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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON

ABSTRACT

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL ADMINISTRATION

Master of Philosophy

MARCUSE'S SOCIAL THEORY - THE SPECULATIVE
CRITIQUE OF INDUSTRIAL CIVILISATION

by Peter Marsh

Marcuse's publications, from his early days in Germany to his
last studies in the U.S.A., are examined to provide an outline
of his social theory. Some biographical elements are included,
and his works are located in the concerns of the Institute of
Social Research, and the rise of fascism and prospects for
socialism in the 1930's. It is suggested that in his pre-1950
publications Marcuse is offering an attempt to develop Hegel and
Marx, and a form of critique which counterposes radical
alternatives to existing social reality. His descriptions of
philosophy, culture, science, social reality and social change,
are examined, and often found to be inadequately detailed in a
variety of ways. His work from 1950 forms a critique of
industrial civilisation that examines cultural and social
structures, and psychological and social psychological
developments with reference to work by Freud. His views of
science and industry could be developed by looking at the social
construction of science. He enlarges upon some of the
speculative areas within Freud's metapsychology and instinct
theory, and offers an attempt to link this view of psychic process
with the development of industrial civilisation. The two
"models of man" that this contains are interesting but
inadequately theorised. In his views of art he offers links
between aestheticism, artistic creation, social theory, and radical
alternatives, which repay analysis. Overall Marcuse offers
challenges to views of social theory and social reality which are
important but problematic in conceptualisation and detail.

Marcuse's Social Theory

- the speculative critique of industrial civilisation

CONTENTS

Introduction

The "popularity" of Herbert Marcuse within social science, Marxism studies, political movements or whatever seems to shift and change in a number of different ways at a number of different times. His views seem, for example, to have been adopted, distorted or dismissed by many shades of political opinion at some point in his life. The emphasis of this study is on the social theory of Marcuse, itself equally subject to popularity changes, and to different uses. For a commentator, and for Marcuse, it might be praise or criticism to call his works "speculation"; in a number of ways this study will consider at various points just what sense it might make to call Marcuse's efforts "speculation". The issue will become clearer as the analysis progresses.

Overall Marcuse has, of course, achieved fame if not notoriety with his involvement with student politics of the 1960s and 1970s. His works are part of the debate about radical social change, and will be taken in that context. Specifically they are also part of the "Old Left" and "New Left" divide, rather splendidly characterised in the early 1970s by McInnes as the "praxis axis versus the action faction" (see McInnes, 1972, p.153). But although it will be suggested that Marcuse's views do include, for example, a notion of "new needs", and thus new bases for action only developing in the course of "action" itself, he also suggests that thought must precede this and so emphasises that "praxis" is important. Marcuse is not easy to categorise. His theorising about political action will not form a major focus of this study, although the "political setting" of his earlier years, which saw fascism developing and the prospects for socialism fading, will be discussed early on, and form an important and continuing backdrop to his analysis. Marcuse's personal commitment to defeating the values inherent in fascism, and to upholding those seen in, for example, the humanistic stance of the early Marx, is a deep and vital element to any understanding of him. Running through his works is a powerful theme of needing to re-think wide areas concerning human values and development in the light of the rise of fascism, and also the rise of Soviet Russia. There is an emotional feel, and in some senses an artistic interpretation of this, running through his works that is quite powerful, despite, for example, a prose style that seems notably convoluted, perhaps especially so to the English reader. George Steiner, a far more elegant writer although not sharing

Marcuse's interpretation of Marx and Freud, does perhaps best summarise aspects of the backdrop to Marcuse's efforts. The following passage from "Language and Silence" refers to the destruction, as Steiner sees it, of the particular genius of "Central European Humanism" with the eruption of barbarism under Stalin and Hitler. He comments that "The blackness of it did not spring up in the Gobi desert or the rain forests of the Amazon. It rose from within, and from the core of European civilisation. The cry of the murdered sounded in earshot of the universities; the sadism went on a street away from the theatres and museums. In the later eighteenth century Voltaire had looked confidently to the end of torture; ideological massacre was to be a banished shadow. In our own day the high places of literacy, of philosophy, of artistic expression became the setting for Belsen. I cannot accept the facile comfort that this catastrophe was a purely German phenomenon or some calamitous mishap rooted in the persona of one or another totalitarian ruler. Ten years after the Gestapo quit Paris, the countrymen of Voltaire were torturing Algerians and each other in the same police cellars. The house of classic humanism, the dream of reason which animated western society, have largely broken down." (Steiner, 1969, pp.14-15).

It will become clear that Marcuse shares Steiner's concerns, although he does not share his answers. Marcuse's answers can be seen, perhaps, as an attempt to be true to a number of different traditions, in some ways to be an "heir" to them; a mantle that he adopts in the shadow of the concerns just noted. He attempts to be an "heir" to the liberal values he sees in the Enlightment, to the development of reason he sees in philosophy, and to the humanistic essence he detects in art. He attempts to be some form of "heir" to German Idealism, and to the development of thought by Hegel, Marx and Freud. It is a role that others have cast him in even in connection with his own earlier setting, with Slater, for example seeing him as the "heir" of the Institute of Social Research's critical values in the light of the post-war developments of the Frankfurt school (see Slater, 1977, esp. pp.89-92). "Tradition" is an important source of "reason" for Marcuse in a number of ways, but also "reason" is seen as triumphing over "tradition". These issues will be developed in some detail, but it might be noted at this stage that one conception of "tradition" counterposed to "reason" in his work is that the "tradition" refers to that of modern capitalism,

or Soviet Russia, and not ancient society. His focus is modern
industrial society, and, for example, as Childs has commented, insofar
as he is a Marxist then he is a Marxist of Affluent Society (see Childs,
1973, p.324).

Although the ways that Marcuse's debate focuses on Affluent Society will
of course be discussed, the intention here is not to make a judgement
on his Marxism, a process which has, in fact, been battled out by others
(see for example, Mattick, 1972; Walton, 1970; Colletti, 1972). Nor
indeed will there be a particular attempt to judge his "Hegelianism",
or whatever. Rather the intention is to chart how he uses theorists
and concepts to try to develop a view of society, and in particular a
critique of industrial civilisation. Through Marcuse's relatively
prolific and scattered publications themes and trends will be identified,
and the attempt will indeed be made to see what sense could be given to
calling Marcuse's works "speculation". Problems and ambiguities will
be noted, and, it is hoped, somelinks will be made with other social
theorists or concerns.

Very briefly, the study will be comprised of the following three sections
where the development from the first section to the second section
approximates to the break between publications before and after 1950.
The first section thus forms an outline of the setting for his analysis,
including an emphasis on early publications with the Institute of Social
Research, and on Hegel and Marx. There is some discussion about the
impact of this analysis on his "method" and on ideas of "political action",
before a move to the second section concerning the social and cultural
structures of industrial civilisation as Marcuse sees them. The third
section covers the more psychological and social psychological aspects of
the critique, and in particular Marcuse's use of Freud. This section
continues to develop a number of the ideas and themes that have been
evident throughout, and they are given final shape here.

The rise of fascism, and the prospects for socialism, form an important
background to this study, which will proceed in the way just mentioned.
But it should also be noted that the development of technology and
industry are crucial. Large-scale society, "mass" society, was indeed
the concern of a number of the emigré group that went to America in the
1930s. The process of modernisation, located in some of the other

concerns that have now been briefly touched upon, was a crucial one
for all thisgroup, and as Hughes has noted "they did not suggest that the
process of modernisation could be either undone or stopped. Their
underlying moral purpose was not to preserve what was left of a society
based on status and cultural privilege; it was rather to protect the mass
men themselves from the fruits of their own liberation by exposing what
had been lost in the process" (Hughes, 1975, p.135). Marcuse's social
theory offers its contribution to this, it offers a critique via
radical alternatives, but as will be shown the contribution is sometimes
clear and sometimes elusive. But it is now in order to turn to the setting
for the analysis, and to look at in a little more detail.

Overall biography and early philosophy

Marcuse was born in Berlin in 1898. He came from a prosperous, assimilated,
Jewish family and in his late teens carried out his military service.
Marcuse, of course, experienced the political upheavals and activities of
Germany in this period and in 1917 joined the Social Democratic Party.
This year also saw the split of that party with the formation of the splinter
group called Spartakusbund, led by Rosa Luxembourg and Karl Liebknecht. The
group attacked the continuation of the war, supported the Bolshevik revolution
in Russia and called for the overthrow of the government by direct action.
This socialist revolution in Germany was to be carried out by the setting up
of workers' and soldiers' soviets or councils. Indeed Marcuse became briefly
involved with a soldiers' council in Berlin. With the abdication of the
Kaiser on 9 November 1918 there was a period of revolutionary disorder and
in January 1919 the Spartacists (who were reconstituted as the Communist Party
of Germany from 30 December) occupied a number of public buildings and
newspaper offices in Berlin. They were driven out by force, and Liebknecht
and Luxembourg were shot by army officers. Marcuse in fact left the Social
Democratic Party in 1919 in protest against its betrayal of the proletariat,
and indeed left politics, to study for a doctorate in philosophy at Berlin
and Freiburg. He received his degree from Freiburg in 1923 for his study of
Künstlerroman (novels in which artists played central roles). His interest
in art was to be evident throughout his life, and his ideas about art have
been one of his major contributions to social theory. From 1923 to 1929 he
remained in Berlin and worked in the book selling and publishing industry.
In 1929 he returned to Freiburg University and studied with Husserl and
Heidegger. These two philosophers clearly have an important role in Marcuse's
work, although he quite rapidly moved away from any detailed adherence to
their ideas. Indeed within three years he was to sever his relationship with
Heidegger and join the Marxist based Institute of Social Research. However
during this period at Freiburg Marcuse wrote a number of articles which
appeared in Maximilian Beck's "Philisophiche Hefte" and Rudolf Hilferding's
"Die Gesellschaft", and Marcuse's first book appeared in 1932. It was
prepared as a Habilitationsschrift, which was a post-doctoral qualifying thesis.
If it was acceptable (after defence in a disputation before the department
consisting of all full professors) it admitted the candidate to the lowest
rank of lecturer in the German University of the 1920's and 30's. The work,
prepared for Heidegger, was called "Hegel's Ontology and the Foundations of
a Theory of Historicity". This work clearly bears the marks of its mentor,
however before Marcuse could join him as an assistant, their relationship
became strained. Doubtless the increasing right-wing stance of Heidegger,

and the opposing politics of the Marxist-orientated student, did not help their relationship. Marcuse left Freiburg in 1932, and was recommended to the head of the Institute of Social Research (Institute für Sozialforschung), Max Horkheimer, after an intercession on his behalf from Husserl. He joined the Institute as a full member in 1933, and taught with it during its period in exile from the increasing persecution in Germany. Thus from 1933 to 1934 he was in Geneva, and 1935 found him, and the Institute, in a more permanent base in the U.S.A.

Before continuing to look at Marcuse's life and studies it is important to consider briefly the origins of the Institute of Social Research, which was to play such an important role in Marcuse's life and work.

The impact of the First World War on radical European intellectuals was major and long-lasting. The ensuing debates about the nature and place of Marxism, of social enquiry and political action were as varied as they were intense. The origins of the Institute for Social Research lay in one of the responses to this post-war climate of discussion, for in 1922 Felix J. Weil sponsored the First Marxist Week (Erste Marxistische Arbeitswoche) in Ilmenau. Weil was the wealthy only son of a German-born grain merchant, and received his doctorate at the University of Frankfurt. He was interested in the idea of sponsoring an institutional framework which would allow independent social research, and work on theoretical innovation. His Work Week included as participants Georg Lukacs and Karl August Wittfogel. The aim, according to Weil, was nothing less than seeing if a 'pure' or 'true' Marxism could be arrived at by allowing different trends the opportunity of talking it out together. In fact much of the time was devoted to a discussion of Karl Korsch's recent work, however a more ambitious alternative to the Work Week was later put to Weil by Pollock, and his friend of earlier years, Max Horkheimer. This resulted in the decision to found the Institute of Social Research in 1923, endowed with a generous foundation grant from Weil, and soon to be in a research building in the growingly fashionable Neue Sachlichkeit style. The Institute was to be primarily based around research, and not around teaching, with an avowedly Marxist emphasis. In 1929 Max Horkheimer took over as the head of the Institute and its period of greatest productivity began. His opening address looked at the history of social theory (an important change from the previous heavy stress on Marxist theory), and a new project was announced.

The new study was to use both public statistics and questionnaire data, and subsequent interpretation from sociological, psychological and economic standpoints. This inter-disciplinary stress was reflected in the new Institute journal, the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. The majority of the articles that appeared in the journal were argued over and evaluated exhaustively by the Institute before their appearance, so it formed less of a vehicle for different viewpoints and rather more a platform for the Institute's convictions. With the arriv al of Marcuse in 1933 there was a clear majority of the Institute's members who were committed to a dialectical, rather than a mechanical, understanding of Marxism. Indeed as Jay observes in his exhaustive study of the Institute, "Within the Institute itself, a smaller group had coalesced around Horkheimer, consisting of Pollock, Lowenthal, Adorno, Marcuse, and Fromm. It is really their work, rooted in the central tradition of European philosophy, open to contemporary empirical techniques, and addressed to current social questions, that formed the core of the Institute's achievements" (Jay, 1973, p.31).

Having very briefly set the scene of Marcuse's early years, we will now turn back to look at his publications before he came to join the Institute of Social Research. Only a brief background outline of these will be given. The idea is to indicate his early philosophical directions and influences. A number will be seen to recur in his work, with some of these generating issues that remain problematic to the end. His work before 1932 is clearly imbued with phenomenological concerns and categories. In one of his earliest articles, "Contributions to a Phenomenology of Historical Materialism" (Marcuse, 1928), Marcuse attempted to link phenomenology and Marxism. He suggested that it might be possible that key concepts in phenomenology ("authentic being" and so on) could be located in Marxist notions (like "class"). He was arguing, for example, that "authentic being" might be paralleld by ideas about the "universal nature" of the working class. Whatever the status of these ideas Marcuse's concern is clear. He is emphasising that philosophy can contain ideas that are important to human action, not mere "speculation", and rejecting notions of allying the study of man to the study of the natural world as seen in the natural sciences. For example, in an article published in 1931 (Marcuse, 1931) Marcuse praised Dilthey for freeing the "Geistwissenschaften" from the methodology of the natural sciences, and restoring their philosophical foundation. But also present in these early ideas was a suggestion that Marxism should become more phenomenological, and

that, for example, the analysis of the ideological super-structure may not
need to be seen in terms of the socio-economic base. Overall Marcuse argued
that Heidegger's analysis, correct in as far as it went, did not anchor
itself firmly enough in historical conditions.

The influence of Heidegger on Marcuse's intended Habilitationsschrift,
"Hegel's Ontology and the Foundation of a Theory of Historicity" (Marcuse,
1932) was perhaps even more evident. This work accepted that the identity
of subject and object was at the centre of Hegel's thinking. Hegel was, if
you like, seen as a "reconciler" not a "critic" and, for example, the concept
of "negation" is seen as not much more than an illusion. This is all in
marked contrast to his later work on Hegel (Marcuse, 1955) where the "actual"
and the "rational" are seen as quite distinct, and not necessarily co-
existent at all.

However, with the publication of Marx's 1844 Economic and Philosophical
Manuscript in 1932 (published in Moscow) Marcuse found a suitable path to move
more definitely away from his Heideggerian concerns. In fact in 1932 he
broke away from Heidegger himself to join the Institute, and published an
article on the Manuscripts which viewed them in very favourable terms which
were clearly a departure from his earlier ideas. It should be noted that
his work on these manuscripts in the 1930's was largely in advance of the
major impact that they were to have on Marxist thinking. It was in the
period after the Second World War that the full effect of Marx's early work
was principally analysed. The swing away from political economy to more
philosophical analysis, which the manuscripts were part of, was an exciting
development for Marcuse. He argued enthusiastically that the manuscripts
offered a philosophical critique of political economy (Marcuse, 1972g). At
the same time they demonstrated the key role of philosophy in Marx's thinking,
and made clear the origins of later Marxist concepts. For now it was possible
he suggested, to see that the basic categories of Marx's theory had arisen
out of the confrontation with Hegel's philosophy. "Man -as-labourer" still
held its central place in Marx's thinking, according to Marcuse, but now the
vital importance of alienated labour could be fully dissected. It was not a
factor arising out of exchange relations but something at one and the same
time more abstract and yet more concretely vital. He said that Marx had
shown in these Manuscripts that alienated labour "is not merely an economic
matter. It is the alienation of man, the devaluation of life, the perversion
and loss of human reality" (Marcuse, 1972g, pp.7-8). In some ways then

Marcuse could be said to have shifted his position from, crudely, "Heidegger located in Marx" to "Marx located in Hegel". Nonetheless one of the central conerns within this analysis reveals one of Marcuse's general directions of argument. In the comment about alienated labour given above it is connected not just with "economic matters" but with "human reality". Marcuse is laying the foundations here for many later studies in which he will be concerned with aspects of this, often looking at psychological ones as well. It is, if you like, a search to expand Marx's notion of "species-being", to find ways that man might be said to be denying his "species-being" in his current form of labour. Marcuse accepts as a fundamental proposition that one component of that labour concerns its inherent creativity. Labour is a creative process in itself, concerned with man's attempt to realise himself. He argues, for example, that private property is grounded in the very condition of alienated labour. Therefore a socialist transformation would not be about a change of ownership as such. Rather it would be about the possibilities open to man, to develop the essential nature of man, after it is appreciated that property is not merely an object but consists of the realisation of labour itself. Presumably Marcuse is echoing ideas here rather like those in Marx's "German Ideology" where it is suggested that it is possible to distinguish man from animals in many ways (such as social order, language and so on) but that he distinguishes himself when he comes to labour. Marcuse does indeed argue that man is not _in_ nature, rather man _is_ nature. Nature is his expression, his work, and his reality (see, for example, Marcuse 1972g, pp.6-21). Marcuse sums up some of these ideas in his suggestion that labour is an "ontological category" (Marcuse, 1972g, p.25).

Within this lively discussion on Marx's work there are two intertwining theories. Marcuse is suggesting that any transformation of society according to socialist principles will involve changes in almost every aspect of the social structure, and changes in behaviour itself. It will be a "total and radical revolution, unconditionally excluding any partial upheaval or "evolution" " (Marcuse, 1972g, p.10). The change from alienated labour involves a total change in society. But at the same time there is a sense in which Marcuse is arguing that human society, at least in the "developed" societies, may involve factors which actually deny some aspects of man whatever the changes in social structure. It may be, he seems to be suggesting, that some of the things that people blame on capitalism may be part of human life. For instance there is an ambiguity within his total stress on man-as-labourer, and his emphasis on man "as", and not "in" nature. In what ways can the fruits of man's labour, perhaps especially with the advances of

technology, be compatible with the idea that man might perhaps have to
choose between respecting and changing nature? If via labour man "realises
himself" does nature, if seen as the object of that labour, "suffer", and in
so far as man is part of nature does man "suffer" too? There are hints here
of later analyses about the possible impact of technology. In terms of
labour itself Marcuse suggests that it is part of man's "essence", but that
contained within this argument, within the definition of "essence" that he
gives, there may be a "proof" that labour always "carries with it" a "tendency
towards alienation" and is not merely a chance historical fact (see Marcuse,
1972g, p.37). Perhaps a world constructed completely in accord with man's
"essence", at least in the sense of man-as-labourer outlined in this study,
is not fully possible? His ideas suggest that a utopian vision of man can
arise from a premise that may itself contain reasons as to why it cannot be
completely established. Aspects of this theme will be returned to later, but
in the meantime it is in order to note some further features of the Institute
of Social Research that Marcuse moved to shortly after this publication.

The origins of the Institute of Social Research have already been discussed,
and Marcuse joined an organisation that was already well established as a
body of independent and critical researchers. However as has been mentioned
he joined a group around the relatively new leadership of Horkheimer that was
increasingly to stress a dialectical, rather than a mechanical approach to
materialist theory. As he joined the Institute it was already quite clear
that the position of a predominantly Jewish group of Marxist scholars was
going to be untenable in Hitler's Germany, and Marcuse's first year with the
Institute was spent in exile in Geneva before he and the Institute moved to
a permanent base in the U.S.A. It is important to appeciate the situation
of this group of intellectuals in America. The Institute had, as we have
seen, stressed its radical and critical approach to social theory, although
with the arrival of Horkheimer its eclecticism had grown. However it had
also seen itself as a forerunner, in a minor way, of the sort of community
that it wanted to see established in society as a whole (see Jay, 1973, p.31).
The social situation of the Institute in terms of its aims and forbears, its
actual location in the U.S.A. and the events in Germany were all of importance
in terms of Marcuse's work. It will be suggested later, for example, that
he emphasises a particular tradition of values that he wants to uphold, and
indeed a "traditional" view of art. Without prejudging the discussion about
the nature of these it it important to note how the Institute's own situation
would emphasise the idea of being heir to a strand of philosophy, of social

theory, and indeed of German social history, which was being upheld in the face of opposing events and ideas. In exile, then, the Institute was faced with not just the failure of working class radicalism in Germany after the first war, but also the growth of a fascist state that was opposed to all its values. For a group that concentrated on the twin poles of praxis and reason the working class defeats and fascist ascendency were extremely bitter events. The unity in the face of these factors, and the existence in a foreign culture led to a stress on their own community which did not breed much interaction with American intellectuals of the time. Indeed the Institute welcomed, and sometimes financed, more intellectual refugees from oppression in Germany, and they attempted to keep alive a German culture and spirit which was very different from the one presided over by Hitler. To this end they insisted on continuing to publish the Zeitschrift in German, and so reinforced further this distance from other academic circles in the U.S.A. It is worth noting that one other factor may have contributed to the relatively tight-knit nature of the Institute in exile, and that is the common thread of Jewishness. Certainly it was part of their common cultural heritage, and obviously an identity which was desperately important in Nazi Germany, although Jay's careful analysis of the situation fails to display it as an overriding factor in their intellectual position (see Jay, 1973, pp.31-33). It was the publication in German, and the lack of contact with American intellectuals that were the most important practical aspects of the Institute's separation from American social studies. When we consider in more detail the background to Marcuse's analysis some of these Institute issues will be raised again.

The possibility of the Institute of Social Research returning to Frankfurt became real quite soon after the end of the World War II. There were approaches from the academic and political community in Frankfurt early in 1946, but initially Horkheimer was reluctant to leave America. Various options, including links with universities in the Los Angeles area (and a German sub-office) were still being explored as late as August 1947. But by 1949 the Institute had accepted the offers from Frankfurt and established itself back in that city. However Marcuse, whose connections with the Institute were now much weaker, chose not to follow the Institute back to Germany. He had published a remarkable study of Hegel in the early 1940's (Marcuse, 1955), and joined the American State Department during the war, staying with that Department until 1950. He eventually became the head of the European section engaged in identifying pro and anti Nazi groups in the Third Reich. The study of Hegel, with its emphasis clear in the subtitle "Hegel and the rise of social

theory", was his only major publication for some years. In 1950 he moved
to become lecturer in sociology and fellow in the Russian Institute at the
University of Columbia. During the 50's he also did research at the Russian
Research Center at Harvard, and gave lectures on psycho-analytic theory in
Washington. In the early and late 50's he published a Freud-based study,
"Eros and Civilisation" and a study of Soviet Russia, "Soviet Marxism". In
a review of Marcuse's work in 1971 the Times Literary Supplement commented
on their disparity, their seeming contradictions, as well as their brilliance,
with perhaps the only common denominator being to elicit the "revolutionary
element" in the works they survey (T.L.S. , 1971). Certainly they display a
remarkable breadth of study. In 1954 Marcuse left Columbia to join the
history of ideas programme at Brandeis University as a lecturer in politics
and philosophy. In 1965 he went to the University of California, shortly
after the publication of "One-Dimensional Man" (Marcuse, 1968d) which, along
with "Eros and Civilisation" (Marcuse, 1969b) was destined to attract international
fame by association with the New Left, the student "rebellioun" and "counter-
culture" of the 60's and 70's. A publication of "One-Dimensional Man" in
1968 had a review quoted on the front cover, it said "The most subversive
book published in the United States this century" (Marcuse, 1968d). Indeed
by 1968 Marcuse was becoming known throughout the West, with his name linked
solidly to the student activities of that period. By October of that year
Marcuse had reached the stage of a B.B.C. T.V. interview with Robert McKenzie
on the programme "24 Hours" which concentrated almost entirely on Marcuse as
the "father of the student rebellion". It was a suggestion that he responded
to by saying that, "the students don't need another father. They believe
that the fathers have made the world, or at least put up with the world, in
which they have to live now. I am in no way the father of the student
rebellion. The students don't need an authoritarian speaker on their behalf.
Nevertheless I completely identify myself with the student movement, and I'm
very happy if my ideas have an influence on them" (Marcuse, 1968b, p.498).
He subsequently spent much time arguing that it was a misinterpretation of
his work that suggested that students were a revolutionary group in any sense
of a "substitute" for the working class, or as "heir to the proletariat"
(see Marcuse, 1970a, p.69, and Marcuse, 1970d, p.93). As perhaps a necessary
counter-part of fame Marcuse also found himself denounced by sections of the
New Left as "utopian" or suggesting that anyway radical change was impossible
(see for example, Breines, 1970, pp.3-6). His comment in 1978, when looking
back on the young who regarded themselves as his followers that he had "had

enough trouble with them" (Marcuse, 1978, p.169) perhaps indicates some of the turbulent currents that surround him, his work, and the interpretation of his work in the 1960's and early 1970's. He continued publishing and lecturing throughout his life, often still generating controversy. In an "Essay on Liberation" (Marcuse, 1972f) in the late 1960's, and 'Counter-Revolution and Revolt" (Marcuse, 1972e) in the early 70's, he continued his themes of sketching elements of a new society, noting the political possibilities of change, and emphasising the contribution of aesthetics to any critique of society. He died on July 29, 1979, and even in the obituaries the deep schisms about his work surfaced. Maurice Cranston (in the Guardian, July 31, 1979) inveighed against what he saw as his rejections of liberal values, accusing him of favouring intolerance, while Anthony Quinton (in the Observer, August 5, 1979) suggested that his philosophy, in so far as it involved notions of human "essence", in effect elevated a "kind of beach-bum taste for the simple life with a good deal of elemental fun in it" to the status of a basic philosophical truth. The many strands within Marcuse's work often do contain some rather extraordinary elements, as will be shown. Some are built upon aspects of his biography and early philosophy which are mentioned above, but it is now in order to look in a rather more detailed way at some of these and other factors to provide a fuller setting for Marcuse's analysis.

The background to the analysis

When Marcuse was asked in an interview in 1978 what he thought had been the Frankfurt School and Institute of Social Research's "positive contribution" he replied as follows, "What Horkheimer himself considered as a distinguishing characteristic was the interdisciplinary approach, applying sociology, psychology, philosophy to the understanding and developing of the problems of the time. In my view, the most interesting contribution was the attempt to answer the question: "What actually has gone wrong in Western civilisation that at the very height of technical progress, we see the opposite as far as human progress is concerned: de-humanisation, brutalisation, torture as a normal means of interrogation, the wasteful development of nuclear energy, destructiveness everywhere, and so on. How has this happened?" Horkheimer especially, but also the others, went back into not only social but also intellectual history, and tried to define the interplay between progressive and repressive categories throughout the intellectual history of the West - especially in the Enlightenment, for example, which is usually considered as one of the most progressive phases in history. The Frankfurt School pointed out to what extent this apparently perfectly clear progressiveness, this liberating tendency, was, at the same time, tied up with regressive and repressive tendencies" (Marcuse, 1978, p.171). In effect Marcuse is talking here about his own heritage, and the way that he attempts to sketch the progressive and repressive tendencies will be discussed throughout the analysis here. But there are two particular aspects of the Institute heritage that need to be sketched in at this stage. Firstly Marcuse has a particular "style" of analysis, and uses a particular "language" that owes much to his early origins. Secondly his analysis of fascism, the political backdrop for the Institute, has features that are of importance throughout his work. These two issues will be discussed below.

It will be recalled that the initial publications of the Institute in America were all in German and that the members had a sense of continuing to keep alive aspects of German culture which they saw as being destroyed in the development of Hitler's Germany (see Jay, 1973, p.40). Perhaps in a small way they were trying to absolve the German language from some of the connection with the atrocities of the Nazis; a half-conscious expression of the idea, as Steiner has put it, that "the German language was not innocent of the horrors of Nazism" (Steiner, 1969, p.140). In the case of some Institute members there was also an attempt to break with the language of the status quo, to write in a way that indicated in itself a difference from

other publications of the time. Although this is not particularly true of Marcuse, the aphoristic and non-linear style of, for example, Adorno has some of its origin in this idea. Indeed Marcuse himself has acknowledged the difficulties which this deliberate "stylistic break" can generate. He has confessed that there were many things in Adorno that he did not understand, and that although he sympathised with the idea that "ordinary language has been so much permeated by the Establishment", attempts to convey a rupture with that Establishment by changing syntax, grammar and vocabulary may or may not be "acceptable" (see Marcuse, 1978, p.171). But although Marcuse may not have attempted this Adorno "break", he does seem averse to publishing works that, for example, systematise his overall approach, or give a specific outline of his theory. On the whole he has published reasonably self-contained studies, and often written his works in essay length. Although his major publications do make reference to each other it is usually brief. The sense of a cumulative exposition of analysis is elusive at best. Certainly reading his work can be quite difficult, not only because of the feeling that continuity is sometimes hard to grasp, but also because of what can perhaps be described as a rather dense prose style. For example, when Marcuse is discussing the "unique" calling of the philosopher, as revealed in an analysis of one of Husserl's publications, he writes as follows. "In the course of such a philosophical undertaking (philosophical also in the sense of a discipline!) in the course of its own inner development Husserl's analysis transcends itself, or rather it descends from the pure theoretical to the impure pre-theoretical, practical dimension. Better - the pure theoretical analysis discovers its own internal impurity, but only to return from this impure sphere to the still pure theoretical dimension of transcendental phenomenology as constituent of the practical, pre-theoretical dimension, the Lebenswelt. (I use the German Lebenswelt. The literal translation "life-world" is too large and too vague in this context; what Husserl means is our own empirical day-to-day world as it is given in immediate experience, practical and other - the world of life and death, in our empirical reality. So I will use either "Lebenswelt" or "empirical reality".)" (Marcuse, 1975, p.226). This kind of exposition seems perhaps particularly convoluted to those who are not steeped in the traditions of German philosophical exegisis. It can only be assumed that Marcuse's "closed" Institute beginnings in the U.S.A. and his later fairly isolated development did not encourage him to break this mould, despite an audience that was not primarily from his own tradition. In a

self-confessed extreme attack on Marcuse, Eliseo Vivas comments that his
prose is seldom easy to understand, and "one often has to read a sentence,
a paragraph, a page, several times to make sure that" the reader "has
understood it" (Vivas, 1971, p.215). He suggests that "Marcuse achieves what
we may refer to in Marcuse's patois as the ponderification of the out-put
of his mental gyrations through the polysyllabification of jargonical
terminology" (Vivas, 1971, p.216). But although Vivas is mildly amusing
about this it is not really the verbal density of his prose that is perhaps
the main issue. Marcuse is difficult to read in many passages if the reader
is not schooled in the same background as Marcuse, but it is the tendency of
Marcuse to assume that same background that can create real problems. For
example, the meaning of "transcendental phenomenology" as mentioned above
will often be assumed by him to be a completely agreed category, a fully
defined and generally acknowledged body of theory. It is difficult to give
examples of this tendency without quoting lengthy extracts from Marcuse,
but basically it revolves around an assumption that his readers will know
about what he means by "the philosophy of Kant" or Descartes, or Husserl, etc.
e.g. "Kant destroyed rational psychology without arriving at an empirical
psychology" (Marcuse, 1972a, p.106)), or "the domination, unshaken from
Descartes to Husserl, of the ego cogito" (Marcuse, 1972p. p.32). Now of
course put in context there are ways in which these statements become clearer,
but there is a definite tendency throughout Marcuse's writings to use jargon
as a shorthand that is not unambiguously translatable. In so far as he is
engaged in the study of the "social and intellectual history" that he refers
to as the Institute's programme he tends to assume that the intellectual strands
within the intellectual history are commonly perceived and need little example
and it does not aid the clarity of his argument.

