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CHANGING MEANINGS OF DEVELOPMENT: DUDLEY SEERS - AN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY

by

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ABSTRACT

Doctor of Philosophy

CHANGING MEANINGS OF DEVELOPMENT: DUDLEY SEERS - AN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY

by Margaret Mary Lipscomb

Against the background of the disappointing record of development since the Second World War, this study explores its history through an intellectual biography of Dudley Seers, a British pioneer in the field. It places special emphasis on the changing perspectives on development reflected in his work, tracing where possible the reasons for these, and addresses his career in three main phases:

(1) 'From Colonial Economics to Development Studies' includes coverage of his time as economic adviser in New Zealand, Burma, the Gold Coast, Malta, and the Caribbean in the 1940s and 1950s; work for the Economic Commission for Latin America and contact with the structuralist school of development in the late 1950s; and work for the Economic Commission for Africa during the early 1960s, when he headed a mission to Zambia. Seers was then optimistic that planned economic growth and import substitution industrialisation programmes, assisted by international financial and technical aid could bring about widespread development in "underdeveloped areas".

(2) 'The Meaning of Development' covers the period 1964-72 when he headed the Economic Planning Staff at the new Ministry of Overseas Development (set up by the Labour Party) and was then appointed first permanent Director of the Institute of Development Studies, during which time he took a prominent part in the ILO World Employment Programme in Colombia, Ceylon and Kenya. As it became increasingly apparent that global inequalities continued to increase, Seers criticised the emphasis on growth as an indicator and target of development, arguing instead that it should be defined in terms of social targets - particularly the elimination of poverty, unemployment and inequality. The perversion of the growth process he attributed in large part to the import and emulation of inappropriate consumption patterns and production techniques, but while urging developing countries to adopt more appropriate techniques he still saw the need for international co-operation in the task.

(3) "The New Meaning of Development" covers Seers' very full career as a fellow at IDS from 1972 until his death in 1983. As a result of changing world circumstances Seers now put greater emphasis on the need for self reliance in developing countries and called for the extension of development studies to Europe, the logic of which eventually resulted in his advocating greater disengagement of Northern industrialised countries from the affairs of the South, including the reduction of aid, a move which, contrary to the Brandt report he considered to be in their real mutual interest. He came to believe an international approach to world problems was no longer feasible and concluded the future lay in a more regionalist approach.

Finally some consideration is given to whether any broader lessons can be learned from such a study.

DEDICATED IN MEMORY OF MY FATHER

WILLIAM CHARLES LIPSCOMB

20 March 1917 - 12 May 1979

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PREFACE

Much of my career has been spent working in a practical way on what are regarded as Third World related issues: teaching in Nigeria, producing publications on development and human rights issues for an international organisation, working in Namibia, and running a centre in the UK for overseas refugees and students, particularly from Africa. After dealing with day to day concerns and problems over a number of years, however, I felt the need for a wider perspective on issues, particularly as situations in many parts of the world appeared to be deteriorating, in both material and human rights terms.

I began reading around the subject of development and discovering in greater detail the facts and figures of growing global diversities which has reduced the greater part of the world's population to a state of wretched and increasing poverty, despite (though, according to some interpretations, because of) the efforts of numerous development programmes and two United Nations development decades aimed at improving living standards. The questions increased as to the reasons why things seemed to be going so wrong and intensified my desire to study the issues in more depth.

My original intention had been to make a study and critical assessment of some contemporary theories of, or ideas about, development in the context of their practical application; though I became aware that this was too vast and vague an undertaking.

In my general reading, however, I came across Dudley Seers' papers "The Meaning of Development" (1969) and "The New Meaning of Development" (1976), which caught my attention partly because the style of writing was lively and immediately accessible, but also because the content and approach was of interest. The papers, which will be examined more closely in Chapters 5 and 6, acknowledged the poor record of development and were critical of the orthodox, purely economic assessment of development, measured only in terms of growth, seeking instead to identify more relevant social and political measurements and targets. Reflected in the papers also was a strong element of reappraisal and a degree of self-criticism on the part of the author, who within seven years acknowledged the necessity of redefining and updating previously held opinions in response to changing global political and economic circumstances. The reappraisal of the author made me wonder to what degree this had been an on-going feature of his approach - and perhaps a general reflection of changing perspectives on development - and it prompted me to look at previous work by Seers.

On searching for further material I learned that Seers had died quite suddenly in 1983, but during a visit to the Institute of Development Studies at Brighton, where he was based for the last sixteen years of his life, the library catalogue indicated that he had been a prolific writer on a range of issues, covering many different countries, over a number of years. Further investigation revealed that, among other activities, he had been an adviser to British colonies preparing for independence in the 1950s and 1960s, worked in Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa, and played a prominent role at the Ministry of Overseas Development during its early years, before he was appointed first permanent

director of IDS, where as well as teaching he continued work as an overseas consultant to international organisations. His career had therefore covered a crucial period in the history of development and he had been close to policy makers and practitioners in the field. It also became apparent that during the course of this varied career his approach to, priorities for and concerns about development had gone through various phases and often quite radical changes. I then began to consider the possibility of studying Seers' career in greater depth, particularly since in being both an overseas adviser and an academic at IDS, he linked practice with theory, though his predominant interest was always in practical application. He was also a colourful and controversial character and while spending his working life within fairly orthodox development roles, he was nonetheless often critical of orthodox approaches, and his own self-critical approach and changes of mind presented an interesting subject of study.

What made the idea of an intellectual biography an exciting and viable prospect for a thesis, was the fact that at that time, in 1985, Seers' office at IDS, containing a wealth of material, both published and unpublished, including many personal papers, had remained untouched since his death two years earlier. Hans Singer, a long-term friend and colleague of Seers, informed me of this during an interview at IDS in the autumn of 1985 and even showed me the office, indicating that I could have access to the papers, provided I had the consent of Seers' family. On gaining the approval of Philip Seers, Dudley Seers' son, I was able to pursue my research during the latter part of 1985 and first half of 1986, before the disposal of the vast majority of the papers and clearance of the office later that year. Although the published material and a few of the papers were retained and now make up the Dudley Seers archive held in the IDS library, the bulk of the papers and correspondence in box files and filing cabinets were taken away in black plastic sacks to be destroyed. As such my access at that time was unique and I was able to make copies of much of the unpublished material and correspondence which is made use of in this study.

My studies have been undertaken on a very part-time basis, combined with work and family commitments, and it has taken a few years of frequently interrupted endeavour to write up the results of my findings. During this time, dramatic changes have taken place on the international political scene, following the break-up of the Soviet bloc - giving, in fact, some of Seers' observations of the early 1980s concerning the future of Europe, a certain relevance in current debate.

The purpose of this study is not, however, to suggest that Seers was a great innovative thinker or provided answers to the problems of growing international tension and increasing global inequalities. Its purpose is rather to provide an insight into the history of development in the post-Second World War period through the career of one British adviser, revealing how changing economic, political and social circumstances at international and national level influenced and changed his approach to development. It is the changing perspectives on development reflected and well recorded in Seers' work that is the particular concern of this study. While it may not provide answers to the problems of development, it does perhaps assist a broader understanding of the issues involved.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would first like to thank Philip Seers, who at an early stage in my research gave me permission to consult his father's papers at the Institute of Development Studies and the staff at IDS who facilitated this; without such access this study would not have been possible. In particular I am grateful to Hans Singer for initially putting me in touch with Philip Seers and for subsequent conversations with him about Dudley Seers' early career, and to Barbara Taylor, Dudley Seers' former secretary, who, as custodian of his papers at the time, made the practical arrangements for my access to his office and provided me with a copy of his own bibliography. I would also like to thank the staff at the IDS library for their assistance over the years and in particular would like to mention Barbara Degenhardt, who in the early stages of my research went to much trouble to locate the extent of Seers' material held in the library. More recently I had conversations with John Toye, the current Director of IDS (who also granted me access to the current Dudley Seers' archive held at the IDS), Michael Lipton and Rosalind David, all of whom I would like to thank for their time.

There are several other former colleagues of Seers who kindly responded to my requests for information. Among those to whom I am indebted are: David Worswick, who lent me his own copy of the 1951 report on Burma when I could locate it nowhere else at the time (though I have since discovered a copy in the LSE library); Dick Ross, who discussed with me the 1951 report he wrote with Seers on the Gold Coast; Dom Mintoff who not only responded to my queries about the 1955 Balogh/Seers report on Malta but referred me to a colleague, Dr Alfred Sant, who generously provided useful background information to the report; and Barbara Castle, Paul Streeten, P.D. Henderson, and Robin Marris all of whom responded to my letters and queries. In particular I would like to mention the assistance of Richard Jolly who, despite a busy schedule, cheerfully endured a lengthy long-distance phone interview concerning Seers' early career and in subsequent correspondence not only answered my queries but offered helpful advice about further contacts and references as well as positive encouragement to press on with the study. Thanks are also due to C. Gilbraith, the Treasurer and Bursar of Pembroke College, Cambridge for looking through the college records to find details of Seers' student days.

In addition, I particularly found useful and appreciated the ready response received from a number of senior civil servants, all of whom I approached, without exception, replied to my queries about the early years of ODM and IDS with letters, phone calls or personal interviews, among these being: Philip Hayes, Sir Anthony Hurrell, Sir Richard King, Donald Kirkness, Robert Porter, William Mathieson, Maurice Smith and Douglas Williams.

In acknowledging the help and co-operation of Seers' associates, however, this in no way implies that they necessarily share the views expressed or conclusions drawn in this study and I would like to emphasise that the use and interpretation of all material in the text are of course entirely my own responsibility.

In addition to making use of the IDS library and that of the University of Sussex, other libraries consulted and whose facilities I used included those of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the London School of Economics and Political Science, Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics, the Overseas Development Administration, Southampton University, the School of Oriental and African Studies, and Surrey University, as well as the local authority libraries in Sutton and Kensington. Thanks are due to the staff of all these establishments as well as to those of a number of other libraries which I contacted by phone in my search for specific publications.

Finally, I would like to thank Alan Brier for his supervision over the years and his encouragement to keep going and my two examiners Martin Dent of the University of Keele and Dilys Hill from the University of Southampton.


Combining studies for a part-time Ph.D. with paid work in a non-related field has not proved an easy undertaking, and I must conclude by acknowledging my appreciation of the ongoing moral support and encouragement of family and friends, particularly at those times when I was tempted to abandon the task in hand, and of their understanding when of necessity I became somewhat of a recluse.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS USED IN TEXT

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific countries
ADI	Arab Development Institute
AID	see USAID
ADIPA	Association of Development Research and Training Institutes of Asia and the Pacific (Bangkok, Thailand)
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations (Thailand)
BOUIS	Bulletin of Oxford University Institute of Statistics
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy (of the EEC)
CEBRAP	Centro Brasileiro de Análise et Planejamento (Brazil)
CEDES	Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad (Buenos Aires)
CENDES	Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo (Venezuela)
CEPLAN	Centro de Estudios de Planificación Nacional (Catholic University, Santiago, Chile)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (USA)
CIC	Centro Ibero-americano de Cooperacion (Madrid)
CIEDUR	Centro Interdisciplinario de Estudios Sobre el Desarrollo Uruguay
CIEPLAN	Corporación de Investigaciones Economicas para Latinoamérica
CIESU	Centro de Informaciones y Estudios del Uruguay
CINVE	Centro de Investigaciones Economicas (Uruguay)
CLACSO	Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (Buenos Aires)
CLEH	Centro Latinoamericano de Economica Humana (Uruguay)
CODESRIA	Council for the Development of Economic and Social Research in Africa (Dakar)
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CRO	Commonwealth Relations Office
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of OECD)
DTC	Department of Technical Co-operation
EADI	European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia)
ECGD	Export Credits Guarantee Department
ECIEL	Programma de Estudios Conjuntos sobre Integración Económica Latinoamericana
ECLA	Economic Commission for Latin America (Santiago, Chile)
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EPS	Economic Planning Staff (at ODM)
ESD	Economic and Statistics Directorate (of OECD)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office

FINAFRICA	Centre for Financial Assistance to African Countries (Milan)
FLACSO	Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (Chile)
FRED	Fund for Rural Economic Development (Canada)
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GNP	Gross national product
HMSO	Her Majesty's Stationery Office
HSD	Human and Social Development (UNU programme)
IBGE	Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (Brazil)
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
ICCDA	Inter-regional Co-ordinating Committee of Development Associations
ICS	Institute of Commonwealth Studies
ICS	Institute of Community Studies
IDEP	Institut pour le developpement economique et la planification en Afrique (Dakar)
IDES	Instituto de Desarrollo Económica y Social (Argentina)
IDRC	International Development Research Centre (Canada) (CRDI)
IDS	Institute of Development Studies (Brighton)
IEA	International Economic Association
ILO	International Labour Organisation (Geneva)
ILPES	Instituto Latinoamericano de Planifación Economica y Social (ECLAC)
IMF	International Monetary Fund (Washington)
INTERPAG	International Problem Area Group (IDS)
IPEA	Instituto de Planejamento Economico e Social (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil)
ISS	Institute of Social Studies (The Hague)
IT	Intermediate Technology
ITT	International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (a US based TNC)
JASPA	ILO Jobs and Skills Programme for Africa (Addis Ababa)
KFAED	Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development
LAFTA	Latin American Free Trade Area
LDC	Less-developed country
MCDS	Malaysian Centre for Development Studies
MNC	Multinational corporation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NIC	Newly industrialising country
NIEO	New international economic order
NISER	Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research
ODA	Overseas Development Administration
ODEPLAN	Oficina de Planificacion Nacional (Chile)
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
ODM	Ministry of Overseas Development (London)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (Paris)

OPEC	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PGPAG	Planning and Government Problem Area Group (IDS)
PISPAL	Programa de Investigaciones Sociales sobre Poblacion en America Latina
POI	Private overseas investment
PREALC	Programa Regional del Empleo para América Latina y el Caribe
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAM	Social accounting matrix
SAREC	Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries
SEANZA	South East Asia, New Zealand, and Australia
SELA	Sistema Economico Latino Americano
SID	Society for International Development
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SNA	System of national accounting
SSDS	System of social and demographic statistics
SSRC	Social Science Research Council
STABEX	Export Revenue Stabilisation Scheme (of the EEC)
TNC	Transnational corporation
TNE	Transnational enterprise
TUC	Trades Union Congress
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Emergency Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
UNIP	United Nationalist Independence Party (Zambia)
UNTAA	United Nations Technical Assistance Administration
UNU	United Nations University
USAID	United States Agency for International Development (Washington)
UWI	University of the West Indies
WEP	World Employment Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
WUS	World University Service



Cartoon of Dudley Seers produced in a Sri Lankan newspaper, 1972, after the publication of his ILO World Employment Report on the country (see Chapter 5).

(*Source*: *The Ceylon Observer*, Thursday evening, 27 July 1972)

INTRODUCTION

"The last 40 years can be called the age of development. This epoch is coming to an end. The time is ripe to write its obituary."[1] These are the opening words of a recent critique of development and, while opinions may differ over this particular interpretation, there is no doubt that there has been widespread concern and disillusion over the poor record of development in so-called Third World countries in the post-Second World War period. Despite initial optimism about the prospects for "the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas"[2] in the 1950s and the activities of two United Nations Decades of Development in the 1960s and 1970s, living conditions have deteriorated rather than improved for the vast majority of people living in such areas and global inequalities have widened. As it became increasingly apparent that "improvement and growth" did not materialise on a wide scale, or necessarily go hand in hand - as the higher growth rates achieved by some countries through industrialisation programmes were often, if not usually, accompanied by rising inequalities and social problems - more effort was made by agencies, theorists and practitioners, to focus and put more emphasis on other social aspects of development, prompting one social scientist in 1979 to note "the dizzy succession of fashions which plague the field: industrialization, employment, income distribution, basic needs, etc. etc."[3]

The generally "gloomy picture" which has emerged, in the words of one Nigerian scholar, "has provoked a serious reappraisal of ideas and thoughts about the development process"[4] and efforts to find new and alternative approaches. Numerous books have been written about the theory and practice of the economics, sociology and politics of development, some providing general overviews of the subject while others concentrate on more detailed and limited case studies.

This study, however, seeks to look at development in the post-war years though the career of one particular man, Dudley Seers, regarded by many as a "pioneer" in the field and described as "one of the world's leading economists in the field of development studies".[5] Seers' own work and experience too reflected a gradual change from optimism to growing disillusion about the prospects of development, and in 1979 he in fact wrote a paper entitled "The Birth, Life and Death of Development Economics" reflecting on the short history of a subject which, as he observed, had only started life in the 1950s in response to the new circumstances presented by the impending independence of many former colonial countries.[6] Nevertheless throughout his career he was always engaged in attempting to find new formulas and ways of approaching the problems of world poverty and inequality and, in so doing, was constantly reassessing his earlier work and ideas. An editorial to his posthumous volume, *The Political Economy of Nationalism* - the manuscript of which he completed shortly before his death in March 1983 - noted not only that he was "a distinguished development economist who, perhaps remarkably, succeeded in being both unorthodox and universally respected" but that he "was always rethinking, revising and discarding earlier ideas - his own as much as those of others";[7] and it is this ongoing reappraisal, and self-criticism, which is of particular interest to this study.

Dudley Seers' name is usually linked with that of the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), at the University of Sussex, where he was based for the last sixteen years of his life. He was appointed its first permanent Director in 1967, playing an influential part

in its formative years and, on his resignation from the post in 1972, remained on as an active and distinguished Fellow until his death in 1983. He had, however, had a varied and full career in the development field before arriving at the IDS. Educated in economics at Cambridge in the late 1930s (still very much under the influence of Keynes), his career in the post-war years included participation in advisory missions to British colonies preparing for independence, work for the United Nations at its headquarters in New York and for the UN's Technical Assistance agency in the Caribbean, as well as employment by two regional secretariats, the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). In 1964 he was appointed head of the Economic Planning Staff (EPS) at the new Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM) in London and subsequently, in 1967, director of the newly established IDS. As well as being actively involved in the teaching functions of the Institute, he headed advisory missions overseas on behalf of a number of international agencies, including playing a leading part in the ILO World Employment Programme of the early 1970s and undertaking missions and projects for the Commonwealth Secretariat, the World Bank, and the United Nations University. In addition he developed close links with a number of international development agencies, serving terms as president of the Society for International Development (SID) and of the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), which he played a part in founding, and assisting in setting up the Inter-regional Co-ordinating Committee of Development Associations (ICCDA).

His career in development therefore spanned over thirty years in various capacities as colonial and government adviser, UN official, development consultant, teacher, and institution builder and his views and opinions were very much based upon and informed by the consultancies and research he undertook in the thirty-five or so countries in which he worked during that time. His advisory work in primary producers and newly independent countries, as well as personal contact with the structuralist and later dependency schools in Latin America, gave him an early understanding of the particular problems and needs of Third World countries expressed by their government representatives in international gatherings such as UNCTAD - and later in demands for a New International Economic Order. He was therefore familiar with the conditions and reasons which prompted the arguments of "developing" countries for fairer trade, increased aid and more independent development. On the other hand his advisory work for the colonial office and Labour governments in Britain and consultancies for international agencies placed him also in close contact with national and international officials, politicians and economists from the more affluent Western - or Northern - governments, whose view of and concerns about development came from a different perspective: that predominantly motivated by their own political and economic interests in protecting, maintaining or extending their sources of raw materials, markets and spheres of interest, though overlaid with a proclaimed humanitarian concern. He therefore had close contacts with development policy makers, practitioners and social scientists in both the so-called "developing" and "developed" worlds, in his capacity as consultant/adviser and also as academic/teacher at IDS.

While often working closely with established official circles, however, he gained a reputation for "challenging orthodoxies" (an oft repeated observation made in the tributes written after his death) and for being critical of "conventional" thinking on development,

being numbered among "dissident economists"[8] in a recent publication. Although trained as an economist and spending his early working years in the UK at the Oxford University Institute of Statistics, he in fact maintained a healthy scepticism of purely economic models and solutions and adopted a multi-disciplinary approach to development, emphasising, from an early point in his career, the importance of taking into consideration the political and social, as well as economic, context of and influences on development. As such his work and interests ranged over a wide array of subjects over the years as he devoted attention to the influence on development of such issues as the brain drain, migration, cultural dependency, geographic and demographic features, the CIA, and academic repression - in addition to the more conventional topics of trade and aid.

It is the purpose of this study therefore to look at development from the perspective of someone whose extensive professional career and wide interests brought him into close association with governments and agencies responsible for influencing and implementing development policy and practical programmes. The span of his career covered a crucial phase of the history of development - from the 1950s - when it was generally believed that economic growth would be the means whereby Third World countries, particularly the newly independent ex-colonies, could achieve widespread development and make the transition from traditional into modern societies - up until the early 1980s - when it was clear that for the majority of such countries "modernisation" had reached only a small minority, living conditions had often deteriorated for the vast majority, while their governments were usually heavily in debt. During this whole period, Seers was involved in an ongoing process of "rethinking, revising and discarding" ideas, so that by the end of his career many of his ideas about development appeared to be diametrically opposite to those he had held earlier in life.

Up to the early 1960s, for example, Seers, like most development economists, accepted economic growth as the basis for development planning, encouraging developing countries to adopt programmes of import substitution industrialisation to increase growth, while urging the richer economies to assist the process by adopting fairer trading practices and making transfers of capital (including aid) to the poorer economies. By the end of the 1960s, however, he was among the first to reject economic growth as an adequate measure of, or target for, development, advocating instead the need to employ more social indicators. By the early 1970s he already had considerable misgivings too about the functioning of aid policies and industrialisation programmes and by the end of that decade was calling for a general reduction in aid, suggesting there were advantages in abandoning large industrialisation enterprises in "developing" countries in favour of returning to traditional skills and alternative technology. Whereas in the 1950s, and early 1960s, he had encouraged the adoption of "European" methods and mechanised techniques, particularly in Africa, in later years he was severely critical of imported techniques and tastes as being in large part responsible for hindering the process of development.

In the early 1960s too he was critical of European intellectuals for allowing narrow nationalism to dominate their thinking instead of taking a broader internationalist view of their global responsibilities to assist poorer areas. By the 1980s, however, it was the internationalist approach which he criticised as naive and potentially damaging, advocating instead that the European region should use available resources for its own benefit, rather than sending them overseas. By this latter stage in his career he in fact

argued that nationalism was a key element in any development strategy and on the whole a healthy trend (at least in what he came to term an "extended" form) and that rather than aiming for a more fully integrated global economy (which had been the aspiration of his early career) the world would be better organised in self-sufficient regional blocs.

There are, therefore, clear and definite changes in his thinking about and interpretation of development - and thereby also the role and content of development studies. When writing his paper on "The Meaning of Development" (1969), followed eight years later by the "The New Meaning of Development" (1977), he expressed doubts about continuing to use the actual term development, sympathising in 1969 with the view that "to use 'development' as a synonym for growth had so debased the word that it could no longer be used by honest people" and agreeing in 1977 "one could - even more easily than in 1969 - defend the view that the word 'development' is too tarnished to be usable". However, on both occasions he decided there were political and institutional reasons for retaining it - the way forward being "to redefine it rather than reject it completely"[9] - and in 1978 he in fact produced a paper entitled "Changing Definition and Measurement of Development".[10] Although, as mentioned earlier, by 1979 he was speaking of the death of development economics (whose death throes, he suggested, could even be said to have started in 1964), again he was not thinking in terms of completely throwing over the subject or writing its obituary, but more in terms of a "metamorphosis", regarding "conventional" development economics as a transitional stage towards a successor which would be more universal and interdisciplinary in its scope.[11] Revision and redefinition, rather than revolution, were the hallmarks of Seers' approach to development.

He was, however, always the first to admit his changes of view or focus and did not shrink from acknowledging, as he did in the early 1980s, "The way I originally formulated issues seems now wrong or badly expressed" and that, in hindsight, much of what he had written appeared "obscure and professionally shaming".[12] Such open self criticism and acknowledgement of errors of judgement can be viewed as a sign of intellectual honesty, but it is nevertheless important to consider why such constant reappraisal was necessary.

Seers himself attributed the modification in his outlook in 1977 in general terms to the unforeseen "rapidly changing world"[13] of the decade and the experience of the professional jobs he had undertaken in the previous eight years (the circumstances of which will be explored more fully in Chapter 6). Darrell Jackson, IDS's Study Programme Administrator in the early 1980s, argued in fact that the very nature of development studies, in being so closely bound up with government policy, rendered impossible any orderly study of the subject since it was always subject to changing national and international political circumstances. At a Conference on the Teaching of Development, held at IDS in 1980 and co-organised by Seers, Jackson maintained:

> To a greater extent than any other discipline or subject, development studies has been inextricably bound up with British foreign policy and our links with the Third World. In a sense, the history of the subject is the history of our involvement, gradual disengagement and re-involvement on another level with the colonial, Commonwealth and other underdeveloped countries. *Any planned, orderly growth of the subject has been rendered impossible by the changing relations with these countries, changing UK governments and policies and of course changes in the wider world.*
>
> Initially it was necessary to train a British colonial civil service in the arts of colonial administration. Then there was a shift to the provision of courses in planning and public administration for the indigenous administrators who would guide and

> implement policies after independence. Later still, as part of an aid programme, the strategy was to supplement the manpower planning needs of such countries by providing specialist training courses in areas where self-sufficiency had not yet been reached. In the continuing discharge of what many would see as a historical responsibility, training and aid policies generally have been permeated by a mixture of short-term philanthropy and long-run enlightened self-interest.
>
> *This singular entanglement with government policy distinguishes development studies from most other scholastic activities.*[14] (my emphases)

Seers' own career in fact can be seen reflected in the above trajectory as his role changed from colonial adviser to trainer of overseas public administrators and adviser on aid and technical assistance; and, as this study will show, his ideas on development, and even his career, were affected and moulded by changing relations with underdeveloped countries, changing UK governments and policies, as well as changes in the wider world. His prominent position within the development field itself, for example, was determined by the changing UK government of 1964 when he was recruited into the ODM, and later the IDS, by the incoming Labour administration. He too acknowledged the political basis for much financial and technical aid and that the pedigree of the subject Development Economics read "By Colonial Economics out of Political Expediency".[15]

However at the same time Seers frequently criticised and protested this "singular entanglement" of development studies with government policy - advocating instead the independence of development policies from foreign policy control and the independence of development studies from civil service or ministerial censorship and interference, often resulting in clashes with government officials (an issue particularly addressed in Chapter 4). Certainly too by 1980 his own trajectory of the history of the subject extended beyond Jackson's version - of "our involvement, gradual disengagement and re-involvement" - as he was urging a further stage of "disengagement".

The linkage and "entanglement" of development and development studies with government foreign policy however makes this study of Seers' an appropriate subject to be addressed within a politics discipline. As well as outlining the history and extent of his work, it seeks to trace through the changes in his views and approach to development, identifying where possible the reasons and influences which brought these about, including political and social, as well as economic factors.

So far there has been only one publication devoted to Seers' work and influence - a special issue of IDS's own quarterly journal, the *Bulletin*, produced by colleagues at the Institute six years after his death, in July 1989.[16] The contributors concentrated on particular themes in Seers' work or aspects of his career, while Richard Jolly made an overall appraisal of his contributions to development perspectives, policy and studies. In addition, reference has been made to Seers' work in more general studies of development, often citing in particular what have become known as his "classic" papers. However, as yet, no major study has been produced on Seers' work and contribution to development and this is a first attempt at such an overall study, in the form of an intellectual biography. It adopts a chronological rather than purely thematic approach in order to trace more clearly the changes in his perspective. It is based very much on Seers' own work and writings which reflect the ongoing process of reassessment and self-criticism and makes use of much as yet unpublished documentation and interviews.

Sources

The main body of source material for this study consists in the work, both published and unpublished, of Seers himself. As will be apparent from his extensive bibliography reproduced at the end of this thesis, he was a prolific writer, producing papers on a wide range of subjects, as well as being responsible for a number of reports for international agencies, governments and academic bodies. He had the facility to write quickly and easily as well as to pull together the work and thoughts of other individuals, which proved valuable when editing joint official reports, or contributory volumes, and having to meet deadlines promptly.

As Richard Jolly has remarked Seers' style of analysis was "situation-specific rather than universal"[17] and his work consists mainly of country reports and articles on particular subjects produced for specific purposes or occasions. Only in *The Political Economy of Nationalism* (1983) did he attempt to produce a more comprehensive outline of his political and economic philosophy, and even this is essentially a reworking of a number papers produced initially for various gatherings; it is also only reflective of the latter stage of his career, standing in stark contrast to many of his earlier views.

The first task of this study was to locate and assemble the wide range of material available and I was fortunate to be supplied with a copy of the last version of Seers' own CV and bibliography (which he had prepared for a proposed trip to Trinidad in 1983 - never made in the event of his death) though it included little of his early published work. However, starting with the material held in the IDS library, the published material was identified from numerous sources and sought out and assembled from a number of libraries listed in the acknowledgements. I would like to point out that the list of his published work produced at the end of this study was put together entirely independently of the provisional bibliography produced by Rosalind David for the special edition of the *IDS Bulletin* (July 1989), though I am indebted to her for having drawn my attention to one paper in particular in the *Economic Bulletin for Latin America* (1962) which I had not come across before.[18] Although the bibliography to this study has been made as comprehensive as possible, it too can only be considered provisional as there are reviews and letters to newspapers that have not been traced and undoubtedly translations which have not been noted, and there may well be other material yet to come to light. However, all the items listed have been consulted (at least in their English versions) as the basis for this study, which is very much grounded on Seers' own words.

Supplementary to the published material, however, I was fortunate, at an early stage in my research, to have access to the papers and material in Dudley Seers' office at IDS, which at that time remained much as it had been when he died, looked after by his secretary Barbara Taylor. Before her retirement in 1986 the office was cleared and although copies of most of the published material and a few other miscellaneous papers were preserved, and now make up the Dudley Seers' archive at IDS, most of the correspondence and other background material relating to courses, conferences, consultancies, etc., accumulated over the years, were discarded. My access in 1985-6 therefore provided a unique opportunity to see and copy some material which now no longer exists, most of it unpublished or originally intended for limited circulation within, or use by, a particular group or audience. There was a mountain of material, needing a

great deal of sifting, much of it proving of interest only as general background information, but some of it adding considerably to the more available published sources.

One of the most useful documents acquired at this time proved to be a "Preface" which Seers had written in 1969 for a planned book, containing a collection of his papers and essays written in the 1950s and 1960s, which he intended to entitle "Structural Development". The intended book was never produced - unfortunately in many ways since it would have presented an interesting contrast to his later collection of papers, written in the later 1970s and early 1980s, and published in *The Political Economy of Nationalism*. However, the unpublished "Preface" itself provides a useful outline of and link between Seers' activities, work and interests in the early years of his career before he joined the IDS as well indications of his own personal assessment of the period, from the perspective of 1969, when he was already director of the Institute. The Preface thus provided a useful framework and structure particularly for Part I of this study.

Among the other papers collected at this time which proved particularly valuable was correspondence relating to "the crisis" at IDS in 1970 over study seminar 15, which provided the basis for the section on this issue in Chapter 4.

I also gained access to many of Seers' journey reports produced during his travels overseas for circulation among IDS staff, all of whom were encouraged to produce such reports when travelling in order to keep their colleagues informed of on-going contacts and projects with overseas agencies, progress of joint ventures, future plans, and so on. Preparing these reports appears to have been an activity Seers enjoyed, treating them like a personal diary, which he wrote up in long hand often on a daily basis (despite heavy work schedules) and sending regular instalments back to IDS to be typed up and circulated by his secretary. Although it was not possible to assemble a complete set of reports covering all his overseas trips, the many that are available do provide a useful and interesting background to his hectic schedule, particularly in the 1970s and early 1980s, including professional and political, as well as much personal, comment and observation, and a great deal of often entertaining local colour. As one of his colleagues Mike Faber has commented, "Dudley's [journey reports] were informative, philosophical, full of *obiter dicta*, inclined to be sexist and abusive of the tribe of bureaucrats, occasionally outrageous but invariably lively".[19]

In addition to written sources, other original material for this study came from personal interviews and correspondence with former colleagues of Seers, most of whom are mentioned in the acknowledgements. Of particular note was the assistance from Dom Mintoff and Alfred Sant from Malta on Seers' early advisory work in the 1950s. In addition the comments and observations of a number of senior civil servants contributed greatly towards an understanding of the early history of ODM and the IDS which is addressed in Chapter 4.

Organisation of study

The study adopts a chronological approach and is organised into three main parts, the titles of which have been taken from titles of articles written by Seers himself and can be seen as loosely reflecting three main stages in his career, as well as indicating three phases in his thoughts on and approach to development.

Part I - "From Colonial Economics to Development Studies"[20]- covers the early period of his career up to 1964, much of which was spent in operational roles overseas, including advisory missions in the 1950s and 1960s to British colonies and former colonies as they prepared for more independent development. This first part is divided into three chapters and adopts, particularly in the first chapter, a more detailed narrative style than in Parts 2 and 3, partly because much of his early work, particularly pre-ECLA, has so far received little attention and even the published material on this period is not widely available.[21] It demonstrates the early influences on his approach to development and indicates how his interest first grew in certain areas of study which he was to pursue for the rest of his career (for example, devising more relevant national accounting systems), while other concerns (such as his emphasis on the importance of growth, industrialisation and international aid) contrast sharply with his later views.

Chapter 1 covers the years up to 1957, first outlining his education in economics at Cambridge University which, after war service and a year working in the office of the Prime Minister in New Zealand in the immediate post-war period, was followed by more grounding in statistical work at Oxford University Institute of Statistics. At this time Seers identified himself as a socialist and developed a close association with the "Keep Left" Bevanite wing of the Labour party, contacts with whose members were to a large part responsible for his first consultancy work overseas in Burma, the Gold Coast and Malta in the early to mid-1950s. A position at the United Nations in New York in 1953 provided the opportunity to widen his knowledge of the international scene, while a posting in the Caribbean with a UN agency gave him more practical experience of the problems faced by statistical offices overseas. All his consultancy work in these early years made him increasingly aware of the fact that Western economic theories and techniques were often not appropriate or relevant to deal with the particular problems of underdeveloped areas.

In 1957 Seers took up a post with the Economic Commission of Latin America (ECLA) and Chapter 2 covers his work there and the influence that Prebisch and the structuralist school had on his thinking, which a fellowship at Yale from 1961-3 gave him the opportunity to reflect upon and write about. The experience in Latin America made him even more aware of the different circumstances facing primary producers, compared to the industrialised countries of North America and Western Europe and, rejecting purely economic or monetarist solutions, he embraced the structuralists' enthusiasm for import substitution industrialisation programmes and planned economic growth models. In this region too, against the background of the Cuban revolution, he became highly aware of the political motivations for development programmes.

His next position with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), during the "wind of change" of the early 1960s when many former colonies were becoming independent, brought to his attention the different nature of the problems facing this continent and the particular constraints on development presented by the lack of skilled and educated manpower, necessitating a different approach to that in Latin America. Chapter 3 therefore covers his work in Africa, particularly in Zambia and South Africa, and his advocacy of international aid and technical assistance.

This first phase of his career, up to 1964, was a mainly optimistic period when, although recognising there were particular problems faced by "underdeveloped" areas, Seers anticipated that a world economic system could be established where the growth and

development of such areas were possible, with the assistance of more equitable trade and aid policies on the part of the developed countries. Such optimism was re-enforced when in 1964, as a result of the Labour Party victory in the October General Election, he returned to Britain, where development was then very much on the political agenda - with the establishment of a new ministry with responsibility for overseas development - and courses on development economics were being set up at various academic institutions throughout the country.

Part II, "The Meaning of Development",[22] is concerned with the years 1964-72 which brought Seers back to full-time work based in the UK - first as head of the minister's Economic Planning Staff at the new Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM) (1964-7) and then as director of the newly established Institute of Development Studies (IDS) (1967-72). During this time, however, his optimism about development prospects was tempered, initially by the experience of working in closer proximity to "the machinery of government", but also, perhaps more significantly, by the disappointing record of development during the 1960s.

Chapter 4 is mainly concerned with the institutional setting and the nature of Seers' work and role at the ODM and later the IDS. At the ODM he was soon confronted by the realisation that his view of development as an international responsibility was not generally shared or embraced by most of the officials and politicians with whom he worked and for whom the meaning of development had a narrower national focus and purpose. The chapter describes his growing frustration with the bureaucracy of Whitehall and his disillusion with the Labour Party's lack of commitment to development, and how the differing approaches to and interpretation of both development and the role of development studies therefore resulted in a certain amount of friction in his work at the Ministry and at IDS. The setting up of the IDS and Seers' appointment as its first permanent director presented him with new challenges and opportunities as the function and role of the new Institute (largely funded by the ODM) were determined, but it too brought its frustrations and problems, reflected particularly in one incident when the ODM objected to the holding of a specific seminar and a controversy arose over the issue of academic freedom and the position of the IDS *vis-à-vis* the Ministry. Although this was resolved, after serving five years Seers resigned the directorship, remaining on as a fellow at the Institute, which provided the base for his work for the rest of his career.

Chapter 5 concentrates on the changes in Seers' own ideas on development during this period as he questioned his previous thinking on issues such as planning, aid and industrialisation against the background of the disappointing record of the 1960s (the United Nations' first development decade) as global inequalities continued to widen. In reviewing the record of development, he particularly criticised the concentration on growth as an indicator and target for development, advocating instead the adoption of more appropriate social indicators and targets - the elimination of poverty, unemployment and inequality. These three social targets were the essence of Seers' "Meaning of Development" in 1969, becoming the focus of much of IDS's work over the following years and being reflected in the ILO's World Employment Programme, in three of whose missions he participated in the early 1970s. He also focused on the distorting influence on development of external influences such as the transference of what he saw as inappropriate consumption patterns and production techniques, as well as international

political and business pressures, while also becoming increasingly aware of the constraints on development policies often imposed by national vested interests. He took an interest too at this time in examining the experience and record of Cuba and Chile as they attempted to pursue a socialist path to development.

The optimism of the earlier period therefore gave way to a greater realisation of the complexity of the development process in this second phase of his career, though he still believed there was a need for a world-wide system of co-ordinated national and international policies to tackle the problems of world poverty.

Part III, "The New Meaning of Development"[23] covers the last ten and a half years of Seers' life as he continued to work as a fellow and roving ambassador for IDS, travelling extensively. It heralds a more drastic change in his views, as he came to consider an internationalist approach to development no longer feasible, emphasising instead the need for self reliance, focusing more of his own work on Europe, and suggesting latterly that the most viable scenario for the future was a world of self-sufficient regional blocs, for which he envisaged an enlarged European Community could provide a prototype.

Chapter 6 outlines Seers' career during these years and traces the various factors that initially contributed to his "new meaning of development" as spelled out in 1977 - greater emphasis on self reliance and the extension of development studies to Europe. One of the major factors was the effect of the oil crisis and the dramatic rise in energy costs on all economies of the world, which further increased Seers' disillusion in growth oriented development, turning his attention to more self-reliant alternatives. In addition the growing demands of Third World countries themselves in the early 1970s for a New International Economic Order, greater self reliance and less interference from "Western" development experts, in part influenced his own endorsement of greater self reliance and calls for a less patronising approach to overseas countries on the part of European development experts. He was also, however, greatly influenced by the fact that the so-called "developed" economies also appeared to be facing their own development problems, with rising rates of unemployment and inflation, aggravated by the oil price rises, as well as mounting competition to their own industries from newly industrialised countries, and as such he saw the rationale for extending development studies to Europe - and learning from the experience of developing countries. At the same time his own growing cynicism at the development record of many of the governments of "developing" countries provided additional reasons for reducing contacts overseas, while Britain's entry into the Common Market, as well as the easing of East-West tensions (particularly with the signing of the Helsinki agreement), opened up new opportunities for work in the European region.

There were therefore a number of interrelated factors contributing to Seers' new meaning of development and to his drawing up what he considered was a more appropriate universal classification of countries (than that of a no longer relevant 3-world system) - one based on their degree of dependence (particularly on the import of oil, food and technology). What he drew attention to was the common nature of world problems and the need for development to be studied as a universal issue, to which universal strategies could be applied (whether in "developing" or "developed" countries) - ones, he argued, based on selective self-reliance, assisted by nationalism.

Chapter 7 considers how he incorporated his new meaning of development into his more practical work and writings, first of all examining his views on the various external

and internal constraints hindering the adoption of more self-reliant and less dependent development policies, including the influence of the TNCs, international financial institutions, geographic and demographic features, cultural factors and administrative mismanagement. It pays particular attention to his own work on devising more relevant accounting systems and social indicators for governments intent on greater economic self reliance in addition to the elimination of poverty, unemployment and inequality. It then turns to his European based work and his application of the lessons of development studies to the region at a time when the EEC was considering the application of three new members from its "periphery". As he increasingly encouraged greater self reliance in the region, reinforced by a protectionist policy, this necessarily also entailed a greater degree of disengagement from the countries of the South, which, he argued, would in fact be to their mutual benefit. His criticism of the Brandt report for its "naive internationalism" and for wanting to increase aid and engagement between North and South proved a point of controversy with many of his colleagues as he came to adopt a position directly contrary in many ways to the views he had held in the mid-1960s. One major exception where he maintained intervention in overseas affairs was still defensible, however, was in defence of human rights; and, despite his emphasis on disengagement, he also continued to undertake consultancies overseas and in fact maintained a commitment to what he termed "real aid" in the form of basic humanitarian relief. At the same time, however, he advocated the desirability of working towards a world divided into self-sufficient regional blocs, having come to the conclusion that a universal solution to the world's social problems had become impossible.

Much of his work during the later period of his career is reflected in *The Political Economy of Nationalism*, but the approach adopted in this study puts the material into context, explaining and demonstrating the background and purpose of some of the original papers on which Seers' volume is based.

In the conclusion a short appraisal of the nature of Seers' contribution to the subject of development and development studies is attempted.

* * *

Throughout, this study is rooted very much in Seers' own words, and the terminology he used at various stages in his career is in itself reflective of the changing history of and attitudes to development. In the 1950s, for example, he referred to the relationship between "imperial" or "metropolitan" countries and "colonial" or "underdeveloped areas" overseas. During the early 1960s, particularly after his time at ECLA, the distinction was between "industrialised economies" and "primary producers", whereas by the early 1970s he employed the terms "rich" and "poor" countries - considering the word "poor" "preferable to the euphemisms 'underdeveloped', 'developing', 'less developed', etc." which he regarded as "vague and in some senses applicable to any country)".[24] In the early 1970s he found the term Third World useful, whereas later in the decade he believed it too had lost its significance, preferring to regard all economies as being in varying degrees dependent; though by the early 1980s he had also adopted usage, for convenience, of the then more widely accepted division of the world into "North" and "South".

As may already be apparent, and is indicated by the chronology of his professional

activities in the Appendix, Seers maintained a very hectic work schedule throughout his life and was constantly investigating new ideas and projects. Very early in his career in 1946, when discussing "the use of one's life", he observed "we have a limited number of days on earth, and 24 hours in each of them.... It is only commonsense to do as well as we can with what we know we have available. Killing time is in literal truth suicide, for time is the one thing of which we have only a limited stock".[25] Certainly he himself was never guilty of killing time. A colleague in the early days in Oxford commented on his "unflagging energy and enterprise", a pace which later colleagues noted "never flagged over his entire professional life".[26] At IDS he was known for his "unique vitality and exuberance" as he constantly brought back "new ideas, new plans, new projects", creating "an aura of excitement" and "stirring things up".[27] With such an full and active career, covering over thirty years of working in many parts of the world, it is inevitable that not all aspects of his work are covered in equal depth in the following chapters.

This study does, however, aim to give an overall trajectory of Seers' work and his interpretation of changing meanings of development, identifying where possible the reasons and influences which brought about these shifts of view and approach. It is essentially an intellectual biography, concentrating on the life and work of someone who is regarded as a prominent British pioneer in the field whose multi-disciplinary approach led him to address a wide range of issues and problems. While the variety of his career and the evolution of his ideas are of interest in themselves, they also provide an insight into the history of the development process and development studies in the post-war years, indicating the increasing sense of disillusion and failure that set in as global inequalities continued, and still continue, to diverge and attempts were made, as they still are, to find new ways of approaching the problems.

PART 1:

"FROM COLONIAL ECONOMICS TO DEVELOPMENT STUDIES"

CHAPTER 1: VISION OF A LAND, AND WORLD, OF PLENTY

The first part of this study deals with the early years of Dudley Seers' career and his overseas experience up to the latter part of 1964, before his appointment at the Ministry of Overseas Development in London. Chapter 1 covers the period from his education in the 1930s up to 1957, while Chapter 2 looks at the influence on his ideas of his work in the Latin American and Caribbean region from 1957 to 1963, and Chapter 3 considers his work in Africa during 1963-4 (the length of chapters in part reflecting the periods of time covered). In 1969 Seers claimed that it was in Latin America that he "first really learned about development problems".[1] However, by the time he took up his post with the Economic Commission for Latin America in 1957, aged 37, his background, education and career had already provided considerable experience of the field, and there was already a strong indication of his future interests and concerns.

This first chapter, in following the course of his career up until 1957, outlines his grounding in economics and statistics at both Cambridge and Oxford Universities, and describes his practical consultancy work overseas, which early on convinced him that the teaching of economics, and use of statistics, had to be made more relevant for the purposes of "underdeveloped areas". Although working for a year as a government research assistant in New Zealand in the immediate post-Second World War period, it was in the 1950s - when he undertook consultancy missions to Burma and the Gold Coast - that he encountered at first hand the particular circumstances and problems faced by primary producers with dominant sectors, while a further consultancy in Malta and an 18-month posting in the Caribbean also brought to his attention the problems faced by small island economies with few natural resources. A spell at the United Nations in New York meantime provided an opportunity to widen his knowledge of global economic problems and international comparisons, and marked the first of many associations with the UN and its various agencies.

In describing these early experiences and influences, which have not been traced or addressed in any depth elsewhere, this chapter follows a more sequential narrative style than is adopted elsewhere. It outlines in some detail the recommendations of Seers' early reports, partly because most of these are not now widely available, but also because in later years Seers was critical of some of his earlier proposals and it is necessary to look at the context in which they were first made.

