UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON

FACULTY OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

THE APOGEE AND DECLINE OF BRITISH HEGEMONY IN PORTUGAL. 1807-1820

by

DOMINGOS OLIVEIRA SILVA

A thesis submitted for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

1985

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON

ABSTRACT

FACULTY OF ARTS

HISTORY

Doctor of Philosophy

THE APOGEE AND DECLINE OF BRITISH HEGEMONY IN PORTUGAL, 1807-1820

by Domingos Oliveira Silva

The period 1807-1820 was an exceptional one in the history of Anglo-Portuguese relations. The centre of Portuguese government shifted from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro after 1807, to return after 1820. French military hegemony in the continent of Europe meant that British trade was largely excluded from that area between 1807 and 1812. This inevitably drew a neutral Portugal into the vortex of Anglo-French global rivalry. The commercial Treaty of 1810, which was a result of the conditions of wartime trade, appeared at first to have been wholly favourable to British interests. The commercial relations between metropolitan Portugal and Britain were however affected by other factors, such as the post-war recession in Europe and opening of the Brazilian ports to international commerce.

A more detailed analysis of the Treaty of 1810 reveals that it was not as favourable to British interests as might at first have appeared. The enactment of the treaty occurred only in 1812 and its stipulations advised an immediate reformulation of the pauta (tariff). This was not made until 1820. Some merchandize such as woollens manufactures began to be favoured only in 1814. The Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro survived the onslaught of British merchants involved in the Port Wine trade, and the latter were barred from the coasting trade and were forced to pay the extraordinary war contribution on the same footing as Portuguese subjects. Furthermore the pauta on which tariffs were to be calculated by the stipulations of the 1810 Treaty was only modified after 1820. Finally, the 1810 Treaty abolished the factories, the representative bodies of British traders in metropolitan Portugal.

Nevertheless, the highest point in British trade with Portugal was reached in 1811 and 1812, before the Treaty was even partially enacted. The enactment of the Treaty coincided with the years of commercial depression and a period in which the Brazilian trade was severely affected. In these circumstances it was easy for the Portuguese press in London to use the Treaty as a means of criticising the governments in Rio and in Lisbon. Not that they lacked material. The poor showing of the government in the negotiations at Paris and Vienna, in 1814-1815, the primacy given to British officers in the Portuguese army, the apparent pre-eminence of Marshal Beresford all gave rise to virulent criticism on the part of the emigré press. Anti-British sentiment played a powerful role in creating the conditions for the outbreak of revolution on 24 August, 1820 in Oporto. The British policy of non-intervention ensured commercial interests, by discouraging intervention from the Holy Alliance powers, so that the new government was obliged to sustain the 1810 Treaty.

This study, based upon official and private manuscript collections in both England and Portugal, has enabled us to suggest a new interpretation of the period 1807-1820.

To Teresa and our children
Carla Sofia and Tiago Nuno

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I should like to acknowledge Prof. Dr. Luis António Oliveira Ramos for his help in planning the first project required by Instituto Nacional de Investigação Científica (INIC) in order to obtain "equiparação a bolseiro no estrangeiro" and for his advice at all times that it was possible to discuss together the subject of this thesis.

I should also like to thank Profs. Drs. Eugénio Francisco dos Santos, Fernando Alberto Pereira de Sousa and Humberto Carlos Baquero Moreno for their support which allowed my coming to England as well as Dr. Vasco Rodrigues.

I should also like to acknowledge the assistance of the staff of all archives and libraries mentioned in this work, especially Dra. Maria Lúcia Cardoso da Costa Alves Moreira who facilitated the consultation of many books of the Instituto do Vinho do Porto.

My thanks to Mrs Hamlin for her care in typing this thesis.

My thanks are especially due to my supervisor, Dr. Frank Colson for his advice, encouragement and constant criticism.

At the same time most people performed a not less important role which favoured the elaboration of my thesis as well as that of my wife. So that I would like to express my sincerest thanks to Dr. Vasco Teixeira and his wife whose incentive has been inestimable. Thanks to all members of my family who encouraged me and Teresa with great enthusiasm, especially our uncle Amadeu.

My thanks are especially due to my mother-in-law and sister-in-law who made much of Carla Sofia and Tiago Nuno with all care, remarkable affection and understanding, alleviating their problems caused by the lack of their parents. All my deepest affection to Carla Sofia and Tiago Nuno. I expect that they will be rewarded as they deserve.

Finally, I should like to thank my wife. Her and my thesis were two "twin brothers" which caused our separation from our Carla and Tiago, family, friends, country and real life. During three and a half years the "twin brothers" very often deprived us of sleep, tranquility, much money and a very hard and constant work. Too little time remained for us. Nevertheless it was enough to ensure success in our objectives. I am deeply grateful to Teresa.

As it is obvious the thesis was entirely my responsibility. The Instituto Nacional de Investigação Científica (INIC) was able to provide financial aid during eighteen months.

ABBREVIATIONS

A.D.P.	- Arquivo Distrital do Porto
A.P.	- Accounts and Papers
B.P.M.P.	- Biblioteca Pública Municipal do Porto
Brit. Mus.	- British Museum
C.L.P.	- Colecção de Legislação Portuguesa
C.J.	- Commons Journals
C.G.A.V.A.D.	- Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro
Cor. Braz.	- Correio Braziliense ou Armazém Literário
O Campeão	- O Campeão Portuguez ou o Amigo do Rei e do Povo
F.O.	- Foreign Office
Inv. Port.	- O Investigador Portuguez em Inglaterra
n.d.	- no date
n.p.	- no page
O Portugues	- O Portuguez ou Mercurio Político Comercial e Literário
P.D.	- Parliamentary Debates
P.P.	- Parliamentary Papers
S.P.	- State Papers
W.P.	- Wellington Papers

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract

Acknowledgements ii

Abbreviations iv

General Introduction 1

Notes 16

CHAPTER I - EFFECTS OF THE ANGLO-FRENCH WAR ON PORTUGUESE TRADE 1807-1811 19

Introduction 20

I. Negotiations between England and Portugal and measures taken to save British subjects and their properties 23

II. The first French invasion and the persecution of the British and seizure of their properties held in Oporto 35

III. The revolt at Oporto - its English support 46

IV. The second French invasion and new persecution of British subjects and the seizure of their properties 53

V. Growth of British influence in Portugal after the expulsion of French troops from Oporto 61

VI. Effects of the British orders in council on the commerce between Oporto and Brazilian and foreign ports 77

VII. Maritime transport between Oporto and Great Britain during the war 91

VIII. Conclusions 102

Notes - I - VIII 110

CHAPTER II - THE BRITISH PRIVILEGES: HISTORIC CLAIMS AND ACTUAL RIGHTS 158

Introduction 159

I. The "ancient" British privileges in Portugal 161

II. Natural advantages 169

III. The claims of British merchants at Oporto against the war contribution levied by the Portuguese government 178

IV. General claims of British merchants 187

V. Conclusions 199

Notes - I - V 206

CHAPTER III - THE BRITISH MERCHANTS VERSUS THE "COMPANHIA": THE STRUGGLE TO IMPLEMENT THE TREATY OF 19 FEBRUARY 1810 227

Introduction 228

I. Antecedents 230

II. The Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro and the treaty of commerce of 19 February 1810 243

III. The Company's defenders 254

IV. The Company's opponents 263

V. Conclusions 272

Notes - I-V 280

CHAPTER IV - TRADE BETWEEN PORTUGAL AND GREAT BRITAIN 1807-1820 302

Introduction 303

I. The carrying trade: the dispute over the ships involved 305

II. The revenues of the British authorities along the Portuguese coast 315

III. Exports from Great Britain to Portugal 327

IV. Exports from Portugal to Great Britain 334

V. Fluctuations of Anglo-Portuguese trade 344

VI. Conclusions 353

Notes - I-VI 359

CHAPTER V - GROWTH OF ANTI-BRITISH SENTIMENT AND THE REVOLUTION OF 1820 381

Introduction 382

I. The anti-British sentiment stimulated by the Portuguese newspapers published in London 385

II. Financial questions between the Portuguese and English governments 398

III. Decline of the British influence in Portugal after the war until the 1820 revolution 415

IV. The policy of non-intervention and protection of the commercial interests after the revolution 429

V. Conclusions 441

Notes - I-V 448

Bibliographical Essay 470

Notes on Bibliographical Essay 492

Appendix A 494
Appendix B 500
Appendix C 506

Bibliography 510

THE

APOGEE AND DECLINE OF BRITISH

HEGEMONY IN PORTUGAL

1807 - 1820

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

During the second half of the eighteenth century Anglo-Portuguese trade was constantly favourable to England, showing only some exceptions such as in 1780, 1790-1792 and 1794-1795[1]. Between 1800-1807 the opposite occurred. A constand and substantial surplus in favour of Portugal was shown by the balance of trade between the two nations mainly in consequence of the exports of cotton and wine.

By this time the British commercial contacts with Portugal[2] were established mainly through the port of Lisbon in harmony with a tradition which at least went back as far as the Crusades[3]. The largest amount of British exports was carried to Lisbon while the largest amount of British imports came from Oporto[4], due to the wine trade which had had its beginning with England in 1678[5].

As a consequence of the economic and social transformations which occurred in England as well as those due to the establishment of the Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro in 1756 in Portugal the exports of wine from Oporto increased almost threefold between 1757-1766 and 1797-1806[6]. The wine company was founded by the Marquês de Pombal under pressure of some individuals of the Douro region with large interests in the wine trade[7]. Its foundation obeyed an economic plan which had in view the dynamization of economic life not only in Portugal but also in Brazil. The Companhia Geral de Pernambuco e Paraíba[8] as well as that of Grão Pará e Maranhão were some of the best examples[9]. The production of rice, cotton and sugar were stimulated by those companies.

By that time the growth of the cotton textile industry at the end of the eighteenth century in England meant that the latter became a foremost client for Brazilian cotton carried principally from Pernambuco, Maranhão, Baía, Rio de Janeiro and Pará to Lisbon and Oporto and afterwards reexported to England as well as to Hamburg, Italy, France, Holland and Spain among other countries. Cotton and sugar as well as other colonial products, together with wine, fruit, cork, hides and salt were the major Portuguese exports to England while the British exported to Portugal: woollens, cottons, and silk manufactures, coal, utensils for pipes, metals and dry cod-fish from Newfoundland. It was nor surprising that trade with England comprised the most significant portion of Portuguese foreign

commerce.

In the first years of the nineteenth century until 1807 the Portuguese economy was in a prosperous condition. Its balance of trade with the foreign nations showed a constant surplus, including with England[10]. So that when the Anglo-French war broke out, Portugal was in a state of neutrality which was favourable to its interests. The pressure coming from both the governments of England and France as well as the commercial interests of the two countries warned Lisbon to maintain neutrality. Therefore when on 27 October 1807 the treaty of Fontainebleau was drawn up between France and Spain which stipulated that Portuguese territory would be divided between the two countries, so as to placate the Queen of Etruria, then adversely affected by the expansionist policy of Napoleon[11]. This plan would lead to the loss of national independence, but its execution was favourable to Napoleon since the orientation of his continental system envisaged the eventual exclusion of British trade from the continent while Portugal was known as "the oldest ally" of England. If Portugal lost its political independence, England would naturally lose a vital support to face France on the continent. Undoubtedly this was the principal cause which led the Prince Regent D. Joao to flee from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro, protected by a British fleet and accompanied by a significant part of the nobility and some of the most important businessmen of Lisbon.

According to Teófilo Braga the withdrawal of the Royal Family to Brazil had been planned at the time of Philip IV of Spain and also at the time of the earthquake of 1755[12]. It was also considered during the secret negotiations which took place in London during August, September and October 1807 between the Portuguese ambassador, Sousa Coutinho and the British secretary for Foreign Affairs, Canning, and was supported by the Prince Regents of the two countries. Effectively the withdrawal occurred precipitately at the end of November 1807 and from that time everything on the future orientation of the Portuguese political and economic life was unclear. Portuguese sovereignty embodied in the person of the Prince Regent was in Brazil while French troops had occupied the Portuguese capital, one day after the flight of the Royal Family. A Council of Regency representing the person of the monarch remained in Lisbon while the central government was in Brazil.

In these new circumstances the Portuguese government had to face unknown difficulties and the situation advised the exceptional measures. By the end of 1807 the Anglo-French war had become an economic conflict, since the dominion of the sea was still arduously disputed. The British published several Orders in Council by which they launched a strong attack against the trade of France and her allies. They demanded that the enemy's ships (French or from another country under the control of France) as well as the neutral ships paid taxes in British ports, or those under the British flag causing the increase of prices on the continent. At the same time the French who had already published the Berlin decree by the end of 1806, declaring the Britannic Isles in a state of blockade, subsequently published the first and second Milan decrees with the purpose of avoiding the effects of the British Orders in Council.

In Portugal the occupying power was not given sufficient time to define policy in political and economic terms. What emerges through the measures which were immediately taken is simple hostility to British properties and interests. The British properties were seized and some British subjects arrested. In contrast, by the end of January 1808 the Prince Regent ordered the opening of Brazilian ports to ships of Great Britain. This measure opened new perspectives to the British trade respecting the colonial products which were previously shipped from the ports of Lisbon and Oporto to the British ports. The British merchants who withdrew from Portugal before the French invasion, as well as several other traders affected by the policy established by the French Milan decrees, organized in London with a view to the creation of structures which facilitated the trade with Brazil, which was stimulated by the Portuguese ambassador in London, Sousa Coutinho and by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Canning. The opening of Brazilian ports has been regarded as having been precipitately taken by the Prince Regent, but it seems that it was supported by influential men of that time such as Acursio das Neves, Azeredo Coutinho and Silva Lisboa considering that it would galvanize the economy of the Kingdom(13).

Meanwhile, during the first six months of 1808 the British blockaded Oporto and Lisbon, but there is evidence that the blockade was relaxed so as to maintain the flow of British trade. Wine continued to be shipped for Great Britain and while some British firms established at Oporto

were closed, others used the name of Portuguese firms and even that of the Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro in supplying its habitual customers[14].

At the same time the British authorities furnished financial and material assistance to the resistance which began to emerge against France by the Spanish juntas and that of Oporto led by the Bishop. This had emerged from a popular rising against the occupation forces of France and Spain.

The effective participation of British forces which led to the expulsion of the French troops by August and September 1808 from Lisbon and by May 1809 from Oporto, contributed to the reinforcement of British influence in the country. Arthur Wellesley, Beresford and Charles Stuart had by the end of that year enjoyed considerable influence in the Council of the Regency which governed the Kingdom of Portugal, especially in the conduct of military affairs (Wellesley and Beresford), political and financial policy (Stuart).

In Brazil, the British authorities were represented by Strangford who was extremely effective as a negotiator. This facilitated the relations with the Prince Regent and his government, so that it is not surprising that negotiations between the two governments were carried out having in view the celebration of a treaty of commerce. By the end of 1809 and early 1810 Portugal traded with England, Spain, Sweden, the Italian Kingdom and a few other countries. Trade with France and her allies was closed while at the same time British trade experienced serious obstacles to overcome the difficulties created by French policy, known as that of Continental system. The majority of the Northern European ports were closed to British shipping. The practice of contraband was intensified, even being stimulated by the Royal Navy which protected islands such as Heligoland, Guernsey, Jersey and Malta, from where the British products were clandestinely shipped, overcoming the barriers of the continental system. In Manchester, Liverpool, Sheffield, London and other cities many factory owners complained that they had to close their plant and sent petitions to the authorities against the policy delineated in the Orders in Council[15]. As the trade of both nations, England and Portugal, faced those difficult circumstances all this facilitated the celebration

of the treaty of commerce of 19 February 1810, in Rio de Janeiro.

This treaty apparently encouraged the liberalization of the Portuguese economy and the principle of reciprocity was the principal ground which orientated it. The ancient British privileges in Portugal remained unaltered, but by the stipulations of the treaty the British exports to Portugal were strongly encouraged since their products paid only 15% duties while those from other countries continued to pay about 30%. Theoretically the existence of monopolies was not compatible with the rules stipulated by the treaty. This led some to think that the Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro would be abolished, since it possessed a monopoly of supplying the wine, brandy and vinegar to Brazil and controlled the prices, the transport, the quality and quantity of wines for exporting, whose practices were constantly contested by the British merchants since the foundation of the Company in 1756. This point apparently gave force to the requests of the merchants, but on the other hand the same merchants lost some force because the treaty abolished the factories, then inactive since the first invasion of the French.

If the opening of the Brazilian ports has sometimes been considered as a conquest of Brazilian markets by the consolidation of British commercial hegemony in Portugal, historians such as Damião Peres, Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, Albert Silbert, Armando de Castro, Oliveira Marques, Miriam H. Pereira, Vilaverde Cabral and Jaime Reis argue that the treaty as well as the opening of the Brazilian ports were injurious to the interests of Portuguese trade.

Miriam H. Pereira, Manuel Vilaverde Cabral and Jaime Reis[9] argue that Sandro Sideri's thesis on "dependence" of the Portuguese trade on Great Britain was both reestablished and reinforced by the opening of the Brazilian ports and the Treaty of 1810[16]. By 1810, the balance of trade showed a deficit of about £1.2m, imports stood at £4.7m, exports at £3.5m (appendix C, Table II). In 1811 that deficit had increased seven times to £8.9m, exports falling to £1.9m, imports rising to £10.8m, (Appendix C, Table II), imports from Britain comprising 55.7% of all imports, (Appendix C, Table III). Portuguese exports to Britain stood at £405,419, imports at £6,146,858 (in offical values) (Appendix C, Table III).

This development has been connected with the reduction of the taxes on the British goods from about 30% to 15% in accordance with the stipulations of the treaty. Nevertheless there is evidence that the enactment of the 15th and 16th articles of the treaty occurred only on 19 October 1812 when these were ratified by the Prince Regent[19]. So that it seems that the causes of the radical change in the state of the Portuguese economy cannot be viewed merely from the point of view of the stipulations of the treaty of 1810. The problem must be seen as a consequence of the sum of exceptional circumstances which became adverse to Portuguese trade. In the first place, the division of political power between Rio de Janeiro and Lisbon. Secondly, the opening of the Brazilian ports to British shipping must be seen as the beginning of the economic independence of Brazil[20] which unavoidably affected commercial relations with Portugal. According to Godinho, who has based his calculations on Balbi, by 1808 the volume of trade between Portugal and Brazil fell very considerably, and remained in deficit until 1816. The exceptional amount of Portuguese imports from England in 1811 must be connected with military activities in the Iberian Peninsula rather than with the stipulations of the treaty. The apogee of the war in Portuguese territory was reached during the first three months of that year. The districts between the Mondego and Tagus were almost totally destroyed, the campaigns seriously affected the agricultural, manufacturing and commercial activities. During the following months it was necessary to restore the life of the Kingdom so that imports were extremely important so as reestablish economic activities.

This task lasted until 1814 while at the same time the Portuguese forces collaborated with the British and Spanish troops against the French in Spanish and finally in French territory. It is not surprising that during this period (between 1811-1814) the Portuguese balance of trade has reached the highest levels of deficit with the foreign nations since the commercial relations with France and her allies continued in abeyance and were only reestablished after the war ended at the end of May 1814. This circumstance permitted that in that year the deficit with the foreign nations fell from £5.3 million in 1813 to £1.4 one year later (Appendix C, Table II).

The disastrous state of Portuguese society and economy during the war

may as well be seen as a consequence of the decline of Portuguese manufactures which can be verified by that time[22]. As a result of this, cotton[23] and wool[24], were shipped from Portugal to England and returned transformed into goods.

In the case of woollen goods only those sold after 5 May 1814 benefited from the taxes levied at 15%. This argues that the treaty was not immediately enforced. Its reciprocity could not easily be assured, since there was a substantial difference in taxes levied on the products of each of the two countries. Moreover the laws and their interpretation as well as their execution by the staff of the administrative services were substantially at variance in each of the two countries.

In 1815, Jeffery (British consul in Lisbon), admitted that the British goods were paying 15% except cottons which had still not been inserted at the pauta. At the same time he recognized that there was a certain laxity at the Portuguese Custom houses in permitting the entry of British colonial produce while the coasting trade was more or less opened to British shipping[25]. Nevertheless between 1811-1814 British merchants demanded that the Prince Regent order that the Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro be abolished in fulfilment of the treaty whose stipulations did not consent the existence of monopolies. At the same time they claimed that the coasting trade be legalized so as to avoid the increase of taxes on British ships which very often carried the goods from England to Lisbon and were then laden in Oporto, mainly with wine shipped for Great Britain. It must not be forgotten that the British exported more to Lisbon than to Oporto, but with the imports the opposite occurred.

The Portuguese newspapers published in London - O Correio Braziliense (1808) and the Investigador Portuguez em Inglaterra (1812) were constantly active against the treaty of commerce of 1810, but on the conflict between the Company and the British merchants established at Oporto took a position which permitted the defence of both parties. In regard to the coasting trade those newspapers contested the facilities enjoyed by the British ships, considering through some articles that the situation of administrative disorganization as well as the incidence of the opening of the Brazilian ports and even some stipulations of the treaty were responsible for the rapid decline of Portuguese commerce until 1814.

It is unquestionable that the British exports increased exceptionally during the period of the war between 1810-1814 (Appendix C, Table III). But impartiality demands that the circumstances of the time must be carefully analysed. Some years later, José Accúrsio das Neves, an influential man of power in that time, recognized that the treaty of 1810 had been ruinous, but reminded his readers of the exceptionability of the circumstances in which it was signed. He alleged, however, that the invasion of British manufactures brought significant profits for the Portuguese Treasury because the majority of them were sold in the colonies. In his view, the greatest prejudice to commerce had been the opening of the Brazilian ports to British navigation in reducing the transactions between Portugal and Brazil and affecting Portuguese shipping which previously carried many products which were subsequently shipped to Great Britain[26]. By 1814 he urged that factories be re-opened in order to alleviate the enormous difficulties which affected the economy of the country[27]. This demonstrates that Accúrsio das Neves was aware that the coming of exceptional quantities of British manufactures could be due to the inactivity of the majority of the existing factories which by that time he recognized to be in a state of decadency[28].

The inability to face the difficulties restrained sometimes the power of manoeuvre of the Portuguese authorities. Even so in regard to the treaty the British had to face many obstacles. In the first place it was only gradually placed in force and some of its stipulations were not fulfilled. The most remarkable example of this occurred with the attempt to abolish the Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro. The British merchants were not able to obtain its abolition because they were not strongly supported by their government in London and faced the opposition of more than forty British wine shippers in Great Britain. The judicial reasons which were alleged by the British merchants were not ungrounded. The Company exercised some degree of power as a "de facto" Monopoly and the monopolies were not allowed by the treaty. Nevertheless it can be argued that when the British authorities felt that the treaty of 1810 could be revoked by the Portuguese authorities in consequence of the conflict over the Company, they abandoned the cause of the merchants of Oporto while the latter were left to pursue judicial arguments to favour their interpretation of the treaty.

It must be pointed out that the claims of the British merchants were always directed to the British authorities in London. In Portugal they were aware that they would not obtain any support whatsoever from the Conselho de Regência. Even during the war years, the British authorities in Portugal met with considerable local opposition. By the end of 1810 Wellington had to face the resistance of Principal Sousa in the question of the strategy to be followed to protect the frontiers[29]. In 1812 Charles Stuart could not convince Conde Redondo of the need to reorganize the distribution of the finances having in view more support for military activities[30].

The war came to an end by the middle of 1814 and peace was assured several months later after the definitive fall of the hundred days government of Napoleon. The post-war treaties, those of Paris and the Congress of Vienna in 1815 confirmed the military victory mainly for England and Castlereagh was in fact the man who influenced the distribution of the zones of territory over which each victorious power of the war could exercise its influence from that time onwards. Portugal and Spain had constituted the main supporters of England during the war. Nevertheless British diplomacy during the post-war treaties developed the principal negotiations with Russia, Austria and Prussia. Portugal and Spain wereabandoned and worse than this Britain permitted the creation of a problematic question on the sovereignty over Olivença between the two countries which has not yet been resolved. In the question of indemnities to be paid by France, (since Portugal had been strongly devastated by the forces of Napoleon). Portugal's interests were undermined by Wellington who was the principal responsible for the commission which studied and stipulated the amounts attributed to each country which presented its claims.

It is true that after the war many events occurred to indicate that British hegemony had fallen into decline. Politically, there is no evidence of any British influence on the Council of Regency and in other sectors of the Portuguese life some indications meant that the things were not going well for the British interests. The payment of the war contribution was demanded of the British merchants established at Oporto as well as the retirement of a large number of British officers from the Portuguese army; in 1815 the Prince Regent ordered that the charter of the Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro be prorogued for a further twenty

years from 1 January 1817 onwards; in 1816 the Prince Regent ordered the prohibition of the coasting trade to all foreign nations. These three measures meant that the British merchants established at Oporto had lost some force perhaps due to the abolition of the factory and even that they had been abandonned by the government of London in demanding the abolition of the wine Company, perhaps so as to avoid the Portuguese government being encouraged to request the revocation or at least the reformulation of the treaty of commerce of 1810. The retirement of a considerable number of British officers was vigorously contested by Beresford but D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz imposed his will despite Beresford having reminded him of the state of indiscipline of the Portuguese army before the arrival of the British officers. Finally the prohibition of the coasting trade was a very adverse decision to British merchants who exported much more to Lisbon and imported much more from Oporto[31]. To compensate for this difference they demanded the complete freedom of trade along the Portuguese coast. This would have facilitated the discharge of goods, normally of wine, which took place in Oporto. The figures for the consulages paid by British vessels demonstrate however that the British shipping was not significantly affected by the prohibition of coasting trade ordered by D. João VI in 1816.

This measure as well as the opening of the Portuguese ports to all the nations after the war ended lead us to think that the crisis of Portuguese trade was alleviated. Nevertheless the overall balance of trade showed a constant deficit until 1820 (cf. Appendix C, Table II), even though British exports were considerably reduced below the levels of 1810-1813/4. The problem was that a grave depression affected the economy of Europe. In reality the buying power of the population had been seriously affected by the wars and as a consequence of this some overall reduction of trade occurred after an initial "boom".

Though exports rose to £5.5m in the immediate aftermath of the war (1815), they fell to £3.1m by 1819. Imports remained consistently higher, falling from £6.9m in 1815 to £4.1m in 1819. (Appendix C, Table II). Though exports to Brazil recovered to 20,584 cruzados by 1815, they had fallen to 16,366 cruzados by 1819, and the small surplus trade between Portugal and Brazil in 1816 and 1817 was wiped out in the following two years[32]. Anglo-Portuguese trade was consistently in deficit, imports generally

standing substantially above exports (Appendix C.III). At the same time Portugal no longer played a significant role in British commerce, falling from 20.6% of overall exports in 1811 to 4.4% by 1819.(Appendix C.III).

The Portuguese newspapers published in London (O Portuguez ou Mercurio Político, Commercial & Literário appeared in 1814) constantly accused the British traders, and the stipulations of the treaty of 1810 as responsible for the state of ruination of Portuguese trade. But the causes of that ruination were deeper. It is clear that the treaty was drawn up in a time of war and at least after the war ended it should be reformulated. Nevertheless the relations between the Portuguese Government in Lisbon and the representatives of London in Lisbon were tense, a state of affairs stimulated by the newspapers published in London. At the same time the Portuguese government in Rio de Janeiro did not really understand the problems of the Kingdom and above all, its members were not in very good conditions to comprehend the new correlation of forces in post-war Europe, and Metropolitan Portugal.

The ruination of the Portuguese economy and the erosion of political directions were occurring at the same time. There were signs of dissatisfaction on the part of many local officers irritated by the maintenance of British officers in posts of command and these were stimulated by indications from Spain of resistance against the decision of Fernando VII in restoring absolutism in that country. Winds of change promoting liberalism were deeply opposed to the prevailing ideas in the Iberian Peninsula which were derived from the post-war treaties, especially those which were defended by the members of the Holy Alliance, absolutely marked by an adherence to the principles of clerical rule and the ancien régime. Between a liberal and revolutionary movement and the maintenance of a weak and decadent absolutism, British policy following a policy of non-intervention in the Iberian Peninsula which protected the interests of the British trade. It is true that there is considerable evidence that the British authorities in Portugal sought to avoid the liberal revolution. Although the most clear example would appear to be that of Beresford, his action was taken in self defence rather than an indication of the position assumed by those responsible for British policy. After the war, the British Envoy in Lisbon, Edward Ward several times noted that Beresford had to face a continuous boycott of his demands for military reforms

by the Conselho de Regência, especially from D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz.

Beresford was persistent and twice went to Rio de Janeiro to obtain the support of the Prince Regent. He was eventually successful in 1815 since new rules drawn up by himself envisaged the reorganization of the army by February 1816. In 1820 the Prince Regent reinforced his administrative autonomy in military matters, but according to the letter Beresford wrote to Wellington on 1st June[33] and 30th July[34] he was concerned to alter the composition of the Council and to be one of its members. But he was still unable successfully to convince the King. By that time, D. João VI was aware that the financial state of the Realm left much to be desired, but he still had confidence in the Conselho and respected the opinion of Beresford. The letter considered the Conde da Feira (D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz) and Conde de Peniche as responsible for the financial and political difficulties of Portugal, but recognized that there were no means by which they could be replaced.

The events of 1817 did not force Beresford and D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz to overcome their differences and make common cause against the conspiracy and the events which culminated by the revolution also found the two at loggerheads. In London, Castlereagh followed the events in Portugal with the greatest attention. He was well informed and did nothing to alter the natural course of events. He did not show any dissatisfaction with the question of the British officers when this arose in 1814, in 1817 and finally in August 1820. It appears that he had no high regard for British interests in commercial terms, nor foresaw that they were in any great danger. The events which followed the revolution suggest that he was correct in his perception. It may be affirmed that the British authorities were deeply concerned with the situation in Portugal especially during the war years. The question of the indemnities demonstrated that by 1817 and 1818 the British no longer required Portuguese support and Wellington did not give weight to their interests[35].

The Portuguese newspapers published in London exploited that fact and continued to appoint the treaty of 1810 as a main cause of the evils which affected the life of the Kingdom. Therefore the Portuguese authorities were aware of the difficulties, but they were incapable of altering them. The commercial relations with England could not explain

the crisis of the regime while the government of Rio de Janeiro remained without capacity of reaction to contradict the difficulties.

The level of imports and exports from and to Great Britain was very high. Though this meant a considerable weight in Portuguese trade this corresponded to a mere two, three, four or five per cent of the British trade. Only in 1811, 1812 and perhaps 1813 was that percentage higher (cf. Ap.C, Table III). Even so it seems that there are no reasons why the balance of trade between the two countries in 1819 should have been such an important factor so as to justify the revolution of 1820[36]. It is true that by 1820 the state of the Portuguese manufacture remained very difficult[37]. It is possible that this fact has been a consequence of the discouragement caused by the invasion of British manufactures, but such a situation constituted only one detail of the global conjuncture. The creation of a favourable atmosphere to the revolution was stimulated precisely in London. The revolution occurred when "public opinion" had been inflamed by the Portuguese newspapers. They stimulated anti-British sentiment mainly because their purpose was to destroy an absolutist régime. Their struggle against British privileges was designed to embarrass the administration and undermine its authority. The Correio Braziliense, the Investigador Portuguez em Inglaterra and O Portuguez tended to flatter the habits, the customs, the laws and the institutions of Great Britain. In order to undermine the régime those newspapers proved decisive. They exploited the existence of British influence in Portugal and in this way favoured the fall of the absolutist monarchy[38].

The anti-British line of those newspapers prepared a favourable atmosphere for the revolution. Nevertheless the documents of the revolutionaries were not concerned with the British. Even in the case of the officers the revolutionary movement followed a line of conduct which was not entirely hostile to them. At the same time British privileges as well as existing treaties were carefully respected.

Miriam H. Pereira in Revolução, Finanças, Dependência Externa attempted to explain the disastrous state of the economic life during the nineteenth century and affirmed: "A tudo isto se sobrepõe o gigante inglês, que no século XIX substitui no inconsciente nacional o gigante Adamastor..."

In terms of the period between 1807 and 1820, such an image is inadequate. The conduct of Portuguese mercantile groups before 1820 remains obscure. Nevertheless there is evidence that during the war, as it was already said, some British firms used the names of the Portuguese enterprises for shipping wine from Oporto for England. In the conflict between the Companhia Geral das Vinhas do Alto Douro and English traders there is no evidence of any action taken by the Portuguese traders. In the question of the payment of the war contribution demanded of the British merchants there is evidence that the amount levied by the Portuguese government was suggested by Portuguese wine traders, natural rivals of the British. But this attitude cannot be interpreted as proof of hostility against the British merchants. For all those reasons, by that time, the British influence in Portugal had not the negative impact which some historians have suggested and the newspapers of that time infer. Sandro Sideri's thesis of the re-establishment of the dependence on the British by the period 1807-1820 has, as the main grounds, the stipulations of the treaty of 1810 which favoured the imports from England. But it is necessary to remember that the high level of trade between Portugal and Great Britain during the war years was a consequence of the loss of the markets in France and her allies and the devastation of war.

Albert Silbert regarded the Anglo-Portuguese relations by that time under a different viewpoint. On the one hand he alleged that the British influence contributed to the establishment of liberal principles in Portugal[39]. On the other hand he defended that by that time the British hegemony reached the highest point: "...a tutela inglesa, política, militar e económica, muito mais forte do que em qualquer outra altura, suscitou uma reacção que se alimentou fatalmente de ideias de oposição ao Antigo Regime". During the war such an idea might be tenable, but after the war the military and political "tutelege" fell into decay.

In terms of economic perspective, a balance of trade deficit cannot be confused with economic "tutelege". The advantages on behalf of the British trade were much more a consequence of the war followed by an economic depression and the autonomous development of Brazil, than that of a policy which had as its purpose the control of the economy of other countries.

British influence in Portugal, in economic terms, had been buttressed by the privileges which were conceded relatively to those of other countries in 1703 and appeared to reach its apogee from the time of the enactment of the treaty of commerce of 1810 until 1813[40].

Though the treaty was ratified by 1811, it was only regulated some years later, when British political and military influence was already in decline. The decline of the British hegemony in Portugal was confirmed by the revolutionary movement which led to the events of 1820 in Oporto.

(1) Godinho, V.M., Prix et Monnaies au Portugal. Paris, 1955, p.254

(2) Macedo, J., O Bloqueio Continental. Economia e Guerra Peninsular. Lisboa, 1962, p.41.

(3) Cf. "Lisbon, its English merchant Community and the Mediterranean in the eighteenth century" in Trade and Commerce, Chapter II by H.E.S. Fisher

(4) Balbi, A., Essai Statistique, p.432

(5) Cf. A Questão Vinhateira do Douro, p.303 and following, Por Hum Anonymo

(6) Cf. C.J., 68, 1812-1813, pp.184-185. Petition of wine merchants, correspondents of the Royal Company of Oporto

(7) Cf. Chapter III, I

(8) Cf. Júnior, José Ribeiro, Colonização e Monopólio no Nordeste Brasileiro. São Paulo, 1976

(9) Maxwell, Kenneth, Conflicts and Conspiracies: Brazil and Portugal 1750-1808. Cambridge, 1973

(10) Cf. Bibliographical Essay in this thesis

(11) Cf. "Le Grand Project Portugais de Godoy" in Napoléon et l'Espagne. 1799-1808, from p.299 onwards by André Fugier

(12) Braga, Teófilo, História das Ideias Republicanas em Portugal, p.33

(13) Godinho, V.M., A Estrutura da Antiga Sociedade Portuguesa, pp.108-115

(14) F.O.63, 165, pp.260V-261

(15) On this subject many data may be found in P.P.,1808, IX (126), 117; P.P., 1808, X(5)X, 51 and P.P., 1812, III

(16) Cf. Sideri, Sandro, Trade and Power. Informal Colonialism in Anglo-Portuguese Relations. Rotterdam University Press, 1970

(17) Balbi, Adrien, Essai Statistique, p.441

(18) Macedo, J., O Bloqueio Continental. Economia e Guerra Peninsular, p.41. In 1811 exports from Portugal for Great Britain amounted to 4,323,864,845 reis

(19) Cf. Chapter II, IV

(20) Cf. O Brasil no Comércio Colonial by José Jobson de A. Arruda

(21) Godinho, V.M., Prix et Monnaies au Portugal, p.275

(22) Neves, José Accursio das, Variedades Sobre Objectos Relativos às Artes, Commércio e Manufacturas, Consideradas Segundo os Principios da Economia Politica; Tomo I, pp.181-219

(23) Cf. Mendes, J.M. Amado, "O Domínio Britanico e a Indústria Protuguesa" in O Século XIX em Portugal. (Comunicaçoes ao colóquio organizado pelo Gabinete de Investigaçoes Sociais em Novembro de 1979)

(24) Cf. Appendix B, Table IV

(25) F.O.63, 188, pp.71-75. Letter from Jeffery to William Hamilton. Lisbon, 30 March, 1815

(26) Neves José Accursio das, Memória Sobre os Meios de Melliorar a Industria Portuguesa, 1820. Lisboa, reediçao de 1963, pp.58-87

(27) On the economic thought of José Accúrsio das Neves, Vitorino Magalhaes Godinho shows his viewpoint in A Estrutura da Antiga Sociedade Portuguesa, pp.108-115

(28) Neves, José Accursio das, Variedades Sobre Objectos Relativos às Artes, Commércio e Manufacturas, Consideradas Segundo os Principios da Economia Política. Tomo I, pp.181-219. Cf. "Mappa das Fábricas estabelicidas na cidade de Lisboa, comarcas do reino, seus proprietarios, estado actual, consumo, e exportação das suas manufacturas"

(29) Cf. Chapter I, V

(30) Many examples of these may be found in Brit. Mus., Ad. Ms:31:236: "Despatches from Sir C. Stuart (Envoy to Portugal) to Lord Castlereagh 1812

(31) Balbi, Adrien, Essai Statistique, p.432. The author refers to: "Les deux tiers des importations anglaises appartiennent à Lisbonne, et seulement un tiers des exportations. Porto y gagne toujours beaucoup à cause de la grande exportation des vins"

(32) Godinho, V.M., Prix et Monnaies au Portugal, Paris, 1955, p.275

(33) W.P., 1/647/5. Letter from W.C. Beresford to the Duke of Wellington. Rio de Janeiro, 1 June 1820

(34) W.P., 1/649/14. Letter from W.C. Beresford to the Duke of Wellington, 30 July 1820

(35) Cf. Chapter V, II

(36) Santos, Fernando Piteira, Geografia e Economia da Revolução de 1820, p.112

(37) Silbert, Albert, Do Portugal de Antigo Regime ao Portugal Oitocentista, pp.75-77

(38) Tengarrinha, José, História da Imprensa Periódica Portuguesa, pp.59-66

(39) Silbert, Albert, op.cit., p.78

(40) This is suggested by the figures dealt with consulages (cf. Chapter IV, II)

CHAPTER 1

EFFECTS OF THE ANGLO-FRENCH WAR ON PORTUGUESE TRADE 1807-1811

INTRODUCTION

The period 1807-1811 was viewed in commercial perspective by Jorge Borges de Macedo in his monograph, entitled O Bloqueio Continental. Economia e Guerra Peninsular, published in 1962. His sources were mostly derived from those in Lisbon.

The Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, Biblioteca do Instituto Nacional de Estatística, Biblioteca e Arquivo do Ministério das Obras Públicas and Biblioteca da Academia das Ciencias, seem to have furnished the bases of his study.

The author also refers to the sources located at the Archives Nationales of Paris as well as the contemporary Lisbon newspapers such as: Almanaque de Lisboa (1807-1813); Correio de Lisboa (1811); Diario Lisbonense (1809-1912); Gazeta da Agricultura e Comércio de Portugal (1812) and Gazeta de Lisboa (1807-1813).

He used these sources to discuss the diplomatic aspects of the blockade and its importance in the commerce, principally of Oporto, of which Anglo-Portuguese trade constituted the larger part.

François Crouzet's study, L'Économie Britannique et Le Blocus Continental (1806-1813), published in 1958, used naturally drawn from the Public Record Office in addition to French sources, but this work only makes tangential references to the Anglo-Portuguese trade. Nevertheless he established that the French trade was much smaller in its both value and volume than the British.

The Continental System. An Economic Interpretation by Eli F. Hecksher, published in 1922 proceeds to make a political and economic interpretation of the period, but does not refer to any special involvement on the part of Portugal.

The papers of the British firms established in Oporto, such as: Offley Forrester, Warre and Quarles Harris, the State Papers, Parliamentary

Papers and Common Journals demonstrate that there is still much to be learned of Portuguese commerce in this turbulent period.

The O Correio Braziliense also provides an overall perspective in political as well as commercial trends.

These sources indicate that the findings of the foregoing studies can be elucidated better to demonstrate the fluctuations to which Portugal's trade was subjected by the implementation of the blockade.

Virtually we attempt to explain the politic, military and commercial conjuncture in international terms, although we are concerned to point out the circumstances of the principal rivals of the time - Great Britain and France. The Portuguese decision to support Great Britain might be explained in balance of trade terms, since Anglo-Portuguese and Franco-Portuguese trade possessed such different weight at least until 1807. Nevertheless the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance only emerged after considerable hesitation on the part of Lisbon.

Secondly we argue that the first French invasion was characterized by actions taken against the British properties which the owners had abandoned during their evacuation in September and October 1807. The consequent fall in trade can be explained by the smaller number of ships leaving Porto for England as well as the reaction of British firms to the French occupation.

A change occurred when political circumstances of Spain suddenly changed in the early 1808. The immediate support of the British government for both the juntas of Spain and that of Oporto was crucial to the revival of trade.

When the Second French invasion came, British and even some Portuguese merchants were evacuated to Lisbon, thought to be less dangerous than a direct sea voyage to England. The French authorities appear to have attempted to seize both British merchants' houses and their goods as an act of policy.

British forces faced both financial and military obstacles in Portugal. The gradual growth of British influence in the military forces and even in the Council of the Regency were a natural result. However undesirable for the Portuguese this permitted Wellesley to organize an effective resistance against the third invasion, but at the same time ensured that the negotiations which led to the treaty of commerce of 19 February 1810 between Portugal and Great Britain would be heavily favourable to British trading interests. In compensation the British authorities furnished substantial support to the zones which had been most devastated by the war.

The detention of a considerable number of Portuguese vessels by the Royal Navy in fulfilment of the instructions under the stipulations of the Orders in Council, published by November and December of 1807, created a delicate situation for the authorities in London. They were unable to resolve it very easily. Only the expulsion of the French troops from Portugal by August and September of 1808 facilitated the release of vessels and their cargoes to their original owners. Nevertheless during the next two years, many owners of Portuguese properties held in England had to send powers of attorney in order to claim their goods. Despite these, many lost everything since the warehouse charges were higher than the estimated value of their property under consideration.

Finally, from 1807-1811 maritime trade between Oporto and England underwent several changes as a result of the conflict. Security, prices, problems created by the war or peace on the sea, illustrate the extent to which trade was disrupted by the deficiencies of war.

1. NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ENGLAND AND PORTUGAL AND MEASURES TAKEN TO SAVE BRITISH SUBJECTS AND THEIR PROPERTIES

The War in Europe attained new perspectives during the year 1806. Up to that time it was essentially a military conflict but afterwards it became not only military but also political and commercial. On land, Napoleon appeared supreme, placing his brothers Joseph Bonaparte and Louis Bonaparte on the thrones of Naples and Holland(1).

On 12 July he was recognized as the Protector of more than a dozen princes by the Confederation of the Rhine(2). He was already Emperor of the French, King of Italy and exercised considerable influence in Switzerland, Bavaria, Wurtemberg as well as in Spain(3).

The collapse of Prussia in October seems to have impelled Napoleon to issue the famous Berlin Decree, a commercial boycott of Britain and her colonies(4). This decree(5) declared the British Islands to be in a state of blockade and prohibited all commerce with England. It was issued on 21 November 1806 and had the aim of affecting not only the English government but also "every individual subject" and "every warehouse, every merchandize, every property of whatever it be, belonging to an English subject".

Such measures should be interpreted as the beginning of a commercial war designed to defeat the British by destroying their substantial trade with the European continent and all its colonies.

English trade was protected by the Royal Navy which possessed 920 ships in 1806, 973 in 1807 and 1,032 in 1808(6) and was carried by the Merchant Navy which in 1800, in England and Wales alone, possessed 12,198 ships with 105,037 men(7).

The substantial rise of the merchant marine can be evaluated from the estimate of ships in 1806, 1807 and 1808 (including Great Britain, Ireland, the British Plantations in America and the West Indies). By that time the merchant marine stood at 22,646 ships of 2,324,819 tons

with 157, 105 men[8].

England's naval strategy in Europe had as its objective the destruction of French trade, the prevention of any invasion into its territory and the guarantee of the security of the Baltic, North Sea, Iberian Peninsula and Mediterranean coasts so as to protect the merchant marine[9]. The success of this policy can be estimated by the extent of the overall foreign and colonial trade of the United Kingdom which had attained the following figures (in official value) during 1806[10]:

Imports of Foreign and Colonial Merchandize £	Exports of Foreign and Colonial Merchandize £	Exports of British and Irish Produce and Manufactures £
26,899,658	7,717,555	25,861,879

The real or declared value of British and Irish produce and manufactures exported reached £40,874,983 in 1806, the highest after 1802.

While the population of United Kingdom in 1806 stood at approximately 17,442,911[11], Portugal's stood at one sixth in 1801[12]. About 6% of this population resided in the district of Oporto which was situated in the province of Minho.

The Portuguese military marine in 1793 stood at 34 vessels (with 1556 cannons)[13], but by 1807 this had risen to 68. These were as follows: 12 ships of line; 16 frigates; 10 brigs of war and 30 gun-boats, armed vessels [14].

Although the Lisbon arsenal was well equipped, that of Oporto was very weak.

By the end of the eighteenth century, the Portuguese mercantile marine had grown to comprise 300 vessels of 84,843 tons. The average tonnage of each ship stood at 282,81 tons and was considered the highest

in Europe after the merchant marine of the city of Dantzig[15].

The Tagus and Barra do Douro ports, at Lisbon and at Oporto, were the most important in the country. In 1806, 328 vessels (about 21% of the total in the country) entered the Douro and 251 cleared for other countries (16% of the total)[16].

English ships calling at Oporto carried substantial quantities of merchandize during 1806[17]. These were normally consigned to British merchants established there.

The British habitually exported woollens, linens and other manufactures and commodities, cod fish from Newfoundland and butter and beef from Ireland. About 22,000 pipes of the famous wine per year were imported from Oporto as well as fruit , cotton and colonial produce from Brazil[18].

Due to the amount of the wine, the majority of the Portuguese exports cleared through Oporto while two-thirds of the imports entered through Lisbon[19]. During 1806 cod fish, coal, utensils for pipes and sets of casks for the wine and cereals came into Oporto and wine cork, fruit cotton, hides, salt, etc. cleared for England[20].

The balance of trade between Portugal and England had normally favoured Portugal[21]. By 1806, according to Portuguese calculations, the value of the Portuguese imports from England was of 6,587,150,292 reis and the exports to England was of 8,201,116,990 reis[22]. According to British sources in the same year the real value of exports from England to all parts of the world was of £53,028,881[23]. About 3.35% of them were exported to Portugal.

Portuguese trade with other countries also remained favourable in 1806, since the country accumulated a surplus of 17,036,000 cruzados[24].

As a consequence of its commercial prosperity, and its extreme military and naval vulnerability, the Portuguese monarchy had every

reason to fear the consequences of a conflict with either Britain or France. Therefore it was logical for the Prince Regent, D. João VI to embark on the only course open to him - a policy of neutrality. This was negotiated with the French Empire, for the price of "15 million cruzados"[25]. The enforcement of the Berlin Decree would have brought Portugal's prosperous neutrality to an end.

Anglo-Portuguese commercial relations were immediately affected by the decree. The French government was conscious of this, for, although the governments of Spain, Naples, Holland and Etruria were immediately sent the text of the decree. D. Lourenço de Lima (Portuguese ambassador in Paris) was only given verbal instructions to close the ports to English Trade[26].

It appeared that Portuguese neutrality was to be tolerated.

Whatever the French may have intimated to D. Lourenço de Lima, Downing Street was under no illusions that France would respect Portuguese neutrality. By the 9th August 1806, several months before their Berlin Decree, Paris was already engaged on detailed planning of the invasion of Portugal[27].

London moved rapidly to try and guarantee the defence of Portugal as well as the protection to be afforded to British subjects and their properties[28]. Such measures were necessary since British merchants were well established in that country, principally in Lisbon and Oporto[29].

By the early years of the nineteenth century the commercial community at Oporto consisted of some twenty firms[30], trading in wine and manufactures which were exported to Great Britain, Europe and North America[31]. This trade was so important that the French had established Consul Guinebaud there in 1801[32].

The commercial balance between Portugal and France in the first years of the nineteenth century had been favourable to Portugal. The

balance reached 9,947,000 cruzados in 1804 and 10,271,000 cruzados in 1806[33]. It can be understood with this in view why the Portuguese government did not care to alter its neutrality.

According to instructions which ordered the Royal Navy to operate in the Tagus[34] it seems that Portuguese neutrality would be convenient to the British pretensions. At the same time it seemed that it would be more or less accepted by the French, at least in a commercial view[35].

The volume of Oporto's commerce realized by the English and the French may be estimated from the movement of vessels. In 1806, 106 entered Oporto from England and 2 from France. During the same period 103 cleared for England and 13 for France[36]. This situation clearly favoured the British, but the British government was not solely concerned with its commercial interests.

The reply to the Berlin Decree was signalled by the Orders in Council of 7 January 1807[37]. In the preamble to the Orders it was affirmed that certain edicts of the French government prohibited "the commerce of all neutral nations with His Majesty's dominions" and they declared "all His Majesty's dominions to be in a state of blockade".

As a consequence the British government invoked its "unquestionable right of retaliation" and ordered "That no vessel shall be permitted to trade from one port to another, both which ports shall belong to or be in the possession of France or her Allies, or shall be so far under their control, as that British vessels may not freely trade thereat".

In the first six months of 1807, 93 ships cleared from Oporto to England and 78 entered Oporto from England, while in the former year, at the same period, the figures had been 48 in the first case and 60 in the second one[38]. So, it may be concluded that the ships' movements increased between Oporto and England, perhaps indicating traders' concerns to compensate the stagnant commerce between England and Northern Europe[39] which was seriously affected by the Berlin

Decree.

Despite the Portuguese pledge of neutrality made to the French, the English continued to trade without encountering great difficulties. On the contrary, there is even some evidence of frequent facilities given by the Portuguese military marine to the British ships. This provoked a certain indignation among the French and still more among the Spaniards[40].

Meanwhile several problems began to emerge between Lisbon and the English.

On 4 February 1807 another order in council was promulgated at the Court of London which protected neutral vessels. It instructed the Royal Navy: "do not interrupt neutral vessels laden with cargoes consisting of the articles hereinafter enumerated, coming for importation to any port of our United Kingdom..."[41]. This measure did not alter the relationship between London and Lisbon even though there has been correspondence exchanged on 27 February[42], 6 [43] and 14 March[44] between Chevalier de Sousa Coutinho, Portuguese Ambassador in London and Lord Howick, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, dealing with the navigation of Portuguese vessels to Hamburg or other Elbe and Weser ports. A reason was that the Royal Navy required an exhibition of proof of the neutral quality of the vessels and their cargoes in consequence of the order in council of 16 May 1806, which ordered the British blockade from the River Elbe to the port of Brest[45].

On 2nd February, James Gambier, the British Consul General at Lisbon, had been in London and previous to his departure he requested instructions about "the late act of the Portuguese government in abolishing the establishment at Lisbon of Porto Franco; the seizure of a quantity of British merchandize by the Portuguese government; the loss of the ship Mentor and the grievances experienced by the British merchants at Oporto in regard to the wine trade and the monopoly of brandy"[46]. The reply which he obtained from his government was: "...the evils

complained of have increased, and are daily becoming more serious"[47]. The same source added a reference to "the repeated infringements upon the hitherto acknowledged privileges of British subjects trading with that country".[48]

At the same time, Sousa Coutinho met on 2[49] and 23 April[50] firstly with Hammond, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and afterwards with Canning but did not obtain any satisfactory reply to his protests against the detention of the Portuguese vessels captured off the German coast.

The movement of vessels between Oporto and North European ports suggests that they might well have been involved with the British patrols on the German coast. In the first five months only the Tentação[51] on 26 February and the Lapa[52] on 15 April sailed for Amsterdam; the Amante[53] and Tres Reys[54] on 10 March, as well as Boa Esperança[55] on 22 April to Russia; the Boa Joana to Hamburg and Anna Christina to Tonningen in April[56]. Finally the Americano[57] sailed for a French port as well in April. The majority of the merchandise carried consisted of wine and cotton.

This scanty movement of vessels could signal the difficulties of transactions between Oporto and North Europe. This was not surprising since the political situation in Europe was becoming more and more clouded not only for the Portuguese but also for the British[58].

In England a cabinet crisis occurred. In March 1807 the Whigs had fallen and the new government was headed by the Duke of Portland and Spencer Perceval, "men of mediocre attainments and vision". Canning became Foreign Secretary and one of the strongest men of the government[59].

While the new cabinet faced many internal problems, the French obtained ascendency on the continent defeating the Russians at the battle of Friedland on June 1807.

French military success was crowned with the treaty of Tilsit signed on 7 July[60], which in Napoleon's opinion marked the apogee

of his Empire[61].

By this time the British had lost their hegemony at the ports of North Europe. At the same time their economic situation in the first half of the year 1807 was relatively favourable[62], so that Portugal would be an important point arduously disputed between the British and French.

In early August, both the French and Spanish ministers to Lisbon demanded that Portugal close its ports to English vessels by 1st September[63], and the French also requested that English vessels, goods and properties be confiscated and their authorities expelled.

On 20th August Chevalier de Sousa Continho, Portuguese Ambassador in London declared "formellement au Ministre Britannique la ferme resolution, de laquelle S.A.R. ne se departira pas de ne jamais consentir aux deux demandes faits par la France de détenir les sujets Britanniques qui se trouvent en Portugal et de confisquer les propriétés anglaises"[64]. However some occurrences in Lisbon somewhat denied the position taken by Sousa Coutinho[65].

In the meantime both British and Portuguese authorities began discussions to defend their mutual interests attempting to avoid spreading alarm amongst both the English merchants in Portugal and the Portuguese in England[66].

At the same time, foreseeing the greatest difficulties on the continent the British took measures to obtain the reinforcement of their maritime power with the aim of supporting their commerce with Southern European ports as much as possible. With this purpose in mind secret negotiations were begun between England and Portugal in August and September and terminated in October 1807[67].

As the British had the hegemony of the seas around the Europe and were strengthened by their possession of small islands such as Heligoland, Guernsey, Jersey and Malta, they intended to secure their influence

at Madeira before the French invaded Portugal[68]. It was during the negotiations in London that the Portuguese Royal Family's withdrawal to Brazil was seriously discussed.

There talks were led by Souza Continho, acting with the support of D. João and George Canning for the British cabinet which culminated in the secret convention of 23 October 1807[69].

Meanwhile, Canning became concerned with regard to the affairs in Portugal, particularly at Oporto and Lisbon. He requested an estimate of the value of the British properties at Oporto[70] and on 29 August he advised Mr Gambier, General Consul at Lisbon, to send Mr Warre, Consul at Oporto "a number of blank certificates to be filled up by him whenever the necessity of using them may arise, or to delegate to him the power of granting certificates" to the vessels to sail for England[71].

Such measures were a symptom that the affairs were looking dark for the British in Portugal. This was confirmed on 25 September when the Portuguese government adhered to the continental system, although refusing the confiscation of the British properties[72].

Three days later at a general meeting of the British factory in Lisbon, the merchants recommended measures for securing their property as much as possible. Many difficulties were raised about the adversities encountered by British shipping in the Portuguese ports.

James Gambier informed them that in the case of emergency he would give certificates to neutral vessels. Finally, it was decided that some vessels would be requested from England to transport Portuguese subjects to Brazil if they so wished[73].

The circumstances dictated an evacuation of the British subjects and their properties without delay[74] and moreover it was necessary to avoid a situation such as that which had occurred in the bombardment of Copenhagen on 2 Spetember[75]. With this in view the diplomatic

negotiations were intensified.

On 29 September, Strangford, Britain's Envoy Extraordinary in Lisbon, successfully requested the Portuguese Government to authorize the free embarkation of British property lodged in the Public Deposits of the Kingdom[76].

On the 2 of October Gambier wrote to Antonio d'Araujo d'Azevedo, Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs, to request his passports[77] acting on instructions from London[78]. On the same day the Prince Regent D. João issued an Edict regretting the French Ambassador's withdrawal from the Portuguese Court[79]. Two days later, James Gambier who had taken the French withdrawal into consideration requested Canning that no time could be lost in removing British subjects residing as well as their property.[80]

Fortunately one convoy had arrived at Lisbon from Newfoundland so that on 8 October Strangford ordered Gambier: "In order to avoid all possible inconvenience and embarrassment it seems to be the wish of the Portuguese Government that the vessels of that convoy would not discharge their cargoes in the Tagus". As a result the proprietors of the vessels were advised to go to Gibraltar where it would be easier to find purchasers for the Portuguese market[81].

This was a signal that would be imminent a decision of the Prince Regent on behalf of the French. At last it happened on 22nd October[82].

In September the value of the British properties at Oporto had been estimated in 2,900,544 $ 270 reis[83]. The value of the "houses and land or immovables" was of 198,653$000 reis[84] and the debts of 527,905 $ 869 reis[85].

"As the movable property consisted chiefly of wines" can be concluded that their value should be about 74.95% of the total amount which was considered "an object of great national importance" according to Strangford[86].

On 23 October a Treasury warrant was issued "to allow goods and the property of British subjects to be imported from Portugal in Portuguese or neutral ships"[87]. By that time British merchants had fled and removed to England as much as they could[88], mainly carried by Portuguese and British vessels[89].

William Warre, British consul at Oporto said: "the first notice of the approaching change of measures in Portugal was intimated to me by Lord Strangford on the 12 September, continued to the 19th, but His Lordship's letters announced danger to the British interests in Portugal...". The preparations began with care so as "to avoid all participation that might alarm and only to caution the Factory and Merchants to be upon their guard". On 26 and 29 Gambier informed that "no time was to be lost in securing and removing both British persons and property. The convoy was appointed for the 10 October and actually sailed on the 17th..."[90]

In Oporto the convoy must have been organized with a certain method since there is evidence that the merchandize duties were paid in the habitual way[91]. Several references affirmed that the convoy was composed of about 80 vessels, coming from Lisbon to Oporto[92]. With regard to the Oporto movement during October, there are no doubts that at that time 57 vessels cleared from the Barra do Douro to British ports. About 20 sailed for London, 6 for Liverpool, 5 for Bristol and the rest were destined to Dover, Hull, Dublin, Falmouth, Greenock, Plymouth, Dartmouth, Toynsham, Jersey, Guernsey, Cork, Portsmouth and Southampton[93].

Each vessel was normally consigned by each British firm but there is evidence that some cases were consigned by British and Portuguese merchants together.

The movement of vessels at Oporto's port was not seriously affected by the events between July and October. During this period 38 vessels[94] sailed from England and 127[95] cleared for British ports. Nevertheless in November and December there were no entries from abroad into Oporto.

Finally the effects of the Berlin Decree extended to all the northern European coast and Portugal.

Despite all this, in 1807 Portugal imported from England 5,422,272,321 reis and exported to England 7,971,196,005 reis in goods[96]. Some 1,678,332,990's worth of goods were imported from England to Oporto in 1807. Exports to England from Oporto reached some 5,236,634,960 reis.

II. THE FIRST FRENCH INVASION AND THE PERSECUTION OF THE BRITISH AND THE SEIZURE OF THEIR PROPERTIES HELD IN OPORTO

The fate of Portugal at the end of October was unknown. On the 27th a secret treaty had been concluded between Spain and France at Fontainebleau which had as its main purpose the division of Portugal[1]. According to the treaty, the province of "Entre Douro & Minho" which included Oporto would be ceded to Marie Louise of Etruria and the South of the country, given to Manuel Godoy who retained an anti-English attitude.

On the one hand the realization of this plan[2] would have been extremely dangerous to the English as it would mean a substantial loss of influence on the continent. It would also cause difficulties at sea, particularly in communications with the Açores, Madeira and the Mediterranean countries, beyond obvious damage of an economic nature[3]. On the other hand the Portuguese naturally feared that they might lose the favourable commercial contacts which they had with the British[4].

It was not surprising that on 4th November Strangford tried to clarify the Portuguese government's intentions respecting British subjects and their property which were still in Portugal[5].

Two days later, Antonio de Araújo de Azevedo, Minister for Foreign Affairs, answered him that the measures to be taken in the immediate future depended much more on the development of circumstances rather than on the will of the government[6]. But, at the same time, the Portuguese Royal Family gave every outward sign of preparing its evacuation to Brazil in accordance with the secret convention of 23rd October. For this purpose he prepared and armed all available ships: "fez então aproximar das costas, e portos do mar todo a seu exército"[7].

Meanwhile British property was confiscated in Oporto. William Nassam complained that the Portuguese Brig Graça e Liberdade loaded at Oporto with two hundred and ninety pipes of red port Factory wine,

sailed in convoy of the Lavinia Lord William Stuart, captain, on the 2 November destined for Liverpool[8]. Due to tempestuous weather it was obliged to return to Oporto on 10 November. There, the cargo was unloaded and as it was British was put in the hands of the Portuguese government .

William Warre, the British consul in Oporto, complained that the majority of his valuable property "remained behind, including 300 pipes of wine, 16,000 pipe staves, other goods, and outstanding debts; besides the furniture of three houses, and a valuable library"[9].

The situation was becoming increasingly difficult for the British, not only in Portugal but also in other countries. The Orders in Council published on 16 May 1806 decreed a blockade from the Elbe to Brest[10]. On 7 January 1807, the attempts to prohibit the trade between "port and port of countries under the dominion, or usurped countries, of France and her allies"[11], became insufficient. The same happened with those of 19 August which ordered that "all vessels under the flag of Mecklenburgh, Oldemburgh, Papenburgh, or Kniphausen, were declared lawful prizes if they touched at an enemy port, unless such a vessel was going from or coming to a port in the United Kingdom"[12]. It seems that on this subject the government felt unsafe and appeared influenced by James Stephen[13]. Ships still engaged in essentially British trade now sailed under flags of convenience, mainly those of North German principalities[14].

Increasing problems began to assail the British government. The result was the issue of twenty-four new orders in council between 11 November and 18 December[15]. Through these, English policy attempted "above all, to raise the prices of the products from the enemy's colonies and from the enemy's parts in all ports where they might compete with goods of Great Britain or her colonies"[16]. For this purpose it was ordered "that all the ports and places of France and her allies, or of any other country at war with His Majesty, and all other ports or places in Europe from which, although not at war

with His Majesty, the British flag is excluded...and all ports or places in the colonies, belonging to His Majesty's enemies, shall from henceforth be subject to the same restrictions in point of trade and navigation, as if the same were actually blockaded by His Majesty's naval forces in the most strict and rigorous manner". And further, "that all trade of the said countries or colonies shall be deemed and condemned to be unlawful and that every vessel trading from or to the said countries or colonies shall be captured and condemned as prize to the captors".

Neutral countries were allowed "the opportunity of furnishing themselves with colonial produce of their own consumption and supply, and even to leave open for the present such trade with His Majesty's enemies as shall be carried on directly with the ports of His Majesty's dominions or of his allies"(17).

Despite the orders in council being very difficult to interpret in detail(18) it seems evident that the British government had as its objective the increase of revenues through the taxes paid in British ports. Also prices of goods reached prohibitive levels in France and the countries of its allies.

To avoid such inconvenience, the French replied quickly on 23 November by the first Milan Decree, ordering in the first two articles the following:

"1. Tous les bâtiments qui, après avoir touché en Angleterre, par quelque motif que ce soit, entreront dans les ports de France, seront saisis et confisqués, ainsi que les cargaisons, sans exception, ni distinction de denrés et merchandises.

2. Les capitaines des bâtiments qui entreront dans les ports de France devront, dans le jour arrivé, faire au bureau des douanes impériales une déclaration du lieu de leur départ, de ceux où ils ont relâché, et lui présenter leurs manifestes, connaissements, papiers de mer et livres de bord"(19).

As these measures were not considered totally satisfactory by Napoleon, as in his opinion the British "Orders in Council" affected the commerce of the "puissances neutres, amies et même alliées de l'Angleterre"[20], on 17 December the second Milan Decree was issued[21]. Through such measures the French pretended to avoid all contacts between British ports and vessels from other nations[22], threatening ships which traded with British ports, with the loss of their nationality.

The British Orders in Council and the French Milan Decree published in late 1807 should be interpreted as signifying a very important juncture in the war between the two countries. No less important was what was happening in Portugal. During November, the negotiations between English and Portuguese authorities were intensified. Strangford, after long trying to persuade the Prince Regent that the British commerce should not be excluded from the Portuguese ports[23], could not avoid an incident where, on 8 November, some British subjects had been arrested[24]. As a result of this he asked for his passport and made all the preparatives for his return to England.

On 17 Strangford and Sidney Smith, who had arrived on the coast some days before with a fleet under his command, decided to establish a rigorous blockade at the mouth of the Tagus[25], in deference to the instructions which they received[26]. Five days later[27] the blockade was performed and, in a final attempt, Strangford persuaded the Prince Regent that the evacuation of the Portuguese Royal Family would prevent problems with Portuguese possessions in America[28].

As a consequence of this agreement on 26 November a decree was issued announcing the withdrawal to Brazil[29], beginning on the evening of 29 November, one day before the arrival of the French troops in Lisbon.

This event delighted the British Foreign Secretary[30]. It meant an enormous setback to French pretensions on the continent mainly to their policy of a continental system[31].

From then the British extended their blockade from the Baltic as far as the Mediterranean, Lisbon was one of the most important points along the whole coast[32].

French troops occupied Lisbon but they did not extend their dominion either to the north, or to the south[33]. They soon took measures against British property and they demanded that the same happened not only in Lisbon but also in the interior[34].

British property in Oporto had, in the meantime, been confiscated in consequence of the decree issued on 8th November and William Nassan confirmed to the Treasury Chambers on 14th December the removal of a large quantity of wine[35]. Also British merchants and manufacturers formerly residing or trading with Portugal, and others complained that as a result of what had happened in Portugal they had suffered great losses either in lands, houses or other property left there, which they had not been able to either remove, or dispose of - from outstanding debts whose recovering was prevented, or from seizures and other acts of violence committed by the government. Among the signatures were Warre, Perry Nassan, William Nassan, Page Noble and Hunt, as well as the greatest merchants who had formerly been in Lisbon[36].

Despite all, British merchants were aware that it could have been worse. As proof of this those lately resident in Oporto asked George Hammond to transmit their vote of thanks to Mr Cambier and William Warre "in order that His Majesty's Ministers may be acquainted with the high sense which they entertain of the services rendered by those gentlemen at the critical period of their departure from Portugal"[37].

Of James Gambier the same merchants exalted "his great zeal to our interests and the promptitude with which he communicated to us the danger impending over our persons and property as well as for the advice which he so readily afforded, as to the most effectual means of ensuring their safety and though from the shortness of the times his endeavours could not be crowned with complete success yet we are fully sensible

that to his recommendations we are in a great measure indebted for that portion of our property which has escaped falling into the possession of the enemy"[38].

Of William Warre the same merchants said that they were "deeply impressed with a sense of the important services rendered us by William Warre Esq., late His Majesty's consul in Oporto as well as with the highest sentiments of personal esteem for his character - Request him to accept our sincerest thanks for his uniform attention to our interests and particularly for his zealous exertions in the protection of our persons and the removal of such part of our property as could be saved in the short period which elapsed from the first intimation he had of our danger till our final departure from Portugal"[39].

In the two documents of 23 February 1808, there may be recognized the signatures of the following merchants: Pinnels, Perry Nassan & Tompsons, Page Noble & Co., Thomas Snow & Co., Harris Harris & Koope, Thompson Croft & Co., Moirs Hathorn & Roberts, Stephenson Searle & Son, Lambert Kingstons & Co., Webb Campbell & Gray, Offley Hesketh & Co., Nash Butler & Co., Swanny Knowsley & Co. and Babington Tedswell & Co.

During November and December there was almost no movement in the port of Oporto, although it is known that only on 28 December the blockade of Lisbon was executed by the English since 22 November extended to Oporto - witness the document sent by Castlereagh, Secretary of State for War to the Lords Commissioners, which reads as follows: "His Majesty having judged it expedient that in addition to the Port of Lisbon that of Saint Urbes of Oporto should be subjected to the most rigorous blockade, and that the same should be enforced in the strictest manner according to the usages of war, acknowledged and allowed in similar cases"[40]. The neutral vessels which attempted to violate this blockade would be immediately stopped even "if they shall appear to be ignorant of the existence of the blockade and have enemy's property on board..."[41].

Before long the British had taken many ships which sailed to and from Oporto and Lisbon[42]. Such detentions meant that even without specific instructions the Royal Navy acted in accordance with the principles established by the "Orders in Council" as Portugal remained under the control of the French both in theory and practice.

After the blockade of Oporto the movement of its port was scanty. In January, 3 vessels entered from Spain, 1 from Hamburg, 2 from Bremen and 3 from Kniphausen[43]. In the months until June it was from virtually these same countries that ships arrived. In May 33 more ships came from Spain[44]. This significant increase must be connected with the events which took place in the north of Spain, which were favourable to the English.

Napoleon, who was desirous of establishing a government in that country which possessed his total confidence, decided to interfere in the dispute which divided the Royal Family and menaced the favourite Godoy. The abdication in March of Charles IV on behalf of his son, Ferdinand VII, followed by the imposition of Joseph Napoleon, the French Emperor's brother[45], caused popular risings led by local juntas in many areas of Spain against the French. These were mainly in the provinces of Asturias and Galicia[46]. Such events must have encouraged Spanish navigation to Oporto[47], perhaps under the protection of the British who were asked to support the leaders of the revolution in Spain, and who were interested in exporting from England using vessels of other nations[48].

In January and February no vessels were registered leaving Oporto, but between March and May five sailed for Hamburg, 6 to Bremen, 5 to Knipeniss and 1 for each of the following countries: Penemburgh, Mecklemburgh and Oldemburgh[49]. During the same period, 8 vessels from Hamburg, 7 from Bremen and 9 from America sailed into Oporto[50]. This meant that there was a relaxation of the blockade to ships from these states[51].

In the first six months of 1808, commerce between Oporto and Great Britain was carried on by "neutral vessels' transactions in some goods as it was in the case of wine'[52].

During the year 1808 only eight British firms exported wine for Great Britain - Warre, Newman, Bearley & Webb, Thompson Croft, Page & Co., Stephenson Searle, Harris Brothers and Burmester[53], but none of them appears on the export lists before July[54], after the revolution with English support against the French in Oporto[55].

From February onwards, not only the Portuguese firms such as Junta da Companhia, Barboza de Lima, João Ferreira Duarte, Thomas da Rocha Pinto, João Ribeiro Vianna and others - but also foreign firms such as Martinez Lopes and Vanzellers & Co., continued to export with regularity[56].

It seems that General Junot was involved in commercial interests during the French occupation[57]. He gave licences to ships with the neutral flag (mainly those of the United States and Kniphausen)[58], with which the British squadron did not interfere, since the British government wished to withdraw from Portugal as much as was possible. This aim was unremittingly pressed by the merchants who had lost some of their property in Portugal[59]. The owners of those ships which had been confiscated by the French at the time of their invasion of Lisbon sought to recover the valuable cargoes which were on board those ships and therefore were prepared to pay Junot high prices for transit licences.

With such practices, Junot achieved notoriety for having built up an enormous fortune which had as principal source the Companhia das Vinhas do Alto Douro[60]. This company exported 1211 pipes of wine in March and 399 in April[61]. This means that during the same two months they exported more than all the British firms did during the whole year of 1808 which totalled 1,204 pipes[62].

It seems that, during the French occupation, some British firms

continued their activity and used the name of the Companhia in order to guarantee the arrival of goods to their customers[63]. Some of their owners left foreign managers in charge to direct their business in their absence. An example was an American citizen Joseph Camo who "became a partner in the firm Webb, Gray, Campbell & Camo - the direct successors of the seventeenth-century firm of Taylor, Fladgate & Yetman"[64]. It seems that "his neutrality allowed him, during the French occupation of Oporto at that time, to render invaluable service not only to his colleagues but to the British Factors generally"[65].

There were some British and other foreign firms in activity such as Martinez and Vanzellers, which were not affected by the French occupation. Some Portuguese tradesmen who established themselves in England maintained commerce with Oporto, despite the obvious difficulties. One example is that on 18 May 1808, a licence requested from the British government to permit "the free admission of three thousand tons of all sorts of grain and flour to be exported either from England, Ireland, America, France or the Portuguese Islands"[66] in neutral ships with permission to enter the ports of Portugal without facing any embarrassment by English cruisers, under the guarantee of being taken the full amount of the provisions in English colonial produce such as sugar, coffee, cocoa, and rice, as well as from thirty to forty thousand hundredweight of fish or English catch[67].

A favourable response was given on 24th May to allow ships to enter "without molestation on the part of His Majesty's cruisers which blockaded Oporto and Lisbon"[68].

Before the events of October and November 1807, some British firms were the exporters of British manufactures to Brazil. This trade was totally supplied from Portuguese ports[69], but afterwards the commercial life of Oporto and Lisbon was deeply affected by its links with Brazil. In fact, the English and Portuguese authorities[70], as well as several British tradesmen, early in 1808, tried to form an organisation in London with the aim of dictating trade links with that Portuguese colony[71].

Their activities culminated on 28 January 1808 with the opening of Brazilian ports to all friendly nations[72], which above all benefited merchants from Great Britain. In this way the British tried to compensate in part for the loss of a substantial part of the European markets[73] and to alleviate grave political difficulties which became more acute during the second half of 1807 and in early 1808[74].

In order to reinforce their sea power and to create difficulties for the French in Portuguese territory, the British took Ilha da Madeira on 24 December 1807 (with covering of the Portuguese authorities)[75]. They maintained the blockade at least at Oporto and Lisbon, and arrested many Portuguese vessels at seas, which were taken to ports in England with the valuable property they had on board[76]. As a result the economic effects created a feeling amongst the population that emigration was the only solution.

In London arose a plan to favour the passage of refugees from Portugal to Brazil[77] and at the same time negotiations were intensified to facilitate increasing commercial activity between England and Brazil[78].

On 26 March 1808, 185 Portuguese emigrants arrived at Portsmouth from Lisbon, carried by British ships[79] and on 12 May, 82 arrived in England after their escape from Oporto and its neighbourhood[80]. A day later, George Hammond was informed that 95 Portuguese emigrants had arrived at Plymouth[81].

While the British sought to increase the difficult task of the French in Portugal, they tried to secure amicable relations with the Prince Regent residing in Brazil. One such step came on 11 March when there was issued "an act permitting the importation of goods from the Portuguese territories on the Continent of South America, in Portuguese ships"[82].

Brazil seemed to be one means of reaching the objective of

creating national resistance against the French occupation. Oporto would perform an important role in carrying this out.

III. THE REVOLT AT OPORTO - ITS ENGLISH SUPPORT

As Oporto's port had been blockaded by the British forces[1] since 28 December 1807 it was not surprising that its commercial activity during the first five months of 1808 had stagnated. Such a situation had a negative impact on the commercial life of the region[2]. At the same time this was adversely affected by the presence of French and Spanish military units. The British merchants who had escaped to England in October before the French arrived did not return. So imports as well as exports collapsed[3].

When the local juntas in both the North and South[4] of Spain reacted to the events of May 1808 by declaring war against France on behalf of Ferdinand VII, the situation in Oporto became untenable. The British government began to support these local juntas[5], mainly Asturias[6], with material aid in their war against the French. People in the city of Oporto became aware that they could count upon their ally for arms and supplies. It was not surprising that on the 18 June the local populace of Oporto rose against the French who had been weakened by the vacillation and retreat of Spanish forces[7]. The rising culminated in the creation of a Junta Suprema do Governo, led by the Bishop of Oporto, D. Antonio de S. José de Castro[8].

Eleven days after the outbreak of the revolt, Lord Castlereagh instructed General Arthur Wellesley to exploit the event in order to stimulate a general rising in the Peninsula[9]. On the 4 July, Sir Charles Cotton, Commander in Chief of the fleet lying off the Portuguese coast appealed to the inhabitants to take up arms[10] and five days after exhorted the population of the south to follow the example of the north[11].

Naturally the Bishop of Oporto, despite his former conduct[12], as well as other members of the junta[13], wrote to Sousa Continho in London, requesting that the British government send an immediate "succour of three millions of cruzados, as well as sufficient armaments for

40,000 men"[14].

A strategy of cooperation between Oporto and London was strengthened by the military intelligence furnished to the British[15] and by the fact that the juntas of Oporto and Galicia had concluded on 5 July a treaty against the French[16], which was considered "of great interest to the British Nation"[17].

The consequences of this new military situation were not merely political. On 4 July an order in council brought to an end the "blockade of all the ports of Spain except such as may be still in possession, or under control of France"[18]. This naturally applied to Portuguese ports. By the end of the month 36 vessels had cleared from Oporto, though only 24 had sailed during the first six months of the year[19].

During the French occupation British exports to Portugal had been carried in neutral vessels. Despite this and the difficulties created by the French, the merchants of London confessed that in the first six months of 1808 they had exported more than "sixty thousands quintals of British caught fish, hoops, staves, corn, rice and other commodities" to Portugal[20].

When the populace rose against the French in June 1808, the same merchants had been granted licences to import almost ten thousand pipes of wine in exchange for British caught fish, paying in duties about five hundred thousand pounds[21]. In order to avoid the competition of those who used British vessels after this event, they asked that the Treasury "direct that all neutral vessels having His Majesty's licence, and sailing from any port of Portugal with a cargo of wine, on or after the 1st day of June 1808, and arriving in any port of the United Kingdom or on before the 30 day of September 1808 the said port of Portugal not being in possession of the enemy at the time of her sailing shall be admitted to entry at the same rate of duty as if imported in a British vessel"[22]. To support this claim, Wellesley

directed on 28 July that the Treasury confine the indulgence to ships sailing with licences granted before the news arrived of the French being driven from Oporto[23]. Such a pretension must have had some success because a warrant was issued, permitting the importation of wines from Portugal in neutral vessels, on payment of the same duties as if they had been imported in British vessels in the case of one coming under import licences and having begun lading before some day ending one month after the evacuation of the French[24]. As a consequence of this, on 3 September, the merchant John Bowden complained to the Board of Trade that he had imported more than 2336 pipes of port wine in neutral vessels under His Majesty's licences which were obtained about the middle of June. As the lading was carried out between 22 and 29 because it had not been possible at an earlier date, the claimant argued that everyone should partake of the advantage equally[25]. This problem must have been solved favourably to the claimants, since there is no evidence that British vessels sailed from Oporto until September[26].

The commercial relations between Oporto and Great Britain were not merely confined to imports and exports. Among the measures taken to obtain one hundred million francs to pay their military expenses, the French had planned to confiscate British merchandize, so that the merchants who owned it would have to pay one third of its invoiced value to secure its release[27].

On 27 June, the Junta Provisional do Governo Supremo lifted the French decrees concerning goods of British manufacture[28]. Nearly one month later they extended their action to all the goods, rights and shares belonging to the British Majesty's subjects[29]. It is clear that the Junta's actions were calculated to encourage the British merchants to return to Oporto. Canning also concurred, when he requested Under-Secretary George Hammond to ask William Warre, the last British Consul, whether he would resume his post[30]. Though he replied that he would be always ready to obey Mr Canning in case of being useful, he was not enthusiastic about the idea, a feeling shared by other

merchants. They seemed to be more anxious to gain compensation for their losses than return to Oporto, for, at about this time, they sought a meeting with Canning to discuss the matter[31]. Nevertheless, the firm of Webb Campbell appeared to be active by 26 July[32].

It was not surprising that the merchants should be reluctant to return. The military and political situation in Portugal remained very fluid, whatever the British government or the junta might argue. Lisbon was still held by the French[33] whose privateers were still on the rampage between Cape Finisterre and Oporto[34]. In England, the end of July saw the sending of more battalions[35].

At the same time there was intense diplomatic and military activity between the Juntas of Oporto and Galicia on the one hand, and London on the other. Wellesley, who was anxious to understand the military situation, wrote to Colonel Gordon on 21 July, informing him that there were 10,000 Portuguese troops in Oporto, and 2,000 Spanish soldiers had marched from Southern Galicia to join them[36]. One week later, Canning manifested his satisfaction with the events at Oporto and communicated that he had already given orders to embark the quantity of arms required by the Bishop of Oporto. He was most cautious in financial assistance having cited that "the drain which has been made upon the British Treasury by the demands of the several provinces of Spain" but promised that "a sum of from two to three thousand dollars will be forthwith embarked and transmitted to Oporto"[37]. On 4 August the Bishop declared that the government had resolved to restore the Portuguese monarchy in all its extent and to restore the Crown of Portugal to its Lawful Sovereign D. John VI[38].

Mutual confidence was established; it was vital to expel the French from Portugal.

Since the commander Charles Cotton had received support from representatives of Viana do Castelo, Figueira and Leiria in the North, as well as Sines and Lagos in the South[39] he decided to land troops

near Figueira in early August[40].

After the belligerents engaged in battle in Roliça and Vimeiro the British signed the Convention of Cintra[41] on 30 August 1808, in terms which were very controversial, in both countries, Portugal and England[42].

The Convention had brought about a period of uneasy peace, but had not removed the threat from the French nor alleviated the finances of the government.

In early September the measures taken had in view the recovery of the finances and the reinforcement of the country's defence, principally at Oporto[43].

The Junta received on 9 September the English loan of 239:746$100 reis metal[44], with which to arm troops and finance government activities. Revenue was to be provided by the tax on wine exports, now reduced to 4,800 reis[45]. It also appealed to "Faithful Portuguese Vassals" to contribute to the government in its hour of need, sending money, clothing and food to the troops [46].

As an incentive to Anglo-Portuguese commerce, on 14 July British gold coins were allowed to circulate freely[47] and on 18 August French ones were prohibited[48]. The war contribution which prejudiced the merchants' activities was extinguished on 19 July[49] and English woollen manufactures which still remained at the Oporto custom house were immediately released. All the properties of other people, or subjects of other countries residing in Portugal, which had been confiscated or seized were returned[50]. With this aim a committee was made up by Lieutenant-Colonel Trant, Antonio Rodrigues de Oliveira and Debluir, Commissioners of War[51].

These measures had some significant results, since some British firms reopened for business: Quarles Harris on 1 October[52], Guilherme Warre on the 19 [53], Noble on the 28 November[54], Croft

on 19 December[55], Wapermeyer on the 23 [56] and Hunt on the 29th of the same month[57]. Nevertheless the last quarter of the year witnessed the entry of only thirty-nine vessels, while only one cleared during the same period[58]. This must be considered the result of the intelligence emanating from the Bishop of Oporto, warning that there would be new French invasions to be launched from Spain[59].

The general consequences of the war during the year 1808 were significant. Seventy-two vessels had entered from England, less than half the number during 1806 and 1807. Forty-six vessels cleared for England, about one fourth of those which had cleared in 1807 and half those clearing in 1806[60]. But this is not surprising since in October 1807 the British merchants had taken large amounts of wine and other products, as well as pieces of furniture and other goods which they wished to retain for their personal use[61]. The oscillation verified in the vessels' movements is naturally reflected in the exports and imports between Great Britain and Portugal[62]. The decrease which occured was mainly due to the official interruption of commercial relations between the two countries.

The wine exports from Oporto in general, as well as those of the British firms, were very seriously affected by these confusing circumstances. In the year 1808 total wine exports were 37,306 pipes[63], 11,552 less than in the former year[64]. The British firms which remained in activity at Oporto exported only 1817 pipes in that year[65]. During the same period the Wine Company (Companhia da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro) and other Portuguese firms exported 35,489[66].

The opening of the Brazilian ports to British vessels on the 28 January also affected the exports of some colonial products, expressly cotton, which had previously been carried in Portuguese vessels and bought at the Portuguese ports, but could now be obtained directly by British merchants.

Symptomatic of the growing uncertainty in Anglo-Portuguese trade

was the plight of those who had attempted to continue the traditional trade in dried cod from Newfoundland. They had been forced to embark the cod on neutral or North American ships, so as to avoid difficulties when Oporto was occupied by the French[67]. Even though the city was now in friendly hands the traders involved suffered severely, since they could not work through their usual agents and consignees who had fled.

IV. THE SECOND FRENCH INVASION AND NEW PERSECUTION OF BRITISH SUBJECTS AND THE SEIZURE OF THEIR PROPERTIES

From a political viewpoint the Portuguese situation seemed to have been definitively consolidated in favour of British interests. The Council of Regency was re-established on 20 September 1808 in accordance with Prince Regent D. João's proclamation of 26 November 1807[1] and the will of the British government. Three of the former members of the council were excluded, while the Bishop of Oporto, whose actions had lately been of crucial importance continued in office. As a consequence the Junta Provisional do Governo Supremo decided on 26 September 1808 to suspend its functions and to cede its functions to the Council[2].

In fulfilment of the Convention of Sintra, on 10 October, the French troops arrived at Oporto from Almeida escorted by two hundred English soldiers[3]. As the population did not permit them to embark without returning all the Portuguese properties in their possession, the British Brigadier Robert Wilson[4] protected their commander. As a result there was a riot among the populace and some French soldiers sought the protection of the British flag against the protesters.

British vessels were also damaged[5], because local troops were unable to control the riots. The city Senate (Senado da Camara) condemned the outrages and promised to indemnify losses caused by those events[6]. While Robert Wilson reacted to this with the greatest gratitude[7], even so the Oporto authorities considered it was of great importance. Proof of this is that the Governador das Armas do Partido do Porto, Tenente General Bernardim Freire d'Andrade e Castro appealed to the authorities under his command to avoid any future disagreeable occurrence between the population and the British troops, especially those which could occur as a result of the differences of languages. This was an attempt to discipline the population as well as the troops since the immediate future appeared very clouded.

This was confirmed on 11 December 1808 when the Governors of the Kingdom ordered the mobilization of all the able-bodied population of between fifteen and sixty years of age to face the enemy once more[8]. Three days later, the Bishop of Oporto acting both as Bishop and also as a member of the Council of Regency and Governor of the Kingdom warned that the common enemy was preparing a new invasion. He exhorted the faithful to defend the country with the greatest efficacy and energy both temporal and spiritual[9].

On the first of January 1809, Lucas de Seabra da Silva, Intendente Geral da Policia da Corte e Reino, ordered the rigorous compliance with the alvará of 25 June 1760, which stipulated that all the strangers and foreigners were subjected to rigorous vigilance[10].

It became evident that this unstable atmosphere did not encourage the British merchants, who still remained in England, to return to Oporto. In London, on 20 December 1808, some of them continued trying to obtain some compensation for their losses at the time of the evacuation in 1807 and stated that they would return to Lisbon but not to Oporto[11]. On the contrary, on 3 January 1809, the Bishop of Oporto told the consul at Lisbon, Villiers, that it was rumoured that the English were taking measures to leave Oporto[12].

On 27 of the same month, the ship Flora arrived at Exeter and its captain informed the authorities that despite many attempts to do so he had not been able to get into Oporto. He added that, on 20 January, he had been warned by an English frigate that "Oporto must at that time be in the hands of the Enemy..."[13]. Another ship had to return to Eymouth on 30 January from off Oporto, having been warned not to enter the port[14].

In England the authorities continued to be pressed by the merchants who demanded indemnities for the losses caused at the time of the evacuation in 1807, the subsequent confiscations carried out by the French. In Leeds, for example, the merchants of the town and

neighbourhood, on 10 January 1809, insisted that the government resolve the problem of the Portuguese indemnifications[15]. To avoid a crisis in early February, George Cranfield Berkeley[16], directed by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, considered that "in the present critical situation of Portugal" it would be advisable to facilitate the removal of British and Portuguese subjects together with their properties to England, Brazil, Madeira or to the Western islands[17].

Finally, at Oporto, the British deputy commissioner, W.H. Pethon (?) proceeded to charter some vessels to carry foods and other goods belonging to His Britannic Majesty to Lisbon. On 9 February he chartered the Hiate Nossa Senhora do Amparo e Almas, captain Bernardino José Matias from Vila do Conde[18]. On 16 of the same month, he chartered the Hiate Nossa Senhora das Neves, captain João Antonio Moreira from Setúbal[19] and finally two days later, he chartered the Hiate Aleluia, captain João da Nova, from Vila do Conde[20]. The charter stipulated that 3,200 reis would be paid daily and 6,400 reis paid ten days after ships arrived in Lisbon[21]. The wine and other products which were not contraband would be delivered to the British General Deputy Commissioner in Lisbon[22]. This measure suggests the route from Oporto to England was unsafe as a result of the military situation in the northern Spain[23]. It would be safer to use neutral Danish vessels to bring goods from Lisbon...to England, according to the instructions of Berkeley[24].

The French armies attempted to invade Portugal by the valley of the Minho river, where they would not face resistance from the Spanish on the right bank. On 17 February news reached Oporto that in the afternoon three days earlier, twenty-one boats were observed coming down from Monção, four of them being sunk near Vila Nova de Cerveira by the defence forces[25]. As a consequence this invasion attempt was frustrated, and the entry of the French troops in Oporto delayed, although "they took some prisoners and destroyed some boats..."[26].

On the following day, Villiers wrote to Canning informing him that

everything was ready for the evacuation to England and he complained that lack of instructions made it difficult for him to decide whether to embark or to remain[27]. One month later he was still there and showed no sign that he wished to return to England[28].

William Carr Beresford, created "Marechal Commandante em Chefe do Exercito Portuguez", on 15 March[29] ordered all the officers to enforce the strictest discipline as an example to the public. At Oporto, Brigadier Caetano José Vaz Parreira , on 17 and 20 of the same month, took measures[30] to discipline both the military and the inhabitants in case of enemy attack. Nevertheless this was inadequate as the French army entered the city without great resistance on 29 March[31].

It was assumed that the French were concerned to seize the second most important city and port of the country, seat of the Port wine trade and the region where a numerous and prosperous British community had been living since at least 1727[32]. So it was not surprising that some British and Portuguese merchants fled to Lisbon to take vessels bound for England. Charles Webber[33] and Antonio de Sousa Lobo's son[34] were among them.

The Bishop of Oporto went to the peak of the Serra do Pilar, contemplated the invasion and fled to Lisbon, taking an "hiate" from Figueira[35]. Many other merchants tried to proceed in the same manner, but without success. Such was the case of José Fernandes da Silva, who ordered, on 19th March, that his vessel Três Reis Magos was put in order by its captain, Thomas da Silva Pereira, to carry his family and several others to Lisbon before the French arrived[36].

Due to the bad weather that vessel, as well as other Portuguese and thirty British ones[37], was unable to clear the port, so that when the French troops arrived, they immediately seized the vessels which had been abandoned on the Douro bar. Money, silver, clothing and other goods of considerable value were plundered or destroyed[38] by the

troops and even by the populace. John Barkley, captain of the vessel Progresso and its seamen Ferguson and Diogo Bridge complained to the authorities of the losses of many pipes of wine and cork which had been loaded since 25 , destined for London[39].

At the same time, Francisco Caetano Pinto, captain of the Bergantim Golfinho complained that the French troops had caused enormous robberies and damage in that vessel, loaded with wine for London since 20 [40]. The firm "Machados & Companhia" as consignee of the vessel Elizabeth , captain Johnson Henderson, declared that it had lost one hundred and fifty pipes of wine, twenty bags of nuts and ninety and three quintals of cork to be carried to Leyt port under the responsibility of the Edinburgh firm of "Bodan & Sherwing".

In fact the French authorities published notices saying that on the afternoon of 6 April wines taken would be returned to their lawful owners, or sold if those were not present. But no Portuguese or British buyers appeared[41].

The British firms, Warre, Webb, Bull and Copke should have been the most affected by the French troops and populace, since they had despatched many pipes of wine some days before, as follows: the first, on 23 - 80; the second on 18 - 146 and five days later - 91; the third, between 20 and 23 - 50 and the last on 27 - 50[42].

During the whole month of March, the most important Portuguese firms had despatched the following pipes: Thomás da Rocha - 485; João Henrique - 630; João Ribeiro Vianna - 500 and the Companhia das Vinhos do Alto Douro - 1405[43]. Nevertheless there is no evidence of any confiscation executed by the French against these or other Portuguese firms. The French attempted to prejudice British intents, and to favour the local population.

Proof of that is that at the moment of the withdrawal, Maréchal Soult, Duc de Dalmatic wanted to give the impression that seizures

were directed only against British traders

On 12 May he ordered that the three thousand and seven hundred pipes of wine taken from the English be divided between the cities of Porto, Braga, Barcelos, Vila do Conde, Povoa, Viana, Vila da Feira, Valongo & Ovar[44].

By that time, however, the French had been expelled from Oporto and so there was no time to put his command into operation.

Moreover the British vessels were the object of the anti-British feeling. The Duc de Dalmatie ordered that the English vessels be delivered "aos particulares do Porto, q. por effeito da guerra ou destruição do povo perderam barcos ou bateis..."[45] and the goods seized by the previous government as contraband were delivered "hum terço aos pobres da cid.e do Porto, outro aos da cid.e de Braga, outro terço aos Marinh. ros do Porto & S. João da Foz, que tiverem perdido mais barcos, ou bateis por effeito das circunstancias"[46].

The French actions were therefore taken against lands, rights, shares and properties owned by the British in Oporto.

The "Procurador da Cidade" was ordered to draw up an exact inventory of everything which belonged to British subjects, requesting the aid of natives and other foreign merchants in the city[47]. Therefore such measure would be difficult to carry into effect, since some lawsuits had been in course since 1807 and since then many transactions had taken place between Portuguese and British firms[48].

Despite this, the "Procurador da Cidade", João Pedro Gomes de Abreu, ordered that some investigations be made in the different parishes under various lieutenants: Joze Ignacio da Cunha in Miragaya; Henrique Vanzeller in Cedofeita; Antonio Ferreira de Moura in Victoria; a sergeant called Jozé in S. Nicollào and Louis Antonio de Souza Reis in S. Ildefonço[49]. This last alleged that he was suffering from health problems and argued that he did not know the value of British coins

nor understood the operations in regard to exchange[50].

At the parish of N^{o}. Snr^{a} da Victoria on 23 April it was stated that John Mesquell(?) owned at S. Miguel Road "huma morada de cazas, as quaes se Epothecarão a D. Ana Margarida Angelica de Cardia, a quem o dito devia soma grande, quando se retirou desta cidade para Inglaterra". John Noble had resided there but "levou consigo a mobilia p^{a} Inglaterra e agora está habitando tropa Franceza nella"[51].

At the parish de Miragaya six British subjects were still residing, but only Diogo Brether and Ricardo Guer(?) owned houses, which had been abandoned and were occupied by the French troops. Other British subjects were two accountants, one servant of Francisco Vanzeller and another who was a small tradesman, all of them without landed property[52].

At the other parishes there was no evidence of goods belonging to British subjects.

Very near the city, at the "Couto de S. João da Foz do Douro"[53], William Warre, John Telles(?) and William Nassan had resided there, according to "Juizo Ordinario", Francisco Joze de O. Silv^{a} Guimarães.

William Warre, the last British consul at Oporto, owned one large house, a garden and a great deal of furniture at the Rua das Musas[54]. John Telles(?) owned a property of magnificent houses and gardens, with small houses for the servants at Rua da Pedreira[55].

William Nassan owned a substantial house with a large garden and a servant's house and a great deal of furniture at the Rua do Monte[56]. At the Rua de Cima[57] there was one property which belonged to a British subject as well as several properties scattered[58] throughout the same locality, which also belonged to various British owners. During the six weeks in which the French troops occupied the Oporto city, they faced many difficulties.

It was difficult for them to create a representative body of

authorities at the Camara[59] and they were never able to eliminate the operations of the Portuguese forces[60], besides which they feared the resistance of a population very considerably affected by the state of terror and panic brought on by the invasion[61].

Soult ordered that the existing newspaper, the Leal Portuguez, be closed down and at the same time stimulated the foundation of a new one which was published under the title Diario do Porto [62] whose purpose would be to act as a propaganda sheet for the French. This was not successful. Agricultural activity ceased while commerce stagnated.

From 29 March to 12 May only three vessels entered into Oporto and two left[63].

The markets were reopened by the French authorities on 3 April[64] but the scarcity of products provoked a famine since the people had no money with which to face the price rise[65], despite the measures taken to counteract it on 15 April[66]. These facts facilitated the expulsion of the French which occurred on 12 May as a result of Anglo-Portuguese action[67].

V. GROWTH OF BRITISH INFLUENCE IN PORTUGAL AFTER THE EXPULSION OF FRENCH TROOPS FROM OPORTO

The seizure of Oporto by the French on 29 March, 1809, precipitated an enormous wave of pessimism in England. Lisbon was thrown into alarm and the Regency implored the aid and protection of the British nation[1].

The response was immediate. On 7 April 134 ships were ordered to make ready for the Tagus: 95 at Portsmouth, 29 at Flamouth, 6 in Guernsey and 4 at Cork[2]. At the same time, some politicians in London became very concerned with events in Portugal - especially after the British army had failed in the north of Spain in late 1808 and early 1809.

On 1 May the Earl of Buckinghamshire analysed the situation in a speech made in the House of Lords. He condemned the behaviour of the Regency in Portugal, and criticised the fact that the army had been very badly and tardily paid. In his opinion these were the principal causes of the insubordination which had overtaken it. He concluded by saying that some measures must be taken to change the situation[3].

On 27 April Sir John Cradock gave over the command of the British troops to Sir Arthur Wellesley. Wellesley attacked Soult and drove him from Oporto on 12 May. The French entered Galicia on the 18 pursued by British and Portuguese troops, after having lost all their cannon, treasury cash, many arms and much baggage[4]. As a result Soult left for Samora, leaving Ney in Galicia and ordering him to hold the province[5].

Despite his considerable success, Wellesley faced unexpected financial difficulties in Oporto. The move from Lisbon had absorbed large sums of money, moreover he had faced difficulties in exchanging Spanish coins in his possession. This meant that he was faced with asking for a loan from the Senate of the city, Companhia das Vinhas do Alto Douro and all existing corporations, the size of the loan

being determined by the largest amount which they could afford[6]. Nevertheless, on 31st May Wellesley complained to Castlereagh that there were deficiencies in the supply of ammunition, and also that the sum borrowed from the merchants of Oporto "was very small indeed". This was a consequence of the merchants of Portugal sending their capital to England, so that there was very little money available. He added that "all the sum borrowed at Oporto was not levied, amounted to about £10,000"[7]. As a result he requested that £300,000 be furnished as quickly as possible and large quantities of shoes for the use of the British troops, as well as biscuits, hay and oats[8].

On 11th June Wellesley wrote to Castlereagh and he reiterated these financial requirements. He said that the army was in debt in Portugal, amounting to not less than £200,000 and that he was expecting about £100,000 from Cadiz in dollars, in exchange for Spanish gold[9].

One week later, Beresford pressed Wellesley to obtain £200,000 every month in order to avoid problems with the troops[10] "in which sum an estimate of a sum of £40,000 a month was included for the Portuguese troops"[11].

The demands were crowned with success on the last day of June since "about 300,000 dollars of £65,000 sterling & the(?) £60,000 sterling in Spanish doubloons(?), £50,000 in Portuguese gold coin & £50,000 in dollars, making a total of £225,000 sterling arrived from England"[12].

On 18th May the governor of the city, Nicolau Trant, issued an order to obtain the return of the goods which had been confiscated at the time of the French rule, i.e. money, silver, properties, ammunitions, etc. But the properties seized by the British troops[13] on the previous 12th May gave the British authorities in Portugal some reason for doubt. On 23rd of the same month, Wellesley informed Villiers that he had found "several English, some Danish, Swedish and French vessels, and a considerable quantity of property some of which had been loaded in these ships, and another part principally cotton which the French had

bought in different parts of the country, and had collected here in charge of the French consul". Moreover he added that among other things three hundred tons of wine had also been detained which he believed to belong to the English merchants. Then he requested Villiers to give his opinion not only under civil law but also in reference to the manner in which the Portuguese Government would deal with the matter.

Wellesley defended that "Oporto being a Portuguese port & the British army acting in this country as allies or even as a subsidiary army, everything taken in Oporto belongs to the government of Portugal"[14].

One week later, Wellington explained the question to Berkeley in a different way. He said that his doubt was whether "we ought to consider the property as prize or the captors entitled to salvage for that which belonged to British merchants". He added that the British intervention could be considered only in the light of an auxiliary force to that of the Portuguese. In the case of enemy property his opinion was that everything belonged to His Majesty "who gives it either by act of Parl.t or by His Proclamation in certain shares to His Navy & His Army"[15].

On 1st June Wellesley wrote to Villiers saying that he had decided that the 60 French cannon should be sent to Lisbon[16]. One week later, he wrote again to Berkeley in regard to the Danish ships which had been taken. He thought that these vessels must not be considered a lawful prize - since Oporto was not a port in the enemy's possession, and French forces had only been in momentary possession of it[17].

Meanwhile, Colonel Trant informed Wellesley that "the cotton & other valuable merchandizes found here amount to not less than £30,000 st." and that the Danish captains were disposing of their ships by selling them to Portuguese merchants". By this time the government had ordered that they were to be sent to Lisbon[18].

These financial and economic problems preoccupied the British

authorities who were anxious to encounter a military solution.

Wellesley was aware that the government in London was divided over the conduct of the Peninsular War, especially after John Moore's death at Coruna. Canning at the Foreign Office supported an offensive but Castlereagh, Secretary of War, was opposed to its continuation[19].

Though French troops had retreated from Oporto to Galicia in a very bad state, on 6 June they tried to take possession of Vigo. But they failed completely to reach this objective[20]. This was immediately transmitted to Trant[21].

Two weeks later, Wellesley established himself at Abrantes and informed D. Miguel Forjaz that the French must have arrived at Orense on the 14th. In the light of that it was decided that Beresford would go North[22] - since it was necessary to act against the enemy in Galicia. He was ordered to mount a strong offensive there to expel the enemy from that region[23].

Until the end of 1809, the operations of the British troops occurred mainly in Spanish territory. Their activity at Galicia and the Minho valley continued. At the same time Arthur Wellesley did not attribute to it any special importance there in his reports[24]. Nevertheless the success obtained at Oporto caused great satisfaction in that city. As a result of this, on 6th June the Senate of the "Camara da Cidade" made its expression of gratitude to Wellesley, offering to him a valuable sword [25].

In London the events in Oporto were very well received by the King, as well as Canning[26].

Canning exploited the favourable circumstances by influencing the Prince Regent in Brazil to change the composition of the Council of Regency in Lisbon[27].

On 6 July the Prince Regent ordered that the Regency be composed

of three governors, and Sir Arthur Wellesley was recognized as "Marechal General dos Meus Exércitos" - with the right of participating in some sessions[28].

Canning soon managed to take advantage of this fact. As the former government had levied war taxes to alleviate its financial difficulties, he tried to secure grants of exemption for British merchants in Portugal by using Villiers' services in Lisbon[29]. Such an initiative received no clear reply, but on 5 September Canning asked Villiers again to intervene in order to get some of the restrictions imposed on British subjects relaxed[30]. At the same time the Committee of the Privy Council for trade early in the same month complained that some of them continued to trade in cotton coming from Brazil, carried by Portuguese vessels, but were not then allowed to do the transhipment without the payment of duties[31].

In October Lord Bathurst, former President of the Board of Trade, was designated Secretary for Foreign Affairs. As he was well aware of the commercial position of England Vis-à-vis Portugal, on 22 November he asked Villiers to request the Portuguese government for the removal of the restrictions still existing on several British manufactures entering Portugal[32]. The results obtained were not very significant because the economic crisis was very grave. Proof of this is that on 21 April 1809 a Convention had been signed between George Canning and the representative of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal for a loan of six hundred thousand pounds sterling to the government in Brazil[33]. During the year other measures were taken, but the war and its impact meant that the revenue of the entire kingdom was reduced to about one third of its usual amount[34].

Nevertheless, in 1809, 207 vessles entered Oporto from England and 181 sailed from Oporto to England[35]. In the same period the products imported into Portugal from England were estimated at 4,531,952$809 reis and the exports to England at 7,324,270$330 reis[36]. In this last figure were included 43,455 pipes of Oporto wine.

37,828 pipes were exported by the wine company and other Portuguese firms, while the British exported only 5,628[37]. Bearley & Webb with 1316 pipes and H. Burmester with 1653 were very active, but after June Warre, Newman, Thomas Snow, Thompson Croft, Page, Stephenson Searle, the Harris Brothers, Abbot[38], Clamouse, Bull, Copque, Butler Tyndler, Pearce and John Searle[39] were active in this trade, although they only dealt with small amounts.

There is no evidence that some British firms had been consignees of products exported during 1809 from Oporto to Brazil, although in January one ship had sailed for there and twenty-nine had sailed from 31 May onwards until the end of December[40].

By the middle of December 1809 the British army gave up its position on the outskirts of Extremadura and Alentejo and moved to a position in Upper Beira, between the Mondego and the Tagus[41]. This decision, according to Arthur Wellesley[42], was taken as a consequence of the advance of the French after the battle of Ocaña - which had taken place in November. On 15 January, the British army had taken up its position with their right flank at Guarda, their left flank extending towards the Douro, and their advanced positions on the Coa. The headquarters were placed at Viseu[43].

During the second half of 1809, Arthur Wellesley considered that the strong protection for the Northern Provinces would be of essential value. Early in 1810, he entrusted these areas to the Northern Militia. Its numbers were estimated at 15,000 and it was the best in Portugal. "They were divided into three divisions: one under General Silveira, another under General Miller and a third under Colonel Trant, each division being aided by a body of Regular Cavalry & Artillery; & the whole under the command of General Bacelar"[44].

Oporto was the principal base of the operations of these forces. With this in view, John Mackenzye, Deputy of the General Commissary of the British Army, organized transport principally for Figueira, Peso

da Regua and Viseu. Some examples may be given. For Figueira, early in March he freighted the Hiate Flor da Murta , captain José Joaquim de Araujo to carry "milho e painço" (corn and millet) and on 16th of the same month the Hiate Santa Cruz , captain Manoel Fernandes dos Reis", to carry "palha de trigo, milho grosso e painço"[46]. For "Calhau da Régua" on 27 of the same month a boat was loaded with wheat which belonged to Manoel Pereira Dias Arrais. It was ordered to go to Francisco Jose Ferreira Lisboa "Comissario Condutor das Bagagens de Sua Majestade Britanica" at that locality.[47] For Viseu, on 21 April fifty oxen were transported by Manoel Homem to furnish the British troops however engaged in operations there[48].

