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ALIENATION AND EDUCATION

by

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ABSTRACT

SCHOOL OF EDUCATION

Master of Philosophy

ALIENATION AND EDUCATION

by Annie Christina Knox

This is a work that isolates the phenomenon of alienation as the most serious problem to confront society and education. The concept of alienation is complex and ambiguous and so from three sociological perspectives the endeavour has been made to arrive at a clear and coherent definition. This definition, substantiated also by readings in psychology and phenomenology, suggests alienation to be a subjective state in the individual, characterised by the loss or impoverishment of the dialectic-in-consciousness. It is not, however, conceived of as one single mode of being. Three modes of subjectivity are isolated as typifications of alienation:- robot consciousness, manipulatory consciousness and the state of mind that is schizoid and tends towards schizophrenia.

The transposition of the examination of these modes to education produces new insights. The discussion of robot subjectivity, whilst revealing close links between systems of power and control in society and educational failure, highlights also the diminishment in humanity of successful school products. The consideration of

manipulatory consciousness exposes and criticises the dubious role of an educational system that is so zealously a socialising agent when society itself is very far from perfect. The perpetuation by schools of all modes of alienation is suggested to facilitate the continuation of determinism and control; to destroy in the individual, his capacity for autonomy and praxis.

As a conclusion to the work the ideal of dealienated subjectivity is suggested as a prime educational goal. The questions of identity and value formulation are found to be inseparable from this ideal. Individual issues are shown to bear relation with collective strivings. Transcendence of socialisation and escape from determinism are seen to be plausible.

Courage, commitment and the formulation of an aware, explicit ideology for education emerge as necessary pre-requisites to accelerate the transformation of educational organisation - with the aim that individual pupil and teacher alike, progress towards dealienated consciousness, to gain a sense of their collective identity within mankind as a whole.

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My brothers, Francis and Tom O'Brien, and my husband Peter were of considerable help to me in their expression of interest, criticism and suggestions for reading. Francis' illumination of R.D.Laing was especially valuable. My children, Elizabeth and Peter, were willing, if sceptical, in allowing me to quote their writings.

I am grateful also to Myra Chivers for her kindly concern and readiness to help. Most of all I am indebted to my tutor, Dudley Plunkett, who sensed and supported my directionality when I was sometimes unsure of it myself. I am sorry only that some of his criticism was not implemented as proficiently as I would have wished.

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INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS

The aim of my paper is to show the alienating propensity of formal education. Ambiguities and complexities surround both the understanding and use of the concept of alienation and so a large part of my work is devoted to an elaboration of its definition. This elaboration has necessitated a close consideration of pervasive uses of the word by sociologists, political theorists, psychologists and others. It has necessitated also the making of a more detailed, subjective definition of the concept, which for me greatly facilitates the examination of alienation, as it is caused or furthered by present-day educational practice.

This more detailed definition of alienation is a highly personal, and I hope, coherent one. It suggests, in essence, a subjective state in the individual that is impaired by a loss in the 'dialectic-in-consciousness'. A phrase suggested to me by Schutz[1.] is used here to sum up the complex subjective process that involves interaction between two levels of consciousness. Perhaps more simply it could be described as the state of impaired subjectivity resulting from a complete identification with socialised self or socialised roles - so that the alienated individual cannot define himself in any other way than by social objectivation.

Alienation, then, I define as impaired subjectivity. Yet on closer examination of social and educational reality it is quickly seen that impaired subjectivity has no uniform mode. The 'dialectic-in-consciousness' can be lost or

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1. A.Schutz, Phenomenology of the Social World (Heinemann, 1972).

damaged in different ways. Thus I have isolated in my work three modes of impaired subjectivity that could be deduced to be types of alienation.

I go on to question how education encourages or compounds these modes; in what way the social forces of determinism and control can operate whilst these forms of alienation are pervasive; and how, more hopefully, we can come to a recognition that neither alienation nor determinism are inevitable.

This work then evolves basically as a critique of formal, institutional education. The origin of its inspiration arose long ago, as the outcome of experiential and intuitive knowledge. Self-conscious evaluation of my own educational biography; teaching of grammar and educationally subnormal children; readings in modern literature; experience with my own four children and their infant friends; infant and later junior teaching - all of these experiences have been the real-life bases for which, later, sociological and educational readings provided the clarification and rational interpretation.

The work then is a critique. The critique, however, for me would make little sense, if it were not made with reference to unrealised educational standards or ideals. If it did not consider the plausibility - the realistic possibility or the urgency of attaining those ideals.

It is for this reason that I finish my paper with a consideration of the conceptual ideal of 'dealienation'. If alienation is defined basically as impaired subjectivity - the assumption must be that subjectivity

can exist in a more perfect, more desirable form. If education has a close concern with the processes and development of subjectivity - it would seem necessary to articulate more clearly what is the form of subjectivity we hope to foster in the individual.

SECTION I

THE DEFINITION OF ALIENATION

1. THE NEED TO CONSIDER THE CONCEPT OF ALIENATION

The concept of alienation, like that of 'identity' as discussed by Erikson[1.] - or of 'art' as discussed by Raymond Williams[2.] has had a reason for its genesis and has undergone varying stages in the evolution of its meaning. As with many other complex concepts that have filtered into everyday speech or have been transposed from one scholastic discipline to another, a bastardisation or diffusion of meaning often occurs in its use.

At our present time in history we may be (whether scholastically or intuitively) in the midst of what Ernest Becker calls 'The great Historical Convergence on the problem of Alienation'.[3.] In texts of sociology the word is used profusely, sometimes closely defined; sometimes with meaning implicit. In works of educational theory there is, more often than not, the acceptance of ambiguous or generalised understandings of the word. A commonplace interpretation seems to have become that which presumes alienation in the individual to be the fact or sense of isolation experienced as a separation from societal context. Such an understanding I feel is unhelpful in any critique of education.

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1. E.Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis (Faber & Faber, 1968).

2. R.Williams, The Long Revolution (Chatto & Windus, 1961).

3. E.Becker, 'Mills' Social Psychology and the Great Historical Convergence on the Problem of Alienation'. The New Sociology Essays in Social Science and Social Theory in honour of C.Wright Mills. Edited by Irving Louis Horowitz (Oxford University Press, 1964).

If a pupil becomes alienated from his slum or ghetto origins, yet incorporated into a middle class culture - is he damaged by education and alienated? If, on the other hand, he retains a sense of belongingness to his deprived origins, and rebels against middle class values - is he alienated? If he is a child of professional origins, but turns hippy - is he alienated? If he conforms to the accepted norms of his social class to the extent of resisting constructive change in societal structures - is he alienated?

Confusions abound - and the indiscriminate use of the concept compounds them. It is for this reason that I make a much closer consideration of the meaning of the concept of alienation, as it is used by sociologists, to render it more amenable for use in educational criticism.

I begin by a clarification of the socio-historical origin of the concept in the work of Marx, juxtaposing to this clarification, the ways in which it was possible for later sociologists to use the same word but incorporate into its definition, wider dimensions of meaning.

2. THE SOCIO-HISTORICAL RELATIVITY OF THE ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT OF ALIENATION[1].

Fundamental to the definition of 'alienation' is the consideration of its origin - in the works of Marx, in nineteenth century industrialised society.[2] It is useful to remind ourselves - as Peter Berger suggests in The Social Reality of Religion - that Marx's perception of a damaged or impaired form of existence was in no way a contrast with earlier authentic or dealienated experience but rather a recognition, because of socio-historical developments, of possibilities of being within the compass of all men's achievement. Phylogenetically and ontogenetically man's development has been from the alienated to the dealienated. What is important to recognise is, that only at a certain time in history, in specific societal conditions, was it acknowledged that it lay within the compass of every man and woman to be completely 'individual' - to achieve the powers of self-determination in the economic, political, cultural and social dimensions of life - regardless

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1. Here I refer essentially to the origin of the popularisation of the concept. I have not discussed Hegel's work.

2. My sources for Marx's use of the concept are as follows:-
R.Schacht, Alienation (George Allen & Unwin, 1971)
K.Marx, Das Kapital (George Allen & Unwin, 1949)
J.Horton, 'The Dehumanisation of Anomie and Alienation. A Problem in the Ideology of Sociology'. British Journal of Sociology, XV (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964).
V.I.Lenin, The Teachings of Karl Marx (Martin Lawrence, Ltd., 1933)
H.T.Jones, Southampton University Thesis, 1972.

of status in society.[1] Marx's concept originates therefore at a time of development in history and society when dimensions of humanity could be seen as relevant to all men, and his diagnosis of 'alienation' in the industrial worker is the recognition of this relevance - and of obstacles that were to prevent some men achieving this ideal - this grasp of the world as a human enterprise, when the world at last became for the individual, no longer 'opus alienum', but 'opus proprium'.[2]

The origin of the concept itself therefore is socially and historically relative. Equally the Marxian definition of the concept is a strictly relative one and although in the Marxian use of the word the most fundamental dimensions of its meaning reside, the transposition of the concept as a tool for enquiry into late twentieth century English Education would have little meaning, if the effort is not first made to see, in what way, elaboration, extension and further definition of the concept, in later sociological texts, makes it more amenable for the purpose.

Marx's definition cannot be understood unless we consider first his interpretation of the relationship between man and society. This relationship he contended was an immanent rather than a transcendental one. Society is not seen as over and above men, as it was by Durkheim, but as an extension of men; an indwelling of man. Men by their

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1. R.Williams, op.cit.

2. P.L.Berger, The Social Reality of Religion (Penguin,1967), p.99.

activity produce society and in that activity produce themselves. In further dialectical process society again produces men.[1] Marx's understanding corresponds to the description of social construction offered to us by the contemporary sociologist of knowledge, of Berger and Luckmann's in particular.[2] They trace the process by which man in dialogue with his fellows objectifies and externalises his subjective experience in forms of increasing detachability, so that from gesture to language; from writing to the repository of past writing; from early systems to inherited institutions, the construction is made of a reality that man experiences, internalises through socialisation and, in continuing dialectic, influences again.

Every man therefore is seen by Marx, as he is seen by Berger and Luckmann, to have the potential to 'realise' society in the course of his own self-realisation. Marx's elucidation of the failure of some men to realise the potentials implicit in their humanity results in his definition of 'alienation' and I shall show in three areas in particular how Marx's ideas were socially and historically relative - but how they provided very sure foundations for the contemporary use of the concept - by social critics, by psychologists, by sociologists of knowledge and by educational theorists.

Marx's recognition of alienation was confined to that state of existence he observed in the worker, whom bitingly he described as the 'one who is bringing his own

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1. Marx wrote of the dialectical process, "it is the science of the general laws of motion both of the external world and of human thinking". V.I.Lenin, op.cit., p.15.

2. P.L.Berger & T.Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (Penguin, 1967).

hide to market and has nothing to expect but a hiding'.[1.] Man's labour, that characteristic human and social activity whereby he extends himself and shapes society, is taken from the worker by the capitalist employer, and is made a thing apart from himself. Work thereafter ceases to be an activity that seeks to satisfy a need - but merely a means to satisfy needs external to it. Part of himself is reified - hypostatised into the whole. His capacity for work, the imaginative projection of his work, his power and control over his work and the product of his work are put at the disposal of another. Even surplus productive capacity is appropriated as surplus profit, to create and strengthen the world existing over and above him. Marx's image of Capital, 'dead labour that vampire-like sucks on living labour and lives the more labour it sucks'[2.] suggests vividly the diminishing of humanity, the alienation he saw in the worker's condition. An alienation that whilst separating man from society and his fellow-men, separated him likewise from himself. His impotence to adapt to his social context or effect change in it was compounded by this 'self-alienation' or 'false-consciousness'. Not only is a part of the worker reified and set over and above him, but this very reified creation of his own self is seen as external facticity, appropriated again and internalised, so that there seems little possibility that the worker can come to a true understanding of his own impaired subjectivity.

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1. K.Marx, Das Kapital

2. Ibid., p.216.

This, briefly is Marx's definition of alienation and clearly there exist, therein, indications of the relativity of his thinking. The condition of alienation he recognised as characteristic of the worker - yet in his vampire image there is implicit too that in oppressors as well as oppressed, there was a damaged form of being - a form of 'living death', that was a mockery and a threat to humanity. One questions therefore the extent to which Marx ignored the possibility that there could exist a form of human and social activity that whilst extending self and shaping society, did so in destructive fashion by causing the alienation of others and self-alienation too.

This possibility might be allowed for if we see in Marx the emphasis upon labour as man's most characteristic human and social activity and consequently the importance placed on the economic and political organisation of society as root causes for alienation.

Admittedly his concern is social and cultural and these he sees as damaged by the prevailing institutions of the economy and government - but, if we are to use the concept meaningfully for our critique, it is important to see that just as alienation is not necessarily a characteristic of one isolated segment of a society - neither is it necessarily the result of the reification of man's labour. It could be argued that if any capacity of man is hypostatised into the whole, he is led to experience himself as other than himself, and in this light the concept assumes very wide dimensions since we see the complexity of inter-relations between the many capacities of man; his many needs and psychic drives; and the complexity of the society

within which these capacities are expressed; these needs satisfied.[1.]

Marx's relativity I would claim can be seen in his isolation of one particular class as the subject of his study; the isolation of one particular capacity of man as a source of alienation. In the third area - that of false consciousness - there is similarly a sense in which Marx was 'of his time'. In his appreciation of this phenomenon, Marx was precocious and acute. He did however suggest with optimism that the workers themselves would lose this 'false consciousness', acquire a sense of their true interests, and revolt against exploitation. It is questionable if this optimism would have been possible had Marx been more fully aware of the depth and complexities of subconscious patternings of behaviour and determined patterns of thought - the power of which psychology and sociology has made increasingly clear to us - and which today, just as in Marx's time, are the perplexing obstacles to many of our efforts to change society, school and ourselves. 'The workers have nothing to lose but their chains', Marx wrote, but as Fromm suggests there was much more.[2.]

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1. E.Fromm, The Sane Society

2. Ibid.

Marx's definition of alienation, then, is characterised by these three areas of socio-historical relativity. It does however retain three fundamental dimensions to its meaning which distinguishes it from the word as it often now exists in commonplace usage.

Of central importance is the stress on the concept of impaired subjectivity. Equally relevant is the assumed potential of all men to achieve the ideal of perfected subjectivity or true consciousness. And lastly, is indicated the essential process of dialectic that is necessary to facilitate the higher evolution of all men, as correspondingly society progresses in more just and humane development.

These three dimensions of meaning are still crucial to the use of the word today. In my consideration of twentieth century sociological use, I hope to show that this is so - in spite of the increased ambiguities in use of the word, that have replaced the socio-historical limitations of Marx.

3. A DISCUSSION OF THE RELATIVITY OF CONTEMPORARY DEFINITIONS; THE SUGGESTED DIVISION OF CONTEMPORARY WRITERS INTO THE CATEGORIES OF NORMATIVE WRITERS AND RELATIVISTS

R.D.Laing in The Politics of Experience makes the observation that since so often alienation is deduced to be widespread, it must of consequence afflict some of the writers on alienation! The result must be that the concept of alienation is itself given an alienated interpretation! Certainly, amidst the plethora of definitions and interpretations I encountered in my readings there could be found ample substantiation for Laing's observation. And yet in attempting to make a closer definition who was I to remain immune from the alienation and relativity I observed elsewhere?

I decided no such immunity could be claimed. Whatever conclusions were arrived at would have their own relativity. But that did not invalidate the attempted elucidation of the concept. For a word to be used so profusely and from so many different perspectives, there would seem to exist some phenomenon, whether of experience or perception, that was in need of definition.[1] A closer attention to contemporary use, whilst bearing in mind the dimensions of meaning suggested by Marx, might suggest a more coherent

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1. A similar idea is argued by R.Schacht and his book Alienation is devoted to the attempt to understand this complex concept.

understanding.

An initial reading of relevant contemporary writers who show a preoccupation with the problem of alienation, caused me to separate these writers into two categories.

As an initial step towards an understanding of the concept I felt I could make a distinction between those writers who use absolute or universal criteria against which to evaluate man's condition and are explicit in their value positions, and those whose stress is on the relativity of man's condition in any given age or society, the examination and criticism of this condition therefore being confined very much more to criteria already existent and acceptable within the specific social framework. For these latter, 'Relativists' as I shall call them, the value position is either implicit or denied and their emphasis is on functional description and analysis in a 'containment' framework. For the former, whom for convenience I designate 'Normatives', description and analysis is only a preliminary emphasis before the most important work is done of offering alternatives; discussing possibilities and ascertaining potentialities. In this sense the Normative writers have a transcendental approach to social theory. They step outside the 'status quo' to evaluate specific conditions against given criteria; and in solutions offered, envisage the possibility of, and necessity for, radical change.

Normative writers examine what 'is' from the perspective of what 'could' or 'should be' and integral to their work is the acceptance of responsibility for and commitment to social change and improvement. As C.Wright-Mills would suggest, these writers exercise the 'sociological

imagination' for their work is characterised by the formulation of substantive propositions or theories that attempt to relate socio-historical structures in the widest sense, and offer new conceptions as to the nature of society, the nature of man or to new facts known about them.[1] Their work then is characterised by the formulation of hypotheses, by the assumption of explicit value positions and by a commitment to action that is made evident in the suggestions they make pertaining to change in either human consciousness or in social structure.

The category of writers termed 'Relativists', however, with their emphasis on functional description and analysis, in what Marcuse terms the 'containment' framework stress as valid to their study what 'exists' in specific social situations.[2] Objectivity and scientific neutrality are claimed as methodological necessities and commitment to or responsibility for action are not assumed to be within the compass of their investigations - although extrapolations from agreed conclusions might seem almost to be an inevitability. Both groups of writers though, 'Normatives' and 'Relativists' alike, use the concept of alienation in their works of social criticism and social investigation and although analysing society from what at first seems to be contrary perspectives, a surprising similarity of conclusions is arrived at by both groups. This

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1. C.Wright-Mills, The Sociological Imagination (Oxford University Press, 1959). He writes of this quality of mind as that which "seems most dramatically to promise an understanding of the intimate realities of ourselves in connection with larger social realities". p.546.

2. H.Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1945)

is a similarity that helps to resolve for us some of the paradoxes encountered when the term 'alienation' is used with the connotations of one particular school, and also makes much more clear to us the value of the concept when making a critique of the present educational system.

I shall consider first a selection of contemporary 'Normative' writers to examine in what way they extend and elaborate the Marxian definition of alienation and then juxtapose to this definition that deduced from writings from the Relativist perspective.

4. THE CONSIDERATION OF NORMATIVE WRITERS' USE OF THE CONCEPT OF ALIENATION

(a) My choice of four Normative writers

Fromm,[1] Marcuse,[2] Williams[3] and McLuhan[4] are writers I have chosen to consider in this context. Accepting as a premise to their works that the relationship between man and society is an immanent one, they have all written extensively in criticism of Western, technological society. They all isolate the condition of 'alienation' or

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1. E.Fromm, The Sane Society (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956)
   Man for himself (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949)
   The Art of Loving (Bantam Paperback, 1956)

2. H.Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 195
   Eros and Civilisation (Sphere, 1969)

3. R.Williams, The Long Revolution (Chatto & Windus, 1961)
   Culture and Society (Chatoo & Windus, 1960)
   Communications (Chatto & Windus, 1966)

4. M.McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962).

'false consciousness' as both a cause of social ills and a barrier to social change and improvement; they all resemble Marx in making explicit their value positions, suggesting that despite the varying conditions of man, in different cultures and at different times in history, there is in his evolution recognisable stages of progress by which he is seen to develop more nearly his humanity - and the humanity of the society which, in dialectic, he makes. The paradox noted by all these writers is that at our present time in history, when ostensibly the means for all men to progress to full humanity are present - regression is the actuality of existence and experience. To evaluate and understand this regression these writers use universal criteria - and in using these criteria explore how far this diminished humanity is the result of the prevalence of alienation.

I will not enter into a complex methodological discussion as to the validity of the Normative standpoint and their assumption of universal criteria whereby man's condition can be evaluated.[1.]

It is interesting though that Peter Berger in A Rumour of Angels, whilst admitting the relativity of knowledge and its relationship with the social conditions under which it is

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1. Of interest is C.Wright Mill's discussion of this question in The Sociological Imagination and also that of J.Horton in his article "The Dehumanisation of Anomie and Alienation. A Problem in the Ideology of Sociology", op.cit. Horton concludes that it is unsociological to deny the influence of values, whatever one's values or value confusion. p.298.

formulated or 'projected' - draws the corollary from this that, since we know our own knowledge to be relative, we cannot exclude other forms of knowledge from our scrutiny, since knowledge of the relativity of knowledge is itself relative! It is possible therefore to be open to the findings of past or cross-cultural consciousness since we are aware of the limitations of the relativity of our own modern consciousness. Fromm, Marcuse, Williams and McLuhan would accept this conclusion of Berger's, but from a commonsense standpoint. They would suggest that historically and anthropologically standards can be deduced conducive to man's evolution in specifically human dimensions. Fromm deduces these standards from a psychological analysis; Marcuse's interest is psychological and ideological; Williams and McLuhan are more alike in deducing criteria from a historical perspective that places cultural and linguistic expression in a very central position. All four, however, in spite of the difference of their emphases see life and social construction as an inter-related complexity, so that change in isolated institutions, economic, political or social, is impossible. They express faith in an organic form of change in society that takes effect in all areas. Since the source of organic growth is deduced as possible only with an individual change in consciousness, the relevance of their ideas to our consideration of educational change is indisputable, since educational systems influence so strongly the formation of individual consciousness.

(b) <u>The state and extent of alienation, as defined by some Normative writers</u>

How then do these Normative writers describe the state and extent of alienation? 'Man does not experience

himself as the active bearer of his own power and richness, but as an impoverished "thing" dependent upon powers outside of himself onto whom he has projected his living substance'[1]. Fromm writes. 'Individuals identify themselves with the existence that is imposed upon them and have in it their own development and satisfaction',[2] is Marcuse's comment. Men exist as 'servants' concludes Williams, pretending to an identification they do not feel - or worse still as 'vagrants' for whom life and selves lack meaning.[3]

For McLuhan man exists in a state of denied experience - his subconscious becoming 'the evermounting slag-heap of rejected awareness'.[4] In all four writers emerges the description of alienation in modern society as a state akin to that described by Marx as existing in the nineteenth century worker. Although now seen as a characteristic of all classes and due to more than economic or political influences, alienation is defined as Marx defined it. Man exists without autonomy and without freedom. He is not merely captive to the institutions that determine his life, he is captive also to the false

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1. E.Fromm, The Sane Society, p.124.
2. H.Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, p.23.
3. R.Williams, The Long Revolution, pp.88-90.
4. M.McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy, p.247.

consciousness that accepts or even welcomes them. He assumes the character of 'robot' susceptible to manipulation and control; the richness of his inner experience is repressed or denied; the power and meaning of his action is divorced from the essence of his being. In short he verges towards non-being or insanity.

This is the depressing description of a modern consciousness so prevalent in society, that these writers suggest it is indeed 'social character'. This is the 'social character' that Reisman defines as being that aspect of personality shared by most members of the same culture, which predisposes those members to wish to act as they have to act, to perpetuate the culture in its present form.[1.] Modern consciousness then is assumed to be an unhappy one by the Normative writers. They observe, as does the socio-psychologist Melvin Seeman, that man in this mode of consciousness experiences himself as powerless. He has the expectation 'that his own behaviour cannot determine the occurrence or the outcomes, or reinforcements he seeks'.[2.] He experiences himself also as meaningless with a low expectancy about predicting the future outcomes of his behaviour. Equally strong is his sense of self estrangement when the self is experienced as an alien or a thing and confirmation for his identity resides entirely

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1. Reisman, The Lonely Crowd (New Yale & Yale University Press, 1950). "In a large society", he writes, "institutions evoke within individuals the appropriate character". p.XXII.

2. M.Seeman, 'The Meaning of Alienation', American Sociological Review (1959), p.784.

in the other.[1] Reisman's exploration of this 'other-directed' social character alerts one to the prevalence of alienation, for by his suggestion that in fact men can and do direct their lives solely according to the criteria of other people's expectations so that 'sense of self' ceases even to be a reality, in specific social conditions. Such a social analysis as Reisman's confirms the conclusions of the Normative school - alienated existence is so pervasive and commonplace that it is at times accepted as the only mode of existence possible in present day society.

In all classes of society; in all walks of life; in all areas of activity alienated existence is pervasive. It is prevalent not only because man's capacity for work is impaired, but because man is no longer free to develop those psychic qualities and needs, that exist over and above the organic, but distinguish man in his humanity. Fromm suggests that these psychic needs can be ascertained objectively by the study of man and unless there is freedom to develop and

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1. In this synopsis of M.Seeman's article, op.cit., I have not included his category of 'isolation'. Certainly, man with the alienated mode of consciousness can experience himself as 'cut off' from society and community, but even more isolated can be the experience of individuals who seek to escape false consciousness. This, I shall refer to later in my work with reference to 'dealienated' consciousness. Writers like James Joyce and D.H.Lawrence, for instance, became alienated from society but they could not be described as alienated in the way I come to define it.

fulfil these needs, not only is man impaired and diminished in his humanity, but the society he makes becomes sick, damaged or even insane.

In this discussion of man's psychic needs the Normative writers extend considerably our understanding of the concept of alienation. They stress the need for 'work' as the need in man to transcend his state as 'creature' by creativity.[1.] Every man is characterised by this basic human potential to be creative and productive. It may not necessarily be in his 'work' situation that this need be fulfilled. Where ever possible this ideal should be aimed for; but in all areas of life creativity must be allowed expression and must be recognised as inseparable from true humanity and essential to dealienated experience.[2.]

Man too must be free to love. Just as his capacity to create distinguishes man from animal, so also does his capacity to love. It is this capacity most of all that Fromm and Marcuse emphasise as impaired by modern civilisation. Love, writes Fromm, is manifest in the non-symbiotic union where there is desire for neither submission or domination. Only when men can love each other in this way can they exist in genuine community.[3.] It is possible now,

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1. E.Fromm, The Sane Society, p.34.

2. R.Williams, The Long Revolution; Culture and Society.

3. E.Fromm, The Sane Society. "Love is union", he writes, "under the condition of retaining the separateness and integrity of one's own self". p.31.
The same idea is dealt with at much greater length in The Art of Loving.

Marcuse contends, with the advance of technology, to organise life in other ways than according to the strict dictates of the 'Reality Principle'.[1] 'Ananke' - the harsh fact of scarcity, demanded that man repress his human capacities to love and create. Men attempted to mitigate 'ananke' by disciplined work - with the result that 'Eros', the life principle of man, became suppressed, and love became divorced from many areas of life and was confined almost exclusively to sexual expression. Man has become alienated then because his psychic need to love is denied development and expression. Love in all its forms is repressed. Love for fellowmen; love in its orientation towards the physical world; love in its unity with creative expression - all are impaired, as is perhaps most markedly of all that love or affective concern that in synthesis with cognitive intelligence is the alliance most fruitful in substantial intellectual endeavour.[2]

The expression and development of creativity and love in all areas of social life must be encouraged, Marcuse suggests. Only with such development can man escape his isolation to gain a sense of relatedness and rootedness without which his existence is intolerable and meaningless. Marcuse

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1. H.Marcuse, Eros and Civilisation

2. J.Flavell, The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget (Van Nostrand,1963);
J.S.Bruner, Towards a Theory of Instruction (Oxford University Press, 1966).
Piaget and Bruner both isolate this cognitive, affective dichotomy in schools' transmission of knowledge and see it as an alienating influence on the child.

and McLuhan suggest it is an impaired 'rootedness' in society when man experiences himself only as belonging essentially to his family - his nation or his race. The rootedness man needs is that which extends his relatedness beyond such narrow bonds, to that sense of belonging by which man experiences himself as rooted in humanity. The 'Global Village' now is a reality. The world can no longer make sense until all men learn to share this knowledge of their common humanity.

Alienation results from the denial of love and of creativity. It results also from the fact that in modern society man cannot fulfil his psychic need to understand. From man's most primitive origins the effort has been made, usually by a religion, to formulate 'a picture', 'a symbolic canopy'[1.] with which could be interpreted the paradoxes of human existence. Such paradoxes, the ecstasy of love and human union, the terror of death, pain and solitariness could not be explained only by reference to the explications of social construction and so quite often this understanding was achieved by reference to some cosmological configuration. Man needs such a frame of orientation and devotion, Fromm would claim.[2.] Not only must it be an intellectual projection. It must be one to which he can relate also with feelings and senses. Without it man senses himself as lost. He senses

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1. P.L.Berger writes in The Social Reality of Religion (Penguin, 1967):

   "The gigantic projections of religious consciousness, whatever else they may be, constitute the historically most important effort of man to make reality humanly meaningful at any price." p.106.

2. E.Fromm, The Sane Society, p.66.

himself to be an alien and unable to 'understand' the realities of his existence and experience, he forgets, ignores, denies or represses them. As Bruner says, he becomes bland in his humanity. Unmoved by either joy or suffering, he becomes as unreal to himself as others are to him.

Alienation can be seen to be extensive in our society in the opinion of the Normative writers, because man no longer fulfils those typically human potentials to love, understand and create. He is no longer 'the centre from which living acts of love and reason radiate'.[1.] Why this is so is a more perplexing question to answer. The Normative writers attempt to answer it in subtle and intricate detail but I would suggest that later when I come to juxtapose the definition of alienation deduced from Relativist writers - a more substantial, more penetrating answer is suggested.

(c) Normative suggestions for possible remedies for alienation

Without understanding the causes of alienation, it is impossible to suggest a way to escape it. Marx concluded that the cause of alienation in the worker was the capitalist control of work - of the means of production; of labour; of the product of labour and of profit. Change this capitalist control - allow worker-participation (or encourage workers to take it for themselves) and alienation would disappear. By the writings of the Normatives, however,

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1. Ibid.

the state of alienation is shown to be the result of a complexity of causes - influences that maintain that condition are manifest in all institutions of society. Economic and political influences have their importance. Williams, especially, is emphatic in his censure of technological and political arrangements that deny or limit meaningful participation - and Fromm's suggestions too, for 'humanistic communitarian socialism' show him to be alive to the reality of economic and political structures - to the need for increased decentralisation and participation.

Much more important however to our understanding of possible remedies for alienation is that exploration of Marcuse and McLuhan which reveals the effects of societal superstructures to be secondary in their influence. These superstructures after all are maintained by collective consciousness, or the dearth of it. If they are seen to be repressive or alienating, one must question the infrastructure of human consciousness in order to see the determinants of behaviour and the conditioners of thought. Here a distinction is made by the Normatives. On the one hand they expose those determining, conditioning influences that destroy man's capacity for involved thinking and impair his ability to act according to light of his reasoning. Fromm and Williams deduce these influences to be possible only where man experiences false needs. He becomes susceptible to prestige, compulsive consumption; to receptive, passive forms of leisure, and allows himself to be distracted, amused and diminished by spurious occupations and ideas. 'Bad art' becomes widespread and participation in it is

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vicarious, futile and enervating.

