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LIBERAL CATHOLICISM AND SOCIETY: ASPECTS OF THE THOUGHT OF CHARLES GORE

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ABSTRACT

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by William Brian Jones

The aim of the thesis is to concentrate on the link between Charles Gore's liberal catholicism and his social thought. The nature of his liberal catholicism will be investigated with specific reference to his relationship to the more orthodox or conventional catholicism in the Tractarian school, particularly to the work of Dr. Pusey. The social and political implications of the Tractarian approach will be identified and Gore's more radical approach to social and political ideology will be related to his more liberal approach to catholic thought and teaching within the Anglican church.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction and the Life of Gore (1)

The aim of this thesis is to examine the social thought of Charles Gore in relation to his liberal catholicism. In order to do this however we need first of all to understand what Gore meant by "liberal catholicism" which was a term he used to describe his own theological position and his own churchmanship. This in turn requires us to get some grip on Gore's complex relationship to the Oxford movement which in the 1830' and 40's, under the leadership of John Henry later Cardinal Newman, John Keble, and Edward Pusey, had led to a revival of catholic theology and churchmanship in the Anglican Church. It is in relation to the more orthodox, and as we shall see, conservative catholic teaching within Anglicanism of the leaders of the Oxford Movement that the specific nature of Gore's liberal catholicism becomes clearer. This liberal catholicism of Gore then in turn informs his understanding of the nature of human society and the kind of contribution that theology can make to an understanding of social problems and a critique of the social structures that generate these problems.

Gore is perhaps still best remembered for his editorship of *Lux Mundi* published in 1889 despite his own voluminous writings on theology and the nature of the church and society. Gore did much more than edit this volume. His leadership of the Holy Party to which the contributors belonged, their meetings and collective intellectual effort, was central to the development of the *Lux Mundi* position and it is in that book most of all perhaps that his relationship to the

Oxford Movement is best understood. He edited the book and arranged for its publication while he was still the Principal of Pusey House, the Oxford centre and chapel set up as a memorial to the life and work of Pusey. As Principal it might be thought that he was the real custodian of the further work of the Oxford Movement and its conception of the role of catholic teaching in the Church of England. *Lux Mundi* was, however, badly received by the more orthodox defenders of the Oxford Movement's contribution to the catholic revival within Anglicanism such as Liddon and it is in this relationship between Gore's more liberal interpretation of the catholic tradition and Liddon's more orthodox defence of the Tractarian position, that the theological roots of Gore's social philosophy and theology is to be found. To put the matter rather crudely at this stage in the argument, it could be said that while many of the Tractarians, particularly Pusey, were in fact concerned with social problems, and indeed as we shall see, led to a great effort to Christianise and moralise areas in poverty stricken urban areas, this concern was not based upon a social theology as much as a concern with private charity whether by individuals or corporately by the church. Despite their concern with poverty and the demoralisation of the poor, the leading figures of the Tractarian movement were either explicitly socially conservative such as Pusey, despite his early Whiggism, or the concern with the poor was not linked to any very well developed theological understanding of society. This stands in marked contrast to Gore whose liberal catholicism led him to develop a social theology which was extremely critical of the prevailing social and economic order.

In order to show this in some detail I shall structure the thesis in the following way. First of all I shall try to outline some of the central features of Tractarian thought and practice, concentrating mainly, though not exclusively on Pusey, because he was the most sustained thinker within the Tractarian movement within Anglicanism after Newman's departure to Rome. This will, as it were, set the scene for the theoretical differences between the Tractarians and Gore. I shall also look at the way in which Tractarian ideas influenced the social mission of the church through the revival of monasticism and the slum parish movement and the assumptions on which this was based. I shall then in turn look at Gore's theological differences with the Tractarians and subsequently look at how his liberal interpretation of the catholic tradition influenced his own social thought. I shall then look at his social theology in some detail and finish with an appraisal of his work.

However, before embarking on this detailed examination I shall sketch out the salient details of Gore's career and look at the context within which his thought developed.

The Life and Career of Charles Gore

Gore was born in Wimbeldon in 1853 the fourth child of the union of Charles Alexander Gore and Augusta Ponsonby, the Countess of Kerry. It was Augusta Ponsonby's second marriage, having first married the heir of the Earl of Landsowne who died two years after their marriage. She married Charles Gore

the elder after eight years of widowhood. Charles Gore was successively page to Lord Wellesley, the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, an official in the Pay Office, secretary to Lord John Russell who played a central part in the passing of the Reform Act. In 1839 he was appointed Commissioner of Woods and Forests which carried a substantial salary and the family settled on a small estate in Wimbeldon Common. His father died in 1897. Charles Gore, the son, and subject of this thesis, then went to Harrow school in 1866 and in time came under the influence of Westcott, then a Master at Harrow who subsequently became a Biblical scholar and a professor of Divinity at Cambridge, finally emerging as Bishop of Durham. In his Life of Gore Prestige points out that Westcott introduced him to exact standards of scholarship, the importance of history for the understanding of religion and to a concern for the poor. His religious life was already influenced by Catholic assumptions and somewhat unusually at that time attended the weekly celebration of the eucharist at the Parish Church in Harrow since there was no weekly celebration in the school chapel. In London he also attended services at St Alban's Holborn then (and still) a centre for catholic life within the Anglican Church and came under the influence of Fr Stanton. From St. Alban's and from attending Church in Fr Stanton's parish in Shoreditch he absorbed some of the assumptions of catholic life and practice such as confession, and fasting on Fridays. In 1870 he won a scholarship to Balliol College Oxford which he entered in October 1871.

At Balliol he was a near contemporary of both Alfred Milner and Asquith the future Prime Minister. Prestige notes that his political sympathies were in

Asquith's direction, but his social concern even then was informed not so much by secular political ideas as by a religious attitudes. As Prestige says:

> His concern for the maintenance of the Christian moral standard, his interest in programmes of personal and social conduct, and his passion for the redress of social grievances, were all subsidiary to the religious motive. He was not a mere humanitarian, with the object of making life easier or pleasanter but the convinced adherent of a theology designed to guard and interpret the Christian revelation, which he held to be the one cure for the inhuman ills of the world. He was a reformer because he was a Christian.(2)

In Oxford he attended the church of the Cowley Fathers - The Society of St John The Evangelist and attended the sermons of Liddon at Christ Church. He joined the Church Union - the group that had been set up to fight for the catholic tradition in the Anglican Church - as well as the Confraternity of the Blessed Sacrament which, as Prestige notes, he later came to regard as rather unhealthy and as Bishop later in his life, he was always rather sceptical of the value of the devotion to the Blessed Sacrament, particularly in the form of Benediction.

One of the main intellectual influences on him at Balliol was the work of T.H. Green. We shall consider the nature of this influence later, but what attracted

him to Green was the emphasis upon a philosophical position which sought to defend a view of Christianity and which placed a concern for the poor and with social work and social service at the heart of the doctrine with this concern being placed within a philosophy of human society. He also struck up a deep friendship with Henry Scott Holland, another disciple of Green, a friendship which lasted until the latter's death.

Gore performed well in academic terms gaining a First Class in both Classical Moderations and in Greats. In 1875 he was elected a Fellow of Trinity College, specialising in his lectures in Greek philosophy and particularly Plato. He was ordained Deacon in 1876. During this period, he struck up a friendship not only with Scott Holland but also with R.J. Illingworth, who became a noted philosopher of religion and theologian and a contributor to *Lux Mundi.* From 1875 Illingworth, Holland and Gore, along with some others, began the practice of taking over a small country parish for the summer, taking over the parochial duties of the incumbent and spending time on reading, discussion and the saying of the daily offices. Holland invented the title "The Holy Party" for this group. The group had a major impact in two ways. First of all it provided the basis of the discussions which eventually lead a wider group to publish *Lux Mundi,* secondly it provided the basis from which grew Gore's interest in the revival of monasticism in the Anglican Church and eventually led him with others to set up the Community of the Resurrection which eventually set up its mother house in Mirfield in Yorkshire and which continues to this day. In 1880 Gore was offered the position of Vice Principal of Cuddesdon College, a theological college in the

Oxford Diocese which gave him the opportunity to concentrate on academic theology and freed him from the need to continue teaching classical thought to Greats students at Trinity. In 1882 Edward Pusey, one of the founders of the Oxford Movement with Newman, Keble and Froude died. Gore admired Pusey, particularly for his disciplined approach to the revival of catholic thought and practice within the Anglican Church and for his attempts to restrain some of the more outlandish practices of the ritualists within the Anglican Church, although as we shall see deeper theological differences emerged as time went on. A proposal was made to create a permanent memorial to Pusey and an appeal led by Liddon, Holland and others (with Gore sitting on the Appeals Committee) soon raised over £25,000. Part of Liddon's aim was to secure a continuing Anglican presence at the heart of Oxford's life, as he was concerned about the increasing secularisation of the University, and to ensure a steady supply of people who would both be well equipped theologically and also a steady supply of priests within the Church of England. Pusey's huge library was to become the academic centre piece for this endeavour and that was to be housed in Pusey House which was to be a centre for both theological study and worship. Gore was offered the post of Principal which Holland urged him to accept and the job clearly spoke to Gore's gifts as it combined both theological scholarship and a concern with the pastoral care of those who studied at the House. Gore took this post in November 1883, having already informed Liddon (3) that he could not promise to adhere to every point of Pusey's teaching. Liddon assented to this although when *Lux Mundi* was subsequently published it became clear that he had not taken Gore's reservations as seriously as he should have done. He clearly

thought that Gore meant that there might be different ways of interpreting Pusey, not that Gore would soon in fact depart quite radically from some of Pusey's central opinions. Between leaving Cuddesdon and taking up his new post Gore travelled to India to take a turn of duty at the Oxford Mission to Calcutta and this signified an enduring interest in the missionary work of the Church outside of England.

While at Pusey House, Gore was, with others such as Wescott, instrumental in setting up the Christian Social Union - 1889 which sought to make the Gospels relevant to social and political issues. There was already in existence the Guild of St Matthew which was of a Christian Socialist persuasion. Those who set up the Christian Social Union felt unable to make this political commitment, and they also felt the need to concentrate on research and education on social questions rather than on political propaganda. There were three distinctive features of The Christian Social Union: to claim for the Christian moral law the ultimate authority in social practice; the study of how Christian moral precepts might be applied to modern social and economic conditions; and "to present Christ in practical terms as a loving Master and King, the enemy of wrong, a power of righteousness and love". Prestige notes that the Christian Social Union caused some concern to Liddon and other conservative Tractarians, but they were to some extent assuaged because while the Oxford branch was based under Gore's leadership at Pusey House, it was not as radical as the Guild of St Matthew, and indeed its development had led many of those who came to Pusey House as adherents of the latter to leave and join the former (4). In his work for the

Union and in his work generally for Christian concern for social questions Gore was particulary concerned for what he called "the apostleship of justice and the responsibility of wealth". As Prestige notes (5) when he later sympathised with the objectives of the Labour Movement it was its concern with justice rather than charity that moved him. It is here that we can see a concern that was not really part of Tractarian social teaching. As we shall see the Tractarians were concerned with poverty, but saw its alleviation to depend a good deal on private charity and on the presence of the church in deprived areas, and although Gore did not reject this, his social analysis, rooted as we shall see in his theological views led him to see the problems of modern society to be so great that they could not be resolved by appeals to charity important though that is in the Christian contexts. Again, perhaps Liddon was to a degree blind to the extent to which Gore had moved away from the assumptions of Tractarianism which as Principal of Pusey House Liddon rather blithely assumed that Gore would respect and uphold. So already we can see in this brief chronology of Gore's life up to this point there were two emerging points of difference with Tractarianism as classically represented by Pusey and by Liddon his disciple. First of all, and most basic for Gore, there were to be theological differences which were crystallised in *Lux Mundi*; and secondly this move to greater political radicalism, rooted in these theological differences. It is the task of this thesis to explore these in more detail.

The theological differences, which will be discussed in detail later emerged very clearly in 1889 with the publication of *Lux Mundi* under the editorship of Gore.

The contributors to the Volume were all members of the Holy Party and the publication of the work caused a certain amount of consternation to the defenders of orthodox Tractarian views. Certainly Liddon took great exception to the work. In a letter to Lord Halifax, the leading Catholic Layman within the Church, Liddon wrote in rather uncompromising terms when he said:

> I did not suspect that he (Gore) had constructed a private kennel for liberalising ideas in Theology within the precincts of the Old Testament and as much of the New Testament bears upon it... is a proclamation of revolt against the spirit and the principles of Dr Pusey and Mr Keble.(6)

No doubt Liddon wished that he had taken to heart a bit more Gore's earlier expressed reservations about his attitude towards the inheritance that Liddon supposed him to be defending. Gore offered to resign his position, but since the other staff members intimated that they too would resign it was thought by the Trustees that this would be too much of a shock for the House to be sustained and Gore continued in his post. The publication of *Lux Mundi* was in no way the end or culmination of the Holy Party. For the next twenty five years it met regularly in the summer at Longworth Rectory near Oxford where Illingworth, perhaps the most accomplished philosopher in the group was the incumbent. Also the Community of the Resurrection came into existence as the result of these activities and on July 25th 1892 six members of the Community, including Gore made their profession and the Community came into existence as a clear

monastic order within the Church of England. This led eventually to Gore resigning his position at Pusey House as the Community, based at Pusey House initially, moved out to Radley of which Gore became the incumbent - with the Rectory being used in these early days as the Community House.

Late in 1894 Gore was offered a canonry at Westminster Abbey by the Prime Minister which he accepted, having already turned down the Deanery of Winchester partly because it would give little time for study, and partly because it would not provide a second base for the community. The Community itself moved from Radley to Mirfield, its subsequent permanent base in 1898. Based in Westminster Gore became rather more detached from the Community and in 1902 he resigned as Superior of the Order, although he remained a member he never took up permanent residence in Mirfield. Gore used his tenure of the canonry to work further on fundamental theology, on Biblical criticism and interpretation and on his social thought and social work and he was in the latter respect much influenced by Canon Barnett, the Warden of Toynbee Hall which had been set up as a centre for social work in the East End and as a memorial to Toynbee who had been a close disciple of T.H. Green and could be seen as a practical embodiment of Green's social philosophy, by which as I have noted Gore was influenced as an undergraduate in Oxford (7). During this period Gore wrote *The Body of Christ* a volume on Eucharistic Theology in which he again showed his philosophical indebtedness to Green. Drawing on Green's idea set out in *The Prolegomena To Ethics* that the nature of an object is determined by its relationships, that the idea of an object is that which is the same in the same

relations, Gore argued that the body of Christ present in the bread and wine in the Eucharist is made what it is by the attitudes and beliefs of the congregation. This was an Idealist justification of the idea of the real presence. The object in question, the body of Christ is the object that it is because of the relationships in which it stands and crucial to these relationships is the set of beliefs and values held by the congregation present at the Eucharist.

In 1901 Gore was appointed Bishop of Worcester. On his appointment Gore relinquished his membership of the Church Union and the Confraternity of the Blessed Sacrament because he felt that, although his own churchmanship was not in doubt, and indeed had been a matter of some controversy in the Diocese on his appointment, he felt that as a Bishop it would be inappropriate for him to belong to specific groups within the Church which advocated a particular type of churchmanship and belief. He also eventually resigned as President of the Christian Social Union which as we saw was the main vehicle for his social thought and action, not because he felt that his was inappropriate for a Bishop, indeed on the contrary, he was very active in social affairs as a Bishop and through his membership of the House of Lords, but rather because he felt that he was unable to give proper time to the duties which being President entailed. Gore spent a good deal of his time as Bishop of Worcester arranging for the division of his huge diocese into the see of Worcester and that of Birmingham and in 1905 he was enthroned as Bishop of Birmingham choosing an urban over the rural diocese because he felt more at home in the city and because it provided an environment within which his social principles could be given more

scope. As Prestige puts it (8) "Birmingham and the episcopate afforded Gore ample scope for social agitation." Indeed he became more radical politically, and progressively moved away from the attitudes and assumptions of the Christian Social Union whose academic approach to social problems he had once so fully endorsed. On his appointment to the Birmingham see he wrote to Scott Holland that "...their great effort to give the CSU a new lease of life had failed. I seem more and more to feel as if the CSU had done its bit and had better (not dry up) but acquiesce in being Academic and leave the Socialists to make a fresh start." (9). Although he did not belong to a particular political party Gore was sympathetic both to the Labour Movement and to the developing social liberalism of Asquith, Haldane and Lloyd George which in turn was indebted to a great extent to the teaching of T.H. Green and other Idealist philosophers (10). One of his tasks as Bishop of Birmingham was to draft a report to a joint committee of Convocation and the House of Laity on the moral witness of the Church on economic questions. The content of the Report will be discussed later in the thesis but for the moment I can record the fact it was very critical of laissez faire economics and the economic theories that underpinned it. The adoption of the Report by the Church led to the establishment in each diocese of a social service committee to encourage the study of these problems and the response of the church to them. In some ways this was the institutionalisation of the assumptions and attitudes of the Christian Social Union on whose behalf as we have seen Gore had worked for so long despite his own growing personal radicalism. These social service committees still exist in dioceses and have since come to be known as Social Responsibility Committees. However the tensions in the churches

approaches to social questions still remain, particularly in relation to the extent to which the Church should confine itself to action in particular areas on behalf of particular disadvantaged groups and the extent to which the Church can speak authoritatively about general political and structural problems in society, a tension which was highlighted in the early 1980's in the differing responses to the report *Faith in the City*.

In 1911 Gore was appointed Bishop of Oxford a see that he held until his retirement in 1918. Gore died on January 17th 1932.

Notes for Chapter 1

1 Information on Gore's life is obtained from G.L. Prestige, *The Life of Charles Gore*, Heinemann, London 1935.

2 Ibid., page 14

3 Ibid., page 53

4 Ibid., page 93

5 Ibid., page 94

6 Ibid., page 105

6 For a discussion of Toynbee Hall and the role of the Settlement Movement in Idealist Thought see A. Vincent and R. Plant, *Philosophy Politics and Citizenship: The Life and Thought of The British Idealists*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1984.

8 See Prestige, op. cit page 274.

9 Ibid.,

10 See Vincent and Plant, op. cit

CHAPTER 2

Tractarian Themes

The aim of this chapter is to explore some of the themes in Tractarian thought by which Gore was influenced and also some of those against which he reacted and which led him to see his own theological position as one of liberal catholicism, which is certainly not a description which the leading Tractarians would have dreamt of ascribing to themselves. Naturally there is neither the scope in this thesis nor the need to engage in a full account of Tractarian theology. I shall rather concentrate only on those themes in their theology which seem to have exercised the most influence on Gore or those against which he most clearly reacted. Also I shall be concerned mainly with the work of Pusey rather than say Keble, Newman, Froude and others although mention of their work will be made in passing. This is partly because the treatment of the Tractarian position has to be made manageable and partly because when Gore published *Lux Mundi* as editor in 1889 as Principal of Pusey House it was, as we have seen against the work of Pusey that he was seen to be reacting most clearly. This is clear for example from the reaction of Liddon, Pusey's biographer, disciple, and prime mover in the establishment of Pusey House. As we saw in Liddon's letter to Lord Halifax, he regarded *Lux Mundi* as a major attack on some of the central assumptions of Pusey's theology and churchmanship. Hence the concentration on the work of Pusey seems to be justified.

The chapter will be concerned with a number of themes which are central in trying to work out Gore's reaction to what might be called the orthodox catholic tradition within the Anglican Church as found in the writings of Pusey. These themes will include the following: an examination of Pusey's views on the role of reason; the role of tradition as a source of doctrinal authority within the church; the role of biblical criticism; views on the role of the sacraments and the theology of the Incarnation which are closely allied in Tractarian thought. I shall then move on to discuss Church State relations in the Tractarian view and finally discuss the approach of Pusey to social and political issues, issues which as we have seen were central to Gore's subsequent position.

The Tractarian Movement is conventionally dated from Keble's 1833 Assize sermon on National Apostasy (1). Certainly Newman in *Apologia Pro Vita Sua* (2) regarded this sermon as marking the beginning of the Oxford Movement or the Tractarian Movement when he said:

> Mr Newman preached the Assize Sermon (on July 14th 1833) in the University Pulpit. It was published under the title National Apostasy. I have ever considered and kept that day, as the start of the religious movement of 1833. (3)

The sermon was occasioned by what was seen to be a crisis in Church State relations. It is described by Dean Church as quoted in Faber's *Oxford Apostles* in the following way:

> The new governors of the country (the Whigs) were preparing to invade the rights, and to alter the constitution, and even the public documents of the church. The suppression of the ten Irish bishoprics, in defiance of Church opinion, showed how ready the Government was to take liberties in a high handed way with the old adjustments of the relations of Church and State. (4)

Keble himself argued in his sermon as follows: "the nation was a part of Christ's Church and bound in all her legislation and policy, by the fundamental laws of the Church." (5) If public opinion rejected this then the nation was in a state of apostasy.

The Oxford Movement was therefore conceived in the context of an attack by political liberalism on the role of the Church in relation to the state. However, the issue soon moved on from this issue profoundly important though it was to the Tractarians, to a general concern with the authority and teaching of the Church. If the Tractarians were consistently to hold such a high view of the role of the Church and the state, then the nature of the Church, its doctrines and its legitimacy were all going to be quite central to the argument. This in turn led the Tractarians into a confrontation with theological as well as political liberalism in their effort to sustain the role which they saw for the Church in the Nation which was under attack by political liberalism. As Faber argues:

> The Church was a legal, constitutional, element in the government of the country. She was this, because she was more than this. By human law she was the Establishment. By Divine law, and by the right of uninterrupted succession, she was the Apostolical Church of Christ in England - and in Ireland. To deprive her of her worldly goods, was as Pusey explained to his brother, an act of sacrilege, not to be justified by any argument of expediency. (6)

However, to sustain this view it was necessary to recover some such view of the church and in the minds of the Tractarians this also involved confronting theological liberalism and this in turn meant developing a view about the role of reason in theology which would be critical of theological liberalism, a view of the role of tradition in contradistinction to that of liberalism, a response to liberal approaches to Biblical Criticism, and a recovery of the implicit Catholic teaching of the Anglican Church on such matters as the sacraments and such central theological dogmas as the Incarnation. It is to the Tractarian views on these themes that we now have to turn.

Reason

The role of reason in theology is not one which can really be treated separately from the other themes, particularly the role and authority of tradition and the authority of the Bible and what I say about the role of reason will have to be considered alongside these other themes as well. However, there are issues here

that can be taken separately and they are also central to understanding Gore's liberal catholicism in relation to the Tractarians" understanding of the limited role of reason in theology. When *Lux Mundi* was published its famous Preface, written by Gore, contained the following words which as we shall see marked a considerable shift away from the Tractarians" view of the role of reason in theology:

> This volume is primarily due to a set of circumstances which exists no longer. The writers found themselves at Oxford together between the years 1875-1885, engaged in the common work of University education; and compelled for their own sake, no less than that of others, to attempt to put the Catholic faith into its right relation to modern intellectual and moral problems...
>
> We have written then in this volume not as "guessers at truth" but as servants of the Catholic Creed and Church, aiming at only interpreting the faith we have received. On the other hand we have written with the conviction that the epoch in which we live is one of profound transformation, intellectual and social, abounding in new needs, new points of view, new questions; and certain therefore to involve great changes in the outlying departments of theology, where it is linked on to other sciences, and to necessitate some general restatement of its claim and meaning...

> The real development of theology is rather a process in which the Church standing firm in her old truths, enters into the apprehension of the new intellectual movements of each age: and because "the truth makes her free" is able to assimilate all new material, to welcome and give a place to all new knowledge, to throw herself into the sanctification of each new social order, bringing forth out of her treasures things new and old, and showing again and again her power of witnessing under changed conditions to the catholic capacity of her faith and life. (7)

On this view the Church has to accommodate itself the growth of new knowledge in science (for example the theory of evolution with which Illingworth, one of the contributors to *Lux Mundi* was particularly concerned), in philosophy, in Biblical criticism, as well as accommodating itself to new understandings in the realms of economics and politics. This approach which seeks to interpret theology in relation to secular reason by the use of reason can be understood as theological liberalism and it is an approach which the Tractarians rejected in their own time because they did not see reason as some kind of autonomous capacity in human life which produces truths to which theology and the Church has to accommodate itself. On the contrary, the Tractarian position is that reason has to be seen as the servant of religious understanding, not the discoverer of truth to which the church has to accommodate itself. This can be shown in two ways. First of all by looking at the Tractarians" theoretical approach to the issues of science, philosophy - in short the exercise of reason, and also more practically by their

opposition to changes proposed in the University of Oxford which would have the effect as the Tractarians saw it of producing a University in the service of secular reason an approach of which they thoroughly disapproved.

The Tractarians, who were largely theologians and biblical scholars rather than philosophers, did not produce a worked-out view of the role of reason in human life, but nevertheless they did have very clear general principles which made them see the exercise of reason as subservient to the revealed truths of religion and in this sense they wanted to preserve the idea of theology as the "Queen of the sciences'.