His initial concern for overseas development was in part a reflection of his adherence to the post-war Labour Party vision of building a classless, povertyless society, and this chapter will also trace his early association and close links with the Bevanite wing of the Labour party (which was to have such a significant influence on the turn of his career later in 1964). However the political and economic, as well as humanitarian, motivations for development also begin to be reflected in his work at this time as international relations cooled between the West and the Soviet bloc in the late 1940s and early 1950s and some British colonies prepared for independence.

Seers' own focus at this time, however, was on the needs and circumstances of the underdeveloped areas themselves. As this chapter will demonstrate, he was basically optimistic that, despite the problems faced, with commitment and some external assistance, progress and development could be achieved in such areas, raising standards of living and enabling them to participate more fully in the world economy. A more comprehensive picture of what his ideas about development were by 1957 will be addressed in the concluding section of this chapter.

Education and early years

Dudley George Seers was born on 11 April 1920, the son of Mabel Edith Seers (née Hallett) and George Clarence Seers, a businessman who managed local branches of General Motors in India, Indonesia and New Zealand. Even as a child, therefore, he travelled overseas quite extensively during the 1920s and early 1930s either accompanying or visiting his parents, later recalling that he thereby "became conscious of what we now look on as development at an early age",[2] though this was inevitably from a privileged vantage point. However it gave him personal experience of the climate of opinion among British colonial expatriates working overseas at the time which in later years he used as material for anecdotes, reminiscing in 1981, for example, "When travelling as a child to India in the nineteen thirties somebody raised the question whether India might not be independent before the end of the century and he was shunned by his fellow-passengers for the rest of the journey!"[3]

While a boarder at Rugby public school between 1932 and 1936, which he did not enjoy, he also recalled a "growing awareness as an adolescent of the 1930s of the problems of unemployment and poverty"[4] within Britain; and in later life said he felt fortunate in being old enough to remember the 1930s for, like the 1980s, it forced "one to question all types of conventional ways of thinking".[5]

In 1938 Seers went to Cambridge to read Economics at Pembroke College, finding the course interesting and university life enjoyable and fulfilling;[6] though, on his own admission, he did not apply himself to his studies as avidly as he might, picking up "a somewhat sketchy knowledge of economics" since he was "too busy with student politics to acquire a really profound knowledge of existing doctrine", eventually being awarded a two-two degree - "with reason" he acknowledged.[7] However, he later implied his sketchy knowledge of existing economic doctrine in fact assisted him in his career as he was less constricted by a blind adherence to accepted economic theory and was able to adopt a more flexible approach in practical development situations.[8]

Student politics resulted in Seers becoming, for a time, "president of a Marxist society"[9] and, he later maintained, it was through "picking up some knowledge of Marxism" that he acquired "a conviction that one could not ignore the social and political aspects of economic change".[10] Though soon finding Marxism "too confining", he observed (from the perspective of 1969) "I believe it helped me to recognise the key

elements in development, and thus to get rid of useless theory".[11]

His lack of application to his studies, however, is reflected in the comments of one of his supervisors, D. L. Bunn, who in the Lent Term of 1939 described Seers as obviously intelligent but "the effort required to understand the groundwork of the subject irks him" and he was "easily distracted"; it was suggested that "more constant application of his energies in the right direction" would be needed for him to do justice to himself in examinations.[12] The College records show he obtained Second Class Honours in Parts I and II of the Economics Tripos, the latter in June 1941, and proceeded to the BA degree in the Easter Term of 1942, and later to the MA Degree in the Easter Term of 1945.[13]

During the Michaelmas Term of 1941 Seers considered undertaking a Ph.D. and asked if he could start work on a subject such as "the compatibility of the Marxian and Keynesian schools" or "the relevance of Thorstein Veblen's work to modern political controversy".[14] Although he wrote some essays and had supervision from Maurice H. Dobb[15] the eminent Marxist economist (then a Fellow at Trinity College and a former graduate of Pembroke himself) and J. W. F. Rowe (a Fellow at Pembroke and Director of Studies in Economics at the College), this was never followed through, as he joined the navy for active service in the Second World War. In the light of later work, however, his choice of subject for study indicates his early interest in the essential linking of politics with economics and in points of comparison between the Marxian and Keynesian schools - though in later years he considered them both equally inappropriate to apply to development problems.

Seers himself does not appear to refer anywhere to his early association with Maurice Dobb - even when in 1967 he reviewed a collection of Dobb's papers and a festschrift produced on his official retirement.[16] The supervisor, who made the greatest impression on him, and whom he described as one of his "original mentors", was in fact Joan Robinson,[17] with whom he maintained contact throughout his career and of whom he always spoke with respect and affection (even when in later years he occasionally disagreed with her approach). Her own interest in analysing the reasons for poverty and unemployment, frequently critical of existing theory, and search "for ways of creating a more just and equitable society"[18] (in Britain and overseas), were concerns which Seers too carried with him throughout his career.

In early 1942, however, he left Cambridge and joined the Royal Navy, first serving as an ordinary seaman and finding "hard manual work" on *HMS Victorious* a sharp contrast but refreshing change to the leisure of College life.[19] He later obtained a commission and was mentioned in despatches for activity in Normandy in 1944,[20] before being demobilised in 1945. During this period, in 1943, he married Patricia Hindell, and in due course had a son and three daughters, though it is not the intention of this study to address the personal side of his life.

Challenge to New Zealand Labour

Following the war Seers worked for a year as a research assistant in the office of the New Zealand Labour Prime Minister, Mr Peter Fraser. Looking back on this experience, he regarded it as useful in making him "aware of some of the problems of primary producers", though he also owned up to a certain degree of embarrassment at his attempts to "apply Keynesian ideas quite uncritically to New Zealand's problems" admitting it was hard for people trained as economists to do practically useful work especially soon after they had graduated and to learn, painfully, that models had to be amended to take account of particular circumstances.[21]

At the time of his work in New Zealand, however, he was dubbed "a brilliant young English Economist" on the cover of the booklet he wrote entitled *The Challenge to New Zealand Labour*,[22] which, as his first publication, provides an interesting insight into his political perspective as a self-proclaimed socialist at this time. The booklet was hailed as "A Constructive Answer to the Walsh Report" - a report by a Mr F. P. Walsh addressed to the Federation of Labour which had called for an urgent increase in production in the post-war period. This report had apparently caused "a remarkable amount of startled attention"[23] amongst a labour force anticipating an improved standard of living following the strict controls of a war economy since it had pointed out that before wealth could be distributed it first had to be produced and that any further dividends to the workers in the way of increased wages or leisure had to be accompanied by greater efficiency of labour.

Seers' message was in fact basically the same, though carrying the argument a stage further in outlining guidelines for addressing the sort of problems faced by the Labour movement in having to operate within a capitalist economy - addressing "particularly the key role of the trade unions in working out this solution".[24] In his view a composite programme of full production and Socialism could be compatible, though it required a change of policy priorities by the Labour movement in that he believed an organised drive to increase production, together with Socialism, "should largely replace the industrial and political programmes of income redistribution as the main Labour policy".[25]

Aware that his argument might well be criticised as "betraying the Labour movement", at the outset he stated his own credentials as an "Englishman with Labour sympathies" and "supporter of the New Zealand Labour Party"[26] - and frequently repeated the underlying aim of working towards Socialism. Whereas others might have pleaded for industrial peace and hard work out of a desire to increase profits, Seers maintained to his potential Leftist critics, he personally was "basically and deeply opposed to the 'profit system'" more specifically "those profits made by companies out of employing people".[27] But while averse to the exploitation of the profit system and considering that "Capitalism had failed as an economic system", his point was that production and economic power still in fact rested in capitalist hands, and since complete socialism was not yet the order of the day, the Labour Government faced the dilemma of having "to operate a capitalist economy based fundamentally on the 'profit motive'".[28] Although this was alien to its whole

outlook, he argued, the Party believed "in improving this system so long as we have to put up with it," and he saw the answer in what he called "a Labour State", based on the profit motive but subject to a large amount of progressive political control to correct the faults of capitalism - though he acknowledged such a state was "probably the most difficult of all States for a Government to run".[29]

One of the main "difficulties" Seers addressed in his booklet was the apparent conflict between Labour's ideal of redistribution and production; for while acknowledging production was not "the main concern" of the Labour movement, whose first job was "to correct all the worst faults of capitalism and to end the social tragedies of poverty and unemployment", nevertheless the consequent "levelling up" of incomes that tended to take place he identified as one of the reasons for lower production in a Labour State.[30] Although agreeing that redistribution was necessary to counter the "grim nightmare" of capitalism, he drew attention to the drawback that it "reduces the incentive to work, and may hamper production"[31] - a dilemma he was to wrestle with at other times in his career. The New Zealand Labour government, since coming to power in 1935, had in fact already done much through its social security and minimum wage legislation to adopt redistributive measures, decrease unemployment and improve living standards and health care, but Seers now maintained "we are approaching the end of the possibilities of redistribution" and for Labour to continue to "go down the blind alley of further redistribution of income", would "end one day in economic crisis and political defeat."[32] This was why it was necessary, he argued, for "a considerable change in outlook throughout the Labour movement" requiring "the organisations of Labour, particularly the unions, to make production the core of their policy" and for "a temporary truce in class warfare on some sectors of the political front".[33]

Such a change was impossible, however, he realised, unless it was demonstrated and generally understood that full production was in the interests of the working class, who would be suspicious that calls for harder work meant more exploitation. Certain conditions and guarantees were therefore necessary to allay their fears, among these being: the example of a Labour Government "travelling with strong and decisive steps towards Socialism"[34] not merely nationalising industries but operating them democratically; the guarantee of full employment and a means of ensuring wage-earners received a share of the proceeds of increased production while profiteering was eliminated; and an insistence on the efficiency of employers as well as workers. Seers maintained that "workers should never co-operate in running capitalism unless they are sure that they are progressing towards Socialism"[35] and that, without the fulfilment of these conditions and guarantees, the other recommendations for full production were null and void.

However, almost immediately he had to put a rider on this in acknowledging that political expediency would dictate that some guarantees should be given *not* to nationalise all privately owned industries since the Labour movement had a vested interest in their economic health and profit margins. This was "the only way to retain political power for labour and therefore the surest way in the long run to achieve Socialism and to end

exploitation for all time."[36] Unions were therefore urged not to continue a relentless attack for a larger share of the profit margin but "'Reculez pour sauter mieux,' which means 'Step back, so as to make a better jump forward!'"[37]

For a Labour State to be successful obviously required the co-operation of the unions and Seers suggested more frequent consultation between government and unions to prevent the party's political programme being wrecked by short-sighted industrial tactics.[38] Further measures he envisaged for achieving full production and Socialism, most requiring union sympathy, included a national wages policy, reduction of strikes, higher taxes on high and unearned incomes and luxuries, incentives and awards to labour, the appointment of an Economic Cabinet to produce a long-term economic plan, political education of workers (including the setting up a College of Labour to teach trade union officials "Marxist and Left-Keynesian economics, with special reference to New Zealand"[39]) incentive payments, increased managerial efficiency, and economising of consumption so that more could be spent on education, health services and public works. The composite programme of full production and Socialism, he claimed would bring the people into production and give it a more social character.

Seers concluded his booklet in rhetorical style with a somewhat utopian vision of Labour's Ideals, and the expectations he had of the Party, in implementing these.

> Labour's appeal and strength lies in the vision of a classless, povertyless society - the great community of the future depicted by William Morris, Bellamy and others. It will be a Land of Plenty, part (we hope) of a World of Plenty, in which each will be free to develop his or her personality to the full, without the poverty, the insecurity, the petty jealousies and snobberies that capitalism breeds.
>
> *This society can only be built by hard work and political struggle. We shall never attain it by sitting back and watching our leaders tapping some of the profits of the exploiters.*
>
> *The vision of the Land of Plenty must always be with us.*[40] (original emphasis)

What, if any, influence Seers' booklet had on policy is not known - C. Morgan Williams MP merely commented that whether one agreed with Mr Seers' conclusions or not the booklet provided "much food for thought and many valuable suggestions".[41] The Labour government was in fact defeated by the National Party in the elections of 1949 as people's post-war expectations were not met and discontent rose with continued controls and the rising cost of living.

The main interest of the booklet lies in indicating Seers' early thinking, though he made it clear that the specific recommendations contained in it were made in response to the particular circumstances faced by post-war New Zealand in 1946.[42] Like many Labour supporters in the immediate post-war years, however, he was optimistic about the future and the prospect of building a "classless povertyless society". But, while upholding Labour's ideals and stating he personally would leave the Party if it ever lost its "driving force of idealism"[43] and became merely a political machine, it is equally clear he believed the Party and the trade unions had to make compromises, particularly concerning their approach to the issue of redistribution, and to reach accommodations with the capitalist system within which they were operating, for the sake of expediency. Short-term

compromises, though raising contradictions and difficulties, were considered necessary for longer-term gain (though how the final breakthrough to socialism would be made by such means was not addressed). Although then considering himself a socialist, Seers distanced himself from those on the Left, whom he acknowledged would consider his solutions "betrayals", and adopted a pragmatic approach to practical political problems, one that avoided where possible, class conflict and industrial disputes (which he regarded as counterproductive) - an approach he was to adopt more generally throughout his career.

Oxford Institute of Economics and Statistics

In 1946 Dudley Seers returned to the UK where, following the 1945 General Election, the Labour Party was also in government, led by Clement Attlee and committed to a programme of nationalisation of industry and widespread social reform. He took up a post as research officer and lecturer at the Oxford Institute of Economics and Statistics, later becoming a senior lecturer, and was also a member of Queen's College, a sister college of Pembroke, Cambridge, where he had been an undergraduate.[44] Oxford was to be his base for the next seven years though Paul Streeten has remarked on the fact that he had no college fellowship during this time.[45]

Seers himself felt the "golden age" of the Institute of Economics and Statistics had passed by the time he joined it with the departure of Michel Kalecki and Kurt Schumacher, but in Oxford he did meet Thomas Balogh, a fellow at Balliol, with whom he established a life long friendship, and he also particularly drew attention to his association at this time with Frank Burkhardt, Director of the Institute, Kurt Martin (née Mandelbaum) and David Worswick.[46] Martin and Burkhardt had recently produced a monograph, *The Industrialisation of Backward Areas* (1945),[47] investigating the resources needed for industrial development in the mainly agricultural countries of south-east Europe, though it was regarded as an illustration for any undeveloped country on the point of undertaking an industrialisation programme; Seers came to regard it as "a seminal work"[48] and in the late 1970s, when calling for the extension of development studies back to Europe, he used it as an early example of European countries being treated as cases for development (see Chapter 6).

At the Institute Seers taught statistics - as he confessed "learning the subject by teaching it" and publishing a number of papers in the Institute's *Bulletin* including what he described in 1969 as "some (mercifully forgotten) papers on income distribution".[49] For the next few years his attention was fixed on the development and reconstruction problems of post-war Britain and Europe, which, like New Zealand, were intent on initiating their own peace time production drives. In the UK national output was particularly affected by material shortages, especially coal where the industry had also been affected by strikes, in March 1944 and September 1947, with miners protesting their low pay and poor working conditions; and it was to the problems of the acute coal shortage that Seers immediately turned his attention in 1947. By this time the euphoria of the 1945 victory, peace and new

government, was wearing a little thin as queues and rationing continued (and even increased) and there was some popular dissatisfaction at the continued austerity measures, despite the social reforms being brought in by the government. Seers' response to these problems is reflected in some of the papers he produced at the Institute.

Coal production

In 1947 Seers published three papers[50] on the coalmining industry, including comparative tables of coal production and consumption from 1928 onwards, but concentrating particularly on the record of the previous three years and the issue of falling stock levels. As a result of his findings, he advocated the need for a central economic plan to increase the production of coal, which, he suggested, could primarily be achieved by increasing the work force and attracting new recruits into the industry by means of various incentives such as the promise of higher pay, the provision of housing, recreational facilities, extra rations, more canteens, subsidised superannuation schemes, and improving the status of miners in public esteem so that mining was considered a "well-paid and important career".[51] The introduction of foreign labour and import of coal were also considered as possible short-term remedies.

Seers foresaw, however, that once the short-term demand for coal was met, Britain might not be able to face competition from the lower costs of continental production and from other sources of energy such as atomic energy derivatives; though as one possible solution he suggested there "may be new markets in what are now colonial countries, as their national income rises"[52] - one of his first references to the role of "colonial countries" as potential markets. He still urgently pressed for an increase in the coalmining production at that time, but his general conclusion, in what is still a contemporary debate, was that eventually Britain would have to plan for a declining labour force in view of what he regarded as the relative inefficiency of its coal production compared to overseas producers. If productivity was not increased, he observed Britain could become a permanent importer of coal, though he viewed this as having certain advantages - "saving the country the cost of maintaining a large industry which is expensive in the human costs it involves and therefore (under full employment) in wages"[53] (though this obviously assumed the continued supply of relatively low cost continental coal).

Within the context of a more general paper on national income, production and consumption he observed in 1952 that, despite the introduction of monetary and other inducements to attract new recruits, the number of miners remained small, and although mechanisation had helped to increase productivity, "mining output was not nearly enough for industry or domestic fires, let alone the foreign buyer",[54] but the further development of the coalmining industry after the early 1950s was not a subject that he pursued.

Lessons from Czechoslovakia?

From Oxford Seers visited Prague in 1947 together with P.D. Henderson, then a Fellow and Tutor in Economics at Lincoln College, to study the effectiveness of Czechoslovakia's post-war two-year plan - an example of a production drive in a country where a large section of industry and finance had been placed under state control (with the nationalising of mines, enterprises belonging to collaborators, and industries of a certain size), though private enterprise still existed and was also covered by the plan.[55] The strength of the trade unions had also been enhanced with increased representation on managing committees of national enterprises and consultative roles in the appointment of managers and the fixing of wages. Initiated in 1945, Czechoslovakia's plan aimed to raise the production of capital and consumer goods above pre-war levels in order to raise the standard of living of the population.

Seers and Henderson observed that the plan was essentially one of reconstruction rather than development, working outwards from the most important bottlenecks in coal, iron and steel, transport and capital goods and adopting targets for certain important sectors of the economy, such as food, instead of regional targets. They noted, with some surprise, that profit making was a major objective, even of nationalised concerns, second only to the production target, and considerable emphasis placed on increasing efficiency to raise production. The fulfilment of the plan required an increase in the productive labour force (including women and juvenile entrants) and a change in the distribution of labour force (mainly through improving wages and conditions in undermanned industries) carried out with the co-operation of the trade union movement. They observed inflation was being controlled by blocking bank balances, to check spending on luxury goods and services, and stabilising prices and wages at approximately three times the pre-war level; and all these measures had seemingly been met with positive response by the workers. The economic recovery was being assisted by foreign credits, a large part from the US and UK, which helped pay for the essential supplies needed for reconstruction, and trade agreements were being made with neighbouring Slav states as a long-term measure to insure against balance of payments difficulties.

From their rather positive assessment, Seers and Henderson drew some "tentative conclusions"[56] following their visit concerning possible lessons for planning in Britain and Western Europe. Czechoslovakia's plan, they maintained, proved that detailed planning techniques could be applied successfully to a complex economy which was fairly highly industrialised, with nationalised and private sector industries, and they attributed this success mainly to the specific targets set for each enterprise, rather than global planning. The provision of these targets, showing the contribution each enterprise was expected to make to the Plan with an estimate of the effect on living standards, was also seen as a powerful stimulus to the working population, "more powerful than slogans generalising the need for higher output".[57] The experience of Czechoslovakia, they believed, also showed that full co-operation from workers in increasing production,

including co-operation in carrying out a wages policy, could be achieved, particularly when union influence was included in the formation and administration of economic policy.

However, their enthusiasm was somewhat premature for popular discontent, already brewing in 1947, was counteracted by the Prague coup in February 1948 with the installation of a one-party and rigidly Stalinist state, under which Czech industries became adjuncts of the Soviet economy.[58]

National income distribution

Seers used his statistics teaching at Oxford to develop the first quarterly estimates of UK national accounts - "an extremely imaginative enterprise"[59] in the opinion of his colleague at the time, P.D. Henderson. Seers devoted particular attention to income distribution, publishing a number of essays on this subject in the Institute of Statistics *Bulletin* between 1947 and 1952, some of which were jointly produced with colleagues like Henderson and D. G. Holland, with two collections of these papers subsequently being published in book form.[60] A large proportion of the papers consist of an analysis and comparison of the cost of living, consumption patterns and income of the working and middle classes pre- and post-war.

The first such paper, which touched on most of the fundamental issues addressed in later essays, examined the 1947 National Income White Paper. Against the background of widespread opinion that post-war Britain was a lot poorer than it had been pre-war, Seers set out "to discover whether, in what way, and for what reasons"[61] this was so. His findings to some extent challenged the popular view, for his general conclusion was that "we are materially richer, not poorer, than before the war, in that the resources provided out of current production are higher in real terms"; though what did particularly concern him was that a larger proportion of resources were now being channelled into military expenditure:

> military requirements now take so much more of the resources than they did before the war that consumption and investment are barely up to pre-war standards. We are poorer in the sense that we deploy our resources in such a way as to increase our military strength rather than economic welfare.[62]

In addition he observed that Britain was also poorer in the sense that it took more of its output to purchase imports, and a large amount of its current production had to be devoted to the restocking of materials and manufactures and rebuilding damaged fixed capital in the immediate post-war years, though these were only temporary effects.

The major decision about deployment of resources, he maintained, was basically a political one, involving a stark choice between living standards and defence expenditure.

> We can either have more consumers' goods, with a quicker end to the inflationary stresses and strains [including rationing, shortages, queues], or retain the defence programme envisaged for the immediate future. The American line of credit, by making available extra resources over and above what we produce ourselves, enables

> us to maintain a high level of military expenditure without too great hardship. We may be faced with a sharper choice between guns and butter in 1948.[63]

This choice between "guns and butter", as well as concern about Britain's growing economic dependence on the United States, were issues also being discussed by the Keep Left group of the Labour Party, with which Seers was then involved, and which will be considered in the next section.

His essay on the 1947 White Paper also compared the distribution of income in the United Kingdom, pre- and post-war and demonstrated that there had in fact been some redistribution towards the poorer income groups. This was the prelude to many more detailed statistical comparisons and studies over the next few years on the cost of living and distribution of incomes, the gist of his conclusions indicating a "general tendency towards a more egalitarian society brought about by the war"[64] and a levelling of incomes.

> What appears to have happened ... is that the top strata (broadly the rentiers, upper-middle class entrepreneurs and richer members of professions) have lost relative to the whole of the rest of the population. The middle sections have gained most, and it is a fundamental gain due to changed relative incomes. This can be ascribed partly to the greater increased incomes of farmers and sole traders. The lowest sections have also gained, but largely because of escaping the increased taxation.[65]

Some sections of the working class, such as the miners and agricultural workers whose income had trebled, he pointed out, had in fact prospered more than others.[66]

His general conclusion was that, despite public opinion in the early 1950s that "we ended the war poorer than we started it and we have been growing poorer ever since,"[67] the figures showed this was not true for the majority and average consumption had not declined. The reasons for the feeling of poverty were complex, he observed, being partly attributable to the fact that the minority who were worse off were the more vocal section of the community, while the many who were better off tended to compare their present position with what it might have been before the war if they had been successful; in addition some people only repeated the opinions of the strata above them, and extremists on Right and Left wanted, for various reasons, to disparage such improvements as had occurred.[68]

Seers himself felt it necessary to clarify his own position in welcoming the apparently more equitable distribution of income.

> Some commentators on my previous work have written as if my conclusions on the tendency towards greater equality imply a criticism of that tendency. I should therefore like to put on record that in my view the moves towards greater equality in recent years were long overdue and have only taken us part of the way towards an equitable income structure.[69]

In a paper written in 1956 he noted a slight regression to pre-war inequalities in real income, both between the rich and poor and within the working class itself, but he maintained the emphasis should be on the word "slight".[70]

Seers later referred to his papers on income distribution as "mercifully forgotten" and

became more sceptical about the use of statistics and critical of his own teaching of statistical methods at this time,[71] observing they did not anchor students firmly enough in reality or demonstrate adequately how to appraise and use material. His major concern was that the reduction of a problem to manageable figures, based on an assumption that all data were firm and reliable, often diverted attention away from the real problem and ignored social and political factors. Though even during his time at Oxford he demonstrated he was already aware of these tendencies, remarking in 1952 that statistical data could be abused "particularly by politicians" and that a naive acceptance of a purely numerical argument was likely to be dangerously misleading.[72] But whatever his later misgivings, his period at the Institute undoubtedly gave him a firm grounding for the statistical work he was to undertake overseas, as did his interest in distributional issues, and it was with colleagues from the Institute too that he had his first opportunity to participate in an overseas consultancy mission, to Burma, which is discussed later in this chapter.

"Keep Left"

During his time at Oxford - "As a release from political libido"[73] - Seers became involved in meetings of the "Keep Left" group of Labour members of parliament, whose manifesto, *Keep Left*, appeared in April 1947, written by Michael Foot, Ian Mikardo and Richard Crossman and signed by a dozen more MPs.[74] While recognising the Government's achievement, the group considered there was a need "for a more drastic Socialist policy if we were not to drift into disaster".[75]

The manifesto urged greater boldness on the government at home to increase the efficiency of production and the workforce, particularly through continuing the nationalisation and welfare programmes, and to seek expanded trade relations in pursuit of greater economic independence, reducing reliance on American funding. It rejected as a "betrayal of Socialist principles" the notion of Britain becoming "the junior partner and the advance outpost of an American-dominated system of 'collective security against Communism'", arguing that the government should "boldly stand up to the U.S. Administration and put forward its own Socialist proposals at every conference".[76] Equally though, accepting Communist leadership was considered a betrayal of British and European Socialism. The task of British Socialism, the group maintained, was to save smaller nations from this futile ideological warfare, and to heal the breach between the USA and the USSR, working towards a united Europe as a means to securing a more peaceful world (a subject which, it is interesting to note, Seers returned to with enthusiasm in the latter part of his career; see Chapter 7). The adoption of a new defence policy was urged to expand the Anglo-French Alliance into a European security pact which would voluntarily renounce the manufacture and use of atomic bombs.[77] While still considering it important for a united Europe to remain "strong enough to deter an aggressor"[78] (through the use of a more conventional fighting force) the group urged the reduction of the armed forces and the withdrawal of British troops from the Middle East.

In reducing such defence expenditure, it was envisaged the government would have more resources to concentrate on the responsibility of developing the African colonies, creating conditions for their eventual independence, and opening up further trading opportunities for Britain. Continued work towards the speedy independence of India, Burma and Malaya was also encouraged so that trade relations could be expanded with "free and friendly peoples", the point being made that "These countries are richly supplied with raw materials and have an almost unlimited demand for the machinery and goods which Britain can supply."[79] In addition emphasis was put on building up economic and cultural, rather than defence, ties with the Commonwealth.

Ian Mikardo, the Keep Left Group's Secretary at the time, regarded Seers as one of the three "top socialist economists" advising the group (the others being Thomas Balogh and David Worswick) and in this respect he considered the group's "resources were better than those available to the party leadership".[80] The group was small but met regularly and, according to Mikardo, was "close-knit, dedicated and very hard-working",[81] writing and circulating papers on different policy areas. He recalled that between 1947 and 1950 the greater part of the group's discussions were about the basic philosophy of the party and the broad economic and social order they were seeking to create, concentrating on the production of a wide-ranging programme for the next Labour government. The group's members, however, have been described as being far from rebels, "displaying no public rancour and posing no threat to party unity", and, following the Prague coup and blockade of Berlin in 1948, and subsequent airlift, it has been noted that the group modified its earlier stand and "accepted the necessity of the American alliance to contain Communism in Europe".[82]

The group did, however, maintain its opposition to rearmament and this emerged as a key issue in 1951 when, in response to American pressure, the British government sought to increase military expenditure because of the Korean War. Seers and Balogh played an important part in preparing background papers for the group early in 1951, demonstrating how such militarisation would be financed - at the expense of further social expenditure - and in one of his Institute papers Seers wrote of "the particularly great burden that Western rearmament places on us".[83] It was in protest at Gaitskell's budget that year, which planned to increase the scale of military expenditure while introducing some health service charges, that Aneurin Bevan, Harold Wilson and John Freeman resigned from the Cabinet and joined the Keep Left group, thereby considerably strengthening its ranks. From then on the group was generally known as the "Bevanites" and its numbers increased from 32 in 1951 to 47 MPs and 2 peers the following year.[84]

According to Seers, it was his disillusion with the Labour government's decision to increase military expenditure which greatly influenced his own decision to take up work outside Britain, launching him on his eventual career in development work. As he put it himself:

> I was driven overseas by a number of forces. The overriding priority which the Labour Government gave to military spending at the end of life (1950-51), killed the

> hope of further social progress - just as it postponed the modernisation of British Industry by a decade. The political position in Britain seemed hopeless.[85]

At the same time though he also recognised that "sure progress had been made in reducing economic inequalities between 1940 and 1950", which his own work at the Oxford Institute of Statistics had demonstrated; and "The real social problems" he considered, "were now clearly overseas."[86]

This attitude was very much a reflection of then current Bevanite opinion. At a May Day meeting in Glasgow in 1951 Bevan himself had insisted on "the moral priority of aid to the underdeveloped world"[87] and the central theme of a Tribune pamphlet *One Way Only* produced in July that year, with an introduction by Bevan, Wilson and Freeman, urged that the "military rearmament of the Atlantic Powers should be subordinated to a World Plan for Mutual Aid" to assist "the under-privileged colonial peoples ... complete their social revolutions",[88] with Britain being encouraged to take a lead in this respect.

Seers' own interest in problems overseas took him on two short-term projects in 1951, one to Burma with an Oxford group of colleagues associated with the Institute, and the other to what was then known as the Gold Coast with another Oxford colleague, C.R. (Dick) Ross, then a fellow of Hertford College; and both of these will be considered in the following sections.

Although taking more interest in work overseas, Seers maintained his links with the Bevanites, who were in opposition after Labour's defeat in the October 1951 General Election, and, together with Thomas Balogh, he continued in an advisory role to the group.[89] At a week-end meeting of Bevanites held at Buscot Park, the home of Lord Gavin Farringdon (an executive member of the Fabian Society) in December 1951, Richard Crossman observed that Harold Wilson, Balogh and Seers "dominated the purely economic argument" at the gathering of some nineteen members (including Barbara Castle).[90] The financing of the arms programme continued to be a subject of debate and in June of the following year Crossman again recorded Seers presenting "a very important and thorough paper to the group estimating the effect of rearmament on the economy".[91] On another occasion he presented a paper on marketing board policy[92] as he discovered the important role these played in the economies of Burma and the Gold Coast. However, while maintaining these contacts with the Bevanite group, Seers was in fact to spend the greater part of the next thirteen years of British Conservative government working overseas.

The economic problems of Burma (1951)

Seers was one of five British economists invited by the Government of Burma in March-April 1951 to help the Ministry of National Planning "in picking out the main economic problems which required attention and to make suggestions and recommendations for dealing with them".[93] The other members of the team were colleagues from the Institute of Statistics (G.D.N. Worswick, F.A. Burchardt and Kurt Martin), and Miss Peter Ady,

who was tutor of St Anne's Society at Oxford and in Rangoon under the United Nations Technical Assistance Programme.

Although Burma had achieved independence at the beginning of 1948, local insurrections had prevented the government carrying out plans for economic development and reconstruction of agriculture and industry, which had suffered great damage during the war. However, by the end of 1950, Worswick observed, "the tides of insurrection had been stemmed"[94] and Burma was able to turn to its economic problems. The British team were given a free hand to investigate whatever they chose and produced a number of papers on various aspects of the economy which were used as background documents for a conference held in the Ministry of Planning, Rangoon, from 9 to 11 April 1951, attended by officials of leading government departments and the Union Bank, together with the British economists. Individual members of the team covered specific topics but all papers were fully discussed and regarded as representing the views of the team as a whole.

Seers, together with Peter Ady, spent much of his time working on the available, but meagre, statistical data, attempting to make a more definitive estimate of the national income of Burma in 1947-8, since it was generally agreed by the team that no plans could be made without a solid background of fact. This mission therefore gave him his first personal experience of the particular circumstances and problems facing a primary producing country highly dependent on one particular commodity, for in Burma rice was responsible for about half the national output, and in 1949-50 had comprised 88 per cent of the country's exports. Here he became more aware of the vulnerability of such an economy with a dominant sector, for, apart from the obvious dangers of being dependent on one commodity for foreign exchange, he observed, it also had to rely on the buying power of a relatively small number of Asian countries (which he considered reinforced the case for greater diversification, suggesting the revival of timber and oil industries as a means of increasing national output).[95] In addition he noted that the country's whole national development programme was also highly dependent on rice production, observing that the rice marketing board played an "important and unusual role" in the country's economy in that the proportion of its substantial profits paid over to the government financed "half the Government's total current outlay" in 1947-8, "covering all the capital investment of the Government and public enterprises (including the railways)", while its retained profits also made a large contribution towards financing capital investment.[96]

Faced with the task of attempting to estimate the national income of this economy and working on the available statistics, it was in Burma that Seers first began to realise that traditional national income tables were of "rather limited use" in dealing with countries with dominant sectors:

> Aggregating the output of agriculture with the output of other industries would fail to reveal the economic structure, because the essential questions in Burma at present are, in the first place, the size and disposal of the rice crop and, secondly, the allied matter of the relations between the rural economy and the manufacturing and servicing industries of the towns.[97]

What was required, he maintained, were income estimates that would "reveal these

structural relations, as a first step towards the construction of a factual basis for policy" and were better suited to the different forms of economic organisation and problems encountered in such primary producing countries, suggesting that the most useful arrangement was "to start with the production of primary products and follow them through the processing and marketing states to the final buyers".[98] As a result, he concentrated on rearranging the available statistical data into sector accounts, displaying the main expenditure and income items of each, to facilitate an understanding of the interrelationship between the different parts of the Burmese economy; the sectors selected for this task being agriculture, minerals, timber extraction, processing, state transport and communications, state marketing, other industries and services, rest of the world, public authorities, household and capital accounts.

In drawing up these accounts he acknowledged the influence of both Lord Keynes and Professor Leontiev: the former for turning attention in war-time Britain to the analysis of national income according to uses made of it and the development of so-called social accounts, tracing payments between enterprises, Government and households, etc.; and the latter for developing "input-output" tables in the USA, showing the value of sales and purchases of each industry and studying income and commodity flows in the nation.[99] The sector accounts, Seers maintained, were the link between these two approaches and it was this system of accounting that he was to use and develop in his work overseas in the 1950s and early 1960s notably in the Gold Coast and later Zambia, Trinidad and Jamaica. At the time of the Burma mission, however, he acknowledged that sector accounting was "somewhat unusual"[100] and might not be readily interpreted by those accustomed to national accounting. The lines of modern research, however, he maintained, were "converging on a sector accounting approach"[101] and to facilitate the interpretation and show the linkage with the two better known approaches of Keynes and Leontiev he arranged the information first in serial accounts of the type used in the UK and secondly in an input-output matrix. The tables were made as comprehensive as possible, given the statistical data available, but there were gaps and while details on government expenditure and agriculture were fairly good, those on commerce, services and private industry were "very hazy",[102] though, once a basic structure was provided, it was anticipated they could be added to and improved.

As well as recognising the limited use of national income tables, it was in Burma also that Seers first queried the usefulness of GNP (gross national product) for international comparisons. In his statistical work it soon became apparent that much of the Burmese economy lay "outside the market economy (e.g. work done on a household or community basis) and thus outside the scope of national income estimates",[103] which made it difficult to measure in the first place. However, despite the difficulty of accurate GNP measurement, he recognised that output per head in the UK was at least twenty times and in the USA forty times higher than what it was in Burma; but, he argued, there was no reason to conclude from these figures that "welfare" per head was forty times as high in the USA as in Burma since there were other considerations to be taken into account which

affected comparative living conditions: "(1) *needs* for fuel, clothing, etc., (2) the costs in strain, travel, congestion, smoke, etc., of an industrial civilization and (3) conventional living standards, not to speak of non-economic considerations."[104] His comments were more factual observations than critical comment, but it is the first indication of his questioning the adequacy and relevance of using GNP either as a measure of development within primary producing countries or for international comparative purposes - issues to which he continued to draw attention throughout his career.

As a result of his work on the data available in Burma, Seers suggested that what was needed was a regular annual economic survey of the economy, illustrating the current use of resources and relating budgetary policy to economic prospects and plans. This was, in fact, the first major recommendation made by the Oxford team in its report, though it was recognised this would require an extensive improvement in the statistical services. An annual survey was considered essential, mainly as a guide for the Government in framing its budget, deciding on the allocation of resources and indicating economic problems where administrative action of one kind or another was required; also, once published, it was anticipated it would serve a useful purpose in justifying to the people why particular, and potentially unpopular, measures were necessary in the interests of the country's economic development.[105]

Seers acknowledged it was not possible as yet to make as comprehensive an economic survey as that prepared in Britain, because of the lack of statistical information on private industry, but it was recognised that in fact most capital development was being undertaken by Government departments and public boards, where more data was available and he considered the economic assessment and development budget could be made more comprehensive as statistical information improved.[106] Elsewhere in the report, the team in fact made it clear they were "not .. concerned with the rate of development in the private sector" which in any case they considered insignificant compared to that of state-funded development; for while it was acknowledged there would be "some investments by domestic business and foreign companies" it was anticipated that, for the time being, this would "probably be rather too little than too much" and "too tardy" and it was generally accepted that "the State ... must take in hand the development work and provide capital and enterprise".[107]

A major recommendation of the team was for the Burmese government urgently to undertake a long-term plan of industrial development, as a necessary step to absorb the rapidly increasing population of working age.[108] The government's own plan of 1948 (which had not been implemented because of the civil strife) had itself supported the fostering of new industries as a means of making the country "less heavily dependent on the fortunes of the market in a very limited range of crops and products".[109] While the Oxford team also considered diversification and increased productivity important reasons for industrialisation, their "strongest single ... overriding argument" in favour of industrialisation (as well as employment in the service sector) was that it would absorb the rapidly growing population of unemployed and underemployed of working age who could

not be absorbed in agriculture.[110] Unemployment was regarded as a potential danger in the already war torn country and to the extent that it was "allowed to persist or to increase" the team observed, "the threat to the political and social stability of the economy grows".[111]

While it was realised there would be an initial skills shortage in undertaking an industrialisation programme, it was suggested that a survey of the resources of skilled labour be made immediately and that foreign technicians, consultant engineers and economists be brought in to undertake particular tasks and to train Burmese workers. In the meantime it was suggested an immediate start could be made on agricultural rehabilitation and public works projects, where less skilled labour was required.

Burma's financial position was considered "remarkably sound" in 1951, particularly considering the disruptions of the civil war, but it was recognised that the capital needed for the necessary large-scale industrial investment, in addition to the further investment in agriculture, public works and social services, could become a major problem for Burma in the years ahead, putting a great strain on the economy. While recommending the budget be framed to encourage greater social and industrial investment by government, state and local authorities to finance as much investment as possible out of domestic resources (private savings for investment being considered too low to be of significance), the Oxford team acknowledged that "recourse to foreign loans may be obligatory at times" and was "sound so long as the increase in production brought about by the investment project is more than sufficient to cover the interest and amortization of the loan",[112] though there was no detailed discussion or suggestions about the precise source of these loans. Equally there was little consideration given to the prospects or implications of what the Burmese Minister of Finance and Revenue later in 1951 referred to as the "joint cooperation between *private* foreign capital and the State" (my emphasis) which, he observed, the Government had evolved during the last few years and was now ready for operation in several of Burma's main industries - and which he considered held "promise of making a substantial contribution to economic rehabilitation".[113] As has been observed, the volume of private investment, including that of foreign companies, was not considered significant by the team at the time, though there is an indication that they considered it "desirable" for the state to control or influence the direction of any such investment.[114]

Attention was given in the report to the control of inflationary tendencies, which, it was recognised, could arise during the development period. Following Worswick's arguments, the team took the view that it was wrong to attribute inflation purely to monetary variations, and suggested that inflationary tendencies could be overcome "by controls and special administrative measures to increase supply",[115] regulating imports and giving priority to essential requirements. While maintaining that monetary institutions and management were only secondary not major instruments of economic control, the team nevertheless pointed out that inappropriate monetary institutions could do harm, and as such they recommended abandoning the sterling exchange standard operated by the Burma Currency Board, which obliged Burma to keep large sterling reserves, and which

they considered damaging for its current development needs where a more flexible monetary system was required.

It appears the Oxford team and its report were well received for on 30 August 1951, four and a half months after the conference in which the team participated, the Burmese Minister of Finance and Revenue presented an Economic Survey of Burma (as suggested by the team) to parliament in Rangoon, in association with the 1951-2 budget. He acknowledged the assistance of the visiting professors in discussing Burma's economic problems, making it "possible to bring our plans in line with modern economic thought" and, despite the limitations of the statistics available, "to examine Burma's economic problems and potential in terms of modern social accounting".[116] In discussing the task of future reconstruction and development, the minister also raised some of the issues brought up in the team's report such as the need to mobilise skills and set up new industries "to absorb at least part of the growing labour force".[117] Acknowledging too that domestic resources alone were not adequate to undertake the necessary diversification, he also accepted the need for foreign advisers and foreign aid ("on terms and conditions consistent with its national sovereignty and social aspirations"[118]), though he also called for financial reparation from those responsible for the war to assist in repairing war damage, which had not been a source of finance contemplated by the Oxford team, and, as has been noted, also made stronger reference to the role of private foreign capital in the development programme of the Burmese state.

The mission to Burma was significant for Seers in that it was his first personal encounter with the problems of what at this time he referred to as an "underdeveloped area".[119] Shortly afterwards in the same year, 1951, he further extended this experience as he embarked on a mission to the Gold Coast in Africa. Although in different continents, both Burma and the Gold Coast were primary producers, with a dominant agricultural sector, and had been (or were still in the case of the Gold Coast) British colonies.

The Gold Coast - financial and physical problems of development (1951)

Seers' invitation to undertake a mission in the Gold Coast arose as a result of work he had undertaken in 1949-50 for the Ministry of Health Committee on housebuilding costs in Britain. When at the end of 1950 the Colonial Office was looking for someone to "enquire into building costs in the Gold Coast and into the organisation and utilisation of building resources in relation to the economy of the territory and to make recommendations"[120] particularly concerning what, and how, building statistics should be collected, Seers was thought to have the relevant experience for the task and subsequently asked C. R. (Dick) Ross, then a fellow of Hertford College, to join him.[121] For both of them it was their first time in Africa and they based their subsequent report on a six-week visit from 25 July to 5 September 1951 followed by three days in Nigeria by way of comparison and subsequent interviews in England arranged by the Colonial Office.[122] In addition Seers found the

experience of his recent work in Burma of relevance in addressing some of the problems of a country with a dominant sector, with cocoa rather than rice being the Gold Coast's major commodity, which in large part determined living standards and the potential rate of development.[123]

Unlike Burma, the Gold Coast was not yet independent, though moves were being made towards self-rule (in part stimulated by riots in 1948 targeted particularly against the stores of the major European trading companies) and in February 1951 the country had its first General Election at which Kwame Nkrumah's Convention People's Party won the majority of seats. Nkrumah, who was in prison at the time for advocating "positive action" (strikes in particular) in pursuit of a "self-government now" policy, was released and invited to become prime minister and it was to his government, more specifically the Minister of Finance, to whom the Seers/Ross report was addressed. In response to recommendations of a working party set up by this new Minister of Finance, the British mission's terms of reference in fact widened to look at the broader economic problems arising out of the building programme (which constituted a major part of the budget for the development programme which had been drawn up[124]) and particularly to investigate steps to reduce inflationary pressure. Their subsequent report, after presenting a brief overview of the economy in recent years, discussed the financial problems already being experienced and those to be anticipated during a period of development (paying particular attention to the problem of inflation), and the physical problems of shortages of labour, materials and skilled personnel facing the country. Recommendations were made for addressing these problems and for improving techniques of planning to enable the programme to be carried out more efficiently.[125]

Seers and Ross approached their task with confidence, considering the Gold Coast economy at this time as "one of the least complicated in the world" whose "main problems should be soon obvious to anyone with professional training".[126] However, on reflection thirty years later, Seers expressed the opinion that "by naively applying a British economic model, without regard to local circumstances"[127] some of their recommendations, particularly concerning borrowing, had been wrong, setting a precedent which had disastrous results not only for the Gold Coast but other countries too. The substance of the report and its recommendations will first be examined in their contemporary context before turning to this criticism.

Accounting procedures

Underpinning the report were similar social accounting and statistical procedures to those Seers had used in Burma, resulting in the production of national accounts for the Gold Coast for the previous three years, based on an input-output account for each major sector of the economy (cocoa farming, forestry, mining, building, railways etc.). Barbara Ingham has commented that "The Seers and Ross report provided the first macro-economic picture of the Gold Coast economy, and incidentally set the standard for some very fine statistical

work which was produced there in subsequent years by the Office of the Government Statistician".[128] Ross himself still considers the technique adopted for the basic accounts and input-output table as one of the most significant features and enduring contributions of the report, a showpiece of statistical adjustment which had an influence on later methods of analysis.[129]

However the accounts did have their limitations, as the authors themselves acknowledged, in that subsistence agriculture, which engaged a large proportion of the population and constituted a sizeable proportion of national output, was not included in the measured product since no monetary transactions were involved. Whereas, by contrast, the total product did include the profits, wages and salaries of foreign firms which were in fact remitted overseas and would not normally be considered part of national income; the reason for this mainly being lack of available information concerning the extent of wages and salaries sent abroad. The term "territorial" as opposed to "national" was therefore used to describe the product, income and expenditure accounts to show they indicated the value of the total output of the territory and all incomes arising in economic activity, not just that of persons and companies resident in the country, but including profits and salaries sent overseas. In some ways the authors observed this provided a better measure of resources available, since "much" profit was ploughed back in the form of further development, though on the whole they agreed national figures would have been preferable.[130] As it was, the figures gave no indication of the amount and extent of "income" that was leaving the country via the foreign owned companies, nor the significance of their position in the country's economy, a subject which will be touched on later in relation to the development programme.