For some, then, alienation is compounded by the distraction from thought and experience. For others, though, Marcuse would argue, in the essential processes of their thought, is the source of alienation. The pervasive legitimations of our societies in the West are dominated by one-dimensional forms of language and discourse. The colossal, complex, inter-related powers of government, technology and bureaucracy have not the intimate control that is manifest in cultural forms, in ideologies (explicit or entrenched), and in language. The 'routinisation' which Fromm bemoans as the 'enthronement of the commonplace' is seen by Marcuse to result from the reduction of man's existence to one dimension; the dimension of the empirical, the operational, the behavioural and the rational. Like Reich[2.] and like Laing,[3.] Marcuse mourns the loss in man of the 'sense of the unknowable'.

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1. R.Williams, Culture and Society
R.Hoggart, The Uses of Literacy (London,Chatto & Windus, 1957).

2. W.Reich, The Greening of America (Allen Lane, 1971). "Rarely is there someone", he writes, "who will admit to being overwhelmed by something totally new". p.62.

3. R.D.Laing, Politics of Experience and the Bird of Paradise (Penguin, 1967).
In his chapter on transcendental experience, he writes, "We live in a secular world. To adapt to this world the child abdicates its ecstasy". p.118.

Transcendental concepts in philosophy are denigrated as obscurities and illusions. The Platonic concepts of 'beauty, truth and goodness' although discussed throughout the history of civilisation, become suddenly redundant. Language becomes reified and functionalised and those forms of speech that have within them the means to transcend what is already defined - the image, metaphor or allusion - become part of esoteric expression and lose their currency in commonplace communication. Language ceases then to be capable of transcendental expression. It can no longer suggest in one reality the dimension of another.

In discourse, Marcuse argues a similar rationalisation is apparent with the loss of the dialectic of thought. No longer persist the tensions between the 'is' and the 'ought'; between 'essence' and 'appearance'; between 'potentiality' and 'actuality'. Man and thing alike are identified with their functions and become more real in that identification than in being distinguished from their functions. Ideals of past cultures, religions and rituals are no longer seen as meaningful expressions of another dimension of reality. They can not be invoked as the 'Grand Refusal' of present ills; for by present society their truths are seen to be esoteric or irrelevant or are reduced to a form of commodity that can be translated into the prosaic and mundane. Paul Valery describes poetry as 'le travail qui fait vivre en nous ce qui n'existe pas'. Alienated man in his one-dimensional experience can find no certainty in what does not exist.

Like the Chinese man who put all his faith in the machine 'he has become uncertain in the strivings of his soul'. He lives in the one dimension of his language, thought and consciousness and cannot escape it.[1.]

(d) Insights gained from Normative use of the concept of alienation

This examination of the Normative use of the concept of alienation has shown how much more elaborate the understanding of the concept has become since first used by Marx. Although the analysis of the subjective condition remains similar, it is now seen to be a condition prevalent in society and a characteristic of all classes of people. It has been shown also to be a state of experience that cannot easily be changed. Men either do not think or think in deterministic fashion. Social institutions affect yet deny most men. More sadly still man denies himself and his fellows.

And yet - the Normatives suggest - we know why this is so! Man has not developed his psychic needs to create, love and understand. Why cannot we change society so that those needs may be satisfied? To change society however those needs must first seek expression. Societal organisation makes this impossible. How then can we solve this conundrum?

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1. McLuhan's exploration of the controlling, determining power of excessive rationality is very similar to Marcuse's although he attributes its dominance to the loss of synthesia in man - that interplay of the audile, tactile and visual which frees imagination.

I would suggest that the Normative writers do not answer this question, although their insights into the existence and cause of alienation are profound. It is when we consider the use of the concept by the Relativist writers that our understanding deepens. It is then that it is possible to see in more precise detail the origin of impaired subjectivity - and the possibility too of escape from diminished experience. It is an escape of the greatest significance to the educational theorists, who have as their greatest responsibility, the formation, in the young of true, unimpaired consciousness.

5. THE CONSIDERATION OF THE USE OF THE CONCEPT BY RELATIVIST WRITERS

(a) My choice of the three Relativist writers

In juxtaposition to these concluding paragraphs that summarize the Normative definition of alienation, I will posit my interpretation of several Relativist writers, who also discuss alienation - not as measured against objective universal criteria but as a phenomenon typical of man in existing social structures. This exploration too has its complexities. It is important to remember - and Fromm reminds us of this[1.] - that 'Relativists', in assuming such a stance, must themselves be reminded of the relativity of their own thoughts. Since they see alienation as a constituent of social character, they must themselves be examined critically lest in their analysis of alienation there are indications of alienated thinking.[2.] In my examination

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1. The same reminder is given by P.L.Berger in Rumour of Angels. "We cannot appeal to alleged modern consciousness as standard to judge past consciousness with". p.59;

   and also by J.Horton, op.cit., Horton, for instance, dismisses the value-free stance of R.K.Merton, who, in discussing anomie and the disjunction in America between legitimate goals and opportunity structures, is himself accepting the success and self-interest ethic of American middle classes.

2. R.D.Laing, The Politics of Experience and the Bird of Paradise (Penguin, 1967). In the introduction to this book, Laing writes,

   > Our alienation goes to the roots. The realisation of this is the essential springboard for any serious reflection on any aspect of present inter-human life. p.12.

I will keep this possibility in mind as a potentially limiting factor in the Relativist's definition of alienation. In spite of this, however, I would suggest that quite marked similarities emerge to the definitions of the Normatives - supplementing and validating those definitions and providing for us a synthetic concept of wide and complex dimensions. It is one that I find invaluable in making a penetrating critique of modern education.

To explore the Relativists' understanding of alienation I have considered ideas of Berger and Luckmann, Peter Berger and Goffmann. Although the emphasis in all three is upon the formation of 'social character' or 'successful socialisation', the discussions pertaining to alienation are intricate and sometimes ambiguous and for this reason I find it more convenient to consider first the sociologists of knowledge and then the social interactionist.

(b) The concept of alienation as it is referred to by the sociologists of knowledge, P.L. Berger and T.Luckmann and Peter Berger

In The Social Construction of Reality by Berger and Luckmann - the notion of alienation is suggested primarily as a consequence of unsuccessful socialisation. Just as reality (that which is taken for granted in a society) and knowledge (the total fabric of meaning) are socially relative - so too is man's identity and sense of self. Self is almost entirely a social product 'a particular, culturally relative form'[1] and 'man's self-production is

1. P.L.Berger & T.Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality.

always a social enterprise'. Since identity-formation or self-formulation are identified so closely with successful socialisation, it must be admitted that in our present pluralist, highly complex society, there exists a strong possibility that alienation will develop.

Whereas the Normative writers concentrated their attention on alienation in adult experience,[1] Berger and Luckmann examine its origin at the level of secondary socialisation. The individual is presumed by them to have the ontological security afforded by successful primary socialisation within the nexus of the family. In the pluralist society the individual is exposed to varying identification structures. Since he is unable to internalise the views of society - an impossibility in the modern society that lacks a stable symbolic canopy of legitimation - he has the need to internalise the views of his group. That group could be socially, educationally, functionally or theoretically defined.

Three possibilities are shown to emerge for the individual. All of them are contributory to an alienated mode of experience. Since the individual is faced with alternative identity patterns, he can accept one role but long for another. Being able to ask, 'Is this the real me?' he finds it possible to assume a palliative identity - a

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1. Not exclusively; their references to educational influences are valuable and I shall consider them later - but they do not explore identity-formation to the same extent as Berger and Luckmann.

'fantasy self' for whom action is no longer a need or perhaps even a possibility. His being is disengaged from his socialised self and he can exist in a state of false consciousness or illusion. He has become very much the 'robot' figure that Fromm and Marcuse describe. He is passive and susceptible to manipulation and control and his condition is compounded by the forces of advertising and popular entertainment that demand no more than vicarious experience.[1.]

This, then, is one possibility for the individual who formulates his identity amidst a plurality of models. Another would be that experience of man who, whilst accepting a certain pattern of secondary socialisation, retains his strongest loyalty for his initial primary identity. He might cry like Portnoy did, 'My endless childhood! Which I won't relinquish - or which won't relinquish me!'[2.] Or sing in impotence as Melanie does, 'Mama, you reared me wrong',[3.]

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1. John Berger, Ways of Seeing (B.B.C. Publication, Pelican Original, 1972). This point is made succinctly by John Berger. He writes,

> The pursuit of individual happiness has been acknowledged as a universal right. Yet the existing social conditions make the individual feel powerless. He lives in the contradiction between what he is and what he would like to be. Either he then becomes fully conscious of the contradiction and its causes, and so joins the political struggle for a full democracy, which entails amongst other things the overthrow of capitalism; or else he lives, continually subject to an envy which, compounded with his sense of powerlessness, dissolves into recurrent day-dreams.

p.148.

2. Philip Roth, Portnoy's Complaint (Jonathan Cape, 1970), p.271.

3. Melanie, "Mama, Mama". Song from the Buddah Record, Leftover Wine.

but basically he will experience himself as alienated - the self as adult, alien to the self as child.[1.]

More frightening still is a third possibility that Berger and Luckmann suggest. It is one not discussed at all by the Normative writers, yet I feel it is a form of alienation most prevalent in our society and one for which our educational system has considerable responsibility. This is the mode of experience that develops when secondary socialisation is successful; but successful only at the cognitive level. In other words the individual assumes certain roles in society - usually in his career or in citizenship - but does so without any affective concern or commitment. He does not play at what he is not - as Portnoy found he had to - he plays at what he is.

This is no manipulable form of consciousness. It is no 'robot' alienation, but rather the mode of subjectivity that can itself manoeuvre and manipulate, and can do so in destructive fashion since affect and concern are conspicuously absent. Aldous Huxley in Eyeless in Gaza explores this form of subjectivity and it is interesting that in that book, he suggests its presence is just as strong amongst intellectuals - with regard to their ideas - as amongst capitalists with regard to their profits! 'Cool alternation' is how Berger and Luckmann describe this form of alienation and when it exists, society is sustained no

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1. This particular form of alienation although often producing the 'exile' from society, has also produced some of the most dealienated individuals - D.H. Lawrence, Miller, Joyce and many others.

longer by the action and objectivations of its participants but becomes the product of a series of reciprocal manipulations.[1.]

These then are three alternatives for the individual in the formation of his sense of self; the alternatives to successful, non-alienated socialisation. In The Social Reality of Religion, however, we see a further complexity in this exploration of developing alienation - for here Berger stresses that just as complete separation of role from self was a form of alienation, so also is that contrary experience - that of complete identification with 'socialised self'. What Berger is now emphasising is, that an a priori condition for the achievement of dealienated existence,[2.] is the need for a certain disidentification. Just as it is essential to re-appropriate one's social self - the self that is made self by others - by the recollection that it too is a product of the individual.[3.] In other words in both the apprehension

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1. This distinction between action and manipulation is an intricate one that Berger and Luckmann do not discuss in detail. It is, however, considered by R.D.Laing, Self and Others (Pelican, 1972).

   Briefly, action is suggested to be that behaviour expressive of experience that takes into account the responses of others as well as self. Manipulation, however, is behaviour that is motivated by intellectual cognizance of the others' response but only with a view to using that response in order to benefit self.

2. The term "non-alienated" I have used already to describe the individual who is socialised without very obvious diminishment. The term "dealienated" I now introduce to describe the person who, whilst adequately socialised, has the capacity to transcend his socialisation.

3. A similar point is made by Sartre in his study of Genet, which is discussed by R.D.Laing and D.G.Cooper in Reason and Violence. A Decade of Sartre's Philosophy (Tavistock Publications, 1964).

of the world and of self it is necessary for the dialectical relationship to be maintained in consciousness. Here is a further elaboration of the Marxian concept. It is the phenomenological stress on the importance of individual consciousness; the consciousness that apprehends the world, and experience, as more than one sphere of reality.[1.]

This is a considerable development from Berger's stance in The Social Construction of Reality. In that book failure in socialisation was stressed as a reason for alienated development. In The Social Reality of Religion however it is made more explicit that in spite of socialisation, there remains also that part of the individual that is termed 'the unsocialised self' and between these two aspects of self must be maintained the dialectic-in-consciousness, if dealienated existence is to be possible. Existence that identifies entirely with socialised self admits of no self that remains unsocialised and hence can accept only the reality of the commonplace experience - that which is already accepted and taken for granted in the given society where socialisation occurs. The 'socialised' self, therefore, denies, explains away or dismisses as irrelevant any indications in their subjectivity of the possible existence of other dimensions of experience that do not easily conform to

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1. M.Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962)
A.Schutz, op.cit.

accepted interpretations of 'reality'.[1] One-dimensional experience is the norm; alienation is prevalent.

Here we arrive at a similarity to conclusions about alienation that have been offered for our consideration by the Normative writers. Since dealienated existence is alive to the dialogue of consciousness - the dialectic between socialised and unsocialised self - realities other than the 'commonplace reality' impinge upon it. Berger and Luckmann describe these other realities as those 'marginal experiences' when dreams, fears, death, loneliness and chaos assume a disproportionate importance and proximity in our experience. Berger in A Rumour of Angels offers another description of non-commonplace realities. These realities are the joyous ones - the realities of knowledge, art forms, loving relationships, humour and religion; all of which, in some way indicate a transcending of the everyday world and a relativizing of the human condition. Dealienation therefore would suggest the existence of a consciousness that denies neither the horror nor the joy of the experience of man - realities in life, that although subordinate to paramount reality, interact with that commonsense reality to extend and enrich its meaning.

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1. This experience has been given artistic formulation by Thomas Mann in his short story Tonio Kröger:

> The good scholars, and the solid majority - they don't find the masters funny, they don't write verses, their thoughts are all about things that people do think about and can talk about out loud. How regular and comfortable they must feel, knowing that everybody knows just where they stand!

T.Mann, Death in Venice
p.133.

A criticism of The Social Construction of Reality must be levelled at this stage. It is stressed there that these joyous realities are 'enclaves of meaning' within commonplace reality, to which return is often difficult. I do not dispute the subjective experience of perplexity in transition from one reality to another[1.] - the dream-like sensation of closing a novel after hours of engrossed reading or the adjustment to people in a tube train after taking leave of a cherished friend - but what I feel Berger and Luckmann have failed to make explicit here, is that in the 'return' again to commonplace reality, return is made with renewed experience, life and richness. With a contribution, whether in terms of understanding or affection, that will in its turn affect, alter and extend that commonplace reality to make it different from what it was before. In other words, without the recognition and transitions from these other realities, would there be any commonplace reality at all or would the world be the 'dungeon in which the person perished, the uninhabitable darkness', that James Baldwin describes.[2.]

How strange it is then that Berger and Luckmann and Berger alone writing from a Relativist position show themselves to be in alliance very strongly with Fromm in their description of potentialities in man and ideal, de-alienated existence. Those 'signals of transcendence'

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1. Again an experience discussed, at times, despairingly by Mann in both Tristan (1902) and Tonio Kröger (1903)

2. James Baldwin, Another Country

that Berger claims to have been 'prototypical human gestures' in all societies and all ages[1]. - activities in seeking knowledge; in creative endeavour; in humour; in ritual and religion to give meaning to the 'realities' of existence and indicate norms for a good life; in relating in loving, non-symbiotic union - all these are termed by Fromm the fruits and means of 'productive Orientation' without which man cannot survive. By Marcuse they are termed fruits of the free development of 'eros'.

Fromm and Marcuse might suggest that without these activities man becomes a robot; Berger and Luckmann - that man becomes robot or more dangerously manipulator. But neither can deny their importance to man's lives.

There is a reservation though to the conclusion, that cannot be ignored. It is that despite the isolation of these activities as the fruits of dealienation, it must be kept in mind that these very fruits that are capable of extending by knowledge and love the commonplace world can themselves become the causes of alienation. They can in fact make alienation more profound. Acceptance of a religion, when the dialectic-in-consciousness is lost, by positing an alien reality against the human, can produce an experience of reification greater than the reification that is socially produced.[2] An institution like marriage

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1. Peter Berger, Rumour of Angels, p.70.

2. Peter Berger, The Social Reality of Religion, p.99.

validated by society for its 'natural' order acquires a sacred and permanent character when legitimated by religion. The whole cosmic order is called upon to support the order of the natural world. It can be forgotten that the origin of the institution of marriage lies in the activity of humans.[1.]

As with religion the reification of artistic forms can be a cause of alienation. This might be seen to happen sometimes in schools, when 'classic' works of literature are studied in imposed and methodical fashion. Often is forgotten, during that process of cognitive cudgelling, that far more necessary is the subjective apprehension of the work of art in consciousness; in involvement; in affection; often in solitariness and peace.[2.] Similar observations could be made about the reification of knowledge;[3.] of relationships that degenerate into interactions,[4.] even of humour. But that is a subject in itself!

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1. Ibid., p.102.

2. R.Williams, The Long Revolution, p.31.

3. G.Esland, "Teaching and Learning as the Organisation of Knowledge": M.Young, Knowledge and Control. An Approach to the Study of Curricula as Socially Organised Knowledge (Collier-Macmillan, 1971).
Esland says of the objectivist's view of knowledge, "it disguises as given a world which has to be continually interpreted". p.75.

3. R.D.Laing, Self and Others, Chapters I, 2, 7, and The Politics of Experience and The Bird of Paradise, Chapters 1 & 4.

There is then a very important way in which these sociologists of knowledge extend and clarify the Normative exploration of alienation. We cannot accept Fromm's conclusions as to 'Productive Orientation' without laying great emphasis upon the dialectic-in-consciousness. Williams, admittedly, would interpret this dialectic as the essential process of creativity in life; the continued activation in consciousness that appropriates anew what exists or has already been perceived in nature or in social expression - but makes possible too the formulation, the definition of what does not exist - "Ce qui n'existe pas" as Valery writes.[1.] Sense of self, then, cannot be understood unambiguously as a "unity of subjective experience".[2.] Fromm's stress on self as agent might suggest that interpretation - but what Berger makes more clear is that "self as agent and subject of his own powers"[3.] is a self within whom there always exists the tensions of consciousness - the dialectic of meaning, action and reflection - that presupposes an openness to experience and an openness to self.[4.]

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1. The sources of this idea were R.Williams, The Long Revolution and Susanne Langer, Problems of Art (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957); Feeling, Form and Expressiveness Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953).

2. E.Fromm, The Sane Society.

3. Ibid., p.205.

4. A.Schutz, op.cit. Schutz writes, "Those experiences are meaningful which are grasped reflectively". p.69.

The individual must have the ability to stand back from his action. He must be able to reflect and distance himself from it in order to experience himself not only as agent of what he does, but self-critical, evaluative agent, who is aware not only of the extent of his commitment in activity, but also of the tensions in his consciousness, that enable him to adjust, adapt or alter the ongoing processes of his life.

What might be questioned in this new awareness of dealienated consciousness, is its ontogenetic status. How far the stress on knowledge of present subjectivity might be seen as related to the ontogenetic development of the subjectivity of the individual. As we observed with Berger and Luckmann the basis of ontological security in the individual is assumed before consideration is given to identity - formation at the secondary level. I would suggest that very often such a basis can not be assumed. That in the individual's grasp of his own subjectivity, by the dialectic-in-consciousness, no less important is it for him to attempt to grasp his past subjectivity - the subjectivity of his childhood.[1.] This effort has been seen

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1. E.Erikson, op.cit.

Erikson suggests that the life of a man is governed by the epigenetic principle. Anything that grows has its ground plan. Out of that plan parts arise and each part has its time of special ascendancy. Adolescent and adult autonomy rest on the characteristics of trust, autonomy and initiative - those qualities of personality acquired in early childhood. It would seem necessary, therefore, to attempt to grasp past subjectivity, to understand one's own development. It is interesting that very many novelists begin their work with a novel that makes such an attempt. e.g.:
F.Scott Fitzgerald, This Side of Paradise
James Baldwin, Go Tell it on the Mountain
Edna O'Brien, A Country Girl
James Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man
D.H.Lawrence, Sons and Lovers

to be made by artists; by processes of religious meditation; by psycho-analysis and by independent self-examination or meditation. It raises the problem of the possibility of the individual having access to subconscious or repressed experience. Although a difficult question, I feel it is highly relevant to the discussion of alienation. It is one I will return to when considering 'tensions of consciousness' with reference to education.

In summary, these are the important contributions made by Berger and Luckmann to our understanding of alienation. In discussing causes they have brought to our attention not only what is commonly noticed - the difficulties of identity formation in the pluralist society but also they have increased our awareness of the importance of continuity between primary and secondary processes of socialisation. If within the development of the individual we remember the corresponding transition from primary to secondary thought mechanisms and the close connection observed between creativity and access to endoceptual levels of thought[1.],

1. I.S.Arieti, The Intra-Psychic Self
Endoceptual thought is suggested by Arieti to be an intermediary stage between thought governed by the image and conceptual thought. It is pre-verbal and non-communicable. It characterises the thought of young children and people of artistic temperament and is also present in some types of dreams. It is the grasp or awareness of something not altogether tangible, definite or definable and yet has conviction and validity within subjective experience. Empathy between people, Arieti says, might have more to do with the sharing of endo-ceptual rather than conceptual thought. It can however change to be translated into concept, artistic form, exocept or a more definite feeling or image. Its proximity to the inner world of the individual and its relevance to the understanding of the complexity and depth of experience, suggest that it is not a form of thought to be ignored at the secondary level in schools.

Berger and Luckmann's stress is something we cannot ignore - especially when our concern is educational where the dichotomy between primary and secondary structures of schools is pronounced. A second contribution is that alienated experience is now understood to be other than passive and receptive. It can also exist in a manipulative form, producing the man who is governed by expediency and lacks the affective criteria of concern or commitment. Thirdly, and perhaps most important of all, there has been a penetration to the internal processes of subjectivity itself. An attempt has been made to understand the intra-psychic dialectic of true consciousness; the consciousness that does not reject experiences of 'marginal realities' but sees them as relevant to self and to the commonsense world.

Berger and Luckmann began by considering identity-formation by reference to socialisation. Alienation could be seen then as a failure in the socialisation process. They progress however to consider identity from an almost Normative perspective. One sentence in The Social Construction of Reality suggested to me the possibility of this development. An individual they suggest in this book, is one with the potential to migrate between a number of available worlds, having "awarely constructed a self out of materials provided by a number of different identities".[1.]

This sentence does not suggest that via the concept of 'social character' alone, we can consider what alienation is. Berger and Luckmann have made an implicit value statement in their use of 'awarely'. The word has enormous

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1. B.L.Berger & T.Luckmann, op.cit., p.190.

significance. By its use is suggested the artistic, psychological and religious connotations of man 'aware', of necessity possessing a degree of autonomy and independence regardless of his social context or form of socialisation. 'Awarely' suggests also the dialectic-in-consciousness defined by the Phenomenological school.

I shall examine Goffman's work[1]. in the light of my examination of the sociologists of knowledge, to see if in his relativity there is a development in the concept of alienation that approximates to that of Berger and Luckmann.

(c) The contribution of the social interactionist, Goffman, to the understanding of alienation

In Goffman's dramaturgical approach that examines the 'presentation of self' in the social context and the inter-relationships between that individual presentation, the social interaction of which it is a part, and the on-going presentation of the institution or establishment, in which the interaction occurs, there is a relativity more pronounced than in Berger and Luckmann. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life is strictly a study of identity patterns prevalent today in American society and although of great value in indicating modes of behaviour and adaptation in existing social life, it also contains many ambiguities, begs many questions, and these I feel must be queried and resolved if we are to understand Goffman's use of the concept of alienation.

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1. E.Goffman, Asylums (Penguin, 1968);
The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Penguin, 1969).

Goffman's relativity is seen in his acceptance of 'other-directed' behaviour as the norm.[1] Presentation of the self as he describes it in the playing out of roles to different audiences, could only exist in a pluralist, hierarchical society, with a heightened sense of conformity; a strong faith in the empirical, observable appearance; and an inborn tendency to judge, measure and evaluate in terms of criteria existing over and above the subjective apprehension of the evaluators. Into his analysis then pervades the emotional climate of our times - that climate noted by all the Normative writers - that of anxiety, fear, hesitancy, insecurity, shame and confusion. Involvement and joy in work is seen to be subsumed into the more important 'job' of 'showing' the work to be done. 'Those that have the time and talent to perform a task well', Goffman writes, 'may not have the time and talent to make it apparent they are performing it well'.[2] This is a statement that presupposes there can be no evaluation that takes into account more than external impressions - or even more surprisingly, presupposes that of necessity there must be for every activity and enterprise an evaluation from others, as if in life there was no

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1. I use the term 'other-directed' as defined by Reisman in The Lonely Crowd. Very similar in meaning is the character with 'Marketing Orientation' that is alluded to by Fromm in Man for Himself. Fromm writes of the powers of this person - 'what matters is not his self-realisation in the process of using them, but his success in the process of selling them'. pp.114-115.

2. Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, p.43.

place at all for growth and development that was not minutely and frequently measured and examined! How this assumption is manifest in education! How far does our measuring, structuring and disproportionate regard for 'appearances' encourage children to assume this 'other-directed' role to the exclusion of a more authentic reaction?

The discussion of plurality of roles increases the complexity of Goffman's argument. The individual 'has as many different social selves as there are different groups of people about whose opinion he cares'[1]. - but since Goffman sees 'self' as expressed in these roles, he is virtually implying plural identity as a norm in society - alienation in that the self in one situation can exist over and above the self in another social context. This is a precarious position to maintain. Lest one self be discredited by the other, the audiences before which they act must be segregated and we sense here a little of the terror that Goffman, I think unwittingly, reveals in present-day existence. 'The impression of reality fostered by a performance is a delicate, fragile thing that can be shattered by very minor mishaps'.[2] One wonders who could live this tightrope life, in terror of exposure - and yet we meet constantly people who do - and see children in schools in exactly that condition of apprehension and insecurity.[3] There is this discrepancy, writes Goffman,

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1. E.Goffman, Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, p.57.
2. Ibid., p.63.
3. Ronald & Beatrice Gross, Radical School Reform (London: Gollancz, 1971). Jules Henry in his essay, "In Suburban Classrooms", writes of school, "it instills the essential nightmare, fear of failure, envy of success, and absurdity". p.92.

between our all too human selves and our socialised selves[1]. - and this statement too is revealing of his relativity to particular social assumptions. The expression 'all too human selves' suggests the view of man as impaired and in need of control - a control that socialisation must impose. How old-fashioned such a view seems! Although in secondary schools especially there is this implicit 'self-image' of the pupil inherent in the structures of organisation, few educational theorists today would not recognise the organic potential of the 'human self' and its need to transcend the socialised self rather than remain its conditioned captive![2].

Throughout The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life I would claim, therefore, there are indications of alienated thinking. The methods of playing roles; the misrepresentations; the mystifications; contrived realities; secrets - all are observable phenomena in the context of given societal structures and organisations; some roles are played sincerely; some cynically or in manipulative fashion; others are played insincerely but with a belief in own sincerity; still others in a state of illusion that disbelieves, yet half-believes. Yet in all this playing of roles there must be the possibility of alienation unless the question is raised of the conscious stance of the individual with regard to his role and his commitment to that role by the light of the criteria he has

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1. E.Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, p.63.

2. Carl Rogers is one educational theorist who is most explicit in expressing his confidence in the organic potential of the human self. In Freedom to Learn (Charles H. Merril Publishing Co., 1969), he describes man's behaviour as 'exquisitely rational, moving with subtle and ordered complexity towards the goals his organism is endeavouring to achieve'. p.290.

within himself evaluated. If in any of these role-playing manoeuvres - sincere, illusory, cynical or insincere, he knows himself in no other way than by the response to his social situation, he must be in a state of alienation. The cynic, knowing he is divorced from commitment and concern is not in such a compounded state of alienation as the individual who identifies himself so completely with his social role that he can not apprehend it again as being of his own creation.

Goffman's writing then has considerable interest for us. He quite rightly indicates the social aspect of self-formulation and the link between identity or sense of self and the objectivations of others. He shows that in a pluralist society those objectivated definitions of self can be radically different and hence the development in the individual of various role-playing facilities.

The question which Goffman does not raise however - though indirectly it is a question that makes its presence felt in Asylums, is that which asks, in what way can a 'sense of self' be considered in terms other than as a 'social presentation of self'? Sartre would say that the individual incorporates into his identity two dimensions of subjective experience. He is 'being-in-itself' and 'being-for-others'. When there is synthesis and the 'being-for-others' is appropriated by the self to become 'being-for-itself' and self is embraced as a vocation, then man can be more than he is for others - although paradoxically what he is for others is an inescapable part of his nature. Only in accepting completely what he has been made by others can he escape the captivity of being

subject to their objectivation.[1.]

In his book Asylums, I feel that Goffman is closer to this perception of a self that defines itself other than by the roles it plays. His elucidation of the self-defining implications of institutions and their implicit self-images is a salutory one - and highly relevant to our theoretical examination of forces of alienation in schools; but here in defining 'self' he is more explicit. 'Our sense of becoming a person comes from being drawn into a wider social unit', he writes, 'our sense of self resides in the little ways in which we resist the pull'.[2.] Is not this the disidentifying function that Berger and Luckmann saw as essential to dealienation? The subtle difference is that whereas Berger and Luckmann saw disidentification as a positive acknowledgment of that 'unsocialised self' that retains tensions in consciousness and awareness of other dimensions of reality, Goffman's is a negative idea. The self can only be seen to 'emerge against something'[3.] and

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1. R.D.Laing & D.G.Cooper, op.cit.

   Genet himself said, "J'ai decidé dêtre ce que le crime a fait de moi", and Sartre comments on this:- "Since his life was rendered unlivable by the others he would live this impossibility as if he had created this destiny exclusively for himself. This is the destiny he willed - he would even try to love this destiny". p.75. Thus Genet combined being-in-itself and for others (the ways in which he had been categorised), with being-for-himself (the way in which he willed himself).

2. E.Goffman, Asylums, p.320.

3. Ibid., p.320. To quote Goffman more fully:- He writes that it is possible to define the individual "asa stance-taking entity, a something that takes up a position somewhere between identification with an organisation and opposition to it, and is ready at the slightest pressure to regain its balance by shifting its involvement in either direction. It is thus against something that the self can emerge".

it is not made clear whether in that 'emergence' the self or the alienated self is produced. The self that seeks 'to resist the pull' is a self, one presumes, that looks in itself for criteria to evaluate the extent and proportion of its commitments - a self that seeks to know itself and from that knowledge, insufficient as it often is - express itself.