That summer, the French troops which operated in the north of Spain extended their actions towards the north of Portugal. It was therefore decided that the military corps under the command of General Bacellar should cross the Douro and engage in various operations against the enemy's communication lines - having as a principal objective the defence of the Northern Provinces[49]. The provision of wheat, corn, barley and meat to the troops[50] and the furnishing of the "militias" with arms had continued at a high rate. Even in London, Sousa Coutinho requested the firm of Lopes & Collins "to procure the arms for the volunteers corps"[51].

Even so by the middle of September, the British authorities, once more, made provisions for a possible withdrawal of British merchants from Lisbon to England[52]. On 19 , Berkeley affirmed that there were sufficient British ships to remove them and their families, and sufficient Brazilian ships to carry 2500 Portuguese civilians and their luggage. The hypothesis of their evacuation as well as that of the British troops was also discussed[53]. Nevertheless the battle of Bussaco[54] ensured to the Anglo-Portuguese forces the victory which tranquillized the authorities a little.

From that time onwards, military activities increased significantly. With General Silveira constantly reporting on the operations in the

area under his command. He confessed that his principal concern was to block the routes towards Viseu. On 3 October French troops stood at Almeida[55] and by the middle of the month others had retreated from Asturias[56]. On 8 December a French patrol was attacked in the area of General Silveira by a Portuguese guerilla band under the command of Bernardo Antonio which caused many deaths and 53 prisoners were taken. They confessed that the French troops under the command of Massena remained in the Almeida and Cidade Rodrigo[57]. A week later an enemy division had occupied Portuguese territory from Almeida to Douro, between the rivers Agueda and Coa[58].

On 26 December there was news that the French army, in the south of Spain, was in difficulties with regards to food and equipment[59], but it was foreseen that they also invaded the Alentejo with troops from Andaluzia[60].

By the early part of 1810, the economic situation in the kingdom went from bad to worse.

The treaty of commerce and friendship was drawn up between the two nations on 19 February 1810 at Rio de Janeiro; Viscount Strangford on the part of His Majesty and the Conde de Linhares on the part of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent were the main negotiators[61].

The treaty was conceived according to "a liberal system of commerce, founded upon the basis of reciprocity and mutual convenience"[62]. The restrictive policy would be replaced by the liberalization of the economy which seemed to be in the Prince Regent's eyes the best solution to the greatest problem of the kingdom[63].

Economic structures remained as before and the results expected were not achieved. As a consequence of this, on 2 August, a "Contribuição Extraordinaria de Defeza" which had been decreed by "alvara" of 7 June 1809 was renewed[64] and the twelve measures taken seriously affected the life of all the citizens. This caused grave problems which extended to the Council of Regency, which was also

faced at this time with the effects derived from the dismissal of Marques das Minas . According to the instructions from the Prince Regent, in August, the Council would be composed of the Patriarch elect Marques Monteiro Mor, Conde Redondo, Principal Souza (replacing Marques das Minas), Ricardo Raimundo Nogueira, Lord Wellington (as previously) and as member of the government for military and financial matters, the British Minister Mr. Charles Stuart[65].

On 15th September Wellesley was informed that the Regency in its meetings discussed matters of military nature. Principal Sousa began to defend the removal of Berseford from the command of the Army and the persecution of the supporters of the French. Moreover Mouzinho, Lemos and even Sodery were involved in intrigues and were arrested, despite the fact that the first two were the general adjutant and military secretary of Beresford and the third the private secretary and translator of Wellington[66]. The Regency decided to advise Wellington to place his army on the frontiers of Portugal rather than withdraw them to a defensive position around Lisbon[67].

As a result of this, on 3 October Wellington directed Stuart to consider three principal points. Firstly, he protested "in the most decisive manner against the interference of the regency in any point whatever, respecting the details of military operations; and especially respecting the precautions deemed by Lord Wellington necessary for enabling the advance of the British troops". Secondly he required Stuart to make every possible endeavour to induce Principal Sousa to go to England or at least to leave Lisbon, since his temper menaced British affairs in the Peninsula. He also asked him to repeal the measures of severity taken against individuals which he considered odious and dangerous. At the same time in documents he confessed the wish to establish contacts with Brazil - in order to change the composition of the Regency, to regulate its powers and rules to prevent any undue interference in military operations, or on other points essential to the defence of the Peninsula[68].

The political crisis began. The difficulties of a beleaguered people were apparent in every aspect of the kingdom's life. At the meeting on 6 October the council, which had become alarmed, decided to ask Wellington to give his opinion about the possible retreat of the Regency to the neighbourhood of Oeyras, as well as the departure of the Portuguese army either for the northern provinces or for the Islands[69]. On the same date, Conde Redondo asked Stuart to obtain flour, wheat and barley from England, since there was lack of these products not only in Estremadura but also in the centre of the kingdom[70].

Two weeks later, Stuart wrote to Lord Wellington saying that "I still however am of the opinion that after the removal of the Principal and the Bishop we shall be a more efficient body to every good purpose, and our government may be rendered more beneficial to the country, if the Prince will allow as greater latitude in financial measures, & rely a little more on the judgement of His Ministers in Portugal for the management of the revenue"[71].

By the end of 1810 the crisis had become more acute. The solution to the disagreement between the Regency and Wellington seemed to be impossible. French troops remained in the lines of Torres Vedras and constantly obstructed the transportation of products to Lisbon mainly carried by boats which were destroyed when they came down the Tagus from Santarem[72]. The payment of soldiers in operations was effected with great delay and Conde Redondo appealed to Charles Stuart to ascertain the best solution through the British authorities in London[73].

Despite all the commercial relations between Portugal and England during the year 1810 suffered a considerable increase. The value of imports from England was estimated in 9,564,761$528 reis and that of exports 10,219,063$660 reis[74].

The movement of vessels which sailed from England to Oporto decreased from 207 in 1809 to 160 in 1810 while the number from Oporto to England increased from 181 in 1809 to 209 in 1810[75]. From these figures it

might be thought that the exports of wine had also increased. But in fact the opposite had occurred. Exports decreased from 43,455 pipes in 1809 to 41,358 in 1810[76].

The British firms exported 3,574 pipes while the Wine Company and other Portuguese exported 37,784[77].

Among the British who were active were: Anthony Pearce Tremlet - 570 pipes; Bernard Clamouse Brown & Co. - 1373½; Burmester & Co. - 222½; Butler, Tyndale & Co. - 46; Danile Bull & Sylvines - 961; Nicholas Copke & Co. - 1777; Noble, Perkines & Co. - 541; Schindler & Rhan - 37; Thomas Snow & Co. - 33 and Webb Campbell, Gray & Camo - 1189½[78]. There is also evidence that the firm Hunt Newman was active during this year, and it may be concluded that the British firms exported rather more than the British sources infer.

The distribution of the wine exported was as follows: to Great Britain - 40,763 pipes; Petersburg and Gotemburg - 419½; Archangel - 114; Malta - 50 and supply vessels of war - 12¼[79].

Despite all the endeavours of the British firms their efforts to increase their trade were continuously obstructed by the privileges of the Wine Company which had the exclusive sale of wines to Brazil[80].

In early 1811 the French reinforced their army. Masséna had come into Portugal with 72,000 men but he had lost 10,000 at the battle of Bussaco, near Coimbra, at the end of September, and by January it is possible that he had lost 10,000 more dead and prisoners. Drouet in December and Foix in January added about 12,000 men - making 64,000 - and Claparede at Guarda added between 8,000 and 10,000 more. This meant that about 50,000 men remained on the Tagus[81].

On 20 January the British army consisted of 41,040 men, of which only 30,765 were in any condition to be able to fight. Two battalions were at Lisbon and two more at Torres Vedras. The Portuguese army joined with the British for service in the field and at the same time amounted to about 23,000 effective men and still more with the garrisons of

Abrantes and Elvas, one regiment of infantry at Cadiz and another with General Silveira in the northern provinces[82].

At the start of the year, Wellington ordered the movement of a large force from Andaluzia to Estremadura to divide Masséna's forces which were endeavouring to take possession of Lisbon. In the first three or four months of the year, the principal fighting took place between the Tagus and the Atlantic, near Torres Vedras. The difficulties of supplying ammunition, food, equipment and other various things, as well as the efficiency of the plan of the defence of Lisbon and the arrival of reinforcements for the British troops in the first days of March, compelled Masséna to retire from his position on the night of the 5 March[83]. The French forces were pursued on the left of the Tagus via Abrantes, the Zêzere river, the Rio Maior and along all the different routes which had been taken by the enemy.

During 1811, the principal military operations occurred most commonly at Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz which were considered of great strategic importance[84]. On 7 May the British military authorities considered that Badajoz and Elvas were the most important points to guarantee the defence of Portugal[85].

On 10 April in a proclamation directed to the Portuguese nation Wellington stated "that the cruel enemy who had invaded Portugal and had devastated their country have been obliged to evacuate it after suffering great losses and have returned across the Águeda. The inhabitants of the country are therefore at liberty to return to their occupations"...[86].

This did not mean that the war on Portuguese territory was over, but it was important to Wellington who exploited the success to revive the quarrel with Principal Sousa on the conduct of the war. He pressed the political authorities not only for the removal of Principal Sousa from the government but also for a radical change of the system of government. He demanded greater support from Brazil. He was concerned to make sure that enemy would be faced with superiority in men and arms

in the case of further invasion[87].

Meanwhile the supply of the British troops in operations in the northern provinces had as its principal support the warehouses on the quay of Monchique at Oporto. For example, in June, various "arrais" residing at "Barqueiros" were mobilized to transport biscuits, barley and other foodstuffs to the quay of "Arroeda" or of "Carvalhas" about nineteen miles from Oporto[88]. The same happened at Coimbra and Celorico da Beira as in the case of Jose Caetano Correia - who under orders from John Mackenzye had to conduct a brigade of fifty carts full of corn and biscuits[89].

The rate of supply in this zone was stepped up in the summer in order to support the attack upon Ciudad Rodrigo which was planned to begin early in September[90]. On 22 August, eighty boxes containing two hundred thousand "duros" in silver were directed to the general paymaster[91].

On 14 of the same month, one hundred and eighty-four bags of oats were carried by cart to Lamego[92].

At this time Wellington received a letter from Conde de Aguiar in Rio de Janeiro dated 18 May which said that the Prince Regent of Portugal had been pleased to confer upon him the title of Conde de Vimeiro and the "Grand Cross of the Order of the Tower & Sword, and a pension of 20,000 cruzados per annum"[93]. On 3 September however, Wellington decided "to decline the acceptance of the pension offered to him, during the continuance of the existing war for the independence of the country"[94].

Wellington was aware that the economic crisis was a profound one, since the districts occupied by the enemy were entirely ruined. He had requested the most prompt and effectual assistance from the British government to guarantee the means of subsistence in the province of Estremadura and in a large part of Beiras[95].

On 8 April the Prince Regent, then governing England in the name of his father, George III, urged both Houses of Parliament to support the campaigns in Portugal. As a result one hundred thousand pounds were placed at the disposal of Sir Charles Stuart.

A committee composed of Ricardo Raimundo Nogueira, one of the governors of the kingdom, who had supported Wellington, John Bell and Henrique Teixeira Sampaio had its first meeting on 26 August 1811. A plan of salvation was created and it was decided that the judge Sr. João Gaudencio Torres and John Croft, a British merchant at Oporto, should visit the invaded districts to determine the extent of the desolation and the number of farmers to be contemplated with animals, seeds, medicines, clothing, carts and timber, peruvian bark, beds, shirts, blankets and sheets be given to the sick[96].

The plan envisaged that 800 bullock carts would be necessary and took into consideration the necessities of the army.

Wellington, therefore, ordered that two hundred carts be constructed at Almeida, the zone of the country which was still affected by the war. At the same time it was recommended to construct a number dependent upon the quantities of materials existing at Oporto and Viana[97].

In October, Oporto remained a prime military concern of Wellington and on 16 he considered it desirable that there be "twelve coppered transports drawing from 9 to 10 feet of water, which could pass the bars of the rivers Mondego and Douro"[98].

As a consequence of the war, during 1811 the economic situation deteriorated. The transactions effected between Portugal and England became highly disadvantageous to the Portuguese trade. Imports from Portugal to England were estimated at 4,323,864,845 reis - less than half those registered in 1810 while the British exports to Portugal were estimated at 21,559,960,503 reis - more than double the size of 1810[99].

The reduction of exports to England must have been due mainly to the enormous reduction in the imports from Brazil which in 1811 were only one tenth of those of 1810[100]. Such figures seem to indicate as well that British merchants did not buy the Brazilian exports carried to the Portuguese ports of Oporto or Lisbon as before the opening of the Brazilian ports to the British trade.

The high amount of British exports, on the one hand must have been a consequence of the treaty of 1810, and on the other hand the effect of the reconstruction of the kingdom. This matter will be analysed several times in the course of this thesis.

No British firm was registered in 1811 as consignee of the goods exported from Oporto to Brazil which were carried in thirty-seven vessels during the course of that year[101].

The movement of trade to Oporto was obviously affected by the war in the country. In 1810, 209 vessels had sailed to England while in 1811 only 172 did so. 160 vessels entered from England in 1810 and 258 in 1811[102].

The decrease in Oporto's wine exports, however, was more significant. In 1810, 41,358 pipes had been exported, but in 1811 only 18,536. The Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro and other Portuguese firms exported 14,624 pipes while the British ones only exported 3,912 - a few hundred more than in 1810[103].

The firms H. Burmester with 615 pipes, Bearley & Webb with 1054, Harris Brothers with 257, Lambert Kingston with 543 and Offley & Co. with 162 had the highest levels of exports in 1811[104]. In this year the last three reopened their activity in Oporto, but beyond those British firms and those of Butler, Nicolau Copque, Clamouse, Schindler, Daniel Bull and Anthony Pearce[105] there is no evidence of the activity of others at the same period.

In 1807, before the war extended into Portugal, the principal British firms at Oporto must have numbered about twenty[106]. At the

end of 1811 they were only half of that number and the scale of their activities was very much reduced.

There is evidence that the British merchants by that time used the name of Portuguese firms to attend to their habitual customers in England[107]. Despite this it is evident that they were affected by the circumstances of war.

On the contrary, the British hegemony in Portugal grew significantly between 1809 and 1811. Its influence in the conduct of the war was notorious. At the same time Wellington and Charles Stuart were placed in power in such a way that they could intervene on financial matters beyond those of a military nature.

In commercial terms it may be affirmed that the British trade knew its apogee in Portugal by 1811[108].

VI. EFFECTS OF THE BRITISH ORDERS IN COUNCIL ON THE COMMERCE BETWEEN OPORTO AND BRAZILIAN AND FOREIGN PORTS

The British had blockaded the Continent from the Elbe to Brest[1] on 16 May 1806. This action affected the commercial life of the ports of the area. The French had by the Berlin Decree[2] issued on the following 21 November declared the British Islands in a state of blockade and prohibited all commerce with England. By an Order in Council published on 7 January 1807 the British prohibited the "trade to be carried on between Port and Port of Countries under the Dominion or usurped control of France and their Allies"[3].

Commercial war between England and France had been declared. Portugal was a neutral nation and as such its commerce would be subjected to the effects of the belligerents' actions.

On 27 February Sousa Coutinho, Minister in London, was informed by Lord Howick that no vessel could trade from any port to the port of Hamburgh, because this had been occupied by the enemy[4]. On 6 March, he sought out Lord Howick to plead that the Portuguese vessels be not affected by the order in council of 7 January, which dealt with the Hanseatic cities[5] and one week later he renewed his endeavours to the same purpose[6]. Despite his pleas the vessel N.a S.a da Conceição e Almas had been detained off Hamburg on 2 April 1807 and Sousa Coutinho requested the Under Secretary of State, Hammond, to release it. Three weeks later he received the reply that he would have to petition the Lords of Admiralty for the return of the ships[7].

At that time the British orders in council affected the commerce between Portugal and Northern Europe to such an extent that on 1 August 1807, Sousa Continho asked Canning to permit that a Danish vessel with a cargo consigned for the Prince Regent be not detained by the British[8].

Nevertheless at the end of August the menace of French invasion

had appeared. The British authorities in London took measures to transport British subjects and their properties from Lisbon and Oporto by neutral ships[9]. This occurred during the month of October[10]. But by the end of this month, while the British benefited from Portuguese cooperation to save their properties as much as possible, Portuguese vessels were detained by the French. On the 1st October, a ship from Oporto to Hamburgh was seized on her arrival in the Elbe, for having touched in England[11]. Twelve days later the Bom Jesus de Fam was detained by British cruisers[12].

It was only on 22 October that the Prince Regent formally abandoned Portuguese neutrality and ahdered to the "Causa do Continente" (French cause). He ordered that the ports were to be closed to the British men of war and to its mercantile marine[13].

The evacuation of British subjects and their properties occurred in October without causing further problems, but on 10 November the Portuguese Brig Graça e Liberdade, loaded with wine for England, consigned by William Nassan, was detained at Oporto[14]. Six days later, the ship Flor do Mar sailed from the Baltic to Oporto and was detained by the British Navy and taken to Yarmouth, where it was "very soon released as there did not appear the smallest ground for detention"[15].

These cases demonstrated clearly how Portugal and Great Britain were becoming more and more deeply embroiled.

In order to alleviate the difficulties, the British authorities published the celebrated orders in council between 11 November and 18 December which had as a principal aim the establishment of a blockade of the French dominions as well as the countries under their control[16]. The vessels which belonged to neutral nations were ordered to touch in ports of the United Kingdom and pay duties there. This measure provoked a price rise and affected the population of the continent.

In retaliation the French published the Milan Decree of

7 December 1807 to force neutral nations not to evade the payment of taxes in British ports.

Portugal had closed its ports to British ships, and had thus become an adversary of the British. Portuguese ships lost neutral status for almost one month and were subjected to the actions of His Majesty's ships of war as well as privateers. At least six of them were detained by the British during the month of November[17].

On 29th November the Portuguese Royal Family fled to Brazil under British pressure and protection[18]. At the same time French troops entered Portugal and transformed the status of her mercantile marine. On the one hand, the Prince Regent, the symbol of Portuguese sovereignty, was an ally of the British and on the other hand Portuguese territory fell under French control. In the confusion which followed, British cruisers seized the Pombinha and Fama in sight of the ship of the line carrying the Prince Regent[19].

In the following month, the British detained at least 14 more Portuguese ships[20]. Three of them sailed to Oporto: Nos sa Senhora da Conceição[21] from Great Britain; Fama[22] from Rio de Janeiro and Ventura Feliz[23] from Recife. Moreover the following ships were also detained[24]: the Maria and Haabet from Oporto to Tonningen; Conferentz Bath Hansen from Copenhagen, the Dolphin and Ferdinandus from Pernambuco and Fortuna from Tonningen, all to Oporto.

It was evident that the growing number of ships detained in Great Britain would soon threaten the commerce of an ally. So, it was not surprising that acting under pressure from the Ambassador in London, the British had published an Order in Council on 6 January 1808 to assure an acceptable agreement[25].

Owners of Portuguese properties detained were divided according to political criteria. In the first place British authorities considered the properties belonging to Portuguese subjects who were not resident in countries under French control. Secondly the properties which

belonged to Portuguese subjects residing in Portugal or in other dominions under French control and thirdly, properties which belonged jointly to Portuguese subjects residing or not under French control[26]. To resolve the problems arising from claims and in fulfilment of the order in council goods were held under the joint custody of agents acting on behalf of His Majesty's government and on behalf of the Portuguese minister in London. These agents included the Portuguese, João Carlos Lucerna and Cateano Dias Santos and the British, William Burn and Anthony Gibbs[27].

As a consequence of this it would be natural to expect that the properties which belonged to Portuguese subjects residing in Brazil or in Great Britain would have been immediately released. They were not. Canning wrote on 13 January 1808 to Sousa Continho alleging that: "It is impossible that the Portuguese property should be released without some undertaking by you on the part of your government, that compensation shall be made for British property confiscated in Portugal"[28]. Moreover the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty began to create many problems regarding the description of the property[29], while Canning was aware that the situation with the mercantile ships detained was becoming disastrous and several goods might be lost. He then made repeated demands to the British authorities that they be returned to their consignees[30].

On 4 February Mr Burmester, a member of the committee, tried to negotiate the release of the Portuguese properties, the majority of which belonged to firms from Oporto. These goods were contained in the following ships[31]: Maria[32]; Haabet[33]; Eunice[34]; Aurora[35]; Conferentz Bath Hansen[36]; Nondina[37]; Dolphin[38]; Ferdinandus[39] and Fortuna[40]. Even though some of these ships came from Brazil there is no evidence that he had any success.

On 23 February, Sir William Scott, judge of the High Court of Admiralty, informed George Hammond that "Sundry Packets found on board various Portuguese ships" were sent for adjudication[41].

Sousa Continho recognized that the question had become a political one and on 9 March 1808, in a long memorandum addressed to the Earl of Bathurst, President of the Board of Trade, he alleged that some of the ships detained had come from Brazil and "in the conference that preceded the order of the 6th" it had been decided that they would be released, but until that moment no ship had been delivered to its captain[42]. Taking a political stance, he argued that "According to every principle of the Law of Nations, no country can be considered as belonging to the Enemy, only because it is occupied by him during the war, and until it is ceded by the legitimate sovereign"[43]. He then proceeded with his protest invoking the circumstances in which the Portuguese ports were shut to the British, the evolution of events during October and November 1807 and the negotiations which culminated in the withdrawal of the Portuguese Royal Family to Brazil. Sousa Continho referring to the Convention signed in London on 22 October 1807 reminded his readers that it was stipulated that: "S.M.B. en son Nom, et en celui de ses successeurs promet de ne jamais reconnaître pour roi de Portugal aucun Prince qui ne soit l'héritier et le légitime représentant de la Maison de Bragance"[44].

The situation was equally difficult for the British authorities since on the 10 March the British merchants and manufactures who traded with Portugal pressed the government to obtain indemnities for losses caused by the French invasion[45]. For that reason, the definitive decisions were not taken and in the meantime the joint committee of the agents attempted to estimate the value of properties as in the case of Ásia Grande examined on 31 March[46].

On 19 April, Sucena who was acting as a member of committee of agents and as Consul General for Portugal, sent to Canning "a schedule of twenty-one of the Portuguese ships detained on their voyages from the Brazil to Portugal, and brought to the ports of Great Britain upon which decrees have been pronounced in the High Court of Admiralty: the remaining three not yet adjudged are supposed to be nearly equal in

value with the others". This document permits us to observe that the valuation of the 21 Brazil ships was as follows: 1. Property restored as belonging to subjects out of Portugal - £158,420; 2. Property decreed to commissioners as Portuguese and Mixed - £267,006; 3. Total value of cargoes - £425,426; 4. Ships - £71,500[47].

The four commissioners wrote to William Fawkener on 28th April to request a decision on the release of the properties and referred to the fact that several ships had arrived in the port of London with property to the value of upwards of £100,000. But at the same time they complained that they had no funds for the payment of "the freights and other heavy charges" and moreover they argued that they had "no means to look to but the sale of the goods, all sale is suspended until the interference of the Marshal is arranged"[48]. Naturally due to this intervention Canning transmitted a long explanation[49] respecting "the restitution of all Portuguese ships and property detained by H.M. cruisers" on 2nd May, which culminated with a new order in council two days later.

This order stipulated that the property belonging to Portuguese subjects, residing in dominions out of the control of the French, would be delivered to their owners.

The property belonging to Portuguese subjects residing in Portugal or in dominions under the French control would remain at the future disposal of the Prince Regent of Portugal. The property belonging jointly to Portuguese subjects residing in Portugal and to others residing in Brazil or in other Portuguese settlements or in the United Kingdom, would be delivered to their owners, but these had previously to become responsible for the remaining part under conditions to be stipulated by the Portuguese minister in London[50].

On 10 May, Sousa Continho requested Canning to permit the ships Minerva, captain Costa , Aurora, captain Gomes , Viamonte, captain Lopes" and Boa Nova, captain Pacheco which were in the ports of Sweden to proceed to Brazil[51]. About one month later, he wrote to

Canning that he had concluded that it was not possible to enact the order in council of 4 May. As a result he returned the mixed Portuguese property to the British authorities[52]. Meanwhile he dissolved the joint committee of the agents, nullifying in this way the powers of the Portuguese members, Sr. Sucena and Sr. Dias Santos[53] and he then wrote to Canning attributing responsibility for the situation to the British government[54].

Immediately Canning explained to him that the responsibility must be attributed to the judge of the Court of Admiralty and he protested against the unilateral dissolution of the commission "which was appointed jointly by the British Government and yourself, without any previous communication with His Majesty's Government"[55].

By this month of June the situation was becoming even more complex. On 17 the commissioners informed Sousa Continho that they were at his disposal so that they could proceed with their task[56] and two days later the ambassador ordered that the commissioners deliver the Conde de Peniche and its property to its owners[57]. But they failed to execute the order and instructed the captain of the ship as they thought fit. At the same time they informed him that they only recognized orders emanating from the Minister[58].

On 20 it seems that Sousa Continho invited all those who owned a proportion of the properties detained or who had interests in the same, to a meeting at his house[59]. There, he informed them of all of the exchange of correspondence and pointed out that he had no responsibility for the situation of the Portuguese properties detained in a state of deterioration, with expenses which in some cases may absorb their total value. The meeting culminated with the creation of a joint committee composed of merchants who were able to establish a scheme which served the interests of the owners of the properties. Henrique Burmester, John Coltsman, M.A. de Paiva, Collings and José Lyne were the members appointed[60].

The behaviour of the Portuguese Ambassador caused reactions which were symptomatic of the lack of clarity of the order of 4 May, in regard to the powers of the Minister and of the commissioners relative to the mixed property. As an example of this, on 6th July, J. Nicholl, V. Gibbs, H. Plummer and F. Lawrence complained to the British authorities that the Portuguese Minister "considers the property so adjudged to have now become wholly subject to his o ders and control in every respect"[61]. They accused him of having the intention of sending some of the ships away from Great Britain with parts of their cargoes on board to sell and dispose of them at the Western Islands, since he had instructed different merchants and some of the captains of the ship without knowledge of the commissioners. The claimants argued that the legal right of the Minister extended "no further than to direct the commissioners to sell any cargo or part of a cargo"[62] and so "that all property should so come into their possession before it is subject to the Disposal of the Prince Regent". As a consequence of this and to avoid problems with charges and expenses the claimants applied to the court of Admiralty and urged the judge to enforce his own Decree[63]. Three days later, the commissioners A. Gibbs, William Burn and C. Dias Santos requested Canning that the execution of the order of the 4 May with their participation "would have afforded the most perfect security to the property and prevented much of the expense and inconvenience which have arisen under the present circumstances"[64].

On 12 July they ordered the captain of the ships not to clear from the ports without permission[65] and one day later Sousa Coutinho nullified these orders at least with regard to the Pombinha. He then ordered Sr. Dias Santos to withdraw any authority from the commissioner[66].

On 27 July the Minister applied to Spencer Perceval to issue a next order[67] which would include a scheme to take into account the problem of the vessels[68]. At the same time he had to demand that the Court of Admiralty suspend every proceeding against the captains of the following ships: Ulisses, captain Joaquim Ferreira ; Fama,

captain Machado"; "Tejo, captain Figueiredo"; "Europa, captain Silva"; "Ventura Feliz, captain Araujo Viza"; "Pombinha, captain Jose Avelino" and "Scipião, captain J.A. Vasconcellos"[69].

The conflict between Sousa Coutinho and the commissioners became now more and more acute, since it was necessary to pay the charges and expenses for the ships under the responsibility of the commissioners, and this required the permission of the minister to sell part of the cargoes for that purpose. By the middle of the month of July this amount was already considerable[70]. Nevertheless Sousa Coutinho wrote to A. Gibbs and W. Burn on 22 July in these terms: "Having received your letters of the 21 and 22 inst. applying for orders for sale, I have to say to you that I have already declared to His Britannic Majesty's Ministers that I would see the whole of the Property given up to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent perish, rather than legalize any Act of yours after the suspension on the 6 June, or concur in future with you in any proceedings, except the regular and honorable Extinction of the agency you formerly belonged to"[71]. In consequence of this the Commissioners William Burn and C. Dias Santos sent a letter to the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury reminding them that according to the orders in council of the 6 January and 4 May, their duty was not confined solely to the custody but ought to be extended to the adoption of all measures calculated to promote the interest of the proprietors[72]. They complained that the procedures of Sousa Coutinho were causing a grave impact since the price of many articles had fallen considerably and the goods of a perishable nature had suffered to so great a degree as to make him apprehensive of a total loss. To avoid more damages they applied to be directed to His Majesty's advocate attorney and solicitor general Dr. Laurent[73]. At the same time the commissioners also publicly accused Sousa Coutinho in the newspapers such as Morning Chronicle

Perceval acquitted the Portuguese Minister, but wrote to him on 9 August that all must agree "in wishing to save as much as possible of the property from destruction". With regard to the conflict between

the Minister and the Commissioners he added that "the authority to be acted upon will then, in this instance, be that of the Treasury and not that of the Commissioners, and therefore I should hope, unobjectionable - Directions will, of course, be given in the warrant for securing the proceeds of the sale to the right owners"(74).

By mid-August cases of property in very bad condition began to appear, such as was the case of the Commerciante , according to the information of the hide broker, Robert Taylor(75), which was transmitted to William Huskisson on 27th on the same month to submit to the consideration of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, since despite the orders given to the Portuguese Ambassador he did not give any direction for the sale of the hides(76).

On 22 August the Junta do Governo of Oporto requested Sousa Coutinho to describe the state of the properties detained in England, but the Ambassador alleged that only the British government would be able to resolve the problem(77).

Four days later, the commissioners were authorized by the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury to release the ships "Bizarria, captain Vidal" and "Ulisses, captain Ferreira" which had been declared by the High Court of Admiralty...to belong to Portuguese subjects outside the control of France, but at that time they had also released the following ships: "Commercio do Rio, Marianna Daphne, Sam Marcos, Felicidade, Fama, Scipião, Conde de Peniche and Flor de Cantanhede"(78).

Meanwhile on 6 August Sousa Continho asked Canning to raise a credit. With this in mind he argued that he had spent more than £20,000 with the defence of the refugees and with the problem of the ships detained by the Admiralty(79). Several charges had to be paid respecting ships such as: the Americano (80), Serra Pequena (81), Sam Pedro Aguia (82) and Commercio do Rio (83).

By the end of August the commissioners had received £13,082, but this amount had already been spent(84). As a consequence of this,

the commissioners demanded a warrant to sell part of property in order to meet the expenses and charges so as to press the British authorities. On 2 September they wrote to George Harrison that "a parcel of 5,000 hides (by the Comerciante) will, in a short time, if not sold, be thrown into the river, as unserviceable"[85].

At last the military and political situation in Portugal favoured the British, and as a result of this, on 21 September, a new order in council was issued which would facilitate the release of all Portuguese property[86]. From this time onwards Portuguese firms and individuals affected by the detention of the goods remained depending only on the "payment of the legal charge thereon, and of the Expenses justly incurred". Cases of doubt would be "decided upon summarily by the High Court of Admiralty, or the Court & Vice Admiralty in which such Property may have been brought to Adjudication".

At Oporto many businessmen affected by the detention of their goods decided to establish their agents in London, to defend their rights. In some cases they granted powers to their own members of the joint named by Sousa Coutinho on 20 June, even before this date.. As an example, on 28 May 1808 José Correia de Faria passed a power of attorney to Guilherme Collins to claim the properties detained in England which had come from the Brazilian ports to Oporto[87]. Manuel Ferreira Comilo, agent of Custodio José Pinto Coelho, businessman residing at Bahia, authorised José Leyte & Co. to claim twenty-two bags of cotton or other merchandize detained by the Navy[88].

On 28 June, Jerônimo Carneiro Geraldes authorized Campbell & Co. to claim eighteen boxes with 923 "arrobas" of sugar which were carried by the vessel Ana Maria to Sennings and five boxes with 2,105 "arrobas" of sugar carried by the vessel Harmonia to Hamburgh[89]. Rüdel Guerner & Co. authorized Lopes Collins on 9 July to claim all their properties which had been transported by the vessel Fortuna from Gering to Oporto[90]. In the same month, on 27 , António José Ferreira Barbosa also used the same firm to urge the release of 10

boxes of cotton which had come from Recife on board the Ventura Feliz as well as the firm Viuva Pinheiro" on 12 August to claim their merchandize[91].

After the order in council of 21 September, the claimants at Oporto sent powers of attorney to different firms to exercise their rights in regard to their properties detained. On 30 September João Coelho authorized George Bridges Reay & Co. to claim 14 bags with cotton, "marca R", which had come from Recife by the vessel Ventura Feliz [92]. Antonio José Pereira de Abreu on 3 October passed a power of attorney to Filipe Clabert and José Leyte for that they got the release of twenty bags of cotton of "no.1, marca A" with 97 "arrobas" and 28 "arrateis" which had been dispatched by Joaquim Carneiro Leal at Pernambuco[93], and were transported on the same vessell.

The Reverendo João de Sousa Pinto on 14 October claimed 12 bags of cotton "marca M.P. & de numeros de 1 a 12" weighting 24 "arrobas" and 21 arratel which had come from Recife to his father Manuel de Sousa Pinto[94] also on the Ventura Feliz . Manuel Jose da Silveira Guimarães authorized Butler & Brothers to obtain 5 boxes with white sugar which had been transported by the vessel Maria , captain P. Valessan of Hamburg to Tonningen[95].

Four days later, Bento José Vieira used the name "D.L. Collins" so that he could release 6 bags of cottom "marca B" which had been dispatched by his representative José Vieira da Mota in Recife and transported by the Galera Ventura Feliz [96].

The size of the goods involved in the operation of the deliverance of the properties detained since the beginning was so large that it mobilized the newspapers of that time. The Correio Braziliense ou Armazem Literário published in London followed events very closely and accused Sousa Coutinho of being responsible for delaying a solution and allowing the deterioration of the goods.

On 6 August the Ambassador pressed Canning for a solution and

complained of persecution moved against him by that newspaper[97].

As the question seemed to come to a happy close he was encouraged to write to the Correio on 9 November 1808[98], explaining the course of the events and accusing the editor of omitting part of the truth and of having been always against him.

Despite the position publicly assumed by the Ambassador, many people continued to suffer, since their goods not yet had been returned to their possession.

From January 1809 onwards further powers of attorney were sworn in at Oporto to claim properties held at the Court of Admiralty in London. On 13 January, Francisco António de Amorim authorised "Fermino de Fartet(?) to release "oito centos mil reis" which had been sent to him by his representatives "José Pereira Guimarães & Co." from Rio de Janeiro by the Navio Fama [99]. Francisco Jose Ferreira on 23 February 1809 authorized "Henrique Burmester & Filho" to claim 100 bags of cacau carried by the vessel Comerciante from Pará to Lisbon[100]. On 10 March, Francisco José da Rocha authorized John Bourderve(?) Jubien & Co. to release all the properties directed to him from Brazilian ports to Oporto or Lisbon[101]. More than three months later, on 20 June, João Pinto Soares passed a power of attorney to A. Lopes Collins to claim 100 "arrobas" of "estopa" which had come from Bahia by the vessel Bizarria [102]. Domingos João Rodrigo de Carvalho took a similar step on 22nd July to João Kirivan & Filhos to claim 21 bags of rice "marca C." dispatched by his brother "Manoel Teotonio Rodrigo de Carvalho excrivão da Meza Grande da Villa de Santos" transported by the Galera Paquete do Porto [103].

Much more surprising is that in the first five months of 1810 more powers of attorney were passed at Oporto with the same purpose. On the 8 February Custodio Baralha & Filho authorized João Bornes to claim 56,000 bradawls which had been carried from Tonningen by the vessel Fortuna [104]. On the same day, M. L. da Silva Leça & Co.

authorized "Burmester & Filho" to claim 4 boxes containing 400 pieces of "oleados" and one box with 100 pieces of "olandilha marcada com a marca M. L. No.3 a 7" carried by the same vessel[105].

On 30 March, José Fernandes Guimarães, residing at the "freguesia de São Torcato, termo da Vila de Guimarães", sent a power of attorney to A. Lopes & Collins to claim 100 hides in hair which had been despatched by his son João António Guimarães at Bahia and carried by the vessel "Bizarria"[106].

Finally, on 9 May of the same year, José Joaquim de Araújo had authorized H. Burmester & Filhos to claim 19 boxes of sugar which he himself had taken on the vessel Zeenimph from Oporto to Tonningen[107]. Nevertheless on 17 June Sousa Coutinho informed the Marquis Wellesley that the restitution of the properties had finished[108].

In conclusion it may be affirmed that the British government fell into a clear contradiction. On the one hand it continued to recognize only the heir of the Casa de Bragança as the legitimate authority. On the other hand the Royal Navy in fulfilment of the British Orders in Council detained the Portuguese ships under the pretext of belonging to a country under the control of the French, while at the same time there were the best relations between London and Rio de Janeiro.

Furthermore, there is evidence that at least 42 Portuguese vessels were detained, including their seizure which occurred in Sweden, in Northern European ports and between Portugal and Brazil. That number must correspond to more than one third of the total of the Portuguese navigation. Naturally all the ships were not simultaneously stopped, but their detention as well as their cargoes had to affect adversely the Portuguese trade. The disagreements between the Ambassador and the commissioners of the property and between the Ambassador and the British authorities unfortunately made everything still worse, so that it may be affirmed that the British laws failed, since they had been conceived to affect, above all, the economy of its principal enemy. In practical terms, they affected especially the economy of its most important ally.

VII. MARITIME TRANSPORT BETWEEN OPORTO AND GREAT BRITAIN DURING THE WAR

By the end of the eighteenth century, the war obliged the British authorities to guarantee as far as possible the security of vessels, crew, passengers and merchandize.

In England the organization of convoys was coordinated by the Admiralty, which consulted the representatives of the merchants in each trade, established timetables and informed other merchants through the principal newspapers(1).

These convoys were defended by escorts provided by the Royal Navy - which in early 1807 had about one thousand ships(2).

Commerce between Great Britain and Portugal was constantly protected since Bayonne and even Basque privateers frequently threatened to capture the vessels(3) bound for Portuguese ports - Viana, Porto, Figueira and Lisbon, - sailing from Britain or Newfoundland.

By 1807 the sailings were made in convoy between Great Britain and Oporto, but even so there is evidence that some vessels had sailed unprotected.

On 12 October António Francisco Carveiro, captain of the vessel Coração de Maria, sailed alone for London(4). He demanded a salary of "48,000 reis" a month, from the owner of the vessel, paid to his wife, even in the event of his capture by French or Spanish privateers(5).

The flight of British merchants from Oporto to England occurred in October and this was also organized in convoys(6). All the vessels available at Oporto were mobilized for this purpose.

Even so, trade continued in traditional fashion. On 14 October Thompson Croft & Co. freighted the Galera Dois Amigos, captained by José Luis to "Viuva Pinheiro" with the support of Arnaldo and Francisco

Vanzeller to transport wine to England in convoy levying an additional sum of £10 per ton (of two pipes or four half)[7].

During the blockade of Oporto ordered on 28 December 1807 by Castlereagh and carried out by the Admiralty[8] the restricted commerce effected between Great Britain and that city was carried by neutral ships under the protection of the Royal Navy[9] and sometimes it seems that this occurred with the personal consent of Junot[10].

There is no evidence of the freight carried by vessels until the revolution of June 1808. The blockade ceased on 4 July[11], and then the navigation was resumed in accordance with the traditional lines. On 19 August 1808, the British merchant firm of Delisle & Brook freighted the Escuna Angelica , captained by Jeronimo Gonçalves da Costa, to its owner Manuel Correia de Aguiar, to transport one hundred and forty pipes of wine to Guernsey and Jersey.

Cork, fruit or other goods also would be carried, should any space remain[12]. The vessel would take seventeen days to load and twelve days to unload - both being the responsibility of the owner of the merchandize. He would pay the captain £7 for each ton of two pipes of wine or four halves when the vessel arrived at these ports and he could travel on board, but in this case he had to purchase his own food. If the stipulated periods were exceeded, the charterer also would have to pay £10 per day[13].

In 1808 the vessels which sailed out of convoy between Great Britain or Newfoundland and Oporto assumed considerable risks. The merchant vessels Alfred and Duke of Kent were captured by a French privateer when sailing with a cargo of fish from Oporto to Poole. A few days later they were "recaptured by H.M.S. Melpomene and taken into Oporto"[14]. The risks were so many to and from Newfoundland that the Admiralty ordered ships to undertake the voyage in convoy - otherwise vessels were subjected to a fine of £1,000[15].

To reduce some of the risks the export firms paid insurance which

protected their merchandize.

On 28 January 1809 the "Companhia das Vinhas do Alto Douro," through its agent Francisco Peixoto da Silva, complained that William Wrigher, the captain of the vessel Friton, had not loaded eleven pipes of wine whose insurance had already been paid as if the transport had been made in convoy[16].

At that time Oporto was in the hands of the Junta headed by the Bishop, but the French pressure was intensified. On 30 January "Le Hyate S. Anna, captaine Arsémio Lopes, ayant été obligé par les vents de s'éloigner de la barre de Porto, fut pris par le corsaire Français l'Hébé, le captaine duquel après avoir jetté à la mer 400 Barrils de poudre et mouillé le restant abandonna la prise en y jettant vingt prisonniers Anglais qu'il avait. Ces prisonniers Anglais, au lieu de permettre au captaine Portugais d'entrer à Porto, l'ont forcé à venir en Angleterre"[17]. The dangers at that time were enormous. Both British and Portuguese authorities were aware of this. The solution of that problem in London was: "Le consul général, J.C. Lucena, avait demandé, et obtenu des Lords de l'Amirauté la protection d'un convoi pour le susdit Hyate, lorsque un ordre de la Cour de l'Amirauté l'a empeché de mettre à la ville, et cet ordre est fondé sur une reclamation de salvage faite par les prisonniers Anglais, très injuste sans doute, puisqu'ils ont empeché au contraire l'entrée d'une secours très nécessaire à la défense de la ville de Porto et de Frontières de ce côté là"[18].

When danger became imminent some merchants sought to withdraw without any loss of time - as happened on 1 April 1809, two days after the seizure of Oporto by the French[19]. James Walsh, formerly a British merchant in Oporto confessed this in a letter to Wellington: "I only arrived here on Friday from Oporto, from whence I fled with all my family, dispairing of reinforcement from England & the French being strong on the banks of the Minho. But now much do I regret my precipitation..."[20].

During the six weeks of French occupation, some vessels sailed from Oporto outside a convoy. For example, on 15 May, Domingos João da Costa wrote to Sr. Francisco José da Rocha, a businessman in Oporto, from Ilha da Madeira and confessed that some days before he had met with a British vessel, sixty miles from Viana from which he had bought some food. At that time he was informed by the British - and subsequently, two days later, by a Swedish "galera" - that the French had taken Oporto. He had to divert to Ilha da Madeira because he feared that otherwise he would be met by British ships of war(21).

After the expulsion of the French from Oporto the chartering of vessels continued. The conditions of the contracts sometimes revealed that ships did not always sail in convoy. On 13 October 1809, Henrique Davis - a British merchant at Oporto, freighted the Bergantim Ana , captained by Pedro Crockevel with the support of John James who was also a British merchant of that city, to transport fruit and ten tons of cork to Portsmouth. The contract did not give any reference to transport in convoy - although it did stipulate that the charterer would be obliged to charge the "Bergantim within nineteen days and to discharge it seven days after it had arrived at that port. The agents of the freighter must pay on arrival three hundred guineas and pay five percent move even if the fruit arrived damaged(22). If the stated periods were exceeded the agents would pay three guineas more for each day(23).

By 1810 there is ample evidence that many vessels continued to sail in convoy. On 2 April A. Croft & Co. complained that José Gardiner, captain of the vessel Minerva, had not appeared at the time of the departure of a convoy from London to Oporto to transport ten pipes of brandy and seven thousand and twenty staves of pipe with an estimated value of two thousand two hundred and fifty pounds. This merchandize had been covered by insurance in London, at the cost of twelve guineas per cent with a return of six pounds per cent. Due to the lack of the fulfilment on the part of the captain, the Association

of assurance refused to pay the return which had been stipulated[24].

The transport in convoy continued, therefore, from Oporto to England. For example, on 25 May, Joaquim José de Figueiredo, businessman at Oporto, freighted the vessel "Frederik", captained by the British John Treadgold, to transport a charge of pipes of wine to London. The vessel was ordered to set sail with the first convoy which departed[25]. The agents for the freight-carriers would be obliged to pay seven pounds duty for each ton of wine on its arrival. If this was not fulfilled by the captain, it would be paid from the total amount of the freight "por inteiro", as well as the total amount which had been spent in the insurance[26].

On 31 July, John Wise(?) & Co. complained that John James, captain of the vessel James promised to carry ten pipes of wine to London in a convoy at the cost of six pounds per ton[27]. He pointed out that the insurance had been arranged on that condition. As the captain did not load those pipes the freight-carrier demanded that the difference in payment to another vessel as well as to insurance agents and other damages must also be the captain's responsibility[28].

About the middle of August, there were rumours of a new French invasion. It occurred in September[29]. Nevertheless on 29 August José Lloyd(?), businessman of Oporto hired the Portuguese Escuna Aliança, captained by José da Nova, from its owner João Fernandes Reys, to transport a complete cargo of sheep to London[30]. The vessel was to leave Oporto on the first appearance of good weather, moderate wind and calm sea. The agents of the hirer would pay a duty in London at a rate of five hundred pounds and one pound more for each animal which arrived there alive and moreover, five per cent "de chapéu" of the total worth of the cargo. The freighter would dispose of the animals eight days after its arrival. If that period was exceeded the captain would receive six pounds more per day.

As a measure of security of the animals' health, half of them should stay on deck for one day and one night while the other half

remained in the hold. After that period the animals had constantly to change places until the end of the journey. The captain promised to transport and keep a sergeant whilst he was aboard and he also would be responsible for the feeding of the animals[31].

It seems that transport in convoy or without it depended mainly on the hirer, since one week later João Jose de Figueiredo, a tradesman in Oporto hired the vessel Magdalena , captained by Diogo John Edwards - a Briton - to carry wine and some cork which was necessary to stabilize the cargo. The captain promised to sail as soon as the vessel was fully loaded, either in convoy or alone[32]. On its arrival in London the agents of the hirer would pay the captain eight pounds for each ton of two pipes or four halves. If the captain carried wine or merchandize belonging to another merchant, the original hirer would not have to pay the captain anything[33].

On many occasions the conditions stipulated in the contracts bound the departure of the vessel only subject to the condition of the weather, winds and sea. In these circumstances, on 22 September, Francisco Brandão (with the power of an attorney readily available through his brother Alexandre Brandão), hired the vessel Ambulator , captained by William Reyd from Britain to transport not more than one thousand boxes of fruit to London. The vessel must leave on the first occasion "que Deus der de bom tempo, vento e mar". The captain on his arrival in London would receive eight pounds for each ton of ten boxes, as well as a supplementary of ten guineas as a reward if his zeal and caution exercised could ensure that the fruit arrived in the best condition possible[34].

By the end of 1810 the majority of the contracts did not refer to whether transport was in convoy or not. For example, on 27 October, William Rocher, a British tradesman in Oporto hired the vessel Dart , captained by Thomas Bergson, a Briton, to transport fruit to Liverpool. On his arrival at this port the captain would receive six pounds and fifteen shillings for each ton of ten boxes and also two and half per

cent as a reward[35].

By the first half of 1811 the hirers of the vessels seldom stipulated in the contracts the condition of transport - whether it was to be in convoy or not. Otherwise it became evident that they avoided much reference to the merchandize which they wanted to carry. Instead they now indicated "fazendas indiscriminadas não sendo contrabandos". Such concerns seem to mean that smuggling at that time was rife, perhaps as a consequence of the third French invasion - which naturally caused great confusion in the economic life of the country. This seems to be so in the case of Francisco Joaquim de Sousa Basto, who on 15th February hired the vessel Hawrriol , captained by Thomas Hancock - a Briton - to carry "carga de fazendas quelhe bem parecer nao sendo contrabandos" to Liverpool, stopping en route at Cork. The hirer would allow twenty-four days for the transportation of his goods and his agents in Liverpool should pay five hundred pounds to the captain, and a further four pounds for each day beyond the duration of the stated period[36].

Also destined for Liverpool, a month later, Manoel Rodrigues hired the Bergantim Indústria captained by James Melburn, a British national, to transport "uma completa carga de fazendas que lhe bem parecer não sendo contrabandos". The captain allowed fifteen days to load and ten to discharge. The agents of the hirer in Liverpool should pay two hundred and forty pounds to the captain and a supplementary three pounds for each day, if the stated periods were exceeded[37].

On 11 May, Pedro José Alves Souto hired the Bergantim Jane & Anne , captained by Jorge Nevers, a British national, to carry "uma completa carga de fazendas que lhe bem parecer" for Leyth. It was stipulated that the vessel would sail without being part of a convoy and the captain allowed twenty-one days to load at Oporto and the same time to discharge in Liverpool. On its arrival, the receivers of the merchandize should pay two hundred and seventy five pounds to the captain, and a further four pounds for each day if it was necessary

to extend the stated periods[38].

In June, there is evidence of contracts which stipulated that the transport should be in convoy. Under this condition on 7th, Vanzeller & Co. hired the vessel Elizabeth, captained by Mathews Walker, to transport two hundred and eighty pipes of wine and some cork, necessary to adjust the scale of charges for London to those of the sea port in Guernsey[39]. The receivers of the duties at Guernsey would pay four pounds ten shillings if there had been any services involved in the unloading and loading and in the case of the scale of duties at that port having been nullified, the agents in London would pay only four pounds for each ton. For the transport of the cork the captain would receive four guineas per ton[40].

Two weeks later, Joaquim José de Figueiredo stipulated the transportation in a convoy when he hired the vessel Harriet, captained by the Briton Thomas Bancock, to carry two hundred and fifty pipes of wine and some cork for London. On its arrival in that city the agents should pay four pounds per ton of two pipes and a further five pounds per each day if the unloading exceeded twenty-one days. If one of the two parts did not fulfil the agreement one would have to pay one thousand pounds to the other one[41].

In early July the vessel Filipe, captained by John Carwal(?) arrived at Oporto, coming from London free of a convoy, with twenty-five bales (ballons?) of flax. It was for José Francisco da Silva Guimarães[42], fifty bales being for Christóvão Guerner[43] and nineteen bales for José Alves & Sousa and thus to two firms jointly[44].

From July until the end of 1811 in the contracts of hire which were drawn up, the hirers returned to dictate the merchandize which they wanted to carry, and some of them continued to stipulate whether it should be transported in convoy.

On 31 July Vanzellers & Co. hired the brigantine Prescott captained by the Briton James Thompson to transport three hundred and

twenty pipes of wine to Plymouth. The vessel would have to be loaded within three weeks and it would sail in the first available convoy. On its arrival at Plymouth the receivers of the wine would pay three pounds per ton of two pipes of four halves[45].

In September and October the transportation of fruit mobilized some vessels, but there is no evidence that the freighters or the captains had demanded convoys to ensure their safe passage.

On 23 September José de Almeida Celorico Junior hired the Bergantim Ana, captained by Ch. Cooksley to carry fruit to London. The hirer took one month to load and fifteen days to unload. His agents in London would apy six pounds per ton of ten boxes or twenty half-boxes if as much was in good condition as was damaged[46].

Four days later João Ribeiro Viana hired the Brig Fortitude, captained by Andrew Thompson, to carry fruit to London. The hirer would take one month to load and his agentsin London would have to pay four pounds per ton and a further five per cent of the total. If one of the two parts had not fulfilled the conditions stipulated, the transgressor would have to pay four hundred thousand "mil reis" to the other[47].

On 2 October two vessels were freighted in similar conditions. João Ribeiro Viana freighted the vessel Prospecto, captained by Gofton Spencer[48], and Alexandre Brandão the vessel Richard[49], under Captain Thomas Greaves. Both the Prospecto and Richard were to carry fruit to London and the agents of the hirers in London should pay four pounds per ton of ten boxes of good or damaged fruit. In the first case if one of the two parts broke the agreement it would have to pay four hundred and eighty thousand "mil reis" to the other. In the second case the captain would also receive a reward of twelve guineas.

Finally, three weeks later, James Martin and João Manoel Penha hired the Brig Flora, captained by Alley Wilson, to carry fruit to either Cork or Liverpool. The price was the same as in the former

contracts. One of the two parts would have to pay three hundred pounds to the other if it failed to comply with the conditions of the contract[50].

It is evident that between 1807 and 1811 convoys sailed from Oporto for England, operating without a timetable which was fixed far in advance. Sometimes, the contracts stipulated that the departure of the vessel was to occur "no primeiro convoy que se oferecer".

Whether goods were transported in convoy seems to be dependent mainly upon the owner of the merchandize rather than the captain of the vessel, though the amount of insurance covering the merchandize depended upon whether the transport of the goods was or was not in convoy.

During this period the transport costs of the wine oscillated between ten pounds in October 1807 and six pounds per ton of two pipes or four halves in July 1810. Once the tension of the war diminished after May 1811, prices remained at about four pounds per ton. Transport costs of the fruit were paid per ton of ten boxes and that oscillated between four and six pounds. Only in September of 1810 did that rise to eight pounds.

At times the transport of animals or fruit was paid on a global scale with a further reward for each animal which arrived alive or for each box of fruit which arrived in good condition.

The port of destination in England did not normally influence the cost of the transport.

If the vessel had a greater capacity than two hundred and fifty pipes the cost could be cheaper - as happened in July 1811 when Vanzellers paid for the transport of three hundred and twenty pipes at three pounds per ton.

Cork was normally used to ballast the transport of the wine pipes.

There is evidence that its transport was paid for at four guineas per ton.

The currency used for payment of the shipping was normally pounds sterling, occasionally in guineas. The "mil reis" were only used in the case of a penalty levied as a result of lack of fulfilment of terms of contracts.

In cases where contracts were not fulfilled the affected parts appealed to the local authorities, or to the consul (or vice-consul) of foreign nations if the conflict involved citizens from abroad.

During the period of the French occupation of Oporto, from November 1807 to June 1808 and from April to the middle of May 1809, there is no evidence that any freight contracts were concluded to transport merchandize to Great Britain.

In time of war, merchants sometimes travelled by mercantile vessels, but also by packetboat. Falmouth was the chief packet station in England(51). There were weekly packets from Falmouth to Lisbon, Spain and the north of Portugal(52). The duration of these journeys depended very much on wind, weather and sea. Normally it took ten days to get from Falmouth to Lisbon, but in the summer this was sometimes reduced to only four or five days if the prevailing winds came from the north(53). There are no reasons to think that the journey was any different to Oporto.

If merchants needed to travel between Oporto and Lisbon they could do it by ship and the journey lasted at least two days(54). It was also possible to travel by land, but the conditions were much more difficult. On 2 January 1811 J. Offley, a British merchant in Oporto confessed: "The road from Oporto to Lisbon as far as Coimbra is wretchedly bad, such as a carriage cannot pass. Mules are used, and an active man can travel from Oporto to Lisbon - about 170 miles - in four days; but it commonly takes 7 days. The accommodation on the roads are miserable"(55).

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

In the early nineteenth century the Anglo-French conflict became as much an economic as a military and political one[1].

The British order in council published on 7 January 1807 did not eliminate the effects of the Berlin decree ordered by Napoleon on 21st November 1806[2].

The cabinet crisis in London during the first half of 1807 as well as the success of the French troops on the continent allowed Napoleon to achieve hegemony in Europe through the treaty of Tilsit, which was drawn up in July 1807.

Portugal found itself neutral before 1806 as such a policy was the most advantageous.

The course of events therefore imposed the taking of a position on behalf of one of the two parts.

The commercial relations with both Great Britain and France gave Portugal considerable advantages. Nevertheless the Portuguese trade derived greater advantages from the relations with Britain[3]. A constant and considerable trade surplus had emerged in the balance of trade with England from the beginning of the century, and moreover the commercial links with Great Britain had been maintained for several centuries[4].

Despite this, on 22 October the Prince Regent adhered to the continental system, in order to remain at peace with France. But the Treaty of Fontainebleau between France and Spain, some days later, envisaged the division of metropolitan Portugal.

Such a plan, if carried through, would have meant the loss of national independence. For this reason, on 29 November, the Royal Family withdrew to Brazil in accordance with secret negotiations which had

taken place in London the previous August, September and October, between Sousa Coutinho, Portuguese Minister and Canning, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

On the following day the French troops arrived in Lisbon. As a result of this the Portuguese territory was in the possession of the French,and the Prince Regent, D. João, the symbol of sovereignty, was on his way to Brazil under British protection.

The effects were immediate with regard to either the grouping of forces involved in war or respecting the state of Anglo-Portuguese trade.

In the first case the invasion of Portugal by France extended French intervention throughout the Peninsula and at the same time it could permit the rise of a great deal of resistance on the part of the Portuguese.

If in the first case the future appeared uncertain, in the second, things became clarified quickly and easily.

The Prince Regent arrived in Brazil and at the end of January ordered that Brazilian ports be opened to the friendly nations. This effectively meant Great Britain. At the same time the traders in London began to make arrangements to stimulate trade between England and the Portuguese colony in America. As a consequence of this, the British trade compensated for a part of its losses in European markets, which also created conditions to extend its influence to South America.

The Portuguese trade, however, was considerably affected. The trade with England was substantially reduced, in part, due to the Royal Navy which, since the end of 1807 was blockading the ports of Lisbon and Oporto, and at the same time constantly patrolled the Portuguese coast. In addition to this, many Portuguese vessels which carried goods across the Atlantic between Brazil, Europe and Portugal were seized by British cruisers. In November and December the British had published

several Orders in Council to eliminate the effects of the Berlin decree while the French published the first and second Millan decree to obstruct the effects of the Orders in Council[5].

The situation of Portugal remained extremely delicate. On the one hand Portuguese territory was occupied by the Franco-Spanish troops. On the other hand the Prince Regent was under British protection.

In accordance with the Convention of 23 October 1807 the British promised to recognize only the heir of the House of Bragança[6].

Moreover British cruisers seized several Portuguese vessels and their properties in fulfilment of the orders in council. This created difficulties to the British government.

By early 1808 the number of Portuguese vessels detained in England probably stood over forty, which, with their cargoes, were speculatively estimated at the value of about one million pounds, according to British sources[7], and 350,40 million cruzados in Portuguese currency[8]. This amount was highly significant for the economic life of metropolitan Portugal and was a particularly grave matter for local commerce, which could not continue without these vessels and their cargoes.

Despite the good relations between Sousa Coutinho and the British government, the situation could not easily be resolved.

Portuguese merchants either personally or through their agents pressed Sousa Coutinho to order the release of their merchandize[9]. At the same time many British merchants demanded to be compensated by the British government for their losses in Portugal at the time of the first French invasion[10]. As a result of this the British government was simultaneously pressed by the British and Portuguese, both claimants.

On 6 January[11] and 4 May 1808[12] the British government ordered the publication of two Orders in Council, regulating the release of the Portuguese merchandise. Nevertheless the stipulations of those

orders could not easily be carried out since the owners of the properties detained in England resided in Portugal, Brazil, and even in other countries which were under the control of the French.

The orders in council of 6 January and 4 May divided the properties detained into three categories: those which belonged to the owners residing in Portuguese territory under the control of the French; those which belonged to the owners residing in territory not under the control of the French and those which belonged to owners in ambiguous circumstances (for example one owner with representatives in London and in Oporto). Despite this the orders were constantly criticised, because they were not easy to execute. Finally, by September, the French were expelled from Portugal. In consequence of this, on the 21 of that month a new order in Council was published which facilitated the release of both the goods and ships[13].

From that time onwards, Portuguese firms and individuals affected by the detention merely had to meet the payment of legal charges on their goods and ships, and to pay such expenses as had been justly incurred.

Many of them sent powers of attorney from Oporto to their agents in London[14]. But the high charges, the commissions and the damages which had occurred in the meantime often led to losses. Some gave up their claims. Only on 17 June 1810 could Sousa Coutinho announce that the situation was fully resolved[15].

The number of vessels stopped corresponded to about 10%[16] of the total of the Portuguese mercantile marine. This had unavoidably affected national trade, during a period of some three years. In addition to this, the French occupation, the permanent atmosphere of war as well as the transportation of goods through neutral vessels which were either European or American, naturally gave rise to great difficulties.

Even after the second expulsion of the French by May 1809, the

British trade faced great restrictions in the Portuguese ports especially in Lisbon[17].

Nevertheless, by that time, the British influence in Portugal was considerable. The Prince Regent gave substantial support to the British. William Beresford was created "Marechal Commandante do Exército Portuguez" on 15 March 1809 and Arthur Wellesley "Marechal General dos Meus Exercitos" on 6 July 1809, with the right to vote on financial and military matters in the Conselho. At the same time the Portuguese army was commanded by a significant number of British officers[18] and 30,000 Portuguese soldiers were paid directly by the British government[19].

It is evident that in such circumstances the restrictions imposed on the British trade had to be removed. The treaty of commerce made between the two countries on 19 February 1810 in Rio de Janeiro appeared to sweep away all the obstructions which the British trade faced in Portugal. If until then the Portuguese trade was affected by the war, detention of the vessels in England and opening of the Brazilian ports to British trade, from that time onwards things naturally became more and more difficult.

The course of events after the middle of 1809 favoured the growth of British interests. In the military field, because the expulsion of the French for the second time had mobilized an extensive national resistance against them. As a result of this the Peninsula became by that time the greatest problem which the French had to face, and they did not know the best way to subdue Portugal.

It is true that at the same time Wellington began to face difficulties because of the opposition of some members of the Council of the Regency, mainly on the part of Principal Sousa on the question of whether the country should be defended whilst operating on the frontiers or in a central position[20]. The actual circumstances of the war led to the placing of Charles Stuart on the Council of the

Regency on 24 May 1810, with the same powers which had previously been granted to Wellington[21].

As a result of this the British influence was reinforced still further in Portugal at the highest level.

Despite this, by the end of 1810 the withdrawal of the Portuguese government from Mafra to Oeiras was planned, as well as the evacuation of British merchants and Portuguese from Lisbon to London, the Western Islands or Brazil. The same measures had been taken before the first and second French invasion with satisfactory results, since British losses had been considerably reduced.

The construction of the Torres Vedras lines[22] under the initiative of Wellington permitted an efficient defence around Lisbon, and by early 1811 the French had to retire once again from the Portuguese territory. This was a victory for the Anglo-Portuguese forces, but it was at the same time a personal victory for Wellington. Above all it guaranteed protection of British interests either in the military conflict with France or in maintaining their commercial hegemony against the policy of the continental system[23] of Napoleon.

Meanwhile the treaty of commerce of 19 February 1810 was enacted. There was an immediate invasion of British products in Portugal. The British claims under pretext of the commercial treaty's stipulations were repeated frequently[24]. The British firms in Oporto remained active, reopened[25] or used the name of Portuguese firms[26], so as to continue to supply their habitual customers with wine, wool, cotton, cork, fruit and other goods.

The commercial treaty had been signed by Conde de Linhares, under the protests of most interests which had been adversely affected[27]. An anti-British sentiment began to be stimulated by the Correio Braziliense, a Portuguese newspaper which had been founded in London by 1808[28]. At the same time the Portuguese administration began to be criticised for the extent of British influence in Portugal[29].

The British authorities recognized their benefits they had gained from the campaigns in Portugal. Parliament voted £100,000 for victims of the war in the most devastated territory of Portugal. This sum was administered by Charles Stuart, the British merchant in Oporto, John Croft and Ricardo Raimundo Nogueira, one of the members of the Council of Regency who had supported Wellington against Principal Sousa in the conflict on the strategy to be followed against the French. The committee included John Bell[30] and Henrique Teixeira Sampaio.

From a military viewpoint the British authorities ensured the national independence to Portugal and at the same time provided Napoleon with an irreducible enemy to the "Continental System". Offensive actions took the place of the defensive ones. The Anglo-Portuguese forces began to operate in Spain so as to expel French troops from the Peninsula and afterwards to fight them on their own territory. At time of the Treaty of Tilsit, the war had been going well for the the French. After the defeat in Torres Vedras the decline of Napoleon had begun almost immediately.

From a commercial point of view, the policy defended by the Orders in Council favoured largely the British interests in Portugal. Obviously the British blockade at Oporto and Lisbon was relaxed to protect British trade carried on by neutral vessels during the French occupation, while the Royal Navy assured a complete security to the navigation between Portugal and Great Britain against the actions of both privateers and the Frency Navy. As a result of this the commercial relations between Portugal and Great Britain changed, as the table shows[31]:

	According to Portuguese sources		According to British sources	
	Portuguese imports (in Reis)	Portuguese exports (in Reis)	British imports (in £)	British exports in £ (real value)
1807	5,422,272,321	7,971,196,005	The annual average was about £1,000,000	1,170,221
1808	1,966,375,040	802,980,620		600,137
1809	4,531,952,809	7,324,270,330		1,124,098
1810	9,564,761,528	10,219,063,660		2,228,83
1811	21,559,960,503	4,323,864,845		6,164,858

It is evident that in 1811 there was a flood of imports into Portugal, even though the Treaty of 1810 had not yet been enacted. Perhaps the devastation caused by the war was partially responsible, coupled with the desire by British merchants to penetrate the continent, and the inability of local Portuguese traders to finance their own exports to Britain. The result was a catastrophic deficit in the balance of trade, in Britain's favour. Unequivocally therefore, 1811 provides a turning point in Anglo-Portuguese trade. Great Britain now derived considerable advantage from both new opportunities and the war, to achieve a favourable balance.

Notes - I

(1) Villat, Louis, La Révolution et l'Empire 1789-1815, Paris, 1936, p.101. For further details: The Peace Tactics of Napoleon (1806-1808), Cambridge, 1929. by H. Butterfield

(2) Goldsmith, Lewis, Recueil des Décrets de Napoléon Bonaparte (extraits du Moniteur), second volume, London, 1813, pp.832-844

(3) Cf. on this subject, Napoléon et l'Allemagne, le Système Continental et les Débuts du Royaume de Barrière (1806-1810), Paris, 1942 by M. Dunam. La Révolution Française et l'Empire Napoléonien, Paris, 1954 and Napoléon et l'Espagne, 1799-1808. Tome 1, Paris, 1930, by André Fugier and op.cit. by Louis Villat

(4) Heckscher, Eli F., The Continental System. Oxford, 1922, pp.88-97 and Seton-Watson, R.W., Britain in Europe, 1789-1914. Cambridge, 1938, p.21

(5) This decree may be found in Recueil des Décrets de Napoléon Bonaparte by Lewis Goldsmith or The History of British Commerce, 1763-1878. Second Edition, London, 1880 by Levi Leone

(6) Lloyd, Christopher, The British seaman, 1200-1860. London, 1968, p.289

(7) Lloyd, Christopher, op.cit., p.551

(8) C.J.64, 1809, p.551 or English Historical Documents, 1783-1832, edited by A. Aspinall and E. Anthony Smith. London, 1959, p.556. In this work the following figures are quoted: 1806 - 22,182 ships of 2,263,714 tons; 1807 - 22,290 ships of 2,281,621 tons and 1808 - 22,646 ships of 2,324,819 tons

(9) Kennedy, Paul M., The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery. London, 1976, pp.123-125

(10) Cf. English Historical Documents. 1783-1832, p.550. For further details: P.P. 1898, LXXXV, pp.48-51

(11) Cf. English Historical Documents. 1783-1832, p.579

(12) Balbi, Adrien, Essai Statistique sur le Royaume de Portugal et d'Algarve, comparé aux autre Etats de l'Europe. Paris, 1822, p.189

(13) Balbi, Adrien, op.cit., pp.381-391

(14) F.O.63, 57, last page. For further details: F.O.63, 62, pp.83-83V, State of the Portuguese Navy in the Tagus, October 20th 1807

(15) Arruda, José Jobson de A., O Brasil no Commércio Colonial, S. Paulo 1980, p.661. The author cited as source: Romano, R. Per una Valutazione della Flotta Mercantile Europea alla Fine del Secolo XVIII, separata do Studi in Onore di Amintore Fanfani, 1962. v.v. p.578

(16) Macedo, Jorge, O Bloqueio Continental. Economia e Guerra Peninsular. Lisboa, 1962, pp.113-144

(17) Macedo, Jorge, op.cit., pp.74-75

(18) S.P., 1832, pp.836-837. On the wine exports between 1796 and 1813 Cf. F.O.63, 165, pp.260-261 and p.447

(19) Balbi, Adrien, op.cit., p.432

(20) Macedo, Jorge, op.cit., pp.74-75

(21) Balbi, op.cit., p.432 and Macedo, Jorge, op.cit., p.41

(22) Macedo, Jorge, op.cit., p.41

(23) C.J., 67, 1812, p.766. For further details: Gayer, Arthur D., W.W. Rostow, Anna Jacobson Shwartz, The Growth and Fluctuation of the British Economy, 1790-1850. volume I. Oxford, 1953, from p.88 onwards

(24) Balbi, A., op.cit., p.441

(25) B.P.M.P., códice No.1270, p.34 or Simão José da Luz Soriano, História da Guerra Civil, Primeira Epocha, Tomo II, Lisboa, 1867, p.602. This author referred to "16 milhoes de francos", the cost of the Portuguese neutrality with France

(26) Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit., pp.601-602 and Napoléon et l'Espagne, 1799-1808. Tome I, Paris, 1930, especially Chapter III (La neutralité Espagnole) I. L'Espagne et le subside portugais, from p.247 onwards, by André Fugier

(27) C.J., 63, 1808-1809, p.531. The document refers to: "the object of this invasion is nothing less than that of dethroning the present Royal Family, and destroying the very existence of the Portuguese Monarchy; the provinces of which are to be portioned out one part to Spain, and the other part, with the town and port of Lisbon, to be given as a separate dominion to the Prince of Peace, or to the Queen of Etruria."

(28) On this subject in C.J., 63, 1808-1809, pp.531-534, may be found the following documents: Dispatch from Mr Secretary Fox to the Earls of Rosslyn and Saint Vincent, and Lieutenant General Simcoe, dated Downing Street, 9th August 1806; Extract of a Dispatch from

SOUTHAMPTON LIBRARY UNIVERSITY

Mr Secretary Windham to the Earl of Rosslyn and Lieutenant General Simcoe, dated Downing Street, 12th August 1806; Dispatch from Mr Secretary Windham to Earls Rosslyn and Saint Vincent, and Lieutenant General Simcoe, dated Downing Street, 28th August 1806; Extract of a Dispatch from the Earl of Rosslyn to Mr Secretary Fox, dated Lisbon, August 30th 1806; Extract of a Dispatch from the Early of Rosslyn to Mr Secretary Fox, dated Lisbon, September 2nd, 1806; Extract of a Dispatch from Mr Secretary Windham to the Earl of Rosslyn, dated Downing Street, September 13th 1806

(29) Fisher, H.E.S., "Lisbon, its English merchant Community and the Mediterranean in the eighteenth century", Chapter 11, in Trade and Commerce, published in 1981, the author writes: "Trade between England and Portugal and the presence of English merchants in Lisbon goes back at least to the time of the crusades. About the mid-seventeenth century the English business houses there consisted of merchants firms in their own right as well as others who were primarily branch houses or factors of firms in England". The author cited: Fisher, H.E.S., The Portugal Trade. A study of Anglo-Portuguese Commerce, 1700-1770 (1971); Croft, J., Tratado sobre os Vinhos de Portugal - sua natureza e historia, etc. desde o estabelecimento da Feitoria Ingleza no Porto, no ano de 1727. (This work may be found at Instituto do Vinho do Porto in Oporto). The Inv. Port., vol.11 (Londres 1811), pp.334-351, published an extract from that work. For further details cf. "The English in Oporto" in Oporto Old and New. London, 1899, pp.38-56 by Charles Sellers

(30) F.O.63, 165, pp.260-261. The document refers to the names of seventeen firms which were active in 1801: Campion Offley & Co., Warre & Co.; Lamber Kingston & Co.; Pennel Smith & Co.; Newman Sand & Co.; Thomas Snow & Co.; Babington Sidswell & Co.; Bearley & Webb; Thompson Croft & Co.; Stratford Swanns & Co.; George(?) & Sons; Page & Co.; Perry Trend & Co.; Stephenson Searle & Co.; Harris Brothers; H. Burmester Mash & Co.; Sam. Abbot. The document at its end refers, without specifying, "other British subjects"

(31) Shaw, Thomas George, Wine, the wine and the Cellar, second edition, London. 1864, Table XIII

(32) Silbert, Albert, Do Portugal de Antigo Regime ao Portugal Oitocentista. Livros Horizonte, p.54

(33) Adrien Balbi, op.cit., p.433 on "Commerce avec la France"

(34) C.J.63, 1808-1809, pp.531-534. Documents cited at note 28

(35) Silbert, Albert, op.cit., pp.59-60. The author affirmed: "Portugal fornece à França coiros, tabaco, açúcar e algodão. O quadro das

exportações de algodão é significativo. Em 1788, ano máximo, segundo parece, a França tinha comprado 56 mil arrobas de algodão brasileiro. Em 1802 compra 190 mil. O montante das importações manter-se-á até 1808 num nivel muito elevado. Em 1804, 1806 e 1807 ultrapassa 330 mil. Desde 1804, facto extraordinário, as vendas de algodão à França ultrapassam as vendas à Inglaterra".

(36) Macedo, Jorge, op.cit., p.66

(37) C.J., 63, 1808-1809, p.553. "Order in Council, prohibiting trade to be carried on between port and port of countries under the dominion or usurped control of France and her Allies. At the Court at the Queen's Palace, the 7th of January 1807"

(38) Macedo, Jorge, op.cit., pp.113-115

(39) Gayer, Arthur D., W.W. Rostow and Anna Jacobson Shwartz, The Growth and Fluctuation of the British Economy, 1790-1850, Vol.I, Oxford. 1953, p.87. The author wrote: "The figures for British foreign trade clearly show the stagnation which immediately followed the beginning of the Continental system, and the successful outcome of the search for compensating markets...". On the same subject cf. "Les conséquences de l'occupation des villes hanséatiques et du décret de Berlin" in L'Économie Britannique et le Blocus Continental, 1806-1813. Tome I, Paris, 1958, pp.211-217 by François Crouzet

(40) Soriano, Simão José da Luz, História da Guerra civil, Primeira Epocha, Tomo II, Lisboa, 1867, pp.602-605

(41) C.J., 63, 1808-1809, p.553. Order in Council, approving Draught of an Additional Instruction to the Commanders of His Majesty's ships of war and privateers. At the Court of the Queen's Palace, the 4th of February 1807

(42) F.O.63, 57 (n.p.) Letter from Lord Howick to Chevalier de Souza Coutinho. Downing Street, February 27th 1807

(43) F.O.63, 57. Letter from Chevalier de Souza Coutinho to Lord Howick. South Audley Street, ce 6 mars de 1807

(44) F.O.63, 57. Letter from Chevalier de Souza Coutinho to Lord Howick. South Audley Street, ce 14 mars 1807

(45) On this order in council may be seen details in P.P., 1812, III, p.258: "Dated of the Orders in Council, the French Decrees and the consequent Acts of the American Government". or in S.P.I, Part 2, 1812-1814, pp.1512-1520: "British Blockade from the River Elbe to the port of Brest - 16th May 1806"

(46) F.O.63, 62, pp.19-20. Letter from James Gambier to Sir Francis Vincent Bart. London 2nd February 1807

(47) F.O.63, 62, p.20v. Letter at note 46.

(48) One of the main factors which at that time were affecting the British privileges was the Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro. For further details: Cf Chapter III, I.

(49) F.O.63, 57 (n.p.). Letter from Sousa Coutinho to Monsieur Hammond, sous-secrétaire d'Etat. South Audley Street, ce 2 avril 1807

(50) F.O.63, 57 (n.p.). Letter from Sousa Coutinho to His Excellency Mr Canning

(51) A.D.P., Cabido no.283, p.2. This book contains the name of the ships, their masters, consignees of the merchandise and date

(52) A.D.P., Cabido no.283, p.4V

(53) A.D.P., Cabido no.283, p.3

(54) A.D.P., Cabido no.283, p.2V

(55) A.D.P., Cabido no.283, p.3V

(56) A.D.P., Cabido no.283, pp.3V-6V

(57) A.D.P., Cabido no.283, p.10V

(58) Dixon, Peter, Canning. Politician and Statesman. London. 1976, from p.106 onwards

(59) Seton-Watson, R.W., Britain in Europe, Cambridge, 1938, p.24. For further details: Canning. Politican and Statesman. London, 1976 by Peter Dixon and George Canning. London. 1932 by Charles Petrie

(60) The stipulations of the treaty may be found at Major Peace Treaties of Modern History, 1648-1967, with an introductory essay by Arnold Toynbee, New York. 1967, pp.469-486

(61) Villat, Louis, La Révolution et l'Empire, 1789-1815. Paris, 1936, pp.100-101 and 127

(62) Crouzet, François, "La prospérité du commerce extérieur britannique pendant la première moitié de 1807", op.cit., pp.220-238

(63) Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit., Primeira Epocha, Tomo III, Lisboa, 1879, pp.585-587: Exigencia da Espanha para que Portugal feche os seus portos aos navios inglezes. Nota do principe da Paz, dirigida ao conde da Ega, Madrid, 20 agosto 1807, and Documento no.119, pp.587-594: A França exige tambem que Portugal feche os seus portos aos navios inglezes. Officio dirigido a D. Domingos Antonio de Sousa Coutinho, nosso ministro em Londres. Palacio de Mafra em 11 de Agosto 1807.

(64) F.O.63, 57. Letter from Souza Coutinho in name of S.A.R. Monseigneur Le Prince Royal. South Audley Street, ce 20 Août 1807

(65) F.O.63, 57 (n.p.). In an extract of letter dated 2nd August 1807 from Joseph White to Menzies(?) White there is a reference that "Lord Strangford had received instructions from the British government to demand the immediate restitutions as a matter of sight, and not of favour grounding(?) the claim upon the infringement of the Law of Nations, the goods having been seized out of the limits of the Portuguese jurisdiction, the only tenable ground upon which the English government could have interfered, but the sentence given in the Courts of Lisbon against the claimants is indirect violation of their own laws"

(66) F.O.63, 57 (n.p.). Letter of several pages from Sousa Coutinho to " son Excellence Monsieur Canning, ce 28 A ut 1807", analysing deeply several points on the development of the political situation since the Tilsit Treaty

(67) At F.O.63, 57 (it contains numerous documents on this subject at that time)

(68) Several documents on this subject may be found at F.O.63, 57 or Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit. Primeira Epocha, Tomo III, Lisboa, 1879, pp.622: "Prevençoes do Ministro de Portugal em Londres sobre a Ilha da Madeira, tomadas de acordo com Mr. Canning, ministro dos Negocios estrangeiros da Gran-Bretanha. Downing Street, 12 de Setembro de 1807"

(69) Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit., pp.626-640: "Convenção secreta, feita em Londres sobre a transferencia da corte e Familia Real da Europa para o Brasil, e occupação da Ilha da Madeira, no caso de uma invasão de tropas francezas em Portugal" or at F.O.63, 57 (n.p.) and S.P., 1812-1814, vol.I - Part 1, London 1841, pp.507-508: "Convention of Friendship and Alliance between Great Britain and Portugal. Signed at London, 22nd October, 1807"

(70) F.O.63, 55, p.246. Letters and Papers from Lord Strangford at Lisbon to the secretary of State, with Drafts. From July 16th 1807 to October 20th 1807, volume II

(71) F.O.63, 62, p.9. Letter from George Canning to Mr Gambier, Foreign Office, August 29th 1807

(72) F.O.63, 62, p.94. Edict. or Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit., pp.598-599; Documento no.122: "Nova recusa do governo Portuguez em proceder ao confisco das propriedades inglezas. Notas dirigidas a Mr de Rayneval, encarregado dos negocios da França em Lisboa. Palacio de Mafra em 25 de Setembro de 1807

(73) F.O.63, 62, p.37. Letter from J. Gambier to the Right Honorable George Canning. Lisbon September 28th 1807

(74) When the French took the Hanseatic cities in 1806, some merchants were arrested and their merchandize confiscated. Nevertheless François Crouzet, op.cit., p.212, affirmed: "En premier lieu, grâce aux dispositions adoptées par les diplomates britanniques, aucun bâtiment anglais, ou venant d'Angleterre, ne tomba aux mains des Français". The author quoted as source F.O.33/36, Nicholas à Howick, 4 et 27 Novembre, 12 déc 1806; Lindeman à F.O.26 octobre 1806, 26 avril 1807

(75) Dixon, Peter, op.cit., pp.112-114 or Seton-Watson, R.W., Britain in Europe, 1789-1914, p.24. For further details: Ruppenthal, R., "Denmark and the Continental system", in Journal of Modern History, 1943 and Ryan, A.N., "The causes of the British attack upon Copenhagen in 1807", in English Historical Review, 1953. At F.O.63, 57 (n.p.). Letter from Sousa Coutinho "A son Excellence Monsieur Canning. South Audley Street, ce 28 a ut 1807"

(76) F.O.63, 62, p.44. Letter from Strangford to J. Gambier. Lisbon September 29th 1807

(77) F.O.63, 62, p.50. Letter from Gambier to Antonio Araújo d'Azevedo. A Lisbonne le 2 octobre 1807

(78) F.O.63, 62, pp.37-44. Several letters

(79) F.O.63, 62, p.56: "Edict: The Prince Regent our Souvereign Lord, not being able to prevent the departure from this court of the Ambassador of His Catholic Majesty, and of the French & King of Italy, has notwithstanding well grounded hopes, that their absence will be only temporary, and that no hostile act will follow on the part of those sovereigns, with whom His Royal Highness is endeavouring to maintain the same good harmony and intelligence which has hitherto so happily subsisted. This made to your Lordship for the purpose of being made public when convenient. To the President of the Board of Trade. Antonio d'Araujo D'azevedo

(80) F.O.63, 62, pp.39-43. Letter from J. Gambier to George Canning. Lisbon. October 4th 1807

(81) F.O.63, 62, p.68. Letter from Strangford to James Gambier. Lisbon October 8th 1807

(82) F.O.63, 56, no.114 and F.O.63, 62, p.94. "Edital: O Principe Regente Nosso Senhor foi servido Mandar remeter à Meza do Dezembargo do Paço o Decreto do theor seguinte.
Tendo sido sempre o Meu maior desvelo conservar em Meus Estados, durante a presente Guerra, a mais perfeita Neutralidade pelos reconhecidos bens, que dela resultavão aos Vassalos desta Coroa; com tudo não sendo possivel conservalla por mais tempo, e considerando outrosim, o quanto convém á humanidade a pacificação geral: Houve por bem acceder à Causa do Continente, unindo-me a Sua Majestade Catholica, com o fim de contribuir, quanto em mim for, para a acceleraçao da Paz maritima. Por tanto sou servido ordenar, que os portos deste Reino sejão logo fechados á entrada dos Navios, assim de Guerra, como Mercantes, da Gran Bretanha"

(83) F.O.63, 55, p.246. An estimate of the value of British Property in Porto, taken from the accounts of the several Houses of the Factory and other resident British subjects, 25 September 1807

(84) F.O.63, 55, p.246. Value of the Houses and land or immovables

(85) F.O.63, 55, p.246. Value of the debts

(86) F.O.63, 55, p.244. Letter from Strangford to the Secretary of State. Lisboa, October 3rd 1807

(87) P.P., 1808, IX. (126) IX, 117. Copy of the warrant of the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, dated 23rd October 1807, giving authority to allow Goods and the Property of British subjects, to be imported from Portugal in Portuguese or neutral ships. Whitehall, Treasury Chambers, 23rd October 1807. The document is signed by Perceval, W.S. Bourne and R. Ryder. It may be found also at: C.J.63, 1808-1809, pp.170, 175 and 560 or F.O.63, 62, p.13

(88) Several authors have furnished different details on this subject: Alan David Francis, in The Wine Trade, London, 1972, p.269, wrote: "...the Portuguese succeeded in hedging for some months without actually agreeing to the French demands and the Oporto Factory was able to profit by this respite to evacuate their families and to send the church plate, their valuables and as many wines as possible home"
François Crouzet, op.cit., p.257, referred: "Le 14 October 1807, un convoi de quatre-vingts voiles quitta Lisbonne, emmenant la plupart des résidents anglais, leurs familles, leur biens meubles et de grandes quantités de coton. Au même moment, un convoi de soixante navires chargés de vins quittait Oporto"
Jorge de Macedo, op.cit., p.71, added some details: "E' certo que nao se averiguou quem partia, nem como partia, para

Inglaterra nessa enorme frota saida de Lisboa em 18 de Outubro que passara pelo Porto...Sao 81 navios ingleses e portugueses que navegam em direcçao aos portos de Inglaterra. Há ainda noticia de um outro comboio - mais difícil de localizar - de fugitivos ingleses saidos da costa portuguesa já em Novembro de 1807". He quoted as source: Os Franceses no Porto - Diário de uma testemunha, anotado e precedido de uma introdução, Porto, 1949, 2º Vol., pp.13-14 by Durval Pires de Lima

(89) In this chapter, VII, there is evidence of some freight of Portuguese vessels realized at that time in Oporto

(90) F.O.63, 64, p.48. Letter from William Warre to George Hammond. London, Jan. 19th 1808

(91) A.D.P., Livro do Cabido no.283 from p.63V to the end. This book called "Receita do Direito Real da Redízima e Portagem" refers to the fact that 57 vessels were registered

(92) Cf. note (88)

(93) The source cited at note (91) has registered all the destinations of the vessels

(94) Macedo, Jorge, op.cit., p.130

(95) Macedo, Jorge, op.cit., p.150

(96) Macedo, Jorge, op.cit., p.41. According to C.J.67, 1812, pp.763 and 766, Great Britain in 1807 exported to Portugal £1,170,221 (real value) or £756,111 (official value)

(97) Macedo, J., op.cit., p.67

Notes - II

(1) On this subject: R.W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe. 1789-1914. Cambridge, 1938, p.24; Louis Villat, La Révolution et l'Empire, p.128; S.F.L. Soriano, História da Guerra Civil, Primeria Epocha, Tomo III. Lisboa, 1879, pp.602-607. According to the Fontainebleau Treaty the division of Portugal would be as follows:
1. A provincia de Entre Douro e Minho, com a cidade do Porto, se trespassará em plena propriedade e soberavia para sua magestade, o rei da Etruria, com o titulo de rei da Lusitania septentrional.
2. A provincia do Alemtejo e o reino dos Algarves se trespassará em plena propriedade e soberania para o principe da Paz, para serem por elle gosados debaixo do titulo de principe dos Algarves.
3. As provincias da Beira, Tras os Montes e Extremadura portuguesa, ficarao por dispor até que haja uma paz, e entao se disporá d'ellas segundo as circunstancias, e segundo o que se concordar entre as duas partes contratantes

(2) "Le Grand Project Portugais de Godoy" in Napoléon et l'Espagne. 1799-1808 from p.299 onwards by André Fugier

(3) Details on England's naval strategy may be found in The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery , London, 1976, pp.123-125 by Paul M. Kennedy

(4) Silbert, Albert in Do Portugal de Antigo Regime ao Portugal Oitocentista , pp.40-83 and Jorge Macedo in O Bloqueio Continental. Economia e Guerra Peninsular , pp.36-43 show a detailed analysis on the Anglo-Portuguese and Franco-Portuguese trade in that time

(5) Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit. Primeira Epocha, Tomo III, pp.600-601

(6) Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit., pp.601-602

(7) The Prince Regent justified his conduct through an "Exposição veridica, e exacta da conduta da Corte de Portugal" published in Rio de Janeiro on 1st May 1808. Cf. C.L.P., 1802 à 1810, pp.491-498

(8) F.O.63, 64, p.11. Memorial to the Right Honorable the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury which was sent to George Canning

(9) F.O.63, 64, pp.48-49V. Letter from William Warre to George Hammond on 19 January 1808

(10) P.P., 1812, III, p.258

(11) C.J., 63, 1808-1809, p.553 or P.P., 1808, X(5)X, 51, p.3

(12) C.J.63, 1808-1809, p.553 or The Continental System. An Economic Interpretation, p.114 by Eli F. Heckscher

(13) Such influence is referred to by Eli F. Heckscher, op.cit., p.112 and Peter Dixon in Canning, Politician and Statesman. London, 1976, p.114. This author affirmed: "Britain replied in kind with a policy originally recommended by James Stephen" in his work War in Disguise

(14) Heckscher, Eli F., op.cit., p.114

(15) Some of these orders in Council may be found in C.J.63, 1808-1809, pp.553-557 or in P.P. 1808(5)X, 51, pp.2-19

(16) On this subject Eli F. Heckscher in op.cit., p.117 quotes as example of source "the utterances of Lord Bathurst, the president of the Board of Trade, and Lord Hawkesbury (afterwards Lord Liverpool), the Home Secretary; in the House of Lords, Feb. 15, 1808 (Hansard, vol.x, pp.471, 485"
François Crouzet in L'Economie Britannique et le Blocus Continental (1806-1813), Tome Premier, Paris, 1958, p.281, affirms: "Le principe fondamental de ces ordres était donc d'interdire aux pays ennemis tout commerce qui ne fût pas avec la Grande-Bretagne et, inversement, d'accorder des facilités considérables au trafic entre cette dernière et l'Europe napoléonienne. Il est vrai qu'on laissait aux pays ennemis la possibilité de conserver des relations entre eux ou bien avec les pays neutres, mais à condition que ce trafic passât par l'intermédiaire des ports britanniques, où tous les bâtiments en provenance ou à destination des ports ennemis devaient venir faire escale, décharger puis recharger leurs cargaisons sur lesquelles des droits de transit spéciaux seraient perçus par la douane anglaise"

(17) C.J.63, 1808-1809, p.554 or Heckscher, op.cit., p.116. About this point he affirmed: "Ignoring details, we may say that the real principal regulations, as distinct from the apparent ones, consists in permitting both direct trade between the home country of a neutral vessel and enemy colonies and also direct trade between the European British port and enemy ports. What is prohibited in the first place, therefore, is direct intercourse between the enemy colonies and their mother countries. But further, in the main, all direct intercourse between the enemy countries, and other ports is prohibited, except when the "other ports" are either European British ports or ports in the vessel's own country. That is to say, intercourse is also prohibited between enemy ports and neutral ports elsewhere than in the home country of the neutral vessels"

(18) François Crouzet, op.cit., Tome Premier, p.281

(19) Goldsmith, Lewis, Recueil des Décrets de Napoléon Bonaparte et des membres du Gouvernement Français, depuis le 18 Brumaire, An 8 (Novembre, 1799) jusqu'à l'année 1812, inclusivement, troisième volume, Londres, 1813, p.190

(20) Goldsmith, Lewis, op.cit., pp.191-192

(21) The second Milan Decree stipulated in the first three articles:
1. Tout bâtiment, de quelque nation qu'il soit, qui aura souffert la visite d'un vaisseau anglais, ou se sera soumis à un voyage en Angleterre, ou aura payé une imposition quelconque au gouvernement anglais, est par cela seul déclaré dénationalisé, a perdu la garantie de son pavillon et est devenu propriété anglaise.
2. Soit que les dits bâtiments ainsi dénationalisés, par les mesures arbitraires du gouvernement anglais, entrent dans nos ports ou dans ceux de nos alliés, soit qu'ils tombent au pouvoir de nos vaisseaux de guerre ou de nos corsaires, Ils sont déclarés de bonne et valable prise.
3. Les Isles britanniques sont déclarées en état de blocus sur mer comme sur terre. Tout bâtiment, de quelque nation qu'il soit, quelque soit son chargement, expédié des ports d'Angleterre ou des colonies anglaises, ou des pays occupés par les troupes anglaises, ou allant en Angleterre, ou dans les colonies anglaises ou dans des pays occupés par les troupes anglaises, est de bonne prise, comme contrevenant au présent décret; il sera capturé par nos vaisseaux de guerre ou par nos corsaires, et adjugé aux capteurs.

See also: The History of British Commerce and of the Economic Progress of the British Nation, 1763-1878, London, 1880, p.119 by Leone Levi, F.S.A., F.S.S.

(22) Hecksher, op.cit., p.124. In The Rise Modern Europe edited by William L. Langer, New York and Evanston, 1938, p.98, it is considered that: "The aim of this Milan decree was to exclude from European waters the ships under neutral registry which the British had pressed into service to carry their wares into ports from which their own ships were barred."

(23) Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit., Primeira Epocha, Tomo III, p.608

(24) This order was a clear contradiction relatively to the frequent affirmations of the Portuguese authorities in declaring that the British subjects would not be arrested neither would their properties be confiscated.

(25) F.O.63, 56. Instructions from Canning to Strangford on 12 November 1807

(26) F.O.63, 58, pp.78-84. Draft, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. Nov.11th, 1807 (most secret)

(27) According to Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit., p.613, the warning of the Prince Regent was made in the following terms: "Pelo presente faço saber a quem convier, que sendo notorio que os portos de Portugal se acham fechados à bandeira da Gran-Bretanha, e qui o ministro

plenipotenciário de sua majestade britanica junto da Corte de Lisboa deixou esta capital, e em conformidade das instruçoes recebidas pelo abaixo assignado, vice-almirante do pavilhão azul, comandante em chefe, a embocadura do Tejo é declarada em estado de rigoroso bloqueio. Pelo presente informo portanto o governo portuguez, que foram expedidas as ordens para que esta medida seja estrictamente executada enquanto durarem os objectos da actual desinteligencia. Os consules dos estados neutros avisarão o seu governo em tempo oportuno de que o rio se acha bloqueado, e de que contra os navios que n'elle tentarem entrar se tomarao todas as medidas autorisadas pelas leis das naçoes e pelos respectivos tratados entre sua magestade britannica e as potencias neutras.

Dado a bordo da nau Hibernia, na altura do Tejo, aos 22 de Novembro de 1807. G. Sidney Smith."

(28) "Participação feita ao governo inglez por Sir Sidney Smith da resoluçao que tomára de bloquear o Tejo, em eumprimento das suas instruções in: História da Guerra Civil. Primeira Epocha, Tomo III, pp.611-614 by S.J.L. Soriano or Cor. Braz. Londres, 1808, from p.5 onwards

(29) Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit., pp.619-620. Documento no.127: (Declara o Principe Regente a sua intenção de mudar a corte para o Brazil, nomeando por esta causa uma regencia para governar o reino)

(30) On this subject: Peter Dixon, op.cit., p.115

(31) Cf. "Le système continental et la crise de l'Empire" (1807-1811) in La Révolution et l'Empire by Louis Villat

(32) Cf. "Les succès de L'Angleterre" in Napoléon, p.331 by Georges Lefebvre

(33) Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit., Segunda Epocha, Tomo I, Lisboa, 1870, p.180. He affirms: "Junot, que mal tinha força para poder subordinar Lisboa e guarnecer devidamente as suas fortalezas, nada sabia das provincias de Traz os Montes e Beira Alta. Limitado nos primeiros tempos a conservar por sua tão somente a provincia da Extremadura, os seus enviados passaram depois a occupar-se da conservação das suas comunicações com Hespanha"

(34) According to Cor. Braz., Londres, 1808, p.86, the order was given as follows: "O Governador de Paris, Primeiro Ajudante de Campo de S.M. o Imperador e Rey, General em Chefe. Em nome de S.M. o Imperador dos Francezes, Rei de Italia, Decreta:

Todos os bens, assim moveis, joyas, prata como de raiz, de qualquer natureza que possão ser, pertencentes a quaesquer individuos, Vassalos da Gram Bretanha, e existentes em todo o territorio de Portugal, serão confiscados.

As mercadorias de manufactura ingleza, de qualquer natureza que ellas possão ser, serão confiscadas.

He expressamente determinado a todo o individuo de qualquer classe a que pertença, que tiver em seu poder algum valor, ou Mercadorias pertencentes a Vassallos da Gram Bretanha, que as venha declarar no prazo de tres dias à secretaria do Senhor Goy, Comissario destinado ad hoc, que assiste na casa No.10, defronte da fonte do Loreto, e no interior de Portugal se deverão fazer estas declaraçoens perante o Magistrado do Lugar.

Todo o individuo, que não fizer exactamente a sua declaração, pagará dez vezes o valor do objecto, que não tiver declarado, e mesmo será castigado corporalmente, se o objecto o merecer.

As mercadorias, euja propriedade tiver sido encuberta de qualquer maneira que seja, dos Negociantes Portuguezes, Francezes, ou de qualquer outra Nação, deverão do mesmo modo ser declaradas, debaixo das mesmas penas.

O Administrador Geral das Finanças e o Conselho de Regencia são encorregados da execução do presente Decreto Lisboa 4 de Dezembro 1807

(35) F.O.63, p.136. Letter from W. Nassan to George Hammond. Treasury Chambers, 14 December 1807

(36) F.O.63, 64, pp.176-177. "Memorial of the British merchants and manufacturers residing or trading in Portugal, done in London on 14 March 1808"

(37) F.O.63, 64, p.188. Letter from Richard Pinnel as a representative of the British merchants lately resident at Oporto to George Hammond. 22 Winchester Street 18th March 1808

(38) F.O.63, 64, p.190

(39) F.O.63, 64, p.192

(40) F.O.63, 58, p.187. Instructions from Castlereagh to the Lords Commissioners, on 28th December 1807

(41) F.O.63, 58, p.1898

(42) Silva, Domingos Oliveira, "Guerra Comercial Franco-Britanica" in Jornal de Noticias published in Oporto on 9th and 10th of April 1984

(43) Macedo, J., op.cit., p.117

(44) Macedo, J., op.cit., p.117

(45) Villat, Louis, La Révolution et l'Empire, pp.131-132 or Raymond Carr in Spain 1808-1975. Second Edition, from p.72 onwards

(46) Dixon, Peter. Canning. Politician and Statesman, pp.117-118 and Raymond Carr, op.cit., from p.72 onwards

(47) According to Jorge Macedo, op.cit., p.117, in the month of May 1808, 33 vessels entered Barra do Douro from Spain while the monthly average since January had been only 5

(48) Cf. in this chapter III

(49) Macedo, J., op.cit., p.118

(50) Macedo, J., op.cit., p.117

(51) On this subject: Cf. orders in council referred at note (15)

(52) Despite the blockade established by the Royal Navy, there is evidence that the exports from Oporto for Great Britain continued, mainly that of the wine. Cf. Cabido no.284 at A.D.P. (Livro para a Receita da Redizima e Portagem da Alfandega pertencente ao Ex.mo Bispo e cabido desta Cid.e)

(53) This may be verified in F.O.63, 165, pp.620-621 or in Wine, the wine and the Cellar, Table XIII. by Thomas George Shaw

(54) Source quoted at note (52)

(55) On this subject, cf. in this chapter III

(56) Source quoted at note (52)

(57) According to Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit., segunda Epocha, Tomo I, p.182, Junot himself received from some merchants established in Lisbon a gift to a value of 40,236$ 120 reis

(58) Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit., p.182-183

(59) Some documents on this subject may be found in F.O.63, 58, p.136; F.O.63, 64, pp.11, 57, 157 and 176

(60) Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit., p.183

(61) A.D.P., Cabido no.283, pp.1-3v

(62) F.O.63, 165, p.447

(63) Cf. F.O.63, 165, pp.260v-261

(64) Francis, David Alan, The Wine Trade. London, 1972, p.271

(65) Cobb, Gerald, Oporto Older and Newer, p.73

(66) F.O.63, 65, p.28

(67) F.O.63, 65, p.28v

(68) F.O.63, 65, p.69. Office of Committee of Privy Council for Trade. Whitehall, 24 May 1808

(69) P.P., 1812, III, 16, p.568

(70) Some documents may be found in F.O.63, 58 (on 31 Dec. 1807) and F.O.64, p.3

(71) F.O.63, p.3."Sketch of a plan for Packets, to be established between England and Rio de Janeiro or the nearest port to His Royal Highness' future residence"

(72) F.O.63, 65, p.193. Translation of a Royal Decree of the Prince Regent of Portugal dated Bahia, Brazil, 28th January 1808

(73) On this subject many details are referred to in P.P., 1808, X (119) X, 81 and P.P., 1812, III, and in The Growth and Fluctuation of the British Economy. 1790-1850, vol.I. Oxford, 1953, p.89 by Arthur D. Gayer. According to this work the official values (in £ millions) of the total exports from England were:
In 1806: Germany (5,6); Prussia (o.5); North Europe including France (7.6)
In 1807: Germany (0.4); Prussia (0.2); North Europe including France (5.1)

(74) André Fugier in La Révolution Française et l'Empire Napoléonien. Paris, 1954, pp.216-217, showed the difficulties as follows: "Après Iéna, Hambourg et Brême sont occupés, un cordon douanier établi sur toutes les côtes de la Mer du Nord. La Hollande donne son adhésion au système impérial en décembre 1806, le Danemark en octobre 1807, la Russie en novembre, la Prusse en décembre, l'Autriche en février 1808. En Italie, Joseph a dès mars 1806 pris les mesures ordonnées; Eugène le fait en décembre; Livourne est occupée en août 1807 et la côte adriatique de l'Etat pontifical en novembre. L'Espagne a acquiescé en février 1807, le Portugal est envahi et Lisbonne prise en novembre". The author still added: "Ainsi, écrit Napoléon au tsar, voilà l'Angleterre en guerre avec tout le monde!"

(75) Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit., Primeira Epocha, Tomo III, pp.640-642

(76) On this subject , cf. in this chapter, VI

(77) F.O.63, 65, pp.200-204

(78) F.O.63, 58 (on 31 Dec. 1807); F.O.63, 64 pp.3, 34 and 267

(79) F.O.63, 64, p.323

(80) F.O.63, 65, p.77

(81) F.O.63, 65, p.20

(82) F.O.63, 64, pp.159-161

Notes - III

(1) F.O.63, 58, pp.187-189

(2) The Livro do Cabido no.284 (in A.D.P.) shows a considerable reduction of exports by that time

(3) According to J. Macedo, O Bloqueio Continental. Economia e Guerra Peninsular, pp.114-118, in the first five months of 1808 the movement of vessels at Oporto decreased more than fifty per cent

(4) According to Cor. Braz., vol.II, Londres, 1809, pp.10 and 11, the declaration was:
"Em nome, pois, de nosso Rey D. Fernando VII e de toda a Nação Hespanhola declaramos guerra, por mar e por terra, contra o Imperador Napoleao I e contra a França: nos estamos determinados a expulsar o seu dominio, e tyrannia, e mandamos a todos os Hespanhoes, que obrem hostilmente contra elle e que lhe fação todo o damno possivel, conforme ás leys da guerra; que se ponha um embargo em todos os Navios Francezes nos nossos portos, e toda a propriedade e effeitos, em qualquer parte da Hespanha que estejam, e quer pertençam as Governo, quer pertençam ao individuos daquella Nação. Da mesma forma ordenamos, que nenhum embaraço ou incommodo se faça á Nação Britanica, nem ao seu governo, nem aos seus navios, propriedades ou effeitos, nem a individuo algum daquella Nação; nos declaramos, que haverá livre e aberta communicação com a Inglaterra; que nos temos ajustado, e intentamos guardar, um armisticio com aquella Nação, e que esperamos concluir uma durável e perpetua paz. Dado no Palacio Real do Alcacer em Sevilla, aos 6 de junho, de 1808. Por ordem da Suprema Juncta do Governo."

(5) Temperley, Harold, and Penson, Lillian, Foundations of British Foreign Policy. From Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902) London and Edinburgh, 1966, pp.22-24

(6) In F.O.63, 65, p.169 the document permits us to estimate how the British protected the Provisional Government of the Austurias and also how they were anxious that the insurrection became extensive to all Peninsula, mainly Lisbon occupied by the French

(7) In Cor. Braz., Londres, 1808, from p.143 to 153 there are many details about the events. At p.145 it is referred to: "As tropas Hespanholas, que guarneciam a cidade do Porto, pelos Francezes, ouvindo que as provincias de Hespanha se revoltávam contra o Ogverno de Bonaparte resolveram fazer causa commum com os seus compatriotas; e prendendo ao seu commandante Francez, Francisco Guesner, entregáram a Cidade ao governo de seus magistrados, e o commando militar o conferiram a Luiz d'Oliveira, um official Portuguez de Patente superior, que fazia as vezes de Governador da cidade pelo Principe Regente, antes da entrada dos Hespanhoens, os quaes, deixando assim a Cidade, aos 6 de Junho, marcháram para Galiza"

(8) The other members of the junta were: two clergymen Dr. Dezembargador Provizor do Bispado Manuel Lopes Loureiro, o Dr. Dezemb. Vigario geral José Dias de Oliveira; two soldiers - Major Antonio da Silva Pinto e o Cap. Commandante do Corpo de Artilheria; two magistrates - o Dezembr José de Mello Freire, Juiz da Coroa e o Dezemb. Luiz de Sequeira da Gama Ayala two citizens - Antonio Matheus Freire de Andrade e Antonio Ribeiro Braga

(9) W.P.1/207. Hibernia off the Tagus, 4 July 1808

(10) W.P., 1/207. Proclamation by Sir Charles Cotton, Bart., Admiral of the Blue, and Commander in Chief of His Majesty's Ships & vessels on the Coast of Portugal. Hibernia off the Taugs, July 4th 1808.

