UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON

SEPARATE DISCOURSES:

A STUDY OF PERFORMANCE AND ANALYSIS

CHEE YEE JENNIFER TONG

A Thesis in One Volume Submitted for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

FACULTY OF ARTS

MUSIC

SEPTEMBER 1994

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON

ABSTRACT

FACULTY OF ARTS

MUSIC

Doctor of Philosophy

SEPARATE DISCOURSES: A STUDY OF PERFORMANCE AND ANALYSIS

by Chee Yee Jennifer Tong

In recent years, the nature of analysis and performance relations has become a concern among music theorists. While many wish to see the practical applications of analysis to performance, they refuse to concede to any simplistic position that sees a direct correlation between structural insights and performance. However, it is rare that the investigations get beyond attempts to make technical analysis more relevant to performers, which virtually turns the analysis-and-performance problem into one for analysts alone.

This thesis attempts to reconstrue the issue of analysis and performance in order that performers can play a genuine part in the discussion of it. Its premise is that the nature of musical performance is such that neither analysts nor performers can ever describe it adequately, and its prime concern is to identify the real issue behind that we ought to be dealing with. This I see as the lack of authentic discourse in academic musical writings: writers do not normally attend to the fictional status of words about music. Consequently, most studies of performance by analysts distort performance by moulding it according to analytical terms. With this in mind, I endeavour to expose the limitations of structuralist approaches to performance in a broad sense, those which see performance primarily as interpretations. This is achieved through critiquing contemporary theoretical liteature on analysis and performance, and through commentaries based on a comparative listening of recordings. The discursive nature of musical writings about performance and analysis is then enhanced through a reading of performers' own writings and a case study of different discourses on a performance attribute. Performers' discourse is thus given credibility and significance. Only in this way, I believe, can the performer be brought back into the scene and have a genuine role to play in intellectual consideration of any performance-related issues.

Thus this thesis is not a study of the inter-relations between musical analysis and performance in its conventional sense. Although it does draw on a specific repertory - that is, nineteenth-century piano music - it is more critical than analytical in nature, and is informed as much by musical knowledge and experience as by insights from literary theory.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

A thesis bearing the sub-title of 'a study of analysis and performance' may be written from as many perspectives as one can think of. Apart from the obvious option of following the path already set out by analysts which seeks to correlate analysis to interpretative decisions in performance (or exposing the limitations of this approach), there are a variety of other ways to proceed. One can, for example, look at editions of music and examine various implications and purposes behind editorial markings. One can also adopt a historical stance and investigate historical documents: for example, pedagogical treatises, and critical/analytical writings that have a bearing on performance. Alternatively, one can look at historical recordings and tease out issues concerning performance styles in various periods, and their relationship with what we know of as 'analysis'. There is, too, the by-now widespread perceptual approach, which essentially uses mechanical aids to measure performance parameters and correlates the result with the structure of the music. Contemporary educational circumstances offer yet another angle: investigating the role and nature of the teaching of analysis in music colleges, for example, might yield interesting insights into analysis for performance - or, alternatively, performing against analysis.

This thesis does not adopt any of these approaches. Its starting point, instead, is a sense of loss in the face of the kaleidoscopic methods of studying

performance in academic circles which, in fact, do not engage with 'real performance' - the unique sound experience which affects and moves us all. It attempts to get to the root of the problem of talking about performance analytically, which, to me, is a problem of language. In brief, I argue that performance needs to be 'de-essentialized' from structuralist approaches which see performances only as interpretations or derivations of analyses. I propose that it is only through discourse that performance can become constructed, so that it can be considered 'in its own terms'. Only in this way can it be revitalized when it is contemplated intellectually.

Hence this thesis is not 'a keen intellectual scrutiny of the notes';[1] rather, it is a scrutiny of words about notes. It turns the study of analysis and performance inside out, as it were, and re-examines it within a broader context. The chapters are organized as a series of progressive essays; the organization resembles that of a story rather than that of a sonata.

Chapter One sets the scene by juxtaposing analytical discourse with the lack of a 'performance discourse'. It argues for the need of a radical break with structuralist language in a truly alternative analytical discourse, and exposes the structuralist biases in our conception of performance. Chapter Two surveys contemporary literature on analysis-and-performance relations, and traces our ingrained patterns of music-theoretical thought about performance back to

[1]James Ellis, `Editorial', *Newsletter of the Society for Music Analysis* No.7 (August 1994), p.3.

Schenker and analytical positivism. Chapter Three turns to 'real performance' by comparing recordings of two Chopin Preludes. It aims to redress the tilted balance between analysis and performance in theoretical thought, but ends up with an impossible situation as I critique my own accounts and expose the role language plays in determining how we talk about performance. This serves as a pivotal point in the thesis. In Chapter Four, I talk about the destabilizing power of performers' own writings from the point of view of language, and end with an attempt to construct an alternative universe of discourse for a performer who appears to be putting forward a kind of 'performer's analysis'. Chapter Five is an attempt to illustrate performance discourse within academic thought, using *rubato* as a case study. It looks at how different meanings of the term have been constructed, and attempts to identify linguistic nuances which are performance-oriented, while confirming the fluidity of a performer's universe of discourse.

I would like to express my deep gratitude to Professor Nicholas Cook, my supervisor, for help and advice throughout; his affirmative and inspiring comments in particular have a large part to play in making this thesis come true. My thanks also goes to Professor Jonathan Dunsby for allowing me to read and quote from the typescript of his forthcoming book which sharpens my ideas substantially; and to Amanda Bayley for her consistent, invaluable support.

CHAPTER ONE

THE QUESTION OF DISCOURSE IN MUSIC ANALYSIS AND MUSICAL PERFORMANCE

Charles Seeger, writing in the sixties, speaks of the 'linguocentric predicament' that all musicologists are trapped in: inherent in the act of writing about music is a bias towards the characteristics of speech, and our main task has been to identify the 'juncture' between 'speech knowledge of music' and 'music knowledge of music'.[1] Carolyn Abbate, years later, writes similarly about this gap between what we know of as and are thrilled by in 'music', and 'words about music', in her stylish prose:

> For interpreting music involves a terrible and unsafe leap between object and exegesis, from sound that seems to signify nothing (and is nonetheless splendid) to words that claim discursive sense but are, by comparison, modest and often unlovely.[2]

---

[1]Charles Seeger, *Studies in Musicology: 1935-1975* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1977).

[2]Carolyn Abbate, *Unsung Voices: Opera and Musical Narrative in the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), p.xv.

The recent surge of interest in narrativity in music represents a modern attempt to come to grips with the problem of music's ineffability. A focussed and intriguing area of study, ranging from Newcomb's structural narratology, Maus' action-agent theory, to Abbate's own theory of the 'voice', it provides a handle for us to grasp and enables us to find our bearings in the intellectual maze of what music is, literally, 'about'. Music, in all such studies, is seen *as* discourse, narrating (or *not* narrating), acting, contributing to a plot. Little attention has been paid to the perspective from the other end - discourses about music seen as writers' construction of a universe of signification related in some manner to the ineffable sound experience which we call 'music'.

As music analysis becomes more and more settled as a discipline in its own right, analytical discourse - that verbal medium in which the analysis is couched - becomes more and more homogeneous and stylized. While analytical methodology differs, there seem to be certain underlying assumptions as regards what constitutes an 'analytical discourse' proper. Analysts write in a certain way in order for their ideas to be taken seriously. If they for any reason need to write in another mode, they often sound ill at ease and apologetic. Kofi Agawu, in his suggestive and illuminating article on concepts of closure and Chopin's Op.28, for example, constructs a fictional account by a hypothetical 'naive listener' of 'the "feel" of closure' as illustrated in Prelude 22.[3] It is a 'metaphorical critical account' that

[3]Kofi Agawu, 'Concepts of Closure and Chopin's Opus 28', *Music Theory Spectrum* 9 (1987), pp.1-17, 5.

contrasts with the 'more technical mode of discourse' in which Agawu analyzes the other Preludes in question in the rest of the article. In a footnote to the naive listener's account, he annotates:

> This is pure fiction, of course, but useful fiction in so far as it enables me to present certain aspects of the musical experience from which I can extract "structural" elements. The naive listener's account has been annotated with measure numbers and an occasional explanatory word in order to make it easier to follow, the point being that the naive listener would not use such specific locations in his description.[4]

It seems, then, that Agawu is utterly conscious of the consensus of how a sophisticated analytical account should be like: it is to be specific, 'structural', and, of course, non-metaphorical. Marion Guck, in a recent article, provides even more ample illustrations of the properties of conventional analytical discourse. After looking at and 'analyzing' a passage in the second movement of Mozart's Piano Concerto in A major, K.488, she comments self-consciously on her own account: 'Though I have articulated many reasons for my hearing, my account may not seem to have reached a point of radiant clarity.'[5] Slightly later, she reiterates that her

---

[4]*Ibid.*, n.21.

[5]Marion A. Guck, 'Taking Notice: a Response to Kendall Walton', *Journal of Musicology* 11:1 (Winter 1993), pp.45-51, 50.

account is 'wavering and contradictory' and that 'perhaps it is disappointing that [she has] not presented something which seems more like a definitive account of the passage.'[6] Conventional analytical discourse, then, must be clear, coherent, unambiguous and definitive - or at least, this is what Guck appears to be saying. Earlier on in the article, she refers revealingly to the analytical account as the 'public text', as opposed to the 'private process' of understanding the music, where thoughts gradually take shape.[7]

This, however, is only part of the picture. There is an obvious ironic twist in what both writers are saying: the very introduction of unconventional analytical discourse in quotation marks within their analyses points to a perception of the possible inadequacy of conventional modes of discourse and a desire to challenge the established norm. When Agawu alludes, possibly with a smirk, to the fact that 'naive listeners' are not supposed to be specific, he is obviously mocking the self-congratulatory analysts who as a group disdain 'vagueness' in any form, especially in metaphorical language. When he says, preceding the quote isolated above, that 'This nebulous construct, the "naive listener", is, alas, none other than myself, or... "an idealized version of myself"',[8] he might well be implying, among other things, that at least part of himself reacts to the music in just such a way and that although

[6]*Ibid.*

[7]*Ibid.*, p.46.

[8]Agawu, n.21.

this kind of language is excluded from the 'public talks' among analysts, it is far from valueless. Guck makes things even more explicit by stating that her point is precisely that her account has not been radiantly clear:

> My wavering and contradictory account is a vehicle for conveying the marvelously subtle and elegant ground-shiftings of this stretch of music. It is meant to capture my sense of how the fleeting sounds stimulate equally ephemeral interpretations.[9]

The inclusion of such annotatory remarks, footnote-like, into the main text speaks for itself: it represents a bold confrontation with what Scott Burnham has referred to as 'those habits of discourse so automatic as to be transparent'[10] - both the habits which define what analytical writing should be like and the habit of relegating such 'personal', introspective remarks to small print.[11] By yielding to a kind of 'unsettled', 'impure', and by some standards unprofessional discourse, Guck is conveying a sense of heartfelt agitation as regards this matter of established analytical prose.

---

[9]Guck, p.50.

[10]Scott Burnham, 'Counterpoint: the Criticism of Analysis and the Analysis of Criticism', *19th-Century Music* 16:1 (Summer 1992), pp.70-76, 76.

[11]This whole piece of unconventional analytical writing, however, is supported and secured by a generic licence - another game which demonstrates the pervasiveness and power of institutionalized discursive convention: within the issue of the journal, Guck's piece is not an article proper, but an informal 'response' to the previous article.

The works of Agawu and Guck, needless to say, merit attention not primarily because they include or employ alternative discourse, but because they propose modes of analysis fundamentally different from that which expresses itself comfortably in traditional theoretical terms. The core of Guck's article is an analysis of the Mozart passage in the form of a text which 'reenacts the introspective process by depicting three states of awareness about a particular moment' in the piece. Agawu's article, fuelled as much by the poetic analogy of closure as by Hoffmann's and the 'naive listener's' metaphorical accounts, provides an analysis of closure which is at once technically sophisticated and evocative of dimensions underaddressed in conventional analysis. Both are, in their own ways, comments on the current state of analysis and its discourse, and to the extent that they do *not* set about mirroring the 'true content' of the musical work in question and taking on pretensions of science, but participate in a kind of self-interrogation of what analysis actually is, they implicitly acknowledge themselves to be stories, fiction, one among many that can be told about the music in question.

Guck, indeed, has precisely this in mind when she remarks, in a different context from the present one, that 'our hope is to characterize the intentional objects or content of musical experiences - to take such a succession [of a sixth and a fifth] into an interpretation or *construal* - a *story* - of a particular musical context, even so simple a construal as recognizing the contrapuntal connection of sixth to

fifth.'[12] Agawu writes towards the end of his article, quite unobtrusively, that 'It is time for my global close.'[13] Just as the naive listener's 'useful fiction' 'draws on a variety of conceptual categories, revealing a cross-dimensional view of the piece',[14] so Agawu's story radiates from Chopin's Opus 28, cuts across certain linguistic, generic conventions and disciplinary boundaries, alluding, resonating, self-evaluating. The most credible analytical writing, it seems to me, is that which recognizes 'the metaphorical status of all words about music',[15] whether it is by alluding to and counterpointing with 'genres' other than analytical writing proper, actually employing metaphorical language, or even simply sounding anxious about itself in the course of the text. It is, in other words, when they do not believe totally in themselves that analytical writings are at their most persuasive, penetrating and forward-looking.

This idea of traditional structural analysis as story has been overtly recognized and argued for in various quarters, from varying perspectives. Nicholas Cook, for example, argues persuasively from the point of view of music perception that 'to hear a piece in Schenkerian terms is to experience it in terms of the metaphor of the Ursatz and its prolongation'.[16] Littlefield and Neumeyer, in a

[12]Guck, p.46. My italics.

[13]Agawu, p.17.

[14]*Ibid.*, p.6.

[15]Abbate, p.xiv.

[16]Nicholas Cook, 'Schenker's Theory of Music as Ethics', *Journal of Musicology* 7:4 (Fall 1989), pp.415-439, 437. See also his *Music, Imagination, and Culture* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).

recent article entitled 'Rewriting Schenker: Narrative - History - Ideology', take as their starting point the narrative nature of Schenker's analytical writing: 'Heinrich Schenker labels his music-syntactical narratives "representations" (*Darstellungen*), which we may take as plots, accounts, or stories.'[17] Abbate elaborates this point eloquently when she compares nineteenth-century and late twentieth-century musical interpretations and concludes that they are equally 'plotted explanations of music', 'event-centred' conceptualizations that see music as one-dimensional event sequences. Whereas nineteenth-century critics use emotive terms and construct explicit stories of drama for music, twentieth-century structural narratives speak of 'tonal "events" or themes as "characters" in a (purely musical) drama'.[18] In the light of contentions such as these, the myths that emotional and structural descriptions of music are somehow antithetical to one another, and that the latter is superior and can take over, break down.

It is not true, however, that the value of metaphoric analysis, or figural (versus structural) accounts, has not been explicitly recognized at all in recent scholarship. Scott Burnham, for example, argues in a recent article that the nineteenth-century programmatic reception of Beethoven's Third Symphony 'make explicit metaphorically some of the same grammatical and stylistic aspects of the music that other analytical methodologies do formally', thereby 'assuming a

---

[17]Richard Littlefield and David Neumeyer, 'Rewriting Schenker: Narrative - History - Ideology', *Music Theory Spectrum* 14:1 (Spring 1992), pp.38-65, 38.

[18]Abbate, p.23.

validity for programmatic interpretations not generally acknowledged today'.[19] Anthony Newcomb has looked directly at the inter-relations between 'expressive and structural interpretations', writing that 'expressive metaphors are often shorthand versions of structural insights - insights which subsequent analytical work may allow us to expand and refine'[20] - a thesis for which Guck provides detailed and well-wrought illustrations in her much earlier article, 'Musical Images as Musical Thoughts: the Contribution of Metaphor to Analysis'.[21] Fred Maus incorporates metaphorical language into his analyses in order to illustrate and advance his theory of instrumental music as an acting agent.[22] While such analyses are intrinsically interesting, I want to argue that by engaging in discourse without realizing or attending to the destabilizing or self-critical nature of it (in the manner I illustrated using the Agawu and Guck examples), the authors of these studies are actually suggesting, quite contrary to what they may have intended, that mainstream analytical discourse is self-contained and all-subsuming; metaphorical language is but one contributing, and therefore subordinate, element in its constitution.

[19]Scott Burnham, 'On the Programmatic Reception of Beethoven's *Eroica* Symphony', *Beethoven Forum* 1 (1992), pp.1-24, 3.

[20]Anthony Newcomb, 'Sound and Feeling', *Critical Inquiry* 10 (June 1984), pp.614-643, 636.

[21]Marion A. Guck, 'Musical Images as Musical Thoughts: the Contribution of Metaphor to Analysis', *In Theory Only* 5:5 (June 1981), pp.29-42.

[22]See especially his 'Music as Drama', *Music Theory Spectrum* 10 (1988), pp.56-73.

The case of Newcomb and Guck is perhaps easier to illustrate than the other two.[23] Guck's article is a report on a test she conducted with her students, in which they were asked to talk about a brief passage in Chopin's B minor Prelude in metaphorical terms. Once an 'organizing metaphor' with all its complexity and richness was generated - a 'breathing laborer' in this case - she asked them to correlate the images with the structural features of the piece, with a view to generating a structural analysis that is enriched and appropriate and that incorporates non-technical language in its description. Her thesis is that 'a complex and refined image', or metaphor, 'offers an analytical universe in a verbal nutshell'; it 'provides food for analytical thought and draws analytical observations together, suggesting a coherent shape, while it continues to hint at further insights.'[24] Such an argument, as is apparent in the title of the piece, presupposes the view that analysis is about - and only about - revealing structural relations, and expresses a complacency towards the unproblematic nature of such an orientation. Metaphor is only a vehicle in enhancing this, and despite the seemingly liberal use of non-technical, metaphorical language in the descriptions, the analytical discourse still advances a kind of pan-structuralism, an unquestioning impulse and consciousness the very constitution of which the essay has set out to challenge and redress. The fashionable and familiar 'charge' of structuralism aside (a passing comment

[23]I am less interested in judging the merits and demerits of particular scholars than in critiquing their ideas, hence the use of the works of the same author to illustrate opposite points. The time lapse between this earlier article and the other one, which is more than a decade, reflects the author's changing perspectives and, what is to me, refinement of thinking.

[24]Guck, 'Musical Images', p.40.

towards the end says it all: 'In order to project musical structure, performers *need* metaphors'[25]), I believe that the basic problem lies in a view of language that is not critical enough: metaphorical language, an alternative mode in the present context, is seen as a lifeless and neutral entity that can be interspersed with the traditional language of analysis without altering, pulling back and forth, the very nature of the analytical consciousness. Guck assumes, in her own words, an 'analytical universe' that is all-secure and unchanging.

The view that the emotive and technical modes of discourse are essentially two ways of saying the same thing is, in fact, pervasive among those broad-minded enough to consider descriptions of music in non-technical language at all. Newcomb, for example, states that 'formal and expressive interpretation are in fact two complementary ways of understanding the same phenomena.'[26] Burnham, for all his desire not 'merely to reduce earlier metaphoric accounts of the *Eroica* to a series of analytical statements closer to our customary discourses about tonal music processes' and not to 'patronize this mode of musical understanding by imputing to it the inchoate glimmers of our analytical discoveries', nonetheless concedes, revealingly, that 'practitioners operating from a range of critical and analytical standpoints notice similar things in this music and *express them in the different languages available to them*'.[27] While there is a certain sense in which this is true,

[25]*Ibid.*, p.42.

[26]Newcomb, p.636.

[27]Burnham, 'On the Programmatic Reception of Beethoven's *Eroica* Symphony', p.18. My italics.

it is by no means the entire picture. Maus, echoing Newcomb, states too that 'both sorts of description - "technical" or music-theoretical, "dramatic" or anthropomorphically evocative - belong, interacting, to the analysis.'[28]

In fact, the strength of Maus' otherwise extremely illuminating article is considerably undermined by the fact that while its whole theory is based on the animistic qualities ascribed to the music in the analytical accounts, it does not acknowledge the constructedness of this discourse. In the intervening 'commentaries' on the analytical sections, Maus touches on the mixed modes of the language used in the analysis but completely overlooks the fact that it is so only because the writer who constructed these accounts *intended* it so. Throughout, statements such as 'the analysis begins by calling the opening a loud, aggressive, abrupt outburst, calling it clumsy, incomplete' abound, and lead on to discussions of music's supposedly inherent qualities of an acting agent, as if 'the analysis' had a separate consciousness of its own and as if it were not a kind of discourse that is inseparable from the intentions of the writer. A result of this view of language's innocence, as it were, is that the essay lacks the depth of writers such as Abbate. Not having come to terms with 'the fact that his or her constitution of music through words, like all verbally couched forms of explanation, has largely to do with literary and institutional traditions, with recurring tropes in writing about music, and not merely with the musical work itself',[29] Maus' analysis, fascinating

[28]Maus, 'Music as Drama', p.63.

[29]Abbate, p.18.

though it is, pays tribute to, rather than deconstructs, mainstream analytical practices in terms of the nature of its discourse and its implications. It shares the deep-seated assumption that there is an analytical 'grand narrative' that is unmediated and free from all intentional nuances and biases.

It seems to me, then, that if we are to do justice to metaphorical accounts of music - an alien configuration in our present age - without perpetuating the power of dominant analytical discourse but with a view to broadening and redefining our analytical vision, the only course to take would be to look at them *alongside* structural accounts, with a recognition that both are equally stories of music. This parallelism would involve radical re-examination of many of the deeply entrenched assumptions about analysis of music such as the use of institutionalized language and the importance ascribed to 'themes' versus 'transitions' in the analysis of 'Sonata Form' types of movements. It would also involve creating an alternative setup with different priorities and methodologies for the metaphorical accounts to be seen operating in. In short, the alternative story would be an altogether different language game, or a separate 'universe of discourse' in Seeger's terms.

E.T.A. Hoffmann's criticism of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, discussed in detail in Robin Wallace's well-known book *Beethoven's Critics*, provides a good illustration of just such a separate universe of discourse. It may be seen as a literal example because it is an account which explicitly *parallels*, rather than attempts to

explain, the music. Dahlhaus calls this 'poetizing paraphrase', the verbal expression of the 'poetic' atmosphere of the music the existence of which is a proof of the music's status as art. It is 'intentionally vague and indefinite', sentimental, and made up of fantastic metaphors. The point, according to Dahlhaus, is not to mirror the content of the music at all, but to measure the capacity of the music 'to evoke at all an atmosphere demanding articulation by a paraphrase however inadequate'.[30] Wallace's thesis, likewise, supports the argument that nineteenth-century analytical (critical) practice was not operating from our present-day premise that the purpose of analysis is to unravel how music works, or even, how music *means*. Rather, the verbal account is to make negotiable the same emotional attributes which the music has made accessible. In this way, says Wallace, 'music was freed from the obligation to refer to anything outside itself, but a verbal point of reference was maintained.'[31] From the point of view of us twentieth-century readers, the agenda behind Hoffmann's commentary has become apparent: it is an apology for 'absolute music'.

According to Wallace, Hoffmann's review of the Fifth Symphony stands out from the rest because it is fuelled by the conviction that the Symphony invokes a 'wonderful, infinite spirit-kingdom', a self-contained, exclusive emotional

[30]Carl Dahlhaus, *Analysis and Value Judgment* (New York: Pendragon Press), translated by Siegmund Levarie, 1983 (originally published in German in 1970), pp.16-17.

[31]Robin Wallace, *Beethoven's Critics: Aesthetic Dilemmas and Resolutions During the Composer's Lifetime* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p.22.

universe the attributes of which (such as pain, fear and longing) belong to the unfathomable. As such, it provides a 'perfect metaphor for instrumental music's ineffable nature',[32] of which Hoffmann is fully conscious. However, in order to drive home this central thesis, Hoffmann is seen operating from a set of unconventional priorities. He chooses his material on the basis of its relevance to this spirit-kingdom, leaving out what might have been important passages of music; places emphasis on transitional, *crescendo* passages which to him embody feelings of longing while not distinguishing thematic material; forces the finale into a renewed expression of fear and longing rather than seeing it as a triumphant end; and allows his technical descriptions, which are thorough, to remain pedestrian so that the role of the extra-musical comments to bind the analysis together can stand out. There is, in the words of Wallace, a kind of 'religious fervor' and 'irrational consistency' with which Hoffmann is seeking to convey this message; in other words, Hoffmann is bold enough to remain true to his vision, his 'guiding concept', throughout, even though it may mean entertaining 'strangely inverted priorities' and appearing 'unorthodox' in our eyes. The resulting discourse, naturally, is a highly individualized one, demanding deconstructive reading. Wallace's claim is that this is Hoffmann at his most powerful.

Hoffmann's case, however, remains straightforward in the light of our consideration of discourse, as the distinctly *ideological* intent behind renders the

[32] *Ibid.*

manifestation of the separate universe of discourse soothingly logical and amenable to understanding. Just as the instrumental compositions that Hoffmann idealized may be seen as 'preserves' or 'national parks of high culture', in the words of Lawrence Kramer,[33] so our view of this particular universe of discourse is mediated by historical understanding and is shielded, as it were, from further interrogation. The radicalism inherent in this view, in other words, might not be fully apparent.

Discourses in the realm of musical performance, as opposed to that of music analysis, present a challenging topic for investigation along the lines of the aforegoing discussions. Succinctly put, I want to argue that there exists also a master-narrative in performance discourse which tends to block off any alternative discourse or consciousness, that this runs counter to our intuitions about the realities of musical performance, and that ultimately, to deal with discussions of musical performance at all is to evaluate and critique the role of institutionalized discourse in music.

Unlike in the realm of music analysis, much in our thoughts and discussions about performance has remained diffuse, cluttered and raw. While 'analytical discourse' has attained a readily identifiable meaning, this is not true of the term 'performance discourse'. While the technical and metaphorical modes in analysis

[33]Lawrence Kramer, 'Dangerous Liaisons: the Literary Text in Musical Criticism', *19th-Century Music* 13 (1989), pp.159-167, 165.

have emerged as distinct, antithetical categories in analytical discourse, it is not at all clear what some of the modes in discourse concerning performance might be. And while the concept of separate universes of discourse in analysis can be effectively shown and easily digested through an example as well-documented as Hoffmann's commentaries, parallel instances in the realm of performance are completely uncharted. The commitment to such a course of inquiry, tilted towards the literary side of the matter, can be explained not so much by fashion - that is, the mushrooming of literary approaches to music in recent years - but by a belief that in order to come to grips with talking about performance in music, we must first learn about the talking itself: pitfalls and possibilities, conventions, power. An interpretative bias in itself, this commitment is directed towards locating the root of the problem rather than offering immediate practical resolutions; it aims at depth rather than breadth.

Nicholas Cook, in a contribution to a forum entitled 'The Future of Theory' in 1989, writes:

> The fixation on musical unity has been, up to now, the principal stumbling block in the development of an adequate theory of musical performance.[34]

[34]Nicholas Cook, 'The Future of Theory', *Indiana Theory Review* 10 (1989), pp.69-73, 72.

Among other things, this thought-provoking statement reveals a perception of the intimate connection between theoretical concerns on the one hand, and our conceptualization of performance on the other. It brings into the theoretical discourse considerations of performance; indeed, Cook goes on to bring the essay to an end by a climactic 'prediction' that a future reconceptualization of performance is going to lead to a re-thinking of the relationship between musicology and music theory. In an intellectual climate where performance is largely excluded from general musical thought, as is aptly noted by Jonathan Dunsby,[35] Cook's statements stand out as valuable exceptions which suggest ways forward.

What Cook is saying, in the statement quoted above, is that thoughts about performance in scholarly circles have so far been conditioned by our ideological commitments in music theory: we rely on the concept of organic unity in music for our understanding of what performance is; we naturally think of performance as an autonomous musical work realized in sound. Although this view finds its most conspicuous manifestation in the exceptionally well-documented thoughts of performance practice of the Second Viennese School - a 'structuralist' performance tradition with its culmination in the recent analysis-and-performance debates (which I will lay out in detail in Chapter 2) - its essence actually permeates every quarter of contemporary thinking about musical performance. This is often masked

[35]See his *Performing Music: Shared Concerns* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming), Chapter 2.

as an exclusive concern with 'analytical interpretation' or a pursuit of 'comprehensive musical understanding' in performance. It seems to me, in other words, that the emphasis on structure and unity in performance is but part of a considerably broader phenomenon: that of conceiving performance in the terms of an intellectual consciousness according to which understanding (making sense or meaning out of), order (in the sense of 'structures'), and, more case-specifically, articulacy and notation are prized over the more elusive categories of the generic qualities of musical sound and the affective quality of listener response. Alan Street, in a recent review, characterizes 'music' as follows, in a context of distinguishing 'repertoire' and 'canon' through 'performance':

> Music, in short, is process first and notation second, a medium in which oral/aural assimilation and repetition take precedence over literacy.[36]

Sadly, the prevailing discourse on performance reflects precisely the reverse.

Performance discourse is somewhat difficult to locate and identify. Although one might argue that one can readily compile 'performance studies'-materials based on a long tradition of pedagogical literature and relevant

[36]Alan Street, review of *Disciplining Music: Musicology and Its Canons* (Katherine Bergeron and Philip V. Bohlman eds., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992) in *Journal of Music Theory* 37.1 (Spring 1993), pp.169-176, 171.

critical/analytical writings such as Schumann's and Schenker's - one looks in vain for discourse on the essential nature of performance in its own terms. In one of the chapters of his book, Dunsby writes briskly about 'the problems of discussing musical performance productively' in modern society, which 'vary...between communities': there are, for example, 'the British tendency to worship intuition, the French love of epistemology, or the American ideal of discursive clarity', and, common to all of them, the absence of the kind of 'clarity of purpose' which characterized the Romantic age.[37] Performance is not examined in the way that analysis, for example, is; there does not seem to be the need of laying bare the assumptions and thinking behind the notion of musical performance. On what might seem an absurd note, the *New Grove* does not have an entry on 'performance' (although it does have a long one on 'performance practice'); it is taken as a musical praxis whose notion is too fundamental to afford any questionable basis.

But this is only part of the picture. As musicians, we all feel deeply about performance, and such feelings surface in specialized, localized intellectual debates which engage performance issues. In other words, much of what I see as performance discourse is hidden, wrapped up, as it were, in layers of possibly irrelevant signification. The analysis-and-performance problem, up to now undoubtedly more about analysis and analytical ideology than about performance,

[37]Dunsby, *Performing Music*, Chapter 5.

nonetheless provides one context (or rather, pretext) for airing some of our deep-seated, but largely unarticulated, views about performance, especially among those who query a straightforward relationship between the two. Joel Lester, for example, writes that 'in analysis, we often seek absolutely justifiable answers; in performance, we often relish diverse answers.'[38] In this particular context, such commonsensical and seldom very illuminating comments about performance perhaps reveal more about unidentified problems and unjustified leanings than about the nature of performance. As Jonathan Dunsby puts it,

> Among music theorists and analysts a clear correspondence between analytical 'interpretation' and actual musical performance is widely doubted. Why this is so, what it may imply, what may be learnt from the situation, all remains hidden...[39]

Because, I would say, we cannot yet articulate what characterizes 'actual musical performance'.