In Asylums, Goffman's penetrating and sensitive analysis of alienation in the inmates of mental institutions (with valid and highly relevant comparisons with other forms of institutions, including schools) - this ambiguity is not resolved. It is not shown how inmate behaviour motivated by the all too human desire for autonomy and an acceptable sense of self, can sometimes result in an alienated subjectivity - but can also result in a dealienated individuality - when the controls of the institution are transcended, in a corresponding transcendence of self.

How can we understand this ambiguity in Goffman? First I shall consider those forms of activity that the inmate uses to preserve a sense of self that has had meaning robbed from him by the imposition of the institutional image. These activities are divided into two sorts - 'secondary adjustments' and 'removal activities'. The 'secondary adjustments' are those means by which the inmate conforms yet at the same time exploits and manipulates the institution. Many such adjustments are described. Make-dos - using available materials for different purposes - the window for the mirror; red crayon for lipstick; processes of working the system with regard to assignments - choosing an assignment where extra comforts or 'perks' are available; the

acquisition of free places or private territory; the invention and utilization of stashes for personal belongings; the systems of communications and perhaps most important of all the various improvised and secreted methods of social services and exchange. All these adjustments involve forms of deception and subterfuge; all are meaningful in preserving the privacy, belongings and relationships necessary for humans to survive in other than animal state. They are also those activities that the rest of us engage in all our life - without the same cost in deception!

The 'secondary adjustments' are seen then to satisfy basic needs and are alienating not because they involve consistent and continual modes of deception, but because often the deception ceases to be recognised in consciousness. The initial pretence becomes the reality. When I consider the manoeuvres of inmates termed 'removal activities' a similar conclusion is reached. They too are precisely those ways in which we seek to make life meaningful - or perhaps distract us from that same search.

If, in engaging in sport, making relationships, gambling, fantasising, participating in religion or venturing into the various 'world-building enterprises' of knowledge, both we and the inmates only seek to remove ourselves - we must first of all ask the questions.

Remove from what? Remove for what? In what way can it be suggested that these removal activities, listed above, produce an alienated sense of self?

Some of these 'removal activities' described by Goffman are those same activities which Peter Berger explores as 'areas of transcendence' in A Rumour of Angels. Defining reality as commonplace, everyday life Berger seeks within the empirically given human situation prototypical human gestures that may constitute signals of transcendence. Signals that can be interpreted as indicating an order and reality that transcends human reality, yet supports and corresponds to it. Berger, admitting present consciousness to be relative, yet seeing all forms of social construction as the result of human projection, suggests that religion too can be studied empirically as a product of human history and suggests the anchorage of theology in human experience by anthropology - in an effort to see throughout time and across countries, types of experience that give an indication of transcendence.[1.]

It is interesting that in this enumeration of 'signals' Berger corresponds so closely to Goffman in his description of 'removal activities'. The universal propensity for order and innate certainty of it, is shown by Berger to be epitomised in the parental role - in that repeated affirmation to the child, 'Everything is alright'[2.] - is considered. Only if there is trust in an underlying

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1. Peter Berger, A Rumour of Angels, p.73.

2. Ibid. Berger writes, "the reassurance, transcending the immediately present two individuals and their situation, implies a statement about reality as such". p.60.

order of universe can such a statement be made and yet it is made constantly and confidently - and we assume was made with equal consistency and conviction by Goffman's inmates, who sought for others to love - to assure, against all evidence to the contrary in their commonplace world, 'Never mind. Everything is alright' - implying, what else? but that this is a relative world after all, and love somehow can banish chaos and suffering.

Goffman also in his 'removal activities' mentions theatre, knowledge and religion. Berger categorises such activities under the label 'Play': 'Play', in the sense that these particular signals of transcendence are in some ways 'a play of joy' - a hymn, in which there is a small grasp at eternity. 'One apprehends joy as being, in some barely conceivable way, a joy for ever'.[1] True knowledge (or substantial knowledge as Coleridge would define it) involves 'ek-stasis' - the standing outside the taken-for-granted routines of everyday life. The ecstasy of exegesis? Watching the extraordinary film 'The Birdman of Alcatraz', one would think so![2] Involve-

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1. Ibid., p.77.

2. This film tells the story of a murderer, condemned to a life-time of solitary confinement, who makes a pet of a small bird which enters his cell. The bird flies away, to return the following Spring with a mate. Birdman is allowed to keep the baby birds and breed them. An illness attacks the birds. Birdman studies exhaustively and discovers the source of their rare disease. The rest of his life, in this subhuman realm, is tranquil and fruitful. Even, at times, ecstatic, in his pursuit of knowledge.

ment in the work of an artist, in the same way suspends 'our living towards death'[1] - as does religious experience or involvement in love with others.

How then can we agree with Goffman and term these activities 'removal' and alienating? Perhaps we become confused because in the same category he places the activities of body-building, gambling, drinking and fantasising - also those in which inmates engage to escape the routine pressures of institutional life. One cannot dogmatically exclude from even these activities, Berger's signals of transcendence. After all, in gambling and drinking, the generation of humour - that very positive relativizer of the human condition, that might be said to affirm that laughter or joy , is the final truth, may be very much facilitated. And yet clearly a distinction must be made. In Berger's signals, as we noted before, the individual escapes himself and time in a sense of liberation and peace. He returns as it were to time and others to offer more than he had when he left. To extend and enrich the life of everyday. 'Birdman of Alcatraz' suffered years of solitary confinement, yet achieved a dealienated mode of existence; experienced himself as agent and with his knowledge made an enormous contribution to society. No true knowledge, one would think, however pure and abstract, could remain fixated in a vacuum. Participants in a loving relationship have a love that binds them to others too. Religious experience when free from reification has shown its fruits in all areas of experience, contributing to man's material and cultural development, as well as moral and spiritual.

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1. Peter Berger, A Rumour of Angels, p.77.

One cannot say that body-building, drinking or fantasising contribute in equal measure either to the development of self in the individual participant or to the experience and thought of the community. In schools we must admit this since we do not include Bingo, ballroom dancing or football pool computations on our timetables! Basically we recognise the value of signals of transcendence in our curricula but confuse utterly their meaning in personal terms. We offer knowledge as reified and stratified and encourage its acquisition at the cognitive level with little affective commitment. Art in all its forms is seen as effete - or the object of cognitive cudgelling. Religion, far too often, is introduced in artificial, institutionalised and reified fashion. So from being signals of transcendence these activities can become tools of compounded alienation.

I would claim therefore that when Goffman explores the forces of alienation in institutional life he does not make sufficiently explicit the possibility that even in the most adverse conditions individuals can and do achieve de-alienated existence. How otherwise can we explain the achievements of people like 'Birdman', Genet, Solzhenitsyn, Baldwin - all of whom were exposed to the overwhelming negation of others yet retained a sense of self and were 'productive' in the finest sense. Certainly Goffman's work is enormously valuable. It is salutary to remember how destructive institutional life can be and yet I feel it is important for us to remember also, more especially as we exist in such strongly alienating conditions in our society, that social determinism is not an inevitability. That it exists is indisputable. Reformed education may offer us one of the few means to escape it.

6. A SUMMARY OF THE CONCEPT OF ALIENATION FROM CONCLUSIONS DRAWN BY NORMATIVES AND RELATIVISTS

From the works I have studied it is not difficult to draw the conclusion that 'alienation' as a subjective experience is widespread in society and in fact in Western Societies assumes the quality of 'social character'. It would not be difficult to substantiate this conclusion by an exploration of works of literature that perceive this condition; nor would it be hard to find in pop music, songs that tell of it in moving, poignant fashion.[1.] A young pupil of mine, aged ten, described people alighting from a Waterloo train:-

> "They'll pour on the platform and scuttle about,
> Like uncontrolled robots, forgetful of self.
> Rushing and pushing without any care,
> Too concerned and involved with their own affairs".

I felt on reading this, that even the child today can perceive this condition in our society. Here a child had made that subtle grasp of one of the paradoxes of alienated experience. The paradox that 'loss of self' produces exclusive concern with 'own affairs': that in contrast, 'sense of self' leads onto productive orientation and the transcendence of self, when 'own affairs' are subsumed to what will eventually benefit others![2.]

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1. Especially interesting I have found the songs of Simon and Garfunkel, the Beatles, Cat Stevens, Melanie, Don MacClean and Alan Price.

2. McLuhan makes this same observation with regard to the characteristics of 'alienation'. In man's search for individuation, he concludes, he arrives at the psychic chiasmus of loss of individuality. All that remains is the egotism of the alienated. - The Gutenberg Galaxy, p.267.

It is not difficult either to deduce, after a scrutiny of these Normative and Relativist viewpoints, that not only is alienation widespread and a characteristic of all classes in society, but that it arises as a result of deprivations other than the political and economic.

Both Normative and Relativist writers, in their different ways, have isolated deprivation in the essentially human activities of knowledge-seeking, creativity, humour, art, religion and loving relationships as being contributory to the development of impaired subjectivity. Even more important they have explored more closely than Marx did, the depth and complexity of the social forces of conditioning and determinism that operate to make the subjective state of alienation a self-perpetuating and intractable one.

The Normative writers show clearly the forces of determinism that operate on thought, language and consciousness. The Relativists illuminate the massive power of objectivation that is incorporated into our institutions, and into the whole ethos of society. This latter insight might be said to be revealed by the Relativists, almost in spite of themselves, for very often the assumption has been made in their works that successful socialisation and identity-formation are parallel processes.

Once we become aware of the power and extent of present-day conditioning: once we grasp the possibility of desirable identity formation and escape from alienation as of necessity involving a self-aware and deliberate dis-identification from socialisation, it becomes possible to make a more helpful definition of dealienation. It is

one that has as its central concern the need for consideration of the dialectic-in-consciousness in each individual subjectivity.

I will make this consideration in Section II of my paper by suggesting a typology of alienated states and showing how in each of these states the present day ethos and organisation of education (and incidentally of society) can contribute to impaired subjectivity.

SECTION II

ALIENATION AND EDUCATION

1. MY UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONCEPT OF ALIENATION AS DEDUCED FROM SECTION I

The concern of Section I of this thesis was the clarification of the concept of alienation. By that clarification it was suggested that it was possible to retain three Marxian dimensions of its meaning. Firstly, the concept rested upon the socio-historically relative assumption that all men had the potential to achieve perfected consciousness; secondly the central issue in the understanding of the concept was that of impaired subjectivity; last of all, in close connection with the notion of impaired subjectivity was the emphasis on impoverished dialectic between man and society - and hence the diminishment of society as an inevitability, as a consequence of man's own diminishment.

Into these three Marxian dimensions of meaning I incorporated the insights I had deduced from the writings of the Normatives and Relativists. Marx's notion of impaired subjectivity was elaborated by the suggestion that the dialectic-in-consciousness was an *a priori* to the development of dealienation or true consciousness in the individual. It was made more complex, too, by the proposition that loss of the dialectic-in-consciousness was not the only form of impaired subjectivity. It was considered possible that the dialectic-in-consciousness could exist, but exist in damaged form. Thus alienation could be deduced to exist in different modes and be revealed by different behavioural characteristics.

Finally, contemporary usage suggested more clearly than Marx the cause and tenacity of the condition of alienation, by indicating not only the widespread deprivation caused to man's subjectivity by the impoverishment in activities termed by Berger 'areas of transcendance'; but also by a much more cogent and penetrating examination of the forces and depth of modern conditioning and determinism. With this foundation to my understanding of the concept, I hope, in Section II, to describe in greater detail the subjective states of alienation and the way in which education contributes towards their development.

I use a typology of alienation modes, by which I isolate three different states of subjectivity. I label these models Alienation 'A' or the state of robot alienation; Alienation 'B' or the condition of manipulative subjectivity and Alienation 'C' which is that state of mind which is schizoid or tending towards schizophrenia.

In my formulation of this typology I have been influenced by R.D.Laing's description of impaired subjectivity in The Divided Self and in my method of diagramatic representation, I owe much to his thought.

Always to be borne in mind in Section II of the work is the fact that any suggested typology of this sort may appear to be dogmatic or over-simplified. In view of the enormous complexity of the problems it attempts to cope with, it must be remembered that this suggested typology is, possibly, one perspective among many that could be taken in an attempt to elucidate them.

For me it seemed a necessary and valuable perspective and made possible the transposition of the study of alienation

to education, in a more coherent and comprehensive way than I had encountered elsewhere.

2. A SUGGESTED TYPOLOGY OF ALIENATION MODES

(a) Alienation 'A' or robot-consciousness

The characteristic of this mode of existence is the tendency towards complete identification with the socialised self. It can exist equally therefore amongst 'working-class' or 'higher classes' in a society - amongst failures as well as successes in an educational system. The individual, regardless of social context, denies the existence of the unsocialised self and represses marginal experiences, so that commonplace reality becomes the only one. He cannot acknowledge within him the terrors, fears and violence that may exist in the world or in his subjectivity: similarly he is impervious to the joy and ecstasy of his experience. Lacking, therefore, the dialectic-in-consciousness, he fails to grasp either himself or his social context as his own human projection and increasingly his action and behaviour conform to the usual, acceptable performances of self in its various roles. He is incapable of praxis - that capacity to reflect and act upon the world in order to transform it.

Much sociological and educational theory emphasise that this particular form of alienation is confined to the 'working-class', to the 'oppressed' or to the failures in a

society.[1] I would disagree that this is so. Complete identification with socialised self is a characteristic of all classes and it would seem much more meaningful to understand modern society in this way - as peopled by individuals in all walks of life, who have lost true praxis.

Perhaps the distinction could be made clearer schematically - not forgetting that such pictorial representation must err in simplistic interpretation.

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1. Amongst those that associate robot-alienation with the powerless are writers like Marcuse, Fromm, Freire and Bourdieu. Also such an association is indicated by Richard Hoggart in Uses of Literacy and John Berger in Ways of Seeing and A Fortunate Man. Reich however in Greening of America and Reisman in The Lonely Crowd see Alienation 'A' as a more widespread phenomenon in society.

Alienation 'A' in a Working-Class Adult[1].



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1. I exclude from this category those working-class adults who have a strong adherence to some minority group - e.g. a religious or nationalist loyalty (as in the case, for instance, of the Irish Catholic, the Jew, the Welsh Presbyterian). These people usually have alternative criteria by which they may come to a more favourable interpretation of themselves.

This is a schematic representation of Alienation 'A' in a working-class adult. Within the vital self, there is no dialectic-in-consciousness maintained between socialised and unsocialised self. There is little opportunity for the development of the psychic needs to create, love or understand and the activities of knowledge, art and religion play little part in life. Subjective alienation is compounded by the fact that the satisfaction of false needs becomes a major and distracting concern - and by the recognition that to influence social, political or economic structures in society, there is no realistic hope. This man therefore accepts his alienation as inevitable - the result in some way of his own inferiority.

Alienation 'A' in a Professional Adult[1].



1. Ray Stevens' song "Business Man" seems to have been written about this individual!

Although typical of another class in society, this individual shares the 'robot' characteristic of the working man. Although seemingly influential in his role of citizen or professional worker, this is a deceptive appearance. Since he is totally socialised, the socialised self is experienced as self in various roles before segregated audiences and the likelihood arises of different systems of behaviour being used in different social settings. Action is 'other-directed' rather than 'meaningful' and because the individual has not for himself formulated, by the dialectic-in-consciousness, any inner criteria of value, he may act in his varying roles in a conflictual way.

As a citizen he may deplore traffic conditions and agitate for less cars; as a golfer he may resent his course being flanked by a new highway - yet as a car manufacturer he must strive to increase car production which is a cause of the evils he criticises in his other roles. He is thus reduced to a 'robot-like' existence as manipulable as the worker - for dilemmas in the fragmented realities of his existence cannot be related to an overall picture of reality and his often industrious, frantic activity is self-cancelling.

Working man and professional man alike are impaired. They cannot see the totality of 'commonplace reality' - the whole social construction as a projection of men and therefore susceptible to transformation. Without this insight, they are oblivious of the paradoxes in society and are impervious to conscientisation. Unaware of the

paradoxes of everyday life, they are incapable of imagining that the totality in existence is not the only reality. What exists is accepted as 'product' and 'facticity' to continue in predetermined fashion. No recognition is made of the fact that a society 'to be' - or man 'to be' - can only 'be' in the state of 'being' and 'process'.

Without this recognition it is not easily conceivable to the individual that change, development, progress are possible in self or in society. Hence is lost that most optimistic joyous force in man, that envisages a higher good and seeks to attain it - or even more surprising can imagine that something as yet unimaginable can come to pass. That the creation of man and of world is yet to be completed. And in that completion a compelling happiness resides.

(b) Alienation 'B' or manipulatory consciousness

The description of Alienation 'A' was that of the individual who, because of his total identification with socialisation, lost the dialectic-in-consciousness. Having no sure sense of his own identity; no intuition of reality other than the commonplace; no sense of process either in knowledge or self or of society, he was seen to be incapable of praxis. Whether a member of the working classes, or of the higher classes in the social order, he was equally susceptible to the 'robot-type' subjectivity. The consequences for a society that was peopled by such individuals could be deduced as, at best, the maintenance of the 'status-quo'; at worst, the collapse of the existing

social structure.[1.]

And yet when we look more closely at society and education, we recognise that the predominance of the Alienation 'A' subjectivity, is not sufficient to account for faults we criticise. Although certainly, many seem to exist with 'robot' characteristics, there are many others who have a great capacity for action and an apparent certainty in their autonomy. These are they whom Berger and Luckmann describe as using the style of behaviour termed 'cool alternation' or 'reciprocal manipulation'[2.] They too are recognised by Goffman to be 'manipulating the system'.[3.]

I hope, therefore, by my exploration of Alienation 'B', to show that false consciousness resides not only in men of reduced action or self-negatory forms of behaviour, but that in fact it can also reside in men who make a considerable impact on their society, but an impact

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1. In Weber's Interpretative Sociology which seeks to understand social behaviour by interpreting the subjective meaning as found in the intentions of individuals, such a conclusion would also be reached. How can there be a structure of social world when the participants in that world provide no structure of intelligible intentional meanings?

   This idea is suggested by A.Schutz, op.cit., in his discussion of Weber's concept of meaningful action.

2. P.L.Berger & T.Luckmann, op.cit., p.191.

3. E.Goffman, Asylums.
   This manipulation is defined as "habitual arrangements by which a member employs unauthorised means, or obtains unauthorised ends, and therefore gets round organisation's assumptions as to what he should do and get and therefore be". p.188.

that is neither enhancing nor transforming, for themselves or for others.

Alienation 'A', as I have already noted, has been recognised and described explicitly by writers of different schools of thought. The main subjective characteristics of total identification with socialisation or loss of the dialectic-in-consciousness is not a difficult perception to make. My suggested mode of Alienation 'B' or 'manipulatory subjectivity' however, has not in the same way been described explicitly. Though often implicit in writings that use the concept of alienation, as in those of Marx or of Illich or Freire, a more complete clarification is seldom encountered and for this reason I discuss Alienation 'B' more fully, before making the transposition to education.

Alienation 'B' in a Professional Adult



This is a diagrammatic representation of the manipulatory subjectivity. Whereas, in the mode of Alienation 'A' it was proposed that complete identification with socialisation caused a loss of the dialectic-in-consciousness, I now make the proposal that in the state of Alienation 'B' there is a very deliberate disidentification with socialised self. This process of disidentification need not take place in all roles; it may happen that for one or more of them there is no affective connection.

As a result of this, the dialectic-in-consciousness is retained but it is imperfect and impoverished and it is as a result of this impoverishment that action is facilitated.

The person who has a manipulatory consciousness has very real perception of both himself and others and of the situations in which he engages. In spite of this perception, however, he is unaffected in the deeper levels of his experience. Although he acts upon others, he is not acted upon by them and hence his action can become dominated by self-interest and be manipulatory.

Whereas the individual with Alienation 'A' tended to see others as more important than himself and to seek his identity in them; the manipulative man senses himself as more important than others and is sure of his identity. In fact the strongest bases of his identity may rest on the negation of others. These others may be reified by him, so that although he can perceive in them many subtleties of response and feelings he does not in any sense identify with these responses or feel affected by them. He can utilize them to his own advantage and have very considerable

autonomy in action.[1.]

What must be emphasised however is that this action cannot be termed meaningful. It is not 'praxis'. If we can agree with Gajo Petroviz's statement that 'a free action can only be one by which a man changes his world and himself'[2.] we cannot call the manipulative action either meaningful or free. Although it changes the world, it does not change the actor, himself. By placing himself beyond the effect or influence of others (or incidentally, the influences of his knowledge, his learning, his career or citizenship) he has made it almost impossible to be affected or influenced by himself.

Also, if we accept Schutz's definition of action as that which is the intended, projected outcome of the dialectic between the stream of experience and attention, of intuition and intellect,[3.] we must observe of the manipulative man that he has not a sufficient or adequate stream of experience to which he can attend. For are we not describing a man whose intellectual response and experience has taken command over other 'experiencing' parts of his nature?

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1. The behaviour of Thomas More as depicted in Robert Bolt's A Man for All Seasons showed reverse qualities to manipulation. So sensitive was he to the responses of others, to King, religious leaders and family, that for him decision and action became extremely difficult. His action, when it came, was meaningful. It was praxis.

2. Freire, The Pedagogy of the Oppressed p.107.

3. A.Schutz, op.cit.

Certainly, artistic perceptions have been made in literature of such a man. Antony Beavis, for instance, in Huxley's Eyeless in Gaza is a self-confessed manipulator of ideas and of people. His friend Miller says of him, 'You are an admirable manipulator of ideas, linked with a person who, as far as self-knowledge and feeling are concerned, is just a moron, and the pair of you associated with a half-witted body. A body that's hopelessly unaware of all it does and feels, that has no accomplishments and that doesn't know how to use itself or anything else!'[1].

In Lady Chatterly's Lover, too, by D.H.Lawrence, similar criticism is made of the manipulatory consciousness. Dukes says during his conversation with Clifford about the manipulating class of industrial overlords, 'Real knowledge comes out of the whole corpus of consciousness; out of your belly and your penis as much as out of your brain and mind. The mind can only analyze and rationalize. Set the mind and reason to cock it over the rest, and all they can do is to criticise and make a deadness... while you live your life, you are in some way an organic whole with all life. But once you start the mental life, you pluck the apple. You've severed the connexion between the apple and the tree, the organic connexion. And if you've got nothing in your life but the mental life, then you yourself are a plucked apple... you've fallen off the tree'.[2].

The manipulative man therefore, would seem to have 'cognition' of people and situations, but if we speak of

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1. Aldous Huxley, Eyeless in Gaza (Penguin, 1955), p.133.
2. D.H.Lawrence, Lady Chatterly's Lover (Penguin, 1960), p.39.

'understanding' as that capacity to grasp with love and reason, this person does not understand - neither does he experience in a way that we would suggest was truly human.

Laing, Piaget, Bowlby and many others stress in the young child's development the need for synthesis of emotional, perceptual, sensual, spiritual and intellectual dimensions of personality and experience. Teilhard de Chardin would suggest a similar need for this synthesis of experience in the adult. If in education certain of these areas of experience are ignored or even denigrated, it could be admitted that school caters for and produces a partial man - a man who may be manipulative, or more seriously, amoral.[1.]

It is not difficult to see the two most obvious consequences of the manipulative subjectivity. The individual seems to have considerable autonomy and power of action, for since, in a deep sense he is unaffected by others, he is free from the emotional constraints that are more efficacious in influencing most of our behaviour for good. The person who is affected by another strongly, very quickly empathises with him. His motivation then to help him becomes at the same time a motivation to help himself. In his empathy it may hurt him more not to perform the helpful

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1. It could be argued that manipulation itself is immoral. It has been a commonplace assumption to our culture that it could be justified with regard to children, the mentally sick and people of primitive cultures. Increasingly this assumption is challenged. There is a very big distinction between facilitating the response to a value and the imposition of a value by the ignoring or invalidation of either consciousness or experience.

act, than it would hurt the other if he were to refrain from it. And thus, paradoxically, it might seem that emotional and moral motivations for our actions arise as if in our strongest interests.

The manipulative man however has not this sense of empathy. He, himself, is not hurt to sense the need or diminishment of the other and so his action is seemingly autonomous and lively, but since increasingly it is governed by his own interest, unaffected by the interest of the other, it is not true praxis. It diminishes rather than transforms society.

A second consequence of manipulative consciousness is no less clear. It is that self as well as world is diminished. As Laing has shown in the extreme case of the schizophrenic, the self cannot be sustained when there is no feedback to inner experience.[1] The schizophrenic cuts off all feedback by operating false-self systems to negotiate with the world. His inner self becomes increasingly the product of primary thought processes and, out of touch with reality and secondary processes, becomes a 'fantasy self' or 'selves'. The person in Alienation 'B' also reduces feedback to the inner self, especially that of the emotional, the spiritual, the sensual and perceptual. His tendency, unlike the schizophrenic, is to organise his personality cognitively - by utilising the secondary thought processes. As he continues in this mode, his inner self, unaffected by his own actions, just as it is unaffected by others, becomes diminished and precarious and it must be admitted that as this inner self grows less with the denial

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1. R.D.Laing, The Divided Self,(Penguin , Pelican Edition, 1965).

of experience, then action too could become less realistic, more manipulative and more damaging. Even pathological.

I included this mode of alienation in my analysis firstly because, however prevalent is Alienation 'A' or robot-like existence, much of social action cannot be explained as the result of that mode of subjectivity alone. Secondly, I think it is a type of consciousness that is considerably influenced by present day educational practice. Since a central cause for its development seems to be that of dichotomy between the cognitive and affective powers of the individual it would seem crucial, later in my paper to understand in Education those processes that encourage modes of learning or behaviour whereby this dichotomy is encouraged.

(c) Alienation 'C' or the Consciousness that tends towards schizophrenia



I will not describe this state of existence in detail since R.D.Laing's book, The Divided Self is devoted to it. It is relevant to our discussion for two reasons. It is useful to compare this mode of existence with that of Alienation 'B' and to notice that there is the similarity that 'self' in both states has an impoverished feedback from reality to inner experience - and it might seem possible that just as in Alienation 'C', the 'real self' in fantasy splits as it is unable to sustain itself - so too Alienation 'B' could very soon draw nearer to the 'schizoid' position.

In other words unless the self is open not only to his own experience, but to that which acts upon it, it can become a precarious entity. It might seem from this observation that neither Alienation 'B' nor Alienation 'C' are as distant from true humanity as Alienation 'A' - for in both these former conditions the 'self' is preserved, even if in fantasy. As Laing shows, even in the severest illness of schizophrenia there can be seen this struggle of the patient to keep that self, or to find the one that was never ontologically secure.

'If one could go deep into the depth of the dark earth one would discover "the bright gold", or if one could get fathoms down one would discover "the pearl at the bottom of the sea" ',[1.] is how Laing quotes from the desperate

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1. R.D.Laing, op.cit., p.205.

search of one of his schizophrenic patients, who herself could see her illness as the struggle to find herself. In Alienation 'A' however, when no 'inner self' can be observed at all and when total identity exists in a state of false consciousness, there is little pain in the individual because there is no struggle; there is little obvious damage to society because there is little action; but nevertheless it might seem the most dangerous condition of all because so unamenable to influence.

My second reason for including Alienation 'C' is because, as Laing suggests, it may in part be caused by ontological insecurity. In other words it is primary socialisation itself that has failed. The baby or young child has never arrived at a sense of himself.

I am sure it is within the commonplace experience of most teachers of reception age children or of those in 'Playgroups' to observe variations in ontological security in their charges. Now that education of pre-school children is increasing so rapidly, it is within the compass of educational theory to make this phenomenon more explicit, so that teachers may become aware of the earliest forms of damaged subjectivity and compensate as far as possible for earlier deprivation. Certainly in my own experience with pre-school children, the favourable objectivation of the teacher and the enticement into experience, and involvement of the young child has allayed many of the symptoms of those seeming to be ontologically insecure.

Obviously it is a complex and difficult area - but if, as Laing suggests, the self may be retrieved even in the adult with a schizoid history - it would not seem too optimistic to suggest that in the very young child schizoid tendencies could be allayed, even halted by concerned teachers, who were fully aware of the importance of ontological security.

In the wider context of educational reorganisation there is also a significance in the consideration of Alienation 'C'. The phenomenon of the increased numbers of those becoming mentally ill in our society is a grave concern for us all. A high proportion of these people have schizoid characteristics or develop schizophrenia.[1.]

If education continues to expand its influence in nursery and other pre-school activities, there is a necessity to understand more clearly the causes of ontological security; the importance of the maternal relationship; perhaps also the part that schools could play in initiating adolescents into desirable parental attitudes.

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1. The recent report from the National Schizophrenia Fellowship, August 1974, estimated that one in a hundred can expect to suffer from schizophrenia before the age of forty-five; that one in six of people at present in hospital - about sixty thousand in all - have the illness. It is likely too, they suggest, that at least another hundred thousand chronic cases exist outside hospital. Quoted in The Guardian, August 1974.

3. THE TRANSPOSITION OF THE EXAMINATION OF ALIENATION 'A' TO SOCIETY AND EDUCATION

(a) The need to distinguish between Alienation 'A' in 'failures' and Alienation 'A' in 'successes'.

Alienation 'A', or robot-alienation, I have already described as that mode of subjectivity resulting from a complete identification with socialised self or socialised roles, and characterised by a loss in the dialectic-in-consciousness. If this description is tenable, therefore, it follows as a natural corollary that it can be a mode of subjectivity of people in all walks of life - or in all sections of education.

The importance of this recognition cannot be over-emphasised. Marx, social critics and educational theorists have all, in my view, placed a disproportionate stress in their works on the elucidation of alienation amongst the members of working classes, the oppressed and the 'failures' of society. To understand contemporary social functioning, and contemporary education, it may be necessary, whilst acknowledging the truth of their findings with regard to the least influential in society, to explore also the alienation and inefficacity of some of the reputedly powerful.

Marx depicted the condition of impaired subjectivity as existing in the nineteenth century industrial worker. Freire remarks upon alienation as a characteristic of the South American oppressed peasant. Marcuse, too, makes the association between the condition of alienation and the

'powerless' in society.[1] In the works of educational theorists, the emphasis is equally marked. "Education fails because it alienates the failures" is a common assumption encountered and in the works of the sociologists of curriculum - of Hopper, Bourdieu, Young, Bernstein in particular - this assumption is endorsed.

