Barker[4] writes of this type of writing that there is, '[...]the apparent ease of access of its discourse, launched from an inner place to an outer, clarified world; the guilty secrecy not only of its writing but of its sexuality;'(p.11), because in writing, '[...]the bourgeois subject substitutes for its corporal body the rarefied body of the text.'(p.62). The Count has no text, his desire is only manifested through those it affects. He becomes an object, rather than a subject, of discourse; he does not self reflect, he does not appear in the mirror.

The most important text in *Dracula* is Jonathan Harker's journal; it is the secrets of Harker's journal that the other texts unravel, granting it the status of 'truth'. This gives credence to Harker's statement that, '-Let me begin with facts - bare, meagre facts, verfied by books and figures, and of which there can be no doubt.'(p.42). The Count is 'un-dead', an impossible being, whose status as an object of 'truth' is present as an absence within the scientific discourse of Van Helsing and Dr Seward. This scientific impossibility is defined as a deficiency of that discourse, as Van Helsing puts it, '"[...]it is the fault of our science that it wants to

explain all; and if it explains not, then it says there is nothing to explain "' (p. 229).

It is not however science which solely destroys the Count, it is also a circulation of texts forming a joined narration which forces members of the group outside of their narrative positions. This transforms them from being isolated observers (writers) into participants (readers), so that 'truth' is produced communally via the exchange of texts. Textuality becomes conflated with the 'truth' of sexuality; Van Helsing says to Mina Harker after reading Jonathan's journal, 'You *may* sleep without doubt. Strange and terrible as it is, it is *true*!' (p. 224), Jonathan on hearing this expresses his relief as 'I felt impotent ' (p. 225). With truth assured, sexuality is assured. The scrutinisation of textuality becomes emphasised, Van Helsing on handing over the collected accounts says to Seward, '"What is here told[...]may be the beginning of the end to you and me and many another; or it may sound the knell of the Un-Dead[...]"' (p. 262). Their collated texts will reveal this secret. Seward observes that when Mina and Jonathan have collated this material '[...]they will be able to show a whole connected narrative.' (p. 269), a 'connected' or meaningful narrative. Mina writes of this text, 'Whilst they are resting, I shall go over all carefully, and perhaps I may arrive at some conclusion. I shall try to follow the Professor's example, and think without prejudice on the facts before me...' (p. 416). The 'facts' before them have surfaced through Van Helsing's encouragement, as he says to Seward, '"Nothing is too small. I counsel you, put down in record even your doubts and surmises "' (p. 146). That which appears to be inconsequential is thus given importance, is urged into discourse. Foucault writes that, '[...]sex became something to say, and to say exhaustively in accordance with deployments that were varied,

but all, in their own way compelling' (p. 32). There was a '[...]polymorphous incitement to discourse' (p. 34). These extracts reveal that this 'incitement to discourse' has occurred, with each diarist keeping an account of their personal recollections and doubts, and these extracts indicate a confession of these doubts.

Thus, when Mina is infected by the Count she is hypnotised, and is forced to disclose her subconscious 'truth'. She is the missing link between the Count's sexuality and the sexuality of the bourgeoisie; like Renfield who mimics the Count's vampirism, she becomes linked to the Count in an '"indexy kind of way"' (p. 296). The Count is the '"[...]author of all this our sorrow[...]"' (p. 260); he can only be destroyed when 'He is confined within the limitations of his earthly envelope' (p. 348), indicating that things associated with writing are problematical because writing is perceived as related to health. Van Helsing sees Mina's lack of interest in her diary as indicative of illness, there is '[...]the silence now often; as so it was with Miss Lucy' (p. 384), and 'She makes no entry into her little diary, she who write so faithful at every pause' (p. 431). This reveals the extent of her absorption by the Count's subjectivity; by an unself-referential pre-bourgeois subjectivity because, Barker again:-

> Pre-bourgeois subjection does not properly involve subjectivity at all, but a condition of dependent membership in which place and articulation are defined not by an interiorized self-recognition - complete or partial, percipient or unknowing...but by incorporation in the body politic. (p. 31)[5]

Absorption into the 'body' politic defines the system mediated through a symbolics of blood. The most overt example of this bodily absorption is the 'seduction' of Lucy Westenra. In her account to Mina of her dream (her seduction) blood plays an important part. It is the taste of the 'something' which is 'very sweet and very bitter,' (p. 121) that surrounds

her and absorbs her in a sexual fashion, i.e. the phallic 'West lighthouse was right under me' (p. 121). Her blood is tested for impurities by Seward; however, '"The qualitive analysis gives a quite normal condition[...]"' (p. 136), leading Seward to believe that her problem might be mental rather than physical. Blood becomes defined through a struggle for ownership of it. The Count corrupts Lucy by taking her blood and by introducing 'moral' impurities. For this to be halted Lucy's blood needs to be replaced from a healthy source, so that she is penetrated in a 'healthy' fashion.

The first transfusion is from her fiancee Holmwood, who is '"[...]so young and strong and of blood so pure[...]"' (p. 149). When Lucy receives this transfusion she re-enters discourse, writing that 'Arthur feels very, very close to me. I seem to feel his presence warm about me' (p. 154). Lucy's body has collapsed into what has given her life; from now on her identity is only secured to the extent that she is absorbed by the blood of others'. The group have unwittingly become vampiric in 'infecting' Lucy's body, but in a way which incorporates her within a notion of the healthy; it is a healthy form of penetration, a disguised sexual act. The second transfusion is with Seward, who recounts the experience as '[...]the draining away of one's blood, no matter how willingly it be given, is a terrible feeling-' (p. 156). It is not absorption here which is the 'terrible feeling', it is the guilty symbolic penetration of Lucy's body by one who has had his proposal to Lucy rejected. Van Helsing warns Seward not to tell Holmwood of this second transfusion as it may '"enjealous him"' (p. 156). Another transfusion is with Morris, who also had his proposal rejected, and another with Van Helsing. With these transfusions completed, there is a curious transformation in Lucy. Although now absorbed by the Count's blood,

nevertheless with the blood of Holmwood, Seward and Morris in her, Lucy has fulfilled her desire for promiscuity. She had previously told Mina about her three proposals, 'Why can't they let a girl marry three men, or as many as want her,[...]But this is heresy, and I must not say it '(p.76). Lucy's death and subsequent transformation into the 'Bloofar Lady' supplies her with a potential promiscuity; previously tabooed as heresy, now her 'purity' has changed 'to voluptuous wantonness'(p.252-3). But, as a vampire Lucy's unhealthy desire is not realised as a fully articulated sexualisation, but rather inverts maternal instinct. As the Bloofar Lady she reverses the role of suckling between mother and child[6], and so challenges a quality of maternity which is seen to adhere to female bodies and which is valorised at the end of the novel in the scene with Mina's child. Mina is in possession of this healthy maternity which is defined as an inner power; she writes, 'We women have something of the mother in us that makes us rise above smaller matters when the mother-spirit is invoked '(p.275).

Lucy is restored to the bourgeois symbolic order through her phallic staking, returning her into being an object of sex. She had 'seemed like a nightmare of Lucy as she lay there, the pointed teeth, the bloodstained, voluptuous mouth - which it made one shudder to see - the whole carnal and unspiritual appearance, seeming like a devilish mockery of Lucy's sweet purity '(p.256). On a previous visit to Lucy's tomb, Seward describes how from Van Helsing's candle 'the sperm dropped'(p.236) onto Lucy's coffin. When it comes to the staking of Lucy's body, the task is passed to Holmwood, because it would be by '"the hand of him who loved her best "'(p.258). Inevitably Lucy's staking is described in terms of erotic abandonment:-

> The thing in the coffin writhed; and a hideous, blood-curdling screech came from the opened red lips. The body shook and quivered and twisted in wild contortions; the sharp white teeth champed together till the lips were cut and the mouth was smeared with a crimson foam. But Arthur never faltered. He looked like a figure of Thor as his untrembling arm rose and fell, driving deeper and deeper the mercy-bearing stake, whilst the blood from the pierced heart welled and spurted up around it. His face was set, and high duty seemed to shine through it; the sight of it gave us courage, so that our voices seemed to ring through the little vault.
>
> (p. 258-9)

Lucy's 'opened red lips' and frothing mouth echo vaginal orgasm, with Holmwood 'driving deeper and deeper'; Holmwood is cheered on by the group as Lucy's body is violated in such a fashion which renders it healthy. With Lucy no longer suspended between life and death she enters the only form of non-textuality permitted, because, 'Death means continuity, in death, not life, each individual is united with the rest, sunk back into the sea of nondifferentiation '[7]. Lucy is absorbed, not into the body politic of the Count's symbolic of blood, but into nondifferentiation. 'Natural' death is privileged here, removing Lucy from suspension between an unnatural life and death; so that she does not function as an absent presence within the sexuality of the bourgeois group.

The Count's staking is not described in such overt sexual terms, his body is violated and he turns to dust, but it is his body (or an idea of it) which is the most striking. His body's incorporal corporality becomes anchored in two ways; one is via physiognomical notions of criminality derived from Lombroso, the other evolutionary whereby the historicity of the Count's body is identified as a weakness, and which links to the notion of criminality. Leonard Woolf in *Annotated Dracula*, makes the following juxtapositions between Jonathan Harker on the Count and Lombroso on the criminal:-

> Harker: 'His (the Count's) face was...aqualine, with high bridge of the thin nose and peculiarly arched nostrils...'

> Lombroso: '(The Criminal's) nose on the contrary...is often aqualine like the beak of a bird of prey.'
> Harker: 'His eyebrows were very massive, almost meeting over the nose...'
> Lombroso: 'The eyebrows are bushy and tend to meet across the nose.'
> Harker: '...his ears were pale and at the tops extremely pointed.'
> Lombroso: 'with a protuberance on the upper part of the posterior margin...a relic of the pointed ear...'[8].

Mina says to Van Helsing, '"The Count is a criminal and of criminal type.

Nordau and Lombroso would so classify him"' (p.406). The Count is declared a criminal by the state of his body; he has criminality inscribed upon his physiognomy and this can be read out. The Count has no body of text, in the sense of non-textuality, but possesses a body which can be read as a text. His sexuality, his symbolics of blood, eschews textual articulation, it is present, readable, because it becomes manifested through others, however this sexuality is linked to the transgression of the 'law' of sexuality. Foucault writes, '[...]the preoccupation with blood and the law has for nearly two centuries haunted the administration of sexuality' (p.149). The Count's sexuality as desire, its manifestation of a symbolics of blood, is the inarticulate element in this. However, the possibility of its existence makes it readable; it is possible to force the Count into textuality by introducing a reading practice (a theory of physiognomy) which locates him by decoding him.

The Count can thus be read as irredeemably criminal and this is linked not solely to his corrupting sexuality, but to an idea of primivitism. He is described as possessing a child-like brain; Van Helsing says '"This criminal has not full man-brain"' (p.405) and that '"[...]he be not of man-stature as to brain. He is of child-brain in much"' (p.406). According to their current ideas of evolution, the modern bourgeois group cannot be bested by what historically precedes it. Yet it is the power of the Count,

the strength of his brain, which is related to physical growth, '"[...]as his body keep strong and grow and thrive, so his brain grow too "' (p.380). It thus becomes necessary to defeat the Count before he becomes fully mature, before he can become '"-the father or furtherer of a new order of beings, whose road must lead through Death, not Life "' (pp.359-60). The child must not be permitted to become 'the father' of a 'new order'. His growth must be thwarted, he has to be condemned to the only permitted form of non-textuality. The triumph of the group is thus both the valorisation of its sexuality, and the means through which this triumph has been assured, the circulation of its texts.

To conclude this section; in *Dracula* there is a play of texts and bodies which implies that they are related. I have used Foucault to suggest that in the novel feudal and bourgeois positions clash. The bourgeoisie has to locate, read and destroy the troublesome sexuality of the Count because it threatens to destroy them. The sensuality of the Count is unspoken and this is decoded by linking him to contemporary accounts of criminality.

I will now read *Dracula* by exploring a contrary movement in the novel. I do this by introducing the sublime. The effect is to offer an alternative reading of the novel which unsettles the claims for scientific certainty to which the novel appears to gesture towards. The following reading will thus in part reassess the claims I have so far established in reading the novel in a Foucauldian fashion.

THE PLACE OF THE SUBLIME.

In the previous chapter I discussed Poe's detective tales in relation to Kant, and there appear to be similarities between how Poe's detective

functions and how the group operates in *Dracula*. In the former, the detective unravels a mystery, a mystery which takes on the proportions of the sublime. In *Dracula* the Count has a similar mysterious status, but is defeated in a way which differs to how a mystery is solved by Dupin. In *Dracula*, the Count is located through a social pooling of knowledge, whereas Poe's detective works in isolation. In this way there appears to be no sublimity. There is no structural play on an isolated subject confronting an overwhelming experience. Even sexuality has been banished from the novel. Carol A. Senf writes about the final scene (the scene with the group and Jonathan and Mina's child) that here; 'Individual sexual desire has apparently been so absolutely effaced that the narrators see this child as the result of their social union rather than the product of a sexual union between one man and one woman '(p. 101)[9]. Social relations overcome individualism which seems to imply that there is no room for, or version of, sublimity in the novel. However, in the figure of the Count notions of the sublime are expressed, and this is apparent at the level of vampirism. It is in the process of infection that the subject is transformed (via transfusion), through a rite of passage which takes on the guise of sublimity. Specifically it is a sexual overwhelming of the subject which occurs, and this is exemplified by Lucy's dream, discussed earlier, culminating in her finding the phallic 'West lighthouse[...]right under me '(p. 121).

In this fashion *Dracula* can be read as working through an attempt to expel desire in such a way that it expels the sublime. It thus celebrates a new era of modernity, a modernity threatened by the 'dead' form of the nineteenth-century sublime. As Harker had put it, the fear is that '[...]the old centuries had, and have, powers of their own which mere

'modernity' cannot kill '(p.49). To see how sublimity is expelled it is necessary to see how it is set up as an oppositional force in the novel.