The rejection, then, of early U.S.A. links has left Marcuse with rather too
isolated a position for his own good. He has had little need, at least in
his earlier works, to debate them with a tradition outside his own background
despite the fact that their major audience was soon to be precisely that
group. Anderson (1976) has noted that this effective lack of debate has even
continued within the grouping that Marcuse could be identified with from a
standpoint in the 1970's. By then the bulk of his writings could be seen
as lying within the concerns, and approaches, of the tradition that Anderson
identifies as Western Marxism (see Anderson, 1976, pp.7-8, for his grouping
of early Marxist theorists, and pp.25-26 for his grouping of "Western Marxist"
including, for example, Lukacs, Korsch, Gramsci, Marcuse and Sartre). Despite

the common concerns with method, and with superstructure and despite the
focus on the lack of socialism and rise of fascism in the Twentieth Century
that this group share, they seldom seem to engage in debate with each other
(see Anderson, 1976, pp.68-9). Marcuse's isolation has, on the whole,
continued. But it has not been an isolation from political events, at least
in the sense of his engagement in a political commentary that runs through
his studies. The reaction to fascism has played a key role in Marcuse's
analyses, and from his early comments about this to his later ones about the
U.S.A. or Soviet Russia he has attempted to take the political "pulse" of his
times. He has been engaged in a kind of continuing survey of the prospects
for genuine socialist change, as he sees it, in the West, and to a lesser
degree in Soviet Russia and the Third World. This occurs in his work in
various forms. Sometimes he specifically discusses political actions, such
as some sort of refusal to cooperate with Establishment rules, whether of
the moral variety about, say "good" language or the legal variety, about,
say, lack of civil rights (see Marcuse, 1972f, p.42, and Marcuse, 1968d,
pp.200-201). Sometimes he discusses possible actors in the socialist change
(e.g. students and the University - see for example, Marcuse, 1970d, p.88),
or possible organisational forms (see the discussion on organisation and
spontaneity in Marcuse, 1971a, pp.11-13). His books have prefaces which he
re-writes to fit what he sees as the changing political times when they are
re-published (see, for example, the "Political Preface" written in 1966 to
"Eros and Civilisation", first published in 1955 - Marcuse, 1969b, pp.11-20).
We shall return to his views on the prospects for change, but the point at
the moment is that this is another element in the complexity of his language
and style. Marcuse's capacity to switch from philosophical analysis to
political commentary is probably rather too great given the inherent
difficulties which also exist in his prose and analysis style. On the whole
his commentary about the political "pulse" will not feature heavily in the
discussions here as it would be better suited to a more historically based
study. However some of the problems that Marcuse's own perspective generates
for any reading by him of that "pulse" will be returned to after we have
considered in more detail Marcuse's analysis of fascism.

Marcuse's early views on fascism are contained in two articles, one published
in 1934 ("The Struggle Against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View of the
State" - Marcuse, 1972p) and one published in 1937 ("The Affirmative Character

of Culture" - Marcuse, 1972a). They both originally appeared in the
journal of the Institute of Social Research (the "Zeitschrift für Sozial
förschung"). Both articles suggest an analysis based upon the "intellectual"
rather than "social" history that was referred to earlier. As Therborn has
commented that the Institute, and aspects of the later Frankfurt School,
tended to analyse fascism via a "philosophical critique of capitalism" rather
than via, say, an analysis of the fascist state (Therborn, 1970, p.94). Thus
Marcuse's discussion of affirmative culture, which ends in the analysis of
fascist culture, begins by looking at the origins of modern, West European,
culture. The starting point for his analysis is to note that for ancient
philosophy "the doctrine that all human knowledge is oriented towards practice"
was at its core, and "it was Aristotle's view that the truths arrived at
through knowledge should direct practice in daily life as in the arts and
sciences" (Marcuse, 1972a, p.88). But while the practical character of
knowledge was fundamental, knowledge itself could be divided into different
forms. The forms could be seen as a hierarchy whose "nadir is functional
acquaintance with the necessities of everyday life and whose zenith is
philosophical knowledge" (Marcuse, 1972a, p.88). Philosophical knowledge
has no specific purpose outside itself, and within the hierarchy there is a
fundamental break between what is "necessary" and "useful", and what is
"beautiful". The highest forms of knowledge and pleasure being the preserve
of pure, purposeless theory has, Marcuse suggests, a basic theme lying within
it. For the world of necessity, of everyday life, is seen as being both in fact
and in essence inconstant, insecure and unfree. Thus for man to have as his
highest goal happiness in the world of real objects and goods would entail
his subjugation to fortune and contingency. Man cannot control this "material"
world, for example, he cannot generate enough goods, nor enough shelter from
the elements. Man's daily toil in providing these things is however obviously
vital for survival. But "ideal" truths ought to reside in more certain and
controlled circumstances than these. The higher strata of society, itself
reliant upon the productivity of the labours of the lower (e.g. in Antiquity
the labour of slaves) can hold these truths as its position is not threatened
by material disorder, as long as the material needs are provided by others.
Marcuse suggests a rather splendid circular side to this argument because at
times the higher order will justify its existence precisely because of its
own connection with higher truths. Aristotle's Idealism, Marcuse suggests,
is a philosophy where "a specific historical form of the division of labour
and of social stratification takes on the eternal, metaphysical form of the
relationship of necessity and beauty, of matter and idea" (Marcuse, 1972a, p.93).

The bourgeois epoch saw a decisive break with the ideas of the relationship between necessity and beauty, and labour and enjoyment. Previously "beauty" and "enjoyment" were separate from "labour" and "necessity" in the philosophy of the times. Marcuse also presumably means to imply that they were separate in the reality of the times, but we shall return to this point soon. In the bourgeois era "free competition" and the "market place" tend to emphasise an abstract conception of human powers. The abstraction also tends to apply to the realm of ideas. The market place of culture is seen as the arena for the jostling of ideas that can be universally applied. In principle man can participate equally in these values. The theory of antiquity justified the labouring of the many to allow a small number to devote themselves to enjoyment and truth. With the bourgeois era all should, at least in theory, be able to direct themselves to this. Now Marcuse acknowledges that there is a divorce here between, if you like, theory and practice. For he suggests that the reality is that the facts of the old order have "not changed" but "the good conscience has disappeared" (Marcuse, 1972a, p.93). There is no longer a theoretical rationale via one group maintaining "higher truths", but nonetheless one group does live off the material productivity of another. Now Marcuse is engaged here in a form of analysis which reflects some of the comments made earlier, and which will be a source of confusion throughout his writings. His justification of the identification of "the philosophy of the bourgeois age" is slim, his discussion of the social structure of that age equally slim. But while we might accept that something like a "market place" of ideas developed, and that one social group gains more from the bourgeois society than another can we fully accept the jump to the disappearance of the "good conscience"? Is this some notion of "false consciousness" or what? The problem is that Marcuse's own connections of "theory" and "reality" seems assumed rather than explored. However the general suggestion that the "higher culture" is meant to permeate all society in the bourgeois era as compared with being reserved for the higher strata in antiquity is built upon by Marcuse by the further suggestion that that culture can be conceptualised as signifying "the totality of social life in a given situation, insofar as both the areas of ideational reproduction (culture in the narrower sense, the "spiritual world") and of material reproduction ("civilisation") form a historically distinguishable and comprehensible unity" (Marcuse, 1972a, p.94). For Marcuse this "totality" view was true in Antiquity, and at the start of the bourgeois era. So the advances of the bourgeois era in "opening up", in theory, the "pursuit" of truth, beauty, equality etc. to all members of society initially referred to this culture. But he sees a later development

of bourgeois culture which he calls "affirmative culture", and which limits
the "pursuit" to the "spiritual world" only, and denies any connection with
the world of material reproduction. Not only that, but this new "culture"
also suggests that the spiritual world is a more important one. He suggests
therefore that there has been a specific variant of culture in the bourgeois
epoch, "which led in the course of its own development to the segregation
from civilisation of the mental and spiritual world as an independent realm
of value that is also considered superior to civilisation" (Marcuse, 1972a,
p.94). This specific form of culture is, in his terms "affirmative culture".
So the actions that could follow debates about "equality" etc. are legitimate
only in terms of the world of ideas. In effect "action" would mean only
further debate. There is therefore a sense in which the conflicts inherent
in analysis of, say, "inequality" can be resolved without reference to the
world of material reproduction. At an abstract level it is possible to
represent equality even if the concrete world is founded on inequality. In
this sense affirmative culture can both affirm and conceal the conditions
of social life. It affirms them by still holding the prospects of debate
etc. about inequality but conceals them by, as it were, limiting the debate's
impact to impact on ideas. There is not any impact on the actual social
structure, social conditions etc. The ideals of affirmative culture are, for
Marcuse, in principle progressive and liberating, but the practice does not
carry them out.

Marcuse's discussion of this is interesting and richly argued, and in the
course of summary full justice has not been done to his argument. It is open
to debate, in ways that were hinted at earlier, as to quite how he has
identified the components of this "culture" and perhaps in particular how he
has identified its "practice". These issues will be returned to, but for
the time being the contribution to a study of aspects of Western thought, to
an aspect of the legacy of the Enlightment, should really be acknowledged.
Marcuse goes on to discuss the development of "affirmative culture" under
fascism. For here he sees the changing nature of debates about ideas
themselves, debates which used to be addressed to what he terms "the soul"
as well as "the mind". Although bourgeois practice in his view sometimes
showed contempt for the mind (see Marcuse, 1972a, p.126), it was, he maintains,
nonetheless a basically rational one. The debates envisioned, for example,
an individual with a viewpoint that was not necessarily the same as the
State's. There was, if you like, an "inner" area of man which was not necessarily

represented in "outer" social collectivities like the State. This is an
idea which Marcuse will later refer to as a "tension" between the "private"
and the "public". But in fascist States this is denied, and the State claims
to represent all men, by representing some supra-individual grouping such as
"the folk", the "race", the "nation" etc. It does this via a deliberate
shift of emphasis in its image, and its actions in terms of addressing its
messages more to the "soul" and less to the "mind". Marches, speeches, all
the paraphenalia of fascism tend to be angled to, in effect, the emotions.
Marcuse sees this as the demise of critical rationalism. "An essential
difference between the soul and the mind is that the former is not orientated
toward critical knowledge of truth. The soul can understand what the mind
must condemn" (Marcuse, 1972a, p.112). Again Marcuse's argument about the
"soul" is a rich one, and he charts philosophy's struggle with this concept,
as compared with what he sees as a rather fine consideration in Renaissance
Literature. For Marcuse the concept is a vital and liberating one but it is
not at all progressive when used in fascist affirmative culture. But the
problem which will arise in later discussions is quite how Marcuse locates
this fascist variant of affirmative culture in terms of economic, social or
political development. The element which seems conspicuously missing from the
discussion about fascist culture is any real consideration of why "affirmative
culture" does not always turn into its fascist variant. Given the lack of a
detailed political analysis of the State it is also not easy to identify just
what features Marcuse really does identify as linking his fascist culture with
a fascist State. How much can it apply to the other States? Marcuse compounds
this problem by an earlier discussion which again sets up an interesting analysis
but offers little in the way of identifying the limits of such an analysis.
In "The Struggle against Liberalism in the Totalitarian view of the State"
(Marcuse, 1972p) published in 1934 Marcuse suggests that even the objections
of fascism to liberalism actually cloud the fact that liberalism may contain
the very seeds of fascism. Liberalism's political demands are rejected by
fascism. He quotes in this article "freedom of speech and of the press,
complete publicity of political life, the representative system and parliament-
arianism, the separation or balance of powers" (Marcuse, 1972p, p.9), as
examples of the areas that are now denied by fascism, but he also comments
that they have not been fully realised within capitalism. Liberalism for
Marcuse contains a rationalist and an irrationalist strand. The former he
is concerned to develop, and, it will be argued, is part of the society that

he would like to see in the future. The latter contains elements that can easily be converted, or be taken up by, fascism. It contains, for Marcuse, elements of the fascist affirmative culture variant, such as a naturalistic interpretation of society (e.g. "folk", "blood", "soul" as unifying concepts and so on) and in its reliance on private property as the foundation stone of liberalism it tends to emphasise an individual defence easily converted to·supra-individual notions (see Marcuse, 1972p, pp.11-19). But the argument is rather weak here, and quite how Marcuse can suggest, for example, that an emphasis on the "privacy of reason" (see Marcuse, 1972p, pp.17,18) can encourage the conjunction of the private and public, individual and State, that he sees in fascism is obscure. Marcuse never really establishes his case about liberalism's irrationalism, although he perhaps indicates some tendencies. His analysis of the elements of fascism itself does not really hinge on this however, and he goes on to discuss notions of "universality" and so on within the fascist State. But for Marcuse the generation of these notions not only relies upon a somewhat sketchy connection of liberalism and fascist affirmative culture, it also relies upon an economic change. "Liberalist rationalism already contains, pre-formed, those tendencies that later, with the change from industrial to monopoly capitalism, take on an irrationalist character" (Marcuse, 1972p, p.14). Marcuse does not give enough detail about the ways that this change affects the development of affirmative culture, nor indeed about exactly what composes such a change. In his analysis he discusses the details of fascist culture in an interesting way, providing good arguments for the suggestion that fascist culture provides change from the conceptions of 19th Century Liberalism, and, as he says, in fascism, "It is not the state that is responsible to man but man that is responsible to the state; he is delivered over to it" (Marcuse, 1972p, p.36). But despite his aim he again never really links fascism as culture to fascism as a State, nor does he provide convincing evidence of the "irrationalist" trend he suggests exists in liberalism.

So Marcuse provides an interesting analysis of culture, but fails to establish its full links with a social setting. There is here an early possibility that his ideas can "drift", and the prospect that all culture in the West is not merely "affirmative" but in effect the fascist variant of this. There are not enough limits in Marcuse's analysis to stop this, and the "free-floating" concept will be seen again throughout his studies. Some of the problems of concepts like One-Dimensional culture (Marcuse, 1968d) can be seen in the difficulties contained in these early studies on fascism. Within

these studies there is also the continuing debate for Marcuse about the nature of the liberal values that he identifies in some aspects of Western thought. In many ways Marcuse suggests that these values in modern society are a "sham" and his analysis is concerned to resurrect them, perhaps to see his own version of them as the true heir of an earlier liberal tradition. But how those values are to be developed and the society which espouses them changed to conform with them is Marcuse's continuing task for analysis. One basis of that task is an idea of reason developed in philosophy, which Marcuse aims to use as a "critical tribunal" in judgement on the world (Marcuse, 1972n, p.136). He develops this in various ways, including a major publication in English, the study of Hegel and the rise of social theory called "Reason and Revolution" (Marcuse, 1955). He plainly intended to address an American audience in this study (see Marcuse, 195 , pp.vii-viii) which is a break from his earlier publications. He also intends to re-evaluate Hegel in the light of the rise of Nazism (and in the light of the criticism that Hegel's philosophy is the part of the philosophy of Nazism). His concern with the socio-historical setting of an analysis relates not only to the past formation but also to the current use. The re-evaluation is a powerful analysis, and it will feature importantly in the next stage of the discussion, preceded by a brief summary of the themes that have been outlined as part of the background setting.

A philosophical critique?

Marcuse has suggested that a tradition of Western philosophy from Antiquity
to the bourgeois era has represented a "flowering" of man's thought. This
process of the generation of ideas, and improvements in man's life, underwent
a decisive transformation in the bourgeois era. The development of "ideals"
and the "use" of them in life moved from being the preserve of one group to
potentially available to all. The economic fact that one group nonetheless
depended on the labour of another did not change. For Marcuse, then,
philosophy has an absolutely central place in man's history and existence.
It is certainly to be located within its time, to be understood in its socio-
historical and philosophical (in the sense of past philosophy and the "fellow"
philosophies of the period) setting. But for Marcuse it nonetheless rises
above any specific historical conditions in the sense that "rationality of
thought" can be separate from the non-rationality of social existence (see
Marcuse, 1972n, pp.147-149). By this Marcuse presumably means that men can
discuss and formulate moral and ethical plans, for example, even in situations
where "morality" may be based upon, say, crude strength of arms. But also
Marcuse has indicated that the exigencies of nature in the ancient world
tended to defeat the overall use of rationality; in the sense presumably
that elements of predictability and stability (at least avoiding say total
starvation after a harvest failure, or total lack of shelter after a storm)
are required for consistent application of, say, rules of conduct. It would
be helpful if Marcuse could have expanded on this more. Some principle of
control of production and disaster would presumably be useful adjuncts of
social frameworks developed according to "reason" not "fate" but it is
possible to see a wide variety of links here. Does Marcuse imply that man's
"reason" cannot cope with the buffetings of "fate"? The details of this
problem will recur, for Marcuse seems to be hinting that if nature was fully
controlled by man then that would allow the full development of reason;
but the full development of reason is necessary for this control. Marcuse
is involved in this issue throughout his writings, he is concerned at this
stage with ambiguous broad-brush descriptions of the problem, and later with
for example, the specific impact of technology. He will also explore ideas
of man living "in harmony" with nature, and how "control" of it may be
undesirable in various ways. In a sense Marcuse is exploring the boundaries
of the control of nature, the acceptable, and necessary, limits of it. It
is a continuing theme with its origins in this early study. But he certainly
sees the bourgeois age as offering the potential for enough control over

nature, enough production of food and so that the justification for "ideals" and their "application" to one social group no longer exists in material scarcity, or the problems of shelter. However rather than this "application" of the "ideals" spreading throughout the various aspects of society (labour, political structures, the beauty of objects, i.e. the entire social and material fabric), they have come to be seen as, if you like, "only" ideals. That is they have come to be "talked about" and not "acted upon". Now it has already been noted that the connection of Marcuse's "affirmative culture" to the actual social setting is slim. The point is that it is difficult to judge just what Marcuse would count as an "ideal" having been acted upon; what would the ideals look like in action, how do we know that this separation has occurred? For the time being we will not pursue this question, although it will feature prominently when we later examine Marcuse's views of the ways that other theorists describe or analyse society. But obviously Marcuse will want to develop the "ideals" that he suggests are contained in philosophy, as well as avoiding what he sees as the error of affirmative culture. That is to say he will want to develop concepts contained in philosophy, but somehow they must be "acted upon" not just "talked about". Marcuse describes this as something like preserving the materialist concerns of idealist concepts (see for example, Marcuse, 1972m, p.162). It may be unfair to ask what a non-materialist concerned idealist concept is, as the general idea of Marcuse's seems a bit clearer than this, at least if we carefully study his ideas about affirmative culture. But it is difficult to know what Marcuse really has in mind, and in many ways the discussion throughout this study will focus around this issue, attempting where possible to give examples of just what Marcuse's notions of "materialist concerns of idealist concepts" might involve.

Throughout this brief summary the word "philosophy" has been used in rather cavalier fasion. Marcuse himself tends to do this when he actually means a "certain tradition in philosophy". But he also means this tradition "interpreted in a certain way", and it is a way that will lead us back to the questions noted above. It will be recalled that Marcuse is attempting to set up a concept of "reason", or conceptualisations based upon this, as a "critical tribunal" in judgement on the world, for "Reason is the fundamental category of philosophical thought, the only one by means of which it has bound itself to human destiny" (Marcuse, 1972n, p.115). Marcuse, then, is concerned with a tradition he wants to identify as "idealist" and "rationalist" (i.e.the flowering of man's thought, rising above social conditions and so on).

A brief list by him of the "idealist-rationalist" tradition in terms of the
"freedom" (in the sense of use of reason) attained by "Descartes' ego cogito,
Leibniz's monad, Kant's transcendental ego, Fichte's subject of original
activity, and Hegel's world-spirit" leads him to conclude that this is "not
the freedom of pleasurable possession with which the Aristotelian God moved
in his own happiness. It is rather the freedom of interminable, arduous
labor" (Marcuse, 1972n, p.139). Hegel represents for Marcuse the most
mature stage of this "idealist-rationalist" process, but his analysis is
"static" and presumably Marcuse means not acted upon. But crucially it is
static at least partially because of the failure to develop "labour" as a
crucial concept. For Marcuse a tradition of philosophy (basically a variety
of German Idealism) culminating in Hegel needs to be analysed for its
conception of "reason" and other conceptualisations that flow from this,
but also needs to be re-read with an eye to the nature of labour. It might
well be argued that the "idealist-rationalist" tradition could represent no
more than bourgeois philosophy, and be an odd choice for Marcuse's search for
a critical theory of bourgeois society. Marcuse disarmingly argues that it
is indeed "bourgeois philosophy", but that in its idealist conception of
reason it rises above this, presumably in the sense sketched out earlier of
rationality in non-rational situations, and also in the sense of Marcuse's
base view of affirmative culture (see Marcuse,1972n, pp.139-141). Marcuse's
task is to extend this "idealism" to the "material conditions of existence",
and this is possible now precisely because of the growth in material prosperity
(see Marcuse, 1972n, pp.141-144). The arguments about the use and nature
of the theories Marcuse turns to so often come back to his basic idea of
the development of affirmative culture. Although a number of aspects of
that idea are open to debate it really should be noted that Marcuse's view
of the "tradition of philosophy" is one that really needs some justification
and which receives very little. As MacIntyre rightly notes Marcuse is
highly selective in his "tradition" (see MacIntyre, 1970, pp.18-19), and by
the kind of sweeping discussion noted earlier ("the philosophy of Kant", etc.),
he is also able to suggest a degree of homogeneity in philosophy which he
needs to justify not merely state. Finally it does seem ambiguous within
the general account that Marcuse gives just how much he is suggesting that,
at least within "idealism", man is inexorably improving and developing. If
so is there a goal or end for this process? Elsewhere Marcuse argues against
what he terms views of "inexorable laws" (see Marcuse, 1972h), but these
are the laws of the development of society not of the mind. Marcuse's
suggestions about the development of reason do look inexorable at least in

part, and when that reason is seen as undergoing massive defeat (as in
fascism) it is not surprising that Marcuse moves to look at inner mental
reasons for that process. Marcuse assumes too much about this process as
he does about the view of philosophy he adopts in general. But given these
important provisos it is now in order to turn to Marcuse's views of the
development of "idealist-rationalism" and his attempts to provide an emphasis
on "materialist concerns".

Marcuse published "Reason and Revolution" (Marcuse, 1955) during World War II.
The focus on reason, the analysis of German Idealism, the links with Marx
and other factors were all aspects of the "keeping alive" of a segment of
German culture that was important for Marcuse. Hegel was to be "rescued"
from associations with Nazism, a tradition of philosophy was to be given a
critical edge, Marxian ideas were to be reviewed; all in all this is a major
and important study. He begins the study by sketching in the socio-historical
setting for Hegel. He outlines the state of the decaying German Reich, and
the impact of the French Revolution and the responses to it. There was, he
suggests, a philosophical setting to be borne in mind as well, which could be
regarded as consisting of the tasks needed to rescue philosophy from the
attacks of British empiricism. The development of "freedom" in the social
world and "reason" in the philosophical one are two poles of this discussion.
For Marcuse "reason" is the key concept in the philosophical process, and
it can be seen as primary to the development of "freedom" in the social one.
Reason is also, "The core of Hegel's philosophy" which is indeed "a structure
the concepts of which - freedom, subject, mind, notion - are derived from
the idea of reason" (Marcuse, 1955, p.5). Hegel's work is a development of
a line of philosophy which, as noted, is given very little detail. Kant
figures briefly in a discussion of cultural idealism and a defence against
British empiricism (Locke also figures briefly). But although other
philosophers do appear, here and elsewhere in the book, it has to be taken
relatively at face value that "Hegel's system is the last great expression
of this cultural idealism, the last great attempt to render thought a
refuge for reason and liberty" (Marcuse, 1955, p.15). The philosophy of
Hegel provides an example of the development of intellectual thought based
upon "the individual", and challenging "custom". As suggested earlier,
Marcuse sees in Hegel an apotheosis of one aspect of the early liberating
tendencies of affirmative culture. But Marcuse also notes, Hegel's emphasis
on analysing the world as in a state of becoming (Marcuse, 1955, p.40). The
method of the dialectic was, then, used to systematise all aspects of knowledge

and experience and weld them into an exclusive whole. Truth can now be
seen to lie in the end state of a process of change, a process which
culminates in a given condition attaining all its objective possibilities.
The final culmination of philosophy will be when the world of facts becomes
truth, and is in accord with reason, and it will signal the end of philosophy
as such (Marcuse, 1955, p.27). As long as this state is not reached, reason
can take refuge in the mind. Its power need not be in any sense subdued.
But liberty and freedom must find a refuge here too, at least in its ultimate
manifestation, for freedom develops as a concept in different ways at
different historical times. Hegel did not use freedom in the sense of some
property possessed by all men as Kant did, nor as indicating some specific
style of social life (in perhaps the sense of J.S. Mill). Rather what
freedom is in each time and place is defined by the specific limitations of
that time and place, and by the goals that characterised it. Quite different
claims by different peoples at different times can all be claims to freedom
in the Hegelian sense.

So Marcuse is not only reading Hegel to find the details of the developed
"philosophy", he wants to see enacted, but is also suggesting that his view
of social development has been demonstrated by the work of Hegel. Hegel can
both start to sketch out "reason" as part of the philosophical tradition,
but also is forced to suggest that that "reason" only applies to the mind.
At best this is ambiguous and at worst plain confusing. MacIntyre suggests
that Marcuse tends to, "read the history of culture through lenses provided
by his own version of the history of philosophy" (MacIntyre, 1970, p.19),
which is a fair point, but he also engages in the very reverse. The problem
is, of course, the failure to spell out the detail of either. Marcuse's
conception of Hegel emphasises then a classical conception of reason, and a
somewhat ambiguous one of freedom seen as interconnected with man's power
of free thought. Presumably if this is not "controlled" by society (in the
sense that affirmative culture limits thought to impact on thought?) then
man, at least at root, is free. It is difficult to know what Marcuse really
means by this, although ideas about man's "internal freedom" will be discussed
later in some detail. In many ways Marcuse emphasises "positive freedom"
(in Berlin's sense - see Berlin, 1967). He is engaged in a quest to justify
"reason" or an interpretation of it in philosophy as the source of control
that can determine what someone should be. But he also seems involved with
Berlin's negative freedom, in the sense that he wants to examine what is
the area in which the person should be left to do or be what he is able to
do or be without interference by others. For example in a later discussion

on ethics, he suggests a notion of freedom that he seems to approve of,
whereby "the essential condition of man is that he be sufficiently free
from external domination to become free for self-responsible action and
behaviour" (Marcuse, 1958, p.198). However the meaning of "domination"
in Marcuse will itself become a subject of discussion so this is really
running ahead of the argument. Marcuse's notion of freedom is, at best,
ambiguous, and in part this relates back to the confusion over the
relation between ideas and actions. Freedom in ideas or in actions or
both? Marcuse notes that Hegel attempted to address his own analysis to
action (in the sense of his writings which give "a series of political
fragments that attempt to apply his new philosophical ideas to concrete
historical situations" (Marcuse, 1955, p.29). But these attempts change,
accompanied by major historical change, after the publication of the
"Phenomenology of Mind" in 1807. This will be returned to, but this is
a suitable point to examine further Marcuse's views on the use of the
"ideal" in action. Hegel's "political fragments" are part of this, but
Marcuse also expands on this via discussions of hedonism and authority.

In an article published in 1938 ("On Hedonism", Marcuse, 1972m) he looks at
the inter-connection of reason and hedonism in philosophy. He suggests that
in ancient philosophy there was a contra-distinction between happiness and
reason, so that the gratification of needs came to be seen as an arbitrary
and subjective element. The two trends of hedonism that he identifies, the
Cyraniac and the Epicurean are both found wanting. The former is too
constrained by the prevailing social conditions; it was if you like a product
of the times. The latter, although attempting to move beyond current wants,
cannot be fully liberating as its basis is reason, and this means that it
can be restricted at present to the ideal, not the material. What seems of
particular interest here for Marcuse's analysis is not really the ideal-
material debate in terms of philosophy-practice, or some similar formulation,
but the values implied in the approach. Marcuse stresses an ethical position
based upon an affirmation of the importance incorporating questions about
human pain and joy in any analysis. He is in effect stating that these should
be components of any consideration of the current or future state of affairs.
For example, he spends some time in his discussion on Hegel and Marx in
Reason and Revolution suggesting that Hegel's apparent resignation to the
fact that happiness might not increase was not the position of Marx (see
Marcuse, 1955, pp.293-295). Although Marcuse clearly accepts along with
Hegel that suffering and pain are inherent in life (as will be shown later),
he wishes to tilt the balance, and indeed to emphasise that in some early

Marxian formulations there is an exploration of happiness. If society
could be changed according to these formulations then the more sensual
components of this would emerge, and he suggests that "hedonism is both
abolished and preserved in critical theory and practice" (Marcuse, 1972m,
p.199). The emphasis on the sensual aspects of hedonism, and the suggestion
that in effect new "needs and wants" will emerge in a new society both
pre-figure Marcuse's later moves towards psychological issues, and an
interest in Freud. Marcuse is at pains to emphasise throughout these early
analyses the centrality of "the individual" as an actor in social, political
and psychological dimensions. The analysis of fascism which was discussed
earlier had suggested an increasingly cohesive State. Marcuse has emphasised
that man is given over to the State, and the individual is expected to
conform in all aspects of his life to State directions, or images. As
mentioned before there is a tendency for Marcuse to apply this to all
"monopoly capital" countries (and he will also apply an analysis like this
to Soviet Russia). "Philosophy", seen in his way, contains and upholds an
important concept of the "individual", and ideas derived from times when
that concept was more notably true in social practice. Freedom and this
"individual" is a theme that Marcuse develops in a theoretical essay on the
development of the family published in 1936 (Marcuse, 1972q). In keeping
with the emphasis that has been noted he looks at certain key philosophies
to chart the development of the idea of freedom, which he inter-connects with
the idea of authority. He follows this development through to philosophers
he associates with the fascist state. He begins with an examination of
Luther and Calvin, for Luther he suggests first brought together the elements
of a specifically bourgeois concept of freedom and separated the authority
of "the office" and that of "the person". But this radical break with the
old passing order was tempered by Calvin, who suggests that "the right to
resist in the face of worldly authorities is in principle limited from the
start" (Marcuse, 1972q, p.69). He obviously regrets this seeing the Lutheran
advance as one of the cornerstones of his concept of individualistic freedom,
but the encroachment on it (or rather the idea that sometimes this cannot be
fought) as a retrograde step. Again Marcuse's notion of freedom is a complex
one about internal and external "right of development". Freedom of thought,
and freedom of liberty both involve internal and external impediments for
him. He develops a theme around freedom looking first at Kant, and then
Hegel. The progression from one to the other is seen as unproblematically
smooth (see Marcuse, 1972q, p.97), but Hegel's stress on "the negative", and
capacity to present a "dynamic" picture of society are changes of great

importance. With these changes Marcuse suggests that German Idealism has
broken through "into the dimension in which the social existence of man is
built up as an authoritative order of domination" (Marcuse, 1972q, p.110).
In effect the rule of individual reason within philosophy has been confirmed
for Marcuse, and the challenge within philosophy to existing ideas has been
strengthened. Exactly how it breaks into the "social existence" is the continuing
problem. However Marcuse now sees a decisive break in bourgeois philosophy,
and he turns to look at the counter-revolution and restoration as personified
in the writings of Burke and Stahl. The counter-revolution, which was
initially against the bourgeoisie, is seen as part of the growth of irrationalism.
The accompanying stress on the continuity and stability of the family, which
the Restoration continues, is finally incorporated (with the irrationalist
tendencies) into the bourgeois state itself. But before looking at this
development, Marcuse notes the alternative offered by Marx. He suggests that
this alternative is capable of moving beyond historical limitations, and
outlining a version of a higher form of freedom (and therefore a reduction in
the distortion of family relationships), for "Marx's work is not a description
of social conditions, but the theory of tendencies of social development"
(Marcuse, 1972q, p.140). As usual there seems a complex mix of ideas behind
this statement, with Marcuse again arguing from a mixed position of a view of
the history of philosophy (Marx as development of rationality and so on), and
a view of the history of culture (Marx as a system of ideas not applied in
social reality and critical of the existing state of affairs). For example,
Marcuse goes on to suggest that the growth of the fascist state has sidestepped
this alternative, and, pre-figured by the work of Sorel and Pareto, it has
politicised theory, and made authority as such its central feature. It is
possible to see in this the notion of the fascist "fusion" of individual and
State, and of the lack of a connection with ideas about authority as part of
freedom; in effect Marcuse argues that fascism emphasises authority solely
for authority's sake, or rather only underlying rationale is the maintenance
of the State. But how does Marx stand outside this development, what are the
criteria for "ideological precursors" (e.g. Sorel and Pareto) and movement
beyond historical limitations (e.g. Marx)? It would seem, in part, to rest
upon the use made, as Marcuse sees it, of the philosophy he discusses. Thus
he suggests in his essay on "Philosophy and Critical Theory" (Marcuse, 1972n)
published in 1937, that an ideology is "neither a sociological nor a
philosophical but rather a political concept" and Marcuse wants critical theory
to consider "a doctrine in relation not to the social conditions of its
truth or to an absolute truth but rather to the interests of transformation"

(Marcuse, 1972n, p.140). The identification of Marx's work as less "socially located" than say, Sorel, rests upon it being critical of the status quo, and not applied by the current political structure; this kind of argument is of course bound to emphasise idealism, for it is in the ideal nature, both in the sense of holding up a critical ideal and not being currently "socially true" that the non-ideological nature of some philosophy lies. Idealism is not tied to its social setting, is not an ideology, is not part of the state's political framework precisely because it is idealism. When this is allied with Marcuse's stress on the development of "reason" and the "individual", the "idealist-rationalist" emphasis emerges. So, to put it crudely, Marcuse wants to see "applied" an analysis that he sees as progressive because of its connection with certain basic concepts, some of them rooted in the Enlightenment; he also sees it as progressive precisely because it is not "applied" now. But to state this implies exploring the connection between social reality and thought which he has made remarkably complex. Some analyses link with some social conditions at some times. When we come to consider his later critique of industrial civilisation some ideas will be put forward which might clear at least a little of the complexity of this. But it is now necessary to return to the discussion of Hegel and Marx to explore the issue further within that.