We cannot disregard the unanimity of opinion in so many writers of social criticism and of educational theory. It is highly relevant to our critique to understand the extent and causes of working-class alienation. Only very recently has the sociology of education, by incorporating into the sociology of educational structures, the sociology of curriculum, thrown into relief the deep-rooted connection between social power and the organisation of knowledge, pedagogy and evaluation. Valuable as this insight is, however, it would be a mistake to consider it as a total illumination.

Just as it is necessary to understand alienation in the failures of education, so too it must be remembered that alienation can occur even more profoundly in the 'successes' of our schools. Because the worker or 'failure' seems more divorced from political and economic control and power; because he is culturally bereft; because he is inarticulate with regard to himself and his social expression[2];

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1. Marcue however, in One-Dimensional Man does refer to the enslavement of the 'capitalist bosses' also and calls them "domination transfigured into administration", subject, like the workers, to be "productive apparatus". p.37.

2. John Berger, A Fortunate Man (Penguin, 1969) Berger writes of Dr.Sassal's patients in a small working community; "They are deprived of the means of translating what they know into thoughts which they can think". p.92.

it is not an inevitable consequence that he is more totally identified with his socialised self than is the professional man or the industrialist.

It could be argued, in fact, that the 'failure' at school or the 'working man' in society, in feeling himself so strongly negated has an impetus to find himself that the 'assured' conformist, successfully socialised person lacks. Whether he has the "tools" to find himself is another matter: or the confidence. But certainly his initial condition of false consciousness can be no more compounded than that of his middle-class counterpart who can identify so closely with the socially esteemed criteria of "success".

To clarify the distinction I have made between robot-alienation in the 'failures' and the similarly impaired subjectivity of 'successes', I will consider separately the perceptions and ideas that suggest its validity.

(b) Alienation 'A' with reference to the educational 'failures' and the socially disadvantaged

Much valuable work has been done that has thrown into relief the seeming inexorability of the processes causing social inequality. Education itself has been one process isolated as a grave cause of the perpetuation of social injustice.

If, as most theorists stress, alienation is the result of violence and oppression, whether in economic terms of thought and consciousness, it is not surprising that we look to the deprived, lowly, least important

classes in society, to point to the prevalence of alienation. Neither is it surprising that after organisational changes in education with the introduction and extension of comprehensive schools, in the endeavour to combat the perpetuation of social inequality, a realisation would be made of forces stronger and more subtle than the structural, in their influence on the preservation of existing social organisation; that there would arise an almost ubiquitous concern to show within the process of curriculum itself the existence of forms of control detrimental to the child of the working class family. The child, who will, almost inevitably, 'fail' scholastically.

A new and valuable insight has been made as curriculum and the organisation of knowldge have become the foci of sociological investigation. Curriculum is now viewed as a phenomenon in the sociology of the culture of a society. Schools are no longer examined just as institutions in which people are processed. This was by far the most typical sociological examination until the last few years. More important, it has been realised that schools must be understood, also, as places where 'knowledge' itself is processed and distributed.

It is only by the linked analysis of these 'knowledge' and 'people' processing activities that we can see more clearly the inevitability of the failure and also the alienation, of working class children.

The discussion that traces a link between the organisation of knowledge in the curriculum and the perpetuation of social inequality, is a topical one and incorporates several theoretical perspectives.[1.] It may be relevant at this stage to summarise briefly the more important of these to show the unanimity in conclusion that reveals the reflection in curricular organisation of social systems of power and control. That this organisation produces alienation in 'controlled' and 'controllers' alike is a suggestion I will consider later, but first it is necessary to show the theoretical justifications for the basic tenet as such.

One important perspective, perhaps the premise to our analysis, is the argument of Berger and Luckmann that defines knowledge and theory systems in relation to commonsense knowledge.[2.] If we can agree with these writers and presume everyday life to be the paramount reality, knowledge and theory systems in a society can be seen as attempts to extend, explain, legitimate and stratify that everyday life.[3.] It is possible then to view

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1. My early thinking in this area was first stimulated by tutorial groups with Jim Lynch and Dudley Plunkett and was further clarified by their book, Teacher, Education and Cultural Change. England, France, West Germany (Unwin Education Books, 1973).

2. P.L.Berger & T.Luckmann, op.cit.

3. Ibid. The paradox is noted by these authors, "that man is capable of producing a world that he experiences as something other than a human product". p.78.

curriculum from a relativist perspective, as a social phenomenon dependent upon the forces that organise and maintain it. In other words we can understand curriculum, not as a 'given', reified unalterable organisation of knowledge that has some absolute status, but as a result of human selection, projection and organisation and susceptible to change both in its content and in its pedagogical assumptions.

As Raymond Williams observes, knowledge in the curriculum cannot be likened to commodities like cars or bread.[1] It is, inevitably, a selection in a given societal context at a particular historical moment. And so it seems relevant and necessary that we should attempt to understand the particular curricular organisation of our own society and time.

If our attempts to reduce social inequality by altering the structures of schools have failed; or if, as in the United States, programmes for compensatory education are of little avail,[2] it will seem more pertinent to inquire into the organisation of knowledge itself; to ask how far contemporary selection, stratification, modes of transmission and organisation of knowledge reflect the interests and values of dominant groups in society and hence contribute to the alienation of less powerful groups of people.

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1. R.Williams, The Long Revolution, p.52.

2. I.Illich, Deschooling Society (Penguin Educ. 1973). Illich refers to the failure of the New York compensatory scheme for education in the years 1965-1968, when three billion dollars were spent.

Berger and Luckmann's perception is one of my premises. It is extended by Bourdieu[1.] and Goldmann,[2.] who give tools for the argument that just as in a society a certain cultural 'habitus' exists (a certain societal consciousness that is manifest in the most diverse expressions of a culture and is reflected in its works of art), so too must educational curriculum be seen as a form of cultural microcosm. It can be seen as an agent of cultural transmission reinforcing very strongly the mode of social transmission existent in society.

Curriculum has no independent life: no objective status. It has its roots inherently in the cultural organisation of society and since that 'culture' is wedded in Western societies to social and economic systems of power and control, the curriculum must reflect the interests and values of the dominant groups.

Bourdieu's analysis is penetrating because he shows empirically the close link between school selection and cultural dominance in society. His examination of the transmission of the cultural habitus; of the determining function of language and of the structural organisation in schools, in their processes of selection and differentiation both of pupils and knowledge areas, reveal that within educational institutions there are reproduced the relation-

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1. I.P.Bourdieu, "Systems of Education and Systems of Thought", M.Young, Knowledge and Control. New Directions for the Sociology of Education (Collier-Macmillan, 1971). P.Bourdieu, "Cultural Reproduction and Social Reproduction", R.Brown, Explorations in Sociology. Knowledge, Education and Cultural Change. Papers in the Sociology of Education (Tavistock Press, 1973).

2. L.Goldmann, "The Sociology of Literature. Status and Problems of Method", International Social Science Journal, 1967, pp.493-516.

ships that exist in society between dominant and other classes.

Systems of evaluation, examination and selection reflect societal organisation as does the organisation of knowledge itself. Knowledge or 'reality-thinking', says Bourdieu is organised in schools by 'diacrisis', the divisions that help to bring order to cultural chaos. Not only, however, are subjects differentiated - but also approach routes are structured in terms of methodological approach and chronological relevance to the individual. Subjects, too, are placed in a hierarchical importance, so that not only are some selected for especial valuing, but within subjects certain areas are selected for extra attention and significance.

From the premise of Berger and Luckmann that suggested the relatedness of knowledge to its social context, we progress to a perception of the relatedness of 'school' knowledge to the dominant groups in society. We recognise one of the paradoxes of education. This is the dysfunction of a system that claims to offer equality, yet on closer examination can be seen to have within it the means to perpetuate inequality and social injustice.

Bourdieu's analysis of the French system has its counterparts in examinations of the organisation of education in England. By Young,[1.] Bernstein,[2.] Davies[3.]

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1. I.M.Young, op.cit.
2. B.Bernstein, "The Classification and Framing of Educational Knowledge". R.Brown, op.cit.
   B.Bernstein, "Open Schools, Open Society", New Society, Vol.10, No.259, 1967.
3. I.Davies, "Management of Knowledge". E.Hopper, Readings in the Theory of Educational Systems (Hutchinson University Library, 1971).

and Hopper[1.] in particular a similar thesis has been argued. These sociologists would suggest that educational organisation is indisputably linked to social stratification, not, of necessity, because children are wrongly processed, but because in knowledge selection and control, pedagogy and evaluation, the working class child is at an immeasurable disadvantage.

Young argues that the dimensions of academic curricula can be seen as "conscious or unconscious cultural choices which accord with the values and beliefs of dominant groups at a particular time",[2.] and his emphasis, as is that of Bernstein's, is to reveal not only the dominant forces of control in society as reflected in education, but also to explore the movement towards educational change and curriculum reform that in turn reflect wider social movements towards equality and social justice.

This whole question of emerging curricular change, so central to Young's and Bernstein's discussion, is more appropriate later in my paper when the possibility of dealienated education is considered and the associated societal change; at this stage however I think it is invaluable to remember this additional perspective of Young and Bernstein, highlighting as it does the subtleties of present educational organisation.

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1. Earl Hopper, "The Total Selection Process as a Societal Functional Problem". R.Brown, op.cit.

2. M.Young, op.cit., p.38.

As does Bourdieu, Young and Bernstein see the significance of the controlling power of language, of structural organisation, of dominant modes of pedagogy and of evaluatory systems. The working class child, familiar only with the 'restricted', descriptive, expletive code of his family enters school with a handicap since professional or middle class children are already relatively at home in the analytical, rational code of educated parlance.[1.] This initial retardation can be very soon compounded if within the structural organisation of school, there is an emphasis on selection and grades and the child then can accept for himself the identity as a 'C' or 'low I.Q.', both terms of designation commonplace amongst teachers. The dominant modes of pedagogy, especially at secondary school level, increasingly exclude from the teaching interaction, the experiential, community knowledge of the child and since in evaluation the dominant forms of language, thought processes and abstract knowledge are the objects of scrutiny, the child 'fails' in his education; becomes categorised; accepts and internalises that categorisation; becomes alienated. He then exists in a state of false consciousness; to

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1. I.B.Bernstein, op.cit.

Although here I have accepted Bernstein's basic distinction between working class and middle class codes of speech, I think it is an over-simplified one. I think it is possible to isolate a third code of speech that has within it the capacity to transcend class-based differences of thought and expression. I will discuss it more fully in Appendix A.

seldom question the school's objectivation of him as 'inferior'; to seek in other ways to compensate for the pain of living as a 'secondary' person.[1.]

Language, school structures, pedagogy and evaluation are not the only mechanisms which Young and Bernstein examine as causes of working class alienation. Just as relevant and even more perceptive is their discussion of knowledge organisation.

Knowledge is ordered in certain ways in our schools. It is differentiated into subjects so that a pupil advancing in his educational career undertakes more and more specialist work so that increasingly his power to understand reality is fragmented; his identity becomes almost inseparably committed to the subject of his study. Knowledge too is stratified. Certain subjects are given a high status; certain methods of study are endorsed as valuable. Access then is allowed only to those proficient in particular ways of working; in particular ways of thinking. Inevitably all but the exceptional working class child is denied access to the areas of knowledge that have a high prestige component or high 'property' characteristics, in that their acquisition is usually accompanied by economic reward. Excessive valuing of literacy, individualism,

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1. John Berger, A Fortunate Man.
Dr.Sassal, upon whose life this book is based, recognises that his young working class patients are settling for the fifth best in life - the intellectual, emotional and spiritual minimum. Their experience, he notes, is reduced to endurance, without great passions or noble concepts. Some writers would make the same observation about much more privileged classes.

abstractness and unrelatedness to work leads increasingly to the exclusion of the lower class child, governed as he is most often by oral, group, concrete and experiential influences in his life.[1.]

The traditional English 'academic' organisation of knowledge would seem then, from these three different perspectives (of Berger and Luckmann; of Bourdieu and Goldmann; of Young, Bernstein, Hopper and Davies) to be the incontrovertible cause of alienation amongst lower classes in society. Education begins the process; later societal experience continues it. Automated, non-participatory work, receptive, passive forms of leisure, a consumption ethos and exclusion from participation in social or political decisions, all must continue to reinforce a process for which formal education itself must accept responsibility.

It may seem a beginning for us to understand 'robot' alienation in the oppressed as resulting from the controlled organisation of education. It may be crucial also to become aware of vested interests in the maintenance of existing forms of stratification in society. They almost preclude the possibility of effecting radical curricular change. The absence completely from central government of any debate concerning the organisation of knowledge is sufficient on its own to alert us to the almost inseparable alliance between power groups in society and the system of knowledge organisation in schools.

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1. M.Young, op.cit., pp.37-38.

This 'beginning' however, this awareness alone, is not sufficient. Bourdieu, Young, Bernstein, and Hopper too in his 'warming up, cooling out' thesis of the educational processes of selection and rejection[1], all write very much within a containment view of society and of school. They analyse present assumptions or those that begin to emerge, but they do not take the Normative stance of suggesting alternative assumptions that could be made before suggesting changes for either society or schools.

If we make it much more explicit that education alienates more than the lower social classes; that society as at present organised can have a diminishing effect at all levels of stratification, we will see the need to inquire more deeply into the educational process. It may not be necessary to escape from the more usual 'containment' analyses, to suggest alternative ideals for society and for education.

The close association at present made between education and socialisation (and most usually the socialisation into an occupational role and its associated status skills) must be seen as problematic and alterable. Since society itself cannot be considered a facticity but subject to transformation by men's praxis, neither can education operate according to the strict dictates of social needs. Man can never be totally socialised into an existent system,

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1. Earl Hopper, "Total Selection Process as a Societal Functional Problem". R.Brown, op.cit.

however conducive it may seem to his well-being. At a time in history when present societal organisation seems most conducive to his alienation or even to his madness, it is imperative that a distance is maintained between identification with the socialised order and the unsocialised self: that also a distinction can be seen between social norms and the possibility of universal norms. Only then can there be formulated the transformations necessary to make of education a humanizing enterprise; to make of man a more humane creature.

It is not sufficient then to explore only the forces of education that alienate the 'failures'. The populist understanding of the concept itself, that emphasises separation in society rather than altered subjectivity has led many to make such an exclusive exploration. It is not a justifiable exclusivity. Paradoxes of educational, societal and global dimensions arouse increasingly the conscientization of people of most diverse concerns. It is suddenly seen that the achievement of educational equality in terms of the present criteria of 'success' is an impossibility and not even desirable.

Education is faced with the seemingly impossible task of transmitting ever-increasing areas of knowledge;

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1. "There is a growing awareness that equality may not be evaluated in mere numerical terms, but is proportionate and analogical in its reality. For when equality is equated with inter-changeability, individuality is negated and the human person extinguished". Ruth Ashen's introduction to Myth and Reality by Mircea Eliade (Allen & Unwin, 1964).

ever-increasing differentiations of subjects; ever more frequently obsolescent skills. It faces too the paradox of instigating a demand for itself that it has not the capacity to fulfil. "No country can be rich enough to afford a school system that meets the demands this same system creates simply by existing", writes Ivan Illich.[1.] When we consider the increasing polarisation produced by education as 'failures' in schools seem to attain ever lower standards in even basic literacy and numeracy, the paradoxical situation seems more irresolvable.[2.]

Society too has its paradoxes to resolve. Polarisation into classes is seen by some to have become more acute in the sixties and early seventies. Paternalistic welfare schemes and compensatory education can often exacerbate the problem they aim to solve. Ever-spiralling production and consumption patterns are dominant. The Hell of Tantalus is created for society members and yet paradoxically the economic well-being of that society rests upon placing its members in that same Hell!

No less clear are the paradoxes of global dimension. The widening gap between rich and poor nations; the failure of much aid; the oppression of minority groups; the possibilities of war - all are paradoxes that impinge increasingly on our own consciousness - and on that of our society and educational system.

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1. I.Illich, op.cit., p.16.

2. Nixon's promise in 1971 that all children would soon be literate before leaving school, is indicative of this polarisation.
Quoted by Illich, op.cit., p.8.

In the face of such paradoxes it would seem meaningless to continue to explore education primarily as a compounder of inequality. Would it be more pertinent to look more closely into the school system, to examine the alienation of its most successful products, and to realise then the need for an alternative paradigm of knowledge, of pedagogy and also possibly of educational and societal organisation?

(c) Alienation 'A' with reference to educational 'successes' and the socially privileged

In my discussion of Alienation 'A' with reference to the school 'failures', I have done little more than summarise the most recent sociological arguments that reveal the close relationship between social dominance and curricular organisation. The mode of 'robot' subjectivity was seen then to develop as a result of a two-way process. The effective exclusion of the working class child from the thought patterns, language, knowledge areas and formal qualifications, that are held, often for no good reason to be necessary in positions of social power and influence, was seen to be paralleled by processes of invalidation and negation.[1] The child, therefore, not only failed to acquire what he had lacked; but he lost what he already had. He was thus made doubly powerless.

What must now be acknowledged, however, and what is not made at all explicit by these same sociologists of curriculum, is that 'failures' are not the only victims of our educational system. Equally sad, we must recognise, is

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1. M.Young, op.cit.

the mode of subjectivity of many of our school 'successes'. Just as working class children were intellectually deprived by non-recognition of their affective, experiential, oral knowledge so too we must admit that the intellectual development valued so highly in our present society, whilst at fault in causing segregation amongst specialists, as well as segregation amongst classes, is equally at fault in diminishing the humanity of its most successfully socialised products.

The working class child who failed scholastically was seen to be alienated because he was socialised so completely to accept his own inferiority and impotence. He identified completely with school and society's objectivation of him and lost the dialectic-in-consciousness that would enable him to see himself apart from that objectivation.

In a very similar way, the intellectual, or scholastic success can also be seen to be susceptible to alienation - whether of robot or manipulatory character. If the intellectual totally identifies with the social objectivation of 'success' he too loses the dialectic-in-consciousness. He denies (and often by education is encouraged to deny) the affective, enactive, experiential modes in his experience. He cannot be free to recognise in himself what McLuhan would term the 'organic strivings' in his nature;[1.] those impulses towards development that arise as an expression of his total humanity rather than the result of a segmented intellectualism. Neither can he recognise in social construction the totality of reality upon which he acts. Although we say he is totally socialised,

1. M.McLuhan, op.cit., p.30.

it is with a fragment of society that he identifies; the fragment of his own particular social class; his school 'specialism'; his profession and associated values, mores and pastimes.

He, too, can sense the impotence of his position, amidst the complexity, enormity and sometimes terror of many of the forces that surround him. As has been schematically represented already, total socialisation into varying, often conflictual roles, precludes the possibility of the individual resolving role conflict by reference to an internally evaluated set of criteria. He may seem to act; he may seem much more participatory and articulate in both the social and political areas of his life, but like the working class man he often finds himself impotent. Socialised completely into his varying roles he is incapable of praxis. He is restricted to actions that are repetitive and conformist; to perceptions that are rote and habitual. His only mode of action is the perpetuation of the 'status quo'.

So far, in my transposition of Alienation 'A' to education, I have examined the perceptions of sociologists of knowledge and sociologists of curriculum who show the link between power organisation in society and the existing forms of pedagogy, evaluatory systems, school structures and knowledge organisation. I have shown that as a result of those perceptions it is not difficult to deduce the existence of robot-alienation in the less successful of our school 'products'.

I have discussed also, however, the reasons why I think these perceptions are incomplete. No matter how we perfect our educational system we can never have all 'successes'; successes, that is, in the terms that society recognises them.

It is a harsh recognition to make that society demands that we 'fail' some of our children. It makes educationalists seem ludicrous to think that if indeed they were able to produce all 'successes' by present standards and norms, they would at the same time be producing a society that was unworkable!

It would seem therefore to be a common-sense conclusion for educational theory that the 'success/failure' and 'equality' concepts were jettisoned and alternative less mystifying, less contradictory ideals were substituted in their place.

And yet the 'success/failure/equality' notions are very deep-rooted in our schools. It is only the awareness that they are deep-rooted in school because they are deep-rooted in society, that can enable us to make alternative recognitions. And it is only a more explicit awareness of the socialising power of education that will help us to go beyond the perceptions of the sociologists I have already discussed to a more total scrutiny of education's alienating power.

Several writers do go beyond these perceptions. In discussing them in greater detail, I hope to consolidate my argument that Alienation 'A', in failure and success alike,

can be produced by an educational system which is too strongly a socialising agent.

Ivan Illich in his powerful negation of school describes modernised poverty as the 'lack of power over circumstances' and the 'loss of personal potency'.[1.] This alienation, a form of social character in its prevalence, exists because for man his imagination has become (in the words of the black Chicago man) 'all schooled up'.[2.] Whether a child succeeds, or fails at school he encounters this diminishment for he is ritualised into the myths of education in order that he be totally socialised. The child as he grows, internalises the institutional assumptions of education. He believes his development and learning can be measured; he accepts that another can define his goals; he assimilates the 'packaged values and commodities' of his school and loses thereby a recognition of what he himself could be - other than by institutional definition - and what his society could be. Having internalised the institutional objectivation himself, he cannot see himself as he is and therefore cannot transcend himself. Having internalised the routinised, ritualised and mysticised social interpretations of reality he cannot see society otherwise. He is unaware of its paradoxes and its dissonances and hence is unmotivated to resolve or transform them.

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1. Illich, op.cit., p.2.

2. Ibid., p.22.

Illich here is making an assertion that comes very close to our definition of Alienation 'A'. And whether it is by reference to 'failure' or 'success' in school - it makes an equivalent emphasis. It is that the child becomes alienated by excessive socialisation. Educational theory, Illich claims, whilst agitating for change and reform - universally strives for one ideal. And that ideal is the thoroughly socialised man, "The co-operative man whose individual needs are met by means of his specialisation in the American system."[1.] Since that system - and to a lesser extent our system, is "a society which needs disciplined specialisation as much from its producers as from its consumers and also their full commitment to the ideology which puts economic growth first"[2.] - we must admit that such a socialisation process is not one we can countenance as a valid educational ideal.[3.] If it is accepted that society has deteriorated to such a degree - educationalists must entertain the hope that children need not of necessity be diminished to serve societal structures. If by education is produced not 'homo faber' but 'homo sapiens' and teachers learn to live with hopes rather than expectations, then making things and manipulating people as a mode of life in society, may come to be re-

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1. Ibid., p.67.
2. Ibid., p.67.
3. R.Williams, Culture and Society. Here a similar criticism to that of Illich, is made of English formal education. Our institutions of education, says Williams, produces the "upper servants" and the "lower servants". The "Ladder" of "Advance" in education is used only by few and is a device to be used alone. It thus consolidates as it sweetens the hierarchy idea.

placed by freer, more organic, creative and more respectful behaviour.

In a similar way to Illich, Freire recognises the power of education to alienate. Admittedly his concern is with the subjectivity of the oppressed peasant in Brazil but in his discussion of education's alienating function he makes a very similar exploration to Illich of educational assumptions, pedagogical styles and evaluatory procedures that reify, objectify and alienate the participants in a learning process - perhaps more especially if they are successful in that process.[1.]

Freire's exposition of the alienating power of education is more elaborate and more penetrating than Illich's although like Illich, the basic contention in his attack is that education aims to produce not 'educated' man but 'adapted' man - 'adapted' man in the sense that Bourdieu, Young, Hopper and Bernstein would agree with. "Education by the exercise of domination stimulates the credulity of students, with the ideological intent (often not perceived by educators) of indoctrinating them to adapt to the world of oppression."[2.] This process of adaptation to oppression, cultural as well as social and economic, is a process we have already examined as illuminated by the sociologists of curriculum, but unlike them

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1. Freire, op.cit. The successful, suggests Freire, become oppressors in their turn and transform everything into an object of domination - men, knowledge and property alike. The successful consciousness, therefore, is sustained by "having" and thus can cease to "be". "Apart from direct, concrete, material possession of the world and of men, the oppressor consciousness could not understand itself - could not even exist." p.34.

2. Freire, op.cit., p.52.

Freire extends his thesis to the expression of normative statements. He makes it explicit that a containment analysis for him will not suffice. Oppressors and oppressed are dehumanised by the existence of dominating education. If we can grasp the origins of that domination we are able to suggest more forcefully, alternative ideals for schools. We can help to accelerate social and educational change that in spirit, if not in theoretical clarity, begins to make itself manifest.

I will not, at the moment, consider Freire's alternatives. These will enter later into my discussion of possibilities for dealienated education. Suffice at present to be aware of Freire's criticism of existing educational practice. His criticism like Illich's is not so much the condemnation of subject organisation, stratification and segregation but a more sweeping condemnation of what he terms the whole 'banking concept' of education. In 'narration sickness' the teacher transmits areas of knowledge as static, compartmentalised, predictable and motionless in a way that defines reality as a facticity and not a process. This reality is fragmented and hence incoherent since subjective associations cannot be made within individual experience.[1.] It is also unreal, since knowledge is transmitted as unrelated to life or existential experience. Knowledge and reality can only be reified in this way if in turn the pupil is reified and the pedagogical pattern, just as predominant in our secondary education, becomes one of dominance and oppression. Pupil is the receptive, passive container who uncritically receives another's view of reality. His consciousness is

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1. In my discussion of the need to consider the intentionality of the learner, p.144, the idea of subjective associations is discussed more fully.

appropriated by another. His own intelligence is deprived. And no less damaged becomes the subjectivity of his teacher who sees no problem in his own knowledge, nor gains insight from the learning of his student.

Freire, thus, shows clearly that education can alienate its most proficient products. Knowledge of self and knowledge of external reality become lost as second-hand 'completed' views of reality are assimilated. Thus are produced men who in knowing most, can do least. They can do least in the sense that if true and free action is defined as the activity that results from reflection, these men are incapable; for education, by obfuscating external reality, makes a fantasy, fragmented world to act in; by obfuscating internal self, makes a miasma within, where reflection grows confused; and by consistently in educational experience, divorcing the field of action from reflection, produce a man who can exist but can never acquire a synthesis between the two.

Illich and Freire draw attention to the alienating propensities of formal education in other countries.

Holly is one writer in England who also endeavours to make the relationship I suggest between education and total socialisation - and therefore the alienation of the successful as well as the failures of school. Again is the stress on instrumentalism and the control of pedagogy. If the 'failure' becomes alienated because of his negative involvement the successful child succumbs to instrumental orientation and in his search for certification feels, as does

Marx's worker, "outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself."[1]. Holly goes on to discuss as a cause for alienation the deliberate divorcing of cognitive from affective concern in the child. What is known is not felt. It is not part of the child and hence is produced the 'uncommitted intellectual', the 'uninvolved educated man'[2]., whom Goodlad deplores as the greatest challenge to efforts to achieve educational reform.

This I feel is a perceptive observation. Amidst all the theoretical proposals made for educational change there is often found a cool detachment, a careful objectivity that in many ways can negate the value of the findings made; the reforms suggested. If intellectual recognition is made of changes needed in our schools it is strange that such changes are seldom suggested with passion. With the responsibility for the child in mind, it would seem not unlikely that scholars in education could argue more forcefully for the good of their charges. The dangers of uninformed, unconcerned, manipulative proselytising would not be serious one would think to a man with nothing to gain for his own interests. The benefits of stating his views with conviction would be many in the interests of the children.

Is it that we ourselves as educationalists, whilst recognising ways in which we have been influenced at school are not ourselves free to escape them? Are we too at times the ones to whom 'intellectualism' is a role, whose ideas remain divorced from true praxis?

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1. I.D.Holly, Society, Schools and Humanity. The Changing World of Secondary Education. (MacGibbon & Kee, 1971).

2. J.I.Goodlad, School Curricula and the Individual (Blaisdell Publishing Co., 1966). p.4.

A few writers then do recognise an association between education, excessive socialisation and the alienation of the successful. Even without this theoretical exposition the condition is brought to our attention by the expressions of the young themselves. The phenomenon of 'dropping out' is one indication that the successful at school or college, often feel themselves to be diminished. Surveys of 'dropouts' in American cities revealed them to have higher I.Q. scores than highschool graduates; and less systematised observations have been made about pupils and students in England.[1.]

An acquaintance of mine, a seventeen year old of exceptional ability, left school within weeks of taking four 'A' levels. He had to withstand collossal pressures to assert this freedom. He explained to me, "I would like my learning to be like the rungs of a ladder I could climb. I try to climb the ladder but it is as if they pile sacks of coal on my back".

He may have been influenced by Schopenhauer in the imagery he chose, but there was no mistaking the pain of his predicament. His was the "Catch 22" plight of education. Like Orr, in the novel by Joseph Heller, the young intellectual must accept the educational definition of himself as 'intelligent'. Should he however, in his

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1. Concern is expressed in England, at present, at the 'drop-out' of well qualified pupils from university entrance. Lord Crowther-Hunt, Minister of State for Education, has spoken of this trend as "profoundly disturbing" and "a trend that must be reversed". He has ordered an urgent government study to be made of it.
Reported in The Times Educational Supplement, 10.1.1975.

intelligence, reject the criteria of that evaluation, he must consider himself stupid!

The Little Red School Book[1] is an astute criticism by the young of an educational process they feel is damaging. It corresponds remarkably closely to the perception of Illich, Freire and Holly that more than anything else education must be challenged because it has become so overtly and completely a process of socialisation - socialisation that amounts to determination and oppression, when the individual submitting to it loses the dialectic-in-consciousness.

"What you learn in school is geared to what society holds in store for you. You're not meant to be interested in too much change"[2] is the youthful recognition of Bourdieu, Young and Bernstein's tenet of 'Knowledge and Control'. To change society, The Little Red School Book argues, you must change education. To change education you must change people and to change people you must first of all change yourself. So like Laing, The Little Red School Book concentrates its analysis primarily on the achievement of dealienation in the self. A priority is the assumption of autonomy and responsibility by the self; the acceptance of self and the self-aware formulation of values - values upon which action may be based. No less important is it

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1. A similar expression to The Little Red School Book was Statement, 1969, of the Montgomery Student Alliance, Maryland. In opposition to excessive socialisation, the central issues stressed were those of'self-concept' and "sense of control over one's own destiny".

2. Little Red School Book (Simon and Schuster, Pocket Books, 1971).

to understand self in relationships - with peers and teachers alike - to escape from the competitive, submissive, individualistic ethos of schools. Self too must be asserted in its institutional setting to achieve democratisation and participation and with regard to the wider reality of society, self must be aware of determining influences upon it; of criteria from other cultures, other times, against which to measure itself.