DE BOLLA'S TWO SUBLIMES

I will now read tne novel in part through Peter De Bolla's *The Discourse of the Sublime*[10]. My claim is that De Bolla's two categories of the sublime, those works *on* the sublime and those *of* the sublime, are reversed in *Dracula*. The paradoxical effect is to grant the Count a peculiarly modern status.

According to De Bolla, discourses on the sublime become replaced by discourses of the sublime. He sees this movement as developing through '[...]ethics via rhetoric and empirical psychology to political economy '(p.34); so that, '[...]the discourse on the sublime transforms from an ethico-aesthetic enquiry into a psychology of the individual '(p.42). De Bolla sees this tendency as a natural progression, because for the discourse on the sublime:-

> [...]once it had begun to describe how an experience is sublime and what caused it, it began to create a discourse which not only explained the effect or demonstrated the mechanism by which it is produced, but also created the experiential possibility for sublime sensations. There is, then a natural tendency for the discourse on the sublime to produce the conditions necessary for the construction of the discourse of the sublime, a discourse which produces from within itself sublime experience. (p.12)

This is something which is worked out in *Dracula*, as the opposing bourgeois group attempt a decisive rupture with a past from which they were produced. This is a point I will return to.

As stressed earlier, the Count is located through an act of deduction, whereby the novel sets up (implicitly) a link between sexuality and

textuality. In this, a community of writers become a community of readers. They make what appears to be illegible, the Count's sexuality, legible through a 'science' of sexuality. Writing is also explored by De Bolla. He writes that, 'The subject as figure works through the text in complicated ways, generating a kind of metaphorics of the subject which is only ever offered as a defigurative reading of the historical context '(p.18). The group attempts to de-historicise the Count by banishing him from the present; failure to do so would result in his history usurping theirs ('We will become as him'); writing becomes the scene where all of this is worked out.

THE PLACE OF WRITING.

I will now explore in detail the function of writing in the novel. So far I have discussed the link between sexuality and textuality; however the use of textuality is not necessarily an 'even' one in the novel, i.e. writing means different things at different times. There are three forms of writing which I will briefly discuss: they are those which represent self-therapy, those moments when writing seems to obscure action, and a specific moment when writing is explicitly linked to economics.

Writing in *Dracula* is the site of knowledge and the site of therapy. This latter is apparent in, for example, Harker's opening journal when he writes '[...]I turn to my diary for repose. The habit of entering accurately must help to soothe me '(p.50). Mina later similarily writes '-I am anxious, and it soothes me to express myself here; it is like whispering to one's self and listening at the same time '(p.91). Later, Jonathan Harker writes 'I must keep writing at every chance, for I dare not stop to

think '(p.344). Writing is therefore a means by which the subject externalises internal anxiety. Anxiety when turned into text becomes distanced from the subject, and this is partly due to the social fashion in which writing is deployed throughout the novel. This is because the written text has implied readers in *Dracula*, so that on a textual level the subject overcomes fears felt in isolation in order to transmit those fears at a communal level. It is a way of re-integrating the isolated subject into the 'conversation' of the novel.

Writing is also defined as a problematic. This is because writing obscures action. Jonathan Harker's opening text ends with him seemingly locked up in Castle Dracula with no means of escape. He hears the workmen removing the Count's coffins. Harker believes that when the men leave he will be killed by the three female vampires he had earlier erotically encountered. However, instead of Harker taking action he prefers to write about his predicament:-

> As I write there is in the passage below a sound of many tramping feet and the crash of weights being set down heavily, doubtless the boxes, with their freight of earth. There is a sound of hammering; it is the box being nailed down. Now I can hear the heavy feet tramping along the hall, with many other idle feet coming behind them. (p.69)

Harker becomes a listener(Harker)/writer, and the reader is never informed of his means of escape. This implies that text is more important than lived 'reality'. This is echoed later in the novel when Dr Seward is informed that Renfield has had a serious accident. This is how he responds to this crisis:-

> The attendant came bursting into my room and told me that Renfield had somehow met with some accident. He had heard him yell; and when he went to him found him lying on his face on the floor, all covered with blood. I must go at once... (p.327).

Seward does not 'go at once', first he writes it down. The implication is

that experience has to be textually mediated in order for that experience to become 'truth'. There is thus a fear, expressed in the journalist's account of the arrival of the Demeter, that experience might take '[...]place more quickly than it takes to write these words '(p.99). This means that another fear is a temporal one, of actions happening more quickly than they can be expressed. Therefore, what fails to coincide with writing is another threat to the group.

I stressed earlier that the link between textuality and sexuality via a scientia sexualis was, historically, a bourgeois formation. If *Dracula* works through this formation then it is not surprising to see a link made, overtly, between writing and money. This occurs in Seward's account of Renfield prior to Renfield's fatal 'accident', where money and writing are explicitly linked in a fashion which echoes *Robinson Crusoe*[11]. Seward writes of Renfield that:-

> He has evidently some deep problem in his mind, for he keeps a little note-book in which he is always jotting down something. Whole pages of it are filled with masses of figures, generally single numbers added up in batches, and then the totals added in batches again, as though he were 'focusing' some account, as the auditors put it. (p.88)

Seward conflates this idea of money with religion. Writing after the rejection of his marriage proposal to Lucy, he writes of Renfield that:-

> He has closed the account most accurately, and to-day began a new record. How many of us begin a new record with each day of our lives?
>
> To me it seems only yesterday that my whole life ended with my new hope, and that truly I began a new record. So it will be until the Great Recorder sums me up and closes my ledger account with a balance to profit or loss. (p.90)

Writing then, is linked to both money and ethics (religion). In this there exists no space which could effectively accommodate the sublime, because the sublime implies a de-materialised moment in which the subject is extracted from social relations. The seeming self-therapy of writing in

the first form discussed here, is embarked upon precisely because it erases isolation. In the second instance, writing becomes more important than action; non-linguistic possibilities are thus placed in a subservient position to writing. In the third moment writing is materialised as an 'account' ledger which is then re-translated into an ethical parable, controlled by an idea of 'profit'. It is an ethical formulation mediated through a materialism inimical to sublimity.

SEX AND THE SUBLIME.

I will now explore the way sexuality is linked to textuality, seeing how sexuality is equated with the sublime. In *Dracula* sexuality becomes expelled from the novel when it is turned into text; in the multivocal structure of the novel sexuality becomes replaced by 'chaste' social bonding.

De Bolla writes of sex and the sublime that:-

> I am thinking here of the evident links that pertain between sublime and sensation and the 'rapture' or 'transport' of sexual union. This is not only because the presumed 'bliss' arising from that union is the only physical analogue that approaches the extreme sensation of the sublime. It is also because the discourse on the sublime produces and examines subjectivity in gender-specific terms, thereby signalling its participation within the larger set of discourses determining sexuality for the period. (p.56)

Therefore knowledge of the Count becomes knowledge of sexuality. This knowledge however is not complete because although there are a series of uneasy identifications with the Count, these are implicit. It is the case that the Count's sexuality seeps into discourse; as Van Helsing tells Jonathan Harker, 'Do you not see how, of late, this monster has been creeping into knowledge experimentally '(p.360). Typically the Count enters

into a subject's consciousness, through dream-like states, keeping his sexuality covert. Lucy writes of the Count's visitations that:-

> I have a dim half-remembrance of long, anxious times of waiting and fearing; darkness in which there was not even the pain of hope to make present distress more poignant; and then long spells of oblivion, and the rising back to life as a diver coming up through a great press of water. (p. 164).

It becomes necessary to make conscious the unconscious. A similar sense of doubt surrounds Jonathan Harker's opening account. Mina writes, 'It may be that it is the doubt which haunts him; that when the doubt is removed, no matter which - waking or dreaming - may prove the truth, he will be more satisfied and better able to bear the shock '(p. 218). The truth exists at an unconscious (sublime, or uncanny) level, a 'truth' which has to be verified by text. It is the dream which bridges this conscious/unconscious divide, but in a way which seems to unsettle both. Mina writes on waking up that:-

> I think that it took me an effort and a little time to realise where I was, and that it was Jonathan who was bending over me. My dream was very peculiar, and was almost typical of the way that waking thoughts become merged in, or continued in, dreams. (p. 308)

This merging has to be clarified for 'truth' to appear. The Count disrupts attempts to clarify knowledge, and it is Van Helsing who is the chief instigator of a social policy which leads to just such a clarification.

Christopher Croft writes of Van Helsing that:-

> His largest purpose is to reinscribe the dualities that Dracula would muddle and confuse. Dualities require demarcations, inexorable and ineradicable lines of separation, but Dracula, as a border being who abrogates demarcations, makes such distinctions impossible. He is *nosferatu*, neither dead nor alive but somehow both, mobile frequenter of the grave and boudoir, easeful communicant of exclusive realms, and as such he toys with the separation of the living and the dead, a distinction critical to physician, lawyer, and priest alike. (p. 177)[12]

There is also an implicit parallel between Van Helsing and the Count, both are described as possessing scientific knowledge; the Count's archaic

and Van Helsing's modern. Also, both are concerned with controlling the feminine. Their endeavours mirror each other in a way which echoes Victor's relation to the monster in *Frankenstein*. I discuss at greater length this idea of the double in relation to Freud, but it should be noted here that in 'The Uncanny'[13] heimlich and unheimlich are conflated meaning that Freud's argument cannot be contained by his terms of reference. Similarly sexuality is problematically 'contained' between the Count-Van Helsing registers, and for this reason mergings have to be strenuously opposed by Van Helsing. What is also implicit in this rejection of mergings, is a rejection of the sublime. In the Kantian form of sublimity, although no object is necessarily required (the sublime as ideational state), there persists the idea of a liberating merger. This is when the subject's capacity for reason is questioned, but this 'anxiety' on the part of the subject is then compensated by an apprehension of a supersensible realm. At this point the consciousness of the subject becomes merged with a noumenal domain. In relation to sexuality in *Dracula*, it is significant that when these mergings take place the subject feels lost or erotically abandoned. This leads Seward to wonder whether 'Is it possible that love is all subjective, or all objective?' (p.242). It is Van Helsing who attempts to inscribe 'healthy' demarcations by using science as a disguised deployment of 'moral' imperatives. It is the separation of conscious from unconscious which appears to be significant. As Van Helsing tells Seward about Lucy, '"She is dying. It will not be long now. It will be much difference, mark me, whether she dies conscious or in her sleep"' (p.193). It is however the potential continuation of feudalism under the guise of sexual relations which offers the most palpable threat.

Sexuality, the past and the potential existence of non-linguistic

experience are the central sources of anxiety confronted by the vampire hunter. In *Dracula* then, the sublime seemingly takes on the status of being a troubling absence.

I will now suggest that *Dracula* reverses De Bolla's two types of sublimity. Such a reading in part unsettles the account of *Dracula which* I have set up. This is because although the Count appears to have the status of a threatening (feudal) absence, read through De Bolla he becomes a threatening internal (psycho-sexual) presence.

A THOROUGHLY MODERN VAMPIRE.

De Bolla writes of the discourse of the sublime that '[...]it is self-reflexive in the first instance, making reference to itself as discourse in its explanatory procedures rather than to adjacent or prior discourses, objects in the world of human subjectivity '(p.34). The Count functions in this broadly self-validating fashion. This is also manifested in the Count's order being defined by dependent membership rather than by external ratification. As he says to the group '"Your girls that you all love are mine already; and through them you and others shall yet be mine - my creatures, to do my bidding and to be my jackals when I want to feed "' (p.365).

The opposing group function through external knowledge, in a pseudo-scientific knowledge embodied by Van Helsing 'M.D., D.Ph., D.Litt., etc., etc.,' (p.138) and Dr Seward. De Bolla writes that 'The discourse on the sublime places external authority as the control for its analyses and descriptions, as the reference point that authenticates its findings.' (p.34).

This means that it is possible to read *Dracula* the other way around, and it is the Count who initiates reversals. Early on he says to Jonathan Harker about his proposed trip to England:-

> When I go there I shall be all alone, and my friend Harker Jonathan - nay, pardon me, I fall into my country's habit of putting your patronymic first - my friend Jonathan Harker will not be by my side to correct and aid me. (p. 34)

This reverses the cultural order at the level of personal identity. The Count's project is also an attempt to return to the past to bring an end to history by making it a repetition.

To refer to De Bolla's definition of the discourse *on* the sublime; it is Van Helsing who supplies both an ethical (quasi-Catholic) platform and a pseudo-scientific explanation. Their project thus bears a similarity to what De Bolla sees as characterising the discourse on the sublime, a discourse which is prior to the *of* form:-

> The discourse on the sublime, in a move that is becoming familiar in our discussion of early eighteenth-century works on aesthetics, is held in check by a prior and unexamined discourse of ethics thereby defusing its potential power to the sublime, and its mutation into a discourse of the sublime. (pp. 79-80)

In *Dracula* this is worked out at the level of sexuality. It is sexuality, as a displaced form of the sublime, which is 'held in check by a prior and unexamined discourse of ethics'; in doing so the 'potential power of the sublime', or the troublesome sexuality manifested by the vampire, is not fully articulated. The Count's apparent 'otherness' then is a disguised 'sameness', the Count is linked to the group because he expresses their sexual politics. This means that the Count is an internal rather than an external 'enemy'. This is briefly acknowledged by Van Helsing; he says of the Count that:-

> There have been from the loins of this very one great men and good women, and their graves make sacred the earth where alone this foulness can dwell. For it is not the least of its terrors that this evil thing

> is rooted deep in all good; in soil barren of holy memories it cannot rest. (p. 288).