In his *Sermons Academical and Occasional* Keble protested very vigorously against what he called the 'irreverent use of reason', and he described this as:

> The tendency to treat as profane what may be sacred, though not as yet proved to be so... To slight the Divine mysteries because we cannot comprehend or explain them...To forfeit divine grace, being unable to trace its workings, we will not take the trouble to seek it.(8)

Walter Lock, Keble's biographer summarised Keble's view of reason very well and very significantly in terms of the general issues at stake in this thesis in the following way:

> Truth was a master to be served, not to be criticised and patronised; it was like the ark which he dreaded to touch with unconsecrated hands. (9)

The phrase "unconsecrated hands" is significant here in that truth was ultimately religious truth and the exercise of reason had to be in tracing the activity of the Divine in all aspects of human life. This point is also well made by David Forrester in his recent book *The Young Doctor Pusey* in which he argues as follows:

> (For Keble) the Oxford Movement represented "a holy warfare" against three foes - Erastianism, Rationalism and Nominalism. Throughout his whole life (1792 -1866) Keble never departed from the cavalier and non-juring tradition of his home background.His intellectual life was one of calm consistency; impressive continuity. From his earliest years he learnt to conceive of the universe, including its spiritual and intellectual elements, as a whole with God at its centre. Unlike most of his contemporaries, he saw the world not so much as a field of activity as a sphere of relationships. He did not consider it man's mission to transform and act on the material world, but be influenced by it. Religion for Keble was the essence of life and the determining factor in all fields of man's life. He detested the separation between religion and philosophy, considering the latter no longer adjusted to the reality of human

existence, since with science it aimed only at attaining useful knowledge as a means to obtain material prosperity. (10)

As Forrester notes, this attitude had a profound influence on Pusey too and it led to an attitude to the world as suffused with Divine immanence and this in turn as we shall see had an important bearing on Tractarian attitudes to the sacraments and to the doctrine of the Incarnation which were a profound influence on Gore. This idea of immanence and the position of reason in a theology which accepted this was well summarised by Henry Scott Holland, Gore's close friend when he wrote in *Personal Studies* as follows:

> ...the visible and the tangible, were but symbols of a transcendent life, the vesture of the spirit, through which its motions made themselves felt. They rejected absolutely the notion of a material earth, isolated and complete, working by cast iron laws, in the mechanical deadness of unintelligent force. On the contrary it was alive, with a life not of its own which alone gave it meaning; and this life was personal, intelligent, sympathetic, communicable to man. In and through nature spirit spoke with spirit, and came in touch with GOD. The church gave him the true clue by which to interpret the external world...The world was sacramental. (11)

This meant for Keble and Pusey that reason was not autonomous, but to be used rightly it had to submit to the authority of the Church and the true religious vision

to which it testified. It was definitely not the case that theology had to accommodate itself to the demands of reason in its irreverent use which would be precisely the kind of rationalistic liberalism on which as Keble said the Oxford Movement was to make "holy warfare" and yet this was just the assumption made in the programmatic Preface to Lux Mundi. This humility in the use of our own reasoning powers and submission to the authority of the truth revealed to man in the Church was clearly stated by Pusey in his Sermon in the third volume of Parochial Sermons (quoted in Forrester) when he says:

> Holy Scripture in many ways tells us that the light does shine abundantly around all. But is seen by those only who have eyes to see; that a certain character of piety and duty and love and humility, towards God and man is necessary to enable us to see; that they who have not this, though they think they see are blind, nay they are the more blind, because they say "we see'; that God revealed His wisdom unto babes, but hides it from the "wise and prudent'. (12)

To be exercised correctly therefore reason has to involve a moral character on the part of the person who exercises it and this character involves submission to authority. Reason is therefore neither an independent test for the truth of theological claims - they do not depend for example on truths discovered in metaphysical or scientific enquiry; nor does theology have to accommodate itself

to truths discovered independently of truth and religious authority. This is a clear distinction between the Catholicism of the Tractarians and that of Gore.

The issue of the irreverent or secular use of reason was not just a theoretical problem for the Tractarians in that they faced the issue in a number of practical ways within the University of Oxford within which most of the leading figures of the Movement had at one time or another held posts. The central issue at stake in this matter was the requirement in Oxford University that all those wishing to graduate had to subscribe to the Articles of the Church of England as contained in the *Book of Common Prayer.* This requirement meant that Dissenters, Jews, Roman Catholics, Unitarians and Free Thinkers were excluded from the University, and of course, the University was to be seen not as an entirely secular institution, but rather that it served a higher religious purpose. The same practice held sway in Cambridge too from which the first impulse of reform was to come in 1834. In that year sixty three resident members of the Senate of Cambridge University petitioned the House of Commons (newly reformed and more sensitive to the needs of Dissenters in particular) and the House of Lords for the abolition of all religious tests. A Bill was passed in the Commons but rejected in the Lords. Despite this defeat the Heads of Houses in Oxford introduced a measure into Convocation for the abolition of subscription. This proposal struck at the heart of the Tractarians view of the relation between reason and religion within a University and Pusey argued that to abandon subscription would 'subvert the system of religious instruction and discipline, so long and so beneficially exercised by us and that by dissolving the union between the University and the Church of

England would impair the efficiency and endanger the security of both'. (13) As we have seen Pusey, Keble and Newman took the view that reason had to be exercised under the authority of divine truth and that its right use required a specific moral character which required the discipline and morality which religion would produce. Hence, the abolition of subscription would undermine precisely the concept of the role of reason in human affairs which the Tractarians wanted to sustain.

The issue was exacerbated for Pusey and Newman because one of the major supporters of Reform had been Hampden, the Regius Professor of Divinity whose election to the post the Tractarians had bitterly opposed on the grounds that he saw dogmatic formulations as fallible human creations rather than divinely inspired formularies. In his *Observations on Religious Dissent* Hampden used this argument among others to argue the case for reform. According to Faber's account in *Oxford Apostles* (page 343 ff) Hampden argued that the articles were fallible human formularies and that none, least of all a young man, ought to subscribe to them without a thorough understanding of what he was doing. The Tractarians opposed both of these views. They had earlier objected to Hampden's appointment to the Regius Chair on the grounds that his views were inconsistent with the Articles and Pusey's vehemence on the point illustrates the fact that he did not see the Articles as human formularies. He argued as follows:

> In our present state it was enough to show that Dr Hampden's system, as system, went counter to that of the Articles, to show the

> leprous spot, and warn people to flee the infection. There is somewhere a very valuable rule of Vincent of Lerins, to this effect "When a heresy first appears, put it down if you can; afterwards if it gains head, and you must enter into arguments... the conflict is moral not intellectual". (14)

The Articles were a standard of orthodoxy and a way of defining heresy and were not human artefacts.

Secondly, Hampden's view that graduands of the University must know what it was they were assenting to rather presupposed the unfettered exercise of critical intelligence, the irreverent use of reason to which the Tractarians objected. This point was put very bluntly by Newman in the controversy when he argued that "Religion is to be approached with a submission of the understanding." (15) Faber points out in an unattributed quotation that Pusey pointed to the example of Cambridge where the Debating Society showed the undesirability of students entering the University without the disciplined approach to intellectual enquiry which a religious test would ensure. Pusey was the most energetic in trying to defeat the arguments of the reformers initially with a flysheet of *Twenty Three Questions* which initially led to the Heads of Houses rescinding their original decision in favour of reform. However the issue soon arose again and the indefatigable Pusey then wrote a pamphlet of *Twenty Seven Questions*. When the Provost of Oriel replied with a set of answers Pusey retaliated with a series of Notes on the *Provost's Answers*. The eventual upshot was that in May 1835 the

proposal for reform was overwhelmingly defeated in Convocation. In retaining a religious test on University entrance the Tractarians had produced a practical defence of their view that reason was in the service of religious truth and that reason should only be deployed within a disciplined moral framework.

From both the theoretical issues discussed earlier in the Chapter and from this practical defence of their view we can see that the Tractarians had a very definite view of the role of reason in religion - religion did not depend upon some rational underpinning, provided for example by metaphysics, nor did theology have to accommodate itself to rationalism whether in philosophy, science or morals, and that reason had to be deployed from within a moralistic and character forming framework. It is therefore rather ironic that decades later after religious tests had been abolished in 1871 and after Pusey's death Liddon had seen Pusey House as a way of keeping a religious presence alive right at the heart of the University. Pusey House was, as we have seen, entrusted to the keeping of Gore as Principal, and yet within a few years in *Lux Mundi* and his other writings Gore had moved a very long way from the assumptions about the role of reason in relation to theology which Pusey and other Tractarians had stood for and Liddon regarded him as having abandoned the Tractarian inheritance that Liddon had supposed he was there to defend.

Tradition

As I said earlier, the issue of the role of reason in theology cannot really be isolated from other themes in Tractarian writings and two of the most important additional themes were the role of tradition and the authority of the Bible. After all if it is not the role of reason to provide some kind of rationalistic philosophical basis for Christianity, but rather it was to deployed within assumptions about Christian truth, then it became rather important to consider what were the authoritative bases of Christianity and in this context the Tractarians saw the answer as lying in the link between tradition and the authority of the Bible. Although to separate these may seem rather artificial, nevertheless it will perhaps help to try to consider them separately.

Newman was the Tractarian who initially looked most fully into the issue of the authority of tradition in religion, particularly in relation to the Primitive Church and the doctrines of the Early Fathers. Patristic Theology was not well developed in England at the time and it was Newman who first insisted on the Oxford Movement taking this issue seriously. It seems clear from Forrester's book on *The Young Doctor Pusey* that it was Newman who introduced Pusey to the importance of the study of patristic writing and of course in time Pusey became a very accomplished patristics scholar. From the account given in Faber's *Oxford Apostles*, it seems clear that it was Provost Hawkins of Oriel, Newman's College and with whom the Tractarians fell out over subscription, who played a formative role in forming Newman's opinions on the subject of tradition in relation both to

dogma and doctrine on the one hand and the authority and the interpretation of the Bible on the other. According to Faber, Newman had been very impressed as an undergraduate by a sermon that Hawkins had preached on the role of tradition. In the view advanced by Hawkins doctrines were not to be learned from the Bible but from the formularies of the Church in the Catechism and the Creeds, which are in turn a product of the tradition of Western Christianity operating under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. This view obviously took root and in a passage from a letter written to Pusey and quoted in Forrester's book, Newman in later life reiterated the point very clearly:

> I am still of the opinion that the great evil of our want of theological knowledge is its resulting in differences of opinion. Men say what they will about going by Scripture not tradition - but nature is stronger than systems. The piety and the services of the Primitive Christians adds to their authority an influence which is practically irresistible with those i.e. who are trained in right feelings and habits. And I think this was intended by the Author of all truth and none but Primitive Christianity can bring this about, for other ages, if they have the right spirit, yet have not (of course) the authority of the first age. As to Scripture being practically sufficient for making the Christian, it seems to me a mere dream - nor do I find it anywhere said so in Scripture - nor can I infer logically that what is confessedly the sole oracle of doctrine, is therefore also of practice and discipline. (16)

This naturally led both Newman and Pusey and Keble too into a concern with Primitive Christianity, Patristic theology, and to tradition, particularly of the early church as a source of doctrinal authority and the interpretation of the Bible. The development of doctrine became therefore a central concern and of course in this sense it is no accident that when Newman decided to leave the Anglican Church for Rome he was engaged in his small community at Littlemore in writing his *Essay on The Development of Doctrine* in which he argued that Roman Catholicism was the one authentic development of the doctrines of the Primitive Church. However for our purposes it is important to see that tradition, the practice of the Primitive Church, and Patristic theology was seen by the Tractarians as providing an authentic disciplined framework within which Biblical interpretation and reflection of authentic doctrine could take place. This required the exercise of reason, but it was an exercise of reason as Newman put it in Littlemore in the service of faith, a faith given a shape and an authority not by reason but by the tracing of the authentic development within the Christian tradition of the early church.

For Pusey who held the same assumptions although they did not lead him to Rome, the work of the Early Fathers also backed up something that we saw in his attitude to reason, namely that the whole created order was to be seen as a manifestation of the divine. As Forrester points out:

> He chiefly valued those Fathers who taught that the "exterior world, physical and historical was but the outward manifestation of

realities greater than itself. Those who insisted that Nature was a parable: Scripture was an allegory: pagan literature, philosophy and mythology, properly understood, were but a preparation for the Gospel".(17)

Hence the authority of the Fathers served in Pusey's mind to underpin the conception of the immanence of the Divine in worldly forms which had led him to reject secularising reason in the first place.

As we shall see later Gore was closer to the Tractarians on the authority of Primitive Christianity and the Fathers as a source for authority in religion, than he was in the Tractarians rejection of secular reason. This comes out clearly in many of his writings, but perhaps most particularly in his *The Body of Christ* in which Patristic theology forms the basis of his approach to eucharistic theology.

Biblical Criticism and the Authority of the Bible

This is a much more complex issue for the Tractarians, particularly in elation to Pusey. At the very beginning of his career Pusey had felt the need to go to Germany to understand developments in Biblical Criticism. When he first visited Germany in 1825 he went with assumptions that seemed a very long way from those of his later Tractarian period. Forrester quotes him as writing as follows about the aims of his visit:

> I hope to derive great assistance from the German Literature in all the critical and scientific parts of Divinity. (18)

After some time in Germany however, Pusey came to the view that as Forrester argues: "for many Christian thinkers in Germany, dogmatic attachment to the Bible or to the letter of the old confessions had become increasingly difficult." (19) and that this approach to Biblical criticism had opened the gates of Rationalism on a scale unthought of in England. Forrester goes on to summarise Pusey's considered view at this time as follows:

> He gave a tentative welcome to the new methods of biblical analysis and appreciated the value of investigating the human element in the composition of the Bible. Understanding the importance of studying the complexities of authorship and of observing the Bible's patchwork of legend, myth, sacred history and poetry he also learnt the significance of investigating its style, vocabulary and content in comparison with other semitic writings. Above all Pusey hoped that he might interpret and mediate to his fellow countrymen ideas which were alarmingly new to them. (20)

However there were limits to Pusey's willingness to take on board some of the more radical scepticism which might be seen as a product of German Biblical criticism. He argued that despite contradictions and inconsistencies in the Biblical narrative, he rejected the view that any of these inconsistencies bore on

doctrine (21). This may well explain why he was later attracted to Newman's approach to tradition and doctrine which we considered earlier. He also took he view that "the object of the Holy Spirit was to preserve us such a record as might serve as a foundation for our faith and a means of edification, not to inform us of all the incidental minutiae of our Saviour's Life".

The product of Pusey's monumental labours in Germany was his two volume *Historical Enquiry into The Causes of the Rationalist Character Lately Predominant in the Theology of Germany*, the first volume of which was published in 1828; the second volume in 1830.

At this time therefore there is little doubt that Pusey did take a view that he was later to repudiate, namely that a rationalistic approach to the interpretation of the Bible was justifiable and that our understanding of the Biblical texts had to be influenced by rational enquiry in this area. So what changed Pusey's mind on these matters? Forrester argues, and there seems to be little reason to dissent from this, that for the reasons that we have seen so far and others yet to be investigated, Pusey began to distrust the role of secular reason, or more generally liberal rationalism which he regarded as destructive of the basic foundations of the Christian faith. That once uncontrolled exercise of reason was taken for granted then there is no real stopping place for it and he is reported as saying that his later writings were to be seen as "an attempt to construct an impregnable fortress which the desultory assaults of criticism could neither shake nor scale".(22) When the liberal rationalistic *Essays and Reviews* was published

in 1864 with its famous essay by Jowett, Master of Balliol, Pusey answered the challenge not in any really positive way as his early approach had signified but by publishing what Forrester calls his "monumentally conservative *Lectures on Daniel the Prophet*". His disillusion with the results of unfettered rationalism and liberalism was complete and he came to regard any attempts to revise the Bible (a project that he had once contemplated doing himself after his visit to Germany) as a product of vanity, which was as Forrester points out, his verdict on the Revised Version of the Bible published in 1881. As Forrester says:

> He thought that the changes in the New Testament would promote a general unsettlement of English religion, and alterations to the Old Testament would be equally productive of evil. (23)

The Bible had to be understood and interpreted within the disciplined framework of the doctrines of the Church, particularly of the Primitive Church and the Fathers and against a view about what was the authentic Catholic development of these traditions. The exercise of reason outside of these constraints would destroy the faith. This point is well made by Peter Hincliff in his essay on "The Church" in *The Religion of the Incarnation* a centenary volume published to commemorate the publication of Lux Mundi. In this essay on page 136 he says the following:

> The Anglo Catholic case was that the authority of the Bible depends on the prior authority of the church. The church after all,

had taken over the Old Testament from Judaism and had created the New Testament out of its own tradition. Therefore the true authority behind Christian teaching is the authority of the church rather than the Bible.

There is an important link here with Gore which will be explored later but for the moment I should remark that Liddon who saw himself as the custodian of Pusey's views and whose own approach to Biblical Interpretation as found for example in his Bampton Lectures on *The Divinity of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ* published in 1866 was extremely conservative was particularly upset by the concessions which he believed that *Lux Mundi* had made to Biblical criticism, particularly in relation to the Old Testament. Liddon in the eighth of his Bampton Lectures on *The Divinity of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ* and the more conservative Tractarians under the influence of Pusey had argued that certain statements of Jesus as recorded in the Gospels guaranteed the historical accuracy of the Old Testament. Prestige for example points out that Jesus refers to Jonah, to the Flood and to the psalms as the work of David (24) and that as the incarnate son of God this guaranteed the authenticity of the Old Testament narrative. In *Lux Mundi* however, Gore had argued that the fact that Jesus makes reference to the Old Testament does not guarantee its narrative or literal truth because he could be citing them for example as allegory rather than literal truth, a point which Pusey himself might have made in his German days. Liddon however rejected this arguing rather as Prestige reports that:

> The points to which he took particular exception concerned the predictive power of prophecy, the alliance with rationalistic theories of the composition of the Pentateuch, the extension of the dramatic hypothesis to writings which seemed to claim an historical character, the admission of myth as a constituent of the Old Testament, and the bearing of the concessions proposed by Gore to "modern unbelief" on the teaching of our Lord. ...He was afraid that Gore would shake the confidence of other minds in the Church of England and strengthen the suspicion that after all the Oxford Movement had done to recover the authority of Catholic antiquity, the leaders of theological opinion had once again "begun to slide down the hill towards the pit of "uncertainty or unbelief." (25)

At stake here is a different relationship between reason and faith and it is one of the central areas within which the difference between the orthodoxy of the catholicism of the Tractarians and that of Gore's liberal catholicism is to be found.

Overall then the important point to bear in mind after this consideration of reason, tradition and the authority of the Bible within Tracatarian thought is that once tradition and the dogmas and doctrines contained within it and the authority of scripture are challenged for example by German Biblical criticism, then there is great pressure to seek a rational foundation for faith which detached faith from the disputed narrative of the Bible and detaches it from the idea that the

traditions of the Western Church are guided by the Holy Spirit. The Tractarians were very suspicious of this perhaps mainly because Pusey had seen in Germany particularly under the influence of Hegel and those who followed him such as Strauss that once the justification of Christianity is supposed to rest on some kind of rationalistic metaphysics, then the whole panoply of faith, the narrative of the Bible, the figure of Jesus himself becomes as it were an imaginative and allegorical statement of truths which can be apprehended on grounds independent of these specifically religious manifestations. So for example Liddon argues in his first Bampton Lecture that:

> ...the Christ of Hegel is not the actual incarnation of God in Jesus of Nazareth, but the symbol of his incarnation in humanity at large.

Once reason takes the place of faith, tradition and the authority of the Bible, then the Bible becomes a symbol and possibly a distorted symbol of a truth which in the metaphysical system has a different sense from what it is seen to have in the Biblical narrative and once this kind of thought is set in train then it can lead to the religious scepticism of second generation Hegelians such as Strauss. Reason has to be at the service of faith and the truth revealed by faith, that is in tradition and dogma and in the narrative of the Bible; it should not be seen as serving as the foundation of religion. It therefore became imperative if this trap was to be avoided to maintain the integrity of the tradition and the integrity of the Bible and this meant having no truck with accommodating either to the liberal demand

to make the faith congruent with the demands of an undisciplined and demoralised conception of the products of secular rationalist thought.

Sacramental Theology

The work of the Tractarians led to a revival of interest in both sacramental theology and in reinvigorating the sacramental life of the Church. Pusey for example wrote a great deal about Baptism and the Tractarian Movement led to a revival in the frequency of the eucharist which placed it at the very centre of the life of the Church. Under the influence of Pusey, at least, it also led to a revival of the sacrament of penance. There are two aspects of this development which are of particular importance to this thesis and they are both aspects of the Tractarian approach in which there is more common ground with Gore, than on the issues discussed previously. These two themes are the link between the sacraments, and particularly of the eucharist and the Tractarian approach to the understanding of the natural world within which mankind is situated; and an insistence upon the social nature of the sacramental life of the Church. As we shall see later both of these aspects of sacramental theology were central to Gore and played an important role in the way he linked theology to a Christian understanding of politics and social life. I shall discuss both of these points briefly.

As we saw in the earlier section on the role of reason in religion, the Tractarians and particularly Pusey and Keble saw the natural world not as a mechanistic

order as revealed by scientific reason but rather one suffused with the spirit of God. As Scott Holland put it, in a passage quoted earlier, Keble saw "the visible and the tangible" as symbols of a transcendent life, and the vesture of the spirit through which its motions made themselves felt," and this assumption about the nature of the world was central to their sacramental theology, as with appropriate modifications it was too for Gore and other *Lux Mundi* essayists such as Paget. The sacraments were not to be seen as purely spiritual encounters with God, but rather the power of God working with water in the case of Baptism and with bread and wine in the case of the eucharist were symbols of the sacralisation of the natural world and of the work of human hands. This idea was also linked with the doctrine of the Incarnation, of the Word made flesh, of Christ's identification with the material, transfiguring the material into something divine. As Forrester says:

> Pusey's accentuation of the importance of the Sacraments stemmed from his manner of regarding the Incarnation. Tractarians as a whole, indeed made this the central dogma of Christianity; their attitude to the Church and sacrament was conditioned by their treatment of them as "extensions of the Incarnation'. (26)

This understanding of the sacraments clearly had potential social implications, because after all the social world as well as the natural world has to be seen as sacramental and therefore the position of people in society and the degree of their poverty and deprivation for example would be clear issues which this kind

of sacramental theology would have to address. These conclusions were not drawn in any systematic way by the Tractarians but they were at the centre of Gore's work as well as other writers of the *Lux Mundi* school, for example Paget. This point is well made by Peter d'A Jones in his book *The Christian Socialist Revival 1877 -1914* in which he argues that:

> If the social message of the earlier Oxford Movement was minimal, its theology was obviously crucial to the development of sacramental socialism. (27)

If as Scott Holland argued at the end of the passage quoted earlier, " The World was sacramental" because of the relationship between the sacraments and the Incarnation then part of that world was the social world which had to be treated in a reverent way and actions and relationships within that world had to be consistent with that sacramental approach. We shall see later that Jones seems to be right when he claims that the social implications of this view were not fully or systematically appreciated by the early Tractarians nevertheless their views on the sacraments in relation to the Incarnation became foundational for the social theology of the *Lux Mundi* school and of Gore in particular.

The second element of the Tractarians sacramentalism was their emphasis on the corporate nature of the sacramental life of the Church. Against the Evangelical tradition, they insisted on the necessity of sacramental life for salvation and since this sacramental life takes place within the Church, there is therefore a corporate

element to salvation. Two passages from Pusey's work imply this without spelling it out in detail. In the third Volume of his *Parochial Sermons* he argues that

> Although all shall not be saved who partake of the Holy Sacraments, there is no revealed method of salvation from original or actual sin...without Baptism; without the Holy Eucharist there is no life. (28)

The means of salvation are corporate, they are to be found within the life of the church.

Similarly in the following passage Pusey waxes very eloquent about the role of sacramental life as necessary for us to be "in Christ" and as Forrester says this means that "being in Christ" "entailed being in the church, especially by participation in the sacraments." (29)

> To Dwell in God is not to dwell on God only. It is no mere lifting up of our affections to Him, no mere being enwraped in the contemplation of Him, no going forth of ourselves to cleave to Him. All this is our seeking Him, not His taking us up; our stretching after Him, not our attaining Him; our knocking not His opening. To dwell in God must be by His Dwelling in us. He takes us out of our state of nature, in which we are fallen, estranged, in a far country, out of and away from Him and takes us

> into Himself. He cometh to us if we will receive Him, He dwelleth in us, and maketh His abode in us. (30)

Pusey therefore rejects a pietistic, individualistic, contemplative attitude in religion. God's dwelling in us is by means of the sacraments and this involves the corporate life of the Church. Again though there is a potential implication for social theology here which is not drawn out by the Tractarians but which became central to Gore. If we only come to God through participation in the Church's life can we be indifferent to the condition of those with whom we come to the Lord's table. I shall consider this point in more detail later, but for the moment it is perhaps appropriate at this point to quote from Gore's *The Body of Christ* to see how indebted he is to this view and how he drew out the social implications implicit in the corporate nature of Tractarian sacramental theology:

> We ought to remember that a great deal is lost - more than can be easily calculated - if at any period this great idea of fraternity is allowed to fade out of the eucharistic language or ritual of the church. A system hardly deserves the name Christian at all which does not impress upon its worshippers that communion with God is no otherwise to be realised than in human brotherhood. (31)

The implications of this are radical and they were drawn by Gore; they were not drawn quite so clearly by the Tractarians , but nevertheless the truth of Jones" judgement quoted earlier about how the Oxford Movement in its earlier

manifestations laid the foundations for seeing the sacraments as a way of linking theology and social theology and Christian social action.