The word chosen to sum up the Gold Coast economy in the first paragraph of the report was "fragile", due to two main economic weaknesses or "special menacing features", identified as - first, the absence of any checks on an inflationary wave of spending, and second, the dependency for most of its foreign exchange earnings on one commodity, cocoa, whose price was considered "one of the most unstable in the world's markets".[131] The long-run prospects of cocoa they judged "doubtful"[132] because not only, as a luxury, was its price in the world market "sensitive to changes in the prosperity of a few highly industrialised countries",[133] but also there was a growing menace of the virus disease, swollen shoot, and the farmers refused to destroy infected trees. The report went into considerable detail concerning measures to combat inflation but devoted less attention to discussing ways of lessening dependence on cocoa.

Controlling inflation and the role of the Cocoa Marketing Board

It was the control of inflation - defined simply as "the result of increases in purchasing power that are not matched by increases in the volume of goods available"[134] - that was considered a major threat to development prospects, and the nature of the problem facing the Gold Coast, in comparison to a "more developed economy", was explained in some

detail. Whereas in a more developed economy inflationary pressures caused by a sudden increase in purchasing power could be absorbed by increased taxes, extra consumer spending (particularly on imported goods), or saving, the report pointed out this was not possible in a country like the Gold Coast where direct taxation touched very few people, inadequate port and transport facilities imposed a limit on the flow of goods from abroad into the markets, while the supply of home-produced goods, even food, could not expand rapidly, and savings institutions were practically unused.[135] A wave of new purchasing power - such as could arise either from an increase in the price farmers received for cocoa, or by an increase in the level of expenditure on development, which created incomes without necessarily increasing the supply of consumer goods - was therefore unable to expend itself on goods or find other financial outlets, but caused people to bid for what goods there were in short supply, forcing up the prices and thus leading to the rapid development of violent inflation. In addition a programme of capital development, as envisioned for the Gold Coast, required the import of building materials, such as cement and steel, which reduced the capacity for the import of consumer goods, thus further aggravating unsatisfied demand and re-enforcing the already present inflationary tendencies.

The fluctuations in purchasing power, occasioned by the price of cocoa, resulting in alternating shortages and surpluses, was considered menacing since it was felt that such an economy could easily get out of control, with an accompanying danger of "social and political disturbances, further disrupting the economy and leading to more unrest".[136]

In such a situation Seers and Ross underlined the incompatibility of economic stability with large increases in cocoa incomes *and* a high rate of development; and warned that the Government and people faced "a choice between a high buying price for cocoa and capital development, if inflation is to be avoided"; and that if the cocoa price was "allowed to rise faster than import prices, the Development Plan cannot be carried out".[137] The logic of this argument meant controlling inflation either by raising import prices or harnessing purchasing power; and the emphasis of their recommendations tended to fall upon the latter.

Economic stability required, they maintained, a policy which would keep home purchasing power and the price of imported goods in step. The solution they proposed was that the Cocoa Marketing Board should assume a more important role in operating a stabilisation policy by fixing the price for cocoa paid out to farmers according to the retail prices of imported consumer goods, ensuring that the amount farmers received should be just sufficient to buy a quantity of imports guaranteeing their current standard of living. The Marketing Board was to act as a kind of shock absorber "to cushion the Gold Coast against the impact of changes in overseas prices" - without this, they warned, "Development without inflation will be impossible".[138]

The government itself was regarded as having "much less room to manoeuvre than the Government of an industrial country"[139] because of its inability to control purchasing power effectively through the budget, since income tax touched very few people. However, the government budget was considered to have "a minor role to play in

regulating the level of demand" through the imposition of import duties on consumer items which, by raising prices of certain items, could control demand and offset rises in cocoa farmers' incomes; but in general import duties were regarded as only a supplement to the general control over purchasing power exercised by the Marketing Board.[140] A more significant government measure was the imposition of new export duties on cocoa (a measure planned to provide £26.5m of the £74m needed for the development plan) which, while not affecting purchasing power directly, did affect Marketing Board profits, and prices paid to farmers inevitably fell.[141] Looked at from a slightly different point of view, Seers and Ross, "the profits of the Cocoa Marketing Board, whether paid in export duties or not, must be the main counter-balance to the inflationary effects of an export surplus and development".[142]

Having judged the prospects of cocoa as "doubtful" the recommendations of the report nevertheless largely depended upon the continued prosperity of the export and that it would continue to provide sufficient revenue and foreign exchange, at least in the short term, until the development plan was under way. The need for diversification was recognised but so was the fact that the other main exports - minerals and timber - were also susceptible to the same influences on the world market, and in any case timber was also required by the home market for construction purposes in order to reduce the need for imported materials and ease the strain on the ports.[143] Industrialisation although considered a possible long-term option, was also not regarded as a priority at this time, as will be seen in the next section.

Development priorities

The major item on the Gold Coast's Development Plan was building and construction, which included programmes for new and improved transport and communication systems - roads, railways, harbours and public works projects - aimed at facilitating the flow and circulation of exports and imports, and backed up by health and educational projects.[144] Government financed public works schemes were essentially the basis of the development plan discussed by the Seers/Ross report. This did not rule out private building (which it was anticipated would also tend to grow) though it was strongly argued that this should be controlled in order to regulate the supply of scarce materials and skilled labour.[145] Nor was investment by private companies seen as inconsistent with government development, though here again, they argued, there was a need for accurate information of future planned investment by the principal companies.[146]

It was obvious, however, that the large private European firms operating within the Gold Coast would inevitably profit from the government development programme, a fact that can be gleaned from the report though is not specifically addressed in any detail. It was noted, for example, that most of the largest building contracts usually went to local branches of leading UK contractors and that on average contractors made 40 per cent profit on a project (which the report considered excessive).[147] In addition imports were

largely handled by a few European firms (such as the United Africa Company - a member of the Unilever organisation) which were not only importers and wholesalers, but also handled some of the retail trade and had a number of other interests related to the building trade and transport services.[148] The report acknowledged the degree of hostility towards European firms, particularly those involved in distribution, and, while not attempting "to weigh the truth" of these allegations, agreed there were potential dangers in such a concentration of economic power.[149] In part Seers and Ross attempted to counteract this with their recommendations for strengthening the Public Works Department (as will be seen below); though, on the other hand, the expertise offered by European firms was also considered valuable to a country suffering from lack of physical and skilled manpower resources. Despite their dominant position, however, there was no overall assessment in the report of the influence of these companies on the economy as a whole, their role in the development programme, or the degree to which they would benefit from this, nor in fact, as was noted above, could the territorial accounts indicate the extent of their economic activities. The focus of the report was on government financed schemes.

Industrialisation did not feature prominently in their report, as it had done in the case of Burma, and, indeed (according to their figures), the government's Development Plan allocated only £1.5m out of a total £74m for industrialisation.[150] Agricultural development was a more fundamental priority, they argued, since the rate of development depended in the long run on increasing output and providing an adequate supply of food for home consumption, thereby raising living standards.[151] While a certain growth in secondary industry, particularly the manufacture of consumer goods of the type usually imported, was considered essential in the long term in order to reduce the fragility of the economy and to provide additional employment and higher earnings, they maintained that ultimately the degree of industrialisation was dependent on how fast agricultural productivity could expand. Certainly for the foreseeable future they anticipated the Gold Coast would "remain predominantly a country of peasant farmers" and the growth of manufacturing "necessarily very slow".[152]

Another consideration was that any sort of industry or manufacturing required fuel and power which, if imported, inevitably increased the cost of production. Since electricity was the only source of power the Gold Coast could produce for itself, the report suggested that any expansion in industrial employment should be based on using electricity, provided it was both plentiful and cheap, reinforcing an argument that the Volta River hydro-electric power scheme should be built on a large enough scale to meet future potential demand.[153]

However, at the time of their mission uncertainty still surrounded the Volta River Project, which had not yet received final approval. It was acknowledged that once the Project began to absorb resources (in terms of labour, importing capacity and finance), the scope for other development, particularly in terms of building and construction, would be unavoidably reduced in the short term at least, but Seers and Ross anticipated that as the project neared completion, the extra capacity would be available for other more

conventional construction work,[154] with which their report was more particularly concerned. There were no concerns at this time about financing the Project and in fact the main constraints and limits on implementing the development programme as a whole were considered to be physical rather than financial, as will be seen in the next section.

Constraints on development - physical rather than financial

In 1951, the actual holdings of sterling by the Gold Coast, mainly as a result of earnings from cocoa, and the prospect of future earnings were believed by Seers and Ross to be sufficient to ensure that development need not fail initially through lack of funds. What this did require, however, was reform of the currency board (as also recommended in Burma), allowing the Gold Coast the right to purchase foreign currency with sterling in order to buy necessary supplies, such as steel and cement, in parts of the world where they were more plentiful than in the sterling area,[155] where shortages had been caused by the Korean war and materials were not always readily available.

While much of the sterling holdings were in the hands of the Marketing Board, the report suggested a more flexible monetary system would facilitate transactions between the government and Marketing Board whereby "it would become possible for the government to buy or borrow sterling from the Marketing Board"[156] - a possibility that was explored further in conversations between the two British economists and Nkrumah, who asked their advice about how he could finance "a long list of very desirable investment projects".[157] Recalling this thirty years later, Seers remarked "We replied in typical Keynesian manner, 'Why not borrow the funds the Cocoa Marketing Board has on deposit in London?'"[158] - the advice which he subsequently regretted (as a first step into the subsequent debt and corruption of later years) and will be returned to below.

At the time, however, it was estimated that, under reasonably favourable circumstances, the government's own funds, together with what it might have to borrow from the Marketing Board, would be enough not only to finance the development programme but a substantial share of the cost of the Volta River Project as well, and to accommodate an anticipated rise in costs of the original budget.[159]

It was only if the Gold Coast was *not* enabled to purchase sufficient dollars in this way that it was suggested loans and grants could be sought from the various international agencies "such as United States 'Point Four' authorities, the United Nations 'Technical Assistance' Organisation or the International Bank";[160] but it was not anticipated that international borrowing of this type would be necessary major source of funding.

The type of assistance that was considered necessary from overseas at this time was "men, machinery and materials" and "'priorities', for quick delivery, rather than financial gifts" - or loans.[161] Constraints on development, Seers and Ross concluded, were physical rather than financial and among the particular problems addressed were shortages of a skilled, motivated, and disciplined labour force, shortages of materials, and shortages of professional contractors in the organisation of the building industry.

Both skilled and unskilled labour was scarce in the Gold Coast, particularly in certain areas and seasons, but one particular problem was the low rate of productivity which Seers and Ross attributed in a large part to the attitude of the workers:

> Low productivity is due to plain dislike of work, as everywhere in the world. But in other countries this disinclination is checked by the traditions of the industry and the sanctions of public opinion: these have not had time to develop yet in the Gold Coast. The only check here is supervision. If there is nobody in charge to watch, the pace of work may fall so low that practically nothing is done.[162]

Poor supervision and discipline, continuous change of jobs, absenteeism and lack of incentive were other factors listed as compounding the problem, and while this attitude to work was possibly understandable when a labourer was working for a foreign Government, they considered it "indefensible" now that political power rested with his own people.[163] Inducing workers to adopt a more positive approach was all part of what they saw as the "transition from tribal society to an economy state of wage-earners and businessmen" the speed of which depended on the people's desire for economic progress and what burdens they were prepared to bear to achieve "a higher civilisation".[164]

There was in fact an underlying assumption that development entailed the emulation of European standards and methods of work (an attitude which Seers was to criticise in later years as being patronising and inappropriate). Low productivity, for example, was in part attributed to disease and poor diet and it was observed, "No great improvement in productivity can be expected, with the present diet - European standard of work needs a European standard of food"[165] with suggestions made for "the formation of new food habits", the provision of canteens or free food for workers, and improvements in food supplies and health care facilities.

Increased use of mechanical equipment, as employed by the building industry in Europe, was also regarded as a positive way of relieving the skilled labour shortage and raising productivity. While mechanisation was not seen as necessary by some, since labour was plentiful and cheap, Seers and Ross considered this view "essentially wrong"; although labour was cheap per day, it was expensive per unit of output, and as a rough general rule they adopted the principle that "mechanisation justified in England is justified in the Gold Coast"[166] (another maxim Seers was to repudiate later in his career). During the mission to Burma there had also been much discussion about the use of capital intensive or extensive methods for the industrialisation programme in a situation where labour was plentiful and cheap but unskilled, so Seers would have been aware of the arguments on both sides of the debate. While Kurt Martin had recommended the development of capital-extensive (rather than -intensive) industries, the Oxford team had also acknowledged that once an industry was chosen for development it should be "on the basis of the most modern technology", since this would bring the "greatest long-run benefits".[167] A similar attitude was adopted in the Gold Coast, and, while it was recognised that machinery might displace other imports, they felt it contributed "more to the country's resources than would almost any other sort of import, by raising the output

of labour".[168]

The increased provision of technical training in schools and special institutes and the introduction of skills tests were regarded as vital measures to relieve shortages of skilled labour and raise standards and here again "a number of ways of passing on European techniques"[169] were suggested. These even included the engagement of unemployed Europeans, such as building workers in Italy, to work alongside men in the Gold Coast; though it was admitted there was a danger of racial friction and a "risk that European workers would slack off to African speeds".[170] A more expensive option was the suggestion that a few could be sent to the artisan training scheme in the UK which would "introduce workers to European civilisation - and to the European pace of working".[171]

The other major means of passing on European techniques was of course in the employment of professional and technical personnel from overseas - teachers, doctors, agriculturalists, engineers - and economists. Despite the high cost of salaries and incentives this entailed, the policy of employing experts from overseas was presented as a sound investment which would yield high returns for the Gold Coast and "one of the best uses it can make of its funds".[172]

> Using imported skill to train the people of the Gold Coast, and raising the average standard of skill throughout the country ... is an essential part of development. Unless skill of all kinds increases, Development is impossible.[173]
>
> The general principle of using foreign exchange to buy skilled services, in view of the difficulty of buying more imported goods, is we believe a sound one. It applies to the medical proposals we have made ... to technical education, but above all to the P.W.D. [Public Works Department]. To enlarge the P.W.D. is in fact a prior condition for the success of the Development Plan.[174]

The particular emphasis on the need to increase efficient and skilled services in the public works department - to inspect and supervise building programmes - was because it was considered large amounts of finance and materials were being wasted due to inadequate tendering for contracts, uneven performance of work, and a major shortage of professional men and contractors in the Gold Coast. The small staff of the PWD were unable to cope with the quantity of work, Seers and Ross observed, and its qualified staff of inspectors and engineers were often lured away by higher salaries and benefits offered by large European contractors, whose major role in the construction industry has already been mentioned. Strengthening the PWD was a way of attempting to offset the influence of these companies.

The "clue" to the whole problem was seen to be "pay" and it was recommended salaries be offered to attract staff rapidly; the assumption being that most of these would be recruited from overseas since it was recommended that "Salary increases should be brought about by increasing the overseas allowance" and by offering sterling pension funds.[175] The expenditure needed to increase the efficiency of the staff was regarded as an economy rather than an extravagance since it was anticipated that better inspection and closer supervision would save 10 per cent of the PWD budget.

Such measures obviously entailed large differences in the pay and living standards of

expatriate staff and local personnel and it was clear that adoption of "European" work practices or food habits in the Gold Coast could not imply immediate adoption of European salaries and lifestyles as well. There were "dangers in letting local professional salaries get very high compared to local wages" it was observed, and while it was recognised that "the standards of the European civil servant will tend to become those of his African successor", it was also anticipated that such standards could "prove embarrassingly high to future Governments",[176] when efforts were still being made to provide basic necessities. But while the potential problems of these wide differences in wages and standards of living were therefore briefly acknowledged, they were not discussed further - the assumption in 1951 seemingly being that a successful development programme would eventually bring about general and widespread prosperity.

For the efficient implementation of the Development Plan itself, it was suggested the Government required the services of an economist, again inevitably from overseas, to assist in co-ordinating a medium-term plan and advise on priorities consistent with available resources. Regular progress reports and an annual economic survey were considered necessary, pulling together into one picture the various economic factors (such as policies on the cocoa price, the scale of development, official salaries, port building, tax levels, price controls and the Volta River project) so that decisions could be taken on the coming year's programme.[177] While the report expressed preference for a permanent resident adviser (assisted by a junior economic statistician), individuals with the necessary combination of qualifications were in such great demand and short supply that it was suggested short-term economic consultants, possibly in a team, might be engaged. The economy of the Gold Coast, as already mentioned, was regarded as one of the "least complicated in the world"[178] and one in which valuable work could be undertaken even during short visits. The role of such economic advisers, it was observed, was not to usurp the functions of government, but to show the implications of various decisions, how much they would cost and how much benefit they would bring - the ultimate responsibility for policies and decisions taken as a result of advice, resting with the government itself.

Mutual benefits of assisting development

The success of the Gold Coast's development plan, in the estimation of the Seers/Ross report, depended therefore to a large degree on the supply both of materials and specialised, skilled manpower assistance from overseas, and since it had originally been commissioned by the Colonial Office, a section of the report was devoted to considering the benefits for the UK itself - moral, political, but mainly economic - of assisting this supply of "men, machinery and materials". "From the point of view of the United Kingdom (and the United States)", the report observed in general terms, "aid to the colonies has not only economic advantages but also increases the political stability of the West"[179] (as well as increasing the stability of the colonies themselves). It was acknowledged that such aid had to be weighed against the advantages of other uses of

resources for political stability, such as rearmament, though, as has already been mentioned, Seers' personal sympathies were very much with the former, rather than the latter use.

The report mainly focused, however, on economic reasons for the UK's special consideration of the Gold Coast, which as a potentially "rapidly developing country" it was argued, could already be making a much larger contribution to the world's trade, but for the congestion of its transport system, which, if relieved, would have ultimate benefits for the United Kingdom.

> With better communications, the Gold Coast could increase considerably her exports of timber and minerals, easing the shortage of primary products, and swelling the sterling area's hard currency receipts. This special position means that assistance to the Gold Coast would yield very high returns.[180]

By way of example, they maintained "surfacing the road from Tarkwa to Takoradi would increase the total output of the sterling area by vastly more than applying the same materials to almost any road in the United Kingdom" - and similar benefits could be expected from other projects, such as the building or extending ports. Equally the provision of technical assistance in the form of teachers, doctors and engineers, was regarded as a means of achieving "a swift and large increase in production".[181]

In addition to the Gold Coast's production and export capacity, however, what was also considered of interest to the UK was its potential importing capacity for, as it achieved greater economic progress and prosperity, the expectation was that it would provide a growing market for capital and consumer goods and import "a great deal more of United Kingdom products".[182]

It was obvious too that the European companies operating in the Gold Coast would also benefit from the development programme, as mentioned above, though, since the focus of the report on government public works projects, this was not an aspect of UK interest directly addressed by the report.

There was, on the whole, an optimistic belief in the report that the Gold Coast only needed initial assistance (of a mainly material, not financial kind) to enable it to achieve economic progress and develop its own self-sustaining momentum. Once its acute physical restrictions had been overcome, its possibilities for "rapid economic growth" were considered "substantial",[183] and once economic progress achieved a certain momentum it was anticipated the country would be able to continue without external assistance; the educational system would become capable of supplying most of the professional needs and increasing prosperity would permit the financing of further development out of its own savings.[184] In brief, the report concluded:

> the Gold Coast is at a stage of development when a little help can make her much more capable of helping herself, and of contributing increasingly to the world economy. The Gold Coast, therefore, can and should argue that apart from any other reasons, it is in the United Kingdom's own interest to give her "priorities" - even in some cases, priorities over other colonies.[185]

At the same time it was also considered essential that Gold Coast development should be

looked at as "part of West African development". Neighbours provided potential markets and offered the prospect of mutual benefits derived from co-operation on transport systems, international freight routes and agricultural policy; and the government was encouraged to consider these possibilities within the framework of its development plan.[186]

Response to the report

According to Ross, he and Seers received close co-operation from the Gold Coast officials with whom they worked while Nkrumah appeared "well disposed" towards the report and their recommendations.[187] It appears their accounting procedures continued to be used as the basis for statistical analysis and that the report may have "sown in Nkrumah's mind positive thoughts on a future policy of taxing cocoa incomes".[188] Ingham, however, has suggested that other aspects of the report were less attractive, particularly the low priority given to industrialisation, and that "Nkrumah and the party regarded it as anti-development, offering few opportunities to speed up change, and not to be taken seriously" - though she observes it was received more enthusiastically by academics at the university in the Gold Coast.[189]

One politician at least who did make use of the Seers/Ross report was Ofori Atta, who, in a question in 1953 to the legislative assembly about "the undesirable monopoly of a few European firms" who were "known to exploit shortages of goods to their own advantage"[190] mentioned the findings of the report of Seers and Ross as confirming his argument.

According to Ingham, the Colonial Office gave the report a cautious reception with criticism, from some quarters, for its treatment of inflation, its novel statistical procedures (which omitted subsistence agriculture), its understatement of the importance of the private sector, and its suggestions concerning the Marketing Board's role, though its recommendations to increase agricultural productivity met with more general agreement.[191] Ross, however, says neither he nor Seers were aware of this reaction; as far as they were concerned the report "fell stillborn from the press" and they had no official response from the Colonial office to their efforts.[192] The fact that they had originally been recruited by a Labour administration (as Labour sympathisers), but subsequently submitted their report as a Conservative government had been elected to office, may have had a bearing on its reception.

A critical reaction to the report was forthcoming, however, from academic circles in the UK in the person of Peter Bauer, then a Lecturer in Economics and Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge University, who particularly criticised the regulating powers proposed for the Marketing Boards, observing that assurances were given when they were established that such boards would not be used as a system of taxation.[193] Together with a colleague from the London School of Economics, Professor F.W. Paish, Bauer also responded in a letter to *The Times* again protesting the same issue; if it was

thought necessary to restrict consumption in order to prevent inflation, they argued, "this should be done by means of taxation imposed by the Government on the whole community in accordance with ability to pay, and not by the arbitrary withholding of income from a section of the community by administrative bodies ostensibly set up to promote the interests of that section".[194] They also seriously questioned the validity of the claim that it would have been impossible to increase the volume of imports because of congestion at the West African ports and railways, a claim which Seers and Ross used in support of the price policies of the marketing board and the restriction of producers' incomes. Bauer and Paish argued that "The expenditure of a sum equal to a fraction of the amounts withheld from producers by the marketing boards would have sufficed to make any additions to the capacity of the ports necessary to enable them to handle more imports."[195]

At the time Seers did not agree with Bauer's free market views, believing instead that setting free the price paid to the cocoa farmers would wreck the Gold Coast in a matter of a few weeks (because of the government's limited room to manoeuvre in applying direct taxation and the risk of inflation).[196] However, thirty years later in 1982, Seers acknowledged "that on one particular policy issue in the 1950s, marketing boards, he [Bauer] had been broadly right and I had been broadly wrong".[197] As he explained, it was the suggestion that the government borrow from the marketing board to finance development projects which he particularly regretted.

> In subsequent visits to Ghana, I saw what was done with the money (Black Star Square, the convention centre, the Tema highway, the shipping line, etc.) and noted the growth of corruption. I could also see the continued poverty of the cocoa farmers in Ashanti (especially in contrast with their counterparts in the Ivory Coast). Since this method of raising money was widely copied, and usually with fairly disastrous results for the economy and thus the political system, as in Ghana itself, I must admit to having made my own small contribution to the present chaos in Africa - by naively applying a British economic model, without regard to local circumstances.[198]

Certainly the debt crisis facing Africa in the 1980s (and even more so the 1990s) contrasts dramatically with the situation reflected in the Gold Coast report of 1951 when finance was considered adequate for development and no constraint on future prospects; though obviously more complex factors contributed to the present state of affairs than followed just from government borrowing from the marketing board. In later years too Seers came to regard the adoption of inappropriate European (or more broadly Western) oriented technologies, education and consumption habits as also contributing to the corruption of the development process (though he never specifically referred back to the Gold Coast recommendations on this subject).

But while in 1982 Seers regretted "naively applying a British economic model, without regard to local circumstances", already in the early 1950s he recognised that there were basically different circumstances and problems confronting economies such as those of Burma and the Gold Coast which meant that they could *not* be treated in the same way as Western industrialised countries. The Gold Coast report in fact warned that any economist going to work in the area should not display "inflexible personal prejudices in

favour of particular policies, which might be quite inappropriate in the Gold Coast";[199] and its authors endeavoured to make their own recommendations "appropriate" for what were considered the particular circumstances and problems facing the country at the time.

Ross, the co-author of the 1951 report, does not in fact regret any of the proposals made at the time, observing that at that time and in those circumstances, they made what they considered were valid and sensible recommendations; and he attributes Seers' later attitude to a growing personal "disillusion in the ability of African governments to behave sensibly"[200] (which can indeed be seen as one of the reasons for Seers' change of view in later life and which will be explored more fully in Chapters 6 and 7).

In the 1950s, however, Seers became increasingly aware and interested in the differences between developed and "underdeveloped areas" and the fact that there were aspects of applied economics, such as national income analysis, as used in Western Europe and the United States, which were not relevant for use overseas. Although this has already been touched on, it is useful to sum up briefly the way in which his first overseas advisory missions influenced his thinking in this respect, since attempting to find more appropriate measures of economic analysis and development proved one of his on-going and long-term concerns.

National income analysis in "underdeveloped areas"

Seers himself acknowledged the influence the missions to Burma and the Gold Coast had in first making him realise "that national income accounts were really of limited use in dealing with problems of countries with dominant sectors",[201] such as cocoa and rice, since the economic problems and statistical resources were not comparable to those of more developed economies; though he observes he came to this realisation "only gradually, and reluctantly".[202] On his return to the UK from the Gold Coast in 1951, he had further discussions on this topic with his colleagues Peter Ady, Dick Ross, Mr Searle the Chief Statistician of the Colonial Office and others,[203] which resulted in the production of a paper later that year on "the role of national income estimates in the statistical policy of an underdeveloped area" which was obviously heavily influenced by the two missions of 1951.

Here he outlined the difficulties in interpreting or assessing accurately what the national income in such countries actually was, partly because of the considerable amount of non-marketed activity, especially food production and building, that was not sold for cash, and also because of the "thin" nature of the statistical material for such areas which made any estimates "subject to large and varying errors"[204] - both problems first encountered by him in Burma. In addition he drew attention to the issue which had become more apparent in the Gold Coast - that in underdeveloped countries "the profit and interest on foreign capital are usually substantial, so that 'geographical' income is very different from 'national' income" depending on how much income was payable abroad - which had resulted in the distinction drawn between "territorial" as opposed to "national"

product, income and expenditure in the accounts drawn up for the Gold Coast (see above p.51).[205]

Partly because of these difficulties in actually assessing the national income of underdeveloped countries, and because of the very different climatic and social conditions of such areas compared with "developed" countries, Seers reiterated his concern, first expressed in the Burma report, that using national income estimates for international comparisons might "be rather dangerous" and "mislead more than they instruct".[206]

Additionally, he now raised doubts as to how relevant or useful the national income "model" was as an indicator of change or for economic planning in an underdeveloped economy, which was so dependent on unpredictable overseas markets and investments, rather than on the internal level of economic activity. The economic history of most primary producers could generally be explained in terms of the history of the main commodity, whereas the national income model had been devised as a summary model for a diverse economy; also the economy and institutions of most underdeveloped countries were "changing at a violent pace", whereas the model assumed a certain stability of structure. The national income model he therefore considered had limited relevance for underdeveloped primary producers, presenting the "wrong picture" and implying the "wrong statistical policy" for an economy that was changing rapidly.[207]

Although it was generally assumed that estimating the national product was necessary in a period of development, Seers maintained that the effect of development was far more extensive than could be indicated by changes in the national income[208] - or by statistics for that matter - pointing out that many immeasurable economic considerations, as well as many non-economic factors, had to be taken into account before deciding on the scale and type of development.

While recognising the limitations of statistics, however, Seers believed they could still be useful in indicating problems in quantitative terms and providing factual guidance, so that administrative decisions were not taken solely on intuition, though, he suggested, there were ways in which the scarce statistical resources available in underdeveloped areas could be put to optimum use and more constructive and relevant methods of accounting adopted. What mattered, he maintained, was "not so much the total value of production as the relations between the various parts of the economy" - the interesting question to him then being "how fluctuations in the exports of the leading commodity percolated through the system as a whole" - and he advocated the advantages of the type of consolidated income-and-expenditure sectoral accounts of the type that had been developed for Burma and the Gold Coast, to take account of what he termed "the lop-sided nature of many economies and the weakness of their statistics".[209] As a priority he suggested statistical resources should be devoted to strengthening and extending foreign trade statistics because of the reliance of underdeveloped countries on the proceeds of exports for much of their income and on imports for most consumer goods and nearly all capital goods. In general his recommendation was to concentrate on specific rather than aggregative data, designed to deal with the particular problems of the territory concerned - whether it was inflation or

food supplies.

One of the significant features of this 1952 paper is that it was selected twenty years later for inclusion in an American textbook of readings on contemporary issues in economics to demonstrate some of the problems of estimating and using national accounts in what by then were called "less developed countries", rather than "underdeveloped areas".[210] Seers' views were to develop and change on a number of issues but his basic concern about the limited relevance of national income analysis in "developing" economies remained constant - though by 1972 it was part of a broader critique of development policies.

United Nations - World Economic Survey (1953)

In 1953 Seers joined the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs in New York to work for about a year on the World Economic Report under the direction of Polish economist Michel Kalecki, whom he had long admired; he regretted having missed him at the Oxford Institute of Statistics, and acknowledged deriving the techniques of analysis used in his papers on national income partly from Kalecki.[211]

The World Economic Report provided an annual appraisal of the world economic situation as a prerequisite for UN recommendations in the economic field, analysing major changes both in domestic economic conditions of countries and in their international trade and payments. In undertaking this task, the UN report reflected the by then accepted idea that the world was basically divided into three broad groups of countries, "economically developed private enterprise economies", "centrally planned economies" and "economically under-developed private enterprise economies", which were the categories adopted for the purposes of the survey. Particular attention was paid in the 1953-4 report to the post Korean war slump in raw material markets, to "the inflationary price increases in a number of economically less developed countries"[212] and to changes in the Latin American countries of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba and Mexico. Another feature was that it contained an analysis of longer range problems of international trade and those factors limiting its expansion. Seers does not indicate with which particular area his own work was concerned but he later paid tribute to the part that the survey played in stimulating professional concern about conditions in poor countries at this time.[213]

Seers' time in New York also coincided with the McCarthy witch-hunts against supposedly Communist sympathisers in the United States. The influence of the witchhunts penetrated the United Nations and Seers observed, "I learned perhaps more about administration and politics this way when the United States Government was inducing the Secretary General to dismiss those whose 'loyalty' (to the U.S., not the U.N.) was suspect".[214] In later years he was, in fact, critical of the way in which Dag Hammarskjold - who became UN Secretary General in April 1953 committed to establishing the Secretariat's independence and integrity - handled the situation. While acknowledging that he had inherited "a very bad situation" from his predecessor Trygve

Lie, Seers observed that the impression gained "from a number of his [i.e. Hammarskjold's] decisions on staff matters (especially actual dismissals of US citizens at the request of their Government) was that he never grasped how demoralised the staff had become or what effect this was having on efficiency. Nor did he seem to care." This unsympathetic assessment was partly based on his experience as a member of a UN Staff Council delegation meeting with the Secretary General on the issue of new regulations on dismissal. Seers further commented "In fact it was very difficult to get through to him; if he made a decision, even one that could end someone's career, the staff had to trust his judgement that this was in the interest of the world."[215]

His work and experience at the United Nations, however, inevitably broadened Seers' experience of international affairs and the world economy and stimulated his interest in identifying the basic differences between economically developed and underdeveloped economies and the reasons why they could not be approached or handled in the same way by economists. During his time at the UN he also met a number of colleagues with whom he was to maintain contact in later years, including Hans Singer, who had been working in the Economics Department of the UN from its early days, and later worked with Seers at both the Economic Commission for Africa and the Institute of Development Studies.[216]

The Economic Problems of Malta (1955)

In 1955 Seers (back in the UK again and based at Oxford) was invited, together with Thomas Balogh, by the newly elected Labour Government of Malta, under Prime Minister Dom Mintoff, "to carry out a general survey of Malta's economic situation".[217] Their invitation arose as a result of their association with the Bevanite and Fabian wing of the British Labour Party, with which Mintoff had cultivated close links while studying in London in the 1940s. Lord Gavin Farringdon, an executive member of the Fabian Society, at whose country home of Buscot Park both the Keep Left and Bevanite groups met occasionally for week-end conferences, had become a personal friend of Mintoff, a frequent visitor to Malta, and a staunch supporter of the Maltese Labour Party and it was he who played a large part in convincing Balogh and Seers to undertake the task.[218]

Mintoff came into office in 1955 with his Party committed to a policy of political integration or union with Britain - on an Ulster type basis, with Maltese members in the House of Commons. (This followed the British government's refusal to grant Dominion status to the island in December 1954 in an endeavour to maintain British control over the defence and external affairs of the island.) Mintoff "associated integration with a British commitment in black and white to bolster the island's economic and social infrastructure, not least with hard cash and productive investment"[219] - and Balogh and Seers were instructed to suggest how the economy could be improved and strengthened by capital development projects and Government action, "to indicate to what extent Malta could legitimately expect economic aid from Great Britain", and "to state what economic measures should be adopted to implement a closer union with Britain".[220]

Two previous reports had been produced on the island's economic and social development - one in 1945 by Sir William Woods and another in 1950 by Sir George Schuster - but both these missions had been sent by the British government and their recommendations had been made "within the constraints of British colonial finance and defence priorities".[221] Balogh and Seers, by contrast, were commissioned by the Maltese government itself and were regarded as "alternative economists", who would provide "a counterweight to the economic experts that the colonial office had been used to sending to Malta".[222] Although Seers and Balogh acknowledged that their strategy and recommendations followed closely those of Woods and Schuster, particularly since few of the previous proposals had in fact been implemented,[223] they were regarded as being "more responsive than previous advisers to the wishes of the Maltese administration".[224]

Seers, together with Balogh, paid at least two visits to Malta in 1955 - during April and August - but by June they had already produced a lengthy Interim Report[225] for Mintoff and acted as "chief advisers"[226] to him when he visited London that summer for preliminary discussions concerning union as a prelude to a conference in September. Mintoff considered the two economists "made a formidable team", who could work for many hours at a stretch and prepare reports on schedule, and although they had differences of opinion, they would compose these before facing outsiders. Of the two, he recalled,

> Dudley had the extraordinary ability to detach himself from the world around him; he had the cold, neutral, scientific approach to economics; he understood how to collect facts (statistics) and how to convert these into mathematical equations allowing for variations in the most convincing manner. He could then turn suggested political solutions into numbers and cloak them with mathematical language. For this statistical prowess he had already established a solid reputation in British academical circles.

Whereas Balogh he considered "the more colourful and controversial figure ... the man with explosive ideas with thousands of contacts, the inspirer, the leading light the one with the flair for turning economics into a flaming sword, striking the arrogant and the oppressors."[227]

For Seers, a study of a small island economy with very few natural resources provided a complete contrast to his previous studies of the larger economies of Burma and the Gold Coast and he valued the experience gained on the mission, explaining "a small country like Malta is a very useful one in which to study development problems, especially those due to population pressure on a limited area of land".[228] Continuous increase of the population, which outstripped the rate of expansion of resources resulted in mass emigration of the better trained and educated - a trend which a fertility survey instigated by Seers and Balogh in 1955 concluded was likely to continue.[229] This was one of the twin permanent problems they identified facing the country and threatening its standard of living.

The second major problem was excessive economic dependence on the British and Allied military forces based there which had seriously distorted the economy. Malta's strategic position in the Mediterranean had turned it into a permanent island fortress and it

had become a major base for the British navy, army and airforce, as well as the headquarters for the NATO Mediterranean Command. As a result the armed forces had become the main source of employment, especially in the dockyard, and the island imported considerably more than it exported, the excess being covered by expenditure of the Services on pay and purchases. In consequence the civilian economy, Seers and Balogh observed, had "atrophied" and become "an economic fossil", living standards depended "wholly on Imperial expenditure", and Malta was "excluded from the control over its own economic destiny".[230]

As a result of these two major problems, which were compounded by a rising budget deficit, the near exhaustion of the War Damage Fund (which had sustained the economy since the war), and the prospect of rising unemployment, they concluded that Malta in 1955 was "facing a severe economic crisis".[231] Its foremost needs, they maintained, were "to create a more balanced economic system less dependent on the dockyard and the Services"[232] and to adopt a development programme which would steadily and deliberately reduce its economic and social disabilities. However, the "complete absence of rivers, timber, coal, iron and metals of commercial value"[233] on the islands, they observed, obviously limited opportunities and choice of action, and the Maltese people faced a difficult problem.

With the possibility of integration in mind and the obvious existing inequalities between the standards of living of the Maltese and British populations, the strategy for development they outlined emphasised "a steady advance towards British standards",[234] in two main areas.

> (1) To raise production in Malta so as to increase the number of jobs, and help standards of living rise towards the standards current in the United Kingdom;
> (2) To raise social services towards the levels in the United Kingdom, by increasing social capital and the means for current expenditure.[235]

Here again, as in the Gold Coast report, is an indication that "European" or in this case specifically British levels and standards of production and social services were at this time considered worthy of emulation and an example to be aspired to by other countries.

The development of common facilities such as water supply, the harbour, roads, sewage and electricity was regarded as a necessary condition for any further development, but the solution to Malta's problems, Seers and Balogh maintained, lay in creating new productive outlets for the Maltese population. "The development of Malta must be based on a programme of lifting productivity in all sectors of the economy - in the dockyards, in manufacturing and in agriculture, to name the most important"[236] - other areas mentioned being fisheries, exploration and exploitation of petroleum, and development of the tourist trade. In the field of social services, it was recommended a high priority be given to improving education as an essential element to economic advance, particularly the introduction of technical education, and that improvements be made in health service and housing provision.

However, it was the need for increased productivity in manufacturing and a higher

level of industrial output to which the report devoted particular attention, though its success was considered dependent on attracting to Malta a number of overseas firms, especially British ones.

> The best hope for Malta (and therefore for those who rely on political stability in Malta) is that British firms can be persuaded, or attracted, to build branch factories there. There seems to be no other way in which enterprise and expertise can flow into Malta at a sufficient rate.[237]

British firms, it was envisaged, would be able to bring in technical experts and skilled foremen to train local personnel in the necessary technical and managerial skills, then lacking in the islands. Seers and Balogh observed their enquiries had led them to the conclusion that "with good management, exercising adequate supervision, Maltese workers are equivalent to British manpower for the same jobs, given the same tools"[238] - the significant difference being that the same wage levels did not apply. The low labour cost, at wages which were anticipated to remain below those of the UK for some time to come, was considered "the greatest attraction of Malta to overseas firms, and therefore it must play a big part in stimulating the birth of industrialisation".[239] While raising wages to UK levels was a long-term objective of integration, the assumption was that the narrowing of differences would occur as industrialisation acquired the necessary momentum.

Malta's Mediterranean climate was regarded as an added attraction for executives of large British firms and their wives and it was suggested that an energetic public campaign (such as that being waged at the time for Puerto Rico in the United States press) should be mounted to draw the attention of British firms to the advantages of setting up branches in Malta.[240] But it was also recognised that additional incentives might be needed to bring British firms to Malta - such as benefits from the Industrial Location Act and tax exemption from both countries in order to encourage profits to be ploughed back into further Maltese development.

Although it was anticipated that the import of such private capital would ultimately stimulate productivity and the planned development programme, more immediate finance was needed to initiate such a programme, and the Maltese government wanted to know what economic aid it could legitimately expect from Britain.

Balogh and Seers attached considerable emphasis to Britain's responsibility for the unbalanced social and economic structure which had evolved in Malta, mainly as the result of British defence policy. This they maintained constituted "an unanswerable case for adequate help to the Islands" and a moral necessity and obligation on Britain's part to support Malta's programme of economic development and social advance.[241] The refusal of full Dominion status they believed had only strengthened Britain's obligation to help the island, particularly since in the past it had made little effort to develop educational and social services and alternative sources of employment for the Maltese. In addition, they argued, Malta had a legitimate right to claim further financial assistance from the military services with bases on the island, in the form of regular and substantial rents for the use of

public facilities such as water, roads, power and sewers - rather than relying on the periodic grants and contributions which up until then had been made and which reduced the relationship of the Maltese and United Kingdom Governments to "that of beggar and giver, a relationship which is notoriously full of possibilities of illwill".[242]

But while the report underlined Britain's responsibility and acknowledged the fact that any hope of a solution entirely depended "on the good will and help of the Metropolitan country" and an increase in the Imperial contribution, it also pointed out that external help did not provide a solution in itself and emphasised the need for Malta to stand on her own feet and "bear her share of the cost of her own economic salvation".[243] A blank cheque could not be expected from the British tax payer, the point being that Malta should "be enabled to break out of its poverty and dependence"[244] and be given the opportunity to *earn* a higher standard of living - again by following Britain's example.

> British taxes, wage levels and social services have been gained by raising productivity. Malta's moral case is that she should be enabled to do the same, not that she should be given these standards before earning them.[245]

Financial assistance, however, was a major enabling factor and, in more specific figures, the report estimated a grant of about £1.5m per annum (out of an estimated total budget of £3.5m per annum) would be needed initially from Britain. It was suggested this took the form of a transfer between governments so that funds could be channelled directly into the sectors that most needed it, rather than taking the form of increased wages or social security benefits, which was regarded as "a handicap on a developing economy".[246] Low interest loans guaranteed by the imperial government were also considered a possible supplementary source of finance. But as development in Malta gathered pace it was anticipated British government finance could be reduced.

To carry out the development programme, a long-term plan was considered necessary, stretching over a number of four- or five-year periods and requiring new administrative arrangements.[247] Proposals for the establishment of an Economic Advisory Office were endorsed, with the recommendation that it should be situated in the prime minister's office and that the Statistical Office should be strengthened, so that co-operation between these two bodies could arrange regular collection and analysis of facts on the structure and trends in the Maltese economy, and ensure that public investment was efficiently steered and the right amount of private investment encouraged.[248]

To discuss the advantages or disadvantages of integration, Seers and Balogh considered outside their terms of reference, but they were favourably disposed to the idea, believing that closer and stronger links between the governments of Malta and Britain were needed at a high level for consultation on economic issues. From the viewpoint of economists, they observed, integration "would have the great merit that Malta's development and stability would be automatically assisted under the 'development area' arrangements for dealing with economically backward areas within the UK";[249] new permanent sources of finance would thus be opened up and there would be a more direct political channel whereby to influence the Services' expenditure, though they registered

some caution that such measures would have to be introduced carefully and gradually over a period of years to avoid serious administrative problems.

In the opinion of one of Mintoff's colleagues, the Balogh/Seers report "provided the economic underpinning for Maltese arguments regarding what needed to be done for integration to happen and prove a success"; and as hectic negotiations took place during 1955 and 1956, covering economic and social assistance to Malta within the integration framework, the Mintoff government proceeded with a development programme for which it sought and obtained British funds. The report provided a basis not only for the economic discussions that were part of the integration negotiations, but also the drawing up of two annual reports (in line with its recommendations) discussing the Maltese budget proposals in 1956 and 1957, which sought "to place the financial appropriations being proposed by the government into the development needs that had been identified in the earlier reports".[250]

Despite prolonged and vigorous discussions, however, the integration that Mintoff was so enthusiastically seeking never came about - "unfortunately"[251] in Seers' eyes. Although initially responsive to the idea of integration the British government, following the Suez crisis of 1956, decided to reduce its military forces on Malta as part of its defence rundown and violent disagreements arose over the issue of financial compensation demanded by Mintoff, who eventually resigned in protest in 1958, remaining out of office until 1971.[252]

The two British economists remained in touch with the Mintoff government between 1955 and 1958 and Balogh in fact went to live in Malta for a time. Seers' contact with Malta lessened, however, as he took up work in the Caribbean though he continued to act "as periodic consultant, ... being more involved in the 'technical', 'statistical' side of project work";[253] After 1958 it was Balogh who maintained closer contact with the Maltese Labour party leader, though Seers retained an interest in the fortunes of the islands, particularly on Mintoff's return to office.

Although Malta was not considered an "underdeveloped" country in the same mould as that of British colonies in Africa and Asia, it did bring to Seers' attention the physical constraints on development policy options faced by a small economy, with few natural resources and a growing population. (In hindsight the report on Malta can also be seen as an early study of the development problems of the European periphery which was to engage Seers' attention over twenty years later - though this was not its focus in 1955.)

What was also noted was the importance of political leadership to the success of Malta's development programme, imposing, in the words of the report, "a task of leadership on the Maltese Government hardly paralleled in history".[254] In fact it was Mintoff's leadership, on his return to office in 1971, when he successfully adopted a policy to extract payment from Britain and NATO for the stationing of forces on the island in support of Malta's public finances, which made a particular impression on Seers. While the 1955 report had suggested claims for payments from the Services were a legitimate source of income which could render substantial contributions, the recommendations were

cautious compared to the unequivocal approach later taken by the Maltese leader. Although Seers acknowledged he did not agree with all Mintoff did, he regarded his actions as demonstrating that even a small country's assets could be exploited to the best advantage by a resourceful leader, providing a lesson other countries could learn from; as will be seen in Chapter 7, he later referred to Mintoff as an example of the sort of political leadership that was needed to carry through an effective development policy.[255]

Statistical advice in the pre-Federation West Indies

At the end of 1955 Seers broke his links with Oxford and was employed until May 1957 by the United Nations' Technical Assistance Programme as a statistical adviser to Barbados and the Windward and Leeward Islands, which gave him an opportunity to gain the practical experience he considered he lacked.

> I felt it was in a way impertinent to lecture about economic statistics without having had to face the real problems of data collection; ... I believed (as I still do [i.e. in 1969]) that one cannot really be a professional economist without serving an apprenticeship in statistics, the raw material of our work.[256]

Having already observed the weakness of statistics in "underdeveloped areas" he now had the task of advising governments on the practical steps necessary for collecting, co-ordinating, interpreting and applying statistics and of training local personnel to continue the process.