The somewhat dated debates surrounding the concept of 'authenticity' in 'early music' provide another context where more substantial ideas and more passionate voices concerning the role and value of performance in music can be

[38]Joel Lester, review of Wallace Berry, *Musical Structure and Performance* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989) in *Music Theory Spectrum* 14:1 (Spring 1992), pp.75-81, 78.

[39]Dunsby, *Performing Music*, Chapter 2.

heard. The antithetical positions of Gary Tomlinson and Richard Taruskin have by now become well-known. Tomlinson holds that the 'authentic meaning' of a work resides in its 'thick' context, the entire 'cultural web' in which the work is situated, and performance can only perform a 'thin' function in articulating this meaning:

> A performance can present little more of a work's original context than the portion of it that exists within the work itself: the internal interaction of its constituent signs and gestures. This is only a part of the conceptual worlds in which the work took on its first meanings: and any performance, therefore, amounts at best to a relatively thin context for authentic meaning.[40]

Taruskin, on the other hand, maintains that a major shortcoming of 'historical' performance is that it 'places the chief emphasis on factors external to the music performed and can actually subvert *real interpretation*',[41] by which he means the personal conviction of the performer which bears upon the performance. Throughout, he upholds the interpretative role of the performer by emphasizing the indelible stamp of the 'subjectivity' and 'personality' of the performer on the performance, and distinguishes 'performance' from 'a documentation of the state

[40]Gary Tomlinson, 'The Historian, the Performer, and Authentic Meaning in Music' in Nicholas Kenyon (ed.), *Authenticity and Early Music: A Symposium* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp.115-136, 123.

[41]Richard Taruskin, 'The Pastness of the Present and the Presence of the Past' in Nicholas Kenyon (ed.), *Authenticity and Early Music*, pp.137-207, 140. My italics.

of knowledge'.[42] 'The composer's intentions' cannot be known, and certainly not through the reconstruction of the original context, so that the notion of 'letting the music speak for itself' is rendered absurd. While this is not the place to tease out the different issues in this 'authenticity' polemic, these two undoubtedly extreme positions seem to me to crystalize much of our values and biases about performance, which resonate in their various forms in the musicological literature at large.

Tomlinson's position, it seems to me, provokes such a passionate counter-reaction from Taruskin - and possibly from many of us - because it violates our ingrained intuitions about music: what it is, how it is different from all other endeavours, why we are drawn to it. By upholding the role and value of historical, contextual knowledge at all costs and downplaying the role of performance and the performer, Tomlinson reaches a conclusion that seems to many, including Nicholas Kenyon, 'startling'. To Taruskin, it is based on a set of 'naive assumptions'. It seems, then, that there is a consensus among most of us that music's materiality is embodied in its performance and, in the candid statement of Renée Lorraine, 'people care deeply about the quality of performance.'[43] There might have been, in the light of this, a central discourse in musical scholarship about 'performance'

[42]Taruskin, 'The Musicologist and the Performer' in *Musicology in the 1980s: Methods, Goals, Opportunities* (D. Kern Holoman and Claude V. Palisca eds., New York: Da Capo Press, 1982), pp.101-117, 109.

[43]Renée Lorraine, 'Musicology and Theory: Where It's Been, Where It's Going', *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 51:2 (Spring 1993), pp.235-244, 236.

itself, the heart and soul of it, as reflected in, for instance, a consideration of its experience - a discourse which is forthright, undisguised, and uninhibited. However, what we see instead is a 'shying away', in the words of Dunsby, 'into the retreats of fragmentary subdisciplines' - or, perhaps, of positions shielded by different ideologies in various subdisciplines - 'with mute performers, and arid commentators'.[44] Not only is the sense of community of being in music in the first place lost, but the sense of the reality of performance becomes more and more distant in scholarly discourse in general.

More specifically, it seems to me that in a broad sense, Tomlinson's extremist position in the historical-musicological scene finds its correspondent in the theoretical scene in the many strains of thoughts which see music as text (as opposed to context) and which, in a similar way, remove us from performance. At one extreme, there are Stravinsky's anti-interpretational stance, and Schoenberg's cry for the 'unnecessariness' of the existence of the performer. These, though clearly a result of a modernist aesthetics which arose as a reaction against the 'over-interpretation' of the romantics, leave a legacy that is equally far-reaching and pervasive, as can be seen in today's general idea of performance as 'reproduction of music' or 'realization of the score'. At the same time, 'interpretation' in the Taruskin-Kerman sense has become stripped of its original vivacity and breadth, hardening, in its most extreme form, into a largely structuralist position which sees

[44]Dunsby, *Performing Music*, Chapter 4.

performing music as primarily articulating structure. 'Interpretation' thus becomes narrowed down into dealings with the score, while the wider issues such as interpretative attitudes and performing styles (both personal and cultural) are neglected.

Schoenberg, in 1940, said to Dika Newlin:

> Music need not be performed any more than books need to be read aloud, for its logic is perfectly represented on the printed page; and the performer, for all his intolerable arrogance, is totally unnecessary except as his interpretations make the music understandable to an audience unfortunate enough not to be able to read it in print.[45]

This reads like an echo of the well-known Brahms anecdote to which Taruskin draws our attention: Brahms once 'declined an invitation to an opera saying that if he sat at home with a score he'd hear a better performance'.[46] The performer, then, is seen as an intruder. While these are perhaps extreme instances directed against 'the stereotype of the "intellectually disreputable" interpreter who exploits music as a vehicle to express his own personality',[47] they nonetheless represent a view of

[45]Quoted in Nicholas Cook, 'Music Theory and "Good Comparison": A Viennese Perspective', *Journal of Music Theory* 33 (1989), pp.117-141, 122.

[46]Taruskin, 'The Musicologist and the Performer', p.103.

[47]Joseph Kerman, *Musicology* (London: Fontana and Collins, 1985), p.190.

performance as the mere acoustic realization of 'real music', which is found in the idealistic entity of the score. Quite apart from questions of the ontological status of music, which is not what I am driving at, such a view marks out dramatically one end of a spectrum of positions which view performance exclusively with what might be called a 'notational' bias.

From such a point of view, performance is conveniently seen as 'realization of the score' in an apparently unproblematic chain of transmission of musical ideas from the composer to the performer to the listener. Although this 'realization' entails 'interpretation' in its various senses, this view implies, and rests on, the unquestioned authority not only of the score, or even of the musical composition as existing in the score, but of literacy and notation in a broad sense. In other words, quite apart from important questions such as the conventional authority of the composer and the ideology of autonomous music, there seems to be a strong epistemological tendency to think about performance more or less solely in the terms of realizing notation in sound, because of the security that 'literacy' gives us. Here, Hayden White's words seem to fit in aptly:

> When we seek to make sense of such problematical topics as human nature, culture, society, and history, we never say precisely what we wish to say or mean precisely what we say. Our discourse always

tend to slip away from our data towards the structures of consciousness with which we are trying to grasp them.[48]

Much of the 'data' - the content - of the 'problematical topic' of musical performance seems to have been 'lost' as we struggle to grasp and articulate it with a consciousness trained and predisposed to deal with 'notes on the page, black and white, music as object',[49] and, by implication, positivist knowledge and logic. The widespread acceptance of the view of performance as primarily 'the realization of the score' in musical scholarship, evident in the theme and orientation of a recent music conference,[50] seems to me incompatible with the ever-hovering, commonsensical view that a satisfying performance involves 'spirit, artistry, emotional communication, and technical skill, together with the power to involve the listener',[51] apart from factors that have to do with the rendering of the score. These are constant concerns that occupy the performer's mind; there seems to be a certain blindness in insisting on posing questions about performance exclusively in terms of the rendering of the score.

[48]Hayden White, *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism* (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1978), p.1.

[49]Philip V. Bohlman, 'Musicology as a Political Act', *Journal of Musicology* 11:4 (Fall 1993), pp.411-436, 420.

[50]The Colston Research Symposium, University of Bristol, March 1994, with the theme of 'The Intention, Reception and Understanding of Musical Composition'.

[51]Peter Williams, 'Performance Practice Studies: Some Current Approaches to the Early Music Phenomenon' in John Paynter *et al.*(eds.), *Companion to Contemporary Musical Thought*, 2 vols. (London: Routledge, 1992), II, pp.931-947, 937.

Jonathan Dunsby's is among the few isolated voices which attempt a break-through. In his forthcoming book on performance, he tries to tackle such questions as contingency, artistry, mystery, anxiety and loss in performance - as well as questions of structure and design. At one point, he tries to re-assert the authority of the performer in the composer-performer-listener relationship:

> Just as...the listener will whether through wearing earplugs or who knows what other form of unintended control render all performance contingent, so the performer renders composition contingent.[52]

The performer, then, has 'pivotal authority', which can be summed up in C.P.E.Bach's words, 'Any passage can be so radically changed by modifying its performance that it will be barely recognizable.' Bojan Bujic, in an essay written from a philosophical point of view and entitled 'Notation and Realization: Musical Performance in Historical Performance', invites us similarly to reconsider projecting 'our modern notion of performance as a logical continuation of the process of composition' into a historical period where this notion did not apply.[53] As Dunsby's allusion to C.P.E.Bach makes clear, this is not so much a particular historical problem as a general problem about thinking through musical performance, which has occupied musical minds for a long time.

---

[52]Dunsby, *Performing Music*, Chapter 4.

[53]Bojan Bujic, 'Notation and Realization: Musical Performance in Historical Perspective' in Michael Krausz (ed.), *The Interpretation of Music: Philosophical Essays* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), pp.129-140, 137.

If our consideration of 'performance' in its broadest sense has been conditioned by an institutionalized consciousness which favours notation and literacy, then our consideration of 'interpretation' in performance has similarly eluded our grasp and is being 'structured' into discourses which reflect this consciousness. These do not reflect what we really want 'interpretation' to mean in performance, but fit in aptly with musicology in their intellectual rigour, specialist interests, neat arguments and technical language.

It may be a comfort to note that one of the best efforts to capture the cherished notion of 'interpretation' in performance comes from within musicology itself. Writing in 1985, Joseph Kerman carefully defines 'interpretation' thus: 'the process by which a unique musical personality works on music in order to bring out its content, substance, or meaning'. It is 'an individual, even idiosyncratic matter', 'less easily analyzed' than its normative sense in historical performance practice. According to him, this is 'what is really meant by "interpretation"...when musicians talk about the way they perform pieces in the standard repertory'.[54] Kerman's complementary text, to which he refers explicitly, is Cone's: 'It is the intensity of the performer's involvement with a work that, coupled with his knowledge, results in conviction - conviction that manifests itself in what we call, not just a correct,

[54]Kerman, *Musicology*, pp.190-193.

but a convincing performance.'[55] Although Dunsby regards this emphasis on the individualistic as an 'extreme position', and although notions of 'musical personality', music's 'content, substance, meaning' can be problematic, Kerman's formulation is a powerful one. This is so not only in its context of critiquing positivist musicology and advocating humanistic criticism, but also because it outlines - reminds us of - a kind of territory which performers and musicologists alike would be happy inhabiting. In a climate where the Stravinskian ideal of performance as 'transmission' of musical ideas by mere 'execution' has become more or less disreputable and the general concern has tilted towards 'interpretation', Kerman's attempt to capture its nature reflects a welcomed sensitivity towards the mentality of musicians at large - including, that is, concert-goers, radio-broadcasters, and press critics.

Unfortunately, 'interpretation' in performance in this broad and lively sense is never fleshed out in musicological literature. There, 'interpretation' is often exclusively interpretation *of* the score, whereas in Kerman's and Cone's formulations, a much more dynamic interaction between the performer and the music is implied. Compare them with Michael Krausz, for example, in his opening words in the Introduction of a recent book of which he is the editor, *The Interpretation of Music: Philosophical Essays*:

[55]Edward T.Cone, 'The Authority of Music Criticism', *Journal of American Musicological Society* 34 (1981), pp.1-18.

> In the opening bars of his Symphony No.3, Johannes Brahms indicates 'Allegro vivace'. How fast is allegro vivace? He indicates that the winds should play 'forte'. How loud is forte? At the third bar Brahms indicates 'passionato' for the first and second violins. How should this passage be played? These sorts of questions preoccupy serious musical performers. They are questions of interpretation.[56]

But these are not what the essays in the book are about, as its subtitle suggests. In fact, they are set out distinctly as the other side of the 'dialectical relationship between the practice of musical interpretation and philosophizing about it' with which the book is *not* concerned. Leaving aside the question of whether one can justifiably talk about 'one side' of a 'dialectical relationship', this dichotomy between 'practice' and 'philosophy' is predicated on, and reinforces, an understanding of interpretation as dealings with 'the notes' and understanding of 'the music'. Susan Bradshaw, in a review of the book, openly counters the emphasis on 'philosophizing' with the all-importance of the practical, thereby articulating this presupposition about interpretation:

> ...it is the interpretation of music *in terms of music* that ought surely to provide the starting point for any meaningful discussion of the subject. Yet it is the notable absence of musical contexts (not just the

[56]Michael Krausz (ed.), *The Interpretation of Music: Philosophical Essays*, p.1.

lack of musical examples overall; it so happens that the one profusely-illustrated chapter is musically naive almost to the point of absurdity) that makes much of this book seem nervously intent on circling around the more abstract edges of concrete musical fact.[57]

Just as Philip Bohlman questions the essentialization of 'music' as the 'object of study' for musicology and proposes that musicology is better thought of as 'a reflexive process, a moving of music into discourse',[58] I query, in a less all-embracing but similarly fundamental way, the orientation of making 'music' the 'object' of interpretation. Interpretation of the score - and, indeed, interpretation *of* anything - nullifies the *act* of interpretation and leads to a kind of discourse which invariably reflects a somewhat unwanted weight and concentration on the nature of the object of interpretation, rather than interpretation itself. This is true of contexts from the most innocent attempt to deal in discourse with questions like 'how fast is allegro vivace' to self-consciously polemical debates to address analytically sophisticated questions such as 'should I articulate the hidden, middleground motive'.[59] This phenomenon, in turn, is the result of an institutionalized

[57]Susan Bradshaw, review of Michael Krausz (ed.), *The Interpretation of Music: Philosophical Essays* in *The Musical Times* (September 1993), p.516. Author's italics.

[58]Philip Bohlman, 'Musicology as a Political Act', p.418. Bohlman, incidentally, provides an interesting gloss to Bradshaw's text when he states that 'I should even go so far as to say that there are times when musicology is driven by the fear that someone is "not really talking about 'the music'" or, even more ludicrously, that an article or book does not use sufficient musical examples to be about "the music".' (p.422)

[59]Wallace Berry's twelve 'examples of interpretive questions' in the second chapter of his book *Musical Structure and Performance* outline a good compass of questions which we would generally consider when thinking about 'interpretation'. These range from the more obvious, commonsensical to the more abstrusely analytical. At their extreme, they suggest a view of performance as articulating

consciousness which is structured and trained to grasp objects rather than to deal with agency, to make sense of content rather than to appreciate process. To realize how deep-seated this consciousness is, we can look at Dunsby's attempt to re-capture what 'interpretation' *can* mean, in his scepticism of the notion of an 'ideal or comprehensive musical understanding' in the minds of performers:

> [Performers] will ...have some personal conception of what 'expression' means, that is, they will have an *attitude*, be it 'this will come over well if I just do what I've been trained to do', or 'I have to pour unrequited love into bar 100 and not forget a touch of fear and loathing at bar 210', or 'this woman conducts the orchestra very well and I'd better play precisely as she is showing me how to'.[60]

Brutally realistic, these snapshots of performers' thoughts are no doubt part of the story of 'bringing one's own musical personality to bear on the work'. The fact that they immediately appear 'trivial' provides just a measure of how we have, in Scott Burnham's words, 'allowed the constructions of academia to dictate the terms of [our] relationship to music', and how we 'value what passes for academic rigor and ideological rectitude and are afraid to be caught outside the sanctuary of these

---

structure. All of them, however, are circumscribed within 'the score', or at best, 'the music'. I shall come back to Berry's book in detail in Chapter 2.

[60]Dunsby, *Performing Music*, Chapter 2.

orthodoxies'.[61] In a less playful way, interpretative *attitudes* - whether, for example, I want to play this piece 'naturally', 'deconstructively', or, for that matter, 'structurally' - are decidedly among the issues that mainstream discourse on 'interpretation *of* the music' has not concerned itself with.

While one might argue that all this is only evident of the different usages of the term 'interpretation', I would argue that the meaning of interpretation is constantly being re-defined in precisely this process, and that, heavily imbued with notational, formal and structural connotations, the sense of 'interpretation' in recent musicological literature has become deadened and nailed down to reflect the academic mind rather than the reality of performance. What is more, the resulting discourse on interpretation has lost its self-awareness and has failed to realize how institutionalized it has become. Consider the titles of some recent pieces which deal with analysis and performance, for example: 'Analytical Issues and Interpretative Decisions in Two Songs by Richard Strauss';[62] 'On the Relationship of Analytical Theory to Performance and Interpretation';[63] 'Rhythmic Process in the Scherzo of Beethoven's Sonata Op.110: Analysis as a Basis for Interpretation and Criticism'.[64] In these, 'interpretation' in performance is assumed to have arisen out of analysis,

[61]Scott Burnham, 'Counterpoint: The Criticism of Analysis and the Analysis of Criticism', p.76.

[62]Marie Rolf and Elizabeth West Marvin, in *Intégral* 4 (1990), pp.67-103.

[63]Eugene Narmour, in *Explorations in Music, the Arts and Ideas: Essays in Honor of Leonard B.Meyer* (Eugene Narmour and Ruth A.Solie eds., Stuyvesant: Pendragon Press, 1988), pp.317-340.

[64]Reed J.Hoyt, in *Indiana Theory Review* 9:2 (Fall 1988), pp.99-133.

and in each case, in their various ways, 'interpretative' suggestions are offered separately after 'analysis' of 'the music in question' is dealt with. A parallel phenomenon can be witnessed in recent Music Analysis conferences in Britain where titles devised to deal with 'performance and expression' reflect a bias towards structure as well as notes and symbols on the page. Bengt Edlund's paper at the 1993 British Music Analysis Conference at the University of Southampton, for example, made just this point: entitled 'Breathing life into a string of semi-quavers', it looked at breathing or slurring in a Bach movement for flute and how it conveys 'formal demarcations, motivic units, and expressive features'. Not that these are irrelevant, unimportant questions, but that a session composed of papers of such orientations, a phenomenon not peculiar to this conference, leaves a somewhat unsatisfactory impression as to what makes up for recent scholarship concerning interpretation and performance.

What, then, in the light of all this, can we make of the situation of 'performance discourse'? Where lies the crux of the matter and what is the way forward? Dunsby presents a somewhat optimistic picture of 'fragmentation' and opts to move towards 'a call for orientation',[65] with a view to formulating 'performance studies' into a discipline. In contrast, I see performance discourse as being taken over by a kind of master-narrative of notation and structure, which means we are almost compelled to think of performance in the structuralist terms

[65]Dunsby, *Performing Music*, Chapter 4.

set up by positivist analysis, because we fail to see that it represents only one of the many stories about performance. To attempt to conceptualize performance otherwise - to attempt, in particular, to come to terms with the ineffable attributes of performance - would, therefore, involve exposing not only the intrinsic limitations of structuralism in performance, but also, more fundamentally, the discursive status of all (including structural) narratives on performance. In other words, we need to *deconstruct* what we have of structuralist performance discourse through re-examining the role of *discourse*. In doing so, our vision of the still-lacking, central 'performance discourse' will change: it is not to be simply *about* performance in the conventional sense; rather, it is likely to be as much about discourse as about performance. This means that the boundary between the language and the object of inquiry will become blurred. Just as Maus' 'metaphorical analysis' examined earlier is 'narrative' only on the surface but 'structuralist', still, at its root, so any attempt at alternative discourse on performance without attending to the role of discourse itself will be at best superficial. The change, in other words, needs to be wholesale; it is to be on the level of paradigm, not that of mere content.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

Analysis and performance relations have emerged as a focussed area of study only recently. Strictly speaking, it was not until the 1980s that those engaged in the study of music as an academic discipline began to write about analysis and performance, and this took the form of isolated studies, chiefly among Schenkerian scholars. It would be fair be say that the publishing of Wallace Berry's monumental book *Musical Structure and Performance* in 1989 provided the first firm basis for discussion and debate, and after that studies on the topic adopted a distinctly polemical character. Before all these developments, however, there was the outstanding solo voice of Edward Cone, whose *Musical Form and Musical Performance* published in 1968 provided, quite unwittingly perhaps, what was to become the first impulse of many scholars who are engaged in discussions about performance and analysis relations at present.

Given that 'Analysis' has not been established and formalized as a discipline until fairly recently, it should hardly seem surprising that the area of analysis-performance relations has gained attention only within the last decade or so. However, to say this is necessarily to restrict one's frame of reference to the findings within the setup of the musico-theoretical scene. It is to ignore the huge

body of written documents, dated over a far longer span of time, by analytical-minded performers, concerned and well-meaning pedagogues wishing to improve the current state of performance, and editors concerned not merely about the technical facility of playing, but about the importance of structural implications. Most recently, there is the input of music psychologists whose empirical studies on performance have inevitable bearings on performance-analysis issues. The concern, then, of theorists nowadays over the analytic element in performance (or, should I say, the implications of analysis for performance) is arguably as age-old as performance itself, and it has been revealed in a variety of contexts.

The fact that such concerns did not come to the fore and become an issue in Anglo-American musico-theoretical circles until the last decade speaks of the advancements of music analysis as a sub-discipline within those circles; on the other hand, it also helps in exposing and explaining the partially predetermined course of inquiry that 'mainstream' studies in analysis-performance relations have taken. To tackle performance at a level sophisticated enough for modern musical scholarship, it seems, the most natural direction to take is to ask how we can apply analysis to it, what twentieth-century analysis has to say to inform and enlighten performers, to bring performance up to date, almost. This consists, to put it simplistically, of advocating and setting up paths for more 'structural' performance, since modern analysis is concerned predominantly with the structure of music. To this extent one can speak of a formalized tradition of analysis-performance studies,

which can be viewed as a sub-branch of formalized analysis. Representing very different stances and degrees of susceptibility to the dangers inherent in the tradition, the voices of scholars like Cone, Meyer, Schmalfeldt, Berry, and Dunsby (to cite a few) talk from the inside, as it were, and help shape the course of the tradition itself. Lying outside this tradition are documents such as performers' writings, to which I referred earlier. They may still tread, or even focus, on the same topic of analysis in performance, but they are written with very different purposes in mind.

It seems fitting, for the purpose of a literature review, to focus on the studies in the formalized tradition. Practicality apart, this is also a way of acknowledging what has so far made up the 'main texts' for this topic of investigation. Whether these texts are adequate in themselves as a basis for future developments remains to be seen.

Wallace Berry's book *Musical Structure and Performance* provides a good starting off point for discussion not only because it is one of the few full-length studies devoted to the topic of analysis and performance so far, but also because it provides a focal point for many problematic issues about applying analysis to performance to surface - though not necessarily by bringing them to the fore and tackling them. These issues include: whether every analytical finding has an implication for performance; in the case where it has, how fast - or whether - we can legitimately move from the structural finding to prescribed performance manners; and, more generally, *how* analysis can be applied in performance at all, in terms of, for instance, structural levels, and degrees of spontaneity.

Berry is not, however, concerned about identifying and tackling these issues in his book; instead, the book represents a devoted effort to provide detailed explanations and elaborations based on assumed, simplistic answers to these questions. It is more expository than argumentative; it concerns itself with surface articulations rather than underlying directions. As a result, despite the thoughtful and thorough analyses provided in the book, there is an overriding sense of mismatch between what it purports to be and what it is, and between who it is intended to address and who it actually does. There are also glaring inconsistencies as regards some of the points he puts forward. However, I would argue that the book provides an extreme and powerful instance for the diagnosis of some of the root problems inherent in applying analysis to performance, through the many

things it fails to achieve. In other words, the subtext of the book is more valuable than its text; the way it provokes and draws out individual opinions on the matter as seen in published reviews of the book is one indication for this. In the end, what the book really communicates is perhaps not so much a thoughtlessness or glibness on the part of the writer, but the sense of helplessness and loss to which his commitment to such an argument inevitably leads.

The premise on which Berry bases his book can be stated simply: analysis provides the only rational basis on which any interpretive decisions are to be made. In his own words,

> The intuitive impulse, fed by experience yet too often unverified and adventitious as to the elements of a particular context, may indeed "hit it right"; but the thoughtful interpreter, stirred by intellectual curiosity no less than by untempered feeling, will seek the reassurance of corroborative rationale, in the analytical exploration of putative, alternative conceptions. And the analysis which informs interpretation affords a basis - the only basis - for resolving the hard questions both of general interpretive demeanor and of those elusive refinements of detail which make for performance which is both moving and illuminating.[1]

[1]Wallace Berry, *Musical Structure and Performance* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989), pp.222-223.

From this point of departure, the book 'asks how, in very precise terms and carefully defined circumstances, a structural relation exposed in analysis can be illuminated in the inflections of edifying performance.' It is about 'the systematic, rational examination of music towards demonstrable insights into structure as immanent meaning, and thence to concrete, pragmatic issues of tempo and articulation reflected in the myriad, subtle details of execution (p.ix-x).' From the outset, then, a distinctive, one-way path *from* analysis *to* performance is assumed to be the proper basis on which to launch the whole discussion. 'Structure' is upheld as the valued characteristic attribute of music which has to assume the paramount role in any good performance. Such premises are seldom questioned in the mainstream literature of analysis-performance studies; in fact, they represent the culmination of a whole historical process of what might be called structuralism in performance, already referred to in Chapter 1, that emerged around the time of Schoenberg (I shall return to this in more detail).

Examined in the light of the questions concerning 'applying analysis to performance' outlined above, the book shows itself to be intensely problematic, in that it fails to sustain its own arguments. First of all, Berry makes it crystal clear that in his view, every analytical finding has an implication for performance. This does not mean, however, that we must *do* something in the performance for every analytical finding, for analysis can tell us *not* to do anything:

> Every analytical finding has an implication for performance, even when it suggests a relatively neutral execution that projects explicit, self-evident factors of structure. Far more commonly, analysis suggests to the performer specific, practical measures that will illuminate the less obvious relations of discerned elements cofunctioning to expressive ends (p.44).

In fact, this idea of 'neutral execution' as a result of analysis is one of the important threads which runs throughout the book. It is first stated in the Preface: 'In fact, the determination that an impartial realization is warranted is no less founded in analysis than a decision to *do* something beyond playing the notes clearly and accurately (p.x).' Later, its significance is made more obvious: '...there are nonetheless infinite possibilities of misrepresenting, and of interpretive intrusion; analysis must often tell the performer what should not be done (p.10).' On the penultimate page of the book, this is spelt out even more clearly:

> It bears reemphasizing that analysis can often tell the performer not to intervene overtly in the interest of one thing only to obscure another, latent value; not to magnify in representation the self-evident and thoroughly established; not to impair expression of the character of a piece...by any violation of its discerned atmosphere;

not to overstate what is assessed as subsidiary in some chosen perspective, at the risk of confusing by distraction and dilution what has been found to be of the immediate or overreaching essence (p.222).

While the idea of 'exercising care to avoid obscuring and distorting important, integral elements (p.217)' seems fair and fruitful enough, especially in the light of simplistic notions such as 'bringing out all important, structural tones by playing them louder', it is actually perverted to become something else throughout the book: instead of positively suppressing natural, but undue, tendencies to emphasize and project certain relations in order to make or clarify a structural point, the idea of 'neutral execution' is expounded almost as a way out of the problem in the face of perplexing alternatives. It is worth noting that each time this idea is stated, it is presented in the context of the undeniable multiplicity of ways of realizing a certain structural element. On one occasion, Berry actually says, 'multiple meaning of an event may suggest that the execution be as neutral as possible and that the notes be allowed to speak for themselves (p.10).' Because there is no inherently correct criterion for favouring one way of realization over another, he seems to be saying, the best thing to do sometimes is not to do anything. Elsewhere, Berry writes, 'the means of proceeding from conceptualization to realization in performance are those of doing and those of not

doing (p.217).' 'Not doing', then, belongs to another category; it is not one of the means of making a point, of 'doing', as it were.

While there is a certain opaqueness as to what Berry really sees as the significance and implications of 'neutral execution', it is quite clear that *in effect*, this 'non-intervention' alternative has been used as a licence for presenting rigorous, exhaustive analyses of the pieces in question without touching on the supposed 'performance implications' for 'analytical findings' at every turn. At least, this is how it comes across to the reviewers of the book. The disproportion between matters of analysis and matters of performance seems so conspicuous that it strikes several of them: Larson and Folio, for example, comment that 'the reader is exposed to numerous analytic observations that do not lead to significant or interesting interpretive interventions. In fact, after many exhaustive (and exhausting) analyses, Berry often concludes that the best interpretive decision is not to intervene.'[2] The case of the discussion of Berg's four Clarinet pieces is cited as an example. John Rink, similarly, remarks on the 'irony' that there is 'disproportionate amount of analytical detail relative to concrete advice on performance'.[3] To him, analytical observations not pertinent to performance are simply 'irrelevant' and should not have been included in the book. Eric Clarke, on

[2]Steve Larson and Cynthia Folio, review of Wallace Berry, *Musical Structure and Performance* in *Journal of Music Theory* 35 (1991) pp.298-309, 302.

[3]John Rink, review of Wallace Berry, *Musical Structure and Performance* in *Music Analysis* 9:3 (1990), pp.319-339, 334.

the other hand, suggests gently that 'Berry could, perhaps, have trodden a little more lightly in his analysis of those passages where he ends up with no definite recommendations for performance beyond those in the score.' To him, Berry's point about neutral execution cannot be used as an excuse: 'At the end of a number of lengthy passages of analysis we get statements to the effect that the performer need do nothing in particular to articulate the music's structure. It is right, of course, that a performer may in some circumstances need to do little more than is explicitly indicated in the score, but it is something of a let-down for the reader to be told this after several pages of often detailed analysis.'[4]

Can the situation be helped? Does every analytical finding have performance implications? To some, the answer to the latter is unequivocably no. John Rink, for example, thinks that such a proposition is blatantly 'objectionable', and attempts to qualify Berry's statement to make it less so. David Beach, in an article entitled 'The First Movement of Mozart's Piano Sonata in A minor, K.310: Some Thoughts on Structure and Performance', honestly faces up to the fact that 'not all of what has been said can be related directly to performance'.[5] In fact, he is exceptionally candid about this from the outset: 'I do not claim that everything I will have to say can or even should be related to performance; some of my

[4]Eric Clarke, review of Wallace Berry, *Musical Structure and Performance* in *Music and Letters* 72 (1991) pp.86-88, 88.

[5]David Beach, 'The First Movement of Mozart's Piano Sonata in A minor, K.310: Some Thoughts on Structure and Performance', *Journal of Musicological Research* 7 (1987) pp.157-186, 177.

comments may simply be observations about certain features of this piece that I find particularly interesting.'[6] If this is so, then one cannot but wonder what the point really is in writing an article on 'structure and performance'. Not surprisingly, the article is in effect not unlike a miniature version of Berry's book, characterized by insightful and exhaustive analyses with minimal, generalized performance suggestions thrown in, almost apologetically, at places.