The Little Red School Book is not a unique document in expressing young beliefs. A similar assertion might be deduced from formulations made in many other Student Protest Movements. As Paul Hirst[1.] remarks, these movements cannot be reduced in their motivation, as has been done by some theoreticians[2.] to 'mindless attacks on culture', 'reactions to immediate concerns of self' nor 'identification with deviants'. They must be seen, as we can see The Little Red School Book, and also the works of Freire and Illich - as responsible, if sometimes inarticulate orientations towards social justice; an attack on accepted values and cultures only in so far as those values contradict values of a higher order for large numbers of people. Those values of a higher order I would suggest, are not merely those of social equality and justice as Hirst concludes, but something more. A recognition perhaps that the whole notion of equality is a confusing concept, a concept based on assumptions of

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1. P.Hirst,"Student Militancy," R.Brown, op.cit.

2. Bryan Wilson,"Explanations of Student Unrest," R.Brown, op.cit.

individualism, control, competitiveness and alienation.

Perhaps what the young recognise is that for educational change we need a completely new conceptual model. A model that defines the individual as more than his socialised self; that defines life as more than the commonplace reality.

(d) Conclusions to the transposition of Alienation 'A' to education

I have explored varying theoretical perspectives that show the connection between curricular organisation, social inequality and the alienation of the 'failures' at school. I have discussed also the formulations of both theorists and students who show the connection between educational practice and alienation in both failures and successes at school. The former insight I would claim is useful but insufficient. An exploration of knowledge that reveals the social origins of its organisation alerts us to the problematic nature of its status; its relativity as a socio-historical projection, dependent upon a particular socio-historical consciousness.

To understand education however the latter insight is indispensable. We can accept the fact that our accepted areas of knowledge are problematic. What must also be realised is that in the transmission of those knowledge areas their ultimate meaning must reside in the way they are subjectively organised in the subjectivity of the learner. This basically is the substance of Freire and Illich's thesis, and dimly present in the proclamations of The Little Red School Book: the recognition that not

only is it important to understand the organisation of knowledge in the curriculum but it is even more essential to understand that 'external' organisation in the way it relates to the subjective organisation of teacher and pupil identity.

"Zones of knowledge are constructed and sustained in the transactional processes of school learning, generating the inferential structures which become co-ordinates of future interpreted experience", writes Esland.[1] Clearly he is alive to the complexity of inter-subjective and intra-subjective negotiation of reality that Schutz and Mead attempt to explore; he is alive also to work of Piaget and Bruner on the schemata of intelligence and the formation of referential systems in the mental processes.

But what remains enigmatic for me in this assertion of Esland's is - if in examining the present-day acquisition of knowledge by formal education, as "the generation of inferential structures which become the co-ordinates of future interpreted experience" how do we understand such a thesis when in the alienated individual there is seen to be a fragmentation of inferential structures - a diminishment of the ability to interpret experience adequately? Is this statement of Esland's an ideal rather than a reality?

It might seem so. Esland's insight into the necessity to understand the subjective organisation of knowledge already organised in the curriculum may have been prompted by the recognition that a 'banking concept' education

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1. G.Esland, "Teaching and Learning as the Organisation of Knowledge". M.Young, op.cit.

does not allow for this subjective organisation. This would explain why knowledge is so often considered without connotations of its expressivity; its intentionality; its creativity or its affectivity. It would explain too why in all the work I have encountered in the sociology of the curriculum there is such scant attention paid to the problematic but immensely important question of the generation of new knowledge. Since the sociology of curriculum is itself a recently generated area of knowledge, this seems most odd.

We have reached a significant conclusion at the end of our transposition of Alienation 'A' to educational organisation. Just as in the earlier analysis of the concept of alienation in Section I we progressed to an exploration of subjectivity or consciousness - so too in our discussion of Alienation 'A' in education we become aware of the importance of the subjective organisation of knowledge. Subjectivity or Consciousness become central concerns. What is recognised clearly now is that educational practice ignored these concerns and produced men of false consciousness. The paradigm crisis that Esland[1.] suggests we face in education (perhaps also in society; perhaps in the world) is in fact a crisis of consciousness. In the face of overwhelming dissonance - in external and internal realities of self and social structure, do we begin to recognise at last our condition of alienation? Do we seek a new plausibility structure - a new 'nomos' by which we may define both ourselves and mankind in general? I would

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1. Ibid., p.94.

suggest we do. I would suggest also that in the educational process the scope is enormous for that definition.

We have made the recognition that complete identification of the individual with his socialisation is alienating. Education has been criticised because in its organisation of knowledge, pedagogy and evaluation it endeavours to identify pupils with a form of total socialisation and thus destroys in them the dialectic-in-consciousness. To restore that dialectic it must again become aware of subjectivity. It must allow also in pupils an increased grasp of inner experience that subjectivity presupposes - to enable them to do more than exist as societal members. To enable them to transcend and transform their society as they correspondingly transcend and transform themselves.

4. THE TRANSPOSITION OF ALIENATION 'B' TO EDUCATION

(a) Further elucidation of Alienation 'B' or manipulatory consciousness

In my typology of alienation modes I described Alienation 'B' or manipulatory subjectivity as that which was characterised by an impaired dialectic-in-consciousness. This individual did not totally identify with his socialised roles. He was able to see some of his roles as the result of his own projections, but because he did not allow himself to be affected by these roles, the inner vital self grew less; the capacity for experience was diminished. The characteristic inadequacy of feedback to the individual became very soon paralleled by inadequacy of perception and lack of realism in action. Paradoxically, both areas of diminishment, could be accompanied by increased action and a very convincing appearance of autonomy in the individual. Both, however, would, in the long term, prove either damaging or false, for their bases would rest on neither the integrity of experience or reflection in the individual personality - nor on an adequate or honest perception of his milieu. Inevitably we must raise the question why, in some arises the capacity to perceive yet remain unaffected by the emotional needs and responses of others. It is a wide question and most likely there are many answers.

Sociologists and psychologists alike would point to deficiencies in early childhood, when the infant, insufficiently loved, failed to love, identify and empathise

in his turn.[1] Philosophers of the Women's Liberation Movement might point to the damaging effect of male/female role conditioning in Western societies, that deliberately repressed in the male his emotional sensitivity and response, so that as men almost exclusively took over the role of the 'actors' in society, it was not surprising to find them insensitive to the emotional needs of others.[2] Maslow, the humanist psychologist would substantiate the thesis by suggesting that socialisation for the male today leads him

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1. John Bowlby, Child Care and the Growth of Love (Penguin, 1957).
   This study establishes as almost irrefutable the links between a continuous, loving relationship in early childhood and the later mature development of the personality. Both Bowlby and Laing would stress the physical, sensuous components of that early relationship, that should ideally, be also emotionally and intellectually alive.

2. I don't think that Kate Millett's thesis is far-fetched in Sexual Politics (Abacus, 1972).
   Concepts of power and domination permeate many contemporary literary descriptions of sexual activity. Male oppression characterises many sexual relationships. Since the sexual relationship itself can be viewed as a cultural microcosm of the more general power-structured relationships in society, it does not seem presumptuous to suggest that any fundamental escape from the ethos of control and manipulation will involve change in our conceptions of sexuality; as well as changes in attitude towards children, minority groups and the poor.

to repress in himself the emotion, fantasy, music, poetry, imagination and tenderness that are as much part of his nature as that of the female.[1.] That in fact it is the repression of these qualities in himself that leads to his dominating attitude towards the female - because those same qualities, manifest more obviously in her, threaten to arouse the ones that he has so sternly repressed in himself.

Men of religion and many psychologists today, also, would indicate that this is a social malaise; a malaise that has grown because in the absence of religion, it is the 'outer' reality only that has credence. The 'inner' world of man, in terms of his feelings, fantasies, thoughts, imaginings and dreams are discounted, in favour of what is 'real', 'pragmatic' and 'expedient' as if in any true sense all that 'outer reality' could exist unless sustained by the inner intentionality and experience of those that existed in it. As if ever change could take place without the attempted synthesis of dream and reality.

They might suggest also, as Dr. Frankl and the school of Logotherapists do, that just as the 'inner' reality of feelings has been ignored, so too have those very obvious realities that are equally threatening to commonplace life, the realities of suffering and death, both of them experiences for self and the other, that provoke most strongly the power to empathise.[2.]

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1. A.Maslow, The Further Reaches of Human Nature (Pelican, 1973).

2. V.E.Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism (Souvenir Press, 1967).

Many more reasons might be suggested for the production of the manipulative, uncommitted man. It is our place here however to enquire into the part that education plays. If, in the structure of schools; in predominant modes of pedagogy or in our present paradigms of knowledge, it can be seen that a child grows and is encouraged to dismiss or repress the extent to which he is affectively concerned with self, others or the world, or with situations in which he engages, it is very necessary for us to re-evaluate completely our educational system. We do not wish to produce men who sense themselves as impotent. Still less do we wish to find the predominant form of action in society to be manipulatory.

Before I attempt to explore the influence of our educational system in producing individuals of manipulatory consciousness it may be necessary to stress that this suggested description of a mode of subjectivity is no more than a conceptual model - and moreover a model that is itself upon a continuum of possible subjective states. If I were to select typical individual examples, one could distinguish between individuals who are manipulative in all their roles in life, and individuals who would manipulate in only one or two. One could also distinguish between various forms of manipulation. Manipulation can occur by the appropriation of consciousness but equally also by the ignoring of consciousness. It can occur also with varying degrees of intentionality - but I hope these distinctions will be assumed and that the reader will understand such simplification to be necessary in order to illuminate the processes of power and control.

Admittedly, many in positions of power and control exist in the subjectivity of Alienation 'A', and their action is rote, perhaps modelled on manipulatory predecessors and peers, but very strongly, I sense, much power and control is exercised with considerable intentionality and often almost pathological disregard for those whom the action affects and it is for this reason I wish to explore the influence of education in the development of the Alienation 'B'-type consciousness.

(b) The effect of the structures of education in producing manipulatory consciousness

Ivan Illich condemns the structure of education as manipulative because it does not exist as a facility 'to be used' freely by the members of society, but as an institution that 'uses' selected members of society, in pre-established ways, for pre-determined ends.[1.] Goffman suggests that schools, like other institutions are manipulative, because like every organisation they generate assumptions about identity.[2.] Since, into the structure of education, is built an implicit self-image of the pupil qua pupil, but also qua human being, self-defining implications are strong. Although school is not a total institution self-defining implications may be even as strong as those, for its explicit concern is with most intimate processes of self-definition, of thought, value and feeling. And its concern comes at a

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1. I.Illich, op.cit.
   More abrasively still Illich writes, "School has become the planned process which tools man for a planned world, the principal tool to trap in a man's trap".

2. E.Goffman, Asylums, p.179.

time when the child is himself in the process of forming an identity, when his secondary socialisation is taking place.

And yet identity must arise from somewhere. Social objectivation is obviously an important component of identity-formation. "Our sense of being a person can come from being drawn into a wider social unit...", writes Goffman. "Our status is backed by the solid buildings of the world...".[1] So the question we are drawn to ask is, if the structure of education is shown to be manipulatory and to produce in its turn manipulatory people, in what way now do we sense that the 'social objectivation' or 'self-defining' 'manipulatory' tendency of schools infringes upon, violates or diminishes the individual his capacity to define himself. In other words whilst we are assuming that self is indeed a social product, as Berger and Luckmann stress in The Social Construction of Reality,[2] are we not now counterposing against that assumption this intrinsic, instinctive, unique but mysterious process by which each individual seeks to define himself? And so, as we become more aware of, and stress, this latter process, we call into question or criticise any institutions of society that seem to override in the individual his capacity in this respect. We then call them manipulatory. As do Illich, Freire, Goffman, Marcuse, Fromm, Klapp, Reich and Reisman and other writers who

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1. Ibid., p.320.

2. P.L.Berger & T.Luckmann, op.cit., p.67.

query the problem of loss of identity in modern society.

It may seem as I explore the manipulative nature of education, with emphasis at present on its structure, that this manipulation would only result in producing individuals characterised by Alienation 'A' subjectivity - or 'robot' consciousness. This seems to be the overwhelming conclusion of most of the writers I have quoted. Certainly such individuals are produced, but what I would like to suggest is that it is almost certainly a correlative process, that as 'robot' alienation is produced in some, so 'manipulatory' alienation is correspondingly produced in others. As some succumb to the manipulatory process and become totally socialised and accept almost completely the self-defining implications of their education and perhaps lose a sense of identity; others do not succumb. They resist the implicit self-image of school, manipulate the institution in their turn, as they seek to preserve their own sense of self and assume many of the characteristics of the Alienation 'B' consciousness. Berger and Luckmann called this process 'cool alternation'[1]. Goffman indicates even more perceptively the pathological qualities of the procedure. The inmate can learn, he writes, "the amoral arts of shamelessness".[2] He can practice "a special kind of absenteeism, a defaulting not from prescribed activity but from prescribed being".[3]

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1. P.L.Berger & T.Luckmann, op.cit., p.191.
2. E.Goffman, Asylums, p.169.
3. Ibid., p.188.

We must ask in what way the structure of education in being manipulatory or assuming too comprehensively the role of identity-former, encourages young people to resist that manipulation, to become in their turn manipulatory.

If an educational system makes enrolment obligatory and continuous over eleven years of a child's life; if it categorises the individual in terms of age, sex, social class, behaviour and intellectual achievement; if regimentation is manifest not only in social arrangements but in the obligatory imposition of curriculum we must conclude that schools appropriate to a frightening extent the autonomy of the pupil.[1.] The child cannot choose to go to school or to leave. He cannot choose who to learn with or the one he would like as a teacher. He cannot choose the content of his learning, the method by which he learns, and the goal of his learning is that decided by another. Built into institutional life are procedures and practices that ensure conformity to the 'status quo'. Various types of privilege and punishments; different kinds of mortifications; echelons in staff hierarchy; dual language and the control of information within the institution- all are methods very like those in the asylum which pressurise the individual to be submissive to the system that exists over and above him - and at the same time confuses and

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1. It is necessary too to consider the negative obligatory mandates of education. It is obligatory for some to leave at sixteen or eighteen if they have no qualifications to continue school. It is obligatory to be excluded from certain subjects. Obligatory too in most cases to stay for a lifetime outside full-time education.

mysticises the processes of that institutional control.[1] The deep discrepancy between the social principles that justify the practices quoted and the social reality that does in fact exist remains often beyond conscious scrutiny and by the maintenance of strict boundaries between the home life and values of the pupil and his institutional life, it is made difficult for him to examine his experience in school by criteria he has more autonomously formulated elsewhere.[2]

There is, therefore, a very strong likelihood that the child in his process of identity formation at the secondary level will identify very strongly with school's definition of him. But as Goffman shows in Asylums, and

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1. E.Goffman, Asylums.

2. The point being made here could be elaborated further. A child's home life; leisure activities; exposure to the mass media and peer influences, all affect his formulation of values. If all that he learns at school is compartmentalised and if all that he learns is 'imposed', there is not the necessary dialectic, comparison and evaluation between the different areas of his life for him to arrive at any deeply felt or held values. The working class child is often impaired in value formation because of too large a gulf between home and school values. The middle class child can suffer because of too great an identification between those two sources of values. Both can be impoverished if the supposedly 'important' values of school are valued only superficially and transmitted badly. This is an idea I will suggest in the conclusion of my work.

as many psychotherapists increasingly reveal - as does the study of Dibs by Virginia Axline[1], the human organism very strongly wishes to define itself in the most acceptable way possible in given circumstances. And so we find that some pupils do not totally identify. As Goffman writes of the inmates - the individual seeks constantly to preserve some sense of autonomy - in spite of often colossally determining influences to which he is exposed.[2] Children in school make many 'secondary adjustments' in an effort to retain the integrity they feel is threatened. One has only to think of the age-old practices of note-passing; non-verbal communications by facial gestures; collaborative and enthusiastic modes of cheating or early-morning joint-homework sessions to become aware that pupils can manipulate teachers to a considerable degree. 'Removal Activities' too can play a large part in the school child's life - the child may be far away in fantasy but by his rapt posture and earnest gaze indicate very strongly to the teacher the assiduousness of his attention. He can excel academically - even to the extent of one boy I knew who acquired six 'A' levels (two of them with 'A' grades) but expresses quite openly to his family, his contempt for all subjects except one in which he felt truly

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1. Virginia Axline, Dibs, in Search of Self (Pelican,1971).

2. This is also a point put forward by John Holt in R. & B. Gross, op.cit. Whereas I have stressed manoeuvres used by children to appear more successful and conforming, Holt describes more negative, hostile adjustments. They do this, he writes, "... by acting much more stupid and incompetent than they really are, by denying their rulers the full use of their intelligence and ability, by declaring their minds and bodies free of their enslaved bodies". p.75.

involved. In my own education I remember with great sadness my own manipulatory attitude towards my musical education. Being almost tone deaf and having no knowledge or experience of musical instruments, I endeavoured to gain a high credit in a theoretical paper by the most elaborate memorisations of notes, which if played I could not even distinguish apart! If I had failed my music examination, I would have been categorised as 'failure' - my instinct to preserve my sense of identity as acceptable - motivated me towards a deceitful and manipulatory position.

What can only be concluded from this examination of school structure is that whatever educational system we have it must become alive to its role as identity-former. Everybody wants to achieve an acceptable sense of their own self. Everybody needs to have their own part in formulation of that identity. Procedures that ignore or make impossible these very strong needs and yearnings in human nature must be rethought and reorganised. Autonomy should not only exist in deceitful or pathological behaviour, but should grow freely within the integrity of child's total personality.

(c) The influence of pedagogy on the formation of manipulatory consciousness

The emphasis of my examination of the influence of educational structures in the formation of manipulatory consciousness was to stress the negative effects of institutional conditioning that a secondary school level in particular negated the child's own self-image and sought to impose upon

him the implicit self-image of the school. As a means of resisting this imposition children could become manipulatory in their turn and whilst maintaining in consciousness a dialectic between socialised and unsocialised self, nevertheless repress ways in which they might be affected by others, in order to assert their own personalities.

A different emphasis emerges from an examination of the influence of pedagogy. If, first of all, we consider pedagogy as a particular type of inter-personal relationship we very quickly see that it shares the characteristics of most inter-personal relationships in our society. If we look to intergenerational relationships; sexual relationships; institutional hierarchical relationships it seems apparent that underlying them all are the qualities of dominance and control. Just as in predominant attitudes to the world; to material goods; to knowledge there is an almost exclusive preoccupation with possession, so too in inter-personal relationships there is an assumption made that people too can be possessed or controlled. 'To have' and 'to be had' are the alternative roles in relating. 'To be' and relate autonomously is a rarity.[1].

It is not surprising then if we see dominance as widespread - whether it is blatant and condemned, on the macro-scale, as in the oppression of minority races - or

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1. The sources for this idea were,
R.D.Laing, Self and Others
E.Fromm, The Art of Loving
Kate Millett, op.cit.

whether it is subtle, insidious and countenanced, on the micro-scale, as in the relationship of husband to wife or parent to child - that in the pedagogy of our schools we find its existence.[1] If there is evidence of dominance of thought by teachers - in other words if teaching can be seen as a form of manipulation - we cannot avoid the conclusion that our schools will produce the manipulative individual. As victims of oppression revolt for their freedom, to become in their turn oppressors,[2] so too do children at school internalise the modes of interaction they are exposed to, and become manipulatory in their turn. Since the whole ethos of society, rewards, and prestige are weighted so heavily as to confirm the 'dominating' character and validate his behaviour according to societal criteria of value, the original ambivalence noted by Freire in the oppressed, between 'desire to be free' and 'desire to dominate' becomes increasingly a certainty in the 'desire to control'.

On what assumptions, on what ideology does our present system of pedagogy rest, so that this manipulative process can occur? A difficulty arises in asking this question since there is so often confusion between what are the implicit, often subconscious assumptions of teachers and what are the verbalised, rationalised, mystifying explanations of their functioning. Goffman has shown this discrepancy

1. H.H.Anderson, Creativity in Childhood and Adolescence (Science and Behaviour Books Inc.,California, 1965). This censure by Anderson of dominating modes of pedagogy is serious, for he sees it as a prime cause for the destruction of creativity in the pupil.
2. Freire, op.cit. Freire discusses this idea in Chapter I and stresses then the identification process. Later in the book, however, the ambiguity and ambivalence of the oppressed consciousness is attended to and implications are made to suggest the splitting of personality. "Part of the oppressed 'I' is located in the reality to which he adheres; part is located outside himself, in the mysterious forces which he regards as responsible for a reality about which he can do nothing". pp.140-141.

Thus again we are reminded of the proximity of the manipulativ consciousness to that of the schizoid.

clearly in his examination of institutions for the mentally sick. The same observation could be made of schools - to see beneath the articulated meaning, we must look for assumptions in the actual behaviour, attitudes and actions of the staffs.

Freire and many other educational theorists suggest that children at school are manipulated because they are reified. Certainly there is a sense in which this happens because the child in school is seen exclusively as child rather than as developing human being. Although in many ways it can be seen as necessary to be aware of the ontogenetic stages of the young person's progress, it must also be stressed that this cannot be a discrete categorisation. Teacher's likewise are developing human beings and it is not unusual to encounter 'pupils' with a maturity in development that is greater than that shown by the adults that surround them.

Age alone is not the only means by which the child is objectified. As I have already noted in the discussion of structural 'self-images', assumptions are made in the pedagogical relationship that, in terms of the whole personality, the child can be categorised, defined and known. The injustice of this assumption becomes palpable when we observe that much of this faith in categorisation rests strongly on the cognitive evaluation of the child. Teachers assume then that the child can be 'known' - but this can only be a partial distorted knowledge for he is seen only in his intellectual capacity. His capacities as an aesthetic, physical, social being are given small credence. His emotional capacities are likewise denied unless there is such obvious distortion or maturity that they interfere with the pedagogical interaction. Least of all is acknowledged the child's spiritual life, world,

aspirations and ideals.

We have then a pedagogy that assumes that children can be evaluated according to societally-acceptable criteria of excellence. Their worth is somehow related to their ability to function independently of their peers; their ability to divorce knowledge from their own experiential, existential situation; their ability to operate at the abstract rather than concrete level of thought - and their proficiency in the 'word' - in the literacy which is itself a relative product of socialisation and would be called by many a compounder of alienation.[1.] If this is the case we must ask a further question. What is the assumption made about the nature of the child, the nature of man that enables the child to be categorised, and enables him to be categorised in this particular fashion?

The word 'unsocialised' provides a clue. I have used this word as Berger and Laing do, as a means to describe that part of self that does not identify totally with society - or the objectivations of others. In their works, as in that of the humanist psychologist Maslow, the word 'unsocialised' has the most positive connotation. Berger, Laing and Maslow in different ways suggest that in this 'unsocialised''inner' or 'deep' self, there reside the forces of love, of value and of vision. There resides there fears and fantasies too but since in the integrated personality the love, valuing, vision, fears and fantasies come under the scrutiny of the intellect there can only be meaning, insight and true development in their

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1. M.Young, op.cit.

synthesis.

Yet when my work was first read by friends an almost universal hostility was expressed to the use of the word 'unsocialised', as if 'unsocialised' and 'dangerous' were somehow synonymous terms. And this confusion I think is at the root of our pedagogical, manipulative procedures. Until very recently there has been the very strong assumption that the nature of child, and of man, was in essence weak or bad. And thus it has been assumed of children that they are 'lazy', 'need pushing', 'won't work', or 'don't know what's good for them'. When you hear in mature post-graduate courses the same observations made, but this time by the adults about themselves, one becomes aware how deeply entrenched is this pessimistic, damaging attitude towards ourselves - and our children. We see also how marked is our fear and ambivalence with regard to our potentialities. Only if we have this attitude of ambivalence can we assume that dominance and control are necessary in the pedagogical relationship.[1.]

The assumption is made commonly then that the nature of man is imperfect; that within the organism itself there are not strong yearnings and potentialities for growth in all dimensions of the personality. It is taken even more for granted, moreover, that if 'nature' as a whole needs control, there are particular parts which are even more unreliable and

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1. A.Maslow, op.cit.
Because Maslow's discussion of "ambivalence towards potentiality" is so interesting, I summarise it briefly in Appendix B.

must be repressed altogether. The 'emotional' dimensions of experience are denigrated so that the word 'emotional' itself has the connotation of 'spuriousness' even when in alliance with intellectual endeavour. "But I love that idea!" as an acknowledgment of the joy and gratification in gaining a new insight would, by most teachers, be considered an immature statement - and not at all in keeping with the seriousness of the cognitive transmission! Sensuous capacities too are virtually denied. In language used this sensuous deprivation is most apparent.[1] Tactile, aural, sexual awarenesses are only rarely allowed expression. It is as if in education the whole human body takes on a sinister connotation. D.H. Lawrence's glorious affirmation of the perceptual, sensual and sexual; Teilhard de Chardin's respectful and grateful valuing of the materiality of our existence - these validations are far from having truly permeated into the consciousness of man in our society or into the attitudes of teachers. We seem to be in that situation where, as in times of most ascetic religion we deny the world, beauty and the flesh. But the spirituality for which those things were once denounced has now been replaced by 'intellectualism'.

Briefly and also dogmatically I have endeavoured to suggest the assumptions that lead to manipulative pedagogy. They are the assumptions that the child's nature is bad or weak; that his emotional, sensual, perceptual, social and spiritual capacities have little relevance to his development; that his cognitive development is of paramount importance and can somehow develop 'in solo'; and of course the most basic

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1. M.McLuhan, op.cit.
In the bible; in Shakespeare; in the works of Donne, Hopkins and Joyce - language is used with a high degree of sensuous awareness.

assumption of all, that if the child is to be totally socialised, we must therefore live in a good society that needs little change; and so the replicating of the present modes of interaction, of dominance and submission, or of Alienation 'B' consciousness and that of Alienation 'A', is all that is necessary.

Those assumptions may remain unexamined, even unconscious in the majority of teachers. What can be made more explicit however are the procedures of pedagogy, whereby these assumptions are reflected in action.

I have already referred to the processes of categorisation and reification of the cognitive domain of the personality. A vast educational literature has been devoted to this whole debate on grading, streaming, chronological fixing - on tests, examinations and scholarships and I will not now enter into the intricacy of the discussion except only to point to the inherent, manipulative possibilities. One, pointed out by Illich, is the deprivation caused by denial: if a child does not reach a required grade, pass a required examination, he is refused access to an area of knowledge which he may most earnestly wish to pursue.[1.] He is thus denied the chance to strive for his own identity. The other manipulative possibility is that of excessive objectivation, whether as successful (in school's terms) or failure. If, as Sartre, Goffman, Berger and Luckmann stress, part of identity is indeed the acceptance

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1. I.Illich, op.cit.

of the objectivations of others, one might ask at this stage, if we did not live in a society where there was such explicit objectivation (institutionalised objectivation that occurred at a vulnerable age), would this influence of objectivation on identity be so pronounced at all? If the pedagogical relationship is the interaction of 'I-it' rather than the 'I-thou' relatedness that Buber describes,[1.] the child is pressurised to accept that objectivation entirely or rebel, possibly at the cost of his own integrity. But if, as Freire suggests, the 'I' as teacher responds to the 'I' of child, in other words if the child is subjectified rather than objectified and reified, then manipulation could not take place.

Categorisation and objectivation are two facets of the pedagogical relationship. Impersonality is another. Or perhaps it is merely a means used to sustain the artificiality and injustice of the former processes. We know in schools of the deliberate cultivation of impersonality and distancing. It is reflected in language and many deference patterns are institutionalised so that instinctive and natural movements towards respect and regard are replaced by artificial procedures that are seldom substantiated by intentionality. With the higher echelons of the staff hierarchy this distancing becomes even more pronounced, so that those in school with the greatest powers and control, may not be even recognisable to many of their pupils.

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1. M.Buber, I and Thou (Edinburgh. T. & T. Clark. Trans. by Ronald Gregor Smith, 1937).

They are ensured a moral invulnerability by this isolation, for since many of the interpersonal duties or discipline and conflict-resolution are delegated to lower staff - they can remain aloof from the censure activated by seemingly unjust measures. Their often close connections with 'higher' society outside their own particular institutions give them a status, permanence and influence which increase their powers.[1].

Categorisation; Objectivation; Impersonality. Tools of manipulation that prevent the development of autonomy and lead to the growth of an individual whose 'seeming' autonomy is the result of his own personal diminishment.

The fourth tool of manipulation in the pedagogical relationship, is of course the most damaging one of all. It is the related attitude of teachers to knowledge and curriculum. This I will consider next, with explicit reference to the production of the manipulative man.

(d) The influence of present knowledge organisation in causing 'manipulative' subjectivity

The structures of education, I have suggested, produce the manipulative man, because by excessive socialisation and objectivation, the individual is deprived of the means whereby desirable identity may grow within

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1. E.Goffman, Asylums.

the integrity and totality of his personality. He must then resort to manipulation in order to preserve a sense of self. I emphasised too that control, excessive categorisation and impersonality in the teacher-pupil relationship serve to confirm the structural influences of the school and are seen likewise to be tools for manipulation. As I indicated earlier, educational structures and forms of pedagogy rest and rely on the existence of certain implicit assumptions about both the nature of the child and the nature of society. Equally important is the fact that they rely also upon implicit assumptions about the nature of knowledge.

If, upon examining those assumptions we are led to query them, it will become necessary to suggest an alternative paradigm of knowledge, that is supported by alternative modes of pedagogy and educational structures. There could be no more pressing reason for this than the revelation that the present organisation of knowledge leads to a serious impoverishment of consciousness.

To clarify my starting-point in this discussion, I indicate in chart form what I feel to be the correlated assumptions made about the nature of the child, society and the organisation of knowledge.

Correlated Assumptions as to Nature of Child, Society and Knowledge

	CHILD	SOCIETY	ORGANISATION OF KNOWLEDGE
1.	That the child should be socialised. Lockean idea that psyche 'tabula rasa'.	That society is a facticity and complete. That society is good.	That the knowledge transmitted in schools is likewise a facticity and complete. It is the view of the reality.
2.	That the child can be reified; objectivated; categorised.[1]	People in society are reified, categorised, stratified into classes.	Knowledge can be objectivated: organised into subject areas: stratified into order of value.
3.	That the child can be segregated. There can be separation from adults; 'differing' peers; community. Even distancing from his own teachers.	That society can operate well with segregation between classes.	School knowledge too can be 'segregated' - from 'commonplace' knowledge: from experiential and existential knowledge: from affectivity: from commitment and action.
4.	That the child can be known and valued primarily for his academic or cognitive abilities.	That society can exist with a primarily materialistic, empirical, objectivist ethos.	That knowledge is primarily utilitarian in purpose - to prepare for a career.
5.	That the child needs control.	That prevalent authority - dominance patterns are necessary.	Knowledge must be ordered, selected, controlled.