Here it is not solely that 'evil' is judged in relation to what is 'good', but that the two are related in an intimate way. For this reason there are a series of disquieting mergings between conscious and unconscious states. As Van Helsing says about Lucy, '"In trance she died, and in trance she is Un-Dead, too. So it is that she differ from all other "' (p. 241). Lucy has entered and now articulates a formulation of the unconscious which is characterised as desire. In the unconscious, social distinctions become erased, and this threatens the social (class) bonding of the group. It is therefore necessary to overcome egoism, and this is apparent in a comment made by Seward concerning Renfield; 'His attitude to me was the same as that to the attendant; in his sublime self-feeling the difference between myself and attendant seemed to him as nothing ' (p. 124). In the sublime social distinctions become obviated. Social distinctions have to be maintained in the struggle against the Count, precisely because he also refuses to recognise those social distinctions. It is when Renfield is in a 'sane' mood that these distinctions appear. He addresses the group as, '"You gentlemen, who by nationality, by heredity, or by the possession of natural gifts, are fitted to hold your respective places in the moving world "' (p. 292).

The sublime then, not only threatens the sexuality but also the social, class, distinctions through which the bourgeoisie function. Yet it is the pressure of the sublime which is internally generated (via sexual politics), and which is positioned within the psyche. Richard Wasson, writing on the use of science in *Dracula*, comes to the conclusion that:-

> These themes add up to the idea that technological progress having cut humanity off from the old superstitious, dark knowldge, makes itself increasingly vulnerable to the demonic powers like the vampire, for,

> having written them off as unreal, civilised man(sic) has no defense against them. Since only doctors of the mind, Seward and Van Helsing, can cope with such monsters the novel carries the implication that demonish forces have been unloosed in the human psyche by technological and political progress. (p. 21)[14]

In this sense the sublime is fully internalised in a way akin to Burke's[15] idea of sublime Terror. It also bears a similarity to the potential overwhelming of the subject suggested by Schiller here:-

> The sublime object is of a dual sort. We refer it either to our *power of apprehension* and are defeated in the attempt to form an image of its concept; or we refer it to our *vital power* and view it as a power against which our own dwindles to nothing. (p. 198)[16]

The sublime generates a sense of terror in *Dracula* because it implies a loss of control on the part of the subject.

In conclusion, in *Dracula* the sublime is internal to the subject. If De Bolla's identification of two forms of discourse concerning the sublime is correct then they can be seen as reversed in Stoker's novel. The implication is therefore that the discourse of the sublime, which is self-reflexive and self-legislating, has emerged from the externally ratified discourse on the sublime. It means that the Count is produced by what has preceded him. This is a process akin to what Harold Bloom identifies as 'Apophrades' in *The Anxiety of Influence*, where; '[...]the uncanny effect is that the new poem's achievement makes it seem to us, not as though the precursor were writing it, but as though the later poet himself had written the precursor's characteristic work '(p. 16)'[7]. This is significant because Bloom uses the idea of Apophrades to suggest the return of the dead. A return which, reading the novel through De Bolla's account of discourses and the sublime, is a necessary one because the discourse *on* the sublime 'naturally' produces a discourse *of* the sublime. The sublime has now become, not a troubling absence, but a troubling presence which has to be

exorcised from within by 'doctors of the mind' who anticipate the work of Freud.

CHAPTER SEVEN: FREUD'S DILEMMA, THE UNCANNY SUBLIME.

INTRODUCTION

My discussion here will initially explore how Freud's 'The Uncanny'[1], *The Interpretation of Dreams*[2] and *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*[3] reveal certain incoherent elements within his theories. In 'The Uncanny' one of the principal difficulties encountered relates to the problem of origins. Freud's exploration of the origins of neurosis, of creativity and of culture remains problematic and these dilemmas are similarly expressed in both *Dreams* and *Psychopathology*.

The seeming disparities between Freud's version of the subject and Kant's can be resolved. David E. Pettigrew's 'The question of the relation of philosophy and psychoanalysis: The case of Kant and Freud'[4], supports my identification of an idea of a fragmented subject inherent in Kant, which is similar to Freud's idea of the disruptive features in the unconscious. Their different accounts of the subject overlap.

The Romantic sublime now enters the domain of the psychoanalytical, and in this the uncanny becomes a 'play' upon, or version of, the sublime. This enables me to resolve Weiskel's[5] failure to recuperate the negative sublime for an oedipal drama.

Finally Stevenson's *The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde*, reveals how the sublime, in the guise of the uncanny, is worked out in fantasy. My suggestion, as throughout this thesis, is that it is in the irrational that the sublime appears as an 'excess' in fantasy. Fantasy thus offers an alternative to a philosophical understanding of the sublime and a

psychoanalytical account of the uncanny. It is similar to, but different from, both of them.

THE UNCANNINESS OF 'THE UNCANNY'.

For Freud, the uncanny is defined as a problematic oscillation between heimlich and unheimlich, out of which fear, recognition and repetition are generated. However, the relationship between heimlich and unheimlich is uneasy. It is a relationship which becomes uncanny due to its inability (successfully) to contain its own terms of reference. Clive Bloom writes of 'The Uncanny' that:-

> The essay ceases to have a recognisable centre for the centre is now split into a problem method which is itself constituted within the production of the uncanny itself. What Freud pursues is not a type of sensibility but a theoretical foundation. The pursuit becomes the process of the uncanny. (p. 105)[6]

This is because: '[...]the uncanny does not compromise psychoanalysis it merely does not allow itself to be encompassed. The paradoxical situation is then produced whereby psychoanalysis produces a term within its discourse that it cannot contain '(p. 102). The uncanny is an analytical compulsion which Bloom sees as supporting a reading practice inherent in Poe's tales. However, the uncanny transcends this, pervading both *Dreams* and *Psychopathology* in ways which similarly disables his 'uncontainable' arguments. Thus the pervasiveness of the uncanny is greater than Bloom would have it. Also, in 'The Uncanny' there is an account of unattainable origins which is defined through an effacement of meaning. It thus becomes problematic to construct this as a reading practice, because *all* practice is undermined. Rather the uncanny reflects a lacuna in sublimity because it implicitly recognises it as an abyssal scene.

I discuss this in greater detail below. This is also carried over into a discussion of *Dreams* and *Psychopathology*. My argument is that Freud sets out similar, or facsimile versions of, the uncanny, and this in part disables his project because the uncanny is distorted by Freud's unacknowledged (unconscious) appropriation of particular versions of the Romantic sublime.

Freud begins 'The Uncanny' with; 'It is only rarely that a psychoanalyst feels impelled to investigate the subject of aesthetics, even when aesthetics is understood to mean not merely the theory of beauty but the theory of the qualities of feeling '(p.339). Freud does not account for the basis of this theory of aesthetics. It is not solely (or 'merely') a 'theory of beauty' but is linked to 'the qualities of feeling'. On the same page he attempts to clarify the terms of this confused account of aesthetics, only to restate that confusion. He writes that he is concerned with; '[...]treatises on aesthetics, which in general prefer to concern themselves with what is beautiful, attractive and sublime - that is, with feelings of a positive nature -' (p.339). Here an idea of aesthetics is partly equated with sublimity. In one way this will later make sense in Freud's essay because the sublime, in its guise of the uncanny, maintains its universalising tendencies. However, this idea of positive feelings in the sublime appears to distance 'The Uncanny' from Kant's 'Analytic of the Sublime'[7]. For Kant the sublime takes on a negative quality because it dramatises the subject's failure to comprehend the sublime moment, a failure compensated at the level of the supersensible realm. Also, for Kant, beauty is defined as an aesthetic apprehension grounded within the perceiving subject; it individualises in ways a priori precluded from an account of sublimity. This is different from Kant's idea of aesthetic

judgement which is universal to the degree that it requires a consensus concerning the rules for understanding the aesthetic object. In this sense it becomes a version of sublimity.

Freud offers a formulation of beauty and sublimity which is not clearly referenced to 'treatises on aesthetics'. It is not that Freud offers an alternative account of the sublime (from Kant's) but rather a muddled version of it. This becomes clearer in Freud's discussion of the subject and their 'felt' responses. His confused account also appears to offer a negative version of the sublime, because of 'unpleasure', which is similar to Burke's understanding of sublime Terror. Freud writes that; 'The subject of the 'uncanny' is a province of this kind. It is undoubtedly related to what is frightening - to what arouses dread and horror '(p.339). As if aware that this is an unsatisfactory account of the 'uncanny', Freud apologises. He writes of himself that; 'It is long since he has experienced or heard of anything which has given him an uncanny impression, and he must start by translating himself into that state of feeling, by awakening in himself the possibility of experiencing it '(p.340). In effect he argues for a position which is analogous to that of Poe's detective. What is of interest is that Freud suggests the possibility of wilfully entering the uncanny; rather than encountering it. As if conscious of this theoretical indecisiveness, Freud switches from giving a programmatic formulation of the uncanny in favour of becoming a reader. He moves from writer to reader in order to search for a textual authority with which to anchor his opening remarks.

Paradoxically in doing so he discovers an authority in Jentsch whose meandering account of the uncanny is echoed in Freud's opening muddled account of aesthetics, the sublime and the uncanny. He writes of Jentsch

that; 'He ascribes the essential factor in the production of the feeling of the uncanniness to intellectual uncertainty; so that the uncanny would always, as it were, be something one does not know one's way about in '(p.341). Freud comments 'that this definition is incomplete '(p.341), before making a reading of the uncanny based upon dictionary definitions.

In Freud's account of the uncanny, after giving a problematic description of aesthetics, he offers a view of the subject who can think themselves into the required 'state of feeling' which enables the uncanny to appear. This conundrum, of the subject who experiences something as an occurrence (an act of the uncanny) but who can nevertheless create that feeling from within, is never fully resolved. This problematic relationship between the internal and the external is in part manifested in his definitions of heimlich and unheimlich through the fashion in which those terms are both different from and yet repeat each other. Freud then discusses Jentsch's formulation of the uncanny, which echoes Freud's own inchoate position, seeing it as in need of completion. There is thus a regress in Freud's account, a movement from definition of theory, to reading of theory, to a new position which attempts to establish the (for Freud psychic) etymology of words. This is a movement which is mirrored in how he defines the uncanny, because one of the defining characteristics of the uncanny is a repetition. He writes that; '[...]the uncanny is that class of the frightening which leads back to what is known of old and long familiar '(p.340). This is echoed in his account of heimlich and unheimlich, or homely and unhomely, as being 'old and long familiar'; because there is a repetition there is also a doubling. In this way, Freud's reading practice mirrors what it is attempting to define.

There is thus a doubling between what Freud sees as characteristic of

the uncanny, and the strategies (theoretical, textual, lexicographical) which he employs to account for it. This is not to say that Freud's review of the existing literature on the uncanny means that his repetition of those accounts is uncanny. Rather it suggests that Freud's text becomes uncanny because his attempts to define the uncanny begin to collapse. This is apparent in the relationship which he sees between heimlich and unheimlich. His initial definition of heimlich suggests that it is a term split along a Culture/Nature divide. Heimlich is firstly accounted for as representative of culture; it is; '(a) (Obsolete) belonging to the house or the family, or regarded as so belonging[...]the members of the household' (p.342). It is secondly defined as on the side of nature; '(b) Of animals: tame, companionable to man. As opposed to wild[...]'(P.342). The second definition constructs a tamed nature, of nature becoming culture; in this way both definitions complement each other because they collapse into each other. The obsolete domesticity apparent in 'the family' is carried over into the taming of animals for domestic purposes (presumably for the family). Freud then accounts for the definition of unheimlich and relates it to heimlich. After a lengthy dictionary account of these terms he writes that; 'What interests us most in this long extract (from the dictionary) is to find that among its different shades of meaning the word '*heimlich*' exhibits one which is identified with its opposite, '*unheimlich*' '(p.345). The one meaning is that of secrecy, of what is kept hidden; '[...]withdrawn from knowledge, unconscious...'(p.346). What is significant in this collapse (or repetition) of heimlich with unheimlich is the fashion in which the uncanny is problematically contained within its referencing. The uncanny has become uncanny because it is neither specifically heimlich nor specifically unheimlich, but both. In this

doubling between heimlich and unheimlich a repetition of meaning takes place which is precisely what Freud sees as one characteristic of the uncanny in the first place. Freud writes that; '[...]whatever reminds us of this inner 'compulsion to repeat' is perceived as uncanny '(p.361). In this way the terms of his argument reinscribe the critical terms which Freud proposes to use in order to create his argument.

This is carried over into his discussion of Hoffman's 'The Sandman'. There Freud writes explicitly about the double. In Hoffman's tale:-

> [...]we have characters who are to be considered identical because they look alike. This relation is accentuated by mental processes leaping from one of these characters to another - by what we should call telepathy - so that the one possesses knowledge, feelings and experience in common with the other. (p.356)

There is uncanniness here because of repetition; in a way a repetition of the terms of Freud's argument which conflate heimlich and unheimlich. These terms of reference, homely and unhomely, are later superseded in Freud's account of death as a version (or source) of the uncanny. It is the subject's relation to the idea of death that evokes the double as that which '[...]was originally an insurance against the destruction of the ego '(p.356). However, for Freud, once narcissism is overcome, the double takes on a sinister aspect; 'From having been an assurance of immortality, it becomes the uncanny harbinger of death '(p.357). This idea of the double, which assures immortality and then promises death, is unstable. In keeping with the way that other forms of implicit doubling have been set up by Freud, they cancel each other out. Whereas with heimlich and unheimlich there is a collapse, in the case of the immortal or murderous portent of the double there is a dialectical resolution. Freud writes of the ego's development with the double that:-

> A special agency is slowly formed there, which is able to stand over against the rest of the ego, which has the function of observing and

> criticizing the self and of exercising a censorship within the mind, and which we become aware of as our 'conscience'.' (p. 357)

The double is now both a stifling and a protective agent in relation to the ego. Stifling, because the 'conscience' operates as a censor; it is this idea which enables Freud to resurrect the terms heimlich and unheimlich in an account of repression. As if having clarified the collapse between the two terms, he writes that:-

> [...]we can understand why linguistic usage has extended *das Heimliche* ['homely'] into its opposite, *das Unheimliche*; for this uncanny is in reality nothing new or alien, but something which is familiar and old-established in the mind and which has become alienated from it only through the process of repression. (pp. 363-4)

The two terms are now subsumed under Freud's category of repetition as that which identifies the uncanny. What however is not addressed is the fashion in which two linguistic (dictionary) terms structure that which is defined by Freud as non-linguistic. Freud thus elides a debate about how figurative language functions in all this. Rather the two terms repeat each other because they are in essence the same; they now however example the uncanny in so doing, instead of being a part of Freud's theoretical structure which controls the debate on the uncanny. The uncanny is now ubiquitous, pervading the very terms employed to describe it. Neil Hertz writes of Freud's schema and the absence of an account of figurative language, that; 'The wishfulness inherent in the model is not simply in its isolating the *forces* of repetition from their representations, but in its seeking to isolate the *question* of repetition from the question of figurative language itself ' (p. 121)[8]. For Hertz, what is uncanny is not what is repeated, but repetition itself.