It will be recalled that Marcuse was suggesting a major change in Hegel's work after the publication of the "Phenomenology of the Mind" in 1807. It is a change which is more a change in the dialectic, rather than a change in the system. Where previously the dialectic was orientated toward the process of history, it is now, Marcuse suggests, orientated toward the end product of this process (Marcuse, 1955, p.92). But the basis of this change lies in the truly radical nature of the consequences of Hegel's own work, and his drawing back from the implications of the radical action that would be necessary to fulfil it. The radical consequences lie in the analysis of reason and freedom that has been outlined with its stress on the potential development of man. The abstration that this involves is based on the notion of the abstration being "truer" or in Hegel's terms, of the facts being brought to reason. Marcuse would seem to be hinting at an agreement with some notion of absolute truth here, despite his denials of it, but the issue as Marcuse sees it is that Hegel's analysis has now actually changed its character. In changing its character, in the shift in the dialectic, it has now come to be more closely allied with the status quo. In essence the previously "non-applied"

has now come to be applied. Marcuse's complex sense of this seems to mean
both that Hegel no longer stresses an alternative set of affairs to the
present, and that the analysis is, if you like, available for use as an
ideology because of this change. Marcuse sees the essence of Hegel's
"Philosophy of the Right" in 1821 as aiding man's reconciliation to the
current arrangement of affairs. The "present" is now seen as able to realise
reason for the citizens of the State, and Marcuse seems to see strong links
now between Hegel and the Prussian State of the early Nineteenth Century.
The philosophy of Hegel, which presaged so much, has now become the philosophy
of the ascendent bourgeoisie, who are remaking feudal Germany. "The 'Philosophy
of Right' is the philosophy of middle class society come to self-consciousness"
(Marcuse, 1955, p.183) suggests Marcuse. The equation of freedom with the
submission to necessity is directly related to the social and political change
of the period and Hegel's partial adaption to them but Marcuse comments that
it is still an analysis based on rationality. This is therefore quite distinct
from Marcuse's view of the later Nazi basis in irrationality, and indeed
"Hegel's philosophy was an integral part of the culture which authoritarianism
had to overcome" (Marcuse, 1955, p.411). Nazi philosophers are quite clear
on this in their work too, as Marcuse notes in some detail (Marcuse, 1955,
pp.409-428). Via, as Marcuse sees it, a change in method Hegel's analysis
shifted to become more linked to its social setting, but in its stress on
rationality it was still opposed to the ideas of Nazism. This is a relatively
unusual emphasis on method for Marcuse who rarely discusses such issues. Even
in this discussion it looks less as if he is really concerned with "method"
as such and more with the fact that Hegel had, in his view, ceased to be
critical of the existing social arrangements. Indeed the reason he sees
Hegel's arguments as being relatively badly defended against charges of
paralleling Nazi ideas is that Hegel had failed to provide a systematic study
of ethics (see Marcuse, 1955, -.200). Marcuse himself is weak in terms of
a systematic study of this as well, although his own ethical standpoint is
of importance to the critical component of his analysis as will be shown.

When Marcuse comes to discuss the connection between Hegel and Marx there is
not much emphasis on the methodological link, but rather on a conceptual one.
Marcuse, of course, lays some stress on the early Marx although he carefully
says these are only "preliminary stages to his mature theory" (Marcuse, 1955,
p.295). Marcuse also suggests that the dynamic, change-oriented character
of the early Hegel is important, where negativity is constituent of being and

furthermore "The negativity everything possesses is the necessary prelude to its reality. It is a state of privation that forces the subject to seek remedy. As such it has a positive character" (Marcuse, 1955, p.66). Indeed it is "impossible to identify anything with the state in which it actually exists" (Marcuse, 1955, p.68). It is worth noting in passing how much Marcuse has changed from his earlier analysis of Hegel that fails to emphasise these factors. For Marcuse then Marxian social theory can be seen as formulated out of an embryo radical core within Hegel. The elements of this core also concern the attempts that Marcuse suggests are evident in Hegel's philosophy to show the resolution of the negative strains via an analysis of property and the family. In his work between 1802-1806 Hegel not only outlines the format of the individualistic society, but also Marcuse suggests, shows how the concept of labour is crucial to the analysis of society. Labour is, of its very nature, a universalistic activity whose product is exchangeable among all individuals. In Hegel's Jenenser system, of this period, the description that he gives of labour is in terms, according to Marcuse, "that clearly foreshadow Marx's critical approach" (Marcuse, 1955, p.28). In the same passage Marcuse suggests that Hegel's emphasis is also on complete subordination of the individual to abstract labour, and exchange relationships. Marcuse quotes from the end of 'Jenenser Realphilosophie' and notes the similarity of the tone to Marx's 'Capital', as well as noting that Hegel's manuscript breaks off abruptly "as if he was terrified by what his analysis of the commodity-producing society had disclosed" (Marcuse, 1955, p.79). Now Marcuse of course goes on to suggest that Hegel's work of the later period had too much of an affinity with the development of existing social affiars; he is critical of the later period which is, he suggests, marked by confusion "of the ideas by which modern society glorified its rise for the reality of this society" (Marcuse, 1955, p.246). This period follows a social transition which "traces a decisive trend in modern society, that in which freedom is internalised" (Marcuse, 1955, p.199), a notion which we have discussed before, for it is a variant of affirmative culture again. In terms of theory it is itself followed by, what Marcuse terms, the rise of social theory. It is to this that we shall now turn.

Marcuse suggests that the history of true Hegelianism becomes the history of a struggle against Hegel. Such splendid formulations do tend, of course, to avert the attention from the exact nature of the "true" Hegelianism (or more to the point how we know it to be true). In many ways Marcuse could be more blunt, for really he is suggesting that Hegel's work had brought to a

close an epoch of modern philosophy. This foundation of philosophy was then
built upon to generate a dialectical theory of society. But, Marcuse notes,
it was built upon in a particular way. For Marx took as a baseline the
notion that Hegel's theory was the most complete expression of the German
bourgeoisie position, but the existence of the proleteriat showed "that truth
has not been realised. History and social reality themselves thus "negate"
philosophy" (Marcuse, 1955, p.261). The proletariat show that current social
reality cannot be connected with the process of reason; in so far as property
constitutes the first endowment of a free person the propertyless proletariat
is not free, and in so far as the exercises of the absolute mind, art, religion
and philosophy constitute man's essence the proletariat is severed from its
essence (see Marcuse, 1955 pp.260-261). Hegel's own formulations have in
Marcuse's eyes demonstrated that the proletariat stands as an indication
that rationality has not ordered present affairs. The rationality, for Marcuse,
now exists in the theory and not the practice, and Hegel's previous critical
role has been taken on by Marx (see Marcuse, 1955, p.258). With labour seen
as a central concept for Hegel, Marcuse finds the continuation via Marx
relatively straightforward. Marcuse suggests that Marx lays great store on
the role of labour as man's self-fulfillment. Marcuse comments that Marx's
views may well mean major changes in labour in future society, and the
discussion about the "abolition" of labour seems particularly appealing to
Marcuse, for he says "These amazing formulations in Marx's earlist writings
all contain the Hegelian term Aufhebung, so that abolition also carries the
meaning that a content is restored to its true form. Marx, however, envisioned
the future mode of labour to be so different from the prevailing one that
he hesitated to use the same term 'labour' to designate alike the material
process of capitalist and comunist society" (Marcuse, 1955, p.293). This
major change is to be brought about by the actions of a proletariat engaged
in self-denying labour; but Marcuse tends to talk in terms of their total
negativity having a universal nature and suspicions of the relentless "progress
of reason" arise again. Does Marcuse see a force through history tending
always to "develop" man's "reason"? There are often grounds for thinking
that he does but he draws back from any direct suggestion, commenting that
"there can be no blind necessity in tendencies that terminate in a free and
self-conscious society (Marcuse, 1955, p.318).

Marcuse's analysis, then, points towards the "inevitable" development of
"reason", but also argues against it, it moves between the "real" and the
"ideal" at different times in different ways with different details and
different emphasis and so on. It is not surprising that in a review of

"Reason and Revolution", and later work, the Times Literary Supplement referred to Marcuse as a "dialectical escapologist" (T.L.S., 1971, p.25). Certainly it could be argued that the "rational" activity of man "develops" rather than just "changes". Men criticise their activities, and engage in activities that comment on activities; activity is not always just "movement", but can be seen, and is often thought of as, "progress". Marcuse, as we have seen expands on this theme, and plays with these sort of ideas delightfully. But his rather dazzling performance leaves the reader with multiple questions about how he reached the conclusions he did, and sometimes just what those conclusions involve. What is the sense of "development" of "reason" that he is discussing, how is it shown in actions, in history, what are its links with philosophy, with German Idealism, and so on? Marcuse dances around these and other issues with great agility, with the interconnection of "reason", "philosophy" and "social setting" taking many forms. But very often it looks more like an interesting series of suggestions rather than detailed study. For a theorist who has hopes of his theory having an impact beyond just theory (see for example, Marcuse, 1972a, pp.149-150), and who suggests that his theory should be "critical of itself and of the social forces that make up its own basis" (Marcuse, 1972n, p.156), this is something of a problem. For example the very objections that have been raised within the Marxian tradition to the development of Hegel's work by the Young Hegelians look applicable to Marcuse. How much has Marcuse's analysis moved "beyond" idealism, is it really connected with "social forces"? Certainly Marcuse does seem open to the criticism advanced by MacIntyre, that he talks too much in terms of difficult to define abstractions (see MacIntyre, 1970, pp.23-36). He tends as it were to talk of "man" rather than actual men, and in emphasising this within Hegel's work he fails to be clear about the nature of the claims he has made. Abstractions are, of course, a fruitful aspect of human enquiry, but what can be justified by them needs more consideration than Marcuse gives. MacIntyre notes that the "abstract" tendency seems to avoid any empirical aspects within Hegel's work, and can in effect be seen as accepting the same view of the actual world as the late Hegel (see MacIntyre, 1970, p.33). The comments about abstractions are fair ones, and Marcuse does need to provide more details of the status of the claims he derives from them. But of course Marcuse would argue that the "acceptance" of the Hegelian world was important for him because of his views about the development of affirmative culture and so on. This, and the problems inherent within it, seems an ever-present issue with Marcuse. Also of importance is the fact that Marcuse tends to accept Hegel's view of

Hegel, at least in terms of being the culmination of philosophy. Of course
in engaging in this entire process Marcuse seems to be doing a sort of
"Marx in reverse" as Anderson has noted (see Anderson, 1976, p.52). Marcuse
is returning to Hegelian notions and re-emphasising metaphysical elements.
The end product of this process is perhaps not quite what Marcuse seems to
have had in mind as the project he (and the Institute) were engaged in.
Commenting in 1957, he wrote, "The Institute had set itself the task of
elaborating a theoretical conception which was capable of comprehending the
economic, political and cultural institutions of modern society as a specific
historical structure from which the prospective trends of development could
be derived. This undertaking was based on certain notions common to all
members of the staff, notably that a theory of history was the prerequisite
for an adequate understanding of social phenomenon and that such a theory
would provide the standards for an objective critique of given social
institutions which would measure their function and their aims against the
historic potentialities of human freedom" (Marcuse, 1957, p.viii). In fact
Marcuse could be said to be missing the very emphasis he wants to give on
"a theory of history" by the process he engages in. Cohen, for example, has
suggested that the basis of Marx's own use of Hegel was to retain the structure
of Hegel's view but not its content (see Cohen, G.A., 1978, pp.1-27). Marcuse,
of course, while putting emphasis on the structure, also puts emphasis on
the content of Hegel's work. Cohen's ideas demonstrate how it is possible
to see a transposition of Marxian content for Hegelian content. Thus Hegel's
structure could be seen as a view of history as the history of a "moving
force" undergoing growth in some "aspect", stimulated by and shown in a culture
which perishes when it has stimulated more growth than it can contain. Hegel's
content could be seen as the world spirit (and derivately human consciousness)
as the "moving force", and self-knowledge as the "aspect". Now, granted this
is a drastic simplification of the argument, there is a change in the content
with the developments of Marx. Marx's content could be seen as the substituting
of human industry for spirit (and therefore the "moving force"), productive
power for self-knowledge (and therefore the "aspect") and rather than seeing
a culture as being outgrown be suggested it was an economic structure. Put
like this it is possible to see how Marcuse is in danger of confusing the
Hegelian and Marxian concepts without due regard to the consequences of his
confusion. Human industry features strongly as content, but is re-read into
the original Hegel with a strong emphasis that limits the understanding given
of the development by Marx. At the same time culture features strongly, and
economic structure rather weakly. The end product of this does seem to be a

view which incorporates some of the strengths of the analysis offered by
Hegel and Marx, but which fails to relate clearly to the changes from one
to the other, and perhaps most importantly does not really analyse the
objections within Marx to some Hegelian formulations. Cohen puts the
development and objections succinctly when he notes that for a study of
societal history, "Marx offers not only a reading but also the beginnings
of something more vigorous. The concepts of productive power and economic
structure (unlike those of consciousness and culture) do not serve only to
express a vision. They also assert their candidacy as the leading concepts
in a theory of history, a theory to the extent that history admits of theoretical
treatment which is neither entirely nor not at all" (Cohen, G.A., 1978, p.27).
Marcuse has engaged, it seems, in a process which offers rather more "vision"
than he suggests himself. He has not developed the "theory of history" as
much as he claims, and as our discussion progresses it will be seen that the
"vision", in the sense of, say, imaginative insights, occupies an increasingly
prominent place in his work. His development of this is, of course, in the
face of the social conditions that have been noted, but also in the face of
the developments of Marxist theory itself. He was to describe later, for
example, Soviet Marxism as a petrified Marxism and as something like an
apology for the State (see Marcuse, 1958). No doubt these elements concerned
him in the 1930's and 1940's as well given the Institute's non-consideration
of a move to Soviet Russia as an option (see Jay, 1973, p.38), and his
knowledge of European political movements of the era. Indeed Marcuse has
never lost the idea that theory must be constantly enriched and changed,
arguing, for example, that by the late 1970's the Western New Left had made
"a fetish out of Marxist theory, treating the Marxian concepts as reified,
objectified categories" (Marcuse, 1978, p.169). Finally Marcuse's work has
developed, in terms of a "theory-practice" link, relatively divorced from the
"social forces" that he noted earlier as a component of his analysis. Certainly
in his early setting he was part of a movement within Marxism that developed
from World War I "via an unending detour from any revolutionary practice"
as Anderson has put it (Anderson, 1976, p.42). Given the socialist set-backs
and fascist gains of this period it is not surprising that Marcuse would claim
that although theory accompanies practice "at every moment, analysing the
changing situation and formalising its concepts accordingly". He adds that
"the concrete conditions for realising the truth may vary, but the truth
remains the same and theory remains its ultimate guardian. Theory will
preserve the truth even if revolutionary practice deviates from its proper path.

Practice follows the truth not vice versa" (Marcuse, 1955, p.322). There is
no reason to excuse Marcuse's confusions about the nature and status of
concepts, or of the "truth", but his attempts to create a "vision" in the
Western world of the late 1930's must command some respect. The further
details of why the essence of this "vision" is, in Marcuse's terms,
"critical", will form the next stage of the discussion.

A description of social conditions?

There is a final element to Marcuse's early works which itself forms a
linking section with his later ones. This involves returning to
Marcuse's comment of approval about Marx, whose work was more than
"a descriptionof social conditions" (Marcuse, 1972g, p.140). The ground-
work for Marcuse's own later discussion of "social conditions", in his
critique of industrial civilisation, can be seen in some of the ways
that Marcuse has enlarged upon this comment. An attempt will therefore
be made both to highlight issues concerned with the comment as they
feature in Marcuse's overall analysis, and to make references to themes
which will only receive detailed discussion later.

The second part of Marcuse's study of Hegel and the rise of social
theory (Marcuse, 1955, pp. 328-389) he entitles 'the foundations of
positivism and the rise of sociology". He starts the discussion by
looking at the system of positive philosophy which grew in the decade
after Hegel's death and in particular the work of Schelling. He
suggests that this system was the basis of Comte's positivism, which
itself was the origin of sociology. Marcuse sees this positive
philosophy as a conscious reaction against the critical tendencies of
French and German rationalism. Despite the non-scientific, metaphysical
nature of much of Schelling's work, it is this work that Marcuse
suggests has within it the trends that will lead to Comte's positivism.
There was an essential, common tendency which aimed to counter the sway
of apriorism and restore the authority of experience. The differences
between the path of the sociological developments in France under
Comte, and those in Germany under, for example, F.J. Stahl, lies for
Marcuse in the different socio-historical conditions. For in France
Comte's views represented the rising star of the bourgeoisie, whereas
in Germany, where the middle classes had 'lost' the battle, Stahl
advocated "monarchic conservatism". But this difference did not
affect the basic unity, any more than did Schelling's apparent non-
factual approach as compared with Comte's factual one. There was a
connection stronger than any such disjunctures, and with the final
transformation of the dialectic into sociology under Lorenz von Stein,
Marcuse suggests what the ultimate nature of this connection
represented. Perhaps not surprisingly, in view of the earlier
discussion, it represented a final severing of any connection with

philosophy. Marcuse notes that "the anti-philosophical bent of
sociology is of great importance" (Marcuse, 1955, p.376). It seems
that all sociology is at least potentially identified with the work of
Comte. It is interesting to compare Marcuse's views with Horkheimer's
analysis, put forward as the Institute's view on the differences between
"critical theory" of the Institute, and "traditional theory" , like
that of Comte (see Horkheimer, 1972, pp.188-252). Horkheimer's views,
which must have been discussed in the Institute, and form part of the
context of Marcuse's early writings, are both an example of Marcuse's
problematic views on "traditional theory" and have at least one theme
within them that Marcuse could profitably have used. Horkheimer
suggests that in "traditional theory" social studies have tended to
follow a "scientific" pattern. This science has provided useful
gains for society as a whole but has been detrimental to social study.
For Horkheimer science is based on tasks, and has generated an
absolutised model of theory, so "What scientists in various fields
regard as the essence of theory thus corresponds, in fact, to the
immediate tasks they set themselves." (Horkheimer, 1972, p.194).
The direction and goals of research are of major importance for
Horkheimer. But the "absolutised" model of theory, which is based upon
some notion of verifiable laws, now applies to all types of theory.
So, for example, most universal propositions generate deductions, and are
regarded as different concepts dependent upon the philosophical
position held by the theorist. Thus for J.S. Mill they are inductions,
for rationalist and phenomenolgical schools they are evident insights,
and for the axiomatic approach they are arbitrary postulates.
Presumably Horkheimer's point is that all social studies, apart from
critical theory, think in terms of verifiable laws even if they differ
in the account given of the status of those laws. This, it might be
thought, would be strongly denied by, say, Dilthey, or by Weber.
Marcuse would at least acknowledge some truth in this as it will be
recalled that he has previously praised Dilthey for his freeing of
the "Geistwissenschaften" from the methodology of the natural sciences
(see Marcuse, 1931). But Horkheimer seems to dismiss all these options,
suggesting for example that Weber's "divergences do not signify a
structural difference in ways of thinking" (Horkheimer. 1972, p.191).
This assertation is not detailed by Horkheimer, and within it can be

seen the context of Marcuse's own dismissal of such a wide realm of
social study which seems such a feature of his work. He writes without
much reference to other social theory, as has been noted, and even
when he does come to write one essay on, for example, Weber in the
1960's it is critical of Weber's conceptualisation of reason which
Marcuse in effect re-terms "capitalist reason" (see later discussion
of Marcuse, 1972i). Marcuse seems to be in at least approximate
agreement with Horkheimer that most of social theory is modelled on
science, and that this is a non-critical process. It is sad that
Marcuse when taking up the discussion of science later partially
follows Horkheimer's "science as tasks scientists set themselves"
where the emphasis on goals and directions of research might come
to the fore, but then re-states this in terms not about the goals of
research but about "operationalism's" view of science and the
consequences for a "behaviourist" social science (see Marcuse 1968d,
pp.27-28). Horkheimer's conception had some possibility of a detailed
critique of science, but rapidly became over-general and all inclusive.
Many decades later Marcuse too follows the all-inclusive error. Marcuse's
early context of a dismissal of a wide range of social theory has
meant both the rejection of theoretical insights that might have
greatly improved his work, and a sometimes idiosyncratic analysis. Even
allowing for the fact that "operationalism" may have been a current
view of science in the 1950's Marcuse's stance is unjustified as we
shall see. Overall Marcuse is not really very convincing about
"method". Horkheimer on the other hand does give some more detail
to "critical theory" which Marcuse, as we shall see, tends to obscure.
According to Horkheimer science (and "traditional theory") fails to
look at the overall framework within which it analyses facts, and it
tends to accept this as "given" (see Horkheimer, 1972, p.297).
Critical Theory, on the other hand, is prepared to analyse and discuss
this. Presumably Horkheimer's suggestion is that critical theory will
be prepared to look at, say, "capitalist methods of organisation",
whereas traditional theory will focus on, say, "worker-management
relations". But he is also clear that critical theorists "interpret the
economic categories of work, value and productivity exactly as they are
interpreted in the existing order, and they regard any other
interpretation as pure idealism. But at the same time they consider it

rank dishonesty simply to accept the interpretation; the critical
acceptance of the categories which rule social life   contains
simultaneously their condemnation" (Horkheimer, 1972, p.208). So
"critical acceptance" seems to imply using but criticising, and we
shall return to this theme soon. But Marcuse appears to be rather
obscure about his version of this process, at least as it applies to
the way that concepts are "abstracted". Thus Marcuse argues that
the process of scientific abstraction is actually a static one, as
compared with his "radicalised Hegelianism" which offers a
transcendent, dynamic critique. Thus he comments, in a discussion
of Hegel's idea of "notion","According to common-sense thinking,
knowledge becomes the more unreal the more it abstracts from reality.
For Hegel the opposite is true. The abstraction from reality, which
the formation of the 'notion' requires, makes the 'notion' not poorer
but richer than reality because it leads from the facts to their
essential control" (Marcuse, 1955, p.56). This is, apparently, to be
contrasted with the processes of positivist science (and therefore
sociology and so on). Thus "mere transpassing of the facts does not
distinguish dialectical knowledge from positivistic science. The
latter, too, goes beyond the facts; it obtains laws, makes predictions,
and so forth. With all the apparatus of its procedure, however,
positivistic science stays within the given realities; the future it
predicts, even the changes of form to which it leads never depart
from the given. The form and content of scientific concepts remain
bound up with the prevailing order of things; they are static in
character even when they express motion and change. Positivist science
also works with abstract concepts. But they originate by abstraction
from the particular and changing forms of things and fix their common and
enduring characteristics" (Marcuse 1955, p.157). The ideas expressed
here seem elusive, from the beginning with the undefined
"transpassing" to the end with the "fixing" of characteristics. Is
he saying that positivist science attempts to draw the general from
the particular,and if so in what way does it "fix its characteristic"?
Why does "the future it precicts never depart from the given"? Marcuse
is presumably making suggestions here not unlike those of Horkheimer's
discussed earlier. Facts can be "abstracted" but should then be

criticised, the context and framework may be important and may be
ignored by abstraction. But much more detail is required if these points
are going to enable the dismissal of science (and "traditional theory")
as non-critical. Taken at face value Marcuse seems to argue that the
process of generalising from the particular that theory engages in
can have the effect of ignoring the "setting" of the particular. No
doubt the discussion of, say, a small group of workers' wages and their
relationship to productivity and so on can remove emphasis on the wider
relationship of, say, wages to profit. But the case that other theories
ignore this and Marcuse's does not is hardly made. Nor is the
suggestion that other theories in essence confuse "is" and "ought" and
that Marcuse's does not. The context, and the criticism are part of
Marcuse's "vision" but their demarcation from other theories or
"visions" is not as great as Marcuse seems to suggest. His "method"
does not look as complex or radical as his writing suggests. On the
whole neither the discussion of method as regards his own work,
nor the discussion of "non-critical theory" are really satisfactory.
It is not just the social study equals science equals passivity equation
that relates to the latter, for his discussion also manages to
misinterpret specific other theorists. Thus Sartre features as
a subject of Marcuse's criticism in his only major publication
during his period, in World War II and after, in the State Department.
Writing in "Philosophical & Phenomenological Research" in 1948 Marcuse
started by sympathising with the notion of the historical absurdity
of the old system arising again after the defeat of fascism (see
Marcuse, 1972o). But he suggests that existentialism is a quite
erroneous response to this, which will, via its idealistic conceptions
lead to a quietistic stance of resignation. This view arises from
Marcuse's critique of "Being and Nothingness" which he suggests offers
forth the two contradictory aspects of existentialism, the one aspect
being the, "transcendental stabilisation of human freedom in the face
of its actual enslavement; the other the revolutionary theory which
implies the negation of this entire ideology" (Marcuse, 1972o, p.162).
For Marcuse, "Being and Nothingness" offers a Sisyphean view of man's
existence with almost no possibility of a breakthrough (Marcuse,
1972o, pp.169-170). It is not even the case that man in chains is
free internally (which is Marcuse's view of early bourgeois society), but

that he is somehow free because he can choose his chains. Marcuse
suggests that this position must be tested against human reality, and that
it must be rejected in the light of its possible justification of
persecution, or even genocide. (Marcuse 1972o, pp.173-174) This is,
of course, a distinct misconception of Sartre's writings which cannot
be seen as justifying homicide in any respect. Marcuse does
acknowledge in a 1965 postscript that Sartre has had a "radical
conversion", and he is full of generous praise about his later work,
but this does not affect the basic point made here (see Marcuse 1972o,
pp.189-190). Marcuse has on at least one other notable occasion
continued this idiosyncratic "positivising" of other thinkers.
Thus in 1964, in "One-Dimensional Man" he suggests that Wittgenstein
was basically a positivist (see Marcuse, 1968d, pp.139-160) and by
selective quotation from the Tractatus he is able to show evidence
for this view. In effect Marcuse is arguing that the famous quotation
"whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" indicated that
Wittgenstein was dismissing all that was unverifiable, and emphasising
resigned acceptance of the status quo. Now this mistake may possibly
have been more acceptable in the 1930's when much of Marcuse's
philosophical writing occurred, and when studies of Wittgenstein were
not nearly so advanced. But this is Marcuse writing in the 1960's
and managing to turn Wittgenstein's emphasis on the importance of the
unsayable into a rejection of it. This surely is the very point that
Marcuse's "vision" is attempting to convey, it is attempting to
highlight the "unsayable". In dismissing Wittgenstein Marcuse was,
of course, dismissing an ally. Indeed Hughes suggests that these
errors also lost Marcuse much of his American academic audience in the
1960's in so far as his "misreading of the Philosophical Investigations
put off many Americans who would have been ready to accept the main
lines of his social analysis" (Hughes, 1975, p.181). Be that as it
may Marcuse is regrettably able to dismiss too much under the all-
embracing, and far from clear bracket of "traditional theory"/"science"/
"positivism" that runs through his works. The areas of theory
rejected by him are pushed together into an over-homogenised whole, and
in some ways this parallels the process he has engaged in about theories
accepted by him. It does not aid his arguments.

Marcuse's "method" then seems so far to contain a confused attack on

other methods or theories, and to be simpler than it might at first
seem. But his analysis of philosophy and culture has stressed a
dialectical approach, and at times seemed dialectical in method. Does
this seem to carry over into the way he will analyse industrial
civilisation? After all he has suggested that his concepts "comprehend
not only the given reality but, simultaneously, its abolition and the
new reality that is to follow it" (Marcuse 1972n, p.145). Earlier on
he was quoted as opposing "dialectical knowledge" with "positivist
science" and approving of the former's "abstraction". Certainly
Marcuse writes in these terms, and indeed uses language which could be
described as from a dialectical tradition. But his views of himself
do not always seem reliable, and the latter effect is to be expected
given the tradition of philosophy he analyses and is steeped in. In
fact, as noted, his analysis of the Hegel and Marx link does not over-
emphasise dialectics. His views on the development of fascism seem to
suggest a static state of fascist affirmative culture in which it is
hard to see the dialectical unfolding of ideas or social forces.
Indeed his later analysis in "One-Dimensional Man" (Marcuse 1968d)
suggests an equally "static" picture of society. Marcuse may be using
a dialectical method but if he is its workings seem under-emphasised
and somewhat obscure. It seems justified, and on the basis of the
confusions noted more rewarding, to take his work on rather different
terms from those that he has set. Conceptual and other links will
appear between the later and earlier Marcuse studies, but his reflections
on method do not seem to correspond fully with his actual operating
method (for a discussion of this from a political philosophy point
of view see Kettler, 1976). Marcuse is emphasising, if you like, the
"critical",as normally understood as criticism,against the "dialectical".
The criticism sets up standards, alternative concepts and so on. His
views are tied in to the process he describes of identifying one side
of "social struggles" with "freedom" and one with "barbarism and
suppression" (Marcuse 1972n, p.146). They are aimed at a version of the
future that he suggests will allow criticism and debates to occur in a
form "worthy of man and without historically absolute forms of social
conflict" (Marcuse 1972d, p.87). To get there he provides views of
rationality, labour, and so on, but he does not as he sometimes seems
to suggest somehow establish their "truth"; what he actually does is to

set up a variety of ideas for consideration about what man might be
able to achieve. Quite how Marcuse's theory seemed in general, and by
his own account, to be immune to the problems of other theories does
not therefore seem such a problem when his views are looked at in
detail. As was noted earlier "truth" is judged in terms of the
prospects for transformation according to Marcuse; to put it over-
simply the "critical theory" of Marcuse has a claim to be critical
because it criticises. The way it does this, the critique and 'vision'
it offers will be seen to be composed of many elements. Perhaps it is
worth noting at this stage that in terms of a "vision" which
incorporates an emphasis on sensuality and happiness, on creativity and
thought there is a hint that Marcuse's life-long interest in art may be
somehow reflected in his own work. Art as criticism, art as creation,
art as the "vision" in literature and so on, is there a connection
here? This idea will be returned to at various stages in the discussion.
At present perhaps the most succinct summary of the process that
Marcuse is about to embark on can be seen within his early studies in
terms of a comment about Hegel. Marcuse comments approvingly on
Hegel's "conviction", that "the absolute mind lies only in art, religion
and philosophy. All these have the same content in a different form:
Art apprehends the truth by mere intuition (Anschauung), in a tangible
and therefore limited form; Religion perceives it free of such
limitations but only as mere "assertion" and belief; Philosophy
comprehends it through knowledge and possesses it as inalienable
property" (Marcuse 1955, p.87). Here we have, of course, the viewpoint
from the "tradition" of philosophy discussed earlier. But the
elements identified in this process seem to tally with Marcuse's own.
He is asserting a claim to truth which has been disputed above, but he
is also putting forward a vision. It is a vision which does indeed
seem to involve elements of "study as art" i.e. "mere intuition"; elements of
"study as religion" i.e. "assertion" and "belief"; and elements of "study as
philosophy" i.e. "knowledge". The disentangling and analysis of these is
partly begun by the discussion that has covered the early works, it will
be given more concrete shape with the turn to the later ones.