He was based in Barbados but at the end of 1956 and beginning of 1957 toured Dominica, Grenada, St Lucia, St Vincent, Antigua and St Kitts, making also a special visit to Jamaica at the request of the Ministry of Finance, and producing a number of reports on the state of statistics in all the islands, recommending how the services might be improved.[257] At the time, following the decision of a conference in London in 1956, negotiations were taking place to link these islands, together with Trinidad and Tobago - all of them still British colonies - into a Federation of the West Indies.[258] Although Seers had left his job in the area by the time the Federation was actually created in January 1958 the issues it raised were obviously widely discussed in the preceding months and are clearly reflected in his work, particularly in his consideration of the relationship between the richer and poorer islands and the political issues concerning redistribution that such inequalities raised.

Seers' job for the United Nations was specifically concerned with the smaller, poorer islands of the proposed Federation - Barbados, the Leeward and Windward Islands - where many regarded statistics as an unnecessary luxury. While sympathising to some extent with this view Seers observed that if the statistical work already being undertaken was carried out properly and used efficiently it could help throw light on the islands' problems and serve their interests. As it was, he discovered much of the data collected in all areas (for example, on population, trade, tourism, emigration, industry, tax, etc.) contained errors or gaps, was never used or was published too late to be of any use, and lacked

uniformity between islands. The proposals in his reports therefore aimed at greater efficiency in collection and presentation of data by individual islands and the adoption of more standardised methods for Federal purposes to facilitate comparison between islands and the drawing up of totals and averages.

In making these proposals Seers maintained it was in the positive interest of the smaller, poorer islands to improve and develop both their own and federal statistics, for the success of the Federation was for some "their only hope for further economic and political advance".[259] It was the poorest islands that had most to gain if they were able to back their case for grants in aid from the Federal Government by accurate and reliable statistics, he argued:

> most of these Islands are beset with such formidable economic problems that their best hope of advancement appears to lie in the Federal Government taking over certain sources of finance and accepting the responsibility for setting a "floor" beneath which social services are not to fall. The poorest members of a Federation always have this interest in strengthening the Federal Government's power to reduce inequalities between average incomes of the constituent units. In the last resort the extent to which this happens depends on the extent to which the poorer islands manage to convey to the Federal electorate an appreciation of the dangers of allowing disparities in living standards and social services to remain. These islands are too poor to be able to do without statistics.[260]

There were, he observed, both moral and pragmatic reasons why such disparities should be reduced. Some redistribution of income took place in all countries and the smaller countries of the West Indies had a moral case for claiming a share in the profits and other incomes of Jamaica and Trinidad, he argued, since they were providing markets for the products of these larger islands, and that the question was "at heart a simpler ethical problem"[261] - dependent though on whether the inhabitants of the richer islands felt an obligation to relieve the poverty of their neighbours. However, the more pragmatic case for such assistance was the possibility of political unrest and other longer-term repercussions, which would endanger the Federation if the economic disparities were ignored:

> one can argue that, apart from moral considerations, the strength and unity of the federation require that there should be no chronic slums. The whole federation will suffer if strikes and riots recur in some of its islands, if some islands are breeding grounds for infectious diseases, or if in some islands the educational system is too poor to develop potential West Indian leaders.[262]

However, Seers also made it clear that he did not consider it the role of an expatriate economist to advocate any particular policy but only to put forward and discuss various possible federal welfare and development programmes.

> I would like to make it clear that I do not say that the Federal Government *should* either attempt to increase the incomes and social services of the poorer sections of the federal community, or try to hasten the rate of economic development. It is not for an economist speaking *qua* economist, particularly an expatriate economist writing in an academic journal, to say what policy should be.[263] (original emphasis)

But the arguments about redistribution and the possibilities of welfare and development

programmes were really purely academic for it is clear he had grave doubts whether the constitution would enable the proposed Federation to do a great deal about the problems since responsibility for significant areas had been left outside the legislative powers of the federal government, thus imposing severe limitations on its ability to act. Agriculture and practically the entire field of social services, including housing, education (other than university), health and social security, were still the responsibility of the individual unit governments, thereby making it impossible for the federal government to undertake a development programme specifying targets for overall social and agricultural advances;[264] whereas the levying of income tax and customs and excise duties (as well as foreign policy) were still to be handled by the British colonial government for the first five years. Federal finances were therefore likely to be low and the extent of federal redistribution small, causing Seers to comment "the coming of the federation will tend, if anything, to cause the gap between rich and poor islands to widen, rather than close" - though he still made the point that since the total population of the poor islands was so small "the transfer of quite an insignificant proportion of the incomes of Trinidad, Jamaica and Barbados would transform the situation in the smaller islands".[265] There was, however, a considerable gap between what he deemed desirable for the smaller islands and what in fact he believed the probable outcome would be. He anticipated federal government ministers would "find themselves frustrated by their inability to frame and carry out programmes of welfare or of development as comprehensive and far-reaching as they would wish" and that federal political leaders would become increasingly aware of "the shackles of the constitution" with political forces splitting into "federal" and "unit".[266]

As anticipated, opposition to Federation grew and in 1962 it was dissolved when first Jamaica then Trinidad withdrew and pressed for independence - one reason being that they felt the British government was trying to force them to take responsibility for the poorer islands.[267] As will be seen in the next chapter, Seers then also returned to the Caribbean, though this time in an advisory capacity to the larger islands of Jamaica and Trinidad addressing the subject of "Economic planning in a country newly independent"[268] (while the remaining smaller islands, for whom he had previously worked, were offered associate status within the Commonwealth and formed the West Indies Associated States). This early period of work in the Caribbean in fact marked for Seers the beginning of an ongoing interest in the area, to which he returned as a consultant on several occasions later in his career.

The meaning of development in 1957

As this chapter has indicated, by the time Seers took up his post in Latin America in 1957, he already had varied experience of working on development issues overseas (in New Zealand, Burma, the Gold Coast, Malta and the Caribbean), and had begun to form his own ideas about the particular problems of "underdeveloped areas". Although the

countries he had been involved with were all under British influence, being either colonies or former colonies, they had presented different problems and challenges in different parts of the world, and his time working at the United Nations had also provided an opportunity to widen his view of international comparisons.

Looking back at the 1950s from the perspective of 1978 Seers observed:

> After the war, developments overseas (especially the independence of India) stimulated professional concern about conditions in poor countries for various reasons, partly humanitarian, partly political (based on a fear that decolonisation would be followed by revolution and the destruction of the world economic system). Associated with this was a new perception of the world as divided into three qualitatively different groups of countries - "developed market economies", "centrally-planned economies" and "underdeveloped", later called "developing economies".
>
> "Development economists" were in fact mostly nationals not of "underdeveloped" but of the "developed" countries ... and they saw the central question as how the "underdeveloped" countries could follow in the footsteps of the "developed" and quickly achieve the same economic prosperity and independence, social welfare system and parliamentary democracy, including institutional protection for human rights. "Development" was essentially an economic problem. Economic growth was considered a suitable yardstick for it (indeed almost a synonym). In the end, growth would mean reduced inequality, unemployment and poverty .... Such progress would be all the easier because the necessary technologies were already available.[269]

While he did not express his views so succinctly in the 1950s, nevertheless the essence of this observation is reflected in his work at this time. His own initial concern with overseas development was in large part motivated by a humanitarian concern for social progress, extending overseas the vision of a classless and povertyless society espoused by the Labour Party in the post-war years - though the political and economic reasons for doing so were also apparent in his early reports. Providing employment and raising living standards in underdeveloped areas, for example, was regarded as a means of offsetting the possibility of political unrest, which was already brewing in some areas, particularly in colonies seeking independence (as Seers himself noted in the Gold Coast and the Caribbean), and ensuring they were enabled to continue to supply their primary products and participate in world trade. As relations between the West and the Soviet Union became more frosty in the post-war years, the assistance and backing of Western nations in this task was regarded as a means of increasing "the political stability of the West" (in Seers and Ross's words) and safeguarding future trade with the essential primary producers. While the Seers/Ross report referred to the Gold Coast being enabled to play a full and increasing part in the world economy - this essentially meant relations between what the UN world economic survey referred to as the "economically developed private enterprise economies" and "economically under-developed private enterprise economies".

Development of "underdeveloped areas", as exemplified in the Burma and Gold Coast reports, was, however, regarded very much in terms of government investment programmes, with little direct attention concentrated on the role and consequences of private enterprise, including private overseas investment; though Seers was beginning by 1952 to recognise the need for different accounting procedures in order to quantify the

extent of overseas investment in individual economies. Certainly though for some economies, such as Malta, he regarded the investment of external companies as crucial for development prospects.

As the Gold Coast report particularly demonstrated, there was a basic optimism at this time about the prospects for development, which was seen in terms of "rapid economic growth" and "a higher civilisation", to be achieved by emulating European standards and practices and adopting European technology. It was considered that with hard work and commitment, together with some outside assistance (often of a technical and material kind rather than purely financial aid), self-sustaining growth could be achieved; the basic concept being that underdeveloped areas should be enabled to help themselves, and that once economic growth achieved a certain momentum, it would be able to continue and progress without much external assistance.

Although generally optimistic about the long-term prospects of development, however, Seers became increasingly aware during the 1950s that an "underdeveloped" country had, as he put it in the Gold Coast report, "much less room to manoeuvre than the Government of an industrial country". While in this instance he was referring to the government's inability to influence purchasing power through direct taxation, he came to realise that more general limitations were imposed by dependency on the export of one major commodity, the lack of skilled and educated manpower, and shortages of materials for development - problems that were faced by most primary producers in underdeveloped areas. In Malta and even more so in the Caribbean he also saw that geographic and demographic factors could also impose limitations on the room to manoeuvre of some small economies.

But what his work overseas particularly demonstrated, to someone who had a grounding in economics from Cambridge and statistics at Oxford, was the inappropriateness of applying European economic analysis to the development problems of primary producers. During 1956, while he was still working in the West Indies, he presented a series of lectures at an International Economic Association course in Singapore for economists from the countries of South East Asia - in which he extended the arguments of his 1952 paper on the role of national income estimates in underdeveloped areas (see above, pp.62-4), explaining further why primary producing economies could not be handled in the same way as the industrial economies of Western Europe and North America and why it was not very helpful even to ask the same questions.[270] The problems causing most worry to the governments of primary producers, and on which they frequently sought advice, he maintained, were not those of long-period growth, but of economic survival month-by-month and that some effort needed to be devoted to short-period analysis of such economies before the long-run projections necessary for planning could be made.

Whereas industrial economies like the United States could be treated as analysable entities using aggregative techniques (since its industry was diversified, its culture homogeneous and its market a single unit), this was rarely valid for primary producers, he

argued, because of "specialization in production, cultural diversity, short-run supply in elasticities, and changing institutions".[271] The essential distinction was between an integrated and a fragmentary economy and whereas he observed "The act of simplification which makes analysis possible in industrial economies is to ignore the fragmentation: in primary producers, it is to select the fragments which matter",[272] such as the main export industry, the government, and the banking system and examine their inter-relation.

While confessing that it took him many years before he fully grasped how far-reaching an adjustment was necessary,[273] he began to argue that a shift of approach was essential away from the application by economists of national income estimates and "'Keynesian' analysis" to primary producing countries, and away from the use of financial policies to offset inflation or trade recessions in such areas. Seers was not the only economist expressing doubts about the appropriateness of national income estimates and Keynesian analysis in underdeveloped areas at this time,[274] but his comments were based very much on his own personal experience and he undoubtedly played a role in popularising these concepts, particularly later in the 1960s. In 1956 he concluded "the General Theory is, geographically at least, a Special Theory"[275] - a theme he was to develop a few years later in his more widely known paper "The Limitations of the Special Case" which again took up the issues raised in this paper with the added experience of work in Latin America - which will be turned to in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 2: LESSONS FROM LATIN AMERICA

In 1957 Seers joined the secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) in Santiago, Chile as Chief of the Survey Section and spent the next four years working in the region, which brought him into close contact with the structuralist school of development and proved a very influential experience in the formation of his own ideas. It was here that he became more acutely aware of growing global inequalities and gained more personal experience of the particular economic and social problems experienced by primary producers, which reinforced his view that "conventional" economic theory (as taught and understood in both Western and Soviet ideology) was inappropriate and inadequate to explain, understand or be applied to their situation. His experience in the region considerably sharpened his critical approach to what he termed "Anglo-Saxon economics" and included a good deal of self criticism of his own earlier approaches. Recognising a need for a more relevant body of theory, he found what he considered more appropriate lessons to be learned from the structuralist school of thought, and came particularly to regard its arguments for programmes of import substitution industrialisation as an important means forward for development.

Politically this was a tense time, following the success of the Cuban Revolution and the coming to power of Fidel Castro in 1959. The rapid deterioration in Cuban-American relations and the development of closer contact between Cuba and the Soviet Union, brought the Cold War (intensified by the erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961) to the forefront in the region, intensifying the West's, and particularly the USA's, political motivation for and interest in development in the Latin American and Caribbean area.

Although publishing little during his time at ECLA, a two-year fellowship at Yale from 1961 to 1963 provided an opportunity for Seers to reflect and write on his thoughts and experiences during this period, which is what Chapter 2 will initially cover. From Yale, too, he renewed his contact with the Caribbean, revisiting Trinidad and Jamaica in 1962 to advise the newly independent islands on economic planning, and also heading a study mission to Cuba on the eve of the missile crisis, at a time when little research and information in English was available on post-Revolutionary developments in the island and Western opinion on the subject was fuelled by propaganda. These experiences too will be addressed in this chapter.

Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA)

The condition of Latin America - and the structuralist school

Seers described the countries of Latin America as undergoing massive problems of "social and economic backwardness" with swiftly growing populations, a large proportion of whom were "illiterate, poorly housed and fed, and without any real say in the political life of their country";[1] per capita income was low, distribution of land and income was very unequal, transport facilities were meagre and overloaded, and agriculture backward, while

political discontent with the conditions of poverty and unemployment was growing. The major economic weakness, he observed, derived from the fact that countries were basically dependent on the export of a few primary products for their foreign exchange, while many goods, including most forms of equipment and machinery, were imported and, with the slump in the commodity markets in the later 1950s, most primary producers were experiencing severe balance of payments crises. Where governments had attempted to relieve the position by industrialising and developing substitutes for goods previously imported, industries were often "inadequate and inefficient", and the countries concerned tended to suffer from high rates of inflation, and were often chronically reliant on foreign aid.[2] He described Latin America as "a fossilised society" whose structure was "audibly creaking";[3] - and it was here that he acknowledged:

> I first really learned about development problems. The Caribbean had still been sleeping its colonial sleep, but development was a real issue in Latin America, and ECLA had established itself, under Raul Prebisch's leadership, as the main source of ideas, especially with its work on 'development programming'.[4]

Set up in 1947, ECLA's initial concern, in Christóbal Kay's words, "lay in discovering the major obstacles to development in Latin America and suggesting policies to overcome these"[5] and under its Executive Secretary, Raul Prebisch, a distinguished team of economists and social scientists had been assembled to address these problems. In the process, as Seers observed "It was soon obvious that traditional theory, classical or Keynesian (even in their 'neo' forms) was little help, and that new theoretical explanations were needed"[6] and as a result there evolved what came to be known as the structuralist school of development. Its major concern was to make Latin American economies less dependent on foreign trade and fluctuations in the commodity markets, in particular at this time by encouraging planned policies of import-substitution industrialisation, to decrease dependence on the import of manufactured goods and ease the balance of payments difficulties.[7]

ECLA's work on "development programming" - or planning - remarked upon by Seers, thereby implied the need for control of the economy and market; tariffs on certain imports were considered essential to protect and develop local industry - as was attention to and improvement of internal transport and communication systems, water and power supplies, which presented potential bottlenecks for any industrialisation programme. In addition internal social and political reforms such as land reform, educational advance and new fiscal systems were regarded by the structuralists as a necessary and essential part of stable development. Foreign capital was considered necessary to assist in raising productivity and growth and its investment in import substitution industrialisation encouraged. This then was the climate of opinion into which Seers arrived in 1957.

Study on inflation

On first arriving at ECLA in 1957, however, Seers felt (as he had done at the Oxford Institute of Statistics) that he had missed what he termed the 'golden age' - Celso Furtado, the Brazilian economist who had played a large part in the development of ideas during its early years had by this time returned to Brazil, Raul Prebisch was working on a country study of Argentina, and ECLA was now more absorbed in regional integration "an important though more pedestrian activity",[8] in Seers' estimation. After spending a period in charge of the Economic Survey of Latin America, which involved fieldwork in Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela, he spent two years heading a study of inflation and growth which brought him into close touch with the Chilean economists Osvaldo Sunkel and Anibal Pinto.

The study of inflation in Latin America proved far more complex than that undertaken in the Gold Coast and Seers found the work "very stimulating",[9] producing some of the interim results in 1962 in an issue of the *Economic Bulletin for Latin America*[10] as well as drawing on its experience and findings in other papers written at Yale, the substance of which will be considered in more detail below. The main body of the study - five substantial mimeod volumes - was never passed as an official report,[11] but it is clear that work on the project gave him a deeper understanding of the problems of primary producers and the limits on their capacity to develop and "room to manoeuvre" imposed particularly by exogenous factors. An historical perspective was adopted, studying the experience of a number of Latin American countries, particularly during the previous three decades (1929 to 1959), and the external world events which had adversely affected their development acknowledged:

> The first thing to make clear is that however bad the policies of Governments in the region were, the originating causes of Latin America's problems were the world depression, the Second World War, and the slowing-up in the growth of the industrial countries in the 1950's.[12]

However, given the external originating causes of problems, the question still remained to what extent problems and difficulties continued because of the failure of government policies or plans.

The study divided the countries of Latin America into two main groups, designated O and U, for the period 1929-59. Group O consisted of eleven mostly small economies (Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Haiti, Honduras, Venezuela and pre-revolutionary Cuba), which were unindustrialised, without strong import substitution, and heavily dependent on foreign trade, particularly with the United States; they were in effect on a dollar standard and generally maintained open economies and orthodox restrictive financial practices. These countries had experienced only mild inflation but, it was argued, weaknesses in the commodity markets had caused stagnation which, when coupled with growing population and rising economic aspirations (especially following the Cuban revolution), was leading

to mounting political tension. Group U consisted of the nine other countries (Mexico, Peru, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay, Bolivia and Paraguay) which had all followed less orthodox financial policies; the first seven larger economies in this group had adopted strong import substitution industrialisation programmes, accompanied by more protectionist measures, and had achieved economic growth. However, they had all also suffered what were then considered high rates of inflation which had accelerated when export markets weakened in the 1950s.[13]

The monetarist/structuralist debate

Inflation in the larger economies of Latin America was a problem of which Seers would no doubt have become aware during his work on the United Nations World Economic Report in the early 1950s (see Chapter 1, pp.64-5) as it was already an issue meriting special attention by the report.[14] By the time he took up his post at ECLA, the attitude towards the problem of inflation and how to tackle it in economies like Chile and Brazil had become, in his words, "The major controversy in economics" in Latin America,[15] between those advocating the monetarist and structuralist positions.

The monetarist view, that deflationary policies were essential, was advocated in the region by the IMF and missions such as that of Klein-Saks, which advised governments to balance budgets strictly, maintain unified and fixed exchange rates and keep their economies open, in the belief that if financial order was established, exports would benefit, private foreign capital be attracted, and growth occur spontaneously.[16] Since United States government agencies and other potential lenders frequently made the provision of their own capital assistance dependent on the conclusion of an agreement along these lines with the IMF, the pressure in this direction was often very powerful. From the monetarists' point of view, inflation was an obstacle to growth and for them, as Seers it, "the *first* necessity was to bring the price rise to a halt, especially by limiting public expenditure, so as to set the stage for sound development"[17] and to open "economies to international influences ... submitting to the discipline these imposed, even it if meant postponing economic development."[18]

The argument of the structuralists, on the other hand, with which Seers acknowledged he "broadly agreed", was that:

> inflation had arisen through the appearance of "bottlenecks" (such as power and transport) in the process of transformation of the economy due to imports substitution, and that inflation could not be halted sharply without major recessions, which would in fact stop investment in easing the bottlenecks and thus postpone the time when fast growth would be possible.[19]

The structuralists' approach was thus that inflation was a lesser evil than stagnation for a country with serious social problems and some inflation had to be tolerated at least temporarily if these problems were to be tackled.

Influence of the Cuban Revolution

From the structuralists' point of view the political consequences of stagnation were in fact plainly demonstrated in the example of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 which had a major influence on thinking and policy in the whole region. Underlying discussion of most problems was the prospect of a major social upheaval if substantial improvements were not made in the living conditions of the vast majority of people of Latin America and the Caribbean. As Seers himself observed, "In Latin America itself, a perennial topic of conversation is: where will be 'the next Cuba'?"[20] It provided a major political incentive to tackle development problems and, as he put it himself, "the region's most urgent needs are that large numbers of people should be properly fed and housed. Even if the present inequalities are not morally offensive, they appear to be politically intolerable."[21]

The Cuban example had in fact met with a rapid response from the United States which, until 1959, had considered Latin America "safely within the sphere of American influence"[22] (in Seers' words) without paying a great deal of attention to the area - no special financial institutions had previously been set up for the region and the official view had been that if IMF monetarist policies were followed, Latin American economies would grow. A change in US policy was marked with the setting up of an Inter-American Bank in 1959 and the Act of Bogota (1960), which established a special fund for social investment, followed in August 1961 by the inauguration of the Alliance for Progress at Punta del Este, Uruguay, with the object of making foreign capital available for promoting rapid economic growth in the countries of Latin America. The intention was to make available a total of $20 billion over a period of ten years, with funds being transferred mainly through AID, the Agency for International Development (also set up in 1961), and to increase income per head by at least 2.5 per cent a year. Potential recipients in the region were required to draw up long-term economic plans, which were scrutinised by US experts, with the need for social reform heavily emphasised; encouragement was given to land reform, industrialisation, education, raising productivity and living standards, etc. - many of the measures the structuralists were in fact advocating. As Seers observed, the United States appeared to be bound to a policy of "permanent counter-revolution"[23] - the aim being to achieve an engineered social transformation in Latin America from outside before there was an opportunity for transformation of a more revolutionary nature from inside.

Fellowship at Yale

Seers' time at ECLA proved an important formative influence on his thinking and career, and when he took up a Visiting Fellowship at Yale in 1961, he had the opportunity to further discuss ideas with Latin American specialists - Joe Grunwald being one such colleague he mentioned in particular[24] - and "a series of papers came pouring out,"[25] demonstrating the influence the experience had on his thinking about development and the

lessons he believed could be more generally learned from the area. Many of the concerns of the structuralists, particularly regarding the irrelevancy of Western taught economics to the situation of primary producers, and the importance of industrialisation and planning, were ones to which Seers had previously given some thought and had sympathy with, but his ideas now developed within a more coherent framework.

Arriving at Yale, Seers found the economic syllabus and much of the research "pretty remote" from what seemed to him, "fresh from Chile, the really important issues".[26] He expressed "some impatience at being confronted with conventional Anglo Saxon economics",[27] which he considered inadequate to address the problems, which he had most recently witnessed in Latin America and the Caribbean, but were also prevalent in the continents of Africa and Asia as well:

> close personal contact with the problems of backward countries instils, for many reasons, a sense of urgency and some impatience. Economics seems very slow in adapting itself to the requirements of the main tasks of the day - the elimination of acute poverty in Africa, Asia and Latin America - just as the previous generation of economists failed to cope realistically with economic fluctuations until after the depression had brought politically catastrophic results.[28]

The developed economies Seers described as "like Narcissus" - "interested almost exclusively in themselves"[29] with research being devoted mainly to local problems, and economists reading little except American or British periodicals, largely unaware of developments such as the Latin American school of structuralists which was "very little known in the United Kingdom or indeed anywhere outside the region".[30] Whereas the industrial countries in the very early 1960s were enjoying an economic boom and there was "not a great deal of discontent with economic conditions", in the rest of the world, he observed, there was "growing discontent" not only in Latin America and the Caribbean, but also among the increasing number of newly independent former colonies where, as he put it, the end of colonial rule had "coincided with the emergence of a feeling that poverty and unemployment should be ended and can be ended".[31]

But, while impatience with poverty had grown, development had tended to slow down in the poorer primary producing economies and been accompanied by increasingly severe economic and political tensions. The political dangers were so obvious that this state of affairs could not continue, he observed, yet "conventional economics" did not have much to offer by way of useful advice:

> the existing body of theory cannot explain what has to be explained, nor can it give the help that is politically essential. What has to explained is why economies grow at different rates, and the help that governments need most desperately is advice on how to stimulate development.[32]

At this point in time Seers held the prevalent view that equated development with economic growth - a view held by most conventional economists, as well as structuralists, and the yardstick adopted by the United Nations in 1960 for its Development Decade which aimed to increase growth in underdeveloped economies by 5 per cent in the ten years - the point at issue being how this could be achieved.

Seers himself anticipated a "major revolution in doctrine looming ahead"[33] and considered lessons could be learned from the experience of Latin America and the work of the structuralist school, observing "the recent history of this region does seem rich in lessons relevant to the whole problem of the growth of under-developed economies (and possibly developed economies too)".[34] In the papers he produced at Yale, therefore, he sought to bring to the attention of "Anglo Saxon economists" not only the nature of the problems faced by Latin American countries but also some of the lessons that could be learned from their experience.

In publishing papers in English journals on problems such as inflation in Latin America and the monetarist/structuralist debate Seers widened circulation of ideas, which were mainly articulated in Spanish at the time, and took discussion of these subjects to international gatherings.[35] The substance of some of these papers will now be considered, looking first at his critique of "conventional" economics and visiting "Anglo-Saxon" economists for their irrelevancy in dealing with the problems of primary producing economies, and the need for more appropriate training for economists intending to work overseas in the future. We will then look at Seers' work on comparative rates of growth which was very much influenced by the structuralist school and demonstrated the rationale for import substitution industrialisation, a policy he supported not only in Latin America but saw of relevance to other underdeveloped economies, advocating its merits himself in the Caribbean, and later in Africa as will be seen in Chapter 3. Following a brief outline of his advisory work on planning in Trinidad and Jamaica, consideration will then be given to his study of the alternative model of development in the area, Cuba.

The limitations of conventional economics - and economists

Reflecting at Yale on "the usefulness of his subject",[36] Seers wrote a paper entitled "Why Visiting Economists Fail" (1962) - a title which he anticipated would "hang around his neck for the rest of his life"[37] - in which he examined the role of Western economists employed as expert advisers supplied under national or international technical assistance programmes to overseas governments and came to the rather sobering conclusion that, "there is little doubt that many of us have been, in some degree, failures"; and "In the ministries of almost any underdeveloped country you can find cupboards full of the reports of economists, reports which have been talked about for a week and then forgotten."[38] Although conceding a proportion of the blame for this might lie with the mismanagement or inefficiency of the host government, it was the "mistakes committed by the visitors" on which he concentrated,[39] arguing that economists working in underdeveloped countries were often ill-prepared and ill-qualified both professionally and personally to cope with the problems they encountered.

What he expressed particular concern about was the narrow specialist or theoretical approach that was often adopted and the uncritical application of conventional Western economic models and techniques, which usually proved unsuitable and inappropriate for

the local context, since economists were frequently ignorant of the specific economic, social and political circumstances and problems of the country concerned, their recommendations often based on short visits. Short-term visitors, "however experienced and eminent",[40] were very unlikely to be a success, he now warned, demonstrating a change of view from his endorsement of the value of short-term economic consultants to the Gold Coast (Chapter 1, p.58).

He confessed to being "astonished" at the "boldness" of economists from Europe and North America in laying down generalisations about what needed to be done in areas like Latin America, when they had never set foot in the country or area before or read any of the regional journals - mentioning, as an example, a large fraction of the eminent economists who were present at a conference on "Inflation and Growth" in Rio de Janeiro in January 1963.[41] He did not exclude himself from criticism, admitting he had fallen into the error himself at first of applying conventional analysis to the development problems of primary producers; it had been a slow and painful process to learn that "'models' had to be amended to take account of the operation of commodity markets" and it had proved "even more difficult" for him, "to acquire an analytical framework appropriate to Latin America".[42]

One of the most important lessons he had drawn from his experience of Latin America, he maintained, was that it was "a mistake to treat underdeveloped economies as if they were developed when one is analysing economic trends" and it was "particularly mistaken to apply 'global' methods of analysis, whether monetary or income, devised for developed countries, or to omit social factors".[43] The uncritical transfer and application of theories and policies, which had been devised specifically for the circumstances of industrial countries as if they were of universal validity was therefore mistaken, he argued, and "conventional economics" - by which he meant both the laissez-faire doctrines of classical and neo-classical theory and Keynesianism, whose global approach he described in 1964 as "an obstacle to the understanding of development problems"[44] - were inadequate and irrelevant to explain what was happening in the primary producers, or offer useful advice. He did not attempt a detailed critique of "conventional economics" but in more general practical terms pointed out various fallacies of approach, methodology and policy.

As was seen in the previous chapter, his work during the 1950s had in fact already led him to much the same conclusion - and he had published papers expressing serious misgivings about the suitability of applying Western economic techniques and theories to underdeveloped areas, where conditions were so different. But, it was a paper written at Yale which was to become the most well known and widely read expression of this view - "The Limitations of the Special Case"[45] - which broadened the discussion, taking into account the experience of Latin America, and gave some consideration to the consequent changes necessary in the training of economists and the direction of future research.

"The limitations of the special case"

This paper has come to be regarded as "a classic article" and "seminal essay",[46] that, in at least one reviewer's opinion, "embarrassed everyone"[47] - while Seers himself described it as "rather rude and carping, written from beyond the academic fringe"[48]. One of the reasons it became so well known was that it was later used as the main discussion paper at the conference on teaching economic development held at Manchester University in April 1964, one of the first major gatherings to discuss this issue.

Seers took up his argument that the body of knowledge taught to economists had been devised for the few developed, industrial economies which presented "a highly special case" with "highly unusual, not to say, peculiar, characteristics"[49] which was of limited professional relevance for work in the largely unindustrialised primary producing economies, since analysis focused on the wrong factors, and the assumed model did not fit the way in which primary producers operated. Conventional economics assumed a highly diversified, private-enterprise, industrial economy integrated into a single market, where little attention needed to be given to regional or cultural differences - an analysable entity with "an autonomous and flexible socio-economic structure ... subject to no formidable exogenous strains" and where investment was the important determinant of income.[50] Very little of this scenario, however, was relevant to the more "typical case" of the largely unindustrialised economy selling primary products for manufactures.

One of the most obvious differences was the crucial importance to primary producing economies of trade and the level of their exports which was a more important determinant of income than investment - yet, Seers observed, the export sector was "rarely stressed in conventional economies".[51] This was a point he had mentioned before, but his experience of Latin America led him to emphasise further differences - particularly the fact that primary producers were continually subject to exogenous strains beyond their control and that they could not be understood unless studied in the context of the world economy since their development was ultimately determined by the prosperity, policies and protective measures adopted by the industrialised economies.

> The sales of their particular primary products, and thus their development, are determined by (i) the rate of growth of the industrial economies that buy from them, (ii) the income-elacticities of demand for the commodities they export (which reflect, *inter alia*, the substitution of artificial materials for natural ones), (iii) protective measures that limit imports into industrial economies, (iv) influences on the distribution of the remaining markets between various suppliers (company policy, preferential tariff arrangements etc.)[52]

For those economies attempting to become partly independent of export performance through import substitution programmes, "conventional economics" were again of little relevance since the process and its limitations were hardly discussed, he observed.[53]

The static nature of the model assumed by conventional economics was also inappropriate for primary producers, he maintained, since insufficient attention was paid "to the social structure, feudal land systems, conventional work practices, the existence of

foreign firms, disparities between regions, racial barriers etc."[54] and to the economic implications of land reform, nationalisation, capital levies or raising educational levels - all issues likely to be the subject of discussion if not policy in primary producers. "In brief" this meant that whereas institutions were "taken as given" by conventional economics, the question for most primary producers was "precisely what institutions to change and how".[55]

Inappropriate conventional methods of analysis and policy measures were often recommended, Seers maintained, because Anglo-Saxon economists often misunderstood the different circumstances and nature of problems facing primary producers and there were three areas of policy in particular which he attempted to clarify in various papers from his experience in Latin America: these being the reasons for inflation, the detrimental effects of monetarist policies, and the arguments for protective measures in primary producers.

Understanding inflation

The inflation experienced by many of the countries of Latin America, particularly those undertaking import substitution programmes, was then considered "severe"[56] and a major problem. Having headed the ECLA study on inflation, Seers devoted a number of papers to this phenomenon explaining the particular circumstances to Western economists who often saw the only answer in strict monetarist policies.

The tendency of "Anglo-Saxon economists" to ascribe inflation to "trade union pressures or financial imprudence"[57] did not fit the Latin American experience, he maintained. Trade unions, apart from those in Argentina, were "hardly strong enough" to play a major part in causing inflation through high demands for wages, which were generally set by government edict and rarely exceeded the rate of price increases. Although conceding there was a certain degree of financial imprudence (through, for example, the failure to collect taxes or the corrupt practices of politicians) this was not a major contributory factor towards inflation. As well as diagnosing the problem wrongly the questions that "Anglo Saxon economists" tended to ask such as whether inflation caused or hindered growth, or whether it was cost-induced or demand-induced, or how much could be afforded, he considered, were "really irrelevant questions, derived from foreign, not Latin American experience".[58]

In Latin America, Seers argued, following very much the structuralists' line, growth could not take place without inflation (unless their export markets were booming), as it was an inevitable corollary of the massive structural change necessary when countries undertook industrialisation programmes. It was therefore meaningless to talk in terms of whether inflation helped or hindered growth, he explained.

> There is an inherent and ever-present risk of inflation in developing economies which export primary products, because of the active or potential need for structural change. So long as exports are booming it is possible to grow rapidly without inflation and without industrialization. But every commodity market weakens one day (even for petroleum), and if growth has to continue then, if only because of population increase,

> structural change has to occur. It is difficult to achieve this without inflation in an underdeveloped country.[59]

A parallel could be made, he suggested with the structural changes needed in developed countries when converting themselves from a peace to a war economy, or vice versa, when inflation was also likely to occur - a situation which, he observed, had also arisen in Bolivia and Paraguay, two countries which had not undertaken industrialisation programmes, but where war had in fact been the cause of runaway inflation.[60]

His main point, however, was that in Latin America generally, inflation was a lesser evil than stagnation for a country with serious social problems and some degree of inflation was inevitable if these problems were to be tackled, though hopefully it was only a temporary phase. In this situation, he argued, it was both inappropriate and dangerous to insist on monetarist deflationary measures which were advocated by the IMF and generally seemed to reflect professional opinion in the industrial countries.[61]

Rebuttal of monetarism

It was odd, Seers remarked, that monetary fundamentalism should be advocated in Latin America when it "had fallen out of favor [*sic.*] in academic circles in the Northern Hemisphere, except perhaps for Chicago and the universities of the Soviet bloc)" and was regarded as "misleadingly facile"[62] and "rather old-fashioned".[63] Three decades had passed "since balancing budgets was standard practice in Britain or even in the United States",[64] he commented, and disillusion had spread in both countries as policies of monetary restraint in the 1950s had proved unsuccessful in checking price increases or stimulating growth. Yet, he observed, monetarism was "reappearing in Latin America like a handed-down suit that no longer fits the original owner".[65]

Attempts to suppress inflation by strict financial policy in Latin America could in any case only succeed if it was carried to a point where structural change and development was slowed down, he observed, which was "a terrible price to pay in an underdeveloped country."[66]

> The result is a serious check to growth, and there is no reason to expect the resultant level and pattern of investment to be compatible with development needs. In addition monopolistic tendencies are aggravated and distribution of income made more unequal (restricting possibilities of further import substitution).[67]

Monetarist policies were therefore insufficient to insure that economic growth would take place at a fast enough pace; the policies adopted tended to ignore the historical roots of the problem and were often counter-productive in effect, aggravating the situation further.[68]

However, not only were the programmes of financial restraint inappropriate and harsh, they were also dangerous, Seers argued. Even within the industrialised countries criticism of monetarist policies had arisen when it was realised inflation and payments deficits could only be cured at the cost of unemployment and semi-stagnation.[69] Within Latin America aggravation of already existing serious economic and social problems increased further the prospect of political unrest and inspired the very desire for change

that those advocating monetarist policies wished to avoid:

> overemphasis on monetary measures involves serious risks. The paradox is that though the monetarist is normally far from a revolutionary, and his preference is for peace and quiet, his policies may lead to social disorder and eventually regimentation of one form or another. His nostalgic wish for a re-establishment of nineteenth-century security is unattainable, and by pursuing it he may hasten the current dissolution.[70]

"Orthodox monetary policies had in fact aggravated the region's severe political troubles", he observed, pointing out by way of example that between 1928 and 1958 Cuba had been one of the countries that "had tried hardest to follow financially orthodox policies, avoiding price inflation".[71] He also drew attention to an editorial in the *New York Herald Tribune* on the overthrow by a military clique in 1962 of President Frondizi of Argentina, who was described as "a victim of orthodox economic planning. His goals, chartered by the International Monetary Fund ... were politically unpopular and, as we now see, almost impossible." Although regarding this as "somewhat of an over-simplification" Seers conceded it contained a grain of truth - though "rather unfair to the IMF".[72]

Despite his criticism of the application of monetarist policies to Latin America, Seers expressed a certain sympathy for the role of the IMF, which he considered was "grappling with a problem that could not be solved within its terms of reference" since it had originally been set up to help industrial countries meet temporary balance of payments difficulties. Its role in assisting developing economies, where the balance of payments problem was more chronic and "an inevitable feature for the present period",[73] had not been envisaged, and somewhat tactfully observed:

> I think we should hesitate before judging the IMF too harshly. After all, it is in a rather unfortunate position, perhaps more unfortunate than it realizes, for it is an agency to help countries in balance of payments difficulties, which are assumed to be temporary and readily soluble.[74]

Necessity for protection

Linked with monetarists' concerns over the need to balance budgets was their opposition to import controls and tariff protection adopted by countries undertaking import substitution programmes, which again, Seers argued, reflected a misunderstanding of the different circumstances of primary producers. In addressing the question "How were today's industrial countries able to grow without going through periods of import control and high protection?"[75] he maintained that the example and circumstances of growth in the first industrialised countries of western Europe and North America were not relevant for or comparable with those economies of Latin America attempting to implement import substitution industrialization programmes:

> the political pressures for growth were far less compelling, in the 18th and 19th centuries, so the pace could be much more leisurely. There were few richer countries to be envied or emulated; these were not very much richer; and in any case communications were not good enough to make people aware of international contrasts. Population growth was also slower.[76]

The time element was also crucial, since to transform a largely illiterate and unskilled labour force into one with the necessary proportions of professional people and skilled workers, "with social cohesion and with the habits typical of the producers and consumers of an industrial society"[77] had obviously been easier to accomplish in a couple of centuries rather than in a couple of decades. The first countries to industrialise, he observed, were also innovators with their manufactures and had therefore faced little foreign competition and could construct a system whereby exports could rise parallel with their imports of foodstuffs and raw materials so controls on trade were against their interest. (What perhaps surprisingly he did not emphasise was the crucial role of the colonial system which enabled the first industrial countries to control access to their cheap raw materials and provided a ready market for their manufactured goods, a scenario which rendered the experience of the economies of the nineteenth-century European industrial revolution incomparable to that of the emerging industrial economies of Latin America.)

Despite the advantageous circumstances faced by the early industrial nations, Seers pointed out, even they too had adopted import controls in periods of structural change, as in wartime, when economies suffered inflationary pressures - and later arrivals to industrialisation in Europe, like Germany, and United States had made extensive use of tariffs. In fact by the early 1960s he observed, Latin American exporters faced "a world full of restrictions" since all the industrial countries were themselves now erecting barriers to protect their own products, restricting imports and imposing discriminatory tariff preferences in favour of their own political and economic interests.[78] The possibility of general free trade did not exist for Latin America, he argued, for in these circumstances "to insist on multilateralism, free trade, and currency convertibility" was "to advocate that Latin America alone open its doors to the full force of international competition".[79]

His explanations of the significance of inflation, monetarism and protection, to the economies of Latin America, as outlined above, illustrated his argument that theories and "policy measures devised for developed economies" were "not necessarily, or usually, transferable to economies" which were "fundamentally different" as were most primary producers.[80] In 1964 he remarked that "As a working rule one could almost say that if a proposition applies in a developed country, the opposite will be true in an underdeveloped country."[81] Yet, he observed, economists working overseas continued to apply principles and policies devised for the special case of industrial countries as though they were of universal validity - which in large part accounted for their failure; but he considered this could be rectified by more relevant training.

The role and training of visiting economists

Despite the shortcomings of visiting economists, Seers did not question the need for such experts at this time and in fact even had an encouraging word for the apparent failures -

> Even if he is ... a failure, in the sense that his report has no affect and his advice is ignored, an economist has a considerable impact on the people he works with.

> Conversations with politicians and officials, especially informal ones, can show them new ways of looking at economic affairs. I have known cases where the main achievement of an economist, but not a negligible one, has been simply to let a minister think aloud about his problems and bring to the surface his real motives and his judgments on social and economic policy; the economist can carry out the function of a psychotherapist. ... and merely by requesting data a visitor can help to bring about a big improvement in official statistics.[82]

Contacts with the local university teachers and students and the broadening of the economist's own outlook in working overseas were also considered positive aspects which could make the journey "thoroughly justified, whatever happens to his report and to his recommendations".[83]

Although the role of economist as psychotherapist is perhaps questionable, it was clear that he believed "Anglo-Saxon" economic advisers still had an important role to play overseas, particularly in the new planning offices that were springing up, provided they had relevant training, experience and preparation.

As it was they were often ill-prepared because of the inappropriateness of their training and he criticised economic textbooks for perpetuating the model of the "special case" as being of universal validity. One popular example, a book by Paul Samuelson which was used in universities of "underdeveloped and developed countries alike" he argued should not be entitled simply *Economics*, but "'The Economics of the U.S. in the Twentieth Century",[84] since its contemporary material was drawn exclusively from the US, and scant attention was given to such subjects as trade, the export sector, the role of industrialisation in development, or the various types of economy. Marxist textbooks he considered equally of limited value for those wanting to understand economically backward countries and he suggested that *Political Economy*, the Soviet textbook found in many countries, should be retitled "a 19th Century interpretation of economic and political change based on experience in Western Europe".[85]

In addition to the textbooks, he was critical of the general chauvinistic and parochial attitude adopted in many universities and the method of teaching of economics. The subject was becoming more abstract with students being taught to manipulate mathematical models rather than interpreting the changing structure of the world economy, and non-empirical instruction he considered was teaching students to think in the wrong way. In relation to his own field, statistics, which he used to teach at Oxford he was equally outspoken and self-critical, observing that whereas training in the use of statistical material could help to anchor a student's approach in reality ...

> Unfortunately 'statistical methods' as usually taught (as indeed I used to teach it myself) does not do this. It may even be positively damaging. Far from showing the student how to appraise and use material, the basic and central requirement, this subject is a museum of curious and ancient tools (mostly taken over from other fields, such as biology). The implicit assumption ... is that the data used are absolutely firm and reliable. It is as if somebody learning carpentry was taught to ignore the properties of different types of wood. The student's attention is thus repeatedly diverted *away from* the essence of the problem; an uncritical attitude to data is gradually acquired, which it may take years to get rid of.[86]

There was, he observed, "so much for economics graduates to unlearn".[87]

To remedy this and better prepare those economists intending to work overseas, there was a need, Seers insisted, for more empirical instruction at universities, enabling students to appraise and use statistical material, to recognise the geographical limitations of the models assumed in their textbooks and lectures, and to take greater account of social and political factors in their studies.[88] What was needed was the construction of models appropriate to local needs and those involved in teaching would do better to "instil in their pupils a sceptical, comparative attitude, rather than constructing and conveying great models".[89] Progress in most scientific subjects, he argued, depended to a considerable extent on comparative research and "the growth of comparative economies could lead to the creation of a more general framework into which special cases (like industrial economies, say, or petroleum economies) can be fitted."[90] Seers himself was to produce two such studies of his own - one on the stages of economic development of a primary producer and another on the mechanism of an open petroleum economy.[91]

He also suggested it would be helpful if "those who worked in universities could spend large portions of their professional careers overseas" so building up "a corps of professional economists with international experience", who would not only then be of more assistance to those overseas countries they were called upon to advise, but would improve the empirical base of their teaching.[92] From the very early 1960s, therefore, Seers expressed a particular interest in the need for changes in the teaching of development economics - an issue which eventually became the focus of his future career.

His initial interest arose, however, as he saw the need for a more relevant theoretical framework to address the problems of primary producers in Africa and Asia, as well as Latin America, than that offered by "conventional" economics.

The need for a theory of development

In the early 1960s Seers envisaged a "major revolution in doctrine looming ahead"[93] and the need for a "general theory of development appropriate to modern economic conditions", considering the most useful procedure was

> to see if there are identifiable stages of economic development with common characteristics at each stage and a mechanism which can carry countries along from one stage to the next. The advantages of a successful classification (a sort of morphology) of development would not merely be that it would show where any country stands in the process of economic change it would also be a step towards the badly-needed general theory of development.[94]

Walt Rostow's *Stages of Economic Growth*,[95] published in 1960, had in fact outlined a five-stage model of economic growth, which had received widespread attention, but Seers summarily dismissed this as "not concrete enough. The 'take-off' is in the end little more than the period at which growth starts to accelerate."[96] He was equally dismissive of what he rather off-handedly termed Karl Marx's "scheme" as having "proved in many ways inadequate to present-day needs" since although feudalism might have developed into capitalism, the next step to socialism had clearly not occurred on a world scale in the

time envisaged. "Both these theories" he contended "suffer from attempting to be all-inclusive."[97]

Seers himself aimed to be more modest, limiting his endeavour to the construction of a development model of primary-producing economies in the middle of the twentieth century. By this time, however, he was clearly of the opinion that a purely economic growth model was of very limited usefulness and that it was essential to introduce social and political factors. His stage by stage analysis, which will be outlined later in this chapter, was very much influenced by the example of the ECLA structuralists.