In Freud's account of the uncanny then, repetition is divorced from figurative language; in a sense it motivates all forms of repetition. What

is revealed in this is that it is controlled by an idea of the same. Meaning returns to its site of departure in a way which does not unsettle that meaning (as in the account of heimlich/unheimlich) but which stresses a circularity that precludes a privileged outside position. Thus potentially everything can get pulled into the uncanny; even, for Freud, psychoanalysis itself; 'Indeed, I should not be surprised to hear that psychoanalysis, which is concerned with laying bare these hidden forces, has itself become uncanny to many people for that very reason '(p.366). But not solely because it lays 'bare[...]hidden forces', but implicitly because it articulates repetition (doubling) itself. As Freud writes at one point; 'These last examples of the uncanny are to be referred to the principle which I have called 'omnipotence of thoughts', taking the name from an expression used by one of my patients '(p.362). This reference to the Rat Man implies a doubling between the analyser and the analysed. As with heimlich and unheimlich, where the two become confused, what is uncanny is narcissistic repetition. Here the Rat Man supplies a theoretical point which accounts for his neurosis, and in so doing the meta-discourse of psychoanalysis becomes defined by a movement of infinite regress. Everything can get pulled into the uncanny, so that meaning is seen to reside in a point of origin (birth, the patient's childhood, etymological origins); or as Freud puts it:-

> It often happens that neurotic men declare that they feel there is something uncanny about the female genital organs. This *unheimlich* place, however, is the entrance to the former *Heim* [home] of all human beings, to the place where each one of us lived once upon a time and in the beginning. (p.368)

Here, neurotic men have a problem with origins, with the fairy tale place where 'once upon a time', 'each of us lived'. In this way meaning becomes a return of an origin which is unattainable, or as Copley and Whale put it,

'[...]the Romantic is always already retrospective.' (p.6)[9]. Which to link to the genital imagery evoked by Freud, ties in with what Shelley in 'The Defense of Poetry' sees as the impossibility of obtaining ultimate meaning, 'Veil after veil may be undrawn and the inmost naked beauty of the meaning never exposed ' (p.291)'[10]. Here meaning is an act of strip-tease, with the female genitals implicitly figured as the unattainable (unrepeatable) origin of meaning. This is also a strictly male reading of meaning by Shelley; as Paul Hamilton writes of this image: '[...]the male interpretive desire expands to achieve an unlimited authority which the female figure is thereby never permitted for herself. Every meaning will have her interpreter ' (pp. 14-15)''.

To summarise this reading of Freud's 'The Uncanny': there is an initial movement going from an attempt at theorising to an act of reading (Jentsch), followed by an extensive concentration on dictionary definitions. The paradoxical result is that the controlling terms of the uncanny, heimlich and unheimlich, become uncanny themselves. Freud then gives a reading to Hoffman's 'The Sandman' seeing it as expressing castration anxiety mediated through the motif of the double. Freud then discusses the varying significances of the double, seeing it as articulating a return of the same (as happens in heimlich/unheimlich); in this way everything becomes potentially uncanny because everything is potentially repeatable. In this, meaning becomes lost as the possibility of an 'outside' critical discourse is precluded, because (as in the example of the Rat Man) it can itself be doubled. The only uncanny area not assimilable to an idea of repetition is the 'home' or point of origin. In this sense there is an idea of an original creativity which can be strived after, in a Platonic sense, but which is not attained.

I made some remarks above concerning Romanticism. I will now turn to this area by discussing Kant's subject. My intention is to reveal that the apparent differences between Kant and Freud, the differences between a conception of a unified transcendental subject versus a fragmented psyche, are disguised similarities.

KANT, FREUD, AND THE SUBJECT.

In this section I begin with a discussion of David E. Pettigrew's 'The Question of the Relation of Philosophy and Psychoanalysis: The Case of Kant and Freud.' I use this article because it concisely accounts for how it is possible to trace similar tendencies in the work of Kant and Freud. It should be noted however, that Pettigrew's stance is philosophical rather than psychoanalytical. In his article Pettigrew initially sets out three fundamental areas of disparity between Kant and Freud.

The first is that whereas Freud is concerned with the possibility of the unconscious, Kant is concerned with how the subject is able to think.

The second is that in Freud's notion of the unconscious there is the view that the mind is informed by various memories and desires; whereas for Kant the mind is essentially blank, or 'without contents' (p. 70).

The third difference is that for Freud the psyche is characterised by its ruptures and desires, whereas in Kant there are no such divisions because he is reliant upon an idea of unity inherent in transcendental experience.

However, these seemingly disparate positions are ones which Pettigrew replaces with 'three points of probable convergence' (p. 83). These are replies to the three differences set out above.

Firstly, Freud sees experience as governed by the unconscious which, for Pettigrew, is similar to Kant's notion of the mind possessing an a priori structure without which it would not be able to give thought to the conditions of its own experience.

Secondly, in Freud there is a search for a unity of the subject, for an originating point at which a rupture occurred. In Kant there is a similar search for unity, which as in Freud's investigation, ironically implies a fragmentation of identity. Pettigrew identifies two movements made towards unity in Kant. The first is an attempt to discover how it is possible for the subject to 'know the world as we say we know it '(p.83). However, in the second movement, reason is 'in conflict with itself seeking the *unconditioned unity* of its experience '(p.83), so that 'The *a priori*[...]as *unifying* is at the same a division '(p.83). Thus the subject is split because it does not necessarily coincide at the level of self-perception, or as Pettigrew puts it; 'Kant's work *calls* forth the paradox of the subject that knows itself as it appears to itself and not as it is in itself '(p.83), therefore the transcendental unity of apperception is unconscious. This is also in part a reply by Pettigrew to the third disparity between Kant and Freud, in the idea of a subject de-centred by neurosis.

Pettigrew's third reply suggests how it is possible to tie in the unconscious with Kantian categories. He writes that Kant's idea of consciousness is characterised by a fundamental absence, or by an abyssal scene. Here the link with Freud is that; 'The unity is abyssal as the inorganic and quiescent state of death itself. The unconscious, and the drive to unification seem both foundational and inaccessible in a way that is analogous to Kant's ideas of pure reason '(p.84).

In this way, Pettigrew links Kant with Freud without collapsing one into the other. These similarities are important because they make possible a reading of Weiskel's *The Romantic Sublime* which accounts for what Weiskel sees as a structural failure in the negative sublime. This is explored in greater depth further on. The contention there will be that where Weiskel sees the negative sublime as being a mere structural version of the Oedipal drama, this failure, or resistance, to a psychoanalytical interpretation is not because the negative sublime is too distant, but because it is too close to psychoanalytical practice. That is to say that there is a significant overlap between the negative sublime and psychoanalysis, so that the reason Weiskel cannot push his argument further is because it would involve psychoanalysis analysing, in part, itself. Such a position, I argue, creates an impossible difficulty for theory and represents an aporia in Weiskel's text.

I will now explore Freud's *Dreams*. In relation to 'The Uncanny', the argument was that the uncanny became uncanny itself because it could not be contained within its form of referencing. I will now discuss the way *Dreams* restates many of the problematics which can be found in 'The Uncanny'. The intention is to reveal the way that Freud's work is ghosted by a term which disables some of his arguments.

THE INTERPRETATION OF FREUD'S DREAMS.

The term homely, or <u>heimlich</u>, occurs in a flippant fashion in *Dreams* when Freud quotes from a letter to Fliess dated 12 June 1890. On a visit to Bellevue Freud had the dream which initiated his investigation of dreams. Freud suggests (half-heartedly) that a plaque should be put on the house in

Bellevue, which would read:-

> In This House, on July 24th, 1895
>
> the Secret of Dreams was Revealed
>
> to Dr Sigm Freud (p. 199).

If it is possible to see the 'home' as a point of origin for Freud, then such a comment takes on a larger significance. The precision recorded in this facsimile of a plaque can be read as the record of the birth of *Dreams*. This overt claim made for hero status is similar to 'the omnipotence of thoughts' Freud found (or rather had 'revealed' to him) by the Rat Man. Freud states that the secret of dreams was revealed to him, rather than discovered. In this way the revelation takes on uncanny characteristics, and this links to the way dreams operate, at a manifest level, to partially conceal their latent content. To return to 'The Uncanny', there Freud writes of <u>heimlich</u>, or home, that:-

> In general we are reminded that the word '*heimlich*' is not unambiguous, but belongs to two sets of ideas, which, without being contradictory, are yet very different: on the one hand it means what is familiar and agreeable, and on the other, what is concealed and kept out of sight (p. 345).

Thus at uncanny moments what has been 'concealed and kept out of sight,' is revealed. It is thus not fortuitous that Freud links his initiation into dream interpretation to the place where such a revelation took place. The house is both the source of origin and the point of departure for a de-familiarisation of experience.

After this letter to Fliess there immediately follows another letter to him (6 August 1899) which outlines Freud's intended construction for *Dreams*. He writes that:-

> The whole thing is planned on the model of an imaginary walk. First comes the dark wood of the authorities (who cannot see the trees), where there is no clear view and it is easy to go astray. Then there is a cavernous defile through which I lead my readers - my specimen dream

> with its peculiarities, its details, its indiscretions and its bad jokes - and then, all at once, the high ground and the open prospect and the question: "which way do you want to go?" (p.200)

Freud leaves open the possibilities for interpretation in an implicit reference to the way absolute meaning (as absolute regress) is elided in 'The Uncanny'. There the uncanny becomes ubiquitous, collapsing the references which try to define it. Here Freud abandons the reader at the 'open prospect', leaving them with a question rather than a determinant answer. This bears a similarity to the sublime; Weiskel writes of the Romantic sublime that 'What happens to you standing at the edge of the infinite spaces can be made, theoretically, to "mean" just about anything '(p.28). The sublime is left open for the possibility of projection (specifically anthropomorphism in the case of Wordsworth). However, for Freud this open question is only possible because he sees dreams as being overdetermined, so that no determinant answer is possible. Freud writes that; 'Even if the solution seems satisfactory and without gaps, the possibility always remains that the dream may have yet another meaning. Strictly speaking, then, it is impossible to determine the amount of condensation '(p.383). This is because; ':each of the elements of the dream's content turns out to have been 'overdetermined' - to have been represented in the dream-thoughts many times over '(p.388-9). Here the uncanny returns (is repeated) because the problem for interpretation is the idea of repetition. As the dream's content is 'represented in the dream-thoughts many times over', the attempt to locate meaning becomes problematic. As Freud writes in 'The Uncanny'; '[...]whatever reminds us of this inner 'compulsion to repeat' is perceived as uncanny '(p.361). This links to Hertz's contention that what is important in the uncanny is not what is repeated, but the act of repetition itself. Freud reaches a similar

conclusion in relation to dreams; 'What appears in dreams, we might suppose, is not what is *important* in the dream-thoughts but what occurs in them several times over ' (p. 416).

Repetition, as a form of emphasis, determines what is significant. This means that 'overdetermination' has now become the site where repetition takes place. It is the site which has to be explored so as to secure meaning. It is the place which reveals the working out of dreams, precisely because dreams are supposed to resist interpretation. Freud then, now sees a way that the dream can be opened and its meaning exposed through an analogy to reading:-

> Yet, in spite of all this ambiguity, it is fair to say that the productions of the dream-work, which, it must be remembered, *are not made with the intention of being understood*, present no greater difficulties to their translators than do the ancient hieroglyphic scripts to those who seek to read them. (p. 457)

Thus the dream can be translated into the type of narrative which Freud had seen controlling the structure of *Dreams*; it ending now through a point of closure which appears to ensure the possibility of meaning. This would appear to differ from the abyssal realm in Kant's idea of the perceiving mind. Here, for Freud, the subject can be unified through an act of interpretation. However, Freud abandons any sense of a complete interpretation of any one dream. This he refers to as the 'dream's navel':-

> There is often a passage in even the most thoroughly interpreted dream which has to be left obscure; this is because we become aware during the work of interpretation that at that point there is a tangle of dream-thoughts which cannot be unravelled and which moreover adds nothing to our knowledge of the content of the dream. This is the dream's navel, the spot where it reaches down into the unknown. (p. 671)

The irony is that what resists interpretation is for Freud least significant. What is important is that it is yet another gesture towards a point of unattainable origin; a return to the umbilical implying the point

of origin referred to in 'The Uncanny', a point also unavailable for interpretation.

The similarities between 'The Uncanny' and *Dreams* largely reside in the importance attached to repetition. In both cases it is repetition which is exposed as a mobilising factor. In 'The Uncanny' meaning becomes located as a problematic because a return to absolute origins is impossible, and this is restated in *Dreams*. The idea of the home (as that to which one returns) is the site of absence, in the sense that for Freud the 'navel' is a meaningless tangle. However, this idea that the navel 'adds nothing to our knowledge of the content of the dream.' revises his earlier view on the significance of this navel, where he had written that; '-There is at least one spot in every dream at which it is unplumable - a navel, as it were, that is its point of contact with the unknown' (p. 186). The unknown by definition resists interpretation and is similar to Kant's abyssal construction of the mind.

One irony in all of this, is the claim that Freud makes for the scientific significance of psychoanalysis in its search after origins; '[...]psycho-analysis may claim a high place among the sciences which are concerned with the reconstruction of the earliest and most obscure periods of the beginnings of the human race' (p. 700).