It is clear, from what the reviewers of Berry's book have said, that what the reader expects - or, more appropriately, is led to expect - is a book not ultimately about analysis but about performance, about assimilating procedures or results of structural analysis into actual playing in order to make better performances. It is expected to be accessible, relevant and practicable for performers - a text, perhaps, to supplement or substitute for the somewhat notorious literature of 'performance guides' (an amalgam of well-known performers' writings, books by instrumental teachers with a distinct pedagogical purpose, and, to a lesser extent, historical theoretical treatises about performance at a given time). It is also expected to address real *performance* issues that performers commonly confront. However, in these, it decidedly fails. The disproportion between analytical details and material pertinent to performance of the pieces outlined earlier is one conspicuous manifestation of this failure, while the convoluted and sometimes unnecessarily technical language, which all reviewers comment upon, is another. Joel Lester, yet

[6] *Ibid.*, p.158.

another reviewer, concludes, for example, that 'this book is not an adequate substitute for a general orientation of theoretical discourse towards the issues that performers confront on a regular basis in a manner that performers will find useful.'[7]

What is significant, and most ironic, is that initially, Berry himself seems to envisage a book which is just like that. In fact, this is why such expectations are created in the reader. Larson and Folio hit the nail on its head when they comment that the purpose of the book is betrayed by its very organization. They quote from Berry's Preface for its alleged purpose:

> to pose critical questions of performance in selected, particular contexts representing important genera of tonal music, and to ask how the analysis of formal and structural elements can be responsive to such questions, establishing a perspective for rational approaches to resolving them.[8]

Disappointingly, they remark, what Berry's book actually does is precisely the opposite - 'it offers detailed analyses *and then* asks what performance interventions

---

[7]Joel Lester, review of Wallace Berry, *Musical Structure and Performance* in *Music Theory Spectrum* 14:1 (Spring, 1992), pp.75-81, 80.

[8]Berry, p.xii.

are appropriate.'[9] Elsewhere, Berry states explicitly that it is 'interpreters' whom he is addressing.[10] His die-hard conviction that such a book should be practical and specific in its performance suggestions reflects such an intended audience; for example, at the end of the second chapter which prefaces his three 'exhaustive analytical essays', he says, 'In each of the studies, detailed concepts of musical organization are set forth as a basis for *pragmatic inquiry* into the *particulars of decision* in performance.'[11] In fact, in the same chapter, he actually devotes a whole section to explaining the importance of 'specificity', and how he does not think earlier texts such as Cone's are sufficient for performers because they offer only principles of 'gratuitous generality'.[12] In the light of these, the reviewers' comments on the point appear exceedingly ironic: Lester writes that 'the book does not appear to be designed for performers';[13] Clarke contends that 'it is not a practical performance guide', because it 'offers no general principles that can be applied from the specific cases examined to a wider repertory';[14] and Rink, again even more pointedly, remarks that 'lack of *specific* instructions to performers is another weakness... and most of Berry's advice tends towards generality', although

[9]Larson and Folio, p.302. My italics.

[10]Berry, p.8.

[11]*Ibid.*, p.44. My italics.

[12]*Ibid.*, pp.8-9.

[13]Lester, p.80.

[14]Clarke, p.88.

'useful practical suggestions occasionally do crop up'.[15] Why is there such a discrepancy between what Berry intended in the first place and what the book eventually turns out to be?

The answer, I believe, is less than straightforward and points to some of the fundamental problems inherent in applying analysis to performance. In attempting to answer this, we will also begin to engage with the second question of whether and how we can move from analytical observations to prescribed manners of performance.

Berry pronounces that 'every analytical finding has an implication for performance'.[16] Such a pronouncement, it seems to me, arises less out of a genuine, whole-hearted belief in its validity than from the position he has cornered himself into because of his vision of the book. In his view, what performers need is a book written for them by a theorist which is packed with both analytical observations *and* their corresponding interpretive implications, presented one after the other. By pinpointing what the performer actually has to *do* once a certain structural finding is articulated, he is hoping that the book can become some kind of handbook for turning analysis into performance, relevant to and useful for performers through and through. To do this, he has to assume a 'unified focus', to use Dunsby's term,

[15]Rink, pp.335-336.

[16]Berry, p.44.

encompassing both analysis and performance,[17] a complete overlap in the goals and ideals of the two activities, so that he can shift smoothly and easily from one to the other. 'Any piece that embodies systematic procedures,' writes Berry, 'reveals principles of structure (*and hence of realization in performance*) that are analogously evident in other pieces.'[18] Or, more overtly, Berry contends that there are 'intense difficulties' in 'pinpointing specific, plausible connections between the findings of analysis and *consequent outlets* in performance'.[19] The best performance from Berry's perspective, then, seems to me to be one which must first of all be conceived entirely in terms of structural analysis, one in which the performer can answer with confidence and certainty at every turn the question which Berry poses towards the end of the book: 'In the light of structural context, why am I doing what I am doing?'[20]

Berry is not unaware of the problems inherent in this approach. In fact, he seems so utterly conscious of them that he keeps reiterating them throughout the book - without, however, trying to resolve them or putting them into perspective. One gets an impression that these problems can be explained away or dismissed once they are acknowledged and raised, and that they are mere obstacles to be

[17]Jonathan Dunsby, 'Guest Editorial: Performance and Analysis of Music', *Music Analysis* 8:1-2 (1989), pp.5-20, 5.

[18]Berry, p.xi. My italics.

[19]*Ibid.*, p.x. My italics.

[20]*Ibid.*, p.219.

overcome along the way in the one-way path he made out from analysis to performance. They pose no threat to his unquestioned, and apparently unquestionable, ultimate goal.

At least twice Berry explicitly summarizes what he conceives to be the main problem in relating analysis to performance:

> Because there may be diverse reasonable analyses of any piece, and because any structural element may be interpreted in different ways, the path from analysis to performance is one of great complexity (p.10).

And again, later in the chapter:

> The area is indeed enormously complex, given that there are many plausible analyses of any piece and that each may point to any number of reasonable choices of tempo and articulation (p.43).

The problem, then, is that of choice. If you are writing a book premised on the assumption that there is a one-to-one correspondence between analysis and performance - that one can move swiftly and freely from one to the other - then the fact that there is more than one way of viewing and realizing a certain structural

finding poses an obvious, bewildering problem. The reader reasonably expects the setting forth of criteria for delineating priorities for choice, or, at least, an attempt to get round the problem by setting it into perspective. This expectation surfaces in the reviews of the book in the form of their expressed disappointment at the lack of 'general principles' in the book.

Eric Clarke is the most severe and most eloquent among them on this point. The second chapter with its twelve 'examples of interpretive questions' is, in Clarke's view, 'something of a mishmash of questions raised but not resolved', which 'reflects the absence of any underlying general framework or set of principles within which Berry might develop a more coherent picture'.[21] Later he repeats that this 'framework of principles' is 'conspicuously absent', and because of this, it cannot be regarded as a 'practical performance guide' which allows us to apply what comes out of the examination of specific cases to a wider repertory.[22] Larson and Folio focus on the contradiction between Berry's stated purpose to 'establish a perspective for rational approaches to resolving questions of performance' and the lack of 'general principles' which should have 'come to the fore' as a result of this endeavour; 'Berry leaves it up to the reader to draw these general principles from his analyses,' they comment wryly.[23] Later, they satirize this

[21] Clarke, p.87.

[22] *Ibid.*, pp.87,88.

[23] Larson and Folio, p.303.

feature of Berry's book by saying that 'one of Berry's few principles is that every principle has an exception', and point to an instance where this principle itself is qualified too.[24] Rink, on the other hand, comments in passing that 'one of the few broad principles articulated in the book is that of variety...in repetition out of "the need to avoid redundancy"' which, he says, is 'hardly a "broad principle" at all'.[25]

Berry, then, attempts no salient principles as regards the problem of choice - the primary problem as he sees it. Rather, what he does is to keep reiterating the problem:

> The challenge to theorist and performer is to decide which specific conclusions about tempo and articulation may reasonably be drawn from analytical observations about place, process, and function in musical events (p.10).

He then shifts quickly and characteristically to his point about 'neutral execution', about how analysis should at least be able to tell the performer what *not* to do. Later on, in the chapter on the Brahms piece, he comments, again,

[24] *Ibid.*

[25] Rink, pp.333-334.

> Because music's framework of underlying, elaborating components can be viewed and projected in many ways, choices are inescapable. Any thoughtful performance will expose particular elements and lines of structure and subordinate others (pp.65-66).

Here, he goes one step further in citing as an example the conflict between projecting a C-flat which is the 'peak of expressive intensity' and a B-flat which is of superior tonal significance (he is talking about Brahms' Intermezzo in B Flat, Op.76 No.4). However, no conclusion is reached; both appear equally important: 'it is inconceivable that a performer not give attention to the... former', says Berry, while the latter can 'make its intrinsic point only if it is not negated in performance (p.66).'

Apart from reiterating the existence of the problem, another of Berry's strategies is to keep warning the reader of the danger of not attending to the problem itself.

> One is aware too of the hazard of an overloaded consciousness in musical performance, when analysis has pointed to multifarious possibilities out of which a coherent whole, comprising compatible, chosen elements, must be derived and conveyed (p.x).

And, again, towards the end of the book:

> There is also risk in analysis that penetrates deeply and expansively, then stops short of deliberate discrimination, leaving the performer's consciousness burdened with conflicting images (p.218).

Thus analysis needs to be 'distilled' (p.218), and 'any thoughtful performance is an individual portrayal arising out of searching scrutiny *and* justifiable selection' (p.xi). Among the actual consequences of this 'overloaded consciousness' on the performer's part are the impossibility of attaining spontaneity in playing (p.x) and 'the error of projecting contradictory images' (p.136).

One of the keys to overcoming the obstacles on the way and moving smoothly from analytical finding to performance, then, is intelligent choice - although no hint is given as to how to make it. The way that Berry circles round the 'problem', as he presents it, without ever trying to tackle it leads one to speculate upon the degree to which such a problem is resolvable at all, particularly at a general level. By assuming that there are valid, rational ways of prioritizing choices concerning the realization of structural observations, one is, in fact, assuming that there is one best way of performance. This contradicts our intuitive understanding of the nature of performance, and is not a position that Berry would like to take up - hence his inability to carry his argument through any further.

Other writers, significantly, starts from where Berry stops. They contend that the often contradictory choices that face the performer do not represent a *problem*; rather, they are part of the *fact* about performance. Edward Cone voices this view eloquently. In his book *Musical Form and Musical Performance*, he contrasts the multiplicity of relations inherent in a composition with the possibility of projecting only a limited number of them in any given performance. He does so in the context of arguing against the existence of such a thing as an 'ideal interpretation':

> The more complex the poem or the composition, the more relationships its performance must be prepared to explain - and the less likelihood that a single performance can ever do the job... We must therefore decide what is important and make that as clear as possible, even at the expense of other aspects of the work.[26]

Using the two implicit voice-leading relationships in the opening of Chopin's C minor Prelude as an example, Cone then illustrates how two relationships can be equally important but incompatible within one single performance. Thus 'whatever decision one makes, one gains something, but one also loses something.'[27]

---

[26]Edward T. Cone, *Musical Form and Musical Performance* (New York: Norton, 1968), pp.33-34.

[27]*Ibid.*, p.35.

However, he does not seem particularly troubled by the prospect: 'After all, there will be other performances!' writes Cone heartily. He then goes on to point out that it is natural for us to desire different interpretations of the same piece each time we hear it. Hence, to Cone, 'every valid interpretation thus represents, not an approximation of some ideal, but a choice.'[28] Although Cone's view that performance consists of the projection of structural relationships needs putting into perspective, the way he deals with the issue of multiple relationships and choice contrasts significantly with Berry's. Unlike Berry, Cone does not present the issue as a 'problem' as such; rather, he sets it up as a perspective. By saying that each performance *is* a choice, Cone is in effect designating choice as a non-issue; we do not demand an answer, because it is not viewed as a problem.

In a similar vein, Lester, in his review of the Berry book, talks about how performers desire diverse interpretations - but within the context of 'the disparity between theorists' and performers' perspectives'. He extends the issue of diversity beyond structural spheres: 'We may love Toscanini and Bernstein without feeling that our sentiments are self-contradictory', he writes in his humane, down-to-earth way. Performers will also 'often seek to rethink their interpretation of a work precisely at the point that they feel they have gotten it right'. Thus there is a basic discrepancy between the goals and ideals of analysts and performers; as I quoted in the previous chapter in a different context, Lester contends that 'In sum, in

[28] *Ibid.*, p.34.

analysis, we often seek absolutely justifiable answers; in performance, we often relish diverse answers.'[29] Again, whether we agree totally with this dictum or not, Lester is saying that 'diverse conclusions of analysis and practice', which Berry sees as a complex problem, is actually in the nature of performance itself; it is a valuable attribute, rather than a perplexing headache.

Other writers touch on this aspect of diversity and complexity in performance in different contexts, and show different responses to it. Carl Schachter, in an article entitled '20th-century Analysis and Mozart Performance', contends that 18th-century teaching manuals 'enunciate general principles' which, though important and valid, are 'not always applicable to specific situations, for the principles that deal with the articulation of the musical surface may conflict with those that deal with tonal structure'.[30] In his view, 'the only way to approach these complexities is through study of the individual piece', which is what he does in his article. It is an understandable and reasonable approach to take, and, although it does not really solve the problem, it allows one to deal, reasonably adequately and convincingly, with incorporating analytical insights into the discussion of performance of one piece. In fact, there is a fair amount of literature which approaches the analysis-performance issue in just such a way, attempting to show how analysis can be used to aid performance in preparing specific pieces. They

[29]Lester, pp.77-78.

[30]Carl Schachter, '20th-century Analysis and Mozart Performance', *Early Music* 19:4 (1991), pp.620-625, 620.

mostly come from the American college circle, with varying degrees of strength, and mostly with distinct pedagogical purposes. The question of analysis-performance relations in this kind of literature, then, takes on a practical, situational edge, with substantial ideological questions being relegated into the background. Some examples of this would be Steve Larson's article entitled 'On Performance and Analysis: the Contribution of Durational Reduction to the Performance of J.S.Bach's Two-Part Invention in C Major',[31] in which he suggests playing the actual reduction as a practical tool; and Cynthia Folio's article on 'Analysis and Performance of the Flute Sonatas of J.S.Bach: A Sample Lesson Plan'.[32]

Janet Schmalfeldt, in her well-known article 'On the Relation of Analysis to Performance: Beethoven's Bagatelles Op.126, Nos.2 and 5', concludes the main body of her text with an equally well-known, italicized dictum: 'there is no single, one-and-only performance decision that can be dictated by an analytical observation.'[33] Taken out of context, this may seem anti-climactic as a concluding statement, because the truth of it seems obvious. However, it is only in context that Schmalfeldt's point can be properly understood: in the idealized exchanges that she presented between the personae of the Performer and the Analyst, it is *the Analyst* who, through careful working out of some of the performance problems in the fifth

[31] In *In Theory Only* 7:1 (1983), pp.31-45.

[32] In *Journal of Music Theory Pedagogy* 5:2 (1991) pp.133-159.

[33] Janet Schmalfeldt, 'On the Relation of Analysis to Performance: Beethoven's Bagatelles Op.126, Nos.2 and 5', *Journal of Music Theory* 29:1 (1985), pp.1-31, 28.

Bagatelle that the Performer puts forward, comes to a temporary conclusion about how some of the problems can be solved by analysis, but not others. In the case in question, for example, the Analyst can provide the Performer with an unequivocal answer about whether she should regard the cadence at b.32 as a fundamental closure, but she cannot inform the latter what precisely to do in order to convey the analytical observation successfully, simply because there is a variety of equally effective means. As a result, what Schmalfeldt is really saying is that she recognizes the *limitations* of analysis for performance, and that she cannot but leave a vast territory - that primarily concerning *performance* - untrod. This is a very different point from that which Berry is making - that the fact that there is no single realization to any analytical observation constitutes a major *problem* in applying analysis to performance. Berry, sadly, misunderstands Schmalfeldt when he quotes her statement to support his point.

While the case of Berry versus Cone/Lester/Schmalfeldt highlights the limitations of Berry's theoretical orientation, it also reveals an important distinction between the two approaches. Broadly speaking, Berry approaches the analysis-performance issue from an *ideological* point of view, seeing it as a problem to be solved, even at the expense of distorting the nature of performance. The ideas of Cone, Lester and Schmalfeldt, on the other hand, represent a predominantly *practical* approach; they observe and uphold certain facts about performance - for example, the freedom of the performer, the diversity of equally desirable

interpretations, and the often contradictory claims between the analyst and the performer. These facts do not constitute intellectual problems, but create *situations* that need addressing.

For Lester and Schmalfeldt, there is a situation to be remedied - that of the existence of a gulf between the performer and the analyst on a practical level: the performer fails to make sense of and absorb analytical insights while the analyst fails to address the performer except in a didactic manner. (For Cone, the antithesis is more between the synoptic nature of analysis and the temporal, experiential nature of performance.) There is a breakdown in communication, and remedy is to be sought in whatever ways can help to engage the two in constructive dialogue. This is a basic assumption in Schmalfeldt's article and is dramatically manifested in the very format that the article adopts - that of hypothetical exchanges between the personae 'the Performer' and 'the Analyst', each seeking to speak with due awareness of the other's activity. In Lester, suggestions are made as to how recorded performances can be used as valuable resources to inform, enrich and shape analyses; in his view, performances 'play a decisive role' in distinguishing 'different categories of analytic statements'.[34] This has the effect of breaking down the discredited absolutist stance of the analyst, and contributes ultimately towards a healthier, more intimate relationship between the analyst and the performer. 'That

[34]Joel Lester, 'Interactions Between Analysis and Performance' in John Rink (ed.), *The Practice of Performance: Studies in Musical Interpretation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

approach will bring performers into the dialogue not as theorists', says Lester, 'but as performers - not as if they were pupils who had to learn what theorists teach them, but as equals.'[35]

In fact, this desire to see the two parties on friendly terms often surfaces in other writings as attempts to ally the two in such a way that they virtually align with one another: Rink, for example, writes (with qualification) that 'perhaps the *best* analysis of a work is its performance',[36] and Schachter states similarly that 'Every analysis is a kind of conceptualized performance, and every performance embodies an implicit analysis.'[37]

While such statements, and the ideas of Schmalfeldt and Lester in general, refresh us with realism and sound musical sense, I would argue that such practical, amiable lines are more effective in countering the dangerously narrow and unrealistic views about performance implied in the writings of analysts such as Berry than in addressing the root of the problem. For if our primary aim is to balance Cone's oft-hailed dictum that 'an analysis is a direction for performance' with its reverse, which is what Lester is essentially suggesting, then what we achieve will be limited to a re-definition of the aims of analysis as a result of taking

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] Rink, review of Wallace Berry, *Musical Structure and Performance*, p.328.

[37] Schachter, p.620.

performances into account. Lester, in fact, articulates just this: '*The whole focus of analysis* could shift from finding the single structure of a piece to finding strategies for interpretation of pieces.'[38] This does not mean, however, that our understanding of what *performance* is all about will be enhanced, in the sense that we understand more about what analytic elements there are in performance, and what real difficulties the performer is facing when he or she wants consciously to play 'analytically'. Schmalfeldt, professing that her ultimate aim is to establish 'a comprehensive critique of the value and the limitations of analysis for performance',[39] similarly eludes performance matters in their own terms.

Ultimately, then, neither Lester nor Schmalfeldt looks at analysis from the point of view of the performer; instead, they accommodate performance into the terms of analysis - surely not in Berry's didactic, prescriptive way, but nonetheless doing more service to analysis than to performance. This is not surprising because the study of analysis is safely rooted in a time-honoured ideology, that of structuralism, whereas 'the study of performance' with an analytical orientation immediately suggests unfamiliar territories. These may include looking at the structural aspect of performance *as the performer conceives it*, and the interaction of this with other elements of performance which have never been systematically investigated, such as the sociology of performance. In the performer's mind,

[38]Lester, 'Interactions Between Analysis and Performance'. My italics.

[39]Schmalfeldt, p.2.

however, a thorough and honest attempt at investigating the relationship between analysis and performance must at least address these latter concerns; anything other than that would be at best superficial and at worst hopelessly biased. The problem, to put it brusquely, is that the performer and the analyst cannot yet communicate - on an ideological level.

Contemporary thinking on performance and analysis, then, seems to be severely constrained by a derived view of performance which is an outgrowth of analytical principles. This represents a kind of 'structuralism' in performance which, as I mentioned earlier, can be traced back to the ideas of Schenker and the Second Viennese School in the early twentieth century.

Heinrich Schenker's writings on performance represent, on the one hand, a strong case where a view of performance is borne out of a full-fledged analytical ideology, but where this is convincing and unproblematic (as Berry's case is not) because the theorist is expressly not concerned with the pragmatics of performance. On the other hand, however, it is in these writings that the ruling ideological basis for performance, that of structuralism and organicism, finds its roots. This basis - initially an offshoot of an analytical ideology - has been taken out of context and used conveniently as a neutral, value-free starting point of almost all subsequent thoughts concerning analysis-performance relations in various ways. In the long

run, it has become virtually impossible to conceptualize performance except in its terms.

In an article entitled 'Heinrich Schenker as an Interpreter of Beethoven's Piano Sonatas', William Rothstein attempts to outline Schenker's 'philosophy of performance' before he goes into the main body of his text on Schenker's performance annotations.[40] Quoting Schenker's typescript *Entwurf einer 'Lehre vom Vortrag'* ('Sketch of a Theory of Performance'), Rothstein states what he thinks is 'perhaps the most important point' in Schenker's thinking about performance:

> All performance comes from within, not from without... Performance must come from within the work; the work must breathe from its own lungs - from the linear progressions, neighbouring tones, chromatic tones, modulations... About these, naturally, there cannot exist different interpretations.[41]

'And elsewhere in the same work,' adds Rothstein, 'he cries, "No 'interpretation'!"'

[40] William Rothstein, 'Heinrich Schenker as an Interpreter of Beethoven's Piano Sonatas', *19th-Century Music* 8:1 (1984), pp.3-28.

[41] *Ibid.*, p.10.

According to Schenker, a musical 'Masterwork' *is* the organic structure objectively present in its score, and its performance is, to quote Rothstein, 'the means of making audible that which is already objectively there in the work'.[42] Since there exists only one correct view of its structure (that is, his own, in terms of the *Urlinie* and its elaboration), it follows that there is only one correct interpretation of each piece. This has to do with ideology rather than pragmatics, for coupled with this is the idea that while all the evidence for understanding the work is in the score, the composer does not offer the performer a prescription for achieving the required effects. In fact, Schenker seems decidedly against prescribing manners of performance for performers. In an essay entitled 'Let's Do Away with the Phrasing Slur', for example, he writes that 'the masters' manner of notation represents the most complete unity of inner and outer forms, of content and symbols'. The composer's 'legato slur', then, 'designates the connectedness of a succession of tones' and is an integral part of the work's content. At the same time, it 'aims specifically at a legato effect only, without prescribing its manner of performance'.[43] For this reason, it should not be corrupted by the editor's 'phrasing slur', which represents a thoughtless attempt at imposing the editor's *own* ideas of form without regard of the master's intent, bypassing the performer's musical understanding.

---

[42] *Ibid.*

[43] Heinrich Schenker, 'Let's Do Away with the Phrasing Slur' in Sylvan Kalib, *Thirteen Essays from the Three Yearbooks "Das Meisterwerk in der Musik" by Heinrich Schenker: An Annotated Translation*, 3 vols. (Ph.D thesis, Northwestern University, 1973), II, pp.53-83, 55.

Schenker's ideas on analysis and performance, then, are much more sophisticated than those of many contemporary writers on the topic, including Berry. While he insists on an intimate connection between structure and the translation of it into auditory terms in performance, he refuses to concede that identifying structural functions has anything directly to do with how each part should be played. In other words, he upholds the performer's freedom, and restricts himself exclusively to talking about the *implications* of analysis for performance. The closest position to this among contemporary writers would be that of Schmalfeldt, who recognizes that there is a whole territory in performance which analysis will fail to address, despite its obvious inter-relations with other aspects of performance. Berry, on the other hand, complains indignantly that Schenker is not 'specific and practical' enough - but in doing so betrays his misunderstanding of Schenker's ideas.

While Schenker consciously abstains from prescription, he is absolutist in saying what performance should be. According to him, there is no one and only correct way of playing a piece, but there is only one correct position to assume concerning performance - namely, performance must elucidate structure, where 'structure' means the *Urlinie* and its expression. A work can only come alive - as is apparent from the metaphor in the above quotation - when its structure is properly understood, and when this forms the basis of its performance. The emphasis on

'from within' points to a kind of internalism: performance is about - and only about - conceptualizing and dealing with the 'inner workings' of the piece; attention is focussed exclusively on 'the work', the autonomous musical object.

In strikingly similar terms, Furtwängler (who studied with Schenker) writes of 'interpretation':

> So long as a work is regarded... as an unfolding organism, a process of vital, organic development, then...there is for every single work only one approach, only one manner of performance, that is appropriate, inherently 'correct'.[44]

In contrast to the 'sterile worship of the literal text on the one hand and the totally vague, all-or-nothing shibboleth of "creative interpretation" on the other', says Furtwängler, *structural* interpretation provides the one and only desirable answer to performers.

Intimately related to this structuralist and organicist position is 'the Schoenbergian assumption that a thorough conceptual understanding of the musical score is the prerequisite of adequate performance.'[45] According to the violinist

---

[44]Ronald Taylor (ed. and trans.), *Furtwängler on Music: Essays and Addresses* (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1991), p.14.

[45]Dunsby, 'Guest Editorial: Performance and Analysis of Music', p.6.

Kolisch, who was a chief exponent of Schoenbergian performance practice, the study of the score

> has to reach much further than usual structural analysis. It has to penetrate so deeply, that we are finally able to retrace every thought process of the composer. Only such a thorough examination will enable us to read the signs to their full extent and meaning and to define the objective performance elements, especially those referring to phrasing, punctuation and inflection, the speechlike elements.[46]

As Adorno (who studied with Berg) puts it, concisely and aptly,

> The idea of integral composition, of a technique in which each note is thematic, answering to its function in the whole, was taken over by Kolisch into the realm of musical presentation (performance). One becomes able to speak of an "integral interpretation". This integral interpretation sets itself the task, not to somehow reflect the work in mere pleasant sounds and smooth outlines, but to realize its structure completely in its own terms, to produce an X-ray of the work.[47]

[46]Quoted in Joan Allen Smith, *Schoenberg and His Circle: a Viennese Portrait* (New York: Schirmer, 1986), pp.105-106.

[47]Quoted in Smith, pp.107-108.

It is no coincidence that such an ideology of structural elucidation *as* performance, originally a reaction to the notoriously 'subjective', 'messy' playing in the previous century, has been taken up as the sole basis upon which to conceive of performance in subsequent generations. This is in line with the general idealistic and positivist spirit in musical thinking in this century, and provides an instance of trying to make sense of and 'discipline' the attribute of music which, perhaps, most defies objective explanation. Consequently, ideals of clarity, coherence and balance between details and 'the whole' reign high, and much effort has been devoted to discussing how best to achieve a kind of performance which can reflect 'a comprehensive understanding of the score' and project the piece as a coherent whole. This view of performance has become so rooted that it has attained the status of a universal truth, and the main reason why analysis was perceived to have close links with performance in the first place is precisely that it, too, has the same goal of understanding and articulating the structure of a piece - which means, by and large, seeing it as a 'coherent whole'. While there are genuine overlaps between the two activities, the danger is that the overlap will be seen as so complete that performance becomes distorted, to an extent that it is subsumed - and consumed - under the terms of structural analysis.

In more specific terms, one expression of this organicist view of performance would be, for example, the idea that the performer should have a clear

'conception' of the whole piece before playing. Erwin Stein, once a pupil of Schoenberg, writes in his book *Form and Performance* that

> The performer must have a crystal-clear conception of the music he is going to play...He ought to hear distinctly and vividly in his inner ear the exact shape of every passage, the extent of every *crescendo*, the accentuation of every phrase.[48]

This rhymes almost exactly with Kolisch's idea of a 'mental concept', which is a result of detailed study of the score, and, as Smith paraphrases it, 'only when one has reached the point where one feels completely certain of how the piece must go should the realization process commence.'[49]

Paradoxically, this does not lead to restrained playing, but to spontaneity:

> The sum of these operations should lead to such a complete incorporation of the work into our consciousness, to such complete identification with it, that at the actual act of performance all conscious thoughts have sunk to a subconscious level and it becomes

[48]Erwin Stein, *Form and Performance* (London: Faber & Faber, 1962), p.19.

[49]Smith, p.106.

> entirely spontaneous. When we have reached that stage, performance is what it should be, *re-creation*.[50]

As Stein puts it, 'when [the performer] performs, he is nothing but the music'.[51] Performance, in other words, is equated with representation of 'the work' which is understood in structural terms.

Berry, writing some sixty years later, echoes Kolisch's ideas of a 'mental concept' and 'subconscious performance' in very similar terms:

> Searching, genuinely comprehensive analysis leads to a shaping, conditioning concept that is distilled from many kinds of inquiry into all elements of structure,

and,

> A derived, conceptual image motivating interpretation is often the ultimate convergence of initially divergent constructs - once they have been considered, reflected on, reconsidered, weighed against the implications of cofunctioning compositional elements, and

[50] Kolisch, quoted in Smith, p.106.

[51] Stein, p.71.

finally absorbed through conscious study to a level of guiding, postcognitive, seemingly intuitive impulse.[52]

That the conceptual image should be 'derived', 'reasoned' and 'comprehended' instead of freely associative, and that it is one of 'unity' and 'wholeness' are characteristic of positivist and organicist thinking. So, too, is the contrast between 'the purely spontaneous' which is interpreted as unreliable impulse and 'apparent spontaneity' which is seen as an ideal.

Another basic principle underlying present-day thinking on performance is the concern about articulating details in the light of 'the whole'. This, too, results from the historical development outlined earlier and features especially prominently in contemporary writings of Schenkerian scholars. A large part of Charles Burkhart's article 'Schenker's Theory of Levels and Musical Performance', for example, is devoted to discussing 'the role of the background' in performance, and in conclusion, he states that the performer

cannot even recognize the diminutions, much less interpret them, until he knows what is being "diminuted" - has a clear conception of the underlying levels. In other words, only when he is aware of the "main" tones can he perceive the diminutions and perform them in

[52]Berry, p.217.

> the light of the main tones. When he does so, the surface will benefit, but not only the surface, because proportioning the small with respect to the large has a way of projecting an impression of the large as well. In this sense the background also is "performed" - the "long line" conveyed.[53]

To Berry, that 'the details of an interpretation are conditioned by a grasp of broad lines and of whole' is 'a most critical point of relation between analysis and performance',[54] even though 'it may be doubted that genuinely convincing balance between detail and the organic whole is commonly achieved in performance.'[55]

The prevailing ethos, then, is that performance is thought about and discussed in terms of projection of underlying structures so that an impression of 'the whole' can be achieved; that is what it means to 'perform from the middleground'. This emphasis on organic unity can be seen even in the realism of Schmalfeldt and Lester. In the context of pointing out how a false move in performance will necessitate a different 'view' all of a sudden, Schmalfeldt writes:

---

[53]Charles Burkhart, 'Schenker's Theory of Levels and Musical Performance' in David Beach (ed.), *Aspects of Schenkerian Theory* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983), pp.95-112, 112.