The influence of structuralism

The structuralists he regarded as the "first indigenous school of economics in an under-developed area" whose theories formed an original and "stimulating contribution to the field of economic growth" that were "sufficiently general to cover all Latin American countries perhaps all underdeveloped countries".[98] As such he considered this school of more relevance than conventional western taught economics for addressing the problems of underdeveloped economies and anticipated the structuralists' influence would grow.

> Since economic growth is becoming increasingly fashionable as a subject, and since the weakness in commodity markets, the population boom and rising economic ambitions appear chronic, the school could acquire in the 1960s an international interest comparable to that of Keynesian economics during the slump-ridden decade of the 1930's.[99]

In explaining structuralism to Anglo-Saxon economists Seers agreed it had certain affinities with Keynesian economics in being "essentially anti-monetarist ... on the whole more easily accepted by the Left than the Right" and able to "inspire a good deal of enthusiasm, especially among the young" - though it differed "in being mainly long-period, and in disparaging global techniques of analysis".[100] But he insisted structuralists should not be treated as a "rather exotic variety of Keynesians" for although opposed to monetarism they "did not advocate inflation or deficit financing, as a matter of principle" - nor, he added, did they "all believe in socialism, in the sense of a highly controlled egalitarian society".[101]

He considered the Latin American school of structuralists provided a basic framework for the systematic and comparative research that was needed by the newly emerging subject of development economics and that it was "sufficiently flexible ... to be extended to other parts of the world".[102] It certainly had a great influence on his own thinking at this time and was particularly apparent in his analysis of the reasons for the striking inequalities in the comparative rates of growth of western industrialised and primary producing economies and the rationale this provided for the adoption of import substitution industrialisation programmes, to be considered in the next sections of this chapter. His stage by stage analysis of such economies he believed could be of relevance to primary producing economies almost anywhere in the world.

Comparative rates of growth - the argument for import substitution

As already mentioned, one of the major concerns Seers expressed on arrival at Yale was the failure of "conventional economics" to explain the slow rate of growth experienced by the majority of primary producers whose per capita income was in the order of seven to eight times lower than that of the industrialised economies of North America and Western Europe. One of the first papers he himself produced at Yale addressed this problem, considering some of the main factors influencing these large and widening international differences.[103]

The need to identify the reasons for inequalities and to find ways to stimulate growth in primary producers, Seers acknowledged, was fuelled by a combination of moral, political and economic motives.[104] While his experience in Latin America had heightened a humanitarian concern for the appalling conditions of poverty suffered by the majority of the population living in underdeveloped areas of the world, he also readily conceded that the "political dangers" were "now so obvious that this state of affairs cannot continue"[105] and in this respect the example of Cuba loomed large -

> It would be naive to ascribe political developments in Cuba entirely to the fact that *per capita* exports and *per capita* income changed little during the period between 1947 and 1958, but it would be just as naive to deny all connexion between stagnation and revolution.[106]

It was also clear that political instability could have economic repercussions and disrupt trading relations. The promotion of growth and reduction of inequalities was therefore regarded as a means to bring about stability which then in itself provided a firmer foundation for further growth.

At this point in his career, as was noted earlier, he accepted the view, prevalent in ECLA, of the importance of fast economic growth as a measure of development and considered that "The proponents of *any* major economic policy measure in an underdeveloped economy are under an obligation to show how this measure will stimulate growth"[107] - although, as his paper on the inflation study makes clear, it was recognised that growth *per se* could only be considered successful if it was accompanied by more equal distribution so that the poorest sections of the community also benefited.[108]

While the United Nations aimed at a 5 per cent growth rate in poorer nations by the end of its Development Decade, Seers himself did not put forward a global target for growth or the resources needed to achieve this, since, he maintained, this was dependent on the circumstances of particular countries or regions. However, in view of the growing demands for higher standards of living and "the danger of a progressive political deterioration" in primary producers, he suggested an ambitious target would be preferable since, even if the objective was to make poorer nations grow twice as fast as industrialised countries, the absolute gap would continue to widen rapidly.[109] In Latin America with the population rising at 3 per cent a year he estimated the national product had to grow at a rate of at least 5.5 per cent a year if living standards were to rise significantly and

unemployment to be contained.[110]

Seers himself essentially endorsed the structuralists' solution to stimulate growth in primary producers - by diversifying the economy through import substitution industrialisation and his study of the reasons for slow growth in primary producers in fact demonstrated that this was the only way forward.

Among the influences believed to be responsible for the slow rate of economic growth in regions exporting primary products and itemised by Seers were:

> the low income-elasticity of demand for food exports; high rates of fertility in unindustrialised countries; the international "demonstration effect"; technological progress in the sense both of economies in the use of materials and the development of synthetic ones; the protection given to farmers in industrial countries; the high profits of non-resident companies exploiting mineral resources; adverse tendencies in the terms of trade; inadequate capital flows; insufficient industrialisation in primary-producing countries.[111]

Many of these factors he argued could not be greatly or quickly changed by policy and were very largely beyond the control of the primary producers themselves. Their rate of growth and development were generally entirely dependent on the sale of their exported commodities, which in turn depended very much on the rate of growth and demand in, as well as the protective measures adopted by, the industrialised countries which bought these commodities. As long as exports were booming it was possible to grow rapidly (as Venezuela had as a result of its petroleum exports) but when markets for export commodities were chronically depressed, as they had been in recent years, primary producers suffered the consequent fall in income and growth. In addition profits of overseas companies absorbed an increasing proportion of export proceeds, he now increasingly acknowledged, and there were often leakages of assets through the banking system.[112]

At the same time, he pointed out, there was a tendency to import more consumer goods, particularly luxury items, encouraged by the "demonstration effect", again a phenomenon highlighted by the structuralists. In the same way as the poor classes in industrialised countries were under social pressure to copy the expenditures of the rich, analogous forces were at work in the world economy and primary producers were attracted by the consumer goods of industrialised countries "stimulated by the widespread exhibition of films, television programmes, etc., originating in the United States (as well as reports of travellers)."[113] The increased import of such consumer items, particularly when commodity markets were depressed and income was not rising, only increased balance of payments problems and widened international differences. The demonstration effect was regarded as not only responsible for changing patterns of consumption but also for influencing official attitudes to follow "conventional" economic theory and policies.[114]

Control of population, Seers agreed, was one problem that primary producers could possibly do something about but he maintained fertility was "not the only or even the major determinant of the international distribution of income" for "a tendency to inequality

was demonstrated with population assumed constant".[115] In fact although considering population growth a "disruptive force"[116] and an important factor to be taken into account in the planning process, Seers himself never advocated population control as a major element in development policy.

The idea that primary producers could try to increase the volume of their exports he also dismissed as a possibility. There was already insufficient demand for many commodities and if the whole area attempted to increase their exports the result would certainly have been "a deterioration in the terms of trade, causing a net decline in real income",[117] he observed. It should be noted, however, that Seers did not entirely adhere to the structuralists' view of the deterioration in the terms of trade for primary producers, as outlined by Prebisch and Singer. Although the ECLA study on inflation, on which he worked, had accepted the fact that slumps in the commodity markets had led to a decline in income and a subsequent deterioration in the terms of trade,[118] shortly after leaving Latin America Seers himself produced a paper entitled "The terms of trade myth and development strategy".[119] The poor terms of trade in the early 1960s was a medium-term problem, rather than a long-term tendency, in his estimation and he observed that the terms of trade in 1964 were "if anything, better than three and a half decades ago".[120] (By 1971, in fact, he argued that complaints about the deterioration of the terms of trade of poor countries and fluctuations in exports were used as "alibis" by some Third World countries to demonstrate they were "helpless in the face of inexorable forces from outside".[121])

Seers maintained it was in volume of goods produced rather than prices,[122] where the great difference between primary producers and industrialised countries lay and which presented more fundamental difficulties demanding more radical change.

> If all that is wrong with the world economy's development is a change in relative prices, one could correct it by devices such as commodity stabilisation schemes, and production controls. But if the case is more fundamental, then either the structure of the world economy has to be changed, or an international fiscal system is needed. Those who cling to the terms of trade thesis do so, no doubt subconsciously, to avoid this conclusion.[123]

He did not consider support of commodity prices feasible since, if effective, he believed it would "repeat on a world scale the problem of U.S. food surplus food-stuffs".[124] As will be seen below, he personally came to the conclusion that an international fiscal system was needed (though how feasible this solution might be he also had doubts about).

The reason economists seemed to accept the terms of trade so uncritically, Seers surmised, lay "in the powerful intellectual support this thesis gives to the case for the industrialization of underdeveloped countries (and more recently to the case for their special treatment in the aid and trade)".[125] But though critical of certain aspects of the terms of trade thesis, Seers himself too considered import substitution industrialisation "the main way" in which an "autonomous increase" in growth could occur in areas like Latin America. The production of import substitutes was "almost the only way by which the primary-producing countries can prevent themselves falling further behind the

industrial countries (or alternatively absorb the population increase), and they have little option but to proceed along this path", he maintained;[126] it provided a means to alter their relationship with the industrialised countries and permit their income "to rise faster than imports (in the long run reducing the dependence on external trade)".[127] Where countries (such as Bolivia and Paraguay) were too small to industrialise and lacked large enough markets for much import substitution, he suggested their affiliation to regional economic unions, such as the LAFTA (Latin American Free Trade Area), could provide a possible answer.

Although the need for increased industrialisation programmes had formed part of the recommendations of previous missions in which he had been involved (for example in Burma and Malta) it was following his time in Latin America that Seers came to regard import substitution programmes as integral to the development policy of most primary producers.

In pursuing a policy of import substitution, studies at ECLA had demonstrated it was necessary for primary producers to adopt measures to protect the growing industries and impose import controls to save foreign exchange, measures with which, as has already been indicated, Seers himself concurred. He considered the "classical" laissez-faire argument for the free play of market forces, and the "infant industry" argument for only temporarily imposed tariffs, as "fallacies", inappropriate for the situation faced by newly industrialising primary producers, maintaining "Instruments such as tariffs, exchange controls, and import licensing are part of the permanent tool-case of any government in a developing country undergoing a population explosion".[128] Such measures could also be complemented, he observed, by import controls and a fiscal system which reduced the demand for imports by direct taxation of the rich, whose consumption patterns had a high import content.[129]

However, the example of primary producers which had already made some progress in adopting industrialisation programmes had in fact shown that they continued to import a high proportion of manufactured goods, including machines, spare parts, and fuel for the new industries, so that "commodity production as a whole grew more slowly than the volume of imports, and there was no net substitution".[130] In addition the accompanying structural changes necessary in improvements to transport facilities, power supplies, communications etc. and the reforms of land tenure, education, and social services also required substantial financing. It was therefore, Seers acknowledged, "an extremely difficult task to equalise rates of growth simply by import substitution" and there was thus a need for increased capital flows:

> Industrialisation requires a great deal of imported capital equipment, not merely in manufacturing but also in the industries producing inputs for manufacturing (electricity, transport, etc.). Consequently a process of substitution involves in itself no net saving of foreign exchange for a long period, and import requirements are more likely to rise than to fall. For this reason, an increasing inflow of capital is the only really practicable means of avoiding a further deterioration in the relative income of area P [primary producers].[131]

The need for capital - and planning

Within Latin America Seers was somewhat cautious about the use of aid and loans, because of the political strings attached and the fact that some countries in the region were already chronically dependent on aid, but it was seen as the task of planning offices to construct projections showing the combined implications of various official targets and policy decisions - including decisions about foreign borrowing.

The necessity for planning had featured in Seers' reports on the Gold Coast and Malta but at ECLA he was also influenced by the work on "development programming" and the importance attached to long-term economic projections for primary producers undertaking import substitution industrialisation. Based on an assessment of the current working of the economy, and using input-output techniques, the aim was to build a set of projections around a growth target for some future year, taking into account such factors as the anticipated growth of population, and level of exports and imports, and make calculations about the necessary rate of industrialisation, level of investment, and rates of taxation, bearing in mind also the risks of inflation and the governments' commitment to social reforms. A planning office could thus estimate, Seers observed, how much industrial development a country needed "from the target rate of growth of the national income and the expected rate of growth of exports and the expected inflow of capital",[132] and arrive at a picture of the sort of patterns of imports and production that would be consistent with higher living standards and employment in the future. This often raised awkward choices for governments - between, for example, accepting the strains and risks of inflation or aiming at a slower rate of growth - though he believed the most acceptable solution was bound to involve a high rate of industrialisation. The merit of projections was that they could help politicians anticipate difficulties and make choices. There were a number of combinations of the variables such as rates of growth, pace of industrialization, degree of anticipated inflation - and foreign borrowing - that could be put to the political leadership by the planning office and it was then up to the government, as Seers put it, "to choose the least unpalatable".[133]

While maintaining that primary producers could "do a great deal for themselves" by undertaking measures to reduce the need for foreign capital, for instance by import controls and taxation of the rich, he nevertheless acknowledged a good deal of capital would still be needed, unless policy in primary-producing countries was "to be very autarkic and planning ... very drastic".[134] However, to avoid the political strings attached to bilateral aid he argued for some form of international fiscal redistribution whereby "a substantial and growing fraction of the savings" of the industrialised countries could be transferred to primary producers to offset their "'built-in' tendency to inequality"[135] and ensure that their rates of growth did not continue to fall or diverge. The idea of international fiscal redistribution will be returned to in the next chapter, since it is one he developed further after his time in Africa, but while still at Yale there were other measures he suggested primary producers could undertake to lessen the need for outside assistance.

One way in which several "economically backward countries" could raise more income to enable them to grow more rapidly, he suggested, was to increase taxation on the foreign companies operating within their economies (particularly those extracting minerals), a recommendation particularly influenced by his visits to the Caribbean islands in 1962 (see below pp.100-3), and an acknowledgement that private overseas investment did have a significant bearing on development. Companies regularly underquoted the value of the export of raw materials, so that they paid less income tax to the country of origin, and had often acquired valuable exploration rights for nothing, observed Seers. Governments on the other hand were frequently tied to royalty agreements involving very small payments, paid depletion allowances on projects the companies would have carried out anyway, and missed opportunities of trade agreements to increase their exports and their tax revenue. Measures were needed, he argued, to enable primary producers to increase their revenue from the companies - though he was aware governments were often reluctant to challenge company procedures because they were afraid of losing the market and lacked not only knowledge about their bargaining position but also the skilled staff necessary to deal with the companies, who often outmanoeuvred them with their greater access to experts in the field of law, accounting, engineering, etc.[136] Similarly, he observed, when overseas governments were trying to attract companies to develop their countries' resources, ignorance often prevailed and they often misjudged what "incentives" (such as tax "holidays" or depletion of allowances) were needed to induce foreign companies to establish or extend their production facilities.[137]

To assist such governments, Seers suggested the establishment of "some international agency" affiliated to the United Nations, to which they could turn for expert advice and technical assistance on tax collection, for briefs on the industries concerned, for help with drafting standard tax and conservation legislation, and for advice on how to proceed in their relations with the companies. Such an agency he anticipated should also gain the support of the governments of the United States and Western Europe, since although they might experience some loss of revenue from the resulting fall in net profits of their companies, yet there were other obvious advantages in that "the more money poor countries collect in taxes ... the less loans and grants they need" - which was also the main advantage to the recipients themselves since it avoided the "the political problems of dependence on aid".[138]

But although pointing out the mutual benefit of such measures, and even observing that the more responsible companies would not object to a fairer system of taxation, Seers was not unaware of the opposition and repercussions such moves were likely to encounter - to be considered in the next section.

The obstacles to industrialisation

The implementation of a programme of protected industrialisation, he recognised, was not an easy process to undertake and involved the risk of external and internal political

tensions with opposition to be expected from the already industrialised countries and from vested interests within the primary producers themselves. This was particularly demonstrated in his paper on the stages of economic growth of a primary producer which presented a model tracing the progression of such a country from an open economy under stress through periods of easy (light industry) then difficult (heavy industry) import substitution to the ultimate stage of export diversification.

Although Seers maintained that exchange controls and import licensing were "part of the permanent tool-case" of primary producers attempting to industrialise, at the same time he also acknowledged that most were under the influence of "one of the great powers" which was likely to obstruct the implementation of such a policy.

> This power will try to keep the door open for the sale of its products, and will discourage or prevent the establishment of high tariffs or import quotas. Moreover, a colony, or neo-colony, is typically in a comatose state; few political leaders realise the need for an aggressive policy of import substitution, or could mobilise sufficient support to carry it through in the face of opposition from importers, landowners, bankers and the dominant foreign power.[139]

As a result, he observed, some of these economies had been forced to remain "open" "with the help of some form of foreign aid or suppressive policies or both"[140] from one of these "great powers".

For those economies which did embark upon a programme of protected import substitution industrialisation, further opposition could be anticipated from the power "in a dominant trading relation with it", from "conservative factions" within the country itself, and from foreign companies operating within its borders as "economic nationalism" grew and the government sought to increase taxation on, and exercise more control over (or even nationalise) the companies.[141] So while supportive of the notion that primary producers could "do a great deal themselves", at the same time formidable problems were anticipated both in getting legislation approved for fiscal reforms and import controls "because of the great political power of those with high incomes" and in attempting to exercise more control over and taxing foreign companies, opposition to which could affect the supply of foreign capital.[142] "The possibility of conflict with foreign interests is inherent in planning", observed Seers.[143]

Once the stage of export diversification arrived the prospect of an even bigger conflict loomed as the long-term solution lay in selling manufactures to developed countries, which again, as he observed, was "a very difficult step if the industrial countries themselves do not facilitate such imports".[144] Experience of Latin America had made him aware of these difficulties and of the fact that a combination of these external and internal pressures sometimes acted "to force an underdeveloped country back to an earlier stage in its development"[145] rather than carrying it forward. Argentina and Chile, and to a lesser extent Colombia and Uruguay, he cited as providing examples of this trend, for having reached the heavy industry stage they had got stuck, and been unable to export manufactures on a significant scale. Recent "stabilization programmes" accompanied by foreign loans with conditions attached, such as those inaugurated by the Alliance for

Progress, he considered "in the class of attempts to force them back to earlier stages" (rather than tackling tasks set by the current stage of development).[146]

Those countries adopting industrialisation policies thus faced formidable problems and political tensions, externally and internally, which could well strain democratic principles. A period of forced industrialisation and structural change, involving challenges to the status of the traditional upper classes and a "shake up in society", was unlikely to be one where there was "a great diversity of open political pressures" remarked Seers, since the only means an effective opposition could gain office was in encouraging popular resentment at the sacrifices involved, which endangered the whole process. But on the other hand to refrain from industrialisation also led to political trouble in time, he observed, since the failure to solve economic and social problems might well end in a regime that was "considerably less liberal than one which vigorously promotes economic development". A government committed to development through a programme of industrialisation was therefore more likely, he believed, to enjoy enough political support from those who saw the possibilities of advancement for themselves and their children to permit in the long run a certain diversity of views.[147] Despite the formidable problems and contradictions, Seers considered planned industrialisation was the only way for primary producers to achieve further growth and development and we will now look briefly at how he applied some of these ideas in the Caribbean.

Planning in the Caribbean

In 1962 Seers visited the West Indian islands of Jamaica and Trinidad, which achieved independence that year, and produced a paper on "Economic programming in a country newly independent",[148] demonstrating the importance he attached to planning and long-term projections for the former British colonies. Although having in mind particularly the needs of the two islands, as well as British Guiana and Barbados, he considered his observations could also be applied more widely.

A rather pessimistic outlook in fact faced the Caribbean islands which were experiencing slow growth and rising unemployment - trends which were intensified by "unfavourable developments" in 1962. The Commonwealth Immigration Act of that year ended the uncontrolled entry into the UK of citizens of the British Empire and Commonwealth, requiring them to have a job secured before entry or a special skill of value to Britain, which severely cut to a fraction the flow of migrants from the West Indies. At the same time exports were diminishing as the expansion of alumina capacity in Jamaica came to an end, and Trinidad's capacity for refining petroleum and its crude output slowed sharply. Although bauxite exports continued to grow, there was increasing competition from production in other parts of the world, where the aluminium companies were operating. Other depressing influences included continuing uncertainty about the effects of economic integration in Europe[149] on West Indian exports, a slackening in the tourist boom and the mechanisation of basic industries (such as sugar) which did not have

large needs for labour. The 1960s appeared to present a pessimistic prospect of a further slow down in growth and higher levels of unemployment.[150]

The achievement of independence, and the consequent rise in political expectations against this background, only underlined "the need for careful and far-sighted planning", Seers observed, to take the territories through what was bound to be a difficult decade ahead, the fundamental problem being "how to achieve an increase in national production fast enough to enable the labour force to be kept in employment, and also to enable *per capita* income to rise".[151]

Most former colonies, like those in the Caribbean, however, were unprepared for "careful and far-sighted planning" and Seers blamed the Colonial Office for failing to give a lead in this respect. Very few members of the old Colonial Service had "ever really grasped the point of economic planning" or seen the need for conscious efforts at co-ordinated economic development, but, he observed:

> from the viewpoint of London, it should have been obvious many years ago that planned development would in time be necessary. If the economic policy implications of political independence had been foreseen, preparatory work could have begun sooner to set up the apparatus, and the present outlook for newly independent countries would be correspondingly brighter.[152]

Long-term economic projections were therefore somewhat of a novelty in such areas but, since the problems they faced were deeply rooted and could not be solved in a few years, the need was for long-term planning, aimed at achieving progress over a number of years. Governments wanted to know "what sort of trends could be expected in factors outside their control" in commodity markets and "what sort of targets they might consequently be able to achieve for incomes and employment"[153] observed Seers, yet there were often few statistics, records of past consumption and production, or details of the transactions of the leading industries and main export sectors, whereby an economist could trace trends and base projections; though he did remark that the statistical material in the West Indies, particularly in Trinidad, was considerably better than in many other underdeveloped countries.[154] He again stressed the importance of developing a disaggregative accounting system adapted to the circumstances of an economy based on the export of primary products so that, among other calculations, the foreign exchange receipts could be estimated commodity by commodity. The modified input-output matrix tried first in Burma and Ghana was now used in the planning offices of Jamaica and Trinidad.[155]

Using what statistics were available the task of a planning office, he maintained, was to express the political objectives of the government within a quantitative framework, built around a set of projections for a future year, as a means of judging whether a total political programme was adequate and feasible. While the central aim of economic policy might be summarised as achieving "the desired rate of growth, without foreign payments crisis and without inflation", projections could help bring out the practical choices to be made (between higher tax rates, population control, and import licensing for example) in aiming at this goal, indicating broadly what sets of policies would be consistent with each other

and other variables. Above all, the merit of projections was that they gave the government "some chance of anticipating roadblocks in the growth process, and of taking action to remove or circumvent them".[156]

Such projections, however, Seers pointed out were not only useful and of interest to the governments of the countries concerned; governments, such as those of the UK and USA, with investments or political interests in these countries were also "naturally interested in their long-term prospects",[157] as were companies planning to invest in the area and foreign banks and international institutions approached for loans. Whereas Crown Agents were prepared to sponsor loans on the London market provided simple accounting requirements were satisfied, he observed, "the International Bank and United States financial houses (public and private) look hard at the total economic possibility of a programme, internal as well as external".[158] Planning was therefore necessary before external aid and investment could be expected.

What Seers did now emphasise was that governments would increasingly have to think in terms of *national* planning, taking into account the private sector, as well as economic decisions under government control, since their economies were so dependent for their revenue on the performance and decisions of the major export industries and companies. This marked a distinct change in emphasis and approach from the reports of the early 1950s, ten years earlier, when in Burma private and foreign investment had been considered insignificant and in the Gold Coast had been included without distinction in "territorial", as opposed to "national", accounts. While, even in the early 1960s, only a few underdeveloped countries had embarked on national planning,Seers observed that Jamaica had made a start in drawing up a programme for the economy as a whole, while Trinidad and British Guiana were making moves towards the same.[159] He anticipated governments would require more consultation with companies in the future concerning such matters as notification of, or even permission for, changes in pricing and production policies - though he did add "How far governments will want to go in this direction, how far they will be able to go (especially in small economies) and what the effects will be, remain to be seen",[160] as much depended on the companies themselves and how far they too were prepared to co-operate. It was partly as a result of his renewed contact with the Caribbean that he produced his paper on "Big Companies and Small Countries", outlining the difficulties governments of small countries had in negotiating with big internal companies, but suggesting efforts should be made to increase revenue from the companies, and recommending the establishment of an international agency to assist in this task, as mentioned above (p.98).[161]

Commenting in 1963 on some projection studies produced on the West Indian economies, which endorsed the pessimistic picture of slow growth and unemployment, Seers concluded that the islands were "challenged to look inwards for sources of growth - to stimulate domestic agriculture and manufacturing, so that many goods which are being imported from outside are henceforward produced at home".[162] Since the process of import substitution industrialisation required a wider market than one island could provide,

the possibility of islands specialising in one or two industries, with reciprocal arrangements allowing duty free entry to the products of other territories was considered a possible solution, as well as the possibility that manufactures could be exported to the rest of the world in association with the LAFTA or the EEC (the European Economic Community).

However, Seers made it clear in his paper on programming that he did not consider it the task of the economist in a planning office to advocate specific development policies but to indicate possible options, assuming more the role of a civil servant. In fact, he made a point of clarifying the position of the economist, as he saw it, in relation to the government officer responsible for taking political decisions on economic matters. While remaining close to the politician, in order to see what sort of targets corresponded to the general political objectives of the government, it was important, Seers maintained, that it was fully recognised the economist was not recommending one policy or set of plans against another and that there was a distinction between political decisions and economic exercises.

> The job of the economic office is to test and advise about the combined implications of policy in various fields, and to show their likely consequences. Thus the economist may say that a certain total programme is inconsistent, or presupposes a large increase in foreign capital investment, but it is dangerous for him to enter, explicitly or otherwise, into the question of whether it is socially feasible or politically desirable. In brief, he should not try to take over, or allow himself to be saddled with, any of the responsibilities of the politician.[163]

The position adopted here was partly to counteract the "special hazard" of politicians expecting too much in the way of "magic formulae" from the economist; but it is a position that also seemingly relieved the economist of any responsibility for future policy based on his projections. In his paper "Why Visiting Economists Fail", Seers also touched on the potential problematic nature of the relationship of the professional economic adviser to the politician and the latter's expectations of the former; while acknowledging that some economists believed it their duty to make value judgements and recommend certain policies - or to prescribe as well as diagnose - he himself adopted a more cautious position in relation to work overseas expressing the opinion that making value judgements about policy in foreign country was "particularly questionable".[164] His remarks no doubt reflect the difficulties of the position in which he sometimes found himself, and the relationship and responsibilities of economic advisers to politicians is one he returned to in later work.

Much was in fact expected of planning at this time and it was regarded as a means whereby former colonies in particular could take steps towards greater self-determination in economic affairs; though there were still many factors beyond their control, not least the workings of the commodity markets and the companies operating within their borders.

Cuba: the alternative development model

During the course of his advisory visits to the Caribbean, Seers made a passing visit to Havana, Cuba in February 1962 and, as he put it himself, "began to realize how very interesting the Cuban attempt to accelerate development was".[165] The "significance of Cuban experience, and its great professional interest", he considered, lay in the fact that it represented "an attempt to achieve broadly the same objectives as those set out in the Charter of Punta del Este (fast growth and a more equal society) but by different means".[166]

Cuba, he pointed out, was a country with many features and "problems of social and economic backwardness ... common to the whole of Latin America"[167]: like other primary producers, it had been excessively dependent on the export of a single crop, sugar, and on the import of manufactured goods, sources of energy and food and had been "so wedded to the U.S. economy" that it was "in many ways an appendage of it";[168] like other economies it had suffered chronic stagnation with highly unequal distribution of land and income, a rapidly increasing population, rising unemployment, poverty and poor social conditions in rural and urban areas, a high level of illiteracy, and an inefficient and corrupt administration. In fact, Seers observed, "Cuba was probably worse off even than other comparable Latin American countries, and these profound disabilities complicated the task of structural change which lay ahead."[169]

Yet the revolutionary government of this "somewhat backward, tropical country" was attempting to achieve a rapid rate of economic growth and social change aiming to eliminate unemployment, poverty and illiteracy within a few years. Like other Latin American governments, it was adopting a policy of increased industrialisation, but, unlike any other economy in the region, it was following socialist principles, using techniques of highly centralised planning, and forging trade and aid links with the Soviet Union rather than the USA. As such it was the only primary producer to have taken this path in the area and its efforts could hardly be ignored "whatever one's political views".[170] It provided an alternative model of comparison - though one it seemed the US was determined to see would not be repeated elsewhere.

Following his visit in early 1962, Seers investigated the possibility of making a more extended visit to investigate economic changes and future prospects - "particularly in view of the almost total ignorance about Cuba in the outside world".[171] Back at Yale he found funding for such an investigation from the Cabot Foundation of Boston (with assurance there were "no strings attached"[172] to the grant) and assembled a team of economists for the mission - Richard Jolly from England, who had been working at Yale, and two Chileans, Andrés Bianchi and Max Nolff. Following a further preliminary visit by Seers to Cuba in July 1962, the team planned to spend 4-6 weeks there during August and September.

However, the co-operation the team expected from Regino Boti, the Cuban Minister of Economics and head of the planning office secretariat, whom Seers had first met during

his time at ECLA, was not forthcoming. Although seemingly supportive of Seers' personal visit to Cuba in February, Boti later felt the team visit "inopportune" saying officials were busy, and if the United States was suffering from lack of information about Cuba, "he did not intend to make it easier for them"[173] - people had already made up their minds either to support or oppose the Revolution and providing further information would serve no useful function; moreover, Cuba had found it could not rely on the objectivity of foreigners in reporting its situation. Seers conjectured[174] that Boti's reaction could have been due to misgivings about the professional quality of Cuba's economic plan, which might not stand up to scrutiny by the team, or to the American source of finance for the visit, which, against the background of US support for the Bay of Pigs invasion the previous year and the massive anti-Cuba propaganda in the US, particularly in the weeks before the missile crisis in October that year, would seem more than likely. In fact, according to Richard Jolly, he and Seers discovered in later years that their funding through the Cabot Foundation came from CIA sources, although at the time they were completely unaware of this connection and had a totally free hand in the way they organised and reported on the mission, being in no way directed or inhibited by their sponsors.[175] The mission's attitude towards developments in Cuba was in fact generally favourable, but the origin of the mission in the United States inevitably aroused suspicions among some Cuban officials.

As a result the team was denied access to certain official statistics, but they were not prevented from travelling and interviewing extensively throughout the island nor deprived of all official data, though they often found this information of poor quality and inconsistent. Under the circumstances they debated whether it was possible to produce a professional enough report but since information was so scarce on what was regarded as "one of the most important political developments in this century"[176] they decided to go ahead, emphasising the incompleteness of the data, the impossibility of a comprehensive analysis and the inevitable tentative nature of their conclusions. Seers' contribution to the study concentrated on the economic and social background of the Revolution and an assessment of the performance of the island's economy between 1959 and 1962, while Andrés Bianchi covered agriculture, Richard Jolly education, and Max Nolff industry.

In his paper, Seers drew out some points of comparison between the way Cuba was handling certain problems in the development process, particularly in relation to inflation, social change and planning, compared to other Latin American countries. Cuba, for instance, had also experienced the same inflationary pressures as other economies in the region, caused by large increases in government spending as a result of the change in economic direction without a corresponding increase in receipts and an inadequate rate of advance in substitution for certain types of imports; these pressures had been aggravated further by a bad harvest causing food shortages. However in Cuba, Seers pointed out, the remedies adopted were different. Price inflation was suppressed by freezing the prices of all key commodities, including staple foodstuffs, at 1958 levels, and holding wage increases in check after initial rises, while basic foods (and later clothing) were rationed to

prevent great inequalities in consumption; consequently there tended to be queues for non-essentials, as in industrial countries during wartime.[177] However despite the rationing Seers observed there were "far fewer people, especially children, seriously undernourished than before the Revolution".[178] As the *New York Times* remarked

> Those who may have thought the Cuban people are starving may be shocked by the author's conclusion that the food supply under rationing in 1962 "is consistently better than it was in the United Kingdom for the years 1942-47."[179]

The state enterprises and the public sector absorbed the heavy losses involved and Seers pointed out the distortions had not been allowed to affect the pattern of investment, which was "determined without respect to profit".[180]

A further significant difference noted in Cuba was that "Social change" had "taken place at an early stage of industrialization". In the rest of Latin America although most of the larger countries had had some success in setting up new industries, Seers acknowledged social change had been very slow. Land reforms had either had only limited impact, as in Chile and Colombia, or had affected mainly public lands, as in Venezuela, and "in no case" had there been "a recognizable alteration in the social structure". Income distribution, in fact, he remarked "may well have become more unequal in many countries, and urban slums remain a very evident social problem in every great Latin American city, as the surplus rural population comes in, searching for work." In addition the great majority of the people in the region, especially in the rural areas played little part in the political process and if anything the public's political role had been reduced rather than increased.[181]

By contrast in Cuba there had been "a general improvement in the economic lot of the country workers and many peasants" through the extension of new housing, roads, electrification and medical services to rural areas, and agrarian reform granting titles to squatters, eliminating rent obligations, establishing a minimum wage and providing year round employment in state farms. An ambitious education programme especially the campaign against illiteracy and expansion of primary education also benefited the rural population in particular. Much of the investment, especially in the first three years of the Revolution, he noted, "was social rather than productive and in various ways raised living standards". The moves towards social equality had been matched by an egalitarian incomes policy so that the distribution of income had become much less unequal, and communal incentives were stressed rather than private self-interest.[182]

Seers acknowledged there were inevitably some "common grumbles" in Cuba not only about wage restrictions and scarcity of food but about such issues as the suppression of organised political opposition, the absorption of religious education into the state system, the difficulties of dealing with bureaucrats and the lack of independent news media. But he concluded that support for the regime was "evidently strongly correlated with former income", since most complaints came from the former rich and middle classes who had most to lose whereas a survey of factory workers had indicated two-thirds were in favour of the regime.[183]

One area, however, open to criticism where mistakes had been made, maintained Seers, was in the field of planning. The *New York Times* remarked that anyone who might have "been under the illusion that the introduction of Government ownership and centralized economic planning are automatic panaceas" would have found revealing "the author's description of the confusion, incompetence and unrealistic euphoria that prevailed".[184] What had been thrown into sharp focus by the experience of Cuba which was of wider significance for all development policy, Seers emphasised, was that "organization, rather than capital, is the clue to really rapid structural change".[185] A major problem faced by Cuba, and shared by other Latin American economies, was the lack of reliable statistics which, combined with overambitious attempts at detailed planning and overoptimistic aspirations, had often resulted in severe disorganisation and failure to create an adequate basis and framework for economic policy; one notable example being that the whole agricultural problem had been underestimated.

However, commented Seers, to attempt to turn a country like Cuba into an advanced industrial economy was a huge undertaking and problems encountered had to be looked at in perspective. As such "Almost any degree of disorganization" was to be considered preferable to the previous situation when there had been no attempt to mobilise any factors of production. In place of the previous chronic poverty, unemployment and little technical progress, there was now at least a hope that the direction taken by the economy would "eventually yield favorable results, including tolerable living conditions and a degree of economic independence". While the Cuban government had made serious planning mistakes, so had other governments in Latin America - and it was "certainly better to make mistakes in a drive for food production than to leave arable land unused". There was evidence too, remarked Seers, that the administration was learning from its mistakes.[186]

One of the criticisms of the study on Cuba was that the authors rarely gave political questions their due or made them explicit, "thus viewing economic and social changes divorced from the popular mood, counter-revolutionary forces, U.S. foreign policy, and so on".[187] It is true that although Cuba's situation was initially described as "sensitive" and arousing "deep political emotions",[188] the political situation remained very much in the background. Seers did remark at the end of his paper that Cuba's future success depended to a large extent on United States policy and international relations, as well as on the morale of the Cuban people themselves, but he also observed that the effect of measures such as the US embargo in some ways acted in Cuba's favour for it provided an excuse for almost any economic difficulty and the greater the international tension, the easier it was for the government "to appeal to nationalism and to maintain a high level of enthusiasm" among its supporters. Although conceding that any assessment of the situation in Cuba could be upset by a complete political change, his general conclusion was that the Revolution was "to a great degree irreversible" and that Cuba could well make considerable progress over the next decade in raising living standards and making its economy less dependent on foreign trade. As far as morale was concerned he concluded, "If awakened aspirations are a strong force anywhere in the world, they are certainly

powerful now in Cuba."[189]

These views, however, did not tally with the official US view at the time and Seers later recalled that he

> tried unsuccessfully to persuade members of the White House staff in 1962 that there was considerable support for the revolutionary government, that one could drive around the country quite safely, etc. It would clearly have been inconvenient for them to accept such evidence... in addition, the propaganda in the press and in television programmes was so strong that even I almost came to doubt my own memory.[190]

Richard Jolly also recalls the enormous emotion the issue raised at the time and how at a seminar held at Yale soon after their return, at which the former governor of the Bank of Cuba was present, the team was accused of fabrication and holding "Fidelista" views because they presented a more positive image of the situation in Cuba than was popularly believed at the time, though their presentation was not uncritical of certain aspects of the Cuban economy. When the book based on the mission, *Cuba: the Economic and Social Revolution*, was published in 1964, it therefore had a mixed reception in the United States, receiving a hostile reaction from much of the popular press which was highly critical of what were seen as it pro-Cuban sympathies.[191]

However from British and American academic journals and from some of the more serious press the book received enthusiastic reviews. Hailed by the *New York Times* as "probably the most important book on Cuba yet to appear in the English language .... an objective and most informative volume",[192] it was also described as "required reading for any person concerned with Latin America or U.S. policy",[193] "indispensable for students of Latin American economic development, and particularly for students of problems of economic planning in primary export economies"[194] and "the most detailed and objective account of the socio-economic transformation attempted by Dr. Castro's Government".[195] There was criticism[196] that some important areas of the economic and social revolution received scant attention such as labour developments, health, social services, culture, recreation, though the authors had made it clear that their study was not exhaustive due to the limits on the material available.

Although a self-confessed non-Marxist[197] view of Cuba, the book's conclusions presented on the whole a sympathetic and fairly positive image of developments within the island and, as one reviewer noted, certainly challenged "the official U.S. view that Cuban socialism rests on dangerously shaky economic foundations".[198]

"Where will be the next Cuba?"

Having studied Cuba's example as a development model, the question arose whether any other country in the area was likely to attempt to go along the same path - and, as noted earlier, Seers observed a perennial topic of conversation in Latin America (as indeed it also appeared to be in the USA) was "where will be 'the next Cuba'?"[199] In a subsequent paper for the *Political Quarterly*, looking at the situation from the point of

view of the State Department, he initially concluded that there were "a number of reasons for confidence"[200] - that there might well in fact be no more Cubas.

To begin with he considered it was impossible for the Soviet Union to assist the rest of Latin America to the same degree as it had Cuba, for while it had been able to buy nearly all Cuba's sugar exports, there was little possibility it would be able to absorb Brazil's coffee or provide a market for other products such as petroleum, cereals and tin, which it exported itself. Financially too, he observed, it would not be able to fund and provide technical assistance to all other countries in the region to the same extent as Cuba. Whereas the United States on the other hand did "have considerable funds available and the intention to use them" and would "inevitably be the chief customer of Latin America for many years".[201]

The other major point he made was that "pre-revolutionary Cuba was unique in showing such a large number of disruptive factors in a single country"[202] and that in no other country of Latin America could all the causes of the revolution be found. To illustrate this he even drew up a table (see Table 2.1, p.110) identifying nine basic reasons for the Cuban Revolution taking the form it did and showing whether these occurred in other countries.[203] While acknowledging the table gave no more than "a very rough general impression" and that the list of causes was not exhaustive it nevertheless demonstrated the uniqueness of Cuba's position. As already mentioned, in the book on Cuba Seers made the point that "Cuba was probably worse off even than other comparable Latin American countries".[204]

In addition, in his opinion, there were other reasons for believing revolutionary movements would not have the political driving force that some people in Washington feared: the experience of the past century and a half suggested that the masses of Latin America required "very great provocation before they are moved to revolutionary action" and also the Catholic Church was "still a stabilising influence".[205] Nevertheless, he acknowledged there was hardly any country where it could be said confidently that a revolution was impossible since the table indicated every one in the region had a number of reasons for discontent, and even if a revolution did not occur it was at least likely that "*some* quite radical governments" would come to power within the next decade.[206]

The situation necessarily posed a dilemma for United States policy makers and the Alliance for Progress, which had been aiding some governments in the area in an attempt to accelerate economic and social progress and prevent political discontent mounting to revolutionary proportions. The Alliance itself, however, had encountered problems, observed Seers, in that it had not always proved possible to control the actions of recipient governments - those political groups in Latin America most likely to carry out the required social reforms were "in some cases ... either Castrophile or at least rather unpalatable to the State Department" and likely to threaten American plantation or mineral interests, whereas the more conservative governments which promised to undertake reforms, after assistance, often reversed their policies.[207] For officials in Washington, he remarked, the outlook seemed gloomy, as Latin America could no longer be considered a safe sphere of

	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Ecuador	Mexico	Paraguay	Peru	Uruguay	Venezuela	Central America (a)
(i) Dominance of foreign capital in export sector (b)	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No.	Yes	No	Yes	Yes/No
(ii) Great rural-urban contrast	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
(iii) Great income inequality	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
(iv) Chronic stagnation ...	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes/No
(v) Severe underemployment	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
(vi) Severe administrative weakness (c)	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
(vii) Strong envy of U.S. living standards ...	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No
(viii) Revolutionary tradition (d)	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
(ix) Political machinery very undemocratic (e) ...	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes

(a) The classification is of course particularly rough here. Moreover the answers indicated do not cover the case of Costa Rica, which has very different characteristics than those of the rest of Central America. (In many ways Costa Rica has features in common with Uruguay). However, Panama, Haiti and the Dominican Republic are in most respects similar to Central America.

(b) There are also cases, such as Brazil and Mexico, where foreign influence is strong enough in other sectors to be politically important (e.g., in manufacturing).

(c) This is a particularly difficult matter to decide. Even in the few cases shown as not being severely inefficient, there are grave weaknesses in some areas (e.g., Argentine railways). One decisive question is whether corruption pervades the administrative structure.

(d) Cases of social revolutions within the past century. What may be just as important are cases of unsuccessful rural violence e.g., in Brazil, Peru and (particularly) Colombia.

(e) Another very difficult question. One clue is whether over 50 per cent of the public voted in recent Presidential elections (assuming these were genuine contests). On that basis, only Argentina, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela would count. Yet both Argentina and Venezuela have experienced mainly military dictatorships since the war, and even in Venezuela one could not say that there was now full freedom of the press or of organisation. In Mexico the result of the election is always a foregone conclusion, but the government party is in some ways susceptible to popular pressures; similarly, in Chile, although the participation in elections is low, there is some feeling of popular consultation.

Table 2.1 Rough indication of the presence (or absence) of various causes of revolution in Latin America (*Source*: Seers, "Latin America and U.S. Foreign Policy", *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 2, April-June 1963, p.210.)

interest for the United States (drawing a parallel with the problem facing the British and French of how to retreat gracefully from former colonies "as the pressures of change grew overwhelming".[208])


But while Seers made the point that another Cuba seemed unlikely and that in any case the presence of more radical governments in Latin America need not necessarily cause alarm in the United States, he recognised the US temptation "to dabble in the affairs of the region" was still strong - despite the problems encountered by the Alliance and the lessons of the Cuban experience.[209] The United States, he observed, appeared to be unprepared to contemplate the presence of more radical or revolutionary governments in Latin America and to be bound to a policy of "permanent counter-revolution", its relationship with Latin American governments dependent on whether it helped Washington in the Cold War or not.[210]

The significance of the Latin American experience

There is no doubt that the time spent in Latin America and later at Yale proved an important formative experience for Seers, as he became more aware of the nature of the problems facing primary producers, particularly of the external factors impinging on their development. This included now a greater appreciation of the significance and consequences of private overseas investment and of the international political pressures that were brought to bear on governments (particularly by the USA in the Latin American region) fueled by Cold War tensions.

However, besides proving a learning experience, it has been observed that Seers played a more positive role during this period, being "a key figure in defining the relationship between Caribbean, Latin American and 'Western' writers on development both through his writing [particularly between 1958 and 1963] and his personal influence", providing a link between "ECLA, economists and governments in Jamaica and Barbados, English economists working on development problems (particularly at Oxford), and the Yale Economic Growth Centre".[211] In this capacity he brought to the attention of English-speaking economists the work of the Latin American structuralists, incorporating almost all the points which later came to be presented as characteristic of the dependency school - though dependency was not a term that was used, at least by Seers, at this time. This assessment was made by the English economist G.E. Cumper, who was working at the University of the West Indies in Kingston, Jamaica, in the early 1960s and was a member of the mission which Seers led to Cuba. In making this point Cumper was counteracting a claim by Norman Girvan that the Caribbean school of dependency was a completely autonomous development, whereas Cumper saw it as a reflection of the larger Latin American debate, with Seers playing a key role in the cross fertilisation. In Cumper's view the only important area missing from Seers' writings at this time was that of the plantation economy and its implications.

John Toye, the current Director of IDS, has also more recently expressed the opinion



that Seers "performed a signal, but undervalued, service to the economics profession in channelling the work of Latin American structuralist economists into the Anglo-Saxon literature in the 1960s".[212]

Seers himself, however, was disappointed that knowledge about and lessons from the area did not attain greater prevalence in the English speaking world. In the 1970s and early 1980s he frequently remarked on how astonished he (still) was at the parochialism of Western European and North American economists who were then discussing monetarism in total ignorance of the similar controversy which had been raging in Latin America for a quarter of a century, observing in 1982, "if our profession had done their homework they would have found important clues for the solution of our own problems in the eighties".[213]

Seers maintained his links with the Latin American structuralists, from which the dependency school later evolved, renewing contact particularly with many of its exiled members following the Chilean coup in the 1970s. While not always agreeing with all aspects of their approach he considered that more relevant lessons for development could often be learned from the Latin American school than from conventional Anglo-Saxon economic theories.

Even in the early 1960s he raised the possibility that industrialised Western countries themselves might learn from the experience of Latin America, commenting that the recent history of the region seemed "rich in lessons relevant to the whole problem of the growth of under-developed economies (and possibly developed economies too)".[214] However, his interest at this time was focused primarily on the problems of the "under-developed economies" and the following chapter will indicate how initially he attempted to apply the lessons of Latin America to the African continent, though the different nature of the situation and problems encountered in there, he soon realised, required a somewhat different approach.