The strengths of the vision, expressed in his post-World War II
works as a critique of industrial civilisation will continue to be our
concern, as will the details of its weaknesses. But, as noted, this

approach does not, of course, take Marcuse on his own terms. He sees
his analysis, it will be recalled, as involving "the standards for an
objective critique of given social institutions which would measure
their function and their aims against the historic potentialities of
human freedom" (Marcuse, 1957, p.viii). Even with the rejection
of these claims that is put forward here there are problems that
derive from them and that appear in quite acute form in some of the
later works. As such they need to be dealt with before moving to
the overall consideration of these works. Firstly, to return directly
to the theme of this section, just what is Marcuse's view of his own
work's relation to a "description of social conditions"? Secondly
how does the apparently mis-stated claim he makes for his own theorising
affect the views he has on any attempts to change "social conditions"?

Marcuse considers his own works as comprehending the given and future
"realities". But it has been suggested that his view of the given
reality, his views on social conditions (past and present) are
sometimes idiosyncratic, and sometimes sketchily conceived. Thus he
has seen "social conditions" as notably coherent across time and
space ("fascist culture" etc.), often as a result of a confusion of the
history of philosophy (itself perhaps notably partial) with the history
of culture. He fails to be clear about cultural changes, economic
shifts and so on not necessarily because he does not provide
evidence, but because he often fails to provide examples. Although the
former might be entangled in issues of just what the status of evidence
is for Marcuse, the latter simply makes his arguments more difficult to
follow, analyse or use. The status of evidence seems fairly cloudy
when, in the later studies, he calls upon some of the "descriptions
of social conditions" himself. Thus, in "One-Dimensional Man", he
suggests quite early on that he rarely gives specific references to back
up his discussions because "there are many unideological analysis of the
facts - such as Berle and Means, "The Modern Corporation and Private
Property", the reports of the 76th Congress' Temporary National
Economic Committee on the "Concentration of Economic Power", ...
the vital importance of the work of C. Wright Mills .... etc."
(Marcuse 1968d, p.14). Marcuse seems to be emphasising here the very
point being made earlier that he operates rather differently from his

specific discussion on method etc. "Abstraction", "dialectical knowledge", and so on as discussed before do not sit comfortably with his actual approach. It does reinforce the view that Marcuse is actually offering us one viewpoint amongst many, a viewpoint which perhaps highlights some aspects of social life that other viewpoints do not; a viewpoint which perhaps offers us some ideas about how social life may be constituted or re-constituted. This will, it is hoped, become clearer as we look at the specific ideas contained in Marcuse's later works, and try, on occasion, to provide the examples that he fails to give. But it does not comprehend reality in the sense that Marcuse seems to mean it i.e. in the sense of some "objective critique" meaning the functions and aims of social institutions "against the historic potentialities of human freedom" (Marcuse, 1957, p.viii). The problems in the fulfilment of Marcuse's hopes seem to lie in part in the use he has made of the essence and appearance distinction that he sees in Marx. The distinction is seen, as is clear from the earlier discussion as amounting to something like the distinction between the actual and the objectively possible. Thus the concept of essence contains an accusation and an imperative because actuality does not match essence. But Cohen, for example, would argue with considerable evidence that the distinction that Marx is making is between what appears to be the case, and what actually is the case (see Cohen, G.A., 1978, pp.329-336). Thus, for example, the worker in a capitalist society has no facilities to produce goods because they are monopolised by the capitalist class and therefore he must sell his labour. But he appears to sell his labour freely because of his freedom to reject one capitalist in favour of another, and "in essence bound to capital, he appears to be a free agent" (Cohen, G.A., 1978, p.336). Cohen's claim is therefore that Marx suggests "vulgar economists" misdescribe facts, whereas Marcuse's earlier suggestions are that they only describe them. Cohen himself argues that some forms of study will then be "subversive" of the existing reality (i.e. "critical" in Marcuse's terms) because apart from subverting our opinions with the new knowledge, they may reveal facts (an "essence" if you like) which some people would prefer not to be known (see Cohen, G.A., 1978, esp. p.342). This account is both more plausible than Marcuse's and highlights some of the problems he faces in relation to "descriptions of social conditions". The power

and acceptability of the "vision" is really reduced by this and the
problems will be seen again in Marcuse's critique of industrial
civilisation.

The second area for discussion before turning to the later works
concerned Marcuse's conceptualisation of social change. Marcuse's
works, as noted, contain a commentary on the prospects for such a
change, as well as some details of what it might involve. This concerns
some notion of revolutionary activity, with socialism seen as a "rupture
of history", a "radical break" (Marcuse, 1968c, p.177). The rupture
will involve the conjunction of quantitative and qualitative change,
and "revolution in the essential sense of the leap from pre-history
into the history of man" (Marcuse, 1968c, p.179). Indeed from a very
early stage, it will be recalled from earlier discussions, Marcuse has
thought in terms of change as "total, radical revolution". But as
time goes on so a notably "internal" emphasis develops and there
is a "need" for "liberation", which is present in man, and the change
"would confom with the very logos of life, with the essential
possibilities of human existence" (Marcuse, 1968c, p.176). The
components of this, and the picture of human nature involved, will
concern us later, but what are the political components of it? In
terms of these Marcuse's principle focus is on the question of "the
right to resist", to "challenge" the existing political and social
values as was noted in the earlier discussion about his views on the
changes within this conception in the Luther & Calvin developments.
But of course in pursuing the actual details of this theme Marcuse
is not helped by the problems discussed earlier about the "description
of social conditions". Thus his attempt to link the "right to resist"
with the "victims" of the "brutal and corrupt regimes of exploitation"
(Marcuse 1972h, p.220) is left without much in the way of "description"
or example, and Marcuse's comments about the difficulties of focusing
on "specific concrete issues" because of the "abstract" nature of the
oppression are lacking in detail and can mean multiple things (see
Marcuse 1972h, pp.221-223). He does in fact seem aware of this issue,
pressing at other times for a "historical calculus" of the current
situation of the "victims" compared with the future prospects under
different conditions (see Marcuse, 1968a, pp.139-140). Marcuse
acknowledges that this is inhuman and quantifying, but maintains that

such a process is the process of history itself but then goes on to argue that repressive "means", including presumably "inhuman" ones, cannot lead to non-repressive "ends" (see Marcuse 1968a, pp.140-147). Marcuse draws back from the consequences of his own argument much as he suggests that a revolutionary need for partial tolerance (i.e. basically, lack of it for the "Right", and use of it for the "Left") should never apply to art where "censorship is regressive under all circumstances" (Marcuse, 1969a, p.102). The lack of specific example in the "historical calculus", or the lack of detail of the current "repressive tolerance" (i.e.it appears to be tolerance as an absolute value but is actually tolerance biased towards thought and not deed, and favouring the status quo - see Marcuse 1969a esp. pp. 95-102) appears as the continuing problem of the divorce from description. The arguments about "ends" and "means", or the impact of censorship on art are more amenable to Marcuse. The detail of political argument is not easily assimilated to his style of theory, nor really to his own interests. For example in a discussion of Chicano riots in 1970 he tends to assert the political "progressiveness" of it, and then concentrate on such issues as goods being used for barricades showing that "the commodity is at the heart of the spectacle" (Marcuse, 1971b, p.99). Marcuse is more at home in the world of ideas than in the world of political action. Earlier on in the discussion it was, for example, noted that Marcuse's analysis of fascism was principally an analysis of philosophy not of the State. Now there are specific elements of politics but even some of these he often "moves" to areas concerning ideas. His notions of the possibility of an "intellectual elite" to guide political change (see Marcuse 1969a, pp.131-137), or his strident comments in the early 1970's that "political practice still depends on theory (only the Establishment can dispense with it!): on education, persuasion - on reason" (Marcuse 1972e, p.132) are indicative of this emphasis. But when it comes to the detail of the elite and its guidance, or the practice of the theory, Marcuse's arguments are weak. As Kettler has noted Marcuse's "conception of revolution as the basis for meaningful political practice" is not very persuasive, and he needs "a better way of acknowledging the diverse ways in which structural changes take place" (Kettler, 1976, p.47). As the discussion continues, and Marcuse's views of industrial society are examined it will become clear that his limited

view of change is related to his analysis of the society, and the problems of over-coherence in particular will receive emphasis. But it will also become clear that his views on rationality, ethics, the nature of industrial organisation and so on do lead to debates about some of the most important problems of political theory in terms, as Kettler puts it, of relating "problems of legitimacy to criteria of rationality" (Kettler, 1976, pp.47-8).

Many of the issues raised in the early works will recur in the discussions that follow about the later ones. The importance of the analysis of fascism, and the centrality of the discussion about rationality will continue to feature. The problems about "descriptions of social conditions" and the appeal to an analysis via a tradition of philosophy will also recur. Overall the theme of the development of Marcuse's "vision of happiness" as Hughes has called it (Hughes, 1975, p.170) will still be a focus, but of course it will be in the changed circumstances of the 1950's and later. Marcuse's own comment about his early works, looking back on them from 1968 was that they were perhaps "not radical enough, that they rejected too little and hold too little to be possible" (Marcuse, 19721, p.xvii). The next stage of the discussion will attempt to show how he tried to develop that radical content.

Industrial civilisation - its social and cultural structures

Introduction

With Marcuse permanently settle in America a second major phase of his
intellectual life began in the 1950s. The problems that have concerned
him from his earlier works, and the ideas within those works now start
to appear within an overall critique of industrial society. It is now
in order to examine that critique. There will be two sections to this
examination, the first concerning the social and cultural structures
of industrial civilisation, and the second the more psychological and
social psychological aspects to the critique. There is, therefore, an
increasing concern with human nature in these studies, and the obstacles
to the development of "reason" and "freedom" take on a particularly
"internal" guise in these later discussions. As C. B. Macpherson has
commented the analysis of "external impediments" to the development of
freedom is "analytically more manageable" than analysis of internalised
ones, and Marcuse, as will be shown, does face some complex problems
(see Macpherson, 1973, p.76). However, the move to, if you like,
"superstructural" concerns that are discussed next also generates problems,
and a number of issues that have been raised already, such as "affirmative
culture" and questions of method will continue to be connected with
difficulties for Marcuse. His critique of industrial civilisation will
be looked at initially by a discussion of ethics, located within the
features of the capitalist and Soviet systems. The discussion will
progress, with reference to "affirmative culture" to look at Marcuse's
views of science and of industrialisation, and the debate that Marcuse
poses about the "level" of development of economic and social factors.
Cohen has commented that Marcuse "takes his sights on social reality by
flying above it" (Cohen, J., 1969, p.51) and the height and speed of
the flight will be a matter of concern. But also Marcuse offers a
critique that has a major place within it for radical alternatives, and
the nature of these will be an important focus. They will be outlined
as a necessary part of the discussion throughout but increasingly it
will seem that Marcuse is somehow suggesting that in joining him in the
discussion of radical alternatives his readers are engaging in some sort
of radical act. In a number of ways this conception will be explored
and criticised. J. K. Galbraith has commented that the "vehement insistence
that economics is wholly scientific and neutral when it is being politically
quite purposeful" depends in part upon economics as a system of belief
and it is therefore not open to easy rebuttal (see Galbraith, 1971, p.53).

Marcuse could be seen as challenging this "belief", but quite how
successfully is another matter as we shall continue to see.

Ethics and industrial civilisation

The nature of ethical issues is of central importance for Marcuse. He
is concerned to study the ways in which modern man guides his behaviour
or is guided, as well as the ways in which life can be judged, or evaluated.
In terms of his analysis of industrial society the nature of ethical issues
seems perhaps to lie in the connection between the "personal" and the
"political" areas of life. The difficulties present in enlarging private
freedom in ways that can co-exist with public good are at the heart of his
ethical concerns. But Marcuse suggests that the notions of "the personal"
and "the political" have undergone substantial shifts in industrial society.
Both, in fact, have had to readjust to the exigencies of industrial life,
as compared with their previous formulations in non-industrial society.
For Marcuse, it is not just that the concepts have changed, but that the
"access" to them has shifted. To explore this it is necessary first of all
to look at how Marcuse sees Western as compared with Soviet morality, than
to look at the basic ideological framework that he sets this view in, the
idea of "affirmative culture".

Marcuse contrasts the "tension" between public and private spheres of morality
in the West with the assumed convergence of the two in the Soviet system.
He notes that the principle of being able to hold opinions or values different
to those that the State holds is an important one in the West. Indeed there
is an emphasis (which Marcuse is sanguine about in practice) on the way that
the individual should be able to have views that are different from those
expressed in the predominant culture, as represented by leaders of public
opinion, education, entertainment or whatever. Western ethics suggests the
unfolding of man's potentialities in society, and in so doing they presuppose
the possibility of an individual fulfilling himself in the context of
general social morality. By this Marcuse seems to mean that there is an
assumption that "man" can fulfill himself, can be true to his opinions, to
his human values, within the general limits set by the society. In fact
the notions of Western ethics are, he suggests, not all that clearly identi-
fiable and they have this hidden historical dimension insofar as they
presuppose a general social morality. That is to say that it is assumed
that the view of man's potential "unfolding" within society is compatible
with that society's own structure, (see Marcuse, 1958, pp.195-209). One of
the difficulties of interpreting these ideas of Marcuse's is that it seems
hard to grasp exactly what he is identifying as "Western ethics". Is it,

for example, Western ethics as a whole, or is it one aspect, for example, "the personal and the political". But really this is part of a wider issue that will run throughout his discussions of the structure of industrial society. For Marcuse, is often not clear about the distinction between aspects of a structure as described by philosophers, or in philosophy (or social theory) and aspects of a structure as it impinges on people in the society itself. Thus the notion of ethics that he describes can be either ethics as philosophers see it (or have seen it), or ethics as, say, social rules of conduct. There is a lack of a guide as to the emphasis on the, if you like, "philosophical" or "social". If Marcuse primarily means the "social" (used in the sense of activities by individuals in the society) then he needs more evidence about his general statements. In fact it is implicit and just occasionally explicit, that he really means a tradition in Western philosophy, and specifically he means a "humanistic liberal" one (see Marcuse, 1958, p.195). Given this it would be helpful if he developed rather more the specific points in this philosophical view, and indeed in so far as it is "social" the specific factors in the society that he wishes to highlight within the public/private segment of the argument that he focuses upon. He does talk of values like "care, responsibility, love, patriotism, diligence, honesty, industriousness, the injunctions against transgressing the happiness of one's fellow men, consideration for the common interest" (Marcuse, 1958, p.232). But the examples and details are rare. It does not by any means destroy Marcuse's argument that this is so, for his emphasis is always on the broad sweep, and the analysis of generalities across society. But it does make for more confusion than desirable, and for some rather odd interpretations by him at various times. At present it should be noted that by emphasising the "philosophical" in Western ethics a surprisingly coherent view of ethics at the "social" end can be generated. But the connection of the "philosophical" and the "social" seems better explored when he analyses Soviet ethics. His overall stance on the Soviet system is to offer an "immanent critique", that is to say, "it starts from the theoretical premises of Soviet Marxism, develops their ideological and sociological consequences, and re-examines the premises in the light of these consequences" (Marcuse, 1958, p.1.). This, Marcuse says, implies two assumptions, firstly "that Soviet Marxism (i.e. Leninism, Stalinism, post-Stalin trends) is not merely an ideology promulgated by the Kremlin in order to rationalise and justify its policies but expresses in various forms the realities of Soviet developments", and secondly, "that identifiable objective trends and tendencies are operative in history which make up the inherent rationality of the

historical process" (Marcuse, 1958, p.1.). Marcuse is careful to attempt
to distance the second assumption from any acceptance of Hegelian metaphysics,
arguing that his own approach will not stress any purpose or "end" towards
which history is moving men as "historical agents, and their's are the
alternatives and decisions" (Marcuse, 1958, p.5). The denial of a
teleological view, and a stress on men as historical agents deciding
alternatives seems sometimes to fade from sight in Marcuse's analysis (for
example, the "all controlling culture" strand in his arguments about the
West). It is an important emphasis however, and will be considered at
various stages in this discussion. The first of Marcuse's "assumptions"
given above specifically relates to the Soviet developments and certainly
gives a rather more precise view than the comments about Western ethics.
At least some attempt can be made to relate Marcuse's views on Soviet Marxism
to other views of its pronouncements and form. The connection between the
"philosophical" and the "social" is given some shape. Perhaps not surprisingly
in the light of the first assumptions Marcuse suggests that Soviet ethics
are much more clearly identifiable, and can be seen as attempting to represent
a "higher" morality. They could be realisation of Marx's humanist ideal.
Marcuse is clear that this idea of ethics owes its origin to the development
of Soviet society which has required the "telescoping" of industrialisation,
and the abandonment of a Western-style liberal ethics. Basically then,
Western ethics suggests that tension between public and private spheres is
a good thing, and Soviet ethics shows the means to integrate the two.
Western ethics results in areas of insecurity, whereas Soviet ethics seeks
to align choice and option in all areas and "the suppression of traditional
liberties assumes a 'positive' function which Soviet ethical philosophy
interprets as the preparation of true freedom" (Marcuse, 1958, p.207).
Marcuse notes that Western liberties are, to Soviet eyes, illusory if not
based on freedom from want i.e. economic security. To Western eyes, of
course, Soviet liberties are illusory without the public/private tension.
In all his manifestations man in Soviet society is to be a social and
political being, and individual privacy is externalised and becomes the
legitimate concern of society. Marcuse presumably has in mind the visions
in Soviet pronouncements of the ideal worker, ideal father and so on. There
is some encouragement, indeed direct compulsion, to at least seem to be
dealing with all your life in a specific way that is shown by the State.
On the other hand Marcuse is suggesting that ethical formulations in the

West emphasise an individual mind which makes moral decisions about areas in life that are not necessarily seen as the concern of supra-individual groupings like the State. This view of Western ethics seems to be one actually derived from a philosophical tradition that is not detailed, although Marcuse writes as if it was part of actual Western life and could somehow be identified as a specific body of concepts that existed in universally agreed form. However these conceptions, at least in so far as they represent a public/private tension are seen as fruitful, although Marcuse suggests that this should be underpinned by some concern to indicate that liberty in the sense of privacy is not to substitute for liberty in the sense of freedom from want. For Marcuse the value of Soviet ethics lies in the recognition that fulfillment of real material needs is an important part of a moral society. But actually Marcuse also sees another value in Soviet ethics, for he suggests that it also holds out real material goals in its vision of a "Communist" society. Morality is given some concrete form in its development by virtue of having the identifiable goal of "Communist" society as its aim. Morality is, if you like, not "just talk", it is based on real needs, and it has an ideal vision that could be given definite shape in Communism. The word "could" is the important one here for Marcuse. The point is that it is possible to sketch it, or perhaps better that it should be possible to sketch it. The emphasis on the possibility gives the option of arguing just what this sketch might look like and this is an important argument for Marcuse that he thinks should be part and parcel of all human lives. He is not, of course, claiming that Soviet society does sketch the details of the future well, or indeed in any detail. Marcuse is perfectly clear that the political practice of Soviet society can actually be to use this prospective utopia as a sort of "jam tomorrow" bribe, but that does not destroy the important fact that it is in principle a goal that can be given definite shape.

For Marcuse then ethics should begin and end in identifiable material concerns. That is that basic material needs should be accepted as part of the ethical concerns we have, and that any judgement about the quality of social arrangements should be able to refer to a specific set of alternative arrangements that represent the superior moral value. These facts figure in the (ideal) ethics of Soviet society, but for Marcuse an ethical framework should also include the idea of public/private separation in some areas of life. How do these two ideals fit together? Marcuse suggests that the liberalist humanist tradition not only lies behind the public/private tension, but also his vision of the alternative social arrangements. For

this is a "fully developed classless society", that has standards that
"recapture the traditional ideal of Western civilisation - freedom, justice,
and the all-round development of the individual"; this is, he suggests,
encapsulated in communist ideal of "from each according to his abilities;
to each according to his needs" (Marcuse, 1958, p.217). So, in its pure
form, the formulations emphasised by Soviet ethics, and those emphasised by
the West, not only could be compatible, they are seen by Marcuse as deriving
from similar concerns. Marcuse is suggesting that some common human values
can be discerned, mostly at the "philosophical" end of the implicit
"philosophical/social" divide present in his work. These values can be given
more shape by their relation to the more "social" elements he attempts to
identify in Western and Soviet cultures. In some ways then the "philosophical/
social" ambiguity is a part of Marcuse's stance that can generate some
stimulating ideas about industrial society. In other ways the ambiguity
opens his arguments up to criticisms that reflect his lack of detail at each
end of the implicit scale.

Marcuse is attempting to offer a critique of industrial society in both its
capitalist and Soviet shapes. The critique suggests that alternative
formulations of ethics would be the foundation of, and seen within, a new
more "human" society. But the critique of industry might seem to imply that
this society must be non-industrial. On the surface, there seems to be a
confusion about this issue within Marcuse's work. Basically are his ethical
principles compatible with industrialism as he sees it? In "Socialist
Humanism?" (Marcuse, 1967b) Marcuse suggests that the new humanistic society
must be made by mechanising labour, increasing productivity and so on. On
the other hand he also suggests that the governing ethical principles of
society are clearly tied to a functional base in that society (see Marcuse,
1958, pp.231-257). Ethics at the "social" end, as, if you like, "rules of
conduct" seem in Marcuse's view to be very closely tied to certain needs of
industry itself. Thus the main principle of Soviet morality as it applies
to work lies in the need for a "competitive work morality". There is no
particular differences within work, and actually it suggests the total moral
equalisation of all spheres of work and there is not any distinction between
alienated and non-alienated labour. The denial of alienation is not abstract
theorising, but rather an attempt to equate Soviet work with a good future
per se, and in doing that it provides a substitute for the Calvinist work
ethic. This Calvinist work morality in Marcuse's view emphasises the need
for work now, due to the reward "above" being so uncertain. For Marcuse then

the logic of industrialism is inextricably bound up with the ethical base of culture, and for Soviet society "the humanist values attached to the end of the road become ritualised into ideology" and "the values attached to the means i.e. the values of total industrialisation become the really governing values" (Marcuse, 1958, p.242). It is these values of industrialisation that really count, as he goes on to say, "socialist morality thus succumbs to industrial morality, while the various historical stages of the latter are condensed into one comprehensive unit, combining elements from the ethics of Calvinism and Puritanism, enlightened absolutism and liberalism, national-ism, chauvinism, and internationalism, capitalist and socialist values. This is the strange syndrome presented by Soviet ethics" (Marcuse, 1958, p.242). It is, Marcuse says, the "need" in the early stages of industrialism for a "well-trained, disciplined labour force that dictates ethical values" (Marcuse, 1958, p.239). It is the "requirement" of the later stages of industrialisation that stresses "intelligent imagination" and "qualitative performance" that dictates ethical values at this stage (Marcuse, 1958, p.240). It is the combination of the two that gives Soviet ethics its melange of values. So despite "ideals" of ethics which Marcuse derives mostly from the "philosophy" end of the implicit divide of his work, the actual "social" end can involve some values being dictated by industry. The development of a morality for specific labour needs and so on may clash with his own views on regarding the possibility of different social structures and developments in the future. Indeed the industry/specific morality link is strong within his work, and he has earlier argued from the "philosophical" end that industrial society emphasises a particular development of Calvinism (see Marcuse, 1972q). If industry requires these values then how is Marcuse suggesting that new values can co-exist with them? It is possible that Marcuse has in mind a specific type of industry, or industrialisation, but if so he does not specify it. He seems to discuss "industry" as a broad aggregate of all industrial processes in the Twentieth Century (as befits presumably the wide analysis he adopts). Certainly the need to beware of determinism in his arguments is a factor he bears in mind, for the industrial needs are "tendencies" and "offered" as "some hypotheses" (see Marcuse, 1968d, p.15). These rather soto voce statements do tend to get lost in the Marcusean grand sweep. But he clearly does mean that industry does need at least some specific aspects of an ethical framework. As it "needs" this he really should spell out more details of it, and also how they will relate to any new society. Marcuse is suggesting that industrial advance is vital to his vision of the future, but it also imposes human costs. The point

for Marcuse is that all his discussions of current industry are founded on the preposition that it involves alienated labour, and not labour per se. For Marcuse alienated labour is "labour that denies individuals the fulfillment of their human capacities and needs, and grants gratification, if at all, only secondarily or after work" (Marcuse, 1970e, p.30). This applies in the West, and in Soviet society (for discussion of the specifically Soviet aspects of this see Marcuse, 1958, pp.233-236). On the other hand the essence of labour is really "the free play of human faculties" (Marcuse, 1958, p.236). This seems to involve changes in rigid work divisions, or "creative" approach to labour which he sees as rather craftsman or artist like, and a qualitative shift to work being more like play in the sense he suggests that Fourier meant it (see for example Marcuse, 1970a, p.68). This is a relatively psychological definition of alienated labour, and as such is seen by Marcuse as the basis of the industrial work ethic. The details of the "model of man" implied will be discussed later, but it is not just the reduction of alienated labour in the process of industry itself that concerns Marcuse. He is clear that aspects of alienated work will still be necessary in any form of industrial labour, and what he is proposing is a reorganisation to reduce it, and an increase in productivity to reduce overall labour time (see Marcuse, 1972b, pp.255-6). This could be reduced even further if production which immediately turns into waste is ended (see Marcuse, 1967a, p.10), by which he seems principally to mean an end to factors like built-in obsolescence (see Marcuse, 1972b, p.256). So Marcuse is reasonably internally consistent in his argument, suggesting that new ethical formulations could apply to an advanced industrial society with changes in the organisation and production of industry, although elements of "current industrial morality" would survive. The argument is an interesting one for Marcuse is asking us to consider just what might have been lost by the growth of industry, and how we might adapt industry to ways that could satisfy man more in all aspects of his life. Marcuse's concern throughout his writing has been to attempt to link up aspects of industrial man's consciousness with the structures of industrial society. Initially it was within the Institute's general concerns in this area, and from the 1940's it has been his own main theme. He is suggesting that it is worth trying to measure up "industrial values" against other values, and asking how one has taken account of the other. For example, he suggests that technology by equalising tasks within work to a supervisory nature may offer the possibility of "democratised" work (see Marcuse, 1941, p.429). But more often he is concerned to highlight what has been lost by the conflict of values that he suggests. Does industrial labour seem

creative, can the need for industrial time-scales in working hours or time-keeping, co-exist with the time-scales of families, child development and so on? These are the sort of questions Marcuse wants us to take seriously. Marcuse has been at the front of those who have suggested that industrial culture may need much more careful analysis. Its growing impact on the Third World makes this seem increasingly relevant on a global scale, for as Peter Berger has suggested a notion of "modernity" may increasingly affect all societies (see Berger et al., 1974). Methods and techniques that may be appropriate to aspects of industrial work itself can be transferred to other areas, so, for example, "problem-solving" as it befits industrial work may carry over to problem-solving of moral issues which may require different techniques. This will be returned to later when Marcuse's views on the impact of science on everyday life are discussed. But it is not just in the impact on the Third World that these issues are now crucial. In the era of the micro-chip Marcuse's discussions seem increasingly pertinent, and the possibility of major change increasingly plausible. The development of the micro-processor means that a major reduction in industrial work is possible, and a new form of work may well be equally possible. Jenkins and Sherman suggest, for example, that two choices face the industrialised countries, "remain as we are, reject the new technologies and we face unemployment of up to 5.5 million by the end of the century. Embrace the new technologies, accept the challenge and we end up with unemployment of about 5 million" (Jenkins and Sherman, 1979, p.113). If they are right jobs can change massively, and work as such might collapse. Marcuse's view from the heights has its limitations but it often encourages us to take up issues that are important. He would no doubt agree with another recent report on the micro-chip which ends with the statement that "the question has to be: who controls the new technology? There is everything at stake. Working people must ensure that they enjoy the benefits of 20th Century science" (C.I.S., 1978a, p.40).

Marcuse often comments on political developments in the industrial societies, and he sometimes links his work with political changes he wants to encourage. The area of the development of technology would seem particularly suitable to such links, and it might be expected that Marcuse would advocate changes that could form part of the programme of political groups. There is, however, rarely a mention of this. The tendency in the discussion on labour to stress the early Marx, and use such utopian socialists as Fourier as examples may be part of the reason (for a discussion of this see Andrew, 1970).

But it may also represent the continuing difficulty over the idea of "affirmative culture". Unless suitable emphases are given to Marcuse's work the idea of "industrial culture" as "affirmative culture" can be beset with the problems of the earlier formulation. For "affirmative culture" suggested that culture can hold out an ideal of, say, "equality" while not in any way encouraging the achievement of that aim, and while justifying a society that often was built upon opposite values. Now insofar as Marcuse uses this conception to emphasise that, in his view, moral goals should be attached to attempts to sketch real social structures that could accompany them, this seems reasonable. Presumably the image of "equality" could also act as an ideological smoke-screen for the unequal society. But Marcuse seems sometimes to go further with this notion, and the idea of an all-pervasive culture that dominates and controls in every fashion is prevalent in parts of his work. There seems to be no escape if the image of the ideal only serves to remove the ideal, and Marcuse becomes somewhat obscure in the extremes of his "one-dimensionality". The vision of modern capitalism that tends to organise "the entire society in its interest and image" (Marcuse, 1972e, p.11), the integration of needs and aspirations into the technological plant itself (Marcuse, 1968d, p.39), these extreme or obscure notions seem to derive from the all-embracing concept of affirmative culture which almost destroys man's "needs" in any realisable sense. Now it is possible to reduce these problems within Marcuse's work, but part of this involves being clear about the kind of problem that Marcuse's efforts can address. Although he is clear that in advanced industrial society, "rarely has a society so system-atically been organised in the interests which control production" (Marcuse, 1972e, p.23), he does not entirely tackle the issue of who gains from this, i.e. just what the "interests" are in different societies. Marcuse is a critic of the overall broad structures within which industrial man generates. The culture of industrial society is his focus and the systems of symbols, of ideas, of beliefs that compose this are the components of his analysis. The application of this analysis is somewhat reduced by ideas like "affirmative culture" which lack conceptual clarity.

"Who gains?" is not then as much Marcuse's concern as "what are we all currently losing?" in industrial societies. In fact Marcuse is arguing that industrial society is really unevenly "developed". He wishes to identify two sorts of progress that could be said to be developed within modern industrial society. One of these is in essence quantitative and one is qualitative. The first view he terms "technical progress". It "means that in the course of cultural development, despite many periods of

regression, human knowledge and capacities taken as a whole have grown, and that simultaneously their application to the end of dominating the human and natural environment has become ever more universal. The result of this progress is growing social wealth" (Marcuse, 1970e, p.28). Indeed advanced capitalist society "has now reached a point where quantitative change can technically be turned into qualitative change, into authentic liberation" (Marcuse, 1968c, p.180). The components of this qualitative change in part represent an alternative view of progress for Marcuse. This view he sees as the one particularly developed in idealist philosophy, and "according to this conception, progress in history consists in the realisation of human _freedom_, of morality" and "the result of progress is taken to be that human beings become continually more human and that slavery, arbitrariness, oppression and suffering are reduced" (Marcuse, 1970e, p.28). This view he terms "humanitarian progress". Marcuse is perfectly clear that the first is a precondition for the second. He has noted before the fundamental problems of scarcity in the ancient world, and the necessity of ethics involving a concrete freedom of want. But the real improvements seen as technical progress, have not led to such great improvements in humanitarian progress. For Marcuse industrial society seems rather like a "Mr. Universe", who can only just scrape through his exams, and still bullys little boys.

Some of this uneven development has now been discussed. The next stage involves more details of the impact of "science" which Marcuse sees as a key factor.