[54]Berry, p.65.

[55]*Ibid.*, p.7.

> Whereas the analyst's verbal medium requires a final commitment to a presently held view, the performer's non-verbal "view" must never be taken as final within a live performance. Just one false move - a finger placed too heavily (or too lightly) on the key, an arm motion that misses its target - can force the performer to adjust the fine points of his strategy; suddenly new decisions must be made, and with these, a new "view" may be born.[56]

While the realism is commendable, it is undermined by the fact that performance is made to be seen in the sole light of projection of a 'view' of the piece.

In a similar vein, Lester makes the point that in preparing for a performance, it is often a freely associated image, articulated in pictorial terms, which 'precedes and motivates understanding of the details'. This is truer to life and more productive than the route which Berry suggests, that we 'begin with the technical aspects of musical structure and build towards a vision of the character of the piece'.[57] Lester goes on to cite a personal, real-life example of playing the finale of Brahms' C minor Piano Quartet when he was deeply inspired by the association of it with the essence of the plot of Wagner's *Flying Dutchman* - 'a wandering soul

[56]Schmalfeldt, p.28.

[57]Lester, review of Wallace Berry, *Musical Structure and Performance*, p.78.

without a haven, forever buffeted by fate'. Having described in detail how some of the features of the movement got round that image, he writes,

> Whereas we as theorists often cringe when confronted by such pictorial remarks, and often allow them only when they are preceded by a detailed account of all the features that lead us to a tentative statement of that conclusion, here was a performer who used the image to inform the details in his focused view of the movement.[58]

While the honesty and boldness in incorporating the idea of a 'subjective', metaphorical image in his thinking about what happens in performance are refreshing and soothing, it takes more careful thought to recognize that Lester may not be going towards much depth. Performance, to him, is nonetheless about 'projection' of an 'image', and his concern does not go beyond the relationship of the details to the whole, the 'focused view of the movement'. In other words, it is still steeped in organicist ideology - and language, despite his liberal attitude towards an alternative, metaphoric language on the surface. Dismantled, we fail to see anything other than a well-used, and perhaps outdated, frame.

[58] *Ibid.*, p.79.

A measure of how much our pre-conceptions about performance have been shaped by the ideals of analysis can be provided by the 'simple distinction' drawn by Jonathan Dunsby between 'interpretation' and 'performance':

> A particular analysis may well lead to the conviction that a particular kind of interpretation is essential, but how to convey that interpretation to the listener in performance is a different matter.[59]

The latter depends on 'instruments, acoustics, even factors such as the time of day', and is concerned, on other occasions, with 'the pragmatism of the rehearsal room or the teaching studio'. It demands a 'sociological understanding', which 'is a much less pure kind of knowledge than the analytical understanding of interpretation which has been an ideal of this century'.[60] Analytical positivism, then, is affecting our view of performance in a deep and far-reaching way; it appears to determine for us what matters most about performance.

[59] Dunsby, 'Guest Editorial: Performance and Analysis of Music', p.7.

[60] *Ibid.*

CHAPTER THREE

COMPARISONS OF RECORDINGS OF CHOPIN

Introduction

In an unpublished paper entitled 'Interactions Between Analysis and Performance', Joel Lester revealingly points out that in the 'vast' analysis-and-performance literature, '...something is strikingly absent...namely, performers and their performances.'[1] The survey of the literature in the previous chapter, while exposing the limitations of many approaches towards analysis and performance relations, confirms this observation and suggests that one of the ways forward might be to bring actual performances by professional performers into the discussion. To be sure, this does not immediately safeguard the validity of the approach; this can be readily seen in Eugene Narmour's attempt, exceptional in drawing upon recordings as evidence, to explicate the 'relationship of analytical theory to performance and interpretation'. In it, he discusses 'why from an analytical point of view a given performance may be heard as being either good or bad, and why performing a given passage one way or another makes a significant difference to the listener's

[1]Joel Lester, 'Interactions Between Analysis and Performance' in John Rink (ed.), *The Practice of Performance: Studies in Musical Interpretation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

experience'.[2] As Nicholas Cook points out in his review of the book, the result of this approach is that 'Narmour ends up...prescribing what has to be done, and judging performances on the basis of how far they do what he says they ought to do',[3] thus falling right into the snare of the authoritarian, one-to-one relationship between analysis and performance.

Lester himself proposes a much more thoughtful approach, as I already touched on in Chapter 2. Contrary to most analysts, he proposes that performances should be used to validate analysis: 'For what power can an analytical assertion carry if clearly contradicted by a performance that is widely accepted as valid?' Thus analysts should 'routinely consider performances of the pieces they analyze', focussing on the ways performances can 'reflect analytical positions', in the process of which different types of analytical statements can be distinguished. Various recordings are drawn upon, then, to show how the performers 'express divergent views on the form' of various pieces, *just as* analysts do.[4]

While much more egalitarian, Lester's approach implies that the nature and function of analysis and that of performance can be identified with one another;

---

[2]Eugene Narmour, 'On the Relationship of Analytical Theory to Performance and Interpretation' in Eugene Narmour and Ruth A. Solie (eds.), *Explorations In Music, the Arts, and Ideas: Essays in Honor of Leonard B. Meyer*. (Stuyvesant: Pendragon Press, 1988), pp.317-340, 318.

[3]Nicholas Cook, review of Eugene Narmour and Ruth Solie (eds.), *Explorations in Music, the Arts, and Ideas: Essays in Honor of Leonard B. Meyer* (Stuyvesant: Pendragon Press, 1988) in *Journal of Musicological Research* 12 (Supplement) 1992, pp.156S-164S, 161S.

[4]Lester, 'Interactions Between Analysis and Performance'.

performance is treated as if it were a kind of one-dimensional 'text' serving only structural, in other words analytical, purposes. 'Performances,' says Lester, 'would join scores and other analyses as the objects that analysts regularly study.' The essence of performance as a *musical* activity in sound is lost, in spite of the reference to recordings. This bias, reflecting the general phenomenon in academic writings about music of regarding analysis as a potent topic of study while taking performance for granted, is made apparent in Lester's statement that the 'interaction' he proposes is one that 'stresses the ways in which *analysis* can be enhanced by taking note of performances'.[5]

A fairer kind of interaction, I would suggest, involves at least making the actual performances the focus of attention before we assess the role of analysis in them. Performances, in other words, need to be considered in their own terms rather than in the terms of analysis. What this actually means and how this can be realized is no simple matter, as there is as yet no tradition of doing this. We must, for example, be prepared to ask hard questions such as to what extent is a performance an 'interpretation', and what the role of the performer is in this, so that the notion of performance can be defamiliarized. Without this defamiliarization, the balance will be forever tilted towards the position of the analyst.

[5] *Ibid.*

The following study is an attempt at rendering performance in writing in the form of commentaries on different recordings of two piano pieces. It is based on a kind of close, comparative listening and adopts what might be called an interpretative bias. This assumes that each performance is (and is no more than) an integral interpretation, and that the performer is identical with the interpreter. The focus is, then, the explication of different *approaches to* interpretation on the one hand, the restricted notion of 'structural' interpretation being questioned and re-examined. On the other hand, the discussion is also geared towards assessing the role of structure in performance, and showing what it means to play structurally; except that, from this point of view, structurally-oriented performance emerges as one choice among others, rather than as the assumed norm of all legitimate performance. In this sense, the discussion is situated still within the analysis-and-performance paradigm, as is more or less defined by the theoretical literature outlined in the previous chapter, but it takes up a broader view both of structure and of what one can do with it. My aim in adopting this rather different approach to the problem, then, is to enhance the understanding of *performance*, rather than that of analysis. The extent to which this can be achieved determines whether we are ultimately to take the following discourse literally as a solution to the problem, or to view it ironically as generating its own critique.

Two of Chopin's Op.28 Preludes, the A Major one and the D minor one, are chosen as target pieces for this chapter primarily because of their conciseness,

their representativeness in the pianistic repertoire, and the availability of a variety of recordings of them. The recordings selected for close listening include those of Alicia de Larrocha, Murray Perahia, Sviatoslav Richter (for the A Major Prelude), Alfred Cortot, Artur Rubinstein, Garrick Ohlsson and Geza Anda (for the D minor Prelude). They are selected for their markedly different interpretations and styles of playing, which often entail different possibilities of how structure can relate (or not relate) to them.[6]

[6]The scores of both Preludes can be found in Appendices 1 and 2.

The A Major Prelude

Introduction

Chopin's A Major Prelude (Op.28 No.7) provides a good starting-point for comparative listening because of its fundamental straightforwardness. Analytically, it presents no problem: it has a most regular and clear phrase structure (8+8, each of which can be further divided into 4- and 2-bar phrases), simple, unambiguous harmonic structure (consisting basically of V-Is and closing with a progression based on the circle of fifths), and a single, obvious climactic point (b. 11-12) which can be accounted for by its degree of discord, textural density, registral and melodic extremity, as well as the suddenness of the harmonic shift. Technically, it is simple and its brevity makes it amount to a musical aphorism. This kind of clarity and unambiguity of structure enables one to focus on performance problems *per se*, which reveal themselves in the different treatment of details by the performers, without having them intermingled with a range of distinct analytical assumptions. I shall look at details such as whether the phrases are articulated as beginning-accentuated or end-accentuated, how the climax is prepared and approached, what line in the texture is brought out, and whether the hypermetre beyond the two-bar level is articulated. The limited variety of expressive means which the performers can use in treating these details - primarily dynamics and rhythmic fluctuations - helps to keep what might otherwise be complex and entangled performance

problems within manageable bounds. On the other hand, it will also become apparent that the very straightforwardness of Op.28 No.7 turns it, paradoxically, into a 'problematic' piece, pushing the issue of 'interpretation' to the fore. Three performances of the Prelude from commercial recordings are chosen for comparison: the performances of Alicia de Larrocha, Murray Perahia, and Sviatoslav Richter.

Alicia de Larrocha

Larrocha's rendition of the Prelude represents a kind of 'natural' playing which can almost be said to be clichéd. If Perahia's performance (to be looked at later) involves an 'interpretation' in the strict sense that expressive parameters are exploited as means logically to achieve an end which is generated from within the music, then Larrocha's performance can be argued to be an instance of 'non-interpretation': not that it is a straight playing involving nothing more than playing all the notes, but that the many expressions that she puts in seem to have been 'tagged on' to a rigid skeleton of music from without, regardless of the actual content of the music.

The first four phrases (b. 1-8) are articulated as an arch-like shape with Phrase 2 as its high-tensioned point, gradually dissipating into the echo-like Phrase

4, with *pp* and a huge *ritardando* spreading over the entire phrase. The tension inherent in the shift to the high register in Phrase 2 is thus reinforced, and so is the relaxation in the falling back to the initial register afterwards. Each phrase is shaped by a *diminuendo* and/or a *rubato* towards the end, the *rubato* being largely free and unmeasured, reinforcing the natural tendency of the phrases to be beginning-accentuated. No attempt is made to counter-balance the natural inclination of the music, and it is not surprising that Larrocha brings out the top line in the melody throughout; this is perhaps one inadequacy in this 'natural' performance of this particular piece, for much of the counterpoint in the inner line is obscured. (For example, in terms of voice-leading structure, the B in b. 2 should go to the C# in b. 3; Larrocha's emphasis on the top A masks the continuity.) One wonders, too, whether the massive *ritardando* in Phrase 4 to wind up the 8-bar phrase is necessary or just clichéd, since the parallelism of the two large phrases of which the piece is made up is so blatant.

The slight emphasis on the downbeat of b. 10 sounds tentative and unconvincing in the context, for so far Larrocha has not given us any impression that she does things to the music with a particular reason in mind. One can, however, see this different articulation of the same phrase as a subconscious attempt to bring about a transition from beginning-accentuated phrases to the end-accentuated one in b. 11-12. The two closing phrases after the climax have the conventional ways of winding up a piece put into them: *diminuendo*, *ritardando*

and *rubato* towards the end, and lengthened anticipatory upbeats. In a way, these two phrases represent an extended version of Phrase 4 (b. 7-8) which brings the piece to a half-close. The emphasis of the top line eludes even the obvious inner moving line of B-A-G# in b. 13-14, and results in an effect of the top A in the penultimate bar having come out of nowhere.

Larrocha's performance strikes one as being a performance in which analysis finds no place. In a simple and straightforward piece like this, her playing, equally straightforward in a way, can be justified. However, just as the straightforwardness of this piece is extremely rare, or even unreal, in the repertoire of western art music, Larrocha's 'natural' way of approaching a piece can also be said to be equally 'unrealistic', or even inadequate when applied to most other pieces.

Perahia

Perahia's performance is characterized by a serenity and calmness that is not usually found in the performance of this piece. He uses very little *rubato* throughout, and in general, he puts in expression in bold and clear strokes.

Despite his choice of a rather fast tempo and the steady rhythm, the Prelude does not sound waltz-like in his rendition, for the metre sounds more like 6/4 than 3/4. This feeling of a duple metre makes the two-bar phrases unambiguous and accounts for much of the serenity in this performance. The effect of the inherent hypermetrical syncopation of the sixth phrase (b. 11-12) in which the emphasis is unequivocally shifted to the latter half of the 6/4 bar, however, is made less conspicuous by Perahia, for it is well prepared by the parallelism in dynamics that Perahia puts in in the previous phrase (b. 9-10): both phrases are clearly articulated with a *crescendo*. In fact, the *crescendo* effect in b. 9-10 is so bold as compared to many other performances that one might reasonably conclude that it is conscious and thought-out. This makes the use of the *crescendo* amount to a strategy to accommodate the sudden change in the structure of the phrase from beginning-accentuated to end-accentuated in b. 11-12 that Chopin clearly intended (as can be seen, for example, by the *crescendo* marking that he puts in and the harmonic weight of the chord on the downbeat of b. 12). Without this kind of accommodation, the music would sound unconvincing and incoherent.

If one agrees that the first phrase of the piece, which is parallelled by the fifth one, is naturally beginning-accentuated, then the use of the *crescendo* when it appears again in b. 9-10 would mean that the same notes are articulated differently, for a reason that is contextual, and arguably, structural. In fact it can be argued that Chopin has hinted at the need for a different articulation of this phrase by the slight,

often neglected, change in the notes themselves: the tie of the E to the downbeat and the addition of the G#. This turns what was an expressively important note which started off the piece, initiated a melodic leap of a sixth, and carried a metrical uncertainty into a casual one which is but part of a chord and has clear metrical implications. The effect of this is that both the 'upbeat' quality of the E in b. 8 and the 'downbeat' quality of what follows are weakened; they fall into one's metrical expectations. As a result, it is by no means clear that the phrase should be beginning-accentuated.

The argument that Perahia approaches this piece in terms of strategies designed to put the climax of the piece (b. 11-12) into context coherently can be further strengthened by what he does after the chord on b. 12. Here the case is more ambiguous because the harmonic progression itself has provided coherence (V^7/ii to ii), and no matter how one plays the phrase, it will make sense in itself. However, one can also argue that the irony of the piece is that its climax is at the same time the beginning of its close, at least harmonically. Thus one needs to play in such a way that both of its functions are conveyed. Most performers follow the loud F# chord with heavy *tenuto* with a *pp* at the start of the next phrase. This highlights the climactic moment and dissociates the following phrase from it, suggesting that closure begins in the next phrase. Perahia, however, makes the climactic chord less rhetorical and dramatic by putting only a slight *tenuto* on the chord, and follows it with a sustained *mf* dynamics until the first half of the next

phrase while introducing a swift *diminuendo* in the three chords afterwards. By doing so, he implies an awareness of the harmonic continuity between the two phrases and of the dual function of the climactic chord. In other words, the uncommon way in which he treats that phrase represents an effort to accommodate structural demands into performance.

In view of Perahia's generally restrained use of expressive means, what he does to the penultimate phrase counts for a lot. One result of this is that when he comes to the closing phrase, instead of putting in a massive *ritardando* or extreme dynamics, he returns to the serenity and simplicity with which he began the piece. One can say that in contrast to Richter's performance, for instance, Perahia makes very little of the actual beginning and ending of the piece, thus conveying the sense that this 16-bar piece is but part of the larger piece of the 24 Preludes. By apparently not doing anything to the music, Perahia is actually saying a great deal. All in all, his performance seems to me to embody a distinctive 'interpretation' to a greater extent than many others' do.

Richter

Richter adopts a very slow tempo (=58). This allows room for the unusually large degree of rhythmic fluctuation on all levels that characterizes his performance.

Richter makes much of the beginning and ending of the piece. The first note, E, is almost like an 'introduction' to the piece in itself in view of the time he takes before the striking of the C#. It plays no part in establishing the tempo and metre of the piece; it is rhetorical and non-metrical. The extra length of the note also adds to the sense of suspense and expectation as the initiating note of the piece. The significance Richter gives to the note is in line with the fact that the E is the only single-note upbeat throughout the piece; all the other upbeats in parallel places either outline an interval or belong to part of a chord, as in the case of the fifth phrase when the E reappears.

Richter treats the last phrase of the piece (b.14:3-16) as a closing gesture in itself. Unlike most other performers who start to wind up the piece at or within the penultimate phrase, Richter re-asserts the beginning of the last phrase with a stronger dynamic, a slightly early upbeat attack, and an emphatic tone as well as a faster tempo. Although the tempo and rhythmic fluctuation may only be a way to 'make up for lost time' (as one of the traditional principles underlying *rubato* is that a stretched rhythm is to be balanced by a hurried one), the overall effect of this articulation is to make the last phrase stand out as a closing gesture on its own, not unlike a 'coda' in one sense, even though structurally this phrase is tied up with the rest of the piece in every way. One can say that in a sense, Richter has taken the last phrase out of its context, introducing an element of disruption by means of his

performance in an otherwise unequivocally continuous structure; in other words, he might be said to be playing *against* structure in this phrase.

In fact, one can argue that this kind of decontextualized, 'gestural' playing is characteristic of Richter's rendition. He seems determined to treat each phrase as an individual gesture and to play around with the surface of the music so much that the obvious is rendered ambiguous. An example similar to that of the ending phrase is the *a tempo* articulation of Phrase 5 after the *ritardando* of the previous phrase, the piece's half-close. The E in b. 8 is 'rushed in': one can say, in retrospect, that the *a tempo* seems to have started *at* the beginning of the bar, before the upbeat, although logically this does not make sense for it contradicts the phrase structure of the music. In this way, the blatantly clear structural division between the first two beats and the third beat of b. 8 can be said to be blurred. To put it in another way, Richter challenges the unambiguity of the projection of a sense of finality associated with the use of *ritardando*. Does Richter mean the *rit* seriously and to what extent does he agree that the piece has come to a 'half-close' at that point?

A still better example of Richter rendering the obvious ambiguous has to do with what can almost be regarded as a peculiarity of this performance: the unequivocally delayed attack on the minim-downbeat at the end of nearly every phrase, despite the *diminuendo* into it. The structure of the phrases is made ambiguous: are they beginning-accentuated or end-accentuated? The *diminuendo*

seems to suggest the former, while the delayed attack seems to put emphasis on the downbeat at the end. Richter's point, one can argue, is not to project them as either, but merely to suggest the inherent ambiguity. But if an ambiguity is set up by this particular articulation, then it is not one that is resolved within the piece, for Richter has conformed to it as a pattern, without trying to develop it logically. If he had, for example, played Phrase 5 with a *crescendo* towards the end so that the phrase becomes clearly end-accentuated, then he would have had developed a logical point: the potential for the phrase to be end-accentuated would have been first hinted at and then brought out into light as a preparation for the upcoming end-accentuated climactic phrase. Richter's conformity to the ambiguous pattern throughout leads one to speculate on the idea that this is not a 'performance proper', but a conscious aural representation of a stage in the preparatory process for performance, the stage in which interpretative choices themselves and the need for them are being suggested. In this way, this is not in itself an 'interpretation' of the piece, but an exposition of what 'interpretation' in performance should involve. To the extent that the role of analysis is to clarify interpretative possibilities, one might perhaps describe this recording as an analysis rather than an interpretation.

Conclusion

A number of things become apparent after examining the three performances. One of these is that for this particular piece, the music has spoken for itself to a very large extent, and 'coherence' - and in another way, 'expression' - is so explicitly demonstrated on the surface of the music that the need for the performer to 'bring anything out' is thrown into question. Larrocha's performance sounds clichéd and banal because she over-emphasizes, almost unthinkingly, what is already there in the music. Perahia's economical use of expressive means implies a tacit recognition of the music's own 'eloquence', while Richter's 'deconstructionist' playing represents a gesture of open resistance to that banality which one can so easily slip into. That the Prelude, because of its very obvious phrase and harmonic structures, is almost a text which 'says too much' is beyond doubt; a more or less straight playing involving only playing all the notes would, in this case, still sound coherent and musical - and maybe, ironically, preferable to the 'natural' way of 'expressive' playing. What cannot yet be determined, so far, is the extent to which this is true of other pieces: how much of 'performing' a piece of music is about, literally, playing all the notes accurately and intelligibly? While the unusually blatant and aphoristic qualities of this piece must be acknowledged, it is possible that this apparently obvious - or even simplistic - proposition is truer when applied to most other pieces than is commonly recognized among analysts who are trying to deal with performance issues.

Another 'problem' of this piece, which goes hand-in-hand with its blatant qualities, is its degree of familiarity among pianists, the fact that it is too well-known. While Perahia's 'structural' performance and Richter's 'deconstructionist' playing can be regarded primarily as attempts to play the piece differently from what everybody else does, Larrocha's performance could have easily been turned into a caricature of natural, commonplace playing, an ironic comment on 'non-interpretation'. The brevity and limited variety of expressive means add to the problem: after all, there is not much that one can do, and not much space for one to do it. In other words, this piece forces the issue of 'interpretation': performers will really have to think what 'interpreting' this piece means before they can play it, and it is not surprising that this draws out a variety of ideas about 'interpretation' itself from among them. One is drawn to ask: in the case of a piece which is less over-played and less turned into a 'text', to what extent does 'performance' mean embodying a definite *idea* about interpretation and about the piece, and to what extent is it devoted to solving musical problems from within the piece?

Just as the three performances represent different facets of 'interpretation', 'analysis' is drawn upon in different ways in each one of them. In Perahia's, the kind of contextual analysis seems to lead directly to the shaping of his performance. In Richter's, analysis is drawn upon deliberately to obscure the obvious structural points by playing gesturally - to defamiliarize the text, as it were. In Larrocha's

case, 'analysis' in the ordinary sense finds no place, except when it is taken to refer to the demonstration of a 'competence' - an internalized knowledge of the grammar of music - which makes the *recognition* of the natural tendencies of the music, and hence her 'natural' way of playing, possible. All in all, in terms of Schenkerian analysis, the performances of this piece which we have looked at are very much examples of playing from the foreground rather than the middleground, and are justifiably so because of the nature of this piece.

The D Minor Prelude

Introduction

In going from the A Major Prelude to the D minor one, we are moving from a musical aphorism towards what might be called a 'real' piece. If the A Major Prelude represents, in the entire pianistic repertoire, a rarity and indeed, an oddity, the D minor one is much closer to the norm, with its considerable length and degree of technical difficulty as well as its variety of figurations and wide range of registers and dynamic levels.

Compared with the A Major Prelude, the D minor Prelude consists of more extended organizing principles and 'structure' becomes a more complex, broader concept more akin to the analyst's mind. 'Through-composed' though it is, it can quite clearly be seen as consisting of 'sections': an expository one in which the thematic material is presented and then repeated wholesale in the dominant key, a middle section in which the theme is somewhat fragmented and the harmonic changes become very frequent, merging into a final section where the theme is recapitulated in tonic no sooner than which begins the drawing to the close of the piece. The middle section (approximately b. 37 to b. 50) presents most analytical interest, and is the only one which cannot be adequately explained by traditional harmonic analysis; for this reason a linear-harmonic graph is shown as Example 1

in Appendix 3. In the other two sections of the piece harmonic progressions are the main analytical events which drive the piece forward. In the expository part from the beginning up to b. 37, the harmony moves sideways, on a larger scale, by a series of ascending thirds (see Example 2 in Appendix 3 for a harmonic reduction). From the D minor harmony in the beginning it moves to F major in b. 15, A minor in b. 19, C major in b. 33, and finally E minor in b. 37. Within each of these tonal areas we find more or less the same harmonic progression of N^6-I-V^7-I. The final section of the piece from around b. 51 is an extended progression of I-IV^6-N^6-I-V^7-I(embellished), as is apparent from the left-hand harmonic changes.

Since 'reduction' - whether harmonic or linear-harmonic - is a more pertinent issue in this Prelude than in the A major one, the danger of falling into a specifically analytical mode of discourse in trying to talk about performance is considerably greater. This is not to say, however, that this Prelude lies at the opposite extreme in terms of the amount of analytical interest presented when compared to the last one. In fact, the D minor Prelude falls rather far short of the requirements of being a piece in what one might call 'the analyst's repertoire', by which I mean a selection of pieces almost like a pianist's 'standard repertoire' which are so frequently and widely analyzed that they are beginning to form some sort of a 'canon'. Such pieces are usually highly ambiguous in one way or another. Some examples would be Chopin's A minor Prelude in the set in question (which is almost 'cryptic'), his F Major Prelude in the same set with the unsolved Eb at the

end, and many of Brahms' Intermezzos which are structurally and harmonically intricate. In such a context, the D minor Prelude finds no place; it is scarcely mentioned in the analytical literature. What this amounts to is that this Prelude seems to occupy the mid-territory between structurally over-straightforward pieces such as the A Major Prelude on the one hand, and the overtly ambiguous and complex ones such as the A minor Prelude on the other. This makes this piece a realistic object for these primarily performance-oriented studies, for while the structural aspect will have to come into play, the danger of the bias towards the analyst's position is lessened.

It must be pointed out too that this piece belongs to a set of 24 and so, in a way, cannot be complete in itself. This is especially so in the case of this particular Prelude because it is the last one of the set. The sheer rhetorical weight of the 'coda' (from around b. 53) and indeed, of the entire Prelude, can be explained in the light of this, and one can argue that there is no need for interpretation for this Prelude for the entire piece is merely a closing gesture of the set. While the A Major Prelude pushes the issue of 'interpretation' to the fore, this one seems to brush it aside. It will be shown, however, that the different treatments of details by the performers do constitute very different interpretations, in a very real sense of the word. The commentary that follows contrasts the markedly different renditions by Alfred Cortot and Artur Rubinstein, in the course of which I shall draw on two other performances, those of Garrick Ohlsson and Geza Anda. The discussion will

be organized around several problematic points in the music where different treatments of them will be compared.

Cortot's and Rubinstein's performances contrast with one another in very significant ways. In general terms, Cortot's playing emphasizes the rhetorical element of the piece, and is characterized by a freedom which allows fluctuations in timing and dynamics. Juxtaposed with this, Rubinstein's playing sounds more restrained. But upon more careful consideration, the fact that he does introduce the element of 'freedom' at places - for example in the form of discreet use of *rubato* - actually calls into question the meaning of the whole concept of 'performers' freedom' (versus the constraints of the music). One can argue that true freedom for the performer, like any other kind of freedom, does not exist in an absolute sense. Rather, it is against the background of constraints that freedom acquires its real meaning. In this sense, Cortot's performance is 'free' only in a superficial sense, while Rubinstein's demonstrates a different kind of freedom which is in a sense more real. This has important implications in terms of the meaning of performing from the surface, and the viability of 'performing the middleground'.

The two performers' different treatments of the very first bars are revealing, setting the stage, as it were, for their contrasting renditions. Cortot treats these bars as a characteristic gesture instead of as an accompaniment or an introduction. He

strikes the first low D with a prominent accent, while hearing and playing every note in the first group of the accompaniment figure in the first bar. He then allows the figure to blur into a smear of sound while playing the notes faster, as he moves towards the end of the second bar. Accompanying this is a clear *diminuendo* over the two bars. In retrospect, one can say that a *rubato* is introduced in the first group of the four, except that further qualification or explanation is necessary because the tempo for the piece has not as such been set up within those two bars; in fact he seems to be going faster towards the end of the two bars when compared with the steady pulse which he eventually establishes in the third bar. In other words, some interesting questions concerning *rubato* already arise: in the absence of any harmonic, melodic or textural reasons, such as in this case, can a performer 'take time' against, as it were, a 'timeless background'? Or, put more accurately, while the performer is certainly at liberty to do this, how does it add to, or alter, the traditional meaning of *rubato* which is based on the notion of deviation from a steady pulse?

What Cortot does, then, is to treat the first two bars as one gesture, devoid of rhythmic and tempo implications. This is contrary to how they look on paper, for if the score suggests anything about performance of the beginning bars, it is four identical *rhythmic* groups to be played in *forte* - possibly a reduced *forte* because the rests in the upper stave and the identity of the figure suggest that it is 'accompanimental', and accompaniments are conventionally to be suppressed. In

the light of this, Cortot has virtually overturned all expectations and endowed new meanings on this beginning, which are in line with the general rhetorical quality of his playing. The effect of this rendition of the opening is one of uncertainty and unsettledness, due mainly to the refusal to establish the pulse which could have been one obvious function of these two bars.

In complete contrast to Cortot's, Rubinstein's rendition of the opening emphasizes the rhythmic quality of the material by putting in clear accents to each of the four low Ds which fall on the main beats of the two opening bars, and by maintaining a *forte* all the way through. This risks rigidity and perfunctoriness, and is not what most pianists would choose to do. Rubinstein, however, shows that he has good reasons to do this, judging from what he does in the rest of the piece. When he gets to the third bar where the 'melody' comes in, for example, Rubinstein retains the pulse in the left hand while playing it with a *subito piano*. The right hand can thus be heard as 'melody' in the simplistic sense that it stands out in terms of volume. (In line with the fact that very few pianists respond to the marked *diminuendo* in b.3 literally, Rubinstein re-interprets it as a kind of 'terraced dynamics', bringing the whole bar down from *f* to *mp* without transition.) Rubinstein does not make it sound 'melodic', however; to him this theme is more like a D minor broken chord not of much melodic interest. It is interesting to note that in b.5 and parallel places, Rubinstein chooses to read the Bb in the right hand as A, thus getting rid of one of the two passing notes and making the melodic

contour even less interesting. This contrasts with Cortot who plays the theme much more melodically, making it stand out, as it were, from the harmony as a different texture. In Rubinstein's playing, then, the left hand which generates the basic pulse is the more important factor taking charge of the driving forward of the music, despite the apparent bringing down of the dynamic level. This is the reason why the overtly rhythmic playing of the first two bars can be justified: Rubinstein is making a point there. That the rhythmic left hand is going to lead the music forward is something which will remain true for the rest of the piece in Rubinstein's playing, as I am going to demonstrate.

