The roles played by British Chiefs of Staff Committee in the evolution of Britain's nuclear weapon planning and policy-making, 1945-55

Abstract

This thesis provides the first analysis of the contribution made by the British Chiefs of Staff to Britain's development as a nuclear weapon state, 1945-55, and is based on recently released official records. The thesis seeks to make a contribution to the theoretical literature on defence policy-making and bureaucratic politics. Three research questions are addressed: (1) the merits of the conventional wisdom concerning Britain's defence policy-making process, which portrays the Chiefs of Staff Committee as prey to parochial service interests; (2) the value of the theoretical literature on inter-service rivalry and defence policy-making; and (3) the applicability of the bureaucratic politics model in analysing Britain's evolution as a nuclear weapon state. The thesis argues that the conventional wisdom is inadequate because it depends upon an implicit bureaucratic politics model. While recognising that organisational politics compounded inter-service rivalries, it is concluded that the underlying sources of inter-service rivalry were rooted in clashing strategic philosophies. At the same time, the intellectual baggage of bureaucratic politics leads to a focus on conflicts within the defence establishment. However, it is concluded that such an emphasis neglects the shared values and beliefs which shaped Britain's security policy in the first decade of the nuclear age. (DX84631)

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