Science, culture and industrial civilisation

Marcuse's analysis of the ramifications of science and technology suggests that the "unequal development" that he identifies in modern society is actually kept unequal by some aspects of science and technology. As we have seen he is anxious that the dual nature of technology should be acknowledged, as in his view it "can promote authoritarianism as well as liberty, scarcity as well as abundance, the extension as well as the abolition of toil" (Marcuse, 1941, p.414). Behind these dual options lie some of the issues discussed earlier, and also a specific view of science. Marcuse suggests that "science, by virtue of its own methods and concepts has projected and promoted a universe in which the domination of nature has remained linked to the domination of man" (Marcuse, 1968d, p.135, emphasis as in the original). The nature of this "domination" is never very clear, although it will be suggested that Marcuse does provide some interesting answers for the way that its "domination" in one sense could at least be part of the unequal development he suggests. In the meantime what are the particular "scientific methods" that Marcuse mentions? He refers to "operationalism" in the physical sciences and "behaviourism" in the social sciences, and he broadly equates the latter with the former. "Operationalism" is discussed via quotation and reference to P.W. Bridgeman's "The Logic of Modern Physics" (published in 1928), which suggests a total empiricism in the treatment of concepts. In effect meaning is limited to the description of specific behaviours and operations. Marcuse goes on to develop this in various ways, but the "philosophical/social" link is again unexplored. Is he talking about the method of science which is actually used by scientists (and if so which, when, etc.)? Is he talking about an "ideal" of a method discovered in writings about method? Unfortunately Marcuse does not clarify this and carries on to note that Bridgeman has suggested that the operational view may lead to a major change in our thinking insofar as we shall tend to limit our concepts to those that can adequately be described in terms of operations. Marcuse comments on this as follows, "Bridgeman's prediction has come true. The new mode of thought is today the predominant tendency in philosophy, psychology, sociology and other fields. Many of the most seriously troublesome concepts are being "eliminated" by showing that no adequate account of them in terms of operations or behaviour can be given" (Marcuse, 1968d, p.27). Marcuse, then, suggests that apparently most social studies have followed this "operational" path. To take one example of this in his writings indicates the inadequacy of the approach. Thus he suggests that philosophy is now "behaviourist"

as well. Whether or not he means that philosophers have followed Bridgeman's methods is unclear, and if he does he offers no real evidence for it. Indeed some philosophical schools that he might have been expected to discuss in this context, for example, the logical positivists do not feature in any detail. A mis-read study of Wittgenstein (as noted before) and a somewhat cursory reading of Ryle and Austin are offered, with no details suggested as to how representative they are of the modern philosophy he apparently finds "one-dimensional", and so uncritical. This is really rather a sorry tale. The adequacies or otherwise of Bridgeman's conceptions of science are unexplored, a badly muddled account of philosophy is given, and apparently most of social science is dismissed in the process. The suggestion implied here that somehow the schools of philosophy before the modern "one-dimensional" ones were more radical has occurred elsewhere in his argument; for example, aspects of philosophy from Hegel were seen as useful in revitalising Marx, or a humanist ethical tradition was discussed. When made in the context of his trite argument here, it sounds merely like a call for the return of any "pre- Wittgenstein" philosophy. As Sedgewick wryly comments, "Philosophy was certainly no more subversive of the existing order when University quadrangles echoed to the disquisitions of MacTaggart and Bradley on the Absolute, or to Bosanquet's apology for the organic State" (Sedgewick, 1966, p.179). Marcuse's arguments on operationalism and behaviouralism are confusing and sometimes plain wrong. The apparent rejection of science per se that can be seen here has also led many critics to suggest, rightly, that an anti-technological streak runs through Marcuse's work, although this has usually been the result of a reading of "One-Dimensional Man" which is the particular victim of the extreme argument (see, for example, Colletti, 1972, pp.129-140, and Sedgewick, 1966). But Colletti's charge that Marcuse's attack is "not on a certain system of social relations, but on industry, technology and science" (Colletti, 1972, p.135) cannot be fully maintained. Certainly Marcuse is guilty of some particularly slap-dash arguments in One-Dimensional Man, and sometimes elsewhere, but he does specifically lay out a case about the inter-connection of technology and social structure. Colletti is really suggesting that it fails to argue the political questions through (such as, for example, "who gains?") and this is true, but Marcuse's attack is on the impact of industry within capitalism, and within Soviet society, rather than a major critique of these societies, or at least that is where its strength lies. As noted he does not advocate any "philosophy of the simple life", rather he wishes in general to see technology directed in different ways, but his arguments about science just outlined do not help him in this. It would be interesting to speculate what would have happened if he had in fact used aspects of

Horkheimer's ideas about science for he might have done his case more justice. These ideas, revolving around science as the tasks that scientists set themselves and the stress on the direction and goals of research, would have added important and lacking dimensions to Marcuse's work. For Marcuse's concern often _is_ with the direction and goals of science, and indeed he suggests that "all programs of an anti-technological character, all propaganda for an anti-industrial revolution serve only those who regard human needs as a by-product of the utilisation of technics. The enemies of technics readily join forces with a terroristic technocracy. The philosophy of the simple life, the struggle against big cities and their culture frequently serves to teach men distrust of the potential instruments that could liberate them (Marcuse, 1941, pp.436-7). (By "technics" Marcuse means the "technical apparatus of industry, transportation and communication", Marcuse, 1941, p.414). So in what ways does Marcuse suggest that human needs sometimes do appear as just a "by-product of the utilisation of technics"? His ideas about this, which do not always rely heavily on his outline of science, are in two areas. Firstly the interconnection of social developments and technological ones, and secondly the way that scientific formulations impress upon everyday life.

The "social developments" related to science are discussed in terms of Marcuse's continuing concern with the "reason", and this time he examines the theme of "rationality" within the work of Max Weber (Marcuse, 1972i). He suggests that Weber's pessimism about the growing bureaucratisation and formal organisation of society is misplaced at least to the extent that Weber over-emphasises the level of development, as it were, of "rationality" in industrial society. Marcuse comments that the bureaucratic "functional office" system does indeed represent a development of rational organisation, but that it may not represent the full development. Rather it probably represents the full development possible within a capitalist context. The efficiency of this model of organisation is high, but the question is "efficiency for what?". Marcuse's view is that it is efficiency for private enterprise, and for profit (see Marcuse, 1972i, pp.205-6). In essence then capitalism distorts the process of development of rationality, and its outward expression in a particular organisational form may only be one phase. Presumably Marcuse is suggesting that a technological society does require some suitable form of organisation based upon some principles of "reason" that do accord with technology's own principles. All industrial societies will require organisation, but Marcuse suggests that the bureaucratic form rather than representing the logical progress of rationality may represent its development under specific conditions. Industry and science may need technical

reason and that may need to be reflected in the organisation of industrial
society (and may presumably conflict more or less with "liberal-humanistic"
principles, as the "new" organisation will still be an "organisation"). But
the specific development of this under capitalism is not necessarily the only
one. The Soviet alternative is just as problematic for Marcuse, for its
bureaucratic form is also based upon alienated labour. This analysis, as noted
is based upon a particular reading of Weber and the arguments come from the
"philosophical" end of Marcuse's "philosophical/social" divide, but there is
perhaps a problem when the more "social" view is added. For Marcuse considers
that current society is very nearly fully controlled, totally ordered and so on.
Does it not seem problematic that the flawed development produces such remarkable
cohesion? As Kettler notes the argument about the controlled society seems to
divert from the arguments in the Weberian analysis, because "capitalism corrupts
society, from this standpoint, because it perfects technical rationality not
because it perverts it" (Kettler, 1976, p.13). In part Marcuse does not resolve
this ambiguity. But of course the "totally ordered society" is partly a product
of the flawed view of affirmative culture and of science. Actually throughout
Marcuse's writings there are references to the strains in the development of
industrial society, both capitalist and Soviet. Even "One-Dimensional Man"
acknowledges the problems that could follow technical productivity in the West,
or political unrest in the Soviet bloc (see Marcuse, 1968d, pp.42-45, and pp.
46-50). But it is not just the, if you like, "philosophical versus the social"
issue that Marcuse has to cope with, for there is a strain within the "philosophical"
that needs clarifying, and in doing this it shows the emphasis that Marcuse's
argument could be seen to have on the control of technology as a problem in
itself. Marcuse's concern with the use of "reason" and its "connections" with
technology involves not only the Weberian discussion mentioned above, but also
a more phenomenological approach. Marcuse takes as his starting point Husserl's
last publication in 1936 called "The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental
Phenomenology" (see Marcuse, 1975). The laying out of Husserl's argument follows
the development of the concept of Reason from its origin with the Greeks. This
conception suggested that man's intellectual faculties are capable both of
determining his own life, and determining, changing and defining the universe.
The subjective and objective aspects of Reason are combined. Philosophy under
this rubric is thus established as science, and as science which gives direction
to all other sciences. But in the growth of science from Plato to Galileo this
idea of Reason has proved successful only in the positive sciences and in the
conquest of Nature. Quite which "sciences" these are, and what is "success"
is left unclear, but for the present it will be assumed that Marcuse means the

physical sciences, and that success is shown by the growth of their capacity to control and use Nature. Indeed Marcuse suggests that the mathematisation of nature that Galileo established, fulfilled the dream of the "purely rational, ideational system" of Plato, but in doing so it removed the very origin, the very content of the scientific process, namely philosophy. The "real" world became that of the conquest of nature, while philosophy was, as it were, removed to remain an "important" "abstract" sphere of knowledge destined for a "hopeless academic existence". Marcuse's interpretation of Husserl is thus that "divorced from the validating 'ends' set by philosophy, the rationale set by science and the rationale of its development and progress became that of the Lebenswelt itself, in which and for which this science developed" (Marcuse, 1975, p.228). Marcuse seems to be setting up some sort of distinction between "knowledge of nature", and "knowledge about how to use that knowledge". But there then seems a further suggestion that the use of that "knowledge of nature" becomes somehow automatic, that there is an "aim" within the physical sciences that removes the necessity for the second sort of knowledge about use. To return to Marcuse, he is suggesting that science ("knowledge of nature"?) seems to have a progress somehow of its own, and in this science, "the quantified ideational forms are abstracted from the concrete qualities of the empirical reality, but the latter remains operative in the very concepts and in the direction in which the scientific abstraction moves" (Marcuse, 1975, p.232). Science as a subject, as an inquiring process, has no "telos" except that very reality that it is apparently exploring. Somehow it seems separate from man's own aims and ideas. But again it must be asked just what this "science" is? Marcuse has generated a fairly imprecise notion of science, and now produces an argument about it which generates a "telos" that seems remarkably difficult to demonstrate. Marcuse in fact objects to one trend within Husserl's analysis that he suggests tends to distance it from actual application, for there is a danger, he says, that "pure philosophy now replaces pure science as the ultimate cognitive law giver, establishing objectivity" (Marcuse, 1975, p.235). It looks very much as though Marcuse may be subject to the very criticism that he raises about Husserl. If Marcuse is taken as generating a view of the philosophy of science then his analysis seems to offer scope principally for somewhat complex philosophical exegesis. But the idea within the analysis that the development of the natural sciences may have, in some sense, outrun man's capacity to control them is well worth preserving. There are repeated references in Marcuse's work to science and technology as "domination", and at times this appears an obscure and elusive concept. The discussions about science as a method, and affirmative culture have highlighted some of the problems in

Marcuse's general discussion of "industrial culture". But within the general analysis there are a series of useful ideas about how science could be said to dominate, or, better, to pre-dominate in aspects of modern industrial life. Marcuse is not particularly asking about the operation of political structures in industrial society, but trying to see the ways in which industry in its various aspects may conflict with moral and other values, or generate organisational forms that do so. The sense given in the discussion about Husserl is the sense that science, via its prodigious applied development, may "unearth" a series of issues which current political, economic, moral frameworks are not developed to cope with. The sheer scale and power of scientific change, the impact on the environment, the numbers of people involved in large technological projects and the difficulties of access to raw materials all seem of concern throughout Marcuse's work. The thesis may not look as radical in the 80's as in the 50's and 60's, but the issues are clearly important. One of Marcuse's own graduate students has developed these themes in more detail. In William Leiss's "The Domination of Nature" (Leiss, 1972), the development of science as a method is outlined, but it is the question "how is power over nature to be used responsibly?" that he goes on to highlight. For Leiss the logic of scientific development is one problem, but the context of that development is interdependent with it. The logic of scientific development may involve various "aims" of its own, but as long as it does produce goods and need natural resources, there will be scope for arguments about distribution and access. The essence of the impact of technology may well concern its own "telos", but whatever this may be the world that it operates in is one of social conflict. The industrialised countries require access to oil and other resources that are unequally distributed between nations and individuals, and they produce goods that are just as unequally distributed. The relationship between nature (whether "organised" as goods, or "there" as matter) and man is the crucial focus of analysis. Fittingly Leiss comments that of the early Institiue members, Walter Benjamin, pointed out that "we should not regard the essence of human technique as the ability to dominate nature. Rather, he suggested, we should view it as the mastery of the relationship between nature and humanity" (Leiss, 1972, p.198). This seems to be the emphasis of Marcuse's idea of "unequal development". He seems to be suggesting that great effort is put into finding new arrangements for reorganising matter, but not enough into reorganising social structures. Or, perhaps, that insufficient attention is paid to the effect of technology on the environment, and that that environment is partly occupied by man! In so far as technology is directed towards total control over nature it provides even more emphasis on the necessity for a

counterbalancing examination of the social ramifications of that process.
Marcuse approves of the ecology drive, but also of ways of seeking the
connections of man's values and aims with the actual process of technology.
In what areas does technological process fulfill whose aims and with what
implicit values; these seem to be Marcuse's main concerns (see, for example,
Marcuse, 1972e, pp.59-79).

Marcuse, then, is concerned with the predominance of technology-related concepts
in various areas of industrial life. These also cover the directly "personal"
areas of a more psychological nature, and also the impact of what he sees as a
"scientised" culture. The "personal" impact relates to sensuous aspects of man
and nature and how they may be affected by industrial society. These issues
will be covered in the later focus on the more psychological areas of Marcuse's
work. The impact of a "scientised" culture however is developed in various
ways by Marcuse. The idea that the general framework of symbols, beliefs,
values and so on is altered in advanced industrial society is given its final
development by consideration of the way that issues are presented in a
technological society. Marcuse suggests that the "closed language" of industrial
societies, "does not demonstrate and explain - it communicates decision,
dictation and command" (Marcuse, 1968d, p.89). This is so within capitalist
and Soviet societies. To examine this idea it is necessary to examine one
example in some detail, as the general theme is touched on throughout Marcuse's
work. Thus he suggests that the development of aspects of industrial sociology
shows the trends he has in mind. He focuses on Roethlisberger and Dickson's
"Management and the Worker" (published in 1947) to argue that studies of this
sort can re-interpret situations in ways that he suggests might conflict with
important social and political considerations. This general idea also features
Marcuse's notion of the "operationalism" of social sciences which was critically
discussed earlier. Indeed the logic of Marcuse's arguments always contains
this trend, and is shaky at best. But Marcuse's most useful contribution may
be to focus on science in terms of the possibility of a predominant social status
for it as a means of expression. Bearing this in mind what then can be made of
his ideas about the "closed language"? It is part of the general notion of
the "social impotance of critical thought" (Marcuse, 1941, p.424), that studies
like the Hawthorne ones can have the potential effect of changing the social
and political impact of critical statements. There can, Marcuse suggests, be
a process whereby a "conversion" of statements to less critical variants is
possible. Thus, the statement "wages are too low" can become "this man's wages
are too low to support his wife" (see Marcuse, 1968d, pp.94-96). For Marcuse
the developments in industrial sociology represent those in various other areas

of life. They show tendencies to convert more general statements which imply
wide political content, into more specific statements which imply that the
overall structure is all right but there is a local problem. One statement is
part of a debate with wider consequences than the others, and it is the forcing
of the debate into the narrower mould that concerns him. The argument that
follows the "conversion" will not be about the proportion of "value-added"
which should go into wages, but rather about the need to re-grade one man's job.
Certainly certain forms of argument are likely to direct attention to different
sorts of issues even though they refer to the same basic problem; it may also
be true that the focus of some more "scientific" types of analysis about social
issues will tend to be on the "particular" with the attendant loss of the more
"general". Marcuse suggests that this is a common process at work throughout
industrial society. But the usual "philosophical/social" divide means that this
is usually justified in terms of references to the industrial sociology (or
whatever) analyses and little evidence for their actual use or impact. Still,
if we assume that some elements of this trend do exist it would seem reasonable
that a focus on the "particular" is less likely to lead to much of an organised
attack on the general state of affairs under which they occur. It also would
therefore seem likely that those who benefit most from current arrangements
will be most enthusiastic about this sort of study. If, say, management find
that Trade Union collective campaigns can be re-focused towards individual
grievances (which cost less and threaten major change less), then it seems
likely that they will embrace that re-focusing. But why is the argument simply
not refuted by, say, the workforce? Implicit within Marcuse's argument is
the assumption that the "status" of the "scientific" argument is higher than
any other form. It may be an "imposed" status in the interests of those that
the arguments serve, but the interesting suggestion within Marcuse's ideas is
really that it may simply be a product of what could be called the social
construction of science. That is to say that there may be an association in
people's minds of certain terms, symbols, phrases, settings and so on with an
idea of "science". This, of course, need not directly represent what "scientists"
do, the point for the analysis here would be to ask if there was a particular
credibility given to "science" in this socially created form, or to particular
aspects of this "science". It would also involve seeing what other ideas are
associated with this "science", because they could conflict with "non-science"
ones when this "science" is used in the general language. This would seem to
be part of Marcuse's meaning of the "Orwellian language" of industrial society
(see Marcuse, 1971a, pp.1-3), and comments on the way that Vietnam's "kill

rates" are discussed side by side with traffic density "rates" (see Marcuse, 1972b, pp.259-260). He suggests that mass society "quantifies the qualitative features of individual labor and standardises the individualistic elements in the activities of intellectual culture" (Marcuse, 1941, p.436). Marcuse seems to be suggesting a de-humanising aspect to industrial culture, death is a statistic like any other, and a product is a product like any other, however much it involves a man's skills or thoughts. Presumably he objects in part to a short-hand description which implies a certain "neutrality" about a subject that may well have moral, social or political components; these only become clear (or rather are clearer) when the subject is more "rounded out" than the quantified abstraction of "rates" and so on. In this case it must be asked how much any notion of scientific "neutrality" in the socially constructed "science" can be carried over into other areas. Does the word "rate" used in the manner above imply "science", and does this tend to be associated with ideas of objectivity? If so the distancing that is implied from the events may well be an effect that does de-humanise in the sense of removing emotion (and possibly therefore removing action that may follow that emotion?) There may also be a sense in which people associate "scientific" statements with "natural laws". If so the "kill rate" can sound rather like a natural event being reported and discussed, rather than the outcome of a specific policy decided upon by man.

Marcuse sketches out aspects of these ideas in various references in his studies of the industrial impact on culture. But he draws back from the discussion in any detail and unfortunately the theme of a sole "scientific" method of "operationalism", or ambiguity about whether "science" somehow contains "its own telos" looms too large in his writings. The combination of the more cogent parts of his critique on industrial civilisation provides an interesting set of ideas which do not quite seem to fulfill their promise of an analysis of the "historical-social project of technology" in which "is projected what a society and its ruling interests intend to do with men and things" (Marcuse, 1972i, p.224). Certainly the need for discussion of the control of technology seems ever more relevant. When industrial societies embark on technological programmes with quite frightening implications (for example, the nuclear reactor development - see C.I.S., 1978b), the discussion might fast be becoming a necessity.

An artistic contrast?

In summary, then, Marcuse has proposed his own view of how a "morality to live by" could be composed (although the elements of the composition are not fully detailed). His propositions have been developed in the light of some of the more "philosophical" views of morality (used simply to mean morality as philosophers describe it) and in the light of some more "social" aspects (used simply to mean morality as potentially identified in social rules of conduct). The whole framework seems compatible with Marcuse's view of the need for a certain "work morality" for industry, and with the need for some form of "work organisation" for industry, although he proposes changes in aspects of each. Potentially this is a powerful analysis, but it is flawed not least by Marcuse's more absolute conceptions of "affirmative culture" which tend to make the analysis very abstract and sometimes difficult to pin down to the genuine social issues that obviously concern Marcuse. Overall though Marcuse does make out a case that industrial society is in some sense unequally developed, focusing more on "what do we all lose?" rather than "who gains?". The sense of unequal development implies that machines are being perfected more than man's social structures, that science is being developed more than moral and political frameworks. Science has, if you like, outrun other forms of discourse and analysis, both in theoretical development and practical application. In general terms, and Marcuse's approach is always to the wide social issues, a case is sketched out that "science" could be seen as a predominant mode of discourse, perhaps principally in the sense of the impact of a "social construction of science". The unequal development in terms of man's own control of science is a fascinating study, and an important issue, but Marcuse does not offer enough evidence or example. Unfortunately this discussion about science is also flawed by a mistaken discussion of "scientific" method, and a tendency to introduce an ambiguous notion of "science" as a subject of study and an activity having its own aim, or "telos".

But if industrial society is unequally developed what is needed to fill the "vacuum" of the lack of development, what is the contrast of full development? Marcuse's suggestions about this are perhaps among his most stimulating. Again and again in his studies he turns to images and ideas from art to inform his critique and to expand the idea of further development and "alternative discourse". For Marcuse, "Art's separation from the process of material production has enabled it to demystify the reality reproduced in this process" (Marcuse, 1979, p.22) and "Art can express its radical potential only as art, in its own language, and image, which invalidate the ordinary language, the "prose du Monde""(Marcuse, 1972e, p.103). Even in a future "classless" society

art would have "lost its elitist character but not its estrangement from society", for art "cannot represent the revolution; it can only invoke it in another medium" (Marcuse, 1972e, pp.103, 104). What Marcuse seems to be arguing is that if the industrial culture tends to have a scientific mode of discourse within it, then an alternative can be seen in art. Much as science reorganises nature in its application so does art. The novel, the painting and so on re-order the elements of the environment, and for Marcuse they do so in a particularly "human" way. If technology tends to destroy creativity by uniformity, machines replacing man and so on, then art could be for Marcuse the quintessence of creativity allowing full flow of man's imagination. In a later discussion about art in terms of Marcuse's views of "man" this point will be examined further. But art really provides the linking theme throughout Marcuse's analysis. He sees art as the junction of the sensuous and the rational, of the emotional and the cognitive. He sees it as recapturing, or rather holding on to values which are denied within industrial society. Much as, say, the philosophical concept of hedonism can in Marcuse's view still contain an example of pleasure which industrial society denies, so art can do the same for aspects of man's culture. In particular he emphasises the values of the bourgeois era in the intellectual not the materal sense (where "intellect- ual" is in terms of the "higher values", science, and the "humanities", the arts, religion;and "material" is in terms of the "actual patterns of behaviour" in "earning a living", 'the system of operational values" and so on - see Marcuse, 1972e, p.83). He is suggesting that art can hold the image of his "liberal-humanistic" principles in the face of a general lack of them in society itself. It is principally art of the classical canon which Marcuse concentrates on, and he envisages its images of the Beautiful somehow being made real in future society. But the components of art also show man's frailty and fears in the sense of tragedy, of loss and pain; for Marcuse art shows man in all his aspects. In so far as art seeks to represent deliberate images of social and political forms it must within Marcuse's vision remain committed to the form of art or risk losing its radical promise. If it challenges this form, if it seeks to be anti-art then it only offers a version of society's existing modes of discourse. Thus the fringe theatre groups who operate agit- prop theatre in the street are more akin to journalism for Marcuse, whereas "committed" artists who stay within art "form" no matter how "realistic" or "naturalistic" do offer the alternative vision (he gives as examples various artists including Büchner, Zola, Ibsen, Brecht, Delacroix, Daumier, and Picasso - see Marcuse, 1972e, pp.85-86). When art within Soviet society is directed towards representing the current reality as the ideal, then for Marcuse it also

loses its radical promise. Art can offer images of alternatives, it can "transcend", but if it is ordered just to beautify the present arrangements this denies this function, and Soviet organisation of art "wants art that is not art and it gets what it asks for" (Marcuse, 1958, p.131). In being forced towards this position the art and science boundaries blur, and art is adornment and not criticism (see Marcuse, 1958, pp.120-135). Art can also emphasise the "general" as compared with the concentration on the "particular" which Marcuse has deplored. Thus "black music" can be seen as the "cry and song of the slaves, the ghettos", it can be the general condemnation of parts of the social structure, but white "rock" music tends to "performance" not participation and each individual listens to an act effectively on their own and "liberation remains a private affair" (see Marcuse, 1972e, pp.114-5). There are many other examples available of Marcuse's references to art to exemplify his case. Put baldly as the ones above have been they sound rather difficult to make sense of, but their interweaving within his work actually seems to form a powerful case. Indeed one of his main contributions to social theory may be his commenting on and use of art throughout his work. But it is not only by detailed examination of the examples that this contribution can really be explored, rather the key factor is that art, via examples and ideas, is offered as a contrast to what happens now within many different parts of life in industrial civilisation. The reader can be forced to think, and to analyse in a different and important way. Earlier a reference was made to Berger's notion of "modernity" as a component of industrial culture. He also suggests that there may be "carriers" of "technological consciousness", where "the primary carriers are those processes and institutions that are directly concerned with technological production. The secondary carriers are processes and institutions that are not themselves concerned with such production but that serve as transmitting agencies for the consciousness derived from this source. The institutions of mass education and communication generally may be seen as the most important of these secondary carriers" (Berger, et al., 1974, p.43). It is, perhaps, the exploration of these "carriers" that is one of Marcuse's main concerns, and his use of art may be best thought of in terms of this. For Marcuse seems to be offering us an alternative "carrier", and he is doing his best to demonstrate it throughout his work. He counterposes the image of the "technological consciousness" with the "artistic consciousness", and although at times it may be difficult to follow and even obscure the process seems worth the effort. It is probably possible to see within Marcuse's work a fairly developed aesthetic theory, and aspects of this have been implicit in this discussion and will be in later ones, but it may be the "challange" that he

offers about art that is the area that should be concentrated on. For he
challenges the reader to "understand" art for themselves, and after doing this
to try to compare it with other views of the reality they know. It is an
invitation to see alternative "carriers". Sometimes the suggestions are in
the form of delightful images, where a poem about cranes flying into the sky
and the clouds is allied with thinking about images of liberation (see Marcuse,
1972e, pp.119-120). Sometimes they are direct references to authors, discussions
of paintings, music and so on. But throughout Marcuse seems to remain "true"
to art in a way that is difficult to describe. Perhaps it is that his references
to it do usually leave it up to the reader to fill in the details of the links
he suggests, the contrast he wants to demonstrate. The ambiguity and gaps
that are seen elsewhere in his work can perhaps appear as a positive factor
in a disucssion of art; art which for Marcuse shows the essence of freedom
and of human creative values. But it is also that it is impossible not to
feel that Marcuse simply takes art very seriously, that he respects it, and
also admires and enjoys it. In an interview in 1978 Marcuse said, "I believe
that in art, literature and music insights and truths are expressed which
cannot be communicated in ordinary language" (Marcuse, 1978, p.171). He has
struggled throughout his works to give expression to that belief, and both the
struggle and the belief seem worthy of respect.

Industrial civilisation - the people within it

Introduction

Marcuse has now continued his examination of the "gains and losses" of industrial civilisation through various cultural avenues. Some of the weaknesses evident in his earlier works have re-surfaced within these later studies. In particular, perhaps, the examination of science as a method, and the lack of detail of social and political concepts (e.g. the State) have brought Marcuse to emphasise a position which can represent science as oppression itself. As Hamilton has commented, "science, from being wrong because contemplative, becomes false because it is employed by a repressive mode of domination, to become domination itself" (Hamilton, 1974, p.58). However although the concept of domination via science is not very clear the idea that science in a cultural sense might predominate, and that it might also have in some ways "out-run" other developments, has been explored. Marcuse has developed this, and other themes that have been noted, in a psychological and social psychological direction and these developments form the next stage of the discussion.

The general concerns that Marcuse expresses in these developments are perhaps those expressed by C. Wright Mills, when he described a version of modern man "who is "with" rationality, but without reason, who is increasingly self-rationalised and also increasingly uneasy" (Mills, 1970, p.187). Marcuse has tackled this in a variety of ways so far, but now we shall be primarily concerned with his attempts to continue via Freud. The kind of problems seen behind early ideas are also seen here. Although emphasis will be given to Marcuse's place within "Frued studies" it is important to remember that his concern is to develop a critique of industrial civilisation. Perhaps he highlights this problem himself in a review of Norman O. Brown's "Love Mystified" when he says that Brown is "stuck with the time-honoured quandary of psycho-analysis: the airplane is a penis symbol, but it also gets you in a couple of hours from Berlin to Vienna" (Marcuse 1972k, p.235). It is perhaps a quandary for Marcuse too.

In continuing this analysis of Marcuse concerns about his relative isolation, and his "high flying" view above social reality will feature in their final form in this section. Some ideas from the previous discussion, for example, the involvement of art as "holding" some image of man will be developed here. With this final section on the more psychological studies within Marcuse the cohesion of the various elements

of his critique can be examined, and this will feature, for example, in the discussion of the "models of man" that he uses. Overall it will now be possible to see how Marcuse has expressed the "vision" which was discussed earlier, and perhaps in particular how art plays such an important role within it.

Marcuse and Freud: The background to the studies

The impact of psychoanalytic theory on all forms of intellectual thought
grew steadily in the early twentieth century. Freud's own work moved more
into the directly sociological and political fields in this period,
following his anthropological discussions in "Totem and Taboo" published
in 1914. Some of Freud's other specific contributions to this area were
not published until the 1930's, but before this the Institute had shown
an interest in psycho-analytic theory. Adorno, for example, had written
a lengthy paper relating psycho-analysis to Cornelius's transcendental
phenomenology. Erich Fromm was, however, the main Institute theorist in
this field, producing a number of papers in the Zeitschrift during the 1930's
on psycho-analytic psychology and social psychology. Marcuse himself seemed
to show little interest in this area during this period. Even his contribution
to the Institute publication on the family showed no concern with the
psychological issues it clearly touched upon when discussing the historical
development of "authority" (Marcuse, 1972q). Marcuse's paper dealt solely
with the development of the concept of authority from Calvin to Pareto
No doubt there was active internal Institute discussion about Freud, as
about other areas of Institute work, but it did not feature in Marcuse's
publications. However the Institute was of course concerned with the political
events occurring in the 1930's; with the rise of fascism and the seeming demise
of the Marxist Social Democratic parties. They were faced with a fascist
government on their own doorstep which led to their departure to the U.S.A.,
and with what Anderson has described as "the long decades of set-back and
stagnation, many of them terrible in any historical perspective, undergone
by the Western working-class after 1920" (Anderson, 1976, p.93). Stalin,
Mussolini, Hitler and Franco were the growing forces in the West. Marcuse
has suggested in interview that he specifically traces his own in-depth
reading of Freud to this period and its political events (see Robinson, 1972,
p.136). What are the themes that we can identify in this new study of Freud?

The political issues and events that faced the left-wing Institute and Marcuse
could clearly tend to lead to a new emphasis on exploring the reasons for the
apparent willingness of the working-class to follow a fascist rather than
socialist path. Jay, for example, notes that within the Institute there was
a "growing dissatisfaction with Marxism, even in its Hegelianised form" which
led Marcuse, "as it had Horkheimer and Adorno, to examine the psychological

obstacles in the path of meaningful social change" (Jay, 1973, p.107). Having
shown that man is bound by external chains it had apparently become necessary
to show that he was bound by internal chains too. Looked at in this rather
abstract fashion the issue becomes somewhat problematic in terms of Marcuse's
adoption of psychological explanations for social change. Quite clearly
there are many other options available to theorists who press for social
change, and yet see the reverse of their aims. The theory can be at fault
in sociological ways and not psychological, or there can be a failure in the
transmission of such theories to those who will act upon them. But to raise
these questions, which may be implicit in Marcuse's stance, shows two of the
problems that Marcuse, and the Institute in general, faced. They lacked, with
certain notable exceptions, the means to verify in any empirical sense the
theories they formulated. In the Institute's case this was not so true as
for Marcuse but for Marcuse in particular it is an issue that keeps recurring.
They also lacked any strong connections with working-class movements, or
political parties. The danger of wondering why "they" can't see that "we"
are right is a real one, although in the confused and terrible times of the
late 1930's and early 1940's it is possible to understand some degree of
isolation. These broad issues will need returning to, but of course, in
general, the study of the links between psychological and sociological
explanations, or character and society are worthy of close attention. Freudian
theory alone may not, however, be the ideal vehicle.