The significance of Rubinstein's treatment of the first two bars can, perhaps, be best understood in comparison with Garrick Ohlsson's performance. The latter's rendition of the opening is also rhythmical rather than gestural, though in a very different way. Ohlsson seems to be trying hard *not* to do anything in the first two bars, that is to say, to play as smoothly as possible without emphasizing any note or any of the groups. In one sense, this is creditable for it is not at all easy to play this technically awkward accompaniment figure evenly without 'letting any note stick out', even for large hands. On the other hand, this kind of neutral treatment of the opening which allows the music to follow its natural tendency has a detrimental effect on the performance of the whole piece: it almost destroys the piece. Since this beginning is made up of *rhythmic* groupings and since the boundaries of the groups coincide with leaps which require the movement of the

hand, the inevitable result is to create a kind of rocking rhythm which is difficult to regulate and which, when 'let go', threatens to dominate the piece. All other elements of the music such as melody and harmony are in the risk of being overruled, given, especially, the insistent appearance of the rhythmic figure throughout the piece until the very end. In this way, Ohlsson's first two bars are almost like the setting off of the metronome, whose dictates are to be followed in the rest of the piece. The tempo is set, in a way which cannot be more overt, but apart from that, very little else is accomplished in those bars. In effect, this amounts to a straight playing whose mechanical quality is apparent. What registers in one's mind after listening to this particular performance would only be the all-prevailing rocking rhythm.

While this rendition lies at the extreme opposite end to Cortot's, the relationship with Rubinstein's is less obvious and more interesting. While both are rhythmic renditions of the first bars, Rubinstein's is conscious and deliberate while Ohlsson's appears to be unintentional. The former asserts the presence of the performer who 'interprets', while the latter lets the music speak for itself. Looking at the whole piece, the left-hand rhythmic accompaniment becomes literally constraining in Ohlsson's performance, while it seems to provide a kind of 'constraint' which exists, paradoxically, precisely for Rubinstein to break free from. To put it more accurately, Rubinstein has chosen to play the accompaniment figures in such a way that they provide a kind of rhythmic framework, or structure,

upon which he can work. In the case of Ohlsson's playing, on the other hand, one can hardly speak of 'structure' at all. It is a kind of 'surface playing' with occasional *rubato* 'thrown in' at places such as b. 54 and b. 61 which cannot but sound artificial.

The ways in which the performers play the scalic, arpeggiated figurations such as in b. 14 and b. 18 provide another example of different ways of looking at the piece. While these figurations are quite obviously 'ornamental' in the sense that they are pure surface figurations, they constitute an important part of the piece rhetorically and gesturally. Cortot, in line with his interpretation of the rest of the piece, responds to the latter. He grades the *crescendo* (for the rising figures) carefully, reduces the left-hand 'accompaniment' to no more than a deep, low sonority which defines the harmony, and, with the use of the pedal, creates the effect of a pleasant sonority which exists outside the temporal structure of the piece. The sense of rhythm is temporarily suspended; in a way, these figurations are not unlike little *Eingängen*, except that the situation is complicated by the presence of the 'rhythmic' left hand. Cortot gets round it by suppressing the articulation of the left-hand figures to the extent that the second group is almost unheard in places such as b. 18 and b. 32. The technical problem of having to fit too many notes into one bar or one beat is simultaneously solved because rhythm and timing cease to be

a constraint in those bars. The overall effect is one of freedom and spontaneity and rhetoric, which paves the way for his treatment of the middle section.

Rubinstein, on the other hand, chooses a less obvious and more 'straightforward' way of playing it. He clings to the pulse which he has set up all through the first section, and is prepared to sacrifice the clarity and the melodic aspect of those figurations for the continuation of the steady rhythm. They are treated more like fingerwork exercises; the left hand remains prominent and no *crescendo* is associated with the rising figures. In cases such as b. 18 where for technical reasons the performer is forced to 'prolong the bar' a bit simply because there are too many notes, Rubinstein makes up for it by immediately returning to the previous rhythm right at the beginning of the next bar. To me, this is an unusual way of playing, for the more obvious mentality of the performer would be to try and avoid the pedantry implied by this kind of strict adherence to the rhythm. Indeed, Rubinstein's rendition could have been labelled 'pedantic' had it not been for the definite reason that he has in mind for doing this, namely, the setting up of a kind of pulse persistent enough to be able to move from a surface level to a more underlying one in order to act as a background against which *rubato* takes place. In Rubinstein's rendition of the piece, this happens in the middle section of the piece, which is from around b. 37-38 to b.50, where heavy *rubato* is frequently introduced.

Rubinstein's middle section is marked by a prominent, but discreet, use of *rubato*. The *rubato* passages are, however, not only alternated by *a tempo* moments so that one never loses track of the basic pulse, but also introduced rationally, as it were, corresponding to the changes in harmony which are swift and frequent. Cortot's rendition of the section, on the other hand, is not unlike playing it in parentheses, a closed section in which one is not bound by any constraints.

The ways the two performers play the one and a half bars which lead to the re-statement of the melody in the remote key of C minor (b. 37:2-38) show a significant difference. While Cortot invests them with substantial interest and regards the subsequent arrival of the theme in C minor as almost a non-event, Rubinstein treats them as a mere transition and emphasizes the arrival of the C minor. Cortot makes a lot of the G in b. 37 by delaying its entry, putting in the accent, as well as relaxing into the Eb augmented harmony over which the G is sustained. In effect, the G becomes a rhetorical note; it is as if there were a fermata on top and the sense of rhythm is suspended. The emphasis on the Eb augmented broken chord through *rubato*, plus the fact that the harmony is not functional at this point but merely arises out of the descending chromatic bass, further reinforce the performer's intention to bring out the rhetoric of the music. The considerably lesser degree of *rubato* with which the subsequent G seventh chord is played, then, becomes logical. The need to emphasize structural points signalled by harmonic goals is considered quite irrelevant in view of the need to create rhetorical moments

which would not have been present had they been played otherwise. This rhetorical moment is not unlike the opening up of a pair of parentheses, after which the music 'recedes' and becomes more distant and dream-like, characterized by a very flexible and loose tempo, heavy *rubato* and a reflective tone.

Compared with Cortot, Rubinstein does the more obvious things as far as these bars are concerned. He ignores the accent on the G in b. 37, plays the bar and the first half of the next bar strictly in time, and does not introduce a *ritardando* until he comes to the G^7. In fact, the *rubato* continues right into the first half of the next bar, after which he resumes the original tempo to which he has been faithfully adhering. This has the effect of blurring the boundary of the start of a new 'section' coming with the introduction of a new key, but the emphasis on the arrival of the harmonic goal, the 'structural downbeat', is nonetheless clear.

The same principle applies to the rest of the middle section in Rubinstein's playing. *Rubatos* are introduced at the beginning of, for example, b. 41 and 43, where the harmonic changes mark off a structural point. After this, the tempo resumes, making it clear that the *rubatos* are only temporary deviations from a basic rhythmic framework. The way Rubinstein plays b. 46-47, again, contrasts significantly with Cortot. While Rubinstein maintains the *mf* dynamics and the strict tempo throughout b. 46 and does not introduce a *subito piano* and a massive *rubato* until b. 47, Cortot singles out the two bars for 'special effects': there is a

sudden drop in dynamics to a *pianissimo* level at the beginning of b. 46, as well as a massive slowing down in the two bars. The effect is that of a lingering echo, and again the sense of temporal structure dissolves completely. Rubinstein's playing, on the other hand, shows a reasoned response to the abruptness of the harmonic shift in b. 47.

The *rubato* in the bar in Rubinstein's playing, in retrospect, actually initiates a process of 'going back to normal', for after that the throbbing rhythm resumes over the next few bars while the harmony repeats itself until its meaning changes. This is achieved not so much by means of an *accelerando* but rather by means of a return to the all-prevailing rhythm straightaway. One effect of this is to make b. 47 stand out free and pregnant with meaning in the context of a regular rhythmic structure, which is what one really wants in a structural playing such as this one. This is because in structural terms, b. 47 is in many ways the pivotal point of the piece after which the whole piece turns and begins its winding up process. It prepares for the harmonic and thematic recapitulation at b. 51 which is only to lead to the Neapolitan sixth harmony in b. 54 which in turn starts to close the piece. Thus in many ways, this pivotal bar serves the same function as the one in the A major Prelude where there is a similarly unexpected shift to the F# seventh chord. In both cases the performer needs to design a strategy to accommodate this within the entire structure of the piece.

Another effect of resuming the rhythm straightaway after b. 47 is that the 'rhythmic recapitulation' actually starts earlier than the harmonic and thematic one in b. 51. The two do not coincide in Rubinstein's playing and he goes straight into b. 51 without any *rubato* or *ritardando*. The point of the 'recapitulation' at b. 51 is being made, however, without Rubinstein doing anything rhythmically. Rubinstein chooses to let the return of the theme and the tonic harmony speak for themselves at that point, while doing something beforehand, that is, from b. 48 onwards. This is effective because the throbbing rhythm, after acting as a background against which *rubato* takes place at places such as b. 47, has by now become a kind of 'rhythmic middleground', which exists on a more underlying level and which assumes a structural significance. The resumption of it means the resumption of a deeper structural framework which ties the piece together. The apparent thematic and harmonic 'recapitulation' at b. 51, then, becomes a 'surface' event which does not call for special treatment. This is one way in which 'the middleground' can become a viable concept in real performance. In terms of traditional formal analysis, the formal distinction at b. 51 as 'Recapitulation' is blurred, much in the same way as that at b. 39 as the start of a somewhat 'developmental' section is.

What arises from this is that one can play structurally without being literal about it. Indeed, in order to secure a convincing structural performance - that is, one in which structure is taken into account and is somehow conveyed in the playing but which does not sound forced or unmusical - the performer has not only

to identify the structural points that he wants to make, but, even more importantly, he has also to 'dress them up', to disguise them according to the context so that they do not sound pretentious or contrived. In other words, a structural point need not often be 'brought out' literally; it can be implied, covered up or conveyed in various subtle and intricate ways. One needs to think of strategies to accommodate points about structure into a 'musical' performance. Rubinstein's strategies, for example, involve shifting the points of articulation of structural points away from obvious places, and manipulating rhythm to create a more underlying structure.

Geza Anda's rendition of the middle section of the piece shows very clearly what a 'literally' structural performance means, and how it does not really work. After a more or less straight playing of the opening sections, Anda enters into a new 'section' by slowing down slightly at b. 38, cutting off before the theme re-appears in c minor at b. 39, and immediately resuming the strict tempo at that bar. A parallel instance is at b. 51, where the same strategy is used. This time the gap between b. 50 and 51 is even larger, presumably because b. 51 is considered even more of a 'recapitulation' than is b. 39. The *crescendo* in b. 50 does not lead directly to the *forte* in the next bar in Anda's playing, for the idea of a gradual increase in dynamic level towards a *forte* has to be modified because of the gap he chooses to put in. So the *crescendo* is rather restrained in Anda's playing, and when he comes to b. 51, the effect is more of a *sforzando* rather than a *forte*. B. 50, too, is played with an obvious *ritardando*, and the tempo resumes precisely at the

next bar. Rhythmic and thematic recapitulation coincide, and there is the suggestion that a new section is opening up. The effect of all this is to mark off b. 51 as *the* Recapitulation, which sounds blatant and predictable, and which immediately creates problems because it soon becomes apparent that this is no real recapitulation but the beginning of the end of the piece. The way Anda resolves this is to put in similar gaps before the second halves of b. 53 and 54, and *rubatos* over those notes where the harmony suggests the beginning of a traditional cadential formula, as if to counter-balance the suggestion of the beginning of a formal recapitulation in the way he played b. 51. This sounds forced and unnatural, and disrupts the flow of the music towards the 'climax' at b. 55 - even though it may only be a purely rhetorical one. The series of chromatic descending thirds in b. 55-56, consequently, is played rather plainly, more as an elaboration of the German sixth harmony than as a dramatic rhetorical gesture: compared with other performances, Anda makes far less of the *fortissimo*, the extreme registers, and the rhetoric implied in this unusual figuration in the context of this piece. Eventually, and not surprisingly, the all-important V-I in this cadential formula appearing in its most literal form at the second half of b. 64 and the beginning of b. 65 is spelt out through accents on the two chords, separation from the context and separation between them, as well as a big *ritardando*. The formal and harmonic structures, clear as they are, are thus 'brought out' in Anda's rendition, in the most literal sense of the phrase.

Such a performance, therefore, reflects not only a purely sectional view of structure, but also a belief that the main purpose of performance is to elucidate intellectual concepts - textbook definitions of structure in this case - irrespective of both the 'eloquence' of the musical material itself and the subsequent result upon the musicality of the performance. It is superimposing 'structure', and the importance of it, upon 'music' and is ultimately didactic and patronizing. An even more extreme case of this would be to play the middleground notes of a piece louder than the foreground ones, thus 'explaining' and upholding Schenkerian concepts of musical structure. Although this is not something which any of the performers does in these recordings, the gist of this kind of thinking is nonetheless revealed in much of the current literature on performance and analysis.

Conclusion

The D minor Prelude forces one to tackle the important issue of the role of structure in performance head-on, where 'structure' is used as an all-embracing term encompassing phrase structure, rhythmic structure, sectional (formal) structure, or hierarchical structure in the Schenkerian sense. In the broadest sense, these are all issues concerning the 'middleground' - the vast territory between the very foreground which consists of all the notes and the very background which is

what constitutes 'a piece': a beginning, a middle and an end. Most performers do things *to* the foreground which alter the middleground.

Viewed in this way, Ohlsson's and Cortot's performances represent rare cases of performances which are encircled within, respectively, foreground and background territories only. What they do does not have any effect upon the 'middleground', as previously defined. Ohlsson's is close to an all-surface playing which is basically a straight playing dominated by an insistent rocking rhythm which blocks off any sense of structure. It is non-structural and does not suggest a 'middleground' in any way. Cortot's playing, on the other hand, presents a much more interesting case. It can be termed a kind of 'stream-of-consciousness' playing where the sense of structure and time is minimal and is not something which is desired. Rather, the essence of it is to capture the elusive and unstructured nature of one's thoughts and present them in their starkest form. The musical approximation of this would be to play as 'subjectively' as one likes, without recourse to structure for rational justification. It is also to play rhetorically to create moments resembling echoes, pauses (dramatic and literary), reminiscences, and so on, which is precisely what Cortot does, especially in the middle section. (B.39, for example, is played as a reminiscence of the main theme rather than as a 'recapitulating' of it formally.) In the context of the whole piece, this whole middle section is more like a reminiscence of something remote, standing out as a kind of cadenza amidst the two relatively more structured beginning and ending sections. This is how the

performer allows himself to interact only with the loose 'background' of the piece, the basic ingredient which ties the piece together, refusing, as it were, to tread upon the controversial grounds in the middle. The performance is rhetorical, improvisatory and idiosyncratic, astructural in a way, and can be better understood, in my view, in psychological and literary terms rather than specifically musical ones.

Structure, then, does not constitute a problem for either Ohlsson or Cortot, if 'structure' in the sense previously defined has primarily to do with the 'middleground' of the piece. Ohlsson plays unaware of the middleground, perhaps self-deceptively, while Cortot very judiciously chooses to take the licence of playing 'in background terms'. They represent exceptions rather than the norm. Most other performers are faced with performance decisions which inevitably have bearings upon 'middleground matters', that is, structure. They may or may not see the relationship between performance and structure as a problem, and if they do, may or may not handle it in a satisfactory way.

For Anda, structure does not constitute a problem for performance either, despite his recognition of the correlation between the two. His 'structuralist' playing shows not only that he sees an easy transferral from the understanding of one to the other, but also the belief that direct realization in sound of a view of the structure of the piece - in this case, sectional structure - is possible and, what is

more, unequivocally desirable. While the idea that performance is *about* clarification of a piece's structure is not new (after all it can be traced back to Schenker and Schoenberg) or in itself offensive, what is really objectionable is the directness or literalness with which one translates the latter into performable terms and realizes it in performance without much critical thought or consideration about the basic demands of performance. Anda's performance sounds forced, unmusical and pedantic; in a word, it comes across as complacent, because it takes for granted that there is a simple one-to-one correspondence between observations about structure and actual playing.

It will have become apparent, by now, that Rubinstein's performance represents a rare but commendable instance of a careful and critical approach to performing in the consciousness of structure. All in all it is a logical and 'structural' performance, as the comparisons with the other performances have made clear, but it is at the same time musical. If we could identify and pin down what is involved in such a playing, we could, perhaps, make an important step forward towards tackling the whole problem.

Essentially, it involves 'problemization' of the idea of playing structurally. In contrast with all the others, structure does constitute a problem for Rubinstein. This is shown in his playing by the very strokes that he uses to resolve the problem, namely, the 'strategies' that I have been describing throughout the course of the

discussion - strategies such as the creation of a 'rhythmic middleground' to articulate the pivotal point, the blurring of the obvious divisions into sections through establishing a kind of 'counterpoint' between different parameters such as rhythm and melody, and so on. These serve the double function of reconciling conflicting demands between performance and structure as well as suggesting in a powerful way the less than straightforward idea of playing structurally. They problemize the idea, and suggest the rejection of the notion of going *from* structure *to* performance. The performer makes the presence of a structural dimension in the performance felt by, paradoxically, designing strategies to show the suppression of it in its most literal form. This often involves identifying key critical points in the piece where the conflicts between performance and structure most surface. There are not normally many such instances in a piece, and in the D minor Prelude, an important one would be b. 47. Deciding what to do with it involves responding to performance demands as well as designing strategies to play its context in such a way that structure will be suggested. In Rubinstein's performance, this is achieved by reserving the use of *rubato* and *piano* dynamics for b. 47, and creating a rhythmic middleground throughout. What he does *not* do is introduce *rubatos* off-handedly to many of the possible places in the middle section, or emphasize the bar by placing accents on the notes within it, especially the A natural. The blurring of the line of possible structural divisions such as b. 39 and b. 51 fits more readily into the picture.

The suggestion of structure in this performance, then, is through concealment rather than projection, suppression rather than bringing out, camouflaging rather than making explicit. The relationship between structure and performance thus becomes dialectical, starting with the essential incompatibility or antithesis between the two. Creativity, flexibility and agility are drawn upon in the process of articulating this relationship, as the use of the term 'strategy' itself implies.

In Place of a Conclusion

What does this kind of commentary or discourse achieve? How far is the sense of performance conveyed and how far is our understanding of performance enhanced? If performance is quite obviously not yet defamiliarized in a way that would enable us to rethink it in terms that lie outside the structuralist paradigm, how different is this representation of performance from that in the theoretical literature considered previously, and what are some of the pitfalls that such discourse falls into which might point to the deeper issues involved?

I am now writing this Conclusion retrospectively as a critique of my own work written previously, when I first started my research. The further I progressed, the more I realized that it does not fulfil its professed purpose of enhancing our understanding of performance, much as it appears to focus on actual performances. The problem is deeper and more subtle than I first conceived it to be.

To begin with the obvious, we might like to summarize what the commentaries do achieve on the level of their immediate content. Firstly, performance is no longer derived, or exploited to serve analytical ends. It seems to have become the object of investigation, and is approached free of the bias of analytical positions which distort the realities of performance. Anda's structuralist playing, for example, is shown to be undesirable and somewhat unreal. Cortot's

fantastic playing without obvious reference to structure is shown to be a valid approach to performance although it may lie outside the analyst's scope of consideration. Secondly, related to this, the notions of both interpretation and performing in the light of structure seem to have been thoughtfully enlarged. There have been instances of non-interpretation (Larrocha) and sub-interpretation (Richter), and Rubinstein's example explores realistic and inspiring ways of playing structurally. Joseph Kerman, among the few who feel strongly for the performer, writes that

> ...the analyst's position represents a drastic simplification of the problem of interpretation as performers themselves see it. Their role is to bring out the 'content' of the music before them, but for the analysts that content is limited to the music's structure; therefore interpretation comes down to the articulation of musical structure. And the mechanism by which this takes place is usually not considered to be within the sphere of the theorist's speculation.[7]

It seems that my particular attempt at rendering performance in writing starts right from where previous efforts stop.

---

[7]Kerman, *Musicology*, p.198.

However, are such enlargements of the ideas of interpretation and structural playing really leading us towards more adequate understanding of the nature of performance, or can they only go so far? Is 'performance' *really* the object of investigation in the commentaries, or is it something else? These doubts arise because intuitively, we can sense that a sense of *performance* is lacking, even though interesting *interpretations* - and an interesting interpretation of the interpretations - might be conveyed. Easily smothered, these doubts might give rise to ideas that point towards the root of the problem.

A central, motivating hypothesis of my commentary on these recordings is the antithesis between structure (and by extension, analysis) and performance. Just as Lester assumes that analysis and performance can be identical, I assume that they are incompatible, to start with. This makes possible the binary oppositions between Richter and Perahia, and Cortot and Rubinstein, for example. By setting what I call 'gestural', 'rhetorical' playing against more structural playing, I imply that the former more readily suggests 'performance' than the latter does; it appeals more to our innate sense of the sound and fury of music, seemingly setting us free from the constraints not so much of structure as of the literacy and precision that govern our trained understanding and articulation of performance. That is why I remarked that Cortot's performance can be better understood in literary and psychological terms than in strictly 'musical' ones.

A similar kind of distinction can be seen *within* the more structural performances, where the need for the 'reconciliation of conflicting structural and performance demands' is identified as paramount in order for the performance to be successful. Whereas 'structural demands' arise straight out of analytical understanding, it is by no means clear where 'performance demands' originate and what characterizes them. 'Musicality' is the kind of word I have used to describe performance demands. However, this area is deliberately left vague in a sense; what really counts is the *distinction* between 'structure' and 'performance' itself. To an extent, the situation is not unlike that revealed in Schmalfeldt's and Schenker's ideas of performance, where the overlap between structural analysis and performance is vigorously investigated while the 'performer's territory' is recognized and left untrod.

This kind of distinction usefully fits in with what Derrida considers to be a 'historical antagonism between two principles of understanding', 'structure and force'. As Lawrence Kramer explains, by 'structure' Derrida means 'the concept of an organized totality, modelled implicitly on visual/geometric order and characterized by an interdependency of parts', whereas 'force' is 'a deliberately imprecise term, ... temporal and dynamic in character and associated with value, beauty, feeling; it is graspable principally as it disrupts structure and compels

change.'[8] Our intuitive, unmediated understanding of performance belongs to the latter principle and therefore justifiably refuses precise characterization. This, in turn, marks the boundary of rigorous scholarly investigation - or so it seems.

In posing this opposition between the rhetorical and the structural modes of playing, then, I was informed by a desire to challenge the literalism involved in understanding performance in purely structuralist terms. What is less obvious, however, is the fact that this very opposition actually situates the matter safely in the familiar, structuralist frame of reference and in doing so, ironically perpetuates what it sets out to challenge.

One manifestation of this is the self-sameness of the discourse and the neatness of the different categories marked by the different kinds of playing. An obvious example would be the play around the phrase 'structural playing': Cortot's playing is termed 'astructural', Ohlsson's 'non-structural', Anda's 'structuralist' - while Rubinstein's is considered rightfully structural. In this way, 'structure' actually becomes a paradigm, an all-encompassing universe of discourse which prevents any disruptive element from gaining weight and growing to have a life of its own, so to speak. Rather, the differing elements can only be understood in terms of structure. The rhetorical in Cortot's playing, for example, is seen only as 'making a difference' within the existing system; it is not appreciated and evaluated

[8]Lawrence Kramer, *Music as Cultural Practice, 1800-1900* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p.176.

in terms which are specifically designed for itself - hence the undelivered (because undeliverable) promise to look at Cortot's playing in 'literary and psychological terms'. The mentioning of the rhetorical in the discourse, in other words, does not possess the force to inaugurate a different kind of performance discourse. To cite another example, when I upheld Larrocha's and Richter's performances of the A Major Prelude as instances of 'non-interpretation' and 'sub-interpretation', I was, without my knowing, perpetuating the notion of interpretation as having exclusively to do with the realization of structural understanding - which I had meant earnestly to break free from.

Language, then, is not 'tame' but possesses the power to get us to the root of our thinking and finely differentiate between what we profess to be saying and what we actually are saying; it does not reflect, but *determines*, meaning. If we take language for granted and disregard the effect of this kind of structuralist language on meaning, we might end up with a text whose overall 'meaning' is precisely the opposite of what we have intended it to be. This is just what happens in the case of the commentary on the D minor Prelude. The structuralist paradigm outlined earlier shapes and determines the final evaluation of Rubinstein's playing in my text: it appears as the climax to which everything else leads, and his structural playing appears to be highly commended at the expense of the other performances under consideration. This is precisely what I had *not* meant to convey, for my original purpose had been, certainly, to appraise modes of performance other than the

structural. What all this means, then, is that any alternative account of performance must go beyond the level of immediate content to that of language; just as a feminist reading is not simply a reading 'from a woman's point of view', but must question the male-originated construction of this view point, so writing about performance (and 'reading' the written account of it) must involve the same sort of radicalism.

Just as on a local level, structuralist language affects and determines the content of part of my text, so on a more global level, my entire written account defines my 'object of investigation', what I was trying to talk about. At the beginning of the chapter, I proposed to talk about actual performances in sound, as opposed to theoretical notions of performance on paper. Earlier on in this Conclusion, however, I commented that the sense of *performance* is still decisively lacking in my commentaries on the recordings; 'performance' as a unique sound experience is *not* talked about. It seems to me that we can no longer escape from the crux of the matter: it is *how* we write about performance that defines, shapes and delimits our notion of performance; how these commentaries are constructed, that is, constitutes their content. Although intuitively, we all know what we value most about performance and what it means to appreciate 'the reality' of it, the way in which we actually go about talking about it constantly takes over; it dictates the course of our thinking, as if to pin us down to notions of performance which we deem wholly inadequate.

This seems to put us into a deadlock. One might wonder whether an attempt to render performance in writing can ever get one anywhere closer to performance itself. For as long as we think of performance as a 'text' whose meaning needs to be supplied through written criticism (just as a literary text needs to be 'concretized' by its reader), the written account will pass for the actuality of performance; but, at a gut level, we cannot agree with this. Hence the antithesis, it seems, is no longer that between performance and structure by now, but between performance and writing.

CHAPTER FOUR

ON PERFORMERS' WRITINGS

Introduction

Just as performances are absent in theoretical performance-and-analysis literature, as Lester remarks, so the performer is ironically absent from our considerations of performance. In the previous chapter, when I professed to be talking about 'real performances', the performers assume only a kind of nominal existence. The focus was almost exclusively on their respective *interpretations*, while the personalities and personal styles of the performers themselves did not come into play: it was almost as if the different performers were mere labels for different interpretative positions. Because of the reaction against the notorious individualism of early-century pianists, performance is nowadays seldom considered as an outgrowth of the consciousness of performers. The result is a gradual, almost imperceptible, loss of the performer's perspective in musicological literature at large. When Kerman, for example, asserts that 'Reading books by the great artists is not the best way to gain understanding of their artistic secrets',[1] and that 'one turns to their recordings to grasp how the resolutions [to the seeming irreconcilables about interpretation in their minds] are actually being made',[2] he is articulating a popular belief that

[1]Kerman, *Musicology*, p.196.

[2]*Ibid.*, p.197.

performers can be best 'understood' through their performances; that, indeed, their actions speak louder than their words. The performer's perspective, then, can be 'represented' by their performances.

This seems to me an over-simplification of the matter because it is based on a number of unrealistic assumptions. First of all, it idealizes performance and reduces it to an interpretative position, whereas in fact, performance is very much tied up with context and contingency. Secondly, it assumes that performers are, to use Dunsby's words, 'pure doers'; they only 'say' things through their performances. Their thinking and perspective behind their performances are not acknowledged and examined. In this way, they are 'silenced'. Thirdly, it assumes that as academic musicians, we are equipped with the means to approach and discuss a performance as it is, in its own terms, without distorting it to fit *our* terms. This is not true; as has been shown in Chapter 3. Involuntarily we turn performances in our written accounts into, for example, interpretations or even analyses; we cannot yet come to terms with the fuzzy aspects of performance such as the personal, the 'expressive', and the rhetorical. We are often at a loss, intellectually, for what 'the reality of performance' means.

Dunsby, among very few others, is clear-sighted and realistic enough to understand the situation well. In many ways, his book on performance is a powerful refutation of Kerman's position that music-making cannot be observed and

commented on both sensitively and realistically. Rather, he is convinced that performers 'think hard'; performances do not just 'happen' and performers do not 'work in some sort of unreflecting trance' to produce 'magical' performances.[3] Hence there is great need and value in discussing what goes on in the minds of performers both during their performance and throughout the period of their preparation. On this pragmatic basis, then, Dunsby attempts to restore the lost perspective of the performer, and in many ways he has been successful.

Dunsby, however, proceeds from the position of the observer and what he does is to put forward 'a workable basis for action' that he deems 'appropriate to the mind of the performer': he asks 'what the musician is probably doing'.[4] He is not, then, primarily interested in hearing what the performers have to say about their own activity or experience; nor is he attempting to address 'performance' - as against 'music-making' - in its own terms: splendid sound made by performers playing in different styles that holds the listener in fascination. This core continues to elude us whenever we try to render thoughts about performance in any way. For Dunsby, this marks the boundary for his verbalization about performance. In the chapter entitled 'The sound of music', where he touches on this 'core' of performance, Dunsby writes,

---

[3]Dunsby, *Performing Music*, Chapter 1.

[4]*Ibid.*

> ...it is not the sound that makes music. It is something *about* the sound...I have to admit that in this sphere the Ecstatics have the upper hand, for it will seem impossible to discuss the sound of music without using some sort of metaphor. If as I first stated 'it is impossible to convey in words', then it can only be represented in them.[5]

Later, he asserts that 'there must always be a sense of frustration at trying to capture things in language of that sort', and quotes Roland Barthes to support his view that 'rather than trying to bend language, to tame it somehow into allowing us to talk about music, let us...ask questions about music that actually can be answered in words.'[6] Dunsby, then, holds that language should reflect our experiences closely and accurately; anything short of this ideal is less than satisfactory.

I would like to propose, contrary to this, that this core of performance is precisely what we should aim at addressing if we want to identify with the performer totally, and that its ineffability does not stop us from doing so, fundamentally because language does not function the way Dunsby thinks it does, as has been shown in the Conclusion of the previous chapter. To put it simply, we are not aiming at 'describing' the ineffable, or 'conveying' it in words. Rather, we

---

[5] *Ibid.*, Chapter 6. Author's italics.

[6] *Ibid.*

are aiming at *constructing stories* to parallel the ineffable, *just as* we already constructed stories - analytical ones, for example - to parallel what we have called 'music'. 'The reality of musical performance' can be *related to* words - but only when we are viewing words critically.

This critical view of language rejects its supposed neutrality and passivity, rejects the idea that it reflects 'what is already there' in the world or in our experiences. Rather, language *constructs* the world and our experiences for us; 'what' we think depends on 'how' we think. Seen in this light, language about music no longer innocently 'conveys' or 'represents' music; rather, it constructs different universes of discourse to parallel the phenomenon which we call 'music'. While academic musicians have constructed various universes of discourse in which to talk about their various activities, performers have yet to create their own universe of signification related to this unique sound experience which we call 'performance'. Until this has been attained - or unless, prior to that, we are willing to acknowledge the constructedness of all discourses about music - musical writers will continue to feel impotent at writing about performance in an intimate *and* accurate way, and performers will continue to be excluded from mainstream academic discourse.