(11) W.P., 1/207. Letter from C. Cotton to Sir Arthur Wellesley. Hibernia off the Tagus, 9th July 1808

(12) According to S.L. Soriano, op.cit., Segunda Epocha, Tomo V - Parte I, p.15, the Bishop of Oporto, D. Antonio de S. José de Castro, on 18 January 1808 had declared for the French

(13) The document is signed by the Bishop and Manoel Lopez Loureiro, Ant^{o} Matheos Rev. da And.d. Cust. Bandira, Antonio da Silva Pinto, José de Mello Freire, José Dias de Oliveira, Luiz de Siqueira da Gama Ayala and Francisco, Osorio Fonseca

(14) F.0.63, 65, pp.264, 325. The last document refers to three million cruzados, and "the entire armament and linning(?) for 40,000 men, and for 8,000 horses - 1000 barrels of powder, and cloth for uniform; moreover some vessels with salt fish and other necessaries"

(15) W.P., 1/207 - Letter on 9 July from S. Brown to Arthur Wellesley informing him about the enemy's forces in Portugal and their position at that time

(16) F.0.63, 65, p.266. It is a document in French showing the treaty with three articles and one additional article

(17) F.0.63, pp.266-267. In its third clause the treaty stated: "l'intérêt de ce traité étant commun également pour la Nation Britannique, ancienne et fidelle Alliée du Portugal, il doit être communiqué a S.M. le Roi de la Grande Bretagne, et a fin qu'il donne sa garantie a ce qui dans le même est stipulé"

(18) BT1, 41, p.31. Order in Council published on 4 July 1808

(19) J. Macedo, op.cit., p.118

(20) BT1, 41, p.2. The memorial of the principal and major part of the Merchants of London, engaged in the commerce with Portugal

(21) BT1, 41, p.2V

(22) BT1, 41, p.3. Among the 31 memorialists, the document was signed by representatives of the British firms at Oporto such as: Martinez, George Sandeman & Co; Guarle Harris & Son; Butler & Sons; Offley Brothers Forrester; Warre Brothers; Dixon Morgan and Croft. Some signatures are illegible

(23) BT1, 41, p.1. Letter from Wellesley to the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury

(24) BT1, 41, p.88. Letter from the Lords Commissioners to Wellesley. Custom House, 19 August 1808

(25) BT1, 41, p.84. Letter from John Bowden to William Fawkener, 3rd September 1808

(26) J. Macedo, op.cit., p.118

(27) S.J. Luz Soriano, op.cit., Segunda Epocha, Tomo V, Parte I, p.26

(28) C.L.P. (1802 a 1810), p.531. The determination was published in the following terms: "A junta Provisional do Governo Supremo por terem cessado os motivos que derão occasião ao sequestro geral praticado nas fazendas de manufactura Ingleza, e outros quaesquer effeitos pertencentes aos vassalos da Gram-Bretanha. Ordena, que o mesmo sequestro seja levantado, e que os ditos effeitos, e fazendas possão girar livremente no commercio, precedendo o Despacho competente, e pagamento dos Direitos devidos. O que se lhe participa para que assim o faça executar na Alfandega desta Cidade, e nas mais das tres Provincias do Norte, expande-se para isso as Ordens necessárias. Porto, 27 de junho de 1808. José de Mello Freire = José Dias de Oliveira = Senhor Superintendente Geral da Alfandega das três Provincias do Norte"

(29) C.L.P. (1802-1810) pp.566 and 567: "A Junta Provisional do Governo Supremo; Determina, que se levante logo o sequestro feito em todos os bens, direitos, e acções pertencentes a Vassalos de SUA MAGESTADE BRITANICA; entregando-se tudo a seus donos, ou a seus legitimos Procuradores"

(30) F.O.63, 65, p.287. Letter from William Warre to George Hammond. Albany Piccadilly, July 26th 1808

(31) F.O.63, 65, p.308. Letter from Bob's Mkerrell(?), chairman of the committee, 28 July 1808

(32) A.D.P., Livro No.284, p.9

(33) W.P., 1/207. A letter from S. Brown to Arthur Wellesley, on 9 July 1808, described the military situation with great detail, indicating the region occupied, contingent of troops, psychological moment, etc.

(34) W.P. 1/207, translation No.5. Four o'clock in the afternoon, the 10th July 1808 (signed by Picaluga)

(35) F.O.63, 65, pp.282, 283 and 285. The Portuguese ships prepared to sail for Oporto on 26 July: Europa - cap. Silva; Ventura Feliz - cap. Araújo and Bizarria - cap. Vidal

(36) W.P., 1/208. Letter from the Duke to Colonel Gordon

(37) F.O.63, 65, p.305. Letter from Canning to S. Coutinho

(38) F.O.63, 66, pp.100-103V. Letters from the junta to C. Cotton

(39) W.P., 1/207. Letter from C. Cotton to Sir Arthur Wellesley, Hibernia off the Tagus, 9th July 1808

(40) W.P., 1/207. Determination ordered by a Junta Provisional do Governo Supremo to Senhor Dez.or Inspector Geral das Repartiçoes civis do Exercito. Doc. No.1: "A junta Provisional do G. Supremo, determina que Vossa Merce, sem perda de tempo, e com toda a brevidade, que possa segurar a promptidao dos fornecimentos, que vou insinuar lhe, no precizo termo de oito Dias, haja de expedir as providencias necessarias para que nas vizinhanças da Figueira e Coimbra se apromptarem as Boyadas precizas para darem provimento de Quinze a vinte Boys por dia á Tropa Ingleza, que se destina desembarcar no citio mais commodo a esta operação.
Incluindo também nas suas providencias o fornecimento da palha, e cevada para seis centos cavalos, calculando, pelo consumo diario de Doze arrateis de palha e meio Algueire de cevada..."
Doc.no.2: "A Junta Provisional do G. Supremo determina que se fação apromptar por estes oito Dias as cavalgaduras necessárias para servir a Tropa Ingleza, que vai a dezembarcar nas vizinhanças da Figueira e Coimbra, cujo preparativo deve consistir em Quinhentas bestas de cela e Albarda sendo maior o Numero das que se destinão para carga, assim como cincoenta carros, para com humas e outros, se haverem de fazer as necessárias conduções e transportes..."

(41) C.L.P., 1802 a 1810, pp.593-597. Also it is possible to examine the "Definitive Convention for the Evacuation of Portugal by the French Army" in "Wellington Papers", 1/212. Some details about the negotiations may be seen in C.J., 64, 1809 pp.17 and 228

(42) The negotiations were carried out by the British Lieutenant-Colonel Murray and by the French General Kellermann and the Convention was ratified by Duc d'Abrantes and A.J. Dalrymple.

In Simao J. da Luz Soriano, op.cit., Segunda Epocha, Tomo V - Parte I, from p.109 onwards the C. Cotton's negative reaction as well as the generalized opposition in Portugal are shown in detail. Also the Bishop of Oporto as well as the Governo Supremo do Porto protested against the Convention. For further details see: F.O.63, 66, p.120 and pp.179-197V

In London the reaction was no more favourable than in Portugal. Canning "was appalled, describing the Convention as ruinous and disastrous". About this subject see: George Canning. London, 1932, pp.60-63, by Charles Petrie and Canning. Politican and Statesman, London, 1976, pp.118-120 by Peter Dixon

(43) C.L.P., 1802 a 1810, p.599. Ordem do Governo, e Plano para hum Corpo de Cavalaria para guarniçao da cidade do Porto

(44) F.O.63, 62, p.212. The document refers to the following: "A Fol.106 do Livro 1º da Receita, e Despesa do Thesoureiro Mór do Thesouro Público Domingos Martins Gonçalves estabelecido nesta cidade pela Junta Provisional do Governo Supremo, lhe ficão lançados em debito a quantia de Duzentos trinta e nove contos sete sentos quarenta e seis mil e cem reis Metal - 239:746$100.

Que entregou dizemos que entrarão neste Thezouro Publico no dia dezoito de Agosto em duzentos noventa e nove mil seis sentos e oitenta e dois, e cinco oitavos Pezos duros de prata moeda de Hespanha, vindos de Inglaterra em cincoenta e dois barriz, pelo emprestimo que o Governo daquele Reino fez as de Portugal; tendo sido contado este dinheiro com assistencia de Francisco Henrique Brekemann Cap. am d'Artelharia Real do Exercito Inglez, e Ajudante de Campo do Brigadeiro General Decken. Deste passa-se dois para hum só valer. E de como recebeo, assignou comigo Escrivão da sobredita Thesouraria Mór. Porto Nove de Setembro de mil e oitocentos e Oito.

Domingos Martins Gonçalves Domingos Pedro da Silva Souto e Freitas." That amount was only a part of about three hundred thousand pounds required by the Bishop. The British merchants at Oporto, both Noble and Hunt at that time in London, proposed to Canning and Sousa Coutinho on 10th September that they "would engage to remit immediately three hundred thousand;" If they received in payment, for the same "Bills on His Majesty's Treasury bearing interest at four or six months date..." For further details see: F.O.63, 66, p.149

(45) C.L.P., 1802 a 1810, p.568. Ordem do Governo declarando a imposição dos 4$800 reis em pipa de Vinho, e o modo da sua arrecadação

(46) C.L.P., 1802 a 1810, p.558. Abolição da Contribuição Franceza e abertura de outra Patriotica e Voluntaria

(47) C.L.P., 1802 a 1810, p.564. The determination was: "Tendo sempre em vista a utilidade pública a beneficio do Commercio, em que se interessa o bem geral da Nação Portugueza: Conhecendo quanto será util ao mesmo Commercio a admissão das Moedas de ouro da Nação Britannica, e que tenhão livre curso, e giro dentro deste Reino de

Portugal: Determina, que as Moedas Britanicas de ouro, abaixo indicadas, circulem, e corrão livremente, com o valor na forma aqui declarada:

Moeda	Valor
Guiné	3$750
Meio Guiné	1$875
Terço de Guiné	1$250

Porto 14 de Julho de 1808 = Bispo, Presidente Governador"

(48) Cf. C.L.P. (1802-1810), p.575. "Attendendo ao gravissimo prejuizo, que soffre o Commercio na introducção, e giro da Moeda Franceza: Ha por bem proibir absolutamenta a sua circulação, para que jámais se possa admitir em quaesquer pagamentos, ou sejão particulares, ou destinados para as arrecadações publicas; não havendo obrigação alguma de aceitar-se, qualquer que seja a sua natureza, qualidade, ou valor. Dado no Porto a 18 de Agosto de 1808. Bispo, Presidente Governador"

(49) C.L.P., 1802 a 1810, p.564. Ordem acerca da abolição da Contribuição Franceza, e Donativos voluntarios da Defeza

(50) C.L.P. (1802 a 1810), p.566. Ordem para o levantamento do sequestro Britannico, e se fazer o Francez

(51) C.L.P. (1802 a 1810), p.600. Proclamação dos Commissarios Britannico e Francez encarregados de fazer executar a convenção de 30 de Agosto para a evacuação de Exercito Francez

(52) A.D.P., Cabido no.284, p.12

(53) A.D.P., Cabido no.284, p.13V°

(54) A.D.P., Cabido no.284, p.15V°

(55) A.D.P., Cabido no.284, p.16V°

(56) A.D.P., Cabido no.284, p.16V°

(57) A.D.P., Cabido no.284, p.16V°

(58) Macedo, J., op.cit., pp.117-118

(59) Cf. in this chapter, IV, note (9)

(60) Macedo, J., op.cit., pp.117-118

(61) On this subject cf. in this chapter, IV

(62) According to C.J.67, 1812, pp.763 and 766, Great Britain exported in 1807 to Portugal in real value £1,170,221 and in official value £756,111. In 1808, real value £600,137 and official value £431,045. According to J. Macedo, op.cit., p.41, Portugal imported from England

in 1807 - 5,422,272,321 reis and in 1808 - 1,966,375,040 reis and exported to England in 1807 - 7,971,196,005 reis and in 1808 only 802,980,620 reis

(63) F.O.63, 165, pp.260-261. In F.O.63, 165, p.447 36,780 pipes are referred to

(64) F.O.63, 165, p.447. According to this document 48,858 pipes were exported in 1807

(65) F.O.63, 165, pp.260-261. The British firms referred to are: Warre & Co. - 20; Newman - 194; Bearley & Webb - 555; Thompson Croft & Co. - 50; Page & Co. - 21; Stephenson Searle & Co. - 101; Harris Brothers - 187; H. Burmester - 61; Other British subjects - 628

(66) F.O.63, 165, pp.260-261

(67) BT1, 41, pp.52-52V. Letter from S. Johns Harbour to the Lords of the Committee of Council for Trade. Newfoundland, 20th July 1808. The signature is illegible

Notes - IV

(1) C.L.P. (1802 a 1810), p.607

(2) C.L.P. (1802 a 1810), p.610

(3) B.P.M.P., códice no.1226, p.180

(4) B.P.M.P., Códice no.931, p.11. Robert Wilson was a British officer who was at Oporto having been one of the founders of the "Legião Lusitana" which had great importance during the Peninsular War. About his military and political career details may be found at the British Museum: Ad.Mans.Ns.30:099; 30:105;30:112; 30:128; 30:135 and 30:137. About the "Legião Lusitana" see: Southampton University Library, W. Papers, 1/212 (18 pages)

(5) F.O.63, 62, pp.225, 228 and 229. Correspondence between Robert Wilson and the local authorities to the middle of October

(6) F.O.63, 62, p.236. Letter from Illustrious Senate in satisfaction, to the British Nation. Porto in the Senate House, 13 October 1808

(7) F.O.63, 62, pp.246-247. Letter from R. Wilson to the Senate

(8) C.L.P. (1802 a 1810), p.664

(9) The beginning of the warning was written in these terms: "Fazemos saber a todos os nossos amados Diocesanos, que o comum Inimigo, tendo sido lançado fora deste Paiz, foi fazer novas associaçoens, e dobrar as suas forças para vir sobre nós com grande poder, fazendo protestos de tornar a levantar as suas Aguias nas Espanhas..."

(10) C.L.P. (1802 a 1810), p.711

(11) F.O.63, 74, p.65. Letter from a representative of the British merchants to Mr Villiers. Dec. 20th 1808

(12) F.O.63, 75, p.67. Letter from Bishop of Oporto to J.C. Villiers, Porto, 3 Jan 1809

(13) F.O.63, 81, p.33. Letter (without signature) to John Cole, London. Exeter, 28 Jan 1809

(14) F.O.63, 81, p.32. Letter from John Cole to George Hammond. London, 31 January 1809

(15) F.O.63, 81, p.12. Letter from Alex Turner to the Government. Leeds 10th Jan 1809

(16) He was at that time Vice Admiral of the Red, and Commander in Chief of His Majesty's ships and vessels employed on the coast of Spain and Portugal from Finisterre to Cape St. Vincent, and from thence to Madeira and the Western Islands

(17) F.O.63, 75, p.135

(18) A.D.P., p.4, No.466, fls 87V-88V

(19) A.D.P., p.4, No.466, fls 95-96

(20) A.D.P., p.4, No.466, fls 96V-97V

(21) The price of the ship's hire was stipulated in the contracts

(22) This stipulation was common in all contracts

(23) Silva, Domingos Oliveira, "Guerra Comercial Franco-Britanica" published in Jornal de Notícias (Porto, 9th and 10th April 1984)

(24) F.O.63, 75, p.135. Instructions from George Crawfield Berkeley to all captains, commanders and officers of His Majesty's Navy and to all officers of British Privateers and Letters of Marque. February 1809

(25) F.O.63, 75, pp.145-146. Letter from the population of Vila Nova de Cerveira Porto, 17 February 1809

(26) F.O.63, 75, p.166. Letter from Villiers to Canning. Lisbon March 3rd 1809

(27) F.O.63, 75, pp.137-139. Letter from Villiers to Canning. Lisbon Feb. 18th 1809

(28) F.O.63, 75, pp.228-231. Letter from Villiers to Canning. Lisbon 20th March 1809

(29) C.L.P. This document is contained in a Collecçao de Legislaçao which exists at the B.P.M.P. (n.p.)

(30) Source quoted at note (29). The two documents were divulged under the title "Aviso Militar aos Leaes Habitantes da Cidade do Porto, E Que Deve Merecer Toda a Observancia" and "Continuação dos Detalhes Militares para o serviço da linha de contravallação Que Corre, e Defende Esta Cidade"

(31) About this subject, amongst other sources may be seen: Cor. Braz., Vol.III, from pp.406 onwards and from pp.521 onwards; Inv. Port., Vol.XXIII, from pp.436 onwards; Simão José da Luz Soriano, op.cit., Segunda Epocha, Tomo II, capitulo III, Lisboa, 1871; B.P.M.P., Códice no.1226, p.180 and O Porto sob a Segunda Invasão Francesa. 1809 by Artur de Magalhães Basto

(32) On this subject cf. Oporto Old and New, pp.38-56 by Charles Sellers

(33) A.D.P., p.4, no.469, fls 101-102 and R.A. Joseph Farington, The Farington Diary, vol.VI, p.221

(34) Artur de Magalhães Basto in O Pôrto sob a segunda invasão francesa. 1809, p.98 referred to: "Muitas pessoas, antes do assalto, haviam levado os seus valores - os seus móveis, até! - para bordo dos navios que se encontravam no Douro, na esperança de poderem fugir por mar Mas o temporal não permitira a saída da barra, e os navios tinham sido aprisionados"

(35) Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit., Segunda Epocha, Tomo II, Capitulo III, p.175, Lisboa, 1871

(36) A.D.P., p.4, no.466, fls 128-129

(37) S.J.L. Soriano, op.cit., Segunda Epocha, Tomo II, Capitulo III, pp.136-137, Lisboa, 1871

(38) A.D.P., p.4, no.466, fls 128-129

(39) A.D.P., p.4, no.466, fls 124V-125V

(40) A.D.P., p.4, no.466, fls 134-135. The robberies and damages were as follows: "As escotilhas ranchos Camara etudo quanto é fechado e aberto de popa e proa = Varios estragos sobre a coberta que forão veziveis = A verga do traquete partida, um mastareu do belasco e pega partido = a borda toda aluida = uma lancha nova de bom lote proporcionada e embarcaçao falta = Um pau de bujarrona = Um virador de cento e vinte braças de cinco polegadas = Um ancorete de quatorze arrobas = pipa e meia de vinho - doze baus arrombados comtudo o que neles estava saqueado = cinco quintais de bacalhau = cinco de biscoito branco = um barril de azeite = dois barris de carne de vaca = um de carne de porco = dois sacos de arroz = um saco de feijão e outras miudezas"

(41) Artur de Magalhães Basto in op.cit., p.107 refers to: "Comprador não apareceu nenhum. Os vinhos que estavam nos barcos destinados a Inglaterra valiam para cima de seis milhoes de francos. Soult bem quis vende-los por qualquer preço. Mas, com grande espanto seu, viu que ninguém lhes pegava. As propostas que teve foram irrisórias: uma casa inglesa estabelecida no Porto dispunha-se a adquirir o vinho por dois terços do seu valor, contando que só pagasse...quando tivesse autorização do seu Governo. Um negociante, também britanico, quis igualmente realizar a transacção, mas pediu que antes o deixassem in a Londres obter a necessária licença: foi e não voltou"

(42) A.D.P., Cabido no.284, fls 20-21

(43) A.D.P., Cabido no.284, fls 20-21

(44) B.P.M.P., Códice no.138, pp.60-61. The document refers to the distribution of the wine as well as Artur de Magalhães Basto in op.cit., p.61

(45) Sources cited at note (44)

(46) Sources cited at note (44)

(47) B.P.M.P., Códice no.138, p.18

(48) B.P.M.P., Códice no.138, p.18

(49) B.P.M.P., Códice no.138, p.18

(50) B.P.M.P., Códice no.138, p.18

(51) B.P.M.P., Códice no.138, p.18

(52) B.P.M.P., Códice no.138, p.18

(53) B.P.M.P., Códice no.138, pp.20-21

(54) The document refers to: "Guilherme Warre Inglez na rua das Mosas deste couto pessue = Huma caza sobrada com seo quintal..."

(55) "João Telles Inglez, pessue na Rua da Pedreira deste couto uma propriedade de cazas magnificas quintal e nas suas pertenças, humas pequenas cazas de criados, com os moveis"

(56) "Guilherme Nassan Inglez pessue na Rua do Monte deste Couto Huma magnifica caza, com grande quintal e caza de criado com os moveis"

(57) "Gonel(?) Inglez pessue na Rua de Cima deste couto o seg^{te}: Huma morada de cazas grandes com caza separada para criados com seos quintaes = Dois armarios ou guardas roupas sem mais outros moveis, cujas cazas estão dezertas, e abertas"

(58) "Numa propriedade de cazas, que he propriedade Ingleza, que foi de Guilherme Brize(?) e se ignora agora o nome definidor; e habita nellas Damião Frz em caza do Porto, não há moveis, q. requer tenção, tem cavallarices separadas, dous quintaes pequenos, e mais um campo na baxa da Senhora da Luz do m.^{mo} Couto pertença da m.^{ma} caza"

(59) B.P.M.P., Códice no.1228. It contains many documents about the seizure of Oporto. The codice no.138 contains some pages with claims and protests made by some local authorities involved in the ceremony of proclamation under the pressure of the French. See also: Artur di Maghalães Basto, op.cit., pp.93-115

(60) About this subject A Gazeta de Lisboa no.24, Suplemento Extraordinário de 14 de Junho de 1809 contains "Diario official das operações militares do general Francisco da Silveira, desde a invasão dos francezes até á sua total expulsao destes reinos". See also: Cor. Braz., Vol.III, from p.109 onwards

(61) See: "O Porto sob os franceses" in op.cit., pp.89-117 by Artur de Magalhaes Basto

(62) Basto, Artur Magalhães, op.cit., pp.99 and 100

(63) Leal Portuguez, 1809, pp.151 and 152

(64) Basto, Artur Magalhães, op.cit., p.98

(65) Basto, Artur Magalhães, op.cit., p.131

(66) B.P.M.P., Códice no.138, p.22 and Artur Magalhães Basto, op.cit., p.132. Both refer to a list of the prices which were allowed at that time

(67) B.P.M.P., Códice no.138, p.181. Beyond the sources above cited, on this subject, one of the best works should be História da Guerra Civil, Segunda Epocha, Tomo II, pp.175-278 by S.J.L. Soriano

Notes - V

(1) W.P., 1/295. It is a document without date and signature on the Second French invasion in Portugal. It ends: "Lisbon was consequently thrown into alarm, and the Regency urgently implored the aid and protection of the British nation"

(2) In W.P. 1/252 there are 12 pages about this subject. The number of ships is referred to as follows: "At Portsmouth: 4 Dragoons - 31 ships; 3rd Do - 27; Artillery Horses(?) - 11; Staff ships - 2; Hay - 16; Oats - 7 and Hospital ship - 1. At Falmouth: 16 H. Dragoons - 28; Comp. Equipage - 1. Guernsey service - 6 and Cork service - 4

(3) Parliamentary Debates, 14 - 1st series, 11 April 1809 to 21 June 1809 - J 301H2. See: Debates on "Campaign in Spain and Portugal" pp.121-173 and "Portuguese Regency", pp.278-290

(4) W.P., 1/290 - Memorandum of operations in 1809, dated 9th December 1809 by Lord Wellington. It refers in 64 pages to many details on the military operations during that year

(5) W.P. 1/290 - Memorandum (Note A)

(6) B.P.M.P. Códice no.138, p.67

(7) W.P. 1/265. Letter from Wellesley to Villiers. Coimbra, June 1st 1809

(8) W.P., 1/263. Letter from Wellesley to Castlereagh. Coimbra 31st May 1809

(9) W.P., 1/265. Letter from Wellesley to Castlereagh. Abrantes 11th June 1809

(10) W.P., 1/264. Letter from Beresford to Wellesley. Lisbon, 19th June 1809

(11) W.P., 1/266. Letter from Wellesley to Villiers. Abrantes, 20th June 1809

(12) W.P., 1/266. Letter from Wellesley to Mr Murray. Castelo Branco 23rd June 1809

(13) This order is contained in a collection of documents on "Legislaçao" (n.p.) in B.P.M.P.

(14) W.P., 1/263. Letter from Wellesley to Villiers. Oporto 23rd May 1809

(15) W.P., 1/263. Letter from Wellington to the Hon. Adm. Berkeley. Coimbra 1st May 1809

(16) W.P., 1/265. Letter from Wellesley to Villiers. Coimbra 1st June 1809

(17) W.P., 1/265. Letter from Wellesley to Admiral Berkeley. Tomar 7th June 1809

(18) W.P., 1/264, Letter from Trant to Wellesley. Oporto 9th June 1809

(19) About this subject cf. R.W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914, Cambridge University Press, 1938, pp.22-30 or Canning. Politician and Statesman, Deidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1976, pp.107-128 by Peter Dixon

(20) W.P., 1/290. Memorandum of Operations in 1809 from Lord Wellington

(21) W.P., 1/264. Letter from Antonio José Viana to Trant. Monção 7th June 1809

(22) W.P., 1/266. Letter from Wellesley to D. Miguel Forjaz. Abrantes 18th June 1809

(23) W.P., 1/266. Letter from Wellesley to Castlereagh. Abrantes 22nd June 1809

(24) Source cited at note (20)

(25) B.P.M.P., Códice no.138 (n.p.)

(26) W.P., 1/264. Horse Guards, 13 June 1809

(27) F.O.63, 97, p.233V. Letter from the Ministre de Affaires étrangères to Wellington. Rio de Janeiro 2 juillet 1809

(28) C.L.P., 1802 a 1810, pp.764-766. The determination was directed to governors in the following terms: "...Sou servido Ordenar-vos, que desde logo reduzais ao número de tres o dos Governadores com voto deliberativo em todos os objectos de Administração Publica, e que estes sejam o Patriarca Eleito de Lisboa, o Marquez das Minas, e o Marquez Monteiro-Mór; ficando empregado na Presidencia da Meza da Consciencia, e ordens Dom Francisco Xavier de Noronha, e exercendo o Cargo de Presidente da Meza do Desembargo do Paço Francisco da Cunha e Menezes, de que lhe Fiz Mercê por Decreto da data desta; e sendo estes dois Membros do actual Governo desobrigados como taes de assistirem ás sessões do novo Governo, em que nao terao parte daqui em diante..." e "...Igualmente sou servido Ordenar-vos, que reconheçais por Marechal General dos Meus Exercitos a Sir Arthur Wellesley, em quanto elle se conservar no Commando das Forças Alliadas Portuguezas, e Inglezas, tomando assim o Passo sobre o Marechal Beresford, como Commandante em Chefe das Forças Combinadas; e logo que assim for reconhecido, o chamareis a todas as sessões do Governo, em que se tratar de organização Militar, ou objectos concernentes ao mesmo fim, de matérias de fazenda, e das grandes resoluçoes que for necessário tomar sobre a defeza do Reino, e da Peninsula, ouvindo em todos esses pontos o seu parecer: E nas occasiões em que elle se achar ausente no Exercito, e nao puder assistir às vossas sessões, então o ouvireis do modo possivel por escuto, participando-lhe tudo, a fim de que elle esteja perfeitamente informado do que se resolver sobre taes materias..."

(29) F.O.63, 76, p.199V. Letter from Villiers to Canning

(30) F.O.63, 74, p.186. Letter from Canning to Villiers

(31) F.O.63, 81, p.226

(32) F.O.63, 74, p.232. Letter from Bathurst to Villiers

(33) C.J., 65, p.629

(34) F.O.63, 81, p.131

(35) Macedo, J., op.cit., pp.119-120

(36) Macedo, J., op.cit., p.41. According to C.J.67, 1812, p.766, the real value of exports in 1809 from Great Britain to Portugal was £1,124,098 (British produce & manufactures - £804,022 and foreign and colonial merchandize - £320,076)

(37) F.O.63, 165, pp.260-261

(38) These nine are referred to in the same document source cit. at note (37)

(39) These seven are referred to at: A.D.P., Cabido no.284

(40) A.D.P., Cabido no.284

(41) W.P., 1/344. Memorandum of Operations in 1810 (it contains about 20 pages)

(42) W.P., 1/344. Memorandum of Operations in 1810

(43) W.P., 1/344. Memorandum of Operations in 1810

(44) W.P., 1/344. Memorandum of Opeartions in 1810

(45) A.D.P., p.4, No.470, pp.25-26

(46) A.D.P., p.4, No.469, pp.47-48

(47) A.D.P., p.4, No.469, pp.85-86

(48) A.D.P., p.4, No.469, pp.100-101

(49) W.P., 1/344. Memorandum of Operations in 1810

(50) A.D.P., No.471, pp.32-33 and 37-38

(51) F.O.63, 97, p.64

(52) W.P., 1/315. Letter from Villiers to Wellington

(53) W.P., 1/315. Letter from Villiers to Wellington

(54) In W.P., 1/315 the may be found/"Distribution of the combined British and Portuguese Army on the 27th September 1810"

(55) W.P., 1/316. Letter from M. Fran.co da Silv.ra to Wellington

(56) W.P., 1/316. Letter from Silveira to Wellington

(57) W.P., 1/316. Letter from Silveira to Wellington

(58) W.P., 1/320. Letter from Silveira to Wellington

(59) W.P., 1/320. Letter from João Lobo Brandão de Almeida (Colonel and governador at Abrantes)

(60) W.P., 1/320. Letter from Silveira to Wellington

(61) S.P., 1812-1814. Vol.I - Part I, from p.513 onwards

(62) Cf. the preamble to the treaty

(63) Carta Régia from the Prince Regent "Para o Clero, Nobreza e Povo". Rio de Janeiro, 7 de Março de 1810

(64) C.L.P., 1802 a 1810, p.897

(65) F.O.63, 97, p.234. The document refers to the following: "Conformément à la comunication qui m'a été transmise, en date de Rio de Janeiro de 11 May 1810 par le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, combinée avec celle que Mr. de Forjaz m'a faite en date du 11 aout 1810, le conseil devrait être composé, à ce qu'il me semble, comme il fait:
- Le Patriarche Elu
- Le Marquis (ci devant comte) Monteiro Mor
- Le Comte de Redondo
- Principal Souza - à la place du Marquis das Minas dont S.A.R. a accepté la démission
- Ricardo Raymundo Nogueira
- Invité au Conseil - comme ci devant-Lord Wellington
- Comme Membre du Gouvernement pour les matières militaires et de Finances Le Ministre Britannique, Mr Stuart

(66) On this subject there are many documents in W.P., 1/316 and 1/320. Cf. Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit., Segunda Epocha, Tomo V, Parte II, pp.144 and following

(67) This position may be confirmed in W.P., 1/320. Letter from Raimundo Nogueira to Snr. Marechal General Lord Visconde Wellington. Lisboa, 6 de Dezembro de 1810

(68) W.P., 1/316. Letter from Wellesley to C. Stuart (Secret and Private) 3rd October 1810

(69) W.P., 1/316. Letter from Stuart to Wellington. Lisbon Oct. 6th 1810

(70) W.P., 1/316. Letter from Conde Redondo to Ch. Stuart. Lisboa, 6 de Outubro 1810

(71) W.P., 1/316. Letter from Ch. Stuart to Lord Wellington. Lisbon Oct. 21st 1810

(72) On this subject there are several documents in W.P., 1/316

(73) W.P., 1/320. Letter from Conde Redondo to Ch. Stuart. Lisboa, 27 Nov. 1810

(74) Macedo, J., op.cit., p.41. According to C.J. 67, p.766, the real value of exports from Great Britain to Portugal was estimated at £2,228,833 (British produce and manufacture - £1,308,216 and foreign and colonial merchandize - £920,617)

(75) Macedo, J., op.cit., pp.119-122

(76) F.O.63, 165, pp.260-261V

(77) F.O.63, 165, pp.260-261V

(78) F.O.63, 117, p.19

(79) F.O.63, 117, p.19

(80) A.D.P., Cabido no.284

(81) W.P., 1/340. Memorandum of the Operations in 1811 made at Freneda in December 1811. It contains 68 pages

(82) W.P., 1/340. Memorandum of the Operations in 1811

(83) W.P., 1/340. Memorandum of the Operations in 1811

(84) On this subject there are many documents in W.P., 1/329; 1/331; 1/332 and 1/340

(85) W.P., 1/332. Letter from Wellington to the Earl of Liverpool. Villa formosa, May 7th 1811

(86) W.P., 1/329. Proclamation directed to the Portuguese Nation, 10th April 1811

(87) W.P., 1/332. State of the Portuguese Gov. hereand at the Brazis. Intrigue of Principal Souza. Letter from Wellington to Villiers. Elvas, May 25th 1811

(88) A.D.P., p.4, No.472, pp.142-142V

(89) A.D.P., p.4, No.473, pp.1-1V

(90) W.P., 1/340. Memorandum of Operations in 1811

(91) A.D.P., p.4, No.473, fls 89-89V

(92) A.D.P., p.4, No.473, fls 90-90V

(93) W.P., 1/340. Letter from Wellington to the Earl of Liverpool

(94) W.P., 1/340. Letter from Wellington to the Earl of Liverpool

(95) P.P. 1813-1814, Vol.XIV, pp.57-87. It contains many details about activities on behalf of the victims of the French invasions

(96) The districts involved were: Torres Vedras, Riba-Tejo, Santarem, Alcobaça, Alenquer, Ourem, Chão de Couce, Tomar, Leiria, Arganil, Coimbra, Crato, Aveiro, Linhares, Vizeu, Trancozo, Tentugal, Guarda, Lamego, Castelo Branco and Pinhel. For further details, cf. Chapter V, II

(97) W.P., 1/340. Memorandum of Wellington dated 20th Nov. 1811

(98) W.P., 1/340. Letter from Wellington to Earl Liverpool. Freneda, October 16th 1811

(99) Macedo, J., op.cit., p.41. According to C.J., 67, 1812, p.766 the real value of exports from Great Britain to Portugal was estimated at £6,164,858, which corresponds to about three times that of 1810

(100) Macedo, J., op.cit., p.42

(101) A.D.P., Cabido No.284

(102) Macedo, J., op.cit., pp.122-125

(103) F.O.63, 165, pp.260-261

(104) F.O.63, 165, pp.260-261

(105) A.D.P., Cabido No.284

(106) Macedo, J., op.cit., p.72

(107) F.O.63, 165, pp.260V-261

(108) For further details cf. in this chapter, VIII

Notes - VI

(1) In P.P., 1812, III, p.258. "Dates of the Orders in Council, the French Decrees, and the consequent Acts of the American Government", and S.P., Part 2, 1812-1814, pp.1512-1520, may be found: "British Blockade from the River Elbe to the Port of Brest - 16th May, 1806

(2) Levi, Leone, The History of British Commerce and of the Economic Progress of the British Nation 1763-1878, London, 1880, pp.113-115 or Recueil des Décrets de Napoléon Bonaparte (extraits du Moniteur), second volume, Londres, 1813, pp.832-844 by Lewis Goldsmith

(3) C.J.63, 1808-1809, p.553 or P.P., 1808, X(5)X, 51, p.3

(4) F.O.63, 57 (n.p.). Letter from Lord Howick to Chev. de Souza Coutinho. Downing Street, February 27th 1807

(5) F.O.63, 57 (n.p.). Letter from S. Coutinho to Lord Howick. South Audley Street ce 6 de mars de 1807

(6) F.O.63, 57 (n.p.). Letter from S. Coutinho to Lord Howick. South Audley Street ce 14 mars 1807

(7) F.O.63, 57 (n.p.). Letter from S. Coutinho to Monsieur Hammond, sous-sécretaire d'Etat. South Audley Street, ce 2 avril 1807

(8) F.O.63, 57 (n.p.). Letter from S. Coutinho to Canning. South Audley Street ce 1 août 1807

(9) F.O.63, 62, pp.9. Letter from Canning to Mr Cambier. Foreign Office, August 29th 1807

(10) Cf. in this chapter, I, note 88

(11) P.P., 1808, X(119), X, 81, p.169

(12) F.O.63, 67, p.287. List of the ships detained between 12 October 1807 and 16 March 1808

(13) F.O.63, 56, 114. Editorial announcing the adhesion of Portugal "à causa do Continente". Lisboa, 22 outubro de 1807

(14) F.O.63, 64, pp.48-49V

(15) F.O.63, 58, p.102

(16) Many documents on this subject may be found in C.J., 63, 1808-1809, pp.553-557

(17) F.O.63, 64, p.280 The ships detained were: Alegria Constante on 22nd; S.to Antonio Tejo on 18th; S. Marcos on 11th; Commercio do Rio on 19th; Balsemão on 23rd and Gratidão on 29th.

(18) In Cor. Braz. London, 1808, pp.20-27, there are many details about this, according to memoranda drawn up by Strangford and Sidney Smith

(19) Cor. Braz., London, 1808, p.194

(20) F.O.63, 64, p.280. The names of the ships and dates of detention were: Pombinha de Lisboa on 6th; Serra Pequena on 7th; Mariana Daphne on 12th; S. Pedro Aguia on 25th; Americano on 14th; Na Sa da Conceição and S. Jose on 26th; Fama on 26th; Oliveira on 17th; Ventura Feliz on 15th; Ulisses on 28th; Europa on 21st; Commerciante on 29th; Boa Fé on 17th; Scipião on 29th and Venador on 27th

(21) Cf. A.D.P., Cabido no.283

(22) Cf. A.D.P., Cabido no.283

(23) Cf. A.D.P., Cabido no.283

(24) F.O.63, 64, p.73

(25) This Order in Council may be seen in Portuguese in Cor. Braz. London, 1808, pp.16-17. In F.O.63, 64, pp.5 and 6 the order in council is referred to: 'Whereas it is expedient in the present state of the subjects of the Most Faithful Majesty and during the Interruption in commercial correspondence between G. Britain and Portugal, that claims should be permitted to be given for Portuguese property brought in and detained by His Majesty's ships of war and privateers: His Majesty is pleased by and with the advice of His Privy Council to order, and it is hereby ordered that claims for Portuguese property given by persons duly authorized by the owners, or by the consul or other person authorized by the Portuguese minister resident at this Court, shall be admitted in the High Court of Admiralty. And it is further ordered that immediate Restitution shall pass of all such property as shall appear by the Bills of lading or other documents found on board Portuguese ships coming from Portuguese settlements to the ports of Portugal, to belong to Her Most Faithful Majesty, or to any of Her subjects residing at the date of this order in the Brazils, or in any foreign settlement belonging to Her Crown or in England or in any Country in amity with His Majesty, upon a general claim for every such ship and goods given by the consul under the authority aforesaid: - And it is further ordered that the property of the subjects of Her Most Faithful Majesty at the date of this order residing in Portugal either belonging to them separately or jointly with subjects residing in the Brazils or other places before mentioned, shall be pronounced to belong as claimed, upon a general claim given for the same on board such Portuguese ships as aforesaid.

And it is further ordered that the property last mentioned, as well as all other property, under private claims already given, or to be given and pronounced to be Portuguese property, and belonging to persons resident in Portugal at the date of this order, shall remain subject to His Majesty's further orders and in the meantime shall be put into the joint custody of agents to be named on behalf of His Majesty, and on behalf of the Portuguese minister resident at this court, or of any Claimant, and that such parts thereof as are perishable or which it may be otherwise expedient to sell, shall be sold by the aforesaid agents, under Commissions to be issued by the High Court of Admiralty, and the proceeds thereof deposited in the said Court: And the Right Honorable The Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, His Majesty's Principal secretaries of State, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and the judge of the High Court of Admiralty, and the judges of the Courts of Vice Admiralty, are to take the necessary measures herein, as to them shall respectively appertain". Fawkener

(26) Cor. Braz., 1808, p.109

(27) Cor. Braz., 1808, p.110

(28) F.O.63, 64, p.19. Letter from Canning to S. Coutinho. Foreign Office. January 13, 1808

(29) F.O.63, 64, p.63

(30) F.O.63, 64, pp.63-70

(31) F.O.63, 64, p.73. Report made by M. Burmester as agent of the Portuguese property

(32) Sailing "from Oporto to Tonningen. Cargo - 10 Chests of sugar of Francisco Guimarães & Co. of Oporto"

(33) Sailing "from Oporto to Tonningen. Cargo - 38 Chests of sugar of the same as above"

(34) Sailing "from Lisbon to Caen. Cargo - 108 bags of Brazil cotton of Joaquim Soares of Lisbon"

(35) Sailing "from Tonningen to Lisbon. Cargo - 220 Packages of linen of the same as above"

(36) Sailing "from Copenhagen to Oporto. Cargo - 17000 staves of the Oporto Company"

(37) Sailing "from Stockholm to Lisbon. Cargo - Sundry articles of iron, about 62 tons of the Viuva Martins, Filhos" & Co of Lisbon

(38) Sailing "from Pernambuco to Oporto. Cargo - flax of Barnabé de Oliveira Maya, Manoel Francisco Guimarães, Viuva Souto e Freitas, Jerónimo Carneiro Geraldes, Penha e Ribeiro all of Oporto"

(39) Sailing "from Pernambuco to Oporto. Cargo - 17 Bundles of flax of António Carneiro da Silva of Oporto and 39 bundles of Manoel Francisco Guimarães of Oporto"

(40) Sailing from Tonningen to Oporto. "The ship claimed & restored = the captain claimed the cargo as per Manifest, the greater of which is Portuguese Property"

(41) F.O.63, 64, p.99. Letter from Admiralty Office to George Hammond. 23rd Feb 1808

(42) F.O.63, 64, pp.149-150. Memorandum from S. Coutinho to Canning on 9th March 1808

(43) Source cit. at note (42)

(44) F.O.63, 64, pp.150-150V. Memorandum from S. Coutinho to Canning

(45) F.O.63, 64, p.157. Memorandum of the Merchants and Manufacturers trading to Portugal which was sent to Canning. London 10th March 1808

(46) According to F.O.63, 64, pp.222-224, the merchandize was estimated at £20,527.5.0 and the ship at £5,000. At the Exchange rate of 64 reis it would be 95,727$200. These calculations were made by the commissioners for Portuguese property: A. Gibbs, W. Burn, Carlos Sucena and Dias Santos

(47) F.O.63, 64, pp.278-280: the names of the ships were referred to in notes (17) and (20)

(48) F.O.63, 64, pp.313-315. Office of Commissioners for Portuguese property. 28th April 1808.

(49) F.O.63, 64, pp.337-341V. Letter from Canning to Sousa Coutinho. May 2nd 1808

(50) F.O.63, 65, p.3: "His Majesty by and with the advice of His Privy Council is pleased to order and it is hereby ordered that all Portuguese property now detained and not already decreed to be restored nor entitled to restitution under His Majesty's Orders of the 6th of January last shall be forthwith decreed to be restored upon claims given or to be given for the same either by the Portuguese consul or other person duly authorized by the Portuguese resident at this court, Minister or by the agents (duly authorized) of those owners and proprietors who are not resident in Portugal; and that the part of the property so restored belonging to persons not residing in Portugal shall be for the use and benefit of the owners and proprietors thereof, and the part belonging jointly to persons resident in Portugal and persons

resident in the Brazils or in any settlement belonging to the Crown of Portugal, or in the United Kingdom, or in any country in amity with the Majesty, shall be given up to such of the owners and proprietors thereof as are resident as last mentioned upon an engagement entered into and security given by or on the behalf of the said part-owners and proprietors, to the satisfaction of the Portuguese minister, to account to the Prince Regent of Portugal for such part of the said point Property as shall belong to persons resident in Portugal; and the part belonging to persons resident in Portugal shall be at the future Disposition of the Prince Regent of Portugal.

And it is further ordered that the joint agents to whom the property has been or shall be delivered pursuant to the said order of the 6th of January last shall be and they are hereby authorized and directed, after the said property shall have been decreed to be restored, to proceed to the sale of such property or of such parts thereof as the Portuguese Minister resident at this court shall signify to them in writing, the expediency of selling in the manner most beneficial for the parties interested therein and to invest the proceeds of such part as shall be sold, in government securities under the previous sanction in writing of the Portuguese Minister and to hold the same together with the property not sold at the disposal and subject to the future Directions of the Prince Regent of Portugal to be signified to them through His Minister resident in London".

In Portuguese, it may be found in Cor.Braz. London, 1808, p.18

(51) F.O.63, 65, p.12. Letter from Sousa Coutinho to Canning. London 10 May 1808

(52) F.O.63, 65, p.104. Letter from S. Coutinho to Canning. 7 June 1808

(53) F.O.63, 65, p.107. Letter from S. Coutinho to Mr Sucena and Dias Santos. London 6 June 1808

(54) F.O.63, 65, p.111. Letter from S. Coutinho to Canning. 7th June 1808

(55) F.O.63, 65, pp.120-122. Letter from Canning to S. Coutinho. June 18th 1808

(56) Cor.Braz. Londres, 1808, p.195: "Senhor! Temos a honra de acusar a recepção da carta de V.Ex. na data de hoje; e, em resposta às suas perguntas, temos de o informar - Que, havendo a Corte do Almirantado decretado, para S.A.R. o principe Regente, em consequencia da ordem em Conselho de 4 de Maio, a propriedade submettida à nossa custodia, nos consideraremos obrigados a obedecer a quaesquer ordens, que V.Ex. possa dar-nos como seu Representante; nem nós concebemos, que haja outro algum canal, por meio do qual possamos receber as ordens de S.A.R., se nao V.E.

Nos faremos executar immediatamente as ordens, que W.Ex. passou, para a entrega das fazendas; e logo que o tempo no lo permitir mandaremos uma conta circumstanciada dos nossos contractos, segundo

o que nos pede.
Temos a honra de ser com o maior respeito

Senhor

De V.E.
J.C. Lucena
A. Gibbs
C. Dias Santos
W. Burne

A.S.E. o Cavalleiro
de Souza Coutinho

(57) Cor. Braz., Londres, 1808, pp.195-196

(58) Cor. Braz., London, 1808, pp.195-196

(59) Cor. Braz., Londres, 1808, p.111

(60) Source cit. at note (59)

(61) F.O.63, 65, p.229. Protests against the orders in council of 6th January and 4th May by J. Nicholl, V. Gibbs, H. Plummer and F. Lawrence

(62) F.O.63, 65, p.231

(63) F.O.63, 65, p.231V

(64) F.O.63, 65, p.227. Letter from A. Gibbs, William Burn and C. Dias Santos to Canning. 9th July 1808

(65) According to Cor. Braz., Londres, 1808, p.196. The letter which was sent by the commissioners to every captain of the ships detained was as follows: "Sr. Cap. F.... Esta carta serve para lhe prevonir, que estando o seu navio debaixo da nossa custodia, em conformidade das ordens do Conselho de S.M.B. não pode sahir deste porto sem nossa licença, e que temos nomeado o Sr. J. Cobb, para vigiar na execução deste Avizo. Londres, 12 de Julho, de 1808"

(66) Cor. Braz., Londres, 1808, p.197. It was in these terms: "O cap. I.A. do Navio Pombinha de Lisboa entregue a S.A.R. com toda a propriedade Portugueza (que antes estava detida) pela ordem do Conselho Privado Britanico irá mostrar aos extinctos commissários, a ordem, que por este despacho lhe dou de não obedecer a ordem alguma que elles lhe dem; e repito ao H.C. Dias Santos a ordem que já lhe dei de não assignar papel algum como Commissário da commissão extincta, pela minha parte ao menos. Londres, 13 de Julho, de 1808"

(67) F.O.63, 65, p.272. Letter from S. Coutinho to Spencer Perceval. South Audley Street, 23 July 1808

(68) F.O.63, 65, pp.274-277. Project on the properties

(69) F.O.63, 65, p.279. Letter from S. Coutinho to "Monsieur le juge de le Haute Cour de l'Amirauté, à fin qu'il suspende toute procédure contre les capitaines cy-dessous només"

(70) F.O.63, 65, pp.293-299. The sums for payment were as follows: "£730 freight from Plymouth to London of the Balsamão; 1557 d°. from Maranhão to Lisbon of the S. Pedro Aquia; 500 d°. from Plymouth to London on part of the cargo landed out of the San Marcos" "Accounts of captor's charges: £174.15.1 on the Ulisses; 347.14.1 - S. Anna & S. Izabel; 110.6.3 - S. Pedro Aquia; 150.2.0 - Vencedor; 144.2.9 - Balsemão 577.16.5 - Fama; 129.13.11 - Europa; 180.9.0 - Alegria Constante; 161.18.5 - Americano and 100.13.0 - Freight of part of the cargo of the Oliveira brought round from Portsmouth". Furthermore "the payment of £518.18.0 - Freight from Plymouth to London of the Europa"

(71) F.O.63, 65, p.304. Letter from S. Coutinho to A. Gibbs and W. Burn

(72) F.O.63, 65, p.291. Letter from the commissioners to His Majesty's Treasury. 26th July 1808

(73) F.O.63, 65, pp.292-293

(74) F.O.63, 65, p.362. Letter from Perceval to Sr. Coutinho. Downing Street, Aug. 9th 1808

(75) F.O.63, 66, p.12. Letter from Robert Taylor (Hide Broker) to the commissioners, 12th August 1808

(76) F.O.63, 66, p.155. Letter from the Commissioners to William Huskisson. 27th August 1808

(77) F.O.63, 66, p.40. Letter from S. Coutinho to Canning. 22nd August 1808

(78) F.O.63, 66, p.163

(79) F.O.63, 65, p.356

(80) "Ship Americano: Amount Brazil Freight £1900; Freight from Guernsey 485; proportioned on value of the cargo £12,800 - turns out 20½ per cent; Insurance from Guernsey 3 per cent and commission 2½ per cent"

(81) "Ship Serra Pequena: Amount Brazil Freight £4,100; Freight from Plymouth 820; proportioned on value of cargo £24,000 - turns out 20¼ per cent; Insurance from Plymouth 2¼ per cent and commission 2½ per cent"

(82) "Ship Sam Pedro Aquia: Amount Brazil freight £4,600; Freight from Portsmouth 700; proportioned on value of cargo £23,600 turns out 22 per cent; Insurance on cargo from Plymouth 1½ percent and commission 2½ per cent"

(83) "Ship Commercio do Rio: amount Brazil Freight £2,200; Freight from Cork 700; proportioned on value of cargo £14,500 turns out 20 per cent; Insurance on cargo from Cork 4 per cent and commission 2½ per cent"

(84) F.O.63, 66, p.139. "State of commissioners cash account: 1808 - Feb. Rece.d of commissioners for expenses £250 each 1000; August 30 - Rece.d to this day on account of property sole under Decrees of the Admiralty Court Persons to the late order of 4 May for Deposits on Goods No.12082 - £13,082;

1808 - May 31 Paid to this day £145; June 21 Paid commissioners 1000; August 30 Paid for Exchange Bills 7142; Paid to this day for freights of coasters from outports of some Brazil cargoes and other charges 3918; In hands of Bankers this day being to answer expenses principally those of Freight of Brazil cargoes from the outports 877. Total = £13,082"

(85) F.O.63, 66, p.157. Letter from the commissioners to George Harrison. 2nd Sept. 1808

(86) F.O.63, 66, p.173. The order in council was issued in the following terms: "Whereas His Majesty was pleased, by His Orders in Council of the sixth of January and fourth of May last to direct certain measures to be taken for the case and custody of Port. Property, belonging to persons residing in Portugal or elsewhere under the controul of France which had been detained by British Cruizers, and to subject such Property to the future Disposition of the Prince Regent of Portugal, in consideration of the owners not being intitled to the Possession of it while they remained under the controul of the Enemy.

And whereas the deliverance of Portugal from such Controul has since been effected and the Inhabitants of the country are again become duly qualified to receive the Restitution of their Property.

His Majesty is therefore pleased, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, to order and it is hereby ordered, that all Portuguese Property shall be forthwith restored to the respective owners thereof, or their lawful Agents, and the persons appointed by virtue of the order in Council of the sixth of January last, for the care and management of the Port. Property, are hereby ordered to restore the same accordingly such Property nevertheless being subject to the Payment of the legal Charge thereon, and of the Expenses justly incurred in respect thereto, and all questions regarding the ownership of such property, where any Doubt shall be entertained by the persons aforesaid with respect to the same, and the charges and Expences thereon shall be decided upon summarily by the High Court of Admiralty, or the Court & Vice Admiralty in which such Property may have been brought to Adjudication = And the Right Honorable the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, His Majesty's Principal secretaries of State, the Lords Commissioners High Court of Admiralty and the Judges of the Courts of Vice-Admiralty are to take the necessary measures therein as to them shall respectively appertain.

A. Funkener"

In Portuguese language the same order may be found in: Cor. Braz. Londres, 1808, pp.378-379

(87) A.D.P., p.4. No.863, fls 106V-107V

(88) A.D.P., p.4, No.463, fls 139-140

(89) A.D.P., p.4, No.464, fls 7-8

(90) A.D.P., p.4, No.464, fls 22-23

(91) A.D.P., p.4, No.464, fls 66-67V

(92) A.D.P., p.4, No.465, fls 14-14V

(93) A.D.P., p.4, No.465, fls 30-30V

(94) A.D.P., p.4, No.465, fls 30-30V

(95) A.D.P., p.4, No.465, fls 31V-32V

(96) A.D.P., p.4, No.465, fls 38V-39

(97) F.O.63, 65, p.331

(98) Cor. Braz., Londres, 1808, pp.509-511

(99) A.D.P., p.4, No.466, fls 47-47V

(100) A.D.P., p.4, No.466, fls 102-102V

(101) A.D.P., p.4, No.466, fls 115V-116V

(102) A.D.P., p.4, No.467, fls 11-11Y

(103) A.D.P., p.4, No.467, fls 50V-51V

(104) A.D.P., p.4, No.469, fls 7V-8

(105) A.D.P., p.4, No.469, fls 6V-7

(106) A.D.P., p.4, No.469 fls 66V-67

(107) A.D.P., p.4, No.469, fls 113-114

(108) S.P., Part I. 1812-1814, pp.546-547

Notes - VII

(1) Crowhurst, Patrick, "Organization of convoys and their departure" in "The Defence of British Trade 1689-1815", pp.43-81, Dawson & Sons Ltd., Great Britain, 1977

(2) Cf. In this chapter, I and II

(3) Crowhurst, Patrick, op.cit., p.38

(4) A.D.P., p.4, No.473 fls 98V

(5) A.D.P., p.4, No.473, fls 99

(6) Cf. In this chapter, I

(7) A.D.P., p.4, No.466 fls 49-49V

(8) F.O.63, 58, p.187. Instructions for the establishment of the blockade in Oporto's port. Downing Street, 28 December 1807

(9) Cf. In this chapter, I

(10) Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit., Segunda Epocha, Tomo I, p.183. Cf. in this chapter, I, note (88)

(11) BTI, 41, p.31. Order in council of 4th July 1808

(12) A.D.P., p.4, No.464, fls 70V

(13) A.D.P., p.4, No.464, fls 71V

(14) Wardle, A.C. "The Newfoundland Trade" in The Trade Winds. A Study of British Overseas Trade during the French wars 1793-1815 by C. Ernest Fayle, C. Northcote Parkinson, A.C. Wardle, C.M. MacInnes, Basil Lubbock, J.A. Nixon. London, 1948, p.238

(15) Wardle, A.C.. op.cit., p.236

(16) A.D.P., p.4, No.266 fls 80V and 81

(17) F.O.63, 80, p.19. Letter from S. Coutinho to Canning. London 19 Feb 1809

(18) F.O.63, 80, pp.19-19V

(19) W.P., Letters to the Duke. 1 April 1809-8 April 1809

(20) W.P., Letters to the Duke. 1 April 1809-8 April 1809. Letter from James Walsh to Wellington. Sunday 2nd April 1809

(21) A.D.P., p.4, No.467, fls 37-37V

(22) A.D.P., p.4, No.468, fls 22

(23) A.D.P., p.4, No.468, fls 23

(24) A.D.P., p.4, No.469, fls 69-69V

(25) A.D.P., p.4, No.469, fls 134

(26) A.D.P., p.4, No.469, fls 134V

(27) A.D.P., p.4, No.470, fls 90

(28) A.D.P., p.4, No.470, fls 90V

(29) Cf. In this chapter, V

(30) A.D.P., p.4, No.471, fls 6

(31) A.D.P., p.4, No.471, fls 6V

(32) A.D.P., p.4, No.471, fls 18V

(33) A.D.P., p.4, No.471, fls 19

(34) A.D.P., p.4, No.471, fls 44-45

(35) A.D.P., p.4, No.471, fls 63V-64

(36) A.D.P., p.4, No.472, fls 17-18

(37) A.D.P., p.4, No.472, fls 46-47

(38) A.D.P., p.4, No.472, fls 104V

(39) A.D.P., p.4, No.472, fls 125

(40) A.D.P., p.4, No.472, fls 125V

(41) A.D.P., p.4, No.472, fls 136-136V

(42) A.D.P., p.4, No.473, fls 4-4V

(43) A.D.P., p.4, No.473, fls 7V-8V

(44) A.D.P., p.4, No.473, fls 28V-29V

(45) A.D.P., p.4, No.473, fls 36v-37

(46) A.D.P., p.4, No.473, fls 94V-95V

(47) A.D.P., p.4, No.473, fls 100V-101Y

(48) A.D.P., p.4, No.473, fls 111V-112V

(49) A.D.P., p.4, No.474, fls 14V-15V

(50) A.D.P., p.4, No.474, fls 16-17

(51) Wardle, A.C., op.cit., p.286

(52) Wardle, A.C., op.cit., pp.286-287

(53) Adrien Balbi, Essai Statistique, p.478

(54) Balbi, Adrien, op.cit., p.479

(55) Farington, R.A. Joseph, The Farington Diary, vol.VI, p.221

Notes - VIII

(1) On this subject one of the best works should be "Commerical War Before the Berlin Decree" in The Continental System. An Economic Interpretation. by Eli F. Heckscher, pp.77-83

(2) Cf. in this chapter, I

(3) In O Bloqueio Continental. Economia & Guerra Peninsular, from p.38 onwards; Jorge Macedo made a convincing analysis in establishing a comparison between the trade with France and with England, since 1777

(4) Cf. in this chapter, I

(5) Cf. "British Counter-Measures and French Retort" op.cit., pp.98-126 by Eli F. Hecksher

(6) F.O.63, 64, pp.150-150V. Letter from Sousa Coutinho to Canning

(7) This amount is deducted from the different sources cited in this chapter, VI

(8) Cf. Cor. Braz., vol.II, pp.192-200. Propriedades Portuguezas detidas em Inglaterra

(9) In the publications of the Correio Braziliense of 1808 and 1809 there are many claims on this subject

(10) F.O.63, 64, p.157. Memorandum of the merchants and manufacturers trading with Portugal assembled by their undersigned Deputies in London, this 10th day of March 1808

(11) F.O.63, 64, pp.5-6

(12) F.O.63, 65, pp.3-5

(13) F.O.63, 66, p.173

(14) It is possible to find many documents on this subject in A.D.P., p.4, No.464 - p.4, No.469

(15) S.P., 1, Part I, 1812-1814, pp.546-547

(16) By the end of the eighteenth century the number of Portuguese vessels employed in the trade was about 300. Cf. O Brasil no Comércio Colonial , p.661, by José Jobson de A. Arruda. This author cited as source: Romano, R. "Per una Valutazione della Flotta Mercantile Europea alla Fine del Secolo XVIII". in Studi in Onore di Amintore Fanfani. Milan, 1962. V.J. p.578

(17) Cf. F.O.63, 96, pp.112-113. A British merchant called Wilson asked Marquis Wellesley to protect the trade of British manufactures in Lisbon, because they were facing restrictions which were unknown for ten years.

(18) Cf. chapter V, I

(19) B.P.M.P., Códice no.931. Exame Analytico do Antigo do Moniteur de 30/11/1810 sobre a Conducta dos Inglezes em Portugal, p.47

(20) Cf. in this chapter, V

(21) The source cited in the note (19), p.18, refers to the government beginning its functions on 4th August "menos o Enviado Britanico q. nao quis acceitar a nomeação sem o beneplácito da sua corte".

(22) After the war the British authorities requested the Portuguese government to pay a part of the respective expenditures. For further details cf. chapter V, I

(23) "The Continental system in Europe (1808-1812) in The Continental system. An economic Interpretation, pp.149-156, by Heckscher, shows the final collapse of that policy

(24) Cf. chapter II, IV

(25) Cf. in this chapter, III and V

(26) The British merchants confirmed this point in documents which may be found in F.O.63, 165, pp.260V-261

(27) On 12 June 1813 Lord Strangford, one of the British negotiators of the treaty, wrote to Conde das Galveas, declaring that during the negotiations of the treaty, there had been strong opposition on the part of the interests which were affected. This document may be found in Accounts and Papers. Thirteen volumes (13). Miscellaneous. Vol.XXXI, 1830

(28) The Correio Braziliense ou Armazem Literário was founded in London by 1808 by the journalist Hipólito José da Costa. He defended the restoration of Portugal and the independence of Brazil. On this subject cf. História da Imprensa Periódica Portuguesa. Lisbon, pp.61-65, by José Tengarrinha

(29) Cf. in the chapter V: "An anti-British sentiment stimulated by the Portuguese newspapers published in London"

(30) John Bell was one of the members of the British staff in Portugal with the task of supporting the army forces. Cf. chapter V, II

(31) The data were extracted from: Jorge Macedo, op.cit., p.41; Trade and Power, pp.234-235, by S. Sideri and C.J., 67, 1812, p.766

CHAPTER II

THE BRITISH PRIVILEGES:
HISTORIC CLAIMS AND ACTUAL RIGHTS

INTRODUCTION

Many works have discussed the extent of British privileges in Portugal. In general terms they tend to deal with limited aspects of these privileges, such as were contained in published sections of commercial treaties or dynastic contacts such as the marriage of Charles II and Princess Catarina, signed at Whitehall on June 23 , 1661. The State Papers, 1812-1814, Vol.1, Part 1, from page 462 to 563, contain these agreements.

Throughout the period under discussion these privileges were not enshrined in these agreements. These only established the rules of the game. Substantial and special favours which protected the British subjects in Portugal were authorized by the Royal Government by various decrees, edicts and regulating measures which may be found in Ad.Man. and 34.329 in the British Library in London. Sometimes they are vaguely cited. Charles Sellers, for instance, in his work entitled Oporto, Old and New, p.178 cites the "Carta de Privilegio e Foral dos Inglezes" and other documents which also protected the merchants from other European states.

This chapter illustrates the chronological sequence of the privileges conceded to the British traders in the Kingdom of Portugal until the treaty of 1810. Additional documentation from Anglo-Portuguese affairs makes it possible to understand the most significant claims of British merchants between 1807 and 1820.

British traders demanded that the Portuguese authorities act to comply with the stipulations of the treaties and subsequent legislation. This enables us to gain a different prespective on British influence in Portugal between 1807 and 1820.

A summary history of the Royal authorization of the privileges provides the necessary background to understand the disputes which arose as a result of both the deficiencies of Portuguese administration, especially the laxity of the administrators in the ports and custom houses, as well as those which emerged from the success of the British merchants, in their

commercial and social relations, especially in Oporto.

It is therefore not surprising that the claims of the British merchants were sometimes excessive. The local authorities urged them to pay the war contribution on the same footing as Portuguese subjects. Yet British merchants alleged that their privileges exempted them from this obligation and simply offered to pay a symbolic amount to the Royal Treasury as a gift.

Fortunately evidence exists that the Prince Regent in Brazil was much more indulgent to British interests than the Conselho de Regencia in Lisbon. The fifteen per cent tariff levied on British goods faced some resistance in Portugal. But this was the most important stipulation of the 1810 treaty as far as the British were concerned.

Though the Prince Regent ceded to British demands to lower the tariff, the pauta was not clearly defined, so that negotiations on the actual duties levied dragged on from 1810 to 1820.

The pauta clearly constituted a common concern. The Portuguese authorities recognized the necessity of its revision while the British merchants argued both for and against any alterations. Nevertheless the hesitations were not overcome until the end of 1820.

I. THE "ANCIENT" BRITISH PRIVILEGES IN PORTUGAL

The traditional trade[1] of the British in Portugal was considered as advantageous by both the British and Portuguese governments, in the "Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Alliance" drawn up in London on 16 June 1373[2].

On 9 May 1386 a new Treaty of Alliance[3] was drawn up between the two governments, allowing "freedom" of trade in Great Britain and Portugal to the subjects of both countries.

As the Genoese were the most privileged traders in Portugal during the fourteenth century, D. João I ensured to the English the same privileges on 10th August 1400[4].

Five years later the King authorized that Fernão Roiz[5] be the judge of the conflicts in which the English businessmen could be involved.

By 1413 in consequence of the war the Portuguese King granted physical protection to the British merchants and authorized them to display their cloths at the doors of the shops in Lisbon[6]. On 6 December 1437 the physical protection granted to the British and French who came to Lisbon was strengthened[7]. Thirteen years later the English vessels and merchandize enjoyed special protection[8].

By 1450 entry into the houses of merchants could be allowed only with the permission of the Judge Conservator, Doctor Nicholao Dias Tinoco. Moreover English merchants "were excused or exempted from paying any manner of rates, taxes, and loans, or performing any personal services, or holding any offices of charge whatsoever". They could not be imprisoned or retained in prison even in a criminal case, without the mandate of their Judge Conservator and were also authorized to carry offensive and defensive arms[9].

By the end of March 1452 the Portuguese King encouraged the residence of the British in Portugal, by dispensing them from the payment of certain

duties and from military service[10].

These privileges were confirmed by D. Alfonso V in 1454 and 1458, D. João II in 1491, D. Manuel in 1497 and D. João III in 1536[11].

The sale of any silk brought by the English as well as the use of mules and knives was authorized on 23 December 1524[12]. The right of inheritance in Portugal was ensured on 30th September 1605[13] and four years later, the sale of their silks was confirmed[14].

On 14 July 1609 D. Filipe declared that the English privileges remained unaltered[15] and in 1626 the exile of foreign subjects to the Portuguese settlements was prohibited[16]. On 29 January 1642 a Treaty of Peace, Commerce and Alliance was drawn up between the two countries, but the privileges remained as before[17]. The difference of religion could not constitute any restriction to the British subjects, and in the case of their death the Judge Conservator would be the main authority to attend to any problems which occurred.

That year D. João IV confirmed that houses belonging to the merchants remained inviolate[18], while they were authorized to bring their own arms into the Kingdom[19].

On 20 July 1654 a new "Treaty of Peace, Commerce, and Alliance" was drawn up between Great Britain and Portugal[20]. It stipulated that English merchants were authorized to sell by wholesale and retail, paying the same duties as were paid by Portuguese merchants. Moreover some facilities for recovering debts were ensured to merchants. In a secret article it was stipulated that "...the goods, merchandise, and manufactured goods of the English, would never pay more than twenty three per cent of rates".

On 29 May 1656 English subjects were exempted from paying the tithe (Decima) on their stock and from being obliged to take upon themselves any extraordinary duties in time of war[21].

Four years later, on 28 April, a new Treaty of Alliance was drawn up between the two governments[22]. The English privileges remained unaltered as well as in the Treaty of Marriage between Charles II and the Princess Catherine drawn up on 23rd June 1661[23].

On 23 August 1667 it was confirmed that English subjects could not be arrested by any officer of justice without a permit from the Judge Conservator[24]. Four days later Thomas Maynard benefited from that determination[25] and on 7 March 1668 Robert Kopke was also favoured[26].

Meanwhile the number of English firms in Oporto began to grow. Christiano Kopke was founded in 1638(?) and Peter Dowker in 1691[27].

The first exports of Oporto wine to England occurred in 1678[28] and in 1691 D. Pedro II authorized the establishment of an English Judge Conservator at Oporto[29]. This appeared to be a result of a burgeoning trade at Oporto as well as a sign that many English subjects were established in that city.

The Desembargador (High Court Judge), Diogo Mendes Duro, was chosen by English merchants to fulfil the functions of Judge Conservator. As the trade continued to grow, one year later, the firm Job Bearley was founded in the same city[30].

In 1692 D. Pedro II favoured the Castillians with the same privileges which were enjoyed by the English[31] and in 1697 English subjects were exempted from paying any duties on the wine consumed at their houses[32].

On 16 May 1703 the Treaty of Defensive Alliance was drawn up between Portugal and Great Britain, confirming the British privileges[33] while the Treaty of Commerce of 27 December 1703[34] ostensibly strengthened the commercial relations between the two countries.

The British woollen manufactures were admitted in Portugal and the wines produced in Portugal were admitted into Great Britain, "deducting or abating a third part of the Custom or Duty"...from the like quantity

or measure of French wine. As a result the cultivation of the vineyards was intensified not only at the Douro region, but also at Viana do Castelo[35]. The production of wine as well as its export considerably increased[36] and more British firms appeared at Oporto. Phayre and Bradley was founded in 1709 and Peter Bearsley in 1736[37].

On 7 May 1708 an alvará was published and subsequently confirmed, ordering the payment of taxes on the stocks of the subjects of several nations residing in Portugal[38]. Nevertheless the subjects from England and Holland were to be exempted. However naturalized subjects of England and Holland were ordered to pay the tax in the same manner as natives.

British merchants were favoured once more on 14 September 1718 by D. João V, regarding the recovery of debt. The King ordered: "...Os Inglezes que assistirem nestes Reinos poderão cobrar suas dividas sem embargo de qualquer alvará ou previlegio que podem ter os devedores..."[39]

On 27 August 1738 the British Judge Conservator in Lisbon, Doutor Ignacio da Costa Quintella requested the King to obtain a Charter of the British privileges.

On 16th December of that year the privileges which were declared in the Foral of the British Nation and in the treaties" were confirmed[40].

By the middle of the eighteenth century some signs appeared which would adversely affect the British privileges mainly at Oporto.

The establishment of the Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro was the most relevant. Its statutes struck against many British privileges or at least they gave rise to several restrictions. So that the British merchants established at Oporto started a long and fierce struggle against the company which irresistibly involved both Governments, English and Portuguese[41].

In the second half of the eighteenth century there is no evidence that other privileges were conceded. On the contrary the British merchants were arduously struggling so as not to lose the ancient ones.

The Convention of Friendship and Alliance made between Great Britain and Portugal on 22. October 1807[42] as well as the Convention of a British loan of £600,000 to Portugal on 21. April 1809[43] had no impact whatsoever on the privileges. By that time, Portugal was in a state of war[44], where Anglo-Portuguese forces faced the French.

The proposal for a new treaty of commerce between the two nations was regarded by the Portuguese government as the only option which would have to be followed[45].

During the negotiations many objections were raised by individuals who felt that the interests would be seriously affected[46].

Even so, Strangford, British Envoy Extraordinary at the Portuguese Court in Rio de Janeiro, obtained the consolidation of the ancient privileges and this meant that certain monopolies which prejudiced British merchants' interests would be swept away. This applied to the Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro.

On 19 February 1810 the treaty was signed at Rio de Janeiro[47]. Its preamble promised "a liberal system of commerce, founded upon the bases of reciprocity and mutual convenience which, by discontinuing certain prohibitions and prohibitory duties, might procure the most solid advantages on both sides, to the national production and industry, and give due protection at the same time to the Public Revenue, and to the interest of fair and legal trade".

The two parts promised that no favour, privilege or immunity in matters of commerce and navigation would be granted to the subjects of any other state , which was not extended at the same time to the subjects of the other contracting part (article II).

On the one hand the duties, taxes or imports would not be greater than those which were paid by the subjects of the most favoured nation (article III). On the other hand "all goods, merchandise and articles whatsoever" which belonged to British subjects would pay fifteen per

cent of duties at the Portuguese ports according to their value (articles XV and XVI).

As the secret article of the treaty of 1654[48] stipulated that the rates paid by the "people and inhabitants of the Commonwealth of England would never exceed 23 per cent", it may be concluded that the new agreement was substantially advantageous to British trade.

Moreover the British obtained a guarantee that "their dwelling-houses, warehouses, and all the parts and appurtenances thereof, whether for the purposes of commerce or of residence" would be respected. Likewise they would not be subjected "to any vexatious visits and searches", nor to "any arbitrary examination or inspection of their books, papers or accounts..." unless such act occurred under the sanction of the competent Magistrate and in the presence of the consul (article VII).

An important point of the treaty was that the British continued to keep their Judges Conservators in those ports and cities in which there were Tribunals and Courts of Justice. These judges would "try and decide all causes brought before them by British subjects, in the same manner as formerly, and their authority and determinations" would be respected (article X).

In the religious field it was guaranteed to the British that they would have liberty of conscience and "leave to attend and celebrate Divine Service , either within their own private houses, or in their own particular Churches and Chapels" (article XII). The factories established in Portugal were abolished, affecting adversely the British merchants (article XXV).

The favours, privileges and immunities which had been granted by treaty, decree or alvará, remained unaltered "except the power granted by former treaties, of carrying in the ships of either Country goods and merchandises of any description Whatever, the property of the Enemies of the other Country, which power is now mutually and publicly renounced and abrogated" (article XXVI).

The eighth article of the treaty stipulated that the commerce of the British subjects within the Portuguese dominions would not be "restrained, interrupted, or otherwise affected by the operation of any monopoly, contract or exclusive privilege of sale or purchase whatsoever..."

The 25th article also stipulated that "...the commerce and trade carried on by British subjects shall not be restricted, annoyed, or otherwise affected by any commercial Company whatever, possessing exclusive privileges and favours within the Dominions of Portugal..." Nevertheless the British failed to obtain the abolition of the monopoly of the Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro(49).

At the same time the Portuguese government demanded that the British merchants pay a war contribution.

In consequence of this, British privileges seemed to be at risk. So on 3 August 1812 Strangford requested the Prince Regent in Rio de Janeiro to clarify the situation(50).

Four days later the Prince Regent ordered the governors of the Kingdom that the 26th article of the treaty be rigorously enforced. Moreover he added that the ancient British privileges must be respected(51).

From 19 February 1810 to 1820 there is no evidence that other privileges have been conceded in Portugal to the British subjects.

As a result of the privileges enjoyed by the British in Portugal the Portuguese economy achieved certain characteristics of a dependent one on the British trade. According to S. Sideri this dependence was consolidated by the early eighteenth century, due mainly to the Methuen treaty(52). By the time of Pombal some resistance occurred with the foundation of companies which adversely affected the British privileges, the best example being the Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro. Nevertheless by the early nineteenth century the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance and French invasions caused the interruption of commercial relations with the allies of France. The economic situation

became difficult. On the one hand the Portuguese newspapers published in London contested many stipulations of the treaty referring that the British privileges were exaggerated. On the other hand the British merchants had been affected because the factories were abolished and claimed that the Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro be abolished. In consequence of some discontment the treaty was only enacted in the course of some years and some of its points were never fulfilled as it was the case dealt with the Wine Company.

II. NATURAL ADVANTAGES

After the Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro was founded in 1756, the British felt adversely affected by their privileges, causing a long struggle which involved the two governments[1].

During the temporary French occupation between 1807 and 1811 British commerce experienced a period of unprecedented difficulties in Portugal, especially in Oporto.

If the government was French the British were persecuted. If it was Portuguese the British were protected.

As the French had persecuted the British merchants in the Northern European ports[2], the British merchants had fled to England before the French invasion[3], but they left many valuable properties[4], which were sequestrated by the French government[5].

The revolt at Oporto by June 1808 decided to release the British properties[6] and to encourage the return of the merchants.

On 29 March 1809 the French invaded Portugal again and seized Oporto and British properties and goods, mainly wine[7].

Six weeks later the French were expelled and the new government supported by Anglo-Portuguese forces returned everything once more to the British merchants[8].

From then onwards the policy of protection for the British was constant, having been crowned by the treaty of commerce of 19 February 1810 which not only confirmed the ancient British privileges but also created conditions which led the British merchants to enjoy other privileges which were previously unknown.

In 1810 Charles Stuart, British Envoy Extraordinary in Lisbon, was included in the Portuguese government with the right to vote on military and financial matters[9]. This circumstance would reflect an advantage

at the administrative level towards British commerce, especially in dealing with the customs houses.

Despite the existence of very controversial points in that treaty, which were disputed by the two parts according to the conveniences of the moment, one of the most important benefits for the British must have resulted from the stipulations of the 15th article. This permitted that "All goods, merchandise, and articles whatsoever of the produce, manufacture, industry, or invention of the Dominions and subjects of His Britannic Majesty, shall be admitted into all singular ports and Dominions of His Royal Highness, the Prince Regent of Portugal, as well in Europe as in America, Africa and Asia, whether consigned to British or Portuguese subjects..."

Such goods would pay fifteen per cent in duties "according to the value which shall be set upon them by a Tariff or table of valuations..."(10).

The first consequence of this was an invasion of numerous and unnecessary articles.

In July 1813, the Investigador Portuguez published a letter addressed to its editors complaining that Portugal had been invaded by British clothes and footwear.

Its author recognized that the 8th article of the treaty permitted the English to sell "by wholesale or by retail". But this stipulation, according to the point of view of that letter, did not confer the right of selling clothes and footwear manufactured, but only raw materials which were used to manufacture them(11).

The British government prohibited the imports of Brazilian produce(12) but stimulated the exports of goods from British colonies. This created unpopularity.

In 1813 Portuguese merchants complained that coffee from British colonies was traded in Portugal, affecting the sale of the coffee coming from Portuguese colonies(13). This was considered as a violation of

the reciprocity which was promised in the preamble to the treaty.

Some exclusive privileges enjoyed by the British merchants were not caused by facilities allowed by the administration. The Prince Regent undoubtedly protected British commerce.

On 23 February 1816 he ordered the prohibition of imports of all kinds of silk from foreign countries excepting England(14). This had been decreed out of respect for the treaty, but it is also true that this opened the doors to the imports of silk from other countries which in such circumstances could be sold more easily at lower prices, under the pretext that they were British(15).

The fifteen per cent on the British goods stimulated exports from England to Spain via Portuguese ports. This benefited general Portuguese commerce, but it was to be expected that the largest profits would go to British merchants(16).

That point on the fifteen per cent duties caused the greatest protests from Portuguese merchants.

They argued that the 26th article of the treaty of 1810 determined that the stipulations contained in former treaties concerning the admission of the wines of Portugal on the one hand, and the woollen cloths of Great Britain on the other, should remain unaltered. In view of this, the stipulations of the treaty of commerce of 1703 should remain in force.

Their Portuguese opposition argued that in Portugal the Portuguese government must increase duties in the course of time on the woollen cloths in the same proportion as those which were levied on Portuguese wines in England.

In 1813 each pipe of wine at Oporto costed £40 and in England about £54 in duties was paid. This corresponded to 135 per cent. The protesters therefore argued that British woollen cloths should pay 135 per cent duties when entering Portugal. Nevertheless due to the ignorance

of the custom houses they continued to pay 30%[17].

Beyond this point the British trade benefited from other profits. One of them concerned the duties paid by the ships and vessels[18].

The 5th article of the treaty of 1810 stipulated that: "British ships and vessels shall enjoy the same favours...within the Dominions of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, that may be shown to Portuguese ships and vessels within the Dominions of His Britannic Majesty, and vice versa..."

By 1813 something very different had occurred.

Portuguese vessels paid the duties in England as follows[19]:

Capacidade dos Navios	Direitos de Luzes			Direitos de Trindade			Direitos de Ramsgate			Ditos de Pilotagem			Ditos de Tonellada por entrada e dock			Direitos por Saida se leva fazendas			Total		
	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
100 TON	11	10	10	3	12	11	2	10	0	3	12	11	12	18	4	12	18	4	47	3	4
150 TON	5	9	4½	16	19	0	3	15	0	5	7	0	19	7	6	19	7	6	70	5	4½
200 TON	7	5	10	22	13	9	5	0	0	5	17	8	25	16	8	25	16	8	92	10	2
250 TON	9	2	3½	28	1	10	6	5	0	7	0	2	32	5	10	32	5	10	115	0	11½
300 TON	10	18	9	33	16	0	8	2	0	7	10	0	38	15	0	38	15	0	137	16	9
350 TON	39	4	8	10	5	4	2	18	4	12	15	2½	45	4	2	45	4	2	155	15	10½
400 TON	45	8	10	14	4	0	3	6	8	14	11	8	51	13	4	51	13	4	180	17	10

At the exchange rate of 67½ reis each ton paid:

1,667 reis; 1,665 reis; 1,660 reis; 1,636 reis; 1,633 reis; 1,568 reis and 1,608 reis at English ports in each one of those cases.

Moreover further duties were paid at the London docks[20].

The British vessels landing in Portugal paid the duties as follows[21]:

Capacidade dos Navios	Direitos das Luzes	Direitos de Ramsgate	Direitos de Toneladas por Entrada	Direitos de Toneladas por Saida	Total
	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
100 TON	6 15 6	2 10 0	12 18 4	12 18 4	35 2 2
150 TON	9 15 6	3 15 0	19 7 6	19 7 6	52 5 6
200 TON	12 2 0	5 0 0	25 16 8	25 16 8	69 15 4

This meant that at the exchange of 67½ reis each ton paid 1,248 reis; 1,239 reis and 1,240 reis at the Portuguese ports in each one of those cases.

According to the Investigador Portuguez each ton of Portuguese vessels paid the average of 2,200 reis duties in England while each one of the British vessels paid only about 1,500 reis in Portugal[22].

It is evident that such a situation was not in accordance with the stipulations of the treaty. So some changes were demanded by Portuguese merchants, who argued for the abolition of duties such as: scavage, package, baliage, etc., paid in England but not in Portugal[23].

On 18 December 1812, the representatives of both the Portuguese and English governments attempted an arrangement on those duties. Nevertheless they concluded that it would be better to maintain their payment in England and to return the difference to Portuguese merchants if they were paying more than the British in Portugal[24].

When the circumstances demanded bilateral negotiations it was always difficult to arrange neat solutions. Sometimes, therefore, a unilateral attempt was sufficient to alter the situation and nullify some privileges

which had arisen by force of circumstance. The Portuguese claims respecting the coasting trade of the British vessels was the most flagrant case.

Newspapers published in London[25] frequently made sharp criticisms of the abuses committed by British navigation, citing various subterfuges which had enjoyed some laxity on the part of Custom houses. In order to avoid further claims on 23 November 1816 the Prince Regent prohibited the coasting trade by the vessels from all foreign nations in the "Reino Unido de Portugal, Brazil e Algarves, e Ilhas respectivas"[26].

Probably this measure reduced certain abuses on the part of the British but it did not affect the businessmen's preference for carrying merchandize, using British vessels between Portugal and Great Britain and vice-versa[27].

The movement of the British vessels at Portuguese ports continued to be substantial. From time to time, some accidents occurred on the sea, mainly between Oporto and Vila do Conde. In order to obviate some of the damages caused by the wrecks, Consul John Crispin, on 29 August 1817, informed the British authorities that he had named Sr. Bernardino da Costa as his deputy at Vila do Conde[28]. He argued that Vila do Conde was a place of some trade and occasionally the resort of British vessels.

The British trade even at the custom houses benefited highly from the stipulations of the treaty. In its 15th article it was established that the British goods paid fifteen per cent of duties "according to the value which shall be set upon them by a Tariff or table of valuations, called in the Portuguese language Pauta".

Moreover that tariff or table of valuation was "determined and settled by an equal number of British and Portuguese merchants of known integrity and honour...", and was subject to the supervision of other British merchants and their authorities[29].

Despite this, sometimes the British disposed of some support on

the part of the staff.

By 1817 John Crispin confessed that the Portuguese subject, João Carlos Xavier attended daily at the custom house to facilitate the dispatch of shipping and merchandize inwards and outwards, serving many years with equal credit to himself and satisfaction to the merchants and masters of the vessels[30].

This appeared to be both a sign of good relations with the staff and simultaneously efficient organization.

Between 1815 and 1820 twenty-two British firms were active[31], trading in wines in Oporto. During that period they exported about 39% of the Oporto wine[32] while during the war period (1807-1814) they had exported only about 26% on average per year[33].

In the commercial field there is some eivdence that the greatest privilege of the British merchants was that they operated only along the Portuguese coast.

In Oporto the British community was very strong, principally dedicated to the trade of wines. There is evidence only that by 1813 Bernard Clamouse Brown owned a tanning factory and another of cotton cloths, but both were in a state of decline[34].

According to the size of consulates' duties, which were only paid by British vessels, the commercial interests of the British were greater in Lisbon than Oporto[35].

Beyond these two important ports the British traded as well in Viana do Castelo, Aveiro, Figueira da Foz, Setúbal and Faro, although in scale very reduced[36].

By the early nineteenth century the Academia Real da Marinha e Comércio was founded in Oporto[37] under the control of the Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro. As the influence of the British trade in the region was considerable it was decided to include the teaching

of the English language in the Academia's programme.

The sale of the British newspapers The Courrier and The Statesman at Oporto by 1809 and 1810 demonstrate the level of interest for the English language and the popularity of the British by that time[38].

One of the most important streets of Oporto was prevailingly inhabited by British families. So it changed its name from "Rua Formoza" to "Rua dos Inglezes"[39].

For a long time the "Rua dos Ingleses", "Rua das Flores" and "Rua de S. João" were the only streets of Oporto which were illuminated at night. In 1817 the local authorities planned to light the entire city. The examples of the "Rua de S. João" and "Rua dos Ingleses" were indicated as the basis of the study of the necessary budget[40].

At the Couto de S. João da Foz, about two miles from Oporto and very close to Douro's bar, some British families lived there. William Warre, John Telles and William Nassan owned their properties which were near the beach.

The houses abandoned by those families at the time of the French invasions, the large gardens and the remains of furniture and sundries, indicate that their economic and social situation was prosperous and contrasted with the general misery which surrounded them[41].

If necessary the British travellers or businessmen who came to Oporto could dispose of the "Palacete da Feitoria Ingleza" which had been built in 1785 and served as a guesthouse or towards such purposes as meetings, entertainments, etc.[42].

The "feitoria" also served as the office of the British consul between 1816 and 1818[43].

The 12th article of the treaty of 1810 permitted British subjects to build "churches and chapels on Portuguese territory, but they had to

appear to be private dwelling houses".

There is evidence that there was by that time a chapel inside the British cemetery which was constructed in accordance with the stipulations of the treaty, situated "dans la partie occidentale de Porto, près de la Torre de Pero Sem, au lieu dit le Cavaco"[44].

In conclusion it may be affirmed that after the expulsion of the French, the British merchants benefited not only from Portuguese laws but also from the facilities on the part of the administration. As a result of this they constituted a social group with a considerable level of influence in Portuguese society.

III. THE CLAIMS OF BRITISH MERCHANTS ESTABLISHED AT OPORTO AGAINST THE WAR CONTRIBUTION LEVIED BY THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT

The revolt which took place in Oporto in June 1808, as well as the military success of Roliça and Vimeiro during August, were insufficient to guarantee the safety of the kingdom.

Sir Williams Carr Beresford was aware of it and on 14 October he planned to increase the effectiveness of the army(1), but he was not able to carry this out. So that the French invaded Portugal for the second time at the end of March 1809.

To avoid the repetition of the same difficulties, on 7 June 1809 an extraordinary contribution was levied over all the sectors of the nation to be paid only in 1809(2).

Ten days later an alvará also levied a new tax on the stamped paper

British authorities paid due attention to the evolution of the military events and to the evolution of the financial crisis. The contrast between the sacrifices demanded from the Portuguese and the privileges secured by the British merchants established in Portugal must have provoked some concerns.

On 14 August 1809 Villiers wrote to Canning, asking for instructions regarding the extraordinary imposts. He affirmed that the British merchants had grants of exemption from war taxes, but at the same time he reminded him that the decree of taxation, in its terms, was general(3).

On 7 March 1810 the Prince Regent ordered the publication of a Carta Regia(4) apparently designed to make his subjects aware of the difficulties of the future. The confirmation of the Carta Regia took place on 2 August(5) and the "Contribuição Extraordinaria de Defeza" was renewed, although with some alterations.

On 10 April 1811 the same contribution was extended for the duration of the war(6) and on 31 July of that year a new "Portaria"

gave instructions to alter some aspects of that contribution[7].

There is no evidence of any reaction on the part of the British merchants after those orders were announced. It was only 3 August 1812 that Strangford explained to the Prince Regent at Rio de Janeiro that the governors in Lisbon were raising obstacles to the implementation of the British privileges[8]. Nevertheless the available document does not show whether in those difficulties the contribution of war was included or not.

The Conde das Galveas replied that the governors had been ordered to preserve the privileges of the English[9] and at the same time he manifested that they would be fairly and religiously performed according to the stipulations of the existing treaties.

Despite the Prince Regent's recommendations, surprisingly, on 2 September D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz replied to a note of Charles Stuart dated 29 August[10], saying that the exemption of the British merchants from payment of the Contribution Extraordinary for the defence of the country could not be allowed[11]. The Secretary of State argued that the tax had been levied to guarantee the safety of the country in which the British merchants resided. So that any exemption either of persons or privileges would not be admitted.

With respect to the payment of the "Decima" it was said that the government had suspended its judgement until His Royal Highness clarified whether the 7th article of the Treaty of 19 February 1810 had revoked the exemption previously granted by the decree of the 9 July 1669. D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz still added that the government would not hesitate to execute the Royal decree in receiving the Contribution Extraordinary for the years 1812 and 1813. He said that the British subjects who were not engaged in trade were not liable to pay the contribution but were liable for the Decima, in accordance with the determination of May 1728 which placed them on the same footing as Portuguese subjects.

In conformity with the express wish of D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz,

Charles Stuart informed the Consul General J. Jeffery who established contact with the Oporto Consul, John Alves[12]. On 13 September 1813 J. Jeffery wrote to the consul, informing him that he had received 3800$000 reis whose amount had been subscribed by the British merchants residing at Oporto "for the purpose of its being presented as a gift to the government towards support of the war". Therefore he reacted favourably to a meeting in Lisbon to study the measures provoked by the hostile attitude of D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz. At the same time he advised that "all British subjects may resist payment of all demands, and submit to seizure or sequestration of their property on account of the Maneio and Decima tax, trusting to the support of His Majesty's Enemy who would be able to prevent the imposition"[13].

It seems that this view was defended by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who advised that the British merchants paid a voluntary contribution as proof that they were also bearing their part for the prosecution of the war[14].

Meanwhile the war had come to an end by the middle of 1814. On 3 June the "Contribuição Extraordinária de Defeza" was extinguished because "os motivos de maior urgencia" had ceased[15]. Nevertheless the end of the war did not alleviate the concerns of the British merchants with regard to the payment of taxes.

On 18 July the Prince Regent expressly ordered that the British merchants residing in the Kingdom pay the "Contribuição de Defeza"[16]. But on 15 March 1815 John Jeffery wrote to the Consul at Oporto, John Crispin, manifesting great satisfaction because he had obtained the information that the Contribution Extraordinary respecting the British subjects had been suspended[17]. Such information, therefore, was not well received since on 2 May 1815 John Crispin wrote to John Jeffery informing him that the Judge of Crime had notified a British firm that he still did not know whether the mandate would be general[18].

Effectively at that time[19] the Judge of the Crime, João Jozé

Pereira da Costa requested the firm Quarles Harris & Sons to pay the sums of 100$000, 200$000 and 300$000 reis which had been assessed respecting the years of 1811, 1812 and 1813.

Ten days later, Crispin informed Jeffery that he had established contact with the Judge of the Crime but the talks had failed[20]. He added that the object of that measure was to establish the power of assessing British merchants contrary to the Decrees and Edicts of the Portuguese Sovereigns, so long recognized, and declared by the 26th article of the commercial treaty of 19 February 1810.

Before Jeffery had received that letter, the Consul General on 13th May 1815, advised, with extreme regret, John Crispin that there was no further resistance to the payment of the war contribution[21]. At the same time he said that the sum deposited from the liberal subscription amounted to 3800$000 reis currency, being at the disposal of the subscribers.

Such position on the part of Jeffery was confirmed four days later by a letter which also referred to the fact that His Majesty's Ambassador had written on that subject to the English government[22].

On 11 September 1815 the Judge of Crimes, as Superintendent of "Decimas, Novos Impostos, Quintos, Contribuições da Defeza nas Freguezias de Sam Nicolau & Sam Pedro de Miragaya" ordered that Quarles Harris & Filhos pay the Extraordinary Contribution of 100$000, 200$000 and 300$000 reis corresponding to the years of 1811, 1812 and 1813[23]. In case of refusal, the Judge affirmed that the property of that firm would immediately be sequestrated and placed under the care of a trustee, while the defendants could be cited to verify their embargos notwithstanding any privileges they might assert. Such embargos must be made within six days[24].

As the defendants did not make any stand despite a long interval, on 22 June 1816 the clerk Antonio Peixoto Marinho accompanied by the Alcaide seized ten pipes of factory wine in the lodge of the defendants

in Villa Nova de Gaia. That wine was placed under the trusteeship of Clemente Monteiro Alvarenga, administrator of the said lodges[25].

Three weeks later, the British merchants Hunt, Newman and Kopk wrote to John Crispin saying that the Judge of Crimes was expecting within a very few days to take definitive measures for selling the property which had been attached[26]. Such information was sent to J. Jeffery by J. Crispin, who confessed under persuasion that the same sentence had been issued against other British houses.

The evolution of the situation was sufficiently clear. The British merchants were aware at that time that it was necessary to act together. On 22nd July of the same year it was resolved unanimously that a committee composed of Mr Harris, Mr Bull and Mr Croft write a memorandum to send to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs[27]. They decided, therefore, that its proceedings be suspended till after the judge had carried his notification into effect by the seizure and sale of their property. On the same day the scrivener Antonio Peixoto Marinho communicated to Quarles Harris that the sum of 600$000 reis had not been paid[28].

In Lisbon the British authorities were deeply concerned with the acts of the Portuguese Government. On 27 July J. Jeffery warned J. Crispin that it was expected that the British merchants would once more be more pressed to pay the war contribution[29]. At the same time the Consul General regretted that the English government had not furnished instructions on that subject since 19 May 1815[30].

As the British merchants recognized that the English government would not act on their behalf , on 1 August they decided to present embargoes to the sequestration of Quarles Harris' firm[31].

The defenders argued that they were exempted by D.João IV's decree dated 29 May 1659 at the time of the war between Portugal and Spain[32]; that by the decree of 26 November 1807 the Regency had promised the most scrupulous attention to the existing laws of the country; that the

extraordinary contribution had been ordered by an alvará dated 7 June 1809, and by a decree of 2 August 1810, which involved only Portuguese subjects; that the recovery of the contribution had been entrusted to the Royal Junta of Commerce[33] assisted by some Portuguese merchants, but only the natives and naturalized foreigners could be subjected to the Royal Junta of Commerce, "in conformity with the 1st paragraph of the 2nd chapter or with the 2nd paragraph of the 18th chapter, or according to its statutes as approved by the alvará of the 16 December 1755".

As the defendants were not naturalized and the alvará of 29 May 1756 declared that the British subjects would be exempted from the "Maneio", "Decima", or any other war impost, they alleged that the sequestration ought to be reversed[34].

On 13 August 1816 the embargoes were considered ungrounded[35] by the Procurator Fiscal who alleged that the defendants had resided many years in the country, had carried on their lucrative business at Oporto and they were subjected to the laws of the country in conformity with the last Royal decree of 18 July 1814. They were strictly bound to pay the contribution demanded.

On the last day of August the sentence was given in favour of the Procurator Fiscal[36] and immediately carried into effect, a petition for the sale of the property under sequestration having been published[37]. On 24 September[38] at the public auction in Oporto, no sum was offered equal to the assessment of the value of ten wine pipes. The High Court judge, Jozé Teixeira de Souza could not appropriate them to the liquidation of the Royal dues, so he ordered that they be offered at a reduced twenty-five per cent of their value[39]. At that time Joaquim Alvarenga, clerk of the defendants, purchased the wine at 84$500 reis per pipe, amounting to 845$000 reis.

On 18 October the Quarles Harris firm was informed that it owed the contribution of 250$000 for the year 1814, which must be paid on the same day[40]. In case of non-fulfilment, the receiver Manoel Francisco de Freitas Guimarães added: "...lhe rogo queira dar se por

requerido, e ficar na certeza de que não posso deixar de effectuar penhora em os Armazens em que V.Sa. tem os seus vinhos, dezejando porem q. V.Sa. se sirva à maneira dos outros senhores da sua Nação, poupar-me este trabalho, mandando satisfazer ao mesmo Recebedor".

Despite the indifference on the part of the British authorities and the fulfilment on the part of the other British merchants according to that document, the firm Quarles Harris continued to resist.

In its protest(41) the firm alleged that the duty was a direct violation of the British privileges. In the second place it was impossible to imagine anything more oppressive and unjust than in being assessed by merchants who were necessarily and naturally rivals and ignorant of its business.

In the third place the firm protested because it alleged that the sums for which the assessors had taxed themselves and their friends were scandalously low compared with those they had levied upon the British merchants.

From that time onwards there is no evidence of further resistence against the war contribution on the part of the Quarles Harris firm. The committee which had been composed of Mr Harris, Mr Bull and Mr Croft presented the required memorandum on 22nd July which was discussed at two general meetings, which took place at Oporto(42).

On 7 December 1816 it was voted that that memorandum be sent to Viscount Castlereagh, signed by the following British merchants(43): Hunt, Newman & Koope; Quarles Harris & Sons; Burmester & Co., Swanns, Knowsley & Co.; Offley, Forrester Webber & Co.; Campbell, Bowden & Taylor; William Snow; Page & Noble; Daniel Bull; James Hebblethwaite; Anthony P. Tremlet; Croft & Co.; Sandeman & Co.; Cockburns, Wauchop(?) Greig & Co.; Butler, Tyndale & Co.; Patrick Kely; Abbot & Killeman(?) and J.B. Rendell(?) & Co.

The long memorandum complained that "the Portuguese policy had as its object nothing less than the total destruction of British commerce and

security" in Portugal. They pointed out the violation of the ancient treaties made between the two countries and above all that of the 9th article of the treaty of 1654[44]. They complained that their lodges had been forcibly entered and their wines taken out and sold by public auction in order to obtain from them a forced contribution.

They also affirmed that until 1807 they had never been called upon to pay war contribution although on two occasions the Portuguese government had levied a contribution upon its own subjects. On one of these occasions the British merchants offered their subscriptions as voluntary contributions. On the other they did not offer subscriptions, due to an intervention by the British Minister. At last the memorandum requested support from the English government in one "cruel necessity which till now has never been disputed and which is indispensible for the security of their Property". The merchants reminded Castlereagh of the laws which exempted them from paying the war contribution. They cited the "Alvará" of 29 October 1450[45]; Carta de privilegios of 28 March 1452[46]; 3rd article of the treaty of 10 July 1654[47]; Provisão of 29 May 1656[48] and Alvará of 7 May 1708, confirmed and registered on 8 February 1717[49].

The petition of the merchants was transmitted to London on 27 December[50] and on 25 February 1817. Castlereagh informed the British Envoy Extraordinary at Lisbon that it had been addressed to the Prince Regent[51] who gave instructions to Strangford to act on behalf of the merchants at the Court of Rio de Janeiro.

One month later, the Oporto British merchants were informed about it by their Consul, J. Crispin, and they assembled at a meeting on 31 March 1817[52], considering such information as very satisfactory.

Due to this they decided to thank Castlereagh "for the promptitude and energy with which his Lordship had laid their memorandum before His Royal Highness the Prince Regent..."[53].

Despite this, that action of the merchants failed once more. On 2 May 1818 they sent a new memorandum to Castlereagh[54], regretting

that "sixteen months had elapsed and the violent and outrageous act of tyranny performed by the Portuguese government had not had adequate reply". Then they appealed to the generous feelings of the Secretary of State to present their cause at the Rio de Janeiro Court or using other measures which were efficacious to avoid "the total destruction of their commerce and security"... From then onwards until the end of 1820 there is no evidence of any success on their part.

IV. GENERAL CLAIMS OF BRITISH MERCHANTS

Before the French invasions the principal struggle of the British merchants in Portugal was against the Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro which, according to their opinion, violated the ancient British privileges[1].

Immediately after the first invasion their struggle was to request the English government to compensate them for the losses which they suffered as a consequence of events[2].

The elimination of the French power at Oporto in June 1808[3] and May 1809[4] and at Lisbon in August of the same year[5] permitted commercial relations between Portugal and England to be resumed.

It is evident that the difficulties prevailed in the new atmosphere of business. On 25 August 1809 J. Jeffery complained that an order had recently been sent to the Custom house at Lisbon "...interdicting the transhipment of the whole, or any part, of the cargoes of any article whatever...", unless a licence was previously obtained[6]. As this affected an ancient British privilege of transhipping American cottons without being subject to the payment of the high duties, on 2 September the Privy Council for Trade requested Canning to demand from the Portuguese government the fulfilment of the 11th article of the treaty of 1654[7], in order to overcome that setback.

The economic difficulties had obliged the Portuguese government to place restrictions on the imports of British manufacture into Portugal. On 22 November 1809 Bathurst, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, wrote to Villiers to persuade the Portuguese government that those restrictions were inconvenient for the two countries for two main reasons[8]. Firstly the prohibition of legal imports encouraged the contraband and the commerce became unproductive to public revenue.

Secondly the restrictions reduced the channels by which the remittances

between the two countries could be made, except by dollars or bullion. A system of freer imports of British manufacture into Portugal would facilitate the remittances for the payment of the Portuguese troops as well as the British army in Portugal.

On 17 March 1810, H. Wilson, merchant in Lisbon, wrote to Wellesley, complaining that during the last ten years he had never seen so many impediments against British manufactured goods[9]. At that time prohibitions had been put on all kinds of jappaned goods; tunbridge ware and woodwork; picture frames; looking glasses; leather sadlery and strip(?) work. The duty on such kinds was above 100 per cent, facilitating some persons who were establishing factories in Portugal under the immediate protection of the Prince Regent. At last H. Wilson asked Wellesley to press the Prince Regent, having in view the reduction of the commercial difficulties in Portugal and to arrange that the British goods be admitted to the Azores or western Islands with a duty of 5 per cent "excluding all other manufactures".

At the same time, replying to Wellesley's request, J. Jeffery manifested himself incapable of making statements on the general state of British commerce in Portugal for several reasons[10]. It was necessary to obtain information from the factories of Lisbon and Oporto, but their prevailing atmosphere was one of confusion.

In the second place, the majority of the factory's members had not returned to Lisbon.

In the third place there was no possibility of consulting account books due to a certain reluctance on the part of the factors in activity. Finally the books of the consulate as well as those of the factory had been taken to Brazil by James Gambier. Difficulties were such that by that time British authorities in Lisbon had lost control of the British vessels and property. It was natural, therefore, that vessels from other nationalities should have enjoyed some privileges which were exclusive to the British.

On 5 May 1810 Jeffery complained to Wellesley that he had experienced difficulties in investigating the various documents and papers furnished to the ships arriving at Lisbon, especially from Gibraltar and Malta, and alleged that they were protected by British privileges(11). Jeffery admitted that many abuses were committed "taking the most unfair advantages, by masking foreign property under the British flag". To prevent such occurrences Jeffery advocated that it would be necessary to seek the guidance of Wellesley.

On 16 May several instructions were given to the Governor of Gibraltar demanding that the vessels which left Gibraltar have Mediterranean papers and certificates of registry(12). Such instructions were observed in Lisbon from 9 June onwards(13) and, at the end of July, Jeffery manifested satisfaction to William Hamilton for the results obtained(14).

In the last three months of 1810 and the first four months of 1811, the future of Portugal and particularly the commercial perspective were an incognita. The British merchants were concerned with their personal safety and if they wanted to lay any claims whatsoever it would have been useless as neither the British nor the Portuguese powers would have been able to attend to them, since they were completely occupied at that time with the military activities(15).

Though the treaty of commerce and navigation had been drawn up on 19 February 1810, but its effects at that time were absolutely unknown.

On 21 March 1811 the British merchants decided to try to abolish the Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro(16). Such an attitude was an important test of the treaty.

From then onwards the British merchants established at Oporto were involved in two struggles against the Portuguese government. For both of them they requested the protection and support of the British government.

On the one hand they demanded the abolition of the Wine Company, invoking

the stipulations of the treaty of 1810[17]. On the other hand they refused to pay the war contribution, alleging that they were exempted by the ancient privileges[18].

By the middle of 1812 Lord Strangford requested successfully the Court at Rio de Janeiro to protect the British subjects in accordance with the stipulations of the treaty of 1810 and their ancient privileges[19].

On 19 August Charles Stuart ordered that Jeffery make a report, estimating, at that time, the state of commercial connections between the two countries. Two weeks later Jeffery addressed him with a long and substantial report on that subject[20]. They were naturally concerned with the analysis of the "Formation of the Pauta". The 15th and 16th articles of the treaty of 1810 stipulated that the levying of duties on goods must be performed, according to the valuation confirmed by invoices or documents produced by the importer. Jeffery argued that such a system was subject to fraud and deception even if supported by oath. His opinion was that "it would be desirable to ascertain the value of all goods exported from Great Britain into Portugal and to regulate the duties accordingly, by a tariff settled and agreed upon in England".

To clarify his idea, Jeffery said that "the evaluation should be regulated by, not the supposed value at the port of importation, but as nearly as can be, the cost or value at the shipping port, with the addition of freight, insurance and custom house charges, on arrival on board, previous to any duties or charges at the port of importation". He further added that it was necessary to distinguish goods of the growth, produce, and manufacture, of Great Britain, from those of foreign countries.

Jeffery requested the British authorities to enjoin the officers at the Custom Houses in England to state correctly on the back of the dockets, the quantity, quality and value of all goods shipped. At the same time he complained that many disputes arose between the officers and the importers, so that his mediation was required in doubtful cases.

Basing his arguments on a report drawn up by Hunt, a merchant at Oporto, Jeffery complained that the duties paid on the codfish imported into Oporto during 1811 amounted to £55,795 13s. 9d., making an excess of duty demanded of £30,658 13s. 9d.

Jeffery, therefore, proposed that the valuation be fixed under four different headings.

1st. Merchandize - 18 per quintal; 2nd quality - 15 per quintal; 3rd quality - 12 per quintal and 4th - 8 per quintal.

In order to explain why excessive duties were levied on British goods, Jeffery stated that the administrator of the Custom House was "a Frenchman at heart, a man rude and uncivil in his office, and not fit for the situation in which he is placed".

Curiously Jeffery's report considered the question of the woollens as a source of great advantage to Portugal, exactly the opposite the position defended by some Portuguese through the Investigador[22].

In the Portuguese view it was alleged that the duties increased on the Portuguese wine in England had amounted to 135 per cent. So that the British woollens must pay 135 per cent in Portugal according to the stipulations of the treaty of 1703 and not the 15 per cent stipulated in the 15th and 16th articles of the treaty of 1810, since the latter treaty stipulated that wines and woollens remained unaltered.

Jeffery did not discuss the legal aspects of the question of the Portuguese wines and British woollens. Nevertheless he argued with conviction. He said that from 30 June 1811 to 30 June 1812 the value of woollens imported into Lisbon had exceeded £447,430 while the duties amounted to £134,000 which corresponded to about 30 per cent. In addition he said: "As the 26th article of the treaty leaves woollens unaltered, in value and duty, which is considered an equivalent for the duty on wine imported in Portuguese vessels, this created a disproportionate advantage for Portugal, and as the restrictions on Portugal wines had

long since ceased, I should presume the extra duty on woollens ought also to be done away with".

Another point of the Jeffery report dealt with the double payment of duties on goods imported at any of the outposts of Portugal, if they were subsequently sent to Lisbon.

Jeffery said that this practice should be eliminated since, if the goods were first imported at Lisbon and afterwards sent to another port of Portugal, no further duties would be demanded.

Jeffery also complained that the goods were only admissible at Lisbon, Oporto and Faro. The privilege of trade at Viana, Figueira and Aveiro had been revoked in 1774.

By that time there was a considerable trade at those ports. So he advocated that the same privilege should be restored.

Afterwards the report referred to the payment of the "Baldeação or 4 per cent transit duty". Jeffery complained that many merchants, consignees of fish cargoes had been compelled "to enter into bonds for the payment of those duties, or suffer, perishable articles to be lost by detention, and as no such duties were charged on British goods admitted into the Brazils for re-exportation in consequence of the exemption from duties on Brazil produce warehoused in British Ports for a similar purpose..."(23).