I want now to use this as a cue to move on to an assessment of the degree and nature of the involvement of the Tractarians, and in this context it means mainly Pusey in political and social action. The way Gore conceived social theology and social action within the Christian church can be seen in relationship to this and therefore it is important to say something about it although as I have made clear the full implications of their sacramental theology were not fully appreciated at the time. There are several facets to the Tractarians involvement in political and social affairs and I shall take them in the following order: their views on the Church and State, Pusey's own commitment to social work and concern for the poor, the role of the Tractarians influence on monasticism and its impact on and concern for the poor, and the role of Tractarian thought and practice in relation to the "slum parishes."

Church and State

I will not spend a lot of time on this aspect of Tractarian thought as my main emphasis on Gore's social thought in relation to Tractarianism does not involve much discussion of Church-State relations. However there are one or two aspects of the issue which are worth consideration in the context of this thesis. As I said at the outset of this chapter the birth of the Tractarian movement can be dated from the preaching of Keble's Assize sermon on National Apostacy and this

sermon was concerned with the relationship between Church and State. As I pointed out earlier Keble and Newman saw the church as bound up with the constitutional legitimacy of the State. As the established Church the Church of England was a central aspect of the state, giving it a kind of moral purpose and basis and important to the state's own legitimacy. As we saw earlier, Keble had argued as follows:

> The nation was part of Christ's Church and bound in all her legislation and policy by the fundamental laws of the Church.

However the proposal by the Whig Government to suppress ten of the Irish Anglican Bishoprics upset this understanding in two ways. First of all it did not respect the position of the Church constitutionally, and given that for the Tractarians the Church's constitutional position was not just an historical accident, but rather a God given status then for the state to interfere with the Church's episcopate was not just some kind of expedient political move, so much as an act of sacrilege, a point which Pusey made to his brother Philip who was a Whig member of Parliament. Secondly, if this move was made by the representatives of the people in Parliament then this was an act of National Apostasy, which was Keble's main point. The Reform of Parliament had opened up representation to a far wider section of the population and the Tractarians were fearful of the effect of a reformed House of Commons with such an interest in Church affairs on the future role of the relation between the Church and State. The legislation was seen as an Erastian act, one in which the political power

sought for reasons of its own to order the affairs of the Church, rather than the Church as it were providing the general moral framework within which legislation would be enacted. The issue was perhaps even more pronounced for the Tractarians because it was concerned with the Church's episcopate. Given that Bishops were central to the authority structure of the Church , and we have seen in the section on tradition how much authority mattered to the Tractarians as opposed to the "irreverent use of reason', then the issue struck at the heart of the authority of the Church which saw Bishops as standing in Apostolic succession. The point was made very vehemently by Newman when he wrote to Pusey that:

> Though all holy interests and the cause of the Church seems to lie at the mercy of bad men who have not the faith, yet we know that the triumphing of the wicked is short. No good ever came... from seizing on consecrated things. (33)

The same point was made also by Pusey for whom, as we shall see shortly, the issue of Church reform instigated by a liberal minded government was crucial to his abandonment of liberalism across the board:

> It is manifestly of the utmost importance that we should in these days, have definite and distinct notions upon the subject, and to those notions adhere uncompromisingly - that not only should we not yield one jot or tittle of right to any expediency, however apparently pressing but that we should take heed that our views of

> right be not unconsciously warped by a reference to expediency - that our rule of right be not crooked. (34)

Pusey was not wholly opposed to Church reform, but he felt that the government had come at the issue from the wrong end , from that of expediency, which in Forrester's view means that he thought that it was being influenced by utilitarian philosophy based on the work of Bentham and popular with dissenters (the government was clearly indebted to utilitarian thought in its proposals on the Poor Law, leading to the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834.) It is perhaps significant to point out that peck at several places in his book on *The Social Implications of the Oxford Movement* points out the extent to which Bentham was hostile to utilitarian thought which he believed animated the public policy of the Whig Government. Pusey was prepared to contemplate Church reform if the move for it came from within the Church, and if it was linked to a view of the needs of the Church formulated from within the Church:

> The present reformers of the Church appear to have begun at the wrong end. Our first object ought not to be , to ascertain how much one might by any possibility to curtail, but how much one ought to retain; what offices the good estate of the Church demands, if not in their present, at least in some kindred form; what duties, in fact, besides those of the parochial clergy and of Episcopal superintendence are required for the healthful condition of the Church. (35)

Forrester argues that despite Pusey's earlier open mindedness about these matters, the way the government approached the issues, and the fear that they were doing so under the influence of a form of rationalistic, utilitarian liberalism was the thing above all else that pushed Pusey over to the Tractarian side of the argument. This led him to give up on liberalism in all its forms, political and theological, despite his own earlier political and theological liberalism, the latter being shown by his two volumes on rationalism in German Theology. It also had a wider implication for his lack of a real social theology since he came to see the liberal attack on Church property as potentially at least an attack on other less sacred forms of property ownership. If the State could dispossess the Church of property and dictate how the resources from this property were to be used, then there was no reason of principle why the state should regard other forms of property ownership as absolute and not to be used to further utilitarian ends. Forrester sums up the argument here as follows:

> It is certainly the case that whilst as late as 1833 Pusey was insisting in his *Cathedral Institutions* that the Church should adapt itself to changing conditions, he had increasingly come to distrust government motives regarding the rights of property owners, and he feared that the Whigs under Grey were guilty of ignoring moral issues in their legislation. This was the basic cause of Pusey's change of heart concerning liberalism. (36)

While this was not developed by Pusey into some general theory of property rights, and his political thought such as it was became deeply influenced by the ultra Toryism of Keble, this issue is important in relation to Gore's social thought in relation to the Tractarian movement for two reasons. Firstly, that movement despite its social concern was essentially Tory. Secondly, although he believed in the rights of property owners, Gore was sympathetic to the Labour Movement and to Socialism and had quite a well developed view of the nature of private property and our rights to it which we shall look at later in the thesis.

Pusey's Concern for The Church In Relation to the Poor

It would be a mistake to infer from the previous discussion, and particularly the last point that Pusey was unsympathetic to the poor. He did indeed have a great sympathy, but this was expressed in a way that did not challenge the rights of property owners and was not particularly concerned with questions of justice and injustice in society at large, but was rather concerned with private charity and with the role of the church in poor areas, a concern that led in the next generation to the Tractarians having a big influence on the slum parish movement. As we saw earlier the sacraments were central in Pusey's view of redemption and he saw the sacraments, particularly the eucharist, as having a direct impact on our concern with the poor. So for example in a passage quoted in Rowell's *The Vision Glorious* Pusey linked these two concerns in an effective manner:

> If we would see Him in His Sacraments we must see Him also wherever He has declared Himself to be, and especially His poor... Real love to Christ must issue in love to all who are Christ's and real love to Chris's poor must issue in self denying acts of love towards them. Casual almsgiving is not Christian charity....the poor, rich in faith, have been the converters of the world; and we...if we are wise, must seek to be like them, to empty ourselves at least of our abundance; to empty ourselves rather of our conceit, our notions of station, our costliness of dress, our jewelry, our luxuries, our self love, even as He ...emptied Himself of the glory which He had with His Father, the brightness of His majesty, the worship of the Hosts of heaven, and made Himself poor, to make us rich. (37)

When Pusey talks about the inadequacy of casual almsgiving in this passage this is not to contrast it with say a programme of political action in the interests of social justice as for example Gore might approve of. The contrast is rather with the degree and constancy of almsgiving. As we shall see in the next paragraph Pusey certainly took his own advice to very extreme lengths.

The difference between Pusey's social involvement and that of the other Tractarians is certainly substantial. Forrester describes the difference in the following way:

> Pusey's Tractarianism was not of the kind which R. W. Church suggests gave no thought to influencing the middle classes or remedying the ignorance and wretchedness of the great towns; in these senses, Pusey's outlook was utterly distinct from that of Keble, Newman and the majority of the members of the Oxford Movement. Much as Pusey shared the theological views of his colleagues, his constant efforts to draw attention to the conditions of the slums in the industrial towns, were exerted over and above the usual Tractarian concentration on the themes of the corporate nature of the Church and the Incarnation.(38)

Pusey in a sense stands somewhere in between Keble and Newman on the one hand and Gore on the other in thinking through the social implications of the Christian Faith and its sacramental expression. Keble and Newman had other interests and while they shared Pusey's views on the corporate nature of religion and the way the Incarnation as it were sacralised the whole of reality including the social world, they did not think this through and their own religious practice did not embody these assumptions to any great degree. Gore on the other hand, as we shall see thought these matters through in what might be thought of as being in a more political and sociological way than Pusey. Pusey was concerned with the poor and as we saw in the quotation cited in the previous paragraph, this was quite central to his understanding of Christianity and sacramental life, but this was not connected to any worked out social theory, and indeed his own social thought was as we have seen rather conservative in relation to property rights.

Unlike Gore therefore Pusey propounded no plans for the social reorganisation of society, but he did have a lively personal concern with the condition of the poor in large cities. This concern manifested itself in two ways: the degree of his own personal charity and alms giving which went very far beyond the casual almsgiving which was mentioned in the previous paragraph and in his concern with the mission to the poor in deprived areas which led in the next generation to the slum parishes phenomenon.

Pusey strongly believed that the Church was a civilising influence in poor areas and he was concerned to make sure that the Church was changing sufficiently to have a clear presence in such areas. He was happy enough to see the resources released from ancient endowments in Cathedrals and so forth used to further the work of the Church in such areas and his objection to the reforms propounded by Lord Grey which we considered earlier was that the initiative for this came from the State rather than from the Church. So for example he argued that the Ecclesiastical Commission which followed the suppression of the Irish Bishoprics had not taken into account sufficiently the need for the Church to use its resources to meet the needs of the new urban areas. He argued that the reforms proposed by the Commission had not really dealt with the question of how far cathedral and collegiate Churches might be rendered most conducive to the efficiency of the Church.(39) He was particularly critical of the Commissions failure to increase the overall number of bishoprics:

> It was impossible that any scheme should even palliate the existing evils, which should attempt to portion out the population of England and Wales among twenty four bishops, the same number which the Church had three centuries ago, when Westminster and Liverpool were villages; our manufacturing towns commons and Lancashire a moor. (40)

This was a central concern of Pusey because he thought that many of the new manufacturing towns were developing in what he called an "heathenish state', and he believed very strongly that the Church if it could extend its parochial organisation into such areas could both counteract what he saw as the moral degradation of the new towns as well as providing a locus of succour for the poor.

> Our ancestors spirit has fled: we have come to the dregs of time...Our old towns and cities are recognised from far by their towers and spires, hallowing all the landscape...Our modern towns have their characteristics - the chimneys of our manufacturies, and the smoke of our furnaces. And we boast ourselves in the multitude of our riches, and our wisdom, and our skill in the mechanical arts, and our knowledge of the physical sciences,and the Bibles which we print; while the only true wisdom we have not known...Shall we inure ourselves, as to a thrice told tale, to hear the myriads who subsist by breaking the Seventh or Eighth Commandment; of quarters in our metropolis which are "sinks of

> iniquity'; of "hells" in our Christian city...Shall we hear, day by day, of drunkenness, debauchery, brutality, profanes, reigning among those who were once made "members of Christ and heirs of heaven" and turn on the other side as if it concerned not us. It concerns us all. (41)

This concern was clearly part of Pusey's own life in that Forrester reports that he donated £5,000 a huge sum in those days to help with the establishment of London Churches, his wife sold all her jewelery for the same purpose and he founded St Saviours Church in down-town Leeds at his own expense. His life was given over to regular almsgiving and a very austere and abstemious life, which intensified after the death of his wife.

Monasticism and Social Concern

The Tractarian Movement, and particularly Pusey's own example, led to the refounding of monasticism in the Church of England after a gap of three centuries, only relieved by the struggle to establish a small monastic community at Little Gidding in Huntingdonshire in the Seventeenth Century. While the revival of monasticism involved the attempt to recover the whole range of monastic and coventual activity, it also had a strong social dimension.

The revival of women's religious orders in the Church was a gradual affair under the influence of the Tractarian Movement and there was strong hostility from the

extreme protestant wing of the Church but this did not deter those who had the vision to revive the monastic ideal, particularly in relation to its concern for the poor in both physical and spiritual terms. The first permanent religious order came into being in 1845 although some women took private vows in the 1830's under Pusey's influence. Pusey founded the first religious order in 1845 at Park Village in London. This was called The Sisters of The Holy Cross. Marian Hughes was the first woman to take a vow of celibacy under the direction of Pusey in 1841 and she then left for France to study the way of life of some of the monastic orders there. Her observations on French Convent life were a great help to Pusey when he first began to draw up a rule of life for the first Community to be established in England since the Reformation. Their work, apart from the round of devotions was devoted to the poor. They visited the sick and the aged in their homes, they visited workhouses and prisons. They organised the feeding and clothing of children and giving shelter to distressed women who were of good character. A school was started for poor children of the order. Pusey was instrumental in setting up the Convent along with Fr. Dodsworth the local vicar and John Keble and the rule was approved by the Bishop of London. In a volume published in 1965 on the Sisterhood the way of life is described as follows:

> The sisters rose at five....The service called Lauds was at six a.m. in the Oratory...at a quarter to seven the Sisters assembled in the same room and Prime was said...Breakfast followed and was taken in silence; indeed, silence was kept all day, except at the hours

> appointed for recreation. After the meal, we said Terce and then went to hear morning prayers in the church. The sisters who were involved in the poor school went to their duties. The school lasted until twelve, when we went home and said Sext. We had dinner at twenty minutes to one, still in silence. The food was good, plain and sufficient. After dinner we talked together in the Common Room. At three we said None...The school was dismissed for the day at half past four. At five there were three quarters of an hour for spiritual reading, then Vespers. Supper followed at six o clock and after it a few moments relaxation. We then prepared to go to church...for those who could not go after the fatigues of the day read the service at home. On our return from the church at eight o clock Compline was said, and the sisters returned to the Oratory after its conclusion for private devotion until twenty minutes past nine when Mattins was said. (42)

So the sisterhood was based upon a strong religious life, but the orientation of the work was clearly social to alleviate both the moral and material degradation of the poor. It is also important to notice, as Rowell points out in *The Vision Glorious*, that for Pusey sisterhoods were able to break out of the unreformed parochial system of the Church, which as we have already seen he criticised, and to deploy a ministry which was not confined by what Pusey took to be the inefficient nature of the existing parish system. While the Park Village Convent was linked to Fr. Dodsworth's Church of Christ Church Albany St. Pusey argued

strongly that convents and monasteries actually had to be free of parochial regulation just so that they could break out of the framework of the unreformed system.

In 1856 the Park Village Community united with the Sisters of Mercy in Davenport, another Pusey inspired group, to form the Sisters of the Most Holy Trinity. The Davenport sisters also had a strong social orientation. The convent under the direction of Abbess Sellon was founded in a very deprived area of Davenport and was strongly supported by the Bishop of Exeter. Many of the children in the area were unbaptised and did not know the Christian Faith and within a few years the charitable work of the Convent was substantial:

> Within two years Mother Lydia Sellon had established the following charitable institutions in or around Davenport: 1) Orphan's home where twenty seven children were boarded lodged, clothed and educated 2) St George's College for sailor boys where twenty six lads were redeemed from misery and vice 3) The House of Peace - a refuge for girls who were trained for domestic service 4) a Home for Old Sailors and their Wives 5) an Industrial School where seventy girls were instructed in needle work as a means of support 6) Six Houses of Hope - model lodging houses for poor families with a school attached for the inmates 7) Lodging Houses connected with the Industrial School 8) A Soup Kitchen where

between eighty to a hundred meals were served daily to old people past work 9) Five Ragged schools.(43)

Mother or Abbess Sellon was also well known for her and her community's work with the victims of the cholera epidemic which broke out in the towns of Davenport and Plymouth in 1849. They offered their help to Fr. R. Prynne the Parish priest of St. Peter's Dockland and they assisted in the nursing of cholera victims. Conditions were appalling and Fr. Prynne reports as follows:

> ...for three months we seemed to be living among the dying and the dead. A temporary hospital was erected in the parish, with an altar set up in the largest ward, in order that everything might be ready for communicating the dying. The sisters asked to receive communion daily to strengthen them in their work and so for the first time since the Reformation, a daily eucharist was begun. (43)

Men's orders were also established again under the influence of Pusey: The Society of the Holy Cross was set up in 1855, and Pusey set up a society of celibate priests at St. Saviours in Leeds a church which he had established out of his own pocket, and in 1857 a semi-monastic community was set up by Frs. Lowder and Mackonochie in Wellclose Square in London, and the Society of St. John the Evangelist was set up by Fr. Benson in Oxford in 1865 and again this society had central pastoral and educational responsibilities. There were also contemplative communities established one of the most significant of which was

a Benedictine Community at Claydon Rectory in Suffolk. This was founded by Joseph Lyne in 1863 who took the name Fr. Ignatius who became something of a scourge for Charles Gore after the publication of *Lux Mundi*, being instrumental in breaking up a meeting in Birmingam which Gore was due to address. Overall therefore Pusey's ideas on the social mission of the Church, while they were perhaps not worked out in the context of a developed social theology were nevertheless influential and mirrored his teaching about the nature of the eucharist and of the Incarnation.

Slum Parishes: Tractarianism and Ritualism

The final aspect of Pusey's influence on the social mission of the Church was through the development of the slum parish movement which was led by priests profoundly influenced by Tractarian theological and ecclesiological ideas and by Pusey's own deep commitment to the social mission of the Church. There are two themes which are important to illustrate in this context. One is to say something about the nature, extent and distribution of the work of the slum parish priests, and also something about their emphasis on ritual. I shall take the latter point first because in spite of first appearances it does mark an important contribution to the role of the church in evangelising the poor and at the same time it does mark a difference with Pusey and one in which Gore found himself more in sympathy with Pusey's views than those of the ritualists.

While the Tractarian Movement had clearly opened the way for the revival of Catholic customs and ceremonies in the Church, many of the leaders of the Movement and particularly Pusey themselves stood apart from the ritualising tendency . As Rowell says:

> The Tractarian leaders had been concerned with the identity and catholic continuity of the Church of England. They had stressed the need as they saw it for a better observance of the rubrics and pattern of worship of the Prayer Book. They had taught a doctrine of reserve which reflected their sense of the majesty and mystery of God. They believed in the catholicity of the Church of England, but did not seek to reintroduce either the medieval ritual of the Sarum service books or contemporary catholic ceremonial though they held many catholic devotional books and the Breviary in particular to be valuable. Pusey was not alone in feeling that the awe and reverence of worship needed to be linked with penitence and sobriety rather than with colour and ceremony. (44)

Pusey was rather reserved in his approach to extending ritual within the Church of England and it was very much the next generation of priests influenced by both the Tractarian movement in theology and by Pusey's own commitment to the poor which saw a greater role for ritual in the service of the Church's mission to the poor than the earlier Tractarians had been prepared to countenance.

The liturgical innovations: the use of vestments with seasonal variations, the use of incense, processions, the easterly celebration of the eucharist, the use of candles and crucifixes on the altar were all used in slum parishes and caused something of a scandal to more protestant members of the church. However, in the view of the slum parish priests this emphasis on ritual had an important missionary effect. This point is discussed at some length in Rowell's the *Vision Glorious* and I shall just sketch the general point of his argument. His basic point is that the slum parish priests were working in missionary situations with people who did not know the faith and most of whom were barely literate at best. It was in their view essential to communicate the faith in visual and striking ways. People might learn more about the sequence of Advent, Christmas, Lent, Passion, Easter, Whitsun and Trinity by the changing colours of vestments and ceremonies than they were likely to learn as catechumens. Rowell quotes Litterdale as arguing the point as follows:

> Ritualism was the "Object Lesson" of religion which communicated religious truth to the illiterate and to women and children. And as such it was superior to the sermonising of Evangelicalism and the aridity of Broad Church Liberalism. Ritualism he argued was the natural component of written liturgy. What an oratorio would be without instrumentation; what jewels uncut and unset are; what a handsome house in the country is without hangings, curtains, carpets, mirrors, or pictures that and worse than that, the Prayer Book without ritual. (45)

Ritual had an educative role in the sorts of parishes ministered to by the slum priests and indicates the difference of setting from that of Dr Pusey who spent his entire working life in Oxford and most of it at Christ Church as did Newman and Keble in a genteel parish near Winchester. The corporate sacramental life of the Church for which the Tractarians had so strongly argued needed ritual to lead people in the slum parishes to an understanding of the nature of the sacraments.

One area of sacramental practice in which the slum priests were more in agreement with Pusey was in relation to confession. After his conversion to the Tractarian cause Pusey laid great store by confession and certainly as Rowell points out it was much used in slum parishes and created a lot of gossip among those who disapproved of it. However as Rowell quotes A.R. Russell as pointing out in his book *The Clerical Profession* the growth of the practice of confession in these areas could be seen as part of the development of the counselling role of the clergy among the poor. In the new industrial centres people had been brought in from more traditional communities and they had lost many of the social means of support in their lives. They came together in very deprived conditions as individuals rather than as members of a supportive community and as Russell says as quoted by Rowell:

> The clergyman's activity in counselling became a system of personal therapy for people who were deprived of the solidarity of the traditional village and the extended family.

Again therefore it is arguable that the missionary activity in poor areas instigated by the Tractarian movement used the sacraments as a way of reaching out to people who lived isolated and depressed lives. As we have seen therefore the slum parish Movement owed a very great deal to the emphasis of Pusey on the social nature of the Church's mission. Perhaps the last word here should be given to Peck in his *The Social Implications of the Oxford Movement*:

> The social implications of religious and ecclesiastical conservatism (of the Oxford Movement, B. Jones) may be ultimately revolutionary. Seeing that such conservatism is the preservation of the liberating dogmas of faith with its emphasis upon the intrinsic supernatural value, the divine issues of human society and the sacramental significance of man's approach to the material world, it is likely that it will discover itself in sharp opposition to a world founded and buttressed in the negation of all these principles. (46)

However it was the next generation of catholic thinkers and theologians in the Anglican church, and in particular Charles Gore who drew out these implications more fully than did the Tractarians of the first generation.

We have now completed our examination of the themes in Tractarian thought relevant to this thesis. The aim has not been to give an overview of the Tractarian Movement overall, clearly even if this were relevant it would be beyond the bounds of this thesis. Rather the aim has been to emphasise those

aspects of Tractarian thought against the background of which Gore developed his own liberal catholic position and his own social thought in relation to theology. The points of similarity and contrast will be taken up in the next chapter.

Chapter 2 Notes

1 G. Faber, *Oxford Apostles.* Penguin, London, 1954, page 306

2 J. Newman, *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*, Collins, Fontana, London, 1962

3 Ibid.

4 G. Faber, op. cit. page 318.

5 Ibid.

6 Page 319

7 C. Gore, ed. *Lux Mundi*, London, 1891 edition pages vii and viii

8 J. Keble, *Sermons Academical and Occasional*, Rivingtons, Oxford, 1848 page 358.

9 W. Lock, *John Keble: a Biography*, Mowbray, 1893, page 230.

10 D. Forrester, *The Young Doctor Pusey*, Mowbray, 1989, page 77.

11 Scott Holland, *Personal Studies*, Mowbray, 1905, pages 91-2

12 D. Forrester, *The Young Doctor Pusey*, op.cit., page 183.

13 E.B. Pusey, *Oxford Declaration*, 2 May 1834

14 Quoted in D. Forrester, op.cit., page 146.

15 G. Faber, op.cit., page 345.

16 D. Forrester, op.cit., page 88

17 Ibid., page 89

18 Ibid., page 32.

19 Ibid., page 38.

20 Ibid., page 39.

21 Ibid., page 40

22 Ibid., page 50

23 Ibid.

24 G.L. Prestige, *The Life of Charles Gore*, Heinemann, London, 1935 page 102.

25 Ibid., pages 103-4

26 D. Forrester, op.cit., page 98

27 Quoted in D. Hadidan, *Keeping the Faith*, ed. G. Wainwright, SPCK, London, 1989, page 372.

28 E.B. Pusey, *Parochial Sermons* Vol 3, Oxford, 1859, page 234.

29 D. Forrester, op.cit., page 97.

30 *Sermons During the Season From Advent to Whitsuntide*, Parker, Oxford, pages vi-vii.

31 C. Gore, *The Body of Christ*, Murray, London, 1901, page 45.

32 See Note 5 above.

33 Quoted in Forrester, op.cit., page 139.

34 Ibid., page 140.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 G. Rowell, *The Vision Glorious*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983 page 82.