Psychoanalysis thus has a privileged position in analysing the past because it identifies the transhistorical psyche in an archaeological fashion. In this way it claims that it can excavate the past from the position of the present. The possession of an original meaning thus becomes possible; in this way the past is preserved, but this view can itself become an example of the uncanny, because it partially fulfils the description of a return of the dead in 'The Uncanny'. There Freud writes of

the uncanny that; 'Many people experience the feeling in the highest degree in relation to death and dead bodies, to the return of the dead, and to spirits and ghosts ' (p.364). This also occurs when such (imaginary) feelings are made manifest:-

> [...]an uncanny effect is often and easily produced when the distinction between imagination and reality is effaced, as when something that we have hitherto regarded as imaginary appears before us in reality, or when a symbol takes over the full functions of the thing it symbolizes, and so on. (p.367)

In *Dreams* the notion that the past lives on in the present is a possible source of the uncanny if this were literally (corporally) true, as it is for example in both *Frankenstein* and *Dracula*. However, the uncanny as a secret come to light, the uncanniness of psychoanalytic practice, pervades *Dreams* as an account of invisible laws. Freud writes of these that; 'The most that we can conclude from this is that it proves that *the most complicated achievements of thought are possible without the assistance of consciousness* -' (p.751).

To sum-up, the uncanny is a pervasive (uncanny) presence in *Dreams*, similar to how it was in 'The Uncanny'. The term has been explored here as being the site which offers access to some primary, or absolute, meaning. The uncanny is analogous to what Freud terms the dream's navel. It is that which appears to resist interpretation. A point of origin is psychically reclaimable in the unconscious, but if manifested would become uncanny. These ideas, of meaning, origins and the nature of the unconscious will now be discussed in relation to Weiskel's *The Romantic Sublime*.

WEISKEL'S SUBLIME.

Weiskel sees the relationship which the poet has to poetic legacy as, following Harold Bloom, an Oedipal one. This becomes expressed by the poet through the way that the sublime is handled. Weiskel writes that:-

> The poet is uniquely vulnerable to the hypsos of past masters, but his counteroffensive of identification or mimesis can make the power of hypsos his own. In its Romantic transposition, this identification exhibits the precise features of an oedipal crisis, as we shall see. These shifting confrontations, the turns and reversals of literary power, are what seem to be the timeless elements of the sublime, requiring only some kind of auxiliary idealism for their local support. (p.5)

Weiskel is thus as much concerned with origins as Freud; it is the poet's identification with, and subsequent movement from (or within) a literary tradition which controls the trajectory of poetic discourse. The sublime is the emotional register of this process, becoming a focal point for both anxiety and liberation. It also defends 'against the fact of origins,' (p.10) and indicates 'the obscure guilt which is the surest signal of those origins ' (p.10). The sublime then is the point where psychoanalytic practice can intervene; because the sublime functions as a psychology; '[...]the sublime comes to be associated both with the failure of clear thought and with matters beyond determinate perception. It is not a radical alternative but a necessary complement to a psychology that stressed its limits ' (p.17).

The sublime is thus as much controlled by the deployment of invisible rules as the Freudian unconscious is. There is therefore a movement which internalises the observing eye in the sublime, which occurs in the collapse of external, or outward looking, modes of perception[12], so that; 'Any excess on the part of the object cancels the representational efficacy

of the mind which can only turn, for its new object, to itself '(p.24). Weiskel explores this in greater depth when discussing Kant, where he writes that: '[...]the sublime moment offers to reason an occasion for self-recognition '(p.42). This is however problematised because in Kant's theory of the mind there is an alternative a priori basis for the mind, which I discussed earlier in relation to Pettigrew. In that reading of Kant reason is problematised when it attempts to think through its status as an'*unconditioned unity* of experience[...]'. Reason is in conflict with itself because it is not possible for reason to think through its function as reason. Thus there is a logical division between how reason works, and how it is to be apprehended. So what the sublime offers to the Kantian realm of reason is in the collapse of perceptual understanding when an unattainable noumenal realm is implied. However, Weiskel takes the view that this moment of crisis for the Kantian subject indicates repression; 'The imagination's feeling of sacrifice or deprivation, the relation of concealment between it and reason - these suggest the role of repression in the sublime '(p.41). It would however logically seem that the sublime liberates because phenomenal restriction is elided and entry into a higher realm made possible. Ironically this is implied by Weiskel when he discusses a split between imagination and reason as exemplifying alienation. He writes of Kant that; 'The affective ambivalence of the sublime, which opposes the imagination's feeling of defeat to the reason's awe of itself, points to a cognitive alienation within the mind as a whole and invites a dialectical interpretation '(p.41).

If a dialectical interpretation is possible then unity becomes restated through the potential synthesis between imagination and reason. However the relationship between the two is not a balanced one, as it resists a

Freudian psychic economy because greater importance is placed by Kant on one term over the other. The subject does not feel alienated (internally) in the collapse of the imagination but is rather granted a privileged role in relation to the noumenal. Thus a dialectic between phenomenal/noumenal is problematic because they are different from, rather than radically opposed to each other.

It is in Weiskel's account of the negative sublime that he discusses alienation. Here it is the case that:-

> The negative sublime apparently exhibits some features of a response to superego anxiety, for in the suddenness of the sublime moment the conscious ego rejects its attachment to sensible objects and turns rather fearfully toward an ideal of totality and power in which it participates or internalizes. (p. 83)

The sublime thus becomes an indicator of Oedipal development. It reveals the way that the poet both identifies with the poetic tradition and affects a repudiation of it. However, Weiskel later comes to view this as problematical when applied to the negative sublime (as distinct from his identification of an egotistical sublime). He concludes that the negative sublime is not constructed along lines which bear a relation to an Oedipal drama because; 'Our line of thought postulates a wish to be inundated and a simultaneous anxiety of annihilation: to survive, as it were, the ego must go on the offensive and cease to be passive ' (p. 105); this was discussed in Chapter Five in relation to Wordsworth and Book VII of *The Prelude*. So then; 'Since the defense is directed primarily against the dangerous passivity, the other component part of the oedipus complex - the aggressive wish against the father - is only structurally motivated and fails to impress us as authentic ' (p. 105).

The suggestion I will make here is that it is possible to reintroduce Freudian categories to discuss the sublime. It is possible to do this

because the Kantian phenomenal/noumenal is played upon in terms of a conscious/unconscious doubling. As implied in the Kantian model, this is a unity which is not dialectically resolved. The unconscious only becomes discerned via its mediation through consciousness, meaning that the unconscious becomes displayed in an already mediated, partially censored, fashion. It is in this way that Weiskel's project is unsuccessful. It is not because of a 'mere' structural play on the oedipus complex, but because it is analogous to the relationship between conscious and unconscious factors. As such it is too close to Freudian practices to be easily discussed by them; so that there is a strange, uncanny, doubling between Kant and Freud. This is replicated in Weiskel's argument when he discusses alienation, there it is the case that; 'In the sublime moment, dualism is legitimated and intensified. The beautiful intimates reconciliation, however precariously and ambiguously; the sublime splits consciousness into alienated halves '(p. 48). Consciousness is doubled in a way recognised by a Freudian perspective. However, such a doubling implies the uncanny because it is dependent upon the terms of strangeness, secrecy and the eventual disclosure of the hidden which characterises it; an idea which as suggested earlier, is carried over into *Dreams*. Thus the negative sublime does not reveal Oedipal anxiety, but rather dramatises the relationship between conscious/unconscious as a displaced version of phenomenal/noumenal. The Romantic sublime as it is expressed in Kant thus has ramifications for a Freudian investigation, and this is partly due to the way it expresses a nascent form of the uncanny. This is apparent, for example, in the first part of *The Critique of Judgement*, where Kant discusses the mind in terms of the inner, mental, possibilities of the subject. This is because:-

> [...]on account of this inner possibility in the Subject, and on account of the external possibility of a nature harmonizing therewith, it finds a reference in itself to something in the Subject itself and outside it, and which is not nature, nor yet freedom, but still is connected with the ground of the latter, i.e. the supersensible - a something in which the theoretical faculty gets bound up into unity with the practical in an intimate and obscure manner. (p.224)

It is the subject's relationship to the supersensible which is here uncanny. Like the sublime it is a 'something' which is 'obscure' and yet 'intimate', it is 'not nature, nor yet freedom'; it is a precusor to the unconscious, because it offers a potential unity which the subject may attain.

These themes of conscious and unconscious, meaning and interpretation and phenomenal and noumenal, will now be discussed in relation to *Psychopathology*, because there Freud extends his account of the conscious/unconscious relationship in order to embrace non-neurotic behaviour, or rather he sees in the 'everyday' the 'abnormal' functions of a seemingly functional psychology.

THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE.

As discussed earlier in relation to 'The Uncanny' and *Dreams*, Freud offers a version of an originary moment which secures absolute meaning. In the former it was an unattainable (birth narrative) return to female genital origins, in the latter it was via the possibility of a trans-historical notion of the unconscious. In *Psychopathology* it is an idea of childhood which offers such a return (in particular to childhood neurosis); this, however, is problematised by the existence of what Freud terms 'screen memories'. In this:-

> One is[...]forced by various considerations to suspect that in so-called earliest childhood memories we possess not the genuine memory-

> trace but a later revision of it, a revision which may have been subjected to the influences of a variety of later psychical forces. Thus the 'childhood memories' of individuals come in general to acquire the significance of 'screen memories' and in doing so offer a remarkable analogy with the childhood memories that a nation preserves in its store of legends and myths. (p. 88)

Freud makes a leap towards the end of this passage when referring to folklore as the receptacle of a culture's 'childhood memories'. Why it is that Freud equates a subject's screen memories to folklore seems to be unclear. In the account of the subject, the return to a point of origin, of childhood, represents a difficulty for Freud which seems less problematic in his final comments concerning the 'nation'. This can be clarified by a return to 'The Uncanny' where Freud discusses the status of the literary text vis a vis psychoanalytic discourse. There he writes of literature that; 'Above all, it is a much more fertile province than the uncanny in real life, for it contains the whole of the latter and something more besides, something that cannot be found in real life' (p. 372). Literature becomes a version of the uncanny because it has a potential to represent a fictive excess. It offers a possible return to origins which is represented by folklore in *Psychopathology*, and which is uncanny because, '[...]an uncanny effect is often and easily produced when the distinction between the imagination and reality is effaced' (p. 367). Thus Freud's account of folklore becomes clear; it offers a fictive understanding of a point of origin which is problematic for the subject due to the interference of screen memories. However, as it is fiction it lacks a certain veracity because it is somehow 'more' than real. This again means that the attempt to negotiate a return to origins leads back to the ubiquitous uncanny. In *Psychopathology* Freud writes that; 'In the field of symptomatic acts, too, psychoanalytic observation must concede priority to imaginative

writers '(p.271). This is partly because Freud regards imaginative writing as a sublimation of a drive rather than a direct (transparent) expression of an inherently sexual urge.

I will now discuss Mary Ann Doane's account of sublimation in *Femmes Fatales*[13]; her feminist reading of Freud links the sublime to sublimation and thus bears relevance to this argument. Doane writes of the separation between the sexual drive manifested through symptomology, and a drive represented by sublimation. She writes that; 'Sublimation[...]has as its product the highest manifestations of human culture, that which constitutes, most exactly, the sublime '(p.249). This is because it is works of the imagination (cultural works) that produce an excess which suggests the sublime. Also, Doane notes that this process of sublimation cannot be reversed; 'Within the Freudian schema, "desublimation" is either impossible or extremely difficult; it is as though the "raising," "lifting," or "elevating" effects associated with the etymological roots of sublimation could not be undone '(250). Thus there is no possible return to origins. It is the imaginative (or folklore) text which appears to contain a culture's history, but it is an excessive form and so is able to 'transport' the reader in a sublime fashion. However, because it is excessive it obliterates origins and makes sublimation irreversible. Therefore a point of absolute origin becomes doubly effaced.

This process is similarly manifested in the subject's relationship to fantasy. It is precisely in fantasy that the subject loses their sense of subject-hood, because; '[...]what the most intense fantasy ultimately effects is the loss of the very distinction between subject and object '(p.253). This is akin to the experience of the Kantian subject. In Kant's schema no object is necessarily present (physically) for a sublime

sensation to occur. However an idea of such an object can result in the collapse of the imagination and so the distinction between the subject and the supersensible becomes blurred. These blurrings between what appear to be mutually exclusive domains also underpin a Freudian account of sublimation and the connection it has with sexuality. Again origins are both present and unattainable. Doane writes that; '[...]while the source or origin of sublimation is sexuality, sublimation is sublimation by virtue of a radical disjunction between the two, a gap which is unbridgeable - the displacement is irreversible.' (p, 254). In this way sublimation bears a resemblance to how screen memories function in relation to childhood memories; and this is due to the way this is worked out in Freud's formulation of folklore.

Freud tries to get around this problem of diminishing origins in *Psychopathology* by attempting to reintroduce, from *Dreams*, a notion of trans-temporality. He writes that:-

> The unconscious is quite timeless. The most important as well as the strangest characteristic of psychical fixation is that all impressions are preserved, not only in the same form in which they were first received, but also in all the forms which they have adopted in their further developments. This is a state of affairs which cannot be illustrated by comparison with another sphere. Theoretically every earlier state of mnemic content could thus be restored to memory again, even if its elements have long ago exchanged all their original for more recent ones. (p. 339)

This is however only a theoretical solution to the problem of disruptive screen memories, and it is in the notion of screen memories that sublimation is analogously worked out. This is in terms which are similar to the uncanny and the sublime because of the level of perplexity which both cause. Doane, for example, writes of sublimation that:-

> Laplanche, Lacan, and Montrelay share a certain nervousness with respect to a concept which emerges in Freud's discourse, which Freud in fact produces, but which remains somehow free-floating, without proper metapsychological grounding, lacking the rigorous systematicity usually

associated with Freud's work. (p.258)

This is because, in the uncanny, Freud's argument cannot sustain the terms used to describe it; his argument thus replicates at an analytical level the terms of its debate. Doane sees this as an example of psychoanalysis searching for a ground of meaning which is outside of its own field, one which is perhaps more properly identifiable with the sublime. She writes on Freud's account of sublimation:-

> What are the terms which Freud is attempting so desperately to keep apart, insuring that one is not contaminated by the other? It would seem that this is psychoanalysis striving to think its own limits, to situate something beyond the grasp of its own methodology. (pp.258-9)

What is beyond its grasp, which I am stressing here, is a form of the Romantic sublime. For this reason Weiskel's account of the synthetic negative sublime becomes undermined. This is because the sublime in Freud is that which, necessarily, has yet to be fully defined. Weiskel appropriates the wrong Freudian model (the oedipus complex) to apply to the sublime, because it is the sublime which is a lacunae in Freud's texts.