Jerfery naturally said that he had advised importers of fish to resist the payment of bonds.

With regard to the performance of the 15th article of the treaty of 1810, Jeffery said that at that time the officers of the custom house continued to be guided by the same books of rates as before.

The valuations were the same and the duties amounted equally to 30 per cent whose practice was extended to woollens. All other articles, with the exception of codfish, not inserted in the Pauta, were supposed

to have been prohibited goods.

With respect to the management of the cod fish duties the report criticised the different practices which took place at different ports. It confined itself to referring to some duties on Newfoundland cod fish which were paid in 1804. At Oporto the duties amounted to $27\frac{7}{10}$ per cent[24], while at Figueira they amounted to 29 per cent, continuing at the same rate at that time[25].

Nevertheless the "donativo" duty of 4 per cent on fish imported into Oporto, Vianna, Figueira, Caminha, Vila do Conde, Esp zende and Aveiro had been contracted for the years of 1807, 1808 and 1809, at the rate of 33,005$000 reis per annum, being considered very favourable to the contractors. In Lisbon at that time, the duties were 26 per cent. In the meantime the implementation of the treaty began to provoke some disagreements.

On 3 October 1812 the Portuguese government wrote to Jeffery, saying "that the basis of the valuation of goods, which are not found in the tariff, should be the Invoices, and the current prices of the goods at the place of their discharge..."[26]. On this subject the letter further added "...that invoices are not understood to be those of the first cost but of the goods at the place of their discharge as being the real value at the time of the valuations, and to which the 16th article (Treaty of 1810) expressly refers, in case of doubt as to the fairness of the invoice..."

Such considerations were not accepted by Jeffery who presented the following example. If 1000 quintals of fish were sold on board at 8$000 reis per quintal, according to his own opinion, they would pay the duties at the rate of 15 per cent making 1,200$000 reis. Nevertheless the custom house at Oporto according to the government exacted a compound duty of 1,380$000 reis, that was 15 per cent on 9,200$000 reis (8,000$000 reis + 1,200$000 reis).

This practice was strongly contested by Jeffery, having, at the same time, said once more that it must be demanded in the admission of British

goods at all ports of Portugal as at Lisbon, Oporto and Faro in accordance with the 15th article of the treaty. On the one hand the prohibition of certain articles of British manufacture to enter into the Custom Houses at the ports of Vianna, Figueira and Aveiro was considered as a direct violation of the treaty. On the other hand it was offensive to the British subjects since the produce of various nations was admitted at those ports.

Very soon the main claims of the British commerce were satisfied by the Prince Regent. On 19 October 1812 it was ordered "...que em quanto se nao fizer a Pauta annunciada no Artigo 15. do Tratado, geral e impreterivelmente se observe nas ditas Alfandegas o methodo estabelecido no referido Artigo 16[27] para as avaliaçoes de todos os generos, e artigos de Commercio Britanico, a que pelo Tratado he concedida a entrada nestes Reinos, e eujos valores se não achão fixados na Pauta, ou Ordens, que lhe servem de supplemento, anteriores à época do dito Tratado; devendo ser das importancias das mesmas avaliações, que hajão de deduzir-se os direitos precipuos, que pelo Artigo 15, e outros do Tratado pertencem à Real Fazenda..."

In regard to the interpretation of the application of the invoice, the Royal determination was made in accordance with the considerations previously addressed by the Portuguese government to Jeffery on 3rd October.

It was ordered peremptorily: "Manda outrosim Sua Alteza Real declarar, que por factura deve entender-se para o dito effeito a conta, nao só do primeiro custo do género, mas igualmente das despezas feitas até o lugar da descarga..."

The question of the Pauta and the levying of the 15 per cent ad valorem on British merchandize seemed to be definitively resolved. Nevertheless a few weeks later it was necessary to adjust a detail further.

On 12 December 1812 the representatives of both governments assembled in London to discuss some difficulties dealing with the performance of the stipulations of the treaty. As a result some rules

were established to make safer the verification of British merchandize in the Portuguese dominions and at the same time so as to reduce the contraband[28].

In 1813 British merchants established at Oporto continued their attempt to abolish the Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro.

On 12 June Lord Strangford requested the Prince Regent to order the abolition[29], but on 29 December this was rejected by the Conde das Galveas[30].

On 10 January 1814 after evidence had appeared of some falsification, Jeffery requested William Hamilton to take rigorous measures in the United Kingdom so as to require more satisfactory proof "by the oath of the importer or consignee before the Consul General or Consul whose duty it will be to guard against fraud by examining the dockets and manifests of the vessels in which they were shipped and to grant certificates accordingly"[31].

About one year later[32] William Hamilton addressed a questionnaire to J. Jeffery, asking for information about the true difficulties which were faced at that time by British commerce[33].

John Jeffery replied on 30 March 1815[34], saying that colonial produce of every description was prohibited as well as wines and brandies of any country. Nevertheless he added that "by particular favor the latter articles have in various instances been permitted to be landed on payment of duties without any fixed rule".

If such cases of laxity were refused he said that the vessels were compelled to leave the port and no permission to tranship their cargoes was granted.

With regard to duties, Jeffery said to Hamilton that all articles imported into Portugal from foreign countries inserted in the book of rates or Pauta paid 30 per cent. The articles which came from Great

Britain paid only 15 percent, but such articles, particularly cottons, were not in the Pauta. Moreover he added that the duties were demanded at the pleasure of the officers of the revenue at whatever valuation they might think proper.

Jeffery at that time considered it opportune to suggest once again care was taken with the dockets respecting British goods exported from Great Britain. Such goods would be subject to duties of 30 per cent since it was not demonstrated that they were the growth, produce, or manufacture of Great Britain".

Jeffery declared that the re-exportation was not permitted at the ports of Portugal without payment of the duties established by the alvará of 26 May 1812.

On the coasting trade he complained once again, saying that if the goods were imported into the outports and afterwards re-shipped for Lisbon they would pay twice. If the goods were first imported into Lisbon the second duties would not be demanded.

By early 1815 the three principal points which were disputed between British and Portuguese interests were clearly defined. The main British goods were imported into Portugal, paying 15 per cent ad valorem in accordance with the stipulations of the treaty. The attempt of abolition of the Wine Company had failed since on 10 February 1815 the Prince Regent ordered its charter to be prorogued from 1 January 1817 until 31 December 1836[35].

The decision of the Prince Regent finally obstructed the most important claims of the British merchants. They wanted either to eliminate all the exclusive privileges of the Company or to obtain the same ones as were enjoyed by it. If they had succeeded, their plan included demands of total inviolability of their houses, cellars and buildings; security to their coopers, labourers and servants; free coasting trade for their vessels; total independence of their Judge Conservator and prohibition of any functions at the custom house, magistrates or other

office of the crown, being performed by any office belonging to the Company[36].

The third point concerned the payments of the war contribution. On 13 May[37] John Jeffery advised that the war contribution was fulfilled, but he did not obtain the approval on the part of the British firms at Oporto which continued in their resistence.

After the sentence upon the war contribution was unfavourably taken against the firm Quarles Harris & Sons, on 7 December 1816[38] and 2 May 1818[39] the British merchants requested Viscount Castlereagh to act in their protection at the Court of Rio de Janeiro, demanding the fulfilment of the treaty of 1810 and the maintenance of the ancient British privileges.

There is no evidence that they received any satisfaction and that they received any repayment of the war contribution.

Meanwhile the prevailing atmosphere in Portugal became hostile to British interests.

On 26 October 1816 Ward had already warned Castlereagh that things were not going well, since in Lisbon there was evidence of "much spirit of opposition to British interests"[40].

Such an environment became less and less propitious to new claims. Despite this, on 24 February 1818[41] John Jeffery addressed Ward informing him that the Portuguese government was desirous of having a new Pauta for the valuation of linens. Nevertheless he feared that a new Pauta (tariff) would generally involve other nations at the same rate of duties.

Jeffery advocated that at that time if a new Pauta were proposed "that all articles of cotton and linen manufacture should be included".

In support of his point of view he said that (though it was not admissible previous to the treaty of 1810) in 1813, a new Pauta on all cotton was nearly completed "but the Duties on the value thereon were

rejected and have since been levied on valuations arbitrarily imposed at the pleasure of the Custom house officers in direct violation of the 15th and 16th articles of the treaty..."

One month later[42] Jeffery wrote once more, manifesting his confusion on the question of the formation of a new Pauta. He confessed that he had received instructions from Castlereagh, advocating the establishment of a new Pauta for British goods imported into Portugal. But those instructions had revealed that Castlereagh would not be aware that most of the principal articles of British imports were cited in the old Pauta. Beyond this Castlereagh would not admit that a new Pauta was designed to facilitate the imports of linens from other nations at the same rate of duties as that levied on British goods, to which that would be very prejudicial.

Jeffery then advocated that it would be better to delay any decision and on the same day[43] he wrote to Castlereagh, communicating his suppositions.

During 1819 the question of the formation of a new pauta was the object of much correspondence between the British and Portuguese authorities[44]. Nevertheless there is no evidence to suggest that an agreement had been found which was convenient to both parts

On 24 July 1819 John Crispin made a Statement[45] concerning the state of British commerce in that city. He manifested great satisfaction at the results analysed through the main items of the commerce, and he predicted the future with equal optimism. Only in regard to the wine did he regret: "If the impolitic system of the present Board of the Wine Company should continue for another vintage, it will probably be attended with ruinous consequences...".

V. CONCLUSIONS

The commercial activity of the British subjects in Portugal goes back as far as the Crusades[1].

There is evidence that before 1400 they were not the most privileged compared with other subjects from other countries. But on 10th August of that year the same privileges which were enjoyed by the Genoese were extended to the English[2].

By 1405 the conflicts of the English which took place in Lisbon were treated by a King's judge[3]. Forty-five years later the King authorized the establishment of a conservator also in Lisbon[4], which permitted the evaluation of the weight of the English interests in that city at that time.

In 1452 the British privileges were placed on the same footing as the "Flamingos, Alemães e Francezes"[4].

From then until the end of the sixteenth century the English ensured the right of inheritance[5] and were exempted from paying Decima on their stock[6], amongst other privileges.

Meanwhile the British interests extended to the city of Oporto. Some firms were established in that city[7] and by 1691 D. Pedro II authorized there the establishment of a judge conservator[8].

By the end of the seventeenth century the British appeared to enjoy a real hegemony in Portugal. So that the Castillians requested successfully the same privileges[9].

The treaty of commerce drawn up on 27 December 1703 strengthened the interests of the British trade in Portugal. As a consequence of this the Portuguese markets were invaded by British woollens, but the exports of wines for England were intensified, favouring mainly the Douro region[10].

In 1708 and 1717 the exemption of the tax on stocks was confirmed to the subjects from England and Holland, but the French and other foreigners were not considered. Nevertheless the British merchants were seriously affected in 1756 by the establishment of the Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro, at Oporto, which, during the second half of the eighteenth century, caused a hard struggle against the Portuguese government(11).

During that period all the endeavours of the British merchants as well as those of the English government failed completely. The Portuguese commerce knew then a favourable period, mainly in the first years of the nineteenth century(12).

The French invasions had altered that situation. The first historic sign of change came with the opening of the Brazilian ports to the friendly foreign nations, which was practically confined to the British nation(13). The second sign was the treaty of commerce of 1810.

An immediate invasion of British goods occurred in Portugal. Some items such as clothing and shoes clearly violated the spirit of the treaty and justified opportune claims on the part of the Portuguese interests(14). Scandalously, the coffee from the British colonies appeared on the Portuguese markets and enjoyed certain indulgence at the custom houses by 1815(15) while the coffee and other colonial produce from Brazil was prohibited in England.

The payment of 15% duties on British goods according to the 15th and 16th articles of the treaty was not performed immediately(16).

Until 4 September 1812 the woollen cloths as well as other British goods included in the Pauta paid 30%. The cod-fish oscillated between 26% at Lisbon and 29% at Figueira. The articles which were not in the Pauta were considered prohibited.

The Portuguese interests represented in the Investigador Portugues published in England against the duties levied on British woollens

argued that the treaty stipulated that they remained unaltered, as well as the Portuguese wine in England[17]. In accordance with such stipulation it was held that the Portuguese wine had suffered, by 1813, a duty increase of 135%. So that it would be just as well to increase the payment to 135% on the British woollens in Portugal.

On 19 October 1812, therefore, the Prince Regent ordered the implementation of the 15th and 16th articles of the treaty[18]. In consequence of this from then all the British goods paid only 15% except cod-fish, cottons and linens which by 1815 were paid according to the amount specified by each custom house in some cases[19].

On 30 March 1815 there is evidence, therefore, that all British goods were paying 15% except the cottons which were not included in the Pauta. At that time Jeffery confessed to the British authorities in London that the colonial produce was prohibited, but that there was a certain indulgence at the Portuguese custom houses with regard to some British colonial produce, as well as to coasting trade[20].

Sometimes British vessels paid at the outports 4%, but at other times they enjoyed a total indulgence. Such affirmations demonstrated that the Portuguese protests published by the Investigador Portuguez in 1813 were fair[21].

As an indication that things were changing, on 23 November 1816 the Prince Regent ordered the prohibition of the coasting trade to the vessels of all the foreign nations without any exception[22].

British merchants exploited the favourable circumstances as much as they could, and as a result the Prince Regent had no doubt in demanding that they pay the war contribution arrears on 18 July 1814[23].

Moreover on 10 February 1815 the charter of the Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro was renewed for a further twenty years from 1st January 1817. The discussion which had taken place on this matter demonstrated that the abolition of the Company would only favour

the unlimited claims of the British merchants established at Oporto[24].

The war contribution caused a situation truly delicate to all the parts involved.

Economic crisis was an evident fact. The Portuguese government could hardly consent to Portuguese subjects making the sacrifice and British subjects being exempted despite their privileges.

British merchants and their authorities recognized the necessity and decided to collect money which amounted to 3800$000 reis[25] and offer it as a gift as evidence of their participation in support of the war[26].

The Portuguese government did not accept the money as a gift since such amount would not correspond to more than one third of that which the main British firms had to pay. It demanded that the British merchants paid as if they were Portuguese[27].

Despite the requests of British authorities the British merchants continued to resist, although only the Quarles Harris firm pursued the lawsuit to its ultimate conclusion.

As a result ten pipes of wine were sequestrated and sold[28]. Curiously no merchant, British or Portuguese, appeared to cover the offer of the wine and Joaquim M. Alvarenga, the clerk of their own firm bought it with a reduction of 25%[29].

In the course of the lawsuit the British merchants were peremptory, arguing with convincing documents that they were exempted. They did not accept that their accessors should be their own rivals, namely Portuguese merchants[30].

British merchants believed that the imposition of the payment was due to the authorities in Lisbon. They therefore drew up three memoranda which were addressed to Castlereagh to send them to Strangford at the Rio de Janeiro Court.

The Prince Regent gave orders of adherence to the treaty, when he ordered that the ancient British privileges be religiously respected[31]. Nevertheless the weight of the facts naturally imposed by the crisis and by the evidence of the national interests led him to take two important decisions.

In the first place the Prince Regent demanded expressly that the British merchants pay the war contribution, and in the second place that the Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro be not abolished, frustrating in this way their vehement desires.

Likewise it is admitted that the British authorities had no arguments sufficiently strong to avoid the decision taken on the Wine Company. Nevertheless it is evident that the memoranda drawn up by the British merchants on the war contribution were sent to Strangford[32]. But there is no evidence that the British authorities had paid great attention to such matters, and many months were spent without a reply.

From the end of 1816 until 1820 there is no evidence that the situation had changed. From 1816 onwards it is evident that the future of the British interests in Portugal was becoming very clouded. The opposition frequently appeared either in the political[33] or in the circles[34].

On 28 February 1818 the prevailing atmosphere of the commercial relations between Portuguese and British authorities was characterized by a certain lack of confidence. Only this may explain that on 23 March 1818, Jeffery had confessed to Ward[35] and Castlereagh[36] that the alterations which were desired by the Portuguese Government on the Pauta could be to equalize the duties on British goods with those of other foreign nations.

On 24 July 1819, John Crispin was very satisfied with the state of the British commerce at that time. He regretted the policy practised by the Wine Company, but he predicted the future with the same optimism[37].

Before the treaty of 1810 the British commerce in Portugal faced enormous difficulties, mainly caused by restrictions which had been imposed by the French invasions period[38]. After the treaty the juridical positions had changed and the British merchants and authorities had reacted strongly. But in reality their preponderance rested upon the extraordinary circumstances of the war.

The treaty was always regarded by the British merchants as their strong support. Its stipulations were constantly invoked either to demonstrate their exemptions or their rights.

As a result the Portuguese considered it always as an obstacle to their commercial aspirations. They regarded it as one of the principal sources of the evils which seemed to affect them, though these stemmed from other causes.

Sometimes the position taken by the Portuguese protesters against the British abuses was exaggerated. The case about the difference of rates levied on the Portuguese vessels in England and on the British vessels in Portugal showed some grounds, but they were not sufficiently strong that they could affirm that there was a difference of 700 reis paid by each ton on behalf of England[39].

At other times the reasons presented were just. The indulgence committed by the staff of the custom houses in regard to the imports of the British colonial produce or on the coasting trade was clearly an unacceptable breach of the treaty.

Finally the British commerce in March 1452 equalized its privileges in Portugal to "Flamingos e Franceses". In 1703 it was placed in a position of certain hegemony, in comparison with other foreign nations. With the treaty of 1810 such hegemony was strengthened, and as a result of this by 1816-1819 some signs of anti-British sentiments had emerged.

The implantation of the British commerce in Lisbon was much more ancient than in Oporto.

There is evidence that by 1450 there was a British Judge Conservator

in Lisbon, while in 1691 one was established in Oporto. Nevertheless during 1807-1820 the British merchants were much more active at Oporto than in Lisbon, at least in matters of privileges and claims.

Notes - I

(1) Cf. Fisher, H.E.S., "Lisbon, its English merchant community and the Mediterranean in the eighteenth century" in Shipping, Trade and Commerce. Leicester University Press, 1981

(2) S.P., 1812-1814, Vol.I - Part I, from p.462 onwards

(3) S.P., 1812-1814, Vol.I - Part I, from p.468 onwards

(4) Brit. Mus., Ad. Ms. 34.329, p.12, or Ad. Ms. 27.344, p.53

(5) Brit. Mus., Ad. Ms. 34.329, p.11V or Ad. Ms. 27.344, p.50

(6) Brit. Mus., Ad. Ms. 27.344, pp.48-50. "...E por que nos he dito que hora lhes fizeram tirar das portas das logeas em que tem seos panos, e mercadorias, os panos verdes que costumavão ter: mandamos que possam tão se quizerem os ditos panos verdes as portas das logeas pella graça que os haviam de ter, que nenhum outro lhos embarque e assim lhe faze de comprir, fassa do que elles nam hajam de se nós virem, nem enviarem com aggravos e al nam façades..."

(7) Brit. Mus., Ad. Ms. 27.344, p.55

(8) Brit. Mus., Ad. Ms. 27.344, pp.47-48. "Dom Affonço a quantos esta carta virem fazemos saber que para bem amor e antiguas pazes que havemos com El Rey de Inglaterra nosso muyto prezado, e amado Primo, amigo e Irmão, seguramos todos os Inglezes q. mercantemente vierem a nossos Reynos, e seos Navios, e mercadorias que elles tiverem que não seiao prezos nem tomados nem acuzados nem demandados nem feyto outro mal, nem dezaguizado dentro dos Portos e costas do mar de nossos Reynos; porem mandamos as nosso Almirante, Capitan Mor da nossa frota, Patrois(?), Corsarios gente de nossos Reynos, que se os encontrarem no mar que os nam tomem nem prendam, nem tonbem nam lhes façao outro nenhum mal nem dezaguizado vindo elles mercantemente..."

(9) F.O.63, 198, pp.52V-53V

(10) Brit. Mus., Add. 34:329, p.12V or F.O.198, pp.53V-55 "...havemos por bem, e queremos que daqui em diante não seja constrangido pa. haver de pagar nem huns nossos pedidos, peitas, finsas(?) nem talhas nem prestidios, nem serviços nem outros, nem huns encargos, nem servidões que por nos nem pellos conselhos nao sejam obrigados a servir em armas, cavalos, etc."

(11) Brit. Mus., Add. 27.344, p.45

(12) Brit. Mus., Add. 27:344, p.137. "...Outro sim tenho por bem e me pras que a ordenação que he feita sobre as mullas, e facas se entenda nelles, e possam nellas andar posto que nam tenham cavallo, sem

embargo da ordenação, que dispoem o contrario, e se algum dos ditos mercadores incorrer nas ditas penas desta ordenação hey por bem que seiam dellas rellevados..."

(13) Brit. Mus., Add. 27.344, p.124. "...Fasço saber aos que este meu Alvará virem que por quanto por hum cappitullo de pazes feytas com El Rey da Gran Bretanha esta determinado que as fazendas de seos vassalos que em meos Reynos nos houverem falescido depois da publicação das ditas pazes, e que falecerem ao diante se entreguem aos seos legitimos herdeyros: dezejando que se cumpra o cappitullo com toda a pontualidade hey por bem e mando que asim se execute, em os Reynos e senhorios de Portugal sem duvida nem embargo algum."

(14) Brit. Mus., Add. 27:344, pp.121 and 122

(15) Brit. Mus., Ad. 27.344, p.123

(16) Brit. Mus., Add. 27:344, p.217

(17) S.P., 1812-1814, Vol.I - Part I, pp.473-480

(18) Brit. Mus., Add. Ms. 34:329, from p.11 onwards: "...entre as provizões, Cartas e Alvarás q. os s.nores Reys destes Reynos lhes concedera, era, que nenhum Alcaide nem merinho lhes entrasse em suas cazas a fazer com elles diligencias algumas nem, em outra parte salvo fosse o dp. seu conservador juiz privativo, ou por seu mandado com uma pena de vinte cruzados, pa. elles salvo, s.ndo, a justiça apos algum mao feitor em fragrante delicto achado..."

(19) Brit. Mus., Add. Ms. 34:329, from p.11 onwards: "assi tam bem podia trazer armas offensivas o Defensivas por todo esse Reyno assi de noite como de dia antes do sino = decorrer; como depois delle, com lume e sem lume, e entrar com ellas nos Lugares prohibidos do todo Esto Reyno e que outrosi convexados(?) pellos almotaceis da Limpeza, que de ordinario, delles era perseguidos..."

(20) S.P., 1812-1814, vol.I, Part I, pp.840-492

(21) F.O.63, 198, pp.56-56V or Brit. Mus., Add: 27:344, p.134

(22) S.P., 1812-1814. Vol.I - Part I, pp.492-494. "Treaty of Confederacy, Friendship, and Union between the Most Serene Prince Alfonso VI, King of Portugal and the Algarves, and England. - Concluded by Francis de Mello, Ambassador Extraordinary from the King of Portugal, on the part of that King, and by the Council of State constituted by the Authority of Parliament, on the part of England"

(23) S.P., 1812-1814, Vol.I, Part I, pp.494-501. Treaty between Great Britain and Portugal, of Marriage between His Majesty, Charles the Second and the Princess Catherine, Infanta. - Signed at Whitehall, 23rd June 1661

(24) Brit. Mus., Add: Ms. 27:344, p.288. "Decreto de 23 de Agosto de 1667 q. manda ao Regedor da Caza da Supp. am q. se observe o arto. 13 do trato. para q. nenhum official de Justissa possa prender Inglez sem licença do seu conservador"

(25) Brit. Mus., Ad. Ms. 27.344, p.288, "Alvará de 27 Agosto de 1667 a favor de Thomas Maynard para q. o conservador dos Inglezes, com dous adjuntos despache todas as suas cauzas por acordao no termo de 4 mezes"

(26) Brit. Mus., Ad. Ms. 27.344, p.290

(27) Sellers, Charles, Oporto Old and New, pp.127 and 232

(28) Sellers, Charles, op.cit., p.218

(29) Brit. Mus. Add. 27:344, pp.208-212. "Traslado do Alvará porque se concedeo a nação Ingleza conservador na cidade do Porto por El Rey D. Pedro segundo no anno de 1691. Eu El-Rey. Faço saber aos que este Alvará virem que o consul da naçao Ingleza me representou por sua petiçam que eu fora servido fazer merce a dita Nação em capitulaçam dessas que tenhao neste Reino hum Menistro que com titulo de seu conservador conheça privactivamente de todas suas cauzas com a izençam de todas as mais justissas, o que a dita nação conservava nesta cidade hoje em o Doutor Manoel Lopes de Oliveira..."

(30) Sellers, Charles, op.cit., p.127

(31) Brit. Mus., Ad. Ms., 27.344, p.220. "Treslado do Decreto de El Rey Dom Pedro Segundo por que foram confirmados os Previlegios dos Inglezes, concedendo-se aos Castelhanos no anno de 1692"

(32) Brit. Mus., Ad. Ms. 27.344, p.265. "Sentenssas do Almoxarife Juis dos direytos Reaes confirmada pello contador da fazenda e pella Rellaçam pellas quais se julgou que se desse aos Inglezes todo o vinho que jurarem vir para o gasto de suas cazas Livre de todos os direytos no anno de 1698"

(33) S.P., 1812-1814, vol.1 - Part 1, pp.501-506. "Treaty of Defensive Alliance between Great Britain and Portugal. Signed at Lisbon, 16th May 1703"

(34) S.P., pp.506-507. "Treaty of commerce between Great Britain and Portugal. Signed at Lisbon, 27th December 1703"

(35) Cf. Aspectos Económicos da Aliança Luso-Britanica, pp.21-28; by José D'Almada. The Englishman's wine. The Story of Port, from p.43 onwards by Sarah Bradford; Oporto Old and New, pp.20-24 by Charles Sellers and Trade and Power..., pp.40-50 by S. Sideri

(36) Cf. A Questão Vinhateira do Douro, p.303 and following, Por Hum Anonymo, Discurso Historico e Analitico sobre o Estabelecimento da C.G.A.V.A.D., pp.59-62, by Christovão Guerner

(37) Sellers, Charles, op.cit., pp.127 and 135

(38) F.O.63, 198, pp.56-56V. "A provision for Law whereby the English are exempted from paying Decima on their stock, and from being obliged to take upon them any Charge in War"

(39) Brit. Mus., Ad. Ms. 27:344, p.277. "Alvará que Sua Magestade concedeo a favor dos Inglezes contra as moratorias pera nao serem obrigados a esperar pella satisfação das suas dividas em confirmaçao do artigo 13 do tratado das pazes no anno de 1709"

(40) Brit. Mus., Add. Ms. 27:344, p.43. "Carta de previlegios e foral dos Inglezes concedidos por El-Rey D. Affonço quinto nos annos de 1454, 1458, confirmados por El-Rey D. Joam segundo no anno de 1491 e por El Rey D. Manoel no anno de 1497, e por El Ray D. Joao treceiro no anno de 1536, e por El Rey D. Felipe segundo de Castella no anno de 1609, e por El Rey D. Joam quarto em o treceiro artigo das pazes celebradas no anno de 1654"

(41) Cf. Chapters III, I and II

(42) S.P., 1812-1814. Vol.I - Part I, London, 1841, pp.507-508. Convention of Friendship and Alliance between Great Britain and Portugal. - Signed at London, 22nd October, 1807

(43) S.P., 1812-1814, Vol.I, Part I, pp.508-513. Convention of Loan between His Britannic Majesty and His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal. Signed at London, 21st April, 1809

(44) Cf. Chapters I, IV and V

(45) Neves, José Accúrsio das, "Effeitos da Regeneração pelo que respeita à Industria" in Cartas de Hum Portuguez aos seus Concidadãos, Carta XV, p.120

(46) A.P.(13). Miscellaneous, vol.XXXI, 1830, p.25. Letter from Lord Strangford to the Conde das Galveas. Rio de Janeiro, June 12th 1813

(47) S.P., 1812-1814. Vol.I, Part I, from p.513 on. "Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain and Portugal. Signed at Rio de Janeiro, the 19th February 1810"

(48) S.P., 1812-1814. Vol.I, Part I, pp.491-492. On 28th January 1808 a Carta Regia ordered that all merchandize from all other nations at peace with Portugal pay twenty-four per cent taxes. Nevertheless on 11th June that sum fell to sixteen per cent if the foreign merchandize was consigned by Portuguese subjects and carried by Portuguese vessels

(49) Cf. Chapter III

(50) F.O.63, 198, p.73V

(51) F.O.63, 198, p.73V. Aviso Regio from Conde das Galvias to Senhor Patriarca Eleito de Lisboa on 7th August 1812

(52) Sideri, S., Trade and Power..., pp.40-54

Notes - II

(1) Cf. Chapter III, I

(2) Crouzet, François, L'Economie Britannique et le Blocus Continental (1806-1813), pp. 211-238

(3) Cf. Chapter I, I and II

(4) B.P.M.P., Códice no.138, from p.6o onwards

(5) On this subject cf. Os Franceses no Porto 1807-1808. Diario de uma testemunha presencial, anotado e precedido de uma introdução. Porto. 1949 by Durval Pires de Lima and Manifesto da Razão contra as Usurpações Francezas. Lisbon MDCCCVIII by José Accursio das Neves

(6) C.L.P., 1802 a 1810, p.531

(7) B.P.M.P., Códice no.138, from p.60 onwards

(8) Cf. Chapter I, V

(9) B.P.M.P., Códice no.931, p.18. Decree of 24th May 1810 published in Diario Lisbonense of 14th November or Gazeta de Lisboa of 16th and 17th November

(10) It was stipulated by the 15th article of the treaty of commerce of 19th February 1810

(11) Inv. Port., vol.VII, pp.412-413. The author complained in these terms: "Jà vao de Inglaterra para Portugal, çapatos feitos, botas, botinas, cazacas e tudo; mas a culpa nao he dos Inglezes, que o que lhes importa he negociar, seja como for: culpados são os administradores das Alfandegas nos Dominios de Sua Alteza Real em admittirem a despacho obra feita, como vulgarmente se diz: por quanto não existe tal estipulação no Tratado... Concedeo-se pelo artigo 8. que os Inglezes possão comprar e vender por grosso, ou em retalho mas em nenhum Diccionario a palavra retalho, significa çapatos feitos, botas feitas, ec."

(12) The 20th article of the treaty of 1810 stipulated that some articles of the growth and produce of Brazil were excluded from the markets and home consumption of the British dominions, such as sugar, coffee, and other articles similar to the produce of the British colonies

(13) Inv. Port., vol.IX, p.757. It was referred to: "Como he possivle que em Portugal se admitta a despacho das Colonias Inglezas, tendo-o nos em tanta copia das nossas proprias Colonias? Se os Inglezes não admittem em seos portos muitos dos nossos generos coloniaes por isso mesmo que elles os tem, e cultivão nas suas proprias Colonias; por que razão o seu Café ha de ser admittido em Portugal? Onde está a decantada reciprocidade do Tratado de Commercio?"

(14) C.L.P., 1811 a 1820, p.435 or Cor. Braz., Vol.XVI, p.213

(15) Inv. Port., vol.XV, p.229

(16) Inv. Port., vol.VIII, p.54

(17) Inv. Port., vol.VII, pp.238-239

(18) Cf. Chapter IV, I. "The question of the ships and vessels as cause of commercial interests dispute"

(19) Inv. Port., vol.VII, pp.240-242

(20) Inv. Port., vol.VII, pp.242-243. The author refers to: "...e alem destes direitos pagáo mais quando entrào na Dock de Londres (London Docks) onde sao por força obrigados a entrar, levando açúcar, tabaco, café, ou outros generos, que não são admittidos para consumo de paiz, 2 penes por cada tonellada, durante 40 dias; e passando delles ¾ de hum pene por tonellada, ou 10 reis cada semana, que passe na dita Dock; propinas aos officiaes da Alfandega, 3 P. por tonellada, por Dover Pierage, nao excedendo a 300 tonelladas, maior pilotagem, que os Inglezes, etc., etc., etc.: de forma que se pode dizer, sem exageração que cada tonellada de navio Portuguez paga em Londres dois mil e duzentos reis de todos os direitos, e impostos; e sejão elles cobrados por quem forem, e seja a aplicação qual for, o facto he que os Portuguezes pagão, e os Inglezes recebem"

(21) Inv. Port., vol.VII, pp.242-243

(22) Inv. Port., vol.VII, p.244

(23) Inv. Port., vol.VII, pp.588, 603-604

(24) Inv. Port., vol.VII, pp.607-611; C.L.P., 1811 a 1820, pp.285-286 and S.P. 1812-1814, vol.1, Part I, pp.562-563

(25) Inv. Port., vol.VII, pp.245 and following; vol.VIII, p.637; vol.IX, p.748 and Cor. Braz., vol.XVI, pp.443 and following

(26) C.L.P., 1811 a 1820, p.527

(27) Cf. Chapter IV, I. "The question of the ships and vessels as cause of commercial interests dispute"

(28) F.O.63, 206, pp.167-169. This document shows in detail the powers attributed to Sr. Bernardino da Costa. His principal duty was to be representative of the British authorities in the Court

(29) This point was determined in the following terms: "This tariff or valuation shall be determined and settled by an equal number of British and Portuguese Merchants of known integrity and honour, with

the assistance, on the part of the British merchants, of His Britannic Majesty's Consul General, or Consul, and on the part of the Portuguese Merchants with the assistance of the Superintendent, or Administrator-General of the Customs, or of their respective Deputies"

(30) Source cited in note (28)

(31) In F.O.63, 198, p.41; F.O.63, 205, p.89 and F.O.63, 214, p.173 may be found memoranda addressed to London which confirm that number

(32) Shaw, Thomas George, Wine, the wine and the Cellar. London. 1864, pp.116-117 and "A Questão Vinhateira do Douro, Por Un Anonymo", pp.303 and following

(33) Many figures may be found at F.O.63, 165, pp.260-261V and F.O.63, 117, p.19

(34) Neves, José Accúrsio das, Variedades Sobre Objectos Relativos às Artes, Commercio, e Manufacturas Consideradas Segundo os Princípios da Economia Politica. Tomo I. Lisboa, 1814, pp.209-211. Bernardo Clamouse Brown was also involved in "Contrato do Tabaco"'s dispute between two groups. One of them was composed by Diogo Ratton; Clamouse & Co.; Domingos Gomes & Filhos; Jozé Diogo de Bastos (merchants at Lisbon). The other one was composed by Companhia de José Antonio da Fouseca. On this subject cf.: Inv. Port., vol.XVI, pp.217-220 and vol.XVII, pp.104-107

(35) Cf. Chapter IV, II. "The Revenues of the British authorities along the Portuguese Coast"

(36) Source cited at note (35)

(37) Balbi, Adrien, Essai Statistique, II, pp.55-56; Louis François Tolenare. Notes Dominicales Prises Pendant Un Voyage En Portugal Et Au Brésil En 1816, 1817 et 1818, Tome I, p.80 by Léon Bourdon and Memória Histórica da Academia Politecnica do Porto, pp.31-33 by Artur de Magalhães Basto

(38) Bourdon, Léon, op.cit., p.78

(39) B.P.M.P., Códice no.1269. Cf.: "Rua dos Inglezes"

(40) Inv. Port., vol.XIX, pp.149-158. The author wrote: "...Quanto aos ferros estabeleceremos em primeiro lugar, que elles devem ser o mais simples possivel, seguros, e decentes, iguaes, e similhantes, tanto por uniformidade, como para não haver differença no custo, podendo servir de modelo os da Rua Nova de S. João, ou dos Inglezes, que reunem as vantagens ditas..."

(41) Cf. Chapter I, IV. "Second French invasion and new persecution to the British subjects and their properties"

(42) B.P.M.P., códice no.1273, pp.144-146. This document refers to the building constructed at the direction of the British consul, William Whitehead: "...talhou a caza com tal magnitude, que comporta huma boa e selecta livraria, sallas, quartos para hospedes onde encontrão comodo abrigo por ter as officinas e misteres correspondentes para isso, bom escritorio e até saloens proprios para bailes e recepção nos grandes e numerosos ajuntamentos por convite nos festejos e solemnidades que os commerciantes britanicos destinão, sendo costume darem anualmente hum baile, ao qual tambem concorrem as familias Britannicas...". On this subject see: O Comércio do Vinho do Porto através da Correspondencia de John Whitehead Consul Britanico na mesma cidade, endereçada a Mr Warre (1793 a 1800) by J.A. Pinto Ferreira; Descripção, p.129 by Rebelo da Costa and Oporto Old and New, pp.42-47 by Charles Sellers

(43) Bourdon, Léon, op.cit., p.35

(44) Bourdon, Léon, op.cit., p.43

Notes - III

(1) C.L.P., 1811 a 1820, p.44

(2) C.L.P., 1802 a 1810, pp.749-752. Mappa da Contribuição Extraordinaria, que deverão pagar somente no presente anno de 1809, e no preciso e improrrogavel termo de dois mezes, os Empregos, e Lojas abaixo declaradas. In the first place the Mappa presents the amounts to be paid by Empregos. In the second place the amounts with respect to Lojas are mentioned:

Bacalhoeiro	de 19 200 a 96 000
Mercearia	de 9 600 a 96 000
Tabernas e Armazens	de 4 800 a 96 000
Tendeiros	de 2 400 a 48 000
Lojas de Bebidas, e Liquores	de 4 800 a 28 800
Ditas de Vinho do Porto	de 9 600 a 24 000
Casas de Cambio	de 24 000 a 96 000
Cambistas	24 000
Casas de Bilhar	de 9 600 a 24 000
Padeiros	de 14 400 a 48 000
Lojas de Ferragem	de 9 600 a 48 000
Estanceiros, e Carvoarias	de 14 400 a 96 000
Estaleiros	de 24 000 a 96 000
Casas de pasto	de 19 200 a 48 000
Casas de Hospedaria	de 14 400 a 48 000
Lojas designadas	de 2 400 a 14 400

(3) F.O.63, 76, p.199V

(4) C.L.P. (1802 a 1810), p.858. Carta Regia ao Clero, Nobreza e Povo do Reino anunciativa de grandes melhoramentos de Agricultura, que compensem o damno, que possa trazer o Tratado de Commércio com a Gra-Bretanha

(5) With regard to the Commerce, it was determined: "O Corpo do Commércio, e Capitalistas pagarão para esta Contribuição de Defeza duzentos contos de réis, distribuidos pela Real Junta do Commercio; não entrando nesta collecta os que verdadeiramente não forem commerciantes, ou capitalistas; e no caso dos collectados requererem compensação com os donativos, que pagarem, se fará nova derrama pelas quantias compensadas, para se inteirar a dita quota dos duzentos contos de reis"

(6) C.L.P., 1811 a 1820, pp.42-44

(7) C.L.P., 1811 a 1820, pp.66-67. It was ordered: "I. Todos os Officios, e Empregos, que devem pagar Decima ordinaria pelo Maneio, assim como os redditos dos dinheiros dados a juro, pagarão duas decimas em lugar de huma. II. O Corpo do Commércio, e capitalistas, em lugar da cóta com que contribuirão nos dous annos antecedentes, ficarão pagando

duas decimas dos seus lucros, e interesses annuaes, exclusive os redditos do Artigo precedente, de que mostrarem pago o duplo do Maneio; e o mesmo pagarão todas as Pessoas de qualquer estado, sexo, ou condição que sejão, que fazem o negócio de cambios, seguros, comissões, e mercadorias, ou outro algum, que se não possa entender de retalho; os Rendeiros de quaesquer contratos Reaes, ou Particulares; os Despachantes das Alfandegas; os Corretores, e Agentes de Letras de Cambio, fretamentos, seguros, e de compras e vendas; e bem assim todos os Commissários, Agentes, ou Feitores, que por conta alheia comprão lans, frutas, vinhos, ou outros generos nas terras interiores do Reino"

(8) F.O.63, 198, p.73V. Letter from Strangford to the Prince Regent. Rio de Janeiro, 3rd August 1812

(9) F.O.63, 198, pp.72V-73V. Carta do Ministro Secretário de Estado dos Negocios Estrangeiros na Corte do Rio de Janeiro, escrita ao Enviado de S.M.B. na mesma corte, participando I.S.A.R. Determinam aos Governadores do Reino de Portugal fação observar a conservação dos antigos Privilégios dos Inglezes no mesmo Reino

(10) F.O.63, 198, p.49V. Letter from D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz to Sir Charles Stuart

(11) F.O.63, 198, p.67

(12) F.O.63, 198, p.49

(13) F.O.63, 198, pp.49-49V. Letter from John Jeffery to John Alves

(14) F.O.63, 197, p.113. Letter from Ward to Castlereagh

(15) C.L.P., 1811 a 1820, pp.308. Portaria supprimindo a Contribuição Extraordinaria de Defeza

(16) C.L.P., 1811 a 1820, p.312. It was ordered: "O Principe Regente Nosso Senhor Houve por bem resolver, pelas suas immediatas Ordens, que todos os Negociantes Britanicos residentes nestes Reinos, paguem a Contribuição de Defeza dos seus lucros Commerciaes continuando porém a praticar-se a respeito da Decima Ordinaria do Maneio, a isempção concedida exclusivamente aos Negociantes de grosso trato, na conformidade das Reaes Ordens; devendo satisfazer os mencionados Impostos de todo o tempo que deverem, assim como os que se forem vencendo..." On this subject many documents may be found at A.N.T.T. in Lisbon (Contribuições de defesa, Maços 12-14, no.s23-28)

(17) F.O.63, 198, p.50. John Jeffery Esq. to John Crispin

(18) F.O.63, 198, p.50V. John Crispin to John Jeffery

(19) F.O.63, 198, pp.45 and 62

(20) F.O.63, 198, p.50V

(21) F.O.63, 198, p.51. J. Jeffery to John Crispin

(22) F.O.63, 198, p.51V. J. Jeffery to John Crispin

(23) F.O.63, 198, p.45V. "Order of Dom João Jozé Pereira da Costa, Judge of Crimes Superintendent of Decimas, New imposts..."

(24) F.O.63, 198, pp.62V, 63V

(25) F.O.63, 198, pp.46 and 63V. Demand and refusal, signed by Antonio Peixoto Marinho and sequestration, signed by the same, Antonio M. Moura, Alcaide and Clemente Monteiro Alvarenga

(26) F.O.63, 198, p.51V. John Crispin to J. Jeffery, 16 July 1816

(27) F.O.63, 198, p.39. "Resolved unanimously that a Committee be appointed to draw up a Memorandum and addressed to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs"

(28) F.O.63, 198, p.63V

(29) F.O.63, 198, p.52. J. Jeffery to J. Crispin

(30) F.O.63, 198, p.52

(31) F.O.63, 198, 46V. Embargoes

(32) Brit.Mus. Add. Ms 27:344, p.134. "Provizam para que os Inglezes não paguem decima de seos maneyos nem que seiam obrigados a nenhum encargo de guerra no anno 1656"

(33) The 6th paragraph of the Royal decree dated 2nd Agusut 1810 ordered: "O Corpo do Commercio, e Capitalistas pagarão para esta Contribuição de Defeza duzentos contos de réis, distribuidos pela Real Junta de Commércio; não entrando nesta collecta os que verdadeiramente não forem Commerciantes, ou Capitalistas; e no caso dos collectados requererem compensação com os donativos, que pagarem, se fará nova derrama pelas quantias compensadas, para se inteirar a dita quota dos duzentos contos de reis"

(34) The embargoes also may be found in Portuguese at F.O.63, 198, p.64

(35) F.O.63, 198, p.47V. "Reply". or F.O.63, 198, 65V. "Resposta"

(36) F.O.63, 198, p.48. "Sentence"

(37) F.O.63, 198, p.48. The Petition for sale of wine was published in the following terms: "The solicitor of the Royal Treasury declares

that in the Execution against the defendants, the usual notices have been given, and that therefore the defendants should be cited to redeem, or appoint a bidder, and the trustee required to produce the property at the mart under pain of imprisonment.

Granted
Signed Figueiredo"

(38) F.O.63, 198, p.48V

(39) The document referred to in note (38) states that the reduction was of forty per cent while document F.O.63, 198, p.66V, written in Portuguese states that the reduction would be "a quarta parte" (25%)

(40) F.O.63, 198, p.60 or p.74

(41) F.O.63, 198, pp.60-61 or pp.74-74V

(42) F.O.63, 198, p.37. Letter from John Crispin to John Jeffery, Oporto, 1e December 1816 and F.O.63, 198, p.35. John Crispin to William Hamilton, Oporto, 14th December 1816

(43) F.O.63, 198, pp.41-42. To the Right Honourable Lord Viscount Castlereagh, His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The memorandum of the Merchants of Great Britain established in the city of Oporto on behalf of themselves and their fellows. The same document may also be found at F.O.63, 205, pp.128-129

(44) The 9th article of the treaty of 1654 stipulated the following: "That neither the King of Portugal, nor any of his Ministers, shall detain, arrest, or attach any Merchants, Masters of Ships, Captains, or Mariners, or their Ships, merchandise or other goods, which belong to this Republic, or any of its People, either for war, or any other use whatsoever, unless the Lord Protector, or those to whom such ships and goods appertain, are first apprized thereof, and give their consent..."

(45) F.O.63, 198, p.52V

(46) F.O.63, 198, p.53V and p.68

(47) F.O.63, 198, p.70V

(48) F.O.63, 198, p.56

(49) F.O.63, 198, p.56V and 71V. All the documents quoted in the above notes may also be found in F.O.63, 205, pp.129-159

(50) F.O.63, 197, p.228. Letter from Ward to Castlereagh

(51) F.O.63, 205, p.9. Letter from Castlereagh to Ward

(52) F.O.63, 205, p.89-89V. General meeting of the British Merchants, Oporto morn. 31st March 1817

(53) F.O.63, 205, pp.89-89V. The document was signed by the representatives of the firms: Swans Knowsley & Co.; James Dawson & Co.; Hunt, Newman Roope; John Hatt Noble; Cockburns Wauchope(?) Greig; Campbell Bowden & Taylor; Geo Sandeman; Offley Forrester, Webber & Co.; Burmester & Co.; Frederik Croft; Lambert & Kingston; Butler Tyndale & Co.; Daniel & Naylor; William Snow; John Killman; James Hoolet(?) Smart(?); Goul James Campbell; Daniel Bull and Patrick Cely

(54) F.O.63, 214, p.174. To the Right Honorable Lord Viscount Castlereagh, His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The memorandum of the merchants of Great Britain established in the city of Oporty, on behalf of themselves and their fellow subjects. This document, beyond those signatures referred to at note (53), was also signed by Quarles Harris & Sons and Croft & Co.

Notes - IV

(1) Cf. Chapter III, I

(2) Cf. Chapter I, II

(3) C.L.P., 1802-1810, p.526. "Proclamação do Governo de S.A.R. e da extincção do Governo Francez"

(4) C.F. Chapter I, IV and V

(5) Cf. Chapter I, V

(6) F.O.63, 81, pp.226-226V. Office of Committee of Privy Council for Trade. Whitehall, 2nd September 1809

(7) F.O.63, 81, pp.226-226V. "...The People of England may trade with the Brazils, and other territories of Portugal in America, through Portugal, in all sorts of Goods, paying such Dues and Customs as others pay there..."

(8) F.O.63, 74, pp.232-235. Letter from Bathurst to Villiers. Foreign Office, Nov.22, 1809

(9) F.O.63, 96, pp.112-113. Letter from H. Wilson to Marquis Wellesley. Lisbon, 17th March 1810

(10) F.O.63, 96, pp.15-16V

(11) F.O.63, 96, p.17. Letter from J. Jeffery to the Marquis Wellesley. Lisbon, 5 May 1810

(12) F.O.63, 96, p.23. Letter from Jeffery to the Governor of Gibraltar. Lisbon, 16 May 1810

(13) F.O.63, 96, p.30. Letter from Jeffery to William Hamilton Esq. Lisbon, 31 July 1810

(14) F.O.63, 96, p.30

(15) Cf. Chapter I, V

(16) F.O.63, 165, pp.191-192V. Meeting of the members of the late Factory of Oporto, held at the City of London Tavern, 21st March 1811. Cf. Chapter III, II

(17) Cf. Chapter III, II

(18) Cf. In this chapter, III

(19) F.O.63, 198, pp.58V-59. Letter from Count of Galvias to the British Envoy

(20) F.O.63, 137, pp.49-54

(21) F.O.63, 137, p.51. Mr Hunt stated his point of view as follows: "...the duties paid or demanded on the quantity of Fish imported into Oporto during the year 1811 amounted to £55,795 13s. 9d. whereas on a valuation at 18d. per Quintal, at the rate of 15 per cent it should only have been £25,137 0s. 0d., making an excess of duty paid or demanded £30,658 13s. 9d.

(22) Cf. In this chapter, 11

(23) Jeffery was referring to the 20th article of the treaty of 1810 which excluded from the British dominions some products such as sugar and coffee, coming from Brazil. As compensation it was permitted that such articles might be received and warehoused in England for the purpose of re-exportation, paying reduced duties and expenses on warehousing and re-exportation. Also the 21st article foresaw the same practice in regard to British goods "not destined for the consumption of the place at which they may be received or admitted, but for re-exportation, either for other ports of the Dominions of Portugal, or for those of other States"

(24) At Oporto, in 1804, the duties on Newfoundland Cod fish were: Dezima - 9 per cent; size - $8\frac{7}{10}$ per cent; Donativo - 4 per cent; Consulado - 3 per cent; Fragatas - 2 per cent and Redizima - 1 per cent. Total = $27\frac{7}{10}$ per cent

(25) At Figueira the duties on fish were: Dizima - 10 per cent; siza - 10 per cent; Donativo - 4 per cent; Consulado - 3 per cent and Fragatas - 2 per cent. Total 29 per cent

(26) F.O.63, 137, pp.86-90. Such affirmation was cited in a letter from John Jeffery to Sir Charles Stuart

(27) The article foresaw the situations which could arise during the interval between the exchange of the Ratifications of the treaty and the promulgation of the Pauta. It determined that any goods or merchandise, the produce or manufacture of the Dominions of His Britannic Majesty arriving in the ports of His Royal Highness, the Prince Regent of Portugal, shall be admitted for consumption on paying the above mentioned Duties of 15 per cent. according to the value set on them by the Tariff now actually established,..." If the merchandise was not specifically valued and rated in the new Pauta, "they shall be equally admitted on paying the same duties of 15 per cent ad valorem, according to the invoices of the said goods and merchandise, which shall be duly presented and sworn to by the parts importing the same..."

(28) C.L.P., 1811-1820, pp.285-286 or Inv. Port., vol.VII, pp.607-608: "It is agreed, that on the importation of any Goods or Merchandize from the United Kingdom, into any of the Ports of the Dominions of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, all such Goods shall be accompanied by the original Dockets, signed and sealed by the proper officers of the British Customs at the port of shipping, and that the Dockets, belonging to each ship, shall be numbered progressively, the total number stated on the first and last docket by the proper officers of the customs, at the final clearance of each vessel at the British port; - and it is further agreed that, prior to the final clearance by the searchers at the shipping port, the dockets for each ship must be collected and fastened together, to which shall be annexed a paper, with the number of the dockets sealed with the official seal, and signed by the searcher. The dockets so collected shall be produced together with the manifest, sworn to by the Captain, to the Portuguese consul, who shall certify the same on the manifest. The dockets thus secured together, and the manifest so authenticated to be returned to the searchers, in order for the final clearance of the ship"

(29) A.P.(13). Miscellaneous, vol.XXXI, pp.1-32

(30) A.P.(13). Miscellaneous, vol.XXXI, pp.1-32

(31) F.O.63, 176, p.136. Letter from John Jeffery to William Hamilton. Lisbon 10th January 1814

(32) F.O.63, 188, p.69. Letter from William Hamilton to J. Jeffery on 8th February 1815

(33) F.O.63, 188, p.71. The questions were: "1. Are there any articles absolutely prohibited to be imported into the country in which you reside? And if so, what are the articles so prohibited? 2. Are there any articles prohibited to be imported into such country, except from the place of their growth or production? 3. Are there any privileges of importation in favour of ships that are of the build or belonging to the country in which you reside? 4. Is there any difference in the duty on goods when imported into the country in a foreign ship? And if so, is it general, or does it apply only to particular articles? 5. What are the rates of duty payable on goods imported into the said country? 6. Is there any tonnage duty payable on shipping entering inwards or outwards in the country in which you reside? 7. Are there any, and if so, what ports in the country where you reside, wherein goods may be warehoused on importation, and afterwards exported, without payment of any duty, and under what regulations?"

(34) F.O.63, 188, pp.71-75. Letter from Jeffery to William Hamilton. Lisbon, 30 March 1815

(35) Cf. Chapter III, V

(36) F.O.63, 165, pp.324-337. Project of a Convention for the Regulation of the British wine trade of Oporto

(37) F.O.63, 198, p.51. Letter from John Jeffery to John Crispin

(38) F.O.63, 198, pp.41-42

(39) F.O.63, 214, p.174

(40) F.O.63, 197, p.197V. Letter from Ward to Castlereagh. Lisbon 26th October 1816

(41) F.O.63, 214, p.75. Letter from Jeffery to Ward. Lisbon 24th February 1818

(42) F.O.63, 214, p.91. Letter from Jeffery to Ward. Lisbon 23rd March 1818

(43) F.O.63, 214, p.89. Letter from Jeffery to Ward. Lisbon 23rd March 1818

(44) F.O.63, 222. In this bundle it is possible to find much correspondence on this subject, but it does not provide elements which might settle the question.

(45) F.O.63, 223. Letter from John Crispin to William Hamilton. Oporto, 24th July 1819

Notes - V

(1) Cf. Chapter I, I, note (39)

(2) S.P., 1812-1814, vol.I, Part I, from p.468 onwards

(3) Sources cited in this chapter, I, notes (4) and (7)

(4) Source cited in this chapter, I, note (11)

(5) S.P., 1812-1814, Vol.I, Part I, pp.491-492

(6) Source cited in this chapter, I, note (21)

(7) Sellers, Charles, Oporto, Old and New, pp.113-259

(8) Brit. Mus. Add. 27: 344, pp.208-212. Traslado do Alvará por que se concedeo a nação Ingleza conservador na cidade do Porto por El Rey D. Pedro II no anno de 1691

(9) Source cited in this chapter, I, note (31)

(10) S.P., 1812-1814, vol.I, Part I, pp.506-507

(11) Cf. Chapter III, I

(12) Cf. Balbi, Adrien, Essai Statistique..., p.441. Bilan du commerce extérieur du Portugal avec les nations étrangères depuis 1795 jusqu'en 1820

(13) The opening of the Brazilian ports to the friendly nations occurred on 28 January 1808. In A Associação Comercial no Império e na República. AntecedentesHistóricos. Rio de Janeiro. 1959, p.15, it referred to: "...Por injunções do governo britânico, que lhe protegera a retirada para o Brasil ante a invasão napoleónica, D. João VI, a 28 de janeiro de 1808, abrira os portos do seu novo Reino ao comércio das "naçoes amigas". Em tais circumstancias históricas, a expressão diplomaticamente genérica "nações amigas" significava de fato, única e exclusivamente, a Grã-Bretanha..."

(14) Cf. In this chapter, II, note (11)

(15) F.O.63, 188, pp.69-75. Jeffery's answers drawn up on 30 March 1815 to a questionnaire which had been sent to him by William Hamilton on 8th February 1815

(16) F.O.63, 137, p.49. Statement drawn up on 4th September 1812 by John Jeffery on the British commerce and sent to Charles Stuart.

(17) This point was stipulated in the 26th article of the treaty

(18) Royal determination of the Prince Regent made at the Palacio do Governo on 19 October 1812 and performed by the "Ministros Conselheiros da Fazenda" on 31 October 1812

(19) Cf. source cited at note (15)

(20) Cf. source cited at note (15)

(21) Cf. In this chapter, II

(22) Royal determination of the Prince Regent made at Palacio do Governo on 23 November 1816

(23) Royal determination of the Prince Regent made at Palacio do Governo on 18th July 1814

(24) Cf. Chapter III, II, III, IV and V

(25) F.O.63, 197, p.113, Ward in writing to Castle reagh, on 27 July 1816, referred to the voluntary contribution encouraged through a dispatch which had been sent from London to Charles Stuart

(26) F.O.63, 198, p.49. Letter from John Jeffery to John Alves on 13th September 1813

(27) F.O.63, 198, p.49V. Letter from Doctor Miguel Pereira Forjaz to Sir Charles Stuart which was written on 2nd September 1813

(28) F.O.63, 198, p.63V. Pinhora "de dez Pipas de Vinho de Feitoria de vinte e hum almudes cada huma..."

(29) F.O.63, 198, p.48V. Sale of the wine on 24th September 1816

(30) F.O.63, 198, p.74. Protesto of Quarles Harris & Sons against the "Louvação de Defeza para o anno de 1814"

(31) F.O.63, 198, p.72V. "Carta do Ministro Secretario do Estado dos Negocios Estrangeiros na Corte do Rio de Janeiro, escrita ao Enviado de S.M.B. na mesma Corte, participando q. S.A.R. Determinou aos Governadores do Reino de Portugal façao observar a conservação dos antigos Privilégios dos Inglezes no mesmo Reino"

(32) F.O.63, 198, p.41. Memorandum addressed to Castlereagh on 7th December 1816; F.O.63, 205, p.89. Memorandum made on 31st March and F.O.63, 214, p.174. Memorandum which was sent on 2nd May 1818

(33) F.O.63, 197, p.197. Ward wrote to Castlereagh, explaining that the British interests in Portugal were unsafe

(34) Cf. Chapter V, III

(35) F.O.63, 214, p.91. Letter from Jeffery to Ward. Lisbon 23rd March 1818

(36) F.O.63, 214, p.89. Letter from Jeffery to Castlereagh. Lisbon 23rd March 1818

(37) F.O.63, 223, p.140. Statement on the British commerce at Oporto from John Crispin to William Hamilton. Oporto, 24th July 1819

(38) This point may be confirmed in F.O.63, 96, pp.112-113. Letter from H. Wilson to Marquis Wellesley. Lisbon, 17th March 1810

(39) Cf. source cited in this chapter, II, note (22)

CHAPTER III

THE BRITISH MERCHANTS VERSUS THE "COMPANHIA" : THE STRUGGLE TO IMPLEMENT THE TREATY OF 19 FEBRUARY 1810

INTRODUCTION

The foundation of the Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro in 1756 was itself a polemic issue. Jacome Ratton in Recordações sobre ocorrencias do seu tempo, de Maio de 1747 a Setembro de 1810 , Sousa Costa in Figuras e Factos Alto-Durienses and Alvaro Moreira da Fonseca in A Ideação da Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro wrote on the principal problems which emerged before and after its establishment.

In its origins it seems that the Company was born as a local response to English merchants accused of adulterating the wine and of controlling its price, sale, etc. as a result of agreements made between themselves. It was subsequently attacked by English merchants who argued that it fixed prices.

During the period 1807-1820, the conflict broke out between the Company and the British merchants only as a reaction to the stipulations of the treaty of 1810. That treaty did not allow the monopolies, so that its interpretation became a crucial matter for local residents in England and Portugal. At the same time it could be argued that the Companhia had already become the object of dispute between Portugal and Great Britain before the controversial treaty was drawn up.

The Portuguese newspapers published in London, Correio Braziliense and Investigador Portuguez em Inglaterra, covered the conflict in great detail, so that the points of view of both sides can be deemed with some rigour. The conflict which involving the Company enables us to examine the extent to which it was supported by the population of the Douro region as well as the weight it possessed in commercial terms both in Portugal and in Great Britain. British merchants were against it because their privileges had been adversely affected after its foundation. Many residents in other regions of the country regarded it with hatred, because its effects were not felt outside the Douro region. At the same time there is no evidence of any actions against it being taken by Portuguese firms, its natural rivals.

The economic and social circumstances in which the Company was founded were important in demonstrating the extent to which the conflict extended from the two claimants to their governments. Despite the pressure the Portuguese authorities did not cede to British merchants whose case was sometimes abandonned by London.

The Treaty of 1810 was ambiguous. In its preamble it invoked the principle of reciprocity and it pointed towards the liberalization of the Portuguese economy, since no monopoly was allowed which could restrain the trade on the part of British subjects. But was the Company a monopoly? If so, the British authorities would have to abolish their chartered Companies as it was the case of the East India Company? The majority of the allegations made by the claimants were of a judicial nature.

The Company's ability to defend its cause also rested on the support which it received from wine merchants long established in Britain. These attempted to demonstrate that the Company's operations did not affect the interests of the British economy nor restrained the freedom of commerce. This discouraged the British authorities from protecting the British merchants established at Oporto. They had already forfeited the advantages accrued from the factory.

The British merchants attacked the maintenance of the Company and demanded its abolition, alleging the stipulations of the treaty. Their claim was supported by those who wanted to liberalize the economy and were identified with the opposition to absolutism. The Portuguese newspapers published in London illustrated the entire conspectus of arguments and constituted a substantial support having in view the discussion of the conflict.

I. ANTECEDENTS

By the middle of the eighteenth century the Oporto wine trade was going through a considerable crisis. Between 1700 and 1750 exports had reached about twenty thousand pipes per year, but by 1754-1755 this had fallen to about 13,000[1].

Before 1750 each pipe arrived to be sold at the price of seventy-two to ninety-six mil reis, but by 1754 it had fallen to the low prices of four, six, to eight mil reis[2]. In September of that year the British merchants residing at Oporto were aware that the quality of the wine had lost its reputation. In order to exculpate themselves in England as well as Portugal, they published a letter and sent it to their clients explaining that the high price of the wine had incited growers to practise frauds and adulterations in the Alto Douro area[3].

Such an initiative was an evident symptom of crisis in the wine trade, but it was also interpreted as a result of an alarming and unexpected reduction of the purchasing power on the part of the agricultural population in the region of the vineyard, who could not obtain the British woollens due to lack of money[4].

By 1754 and 1755 the planters in the region neither had money to acquire things as necessary as clothing and food nor the indispensable means with which to cultivate the vineyards which had increased significantly since the Methuen treaty of 1703[5]. As a consequence of that miserable state many people perished from starvation or because they had not "dez ou doze tostões" to buy quinine salts to cure the malaria which had spread in the region[6].

At that time a Spanish merchant named D. Bartholomeu Pancorbo appeared in Oporto and he was also involved in the wine trade. When he discovered that the British merchants controlled the prices of the wine which was exported to Great Britain and Brazil, he began to buy the wine at higher prices and planned to create a company with representatives in many cities of Europe so as to extend its activity to the ports of the

Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas. With this in mind he established contacts with influential men in the trade such as Joseph Dumond from the Duchy of Lorraine and Giorgio, secretary to Maria Teresa of Austria[7].

This initiative was not successful. Perhaps as a result of his incapacity to carry on the enterprise, his excessive generosity in the purchases of wine or even the boycott moved by the British merchants led by Diogo Stuart[8]. Pancorbo disappeared from the businesses in 1755 and it seems that he died in December 1756. The idea of creating the company to compete with the British was therefore killed off even before his death, by the action of those Portuguese who possessed interest in the wine trade.

By August 1753 Luis Beleza de Andrade had become administrator of the "Morgadio do Bom Sucesso" at the Vila de Valdigem due to an inheritance from his father Marechal José Vicente de Andrade Beleza after his wife's death[9]. During the vintages of 1753 and 1754, Luis Beleza de Andrade was aware of the deep poverty in which the population of Douro was living. He considered that the best remedy would be to encourage the direct exports of the Oporto wine. With this in view he sent representatives to Russia to observe the possibilities of that market.

To encourage support from the court in Lisbon he persuaded Antonio Bernardo Alvares de Brito "Procurador da cidade do Porto" to inform the king about the calamitous situation in the wine region[10]. At the same time he established contacts with a Dominican, "Mestre Doutor Frei João de Mansilha", who was born in Penaguião[11]. Both Beleza de Andrade and Mansilha organized several meetings in which many proprietors participated so as to support the initiatives of the two leaders, who were able to protect them in their agricultural activities.

As a consequence of those actions it was recognised that there was a need to mobilize the capital, tied up in agriculture on behalf of the planters, to protect the quality of the wines and to eliminate the powerful influence of the British merchants in the wine trade.

The actions developed afterwards were constantly dominated by an anti-British and anti-Pancorbo sentiment[12].

On 13 September 1756 the Institution of the Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro was established by the king.[13]

After the earthquake of the 1 November 1755 the government had to face two great problems. While one of them was the reconstruction of Lisbon the other one was the absolute necessity of fighting the ruinous situation in which the two provinces of Beira and Tras-os-Montes remained[14]. At first sight the Company had been created to establish a method for restoring and continuing the cultivation of the wines of the Alto Douro, but in reality it completely altered the rules of the game in the wine trade. The Company promised to ensure the reputation of the wines and guarantee their regular prices (section X) and make loans to the planters if necessary (sections XI, XXXIII and XXXIV). At the same time it detained the privilege of a judge conservator (section VII), the exclusive trade of wines, brandies and vinegars carried from Oporto to the regions of S. Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Bahia and Pernambuco in Brazil (section XIX), as well as the exclusive selling of vinho de ramo (sold at home by retail) in the city of Oporto and three miles around it (section XXVIII).

Above all, the Company took into its hands the control of the quality of the wines of embarque (selected for abroad, Brazil and other colonies) produced in the região demarcada at Douro (sections XXIX and XXXI).

A few weeks later the region was fixed, comprising sixty-seven parishes along the valley of the Douro[15].

Once the notice of the Company's establishment became known, it caused deep satisfaction at Oporto, expressed in messages sent to Sebastião Jozé de Carvalho e Melo, from the Douro region. These were normally signed by Luis Beleza de Andrade and other citizens with large interests in the wine trade. The Camara of Oporto ordered that illuminations be placed in the windows of the houses for three nights.

At Cima do Douro the notice was celebrated "com gerais luminarias e repiques, folias e encamisadas". A "Te Deum" was performed at the Igreja de Nossa Senhora da Graça of the "Colégio dos Meninos Órfãos" in Oporto with the presence of many authorities, members of the Relação, Religious communities, nobility and common people. It was the celebration of the release from the slavery of the British trade, according to the opinion of some of those that were favoured by the new institution(16).

Otherwise there were many interests affected and many positions were taken against the Company. British merchants settled at Oporto immediately and repeatedly protested to the Portuguese government. They also demanded that London urge Lisbon to guarantee the privileges stipulated in the treaties(17).

At the same time small traders, shopboys and servants in the service of British houses demonstrated against the Company(18). By the time of S. João in June 1757 the British merchants began to prepare the loading of the vessels with wine for Brazil, a month earlier than usual. This action was considered by the local authorities to be a deliberate provocation and afterwards some insurrections occurred, in which some Portuguese were involved. As a result, on 17th November the merchants Antonio da Costa Cardoso and the brothers Cativos were subsequently ordered to be killed(19). As such penalties obviously could not be undertaken on the British, they continued to exploit all opportunities to injure the Company and its members.

The British merchants persuaded some captains of vessels not to appear at the time of departure of their vessels from the port, laden with cargoes belonging to the Company. At the same time the British merchants encouraged the firms and the population to avoid making deposits of money with the Company. Nevertheless the Portuguese government took measures to nullify those purposes(20).

On 13 May 1760 the British merchants presented a petition against the Company to the Court of London. It was only on 22 October that

D. Luis da Cunha alleged in reply that the commerce between the two nations was never more firm, nor more advantageous to both in general, since the establishment of the said Company[21]. He related the history of the Company's foundation before he replied to the nine complaints of the British merchants. Then he advocated that all the free and sovereign states could publish political and economical regulations or laws which were deemed useful to their subjects and the foreign subjects residing there, which they would be subject to[22].

The British merchants had invoked the treaties of 22 May 1764, 10 July 1654 and 23 June 1761, which stipulated that the subjects of both crowns were permitted to trade freely with the other's dominions. They argued that the treaties were being broken by the statutes of the Company. Dom Luis da Cunha replied that those treaties as well as the 15th article of the treaty of defensive alliance of the 16 May 1703 were mutual and reciprocal to the subjects of both nations. He alleged that despite the fact that "they have been substantially altered on the part of England by the act of navigation of 23 September 1670, by another act of tonnage and poundage passed in the same year and by other acts of Parliament..."[23]

Dom Luis da Cunha also alleged that the company only restrained the liberty of mixing the good wines with the bad and it fixed the prices to prevent the planters selling for more, and not for the Portuguese or English individuals buying for less[24].

British merchants had complained that the 19th article of the Institution of the Company nullified the 11th article of the treaty of 1654 since the institution enjoyed the exclusive commerce of wines, brandies and vinegars carried to Brazil. D. Luis da Cunha argued that the prohibition stipulated in that article was common to Portuguese subjects[25]. Likewise he repeated the argument that the 30th article of the Company was contrary to the freedom of trade. He alleged that the demand stipulated in that article of transporting wines from Douro to Oporto only under a passport, had as its aim the avoidance of the

practice of frauds and adulterations[26]. It was with the same reason in mind that he refuted the complaint regarding the 31st article of the Company which stipulated that "all the wines for foreign exportation must be qualified, marked and provided with permits"[27].

The Secretary of State in that document had pretended to consider the British merchants' claims as if they were a result of private interests affected without violating the general observations of the treaties of commerce[28]. But the British merchants did not stop pressing their government in London. As a consequence, there is evidence that in early January 1763 the question of the Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro had been transformed in a dispute between the Portuguese and English governments[29].

Edward Hay, the British Envoy in Portugal talked with Conde de Oeiras (Pombal) upon the subject of the wine company and many aspects in regard to the general commerce between the two nations were discussed. Conde de Oeiras complained that the "last duty of four pounds per ton on Portugal wines was contrary to the sense" as it would increase the price and it would decrease the consumption in England[30].

In regard to the statutes of the Company he said that their objective was to put a stop to the adulterations of the wine, so that it arrived in England "in a pure and genuine state". Edward Hay argued that the Company had an oppressive conduct on three points. In the first place the "English merchants, after buying wines from the farmer, should be free to do with them as they pleased and not be subjected to having them tasted by the Company before they could be shipped". Secondly they should have the liberty of making and selling vinegars and brandies, and thirdly a new duty called the <u>donativo</u> of two per cent had been added to the <u>consulado</u> upon imports and exports to finance the building of two frigates to convey the Company's ships to and from the Brazils. He suggested that in this case the British merchants should be exempted from the tax, since they were excluded from trading with that Portuguese colony, due to the exclusive privilege of the Company.

In reply Conde de Oeiras alleged that there had been no rejection of British merchants' wines for embarcation and that the trade of vinegar and brandy must be exclusively taken into the hands of the Portuguese. In regard to the third point he appeared to be willing to accept the claim of the British[31]. Two months later, Edward Hay requested the Conde de Oeiras to redress the laws which regulated the commercial matters between the two nations[32]. As the main points which affected the British and needed most attention, he pointed out "the contempt of the judge Conservator's jurisdiction and the subjection of the merchants to the wine Company". Edward Hay complained that often the British merchants were disturbed by officers of other judges who entered their houses under the pretext of searching for snuff or other contraband. Conde de Oleiras admitted that that was wrong, and promised that a new decree was going to be issued to redress the 13th article of the treaty of 1654 which would prevent such occurrences. On the contrary, in regard to the alleged oppression of the Company, Conde de Oeiras argued that the British merchants had ruined the wine trade and the Company had been created to restore it. Nevertheless he reminded Edward Hay that the British were free to enter into the Company through the purchase of shares, thus becoming entitled to all the privileges of the statutes of the Company[33].

On 27 May 1763 Edward Hay delivered a new memorandum about the Company to D. Luis da Cunha, but the Portuguese government did not take this into consideration[34]. In early November the British envoy once again established direct contact with Conde de Oeiras, claiming that the Company restrained the trade of the British, mainly in the 33rd article of its statutes respecting the wine prices. Conde de Oeiras denied this and alleged that the Company was an institution of civil nature and the foreigners notwithstanding the existence of treaties had to obey the civil laws of the country where they were resident. Moreover he reminded Hay that the reciprocity which had been stipulated in the treaties of commerce was not being clearly enforced in England[35].

As the situation remained without alterations, on 31 October 1764

a merchants Committee sent a new memorandum to Earl Halifax on behalf of themselves and of the British factory at Oporto[36]. They renewed all the complaints which had already been presented against the statutes of the Company and referred to other aspects of oppression which were affecting them. As examples, the complained that the company had the power to seize for their use carts, boats, artificers and all appendages of commerce (sect. VIII) and above all they criticised its privilege with regard to debts, mainly that which permitted the preclusion of all other creditors (sect. VII; XI; XXXVI; XXXVII and XLIII)[37].

Two weeks later Consul Whitehead certified that some wines from Cima do Douro belonging to Messrs. Croft, Stewart and Croft had been condemned by the Company as unfit for shipment. The British judge conservator advised that an application to the Court at Lisbon was the only recourse[38]. This example seemed to be proof of one of the most important complaints of the merchants.

On 16 January 1765 the Earl of Halifax sent some documents containing the answers of the Portuguese Court to the British claims to Edward Hay[39] who sent them to Consul Whitehead at Oporto two weeks later. The consul informed him that the British factors alleged or observed whatever they were pleased to communicate to London without loss of time[40]. The reply was made with long delay, many of the principal members of the Factory at Oporto at that time were absent. On 3 May the consul sent to Edward Hay the merchant's replies, his own answers to the letters received from Lord Halifax as well as the instructions contained in the letter of the Board of Trade of 1 April 1715, to Mr Secretary Stanhope at that time[41].

During two years there is no evidence of correspondence on that subject. Nevertheless, on 10 March 1767 the Lords of Trade sent to the King in Council a long and exhaustive report in which the commercial relations between Portugal and England were closely analysed[42]. Such a document had as its principal aim the demonstration that the many rights and privileges of the British merchants granted by treaties and

Royal edicts were being continuously violated on the part of the Portuguese authorities. Undoubtedly the statutes of the Company were the principal matter of that report. After its regulations were clearly placed in confrontation with numerous articles of the treaties signed between the two nations it was concluded that it was impossible for His Majesty's subjects at Oporto to carry on the branch of trade wine in competition with the Company. They foresaw that the maintenance of the existence of the British factory at Oporto could be in danger since the number of British ships trading to Oporto had already been very considerably reduced since the establishment of the Company[43].

Despite the commercial problems between the two nations caused by the establishment of the Company in 1756, twenty years later, the Portuguese authorities obtained an evident sign of success. The average of wine exports increased from about 12,000 pipes in 1754, 1755 and 1756 to about double in 1776[44] which meant the recovery of the wine reputation which had been the principal objective of the institution of the Company (sects. X and XXX). At that time the Company seemed well established in Portugal as well as in England. On 24 June 1776 the Company's agent at Lincoln communicated with Mr Dottering of Gainsborough to state that: "The Company have exclusive privilege of first choice of wines. The last vintage produced 21,000 pipes of the best wines we have had these 20 years. This Company bought 17,000 of them, before anyone was admitted to buy"[45]. To stimulate the purchase of the Company's wines the agent was authorized to say that he would sell cheaper and with better facilities in credit for six or twelve months[46]. In consequence of that, it was not surprising that at that time no less than ninety-three wine merchants of London had already given orders for samples[47].

On 6 August the same points were invoked by James Archers, the Company's agent in London, when he wrote to Mr Jaunders of Plymouth[48]. Two weeks later the same agent wrote to another potential client saying that the Company was as absolute with regard to wine at Oporto, as the India Company was with regard to Indian goods[49].

On 26 August he sent a new letter from Steel Yard to Mr Edward Campion offering fifty pipes of good wine at the moderate price of 55 000 reis per pipe.

That price was considered by the British merchants as speculative[50]. But the Company had reason for acting safely, since it was authorized to continue operating for a further twenty years by an alvará of 28 August 1776[51]. This was still more useful for the agents of the Company. A few days later they sent a letter only to the principal merchants in England, stating that the Company had the power of selecting the best wines for exportation, and it had resolved to trade only with the principal merchants and would not ship any wines to private gentlemen, petty traders, taverns or inns[52]. As proof of the Company's successful businesses, on 25 October its ex-agent James Archer declared that was "very well known, what fine fortunes Mr Almult and Mr Manoel Viera have made by corresponding with the Company". At the same time he warned that Mr Paul Amsinck of the Steel Yard was also appointed as its agent and from thence he would receive orders for it[53].

The situation seemed to have become untenable for British merchants, and with support from the consul, at the end of October, they sent once more a memorandum to Robert Walpole, the British envoy in Lisbon[54]. Through it they declared that there was a tendency to create a monopoly of the wines of the Alto Douro in exclusion of British subjects, putting in danger the maintenance of their rights and privileges. They cited the Company's exclusive privilege of selling the wines for Brazil, brandies and the wines of "ramo" to the taverns at Oporto and reminded them that they had endeavoured to obtain at least the liberty of buying the wine necessary for British commerce[55]. They complained that their exertions had been in vain and as proof of this showed that, on 17 October 1769, the growers in the district with wine for embarcation were prohibited "from selling to anyone before his wines had been approved, and the quality and corresponding price ascertained by the Company, after which, by the 3rd of the same alvará, he cannot refuse the sale of his wine to the first bidder, whether the Company or legal British exporter"[56].

Moreover on 5 September 1774 an edict was published by which half of the produce of the vintage in the district of exportation was for the use of the "ramo" or taverns.

That particular edict and still more the edicts published on 14 August 1775 and 16th September 1776 permitted the Company to obtain in the district for export wines at the tavern prices of 10 000, 15 000 to 19 000 reis while the British exporters, if they wanted the same wines, would be obliged to pay them at the prices of 30 000 and 36 000 reis[57].

In consequence of such regulations, according to the opinion of the British merchants, the Company could make mixtures of vintages which would permit sale at cheaper prices while the British were compelled to buy at second hand and to sell more expensively[58].

In fact, whether or not due to the Company's intervention, the wine exports between 1776 and 1796 increased about 18,000 pipes per year[59]. As a result of this the Portuguese government had no doubts in publishing a new edict on 20 October 1791, prolonging the duration of the Company from the 1 January 1797 until 31 December 1816[60].

The British merchants, however, continued with their campaign against the Companhia. They attacked the Compnahia as inefficient, claiming that it enjoyed the exclusive privilege of supplying the brandies, but the farmers and the traders were constantly affected by its delays and reduction of the quantities[61]. To this, on 3 January 1800, the Board of the Company alleged that they had never refused any brandies to the English merchants, depite their animosity against the Company. As proof of this the Board alleged that the British merchants had sought to purchase all the brandies which the Company had in their warehouses[62]. To avoid this, the Board had to recourse to the Catalonian brandies "but the capture of the neutral vessels Cidade de Sinyrna, and Frugustava laden with brandies and being carried to Gibraltar by English Privateers, where their cargoes were unjustly condemned as legal prizes, perhaps by the sinister machinations of the very Englishmen residing in this city, was the reason for our

Company not having in their warehouses an abundant depôt..."[63].

One month later, Mr Whitehead, British consul at Oporto, guaranteed to Robert Walpole that the fact of the Company being unable to supply the necessary quantity of brandy even at their exorbitant price, remained confessedly and notoriously true[64]. On 14 February 1800 the British Factory at Oporto with support of their consul sent a new memorandum to Robert Walpole, and insisted that the want of brandy still remained, and the wine business was considerably affected. At that time the Company was owing thirty and a half pipes of brandy. Afterwards they refuted the insinuation in regard to the ships which had been detained by the British privateers in Gibraltar and at the same time appointed as the real cause of the beneficial increase of the wine trade at that time, the increase of wealth and luxury in England[65].

They continued to complain that their control by the Company was untenable and that "evidently involves the continuance of our trade in Douro wine, subject to the capricious control of a favoured monopoly administered by a few individuals"[66].

A few days later Robert Fitzgerald advised Mr Warre, the new British consul and a merchant at Oporto, that the Oporto factory would present a statement demonstrating that there had been violations of the treaties[67].

In the first four years of the nineteenth century fifty and five thousand pipes of Oporto wine were exported per year[68]; despite this on 7 June the Consul at Oporto and other merchants of the British factory complained once again that their trade in Douro wine had been declining since 1788 and was approaching total ruin[69]. They alleged that the monopoly of brandy in the hands of the Company affected farmers and traders who could not guarantee the fine wines due to a notorious lack of brandy. Moreover the Company was receiving payments for the brandy a considerable time before delivering it. Delays caused by the Company were a detriment to navigation, as very often the ships, duly freighted, delayed in consequence of the want of brandy normally detained by the Company for

its own[70]. In the second place they pointed out the exorbitant quantity of wine bought by the Company, which always benefited from the right of preference over all other purchasers. The quantity remaining was generally insufficient for the trade and even so it was disputed by some deputies of the Company, who were large proprietors of vineyards, yet more buyers than sellers[71].

In addition to this the merchants accused the Company of invoking that their extensive purchases were necessary for the supply of wine to Brazil, and to allow it to sell vinho de ramo since it was buying wines from Viana and Figueira. As a result of this policy, the Company could forestall the factory wine at the price of 109 000 reis per pipe and sell it at 112 000 reis, despite the increased change of duties, agency and commission in England. They finished their memorandum regretting the ruinous inequality and appealed to the British authorities to act against such a situation where the British trade found itself at the Douro wine region[72].

Although their reasons seemed just, the situation remained unaltered until the treaty of commerce was drawn up between the two nations on 19 February 1810.

II. THE COMPANHIA GERAL DA AGRICULTURA DAS VINHAS DO ALTO DOURO AND THE TREATY OF COMMERCE OF 19 FEBRUARY 1810

The treaty of commerce and navigation made between Great Britain and Portugal, signed at Rio de Janeiro on 19 February 1810[1], seemed to be, in the eyes of the British merchants, the decisive argument to obtain the wanted release from the Wine Company. In its preamble the treaty declared that it would be adopting "a liberal system of commerce, founded upon the basis of reciprocity and mutual convenience, which by discontinuing certain prohibitions and prohibitory duties might procure the most solid advantages on both sides, to the national production and industry, and give due protection at the same time to the Public Revenue, and to the interests of fair and legal trade".

In addition the 8th article of the treaty stipulated "that the commerce of British subjects within his dominions shall not be restrained, interrupted, or otherwise affected by the operation of any monopoly, contract, or exclusive privileges of sale or purchase whatsoever...". At the same time, the 25th article stipulated "that the commerce and trade carried on by British subjects shall not be restricted, annoyed or otherwise affected by any commercial company whatever, possessing exclusive privileges and favours within the Dominions of Portugal".

The nature of the Company's statutes clearly contrasted with the preamble as well as with the terms of those articles of the treaty.

At first sight it would not be foreseeing any difficulties for the claims of the British merchants established at Oporto.

On 15 March 1810 the Prince Regent ordered that the treaty be carried into execution on 13 August[2]. The British merchants would have the first opportunity to evaluate the acceptance of the treaty at the time of buying the wines, which would take place in the first two months of the year. As the wine Company maintained its power and control, until 21st March 1811, the British merchants resolved that Mr Warre, Mr Kingston and Mr Noble compose a committee to draw up and present a

memorandum to the Lords of Trade, demanding that Portuguese authorities enforce the 8th and 25th articles of the treaty on the wine trade in Oporto[3].

This memorandum was sent on 8 April and it demanded an explicit declaration from the Portuguese government, stating that British subjects were "entitled to the free purchase and sale of all wines, brandies and vinegars at any and at all times in every part of Portugal and the dominions thereof, and also to make brandies for their own use or sale"[4].

On 31st May the treaty was enacted in England[5]. From that time onwards the British and Portuguese subjects involved in the commerce were subjected to the agreements dictated by the treaty.

The next season in which the purchase of wine could take place would be in February 1812. By mid January, British merchants established at Oporto wrote to Consul General Jeffery to remind him of the approach of the period in which the wines should be purchased. At the same time they complained that the Company still preserved the privilege of importing brandies and requested that the Consul obtain the same privileges and favours from the Portuguese government, as might be enjoyed in Portugal "by any commercial body or company whatever"[6].

One week later, Charles Stuart wrote to D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz, citing him these complaints and the pretensions of the Oporto British merchants[7]. The Portuguese Secretary of State replied to the British Envoy at the end of January, saying that: "Such complaints were premature, because in that year there had been a delay in the purchases of the wine as a result of the want of means of carriage, by land as by water, due to military activities". He still added that the powers and rights of the Company were granted by laws which only the sovereign could revoke[8].

From this time onwards the question of the Company remained in the same circumstances as before the treaty of 19 February 1810. Thus the stipulations of the treaty, mainly in its 8th and 25th articles, caused great discussion, the Portuguese newspapers published in London being

the most active[9]. The essential matter of the discussion was the fate of the Company.

In both May[10] and July 1812[11] the Investigador Portuguez published two letters which had been addressed to its editors, replying to the "Treaty on the wines of Portugal" which had been written by Croft, British merchant at Oporto and also published in the same newspaper. The first of those letters defended the Company and the second one attacked it.

Such a question concerned the Portuguese government to an extent that on 8th July D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz requested Charles Stuart for a specific declaration of the abuses and complaints which the British merchants had made against the Company to be sent to the Prince Regent [12].

D. Miguel seemed to want to gain time, but the British merchants did not want to lose it. Two weeks later, as members of the late factory at Oporto, they sent a petition to the House of Commons[13]. The petitioners reminded the readers of their heavy losses at the time of the French invasions and invoked the preamble of the recent treaty of Commerce, particularly its 8th and 25th articles. They complained that they had addressed various petitions and memoranda to His Majesty's Ministers but they had not obtained their release from the Wine Company at Oporto. They solicited immediate measures be taken "for the due performance of the 8th and 25th articles of the treaty, in order that British subjects may have free and unrestrained permission to buy and sell from and to whomsoever they may please, whether by wholesale or retail, and enjoy the same freedom of commerce in Portugal as Portuguese subjects do here, in the purchase and sale of the produce and manufacture of this country..."[14]. This petition was signed by thirty-five individuals. Nevertheless it seems that they represented only nineteen firms[15]. During its debate, Canning admitted that if the evil had not been remedied in that time, that it was discussed at the next session[16]. Lord Castlereagh considered "that the case was of sufficient national importance to induce enquiry but that it was not necessary to press the matter in the current session[17].

Mr Baring declared that "the interests of the merchants of both countries should be attended to" and Mr Rose "observed that by the treaty, Portuguese subjects were placed on the same footing with British"[18]. Lord Castlereagh still added that he "knew that the Prince Regent had professed himself anxious to support this part of the treaty"[19].

Such discussion, on the Wine Company, in Parliament, was the beginning of a new period in that conflict.

Meanwhile, the representatives of the Company were preparing to struggle against the British merchants in England. As a result of their initiatives, on 25 July, they had secured the support of forty-four traders, who traded the wine with both British merchants and with the Wine Company, granted their support to "Senhores Neiva & Sá", the Company's agents in London[20].

The supporters of the Company complained against the Privy Council of Trade and demanded that it be demonstrated that the regulations of the Company were "highly grievous and oppressive" and "that they all contributed to establish in the Company a monopoly against British subjects, from which, by Treaty, they have a right to be exempted and requested that any decision was not taken before they were heard"[21].

They also wrote to Lord Castlereagh, stating their firm belief that the existence of the Company was advantageous to the two nations[22]. The large number of claimants prepared to support the Company seemed to influence the response of the Lords of the Privy Council for Trade, who replied that it was not usual to furnish information as that which they had required, but at the same time they promised that they would be at the disposal of hearing their allegations[23].

On 30 July, Mr Warre and Mr Kingston, as representatives of the late factory at Oporto, presented their case personally to the Lords of the Privy Council for Trade. At the same time the British correspondents of the Company, represented by Messrs. Atkinson, Smith and Bradley, delivered a long memorandum, in which they contested those detractors of the Company

and defended it once more as advantageous to the commerce between the two nations[24].

Meanwhile the Lords of the Privy Council for Trade had asked the representatives of the Oporto British merchants to reply to a series of questions on the powers of the Company, according to its statutes. On 31st July Mr Kingston and Mr James Warre gave their responses, in which they pointed out that the Company was "exempt from all control and not accountable to any tribunal whatever"[25].

Moreover they referred to the fact that the Company bought the wines "at their own price, for a half or even two thirds less than the English pay for wines of inferior quality within the confined District"[26]. In other points they confined themselves, repeating the complaints previously presented in memoranda and petitions[27].

From July until the end of 1812 the Company's conflict worried, beyond the various authorities, many other individuals. At that time the representatives of various firms in activity at Oporto were assembled in permanent meetings[28].

The Company's agents "Senhores Neiva & Sá" as well as its various correspondents in England were constantly exchanging correspondence. As a result of this, a great deal of support arrived from the provinces to protest against the abolition of the Company. From Chichester, Southampton, Dover, Bury, Exeter, Hull, Newcastle, Bristol, Glasgow, Lincoln, Edinburgh, Plymouth, Aberdeen and other localities, many messages were sent to authorize their representatives in London to inform the Lords of Privy Council for Trade that the wine Company was useful to the wine trade as well as to the revenues of Britain's commerce[29].

At the same time the Portuguese newspapers published in London[30] dedicated substantial space to this conflict. The Investigador Portuguez em Inglaterra in its publication of November[31] affirmed that at the time it was necessary to resolve the great question - whether the Companhia dos Vinhos do Alto Douro should be maintained or abolished.

That publication noticed that it had published some letters on behalf of the Company and against it. At that time it foresaw that the position of defence of the Company assumed by its forty-four correspondents would be able to facilitate a victory over the members of the British factory at Oporto[31].

The defendants' actions culminated on 19 February 1813 with the sending of a petition to the House of Commons in which they refuted the contention that the "Company was an establishment whose tendency and intention was the exclusion of His Majesty's subjects from the traffic in the wines of Portugal"[32]. At that time they defended the view that "the Petitioners are satisfied that they are able to prove, upon any candid enquiry into facts, that the royal wine Company's Charter is not productive of any restriction or hindrance to the free commerce of British merchants, but that, on the contrary, the existence of the Company and its control over the making of the wines, and all their regulations as heretofore and at present enforced, is essential to the protection of the trade itself"[33].

Meanwhile the Prince Regent had stimulated the public discussion on this subject[34]. So it did not fade from the public view. On 6th March, the Investigador Portuguez published a letter which attempted to analyse the conflict in the light of the treaty of 1810[35]. In the first place the letter questioned whether the Prince Regent would be obliged to abolish the Company in accordance with that treaty. In the second place whether it would be convenient to do it. The author re-wrote the stipulations of the 8th and 25th articles of the treaty and concluded that no express mention was made of the name of the Company.

Moreover the promise of abolishing the Company could not have been made, according to the author, because the Prince Regent had ordered that its charter be prorogued until 1816. Finally, the letter tried to analyse whether the Company was a monopoly, since in this case it would have been abolished as a direct consequence of the 8th article of the treaty.

In such a perspective, on one hand the author defended the view that the Company was not a monopoly, since it bought the wines at the same time as other buyers, British or Portuguese in accordance with the petition of the Company's correspondents which had been presented on 19 February to Parliament. On the other hand he defended the view that it was a corporation instituted to protect the purity and to preserve the best quality of the wine and to execute the laws drawn up by the authorities of the country. The author recognized the Company's privileges of the exclusive sale of the "vinhos de ramo" in the city of Oporto as well as that of making and selling the brandy, but he also pointed out the valuable services which the company made to the State in advancing money to the Treasury when it was necessary(36).

If the Treasury, in a financial sense, enjoyed some benefits from the Company, it was obvious that the population of the wine District should assume a position in this conflict. At that time the wine District(37) comprised forty-seven "freguesias"(38) in the north of Douro river and twenty in the south(39).

On 8 May 1813, fifteen petitions(40) from the towns and boroughs in the District on the Upper Douro, known as the "Do Vinho de Embarque" were addressed to the Portuguese government in order to request the Prince Regent that the Company be maintained and its charter prorogued for a further twenty years, so as to avoid the ruin of the District and an incalculable loss to the State(41).

Meanwhile the discussion of the Company's conflict caused the greatest interest in many sectors of the society. The Investigador had frequently dealt with the subject(2). At the same time the Royal Academy criticised some of its powers and mainly some of the abuses, but normally without arguing for its total abolition(43).

In consequence of all this, the situation became very confused. By this time the Company's agents in London, Srs. Neiva & Sá, addressed a circular letter to its correspondents in England(44). They recognised that the wine trade had been lately reduced(45) but they still believed

that they knew its causes, but they had no "powers to prevent them, nor to control some other public events". At the same time they appealed to their correspondents to have the courage to face the setbacks, so as to buy the Wine Company's wine. Due to these circumstances they informed readers that it had been decided to reduce the price of the wine(46). Such an attitude was a symptom that the things were not going well for the Company.

On 12 June 1813, Lord Strangford, British Extraordinary Envoy at the Portuguese Court in Rio de Janeiro, therefore, was aware that this would be the best time to press the Portuguese authorities to abolish the Company. Writing to the Conde das Galveas he complained "of a positive breach of faith on the part of Portugal" in the maintenance of the monopolies, exclusive privileges, and jurisdiction of the Wine Company of Oporto(47).

Lord Strangford threatened that if the British merchants were not permitted before the next vintage "to buy and sell, when, where, and how they may think proper, and to re-sell, transport, and export wines, vinegar and brandies, and freely to make their own brandies and vinegar, without impediment, interference, or control on the part of the Company or others, according to the plain intent and meaning of the treaty, His Majesty's Government is fully resolved to propose measures to Parliament for encouraging the importation into the British dominions of wines from other countries".

When it came to a discussion of the omission of the name of the Company in the stipulations of the treaty, Strangford alleged that the resistance against the treaty had been violent even in the parts most advantageous to Portugal due to private interests of powerful individuals which were to be affected. Despite this, Strangford defended the view that the obligation to abolish the Company, or at least to nullify its action on commerce, was virtually implied in the treaty. If this did not occur, he declared that Brazil might "forfeit a great part of her future claims to the benefits of British Alliance"(48).

On 29 December 1813, in accordance with the Prince Regent's orders, the Conde das Galveas replied to Lord Strangford[49].

In the first place, Conde das Galveas argued that the complaints presented by London were ungrounded and as proof he pointed to the large number of respectable wine merchants in England who were supporting the maintenance of the Company.

In the second place, Conde das Galveas suggested that the stipulations of the 8th article proved that the abolition of the Company had never been agreed. On this point he alleged that on 12th January 1812 the Conde de Linhares, one of the negotiators of the treaty, had declared

that the Prince Regent would not establish in his dominions any monopolies, contracts or privileges, which were disadvantageous to the commerce of Great Britain, but that the intention was for the future and not retrospectively. Moreover Conde das Galveas cited other notes which had been addressed to Lord Strangford by Conde de Linhares in which it became evident that he was not authorized to decree the abolition of the Company, but rather that he had orders to abolish the factories in Portugal. Afterwards the Conde das Galveas added that the Prince Regent never could not consent to the extinction of the Company despite the 8th article of the treaty since the treaty dealt with Royal monopolies or contracts of the Crown, but the Company operated "for private interests of all those who have intrusted their capital to its management...".

Besides this the Conde das Galveas alleged that the British merchants at Oporto had "the full power of buying wines even cheaper than the natives, and of exporting it in whatever quantities they may think proper, without any opposition from the Company". The only restriction was that the wine could not be adulterated. He still added that the Company was convenient not only to Portugal but also it ensured considerable profits to the British merchants and to the income of Great Britain since the reputation of its wines assured the heavy taxes with which it was charged.

In conclusion the Conde das Galveas defended the view that even though the Company was tacitly included in the general stipulations of the 8th

and 25th articles of the treaty, its abolition could not be granted. He alleged that the Act of the 51st passed on the 31 March 1811[50] had established the principle that "no privileges granted by law to persons or corporations, before the conclusion of the Treaty would be abolished".

As a consequence of the Act of 31 March 1811 and following the principle of the reciprocity which inspired the treaty, the Company would have to be excluded from the 8th and 25th articles which had been alleged to have extinguished it. Similarly the East India Company in England would maintain its privileges although it was unquestionably a perfect monopoly. As a result of the Portuguese arguments the future of the Company was tacitly secured. Such a decision was not surprising, nevertheless the resistance against the 1810 treaty grew stronger and stronger. The protests continued through the newspapers which were published in London and which circulated in Portugal[51].

By early 1815 there were rumours that a new treaty would be made between the two nations. Nevertheless, Castlereagh assured Parliament that the only difference of opinion was that the Portuguese government had not yet decided to abolish the monopoly of the Wine Company[52].

The Portuguese government knew that the British firms established at Oporto appeared to be prosperous[53]. Such circumstance seemed to deny their principal allegations.

In 1814 a new British firm Cockburn was established at Oporto[54]. This naturally reduced the weight of the Oporto British merchants' reasons, having in view the end of the Company as well as those alleged by the British government. From 1811 onwards the wine exports had also increased. In that year eleven British firms[55] had exported 1801 pipes[56]. In 1812 that number frew to 5,820 and in 1813 to 6,801 pipes[57]. On the one hand this discredited the claims of the British merchants who traded at Oporto and on the other hand, if in 1811 the total amount of wine exported from Oporto had been about 18,000 pipes[58], in 1812, 1813 and 1814, the average was about 23,000 pipes.

Meanwhile Strangford's threat[59] was carried out in 1813. The British authorites reduced the duty on Cape wines from 9s. 1¼d. to 3s. 0½d. and in 1814, after Napoleon's abdication, the duty on French wines was reduced from 19s. 8½d. to 13s. 8½d. per imperial gallon[60] while other wines remained unaltered[61]. These measures discouraged the entry of Oporto wine to England. Nevertheless such circumstances did not affect the Portuguese authorities since the Prince Regent ordered on 10 February 1815 that the Companhia Geral de Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro's charter be prorogued from 1 January 1817 until 31 December 1836[62].

III. THE COMPANY'S DEFENDERS

When the Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro was established in 1756 the population of the wine region was in a state of deep misery[1].

Many alleged that that situation was caused by the actions of the British merchants established at Oporto. They argued that those merchants colluded to buy the wine at the lowest prices[2].

They also considered that the reputation of the wines had deteriorated due to the practice of adulteration introduced by the British merchants whose malpractices had been described by J. Croft in his work Treaty on wines of Portugal[3].

By September 1754 the quality of Oporto wine was considered dangerous to the health[4] and in consequence of this the exports for England had considerably decreased[5]. At that time the British merchants had recognized that the wine had deteriorated[6] and they ordered that their representatives go through the Upper Douro to instruct planters[7] to ensure the quality of the wine. But the representatives of the planters immediately refuted any responsibility for poor quality of production, and they addressed British merchants to seek the causes alleging that the wines' adulteration had originated in the planters' stores or in the warehouses of the British merchants' representatives[8].

The Company considered the defence of the wines' purity as its principal concern, and this point represented the strongest argument of its supporters[9].

The stipulations in the Company's statutes, as well as the Royal edicts and alvarás which regulated its action[10] were considered as a sufficient guarantee of the best quality of the wines.

The main argument of the Company's advocates was that the defence of the purity of the wine began in the demarcation of the area which had

been established with the exclusive purpose of producing wines for embarkation ("vinhos de embarque")[11]. Moreover on 30 August 1757 the use of the excrement in the cultivation of the vineyards had been prohibited[12] to avoid the production being affected in its quality. With the same aim some products which could deteriorate the wine were prohibited. The "baga de sabugueiro, caparrosa, pao campeche, folhelho de uva tinta" were some examples of them[13].

The Company possessed the exclusive privilege of making and selling brandy extracted from the wine which was produced in certain districts. This brandy was mainly destined to guarantee the conservation of the wines at the warehouses and to protect them during their transportation overseas.

On 16 December 1760 an alvará ordered the establishment of factories of brandy and fixed its price in accordance with the quality. The brandy was commonly considered as an important factor to guarantee the best wines' quality and so that all the planters and wine traders remained dependent on the Company's supply.

If some delays occurred in supplying the brandy the most serious setbacks would be to the wines which were to be transported by sea[14]. The defenders of the Company recognized that it had not been very efficient in the performance of this task.

The "vinho de ramo" could not be bought or introduced into the demarcation zone of the "vinho de embarque"[15] and the "carreiros, almocreves" and other transporters of the wine would be punished if they transgressed this regulation[16].

Pipes of wine sold for embarkation had to be previously checked by the Company's services so as to avoid its transport being made in illegal containers[17]. The "vinho de embarque" could be casked in cellars which belonged to other planters only when they did not possess sufficient ones for their own production. Even so this permit could only take place within the same parish[18]. In such cases the planter had to inform the Company's commissary on the vineyards in which the grapes had been

picked up, as well as their location[19].

The Company possessed absolute control over the transportation of all wines from the Douro region down to Oporto[20], but above all it assessed the quality of the wine by a method which was considered very controversial. Even so the Company's supporters argued that the machine (so-called "tambladeira") which was used in the operation was efficient, as well as the smell and the colour[21] which were checked by responsible and experienced people, could not admit any suspicion.

As a demonstration of the Company's efficiency, its defenders pointed to the growing reputation of the wines in England and consequently the increase of their exports. The wine merchants who were the Company's correspondents in Great Britain demonstrated that there had been a decline of wine exports before the establishment of the Company. They declared that 19,420 pipes of wine had been exported in 1747; 13,820 pipes in 1754; 12,869 in 1755 and 12,111 pipes in 1756, time of the Company's foundation.

After the establishment of the Company, they declared that the wine exports had increased in the following way[22]:

First decade -	1757-1766	-	186,130 pipes
Second decade -	1767-1776	-	214,601 pipes
Third decade -	1777-1786	-	244,744 pipes
Fourth decade -	1787-1796	-	432,340 pipes
Fifth decade -	1797-1806	-	471,500 pipes

It becomes evident that such figures, confirmed in different sources,[23] show a significant growth in exports, mainly forty or fifty years after the foundation of the Company. Nevertheless British merchants established at Oporto were not alone in alleging that that was more a consequence of the prosperity of the middle classes by the second half of the eighteenth century in England than of the reputation of the wines[24].

The supporters of the Company, therefore, did not confine reference to figures in defending their view. For example, they considered that

the Company performed a fundamental role in establishing prices for the wine trade. They argued that such practice prevented the machinations of the wine traders which had carried out by the British merchants before the Company[25].

A natural consequence of this was that the prices had increased in accordance with the criteria used by the Company and under the control of the government. In such circumstances, the planters were compensated for their expenditures of the production and the traders were able to obtain sufficient profits for their capitals invested in the trade[26].

Really the Company was highly regarded by the population of the Douro region. The representatives of the Camara, Nobreza e Povo from the Villa de Ervadoza declared that between 1750 and 1756 the price of the wine had fallen to ridiculous levels of 10$000 and 6$000 reis per pipe while after 1756 prices never fell below 25$000 and even reached 60$000 reis per pipe[27].

At the same time the representatives of the Camara, Nobreza e Povo from Vila de Armamar declared that the Company had been founded at a time in which the traders had reduced the wine prices to 7$000 and 8$000 reis and afterwards the prices increased to 36$000, 40$000 and even to 60$000 reis[28].

Although prices were fixed by the Company and enforced by government action, the Company's supporters were aware that it was impossible to prevent illegal agreements made by the traders mainly when the grape harvest was very small[29]. In such cases the prices were the result of speculation on the part of the traders and planters[30].

Many supporters of the Company recognised that some of its duties were not being carried out.

They pointed the constant delays which occurred in supplying brandy, above all at the time of the French invasions. They alleged, however, that the difficulties had been caused by the atmosphere of war[31] and very often by scarcity of ships which were employed in the service of the army[32].

At the same time others admitted that the Company abused its powers. A petition sent to the Portuguese government requested that the Prince Regent order convenient investigation[33].

The position taken by the correspondents of the Company in England against the petition of the members of the Factory at Oporto, offered an important argument to its defenders. After they had declared that they bought wine from the Company as well as to other Portuguese and British firms established at Oporto[34] the idea that there was a monopoly seemed to them a false one.

The British merchants claimed that the principal aim of the Company was their total exclusion from the Oporto trade[35]. Their countrymen refused that argument, alleging that the exclusive privileges of the Company were a means of defending the quality of the wines.

The Company naturally enjoyed special privileges[36]: a judge conservator with private jurisdiction; the exclusive trade of wines, brandies and vinegars for the regions of S. Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Baia and Pernambuco; the exclusive sale of "vinho de ramo" in the city of Oporto; exclusive manufacture and supply of the brandy; qualification of the wine; control of the wine prices; control of the transportation from the Douro region to Oporto.

At the same time it enjoyed the privilege of priority in recovering debts over other creditors.

In these circumstances it was difficult to deny that the Company constituted a monopoly. In July of 1812, the British wine merchants, correspondents of the Company in England, declared (during a meeting which took place at the Court of the Privy Council for Trade) that there were both British and Portuguese merchants, exporting wine[37]. They added that the Company was really an institution which supervised the quality of the wine and its trade, since it had been established for protecting itself against collusions, speculations and adulterations which had been executed by the British merchants at Oporto[38].

To refute the idea of monopoly the correspondents of the Company alleged that the Company never had exported to Great Britain more than

5,000 pipes in any one year prior to the invasion of Portugal even when the annual average of exports had risen to about 50,000 pipes[39].

The Company's defenders also recognised that during the war British firms had decreased their shipments[40]. They argued that sometimes the names of Portuguese firms, including that of the Company, had been used as if they were British for fear they would lose their habitual clients[41].

In other words, exports had considerably decreased as a consequence of the consumption of the allied and French armies in 1811[42].

There is no doubt that when the Company's supporters affirmed that it was useful to Portugal they thought mainly in the benefits it brought to the north of the country and its subsequent effects on the general life of the country[43].

Clearly the populations of the Douro region supported the Company. They alleged that it had allowed them to improve their acquisitive power and stimulated the cultivation of the vineyards[44]. But beyond this point the planters considered it a useful support in lending money at interest of three per cent. This was regarded by the agricultural population as an advantageous practice which could be used in many occasions[45].

The roads in the Douro were built with the revenues of the duties which were paid by "vinhos de ramo (200 Reis each pipe) and "vinhos de embarque" (400 Reis each pipe)[46].

The city of Oporto also took advantage from the wine trade. Both qualities "de ramo" and "de embarque" paid 660 Reis of duties for each boat and 30 Reis for each pipe which entered the city and those amounts were destined for the expenditures of the city government.

Each pipe of wine paid 600 Reis and of brandy paid 2,400 Reis towards the Regiment garrison in the city[47].

At the same time, each vessel of "vinho de embarque" paid 100 Reis on entering or leaving the port of Oporto, such revenues being for

repairing the bar[48].

Finally each pipe of wine of any quality paid 40 Reis for the canalization of the Douro estuary.

The company also exercised significant influence at national level as each pipe of wine paid 400 Reis towards the cost of elementary schools[49] and contributed 4,000 Reis towards the interest and amortization of the Royal Debt.