In the light of all this, the endeavour to look at performers' writings takes on a different edge. In what follows, I am approaching performers' writings not to 'hear

what they have to say' in the conventional sense. Rather, I am viewing them more as implicit statements about the status of discourse in music, and in this, they have a lot to say. To reconstruct the performer's perspective, I believe, is not quite so straightforward as simply to look at the content of their writings. If it were so, I would probably join Dunsby in the rhetorical question he poses towards the very end of his book: '*must* we read the memoirs of performers - Artur Rubinstein's, for instance - in order to get to the reality of musical performance?'[7] Rather, it involves *reading* their writings in the sense of criticizing a literary text, with a view to discovering (or uncovering) what might well be a performer's specific discursive universe. This, in turn, demands the dismantling of many of our habits of reading musical discourse (which will be instructive in subsequent inquiries). In this way, hopefully, performers might begin to be empowered.

[7] *Ibid.*, Postscript.

Marginalized as sub-scholarly discourse and traditionally dismissed as 'impressionistic', 'unscholarly' and 'belonging only to the coffee-table',[8] performers' writings exhibit great strengths in their self-consciousness, anxiety, and effort to earn a right of expression, because they challenge our assumptions about words about music in general, and about performance in particular. They display a kind of awkwardness and uncertainty about their own identity and their place in musical literature. This can be seen in the author's or editor's attempts to dress them up as if they were more akin to conventional texts in the area of interpretation than they actually are.

Cortot's book (or rather the book ascribed to Cortot), *Studies in Musical Interpretation*, provides a good illustration for this.[9] A re-enactment of Cortot's lessons by one of his pupils, the book is actually made up of a loose string of Cortot's ideas on a corpus of musical compositions. By affixing the conventionally academic title, putting in a foreword (by Cortot), a preface and a postlude (by the editor), and organizing Cortot's ideas according to musical composition and genre, the editor turns what were unstructured, spontaneous remarks in teaching into a concentrated, coherent 'text'. Their contextual associations are shunned and they become public, fixed, and long-lasting. As such, the book promises logicality, coherence and rapport with the reader as a result of the 'generic contract' on this

[8]Dunsby, *Performing Music*, Chapter 4.

[9]Alfred Cortot, *Studies in Musical Interpretation*, set down by Jeanne Thieffry, trans. Robert Jaques (London: George G. Harrap, 1937).

particular level. At the same time, however, it preserves authenticity and a degree of intimacy by keeping the content of Cortot's teaching in quotation marks all the way through, with odd, occasional sentences from the editor thrown in which are hardly noticeable. While all this can be seen in terms of the tactics of commercial packaging, my point is rather more oblique and sombre: the discourse of performers cannot be happy in and of itself; it is compelled, somehow, to aspire to, or pretend to be, something else. In other words, there is an inbuilt sense of unease and inadequacy in performers' discourse which defies classification of it as a self-sufficient text and which makes it remain 'casual', 'domestic', and, indeed, to some, an anomaly which does not deserve attention.

Schnabel's book *My Life and Music* provides another example of the awkward situation of performers' discourse.[10] The core material exists, so to speak, in quotation marks within quotation marks, and Schnabel is utterly conscious of it. With its title, the book takes on the outward appearance of an autobiography, but a glance at its content easily betrays the fact that it pays only lip-service to the genre: the book consists of two equally-sized parts which are both records of a series of twelve university lectures that Schnabel gave. The first part consists of the actual talks - which are vaguely autobiographical - while the second is a collection of questions and answers at the end of each lecture. There is no apparent connection between the two parts, as the editor frankly admits, twice, while the preserved

[10]Artur Schnabel, *My Life and Music*, foreword by Sir Robert Mayer, introduction by Edward Crankshaw (Gerrards Cross: Colin Smythe, 1970).

question-answer format for the latter part allows for the loosest possible organization. The division of both parts into twelve 'chapters' is, moreover, entirely situational, without structural implications; the talks follow on from one another in the way different sessions in a story-telling situation do. Instead of being formal, tightly organized and distanced, Schnabel's talks are personal, conversational and distinctly story-like. They exist only within quotation marks as 'university lectures'.

Both the editor and Schnabel himself are utterly aware of these incongruities and openly acknowledge them. The editor, when introducing Schnabel to the centre of the stage, remarks that the 'autobiographical thread' is only 'fragile';[11] it is used merely to string Schnabel's ideas about many things together. Slightly later he comments on the 'private' nature of Schnabel's talks:

> The talks were not intended for publication. But then, in a sense, nothing Schnabel ever did was for publication: even at his most formal concerts the effect was not of a virtuoso communicating to a vast audience, but, rather, of the public being allowed to watch and overhear the private communing of a profoundly engaged musician.[12]

---

[11] *Ibid.*, p.ix.

[12] *Ibid.*

Indeed, the impression that we get as readers of the book is that we are being allowed to overhear 'the private communing' of one profoundly engaged in the verbal medium, despite its claim to be otherwise. In fact, Schnabel felt so uncomfortable about his having to talk as a lecturer that he had to take up much space for 'introductory remarks' before he actually began to talk in his first lecture. He was openly apologetic:

> Not only is my English imperfect, but I am, actually, not entitled to do what I am going to do here because I am 'only a musician'.[13]

This was amplified, later, in a revealing passage:

> You expected me, I know, to speak of music. But quite apart from the insurmountable difficulty - as I see it - of presenting, or indicating, with a medium other than tones the essence, interior life, origin, spontaneity, or function of music, I have no training, no experience, and no ambition to do that. Anybody who communicates knowledge at the University of Chicago must, of course, be an expert - at least in the technique of communicating through words and figures. To acquire such a technique takes time. "Direct" music demands all my time.[14]

---

[13] *Ibid.*, p.3

[14] *Ibid.*, p.4.

Quite apart from considerations of the fairness of such verdicts, the inclusion of remarks such as these points powerfully to the force of literary and verbal conventions, and introduces yet another pair of quotation marks which appears to 'frame' the main narrative. Indeed, this framing device becomes most apparent when Schnabel finally gets to the point where he says:

> I announced that I would give you an account of my career. What I have said so far is clearly not a part of it, but rather a confession of faith. It is time to begin the narrative.[15]

It does not take a reader with wild imagination to project that in what is forthcoming, Schnabel will keep 'spilling over' that frame, only to reinforce the impression of one so 'profoundly engaged' in a kind of 'private communing' as to defy all beliefs that language can be tamed. Indeed, Schnabel tells of stories about times and places and 'ways of life' which go well beyond 'an account of his career'. Despite ongoing struggles, as it were, it is the 'voice-Schnabel' (in the Abbate sense), rather than the 'plot-Schnabel', who leaves his readers with the biggest imprint: the former disruptive, tentative and intimate, and the latter logical, sure and public.[16]

---

[15] *Ibid.*, p.6.

[16] I am borrowing this idiosyncratic construction from Richard Taruskin who, in a review of Abbate's well-known book (Taruskin, Review of Carolyn Abbate, *Unsung Voices: Opera and Musical Narrative in the Nineteenth Century* in *Cambridge Opera Journal* 4:2 [July 1992], pp.187-197),

The focus of the case is sharpened when Schnabel's own writings are seen in contrast with what might be called their supplementary text (even in the more severe deconstructionist sense!), Konrad Wolff's well-known book on *Schnabel's Interpretation of Piano Music*, formerly entitled *The Teaching of Artur Schnabel.*[17] In it, Wolff attempts to outline Schnabel's principles of playing in a very systematic manner, quoting Schnabel directly only now and again. Unlike Schnabel's own books, it has a clear structure; as stated in the Preface, it deals chapter by chapter with problems such as the articulation of phrases and characterization of compositions, with introductory and concluding remarks in the framing chapters. Since the book was 'originally prepared while its author was studying with Schnabel, and supervised by the master himself', it has a kind of alleged authority attached to it. Contrary to what happens in Cortot's book, however, Wolff's voice is the dominant one in this. Although committed to explicating Schnabel's ideas and rendering them intelligible, Wolff does not make any attempt to capture Schnabel's tone of voice; the narrative is Wolff's rather than Schnabel's.

While many of the ideas presented in the book are interesting, what is pertinent at this point is the way in which the book sets itself up as an 'objective

---

regrets the 'persistent tension' between the 'plot-Abbate' and the 'voice-Abbate', the former being 'an American academic seeking disciplinary turf', and the latter 'the possessor of the finest lyric gift among musical critics now writing' (p.188). It is an adaptation of the phrases rather than a strict reference to them.

[17]Konrad Wolff, *Schnabel's Interpretation of Piano Music* (London: Faber and Faber, 1972, this edition 1979).

text', revealing unerringly the truth about Schnabel's interpretation. In contrast to Schnabel's own writings the point of which is more the 'voice' than the 'plot', Wolff's book expressly concerns itself with principles, rules, systems. As he states in the Preface,

> What he [Schnabel] said and what he demonstrated by playing during his lessons amounts, in other words, to a complete system. Although several respected and competent pianists, in their or their pupils' collected articles, memoirs, etc., have much to say about a number of musical details, there is no up-to-date book surveying the musical territory of the pianist-interpreter in general... The present book, though its conclusions (or at least, some of them) are clearly debatable, certainly comes none too soon to fill this gap.[18]

In an interview with Alfred Brendel on Schnabel's interpretation that is reprinted in Brendel's recent book, Wolff refers to what he tried to explain in his book as 'Schnabel's doctrines': 'rules' such as those to do with loudness within chords, and with what we call 'hypermetre' (Schnabel has a heavy-light-light-heavy scheme as far as four-bar phrases are concerned).[19] This is also how Brendel receives the message of the book. Although he maintains that Schnabel's guidelines must be

---

[18] *Ibid.*, p.12.

[19] Alfred Brendel, *Music Sounded Out* (London: Robson, 1990), pp.225-250.

examined 'with a grain of skepticism' instead of misunderstood as 'dogmatic rules',[20] and that 'Schnabel did not have such a simple mind that he had simple rules',[21] his whole interview with Wolff is nonetheless a gentle refutation of some of Schnabel's rules by putting forward his own version. As such, Brendel is actually reinforcing Wolff's implicit but powerful message that what really matters about Schnabel and his playing are the many solid principles and methods that we can adopt, but not the inherent contradictions and 'debatable conclusions' that both Brendel and Wolff admit in passing, and the implications thereof.

Indeed, this underlying perspective, together with Wolff's generally impersonal tone and his occasional and not always justifiable references to the ideas of theorists such as Schenker, represent a determination to dress the book up as a mainstream text (and textbook). Thus the book stands in quiet antithesis with Schnabel's own writings, which the author does not seem to have shown any awareness of or interest in. While it is true that 'this book does not attempt to represent Schnabel as all-knowing and infallible',[22] it does represent him as a 'cerebral musician', which Edward Crankshaw in his introduction to Schnabel's book decries as a mere 'label'.[23]

---

[20]Brendel, Preface to Wolff, p.6.

[21]Brendel, *Music Sounded Out* p.228.

[22]Brendel, Preface to Wolff, p.6.

[23]See Schnabel, *My Life and Music*, p.xii.

Strikingly, Schnabel himself seems to have taken up the cue from Wolff. He wrote in one context about Wolff's book: '[His book] is a comprehensive elucidation of a complex and subtle problem',[24] emphasizing its analytical and logical features, as well as its 'closedness' and autonomy, and completely disregarding the disparity between this and his own writings. There seems to be a willing submission to the generic force embodied in Wolff's re-presentation at the cost of respect for his own handiwork. Alfred Brendel exhibits the same kind of values in his Preface to the Wolff book:

> We are thankful for Professor Wolff for having put down his teacher's message so clearly and unpretentiously, and, *in contrast to the style of some of Schnabel's own writing*, in a presentation of praiseworthy objectivity.[25]

This ideal of 'objectivity' coincides exactly with what Brendel says in the Preface of his own book:

> [This book is] written by a musical practitioner who has little inclination to be autobiographical. Even in his most personal and specific statements, he hopes to draw attention to problems less

[24]The context is a testimonial to Wolff, reprinted in part on the back cover of Wolff's book.

[25]Wolff, p.6. My italics.

personal and specific than his own, and to relate his observations or musings to a larger context.[26]

The self-consciousness conveyed in such remarks almost betrays their whole meaning; it is almost as if they were echoing the prevalent and approved ideas on writings about music rather than making their own point.

From what we have seen so far, performer's writings are often equivocal, full of qualms, and self-effacing. On the surface, they appear to be willing to subsume under, and aspire to, the identity and status of academic writings on music, but their self-consciousness and their ironic tone of voice constantly reveal, contrarily, a desire to break free from them. Their helplessness at the situation may well be the result of the absence of a discursive universe that deals with, in Schnabel's words, 'the essence, interior life, origin, spontaneity, or function of music'; it may also be that performers are so much regarded as 'pure doers' that they have not yet been given a chance to speak. There is, sadly, a degree of bitterness in Schnabel's comment that he is 'only a musician'.

We can gain more insight into the performers' sensibility and their purposes in talking in a certain way by looking more specifically at their references to

[26]Brendel, *Music Sounded Out*, p.1.

Schenker and to music analysis. Just as generally, performers' writings appear to imitate, yet at the same time remain withdrawn from, academic writings in music, so in a more specific way, performers incorporate Schenker and analysis into their writings with a kind of ambivalence: they acknowledge and react against them at the same time. In contrast to professional analytical discourse where Schenker has attained a kind of mythical status (especially since what William Rothstein has called his 'Americanization'[27]) and where technical sophistication and insitutionalized thought reign supreme, performers mention and approach Schenker and analysis in a much more pragmatic and open-ended way.

At first sight, performers' very occasional references to Schenker in their writings seem inconsequential. Alfred Brendel, for example, refers a number of times to Schenker's edition of the Beethoven sonatas in his 1976 book, and commends it as 'exemplary'.[28] He admits that his readings are convincing, and twice quotes his markings and annotations. He also demonstrates awareness of Schenker's analytical method in passing, parenthetical remarks such as 'if we know that there is an extremely important harmonic progression - if, for instance, we analyze a piece in Schenker's way...',[29] or, in his 1990 book, '("auskomponiert", to use Schenker's term)', when he talks about a basic motif provided with additional

---

[27]See William Rothstein, 'The Americanization of Heinrich Schenker', in Hedi Siegel (ed.), *Schenker Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp.193-203.

[28]Alfred Brendel, *Musical Thoughts and Afterthoughts* (London: Robson, 1976), p.21.

[29]*Ibid.*, p.145.

notes.[30] Oblique remarks such as these are typical, as can be seen also in Wolff's book on Schnabel's interpretation, previously mentioned. His are more blatantly sceptical, or even sarcastic. In a footnote to the discussion of the bass motif in the last eight bars of the Prestissimo of Beethoven's Op.109, for example, Wolff annotates: 'Schenker's careful analysis of this Sonata, strangely enough, does not mention this.'[31] Slightly later, in his discussion of 'melodic connections', Wolff writes: 'Schnabel (without, to my knowledge, quoting Schenker) looked at melodic lines as *Urlinien* in basically the same sense in which Schenker used the term.'[32] That performers should refer to Schenker explicitly in their writings might seem surprising to some; the relegation of such remarks to footnotes and parentheses provides a measure of the sense of alienation and incongruity that the performers feel about Schenker, and the verbal world associated with him. At the same time, however, such references are made *as if* they were to lend body and credibility to their discourse.

Performers, then, incorporate Schenker into their discourse not unequivocably as an authority to appeal to, nor as a phenomenon to explicate, but as a case, among many others, to consider. This case is laid open to all; there are uncertainties, hidden suspicion and a lot of unarticulated nuances, but the fact that

---

[30]Brendel, *Music Sounded Out*, p.145.

[31]Wolff, p.123.

[32]*Ibid.*, p.128.

these exist is visible and undisguised. We do not find in it the same attention and reverence towards the figure and his theories that we nowadays take for granted, or the same degree of sophistication in the understanding of his analytical methods - *but*, if we look for such things, we miss the point. What is communicated, and powerfully so, is the unique sensibility - characterized by, for example, tension and anxiety - which is trying to grapple with the foreign world of Schenker and analysis, and with words. Its very jaggedness is part of its message.

This equivocal relationship with the Schenker-figure is extended, in these writings, to the relationship with music analysis as a whole. Both the Wolff and the Brendel books contain passages where the authors put forward their views of music analysis explicitly. Brendel, for example, when asked whether he thinks music analysis is of any value to the performer as a performer, in an interview recorded in his 1976 book, replies:

> I think every performer should have a sound background as a composer, and know enough about traditional harmony and counterpoint... As for analysis, there are many ways of analysing music, some more helpful to performers than others. But it's interesting to note that composers have rarely spoken at all about musical analysis... One finds, on the other hand, a lot of comment about atmosphere, about character, about poetic ideas... Analysis

should never be taken for the key to the sort of insight which enables a great performance...[33]

In the sequel to this, in 1990, Brendel writes:

I feel that few analytical insights have a direct bearing on performance, and that analysis should be the outcome of an intimate familiarity with the piece rather than an input of established concepts.[34]

This comes in a context where Brendel is actually quoting from the Wolff book, where Schnabel's attitude to 'theoretical analysis' is explained, even more eloquently:

Theoretical analysis as such is no cure-all either, as Schnabel pointed out. 'It does no harm to know,' he would say. He always encouraged students to find out as much as possible about the structure, harmonies, motivic techniques, etc. used in each score, but there is no basis for interpretation in most of this. *Fruitful* analysis is the result of spontaneous reaction to some musical detail which

[33]Brendel, *Musical Thoughts and Afterthoughts*, p.145.

[34]Brendel, *Music Sounded Out*, p.249.

> puzzles the musician so that he investigates what happens here in particular. To *begin* the study of a new work by analysing its form, in school term-paper fashion, is more harmful than helpful.[35]

Slightly later, he contrasts this kind of 'pseudo-scientific analysis' with 'true analysis' which is 'but a clarification and intensification of musical sensitivity, an additional push in the right direction as established by musical instinct'.[36]

Passages such as these prove less revealing than one might perhaps expect them to be. After all, it is commonplace to learn of the performer's view of analysis as academic, rigid and mechanical, of the appeal to instinct rather than the brain, and of the indifferent, it-does-no-harm-to-know attitude which is deep distrust in disguise. What is intriguing, however, is the actual demeanour of their writings, in the light of remarks such as these.

Brendel's writings, for example, are 'analytical' in fact if not in appearance. A closer look at them would reveal that they are not only saturated with suggestive allusions to analysts and other performers, but are also offering 'analyses' of musical passages - though without the usual kind of pose, and not in ordinary analytical prose.

---

[35]Wolff, pp.18-19.

[36]*Ibid.*, p.19.

Brendel is informed about what is going on in the music-theoretical world, even though he is not particularly eager to demonstrate it. In the first essay in his first book, 'Notes on a Complete Recording of Beethoven's Works', for example, there is a section in which he surveys and evaluates the 'large quantity of critical writings' about Beethoven, including editions and analyses. Of the older literature he recommends Czerny, and to round off the section he remarks briefly, 'Of all the analyses, those by Tovey, Schenker and Ratz (Op.106) prove more helpful to me than Riemann or Nagel.'[37] Elsewhere, he alludes to Schoenberg as 'one of the supreme analysts', and refers to what he said in one of his letters about formal analysis.[38] His later book shows even richer allusions to critical writings on various pieces. In discussing the Chopin Preludes in passing, he refers to Anton Rubinstein, Cortot and Lenz for their devising of titles for each piece; for Beethoven's *Diabelli Variations*, he quotes from Schindler, Lenz, William Kinderman, Wolff, Schnabel's recordings, and Jürgen Uhde, among others;[39] in discussing some of the Beethoven sonatas along the way in the essay on Schubert's last Sonatas, Rudolf Réti's analyses are very much in the foreground, providing a supplementary text to, and perhaps motivating, Brendel's text which is no less than motivic analyses of the sonatas in question provided by himself.[40] In his former book he provides a

[37]Brendel, *Musical Thoughts and Afterthoughts*, p.20.

[38]*Ibid.*, p.145.

[39]Brendel, *Music Sounded Out* pp.37-53.

[40]*Ibid.*, pp.72-141.

detailed analysis of the first movement of Beethoven's F minor Sonata, Op.2 No.1, in the light of what he calls 'the technique of foreshortening'(something to which I will return later), while he is explaining the form of Beethoven's sonatas.

It seems that in Brendel, on the one hand, a colourful world made up of a vast number of musical personalities and their critical-analytical methods has been invoked, but each of them only touched lightly upon; Brendel seems to be reluctant to settle into any one kind of 'analysis', or to focus his analytical insights through the use of a well-defined, specialized language. On the other hand, he *analyzes* with passion where he will, using his own peculiar way of analysis, and making it known with ease. Apparently, then, there is once again a kind of ambivalence in the performer's attitude - in this case to 'analysis' - that is in line with the overall sense of unease and unsettledness that seems to characterize performers' writings.

However, this two-fold attitude to analysis is paradoxical only insofar as we are holding on to our particular notion of what analysis is and what analytical discourse should be like. It may well be that in the consciousness of performers, analysis of music becomes meaningful in completely different terms: for example, it might be that to performers, 'analysis' is not a definable 'notion' as it is to us, but a *sensibility* of tampering with the music from without using musical or non-musical means, which manifests itself in just the way we see in Brendel's writings (and which, therefore, encompasses both 'metaphorical' analysis and syntactic

analysis). If such is indeed the case, then it will become irrelevant to ask whether, and how, performers are for or against 'analysis' the way *we* think analysis is, and the apparent paradox outlined above will dissolve. If such is the case, it will mean, too, that the content of what the performers are trying to say about analysis is completely wrapped up in the way it is presented; the what and the how become inseparable. The performers will have effected a radical break in their discourse with academic writings; there is not a common reference point.

Brendel's explicit attempt at constructing a framework to incorporate 'analytical' insights using his method of 'foreshortening' provides us with a concrete case through which we can try and evaluate the validity of a scenario such as this one. It provides a kind of focal point amidst an essentially fluid discourse; its outward resemblance to what we know of as 'analysis' makes it easier for us to keep our bearings.

Brendel says in the Preface to his 1976 book:

> Some of these articles are, at times, rather technical. It is impossible to avoid superficiality without, at certain points, talking about music in specialized terms. Some are only outlines for further investigation; I thus invite colleagues whose time is less limited than my own to

> test and pursue more thoroughly Beethoven's use of the technique of foreshortening which I have sketched in the lecture on 'Form and Psychology in Beethoven's Piano Sonatas'. To me it has explained a number of matters which other methods of analysis have left untouched.[41]

In the light of what is happening in the 20th century analytical scene, it is easy to cast an ironic light on such a passage. I believe, however, that Brendel means it literally, with all sincerity. While it will not appear to *us* that his analyses are 'technical' with 'specialized terms' which 'avoid superficiality', the fact that it appears so to him provides just a necessary measure for the difference in our 'situated perspectives'. A microscopic look at Brendel's 'analysis' of a Beethoven movement will show how he is able to 'theorize' boldly and persuasively; at the same time, it will become clearer whether, and if so how, Brendel is operating within an esssentially different discursive universe from that with which we are familiar.

In an essay entitled 'Form and Psychology in Beethoven's Piano Sonatas' in his earlier book, Brendel compares the sonatas of Beethoven and Schubert, and elaborates on his analogy that the former composes like an architect and the latter a sleepwalker. As a 'technical proof' for the tightness of Classical form epitomized

---

[41] Brendel, *Musical Thoughts and Afterthoughts*, p.9.

in Beethoven, he brings in the technique by which 'Beethoven generally constructs his principal themes', that which he 'would like to call, for want of a better name, the technique of foreshortening'.[42] Without further explanations, he goes straight on to show this by the 'simple example' of the principal theme of Beethoven's Op.2 No.1 in F minor:

Ex.1



Then he comments:

> The succession of harmonies up to the fermata is foreshortened according to the following scheme: two two-bar units, two one-bar units, three half-bar units. Motivic and rhythmic foreshortenings add to the process. This technique dominates not only the thematic construction but, in a much more complex way, the organization of the whole movement.[43]

[42] *Ibid.*, p.42.

[43] *Ibid.*, p.43.

Slightly later, he says that 'it gives Beethoven's music its inexorable forward drive', and 'ventures to say' that 'this is *the* driving force of his sonata forms and a basic principle of his musical thought'. 'Later,' he says, 'I shall say a few words about how this technique works.'[44] This comes towards the end of the essay where a relatively focussed explanation and discussion can be found, and where illustrations apart from those in sonata forms are given. However, we are referred once again to what is to come later: 'As an introduction to the general foreshortening process I shall give a brief analysis of the first movement of Op.2 No.1',[45] which comes as an appendix at the end of the book, and in a format most congenial to us as a piece of 'analysis'.

Once again, it seems that the contradictions and tension inherent in this treatment of the analytical element are difficult to resolve. The discourse both calls for and repudiates an attitude from the reader which takes analysis seriously: it starts off by not setting any analytical pose but ends in a thorough and full-scale 'analysis' of a peculiar kind - in the *appendix* - which demands careful and attentive reading nonetheless. Is the appendix, then, a 'supplement' to the main text in the deconstructionist sense?

---

[44] *Ibid.*

[45] *Ibid.*, p.51.

The actual analysis of the Op.2 No.1 movement itself is likely to cause objection and bafflement, as it seems to upset our sense of priorities in analyzing music. Pedestrian though it might seem, I believe what really makes reading the analytical discourse disturbing is the autocracy inherent in the perspective that the process of foreshortening is all-subsuming and all-governing; there is no room for what normally first catch the attention of conventional analysts, such as voice-leading processes. The apparent blindness or obliviousness towards such matters accounts for the likely charge from analysts that the analysis is faulty. For example, in the analysis of the theme of the movement quoted above, the way Brendel treats the last two bars seems puzzling:

Ex.2



The square brackets, indicating how the theme is foreshortened, seem to contradict our innate sense of phrasing, voice-leading, and in a word, structure. Brendel, however, holds that the harmony is foreshortened, as the harmonic rhythm quickens from one every bar to two in a bar; and the rhythm is foreshortened as 'the rhythmic organization gets tighter when notes on strong beats are followed by syncopations'.[46] A similar case of demonstrating the processes of foreshortening at the expense of conventional analytical priorities occurs in bars 25-29. Whereas we

[46] *Ibid.*, p.51.

would hold that what is happening in the passage, on a foreground level, is an ascent from G through A flat, B flat and C on the tonic harmony to D natural on the subdominant to E flat on the dominant, Brendel not only dissociates bar 26 from 25 and the second half of bar 27 from its first half, but also holds that the D-A flat-D figure is different from what comes before in that every note in it has melodic importance. This is how he puts it, from bar 26:

> The right hand now breaks up into ascending syncopations.
>
> Ex.3
>
> 
>
> From bar 27, where the left hand is further subdivided, the figurated syncopations of the right hand give way to exclamations in which each note has melodic importance; these exclamatory groups are also dynamically emphasized.[47]
>
> Ex.4
>
> 

Thus on both the harmonic and motivic levels, there is foreshortening going on; if we symbolize it by square brackets, the result will be like this:

---

[47] *Ibid.*, p.156.

Ex.5



The tightening process fits in well with the 'exclamatory' nature of the last group. This reading is repeated in the parallel passage in the Development, bars 61-63. Here, Brendel is even more explicit:

> In bars 61/62 the player has to be aware of the rhythmic subdivisions that are required.

Ex.6



> When the pedal point on F in the middle voice is abandoned, each of the quavers is given equal importance.[48]

Brendel, then, drives home relentlessly what he considers to be of utmost importance in the organization of a piece in unashamed disregard of conventional priorities. He does not assume any prior knowledge of 'analysis' in his readers, nor does he seek to engage with professional analysis. Thus he is operating without the

[48] *Ibid.*, p.159.

aid - or the constraint - of generic conventions. As a writer he is trying to construct his own verbal universe, and is trying to engage seriously with words as do other 'writing musicians', academic ones notwithstanding. While one can easily think that Brendel is simply showing his ignorance of the achievements of professional analysis, I would argue that he has a completely different agenda.

It is quite apparent that what Brendel does in his 'analysis' is performance-related: after all, the comment on bars 61-62, quoted above, is directed to 'the player', and for bars 27-28, Beethoven's dynamics are highlighted. Brendel's added symbols for the latter half of bar 62 in Ex.6 make a lot of sense if seen as directions for the performer rather than as an analytical point. 'Foreshortening', being 'a never-ending tightening of the musical argument', is fundamentally a representation of climactic structure in music which has a lot to do with performance. It is valid in a performance context for identifying points of tension. For example, in bars 93-94 where the foreshortening process (melodic and rhythmic) culminates in repeated notes, Brendel comments that 'in spite of the very low dynamic level, the rhythmic intensity of each repeated note commands our attention', while 'Jekyll' quickly 'turns into Hyde' as 'the introduction of a second and third voice in bar 95 changes the hearing pattern' [Ex.7].[49] Thus bars 93-94 are simultaneously the highest point of tension and the beginning of its dissipation, and this observation is directly relevant to performance.

[49] *Ibid.*, pp.160-161.

Ex.7



However, this does not explain why 'foreshortening' means so much to Brendel; after all, the same observation can easily be obtained through traditional formal analysis. It does not explain, either, why this kind of 'analysis' remains a theme in Brendel's thinking while he is convinced that 'analysis should never be taken for the key to the sort of insight that enables a great performance'. While it is neat and convenient to view Brendel's analysis as a kind of 'performer's analysis', distinct from - but analogous to - 'analyst's analysis', the fact that this is not a satisfactory position is clear from the entire demeanour of Brendel's discourse. With what might be called its 'impurity' in content, attitude, language and purpose as seen in the many apparent contradictions and tensions identified so far, it is difficult to conclude that Brendel's analysis lies in the same frame of reference as the analysts'. In other words, although the *content* of Brendel's 'analysis' may look like a species of 'analysis proper', it actually belongs to an entirely different universe of discourse.

It seems to me that Brendel's analysis is more comparable with Rachmaninoff's memorable, but mysterious, 'culminating point' than with the kind

of 'performer's analysis' that exists in analysts' imagination, for instance, in John Rink's.[50] The former is well-documented:

> In every piece [Rachmaninoff] aimed at one culminating moment - what he called "the point". According to his friend Marietta Shaginyan he once raged at himself after a concert: "Didn't you notice that I missed the point? Don't you understand - I let the point slip!"[51]

And according to Shaginyan,

> the musician must always be able to approach [the point] with sure calculation, for if it slips by, the whole structure crumbles, the work goes soft and fuzzy, and cannot convey to the listener what must be conveyed.[52]

---

[50]Rink, in his review of Wallace Berry's book *Musical Structure and Performance* (pp.323-328), describes a kind of 'performer's analysis' that he thinks might be truer to the way performers 'analyze', if they do at all: essentially, it attends to musical 'shape' which is 'dynamic' through 'its sensitivity to momentum, climax and ebb and flow'; it arises out of 'informed intuition' and forms part of the performing process. I consider this a typical formulation of 'performers' analysis' by analysts.

[51]Harold Schonberg, *The Great Pianists* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1964), p.368.

[52]*Ibid.*

Rather than seeing it as evidence for the importance of structure to a 'romantic' pianist, as Dunsby does in the last chapter of his book, it seems to me that the essence of 'the point' lies in its value to Rachmaninoff rather than its explicable content. To Rachmaninoff, it means everything about the piece; it is a way of summarizing the piece in terms of performance. In a similar way, I would suggest that 'foreshortening' is performing the same function to Brendel: it is a useful way to sum up the performance tendencies of the piece, and as such, it has nothing to do with 'analyzing' in its music-theoretical sense. Rather, it constitutes a plausible way of formulating in words what is essentially private and ineffable. In other words, Brendel is trying to construct his own universe of signification, where none existed previously, to parallel the sound experience of performance which means so much to him. Why 'foreshortening' is so important remains known, ultimately, only to himself.