Doane's conclusion is that Freud wished to grant the sublime a free space so that he could grant culture (or a 'high' version of it) a privileged position. She writes that:-

> What Freud experienced and attempted to deny was a certain historical assault on the sublime. Aesthetics and aesthetic activity held an important place for Freud, sometimes a quasi-sacred one. This inevitably motivated his constantly failing attempt to safeguard an area of culture from his own interpretive psychoanalytic techniques, in particular, symptomatic reading. (pp.265-6)

However, I take issue with Doane's reading of the aesthetic object. My suggestion is that a special place is accorded to the aesthetic object in Freud, not because it is an aesthetic artefact, but because of what goes on within it; and because he can only understand what goes on within it, in an idealist way, he repeats Kant.

When in 'The Uncanny' Freud interprets Hoffman's 'The Sandman' he does not approach Hoffman's text as exemplifying aesthetic accomplishment. Rather he sees it as representing a particular neurosis, the castration complex, which he links to the uncanny through the doubling of characters. He also defines the literary text as containing 'the whole' of 'real life', 'and something more besides, something that cannot be found in real life.'. In this way the literary is an example of the uncanny because it 'realistically' creates the imaginary. It offers a possible return to origins which screen memories camouflage. Therefore, in relation to sublimation, Freud's valorisation of the cultural (or fictional) is not couched in terms linking it to aesthetic contemplation, but is rather the site where the uncanny (as the sublime) is deployed. It becomes the space beyond which psychoanalysis cannot progress. It is similar to Freud's inability to explain one of the mechanisms he sees as governing slips of the tongue, and which also implies the inherent sociability of sublime apprehension. Freud writes that; 'Now slips of the tongue are in a high degree contagious, like the forgetting of names...I cannot suggest any reason for this psychical contagiousness '(p. 104). This follows an invisible rule concerning contagion, but because of its invisibility it is only possible to describe it rather than account for it.

One of the premises of this thesis is that in the Gothic there is a working through of a parallel version of the Romantic sublime. It is thus not fortuitous that Freud discusses the uncanny in relation to a Gothic text. The Gothic version of the sublime is a parallel one because in its use of 'fantastic' elements it offers a potentially excessive form of it. To see how the ideas in this chapter are rehearsed in the Gothic I will now examine Stevenson's *Jekyll and Hyde*. I have selected this text rather than

'The Sandman' in order to show how widely the sublime has entered the Gothic discourse. Particular attention will be paid to how the uncanny is worked through in Stevenson's novella, with specific reference made to how its deployment of the double suggests the terms of Freud's treatise.

JEKYLL AND HYDE.

Towards the end of Stevenson's tale, in the account attributed to Henry Jekyll, the idea of the double is discussed explicitly. Here the separation between 'good' and 'evil', a separation explicitly organised by the foregoing action, is collapsed. Jekyll expresses the view that:-

> Though so profound a double-dealer, I was in no sense a hypocrite: both sides of me were in dead earnest; I was no more myself when I laid aside restraint and plunged in shame, than when I laboured, in the eye of day, at the furtherance of knowledge or the relief of sorrow and suffering. (p. 81)

Here the idea of public morals is conflated with an idea of a philosophy of morals as a 'science' of the subject. In effect 'ethical' behaviour is external to the subject, whose own behaviour is seen as innate. However, this idea of an innate subject is not biologically controlled, but takes place at the levels of consciousness and desire.

It is thus similar to Freud's formulation of the relationship between consciousness and unconsciousness; both becoming dependent upon each other in *Psychopathology* through a mediated form via paraplexes. In a similar way Hyde is screened through Jekyll because it is through the latter's account that Hyde is discussed. This is however problematic because of the ambiguity about authorial control in Jekyll's narrative. I will discuss this later suggesting that Jekyll's account approximates to an anxiety concerning origination which can be found in Freud.

In the above quote the subject bears a similarity to how Freud collapses the controlling references of heimlich and unheimlich in 'The Uncanny'. The view ascribed to Jekyll is that:-

> [...]I learned to recognise the thorough and primitive duality of man; I saw that, of the two natures that contended in the field of my consciousness, even if I could rightly be said to be either, it was only because I was radically both.(p.82)

In this way Jekyll-Hyde is the authentic container of subjectivity, and this authority is guaranteed through self-knowledge, by a 'Jekyll (who was a composite) now' (p.89). Thus the two categories of Jekyll and Hyde, although the domain of some 'authenticity', are unable to contain that authenticity. This is because the subject is either Jekyll or Hyde at any one time and can never be both. In this way it dramatises Freud's attempt to separate heimlich from unheimlich. The terms of Freud's debate collapse in a similar way that Jekyll-Hyde collapse because both contain the same authenticity, the one homely the other sinister. The unity of the subject is not guaranteed as the formulation of Hyde is built on a misconception concerning the accessibility of the self. Jekyll sees this as his inability (or the inability of contemporary 'science') to go beyond a mere doubling:-

> [...]man is not truly one, but truly two. I say two, because the state of my own knowledge does not pass beyond that point. Others will follow, others will outstrip me on the same lines; and I hazard the guess that man will be ultimately known for a mere polity of multifarious, incongruous and independent denizens. (p.82)

This is a mandate for a future science and an admission of failure. As suggested earlier, the Jekyll-Hyde poles bear a similarity to Freud's heimilich-unheimlich. The Jekyll-Hyde matrix cannot contain subjectivity in the same way that heimlich-unheimlich cannot contain the uncanny or the sublime. The Jekyll-Hyde separation becomes collapsed because it is an inadequate separation.

This idea of separation leads Jekyll into a discussion of origins, in a manner similar to Freud's search for an originating *moment*. Jekyll writes of 'Good' and 'Evil' that; 'It was the curse of mankind that these incongruous faggots were thus bound together - that in the organised womb of consciousness these polar twins should be continuously struggling. How, then, were they dissociated?' (p.82). This question is left unanswered because those origins are unattainable. This is translated into the appearance of Hyde who is, the story suggests, an example of a primitive (original) desire. However, because origins are unattainable his presence is problematic. He is both physically present and figuratively absent. This is a view which inheres to all the other characters who encounter him. In the beginning of the tale Enfield attempts to describe Hyde to Utterson:-

> "He is not easy to describe. There is something wrong with his appearance; something displeasing, something downright detestable. I never saw a man I so disliked, and yet I scarce know why. He must be deformed somewhere; he gives a strong feeling of deformity, although I couldn't specify the point. He's an extraordinary-looking man, and yet I really can name nothing out of the way. No sir; I can make no hand of it; I can't describe him. And it's not want of memory; for I declare that I can see him this moment." (p.34).

Hyde remains hidden because the vocabulary does not exist which can describe him. This is something made explicit in Utterson's description of Hyde:-

> [...]he spoke with a husky, whispering and somewhat broken voice, - all these were points against him; but not all of these together could explain the hitherto unknown disgust, loathing and fear with which Mr Utterson regarded him. 'There must be something else,' said the perplexed gentleman. 'There *is* something more, if I could find a name for it.' (p.40).

In *Jekyll and Hyde* subjectivity is non-unified. This relates to Freud's idea of the subject split upon a conscious/unconscious axis. The tale replicates the terms heimlich and unheimlich and collapses them into the Jekyll-Hyde relationship. It is Hyde who poses a problem for

representation because he represents in part an unattainable, primitive origin. This is also echoed in 'The Uncanny', *Dreams* and *Psychopathology*. Again because Hyde exemplifies a primitive original moment he poses a problem for representation because origins have been effaced.

I will now describe the social space between Jekyll and Hyde which in part accounts for the revulsion in which Hyde is held. Here the attempt to locate Hyde within a class structure highlights the way that he is both within and excluded from a controlling structure. He is considered neither lower or upper, but somehow the same depending upon the class of the character who apprehends him. I will now outline how it is that Hyde becomes associated with a fear of the working class. In the tale social position is exemplified by '[...]Henry Jekyll, M.D., D.C.L., LL.D., F.R.S., & C. '(p.35), whereas Hyde occupies a social position where there are; '[...]many ragged children huddled in the doorways, and many ragged women of different nationalities passing out, key in hand, to have a morning glass '(p.48). Hyde thus represents the invisible nature of working class culture, which is effaced and kept silent by a middle class discourse which seeks to banish such experiences from social practice. The area of Soho occupied by Hyde appears to Utterson to be '[...]like a district of some city in a nightmare '(p.48).

Hyde is therefore separated from Jekyll along a social axis as well as a 'moral' one. Hyde thus in part becomes an object of fear because his existence suggests that class hierarchy is collapsible because it is reversable. However this is not the sole space between Jekyll and Hyde, there is also a 'moral' one which becomes conflated with physicality. This other gap is dramatised in the tale through the way that Hyde is seen as internally generated, so that; 'Jekyll had more than a father's interest;

Hyde had more than a son's indifference '(p.89). In this way the uneven relationship between the two is physically dramatised; 'The evil side of my nature, to which I had now transferred the stamping efficacy, was less robust and less developed than the good which I had just deposed.'(p.84). There is thus a fear of degeneration which David Punter[14] sees as characterising *Jekyll and Hyde* as well as *The Island of Dr Moreau*[15], *The Picture of Dorian Gray*[16] and *Dracula*. A fear that the evolutionary (and class) model could be reversed and which is apparent in Hyde's 'ape-like fury' (p.47) when he murders Sir Danvers Carew and when Jekyll laments Hyde's 'ape-like tricks that he would play me '(p.96). However, as in the discussion on Kant concerning the phenomenal and the noumenal, there is no dialectical resolution between Jekyll and Hyde. This is because one side is 'stronger' than the other and because they are doubled.

They are dependent upon each other rather than radically antagonistic towards each other. Although antagonisms between the two do later emerge, these are positioned in the tale as 'natural' antagonisms, as being warring factions within the self. There is however a suggestion that the relation between Jekyll and Hyde is arbitrary because it depends upon a chemical contingent. Therefore the relationship between the two is not necessarily a natural one. This problematises Jekyll's idea of the innate existence of Hyde. This becomes clear in Jekyll's account of his experimentation. He writes of his first transformation that:-

> That night I had come to the fatal cross roads. Had I approached my discovery in a more noble spirit, had I risked the experiment while under the empire of generous or pious aspirations, all must have been otherwise, and from these agonies of death and birth I had come forth an angel instead of a fiend. The drug had no discriminating action; it was neither diabolical nor divine; (p.85)

Thus, subjectivity in the Jekyll-Hyde relationship is unstable, and

this is caused by a chemical process which '[...]controlled and shook the very fortress of identity '(p.83). Hyde is socially other to Jekyll, and yet he is the same because he is representitive of Jekyll's desires. The subject is split and this is dramatised socially and physically. The unification which Jekyll seeks through Hyde is thus disrupted. It is Hyde who appears as the uncanny, being similar to what Freud saw as the imaginary becoming real. Also because Hyde is uncanny he takes on characteristics which thus inhere to the sublime. His appearance causes a subjective response which confounds the imagination, and this is true for all subjects who encounter Hyde. But there does exist the possibility that Hyde can be recuperated for reason, what is required is a 'name for it'. Hyde has also been produced through a scientific discourse which links the tale to *Frankenstein*. Jekyll's experiments take place in what was an anatomy theatre but '[...]his own tastes being chemical rather than anatomical,'(p.51) he has turned it into a laboratory; the tale thus implies a similarity to, and a break with, Frankenstein's production of the double. Hyde is also an uncanny element to the extent that he exemplifies an originating moment of pre-social (located in the tale as un-social) desire, which accounts for '[...]the odd, subjective disturbance caused by his neighbourhood'(p.77). Jekyll accounts for origins in relation to Hyde, but only in terms of an inadequate duality. It is because this duality is an inadequate one that it becomes precarious. It is because identity is neither Jekyll or Hyde but both, that identity is made unstable and this is reflected in Jekyll's document; there Jekyll loses a sense of an 'I' which is controlling the narrative, so that he writes about himself in the third person. As in, for example, 'Jekyll was now my city of refuge '(pp.91-92), and 'The powers of Hyde seemed to have grown with the sickliness of

Jekyll '(p.95). It is through writing that Jekyll attempts to maintain his identity because; '[...]I remembered that of my original character, one part remained to me: I could write my own hand '(p.93). However this is an inadequate anchor for identity because the 'hand' of Jekyll is also that of Hyde. Jekyll writes of Hyde's '[...]ape-like tricks that he would play me, scrawling in my own hand blasphemies on the pages of my books, burning the letters and destroying the portrait of my father '(p.96).

Here Hyde again effaces the idea of origins by destroying the portrait of Jekyll's father. This is because Hyde defines the identity of Jekyll and not family bonds. Therefore although identity is controlled by the referencing between Jekyll and Hyde it is not contained within it. This is made explicit both in Jekyll's use of third person narration and in the final struggle between Jekyll and Hyde.