But alongside the demise of socialism, specific aspects of the rise of fascism
were important for Marcuse. There is, he suggests, an emphasis on
"universalism", and "compared with individuals, the social totality as self-
subsistent and primary reality becomes, by virtue of its pure total character,
a self-subsistent and primary value: the totality is, as totality, the true
and the genuine" (Marcuse, 1972p, p.7). Marcuse seems to be suggesting that
some aspects of "individualism" (which he does not clearly specify) are
subsumed under some kind of "mass-society" (which he sometimes specifies as
"the state" and other political formulations, but more often refers to as an
overall cultural grouping e.g. the Volk). To put it another way, he suggests
that a key characteristic of pre-fascist bourgeois society is an emphasis on
the private realm. Some areas of life are essentially private, they are not
the business of public institutions. They should not be organised, e.g.
economic privacy, and they should not be dictated, e.g. political privacy
(see for example, Marcuse, 1972p, pp.16-18). Under fascism however these

areas are changed radically. This is an era of, "total mobilisation", through
which the individual must be subjected in all spheres of his existence to the
discipline of the authoritarian state (Marcuse, 1972a, p.124). Marcuse talks
in terms of the demise of individuality, and the exemption, under liberalism
(pre-fascism) "of concrete regions of private life" from control by collective
entities like the authoritarian state (Marcuse, 1972a, p.124). Now Marcuse
is discussing here, it would seem, both a simpler and more complex view than
comes through his already somewhat convoluted prose. At its simpler level
he could seem to be suggesting, somewhat unexceptionally, that fascism seeks
direction from the centre of political and economic processes. The previous
era (defined only as bourgeois capitalism) presumably allowed some degree of
privacy to economic process; although it is not clear quite what Marcuse has
in mind, it seems acceptable that economic central control is a hall-mark of
fascism. The demise of any concept of political pluralism under the rise of
over-arching concepts like "the German nation" and central political control
also seems acceptable. But surely Marcuse is also suggesting a more complex
factor here that involves some fundamental character shift in the development
of fascist mass society (and he is equivocal about whether or not it really
accompanies forms of monopoly capitalism in non-fascist states). Presumably
Marcuse is suggesting something like this: the early bourgeois period is
characterised by the individual using his reason to arrive at the truth. In
that sense it is a rational era, in contrast, say, to a period when men
accepted the authority of tradition. In the fascist era man cannot use his
reason so freely, as some of the conceptual areas he should be able to explore
are "removed" from everyday life (e.g. political pluralism is replaced by
monism). Now, if this is the point that Marcuse is making it would suggest
that he needs to be concerned with the ways that these concepts are "removed"
from everyday life. The overall culture emphasises the new concepts, and
seeks to impose them overall. Perhaps another angle to this could be via
German philosophy, especially Kant, where rationality could be said to be
identified with autonomy. The free man is the rational man, and in so many
ways fascism is establishing unfreedom. Marcuse has been continually concerned
about the tension between the public and the private areas of life. In what
ways can actions seen as "private" guide the "public realm"? What public
rules are necessary to allow one man's "private realm" development which does
not affect anothers? These sort of questions, and the concerns in general of
political philosophy, appear regularly in his studies. What appears to happen
with the development of his work in the post World War II period is that these
questions appear as questions about "individuals" and "masses", and their
conceptualisation is somewhat vague, and their emphasis psychological in
orientation.

For Marcuse, then, there seem to be issues derived from his ideas of political developments, and the formulation in theory of these developments, that need classification concerning the character structure of "fascist man". This, of course, was an Institute concern (e.g. "Studien über Autorität und Familie" (Institut für Sozial forschung, 1936)), and a concern of many of its members (e.g. Adorno et al, "The Authoritarian Personality" (Adorno, 1950)). Marcuse's versions of the issues are often pitched at a somewhat complex theoretical level, and with terminology that is not clearly defined, but the issues are obviously important. They relate fairly directly to Marcuse's concerns with the idea of freedom, and the notion of rationality. Rationality would indeed seem to provide the third theme underlying the new-found Marcusian interest in psychology.

Marcuse's work has a continuing emphasis on the idea of "the rational" which it is sometimes hard to pin down. In so far as he is concerned with the more inner workings of man and the psychological notions of "acting rationally" it seems strange that he should choose to examine a psychological tradition that is derived largely from a study of the irrational. Psycho-analytic theory has its origins in hysterical reactions, and phobias, and can perhaps be seen at its clearest when it is explaining seeming irrational (or perhaps non-rational) actions like slips of the tongue. Now actually this argument, although sometimes put forward, cannot be carried very far. In exploring aspects of irrationality Freud could, after all, be said to be showing the way to more rational behaviour. Indeed this does seem the basis of Marcuse's approach. For example, in one of his later comments on Freud Marcuse suggests that he wants to counteract "the widespread misunderstanding that Freud is in any sense an irrationalist. There is perhaps no more rationalistic thinker of the past decades than Freud, whose entire endeavour is aimed at showing that the irrational forms that still operate in men must be subjected to reason if human conditions are to improve in any way" (Marcuse, 1970e, p.33).

Freud's own view on the prospects of when and indeed if the rational in man would triumph were not, of course, over-optimistic, but the nagging doubt about Marcuse's psycho-analytic endeavours does not really realte to the idea of exploringthe irrational for the rational. Rather it concerns the possibility that the reason for it could be related to a view of the working class actions he was witnessing (whether the demise of the Social Democratic Parties, the Moscow trials or the Spanish Civil War) as being examples of working class irrationality. To say, and to argue, that there may be "irrationality" within

these actions is of course perfectly feasible. A debate about the loss of long-term aims for immediate ones seems relevant, as does an analysis in terms of unforseen consequences, or hidden aims. That is to say that the public who supported, for example, the Nazis may have taken an immediate view about immediate personal gains that ultimately cost them dearly. The working class support for the Nazis presumably needs analysis vis a vis the Nazis' support for, and from, business. There are these, and many other ways of looking at the rationality of these actions. But there is a suspicion that Marcuse's approach to this has at least a suggestion that the irrationality of actions lies in not acting in ways deemed rational by Marcuse, and that this is an origin of the search for the psychological obstacles to change referred to earlier. If it is even a very small part of the search it can obviously have important consequences, and some of the rather elitist strains in Marcuse's work may be a result of just such a process. The search for the "real" roots of man's actions and the adoption of Freudian instinct theory may also be connected with this stance.

The final theme that can usefully be highlighted before turning to the detail of Marcuse's studies concerns the issue of how we view the contribution of the past to the present. Marcuse has a continuing concern with this issue looking at in terms of theory, and in terms of past and present events. Within theory he is concerned with both over-arching concepts, and in elucidating what is time-specific within the essential formulations. Thus he has, for example, traced the concept of hedonism from some of its Greek philosophical forbears through to a possible use in modern forms of social theory (see Marcuse, 1972m). Alternatively he has argued that some of Weber's arguments about reason relate to a formulation of reason that is historically specific to a form of capitalism (see Marcuse, 1972i). In the light of this it will come as no surprise to find that Marcuse's reading of Freud attempts both a historical "location" of some concepts, and an attempt to see the over-arching contribution made across time periods. As usual the periods seem loosely defined, a point which will emerge later. But there is another sense of the "contribution of the past to the present" running through Marcuse's work which relates to a general stance on maintaining what was good from past eras while allowing modern advances. In theoretical formulations, for example, Marcuse's analysis of hedonism leads him to suggest that the concept is both "abolished and preserved in critical theory and practice" (Marcuse, 1972m, p.199). Indeed one of the aims of critical theory is to prevent "the

loss of the truths which past knowledge laboured to attain" (Marcuse, 1972n, p.152). To put it more simply he means, in part, that the best of the old is to be added to the best of the new. This would also seem to apply to technology, for example, where some old techniques should be maintained, but new ones accepted where significant social gains are possible. Or to political economy where aspects of, say, the freedom of the early bourgeois era should be maintained in the versions of social and economic structure implied in Marcuse's analysis. To maintain the "remembrance of what could be" (Marcuse, 1972a, p.98) is importance for Marcuse. Clearly the general stress in psycho-analysis of the interplay of past and present is of direct relevance to Marcuse's project. One of the less fortunate consequences of this can however be seen in the emphasis it gives to certain aspects of Freud's work. Marcuse is searching for some "basic character of man", and the "drives" that power him. An emphasis on Freud's instinct theory which attempts to outline this is inevitable. But in putting heavy emphasis on this area Marcuse is relying on an area of Freudian studies that is notably speculative, and was not highly developed by Freud. In some ways if we reject Freud's description of man's past and his psychic structure we must reject Marcuse's, for Freud is central to Marcuse's later studies. As we shall discuss later, Marcuse's work must be taken within a tradition of Freudian studies, and if it is not then it is subject to a great many problems.

The background to his later studies therefore concerns the rise of fascism, and the apparent demise of socialism. Issues of "reason" and "freedom" continue to occupy prominent places. The ways that we can criticise the present from lessons of the past, in fact the values inherent in past eras, continue to occupy Marcuse. The details of these later studies can now start to be outlined.

Marcuse's psychological and social psychological critique of industrial
society.

The Framework in Freud

It has been suggested that Marcuse's work has a number of strands within it
which might emphasise a need for, or an affinity with, a psychological
approach to social problems. But in fact Marcuse is suggesting that the border
between the "psychological" and the "social" is now blurred beyond distinction.
Thus "psychology could be elaborated and practiced as a special discipline
as long as the psyche could sustain itself against the public power, as
long as privacy was real, really desired and self-shaped; if the individual
has neither the ability nor the possibility to be for himself, the terms of
psychology become the terms of the societal focus which define the psyche" and
the task is, "to develop the political and sociological substance of the
psychological notions" (Marcuse, 1969b, p.21). Presumably Marcuse means
by this that the actions of individuals do not derive from autonomous
decisions, and they are directly traceable to wider political aspects. So,
can this be re-phrased in a more concrete form? For example, I may think that
I want a new video tape recorder, but in fact the idea has been generated by
a social system that sets a high value on new consumer technology. Furthermore
my desire will be strenghened by a specific social focus derived from the
system, for example, a competitive desire to own more than my neighbour.
Finally when all this results in my purchasing the equipment I am contributing to
a profit-based system which favours the few at the expense of the many.
Now each part of this example could be discussed, and empirically tested. It
would be open to investigation via a number of theoretical frameworks, such
as social learning theory, or the concept of reference groups. But Marcuse
wishes to go further than this in his suggested conversion of the social to
the psychological. He speaks of an era when privacy was "really" desired,
and when the individual had the ability and possibility to be "for himself".
He wants, presumably, to elaborate the difference between false and true
desires, and between the individual and the "individual swayed by the crowd".
He is quite clear that this is not possible via therapy, for "private disorder
reflects more directly than before the disorder of the whole, the cure of
personal disorder reflects more directly than before on the cure of the
general disorder" (Marcuse, 1969b, p.21). For him the society is sick, and
is reflected in its sick members, although these factors are so intertwined

as to make the perception of sickness complex. If we are brought up to
accept the "disorder of the whole" and the "private disorder" as rational
(or rather as non-problematic) we will not necessarily comprehend our sickness.
So Marcuse notes that the "class structure, and the perfected controls required
to sustain it, generate needs, satisfactions and values which reproduce the
servitude of the human existence" (Marcuse, 1972f, p.15.). Needs are therefore
"generated", satisfaction is "controlled", and the underlying purpose is the
maintenance of a particular socio-political system. How much Marcuse is
consistent about this, how much he is able to show this, and ways in which
the concepts can be clarified are all covered later. Perhaps we should note
the distance that Marcuse has now moved from the more modest hopes that Freud
expressed for the application of psycho-analysis to social questions. Freud
in fact suggested that "the mental life of human individuals, when subjected
to psychoanalytic investigation, offers us the explanations with the help of
which we are able to solve a number of riddles in the life of human communities
or at least to set them in a true light" (Freud, 1973, pp 202,3). Marcuse
clearly has wider aims in mind.

In developing his critique of industrial society Marcuse directly uses
terminology and concepts derived from Freud's final outline of instinct
theory. He also uses elements from Freud's studies on "social" questions,
viewed within a psycho-analytic frame. At least for initial discussion
Marcuse takes the Freudian concepts "whole". The version of Freud that Marcuse
adheres to is outlined below. Using Freud's own version provides the terminology
and concepts that Marcuse uses, and it also provides a "baseline" from which
to assess some of Marcuse's development of psychological and psycho-analytical
concepts.

A succinct version of Freud's final instinct theory can be found in "An
Outline of Psycho-analysis" (Freud, 1939). Here he suggests that the basic
psychic structure of the brain is formed by three agencies. The exact nature
of these agencies is not to be interpreted in the form of, say, a "map of
the brain", rather they represent the conflicting forces, or desires, whose
conflicts or co-operation form our overall psychic functioning. The oldest
of these agencies is the id, and it contains everything that is psychologically
inherited, that is present at birth, and also the instincts. The id operates
in an area basically unknown to us, that of the unconscious. A portion of
the id, influenced by the perception of the real world, has undergone a

special development and is called the ego. The ego effectively straddles
the areas of pre-conscious psychic activity (i.e. areas sometimes amenable
to conscious explanation), and the unconscious. Its development follows the
pattern of oral, anal and genital stages that is also the way that libido
(or life energy, some form of basic driving force) "emerges" in the real
world. The basic sexual drive is, if you like, centred around the oral, anal,
and genital areas in turn in childhood. This is its developmental structure.
The "real world" for the child is normally that of the child's parents. So
the "perception of the real world" that affects the ego is principally the
world surrounding the child as it develops. Self-awareness and bodily
development are linked, and so are sexuality and thinking for the libido is
sexual desire, in a form of hypothetical mental energy, that finds expression
via the erotogenic zones (oral, anal, genital) and in other ways. The ego
has the task, in essence, of self-preservation. It performs this task in
connection with external events by becoming aware of stimuli, avoiding them,
dealing directly with them or changing them. Conscious perceptions belong
to the ego, and the tasks just suggested can be seen psychically and
behaviourally e.g. as memory (awareness of stimuli), flight (avoidance),
adaption (dealing directly with stimuli) or activity (changing stimuli). For
internal events the ego can act as an inhibitor, it can repress ideas keeping
themout of conscious perception. Its repression functions, including repression
of the id, are all unconscious. The long childhood period of dependence on
parents leaves behind it, via resolution of the Oedipus complex, a special
agency in the ego which could be seen as prolonging parental influence. This
agency, the superego, is a form of conscience. It is introjected parental
authority. Introjection, for Freud, is the process by which the relationship
with something external is replaced by one with an internal mental state.
It is a counterpart of identification. Introjection of parental authority
can be seen to fulfill two aspects of introjection as a psychic process,
firstly it is a defence against separation-anxiety and secondly a
factor helping in the development of the autonomous individual. As Marcuse
puts a rather high stress on this process it is surprising that he does not
discuss the Oedipus complex, a key component of it, but his references to
it are brief and its detail as seen by Freud need not concern us. The
final outline of the conscious and unconscious psyche therefore has the ego
acting as a form of arbitrator between the competing demands of the id, of
the superego, and of reality. Freud suggested that the main drive for these
psychic processes arises from two basic instincts. He is hesitant about the
number and nature of them, and whether their energy can switch from one to

another, a process he called replacement. Even in his final works he suggested that replacement was insufficiently understood and indeed that the existence of only two instincts was an assumption after long hesitations and vacillations (see Freud, 1939, p.150). The two instincts he proposed are Eros, the life instinct and Thanatos, the destructive instinct, and they feature prominently in Marcuse's analyses. It is difficult to tell directly from Freud quite how the death instinct operates. Both Eros and Thanatos as they appear in action may have a conservative nature, attempting to restore life to an earlier form of things (perhaps ultimately aiming at an inorganic state - death may be "built-in"- see for example Freud, 1961, pp.30, 31. Marcuse develops these very tentative ideas of Freud in great depth, and there is not that much to build on within the original. In particular the relationship of Eros and Thanates to each other and to libido is not clear to Freud, indeed "the assumption of the existence of the instinct (of destruction) is mainly based on theoretical grounds," and "it is not entirely proof against theoretical objections" (Freud, 1963, pp.58, 59). Libido is involved as a basic drive in "every instinctual manifestation" but " not everything in that manifestation is libido" (Freud, 1963, p.58 footnote). Marcuse does see libido as the basic drive, and total drive of the instincts. In fact unlike Freud everything does appear to be libido, and this leads to some problems that will be discussed later. Libido, of course, appears "in action" in various sexual or sensual activities and if as it were "bottled-up" can be the source of neuroses. Its other path for expression is via "sublimation" where the drive appears as creative energy in, say, art or work. This is not a repression of sexual drives but a redirection towards a necessary and useful adaption to reality. The whole basis of modern civilisation is based on instinctual repression to enable communal life (e.g. controls on aggression and sexual jealousy), and to encourage production whether cultural or material. Freud was unwilling to say whether or not he felt this repression was justified, although he was worried about the control of the aggressive and self-destructive instinctual forces (see Freud, 1963, pp.81-82). Finally Marcuse also draws upon Freud's conjectures about the origins of society. Freud notes these origins as containing some sort of arrangements whereby incest was forbidden, and sexual laws were formulated. From this basis the relationship between families was organised. But behind some activities of tribal clans such as animal killing and eating of a totem-animal, Freud suggested might lie a deep myth concerning man's past. The early groups of ape-like humans with a patriarchal leader (as seen by Darwin) may have had a revolution by the

younger men, who were acting out of jealousy for the sexual rights the patriarchal leader had over the young females. This leader was killed and eaten, and the ensuing guilt of this Oedipal crime led to laws mentioned earlier about murder and incest and to tribal totem activities. The combination of the sexual arrangements being socially ordered, and the discovery that via co-operative work man's lot on earth could be improved provided, according to Freud, the two-fold foundation of the communal life of human beings (see Freud, 1963, pp.36-38) and these will be considered in the following discussion (for a relatively specific outline of "Marcuse's Freud", see Marcuse, 1969b, esp. pp.36-56).

In the context of the many studies that are now available linking Freud and social theory this outline of his work as seen by Marcuse might not seem so very remarkable. But "Eros and Civilisation" was first published in 1955 in the U.S.A. and was one of the earlier studies in this area. It is undoubtedly something of a pioneering book, and Marcuse has drawn together some fascinating ideas from within Freud's work, which well repay study.

Four themes can be seen in Marcuse's development of Freud. They concern the socio-historical nature of Freudian concepts, the nature of technological advance, the individual and society, and the importance of art. We shall turn to these next.

Socio-historical and biological concepts - the Performance Principle, surplus repression and repressive desublimation.

Marcuse makes specific attempts to locate historically some aspects of the Freudian outline. Thus the "amount" of repression that civilisation necessitates is examined, the nature of the "reality" that the psyche reacts to and the forms of sublimation activity available are looked at. Secondly he relates the outline to an industrial society with advanced technology. This area is intertwined with the social organisation and to some degree economic organisation of such a society. The social component of this, such as the nature of the family, the relationships of individuals and so on form the third development; finally he attempts to expand upon some of the ideas about the unconscious which Freud suggests, looking at art in particular, as well as some sort of idea of the political freedom attendant upon different forms of conscious and unconscious links. Bearing in mind the Freudian building blocks these four areas will now be examined.

Marcuse suggests that the "biological" and the "socio-historical" aspects of Freud should be distinguished. The Freudian principles have been based on the development of civilisation, the entire history of which has been a history of organised domination. As such some of what appears fixed and "biological" in Freud may be "socio-historical". Marcuse in fact uses the term biological rather loosely, but in the case of his development of Freud he seems to mean by "biological" psychic concepts or processes, those which are an unchanging part of man and these concern the basic instinct structure and the process of libidinal drive. He suggests that other factors, particularly reality and pleasure principles, can be related to historical eras. Freud has captured the essence of these in general, and in bourgeois civilisation in particular, and we shall explore this in more detail later. Along with a specific historical form of the reality principle, the amount of repression of instinctual drives is also socio-historical, as is a specific form of non-satisfying activity (in the instinct/drive satisfaction sense). This activity looks like a "genuine" release of libido, but it is not and Marcuse refers to it as a repressive desublimation. These changes, Marcuse suggests, are about "extra-polation" of Freud, and not about "adding some sociological factors" (Marcuse, 1969b, p.44). Marcuse appears prepared to stand or fall by the side of Freud.

The first major development therefore concerns the reality principle. For Freud the psychic processes operate under the two principles of pleasure and of reality. The pleasure principle is the primary one, and is linked to the unconscious. Under it we would be seeking immediate gratification of wishes. The reality principle on the other hand allows some delay between wish and fulfillment and we can defer gratification. The reality principle is necessary for us to function at all. Without it we would be so overwhelmed by multiple, intense wishes that we would be virtually paralysed. We would be so concerned with the thought of food in general for example, that we would not be able to organise ourselves to plant crops, or even pick fruit, in order to obtain food in particular. Now Marcuse suggests, with Freud, that the operation of the reality principle has been the basis of the productive although in many ways unpleasurable labour which itself has given us so many material advances (see for example, Marcuse, 1970b, p.11.). But under modern conditions of surplus, and in particular under the condition of alienated labour, this principle can be seen as being operated in recent history in a particular manner. It currently operates as a performance principle. Marcuse seems to mean by this that work could have equal pleasure rewards and economic rewards but that historically it has not, and accordingly the designation performance

principle emphasises "that under its rule society is stratified according to
the competitive economic performances of its members". He also notes that
"it is clearly not the only historical reality principle" (Marcuse, 1969b,
p.50). Unfortunately Marcuse does not detail just what these are, and in so
far as he does not do this the changes he makes in the principle are not very
clear. What is the "basic reality principle"? Is it somehow how man operated
in Freud's time? In fact as we shall see in a later discussion about "the
individual", and as has already been noted about Marcuse's seeming desire for
some reinstatement of an earlier bourgeois society, this may be the case. The
performance principle as it stands contributes to an interesting debate about
the shifting nature of the reality that the reality principle operates within.
It does not seem to add much beyond this. Marcuse's ideas about that "reality"
need further critical analysis which will also be covered later, but we should
note now the emphasis on alienated labour. For Marcuse is seeking to convert
such concepts into psychological ones. The same could be said, for example,
of the connection of hedonism and sensual categories. Thus Marcuse has already
inferred, in 1932, that alienated labour is "not merely an economic matter,
it is the alienation of man, the devaluation of life, the perversion and loss
of human reality" (Marcuse, 1972g, pp.7, 8). But the achievements of
civilisation operating under this performance principle may have "created
pre-conditions for a qualitatively different non-repressive reality principle"
(Marcuse, 1969b, p.111). It seems as if man may operate very differently in
the future, an idea which forms the basis of some difficult problems for
Marcuse, as we shall see when discussing his "models of man".

The second development of Freud concerned the idea of surplus repression.
The repression of instinctual satisfaction that is necessary for civilisation
at all is, according to Marcuse, exceeded in modern industrial society because
of the basic social domination within that society. The degree of surplus
repression thus shows in some way the degree of unfreedom. The nature of this
domination is part of a continuing debate within Marcuse's works, that is
never carried through in detail. The repression that is basic to civilisation
is presumably that which is related to man's biological needs as compared
with the socio-historical factors of domination. But the identification of
these needs is somewhat difficult when Marcuse defines them as functional to
the social organisation of man (i.e. approximately Freud's usage) and also
causing "if not satisfied" the "dysfunction of the organism" (Marcuse, 1972f,
p.20). This tautological argument does not really advance Marcuse's case.

He is continuing to search for the basic character of man, and it is increasingly
generating difficulties for him.

The final socio-historical emphasis that Marcuse wishes to develop concerns
the notion of sublimation. He suggests that the burgeoning in advanced
industrial society of works of art (via reproduction, etc.), and cultural
activities, and also the increasing liberalisation of sexual areas, the
"permissive society", may not represent the constructive channelling of
libidinal energy that it would seem to represent. Rather than being genuine
sublimation, or erotic release, it actually is "controlled desublimation"
(see Marcuse, 1968d, pp.69-72). The muzak in the supermarket is not merely
a pale shadow of actual Bach (presumably Marcuse means something like live
playing in surroundings that encourage careful listening), but may have the
opposite psychic effects in terms of instinctual relase of gratification. In
so far as this is the product of the system of domination operative in these
societies this is "repressive desublimation", and represents the specific
socio-historical form of the sublimation process. Unfortunately Marcuse's
concept of domination seems to lack clarity. As domination's nature is open
to debate so the nature of repressive desublimation that apparently serves it
will also be seen to be somewhat vague.

Technological advance and its psychological impact

Running through these new socio-historical factors is the second area in Marcuse's
new reading of Freud, that of technological advance. Throughout Marcuse's work,
and especially evident in "Eros and Civilisation" and "One-Demensional Man"
is the theme that the impact of technology has somehow dehumanised man. It
has made him enormously powerful via weapon   enabled him to affect nature
massively, and altered his working practices in a myriad of small and large-
scale ways. Marcuse's stance that the psychic repression that lies behind this
development may have opened the way for more psychic freedom than ever envisaged
by Freud is an interesting "radicalisation" of Freud. It implies that Freud's
pessimism about the need for instinctual repression, at least at the current
level, may be proved wrong. Modern society founded on instinctual repression
and hence productive labour, is one for Marcuse where there is progressive
"elimination of personal initiative, inclination, taste and need" (Marcuse,
1972b, p.258). Within this, work is alienated labour, and Marcuse seems to
imply that work at its most alienated, and in a basic sense unpleasurable,
is work within technological manufacture. Presumably he has in mind something

like the production line, where the appalling pressures of machine-dictated processes may be at its worst (there are of course many descriptions of this process available, as Marcuse would say, such as Benyon's "Working for Fords" (1975)). But technology also represents the possibility of less work. He suggests that "technology operates against the repressive utilisation of energy in so far as it minimises the time necessary for the production of the necessities of life, thus saving time for the development of needs beyond the realm of necessity and of necessary waste" (Marcuse, 1969b, p.84). But although Freud's notion of work as unpleasure may figure in these arguments for Marcuse, he is on the whole talking about conscious processes. His objections sound like good liberal assumptions about the need to remove some of the more awful jobs around (and no one can doubt that they exist in wide numbers in industrial countries, and also of course in non-industrial). The humanitarian desire to improve the quality of work in general may lie behind Marcuse's statements rather more than Freud does.

Technology also leads to another new psychic situation, Marcuse suggests, whereby the destructive power it gives to man in the form of weaponry may be less controllable because of its psychic connections than more primitive versions. There is a separation of act and result in, say, the firing of a gun which is unlikely to be as extreme with a dagger. "Technological aggression" does not satisfy aggression urges (themselves the expression of instinctual forces) as much as direct aggression. Marcuse suggests a principle component of this is lack of "engagement of the body", and if it is true "the experience of advanced capitalism becomes involved in a fateful psychical dialectic which enters into and propels its economic and political dynamic: the more powerful and "technological" aggression becomes, the less it is apt to satisfy and pacify the primary impulse, and the more it tends towards repetition and escalation" (Marcuse, 1972b, p.264). This is a rather intriguing argument, but in terms of Freud it does suggest that libido is clearly "available via" Eros and Thanatos, but somehow when serving Thanatos and destruction it is not "really" released and so can be sort of everlasting. The Eros and Thanatos split does not easily fit the energy drive model of Freud's anyway, and Marcuse is developing it along particularly fanciful lines here. The idea of work in the service of Eros as, say, art, and work in the service of Thanatos as, say, the production line is equally fanciful. The conclusion that they represent humanitarian values about aggression and satisfaction, rather than developments of Freud seems inescapable. The pursuit of these, and the question of improving work or releasing destruction, is of course eminently

reasonable. Within it Marcuse, like perhaps the majority of us, has a
love-hate relationship with technology, which produces the goods and also
produces the ɔomb.

The concept of the "individual"

The technological changes in advanced industrial society have accompanied social
changes of a far-reaching nature according to Marcuse, and these involve the
third area for discussion, that of the place and development of the individual
in society. For Marcuse each individual is now "an atom in the co-ordinated
mass of the population" (Marcuse, 1972e, p.12). But this is not a mere
metaphor in his analysis, as he is suggesting much more than, say, the growth
of large-scale enterprises, or the rise of centralised bureaucratic control.
Marcuse is suggesting that the psychic effect of an increasingly organised
society (as he sees it) is an increasingly organised psyche. The mental
counterpart of the "subjection of previously private, asocial dimensions of
existence to methodological indoctrination, manipulation, control" (Marcuse,
1970c, p.46) is that the previously private area of the psyche has been not
just indoctrinated but altered in terms of its internal functioning. This
can be, he suggests, explored in Freudian terms but in doing so it becomes
clear that the basic assumptions of Freud "have become obsolescent to the
degree to which their object, namely the 'individual' as the embodiment of
id, ego and superego has become obsolescent in the social reality" (Marcuse,
1970c, p.44). Bascially Marcuse is saying that the formation of the ego
itself is affected in advanced industrial society. It is affected by the
reality it has to adjust to, whether in the form of alienated labour, or the
increasing restriction of consumptive pleasure to the world of mass produced
goods. It is also affected by indoctrination and manipulation. Marcuse
discusses this in terms of the use of language to ascribe moral value (he
seems to have in mind "helpful moderates" versus "mindless militants" and so
on), as well as some forms of direct censorship-type control of the media.
He also talks in terms of economic power of control, of the military-industrial
complex, and sometimes in terms of the whole social apparatus of advanced
industrial capitalism from education to advertising. All these things somehow
impinge on the psyche with the same message, that is to "support the system".
Now obviously Marcuse is in danger here of the rather unsurprising functionalist
finding that the various institutions of a society tend to support that
society. He certainly takes his own vision of the society of total control
to extremes that imply a stability and coherency that could not be justified.

He perhaps takes the adverts' claims too seriously himself? His argument
that the model of psychic functioning developed by Freud could not operate
to its best level in this society needs rather more elaboration of the society.
He gives us an exhilarating ride through the "manipulation system" and gets
away with a blurred version of it by relying on speed to cover vast areas.
But what about man's psychological development in this, what happens in the
formation of our psyches. Marcuse also suggests that the ego now has, as an
ego-ideal (i.e. a model to develop towards) a collectivised ego of the mass
society. Instead of relating to an ego-ideal principally derived from within
the family, it now relates to one derived from the general culture of mass
society (presumably that portrayed on T.V. and radio, as well as via
socialisation agencies like schools - these seem to be the examples). This
weakening of the ego as an individual force is coupled with repressive
desublimation in society at large. He even hints that the formation of the
superego may be via introjected authority from the leaders within society
rather than within the family.(see, for example, Marcuse, 1970c, pp.47, 48 and
Marcuse, 1969b, p.86). Again there are some interesting points about the
impact of family changes, the role of T.V., the nature of a "global village"
and so on. The exhilirating ride continues without a pause, as he also attempts
to compare aspects of life now with aspects of life as he thinks it might be
if his logic about technology, instincts etc. is correct. In terms of concrete
examples these involve aspects of the "New Sociability" which he attempts to
identify within the counter-culture movement of the early 1970's, as well as
a series of references to sensuality in general, and to peace in general
(see, for example, Marcuse, 1972f, pp.31-44, or Marcuse, 1972e, pp.59-78).
He draws a series of pictures of the "beautiful" in terms of peace and sensuality
which are often in broad generalisations, but are perhaps best summed up as
a particuarly artistic and sensual vision of Marx's much quoted all-round-
individual doing his fishing and philosophising. This is an example that
Marcuse gives, but he is clearly aware of the difficulties of such a description
(indeed any description) of future life which can easily sound ludicrous or
trivial, especially when the sheer scale of industrial society sounds so
dominating. Marcuse refers to the "joking-ironical sound" of the Marxian
idea, and acknowledges that future society will be on a large scale, but he
nonetheless is suggesting this new vision of man as a possibility (see, for
example, Marcuse, 1972f, p.29). If we can slow down Marcuse's hectic pace
through all these factors we come up with a collection of ideas that sound
remarkably like the concerns of the well informed liberal. The role of the

school, bias in the media, the possibility of a satisfying job all probably feature as problems for our well informed liberal, even if he or she would put them more mundanely than Marcuse. On the whole he has probably highlighted these and other issues in advance of popular concern, and his aim for a commentary on current social affairs would seem partially fulfilled. In at least one sense Marcuse in his works in the 60's and 70's seems more the liberal journalist than the left-wing theoretician. However aspects of the journalism have their merit, and aspects of the theoretician although that side requires further analysis. Unfortunately the works of journalism, however prescient they are, tend to date quickly, and turn into a source perhaps more for historians than others.

Marcuse has had an enduring interest in art throughout his studies, and the Freudian studies on this area give the final theme that he covers.