Conclusion

This example of Brendel and foreshortening is suggestive and instructive in many ways. First of all, it illustrates in a concrete manner the fundamentally different relationship between words and meaning which I regard as vital if we are to come to terms with talking about performance. According to my thesis above, the term 'foreshortening' *means* to Brendel in an unconventional way: it does not primarily 'signify' (a system of analysis), nor does it 'represent' (a way of looking at Beethoven's music), but it distinctly *parallels* the ineffable qualities about performance that can only be felt inside Brendel. In other words, words do not pretend to have a direct bearing on the 'objective truth'; they exist as discourse. If, as I explained at the end of Chapter 3, the writer's consciousness always sets in with its particular biases to *become* the object of inquiry whenever we employ language to 'convey' performance, then this alternative, indirect relationship between words and meaning becomes the key to get us out of this impossible situation. Brendel, and Rachmaninoff for this matter, are not trapped by their own words about foreshortening and 'the point' for their inadequacy at mirroring the performance experience, precisely because they consciously withdraw from employing language with such an intention in the first place.

Secondly, following on from that, this example gives us a measure of what it takes to reconstruct the performer's perspective in its own terms. When 'the

technique of foreshortening' - what on the surface seems to signify a specific analytical method - no longer 'signifies' *anything*, then we can no longer ground our understanding of anything the performers say on our usual epistemological patterns, which means we are constantly at the risk of losing our bearings. The other side of the picture, however, reveals that it is precisely verbal interfaces such as this masked 'analytical method' which set up starting points to open up subsequent inquiries. Rachmaninoff's 'point', for example, may not at first sight be recognizable by academic musicians as 'significant' discourse, because arguably, it exists entirely within a foreign universe of discourse without referencing our familiar consciousness in any way. This is instructive, for locating verbal contact points such as that which 'foreshortening' provides may lead to the opening up of more of the performer's discursive territory on which we have feared to tread.

Thirdly, it might be enlightening and reassuring to many of us to have seen that the construction of a universe of intransitive significance relating specifically to the performing experience is not something that is entirely unthinkable; after all, the performers themselves are engaged in it. If coming to terms with performance depends as much on a changed relationship with language as on a new universe of discourse which substitutes for the structuralist one, then what Brendel's example shows is that ultimately, these two merge into one: the alternative universe of discourse is one in which language becomes vital and potent. The 'parallelling' of language with performance that I outlined earlier itself becomes the content of the

replacement, because these words - the discourse surrounding 'foreshortening' in this case - no longer bear directly on other 'objects'. What this implies is that the kind of 'performance discourse' I have been envisaging is to be alternative in its entire demeanour: we are no longer to think of it as a closed universe with words specifically designed to fit 'performance', but as an open, unfixed discursive world that involves points of reference to the heart of the experience which we know as 'performance'. This world is constantly in a state of flux; it is, in other words, a process in itself.

On a more general level, performers' writings as a whole are suggestive of this kind of discursive universe as academic writings never are. With their looseness of structure, elusiveness in 'subject matter', and their consciousness of their own status as discourse, they exemplify 'true discourse' as Hayden White formulates it: a '*mediative* enterprise' that 'moves "to and fro" between received encodations of experience and the clutter of phenomena that refuses incorporation into conventionalized notions', and '"back and forth" between alternative ways of encoding this reality'.[53] They have much power in deconstructing 'a conceptualization of a given area of experience which has become hardened into a hypostasis that blocks fresh perception',[54] which is the condition academic discourse on performance is in.

---

[53]Hayden White, *Tropics of Discourse* p.4.

[54]*Ibid.*, p.3.

CHAPTER FIVE

RUBATO DISCOURSES

Introduction

In this chapter, I attempt to magnify the propositions put forward at the end of Chapter 4. Brendel's example of foreshortening and my interpretation of it, if evocative and instructive, remains embryonic and somewhat 'fictional' to the extent that it sounds off-hand. Performers' writings, too, are scarce as compared to academic musical writings; thus they may not be the best place to turn for more elaborated examples of the construction of performance discourse. More importantly, our concern has been as much to empower the performer as to enable the writer of music to deal with ineffable performance; in fact, they are part and parcel of the same thing. To have the performer regain his or her place in academic musical discourse is to have the academic writer identify totally with the performer's way of seeing and speaking. Ultimately, therefore, it is common ground that I am aiming at restoring - a premise shared by both the performing musician and the writing musician that what they are dealing with is in essence deeply personal, profoundly moving and, unabashedly, indescribable in words. With the almost grudging silence of the performer and the unreflected, unmediated eloquence of the academic, such a basic premise has been on the verge of

disintegrating. Only when the two are equipped and encouraged to *speak* from a common perspective can the premise be laid bare and put into place once again. The next logical step, therefore, would be to explore the possibilities of functioning with this alternative setup *within* academic settings.

This chapter, then, proceeds from the other end. If 'foreshortening' in performers' writings provides a verbal interface with academic musicians in that it is a kind of significance seemingly recognizable to them, then *rubato* - our chosen case in this chapter - is richly written about in the academic literature while recognizable to performers as something profoundly relevant. Our task, then, consists of teasing out the layers of meaning with which the term *rubato* has been endowed in various contexts and exposing their discursive nature, at the same time interpreting them from a specifically performance perspective that is related to the experience of playing *rubato*. This, in turn, becomes a handle for the identification of a different mode of discourse closely related to performance that is already embedded *within* academic writings.

In a press review of a Cherkassky recital in London back in the 70's that was recorded live, the following was said of Cherkassky's performance:

> Cherkassky's Schubert Sonata is far more than a string of gorgeous moments and whimsical puffs of *accelerando*. For all the apparent spontaneity, the variations of touch and timing add up structurally, too, and the Chopin E minor Prelude is an example of rhythmic free-floating based on an instinctive grasp of what Schenkerian analysts would call the middleground.[1]

Setting aside the implications of the very suggestive final statement, the idea of *rubato* seems to occur a number of times in different forms even in these few words. There are the 'whimsical puffs of *accelerando*', 'variations of timing' and 'rhythmic free-floating'. These vague but vivid phrases suggest, on the one hand, the fascination the listener-critic holds towards *rubato*; on the other hand, their imprecision has for decades fuelled scholarly investigation into the exact nature of *rubato* in syntactical terms.

Traditionally, *rubato* is said to be of two basic types. Apel, in the *Harvard Dictionary of Music*, maintains that all the controversies concerning the nature of *rubato* are unnecessary if we recognize that 'there exist two types of *rubato*, one

---

[1]David Fanning, 'At a Grail's Pace', *The Independent*, 25 Jan., 1992. I am grateful to Ronald Lumsden for drawing my attention to this review.

which affects the melody only, and one which affects the whole musical texture'.[2] Rosenblum, in a carefully documented book on performance practices in Classical piano music, distinguishes between a kind of 'contrametric *rubato*' which is an eighteenth-century idea and 'tempo flexibility', which is what the nineteenth century tended to identify *rubato* with.[3] For Rosenblum, the two are 'strongly contrasting concepts of rhythmic flexibility', the former referring to 'a redistribution of rhythmic values in a solo melody against an accompaniment that maintained a steady beat in a constant tempo', the latter to 'a form of flexibility related to the effect of *ritardando* and *accelerando* to a greater or lesser degree.[4] Eigeldinger, in his authoritative and extremely valuable book on Chopin as pianist and teacher, concludes that Chopin's *rubato* took two different forms: one descended from the Italian Baroque tradition, transposed from the vocal to the instrumental field, and comprising an independence of the two hands with a free, right-hand melody against a rhythmically steady accompaniment, the other consisting of 'fleeting changes of pace relative to the basic tempo' which may 'affect a whole section, period or phrase'. This latter thus 'affects the musical structure from top to bottom, not merely the melodic line'.[5]

---

[2]Willi Apel, *Harvard Dictionary of Music*, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951), p.654.

[3]Sandra P. Rosenblum, *Performance Practices in Classic Piano Music: Their Principles and Applications* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988).

[4]*Ibid.*, pp.373, 382.

[5]Jean-Jacques Eigeldinger, *Chopin: Pianist and Teacher*, trans. N. Shohet and R. Howat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p.120.

While Rosenblum views the two forms of *rubato* seemingly neutrally with no value judgement attached to them, Eigeldinger openly states that only the former, what might be called 'polyphonic', meaning of *rubato* is orthodox; it is 'traditional and original'. The latter is *rubato* 'by extension' only. This position is echoed in McEwen who, in a book on *Tempo Rubato* in 1928, similarly holds that 'in recent years there has been a considerable extension of the [classical] principle [that is, the 'polyphonic' principle], which has carried the use of Tempo Rubato far beyond that indicated by the dicta and recorded practice of classical musicians.'[6] In his book on Chopin playing, James Methuen-Campbell characterizes the two meanings of *rubato* as 'precise' and 'loose' respectively, thereby associating the 'polyphonic' type with precision and syntax.[7]

The tradition of the free-melody-versus-steady-accompaniment *rubato* seems to be long and well-documented. As early as 1900, there existed a tradition of defending Chopin from 'misusing' the *rubato* by 'overdoing'. Huneker, an American newspaper critic, referred then to what Mikuli, one of Chopin's pupils, said about how Chopin actually played.[8] There, the 'polyphonic' idea of *rubato* surfaced. This is reiterated throughout the musicological literature about Chopin and about *rubato*. Eigeldinger, for example, quotes from Mikuli and Lenz:

---

[6]John B. McEwen, *Tempo Rubato: or Time-Variation in Musical Performance* (London: Oxford University Press, 1928), p.10.

[7]James Methuen-Campbell, *Chopin Playing: From the Composer to the Present Day* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1981).

[8]James Huneker, *Chopin: The Man and His Music* (New York: Dover, 1966, original edition 1900).

> In keeping time Chopin was inexorable, and some readers will be surprised to learn that the metronome never left his piano. Even in his much maligned tempo rubato, the hand responsible for the accompaniment would keep strict time, while the other hand, singing the melody, would free the essence of the musical thought from all rhythmic fetters...[9]

> What characterized Chopin's playing was his rubato, in which the totality of the rhythm was constantly respected. 'The left hand,' I often heard him say, 'is the choir master: it mustn't relent or bend. It's a clock. Do with the right hand what you want and can.'[10]

This is not, however, where the idea of 'polyphonic' *rubato* originated. Both Huneker and Eigeldinger, among others, trace it back at least to Mozart: in a famous letter to his father, Mozart is said to 'proudly relate' that 'they are all amazed that I play accurately in time. They can't grasp that in tempo rubato in an Adagio the left hand goes on unperturbed; with them the left hand follows suit.'[11]

---

[9]Quoted in Eigeldinger, p.49.

[10]*Ibid.*, p.50.

[11]Quoted in Eigeldinger, p.119 from W.A.Mozart, *Briefe und Aufzeichnungun* II, p.83.

From the start, then, we can see that the supposed 'orthodoxy' of this meaning of *rubato* depends on a number of things. Firstly, in contrast to its other meaning related to the effects of *accelerando* and *ritardando*, this *rubato* is 'documented'. This, supposedly, forms the evidence for establishing the 'real meaning' of the term. Not only is the accuracy of the sources assumed, but their original contexts are not examined. Also, non-written sources are ignored. Secondly, and more important to my present purpose, what seems to make up this *rubato* can be easily turned into a 'definition' in terms of syntax. While in the documents the idea is introduced as in real-life performance contexts, it is decontextualized in the secondary sources to become a *principle of playing*, in the sense of 'this is how *rubato* should be'. It becomes a matter of *grammar*, or 'competence' in Chomsky's well-known term, rather than a matter of 'performance'. The former, in Chomsky's formulation, refers to the grammatical knowledge of a language user that is internalized, while the latter refers to its application in actual situations. It seems that in this way, it is legitimate to talk about 'performance' purely in terms of neat, grammatical rules.

The tendency to interpret 'performance' as an epiphenomenon of 'competence' can be further seen in the use made of the 'polyphonic' *rubato* in musicological literature. It is often invoked as a defence against the supposed 'rhythmic lawlessness' in the playing of some pianists. Documentation of this latter runs directly parallel to the mainstream 'classicizing' of *rubato*: there is the

tradition of decrying the 'Romantics' for abusing rhythmic liberties, and distorting the music to an intolerable extent. This too is well-documented, but the descriptions seem to be characterized by generality and passion, in contrast to the 'objectiveness' and precision in the descriptions of the 'polyphonic' *rubato*.

Eigeldinger articulates this well. To him, this 'malpractice' of *rubato* constitutes a 'tradition' of its own: the 'generations of pianists subsequent to Chopin's' were 'victims of a pseudo-tradition' who 'submitted his music to agogic distortions in the name of the vague and convenient term "rubato"', and it was not until 1930-40 that 'this type of pseudo-rubato disappeared from most playing'.[12] Rom Landau, in a biography of Paderewski, cites Bernard Shaw's comments in 1890 on Paderewski's playing as one of the many instances in the musical-critical scene at the time of complaints about misusing *rubato*: 'He is always sure of his notes; but the licence of his tempo rubato goes beyond all reasonable limits.'[13] These, though passionate, do not seek further to examine the exact nature of the 'pseudo-rubato', or to find out who the 'victims' were. Landau seems to suggest they were the 'Romantic' composer-pianists such as Chopin, Schumann, Brahms, Liszt. Schonberg, on the other hand, directs his accusations against the generation of almost 'notorious' pianists such as Pachmann, Paderewski, Lamond, d'Albert,[14] while Eigeldinger, in the above quote, seems to hold *all* pianists subsequent to

[12]Eigeldinger, p.118.

[13]Rom Landau, *Paderewski* (London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 1934), p.55.

[14]Harold Schonberg, *The Great Pianists* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1964).

Chopin's generation and prior to 1930 at fault. Ironically, this line of thought has been accepted and taken for granted throughout the decades, and has played a large part in imbuing the modern-day usage of the term *rubato* among practitioners with the connotation of careful control and discretion in rhythmic deviations, which supersedes that of freedom and flexibility.

It seems to me that there is a kind of verbal tug-of-war going on here, which only highlights our impotence and perplexity in the use and handling of language in the face of a performance attribute as elusive as the *rubato*. On the one hand, we try to 'tame' and 'discipline' the 'wild' *rubato* into a grammatical rule; on the other hand, what seems to be a target of attack, the negatively defined 'wild' *rubato* is in fact a powerful statement *against* 'grammar' - and against articulacy at the same time.

This latter vein of thought concerning *rubato*, although suppressed, can be identified in other contexts as well. In the *Harvard Dictionary of Music*, for example, Apel contrasts the eighteenth-century *rubato* based on a 'give-and-take principle' with 'the "full" *rubato* of Chopin and Liszt'.[15] Writing in 1963, Harold Schonberg, too, states that 'only within the last fifty years has there been such a thing as the concept of a basic metrical pulse and a sobriety in the use of such expressive devices as the ritard, accelerando, rubato and dynamic extremes.'[16]

---

[15]Apel, p.654.

[16]Schonberg, *The Great Pianists*, p.132.

'Sobriety' is obviously the key word here; somehow or other, in the previous century, *rubato* was less sombre a thought, more truly free and, indeed, 'fuller'. Once again, a non-grammatical *rubato* is implied, this time in positive terms, but its nature remains impenetrable.

An epitomizing instance for this alternative, 'ineffable' *rubato* can be found in an anecdote in Chopin playing which is documented in many sources.[17] Lenz recorded a scene during one of his lessons with Chopin. He was playing the Mazurka in C Op.33/3 when Meyerbeer came in for an unexpected visit. Meyerbeer commented a few times that it was in 2/4, although the piece was written in 3/4. Chopin then lost his temper and sat at the piano to play. He insisted that it *was* in 3/4, but was unable to convince Meyerbeer. Hallé and Moscheles recorded similar instances. The implication was that Chopin's *rubato* was so unrestrained that the metre was actually lost in the playing; as Berlioz commented, 'Chopin *could* not play in time.'[18]

This incident reveals vividly the paradox in talking about performance. There seems to be a great gap between what actually happens in performance and one's verbalization of it, including the performer's. Pedagogical discourse cannot 'convey' performance accurately either, for Chopin was supposed to teach a kind

[17]See, for example, Eigeldinger, *Chopin: Pianist and Teacher*, pp.72-73.

[18]Quoted in Eigeldinger, p.272 from Berlioz, *Memoires*, II, p.296.

of 'polyphonic' *rubato*. The resulting excuses to explain away this incommensurability, in this particular case, not only show the general inability to come to terms with performance attributes, but also show how different discourses can take over and frame the discussion in completely different terms. Scholes, for example, uses it as an evidence for Chopin's inability to 'accurately analyze his own rhythmic actions',[19] while McEwen comments that '...Chopin, whatever he may have actually done in performance, *intended* to carry out the same principle [of 'polyphonic' *rubato*].'[20] Such comments presuppose the psychological reality of the 'grammar' of *rubato*, and sees the dichotomy as between mental representations and overt actions. Schonberg, on the other hand, concludes that 'Chopin's rubato differed - in the Mazurkas at least - from all others in that it was broader', and that he 'probably used far less rubato while playing his non-national music'.[21] Eigeldinger, similarly, designates it as 'national rubato', a completely separate category and frame of reference for *rubato*, the justification of which is at odds with his insistence on the 'orthodox' meaning of *rubato*. I shall be coming back to these other aspects later.

It seems, in the light of all this, that 'polyphonic' *rubato* has been shown more and more to be a feeble notion. Although it poses itself as 'grammar' - that is,

---

[19]Percy A. Scholes, *The Oxford Companion to Music*, 10th edition, edited by John Owen Ward (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p.895.

[20]McEwen, *Tempo Rubato* , p.10. Author's italics.

[21]Schonberg, p.144.

an abstract principle or rule on which to base our understanding of what happens in real life - real-life situations of performance demand alternative modes of understanding, those which are outside the syntactical domain altogether. The feebleness of the 'polyphonic' idea can be further seen in the qualifications of its usage in some of its 'definitions': Apel, for example, writes that '...this type of rubato...naturally, is restricted to the limits of one or two measures, after which the accents of melody and harmony will again coincide.'[22] Scholes writes that 'the literal application of the principle...could be made only to certain limited types of composition, or grave harmonic clashes would result.'[23] He goes on to say that for contrapuntal compositions, such a principle will be inapplicable. Such qualifications, attempting to address the difference between 'competence' and 'performance', only highlight the irreducibility of performance to the application of grammatical rules. The metaphorical language invoked earlier on, such as 'national', 'full' or 'wild', distances us from the syntactical domain, and acknowledges, at the same time, that there does not exist a universe of significance that can convey performance adequately with what might be considered full intellectual vigour.

The notion of the 'polyphonic' *rubato*, then, cannot 'define' *rubato*. Rather, it shows up the inadequacy of approaching *rubato* first and foremost in terms of a

[22]Apel, p.654.

[23]Scholes, p.895.

'what'. To carry the argument further, investigations into treatises before Chopin's and Mozart's time reveal that the emergence of the 'polyphonic' idea is actually a result of a reinterpretation of certain pedagogical principles which incorporate this idea as an *effect*. It was not initially meant to be a description of actual performance. In his famous *Essay*, C.P.E.Bach, for example, speaks of *tempo rubato* as consisting of a redistribution of any number of notes in an embellished melody against another part which strictly observes the beat:

> When the execution is such that one hand *appears to* play against the metre while the other strikes all the beats precisely, then one has done everything that is necessary.[24]

A musical example from his *Six Sonatas for Clavier with Varied Reprises* quoted by Rosenblum in her book on Classical performance practice makes it very clear what Bach has in mind:[25]

Ex.1



[24]Quoted in Rosenblum, p.374 from E. Bach, *Versuch uber die wahre Art das Clavier zu spielen*, 3rd ed., Pt. I, pp.99-100. My italics.

[25]*Ibid.* p.375.

Türk, another well-known pedagogue, speaks of a kind of 'schematized' *rubato*, which Rosenblum terms 'contrametric *rubato* by uniform displacement':

> The customary and somewhat ambiguous German term *verrucktes Zeitmass* [displaced tempo] is not very fitting, for the bass voice goes its way according to the metre (without displacement), and only the notes of the melody are moved out of place, *as it were* [gleichsam].[26]

The musical examples he gives reveal that he is, in effect, speaking of syncopation, which is later confirmed by him verbally:

Ex.2



Both Bach and Türk, then, are devising precepts for performance to produce certain *effects*, in this case, the effect of a free, melodic part versus a steady part, an *impression* of freedom. They are not drawing up 'rules' in the sense of formal linguistics, that is, grammatical principles that have psychological validity. Rather, their 'rules' - 'playing all the notes of the same value exactly equally' and 'displacing the notes' respectively - are prescriptions of what to do; they are like

[26]Daniel Gottlob Türk, *School of Clavier Playing*, trans. R. Haggh, (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1982, original edition 1789), p.364. My italics.

performance manuals, or grammar books in their traditional sense.[27] As such, the description of what actually happens in real-life performance settings is not their concern. In other words, they are not addressing the issue of to what extent *rubato* makes 'free' - or 'wild' - playing.

In the light of this, the documentations which trace the 'polyphonic' idea of *rubato* back to Bach and Türk, validate it by the examples of Mozart and Chopin, and establish it as the 'orthodox meaning' of *rubato* are actually confusing several ideas at once. First of all, the pedagogical was transferred into a performance context, which is implicit in what Mozart and Chopin said about their own playing. This, then, was taken up by scholarly writers such as Eigeldinger and Rosenblum to 'define' *rubato*, to 'fix' its meaning so that what happens in performance can be measured and judged against this ideal theoretical construct. As such, it becomes a kind of 'descriptive grammar'. When this 'polyphonic' idea was drawn upon to defend Chopin against 'rhythmic lawlessness' in playing, it becomes prescriptive in performance contexts once again. There is a lot of confusion and uncritical thinking involved in this one facet of *rubato* alone. What all this shows is that in the course of time, *rubato* has become a universal term shared by various linguistic communities within their disparate semiotic domains.

---

[27]See Roy Harris, *Language, Saussure and Wittgenstein: How to Play Games with Words* (London and New York: Routledge, 1988) for different notions of grammar, especially pp.62-64.

While 'polyphonic' *rubato* is shown to be a theoretical artefact whose viability is at stake, the other kind of *rubato* which the academic authors mention, that approximating the effect of *ritardando* and *accelerando*, appears much closer to a performer's intuitive conception of *rubato*. Apart from the 'definitions' quoted earlier, Rosenblum describes this kind of 'agogic *rubato*' this way:

> At its *subtlest*, agogic *rubato* may be merely a *suppleness* in the movement within a small number of beats, induced, perhaps, by an especially *expressive* turn of phrase or harmony. It might even include the *lingering* on individual notes described earlier as agogic accentuation. In more openly expressive moments the tempo may be noticeably stretched or accelerated...*Hence this rubato is most used in music expressing the individualistic, the different, the seeking, the unending*.[28]

Eigeldinger, although attempting to frame his definition of this kind of *rubato* syntactically, nonetheless employs phrases such as '*fleeting* changes of pace' and 'slowing down or accelerating *the flow*' to indicate flexibility. In a footnote to one of the phrases that Lenz uses to characterize this *rubato*, Eigeldinger penetrates to the heart of it. Lenz recalls Chopin's playing thus:

---

[28]Rosenblum, p.382. My italics.

> In the fluctuations of speed, the holding back and pushing on [*Hangen und Bangen*], in rubato as *he* understands it, Chopin was charm itself...[29]

And Eigeldinger annotates *Hangen und Bangen* in this way:

> This expression defies exact translation, so closely does it belong to the essence of German Romanticism: it portrays a kind of breathless and vaguely troubled rhythm.[30]

Both Rosenblum and Eigeldinger, then, switch to a mode of language that is 'vague' and 'metaphorical' for this kind of *rubato*. It highlights the ineffable, individualistic, personal and 'expressive'. It recalls the language that press critics use, and is strongly associated with the commonsensical, innate sense of what *rubato* means - which is also that closest to a performer's sensibility.

While a piece of journalistic criticism which draws on this kind of language on *rubato* is normally treated with disdain in scholarly circles,[31] the existence of such a conception of *rubato* in the books of the academic writers is legitimated,

---

[29]Quoted in Eigeldinger, p.52.

[30]Eigeldinger, p.122.

[31]David Fanning, whose record review I quoted earlier, is, incidentally, a well-known academic writer who also writes for the press, and does so with a strikingly different language.

precisely because it is designated as a 'type' of *rubato* under the generic 'Rubato', a construction existing within, and therefore subordinate to, the all-powerful structuralist (as against the narrative) paradigm. This separates the 'what' from the 'how', and puts in place what are actually different discourses under one neutral grand-narrative. In this way, the danger of this 'arbitrary' *rubato* initiating fundamental changes in our understanding of performance attributes is eliminated; to put it in another way, the performer's perspective on *rubato* is suppressed and the performer is disempowered in academic writings. Outside this dominant paradigm, as, for example, in journalistic criticism, metaphorical language becomes somewhat lifeless and irrelevant to the academics.

This disciplining, as one might term it, of the 'expressive' *rubato* can be further seen in the academic writers' treatment of it. As has been mentioned earlier, both Eigeldinger and Rosenblum regard this *rubato* as an extension or derivation of the 'polyphonic' idea, thereby giving it peripheral status. While Eigeldinger talks about it in mostly negative terms, emphasizing how it should not be misused or confused with *tempo ad libitum*,[32] Rosenblum concentrates on the 'thesis' that 'the degree to which composers indicate rhythmic and tempo flexibility in their music may properly be regarded as one reliable clue to the kind and degree of discretionary flexibility appropriate in performance of their works.'[33] This roots the discussion in *notated* rhythmic flexibility (such as where it is marked *fermata* or

[32]See, for example, Eigeldinger, p.119.

[33]Rosenblum, p.383.

stringendo) without having to deal directly with the ineffable. Similarly, in his recent book on early recordings and musical styles, Robert Philip distinguishes three kinds of *rubato* to do with the levels of the note, phrase and tempo respectively: 'Tenuto and agogic accents', 'Accelerando and rallentando' and 'tempo variation'. By focussing on the debate about 'the principle of balance', the rule of having to 'pay back' what we have 'stolen' in time, his discussion of 'accelerando and rallentando' bypasses the 'expressive' aspects of it but upholds, once again, its 'grammar'.[34]

Ironically, perhaps, music psychologists also talk about 'expressive' playing. In recent years, psychological research into music performance has become specialized, and *rubato* - or temporal variation in performance in its broader sense - is among the topics that intrigue psychologists. To them, the structure of the music has a large part to play in the rhythmic variations introduced into a performance, and various approaches have been developed to correlate the two. Neil Todd, for example, develops a 'model of expressive timing' by which 'durational structure', that is to say *rubato*, can be 'generated from the musical structure'.[35] He shows that a performer typically slows down at a phrase boundary (or a structural ending), and the degree of slowing is determined by the structural

[34]Robert Philip, *Early Recordings and Musical Style: Changing Tastes in Instrumental Performance, 1900-1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

[35]Neil Todd, 'A Model of Expressive Timing in Tonal Music', *Music Perception* 3:1 (1985), pp.33-58, 33.

importance of the boundary in the terms of Lerdahl and Jackendoff's time-span reduction. The model is then tested by comparing it to the durational profiles in real performances of Haydn, Mozart and Chopin's works, the result of which shows that there is a close correspondence between the two. Eric Clarke, in another experiment, shows that performers are less successful in reproducing patterns of *rubato* that are not supported by the structure of the music than they are in those that are structurally anchored.[36] Hence 'convincing expressive performances can only be reliably achieved when the underlying musical structure has been understood and assimilated.'[37]

This kind of empirical investigation situates *rubato* in a completely separate semiotic domain. In these studies, *rubato* - variations in performance timing - is looked upon as a phenomenon whose occurrence is shown to be governed by certain regularities. The psychologists are aiming at discovering these regularities as propensities, not at regularizing their realization. Thus they are aiming at producing a grammar of *rubato* in a very real sense. In this light, *rubato* (nuance in performance) sheds all its associations with the individualistic and the 'mysterious', and becomes a feature that can be regularized and cast in deterministic models. It can be equated with 'durational structure' in its technical sense, which is determined in turn by the structure of the music. We have to situate ourselves in

---

[36]Eric Clarke and Cathy Baker-Short, 'The Imitation of Perceived Rubato: A Preliminary Study', *Psychology of Music* 15:1 (1987), pp.58-75.

[37]*Ibid.*, p.58.

this specific perspective as we look into this realm of thought so that *rubato* will still come forth as a 'meaningful' term; we may be disorientated if we hold on to our customary grasp of the idea of *rubato*.

A more specific example of how the meaning of terms changes with different perspectives would be the term 'expression' in these studies. While we might reasonably expect it to mean the personal and the individualistic, it becomes annexed as a description of something purely systematic, without room for personal variation. It is employed to refer to systematic variations in rhythm, and unabashedly. Clarke, for example, writes that 'the main thrust of [the work of developing timing models] has been to demonstrate that performers generate expression *during* performance, using the music's structure as the generative source.'[38] 'Expression' is thus seen solely as structurally oriented; the performer does not 'express' anything, rather, the music (or the music's structure) 'expresses itself'. In this way, the performer's perspective has been robbed of its validity, but grafted onto a structuralist view of music governed by the ideology of the autonomous musical work. Only in this frame of reference, it seems, can the meaning of 'expression' be clear and secure enough for it to be employed unself-consciously as signification. 'Expression' in Rosenblum's sense, on the other hand, remains a somewhat embarrassing and puzzling term in academic musical discourse. The psychologists, then, have successfully constructed their own universe of discourse on *rubato* - which involves redefining, implicitly, some of the

[38] *Ibid.*, author's italics.

terms related to performance that are used in everyday discourse. It is out of reach for, or even irrelevant to, the performer.

A related story of *rubato* similar to that of the psychologists would be the analysts'. The thrust of it, in recent literature, involves correlating *rubato* with the middleground structure of a piece. The work of Maury Yeston and Nicholas Cook is representative in this area. In his well-known article entitled 'Rubato and the Middleground', Yeston argues for the importance of the middleground in preserving a piece's metrical structure in the face of rhythmic variations in the foreground. 'A passage may be rhythmically altered,' he says, 'only insofar as its characteristic accentual structure is not abused',[39] and this characteristic accentual structure is a function of the middleground. Using the example of a Bach fantasia, he offers 'caution' to the performer: 'freedom is allowed in the choice of foreground arpeggiation and rhythmic motive, but variances in tempo and long-span durational values must still more or less preserve the format of the underlying plan.'[40] The middleground's 'elasticity', in other words, becomes 'the limit of a rubato treatment'. The premise for this thesis is that the modern practice of *rubato*, unlike that in the eighteenth century, unduly stretches or alters the rhythm in *all* parts of the music. Nicholas Cook, on the other hand, approaches the topic from the other end. Using empirical methods, he measures the durational spans or tempo

[39]Maury Yeston, 'Rubato and the Middleground' in M. Yeston (ed.) *Readings in Schenker Analysis* (Yale, 1977), pp.94-106, 100.