The death of Jekyll/Hyde occurs in secret; it is a part of the hidden of both Hyde and the uncanny, so that it remains unclear whether Jekyll has killed Hyde or Hyde killed Jekyll. When Utterson finds the body (the body of Hyde) he '[...]knew that he was looking on the body of a self-destroyer '(p.70). But at this point because identity has become confused it is ambiguous which side of the Jekyll-Hyde matrix was responsible. Jekyll's account finishes with the equally ambiguous; 'Here, then, as I lay down the pen, and proceed to seal up my confession, I bring the life of that unhappy Henry Jekyll to an end '(p.97), which is a comment which could have been made by Hyde. The story thus resists a closed ending by suggesting the impossibility of a full interpretation. In this way the uncanny is maintained throughout.

Jekyll and Hyde works through many of the features which characterise both the Romantic sublime and Freud's idea of the uncanny. The sublime

functions in Stevenson to confound understanding. Hyde has a precarious status as an absent presence. He is perceived as both part of humanity and as something excessive, as in part inhuman(e). In a Kantian sense this failure figuratively to represent Hyde is compensated by an idea of reason furnished by Jekyll's philosophy of the subject and by the pseudo-scientific discourse which has produced him. Jekyll has attempted to formulate a subject who can explain subjectivity because he sees the subject as non-unified, and therefore unconstrained by the pressures of some undefined bourgeois ideology. However, this formulation of the subject is inadequate for Jekyll because it only admits of a duality which reflects the state of modern science.

Thus the attempt to anchor Hyde is through a theorising of the subject and a valorisation of scientific procedure. In this way a Kantian idea of reason becomes evoked. This is because neither Jekyll's philosophy nor his science can effectively anchor the subjectivity of Hyde, so that an idea of reason rather than its attainment is implied. Hyde however, does not solely take on the guise of the sublime, he also becomes representative of the uncanny. This is apparent in the doubling in Stevenson's tale. In 'The Uncanny' Freud had written of the double that 'From having been an assurance of immortality, it becomes the uncanny harbinger of death '(p.357). Later Freud anecdotally discusses the uncanny apprehension of the double, this is when he recounts how he caught sight of himself in a mirror but failed to recognise himself; 'I can still recollect that I thoroughly disliked his appearance '(p.371). Hyde is similarly uncanny for Jekyll because he fails at certain points to fully recognise himself in Hyde; 'Henry Jekyll stood at times aghast before the acts of Edward Hyde '(p.87). Hyde also operates as the uncanny for the other characters by

appearing as a primitive element within their 'civilised' world. Freud writes, and here the first part pertains to Jekyll and the second to the social practice set up in the tale, that:-

> Our conclusion could then be stated thus: an uncanny experience occurs either when infantile complexes which have been repressed are once more revived by some impression, or when primitive beliefs which have been surmounted seem to once more to be confirmed. (p. 372)

This links to what Punter identifies as a fear of degeneration in the tale.

This is not to say that *Jekyll and Hyde* either anticipates Freud in any explicit way, nor to suggest that the tale is unproblematically assimilable to Freud's theory. It offers a parallel version of both the Romantic sublime and the uncanny but cannot be collapsed into either. Rather it is the fantastic excesses of the tale which express similar concerns, but in an imaginary form. Also, in the sublime and the uncanny an idea of the subject is set up which is experiential whereas in the Gothic the subject is handled in 'irrational' or impossible ways. In this way it offers an alternative understanding of the sublime and the uncanny, and can be read back into those concepts to reveal their own irrationality. This is particularly significant in relation to the uncanny as being a 'play' upon the sublime. Stevenson's story highlights the problem of anchoring identity within a split form of referencing, and this can be read back into the uncanny revealing the fashion in which such a problematic (re)occurs.

CONCLUSION.

Two basic conclusions can be drawn from this chapter. Firstly, that there is a similarity between Kant and Freud and this is revealed by how the uncanny becomes a 'play' upon the sublime. Both the sublime and the

uncanny represent the potential sites where interpretation collapses. In Freud, it has been argued, there is a pervasive sense of the uncanny which both defines an idea of an unattainable origin, and a formulation of the double.

Secondly, in Stevenson's *Jekyll and Hyde* a similar idea of the double is entertained, and the tale's representation of the irrational can be read back into Freud. Such a reading would reveal where, and how, the controlling devices of the uncanny are prone to becoming uncanny themselves because in Stevenson's novella the loss of control is characterised by this creeping 'I'. In this way Stevenson's tale dramatises the transmutation of the sublime into the uncanny, but in such a manner that the irrational features of that concept are made explicit.

CONCLUSION, AND THE WAY FORWARD.

In these closing remarks I will restate the premise of my arguments and also indicate the way forward for further research into this area. I also take this opportunity to highlight what I believe is unique in this thesis.

This thesis has not been an analysis of the Romantic psyche. That is an area explored at length by both Weiskel[1] and Punter[2]. My argument is the obverse of theirs; it is not an exploration of the 'unspoken' subjectivity of Romanticism but rather of how it is that Romantic subjectivity is constructed like a version of the unconscious. My work breaks from theirs by substituting the sublime for the unconscious. My argument is that the sublime becomes appropriated by Freudian psychonanalysis as a model for what the psyche is. However, this often disables some of Freud's arguments because the sublime is not a unified concept. This means that Freudian psychoanalysis does not assist in a critique of Romanticism (as Weiskel attempts to show), but rather restates many of its problematics.

The special place where the sublime is attacked is in fantastic versions of it. It is there that the philosophers of the sublime's claims to certainty are challenged. For this reason the Gothic highlights the inconsistencies in Freudian thought. My closing section on *Jekyll and Hyde* is therefore an exploration of the way that the analytical aporias encountered in Freud's 'The Uncanny'[3] are *already* debated as a central theme in Stevenson's novella. It could be argued that Freud's reading of 'The Sandman' results in his troubled account of uncanniness; however such a view would fail to address a wider context in which Freud's other works, such as *Dreams*[4] and *Psycopathology*[5] also manifest some of the characteristics of the uncanny. The Freudian appropriation is thus more

insidious than direct, and thus leaves itself open to a re-critique from the Gothic.

To build upon this research would require a more extensive examination of Freud's writings. This thesis has focused upon a genealogy of the unconscious which enables such an examination to occur. It also makes possible an examination of Freud via Foucault. This way of approaching Freud would involve analysing how Freud's formulation of the subject, as riven by desire, meets its counterpart in Foucault's idea of the creation of 'Man' as that which characterises the modern episteme. This would also enable the placement of psychoanalysis within the space of the human sciences as Foucault plots it in *The Order of Things*[6].

My investigation has been framed by contemporary critical theory. The work of Kristeva and Foucault has been of assistance in supplying evidence for a particular history of subjectivity. My thesis draws upon but also extends their understanding of how the subject is constructed. Therefore another contribution which this thesis makes to scholarship is through offering a novel formulation of Romantic subjectivity. It also contributes to a history of literary criticism which is grounded in a Foucauldian discourse.

What is unique about my approach is the privileged position which I see the Gothic as having in relation to the sublime. This Gothic is both shaped by the sublime and affords a critique of the sublime's irregularities. My reading of the sublime has been reliant upon the counter-cultural claims which I see the Gothic making. It is the site where claims to certainty are explored and critiqued. The Gothic thus offers an alternative version of events, or an alternative history. This 'otherness' of the Gothic is produced both as a reaction to the orthodox view and as a new version of

possibilities. What I mean by this is that the counter-cultural productions of the Gothic create a genealogy resistent to cultural orthodoxy. The practice of psychoanalysing the Gothic text can therefore be reversed, revealing that the Gothic text is not exposed by Freudian concepts, but rather that Freud can be read through the Gothic. In this way the Gothic resists the tactics of a Freudian account by *already* having debated the use of those tactics in the first place.

This thesis also crosses a Romantic/Victorian literature divide. My suggestion is that there is a philosophical continuity between them. The sublime alters from being a conception of nature to assisting in urban descriptions, as in Poe. Later, with Stoker, the sublime becomes turned into a psycho-sexual drama. This thesis thus challenges the idea that the relation between the Romantic and the Victorian periods is marked by discontinuity.

I also regard this thesis as contributing to existing scholarship on the Gothic. It offers a reading of selected writings from Mary Shelley, E.A. Poe, Bram Stoker and R.L. Stevenson and suggests that these texts participate in a culture of resistance which challenges such areas as the sublime, aesthetics, sexuality, and forms of rationality. It is also not fortuitous that many studies of the Gothic form are psychoanalytical interpretations. I hope I have shown that it is possible to construct a new relationship between the psychoanalytical and the Gothic.

ENDNOTES.

Preface.

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2./David Punter, *The Romantic Unconscious: A Study in Narcissism and Patriarchy*, (London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989).

3./Clifford Siskin, *The Historicity of Romantic Discourse*, (Oxford, OUP, 1988).

4./Peter De Bolla, *The Discourse of the Sublime: Readings in History, Aesthetics and the Subject*, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1989).

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6./Mary Poovey, *The Proper Lady and the Woman Writer: Ideology as Style in the works of Mary Wollstonecraft, Mary Shelley, and Jane Austen*, (London, Chicago UP, 1984).

7./Meena Alexander, *Women in Romanticism: Mary Wollstonecraft, Dorothy Wordsworth and Mary Shelley*. (Basingstoke, MacMillan, 1989).

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10./Chris Baldick, *In Frankenstein's Shadow, Myth, Monstrosity, and Nineteenth-century Writing*. (Oxford, Clarendon, 1990).

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12./Immanuel Kant, 'Analytic of the Sublime' in *The Critique of Judgement*. Part 1, Trans James Creed Meredith, (Oxford, Clarendon, 1986) pp.90-203.

13./Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An archeology of the Human Sciences*. (London, Tavistock, 1982) pp.303-343.

14./Sigmund Freud, 'The Uncanny' in *Art and Literature: Jensen's Gradiva, Leonardo Da Vinci & other works*. Trans James Strachey, Ed Albert Dickson Vol 14, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1985) pp.339-376.

15./Julia Kristeva, *The Kristeva Reader*. Ed Toril Moi, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1987).

16./Neil Hertz, *The End of the Line: Essays on Psychoanalysis and the Sublime*. (New York, Columbia UP, 1985).

17./Rosemary Jackson, *Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion.* (London, Methuen, 1986).

18./Edgar Allan Poe, *The Complete Tales and Poems of Edgar Allan Poe.* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1982).

19./Bram Stoker, *Dracula*, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1979). Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

20./Robert Louis Stevenson, *The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde and Other Stories.* Ed Jenni Calder, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1984). Futher references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation

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3./Neil Hertz, *The End of the Line: Essays on Psychoanalysis and the Sublime.* (New York, Columbia UP, 1985). Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

4./Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, *The Coherence of Gothic Conventions.* (London, Methuen, 1986). Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

5./Cassius Longinus, *'Longinus' On Sublimity.* Trans D.A. Russell, (Oxford, Clarendon, 1965). Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

6./Joseph Addison, *Addison's Essays from The Spectator.* (London, Routledge, undated copy - Southampton University Library). Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

7./Peter De Bolla, *The Discourse of the Sublime: Readings in History, Aesthetics and the Subject.* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1989) p.34.

8./See Jacques Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis.* Ed Jacques-Alain Miller, Trans Alan Sheridan, (London, Penguin, 1986) pp.218-219.

9./This (re)gendering of the sublime seems to be a new departure. It appears that Addison regards nature as female and the 'soul' as male.

10./Edmund Burke, *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origins of our Ideas of The Sublime and the Beautiful.* Ed James T. Boulton, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1987). Futher references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

11./Stephen Knapp, *Personification and the Sublime.* (Cambridge, Harvard UP, 1985). Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

12./John Milton, *Paradise Lost & Paradise Regained.* Ed Christopher Ricks, (New York, Signet, 1968). The lines are:-

> No rest: through many a dark and dreary Vale
> They pass'd, and many a Region dolorous,
> O'er many a Frozen, many a Fiery Alp,
> Rocks, Caves, Lakes, Fens, Bogs, Dens, and shades of death,
> A Universe of death, (Book II, 618-622) p.86.

13./Immanuel Kant, 'Analytic of the Sublime' in *The Critique of Judgement.* Part 1, Ed James Creed Meredith, (Oxford, Clarendon, 1988) pp.90-203. Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

14./Frederich Schiller, *On the Sublime & Naive and Sentimental Poetry.* Trans J.A. Elias, (New York, Ungar, 1975).

15./Sigmund Freud, 'The Uncanny' in *Art and Literature: Jensen's Gradiva, Leonardo Da Vinci & other works.* Trans James Strachey, Ed Albert Dickson Vol 14, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1985) pp.339-376.

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18./M.G. Lewis, *The Monk.* (Oxford, OUP, 1987).

19./See *Frankenstein.* p.86.

20./See, for example, the urban/rural opposition in Ann Radcliffe's *The Mysteries of Udolpho.* (Oxford, OUP, 1988).

21./Julia Kristeva, *Word, Dialogue Novel,* in *The Kristeva Reader.* Ed Toril Moi, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1986) pp.24-33.

22./Michel Foucault, *The order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences.* (London, Tavistock, 1982) pp.303-343.

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2./Julia Kristeva, *Word, Dialogue and Novel*, in *The Kristeva Reader*. Ed Toril Moi, (London, Tavistock, 1986) pp.24-33. Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

3./Julia Kristeva, *Freud and Love: Treatment and its Discontents*, in *The Kristeva Reader*. Ed Toril Moi, (London, Tavistock, 1986) pp.238-271. Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

4./Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences*. (London, Tavistock, 1982). Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

5./Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality Vol I*. Trans Robert Hurley, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1990).

6./Frances Ferguson, 'The Nuclear Sublime' in *Diacritics*. No 14 1984.

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13./Steven Knapp, *Personification and the Sublime: Milton to Coleridge*. (Cambridge, Harvard UP, 1985). Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

14./David E. Musselwhite, *Partings Welded Together: Politics and Desire in the Nineteenth-century English Novel*. (London, Methuen, 1987).

15./Baldick p.4.

16./Sigmund Freud, 'The Uncanny' in *Art and Literature: Jensen's Gradiva, Leonardo Da Vinci & other works.* Trans James Strachey, Ed Albert Dickson Vol 14, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1985) pp.339-376.