1. D. Ingleby, "Ideology and the Human Sciences: Some Comments on the Role of Reification in Psychology and Psychiatry". T. Pateman, Counter Course. A Handbook for Course Criticism (Penguin Educ. Special, 1972).

In making this examination of Alienation 'B' it becomes clear that I already query these assumptions about the child. Such a querying then must of necessity, in view of the supposed correlations suggested, lead to a query about the 'assumed' properties of society and likewise presumed ideas with regard to knowledge organisation.

If, as I suggested earlier in the paper, in my transposition of Alienation 'A' to Education, the central consideration with regard to knowledge organisation becomes that of the organisation of knowledge in the subjectivity of the learner, it might seem possible to generate new assumptions or ideas about the nature of child, society and knowledge, that in many ways would, in theory, resolve much of the conflictual and also confused thinking in this area.

To clarify these possible new assumptions I use another chart, and in the elucidation of it hope to show the areas of relevance that would obviate the need for children to become manipulatory in their approach to the acquisition of knowledge, or to develop the manipulatory consciousness in their later use, or abuse of it.

Plausible New Assumptions about the Nature of Child, Society and Knowledge

	CHILD	SOCIETY	THE SUBJECTIVE ORGANISATION OF KNOWLEDGE
1.	The child's identity evolves in the dialectic of objectivation subjectivation. He should never be totally socialised.[1]	Society is not a facticity or complete. It should exist in a state of 'process'. Increasingly we sense its imperfections and hope to remedy them.	Knowledge is not a facticity or complete. We have only isolated view of different faces of reality. Like the individual, and society it is in a state of process or evolution.
2.	The child cannot be reified, objectivated, categorised. A more respectful, humble attitude is needed towards the complexity of his personality and potentiality.	In our society the assumptions about class are not only unjust but dehumanising for all.	Knowledge divisions can be a convenience but in the mind of the child, the schemata of intelligence break down the artificially divided areas. This must be allowed for in schools.
3.	Segregation of the child is a disadvantage. Emotional, social, intellectual needs often require different 'age' associates. Distancing is a falsification of inter-personal relations.	A society without community is diminished.	Knowledge cannot exist in 'solo'. It is only of use if it is integral to the personality of the learner; to the life of the community.
4.	That the child cannot be known. He must be valued primarily as an 'end' - a unique individual. The totality of his personality must be valued- physical, psychic, noetic. Identity and vocation are central concerns.	That within society men's psychic and noetic needs must be fulfilled. Society is in need of transformation in order to preserve the sanity and humanity of man.	Knowledge acquired in schools must become 'intrinsic' to the learner. The pupil's intentionality and expressivity must be relevant. His experiential and existential situation related. Knowledge of self: of inner experience; of values need priority.

(cont. ..

(continued)

	CHILD	SOCIETY	THE SUBJECTIVE ORGANISATION OF KNOWLEDGE
5.	The child needs to develop in autonomy and freedom. The basic organic nature of man is good. Creativity is a natural propensity of all men and leads to evolution and development.	Society can be transformed by a change in consciousness and by the praxis of autonomous men. A 'new' reality can emerge. What will it be?	The generation of 'new' knowledge is of central importance.

1. S.Arieti, The Intra-Psychic Self (1967, Basic Books). He formulates the thesis that the child's development arises from the dialectic between the intra-psychic and the interpersonal - but suggests as does Leibnitz that we must begin with the intra-psychic: that is with the potentials existing at birth. We can only do this by understanding the fact of phylogenetic evolution as well as ontogenetic development.

In making this second correlation between plausible new assumptions about the nature of child, society and knowledge and in focusing attention especially upon the subjectivity of the learner, several new considerations emerge as important in discussing the problem of 'manipulative' acquisition of knowledge.

Coleridge, long ago, made the distinction I refer to when he spoke of true knowledge being 'substantial' to the learner. Illich also made a similar perception when he distinguished between 'extrinsic' and 'intrinsic' knowledge. Goodlad, Holly, Bernstein, Esland, Freire also make similar less explicit recognitions - but what they all, in essence, allude to is the damaging possibility that 'knowledge' can be 'acquired', but in an alienated fashion. If the learner does not recognise the fault in the processes of his own acquisition he will use it unreflectively, in robot fashion. If, however, he does become aware of it, he can acquire seeming autonomy and use it manipulatively. "He can play at what he is", as Berger and Luckmann write.[1.]

How then in schools, we ask, is the subjective organisation of knowledge ignored, so that its acquisition remains a second skin, to be sloughed off or used as a chameleon-type disguise? In the first three sets of assumptions about knowledge on the chart, it was observed that knowledge should not be considered a facticity; that subject divisions were useful but artificial and

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1. P.L.Berger & T.Luckmann, op.cit., p.191.

susceptible to alteration; that knowledge could not exist in some 'vacuum'-like state divorced either from learner or his social context. If we progress further however, to consider Sections 4 and 5 of the chart, it would seem impossible for a disagreement to exist about 1, 2 or 3, if the latter assumptions were intrinsic to pedagogical ideology.

All these assumptions are essentially connected with the question of the 'subjective' organisation of knowledge.[1] If we accept Piaget's description of functioning intelligence as the dialectic between centrifugal and centripetal processes[2] and also the maxim made explicit

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1. The importance of the consideration of the subjective organisation of knowledge was shown at the end of my transposition of Alienation 'A' to Education, pp.108-111.

2. Piaget's theory of intellectual operations suggests this two-fold activity of the mind by the model of "an image of an active organism which both selects and incorporates stimuli in a manner determined by its structure, while at the same time adapting its structure to the stimuli". p.36. The centrifugal process of intelligence is, therefore, that of the gradual objectification of external reality. The centripetal process is that of burgeoning self-awareness. In other words, "it is by adapting to things that thought organises itself and it is by organising itself that it structures things". p.47.

by Inhelder and Piaget and also by Arieti, that within intelligence there is cognitive and affective inter-dependence - so that both these processes are 'indissociably united in the functioning of the personality',[1] it becomes clear that central to our discussion on knowledge are not only the pupil's experiential and existential situation - the objectivities dealt with by the centripetal processes - but also the affectivity, intentionality, creativity and expressivity of the self of pupil: the 'subjectivities' dealt with by the centrifugal processes.

In a way it is artificial to separate objectivity and subjectivity in this way. The processes after all occur in dialectic and there must be times when experiential and existential situations are preoccupying; others when inner states of self need extra attention. I make the distinction, though, partly for clarity, partly also because in much educational theory emphasis is placed on one particular factor to the exclusion of others.[2]

(i) The dismissal of experiential and existential realities of the pupil

John Holt in the Underachieving School quotes from Freire in support of his thesis on the need and method for the awakening

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1. Ibid., p.80.
2. For instance, in reading works like Midwinter's on community education (R.Hooper, The Curriculum Context, Design and Development (Oliver & Boyd, 1971)), I get the strong impression that experiential needs are over-emphasised. In Freire, both existential and experiential realities are given consideration, but inner realities in less detail. Bruner sometimes emphasises the existential and inner (cognitive) at the expense of experiential and inner (affective).

of true consciousness. Experiential reality must become central to education. The learner, he writes, must be 'taken from where he is, helped to understand that, then helped to grow from there further and further into the real world that surrounds him'.[1.] In almost the same words a psychotherapist might describe his method of treating a patient with some personality disorder. Basically exactly the same recognition is made, whether in regard to education or to psychotherapy. It is that the experience of the individual, however strange or deviant it may seem in either context, is valid to the experiencer and he cannot move beyond it, without first recognising, understanding and expressing it. Any process of invalidation of experience does damage to the personality and although in the educational system especially it may lead to very plausible 'cover-up' development, there will remain splits and dichotomies that will impair the individual in his power to form values; know himself; or take meaningful action.[2.]

A great deal of valuable literature by English educational theorists discusses in detail the value of the consideration of experiental reality to the organisation of knowledge.[3.] It would seem repetitive therefore to

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1. John Holt, Freedom and Beyond (Pelican, 1973), p.195.

2. David Ingleby, "Ideology and the Human Sciences: Some Comments on the Role of Reification in Psychology and Psychiatry". T.Pateman, op.cit.

3. The best known and most fully implemented in practice being Midwinter's Community Project.

rearticulate those sound and well-formulated ideas to express again the need for the child to be accepted as he is, and for him to have an opportunity to find and explore who he is. His home and values; the community he lives in; his language (most especially); his more intimate concerns and interest, they are all his experience; all valid to him and the foundations for future educational growth.

In most primary schools and certainly in the established community schools, there is increasing implementation of this recognition, yet still, the fact that most teachers are themselves of a different social origin, is conducive to the invalidation of experience in schools where the community ideology is clearly defined. It is in secondary schools, however, where the problem assumes new and more serious proportions. Language becomes increasingly the rational code that Bernstein distinguished. The concrete, the anecdotal, the experiential influence are increasingly excluded. 'Bodies of academic knowledge' are transmitted. More commonplace areas of knowledge are excluded and denigrated. Many issues of vital importance to the experience of the adolescent, although of the most central relevance to his life, are ignored completely, as if too inflammable, too personal, too value-laden. I remember listening to a discussion once between a head, senior mistress and form-teacher. They had gathered together in democratic fashion to discuss the lack of progress in an intelligent adolescent girl. Her parents had recently separated; her behaviour was reprehensible in that she had been found writing sexual graffiti on the lavatory wall. In her dress,

appearance and behaviour towards the boys in her class there was a sexual blatancy that was the cause of concern. A great deal of talk went on, as to discipline measures; home contacts; staff relationships; subject involvements. And yet not once in this very long discussion was the point raised that for this girl, in her particular home difficulties, at her vulnerable age in life, many very serious sexual issues were at stake. Her behaviour and very being showed this to be the case, and yet every aspect of the situation that had connotations of sexuality, were avoided rigorously.

Similar points could be made about other experiential realities that are ignored. About race; drug-taking; violence; future work and its humiliations - but the over-riding conclusion must be: if secondary education is geared to pretend so much does not exist, what possibility have pupils to relate what is learned in schools to what is important in their own lives? Such exclusions can only lead to placing the child in a state of psychological isolation and vulnerability, and worse still, encourage the development of vast complexes of defensive strategies, of fears, envy, dislikes, distancing, despairs that have as ultimate conclusion the devaluing of self and loss of identity, or in contrast, the devaluing of others and the manipulative mode of consciousness.[1.]

I have dealt very briefly with the need for education to countenance the experiential reality of the pupil, because it has had such detailed excellent treatment elsewhere. When we come to consider the importance of existential reality in the context of schooling, there is a more

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1. A.Maslow, op.cit.

difficult perception to make. With regard to experiential reality, social inequalities and injustices and recognition of their perpetuation by educational structures, even the 'equalising' comprehensive, threw into relief the need to consider the different starting points in each child's life.

When we consider existential reality, however, there is no sociological literature that can point to its presence or relevance, for we exist in a society that chooses to ignore it. Just as twenty years ago, the experiential situation of working class people was virtually ignored in education, today we could say the existential situation of all people is dismissed from mind.[1.]

When I read Berger and Luckmann's The Social Construction of Reality and contemplated their definition of the commonplace paramount reality as that of the 'Spatial, Temporal and Interpersonal', I queried in my mind why these should be considered compelling and massive in their influence, when in all men's experience, there are times when other realities dwarf them. I thought in my own experience of realities of pain, of giving birth, of feeling utterly alone, of the prospect of death (but this not very convincingly), and I became aware that Berger and Luckmann were in fact ignoring the existential realities, and in the context of their thesis

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1. Although in adult society and in education little account is taken of existential realities, children often have an acute awareness of them. In Appendix C I have included some writings of my own children that show this. They were written before I began this work and to my knowledge did not arise from any immediate or obvious personal experience.

quite justifiably, since in our society and Western civilisation itself, man's basic human condition, his aloneness and the transitory nature of his life are repressed.

Freire's emphasis on the need to take into account existential reality is not surprising in a country where death and pain are commonplace and unconcealed. Bruner's recognition is more imaginative given his own social context. "We have become remote from the immediate tragic forces of life", he writes. "We have become bland in our humanity". And again, that cringe-making phrase! "We have prettified reality".[1] Fromm would make the same points in his discussions of routinisation, as would Maslow, de Chardin and Frankl. As would Laing, Goffman and many others.

And yet in education there remains an embarrassment and reticence that is hard to combat. It might however emerge that as inter-personal and social psychology increase their theoretical influence upon educational theory - that consideration of existential reality will become central to the organisation of knowledge. If increasingly man is recognised for his noetic capacities and needs - if increasingly ignorance of these is seen to

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1. Jerome S.Bruner, Toward a Theory of Instruction (Oxford University Press, 1966), p.160.

lead to diminishment and metapathology,[1] new orientations in education may allow for the emergence of more serious considerations of meanings, morals and values, whether in the historical, anthropological sense or in terms of the examination of modern life, or modern consciousness.

(ii) Denial of intentionality in the learner

Intrinsic to the functioning of intelligence is the operation of intentionality. From birth, it is seen to be the most noticeable characteristic of the baby, in the adequate environment, that he has an almost unquenchable urge to learn. He is intent upon the reality that surrounds him, so that he seeks to explore and know it, to make it his own, so that within him is built a construction of that reality, 'a stored model of the world'.[2]

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1. 'Metapathology' is a term I encountered in the writings of Frankl and Maslow. It suggests a sickness of the spirit that afflicts men who are unaware of their meta-needs, or can even more acutely distress those who are aware of them, but cannot express or fulfil them. John I.Goodlad, op.cit. and John Holt, Freedom to Learn and Freedom and Beyond, are two educational writers who are critical of the opportunities in society for men to develop and satisfy their meta-needs.

2. (a) Piaget's description of knowledge as always existing in a relationship of object/subject; never just a mimic, but a construction. J.H.Flavell, op.cit.

   (b) Bruner's description of man's knowledge as a 'stored model of the world'. J.S.Bruner, op.cit.

which as his thought advances includes the 'stored model of himself' as he, to himself becomes a reality. As thought, to his own thought, becomes an object.

As the young child seeks to learn he begins to develop the schemata of intelligence. As a result of the formation of the schemata his intentionality becomes directed towards whatever problems are relevant to schemata already present. In other words, once the schemata are formed, it is inherent to their nature that they should be generalised to incorporate more of reality, within their field of application and, as they are generalised, become even more differentiated to focus more sharply on reality. Complex, interlocking relationships are built up between the schemata, and these relationships, unique, in each individual, define the direction of his intentionality. Given, always the existence of a rich and stimulating environment (and very much a part of this environment must be the minds and trust of the adults in charge of the child) it would seem almost an impossibility, that with respect for his intentionality the child would not learn fast, enthusiastically and creatively.[1.]

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1. This idea can be accepted if creativity itself is understood as the association of schemata that have no conventional, traditional relationship. In some measure, also, it must be understood, as the process of rejection. If there is to be the generation of new knowledge, it would seem most likely that some of our previously differentiated areas of knowledge could be rejected.

The schemata of intelligence are self-generating concluded Piaget.[1] They have an intrinsic need to perpetuate themselves by more functioning. They are characterised by restless seeking, absorption and then as a sense of completion and assimilation is reached - the experience of joy, illumination, serenity and worth. Theoretically, then, the intentionality in knowledge-seeking is permeated by affectivity, whether in the drive to its acquisition or in the experience of a subjectivity - secure recognition.[2]

Are there however psychological assumptions about the nature of knowledge acquisition in schools, that suggest such an understanding of intentionality and its relation to the schemata of intelligence? I would suggest not, and least probably at the secondary-school level. Recognition of the existence of schemata: confidence in their self-perpetuation: respect for their powers of differentiation and generalisation, most of all humility before their mystery in the subjectivity of the learner. All of these perceptions would lead us to admit that intentionality in secondary education is given very little consideration. As is identity: and autonomy (which are both so closely linked).

I could not write so strongly in support of Piaget's perceptions, or of some of Holt's recognitions in this area, had not I evolved similar ideas myself. After practical experience with 'educationally' subnormal girls of fourteen and fifteen, with pre-school children in playgroups, with

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1. J.H.Flavell, op.cit.
2. M.L.Johnson Abercrombie, The Anatomy of Judgement (Penguin, 1969).

my own children and those in classes of an infant school, I was drawn to this conclusion. All these areas of activity indicated that a central consideration of intentionality could lead to an amazing progress in development of both personality and learning. Many of these perceptions came as a surprise. I found it hard to understand how a young child could suddenly become entranced with an area of mathematics and drive himself to explore it, with an intensity and concentration typical of one far beyond his age. And then to see him make an accelerated burst in his linguistic skills, although for weeks they had seemed neglected and dormant. I found it equally strange to see a bee-hived, teenage girl with love-bitten neck, extend her initial preoccupation with symmetrical drawing to an avid interest in Greek architecture and stories of the Greek gods. She talked (but could not write) with seriousness and wonder about religion. She seemed hushed with respect for herself.

And yet in secondary education the forces that ignore intentionality are colossal. If you love poetry and wish to immerse yourself in it, you must still have the one lesson a week: the poem 'fit' for your age, the peers too, and the teacher! If you find in your history course that a particular episode fascinates you and challenges you, you cannot dally by the wayside but must march on in the chronological charge! You must become, as Scott Fitzgerald has said, "that most limited of all specialists - the well-rounded man". And alas when the

time emerges for you to choose your 'specialism', you no longer know your intentionality! In terms of real knowledge there are no problems left for you.

The most important results of a good educational background are lost. There is no sense of vocation. No destiny. No meaning that is uniquely for you.

If you are lucky you may find it again when some of the wounds of education have healed.[1]

(iii) The ignorance of expressivity as a cause of the manipulative acquisition and use of knowledge

It is difficult to consider the concept of expressivity in isolation from that of experience. Fundamentally the concern of education must be centred on the relationship of experience to behaviour. Education could be seen as the provision or facilitation of experience with a view to modifying behaviour. Expressivity might be defined as that behaviour which is directly expressive of experience. Other modes of

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1. My ideas with regard to intentionality were influenced by Max Wetheimer, Productive Thinking (London, Tavistock Publications, 1961)
R.G.Collingwood, An Autobiography (London, Oxford University Press, 1939).
Wertheimer's conviction of man's innate intellectual craving is unambiguous. He writes,

> In human terms there is at bottom the desire, the craving to face the true issue, the structural core, the radix of the situation; to go on from an unclear, inadequate relation to a clear, transparent, direct confrontation - straight from the heart of the thinker to the heart of his object, of his problem.

behaviour might be seen to be the result of the ignorance of experience; the effect of diminished experience or even of the attempt to eliminate or conceal experience.

Could there be a criticism made of modern education, at the secondary level in particular, in that it operates as if oblivious of the characteristics of experience? The ignorance of intentionality that I outlined in the previous section, with the associated minimising of affectivity, is only one indication of this. In that discussion it became clear that as the schemata of intelligence are formed, they associate and differentiate to define further problems and the direction of interest.

It could be seen, too, of personal experiences, or learning experiences (what is the difference?) that they 'transform a given field into a field of intention and action'.[1] The field may be 'inner' or 'outer', but a tension has been aroused and the organism will seek to resolve it.

Education does not only ignore the quality of intentionality that is intrinsic to experience. To a large extent it dismisses the fact that experience is neither

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1. R.D.Laing, The Politics of Experience and the Bird of Paradise, p.20.

static nor a facticity but the interweaving of different experiential modes. It is not only necessary to consider the relationship between the dream, phantasy, imagining and unrealistic processes of consciousness in the inner, unsocialised self that are in constant dialectic, ideally, with the encoded, theoretical, reflective, socialised consciousness of socialised self, but also the relationship between this dialectic and the processes of preconscious or subliminal experience and learning.[1.]

Perhaps this could be represented diagrammatically:-

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1. Kubie, The Forgotten Man of Education

Kubie differentiates the three levels of consciousness:- the conscious, symbolic; the subliminal and the unconscious. I have included in the consideration of consciousness, the inner self, governed by primary thought processes. Kubie's 'subliminal' is outside awareness but feeds into it. My 'inner self' is within awareness: i.e. the dreams, imaginings, phantasies, hopes are 'real' and 'known' to the individual even if not realistic and socially acceptable.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTENTIONALITY: DIRECTION: VOCATION AND



Education then neglects to take into account this enormously complex negotiatory system that exists uniquely in each individual as he undergoes experience, incubates it, seeks to know that experience and expresses it. It neglects too, and I have omitted it on my chart, the whole area of considerations surrounding the concept of the unconscious, so much of which is relevant when we consider defence mechanisms and blockages that develop in resistance to the imposition or falsification of experience, and also to the imposition of knowledge or skills.[1.]

Perhaps it is clearer now why in suggestions for educational change we stress the importance of expressivity. Experience is dynamic and in complex dialectic. It can be felt or sensed in the individual but not known. This feeling arouses tension and excitement, often after a period of stillness and wonder and it seems almost as if there is impeded growth if there is not the chance to express, to self and to others.

"Thought tends towards speech as towards completion", writes Merleau-Ponty.[2.] "The transitory ineffable nature of the words must be transmitted to the permanency of writing", writes Freire, "if they are to have the power to unlock reality."[3.] One would expect in schools that by now such recognitions should be made; that intentionality and

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1. Bruner, op.cit.

2. Merleau-Ponty, op.cit., p.177.

3. Ivan Illich, op.cit.

expressivity are central to the acquisition of knowledge and cannot be ignored.

Expressivity is not allowed for in schools in social interaction nor in inter-personal relationships. It is actively discouraged in speech by the predominance of verbalism or the linguistic conventional as a mode of communication.[1] It is not facilitated by the provision of rich resources for the expressive arts of drama, art-work, dance, physical movement, imaginative writing nor music, neither is there very much latitude for individual choice and preference in areas especially valued. Least of all is it countenanced as intrinsic to intellectual endeavour, with the valuing of creative or divergent thinking and solutions.

Expressivity then has a direct relationship with experience. The mystery and complexity of that experience must be respected.[2] And the expressivity that arises naturally from it must be given the freedom to do so - without the overbearing direction and oppression of the teacher.

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1. This has been a perception of very many writers who have described 'school' language as a form of social control. I could refer to Rosen, Barnes, Bernstein and Britton amongst many others.

2. Laing writes of the pressures prohibiting expressivity, "someone with an insistent experience of other dimensions, that he cannot entirely deny or forget, will run the risk of either being destroyed by the others, or of betraying what he knows." The Divided Self, p.11. I found myself wondering on reading this what reception would greet a pupil's description of a numinous experience.

So far it has been suggested that manipulative knowledge acquisition arises with the dismissal of the experiential and existential realities of the pupil; with the ignoring of his powers of intentionality and expressivity.

The further questions of self-knowledge, identity-formation, value formation and the generation of new knowledge I will defer until Section III of the thesis since it is my hope, that after having pointed to failures in education that allow for alienated development, I may be able to offer a definition of an ideal of dealienated consciousness towards which Education could strive.

If such an ideal is seen to be plausible, the achievement of self-knowledge, identity, value formation and the generation of new knowledge, will be central concerns.

SECTION III

DEALIENATION AND TRANSFORMATION

1. THE PLAUSIBILITY OF SUGGESTING THE IDEAL OF DEALIENATION AS A PRIME END OF EDUCATION

Explicit in my work so far has been a criticism of many aspects of Western society, its organisation and its ethos. In making that criticism however, the burden of my argument was not so much to stress the injustice or inequalities of social institutions; but rather to highlight the inadequacy of a society that is responsible for producing alienated people. Since the social institutions of education have been shown in large measure to contribute to the development of the three modes of alienation already described, it becomes necessary at this stage to consider what is the alternative consciousness that could be encouraged in schools if we wish to avoid that of the robot, the manipulator or the schizophrenic.

This alternative, preferable consciousness could be described as 'dealienated'. It is possible, I would suggest, to formulate a conceptual ideal of 'dealienation' which could be instated in educational theory as a prime educational goal, and whatever other aims and objectives are recognised and formulated, these could be seen to support and strengthen this prime goal. First, however, such an ideal must be shown to have plausibility. I hope to show in this third section of my paper that it is (A) an ideal that can be theoretically defined; (B) an ideal state of consciousness that has been recognised in existence in certain individuals;

(C) a mode of subjectivity not only conducive to desirable identity-formation and psychic health but one that is productive of fruitful interaction and dialectic between the individual and the social milieu in which he moves; and (D) last but not least, I hope to indicate the ideal of dealienation to be one that is achievable, once recognised and valued, and to show that no social institutions have it so much within their powers as family and school to further that achievement.

2. A THEORETICAL DEFINITION OF THE CONCEPTUAL IDEAL OF DEALIENATION

(a) Introduction

The concept of dealienation contains within it two contrasts. On the one hand is implicit the socio-historical contrast with the inevitable alienation existing in past ages, when socialisation and complete identification with role was, for most people, the only *modus vivendi*.

On the other hand, there is contained in the concept, a contrast that is relative to modern times. Now, as Williams points out, the specific societal conditions do exist for self-determination and escape from alienation.[1] Possibilities emerge in our plural, highly complex society, for awareness, disidentification with socialisation and the autonomous formulation of values and identity. De-alienation, then, in this context is not the opposite to an alienation that is inevitable because of social organisation. It is an ideal state of consciousness to be contrasted with the various states of impaired consciousness I have already described. And these states I would suggest are impaired, not because the possibilities for perfectibility are absent, but because they are not understood.

In suggesting the conceptual ideal of dealienated existence it must be emphasised that this mode of existence

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1. R.Williams, *The Long Revolution.*

can in no way be considered as a 'product' but rather as a 'process'; a mode of being which has no finality. This theoretical description, then, must at times seem generalised and over-simplified. It can be little more than a mere suggestion of the possible characteristics of that state, bearing in mind that the individual subjectivity can become more and more dealienated, just as too it can become alienated in several different ways, to varying degrees, if the dialectic-in-consciousness is lost or impaired.

My theoretical elucidation of the ideal of de-alienation is divided into two parts. First to be considered is the subjectivity as it operates in the 'here and now' or at the 'frozen moment of operation'. In other words the attempt is made to clarify what happens in the individual consciousness as he experiences, learns, thinks and acts. I will then go on to consider the equally important question of the ontogenetic consequences of the development of the dealienated subjectivity. More clearly, I will try to understand what happens in the development of the personality as the individual lives, year by year, or through the kinds of sequential changes suggested by Erikson's seven 'epigenetic stages'.[1.]

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1. E.Erikson, op.cit.
R.M.Jones, Fantasy and Feeling in Education (Penguin, 1972) Chapter 6.

(b) The operation of dealienated subjectivity in the 'here and now'



1. The relationship between 'real' self and 'false' other is problematic. It has been the subject of controversy between Carl Rogers and Martin Buber amongst others. In simplified terms I discuss this relationship in Appendix D.

Again I use the Laingian-type diagram to elucidate this ideal state of consciousness. Much of it may be understood because of the obvious contrast with the schematic representations of the alienated modes.

Vital self is represented by the circle, as an entity. Self, therefore is suggested to be real and to exist. It is described also as embodied. In spite of many of our Western traditions (like the one that uses doctors for body ailments and psychologists for troubles of the mind) there is the suggestion made that mind and body; intellect, emotions and senses are indissolubly linked; can be experienced in synthesis.[1] Within the vital self arrows are drawn to suggest the dialectic-in-consciousness that exists between the roles of the socialised self and the unsocialised self. For all roles there is affect and commitment, so it is inconceivable that after mediation with the unsocialised self, self in one role can vary intrinsically from self in another role.

Most difficult to understand are the concepts of unsocialised self and that of the dialectic-in-consciousness. As was discussed earlier with reference to the manipulatory mode of subjectivity the unsocialised self is suggested to be

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1. N.Malcolm, Problems of Mind (Allen & Unwin, 1971).
D.Holbrook, The Dehumanisation of Sex (Pitman, 1972).
Merleau-Ponty, op.cit.
This last author suggests that "Man taken as a concrete being is not a psyche joined to an organism, but the movement to and fro of existence which at one time allows itself to take corporeal form and at others moves towards personal acts". p.88.

good and positive in the direction of its growth. It could be called also the inner self; the inner stream of consciousness. Much that arises in this inner, unsocialised self is unique, idiosyncratic, nebulous, ineffable. It is experience that has not yet been codified so that it can become socially understood reality - part of the common pool of society's meaning.

We could speak of this experience, and then only incompletely, as the fantasies, imaginings, dreams, terrors, dreads of man's subjectivity. We could speak of it also as recognitions, intuitions, unspoken convictions, commitments. Most certainly of all we could speak of it as mysterious, tantalising and fugitive and yet nevertheless, in the subjectivity of the individual, compelling and important.[1.]

The notion too of dialectic is complicated. Phenomenologically it would be described by Schutz[2.] as the interaction between two levels of consciousness. The inner stream of consciousness, with its own authentic temporal field (unsocialised self) is reflected on by the intellect (socialised self) which belongs essentially to the spatio-temporal world of everyday life. Translated into the language of thought processes this would mean there is negotiation between the primary, endoceptual, analogic processes of childhood (with all their creative potential) (and unreality) and the secondary rational processes of thought of the adult.[3.]

In a more practical way it could be said to be the process of negotiation required when we recognise that

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1. R.M.Jones, op.cit.
2. A.Schutz, op.cit.
3. S.Arieti, op.cit.

duration and importance of experience that is subjectively sensed, need have no direct correlation with socially defined and timed estimate of that equivalent experience.

My glance at a flower, for instance, on a particular day, may be for me a momentous, elongated experience - perhaps by association representing another world of experience; perhaps by symbol bringing a new awareness of self - and yet still throughout remaining "my glance at a flower". An observer's glance at my glance may be a very transitory and superficial interpretation of it. And in some way I must recognise both the validity of my own experience and at the same time the social objectivation of it.

If the dialectic-in-consciousness is alive within me I will make those recognitions. I cannot dismiss my own experience of the "glance", yet I must be realistic enough to be aware of most experiences of "glances". Were I a poet I might be successful in translating my "inner stream of consciousness", so that it, in itself, becomes a socially acceptable and common objectivation.

The dialectic-in-consciousness then could be defined as interaction between experience and attention; intuition and intellect. But always with the reminder that at the deepest level of experience, there is much that may never be accessible to reflection. Some experience must remain unthought, ineffable, unverbalised; yet nevertheless authentic in that it is felt but not reflected upon.

So far I have stressed, in particular, inner experience. Perhaps because in Western societies this is so little understood or emphasised. As Henry Miller wrote of Nordics, "Never once had they opened the door which leads to the soul", and of himself, "There is only one great adventure and that is inward towards self."[1.] I do not however wish to minimise the "socialised" side of the dialectic. The individual experiences, but to be emphasised also is his need constantly to reflect upon, understand and express that experience. Hence he has need for the most adequate tools of society - language and thought forms - by which he may encode and encapsulate that experience.[2.]