[40]*Ibid.*, p.101.

profiles of actual performances of specific works, and shows how they correlate to the middleground structure as established by technical analysis.[41] In many ways, his work provides a practicable counterpart for Yeston's ideas.

Both Yeston and Cook, then, seek to show how *rubato* can be 'structural'. Both render *rubato* negotiable by grounding it in the terms and setup of music analysis, thereby creating a discourse which, once again, inhabits its own semiotic universe. Yeston more or less avoids talking about performance issues; his 'caution' to the performer quoted earlier is so abstract and analytically oriented that it is hardly intelligible to the performer. Cook comes a lot closer to the facts of performance by, for example, distinguishing 'rhetorical', local effects of *rubato* from 'structural', middleground ones in his article on Furtwängler and Schenker; but, necessarily, he is defining and considering the rhetorical in the terms of the structural.

We must not be misled into thinking that, in the light of these 'little narratives' on *rubato*, the kind of 'performer's *rubato*' that I have been arguing for is simply another component in the general picture of 'what' *rubato* 'means', a missing piece in the jigsaw the completion of which would yield a comprehensive

[41] See Nicholas Cook, 'Structure and Performance Timing in Bach's C Major Prelude (WTC I): An Empirical Study', *Music Analysis* 6:3 (1987), pp.257-272; and 'The Conductor and the Theorist: Furtwängler, Schenker, and the First Movement of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony' in John Rink (ed.), *The Practice of Performance: Studies in Musical Interpretation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

and coherent picture of what musicology can do. To say this, we must recapitulate, would be to suppress the ideology behind each semiotic sphere, and to reduce universes of discourse to, simply, areas of interest or subdisciplines. It would also be to oversimplify the case of creating a 'performance discourse' which would be dealing essentially with the ineffable. Rather, the plurality of discourse testifies to the power of language to destabilize musicological discourse at large by disposing readers to different vantage points and in the process, transforming the meanings of terms. It speaks *against* the hypothetical notion of a performer's *rubato* discourse that is so 'complacent' and 'innocent' as to be easily incorporated into musicological discourse in general. This is achieved both by the sheer volume and weight of non-performance-oriented discourses and by the very structure of consciousness that is implicit in all of the discourses considered so far.

There exists, I am arguing, a 'master-narrative' in academic writings to do with 'performance' which tends to block off any alternative mode of thinking which does not fit into the mainstream consciousness. This centralizes the syntactical, the structural (in its technical sense), the notated and the literal while marginalizing the semantic, the 'expressive', the aural and the ineffable. Above all, this master-narrative fails to grasp its own identity: it insists on answering the 'what', in this case, of *rubato*, while refusing to recognize narrative itself as an epistemological category. This is why we are stuck with ineffability and why, so often, we delude ourselves into thinking that we are talking about performance

when in fact we are not. 'Performance' - and *rubato* in a performer's epistemology - is, in these ways, denied its place in general musical thought. It is, apparently, approached from very many different perspectives - apart from that which is the most basic, fundamental, and cherished.

Our task, then, is at least two-fold. On a more local level, 'performance discourse' needs to be a universe of discourse in its own right that would allow us to tackle the semantic, the associative, and the elusive. At the same time, in order to achieve this, we must be aware of the status of this discourse itself, for it is precisely this awareness that grants discursive status to *all* musicological discourse, thereby giving sanction to render the elusive negotiable with words. Thus the local level is intertwined with the global, where the narrative is to be restored as a way of knowing.

To return to the case of the *rubato*, what all this means is that, to put it in a nutshell, we are not interested in *what rubato* means, but *how* it means. Essentially, I argue that it 'means' by being *in use*; its meaning arises from its realization in context. In other words, I am arguing for a *pragmatics* of performance in its vigorous sense, where the understanding of performance as communication is not dependent upon some abstract knowledge of how performance attributes, ideally, 'work'. This, at the same time, provides an illustration of how discourse can, in itself, be the source of organizing knowledge.

The case of what is called 'national *rubato*' serves as a powerful example for both alternative discourse and alternative *rubato* in the sense of a 'performer's *rubato*'. This is outlined in Eigeldinger. According to him, this *rubato* is derived from the mobile rhythm of the Polish folk melody the Mazur, and is closely associated with the playing of Chopin's Mazurkas. He argues that this national *rubato* constitutes a third, important component in Chopinian *rubato* (apart from its 'polyphonic' and 'agogic' meanings), citing as evidence the fact that of all Chopin's works which contain explicit markings of 'rubato', three quarters are in genres to do with Polish folk music (chiefly Mazurkas). There, the term *rubato* serves 'merely to underline the precise flexibility required for these subtle nuances'.[42] Further remarks such as 'When one of his French pupils played his works...Chopin would often remark that...the Polish element and the Polish inspiration were lacking', or 'one had to be Polish to feel the subtleties of the national rhythm'[43] enhance the mystical aura surrounding 'national *rubato*'. It is *rubato* by association, idiosyncratic and instinctive, and defies articulation in words.

Eigeldinger, nonetheless, feels obliged to 'explain' its meaning in syntactical terms. Apparently, this *rubato* generally involves lengthening the first

[42]Eigeldinger, p.121.

[43]Quoted in *ibid.*, p.122.

beat or shortening the third beat, giving the effect of duple metre in a typically triple metre piece. The former has the support of Hallé's account of Chopin's playing of his Mazurkas: the impression of a duple metre is attributed to 'the result of his [Chopin's] dwelling so much longer on the first note of the bar' (after which Chopin, significantly, 'laughed and explained that it was the national character of the dance which created the oddity').[44] The latter is supported by Lenz's remarks concerning the Meyerbeer visit referred to earlier. He describes Chopin's 'loss of metre' in this way: 'Though the third beat loses some of its value, submerged as it is in the flow of the melody, still it does not cease to exist.'[45] Presumably, then, the theme of Chopin's Op.33/3, the Mazurka he played before Meyerbeer (Ex.3), was played to something like the following effect (Ex.4):

Ex.3



Ex.4



Or, if we notate it on the basis of Hallé's explanation, it becomes:

Ex.5



[44]Quoted in *ibid.*, p.72.

[45]*Ibid.*, p.73.

Both of these give the effect of duple metre. But we can never really be sure whether this was how it sounded. Eigeldinger, in another footnote, writes of 'the delicate question of Chopin's accentuation in his Mazurkas', where he concedes that 'to attempt...a reconstruction of Chopin's individual way of accentuation would probably be fruitless and out of place'.[46] Thus, even though he starts off explicating the 'national *rubato*' phenomenon, the discussion gradually shifts to 'agogic accents' (as against 'dynamic accents') and how accents are notated in Chopin. The furthest we get in relation to national *rubato* is this: 'If Chopin's accentuation (as taught by him) could be heard in terms of duple metre, the reason lies mainly in a combination of two effects: the constant shifting of accents characteristic of the Mazur...with, above all, Chopin's frequent lengthening of the first beat.'[47] This does not help us very much in grasping this 'national *rubato*' in syntactical terms.

It seems that in this case, *rubato* is very much associated with nuance and actual playing, rather than with 'definitions' in books. It is described in terms of 'effects'; it cannot be reduced to a structural description. Its identity and viability are based on an understanding of performance as *communication*; they do not rest on the assumption that *rubato* equals rhythmic irregularity set against a background

[46] *Ibid.*, p.147.

[47] *Ibid.*

of underlying regularity, which is what underlies all 'definitions' of *rubato*. In other words, musical performance is not understood in terms of 'competence'. Instead, this *rubato* only makes sense if a specific *context* is understood - in this case, an extra-musical context of Polish nationalism. It is 'semantic' *rubato* - it carries messages, and 'expresses' something other than 'the music'. In these ways, 'national *rubato*' is suggestive of an alternative *rubato* which is more in line with what *rubato* means to a performer, with all its elusiveness, evocativeness, and sensuousness. It constitutes a separate universe of discourse.

In musicological discourse - just as in performance itself - this kind of *rubato* 'means' fully only by being in use. Jeffrey Kallberg says of genre,

> Shared characteristics are only partially relevant to definitions. They provide factual information about a term; they classify it. But they do not explain its meaning. The meaning of a term instead is connected to the willingness of a particular community to use that word and not another; meaning sheds light on the characteristic uses of a particular term as opposed to others that are available.[48]

The full significance of national *rubato*, too, can only be appreciated when the idea is couched in an appropriate context, for example, that of discussions of genre.

---

[48]Jeffrey Kallberg, 'The Rhetoric of Genre: Chopin's Nocturne in G Minor', *19th-Century Music* 11:3 (Spring 1988), pp.238-261, 243.

Kallberg's same article on Chopin's G minor Nocturne (Op.15 No.3), entitled 'The Rhetoric of Genre', provides just such an example. There, he argues that genre is a rhetorical technique communicating meaning rather than a simple study of shared characteristics, and uses the idiosyncratic Nocturne as an example. The meaning of the piece, he argues, lies largely in the play between different generic categories that the piece clearly evokes. The reference to the national *rubato* comes in right at the beginning, when Kallberg quotes a contemporary review of the set of Nocturnes to which the G minor one belongs. In it, the critic complains that the demand for *rubato* is too difficult to execute. Kallberg contends that this 'fixation on *rubato*' on the critic's part arises entirely out of considerations of the third piece in the set, the Nocturne in question, at the beginning of which Chopin marked *languido e rubato*. This heading, he goes on to say, 'conjures up associations that more normally arose in the contexts of Mazurkas',[49] since, as I said, some three-fourths of its appearances occur in the Mazurkas. In a footnote, he makes it clear that what this generic signal of Mazurka signifies is its 'associations with Polish folk culture'. Thus, the requirement of a kind of *rubato* in playing which can somehow reflect these associations is implied. In this instance, then, we see the concept of a 'semiotic' *rubato* in use, a notion which in other contexts might fail to stand as viable.

[49] *Ibid.*, p.247.

Another hypothetical example may be seen in one of Jim Samson's articles, again on Chopin and genre, where he talks about an 'ironic mode' in the use of genre:

> The work is not a march, a waltz or a mazurka but rather *refers to* a march, a waltz or a mazurka. The popular genre is then part of the content of the work rather than the category exemplified by the work, and its markers may well be counterpointed against those of other popular genres, as well as those of the controlling genre.[50]

By implication, then, if a performer 'rubatos nationally', as it were, he or she may mean it whole-heartedly or use it in quotation marks.

As well as being an alternative, performer's *rubato*, then, this 'national *rubato*' suggests and promotes a different kind of '*rubato* talk' altogether. One way of putting this would be: 'national *rubato*', by its very name, provides a pretext for a kind of free talk on *rubato* wherein different criteria and ideals can surface. By being openly 'metaphorical', 'what *rubato is*' becomes what it *represents*. Words such as expressiveness, fullness and strangeness, which are generally 'censured' in mainstream academic discourse, all find a place, as if thrown out in a 'brainstorm

[50]Jim Samson, 'Chopin and Genre', *Music Analysis* 8:3 (1989), pp.213-231, 225.

session' in a discussion. In other words, precision of meaning in definitions gives way to open-endedness in discussion of effects; content gives way to process.

By fostering another mode of discourse, national *rubato* challenges the complacency of all discourses on *rubato* and asks if they are all equally 'metaphorical'. This can be shown by comparing 'national' *rubato* with a hypothetical notion of 'metrical' *rubato*. On a syntactic level, what we have called 'national *rubato*' can be boiled down to an alteration not of rhythm but of *metre* itself. It is *rubato* at a deeper level, in a Schenkerian sense. Thus, the term 'metrical *rubato*' seems to signify the nature of the *rubato*, and thus serve the purpose of classification equally well. It seems interchangable with 'national *rubato*'. However, in this case, the connotations of 'national' *rubato* - not only its extra-musical associations but also its particular qualitative 'meanings' - will be completely lost. Just as 'national' *rubato* shapes for us a particular mode of thinking and course of inquiry, so 'metrical' *rubato* leads us on to ask other questions: is there, for example, still an underlying regularity when *metre* is altered, and if so, where might it be located? How are various kinds of rhythmic *rubato* superimposed on this metric *rubato*? Seen in this light, both 'national' *rubato* and 'metric' *rubato* dispose us to certain perspectives while suppressing others. In this sense, the syntactic is no less 'metaphorical' than the semantic (which we normally, narrowly label 'metaphorical'); neither can claim to have possessed 'the truth' about *rubato*. What *rubato* 'is', ultimately, remains a matter of how it is meant. As

Bakhtin says in his critique of linguistics, 'There are no "neutral" words and forms...language has been completely taken over and shot through with intentions and accents.'[51]

[51]Quoted in Ken Hirschkop, 'The Classical and the Popular: Musical Form and Social Context', in Christopher Norris (ed.) *Music and the Politics of Culture* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1989), pp.283-304, 285.

Conclusion

'National *rubato*', then, provides a proven instance for what I would call 'performance discourse' within the academic setting. Like 'foreshortening', 'national *rubato*' is not a name that signifies, but a verbal paraphrase of something ineffable at the core of the performance experience, a kind of urge, almost, that exists within the performer. For this reason, discourse surrounding national *rubato* is always in a state of flux, as it seeks to operate without referents, hence its obscurity and apparent contradictions. As such, it exhibits an alternative demeanour at the same time as it makes references to the alternative world of performance. The twinkling existence of 'expressive' *rubato* in various contexts provides the initial clue to a performer's perspective on *rubato* that is to be (re)constructed; in those contexts, the indirect relationship between words and performance is already in operation.

The overall picture, then, is not quite as dismal as the attempt to revitalize performers' writings might suggest. After all, in *rubato* discourses, we are dealing with existing and largely familiar materials, if in an unconventional way. In Chapter 1, I remarked that performance discourse is very much 'hidden' in academic writings in music, in the sense that our intuitive feelings about what make up 'performance' are only brought to light briefly and indirectly through intellectual debates. My vision then was of a forthright, distinctive universe of discourse about

performance. Now, the nature of the 'hiddenness' of performance discourse is more finely spelt out: it is embedded within the 'deep structure', as it were, of words. The 'expressive' *rubato* and national *rubato* have not hitherto been noticeable as 'performers' *rubato*' because the deeper meanings of language have not been recognized; instead, ambiguous terms such as these have for years maintained the status of 'signifying nothing'. However, with the recognition that they do not *signify* at all, but circumlocute, they come alive again as potent entities *suggestive of* performance, and our vision of performance discourse changes from that of a closed verbal world to an open, moving verbal flux. 'Performance discourse' exists amidst layers of freely-flowing words.

AFTERWORD

From a bird's-eye view, the presentation of this thesis illustrates its content: setting aside Chapter 1, which sets up the scene (and can be seen as a gesture to conform to the genre of a doctoral thesis), the progress from Chapter 2 to Chapter 5 illustrates change, difference, and fluidity of discourse. In the end, too, the thesis remains open-ended. In a peculiar way, such a demeanour recalls Rosenblum's description of 'expressive' *rubato* as 'the individualistic, the different, the seeking, the unending'. It is also strangely reminiscent of Brendel's suggestive comment in the Preface of one of his books: 'Essays are not oracles. I like to see them...as works in progress; in this they resemble musical performances which continue to call for new insight, and improvement.'[1]

I started off with an explicit, 'normal' portrayal of the 'analysis-performance problem' as it is commonly conceived, which is to say as a problem for analysts. As a gesture to engage with 'real performances' and thereby involve the performers, I turned to look at recordings. There, I sought to locate the interface, in specifically musical terms, between performance and structure, and by implication, analysis. This, however, ended up with an impossible situation and I was faced with a different kind of problem altogether: that of the relationship between performance and words. Thereafter, the outlook of the thesis changes: as I

[1]Brendel, *Music Sounded Out* p.1.

abandoned my original project, as it were, and turned to a different one, the discourse moved away from the domain of conventional academic writing and turned into a series of self-constructed stories. While the 'generic contract' of a doctoral thesis needs to be maintained, the discourse draws upon more private, subjective, and experiential modes of knowledge and becomes fluid. No longer is it organized around pieces of music or a specific intellectual 'problem'; instead, it seeks to create its own focal points. The way I frequently refer back to previous comments, critiquing them and re-creating them in new modes, illustrates that my entire discourse is a process of change, exploration and regeneration; it is not an enclosed whole. Thus the concepts of Difference and the Other feature not only in the content but also in the presentation of the thesis.

In the latter chapters, the interfaces to be located become verbal ones, and the non-communication is seen to be between writing musicians and performing musicians, rather than between the analyst and the performer. In the course of this, 'analysis-and-performance' as a generic term dissolves. What is left - or, rather, what is created - is a *sense* of performance felt in between unlovely words, analytical or not. Hence analysis and performance relations as a topic of investigation recedes; the last two chapters are best regarded as processes, suggesting, intimating and evoking performance. The message is clear: once 'performance' is essentialized as an object of investigation, it stops being what it is and we defeat our purpose. 'Analysis', too, is both de-essentialized and de-

emphasized in these latter chapters; it exists only as a discursive shadow, as it were. If, as Dunsby puts it overtly in the Postscript of his book, '"real" musical performance...is just what it says it is, and obviously it does not take place in books [or theses] like this one',[2] then there is no reason why this should not be true of 'real' musical analysis, which is an act in just the same way. My thesis, then, is a study *of* analysis and performance only in a remote - or, if you like, pseudo - sense. It is more 'performance discourse' itself - the *moving* of performance into discourse.

The common ground between the writing musician and the performing musician that I referred to in the previous chapter, then, has to be internal and invisible. Performance discourse is *not* a common language in which performers and writers can 'talk about performance' from the same situated perspective; rather, it is a common goal. Performers and writers on music talk in distinctly different languages; their mutuality lies in a deep feeling for the sound of music which is subjective and experiential and can only exist *within* them. As Harris contends, 'linguistic communication *is* the reaching of agreement by means of verbal signs in particular interactional episodes',[3] and does not *require* prior agreement in definitions and judgements, so the 'talk' between two 'foreigners' need not be characterized by mere incomprehension. Instead, in a different sense,

---

[2]Dunsby, *Performing Music*, Postscript.

[3]Roy Harris, *Language, Saussure and Wittgenstein*, p.120.

'communication' has to take place all the time in ways that are experiential, experimental and ad hoc. To this extent, then, separate discourses among musicians are not destructive or divisive; they are, on the contrary, creative, productive and full of potential. As Maus says of 'diversification of discourse about music', it is to be 'a free activity of imaginative exploration, and a positive pleasure'.[4] In the end, I believe, it is a kind of nourishment to our communal musical life, the vitality of which deserves preserving by every possible means.

[4]Fred Maus, 'The Future of Theory', *Indiana Theory Review* 10 (Spring/Fall 1989), pp.92-95, 93.


Andantino
7.
p dolce


Allegro appassionato
f
sempre f
Ped.
PWM
231


con forza
cresc.
p
f
cresc.
ff
PWM


cresc.
fff strello
sempre ff
strello
fff
PWM

Ex.1



Ex.2



BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbate, Carolyn, *Unsung Voices: Opera and Musical Narrative in the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).

Agawu, Kofi, 'Concepts of Closure and Chopin's Opus 28', *Music Theory Spectrum* 9 (1987), pp.1-17.

Apel, Willi, *Harvard Dictionary of Music* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951).

Beach, David, 'The First Movement of Mozart's Piano Sonata in A minor, K.310: Some Thoughts on Structure and Performance', *Journal of Musicological Research* 7 (1987), pp.157-186.

Berry, Wallace, *Musical Structure and Performance* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989).

Bohlman, Philip V., 'Musicology as a Political Act', *Journal of Musicology* 11:4 (Fall 1993), pp.411-436.

Bradshaw, Susan, Review of Michael Krausz (ed.), *The Interpretation of Music: Philosophical Essays*, in *The Musical Times* (September 1993), p.516.

Brendel, Alfred, *Musical Thoughts and Afterthoughts* (London: Robson, 1976).

------ *Music Sounded Out: Essays, Lectures, Interviews, Afterthoughts* (London: Robson, 1990).

Bujic, Bojan, 'Notation and Realization: Musical Performance in Historical Perspective', in Michael Krausz (ed.), *The Interpretation of Music: Philosophical Essays* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), pp.129-140.

Burkhart, Charles, 'Schenker's Theory of Levels and Musical Performance', in David Beach (ed.), *Aspects of Schenkerian Theory* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983), pp.95-112.

Burnham, Scott, 'On the Programmatic Reception of Beethoven's Eroica Symphony', *Beethoven Forum* 1 (1992), pp.1-24.

------ 'The Criticism of Analysis and the Analysis of Criticism', *19th-Century Music* 16:1 (Summer 1992), pp.70-76.

Clarke, Eric, Review of Wallace Berry, *Musical Structure and Performance*, in *Music & Letters* 72 (1991), pp.86-88.

Clarke, Eric and Baker-Short, Cathy, 'The Imitation of Perceived Rubato: A Preliminary Study', *Psychology of Music* 15:1 (1987), pp.58-75.

Cone, Edward T., *Musical Form and Musical Performance* (New York: Norton, 1968).

------ 'The Authority of Music Criticism', *Journal of American Musicological Society* 34 (1981), pp.1-18.

Cook, Nicholas, 'Structure and Performance Timing in Bach's C Major Prelude (WTC I): An Empirical Study', *Music Analysis* 6:3 (1987), pp.257-272.

------ 'Music Theory and "Good Comparison": A Viennese Perspective', *Journal of Music Theory* 33 (1989), pp.117-141.

------- 'Schenker's Theory of Music as Ethics', *Journal of Musicology* 7:4 (Fall 1989), pp.415-439.

------- 'The Future of Theory', *Indiana Theory Review* 10 (1989), pp.69-73.

------- *Music, Imagination, and Culture* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).

------- Review of Eugene Narmour and Ruth A. Solie (eds.), *Explorations in Music, the Arts and Ideas: Essays in Honor of Leonard B. Meyer*, in *Journal of Musicological Research* 12 (Supplement) 1992, pp.156S-164S.

------- 'The Conductor and the Theorist: Furtwängler, Schenker, and the First Movement of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony', in John Rink (ed.), *The Practice of Performance: Studies in Musical Interpretation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

Cortot, Alfred, *Studies in Musical Interpretation* (set down by Jeanne Thieffry, translated by Robert Jaques, London: George G. Harrap, 1937).

Dahlhaus, Carl, *Analysis and Value Judgment*, trans. Siegmund Levarie (New York: Pendragon Press, 1983, original in German 1970).

Dunsby, Jonathan, 'Guest Editorial: Performance and Analysis of Music', *Music Analysis* 8 (1989), pp.5-20.

------- *Performing Music: Shared Concerns* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

Eigeldinger, Jean-Jacques, *Chopin: Pianist and Teacher As Seen by his Pupils*, trans. Naomi Shohet with Krysia Osostowicz and Roy Howat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

Folio, Cynthia, 'Analysis and Performance of the Flute Sonatas of J.S. Bach: A Sample Lesson Plan', *Journal of Music Theory Pedagogy* 5:2 (Fall 1991), pp.133-159.

Guck, Marion A., 'Musical Images as Musical Thoughts: the Contribution of Metaphor to Analysis', *In Theory Only* 5:5 (June 1981), pp.29-42.

------ 'Taking Notice: A Response to Kendall Walton', *Journal of Musicology* 11:1 (Winter 1993), pp.45-51.

Harris, Roy, *Language, Saussure and Wittgenstein: How to Play Games with Words* (London and New York: Routledge, 1988).

Hirschkop, Ken, 'The Classical and the Popular: Musical Form and Social Context', in Christopher Norris (ed.), *Music and the Politics of Culture* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1989), pp.283-304.

Hoyt, Reed J., 'Rhythmic Process in the Scherzo of Beethoven's Sonata Op.110: Analysis as a Basis for Interpretation and Criticism', *Indiana Theory Review* 9:2 (Fall 1988), pp.99-133.

Huneker, James, *Chopin: The Man and His Music* (New York: Dover, 1966, original edition 1900).

Kalib, Sylvan, 'Thirteen Essays from the Three Yearbooks "Das Meisterwerk in der Musik" by Heinrich Schenker: An Annotated Translation', 3 vols., Ph.D. thesis, Northwestern University, 1973.

Kallberg, Jeffrey, 'The Rhetoric of Genre: Chopin's Nocturne in G Minor', *19th-Century Music* 11:3 (Spring 1988), pp.238-261.

Kenyon, Nicholas (ed.), *Authenticity and Early Music: A Symposium* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).

Kerman, Joseph, *Musicology* (London: Fontana and Collins, 1985).

Kramer, Lawrence, 'Dangerous Liaisons: the Literary Text in Musical Criticism', *19th-Century Music* 13 (1989), pp.159-167.

------- *Music As Cultural Practice: 1800-1900* (Berkeley and Oxford: University of California Press, 1990).

Krausz, Michael (ed.), *The Interpretation of Music: Philosophical Essays* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993).

Landau, Rom, *Paderewski* (London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 1934).

Larson, Steve, 'On Performance and Analysis: the Contribution of Durational Reduction to the Performance of J.S. Bach's Two-Part Invention in C Major', *In Theory Only* 7:1 (1983), pp.31-45.

------ and Folio, Cynthia, Review of Wallace Berry, *Musical Structure and Performance*, in *Journal of Music Theory* 35 (1991), pp.298-309.

Lester, Joel, Review of Wallace Berry, *Musical Structure and Performance*, in *Music Theory Spectrum* 14:1 (Spring 1992), pp.75-81.

------ 'Interactions Between Analysis and Performance', in John Rink (ed.), *The Practice of Performance: Studies in Musical Interpretation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

Littlefield, Richard and Neumeyer, David, 'Rewriting Schenker: Narrative - History - Ideology', *Music Theory Spectrum* 14:1 (Spring 1992), pp.38-65.

Lorraine, Renée, 'Musicology and Theory: Where It's Been, Where It's Going', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 51:2 (Spring 1993), pp.235-244.

Maus, Fred Everett, 'Music as Drama', *Music Theory Spectrum* 10 (1988), pp.56-73.

------ 'The Future of Theory', *Indiana Theory Review* 10 (Spring/Fall 1989), pp. 92-95.

Methuen-Campbell, James, *Chopin Playing: From the Composer to the Present Day* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1981).

McEwen, John B., *Tempo Rubato: or Time-Variation in Musical Performance* (London: Oxford University Press, 1928).

Narmour, Eugene, 'On the Relationship of Analytical Theory to Performance and Interpretation', in Eugene Narmour and Ruth A. Solie (eds.), *Explorations in Music, the Arts, and Ideas: Essays in Honor of Leonard B. Meyer* (Stuyvesant: Pendragon Press, 1988), pp.317-340.

Newcomb, Anthony, 'Sound and Feeling', *Critical Inquiry* 10 (June 1984), pp.614-643.

Philip, Robert, *Early Recordings and Musical Style: Changing Tastes in Instrumental Performance, 1900-1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

Rink, John, Review of Wallace Berry, *Musical Structure and Performance*, in *Music Analysis* 9:3 (1990), pp.319-339.

Rolf, Marie and Marvin, Elizabeth West, 'Analytical Issues and Interpretive Decisions in Two Songs by Richard Strauss', *Intégral* 4 (1990), pp.67-103.

Rosenblum, Sandra P., *Performance Practices in Classic Piano Music: Their Principles and Applications* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988).

Rothstein, William, 'Heinrich Schenker as an Interpreter of Beethoven's Piano Sonatas', *19th-Century Music* 8:1 (1984), pp.3-28.

------- 'The Americanization of Heinrich Schenker', in Hedi Siegel (ed.), *Schenker Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp.193-203.

Samson, Jim, 'Chopin and Genre', *Music Analysis* 8:3 (1989), pp.213-231.

Schachter, Carl, '20th-Century Analysis and Mozart Performance', *Early Music* XIX No.4 (1991), pp.620-625.

Schmalfeldt, Janet, 'On the Relation of Analysis to Performance: Beethoven's Bagatelles Op.126, Nos.2 and 5', *Journal of Music Theory* 29 (1985), pp.1-31.

Schnabel, Artur, *My Life and Music*, foreword by Sir Robert Mayer, introduction by Edward Crankshaw (Gerrards Cross: Colin Smythe, 1970).

Scholes, Percy A., *The Oxford Companion to Music*, tenth edition, edited by John Owen Ward (London: Oxford University Press, 1970).

Schonberg, Harold C., *The Great Pianists* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1964).

Seeger, Charles, *Studies in Musicology, 1935-1975* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1977).

Smith, Joan Allen, *Schoenberg and His Circle: A Viennese Portrait* (New York, 1986).

Stein, Erwin, *Form and Performance* (London: Faber & Faber, 1962).

Street, Alan, Review of Katherine Bergeron and Philip V. Bohlman (eds.), *Disciplining Music: Musicology and Its Canons* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992), in *Journal of Music Theory* 37.1 (Spring 1993), pp.169-176.

Taruskin, Richard, 'The Musicologist and the Performer' in D. Kern Holoman and Claude V. Palisca (eds.), *Musicology in the 1980s: Methods, Goals, Opportunities* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1982), pp.101-117.

------- 'The Pastness of the Present and the Presence of the Past' in Nicholas Kenyon (ed.), *Authenticity and Early Music* (1988), pp.137-207.

------- Review of Carolyn Abbate, *Unsung Voices*, in *Cambridge Opera Journal* 4:2 (July 1992), pp.187-197.

Taylor, Ronald (ed. and trans.), *Furtwängler on Music: Essays and Addresses* (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1991).

Todd, Neil, 'A Model of Expressive Timing in Tonal Music', *Music Perception* 3:1 (1985), pp.33-58.

Tomlinson, Gary, 'The Historian, the Performer, and Authentic Meaning in Music' in Nicholas Kenyon (ed.), *Authenticity and Early Music* (1988), pp.115-136.

Türk, Daniel Gottlob, *School of Clavier Playing*, trans. Raymond H. Haggh (Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press, 1982; original edition 1789).

Wallace, Robin, *Beethoven's Critics: Aesthetic Dilemmas and Resolutions During the Composer's Lifetime* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

White, Hayden, *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism* (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1978).

Williams, Peter, 'Performance Practice Studies: Some Current Approaches to the Early Music Phenomenon' in John Paynter *et al.* (eds.), *Companion to Contemporary Musical Thought*, 2 vols. (London: Routledge, 1992), II, pp.931-947.

Wolff, Konrad, *Schnabel's Interpretation of Piano Music* (London: Faber & Faber, 1972; this edition 1979).

Yeston, Maury, 'Rubato and the Middleground', in Maury Yeston (ed.), *Readings in Schenkerian Analysis* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977), pp.94-106.

DISCOGRAPHY

Cortot, Alfred, *Chopin: Preludes/Impromptus, Barcarolle, Berceuse* (EMI CDH7 61050 2 [1988]).

Ohlsson, Garrick, *Chopin: Complete Preludes, Barcarolle Op.60* (EMI HQS 1338 [1974]).

Perahia, Murray, *Portrait of Murray Perahia* (CBS CD42448).

Richter, Sviatoslav, *Richter Plays Chopin, Tchaikovsky and Rachmaninov* (Olympia OCD 112 [1989]).

Rubinstein, Artur, *Chopin: Preludes, Sonata No.2, Barcarolle, Berceuse* (BMG GD 60047 [1989]).