New duties were created with the expenses of the war. On 27 June 1808 the Junta of Oporto ordered that each pipe of wine paid 4,800 Reis and on 8th August that each one of brandy paid 20,000 Reis and of vinegar 2,400 Reis. As the economic crisis had become more acute, an additional duty of 6,000 Reis was ordered [50] on each pipe of wine for embarkation[51].

Moreover it appears that the Company supported many monasteries and convents, which were great producers of wine in the Douro region[52]. It enjoyed popular sympathy because it encouraged the circulation of pecuniary resources which otherwise would not have existed[53].

By the early nineteenth century the average annual revenue from the Douro wine was eight or nine millions cruzados while the authorities received about one million and a half cruzados per year from duties.

By that time the population of the region had also begun to grow due to the improvement in the standard of living[54].

The Company was not only a great economic support to the development of the Douro region, but also a significant and powerful support for the ancien regime.

As a result of all this neither the English Cabinet nor Parliament paid much attention to the claims of the Oporto British merchants in order to obtain the abolition of the Company.

The position assumed by the Company's correspondents in England

suggest that they gained from its competition with British and other Portuguese firms in the wine trade. They had reason therefore, to fear that if the Company disappeared their profits would be considerably affected since the British merchants would have more facilities to control prices[55].

The Company was not disadvantageous to the British trade. The British petitioners against it represented only nineteen firms, all them established at Oporto[56], while it was defended in England by over forty wine traders[57].

Moreover those British firms trading at Oporto were hardly impoverished. They seemed even more prosperous after the establishment of the Company than before it[58].

The British Treasury benefited from the efficiency of the Company due to its protection of the quality of the wine against frauds and adulterations and as a result of this the imports in Great Britain had increased considerably[59].

Between 1807 and 1814 an annual average of nine million imperial gallons of wine entered the United Kingdom, being about half of that amount from Portugal and the remaining from Cape, France, Madeira, Spain, Canaries and the Rhine[60].

After 1805 Portuguese wines paid 9s. and 1¼ per gallon of customs and excise duties[61].

Besides this also there were other duties as for example, scavage, portage, packers' fees and officers' fees of all kinds payable at different rates in different ports[62]. So the Oporto wine trade could not be considered as a bad business to the British traders and the Treasury. They were aware that the Oporto wine was highly appreciated by the British. Proof of this was that between 1804 and 1813 about 65 per cent of the wines imported from all parts of the world, came from Portugal[63].

It may be concluded, therefore, that the British merchants established at Oporto were not motivated to distinguish their own interests from those

of the Treasury. As proof oof this is that they did not attempt to obtain the support of the British wine merchants[64].

On the contrary the Company used the support of the countrymen of the Oporto British merchants.

If the Company disappeared, its defenders argued that the United Kingdom would be invaded once more by adulterated wines as well as those wines which arrived from the Island of Guernsey[65]. At the same time the immediate profits of those British merchants established at Oporto would be large but they would only be temporary[66]. Otherwise, the abolition of the Company would only lead to renewed social and economic misery in the Douro region[67].

IV. THE COMPANY'S OPPONENTS

The Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro had many enemies and consequently many detractors. An economic institution supported by the politic power, with regional characteristics and with special privileges, it is obvious that its natural detractors were all those who composed the opposition to the regime or those who expressed the voice of unprotected interests from other regions of the country above all, all those who were affected by its privileges.

Many partisans of the French had fled to Paris and London after the first victory of the Anglo-Portuguese forces over the French troops(1).

It is evident that during the period of the invasions, the newspapers and pamphlets(2) published had as their principal aim to protect the power. So that there is no evidence that at that time the existence of the Company has been discussed. Nevertheless the Correio Braziliense ou Armazem Literário founded in London by 1808 as well as the Investigador Portuguez em Inglaterra which began to be published in London from 1811 onwards dedicated substantial space to the Company mainly after 1810 in consequence of its dispute with the British merchants established at Oporto.

Despite the repression used by the political power in the interior of the country, some points of critical analysis were at that time published by the Academia das Ciencias de Lisbon in Memórias Económicas(3). But such publication had above all scientific purposes. The natural detractors of the Company were the British merchants who were injured by special privileges. They constituted a community which was very strong and enjoyed a special statute which decreased the political risks of protest. So that they decided to confront the Company since its foundation and maintained a persistent attack against it after the treaty of commerce of 19 February 1810 had been drawn up(4).

The majority of its detractors considered the Company as a monopoly.

They alleged that it detained the special privilege of exclusive trade of wines, brandies and vinegars for the regions of S. Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Baia and Pernambuco; exclusive sale of "vinho de ramo" at the city of Oporto and neighbouring districts, the exclusive manufacture, supply and imports of brandy; qualification of the wines and the power of fixing the wines prices and controlling their transportation from the Douro region to the city of Oporto(5).

The Company's detractors vigorously rebutted the argument by which the defenders considered that those special privileges had as principal aim the protection and defence of the purity of the wines against fraud and adulteration. On the contrary, they affirmed that the members of the Company acted fraudulently and adulterated wines but were protected by the regulations of the Company and by laws enacted by the government(6).

The exclusive privileges were discussed, above all by the detractors of the Company who contested its rights on fundamental grounds. They considered that the Company attacked the right of property in Alto Douro, because apparently, the planters were the owners of their own lands, but they could not plant the vines that they desired, even of those that were situated in contiguous districts(7).

The Company did not allow the planters to cultivate the kinds of products in accordance with the quality of the soil and the best means of increasing production(8).

The Company's opponents considered that the demarcation area had been fixed in deference to private interests. Many of them argued that it was a source of great injustice(9) since many wines outside of that zone were very often better than others produced within it(10). As a consequence these were sold at lower prices, because they could neither be introduced into the demarcated zone nor shipped for embarkation(11).

The qualification of the wines supervised by the Company was a point which lay at the heart of the dispute. A British author commented: "Here is where the corruption came in"(12). In 1802 the Prince Regent ordered the publication of an alvará to prevent frauds(13). Its

regulations ordered that the casks of the planters be checked and controlled by the Company's officers. The risk of false declarations on the amount of wines produced by each planter would be considerably reduced, as well as the practice of contraband which would involve the use of wine from different zones.

Nevertheless the same measure stimulated the denunciation of fraud since it promised that bounties should paid to those who denounced the activities of earlier and others who were involved in the transportation of contraband wines.

The evaluation of the quality of wines depended exclusively on the Company, although some of the officials who took part in this task were chosen by the Camaras, almost always under the Company's influence(14).

After qualification of the wines, the Company fixed the amount which the planter might sell(15). Its transportation from the Douro to Oporto and abroad was made under Company's licence(16).

Moreover, as the stablishment of wine prices was an exclusive privilege of the Company(17), the British merchants complained that this fixed the price of purchase and sale without control or competition. The grower could not sell to his neighbour, but must sell to the Company and could only retain limited quantity for his own consumption(18). This practice would sometimes facilitate certain manoeuvres which favoured the Company. The purchase of the best wines at lowest prices or the sale of the worst wines at the highest prices would be some of the practices which were alleged by the Company's detractors(19).

At other times the Company could limit the sale so as to guarantee the prices which served their own interests.

British merchants attempted to demonstrate that in several years only half of the wines of the demarcation area had been sold for Britain, being taxed at 36$000 and 30$000 Reis per pipe. The other half of the farmer's produce was taken for home consumption or permitted sale for export(20).

The law prohibited the sale under severe penalties at a higher price than the maximum set by the Company. Some of the members of the factory complained in July 1812 that the purchasers of the previous year's vintage had paid from 60 to 80 per cent and in some cases 100 per cent above the maximum[21].

The exclusive trade of wines, brandies and vinegars from Oporto to S. Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Bahia and Pernambuco in Brasil had been very heavily contested since the time of the Company's creation[22]. Therefore the contestation became stronger in August 1776[23]. At that time it was allowed that wines, brandies and vinegars from Estremadura could be sent to Baía, Paraíba and Maranhão if the Company did not hold sufficient stocks in Oporto. Such determination still added that Rio de Janeiro and ports further to the South were exclusively for the Company. If other exporters attempted to send such articles from Oporto, they would be condemned in a value equal to that of the merchandise detained, half of the revenue going to the Company and the remainder to the informer.

An extra duty was of two per cent had been imposed on all goods and merchandise which shipped from Oporto to be built two frigates to protect the Company's ships which sailed in convoy between Oporto and Brazil. The British merchants considered that duty as a violence since they were excluded from that trade[24].

All these circumstances were invoked by the Oporto British merchants who accused the Company of being responsible for the Brazilian trade decline. They alleged that before the establishment of the Company each pipe of wine was sold in Brazil at the cost of 25,000 Reis and after it about 100$000 Reis. As a result of this they added that many vessels needed to complete their cargoes with English cod-fish and sometimes with olive oil which was not abundant in Oporto[25].

The exclusive retail trade of the Company was considered as odious by its detractors. When it was created that exclusive privilege was confined to the city of Oporto and neighbouring localities which were situated within three miles of it[26]. In December of 1760 that privilege was extended to four miles

in circuit[27]. Twelve years later it was extended to take in Peso da Régua, Penaguião, Mesão Frio, Barqueiros, Teixeira, Tourais and Sabrosa de Folhadela[28]. The Company neither bought nor allowed that the planters from the neighbour localities from Oporto sold their own wines, even when such wines were of high quality[29]. It is obvious that such prohibition caused them heavy damages and consequently the greatest resentment.

In 1807 was granted the exclusive privilege to the Company to retail bottled Oporto wine in the city of Lisbon. This decision signalled clearly that the Company had reached a significant weight in the national trade and above all at the highest level of political power.

The exclusive sale of brandy at fixed prices and also the privilege of establishing stills in three provinces of the North was not less odious than other ones[31]. The planters, the wine traders and the sponsors for the transportation of the wines, all them contested that the supply of the brandy was made exclusively by the Company. The brandy was an important factor in the conservation of the wine at the lodges, warehouses, as well as during its transportation, mainly on the sea. Due to the frequent delays in supplying the brandy the Company had become very much unpopular and the arguments used by its administration to explain the delays were not sufficiently strong to persuade its detractors[32]. As it enjoyed a complete monopoly of brandy, even in importing it from abroad, the pleas emerged from everywhere[33]. On this subject the Oporto British merchants were peremptory. They reminded them that before the Company came into existence, the natives and British could make brandy of very superior quality from 60$000 to 80$000 Reis and it was then in such abundance that it was exported to Germany. In 1760 it had been ordered that the maximum cost for sale would be 87$000 Reis. Ten years later that price had been extended to 110$000 Reis and in 1812 each pipe had the cost of 286$000 Reis per pipe, ready money, without cask. Despite this and the mixture of brandy with wines in abundance, the Company's mismanagement and its abuses had demanded that brandy be imported from France and Naples[34].

The Company's detractors analysed in detail the inconveniences

caused by the exclusive privileges of the Company. Nevertheless they felt it difficult to refute the growing wine exports from Oporto to England during the second half of the eighteenth century.

When facing the Company's defenders[35] they refused to accept any success as a consequence of the Company's exclusive privileges in protecting the wines against the frauds and adulterations. The detractors pointed out that the average of wines imported from Portugal into England, for twenty years, previous to the Company's institution, was of 22,121 pipes while the average of the subsequent 20 years was of 22,176 ones[36]. Withregard to the substantial increase of the wine trade during the second half of the eighteenth century, reaching some years about 50,000 pipes of exports average, they alleged that that must be attributed rather to accident and emulation of merchants than to any of the Company's regulations. In their opinion, the reduction of duties which had taken place in 1776 as well as the increasing of the middle classes' acquisitive power had encouraged the use and the habit of wine consumption in Great Britain[37]. They still added that in 1811 only 18,536 pipes had been exported. So that such amount was 3,640 pipes less than the annual average verified from 1756 to 1776[38].

Above all, the Oporto British merchants wanted to demonstrate that they were to be excluded from the Oporto wine trade due to the Company's privileges[39]. But other detractors, mainly those who expressed their voice through the newspapers, were persuaded that the Company would have very few supporters. They believed that all the incorrupt Portuguese wished vehemently the abolition of the Company[40]. Nevertheless such opinion prompted a question. How would it be possible for the company to stand up against such strong opposition?

The Company's detractors explained its maintenance resulting from a strong structure which was composed of its special privileges protected by a jurisdictional superstructure, totally independent of any court of politic power[41].

The Company's judge conservator enjoyed independent jurisdiction from

all judges and tribunals notwithstanding all existing rights and laws to the contrary. Moreover, according to the Company's statutes, the Conservator and Magistrates carried out its orders. Naturally the judge conservator was appointed by their own Company[42]. Such circumstance stimulated the subservience. Moreover its magistrates were promoted for their efficiency in defending the interests of the Company[43].

This scheme of jurisdictional protection was still strengthened by a "Procurador Fiscal da Companhia" who advocated its maintenance and interests[44].

Few could forget that the Company had been created against considerable popular opposition, that not a few people had been executed for their opposition to it,[45] that its preponderance was the cause of continuous subterfuges and considerable fear. As a result the Company was the object of local hatred.

It is obvious that despite all that, many infringements were committed. As example, it seems that some planters, who were living at the Douro demarcation zone, introduced wines inside, coming from neighbour villages, contrary to the law[46]. This, sometimes, happened taking risks and without consequences, but other times some honest planters could be incriminated without any guilt and be punished without any possibilities of self-defence because of the pecuniary compensations given to the informers, very often without scruples.

The adulteration of wines, using mixtures of different qualities, was also a very common practice. As a repressive measure, the use of informers prevented neither fraud nor contraband According to some detractors, the regulations and laws which protected the Company in fact allowed its deputies and officers to act as privileged contrabandists[47]. This was a natural consequence of a system which established that any resistance against the Company's officers, by deed or word, would be punished by their Judge Conservator, as if committed against the King's officers of justice[48]. In some cases the penalty could be death and confiscation of property[49].

According to other detractors, the system encouraged the corruption at all levels. The qualification of wines would be the sector most affected. Many were accused of receiving bribes to classify the wines, the principal aim being the guarantee of the best profits. The proof of the wines without the presence of any witness facilitated very much such kind of corruption(50).

At the highest level also there would be some actions absolutely contrary to the laws. One of the most notorious was the introduction of extraneous wines into the demarcation zone or the qualification of "vinhos de feitoria" for consumption as if they were "vinhos de ramo" and vice-versa. Sometimes, this practice had as principal aim to prevent certain buyers obtaining some wines of quality at a time which was not convenient to some members of the Company. These, in such cases, acted in simple pursuit of their own interests. Fixing the quality and quantity of wine by the Company itself almost always went against the farmers and wine traders(51).

It is obvious that in such circumstances the Company could sell at lower prices in England(52). Its detractors exploited this fact and they alleged that the Company did not defend the prices as it was its duty(53).

Such behaviour caused the greatest indignation even in intellectual circles. In Memorias Económicas da Academia Real das Ciências a long memorial was published on that subject. It pointed out the foundation of the Company, various subsequent edicts obtained to promote its own interests and not the public interest, the mistakes of its administration and more particularly, how it had failed in the purposes for which it had been originally instituted(54).

Finally the Company enjoyed a special privilege which was abominated by everybody engaged in the trade. Its capital was totally independent from all the tribunals or any jurisdiction(55). In cases of lawsuits which involved several debtors, the Company would always be the first creditor to be considered. The debts had to be recovered by its

Judge Conservator or by the Minister who would naturally have to execute judgement if the Royal revenues were involved, notwithstanding any privileges whatsoever or resolutions of the sovereign which might be alleged to the contrary[56].

In consequence of all this, the majority of the Company's detractors demanded that it be abolished. They alleged that the quality of the wine would not be affected as happened in France where there was neither a Company nor similar institution and despite this, its wines were famous and sold at the highest prices[57].

V. CONCLUSIONS

It seems that the first Oporto wine was exported to Great Britain in 1678[1]. One decade later about 6,000 pipes had been exported. Between 1688 and 1707 the amount of exports rose to about 150,000 pipes[2]. The treaty of Methuen of 1703 allowed for considerable increase in the cultivation of the vineyards of the Douro region and as a result of this the export wine was almost doubled between 1708 and 1727[3].

By 1727 some British merchants established at Oporto were mainly concerned with the wine trade[4].

Between 1728 and 1747 the exports had increased in average by twenty-five per cent[5]. During that period the wine trade from the Douro area fell undoubtedly into the hands of British merchants. They controlled the prices, bought and sold the wines as they pleased, practically without competition[6].

The easy management of that trade seems to have encouraged certain practices of adulterating the wine, using "elderberry" and other ingredients[7]. As a consequence the reputation of the wine fell and exports fell sharply between 1748 and 1756[8]. British merchants were naturally seen as guilty and blamed for the decline as well as the depression which had affected the population of the Douro[9].

Such circumstances stimulated some of the largest proprietors of farms in Douro who organized and were supported by a solidarity wave, coming from many small planters. All were anxious to set up an institution which would defend their interests and at the same time which would fight the enormous influence of the British merchants.

The initiatives were successful and culminated in 1756 with the creation of the Companhia Geral da Agrícultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro.

The special privileges which were granted to the Company affected

irrefutably the previous hegemony of the British merchants in the wine trade, mainly in the control of the prices and above all in their freedom of buying and selling where, when and as they pleased, in accordance with treaties which had been made between the two nations[10].

It seems that there is no doubt that the Company was created mainly to protect the quality of the wines. If the amount of wines exported, after the Company's establishment, can be considered as a significant factor to evaluate its success, it can be concluded that its purposes were reached in the course of the second half of the eighteenth century and in early nineteenth century[11].

By that time the Portuguese economy knew a certain stability which became somewhat prosperous between 1800 and 1809, having reached its apogee in 1806 and 1807. At this time the commercial balance with the foreign nations was favourable, amounting to about 18,000,000 cruzados per year[12]. Oporto's wine trade provided the principal metropolitan contribution to exports.

The wine was unquestionably the most important factor which permitted that situation. During nine years, from 1801 to 1809, the wine exports to Brazil and foreign nations reached the annual average value of 13,000,000 cruzados[13]. So, from that viewpoint, the Company did not justify any objections.

The British merchants, its principal and natural opponents, fought it constantly, alleging the violation of their privileges and they pointed out that the increase of wine exports in the second half of the eighteenth century was much more a consequence of the middle classes development in England[14] than that of the Company's action in protecting the quality of the wines.

This is the controversial point which may be worthy of discussion. In other points, on the one hand, the Com pany was attacked because it was affecting or had affected some interests[15] and on other hand it was defended because it was defending or had protected other interests[16].

The study of the documents emanating from both parts, British merchants

in Oporto and members or representatives of the Company, does not lead to any firm conclusion Each one of them defended very distinct interests.

The principal discussion took place in the Portuguese newspapers published in London. The Investigador Portuguez em Inglaterra was the most active. It began its publications in London in June of 1811, it seems that under the influence of Sousa Coutinho, Portuguese Ambassador in London to face Correio Braziliense openly against the Ambassador[17] and simultaneously in opposite to the Portuguese government.

Although the publication of different viewpoints may mean some impartiality, the Investigador Portuguez defended much more the maintenance of the Company than its abolition.

Despite natural difficulties in obtaining an impartial view it is possible to distinguish some of the advantages of the Company.

In the first place it is more or less commonly admitted that, in spite of everything, the quality of the wine was more protected after the establishment of the Company than before. The separation between "vinho de feitoria ou de embarque" sold to the foreign nations and "vinho de ramo" for consumption in the Kingdom was an advantageous one , although susceptible of criticism.

According to some impartial opinions all the special privileges of the Company had as its principal aim to obtain the total control of the wine from the production area until the merchandise was loaded and carried to Oporto's port.

In the second place the cultivation of the vineyards was intensified, several thousands of workers were employed in the Company's services and as a result of this there was a great development of the Douro with the opening of routes, the creation of some factories of brandy[18] and an increase in population, mainly in Peso da Régua, Penaguião, Lobrigos and Cumieira which were the best examples[19].

In the question of the wine prices there cannot be doubt that the

Company obtained some success. Its policy tried to conciliate the interests of the planters and those of the wine traders[20]. The British merchants complained against the Company because they had lost the control of the price, but they did not obtain any support either from other British wine traders in England or from Portuguese firms which traded large amount of wine at that time. As proof of this is that in 1810, 41,358 pipes were exported from Oporto, 40,763 pipes to Great Britain, 419 to Petersburg and Gotemburgh, 114 to Archangel, 50 to Malta and 12 to supply vessels of war[21]. The Company exported 9,367 pipes, the British merchants 2,614 and other foreign firms less than one thousand while Portuguese firms exported about 28,000 pipes[22]. Among the forty-one Portuguese firms, those which traded the largest amounts were Thomas da Rocha Pinto, Correa de Aguiar and Joaquim José de Figueiredo with more than 2,000 pipes each. José da Cruz de Ascensão, Jaoquim da Costa Lima e Cunha and Ana Perpetua de Barros e Mello exported about 1,000 pipes each.

Apparently all these Portuguese firms and other small ones would have the same reasons to act against the Company since its regulations obstructed them no less that it did to the British. Nevertheless there is no evidence of any initiative taken by them, either for or against it.

What has been mentioned leads to the conclusion that the wine trade contributed to the setting up of various Portuguese firms at Oporto but they were not able to take any position on the conflict, or at least did not leave any known evidence of their action. This may mean that the Company did not affect the wine trade as much as the Oporto British merchants wanted to plead.

Undoubtedly one of the Company's greatest advantages was that it benefited the wine traders in England. The position assumed by them in February 1813[23] is clear on this subject. It is evident that if the Company disappeared the British Treasury would not be affected, but those traders would be substantially affected since

they would lose their customary suppliers in Portugal, and would hardly be likely to obtain wines at the same low prices.

Impartiality also demands that various inconveniences be pointed out . All of them originated from the regulations and the special privileges of the Company. In conformity with these it attacked the rights of property at the demarcated zone[24] and it became extremely unfair to the planters from neighbouring villages of that zone, because they were obliged to sell their wines at lower prices, even though some of their were of better quality. Moreover such planters were prohibited from selling their wines in the city of Oporto even when living and possessing their vineyards very near to the city.

The power of controlling the prices, and the special privileges of selling "vinho de ramo" at Oporto and the brandy at Douro, Tras-os-Montes and Beira, as well as the exclusive privilege of the wine trade, brandy and vinegar for Brasil, became therefore odious to those who defended the liberalization of economic life. In the Brasilian case the peoples most affected were the consumers of those three merchandises. since the Company supplied them without any competition, at prohibitive prices, only accessible to a small social elite.

The Oporto British merchants alleged the violation of the treaty of commerce of 1810 in its 8th and 25th article to obtain the abolition of the Company. With the aim of persuading the British government they also argued that the Portuguese government's resistance against such abolition meant that it had as its main objective their exclusion from the wine trade at Oporto. As proof of this, the British merchants pointed out that between 1796 and 1807 they had exported the average of 25,000 pipes per year while in the following years until 1811, they had exported about one tenth[25]. They still alleged that during the same period the Company and Portuguese firms had increased their wine exports[26].

It is evident that such pleas omitted deliberately the war atmosphere

after 1807 which had forced the majority of the British merchants to flee for England. Moreover they also omitted that the legal commerce between Oporto and Great Britain had been practically interrupted since October 1807 until June 1808 and from the end of March until the middle of May of 1809. Beyond this, the north of Portugal continued to be subjected to atmosphere of war until 1814. This circumstance did not allow the definitive return of many British merchants. In consequence of this, during the war, the active British firms were nevermore than a dozen[27]. Only in 1816 is there evidence of eighteen active firms.[28].

There is evidence as well, that at least in 1810 and 1811, some Portuguese firms names were used on behalf of British ones which were stopped[29]. This is a sign of good relations between Portuguese and British firms.

There is no evidence that the Company's conflict had seriously affected the commercial relations between Oporto and Great Britain.

If the Company was really affected by the 8th and 25th article of the treaty of 1810, the British government had the right either to demand its abolition or to revoke that treaty. As neither one thing nor other one took place, it can be concluded, at least, that the Company did not affect the commercial interests of Great Britain.

In fact it was affirmed in the British Parliament that there was no problem in regard to that treaty, but only a different viewpoint on the part of both governments, English and Portuguese, over the Wine Company[30].

It is possible that 1812 and 1813 were not the best years for British merchants to demand the abolition of the Company, since the Portuguese claims against the treaty of commerce were being dealt with by the government in Rio de Janeiro.[31] But also it is sure that the revolt at Oporto in June 1808 had given power to a government which was supported by the British government[32] and there is no evidence of any initiative taken in that time to abolish

the Company, despite the strong and continuous struggle engaged against it by the British merchants since its establishment in 1756.

One other point seems to be important. Some existing documents suggest that the Company had facilitated the success of the French occupation, between March and May of 1809. At least there is no evidence of any resistence against the occupation of the Company's warehouses at the time in which the British merchants had been sequestrated(33).

Moreover the Company facilitated at that time a loan to the French authorities(34) which was the object of compensation before the withdrawal of the French troops.

After his entry into Oporto, some weeks later, Arthur Wellesley applied to the whole business community established at Oporto for a high loan. There is no evidence of any generosity on the part of the Company(35).

The Oporto British merchants were the Company's natural opponents, but the British consumers were its traditional and most faithful client. So it is difficult to understand the Company's attitude.

If the French were to dispose of a government of their confidence, at Oporto, it seems possible that the Company would be abolished or at least reformed, because its special privileges were not in accordance with the liberal system supported by the invaders. It is easy to foresee that in such case the Oporto British merchants would not be favoured by such situation. They had always defended the liberalization of the Portuguese trade but under French power, their situation would become worse.

The Anglo-Portuguese forces were victorious. The French were the common enemy, but the economic interests of the two nations were distinct. The Oporto British merchants did not obtain the abolition of the Company, because although the treaty of commerce pointed towards the liberalization of the trade in Portugal, the British government, having to choose between the interests of that body of British subjects and British

domestic interests decided on behalf of the latter ones. So that it created difficulties to the entry of the Portuguese wine but it did not revoke that treaty of commerce. The Company represented a powerful group of local Portuguese producers; by 1807 it had gained a substantial market in Britain. Though the English merchants in Oporto recovered their position after the end of hostilities, they were unable to dislodge the wine Company, which continued in existence until the establishment of the liberal structures of the Portuguese economy after 1834. It may be affirmed that the wine Company was an authentic heir to Pombal's régime and effectively survived both the invasion and the treaty of 1810.

Notes - 1

(1) Por um anonymo, A Questão Vinhateira do Douro considerada em todas as suas relações com a agricultura e commércio, Porto, 1849, p.303 and followings; Discurso Histórico e Analytico sobre o Estabelecimento da Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro Lisboa, 1814, pp.59-62. by Christovão Guerner and The Past, Present & Probably the Future London, 1824, p.89 by James Warre

(2) F.O.63, 165, p.74. Translation of the Deduction enclosed in Dom Luis da Cunha's letter of the 22nd October 1760, to the Earl of Kinnoul. About the fall of the exports and prices at that time may be also seen: O Vinho do Porto na Época dos Almadas, Suplemento ao Caderno No.212 (Agosto de 1957) do Instituto do Vinho do Porto, pp.12-14 by Álvaro Moreira Fonseca

(3) F.O.63, 165, p.74, doc. cited at note (2).

(4) Sousa Costa, Figuras e Factos Alto-Durienses. Anais do Instituto do Vinho do Porto, 1953, p.24

(5) F.O.63, 165, p.74V

(6) Sousa Costa, op.cit., p.25. The author cited as source "Livro 59-D, da Torre do Tombo" in Lisboa which refers to the Institution of the "Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro". (MDCCLVI)

(7) Sousa Costa, op.cit., p.26.

(8) Fonseca, Alvaro Moreira da, A Ideação da Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro. Anais do I.V.P. - 1955-1956, pp.15-48. This author cited several works which refers to D. Bartholomeu Pancorbo: "Memoria sobre o estado da Agricultura e Comércio do Alto Douro" in Memórias Económicas da Academia Real das Ciencias de Lisboa. Tomo III, 1791, by Francisco Pereira Rebelo; Recordações (1813), by Jacome Ratton; História do Reinado de El-Rei D. José, tomo I, 1867, by S.J.L. Soriano; Marquez de Pombal, 1906, by D. Miguel Sotto Mayor; "Dom Bartolomeu Pancorbo. O homem que deu a ideia para a fundação da Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro..." in Boletim Cultural, da Camara Municipal do Porto - vol.XVI - Marco - Junho 1953 - Fasc.1-2. by Artur de Magalhães Basto. About the same subject: "The Oporto Wine Company" in Oporto Old and New, pp.113-119 by Charles Sellers

(9) Fonseca, Álvaro Moreira da, op.cit., p.49-50

(10) Fonseca, Álvaro Moreira da, op.cit., p.51

(11) Fonseca, Álvaro Moreira da, Génese de um Alvará Pombalino. Anais do Instituto do Vinho do Porto, 1961-1962 from p.15 onwards

(12) Fonseca, Álvaro Moreira da, op.cit. at note (8), p.118

(13) It may be found in A.D.P., Cabido 449. Instituição da Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro, Lisboa MDCCLVI, p.31

(14) F.O.63, 165, source cited at note (2), p.74V

(15) Cf. in this chapter, II, notes (38) and (39)

(16) Sousa Costa, Figuras e Factos Alto-Durienses, pp.52-53; and O Vinho do Porto na Época dos Almadas, pp.23-30 by Alvaro Moreira da Fonseca

(17) F.O.63, 165, pp.71-73. Letter from Dom Luis da Cunha, Portuguese Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Earl of Kinnoul, His Majesty's Ambassador in Portugal. Belem 22nd October 1760

(18) At the time of the "Carnaval" of 1757 there was a popular rising against the Companhia known as "Revolta dos Borrachos" culminating by the arrest of many peoples and death penalty for twenty-one. Cf. Sousa Costa, Figuras e Factos Alto Durienses, 1953, pp.65-75

(19) Cf. Fonseca, Álvaro Moreira, O Vinho do Porto na Época dos Almadas, pp.35-41

(20) Fonseca, Álvaro Moreira, op.cit., pp.35-41

(21) F.O.63, 165, p.72V

(22) F.O.63, 165, p.75

(23) F.O.63, 165, pp.75-77

(24) F.O.63, 165, pp.77-78V

(25) F.O.63, 165, p.79V

(26) F.O.63, 165, p.82V

(27) F.O.63, 165, pp.83-83V

(28) F.O.63, 165, p.72

(29) F.O.63, 165, p.84. Extract of a letter from the Hon.ble Edward Hay, His Majesty's Envoy in Portugal, to the Earl of Egremont, dated Lisbon 12th January 1763. This document contains the subject of the talk between Edward Hay and Count de Oeiras

(30) F.O.63, 165, p.84

(31) F.O.63, 165, pp.84V-85V

(32) F.O.63, 165, p.86. Extract of a letter from the Hon.ble Edward Hay, His Majesty's Envoy in Portugal, to the Earl Egremont, dated Lisbon March 18th 1763

(33) F.O.63, 165, pp.86-86V

(34) F.O.63, 165, p.87. Letter from the Hon.ble Edward Hay, His Majesty's Envoy in Portugal to the Earl Halifax dated Lisbon 5th November 1763

(35) F.O.63, 165, pp.87-88V

(36) F.O.63, 165, p.100. The Memorial of a Committee of the Merchants of Great Britain in behalf of themselves and of the British Factory resident at Oporto in Portugal to The Right Honourable Earl of Halifax

(37) F.O.63, 165, pp.102-103

(38) F.O.63, 165, p.198. Certificate of Mr Consul Whitehead

(39) F.O.63, 165, p.70. Letter from the Earl of Halifax, to the Hon.ble Edward Hay, His Majesty's Envoy in Portugal. St. James 16th January 1765

(40) F.O.63, 165, p.69. Letter from the Honourable Edward Hay, His Majesty's Envoy in Portugal, to Mr. Consul Whitehead at Oporto. Lisbon, 16th February 1765

(41) F.O.63, 165, p.89. Letter from Mr Consul Whitehead at Oporto to the Hon.ble Edward Hay, His Majesty's Envoy in Portugal. Porto May 3rd, 1765

(42) F.O.63, 165, pp.122-155. Report to His Majesty of the Lords of the Privy Council for Trade, dated the 10th March 1767. The same document also may be found in "Accounts and Papers, Thirteen Volumes (13). Miscellaneous Session 5 February - 23 July 1830, VOL.XXXI. "Papers relating to the Wine Company at Oporto and other monopolies in Portugal" or S.P., 1829-1830, London, 1832, pp.798-838

(43) This is one of the conclusions submitted to His Majesty's consideration. The others were dealt with prohibitions of various goods from England, increase of duties, laws which affected the jurisdiction of the British judge conservator, commerce with Brazil and the payment of debts by shares of the Wine Company and others. On the movement of vessels at Oporto at that time of O Movimento da Barra do Douro durante o século XVIII: Uma Interpretação, Tabela I by Virginia Rau

(44) Cf. "Mappa do vinhos de Embarque annualmente exportados pela Barra do Porto" in op.cit., pp.59-60 by Christovão Guerner, or "Exportação de Vinhos do Douro, desde 1757 (primeiro anno da Gerencia da antiga Companhia) até 1834 em que foi extincta in A Questão Vinhateira do Douro por Um Anonymo in 1849

(45) F.O.63, 165, p.217. Letter from the Wine Company's agent to Mr. Dottering of Gainsborough, dated Lincoln 24th June 1776

(46) F.O.63, 165, p.218

(47) F.O.63, 165, p.218V

(48) F.O.63, 165, p.219. Letter from the W. Company's agent to Mr Saunders of Plymouth, dated London 6th August 1776

(49) F.O.63, 165, p.220. Letter from the Wine Company agent dated London 22nd August 1776

(50) F.O.63, 165, p.219V. Letter from the Wine Company's agent to Mr Edward Campion dated Steelyard 26 August 1776

(51) F.O.63, 165, p.164V. Edict prolonging the duration of the Wine Company at Oporto, 20 years, from the 1st January 1777 and ending the 31st December 1796

(52) F.O.63, 165, p.215. Letter in 1776 of the Company's agent to the wine trade in England

(53) F.O.63, 165, p.221. Letter from Mr James Archer, Ex-Agent of the Wine Company, dated Oporto, 25 October 1776

(54) F.O.63, 165, p.168V. Memorial of the consul and British merchants at Oporto, to the Hon.ble Robert Walpole, His Majesty's Envoy, dated the 24th October 1776

(55) F.O.63, 165, p.169

(56) F.O.63, 165, p.169V

(57) F.O.63, 165, p.170

(58) F.O.63, 165, pp.170V-172

(59) See: note (43)

(60) F.O.63, 165, p.166V

(61) F.O.63, 165, p.175V. Representation from the Board of the Oporto General Wine Company to M. Pinto, Secretary of State, dated the 3rd January 1800

(62) F.O.63, 165, p.176V

(63) F.O.63, 165, p.178. The document was signed by António Joze da Cunha Reis, Domingos Martins Gonçalves, Gaspar Cardozo de Carvalho Fonseca, Nicolão Francisco Guimarães and José Dias de Lima

(64) F.O.63, 165, p.180. Letter from Mr Consul Whitehead to the Hon.ble Robert Walpole His Majesty's Envoy. Porto 3rd February 1800

(65) F.O.63, 165, p.181. Memorial of the Consul and British Factory at Oporto, to the Hon,ble Robert Walpole, His Majesty's Envoy dated Oporto the 14th February 1800

(66) F.O.63, 165, p.183

(67) F.O.63, 165, p.184. Notes from Lord Robert Fitzgerald, His Majesty's Envoy, to Mr Consul Warre

(68) Cf. note (44)

(69) F.O.63, 165, p.185. Memorial of the Consul and other merchants of the British Factory at Oporto to Lord Robert Stephen Fitzgerald His Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of Lisbon

(70) F.O.63, 165, p.185V

(71) F.O.63, 165, p.186

(72) F.O.63, 165, pp.186V-187V

Notes - II

(1) S.P., 1812-1814. pp.513-563

(2) F.O.63, 165, p.224V. Royal decree ordering the enactment of the treaty of 19 February 1810 from 13 August onwards

(3) F.O.63, 165, p.191. Meeting of the members of the late Factory of Oporto, held at the City of London Tavern 21st March 1811

(4) F.O.63, 165, p.190V. Memorial of the Committee of the members of the late Factory at Oporto, to the Lords of Trade

(5) Statutes United Kingdom, 50 Geo III to 52 Geo III, Vol.IV, London MDCCCXII, pp.373-376."An Act for carrying into effect the provisions of a Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, concluded between His Majesty and His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal" (31st May 1811)

(6) F.O.63, 165, p.188. Letter from the merchants at Oporto, to Mr Consul General Jeffery

(7) F.O.63, 165, p.188V. Note from the Portuguese Secretary of State to Mr Stuart, His Majesty's Envoy

(8) F.O.63, 165, p.189

(9) At that time the Portuguese newspapers published in London were: Correio Braziliense ou Armazem Literario (Londres, 1808-22) and O Investigador Portuguez em Inglaterra (Londres 1811-19). On this subject cf: História da Imprensa Periódica Portuguesa, Portugália Editora, Lisboa, pp.59-66 by José Tengarrinha

(10) Inv. Port. Vol.III, pp.431-446

(11) Inv. Port. Vol.IV, pp.59-71

(12) F.O.63, 165, p.189V. Note from the Portuguese secretary of State to Mr Stuart, His Majesty's Envoy

(13) This petition may be found in F.O.63, 165, pp.228-230 or at C.J., 67, 1812, pp.546-547., or still at Parliamentary Debates, 23, 1st series, 5 May 1812 to 30 july 1812 F301H2, pp.1178-1187

(14) F.O.63, 165, pp.229-229V."Petition presented to the Honorable the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in Parliament assembled by the late Factory at Oporto, on behalf of themselves and others concerned in the Portugal trade"

(15) Cf. Relação dos factos praticados pela commissão dos comerciantes de Vinhos em Londres, correspondentes da Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro Lisboa Impressão Régia, 1813 (There is a copy in Instituto do Vinho do Porto at Oporto.) The firms and the signatures were those of: 1. Diogo Warre; 2. Carlos Page; 3. Roberto Butler, Thomaz Nash, Roberto Tidswell, Ricardo Butler; 4. C.G. Webster, Guilherme Ofley, Guilherme Babington, Carlos Ofley, Diogo Forrester; 5. Roberto Mackerell; 6. Reid, Irving, & Ca.; 7. Joao Searle, Samuel Brown; 8. By Guilherme Wye, G.W. Wye; 9. Isaac Thompson; 10. Quarles Harris, R. Harris, Diogo Dawson Harris; 11. David Egan, Lambert & Co.; 12. Menzies, White, & Co.; 13. João Cole, & Ca.; 14. Thomaz H. Hunt; 15. J.W. Burmester; 16. Joao Bulkeley; 17. Thomaz Croft; 18. By H.W. Cropp, Joao Guilherme Brasley

(16) Parliamentary Debates cited at note (13), pp.1179-1180

(17) Parliamentary Debates cited at note (13), p.1181

(18) Parliamentary Debates, cited at note (13), p.1181

(19) Parliamentary Debates, cited at note (13), p.1181

(19) Ricardo Sanderson, Guilherme Hudson and Guilherme Lynch

(20) Source cit. at note (15), pp.3-10. This support was signed by the following wine traders:

Alex. P. Allan & Alex. Smyth	..... Mark Lane
E.K. Jones & H.W. Atkinson	..... Mark Lane
William Baker	..... Hart Street
Jones, Holland & Co.	..... Rood Lane
Edward Parkins & Co.	..... Mark Lane
William Chatfield & Co.	..... Savage Gardens
William Wyld & Sons	..... Lawrence Pountney Lane
Robert Waller & Son	..... Cross Lane, St. Mary Hill
Griffiths & F rcomb	..... Great Tower Street
Randle Hopley & Co.	..... Great Tower Street
J.J. Lister	..... Token House Yard
George Kier & Son	..... Bridge Street, Westminster
Robert & William Pulsford	..... Great St.Helens
E. Butler & Sons	..... Water Lane
John Wild & Son	..... Martin's Lane
Allnut & Harrison	..... Mark Lane
John & Walker Gray	..... Walter Lane
Robert Jones, Mardell, & Co.	..... St. Mary Hill
Ramsay, Lane & Co.	..... St. Mary Hill
H.J. Newton	..... Aldgate High Street
John Warren	..... Piccadilly
Christopher Idle, Brother & Co.	..... Strand
Clode E Mathew	..... Bishopsgate Street
George King & Son	..... Falcon Street
Laforest & Jones	..... College Hill
William Sherwood	..... Mark Lane
Joseph Geldart & Son	..... Norwich
James Russell	..... Bristol
Murray, Cobley, & Plaisto	..... Chichester
William Lintot & Son	..... Southampton

Edward Thompson	.....	Dover
Kay & Ledell	.....	Hull
Surtees, Wallis, & Croser	.....	Newcastle
Yarworth, Jones, & Moore	.....	Bristol
William Forlong & Son	.....	Glasgow
Ann Gibbeson & Son	.....	Lincoln
John Blackmore	.....	Exeter
William & Thomas Hunter	.....	Edinburgh
John Collier	.....	Plymouth
William Hall & Co.	.....	Edinburgh
Edmund Squire	.....	Bury
Squire, Son & Hills	.....	Norwich
Brebner & Co.	.....	Aberdeen
Thomas Chapman	.....	Putney

(21) Source cit. at note (15), pp.11-12

(22) Source cit. at note (15), p.15

(23) Source cit. at note (15), pp.16-17

(24) Source cit. at note (15), pp.18-48

(25) F.O.63, 165, p.193. Answers to the Queries sent by the Right Honourable the Lords of the Privy Council for Trade

(26) F.O.63, 165, p.194

(27) F.O.63, 165, pp.194V-197

(28) At the archive of the firm Quarles Harris may be found the book entitled "Copy Book 1811-1812" which contains many letters in which many meetings were referred to having as main subject the performance of the recent treaty of 1810 in its articles 8th and 25th

(29) Source cited at note (15), pp.59-90

(30) Inv. Port., vol.V (Novembro 1812)

(31) The source cited at note (15) refers many details dealt with the struggle between the British merchants at Oporto and the Company. The English wine traders recognized that the Company played an important role in defending the purity of the wines and its maintenance would be the best support for the defence of the wine's price

(32) C.J., 68, 1812-1813, p.184

(33) C.J., 68, 1812-1813, p.184-185. The same petition may be found at Inv. Port., Vol.VI, p.p.137-140 or in Parliamentary Debates, 24 1st series, 24 November 1812 to 9 March 1813, J301H2

(34) Inv. Port., Vol.VI, p.331

(35) Inv. Port., Vol.VI, p.331

(36) Inv. Port., Vol.VI, pp.332-339

(37) This subject may be found in Dicurso Historico e analytico sobre o Estabelecimento da Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro. Lisboa, 1814, pp.63-67 by Christovão Guerner

(38) From West to East the freguesias were: Barqueiros, Villa Juzãa, S. Nicoláo, Santa Christina Villa Marim, Cidadelhe, Moura-Morta, Oliveira, Fontelas, Loureiro, Godim, Pezo, Lobrigos, S. Miguel, Sanhoane, Medrões, Fontes, Cever, Fornellos, Comieira, Folhadelas Ermida, Alvações do Corgo, Vilarinho dos Freires, Abaças, Poiares, Covelinhas, Galafura, Guiães, Vilarinho de S. Romão, Provezende, S. Christovão, Goivães, Cazal de Loivos, Vilarinho de Cotas, Cotas, Castedo Castanheiro, Riba Longa, Sanfins, Villar de Massada, Valle de Mendiz, Sabroza, Favaios, S. João de Covas, Goivinhas, Paradela de Guiães.

(39) Also from West to East: Barro, Pennajoia, Samudaes, Cambres, Sande, Valdigem, Parada do Bispo, Fontello, Armamar, Adorigo, Valença, Taboaço, S. Pedro das Aguias, S. Adrião, Villa Seca d'Armamar, Folgoza, Cazaes, Ervedoza, Soutello, Nagozello

(40) The petitions were drawn up by the "Camara, Nobreza e Povo" from Villa de Parada do Bispo, Comarca de Lamego; Villa do Soutelo, Comarca de Trancozo; Villa de Ervadoza do Douro, Comarca de Francozo; Villa d'Armamar, Comarca de Lamego; Villa de Taboaço, Comarca de Lamego; Villa de Barcos, Comarca de Lamego; Villa Seca de Armamar, Comarca de Lamego; Villa de S. Martha de Penaguias, Comarca de Vila Real, Provezende Vila Real; Mezas Frio; Goivaens, Villa Real and by the "Lavradores de Vinho d'Embarque de Villa Real, Lavradores no termo da cidade de Lamego, Lavradores do Distrito de S. Mamede de Riba Tua, e officiais da Camara da mesma Villa and Lavradores do Concelho da Villa de Alijó, por intervenção dos officiaes da Camara"

(41) F.O.63, 165, pp.267-310

(42) In F.O.63, 165, pp.226-226V. Memories from the following publications: Inv. , Vol.IV, pp.59-79; pp.639-647 and vol.V, pp.72-75 and pp.205-212

(43) F.O.63, 165, pp.226-226V. At the same documents there are memoires extracted from: Memórias Económicas da Academia Real das Ciências - vol.3, pp.36-72 and pp.73-153

(44) F.O.63, 165, p.447V. Circular letter of the Wine Company's agents to its Correspondents in England

(45) According to the document at F.O.63, 165, p.447, the Company had exported 9,367 pipes in 1810; 7,438 in 1811 and 4,147 in 1812

(46) Source cit. at note (44), pp.447-448

(47) A.P., vol.XXXI, 1830, pp.25-26 or S.P., 1829-1830, pp.839-840

(48) S.P., 1829-183o, p.838. Letter from Lord Strangford to the Conde das Galveas. Rio de Janeiro, 12th June 1813

(49) A.P., vol.XXXI, 1830, pp.27-32 or S.P., 1829-1830, pp.840-850. Letter from the Conde das Galveas to Lord Strangford. Rio de Janeiro, 29th December, 1813

(50) Statutes United Kingdom, 50 Geo III to 52 Geo III, vol.4 London MDCCCXII, pp.373-376. In the 9th paragraph of the Act 51st of the King it was stipulated that it would not be revoked"...anywise alter any Special Privilege or Exemption to which any person or Persons, Bodies Politic or Corporate, is or are now entitled by Law, but the same shall be continued as heretofore"

(51) Tengarrinha, José, História da Imprensa Portuguesa, pp.50-67

(52) O. Portugues, vol.IV, p.453

(53) Inv., vol.V, p.441

(54) Bradford, Sara, The Story of Port. The Englishman's Wine. 1969, p.71 and Charles Sellers, Oporto Old and New, 1899, pp.170-171

(55) F.O.63, 117, p.19. According to this document in 1810 the active British firms were: Anthony Pearce Tremlet; Cropp & Co.; Bernard Clamouse; Burmester; Butler, Tyndale & Ca.; Daniel, Bull & Silvius; Nicola Copke & Ca.; Noble, Perkines & Ca.; Schindler & Rham; Thomas Snow & Ca.; Webb Campbell, Gray & Como

(56) F.O.63, 165, p.447

(57) F.O.63, 165, p.447

(58) F.O.63, 165, pp.260V, 261 and 247

(59) Source cited at note (48)

(60) P.P., 1898, LXXXV, pp.147-148. Total rates of duty per imperial gallon in Great Britain (Customs and Excise), 1786 to 1851. For further details, Wine, the vine, and the cellar, second edition, London, 1864, from p.112 onwards by Thomas George Shaw

(61) At that time the duties paid in Great Britain per imperial gallon on wines were: Portugal, Spain, Canary and others - 9s. 1¼d; Madeira - 9s. 2½d. and Renish 11s. 3d.

(62) The alvará may be found in C.L.P. 1811 a 1820, pp.338-339 or in "O Portuguez vol.III, p.152. The alvará was published in the following terms: "Eu o Principe Regente faço saber aos que este Alvará virem: Que havendo-me sido presente os grandes beneficios que à Lavoura, e ao Comercio Nacional e Estrangeiro se seguirão do Estabelecimento da Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro, no decurso do templo da sua outorga: e querendo continuar a todos os sobreditos interessados os mesmos beneficios: Hei por bem prorogar o termo da mesma Companhia por outros vinte anos, que hao de ter principio no dia primeiro de Janeiro de mil orto centos e desassete, e acabar no ultimo de Dezembro de mil oitocentos e trinta e seis, para se continuar a duração della, debaixo da observancia das mesmas Leis, Privilegios, Alvarás, Disposiçoens e Ordens, por que actualmente se acha governada"

Notes - III

(1) On this subject may be seen the following sources: F.O.63, 165, pp.74-83V. Translation of the Deduction enclosed in Dom Luis da Cunha's letter of the 22nd October 1760, to the Earl of Kinnoul; A Ideação da Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro by Alvaro Moreira da Fonseca; Reflexões analiticas sobre os principaes fundamentos da C.G.A.V.A.D. by Anastacio Alexandrino Lopes Cruz

(2) This point was alleged by many representatives from boroughs in the District of Cima do Douro when they requested from the Prince Regent the maintenance of the Company by 1813. Their petitions may be found in F.O.63, 165, pp.266-310V. As example, the "Camara Nobreza e Povo da Villa de Ervadoza do Douro" declared: "Estes senhores (membros da Extinta Feitoria do Porto), são aquelles mesmos que nos annos de 1750 até 1756 com escandalozo monopólio fizerão baixar o preço do generozo vinho do Douro a 10$000 até 6$000..."

(3) Croft, J., Treaty on wines of Portugal. Extracts of this work were published in Inv. Port. Vol.II, pp.334-351. Its translation in Portuguese may be found at: Instituto do Vinho do Porto at Oporto

(4) On this subject may be seen: "Relação dos Factos Praticados pela Comissão dos Comerciantes de Vinhos em Londres, correspondentes da Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro", pp.91-94

(5) According to A Questão Vinhateira do Douro by Um Anonymo, between 1738 and 1747, 185,563 pipes of wine were exported while between 1748 and 1756 only 147,189 pipes

(6) Circular letter from the British merchants to their representatives at Cima do Douro by September 1754. It is referred to in the work cited at note (4)

(7) The instructions consisted of: separation of wines from different locations; more people in the treatment of the wine; more boiling of the wine; supply of the brandy in very good conditions for the conservation of the wine by the time of S. Martinho (11th November) and separation of the black grape from the white one.
On this subject cf source cited at note (4)

(8) "Resposta dos Commissarios Veteranos às novas Instrucções da Feitoria" in op.cit., note (4), pp.95-102

(9) According to the section X of the Statutes of the Company, its main aim was "...sustentar com a reputação dos vinhos a cultura das vinhas e beneficiar ao mesmo tempo o comercio, que se faz neste genero, estabelecendo para ele hum preço regular, de que resulte competente conveniencia aos que o fabricão e respectivo lucro aos

que nele negoceião; evitando por huma parte os preços excessivos que impossibilitando o consumo, arruinão o género, evitando pela outra parte, que este se abata com tanta decadencia, que aos Lavradores não possa fazer conta sustentarem as despezas annuaes da sua agricultura".
The statutes may be found in A.D.P., cabido no.449, under the title: Instituição da Companhia Geral da A.V.A.D.

(10) Editais, Alvarás, Ordens Régias, Portarias, etc. (1754 a 1843) may be found at A.V.A.D.-Exs.1 a 6 e 129 a 141" or Inv. Port.; vol.XVIII, pp.209-212

(11) According to section XXIX of the Institution of the C.G.A.V.A.D., the instructions on this subject were: "Devendo-se separar inteira e absolutamente para o embarque da América, e Reynos estrangeiros vinhos das costas do Alto Douro, e do seu territorio de todos os outros vinhos, dos lugares que somente os produzem capazes de se beberem naterra, para que desta sorte a inferioridade destes vinhos não arruine a reputação que aquelles merecem pela sua bondade natural"

(12) Alvará of 30 August 1757

(13) Alvará of 16th September 1771 and 10th April 1773

(14) Inv. Port. Vol.III, pp.431-446. "Carta aos Redactores do Investigador...", 20 de Março de 1812

(15) Alvará of 16th January 1768

(16) Alvará of 21st September 1802

(17) Alvará of 21st September 1802

(18) Alvará of 29th November 1804

(19) Avisos of 12th September 1772 and 22nd September 1777

(20) F.O.63, 165, pp.193-197. Answers to the Queries drawn up by the Right Honorable the Lords of the Privy Council for Trade. The wine traders Kingston and James Warre were their authors in July of 1812

(21) Inv. Port (Novembro 1812), p.75

(22) C.J., 68, 1812-1813, pp.184-185. Petition of wine Merchants, Correspondents of the Royal Wine Company of Oporto (19 February 1813)

(23) In A Questão Vinhateira do Douro, 1849, p.303 and followings, by Um anonymo, its author shows figures very similar.

(24) Source cited at note (20)

(25) F.O.63, 165, pp.266-310. Fifteen petitions which were sent to the Portuguese government in May 1813 by the representatives of the wine region of Cima do Douro, supporting the maintenance of the Company. On this subject may also be seen, Essai Statistique, pp.155-161 by Adrien Balbi

(26) Inv. Port., vol.III, p.438. Carta aos Redactores do Investigador..., 20 Março 1812. According to its author, in 1810 and 1811 the Company fixed the price of the wines in 60$000 (1st quality) and 54$000 (second one)

(27) F.O.63, 165, pp.273V-274V

(28) F.O.63, 165, pp.275-277V

(29) Source cited at note (26)

(30) Inv. Port., vol.V, pp.224-233. Exame das observações sobre o alvará de 21 de Setembro de 1802 relativo à Companhia do Porto

(31) Inv. Port., vol.IX, pp.230-233. Aditamento ao Discurso sobre a Companhia Geral do Alto Douro de Dezembro de 1813. This speech has been attributed to José Jacinto de Sousa and may be found at "B.P.B.-Ms.9324"
On the same subject may also be seen: Analize sobre as matérias expendidas nas memorias A.B.C. das quaes a primeira foi feita em janeiro de 1813 sobre os vinhos da Colheita de 1812; a segunda em janeiro de 1814 sobre os da novidade de 1813, e a terceira sobre a necessidade da permissão de se importarem Agoas-ardentes. by Cristovão Guerner

(32) The actual British firm Croft, established in Vila Nova de Gaia-Porto, owns a valuable archive in which it is possible to find many sources about this time.
On the matter of the vessels the best sources are: Letters, 1808-1811 (Boat Book 1812-1832) and Copy Book. 1811-1812. In these books there is evidence of many complaints about the lack of boats employed in the war which affected the transportation of the wine from Douro to Oporto

(33) F.O.63, 165, p.276V

(34) Relação dos factos praticados pela Comissão dos Comerciantes de Vinhos em Londres, correspondentes da C.G.A.V.A.D., pp.21-22

(35) C.J., 67, 1812, pp.546-547. Petition of members of the late Factory at Oporto, presented to the Parliament on 22nd July 1812

(36) Cf. A.D.P., Cabido no.449. Instituição da Companhia Geral da A.V.D.A., Lisboa MDCCLVI

(37) F.O.63, 117, p.19. According to this document in 1810, 41,358 pipes of wine were exported from Oporto by 56 shippers, including British and other foreign wine traders as well as Portuguese firms. The Company should have reached its apogee at that time, exporting 9,367 pipes. In 1811 only 18,536 pipes were exported by 35 firms. The exports of the Company also fell to 7438 pipes

(38) Cf. source cited at note (34). The same may be confirmed in a letter dated 6th March 1813 published in Inv. Port., vol.VI, pp.331-339

(39) Cf. C.J., 68, 1812-1813. Petition of wine merchants, correspondents of the Royal wine Company of Oporto presented to Parliament on 19 February 1813

(40) Cf. F.O.63, 165, pp.260V-261 and 447 as well as F.O.63, 117, p.19

(41) In F.O.63, 165, pp.260V-261, the British merchants confessed that "in the years 1810 and 1811 some wines were shipped for British in Portuguese names". The same may be confirmed at the source cited in note (34), pp.156-157

(42) Source cited at note (39)

(43) Balbi, Adrien in Essai Statistique, pp.157-160 drew up some considerations on this subject

(44) This point was unanimously argued by the fifteen petitions sent to the Prince Regent by the population of Douro region (they are to be found in F.O.63, 165, pp.266-310)

(45) This point is confirmed in the petitions referred to at note (44), Essai Statistique, pp.157-160 by Adrien Balbi and Inv. Port., vol.IX, pp.230-233

(46) Alvarás of 13th December 1788 and 23rd March 1802

(47) Alvarás of 10th November 1772, 15 February and 16th December 1773

(48) Carta Regia of 15th February 1790

(49) Alvará of 16th December 1773 and Decree of 28th June 1800

(50) Aviso Regio of 15th March 1811

(51) For further details on duties at that time: Discurso Histórico e analytico. 1814, pp.50-58 by Christovão Guerner

(52) Inv. Port., vol.II, pp.334-351

(53) According to the X section of the Instituição of the Company, its capital at the time of the foundation was of 1,200,000 cruzados divided in shares with the value of 400,000 reis per each. Cf. Inv. Port.vol.III, pp.437-438

(54) Balbi, Adrien, op.cit., p.156

(55) Source cit. at note (39)

(56) Source cit. at note (34), pp.23-48

(57) Source cit. at note (34), pp.9-10

(58) Inv. Port., vol.III, pp.440-441

(59) Source cit. at note (22)

(60) James, W. Bosville, Wine duties..., pp.36-52

(61) Cf. P.P., 1898, LXXXV, pp.147-148 and Wine, the wine and the Cellar, 1864, pp.112 and following by Thomas George Shaw

(62) About duties on wines and other merchandize Cf. C.J., 64, 1809, p.549; 68, 1812-1813, p.848; 73, 1818, pp.641-645; 74, 1818-1819, pp.922; 76, 1821-1822, pp.953-959 and 966-968

(63) Shaw, Thomas George, op.cit., Table X and "wine retained for Home Consumption in the United Kingdom, with the amount of Duty received from 1787 to 1898, both years inclusive" in P.P., 1898, LXXXV from p.150 onwards

(64) Source cit. at note (34), p.58

(65) Inv. Port., vol.III, p.445

(66) Inv. Port., vol.III, p.444

(67) Unanimous opinion was argued by the petitions referred to in note (25)

Notes - IV

(1) On this subject it may be seen: B.P.M.P., Códice no.931" Exame Analytico do Artigo do Moniteur de Trinta de Novembro de 1810 sobre a conducta dos Inglezes em Portugal"

(2) Cf. "A imprensa portuguesa durante as invasões francesas" in História da Imprensa Portuguesa, pp.54-59 by José Tengarrinha

(3) Academia das Ciencias de Lisboa, Memórias Económicas, 1789-1815

(4) Cf. Chapter III, I

(5) F.O.63, 165, pp.200V-212. Edict of 1756 and subsequent edicts

(6) F.O.63, 165, pp.200V-212

(7) Balbi, Adrien, Essai Statistique, pp.159-160

(8) As an example, the alvará of 30th August 1757 prohibited the use of excrement in the cultivation of the vineyards

(9) Inv. Port., vol.V, pp.211-212. Carta imparcial sobre a Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro

(10) Balbi, Adrien, op.cit., pp.159-160: Charles Sellers, Oporto Old and New, p.118 and F.O.63, 165, p.194

(11) This stipulation of the laws was very often violated. On this point cf: "Antecedents" in this chapter

(12) Sellers, Charles, op.cit., p.118

(13) Alvará of 21 September 1802

(14) Inv. Port., IV, pp.639-647 (Julho, 1812). Observações sobre o Alvará de 21 de Setembro de 1802 relativo à Companhia do Porto

(15) F.O.63, 165, p.194

(16) Sections 30 and 31 of the statutes of the Company. Wines found out of the regular roads would be confiscated by the Company. Inferior wines clandestinely introduced into unqualified houses would be forfeited. To control export wines the Company annually sent abroad a list of the exported wines

(17) Sections 14th and 33rd of the Company's statutes

(18) F.O.63, 165, p.194. Complaints of the British merchants at Oporto sent to the Lords of Privy Council for Trade in 1812

(19) Inv. Port., vol.IV, p.644; F.O.63, 165, pp.193-196 and Adrien Balbi, Essai Statistique, p.160

(20) F.O.63, 165, p.194V

(21) F.O.63, 165, p.196. For further details on prices, cf: Inv. Port., vol.V, pp.205-212

(22) Section XIX of the Company's statutes

(23) Royal Edict of 6th August 1776

(24) F.O.63, 165, p.203. The British merchants were excluded from the trade to Brasil in consequence of the stipulations referred to in the 19th and 24th sections of the Company's statutes

(25) Inv. Port., vol.V, pp.2 5-213 and 393-402

(26) Section XXIX of the Company's statutes

(27) Royal Edict of 16 December 1760

(28) Royal Edict of 10 March 1772

(29) Inv. Port., vol.V, pp.209-210

(30) Royal Edict of 20 July 1807

(31) F.O.63, 165, p.207

(32) Cf. "Antecedents" in this chapter

(33) Inv. Port., vol.IV, pp.59-79; 639-649 and vol.V, p.398

(34) F.O.63, 165, pp.196V-197. Complaints of the British merchants at Oporto to the Lords of Privy Council for Trade in 1812

(35) Cf. "The Company's defenders" in this chapter

(36) F.O.63, 165, p.195V

(37) F.O.63, 165, p.195. On this subject it may be seen: Lusitanian sketches..., vol.II, pp.285-302 by William H.G. Kingston; Influencia da Política Aduaneira da Gra-Bretanha sobre o Comércio de vinhos neste pais, p.16 by Jaime Lopes Amorim and Wine and the wine trade, p.11 by André Simon

(38) C.J., 67, 1812, pp.546-547. Petition of members of the late Factory at Oporto

(39) Document cited at note (38)

(40) Inv. Port., vol.V, pp.205-212 and 393-402. "Carta Imparcial sobre a Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro". Its first publication had been in June 1777 at Oporto and by 1812 it was yet considered with actuality

(41) Section VII of the Company's statutes

(42) Section VII of the Company's statutes

(43) Section XLII of the Company's statutes

(44) Section VII of the Company's statutes

(45) Cf. "Antecedents" in this chapter

(46) Inv. Port., vol.V, p.400

(47) Inv. Port., vol.IV, pp.641-642

(48) Section XL of the Company's statutes

(49) Royal Edict of 24 October 1764

(50) Inv. Port., vol.IV, p.643

(51) Inv. Port., vol.V, pp.210 and 397; "The Oporto Wine Company considered, and its effects in deteriorating Portuguese wines" in op.cit., pp.89-97 by W. Bosville James

(52) Cor. Braz., vol.X, p.828

(53) Inv. Port., vol.V, p.210

(54) F.O.63, 165, p.226. Extract from Memórias Económicas da Academia Real das Ciencias, vol.3, pp.73-153

(55) Section XXXV of the Company's statutes

(56) Section XXXVII of the Company's statutes

(57) Inv. Port., vol.IV, p.647

Notes - V

(1) Cf. Discurso Historico e Analytico..., p.59 by Christovão Guerner and A Questao Vinhateira do Douro, p.303 by Um Anonymo

(2) According to "A Questao Vinhateira do Douro, p.303 the exports of wine for Great Britain were: between 1688 and 1697 - 76,682 pipes and between 1698 and 1707 - 71,889 pipes

(3) According to the same source in 1708-1717 (96,444 pipes) and in 1718-1727 (176,928 pipes)

(4) On this subject it must be seen: Oporto, Old and New, pp.38-56 by Charles Sellers

(5) Source cited at note (2). In 1728-1737 (192,341 pipes) and in 1738-1747 (185,563 pipes)

(6) This viewpoint was defended unanimously by the population of the Douro. Cf.: F.O.63, 165, pp.266-310V

(7) Cf. Croft, J. Treaties on Wines of Portugal

(8) Source cited at note (2). In 1748-1756, (147,189 pipes were exported)

(9) F.O.63, 165, p.71-73. Letter from Dom Luis da Cunha, Portuguese Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Earl of Kinnoul, His Majesty's Ambassador in Portugal, dated Belem 22nd October 1960. On the same subject: Génese de um Alvará Pombalino and A Ideação da Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro by Alvaro Moreira da Fonseca

(10) F.O.63, 165, pp.193-197. Answers drawn up by the Right Honourable the Lords of the Privy Council for Trade. London 31st July 1812

(11) According to the source cited at note (2), the exports for England were: in 1757-1766 (186,130 pipes); in 1767-1776 (214,802 pipes) and in 1797-1806 (415,967 pipes)

(12) Balbi, Adrien, Essai Statistique, p.441

(13) Balbi, Adrien, Essai Statistique, p.152

(14) Cf. source cit. at note (10)

(15) The best proof is the "Petition presented to the Honorable the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in Parliament" in July 1812. It may be found at F.O.63, 165, pp.228-230 or C.J., 67, 1812, pp.546-547

(16) The best examples are: 15 petitions of the Douro population requesting the Prince Regent to maintain the Company (F.O.63, 165), pp.266-310V as well as the petition of 43 British wine traders who argued in London forthe maintenance of the Company. This document may be found in Relaçao dos Factos Praticados pela commissão dos Commerciantes de Vinhos em Londres, correspondentes da Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro, pp.3-10

(17) Cf. Bourdon, Léon, Louis-François de Tollenare. Notes Dominicales, pp.85-87 and in this work, Chapter I, VI

(18) Neves, José Accursio das, Variedades sobre Objectos relativos às Artes, Comércio e Manufacturas, pp.181-219. According to this work, by 1814, the stills would be active in Murça (Vila Real); Cabriz d'Oliveira de Conde; Travassos de Canaes; Saldonos Mouraz, Banho and S. Vicente (all them in Viseu)

(19) Balbi, Adrien, Essai Statistique, pp.155-161

(20) Balbi, Adrien, op.cit., pp.155-161

(21) F.O.63, 117, p.19

(22) F.O.63, 117, p.19

(23) Source cited at note (16)

(24) Balbi, Adiren, op.cit., pp.155-161

(25) F.O.63, 165, p.447. A comparative statement of the wines "Licensed for exportation" shipped at Oporto, during eighteen years from 1796 to 1813

(26) F.O.63, 165, p.447

(27) Cf. F.O.63, 165, pp.260V-261 and 117, p.19

(28) Cf. In this work, chapter II, III. "The British merchants established at Oporto against the war contribution levied by the Portuguese government"

(29) F.O.63, 165, pp.260V-261

(30) O Portugues, Vol.IV, p.453

(31) Cf. Chapter V, I "The anti-British sentiment stimulated by the Portuguese newspapers published in London"

(32) Cf. Chapter I, III "Revolt at Oporto with English support"

(33) Cf. Chapter I, IV. "Second French invasion and new persecution to the British subjects and their properties"

(34) Cf. Chapter I, IV

(35) Cf. Chapter I, V. "Growth of the British influence in Portugal after the expulsion of the French troops from Oporto"

CHAPTER IV

TRADE BETWEEN PORTUGAL AND GREAT BRITAIN 1807 - 1820

INTRODUCTION

There is no evidence of any specific study on the vessels and ships which dealt with the Anglo-Portuguese trade at this period. The proportional weight of British trade along the Portuguese coast has also not occupied the attention of the historians.

On the contrary, there are abundant studies on the imports and exports between the two countries. The wine trade has been the most privileged. Commercial Relations of England and Portugal by Shillington and Chapman; English Overseas Trade Statistics, (1697-1808) by E.B. Schumpeter; Douro. Esboços para a sua História Económica by A. Guerra Tenreiro; On Wine by T.G. Shaw; Wine Duties by W.B. James and The Past, Present and Probably the Future State of the Wine Trade by James Warre liberally illustrate the transactions of wine merchants since 1678.

Beyond the wine trade, existing studies refer to the commerce between the two nations in general terms, but the period of 1807-1820, unfortunately has been a few contemplated as has been demonstrated in the general Introduction.

This chapter has as its principal purpose the analysis of the weight of Anglo-Portuguese trade in that of each of the nations and to demonstrate the principal disputes over the nationality of the vessels as well as the taxes levied on them in the two countries.

The question of the ships and vessels had long concerned both British and Portuguese authorities. The treaty of 1810 had an impact on trade which is now discussed. The correspondence exchanged between the British and Portuguese authorities as well as the discussion which largely took place in the Portuguese newspapers published in London, permits us to understand the disagreements which occurred.

An attempt to demonstrate the proportional weight of the British trade along the Portuguese coast can be made. Authors have often

referred only to the British trade and their interests in Oporto and Lisbon. Now the available data has allowed us to evaluate its relative weight in Viana, Aveiro, Figueira da Foz, Setubal and Faro.

Unfortunately the data dealt with the exports between Portugal and Great Britain are incomplete, those for 1813 were destroyed by fire. Much numerical data may be found on both imports and exports in the Public Record Office. They allow us to know the value of the merchandise exported from Portugal, Azores and Madeira to Great Britain (London, outports and Scotland).

In regard to the British exports the available data establish the value of the British merchandise as well as that of the reexports of foreign and colonial merchandise from Great Britain (London, Outports and Scotland) to Portugal, the Azores and Madeira, between 1809 and 1820, except 1813.

It is demonstrated that the oscillation of the Anglo-Portuguese trade was influenced by factors such as: opening of the Brasillan ports to the British shipping, the French invasions, and Treaty of commerce of 19th February 1810, as well as the general Anglo-French conflict.

1. THE CARRYING TRADE: THE DISPUTE OVER THE SHIPS INVOLVED

The commercial relations between Portugal and England were always subordinated to the legal conditions and to the circumstances of peace or war in each time and in each country.

It is evident that before the overseas discoveries the Portuguese trade was exclusively guided towards Europe. As it was already said, England, for a long time, was specially privileged in its commercial links with Portugal.

Despite the several discoveries which occurred in the course of the second half of the fifteenth century either in Africa, or in Asia and South America, such events did not impede the Portuguese Kings to concede the greatest protection to the British navigation along the Portuguese coast. In the "Carta de Privilégios e Foral dos Ingleses" promulgated in 1454 it was ordered that the British subjects and their ships and merchandize "que mercantemente vierem a nossos Reynos ...nao seiao prezos nem tomados nem acuzados nem demandados"...[1]

This privilege was conceded by D. Afonso V, was confirmed by D. João II in 1491, D. Manuel I in 1497, D. João III in 1536, D. Filipe II from Castile in 1609 and D. João IV in 1654.

Meanwhile the treaty of Peace, Commerce and Alliance drawn up between the two countries at London on 29 January 1642[2] as well as that of 20 July 1654 at Westminster[3] stipulated several points, regulating the navigation of both Portugal and England.

The rules to be observed, by shipping of both nations, mainly in circumstances of war, were proposed in the treaty of Defensive Alliance drawn up at Lisbon on 16 May 1703[4]. As a result of the laws which were enacted by the two governments the majority of the vessels which sailed to Portugal during the eighteenth century were of British nationality. An example is that of the movement of the Douro bar at Oporto. Between 1733 and 1743 and between 1764 and 1785, about 67%

of the vessels which entered at that port were English[5].

Also the general movement at the Portuguese ports between 1801 and 1811 is still more expressive, since the British vessels which entered Portugal were about 78% of the total of foreign vessels[6].

The outbreak of war between England and France by early nineteenth century and mainly the British Orders in Council and the Berlin and Milan decrees since the end of 1806 until the end of 1807[7] created economic conflict.

The Portuguese were obliged to abandon their position of neutrality, supporting England against France. The Portuguese Royal Family withdrew to Brazil at the end of November 1807. In consequence of these events on 28 January 1808 the Prince Regent ordered the opening of the Brazilian ports to the English shipping. It is evident that that measure adversely affected the Portuguese maritime trade. It was until then principally engaged in the Brazilian trade, in supplying the Portuguese ports, where, before 1808, the British vessels were supplied with products coming from Brazil, especially cotton. From that time onwards, the British vessels could sail directly to Brazil and consequently the Portuguese ones reduced their field of action. These circumstances seemed to force Portuguese negotiators, so as to conclude a treaty of commerce with England, which would take into consideration the diverse factors in defence of the natural interests of national trade. It is evident that if the British shipping had benefited from the opening of the Brazilian ports, naturally Portuguese shipping should be compensated as other points which should be subjected to a bilateral agreement. Nevertheless this did not happen. The treaty of commerce of 1810[8] in its 4th article stipulated that "there shall be a perfect reciprocity on the subject of the Duties and imposts to be paid by the ships and vessels of the High Contracting Parties, within the several Ports, Harbours, Roads, and Anchoring places belonging to each of them...". The principle of perfect reciprocity seemed to exclude the possibility that doubts could arise in the future. Nevertheless the 5th article

opened the door to them in stating that: "...the same rates of bounties and drawbacks shall be established in their respective Ports upon the exportation of goods and merchandises whether those goods or merchandises be exported in British or in Portuguese ships and vessels..."

This clause engendered some problems. For example, Portuguese vessels would be exempted from some duties which were only paid by foreign vessels in England such as anchorage and scavage and others. Yet how could the nationality of British or Portuguese ships be defined?

Negotiators predicted some controversy on this point. They stipulated that in order to avoid any differences or misunderstanding with respect to the regulations which may respectively constitute a British or Portuguese vessel, the High Contracting Parties agree in declaring that all vessels built in the Dominions of His Britannic Majesty, and owned, navigated, and registered according to the Laws of Great Britain, shall be considered as British vessels...".

Portuguese vessels would be considered all those which were "...built in the countries belonging to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, or in any of them, or ships taken by any of the ships or vessels of war belonging to the Portuguese Government, or any of the Inhabitants of the Dominions of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, having commissions or letters of marque and Reprisal from the government of Portugal, and condemned as lawful Prize in any Court of Admiralty of the said Portuguese government, and owned by the subjects of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, or any of them, and whereof the Master and three-fourths of the Mariners, at least, are subjects of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal.."

In regard to the stipulations of the ancient treaties, Decrees or Alvarás, it was only renounced and abrogated the power "of carrying in the ships of either Country goods and merchandises of any description whatever, the property of the Enemies of the other Country".

The future would confirm the failure of these attempts to define the

nationality of British or Portuguese vessels. Despite the care taken by the negotiators, on 17 June 1810 Marquis Wellesley as His Majesty's Principal secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, proposed to Chevalier Souza Coutinho, Portuguese ambassador in London that: "in addition to the qualifications therein expressed, such other ships will likewise be entitled to be considered as British ships, which shall have been captured from the Enemy by His Majesty's ships of war, or by subjects of His Majesty furnished with letters or Marque by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and regularly condemned in one of His Majesty's Prize courts, as a lawful prize..."

The terms of the treaty in its stipulations on ships and vessels caused a certain animosity on the part of the Portuguese newspapers published in London. For example the exploitation of a letter addressed on 16 August by Sousa Coutinho to the Portuguese merchants established in London(10). The letter ordered that the captains of the Portuguese vessels as soon as possible after their clearance from the custom-house at the London port, had to write a second manifest of the merchandize and afterwards to send it to the consul. The author of this article argued that such a measure caused more delay to Portuguese navigation while the British vessels did not face similar obstacles.

That attitude of the newspaper was only a sign of the unfavourable reactions which could occur at any opportunity. This soon appeared.

Some Portuguese vessels had arrived in London and their captains did not demonstrate that their ships had been built at any of the Portuguese territories. On 4 January 1811 the Lords of the Treasury had to instruct the commissaries of the customhouse rights(11), invoking the stipulations of the 5th article of the treaty of 1810 as well as the chapter 2 of the Act 48°. of George III(12), but ordered that such cases were treatened with some indulgence.

The question of the vessel's nationality must have provoked correspondence between the two governments, pressed mainly by a memorial made by various merchants from Portugal and Brazil(13). As a result

of this the Portuguese government wrote to the British authorities as follows: "Que se conceda permissão a todo equalquer Navio Portuguez, que como tal lhe tenha sido permittido entrar nos Portos da Gra-Bretanha, para ser considerado a todos os respeitos como navio Portuguez, ainda que conste não terem sido construidos estes Navios em Porto algum do Territorio, ou Possessões pertencentes ao Governo Portuguez... com tanto que elles sejam possuidos por Vassallos Portuguezes, e navegados segundo a Lei..."(14)

This dispute over Portuguese vessels built at foreign countries implied another one in regard to the internal policy on vessels.

In order to stimulate the national navigation, on 4 February 1811 the Prince Regent had ordered that all ships and vessels which were not Portuguese, although belonging to Portuguese subjects, were prohibited from importing into the ports of "Portugal, Brazil, Ilhas dos Açores, Madeira, Cabo Verde, Portos da Costa de Africa Occidental, Ilhas adjacentes sujeitas a minha Real Coroa, Producções, ou Manufacturas da Asia, e China, ou de qualquer Porto, ou Ilhas Nacionaes, ou Estrangeiras, além do Cabo da Boa Esperança, e mares do Sul...". In consequence of this and in order to prevent some Portuguese owners of vessels built at foreign countries before 4 February from being prejudiced, on 19 November the Prince Regent ordered that the maintenance of the prohibition of 4 February would be limited to the vessels built at foreign countries, but purchased after that time(15).

There is no evidence that the question of the vessel's nationality affected the British authorities. On 4 September 1812(16) and on 18 October(17) John Jeffery drew up a long statement with many details on the principal points which were affecting at that time the British commercial interests in Portugal. Nevertheless he did not refer any word on that subject.

To avoid the repetition of conflicts, as a result of pressure of Portuguese authorities, some points of the treaty of commerce were adjusted in London with the English government on 18 December 1812.

The question of the Portuguese vessel identification was not raised. On the contrary and despite the inexistence of any evidence on complaints on the part of the British subjects it was agreed: "... that the official certificate of Registry signed by the proper officers of the British customs, shall be deemed sufficient to identify a British built ship, and that on the production of such certificate, she shall be admitted as such in any of the Ports within the Dominions of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal."(18)

This system of identification was favoured by some Portuguese. The Investigador Portuguez argued that it was better than the passports of the Portuguese vessels, very often subject to falsifications due to the scarcity of details which were displayed in them. As a consequence, several vessels from other countries would be able to use them, seriously jeopardizing the Portuguese trade(19).

Despite this, the question on the nationality of the vessels continued and it became necessary to adjust certain details. So that, on 11 February 1813 it was ordered by the Conselho de Regencia that: "para legalizar os Navios de construcção Britanica, se haja por sufficiente nestes Reinos a Certidão do Registo, assignada pelo Official respectivo da Alfandega do Porto, donde procedeo o Navio...".(20)

This point caused strong opposition on the part of the owners' representatives of vessels built in other foreign countries. On 8 October , a letter was published in the Investigador Portuguez, protesting against that determination, arguing that the vessels built in England were certified having in view the benefits from the treaty. Those which had been built in other countries were excluded from them. In the author's opinion that measure tended to benefit British shipping since the majority of the Portuguese vessels were not built in England(21).

Meanwhile the disagreement among the Portuguese became general on the points which had been adjusted respecting to the treaty. The discussion on the nationality of the vessels spread towards other points. The payment of the duties in England such as scavage, Package and

Trinity Dues was a matter for considerable controversy[22]. The Portuguese protesters alleged that the difference between what the Portuguese vessels paid in England and what was paid by the British vessels in Portugal was not compensated by the solution found in the negotiations realized in London on 18 December 1812[23].

Moreover the Portuguese protesters also argued that British shipping was excessively privileged by the stipulations of the treaty, as well as by the points which were subsequently agreed[24].

The Portuguese minister in London was even accused of playing a role on behalf of the British interests, during the negociations and of prejudicing at the same time the Portuguese ones, when he demanded documents from the captains of the Portuguese vessels which were not demanded from the British[25].

If the decision on the verification of British merchandise in the Portuguese Dominions[26] was considered as a measure which would reduce contraband, the mode of levying duties of 15 per cent on British goods in Portuguese ports[27] was regarded as favourable to British interests[28].

By the same time it seems that the British merchants were aware that the circumstances were highly favourable to them, but their privileges granted by the treaty encouraged them to obtain as much as they could. They enjoyed some laxity on the part of the Portuguese custom houses, permitting to them many cases to engage in the coasting trade without any penalties and several times without any levying of duties[29]. Nevertheless the British merchants planned to legalize that practice, alleging that they could to complete the lading of wines at Oporto when they had already been partly laden at other ports[30]. Their pretensions were therefore frustrated since on 23 November 1816 the D. João VI ordered the total prohibition of the coasting trade to all the vessels from the foreign nations[31].

By that time war had ended. Some signs appeared, indicating that the British influence in Portugal was diminishing. On 18th June 1814

the Portuguese government had ordered the opening of the Portuguese ports to all the nations which had previously been its enemies[32]. Despite this, the British navigation was not affected. On 30 March 1815 Jeffery informed the authorities of London that in Portugal the questions of the navigation were going well and that there were not any privileges of importation in favour of ships which were built in Portugal or belonged to Portuguese subjects[33]. Jeffery's satisfaction expressed the overwhelming hegemony of the British shipping carrying the merchandize between Great Britain and Portugal.

In 1814 82% of the ships which sailed from Portugal to Great Britain were British[34]. In 1815 the same percentage remained[35] and by 1816 this had increased to 92%[36]. The number of British ships clearing from Great Britain to Portugal reached 75%, 78% and 88% of the total[37]. From that time onwards there was no safe evidence that that trend had changed. In the meantime the contraband probably grew.

On 8 July 1817 twenty-one measures were taken by the Portuguese government which were reinforced with five more on 30 August[38].

By mid October the Portuguese government ordered the closure of the Portuguese ports to the vessels which arrived from Ireland in consequence of "febre epidemica"[39]. On 22 October the same order was extended to all vessels which arrived from England. Such action led John Jeffery to complain to William Hamilton on 7th November, saying "that about 50 vessels with cargos principally consisting of perishable articles have been placed under strict Quarantine and many of them obliged to discharge their cargos on the Quarentine ground after laying the full period of the time prescribed at a very considerable expense and attended with serious injury..."[40]

Meanwhile this setback was overcome because there is no evidence of any complaint on the part of the British authorities dealing with navigation. On the contrary, during the same period many merchants

complained that some foreign vessels were affected by deficient documentation.

As a result of this, on 14 August 1819, the Governors of the Kingdom recognized that many ships from Hamburg , Sweden and other foreign ports had caused "gravissimo prejuizo dos comerciantes, empate e avaria das fazendas importadas...". A series of rules were drawn up[41], involving all the foreign countries, except those of British dominions so as to eliminate all the difficulties.

As that determination excluded the British vessels may be concluded that the stipulations of the treaty of 1810, duly adjusted on December 1812, continued to be enforced.

By early 1820 there were some complaints on the part of both British and Portuguese merchants.

On 29 April 1820 John Jeffery informed William Hamilton that the Portuguese authorities had placed additional guards on board British vessels, in violation of the 4th article of the treaty of 1654[42]. On 3 April the Portuguese consul at Bristol, Antonio Barão de Mascarenhas had complained that the Portuguese ships, from the Convention of 1812 to 1818, had paid the same port duties as had other foreign ships[43]. As a consequence of this on 27th June the Portuguese government ordered that: "...os proprietarios de navios, que estiverem nas dictas circunstancias, que podem mandar receber as quantias que lhes competirem, dirigindo-se para isso ao mencionado consul, que por serviço da nação se offerece gratuitamente a encarregar-se dos documentos dos interessados, e procurar-lhes a seu em bolço...".

It will be concluded that between 1807 and 1820 the British shipping was highly favoured. In the first place on 28 January 1808 when D. João VI opened the Brazilian ports to its ships. In second place on 19 February 1810 by the stipulations of the treaty of commerce which were clarified on December 1812 in London.

The decision taken on 11 February 1813 by the Governors of the Kingdom by which the Portuguese ships built in England would enjoy the condition of being considered Portuguese property according to the stipulations of the treaty prejudiced the owners of the ships built in other foreign countries. By the first years of the nineteenth century the British ships reached in Portugal overall supremacy. This was reinforced by the impact of the French invasions.

. As example, at Oporto in 1807 and 1808 their movement reached an average 25% of the total, having their clearings been only 7% in 1808[44]. From May 1809 onwards the proportion of British vessels arose as far as 50%[45]. In Lisbon the reflexes of the apogee of the war was felt in the first four months of 1811. In the first six months of that year, 42% of the vessels which arrived in that city were British[46]. The figures reached the same proportion in 1812[47] and 1813[48].

The only rival navigation was that of United States of America which at the same period oscillated between 30% and 40%. From 1814 to 1816 the percentage continued to be very high, considering as it was said, Portugal, Madeira and Azores.

From 1816 until 1820 it is not possible to refer percentage because there is no evidence on the movement of other foreign navigation. Nevertheless it will be affirmed that in absolute terms the movement of the British navigation remained at approximately the same levels[49].

All these reasons demonstrate that there was a considerable dependence of the Portuguese trade on the British mercantile marine during the period 1807-1820, but its apogee was reached by 1811-1813. This may be demonstrated through the table of consulages paid by British vessels in Portugal[50]. Its figures suggest as well that the prohibition of coasting trade carried out by foreign vessels ordered by D. João VI in 1816 did not affect the British shipping along the Portuguese coast.

II. THE REVENUES OF THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES ALONG THE PORTUGUESE COAST

By the mid-fifteenth century[1] the British commerce began to be supported by a Consul General established in Lisbon while it was only at the end of the seventeenth century that a consul was authorized in Oporto[2]. In consequence of the first French invasion the British authorities disappeared from Portugal. Strangford and Gambier went to Brazil[3] and William Warre fled to London[4]. Only on 30th December 1808 did Canning order that John Jeffery be created Consul General in the European Dominions, residing in Lisbon[5].

Canning pointed out the necessity of taking care of the affairs of the British subjects and of assisting them in all their lawful concerns, protecting them with "the like pre-eminences, prerogatives, liberties, immunities and exemptions" in accordance with the laws in vigour.

Moreover the English Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs recommended to him that he abstain from engaging in commerce on his own account. At the same time he ensured him a salary at the rate of £1500 per annum and in addition to this fixed sum, one third part of the amount of the fees levied on British ships and merchandize as was the custom[6]. This proportion, however, could be liable to His Majesty's appreciation. In the event of the aggregate of the fees collected in the course of one year not amounting to £1,500, the difference would be paid by His Majesty's civil list[7].

This way of payment to the Consul General suggests that the tariff of consulages received by the Consul General in Portugal must be taken into consideration. Fortunately there is the evidence of two documents which permit to clarify this point.

On 25 June 1812, John Jeffery affirmed in a letter sent to William Hamilton that the consular fees were charged on British ships only.

The merchandize was excluded[8]. By that time the amounts of consulage and fees corresponding to the years 1809, 1810 and 1811 had been received at Lisbon, Oporto and outports[9]. Their analysis permit the conclusions that the tariffs were similar to those which were published on 31st July 1817, as follows[10]:

TARIFF OF CONSULAGES RECEIVED BY THE CONSUL GENERAL IN PORTUGAL

	Mil Reis	Sterling Exchange at Par £. s. d.
- On each ship entering to lade or unlade, with the exceptions undermentioned, 12 000 reis of which sum the Vice-Consuls are paid 3 000 reis, and the Consul General retains	9 000	2 10 7½
- On each ship entering for the sole purpose of lading oranges and lemons, or salt, 9 000 reis; of which sum the Vice consuls are paid 3 000 reis, and the Consul General retains ... ... (These Consulages are levied by long custom; in conformity with the Royal Letters Patent, which directed that 3 000 reis thereof should be paid to the Vice Consuls)	6 000	1 13 9
- On each ship arriving and departing in Ballast, or without lading or unlading any part of her cargo, 7 500 reis; of which sum the Vice Consuls are paid 3 000 reis, and the Consul General retains ... ... (This consulage is levied by long custom. The amount of all Consulages received by the Consul General at Lisbon, and by him from the Consul at Oporto, or from the Deputy Consuls at the outports of Portugal, are accounted for by him annually to His Majesty's Government and form part of his yearly income of £1,500)	4 500	1 5 3¾

Between 1808 and 1810 the British interests in Oporto were under the care of either British military authorities or the consuls from other nations. On 25 October 1811 John Jeffery wrote to Marquis Wellesley[11], that in November 1809 he had attempted to establish a new consul in Oporto. But then any attitude would be delicate since it was not known whether Mr William Warre wished to resume his previous post.

On 25 October 1811 John Jeffery announced that he intended to nominate Mr John Alves consul at Oporto in accordance with Mr Warre's proposal. Warre argued that John Alves had been his assistant, but although he was a person of respectable character, "he was not of sufficient consideration to hold permanently that office; nor would it meet with the approbation of the Porto merchants...". In consequence of this John Jeffery proposed John Crispin as British Consul at Oporto. He argued that Mr John Crispin had been a merchant for some years established in Lisbon, well acquainted with the laws, customs, and commerce of Portugal, and during the last war had served for some time as Mr Consul General at Lisbon "when he received high testimonials and thanks from the Factories for his ability in discharging the duties of the Office, as well as from the Naval Commander in Chief, for the zeal shown for His Majesty's service upon occasions of great exertion". There is evidence of services rendered by John Crispin by the end of 1811[12] and his name was referred to as Consul of Oporto, at least since the month of June 1813, as well as that of Mr John Miller as vice-Consul[13].

The consulages levied on British ships in Oporto during the period 1807-1820 should be the same which were ordered on 31 July 1817 in accordance with the same reasons which were indicated with respect to the consulages levied in Lisbon. In Oporto they were as follows[14]:

TARIFF OF CONSULAGES AND FEES RECEIVED BY THE BRITISH CONSUL AT OPORTO

	Mil Reis	Sterling
	Exchange at Par	
		£. s. d.
- On each ship to lade or unlade, with the exceptions undermentioned, 12 000 reis; of which sum the Consul remits to the Consul General at Lisbon 9 000 reis, and retains	3 000	- 16 10½
- On each ship entering for the sole purpose of lading oranges and lemons, or salt, 9 600 reis; of which sum the Consul remits to the Consul General at Lisbon 6 000 reis, and retains ... (These Consulages are levied by long custom, in conformity with the Royal Letters Patent, which directed that three mil reis thereof for each ship should be paid to the Vice-consul)	3 000	- 16 10½
- On each ship arriving and departing in ballast, or without lading or unlading any part of her cargo, 6 000 reis; of which sum the Consul remits to the Consul General at Lisbon 4 500 reis, and retains ... ... (The Consulage is levied according to custom. The amount of all Consulages retained by the Consul are accounted for by him annually to His Majesty's Government, and form part of his yearly income of £700)	1 500	- 8 5¼

It would appear that British vessels paid the same duties of consulages in Viana, Figueira, Aveiro, Setubal and Faro as in the ports of Lisbon and Oporto. There is evidence that the accounts of consulages paid by British vessels between 31 of December 1808 and 31st December 1811 amounted to £5,506 and the certificates which were passed during the same period amounted to £312[15].

From 30 June 1809 onwards it is, therefore, possible to refer to the accounts of consulages received by the Consul General not only respecting Lisbon and Oporto but also the outports as follows[16]:

(In mil reis)

	LISBON	OPORTO	VIANA DO CASTELO	SETUBAL	FIGUEIRA	FARO	TOTAL
1809 a)	1290 000	1089 000	45 000	54 000	24 000		2502 000
1810	3807 000	2160 000	120 000	126 000 a)	51 000 a)	256 000	6520 000
1811	7054 000	1319 000	216 000	236 500	498 000 c)	76 500	9399 500
1812	4309 500	1809 000	144 960	331 500	99 000	90 000	6783 960
1813	4372 000	2178 000	162 000	309 000	310 500	229 500	7560 500
1814	2545 500	1548 000	123 000	163 500	97 500	144 000	4621 500
1815 a)	2022 000	1080 000	135 000	90 000	103 500	117 000	3547 500
1816 b)	1783 500	652 500	27 000	190 500	48 000	72 000	2773 000
1817 b)	1159 500	724 500	33 000	54 000	36 000	58 500	2065 500
1818	2884 500	1919 000	123 000	216 000	93 000 c)	135 000	5170 500
1819 a)	1452 000	972 000	72 000	63 000	63 000	63 000	2685 000
1820 a)	1182 000	1089 000	36 000	100 500	72 000	108 000	2587 500

a) From 1 July to 31 December

b) From 1 January to 30 June

c) It includes Figueira and Aveiro

In the accounts received by the Consul General were included the amounts corresponding to the fees which were levied as follows[17]:

	Mil Reis	Sterling Exchange at Par £. s. d.
- Certifying the shipment of wine to the Isle of Man, in virtue of Licences from the Board of Customs, for each licence	- 480	- 2 8½
- Examining translations, or Papers of Accounts	1 600	- 9 -
- Ditto - if of one sheet	3 200	- 18 -
- Certifying translations, with seal of office	1 600	- 9 -
- " with seal of office, the signatures of Portuguese Magistrates, Notaries Public, & c.	1 600	- 9 -
- " with seal of office, the signature of the judge of the Custom-house to depositions of the export of wool, cotton, & c being the growth or produce of the Portuguese dominions	2 400	- 13 6
- " with seal, of the landing of bounty goods, & c.	1 600	- 9 -
- " or other public documents of a general nature	1 600	- 9 -

Beyond these documents the Consul's office passed documents which were not subject to the payment of fees. As examples may be pointed: affidavits, certificates of every description to British officers; certificates or documents for the public offices; certificates to persons in low or reduced circumstances and certificates to obtain passports.

On the first days of July and January of each year John Jeffery after he received the amounts of consulages and fees respecting to the

previous six months ordered that be registered at the official books in accordance with the following formality[18]:

"John Jeffery His Majesty's Consul General of the European Dominions of Her Most Faithful Majesty, do hereby make oath, that the foregoing contains a true & faithful account of all consulages (and fees) received by me at Lisbon, and also from the several deputy consuls within the district of my appointment between (the 1 January & to the 30 June) or (1st July and 31st December) of each year.

At Oporto, John Crispin proceeded in the same way. Nevertheless in addition to this, two British merchants (from time totime they were different) established at the city, witnessed the act and declared the following[19]:

"We the undersigned being two principal British merchants at Oporto, do hereby declare the current rate of exchange on...(date) to be [It was of 67½ by mil reis, except in 1816 (57½), 1817 (60½), 1818 (60), 1819 (53½) and 1820 (50½)] and the discount on Government paper money to be (between 20% and 30%). Given under hour hands at Oporto the... (date followed by two signatures)".

There is no evidence about what effectively happened at the outports of Viana do Castelo, Figueira, Setubal and Faro. The existing documents refer only to the accounts received by each deputy consul being sent to the Consul General in Lisbon.

On the contrary there is evidence that some times some questions arose due to mistakes which were committed respecting the number of British ships entering ports and outports. In case of mistakes sometimes it became necessary to republish the right amounts in the official books of London, as happened with the consular fees of Oporto in 1819[20].

Other cases were frequent. On one hand the movement of vessels was registered in the lists of the British authorities and in those of the customhouse and normally the true figures were omitted or escaped to the control of the authorities for reasons of duties payment[21].

On other hand some vessels entered under Franquia which means that they had liberty to proceed again with the same cargo. In this case they paid only half[22].

Furthermore the Portuguese authorities controlled the movement, registering the ships which entered the customhouse list and those which cleared in the office list. At the end of the year some ships entered and when they cleared had already begun a new year. In these cases the number of entries and that of departures was not normally coincident.

All that could cause problems and justify a reexamination of the accounts presented by the respective services established in Portugal.

The general statements of British vessels respecting the years 1811, 1812, 1813 and 1814[23] refer to figures higher than those that were drawn up with the aim of paying accounts of consulages[24]. It is evident that the accounts were reviewed by 1815[25]. On 17 April John Crispin confessed to William Hamilton: "I found shortly after my arrival at this place, that the incorrect state of the Registers of entries and clearances of British vessels precluded me from the power of giving a proper account of their actual number and a just return of the consulages received..."[26].

After the war, the original of the consulages accounts were transmitted to London via Corunna and the duplicate via Lisbon[27].

Moreover the consulages and fees, the British merchants were subjected to the payment of the Contribution Fund as follows[28]:

	Mil Reis Exchange at Par	Sterling £	s.	d.
- On all Tonnage Goods, except wheat, barley, rye, coals, timber, boards and lumber	200 per ton	-	1	1½
- On all wheat, barley, rye, coals, timber, boards and lumber	100 per ton	-	-	6¾
- On all other Goods and Merchandizes exported from any part of the British dominions to Lisbon, or to any other part or place in the Portuguese dominions	15 per cent on the freight			
(Of the foregoing sums, the Consul receives no part, nor does he derive the least advantage from them. The application of the monies is regulated by the Act of 8 Geo.1, C.17.)				

On 31 July 1817 John Crispin declared that he had received no sum whatsoever since his arrival. He believed that the contribution fund considered in general terms was not received since the first French invasion[29] and such situation remained by 1820[30]. Considering the contribution fund in its distinct aspects, John Crispin explained that the inward contribution had been reestablished, "but received in a most vague manner".

In 1815 it amounted to 9,361, 387 Reis and in 1816 to 8,593,687 while in 1804 it did not exceed 1,728,553.

John Crispin pointed out that the outward contribution previous to the French invasion was regulated by the act but it had become the merchant's fund. With this purpose each pipe of wine exported whether by British or foreign merchants or even by the Wine Company paid 300 Reis and each box of cotton paid 100 Reis. In some years, when the exports were from 40 to 50,000 pipes of wine, the outwards fund had amounted to between 12 and 15,000 000 Reis. Those amounts were applied

in liberal pensions, support of a chaplain, physician, conservator or besides 1,000,000 to the deputy consul and allowances to his assistants. Nevertheless "the fund had ceased altogether with the departure of the merchants upon the invasion of the enemy"(31).

The existing documents about consulages, certificates and charges respecting the British authorities in Portugal permit us to extract some conclusions.

In first place the average of the consulages received in Lisbon amounted to between 51% and 58% of the total. In 1811 reached the maximum which was of 75% and the minimum occurred in 1820 which was of 45.7%. The average received at Oporto oscillated between 24% and 34%, except in 1809 and 1820 which was of 43,5% and 42%. The lowest value at Oporto was of 14% in 1811, which is surprising since in that year was registered the highest number of British ships.

The average of consulages received in Viana, Figueira, Setubal and Faro oscillated between 1% and 4% in each one of those outports, except that of Setubal which reached 6.9% in 1816.

As the consulages were levied above all on vessels, it must be presumed that their levels should correspond to the movement of British vessels in the same years. Nevertheless the analysis of the figures does not always confirm such a suggestion. For example, in 1811 the consulages received at Oporto amounted to 14% of the total while the movement of British vessels rose to 293(32), the highest number between 1807 and 1820. This does not mean, therefore, that the average of consulages received at Lisbon, Oporto, Viana, Setubal, Figueira (sometimes the documents refer to Figueira and Aveiro) and Faro were not enough expressive in regard to the weight of the British commerce in each one of those Portuguese ports. On the contrary, it seems that the consulages constitute a true sign about the real fluctuation of the British commerce along the Portuguese coast during the period 1807-1820.

The average income of certificates was about 2% of the total of the

consulages between 1812 and 1820, but between 1807 and 1811 the average of certificates was of 5.7%[33].

The normal charges consisted mainly of books and stationery, postages, messengers and boat hire, office rent, procuring copies of papers from the public offices, gratuities and extra assistance in copying and translating those official documents.

Between 1810 and 1811 the charges oscillated between £55 and £100. In 1812 it increased to £352 due to the rent of offices and residence by which £200 were paid from then onwards, but it is not possible to add if the alteration is respecting to Lisbon, Oporto or any outport. By 1813 and 1814 two clerks were employed whose salary was of £300, but in 1815 this amount was reduced to half and in 1816 the charges resumed the levels of the period between 1810 and 1812[34].

In conclusion it may be affirmed that the highest point of the revenues of the British authorities was reached between 1811 and 1813. This confirms that the movement of British vessels as well as the values of British exports to Portugal reached their apogee at the same time (Cf. Ap.A, Table I and Ap. C, Table III). The years 1811-1813 constituted an exceptional period: revenues reached a peak in this period as British ships sought to supply markets opened by the war, and their troops in campaign in Portugal, Spain and France. After 1813 revenues fell as the pattern of trade changed and "normal" commercial relations began. Even so the fall was accentuated by other effects of recession and Anglo-Brazilian trade.

III. EXPORTS FROM GREAT BRITAIN TO PORTUGAL

It is well known that in 1807 British commerce experienced a considerable crisis in the northern European ports[1]. Despite the events which took place at the end of the year, exports for Portugal were not significantly affected. There is evidence that 3104 tons of iron[2] as well as 2,939 cwts. of copper[3] were exported. The total of the official value of the exports amounted to £756,111[4], more than half that of 1806. According to Portuguese sources its value was more than £1,000,000[5]. There is evidence that its value would correspond to as much as 3.3% of the total British exports[6].

It was in the first six months of 1808 that trade with Portugal faced the greatest difficulties. Nevertheless the merchants of London admitted that during that period they had exported to Portugal more than sixty thousand quintals of local British caught fish, as well as hoops, staves, corn, rice and other commodities, carried by neutral vessels[7]. During the same period British commerce sought to organise, so as to increase trade with Brazil[8].

On 28th January 1808 the Prince Regent D. João had opened Brazilian ports to British shipping and as a result of this British merchants could increase exports and at the same time obtain imports from Brazil which they had habitually purchased at Lisbon and Oporto, especially cotton.

Once the French troops had been driven out of Oporto and Lisbon between June and September British commerce resumed exports. Nevertheless, their official value for the year fell to £431,045[9].

By mid 1809 Anglo-Portuguese military forces had once again expelled French troops from Oporto (which had fallen into their hands on 29 March) and from then onwards commercial conditions became still more favourable to the British in the entire country due to Beresford and Arthur Wellesley who led the Anglo-Portuguese forces and could influence the Portuguese government. As a consequence the ships from England

predominated in the ports of Lisbon and Oporto, comprising about 70% of the total shipping in Oporto in 1809. Naturally British exports rose in official value in that year standing at £840,649[10].

The exports of linens from Britain increased considerably, especially those of foreign origin which amounted to £31,002, although other evidence is not extant[11].

On 19 February 1810 the treaty of commerce between Portugal and England was drawn up, stipulating that British exports to Portugal paid only 15% ad valorem duties while those from other countries paid about double. The treaty was not enacted in England during 1810, but the British merchants were pressed by the difficulties which they continued to face at the northern european ports and at the same time by the lack of markets which absorbed the excess of their products[12]. In consequence of this, they began to invade Portugal with large quantities of merchandise whose value amounted to £1,492,081[13].

On 31st May 1811 the treaty of commerce made between the two countries was enacted in England by the act 51, Cap.XLVII[14]. By that time, French troops were once more expelled from the Portuguese territory which was severely affected, especially at the agricultural regions of Beiras, a centre of the country and north of the Tagus. As a result of this considerable quantities of iron, copper, manufactured goods as well as food stuffs were imported from England. Among them 469,548 barrels of corn and grain were carried to obviate the poor harvest in Portugal. The greatest amount of products exported were barley, oats and wheat, respectively 194,208, 158,430 and 115,706 barrels. Furthermore exports of smaller quantities of beans, pease and rye took place as well as 35,711 cwts of oat meal and wheat flour[15]. In 1808, 1809 and 1810, only 52,093 gallons of rum had been imported, but in 1811 that number rose about six times[16] The stipulation on the payment of 15% of duties on British goods had not yet been enacted in 1811, but despite this there was an unusual invasion of British merchandise in the Portuguese ports whose official value reached £4,729,446, the highest point of the period 1807-1820[17]. This corresponded to 20.6% of the total of British exports in the year in which they reached the lowest point

of the same period (cf. Ap.C, Table II) Portuguese sources set the value of those exports at about £6,000,000[18]. On the one hand this substantial growth of exports from Great Britain to Portugal was possibly due to the favourable psychological conditions created by the treaty of commerce of 19th February 1810. On other hand it may have been the result of pressure on the part of the British traders who by that time faced great difficulties in the Northern European ports. After the Spring of 1810, the coast from Holland to the Elbe was completely shut against the British commerce[19]. Moreover in 1810 the British exports had considerably decreased to Sicily and the Levant and had increased to United States. However, in 1811 British exports to the United States fell to a fifth of their former amount[20].

As the general interests of the British merchants were adversely affected, in 1812 the English government decided to abandon the Orders in Council, which had been principally published before the end of 1807. By that time the policy of the continental system had also collapsed[21].

At the same time the impact of the war in Portugal began to abate and the Portuguese markets were less hard pressed by British commerce, which by that time was recovering from the crisis of 1810-1811. On 26 May 1812 it was ordered that the merchandize warehoused at the customhouses, imported or to re-export, had to pay of duties five per cent ad valorem beyond the hire of the warehouses[22]. All these circumstances contribute to reduce British exports to Portugal during 1812. But even so their real value according to British sources stood at £3,460,897[23]. Exports of copper, iron and linens increased and others, such as cotton goods, reached high levels. The manufactures of cotton rose to £2,132,852[24]. Between 1812 and 1815 the British percentage of all exports to Portugal commerce witnessed a boom, despite the war against the United States in 1812-1814. The Anglo-French conflict continued until May 1814 and by the middle of that year Portuguese ports were opened to the shipping from the countries which had been during the war French allies. Those returns for 1813

are unknown, but it is known that in 1814 British exports to Portugal amounted in real value to £2,732,062, to Açores £99,113 and to Madeira £220,151[25]. In 1815 that value fell to £2,390,889 (Portugal), £39,822 (Açores) and £200.796 (Madeira)[26]. Between 1813 and 1815 the exports of linen, copper and iron also continued at high levels. Manufactures of silk reached the values of £10,087 in 1814 and £5,666 in 1815[27] while those of cotton amounted to about £1,000,000 each year[28] and those of woollens to £727,805[29]. There is evidence that in 1814 and 1815 55,000 Qrs of corn and grain as well as 13,500 cwts of meal and flour were annually exported to Portugal[30].

By 1815 the force of British trade began to slacken. Exports to the Continent diminished, because markets could not absorbe the stocks of goods which had accumulated and included large amounts of colonial produce.[31] By 1816 British merchants tried to dump the merchandize at their markets, but success was limited. At the same time trade with Portugal showed certain signs of recovering. Even so imports amounted to only £5,000,000, about 55.7% (Cf. Ap.C, Table III) of the goods being supplied by the British[32], where trade amounted to £1,798,481[33]. By that time British trade was depressed since exports to the United States of America and the British W. Indies had fallen off. Nevertheless some exports to Portugal increased. The official value of linens (British, Irish and Foreign) was of £52,637[34] and that of the manufactures of silk was of £6,838[35]. There was also a substantial reduction in some sectors of trade such as some sorts of iron and above all the manufactures of woollens whose value amounted to £568,453[36].