38 D. Forrester, op. cit.

39 E.B. Pusey, 'Royal and Parliamentary Commissions', *The British Critic*, April 1838, pages 458-9

40 Ibid., page 464.

41 E.B. Pusey, 'Churches in Modern Britain', *British Magazine*, November 1835, pages 5-12.

42 *The Park Village Sisterhood*, Privately printed, 1965, pages 37-8

43 Quoted in Rowell, page 125.

44 Ibid., page 127.

45 Ibid., page 133.

46 W.G. Peck, *The Social Implications of the Oxford Movement*, Scribeners, New York, 1933, page 4

CHAPTER 3

Charles Gore and Liberal Catholicism

The aim of this chapter is to consider some of the basic themes and issues surrounding Gore's idea of liberal catholicism; I shall then in the next chapter identify the ways in which this position affects his approach to social and political theology and the engagement of the Church in social issues. As I made clear in the two earlier chapters, Gore's ideas on the nature of liberal catholicism have to be set against the understanding of the catholic tradition which he inherited from the Tractarians and which, as we also saw, the preeminent guardian of that tradition, Liddon, believed that Gore had to some extent abandoned in *Lux Mundi*. In perhaps the clearest statement of liberal catholicism that he ever made Gore argued as follows:

> I believe with a conviction the intensity of which I can hardly express, that it is...the God given vocation of the Church of England to realise and to offer men a Catholicism that goes behind the Reformation in real and unimpaired connection with the Catholicism of the past.. which is scriptural and represents the whole of scripture; which is rational and can court the light of all genuine enquiry; which is free to deal with the new problems and wants of a new time while it does the old work of conversion and

> sanctification; which acknowledges the authority of its ministry, but an authority constitutional, not absolute; scriptural, not arbitrary.(1)

This definition of his position, as I hope to show, entails a general discussion of his view of the role of reason in religion; the role of tradition and its relationship to authority; the nature of the Bible and its authority within the Church; the impact of all of this on the general nature of authority in the Church and its limits. It also implies a discussion of Gore's views of specific doctrines, two of the most important of which are to do with the nature of the Eucharist and with the doctrine of the Incarnation. Most of the time I shall concentrate on what Gore himself says, however at various points I shall also refer to the work of Paget and Illingworth. They contributed to *Lux Mundi* and were close friends of Gore, and it therefore seems reasonable to assume that, since he published their essays in *Lux Mundi* and they were close friends and members of the Holy party, their views should be taken as being close to those of Gore; where I believe it is important for developing an understanding of Gore's position I have in fact referred to them as well.

Liberal Catholicism and the Role of Reason

This is perhaps the area most of all in which Gore's liberal catholicism differs in a rather profound way from that of the Tractarians. I have already discussed the Tractarians" view of reason in religion and I do not have to restate it in this chapter. They were however opposed to what Keble called the "irreverent use of

reason" and took the view that reason should be used only as an instrument within the received doctrines of the Church and scriptural authority. This became very clear as we saw in relation to Pusey who began his career by being very interested indeed in the role of reason within German theology and in Biblical criticism. However, as we saw, he became gradually disillusioned with liberalism in all its forms, political, intellectual and theological. Gore however saw an appeal to reason as being of vital importance in liberal catholicism as he understood it. As we saw earlier the whole task of *Lux Mundi,* as described in his editorial Preface, was to bring an understanding of the basic doctrines and principles of the Catholic faith into some kind of appropriate relationship with modern intellectual life and concerns. He took the view that Catholicism rests upon, or is involved in, a threefold cord of scripture, reason and tradition, and therefore it is vital to get a clear indication of his views about the weight which should be attached to each of these within the Catholic tradition. Gore clearly believed that it was this threefold cord which defined the particular Anglican understanding of the Catholic tradition. He argued that this was not some kind of new invention on his part, but had been at the centre of Anglicanism since the Reformation and was a particular feature of the Caroline Divines. He argued that since the Reformation the Church had:

> ...retained her hold on the ancient structure of the Church while she opened her arms to the new learning, the new appeal to scripture, the freedom of historical criticism and the duty of private judgement.

This emphasis on the role of reason led Lord Halifax, the leading lay catholic within the Anglican Church, and a defender of the orthodox, Tractarian tradition within the Church, to argue that Gore was at heart "a Protestant free thinker" (2), which reiterated Newman's view of *Lux Mundi* which was published just before he died.

In trying to identify the role of reason in Gore's thinking we have to recognise two central understandings. Gore's commitment to reason did not imply that he believed that Christianity had to depend upon a particular kind of metaphysic or speculative philosophy, as Hegelians believed. To do this is to turn Scripture and dogma into a kind of exemplification of a truth which can be attained on other (ie. rational) grounds Gore believed that those thinkers who took this view, particularly Campbell, whom he criticised in *The New Theology and the Old Religion* completely misrepresented the Christian understanding of the Incarnation. He believed that speculative or natural theology could indeed establish the existence of God. He therefore supported a general claim that theism was a perfectly sound intellectual position, but equally he felt that the God established by natural theology would fall a long way short of an understanding of the nature of God as revealed in the Christian religion. This point is well made by Carpenter in his book *Gore: A Study of Liberal Catholicism*:

> And yet he believes that the God of speculative reason falls very far short of what is the best spiritual experience that man requires. At its highest, philosophic inquiry can provide only some sort of

> monism or pantheistic theory which makes the universe as essential to God as he is to the universe. It is unable to progress to the higher pantheism and this applies equally to ancient philosophy and to current philosophy. (3)

The ideas which Carpenter cites are to be found for example in Gore's books *Can We then Believe*? and in *Belief in God*, as well as in his Gifford Lectures on Natural Theology, *The Philosophy of the Good Life*.

These points require us to look briefly at the way Gore as well as others of the *Lux Mundi* school, such as Scott Holland and Illingworth, were indebted to the philosophical work of T.H Green, particularly his *Prolegomena to Ethics* and his *Lay Sermons*. Green had been the dominant philosophical influence in Oxford when Gore was an undergraduate and had been the Philosophy Fellow at Balliol when Gore was there as a student. There are several reasons why we need to look at this idealist influence: first of all because it gives us some idea of the strengths and weaknesses of metaphysics in relation to religion in Gore's view; secondly because it does enable Gore to take the claims of reason more seriously than the Tractarians; finally because Gore uses Green's ideas in his account of the social nature of the eucharist which linked the sacramental life of the Church to social and political witness.

It is obviously not possible to give a full account of Green's approach to philosophy and its relation to theology in this thesis, but a number of points need

to be made. In what follows I shall follow the line set out by Professor Plant and Dr Vincent in their book on Green, *Philosophy Politics and Citizenship: The Life and Times of the British Idealists.*(4)

Green was writing under the influence of Kant, but particularly of Hegel, in a situation in Victorian Britain in which religious beliefs were coming under attack both from natural science and the historical critique of the Bible. Green provided a philosophical system which set out, in a philosophical way, the values and principles which he believed were part and parcel of ordinary Christian consciousness. Green argued that:

> Philosophy does but interpret with full consciousness and in system, the powers already working in the spiritual life of mankind. (5)

Philosophy was not just some kind of abstract system of ideas, but in fact was a systematic and rational working out of that which was implicit in ordinary religious consciousness.

Green however thought that philosophy was of vital importance in this because it enabled the truths which lay at the heart of Christianity to be stated in a rational way independent of the disputed historical evidence contained in the Bible about the life, death and resurrection of Jesus.. He says on this point:

> At a time when every thoughtful man accustomed to call himself a Christian is asking the faith which he professes for some account of its origin and authority, it is a pity that the answer should be confused by the habit of identifying Christianity with the collection of propositions which constitute the written New Testament (6).

Arnold Toynbee, one of Green's disciples, says of Green's endeavour that:

> Earnest and thoughtful people are willing to encounter the difficulty of mastering some unfamiliar phrases of technical language when they find that they are in possession of a sharply defined intellectual position on which their religious faith can rest. (7)

Because the historical basis of Christianity was being eroded by Biblical criticism, by which Green was himself profoundly influenced, Christians had to seek a foundation for their faith which would rest it on something other than the disputed historical evidence in the Bible.

The approach of Green could hardly stand in a greater degree of contrast with the approach of a Tractarian like Pusey. In some ways, as we saw in the previous chapter, Pusey had in his early career grappled with the same problems on the basis of faith produced by Biblical criticism. As we saw, his response was to try to reject theological liberalism by a conservative defence of the Bible rather than seeing the problem as being resolved by resting Christian belief on a metaphysical

basis. His disciple Liddon followed him in his book *The Divinity of Our Lord*, as we saw in the last chapter. Green however rejected this approach and did try to produce a metaphysical theory which would actually do this. It was as well a philosophical theory which suggested central social dimension of the Christian faith by restating in systematic terms the truths of Christianity, including ideas about the common good. This was particulalry important to Gore. Green summarised his approach to the relationship between Christianity and reason in the following passage from a review of John Caird's book on *The Philosophy of Religion* which was essentially a restatement of Hegel's position:

> That there is one spiritual self conscious being of which all that is real is the activity and the expression; that we are related to this spiritual being not merely as parts of the world which is its expression but as partakers in some inchoate measure of the self consciousness through which it at once constitutes and distinguishes itself from the world; that this participation is the source of morality and religion; This we take to be the vital truth that Hegel had to teach. It still remains to be presented in a form that will command general acceptance among serious and scientific men. (8)

This led Green to seeing the divine as implicit in all life and experience and to a view of God which is essentially pantheistic:

> If there is an essence within the essence of Christianity it is the thought embodied in the text that I have read; the thought of God not as "far off" but as "nigh', not as master but as father, not as terrible outward power forcing us we know not whither but as one of whom we may say that we are reason of his reason, and spirit of his spirit, who lives in our moral life and for whom we live in living for the brethren, even as in so doing we live freely. (9)

This passage is taken from the Lay Sermon given in Balliol College Chapel on the text *The Word is Nigh Thee*. This led Green in his more philosophical style to say the following:

> Our formula then is that God is identical with the self of every man in the sense of being the realisation of its determinate possibilities...that is being conscious of himself, man is conscious of God and thus knows that God is but knows what he is only in so far as he knows what he himself really is. (10)

This leads Green to attempt in *The Prolegomena To Ethics* to try to work out a metaphysical system which would represent these truths independently of the disputed historical record of the Bible. The same is true in relation to science which was also a source of doubt in Victorian England. In *The Prolegomena* he argues that if we reflect on matters of fact and on what we understand by an object, then we shall find that here too in relation to things which are central to

science we shall see that scientific enquiry is not antithetical to faith but rather that a proper understanding of the nature of what it is to be an object characterised by science itself presupposes some kind of metaphysical principle which is the same as God. He argues that the nature of an object is given by the relations in which it stands. Something is what it is only because it stands in the same set of relationships. Relationships are mind dependent and thus objectivity is mind dependent: that is just what objectivity, understood in this relational sense actually means. However, he does not want to be committed to a subjective idealism in which the individual self constitutes the relationships and thus the objects that it confronts, but rather that the concepts, in terms of which we identify relationships, are the product of what he calls an eternal intelligence:

> An eternal intelligence realised in the related facts of the world, or as a system of related facts rendered possible by such an intelligence, partially and gradually reproduces itself in us, communicating piecemeal, but in inseparable correlation, understanding and the facts understood, experience and the experienced world. (11)

This notion of relationship and therefore objectivity is presupposed by science and cannot itself be given a scientific or natural explanation. The passage just quoted defines in a metaphysical style the same conception that is put in a more religious definition in the final passage quoted from the Sermon *The Word is Nigh Thee* quoted earlier. Green's theory seemed therefore to resolve a central problem in

relation to religion in Victorian England in that it seemed to provide a way of defending the essential core of Christian belief independently of the two great sources of doubt: Biblical criticism and the growth of science.

It is worth pointing out, in passing that, there is not a sharp contrast between Green's view of the world and that of Keble and Pusey which we looked at in the previous chapter. As we saw then they both saw the natural world as suffused with the light of Divine immanence. There is however a big difference in the source of the vision. For Keble and Pusey this approach was the result of a conviction rooted in the Bible and the doctrines of the Church. Green however sought to rest a not dissimilar approach to the natural world on a metaphysical basis just because he felt that the Bible, and the authority of the Church and doctrines resting on the Bible, were not sufficient in the modern era. His metaphysical security allowed Green to be content with Christianity even though it was under attack from both science and Biblical criticism. As we shall see, and implicit in what has gone, before, Green's view also entailed an ethical doctrine about the common good which was influential on Gore and the *Lux Mundi* group. Consideration of this will be postponed until the next chapter when we look at Gore's approach to social affairs.

Having given this thumbnail sketch of Green's philosophy we now need to consider what Gore took from it and what he rejected.

The first thing we need to notice is that, given Gore's insistence that liberal catholicism is marked by the threefold cord of reason, Scripture and tradition, he was compelled to stop quite a long way short of Green's position. This was because Green downgraded the role of Scripture, tradition and doctrine and questioned the role of the Church in interpreting scripture in an age when the authority of Scripture was subject to vigorous dispute. The three fold cord required Gore to be much less radical than Green in his attitude to scripture, but not as conservative as Pusey. He could not be as conservative as Pusey in relation to the Bible if he wanted to be true to the assumptions of *Lux Mundi* in terms of putting the Christian faith into a right relation to modern intellectual enquiry, including historical scholarship on the Bible. However we shall look at this more fully later when we consider Gore's attitude to Biblical criticism.

Gore is also very different from Green in that he sees greater limitations on philosophy in relation to religion than does Green. This comes out in two ways. First of all in a general way to do with the nature of philosophical enquiry. Gore argued that the most that philosophy could achieve on its own would be to show that God exists, not what His nature is. In his book *Belief in God* he argues that philosophy can lead us to the view that God is not what he is. The nature of God or his personality has to be revealed in the scriptural narrative and therefore the revelation of scripture is necessary for understanding the mind or personality of God and this cannot be established through philosophical enquiry. Philosophy and reason are therefore important but they have to be complemented by scripture. The philosophy of religion cannot be a foundation for religious belief

with a view about the attributes of God which are essential for Christian life and worship. Therefore Gore had to reject Green's approach as a full approach to the nature of religious belief and experience. It had to be complemented by scripture and this then required the rehabilitation of the role of scripture in a way that Green believed to be unnecessary.

This connects to the second point in that he believes that philosophically inspired pantheism in the philosophy of religion contradicts the nature of Christian belief as it is found in the Bible. In the *New Theology and the Old Religion*, he rejects the approach of Campbell to the philosophy of religion. While he regards Campbell as a rather crude Hegelian, his criticism is applicable to pantheism as a whole however subtle its development might be. First, he argues *The New Theology and the Old Religion*(12) that "No breath of pantheistic identification of Godhead and manhood is felt in the New Testament'. Secondly he argues that this kind of pantheism is untrue to our religious experience in that our religious experience teaches us an utter humility "which made quite impossible any identification of themselves with God." (13)

In his study of Gore, Carpenter makes the point that some of these views are not consistent with what Gore says about the relationship between God and man in his Bampton Lectures, published in 1891. In them, he placed great emphasis on the relationship between God and man, and points out that St Paul and St John "took possession of the Hellenistic idea of the immanent God and identified themselves with it but they held this doctrine on the background of the prophetic

faith in God as transcendent and self complete', a view which Carpenter points out Gore took in *Can We Then Believe?*. Carpenter concludes with the following important point which I think shows particulalrly clearly the difference between Green and Gore:

> The primary idea of God in Christian philosophy must always derive from the self disclosure of God through the prophets and made final in Christ. (14)

Overall, therefore, Gore wants to argue that there is a kind of mystery in our relationship with God and in our understanding of the nature and personality of God. Philosophy is valuable, it can take us a long way but we need more and this is to be found in the narrative of the Bible as the self disclosure of God. Indeed some of Green's followers within the Hegelian school also took the same view as can be seen in the work of Pringle Pattison, particularly his book *Hegelianism and Personality*.

These are the points of difference between Gore and Green and they illustrate not only his relationship with one of the dominant intellectual influences on his life, but also indicate Gore's general view of the role of reason in theology. The points we have looked at do indicate that Gore is much less removed on this view from the Tractarians than some critics have suggested. Reason has a role to play, but only as part of the threefold cord of reason, sripture and tradition. Gore does

not endorse the "irreverent use of reason" autonomous and cut off from the self disclosure of God in the Bible and in the doctrines of the Church.

However, despite this there are similarities between Gore and Green which should be recorded. As I have already said, most of these will be in the field of social philosophy which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. There are however two points that are worth making in this context. The first is that Gore was impressed by Green's general spiritual metaphysics which seemed to allow for a view of intellectual and scientific development as not being fundamentally at odds with the Christian faith. This enabled Illingworth for example in his chapter in *Lux Mundi* to try to reconcile the theory of evolution with Christianity. The same point is made by Gore in his contribution to *Lux Mundi*, but since this was not in that essay his main theme, his approach is much more programmatic: "Nature is one great body, and there is breath in the body; but this breath is not self originated life, it is the influence of the divine spirit" (page 232). Gore and his colleagues were concerned to promote a unifying theology which would make theology consistent with scientific and intellectual discovery, but in the absence of an overall metaphysical theory allowing for the implicit reconciliation of science and religion, this would have been much more difficult. Indeed it would be much more difficult now to engage in a project like *Lux Mundi* which assumed that intellectual enquiry rooted in such a spiritual metaphysic could be regarded as benign in relation to Christianity in the absence of such a metaphysic.

Secondly Gore actually used Green's arguments about the nature of objects and relationships at a crucial point in the argument in *The Body of Christ*. As a book on the nature of the Eucharist, it again shows the interplay of reason and doctrine in Gore's theology. The passage is long but I shall cite it in full because it can then be compared with the brief account of Green's view on the nature of objectivity and relationship to be found in *The Prolegomena to Ethics* and summarised earlier in this chapter:

> ...it is of real importance that we should recognise that faith - the common faith of the Church - probably plays the same part in actually constituting the spiritual reality of the sacrament as the common reason of man does in constituting the objects of the natural world: that is to say we should expect spiritual objectivity to follow the same law of relation as natural objectivity.
>
> No doubt to hold that the faith of the Church goes to constitute the spiritual reality of the presence, so that for one who is altogether outside that faith the spiritual reality cannot be said exist - to hold this some would say, is equivalent to denying its objective character. But they would say so in haste; because it had not fallen in their way to study metaphysics, which is the science of first principles of reality known to us.

Metaphysical study makes us conscious how much the mind...has to do with actually constituting the objects of the outward world - the trees, the animals, the persons. Mind as it is in me and all men, not only perceives these things as ready made, but also has to do with making them to be. God we commonly say creates things in nature, and he creates mind. But in fact the two things are inseparable...Relations are the work of the mind, and relations are necessary to make objects. On the other hand it is only the sensations given from the outside which enable the mind to perceive and know, and so become a mind at all...And it would be of a piece with this if we were to suppose that a similar relation exists between the spiritual presence of Christ in the eucharist and our corresponding faculties of spiritual perception - if we are to suppose that though it is God who makes the bread to be the body of Christ and not man...., and yet he makes this spiritual reality relatively and not absolutely: in such sense as to exist only for faith, the faith of the believing and worshipping Church, just as he creates the world relatively and not absolutely, that is, to exist for rational beings and by the action of thought.

And we observe that this doctrine of relativity makes the reality of objects neither in the sphere of nature nor of the spiritual world depend on the precarious state of mind of any individual. The trees and flowers do not depend on my mind for their existence, but

> on the action of that common reason in which all men more or less effectively share, but which at the bottom has its origin out of the divine reason....So the spiritual presence of Christ in His Body and His blood (and all that goes with it) rests not on the precarious faith of any individual, but is so relative to the faith of the Church as a whole - that common faculty which rests at bottom on the activity of the Holy Ghost - as that apart from faith, or for one who in no way shares it can no more in any intelligible sense be said to exist than the beauty of nature can be said to exist for what is quite without reason. For here again existence proves to be a relation to a consciousness - only now it is not a mere spiritual sensibility, but spiritual faith. (15)

This passage is very important for three reasons. The first is that it shows in some detail how the threefold cord works for Gore. Here we have a doctrine or belief, that the bread and wine are in some sense the body and blood of Christ. This in turn is rooted in both scripture and the traditions and doctrines of the Church. However the nature of the spiritual presence of Christ in the eucharist is made compatible with the prevailing account of the nature of objects given in idealist metaphysics and therefore in proper *Lux Mundi* style is brought into a right relation with prevailing intellectual views. Secondly in this particular case, despite what was said earlier, it does indicate a difference from the Tractarians. One could hardly imagine Keble or Pusey trying to elucidate the nature of the sacraments with reference to a philosophical theory. Finally the link between the

objectivity of the presence of Christ in the eucharist and the corporate faith of the Church is in an analogical relationship with the nature of objects being dependent on the common role of reason. This gives a kind of philosophical justification for the corporate nature of the sacraments which as we shall see comes to have important social significance for Gore.

I have now concluded my examination of the role of reason in Gore's theology and I want to draw a general conclusion from this which is only implicit in what has gone before and this has to do with the role of reason in social theology. Because of their sceptical view of reason the Tractarians would not have thought it appropriate in their social theology to bring theology to bear on the results of rational enquiry within what we might now call the social sciences. However, because of Gore's clear view of the link between theology and the role of reason he does precisely this, drawing particularly on ideas of the common good which are heavily indebted to the writings of Green and other Idealists.

The Role Of Scripture in Gore's Liberal Catholicism

We have already considered some aspects of this issue in the previous section in relation to the complex issue of the relationship between scripture and reason. Given that for Gore reason can only take us so far in our knowledge of God and we need to have this supplemented by God's self disclosure in the Bible we now need to go on to look at his view of the nature of scripture and its authority which

is the central theme of his essay in *Lux Mundi.* He needs to meet Green's challenge that scripture is now an insecure basis for the authority of Christianity, given the unreliability of the historical record as revealed by German Biblical criticism. This leads Green to seek a new basis for faith in the authority of metaphysics. As we have seen Gore rejected this view, but in rejecting it he has to some degree at least to restore confidence in the authority of scripture as a basis for faith and tradition, the other cords in the three-fold liberal catholic cord. At the same time however, if he is to be consistent with his claims about the role of reason he cannot, like the Tractarians, withdraw from the debate about Biblical interpretation and criticism as, for example, Pusey did with his conservative commentary on Daniel in the face of hostile criticism. It is rather doubtful whether these different concerns in Gore's mind could be reconciled and certainly his reconciliation is unlikely to satisfy either radicals in relation to the Bible or conservatives like Pusey and Liddon. As we have already seen in relation to scripture Liddon assumed and bitterly regretted that Gore had abandoned Pusey's position, however it is doubtful that the position that Gore arrives at between conservatives like Pusey and Liddon on the one hand and radicals like Green is a stable one. Gore's reconciliation essentially depends on treating the Old Testament in a different way from the New. Gore makes no bones about his commitment to a rational approach to the Bible when he says in that essay in *Lux Mundi* that:

> When Christianity adopts, as in the modern Romanist system, a different tone, proscribing free enquiry as "rationalistic" and making

> an appeal to antiquity, in order to test the present teaching of the Church, a "treason and a heresy', it is to bring its own rational heritage, and adopting a method which Charles Kingsley had good reason to call Manichean. It is the test of the Church's legitimate tenure that she can encourage free enquiry into her title deeds. (16)

However in fact despite all the subtlety of Gore's approach he uses the latest assumptions about Biblical criticism in relation to the Old Testament but does not do so in relation to the New Testament.

There are several themes in his discussion of the Old Testament which I shall mention without discussing in detail since the aim is to illustrate his general approach, rather than engaging in detailed analysis which is irrelevant to the main themes of this thesis. First of all he is influenced by the approach which sees the Old Testament as history. For Gore under the dispensation of the Old Testament God acts within the history of a particular nation, namely the Jews. This leads him to a number of insights into the nature of the Old Testament. The first point that he makes is that the Old Testament has to be read in a developmental way: that is to say "it is of the essence of the Old Testament to be imperfect because it represents a gradual process of education by which man was lifted up out of the depth of sin and ignorance'. This contrasts with the New Testament: "it is of the essence of the New Testament, as the religion of the Incarnation, to be final and catholic'. (17) Because it is developmental, related to the history of a particular nation, it follows from this that for Gore what is important when considering the

inspiration of the Old Testament is to regard it as the general revelation of God in history that matters, not in the historical detail:

> The revelation of God was made in an historical process. Its record is in large part the record of a national life: it is historical. Now the inspiration of the recorder lies, as we have seen largely in this, that he sees the hand of God in history and interprets His purpose. (18)

However, this does not guarantee the historical veracity of every detail in the Old Testament, but this does not detract from its inspiration if it is understood in the way that Gore characterises it.(19) Later in the argument Gore gives some examples of historical idealising that goes on. While inspiration may exclude deliberate falsehood or deception, it is not inconsistent, he argues, with this sort of idealising.

He then goes on to argue that the narratives in the Old Testament before the call of Abraham should be read as allegories or myths. Again it would be a mistake in Gore's view to see myths or allegories as falsehoods and indeed may have been necessary as a basis for primitive peoples to have apprehended general truths:

> Now has the Jewish history such an earlier stage: does it pass back out of history into myth? In particular are not its earlier narratives, before the call of Abraham, of the nature of myth in which we

> cannot distinguish the historical germ, though we do not at all deny that it exists? The inspiration of these narratives is as conspicuous as that of any part of scripture, but is there anything to prevent our regarding these great inspirations about the origins of all things - the nature of sin, the judgement of God on sin, and the alienation among men which follows their alienation from God, - as conveyed to us in myth or allegorical picture, which is the earliest mode in which the mind of man apprehended the truth. (20)

Finally Gore points out, in a way that particularly offended Liddon, that we cannot use the sayings of Jesus on the Old Testament (for example his references to Jonah, the Flood, Davidic authorship of Psalm 90) as a general endorsement of the veracity of the Old Testament in the historical sense. No doubt Jesus regarded the Old testament as inspired in his sense, but under the conditions of the Incarnation, as Gore understood it, Jesus was constrained by the knowledge and limitations characteristic of human nature. This could therefore not guarantee the historical truth of Christ's judgements.