The importance of art

Marcuse comments that "Freud singles out phantasy as one mental activity that retains a high degree of freedom from the reality principle even in the sphere of developed consciousness" (Marcuse, 1969b, p.119). As he has portrayed the current form of the reality principle, the performance principle, as being a particular form of repression, this area of phantasy is for Marcuse one of the important last areas where man's true humanity is portrayed. The concrete form of the imagination shown in art therefore holds out a promise of being able to portray an image of freedom, an image of a different form of human life, which is otherwise denied in a society dominated by the performance principle. His emphasis on the importance of imagination (and indeed on aesthetics in general) runs throughout his work. The imagination links the senses and freedom, via the senses providing the material and the imagination fashioning it in the realm of psychic freedom. At least internally, and externally in art, there is an area for Marcuse that can transform experience in non-repressive ways. Indeed he suggests that these rights and truths of imagination should become the demands of political action (see, for example, Marcuse, 1972f, pp.36-38). But it is not as much the actual "content" of art which portrays these imaginative truths as its "form". This is true in perhaps two senses for Marcuse in connection with psychic pressures. Firstly the "style, rhythm, meter introduce an aesthetic order which is itself pleasureable" (Marcuse, 1969b, p.122). Indeed he sees in the unrealistic and atonal art of the 1950's a flight away from its revolutionary potential. For Marcuse it is the emotional sweep, the beautiful design, that provides

the form that represents an essential quality of humanity that is increasingly
lost in modern society. The aesthetic form responds to "certain constant
qualities of the human intellect, sensibility, imagination" an area that
philosophical aesthetics has interpreted as beauty (see Marcuse, 1972e, p.87).
But the second important factor in art that features in Marcuse's connection
of it to the imagination, concerns the ability of art to re-order events, to shape
its component parts in a fashion dependent on beauty, and not, say, solely on
commercial gain. The imagination can reorganise in this way, when this is not
possible in most of life in general. The organisation of reality is open to
experiment in art. In this sense he suggests that even, say, surrealism can
represent the world in greater truth than direct comprehension, for the fact
that "the propositions of the artistic imagination are untrue in terms of the
actual organisation of the facts belongs to the essence of their truth"
(Marcuse, 1969b, p.125). But the diffusion of these images of truth to a
wider public via, say, reproduction does not entail a wider audience for their
liberating ideals according to Marcuse. In one way the use of them as commercial
decoration, or muzak background, diminishes their impact in terms of quality
or in terms of the lack of concentration on them that this entails. It also
means, he suggests, that the qualitative difference with the established reality
principle is weakened when art is side by side with the repressive factors of
the daily work or consumption world of the performance principle. To maintain
this power the great works of art must retain a separateness from at least
some parts of everyday life. The art and reality separation implied in this
will be returned to later.

Art, for Marcuse, both portrays and links aspects of man's immediate past (e.g.
the bourgeois "individual") and more general past (e.g. the direct portrayal
of man's instinctual structure) in a concrete aesthetic form that can act as
a mirror to the future. Marcuse notes that "art has reorganised what is and
what could be, within and beyond social conditions. Art has rescued this
knowledge from the sphere of abstract concept and embodied it in the realm of
sensuousness" (Marcuse, 1979, p.67). Indeed the very term "aesthetic" combines
for Marcuse aspects of reason and aspects of sensuality. Aesthetic form can
be used to outline the principles of a civilisation where reason is sensuous
and sensuousness rational. Presumably Marcuse is suggesting man's rationality
and sensuousness can both be detected in artistic portrayal. He is certainly
suggesting that a rethinking of the connection of these two areas is possible
via an approach to aesthetics, based he suggests, on Schiller's "Letters on

the Aesthetic Education of Man" (see Marcuse, 1969b, pp.143-160). Given that reason can be seen to underly the reality principle and sensuousness to underly the pleasure principle it also suggests the bringing together of two seemingly divorced principles of psychic functioning. So, for Marcuse, reason and sensuality can be seen as linked in art. The philosophy of Schiller and Kant lies behind this connection. In so far as Schiller could be said to be looking at how man's psyche would have had to have been for there ever to have been a genuine harmonious and free personality, Marcuse is using Schiller much as he has used parts of Freud.That is the use of Freud to show the possibility of the rational side of man via an exploration of the irrational. Jameson has explored this idea in some detail (Jameson, 1971, pp.106-116), and it makes an interesting philosophical study. Of course much as Freud had no real grounds for saying when the rational side of man would triumph, so Schiller's free and harmonious personality may not be an option. But Marcuse holds on to these options, and even though he does not forsee short-term change, he is in at least his view of man "through art", an optimist and a radical.

We shall now turn to three contributions to his radical optimism and look in more detail at his development of Freud, his view of man, and his view of art.

The development of Freud

Within the general context of studies using Freudian ideas what particularly
has Marcuse been able to contribute? It has been noted that he has taken as
a basic outline some of the ideas within Freud's own work that were not
brought together in systematic fashion by Freud, and that represented some of
the last developments of his work. The process of doing this and attempting
to enlarge upon the ideas has been an interesting contribution in itself.
But also, as noted, Marcuse has generated new concepts, or changes, such as
the Performance Principle and so on. He has also looked at the impact of
technology, the role of the individual and the importance of art. There are,
of course, flaws in the analysis, but in general he has contributed to the
work on the less commonly analysed areas of Freudian theory. Indeed, within
this, the areas that Freud only sketched in are often those enlarged on
by Marcuse. For example, in connection with art, Freud tended to concentrate
discussion on the artist and not the work or the audience. Marcuse accepts
Freud's view on the artist, which is perhaps essentially art as fantasy, a
family Romanticist view. He would also accept the separation of the form and
content in art that suggests to Freud that form gives rise to "fore-pleasure"
and content to secondary pleasure (see Holland, 1964, pp.28-30). The content often
not really being "pleasure" but a form of defence. Thus we may pay attention
to jokes in the context of a comedy act, which focusses our attention, and
gives us "fore-pleasure" in the setting, the general creativity of it all and
so on. But the content of the jokes may release laughter which is connected
with the "meaning" or " content"and is a defence to deal with unconscious
fantasies, feelings or fears. Now Marcuse has developed the first area about
form, whereas Freud concentrated on the second. Marcuse is fleshing out the
Freudian ideas. He also gets involved in difficulties of this, as will be
noted later about form and content. But in this expansion of Freud as in the
other areas he usually has an affinity with Freud's humanistic concerns.
The desire not to "reduce" art by analysis of it, or as Holland says a "view
of the creative process" that "makes art both product and proof of the
dignity of man" (Holland, 1964, p.20); these ideas seem shared by Marcuse and
Freud. The concern about the "price" that man pays for civilisation is also
shared, but here, as perhaps with his earlier studies on Hegel, Marcuse seems
intent to develop an analysis that might seem conservative, into one that is
radical. In critical studies of Marcuse both MacIntyre (1970, p.43) and
Cranston (1973, pp.157-185) comment on the conflict between Freud's conservatism
as an individual and as a theorist and Marcuse's radical views. But Marcuse has

demonstrated that within the theory there are at least prospects for radical
use. Actually Freud himself suggested that with economic productivity there
might be a possibility of major social change which could lessen the need for
psychic repressions (see Freud, 1973, p.218). Marcuse might also not be
quite as radical as suggested, but that is a different matter. There is no
doubt that Marcuse and Freud also share some basic humanistic values and
concerns, but this should not lessen the attention we pay to the novelty of
Marcuse's work. Not least in the attempt to combine aspects of Marx and
Freud, Marcuse has contributed to a wider movement in social studies. As Jay notes,
"Eros and Civilisation" amongst other works, has now been so absorbed that
it is "difficult to appreciate the audacity of the first theorists who proposed
the unnatural marriage of Freud and Marx" (Jay, 1973, p.86). Marcuse has a
firm place amongst those who have attempted to show that Marx and Freud could
at least be seen to be addressing similar questions. It might be argued of
course that this is not necessary if "the failure of socialism" is taken as
the motive for doing it, and Walton (1970) for example suggests that Marcuse
could have answered this question within a Marxist tradition. But again this is
to deny the contribution to Freud studies, or to attempts to link the concerns
and work of two remarkable men. Marcuse is prepared, as always, to study the
grand theory, and debate grand questions.

The nature of this theory and the nature of the grand questions seem worthy
of closer attention. Marcuse has firmly adopted Freud's instinct theory, and
indeed heavily criticises those who use Freud's analysis without this contribution
(see, for example, his comments on the neo-Freudian such as Erich Fromm, who
was once a colleague in the Institute, . Marcuse, 1969b, pp.190-215). The
instinct theory has at its core a "basic energy" concept of libido. This
operates in a way that for Freud, and Marcuse, seems to parallel a closed
energy system regulated by the physical law of conservation of energy. Libido,
then, is the driving force for each individual, probably being a fairly constant
quantity of energy within each individual. As Stafford-Clark comments, Freud
suggested that libido "could be treated almost as though it were a physical
quantum of energy" (Stafford-Clark, 1967, p.107). We shall later see that
the "almost" tends to disappear in Marcuse's version of this. Freud suggested
that libido can become attached to different objects or complexes, and only
the remainder will be available for sexual drive. All in all the picture is
based upon some sort of hydraulic analogy where quantities of matter flow
into different containers via varying pressures and so on. Within the energy

field the parallel could presumably be Helmholtz's principle of the conservation
of energy. Freud is somewhat ambiguous about the precise nature of this
libidinal energy, although it certainly behaved in the manner just described.
He is, of course, equally ambiguous about the connection between neurological
structures and the areas of id, ego and superego. He carefully refrains from
suggesting that the latter are specific areas in the cortex or specific neuro-
physiological processes, although he does have a background in physiology and
kept an interest in that area and its relation to psychoanalysis all his life.
Indeed although he was quite clear that psycho-analysis was a branch of
psychology and not medicine, it is clear that, as Stafford-Clark says "privately
he still regretted this, in so far as the project for a scientific psychology
had never proved possible for him. He would have preferred the knowledge of
physiology, anatomy, and neurology in which he had been trained, and to which
he himself had contributed in his earliest research, to have been indispensable
to his subject. But they were not: nor at that time, could they even be
related to it " (Stafford-Clark, 1967, p.173). The libido theory for Freud was
therefore an area that was probably "hovering on the brink" of being amenable
to assessment by scientific medicine. Now of course Freud may well simply be
mistaken in his idea about the application of science to this area, or indeed
in his perception of the nature of science itself. Actually Freud considered
that "strictly speaking there are only two sciences, psychology, pure and
applied, and natural science" (Freud, 1973, p.216). But the point is not to
debate Freud's philosphy of science (and of course there is no reason why a
great psycho-analyst need to be a great philosopher). For Freud the operation
of libido broadly followed an analogy with a hydraulic system, it was probably
a closed system, it acted as if energy was conserved and so on; there was some
ambiguity in Freud's model. But in Marcuse's version of it there is no doubt
that energy is limited in quantity, contained in various ways, and released
in various ways. Libido and the instinct theory has taken on the nature of a
closed fixed-energy system. "Quantums of energy" are "stored up through
renunciation" (Marcuse, 1970e, p.36), and libido is "released" and can
"overflow" and so on (Marcuse, 1969b, p.163). Bit if this is the source of
all our energy what process is happening with "repressive desublimation" which
does not really "gratify" the instincts (i.e. release libido). If libido is
not released just what is the motive power? Furthermore if libido is contained,
repressed and so on as Marcuse describes in modern society, then how does

he justify his assertion that society is so stable? Surely all this repressed
energy is potentially a force for instability. As long as Marcuse maintains
a strong commitment to the hydraulic/energy model (even if only as an analogy)
then his own logic looks dubious. His suggested answer to this point about
instability may be that libido can emerge in the service of Eros or Thanates.
It can generate productively or destruction. This is a fine sounding notion
which makes interesting reading, and in symbolic terms it may really be
rather powerful. But Marcuse is avoiding the issue of what real events or
behaviours this could be related to, and in doing that he really allows a
wide choice to the reader, for without any guidelines of substance one man's
Eros could all too easily be another man's Thanatos. Is the Bomb a deterrent
or an aggressive weapon? But for Marcuse there is also the complication that
he emphasises the fixed amount of energy available. Libido is limited, and
Eros and Thanatos play a zero-sum game. Given this limit there is only a
given quantity of energy that can be sublimated and find expression in work
and play or labour and art. This logic could seem to underly Marcuse's
concerns to suggest the limitation of work (despite his stress on man's creative
side) and the limits to the 'quantity' of art (despite its liberating side).
The overall thrust of these arguments is carried to an extreme because of
an underlying logic within the instinct theory. Finally there is an affinity
between the energy model and Marcuse's general lack of any appeal to verification.
Apart from the fact that it is hard to see what could verify the energy model he
uses, there is a capacity available because of it to refer to seemingly concrete
processes (e.g. the attachment of energy, libidinal drive and so on) and their
outcome (e.g. internal repression, repressive desublimation and so on). But
of course these processes do not need any particular behavioural attribute
in the "outside" world. As Sedgewick suggests, there is "a surprisingly
simple fixed-energy model in which depersonalised forces are switched, shuffled
and shunted about with little reference to actual behavioural events"
(Sedgewick, 1966, p.168). It all sounds as if concrete facts are being
discussed, but their availability to study via any sort of outcome in the
real world is not high. For Marcuse the same behaviour could come to be the
end product of an energy process that was constructive or destructive, "high
release" or "low release" and it is difficult to detect any real basis as to
how we judge this. To take an example Marcuse invites us to "compare love-
making in a meadow and in an automobile, on a lovers' walk outside the town
walls and on a Manhattan street. In the former cases, the environment partakes
of and invites libidinal cathexsis and tends to be eroticised. Libido
transcends beyond the immediate erotogenic zones - a process of non-repressive
sublimation" (Marcuse, 1968d, p.70). As long as the discussion is about an
internal flow of forces it can allow Marcuse to make comparisons like this

sound as if they are based on detailed analysis. We might wish to go along with his suggestion that "technological environments" do restrict and limit libido, but the comparison chosen will surely affect our view. As Sedgewick comments "Had Marcuse compared a damp, cold, bug-ridden meadow with the erotic environment more usually offered by technology - i.e. bed, Nature's advantages might have been less apparent" (Sedgewick, 1966, p.170). Overall then Marcuse has generated a number of problems by his emphasis on a fixed-energy model that Freud attempted to keep rather more at arm's length. In generating these problems he has, however, highlighted the possible logic of Freud's model and it seems to lead to dubious results. In some ways of course for Freud the discovery of "instincts" and "libido" were possibly temporary answers to evolving problems within his studies. To use them in social theory may involve a slightly different approach to theory itself. Quite clearly any notion of the limitation of drive energy can lead to "more means worse" arguments and the like, which are at best simplistic. Marcuse's own analysis needs to have these assumptions spelled out. But the real issue perhaps relates to the idea that the instinct theory could be seen at its best in social theory if used in an "as if" sense. The id is not much help as a concept if we are looking at what different parts of the brain do. However as an idea in semi-allegorical form about the sensual side of man it may have great value. Eros and Thanatos are mythic heroes as well as part of the instinct theory and perhaps this status needs emphasising. After all this would emphasise the ambiguous nature of psycho-analysis altogether. Cioffi has referred to psycho-analysis as a "pseudo-science", where the issue is not that it cannot be refuted but rather that it cannot be proved (Cioffi, 1970, pp.471-499). Even in the realms of practicing analysts there are strands of the symbolic allegory idea. For example Storr suggests that psychoanalytic method can be best seen as "semantic interpretation" (Storr, 1968, p.81). Marcuse's work might then be seen as, in part, a sort of artistic critique of society, suggesting new angles on social problems and issues rather than offering specific analogues of them in the social theory mould. This idea will be returned to, but of course, it does not suggest that Marcuse as theorist should be dismissed or ignored, nor that concepts like verification do not matter. In connection with the latter Marcuse does seek to describe aspects of the social world in concrete terms, and when he does so it is encumbent upon him to at least point to examples of what he has in mind. In fact he is not over-careful about this, and his development of the ideas about the "individual" demonstrates the kind of problems this can give rise to.

In advanced industrial society Marcuse suggests that the ego has to respond
to a reality that is composed of "technological rationality","alienated labour"
and capitalist opression. The reality of the performance principle. But the
ego forms in response to a father-son struggle ultimately resolved via the
Oedipal phase. Marcuse suggests that it is now more relevant to see what the
ego aspires to (the ego-ideal) in terms of a "collectivised" ego-ideal. The
reference point, if you like, for our psychic development now focusses not on
the father but on the culture as a whole (see Marcuse, 1970c, esp. pp.46-50).
The bureaucracy, the administration, the media, the education system and so
on all act as substitutes for the father. Furthermore the son is no longer
dependent upon the father for his employment. Marcuse offers no references
for these factors, and although put forward initially as "suggestions" they
are ideas that run throughout his work. They represent, of course, part of
the carry over from the concern about the rise of fascism. Indeed the ideas
are derived from Freud's analysis of organisations with leaders (the Church,
the Army) and there are echoes of the "leader-state" that Marcuse has
described in his earlier writings. Again we might reasonably suspect that what
he wants to find pre-dates his analysis. But the issue here is the systematic
neglect of any concept of verification. No doubt the ideas of the changing
function of the family are in part those of Institute publications (such as
the Studies on Authority which covered some of these areas) but Marcuse either
assumes that we have read what he has read, or does not deem the reference
relevant. Throughout his work he tends to act as if facts were established
when they are often open to debate. Some of his ideas about social events
must be regarded as tentative hypotheses rather than "probable fact". It should
be added that he does tend to confirm this process by referring to Freud's
most speculative work as if also "probable fact". Freud at least sounds rather
more humble, referring in "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" to this work as
"speculation, often far-fetched speculation, which the reader will consider
or dismiss according to his individual predilection" (Freud, 1963, p.18).
Although Marcuse might see himself following in the footsteps of the next
sentence of Freud's, where he suggests that the work "is further an attempt
to follow out an idea consistently out of curiosity to see where it will lead"
(Freud, 1963, p.18). Marcuse's work does do this in part for ideas of
Freud's, but when relating them to events in social reality we are entitled
to ask "what?" and "when?" and sometimes Marcuse's answers are rather slim.

Marcuse, then, has indeed produced developments within the context of Freudian
studies that repay attention, and raise issues and problems for Freud, social

theory, and Marcuse's own analysis. As theorist or commentator he seems to
oscillate between some form of philosopher or artist. In his more journalistic
moments, it might be said, he should be more scientist, at least in terms of
evidence and rigour. It is, all in all, a somewhat quixotic blend of
explanation, criticism or description. Perhaps the combination of explanation,
criticism and description itself represents the difficulties of the task
Marcuse is attempting. He is trying to see Western society as a totality, and
Peter Berger has commented that the difficulties that modern men have in
doing just that may lie behind the extraordinary growth in psycho-analytic
studies and ideas in the Twentieth Century (see Berger, 1965). But as he
suggests, if this is so, if the "unconscious" as an idea could reflect this
difficulty, then the "lack of intelligibility of the decisive economic processes
is paradigmatic in this connection" (Berger, 1965, p.39). Marcuse has not
made these any clearer at all. In fact in at least this sense Marcuse's work
is a reflection of the very problem he suggests exists for modern Western man.
His struggles to grasp the total picture are the struggles that perhaps face us
all. Again his attempt might seem to have as much to commend it as his end
product.

Marcuse's "models of man"

The nature and scope of man's motivations, and the impulses that shape him,
are part of all forms of social theory. If the metaphysical nature of "man" is
taken to be essentially based on self-interest, then the view of the social
structure within which he operates will be very different from a "man" who is
seen as being born with innate goodness and an other-regarding nature. The
Hobbesian need of chains, and the Rousseauistic attempts to avoid them have
represented two of the poles of this question. It is a question that Marcuse
has attempted to tackle. He has suggested, for instance, that Freud's ideas
about the necessity of repressive social/psychic control to maintain the fruits
of civilisation should be closely examined, and to some degree modified. Within
this debate the contribution to man's development from the social world he
lives in, and the contribution from his basic "biological" make-up are in
constant interplay. The kind of explanation of man's growth that stresses
"nature" and that which stresses "nurture" are intertwining contributions to
ex planations of man's ultimate functioning. They are sometimes opposed, or
appear to be, as in the debate about the hereditory or learnt sides to
intelligence. However this does not imply they are opposed in general; nature
and nurture require each other. Martin Hollis (1977) has suggested that it
may be helpful to consider the question in terms of a black box with the two
"inputs" of nature and nurture. He sketches, purely as a heuristic device,
the following diagram.

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NATURE →⌐‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾⌐
         |         |  →
NURTURE→�_    |
        ⌐_____⌐
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
Nature and nurture as input, our "model" of man in the at present unfilled box,
and man's output and effect on the world coming from the box. He develops
this idea in a way which forms a useful critical tool with which to examine
Marcuse. But is is important to bear in mind that these ideas are put forward
as mentioned, as heuristic devices, as Hollis puts it, "they are offered solely
as aides-memoire, perhaps useful if taken lightly but confusing if dwelt upon"
(Hollis, 1977, p.4). Quite clearly the filling of the box can take a multi-
plicity of forms, but Hollis's self-limitation to two basic models fits our
analytic purpose well. He suggests the division of the models into Plastic
and Autonomous man, these two versions falling into groups of theories treating

human nature as passive or active. The distinction between these two involves
the process of "feedback" from man's actions in the world. He suggests that
we can formulate two models that would be represented pictorially as shown:

Plastic man:

Autonomous man:

Thus "Plastic man is a programmed feedback system, whose inputs, outputs and
inner workings can be given many interpretations", whereas "Autonomous man has
some species of substantial self within. But what species of precisely what
is an open question and nothing should yet be read into the drawing of a little
match-stick man inside" (Hollis, 1977, p.5). It is not proposed here to
continue to explore these models as such, nor indeed the specific use that
Hollis makes of them. We shall instead be looking at the interlinking of the
models, and at the groupings of social theories that tend to accompany each
model. The two broad groupings comprise one tending to focus more on social
systems and social control, and the other tending to focus more on interaction
and the generation of social groups. These two groupings could be classified
or described in many different ways. The first will tend to see the notion
of social system as a methodological pre-requisite. Given that man is viewed
as in need of external constraint there is some primacy of the idea of social
system in an ontological sense as well. Hypotheses about concensus, or central
value systems would typically need to accompany this theoretical stance. On
the other hand the second grouping will tend to see society as the creation of
its members perhaps typified in the idea of the social system as the outcome
of social interaction. Hypotheses about shared meaning, and imposing definitions
on others will need to accompany this approach. Each grouping would, of course,
propose a very different form of utopia. Indeed Dawe (1971) suggests that it
is from these utopias that the groupings derive their meaning and their use
and that they are therefore doctrines, but it is the involvement of the
different models of man that concerns us more at present.

The use of the concepts of both Plastic man and Autonomous man seem evident
in Marcuse's work. Consideration can first be given to Plastic man. At times

Marcuse suggests a society of total control. For example in his discussion of bureaucratically administered modern society in "Eros and Civilisation" he comments that "At its peak, the concentration of economic power seems to turn into anonymity: everyone, even at the very top, appears to be powerless before the movements and laws of the apparatus itself" (Marcuse, 1969b, p.88). He makes it quite clear that this control is deeply rooted in the very nature of modern man. The process of internalisation is complete, the very core of man is subject to the system's rule. He suggests that "the individual reproduces on the deepest level, in his instinctual structure, the values and behaviour patterns that serve to maintain domination, while domination becomes increasingly less autonomous, less "personal", more objective and universal. What actually dominates is the economic, political and cultural apparatus, which has become an indivisible unity constructed by social labour" (Marcuse, 1970b, p.3). The idea of the apparatus being constructed by social labour is a point that will be returned to, at the moment the unity of this all-embracing societal structure is the point that concerns us. Marcuse's "one-dimensional men" cannot even fully comment on themselves, they have become so "object-like". He comments for example that "In the last analysis, the question of what are true and false needs must be answered by the individuals themselves, but only in the last analysis; that is, if and when they are free to give their own answer. As long as they are kept incapable of being autonomous, as long as they are indoctrinated and manipulated (down to their very instincts), their answer to this question cannot be taken as their own" (Marcuse, 1968d, pp.22, 23). Indeed in this society "the social controls have been introjected to the point where even individual protest is affected at its roots" (Marcuse, 1968d, p.25).

These brief glimpses of Marcuse's version of a Plastic man suggest that in almost all respects man can be considered as a non-autonomous object. He is, if you like, almost totally Plastic. This vision of man has affinities with an analytical representation of the world that has a heavy emphasis on a social systems perspective. Such a man would be subject to control by the systems that are beyond his independent control. But there are a number of problems for Marcuse with such an analysis.

Firstly it would seem important for him to establish just what the implications are for his theoretical outlook in general. His criticisms of positivistic social science, and his critical theory framework do not sit easily with the implied "social systems" orientation of the "Plastic man" model. But there is

a further problem which Marcuse needs to face that derives from his extreme
adoption of the "Plastic man" model. For all analyses that involve such a
model are vulnerable to an "over-socialised conception of man" as Wrong has
put it (Wrong, 1976, p.104). Two basic issues in sociology are outlined by
Wrong concerning what he refers to as the Marxist question and the Hobbesian
question. The former is concerned with understanding the sources of social
cohesion, with asking "how is social order possible?". The latter is concerned
with more social psychological issues, with asking "How is it that man becomes
tractable to social discipline?". Answers to the Hobbesian problem, he
suggests, often give rise to an over-socialised conception of man. In essence,
if the answer is that society is socialised man, then how do we explain
that man has any feelings of repression, conflict, etc.? In Marcuse's case,
how would he have come to perceive the "problem" of Plastic man if he himself
is subject to the powerful forces he suggests would ensue? Given some cracks
in the process it is still reasonable to ask Marcuse how he thinks the situation
could be changed. Do the masses need arguments or treatment? If it is the
latter is Marcuse not open to the very objections that he suggests his critical
theory reveals about others? Has critical theory turned into a social systems
model suggesting treatment? Instead of facing this issue, Marcuse suggests
that a critical position can be found by erecting a model of ideal man with
which to compare and criticise the present. This ideal man apparently could
really exist in an alternative less repressive society. Suddenly the
theoretical questions look to be more about the difficulties of descriptions
of man in the "State of Nature". But Marcuse also argues that elements of
that man exist now, and this is an important point. Presumably this is part
of the "crack" within the system which can allow criticism and unease. This
model of man is a very different one from the previous example. For this "man",
his needs would emerge "only in the collective practice of creating an
environment" (Marcuse, 1972f, p.38). The ideal is created in man's imagination
he can elaborate this in a sort of surrealistic fashion, often via the medium
of art, and he can come to develop the real world in a form that corresponds
to this artistic form (see Marcuse, 1972f, pp.36-38). Here, indeed, men can
rebel and change the world. Mostly these people seem to be "outsiders" who
he suggests might be those who are less controlled by society, somehow beyond
its full repression. The "outsiders" (the students, Blacks and unemployed all
feature at various times - see for example Marcuse, 1972f, and 1968d) are
joined by those who have at least part of their psychic space capable of
operating in an autonomous way. It may be in the area of sexual liberation
(see Marcuse, 1972e), or in the area of art (see Marcuse, 1972c) or in the

feminine aspects of man (see Marcuse, 1972e, esp. pp. 77, 78). One of the
main needs is now seen as encouraging the relative freedom of thought in
the Universities, and urging liberals in the community to join in with radical
movements (see Marcuse, 1972e, pp. 54-56 and 1971a, pp. 10-13). Whatever the
exact nature of this future/past-present man the specific groups do now sound
very reminiscent of Tom Wolfe's "radical chic" of the 70's. However, this is
a conceptualisation of man capable of acting in his own accord, and in at
least some respects beyond the dictates of the social system. This man, in
short, fulfills the basic requirements of the alternative heuristic model,
"Autonomous man".

Marcuse's analysis apparently reveals two "models of man" within the current
reality. One of which contains components (it seems unclear exactly what
components) of the future ideal of man that is in some senses a reference
point for current criticism. In so far as these two models do have affinities
with different theoretical perspectives Marcuse needs to give some attention
to the implications of this for his own critical theory. In so far as "Plastic
man" suffers from the "over-socialised" problem he needs some defence from
this criticism. He also needs to acknowledge the obverse of the "over-socialised"
problem which comes to the fore in connection with "Autonomous man". For if
all men derive their own social reality, how is social order possible? There
are obviously a number of solutions to this, but Marcuse's seems to be to
on the whole ignore the issue, or to attempt to remove it by suggesting that
basic biology provides the answer. His suggestion that there might be "an
instinctual foundation for solidarity among human beings - a solidarity which
has been effectively repressed in line with the requirements of class society,
but which now appears as a pre-condition for liberation" (Marcuse, 1972f, pp.
19, 20).is a dangerously circular argument to pursue.

Finally, it should be noted that the extreme pictures and extreme separation
of the Plastic and Autonomous models are part of the "manicheistic" tendency
that Parekh (1972) has observed. With these extremes the problem of moving
from the repressed world to the liberated one becomes very difficult. Freud
commented about Bolshevism's "questionable and unprovable" illusions that
human nature can be altered in the course of a few generations so that "people
will live together almost without friction in the new order of society and
that they will undertake the duties of work without any compulsion" (Freud,
1973, p.217). Marcuse has attempted to tackle these illusions, but has given
himself an even more difficult task in terms of the extreme gap he has developed,
and must bridge, between his two models of man. Partly due to this the "radical

chic" catalogue of outsiders emerges, and Marcuse struggles to see the
"cracks" and options his analysis does not easily permit (see for example
Marcuse, 1970a, pp.69 and 80, and 1969c). The point is that Plastic and
Autonomous man can both be seen to exist now, and this theoretical approach
of Marcuse could accommodate that if he was not so bound up in the search for
an ideal model to use as critical reference point. The psychological critique
that attempts to explain social institutions is anyway fraught with difficulties.
Now of course there are various ways in which the Plastic and Autonomous ideas
could be connected and Marcuse's studies given a firmer theoretical base.
Indeed the useful attempts at this kind of issue by George Herbert Mead, and
the later developments by Berger and Luckman (1971) would seem precisely the
kind of work that Marcuse should acknowledge but never does. His individualism
is both his strength and his weakness. Now Berger and Luckman's development
not only could seen as the attempt to link the Plastic and Autonomous models
via the notion that society is both objective and subjective reality but also
it reintroduces "real man" into Marcuse's analysis. The problems he raises
about the links between technology and aggression, sensual components of life
and so on can take a real form via the notion of the "social construction of
reality", as Berger and Luckman describe it. Now this will involve some
rather different ideas from the Freudian ones of the unconscious and so on.
In part Marcuse could be seen as discussing these as an additional layer of
analysis. His critique has on the whole seemed to rely on Freud, but often
been concerned with "grand" questions (morality and immorality, freedom and
slavery, technology and nature and so on) approached really in multiple ways.
The unconscious has its uses in Marcuse's analysis, but certainly a removal
of the fixed energy drive model is important to make the analysis cogent.
Freud would, of course, still figure as being studied in his own right in
this "expurgated" Marcuse, and the fine symbolic battles of Eros and Thanatos
would still have their place. The great questions deserve great protagonists.
What this really suggests is that Marcuse's critical theory may not always be
fully involved in Marcuse's critical method, and that in some respects this
is just as well. For although a number of difficulties have been highlighted
in his method which point to theoretical gaps, the same gaps seem to allow
some development which make his work rather more cogent. Of course the idea
that we might view his work as studies of Freud, and as highlighting aspects
of "grand" issues still stands and has already been discussed. The notion of
Eros and Thanatos (and so on) as some sort of artistic critique of society will
be covered later. But it is in order to suggest the fashion in which a
Plastic and Autonomous "join" may allow Marcuse's analysis back into more
conscious concerns.