In 1817 the Portuguese balance of trade experienced the best situation after 1809 since both imports or exports stood at about £4,400,000[37]. 34.2% of that amount was imported from Great Britain[38]. British trade in that year began to recover slowly with exports to Italy, Foreign W. Indies and British W. Indies increasing.

The peak of recovery was reached in 1818, but by the end of this year a general economic crisis occurred both on the Continent and United States of America. The subsequent depression affected, above all, the

British industry. The exports of copper to Portugal as well as those of sheets and nails fell by 20%[39]. The value of manufactures of woollens stood at £381,613 and was considerably lower than that of the previous year which had reached £572,662[40]. The real value of British exports to Portugal stood at £1,243,469 which corresponds to about 3% of total trade[41]. By 1819 the economic crisis reached its lowest point in Europe. The Portuguese economy was severely affected by it. Imports rose significantly while exports were substantially reduced. According to Portuguese sources the British trade exported merchandize in the value of about £2,000,000[42] but British ones refer only to £1,316,343 to Portugal, £53,118 to Açores and £153,475 to Madeira[43]. This high amount of British exports in 1819 has been used as a support of some authors in explaining the dependence of the Portuguese economy on the British trade and suggesting that that will have been one of the reasons of the 1820 revolution at Oporto[44]. Nevertheless this circumstance was hardly a new feature of the relations between the two countries. During the war circumstances had been even more disadvantageous to the Portuguese trade and this disadvantage was declining.

An analysis of the British exports allow us to conclude that there had been considerable differences in the several sorts of merchandize exported. Some of them even diminished. For example, copper fell from 2431 cwts to 1,736[45] and some sorts of iron also decreased[46]. Much merchandize continued to enter at more or less the same rates. Linens, for example, whose value amounted to about £40,000[47] even though the manufactures of woollens fell to £412,415[48] about 30% lower than in 1815, 1816 and 1817.

In 1820 it seems that the British exports to Portugal increased to about £1.8 million[49].

The value of linens rose to about £45,000[50] and that of manufactures of woollens to £426,586[51], as well as the amount of iron, principally in bars which had doubled relatively to the previous year[52].

During the period 1807-1820 British exports consisted essentially of manufactures of woollens, silk and cotton, linens, iron and copper, but there is evidence of a considerable number of other sorts of merchandize which included both British produce[53] and Foreign and Colonial goods[54], which were also exported to Portugal. Among them, some were foodstuffs.

For example in 1811, 1814 and 1815 many thousands of Qrs and Cwts of barley, oat, wheat, wheatflour, were exported to Portugal as well as small amounts of beans, malt, pease and rye[55]. More surprisingly perhaps the rum was also exported. About 43000 gallons were shipped annually. The highest point was reached in 1811 and the lowest between 1818 and 1820 when only 500 and 800 gallons were shipped in each year[56]. Small amounts of coal[57] were exported in 1819 and 1820 as well as tin[58] between 1815 and 1819. The exports of earthenware of all sorts, including porcelain were still more significant. Between 1814 and 1820 they reached the value of about £13,000 by each year[59]. During the same period, about 440 cwts of raw sugar and 230 cwts of refined sugar were annually exported[60]. As was traditional, Irish butter continued to be traded for Portugal. About 50,000 cwts were sold every year[61].

The study of the British exports becomes quite difficult. The existing sources at the Public Record Office under the reference CUST8 and CUST10 show the merchandise which was exported from London, outports in England and Scotland to Portugal, the Açores and Madeira. Other sources such as the Commons Journals show the figures of the merchandize, though sometimes without distinguishing neither the origin nor the destiny. The global values of the merchandize are often given for Portugal, without specifying other details. But a careful study using the available sources allows us to conclude that in global values sometimes included both the Açores and Madeira. In regard to the origin of the merchandize there is evidence as well that sometimes Ireland has been included. As a result of this the average of exports from Britain expressed as a percentage may cause some confusion. For example, the average of the exports respecting the period 1807-1810, including

Portugal, Azores and Madeira should have been about 3.1[62], but the figures from different authors permit us to conclude that it oscillated between 3.4% and 4.9%[63].

In regard to 1811 opinions may also be quite different. According to official sources the percentage oscillated between 14.4%[64] and 21.3%[65], even though some authors refer to lower figures[66]. In the period 1811-1815 there is evidence that the annual proportion of all exports stood at 10.8%, but official sources permit us to conclude that it may have stood at about 10.4%[67]. Other sources include the exports to Portugal in the group of those which comprise the southern European countries[68] and merely indicate the values of British imports and exports[69].

On the period 1816-1820 the sources demonstrate that the annual average was of 3.7%[70] including the figures dealt with Azores and Madeira, but at least one author indicates figures which permit to conclude that the average will have been of 4%[71] while other one refer to 4.3%[72]. It is evident that British exports were adversely affected by the French invasions. In 1811 the situation was reversed, especially in consequence of the expulsion of the French troops and subsequent needs of supplying many different sorts of merchandize so as to alleviate the problems caused by the devastation of the war. Natural the local economy from 1811 onwards and as a result of this British exports decreased every year until 1819 (Cf. Ap.C, Table III). The end of the war by 1814 the Portuguese markets were opened to the trade of all nations. Naturally the British exports stabilized from 1815 at levels between 5.1% and 3.2% (Cf.Ap.C, Table III).

IV. EXPORTS FROM PORTUGAL TO GREAT BRITAIN

By the early nineteenth century the principal exports from Portugal to Great Britain consisted of wines, sheep and lamb's wool and still more the cotton and sugar which came from Brazil.

In 1807 the exports of wine stood at 6,219,209 gallons[1] which corresponds to 61.5% of the total of overall British imports. 48,333 pipes were shipped from Oporto[2]. This high figure was mainly influenced by the withdrawal of British merchants who took with them everything which they could, among the goods which they owned at that time, especially wines[3]. The exports of sheep's wool was sustained at the level of previous years. They stood at 289,067 lbs, corresponding to about 2.5% of British imports[4]. Among the Brazilian products, in 1807 Portugal exported about 102,232 arrobas of cotton, corresponding to 19.5% of total imported by Britain and 4,062 arrobas of sugar (Cf. Ap.B, Table IV).

Furthermore 1,888 cwts[5] of tallow were sold abroad as well as several varieties of fruit[6]. According to Portuguese sources the value of exports from Portugal in 1807 was £2.2 million which corresponds to 38% of overall imports[7].

In 1808 Portuguese territory was occupied by the French and Brazilian ports had been opened to the British shipping. Naturally the exports of Brazilian products which came via Portuguese ports were adversely affected. The exports of sheep's wool were also considerably reduced and fell by about 10% corresponding to 1.3% of the total of the British imports which fell as well by about 20% relatively to 1807[8]. The exports of wine were still permitted by Junot during the first half of 1808[9]. Wine continued to be carried in neutral ships which were protected by Royal Navy. Despite this wine exports were reduced by about 10%, corresponding to 47.6% of total British imports[10]. Only 22,673 pipes of Oporto were exported[11], although a British merchant claimed that 36,916 pipes were shipped[12]. Exports of tallow were

reduced by 41%[13].

The overall value of Portuguese merchandise exported in 1808 to Great Britain has been estimated at £25,000[14], corresponding to 14% of the overall exports[14]. It is evident that the French invasion adversely affected the Portuguese trade but by September the French troops were expelled, returned by the end of March 1809 and were definitively expelled from Oporto six weeks later.

By the second half of 1809 the military and political situation became more favorable to the commercial interests of the British in Portugal. The re-exports of Brazilian cotton fell considerably, but those of sugar increased about 50% relatively to 1807 (Cf. Ap.B, Table IV). This permits us to conclude that even though Brazilian ports were now open to British shipping, Brazilian products continued to be re-exported to England through Portuguese ports.

In 1809 the exports of sheep's wool reached 969,033 lbs, growing about ten times over[15]. On the contrary wine exports fell by about 8%, and Portuguese wines constituted only 42% of overall wine imports to England during the year[16]. Even so 42,436 pipes of Oporto wine were sold to England[17].

Exports of tallow fell by more than 100%[18]. Although during 1809 British commerce significantly increased its exports to Portugal, at the same time Portuguese exports to Great Britain also returned to their former level, reaching more than 50% of total Portuguese exports[19].

In September 1810 the third French invasion necessarily affected overall trade. The port of Oporto was not seriously affected but that of Lisbon was frequently threatened. During that year the Portuguese exports for Great Britain exceeded those shipped the previous year, principally consisting in some products which came from Brazil. Cotton exports grew by more than 20% while sugar exports were almost ten times greater (Cf. Ap.B, Table IV). The exports of sheep's wool was of 3,018,961 lbs, corresponding to 27.6% of overall British imports[20]. Shipments of wines grew by about 50%, reaching 59.4% of overall

imports[21]. 40,498 pipes were sold at Oporto[22]. Exports of tallow increased by more than three times[23].

According to Portuguese sources the total of exports to Great Britain in 1810 amounted to about £2.8 million which means a surge of about 30%[24] compared to 1809. Nevertheless British sources state that only goods to the value of £1,248,886 were imported from Portugal, £210,138 from the Azores and £119,710 from Madeira[25].

The French troops were expelled from the Portuguese territory in the first months of 1811. Economic activity took some time to recover and agricultural life was deeply affected principally in the Beiras as well as the centre of the country. Perhaps as a consequence exports of sheep's wool fell by 50%, but the same occurred with the imports of the wool coming from other parts of the world to Britain. There is evidence that the Portuguese wool was one of the less affected since 1,790,286 lbs were imported, reaching 37.8% of the total shipped into Great Britain[26]. Wool imports to Britain from Denmark, Norway, Russia, Poland, Prussia, Germany and Gibraltar were far more adversely affected. This caused some problems in the manufactures of woollens. Even so on 27 July 1812 Lord Sheffield in a speech at Lewes attempted to demonstrate that the 4,739,972 lbs of wool imported in 1811 was a more normal occurrence. According to his opinion, 11,768,926 lbs in 1807 and 10,936,224 lbs imported in 1810 had constituted an abnormal occurrence[27].

Exports of wine fell to about one third, having the 2,061,303 gallons from Portugal reached only 44.6% of the total imported into Great Britain[28]. Only 18,378 pipes of Oporto wine were exported. 14.1% of them were consigned by British firms, the lowest level of the period 1807-1820. Brazilian cotton exported from the Portuguese ports to Great Britain was only about one sixth compared to that of 1810. This seems to have been a consequence of reduction in the shipment of cotton from Brazil to Portugal[30]. There is evidence that Portugal had exported to Great Britain £7,910 in gold coin and £120 in silver coin. In 1811 that amount increased more than three times[31].

According to Portuguese sources the total value of Portuguese exports to Great Britain in 1811 amounted to a little more than £1 million[32]. This would be about one fifth of the British exports to Portugal in the same year[33]. Despite this, British sources state that the merchandise imported from Portugal costed £378,352, from Azores £14,849 and from Madeira £12,218[35].

In 1812 the Anglo-Portuguese troops continued active in Portugal but their principal theatre of operations was on Spanish territory. The reconstruction of Portugal envisaged especially the reduction of problems of agriculture in the areas most affected. As a result of this the principal exports to England grew, quite rapidly. Exports of sheep's wool reached their highest point in the period 1807-1820. 4,642,280 lbs[36] were exported which corresponds to 66.2% of the total imported into Great Britain. The wine also experienced a significant increase of about 50% relatively to the previous years, although it reached only 42.3% of the total imported into Great Britain[36]. In 1812, 22,647 pipes[37] of Oporto wine were sold to Great Britain, about 30.8% exported by British merchants. Brazilian cotton exported by Portugal grew by almost 100% relatively to the previous year, while only 5,928 arrobas of sugar were exported to Great Britain through the Portuguese ports. The exports of tallow were also not very significant since only 382 cwts were shipped[37]. Exports of gold coin grew about 100%, standing at £50,088[38] more than the double those of 1811.

According to Portuguese sources the value of the merchandise exported to England stood at approximately £2 million[39], but British sources demonstrate that exports from Portugal were valued at £693,745, from the Azores £18,930 and from Madeira £22,670[40].

There is no evidence of figures in British sources on 1813[41]. The Portuguese ones state that the global value of exports from Portugal stood at about £3 million[42]. Only some 16,966 arrobas of Brazilian cotton were shipped to England. The exports of sheep and lambs wool were about 3,000,000 lbs as in 1810, reaching 33.4%[43] of the total imported into Great Britain. There is evidence that 21,124

pipes of wine were shipped from Oporto[44]. Exports of gold and silver coin fell to about one tenth of their value in the previous year. That value amounted to £5,768[45].

Portuguese exports in 1814 and 1815 were very similar in value and composition. The Brazilian cotton shipment stood at 74,000 arrobas each year, corresponding to a rise of five times over. Sugar exports fell from 21,614 to 5,332 arrobas. The figures of sheep and lamb's wool also fell lower, having been respectively of 2,511,574 lbs in 1814 and 1,146,607 in 1815[46], which correspond respectively to 16% and 7.6% of the total imported into Great Britain. On the other hand, the amounts of wines shipped rose too little. There is some evidence that 3,486,710 gallons were exported in 1814 and 3,827,706 in 1815[47]. 24,452 pipes came from Oporto in the first year and 31,678 in the second[48].

According to British sources in 1814 the global value of the exports from Portugal to Great Britain stood at £669,437, coming from Azores £6,948 and £20,553 from Madeira[49], while in 1815 the global value fell to £604,948 from Portugal, £19,498 from the Azores and £14,376 from Madeira[50].

By that time the Portuguese economy was in serious difficulties. Only such a situation can explain the amounts of gold and silver coin sold for England. In 1814 £97,692 of gold coin and £22,362 of silver coin were shipped to Britain while in 1815, £484,572 of gold and £266,455 of silver followed the same route[51]. The balance of trade in these two years experienced an annual deficit of about £1.4 million[52]. It became less unfavourable in 1816 despite the reduction which affected some exports to England. For example, only 493,277 lbs of sheep's wool was exported corresponding to only 6.1% of the total imported into Britain[53]. The wine shipments were also affected. 1,936,378 gallons came from Portugal, 45% of total British imports[54]. Of that amount 15,515 pipes were sold at Oporto which was the lowest of the period 1807-1820[55].

It is possible that such a decrease was a reaction against the prorogation of the Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro whose abolition was demanded by British merchants established at Oporto. On the other hand it may have been consequence of the reduction of the imports of wines into Great Britain which fell about 50% relatively to the previous year (Cf. Ap.B, Table III). Brazilian products exported by Portugal were also affected what meant difficulties in the British markets. Only 19,464 arrobas of cotton were shipped in 1816 and 3,242 of sugar. On the contrary, the highest amount of bullion and coin was shipped between 1810 and 1818. £665,198 of gold coin and £116,400 of silver were sold as well as £160 of gold bullion(56).

In 1816, according to British sources, the total value of the merchandise exported from Portugal amounted to £329,901 while those from the Azores and Madeira amounted to £14,218 and £9,933 respectively(57). Nevertheless Portuguese sources refer that that value amounted to more than £1 million which corresponding to 25.9% of the total of overall exports (Cf. Ap.C, Table III). At the same time about 15% of them were sold to France and also 15% to Italy(58). This permit to conclude that the Portuguese trade appeared to benefit from the reestablishment of commercial relations with France and her allies after the war's end.

During 1817 the exports to Great Britain appeared with some signs of progress in some articles. The sheep and lamb's wool almost doubled, although it has been only 5% of the total of its British imports(59). The growing of the exports of wines was also significant since 3,078,218 gallons were brought, reaching 52.5% of overall imports(60). Of them 26,526 pipes came from Oporto(61). Brazilian cotton shipments reached the highest amount of the period 1807-1820, - 118,170 arrobas. It must be pointed out that in this year of 1817 also the shipment from Brazil to Portugal reached its peak of the same period which stood at 296,842 arrobas. Naturally the exports of gold and silver coin decreased, although their amounts remained at high levels. £209,556 of the first and only £611 of the second one were sold by Portuguese traders(62).

The total value of the merchandise exported in 1817 amounted to £563,506 while those which came from Azores and Madeira amounted to £10,871 and £10,235 respectively[63].

In 1818 the British economy showed some signs of recovery after the post-war depression. Its exports and imports increased significantly[64]. Portuguese exports to Britain also increased. The shipments of Brazilian cotton suffered a fall of about 100%, the same proportion which occurred in the shipments from Brazil to Portugal. Sheep and lamb's wool increased about 100%, corresponding to 5.3% of the total imported into Great Britain[65]. Exports of wine grew more than 30%, although its percentage in terms of the total British imports fell to 50.8%[66]. 32,581 pipes were shipped from Oporto[67], an impressive total, taking into account the difficulties of the British markets in the period[68].

According to British sources the total value of the merchandise which came from Portugal was of £692,167 while those from Azores and Madeira costed £14,019 and £15,077[69]. Exports of coin were considerably reduced. Only £31,073 of gold and £2,166 of silver took place in 1818. 1819 was when the general post-war crisis experienced its lowest point[71]. The Portuguese imports from England amounted to about £1.5 million while the exports to there were a little more than one third. Sheep and lamb's wool reached 1,808,251 lbs which corresponds to 11.2% of the total imported by British traders[72]. The shipments of Brazilian cotton suffered a considerable fall. Only 2,783 arrobas were exported to Great Britain. This is surprisingly since the shipments from Brazil to Portugal increased about 10% and there is evidence that its shipments from Portugal to other nations were not significantly altered.

Only 2,783 arrobas were exported to Great Britain. The wine was also affected since only 2,339,580 gallons came from Portugal[73], of which 19,253 pipes came from Oporto[74].

According to British sources the total value of the merchandise which was exported from Portugal was of £417,716 while those from Azores

and Madeira cost. £24,315 and £14,012[75]. Portuguese sources show that the total value was alittle greater than £1 million, half of the value of imports from Great Britain and 37.3% of the total of Portuguese exports[76].

In 1820 the general crisis of the international economy continued to affect the Portuguese trade. The revolution of 24 August may have also contributed for its difficulties. In regard to the exports the most significant fall was dealt with the sheep and lamb's wool. Only 95,187 lbs were carried to Great Britain corresponding to only 1% of the total British imports, the lowest point during the period 1807-1820[77]. The exports of cotton increased few significantly. The wine experienced a little grow. 2,457,410 gallons came from Portugal[78] which corresponds to 47.5% of the total imported into Great Britain. 22,136 pipes were sold at Oporto[79], one of the lowest amounts of this period. According to British sources the total value of the merchandise which came from Portugal stood at £353,254 while those from the Azores and Madeira was of £27,053 and £20,228[80].

Naturally the revolution of 24 August may have adversely affected the trade. Nevertheless it must be pointed out that the revolution took place in Oporto. The port was closed for one day only and there is evidence that from 25th onwards Portuguese and British firms were consignees of merchandise for exportation[81].

The principal Portuguese exports during the period 1807-1820 were: sheep and lamb's wool, wines, gold, silver, sugar and cotton[82]. It is necessary to be aware that the figuresreferred dealt with the cotton, are respecting to that one which was exported by Portugal and not to the cotton which was carried directly from Brazil. Some British sources recorded them together, but the figures are obviously different. As example, in 1809, 1810 and 1811 the cotton imported from Portugal was registered in the group of European exporters[83]. In 1812, 1813 (there is no figures because the records were destroyed by fire) and 1814 it was registered having as its origin "Portugal and the Portuguese settlements in America"[84].

In the year 1814 the figures on cotton imported from Portugal and Brazil appear separated[85]. The following table shows the difference of amounts between 1814 and 1817:

	From Portugal in lbs.	Percentage of the total	From Brazil in lbs	Percentage of the total
1814	2,130,922	3.5	22,751,258	37.9
1815	2,187,335	2.2	13,104,267	13.2
1816	1,219,470	1.3	20,046,989	21.3
1817	3,266,068	2.6	16,338,861	13

Such as happens with the total value of imports and exports, also sometimes on the cotton there is no clear connection between British and Portuguese sources. For example through the first sources which may be confirmed at the above table the exports of 1814 and 1816 are very similar while through the second ones, Portugal exported about four times less in 1816 than in 1814 (Cf. Ap.B, Table IV). Furthermore other merchandize were exported by Portugal. As examples may be pointed seeds, cork, fruit, barley, beans, indian corn, oats, wheat, earthenware and porcelain and even copper and iron, although in the majority of these cases the amounts exported were not very significant. For example, the onion seeds appear in lists of imports into Great Britain between 1810 and 1818, . 6 cwts the highest amount in the last year[86]. In 1810, 1,371 cwts of clover seed, and 24,094 bushels of flax were exported as well as 1,285 in 1811, 472 in 1812 and 280 in 1815. Between 1812 and 1818 about 10 lbs of garden seeds were also sold annually[87]. There is also evidence on the exports of fruit in official lists in England. It is also possible to consult many contracts for the charter of vessels to transport large quantities of fruit during the months of September, October and even November[88]. In 1817 there is evidence of Qrs. 1,115 of barley, 502 of oats and 32 of wheat while in 1818 Qrs 395 of beans

and 1,719 of corn and grain were also sold[89].

In 1814 the exports of earthenware and porcelain amounted to £338 by value, and in 1818 to £50 but exports in the remaining years were insignificant[90].

There is also evidence of exports of pig iron and scrap copper. 33 tons were exported in 1815 and of the second 15 cwts in 1818[91].

In general terms, it may be affirmed that the British imports from Portugal were affected by both the oscillations of the market in Great Britain and the extent to which the latter was now trading directly with Brazil. Portuguese exports were necessarily affected by the war, a revival to levels achieved before 1807-1808 did not occur. A general recession occurred, perhaps as a result of a slump in English demand.

V. FLUCTUATIONS OF ANGLO PORTUGUESE TRADE

During the period 1807-1820 either the statements made by the British consul general in Lisbon or those of the consul in Oporto were constantly concerned with the transports of merchandize through British ships.

The movement of vessels became so intensive that the Portuguese newspapers published in London criticised frequently the fact in energetic terms arguing with that this prejudiced the national shipping fleet(1). There is no reliable evidence on the movement of British ships in Lisbon during that period. Nevertheless the available data permit us to conclude that during the war about forty per cent of the ships which entered Lisbon were British. Moreover between 60 and 90% of the ships which came from Lisbon to Great Britain were also British(2).

In regard to the movement of ships at Oporto there is evidence that in 1807 and 1808 about 30% (in number) were British, in 1809 68.2% in 1810 62.4%, in 1811 47%, in 1812 35.7%(3), in 1816 22.3% and in 1820 26.5%(4). They never constituted less than 50% of the foreign ships entering Lisbon(5).

As there are a substantial number of documents showing the amounts of consulages which were paid only by the British ships and vessels in the ports of Lisbon and Oporto as well as in the outports of Viana do Castelo, Setúbal, Figueira and Faro it is possible to arrive at an estimate of the weight of the British interests in those places(6). The available figures are concerned with the period 1809-1820. Their analysis permit to conclude that the amounts of consulages paid in Lisbon were between 51% (1809) and 75% (1811). 1809 was the year in which the British interests were more concentrated in Oporto and 1811 was when the maximum of British exports occurred. These had in view to attend to the necessary supplies of metals (copper and iron) and mainly of manufactures, linens and some amounts of foodstuffs to alleviate some of the evils caused by the war(7).

In Oporto the amounts of consulages oscillated between 26.7% in 1812 and 43.5% in 1809, with the only exception in 1811 which was of 14%. This last number may well be one of the errors which the Consul Crispin complained of with respect to the period before his arrival at Oporto[8]. But it also may indicate that the surge of British exports which occurred in 1811 was directed mostly to Lisbon, the closest port to the areas most affected by the war.

On the consulages paid in the outports of Viana, Setúbal, Figueira (some documents refer to Figueira and Aveiro together) and Faro the figures are very clear. Their average in Viana oscillated between 1% in 1816 and 3.8% in 1815. That of Setúbal reached a peak of 6.9% in 1816 and only 1.9% in 1810 while that of Figueira stood at 5.3% in 1811 and 0.8% in 1810. In Faro was registered the maximum of 4.2% in 1820 and the minimum of 0.8% in 1811[9]. It seems that the influence of the British navigation at the outports of Viana, Aveiro, Figueira, Setúbal and Faro was slight normally concerned with the shipment of dry cod fish normally coming from Newfoundland[10].

There is evidence that in 1811, 369,838 quintals of Newfoundland cod fish was imported in British vessels into Lisbon, Oporto and Vianna[11]. In 1812 that amount fell to 216,343 quintals which were destined as follows: Lisbon - 106,125; Oporto - 86,581; Figueira - 3110 and Vianna - 20,527[12].

On 15 February 1820 John Jeffery wrote to Castlereagh informing him on the quantity of "British salt cod fish imported into the ports of Portugal between the 31 December 1815 and the 31 December 1819 inclusive as well as the quantity imported from the United States of America during the same period". Unfortunately, therefore, the existing document effectively does not refer to the figures[13]. It must be remembered, however, that the trade of dry cod fish in Setúbal and Faro was hardly significant. Between 1802 and 1812 only 262 quintals were imported into the first port and during the same period the same source adds that no cod fish was imported due to the supply of fresh fish on the Algarve coast[14].

Also it cannot be forgotten that by 1812 woollens, cottons, silk and linen goods were only admissible in Lisbon, Porto and Faro. Some trade in these articles occurred at Viana, Figueira and Aveiro, but it was illegal, since it had been prohibited from these towns in 1774. There is no evidence that such restriction has been raised until 1820. Such merchandize was one of the most important of the British exports. Unfortunately there is no safe evidence of figures relatively to several years. Nevertheless it is possible to affirm that the highest amounts involved the manufactures of wool and cotton. The first one by 1812 continued paying about 30% of duties[15] and it seems that only on 5th May 1814 the duty of 15% began to be paid[16].

According to Portuguese sources between 1808 and 1814, the average of woollens manufactures imported into Portugal was of about 6 millions of cruzados while between 1814 and 1819 it increased to about 7 millions[17]. More than nine tenths of that amount came from England and the same source shows that in 1808 1 million was imported and the maximum was reached by 1811 and 1812 which was of 11.5 and 14.5 millions of cruzados. After the end of the war until 1819 the annual average fell to about 5.5 millions. This means, apparently, that the question of the pauta did not influence the British exports of woollens manufactures to Portugal. Their principal sorts consisted of sundries (hosiery, rugs, coverlids, tapes and small wares), carpets and carpting, napped coatings, duffels, kerseymeres, baizes, stuffs, flannel, blankets, etc.[18]. The substantial amounts imported into Portugal after 1810 seem to have adversely affected the Portuguese industry. By 1814[19] six factories were in decline[20], four in a stationary state[21] and only one in good order[22]. Those factories which had persisted in Covilhã by 1820 had fallen into bankruptcy overwhelmed by the British competition[23].

The state of the cotton factories is also similar according to the same source. Before the treaty of commerce of 1810 the imports of British cotton goods were prohibited, but afterwards the prohibition was removed[24]. Their exports to Portugal reached the highest value in 1814 (£1,078,396) but fell to £613,816 in 1817[25]. The main sorts of

manufactures of cotton consisted of cotton tapes and small cotton for stitching and sewing, fustians, jeans, velvets, velverets, etc.[26].

There are some difficulties in estimating British exports of silk goods. There is evidence that in 1814 their value amounted to £10,087 while in 1817 and 1818 it fell to about £2,700[27]. The sorts of stuffs included gauze and crapes, as well as stocking, gloves and sewing silk were the most important[28].

The exports of linens were more significant in the global value than those of silk goods. The records of 1809-1811 and 1813 were destroyed by fire. So that it becomes impossible to affirm that the sum of British, Irish and foreign linens imported in 1809 and 1810 amounted to more that £60,000 and in 1811 more than £100,000. In 1812 their value reached its highest point which was £218,282. The lowest occurred in 1818 and it was of £27,515[29]. This must have been a consequence of the fact of that by that time Irish linens were prohibited in Lisbon[30].

While the percentage of exports of manufactures (woollens, cotton and silk) to Portugal, Madeira and Azores, oscillated between 4% and 7% of the total of the British exports, the percentage of the metals exports was lower. With the exception of 1807 and 1812 which was of 8.2% and 10% in the rest of the years the percentage of British iron in bars was between 1.5% and 4%. The percentage of the iron reexported, however, was very high between 1807 and 1814. It oscillated between 5.8% in both years and reached the highest point in 1811 which stood at 42%. From 1815 onwards the percentage oscillated between 0 (zero) in 1817 and 2.4% in 1819[31]. Exports of copper climbed to 7.2% of the total British exports in 1813 and in the rest of the years oscillated between 0.6% in 1808 and 4.8% in 1814[32]. All this means that the maximum consumption of metals in Portugal was reached during the war.

During the period 1807-1820 the Portuguese exports to Great Britain consisted mainly of wines, sheep and lamb's wool, the cotton and bullion and coin of gold and silver. The wines reached the highest

percentage of the total of the British imports in 1807 and in 1810 which stood at 61.5% and 59.4% respectively. The lowest percentage occurred in 1809 and 1812 which was of 42% and 42.3%. In the rest of the years it oscillated between 43.1% in 1819 and 53.8% in 1815. In absolute figures between 1807 and 1810 about 5.7 millions of gallons were annually exported by Portugal to England. From then until 1815 that average fell to about 3.5 millions. In 1816 only about 2.0 millions (the lowest point of 1807-1820) and 1819 and 1820 about 2.5 millions, (Cf.Ap.B, Table III). This means that the circumstances of war did not affect the wine trade with the exception of the year 1811 in which the army consumed an unusual quantity of wine. The lowest figures dealt with 1816, 1819 and 1820 may be explained by the difficulties of the markets in England as a reflex of the general crisis occurred by that time as it may be confirmed by abundant correspondence of the time[33].

The case of the sheep and lamb's wool is very similar to that of the wine. In 1808 exports to England were deeply affected by the French occupation and the blockade established by Britain. In that year their value was of only £30,619, but in other years of the war it oscillaged between £2 millions and 4.5 millions. In 1816 fell once more to about £o.5 million and still less in 1820[34]. However it must be pointed out that the figures were not exclusively concerned with the wool exported by Portugal. Proof of this is that in 1812 the records show that the value of the wool exported to Great Britain from Portugal and Madeira was of £4,642,280 (Cf.Ap.B, Table II) while the total value of exports from Portugal, Azores and Madeira in the same year was only of £735,345 (Cf. Ap.C, Table III). It is known that Spanish wool was included in the amounts shipped from Portugal and there is evidence that such practice had already been in existence by the end of the eighteenth century. Despite this, by the middle of 1814, the Investigador Portuguez em Inglaterra published an article showing the amounts of foreign wool imported into Great Britain between 1809 and 1814. Its author pointed out the high quantities of wool which came from Portugal and argued that the country must not disperse of such a vital raw material. The

writer added that more factories were necessary as well as to renew the existing ones. At the same time the author added that the figures of exports from Portugal were not correct since from 1809 onwards large amounts of wool were transported from Spain and afterwards embarked at Portuguese ports[35].

The analysis of the cotton exports from Portugal to Great Britain has to be regarded in its connections with the Brazilian trade of both nations, Portugal and Great Britain. Before the opening of the Brazilian ports to the British navigation the British traders bought the Brazilian cotton which were carried via Portuguese ports. It seemed natural that after this all the Brazilian cotton bought by the British came directly to Great Britain. Nevertheless such supposition was not totally confirmed. Between 1801 and 1807 an annual average of 543,878 arrobas of cotton were exported from Brazil to Portugal. 45.6% of this was annually reexported.from Portugal to Great Britain during the same period. There is no evidence of figures dealt with 1808, but between 1809 and 1814 that annual average fell to 121,600 arrobas. 48% of this cotton was reexported to Great Britain in this period of war. This means that the imports of cotton from Brazil to Portugal decreased but the proportion of its reexports from Portugal remained practically unaltered. Between 1815 and 1820 the annual average increased once more to 230,936 arrobas, but only 20.3% were reexported from Portugal to Great Britain in this post-war period. This fall was clearly a consequence of the war's end between England and United States which favoured the supplying of cottons directly from North America[36]. To understand more easily, only with base on figures of exports from Portugal it will be convenient to look at the following table[37]:

	EXPORTS OF COTTONS FROM PORTUGAL FOR ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD (arrobas)		EXPORTS OF COTTON FROM PORTUGAL TO ENGLAND (arrobas)		PERCENTAGE FOR ENGLAND
YEAR	TOTAL	ANNUAL AVERAGE	TOTAL	ANNUAL AVERAGE	
1801-1807	3,643,359	520,479	1,736,448	248,064	47.6
1809-1814	579,199	96,533	350,831	58,471	60.6
1815-1820	1,158,905	193,150	281,522	46,920	24.3

The period of 1801-1807 shows the highest figures of exports either for all the parts of the world or England, 47.6% being the percentage for the latter.

As Portugal was involved in the war and its ports threatened, Brazilian ports were opened to the British navigation in 1808, obviously the exports of cotton to Portugal diminished and consequently the reexports for England were lower. But the percentage of exports for England was higher than in the previous period, because Portugal lost its habitual clients such as France, Russia, Holland, Sweden (after 1810), Prussia, Denmark and even Hamburg, maintaining only Spain and Italy. After the end of the war the traders from those nations resumed their commercial relations with Portugal and naturally the percentage of exports to England fell, although the total of exports from Portugal to all the foreign countries had doubled. Omitting the period of war and comparing both periods, before and after the war, the table shows that the total exports for all foreign countries as well as its percentage fell by about half. This demonstrates that the Portuguese cotton trade was adversely affected by the opening of the Brazilian ports to the British trade.

The gold and silver in bullion or coin were some of the most

important and valuable exports from Portugal to Great Britain. There is no evidence of figures dealt with 1807, 1808 and 1809, but between 1810 and 1813, an annual average of £22,038 was the cost of the two metals bought in Portugal and paid by British traders. In 1814 that average increased to £120,054 and in 1815 and 1816 it was £766,392 (Cf. Ap.B, Table V). These figures may be concerned with the Portuguese balance of trade (Cf. Ap.C, Table II). In 1815 and 1816 the average of exports of gold and silver were the highest in the period 1807-1820 and was in 1816 that the deficit was reduced to about £0.5 million and one year later, practically disappeared. It seems that this case of the gold and silver is not so directly connected with the trade between Brazil and Portugal as it happened with the cotton. For example the gold sold in Portugal came from other origins such as Spain. Between 1807 and 1814 the value of the annual average of gold exported from Brazil to Portugal was of 388,899 mil reis and between 1815 and 1820 it fell to about one tenth of that. By that time the production of the gold in Brazil was reduced[39] and moreover £120,000 were annually exported from Brazil to Great Britain in gold and silver between 1807 and 1813. That average was reduced to £90,412 between 1815 and 1818 (Cf.Ap.B,Table V). Naturally this occurred because the Brazilian balance of trade with Great Britain showed a considerable and constant deficit in consequence of the D. João VI's authorization of 28 January 1808 which authorized the direct trade between the British and Brazilian ports[40].

In conclusion it may be affirmed that the fluctuations of the principal products traded between Portugal and Great Britain by that period 1807-1820 were influenced by global events in which both countries were involved. For example, the reflexes of the French invasions in Portugal caused the growth of imports from Great Britain of certain articles as it was the case of foodstuffs and metals in 1811 or the woollens manufactures between 1811 and 1814. The increasing of exports from Great Britain to Portugal appears as well, as a form of pressure from the British trade to compensate some losses in the northern European markets which were open or closed to the British in

accordance with the course of the military events on the continent. The Anglo-American war was also an important factor which influenced the international trade of the time. By that time Britain continued to be supplied from Portugal with cotton coming from Brazil. This favoured the Portuguese trade, because by the same time the commercial relations with some European countries which supported France had ceased. The most flagrant cases were Austria, Holland, Prussia, Hamburg and Denmark. After the end of the war many of the Portuguese exports to Great Britain diminished, but this was due to the fact that Portugal resumed commercial relations with the previous supporters of France during the war. The cotton was the most flagrant case. But there were other cases which were a direct consequence of the difficulties felt in the British as well as international markets as happened with the wine.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

It is known that Portugal in 1807 took its option in favour of England due to several reasons. In first place it was a way of preventing the loss of national independence and in second place in terms of trade there were more interests with the British than with the French. The results of this were the opening of the Brazilian ports to British trade as well as the Treaty of commerce of 19 February 1810. In the first case the Prince Regent D. João had supporters on this policy which was regarded as a measure which envisaged the liberalization of economic life[1]. Furthermore it corresponded to the satisfaction of a British proposal which seems to have been negotiated during the withdrawal of the Royal Family from Lisbon to Brazil[2]. It was natural that this attitude should have been assumed by the British, because from 1807 the northern European ports were practically closed to British shipping. The policy of the Orders in Council carried out by the British caused great discontentment on the part of many traders, because the French quickly enacted the first and second Milan decrees as a measure of retaliation. This atmosphere of mutual hostility became difficult for commercial relations between the two nations and consequently all the European nations were more or less affected by the events.

The opening of the Brazilian trade to the British alleviated considerably the clouded atmosphere which prevailed in Britain. In the first months of 1808 many merchants organized in London to encourage the trade with Brazil and many of them went to that Portuguese settlement and established there, especially trading in cotton[3]. There was no significant opposition on the part of the Portuguese merchants, but later the local population criticised the excess of protection and privileges which were conceded to the British traders, in consequence of the treaty of 19 February 1810, especially on the point which permitted the imports of British goods paying duties of only 15% while the Portuguese ones paid 24%[4].

The treaty of commerce, therefore, must be analysed considering the time of war and its subsequent implications. Many British traders at that time pressed their government to put an end to the policy of the orders in council, persuaded that the policy of retaliation performed by the French would be unavoidably overcome. Many owners of factories as well as many traders complained that they had to close their houses and constantly alleged that there was a high number of unemployed workers(5). To the British pressure the Portuguese authorities had no convincing reply. By that time there were no commercial relations between Portugal and France, Austria, Holland, Prussia, Denmark and Hamburg, all of them traditional clients and suppliers of the Portuguese trade(6). Even with Russia and Sweden as well as Italy the trade was being seriously affected by the war. Even the colonial trade between Portugal and Brazil was favourable to the latter from 1800 onwards, except in 1804 and 1808(7). In these circumstances and still further because the colonial trade showed a constant surplus only with the Western Africa(8), the Portuguese authorities signed the treaty of commerce with Great Britain on 19 February 1810, having been the principal negotiators, D. Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and War and Lord Strangford, British Envoy Extraordinary to the Court of Rio de Janeiro. The treaty was agreed by two countries each severely affected by the war, whose favourable outcome was by no means certain.

The decree of 28 January 1808 had opened the Brazilian ports to all friendly nations, but the treaty of 1810 meant that opening was accessible to the British because their goods paid 15% duties while those from other nations paid 24%. The effects of the treaty in Portugal were especially favourable to the British, but only because the goods from other nations could not compete with the goods from Great Britain due to the considerable difference in duties and many competitors were excluded by the war. Portuguese metropolitan production was unavoidably affected, principally in the case of manufactures(9), because the country was still devastated by the invasions.

The treaty has often been pointed out as the principal cause of the unusual growth of the British exports to

Portugal in 1811. The favourable psychological atmosphere created by the treaty would have facilitated the British exports, but as far as the pauta was concerned the Treaty was only enacted by the Prince Regent in 1812.[10] Nevertheless the highest value of British merchandize exported from Great Britain to Portugal occurred in 1811 and the highest amounts of woollens manufactures were exported in 1812, 1813 and 1814, but the duties of 15% on them were only imposed from May 1814 onwards. This seems to mean that the figures for British exports were more a consequence of local and momentary needs than other causes. This may be confirmed through the figures and diversity of goods exported in 1811 which appeared clearly concerned with the devastation caused by the third French invasion by late 1810 and early 1811. Against this viewpoint it may well be alleged that in 1811 there was a substantial increase of export from Great Britain to the Azores and Madeira and in these islands there had not been the devastation caused by the war. In fact there is evidence that there was a significant increase in exports in 1811, principally to Madeira, but the available figures only deal with the reexports of Foreign and Colonial merchandize. The figures on exports of British merchandize, unfortunately are unknown relatively to the years between 1807 and 1811 as well as 1813[11]. Despite all it may be presumed that in 1811 and even in 1812 the treaty should have caused a certain confusion in the commercial relations between the two nations. Consequently many traders from the two nations may have benefited from such an atmosphere. Nevertheless this viewpoint cannot convincingly explain the enormous difference of the figures of exports dealt with in 1811 relative to the rest of the years of the period 1807-1820. There is evidence that many British traders complained on the difficulties of their commerce on the northern European ports after the Treaty of Tilsit of July 1807. But at the same time, many of them referred that their salvation had been the significant growth of their exports to Portugal, Spain and other Catholic countries, as well as towards Brazil. They added that they continued to trade with the traders of the continent, but through contraband, using important points of support on the Continent such as Heligoland, Jersey, Guernsey, Gibraltar and Malta[12]. The most

favoured articles were the woollens and cottons manufactures as well as the dry codfish, especially traded with the Catholic countries, with less risk and with higher profits.

The continuation of the war influenced clearly the figures of British exports to Portugal. Comparing the annual average of their real value of £3,262,966 between 1809[13] and 1814 and that of £1,397,225 between 1814 and 1820 may be concluded that the British exports after the war suffered a reduction of more than 100%. This was a common occurrence with the British trade, principally after 1816, becoming still more difficult with the general economic crisis of 1819 and 1820 which affected the international economy. In this approach it may be affirmed that the end of the war did not benefit the British trade which subsequently experienced difficulties of absorption of its products mainly on the European Continent and United States of America, reaching its lowest point in 1819[14].

The Portuguese exports to Great Britain between 1807 and 1810 and only failed to exceed that of the imports from Great Britain in 1808(Cf.Ap.C, Table III). 1811 was unequivocally the year of the turning point in the commercial relations with Great Britain. A constant deficit took the place of the previous surplus. The deficit of about £6,000,000 in favour of the British trade became drastic for the state of the Portuguese economy in that year. The Portuguese exports to the countries which supported France stopped by 1807 and the loss of those markets were not compensated. In addition to this the exports from Portugal to Great Britain even diminished. Between 1811 and 1814 the annual average of their value was £612,567 while between 1815 and 1820 it stood at £525,887. Considering that in the first of those periods the Portuguese commercial relations with various countries were interrupted and in the second one were resumed, it may be concluded that the postwar fall of Portuguese exports to Great Britain was too slight. All this permits us to conclude that the years of war, between 1811 and 1814, were disastrous to Portuguese trade, considered in general terms. The causes of that were not only British exports since the deficit of the balance of trade with the foreign

nations is more than that of the trade only with Great Britain (Cf. Ap.C, Tables II and III). During the same period the traditional deficits with the eastern colonies as well as with Brazil were even greater than usual[15]. Only in 1818 and 1819 is that the deficit of the Portuguese balance of trade with the foreign nations coincide approximately with that of the Anglo-Portuguese trade (Cf. Ap.C, Tables II and III).

Between 1810 and 1820, about 70% of the Portuguese exports to Great Britain were carried to London and the rest of the outports and Scotland[16]. Nevertheless only about 50% of the British exports were shipped from London to Portugal, Azores and Madeira. The other 50% were shipped from outports and Scotland[17].

According to British sources it may be affirmed that the weight of Portuguese trade on the British one was of only limited significance at certain times. In 1810 the British imports from Portugal comprised 4% of their total value and from then onwards oscillated between 1.2% and 2.8%. In regard to the exports from Great Britain to Portugal their percentage relatively to the total to all the parts of the world, was of about 20% in 1811, and 7% in 1814, but in the rest of the years their percentage oscillated between 2% and 5% (Cf. Ap.C, Table III). On the contrary, the British trade had an enormous weight on the Portuguese one. According to Portuguese sources, there is evidence that normally Portugal imported more than 50% of its total importation from Great Britain and exported more than 60% of its total exports to there. After the war, in 1816 and 1819 the value of the exports fell to 25.9% and 37.3%. An explanation of this fact is that after the war the Portuguese exports diversified towards more countries than during the war.

All the figures confirm that the unusual levels of British exports as well as their navigation to Portugal reached their apogee by 1811-1813 and seems that the prohibition of coasting trade ordered by D. João VI in 1816 did not affect British shipping[18].

Finally it seems that it may be affirmed that during this period

1807-1820, two important developments benefited British trade. In the first place the opening of the Brazilian ports to the British shipping and secondly the treaty of commerce of 19 February 1810. The circumstances of war justified the opening of the Brazilian ports and the treaty between 1810 and 1814. After the end of the war the Portuguese authorities naturally demanded the revocation or at least the reformulation of the treaty. But neither one thing nor the other occurred. At the same time we must be careful not to confuse the apparent cause of conflict between Britain and Portugal with the impact of global economic change. The exports to Portugal grew to an apogee in 1810-1811, before the treaty came into operation, once it came into effect they had begun to decline as a result of changes in the pattern of trade and a crisis in the British economy, which severely affected textile production and imports of cotton and wool, as well as wine. The Treaty was never fully brought into operation. The result of this was the exploitation of an anti-British sentiment stimulated by the Portuguese newspapers published in London which prepared the favourable conditions to the revolution to put an end to the absolute monarchy and consequently to the British privileges, which may have been the result of larger economic developments rather than Portuguese subservience to English demands. However, in the eyes of public opinion the excess of the privileges of British traders was the principal cause of the evils which affected the economic life of the Kingdom.

Notes - I

(1) Brit.Mus., Add. 27.344, pp.45 and following. Carta de privilegios e Foral dos Inglezes

(2) S.P., 1812-1814, vol.I - Part I, pp. 473-480

(3) S.P., 1812-1814, vol.I - Part I, pp.480-492

(4) S.P., 1812-1814, vol.I - Part I, pp.501-506

(5) Rau, Virginia, O Movimento da Barra do Douro durante o século XVIII, Porto, MCMLVIII, Tabela I. For further details about the ships arrived at Lisbon in the eighteenth century cf. Portugal e a Economia Pombalina, p.89 by Jorge Macedo

(6) Macedo, Jorge, O Bloqueio Continental. Economia e Guerra Peninsular, Lisboa, 1962, p.60

(7) Cf. Chapter I, I and II

(8) S.P., 1812-1814, vol.I - Part I, pp.513-562

(9) F.O.63, 97, p.107. Letter from Wellesley to M. de Souza. or Cor. Braz., vol.VII, pp.47 and 48

(10) Cor. Braz., vol.IV, pp.299-300. "Carta circular, aos Negociantes Portugueses em Londres" and "Reflexoens sobre a carta acima"

(11) Cor. Braz., vol.VI, pp.42-43. Carta dos Lords do Thesouro aos commissarios dos direitos da Alfandega sobre certos navios Portugueses

(12) According to their stipulations "the same rates of bounties and drawbacks shall be established in their respective Ports upon the exportation of goods and merchandises whether those goods or merchandises be exported in British or in Portuguese ships and vessels..."

(13) C.L.P., 1811-1820, pp.15-16. Cópia de Nota Oficial on the vessels of Portuguese property built in foreign countries. Palacio do Governo, 7 de Fevereiro, 1811

(14) The "Nota Official" stipulated: "...e tambem que qualquer Navio, que tenha dado à vela para algum Porto Britanico, com documentos fornecidos pelo Governo Portugues residente no Brazil, por onde mostre que foi considerado pelo mesmo Governo como Navio Portuguez, e por isso destinado para aquella viagem, possão entrar como Navio Portuguez, ainda que não tenha sido construído, segundo determina o Acto acima citado, comtanto que seja navegado conforme a Lei, e que tenha sahido de hum Porto do Brazil do Dominio Portuguez,

antes do dia 29 de Setembro ultimo, em cujo tempo ao mais tardar devia ser geralmente conhecida a qualidade dos Navios Portuguezes, a que he permittida a entrada nos Portos do Reino Unido, segundo as Determinações do Acto 48 Jorge III, cap.II. e do Artigo 5°. do Tratado

(15) C.L.P., 1811-1820, pp.91-92. Decree of 19 November 1811, published on 3rd February 1812. Cf: Cor. Braz., vol.VIII, pp.283-284

(16) F.O.63, 137, pp.49-69V. Statement from John Jeffery to Charles Stuart, Lisbon, 4 September 1812

(17) F.O.63, 137, pp.86-90. Statement from John Jeffery to Charles Stuart, Lisbon, 18th October 1812

(18) Inv. Port., vol.VII, pp.607-609 or C.L.P., 1811-1820, pp.285-286

(19) Inv. Port., vol.VII, p.610

(20) C.L.P., 1811-1820, p.220. The order's introduction was drawn up as follows: "Sendo necessario estabelecer o modo, por que devem habilitar-se os Navios, e Mercadorias Britanicas nos Portos, e Alfandegas destes Reinos, para poderem nelles encontrar os Proprietarios, e Consignatarios os favores estipulados no Tratado de Commercio de 19 de Fevereiro de 1810, ou os mesmos Proprietarios, e Consignatarios sejão Inglezes, ou Portuguezes"

(21) Inv. Port., vol.VIII, pp.60-61. "Senhores Redactores do Investigador Portuguez. Londres, 8 de Outubro de 1813"

(22) This point was frequently discussed at that time by the Portuguese newspapers published in London

(23) S.P., 1812-1814, vol.I - Part I, pp.562-563. Agreement between the British and Portuguese Commissioners, on 4 Points connected with the execution of the Treaty of Navigation and Commerce, of 1810. Signed at London, 18th December, 1812

(24) The points had been: The identification of British ships; the verification of British merchandize in the Portuguese dominions; arrangement of scavage, package and Trinity dues and the mode of levying duties of 15 per cent on British goods in Portuguese ports

(25) Cor. Braz., vol.X, pp.281-289. Regulamentos do Governo sobre o Comercio em Portugal. Resposta a certa passagem do Jornal, pseudo Scientifico. at pp.832-837. Carta ao Redactor, sobre as relações comerciais entre Portugal e a Inglaterra

(26) On the verification of British Merchandise in the Portuguese Dominions it was agreed: "That, on the Importation of any goods or Merchandize from the United Kingdom, into any of the Ports of the Dominions of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal,

all such goods shall be accompanied by the original cockets, signed and sealed by the proper officers of the British Customs at the Port of Shipping, and that the cockets belonging to each ship, shall be numbered progressively, the total number stated on the first and last cocket, by the proper officers of the Customs, at the final clearance of each vessel at the British port, - and it is further agreed, that, prior to the final clearance by the searchers at the shipping port, the Cockets for each ship must be collected and fastened together, to which shall be annexed a Paper, with the number of the cockets sealed with the official seal, and signed by the searcher. The cockets so collected shall be produced together with the Manifest, sworn to by the captain, to the Portuguese Consul, who shall certify the same on the Manifest so authenticated to be returned to the searchers, in order to the final clearance of the ship

(27) On the mode of levying duties of 15 per cent on British goods in Portuguese ports it was agreed: "That the most equitable mode of adjusting this matter so as to secure to the Portuguese Revenue the full payment of the duty of 15 per cent, and to afford to the Merchant the certainty of not being compelled to pay more in any case, appears to be thus:

That the importer shall, on making the Entry at the Portuguese Custom House, sign a declaration of the value of his Goods to such amount as he shall deem proper, and in case the Portuguese examining officers should be of opinion that such valuation is insufficient, they shall be at liberty to take the goods, on paying the importer the amount, according to this Declaration, with the addition of 10 per cent, and also returning the duty paid.

The amount to be paid on the goods being delivered to the Portuguese officer, which must be within fifteen days from the first detention of the Goods

(28) Inv. Port., vol.IX, pp.748-763. It is a document, analysing the state of the Portuguese navigation by 1814, in thirty-four points, and vol.X, pp.338-341. "Acerca de importantes determinaçoens da R.J. do Commercio"

(29) For further details cf. Chapter II, II

(30) F.O.63, 165, pp.324-337. The project of a Convention for the Regulation of the British wine trade of Oporto included in Paragraph 9: "British ships partly laden with wines of Portugal, and having regular clearances may finish their ladings with wines of Oporto"

(31) C.L.P., 1811-1820, p.527

(32) The order was made as follows: "...He sua Alteza Real Servido ordenar, que em consequencia se admittão de ora em diante nos portos desses reynos, todas as embarcaçoens Francezas, e das outros potencias, que, por se acharem sujeitas ao seu dominio,

ou influencia, se consideravão inimigas de Portugal; determinando, que taes embarcaçoens se recebão como amigas, facilitando-lhes aquelle commercio, que està permittido às naçoens actualmente em paz, e amizade com esta corte; e em reciprocidade ficão habilitados os vassalos Portuguezes, para seguirem com os seus navios a quaesquer portos pertencentes ao dominio daquellas naçoens"

(33) F.O.63, 188, pp.69-71V. Answers given by John Jeffery to Questions which had been required by William Hamilton on 30 March 1815

(34) C.J.. 72, 1817, pp.756 and 759

(35) C.J.. 72, 1817, pp.757 and 760

(36) C.J. 72, 1817, pp.758 and 761

(37) When it was referred Portugal, it must be also considered Madeira and Azores

(38) C.L.P.. 1811-1820, pp.576-577

(39) F.O.63, 206, p.74-80

(40) F.O.63, 206, p.83. Letter from J. Jeffery to William Hamilton. Lisbon 7th November 1817

(41) C.L.P., 1811-1820, pp.687-688. It was ordered in the following terms: "...Manda declarar que todos os generos, mercadorias, e effeitos, que se expedirem dos Países estrangeiros, à excepção dos Domínios Britanicos, para poderem ser admitidos a despacho nas Alfandegas destes Reinos, sendo nellas permittida a sua introdução, devem indefectivelmente vir acompanhados dos Bilhetes originaes de despacho da Alfandeza do Porto de sahida, pertencentes a cada Navio, numerados progressivamente, rubricados, cosidos juntos, e cubertos com hum Attestado do Consul, ou Vice-Consul Portuguez no districto a que pertencer o tal Porto, em que certifique, a authenticidade, e numero dos mesmos Bilhetes, de forma que delles não possa separar-se algum, nem substituir-se, ou ser introdusido outro de novo, sem que deixe conhecer o estravio ou falsificação; sendo além disto legalizado tambem pelo Consul ou Vice-Consul o Manifesto da Carga, e sellados com o Sello Consular ambos os papeis"

(42) F.O.63, 232, p.64. Letter from John Jeffery to William Hamilton. Lisbon 29th April 1820

(43) Cor. Braz., vol.XXV, p.148. Edictal da Junta do Commercio em Lisboa, sobre os direitos dos navios Portuguezes em Inglaterra

(44) Macedo, Jorge, O Bloqueio Continental. Economia e Guerra Peninsular. Lisboa 1962, p.61

(45) Macedo, Jorge, op.cit., p.61

(46) F.O.63, 117, p.59. Statement of John Jeffery. Lisbon 30th August 1811

(47) F.O.63, 158, p.7. Statement of John Jeffery. Lisbon 15 January 1813

(48) F.O.63, 158, pp.26-27. Number of vessels of all Nations which entered the port of Lisbon between the 1st of January and the 30th of June 1813

(49) In this chapter, section II

(50) Cf. in this chapter, II

Notes - II

(1) Cf. Chapter II, I

(2) British Mus. Add. 27.344, p.317. Alvará de 3 de Setembro de 1690 por Q.S.M. nomeia conservador dos Inglezes na cidade do Porto ao Dr. Diogo Mendes Duro

(3) F.O.63, 215, p.137. Letter from John Jeffery to Sir William Hamilton. Lisbon 7 February 1818

(4) Cf. Chapter I, I and II

(5) C.J., 64, 1809, p.656. Copy of Mr Jeffery's Commission as Consul General in the European Dominions of Her Most Faithful Majesty

(6) F.J., 64, 1809, p.556. Copy of a Dispatch from Mr. Secretary Canning to John Jeffery Esq., dated Foreign Office, 31st December 1808

(7) P.P., 1809. House of Commons, vol.10, (21) XII, 315. Dispatch from Mr. Secretary Canning to John Jeffery, Esq.; Foreign Office, 31st December 1808

(8) F.O.63, 137, p.40. Letter from John Jeffery to William Hamilton. Lisbon, 25 June 1812

(9) F.O.63, 96, pp.9 and 28; 117, pp.15 and 62; 137, p.30

(10) C.J., 77, 1822-1823, p.751. No.14, Tariff of Consulages received by the Consul General in Portugal

(11) F.O.63, 117, p.72. Letter from John Jeffery to the Marquis Wellesley. Lisbon 25th October 1811

(12) F.O.63, 188, p.144. An Account of Consulages received at Oporto, and of Consul Crispin's appointment, from the 6th October to the 31st December 1811

(13) P.P., Miscellaneous, Accounts and Papers. 1814-1815, vol.X, p.160. A list of the consuls and Vice Consuls, in Spain and Portugal, since the month of June 1813. There is evidence of documents, affirming that John Alves, at least temporarily, performed the functions of consul at Oporto. This may be confirmed at F.O.63, 117, p.72 or 206, pp.153-162

(14) C.J., 77, 1822-1823, p.751. No.15, Tariff of Consulages and Fees received by the British Consul at Oporto

(15) F.O.63, 137, p.40. Letter from John Jeffery to William Hamilton, Lisbon 25 June 1812

(16) Such figures may be found at F.O.63, 96, p.9 and 28; 117, pp.15 and 62; 137, p.30; 158, p.4; 176, p.152; 188, p.67; 198, pp.11 and 29; 206, p.59; 215, p.163; 223, p.102; 232, p.19; 241, p.16

(17) C.J.77, 1822-1823, pp.751 and 752. Tariff of Consulages received by the Consul General in Portugal and Tariff of Consulages and Fees received by the British Consul at Oporto

(18) This declaration is repeated in the documents referred at note (16)

(19) sources cited at note (16)

(20) C.J., 76, 1821;1822, p.577

(21) F.O.63, 188, pp.152V-153. General statement of British vessels, which entered inwards and cleared outwards at Oporto, during the year 1811

(22) F.O.63, 188, pp.152V-153

(23) F.O.63, 188, pp.152V-156. General statement of British vessels, which entered inwards and outwards at Oporto, during the years 1812, 1813 and 1814

(24) F.O.63, 188, pp.144-146

(25) F.O.63, 241, pp.157-159. Copies of four accounts transmitted to William Hamilton Esquire, in J. Crispin's Dispatch of the 17th April 1815

(26) F.O.63, 188, p.142. Letter from John Crispin to William Hamilton. Oporto 17 April 1815

(27) F.O.63, 241, pp.163, 165 and 167. Extracts from J. Crispin's letters to C.R. Roughton Esq., to William Hamilton and to Thomas Bidwell Esq. Oporto 17th April 1815

(28) C.J., 77, 1822-1823. Statement of the several sums levied at Lisbon and at Oporto, and received by the Treasurer chosen annually from among the British Merchants in charge of the Contribution Fund, under the act of 8 Geo,1, C.17

(29) F.O.63, 206, p.153. Letter from John Crispin to William Burn Esq. Oporto 31st July 1817

(30) F.O.63, 241, pp.179-179V. Private Memorandum. The document has no date but should be of 1820 since it refers to occurrences of 1819

(31) Document cited at note (29), pp.153-162

(32) The movement of British vessels in Oporto may be found at F.O.63, 188, pp.144-155V; 206, pp.135-143; 215, pp.188-192; 223, pp.144-150; 233, pp.86-88; 241, pp.157-159

(33) Document referred at note (15)

(34) Documents referred at notes (15) and (32)

III - Notes

(1) Gayer, Arthur, W.W. Rostow, Anna Jacobson Shwartz, volume I, Oxford, op.cit. 1953, p.89 or English Historical Documents. 1783-1832, London. 1959, p.551

(2) C.J., 70, 1814-1816, pp.868-873. Such amount includes British and Foreign iron in bars

(3) C.J., 67, 1812, pp.758-759

(4) C.J., 67, 1812, p.763. According to C.J., 67, 1812, p.766 the real value was of £1,170,221 (it should include Azores and Madeira)

(5) Macedo, Jorge, O Bloquei o Continental..., p.41

(6) C.F. Appendix C, Table III

(7) Cf. Chapter I, III, note (20)

(8) Cf. Chapter I, II

(9) C.J., 67, 1812, p.763. According to C.J. 67, 1812, p.766, the real value was of £600,137 (it should include Azores and Madeira)

(10) C.J., 67, 1812, p.763 or Arth Gayer, op.cit., p.89. According to C.J. 67, 1812, p.766, the real value was of £1,124,098 (it should include Azores and Madeira)

(11) C.J., 78, 1823, pp.878-891

(12) Cf. Gayer, Arthur, op.cit., p.90 or The Continental System. An Economic Interpretation, pp.243-244 by Eli F. Heckscher

(13) C.J., 67, 1812, p.763. Gayer in op.cit., p.89 refers only £1.3 million while C.J., 67, 1812, p.766 refers that the real value was of £2,228,833 (it should include Azores and Madeira)

(14) Cf. Statutes United Kingdom, 50 Geo III to 52 Geo III, volume 4. London MDCCCXII, pp.373-376

(15) C.J., 67, 1812, p.753

(16) C.J., 77, 1822-1823, pp.970-971

(17) C.J., 67, 1812, p.763. According to C.J., 67, 1812, p.766 the real value was of £6,164,858 (it should include Azores and Madeira)

(18) Macedo, Jorge, op.cit., p.41

(19) P.P., 1812, III, p.523

(20) Gayer, Arthur, op.cit., p.89 or English Historical Documents. 1783-1832. London, 1959, p.551

(21) Gayer, Arthur, op.cit., p.110 or The Continental System..., pp.139-146 by Eli F. Heckscher

(22) C.L.P., 1811 a 1820, pp.143-146. Alvará regulando os direitos da Reexportação, Baldeação, e depósito dos géneros não destinados para o consumo do lugar, em que forem admitidos, e pena dos extraviados. Some of its stipulations may be found in Cor. Braz., vol.IX, pp.712-718

(23) Cf. CUST8, 1 and CIST10, 4. The real value of the exports to Azores was of £86,708 and to Madeira £216,112

(24) C.F., 70, 1814-1816, p.851

(25) Cf. CUST8, 2 and CUST10, 5

(26) Cf. CUST8, 3 and CUST10, 6

(27) C.J., 72, 1817, pp.740-742; 73, 1818, pp.700 and C.J., 74, 1818-1819, pp.964-965

(28) C.J., 70, 1814-1816, p.851 and C.J., 74, 1818-1819, pp.945-947

(29) C.J., 74, 1818-1819, pp.955, 961 and 962

(30) C.J., 70, 1814-1816, pp.815-821 and C.J.81, 1816-1817, pp.870-873, 882-885 and 888

(31) Gayer, Arthur, op.cit., pp.110-113

(32) Balbi, Adrien, Variétés Politico-Statistiques sur La Monarchie Portugaise, Paris, 1822. XI and XII Tables

(33) CUST8, 4 and CUST10, 7. The same value is referred by Gayer, op.cit., p.146

(34) C.J., 72, 1817, p.742 and 78, 1823, pp.883 and 887-891

(35) C.J., 72, 1817, pp.740-742

(36) C.J., 74, 1818-1819, pp.955-962

(37) Sideri, S., op.cit., p.237. Balbi in Essai Statistique, p.441 pointed out that the deficit was only of 95,000 cruzados

(38) CUST8,5 and CUST10, 8

(39) C.J., 73, 1818, p.691 and 74, 1818-1819, p.967

(40) C.J., 74, 1818-1819, pp.955, 961 and 962

(41) CUST8, 7 and CUST10, 9. According to C.J., 77, 1822-1823, pp.1032 -1033 or op.cit., p.146 by Gayer that value was of £1.4 million

(42) Balbi, Adrien, Essai Statistique..., p.442

(43) CUST8, 9 and CUST10,10. The C.J., 77, 1822-1823, pp.1032-1033 as well as Gayer in op.cit., p.146 refer about £1.5 million

(44) On this subject the best example may be Geografia e Economia da Revolução de 1820 by Fernando Piteira Santos. For further details see: General Conclusions

(45) C.J., 75, 1819-1820, pp.773 and 774

(46) C.J., 74, 1818-1819, pp.967, 968, 969; 75, 1819-1820, pp.773 and 774

(47) C.J., 78, 1823, pp.883 and 887-891

(48) C.J., 75, 1819-1820, pp.769 and 771

(49) C.J., 77, 1822-1823, pp.1032-1033 or Gayer, op.cit., p.146. (It is included Azores and Madeira)

(50) C.J., 78, 1823, pp.883 and 887-891

(51) C.J., 76, 1821-1822, pp.1064 and 1065

(52) C.J., 76, 1821-1822, pp.1078-1081

(53) These may be found at CUST8 (from 1 to 10)

(54) These may be found at CUST10 (from 1 to 11)

(55) Cf. C.J., 67, 1812, p.753; 70, 1814-1816, pp.815-821; 71, 1816-1817, pp.870-873, 882-885 and 888

(56) C.J., 77, 1822-1823, pp.970-971

(57) C.J., 76, 1821-1822, pp.1073-1074

(58) C.J., 72, 1817, p.753; 73, 1818, p.692; 74, 1818-1819, p.966 and 75, 1819-1820, p.774

(59) C.J., 76, 1821-1822, pp.1052-1055

(60) C.J., 76, 1821-1822, pp.1052-1055

(61) C.J., 76, 1821-1822, p.1053

(62) This average was extracted with base on the figures shown in Ap.C, Table III

(63) S. Sideri in op.cit., p.324, refers that during the period 1806-1810 the percentage of British exports to Portugal was of 4.9% of their total. Nevertheless, according to Gayer, op.cit.; p.89 it would have been of 3.4%

(64) Calculations made with base on the figures shown in C.J., 67, 1812, p.763

(65) Calculations made with base on the figures shown in C.J., 67, 1812, p.766. Cf. Ap.C, Table III

(66) Gayer, op.cit., p.89, affirms that it will have been of 4.6% while S. Sideri, op.cit. p.234 considers that during the period of 1811-1815 was of 10.8%. This author does not refer the figures dealt with each year, but it is natural that the year 1811 has influenced the average of that period of four years

(67) Calculations made with base on the figures shown in CUST8 and CUST10, including Azores and Madeira

(68) As example of English Historical Documents. 1783-1832, p.551

(69) P.P., 1898, LXXXV, p.48

(70) Sources referred at note (67)

(71) The figures referred in C.J., 77, 1822-1823, pp.1032-1033 are the same referred by Gayer, op.cit., p.146

(72) Sideri, S., op.cit., p.235

Notes - IV

(1) P.P., 1898, LXXXV, p.155. This source refers the wines imported from 1786 to 1896, both years inclusive. The figures are respecting to the wines from Portugal. The same source also contains figures of wines from Cape, France, Madeira, Azores, Spain, Canary, Rhine and "of other sorts"

(2) Questão Vinhateira do Douro, Por Um Anómino. Porto, 1849, p.303 and following. James Warre, op.cit., p.89 refers only 42,201 pipes

(3) F.O.63, 55, p.246. "An estimate of the value of British Property in Porto, taken from the Accounts of the several Houses of the Factory and other resident British subjects, the 25 September 1807"

(4) C.J., 67, 1812, p.759

(5) C.J., 71, 1816-1817, p.908

(6) At CUST4 (from 4 to 15) There are references to all the merchandise exported from Portugal, Azores and Madeira to Great Britain during the period 1807-1820, except 1808 and 1813. The same figures are also referred at CUST5 (from 1D, 1E, 2 to 9)

(7) Balbi, Adrien, Essai Statistique, p.441; Jorge Macedo, op.cit., p.41 and S. Sideri, op.cit., p.237

(8) C.J., 67, 1812, p.759

(9) Cf. Chapter 1, 11

(10) P.P., 1898, LXXXV, p.155

(11) Por Um Anónimo, op.cit., from p.303 onwards

(12) Warre, James, op.cit., p.89

(13) C.J., 71, 1816-1817, p.908

(14) Balbi, Adrien, op.cit., p.441 and J. Macedo, op.cit., p.41

(15) C.J., 67, 1812, p.759

(16) P.P., 1898, LXXXV, p.155

(17) Por Um Anónimo, op.cit., from p.303 onwards. James in op.cit., p.89 refers 43,951 pipes

(18) C.J., 71, 1816-1817, p.908

(19) Macedo, J., op.cit., p.41

(20) C.J., 67, 1812, p.759

(21) P.P., 1898, LXXXV, p.155

(22) Por Um Anónimo, op.cit., from p.303 onwards. James Warre in op.cit. refers 42115

(23) C.J., 71, 1816-1817, p.908

(24) Macedo, J., op.cit., p.41

(25) CUST4, 6. Considerable differences like this one shown by Portuguese and British sources demonstrate that sometimes it is not advisable to compare figures from different sources or from different countries. In the course of this thesis many examples become it evident

(26) C.J., 1812, p.759 or Inv. Port., vol.X, p.281. Adrien Balbi in Essai Statistique, p.170 refers that in 1811 Portugal exported for foreign countries 8302 arrobas of wool in the value of 132,832,000 Reis

(27) Cor. Braz., vol.IX, p.215

(28) P.P., 1898, LXXXV, p.155

(29) Por Um Anónimo, op.cit., from p.303 onwards. James Warre in op.cit., p.89 refers 21208 pipes

(30) Ribeiro, Maria de Lourdes Roque de Aguiar, As Relações Comerciais entre Portugal e Brasil segundo As Balanças de Comércio. 1801-1821, pp.105-107

(31) C.J., 74, 1818-1819, p.1120

(32) Macedo, J., op.cit., p.41

(33) C.J., 67, 1812, p.766

(34) C.J., 67, 1812, p.763

(35) CUST4, 7 or CUST5, 1E

(36) P.P., 1898, LXXXV, p.155

(37) C.J., 71, 1816-1817, p.908

(38) C.J., 74, 1818-1819, p.1120

(39) Macedo, J., op.cit., p.41

(40) CUST4, 8 and CUST5, 2

(41) The records of 1813 were destroyed by fire

(42) Balbi, Adrien, op.cit., p.441 or S. Sideri, op.cit., p.237

(43) C.J., 69, 1813-1814, p.768. The British sources do not refer the total imports of wool, but the Inv. Port., vol.X, p.282 shows that was of 8,869,432 lbs.

(44) Por Um Anónimo, op.cit., from p.303 onwards. James Warre in op.cit., p.89 refers 21,195 pipes

(45) C.J., 74, 1818-1819, p.1120

(46) C.J., 69, 1813-1814, pp.767-768; 70, 1814-1816, p.854; 71, 1816-1817, p.893 and 74, 1818-1819, p.955

(47) P.P., 1898, LXXXV, p.155

(48) Por Um Anónimo, op.cit., from p.303 onwards. James Warre, op.cit., p.89 refers 24,437 pipes in 1814 and 31,641 in 1815

(49) CUST4, 9 or CUST5, 3

(50) CUST4, 10 or CUST5, 4

(51) C.J., 74, 1818-1819, p.1120

(52) Balbi, A., op.cit., p.441 or S. Sideri, op.cit., p.237.

(53) C.J., 74, 1818-1819, pp.932 and 955 and 955 or 78, 1823, p.879

(54) P.P., 1898, LXXXV, p.155

(55) Por Um Anónimo, op.cit., from p.303 onwards. James Warre, in op.cit., p.89 refers 15527 pipes

(56) C.J., 74, 1818-1819, p.1120

(57) CUST4, 11 or CUST5, 5

(58) Balbi, Adrien, Variétés Politico-Statistiques sur La Monarchie Portugaise, XI Tableau Général

(59) C.J., 74, 1818-1819, pp.932 and 955 or 78, 1823, p.879

(60) P.P., 1898, LXXXV, p.155

(61) Por Um Anónimo, op.cit., from p.303 onwards. James Warre in op.cit., p.89 refers 26,389 pipes

(62) C.J., 74, 1818-1819, p.1120

(63) CUST4, 12 or CUST5, 6

(64) Gayer, Arthur, op.cit., p.145

(65) C.J., 74, 1818-1819, p.955 and 78, 1823, p.879

(66) P.P., 1898, LXXXV, p.155

(67) Por Um Anónimo, op.cit., from p.303 onwards. James Warre in op.cit., p.89 refers 32465 pipes

(68) On this subject cf. General Correspondence of the British firm Cockburn established in Vila Nova de Gaia-Porto, dealt with the years 1816, 1817 and 1818

(69) CUST4, 13 or CUST5, 7. The C.J., 77, 1822-1823, pp.1032-1033 refers that the official value of the merchandise exported from Portugal, Azores and Madeira was of £707,245

(70) C.J., 74, 1818-1819, p.1120

(71) Gayer, Arthur, op.cit., from p.145 onwards

(72) C.J., 78, 1823, p.879

(73) P.P., 1898, LXXXV, p.155

(74) Por Um Anónimo, op.cit., from p.303 onwards. James Warre in op.cit., p.89, refers 19.135

(75) CUST4, 14 or CUST5, 8. The C.J., 77, 1822-1823, pp.1032-1033 refers £456,044, including Portugal, Azores and Madeira which corresponds to the same value

(76) Balbi, Adrien, Essai Statistique..., VI Tableau Général

(77) C.J., 76, 1821-1822, p.1066 or 78, 1823, p.879

(78) P.P., 1898, LXXXV, p.155

(79) Por Um Anónimo, op.cit., from p.303 onwards. James Warre in op.cit., p.89 refers 22.055 pipes

(80) CUST4, 15 or CUST5, 9

(81) A.D.P., Cabido no.322, from fls 133V onwards

(82) At CUST4 (from 4 to 15) and CUST5 (from 1D to 9) may be found all the sorts of merchandise exported from Portugal, Azores and Madeira

(83) C.J., 70, 1814-1816, p. 851

(84) C.J., 70, 1814-1816, p. . The figures are: 1812-16,108,030 lbs and 1814- 24,882,180 lbs.

(85) In C.J., 74, 1818-1819, pp.932 and 933 the amounts of cotton are shown coming from Portugal and Brazil with destiny to the ports of Bristol, Lancaster, Liverpool, London and ports of Scotland

(86) C.J., 74, 1818-1819, p.902

(87) All these figures may be found in C.J., 71, 1816-1817, pp.874-877 and 74, 1818-1819, pp.900-902

(88) In the chapter I, VII, it is possible to find some examples, from Oporto for England. Adrien Balbi, op.cit., p.154 refers the amounts of several sorts of fruit which was exported annually by Portugal between 1796 and 1819.

(89) C.J., 74, 1818-1819, pp.878-881 and 891 and 76, 1821-1822, pp.1022-1025

(90) C.J., 76, 1821-1822, p.1077

(91) C.J., 74, 1818-1819, pp.966 and 975 and 76, 1821-1822, p.1082

Notes - V

(1) Cf. in this chapter, I

(2) Cf. in this chapter, I

(3) Macedo, Jorge, op.cit., pp.113-126

(4) This percentage was obtained through the figures referred in documents respecting to consulages (in this chapter, II) and in Balbi, Adrien, Essai Statistique..., Tome Premier, Paris, 1822, p.467:"Tableau du nombre des vaisseaux entrés dans les principaux ports du royaume dans les années 1796, 1801, 1806, 1811, 1816 et 1820"

(5) Balbi, Adrien, Essai Statistique..., p.467

(6) The figures may be found at: F.O.63, 96, pp.9 and 28; 117, pp.15 and 62; 137, p.30; 158, p.4; 176, p.152; 198, p.11 and 29; 206, p.59; 215, p.163; 223, p.102; 232, p.19 and 241, p.16

(7) In this chapter, III

(8) In this chapter, II, note (26)

(9) Table in this chapter, II

(10) F.O.63, 137, pp.49-70. Statement on the state of the British trade in Portugal which was sent by John Jeffery to Charles Stuart on 4th September 1812; F.O.63, 223, pp.140-140V. Letter from John Crispin to William Hamilton, Oporto 24th July 1819 and F.O.63, 233, pp.90-91. Statement of John Crispin made at Oporto, 10th July 1820

(11) F.O.63, 137, p.25. Memorandum of Exports and imports into Portugal from the 1st of January to the 31st December 1811 transmitted in a letter from M. Consul Jeffery dated February 2nd 1812

(12) F.O.63, 158, p.15V and 17V. Quantity of Newfoundland fish imported into Portugal during the year 1812

(13) F.O.63, 232, p.25. Letter from John Jeffery to Viscount Castlereagh. Lisbon 15 February 1820

(14) F.O.63, 137, pp.49-70. Statement from John Jeffery to Charles Stuart. Lisbon, 4th September 1812. For further details: C.J., 70, 1814-1816, pp.859 and 864 and 72, 1817, pp.332, 333 and 363; P.P., 1812, (231) III, 689, pp.94-99 and 167-171

(15) F.O.63, 137, pp.52V-53. Document cited at note (14)

(16) Silbert, Albert, Do Portugal do Antigo Regime ao Portugal oitocentista, Livros Horizonte, p.73

(17) Pereira, Miraim Halpern, Revolução, Finanças, Dependencia Externa, pp.242-243

(18) C.J., 70, 1814-1816, p.855; 74, 1818-1819, pp.955-962; 75, 1819-1820, pp.769-771 and 76, 1821-1822, pp.1064-1065

(19) Neves, José Accúrsio das, Variedades sobre objectivos relativos as ARTES, COMMÉRCIO, E MANUFACTURAS, consideradas segundo os Principios da Economia Politica, Tomo I, pp.181-219. "Mappa das Fabricas estabelecidas na cidade de Lisboa, ecomarcas do reino, seus proprietarios, estado actual, consumo, e exportação das suas manufacturas"

(20) In Cellas Coimbra one belonging to "Manoel Joaquim Pimenta de Carvalho e outro"; in Covilhã, one belonging to "D. Leonor de Amorim and other to António José Raposo"; in Portalegre two, being one belonging to the Portuguese Kingdom and other to José Larche; in Porto, one belonging to Martins Arantes e Martins

(21) In Lisbon two belonging to Viuva Moraes e Carvalho, and Carlos Valles; in Covilhã, one belonging to Jose Mendes Veiga and other to Antonio Pessoa de Amorim

(22) In Porto, one belonging to Placido Lino dos Santos Teixeira

(23) Silbert, Albert, op.cit., p.72

(24) Document cited at note (14), p.62V

(25) C.J., 74, 1818-1819, pp.945-947

(26) C.J., 74, 1818-1819, pp.945-947

(27) C.J., 74, 1818-1819, pp.964-965

(28) C.J., 74, 1818-1819, pp.964-965

(29) C.J., 78, 1823, pp.883-891

(30) In F.O.63, 214 and 232 there are several elements on this subject

(31) C.J., 70, 1814-1816, pp.868-873; 74, 1818-1819, pp.970-979 and 76, 1821-1822, pp.1078-1083

(32) C.J., 67, 1812, pp.758-759; 68, 1812-1813, p.855; 69, 1813-1814, p.764; 70, 1814-1816, p.873; 71, 1816-1817, p.906; 72, 1817, p.751; 73, 1818, p.691; 74, 1818-1819, pp.967-969 and 75, 1819-1820, pp.773 and 774

(33) P.P., 1898, LXXXV, p.155

(34) C.J., 67, 1812, p.759; 70, 1814-1816, p.850; 69, 1813-1814, pp.767 and 768; 70, 1814-1816, p.854; 71, 1816-1817, p.893; 74, 1818-1819, pp.932 and 955; 75, 1819-1820, p.767; 76, 1821-1822, pp.1066 and 1067; 77, 1822-1823, p.992 and 78, 1823, p.879

(35) O Inv. Port., vol.X, pp.281-283 and Adrien Balbi, Essai Statistique, p.170: "Tableau de la quantité et de la valeur de la laine exportée du Portugal par les nations étrangères dans les années 1796, 1801, 1806, 1811, 1816 et 1819"

(36) Viveiros, Jerónimo de, História do Comércio do Maranhão. 1612-1895, pp.129-140

(37) The figures were extracted from: As Relações Comerciais entre Portugal e Brasil segundo "As Balanças de Comércio" 1801-1821. Lisboa, 1972, pp.107-112 by Maria de Lourdes Roque de Aguiar Ribeiro

(38) Ribeiro, Maria de Lourdes R.A., op.cit., p.133

(39) Arruda, José Jobson, O Brasil no Comércio Colonial, 1980, p.620

(40) Arruda, José Jobson, op.cit., from p.624 onwards

Notes - VI

(1) In "A Estrutura da Antiga Sociedade Portuguesa", pp.108-109 Vitorino Magalhães Godinho affirms that the opening of the Brazilian ports to the foreign trade was inspired by José Acúrsio das Neves, Azeredo Coutinho and Silva Lisboa

(2) On this subject cf. Épocas de Portugal Económico, pp.452-460 by J. Lúcio de Azevedo

(3) Cf. "Abertura dos portos do Brasil, ao comércio das nações amigas. Real Junta do Comércio. Tratado de 1810 com a Inglaterra. Comerciantes ingleses no Maranhão. Fase de prosperidade" in História do Comércio do Maranhão, São Luís. 1954, pp.115-128 by Jerónimo de Viveiros

(4) Viveiros, Jerónimo, op.cit., p.120

(5) On this subject cf. P.P. , 1808, IX (126) IX, 117; P.P., 1808, X (5)X, 51 and P.P., 1812, III

(6) Balbi, A., Essai Statistique, from p.431 onwards

(7) Godinho, Vitorino Magalhães, Prix et Monnaies au Portugal. 1750-1850, p.275

(8) Godinho, Vitorino Magalhães, op.cit., p.275

(9) Cf. in this chapter, v.

(10) Cf. chapter II, IV

(11) There are many detailed informations on this subject at CUST10, 3. Nevertheless they are only dealt with the exports of Foreign and Colonial merchandise. On the exports of merchandise produced in Britain there is evidence only after 1812 (CUST8, 1)

(12) On this subject cf. P.P., 1808, IX (126) IX, 117 and 1812, III

(13) It was considered 1809 because it was the year in which the first intervention of British forces occurred in Portugal

(14) Cf. English Historical Documents. 1783-1832, p.

(15) Godinho, Vitorino Magalhães, Prix et Monnaies au Portugal. 1750-1850, p.275

(16) The calculations were made with base on the figures shown by CUST4, from 4 to 15

(17) The calculations were made with base on the figures shown by CUST8 (from 1 to 10) and CUST10 (from 1 to 11)

(18) Cf. Table on consulages in this chapter II and Ap.C, Table III

CHAPTER V

THE GROWTH OF ANTI-BRITISH SENTIMENT AND THE REVOLUTION OF 1820

INTRODUCTION

The 1820 revolution stands as one of the most important turning-points in the history of Portugal. It signalled the onset of a transition between absolute monarchy and constitutionalism. It is often seen as the end of the ancien régime in Portugal.

This event has naturally received considerable attention from many historians.

The diplomatic works written by Adriano do Nascimento, Revoluçao de 1820 (Documentos Inéditos) and Antonio Vianna Apontamentos para a História Diplomática Contemporanea. A Revolução de 1820 e O Congresso de Verona illustrate the difficulties faced by the revolutionary movement in the international conjuncture of that time.

At the same time the work of Fernando Pereira Marques, Exército e Sociedade em Portugal demonstrates the extent to which the presence of British officers in the Portuguese army influenced the outbreak of the revolution. This point has been the object of some chapters included in books on the History of Portugal.

Manuel Fernandes Tomás, one of Sinedrio's leaders in A Revolução de 1820 (edited by J. Tengarrinha), Julião Soares de Azevedo in Condiçoes Económicas da Revolução Portuguesa de 1820 and Fernando Piteira Santos in Geografia e Economia da Revolução de 1820 argue for a general economic interpretation the events of 1820. Even so none of these studies clearly links the development of Anglo-Portuguese relations in the course of the years between the war and 1820.

At the same time the British historiography has not paid specific attention to the event despite its origins as manifestation of anti-British sentiment. The revolution itself has received only limited attention. Some chapters were included in global treatment of foreign policy. "The Portuguese Revolution 1820-1822" in The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh. 1815-1822. Britain and the European Alliance, by

C.K. Webster illustrates the orientation of British policy at that time.

In economic terms the 1820 revolution has been virtually ignored by British historians. This is hardly surprising since, in terms of British overseas trade the commercial relations with Portugal were not particularly significant. Nevertheless the revolution of 1820 placed an end to a period in which British influence had reached its apogee. The global perspective of British trade had altered in 1807 after the Treaty of Tilsit. European markets were virtually closed to commerce and events in Portugal precipitated the opening of Brazilian ports.

Furthermore British victory in the long war with France began in Portugal and victory was obtained through collaboration with British troops with Portuguese troops.

The 1820 revolution in addition to those of Spain and Naples denoted resistance against the reactionary policy which emerged victorious in Europe in the wake of the Congress of Vienna. Anglo-Portuguese relations played a critical role in the revolution and provided the pretext for revolt.

Anti-British sentiment was stimulated by the Portuguese newspapers published in London: the Correio Braziliense ou Armazém Literário (1808-1822), the Investigador Portuguez em Inglaterra (1811-1819), the O Portuguez ou Mercurio Político, Comercial e Literário (1814-1823) and the O Campeão Portuguez ou o Amigo do Rei e do Povo (1819-1821). They tended, as we have seen, ton confuse the impact of global recession in the post-war years with possible British dominion in Portugal. They were also reacting to the continuing weakness of the Luso-Brazilian trading system, itself badly affected by the recession. These newspapers stimulated a more liberal perception of public affairs which ultimately led to the erosion of the support for the government in Lisbon.

The main financial questions which arose between the governments of the two countries dealing with loans, payments of troops, subsidies and indemnities in consequence of the treaties after the war, naturally exacerbated tensions excited by the newspapers. At the same time commerce only recovered slowly after the war when imports of British products began to slacken.

Meanwhile the British government followed a coherent policy in response to the breakdown of the ancien régime in Portugal which occurred with the outbreak of the revolution. There is no evidence that the British government actively supported the pretensions of British traders, but was influenced by strategic considerations and was anxious to avoid any intervention in Portuguese affairs on the part of other European powers. The situation in Europe and the Americas remained extremely fluid, while the policy of non-intervention effectively served to protect British interests after the outbreak of revolt on 24 August 1820. In this context it was not surprising that the new government in Lisbon sought to assure London that it had no intention of breaking the treaty of 1810, only a portion of which had been fully enacted.

I. THE ANTI-BRITISH SENTIMENT STIMULATED BY THE PORTUGUESE NEWSPAPERS PUBLISHED IN LONDON

The French Revolution had provoked a great instability in Europe and naturally the autocracy and absolutism continued prevailing in some of its countries. Portugal and Spain were in these conditions.

It was not surprising that many of those with liberal ideas withdrew from those countries to others whose political regimes were apparently less repressive.

By the early nineteenth century the English polity appeared to be one of the most stable in the world. By 1807, London had become a refuge for many Europeans, mostly Portuguese, French, Germans and Italians. Though some of them sought to publish newspapers, only a Portuguese initiative was successful(1).

By that time, Hipolito José da Costa Pereira Furtado de Mendonça who had been jailed for three years in Lisbon by the Tribunal of the Santo Oficio, published the O Correio Braziliense ou Armazem Literário (2).

In its first publication soon it became evident that it had as its main purpose to analyse, discuss and suggest everything which might be advantageous to the peoples of Brazil and Portugal.

By 1809 some rumours about a new treaty of commerce between Portugal and England began to appear. Some press articles advised that the Portuguese should proceed with caution.Their authors pointed out that the circumstances surrounding the new treaty were new since the Portuguese Royal Family found in Brazil and the negotiators must be aware that the export of the main Brazilian products were prohibited in England so as to prevent competition with those which came from the British colonies. Moreover the authors argued that negotiators should take into consideration the agricultural and manufactures which might develop in Brazil. The author argued that manufactures either produced in Brazil or imported from other countries might offer more advantages than those from England. He added that "A Inglaterra pode, sem duvida offerecer

vantagens ao Brazil, que nenhuma naçao da terra poderia appresentar-lhes. Os Inglezes podem enriquecer-se no Brazil, fazendo felizes os seus habitantes"[3].

Natural expectations were replaced by discontent after the publication of the treaty of 19 February 1810. In a long article entitled "Exame do Tractado de Commercio entre as Cortes do Brasil, e da Inglaterra" he pointed out several aspects in which, to his viewpoint, many formal mistakes had been committed in translating the text into Portuguese. The article also pointed out that the lack of reciprocity was obvious; the British subjects residing in Brazil would enjoy more rights than the native-born; the influence of the treaty would obstruct the prosperity of the future Brazilian Kingdom and lastly, its compromises would constitute a humiliation to the dignity of the Portuguese Nation[4].

During 1811 the Correio Braziliense discussed the effects of the treaty in various issues and concluded that it would be disadvantageous to Portuguese interests. As a consequence of this it urged that the Prince Regent should refuse to ratify the treaty. At the same time the writer accused the English government of pressing the Portuguese authorities, through the main Portuguese negotiator, Conde de Linhares, to fulfil their word[5]. In 1812 it became evident that that newspaper followed a conduct mostly characterized by constant attacks against the Portuguese government and its administration while it regarded the British commercial system as worthy of being followed.

As example an article criticised the Portuguese ambassador in London, Conde de Funchal who had organized a meeting in his house with some Portuguese merchants to discuss some difficulties connected with the treaty. An agreement had already been drawn up to establish an Anglo-Portuguese committee. Nevertheless the ambassador declared that he had nominated two merchants to it. The author remembered that according to the British practice, such deliberations were taken by representatives of clubs or associations of each branch of commerce[6].

It is evident that at the first sight the Correio Braziliense

pointed out the virtues of British commerce to Portuguese readers. But at the same time, it accused the British wool and cotton manufactures of affecting adversely the Portuguese manufactures of Covilhã and Portalegre. Moreover it noted that Ireland exported 80,000 quintals of butter and salt meat to Portugal while the country was also bringing salt cod fish from Newfoundland which was sold by British merchants(7).

By the middle of 1811 a new Portuguese newspaper had been founded in London, with the support of Domingos António de Sousa Coutinho, Conde de Funchal who was Rodrigo Domingos de Sousa Coutinho's brother, Conde de Linhares, Secretary for Foreign Affairs and War of the government in Rio de Janeiro(8).

The new newspaper called "O Investigador Portuguez em Inglaterra" was designed to counter the Correio Braziliense in the public opinion of the Kingdom of Portugal. In order to secure it more credibility its orientation and direction were trusted to both, Bernardo José de Abrantes e Castro and Vicente Pedro Nolasco da Cunha, known by their masonic ideas. Obviously the Investigador Portuguez em Inglaterra sought to support the task of the Portuguese government, mainly in the questions in which mostly the English government was involved. The important question of the abolition of the Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro(9) and above all the discussion on the 19 February 1810 treaty of commerce were the subjects more frequently treated by that new publication. Since they were concerned to support the government the newspaper was sometimes placed in an anti-British position. This happened during 1812 through articles which defended the stipulations of the treaty, although recognizing most of their evils due to some English laws with which there were obstructions.

By early 1813 the position assumed by the two newspapers was clear. The Correio Braziliense was systematically opposed to the Portuguese government and both were against the treaty of commerce. Nevertheless the relations between the two may be estimated through an article published in Correio Braziliense under the title "Tractado de Commercio com a Inglaterra". Its author wrote: "Os partidistas do tractado seguiram o plano; primeiro de fazerem invectivas contra nós por

fallarmos mal delle; depois, de o justificar em publico, e em particular; louvando-o como o primor d'obra da politica do Conde de Linhares, e este Ministro apresentou a S.A.R. uma memoria particular, destinada a provar-lhe as excelencias do tractado..."(10)

In regard to the British and the treaty the same newspaper wrote that: "A questão pois não he sobre o tractado ser ou não pessimo; nisto todo o mundo convem. A questão he o grito que tem levantado os partidistas dos Souzas contra os Inglezes. Nós conhecemos mui bem as consequencias de entrarmos nesta questão com nossos adversários. Até aqui eramos Jacobinos, e Francezes; e agora seremos Inglezes; maniacos, etc...". In its publication of July 1813, the Investigador Portuguez em Inglaterra, presented an exhaustive analysis on the treaty in publishing the "Carta dirigida aos Redactores do Investigador Portuguez em Inglaterra" dated Lisbon, 20 June 1813(11). Its author held no doubt that the execution of the treaty had damaged the economic interests of the Portuguese Nation and he accused the British of abuses committed in the present as well as in the past which had naturally provoked resentment against the British. The same conduct was repeated by the same newspaper in the following November, although a response to the "Carta sobre o Tratado de Commercio entre Portugal e Inglaterra" had been published appealing that the sovereign and his subjects discussed their ideas on the interests of the Nation, since the complaints against the foreigners would be unnecessary if the Portuguese eliminated their own faults(12).

In 1814 the two newspapers maintained an orientation more directed towards the real problems of economic life which concerned Portuguese people rather than the quarrels between themselves, although they attacked the causes which obstructed the solutions. For example, the Correio Braziliense published an article "Commércio interno de Portugal" in which it referred to the crisis in the production of olive oil and soap alleging that the land was the same and the climate had not changed while the lack of soap seemed to be provoked by the monopoly of the Contract of tobacco(13). It accused the slow and decadent bureaucracy of the government which in some cases spent one or two years or more

to elaborate and enact a law. In contrast it pointed out that the British Parliament made laws through the actions of its members who were representatives of the different classes and instructed in the different branches of commerce. This contact with the real problems permitted to find the best solutions with advantages for all the Nation. At the same time the article "Commercio de Portugal" referred: "Falar contra a admissão das fazendas Inglezas, sem que Portugal as tenha suas, he deitar palavras ao vento: desejar a extincção do contrabando, quando os defeitos dos Regulamentos de Alfandega convidam às fraudes, he contemplar um impossivel"(14).

In 1814 the Investigador Portuguez em Inglaterra changed its management. José Liberato Freire de Carvalho became editor, releasing the newspaper from the influence of the Conde de Funchal and after September 1816 from his successor the Duque de Palmela(15). This circumstance permitted that some articles were more impetuous in the attacks on the government and consequently against British influence in the Portuguese affairs, especially in the commerce. In one of them, nineteen points were referred as being the principal causes of the decline of Portuguese life which at the same time benefited the foreigners, mostly the British(16). They would be classified in three groups. Firstly - Rules contrary to national industry which were not demanded by foreigners; Secondly - Privileges without reciprocity to the Portuguese subjects abroad and thirdly - Privileges which must not be conceded or, on the contrary, conceded to both, national and foreign subjects.

By that time a new Portuguese newspaper appeared, also published in London. It was called O Portuguez ou Mercurio Politico, Commercial e Literário , founded by José Bernardo da Rocha Loureiro refugee in England since 1812(17). Its orientation was openly against the existing Portuguese government, and anti-British. It argued that the Portuguese society should be transformed with a revolution. Given this point of view, this newspaper was clearly to attack British support of the system. In exploiting an intervention of Lord Grenville at the House of Lords, when he remembered that Portugal owed a great deal to

England for its protection during the war, the Portuguez stated that the contrary would be more correct[18]. In subsequent issues it counter-attacked constantly keeping the unpopularity of the British in the eyes of the Portuguese people. Its orientation was systematically anti-British. Naturally enough the most flagrant cases were the presence of the British officers in senior commands within the Portuguese army[19] as well as the British refusal to support the Portuguese claims to repossess Olivença[20] still in the hands of Spain[21].

During 1815 the attention of the newspapers was directed towards international relations and dealt with the arrangements made at the Congress of Vienna. The Correio Braziliense did not fail to note that the British newspapers had alluded to friction between the Portuguese and the English government. According to their news, the Portuguese refused to abolish the slave trade and to send troops to France against Napoleon. At the same time British newspapers also referred to "a notavel desafeição do publico contra os Inglezes, em todo o paiz, e em toda a parte fomentada pelos homens principaes...".

Such references to Portugal provoked a reaction from the Correio Braziliense: "Lembrem-se, que para S.A.R. o Principe Regente obter na Inglaterra um emprestimo da insignificante somma de 600,000 libras, se ofereceo a hipotheca das rendas da Ilha da Madeira, que ficou aquella ilha guarnecida por tropas Inglezas até o fim do pagamento, e que para cumulo da vergonha, dous negociantes Portuguezes foram em Londres aprezentados como abonadores dos pagamentos; o que servio de pretexto para se violar a ley da instituição do Banco do Rio de Janeiro".[21]

On 4 May The Times published an article, criticising the Portuguese government for demanding that British merchants pay the war contribution in Portugal alleging that they were exempted by the privileges granted in the past and still in vigour. The Investigador Portuguez strongly contested such position and argued: "...se os Inglezes residentes em Portugal, forem exemptos de ali pagar os tributos nacionaes, então nesse cazo hé de toda a razão, direito, e justiça, que o nosso Governo reclame tão bem o mesmo privilegio para todos os Portuguezes residentes em Inglaterra".[22] It is probable that position over these questions

created in Portugal considerable anti-British feeling in Portugal.

By 1816 this hostility was already evident, and extended to some members of the government in Lisbon. By mid April, the British consul in Lisbon ordered that Thomaz Rice Thomas, a British subject be arrested under the pretext that he had damaged a London commercial house. This led D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz to inform the British Envoy Extraordinary in Lisbon that: "Sente desprazer o abaixo assinado em ser obrigado a declarar ao Sr. Eduardo Miguel Ward que nesta deligencia e efficacia do Consul Britanico foi levada a hum excesso que se não conforma com as leys e costumes neste Paix, não tendo o supposto delinquente sido achado em flagrante..."(23).

Meanwhile O Portugues ou Mercurio used any pretext to attack the British influence in Portugal.

The newspapers constantly exploited the fact that the English officers could still be found in the Portuguese army (24). The funeral of the Queen D. Maria I was a typical pretext to excite the anti-British sentiment. The author of an article alleged that there was no money to the pay for the ceremonies. Sarcastically he suggested that the expense should be met by London which had reached so much profit from the facilities offered by the Portuguese laws. In contrast the Spanish government practically prohibited the imports of British manufactures by laying heavy duties on them(25).

The Correio Braziliense also in "Observaçoens sobre o estado actual do Commercio Portuguez"(26), "Estado decadente do Commercio de Portugal"(27) and "Decadencia do Commércio de Portugal"(28) criticised the participation of British merchants in drawing up the Custom houses pauta in Brazil, protesting against the British commercial privileges in arguing against the growing foreign commercial interests in Portugal contrary to national interest.

The popularity of the British in Portugal had diminished by 1816 and some occurrences further compromised their position. In June, A.J. Almeida, British vice-consul at Villa Real de Santo António had been arrested in consequence of having denounced as being implicated

in contraband tobacco dealings[29].

By September Canning spoke to the British merchants in a farewell dinner given at the Teatro de S. Carlos in Lisbon. He intended to signal his departure with words of gratitude emphasizing Anglo-Portuguese cooperation against the common enemy during the Peninsular War. At last he sought to alleviate the prevailing tension in the following terms: "...Diria que nao há lugar para ciumes commerciais, ou politicos entre a Gra-Bretanha e Portugal: - diria que o Mundo hé bastantemente grande para o commercio Portuguez e Britannico; e que a Gra-Bretanha, que nunca abandonou o seu Alliado em tempos desastrados, nenhum outro prémio quer por todos os seus esforços, e sacrificios do que a mutua confiança e comum prosperidade[30].

The constant attacks of Portuguese newspapers in London against the treaty of 1810, the British privileges, the decadent state of commerce, the British officers in the army and above all against the preeminent role played by the regime as well as their defence of liberal ideas and principles caused a reaction in Lisbon.

On 17th June 1817 the Correio Braziliense and O Portuguez were prohibited from circulating in Portugal and Brazil[31]. The proclamation which announced that prohibition stated that those who were guilty could be punished with six months of prison for the first offence and even exile in Angola if someone was accused for the crime a third time[32].

The Investigador Portuguez em Inglaterra was excluded because it was supporting the government in Lisbon. Despite this it emphasised divergences between the Portuguese and English governments in the event of D. João VI's plans to return to Lisbon. Moreover it published the correspondence between the Portuguese Minister inLondon and Castlereagh which had occurred on 14th July and 13th August. The first complained that after the insurrections which had taken place in Pernambuco in early March, the British consul John Lampriere had recognized the revolutionary government. Castlereagh replied disapproving the consul's conduct but the occurrence allowed suspicions to arise in

the eyes of the Portuguese people[33].

Meanwhile the so-called "Conspiracy of 1817" occurred in Lisbon. The newspapers published in London naturally dedicated substantial space to it during the following years. At first they confined themselves to divulge only the reporting on the subsequent investigations by the authorites. The editors of the newspapers expected that several currents of opinion had emerged in both England and Portugal. Therefore in their general conduct the Portuguese newspapers were cautious.

On the one hand official investigations revealed that the conspirators had as their principal aim the collapse of General William Beresford's rule over Portugal. On the other hand, Barao d'Eben, a British officer was involved in the events. At the first sight these two facts were contradictory, although Barão D'Eben might have been occasionally drawn into the net of the conspirators. It seems that since the evidence from the official argument was so unclear, the newspapers published a work which had appeared in Lisbon under the title "Reflexoens sobre a conspiração descoberta e castigada em Lisboa, no anno de 1817. Por um verdadeiro amigo da Pátria" (Lisboa 1818)[34]. This work sought to persuade others of the justice of the culprits' condemnation. Since there was no freedom of the press it could hardly have been published in Lisbon if it took the side of the opposition.

The Correio Braziliense and Investigador Portuguez em Inglaterra demonstrated the partiality of the condemnation based on the scarcity evidence used in the investigation. The involvement of the British in the events of 1817 was always treated with the greatest care. The following extracts would seem to be highly significant : "Conspirar contra o Marechal General foi certamente um crime, mas ninguem dirá que foi crime de Lesa-Magestade"[35] and "...os governadores de Portugal, fazendo exterminar do Reyno um dos réos (o Barão d'Eben) em conformidade da sentença, negaram-lhe uma copia do processo, que elle requereo, para com ella se justificar do mundo, e a seus amigos. Negaram-lhe mais os seus papeis proprios, que lhe foram apprehendidos, e os quaes não tinham relação com o supposto crime"[36]. On 27 July 1818 this

fact was contested by the Morning Chronicle which published a speech made by the Duke of Sussex to the Lords arguing that Barão D'Eben had been unjustly condemned. At the same time he denied that he had ever had any contact with this British officer as had been alleged by a newspaper.

The Investigador Portuguez printed a letter written by the Baron and published in The Times of September 11 in which he affirmed that he had not received any letter from Duke of Sussex since 1812(37).

Meanwhile the events in Pernambuco, the conspiracy in Portugal and the constant articles published in the Portuguese newspapers of London were taken into consideration by the government which took some decisions. The most remarkable of them seems to have been the publication of an alvará on 25 April 1818 by which abolished the exemptions from duties and implemented new duties on national and foreign products. The decision was received with more applauses than criticism and regarded as proof of the justice defended by the newspapers. Essentially that alvará recognised the causes of the economic crisis in which the Kingdom found itself(38). The "O Portuguez" was the only newspaper which made some objections to the stipulations of the alvará, and exploited them for attacking the British. As examples it pointed out that it was right that all the exemptions of duties had been abolished excluding some cases including the personal effects of the Ministers to Foreign Courts. "O Portugues" reminded its readers "Saiba o Governo, que se tem pedido nas alfandegas inglezas, Segundo nos informam, as chaves dos baús aos Ministros portuguezes, que viajam; e sabemos, que está aqui a Secretaria Portugueza fazendo uma despeza enorme com cartas e despachos, que lhe vem de Lisboa por o Paquete; ao mesmo tempo que ao Ministro Britannico em Lisboa tudo lhe vai do seu pais de graça, isto hé, sem que nas alfandegas o depenem com direitos". A much contested point was that the alvará ordered that the foreign coin paid 2% of clearance duties. The author reminded his readers that the bullion and foreign coin of gold or silver were duty free. And he added: "Os Inglezes, nessa parte, como em quasi tudo, legislam sabiamente, pois o meio conhecido de chamar ao paiz o oiro e prata estrangeiro, e de ahi o conservar, assim como o proprio

seu, náo he o d'impor lhe tributos de sahida, mas sim o de conservar a balança do commercio de maneira que ella penda para a sua parte, fazendo as outras naçoens tributarias da industria delles, com ella atrahindo as matérias 1.as. doutras naçoens, que elles hão mister, e até os metaes preciosos d'ellas, quando essas materias brutas não cheguem, em uma palavra, ordenando as cousas, de sorte que importem pouco, e exportem muito." Moreover the author regretted that the British continued to carry salt cod fish from Newfoundland to Portugal, although the Portuguese were the first people to fish it on that sea.

The difference of duties paid by the British vessels and their products in Portugal and those which were paid by Portuguese in Great Britain were the object of anti-British agitation (39). Yet the government of Rio de Janeiro had taken some measures which would protect Portuguese interests and were considered worthy of support. So nobody could have foreseen in 1819 that the winds of revolution would blow so strongly in the Iberian Peninsula.

In 1816 Spain had adhered to the Holy Alliance and from then onwards an atmosphere of constant conspiracy invaded political life. Portuguese and Spanish conspirators remained in constant contact in accordance with the declarations published on the conspiracy of 1817 in Portugal (40). In London Portuguese newspapers began to flatter the Spanish revolution and to defend openly a necessity of the Portuguese people to prepare to the revolution. The government in Brazil and the Council of Regency in Lisbon were denounced incapable of finding solutions. The British were accused of being responsible for the miserable situation which affected the decadent Portuguese economy, mainly due to the treaty of commerce of 1810. Two newspapers distinguished in this campaign: "O Portuguez" and "O Campeão Portuguez ou o Amigo do Rei e do Povo" which appeared on July of 1819, replacing the "O Investigador Portuguez em Inglaterra", disappeared by that time (41).

"O Portuguez" referred that in London there were rumours that in Portugal some actions prepared with the aim of envisaging the release from the British. It announced that there was a notable lack of

paper money. At the same time he sought to persuade the readers that the British government had ordered Beresford to go to Rio de Janeiro to obtain money with the purpose of paying nine months of arrear in the army. At last the author of the article defended this point of view: "O governo Inglez...manda-lhe requerer, que mude de systema; que ponha em melhor ordem seus negócios e que dê um Governo liberal a Portugal, senão, hade vêer este quebrar lhe a obediencia e unir-se com Hespanha: enfim que so o Governo Brasileiro se descuida no tomar estes conselhos, serão elles Inglezes desobrigados de valer a Portugal, e ao Rey assegurar esse senhorio."(42)

The Campeão Portuguez ou o Amigo do Rei e do Povo in its first publication was absolutely against the British. In first place it presented a letter dated 14 June 1819 directed to the editor of The Times seeking to demonstrate that the British goods paid legally in Portugal 15 per cent, although really was 13½%. At the same time some of the Portuguese goods paid in England about 600%, although according to the stipulations of the treaty of 1810 they paid the same amount which was paid by the most favoured nation. In order to persuade the readers, the newspaper presented a table of imports and duties of the Portuguese products in the port of Liverpool during 1818. This demonstrated that the duties had oscillated between 19% and 316% and the total of the imports had amounted to £141,330 while the sum of the duties had amounted to £98,355, which corresponds to 69.6% of the total imports. The same publication also accused the British of having supported the Oporto revolt in 1808, which was led by the Bishop who had formerly supported the French. It denounced the conspiracy of 1817 which had victimized true patriots as having been instigated by the British(43).