When Gore resorts to the New Testament his view changes. He argues that the idealising and generally inspired view of the Old Testament cannot be applied to the New "without results disastrous to the whole Christian creed...It is because the Old Testament is the record of how God produced a need or an anticipation or ideal, while the New Testament records how in fact he satisfied it. The absolute coincidence of idea and fact is vital to the realisation, not in the preparation for

it. It is equally obvious too, that where fact is of supreme importance, as in the New Testament, the evidence has none of the ambiguity or remoteness which has none of the ambiguity or remoteness which belongs to much of the record of preparation" (21)

Gore's ultimate reason for drawing this kind of distinction which gave veracity to the historical record of the New Testament while limiting this claim in relation to the Old, was his commitment to the doctrines of he Incarnation and the Trinity and the fact that Christ founded the Church and its sacraments. He believed that historical scholarship could in fact establish the historical veracity of the New Testament, but this seems partly at least to be based on the Church, its doctrines and traditions.

It was vital to Gore to be able to make this distinction which stayed with him for the rest of his life otherwise he would be very vulnerable to Hegelian criticism that we should treat the whole of scripture not as an historical record, but as a kind of allegory of the human condition; this could now be stated in rational philosophical terms and did not have to have recourse to myth, and allegory, a philosophy which would lift religion from *Vorstellung* (picture thinking and allegory) to *Begriffe* (to concepts and to systematic truth). If Gore was vulnerable to this criticism then it would place the foundation of Christianity onto metaphysics rather than the narrative of the Gospel; this was a view which he regarded, not as wholly wrong, but as incomplete. It would also be likely, as he argued in his critique of Campbell in *The New Theology and The Old Religion*, to

transform the Incarnation of God in Christ from a unique event to a kind of symbol of the relationship between God and all men. While as we shall see Gore was second to none in drawing out the social implications of the Incarnation for all of human life and history this was because he did believe that Jesus was truly the individual incarnation of God. This was not just some kind of *Vorstellung* of a relationship between God and men that could then be set out in philosophically acceptable terms.

Given subsequent developments in New Testament scholarship it is clear that Gore's attempt to draw a line under the Old Testament in terms of critical historical scholarship does not represent a stable resting place. Despite his indebtedness to the Hegelian/Green position, he argued that the veracity of the New Testament can throw on the nature of God in a non allegorical way. Yet he may still be seen as vulnerable to the criticisms levelled against more radical position of Green, and in a much less nuanced way, of Campbell because of his use of idealist metaphysics.

Tradition

I now want to turn to the third part of the threefold cord which Gore regarded as characteristic both of liberal catholicism and Anglicanism, once it had been properly understood. Because it is part of the threefold cord, tradition cannot be treated separately; the points made in relation to both reason and scripture have

to be seen as background to the present discussion. Equally I want to emphasise those parts of Gore's view of tradition which relate most closely to the points made already about reason and scripture. A good deal of his thought about tradition has to be considered against the background of his view of the Fathers of the Church and how they viewed their own teaching. Like the Tractarians such as Pusey, Newman and Keble, he was convinced of the importance of Patristic theology in securing what he called in *Lux Mundi* the "title deeds" of the Church. In his view the most appropriate way of characterising the thought of the Fathers is that they saw themselves as handing on and defending a tradition that had been given once and for all in the apostles. He was rather critical of Newman's *Essay On The Development of Christian Doctrine* of 1845, because in at least one sense Gore wanted to argue that there is no development of Christian doctrine at all. On the face of it this may seem odd given that his position has been clearly differentiated from conservatives such as Pusey and Keble. I have also argued throughout this thesis that Gore wanted to bring Christianity into a right relation with modern intellectual conditions. In this sense, it could be argued that Christian traditions have to be modified to take account of new scientific and intellectual developments. However, his reading of the Fathers led him to the view that in a fundamental sense there is in fact no development. The Old Testament, as we have seen, is regarded by Gore as developmental but he strongly resists this view in relation to the New Testament and in the faith of the Apostles. In this he sets himself at odds with Green and his mentor Baur on these matters. Green argues in his own *Essay on Dogma*, following Baur's *Geschichte der Christlichen Kirche*:

> The revelation is not therefore made in a day or a generation, or a century. The divine mind touches, modifies, becomes the mind of man, through a process which mere intellectual conception is only the beginning but of which the gradual complement is an unexhausted series of spiritual discipline through all the agencies of social life. (22)

This again is connected with the implicit pantheism in Green which Gore rejects. If in fact God is identified with the self of man, then the revelation of God consists in the further development of human life and human history in which that self in each person strives to live the moral life. As quoted above, in no clear single complete account of this is it exhausted. So why did Gore reject the idea of the development of tradition. The first point has to be made in relation to Gore's approach to the Fathers (here I follow Carpenter's interpretation).

Gore denied that the Fathers thought of themselves as adding to the faith in The *Reconstruction of Belief.* He argued three points to counteract this view.

1) The Fathers were not behaving as philosophers in search of the truth but as guardians of a sacred tradition of revealed truth to be handed down through the ages.

2) They had no conception that they were enlarging he Christian tradition: their position was negative, to say no to certain tendencies of thought that would have undermined the faith.

3) Their choice of terms was not determined by philosophical considerations, but by the necessity of finding the best terms they could find to guard belief, they adopted current terms, but stamped on them new significance.(23)

Given the importance of the Fathers to the Tractarians and to Gore in providing a model of how theology and apologetics should be done, then they were to be seen as guardians and interpreters of tradition and not as extenders or modifiers of it. That tradition was given to the Apostles, we still possess it in the New Testament and the task is to guard it. Given this view of Gore's the question then is to explain how Gore could have defended the view which was central to *Lux Mundi*, of relating the faith to modern scientific and intellectual developments, and how Gore could be seen as betraying Gore and the earlier Tractarians. Gore was himself clear about this issue and he drew a sharp distinction between theology and dogma. There could be developments in theology, indeed there had to be, but there was to be no development of dogma. (a point made in *The Reconstruction of Belief*).(24) So he argues that in relation to theology the divine self disclosure is not confined to the Biblical Record. God discloses himself in civilisation rightly so called and this includes nature, art, science and history. It is therefore incumbent on the Church in relation to

theology to try to put itself in a right relation to these features of civilisation. That is what he and his coauthors tried to do in *Lux Mundi*:

> ...to enter boldly into the thought and imagination and science of its time, adopting and appropriating, or rejecting and so fashioning its theology, which will be in measure different for each epoch and each new century. (25)

Dogma, however, does not change and must be guarded by tradition and this is a central role for the Church. Theology can and must change and this is where the link between tradition and reason comes in. Theology is rational and tries to link itself to intellectual developments and to incorporate these. Dogma however is given and cannot be changed and has to be guarded in the traditional teachings of the Church. A central feature of Gore's liberal Catholicism lies in this distinction and particularly in his view that in some Churches, particularly the Roman Church what is seen as dogmatic and necessary to salvation has extended incredibly. Much of this would be better seen as theology which can change, should change and is certainly fallible. Dogma should be limited and should not go beyond what is found in scripture. This then enables us to see how tradition and reason are linked in Gore's threefold cord in relation to liberal catholicism. However, as the last point made in the previous sentence makes clear, there is now a need to look at the relation between tradition and scripture.

This is a very large topic both generally and in Gore's own work and I do not intend to try to explain all or even many of the facts of Gore's views here. However it is necessary to say something to explain his general view of the relation between scripture and tradition to parallel what I have said about the relationship between tradition and reason. On the face of it Gore seems to be in a rather paradoxical position in relation to scripture when we bear in mind what he has said about the role of dogma in relation to tradition. Dogma as we have seen does not change, and is to be tested by an appeal to the Bible and the witness of the Apostles contained in the Bible. Given this it does not seem to be all that clear what the role of tradition is in interpreting the Bible. Indeed on the face of it, as Gore himself acknowledges, two things would seem to be implied by what he has said: the first is that it would appear that he is in a position very close to Protestantism given his insistence on the basic authority of the Bible in relation to dogma; secondly if his commitment is to the Bible rather than the magisterium of the Church as handed down in tradition then it would seem that his position is vulnerable to Biblical criticism. If the latter were to be accepted, then, as we have already seen it might be difficult to avoid Green's position, namely that a metaphysical basis for religion is necessary if the Biblical basis is vulnerable; a position which as we have seen Gore rejects. In discussing the first of these issues in *The Reconstruction of Belief*, Gore takes the view that Roman Catholicism has been much less unsettled by Biblical criticism than has Protestantism and he argues that this is so because the faith of the Roman Catholic is founded not on a direct appeal to the Bible, but on the Creed of the Church and its traditional teaching. Gore argues, in *The Reconstruction of Belief*,

that the Roman Catholic position is the correct one and it seems that he takes this view for two broad reasons. He argues first of all that the New Testament writers see themselves as addressing groups who are part of a religious community - particularly obvious in the case of St Paul's Epistles. They are already a part of the Church and have received instruction in the nature of the faith and its moral demands. Secondly the Church at this time predates the Canon of the New Testament and the activity of the Church gave the Christian his point of view when looking at and interpreting scripture. So when he says that dogma is given in the Apostolic writing and witness as revealed in the New Testament this Canon was formulated within the point of view grounded in the Church and its teaching. He summarises this point in *The Reconstruction of Belief* in the following way:

> If in result it was agreed that "the Bible is to prove" the legitimacy of the Church's teaching - ie. it is the final court of appeal - yet certainly it was the function of the Church to teach in the first instance. (26)

He goes on to argue that the Apostles Creed and the Nicene Creed are fully authoritative for the Church and in saying this he is in some danger of inconsistency in his view of the relationship between tradition and scripture. He seems to be according an independent degree of authority to the Creeds which were formed after the Canon of the New Testament, and therefore they do not stand in the same relationship to the New Testament as the teaching office of the Church before the Canon was formed. However his response to this point was

twofold. In the first place he argued that the Creeds could stand the test of Scripture and that they could therefore be regarded as having their authority derived ultimately from the Bible rather than from the traditions and Councils of the Church. Secondly, he argued that Biblical criticism had failed to shake the idea that the Creeds were scriptural and that the Gospel's were in a sense summarised in the Creeds. (27)

It is not central to the purpose of this thesis to try to determine whether Gore's view here is a consistent one. The main aim has been to try to provide an account of the relationship between the threefold cord of reason scripture and Tradition. In the next chapter, having set out some of the basic issues in Gore's account of the nature of liberal catholicism we shall look at how he brings these principles to bear on his account of the doctrines of Incarnation and the Sacraments and then to show how he draws out of this what he takes to be the clear social implications of the Gospels.

Chapter 3 Notes

1 C. Gore, *Orders in the Church of England*, Report of the Church Congress, 1899, page 302.

2 Quoted in J. Carpenter, *Gore: A Study of Liberal Catholic Thought*, Faith Press, page 57.

3 Ibid., page 76.

4 Published by Blackwell, Oxford, 1984.

5 T.H. Green, *Collected Works*, ed. L. Nettleship, Longmans, London, 1885-8, Vol.3, page 93.

6 Ibid.

7 A. Toynbee, *Industrial Revolution*, David and Charles, Newton Abbot, 1969 (reprint), page 44.

8 T.H. Green, *Collected Works*, Vol.3, op.cit., page 146.

9 Ibid., page 221.

10 Ibid., page 227.

11 T.H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1906, page 31.

12 C. Gore, *The New Theology and The Old Religion*, Murray, London, 1912, page 48.

13 Ibid., page 47.

14 Carpenter, op.cit., page 79.

15 C. Gore, *The Body of Christ*, Murray, London, 1902, pages 149-153.

16 C. Gore, *Lux Mundi*, Murray, London, 1891 reprint, page 239.

17 Ibid., page 240.

18 Ibid., page 258.

19 Ibid., page 249.

20 Ibid., page 262.

21 Ibid., page 260.

22 T.H. Green, *Collected Works*, Vol.3, op.cit., page 239.

23 Carpenter, op.cit., page 129.

24 C. Gore, *The Reconstruction of Belief,* (in three volumes) Murray, London, 1926, page 840.

25 Ibid., page 872.

26 Ibid, Page 893.

27 C. Gore, *The New Theology and The Old Religion*, op. cit., page 217.

CHAPTER 4

The Incarnation and Its Social and Political Implications

This chapter will be divided into two parts: the first will be concerned with the view of Gore and other *Lux Mundi* theologians on the nature and the role of the Incarnation and its extension as sacraments; the second part will look at what Gore sees as the social and political implications of his Incarnationalist and sacramental theology.

Section 1

The Incarnation

Lux Mundi is subtitled 'A Series of Studies in the Religion of the Incarnation' and there can be little doubt that the nature and scope of the Incarnation lie at the heart of the essays in the volume. However attention will not be focussed on *Lux Mundi* alone, but will also draw upon other of Gore's writings on these themes. As we shall see most of these themes connect up one way or another with the general issues in liberal catholic theology which we have been discussing so far. However, it is in relation to the *Lux Mundi* interpretation of the Incarnation that the bridge is built between theology and social and political theology.

In the essay on 'The Incarnation and Development' in *Lux Mundi*, written by R.J. Illingworth, a close friend of Gore and member of the Holy Party, he makes it

clear that he sees the emphasis on the Incarnation in *Lux Mundi* as a corrective to the emphasis on Atonement in evangelical theology. The aim is not to downgrade the Atonement, so much as to situate it in the context of a proper understanding of the role of the Incarnation. This was a readjustment which he thinks wholly compatible with he traditions and doctrines of the Church and in particular with the Fathers - who as we have seen were particularly authoritative for Gore. In Illingworth's view this emphasis on Atonement had detrimental affects within Christianity, making it incline towards a more private religion, to do with personal sanctity and individual salvation:

> The general tendency of thought since the Reformation has been in the direction of these partial presentations of Christianity. The Reformers, from various causes, were so occupied with what is now called Soteriology, or the scheme of salvation, that they paid but scant attention to other aspects of the Gospel. And the consequence was that a whole side of the great Christian tradition, and one which many of its greatest thinkers had lavished the labours of a lifetime, was allowed to sink into comparative oblivion; and the religion of the Incarnation was narrowed into the religion of the Atonement. Men's views of faith dwindled and became subjective and self regarding, while the gulf was daily widened between things sacred and things secular; while among which latter, art, science and the whole political and social order came to be classed.

> Far otherwise was it with the great thinkers of the early Church; and that not from an underestimate of the power of the Cross, which was bearing daily fruit around them, of penitence, and sanctity; and martyrdom; but from their regarding Christian salvation in its context. They realised that redemption was a means to an end, and that end the reconsecration of the whole universe to God. And so the very completeness of their grasp of the Atonement led them to dwell upon the cosmical significance of the Incarnation, its purpose 'to gather together all things in one'. (1)

We see here the implications of the attempt of the *Lux Mundi* school of theologians to rediscover the significance of the Incarnation. In their view this will have the effect of breaking down the barriers between the sacred and the secular so that it will be possible for the Church to relate its message to social, economic and political conditions without being subject to the criticism that it is straying beyond its proper sphere, namely the sacred. If the material circumstances of individuals is part of the world within which God has revealed himself through the Incarnation of Christ, then it does not stand in opposition to the sacred. Rather as Charles Gore noted in his Preface to *Lux Mundi*, it will enable the Church to 'throw herself into the sanctification of each new social order'. (2)

However, before we move on to look at these political and social implications of the Incarnation we need to be clear about what the *Lux Mundi* writers meant by

the Incarnation; how they saw the relation between God and the world and within that scientific and intellectual endeavour; and how the issue of the incarnation relates to the sacramental life of the Church, (this latter point is particularly important for looking at the social implications of Incarnationalist theology).

Although the emphasis of this chapter will be on the Incarnation, it should not be assumed that Gore and the other authors of *Lux Mundi* were trying to minimise the importance of the Atonement. Indeed to do so would be another partial presentation of Christianity of the sort that Illingworth complained about in the passage cited earlier. Gore put the point in the following way when he argued that there had been a proper reaction against the stress on the Atonement within what he called 'old fashioned Evangelicalism':

> There has come, and rightly, a great reaction; but it appears to be imagined in some quarters that we are almost to abandon the preaching of the doctrine of the atonement and of the vicarious aspect of Christianity, confining ourselves to the doctrine of the Incarnation and its extension in the sacraments of the Church. Now nothing that has taken such a hold on the human heart as the doctrine of the atonement could ever pass into oblivion. It may have been put into undue prominence, and we must rectify the balance; but no more. (3)

Gore was therefore clear that the incarnational emphasis in *Lux Mundi* was to be seen as a corrective and should not to be taken as an attempt to replace one dogma with another.

The second point to make at this point is that the incarnational emphasis on the doctrine of the Incarnation was something that the new theologians associated with *Lux Mundi* had derived from their earlier Tractarian mentors. While, as we have seen, Liddon reacted very badly to *Lux Mundi*, nevertheless the emphasis on the Incarnation was part of the inheritance of the Tractarians. What marked a difference, as we shall see, is a willingness to grapple with the intellectual problems of the Incarnation, and in particular with the philosophical problems involved in the idea of divine immanence. This was something that did not really concern the Tractarians, to struggle with the intellectual problems of reconciling a doctrine of the Incarnation, as divine immanence in the natural and social worlds, with current intellectual debate, discovery and enquiry, in science and philosophy. If, as Maurice Wiles argues in his essay on 'The Incarnation and Development' in *The Religion of the Incarnation*, a commemorative volume to signify the centenary of *Lux Mundi*, the *Lux Mundi* approach implies a unitary approach in theology, (4) then, that theology must address in detail the understanding of the world revealed in science and philosophy.

In their writings on the Incarnation the *Lux Mundi* school stress two broad understandings. First of all there is a concentration on what the Incarnation means for our understanding of the nature of God; secondly here is a concern for

what it means in relation to the world. I shall spend some time on each of these themes.

The Incarnation and the Nature of God

One way of trying to look at the *Lux Mundi* essays and Gore's other related writings is to say that they wished to steer a course between two extremes. They wished to undermine the idea of God as wholly transcendent, wholly other, and disconnected from the world, whose existence has to be invoked to cover the gaps in our understanding of the nature of reality. Against this they wanted to set the idea of an immanent and indwelling God, (a view which owing something both to Hegel and Green who are cited as philosophical authorities by several of the writers of the essays). Equally however, they wanted to avoid pantheism which carried with it the real possibility that the Incarnation of God in Jesus could be seen only as symbolic of the overall relationship between God and the world, as Hegel thought; (we saw, in Chapter 2, how Liddon believed there was a real danger in this approach which he tried to combat in his Bampton Lectures on The Divinity of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ). The essayists and Gore were conscious of this possibility and they wanted to guard against it. They therefore wanted to insist on the uniqueness of the Incarnation while at the same time arguing that a proper understanding of the relationship between man and God as immanence was in fact compatible with a proper understanding of the nature of the unique Incarnation of God in Christ.

I want to turn to the first of these issues initially. It is a theme in both the essays by Illingworth on 'The Incarnation and Development' and in Aubrey Moore's essay on 'The Christian Doctrine of God'. For Moore, the doctrine of the Incarnation shows the falsity of Deism, and of God as the God of the gaps in our understanding of the nature of the world. On this point he argues as follows:

> Slowly but surely that theory of the world has been undermined. The one absolutely impossible conception of God, in the present day, is one which represents Him as an occasional Visitor. Science had pushed the deist's God farther and farther away, and at the moment when it seemed as if He would be thrust out altogether, Darwinism appeared, and, under the disguise of a foe, did the work of a friend. It has conferred upon philosophy and religion an inestimable benefit, by showing that we must choose between two alternatives. Either God is everywhere present in nature, or He is nowhere. He cannot be here and not here. He cannot delegate his power to the demi gods called 'secondary causes'. In nature everything must be His work or nothing. We must frankly return to the Christian view of direct divine agency, the immanence of Divine power in nature from end to end, the belief in a God in Whom not only we, but all things have their being, or we must banish Him altogether. It seems as if, in the providence of God, the mission of modern science was to bring home to our unmetaphysical ways of thinking the great truth of Divine

> immanence in creation, which is not less essential to the Christian idea of God than to a philosophical view of nature. (5)

The point is also made strongly by Illingworth, in his essay on 'The Incarnation and Development', when he argues that the Christian response to the challenge of science must be met:

> Not by laying stress, like the later Deists, upon God's infinite distance from the world, but on the closeness of his intimacy with it, by reviving what is the Patristic doctrine of the Incarnation, as the climax and keystone of the whole visible creation. (6)

Illingworth goes on to argue that this was not merely a doctrine of the Early Fathers but also of medieval Christian thought. He gives a number of short quotations to indicate how, in his view, the schoolmen in fact linked the doctrine of the Incarnation to Divine immanence in the created order:

First of all from St Thomas:

> As the thought of the Divine Mind is called the Word, Who is the Son, so the unfolding of that thought in external action is named the word of the Word.

Then from H. de Boseham:

> The whole world is a kind of bodily and visible Gospel of that Word by which it was created.

Then from Duns Scotus:

> Every creature is a theophany.

And from St Bonaventure:

> Every creature is a Divine word, for it tells of God.

St Thomas Aquinas:

> The Incarnation is the exaltation of human nature and the consummation of the Universe. (7)

To restate the meaning of the Incarnation is therefore to rediscover the immanence of God.

Moore in his essay believes that Christian thought has often posed a false antithesis: either the utter transcendence or wholly immanence of God.

> It is these two one sided views which the Christian doctrine of God brings together. Religion demands as the very condition of its existence a God who transcends the universe; philosophy as imperiously requires his immanence in nature. If either Religion denies God's immanence, or philosophy denies that he transcends the universe, there is an absolute antagonism between the two, which can only be ended by the abandonment of one or the other....As long as any remains of dualism exist, there is a region however small, impervious to the Divine power. But the Old Testament doctrine of creation, by excluding dualism, implies from the first, if it does not teach, the omnipresence of God. For the omnipotence of God underlies the doctrine of creation, and omnipotence involves omnipresence.(8)

The aim of the *Lux Mundi* school is therefore clear, to restate the idea of divine immanence while at the same time not taking the pantheist road of identifying God with nature; it is about rather seeing God as also transcendent and learning about the nature of divine immanence from the doctrine of the Incarnation. This would the mean that they had avoided the trap which Liddon believed Hegel had fallen into of seeing the Incarnation of God in Christ as just an exemplar or symbol of the general relationship between God and the world. The tightrope which they were walking here was well recognised by Illingworth when he argued that:

> We need not fear to transgress the limits of the Christian tradition in saying that the physical immanence of God the Word in His creation can hardly be overstated, as long as His moral transcendence is also kept in view. (9)

It is worth noting in passing that this tension between Divine immanence and Divine transcendence is also to be found in T.H. Green. He argued, in his review of John Caird's *Introduction to The Philosophy of Religion*; (10)

> That there is one spiritual self conscious being of which all that is real and the expression; that we are related to this being not merely as parts of the world which is its expression but as partakers in some inchoate measure of the self consciousness through which it at once constitutes and distinguishes itself from the world: that this participation is the source of morality and religion; this we take to be the vital truth which Hegel had to teach.

Green's point about the spiritual self consciousness both constituting and distinguishing itself from the world is a central aspect of the tension within the thought of the *Lux Mundi* school which they sought to resolve.

This view of the understanding of the Incarnation involves what Moore calls a 'Theomorphic view of man' as the essence of the Christian faith (11), but of

course not just a theomorphic view of man but also of the natural and social order of which he is a part.

These themes are clearly echoed by Gore in his own *Lux Mundi* essay on 'The Holy Spirit and Development' in which he argues as follows (12):

> ...the Spirit claims for His own, and consecrates the whole of nature. One Spirit was the original author of all that is, and all that exists is in its essence very good. It is only sin which has produced the appearance of antagonism between the Divine operation and human freedom, or between the spiritual and the material. Thus the humanity of Christ, which is the Spirit's perfect work, exhibits in its perfection how every faculty of human nature, spiritual and physical, is enriched and vitalised, not annihilated, by the closest conceivable interaction of the Divine energy....Gnostic dualism turning every antithesis of nature and grace, of spirit and flesh, of natural and supernatural, into an antagonism, forced upon the Church the assertion of her own true and comprehensive Creed. That everything in Christianity is realised 'in flesh as in spirit' is the constantly reiterated cry of St Ignatius....That the spiritual is not the immaterial, that we become spiritual not by any change or curtailment of nature, nor by any deprecation or ignoring of the body is the constantly asserted principle of St Irenaeus.

The central theological difficulty here is how to defend the claim about the uniqueness of the Incarnation of Christ and thus to avoid the problem that Liddon saw in this kind of context. It is not really sufficient to lay stress upon the transcendence and immanence of God as both being aspects of the same fundamental truth about the nature of God. There has to be some account of the uniqueness of Christ if the Incarnation is not just to be a form of picture thinking, as Hegel have it, about the fundamental relationship between God and the world.