CHAPTER 3: LESSONS FROM AFRICA AND THE ARGUMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL AID

After concentrating mainly on development issues in Latin America and the Caribbean for over five years, in 1963 Seers was appointed Director of the Economic Development Division of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), another United Nations regional secretariat. Here too he was confronted with widespread poverty and problems of underdevelopment and made even more aware of international inequalities, as primary producers in Africa were in general poorer, in per capita terms, than those in Latin America.

Africa, however, presented a very different scenario to that of Latin America as the early 1960s were witnessing "the wind of change" sweeping through the continent as a wave of newly independent countries were emerging from colonial rule to independence and assuming political responsibility for their own future development policies - and expectations were high. The year 1960 in particular had witnessed the independence of a spectacular number of countries especially in West and Central Africa - Chad, East Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), the Belgian Congo (later Zaire), Dahomey (later Benin), Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Togo and Upper Volta - and as Seers took up his post in East Africa, Uganda and Kenya had also joined their ranks in 1962 and 1963 respectively, and Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia were preparing for independence in 1964.

As the newly independent countries took up their seats at the United Nations, amounting to what Seers described as the "enfranchisement of the underdeveloped world",[1] they began to express their dissatisfaction with the international terms of trade and to demand reforms at the 1964 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). At the same time former colonial powers, and the United States, were anxious to reaffirm and protect their vested interests and trading relationships with these primary producers.

Looking back to this period from the perspective of the 1970s and 1980s Seers observed, "From the viewpoint of the governments of the major capitalist countries, there was grave danger that ex-colonial countries might, if there was little social progress, fall under Communist domination: then investment opportunities and access to markets and sources of raw materials would be diminished"; he spoke in terms of "neo-colonialism" replacing colonialism and referred to the United States' role in helping to overthrow Lumumba (regarded as a left-wing, nationalist leader) in the Congo in 1961, in order to protect Western "neo-colonial" interests.[2] However, in the early 1960s the issues were not addressed quite so directly in Seers' work (the word "neo-colonial" not featuring in his writings until the late 1970s). Nevertheless, the underlying concerns of the Western powers for their economic and political interests, as well as the expectant hopes of the newly independent nations, were undoubtedly apparent at the time and indeed are reflected

in the reports Seers produced. And although he made no specific reference at the time to the Congo crisis, there were more general references to "political disorder" or "ominous" political events - which he cited as added incentives for increased international aid.

During his time at ECA, Seers was involved in two major pieces of work - embarking on a new Economic Survey of Africa, producing himself the section on the Republic of South Africa, and heading a UN economic mission to Zambia.[3] Both of these reports will be considered in this chapter and attention given to his increased concern with the subject of international aid - financial and technical - which grew out of his experience of Africa in 1963-4.

Latin American Lessons in Africa

During his first months in Africa Seers admitted he was still very much influenced by his work at ECLA and was "too 'Latin American'" in his approach, particularly in "putting too much weight on the foreign trade bottleneck and not enough on education".[4] This influence was particularly demonstrated in his enthusiasm for import substitution industrialisation as an integral part of development policy in Africa. At the first University of East Africa conference on "Public Policy: the Machinery of Planning" held at Kampala in September 1963, for example, he observed "Even if there were no population increase the 'wind of change' now blowing at near gale strength, would in itself make development, and therefore import substitution, imperatively necessary"[5] - thereby practically equating development policy in the continent with import substitution. Using the sort of calculations familiar at ECLA he maintained that industrialisation for Africa was "an essential part of any programme for economic growth at more than five per cent a year, as is necessary under East African conditions with a population increase of nearly three per cent a year, and rising political demands" and that the "first step in a development strategy" was "to look through a list of imports and see what items (agricultural or industrial) one could make at home"[6] to prevent the leakage of purchasing power out of the country, or region. As in Latin America, he urged the necessity of protective policies and tariffs, suggesting too the possibility of economic union with neighbours to enlarge markets.

However, he did temper these recommendations with certain cautions, for example, rejecting what he termed the fallacy that the importance of industry should be over-emphasised compared to agriculture. To neglect agriculture, he argued, was as serious as neglecting industrialisation and, for the swelling town labour forces to be fed, continued attention needed to be paid to agricultural production. Equally, he pointed out manufacturing itself was not expected to provide a great deal of employment; but, if industry developed, the consequent rise in incomes would "permit a substantial expansion of employment to take place in the economy as a whole". A quick fall in the expenditure of foreign exchange should also not be expected, because of the need for continued imports, as well as "a rising outflow of profits to foreign investors"; but it was anticipated

that industrialisation would make it possible for incomes to rise faster than imports, and that eventually after a decade or so, dependence on the proceeds of a few primary products would be lessened.[7]

One country that was adopting an "industrialisation first" strategy was Ghana, which had achieved independence in 1957 under Nkrumah's leadership but by the early 1960s was suffering growing foreign exchange problems due to diminishing export earnings, particularly from cocoa. In April 1963 Seers was one of a number of international economists invited by Nkrumah to discuss a Seven Year Development Plan, drawn up in 1961 and intended to become operational from 1964;[8] it aimed to establish the predominance of the state sector in both industry and agriculture, though financing this largely by external loans. Unfortunately, no record has been found to Seers' reactions to the Plan, which envisaged a scale of industrialisation programme far exceeding anything foreseen by his Gold Coast Report of the early 1950s, when the growth of manufacturing had been regarded as "necessarily very slow" and it was anticipated the country would remain "predominantly a country of peasant farmers" (see Chapter 1, p.54). Ingham has reported (from the first-hand experience of Killick who was present at the 1963 conference) that the experts offered little fundamental criticism of the strategy, their constructive advice being directed largely at technical aspects of the plan; and indeed Seers' only recorded comment some years later was to the effect that the phases of the 7 year plan did not accord with those of the Volta River project.[9] Ingham herself has argued that "what happened in Gold Coast/Ghana at this time was broadly in line with the policy advice on offer then from Western economists such as Seers" - particularly with regard to its emphasis on *national* economic planning and the massive import substitution programme.[10]

An indication of Seers' link with Ghana at this time and the transfer of his own thoughts on import substitution from Latin America to Africa was the publication in the *Economic Bulletin of Ghana* in 1963 of his stage-by-stage analysis of the economic development of a primary producer adopting a policy of import substitution, based on the Latin American experience. Ghana's growing foreign exchange problems were similar to those faced by Latin American economies, he observed, and the model fitted the experience of Ghana quite well, with the economy entering the phase of an "open economy under stress" in about 1955 and the period of a closed economy in a period of "easy import substitution" in 1961.[11]

However, Ghana's experience was by no means typical nor even a model most African economies were able - or perhaps even wished - to emulate. Ghana's balance of payments difficulties and its resort to foreign borrowing, for example, though similar to the situation faced by many Latin American countries, was by no means typical of most African countries at this time, which though deemed poor, were not among the world's leading debtors and many were in fact net creditors in the early 1960s.[12] Having considered during his time in Latin America that structuralist ideas were sufficiently general to cover "perhaps all underdeveloped countries"[13] Seers, therefore, came

increasingly to recognise major differences in patterns of development between Latin America and Africa and his practical work during his time at ECA brought out essentially different circumstances.

> This job brought out strikingly that although a basically different theory was needed in Latin America from what was taught in the industrial countries, what suited Latin America was not by any means what was needed in tropical Africa. For one thing, the foreign exchange constraint is far less important (except perhaps in Ghana and the Congo-Kinshasa); the dominant constraint is high-level manpower, especially in Zambia where there were barely 100 African graduates at the time of independence.[14]

It was as a result of his time in Africa that Seers in fact developed a greater interest in manpower issues and became more concerned about the need for technical assistance and increased financial aid in such areas. We will first, however, look at the content of his work in South Africa and Zambia and then consider more fully his arguments for the mobilisation of more international aid.

Economic survey of South Africa

The new economic survey of Africa aimed to provide an up-to-date comparative analysis of the experiences, development efforts and achievements of the new African countries and to increase understanding of the major problems they faced as they attempted "to build modern and viable economic societies", illuminating "the range of possible solutions," and looking particularly at the potential for and benefits of closer "economic co-operation" and "inter-country collaboration".[15]

In comparison to the newly emerging independent countries in the continent, South Africa presented a stark contrast. Seers remarked to Jolly that he found his visit there "as interesting as Cuba"[16] - though obviously for different reasons. The apartheid policies of racial segregation instituted by the South African government, dominated by the Afrikaner National Party, had been met with increasing international criticism, especially from the newly independent countries, and particularly after the Sharpeville shootings of March 1960. Following condemnation of the shootings by the conference of Commonwealth prime ministers in March 1961, South Africa had declared itself a republic and withdrawn from the Commonwealth in May 1961.

Against this background, the ECA report, however, confined itself to presenting a strictly economic assessment of South Africa's problems, with apartheid policies being addressed in terms of the barriers they presented to the country's potential for growth, and changes recommended as a means to ensure future economic progress - reform being regarded as preferable to unrest and possible revolution. Apartheid was therefore presented as unworkable, rather than wrong. At a time when nationalist aspirations for independence were being fulfilled in other African countries, little or no consideration was given directly to the black nationalist movement in South Africa or human rights issues - the black population being presented very much as the object of reform. The terms black and white are in fact not used in the report - the white South African population and

immigrants being described as "European", and the black population as "non-European", African or "those of mixed race" - the terminology reflecting usage in the mid-1960s.

The report initially pointed out that although the South African economy appeared strong with a big industrial sector producing a large proportion of its needs, an unequalled mineral base, diversified agriculture, and an average income of $400 high in comparison with the rest of Africa (where the average was $100), there were "fundamental weaknesses in the internal economy" and "flaws in the social structure" which, it was anticipated, would increasingly impede its growth.[17] Further development, including industrialisation, was considered necessary but it was anticipated this was likely to increase tensions unless certain problems were addressed; "The most conspicuous" of these problems being identified as "the extreme inequality of income distribution" - the "consequence of various forms of segregation,"[18] - for while the average income of Africans was about $100, that of Europeans was over $1,500. This demonstrated very clearly that the average figure of $400 was misleading and that the measurement of per capita income was "not a very meaningful figure"[19] - a further example of the misleading nature of national income analysis, as already pointed out by Seers and an issue he was to take up again a few years later when attempting to identify more relevant development indicators.

The main point made by the report, however, was that such a highly unequal distribution would "act as a brake" on the rapid development which was needed in the internal economy if the present rate of economic progress was to be maintained in the decades ahead.[20] While recognising that many industrially advanced countries had experienced very unequal income distribution during the early stages of development (though none as extreme as South Africa), "the move towards greater equality" had proved "part of the growth process,"[21] and those European countries which had not shown a tendency for more egalitarian income distribution, had failed to share fully in the economic advance of Europe. The inference for South Africa was that a move towards a more equal distribution of income would "gradually become more and more essential as a condition of further progress and this must involve increasing African wages, as is indeed already becoming irresistible"[22] - one of the reasons for its irresistibility being that growing reliance on "non-European labour" in industry was increasing their potential bargaining power and organisation. "If income were distributed more evenly", the report concluded, "and associated political changes took place, ... tensions would be eased and the economic development of South Africa could be accelerated."[23]

However the majority of the "non-European labour" were engaged in unskilled work. The inferior educational provision for Africans and the racial barriers on recruitment to positions of authority in the workplace, the report maintained, presented yet another potential brake on progress since one of the problems South Africa faced for the future, it forecast, was an insufficient supply of skilled and professional European manpower within the country to carry forward the rapid economic progress necessary. While immigration of Europeans with professional qualifications could temporarily help ease the shortage, it was anticipated the flow of such immigrants would dwindle if incidents of political unrest

continued. Further progress therefore required "a widening of the sources of recruitment for professions and skilled jobs" which was "prevented by laws and practices designed to keep the top jobs for the European minority."[24] The logical implication was the removal of racial barriers on recruitment and on geographical mobility and the reduction of inequalities in educational provision,[25] which in most other parts of Africa was already being extended. Initially, however, the report envisaged "a bigger role in the economy for those of mixed race"[26] since they had received more education than Africans and had relatively more political influence; thus tacitly accepting the hierarchy implicit in the apartheid system.

Racial barriers and discrimination in all areas of life had reduced the African population to a miserable existence which was unbeneficial to the economy as a whole, the survey acknowledged. Taking the evidence of an official South African report, which described the (black) industrial working class as "inadequately housed and fed", with a "disintegrated social and family life", "forced to travel long distances to and from work", "falling an easy prey to immorality" and, perhaps more significantly, "political subversion",[27] the ECA report concluded that under the present conditions:

> The labour force does not have the training health or social stability required for an advanced industrial structure, nor can it provide the markets big enough to permit standardized mass production of many types of consumer goods.[28]

In addition, the actual physical enforcement of apartheid required heavy administrative outlays in controlling the movement of the population and often involved what the report considered wasteful and inefficient use of capital - "The provision of separate vehicles, schools, hospitals, etc., for different races wastes capital".[29] Rising internal discontent at economic and political disparities also meant the policy of apartheid itself was "so unpopular" that its enforcement required "mounting non-productive expenditures on military and police forces" which reduced the capacity to finance productive investment.[30] The practical measures necessary to enforce apartheid policy, the report therefore maintained, presented "obstacles to economic development" and mineral and agricultural resources could have been developed faster if such "obstacles" and "flaws in the social structure" had not existed.[31]

The unacceptability of apartheid to the international community, particularly to other African countries, was also regarded as endangering its economic prospects, particularly its export trade and holding up the possibility of continental integration.

> The natural role for the South African economy, with its excellent mineral endowment, and its head start in industry, would be to develop exports of equipment to the rest of the African continent; the path of continental integration is, however, blocked by the unacceptability of this policy of *apartheid* to other African nations. In fact, South Africa faces the prospect of a decline in its exports as African governments take over control in neighbouring territories and as the pressure of concerted action against the Republic mounts.[32]

The report envisaged some firms could be reluctant to continue to invest in South Africa since they "might themselves become the object of boycott campaigns in other countries."[33]

The ECA report concluded that the logic of the situation required a bigger role in South Africa's economy for the non-European races. Although it was recognised that their mounting economic strength would "make policy dilemmas more acute", on the other hand denial of any political advance was regarded as potentially economically counter-productive.

> If political advance is conceded to them, it will cause institutional changes (e.g. union recognition, enfranchisement) which will pave the way for further advance; yet if it is resisted, this will involve repression of a type that arouses opinion in other African countries to demand stronger action against the Republic, increasing the military burden and involving further set-backs to foreign trade.[34]

A solution of political problems was therefore regarded as a means of paving the way to a faster growth rate, with an expansion of exports to other African countries, "as the artificial obstacles to development were removed".[35]

References to political advance for the black population as a concession (rather than a right) and to apartheid as "an artificial obstacle to development" (as opposed to an abuse of human rights) now appear highly insensitive, and at the time seemingly gave little recognition, and only very indirect support, to the demands of the black nationalist movement for a united democratic South Africa. However, the ECA report aimed to present a strictly economic survey of the situation in South Africa and a reasoned economic argument demonstrating the unworkability of apartheid and the pragmatic need for political change to ensure future growth and prosperity, rather than addressing the political, moral and human rights aspects of the issue. As such it was mainly aimed at those then in positions of authority - the South African government and business interests, both internal and international - who were considered to be in a position to change policy.

While economic issues did eventually contribute to forcing political change on the South African government, it took longer to bring about than was anticipated in the early 1960s; the economic, political and military strength of South Africa in the region having been underestimated, while both the potential room to manoeuvre of neighbouring African countries and the degree of international commitment to concerted action against the Republic were overestimated. The structure of South African trade had too many advantages for its main creditors,[36] the United Kingdom and the United States, who were slow to react and jeopardise these interests, while Western companies continued their economic investment in and support for South Africa for several years to come, before having seriously to contemplate the repercussions of boycotts.

Zambia - planning in action

The job Seers himself found most interesting during his time at ECA was as leader of a joint UN, ECA and FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) mission to Zambia (or Northern Rhodesia as it was still known at the time).[37] The request for an advisory mission came from the government in September 1963 which considered it did "not have

the expertise and resources required to meet all of its planning needs"[38] in light of the fact it was to take overall responsibility for the economic affairs of the country when the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was terminated on 31 December 1963. The purpose of the mission was therefore to help the government "to establish the broad framework and policy of an integrated economic and social development plan and to elaborate the transitional programme"[39] assessing needs for personnel, technical assistance and further studies. Seers arrived in the country in November 1963, a month before the dissolution of the Federation and, following elections, Kenneth Kaunda, leader of the United Nationalist Independence Party (UNIP), was appointed prime minister in January 1964.

After the experience of planning in Latin America and his advisory role in the West Indies, the mission to Zambia provided an opportunity for Seers to become practically involved in planning in a situation where the new government was attempting to make a fresh start for the imminently independent country. He headed a team comprising six experts and sixteen consultants and research officers, who were not all necessarily in the country at the same time, but spent varying periods of time there ranging from two to ten weeks. Richard Jolly, who had previously accompanied Seers to Cuba, was one of the team, producing the sections of the report on manpower and education; he records that the whole report was constructed in close liaison with Kaunda's cabinet, which devoted four whole day sessions to the mission's work, in addition to detailed discussions with individual ministers and the prime minister himself.[40] It was finally submitted to the Cabinet in March 1964 and later that year on 24 October the independent republic of Zambia came into being with Kaunda as president.

The report is a detailed and wide-ranging analysis of the Zambian economy and even after Seers' death, and therefore taking into consideration all his later work, Jolly in fact described it as "Dudley's best report", expressing admiration for the way in which he went about the task of focusing the mission's efforts, in co-operation with Zambian officials, on identifying the strategic issues and working out policy options and recommendations "in a process of professional analysis and political interaction which is probably unique in the experience of international technical assistance missions".[41] However, Jolly himself was not uncritical of some aspects of the report and his observations will be taken into account in the following discussion.

The "peculiar" economy of Zambia

The report began with an economic assessment of the country which only highlighted the daunting task facing the new Zambian government inheriting the consequences of both colonialism and more recently federation. The very first paragraph in Chapter I stated "The great majority of the people of Zambia are poor, under educated (if not illiterate) and unhealthy"[42] and a picture emerged of a very unequal, segregated society, highly dependent on the production of one commodity, copper, and experiencing slow growth.

What is termed the "peculiar economy" of Zambia was dominated by the production

of copper, which accounted for nearly two-thirds of the country's total commercial product, and meant the economy was highly exposed to constant fluctuations in the world copper market.[43] However, since almost all the industry's capital was held abroad by the three main companies involved in mining the copper, most of the profits and royalties flowed out of the country.[44] Nevertheless the "relatively small proportion" which did flow into the Zambian economy still provided a great part of the government's revenue and the industry itself and its off-shoots provided most of the commercial and professional incomes in the country. A corollary of dependence on the sale of one commodity, noted by the report, was a serious dependence on imported consumer goods and equipment which, it was observed, reflected "the failure to develop local industries".[45] Unemployment was high, particularly for Africans, whose standard of living was very poor and the greatest failure of this economic structure, the report maintained, was that it had "proved incapable of absorbing labour in productive employment".[46]

Although the situations of South Africa and Zambia were so fundamentally different, they shared certain features in common such as glaring inequalities between rich and poor, and white and black, and the lack of an educated and skilled African workforce. In the rural areas it was noted there were "almost no industries, few schools or hospitals, and agriculture" was "extremely backward". Africans lived in low standard housing, on a monotonous and inadequate diet, prone to diseases, making little contribution to the economy, compared to their potential. In the towns too, despite the superficial prosperity, the same conditions of poverty and deprivation prevailed, aggravated by the high level of unemployment. Those Africans with jobs were marginally better off but were nearly all unskilled manual workers.[47]

By comparison, the report observed, Europeans were "enjoying vastly superior standards of living, housing, educational and medical care". This very small minority had the best paid jobs in the mines and the railways, worked the most prosperous farms, owned nearly all the financial wealth and held almost every senior position in the civil service.[48]

This racially based inequality had been buttressed by "the segregated school system, with separate and highly unequal facilities for pupils of different races" which was described as a "particularly awkward inheritance" for Zambia and accounted for the fact that on the eve of independence there were fewer than a hundred Africans with degrees. Segregated hospitals and prison systems, and different standards of agricultural extension services for African and European farmers, presented further examples of inequality.[49]

As well as facing these deep imbalances, gloomy predictions were being made about Zambia's economic future, particularly by the white community both within the country itself and in neighbouring Southern Rhodesia, formerly too a member of the Federation but now governed by the Rhodesian Front party implacably opposed to the idea of African majority rule.

Seers, however, was optimistic about Zambia's future and this was reflected in the report which maintained that immediate prospects for the country had improved with the dissolution of the Federation and the immanence of independence. Despite the deep

structural defects which still marred the economy, it was optimistically forecast that the way lay open for "a surge forward",[50] and that Zambia was fortunate "in having a great potential for growth".[51]

The mission presented an economic appraisal of the situation and, bearing in mind the political objectives of the government, indicated what could be achieved if certain policies were adopted. The general objectives to which the economic strategy of the report were directed, as worked out in discussions with the Cabinet, were: to raise employment and living standards; to promote greater equality (between urban and rural areas, rich and poor, and European and African); to encourage "Zambianisation" and broad educational advance as a step towards creating a multi-racial society; and to create a sound economy in order to provide stability and permit further progress, without causing social disruption in the process. There was a desire too that the development of Zambia should be thought of as part of the regional development of the continent, especially of East-Central Africa.[52]

Underpinning the report and its economic projections was the use of a modified input-output accounting table (used most recently by Seers in the planning offices of Jamaica and Trinidad), adapted to the essential characteristics of the export-orientated economy of Zambia. Seers admitted that some of the statistics used for these calculations were "very rough", "the estimates of future productivity changes were little better than guesses" and that there were "inevitable sources of error and inescapable uncertainties about the future when one is dealing with a country at such a low level of economic development".[53] But nevertheless the accounting frame had been adapted to local circumstances, and, in accordance with his previously expressed views, he put more faith in the calculations and main policy conclusions so derived, than in "the use of sophisticated programming methods" from developed countries which he considered were not useful or feasible for the local conditions and could have diversionary or even dangerous consequences.[54]

The avoidance of social disruption and maintenance of political stability were underlying concerns of the report, which saw a potentially dangerous "dichotomy" appearing now that political power was passing out of the hands of the "Europeans" who, however, still glaringly retained most of the economic and social power.[55] While on the one hand Africans had "somewhat unreal expectations" of what could be achieved "simply by gaining Independence", observed the report, on the other, among the expatriates, there was "a general feeling of insecurity", and many were "not fully reconciled to recent developments".[56] The mission in fact met with opposition from the broader white community, particularly the civil servants, and it was acknowledged that in all newly independent African territories there was "a problem of accustoming the Europeans to the need for political and economic change".[57] The report, however, attempted to accommodate the interests of both Africans and Europeans and, while advocating the rights of the newly politically independent country and urging the acceleration of "Zambianisation", at the same time it made efforts to allay the fears of the expatriate community to prevent them leaving the country and depriving Zambia of skilled manpower and economic investment. But the potentially conflicting interests of these two

groups are apparent in the various issues discussed.

Six "key and controversial issues"[58] on which hard decisions had to be taken for Zambia's economic future were identified: copper production, foreign exchange and taxation, wages and prices, high-level manpower, the Europeans, and trade links with neighbouring countries. We will look at each of these briefly and in addition the report's recommendations regarding transport and agriculture.

Copper production and foreign exchange

"Since the Government will rely on the mines of Zambia to pay for the imports needed to develop the country, policy towards this sector is of vital importance"[59] stated the report, recommending as central to strategy an expansion of copper output as the main earner of foreign exchange. To achieve a rise in the capacity of the copper mines, however, it was recognised there was a need for mutual consultations and a "marriage of convenience" between the Government and the private overseas based companies concerned, with the major understanding that the mining companies would not be nationalised for at least fifteen years. Such a recommendation marked a fundamental change from the approach of the 1950's consultancy missions to the Gold Coast and Burma, in which Seers had been involved, when little recognition had been given to or significance placed on the role of the private sector and overseas investment in development programmes which were regarded as essentially the responsibility of the government and the public sector.

Since both sides fundamentally needed "a secure political and economic climate in the critical years" that lay ahead the report observed that "the main interest of the companies (a safe and growing body of profits)" was "not incompatible with the chief concern of the Government (to be able to rely on an upward trend in revenue to finance its development plans)".[60] Such an arrangement would also bring many "intangible benefits", it was anticipated, whereas "Conversely, antagonism would harm industry and Government, and if relations deteriorated to the point of nationalization, both would suffer".[61] Consequently first among a summary of the mission's principal recommendations was that

> An agreement should be proposed with the Copper Mining companies in which the Government would undertake to refrain from nationalising them, to limit taxes on copper, and to consult with the companies on matters of mutual interest. The companies would undertake to adhere to an agreed schedule for expanding capacity and output, and for Africanizing the labour force; and to make technical information fully available. In order to cement this understanding, arrangements could be made for the Government to receive equity shares in lieu of royalties and taxes, thus giving it direct participation in the industry.[62]

The companies were urged to realise that although some of the measures might appear "drastic", the conditions they had so far enjoyed could not last; the new recommendations were only what was appropriate for an independent country - the question for the industry being "whether political stability could be maintained for any length of time at a cheaper price".[63]

Seers' report maintained that the Zambian government was "pragmatic" on the question of private enterprise and recognised the country must depend on it for the foreseeable future "including expatriate firms".[64] Jolly, however, has acknowledged that these were "enormously delicate issues" at time and in 1971 commented that the emphasis on the agreement by Government not to nationalise the companies before 1970 did seem "a little tame" in the light of later reforms (in the Mulungushi and Matero Declarations) which the government were obliged to implement.[65] For despite recommendations for a greatly strengthened Ministry of Mines, whereby it was envisaged the government could increase its administrative control over the industry, the appeals of the Seers' report for co-operation in a marriage of convenience were obviously insufficient to bring about a change in companies' operations as they continued to remit excessive profits abroad with little attempt to reinvest in the local Zambian economy.

At the UNIP conference of 1968 at Mulungushi, therefore, President Kaunda declared it unacceptable that the Zambian economy continue to be directed by foreign firms and criticised the mining companies for still expatriating a large portion of their profits at the expense of mining development, announcing that from then on the maximum they would be allowed to remit abroad was half their profits, the other half being utilised for further development of the mines. Little action resulted and at Matero in 1969 Kaunda followed up his earlier declaration with a demand that owners of the mines give 51 per cent of their shares to the state. Although there was a major reorganisation with the formation of two new companies (Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines and Roan Consolidated Mines), "The foreign companies still kept effective control of the mines".[66]

While the report's recommendations concerning the mining companies were over cautious, proposals concerning the collection of royalties had more positive results for the Zambian economy. In order to ensure that as much foreign exchange as possible was made available to finance the development programme, the report advised the government to reduce the outflow of profits and royalties suggesting "this could be done by taking over the royalties collected by the BSA Company [British South African Company Ltd] and by levying a 5 per cent duty on the exports of copper".[67] Taking over the BSA royalties was a measure that the Zambian government fully endorsed and successfully achieved on the eve of independence (at a price of only £2 million); it was regarded as a bold step by the Kaunda government, representing "a successful economic coup over expatriate vested interests in the mining sector".[68]

One of the problems about relying on the output of copper for the bulk of Zambia's foreign exchange was its vulnerability to world recession - the fluctuation of its price, and thereby of government revenue, making planning projections very difficult. However, the report assumed there would be no major recession in the near future, and in fact suggested Zambia take measures to avoid such an occurrence by convening a major international conference of copper producers to consider ways to stabilise prices.[69] It was, however, anticipated that the existing and prospective supplies of foreign exchange would be sufficient to provide a cushion against a moderate slump.

In 1971 Jolly concluded that Seers' mission had been "unnecessarily pessimistic"[70] concerning copper production and had also greatly underestimated developments regarding copper price for that period. As it turned out this was perhaps just as well since increases in other sectors of the economy, particularly agriculture, were tremendously overestimated, though overall the growth in real national income as a result of the copper price was faster than had been anticipated. However, in subsequent years the price dropped considerably again[71] with consequent repercussions for national income - demonstrating the problems of making accurate projections of future trends for planning when drastic fluctuations in world markets could occur.

In addition to revenue anticipated from the copper industry, Seers' report in 1964 suggested personal taxation should be increased in an effort to reduce the import of consumer goods, especially luxuries, though import controls and quota restrictions were not recommended.[72] It was estimated that the expansion of government revenues from the new taxes suggested would cover the whole development programme and that private sector profits would be adequate to cover the investment required.

One "almost unique feature" of the development plan for Zambia, noted the Seers report, was that it was "not necessary to rely on any (net) flow of capital from overseas".[73] It was estimated that changes in royalty arrangements and increases in taxes would ensure a sum of public and private savings sufficient to finance the necessary scale of capital development and it was concluded that if the recommended policies were carried out, there would be no *net* need for foreign capital at least for the first five years.[74] Discussion of overseas financial aid (the provision of which Seers came to consider essential for many areas of Africa), therefore, did not appear in the report since it was thought unnecessary - though technical aid in the form of manpower was considered crucial as will be seen below. Acquiring loans from overseas bodies was considered a possibility for the future only when political stability had been demonstrated and economic development had become reasonably rapid.[75]

Wages and prices

The wage and salary question, the report warned the Zambian Cabinet, was

> perhaps the most serious problem facing the Government: its decisions on the wages and salaries it pays itself, and the way it exercises its influence on wages and salaries in the private sector, may be decisive in determining whether Zambia will become during this century a modern developed country.[76]

Economic development was equated with "wartime mobilization"[77] and as such required drastic, stringent action. The government was therefore urged to formulate a national wages policy, including a wage freeze, so that it was able to improve standards of living in other ways, through raising employment, achieving educational goals and rehousing people - "there must be widespread realization that Zambia can have big increases in wages or big increases in employment, *not both*".[78] A necessary corollary of a wage

freeze was that prices should not rise and, although the report considered extensive price controls should be avoided, the main need was seen to be "to stabilize prices of key items in the consumption of Africans".[79]

To convince the public that a wages policy was necessary to achieve an improved standard of living, it was suggested the government solicited the assistance of trade unions to explain the purpose of the policy - and to avert strikes.

> Accelerated economic development (like wartime mobilization) changes the functions of many sections of society, not least trade union officials. One of their jobs is now to help extend employment and raise production - and to explain to wage-earners the purpose and implications of development policy. Most important of all, as leaders who see the significance of economic development to the people of Zambia, they should do all they can to avert strikes in key industries - whatever the provocation.[80]

In return for carrying this responsibility, the government was urged to consult with the unions, formally and informally, on central economic issues - recommendations that are reminiscent of Seers' advice for the post-war production drive in New Zealand in 1946 (see Chapter 1, p.36).

One of the specific recommendations concerning wages was a "Recognition that Africans moving into European jobs cannot reasonably expect to be paid expatriate salaries"[81] since, it was argued, a highly unequal distribution of income would prejudice both economic advance and political stability. (This was a problem that had been anticipated in the earlier Gold Coast report; see Chapter 1, p.58.) Although it was suggested that the current income inequalities should be reduced through income tax increases on the higher earners, it was recognised that this might "cause key expatriates to leave"[82] and in fact the report also contained recommendations that Europeans be "compensated to stay",[83] with special contracts including financial inducements.

Considering the massive discrepancies in wages between Africans and Europeans in employment, the bare subsistence level at which the majority of Africans lived, and the fact that most Zambians anticipated independence would bring higher wages and living standards, it is hardly surprising that the recommended policy of wage restraint was not adhered to, with the Brown Commission in 1966, for example, recommending a 22 per cent increase in the wages of African miners.[84] However, such large wage increases, Seers considered, ruined the first Zambian development plan (which had assumed no sharp wage increases)[85] and resulted, in Jolly's view, in many of the consequences predicted by their report: the rural-urban gap doubled "at least half due to the increases in real wages", employment rose less than projected "in part due to the response of employers to higher wages", wage increases in the mining industry resulted in "greatly reduced Government revenue" and wage rises generally caused rises in prices and imports.[86] But, as they both obviously recognised, any policy towards wages and incomes in Zambia was inevitably influenced by the history of racial discrimination and the "the glaring differences" still apparent in the independent nation "between the standards of living of most Africans compared with most non-Africans",[87] and the understandable desire to close that gap.

Manpower needs and Zambianisation

Standards of education were another area where glaring differences occurred. It was estimated that the majority of Africans in Zambia had in fact never been to school at all[88] and "lack of skilled and professional manpower" among this workforce was regarded as "the main obstacle to growth for the next few years, not shortage of foreign exchange"[89] - and that this had potentially dangerous implications for political stability.

> It is not too much to say that Zambia, in terms of high level manpower, is one of the least educated countries in a most under-educated continent. This demonstrable fact presents Zambia with its gravest danger on the eve of Independence. Not merely will the shortage of highly educated people be the greatest obstacle to economic expansion; even political stability could be threatened. Independence and nationhood mean little if the reins of government are not taken up by local hands; every African country which has recently gained Independence faces this task yet many of them have benefited from a preparation very much longer and more complete than that of Zambia.[90]

The urgent need for all forms of education and training to be rapidly expanded in Zambia to prepare a workforce for all sectors of the economy including the mines, agriculture and industry, transport and commerce was therefore one of the major concerns highlighted in the report presented to Kaunda and detailed proposals for the extension of education at all levels were made.[91] Not least, it was recommended, there was a need for a "large number of administrative and executive personnel throughout Government" and for a new Central Planning Office to integrate the development plans prepared in the various ministries. Since there were few Zambians qualified for government posts, four policies were deemed necessary - to "Zambianise" the civil service as quickly as practically possible, to retain expatriates, to increase recruitment from other countries and to use the existing skilled manpower to the best advantage.[92]

The acceleration of Africanisation and Zambianisation (including the appointment of a Director of Zambianisation) were stressed throughout the report though it was recognised the gap between demand for and supply of senior African administrators and other high level staff would not be closed for years. Jolly, who was very much involved in drawing up the manpower section of the report, commented that the plans for the extension of education were in fact much less than was required to meet the targets of full Zambianisation in 1980 and that although this deficiency was realised at the time, proposals for a more rapid expansion of secondary and university education were thought impractical in the circumstances. However, he did consider it a weakness of the report that this problem was not made apparent at the time and that the need for more ambitious proposals were not openly discussed.[93]

To make the best use of existing manpower it was suggested a high level committee be set up to oversee its allocation, with a scheme of rationing introduced to avoid competition between employers to recruit the few people available at each level (with the danger of escalating wages), and with overseas scholarships carefully scrutinised to ensure they accorded with national needs in order to prevent too many students being lost abroad.

In hindsight Jolly commented that the scheme of rationing was "so partially implemented as to be totally inadequate"[94] and manpower inflation resulted, as anticipated.

Because of the acute shortage of qualified Africans the report put considerable emphasis on the need to retain the skills of key Europeans within the country for, it warned, if half of them left within a year of independence as had happened in some other countries, "comprehensive development planning would become impossible, and development itself slowed down, if not reversed".[95] The government was therefore urged to take steps to "convince the European population that development is possible and desirable - indeed essential from the point of view of *their* interests too"[96] and to offer special contracts and adequate incentives, mainly of a financial nature, to encourage them to remain within the country - and to recruit additional manpower from overseas. The need for expatriate manpower in Africa was reflected very much by Seers at the Manchester conference, which took place immediately after the submission of the Zambian report, and where he expressed the hope that it would be increasingly accepted that a large fraction of each profession, including economists, should be working overseas, especially in Africa.[97]

Although regarding the threat of a mass exodus by Europeans "somewhat overdone" Jolly considered the recommendations for maintaining existing and attracting new expatriate personnel "sensible" and that if more of them had been implemented many of the recruitment problems subsequently experienced by the government would have been avoided with positive effects for the Zambian economy as a whole.[98]

Trade links - and transport

Looking to the future the Seers' report recognised that in the regional context Zambia was "at the heart of a great potential market"[99] which offered possibilities for co-ordinating development plans and strengthening trade links with its neighbours, with a view to wider economic integration in Africa. Zambia was considered in a good position geographically and strong enough economically "to play a leading part in the creation of a proseperous [*sic*] trading area, that could later merge with other such areas into a unified economy of Africa."[100]

Within this framework Zambia's relationship with Southern Rhodesia was considered the "most difficult question", though mainly because of the one-sided nature of its trade agreements; for whereas Southern Rhodesia bought very little from Zambia it exported to it a wide range of products, many of which, the report observed, could have been produced in Zambia itself;[101] and the development of Zambia's own manufacturing sector was regarded as having an important and vital role to play if the country was to achieve rapid and sustained economic growth.[102] The report agreed that Zambia would gain by reducing imports from Southern Rhodesia and, while acknowledging there were "many political aspects to this question", suggested that on "purely economic grounds" tariffs might be raised on such imports, pending a trade agreement (though urging caution against

raising prices and undue increases in the cost of living through such measures).[103] A similar approach was suggested towards South Africa, which had until then enjoyed preferential trade agreements with Zambia. While again recognising trade relations with South Africa might "well develop along lines determined by political rather than economic considerations", the report went on "Disregarding politics, ... the same principle should be applied ... as to other countries, i.e. no preferential treatment in the absence of adequate reciprocity".[104] It was, however, impossible to "disregard" the political aspects of Zambia's relationship with its southern neighbours in the region and take a purely economic view of the situation - as the rest of the section also demonstrates.

The report did suggest that trade should be developed with neighbours such as the Congo and Malawi, while large-scale trade with Tanzania (then still Tanganyika) and the rest of East Africa was considered a more distant prospect, requiring considerable transport improvements. But although the need for improved transport for all new trading links was mentioned in the report and recommendations were made for a road building programme, in Jolly's estimation the mission failed to see that transport was in fact a central issue to which it accorded insufficient attention.[105] This was particularly true in respect to the proposed railway link with Tanzania; and resulted mainly from the fact that too little regard was given to the political context of Zambia's position in the region.

Zambia's trade and export links were highly dependent on Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, both of whose governments were hostile to the concept of black majority rule, as well as on a rail link through Mozambique which was under Portuguese control. There was therefore a growing feeling in Zambia that trade links should be strengthened with the north in order to reduce dependency on the politically unsympathetic nations controlling the southern routes and interest grew in the idea of building a railway link from the Zambian copperbelt to the Tanzanian coast to provide an alternative route for the export of copper, thus relieving dependence on the Rhodesian railway system to the south. At the beginning of 1963 in fact Kaunda had maintained "This railway is a political necessity" adding "Even after Rhodesia wins majority rule [an event he obviously anticipated would be more imminent than in fact it turned out to be], there will still be Mozambique and South Africa between us and the sea".[106] He started discussions on the matter with Nyerere that year and by the time of the election in January 1964 UNIP's manifesto undertook to give the railway priority. By the time of the Seers' mission, therefore, there was considerable support for the link in the Cabinet, especially from the prime minister.

However, the Seers' report came to the conclusion that there were neither adequate security nor economic reasons for embarking on such a project. It anticipated that relationships with Southern Rhodesia were "likely to be on a firm basis within the next few years", and although acknowledging "there might still be political difficulties in the 1970's" within the Central African region, "the 'security' case for the link" was not considered "strong enough to weigh very heavily in the final decision"; while the economic reasons were described as "speculative" and thereby not constituting a firm case

for the railway.[107] In addition it was thought there was a risk it would prove "an expensive mistake, setting back the country's development, perhaps seriously", and as such the report recommended that no expenditure should be made on construction, or even a survey, for the time being (though it was not ruled out as a possibility later in the century).[108]

Although the consequences of Southern Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in 1965 (which made a northern link even more vital) might not have been foreseen, many Zambians obviously considered there were already sufficiently strong enough reasons for the link in 1964; but Seers seemingly did not appreciate that the railway could provide a vital means whereby Zambia could increase its economic independence - or self reliance as he would have expressed it in later years. Despite the supposedly close working relationship between the mission and the Cabinet this was obviously one occasion where the planners ignored or failed to appreciate the wishes of the Zambian politicians; and it has been suggested that their judgement might have been swayed by the findings of a World Bank report of early 1964 that had already turned down the project as economically unviable.[109] The failure to deal adequately with this topic and assess the commitment to the link was in Jolly's estimation "Perhaps the greatest misjudgement" of Seers' mission - "a political and economic error" - which proved "a real political disappointment in the report and may have lost some political support for its other proposals".[110]

The question of the railway in fact arose again the following year in March 1965 when Kaunda approached the Labour government then in power in the UK to re-examine the question of aid for the Tanzania/Zambia railway. Harold Wilson asked Barbara Castle, then Minister of Overseas Development, to look at this proposal, but she responded that her experts (one of whom was Dudley Seers at the time, though he is not mentioned by name) did not consider it an "economic proposition" or "top development priority", though an offer was made at this stage to contribute towards a feasibility survey.[111] For Zambia and Tanzania, however, the railway became more vital following Ian Smith's UDI in December 1965, and as a result of Britain's refusal to help, they turned to the Chinese for assistance in building the link.

Agriculture

Although agriculture was not included in the list of "key issues" it nevertheless had a prominent place in the report, reflecting the joint responsibility of the FAO in the mission's work. The content of its recommendations was encapsulated in the opening sentence of the chapter on agriculture - "Economic and social progress in Zambia depends on the rapid modernization of its traditional agriculture".[112] Proposals for such modernisation included the reform of land tenure; the reorganisation of marketing and credit institutions; expansion of education and training; resettlement schemes to move families from more crowded rural areas into Chombwa units; and the use of European

expertise and experience to develop African agriculture particularly in the establishment of cattle ranching units and large-scale commercial farms.[113] European achievements were presented as examples to emulate.

> European farmers could contribute greatly to future development because they possess an immense amount of skill and experience, especially in the production of Virginia tobacco, maize and beef. Their high achievements are a valuable index of what can be done. In particular they could help train selected Africans to become large-scale commercial farmers through schemes of apprenticeships, and to supervise Africans on their own farms on a profit sharing basis.[114]

Mechanisation of agriculture, particularly in the provision of tractors[115] (accompanied by training in their use, care and maintenance) was one of the major recommendations intended to achieve a rise in output. The objection that such mechanisation was inappropriate in a country suffering high unemployment was considered invalid because of the shortage of manpower in rural areas.[116] This was another subject on which Seers was to change his views dramatically, for fifteen years later he was utterly opposed to such modernisation proposals advocating instead a return to labour intensive traditional methods of agricultural production (as will be seen below in Chapters 6 and 7).

The proposals made by the mission in 1964 were, in fact, far too ambitious, demonstrated by the fact that commercial output, expected to double between 1965 and 1970, only rose by 8 per cent, a point made by Jolly. However, he had a more pointed criticism of the report's agricultural section - that, while much attention was given to agricultural production, too little attention was devoted to the more fundamental problem of rural development: "Seers failed to see that the whole problem of rural development was one of the central issues of choice at least as important as the six he identified."[117] Although the problem of a widening urban-rural gap was identified in the report, there was, he considered, insufficient consideration given to the need for broad based rural development to offset the bulk of expenditure on and investment in urban facilities.

Response to the Zambian report

Richard Hall has remarked that the Seers' report on Zambia was accepted by Kaunda and his colleagues as "the Bible for national development"[118] though Richard Jolly considered full use was not made of the mission's work, both because of the inadequate response of the government and because of some weaknesses within the report itself.

When the report was published, the Government of Zambia in fact included a prefatory note indicating that it was "for information only" since no final decision on it had yet been taken and that "The views expressed and the recommendations made in the Report do not therefore necessarily reflect the policies and intentions of the Government".[119] But, Jolly has remarked that this did not imply that the report was not generally acceptable but was rather a literal statement that the government had not yet set up a committee to evaluate it in detail and decide what and how recommendations should be implemented (though it appears no such committee was ever in fact set up).[120] There

were areas where the report did have some influence, Jolly recorded, in particular the use by the Zambian Central Statistical Office of the statistical framework developed by Seers for the first National Development Plan. In addition he pointed out that some of its findings were used in manpower planning, some of the financial procedures adopted, and certain changes made in the institutional structure of government.[121]

As we have seen, though, Jolly himself was critical of some of the report's recommendations though he maintained the weak sections were a reflection of the calibre of some of the experts who first drafted them - amongst whom, it should be emphasised, he did not include Seers. The weaknesses of the report, he observed, confirmed "the criticisms that many persons [including Seers] have made of visiting missions in general - that many of the experts are not very expert"; of the twenty-two members of the team he estimated only eight or ten made serious contributions to the final recommendations and although Seers' strong hand as head of mission could remove some weaknesses and integrate the whole, it had been impossible for him to rewrite the complete report.[122]

By the end of the decade there was a growing feeling of disillusion in Zambia with outside high level missions, and at a graduation ceremony at the university in Lusaka in 1969 the Vice Chancellor appealed to the Government to recognise and use the expertise at home before hiring consultants from abroad. However, in the circumstances of 1964, with no Zambian university, few academic and qualified personnel and the civil service dominated by colonial administrators, a report such as that produced by the Seers' mission could not have been undertaken by local people, in Jolly's estimation; in fact, he observed, "an outside mission led by an economist of international reputation had a special role in helping to dispel the rumours, provide a more realistic perspective and give authority and to make specific the economic ambitions of the new Cabinet".[123] At a time when there was a great deal of scepticism, and fear, on the part of many white expatriates at the transfer of political power to a black majority government he regarded Seers' contribution as one of "political courage and vision" which was considerably at variance with that of colonial civil servants at the time.[124]

But, while its support for greater Zambianisation might have been at variance with the wishes of colonial civil servants, it still adopted a fairly cautious approach in accommodating and protecting the interests of the expatriate community. In particular the approach it adopted towards the copper mining companies, recommending a marriage of convenience and avoidance of nationalisation, meant ultimately the companies were enabled to continue exploiting the Zambian economy, later requiring stronger measures to be taken by government. Certainly it did not fulfil "the economic ambitions of the new Cabinet" with regard to the Tanzam railway, demonstrating in this respect a rather limited economic assessment rather than taking into account the wider political context of the scheme.