By 1820 anti-British sentiment was rising very strongly. On 14th October 1819 the government in Rio de Janeiro ordered that the Campeão, ou do Amigo do Rei e do Povo be prohibited from entering the country, but the creation of favourable conditions for the revolution was intensified(44). In January 1820 the Campeão continued to attack British interests reminding the readers of the responsibility of the

British merchants of adulterating the Oporto wine by 1750-1755. In its propaganda of liberal ideas the "Campeão" reminded that the Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro had been useful, because it had at that time defended the purity of the wine and increased its price. Nevertheless now the Company would not be compatible with the principles of the revolution[45]. On this point the "Campeão" appeared defending the view of the British merchants who wished to abolish the Company. Nevertheless its orientation was clearly anti-British and anti-monopolist. With this purpose the "Campeão" followed with the greatest attention the course of the events in Spain.

On 1 January the Riego insurrection occurred and Ferdinand VII had been pressed to accept the 1812 Constitution on 7 February. The "Campeão" intensified then its propaganda for the revolution in Portugal. The reaction caused in London by the events in Spain was treated with special relevance[46].

In July it demonstrated that revolution was unavoidable and admitted the future union of Portugal with Spain[47]. At the same time the "Correio Braziliense" abandoned its attacks and intensified its main struggle for the independence of Brazil, but manifesting peremptory against the union with Spain. On this matter it added: "Protugal nunca será conquistado pela Hispanha..."[48]. The Portuguese newspapers published in London attacked the British, because their privileges affected the economic life of the Kingdom, especially those which derived from the treaty of 19 February 1810. Nevertheless the attacks of the Portuguese London newspapers were a means to an end - the diffusion of liberal ideas. Such as Luz Soriano affirmed: "...foi a imprensa periódica ou o jornalismo portugues em Londres quem, por aquele tempo, principiou a difundir abertamente entre nós, por todas as classes da nação, as ideias liberais..."[49].

II. FINANCIAL QUESTIONS BETWEEN BOTH PORTUGUESE AND ENGLISH GOVERNMENTS

The financial questions between the governments of Portugal and England were indelibly marked by the war against France. There is evidence that the first payments effected by the British government respecting to military activities in the Peninsula occurred by 1808. In this year the accounts of money paid or remitted by the Paymaster General of the Forces, for the service of the Army in the Peninsula, including British, Foreign and Portuguese troops were as follows[1]:

	£	s.	d.
- Bills drawn by Deputy Paymasters General for Ordinary services	240,941	10	3
- Deduct Bills in favour of Commissaries, in repayment of Advances out of Extraordinaries	199,011	19	7
	41,929	10	8
- Bills drawn upon the Treasury by Commissaries and others, for Extra services, and paid in this year	196,656	7	11
- Remittances in Bullion, and specie to commissaries, Consuls and others	2,861,339	19	9
- Freight of specie, Passage of officers, and other expenses paid at home	7,388	14	-
- Estimated Expense of Clothing for two-thirds of the year	74,000	-	-
	3,181,314	12	4
Deduct dollars returned from Spain and Portugal	277,774	-	-
	£2,903,540	12	4

In order to obtain an easier understanding on the Portuguese participation it must be affirmed that on 30 September 1808 the effective Portuguese troops paid by Great Britain were composed of 16,050 men[2].

An alvará published on 14 October ordered that the Portuguese participation must consist of 12 regiments of infantry of 18,600 men (1,550 each one) and 3 batallions of Caçadores composed of 1,884 men (628 each one)[3].

In August 1809 the annual expenditure with the Portuguese 20,000 men were estimated at about £640,300[4]. Such amount would correspond to about 26% of the total sum spent by the British in the Peninsula in 1809 which was as follows:[5]

		£	s.	d.
- Bills drawn by Deputy Paymasters General, for Ordinary Services		596,000	-	-
- Bills drawn upon the Treasury by Commissaries and others for Extraordinaries, and paid in this year	£1,824,645 18s.8d.			
- Deduct the above Bills drawn by Deputy Paymasters General, in favour of Commissaries, in repayment of Advances out of Extraordinaries	596,000	1,228,645	18	8
- Remittances in Bullion and Specie to Commissaries, &c.		461,926	-	-
- Freight of Specie, Passage of Officers, and other Expenses paid at home		77,384	8	10
- Estimated Expense of Clothing		87,000	-	-
		£2,450,956	7	7

Despite this financial support to the military activities on the part of the British government, the Portuguese Government had to face

serious difficulties which demanded the recourse to the external credit. As at that time England was the principal country in good standing with Portugal, the British government naturally satisfied the Prince Regent's requirements by floating a loan of £600,000 in London on 21st April[6].

The Prince Regent undertook to pay the interest of the same, and to provide a sinking fund of 5 per cent. The principal revenues of the Island of Madeira were considered as a security for the due fulfilment of the contract.

In 1810 the military activities increased and consequently the expenditures were higher, according to the following figures[7]:

	£	s.	d.
- Bills drawn by Deputy Paymasters General, for Ordinary Services	821,000		
- Deduct Bills in favour of Commissaries, in repayment of Advances out of Extraordinaries	786,000	-	-
	35,000	-	-
- Bills drawn by Commissaries and others upon the Treasury for Extraordinaries, and paid in this year (including £980,000 voted for Portuguese troops)	5,188,601	7	-
- Remittances in Bullion and Specie to Commissaries, &c.	697,675	14	9
- Freight of Specie, Passage of Officers, and other Expenses paid at Home	22,744	17	9
- Estimated Expenses of Clothing	122,000	-	-
	£6,066,021	19	6

Besides the £980,000 which were above referred, there is evidence that in the same year the British government conceded a subsidy to Portugal of £1,237,517[8]. Nevertheless it is possible that the two references in different sources are respecting to the same subsidy, whose difference will may be involved in future questions between the two governments.

In 1811 the expenditures with the Army in the Peninsula grew still more[9]:

	£	s.	d.
- Bills drawn by Deputy Paymasters General, for Ordinary services[10]	758,197	4	2
- Deduct Bills in favour of Commissaries, in repayment of Advances out of Extraordinaries	630,000	-	-
- Bills drawn upon the Treasury by Commissaries and others for Extraordinaries, and paid in this year (including to £2,000,000 voted for Portuguese Troops, &c. and £100,000 for Portuguese sufferers)	8,582,843	9	5
- Passage of Officers, Losses, and other Expenses paid at Home	25,659	7	8
- Estimated Expense of Clothing	170,000	-	-
	8,906,700	1	3

The total of these sums paid (not including the loan of £600,000 to Portugal) or remitted by the Paymaster General of the Forces amounted to £20,181,250 from April 1808 up to the 24 December 1811.

Besides these expenditures there were other ones which composed the items Ordnance, Victualling, Storekeeper General and Commissary in Chief.

The first of them consisted of bills drawn by the Ordnance Paymasters

in the Peninsula or drawn by him in favour of the Commissaries General (in this case, it is presumed that the bills were not negotiated in the Peninsula). The second one consisted of the costs of provisions and victualling stores for the use of the troops, being managed either by the Spanish government or by the Portuguese government. The third one was respecting to the value of the stores shipped by the Storekeeper General. The fourth one consisted of clothing, accoutrements and stores, oats and barley, species purchased and shipped by the Commissary in chief.

From 1808 to 1811 the total of these four items, adding what was referred to the Paymaster General may be summarized in the following table(11):

ITEMS	Amount of sums paid for the service of the Army in the Peninsula, including British, Foreign and Portuguese troops			Amount of Advances in money, arms, stores, or otherwise, made to the Spanish government		
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
Paymaster General	20,181,250	18	10	-	-	-
Ordnance	281,117	4	5	1,647,809	18	9
Victualling	593,186	1	1¾	49,093	17	6¼
Storekeeper General	426,899	16	3¾	369,257	15	7
Commissary in Chief	822,158	13	6	469,826	5	2
Total	£22,304,612	14	2½	2,535,987	17	-¼

According to the same source, during the same period, the amount supplied for the use of the Portuguese government respecting the item Victualling was of £61,427 while the amount supplied for the troops in general was £532,159. This cannot be interpreted as if the Portuguese government managed sums of money only regarding to that item. There is evidence, for example, that between 28th April 1809 and 30th November 1810, the Portuguese government received £1,132,425 from John Bell, the

Deputy Superintendent of British Aids[12]. Two-thirds of that amount were paid in specie and one third in paper Reis.

According to a memorandum transmitted by John Bell to Charles Stuart a disagreement had occurred with the Portuguese government. The representatives of the British authorities presented the accounts with a balance on behalf of themselves of £485,369 while the Portuguese claimed that it was only of £230,746.

Despite all during the same period John Bell, naturally supported by Charles Stuart, lent a further £50,000 to the Portuguese Treasury then under the administrator, Conde Redondo[13].

In the bills of 1811 a subsidy of £2,000,000 for Portuguese troops was included as well £100,000 for Portuguese sufferers. According to other source the subsidy of 1811 will have been only of £1,832,168[14].

In chapter I (V) reference has already been made to those affected by the invasions [15]. Nevertheless it will be convenient to refer to the plan of application of that sum. On 31st August 1811 the commission composed by Charles Stuart, Ricardo Raimundo Nogueira, John Bell and Henrique Teixeira Sampaio assembled to make an "Estimate for the Appropriation and Expenditure of the £100,000 sterling voted by Parliament, to assist the Inhabitants of the Districts of Portugal invaded by the Enemy".

It was as follows[16]:

- £100,000 sterling, exchange at 70d. per 1,000 Rs currency, is	R.342,859 000	
- Discount on the one half in paper money, at 25 per cent is	42,857 375	
Is in coin R.	300,001 625	= Dollars 375,002

- The sum appropriated for Cattle is	200,000
- The sum appropriated for Orphans	38,133
- The sum appropriated for Seed-corn	50,000
- The sum appropriated for Timber	5,730
- The sum appropriated for Iron for carts	10,000
- The sum appropriated for Vats	1,200
	305,063
- Remaining for Hospitals, Medicines, Clothing, etc.	69,939
Total in Spanish dollars	375,002

There is evidence, therefore, that that sum was paid in twice. It seems that in 1811 a parcel of £39,555 was paid, and the remaining part of £60,445 was paid in the following year[17].

The French forces had meanwhile been expelled from the Portuguese territory by the beginning of 1811. Nevertheless Portuguese troops continued as part of the Allied forces fighting against the France on Spanish soil. The lack of documents which is observed in the same sources or in others makes more difficult the task of analysing the financial questions respecting to the years 1812-1814.

It is known, therefore, that in 1810 and 1811 the British expenditures with the Army, Navy, Ordnance and war, amounted to about £48,000,000 per year while in 1812, 1813 and 1814 their annual average grew to respectively £53,592,699, £58,834,552 and £74,180,385[18].

Between 1808 and 1811 the British expenditures with the war in the Peninsula amounted to about 25% of the whole during the remaining three years, it is natural that such percentage has grown because the Allied forces penetrated into the French territory, augmenting consequently the expenditures with transports, material, etc. By the end of the year 1812, more disagreements occurred between the British and Portuguese authorities, which were caused by financial difficulties. D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz had called the attention on the part of Sir Charles Stuart, complaining that in October nothing had been paid notwithstanding

the orders of Marshall General Beresford. This would be a consequence not only from the deficit which had been experienced, but also from the diminution of payment on account of the subsidy during the year[19].

D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz threatened to reduce the effectives of the Portuguese army. As a result a detailed analysis of the economic situation was drawn up [20]. As a result of this, on 5 November Charles Stuart criticised the administration in the economic sector, arguing that: "Les intérêts du Royaume exigent plutôt des efforts de la part du trésor Portugais que des nouveaux sacrifices de la part de son allié"[21]. Two days later the decisions taken by the government were strongly defended and justified by the Marquis de Borba, as Administrator of the Royal Treasury[22].

There is evidence that in 1812 the British authorities conceded to the Portuguese government a subsidy of £2,167,832[23], although it is unknown if that sum of money will have been paid before or after that disagreement.

On 28 July 1813 the committee which had been appointed to direct the Distribution of the £100,000 conceded by the British Parliament laid the final statement of their performed duty before the sovereigns of the two nations[24]. This fact contributed to alleviate the devastation caused by the third French invasion in the territory between the Tagus and the line between Castelo Branco, Viseu and Coimbra.

The Portuguese authorities acknowledged this fact with public thanks which were directed to the authorities of London, especially because the performance of the plan was totally efficient[25]. By 1813 there is evidence that the British government had conceded to the Portuguese government the sum of £1,644,063 while in 1814 another had amounted to £1,500,000[26].

The war had ended by early 1814 and by the end of the year there were disagreements between the two governments. On 5th December, Bathurst instructed Canning to negociate with the Portuguese authorities in Lisbon "on the subject of the difficulties experienced in the

arrangement of the subsidiary amounts with Portugal"[27]. On 21 January 1815 a treaty was made at Vienna between the two nations by which England paid £300,000 to the representative of the Prince Regent in London "in discharge of Claims for Portuguese ships detained by British cruisers previous to the first day of June, 1814, upon the alleged ground of carrying on an illicit Traffic in Slaves"[28]. On the following day and also at Vienna it was decided by the representatives of the two powers, among other points that[29] "His Britannic Majesty agrees, at the same time, to remit, from the date at which the ratification mentioned in the 1st Article shall be promulgated, such further payments as may then remain due and payable upon the loan of £600,000, made in London for the service of Portugal, in the year 1809, in consequence of a Convention signed on the 21st of April of the same year..."

In consequence of that stipulation, the loan of £600,000 was completely remitted, when until that time, the Portuguese government had already paid the following[30]:

Date of payment	On Account of Interest			On Account of Redemption			Total		
	£	s.	d	£	s.	d	£	s.	d.
10.10.1809	13,585	1	6	15,000	0	0	28,585	1	6
5. 4.1810	13,585	1	6	15,000	0	0	28,585	1	6
10.10.1810	13,585	1	6	15,000	0	0	28,585	1	6
5. 4.1811	13,585	1	6	15,000	0	0	28,585	1	6
10.10.1811	13,585	1	6	15,000	0	0	28,585	1	6
5. 4.1812	13,585	1	6	15,000	0	0	28,585	1	6
10.10.1812	13,585	1	6	15,000	0	0	28,585	1	6
5. 4.1813	13,585	1	6	15,000	0	0	28,585	1	6
10.10.1813	13,585	1	6	15,000	0	0	28,585	1	6
5. 4.1814	13,585	1	6	15,000	0	0	28,585	1	6
10.10.1814	13,585	1	6	15,000	0	0	28,585	1	6
5. 4.1815	13,585	1	6	15,000	0	0	28,585	1	6
	£163,020	18	0	£180,000	0	0	£343.020	18	0

On 25 March Portugal adhered to the stipulations of the Congress of Vienna[31]. Due to this, on 20th November the Portuguese government was placed in conditions to be benefited from France which undertook to pay 700 million francs to the Allied Powers[32]. 50,000,000 of francs of that sum were to be annually paid by France, for the pay, clothing, etc. of the Allied Army of Occupation[33] which remained in the French territory during about three years more. But the remaining part was to be divided. It seems that only a sum of 2,000,000 francs were paid to Portugal[34] but despite this the financial questions which resulted from the end of the war between the two governments, continued for the future.

As proof of this is that on 10 May 1816 D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz requested Ward the receipts corresponding to the sums of money "que o commissario Portuguez encarregado do pagamento das tropas que entrarão em França no fim de 1813 e principio de 1814, recebeo ali dos commissarios Britannicos para a clareza com que devem aparecer as contas dos subsidios fornecidos a este Reyno pela Gra-Bretanha para sustentação da guerra"[35].

This matter was the object of frequent discussions, because the documents found in London and the responsible peoples in the meantime had been transferred elsewhere[36]. On 1st October, therefore, an account was transmitted from the Foreign Office in London to Ward as follows: "...the quantity and value of provisions and stores supplied by the Victualling Department for the use of the Portuguese Government at the period therein mentioned (it is not referred), amounted to £88,892"[37]. One month later, Ward wrote to Castlereagh saying:[38] "A few weeks ago I presented to the government here the general account of subsidy for the year 1811, with which I was furnished by Mr Auditor General Dawkins". Ward at that time foresaw that that point would cause much discussion. The accounts presented and the counter-statements of the Portuguese government would not be easy of finding adequate solution. Finally he argued: "I find that there are different opinions entertained respecting the side on which the balance of the total account will turn for the year abovementioned we bring ourselves in debtors for

£150,000[38].

Meanwhile the discussion had begun on the plunders taken in the Peninsular war. It seems that in 1813 Wellington would have said that the plunders which were taken must be divided in four parts, being two of them to the British army and each one of the remaining ones to the Portuguese and Spanish armies[39].

According to a calculation made under the supervision of Beresford the total value of the plunders taken to the French in Portugal, Spain and France stood at £916,540 - 2 - 6½[40]. On 24 February 1816 Marquez de Aguiar wrote from Rio de Janeiro to Cypriano Ribeiro Freire to claim before the British government the payment of the Portuguese part[41]. Marquez de Aguiar alleged that until that time the only plunders as a result of six years of war in possession of the Portuguese, were "cincoenta peças das tomadas em Vittoria, e 20 a 30,000 pesos duros (parte do dinheiro que n'esse mesmo logar se tomou ao inimigo)". At the same time he protested at the fact that the Spanish army had received three times more than the Portuguese even though its numbers had been smaller.

In order to assert the justice of their claim, Marquez de Aguiar alleged that in the battle of Orthez, the plunders taken, had been valued at £446.305 - 13 - 7½. According to Wellington that battle had been decisive in the taking of Bordeaux and moreover the British authorities had seized everything into their hands although their forces were only $\frac{1}{3}$ while the Portuguese ones participated with $\frac{2}{3}$ and the Spanish had not cooperated.

Marquez de Aguiar called, therefore, the attention of the Portuguese representative in the following terms: "Por occasião d'esta reclamação espera o principe regente meu senhor, que o ministerio de sua magestade britannica se desabusará, supposto o saldo devido pelo governo de Portugal ao commissario inglez, e que falhará necessariamente o mencionado pretexto com que se pretendia embargar, ou empatar o pagamento (que já se não póde dizer prompto) das 300,000 libras estipuladas para indemnização dos navios portuguezes, tão escandalosamente capturados

pelos cruzadores britannicos". It is notorious in this document that at that time there were deep divergence between the two governments caused by financial questions. Proof of this is the reference to the payment of the £300,000 to Portugal which had been as compensation for the losses of the Portuguese vessels which had been taken by the British cruisers in circumstances unconnected with the affairs of the war.

On 6 May Cypriano Ribeiro Freire wrote from London to Marquez de Aguiar informing him that the plunder taken in France during the war had been evaluated at £800,000. Nevertheless he regretted to have to inform that the Parliament had voted that sum exclusively for the British army(42).

It is clear that such deliberation had to cause numerous protests on the part of Portuguese authorities, although without success(43). On 3 April 1817 Castlereagh presented an account of £255,793 - 0 - 9¾ to the Portuguese government, which seems to correspond to or demonstrate a compensation for the amount required by Portugal over the £800,000 of the plunders value(44). In this claim, Castlereagh argued that that amount had been spent in the construction of the Torres Vedras line. As it had permitted the victory over the French during the third invasion, the Portuguese government must assume at least a part of that charge. To this, five days later, Conde Palmela replied to him as follows:(45) "Ninguem pode por em duvida as imensas vantagens que a construcção das linhas de Torres Vedras trouxeram para o bom successo da guerra da peninsula; mas esta medida nao foi todavia tomada de acordo com o governo de Portugal, nem adoptada por sua Magestade fidelissima, cujos subditos fizeram toda a dita guerra, e notavelmente a campanha de 1810, de que se trata, soffrendo perdas e sacrificios, que se devem ter como havendo já pago todas as despezas que d'elles se deviam exigir, e tanto mais quanto que o resultado d'esta campanha, assim como o de toda a guerra, foi tão vantajoso para a Inglaterra como para Portugal".

As unequivocal sign of discontentment Conde Palmela added: "...não parece justo obrigar agora o governo portuguez a pagar a respectiva medida, depois de sete anos de silencio a similhante respeito".

Meanwhile, according to the stipulations of the treaty of Paris on 20 November 1815[46], the Duke of Wellington was appointed chairman of the arbitration commission to consider the claims still not satisfied, and presented by the various nations. The Portuguese commission was composed by the officer of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, José Basilio Rademaker and the merchant Bernardino Daupias. The principal list of the Portuguese claims was as follows[47]:

	Dinheiro Portuguez (Reis)	Dinheiro Francêz (Francos)
1º. - Lista dos navios portuguezes confiscados nos portos da França em 1807, reclamando os certificados dos productos das vendas para se proseguir na sua reclamação		
2º. - Reclamação do empréstimo forçado pelo general Junot aos negociantes de Lisboa	800,000 000	5,000,000
3º. - Reclamação do dinheiro tirado por ordem do general Junot do deposito publico de Lisboa	320,000 000	2,000,000
4º. - Reclamação de José Francisco Castanheira por vinhos que forneceu a um regimento francez em Cascaes	218 040	1,365
5º. - Reclamação de 3.097 espingardas, propriedade portugueza, tomadas pelas auctoridades francezas em Brunswick e Hamburgo	16,787 577	104,922.42
6º. - Reclamação das cargas dos navios Santo Antonio e Bonafides, pertencentes a negociantes portuguezes, e tomadas em Hamburgo pelas auctoridades francezas	272,707 200	1,704.420
7º. - Reclamação de fundos pertencentes a portuguezes, que foram confiscados em Hamburgo por ordem do principe de Eckmuhl	18,814 946	117.593.29

	Dinheiro Portuguez (Reis)	Dinheiro Francêz (Francos)
8°. - Reclamação do valor da prata tirada por ordem do General Junot ás igrejas de Portugal	1,434,424 887	8,965,155
9°. - Reclamação da carregacão da nau da Judia Conceiçao, tomada em Maio de 1808 pelo corsario Le Revenant, e conduzida á ilha de França, onde foi condemnada	204.874 966	1,280,468.53
10°.- Reclamação de tres navios tomados em 1794, e outros em 1805, antes da guerra, e em 1814 antes do armisticio	547,123 626	3,419,522.53
Alem de 15,524,928 francos e 5 soldos, moeda de França das colonias, e dos valores a que montaram os navios do artigo 1°.		
	3,614,951 242	22,593,466.77

The first meeting between Wellington and the Portuguese commission took place in Paris on 11 February 1818[48]. Either in the first or in the two following, Wellington defended that the majority of the Portuguese claims could not be admitted because they were not subjected to the stipulations of the Convention made on 20 November 1815. Despite this Wellington concluded that the claim of 5169 francs respecting a purchase of wheat and that of 5,000,000 francs which corresponded to a loan which had been demanded to the merchants of Lisbon might be admitted.

On 25 April 1818 Wellington and the representatives of Germany, France, England, Prussia and Russia[49] announced that all the foreign claims against France were extinguished. This was an abusive and unilateral decision which was repudiated by the Portuguese government and which obviously caused the greatest indignation against the British authorities. In consequence of this on 31 July 1818 the Portuguese authorities presented the list of claims before the French government, directly by the Marquez de Marialva. Nevertheless there is evidence that Portugal received only 2,000,000 francs[50]. It is natural,

therefore, that Wellington was concerned to compensate England for possible Portuguese debts which resulted from accounts respecting the payment of goods during the war. There is evidence that on 11th December 1818 there was a considerable disagreement between the two governments regarding the accounts.

On that time the responsible commission declared(51): "La somme totale des articles 5 et 6 s'élève à £11,348 qui avec la relation a séparée de l'article 16 forme le total de £39,373 provenant des diverses denrées livrées en gros dans les dépôts du Commissariat Portugais...". But that sum was relative to 1808-1811.

On 21 January 1819, D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz wrote to Ward(52) saying that many documents must come from London, "sans lesquelles ou ne peut vaincre des difficultés qui empêchent beaucoup l'arrangement non seulement de ce compte, mais encore ceux des autres années". D. Miguel was referring to the accounts of 1812 and he protested against the sum total of £684,884. He alleged(53): "Cette addition comme la exprécédent, est excedante en denrées et en prix". The British representative analysed the observations of D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz and one month later complained that(54): "I have to express my regret that Dom Miguel Forjaz has not stated in his note the nature of the doubts and difficulties relating to the subsidy accounts...". Upon the prices he added: "I must observe however that in general the prices charged in the subsidy account are lower than those which are paid by the British government".

The financial questions between the two governments seemed to go on without solution and their circumstances became more and more difficult, mostly on the part of Portugal. On 26 October 1819 João Antonio Salter de Mendonça transmitted to D. João VI an economic analysis on the state in which he found the country. He affirmed(55): "Estamos, portanto, nas mais terriveis e dolorosas circumstancias em que nunca nos vimos, achando-se o erário falto de meios para despezas tao excessivas; o povo pobre, sem pagamento dos seus vencimentos, e vexado sem commercio, sem navegação, quasi sem numerário...".

João Antonio Salter de Mendonça made some suggestions, some of

them which would affect the future of the military forces. He expressed in convincing terms, declaring that it would be necessary urgently to pay the army which was many months in arrears. He was clearly aware that if such payments were not made the revolution would be unavoidable.

It was in this atmosphere of difficulties that by the early 1820 the accounts with England still had found no arrangement(56). In addition to this, the question of the plunder in the meantime had been reopened. On 11 April 1820(57) the British authorities replied to a note which had been sent them on 15 March, "relative to the claim of the Portuguese Army on account of the prizes made during the late war in the Peninsula by the combined armies under the command of His Grace the Duke of Wellington". The main point alleged by the Portuguese was respecting to the property which had been captured at Bordeaux. As this question was attacked by Beresford and government together, the British authorities declared that they would consent that a person be appointed who was able "of investigating the accounts and reporting what proportion of the value of the captured property came into the possession of the officers of the British and Portuguese governments respectively, and were subsequently applied to the uses of those governments or Armies".

This Portuguese initiative must be simultaneously interpreted as a concern to repair an injustice, but at the same time this denoted an evident crisis of financial nature which, according to the governors' opinion at that time began to be desperate(58).

The British authorities paid, therefore, the greatest attention to everything which could affect their interests in Portugal. On 29 July 1820 Ward wrote to Castlereagh informing him in the following terms(59): "I have heard it hinted that this government intend to put a stop to the exportation of coin from this country to England..." To this he added: "I have deemed it necessary to apprise you of the possibility of a seizure to a considerable amount being made should this threat be put in execution".

Two weeks later, there is still evidence that the investigations on the accounts between the two governments went on. At that time the British authorities claimed from the government of Portugal the value of certain military supplies furnished during the late Peninsular war to the Portuguese Regiment of cavalry under the command of Colonel Higgens[60].

On 24 August the revolution broke out in Oporto and the subsequent events caused the suspension of relations between the two countries, remaining in this state by the end of the year[61]. In consequence of this it may be suggested that by that time the financial questions, respecting the war between the two countries, had still not been resolved.

III. DECLINE OF THE BRITISH INFLUENCE IN PORTUGAL AFTER THE WAR UNTIL THE 1820 REVOLUTION

When the British Army was sent to the Peninsula to support the resistance against the French invasions, the commanding officers delivered the command of Portuguese units raised at the same time to British officers as often as possible. This was naturally exploited by the common enemy. On 30th November 1810 the "Moniteur"[1] asserted that the Portuguese did not like the British while it added that British officers had taken the places of Portuguese and as a consequence many disputes had arisen between the officers from the two countries.

Portuguese authorities reacted to what they saw as an attempt to provoke dissension among the Anglo-Portuguese forces, something already attempted by Soult in 1809. Nevertheless it was well known that some Portuguese officers had accompanied the Prince Regent to Brazil, others had fled to France to fight under Napoleon's orders and others had been lost in the chaos caused by the French invasions. Even so there were good relations between British and Portuguese officers. In March 1809, the mob of Braga had killed General Bernardim Freire. Then his assistant had asked the British officer, Baron d'Eben to take command of the forces facing the French. Afterwards the author of the response to the "Moniteur" affirmed that British officers commanded Portuguese troops in defending Portugal just as the French had sent the Spanish army commanded by the Marquis de la Romana to fight in Denmark and Holland while the troops from the Confederation of the Rhine were sent to fight in the Peninsula.

The end of the war came on 30 May 1814[3]. On 12 September 1814 Beresford wrote to Castlereagh informing him that several conversations had taken place on that matter between himself and D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz, Minister of War in the presence of Mr Casamayor, British Chargé d'Affaires in Lisbon[4]. From those conversations and according to the letter, the attitudes had already hardened. D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz argued that British officers should be either reduced or excluded from the army as quickly as possible, leaving not

more than one Major General, two Brigadiers, two Colonels, two Lieutenant Colonels, two Majors and thirty captains. He pointed out that the maintenance of any large number would be displeasing to the government and bear heavily upon its finances.

Beresford complained that this view had been formed without the advice of the Commander in Chief and in his own absence and merely served private interests. He reminded Castlereagh that the Portuguese authorities were unacquainted with the old system of abuses which had prevailed before 1809. Beresford informed Castlereagh that it was impossible for him to tell the Lisbon government all the reasons why it should retain a considerable number of British officers without giving offence. He alleged "that the Portuguese officers, even the best we have at present, will not control their inferiors, or enforce rigidly or scarcely at all, the orders and regulations for the Army...".

As D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz was not prepared to compromise, Beresford agreed to an annual reduction "to any number the government thought fit finally to retain". This was also unacceptable to Forjaz. As a consequence Beresford proposed to Castlereagh that "if the British government feel any interest in the maintenancy of the Portuguese Army, in a state of discipline, or as an Army, it would certainly be right that some estimation of that nature should be made to the Court of Brazil before its return, as no doubt whatever, it will be attempted to prejudice it, more by Private, than by Public letters...". The final part of the letter permits us to conclude that Beresford was convinced that the course of the matter would lead to a way subjected to his own view and influence, as it may be evaluated through these terms: "I shall in the meantime continue to put in practice the system I submitted to your Lordship, and which met your concurrence, and I shall send from this service as many of the British officers as I consider this service can dispense with at this period, and which will not be few".

There is evidence that on 5 October two lists of officers were announced. The first one was entitled: "Return of officers now serving in the Portuguese Army"(5). It listed one hundred and

two names and it indicated the British Rank and Regiments as well as the dates of the British commissions. The officers' names were followed by those of twelve staff surgeons. A second list, under the title "Return of British Officers removed from the Portuguese service"[6] contained seventy-six names of British officers with the name of their Regiments. Moreover it included one Inspector General of Hospital and twelve staff surgeons.

The return of the Portuguese Royal Family to Lisbon seemed to be the aim of the British authorities in both Rio de Janeiro and in London. On 20 February 1814, Viscount Strangford wrote to Castlereagh that "His Royal Highness has explicitly stated to me, that as soon as ever Great Britain declared, that his return to Portugal is necessary, he will accede to any intimation to that effect."[7].

While the Prince Regent's mind seems to have been wavering by the end of the war, a number of reasons advised his return after it. On 25 July, Castlereagh reminded him of the "intelligence of the capitulation of Paris, the fall of Bonaparte, the re-establishment of the two Houses of Bourbon on the thrones of France and Spain, and the reduction of France within the limits of 1792". He added that measures had already been taken to prepare a British squadron to assist in convoying the Portuguese Royal Family from Brazil to Portugal, "under the command of Sir John Beresford, brother of the Field Marshal to attend him to Europe"...[8].

On 26 August the Foreign Office ordered that a squadron be readied for that purpose[9] and one month later Earl Bathurst informed Strangford that a squadron of British warships were ordered to Rio de Janeiro[10]. On 25 January 1815 Strangford informed Castlereagh that His Royal Highness alleged that he must remain at his residence in Rio "at least till he should have placed this country in a perfect state of security..."[11]. Despite this other negotiations proceeded between the two governments. On 21 January 1815 a Convention between the two nations was drawn up in Vienna relative to the indemnification of Portuguese subjects for certain detained Slave trade vessels[12].

It was stipulated in the first article "that the sum of £300,000 be paid in London...in discharge of claims for Portuguese ships detained by British cruisers previous to the 1st day of June 1814, upon the alleged ground of carrying on an illicit traffic in slaves".

In the following day, also at Vienna, a treaty[13] was drawn up by the representatives[14] of the two nations to restrict the Portuguese slave trade as well as to annul the Convention of 1809 and the Treaty of Alliance of 1810. The main consequence of this treaty derived from its fifth article which stipulated: "His Britannic Majesty hereby agrees to remit, from the date at which the Ratification mentioned in the 1st article shall be promulgated, such further payments as may then remain due and payable upon the Loan of £600,000, made in London for the service of Portugal in the year 1809".

On 11 February 1815 the Conde de Palmela, A. Saldanha Gama and Joaquim Lobo da Silveira proposed to Castlereagh that Portugal would definitively abolish the slave trade within a period of eight years if the treaty of 1810 was also abolished[15]. Two days later, they received Castlereagh's reply, declaring that he was only concerned to quickly abolish the slave trade unconditionally since it was regarded as one of the principal tasks of his government. At the same time he offered to open new talks having in view some adjustments of the treaty taking into consideration the most recent circumstances[16].

Napoleon's flight from Elba precipitated renewed hostilities with France. On 25 March 1815 Austria, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia concluded a treaty to maintain the conditions of the treaty of peace concluded at Paris the 30 of May 1814[17]. During the negociations on the arrangements after the war, Castlereagh defended a policy of non intervention. He had as his main concern to guarantee the British hegemony in terms of international concert. At the same time he did not accept the imposition of any government even upon France[18]. On the contrary other powers such as Austria and Russia disputed the leadership of the international concert and admitted actions anywhere to guarantee the peace[19].

All the events after the end of the war did not favour the Portuguese interests. On 8th April, Portugal adhered to the treaty of Alliance of the 25 March 1815. One of its clauses stipulated that Portugal would provide 30,000 men, 3,000 of cavalry and 27,000 of infantry[20]. The performance of this point implied an authorization of the Prince Regent which led to a considerable delay in the indispensable operations. The necessary post-war arrangements were established in the Congress of Vienna by June 1815. The British hegemony was recognized[21]. Its support could be important for Portugal which claimed the recovery of Olivença held by Spain. The 105th article of the general treaty recognised "the justice of the claims of H.R.H. the Prince Regent of Portugal and the Brazils, upon the town of Olivença and the other territories ceded to Spain by the Treaty of Badajoz of 1801..."[22]. Nevertheless no date was fixed and that stipulation was never carried out. Such fact was constantly exploited by Portuguese newspapers published in London as having been a result of a position of neutrality on the part of England and at the same time a lack of capacity on the part of Conde Palmela and his two collaborators, although they insisted frequently on its return to Portugal[23].

In the sequence of the events after the Congress of Vienna a new political fact occurred which seized the initiative in international relations from British hands. This was the emergence of the Holy Alliance proposed by Tsar Alexander I of Russia.

Alexander, the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria solemnly declared that their object was only "both in the administration of their respective states, and in their political relations with every other government, to take for their sole guide the precepts of that Holy Religion; namely the precepts of justice, Christian charity and peace"...[24] Such principles perfectly identified with the traditional monarchies and contrasted with the liberal traditions. In terms of international relations the Holy Alliance appeared to support the absolutist monarchies. Apparently the Royal Family in Rio de Janeiro would take advantage from this fact for the future.

England did not adhere to the Holy Alliance. This position was coherent with the principle of non-intervention defended by Castlereagh. This contrasted clearly with the instructions of the Holy Alliance in defending that its principles "must have an immediate influence on the Councils of Princes, and guide all their steps, as being the only means of consolidating human institutions, and remedying their imperfections..."[25] It is possible that this new political fact was a weighty factor in the maintenance of the Portuguese Royal Family in Brazil. At the same time it should not be forgotten that by that time the struggle for the independence of the Spanish colonies was under way.

On 20 November, the Second Peace of Paris was concluded, differing from the first one "in limiting France to the frontiers of 1790, in imposing the payment of an indemnity, and in providing for an allied army of occupation in France"[26]. In its fourth article it stipulated that "the pecuniary part of the indemnity to be furnished by France to the Allied Powers be fixed at the sum of 700 millions francs, being the mode, the periods and the guarantees for its payment regulated by a special Convention. Portugal presented well founded reasons to obtain a considerable, but just share in the indemnity.

But the Duke of Wellington was the principal member of the commission to resolve the indemnities question and he placed many obstacles in the way of the Portuguese claims[27].

The series of post-war treaties was crowned on 20 November 1815 by the treaty of Alliance and Friendship between Great Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia (Quadruple Alliance), signed at Paris[28]. It strengthened the previous agreements as a measure of securing the peace, but it altered nothing at all, on the level of international relations. Meanwhile, in Portugal, by the month of August, public opinion was surprised by some occurrences which were signs of a grave crisis in the army. It seems that several times Beresford attempted to go to Brazil but he was not authorized to do so. At last he chartered a vessel on his own account and the Council of Regency could not oppose him.

It was known that Beresford pretended to enforce his powers in the army. He did not admit that the promotions and many details on

organization could be subjected to the Council of Regency.

On 10 August 1815 at the moment of embarking, the Marshal was surrounded by a strong group of officers as a signal of their gratitude for his valuable services paid during the war and at the same time a way of protesting against the Council of Regency in Lisbon, particularly against D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz, Minister of War[29]. The same source recorded that at the same time the Portuguese army had reverted to a state of general indiscipline.
A year earlier Beresford had written to Castlereagh and foresaw the state of indiscipline in the event of the British officers being removed from the Portuguese army[30].

The question of the British officers had really created a crisis within the Army. The future of Beresford in its leadership was an incognita. By the end of 1815 between the governments of both Portugal and England, there were mainly the following questions: the British officers in the Portuguese army; the neutrality of the British over the Portuguese claim to recover Olivença; the financial and material adjustments connected with the end of war; British resistence against a treaty to replace that of 19 February 1810[31]; resistence of the British merchants residing in Oporto against the war contribution[32] and resistance of the Portuguese government against the abolition of the Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro demanded by the British merchants[33].

During 1816 there is evidence that the British authorities paid particular attention to the security of the Peninsula. By early that year Castlereagh requested information from Ward on the defensive system of the Portuguese ports. On 25 April, Charles Stuart, who was British representative at Paris, wrote to Wellington informing him that there was a society of people in London who were unfriendly to the cause of the Spanish government and that they were supporting anti-government actions in Paris according to the statements of Spanish subjects who had been arrested[35]. On the same day Stuart also wrote to Castlereagh providing him with numerous details on the plot. He added that the analysis of the documents seized permitted him to conclude that

there was an extensive conspiracy against the Spanish government. As evidence of these conspiratory activities Stuart informed London that some of the conspirators had been members of the Spanish Cortes and others connected with the Department of Finance at Madrid[36].

Meanwhile the question of the British officers justified detailed instructions sent from Castlereagh to Ward. As Beresford had not yet returned from Brazil, Castlereagh instructed Ward to gain time till the Marshal's arrival. When Ward though fit he was ordered to confer with the Field Marshal and subsequently to notify D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz upon the decision taken by the House of Commons[37].

One month later, Ward informed D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz that there was no intention to recall the British officers who were in the Portuguese army. Nevertheless the instructions added: "His royal Highness the Prince Regent for maintaining on full pay those officers holding commissions in this service as well as in that of His Most Faithful Majesty, have not been provided fora period extending beyond the 24 December of the present year, after which date those British officers continuing to serve in the army of Portugal will (on the score of any British allowance) be considered as entitled only to the usual half pay allotted to their respective ranks in His Britannic Majesty's service"[38]. Such determination implied heavy expenses for the Portuguese Treasury which it was clearly unable to bear. In the meantime Beresford had arrived from Brazil bringing with him many decrees signed by D. João VI, implementing the military reforms advocated by the British Marshal . The principal of them was the alvará published on 21 February 1816 by which was established the "Regulamento para a Organização do Exército em Portugal".[39]. Nevertheless Beresford's desire for the absolute control of the army was never achieved.

On 26 October Ward wrote to Castlereagh that he was extremely pessimistic in regard to the future of British interests in Portugal[40] and by the end of 1816 and early 1817, the affair the British officers had become clearly political, out of the control of Beresford.

In November Portuguese troops had occupied the province of Banda

Oriental (Montevideo)[41]. This event was discussed on 19 March 1817 in the House of Commons. Castlereagh was hostile to the intervention and concerned with the collaboration of British officers in hostilities against states which were not at war with England[42].

Three days earlier the representatives in Paris of Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia, stimulated by Ferdinand VII had protested against that occupation of the Banda Oriental[43]. This meant that the government in Brazil was creating a crisis between the principal members of the Holy Alliance with which the Spanish government was connected by family and political ties.

At the same time a revolutionary movement had broken out in Pernambuco[44] while the growing friction between Beresford and the governors in Lisbon caused a certain vulnerability in the regime. On 26th April, the situation had deteriorated. Ward informed Castlereagh that "Marshal General Lord Beresford finds all his endeavours to carry into effect the system recommended by him and approved by the King for the formation of the government and maintenance of the army of this country so effectually opposed in all its details by the authorities here, that he has resolved to send his military secretary, Lieut.Gen. the Viscount of Juromenha lay before His Majesty a true account of the state of the case. That officer will sail from hence in the course of the next week"[45]. Apparently it seemed that only a new and significant event would place Beresford and the Council on the same side.

In May the kingdom was surprised by the discovery of a conspiracy which was designed to ensure national independence and bring despotism to an end[46]. The persons who were arrested on the night of 25 and 26, and the documents seized, permitted the conclusion that the revolutionary movement had as its principal aim, the establishment of a liberal regime which would not be compatible with the maintenance of Beresford in his post[47]. The death penalty which was meted out to General Bernardim Gomes Freire de Andrade and other culprits naturally reflected on Beresford's relations with the army. The disagreements between Beresford and D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz

also had to be overcome since they were the leaders against the conspiracy and for the future they had to face the common enemy.

The British newspapers had discussed the conspiracy, manifesting some satisfaction on its discovery, even though the Baron d'Eben was said to be involved[48]. Meanwhile the conspiracy was unsuccessful but the ideal of revolution did not finish with the reaction commanded by Beresford and D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz during the period between May and October.

Under the initiative of Manuel Fernandes Tomás on 21 January 1818 an association called "Sinédrio" was created at Oporto inspired by liberal and masonic ideas and having as its principal objective "observar os acontecimentos em Portugal e Espanha, tomando devagar o pulso às tendencias e aspirações do espírito público"[49]. It is evident that the regents in Lisbon paid greatest attention to such initiatives. On 30 March 1818 they ordered the prohibition of secret societies[50]. This was an unequivocal sign that there was a revolutionary movement in Portugal and the authorities recognized the necessity of using repression.

British policy in terms of international relations continued to be conducted under principles which did not admit any interventions into the internal affairs of other countries. The members of the Holy Alliance considered themselves to be the defenders of the peace and of the tranquility of others and believed that they could intervene militarily in the affairs of the Iberian Peninsula.

The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle held in November 1818 decided upon the "withdrawal of the occupation army from France and re-admitted France to the meetings of the Powers"[51]. On 15 of that month the five cabinets of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia and Russia signed a declaration of principles which seems to have been influenced by the policy defended by Castlereagh. The doctrine which defended the "perpetual and continuous surveillance over the domestic affairs of their smaller neighbours, or of each other" was repudiated[52]. The importance of the peace, the concord, the moderation and the justice were highly praised during the Congress. But after the Congress the

prevailing doctrine was unquestionably reactionary and characterized by absolutism[53].

By early 1819 Beresford was absent once more. The state of the army seemed to have deteriorated more and more, according to a letter from Ward to Castlereagh which was sent on 19 February. Any project initiated by the Marshal was withdrawn under the pretext of lack of money[54]. There is evidence that by June Beresford visited Oporto and Aveiro but it seems that his contacts were only established with John Crispin and representatives of commercial interests[55]. Finally on January 1 1820 a liberal revolution broke out in Spain[56]. The course of the events was followed closely by both Great Britain and the members of the Holy Alliance. The newspapers from Madrid were the subject of great arguments.

Paris, Vienna and London were the places where the major arguments took place. The powers of the Holy Alliance pressed for intervention and planned possible action should the same thing happen in Portugal[57].

England once again advocated an independent policy, even after Ferdinand VII adhered to the Constitution imposed by the revolutionary movement. On 5 May Castlereagh refused to use force in the internal affairs of other states[58] and one week later informed the Portuguese Court of the English position[59].

His position naturally discouraged immediate measures demanded by some Holy Alliance members. Nevertheless the British interests in Portugal were hegemonic.. So that, naturally the British authorities would neither plan any aggressive action nor counter-revolution. It may be said that they attempted to avoid revolution with urgent reforms in accordance with the Prince Regent. With such objective in mind, Beresford went to Brazil, arriving there by the middle of May, according to a long letter sent to Duke of Wellington by himself from Rio de Janeiro on June 1st.[60] Beresford said that D. João VI and his ministers feared a repetition of the Spanish events in Portugal. But due to the distance and to the safety in which they found Brazil, they could not understand the imminent danger of a revolution in Portugal.

D. João VI did not feel disposed to return immediately to Portugal as Beresford had requested. At the same time he was prepared to allow the Prince Royal to go back to Portugal, although with limited power. Beresford told him that the government in Lisbon had no real control over public revenue neither in its collection nor distribution. Many abuses had occurred under the responsibility of Marquis of Borba and Count of Peniche.

The problem of Beresford's dependence on D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz, Minister of War, was also discussed as well as the responsibility which should be attributed to this Minister for the miserable situation in which the economy found itself.

Beresford's solution to the Portuguese crisis was his participation in the Council of Regency with the right of vote on all matters as well as the command of the army with total independence. This meant that the new organization of the army enacted in 1816 was not sufficient guarantee to him. On 30 July Beresford wrote to the Duke of Wellington informing him that he had been appointed as "Marshal-General Junto à Real Pessoa" with every authority in Portugal entirely independent of the government[61]. At that time he added: "I will not say that no change will take place in the next 10 or 12 days". His doubts, therefore, were dissipated since D. João VI, on the previous day had given the command of the army in accordance with Beresford's request [62].

The terms of the decree published ensured the total independence of Beresford especially in relation to D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz, Minister of War. At the same time the decree omitted any reference to Beresford's claim by which he intended to participate in the meetings to which he had claimed a right. In this point Beresford was unsuccessful since he confessed to Wellington that on the one hand it was necessary to prevent the formality of being declared as one of the governors but on other hand it was necessary for him to participate when he thought it fit[63].

By early August Beresford had not yet arrived from Brazil, but Ward informed constantly Castlereagh on the course of events. On 7 of the same month Ward made once more an analysis on the state

of things at that time[64]. He did not believe that an immediate revolution was possible. In his view, the circumstances were favourable for the establishment of a Constitution and much less so for a union with Spain. Despite this Ward was concerned with the conduct of many Spaniards in Lisbon. He confessed that they were "very capable of working dissatisfaction into disloyalty and it is remarked that there are no steps taken by the Police to restrain the agitators". At the same time he added that the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires was violent "in his expression of disapprobation of the actual government here; and this seems mingled with an undisguised jealousy of the favourable footing upon which the British interests in this country are placed". Ward regretted the financial crisis which had brought "an arrear of many months in the pay of the Army and of officers on half pay". He expressed the opinion that if the troops were punctually paid, all the intrigues on the part of Spain would be harmless.

Ward recognized that the state of things was dangerous but he supposed that the popular sentiment was "still very far removed from a motive to action". On 18 August the British consul at Oporto, John Crispin requested William Hamilton to go to England, invoking family affairs, consequence of six years, spent without interruption, at his post[65]. This attitude suggests that he had no suspicion that a revolution might break out. On the following day continued to observe the Spanish Chargé d'Affairs in Lisbon, D. José Maria de Pando and informed Castlereagh of his movements. At that time there were many Spanish refugees of the Royalist party in Portugal. Under this pretext D. José Maria Pando requested the Portuguese government to negotiate their repatriation. Nevertheless Ward considered that that attitude was "more with a view to making out a grievance, than any real anxiety respecting the individuals themselves"[66].

Five days later, revolution broke out in Oporto[67]. The analysis of the available documents permits us to suppose that only Beresford had attempted to prevent it. His contacts in Rio de Janeiro were designed to make alterations in the Council of

Regency, organization of the army, administration and reforms in the economy[68]. The revolutionary movement demonstrates therefore that British influence in Portugal was precarious at best. The Portuguese newspapers published in London exaggerated the British support for the regime because they overestimated Beresford's power, and were unaware of the extent to which the Council was determined to limit his influence. At the same time they failed to note that Castlereagh did not perceive that Beresford was a representative of the British government. In commercial terms they misread the crisis as a result of the overbearing influence on the part of British traders.

IV. THE POLICY OF NON-INTERVENTION AND PROTECTION TO THE COMMERCIAL INTERESTS AFTER THE REVOLUTION

The revolution broke out in Oporto on 24 August. The proclamation to the Army by the military leaders[1] as well as that to the people of Portugal by the Junta Provisional do Governo Supremo do Reino[2] presented as immediate objectives of the revolution: the formation of a provisional government and the convocation of the Cortes to prepare a Constitution which ensured the rights of the citizens[3].

The revolution was inspired by liberal principles and masonic ideas. Its outbreak was realized under the action of both representatives of the army and members of the Sinedrio founded in January 1818[4]. On the revolution's day, John Crispin, British consul at Oporto, wrote to Ward, informing him of the events adding that the British officers attached to the army had been suspended from their commands and double guards had been placed at all the ports[5]. On the following day, the consul wrote that business would continue without interruption even though as a consequence of the events the discount on paper money had fallen and it was supposed that an order, prohibiting the export of bullion would be published immediately[6].

Two days later, Ward had not be informed of the movement at Oporto. He wrote to Castlereagh informing him that M. Saldanha, Portuguese Envoy in Madrid, would be included as a governor of the Kingdom or one of the two secretaries as a result of the Beresford's contacts with D. João VI in Rio de Janeiro[7]. Moreover he confessed his and the army's expectation that Beresford would rapidly return.

Meanwhile at Oporto, everything was becoming clearer. On 24 Frederick Jebb, first surgeon of the army, had been suspended under the pretext that the new order of things did not consent his continuation in the army[8]. The same order was probably given to all the serving British officers since on 26 John Crispin informed William Hamilton that they continued to arrive from the province" and others are shortly expected from the distant parts of the north"[9]. At the same time

the consul said that the "Provisional Government had called upon the treasurers of the public revenue for the balances in their hands, and it is said large sums have been offered by individuals".

In the meantime some doubts had arisen on the fate of the British officers since it was rumoured that they had been suspended from duties and not dismissed. Their pay had been guaranteed and meanwhile they had been informed that they might remain till the meeting of the Cortes[10]. John Crispin believed that Brigadier Maxwell Grant and other officers, who were very popular in the army were under home arrest[11]. At the same time he had been concerned that other consuls established at Oporto had been officially informed on the new order of things on the 26 [12].

Only on the 28 did he receive a letter signed by José Ferreira Borges informing him that the events which had taken place at Oporto "em nada altera, nem as relaçoens commerciaes, nem quaesquer outras que até então subsistão entre a Nação Portugueza, e aquella cujos interesses V.nce aqui promove, no lugar em que se acha". As indication of goodwill, the letter still added: "Quer tambem a Junta que Vmce se persuada que Ella aproveitará com particular satisfação, qualquer occasião de prestar a Vmce todos os auxilios conforme as Leys do Paíz e Tractados existentes, para que Vmce possa mui pontualmente desempenhar seus deveres"[13].

As a consequence the relations between the new government and England were clarified unilaterally. The British officers continued to be suspended and the reaction of the London's authorities was an incognita. It became also necessary to know which position was being taken in other parts of the realm: the Council in Lisbon and D. João VI and his government in Rio de Janeiro. At the same time the new government wished to discover the reaction of other European powers.

Meanwhile the revolution followed its course. On 28 the Junta in Oporto directed a proclamation to the inhabitants encouraging them for the revolution and at the same time it informed the Alto Douro region that the Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto

Douro would continue in operation[14].

By the same time Conde Amarante made a proclamation in Tras-os-Montes against the revolution and the same position was taken by the Tenente general, Antonio Marcelino de Victoria in Beira Alta[15]. At last the position of the governors was known. On 29 they made a proclamation against the political events at Oporto[16] and at the same time they requested the financial aid of the British government to compensate the losses of the revenues in the north caused by the revolutionary events[17]. Three days later the governors announced the convocation of the Cortes[18].

At the same time, John Crispin faced a delicate situation in Oporto. He received all the documents sent by the Junta and corresponded with José Ferreira Borges[19]. Moreover he confined himself to sending them to the British authorities in Lisbon, but he regretted that he had no instructions to deal with the present crisis. John Crispin established contacts with the French consul who was following the same line of conduct[20]. Meanwhile the authorities in London did not know of events at Oporto. This was normal since only on 29 the news of the revolution were known in Lisbon. Ward informed Castlereagh and sent him copies of publications from both the Junta in Oporto and the governors in Lisbon[21]. Ward suggested that only the Conde Amarante would alter the course of the revolution and informed that he had established contacts with Conde Palmela who would be in the disposition of proceeding immediately to Rio de Janeiro in the Frigate Creole.

On the same day the French chargé d'Affaires in Lisbon sent copies of the same documents to the French authorities, but he did not add any comment[22]. On 31 John Crispin informed William Hamilton that the Conde Amarante had mounted a cordon across Trás-os-Montes against the Junta while the General Pamplona ensured support in Aveiro and Coimbra[23].

Two days later the same information was confirmed, being added that the Junta had decided the continuation of the Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro. This was regretted by John Crispin who added that that would meet with opposition from some of the members of the Junta[24].

The signs of resistance against the revolution appeared to alarm the revolutionary movement and on 2 September the Junta proclaimed: "Portugueses! Temos forças, temos meios de sustentar a mossa causa. Ella éjusta, é tambem a causa dos nossos vizinhos, os hespanhoes, e por isso tropas d'elles occupam já nossas fronteiras na Galliza, aonde se acham promptas a auxiliar a nossa independencia"(25).

Despite all the political and military events, commercial life continued uninterrupted at Oporto. The custom house had been closed on Thursday, 24 August but was reopened in normal conditions on the following day(26). Nevertheless many feared for the future. On 3rd September a British merchant wrote to the British authorities in Lisbon, indicating that the Junta had requested assistance from Spanish forces. He foresaw that one week later, decisive events must occur due to resistance of Conde Amarante and General Pamplona who had known the plans of the revolution and in consequence of this, the revolutionary movement had to anticipate its outbreak(27). The merchant confessed persuaded that ships of war coming from Lisbon would surround the coast around Oporto while the Generals Pamplona and Victoria would operate on the land. Then he added: "...in any case our situation here will not be very agreeable".

By that time an atmosphere of tension prevailed in Lisbon. In consequence of this, on 2 September four British merchants requested the British Consul General that "it was highly desirable that British subjects and their property should have some protection to which to recur in case of absolute necessity; what it would be very satisfactory that H.M.S. "Creole", cap. McKenzie, the only vessel of war in this port, should remain here for a short time"(28).

The British merchants established on the island of Madeira also asked Bathurst for protection. They argued that there were many English families residing in the Island and "many merchants with extensive mercantile to the amount of several hundred thousand pounds is invested". According to their opinion, the majority of the Island's population supported D. João VI (it seems that they did not know the positions

taken by the Revolutionary Junta), but they feared the outbreak of revolution[29].

Meanwhile in Lisbon there was tension but the situation remained unclear. On 6 September the Conde da Feira (D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz) requested Ward to delay the departure of the English Frigate Creole, arguing that Conde Palmela had to remain in Lisbon for some days. At the same time the governors confessed to Ward that the best service which could be paid by Beresford to the Kingdom would be his withdrawal from Portugal after his arrival from Brazil[30]. The captain of the Creole protested against the delay, alleging the weather and lack of instructions[31].

Ward reacted, requiring the vessel to delay until the 18 as the governors had requested arguing that it was necessary to support the Council of Regency against the revolutionary Junta and to protect the British merchants and their properties who were, he felt, very much alarmed by events[32]. At that time, Ward took that position under his own responsibility since there is no evidence, until then, of any instructions from London. Only on 9 September the French ambassador in London informed through Dépêche Télégraphique de Paris on the events which had taken place in Portugal[33]. On the following day Duc Decazesrequested Castlereagh a personal contact to discuss the matter[34]. This attitude seems to be an indication of friendly relations between the English and French governments.

In Oporto the British consul continued to be in contact with his French colleague. On 9 he complained that the communication with Lisbon had ceased and he continued "without information from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires or the consul General"[35].

It was only on 9 that in Lisbon the Council through Conde da Feira, acting on their own behalf, notified the representatives of the foreign governments of the events in Oporto and informed them that the Cortes would be convoked and that the provinces of Alentejo, Algarve, Estremadura, Tras-os-Montes and Beiras remained on their side, against the Junta of Oporto[36]. Three days later, Ward transmitted this information to Castlereagh, but he observed: "I have heard

my colleagues of France, Austria and Russia complain much of the reserve used towards them by that Minister (D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz). I cannot myself boast of being treated by His Excellency with any greater confidence"[37]. On the following day Ward informed Castlereagh that the governors had ordered that the British officers in Lisbon should be replaced so as to avoid any tension between them and local officers[38].

By that time, from Oporto, General Blunt had written to Castlereagh, informing him that the British officers were respected by the new authorities in the North of the Kingdom. He predicted that the King would not disapprove them since they had not compromised him in their duty[39]. Moreover General Blunt believed that the garrisons in Lisbon would immediately unite with the rebels in the north[40]. On the same day, 13 of September, Castlereagh expressed an early hint of the position to be assumed by his government. As Conde da Feira had sent him a letter, Castlereagh replied that no financial aid could be given to the Governors. Such decision would only be taken by Parliament and at that time there were no possibilities of satisfying their request. The assistance of a British squadron, he argued, could be counter-productive and he added: "...De resto, à vista das más disposições em que os Portugueses se acham a nosso respeito, qualquer demonstração que fizessemos em favor da causa de el-rei, serviria só talvez de os afastar da lealdade, que ao menos apparentemente professam a sua magestade, e lhes offereceria um pretexto para se lançarem nos braços dos hespanhoes, o que é da maior importancia procurar evitar"[41].

As consequence it may be concluded that British policy was not designed to deter the revolution. In the meantime the concern for the defence of the commercial interests was constantly manifested. By 16 September John Crispin wrote to William Hamilton, informing him that troops of the Provisional Junta would have reached Coimbra on their way to the capital. At the same time he believed that Conde Amarante would be stopped at Orense and General Victoria at Guarda. On the morning of that same day pickets of militia men had been placed along the sea shore. Nevertheless there was no interruption

of British trade and navigation[42].

In Lisbon, Ward expressed his satisfaction, because everything continued in a state of tranquillity "which it is to be hoped will not be disturbed"[43]. Meanwhile Lisbon was considered the place in which the revolutionary cause would be gained at last. M. Pando, Spanish Chargé d'Affaires continued his anti-British propaganda[44], showing himself to be the only foreign representative concerned with influencing the direction of the events.

The governors intensified their contacts in Europe[45] looking for support. Nevertheless their endeavours were in vain. The union of the revolutionary movement with that of Lisbon occurred on October 1st. On the following day the new political power transmitted to Mr. Edward Michael Ward, Chargé d'Affaires of His Britannic Majesty that the union of the temporary government established in Lisbon with the Provisional Junta of the Supreme Government of the Kingdom of Portugal had been publicly declared in accordance with the annexed letter and decree. Furthermore the document added: "The Provisional Junta of the Supreme government of the Kingdom hopes that this event will not disturb, but rather facilitate the relations of good understanding and friendship existing between the two nations"[46].

At that time the position of the government in Rio de Janeiro continued to be unknown. The British government did not recognize the revolutionary power, which impeded the direct dialogue between the two parties. This point was complicated by the problem caused by the arrival of Beresford from Rio de Janeiro which occurred on 10 October, on board the Vengeur[47].

The new government refused to authorize the landing of Beresford, invoking the threat to public order which would result. At the same time it was pointed out that the Vengeur could remain at the Tagus but the general was ordered to leave in the packet Arabella which was to depart[48]. Captain Maitland of the Vengeur refused to depart without being instructed from London[49] while the packet Lady

Arabella was instructed to remain in Lisbon until the arrival of the other one[50].

Hermano Jozé Braancamp de Sobral, minister for Foreign Affairs in the new government had to take up many issues directly with the ship's captain. He had to take care of the delivery of many boxes of money which had been carried from Rio de Janeiro. Only on 16 October was this completed[51]. Hermano Jozé Braancamp de Sobral informed in detail Lord Castlereagh and justified the government's refusal to allow Beresford to disembark. He invoked once again that the public tranquillity could be disturbed. Even so Hermano Sobral recognized, referring to Beresford, "his efforts, experience and talents towards effecting the Restoration of these realms in 1808 and expelling the common enemy"[52].

Before his departure on 18 October, Beresford had been visited by four British officers of high rank. They were also instructed to leave the country immediately[53]. This fact was mentioned in the official gazette which added, however, that it was not a proof of hostility against the British nation[54]. This care on the part of the revolutionary government was justified by events elsewhere.

By that time the revolutionary events in Spain, those in Portugal and in Naples, provoked a reaction from the Holy Alliance. Tsar Alexander of Russia was anxious to commit military forces to the Peninsula while Matternich used Austrian rights in Italy to restore order in South[55]. The Congress of Troppau inspired mainly by Alexander, began in mid October[56]. The British government took no formal part, though Lord Stewart, British ambassador at Vienna, was present with a "watching brief"[57].

The positions were known. The members of the Holy Alliance admitted the intervention in other states. The British policy of non-intervention did not support any proposal of intervention. This policy , coherently applied in Portugal did not affect the commercial interests. In terms of international policy such an attitude benefited the liberal government of Portugal, because it discouraged in a certain

measure the Holy Alliance from carrying out any aggressive actions against Portugal.

On 18 October Castlereagh wrote to Ward, approving his prudent and firm line of conduct pursued during the events and at the same time he observed: "In the present state of affairs the King is not prepared to accredit you to the existing authorities at Lisbon, but this need not interfere with your informal residence there for the transaction of the ordinary intercourse between the two countries. You will however abstain from expressing any opinion or performing any act until further orders, which might amount to a formal recognition of the new order of things on the part of your government..."(58) The instructions enjoined Ward to maintain and protect British subjects and their interests.

The question of the British officers remained unclear. Nevertheless on 28 October the commanders of the military units of the Beira, Minho and Tras-os-Montes, were instructed to inform British officers who had been in service with the Army that they should be present at a meeting which would take place at Oporto. Its purpose would be to discuss the most convenient destiny for each of them since they would have to sail on the first available ship(59).

At that time the position taken by the new government relative to the British seemed designed to assure political independence, exclusion of the officers and its desire fully to comply with existing treaties.

There is no evidence that the new government objected to the treaty of 19 February 1810 which had been so often the object of protests, before the outbreak of the revolution. On 8 November Castlereagh defined the main lines of his policy upon the Portuguese revolution in despatches sent to Lisbon, Madrid and to Lord Stewart, at the Congress of Troppau(60).

Firstly he recommended prudent reserve since the government in Portugal was not legitimated by the authority from the sovereign.

Secondly, Castlereagh ordered that relations between the subjects of the two crowns should be ruled by existing treaties "avoiding any ostentatious display either of intimacy or of hostile separation from those who have assumed the powers of government". He advised that ordinary business respecting to British subjects could justify contacts with the government, but at the same time ordered that Ward exclude himself from any official functions and of public character which compromised the Court.

Thirdly, Castlereagh argued that: "In the present state of things in Portugal, the best issue perhaps that could occur would be some amicable arrangement between the King and His European subjects". For this purpose he suggested Count Palmela as an intermediary who could successfully negotiate a settlement.

Fourthly, Castlereagh considered the possibility of intervention by members of the Holy Alliance as follows: "Whatever turn things may take, any menace on the part of this country or any supposition that our influence was likely to be employed, so as to favour vindictive measures or to recommend to the King to attempt a system of unqualified reaction, would as we conceive, be extremely prejudicial to the King as well as to the general interests.

Finally, Castlereagh recommended that direct correspondence be exchanged between the British ambassadors of Lisbon and Madrid and that "a vigilant eye was kept upon the conduct of the Spanish government and their agents in Portugal". In cases where some doubts existed he advised them to communicate and to concert their actions as far as circumstances permitted "with the agents of other Allied Powers resident at Lisbon, adhering however in all cases to the spirit of the instructions received from the government".

If other European countries had thought that the British would take an aggressive initiative against the Portuguese revolution, their belief was ungrounded. In consequence of this it was natural that the Spanish authorities should lessen anti-British pressure in Lisbon.

Castlereagh used his influence to face the anti-British sentiment expressed by the Spanish authorities[61]. On 9 December, Ward complained of M. Pando's conduct. At the same time Ward said that there were rumours about his removal from Portugal and an officer would take his place, who had played an active democratic role in the late affairs in Spain[62].

The decision by the Emperor of Austria to intervene in Naples was, according to Ward, creating great anxiety, since its political situation appeared to be very similar to that of Portugal. In an understandable reaction to the Austrian actions, on 15th December the Portuguese government directed a manifesto to the Portuguese nation as well as to the sovereigns and peoples of Europe, whose preamble was as follows:[63] "A Nação portugueza, animada do mais sincero e ardente desejo de manter as relações políticas e comerciais, que até agora a tem ligado a todos os governos e povos da Europa...julga de indispensavel necessidade offerecer ao publico a succinta, mas franca exposição das causas, que produziram os memoraveis acontecimentos ha pouco succedidos em Portugal". The analysis of all the sectors of the economic life which followed, pointed out the evident deficiencies on the part of the council of Regency which had been deposed.

If this document was not sufficiently convincing at least the British may have been aware that similar considerations had been levelled in the letters which Beresford had sent to Wellington from Brazil in June[64]. In these letters Beresford had stated that Forjaz and Conde de Peniche were responsible for the disaster which had overcome the Council.

It is unquestionable that the manifesto contained a contradiction in the policy of the Portuguese government. On the one hand it wished to maintain commercial relations with the other nations as before. On the other hand it criticised the 1810 treaty and considered it had been disastrous. At the same time the revolutionary government declared that it would remain faithful to it. Until the end of December 1820 there is no evidence of any objection to the treaty on the part of the government while the British merchants and Portuguese

firms continued trading[65]. Perhaps the treaty was more of a symbol than anything else.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Before the war the Portuguese economy in terms of balance of trade was considerably favourable. Since 1796 only in 1797 and 1799 had it shown a deficit lower than one million pounds. Its surplus was constant between 1800 and 1806, showing about £2 million in 1803, 1804 and 1806 while in 1802 and 1805 it was of about £1 million.

Portugal was involved in the war in 1807 and despite the difficulties the surplus remained during the years 1807 (£1.9 million), 1808 (£0.8 million) and 1809 (£0.2 million)[1]. In 1810 the circumstances changed for the worse, having reached more than £1 million of deficit. One year later that deficit ballooned to about £9 millions, the onset of disaster. From then onwards the deficit decreased, having been practically nullified by 1817 and back to about £1 million in 1818 and 1819.

As the Anglo-French conflict was seen as the impetus to Portuguese involvement it was natural that the Portuguese considered England and France as responsible for the difficulties which they had to face. Nevertheless the level of responsibility attributed to each of them was different. The French had invaded the Portuguese territory with a plan which had in view the destruction of national independence[2] while the English went to Portugal to fulfil a pledge and at the same time to defend their interests either in Portugal or in England. There is evidence that the conduct of the French troops was intolerable for their abuses of sequestrations, violations of goods and properties, robberies, etc.[3]. French sources say that the English troops followed a line of conduct very similar to that. but really there is no evidence that their conduct may be objected to[24]. The French had been expelled from Portugal by early 1811 while the British remained in Portugal during the war and some part of their officers, after it. The Portuguese newspapers which appeared in London were mainly partisans of the liberal ideas, defending principles of freedom, democracy, equality before the law, among others. For ideological reasons the Correio Braziliense did not attack the French and at the same time did not attack the British presence in Portugal during the war as this

presence had the support of the Prince Regent, whose legitimacy was never contested. The Correio Braziliense and the Investigador Portuguez em Inglaterra regarded the relations between Portugal and England as at many points justifying severe criticism either during or especially after the war.

The commercial relations between the two countries were a constant pretext for anti-British sentiment. This anti-British sentiment was exploited from two points, apparently contradictory. On the one hand the two newspapers attacked the British privileges in Portugal, mostly those which resulted from the stipulations of the treaty of 19th February 1810. On other hand they saw the British political system as something to be emulated. They pointed out that the members of the British Parliament were representatives of the social groups, defending the interests of every branch of trade, industry, etc. As a result, the British could draw up laws which defended their national interests. On the contrary the prevailing autocracy in the Portuguese system did not allow that the laws be drawn up with the same efficiency.

In general terms, the newspapers published in London attacked the British in Portugal while they flattered their institutions in England. They attacked the Council of the Kingdom in Portugal as well as the general government in Rio de Janeiro, protesting against their incapacity and denying its legitimacy. The newspapers were creating a public opinion which would be receptive to liberal ideas while, simultaneously, destroying the support of the autocratic, absolutist ideas of the political regime as well as the monopolies inherent in its economic structure.

The end of the war in 1814 created difficulties for British interests in Portugal. In the first place the British refused to alter the treaty of 1810[6] drawn up during the war in which the Portuguese saw their political and commercial relations interrupted with France and her allies. In the second place a large number of officers remained at the service of the Portuguese army[7]. Thirdly, during the negotiations of the post-war treaties, the representatives of the British policy did not defend Portuguese interests, especially on the return of Olivença[8] then held by Spain and claimed by the Portuguese. Fourthly,

the indemnity of 2,000,000 francs from France did not correspond either to the size of Portuguese forces or to their risks as was the case with the seizing of Bordeaux[9]. At the same time the commercial position of Portugal continued to deteriorate.

All this series of circumstances caused an anti-British sentiment which extended to the several groups of the Portuguese society[10]. After 1814 the two newspapers, the Correio Braziliense, the Investigador Portuguez em Inglaterra and still further O Portuguez, ou Mercurio Político, Commercial e Literário, created a strong wave of anti-British feeling exploiting the friction of the treaty of 1810. This criticism continued, even though the treaty was only slowly and partially implemented.

The treaty was very often attacked, but the most sensitive area was undoubtedly the presence of the British officers in the service of the Portuguese army. The idea of that Beresford detained significant power in Portugal and the British officers dominated the army, was constantly promoted and cleverly exploited by the newspapers[11]. Nevertheless, there is evidence that after the end of 1814 Beresford had lost ground to the governors and his principal opponent was D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz[12]. The only evidence of support for Beresford, after the end of war, occurred on 10 August 1815, when he was about to depart for Brazil, from where he intended to reinforce his powers[13].

After his return from Brazil he faced heavy resistance on the part of the governors[14]. The discovery of the conspiracy of 1817, apparently led many to predict that the divergence of Beresford with the governors had vanished since according to the information divulged, both were threatened by it[15]. On the contrary there is some evidence that after the events of 1817 the relations between the Marshal and the Governors continued as bad as ever[16].

The events of 1817 created an atmosphere which became vulnerable to initiatives of a revolutionary character. The army was deeply divided by the effects of the conspiracy, mainly due to the application of the death penalty to some of the culprits, considered as act of extreme violence. With the régime in crisis, and difficulties it faced in controlling the army, it could be presumed that there

was a favourable conjuncture in which a new political regime might emerge.

The Sinédrio led by Manuel Fernandes Tomás, José Ferreira Borges, José da Silva Carvalho and João Ferreira Viana took advantage of the existing psychological conditions. Its contacts with the Spanish revolutionary movement during 1818 and 1819 and its liberal principles were widely known through the newspapers published in London and clandestinely introduced in Portugal, facilitated by the growth of the opposition and consequently the weakness of the regime.

The British authorities and merchants in Portugal were aware that their interests were threatened(17). Nevertheless those in London did not manifest any sign of alarm.

The intervention of the Portuguese troops in the River Plata did not enjoy the British support and the attitude of the British Consul in Pernambuco(18) on behalf of the insurrection did not mean more than a formal condemnation on the part of the British authorities in London. At the same time, there were the movements of independence which affected the Spanish colonies of America and which would be creating conditions which would lead Brazil in the same direction.

The British position seemed equivocal(19). Even so, there is evidence which suggests that the British authorities paid the greatest attention to all the steps of the Spanish revolutionary movement in order to avoid a union of Spain with Portugal(20).

In terms of international policy, the orientation followed by the British and by the members of the Holy Alliance was completely different. The British were against intervention in other states while the others were for it. With this policy of non-intervention the British became less unpopular and consequently they could defend their commercial interests in other countries with better efficiency. Taking into consideration the British concerns respecting to their hegemony on the seas and consequently over the international trade, at that time, although the size of their trade with Portugal was

considerable[21], it was not enough significant that it justified any attitude to avoid the revolution in Portugal.

In the question of indemnities from France caused by the post-war treaties the Portuguese interests were underestimated by Wellington, and it appears that the reasons alleged by the Portuguese mainly in regard with the plunders taken in Bordeaux[22] were barely heard.

The costs of the construction of the lines of Torres Vedras by 1810[23] as well as the disagreements on the question of the indemnities, constituted factors which caused the growth of a friction which had emerged after the treaty of 1810.

The revolution which occurred in Oporto on 24 August 1820 had been, in its origins and development, fomented by anti-British sentiment. If the British had no reasons to encourage a revolution in Portugal, it is evident that they also had no reasons to prevent it. Times had changed and British influence in Portugal was no longer so crucial to the countries' strategic interests.

After the outbreak of the revolution it was possible to conclude that it had been a consequence of a general economic crisis unanimously recognized[24], caused by a political system which was not representative, an inefficient administration and an army which was divided. The revolution was successful because its leaders exploited in the best way the prevailing dissatisfaction in the Kingdom, the favourable conjuncture of the time, mainly that which derived from the Spanish revolution as well as the adhesion of influential men who acted rapidly in important units of the army[25].

It is evident that the British enjoyed considerable facilities in the Portuguese trade. Nevertheless, if there were effectively excessive privileges which benefited the British trade, the responsibility of this must be attributed to the Portuguese authorities which were consenting to it. If the revolutionary leaders of 1820 really held this conviction, then they carried out a contradictory policy. Effectively they were aware before the revolution that the treaty of 1810 was adverse to the commercial interests of Portugal. After the revolution the Suprema Junta do Governo pointed out that that treaty had been

disastrous[26], but at the same time it promised either in Oporto[27] or in Lisbon[28] that the stipulations of the Treaty would be fulfilled.

If the treaty affected the real interests of the Portuguese it should perhaps have been abrogated, or at the very least revisions should have been requested. Until the end of 1820 there is no evidence that this took place. This perhaps indicates that the revolutionary movement was initially solely concerned with political matters.

Naturally the British government did not recognize the new authorities in Portugal[29], but there were unilateral relations since the leaders of the revolution informed the British consul at Oporto, and afterwards the Chargé d'Affaires in Lisbon and at the last even Castlereagh on the main steps of the revolution, taken by the time of the landing of Beresford from Brazil. This served perfectly the British interests. The British officers were suspended[30] but there is no evidence of any reaction on the part of the British government, demonstrating that it did not constitute significant concern. In the case of the landing of Beresford[31] the revolutionary government had to talk with the captain of the Bessel Vengeur.

Meanwhile commercial relations remained as before. Oporto was closed on 24 August only, and from then there is no evidence of any British complaint.

Also there is no evidence that the tendencies of the revolution had been particularly anti-British either on the part of the new authorities or the population. The British communities established in Portugal at first manifested some fears for possible disturbances in which they could be involved. Only one British merchant established at Oporto manifested a certain lack of confidence for the future[32]. Four British firms in Lisbon requested protection, requesting inclusively the presence of the ship of war Creole which found at the Tagus[33]. In the Island of Madeira, British merchants requested protection from the authorities in London[34]. Even so they never indicated that they had been the object of any hostile actions. There is also no evidence of any hostile actions on the part of Portuguese merchants,

natural rivals to British interests.

As a consequence, the British authorities could, during the revolutionary period, observe with some tranquility the course of events. There is only evidence that John Crispin regretted that the continuation of the Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro had been announced by the new authority[35]. This fact will have constituted considerable frustration to the British because the Company enjoyed privileges which affected those of the British merchants and at the same time it was hostile to a liberal government. It was known that the British wished to abolish the Companhia[36] and everybody was aware that its statutes were not compatible with a liberal economy. Nevertheless it survived the revolution intact.

The revolutionaries faced a true dilemma: to take decisions as a revolutionary movement and risk invasion or to wait until the movement enjoyed the support of the legitimate sovereign. The new government chose to wait.

The British also waited until the course of the revolution became clear. On 8 November, Castlereagh instructed Ward in order that the commercial interests be ensured and the British subjects protected[37]. A period of exceptionality had ended. Portugal occupied but a minor role in the course of events as viewed from London.

Notes - 1

(1) Cor. Braz., vol.XV, p.752, by 1815, referred: "...os dous papeis de novidades, em Francez, circulam em consequencia da generalidade daquella lingua, que os faz adaptados para o uso das naçoens do Continente: a gazeta Alema , apezar das muitas naçoens que fállam aquella lingua, não pode conservar-se; e o periodico Italiano, que se tentou estabelecer em Londres, findou em breve tempo por falta de circulaçao"

(2) Bourbon, Léon, op.cit., p.86. For further details the author cited: "Joaquim de Sancto Agostinho Brito França Calvão, Reflexões sobre o Correio Braziliense, 1809 and José Joaquim de Almeida e Araujo Correa de Lacerda, Exame dos Artigos historicos e politicos que se contem na Collecção periodica intitulada Correio braziliense no que pertence somente ao reino de Portugal, 1810

(3) Cor. Braz., vol.II, pp.129-133

(4) Cor. Braz., vol.V, pp.189-197 and from p.302 onwards

(5) Cor. Braz., vol.VII, pp.455 and following

(6) Cor. Braz., vol.IX, p.380

(7) Cor. Braz., vol.IX, p.723

(8) Bourdon, Léon, op.cit., pp.85-86

(9) Cor. Braz., vol.XI, p.214

(10) Cor. Braz., vol.XI, p.218

(11) Inv. Port., vol.VII, p.232 and following

(12) Inv. Port., vol.VIII, from p.53 onwards

(13) Cor. Braz., vol.XII, pp.834-843

(14) Cor. Braz., vol.XIII, pp.621-626

(15) Bourdon, Léon, op.cit., p.86

(16) Inv. Port. vol.IX, p.444 and following. The nineteen points were: "1. E o maior de todos, o estimulo geral dado a industria estrangeira, prohibindo constantement a exportação de quazi todas as producçoens da terra, e de todas as mnaufacturas Portuguezas, - e admittindo constantemente todos os mantimentos de fóra, e todas as manufacturas estrangeiras. 2. A conservação dos pezados tributos internos sobre todas as producçoens da terra de que era prohibida a exportação; 3. Admissão de todos os mantimentos de fora, livre de todos os direitos de entrada; 4. Fortes direitos

de sahida sobre todos os generos Europeos ou Coloniaes de que era livre a exportação; 5. Modicos direitos de entrada sobre as manufacturas estrangeiras; 6. Pezados direitos sobre o proprio peixe fresco e salgado; 7. Igualdade de direitos de entrada e sahida sobre os navios, sejão estrangeiros ou nacionaes; 8. Igualdade, ou inferioridade de direitos de Porto aos navios estrangeiros; 9. Relaxaçoens nas Alfandegas, e máos methodos de percepção, que facilitarão o contrabando; 10. Izenção de Decima e outros tributos; 11. Izenção, incerta dos Encargos Municipaes; 12. Apozentadoria passiva; isto he: Izenção do direito de apozentadoria em suas cazas e armazens; 13. Preferencia exclusiva, concedida oas credores Inglezes sobre os bens sequestrados pela Inquisição, e estendida aos Negociantes de todas as Naçoens, excepto os Portuguezes; 14. Izenção da Milicia de mar e de terra; 15. Izenção da jurisdição ordinaria; ou juiz conservador; 16. Izenção de visitas e buscas da justiça; 17. Direito, incerto, de lhes serem restituídos os marinheiros dezertores dos navios mercantes; 18. Direito incerto, de lhes serem restituídos os Falsários; Privilegio de serem Assignantes

(17) Bourdon, Léon, op.cit., p.86

(18) O Portuguez, vol.I, p.150

(19) O Portuguez, vol.II, p.175

(20) O Portuguez, vol.II, p.95

(21) Cor. Braz., vol.XV, pp.257-261. For further details, cf. in this chapter, III

(22) Inv. Port., vol.XII, pp.657-660

(23) F.O.63, 197, p.58. Letter from Dom Miguel Pereira Forjaz to Mr Ward. Palacio do Governo em 18 Abril 1816

(24) O Portugues, vol.IV, p.454 and following

(25) O Portugues, vol.V, pp.281-286

(26) Cor. Braz., vol.XVI, pp.574-576

(27) Cor. Braz., vol.XVII, pp.28-33

(28) Cor. Braz., vol.XVII, pp.161-170 and pp.284-294

(29) F.O.63, 214, p.168. Letter from the Portuguese Secretary of State in response to Mr Ward's notes of the 30 June and 4 July

(30) Inv. Port., vol.XVII, pp.99-103. Falla de S. Ex. Mr. Canning no jantar que os Negociantes Inglezes lhe derão na Salla do Theatro de S. Carlos nas vesperas da sua retirada de Portugal

(31) Bourdon, Léon, op.cit., p.86. For further details this author cited: Diccionario bibliographico portuguez, III, pp.198-200 and 326-330; IV, pp.57-59, 381 and VII, pp.21-22 by Innocencio Francisco da Silva; História geral do Brasil, V, pp.223-235 by Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen; Hipólito da Costa e o Cor. Braz., p.43 by Carlos Rizzini. On the same subject cf. História da Imprensa Periódica Portuguesa, pp.59-66 by José Tengarrinha. The Inv. Port., vol.XIX, pp.245-246, published the Portaria on the prohibition as follows: "Manda El Rey Nosso Senhor excitar a exacta observancia da Sua Real Ordem de 17 de Setembro de 1811, participada á mesa do desembargo do paço em 22 de Março de 1812, e que prohibio nestes reinos a entrada, e publicação do periódico intitulado Correio Braziliense, e de todos os excriptos do seu furioso e malevolo author, e porque ainda sao mais sediciosas, e incendiárias, se he possivle, as terriveis maximas do outro periodico intitulado "O Portuguez", que tambem se dirige a concitar tumultos, e revoluçoens nos povos para perturbar a harmonia estabelecida em todas as ordens do estado, e introdusir a anarchia, fazendo odiosos os dous supremos poderes, que Deos ordenou para governar os homens, com o evidente objecto de destruir os altares, e os thronos! manda outro sim Sua Magestade que seja igualmente prohibida a entrada, e publicação nestes reinos do dito periodico O Portuguez: manda finalmente o mesmo Augusto Senhor, que, todos os vassallos destes seus reinos, não recebão, nem vendão, ou retenhão em seu poder os referidos dous periódicos, e menos os espalhem por qualquer modo que seja..."

(32) Inv. Port., vol.XIX, pp.246-247

(33) Inv. Port., em Ingl., vol.XIX, pp.401-403

(34) Cor. Braz., vol.XX, 1818, pp.473-485; vol.XXI, pp.355-366 and Inv. Port., vol.XXII, pp.327-335

(35) Inv. Port., vol.XXII, p.331

(36) Cor. Braz., vol.XX, p.483

(37) Inv. Port., vol.XXII, p.477

(38) Cor. Braz., vol.XXI, pp.151-159 and Inv. Port., vol.XXII, pp.239-249

(39) O Portuguez, vol.VIII, pp.273-317

(40) O. Campeão, Julho, 1819, pp.290-302. Narração que Joze de Andrade Corvo de Camoens, Fidalgo Cavaleiro da Caza de Sua Magestade Fidelissima, e Ajudante de Ordens do Marechal de Campo Conde de Rezende, remete por mão do Visconde de Juremenha, para ser aprezentade a El Rey Nosso Senhor. Lisboa, 30 de Julho de 1817"

(41) Tengarrinha, José, op.cit., pp.61-64

(42) O Português, vol.X, pp.333-373

(43) O Campeão, ou o Amigo do Rei e do Povo, Julho, 1819, pp.48-55, 61-69; 170-176; 204-211; 235-243; 290-303 and 369-372

(44) O Campeão, vol.II, p.247

(45) O Campeão, vol.II, pp.133-143

(46) O Campeão, vol.II, pp.143-144

(47) O Campeão, vol.III, p.58

(48) Cor. Braz., vol.XXV, pp.70-77

(49) Soriano, S.J. Luz, op.cit., Tomo II, p.455

Notes - II

(1) C.J., 67, 1812, pp.676-679. An account of all sums of money paid for the service of the Army in the Peninsula, including British, Foreign, and Portuguese troops; from April 1808 up to the 24th December 1811, or as near thereto as the same can be made out:- Also, An Account of any Advances in Money, Arms, Stores or otherwise, made to the Spanish government by Great Britain; from April 1808 to December 1811 as far as the same can be made out

(2) Cor. Braz., vol.IV, p.349

(3) Cor. Braz., vol.IV, p.349. Note of John Bell, Deputado superintendente dos auxilios Britanicos. Lisboa, 16 de Dezembro 1809

(4) Cor. Braz., vol.IV, p.349. Calculations effected by Joaquim da Costa e Silva which were delivered to John Bell

(5) C.J., 67, 1812, p.677

(6) S.P., 1812-1814, vol.I-Part I, pp.508-513 and C.J., 77, 1822-1823, pp.780-781. Convention of Loan between His Britannic Majesty and His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal. Signed at London, 21st April 1809

(7) C.J. 67, 1812, p.677

(8) C.J.77, 1822-1823, p.781. Account of all sums of Money paid or advanced by way of Loan, subsidy, or otherwise, to any Foreign State, from the year 1792, up to the present time, distinguishing the Amounts paid in each year; so far as the same can at present be made up and extracted from the Accounts of the Public Expenditure. The same figures may be found in English Historical Documents. 1783-1823, p.581, by A. Aspinall and E. Anthony Smith, 1959, London

(9) It is referred to in note (7)

(10) The document refers to the following: The bills stated to be drawn in this year in repayment of Advances of Specie, are the Amount only to the month of August; but as Bills of this description, for the remainder of the year, would equally increase the Amount of Bills drawn for Ordinaries, and of Bills deducted for Advances from Extraordinaries, they would not affect the Balance

(11) C.J., 67, 1812, p.676

(12) W.P., 1/320. This bundle contains a letter of thirteen pages with the title: British Aid Office, Lisbon, 1 December 1810. It was written by John Bell - Dep.Superintendent of British Aids and transmitted to Charles Stuart

(13) The document referred to at note (12) includes many numerical data which permit to evaluate the difficulties of checking the accounts

(14) C.J., 77, 1822-1823, p.781 or in English Historical Documents. 1783-1832, p.581 by A. Aspinall and E. Anthony Smith

(15) In chapter I, V

(16) P.P., 1813-1814, vol.XIV, pp.57-87. Report of the Committee appointed to direct the Distribution of the Grant voted by the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, for the Relief of the Inhabitants of the Districts in Portugal, laid waste by the Enemy in the year 1810. Some references to this subject may be found in Cor. Braz., vol.VII, from p.376 onwards

(17) Sources cited in note (14)

(18) English Historical Documents. 1783-1832, p.577, by A. Aspinall and E. Anthony Smith

(19) Brit. Mus., Add.31.236. Dispatch from Sir C. Stuart Envoy to Portugal to Lord Castlereagh, pp.153-154V

(20) Brit. Mus., Add.31.236, from p.145V onwards. "Receipt and Expenditure of the Royal Treasury during the m onth of October 1812" and "Statement of what was received to fulfil the approved Estimate for the month of October last part" were the main points which were studied

(21) Brit. Mus., Add.31.236, pp.156-157. Letter from Mr Stuart à Son Exce. D. Miguel Forjaz. Lisbonne ce 5 Novr. 1812

(22) Brit. Mus., Add.31.236, pp.159-164. Translation of a letter from Marquis de Borba to D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz. Lisbon 7th Nov.1812

(23) Sources referred at note (8)

(24) Source cited at note (16)

(25) Cor. Braz., vol.XIV, pp.245-246. Documento relativo à Distribuição dos Auxilios Britannicos, a favor dos Portuguezes. Letter from D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz to III.mo e Ex.mo Senhor Conde Funchal. Palacio do Governo, em 4 de Setembro, de 1813

(26) Sources cited at note (8)

(27) F.O.63, 176, p.11. Letter from Bathurst to Rt.Hon. Geo. Canning. Foreign Office, Decr. 5th, 1814

(28) S.P., 1815-1816, pp.936-937

(29) S.P., 1815-1816, pp.937-939

(30) C.J., 77, 1822-1823, p.781

(31) S.P., 1814-1815. London, 1839, pp.467-468. Treaty of Accession of Portugal to the Treaty of Alliance of the 25th March, 1815, between the Four Powers. - Signed (in English and Portuguese) at Vienna, the 8th April, 1815

(32) Cf. English Historical Documents. 1783-1832, from p.951 onwards. The Second Treaty of Paris, 20 Nov. 1815

(33) The article V of the Second Treaty of Paris stipulated that these troops must not exceed 150,000 men

(34) Damião Peres, História de Portugal, vol.VII, MCMXXXV, p.24

(35) F.O.63, 197, p.69. Letter from D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz to Ward. Palacio do Governo 10 Maio 1816

(36) Several documents on this subject may be found in P.R.O., F.O.63, 197

(37) F.O.63, 197, p.23. Letter from the Foreign Office to Mr Ward. October 1st 1816

(38) F.O.63, 197, pp.202-202V. Letter from Ward to Castlereagh. Lisbon 1st November 1816

(39) Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit., Terceira Epocha, Tomo VI, pp.101.107. Reclamação da quota parte dos despojos da guerra da peninsula para serem distribuidos ao exercito portuguez

(40) op.cit. at note (39), pp.101-102

(41) op.cit. at note (39)

(42) op.cit. at note (39), pp.108-109. Nota do Conde Palmella, dirigida a Lord Castlereagh, em resposta à que este ministro lhe enviára, exigindo de Portugal o pagamento das despezas que occasionára a construcção das Linhas de Torres Vedras em 1810

(43) op.cit. at note (39), p.107. The author affirms that many documents on this subject could be found in the Vol.XI do Supplemento aos Tratados do Visconde Borges de Castro

(44) Doc. referred to at note (42)

(45) Doc. cited at note (42)

(46) In this chapter, III

(47) op.cit. at note (39), p.316. Lista das reclamações apresentadas ao governo francez pelos commissarios liquidadores portuguezes, e por estes dirigida à commissão franceza em 31 de Julho de 1818, na conformidade do que foi determinado na conferencia de 29 do mesmo mez e anno

(48) op.cit. at note (39), pp.317-324. O Duque de Wellington tem como inadmissiveis as reclamações, que os commissarios liquidadores portuguezes lhe dirigiram

(49) Their representatives were as follows: German - Baron de Vincent; France - Richelieu; England - Charles Stuart; Prussia - Count Goltz and Russia - Pozzo di Borgo

(50) Peres, Damião, História de Portugal, vol.VII, MCMXXXV, p.24

(51) F.O.63, 222, p.36. Extrait d'une enquête de la Commission chargée de l'examen des comptes des denrés fournies par l'Angleterre au Portugal, pendant la dernière campagne, en date du 11 December 1818

(52) F.O.63, 222, p.35. Letter from D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz to Mr Edouard Michel Ward. Au Palais du Gouvernement, 21 jan 1819

(53) F.O.63, 222, p.36. La somme totale des articles 7 et 8 de denrées fournies à L'armée Portugaise en campagne

(54) F.O.63, 222, pp.37-37V. Lisbon 22 February 1819. The document is not signed, but it is possible that the author of the document is Richard Dawkins, Auditor General in Lisbon at that time. This may be confirmed in C.J.76, 1821-1822, p.1199

(55) Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit., pp.208-211. Exposição de João Antonio Salter de Mendonça, dirigida para o Rio de Janeiro, pedindo providencias para melhorar o miseravel estado da fazenda publica

(56) There is evidence on this subject in F.O.63, 235, pp.62, 70 and from 90 onwards

(57) F.O.63, 235, pp.62-62V. Note from the Treasury Chambers, 11th April 1820. The signature is not legible

(58) Almeida, Fortunato, História de Portugal, Tomo VI, 1929, pp.18-23. The author refers to the terms in which on 2 June 1820 the governors transmitted to D. João IV the state of the Public Treasury at that time

(59) F.O.63, 231, p.31. Letter from Ward to Lord Castlereagh. Lisbon 29th July 1820

(60) F.O.63, 231, pp.9-9V. Copy of a letter which was sent to Mr Ward (it is not signed) on 13th August 1820

(61) Cf.In this chpater, IV

Notes - III

(1) B.P.M.P., Códice no.931, pp.3-48. Exame Analytico do Artigo do Moniteur de Trinta de Novembro de 1810 sobre A Conducta dos Inglezes em Portugal

(2) Source cited at note (1). The document neither presents the name of the author nor refers to publication

(3) Kertesz, G.A.. Documents in the Political History of the European Continent. 1815-1939, Oxford 1968, pp.1-5

(4) F.O.63, 176, pp.229-233V. Letter from Beresford to the Lord Viscount Castlereagh, Lisbon 12th September 1814

(5) F.O.63, 176, pp.241-242V. Return of officers now serving in the Portuguese army. Lisbon 5 October 1814

(6) F.O.63, 176, pp.243-244V. Return of British officers removed from the Portuguese service. Lisbon 5th October 1814. The same list may also be found in Inv. Port., vol.XII, pp.105-107. Ordem de Dia do Quartel General do Pateo do Saldanha, 13 de Outubro, de 1814

(7) C.J., 72, 1817, p.627 or P.P., 1817, XIII, pp.469-471 Extracts of a Dispatch from Viscount Strangford to Viscount Castlereagh; dated Rio de Janeiro, February 20th, 1814:- Received April 24th, 1814

(8) Sources cited at note (7). Extract of a Dispatch from Viscount Castlereagh to Viscount Strangford; dated Foreign Office, July 25th, 1814

(9) Sources cited at note (7). Copy of a Letter from Earl Bathurst to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty; dated Foreign Office, August 26th 1814

(10) Sources cited at note (7). Copy of a Dispatch from Earl Bathurst to Viscount Strangford; dated Foreign Office, September 28th 1814

(11) Sources cited at note (7). Extract of a Dispatch from Viscount Strangford to Viscount Castlereagh; dated Rio de Janeiro, January 25th, 1815

(12) State Papers, 1814-1815, pp.345-348. Convention between Great Britain and Portugal, relative to the Indemnification of Portuguese subjects for certain detained Slave-Trade Vessels; - Signed at Vienna, 21st January, 1815

(13) Source cited at note (12), pp.348-355 or C.J., 73, 1818, pp.548-551

(14) The representative on the part of the United Kingdom and Ireland was Viscount Castlereagh and on the part of Portugal the representatives were D. Pedro de Sousa Holstein, Conde de Palmella; Antonio de Saldanha Gama and D. Joaquim Lobo da Silveira

(15) Inv. Port., vol.XII, p.473 or State Papers 1815-1816, pp.974-975

(16) Source cited at note (15), pp.473-474

(17) Kertesz, G.A., Documents in the Political History of the European Continent. 1815-1939, pp.5-7. Treaty between Austria, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia 25 March 1815

(18) Source cited at note (17)

(19) Temperley, Harold and Lillian M. Penson, Foundations of British Foreign Policy from Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902), 1966, pp.47-48

(20) State Papers, 1814-1815, pp.467-468. Treaty of Accession of Portugal to the Treaty of Alliance of the 25th March 1815, between the 4 powers. Signed at Vienna, the 8th April 1815. or O Português, vol.IV, pp.429-431

(21) Fay, C.R., M.A., Life and Labour in the Nineteenth century. Cambridge. 1920, p.3

(22) Douglas, David C., English Historical Documents XI - 1783-1832, London. 1959, pp.938-949. In regard to Portugal the treaty stipulated:

Article CV. - The Powers, recognising the justice of the claims Of H.R.H. the Prince Regent of Portugal and the Brazils, upon the town of Olivença and the other territories ceded to Spain by the Treaty of Badajoz of 1801, and viewing the restitution of the same as a measure necessary to insure that perfect and constant harmony between the two Kingdoms of the Peninsula, the preservation of which in all parts of Europe has been the constant object of their arrangements, formally engaged to use their utmost endeavours, by amicable means, to procure the retrocession of the said territories in favour of Portugal. And the Powers declare, as far as depends upon them, that this arrangement shall take place as soon as possible.

Article CVI - (The stipulations contained in the 10th article of the Treaty of 30 may 1814 between Portugal and France, shall be of no effect.)

Article CVII - (Portugal to restore to France part of French Guiana)

(23) In Soriano, S.H. da Luz, op.cit., Terceira Epocha, Tomo VI, pp.59-68, found some documents on this subject. The first claim had been presented by Conde Palmela to Wellesley on 9 November 1809 as compensation of its release from the French operated by Anglo-Portuguese forces

(24) Kertesz, G.A., op.cit., pp.7-9. The Holy Alliance, 26 September 1815

(25) This is an extract from its preamble

(26) Kertesz, G.A., op.cit., pp.9-14. Second Peace of Paris, 20 November 1815

(27) In this chapter, II

(28) Cf. English Historical Documents, 1783-1832, pp.955-957

(29) Cor. Braz., vol.XVI, pp.148-157. Ligeiro esboço da partida do Marechal Lord Beresford para a Corte do Rio de Janeiro. According to that source, the article will have been written on 1st December 1815, and it quoted the vol.XV of the Cor. Braz., p.235 which had published an "Ordem do dia" of the Marshal connected with the same matter

(30) F.O.63, 176, pp.229-234. Letter from Beresford to the Lord Viscount Castlereagh. Lisbon, 12th September 1814

(31) By that time, it was asked at the Parliament to Castlereagh if there was a new treaty, having he answered: "...que ainda vogava o de 1810, e só existia alguma diferença de opinião, por não ter ainda querido o Governo Portuguez abolir o monopolio da Companhia dos Vinhos" in O Português, vol.IV, p.453

(32) Cf. Chapter II, III

(33) The Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro had been prorogued on 10 February 1815. For further details: chapter III, section II

(34) F.O.63, 197, p.37. Letter from Ward to Castlereagh. Lisbon, 29th March 1816

(35) W.P., 1/505. Letter from Charles Stuart to Wellington. Paris, April 25, 1816

(36) W.P., 1/505. Letter from Charles Stuart to Castlereagh. Paris, April 25, 1816

(37) F.O.63, 197, pp.15-17V. Letter from Castlereagh to Mr Ward. Foreign Office, August 26, 1816

(38) F.O.63, 197, p.137. Letter from Ward to D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz. Lisbon 25 Sept. 1816

(39) C.L.P., 1811 a 1820, pp.386-417. On this subject cf "A Reorganização do Exército. A Presença Inglesa e os Militares" in Exército e Sociedade em Portugal No Declínio do Antigo Regime e advento do Liberalismo, pp.154-157 by Fernando Pereira Marques

(40) F.O.63, 197, pp.197-198. Letter from Ward to Castlereagh. Lisbon, 26 October 1816

(41) State Papers, 1816-1817, pp.982-989. Proclamation of the Portuguese Commander-in-Chief to the People, on the entrance of the Portuguese Troops into the Province of Monte Video; Decree of ditto, for the punishment of Disturbers of the Peace and Correspondence with Buenos Aires, relative to the Occupation of the Province of Monte Video by the Portuguese Forces

(42) Inv. Port., vol.XVIII, pp.292-293

(43) Soriano, F.J.L., op.cit., pp.124-126. Nota dirigida ao Marquez de Aguiar, Ministro e Secretário d'Estado dos Negócios Estrangeiros na Corte do Rio de Janeiro, pelos cinco ministros das cinco grandes potenças, que em Paris constituiam a commissão da chamada Santa Aliança

(44) Soriano, S.H.L., op.cit., pp.126-129. Participação da revolução de Pernambuco em 1817, feita para Lisboa pelo conde da Barca. On this subject cf: Domingos Martins e a Revolução Pernambucana de 1817. 1974 by Norbertino Bahiense

(45) F.O.63, 205, p.106. Letter from Ward to Castlereagh. Lisbon 26th April 1817

(46) Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit., pp.151-152. Proclamação do chamado conselho regenerador, reputado como o que promoria a revolução de 1817

(47) F.O.63, 205, pp.229-241V. Luiz Gomes Leitão de Moura... Contra os Réos de alta Traição. Many documents on this subject also may be found in Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit., pp.132-183

(48) Inv. Port., vol.XIX, pp.108-109. The Times of 21st June was one of them according to its correspondent in Lisbon who had written on 1st of the same month

(49) Cf. Grande Enciclopédia Portuguesa e Brasileira, vol.XI, pp.117-119

(50) Cor. Braz., vol.XXI, pp.144-147. Alvará, porque se prohibem as sociedades Secretas. Palaceo da Real Fazenda de Santa Cruz, em 30 da Março, 1818

(51) Kertesz, G.A., Documents in the Political History of the European Continent. 1815-1939, pp.14-17

(52) Marrot, J.A.R., A History of Europe. From 1815 to 1939. London. p.44

(53) Vianna, António, Apontamentos para a História Diplomática Contemporanea. A Revolução de 1820 e o Congresso de Verona, Lisboa. 1901, pp.11-27

(54) F.O.63, 222, p.31. Letter from Ward to Castlereagh. Lisbon, 19 February 1819

(55) F.O.63, 241, p.180C. Private letter from J. Crispin to E.M. Ward, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Oporto, Friday, 28 May 1819, and F.O.63, 241, p.180D. Extract of a private letter from E.M. Ward to J. Crispin, dated Lisbon 19 June 1819

(56) F.O.63, 232, pp.46-54. It contains the proclamations of the revolutionary movement

(57) Cf. op.cit., at note (53)

(58) Temperley, Harold and Lillian M. Penson, Foundations of British Foreign Policy. From Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902), from p.48 onwards. Document 6. The State Paper of 5 May 1820; or the Foundation of British Policy

(59) Vianna, António, Apontamentos para a Historia Contemporânea. A Revolução de 1820 e o Congresso de Verona. Lisboa, 1901, pp.36-37. He wrote as follows: "A resposta de Lord Castlereagh as propostas russas foram terminantes, e desfizenam as machinações do Marquez de Marialva e de D. Joaquim Lobo da Silveira, as quais não tinhamsido mal acolhidas, tanto pelo duque de Richelieu, como pelo governo prussiano"

(60) W.P., 1/647/5 - Letter (16 pages) from Beresford to Duke of Wellington. Rio de Janeiro, 1 June 1820

(61) W.P., 1/649/14. Letter from W.C. Beresford to the Duke of Wellington, 30 July 1820

(62) Cor. Braz. (published in November 1820), vol.XXV, pp.483-485

(63) Doc. cit. at note (61)

(64) F.O.63, 231, pp.33-34. Letter from Ward to Castlereagh. Lisbon 7th August 1820

(65) F.O.63, 233, p.110. Letter from John Crispin to William Hamilton

(66) F.O.63, 231, p.35. Letter from Ward to Castlereagh. Lisbon 19th August 1820

(67) Nascimento, Adriano do, Revolução de 1820. Coimbra, 1962; Santos, Fernando Piteira, Geografia e Economia da Revoluçao de 1820. Publicaçoes Europa-América, 1980; Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit., Terceira Epocha, Tomo VI. Lisboa 1887 and Vianna, António, Apontamentos Para a Historia Diplomática Contemporanea. A Revolução de 1820 e o Congresso de Verona. Lisboa, 1901

(68) Sources cited at notes (60) and (61)

Notes - IV

(1) They were: O commendador Sebastião Drago Valente de Brito Cabreira, coronel de artilheria no.4; Bernardo Correia de Castro e Sepulveda, coronel de Infantaria no.18; Domingos Antonio Gil de Figueiredo Sarmento, tenente coronel commandante de infantaria no.6; José Pereira da Silva Leite de Berredo, tenente coronel commandante do real corpo da policia; José de Sousa Pimental, major commandante interino das milicias do Porto; José Pedro Cardoso e Silva, major commandante das milicias da Maia

(2) The junta was composed of António da Silveira Pinto da Fonseca - President; Sebastião Drago Valente de Brito Cabreira - vice-President and Bernardo Correia de Castro e Sepulveda. Pelo clero, Luiz Pedro de Andrade e Brederode, deão; Pela molereza, Pedro Leite Pereira de Mello; Pela magistratura, Manuel Fernandes Thomás; Pelo commércio, Francisco José de Barros Lima; Pela provincia do Minho, José Maria Xavier de Araújo; João da Cunha Souto Maior, Secretários, José Ferreira Borges; José da Silva Carvalho; Francisco Gomes da Silva

(3) F.O.63, 233, pp.138-141V. The documents contain Diário Nacional No.2 and No.2, including Manifesto da Junta Provisional do Supremo Governo do Reino aos Portuguezes

(4) Cf. in this chapter, III

(5) F.O.63, 231, p.45. Letter from Consul at Oporto to Ward, 24 August 1820

(6) F.O.63, 231, p.45V. Letter from John Crispin. Oporto, 25th August

(7) F.O.63, 231, p.37. Letter from Ward to Castlereagh. Lisbon, 26 August 1820

(8) F.O.63, 233, p.119. Letter from the members of the Military Council who signed the Proclamation to Illmo. Snr. Frederic Jebb

(9) F.O.63, 233, pp.124-124V. Letter from J. Crispin to William Hamilton

(10) Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit., pp.228-229. Officio dirigido ao Coronel Sebastião Drago Valente de Brito Cabeira, com o fim de sairem do Exercito Portuguez os officiaes Inglezes, que n'elle tinham patentes

(11) Source cited at note (9), p.124

(12) Source cited at note (9), p.124

(13) F.O.63, 233, pp.130-132. Letter from José Ferreira Borges to S.or Consul da Nação Ingleza. Ds. G.de Mm.cè. Porto e Paço do Governo, 28 d'Agosto de 1820

(14) F.O.63, 233, pp.147-151

(15) Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit., pp.229-231

(16) State Papers. 1819-1820, pp.993-995. Proclamation of the Regency of Portugal, relative to the Political Events at Oporto. - 29th August, 1820

(17) Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit., p.374-376. Participação feita pelo Conde da Feira a Ráfael da Cruz Guerreiro who was in London.