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4./David Hume, 'Of the Rise and the Progress of the Arts and Sciences' in *Of the Standard of Taste and other essays.* Ed John W. Lenz, (Indiana, Bobbs-Merrill Co, 1965) pp.70-94. Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

5./Velleius Paterculus, *The History of Rome.* Trans Frederich W. Shipley, (London, Heineman, 1890). Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation

6./Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations.* (Oxford, Clarendon, 1944).

7./Thomas Weiskel, *The Romantic Sublime: Studies in the Structure and Psychology of Transcendence.* (Baltimore, John Hopkins UP, 1986) p.28.

8./It is this reference to 'beauty' which makes it problematic to link this to a specifically Kantian sense of the sublime.

9./Edmund Burke, *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origins of Our Ideas of The Sublime and the Beautiful.* Ed James T. Boulton, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1987).

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13./See Burke, p.64.

14./Neil Hertz, *The End of the Line: Essays on Psychoanalysis and the Sublime.* (New York, Columbia UP, 1985).

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1./Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 'The Rime of the Ancient Mariner' in *The Complete Poetical Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge.* vol I, Ed E.H. Coleridge, (Oxford, Clarendon, 1975) pp.186-208. Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

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3./Immanuel Kant, 'Analytic of the Sublime' in *The Critique of Judgement.* Part 1, Trans James Creed Meredith (Oxford, Clarendon, 1988) pp.90-203. Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

4./Karl Kroeber, *Romantic Fantasy and Science Fiction.* (London, Yale UP, 1988). Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

5./Edgar Allan Poe, *Narrative of A.Gordon Pym* in *The Complete Tales and Poems of Edgar Allan Poe.* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1982) pp.748-866. Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

6./Percy Bysshe Shelley, 'Alastor; or, the spirit of solitude' in *The Complete Poetical Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley.* Ed Thomas Hutchinson, (Oxford, OUP, 1991) pp.14-29.

7./Peter Brooks, '"Godlike Science/Unhallowed Arts": Language, Nature and Monstrosity' in *The Endurance of Frankenstein.* Ed G. Levine and V.C. Knoepflmacher, (London, California UP, 1979) pp.205-220.

8./Raymond Williams, 'The Metropolis and the emergence of Modernism' in *Unreal City: Urban experience in modern European Literature and Art.* Ed E. Timms and D. Kelley, (Manchester, Manchester UP, 1985) pp.13-24.

9./Carl Woodring, 'The Mariner's Return' in *Studies in Romanticism* vol II, Summer 1972 No 3.

10./J.G. Lockhart, in *Blackwood's Magazine*, 1819 pp.3-12. Cited in *Coleridge - The Ancient Mariner and Other Poems.* Ed A.R. Jones and W. Tydeman, (Basingstoke, MacMillan, 1973) pp.76-80.

11./Richard Haven, *Patterns of Consciousness: An Essay on Coleridge.* (Massachusetts, Massachusetts UP, 1969).

12./Jean-Pierre Mileur, *Vision and Revision: Coleridge's Art of Immanence.* (London, California UP, 1982).

13./Katherine M. Wheeler, *The Creative Mind in Coleridge's Poetry.* (London, Heinemann, 1981). Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

14./Jerome J. McGann, *The Beauty of Inflections: Literary Investigations in Historical Method and Theory.* (Oxford, Clarendon, 1988).

15./Edward E. Bostetter, 'The Nightmare World of 'The Ancient Mariner'.' in *Coleridge - The Ancient Mariner and Other Poems.* Ed A.R. Jones and W. Tydeman, (Basingstoke, MacMillan, 1973) pp.184-199.

16./David Aers, Jonathan Cook and David Punter, *Romanticism and Ideology: Studies in English Writing.* (London, Routledge, 1981).

17./Mary Shelley, letter written to Maria Grisborne 22 Januray 1819, in *The Letters of Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley.* vol I. Ed Betty T. Bennett, (London, John Hopkins UP, 1980) pp.85-86.

18./H.G. Wells, *The Time Machine.* (London, Dent, 1985).

19./Herman Melville, *Moby-Dick.* (London, Dent, 1993) pp.111-122.

20./This links to what Edmund Burke writes about 'unhealthy' solitude in his *Enquiry* p.43.

21./Carlo Ginzberg, 'Morelli, Freud, and Sherlock Holmes: Clues and Scientific Method' in *The Sign of Three, Dupin, Holmes, and Pierce.* Ed Umberto Eco and Thomas A. Sebeok, (Bloomington, Indiana UP, 1983) pp.81-118. Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

22./Sigmund Freud, 'The Moses of Michelangelo' in *Totem and Taboo and other Works* in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud.* vol xiii, Trans James Strachey (London, Hogarth, 1960).

<u>Chapter Five: Representations Of The Sublime In Wordsworth, Representations Of Kant In Poe.</u>

1./William Wordsworth, *The Prelude: or Growth Of A Poet's Mind.* Ed Ernest De Selincourt, (Oxford, OUP, 1984). Further references are to this edition and are in brackets after quotation.

2./Samuel Johnson, 'London' in *The Poems of Samuel Johnson.* Ed David Nichol Smith and Edward L. McAdam (Oxford, Clarendon, 1974) pp.60-81. Further references are to this edition and are in brackets after quotation.

3./Edgar Allan Poe, 'The Man of the Crowd' in *The Complete Tales and Poems of Edgar Allan Poe.* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1982) pp.475-481. Further references are to this edition and are in brackets after quotation.

4./Edgar Allan Poe, 'The Murders in the Rue Morgue' pp.141-168 and 'The Purloined Letter' pp.208-222 in *Complete Tales.*

5./Edgar Allan Poe, 'Mesmeric Revelation' in *Complete Tales* pp.88-96.

6./Clive Bloom, 'Poe and the Literature of Analysis: A Study of the implications of Edgar Allan Poe's Critical Theory for the Psychoanalytic reading of Literature.' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Southampton, 1983) pp.108-132. Bloom reads 'The Man of the Crowd' as expressing counter transference, as a resiting of the analytical scene implied in 'The Uncanny'. Here I discuss the urban as the locus of the sublime, rather than reading it as an allegory about a psychodrama overtly concerned with the double. That is, my reading is about the sublime, not the uncanny, although I do acknowledge that my reading follows a similar trajectory.

7./Max Byrd, *London Transformed: Images of the City in the Eighteenth-century.* (London, Yale UP, 1978).

8./Mary Jacobus, *Romanticism, Writing, and Sexual Difference: Essays on The Prelude.* (Oxford, Clarendon, 1989).

9./Ann Radcliffe, *The Mysteries of Udolpho.* (Oxford, OUP, 1988). Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

10./Juvenal, 'Third Satire' in *Juvenal and Persius.* Trans G.G. Ramsay, (London, Heinemann, mcmxx) pp.31-57.

11./Thomas Weiskel, *The Romantic Sublime: Studies in the Structure and Psychology of Transcendence.* (Baltimore, John Hopkins UP, 1986). Further references are to this edition and are in brackets after quotation.

12./De Sade, 'Florville and Courval: or The Works of Fate' in *The One Hundred and Twenty Days of Sodom and other writings.* Trans Austryn Wainhouse and Richard Seaver, (London, Arrow, 1991) pp.133-182.

13./Ann Radcliffe, *The Italian.* (Oxford, OUP, 1987). Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

14./Jane Austen, *Northanger Abbey,* (London, Dent, 1974).

15./Rosemary Jackson, *Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion.* (London, Methuen, 1986). Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

16./Clive Bloom, 'Poe and the Literature of Analysis' regards this as exemplifying the failure of language. An interesting point but I think that any 'failure' here is more specifically located.

17./Immanuel Kant, 'Analytic of the Sublime' in *The Critique of Judgement.* Trans James Creed Meredith, (Oxford, Clarendon, 1988) Part 1, pp.90-203. Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

18./Immanuel Kant, 'Critique of Aesthetic Judgement' in *The Critique of Judgement.* Part 1, pp.8-227. Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation

19./Immanuel Kant, 'Critique of Teleological Judgement' in *The Critique of Judgement.* Part 2, pp3-164. Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation

20./Immanuel Kant, 'The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason' in *Critique of Practical Reason.* (London, Longmans, 1967) Part 1. Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

21./Sigmund Freud, 'The Uncanny' in *Art and Literature: Jensen's Gradiva, Leonardo Da Vinci & other works.* Trans James Strachey, Ed Albert Dickson Vol 14, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1985) pp.339-376.

<u>Chapter Six: Textuality and Sublimity in *Dracula.*</u>

1./Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality.* vol I, Trans Robert Hurley (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1984) p.118.

2./Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality.* pp.62-63. Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

3./Chris Baldick, *In Frankenstein's Shadow: Myth, Monstrosity, and Nineteenth-century Writing.* (Oxford, Clarendon, 1990). Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

4./Francis Barker, *The Tremulous Private Body: Essays on Subjection.* (London, Methuen, 1984). Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

5./There is however a sense in which this can also apply to Bourgeois subjectivity as well, because this is a model of subjectivity which is denied in the Bourgeois emphasis upon individuality.

6./See Rosemary Jackson, *Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion.* (London, Methuen, 1986) pp.120-121 where Jackson gives an interesting Lacanian reading to Lucy's transformation.

7./Jessica Benjamin, 'Master and Slave: The Fantasy of Erotic Domination' in *Desire.* Ed Ann Snitow, (London, Virago, 1984) p.296.

8./Leonard Woolf, *Annotated Dracula.* (London, N. Potter, 1975) p.300.

9./Carol A. Senf, '*Dracula*: The Unseen Face in the Mirror' in *The Vampire and the Critics*. Ed Margaret L. Carter, (London, UMI Research Press, 1988).

10./Peter De Bolla, *The Discourse of the Sublime*. (Oxford, Blackwell, 1989). Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

11./Daniel Defoe, *Robinson Crusoe*. (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1981).

12./Christopher Croft, '"Kiss me with those red lips": Gender and Inversion in Bram Stoker's *Dracula*' in *The Vampire and the Critics*. Ed Margaret L. Carter, (London, UMI Research Press, 1988).

13./Sigmund Freud, 'The Uncanny' in *Art and Literature: Jensen's Gradiva, Leonardo Da Vinci & other works*. Trans James Strachey, Ed Albert Dickson Vol 14, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1985) pp.339-376.

14./Richard Wasson, 'The Politics of *Dracula*' in *The Vampire and the Critics*. Ed Margaret L. Carter, (London, UMI Research Press, 1988).

15./Edmund Burke, *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origins of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful*. Ed James T. Boulton, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1987) see pp.57-58.

16./Frederich Schiller, *On the Sublime & On Naive and Sentimental Poetry*. Trans J.A. Elias, (New York, Ungar, 1975).

17./Harold Bloom, *The Anxiety of Influence*. (Oxford, OUP, 1975).

<u>Chapter Seven: Freud's Dilemma, The Uncanny Sublime.</u>

1./Sigmund Freud, 'The Uncanny' in *Art and Literature: Jensen's Gradiva, Leonardo Da Vinci & other works*. Trans James Strachey, Ed Albert Dickson Vol 14, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1985) pp.339-376. Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

2./Sigmund Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*. Trans and Ed James Strachey vol 4, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1986). Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

3./Sigmund Freud, *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*. vol 5, Trans Alan Tyson, Ed James Strachey (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1987). Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

4./David E. Pettigrew, 'The Question of the Relation of Philosophy and Psychoanalysis: The Case of Kant and Freud' in *Metaphilosophy*. Ed Terrell Ward Bynum, vol 21, Nos 1 & 2, Jan/April 1990. Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

5./Thomas Weiskel, *The Romantic Sublime: Studies in the Structure and Psychology of Transcendence*. (Baltimore, John Hopkins UP, 1986). Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

6./Clive Bloom, 'Poe and the Literature of Analysis: A Study of the implications of Edgar Allan Poe's Critical Theory for the Psychoanalytic reading of Literature.' (unpublished doctoral thesis, Southampton University, 1983). Further references are to this edition and are given in brackets after quotation.

7./Immanuel Kant, 'Analytic of the Sublime' in *The Critique of Judgement.* Part 1, Trans James Creed Meredith (Oxford, Clarendon, 1988) Part 1, pp90-203.

8./Neil Hertz, *At the End of the Line: Essays on Psychoanalysis and the Sublime.* (New York, Columbia UP, 1985).

9./Stephen Copley and John Whale, *Beyond Romanticism: New Approaches to Texts and Contexts 1780-1832.* (London, Routledge, 1992).

10./Percy Bysshe Shelley, *A Defense of Poetry* in *Shelley's Prose: The Trumpet of a Prophecy.* Ed David Lee Clark (London, Fourth Estate, 1988).

11./Paul Hamilton, ''A Shadow Of A Magnitude': The Dialectic of Romantic Aesthetics' in *Beyond Romanticism* Ed Stephen Copley and John Whale pp. 11-31.

12./See also Angela Leighton, *Shelley and the Sublime.* (Cambridge, CUP, 1984) pp. 18-23 for a similar argument.

13./Mary Ann Doane, *Femmes Fatales: Feminism, Film Theory, and Psychoanalysis.* (London, Routledge, 1991).

14./David Punter, *The Literature of Terror: A History of Gothic Fictions from 1765 to the Present Day.* (London, Heinemann, 1980). See pp. 239-267.

15./H. G. Wells, *The Island of Dr Moreau.* (London, Pan, 1975).

16./Oscar Wilde, *The Picture of Dorian Gray.* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1990).

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1./Thomas Weiskel, *The Romantic Sublime: Studies in the Structure and Psychology of Transcendence.* (Baltimore, John Hopkins UP, 1986).

2./David Punter, *The Romantic Unconscious: A Study in Narcissism and Patriarchy.* (London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989).

3./Sigmund Freud, 'The Uncanny' in *Art and Literature: Jensen's Gradiva, Leonardo Da Vinci & other works.* Trans James Strachey, Ed Albert Dickson Vol 14, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1985) pp. 339-376.

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6./Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences.* (London, Tavistock, 1982).

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