This was an issue that Gore tried to explore in his Bampton Lectures on *The Incarnation* as well as in *Lux Mundi*; I will sketch his view in outline as the detail itself falls outside what needs to be considered for the purposes of this thesis. Gore draws first of all on the position of the Fathers whom as we have seen he takes as being particularly authoritative. He points out that they understood that no one who believes that God is living and manifests himself in the world (see points above made by Illingworth and Moore)(12) could fail to believe that His presence was intensified in Christ. Gore takes the Fathers to believe, given their indebtedness to the Logos thought of Greek philosophy that God reveals himself in nature, in beauty, in art, in order and in morality and that the Incarnation of Jesus gathers up and completes the previous disclosure of God in the human mind and conscience (13). Thus for Gore, as for the Fathers, the Incarnation is 'the crown of natural development'. Gore then links this point with something that he derived from the Idealists, namely that nature develops from the inorganic to the organic, through animal to rational life, and he argues that this process of

evolution (which Illingworth discussed more fully in his *Lux Mundi* essay) is a progressive revelation of God. He goes on to argue that this revelation reaches a climax in Christ who shows what human life can be on its moral side and what the relationship between God and man can be like. This latter point is important in relation to Gore's kenotic Christology which is theologically very important. The kenotic view was that during his earthly life Christ abrogated his superhuman powers and 'emptied himself fully into being human'. As Carpenter points out in his study of Gore, this is a highly controversial view and concerns two points. The first is whether Christ abandoned his God given qualities of omniscience and omnipotence, or whether he used these very powers to limit his own nature to the fully human. The second is that while Christ might be thought to have abandoned, in whatever sense, his supernatural metaphysical qualities such as omniscience, he could not really be the Christ, as Gore understood him, if he also abandoned such ethical qualities as being perfect. Carpenter points out that a standard criticism of Gore's position, as represented by Dr Mascall in his book *Christ and The Christian Church*, implies that Gore had so to speak amputate the Godhead in order to bring it down to human level.(14) Nevertheless whatever these theological controversies, for Gore Christ is natural:

> A Christ inconsistent with nature the reason of man could not have found a place for. (15)

However for Gore Christ is also supernatural in the particular sense that he gives to that word. He does not regard the supernatural as independent of nature or

the natural. Rather going back to the points that he made about evolution from the inorganic, to the organic, from the animal to the rational, Gore argues at each of these points the higher development is supernatural from the standpoint of the lower level. As the moral life, as Green argued, is supernatural from the standpoint of our desires and our instincts, so Christ is supernatural from the standpoint of man and his ordinary moral conceptions. In Christ all the human possibilities are opened up, in terms of our relationship to the natural world, our fellow men and our relationship with God. Christ both consummates an order in the sense of being the highest possible development within that order, but he also redeems it, and offers the possibility, if we will take it, of securing something from the moral ruin of human life.

This last point is important both for understanding the nature of Christ as the Incarnate son of God, and also for understanding the nature of divine immanence. The role of the Divine in human life is corrupted by sin but redeemed by Christ, who taking our humanity, reveals to us the possibilities mentioned in the previous passage. This is a central theme of the *Lux Mundi* essay by Gore:

> Our race was created for conscious fellowship with God, for sonship, for the life of the spirit. And it is just in this department that its failure has been most conspicuous. It is here that the Divine Spirit has found His chiefest disappointment...In the highest department of created life, where alone lawlessness was possible, because what was asked for was the cooperation of free service to

> carry out a freely accepted ideal- there alone is the record of lawlessness.

The point here being, going back to the development of rational life out of inorganic, organic and animal life, that lawlessness and alienation from God are characteristic only of the highest form of life, namely the human. Gore then continues:

> Thus the word, which in fact most forcibly characterises man's spiritual history, so far as it has been according to the mind of God, is not progress but recovery and redemption. It is not natural but supernatural - supernatural that is in view of the false nature which man made for himself by excluding God. Otherwise the work of redemption is only the reconstitution of the nature which God had designed. (16)

Sin, which does not apply to the natural world, has led to a distortion of the nature created by God, and because of sin it has to be redeemed and reconstituted. Christ is the example of how human life can be lived, and it is a life which, because of the kenotic nature of the Incarnation, is one which is at one with human life, experience and temptation. Gore makes this point very clearly when he argues that:

> In Christ humanity is perfect, because in Him it retains no part of that false independence which in all its manifold forms is the secret of sin. In Christ humanity is perfect and complete, in ungrudging and unimpaired obedience to the movement of the Divine Spirit, Whose creation it was, Whose organ it gave itself to be....All that perfect human life had been a life of obedience, of progressive obedience, a gradual learning in each stage of experience what obedience meant....And because he thus made our human nature the organ of a life of perfect obedience, therefore He can go on to make that same humanity, freed from all the limitations of this lower world and glorified in the spirit at the right hand of God, at once the organ of Divine supremacy over the universe of created things...and the fount to all the sons of obedience and faith of its own life. (17)

This therefore is the basis of Gore's claim that Christ's Incarnation is unique, but it is a **uniqueness situated within a process of development** which has in a sense now come to an end in that **Christ has opened up to us all the moral possibilities of being human.** It is a way of putting flesh on the bones of Illingworth's claim that the moral transcendence of God has to be maintained as part of a doctrine of divine immanence. Unlike Hegel and other Idealists the figure of Christ is unique and not just a picture of divine indwelling. Because of sin we have to be recalled to our true nature and in being recalled to this, including our material, social and intellectual nature, for Gore we shall be free. While Gore wants to

differentiate this position from that of Hegel and other German Idealists such as Strauss, he is quite close to T.H. Green. Green talked of the glorified life, when we live according to moral demands which are part of the self disclosure of the divine within persons. (18)

It follows from all of this that the task for the *Lux Mundi* school in relation to elucidating the nature of Divine immanence is two fold. In relation to nature in its inorganic, organic and animal sense in which the possibility of choice is absent, it means trying to trace out the ways in which the discoveries of modern science, for example in geology or in evolutionary theories, are in fact capable of being made compatible with the idea of the indwelling of God. As we have already seen in relation to Illingworth and Moore they take this idea very seriously. To use a metaphor from William Temple coined in 1939 to which we shall return later the task is to create a map of knowledge that will render knowledge compatible with the general theological stance of the *Lux Mundi* school. Illingworth certainly tried to do this in relation to evolutionary theory both in *Lux Mundi* and elsewhere. In doing this they were acting under the general imperative that Gore had set them in the Preface to *Lux Mundi*:

> The real development of theology is rather the process in which the Church, standing firm in her old truths, enters into the apprehension of the new social and intellectual movements of each age: and because 'the truth makes her free' is able to assimilate all new material, to welcome and give place to all new knowledge, to

> throw herself into the sanctification of each new social order, bringing forth out of her treasures things new and old, and showing again her power of witnessing under changed conditions to the catholic capacity of her faith and life. (19)

In doing this Gore and the *Lux Mundi* theologians were taking more seriously and wrestling in much more detail with the Tractarian view of the relationship between God and nature which, as we saw in Chapter 2, was central to their thought.

In relation to human life however, where 'lawlessness' and sin are possible, it is a matter of reconstituting life according to the 'theomorphic view of man' exhibited in Christ who, under the kenotic assumptions of Gore's Christology, has limited himself to purely human powers. The fact that this reconstitution has to take place does not mean turning one's back on the idea of divine immanence; as the figure of Christ as natural man shows, all the possibilities of living what Green called the glorified life are in fact implicit in our natural, intellectual, moral and social existence. They are however, distorted by sin and have to be reconstituted within the world. This is the task of the Church and the sacraments which Gore takes to be essentially for the reasons just given, to be extensions of the Incarnation.

Church, Sacraments and Incarnation

In his book on Gore Carpenter argues as follows:

> Armed with the Tractarian insistence upon the visible Church and the new emphasis in personal idealism upon the necessity of social fellowship for the realisation of individuality, he sought to commend the Catholic view of the Christian community to men of his generation. (20)

The aim of the Church is to reconstitute life in the image of Christ using all the natural resources of human life. There are four distinct elements to Gore's approach in this context. The first is the idea set out in the above quotation from Carpenter, namely that true individuality is to be found in community. This was a central theme of Gore's work. It does seem to be he case that in this approach he was profoundly influenced by Green and other Idealist thinkers. As we shall see along with his view about the nature of the sacraments this is the area in which he connects together the idea of the Incarnation, the Church and sacramental life as extensions of the Incarnation, with his social and political thought. He is very clear about the social nature of Christian life, which he believes Evangelicalism has underplayed, when he argues about the Christian life that:

> It is social. It treats man as a social being who cannot realise himself in isolation. For no other reason that grace is the restoration of nature, the true, the redeemed humanity, is presented to us as a society or Church. (21)

Christian life has to be lived within the Church because it is only within the Church that a redeemed humanity which is social can be reconstituted. In his book *The Church and the Ministry* he agrees with Aristotle that man is a politkon zoon and that it is only in merging himself into a larger whole that he realises his true individuality and freedom. He goes on to argue that:

> Fellowship with God is to be won through fellowship with His Son, but that not otherwise than through fellowship with His Church. (22)

As we shall see below this idea is connected with the sacraments, but for the moment I want to continue with the idea suggested by Carpenter that the influence of Idealism was very strong at this point of Gore's thought.

Hegel had argued very strongly, particularly in *The Phenomenolgy of Spirit*, that personality is socially constructed in two basic respects which are similar in that they are concerned with overcoming 'otherness'. I realise my nature in struggling to overcome the otherness of the material world by labour and by generally acting on the world to make it conform to my purposes and projects and this has a clear

social dimension, particularly in labour. I also develop my self consciousness through becoming recognised as a person by others as the section on the struggle for recognition in *The Phenomenology* shows (points which are repeated in his Lectures on *The Philosophy of Religion*). In his *Prolegomenon to Ethics* and his other occasional writings, Green takes over the main elements of Hegel's ideas here. There is a non contingent relationship between self and other. The self can only become what it is in interaction with others and he argues that: 'society is the condition of the development of our personality ' (23). Plant and Vincent, *Philosophy, Politics and Citizenship: The Life and Thought of the British Idealists*, argue the point in the following way:

> The basis of Green's position here seems to be derived from Hegel's view that mutual recognition is necessary to one's own consciousness of self. We learn to regard ourselves as persons in certain sorts of social situations: in family life, in society and in the political life of the community, in which there are reciprocal rights and obligations which give formal recognition to persons and their relationships. Education in both the narrow sense and in the wider sense of socialisation has as its presupposition the development of the person beyond the level of our conditioned animal nature. Society in Green's view 'supplies all the higher content to this conception, all those objects of a man's personal living for which he lives for his own satisfaction'. (24)

Green argues this point as follows:

> Human society presupposes in persons a capacity - subjects capable each of conceiving himself and the bettering of his life as an end in himself - but it is only in the intercourse of men, each recognised by each as an end in himself and not merely a means and each as having reciprocal claims that the capacity is actualised and we really live as persons. (25)

Human nature and a sense of self are therefore socially mediated. Such an idea is not hostile to that of individuality, because individuality in fact depends upon it. I am an individual most fully when I act on my own best moral conceptions and these have to be given within a social context - as Green observes, society supplies all the higher content for this conception.

It is this idea that Gore takes over in relation to the idea of the Church as a society. Given that it is the custodian of the idea of what human life can be if transformed through its knowledge and belief in the Incarnation, then it follows that for Gore I can only live in accordance with what is the best for myself and be free within the fellowship of the Church. (It is worth pointing out, since it will become significant in the next section on the sacraments, that Paget in his chapter on the Sacraments in *Lux Mundi* uses Green's argument in *The Prologemena to Ethics*, explicitly to make the same point. It is also worth noting that exactly the same arguments are used by Lock in his essay on 'The Church' in *Lux Mundi*. In

the opening paragraphs of that essay in which these points are made Lock points out his debt to Henry Scott Holland who in turn was the *Lux Mundi* essayist most completely influenced by Green). The means whereby the Church provides this higher content to our desires and helps us to move away from sin and to live the life of Christ is its sacramental structure. So Gore, following his assertion that personality is social, goes on to claim that:

> Sacraments are the ordained instruments of grace, and sacraments are in one of their aspects, social ceremonies - of incorporation or restoration, or bestowal of authority, or fraternal sharing of the bread of life. They presuppose a social organisation. (26)

This social organisation is the Church and the necessity of the Church for salvation rests in this respect, on the social aspect of the personality which Carpenter is right to see this as a reflection of the influence of Idealism on Gore in particular and on the *Lux Mundi* school more generally.

Gore has been regarded as arguing that the Church and its sacraments are extensions of the Incarnation. However, as Carpenter points out, there is some ambiguity about Gore's stance here. In an article published in 1917 on 'The Theological Bearings of Certain Extra Liturgical Uses of the Blessed Sacrament' (published in the *English Church Review* he says:

> It is thus that the Church is 'the extension of the Incarnation' and the Holy Sacrament is the chief instrument of this extension.(27)

However it is important to notice that he puts the phrase: the extension of the Incarnation into quotation marks and it is important just to identify the hesitancy in Gore's view which the use of quotation marks indicates. Gore's view seems to be more that here is not an identity between the Incarnation and the sacramental life and work of the Church, so much as an analogy between them. In *The Body of Christ*, as Carpenter points out, he argues as follows:

> There is in fact an analogy in fundamental principle between the incarnation and the sacraments, but it does not admit of being carried out in detail.(28)

His reason for saying this is rather obscure but it is as follows:

> It may be worth while in this connexion remarking that we have no right to carry out the analogy of the incarnation and the eucharist so far as to say that the union of the supernatural and the natural elements is an indissoluble union in the latter case as in the former. It is not indissoluble, just as also it is not personal or 'hypostatical' as the technical phrase goes.(29)

Carpenter interprets this as meaning that the Incarnation is sui generis (for reasons that we have seen)and that the principle involved in the sacraments while truly analogous is not identical to that of the Incarnation. Whatever the truth about the correct interpretation of Gore's view here it is a good opportunity for us to move on to the second set of reasons as to why Gore believes that membership of the Church is essential to fellowship with God. We have so far discussed just one of the four reasons, that to do with the Idealist inspired view of the social nature of reality. We need now to move on to the second of the four reasons which has to do with the nature and role of the sacraments.

The sacraments and the Incarnation

I want to start this part of the investigation with a quotation from *The Body of Christ* in which Gore argues:

> That the individual is to be the product of society, not indeed wholly, but mainly and in most cases, is I say, the lesson which universal nature bears upon its face...
>
> And this law passes unchanged into the kingdom of redemption. There, also, the individual Christian is to be what he is, and to become what he can become, by relations to the divine society, the Church. And it is in the method by which he is first brought into 'the household' and then to be fed there, that this is apparent.

> That is to say that the sacraments, which are means of personal grace, are also social ceremonies: ceremonies only possible among members of a society . (30)

He summarises this idea in *The Body Of Christ* (31) when he argues that 'We share a common and a transmitted life' the nature of which seems to him as obvious as it is mysterious.

He develops this idea further in an appendix in that book, but the main point is made clearly enough here, that the social nature of the personality is linked not just to the founding of the Church as a necessity, but also to the sacramental life of the Church which is again a corporate activity. This is the first of two reasons that Gore gives for thinking of the sacraments as extensions or at least analogies of the Incarnation.

The second has to do with the fact that the two chief sacraments,baptism and the eucharist, also make use of natural objects, water, bread and wine, as a means of conveying a spiritual and corporate message. Given that for Gore as we have seen in his essay in *Lux Mundi*: '...the Spirit claims for His own and consecrates the whole of nature' the use of natural forms as a basis for the sacraments is essential for Gore and again is tied up with his view of the link between the Incarnation and the immanence of God in the natural order which I have already tried to explore. This point is a central theme of Paget's essay on 'The Sacraments' in *Lux Mundi.* There are two aspects of his work which merit

attention given the main themes of this thesis. The first is the idea that Paget explicitly roots in the philosophy of T.H. Green, namely that there is a clear interaction between the spiritual and the material. Our desires, wants and drives may be part of our natural embodiment, but once these drives are directed by consciousness then a moral element becomes central:

> The merely animal fulfilment of merely animal demands, devoid of moral quality, is only possible within that dark tract of instinct which lies below the range of our consciousness. When once desire is consciously directed to its object...a moral quality appears, a moral issue is determined: and the act of the body becomes an event in the life of the spirit. (32)

Paget explicitly refers to Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics* at this point, arguing that Paget wants to make here is that in general the capacity for moral and spiritual endeavour is in interaction with the material world, in this case as it is manifested in our material nature. This general point is then linked to the importance of the sacraments and their relationship to the idea of the Incarnation:

> As our Saviour gradually sets forth the outlines of His design for the redemption of the world, at point after point the Sacramental principle is affirmed, and the material instruments are designated for the achievement of his work....As in the Incarnation, so also in the preparation of the Church to be the ever present witness to

> Christ, the guardian of His truth and the home of His people, the principle was sustained that, in the redemption of the world, God would be pleased to take the instruments of His work out of that world which he was renewing: that the quickening Spirit would not repel or destroy he material order, but would assume, pervade and use it.(33)

This view which Gore also shared had very profound implications as we shall see for Gore's social and political thought. However, before going on to see what these are it is worth quoting in full the opening of Chapter 3 of *The Body of Christ* which is called 'the Sacramental Principle'. In it we see just how far he takes he idea of the Spirit consecrating nature in the sacramental life of the Church and the extent to which he agrees with Paget's view set out above. The quotation is long, but it is worth reproducing as it does say something profound about how Gore sees the sacramental principle in relation to the rest of human life:

> There is, it must be admitted, a tendency in Protestantism, partly to be explained by reaction, towards a conception of spirituality which is certainly not completely Christian - a conception which puts the spiritual straight off in opposition to the material, so that the idea of a spiritual gift attached by divine ordinance to material conditions is rejected as unworthy of God. It is questionable whether those who hold such language can ever have really reflected on the conditions under which indisputably the most

important and fundamental spiritual gift given on this earth, the gift which is the necessary foundation of all others- the gift of the human soul, capable of all spiritual activities, and destined for immortal fellowship with God - is actually given. The production on this earth of a human soul or personality, with all its tremendous and eternal possibilities for good and evil, is by God's creative will indisputably attached to material conditions; and such conditions as are in experience found to be the most liable to be misused, and to become not material, but carnal...This dependence of the immortal spirit - the only seat of human spirituality - upon material conditions, at its origin and throughout its existence upon the earth, is the most convincing refutation of a great deal of language used in repudiation of the sacramental principle.

So inextricably, in fact, is the human spirit implicated in the flesh, that it is only through the perceptions of the senses that it is able to originally act at all; and in the relations of men to one another their life is carried on, to an extent which reflection leads us to realise more and more, upon a basis of what one might call natural sacraments. Thus handshaking is the sacrament of friendship, and kissing the sacrament of love. And each in expressing also intensifies the emotion which it expresses. The spirit in us feeds upon the material of its own symbols.....Thus there can be no doubt that, on all human analogy, a religion which, like the Christian

religion, exists to realise communion with God under conditions of ordinary human life, and which refuses to confine its message to some select class of philosophers who may claim (though it is an idle boast) to live a life aloof from the body - such a religion for common men must have developed, apart from any question of authority, sacramental ceremonies. They are, as all history shows, the natural means for religion to use.

Would then the divine principles of the Christian religion hinder such use of sacraments? On the contrary, the religion of Christ come in the flesh - associates the lower and material nature with the whole process of redemption and teaches us that not without a material and visible embodiment is the spiritual life to be realised either now or in eternity. The spiritual, in the New Testament, means not only what is separated from the material or bodily, but that in which the spirit rules, or that which expresses a spiritual meaning. (34)

All the main themes of Gore's view of the sacraments are held together in this passage: their social nature, their transformation of the material world, and their connection with the Incarnation. From this various social implications follow which will be discussed in detail later in the Chapter but for the moment they can be said to include the following. First of all the social nature of the sacraments as part of the corporate life of the Church meant that the idea of fellowship had

to be central to the celebration of the eucharist and this fellowship was not to be understood as a purely personal one but had a direct impact on our concern for the material condition of those who share the fellowship of the Church with us. Secondly, the idea of the sacrament as the use of nature for spiritual purposes broke down a sharp distinction between the sacred and the secular, the spiritual and the material. This last point is made very clearly by Paget:

> And so through sacramental elements and acts Christianity maintains its strong inclusive hold on the whole of life. The consecration of material elements to be the vehicles of Divine grace keeps up on earth that vindication and defence of the material against the insults of sham spiritualism which was achieved for ever by the Incarnation and Ascension of Jesus Christ....Thus was the visible received up into glory; thus was the forecast of spiritual capacity in the material perfectly realised.(35)

We shall consider the full impact of these ideas about the Church and the sacramental order for the social and political though of Gore later. For the moment however, I want just to say one more thing about the social nature of the Eucharist, before going on to discuss the other two reasons that Christ had, in Gore's view, for founding a Church. I shall then mention these last two points for the sake of completeness, but they are not central to the main aim of the thesis.

In the first chapter we saw that Gore as a young man took to Anglo-catholic forms of worship and that he joined the Confraternity of the Blessed Sacrament. However, he became uneasy about both the idea of the reservation of the sacrament in a tabernacle for the veneration of the faithful, and about services such as benediction. He was wholly in favour of the reservation of the sacrament for the sick, but not as an object of religious devotion and when he became a Bishop he was quite severe with those clergy who wished to engage in these practices. Part of the reason for his objection was that they were essentially Roman Catholic practices, not sanctioned by the traditions of the early church. His main objection however was as the result of applying the view about the corporate nature of the eucharist. For him the bread and wine, as the Body and Blood of Christ were for communion, that is as part of Christian fellowship, they were not objects of private devotion or veneration. To some extent therefore Gore's approach to an understanding of the eucharist was incompatible with the ideas of some of the slum priests whose work we discussed in Chapter 2. Those priests argued that graphic religious ceremonies such as Benediction were if fact necessary for common and uneducated people to have a practical grasp of the nature of Christianity in a situation in which many of them could not read or write. Gore's answer to them would presumably be that in fact a service such as Benediction or the private veneration of the sacrament might lead one of the laity to become mistaken about the essentially corporate and social nature of the sacrament as manifested in communion.

I shall now turn to the two other reasons that Gore gives as to why Christ founded a corporate body, the Church as the medium of salvation, but since these do not directly affect his social and political theology, I shall deal with them only very briefly. The first of these two reasons he discusses in his book *The Church and the Ministry* and is based on the idea that Christ set himself to create a new humanity from the nature of the old and in order to do this he withdrew some of his followers from the world to which they were tied to instil into them what this new transformed humanity would be so that others would draw after them. This might on the face of it appear inconsistent with all the points made in this chapter about the material world in Gore's theology, but this is not so since the message of the new humanity was to be one which involved the redemption of the material world as exemplified in human nature and not some kind of flight from it. The second reason that Gore gives is that since Jesus saw himself as the Messiah, and that the Messiah as understood in the Old Testament was to be the head of a Kingdom, so Jesus in a sense founded his own Kingdom. This, as Carpenter says while not being a kingdom of the world, was nevertheless a kingdom within the world as 'a net to gather every kind.' (36)

We have now completed our examination of Gore's view of the Incarnation, the Church and the Sacraments. In the remainder of this Chapter I shall look at the social and political implications of these views as Gore saw them.

Section 2

The Social Implications of Gore's View of The Church, Sacraments and Incarnation.

I want to begin this section with three quotations which give some flavour of Gore's general approach to these questions.

> We deny the verity of the Incarnation in its principle if we deny the Christian spirit the privilege, aye, and the obligation,to concern itself with everything that interests and touches human life. (37)

> Jesus Christ is really the Saviour and Redeemer of Mankind, in its social as well as its individual life and in the present world, and in the world to come. (38)

> I have sat down bewildered before the blank and as it seems to me, simply stupid, refusal of the mass of Church people to recognise their social duties, to educate themselves about social questions.(39)

It is implicit in what has gone before that there are three major reasons why Gore thought that social concern was at the centre of Christian life. The first and most central reason from which the other two flow is his account of the nature of the Incarnation, of the Word made flesh, and to social conseqeunces. These include

how we are to understand this in relation to the whole of human life, given his view about the relationship between the spiritual and the material as noted above in The Body of Christ. Secondly there is the issue of the corporate and sacramental life of the Church, which as we have seen is located in his account of the Incarnation. Ideas like fellowship, brotherhood and the common good stand at the heart of this kind of approach to the sacraments . Finally there is the idea that the Spirit consecrates nature. As we have seen, this is central to Gore and Paget's view of the nature of the Incarnation which has the effect of removing the false barrier between the sacred and the secular. This last point is picked up by Campion in his essay on 'Christianity and Politics' in *Lux Mundi* when he argues that:

> Christianity is thus not a higher order, standing over against and correcting a lower, but is itself the product or rather the natural outgrowth of the progressive moral consciousness of mankind. The value of this mode of thought is in emphasising the sacredness of secular interests and duties, and in its protest against dividing the field of conscience, and assigning to one part a greater sanctity than the other.(40)

Given these three points one can see why Gore believed that the Church had a duty to preach a social gospel and that this was not ancilliary to a more basic theological message, but stood at the heart of the central Christian idea of the Incarnation. However, it now remains to consider how this approach was 'cashed

out' in Gore's social thought, because in Gore's view this had to be set in the context of a more general view about the life of man in society. This would consider, among other things, quite detailed accounts of the state, the common good, property, social justice, rights and obligations and the nature of economic organisation. As he says in The Body of Christ:

> ..that the communication of this spiritual life to us by means of a material and social ceremony is quite analogous to the whole of what we know about the relation of the human spirit to bodily conditions, about the relationship of the individual to society, and about the principles of the preeminently human and social religion of the Son of Man. (41)

Because the religion of the Incarnation has these clear social implications an understanding of the basic nature of social duties and rights is not for Gore an incidental part of theology. It has to be at its heart and these issues have to be worked on by the theologian who takes the Incarnation seriously just as much as he has to work say on Biblical interpretation or on Patristic theology. In this we see a clear difference with the older Tractarians who were discussed in Chapter 2. While they would have agreed with Gore about a social dimension of Christian life, they did not try to work out what this might mean beyond seeing the issue as one of private charity and requiring the Church to be represented in all the geographical areas of society, particularly the most deprived. They certainly did not try to work out a social theology. Gore did to some extent, and as we shall

see, this was again in many respects indebted to Idealist thought and in particular to the work of T.H. Green. In his essay on 'Christianity and Politics' in *The Religion of the Incarnation*, David Nicholls argues:

> There are these three theses common to the *Lux Mundi* position. First that the state is God's creation, possessing authority ultimately derived from him. Secondly that it is the state's purpose to effect the common good. Thirdly that the lineaments of this common good and the limits of the state's legitimate authority are determined by moral principles and ideals, deduced from the Christian faith and prior to any political order. (42)

I shall leave until the final chapter an examination of the critique of *Lux Mundi* and Gore's position which Nicholls derives from this characterisation. What I want to do at the moment is to look at two elements of Nicholl's account, namely those to do with the role of the state and the common good, and the related ideas of justice, rights, and property which Gore regarded as being closely related to the idea of the common good.