(18) Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit., pp.241-243. Proclamação dos governadores do Reino, annunciando o chamamento a Cortes dos antigos tres estados do reino. It may be also found in S.P., 1819-1820, p.995

(19) F.O.63, 233, pp.134-136. Letter from John Crispin to Ill.mo Snr José Ferreira Borges

(20) F.O.63, 233, p.39. Letter from John Crispin to William Hamilton

(21) F.O.63, 233, p.39. Letter from Ward to Viscount Castlereagh. Lisbon, 29th August 1820

(22) W.P., 1/653/2/4. Letter from Lesseps to "Son Excellence Le Duc de Cazes. Lisbonne le 29 août 1820

(23) F.O.63, 233, p.142. Letter from John Crispin to William Hamilton. Oporto, Thurs. 31st August 1820

(24) F.O.63, 233, p.145. Letter from John Crispin to William Hamilton. Oporto, 2nd September 1820

(25) Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit., Terceira Epocha, Tomo VI, pp.263-264. Proclamação da Junta Provisória do Porto em 2 de Setembro de 1820, certificando o auxílio de tropas hespanholas

(26) A.D.P., Cabido no.322, from p.133 onwards. Livro de Receita da Redízima por entrada

(27) F.O.63, 236, p.62. Copy of a letter from a merchant at Oporto. 3 September 1820 (It does not contain any signature)

(28) F.O.63, 231, p.74. Letter from John Burkeley & Son; John Leigh; Fitzgibbon (?) and James F.(?) to John Jeffery. Lisbon 2 Sept. 1820

(29) F.O.63, 236, p.61. Letter from a British merchant (the signature is illegible) to the Rt.Hon. Earl Bathurst. London 18 September 1820

(30) F.O.63, 231, p.70. Letter from Conde da Feira to Ward. Palace of the Regency, 6th Sept. 1820

(31) F.O.63, 231, p.79. Letter from Captain Mackenzie to Mr Ward. H.M. Ship Creole, at Belem, River Tagus 8th Sep. 1820

(32) F.O.63, 231, p.80. Letter from Mr Ward to Captain Mackenzie. Sep.8, 1820

(33) W.P., 1/653/2/3. Dépêche Télégraphique de Paris du 9 septembre 1820 à deux heures du soir

(34) W.P., 1/653/2/2. Letter from Le Duc de Cazes to Lord Castlereagh. Londres ce 10 Sept. 1820

(35) F.O.63, 233, p.160. Letter from John Crispin to William Hamilton

(36) F.O.63, 231, pp.87-88. Note from the Secretary of State to Mr Ward. Government Palace 9 Sept 1820

(37) F.O.63, p.85. Letter from Ward to Castlereagh. Lisbon Sep.r12-1820

(38) F.O.63, p.116. Letter from Ward to Castlereagh

(39) F.O.63, 233, p.262. Letter from Major Gen.l to the Rt Hon.ble Lord Castlereagh. Oporto 9th Sept. 1820

(40) F.O.63, 233, p.264. Private letter from Major Gen.l B. Blunt to Rt Honorable Castlereagh. Oporto 13th Sep. 1820

(41) Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit., pp.381-383. O governo inglez nega-se ao pedido, que se lhe fez em 13 de Setembro de 1820, de socorrer Portugal com algum dinheiro, e com uma sua esquadra

(42) F.O.63, 233, pp.184-184V. Letter from John Crispin to William Hamilton

(43) F.O.63, 241, p.181V. Letter from E.M. Ward to John Crispin. Lisbon Sept. 1820

(44) F.O.63, 231, p.127. Letter from Ward to Castlereagh. Lisbon 20 Sept. 1820

(45) Cf. op.cit. cited at note (25)

(46) F.O.63, 231, p.141. Circular to Foreign Ministers

(47) F.O.63, 233, p.270. Note from Hermano Joze Braancamp do Sobral to the Captain Maitland

(48) F.O.63, 233, p.278. Letter from the agent of pacquets Gregório Gomes da Silva to Hermano José Braancamp de Sobral

(49) F.O.63, 233, p.282. Letter from Fredk. Maitland to Hermano José Braancamp do Sobral. River Tagus, October 13, 1820

(50) F.O.63, 233, p.284. Letter from Barreto Gomes to Senhor Gregorio Gomes da Silva

(51) F.O.63, 233, p.266. Letter from Hermano Jozé Braancamp de Sobral to Illmo e Exmo Sr. Viscount de Castlereagh

(52) F.O.63, 233, p.268. Letter from Hermano Joze Braancamp to Viscount Castlereagh. Palace of government, 16 October 1820

(53) F.O.63, 231, p.143. Letter from Ward to Castlereagh. Lisbon, 17th October 1820

(54) F.O.63, 231, 176. Copy of an article published in the Gazette

(55) Marriot, J.A.R., op.cit., pp.44-45

(56) op.cit. at note (55) and Antonio Vianna, op.cit., pp.72-73

(57) Marriot, J.A.R., op.cit., p.45

(58) F.O.63, 231, p.15. Letter from Castlereagh to E.M. Ward. The document continued as follows: "...You will however consider it your duty, as long as the Persons and interests of British subjects are duly protected under the treaties existing with H.M.J. Majesty, to continue to pursue a temperate and conciliatory line of conduct without however in any degree committing the sentiments of your court upon the late political transactions.

You may rely on receiving from me instructions for the direction of your conduct should the King feel himself called upon to make any alteration in the line of conduct, which under all the circumstances of the case, His Majesty has felt himself called upon to adopt and I should have addressed you sooner on this subject, had not the obvious line of duty which circumstance determined.

You to follow in the absence of instructions, sufficiently provided for every ordinary contingency till His Majesty could from the development of events, feel himself enabled to convey to you more conclusive orders"

(59) F.O.63, 233, p.229. Note signed by Mathias Joze Dias Azevedo and Joao Alexre Gourlade(?), Secro do Govo. das Armas. Palacio do Governo 28 de Outubro de 1820

(60) F.O.63, 231, pp.19-22V. Note "Most secret and confidencial" from Castlereagh to Mr Ward. Foreign Office, November 8 - 1820

(61) This fact is suggested by a letter which had been sent by General Alava to Arthur Wellesley. This document may be found in W.P., 1/654/2

(62) F.O.63, 231, p.183-185. Letter from Ward to Lord Castlereagh. Lisbon 9th December, 1820

(63) F.O.63, 231, pp.216-228. Manifeste de la Nation Portugaise aux souverains et Aux peuples de l'Europe. Lisbonne, le 15 December 1820. The same document also may be found in State Papers, 1819-1820, from p.361 onwards or in S.J.L. Soriano, op.cit., pp.299-315

(64) Cf. in this chapter, III

(65) As example it may be pointed out: A.D.P., Cabido no.322 from p.134 until the end

(66) F.O.63, 231, pp.212-212V. Letter from Ward to Lord Castlereagh. Lisbon, 21 December 1820

Notes - V

(1) Balbi, Adrien, Essai Statistique sur Le Royaume de Portugal et d'Algarve, Tome Premier. Paris, 1822, p.441 or S. Sideri, Trade and Power, Informal Colonialism in Anglo-Portuguese Relations. Rotterdam University Press, 1970, p.237

(2) B.P.M.P., Cõdice no.931, pp.3-48. Exame Analytico Do Artigo do Moniteur De Trinta de Novembro de 1810 sobre A Conducta dos Inglezes em Portugal

(3) For further details: chapter I, IV. On this subject with great interest. José Accursio das Neves, Manifesto da Razão contra as Usurpações Francezas. Lisboa MCCCCVIII

(4) The source cited at note (2) contains several details on this subject. Moreover there is no evidence of any acts practised by British troops which have affected the properties belonging either to the national subjects or others from abroad

(5) As example, Cor. Braz., vol.IX, p.380

(6) Cf. in this chapter, III

(7) F.O.63, 176, pp.229-234. Letter from Beresford to the Lord Viscount Castlereagh. Lisbon, 12th Sept. 1814. In this document Beresford affirmed that the presence of the British officers would be necessary to guarantee the state of discipline of the army.

(8) Cf. in this chapter, III

(9) F.O.63, 235, p.62. Letter from Ward to Treasury Chambers, on 11th April 1820

(10) Bourdon, Léon, Louis-François de Tollenare. Notes Dominicales prises pendant un voyage en Portugal et au Brasil en 1816, 1817 et 1818. Tome I. Paris, 1971, p.76. The author wrote on the atmosphere against the British by that time, saying: "On dirait qu'une défiance sourde existe chez les Portugais à l'égard des Anglais"

(11) The document cited at note (7) is very expressive on this subject. Despite this, Beresford manifested confident. Before and after the events of 1817 Ward informed Castlereagh on the boycott which was moved against him. Nevertheless even by June 1820 Beresford manifested the same sentiment through a letter which was sent by him to Wellington from Rio de Janeiro: W.P., 1/647/5 and 1/649/14

(12) The letters which found in W.P., 1/647/5 and 1/649/14 are very expressive on this subject

(13) Cor. Braz., vol.XVI, pp.148-157. Ligeiro esboço da partida do Marechal Lord Beresford para a Corte do Rio de Janeiro. Por um Portuguez imparcial

(14) F.O.63, 197, p.144. Letter from Ward to Castlereagh. Lisbon 19 October 1816 and F.O.63, 197, p.197, idem. Lisbon 26 October 1816. The two documents showed the difficulties faced by Beresford by that time

(15) F.O.63, 205, pp.229-241V. This document refers to the sanctions which were applied to the culprits. Their declarations confirmed a plan which had in view the expulsion of Beresford from the army and the establishment of a new order of things

(16) F.O.63, 222, p.31. Letter from Ward to Castlereagh. Lisbon 19 February 1819

(17) Source cited at notes (14) and (16)

(18) Cf. in this chapter, III

(19) In regard to the movements of independence in America, on the one hand there is only evidence of the support of the British consul to the act which took place at Pernambuco, formally condemned by Castlereagh. On the other hand the intervention of Portuguese troops in River de la Plata was immediately criticised

(20) Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit., pp.381-383. O governo inglez nega-se ao pedido, que se lhe fez em 13 de Setembro de 1820, de socorrer Portugal com algum dinheiro, e com uma sua esquadra and F.O.63, 231, pp.19-22V. Note "Most secret and Confidential" from Castlereagh to Mr Ward. Foreign Office, November 8, 1820

(21) Cf. Ap.C, Table III

(22) Cf. note (9) and Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit., pp.101-107. Reclamação da quota parte dos despojos da guerra da peninsula, para serem distribuídos ao exercito portuguez

(23) Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit., pp.317-324. O Duque de Wellington tem como inadmissiveis as reclamações, que os commissarios liquidadores portuguezes lhe dirigiram

(24) The crisis was recognized by the very governors of the Kingdom and confirmed by the revolutionary movement. On 26th October 1819 João António Salter de Mendonça transmitted a grounded report to D. João VI on this subject. It may be found in Soriano, S.J.L., op.cit., pp.208-211. Exposição de João Antonio Salter de Mendonça, dirigida para o Rio de Janeiro, pedindo providencias para melhorar o miserá vel estado da Fazenda publica. On 2nd June 1820 a new report was transmitted. It may be found in: Almeida, Fortunato de, História de Portugal, Tomo VI. 1816-1910. pp.18-23. On 15th December, 1820, the revolutionary government explained to the European countries

the reasons of the revolution and it confirmed the crisis in peremptory terms. It may be found in S.P., 1819-1820, from p.361 onwards. "Manifeste du gouvernement de la Nation Portugaise aux souverains et aux Peuples de l'Europe - Lisbonne, le 15 décembre, 1820". On 3 and 5 February, Manuel Fernandes Tomás read at the Cortes a report alleging "como secretário que tinha sido dos Negócios do Reino do Governo que acabou, lhe cumpria fazer à assembleia uma exposição do estado em que se achava o País". This report may be found in: O Campeao Portuguez ou O Amigo do Rei e do Povo, vol.IV, from p.4 onwards: "Estado de Portugal do fim do anno de 1807 até 23 de Agosto de 1820" or in Manuel Fernandes Tomás. A Revolução de 1820 (Recolha, Prefácio e Notas de José Tengarrinha), Seara Nova, 1974, pp.51-74

(25) Grande Enciclopédia Portuguesa e Brasileira, on this subject refers to: "A ausencia de Beresford, que embarcou para o Rio de Janeiro em fins de Março de 1820, com o intuito de trazer lá dinheiro para o pagamento das despesas militares, facilitou os trabalhos revolucionários. Alguns dos novos e dos antigos membros do Sinédrio dedicaram-se com entusiasmo ao aliciamento das principais personagens militares que eram necessárias aos fins que se propunham. O desembargador Soto-Maior conseguiu a adesão do brigadeiro Pinto da Fonseca, irmão do Conde Amarante, governador das Armas de Trás-os-Montes; este, pro seu turno, trouxe o Coronel Sebastião Diogo Cabreira, comandante da artilharia do Porto. Ferreira Borges, Silva Carvalho e Gomes da Silva conseguiram aliciar vários oficiais colocados em postos de comando. Fernandes Tomás partiu para Lisboa, a entender-se com os revolucionários da capital. Quando regressou ao Norte, soube que dera a sua colaboração ao Sinédrio, embora sem se filiar nele, o prestigioso professor da Universidade Frei Francisco de S. Luís, o qual, indo a Braga, conseguira a adesão do coronel Teixeira de Barros, comandante de Infantaria 9, e interinamente da brigada a que pertencia esse regimento. A do Marechal de campo Magalhães e Lacerda assegurava o apoio de muitas forças de Trás-os-Montes"

(26) S.P., 1819-1820, from p.361 onwards. "Manifeste du Gouvernement de la Nation Portugaise aux Souverains et aux Peuples de l'Europe. Lisbonne, le 15 décembre, 1820"

(27) F.O.63, 233, pp.130-132. "Note from José Ferreira Borges to Sor Consul da Nação Ingleza"

(28) F.O.63, 231, p.141. Circular from Foreign Ministers to Mr Edward Michael Ward. 2 October 1820

(29) Until the end of 1820 there is no evidence of any initiative taken by the British authorities. They confined themselves to the reception of the information which was transmitted by the revolution any movement

(30) In this chapter, III

(31) Cf. note (30)

(32) F.O.63, 236, p.62. Copy of a letter from a merchant at Oporto, 3 Sept 1820

(33) F.O.63, 231, p.74. Letter signed by the representatives of four British firms which was transmitted to J. Jeffery. Lisbon 2nd Sept. 1820

(34) F.O.63, 236, p.61. Letter from a British merchant to Bathurst. London 18 September 1820

(35) Cf. in this chapter, III

(36) Cf. note (35)

(37) F.O. 63, 231, pp.19-22V. "Most secret and confidencial. Letter from Castlereagh to Ward. Foreign Office. November 8, 1820

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

The period 1807-1820 was of crucial importance in the history of both Portugal and Great Britain and can be considered as one of the most controversial in the history of the relations between the two countries.

The war between England and France reached the highest peak in 1807. Portuguese neutrality favoured the commercial relations with all the countries of the world. Between 1801 and 1807 the Portuguese balance of trade with the foreign nations showed a constant surplus as follows[1]:

	Imports (in cruzados)	Exports (in cruzados)	Surplus (in cruzados)
1801	48343000	62759000	14415000
1802	44855000	53513000	8657000
1803	37670000	53820000	16150000
1804	44602000	52652000	8049000
1805	49141000	56635000	7493000
1806	41102000	58138000	17036000
1807	34740000	52498000	17757000

By the middle of 1807 the French achieved military, political and economic hegemony over the British in Europe, especially after the Treaty of Tilsit was drawn up in early July.[2]

Negotiations between Portugal and those two countries were intensified[3] but the Prince Regent vacillated. On 25 September he adhered to the cause of France[4]; on 20 October he ordered that Portuguese ports be closed to British navigation.[5]

On 26 November a "Junta do Governo do Reino" was created and instructed, having in view the flight of the Royal Family to Brazil[6] which took place three days later under the protection of the British squadron. Meanwhile the French invaded Portugal and seized Lisbon.

In January 1808 the Prince Regent ordered the opening of Brazilian ports to British navigation. This decision has been interpreted in various ways.

José Acursio das Neves, President of the Real Junta de Commercio, Agricultura, Fábricas & Navegação argued that such a decision was the result of the circumstances of that time[7]. Almeida d'Eça in A Abertura dos Portos do Brasil argued that that decision registered the beginning of the economic independence of Brazil. Joel Serrão in Do Sebastianismo ao Socialismo em Portugal, p.44, seems to suggest that viewed from a social perspective the opening of the Brazilian ports favoured the Portuguese bourgeoisie rather than British trade. He explained "...não haveria motivos suficientemente fortes para que a burguesia de então se sentisse muito lesada pelo absolutismo, que lhe abria os portos brasileiros, escorraçando deles as mercadorias estrangeiras, especialmente as inglesas".

The opening of the Brazilian ports to the British trade as well as the Treaty of Commerce drawn up on 19 February 1810 in Rio de Janeiro has been unanimously considered as the major cause of the ruination of the bases of the Portuguese economy. This view is supported by Oliveira Marques in his História de Portugal, volume II, p. 3 and Armando Castro in Introdução ao Estudo da Economia Portuguesa (Fins do séc.XVIII a princípios do séc.XX), p. 231.

The Anglo-Portuguese cooperation against the French troops from the middle of 1808 to 1814 has also been one of the most discussed points in the history of the relations between the two countries. José Acúrsio das Neves, in Cartas de Hum Portuguez aos seus Concidadãos (carta XV)[7], suggested that the British aid was the guarantee for

the Portuguese independence, at that time threatened by the French occupation.

The conflict generally known as the Peninsular War lasted until 1814. Its history has been the object of numerous works such as: História Geral da Invasão dos Francezes em Portugal by José Acúrsio das Neves; História da Guerra Civil e do Estabelecimento do Governo Parlamentar em Portugal, Tomo I, II, III and V by S.J.L. Soriano; History of the War in the Peninsula by Sir F.P. Napier; A History of the Peninsular War by Charles Oman; Guerra de la Independencia by D. Jose Gomez de Arteche y Moro and Les Guerres d'Espagne sous Napoléon by E. Guillon.

Their interest is, above all, of a military and chronological nature.

By 1809 British influence in the Portuguese army had been strengthened. Arthur Wellesley (later Duke of Wellington) and William Beresford were its principal commanders and had the support of the Prince Regent (D. João). On 6th July 1809, the Prince Regent admitted Wellington to the Council of Regency with the right to a vote on military and financial matters(8). He was replaced on the Council by Charles Stuart(9) in August 1810 due to his involvement in the war.

It is evident that in these circumstances the weight of British interests at a military and political level was very considerable, especially during the war.

After the war the principal commander of the Portuguese army was Beresford, but he met with considerable opposition.

The conspiracy of 1817, which was led by Gomes Freire de Andrade and others, was the most evident sign. As a consequence of this, various historians have considered that British influence at that time had reduced the country...to a military and political dependence on England.

Victor de Sá, António Sérgio, Damião Peres and Oliveira Marques have written extensively on the subject.

Victor de Sá in A Crise do Liberalismo e as Primeiras Manifestações das Ideias Socialistas em Portugal (1820-1852) affirmed that: "A partir do momento em que, nas invasões napoleónicas, uma esquadra inglesa levara a família real portuguesa para o Brasil (1807), a Grã-Bretanha passara a exercer efectivamente o seu domínio em Portugal: o exército era comandado por oficiais superiores britânicos, o marechal Beresford "Generalissimo" das tropas portuguesas desde 1809, gozava em Portugal de autoridade mesmo superior à do governo da "Regencia": tinha poder análogo ao de um vice-rei..."

Fernando Pereira Marques in Exército e Sociedade em Portugal. No declímo do Antigo Regime e Advento do Liberalismo, p.156, appears to defend a similar idea, arguing that between 1809 and 1814, 343 British officers served in the Portuguese army while at the same time 876 Portuguese officers departed. Nevertheless in the post-war period, this author recognized the weight of British influence in the army but he had no doubt that the army was against the "Domínio Ingles" (op.cit. pp.172-179).

António Sérgio, in Breve Interpretação da História, p.110, referring to the post-war period, affirmed peremptorily: "Em Portugal governava Beresford. O descontentamento dos militares suscitou a conjuração de 1817, que custou a vida a Gomes Freire...".

Damião Peres in História de Portugal, volume VII, pp.24-25, complained against the conduct of the British after the war and regretted that Beresford and the British officers continued in service in the Portuguese army, enjoying benefits "só raramente igualados pelos dos seus camaradas portugueses".

Oliveira Marques in his História de Portugal (Desde os tempos mais antigos até ao governo do Sr. Pinheiro de Azevedo), vol.II, p.4, suggests that at the end of the ancien régime, Portugal was economically

ruined and politically subordinated to England. He wrote: "O Portugal monárquico-constitucional foi, de facto, ou tentou ser, uma ordem nova revolucionária. Partiu do caos, do ponto mais baixo no declínio económico e na subordinação política à Inglaterra".

Although there have been several studies of the relationship between London and Rio de Janeiro(10), there is no evidence of any similar work on the diplomatic relations between Portugal and England in this period.

Nevertheless there are several important collections of documents on the period, the best of which is probably the Collecção dos tratados, convenções, contratos, e actos publicos celebrados entre a coroa de Portugal e as mais potencias desde 1640 até ao presente by José Ferreira Borges de Castro. Volumes IV (1793-1814); V (1815-1826) and VI (1818-1944) contain many documents which deal solely with bilateral relations.

The História da Guerra Civil e do Estabelecimento do Governo Parlamentar... (1777-1834) by Simão José da Luz Soriano, refers to the period 1807-1820 and published documents of a diplomatic nature as well as those which refer to military and politic matters.

Even though limited to the period of the Peninsular war the Excerptos históricos e collecção de documentos relativos à guerra denominada da Peninsula e as anteriores de 1801 e de Roussillon e Cataluna deserves to be cited(11).

There is evidence that most of the documents referred in those works are translations from originals which may actually be found in the "Wellington Papers Collection" at the Southampton University Library.

A study which dealt with the 1820 revolution and attempted to set it in an international context was written by Antonio Viana in Apontamentos para a História Contemporânea. A Revolução de 1820 e o Congresso de

Verona . This work clearly suggests that British policy failed to protect Portuguese interests during and after the Congress of Vienna in 1815.

The question of the commercial relations between Portugal and Great Britain is undoubtedly a most controversial one.

On the period before 1807-1820 there are several studies on that subject, but unfortunately the majority of them are too slight to merit more detailed discussion(12).

A statistical treatment of the wine trade can be found in English Overseas Trade Statistics by E.B. Shumpeter, comprising the period 1697-1808. This provides data on Oporto's wine exports from 1678, and for the Portuguese wine trade in general during the last decades of the eighteenth century.

In terms of general trade realized between the two nations deserve to be cited the main three works: Commercial Relations of England and Portugal by Shillington and Chapman, comprising the period between the crusades and 1807; The Portugal Trade. A Study of Anglo-Portuguese Commerce by H.E.S. Fisher, comprising the period 1700-1770 and Trade and Power. Informal Colonialism in Anglo-Portuguese Relations by Sandro Sideri comprising the period between the seventeenth and twentieth century.

Sideri's work clearly provides us with useful insights. In the first place it comprises the period 1807-1820 and secondly, such as its title suggests, defends the thesis of the "economic dependence" regarding the Portuguese economy as a dependent one in terms of the commercial policies followed by the two countries.

Sideri (op.cit. pp.18-39) considers that that dependence had its origins in the middle of the seventeenth century and this was consolidated by the Methuen Treaty (1703). Pombal attempted to resist the increase in dependence by creating companies which eroded the British privileges. Sideri also demonstrates that the average annual

value of British exports to Portugal, during the period 1796-1810, oscillated between £0.81 million and £1.40 million which corresponded to about between 3.9 and 4.9% of total British exports.[13]

The average annual value of British imports from Portugal in the same period was approximately £0.70 million and £1 million which corresponded to about between 2.9 and 3.3% of total British imports.

In my view this does not demonstrate the Portuguese economy's dependence on the British trade, because the question was only placed in terms of British trade. For easier understanding it would be necessary to refer to the percentage of Portuguese imports and exports from and to England which was omitted by the author. In consequence of this, it will be opportune to compare in global terms the British and Portuguese trade between 1801 and 1810[14].

	PORTUGUESE TRADE (In £ million)		UNITED KINGDOM TRADE (In £ million)	
	IMPORTS	EXPORTS	IMPORTS	EXPORTS
1801	5.4	7	31.7	35.2
1802	5	5.9	29.8	38.2
1803	4.2	6	26.6	28.4
1804	4.2	6	27.8	31.5
1805	5.5	6.3	28.5	30.9
1806	4.6	6.5	26.8	33.5
1807	3.9	5.8	26.7	30.9
1808	0.8	1.6	26.7	30.3
1809	2.5	2.7	31.7	46.2
1810	4.7	3.5	39.3	43.3

The table shows the considerable difference in the value of the imports and exports realized by each one of the two countries.

With regard to the commercial realtions between the two countries between 1801 and 1807, according to Portuguese sources, this can be estimated by the following table[15]:

Anglo-Portuguese trade
(In cruzados)

Year	Portuguese Imports	Percentage of the total	Portuguese Exports	Percentage of the total
1801	12198393	25.2	24127536	38.4
1802	16734435	37.3	21180425	39.6
1803	13968732	37	26285625	48.8
1804	14412214	32.3	18566230	35.3
1805	14594264	30	22163027	39.1
1806	16467875	40	20502792	35.3
1807	13555680	39	19927990	38

Between 1801 and 1807 the Portuguese balance of trade with England was in constant surplus. Nevertheless imports from England stood between 30%and 40% of the total and the exports between 35% and 49% of the total of Portuguese trade.

In terms of the overall pattern of Portuguese trade this was shewed in favour of England.

Portuguese trade with the colonies was completely different. During the same period the balance of trade with the Eastern Colonies and Brazil was in constant deficit (except with Brazil in 1804) while that with those of Western Africa was in constant surplus (cf. table below)[16].

PORTUGUESE TRADE WITH THE COLONIES
(In thousand cruzados)

Year	EASTERN COLONIES				WESTERN AFRICA				BRAZIL			
	Imports	Exports	Deficit	Surplus	Imports	Exports	Deficit	Surplus	Imports	Exports	Deficit	Surplus
1801	5501	2761	2740		104	2635		2531	36941	26700	10241	
1802	5833	3222	2611		114	2372		2258	25883	25379	503	
1803	6265	3648	2617		17	2085		2067	28330	24821	3509	
1804	5423	4855	568		71	2261		2190	27999	28458		458
1805	4417	3769	648		30	2033		2003	34871	23763	11108	
1806	4486	4057	429		93	1943		1849	35384	21065	14319	
1807	6915	6359	556		39	1379		1358	34819	17382	17437	

In the first decade of the nineteenth century the British trade was supported by a formidable merchant marine of approximately twenty-two thousand ships, more than 2 million tons overall[17]. This was protected by the Royal Navy which by that time possessed about one thousand ships[18].

This infrastructure ensured the British a hegemony over international trade in general. Napoleon was aware of this predominance and attempted to reverse the situation justly by excluding British trade from the Continent of Europe and secondly establishing the continental economic organization known as the "Continental System"[19].

Louis Villat in La Révolution et l'Empire, p.127, suggests that he would follow a three-pronged strategy: "premièrement, dans le consentement, volontaire ou forcé, de tout le continent à exclure de tous ses ports le commerce britannique; secondement, dans la substitution de l'industrie manufacturière continentale à l'industrie britannique; troisième enfin , dans la paix maritime et la liberté des mers, arrachée à l'ennemi commun par la ruine de ses finances ou même de sa marine, écrasée sous la coalition des forces navales de l'Europe entière".

In the dispute between the British which wanted to preserve their hegemony on the sea and subsequently in the international trade and the French which pretended to transfer such hegemony to the continent, Portugal played an important role.

José Arruda in O Brasil no Comércio Colonial , p.661, declared that the Portuguese mercantile marine stood at only about 300 vessels by the end of the eighteenth century, although there is evidence that it possessed some of the largest ships, since the average of vessels was exceeded only by the grain-carrying vessels belonging to Dantzig.

Balbi in Essai Statistique..., p.382, refers to the fact that the Portuguese navy stood at 37 vessels with 1556 cannons. This represented the largest fleet possessed by Portugal since the Middle Ages.

The withdrawal of the Royal Family from Lisbon to Brazil at the

end of November 1807 under pressure of the British authorities and in accordance with a secret convention[20] drawn up in London and signed on 23 October, as well as the expulsion of the French troops from Portugal in 1808 and 1809, caused the interruption of commercial relations between Portugal and the countries which were allies of the French.

On 19 February 1810 a Treaty of Commerce was drawn up at Rio de Janeiro between Britain and Portugal. This treaty permitted the importation of British goods into Portugal, paying only duties at 15% while the goods from all other countries continued to pay some 30%. Moreover the longstanding British privileges in Portugal remained unaltered and the several stipulations of the 1810 treaty were guided by the principle of reciprocity in questions regarding rights and duties. Naturally this principle of reciprocity contrasted with the difference of means at the disposition of the two countries.

For example the British manufactures were imported without restrictions and this led to grave difficulties for Portuguese products. The case of duties paid by vessels was a still more flagrant one. The equality of duties paid in Portugal and in England favoured British shipping since the Portuguese mercantile marine was principally engaged in the trade with Brazil, Africa and Asia. This imbalance of advantage was exaggerated by the war because Portugal did not dispose of a navy to protect the vessels employed in the trade since the ships had already withdrawn to protect Brazil.

The opposition to the treaty immediately appeared and was constantly encouraged by the Portuguese papers published in London: the Correio Braziliense founded in 1808 and the Investigador Portuguez em Inglaterra founded in 1811.

The war ended in 1814 and on 23 July the Portuguese ports were again open to French and other shipping[21].

Despite this and all the alterations in the international relations caused by the post-war treaties, the treaty of commerce between Portugal

and Great Britain remained unchanged, though its implementation was at best partial.

Since Portugal's economy fell into dangerous decline the commercial relations between the two countries during the period 1807-1820 have given rise to a continuous polemic, which began at that time. José Acúrsio das Neves and Adrien Balbi wrote in the early 1820s and their works have been and continue to be important sources for subsequent studies. In Cartas de Hum Portuguez Aos Seus Concidadãos (Carta XV, pp.119-120), José Acúrsio das Neves argued against the accusations directed to the government by 1814: "Duas cousas se imputão principalmente ao Governo Real, como causas das nossas desgraças em commercio, e manufacturas; a abertura dos portos do Brazil às nações estrangeiras, e o Tratado de Commercio com Inglaterra. Sem entrar por agora em discussões a este respeito, bastará dizer que he necessário distinguir os tempos e as circumstancias. Separado inteiramente Portugal dos seus Estados ultramarinos, e subjugado por hum usurpador poderosissimo, de que se não podia entrever nem remotamente a quéda, como podia o Brasil dispensar-se do commercio estrangeiro? Quem nos resgataria da oppressão, e nos restituiria a mossa existencia política, sem os auxílios da Gram-Bretanha? E como poderiamos obtellos sem sacrificios? Bom seria que se podesse evitar ou fazer hum Tratado entre o pupilo e o seu tutor: a fazer-se, havia de ser favoravel ao tutor."

In 1820, José Accursio das Neves attempted to demonstrate that the treaty was not so disastrous as it appeared, showing the woollen manufactures imported into Portugal as follows[22]:

Year	Value (in million cruzados)	Year	Value (in million cruzados)
1800	10.9	1810	8.6
1801	6.1	1811	8.8
1802	8.7	1812	11.4
1803	6.1	1813	14.5
1804	4.5	1814	12.4
1805	5.9	1815	7.8
1806	6.2	1816	6.1
1807	6.8	1817	6.9
1808	1.3	1818	4.9
1809	3.7	1819	4.8

José Acúrsio das Neves recognized that nine-tenths of those amounts were paid to England. Comparing the figures corresponding to the period 1815-1819 with those of the period 1803-1807 he declared that there was not any great difference. In order to justify the British privilege of paying duties of 15% he reminded his readers that before the French invasion, a great part of the manufactures were re-exported to the colonies which were only supplied by Portugal traders who derived some profits from this transaction as well as from transport insurance and commissions. As Brazil began to be supplied directly from England the difference of profits had adversely affected the interests of Portuguese traders.

The implications of the treaty on the Portuguese manufactures were, in his view, unavoidable. In Variedades, Sobre Objectos Relativos às Artes, Commercio, e Manufacturas, Consideradas Segundo os Principios de Economia Politica, Tomo I, pp.181-219, published in 1814, José Acúrsio das Neves recorded the names of all the existing factories as well as

other owners in Portugal and analysed the state of their business, classifying them as being 'in progress', 'stationary' and 'decadent', concluding that decadence prevailed.

In 1822 Adrien Balbi published two remarkable works written in French which present a great deal of information on the economic life of Portugal, especially in the first two decades of the nineteenth century. They are entitled: Variétés Politico-Statistiques sur La Monarchie Portugaise and Essai Statistique sur Le Royaume de Portugal Et D'Algarve, Comparé Aux Autres Etats De L'Europe, Et Suivi D'un Coup D'oeil Sur L'Etat Actuel Des Sciences, Des Lettres Et Des Beaux-Arts Parmi Les Portugais Des Deux Hémisphères.

In his first volume Balbi refers to the History, Geography, Government and structures of the sectors of the economy of Portugal. From a commercial viewpoint there are many aspects of the economy in "Etat actuel de l'agriculture en Portugal" (pp.143-183). He concludes that the "Compagnie générale des vins du Haut Douro" (pp.155-157) was a useful contribution to the general economy and especially to the development of the Douro region. In "Tableau de la quantité et de la valeur de la laine exportée annuellement dans les années 1796, 1801, 1806, 1811, 1816 et 1819" he suggests that the wool trade also played a substantial role in the economy.

In "Commerce Extérieur Avec Les Nations Étrangères" (pp.431-445), Balbi shows the main goods imported and exported from and to England, France, Low Countries, Hamburg, Spain, Russia, Sweden, Denmark, Prussia, Italy, Austria, United States of America and Southern Barbary or the Empire of Maroc.

Though Balbi records that the economic situation was not one of overall decadence, nevertheless his writings lead one to conclude that the difficulties of the country increased quite dramatically after 1811.

Louis-François de Tollenare, who travelled through Portugal and Brazil between 1816 and 1818, wrote Notes Dominicales Prises Pendant

Un Voyage En Portugal Et Au Brésil En 1816, 1817 Et 1818 , subsequently edited by Léon Bourdon in 1971. Although useful the work appears to see Portuguese decadence as a result of British hegemony, but his conclusions should be read with care since Tollenare seems to have been very anti-British in his general comments.

The relationship between Portugal and Great Britain in the period 1807-1820 is also treated in several chapters of História de Portugal. Damião Peres, Fortunato de Almeida, João Amial, Oliveira Marques and Hermano Saraiva linked the presence of the English with the state of the economy, without discussing the connections between the two. In Dicionário de História de Portugal, vol.II, pp.113-120 directed by Joel Serrão, the author of "Comércio Externo", although falls into the same trap as Damião Peres, he considers the "dependence" on Great Britain in the following terms: "...é ainda a acentuada dependencia relativamente à Gra-Bretanha, que se expressa tanto nos tipos de trocas entre os dois países (exportação de produtos agricolas e importação de artigos manufacturados) como no domínio de importantes actividades económicas nacionais pela Inglaterra, como sucede na produção do vinho do Porto, em diversos sectores da indústria extractiva, nos transportes e comunicações, etc.", but presents no detailed documentation on these aspects of trade. Monographs on economic affairs in the period of 1807-1820 have been written by Albert Silbert, Armando de Castro, Jorge Borges de Macedo, Sandro Sideri, and Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, among others.

The work Do Portugal de Antigo Regime ao Portugal Oitocentista by Albert Silbert contrasts the active relations of commerce between Portugal and France in the first decade of the nineteenth century (op.cit., pp.36-73) with those after the French invasions (pp.75-83). The author declares that after the war the prevailing idea in Portugal and the continent was that the country was a British colony to a greater extent than Brazil. For this reason he argued that: "Foi muito mais a influencia inglesa que esteve na origem do desenvolvimento dos principios liberais, na medida em que o contacto com a Inglaterra (e

talvez com o exemplo esp anhol) trouxe novos hábitos de espirito". He believed that British hegemony reached its maximum effect in the aftermath of the war.

Armando de Castro in Ensaios de História Economico-Social; Introdução ao Estudo da Economia Portuguesa (Fins do séc. XVIII a princípios do séc. XIX) and A Dominação Inglesa em Portugal firstly refers to the Portuguese exports and imports during the first two decades of the nineteenth century and concludes (p.154) that: "A Inglaterra desfrutava dum monopólio de facto na colocação de tecidos de algodão e dum monopólio quase total para os lanifícios importados". In his second work (p.231) he uses a table drawn from Acúrsio das Neves to conclude that: "Pode ver-se o que significou para a Inglaterra e para Portugal, o Tratado de 1810, tendo-se presente os seguintes numeros: em 1805, o valor do comércio inglês com o nosso país atingia 2,027,650 libras e em 1811 ascendia a 6,164,858 libras. Uma análise superficial do comércio externo británico em 1811 revela que Portugal constituía, então, o primeiro mercado para os exportadores ingleses". Finally in A Dominação Inglesa em Portugal the author included as evidence of English hegemony a transcription of three "pamphlets" entitled: "Proclamação nos fins de janeiro de 1825 se espalhou na cidade do Porto, Provincias do Minho e Trazos-Montes, Contra A Nação Ingleza em particular contra o Governo de S.M.B." (pp.117-120); "Proclamação ou Manifesto" (pp.121-127) and "A Dominação Ingleza em Portugal. O que é de que nos tem servido a Alliança da Inglaterra. Por um compatriota de Gomes Freire d'Andrade" (pp.131-163).

Though no comment is given by the author, the anonymous pamphlets are vehemently anti-British and were published after 1820. Their contents criticised the conduct of the British during the Peninsular war and after. They pointed out the disastrous effects of the treaties with England, mainly that of 1810 and reminded the Portuguese patriots that the victims of the "Conspiracy of 1817" such as Gomes Freire de Andrade had fallen as a result of the British influence in the army at that time. In other words, Armando Castro believes that British influence

had undermined Portugal and its economy in the late 1810s.

In contrast with these simple ideas, Jorge Borges de Macedo attempted to establish Anglo-Portuguese relations on a wider context. In O Bloqueio Continental. Economia e Guerra Peninsular , he refers to the diplomatic relations between Portugal, France and England and analyses the development of the political events from 1806/to 1814. He establishes a comparison between the commercial relations of Portugal with France (pp.38-41) and England (pp.41 and following). His tables (pp.113-167) about the movement of vessels, mainly at the Douro bar show substantial information. He believes that British predominance was not affected by the blockade.

In contrast Sandro Sideri in Trade and Power. Informal Colonialism in Anglo-Portuguese Relations, (chapter VI, pp.120-125) explains the economic crisis, connecting it with the Anglo-Portuguese alliance and French invasions. In Table 1, (pp.234-235) he shows the Anglo-Portuguese trade since 1697 until 1915 and argues that the French invasions re-established an economic dependence which had been interrupted by the rule of the Marquês de Pombal.

On the other hand Vitorino Magalhães Godinho in Estrutura da Antiga Sociedade Portuguesa studied this period essentially in a theoretical perspective and envisaged the dependence of an agricultural and mercantile economy on that of an industrialized nation as occurring in this period. Unfortunately he does not present a numerical analysis of the period.

In Prix et Monnaies au Portugal. 1750-1850, published in Paris (1955), he uses abundant numerical data on prices in Lisbon as well as in the provinces (Porto, Bragança, Setúbal, Évora and Açores). An appendix includes some documents about the commercial and industrial situation. Nevertheless the subject of this thesis as well as its time are not contemplated by them. He concludes that (p.279): "Etroitement rattachée à la Grande-Bretagne, ce n'est pourtant guère en contre-coup de difficultés britanniques que l'économie portugaise vient à être

accablée par une crise aussi profonde..." As factors of the general crisis Vitorino Magalhães Godinho refers to the invasions and to the movement which led to the independence of Brazil. On the principal branch of the economy of that time, he believed that (pp.279-280): "La crise commerciale après avoir fait bondir les prix en un dernier sursaut, infléchit leurs courbes de longue durée de la hausse vers la baisse. A son tour, la descente des prix, effet de la crise et expression de la dépression commerciale, amène un effort considérable de développement des industries et de modernization de l'outillage".

British influence in Portugal during the period 1807-1820, considered in global terms, has been discussed by many intellectuals writing during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The idea which was cultivated during the nineteenth century was that the British ruled Portugal.

Almeida Garrett in Portugal na Balança da Europa, published in 1830, (L ivros Horizonte, n.d., p.32), wrote that: "Nessa antiga balança Portugal era considerado como um contrapeso necessário ao equilibrio das três grandes potências do oeste da Europa, França, Inglaterra e Espanha. A mais interessada era Inglaterra; e daí lhe ter sustentado e garantido sua independencia. Se esta independencia era real ou nominal, se as condições dela eram toleráveis, não é ainda para aqui examinar".

Referring to the period after 1820 revolution Almeida Garrett added: "Portugal abandonado pelo seu chefe e entregue à mercenária tirania de seus desprezíveis baxá, deu então o grande exemplo de uma nação pequena, oprimida, que ouve pela primeria vez a palavra liberdade (op.cit., p.69).

In Portugal Contemporâneo, p.44, Oliveria Martins affirmed peremptorily that by that time England ruled Portugal through Beresford.

Teófilo Braga in his História das Ideias Republicanas em Portugal (edição 1983), p.33, criticised the withdrawal of the Prince Regent to

Brazil and the conduct of his government which "no meio dos desastres e das misérias publicas só afirmava a sua antiga realeza por meio de portarias paternais, chamando amigo ao general inglês Beresford que nos governava militarmente sob o regime da chibata e da petulancia dos seus oficiais".

More recently, Joel Serrão wrote in Do Sebastianismo ao Socialismo em Portugal that Portuguese absolutism fell into decline due to French revolutionary ideology, the French invasions between 1807 and 1810 and the gradual independence of Brasil by 1808-1822. In consequence of this the "renovo do tradicional predomínio inglês" occurred.

In 1971 Franco Nogueira published As Crises e os Homens . At p.241, referring to the period 1814-1820 he wrote that Beresford "na efectividade das coisas, governava Portugal".

Albert Silbert regards the British influence at that time in its apogee, although he has not demonstrated the following affirmation: "...a tutela politica, militar e económica, muito mais forte do que en qualquer outra altura, suscitou uma reacção que se alimentou fatalmente de ideias de oposição ao Antigo Regime".

Lúcio de Azevedo in Épocas de Portugal Económico re-edited in 1978 regarded this period of the Portuguese history from a distinctly anti-British point of view. On page 456 he cited Palmela (extracted from Vida by D. Maria Amália Vaz de Varvalho, t.3°., p.63) to affirm that the treaty of commerce of 19 February 1810 had been "o mais lesivo e desiqual que duas nações independentes jamais contrairiam". Therefore Lúcio de Azevedo does not feel safe on the commercial relations between Portugal and England by 1807-1820. In a little résumé on page 460 he affirmed that: "O predominio económico e político da Gra-Bretanha não se estabeleceu pelo tratado de Methween, como se tem pretendido, jà existia antes, pelo de 1654, que nos impôs obrigações e lhe criou direitos excepcionais. A sombra dele, frutificou o rebento de 1703, e medrou entre nós o bretão em fortuna e autoridade. Obstinado em

manter-se logrou renascer das próprias cinzas, depois de extinto..." The author continued his interpretation along those lines, but surprisingly failed to refer to the decade 1810-20 basing his interpretation on the 1840s when the British claimed that their privileges were adversely affected.

In 1979 three works were published, showing their interpretations on the same subject, deeply identified with the thesis of dependence defended by Sandro Sideri. Miriam Halpern Pereira in Politica. Economia (Portugal nos séculos XIX e XX), refers to the period as one of transition between the absolutist and constitutional monarchy. She wrote: "Adquirida a independéncia política, que constituiu a primeira grande vitória do liberalismo, persistia a extrema dependencia económica em relação à Gra-Bretanha..."

In Revolução, Finanças, Dependência Externa (de 1820 à Convenção de Gramido), she reiterated the same thesis of dependence in these terms: "A crise da sociedade do Antigo Regime integra-se numa problemática tornada particularmente complexa pela perda da independência nacional e pela desagregação do principal eixo da estrutura imperial, de que o Brasil constituía o suporte fundamental. Subjacente a essa modificação geo-política encontra-se a nova forma que a dependência de Portugal em relação à Gra-Bretanha viera a assumir desde o início do século XIX".

In "Introdução" (pp.7-45) of Portugal na Alvorada do Século XX. Forças Sociais, Poder Político e Crescimento Económico de 1890 a 1914, Manuel Villaverde Cabral appears as more moderate. He argues (p.10) that": Só a ideologia patriotica pode levar certos autores a esquecer que, sem dependencia inglesa, Portugal seria Espanha, seria quando muito Catalunha".

He explains the crisis of 1807-1820 as a result of the French invasions; the policy of terra queimada performed by Wellington during the third French invasion by 1811; withdrawal of the Royal

Family for Brazil as well as other powerful families with their properties and subsequent delivery of the Portuguese administration to the British army and finally "os tratados comerciais...por neio dos quais o Estado Português entregava sucessivamente à Inglaterra o mercado brazileiro e, depois, o próprio mercado metropolitano".

As a result of the foregoing discussion it can be concluded that the period 1807-1820 has mainly been studied in a military perspective. The studies of policy during the period are scanty and normally included within more general works. This applies in the case of the various books of História de Portugal or they are dealt with as part of the History of England, particularly with works on British or Portuguese foreign policy such as Foundations of British Foreign Policy from Pitt (1792) To Salisbury (1902). Old and New Documents selected and edited by Harold Temperley and Lillian Penson, published in 1966.

Many studies have attempted to deal with the period from an economic viewpoint, but unfortunately the majority of them are not well documented. In some ways few have moved beyond works such as those of José Acúrsio das Neves and Adrien Balbi. Among the remaining studies the best documented seem to be those of Jorge de Macedo, Sandro Sideri, Vitorino Magalhães Godinho and François Crouzet which are supported by a great deal of primary evidence.

Jorge de Macedo grounded his study on manuscript sources found in Lisbon (Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, Biblioteca do Instituto Nacional de Estatística and Biblioteca da Academia das Ciencias) and of Paris (Archives Nationales) and various secondary ones, including the works of François Crouzet, José Acúrsio das Neves and Adrien Balbi (cf. op.cit. p.209 and following).

Sandro Sideri based his investigation on other sources in Lisbon (Arquivo Histórico do Ministério das Obras Públicas, Biblioteca do Instituto Nacional de Estatística and Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa) as well as those in England (Board of Trade, British Museum, Parliamentary Papers, those of the Historical Manuscripts Commission

and those in Public Records Office). He also drew conclusions from Adrien Balbi, Jorge Macedo and Vitorino Magalhães Godinho (cf. p.236 and following).

Vitorino Magalhães Godinho based his study Prix et Monnaies au Portugal. 1750-1850 in manuscript sources in Évora (Biblioteca Publica e Arquivos Departamentais); Lisboa (Biblioteca Nacional and Arquivos da Misericórdia); Paris (Archives Nationales); Porto (Arquivos da Misericórdia) and Setúbal (Arquivos da Misericórdia) (cf. op. cit. xi).

François Crouzet derived his findings from manuscript sources drawn from the Public Record Office and British Museum in London as well as "Archives d'entrepreses" in several British cities beyond the French archives of the Foreign Affairs (op.cit., pp.21-31).

Only specialized aspects of the period are some works on the wine trade, but those have merited monographic studies of comparatively little overall value. Alan David Francis published The Wine Trade in London in 1972. He refers to the vicissitudes suffered by the British in the period, but subsequently overcome. In Oporto Old and New written by Charles Sellers and published in 1899 many references are also made to the setbacks faced by several British firms established at Oporto during the Peninsular War.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY - Notes

(1) Balbi, Adrien, Essai Statistique..., p.441

(2) Cf. Major Peace Treaties of Modern History, 1648-1967 with an introductory essay by Arnold Toynbee. New York, 1967, pp.469-486

(3) Cf. Chapter I, 1.

(4) The Royal Edict may be found in F.O.63, 62, p.94

(5) C.L P., 1802 a 1810, p.467. Decreto mandando fechar os Portos deste Reino às Embarcaçoes da Grã-Bretanha

(6) C.L.P., 1802 a 1810, p.474

(7) Neves, José Acúrsio, "Carta XV", in Cartas de Hum Portuguez aos seus Concidadãos. Lisboa, 1823, p.120

(8) C.L.P., 1802 a 1810, p.764. Carta Régia aos Governadores do Reino reduzindo a tres o numero dos mesmos e para ser reconhecido por Marechal General Sir Arthur Wellesley, e ouvido em todos os objectos Militares.

(9) F.O.63, p.234. The document refers to the composition of the Council of Regency. The roles of the British members were established as follows:
"Invité au conseil - comme à devant Lord Wellington; Comme membre du Gouvernment pour les matières militaires et de Finances Le Ministre Britannique, Mr. Stuart."

(10) Cf. The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade. Britain, Brazil and the Slave Trade Question (1807-1869) by Leslie Bethell and British Preeminence in Brazil: Its Rise and Decline by Alan K. Manchester

(11) Chaby, Claudio Bernardo Pereira de, Excerptos historicos e collecção de documentos relativos à guerra denominada da Peninsula e as anteriores de 1801 e de Roussillon e Cataluna, vol.VI, Lisboa, 1882. (It is referred to by J. Macedo, op.cit., p.212)

(12) Several hundred works are cited in Esboço de uma Bibliografia (Nos Anais do Instituto do Vinho do Porto) published in 1945 with Segundo Aditamento in 1947 and Terceiro Aditamento in 1952

(13) Sideri, S., op.cit., pp.234-235

(14) These figures were extracted from: Trade and Power..., p.237 and English Historical Documents, 1783-1832 edited by A. Aspinall and E. Anthony Smith

(15) These calculations were made based on the figures shown by Adrien Balbi in Essai Statistique..., p.441 and J. Macedo in O Bloqueio Continental...., p.41

(16) Cf. Godinho, Vitorino Magalhães, Prix et Monnaies au Portugal, 1750-1850, p.275

(17) Cf. English Historical Documents, 1783-1832, p.556

(18) Lloyd, Christopher, The British Seaman, 1200-1860. London, 1968, p.289

(19) Fugier, André, Histoire des Relations Internationales. Tome Quatrième, pp.226-227

(20) This convention may be found in F.O.63, 57 (n.p.); S.P., 1812-1814, Vol.I-Part I, London, 1841, pp.507-508 and História da Guerra Civil e do Estabelecimento do Governo Parlamentar. Primeira Epocha. Tomo III, pp.626-640

(21) C.L.P., 1811 a 1820, p.315. Portaria para que se pratique com as Embarcações Francezas, o que se observara antes do anno de 1792

(22) Neves, José Acúrsio das, Memória sobre os Meios de Melhorar a Indústria Portuguesa. Lisboa, 1820 (reedited in 1963), pp.58-87

APPENDIX A

TABLE I BRITISH EXPORTS 1809-1819

(REAL OR DECLARED VALUE IN £)

YEAR	BRITISH EXPORTS TO PORTUGAL			BRITISH EXPORTS TO AZORES			BRITISH EXPORTS TO MADEIRA		
	FROM ENGLAND	FROM SCOTLAND	FROM G. BRITAIN	FROM ENGLAND	FROM SCOTLAND	FROM G. BRITAIN	FROM ENGLAND	FROM SCOTLAND	FROM G. BRITAIN
a) 1809	266,046	2.020	268,066	10,429		10,429	50,453	829	51,282
a) 1810	573,407	2,059	575,467	24,515	33	24,548	46,171	59	46,230
a) 1811	1,116	68,453	1,185,407	9,898	798	10,696	61,670		61,670
1812	3,181,660	279,237	3,460,897	86,708		86,708	216,077	35	216,112
1813									
1814	2,657,679	74,383	2,732,062	97,645	1,468	99,113	219,367	784	220,151
1815	2,355,461	35,428	2,390,889	38,731	1,091	39,822	199.909	887	200,796
1816	1,733,590	64,891	1,798,481	23,173		23,173	151,731	1,816	153,547
1817	1,478,046	26,139	1,504,185	48,272	754	49,026	125,370	259	125,629
1818	1,234,421	9,048	1,243,469	38,458		38,458	192,711	2,549	195,260
1819	1,290,713	25,630	1,316,343	52,043	1,075	53,118	151,626	1,849	153,475

Sources: CUST 8, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 - Ledgers of Exports of British Merchandize

CUST 10, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 - Ledgers of Foreign and Colonial Merchandize

a) Figures from only CUST 10

TABLE II BRITISH EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURES OF COTTON AND SILK 1812-1818

YEAR	COTTON TWIST OR YARN	PERCENTAGE	COTTON AND LINEN MIXED	PERCENTAGE	MANUFACTURED GOODS	PERCENTAGE	MANUFACTURES OF SILK	PERCENTAGE
	£. s. d.		£ s. d.		£ s. d.		£ s. d.	
1812					2,132,852 0 0	12.6		
1813								
1814	7,160 0 0	0.2	192 0 0	0.2	1,078,396 3 2	6.2	10,087 5 1	4.6
1815	20,628 7 0	1.2	250 0 0	0.2	981,885 18 9	5.1	5,666 14 0	2.2
1816	9,775 0 0	0.4	335 0 0	0.3	830,593 4 4	6.4	6,838 6 6	3.6
1817	10,147 0 0	0.5	474 0 0	0.4	613,816 9 0	4.3	2,722 8 3	1.5
1818							2,633 12 5	

Sources: C.J. 70, 1814-1816, p.851 and 74, 1818-1819, pp.939-965;
72, 1817, pp.740-742 and 73, 1818, p.700

TABLE III MANUFACTURES OF WOOLLENS EXPORTED TO PORTUGAL 1815-1820

YEAR	SUNDRIES (HOSIERY, COVERLIDS, TAPES AND SMALL WARES			PERCENTAGE	WOOLLENS MIXED WITH COTTONS			PERCENTAGE	WOOLLENS AND WOOLLEN YARN			PERCENTAGE
	£	s.	d.		£	s.	d.		£	s.	d.	
1815	46,374	9	0	16.6	5,253	5	0	2.7	727,805	16	1	7.1
1816	35,205	12	0	18.1	5,918	16	0	4.4	568,453	12	4	6.8
1817	14,670	9	0	8.9	3,826	19	0	2.2	572,662	4	6	7.2
1818	19,661	8	0	10.7	5,889	0	0	3.4	381,613	16	10	4.2
1819	9,127	0	0	10.2	3,286	0	0		412,415	15	0	6
1820	4,778	0	0	10.6	972	12	0	1.2	426,586	13	6	6.8

Sources: C.J., 70, 1814-1816, p.855; 74, 1818-1819, pp.955-962;
75, 1819-1820, pp.769-771; and 76, 1821-1822, pp.1064-1065

TABLE IV BRITISH EXPORTS (METALS) 1807-1820

YEAR	BRITISH IRON IN BARS				PERCENTAGE	FOREIGN IRON IN BARS				PERCENTAGE	BRITISH COPPER			PERCENTAGE
	Tons	c.	qrs.	lbs.		Tons	c.	qrs.	lbs.		Cwts.	qrs.	lbs.	
1807	886	12	2	9	8.2	387	15	0	6	5.9	2,939	1	6	4.3
1808	351	18	2	0	2.2	421	12	0	18	6.4	393	3	9	0.6
1809						1,024	10	3	13	11.9	681	1	1	1
1810						2,621	18	1	25	23	717	0	8	1.2
1811						3,408	0	1	27	42	1,403	2	16	2.9
1812	2,371	1	1	22	10	2,519	1	0	1	25.3	1,585	1	26	2.4
1813											823	3	10	7.2
1814	899	10	3	11	4	593	6	2	14	5.8	2,939	1	23	4.8
1815	344	11	0	7	1.4	129	8	3	11	0.9	3,539	2	22	3.5
1816	526	6	0	10	2	20	0	0	0	0.2	3,824	0	1	3.7
1817	470	0	0	16	1.2	4	5	1	3	0	2,981	3	24	2.2
1818	730	6	0	3	1.5	78	8	1	25	1.6	2,431	2	6	2
1819	725	14	1	0	2.7	92	15	0	24	2.4	1,736	3	18	1.8
1820	1,223	8	3	0	2.9	27	14	1	8	0.7				

Sources: C.J. 67, 1812, pp.758-759; 68, 1812-1813, p.855; 69, 1813-1814, p.764; 70, 1814-1816, pp.868-873; 71, 1816-1817, p.906; 72, 1817, p.751; 73, 1818, p.691; 74, 1818-1819, pp.967-979; 75, 1819-1820, pp.773-774 and 76, 1821-1822, pp.1078-1083

TABLE V LINENS EXPORTED TO PORTUGAL, AÇORES AND MADEIRA 1808-1820

YEAR	BRITISH LINEN	PERCENTAGE	IRISH LINEN	PERCENTAGE	FOREIGN LINENS	PERCENTAGE
	£ s. d.		£ s. d.		£ s. d.	
1808	11,798 2 2	1.2	4,290 1 0	1.5	1,672 12 7	1.4
1809	a)		7,126 5 0	2	31,002 14 1	5.1
1810	a)		21,681 12 0	6.3	51,714 16 3	7
1811	a)		32,051 0 6	17.6	42,066 4 3	21.8
1812	174,880 11 10	20.8	24,944 6 9	7.9	6,580 18 1	6.6
1813	a)		a)		a)	
1814	25,282 9 6	2.2	18,384 0 0	4.4	1,689 0 2	1
1815	15,609 0 0	1.4	27,033 1 0	5	546 9 0	0.5
1816	20,344 5 9	1.9	30,823 4 6	6.5	1,470 13 4	4
1817	20,174 16 0	1.4	19,930 11 0	3.4	472 3 6	2.9
1818	15,602 1 4	0.9	27,202 8 0	2.2	1,569 6 0	9.4
1819	27,202 8 0	2.2	11,945 6 0	3.7	274 13 0	4.2
1820	30,128 0 0	2	14,323 14 0	2.8	-	-

Sources: C.J. 78, 1823, pp.883-891

a) Records destroyed by fire

APPENDIX B

TABLE I PORTUGUESE EXPORTS 1810-1820
(Official Value in £)

YEAR	EXPORTS FROM PORTUGAL			EXPORTS FROM AZORES			EXPORTS FROM MADEIRA		
	TO ENGLAND	TO SCOTLAND	TO G.BRITAIN	TO ENGLAND	TO SCOTLAND	TO G.BRITAIN	TO ENGLAND	TO SCOTLAND	TO G.BRITAIN
1810	1,181,249	67,636	1,248,886	209,764	374	210,138	119.068	642	119.710
1811	365,647	12,705	378,352	14,849		14,849	11.690	528	12.218
1812	656.340	37.404	693,745	17,368	1,561	18,930	21,600	1,070	22,670
1813									
1814	634,278	35,159	669,437	5,495	1,453	6,948	20,428	124	20,553
1815	572,401	32,546	604,948	18,217	1,280	19,498	13,449	927	14,376
1816	302,917	26,984	329,901	12,665	1,553	14,218	8,957	976	9,933
1817	537,466	26,039	563,506	9,853	1,017	10,871	9,787	448	10,235
1818	661,408	30,757	692,167	1,215	803	14,019	13,325	1,751	15,077
1819	391,773	25,943	417,716	21,843	2,472	24,315	11,518	2,494	14,012
1820	324,923	28,330	353,254	24,439	2,614	27,053	17,635	2,592	20,228

Sources: CUST 4, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 - Ledgers of imports: under countries

TABLE 11 WOOL EXPORTS FROM PORTUGAL 1807-1820

YEAR	SHEEP'S WOOL EXPORTED FROM PORTUGAL AND MADEIRA TO GREAT BRITAIN	LAMB'S WOOL EXPORTED FROM PORTUGAL AND MADEIRA TO GREAT BRITAIN			TOTAL OF WOOL EXPORTED FROM ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD TO GREAT BRITAIN	PERCENTAGE OF THE PORTUGUESE WOOL
	lbs.	cwts.	qrs.	lbs.	lbs.	
1807	289,067				11,768,926	2.5
1808	30,619				2,353,725	1.3
1809	969,033				6,845,933	14.2
1810	3,018,961				10,936,224	27.6
1811	1,790,286				4,739,972	37.8
1812	4,642,280				7,014,917	66.2
1813	2,965,565				8,869,432	33.4
1814	2,511,574				15,712,517	16
1815	1,146,607				14,991,555	7.6
1816	493,277	4,404	1	1	8,117,864	6.1
1817	729,243	6,511	0	11	14,715,843	5
1818	1,409,490	12,584	2	26	26,405,486	5.3
1819	1,808,251				16,190,343	11.2
1820	95,187				10,043,746	1

Sources: C.J.67, 1812, p.759; 69, 1813-1814, pp.767 and 768; 70, 1814-1816, p.854; 71, 1816-1817, p.893; 74, 1818-1819, pp.932 and 955; 75, 1819-1820, p.767; 76, 1821-1822, pp.1066 and 1067; 77, 1822-1823, p.992 and 78, 1823, p.879. The figures respecting to 1813 may be found in "O Investigador Portuguez em Inglaterra", vol.X, p.282

TABLE III WINES EXPORTED FROM PORTUGAL 1807-1820

YEAR	WINES EXPORTED FROM PORTUGAL TO UNITED KINGDOM	WINES EXPORTED FROM ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD TO UNITED KINGDOM	PERCENTAGE OF THE PORTUGUESE WINES
	Imp. Gals	Imp. Gals	
1807	6,219,209	10,106,715	61.5
1808	5,274,445	11,079,076	47.6
1809	4,891,406	11,622,471	42
1810	6,450,111	10,818,612	59.4
1811	2,061,303	4,624,106	44.6
1812	3,435,272	8,114,317	42.3
1813			
1814	3,486,710	7,136,941	48.9
1815	3,827,706	7,116,109	53.8
1816	1,936,378	4,306,528	45
1817	3,078,218	5,860,112	52.5
1818	4,026,404	7,918,385	50.8
1819	2,339,580	5,430,634	43.1
1820	2,457,410	5,170,046	47.5

Source: P.P. 1898, LXXXV, p.155

TABLE IV BRAZILIAN PRODUCE EXPORTED FROM PORTUGAL 1807-1820

YEAR	COTTON EXPORTED TO G. BRITAIN		SUGAR EXPORTED TO G. BRITAIN	
	IN ARROBAS	IN MIL REIS	IN ARROBAS	IN MIL REIS
1807	102,232	1,131,186	4,062	9,370
1808				
1809	91,897	862,405	6,353	10,476
1810	115,630	1,197,871	60,338½	127,358
1811	18,963½	143,979		
1812	33,886	204,868	5,928	13,708
1813	16,966	146,586		111,874
1814	73,489	823,076	21,614	73,573
1815	74,872½	850,551	5,332	19,989
1816	19,464	239,796	3,242	10,208
1817	118,170½	1,278,667		
1818	58,379	655,460		
1819	2,783	27,421		
1820	7,854	65,671	3,054	8,100

Source: Biblioteca do Instituto Nacional de Estatistica: Balanços Gerais do Comércio do Reino de Portugal com os seus domínios e nações estrangeiras em 1807, 1809-1820

TABLE V GOLD AND SILVER SHIPPED FROM PORTUGAL AND BRAZIL TO GREAT BRITAIN 1810-1818
(in £ sterling)

YEAR	EXPORTS FROM PORTUGAL					EXPORTS FROM BRAZIL					EXPORTS FROM ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD(1)					% from Portugal	% from Brazil	% from
	BULLION		COIN			BULLION		COIN			BULLION		COIN					
	GOLD	SILVER	GOLD	SILVER	TOTAL VALUE	GOLD	SILVER	GOLD	SILVER	TOTAL VALUE	GOLD	SILVER	GOLD	SILVER	TOTAL VALUE			
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£			
1807																		
1808																		
1809																		
1810			7,910	120	8,030	2,980		17,120	13,466	33,566	9,795	1,944	139,948	334,487	486,174	1.7	6.9	8.
1811			23,769	508	24,277	13,748	140	98,735	12,785	125,408	22,423	4,947	319,173	449,948	796,491	3.0	15.7	18.
1812			50,088		50,088	15,170		208,350	5,084	228,604	24,080	19,072	378,414	303,759	725,325	6.9	31.5	38.
1813			5,678	90	5,760	9,040	1,100	80,005	2,280	92,425	27,160	1,100	107,695	74,554	210,509	2.7	43.9	46.
1814			97,692	22,362	120,054						7,983	487	188,375	86,489	203,334	59.0		59.
1815			484,572	266,455	751,027			164,298	5,030	169,328	4,340	16,150	695,647	730,900	1,447,037	49.4	11.7	61.
1816	160		665,198	116,400	781,758	848		14,951	659	16,458	34,143	63,793	692,322	661,218	1,451,476	53.9	1.1	55.
1817			209,556	611	210,167	20,806		126,787	1,338	148,931	87,415	71,489	354,080	752,281	1,265,265	16.6	11.8	28.
1818			31,073	2,166	33,239	4,480		22,454		26,934	51,676	56,984	60,928	360,602	530,190	6.3	5.0	11.

Source: C.J., 74, 1818-1819, p.1120

(1) Bahamas, Brazil, British America, Gibraltar, Jamaica, Malta, Portugal, South America, Spain, West India Islands

APPENDIX C

TABLE I FOREIGN AND COLONIAL TRADE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM 1807-1820

YEAR	IMPORTS OF FOREIGN AND COLONIAL MERCHANDIZE	EXPORTS OF FOREIGN AND COLONIAL MERCHANDIZE	EXPORTS OF BRITISH & IRISH PRODUCE & MANUFACTURES	REAL OR DECLARED VALUE OF BRITISH AND IRISH MANUFACTURES EXPORTED	DECLARED VALUES OF THE TOTAL EXPORTS FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM	OFFICIAL VALUE OF THE TOTAL EXPORTS FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM
	OFFICIAL VALUE					
	£	£	£	£	£	£
1807	26,734,425	7,624,312	23,391,214	37,245,877	35,412,867	31,064,940
1808	26,795,540	5,776,775	24,611,215	37,275,102	35,007,591	30,449,036
1809	31,750,557	12,750,358	33,542,274	47,371,393	44,794,452	46,377,229
1810	39,301,612	9,357,435	34,061,901	48,438,680	45,761,121	43,568,757
1811	26,510,186	6,117,720	22,681,400	32,890,712	29,893,549	28,904,169
1812	26,163,431	9,533,065	29,508,508	41,716,964		39,226,283
1813						
1814	33,755,264	19,365,981	34,207,253	45,494,219	45,494,119	53,573,234
1815	32,987,396	15,748,554	42,875,996	51,603,028	51,632,971	58,629,371
1816	27,431,604	13,480,780	35,717,070	41,657,873	41,657,858	49,195,461
1817	30,834,299	10,292,684	40,111,427	41,761,132	41,492,312	50,403,841
1818	36,885,182	10,859,817	42,700,521	46,603,249	46,112,800	53,561,886
1819	30,776,810	9,904,813	33,534,176	35,208,321	34,881,727	43,438,989
1820	32,438,650	10,555,912	38,395,625	36,424,652	36,126,322	48,949,880

Sources: English Historical Documents 1783-1832 Edited by A. Aspinall and E. Anthony Smith. London, 1959, pp.550 and 551 or P.P., 1898, LXXXV, pp.48-51

TABLE II PORTUGUESE TRADE
(£ millions)

	FOREIGN COUNTRIES				COLONIES			
			TRADE BALANCE				TRADE BALANCE	
YEAR	IMPORTS	EXPORTS	SURPLUS	DEFICIT	IMPORTS	EXPORTS	SURPLUS	DEFICIT
1807	3.9	5.8	1.9		4.7	2.9		1.8
1808	0.8	1.6	0.8		0.2	0.5	0.3	
1809	2.5	2.7	0.2		1.6	1.1		0.5
1810	4.7	3.5		1.2	1.1	1.1	-	-
1811	10.8	1.9		8.9	1.5	1.0		0.5
1812	9.6	2.9		6.7	1.5	0.9		0.6
1813	8.1	2.8		5.3	2.0	1.2		0.8
1814	6.3	4.9		1.4	2.6	1.9		0.7
1815	6.9	5.5		1.4	3.6	3.1		0.5
1816	5.0	4.5		0.5	3.5	4.0	0.5	
1817	4.4	4.4	-	-	3.1	3.1	-	-
1818	5.5	4.7		0.8	3.3	3.0		0.3
1819	4.1	3.1		1.0	2.6	2.3		0.3

Sources: Balbi, Adrien, Essai statistique, Tome I, pp.441-445 and Sideri, S., Trade and Power. Informal Colonialism in Anglo-Portuguese Relations, p.237

TABLE III ANGLO-PORTUGUESE TRADE 1807-1820

	PORTUGUESE SOURCES				BRITISH SOURCES (Including Azores and Madeira)			
YEAR	PORTUGUESE IMPORTS	PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL IMPORTATION	PORTUGUESE EXPORTS	PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL EXPORTS	BRITISH IMPORTS FROM PORTUGAL Official Value in	PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL	BRITISH EXPORTS TO PORTUGAL Real Value in	PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL
	(Cruzados)		(Cruzados)		£		£	
1807	13,555,680	39%	19,927,990	38.0%			1,170,221	3.3
1808	4,915,937	71.8%	2,007,451	13.8%			600,137	1.7
1809	11,329,882	51.3%	18,310,675	74.3%			1,124,098	2.5
1810	23,911,903	56.1%	25,547,659	81.6%	1,578,734	4.0%	2,228,833	4.9
1811	53,899,901	55.7%	10,809,662	62.5%	405,419	1.5%	6,146,858	20.6
1812	43,335,911	50.4%	17,318,973	66.2%	735,345	2.8%	3,763,717	
1813								
1814					696,938	2.0%	3,051,326	6.7
1815					638,822	1.9%	2,631,507	5.1
1816	24,889,501	55.7%	10,465,982	25.9%	354.052	1.3%	1,975,201	4.7
1817					584,612	1.9%	1,678,840	4
1818					721,263	2.0%	1,477,187	3.2
1819	18,665,392	50.2%	10,522,717	37.3%	456.043	1.5%	1,522,936	4.4
1820					400.535	1.2%	1,824,904	5.1

Sources: Balbi, Adrien, Essai Statistique, p.441
Balbi, Adrien, Variétés Politico-Statistiques, V and VI Tableau Général
Macedo, J., O Bloqueio Continental, p.41

Sources: C.J., 67, 1812, pp.763 and 766; 77, 1822-1823, pp.1032-1033;
CUST 4 (from 4 to 11) and CUST 5 (from 10 to 9);
CUST 8 (from 1 to 10) and CUST 10 (from 1 to 11)
and English Historical Documents, 1783-1832,

1. PRIMARY SOURCES

1.1 MANUSCRIPT SOURCES IN ENGLAND

1.1.1. BRITISH MUSEUM

Add.27.344 - Carta dos privilegios concedidos á nasçam Britanica assim pelo foral como pelas capitulações de pazes: passada a instancia de Abrahão Castres consul geral da mesma nasçam em este reino de Portugal e seus senhorios. Dada e passada em XXII de Agosto de MDCCXLVI annos.

Add.34.329 (fls 11-17) - Carta de Privilegio e Foral dos Inglezes confirmado por El Rey Dom João o quarto no anno de 1642.

Add.31.236 - Ofícios originais de Sir Charles Stuart (depois Lord Stuart de Rothesay), enviado de Inglaterra em Lisboa, dirigidos ao Seu Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros, o Visconde de Castlereagh (Robert Stuart) e ao sub-secretário de estado William Hamilton, de 5 de Julho a 7 de Novembro de 1812.

Add.30.099 - Diário do general ingles R. Wilson, relativo ao tempo em que serviu com a Legião Portuguesa durante a guerra peninsular, (de 14 de Agosto de 1808 a 2 de Outubro de 1809).

Add.30.135 - Papéis de Sir R. Wilson relativos à constituição e serviços da Legião Lusitana debaixo do seu comando durante a guerra peninsular, com plantas das posições ocupadas pela Legião nas batalhas de Banos e de Talavera, descrições das marchas efectuadas etc. 20 de Agosto de 1808 a Dez. de 1809

1.1.2. PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

BT4 - General Registers and Indexes. 1808 to 1864

1 - 1808 Sep. - 1816 Jan.

2 - 1816 Jan. - 1820 Jan.

3 - 1820 Jan. - 1823 Jun.

BT6, 65 - (It contains <u>The Past, Present, & Probably the Future state of the Wine Trade</u> by James Warre)

CUST 4 - Ledgers of imports: under countries

4 - 1807; 5 - 1809; 6 - 1810; 7 - 1811; 8 - 1812; 9 - 1814; 10 - 1815; 11 - 1816; 12 - 1817; 13 - 1818; 14 - 1819; 15 - 1820.

CUST 5 - Ledgers of imports: under articles

1D - 1807; 1E - 1811; 2 - 1812; 3 - 1814; 4 - 1815; 5 - 1816; 6 - 1817; 7 - 1818; 8 - 1819; 9 - 1820.

CUST 8 - Ledgers of Exports of British merchandise

1 - 1812; 2 - 1814; 3 - 1815; 4 - 1816; 5 - 1817; 7 - 1818; 9 - 1819; 10 - 1820.

CUST 10 - Ledgers of Exports of Foreign and Colonial merchandise

1 - 1809; 2 - 1810; 3 - 1811; 4 - 1812; 5 - 1814; 6 - 1815; 7 - 1816; 8 - 1817; 9 - 1818; 10 - 1819; 11 - 1820.

F.O.63

54 - 1807 - Jan-June Viscount Strangford
55 - 1807 - July-Oct. Viscount Strangford
56 - 1807 - Oct.-Dec. Viscount Strangford
57 - 1807 - Jan-Sept, Domestic, Chevalier de Souza, and various
58 - 1807 - Oct.-Dec. Domestic, Chevalier de Souza, and various
62 - 1807 - April-1808 Oct., Sir Robert Wilson, and Consuls James Gambier, J. Pringle, John Bell, John Lempriere and William Harding Read
64 - 1808 - Jan-May. Chevalier de Souza, Domestic, and various
65 - 1808 - May-August Chevalier de Souza, Domestic, and various
66 - 1808 - Aug.-Oct. Chevalier de Souza, Domestic, and various
67 - 1808 - Nov.-Dec. Chevalier de Souza, Domestic, and various
73 - 1809 - July-Sep. Papers on the proposed Treaty of Commerce, Portugal and Brazil.
79 - 1809 - Consuls John Jeffery, William Harding Read, Henry Veitch, and others

80 - 1809 - Domestic, Chevalier de Souza

81 - 1809 - Domestic various

87 - 1810 - Francis Hill, Consuls James Gambier, Frederik Lindeman, John Lempriere and various (Brazil)

88 - 1810 - To Charles Stuart

89 - 1810 - Feb.-April. From Charles Stuart

90 - 1810 - April-June From Charles Stuart

91 - 1810 - June-Aug. From Charles Stuart

92 - 1810 - Aug.-Sep. From Charles Stuart

93 - 1810 - Sept.-Oct. From Charles Stuart

94 - 1810 - Oct.-Nov. From Charles Stuart

95 - 1810 - Nov.-Dec. From Charles Stuart

96 - 1810 - Consuls John Jeffery, Henry Veitch, William Harding Read, James Alton, and Tomas Perkins, F.C. Philips, Thomas Wilson, etc.

97 - 1810 - Chevalier de Sousa

98 - 1810 - Jan.-May Domestic various

99 - 1810 - June-Aug. Domestic various

100 - 1810 - Sept.-Dec. Domestic various

From 105 to 116-1811 - From Charles Stuart

117 - 1811 - Consuls John Jeffery, Henry Veitch, William Harding Read and various

118 - 1811 - Domestic. Chevalier de Souza

126 - 1812 - To Sir Charles Stuart

From 127 to 136 - 1812 - From Charles Stuart

137 - 1812 - Consuls John Jeffery and William Harding Read, Marquis of Wellington, Sir W.C. Beresford, and various

138 - 1812 - Domestic. Conde de Funchal

150 - 1813 - To Sir Charles Stuart

From 151 to 157 - 1813 - From Charles Stuart

158 - 1813 - Consuls John Jeffery, William Harding Read and various

159 - 1813 - Domestic. Conde de Funchal

165 - 1813 - Papers relating to the Oporto Company

171 - 1814 - Jan-Feb. - Sir Charles Stuart

172 - 1814 - Feb.-April - Sir Charles Stuart

173 - 1814 - April-July - Louis Casamajor

175 - 1814 - Aug.-Nov. - Louis Casamajor

176 - 1814 - George Canning. Consuls John Jeffery, William Harding Read, and Henry Veitch, etc.

177 - 1814 - Domestic, Conde de Funchal

184 - 1815 - Jan.-Sept. - To George Canning

From 185 to 187 - 1815 - From George Canning

188 - 1815 - Lord Beresford and Consuls John Jeffery, William Harding Read, Henry Veitch, Archibaldi Brounlie, John Crispin, Robert Hesketh, and John Lempriere (Portugal and Brazil)

196 - 1816 - March-Dec. - Edward M. Ward

198 - 1816 - Consuls John Jeffery, John Crispin, William Harding Read, Alexander Cunningham, Robert Hesketh, Lord Beresford, etc. (Portugal and Brazil)

200 - 1816 - Jul-Dec. - Domestic. M. de Freire, Count Palmella and various

205 - 1817 - Edward M. Ward

206 - 1817 - Consuls - J. Jeffery, J. Crispin, W.H. Read, etc.

207 - 1817 - Domestic, Count Palmella and M. Guerreiro

214 - 1818 - Edward M. Ward

215 - 1818 - (The names cited at 206)

216 - 1818 - Count Palmella and Chevalier Guerreiro

222 - 1819 - Edward M. Ward

223 - 1819 - Consuls H. Chamberlain, Robert Hesketh, William Pennell, Alexander Cunningham, and Henry Dickenson, John Jeffery, John Crispin, and William Harding Read, etc. (Portugal and Brazil)

224 - 1819 - Count Palmella and Chevalier Guerreiro

231 - 1820 - Edward M. Ward

232 - 1820 - Jan-June - Consul General John Jeffery

233 - 1820 - Consuls John Jeffery, John Crispin, William Harding Read and Henry Veitch

234 - 1820 - Domestic, Count Palmella, Chevalier Guerreiro, Chevalier de Souza

235 - 1820 - Jan-June - Domestic various

236 - 1820 - Jul.-Dec. - Domestic various

238 and 239 - 1821 - Edward M. Ward

241 - 1821 - Consuls (the names cited at 233)

1.1.3. SOUTHAMPTON UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
WELLINGTON PAPERS

REFERENCE

1/207 - Letters to the Duke, 1 Jul.1808 - 31 Jul.1808
1/208 - Letters from the Duke, 1 Jul.1808 - 26 Jul.1808
1/212 - Miscellaneous papers, Aug.1808 - Sep.1808
1/252 - Letters to the Duke, 1 Apr. 1809 - 8 Apr. 1809
1/263 - Letters from the Duke, 17 May 1809 - 31 May 1809
1/264 - Letters of the Duke, 1 Jun. 1809 - 29 Jun. 1809
1/265 - Letters from the Duke, 1 Jun. 1809 - 16 Jun. 1809
1/266 - Letters from the Duke, 17 Jun. 1809 - 30 Jun. 1809
1/290 - Letters from the Duke, 6 Dec. 1809 - 27 Dec. 1809
1/295 - Miscellaneous papers on Portugal and Spain 1809
1/315 - Letters to the Duke, 16 Sep. 1810 - 30 Sep. 1810
1/316 - Letters to the Duke, 1 Oct. 1810 - 21 Oct. 1810
1/329 - Letters from the Duke, 1 Apr. 1811 - 30 Apr. 1811
1/331 - Letters to the Duke, 15 May 1811 - 16 May 1811
1/332 - Letters to the Duke, 1 May 1811 - 31 May 1811
1/340 - Letters from the Duke, Sep. 1811 - Dec. 1811
1/344 - Miscellaneous papers 1811
1/318 - Letters from the Duke, Oct.1810 - Dec. 1810
1/355 - Letters from the Duke, 1 Dec. 1812 - 31 Dec. 1812
1/381 - Letters from the Duke, 1 Dec. 1813 - 31 Dec. 1813
1/438 - Letters from the Duke, 1 Dec. 1814 - 30 Dec. 1814
1/647/5 - Letter from Beresford to Duke Wellington
1/647/15 - Letter from Lord Liverpool to Arthur Wellesley
1/649/14 - Letter from W.C. Beresford to the Duke of Wellington

1.2. MANUSCRIPT SOURCES IN PORTUGAL

1.2.1. ARQUIVO DISTRITAL DO PORTO

Cabido do Porto:

Livro no.283 - Receita do Direito Real da Redizima e Portagem Q. se arecada dentro da alfandega anno de 1807 (It contains the exports from Oporto to the northern European and Brazilian ports, showing the dates, names of vessels, their captains and destinies as well as the merchandizes and their consignees)

Livro no.284 - Receita da Redízima e Portagem da Alfandega pertencente ao Ex.mo Bispo, e Cabido da Cidade do Porto (It contains the exports from Oporto to the northern European and Brazilian ports, between 1808 and 1811, showing only the merchandizes and their consignees

Livro no.287 - Livro da arrecadação da Redizima pertencente á Ex.ma Mitra, e Cabido do Porto feito no anno de 1809

Livro no.288 - Livro de arrecadação da Portagem do Mar na Alfandega (1811-1814)

Livro no.291 - Livro de Receita do Direito Real da Redizima e Portagem que se arecada dentro da Alfandega (1812)

Livro no.292 - Livro de Receita do Direito Real da Redizima por entrada que se arrecada dentro da Alfandega (1812)

Livro no.293 - Livro de Receita do Direito Real da Redizima e Portagem que se arrecada dentro da Alfandega (1813)

Livro no.295 - Livro da arrecadação da Portagem e Redizima (1814)

Livro no.296 - Livro da arrecadação da Portagem e Redizima (1814)

Livro no.297 - Livro da Portagem e Redizima (1815)

Livro no.298 - Livro de Receita da Redizima por entradas (1815)

Livro no.302 - Livro de Receita, de Redizima por entradas (1816)

Livro no.305 - Livro de Receita, de Portagem e Redizima (1816)

Livro no.306 - Livro de Receita, de Redizima por entradas (1817)

Livro no.307 - Livro da Portagem e Redizima (1817)

Livro no.313 - Livro da Receita da Portagem e Redizima (1818)

Livro no.315 - Livro da Redizima por entrada (1818)

Livro no.316 - Livro da Arrecadação da Redizima (1819)

Livro no.317 - Livro de Receita da Redizima por entrada (1819)

Livro no.318 - Livro da Receita da Portagem e Redizima (1819)

Livro no.319 - Livro da Arrecadação da Redizima pertencente à Mitra e do Cabido da Sé do Porto (1820)

Livro no.320 - Livro da Arrecadação da Portagem do mar pertencente à Mitra e ao Cabido da Sé do Porto (1820)

Livro no.321 - Livro da Receita da Portagem e Redizima (1820)

Livro no.322 - Livro de Receita da Redizima por entrada (1820)

Livro no.323 - Livro de Arrecadação dos Direitos da Portagem da Terra

Livro no.449 - Instituição da Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro (MDCCLVI)

1.2.2. ARQUIVO NACIONAL DA TORRE DO TOMBO

Junta do Commercio

Observação	Annos	Maços	No. ordem
Contribuições de defesa	1809-1813	12-14	23-28

Lista dos Livros da Balança Geral do Comércio de Portugal com os seus dominios e naçoes estrangeiras

Cotas	Anos	Observaçoes
197	-1814-	Datada de 1815, Dez., 9
198	-1815-	Datada de 1816, Nov., 15
199	-1816-	Datada de 1817, set., 18
200	-1817-	Assinada pelo Contador Geral Mauricio José Teixeira de Morais
201	-1818-	Idem
202	-1819-	Idem
202-205	-1820-	Idem

1.2.3. BIBLIOTECA DO INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ESTATISTICA

- Balanças Gerais do comércio de Portugal com os seus domínios e nações estrangeiras em

1807, 1809, 1810, 1811, 1812, 1813, 1814, 1815, 1816, 1817, 1818, 1819, 1820.

1.2.4. BIBLIOTECA PUBLICA MUNICIPAL DO PORTO

Códice no. 138 - "Relação dos bens pertencentes aos Inglezes "drawn up on 19th April 1809

- "Dispoziçoens que deixou decretadas o Ex.mo Marichal Duque de Dalmacia" on 12th May 1809
- "Carta do Ill.mo e Ex.mo Gen.al (Arthur Wellesley) do Exercito Britannico e Portuguez ao Ill.mo Snr. Prezidente do Senado da Camara da Cid.e do Porto" on 21st May 1809
- Oferta de uma espada a Arthur Wellesley pelo Senado da Camara do Porto on 29th November 1809

Códice no. 931 - Exame Analytico do Artigo do Moniteur de Trinta de Novembro de 1810 sobre a conducta dos Inglezes em Portugal

Códice no. 1228 - It contains some documents dealt with the French presence at Oporto

Códice no. 1269 - "Rua dos Inglezes"

Códice no. 1270 - It contains some documents on the Portuguese neutrality during the Franco-British conflict and other general aspects on the Peninsular War

Códice no. 1273 - "Casa ou Palacete da Feitoria Ingleza"

1.2.5. BRITISH FIRMS ESTABLISHED AT OPORTO

CROFT - Copy Book 1811-1812; Letters 1808-1811 (Boat Book 1812-1832)

R.E.J. COCKBURN & Co. - General Correspondence received in 1816; 1817; 1818 and 1820

OFFLEY FORRESTER - Oporto Journal, (11th January 1819 to 31st December 1825) and Copy Book (1820 to 1824)

1.3. OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS IN ENGLAND

1.3.1. ACCOUNTS AND PAPERS

A.P., Thirteen volumes (13). Miscellaneous. Session 5 February-23 July 1830. Vol.XXXI, 1830

1.3.2. COMMONS JOURNALS

Vol.62, 1806-1807
Vol.63, 1808-1809
Vol.64, 1809
Vol.65, 1810
Vol.66, 1810-1811
Vol.67, 1812
Vol.68, 1812-1813
Vol.69, 1813-1814
Vol.70, 1814-1816
Vol.71, 1816-1817
Vol.72, 1817
Vol.73, 1818
Vol.74, 1818-1819

Index, 56-75, 1801-1820

Vol.75, 1819-1820
Vol.76, 1821-1822
Vol.77, 1822-1823
Vol.78, 1823
Vol.79, 1824-1825

1.3.3. PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES

P.D., 14 - 1st series, 11 April 1809 to 21 June 1809 - J301H2
P.D., 23 - 1st series, 5 May 1812 to 30 July 1812 - J301H2

1.3.4. PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS

P.P., 1808, IX (126) IX, 117; P.P., 1808, X (5) X, 51;
P.P., 1809, X and XI; P.P. 1810, XIII; P.P., 1812, III;
P.P., 1813-1814, XIV; P.P. 1817, XIV; P.P. 1826-1827, XXV;
P.P., 1834, XLIX; P.P., 1835, LI; P.P., 1898, LXXXV

1.3.5. STATE PAPERS

S.P., 1 Part I, 1812-1814
S.P., 1 Part II, 1812-1814
S.P., 2, 1814-1815
S.P., 3, 1815-1816
S.P., 4, 1816-1817
S.P., 5, 1817-1818
S.P., 6, 1818-1819
S.P., 7, 1819-1820
S.P., 8, 1820-1821
S.P., 9, 1821-1822

1.4. OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS IN PORTUGAL

1.4.1 Collecção da Legislação Portugueza desde a ultima compilação das Ordenaçoes oferecida a El Rei Nosso Senhor pelo Desembargador Antonio Delgado da Silva. Legislação de 1802 a 1810 and Legislação de 1811 a 1820

1.5. NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

1.5.1. Correio Braziliense ou Armazém Literário (Londres, 1808-1822): vols - I-XXV

1.5.2. El Censor, Periódico Politico y Literário, Tomo II Madrid, 1820, 16 Sept.-12 Oct.

1.5.3. Correio de Lisboa, 1811

1.5.4. Diário Lisbonense, 1809-1912

1.5.5. Gazeta de Lisboa, 1807-1813

1.5.6. O Investigador Portuguez em Inglaterra (1811-1819): Vols II-XXIII

1.5.7. Leal Portuguez, 1809

1.5.8. O Campeão Portuguez ou o Amigo do Rei e do Povo (1819-1821): vols - I-III

1.5.9. O Portuguez ou Mercurio Politico, Comercial e Literário (1814-1823): vols IV-X

1.6. CONTEMPORARY SOURCES

Academia das Sciencias de Lisboa, Memórias Económicas, Lisboa 1789-1815

Academia das Sciencias de Lisboa, Memórias de Literature Portuguesa, Lisboa, 1792-1815

Balbi, Adrien, Essai Statistique, T.I, Paris, 1822

Balbi, Adrien, Variétés Politico-Statistiques sur La Monarchie Portugaise, Paris, 1822

Bourdon, Léon, Louis-François de Tollenare. T. I, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1971

Carneiro, Manuel Borges, Portugal Regenerado Em 1820, Lisboa 1820

Croft, J., A Treatise on the Wines of Portugal, York, 1788

The Defence against the petition of some English Factors at Oporto by the Correspondents of the Royal Wine Company for the Agriculture of the Wines of the Alto Douro, London 1812

Demonstração analytica dos bárbaros e inauditos procedimentos adoptados como meio de justiça pelo imperador dos Franceses para a uzurpação do Throno da Serenissima Casa de Bragança e da Real Coroa de Portugal, Lisboa 1810

Farington, R.A. Joseph, The Farington Diary (8 vols), Hutchinson & Co., London, 1926

Franzini, Marino Miguel, Reflexões sobre o Actual Regimento do Exército publicado em 1816, Lisboa 1820

G., A.P.D., Sketches of Portuguese life, manners, costume and character London, 1826

Goldsmith, Lewis, Recueil de Décrets, Ordonnances, Traités de Paix, Manifestes, Proclamations, Discours, etc., Londres, 1813

Guerner, Christovão, Discurso Historico e Analytico sobre O Estabelecimento da Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro, Lisboa, 1814

Instituição da Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro, Lisboa, MDCCLVI

Itinéraire du Portugal ou Guide des Voyageurs et Tableau des grandes routes, chemins de traverse et de communication, Bordeaux, 1810

Kinsey, W.M., Portugal Illustrated, London, 1828

The Journal of Mrs. Arbuthnot 1820-1832, vol.II, MacMillan & Co.Ltd., London, 1850

Memória sobre o estado actual do Commércio dos Vinhos do Alto Douro, e das Agoas - ardentes para sua respectiva lotaçao 1813-14

Neves, José Acúrsio das, Memória sobre os meios de melhorar a Indústria Portuguesa considerada nos seus diferentes ramos, Lisboa 1820

Neves, José Accursio das, Manifesto da Razão contra as Usurpações Francesas, Lisboa, MDCCCVIII

Neves, José Accursio das, Variedades, sobre Objectos relativos às Artes, Commercio e Manufacturas, T.I, Lisboa, 1814

Ratton, Jácome, Recordações de...sobre ocorrencias do seu tempo, de Maio de 1747 a Setembro de 1810, 2do Edo, Coimbra, 1920

Relação dos Factos Praticados pela Comissão dos Comerciantes de Vinhos, em Londres, correspondentes da Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro, no Porto, Lisboa, 1813

Sousa, José Jacinto de, Discurso sobre a Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro, 1813

Tomás, Manuel Fernandes, A Revolução de 1820 2do Ed., Lisboa 1982

Warre, James, The Past, Present, & Probably the Future State of the Wine Trade London 1824

2. SECONDARY SOURCES

Aires, Cristóvao, Dicionário Bibliográfico da Guerra Peninsular

Almada, José de, A Aliança Inglesa. Subsidios para o seu estudo, Lisboa, 1946-47

Almeida, Fortunato de, História de Portugal, T.VI, Coimbra, 1929

Almeida Garret, Portugal na Balança da Europa, Livros Horizonte

Ameal, João, História de Portugal, 5th ed., Porto, 1962

Amorim, Jaime Lopes, Influencia da Politica Aduaneira da Grã-Bretanha sobre o Comércio de Vinhos neste País, 1942

Anderson, M.S., The Ascendency of Europe - Aspects of European History. 1815-1914, Longman, 1980

Artola, Miguel, La Burguesia Revolucionária (1808-1874), Altaguara, 1976

A Associação Comercial no Império e na República. Antecedentes Históricos Rio de Janeiro, 1959

Azevedo, J. Lúcio, Épocas de Portugal Económico, Lisboa, 1978

Azevedo, Julião Soares de, Condições Económicas da Revolução Portuguesa de 1820, Lisboa, 1944

Arruda, José Jobson de A., O Brazil no Comércio Colonial, São Paulo, Editora Atica, 1980

Bahiense, Norbertino, Domingos Martins E A Revolução Pernambucana de 1817, Brasil, 1974

Baines, Edward, History of the Cotton Manufacture in Great Britain, Cass, 1966

Barraclough, Geoffrey, Main trends in History, New York & London, 1979

Basto, Artur de Magalhães, Memória Histórica da Academia Politecnica do Porto

Basto, A. de Magalhães (ed.), O Porto, Lisboa

Basto, Artur de Magalhães, O Pôrto do Romantismo, Coimbra, 1932

Basto, Artur Magalhães, O Porto sob a Segunda Invasão Francesa. 1809

Bell, Herbert and C.F. , Lord Palmerston, London, Longmans, 1936

Bethell, Leslie, The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade. Britain, Brazil and the Slave Trade Question. 1807-1869. Cambridge University Press, 1970

Bouvier, Jean, L'Histoire sans Frontières, Les Rothschild, Fayard, 1967

Boxer, C.R., The Portuguese Seaborne Empire. 1415-1825. London, Hutchinson, 1969

Boxer, C.R., Vicissitudes of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, Lisboa, 1958

Bradford, Sarah, The Story of Port. The Englishman's Wine. Macmillan, 1969

Bradford, Sarah, The Englishman's Wine. Macmillan 1969

Cabral, Manuel Villaverde, Portugal na Alvorada do Século XX, Lisboa, 1979

Campbell, Roy, Portugal, Reinhardt, 1957

Carnota, the Conde da, Memoirs of Field-Marshall the Duke de Saldanha. London, Murray, 1880

Carr, Raymond, Spain 1808-1975. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1966

Carvalho, José Liberato Freire, Memórias da Vida de José Liberato Freire de Carvalho, Lisboa, 1982

Castro, Armando, A Dominação Inglesa em Portugal. 2a. Ed 1974

Castro, Armando, Ensaios de História, Económico-social. 1967

Castro, Armando de, "As finanças publicas na economia Portuguesa da primeira metade do século XIX" in O Liberalismo na Península Ibérica na Primeira Metade do século XIX.

Castro, Armando de, Introdução ao Estudo da Economia Portuguesa, Lisboa, 1947

Castro, Armando de, O Pensamento Económico no Portugal Moderno, Lisboa, 1980

Castro, Visconde José Ferreira Borges de, Collecção dos Tratados, Convençoes, Contratos e Actos públicos celebrados entre a Coroa de Portugal e as mais potencias desde 1640 até ao presente. Lisboa, 1856

Chantal, Suzane, La Vie quotidienne au Portugal, Hachette, 1962

Clayton, Arnold Burgess, The Life of Tomas Antonio de Vilanova Portugal, Columbia University, 1977

Cobb, Gerald, Oporto Older and Newer, Chichester Press 7059

Constancio, Francisco Solano, Novo Diccionário de Lingua Portuguesa, Paris, 1836

The Correspondence of George, Prince of Wales 1770-1812, vol.VI. Cassell, 1969

The Correspondence of George, Prince of Wales 1770-1812, vol.VIII. Cassell, 1971

Crawfurd, Oswald, Portugal Old and New. Kegan Paul, London 1880

Crouzet, François, L'Economie Britanique et Le Blocus continental. Paris, 1958

Crowhurst, Patrick, The Defence of British Trade 1689-1815. Dawson, 1977

Cruz, António, As Invasões Francesas. Porto, 1970

Day, Clive, A History of Commerce, Longmans, 1922

Dias, José Sebastião da Silva and Maria da Graça Silva Dias, Os Primórdios da Maçonaria em Portugal. Coimbra, 1980

Dias, Maria da Graça Silva, "Anglismo na Maçonaria em Portugal no limiar do século XIX", Análise Social, XVI (1980)

Dicionário de História de Portugal, Lisboa, 1963-71

Dixon, Peter, Canning. Politician and Statesman. London, 1976

Droz, Jacques, Europe between Revolutions. 1815-1848. London 1967

Dunam, M. Napoléon et l'Allemagne. Le système Continental et les Débuts du Royaume de Bavière (1806-1810). Paris, 1942

Eça, Vicente d'Almeida d', A abertura dos portos do Brasil. Ensaio histórico. Lisboa 1908

Edwards, Michael M., The Growth of the British Cotton Trade, 1780-1815. Manchester University Press, 1967

English Historical Documents, 1783-1832. Eyre & Spottiswoode, London, 1959

Fay, C.R., Life and Labour in the Nineteenth Century. Cambridge University Press, 1920

Fisher, H.E.S., The Portugal Trade. 1971

Fisher, H.E.S., Shipping, Trade and Commerce. Leicester University Press, 1981

Flinn, M.W., British Population Growth, 1700-1850. London, 1979

Fonseca, Alvaro Moreira da, Génese de um Alvará Pombalino. 1961-62

Fonseca, Alvaro Moreira da, A Ideação da Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro. 1955-56

Fonseca, Alvaro Moreira da, O Vinho do Porto na Época dos Almadas. 1957

Fontana Economic History of Europe. Ed. Cipolla

Fontana, Joseph, La Quiebra de la Monarquia Absoluta. 1814-1820. Barcelona, 1978

Francis, Alan David, The Wine Trade. A. & C. Black, London, 1972

Fugier, André, Napoléon et l'Espagne, 1799-1808. T.I. Paris, 1930

Fugier, André, La Révolution Française et l'Empire Napoléonien. Paris, 1954

Gayer, Arthur D., The Growth and Fluctuation of the British Economy, 1790-1850. Vol.I, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1953

Godinho, Vitorino Magalhães, A Estrutura da Antiga Sociedade Portuguesa, Lisboa

Godinho, Vitorino Magalhães, Prix et Monnaies au Portugal, 1750-1850. Paris, 1955

Grande Enciclopédia Portuguesa e Brasileira, vol.XI

Guedes, Armando Marques, Aliança Inglesa (Notas de Historia Diplomática). 1383-1943. Lisboa, 1943

Heckscher, Eli F., The Continental System. An Economic Interpretation. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1922

História Da Cidade do Porto. Portucalense Editora, 38

História de Portugal. Barcelos, MCMXXXV

Hobsbawm, E.J., The Age of Revolution. Europe 1789-1848. London, 1962

James, W. Bosville, Wine Duties. London, Longmans, 1855

The Journal of Mrs Arbuthnot 1820-1832, vol.I, MacMillan, London, 1950

Kennedy, Paul M., The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery. London, 1976

Kingston, William H.G., Lusitanian Sketches, vols.I and II. London, MDCCCXLV

Lee, C.H., A Cotton Enterprise 1795-1840, a history of McConnel & Kennedy fine cotton spinners. Manchester University Press, 1972

Lefebvre, Georges, Napoléon. Paris, 1965

The Letters of King George IV, 1812-1830. Cambridge University Press, 1938

Levi, Leone, The History of British Commerce and of the Economic Progress of the British Nation, 1763-1878. London, 1880

Lima, Durval Pires de, Os Franceses No Porto. 1807-1808. Porto, 1949

Lima, Manuel de Oliveira, O Movimento da Independência (1821-1822). São Paulo, 1972

Lindsay, W.S., History of Merchant Shipping and Ancient Commerce. London, vol.I 1876

Livermore, Harold Victor, A New History of Portugal. Cambridge University Press, 1966

Livermore, Harold Victor, Origens das Relações Luso-Britanicas: O primeiro historiador inglês de Portugal. Lisboa, 1976

Livermore, Harold Victor, Privilege of an Englishman in Portugal. 1954

Lodge, Sir Richard, The English Factory in Lisbon, dans transactions Royal Historical Society. 1933

Lloyd, Christopher, The British Seaman. 1200-1860. London, 1968

Lobo, Constantino Botelho de Lacerda, "Memória sobre a cultura da vinha em Portugal", Memórias Económicas, II

Macedo, Jorge Borges, Problemas de História da Indústria Portuguesa no século XIX. Lisboa, 1982

Macedo, Jorge Borges de, O Bloqueio Continental. Economia e Guerra Peninsular. Lisboa, 1962

Major Peace Treaties of Modern History, 1648-1967. vol.I. New York, 1967

Manchester, Alan K., British Preeminence in Brazil: Its Rise and Decline Univ. of North C rolina Press, 1933

Marques, A.H. Oliveira, História de Portugal. Lisboa, 1972-74

Marques, Fernando Pereira, Exército e Sociedade em Portugal. Lisboa, 1981

Martins, Oliveira, Portugal Contemporâneo. Lisboa, 1953

Martins, Oliveira, Obras Completas de Oliveira Martins, Politica e Economia nacional. Lisboa, 1954

Martins, Oliveira, Obras completas de Oliveira Martins. Estudos de Economia e Finanças. Lisboa, 1956

Oliveira Martins, Joaquim Pedro, História de Portugal. Lisboa, 1972

Oliveira Martins, Joaquim Pedro, Portugal Contemporâneo, Lisboa, 1976

Maxwell, Kenneth, Conflicts and Conspiracies. Brazil and Portugal. 1750-1808. Cambridge University Press, 1973

Nascimento, Adriano do, Revolução de 1820. Coimbra, 1962

Nowell, Charles E., A History of Portugal. 1952

Pereira, Miriam Halpern, Revolução, Finanças, Dependência Externa, vol.I Lisboa

Pereira, Miriam Halpern, Politica e Economia. Livros Horizonte, 1979

Petrie, Charles, George Canning. London, 1932

A Questão Vinhateira do Douro. Porto, 1849

Ramos, Luis A. de Oliveira, O Porto e as origens do Liberalismo. Porto, 1980

Rau, Virgínia, Estudos de História Económica. Lisboa

Rau, Virginia, O Movimento da Barra do Douro durante o Século XVIII: Uma Interpretaçao. Porto, MCMLVIII

Refford, Arthur, The Economic History of England, 1760-1860. Longmans, 1960

Ribeiro, Maria de Lourdes Roque de Aguiar, As Relações Comerciais entre Portugal e Brasil segundo as "Balanças de Comercio" 1801-1821. Lisboa, 1972

The Rise of Modern Europe, Europe and the French Imperium, ed. William Langer. New York, 1938

Sá, Victor de, A Crise do Liberalismo e a manifestação das primeiras ideias socialistas em Portugal. Lisboa, 1974

Salter, Cedric, Introducing Portugal. London, 1956

Santos, Fernando Piteira, Geografia e Economia da Revolução de 1820. 1980

Saraiva, José Hermano, História Concisa de Portugal. Lisboa, 1978

Schumpeter, Elizabeth Boody, English Overseas Trade Statistics 1697-1808 Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1960

O Século XIX em Portugal. Editorial Presença. 1979

Sellers, Charles, Oporto, Old and New. London, 1899

Seton-Watson, R.W., Britain in Europe. Cambridge, 1938

Shaw, Thomas George, Wine, the vine and the Cellar. Longman, London, 1864

Sérgio, António, Breve Interpretação da História de Portugal. Lisboa, 1978

Serrão, Joel, Do Sebastianismo ao Socialismo em Portugal. Lisboa, 1973

Shillington and A.B.W. Chapman, Commercial Relations of England and Portugal. 1907

Sideri, S., Trade and Power. Informal Colonialism in Anglo-Portuguese Relations. Rotterdam University Press, 1970

Silbert, A., Autour de Francisco Solano Constancio. 1950

Silbert, Albert, Do Portugal de Antigo Regime ao Portugal Oitocentista.

Silbert, Albert, Le Problème Agraire Portugais. Paris, 1968

Silva, Domingos Oliveira, "Guerra Comercial Franco-Britanica" in Jornal de Notícias Porto, 1984

Simon, André L., The History of the Wine Trade in England, vol.III. London, 1964

Simon, André L., The rise and Progress of the Wine Trade in England from the earliest times until the close of the fourteenth century, vol.I. London, 1906

Soriano, Simão José da Luz, História da Guerra Civil e do Estabelecimento do Governo Parlamentar em Portugal. (From 1777 to 1834)

Sousa Costa, Figuras e Factos Alto-Durienses I, Porto, 1953

Sousa, Maria Leonor Machado de, Solano Constancio: Portugal e o Mundo nos primeiros decénios do século XIX. Lisboa, 1979

Temperley, Harold and Lillian M. Penson, Foundations of British Foreign Policy from Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902). London, 1966

Temperley, Harold, The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-1827. London, 1925.

Teófilo Braga, História das Ideias Republicanas em Portugal. Vega (n.d.)

Trend, J.B., Portugal. London, 1957

Tengarrinha, José, História da Imprensa Periódica Portuguesa. Lisboa

Tengarrinha, José (ed.), Manuel Fernandes Tomás. A Revolução de 1820. Lisboa, 1982

Vianna, António, Apontamentos para a História Diplomática Contemporanea. A Revolução de 1820 e o Congresso de Verona. Lisboa, 1901

Villat, Louis, La Révolution et l'Empire 1789-1815, II. Paris, 1936

O Vinho do Porto, Instituto do Vinho do Porto, Porto

Viveiros, Jerónimo de, História do Comércio do Maranhão 1612-1895. Sao Luis, 1954

Wardle, A.C., The Trade Winds. A study of British Overseas Trade during the French Wars, 1793-1815. London, 1948

Seton-Watson, R. W., Britain in Europe, 1789-1914. Cambridge University Press, 1938

Webster, C.K., The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh. 1815-1822, Britain and the European Alliance. London, 1925

Webster, William Clarence, A General History of Commerce. The Athenaeum Press, Boston, U.S.A. and London, 1903