Compared to other official reports of the day, particularly by the World Bank, however, Jolly maintains "the Seers Report was politically much more aware", as well as "technically more in touch with professional economic analysis".[125] Certainly, the report

demonstrated an awareness of and sensitivity to the social conditions and inequalities prevailing within the country and the internal political tensions that these caused, and it addressed the issues involved in very practical terms, avoiding unnecessary economic terminology. However, while recognising there were political considerations to be taken into account regarding Zambia's external economic relations, the report adopted a rather cautious approach to these issues and based its recommendations on purely economic grounds, either overlooking, or considering there was no immediate cause for concern, in the regional political context.

The necessity for international aid

The poverty and lack of skilled and educated manpower encountered in Africa focused Seers' attention again on global inequalities, the international differences of living standards between developed and underdeveloped areas, and the waste and maldistribution of world resources. He returned to one of his earlier 1950s arguments criticising government expenditure on rearmament for holding back social progress, now drawing particular attention to the waste of expenditure and technical resources on arms, especially nuclear arms, which diverted such resources from being used to end human poverty.[126]

After working at ECLA Seers had also voiced concern about the poverty he had witnessed and the slow rate of growth of primary producers but the size of the gap between the average incomes of such economies compared to Western industrialised countries was even more strikingly evident on the African continent. Latin America, he observed, was in the main "much less poor than Africa or Asia"[127] in terms of both income and manpower resources. On first arriving in Africa, as was mentioned above (pp.114-15), he advocated the adoption of import substitution industrialisation programmes to stimulate growth, but by 1964 he acknowledged that most African countries had "little immediate prospect of exporting manufactures in quantity" and following the Latin American path.[128] The problem of development was "different for Africa", and it was in trying to formulate a response to the different circumstances that resulted in his "eloquent advocacy of aid as a vitally necessary addition to trading receipts"[129] voiced at an international seminar on African primary products and international trade held at the University of Edinburgh in September 1964. Earlier that same month at a conference on foreign aid held at the University of East Africa, Dar es Salaam in September 1964 he had also spoken out on the need for international aid.

While Seers' advocacy of technical assistance from overseas was very much consistent with his prior recommendations in Africa, his strong support for financial aid was something of a new departure. In Zambia, for example, the Seers' report had observed that while outside technical assistance was crucial for the country, overseas financial aid was not necessary. This too had been the conclusion of the Gold Coast report in the 1950s, when finance had not been considered a constraint on development - though by 1964 Ghana had indeed borrowed extensively overseas to finance its development

programme. The majority of African countries at this time, however, as Seers noted, were not leading debtors - and many in fact were "net creditors on short-term account".[130] It was "The special interests of Africa" - the sub-title of his Edinburgh conference paper - which he now argued made international financial aid necessary for Africa's development - though he spoke in very general terms and did not detail the needs of specific countries.

His reasoning was that development in Africa needed to be a good deal faster and growth rates higher if the continent was to have a "reasonable chance of achieving a stable political situation later in the century", calculating that African output needed to grow at a rate of 7 or 8 per cent a year for several decades, measured in terms of per capita income.[131] Since, however, the supply of foreign exchange from the export of primary products could not be expected to rise at this rate (and African economies could not be expected to grow more quickly than their exports) the conclusion he reached was that Africa needed "financial aid on a big scale" and that this aid would have to grow rapidly, if the necessary economic growth was to take place without severe strains.[132] To co-ordinate the supply and distribution of this aid, both financial and technical, he returned to his argument for the setting up of some international machinery for aid, and the eventual establishment of an international fiscal system.

It was at the conference in Dar es Salaam that he explored in more detail the subject of international fiscal redistribution, which he had first considered at Yale (see Chapter 2, p.97).[133] But while earlier he had mentioned there was a need for "machinery" to set in motion some form of redistribution - whereby a substantial and growing fraction of the savings of industrialised countries should be transferred to primary producers to offset the "'built-in' tendency to inequality" and ensure that rates of growth did not continue to fall or diverge - he had not discussed in any detail how the capital was to be raised or what machinery and criteria were needed for its distribution. At Yale though it appears he was thinking mainly in terms of long-term loans at low interest rates rather than gifts of aid as such.[134] However, in 1964, following his experience of Africa, Seers set out in more detail his ideas and reasons for setting up a Commission on World Income Distribution as a first step towards an international fiscal system. He was now no longer talking in terms of loans but of the need for "machinery for making substantial and growing transfers without repayment obligations, transfers that can be relied on to support general long-term development plans".[135]

His new thinking on aid may well have been influenced or at least informed by the demands made at the initial meeting of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), held from March to June 1964 in Geneva. This conference witnessed representatives from seventy-seven of the primary producing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America expressing their dissatisfaction at trading relations with the industrialised nations and demanding reforms, including the adoption of more preferential trade arrangements, commodity stabilisation schemes, and greater financial flows from the richer countries. One reason Seers would have taken a particular interest in its proceedings was that it was greatly influenced by his former ECLA colleague, Raul Prebisch, who in

fact became UNCTAD's first Secretary General when it was decided the initially envisaged one-off conference should be established as a special body of the UN directly responsible to the General Assembly. UNCTAD was a reflection of the fact that primary producers, whose ranks were rapidly being swelled at the United Nations by newly independent countries, were asserting their position as the suppliers of the raw materials and natural products, on which the industrialised countries were dependent. As Seers remarked:

> The recent achievement of independence by a large number of countries has changed the international scene to an extent which we can hardly as yet assess. The resultant enlargement of the General Assembly amounts to the enfranchisement of the under-developed world. Moreover, the degree of co-operation between the 75 [*sic*] 'developing countries' at this year's Geneva Conference on Trade and Development presages future combined action; they have as suppliers of essential materials and fuel to the developed countries, a bargaining position which is as yet hardly realised, let alone used.[136]

Sooner or later he warned the under-developed countries would press more strongly for a redistributive system - the adoption of the "development decade" target growth rate of 5 per cent - and calling of the Geneva Conference - being only an indication of possible future action. His own renewed interest with redistribution can be seen as a response to these changes in the international scene.

Aid too was an issue in the British general election called for October 1964 as the Labour party, out of office for thirteen years, included in its manifesto a commitment to increase the share of national income devoted to essential aid programmes and to set up a Ministry of Overseas Development to co-ordinate the British aid and development programme. Many former colleagues from the old Keep Left group now held prominent positions within the party, and the possibility of their assuming office and being responsible for implementing a more enlightened aid and development policy would inevitably have been of interest to Seers and no doubt also had some influence in focusing his attention on this issue at this time.

The current measures for "international redistribution", most of which was transferred via bilateral aid arrangements, Seers argued, were "both inadequate and primitive": inadequate because sums involved were too small, amounting to less than half a per cent of the total income of the rich countries, whereas he considered this should be at least doubled; and primitive because such aid was basically charitable in nature, being dependent largely on the "whims of the rich instead of being objectively determined and predictable" - it could be cut off at any time, and was often disbursed in a fragmentary way for projects rather than being part of an integrated development strategy, thus making it difficult for governments to plan responsibly.[137] Bilateral aid also inevitably imposed limitations on the independence of underdeveloped countries since it was often "tied" to being spent in the donor country or linked to other political issues, as he had witnessed particularly in Latin American.[138] In addition he considered the present system increased international tensions since poor countries were given opportunities to exploit divisions

between the rich by playing one against the other.[139]

While accepting that there might not be an alternative to bilateral aid for some years Seers argued that ultimately the only satisfactory framework for transfers between rich and poor countries was an international one - a permanent international aid agency, responsible to the General Assembly of the United Nations, which would automatically make transfers to support long-term development plans and particularly assist those countries which were lagging.[140]

Just as greater equality and a reduction of the gap between rich and poor had been assisted in developed countries by the spread of the franchise, stimulating working-class political organisation and calls for social reform programmes, so he envisaged the same might be achieved on the the international plane, as the newly enfranchised developing countries in the United Nations now made their own demands for reform.[141] The analogy was extended to the fiscal system for he envisaged a scheme whereby those countries lagging in development would receive assistance from the international community, "just as, for example, North Wales is permanently assisted by the fiscal system of the United Kingdom, at the expense of South-East England, which however does not realise it gives this 'aid'."[142] In order to raise finances for the new agency he suggested some possible forms of international taxation including assessments of governments based on per capita income, the application of a special indirect tax - such as a tax on airline tickets, and the levy of supplements on national taxes on items such as petrol, alcohol sales or income tax.[143]

In deciding the criteria for the disbursement of aid Seers took the view that the main criterion should be "the simple one of need, measured for example by *per capita* income", or possibly the severity of unemployment, so that the poorest countries were not excluded, rejecting what he termed "the doctrine of 'picking the winners'" - helping only those countries with a big economic potential which would later be self supporting.[144] While eventually he was hopeful there would be an acceptance of the automatic social right to relief of those in need, initially he suggested a large part of aid should be linked to world targets for improving social conditions such as the elimination of unemployment, the achievement of literacy, and improvement in health facilities and standards of nutrition.[145] For countries, like many in Africa, lacking the administrative capacity and sufficient skilled manpower to carry out development programmes, he recommended professional help should be made available to make the financial assistance effective, suggesting that rich countries could be required to provide a specified total of both finance and high-level manpower in the form of technical assistance under the proposed international fiscal system.[146]

The feasibility of any international aid or fiscal system obviously depended, however, as Seers acknowledged, "on the willingness of the rich countries to carry the financial burden" and at first sight, he admitted, it looked as if moves in this direction would be met with intransigent opposition.[147] At Yale, although aware that his arguments for a transfer of funds might seem "unrealistic" (particularly given the balance-of-payments problems

now facing some industrial countries like the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, the United States), he had presented few specific arguments for the co-operation of donor countries - though the increased political and economic stability which it was assumed would result from a greater degree of world equality was an implied advantage.[148] There was almost an assumption that richer countries would naturally adopt a positive attitude towards the idea of redistribution, and other reforms, reflected in such optimistic remarks as "What can reasonably be expected of area-S [industrialised] countries is that they will put themselves in a position to make the necessary contributions" and "Once a policy objective on the distribution of world income is accepted ... the attitude of industrial-area countries will change. If you are committed to someone's support there is not much point in making, for the sake of doctrine, the solution of his economic problems more difficult."[149]

In 1964, however, at the Dar es Salaam conference on foreign aid, Seers spelled out in more tangible and practical terms the "virtues" of moves towards bigger and more international aid arrangements for the developed countries themselves, based very much in terms of their own self-interest. The money given in aid it was argued "would flow back in the form of demand for their exports, and to a large extent for the products of heavy industries" (many of which were standing partially idle at the time), thereby raising economic activity and incomes in almost every country and virtually guaranteeing a "continual expansion of world trade".[150] In addition, as markets expanded, and particularly if the political climate improved, the scope increased for private investment[151] - which he now accepted played an important role in financing and greasing the wheels of development.

Ultimately Seers optimistically envisaged the developed countries would fully accept their responsibility to eliminate human poverty,[152] but in the meantime the threat of political instability in primary producing countries was presented as another powerful reason for taking steps to offset global inequalities and adopting a more positive attitude towards redistribution.

> so long as there is no effective redistributive machinery, the sources of raw materials and foods for the markets of the industrial countries will be threatened by political disorder. In fact, certain developed countries may in the end adopt a positive attitude as a result of political events they find ominous.[153]

In fact, as an international fiscal system developed he believed the general political climate of the world would improve, reducing the risk of local wars and lessening the strategic insecurity of the great powers and enabling them to spend less on armaments.[154]

A further advantage of a secure framework for transfers, Seers maintained, was that it "would reduce autarchic tendencies in the under-developed countries", from which point he went on to outline the advantages of specialisation:

> Under present circumstances, there is really little option for under-developed countries except to industrialise, at whatever the cost to themselves and the rest of the world. Yet it is fundamentally more rational to concentrate the world's industries to a considerable extent in a few countries (especially heavy engineering and chemical

> industries), and to make regular transfers of part of the large potential profits of their expansion to countries at a lower level of industrialisation. The world economy would then become properly integrated, and would grow faster.[155]

Here again he pointed out a parallel with the internal workings of the typical developed country, where industries were concentrated in the main urban centres but the fiscal system operated to benefit the unindustrialised areas. This did not mean that no industries were needed in under-developed countries, or that industrialisation should be discouraged; the point was that with a system for redistribution of resources they would feel the need to do so less acutely. Taken within the context of his earlier comments on the obstructive attitude of the more developed countries towards primary producers attempting to industrialise and the exploitative tendencies of foreign owned companies working there (see Chapter 2, p.99), this depiction of the benign working of a fully integrated world economy presented a somewhat utopian scenario, and seemingly did not take into consideration the prospect that international specialisation could place non-industrialised countries in an even more vulnerable position dependent entirely on regular transfers and the largesse and co-operation of richer economies.

Seers himself acknowledged that the idea of an international distributive scheme still looked utopian in the 1960s and that it was naive to imagine that the developed countries would be persuaded to support it by such arguments as he had put forward alone. Its success, he believed, depended partly on the mounting strength of the under-developed countries, but also on changing attitudes in the developed countries, "an essential prerequisite" being "to change the way in which people think about the relation between national and international policies".[156] It was difficult for anyone to appreciate the need for change in international institutions when the great part of teaching and research on economic problems at all levels was conducted from a purely national point of view and little work had been published on the structure of the world economy or the distribution of world income. As such he considered the parochial nationalism of developed countries needed to be challenged;[157] as similarly "autarchic" tendencies in primary producing countries needed to be reduced. National sovereignty he saw as a hindrance to the ideal working of an international aid system, but the growing interdependence of the world, he envisaged, would lead to greater integration of the world economy and the elimination of economic sovereignty.[158]

As a first practical step to bring about a more positive attitude towards an international fiscal system Seers suggested setting up a Commission on World Income Distribution, to demonstrate the structure and trends of the world economy, and make projections for the future, bringing out the need for financial and technical aid - a type of international plan. The Commission would "give a lead to informed public opinion", "provide career possibilities to those interested in a policy of reform" and undertake research programmes whose findings would be publicised and eventually result in institutional action for the establishment of an international fiscal system. As time passed, Seers envisaged the advantages of such a system would become more obvious to all countries, under-

developed and developed, and obstacles would "melt away".[159] In conclusion he remarked,

> The final outcome, by whatever route it is reached, will be a world economic programme to match human needs against human resources, and including a timetable for reaching certain social and economic targets at certain dates. Conscious long-term economic planning is becoming, in various ways and to various degrees, an accepted feature of the national systems of developed countries. But international planning is still more remote from today's order of business. It may be for the 1980's rather than the 1970's.[160]

In fact by 1980 and the publication of the Brandt report, which called for a new international order and "massive transfers" of resources from rich to poor countries in the mutual interest of both underdeveloped and developed countries, using in essence some of economic arguments cited here, Seers had considerably altered his viewpoint. By then he was sceptical about the benefits of aid, and in fact was actually arguing for its reduction, and no longer supported the feasibility of an international approach to development problems, advocating instead policies of self reliance and the positive nature of nationalism (issues which are taken up in Chapter 7).

In 1964, however, Seers argued that an international approach to development was essential if global inequalities were to be mitigated and a more evenly balanced world economy achieved; and that an essential part of that approach was to increase aid programmes to assist overseas development.

The perspective of 1964

In his work overseas in Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa Seers had witnessed the poor standards of living, low per capita income and slow rates of growth experienced by the majority of primary producing countries, compared to the industrialised economies of North America and Western Europe. In response he had generally supported the structuralist solution of encouraging policies of planned import substitution industrialisation, supplemented by international aid where necessary, to stimulate growth and thereby, it was anticipated, widespread development. Such a process, however, he became increasingly aware, often faced great obstacles not least from the developed economies themselves, and progress in the primary producers therefore depended heavily on co-operation from the richer economies. From his work experience he concluded that needs and priorities were different in different regions; and whereas the main concern in Latin America was to obtain concessions on trade and the lifting of tariff and quota barriers, Africa and Asia were in greater need of financial aid and technical assistance (though he acknowledged this was a generalisation and there were differences within each region). He believed, however, that these differing requirements were perfectly compatible, and that "A world economic system could therefore be established that enabled each underdeveloped area to achieve its objectives",[161] though this ultimately depended on the necessary co-operation from the developed economies.

There were obvious political and economic motivations for the more "developed" economies to co-operate in this process and to assist with aid programmes, which, as has been mentioned (pp.113-14), Seers spelled out more directly when reflecting on this period in later years. However, as he himself acknowledged even in retrospect, "In addition, egalitarian and humanitarian tendencies had been reinforced by wartime propaganda".[162] While, as is apparent from both Chapter 2 and the previous section, he was aware of and included in his argument the political and commercial benefits to developed economies of implementing more enlightened trade policies and contributing towards aid programmes, it was nevertheless the humanitarian, egalitarian and more altruistic reasons for fairer trade and aid policies on which he focused at the time. In 1964 he observed optimistically that "world opinion" was "starting to stir" for better arrangements to redistribute income internationally[163] - partly in response to demands made by the underdeveloped economies which had gained a voice in the United Nations and bodies such as UNCTAD. There seemed to be emerging in the first half of the 1960s, he reflected a few years later, a plausible world economic pattern where, "within a framework of a high degree of international specialization" there would be "a growing involvement of rich countries in the affairs of the poor, an involvement which would lead to rising transfers of public and private capital and of technical personnel, and increasing influence of aid agencies on the policies of recipients" resulting in "a more even balance of growth in the world economy".[164]

The United Nations Development Decade aimed to increase growth in under-developed economies by 5 per cent by the end of the decade, aided by the transference of capital and technical assistance from the richer industrialised countries, and in the first half of the decade Seers had some confidence in the effectiveness of such international bodies and its agencies. In addition to advocating the benefits of an international fiscal system to administer aid, he had himself also encouraged the idea of setting up an international body to advise primary producers on their negotiations with overseas companies (possibly under the auspices of the UN) and supported proposals for building up a body of international experts, including economists, to work overseas in developing countries.

As a result of his experience in Latin America and Africa, however, Seers voiced concern that economists and other experts working overseas should be more appropriately trained and prepared for the task. The subject of training was already also being taken seriously by both academics and government officials[165] in the UK, particularly in relation to the needs of newly independent former colonies, as a stronger focus was put on development studies and new courses in development economics were launched in London, Oxford, Cambridge, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Leeds and Belfast. Seers' challenging paper on "The Limitations of the Special Case" (discussed in Chapter 2, pp.85-6) was in fact used as the background paper for a major conference on "The Teaching of Development Economics", held at Manchester in April 1964. While later reflecting that the pedigree of Development Economics at this time read "From Colonial Economics out of Political Expediency", Seers himself nevertheless looked back on this conference as "a

landmark in the evolution of both the subject and its teaching" since it voiced the first major public misgivings in Britain that "the current, orthodox economic theory [was] inadequate in this field".[166]

A further question raised at the conference, apparently initiated by Joan Robinson, was whether conventional textbook analysis was relevant, not only for the needs of primary producing countries overseas (as Seers argued in his paper), but for development anywhere, western industrialised countries included.[167] Although having some sympathy with this position, Seers himself did not then devote attention to this more fundamental issue, observing "I did not want to move into that battle, which is less obviously winnable",[168] preferring as he put it "to fight one battle at a time", concentrating his efforts on the needs of primary producers. It was not in fact for another ten years - when economic conditions in the industrial "developed" countries had deteriorated considerably, providing mounting evidence that "conventional" economics had proved equally inadequate and irrelevant in their area of origin - that Seers returned to address the broader issue (as will be discussed in Chapter 6).

Already in the early 1960s, however, he believed that industrialised Western countries could themselves possibly learn from the experience of areas like Latin America, and at the conference in 1964 made the suggestion that a student who received instruction in development processes overseas

> would be helped to deal with the problems of the United Kingdom, because the issues in development economics are issues which are relevant to this country too. It would in fact be interesting to study this country as a development problem, using the techniques which have been worked out in underdeveloped areas.[169]

This again, however, was a subject he took up more seriously in later years, particularly in the mid-1970s.

In the mid-1960s his concerns were focused primarily on the condition and problems of the underdeveloped economies of Africa, Asia and Latin America and the imperative to improve their condition; and the new courses on development economics, as well as the discussions at the Manchester conference in 1964, seemed a positive indication that there was serious interest and concern in academic circles to improve research and teaching on the subject. Voluntary bodies, too, were also gaining increasing public support for development work.

Prospects for a more positive approach to development by the British government itself were seemingly enhanced in October 1964 when the political scene changed as the Labour party in fact won the General Election and Harold Wilson became Prime Minister - resulting in major consequences for Seers' own career. Included in the party's manifesto, as previously mentioned, had been the promise:

> Labour will create a Ministry of Overseas Development [ODM] to be responsible not only for our part in Commonwealth Development but also for our work in and through the specialist agencies of the United Nations. This new Ministry will help and encourage voluntary action through those organisations that have played such an inspired part in the Freedom from Hunger Campaign. We must match their

> enterprises with Government action to give new hope in the current United Nations Development Decade.[170]

Since early 1964 a Fabian working group, under the chairmanship of Thomas Balogh, had been determining the shape of the new ministry and, following Labour's victory, Barbara Castle was appointed its first minister of cabinet rank, with Sir Andrew Cohen as Permanent Secretary. One of Balogh's recommendations to the new minister was that an economic planning staff of twenty economists and statisticians should be set up to advise the minister and, on his strong recommendation,[171] Dudley Seers was appointed to head this team. Seers' recollected:

> Within a few hours of the election I was invited to return to England from the Economic Commission for Africa, and establish a staff of economists and statisticians at the Ministry - an unusually flagrant political appointment, for those days.[172]

Seers had already decided to leave ECA at the end of 1964 because of what he termed "personal differences with Robert Gardiner",[173] who was then ECA's Executive Secretary and he enthusiastically took up his new post as Director General of the Economic Planning Staff at the ODM, renewing acquaintances with previous Bevanite colleagues in the new administration and new ministry; though his expectations of what might be achieved for world development by the new ministry under a Labour administration were to prove short-lived, as will be explored in the next chapter of this study. Having spent much of the past thirteen years of Conservative government in Britain in operational roles overseas, his return to the UK marked a decisive turning point and opened a new phase in his career, as he continued to work on development issues, but from the context of a British based institution, first of all the Ministry of Overseas Development and later the Institute of Development Studies.

PART II:

"THE MEANING OF DEVELOPMENT"

CHAPTER 4: THE MINISTRY AND THE INSTITUTE

> Everything seemed to be set up for a new international policy then - a new Ministry, a tough Minister, professional expertise, the right support from some of the most powerful people. How, in spite of these good omens, could things go so wrong? It is now clear that setting up an independent Ministry is merely an empty gesture unless there is real support within the government for its policies.[1]

These words of Dudley Seers and Paul Streeten (who became his deputy on the new Economic Planning Staff (EPS)[2]), written following the Labour Party's defeat in the June 1970 election, reflect the initial optimism in 1964 that a new international policy with a commitment to the relief of world poverty would be ushered in by the Labour government, and the feeling of disappointment and disillusion which gradually set in amongst many of its supporters during the administration. Part of this chapter will be concerned with looking at the background to and reasons for this change of view.

Barbara Castle, the new Minister of Overseas Development, herself observed that although initially the Left felt it was "on its way" in 1964 when Labour took office, "the halcyon days of left-wing hopes were to be short-lived" as Harold Wilson demonstrated he "was taking no revolutionary risks" and "there was a clear right-wing majority in the Cabinet"; caution being dictated by two problems which "threatened to swamp the Government": "Peril No. 1" being "the Government's minute majority" (having an overall majority of only five) so that "From the word go the Government had to act in the knowledge that its life could be very limited" and "Peril No. 2" being the balance of payments deficit, which was standing at £800 million.[3] Although the government's majority was increased at the April 1966 election, economic difficulties persisted, and sterling was devalued in 1967.

Even during the first year at the ODM Seers himself became increasingly aware of the restrictions and limitations which balance of payments difficulties imposed on the new Ministry taking any action, particularly on aid programmes. During the same period, however, several of the government's policy decisions also seemed to contradict the notion that Labour was to pursue a more enlightened international policy. Wilson's emphasis on good relations with the United States as a cornerstone of foreign policy (despite many of his own MPs' opposition to the US's bombing of North Vietnam from early 1965), his attempts to reach a reconciliation with Ian Smith in Rhodesia, the sale of aircraft to South Africa, and the government's introduction of an immigration bill announcing a big cut-back in entry permits hardly exemplified a greater commitment to assist the Third World.

Initially, however, there was an air of optimism within the new Labour administration and enthusiasm surrounding the setting up of the ODM, one of four new ministries promised in the election manifesto.[4] This chapter will look at Seers' work as Director of the Economic Planning Staff at the ODM from late 1964 and his initial hopes and expectations of what the Ministry would be able to achieve, some of them expressed in the 1965 White Paper, which he assisted in preparing, outlining the work of the new Ministry. It will then examine what influence his experience of the "government machine at work"

had on his thinking, particularly with regard to administrative reform of the Civil Service, aid administration, and the Labour party and government itself. Although disappointed that more was not achieved during these years, one major development, affecting his own career, was the establishment of the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) to which he was appointed the first permanent director in August 1967. An outline will be given of the setting up of IDS and the events and busy schedule of Seers' first years as Director until his resignation from the post in 1972. During this period the Institute faced what Seers has termed its "first big crisis" in 1970, when he found himself in the middle of a serious disagreement between the ODM and IDS staff on principles of academic freedom.

This chapter will therefore mainly be concerned with Seers' work and experience at the ODM, his administrative role as director at the IDS, and the (sometimes difficult) relations between ODM and IDS. While an indication will be given of the range of his work and professional activities at the Institute, the influence this had on his own ideas on development during this period of the late 1960s and early 1970s will be covered in more detail in Chapter 5.

Expectations of the ODM

Certainly in the first months of the Wilson administration Seers recalled "morale was high, and ODM an exciting novelty"[5] and he and others concerned with development issues were optimistic that the new Labour government would adopt policies demonstrating its previously proclaimed ideals of international solidarity and pursuing more constructive measures to tackle global inequalities. During their time in opposition many Labour politicians had expressed commitment to the relief of world poverty and the creation of an integrated world community and Seers and Streeten drew particular attention to a book the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, had himself written in 1953 entitled *The War on World Poverty*, which, they observed, was "pervaded by a sense of outrage at the world's social evils", and had called for increased aid flows as part of an international plan.[6] The 1964 Labour Party manifesto itself had also made promises to increase the share of national income devoted to aid programmes and to discuss proposals for expanding the trade of the developing nations, within the context of creating a genuine world community.[7]

The creation of a new ministry under a minister of cabinet rank in itself appeared to demonstrate the importance the government attached to development issues. Discussions had, in fact, taken place during the previous Conservative administration about setting up a Ministry to co-ordinate the aid programme and in June 1964 the Secretary for Technical Cooperation had recommended the setting up of "a single ministry for the management of development aid".[8] However, during a debate in the House of Commons in February 1964, Harold Wilson (then still in opposition) had spoken of a ministry "to take over all responsibility for all Commonwealth and other overseas development",[9] and the Labour Party manifesto had also indicated that the new Ministry would have responsibility for a wider range of development issues than just aid. While the centralisation and co-

ordination of all types of both financial aid and technical assistance was certainly regarded as essential, for there were at least seven different departments with some responsibility for aid,[10] Thomas Balogh's working group, which determined the shape of the new Ministry, envisaged that ODM would also co-ordinate aid with policy in other areas such as trade, migration, and international monetary reform, to facilitate the working out of a coherent development strategy. The ODM, Seers and Streeten therefore anticipated, would be "a department concerned with all aspects of policy affecting the Third World" not "just an aid Ministry"[11] and being outside the Foreign Office, that it would be in a position to initiate development policies which were not always subordinate to Britain's political and commercial interests, but more international in outlook - though how realistic these expectations were will be explored more fully below (p.154-6). (Certainly, while the Colonial Office and to a lesser extent the Commonwealth Relations Office, had reservations about Labour's proposals, fearing a consequent diminishment of their own responsibilities in certain areas, D. J. Morgan has observed that the Foreign Office itself did not foresee difficulties, since in 1964 at least (development) aid was not yet considered a major issue and virtually all Foreign Office aid was administered separately.[12])

The new Minister, Barbara Castle, viewed the new Ministry as a guarantee that overseas aid was no longer to be regarded as a charitable donation from rich to poor but "an essential motor of world development" and recounts that she shocked Conservative politician Rab Butler by asserting that the purpose of Britain's aid in future "was not to secure political or trade advantages, but to 'maximize development'".[13] She expressed her vision of the broader role the ODM might play some eight months after taking office when she spoke of building up the Ministry until it played "a decisive influence in foreign affairs".[14] Seers had great respect for the new Minister as a person of "outstanding determination and energy"[15] and also had high regard for her Permanent Secretary, Sir Andrew Cohen, who had previously been Director General of the Department of Technical Co-operation (DTC) (now absorbed into the new Ministry) and had a strong personal interest in development issues. Cohen was an open Labour supporter and, although apparently finding some of the Minister's appointees "alarmingly radical", he always loyally supported her.[16] The creation of the new Ministry was also "a great excitement"[17] for officials at the DTC who comprised the nucleus of staff for the ODM, their numbers being supplemented by officials from the Colonial Office and Treasury.

The introduction of the new EPS into the Ministry, on the advice of Thomas Balogh, was aimed to introduce into policy-making more professional expertise than that offered by civil servants alone. In Seers and Streeten's view, this also brought into Whitehall "those who were sympathetic to the Government's approach to overseas problems, and who saw Britain's role not just as the dispenser of financial and technical help to former colonies but as a pioneer in creating a more equitable world system".[18] Following the appointment of Paul Streeten as Seers' deputy, a team of twenty economists and statisticians had been gathered to staff the EPS, organised into three divisions; one statistical, one dealing with general economic policy issues, and the third consisting of a

group of economists with considerable overseas experience, each working in a geographical department.[19]

It was against this seemingly promising background of commitment by the Labour government to development policy and the enthusiasm and drive of the new Minister and her staff that Seers took up his new post.

"The government machine at work"

Initially he found "it was interesting to see the government machine at work,"[20] though there was at first a considerable amount of friction in Whitehall surrounding the setting up of the ODM and opposition from regular officials to the introduction of the EPS into the Ministry. This can partly be attributed to the inevitable adjustments that had to be made in the new scenario: a new (Labour) government, a new Ministry and Minister, and the introduction of a new group into the Ministry - an economic planning staff acting as personal political advisers to the Minister.

A considerable amount of tension arose particularly between the ODM and the Colonial Office, which felt its responsibilities were being undermined by the new Ministry, the main cause of dispute being the question of financial assistance to the colonies, over which the Colonial Office wished to retain sole control, maintaining that the ODM should be concerned with UK aid to independent countries only.[21] Although an agreement was eventually reached, whereby responsibility for development aid to the colonies was transferred to the ODM while budgetary aid remained with the Colonial Office, some colonial officials were "bitterly disappointed by the outcome" and felt a deep sense of betrayal.[22]

In addition personal considerations entered into play as the Minister herself and her Permanent Secretary were initially regarded with some suspicion, particularly by some Colonial Office officials, for their left-wing views and "anti-colonial disdain". Barbara Castle was at first considered a "fanatic" by some, though she succeeded in winning the respect of most officials for being fair-minded and prepared to listen to and discuss their advice and to record her decisions.[23] Andrew Cohen, although highly respected by some officials in the ODM as "a man of ideas ... a Whitehall mandarin ... a philosopher statesman, with strong academic roots",[24] was regarded by others in the Colonial Office as being "a dangerous man, both megalomaniac and doctrinaire".[25]

Seers and the staff of the EPS therefore experienced some of these uneasy adjustments surrounding the setting up of the new Ministry, but in addition they also attracted their own critics. The position of the EPS as political supporters as well as professional economic advisers of the Minister was not only new but also somewhat ambiguous, since their position was not clearly defined in relation to the regular officials. It was believed by some that Seers had "picked his own initial staff in defiance of the Civil Service Commission",[26] though Streeten maintains recruitment was undertaken "with the conventional civil service veto after 'positive vetting,' or political objections".[27]

Streeten does, however, recall they were initially met with "fierce opposition"[28] from officials; though one official has remarked their attitude to the EPS was one of "pained forbearance" rather than hostility. Certainly it seems the EPS was regarded by some senior bureaucrats as the Minister's "new toy", spending its time engaged in endless inconclusive discussions and composed of people who were "total amateurs at the Whitehall game of operating in files" and "not accustomed to the constraint of time, or swift commitment".[29] Much of the work undertaken by the EPS was regarded by many as too theoretical and/or irrelevant for the immediate working needs of the Ministry. There was inevitably some resentment too at the assumption that officials at the ODM were lacking in economic expertise and needed the services of a special economic staff; and some feeling from other quarters that the EPS was too large and too expensive and that such expertise was needed in the field rather than in London.[30]

In the face of such feeling, Streeten recalls Seers' aptitude at "the power game" playing "skilfully [*sic*] for his place in the civil service hierarchy" and establishing that his position came between the Permanent and Deputy Secretary, not from any personal ambition but in order to establish formally the position of the planning staff within the Ministry and to ensure that its operational, not merely advisory, role was recognised.[31] As a result of his efforts Seers had direct formal access to the Minister, though again this apparently led to "a good deal of jealousy and accusations of irregularity (if not conspiracy)"[32] from official quarters. In addition Seers established that every submission to the Minister had to indicate the economists' opinion - again a measure considered by some officials as extremely time wasting and inefficient.[33] It was also at his suggestion that Mrs Castle decided to hold weekly meetings at the Ministry to exercise tighter control over the department and "to influence policy in advance instead of waiting for submissions to be put up ... at the last minute, or allowing officials to pre-empt the Ministry line."[34]

Seers applied himself to trying to develop a sense of team work and co-operation between the Minister, economists, administrators and civil servants in the ODM, achieving some degree of success and Streeten describes him as "the perfect diplomat"[35] skillful in working with regular officials and gaining their confidence without yielding to their views. One of his ideas was to organise a working weekend in February 1965 at Buscot Park (where back in the 1950s he had attended gatherings of the Keep Left group). Barbara Castle recalled in her diary:

> Down to Buscot for a Chequers-type discussion weekend with the heads of the departments of my Ministry plus the economists. It was Dudley Seers's idea and he had organized the agenda. His staff had produced the papers for opening the discussion. It all went excellently. The administrators listened attentively while the economists unravelled their expertise. They gradually thawed out and in the end we had some excellent discussions. Everyone agreed it was a huge success and even the most conventional amongst the civil servants said they had learnt a lot and hoped that the experiment could be repeated in six months' time.[36]

But while senior officials in the ODM, such as Sir Richard King, have acknowledged the important role and enormous contribution made by the EPS to the work of the Ministry,[37]

others remained less enthusiastic. One official still considered "The main contribution of the EPS to the ODM was delay" and that the bureaucrats in general adopted "a sceptical but tolerant view of the EPS".[38] Richard Crossman, Minister of Housing, at the time himself observed that there was profound resistance in the Civil Service to the bringing in of outside advisers and to anybody with direct access to the Minister.[39] In the following sections there will be further examples of the differences that arose between Seers and the EPS on the one hand and Whitehall officials on the other, and these uneasy relationships were later strongly reflected in Seers' own recommendations for the reform of the Civil Service.

However, the optimism and enthusiasm of the early months of the Labour administration initially overcame scepticism, and the idealism Seers and Streeten had considered evident in the election manifesto and the creation of the ODM they also believed "seemed to be confirmed by the Ministry's first White Paper" published in 1965, entitled *Overseas Development: The Work of the New Ministry*, though even its drafting reflected on-going differences between the economic advisers and officials.[40]

The ODM White Paper

Seers, Streeten and the EPS played a significant part in the preparation of the White Paper, though recollections vary slightly as to the precise nature of and the circumstances surrounding that contribution. R. S. Porter, in 1965 Director of the Geographical Division of the EPS, recounts that initially the drafting was entrusted to the administrators, the EPS not even being invited to contribute, and that it was at a fairly late stage that Seers and his colleagues, Streeten and Robin Marris, were "confronted with what they considered to be a very bland draft which seemed to them quite out of keeping with their vision of the style of the new Ministry".[41] In response, they prepared their own version which was accepted by Andrew Cohen and Barbara Castle and which, Porter understood, covered the first five chapters of the final White Paper. Streeten, however, maintains that the contribution of the EPS was 100 per cent and that Seers, Marris and himself wrote the whole paper "from start to finish" with Sir Andrew Cohen and Sir Alan Dudley, ODM's Deputy Secretary, participating in the drafting process, adding qualifications.[42] Seers himself throws no light on the extent of his contribution to the writing of the paper, only remarking that he helped to write it, and Marris cannot recall work on the White Paper at all.[43]

The end product, however, Seers and Streeten themselves acknowledged in 1972, did reveal "signs of multiple parenthood, reflecting the views of officials of many departments", and thus also of "the then unresolved political conflicts within Government, and between ministers and officials".[44]

The initial paragraphs certainly emphasised that the purpose of the aid programme was "to promote social and economic *development*" (my emphasis) and that its basis was a "moral one", operating through the transfer of economic resources and human skills. Development itself was presented as "more than reducing poverty and unemployment" and

as meaning "fulfilling aspirations towards steady and continued social and economic progress" and "the transformation of traditional societies into modern ones": "Our aim", maintained the White Paper, "is to do what lies in our power to help the developing countries to provide their people with the material opportunities of using their talents, of living a full and happy life and steadily improving their lot."[45]

However, the political objectives and economic advantages of development aid for Britain were also clearly spelled out too, for while the paper maintained that aid could not be expected "to be an insurance against political tensions", nevertheless it pointed out the dangers of poverty in a world of growing wealth causing discontent and unrest, to which economic and social development was the only possible answer and argued "we must therefore be ready to share our wealth and knowledge so as to help promote the progress and *strengthen the stability* of the developing countries" (my emphasis).[46] Economically the advantages were more obvious and tangible.

> The provision of aid is to our own long-term economic advantage. We have a special interest in encouraging the expansion of international trade; this will be promoted by increasing prosperity which aid can help to further. By helping to raise incomes in the developing countries we can provide expanding markets for exports and safeguard the supply of our imports and the return on our investment. These are real advantages and we should seek to secure them as far as we can.[47]

While the qualification followed that economic advantages should only be a secondary consideration in giving aid, the primary motivation being the moral imperative, it is clearly impossible to regulate motivation, and the White Paper's proposals included recommendations which would have greatly favoured the export of manufactured goods from the developed economies.

The impression given by Seers and Streeten is that while the EPS was trying to uphold the moral and altruistic motives for aid, officials were more concerned about spelling out the political and economic rationale and advantages for Britain as the donor.[48] As they commented:

> Whenever an assertion is made which appears to commit the Government to a definite moral position, it is immediately withdrawn, contradicted, or softened. "The basis of the aid programme ... is a moral one" but: "the provision of aid is to our long-term economic advantage". Or: "it is in the nature of aid that we should accept an economic sacrifice when giving it" but "we give aid because in the widest sense we believe it to be in our interest to do so as a member of the world community". Or: "aid is not a means of winning the friendship of individual countries", though "we are glad to offer aid to our friends." And so on. Political security; altruism; commercial advantage and profit seeking; they are all grist to the mill and everyone can take his pick.[49]

However, despite the equivocations, in general the EPS directors considered the end product "sounded optimistic and independent", and that it "was positive and struck a completely new note".[50] It basically reflected their philosophy on development at the time, and many of the issues raised are familiar reflections of Seers' own recent concerns, particularly as expressed at the seminar on international aid in 1964 (see Chapter 3, pp. 133-9).[51] While stressing the underlying moral imperative for the rich to assist the poor,

as fellow members of a world community, its objective was two-fold "to promote the development of the poorer countries and the expansion of the world economy"[52] - which in the long run would be of mutual benefit to both poor and rich economies. As the White Paper put it "We give aid because in the widest sense we believe it to be in our interest to do so as a member of the world community".[53]

Unlike previous White Papers in this field, which had been largely descriptive, it contained considerable statistical and economic analysis, for which Seers was largely responsible,[54] with the purpose of showing the necessity for financial and technical aid. The data demonstrated the increasing disparities between the rates of growth of poor and developed countries with the resulting growing inequalities in the world community;[55] and the slowing down of economic development in poorer countries was attributed to three main factors, all of which Seers had himself become aware of during his time working in Latin America and Africa: first, the growing shortage of foreign exchange (due to falling prices for exports of primary products and the rising price of imports); second, the lack of qualified manpower, accentuated in some cases by the outflow of expatriate staff, and increasing population pressure, with consequent chronic unemployment and under-employment in many countries; and third "the burden of debt" faced by many countries, particularly in Latin America, with debt service payments eating up a large proportion of aid receipts in some cases; as a result, it was observed, while the total financial flows towards the developing countries had risen only moderately since 1961, flows in the opposite direction were rising more sharply.[56]

The developing countries' need for foreign exchange and qualified manpower were the two problems addressed particularly in the paper. The supply of foreign exchange, needed to purchase imports (described as "the life blood of economic development; ... essential to the realisation of ... development plans"), was regarded as either having to be earned through exports or supplied through private investment or government aid.[57] But, it was observed, with commodity prices weakening after 1964, it seemed unlikely that primary producers would be able to increase their export earnings to sustain even moderate growth rates - and the outlook for achieving the 5 per cent target set by the UN for the end of the decade seemed bleak. The White Paper therefore pointed out "However much the developing countries may struggle to help themselves by expanding exports, or developing the manufacture of import substitutes, there does not seem any prospect of their being able to finance out of their own resources the rising imports which development demands";[58] which thereby provided the argument for more aid - or private investment.

Although the paper was concerned with British aid, the international nature of the issue was emphasised since the problems encountered could only be tackled effectively by the combined effort of all industrialised countries and international organisations working with the developing countries. An increase in the proportion of multilateral aid (which at that point accounted for only 10 per cent of the British programme) was recommended as having mutual benefits for recipient and donor: it was regarded by developing countries as

being more objective than bilateral aid, which was often tied with political or commercial strings, and it could also benefit Britain which, provided it remained competitive, could "expect to gain at least a corresponding share of the additional trade which this aid finances".[59] Regional co-operation and planning between developing countries was encouraged, as was co-operation between donor countries "as part of a great international effort".[60]

Bilateral aid remained, however, the largest part of the programme and one major decision announced was "to make development loans free of interest in appropriate cases"[61] particularly because of the burden of debt faced by many countries. For the programme as a whole emphasis was put the importance of planning aid, to ensure it was channelled where it would make the most effective contribution and reduce the possibility of waste, and on partnership with recipient countries. The Ministry announced its intention "to make a more deliberate effort to select, in agreement with the recipient country, the fields of activity or projects on which our aids should be concentrated",[62] and to recruit expert missions to send to countries to help in the process of forward planning thereby keeping a closer eye on those projects it intended to finance.

The White Paper particularly highlighted the important part private enterprise could play in assisting the progress of developing countries. While its involvement had been encouraged by the British government (with generous fiscal treatment of overseas investment[63]) in recent years, the paper noted, private investment had fallen, which it attributed to the practical difficulties of operating in countries with shortages of skilled manpower and basic utilities and to an often unsettled political climate. In this situation government aid was presented as being complementary to that of private investment in that it helped to create the basic infrastructure (in terms of transport, power and human skills) on which industry could draw and worked towards building up a political climate favourable to the inflow of private capital from overseas. Attention was drawn to the importance of the private sector's contribution to overseas countries not only in providing capital (which it was hoped might be regarded as having less political strings attached than government sources) but also in providing technical assistance in the form of training in managerial and technical skills.[64]

The whole issue of technical assistance was, in fact, given high priority in the White Paper - the provision from Britain of skilled men and women (professional, technical and administrative staff) to help forward development overseas, coupled with the extension of education and training for local people in the developing countries themselves. Among other measures announced were new training programmes, the strengthening of Service overseas by volunteers, and increased provision of visiting teams of "experts" for periods of work overseas, including the provision of more economists and statisticians to assist with the preparation and carrying out of plans and to advise on priorities in development policy.[65]

In retrospect, the most significant and longstanding recommendation of the White Paper, certainly in regard to Seers' subsequent career, was the announcement in the section

dealing with technical assistance of "a major initiative"[66] - the setting up of a new institution, to be called the Institute of Development Studies, the venue of which, after considerable debate, was to be Sussex University. This, however, will be covered in more detail in a later section (pp.169-73).

This then was the outline of the White Paper which Seers and Streeten generally welcomed as optimistic and independent. The features of the report which they regarded as being particularly positive were the emphasis on aid as a means to accelerate development, the support for increased multilateral aid, the importance attached to forward planning of aid, regional co-operation and technical assistance, and the decision concerning interest free loans.[67]

But although a great deal of enthusiasm and hard work went into preparing the ODM White Paper, it seemed at one point that it would never even see the light of day, due to the financial crisis confronting the Wilson government. The paper itself in fact contained a number of indications of possible financial restrictions, for despite the assertions that "we must ... be ready to share our wealth" and "accept an economic sacrifice", there were also warnings that: "There are many claims on our resources" and "our balance of payments imposes severe limitations on our capacity to help".[68] The Treasury had not even allowed the ODM to include any specific figures on aid expenditure within the White Paper, since the national plan had not yet been published and a great deal depended on the strength of Britain's own economy and its balance of payments.[69]

In July 1965 the government announced public expenditure cuts and a cabinet decision was taken to postpone publication of all White Papers until September. Richard Crossman (whose views on the ODM will be touched upon again below) described Barbara Castle's frustration at this time - his reference to "her little Department" indicating that ODM was not regarded as of major significance by some other members of the cabinet at the time

> poor Barbara explained to me that her little Department had been sweating their guts out and working every Saturday on a great new White Paper on Overseas Development. "The increase I wanted between now and 1970 has been cut back to virtually nothing," she said, "If I can't even have a White Paper, how can I justify building up the Department? What about Dudley Seers and Marris and the rest of the economists I have brought in? How can I face them. Andrew Cohen is on the verge of suicide."[70]

Seers recalls that the White Paper "was nearly suppressed" and "was held up for some weeks by opposition from other departments which were having some success in briefing their Minister about the dangers of ODM initiatives or even pronouncements, in view of the foreign exchange crisis which was rapidly developing."[71] After being "put on ice for some weeks", however, the ODM White Paper "was only brought out of cold storage (rather hurriedly) to offset the very bad impression that was expected to be created abroad by a policy statement on immigration"[72] - another White Paper on *Immigration from the Commonwealth*, announcing big cut-backs on entry permits.[73] To counter any residual opposition to the ODM White Paper, Seers recounts "the document was suddenly cleared

by a Wilsonian masterstroke - he put it to the cabinet when they were on the point of adjourning for lunch - and rushed into print,"[74] on 3 August 1965, the same day unfortunately as "an appalling fall in the gold reserves"[75] which did not augur well for the possibility of increasing aid programmes.