The *Lux Mundi* Position and the State.

Here my main source will be not so much the work of Gore, but rather the essay by Campion in *Lux Mundi*. We can however, I believe be reasonably sure that Gore would indeed have endorsed that position partly because it is consistent with

what he says on other grounds and in other writings and also because all the essays were in fact discussed and agreed by the contributors to *Lux Mundi* before it was published. There are several elements in Campion's position which I want to discuss: the nature of the state from a Christian perspective, its relationship to the idea of the common good and the moral framework within which the state should operate.

At the beginning of his essay Campion takes the obvious line which we can now see is central to the *Lux Mundi* position, namely that the Church as a whole has to have a concern with social and political life. It is only in exceptional cases, for example in the case of contemplatives , that the 'leading minds of Christendom' have recognised 'the abdication of responsibility for the problems, the entanglements, the more or less secular issues of the ordinary social life of mankind.'(43). The task of the Church in relation to the state is in Campion's view to spiritualise life and to maintain a high standard of morality while at the same time interpenetrating a non-Christian or very imperfectly Christianised society. He points out that the state has to be conceived as having a moral end, and that unlike the philosophers of laissez faire morality cannot be defined in private terms with the function of the state being of a 'minimising' kind. This would only provide a framework of law within which individuals are then able to pursue their private goods. He accepts the fact that for philosophical idealism the state has a moral end, but at the same time he accepts that there are limitations on this:

> However much we may welcome the freer recognition of corporate responsibility, and the nobler conception of the state as having a moral end; yet we cannot help perceiving that certain limitations are, as a self acting law, imposed on its moral influence. (44)

There are two main reasons in Campion's view for this limitation. The first is that the ultimate sanction of the state is force since it has to be seen as the 'armed conscience of the community. In order to secure the social order and the minimal conditions of existence the state therefore has to have the sanction of force as well as that of morality, but he argues that the force associations which thus grow up around all state action weaken and enervate its appeal to the higher motives.' Secondly the state can only secure through the law what he calls a minimum of morality.

Despite these two caveats Campion argues that 'the State is sacred:it is of God: it is no necessary evil: but an organ of good living,' but it does have these natural inevitable limitations. This leads him to argue that it is exactly for these reasons that the church has to step in 'to supplement the moral action of the State, not as one part supplements another part of a single whole, but rather as a higher supplements a lower order.' The latter is significant because it is the sort of language which Gore and Paget use when they talk about how the sacraments transform or consummate the material nature on which they are based, and how they also talk of the Incarnation in respect of the material world. For Campion too, there are the minimal moral ideals of secular law, and the maximal ideals of

Christian life, and the Church must try to interpenetrate the state with these higher ideals. He argues that while the state should be seen as having divine sanction, as suggested in the New Testament, that Christian thought on politics indicates that political authority is based on trust and stewardship and the object of that stewardship is the common good:

> ...stress was laid on the duty of those holding power. Emperors and kings, magistrates and officers who were Christians had a claim for guidance and instruction in the exercise of these various functions. The claim was met by showing them that whatever the earthly source of authority may be, all just power is of God, and therefore must be regarded not as a privilege, nor as a personal right, but as a trust to be undertaken for the good of others. (45)

Campion therefore goes on to criticise the Caroline Divines (heroes to Keble and Pusey) who taught a doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings which was too extreme to be compatible with the traditions of the church.

The aim of the Church within the state is therefore to hold out a conception of the common good to which the state should aspire. (46)

This obviously leads to questions about arguments for the establishment or disestablishment of the Church which as we saw exercised Pusey and Keble in the 1830's, In them it looked as though what Campion sees as the proper relationship

between Church and State was being reversed. Campion argues on this as follows:

> ...the most perfect ordering of things would seem to be one in which the Church and State were two parts of one whole, recognising one another's functions and limits, and mutually supporting one another. Thus religion would be put in its true place as at once the foundation and the coping stone of national life. And the state with all its administration would be given a distinctively Christian character. The difficulty in England is to maintain this point of view in connection with the increasingly non religious (not necessarily anti religious) colouring of the State.....But the truth remains that religion is an element in the highest national life . (47)

This leads Campion, towards the end of his essay, to see the state as a means to an end, the glorified life. The religion of the Incarnation frankly recognises man's social nature. It is not good for man to be alone. And the family, State and Church on earth are training places for a common life in the City of God.' (48)

Given that the Church has a conception of social duty which is central to its theology, it then has to come to some view both about how far the state can by its own particular powers and functions lead to the achievement of these social duties, and secondly what its own relation to the state in the sense of its

establishment should be. This was the agenda set by the *Lux Mundi* theologians, now I shall look at how Gore follows through most of these main lines. I shall deal first of all with the moral duties which the Christian should be trying to press on his fellow citizens in fulfilment of the incarnational principle and all that flows from that. I shall then at the very end of the Chapter consider Gore's views on the establishment of the Church.

The Common Good: Legislation and Character

It was not Gore's view, or for that matter any of the *Lux Mundi's* school, that legislation and government action should be the prime field for securing justice in society. They agreed with Campion that the law and coercion appeal to the lowest motives, whereas, ideas such as justice and the common good are ideals which are rooted in the Christian faith. Their pursuit cannot be secured by law alone; there had to be an indispensable element of personal commitment to these ideals before they could in any sense be underpinned by the law. This commitment was interfered with by sin and self interest and therefore there had to be individual regeneration leading to a strong conception of Christian fellowship and brotherhood, before these ideals would have much chance in a legislative form. In this context the *Lux Mundi* writers laid a great deal of stress on the idea of character and its regeneration, which was also a central theme of T.H. Green and the Idealists. In his essay in *Lux Mundi* on 'Christian Ethics' R.L Ottley has a whole section devoted to 'Christ The Source of the Recreation of Character' and this emphasis fits in with what Nicholls says when he argues that:

> The principal link between theology and politics - between God and the state - is believed [by the *Lux Mundi* school] to be ethics. (49)

Ottley regards sin as the violation of the moral order and the misdirection of desire and only by the recreation of the character of the individual can desire be directed aright and lead to a fulfilling of personal and social duties. This idea is central to Green's thought as well as the other Idealists. Green for example argues that:

> Until the object thought of as good comes to be a state of mind or character of which the approach to the attainment by each itself is itself a contribution to its attainment by everyone else, social life must continue to be one of war. (50)

Given the social nature of the self, as understood by the *Lux Mundi* school and the Idealists, the development of character for Green, will turn towards not just individual self realisation, but will also involve a commitment to other people and their needs. Character has to be formed in social ways, as Green had argued in relation to human nature generally, and in ways Gore and the *Lux Mundi* writers agreed with. The role of the Church was to act as a framework within which character and the acknowledgement of duty was to be formed. As Ottley says: 'The Church is a school for character'.(51)

This emphasis on character has two broad implications, but the assumptions lying behind it colour virtually every aspect of Gore's social thought and indeed, as we shall see his view of the relation between Church and state. The first has to do with the power of legislation in reform. Gore took the view that while legislative reform was indispensable, its results were likely to be very precarious if they were not rooted in a deep public commitment to the moral imperative for reform. This commitment, in turn, required a change in character and motivation among large groups of people. The role of the Church in dealing with these 'higher motives', as Campion calls them, is central to the creation of this remoralised public opinion. In a sermon on 'Divine Correspondence' in 1900, Gore makes the point in the following way:

> Manifestly there has been material, intellectual, spiritual and social progress. But everywhere progress is precarious and critical. Real progress depends upon Divine correspondence...and this means for us the gifts and the presence of God. (52)

The point is more fully made by Campion in 'Christianity and Politics' in *Lux Mundi* in which he criticises what he sees as the mechanistic emphasis on distribution within socialism. Campion is not opposed to the aspirations of socialism, but distributive justice will only work when it is underpinned by character:

> Thus so far as Socialism looks to the moral regeneration of society by a merely mechanical alteration of the distribution of the products of industry, or the mode of holding property, it has to be reminded that a change of heart and will is the only true starting point of moral improvement.....So far we have considered the way in which Christianity has strengthened and defined on the side of duty, which itself is one form of charity or love, the motives which make men good citizens, good property holders, and so has supplemented the moral forces of the State, by raising the common standard of opinion and conviction on which all possibility of State action rests. (53)

So the initial implication of the emphasis on character, which as we shall see informs all of Gore's approach to social questions is that the legislative action of the state depends upon moral underpinnings, and the Church as the school of character has the central role to play in this.

The other broad implication of the recognition of the importance of character is the attempt by Gore and the *Lux Mundi* school to individualise social categories to bring home more directly the nature of personal social responsibility and thus the role of character. This point is made particularly well in an Appendix to *Lux Mundi*. The authorship of the Appendix is not revealed. It is likely to be by Gore as the editor, but even if it was not written by him *Lux Mundi* did defend a common position arrived at only after much discussion within the Holy Party and

can be regarded with some confidence as articulating his own view of these matters. It is argued in the Appendix that:

> As to the social sphere generally, we begin by remarking that, from the Christian standpoint, every transaction between man and man is to be regarded as personal, and therefore ethical. The most significant fact perhaps of our time is the progress of transition from (so called) political to ethical economics. To reason rightly on social problems we must ever have regard to personality. For ethical purposes the abstract terms Capital, Labour, Production, Wealth etc must be replaced by personal terms, Employer, Employee, Producer, Man of Wealth etc. Our problem is how to supersede the technical and legal relation by the personal.(54)

Only by this personalising of social and legal categories will the relations of man in society, both political and economic be brought within the sphere of the personal and only then can ethical considerations and thus the role of character be brought to bear upon the issues.

The achievement of the common good which is regarded by Campion as the goal of the state (to the extent that a state which does not aim at the common good cannot be regarded as a legitimate state) requires a regeneration of mind and character in relation to all the elements of the common good: the personal pursuit of wealth, the role of property, the relations between capital and labour, the

nature of justice, the role of democracy, and the scope of rights and duties. The Church has the fundamental role in setting out the nature of the motivations and the duties here, but as we shall see, and indeed as we have seen implicitly in the argument so far, Christian morality in these spheres draws crucially in Gore's writings on the work of Idealist social philosophy. I shall now look at some of the elements mentioned in the common good and look at how Gore relates these to both character and to Idealist social thought.

First of all I want to take the case of property. This is important for two reasons. First of all it is an essential element in the idea of the common good; secondly it throws light on how Gore and the *Lux Mundi* philosophers dealt with the idea of rights and duties. Both aspects of property in turn illustrate the extent to which they drew upon philosophical idealism. As we saw earlier in Chapter 2 Pusey and the older Tractarians were very conservative in their view of the nature of property. Pusey was bothered by the way in which the Whig Government in the 1830's was riding roughshod over the churches's property rights in relation both to the Irish Bishoprics and in relation to the endowments of English Cathedrals. His defence of the rights of the Church against the Erastian actions of the Government led him to a general conservative view about the nature of property, while at the same time he did not produce a general theory to defend existing property rights. Hence his concern for the poor, central as it was to his view of Christianity and of his own moral life, was situated within this rather conservative view. Gore however took quite a different view. His view of property was quite radical, and it was situated within a general theory which owed

a very great deal to Green. In 1913 Gore wrote an Introduction to a volume called *Property: Its Duties and Rights, Historically, Philosophically and Religiously Regarded.*(55) This piece, he argued that a general philosophy of property was needed before propaganda in relation to a change of personal view about restrictions on property rights could be profitably engaged in. This argument is important in three respects. First of all it showed the distance between his own view and that of Pusey who as we have seen had not developed any such theory; secondly it shows that his view about how character and motivation in regard to property had to be rooted in a more general conception of the nature and scope of property rights; thirdly as we shall see, this general philosophy of property was in fact rooted in Idealism.

There are two central themes in Gore's account of property; Gore argued that property is essential to the development of personalty and character. This view which was developed by Hegel in the section on 'Abstract Right' in The Philosophy of Right, and was taken over by Green in *The Prolegomena to Ethics* is quite different from the two rival views. One of these , following from Hobbes and Locke, was that property as a natural right was antecedent to society; the other, the utilitarian view associated with Bentham and Mill, argued that property was justified by utility, that the possession of private property produced the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The Hegel/Green/Gore view was different: property was essential for the development of the person, for his character and his freedom, and it contributed to what he called' 'the chance of

making the best of themselves, to feel that an adequate measure of free self realisation is granted to them'. (56)

This linking of property to self realisation had a number of implications for Gore. First of all property was not some kind of absolute right. It was secondary, as a means to self realisation. Property for use was what man needed for freedom. Beyond this, property became an instrument of power for the rich which might well involve the denial of property as a means of self realisation for the poor. Property has to be linked to an idea of the common good and self realisation. As we have seen for Green and for Gore these are not antithetical in that the nature of the self is social, and in realising myself, I am realising something which has a social orientation. Property has to be linked to self realisation and to character, a point clearly made again by Campion in *Lux Mundi* when he argues:

> ...Christianity urges that if there is private property, its true character as a trust shall be recognised, its rights recognised and its attendant duties performed. These truths it keeps before men's eyes by the perpetual object lesson of the life of the early Church in Jerusalem, in which those who had property sold it, and brought the proceeds and laid them at the Apostle's feet and distribution was made to every man according to his needs..(57)

While Campion relates his view to the traditions of the early Church, Gore argues that a theory of property rooted in the Idealist tradition illuminates the basic issue

here. This is consistent with the overall aim he had in *Lux Mundi* and elsewhere of bringing the best of intellectual endeavour within the sphere of theology to illuminate the doctrines of the Church.

This linking of property to personality and character coupled with the idea of moral equality in the sight of God implied a distributive principle. We shall look at the views of Gore on justice shortly, but Hastings Rashdall, another contributor to the symposium on property draws out the point here in relation to Green, a view which Gore endorsed.

> Green's strong sense of the necessity for property for the building up of character led him however, not so much to exalt the sacredness of property in the hands of the large owner, as to insist on the necessity of such legislation as would tend to the diffusion of property as widely as possible among the masses. (58)

The link between property, self realisation and the development of character implied a concern for its just distribution which is not a necessary characteristic of either utilitarian or natural right approaches to property.

The final aspect of the philosophy of property which Gore took from Green and which will lead us to a more general account of rights is that property has to be socially defined. While possession may be an action which does not involve social recognition, property as a right presupposes a society, a morality and a legal

system within which rights are defined, recognised and regulated. As we have seen for Green, the basic social morality within which property rights have a place is to be seen in relation to a sense of common good and self realisation. Again, the logic of property rights lies in these sorts of moral concepts, and must impose limits on accumulation. This point is well developed by William Wallace a follower of Green, who argued that:

> Rights are not carried from birth, but are recognised claims in a community, presupposing a common standpoint. The controlling authority is the logical antecedent to the individual man. The authority and its attendant institutions make man what he is. The mere individual has no rights as such; he has rights only as a person, as a member of society as embodying in himself...the larger aggregate. (59)

It is not the job of society to protect preexisting natural rights, but rather to ensure that those rights to property which presuppose society and a common standpoint do in fact contribute to the conception of the common good and self development which are central to that standpoint.

This point about the social basis of rights is taken over by the *Lux Mundi* school, and is repeated in the Appendix to *Lux Mundi*. It rejects the individualistic view of rights characteristic of the natural right school and argues instead that:

> A Christian theory of rights is required. The prevailing view of them is individualistic. It is forgotten that the rights of one man have their ground in the obligations of another; they are limited by the claims of other personalities on our own; a right is in fact, a condition of the fulfilment of a duty. (60)

Again, the idea of having a right is regarded as being derivative from a social framework which embodies the common good, which later in the Appendix (61) is called brotherhood, and the idea of self development as implying duties to others. As MacKenzie, another Idealist follower of Green argues in a passage reminiscent of the *Lux Mundi* position, a right is concerned with the equal chance of 'getting and keeping the means of realising a will which in possibility is a will directed to a social good.' (62)

Overall then we see how influential the Idealist position is in producing for Gore and the *Lux Mundi* school a general theory of property and rights in general. This illuminates what Campion argues is the implicit Biblical tradition of the Church, but which will at the same time provide what Gore argued was necessary, namely a general theory of property. This in turn would provide the basis for a set of new motivations and building up a new character in relation to property within the Church as the school of virtue. This would then, in its turn, underpin in a morally indispensable way the prospects of political reform in relation to the just distribution of property and other rights.

These ideas led the *Lux Mundi* school, and Gore in particular, to a substantial set of reflections on the relations of capital and labour which are underpinned by both the account of character and the account of the nature of property rights. As we saw earlier, the author of the Appendix (63) argues that the emphasis on character in social life means the attempt to personalise social relations and to get away from abstract categories like capital and labour, so that in this more personal form, men may come to learn their duties to one another. This scheme is taken further in the Report to the Convocations of York and Canterbury in 1907 on *The Church's Witness on Economic Subjects* which Gore wrote and which is printed as an appendix to *The New Theology and The Old Religion.* In the report he criticises classical political economy for implying that the economy runs according to mechanical rules. This is a view which he takes to be incompatible with the idea of the Incarnation, which consecrates the whole of nature, and which makes moral categories relevant everywhere in human dealings. He also criticises political economy because its does tend to deal in abstract categories which again has the effect of displacing the role of morality.

He also criticises the idea of the unlimited accumulation of wealth. For wealth and property are only justified as a means and not as an end. Property and wealth are secondary to self realisation.

It is the link between self realisation and the common good on the one hand, and the idea of the moral equality of persons on the other, that leads Gore in the direction of social justice. Campion gives a particularly strong evocation of the

idea of Christian moral equality in 'Christianity in Politics' in *Lux Mundi*, when he argues as follows:

> The root ideas of Christian anthropology rest on the Christian conception of God as one yet threefold. Thus on the one side, Christianity attaches to the individual personality a supreme and infinite value as the inmost nature of one made in the image of God, redeemed by the self sacrifice of Christ, and indwelt by the Spirit of God. And thus it develops the sense of separate personal responsibility. It is on this basis that what is true in humanitarianism rests. Behind all class and social differences lies the human personality in which all men are equal. But on the other side it frankly recognises man's inherently social nature. (64)

The same point is made, in relation to the idea of forgiveness, by Ottley in his essay on Christian Ethics in *Lux Mundi* when he says:

> ..the fact of the equality of men in relation to their common father, invests even the antisocial sinner with the dignity of brotherhood.(65)

Gore argues in *The Sermon On The Mount*, that the principle of equal consideration for all which he sees as the basic principle of justice, is 'the principle of all Christian social conduct.' (66) He goes on to argue that since self

realisation is central to the human personality each is to have it equally. This then means that property, which for Gore and the *Lux Mundi* school is secondary as a means to self realisation, should be distributed in a way that gives the opportunity for self realisation to all. Gore argues the point in the following way:

> The tenure of property in any community must be judged by its tendency to promote what is the real end of civil society - that is the best possible life for man in general and all men in particular.(67)

In practical terms, this means for Gore that, for example what he calls a living wage for workers, became a subject for agitation in his role in all three bishoprics, yet in his view it went further than that and also had to include'..deeper questions of security, of knowledge for workers, of shares in management, in profits.'(68) His concern for education incited Albert Mansbridge to help found the Workers Education Association, and Gore along with Tawney and Temple, were among its most central 'establishment' supporters.

Two further points are worth making about justice in relation to Gore and the *Lux Mundi* school. Carpenter cites a passage from Gore in which he argues that the concern with justice is 'substantially the indictment of the prophets.'(69) The prophets were concerned with 'righteousness', which Gore understands as social justice. However, it can be argued that a concern with righteousness has to do with individual morality rather than with social justice and this is a point to which

we shall come back in our assessment of Gore in the final chapter. The second point is made by Ottley in 'Christian Ethics' in *Lux Mundi* when he argues that:

> It follows that obligation, thus founded on personal relationship to God, is absolute and independent of variation in the specific demands of the law. Human goodness will consist in correspondence with the will of God, and the degree of clearness with which a man apprehends that will is the measure of his obligation. This principle seems to preclude any idea of supererogatory works and tends to neutralise for the individual conscience the distinction between 'commands' and 'counsels of perfection.'(70)

This is a very important idea because it follows from it that a concern with duty to our fellow men is expressed in the corporate life of the Church and cannot be seen as a discretionary aspect of Christianity and resolvable into acts of private charity. Doing justice is in fact a strict duty which the Church should express in its corporate witness in society and which should lie at the heart of any state permeated by Christian values.

The concern with justice and with the character which underpins a concern with justice was central to Gore's assessment of socialism. He was, as we saw in Chapter 1, sympathetic to socialism in a way that scandalised Liddon. He saw the main force of socialism as its denunciation of privilege and inequality. He

rejected Marxism which he saw as deterministic and involving an understanding of the economy and social life as subject to mechanical laws. This was just as much incompatible with Incarnationalist doctrine as classical political economy. As we have already seen Campion took the same view in *Lux Mundi* in which he argued that what he took to be the mechanistic implications of distributive socialism, detached from the reform and regeneration of character, would be very dangerous. This view was echoed by Gore when he argued that an 'experiment with state socialism based on the average level of human character as it exists at present would be doomed to a disastrous failure'. (71)

The final area of Gore's social and political thought is democracy. He argued that democracy was a divine movement in human history (72) and that it had to be tried, but central to his view and worries about democracy was the role of character again:

> The vox populi can so easily lend itself to the purposes of the evil one because the popular cry for social regeneration is accompanied in such slender measure by a sense of the need for personal regeneration. (73)

Only a moral character and a sense of social duty would allow democracy to be a benign force in the world. This idea is connected with his own and *Lux Mundi* ideas of freedom which again are indebted to Green. For these thinkers the idea of negative liberty, of freedom from interference and coercion, was not sufficient.

The idea of freedom had to be linked to a conception of the good, that is to say to the entwined ideas of self realisation and the common good, and a sense of the duties that flowed from this. Freedom is positive, it means living a particular kind of life and the formation of the moral character hat would allow this to happen. For Gore, democracy is not to be justified by an appeal to negative liberty, but presupposes positive freedom and the character to go with it. For Gore this positive liberty was connected with the Christian ideal and the Christian life as the school of virtue:

> Christ is the true liberator, the true emancipator of man, because he laid the foundation of human liberty so deep in the redemption of the individual from personal sin and selfishness.(74)

The same point is made by Ottley in 'Christian Ethics' in *Lux Mundi* when he says that:

> The end of discipline is, of course, freedom: that is, the perfect domination of the Spirit in man. (75)

This view of freedom is essentially the same as that of Green and the other Idealists. So for example Caird argued that:

> The law of liberty is to retain permanently the consciousness of the better self in subjection to which alone we can be truly free. (76)

Freedom and democracy will only work when both are related to the regeneration of character which in turn will be linked to a conception of the good, which in Gore's view the Church is there to provide. This then naturally leads us on to consider the role of the Church in all of this and the relation which Gore envisages between Church and State.