The operation of "false needs" for example is a problematic area within
Marcuse's analysis. The suggestion is that men may choose in ways that do
not satisfy themselves in some essential fashion. Marcuse has provided
interesting ideas about this, but the nature of the "essential" leaves the
analysis with all too few links with man's conscious concerns. If we can
provide more of a notion of these links, and perhaps set Marcuse's fairly
individualistic analysis in a more social setting this would provide more
substance to Marcuse's claims. For example would it be helpful to consider
this notion of satisfaction in relation to perceived aims and actual outcome?
If someone actually wants (in the sense that he says he wants and acts as if he
wants) peace and quiet but seems to end up surrounded by noise, then we might
have our Autonomous man yearning "essentially" for peace, and Plastic man,
operating on this "false need" of noise, triumphing. This could certainly be
one layer of analysis, but could we also suggest that the social process
involved in the translation of choice into action is equally worthy of analysis,
and neglected by Marcuse's "manicheism"? A brief sketch of some ideas about
processes of choice in advanced industrial society can indicate the use of
this. For example, Fred Hirsch (1977) looks at the issue of people attempting
to move to the suburbs of a city. In so far as they do this to make the
best use of unspoiled countryside, and yet to have easy access to the facilities
of a city they may in practice defeat their own objectives. For the end product
of the decisions of many people to move to the suburbs can be the destruction
of the country and the depletion of the inner city. With the wider affluence
of industrialisation this problem can be exacerbated; as participation in such
choices grows via individual economic improvement so the very nature of the
choices themselves change. People are not just "entering the game" because
they can now afford to move, they are changing the game itself. As Hirsch
says, "Everyone has a choice of living in the city as it is or in the suburbs
as it is, but not between living in the city and suburbs as they will be when
the consequences of such choices have worked through" (Hirsch, 1977, p.40).
Perhaps it is possible to seek peace and quiet but in the process actually
generate noise. The individual choice, particularly in affluent societies,
often has social consequences which may actually deprive the individual of the
aims of his choice. The mechanisms by which this occurs (such as the time-scale
of inner city decay versus the time-scale of the move to the suburbs and so on)
provide a rich field of analysis, which does not need to rely upon notions of
psychic functioning. The social consequences are much less noticeable if there
are only a few people exercising major economic theories (in the sense of
where they live, or buying a car). But as increasing numbers can buy cars so

they may undermine the finances of public transport, forcing more people to
buy cars and suffer the traffic jams and the loss of freedom of movement that
they hoped to gain in the first place. This also has an impact on what people
can choose between. The possibility of buying the car will continue, but
people cannot choose to travel on a bus service that has been discontinued.
But choice may also be presented rather differently, for instance the "choice"
of increased public spending on, say, clean air may only be presented as a
peripheral part of a political manifesto, whereas goods are advertised every
day. J.K. Galbraith has, of course, analysed this elegantly and at length
(see for example Galbraith, 1970, 1975). He has also suggested that the
affluent industrial society presents new issues in terms of choice between
goods. He notes, with his usual style, that "wealth is not without its advantages,
and the case to the contrary, although it has often been made, has never proved
widely persuasive. But, beyond doubt, wealth is the relentless enemy of
understanding. The poor man has always a precise view of his problem and its
remedy: he hasn't enough and he needs more. The rich man can assume or imagine
a much greater variety of ills and he will be correspondingly less certain of
their remedy" (Galbraith, 1970). In a world that Douglas and Isherwood (1980)
have termed a "world of goods" such men may of course tend to see remedies in
terms of goods alone, which may be a further aspect of the "enemy of understanding".

The effects of affluence on choice are not straightforward. The choice of, if
you like, Autonomous man can have social implications, which affect the outcome
of these choices in a way that looks like Plastic man made them. The nature
of Western affluence as predominantly private affluence, or at least private-
oriented, also leads to choice between things that may not pose too much of an
alternative. It is this car or that car, not the train versus the bus. Indeed
Galbraith's rich man's remedies may all too often be limited to goods alone.
Marcuse's analysis highlight these issues and provide a dramatic portrayal of
them, but if we want to provide more explanation we may well be able to provide
them at a somewhat simpler level. Certainly if we want action to follow the
critical studies then the social implications of choice will be a more
productive road to follow. Marcuse, as usual, may be best seen as alerting
us to the issue.

Marcuse, art and meaning

Marcuse's radical analysis has incorporated a focus on art, and some specific analyses of art throughout. For Marcuse "art does not stand under the law of revolutionary strategy. But perhaps the latter will one day incorporate some of the truth inherent in art" (Marcuse, 1979, p.57). Although aspects of this "truth" have already been discussed it is in order to consider in more detail just how Marcuse has dealt with art in his writings. His contributions merit this, but his views on art also suggest a way that his overall work may usefully be viewed. In the long history of the interconnection of art and politics the view that art is somehow separate from reality, a universe on its own, has usually been associated with a perspective that denies the involvement of politics and art. However recently Marcuse, and others, have suggested that this very separation may form a seemingly paradoxical connection between art and radical social thought (for a brief review of this see Graff, 1973). How has Marcuse portrayed this connection?

Form or content - a basic issue?

Marcuse has outlined a viewpoint on art which suggests some form of deep division between both form and content, and art and reality, as crucial. Rhythm, style and meter have been suggested as essential components of art by Marcuse, and in fact the "form" of art is seen as crucial (for example, Goya's form is seen as contradicting the content of war horrors - see Marcuse, 1972c, p.55). The form of art has been seen as associated with the senses (and essential instinctual needs), and representing the important creativity in man. The form of art is therefore associated with the non-repressive aspects of man, and man's true functioning is at least partly revealed. But form, it is also suggested, sets art off from reality; the reality that for Marcuse is a repressive one. But it goes further than this in that art can also "accuse" reality — presumably the portrayal of non-repressed man's capabilities are part of this. The argument has been phrased in terms of the "free" area of fantasy, the ordering of reality by man's aesthetic judgement in art and so on. But within these arguments Marcuse has tended to argue as if the d vide between form and content was total (see for example, Marcuse, 1972c). Perhaps it is reasonable to ask just what we do therefore make of the content of art. Goya's pictures do depict war horrors as Marcuse, of course, realises. The "ordering" of content by artistic standards is perhaps crucial. But if so just how does he see the content as representing in any way the "reality" it is derived from? Is it rather like the psycho-analytic view of dreams as re-ordering elements from everyday life as the basic units, but not meanings, of dreams? What would this mean with a specific example? For instance,

John Berger and his colleagues have commented on two pictures of the poor by
Hals, where the poor smile at the better-off, while offering what they have
for sale, and he suggests that such pictures assert two things: that 'the poor
are happy, and that the better-off are a source of hope for the world"
(Berger et al, 1972, p.104). How would Marcuse reject this comment? For
presumably he would want to assert that in some sense the form overrode the
content and that Berger's comments may be correct but do not imply the impact
of the painting? Yet, his general critique of industrial society relies in
part upon such ideas as the effect of advertising   reinforcing certain behaviours
and concepts, and other forms of direct manipulation by those in power also
having an effect of establishing the correctness of things by symbolic
manipulation (e.g. corporate images are devised for marketing purposes, and
for internal purposes to keep the workforce productive via pride, fear or
whatever). Advertising in portraying say sexist ideas, apparently contributes
to a sexist world, but art drawing upon that sexist world does not. Marcuse
is attempting to analyse the perception of art, and in emphasising the
psychological is liable to ignore the sociological.

So far the focus has been on the "consumer" but doesn't an equal problem apply
to the "producer"? Marcuse often refers to classical painting and talks of
great arts "power of negation", how it represents the past, the real individual
and so on. But the social context of the artist seems relevant as well. The
patron of the artist weilded great influence over the content of the painting,
and indeed over the way that content was portrayed. Even taking it on Marcuse's
own terms and being prepared to argue that such paintings could be said to
represent or portray in some sense the "individual" of the early bourgeois
period, they also must have involved other facets of that period. New attitudes
to commodity and exchange, the new relations of employer and employee are
presumably all to be represented from the patron's world, and the artist must
attempt to produce for that vision. Now these strands of argument stand amongst
many that could be followed to suggest that Marcuse is going to have at the
very least some problem in maintaining that art, via a notion of form, is
divorced from reality in some sense that can allow art to be critical of that
reality almost in spite of its content. Marcuse's manicheistic tendency is
clear again, and his extreme stand must be modified to be analytically useful.
It is, of course, part of the continuing problem of the concept of affirmative
culture. The notion of the modern affirmation culture that somehow embodies
ideals about man in a way that Marcuse sees as incapable of actually affecting
the world. Rather they reconciled man to this world by virtue of holding out
these actually unattainable ideas as if they were the real ones of the social
world. Because we can see ideals, we can presumably assume our real world

still attempts to uphold them. Quite how this operation occurs is difficult
to analyse, and aspects of the Plastic-Autonomous divorce seem part of the
confusion. But the point here is just what this "culture" of affirmative
culture is. It seems divorced from reality, perhaps paralleling art's divorce.
But how does it get transmitted within society, just what does it look like?
The abstraction that is involved here is part of the underlying logic that has
led Marcuse to shift back and forth over the years about the emancipatory
nature of art. Art embodies the ideals of man (truth, beauty, etc.) and
reconciles man to his present existence (e.g. Marcuse, 1972a), and art embodies
the ideas and thus can represent, if only we can act on it, the possibility
of less repressive forms of existence (e.g. Marcuse, 1972f, esp. pp.42-45).
Art can be seducer, keeping us to the status quo, or siren showing us the
prospects of the evolution. Or as Marcuse says, "As part of the established
culture, art is affirmative, sustaining this culture; as alienation from the
established reality art is a negating force. The history of art can be
understood as the harmonisation of this antagonism" (Marcuse, 1972c, p.54).
In general terms these are interesting points, and Marcuse is engaged in his
usual grand issues. In terms of actually acting on this, however, it is
difficult to know what to make of it. Marcuse's guide to action is to suggest
that we need a somehow "more artistic" social world, where issues of, say,
beauty, are issues of the day, issues of political concern. Again the humanistic
value, and the genuine commitment to art seem to emerge. The idea of more
creative work, of beauty being an issue of public debate and so on, these things
seem decent aims. Perhaps, although he would never make the analogy, the idea
of Islam represented in not just religion but art, architecture and so on
would seem to parallel this notion. Or we could point to Chairman Mao's
fame within China as a great calligrapher (rightly or wrongly earned, the
point is that he was proud of it - it is difficult to see such translation
of realms in the West). But Marcuse also points to the "demarcation" lines
around art, to the crucial nature of the setting (see for example, Marcuse,
1968d, pp.68-73). He also suggests that art is concerned with the imagination
of the artist, linking up with the imagination of the audience. Art affects
not just "consciousness" but also "drives" (Marcuse, 1979, p.32). What can
we really make of this in terms which do not rely so heavily on instincts,
nor on form and content as divorced? Can we maintain Marcuse's radical vision
of artistic truth as somehow a key to the direction of the political and social
world, while making his ideas slightly m ore concrete?

Form and content - a way forward?

Marcuse gives us some idea of a way out of the dilemma of total abstraction
by his comments on Brecht, and on Tolstoy and other "classic" novelists. He
suggests that Brecht has shown a way to represent the contemporary world as
subject to change, and to combine education and entertainment. Brecht has
shown that "not empathy and feeling but distance and reflection are required"
(Marcuse, 1968d, p.65). On the other hand sexuality is best represented
within "classical" rather than "modern" literature, for in the former it is
portrayed as sublimated, and in the latter is repressively desublimated.
Leaving aside the debatable use of sublimation and fixed-energy models
Marcuse is implying that sensuality is "contained" in the former, and that
its release is possible in basic instinctual ways which will gratify and
fulfill part of the purpose of the pleasure principle. In the latter sex and
violence are often depicted graphically, and are seen as just one aspect of
everyday life, they occur more as acts, but have less meaning as emotions.
He contrasts the sexuality of Racine, Tolstoy's and others novels where
sexuality is "absolute, uncompromising, unconditional....beyond social morality",
with O'Neill and Faulkner whose sexuality is "infinitely more realistic, daring,
uninhibited. It is part and parcel of the society in which it happens, but
nowhere its negation. What happens is surely wild and obscene, virile and
tasty, quite immoral - and precisely because of that, perfectly harmless"
(Marcuse, 1968d, p.73). Now although Marcuse's theoretical position is clear
that it is "form" that is the radical factor, this analysis of novels looks
awfully like what other people would call "content". Perhaps the form./content
gap is, if you like, rather more in his theory than his practice? Leaving
aside this for a moment (and leaving aside his judgement about Tolstoy, O'Neill
etc.), is Marcuse attempting to suggest that Tolstoy represents "real"
sensuality? If so this raises, as usual, the issues of just what this is,
but anyway it seems a contrast with the fact that Brecht is commended for his
avoidance of empathy (which is presumably "real" sensuality). His search, as
noted, is for psychological effectiveness, but it seems elusive and difficult
to define. Feyerabend (1967) has suggested that art itself has been concerned
with this search for psychological effectiveness during the Twentieth Century.
He notes Brecht's attempts, and the fact that Brecht often found the audience
continuing to see his characters more as say heroes than symbols (Mother
Courage always seems to draw sympathy for the mother more than realisation of
her connection to the economies of war). Peter Weiss's "Marat/Sade" is also
a play where despite a battery of "alienation-effects" the audience has seemed

to the author resolutely over-involved. Now for Marcuse any such debate is liable to be affected by the confusion over Plastic or Autonomous man. Just what sort of man is doing the creating or the viewing? This confusion might be lessened here if we concern ourselves less with communication factors as such, and rather more with what is being communicated. The problem with this has been that Marcuse has seemed to imply a separation between form and content that is difficult to work with; now we should consider just how form and content together might nonetheless form the kind of communication he has in mind. So if the form and content of art are to reveal aspects of the "truth" about man perhaps we should reinterpret this as meaning that they might indicate for us new models of behaviour. Further if Marcuse's argument's emphasis is shifted from communication process to the nature of the communication itself, perhaps we should view his stance as a suggestion that we view art in a certain way. Marcuse, then, would be seen as encouraging us to look at art as showing models of behaviour as a major part of his argument. This is not to devalue the more abstract theories, the connections between truth, beauty and need, or the sensual links of, say, music. It is however to suggest that if Marcuse genuinely wants art to be taken seriously in social theory, and finally in shaping man's life, the most productive area for this may be the new direction suggested. There is no doubt that it is potentially fruitful. For at root this idea is suggesting that art can show man measured, as it were, against his options. The human frailty of Anna Kerenina against the engulfing passion that can be felt in our lives. The initial, all too human state of Lear, against the truths he can speak only later when "mad" on the heath. This has been put forward by artists themselves, for instance the playwright Edward Bond has suggested that art "always insists on the truth" and "every artist often feels that what he's created is "right", and he's not free to alter it. It's life that in comparison seems arbitrary and random - because society is usually based on injustice or expediency but art is the expression of moral sanity" (Bond, 1974, p.viii). Perhaps Marcuse's particular stress on "great" art is now clearer. Because if for Marcuse, as for Bond, art is a struggle to tell the truth then the quality of that truth will depend on the quality of the artist. But also Marcuse seems to be suggesting in general that new options can be shown in art, new ways in which man can develop more fully. Art can offer a challenge to this by questioning the fact that the present way of doing things is the only way. Marcuse comments that "one of the most effective rights of the Sovereign is the right to establish enforceable definitions of words" (Marcuse, 1972f, p.76). In the sense that is being

suggested here he is offering up art as a challenger to the Sovereign.

But this view of Marcuse on art also links up with the attempt to show a way
to link the Plastic and Autonomous models of man in Marcuse. A Berger and
Luckman type of analysis provided the link, and subjective and objective
reality could be jointly considered. Now this view of art would, for example,
suggest that art can show us how others construct their reality. We can see
the "trick" by which the world appears subjective and objective at once. In
a play, for example, we can see that the characters' world is not limited solely
to "the character at that point in time". We can see how it is shared by others,
changes over time, can be re-constructed in more or less moral ways and so on.
Presumably we might also be able to see the worlds of others that were previously
closed to us. We might see rather more of the world as seen by our neighbours,
bosses, lovers etc. Also of course we might see alternatives, perhaps a number
of them, to the paths that we take now. It might seem increasingly possible
to be less sexist, for example, if characters have struggled with this in a
play. Certainly these tentative ideas are consistent with the suggestions
about Marcuse's models of man, and the review of his aesthetics. It reflects
a viewpoint that can accumulate the idea of sociology (and social study in
general) contributing to art, and art to social study. Thus, for example,
Baumann has explored the parallels between the theoretic and artistic concepts
of Mead and Pirandello (Baumann, 1967). Mead being engaged in the examination
of the relationship between social structure and psychological reality, and
Pirandello looking at man's orientation to his society. These could be more
general stances of theorist and artist, but in the case of Mead and Pirandello
they perhaps come together over the idea of "role". For Pirandello actors
can be both "actor and critic of his own action", and the "subject and object
of dramatic action". By exploring this in relation to Mead's view of man as
a subject which is an object to himself, both art and social theory can be
explored and developed. The theatre lends itself particularly well to this
kind of exploration, but novels and even paintings can be constructively
explored as well. John Berger, for example, examines the idea that women were
portrayed in classical art of the bourgeois period as if objects to be viewed.
He suggests that a man's presence might be defined by what he can do, and a
woman's by what can be done to her, "and so she comes to consider the surveyor
and the surveyed within her as the two constituent yet always distinct elements
of her identity as a woman", i.e. she looks at herself being looked at, and
so   "men act, and women appear. Men look at women. Women watch themselves
being looked at", and the surveyor of the woman in herself is male (Berger,
et al, 1972, pp.46-47). Clearly this sort of analysis can be related to the
role of women in different eras, male/female perceptions of male/female roles

and so on. It does not devalue art, and of course leaves the way open for arguments of critical misinterpretation, but it shows how social studies and art can intertwine. The point is to indicate that Marcuse's invitation to view art in his way is potentially fruitful and could offer advances in understanding both art, social studies and the social world.

Marcuse's major emphasis is on art from the classical canon and he is sceptical or dismissive of much that is modern. In part this could be that his confusion about "the role of reality", as it were, spills over into his rejection of anything that uses modern terms as a basis. This seems the case both in instinct theory terms (i.e. modern sensual actions are not really satisfying), and in terms of art's vital role in being different from the current social world. In fact if Marcuse's main value lies in his "art as models of behaviour" approach then O'Neill should not get such total rejection. The "human passions" are played out against a current background but they are at least potentially as much about truth and sensuality as Anna Karenina. Of course art has lasted over centuries, and it has a potential for Marcuse's search to avoid losing the qualities of the past which is part of its appeal. There is also the sense, worthy of a separate discussion, in which the "truth" revealed is related to the quality of the artist, and Marcuse emphasises the work of great artists in particular. But he is in danger of losing the fact that modern attempts will be potentially creative of "truth", and will embody the main project he has outlined for art. He is also in danger of losing some potentially radical aspects of modern development in communications. Why emphasise the theatre against film or video? The theatre, of course, can be seen as particularly relevant in terms of its audience atmosphere, "live" feel, development of roles and so on. It is also something of an obvious link with man's past, whether in being akin to children's play or in its long history of development, or even in the sense that Hilton has suggested, that "the theatre is an anachronism; a flesh and blood handicraft product in a technological age" (Hilton, 1971, p.35). It is possible to sympathise with this and yet to feel that the divide between art as liberating and T.V. as oppresive is too great. There are of course a number of Marcusian objections to the industrial society that tend to confirm his view of T.V. It is technological, portrays the views as objective but actually shows only one view, it is part of the "mass" link-up as compared with individual ideal, and so on. All these strands have been seen, and accordingly T.V. is not much valued by Marcuse. Now apart from the fact that T.V. provides the largest audience for drama, the technology of "new media" at least has the prospect of radical use. After all the new technology of video, for example, gives the potential for more "democratic"

communications and so on (for a radical view on this see Enzensberger, 1970).
Although many things are doubtless better accomplished by handbills, than
"community video", and although simplicity and "natural" forms have their
value in a complex technological society, the current structure of communications
should not just be taken for granted by Marcuse.

So Marcuse views art in its creation and use as a vital part of any struggle
to understand the social world. But in terms of actively changing that world
the connection of art to political activity is bound to be problematic. Art
can offer radical conceptualisations of the world, and the struggle to relate
art to truth to life is a crucial one. The ambivalence of the connection of
this with "real" politics should perhaps be left to be summed up by an artist.
The following verses are the first three from Hugh MacDiarmid's "Second Hymn
to Lenin", written in his splendid Scottish dialect (MacDiarmid, 1975, p.191).

> "Ah, Lenin, you were richt, But I'm a poet
> (And you cu'd mak allowances for that!)
> Aimin' at mair than you aimed at
> Tho' yours comes first, I know it
>
> An unexamined life is no' worth ha'in'
> Yet Burke was richt; Owre muckle concern
> Wi' Life's foundations is a sure
> Sign o' decay; tho' Joyce in turn
>
> Is richt, and the principal question
> Aboot a work o' art is frae hoo deep
> A life it springs - and syne hoo faur
> Up frae't has the poo'r to leap."

Marcuse's art?

Art is in some sense engaged in the sketching out of alternative models of
the social world. Marcuse also sees his task as sketching alternatives. His
vision of art as "critical despite reality" is paralleld by his own attempts to be
so in his work. There would appear to be some obvious links between art as
he sees it, and his analysis as he sees it. It has been argued that social
studies and art can throw light on each other, and that they engage in similar
tasks. What are the implications of this for the way we view Marcuse's work?
He is engaged in highlighting alternatives, e.g. as commentary on the new
sensibility of the counter-culture, but perhaps more importantly his "style"
is often more imaginative than analytic, he tends to deal in the sweeping
statement, the dramatic over-emphasis and not the detailed concept. Indeed

his ideas are often expressed in ways that sound nearer to art than social
analysis as often understood (e.g. advocating the changing of the cultural
heroes of the Performance Principle, Prometheus, Pandora, to the alternatives
of Orpheus and Narcissus - Marcuse, 1969b, Ch. 8). Eros and Thanatos form
powerful images battling it out across Marcuse's pages. As Sedgewick, who is
not very sympathetic to Marcuse, has noted, his last essays and lectures
"convey urgent ideas", covering important problems "sketched in ringing
cadences" (Sedgewick, 1979, p.296). Now this is not to suggest an equivalence
between Marcuse's work and art, although it is to suggest that attention should
be paid to the nature of Marcuse's analysis, and that the theoretical flaws
should sometimes be seen in this light. Marcuse is not an artist, but his
style of analysis sometimes seems akin to art, or perhaps better seems almost
to parallel art. Perhaps an example would help. Marcuse's concerns with the
lessons of the past, the "recherche du temps perdu" becoming "the vehicle of
future liberation", have an air sometimes more of poetry than of social analysis
(see Marcuse, 1969b, p.34). What echoes could be found in, for example, the
opening phrases of Eliot's "Burnt Norton"? In Eliot's words:

> "Time present and time past
> Are both perhaps present in time future,
> And time future contained in time past.
> If all time is eternally present
> All time is unredeemable.
> What might have been is an abstraction
> Remaining a perpetual possibility
> Only in a world of speculation."

> (Eliot, 1959, p.13)

How can one compare this directly with passages from Marcuse? Both the writers
may reflect the same interest, even share the same idea, but the poet "condenses"
it. The poet challanges us to understand, whereas the social critic seeks
to guide more directly. Marcuse's passage is in a section on man's
phyllogenetic and ontogenetic past, Eliot's may concern this but the method
is clearly different. Ian Craib has explained this succinctly in an examination
of the connections between John Berger's "G" and "Eros and Civilisation" both
of which offer an explanation of sexuality (Craib, 1974   ). As with
Eliot and Marcuse, the social theorist is amenable to summary in a way that
would destroy the work of the artist. The artist uses words more as if
"symbols", symbols which to a greater or lesser extent are a substitute for

the object under discussion, while the theorist tends towards "signs" in
the Sartrean sense that they point directly to an object. "The central point"
says Craib, "is that Marcuse, and sociology, and social theory in general,
tend to use words as if they were simple signs" whereas "the use of words in
literature is, as it were, multi-dimensional" (Craib, 1974, p.327). But these
distinctions are broad ones, and the categories of "novel" or "poem" and
"social theory" can intertwine because of this shared object of study, and
often shared approach to that object (e.g. Mead and Pirandello and the use of
role). It is interesting that Craib chose Marcuse for his study, because
Marcuse actually uses many symbols in writing, whether on the mythic scale
like Eros and Thanates, or Orpheus and Narcissus or Prometheus and Pandora,
or in other terms (one-dimensionality, the Orwellian language of the Twentieth
Century and so on). In this use lies some of his value, as these symbols can
challenge, can encompass wide questions and so on. But there is also the same
difficulty of interpretation as in artistic criticism. Rather than Craib's
comment that he tends to use words as simple signs the point is surely that,
at least in comparison with other theorists, he does not use signs that much.
But this is to put it rather crudely, the issue is that Marcuse has a leaning
towards symbols, and the majestic viewpoint of the artist, rather than to signs
and the more humble detail of the average sociologist.

In the future Marcuse's hope is that men may be able to see with the eyes of
Cezanne, if art can suitably shape the reality they see (Marcuse, 1972c, p.58).
Indeed "the world should be experienced as the lovers of all times have
experienced it, as King Lear experienced it, as Anthony and Cleopatra experienced
it" (Marcuse, 1978, p.171). Marcuse's message is the same, and art plays its
role within it in multiple ways.

Conclusion

The development of Marcuse's speculative vision has now been outlined,
but in conclusion some of the threads running through the outline
could be drawn together.

Peter Berger has commented that "the basic questions to which the
social scientist addresses himself are questions that involve
inordinate amounts of human anguish and human hope. There is
something obscene about the social scientist who pursues his
inquiries in a stance of aloofness from this anguish and hope"
(Berger et al, 1974, p.205). Marcuse has addressed himself to the
core of some of these questions, and has, in a variety of ways that have
been discussed, struggled to avoid being aloof. His commitment to that
struggle has not been questioned, but it has been only partially
successful. The "scale" of Marcuse's enterprise in offering a
critique of advanced industrial civilisation based upon the work of
Hegel, Marx and Freud has been daunting. Within it there has been a
concern with human pain and happiness that would deny the aloofness
that concerns Berger, but in the course of the analysis Marcuse's
efforts have been "speculation" in both positive and negative senses.
In the sense of "speculation" as simply "pursuing an enquiry" he has
indeed offered a reading of Hegel, Marx and Freud which contains
valuable developments. In particular, perhaps, his attempts to
link industrial "psyche" and industrial developments are richly argued,
albeit with problems and difficulties in the argument. He has
"speculated", in the sense of forming "conjectural opinions" on
aspects of political philosophy which are at the core of that
discipline's concerns; issues about freedom and oppression, the
obstacles to "rational" development and the links between legitimacy
and rationality. All this within a context of industrial civilisation
and with relevance to current issues that should form the focus of
more modern political theorists than is often the case. As Kariel
has remarked, the "present" is "not so much a concept as a benign state
of being" for too wide a range of modern political theory (Kariel, 1969,
p.769). The exploration of "men loving their chains", or operating
as "Plastic Men" as compared with an "Autonomous" vision can be
located in a tradition from Hobbes & Rousseau, as well as the
forebears that Marcuse would claim. He has offered "challenges" to much

that is taken for granted in public concern, or in some political theory.
Kettler has suggested that "if Marcuse has not developed an entirely
adequate political theory, his work, if properly understood can be
very good for political theorists" (Kettler, 1976, p.48). As we
have seen the caveat "if properly understood" is an important one.
Finally Marcuse has "speculated" in terms of "imaginative insight"
and offered creative ideas about, for example, the linking of art,
aestheticism, social theory, and radical alternatives. Some "challenges"
have been issued to views of technological development, or options
for the future, social and cultural development, although here, as
elsewhere, the isolation of Marcuse's theorising has not been to his
advantage. Marcuse's own hope is that intellectuals must "prepare the
ground for future alternatives" (Marcuse, 1967b, p.99), and in some
ways he has been able to do this. "Speculation" is clearly a vital
process within this, although it contains the negative side of being
divorced from reality, difficult to demonstrate, and possibly over-
idiosyncratic. Marcuse has fallen victim to this as we have seen.

Marcuse's "challenges" then are important and worth acknowledging.
His refusal to take for granted areas of theory, or social development
is refreshing, although it equally develops problems in the analysis.
But examination of the "fruits" of the Enlightenment and the "fruits"
of technology while emphasising the creative spirit in man has
offered at times a view of the possible development of man and society
that is important and powerful.

Nonetheless some strong criticisms have been levelled at Marcuse
and it would be wrong to under-emphasise these. As his works have
stressed the importance of art in multiple ways perhaps an artist
should be allowed a counter-balancing word about these flaws. A
stanza from T.S. Eliot might be suitable strong self-criticism for
Marcuse, as follows,

> "No! I am not Prince Hamlet, nor was meant to be;
> Am an attendant lord, one that will do
> To swell a progress, start a scene or two,
> Advise the prince; no doubt, an easy tool,
> Deferential, glad to be of use,
> Politic, cautious, and meticulous;
> Full of high sentence, but a bit obtuse;
> At times, indeed, almost ridiculous -
> Almost, at times, the Fool".
>
> (Eliot, 1972, p.14).

Marcuse's work contains much that is of merit, and much that deserves analysis and thought. His commitment to important human values is deep. But perhaps Eliot's words provide the necessary degree of ambiguity that any judgment about the quality of his studies must contain.

Appendix

Summary of approximate dates and details of Marcuse's works

(Some biographical details are included)

Publications are in English from 1941 unless noted otherwise.

1898   Born.

1919   Resigned from Social Democratic Party in Germany.

1923   Dissertation on Künstlerroman - Doctorate from Freiburg.

1928   Beiträge zu Phänomenologie des historischen Materialismus
           (Marcuse, 1928)

1929   At Freiburg University, started study with Husserl &
           Heidegger.
           (Horkheimer took over as head of the Institute of Social
           Research).

1931   Das Problem der gesichtlichen Wirklichkeit, (Marcuse 1931).

1932   Hegel's Ontology & the Foundations of a Theory of Historicity
           (Marcuse, 1932) in German prepared as Habilitationschrift.
           Marcuse left Freiburg, links with Institute formed.
           The Foundations of Historical Materialism - published in
           Die Gesellschaft (Marcuse, 1972g).

1933   Became full member of the Institute.

1934   The Struggle against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View
           of the State, published in the Institute journal the
           Zeitschrift für Sozial forschung (Marcuse, 1972p).

1935   Institute moved to the U.S.A.

1936   The Concept of Essence. published in Zeitschrift (Marcuse, 1972d).
           A Study on Authority published in an Institute collection
           (Marcuse, 1972q).

1937   The Affirmative Character of Culture published in the
           Zeitschrift (Marcuse, 1972a).
           Philosophy & Critical Theory published in the Zeitschrift
           (Marcuse, 1972n).

1938   On Hedonism published in the Zeitschrift (Marcuse, 1972m).

1941   Some Social Implications of Modern Technology published in
           English in Studies in Philosophy and Social Science
           (Marcuse, 1941).
           Reason & Revolution published in English (Marcuse, 1955)
           Started with O.S.S.

1948   Sartre's Existentialism in Philosophy & Phenomenological
           Research (Marcuse 1972o).

1950   Finished with State Department.

1951   Lecturer at Columbia, fellow in the Russian Institute.

1954   Lecturer at Brandeis.

1955   Eros & Civilisation   (Marcuse, 1969b)

1957   Freedom & Freud's Theory of Instincts, published in German
        in the Frankfurt Beitrage zur Sociologie (Marcuse, 1970b).
        Progress & Freud's Theory of Instincts, published in German
        in the Frankfurt Beitrage zur Sociologie (Marcuse, 1970e).
        The Democratic & Authoritarian State (edited and prefaced)
        (Marcuse, 1957).

1958   Soviet Marxism - a critical analysis (Marcuse, 1958).

1959   Karl Popper and the Problem of Historical Laws (Marcuse, 1972j).

1963   The Obsolescence of the Freudian Concept of Man - delivered
        as a lecture (Marcuse, 1970c).

1964   One-Dimensional Man (Marcuse, 1968d).

1965   Lecturer at University of California, San Diego.
        Repressive Tolerance (Marcuse, 1969a).
        Ethics and Revolution (Marcuse, 1968a).
        On Science and Phenomenology, published in Boston Studies in
        the Philosophy of Science (Marcuse, 1975).
        Negations, published in German as Kultur & Gesellschaft
        (Marcuse, 1972l).
        Industrialisation and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber
        published initially in German (Marcuse, 1972i).

1967   Lore Mystified: A Critique of Norman O. Brown, in
        Commentary (Marcuse, 1972k).
        The Obsolescence of Marxism (Marcuse, 1967a).
        Socialist Humanism? (Marcuse, 1967b).

1968   The End of Utopia, published in German in Psychoanalyse und
        Politik (Marcuse, 1970a).
        The Problem of Violence and the Radical Opposition, published
        in German in Psychoanalyse und Politik (Marcuse, 1970d).
        Liberation from the Affluent Society (Marcuse, 1968c).
        Interview (Marcuse, 1968b).
        Aggressiveness in Advanced Industrial Society (Marcuse, 1972b).

1969   A Re-examination of the Concept of Revolution (Marcuse, 1969c).
        Freedom and the Historical Imperative given as a lecture
        (Marcuse, 1972h).
        An Essay on Liberation (Marcuse, 1972f).

1971   Riot and Representation - the Significance of the Chicano
        Riots   (Marcuse, 1971b).

        The Movement in a New Era of Repression: An Assessment
        (Marcuse, 1971a).

1972   Counter-revolution and Revolt   (Marcuse, 1972e).

        Art as Form of Reality   (Marcuse, 1972c).

1977   The Aesthetic Dimension published in German (Marcuse, 1979).

1978   Interview   (Marcuse, 1978).

1979   Died on July 29.

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