If language and thought-forms are looked upon in this way, they can no longer be considered determining.[3.] Although in inner experience there may well be what has never been expressed in culture or language, the examination of that experience must be the force which extends and

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1. Henry Miller, Tropic of Capricorn (Panther, 1957). p.11.

2. J.S.Bruner, op.cit.
   Bruner contends that this, in fact, is the most important function of education, to provide tools by which experience of reality may be encoded and translated. I would wish to add also the "experience of reality of self", to include feelings and fantasies as well as values and intentions.

3. In Appendix A I have discussed briefly why language need not be determining.

alters culture and language, to formulate, "ce qui n'existe pas",[1.] "to bring light into the uninhabitable darkness".[2.]

The dialectic, however, is not complete with the discussion of negotiation between socialised and unsocialised self. On the diagram, connecting lines are drawn between "vital self" and "real other". The microcosmic dialectic, therefore, within self has its counterpart macrocosmically between reflection and action. There is experience, attention to that experience, reflection and as a result of that reflection there is meaningful action or praxis. The dealienated individual then is presumed to have reality of perception; susceptibility to influences about him and equally important, a capacity for praxis; that action previously defined as most likely to be transforming,[3.] for self and for society.

Certain conclusions emerge from this conceptual elucidation of the dialectic-in-consciousness. The concept of real or vital self becomes of central importance. Emotional and sensuous dimensions of the personality are assumed to be integral with the intellectual and spiritual. Inner experience, both emotional and imaginative or fantastic, are given an important status. Individual autonomy is assumed to be possible in spite of conditioning or influences towards determination. Last but not least, with regard to the social context within which we all live, commonplace

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1. Paul Valery,

2. James Baldwin, Another Country.

3. The use of the word "transforming" is based on the assumption that some actions lead to evolution, development and actualisation and increase of potentiality. Unlike the word "changing" it is an evaluative term.

reality is easily grasped as relative and problematic and hence can be deduced a need to consider the possibility of other transcendant "realities",[1] that can arise to extend our own.

All of these conclusions can be seen as highly relevant to a discussion of educational change. Before they can be pursued further however, there remain serious shortcomings to this "here-now" description of dealienated subjectivity. A consideration of the ontogenetic consequences of such a subjectivity will I hope remedy those limitations and indicate ways in which the conclusions could be applied.

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1. This is a confusing duplication of the word in this particular context but I am using Berger and Luckmann's distinction here, the "commonplace reality" being that which is generally accepted in a society; the "other realities" being those which have been "commonplace reality" in other ages; in other cultures; even in individual experience. Or perhaps in no one's experience - yet.

(c) The Ontogenetic development of consciousness in the dealienated subjectivity

So far, the "here-now" description I have made approximates very closely to phenomenological descriptions made in particular by Schutz and Merleau-Ponty, but also explored by R.D.Laing.[1] To stress exclusively, however, the "here-now" moment of experience, is a mistaken emphasis. Indeed it could be partly as a consequence of this over-emphasis on the "here-now", combined with the empiricist trend to negate value certainty, that the idea of "true consciousness" has been formulated but in a depressing way has remained unrelated to life and action in society. It could be seen to have been, almost, a barren thesis.

I would make the suggestion therefore, that although the dialectic-in-consciousness is a central concept to the understanding of the ideal of dealienation, it is in itself insufficient. Although it accounts for one particular and desirable mode of consciousness, it does not sufficiently explain another phenomenon in subjective experience; a phenomenon I became aware of in my own personal experience, and later found clearly articulated in the writings of Maslow, de Chardin, Frankl and Buber.

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1. It also approximates closely to the literary portrayals of consciousness of writers like
   Joyce Cary, The Horse's Mouth
   Virginia Wolf, The Waves
   James Joyce, Ulysses

This phenomenon seems to follow as a product or result of the dialectic-in-consciousness.[1] It could be called the process of individuation. That was the process that Jung thought could only be achieved in middle age as a going-back on socialisation.[2] (He did not seem to envisage that if it were necessary in middle age there must have been forces in early socialisation that were harmful and could have been altered). It could also be called the process of identity-formation. But basically I wish to describe that process in the individual, facilitated by the dialectic-in-consciousness, whereby he builds up his schemas of values and priorities; schemes that become the guidelines of his life and account for his need, drives, evaluation, actions. Indeed, for the reality of his very being itself.

If the phenomenological stance is taken, one could admit that this process of value formulation took place moment-by-moment as experience and reflection ran their course. Partly, this must be the case. Yet by this interpretation we get no explanation nor understanding of the quality most distinctive in value stances: that characteristic of certainty and emotional commitment that lends to the individual the

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1. In Huxley's Eyeless in Gaza, Antony Beavis had characteristics of the manipulative consciousness yet he was himself well aware of these characteristics and always maintained a very lively dialectic-in-consciousness. It is interesting that in middle age he gains the affect and commitment, which for so much of his life he had known himself to lack.

2. F.Fordham, An Introduction to Jung's Psychology (Penguin , 1972).

power to assert his value, pursue his aim, defend his ideal; often against strongly opposing forces.[1.] Neither do we gain any understanding of the formation of identity as such, or the formation of identities that we admire.

To describe therefore the ontogenetic process and to make a more adequate theoretical definition of the conceptual ideal of dealienation, it is necessary to make it explicit that consciousness is not wholly, entirely and continuously the process described as the dialectic-in-consciousness. Within the stream of experience can be isolated certain distinctive, unique, experiential modes, qualitatively different from those which are recognised generally to be the more commonplace modes of human experience. It is largely as a result of this alternation in experience, that schemas of values are formulated. Thus it is seen to emerge that the whole question of value formulation is a central one to the concept of dealienation.

Until this is fully accepted, I would suggest, there will remain a confusion in schools and in society that

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1. J.I.Goodlad, op.cit.
Goodlad is preoccupied with this problem of commitment, which he finds noticeably lacking in intellectuals. He says "that only through action following understanding and commitment does man forge the links in the chains of his own humanity and of mankind's immortality". p.4.

will be only too clearly reflected in the confusion of individuals in their search for identity, perhaps even sanity.[1.]

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1. This, virtually, is the thesis of E.Fromm, Man for Himself.

> Fromm argues cogently in support of the existence of objective, valid norms. Man builds up schemas of values and norms in order to realise his potentialities and upon their validity rests his mental health. My concern, at the moment, however, is with the subjective processes of value formulation and so I do no more than refer to the thesis.

(d) The need to recognise alternations in experiential modes to understand the ontogenetic development of dealienated subjectivity

Our discussion so far of the conceptual ideal of dealienation has caused us to look beyond the basic premise of the dialectic-in-consciousness. Whilst such a notion of dialectic was sufficient to explain dis-identification of self from socialised self and would account for the existence of men who were not in accord with their socialisation, it would not explain the existence of alternative values, ideals and models, that men wished to substitute in place of those already present. And it is this question of value and ideal formation that I feel it is crucial to understand as a natural development in the achievement of dealienation.[1.]

Maslow, de Chardin, Buber and Frankl are writers who discuss very little the problems of socialising influences, of conditioning or determinism, but whose concern is with the question I have just outlined. Although

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1. Although in my discussion of alienation and further exploration of the conceptual ideal of dealienation I bring attention to the absence of values, and need for values in the individual, the natural consequence of the argument is to point to the lack of clearly articulated values in the institutions in which man finds himself. This collective aspect of value formulation I consider more closely in the conclusion of my work.

their approaches vary, being those of humanist psychologist, philosopher, philosophical anthropologist and logotherapist, and although in each one there is a variation in both vocabulary and emphases, there is a basic unanimity in a major conclusion they all reach. A conclusion that clarifies for me, the understanding of the ontogenetic development of dealienation and makes its relevance to education inescapable.

Each of these writers seeks to define an alternation in subjective experience that accounts for the formulation of values and ideals. Maslow uses the term "peak-experience" or "being-cognition".[1.] De Chardin speaks of our "Resonance to the All" or "cosmic affinity" and cosmic direction".[2.] Buber describes the alternation as "the moment of true relating", "the moment of meeting" or "the encounter with the Thou"[3.] and Frankl calls it the "moment of meaning".[4.] What is clear though from their writings is that they all allude to the same phenomenon of subjective experience. For a time, perhaps very briefly, there is a break in the dialectic-in-consciousness. Not because the individual becomes unaware or falsely conscious; but because unexpectedly, often mysteriously,

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1. A.Maslow, op.cit.

2. Teilhard de Chardin, Le Milieu Divin (Fontana, 1964); The Phenomenon of Man (Harper Row Publishers, New York and Evanston, 1959).

3. I.M.Buber, I and Thou (Edinburgh. T. & T. Clark, 1937). Between Man and Man (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1947); The Knowledge of Man (Allen & Unwin, 1965).

4. V.E.Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism (Souvenir Press, 1967).

he enters a realm of experience within which there is no dialectic. Instead of experience, attention and evaluation occurring in an orderly process, there is a fusion of experience and evaluation. What is known is known at once and with certainty. And it is known to be good. Fusion takes place then between experiencing and evaluatory functions; it takes place between emotion and reason and most important of all there is no longer a dichotomy between fact and value. As a result of this type of experience and as a result of the joy, rapture and sense of completion that it brings, the individual has acquired a pivot of value, an ordering principle for his own personal hierarchy of meanings, that are intrinsic to him and motivate his life.

Schematically therefore the theoretical description of the conceptual ideal of dealienation could be more meaningfully represented by a series of diagrams. The dialectic-in-consciousness is still the prevalent mode of consciousness, but more and more frequently, as dealienation proceeds, there is the alternation to "peak experience" or "moment of meaning". The peak experience in its turn acts back upon the nature of the dialectic to confirm and strengthen the vital self and just as important increases and affirms the power of the individual to act more meaningfully in his society.

In a simplified manner, the diagrams could be represented thus:-

THE ONTOGENETIC DEVELOPMENT OF DEALIENATED CONSCIOUSNESS



The Dialectic-in-Consciousness

Buber's World of 'It'

Absence of Dialectic-in-Consciousness

Moment of Meaning, Peak Experience or Value Formation

Buber's World of 'Thou'

1. The term 'other' here does not merely suggest 'person'. It can also indicate the world of nature; the world of knowledge and art; the world of God and the spiritual.

Yet still there is an inadequacy of representation that is difficult to compensate for. What does suddenly become clear, however, in making this theoretical exploration into dealienated subjectivity, is that it is no more and no less than an attempt to understand, at the subjective level, those objective occurrences referred to earlier in the paper as the fruits of dealienation. Then we spoke of Berger's 'Signals of Transcendence', Goffman's 'Removal Activities', Fromm's 'Fruits of Productive Orientation', Marcuse's 'Fruits of Eros'.

In Section I of my paper I made the observation that by them the individual escaped time, space and self, but he returned with more than he had when he left. Now, from this subjective understanding, we deduce that he returns to "be" more than he was when he left. To be firmer in his identity and sense of self.

So in spite of the inchoate nature of the discussion at this stage, there is obviously a validity and a relevance that cannot be ignored.

3. THE EXISTENCE OF DEALIENATED CONSCIOUSNESS IN CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS

Perceptions and the conviction of the existence of a higher, more desirable form of humanity can be reached in many ways. It can be made in personal encounters when one recognises the qualities of humanity - love and reason amongst others - that a fellow human being brings to his life. Maslow claims that it was personal encounter with Wertheimer and Ruth Benedict that first inspired him in his investigations into The Farther Reaches of Human Nature. He glimpsed, he said, two examples of the "growing tip" of mankind; two people, who intellectually, emotionally, physically and inter-personally, appeared to live in a state of full humanness. His fascination became to explore that more highly developed potentiality.

Frankl, too, was strongly motivated in the development of his views on the noölogical needs and capacities of man by personal encounters. Whilst Maslow observed people with every freedom to develop their humanity, Frankl observed those who were cruelly diminished by the ordeals of concentration camps. Yet both came to the same conviction. Certain people can show us, by their lives, the qualities of true humanness.

And yet, as Maslow himself would admit, recognition of dealienated consciousness because of personal encounter, is a vague and subjective process unless it is substantiated

by other more objective procedures. There is now a growing body of psychological research, Maslow's and Lewis Termann's[1.] amongst others, that makes much more convincing the subjective arguments that Maslow put forward. There is also a wide area of literature, wherein it could be seen that novelists such as Lawrence, Joyce, Solzhenitsyn, Baldwin, E.M.Forster amongst others, have as a major concern the definition of the "dealienated" personality - often as he exists in diminishing or alienating surroundings.[2.]

Both these areas are rich in indications of the existence and reality of the ideal I discuss, and they offer scope for scholarship of an order I cannot now attempt. It may be more fruitful here to suggest that if this ideal has a reality, then these scholars will have defined it and its consequences in similar ways. This I will study in my next section, which briefly summarises some of the characteristics of dealienation isolated by these writers.

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1. A.Maslow, op.cit. Here is discussed Lewis Termann's study of children in California with high I.Qs, and the generalisation in conclusion, that all desirable traits in a human being correlate positively. p.6.

2. If we accept Goldmann's thesis of the importance of literature in reflecting societal consciousness - or emerging consciousnesses - there is validity in this particular approach. L.Goldmann, "The Sociology of Literature. Status and Problems of Method", op.cit.

4. SUGGESTED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEALIENATED CONSCIOUSNESS

Maslow, De Chardin, Buber and Frankl are unanimous in describing the qualitative change in subjective experience that was alluded to as "peak experience" or "moment of meaning".[1] Likewise they share a unanimity in describing characteristics and consequences of that change in consciousness. In exploring those consequences it would seem to emerge that dealienation results in the formation of satisfying individual identity as correspondingly it produces the potential for meaningful, positive action in society.

A primary characteristic, stressed by all these writers, is that 'peak experience' is in no way a unique type of feeling to be associated with 'specially valuable' activities, neither is it a change in consciousness that is within the capacity of a limited, gifted few. All men's experience can change in this way: indeed it is not truly human if it does not. In all areas of life too, the transformation can occur. De Chardin and Buber in particular lay emphasis on 'peak experience' or 'true relating' with regard to the world of senses - to nature, to sexual love, to parental love - to all the materiality of existence. As Buber so beautifully describes it, "You may unmask my soul as a loose aggregate of sensations;

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1. I use the term "peak experience" because it is so deeply entrenched in Maslow's work and in the context of his thought, it is a key concept. It has the defect, however, in our present decade, of evoking associations of 'unreality', 'superficiality' and 'transitoriness'. These suggestions, I would wish to emphasise, have no connection with Maslow's use of the term.

then it bestirs itself and feels the splendour of the night or the affection of a child and is as firm as a crystal".[1.] "To see or lose oneself in the beauty of the world - the beauty of being" is to "see the Divine Smile"[2.] says De Chardin. A reading of D.H.Lawrence, a scrutiny of a Van Gogh painting, both equally would substantiate these observations of both Buber and De Chardin, for both would impart that self-same conviction of peak experience and meaning. In seeing this now, or hearing or feeling it, the limits of my ego dissolve. A new, often undefinable joy and knowledge enters my soul and I am made anew. Having had such experience how could one doubt that there must remain in the experiencer a valuing of life at its material sources, that could never be vanquished?

Just as De Chardin and Buber lay particular emphasis on the materiality of man's existence, and man's capacity to relate to it transcendentally, so all four writers lay stress on other areas of life. They speak of the world of work and creativity; the world of all inter-personal relationships; the world of knowledge and the world of religion.[3.]

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1. Martin Buber, The Knowledge of Man, p.27.
2. De Chardin, Le Milieu Divin.
3. In Susanne Langer, op.cit., with regard to creativity; In Max Wertheimer, op.cit., with regard to knowledge; In R.Otto, The Idea of the Holy (translated by John W. Harvey, Pelican, 1959) with regard to religion, I found further substantiation for this idea.

But whatever the area of experience to which the peak experience is related, a common characteristic is found. A persistent recollection and acceptance remains. Here is growth; meaning; valuing; optimism. From this particular moment a new ordering principle has emerged in the individual life; and from this new recognition, this valuable perception, life can be lived anew. In the most prosaic routines of everyday life; often amidst cruel diminishments, it will be of influence.[1.]

This then, is one characteristic of peak experience - that it can occur in all areas of living and can occur within all men. A second characteristic posited by these writers is a much more problematic one. If, as they all suggest, alternation in consciousness takes place strangely, without the control or deliberate striving of the individual, does it indicate that there is some absolute, some 'other reality' that exists over and above men? Is there a clear and definite pathway by which man can evolve, develop his highest potentiality - become even more than he is? In a common-sense fashion this presence of 'absolute standards' existing over and above us would not be hard to understand. One could imagine (were it not infantile to try!) that early man enjoying

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1. I have not entered into a discussion of either De Chardin's work on the 'passivities of suffering' or Frankl's treatment of 'human diminishments' since in education our aim is to reduce these to a minimum. In view, however, of what can be the reality of educational practice, it might seem that this discussion would be highly relevant, but not perhaps within the compass of my work at this stage.

the rapture of one of his first communications in speech, must have said to himself (or felt) "this is good". Not just in some personal, temporal, introspective sense, but in a sense that it was good for him, for all men, for all time. Similarly, De Chardin has argued, that each new perception we make today, we recognise to be in some way, a perception for all time, for all men. In fact, if we did not have (however implicitly) a conviction of the eternalisation of action men could not work - or even live.

Admittedly we often thread our way precariously through false perceptions or incomplete ones. Yet it seems to be evident that in all men's endeavours, perceptions, strivings and recognitions there is both an ontogenetic and phylogenetic conviction of progress and advance, of evolution and development.[1.] What is this response, De Chardin asks, when man in rare moments experiences great emotion in relation to nature, beauty, poetry or religion? Is it that there is deep accord between two realities that seek each other? Is there an absolute

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1. Already in my work I have used concepts that have intrinsic to them the ideas of evolution and development. 'Praxis', for instance, suggested action that was good, for self and society. 'Transformation' too indicates change that is for the better. The recognition being made here is that whatever life, social conditions, natural phenomena presents, the individual (and likewise the collectivity) has a choice to make, between growth and diminishment; between good and evil.

reality that is increasingly revealed to us as we live in our own relative reality?[1.] "Of what materials I am composed, from what animal I am descended, of what functions I am the slave, it is salutary for me to hear, still that means nothing to me when I dare to think of the Infinite, to behold the Infinite, and interwoven with the Infinite, experience myself as Infinite" writes Buber.[2.] One does not seek the Peak Experience, claims Maslow, one is seized by it as if existing over and above us was this world of meanings and values of which we are usually unaware.[3.] Man, writes Frankl, cannot develop 'in solo'. He develops only in relation to his discovery of the meaning that exists uniquely for him - but also over and above him.[4.] "Existence falters", he says, "unless it is lived in terms of transcendence towards something beyond itself".

Thus, by all four of these writers, the same controversial characteristic of 'dealienated consciousness' is suggested. Peak experience leads to valuing, meaning and optimism. It leads also to the clarification of the needs, drives and motivations of each individual. During that process of clarification, needs and drives evolve so that increasingly man is able to advance beyond his more basic physical and psychic needs - to the higher needs of meaning, valuing and morality. Whether we call these needs meta, noological or noetic, as do Maslow, De Chardin and

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1. Teilhard de Chardin, Phenomenon of Man, p.266.
2. M.Buber, Towards Authentic Existence, p.28.
3. A.Maslow, op.cit.
4. V.E.Frankl, op.cit., p.12.

Frankl, we refer essentially to the same process of development, the development Fromm referred to as man's need to formulate an adequate frame of devotion, whereby with love and reason, he can direct his life.

Autonomously and uniquely, within each individual the process should occur, but in the optimum environment and conditions, it would seem likely that all these individually evolved schemas of values could concur. And perhaps, if we can agree with these writers, concur in a dimension that ultimately transcends us.

Associated with all areas of life, within the capacities of all men, the peak experience, in association with the on-going process of the dialectic-in-consciousness, helps to define the values, needs and drives of the individual personality, and these not only in relation to the physical and psychic nature of man but in increasing integration with his noetic capacity.[1.] Inevitable therefore is the connection between the process of 'de-alienation' and that of identity-formation, for how else do we measure the strength of identity than by the unique-ness, commitment and awareness, with which a person, purpose-fully and positively, attempts to order and direct his life?[2.]

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1. Although fascinating, the discussion of both Laing and De Chardin of some men's capacity to progress solely to the noetic - to the disembodied self - it is in the present context esoteric and certainly neither of these writers would wish to denigrate the essential place of both man's physical and psychic needs and capacities.

2. In using the generalisation 'life', I am referring to all areas, as Maslow did - the physical, intellectual, emotional, interpersonal, spiritual.

At once it becomes clear why the conceptual ideal of dealienation has such a profound importance for education. Now, more than ever before, the question of identity-formation is seen to be a crucial issue for educational theory. Can we really accept that the desirable identity to foster in education is the one that some claim to be the most prevalent in modern society? The non-identity? The identity that alters as it alteration finds?[1.] Or, as an alternative, can we likewise take it for granted that education has no responsibility for identity as such but that it fulfils its duties as it equips children to operate effectively in a sum of dissociated roles - the method of operation seen as prevalent by other social critics.[2.]

If we can tolerate neither of these ideological positions, but pay attention instead to the vast body of sociological, psychological and literary works that reveal man to be in search of identity, in a way that has probably never happened before in the history of civilisation,[3.] the importance of the concept of dealienation in educational theory seems irrefutable.

Because of this relevance and because also the concept of identity in itself contains many ambiguities,

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1. Reisman, op.cit. This reference is to the "other-direction" consciousness that Reisman describes.

2. Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life.

3. O.Klapp, The Collective Search for Identity.

I will discuss in the next section in what way I understand the association to exist between dealienated existence and the formation of desirable identity. And how in its turn this desirable identity has as its inevitable result fruitful interaction with society.

5. THE CORRELATION BETWEEN DEALIENATION AND THE FORMATION OF DESIRABLE IDENTITY

References to identity have run like a thread throughout this paper and just as before the association was made between alienation and various forms of identity formation, now it is necessary to see the link between the ideal of dealienation and the formation of 'desirable identity'.

There are inherent paradoxes in the concept of identity. In the discussion on alienation and its transposition to education it seemed to be used as a negative concept. Some people had the identity of the 'non-identity'; some were described as having the 'variable identity' existing as Erikson describes, on "the murky sea of adjustable roles".[1.] These were largely the individuals existing in the condition of Alienation A.

Yet other people were described as having a strong sense of identity, as were those experiencing the manipulatory consciousness, who were aware of themselves as more important than others. This identity, too, could be seen as negative, for it was a strength of identity that could only exist as a result of the diminishment and manipulation of others; (and also of ideas and things). That is, no sure sense of identity resided in the individual's being other than that which he gained from undermining the identity of another. Take away this capacity from him and it would seem likely that the manipulative individual would very quickly founder.

Negative, too, in a more obvious sense was the identity of the schizoid person or the schizophrenic. Unable

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1. E.Erikson, op.cit., p.306.

to accept the negations or ambiguous objectivations of his life; unable to involve himself actively in real people or things, he was driven to form for himself a fantasy identity that he carefully concealed behind some apparently plausible 'socialised' identity - until at last the fantasy obtruded into real life.[1.]

Obviously, when we speak of desirable identity and consider it in the context of education, we are concerned to obviate these three negative conditions. And yet is it as an alternative that we have identity-consciousness, identity-search, identity-confusion or the painful sense of identity loss? To those with the negative identities, or forms of alienation, identity was not called into question in the subjectivity of the individual - except perhaps in the extreme case of the schizophrenic undergoing successful therapy. In the case of some who do not have the negative identity (and these in increasingly great number) there is the self-conscious questioning; sometimes the inarticulate seeking, that is characteristic of identity consciousness or identity confusion.[2.]

But this is not what I have termed 'desirable identity'. What I suggest could be first understood therefore is that identity awareness and consciousness (i.e. the subjective querying of identity) can be likened to the phenomenon of the 'dialectic-in-consciousness'. Both can be seen to be the essential preliminary stages to the development of 'desirable identity' or 'dealienated subjectivity'. Just as I suggested that 'peak experience' or 'moment of meaning'

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1. R.D.Laing, The Divided Self.

2. O.Klapp, op.cit.

followed in the ontogenetic development of the individual within whom the dialectic-in-consciousness was alive (as it did in the case of Antony Beavis in Eyeless in Gaza) - so now I suggest that desirable identity can most likely be formed after a period of identity-consciousness or confusion.

Eric Erikson writes that at our present time in history we have an important moral decision to make. It is that "a certain painful identity-consciousness may have to be tolerated in order to provide the conscience of man with a critique of conditions ... with insights and conceptions to heal himself - lest he become a pseudo-species".[1] He is saying a very similar thing to De Chardin in the Phenomenon of Man. It is that at this present time in society and history - economically, politically, technologically - the tools are present to facilitate the ascent of man to higher consciousness; to a further step in his evolution in specifically human dimensions.

More important by far, however, is the fact that psychic and sociological self-awareness is present and increases daily. Insights are being made into deeper social and psychological realities and increasingly it is realised that these realities can no longer be countenanced as sustainers of political and cultural structures. Eventually political and economic re-organisation may seem desirable but since these structures rely upon intentionality and consciousness, the transformation of society would seem most likely to evolve first and foremost from the transformation of individual consciousness, and the

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1. E.Erikson, op.cit., p.298.

transformation of those institutions most closely concerned with its formation, family and education.

At this present time, therefore, it would seem possible that man, if he wishes, education, if it wishes, can make the decision; accept the vulnerability as well as the fortitude, to forge a desirable identity; ascend to a higher form of consciousness, and become dealienated.

De Chardin writes, "What we are up against is the heavy swell of an unknown sea", and again, "What does matter is that we should be told that, at the cost of what we are enduring, life is taking a step, in us and in our environment,"[1.] suggesting, as does Erikson, our present awareness of potentiality and growth; our present fear of change and the unknown.

Yet still we have not clearly understood what are the characteristics of desirable identity nor how they can be seen to be correlative with those of the dealienated consciousness. Already in my elucidation of that mode of subjectivity, I have suggested that increasing self-awareness, self-knowledge, the increased capacity to experience, the integration of experience and the growth in strength and vitality of self came as a consequence to the alternating modes of the dialectic-in-consciousness and the peak experience. Awareness, self-knowledge and integration of self led in their turn to the evolution and development of a central value system whereby to the individual it became increasingly clear what must be the direction of his intentionality; the mode of his expressivity, in whatever personal or social circumstances he found himself.

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1. Teilhard De Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, p.213.

Communication within himself was paralleled by the desire to communicate beyond himself and since the intimate processes of ascending consciousness were his, any communication or activity by the self could only be characterised by originality, sincerity, integrity and commitment. Values were formed; needs evolved and increasingly the individual became dominated by his need for meaning and morality.

There is very much in this description of de-alienated consciousness to suggest it is likewise a description of desirable identity. An adequate self-concept; a realistic sense of autonomy; a positiveness and optimism with regard to life; a capacity for praxis; a uniqueness in self and in its productivity, whether in terms of 'being' or 'doing' - these would seem qualities we would like our children to grow with - qualities we would like to have ourselves. As would seem also the capacity to develop a sense of vocation or direction in life; the capacity to develop values.

If, though, as I suggest, these are the characteristics of 'dealienated subjectivity' or 'desirable identity' how can we be sure they will likewise be conducive to fruitful interaction between individual and his society?

Enough has been said to suggest that there must be interaction - and interaction sustained by intentionality, or else society crumbles.[1.] Enough has been said also to indicate the need to obviate one-sided action, or manipulation.[2.] One-sided action arose, we saw, when self-interest was dominant; when the ethos of 'possession' was strong.

1. Robot consciousness lacked above all this intentionality.
2. Manipulatory consciousness produced this one-sided action.

With the prevalence of desirable identity, however, this cannot be so. Again is seen the ambiguity of the concept of identity, for it would seem likely that as the individual gains desirable identity or a dealienated consciousness, he, at the same time, loses it! He has gone beyond identity, whilst at the same time having the strongest sense of it. "I am me, and more than the me, that would not be me, if that me were to go" was the paradoxical expression of an acquaintance of mine, who had a sudden and joyful insight into the strength of her own identity. Erikson, in less enigmatic terms would describe the same experience of the individual who becomes "as truly individual as he will ever be and as truly beyond all individuality".

There is no hint therefore in the definition of dealienated consciousness of the self-centred, self-obsessed or selfish. Desirable identity's ultimate achievement is to go beyond self, towards the transformation of the world we live in; the species to which we belong. We cannot even think solely in terms of our own society. So much of class, race, religion, Erikson notes, that sustains identity, is false and negative because its strength resides on the diminishment of other classes, races and religions.[1.] Desirable identity, with its vitality in the individual, will transcend this segregationalism, without necessarily rejecting the positive sources of its growth.

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1. Kate Millett, op.cit. This writer would include contemporary sexual identity alongside the prescriptive roles of racial caste and economic class, as negative and diminishing. Male identity, she suggests, is sustained by the diminishment of the female.

Neither can we think solely in terms of our own age-peers. As Erikson suggests in his elucidation of the 'epigenetic' phases of man's life, there comes a time, when identity is formed, that the individual's concern becomes that of responsibility for the whole generational process. As parents and teachers we cannot say importantly that the children need us! We must admit too that we need them to need us! Whether our lives are with children or theoretically exploring ideas for our children, we have a need to pass on to them the values we have ourselves inherited and evolved so that the species may continue to grow, in strength and humanness.

For values cannot exist in a vacuum. Their essence resides in the demand they exert upon the life and action of the individual who holds them. Desirable identity and dealienated consciousness had as a consequence the development and evolution of meaning, values and morality.

Fruitful interaction with society would seem then to become inevitable for the dealienated individual; for the individual with desirable identity.

CONCLUSION

IS THE CONCEPTUAL IDEAL OF DEALIENATION ACHIEVABLE, ONCE RECOGNISED AND VALUED?

I began this work with a conviction that progress towards the understanding of the phenomenon of alienation was as crucial for me as an individual as it was relevant to my understanding of educational and societal organisation. It became very soon a study that ramified in many directions and posed a host of questions. At times it seemed as if what was demanded of me was the articulation of a comprehensive philosophy of education, or even a philosophy of life. This was a task I was ill-equipped for.

The stress of my enquiry throughout fell predominantly on problems of individual consciousness. This was not intended to be a reversion to the traditional, philosophic model of man 'alone'. The assumption was always present that inseparable from the consideration of individual consciousness was the corresponding scrutiny of his dialectic with society, and its dialectic with him. If, however, in sociology we have been made aware of an impoverishment in this dialectic and often the complete absence of it; and if in psychology and phenomenology and other studies of consciousness we have learned of the lack of dialogue within individual experience, we are forced into a perception that there is a connection between the two issues. And so, if I centre my enquiry upon the phenomenon of alienation in the individual, I am at the same time throwing into relief the

phenomenon of the individual's 'alienation' from society. Thus there must be a link between suggestions for the perfecting of consciousness and suggestions for change and transformation in society and in education.