Given that for Gore the Church has to stand as a school for character without which social reform and social justice is unlikely to survive (in that social justice has to be underpinned by right moral relationships), how is it best able to do this? Is it best able to be done by the Church being a national Church, and established as part of the state, or is it best done by the Church being independent of the state? As we shall see, Gore came round to the view that disestablishment was probably the best way forward, but he only gradually came to this view. The important feature which seemed to weigh on his mind most in coming to this view was that he saw the Christian life as a 'Way' which had to have its own morality, its own control over its affairs and discipline, and to avoid watering this down by accommodation to the average morality which he believed that the state as currently constituted represented. In witnessing to a moral ideal of the sort that he and the other *Lux Mundi* thinkers had developed in relation to modern intellectual movements from the Biblical and traditional sources within Christianity, he argued that he best way the Church could in fact witness to these ideals was to preserve its own moral integrity:

> What is wanted in the midst of the bewildered world is the witness of the true life visibly being lived by an organised society of men - the witness of the Way. That is the only effective witness. (77)

According to Gore despite his own predilection for theology, philosophy and dogmatics, essentially Christianity is a way of life and a form of witness to the truth and it must, in order to witness to the truth avoid expediency and not court popularity. Only by fulfilling this role will the Church be able to witness to the moral truth as revealed in the religion of the incarnation and only by the use of the discipline imposed by the truth can it be the school for character, which as we have seen is the basis of Gore's whole attitude to social reform. It is therefore important to Christianity that its witness should have integrity and depth and this is more important in his view than numbers:

> What we want is not more Christians, but much rather, better Christians - that is to say, Christians who have more perception of what the moral effort required for membership in the catholic brotherhood really is. (78)

This in Gore's view would not lessen the likelihood of social reform since in his view moral reform comes from the witness of small groups of sanctified persons, as Jesus' and the Apostles' own example shows.

However, he came to the view that establishment of the Church was in fact a hinderance to this . The Church as the established Church did not have the freedom to impose its own discipline and it was open to all comers. The relationship between Parliament and the Church was undermined when the majority of legislators were not fully convinced of catholic Christianity:

> What likelihood is there that the will of the majority should submit itself to the law of Christ? And if it be unlikely, what right had the Church to hamper her liberty to express and enforce by moral discipline on her own members the unchanging law of Christ? (79)

Eventually these arguments pushed him towards favouring disestablishment: membership, discipline, witness, not compromising principles, were all essential if the Church was to be a school for character. Yet these were compromised by establishment, and in a quotation cited by Carpenter so Gore argues that 'Disestablishment, more than anything else, would throw us on our principles.' (80). Carpenter justly concludes by focussing on the relationship in Gore's mind between disestablishment and the social mission of the Church in the following way:

> It has been observed that Gore wanted disestablishment primarily for the sake of the Church, or in the interests of religion, but the close connexion between the interests of the Church and its mission in society, as he conceived of them, was never far from his mind.

> Establishment was for him a hinderance to the moral and social witness of the Church. (81)

We have now completed our examination of Gore's liberal catholicism and the way in which this affected his social and political thought. In the next chapter we shall consider a framework within which Gore's views can be assessed.

Chapter 4 Notes

1 C. Gore ed. *Lux Mundi,* Murray, London 1891. reprint pages 133-4

2 Ibid., page viii

3 C. Gore, *The Mission of the Church*, (Murray, London 1892), pages 107-8.

4 *The Religion of the Incarnation*, ed. R. Morgan, Bristol Classical Press, Bristol 1989, page 83

5 C. Gore, *Lux Mundi* op.cit., page 74.

6 Ibid., page 135.

7 Ibid., pages 135-6.

8 Ibid., pages 69-70

9 Ibid., page 140

10 J. Caird, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*,

11 C. Gore, *Lux Mundi*, op. cit., page 147

12 Ibid., pages 239-40.

13 C. Gore, *The Incarnation Of The Son Of God*, Murray, London, 1891 page 42-3.

14 J. Carpenter, *Gore: An Essay in Liberal Catholic Thought*, Faith Press, London, 1960 page 169.

15 C. Gore, *The Incarnation of the Son of God*, op. cit., page 33.

16 C. Gore, ed. *Lux Mundi*, op.cit., page 233.

17 Ibid., page 234-5

18 T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1906 page 189.

19 C. Gore, ed. *Lux Mundi,* op.cit., page viii.

20 J. Carpenter, *Gore: The Incarnation of the Son of God*, Murray, London,

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22 C. Gore, *The Church and the Ministry*, Rivigtons, Oxford, 1886 page 244.

23 T.H.Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, op.cit., page 219.

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29 Ibid.

30 Ibid., page 41.

31 C. Gore, *The Body of Christ*, Murray, London 1902 page 33

32 C. Gore ed *Lux Mundi* op.cit page 300.

33 Ibid., page 305

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35 Ibid., page 305.

35 Ibid., page 309

36 J. Carpenter, *Gore* op.cit., page 216.

37 *Report of the Church Congress*, 1895, cited in Carpenter op.cit., page 224.

38 C. Gore, *Christ and Society*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1928 page 18.

39 C. Gore, 'The Social Obligations of the Citizen', in R. Sheppard ed. *The Church and Citizenship*, Mowbray, London 1912.

40 C. Gore, ed. *Lux Mundi* op.cit., page 318

41 C. Gore, *The Body of Christ*, op.cit., page 47.

42 D. Nicholls, 'Christianity and Politics' in *The Religion of the Incarnation,* ed. Morgan, op.cit. page 172.

43 C. Gore, ed. *Lux Mundi* op. cit., page 319.

44 Ibid., page 322.

45 Ibid., page 328.

46 Ibid., page 328.

47 Ibid., page 334.

48 Ibid., page 337.

49 D. Nicholls, *Christianity and Politics*, op.cit., page 172.

50 T.H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, op.cit., page 289.

51 C. Gore, *Lux Mundi*, op. cit., page 371

52 J. Carpenter *Gore* op.cit. page 250.

53 C. Gore ed. *Lux Mundi*, op. cit., page 329.

54 Ibid page 385.

55 56 C. Gore ed. *Property Its Duties and Rights* Macmillan London 1915 page ix

56 Ibid., page xiv

57 C. Gore, *Lux Mundi*, op.cit., page 329.

58 C. Gore, ed. *Property*, op.cit., page 57.

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60 C. Gore, *Lux Mundi*, op.cit., page 385.

61 C. Gore, op. cit., Appendix

62 Ibid.

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64 C. Gore, ed. *Lux Mundi* op.cit., page 337.

65 Ibid., page 365

66 C. Gore., *The Sermon on The Mount,* Murray, London 1896 page 169.

67 C. Gore, ed. *Property* op.cit., page 351.

68 Cited in J. Carpenter, op.cit., page 256.

69 Ibid., page 248

70 C. Gore, *Lux Mundi,* op. cit., page 351

72 Ibid., page 249

73 C. Gore, *Dominant Ideas and Corrective Principles,* Mowbray, London 1918

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78 Quoted in J. Carpenter, *Gore,* op.cit., page 259.

79 C. Gore, *The Mission of the Church,* op.cit., page 129.

80 J. Carpenter, *Gore,* op.cit., page 262

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CHAPTER 5

Towards an Assessment

This chapter cannot in any sense be seen as an attempt to produce an assessment of Gore's overall enterprise in theology, largely because the thesis itself has not attempted to produce an overall view of his thought. I have concentrated mainly on only those aspects of his thought which bear on his social and political concerns and I have considered his relationship to the Tractarian Movement only in those terms. So the aim of this chapter is strictly circumscribed. Nevertheless critics of Gore have entered a number of criticisms of his views about the relationship between theology and society. These need to be explored a little.

The first concern which I shall consider is a very general one. It was part of Gore's view of the nature of Catholicism in general and his view of the nature of the religion of the Incarnation in particular that it should yield, at specific stages of human society, a general picture of how the basic unchanging dogmas of the Church can be related through theology (which does change), to the whole movement of intellectual life of a given epoch. As we have seen this general and synoptic task of theology is central to Gore's approach and is in some sense the basic presupposition of *Lux Mundi*. In his book *Can We Then Believe?* Gore

argues that the Creeds and dogmas of the Church have to be in harmony with science and that the Church 'must be capable in virtue of its principles, of providing such a philosophy, or synoptic rationale of the universe of things, as should make men feel its intellectual glory.' (1) In this thesis, we have looked at a special case of this, but any overall assessment of the *Lux Mundi* approach would have to consider not only what is implied for ethics and politics, but also for the whole framework of human intellectual endeavour. This holistic approach poses two sorts of questions: the first is whether such a general account is in fact possible, and if it is possible, whether it is desirable. In his essay on Illingworth in the centenary volume on *Lux Mundi The Religion of the Incarnation*,(2) Maurice Wiles argues the case for a holistic approach to theology. He argues that if we are as Christians to embrace both science and religion we cannot take these to be separate spheres of human existence and understanding with their own laws and their own logic. Rather as the *Lux Mundi* method implies we should keep at least as an ideal the unified account both of religion and science:

> If traditional Christian truth and modern scientific knowledge are both to be embraced, that can only be done (it has come to seem to many) by rejoicing with the neo-orthodox in the paradoxical character of their relation to one another or by insisting with the neo Wittgensteinians in the role of traditional doctrine as a grammar of faith that needs no further justification. Illingworth would have no truck with such escape routes, and nor should we. If there is such a thing as a spirit of distinctively Anglican theology,

it should express itself in the repudiation of such alternative approaches and the continued pursuit of one more unitary vision.(3)

The difficulty with this is partly its possibility, partly its desirability. We face an intellectual and scientific world which is vastly more fragmented than it was when Gore and Illingworth were writing. Knowledge is very far from being unified in itself never mind the possibility of interpreting that knowledge in a unified fashion within theology. Forms of knowledge: scientific, philosophical, social scientific embody deep divisions between them; and there are also deep divisions about method within these forms of knowledge themselves. A *Lux Mundi* approach would need to not only incorporate a theological understanding of scientific discovery, it would also have to embrace a theology of history, which is explicit in some of the contributions to *Lux Mundi* as well as Gore's emphasis on social and political matters. This may have been easier for Gore than it is for us, because as I hope the thesis has shown he was very indebted to Hegelian inspired Idealism, which was perhaps the last great attempt at a unifying vision, linking the nature of science, human life and morality together with religion. However, in the absence of such an overall philosophical vision on which theology could draw the attempt at such a unified view would now be very difficult.

The second question which arises is whether such a unified approach is in any case desirable. David Nicholls, in his contribution to the same volume, is clear that there are potentially totalitarian overtones in a claim that religion embraces the whole of life in both theory and practice:

> I believe that the attempt to Christianize or sanctify the secular order, breaking down any distinction between sacred and secular, has totalitarian implications, particularly in a situation of cultural and social pluralism. (4)

Such a view would mean moving a long way from Gore's and the *Lux Mundi* group's view about the theology of the Incarnation which did involve the idea of the sanctification of the natural, social, moral and personal world by Christian values. Nevertheless Nicholls has a point. In a situation in which religious people, not to mention humanists and others have in our present society different views about the ends and goals of human life, does it in fact make sense and is it desirable to try to propagate Christianity as some kind of substantive end for the social order, expressing itself in an idea of common good and underpinned by an idea of Christian moral character, rather than trying to preserve a liberal political settlement which allows the Christian Church to witness in its own way to the truth, without assuming that the aim is to make that a truth by which we should all live. If however we take this view it would imply a clear rejection of Gore's view of the nature of the Incarnation.

The other general difficulty with Gore's view about theology interpreting and incorporating into itself the basic assumptions of contemporary intellectual life is that it does run the risk of becoming the captive of those intellectual trends. This might well be seen in Gore's own approach. As we have seen, this is very indebted to the Idealism of T.H. Green and more remotely that of Hegel. This

is so both in the general sense, that it is Green's idea of the eternal principle involved in science that allows Gore to assume that science is not a threat to Christianity - a view taken further by Illingworth; it is also the case in the particular case of Gore's own views about for example character, property and the common good. However, the force of this kind of Idealism which Gore both incorporates into his theology and then uses as a basis for further theological enquiry has been weakened, some would say fatally by intellectual developments in philosophy since Gore's day. If however, he has incorporated this thought into the heart of his theology, how far is theology then vulnerable when the philosophy which it has absorbed is found to be weak? It is all very well saying, as Gore does say, that dogma does not change but theology does and therefore theology can move with subsequent movements of thought, yet where does this then leave his elucidation of Christian social theology if it is hooked into a philosophical position which allows him to talk about property, the nature of rights, and character in the way that he does? Would an attempt to accommodate theology to social philosophies, such as those found for example in Rawls or Nozick, be satisfactory because they could well lead to quite a different view about the nature of our social duties and about the nature of the moral framework which grounds those social duties. It could therefore be argued that the Incarnationalist attempt to produce a unified theology could make theology the prisoner of what are in fact only passing intellectual trends with no obvious way out of the account of the features of human experience and social life given by subsequently heavily criticised forms of thought.

A practical example of this can be given by a controversy in Gore's own day. As we have seen Gore interprets Christian duties in relation to society in terms of social justice and the moral character which would underpin social justice. In his essay *'Religion and Economics'*(5) Bishop Hensley Henson criticises Gore's account of social justice for its naivety. His objection is partly that it is unlikely that industrial society would be reformed by moral appeals such as Gore issued; but more importantly for our purposes he argued that it was in fact very difficult to give any precise meaning to the idea of justice in the economy. He argued that the concept of social justice was futile as a formula. In his book on Gore Carpenter points out that for Gore the insistence on social justice was as Gore argued 'substantially the indictment of the prophets.' In The Old Testament it is no doubt true that the prophets criticised injustice, but they lived in a very simple society in which there was clear agreement about the basis of morality. However as modern thinkers such as Hayek have observed, making in much more detail Bishop Henson's point, while an appeal to social justice may have a place in small scale homogenous societies, we are not in that sort of society now. There are many different ways in which social goods could be distributed: according to need, merit, desert, equality, entitlement and so forth, and we lack any kind of moral framework to resolve these sorts of problems. Nor can the church resolve them within its own moral framework. It is just not possible to work out a clear set of principles of justice to guide public policy which one could say were essentially Christian. If they command assent within Christianity they are likely to be too general to be useful; if they are specific enough to be useful their roots in Christian doctrine are likely to look weak and will not command general assent

among Christian people. Gore, as we have seen links his account of social justice to Idealist notions about property, self realisation and the common good, but if these ideas have lost their philosophical underpinnings in some kind of unitary social philosophy, then Henson's critique begins to look formidable.

This point takes us to the idea of the common good which unites both this last point and the one made by David Nicholls about the undesirability of a *Lux Mundi* view in the context of pluralism. For Gore and for the Idealists the state should have a moral aim and that is the common good, an account of which is rooted in the Idealists metaphysics of self and society, and for Gore is given specific content by an account of Christian duties. However Nicholls criticises this view in the following way:

> A final inadequacy of the model under consideration [the *Lux Mundi* one] is a comfortable belief in the common good - that is some substantive state of affairs which is in the interests of all - and that there is no conflict of interests that cannot be resolved with a little give and take. It is thought to be the duty of governments to bring this state of affairs into being with assistance from the churches. There may truly be some structural arrangement within which the various individuals and groups composing the state may freely able to pursue their several substantive ends, but this is quite different from envisaging the government's task as the pursuit of a single substantive end.(6)

This is an issue that Gore does not really tackle other than a generalised criticism of classical liberalism which embodies Nicholl's view of a structural approach to the common good. A central question for the modern state and for Christian social theology is how far the Christian does want to see the state, as Gore and Green did, as having a substantive moral purpose derived from Christian morality,and how far in fact the state should rather provide the framework of mutual non coercion within which individuals can in fact pursue their own good in their own way. This is sometimes defined as the issue of whether the state should be seen as telocratic as embodying some substantive purposes, and how far it should be seen as nomocratic, as providing the framework of law and opportunity within which individuals free from coercion are able to pursue their own good. Gore did not really face the fact of pluralism and yet it is precisely the fact of pluralism that has pushed many liberal thinkers in the direction of the nomocratic state.(7)

Having said this however, it still remains true that many thinkers about politics are unconvinced that a purely neutral structural approach to the state is possible and that all rules presuppose some view of the good (8). If this argument is cogent then we still face the problem of how to ground a conception of the good in a criterionless and pluralistic society. In some ways Gore's emphasis on 'The Way' as the basis of Christian life which tries to keep the integrity of a social and moral vision, despite what might be happening in society at large, is not wholly unlike A. MacIntyre's view (9) about the need to keep alive communities of faith in a society that has progressively lost a sense of its moral base. This issue is yet

unresolved in liberal political thought and the issue is sometimes defined in terms of an opposition between liberal individualistic and communitarian thought and Gore's views have some salience to this debate. However, in some sense he is unlike MacIntyre because he does believe that the community of faith of Christians following The Way, is (following Green) a reflection of what at a deeper level is in fact a high degree of common ground between the Christian and the rest of society. Gore's commitment to Idealism and the religion of the Incarnation gives him the confidence that this is true. However, this will not impress MacIntyre who had rejected the thesis that philosophical Idealism in some way is a reflection of the deeper morality of society which is overlaid by liberal individualism. He rejects this idea as philosophically inconceivable in his book *Secularisation and Moral Change* (10). So in some sense the issues raised by Gore are still with us and, though in a very different style are, still at the centre of debate in social thought.

I want now to turn to a further criticism of Gore and the *Lux Mundi* theologians which Nicholls directs at their social and political thought. In the essay already cited he argues that the *Lux Mundi* theologians are in fact treating their social and political theology as a set of deductions from a set of more basic theological beliefs. He argues in describing their views that:

> ...the lineaments of this common good and the limits of the state's political authority are determined by moral principles and ideals,

> deduced from the Christian faith, and prior to any political order.(11)

Before I go on to discuss whether or not this is a fair characterisation of what Gore and others thought they were doing in social theology, I just want to indicate what Nicholls believes is wrong with this idea of how to do social and political theology. If we treat social and political doctrines as deductions from more basic theological premises, then if a circle is to be avoided those more basic theological premises will have to be *free of social and political assumptions.* However in his article Nicholls argues that this is not so. All theologies are conceived and written in specific social and political circumstances (a view which is set out more fully in *Deity and Domination*) and he contends that our understanding of the nature of God is itself influenced by the social and political conditions under which theology is developed. So the social and political assumptions which are deduced from core theological doctrines are in many ways already presupposed by those doctrines. Therefore social and political theology cannot, as part of a systematic approach, be regarded as the end point in a series of arguments from premises which do not contain social and political assumptions. He argues for a different approach in the following passage:

> I have here been arguing that the connection between Christianity and politics is a dialectical one. There is no possibility of simply working out the political implications of a 'neutral' theological understanding enjoying immunity from political taint.

> ...truth is revealed in a specific political context, in language and images which are influenced by this fact, and it is apprehended in the present day by Churches which similarly exist in such a context. Neither theology nor moral principles, then, are immune from political taint. (12)

If we then go back to his assumption that the *Lux Mundi* group were in fact trying to deduce social and political doctrines from a set of socially and politically neutral sources, so that, in his words, these social and political truths which theology teaches are prior to any political order, then this view must be wrong.

It is possible however, to argue that the *Lux Mundi* school and Gore in particular have not fallen into the trap which Nicholls believes exists. This is so for two reasons: one to do with the *Lux Mundi* approach generally; the other being more specific to Gore.

It could be said that the whole *Lux Mundi* group in fact accepted the dialectical approach which Nicholls argues we should accept - presumably this means that we have to accept that our theology is to some extent conditioned by social circumstance but we then have to somehow strike a balance between our theological understanding and what we take the desirable nature of social and political life to be. However, this is very like the *Lux Mundi* approach which wanted to take present day understandings about nature, human nature and society and both to interpret those understandings in the light of theology and to

use those understandings to correct theological assumptions. To take an example outside the social and political sphere, it seems clear that Illingworth is trying both to interpret evolutionary theory in the light of theology and equally to use that theory to modify some views about the nature of the transcendence of God and to undercut the denial of His immanence. This seems to be a *dialectical* approach as Nicholls understands it and it is arguable that the same is going on in their treatment about society and politics. Indeed if this were not so it would be difficult for Gore to argue as we saw he did in Chapter 3 that theology does change under the impact of intellectual advances in other spheres.

The second reason why Nicholls may have given a mistaken description of the *Lux Mundi* approach and why he believes that they are vulnerable to his criticism, is that he has not noticed some valuable points made by Carpenter at the end of his study on Gore. He points out that Gore's emphasis on Christianity as 'The Way' implies for Gore that Christianity is not just a set of theological propositions however important these may be but for Gore Christianity is 'not first a philosophy or system of ideas. It is first a life.' The life of course has a theological background, because as Carpenter points out how men behave towards one another will in Gore's view depend on what they believe about God, but he says' Christ offers to men not first a doctrine to be apprehended by the intellect an afterwards applied to life. He teaches men a way of living which involves or is based on theology.' (13) If this is characteristic of Gore's approach then it does not seem that Nicholl's version of Gore's doctrine can be true. The

theology is a way of encapsulating a way of living; it is not that the way of living in society is derived from some prior intellectual system.

I want now to turn to Gore's appeal to the early Church and the Fathers in relation to social and political theology. As we have seen for both the older Tractarians and for Gore the early church and its theology are paradigmatic, but Peck, in his book *The Social Implications of The Oxford Movement*, argues that the appeal to the Fathers is rather limited in respect of understanding the social and political implications of the faith. There are two issues here.

The first is that the early church faced quite different problems, a different sort of society, and a different psychological situation. It is no good just invoking what the early Church or the Fathers did or did not do or say for guidance about what we should be doing in the twentieth century. It will be remembered from the last chapter that Ottley (in his essay on 'Christian Ethics' in *Lux Mundi*) cited the example of the community of property of the Church in Jerusalem. But he does not manage to draw out any very clear implications from this. This is not just accidental. It is a difficulty inherent in a body of thought which takes the early Church and the Fathers as a basis for faith and doctrine and then tries to draw out the social and political implications of such a faith. What has to be explained, and in Peck's view is not explained, is what the bridge is between that ancient faith facing quite different circumstances and our own day. (14)

The second point which is elaborated by Carpenter building on Peck applies this point to Gore's account of the way as central to his account of the Church. The early church was in a sense self contained and withdrawn from the world of common social and political life and in some respects at least Gore seems to be advocating the same thing. If he is, the question arises of how far it is possible to think of winning the world by such an insulated example. This is what Carpenter says:

> ...even though Gore did not advocate the policy of Christian withdrawal from the secular social structure,his belief that the primary way for the Church to make its social witness was by the intensification of its interior life, maintaining high standards of membership and existing in marked separation from the surrounding world, has a certain affinity with this policy - at least enough to render several of Peck's remarks pertinent to our discussion. (15)

There are two comments to make here. The first is in respect of the authority of the early church and what possible relevance this can have today when we are faced with a totally different society. The response can be made that if we take the example of Ottley (not discussed by Peck) then when he takes the example of the community of property in the Church in Jerusalem he is not suggesting that this approach is taken over in quite different conditions. What he is trying to show is that the practice of the early Church implied several things about the

general nature of property: that it was a trust, that it should be used to help the needy, and that there should be clear limits to acquisition. The issue then is not just to argue for a transfer of their understanding of what this meant in their own society to our own very different one. Rather the important thing is to work out what these general moral limits on property clearly set within the early church might mean in our own day. So the example is still indirectly relevant.

On the second point made by Carpenter we are back with the issue that we discussed earlier when we referred to MacIntyre. Although for Gore the Church should act as Carpenter suggests, the way Gore would avoid Peck's criticism is that in acting in that way and being true to itself the Church still can redeem the world. This arises partly from following his Incarnationalist faith and partly because of his confidence in Idealism. As a result, Gore would clearly think that in a sense being true to 'The Way' is being true to the world and human society at its deepest level and the world will come to recognise that.

Finally I want to turn to the issue of character and social reform, which was central to Gore's thought as it was to the Idealists. What is central to this argument is that there must be a moral commitment behind reform if reform is to work. Many of the reforms which Gore would like to have seen were in fact achieved under the impact of social democracy in this country, and one of the main social democratic thinkers was R.H. Tawney who was a friend and a disciple of Gore. In both his books, *Equality* and *The Aquistive Society*, Tawney accepted Gore's point and tried to make the moral issue central to reform and to the

achievement of greater justice and equality. However as Vincent and Plant make clear in their book on the Idealists, (16) this approach was somewhat eclipsed un the post war world when it was rather assumed by revisionist socialist thinkers that greater social and economic justice could come in a relatively painless way through economic growth and because of this the moral basis of reform was neglected. As we saw in the previous chapter however, Gore believed that reform without a moral basis would be fragile and precarious. The history of the past fifteen years shows that he may well have been right and that the moral case for social justice has to be made all over again and people have to be convinced of their social duties. So overall Gore may well have been right to put issues of morality and character at the centre of his agenda for reform.

Chapter 5 Notes

1 C. Gore, *Can We Then Believe*? Murray, London, 1926, page 178

2 M. Wiles, *The Incarnation and Development* in *The Religion of The Incarnation* ed. Morgan, Bristol Classical Press, Bristol, 1989

3 Ibid., page 83.

4 D. Nicholls, 'Christianity and Politics', in *The Religion of the Incarnation*, ed., R. Morgan, Bristol Classical Press, Bristol, 1989, page 173.

5 Hensley Henson, 'Religion and Economics, *Edinburgh Review*, 1926.

6 Nicholls, op. cit., page 182

7 R. Plant, *Modern Political Thought*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1991 Chapter 3.

8 Ibid., Final Chapter.

9 A. MacIntyre, *Secularisation and Moral Change*, Oxford University Press Oxford, 1972

10 Ibid.

11 Nicholls op. cit., page 172.

12 Ibid., page 180

13 J. Carpenter, *Gore: A Study of Liberal Catholic Thought*, Faith Press, London, 1960, page 258

14 W.G. Peck, *The Social Implications of the Oxford Movement*, Scribeners, New York, 1933, page 243.

15 J. Carpenter op.cit page 265

16 A. Vincent and R. Plant,*Philosophy, Politics and Citizenship*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1984, Final Chapter.

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