In Section III of my paper, with the formulation of the conceptual ideal of dealienation (and the corresponding achievement of desirable identity), two overall conclusions were reached. A two-fold process was deduced to be necessary if man were to attain true consciousness. First of all, it was argued, he must come to a knowledge of the psychic and social objectivations that have defined him. The dialectic-in-consciousness was the necessary tool I suggested for him to acquire this awareness. Secondly, he must participate in those areas termed 'signals of transcendence' and sometimes characterised by 'peak experience' and meaning. The first activity would lead to awareness and reflectivity; the second to knowledge and growth of self. And of course there would be the constant inter-feeding, amalgamating process between the two.[1.]

In more commonplace language the above paragraph could be re-stated: We have come to realise that man must become aware of the forces of conditioning and determinism in his life, and must likewise grasp and live in those experiences and activities that give him the means to transcend this determinism.

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1. This process was represented diagrammatically on p.173.

In diagrammatic form the processes conducive to the development of dealienated consciousness and escape from determinism could be represented thus:-



In many ways this representation is unhelpful. In the development of true consciousness the number of variables is enormous and the number of provisos I could make might take a book on its own. I could for instance suggest that Section A and awareness of primary socialisation may be redundant for a personality with pronounced ontological security. I could also suggest that Section B might seem irrelevant to a child who had grown up critically and independently and had autonomously developed his intentionality to the extent of resisting many social objectivations. Certainly Section B would become very much less important if the conditioning and controlling powers of home, school and society became less excessive.

It could be stated too that there is considerable interdependence in the sections suggested. Involvement in the areas of transcendence, for example, could be the occasion for peak experience and value formulation but could also be a step towards that acquisition of meaning. There could even be imagined individuals who were the victims of crude social objectivation, were deprived of most expression in terms of areas of transcendence, yet arrived at a state of dealienation because of their confrontation with severe diminishment.[1.]

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1. I am thinking in this of characters like Shukhov and Kostoglotov in A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovitch by Solzhenitsyn. It could be argued, however, in the case of these characters, that diminishment in many of the 'civilised' manifestations of life, forced them back to a recognition of the value of life itself.

The representation is not unhelpful, however, if we make the transposition of the influences on the individual consciousness, to understand those that are now affecting and transforming societal consciousness as a whole and the institutional consciousness of education in particular.

In fact a very similar thesis could be argued for the collective aspect of consciousness, as I have argued for the personal level: transformations now underway can be understood as resulting from this two-fold process of the comprehension of determination, and transcendence of it.

In correspondence with my representation of identity search at the subjective level, I show by the following chart these same processes operating at the societal level, both in the realm of knowledge theories and of inarticulate social movements.

PROGRESS TOWARDS DEALIENATION AT THE SOCIETAL LEVEL



Footnotes to Chart:

1. I have used the symbol /\ to indicate a lack of area of neglect.

2. These social movements are dealt with in great detail by
   W.Reich, op.cit.
   O.Klapp, op.cit.

3. See above, fn. 2.

4. Empirical sociology can also at times be considered a compounder of social objectivation. Very much depends upon the ontological premises of the investigation in question. Kate Millett makes a penetrating consideration of this subject in Sexual Politics, "The Influence of Functionalism", pp.220-233.

Again this is a generalised representation. It is not, however, difficult to see the closeness of the correspondence I suggest. Something clearly is happening at the societal level (very much more emphatically in America than in England) that we very much wish to happen at the individual level. Self-awareness and critical reflectivity are accompanied by a seeking for value and meaning. It is unfortunate that at the societal level it is usually two different groups of people who are involved in the separate processes; i.e. the intellectuals in reflectivity; the young, in search for meaning.[1.]

The biggest area of lack on the societal chart is in Section E. Whereas I suggested a characteristic of dealienated subjectivity to be that of peak experience with its accompanying joy and certainty, no such counterpart can as yet be clearly sensed at the societal level.

In other words we cannot point to any integrated societal experience of value - no peak experience in collective terms. This lack, Klapp[2.] claims, so strongly

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1. In England, however, in processes and suggestions for change I feel there is an absence of vitality and dynamism; a cautiousness and temerity that invalidates some of the very valuable work being done.

2. O.Klapp, op.cit.

evidenced in the dying and neglect of ritual, celebration, ceremony and pomp, is the reason why societal members cannot be sustained in their own individual grasp of meaning and value.

Klapp would claim that people have the need to experience meaning in unity with others. As ritual dies there are no social categories that enable people to experience together and thus there is a serious diminishment of humanity and a sense of individual isolation.

If I make the transposition again of these general societal processes to the emerging or suggested transformations in the institution of education, a similar observation can be made. In the last two decades numerous changes have arisen or been suggested in the field of education. Often they have seemed to be discrepant with one another, or they have been suggested with little theoretical clarity; sometimes they have been theoretically clear but pragmatically unrealistic; often they have attempted to rectify one particular fault in education and ignored the pertinence of many other issues.

The transposition, I suggest, however, does offer some clarification of these diverse and confusing movements. They can all be seen as symptomatic of those general societal processes which seek to understand conditioning and objectivating forces and strive at the same time for transcendence of them: for an adequate experience and formulation of what man is, or could be.

The following chart suggests the processes I have indicated, but this time in the field of education.

EMERGING TRANSFORMATIONS IN EDUCATION
(In practice and in theory)



There is then a unity of purpose in all these suggested or emerging changes in the field of education. They are changes that have a degree of correspondence with changes we would wish for in the individual consciousness; changes that also emerge in a more general way at the societal level.

What we must now ask, however, is whether, although a coherent ideal has been formulated and although at the societal and educational levels some of its sustaining transformations are already manifest, there is a possibility that true consciousness can become reality? Is it possible that formal education can strive for the ideal more forcibly and synthesise the multitude of endeavours already in motion?

In other words, I suggest that the ideal I discuss has no relevance unless there is taken into account the severity of the conflictual situation in which it is suggested - in which we live.[1.]

"The shadows are lengthening", writes Fromm, "the voices of insanity are becoming louder".[2.] "There is the danger", writes De Chardin, "of the world refusing itself when perceiving itself through reflection".[3.] "There are ideas and ways of thinking with the seeds of life in them,

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1. This question has, at root, the same perplexities as the real/false relationship that is touched on in Appendix D.

2. E.Fromm, The Insane Society, p.263.

3. T.De Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, p.226.

and there are others, perhaps deep in our minds with the seeds of a general death. Our measure of success in recognising these kinds and naming them, making possible their common recognition, may be literally the measure of our future".[1] So speaks Williams, who, like Marcuse, like Illich, like Laing, is very strongly aware of the crisis in our society today.

In fact a common characteristic can be seen in almost all the writers who have influenced my thought - not only the more extreme social critics I have quoted here. If we can give credence to subliminal experience - and I have said earlier that we can - the overriding registration in my mind from this amalgam of writers was almost as if in joint voices they were saying, "What seems to be, is not; what has worked so far is built on shaky foundations; there is a great discrepancy somewhere and we must understand and rectify it".

But sometimes, too, I was aware of notes of panic and fear. As if to say, "We have left it too late; the chasm is widening, the abyss yawning. Before cataclysmic change is upon us, let us understand the situation as it is; let us conserve those strengths that we still value; but let us be clear what they are and embrace them wholeheartedly, whilst at the same time recognising their inadequacies, admitting our lack and envisaging without destructiveness, the steps we must take to bring back hope and optimism into our lives".

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1. R.Williams, Culture and Society, p.336.

And yet it is itself a source of optimism that conflict and fear are admitted, that faults are perceived and openly criticised. One cannot cure an illness unless it is diagnosed correctly. But neither can one wish to cure it unless in the mind of the healer is the knowledge of the reality of health; the conviction of its value; irreducible joy in its acquisition and grave and vigilant responsibility in its maintenance.

It is because of my concern with this understanding that my conclusion is related so little to pragmatic suggestions for educational change. In my chart of "emerging transformations in education", areas A and B show an awareness of social objectivation (and implicit criticism of social organisation and consciousness) in a way that would have been inconceivable twenty years ago, when O'Connor's views were so widely held.[1] Areas C, D and E indicate

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1. I refer to this because at the time I was training to become a teacher I found it very difficult to accept the absence of any explicitly formulated goals and ends for education. I wrote a paper then that criticised D.J.O'Connor's denigration of metaphysics in An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education. I queried his assumption that educational aims could only have the authority of man's general agreement now and the tendency of opinion over the ages.
   Since he defines metaphysical statements as those that assume "the existence of entities and facts lying outside the range of human observation and experience", I am still unable to agree with him. How can one as each new day seems to bring more and more within the range of human observation and experience?
   And since today there is not general agreement about educational aims and the tendency of opinion over the ages is under close scrutiny - we can still less easily accept that authority as sufficient.

transformations that have as object the realisation of self and the transcendence of socialisation. As yet they are by no means substantially implemented, but at least they are envisaged; they have been given some theoretical clarification and often have a reality in practice that can act as model and enlightenment for education in general.[1.]

There are, however, four noticeable areas of neglect even in the midst of all these suggested transformations. Three of these areas related to D, the circle that indicates the relevance of the signals of transcendence (of knowledge-seeking, the arts, relationships, religion and humour). As yet in education it is only in the area of knowledge-seeking that adequate perceptions and changes are occurring: that an adequate paradigm is being explored.[2.]

With regard to the arts, there needs to be in schools a radical rethinking, refeeling of attitudes to the arts, both with regard to the art of past centuries and with regard to contemporary individual and collective artistic endeavour.

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1. It would be a mistake to be too optimistic about this. As yet the schools that incorporate new ideas are very limited in number.

2. The discussion of the effect of present knowledge organisation in causing manipulative subjectivity, indicates some of the basic assumptions of an alternative paradigm of knowledge. Section II, p.131.

With regard to relationships, although increasingly the inter-personal is valued, there is still enormous progress to be made before we can escape the control and possession ethos or the impersonality and manipulation of interactionism.[1] Much of sociological thinking endeavours to understand man's development as part of a collectivity. It is not upon collectivity, Jung says, that the inner cohesion of a society rests, but upon each separate meeting of two people.[2] Buber and De Chardin, I think, give the most adequate, reverential treatment of authentic relationship and there is a place in educational theory for a relating of these ideas and suggested ways of living.

The third area of transcendence I suggest is neglected, is that of religion. I think there is a need in schools for an understanding to be sought of the phenomenon of religion - not only as a source of morals; not just as corporate communal experience; not necessarily as a historical fact (although this is important); but in terms of man's innate religious capacity; his age-long propensity to experience the numinous; his response to what is the mystery of his life.

(And humour? Perhaps that will evolve on its own without too much facilitation from drinking and gambling!)

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1. R.D.Laing, Self and Others.
   E.Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life.

2. Discussed by Buber in Between Man and Man.

These large areas of neglect I have indicated in briefest detail. They should fit into context with the very many transformations already in process. My work, however, I understand as theoretical, even ideological, in character - attempting to give some clarity to and justification for educational changes of such diverse aspects.

Educational theory, I believe, lacks above all a coherent, visionary ideology, to sustain and reaffirm the efforts of many troubled practitioners.

It seems necessary at this stage to clarify my use of the word ideology. I understand its meaning to be that of a satisfying, formulated world-picture from which can be deduced evaluatory principles pertaining to the world, nature, man, morals and society.[1.] Into that meaning is not automatically incorporated either the idea of imposition by dominance or the idea of manipulation by mystification or propoganda. The Communist and Nazi experiences of this century should alert us to reject the former idea. The Western 'hypocrisy' experiences would lead us to repel the latter.

Whatever abuses the formulation of ideologies have led to, I cannot agree with the philosophical positions of the Logical Positivists[2.] or the Linguistics,[3.] that militate against or abstain from any ideological activity. The

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1. My understanding of this concept derives from
E.Erikson, op.cit.
E.Gellner, The Devil in Modern Philosophy (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974).

2. A.J.Ayer is a representative of the Positivist school of Philosophers.

3. Wittgenstein represents the school of Linguistics.

Positivist suggestion that no statement has meaning unless it is factual, is for me meaningless. To my mind "meaning" itself is an evaluative, highly subjective word so by that very assertion the Positivists have broken their own rule. The Linguistic philosophers, likewise, have flaws in their reasoning. Admittedly, it is very necessary to recognise, as they do, the determinism of the conceptual systems in which we are encapsulated. It is relevant, too, to clarify, as far as we can, the relativity of our own thought-processes and even consciousness. But once we are in the aware position of examining our own relativity, we are, by that very activity, expanding the very concept of awareness.[1.] We are then facilitating the comparison of our own concepts with other conceptual systems, of which, in this rapidly-changing, swiftly-shrinking, knowledge-accrueing world, we have increasing cognisance; geographically and historically.[2.]

Since we are able to make such comparisons we must relinquish the idea of some cosy conceptual cocoon to think in. (Sink in?). It becomes possible and in fact highly necessary in view of the plethora of examples, models, ideas to which we are exposed, to generalise, hypothesise and make ideological coherence out of multiplicity and chaos.

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1. This thought was made clear to me in correspondence with Dudley Plunkett.

2. An instance of such comparison is to be found in R.Horton, "African Traditional Thought and Western Society", M.Young, op.cit.

People who suggest the need for ideological clarity have come under attack by members of both these philosophical schools. It has been suggested of them that they"reach out for the spurious comfort of the general theory, or comfort their anxiety with the intoxication of loose and far-reaching claims".[1.] I would reject such criticism. As Gellner suggests it is not really such an extraordinary thing to suppose that one can talk or write sense - or that concerned people with a real interest can (and this we presume most educationalists to be). After all, for centuries men have accepted the fact that the discussion and formulation of sensible ideas was the "natural and secure birthright of some men of good faith and sound training".[2.]

Neither is it an altogether unjustifiable activity to seek to resolve a generalised intellectual anxiety; to seek "to make explicit the basic premises of one's activities"; to endeavour to come to a coherent understanding of man's life, its meaning, its direction and its potential.

Life after all has the pressing and inescapable need to be lived. Although it would seem at times a balm if one were to have two lives - one in which one could find out how to live, the other in which to live well - that cannot

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1. E.Gellner, op.cit., p.18.

2. Ibid.

be so. We are faced always with the decisions, the choices and the actions.

Although overwhelming at times may seem the dangers of formulating a plausible world-picture[1.] - of suggesting an ideology for education and for life, it would seem to be an inescapable commission. Some philosophical positions have led to such a pessimistic view of man and life that the proponents of them have been led in conscience to reject the idea of progeny: "Stop Life!" in other words. It may be that if we do not more earnestly assert the need for ideology that, as educationalists, we will be in that same position, of saying (No) to the life of man's mind, spirit and intelligence.[2.]

Just as in individual intelligence, each advance of the intellect is secured by a completion, so that resulting completions (always incomplete) lead on again to a higher and more complex completion, so too I think, collective intelligence has the need to make, or attempt a collective completion, an ideology that will satisfy within the limited and relative context of its situation in a given society, at a given time.

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1. This danger would not seem so threatening, however, if a greater understanding were achieved of the forces of objectivation and manipulation; if greater faith and trust were to be placed in the freedom and integrity of individual conscience.

2. This would be a conclusion of Erikson's, who correlates the crisis in youth's identity with the ideological crisis of modern society. op.cit.

We cannot know all; we are sure of little; our vulnerability is enormous and yet until we can put into words what it is that we value we cannot act. But neither can we rectify or refine our actions.

Already, some sort of ideology exists. C.Wright-Mills would argue that it is so entrenched that it is neither easy to assess nor refute and so does not provoke the conflict that is necessary as a spur to constructive change.[1] Young, Bernstein and Bourdieu would argue that much of this entrenched ideology is merely the legitimisation of vested interests and power groups in society and therefore has no overall validity for the majority of children.[2] Weber would argue that if it is an ideology that is not clearly recognised and apprehended, it is merely a form of sedimentation in society, for it is not sustained by intentionality and therefore cannot be influential towards praxis.[3]

An ideology, however, need have none of these three characteristics. It can be explicit and recognised so that it is sustaining and validating: it can be explicit also with the result that conflict, argument and dissension are provoked and a critical, animated dialogue is engendered that may prove efficacious in producing further transformation.

Nor need it be the legitimisation of vested interests. Many ideologies in the past have arisen in the

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1. C.Wright-Mills, op.cit.
2. M.Young, op.cit.
3. Discussed in Schutz, op.cit.

first place as critically, abstracted ideas from a way of life or thought and their roles later became perverted as only certain classes of society were addressed by them and protection was increasingly sought against the encroachments of other, usually exploited groups. This, I hope, is not now the case. Any ideology to be formulated for education will be one that pertains to all men and women, and to all children in our schools. It will be one arising from life and practice in schools, for as democratisation and participation proceed the gulf between theorist and practitioner will lessen.

Thirdly, and in the context of this work, most crucially, the ideology we formulate for education can and must be sustained by intentionality. An imposed value ceases to be a value. Imposed or manipulated ideologies become very soon the vehicles of dehumanisation. Clarification, illumination and lived example can be the only means of extending ideologies that we value. Change may be slower but if it evolves democratically it should be sustained by intentionality and never be so rigid that further transformation is precluded.

The most central and highest capacity of man, I concluded at the end of Section III was his ability and need to form values and arrive at meaning and morality. Upon the utilisation of this ability rested his identity and psychic health. It is a reassurance to think that if at the collective level we can be more successful in

clarifying educational ideology, emerging transformations will be quickened and extended, especially when the common goal of many different enterprises is seen. Perhaps in schools, more than in any other institution in society, there will be made possible what is now lacking, the "collective peak experience", the "experience of meaning" in unity with others.

"Every increase of internal vision is essentially the germ of a future vision which includes all the others and carries still further on", writes De Chardin.[1.] "A human crisis is always a crisis of understanding", says Williams, "What we genuinely understand we can do".[2.]

Much remains to be done in education; much to be envisaged; much to be understood. If, however, central to our concern remains the consideration of ideology, I do not believe that education will remain alienating. I believe that the conceptual ideal of de-alienation will be achieved, once recognised and valued.

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1. De Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, p.230.

2. R.Williams, Culture and Society, p.338.

POSTSCRIPT

If I attribute any special importance to my work it is because it has made explicit for me the need for the development of a scheme of values for education. The definition and description of alienation, the discussion of its manifestations, causes, extent and impoverishment, all have made clear to me that its continuance rests to a large extent on the entrenchment and inexplicitness of ideologies and values that are often unfair, dishonest, sedimented and worst of all, unsustained by intentionality.

My examination of the ideal of dealienation, however, suggests that the prime attribute and need of the individual consciousness is the formulation and acquisition of a hierarchy of values and meanings; values that whilst pertaining closely to man's material and psychic well-being, point even more strongly towards the spiritual, transcendental manifestations of personality.

Admittedly I have argued the existence of this capacity strongly at the level of the personal, but in this conclusion I have endeavoured to show in very general terms that the awarenesses we begin to make and the ideals we suggest for the individual, have their correspondence also at societal and educational levels.

The individual has indeed the capacity to formulate schemes of values alone. He may need to very often, as he exists amidst much of the conflict and diminishment already discussed in society and school. Ideally, though, we would not wish that entire burden on him. It may be only the

psychologically and spiritually most strong who could bear it. Far better if theoretical understanding could be achieved, if ideological clarification could begin, so that in the institutions of education at least, those areas of life shown to be a source of value for the individual, could be sustained and substantiated in community.

APPENDIX A

A POSSIBLE THIRD CODE OF SPEECH?

Much has been written of the determining power of language. Sapir Whorf wrote of language that an individual is "utterly unaware of this organisation and is constrained completely within its unbreakable bounds".[1.] Bernstein's well-known analysis of the two English codes of speech confirms this conclusion and shows how forms of language determinism perpetuate social inequality. He suggests that the two prevalent codes of speech are the descriptive, expletive, restricted code of the working class, so clearly exemplified by the brutish, sterility of speech in a programme like "Till Death do us Part" - and the analytical, rational, elaborated code, used so concisely by the comperes of "Blue Peter".

What seems strange to me is that when educationalists have discussed the control potential of these codes, there has seldom been suggested a possible third code of speech; one that is seen most clearly to exist in Gaelic communities and is not confined to class origins as are the other two codes.

When teaching infants to read I became very quickly aware of the lack of this third dimension of language in reading schemes. Most of my pupils (in a Lancashire mill village) used themselves a restricted code. Peter and Jane, Janet and John, Simon and Elizabeth, et.al. initiated them painfully into a more rational, less realistic tongue. And

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1. Quoted by Bourdieu in his article "System of Education and Systems of Thought", M.D.Young, op.cit.

yet in the fairy tales of Hans Andersen there lay an alternative dimension of language - an affective, endoceptual, poetic code, rich in metaphor and image, to which the most deprived child could respond readily.

I do not suggest that this code can exist only in literature and story. The language of the characters in a programme like "Me Mammy" reveals it to be a language of people. The speech of the Mayo peasants in Synge's "Playboy of the Western World", reveals even more vividly, more hauntingly, some of its predominant characteristics.

There seems to be present often a volubility that in its excessive use of words, implies the limitation of the word. There is the frequent resource to metaphor, again suggesting that to understand this present dimension of experience, we needs must leap into another. Imagery is rich, so that in spite of transcendence, the perceptual and sensual are overwhelmingly present, suggesting a synthesis of intelligence and experience.[1.] Above all there is present the affective component of intelligence, that speaks not only through the word or figures of speech but through the repetitions and rhythms in which these former are placed.

This very subjective analysis of a possible third code of speech suggests two things to me. By its very nature it cannot be deterministic as are the codes of Bernstein, for within it lie the 'tools' of transendence. Within it too can be found the 'tools' Dr.Sassal[2.] found

1. John Donne's poetry, often described as colloquial and modern in its form, also has this characteristic of allying the sensual with the spiritual: as in the sonnet "Batter my heart three personned God..."

2. John Berger, A Fortunate Man.

lacking in working class culture, the means whereby emotional and introspective experience was examined and defined. That Sassal assumed this experience was available to the middle classes is a little surprising! It was not until he himself was in his mid-thirties that he came to a recognition that it was his own emotional and imaginative life that must first be confronted honestly, before he could understand his patients.

As a result of these experiential observations I suggest that it is not an unreasonable proposition to make, that language as we know it in literature, and as we have heard it spoken by peoples, is not of necessity confined in its character either to class or educational system but has intrinsic to it, the power to transcend not only social differences, but also individual 'conscious' experience.

APPENDIX B

MASLOW'S DISCUSSION OF "AMBIVALENCE TOWARDS POTENTIALITY"

Maslow writes that with the weakening of the real self comes the weakening of the inner signals or organic strivings. The loss of this inner directionality gives more room for defensive strategies and coping responses, both of which have as a result the evasion of growth and the diminution of consciousness. One of these defences, Maslow says, is the Jonah complex - ambivalence about our human possibilities. He writes, "We are generally afraid to become that which we can glimpse in our most perfect moments, under the most perfect conditions, under conditions of greatest courage".[1.] In other words we can enjoy the god-like possibilities of ourselves but simultaneously shiver in awe of them.

This ambivalence towards possibilities in ourselves is accompanied by ambivalence towards good qualities in others, or human nature in general. And this leads on to the counter-valuing we encounter so often in the teaching profession, because by projection, the teacher is led to deprecate the ability or talents in his pupil, since awareness of them, lessens his own regard for himself. An eight-year old boy once reminded me kindly of the difference between materials that were translucent and those that were opaque. At the time I felt I was being ambitious in helping the children distinguish between transparency and translucency in glass and plastic milk bottles! When I related the incident with astonishment to other members of staff, I was reminded rather less kindly, that the boy should

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1. A.Maslow, op.cit., p.37.

be reprimanded for his impertinence rather than praised for his perception!

A teacher, Maslow suggests, should combine pride and humility. He should have pride in his own abilities and humility before the existential limitations to himself. Hence he should acquire the ability to fully value the gifts and promise of those he teaches. Like Aldous Huxley, who accepted his own talents and used them, the teacher should be able to marvel at all things interesting, fascinating and miraculous.

One cannot teach for long without realising that these things abound.

APPENDIX C

EXISTENTIAL ANXIETIES IN YOUNG CHILDREN

To illustrate this point of my text I have chosen writings from two of my own children. The first two were written by Peter at the age of ten at odd leisure moments at home, without solicitation or without any apparent difficulty in his life that I felt might have made him more serious or apprehensive. The first poem is clearly an expression of his awareness of life's transitory nature and of the overwhelming confrontation that the imagination can make sometimes with death, throwing, as it does, the whole possibility of life into question. The second poem expresses an insight into the inevitability of man's diminishment and the dreadful sadness that such an awareness occasions. It interested me because although he wrote it in the form of a child-like allegory and although it was often clumsy in expression, it was, by its very ideosyncracy, authentic in mood and meaning.

Life

Into an earth is the start
From then our life has begun
The life of decisions building into one big decision
Why is it that we start and end?
Is it at the start the end?
Or is it the end in five years
Or ten or twenty or fifty or maybe now!
It is impossible to live on, for ever death comes at
us now or then.

TEMPTATION

Along the path of life I go,
Will I spend my 30 coins, No!
A man stands on the edge of my path,
Looks poor leaning on his staff.
The man is up to me,
He looks at my feet and; say he
"With those feet you could not sit,
Not to mention walk but these will fit".
He brought to me a pair of boots,
Strong and beautiful to the roots.
"These are yours for 10 coins clear".
"I cannot I fear
For I only have 30 coins here".
"But these are strong will last you well
Buy them and in them dwell".
"No I won't give in".
"But ten coins is no sin".
"Yes these are good, I might".
"Go-on in these there is no fight".
"Yes with these boots I'll go"
On twenty coins, live on so".
I bought the boots and on I went.
There an angel for me it has been sent
Twenty and ten coins to live on;
No it can't be so, now I am gone.
In the face of the devil I bow.
These ten coin boots worth nothing now.

Elizabeth wrote the following letter when she was eleven. She told me that when she wrote it she was imagining that her life was nearly over and if that were so she must tell certain things to her friends.

"My dearest friends,

I would like to tell you how much I enjoyed life. Even though my part was a tired and criticised thought. I was born with a fresh life in front of me. e.g. A juicy gold apple without a bruise or scrape. As my life enlarged the apple was bitten and scraped. As I undertook worries and decisions my apple was bruised. When I was wed it was if a wall had been rebuilt.

Later I became scared, horrified by the present world's action, the happy society becoming proud, vain, cruel and unhappy. There were fights and general violence. I protested, tried to communicate with other persons. This community needed being built, strengthened with care and thought. How many people

> have actually thought what they are doing and saying - not many. I hope more will carry on my research on today's society".

Clearly Elizabeth had a sense of several existential realities. Her apple image expresses very clearly the sense of the inevitability of diminishment, that was present also in Peter's poem "Temptation". She was aware too of life's transitoriness - to the extent of imagining her friends reading what she had written after her death, even to the extent of imagining the tiny, unimportant memory she would remain in their minds, "though my part was a tired and criticised thought".

The second part of her letter is more experiential than existential, yet even here there is expressed the anxiety of aloneness - the sense of perceiving and suffering anti-life forces and despairing a little that these perceptions could be shared and acted upon.

APPENDIX D

WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 'REAL' SELF AND 'FALSE' OTHER?

In my discussion of the operation of the dealienated consciousness in the "here and now", my intention was to explore ideal conditions of relating. It was the interaction between 'real self' and 'real other' that was the centre of interest. There remained in the chart, however, an important omission. This was the relationship of 'real self', to what, for brevity, was described as 'false other'.

Implicit in the category of 'real other' were all those areas to which man relates by virtue of his potential as ascending consciousness. Thus 'real other' could be defined not only as person, but as body of knowledge, work of art, nature and social institution - in fact all those points at which the world can meet man in real reciprocity.[1.]

The category of 'false other' however, I intend to discuss more narrowly in terms of either the person (in interpersonal relating), or the collectivity (or social institutions), in which man finds himself. Those other points of meeting with the world are assumed to bear relation with this examination.

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1. This, in fact, is Buber's definition of a real person - one who lives in real reciprocity with the world, at all points at which the world can meet man. M.Buber, Between Man and Man.

The harshest recognition we make when we consider the controversial relationship between 'real self' and 'false other' is that although 'real self' was discussed as an ideal state of consciousness, with a very limited number of models to point to in existence, the 'false other' could be shown to have more reality, be more prevalent and have more power.

Without this recognition the total import of Section III would be invalidated. Whilst I have outlined man's potential for good and made plausible the ideal of human perfectibility, it has not been forgotten that overwhelming at times can seem the 'false' or even 'evil'. Neither Buber nor De Chardin, although so optimistic and respectful with regard to human nature, are blind to the possibilities in man for disintegration, destructiveness and evil. There must be times then when 'real self' encounters 'false other' and has no alternative but to reject him. Although, as Rogers says, every human being must elicit our "unconditional positive regard", there are inevitably great limitations to our relating in an ideal way, to all men. It may even happen in certain circumstances that the individual who feels his reality threatened by those that surround him, must seek to preserve his humanity in "survivor" conditions, without the social confirmation and validation that most of us need.[1.]

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1. Terrence des Pres in his article "Survivors" suggests that so prevalent is falseness and diminished humanity, spiritual innocence may only be preserved in this anguished solitariness. "The Survivor", Encounter Magazine, 1971.

What though, of the relationship of 'real self' to 'false other" when by other is understood the collectivities and social institutions in which man moves? In a very general sense, many of our institutions could be called 'false' because of their propensity to perpetuate social injustice and inequality; because of their ability to cause alienation.

We are reminded here of Buber's mitigating remarks to Rogers about confrontation with evil. Although, as Buber says, evil must be rejected sometimes so that innocence may survive, it is seldom that all is evil. Just as in man's soul exists the polarity between those poles, so too in society I would suggest there is sufficient potential to allow for transformation. The greatest part of this potential is the awareness in many different sectors of society (in educational institutions, amongst the young; amongst intellectuals; in the ideas of women) of an alternative lifestyle and ethos that must be pursued if man's essential humanity is to be preserved and developed further.

I do not believe that violence or revolution are necessary if society is to be transformed. Much more credible seems the apolitical stance of R.D.Laing[1]. which suggests that growth in consciousness and transformation in personality are almost irreversible in the individual, once attained, and irrepressible in social effect, once valued.

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1. R.D.Laing, The Politics of Experience.

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