During the same month the National Plan was being discussed by the cabinet and its publication a month later effectively counteracted the White Paper's recommendations for increasing the transfer of resources to developing countries. Realising its implications, Seers had furnished Barbara Castle with detailed criticism of the Plan - "that it lacked historical context, was too parochial, failed to integrate social purposes with economic ones, and was professional bad planning anyway"[76] - which she brought up in the cabinet discussion, but to no avail. Although still paying lip service to the importance of aid, the Plan made clear that it would "be necessary to scrutinize the aid programme with particular care so long as the United Kingdom balance of payments is under such great strain".[77] In effect "a ceiling had been clamped on aid", in Seers and Streeten's view, and over the next three years "the real value of net aid declined for the first time since the war." They observed:

> The August White Paper and the September National Plan express the two souls of Labour: one generous and far-sighted, conscious of international responsibilities and opportunities - the other narrow, nationalistic, materialistic; one looking outward - the other inward; the long-hairs and the skinheads.[78]

This, for Seers, became symptomatic of the general trend in government policy as the "skinhead" soul of the Labour party seemingly predominated and the pre-election commitment to overseas development and a more internationally oriented policy gave way to more national and parochial concerns. In addition it became increasingly clear that the ODM was not to take on the wide-ranging responsibilities of a development ministry as Seers had originally anticipated.

Disappointment in ODM as a development ministry

The ODM White Paper had stated that "The central purpose of the new Ministry is to formulate and carry out British policies to help the economic development of the poorer countries",[79] but Seers became increasingly disappointed that this was narrowly interpreted so that the ODM did not, or was not enabled to, assume responsibility for or have a say in the wider aspects of British policy affecting overseas development and the Third World, particularly trade agreements, but remained very largely an aid ministry, whose decisions were still very much dictated by British foreign policy and commercial interests, rather than by more international concerns. As he and Streeten observed "The conception of the Ministry as a *development* Ministry rather than an aid Ministry, with a voice and representation in all issues affecting development, never really took hold in Whitehall."[80]

But optimism in the feasibility of the ODM adopting such a role was perhaps

unrealistic from the outset. In preliminary Whitehall discussions in 1963 and 1964, under the Conservative administration, the primary reason for contemplating setting up a separate Ministry of Overseas Development had been that it should co-ordinate and manage the aid programme - and that, in doing this, it would have a political function, serving the broad policies laid down by the Foreign Office and the CRO.[81] While the Labour government, coming to office at the end of 1964, was committed to setting up a far more autonomous ministry, separating development aid from the policy of other overseas departments, its primary function was none the less the administration of aid. When Mrs Castle submitted a note to the Prime Minister on the function of her new ministry the listed responsibilities were all concerned with financial aid and technical assistance, which included development aid and liaison with international aid organisations and UN agencies concerned with technical assistance, but no reference was made to activities in other policy areas.[82] The White Paper itself, to which Seers contributed, had also been almost uniquely concerned with the British aid programme, with UNCTAD's demand for more liberal trade policies, for example, receiving only a brief mention and no serious consideration.[83]

Even in the co-ordination of the aid programme itself, there were certain important areas of responsibility remaining outside the authority of the new ministry which meant that it did not even have comprehensive control of all aid. The Colonial Office, for instance, still retained major responsibility for the remaining dependent territories, particularly for budgetary aid, and also for the content and approval of development programmes which the ODM funded in these areas.[84] In addition, ODM had no say in the disbursement of the far more substantial military aid, which remained under "the Foreign Office, Commonwealth Relations Office and the Colonial Office"[85] and, as has been mentioned, the Foreign Office's own aid was administered separately (see p.146 and n.12).

Key representational posts, on such bodies as UNCTAD and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), where aid was a prominent issue in discussions, were also out of ODM's remit, the Board of Trade retaining responsibility for the British delegation to UNCTAD and the Treasury retaining the British Executive Directorship in the IBRD. Seers and Streeten had anticipated a development ministry might have been able to bring British influence to bear on constructive initiatives towards a more integrated world economy through the forum of UNCTAD or by hastening "the gradual conversion of the Bank to a more development-orientated role". Instead they were disappointed to see the "feebleness" of the British delegation at the 1968 New Delhi UNCTAD (which they considered was less sympathetic to the needs and demands of developing countries than the Conservative-led 1964 delegation had been) and the "conservative" course which the Treasury pursued on all major policies at the Bank.[86]

Though there was supposedly co-operation between the various ministries concerned with overseas development issues, Seers and Streeten were increasingly frustrated by what they saw as the obstructionism of other government departments, especially the Treasury,

towards the work of ODM and any proposals it put forward.

> the alliance between the Department of Economic Affairs, concerned with British economic growth and firmly anti-aid, the Treasury, resisting all forms of public expenditure and overseas expenditure in particular, and the Board of Trade, became almost invincible in suffocating the goodwill, idealism and talent assembled in the ODM, which only got half-hearted support from the (unreformed) overseas departments.[87]

Any ideas or plans that ODM would become a ministry responsible for overseeing a range of issues affecting development were thwarted by the fact that it was rarely involved in negotiations and policy-making in those areas affecting relationships with overseas countries and development, causing Seers and Streeten to observe:

> when there were negotiations on immigration, the Kennedy Round, the scheme for generalized preferences for manufactures, agreements for commodities such as cocoa, cotton textiles, entry into the Common Market, or international monetary reform, ODM was either not represented at all, or only very meagrely. Often it was not even consulted. The Economic Planning Staff, which was created to keep an eye on these wider issues, was kept too busy on aid problems and in any case had not the armoury to keep up the unequal battle against the powerful combination of the rest of Whitehall.[88]

Even within ODM itself Seers and Streeten felt there was insufficient appreciation of or concern for broader development issues other than aid, commenting "many of its officials naturally see it not so much as a Ministry concerned to make British policy in many fields helpful to development but rather as a sort of jumbo version of the old Colonial Development and Welfare operation" providing aid, mainly to ex-colonies, to shore up positions of commercial advantage or as financial compensation for failure to development them in the past.[89]

Certainly most ODM officials regarded aid administration as their primary function, considering that broader development issues were not their concern - "We were *of course* an aid Ministry; that was why Parliament gave us money to disburse. Broader development issues, such as why give aid at all, were not our business", one has commented.[90] This demonstrates the differing views of the role and function of the ministry held by the EPS and ODM officials, who did not appreciate what they regarded as the EPS's obsession with the broad macro-economic framework. [91] In addition the idea that "politics should be taken out of aid" and that the new ministry would be able to emphasise "the more noble humanitarian aspects of aid" was regarded as a "romantic view" not only by officials but also by other academics, who accepted that aid was an instrument of long-term foreign policy and that political self-interest was the main motive behind aid-giving - including development aid.[92]

There was in fact some feeling in Whitehall in 1964, particularly among Treasury staff, that a separate ministry to administer aid was not necessary and that what was required was an aid wing within a more unified foreign affairs department - a conclusion that some officials at the ODM had reached themselves by 1967 - a further indication they not only considered aid their primary responsibility but also accepted its function as an

integral part of foreign policy.[93]

Even within the Labour cabinet itself there were reservations about the need for a separate development ministry and Richard Crossman (who considered all the new ministries unnecessary and difficult to defend in terms of their functional merits), remarked of the ODM in June 1965 "What is achieved by creating Barbara's little Ministry of Overseas Development?" Although acknowledging "Certainly it doesn't do any harm" he obviously did not attribute it with any dynamic role and, while not suggesting it should then be an arm of the Foreign Office, he did consider the ODM, the Colonial Office and Commonwealth Relations Offices could comfortably be rolled into one under one cabinet minister.[94]

Thus while there were bureaucratic constraints on the functioning of the ODM - and the work of the EPS - there was also a lack of enthusiasm for the new ministry from certain quarters within the Labour party itself. Seers in fact became increasingly aware of and disillusioned by the diminishing degree of commitment to overseas development displayed not only by individual cabinet ministers, but by the Labour government as a whole, especially in light of the party's manifesto promises made before the election and which, he and Streeten commented somewhat bitterly, "some of us were naive enough to believe)".[95] There were various measures taken and policies pursued by the government, which, in Seers' estimation, diminished the ODM's role and undermined and betrayed the party's proclaimed commitment to a more international, development-oriented strategy, which will be examined briefly in the next section.

Disillusion with Labour's commitment to overseas development

The removal of Barbara Castle to the Ministry of Transport after only fourteen months in office (as a result of a cabinet reshuffle in December 1965) Seers regarded as a turning point in the fortune of the ministry and a blow to its independent status, remarking later "ODM, economic planning staff and all, was really at the mercy of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, once Barbara Castle was called to higher forms of service".[96] Certainly the minister had not only demonstrated a strong commitment to building up the new ministry, but she had been prepared to take an independent stand in cabinet on issues affecting overseas policy, particularly on the issue of Rhodesia. She spoke up consistently against concessions to or a settlement with the Smith regime in Rhodesia, and in Crossman's estimation, this was the main reason for her removal to the Ministry of Transport.[97]

Mrs Castle was reluctant to leave but it is clear from her diary entries at the time that Seers was highly thought of for the work he was doing at ODM and his continued presence on the Economic Planning Staff was regarded as important, by herself and Harold Wilson, for maintaining continuity and assisting the new minister.[98] Seers, who regarded Mrs Castle as an exceptionally strong and capable minister, was extremely disappointed at the change and seemingly never had quite the same close rapport and

working relationship with her successors.

Tony Greenwood, previously Colonial Secretary, was her immediate successor but held office for only eight months before being replaced in August 1966 by Arthur Bottomley, during whose time in office the ministry suffered another setback in being demoted from cabinet status in January 1967. Bottomley was then minister for just a year when he was replaced by Reg Prentice, who retained the post for two years before being succeeded in the cabinet reshuffle of October 1969 by Judith Hart who remained minister for the last eight months of Labour government. The removal of the ODM minister from the cabinet only two years after the creation of the ministry was in Seers' and Streeten's words "an act of both symbolic and genuine significance".[99] Together with the quick turn-over in ministers, it seemed to typify the short-lived nature of the government's commitment to and concern for overseas development.

The ceiling put on the aid programme was also considered another retreat from election promises and Seers seriously questioned whether "the balance of payments difficulties were the *reason* for the severe constraint imposed on the aid programme ... or whether they served as an *excuse* for the lack of political will of some Labour politicians".[100] Barbara Castle in fact recorded the lack of commitment to the aid programme and the opposition encountered from some ministers in cabinet to time spent on discussing aid, which was attacked from certain quarters "as a luxury we could not afford" - while one particular minister commented "They'll only waste it".[101] Seers recalled that the EPS carried out research to demonstrate that aid was not a foreign exchange burden and could in fact be beneficial for British balance of payments but Treasury officials would not allow their findings to be published.[102]

Far from demonstrating its commitment to assisting developing countries and reducing global inequalities, Seers considered the Labour government pursued policies which actively obstructed development. British delegations had adopted an "unconstructive attitude ... in international discussions on trade expansion" and further restrictions had been imposed on the import of textiles from developing countries.[103] Decisions too had been made about joining the EEC without analysing the consequences on developing countries in the Commonwealth, a Corporation Tax had been introduced which discouraged private foreign investment in developing countries,[104] and the Commonwealth Immigration Act had demonstrated the narrow nationalist and discriminatory nature of immigration policy. Of the government's relations with Africa, he was critical in particular of its "petulant response" in cutting off aid to Tanzania (in response to the Tanzanian government's announcement of July 1968 that it would cease paying pensions to British administrators who had served there before independence) and its "bungling of the Rhodesian rebellion" as Harold Wilson (despite the initial protests of the ODM's first minister) worked to reach an agreement with Ian Smith to legitimate his regime while affording little co-operation to Zambia.[105] As Seers observed of Britain's record in Africa, rather than assisting the poorer countries of the region, the British government had aligned itself with what were regarded as the "oppressive regimes" of

southern Africa.[106] In addition, support for USA policy in Vietnam, including increased British aid to South Vietnam and its neighbours, had also demonstrated where the government's allegiances lay in the eyes of the Third World.

On the whole Seers, together with Streeten, regarded Labour's record as "discreditable" considering there had been a "spectacular divergence between Labour promise and fulfilment".[107] The setting up of a new independent ministry had proved an empty gesture without the real support needed for its policies from within the Government. Instead of strong political leadership insisting on an international strategy, demonstrating genuine sympathy for and understanding of the problems of the world's poor, they considered Labour had given in to more immediate nationalist pressures and shown itself to be "*very* parochial"[108]

The disappointing record of the 1964-70 Labour government was to have a long lasting effect on Seers' attitude to the Party. In 1968, after moving to IDS, he was still urging the Labour government to give a larger role to the ODM to "help us adopt a more constructive attitude to the Third World" and to commit itself to more positive aid and trade policies to help reinforce internationalists in other rich countries, warning "the present lack of attention to principles undermines the basis of future opposition".[109] Just prior to the June 1970 election, both Seers and Streeten added their signatures to a letter to *The Times* newspaper highlighting the fact that none of the three main parties, including Labour, had put any emphasis on world issues and international development in their party manifestos or platform speeches during the election campaign.[110] When, therefore, in 1972 Harold Wilson (then in opposition) was again making a commitment to policies favourable to developing countries, Seers came back with an open letter reminding him of the dismal record of the earlier administration in relation to development, commenting that discarding its principles when in power and restating them in opposition was "a demoralising sequence which will in the end deprive the party of its appeal to idealism".[111]

For Seers, working at the ODM was "a rather sterile period so far as publication was concerned" though there were two particular aspects of his work at the ministry - singled out by himself for particular mention - which did result in publications in late 1967 and early 1968. One was seeing "the government machine at work", which inspired a number of "reflections on the power of the civil service", and the other was learning "a good deal about aid" in the various meetings of donors that he attended both in the UK and overseas and which led to modifications in his views on both financial and technical aid.[112] A major development during his time at the ministry was of course the foundation of the Institute of Development Studies, which will be discussed in a subsequent section, but we will first consider his papers on the Civil Service and aid, which were directly influenced by his work at the ODM and which were in fact published as he was taking up his post as director of IDS.

Reflections on the Civil Service

The government machine, which at first Seers had found "interesting", soon produced many frustrations not only with the compromising nature of Labour policies but also the obstructionism of government bureaucracy and he observed the problems encountered bore comparison with situations he had experienced overseas.

> It became clear to me then that the problems of development in Britain were not entirely different from those in what one usually means by "underdeveloped" areas. Certainly bureaucracy in all its forms, however benevolent, creates many different kinds of obstacles.[113]

In 1966 Harold Wilson set up the Fulton Committee, "To examine the structure, recruitment and management, including the training, of the Home Civil Service and to make recommendations",[114] as concern was expressed about not only the background and education of civil servants but also the relevance of their qualifications. A high proportion had civil servants had been educated at public school and were considered, by many Labour supporters, as largely conservative in outlook and out of touch with reality, and few had had any professional training in the fields in which they were working. Seers was invited to submit a paper to the Committee, a revised version of which was subsequently published in a collection of essays entitled *Crisis in the Civil Service*, using the opportunity to discuss the view that the major problems Britain was facing were basically due to its rigid and inflexible bureaucratic machinery which was in need of reform. This was not a new argument but part of a genre of writing critical of "the establishment" in which his friend and colleague Thomas Balogh had played, and continued to play, a leading part. The restructuring of what was seen as an outdated and inadequate Civil Service, particularly in the Treasury, was regarded as an essential precondition to enable government, particularly a Labour government, to implement policy.[115] The introduction of the EPS into the ODM had been one attempt to provide the minister with more professional expertise than that available from civil servants and thus better informed control over the ministry.

Seers' own remarks on the Civil Service must therefore be seen in the context of an ongoing debate, but are also a reflection of his own personal experience of working close to Whitehall in the EPS. He voiced similar concerns about "modernising the machinery" of government in a Penguin Special book, *Matters of Principle: Labour's Last Chance*, in which he and six other Labour party supporters recorded their disillusion at the performance and lack of idealism of the Wilson government and urged a return to Labour party principles, as "the only modern expression of the reforming, idealistic, humane, co-operative and enterprising tradition in British politics".[116]

At this point in the mid-1960s Seers described Britain as being "in a deep and chronic crisis", having been unable to cope, in relation to its pretensions, for over 50 years: its military weakness had led to increasing reliance on American strategic support and economic aid, the breathing space created by the prosperity of the 1950s had been largely

wasted on producing costly, useless and irrelevant arms, and current foreign exchange crises were being met with short term measures such as raising interest rates which achieved only temporary respite by slowing down industrial modernisation and expansion. The Wilson government's attempts to join the European Common Market, of which he make us a great power again." The economy was staggering along and unless Britain regained a degree of technical leadership, he warned, it could suffer worse stagnation, growing social strains and declining political toleration such as existed in "the shabby totalitarian regimes of the Iberian peninsula." However, he believed Britain still had a constructive international role to play in helping reduce world tensions and avert war - provided it did not attempt to assume the role of a big military power, and that its basic problems could be addressed.[118]

The cause of these problems, as with the fundamental problems of development in any country, Seers maintained, was not, however, basically economic.

> The sickness goes too deep to be cured by pulling down tariff walls - or by devaluation or slashing our military expenditure, necessary though these may be. This sustained and growing inability to manage our affairs suggests that the roots of our problems are not really economic at all. We must look for attitudes and institutions which are too rigid and inflexible to permit the adjustments we need to make if we are to cope with the increasingly fierce competition of the second half of this century.[119]

These rigid and inflexible attitudes and institutions he regarded as being embodied in the British Civil Service which, because of the background and education of the majority of its personnel, tended to be "conservative" by nature and concerned primarily with maintaining stability and the status quo. As such, he commented, it reflected the archaic attitudes of Victorian or Edwardian times, when continuity was an important virtue for an imperial power, but was ill-equipped to deal with the problems facing a modern industrial state when far greater flexibility was required.[120] Admirable though civil servants might be as individuals - and he conceded "In many ways it is the most honest and intelligent group of men in the world" - this did not make them "an appropriate instrument for dynamic change".[121] Most civil servants, he maintained, lacked professional expertise and practical experience of the modern world, particularly in the areas of economics, industry, and commerce, yet they had enormous power in influencing and implementing policy. Even where efficient and courageous ministers with principles had been appointed, they were unable personally to control all the activities of their ministry, and working relationships had developed where senior officials frequently manipulated and dominated ministers, curtailing their authority and effectively leaving real political power with the Civil Service. The power of Treasury officials, who had a representative on practically every inter-departmental committee (and whose restraining hand had become increasingly apparent at ODM) was particularly singled out for mention, the Treasury knights being described as "the most powerful politicians in Britain today".[122]

apparent at ODM) was particularly singled out for mention, the Treasury knights being described as "the most powerful politicians in Britain today".[122]

There were, therefore, two central reasons for reform in Seers' eyes - firstly that the Civil Service had too much political power and secondly that it was inadequately equipped as an administrative machine to cope with the problems of a rapidly changing world. The debate on the modernisation of the service, presented by the Fulton Report, he believed, could "create a real chance of removing the central obstacle to the country's development".[123]

Although the Fulton Committee focused on the home Civil Service, Seers also took the opportunity to express an opinion about Foreign Office officials (both in London and overseas) whose narrow "conservative" attitudes and lack of professional expertise, he considered, made it difficult if not impossible for more positive policies of international co-operation, to be pursued, especially with developing countries. Members of the diplomatic service, he commented, often conveyed, albeit unconsciously, "an impression of condescension to the rest of mankind, particularly citizens of the 'Third World'", with some of its elder members showing "a fairly strong streak of xenophobia", which inevitably resulted in cool relations with the countries concerned, or a tendency to support the more conservative overseas regimes, often military dictatorships. In addition, he observed, diplomats displayed an "amateuristic bias in analysis and policy formation", and few had "any appreciation of the underlying trends (in population, employment, food production, etc.)" of the countries in which they were working, basing their reports on "cocktail party gossip" rather than sound economic analysis and seemingly deriving policy from intuition rather than from systematic information, with the result that most reports were far from objective.[124]

There were two policy areas where Seers considered the Service's prejudices and lack of objective long-term policy formation had particularly adversely affected Britain's position. One was "the prejudice of Foreign Office officials - and indeed Whitehall in general" - against the United Nations and its agencies, which was constantly criticised for its administrative weakness, thus undermining confidence in any attempt to achieve greater international co-operation through the UN. The other was growing dependency on the United States.

> Tactical needs cause the Service to rely heavily on the United States for support on questions such as Rhodesia, not to speak of sterling - the 'special relationship' provides us with a shield, behind which we can still enjoy the semblance of the glory of an imperial power.[125]

As a result, he observed, military expenditure overseas was greater than the country could afford and support of American policy in Vietnam and elsewhere was damaging Britain's prestige in the eyes of the rest of the world, and impairing the prospects of constructing a real international system for preserving peace.

Seers' argument that real political power lay with the Civil Service, rather than the politicians - including his observation that Britain's support of United States' policy was mainly due to the tactical needs of the Civil Service, rather than a political decision of the

government - obviously raised the question as to where he believed ultimate responsibility lay for the failure of the Wilson administration to live up to its promises. In 1968 he maintained "the Civil Service is so constructed that there was no way of carrying out the programme on which the Labour government was elected in 1964,"[126] irrespective of the economic crisis. However, when writing with Streeten in 1972 more emphasis was placed on the Labour government's own failure - "It would be too easy to blame the Civil Service or the inheritance from the Tories or economic adversity or the limited scope set by outside pressures for the gap between promise and fulfilment",[127] though at the same time they also acknowledged that "an enlightened international policy - even an enlightened aid policy - was out of the question so long as a group of somewhat archaic but intelligent officials in the Foreign Office (and in the Commonwealth Relations Office, as it then was) determined strategy in all its essentials".[128] Ultimately, though, this line of argument implies it was a failure of political will on the part of the government to initiate the necessary administrative reform that might have enabled it, or given it greater freedom, to carry out its election promises.

Certainly in Richard Crossman's view, expressed during Labour's first year in office, Harold Wilson was "deeply conventional in his acceptance of the Civil Service hierarchy" and any chance the Government might have had of introducing basic changes was lost because key personnel were left in key positions; in his opinion instead of creating new ministries, more would have been achieved by changes in individual personnel. As it was, he maintained, there had been a tremendous reassertion of Civil Service confidence and initiative, "including a determination to prevent any more new ideas being launched".[129]

Seers himself felt it was essential for a Labour government to curb the power of and reform the Civil Service, especially in the Foreign Office, "if a new and less parochial approach is to be adopted on the world's problems and we are to help create in this century a world order under the United Nations".[130] It was a subject he was to return to in his open letter to Harold Wilson in 1972[131] and again in 1975, when Labour was back in power, with a paper posing the question "Can Labour Control the Foreign and Commonwealth Office?"[132] In increasingly stronger terms he referred back to the "manipulation" of foreign office officials during the 1964-70 administration and the impossibility of the government being able to play a constructive role in the new world order unless it did in fact increase ministerial control over what was then the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and grasp the policy making machinery. Organisational reform Seers therefore regarded as the essential starting point not only for undertaking an "enlightened international policy" but for tackling other basic problems facing the country: "Administrative reform is not, of course, a sufficient condition for solving our fundamental problems, but," he maintained, "it is certainly a necessary condition".[133]

As a basis for the package of reforms necessary "to modernise administrative practices" Seers supported suggestions for a new planning initiative to shift the emphasis of work of all ministries towards the solution of the country's long-term problems, rather than short-term piecemeal reforms. Such an initiative required the setting up of planning

units in each ministry, staffed by both outside professional experts and administrators, in order to undertake a thorough analysis of past problems and establish a set of clearly understandable national goals to be achieved within a specified period.[134]

An essential requirement for reform, and the key to reducing the political power of the Service, Seers argued, was in fact for ministers to bring in their own professional expert advisers (especially economists),[135] who would have direct access to the minister and also be enabled to discuss policy with officials and attend any of their meetings. While from his own experience in the EPS he knew the position of economic advisers could be "anomalous" and in most cases they had been "so few and so isolated that they could be by-passed without much difficulty," he considered the debate surrounding the Fulton report provided an opportunity to create in every ministry "a category of specifically *political* advisers to act as the eyes and ears of ministers" (emphasis in original); if the opportunity was missed he believed "the prospect of real changes in major fields of policies [would] remain very dim".[136] While "the final change needed to tilt the balance of political power away from the Civil Service" he suggested, with undoubted feeling but somewhat unrealistically, was "to break up the Treasury."[137]

At the same time, he maintained, the Service itself needed to be made more efficient, one recommendation being to broaden the social base of recruitment, suggesting in the case of the FCO that a quota system and selection procedures be adopted to ensure it was not predominantly staffed by public school graduates. In addition he proposed officials be allowed to take sabbaticals allowing them "to work in the real world for a spell" to broaden their experience and that early retirement of the older members of the Service, who might find reform uncongenial, be facilitated and even encouraged to make room for younger more suitably qualified officials.[138]

Seers was also of the opinion that civil servants' actions should be subject to closer evaluation and scrutiny to make them more accountable and less secretive, suggesting, as a start, lifting the prohibition on the disclosure of committee minutes and advice to ministers. He supported the reform of the Official Secrets Act, which rather than protecting national secrets from enemy powers, he maintained, had been used to protect "the reputations of politicians and civil servants from public attack," thereby permitting "incompetence to go unreprimanded and old-fashioned prejudices to reign unchecked".[139] Regular meetings between political heads, senior civil servants and advisers (such as he had initiated at the ODM) would also help broaden the base and accountability of policy making, he suggested, as would the setting up of parliamentary committees to question civil servants as well as ministers on reasons for policy.

Resistance to reform was inevitable, he acknowledged, in Britain as it was overseas - "Those working in the field of development are familiar with the case of a society resistant to change, where political power remains permanently in the hands of a restricted group and economic growth is slow".[140] But in 1968 Seers still considered it was not too late for the Labour Government to reform the administration, adopt comprehensive planning and create adequate machinery for carrying out the policies endorsed in 1964.[141]

When an opportunity for review of British representation overseas was undertaken in 1969, under the chairmanship of Sir Val Duncan, its recommendations did not, however, reflect the changes envisaged by Seers. By this time at IDS, Seers together with his colleagues had supported the principle of professional reinforcement of overseas posts by recommending a considerable increase in the full-time aid administrators in overseas postings. But the committee did not agree that such an increase was necessary and in fact its recommendations to government effectively sought to reduce British representation in the poorer areas of the world.[142] When the government followed the committee's advice not to increase resources devoted to aid administration, Seers considered this yet again reflected the lack of weight the Labour Party in government was prepared to give to the problems of world poverty and a genuine overseas development policy.[143] The fact that he was still calling on Labour leaders to tackle administrative reform of the Foreign Office in 1972 and 1975 indicates that few steps were taken in this direction.

In 1968, however, as well as advocating administrative reform, Seers argued that the Labour Party itself should improve its own organisation to heal the gaps in communication that had arisen within its own ranks between ministers and members of parliament and the constituency parties, unions and the electorate. The increased resort to demonstrations in Britain he considered was a natural consequence of the man in the street's feeling of impotence in influencing policy and a change in the style of leadership involving greater consultation with the public, together with a stronger adherence to principles, was necessary to avoid electoral disaster. If there was no effective party of change in British politics he warned "we will fail to carry out the changes we need to make for economic and political survival, and discontent will take increasingly violent and disorganized forms" - a warning more usually expressed in relation to overseas countries as an incentive to adopt development programmes.[144]

The application of development studies to Britain was a subject that Seers was to pay more attention to in the late 1970s but, as we have seen, in referring to bureaucratic obstacles and the common need for administrative reform and planning he already observed in the late 1960s that problems of development in Britain were not entirely different from those in underdeveloped countries. His contribution to the conference on the crisis in planning,[145] held at IDS in 1968 (and to be considered in more detail in Chapter 5), was preoccupied with administrative structures and the shortfalls of the relationship between politicians, planners and administrators. This was, in fact, a reflection not only on his work overseas but also of his experiences of working in Whitehall.

Aid - positive and negative

Aid was a further issue which Seers himself particularly mentions as a subject he learned a good deal about during his time at the ODM - "not merely British aid, but also the aid programmes of other 'donors' through official visits and attending meetings of the DAC (the 'donors club' in Paris)" [Development Assistance Committee of the OECD];[146] he

also went to Washington to see representatives at AID and the World Bank.[147] An additional opportunity to exchange views on the aid programmes of other countries was provided by a week-end international conference held at Ditchley Park in June 1966, sponsored jointly by the Ditchley Foundation and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), to discuss the effectiveness of aid as a means of achieving the economic development of poor countries.[148] The conference brought together about two dozen participants, mainly practical aid administrators, from France, Germany, the United States and Britain, who worked either for international organisations, such as the World Bank, the OECD and UNESCO, or for government departments and organisations responsible for administering bilateral aid programmes. All attended however in their personal, not official, capacities, including Seers from the ODM.

As we have seen, Seers came to the ODM with a positive attitude towards aid and the contribution it could make towards development and reducing inequalities in the world - an attitude also reflected in the White Paper - and he was critical of the restraint imposed on the volume of aid made available by the British government. However, during his time at ODM he started to become "somewhat sceptical about the value of financial aid" as he began to understand "the development process was more complex than obtaining and using foreign loans".[149] His broader views on aid in relation to "the development process" will be covered in the next chapter, but here we will look briefly at his concerns about the British aid programme, which in part overlapped with his more general interest in administrative reform.

In general Seers continued to be basically supportive of the aid programme at this time, stating in a Cambridge university journal in late 1967: "We 'do-gooders' are right to be pro aid rather than anti, and if I were writing for the unsophisticated, I would not say anything to discourage their support for the aid programme".[150] However, concentrating merely on increasing the size of the aid budget, he maintained, was unproductive unless serious consideration was also given to the effectiveness of the aid programme (by which he meant how far and efficiently it was being used "to promote social and economic development" as stated in the White Paper) and to other ways (besides aid) in which British policy affected overseas development.

With regard to the programme itself, he was of the opinion that for any aid to be effective administrative reform was necessary involving heavy professional reinforcement of overseas posts to handle aid questions and mobilise available resources in the real interest of the recipient's development. However, it was clear that in many embassies and high commissions the same person was often responsible for promoting exports as well as administering aid, making it difficult to separate the two functions, so that aid was frequently regarded as a reward for commercial or political favours. It was in an attempt to remedy this situation that Seers and his colleagues at IDS recommended to the Duncan Committee a considerable increase in the number of full-time, trained aid administrators in overseas posts who, as far as possible, would not combine commercial and aid work. However, these recommendations went unheeded and not only did the Committee regard

an increase in personnel unnecessary it recommended that in fact aid and commercial work should be integrated "in order that the overall objectives of the Government may be adequately served".[151]

The effectiveness of aid, Seers became increasingly aware, was therefore often limited by the fact that it was not necessarily steered towards governments primarily for development purposes but was more often used to promote donors' exports (about two-thirds of grants and loans being tied to the supply of British goods and services), protect investments, and support foreign policy (the Wilson government's increase of aid to South Vietnam and reduction to Tanzania being a case in point). While such a policy was "not ... necessarily damaging", he remarked, it did mean aid was exercised with the interests of the donor rather than the recipient in mind.[152] In a note to the House of Commons Select Committee on Aid in early 1970, following an announced increase in the British aid programme, he observed there was a danger that the increase would be frittered away "under pressure from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office", and urged "a lessening of the weight attached to British commercial and foreign policy objectives" in preference for an "emphasis on our moral obligations" to apply aid to relieve poverty and for development purposes even in countries which were regarded as unfriendly to Britain. As well as being an inspiring act of leadership which could help improve the international climate, he added by way of incentive, such a policy might also well have long-run commercial and political value.[153]

Since, however, the primary purpose of aid was clearly not necessarily to assist the development of the recipient country (whatever the accompanying rhetoric), Seers suggested the ODM should be required to explain the rationale of its aid programme country by country, classifying it according to its main objectives - development, welfare, or supporting Britain's strategic interests, etc. - so that at least the situation was clarified. This also gave additional weight to his recommendation that a larger proportion of British aid should be channelled through international agencies since multilateral aid did not so directly reflect the commercial and political interests of individual donors and could be used more objectively for development purposes.[154]

But while concerned that aid should be directed at governments with the purpose of stimulating development, Seers now began to observe that its effectiveness was sometimes also counteracted by the recipients themselves:

> The cold reality is that in some countries aid does permit the survival of regimes which are not merely undemocratic - on any definition - but themselves the chief obstacles to development. Examples are absolute monarchies, administrations dominated by landowners, political elites that line their own pockets, military cliques that waste public funds on expensive weapons.[155]

This was a point he was to develop with increasingly greater force over the years. However, it was around 1966-7 that he first began to voice concern about this issue which had in fact been a subject of discussion at the June 1966 Ditchley Conference, indicating that his views could have been influenced or informed by his closer association with

representatives of the major international donors. Aid to governments that obstructed development he considered "negative aid" - though he maintained he was not in favour of making aid conditional on detailed "performance criteria" (usually based on strict monetarist principles) as required by the American government, remarking:

> Personally, I do not think we know enough about the process of development to impose policies on any independent government, and it is very doubtful whether such pressure is ultimately effective either in winning friends or in bringing about development; besides conditions for aid are usually in the end political rather than economic.[156]

Nevertheless, he did suggest there were certain "objective tests" which could be applied to judge whether a government was hindering its own development; tests such as recording how fast education and the extension of cultivated land was spreading in rural areas, how big and many were the cars used by ministers, how high a proportion of imports consisted of luxury goods, whether a regime depended for survival on military aid, etc. While admitting such tests could not be applied in a simplistic way, he considered they could give some indication as to whether aid was actually harming rather than helping the country concerned and should be reduced. In addressing the seeming contradiction of supporting such objective tests while criticising performance criteria, Seers maintained the suggested tests were a very weak form of pressure compared to detailed performance criteria and they reflected "the interests of the recipients not the donors"[157] - though they obviously still involved some value judgements on the part of the donor.

In addition to becoming more sceptical about the value of financial aid, following his time at ODM, Seers also began to express reservations about technical assistance. After his experience of the chronic shortage of skilled manpower in Africa he had been very supportive of the idea of technical assistance, which was also afforded a high priority in the recommendations of the 1965 White Paper. But in looking carefully at technical assistance, the deployment of experts to work overseas, and the training programmes provided for overseas students, he "concluded that they were often counter-productive because of the common fault of applying (or teaching) uncritically the principles which had evolved in industrial countries"[158] and which were unsuitable or irrelevant for overseas countries, and often positively harmful to their development. He particularly stressed the damage that could be done to poor countries by influencing overseas' students consumption habits and political attitudes while they were training in Britain, or encouraging them to stay in industrialised countries, observing: "To take a bright young man from a country in Africa or Asia and seduce him to work overseas by a high salary, or to instil an acceptance of Keynesian economics, may do as much harm to his native land as bombing a bridge or defoliating a forest."[159]

However, these remarks were obviously not meant to be a wholesale criticism of the entire technical assistance and training programme, particularly since the latter was made just as he was taking up his post as director of the Institute of Development Studies. It was more a development of his earlier argument that Western industrialised standards and

solutions were frequently unsuitable and irrelevant for the needs and problems of developing countries. His point was that more professional care needed to be taken over the organisation and implementation of technical assistance and training programmes to ensure they catered more relevantly for the real circumstances and needs of the developing countries at which they were aimed.

In addition to recognising the need for some reform of the financial and technical aid programme, a major point Seers insisted upon was that aid was not the most important British policy affecting development, which was why he had been so disappointed in the failure of the ODM to acquire wider responsibilities. Britain's quotas on textile imports and policies on preferences and commodity prices, its application for membership of the EEC, its immigration policies and its attitude in supporting the United States' embargo of Cuba and Vietnam policy had "far greater effect on the development of the world's poor countries than a few million pounds more or less in aid".[160] This, as we will see, is again an argument that was to have repeated airings in Seers' work in the future - and in fact most of the issues surrounding aid mentioned here will be taken up again within the context of his later career.

But despite some growing reservations about the value and effectiveness of aid, he still believed in 1967 that the British aid programme was "on any reasonable assessment, overwhelmingly positive",[161] especially since the creation of ODM, and he acknowledged that many countries, like India for example, would face severe challenges if it ceased to be available. But what he did stress was that improving the effectiveness of aid, reducing its negative elements, and paying more attention to other policies which affected the Third World, were equally if not more important than increasing its quantity. Given the balance of payments problems faced by industrialised countries such as Britain at the time, emphasis on the quality rather than the quantity of aid, also suited the interests of the donors as well.

The foundation of IDS

Despite the bureaucratic frustrations of working at the ODM and the growing disappointment with Labour's record, the one constructive proposal that remained from the White Paper, and certainly the most significant in regard to Seers' career, was the announcement of the "major initiative", the setting up of a new institution, to be called the Institute of Development Studies.

The idea of a "special institution" had originally been mooted by a "Committee on Training in Public Administration for Overseas Countries" appointed by the Department of Technical Co-operation (DTC) in December 1961 under the chairmanship of Lord Bridges. The concern of this Committee was that whereas many colonial territories were rapidly advancing towards political independence, most had not developed an adequate educational base upon which a new public service could be built. While it regarded local training assisted by British officers prepared to work overseas as one solution to this

problem, the Committee considered "the provision of opportunities for training and study in Britain" remained the most important service which could be offered to the developing countries.[162] The Bridges report, published in January 1963, therefore recommended an immediate investigation "into the factors which would have to be taken into account in establishing a special institution in Britain for top level training in administration (including development training), combined with research into the fields which the training covers".[163]

In July 1963 the Secretary for Technical Co-operation, Robert Carr, reported that the British government warmly welcomed the Committee's proposals and was "determined to give effect to them in the most practical way, with a full sense of urgency".[164] By the time Seers attended the Manchester Conference on the teaching of development economics in April 1964, a representative from the DTC announced that the Department had indeed been engaged in investigating the idea of a special institute, as a focus of research and training in public administration and development, and that a decision was expected in the near future.[165] Andrew Cohen, then Director General of the DTC, was himself an enthusiastic supporter of the idea and, according to Seers, was responsible for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers endorsing the proposal for a "special institution" at their conference in 1964.[166] By the time the DTC's Advisory Council for Training in Public Administration (chaired by Sir John Maud) gave its own endorsement to the proposal in December 1964, the Labour Party was in government, and the recommendation for a special institution gained keen support from both the overseas development minister, Barbara Castle, and Andrew Cohen, now in his capacity as Permanent Secretary at ODM. Thomas Balogh, now Harold Wilson's Economic Adviser, was also enthusiastic about the project and the prime minister himself was known to be "quietly in favour".[167] By the time Seers joined the ODM recommendations for a "special institution" were therefore well on the way to gaining official approval and the idea had been widely discussed in academic as well as official circles.[168]

Hans Singer is of the opinion, though, that this sequence of events does not do justice to the role played by Seers during this preliminary phase. He recalls Seers initiating discussions about the nature and function of such an institution with himself and Richard Jolly when they were all working for ECA in Addis Ababa in 1963/64 following the publication of the Bridges Report and speculates that he was also at the same time communicating his views to friends and colleagues, such as Thomas Balogh and Andrew Cohen, in the UK. As such he sees Seers as "the real initiator of the IDS in firming up the very tentative - not to say sceptical - findings of the Bridges Committee and by inducing (or confirming) Andrew Cohen into support for the 'Special Institution'".[169] Singer, however, himself concedes that this is a personal view which may not give due credit to the crucial role of Andrew Cohen, who was also an influential driving force behind the idea.

What does seem clear is that Seers was interested in and enthusiastic about the idea of such an institute from the time the Bridges report appeared and began to consider

practicalities, such as how it would operate and what its curriculum would be. He undoubtedly contributed to the debate about plans for its establishment, though the influence of his opinions at this earlier stage is uncertain. His personal role in helping to mould the future of the new institution is more easily traceable once the proposal was officially endorsed and he was working at the ODM. As an ODM official has commented "I suspect it [the setting up of IDS] was a collaborative production, like most children, with Dudley as the consultant obstetrician."[170]

The one major question that had not been settled by the time Labour came to power and Seers joined the ODM was the venue of the new institution. There had been considerable discussion as to where it should be established with Oxford and Sussex universities putting forward competing claims from as early as 1963.[171] In this debate Seers aligned himself firmly with the Sussex supporters, together with Barbara Castle, Andrew Cohen and Sir John Wolfenden, Chairman of the University Grants Committee - against the advice of the Maud Committee and the opinion of friends and colleagues Thomas Balogh and Paul Streeten who favoured Oxford. Seers maintained that Sussex argued its case more persuasively and made a stronger commitment to the new institution,[172] though Paul Streeten has suggested that Seers' allegiance to Sussex was more a reaction against Oxford and the fact that he had never been admitted to its inner circle and elected to a fellowship when working at the Institute of Statistics.[173] Certainly most agree the minister's choice of Sussex was influenced by her own personal experience as an undergraduate at Oxford which she had disliked as being snobbish, out of touch and reactionary.[174] However, in the view of at least one official the choice was probably determined by more practical considerations - "No doubt the capital costs of an establishment at Sussex were much lower and the relationship with the University would be easier to negotiate."[175]

During the early months of ODM, plans for the institute took shape, though Seers recalls that "there was a good deal of opposition" to its setting up "from officials in the Foreign Office, the Commonwealth Office and the Board of Trade, who no doubt sensed the sort of institution likely to emerge" and he recalled accompanying Barbara Castle and Andrew Cohen on visits to each of the ministers concerned as she appealed to them for their political support in an attempt to by-pass the official conservatism of their ministries.[176] In the opinion of one Colonial Office official "the general view in the Colonial Office was that it [IDS] would be an irrelevance & waste of money which was badly needed elsewhere".[177] Treasury officials too, Seers remarked, were equally hostile only agreeing reluctantly to its establishment on two conditions.

> First it was to be regarded as an "experiment", which could be terminated at the end of its first quinquennium. Second, a substantial part of its budget would depend on fees from participants on courses, for the most part ultimately financed by ODM, but separately from the Ministry's institutional support.[178]

While the increased aid proposals of the White Paper were considered out of the question because of balance of payments difficulties, at least plans for the creation of the institute

did not entail financial resources leaving the UK but provided a way of retaining ODM money within the country.

The ODM White Paper provided the official vehicle to announce the setting up of the "major new initiative" to be called the Institute of Development Studies. IDS, as it came to be known, was to fill several needs, its main function being to organise advanced study courses on the "problems of overseas development in all aspects of economics, social studies and administration" covering not only modern theories of development, but also paying special attention to the practical experience of developing countries. It was proposed that three types of people would be catered for: firstly "senior administrators from overseas countries, especially those working in or destined for senior places in planning offices and economic departments"; secondly, British graduates wanting to specialise in problems of overseas development; and thirdly British government officials working, at home or overseas, on the problems of developing countries.[179] A small but highly qualified and experienced staff was to conduct the courses and carry out research, supplemented by distinguished visitors from other countries who were experts in the field. It was anticipated the Institute would play a leading part in advancing knowledge of development and working out a development strategy.[180]

With the enthusiastic involvement of Andrew Cohen a Formation Committee, under Seers' chairmanship, was set up soon after the publication of the White Paper in the autumn of 1965 to advise the Minister on the financial and personnel needs of the Institute and to recommend what steps should be taken to establish it.[181] Advice was sought from Gunnar Myrdal who commented "that in general he distrusted institutes of the type proposed but believed that Britain was one of the few countries where it could succeed".[182] As chair of the Formation Committee Seers was now in a better position to bring his ideas to bear on the shape and role of the institute and was anxious to steer it away from being seen as mainly a training institute for public administrators from former British colonies (in the original Bridges Report's mould) and the White Paper's recommendation that courses be provided for British graduates and government officials did widen the scope of the institute. Seers apparently disliked the connotations attached to the word training (preferring generally to use the term "teach") and wanted to avoid any implication that Britain could tell the world how to develop, emphasising instead that its central objective was "to acquire and communicate understanding of the development process" - through "the refinement of theories by research and their transmission by formal teaching and ... by direct involvement in the problems of development".[183] Though teaching was a vital part of the Institute's function, as well as a "financial necessity",[184] he was keen to develop its research function and two of his oldest colleagues, Paul Streeten and Hans Singer, have both commented they considered he was influential in shifting IDS's role towards one that put a stronger emphasis on research work.[185]

As early as January 1966 an embryo IDS had been established on the University of Sussex campus in Essex House with a small staff comprised of Acting Director Richard Symonds, an Administrative secretary, administrative assistant and two secretaries.[186]

But it was not formally established until 20 April that year and the Governing Body, under the chairmanship of Lord Fulton, met for the first time the following day on 21 April 1966.[187] An Academic Advisory Committee of distinguished social scientists was set up to guide the Institute's growth, particularly with regard to the appointment of staff; sociologists and political scientists as well as economists were sought, a major requirement being that Fellows should have spent some years working overseas and were willing to do more fieldwork. As Seers saw it a particular feature of the Institute was that "research, teaching and operational experience would fertilize each other".[188]

Paul Streeten took over as Acting Director in September 1966 and a ten day Founding Conference was held at the Isle of Thorns, the University of Sussex conference centre at Chelwood Gate, at which members of the Governing Body and Academic Advisory Committee met with a number of international development experts from Britain and overseas, the aim being to discuss ideas "on how the Institute should develop, and to provide contacts and links, but also to make the Institute better known".[189] Although not reaching any detailed conclusions on the future work programme, it was felt discussions at the conference provided a stimulus for future research and a further gathering of experts was held in November 1966 to consider the role of science and technology in the Institute's programme.

The Governing Body set up a committee to consider the full-time Directorship, as a result of which Seers was appointed and took up the post on 1 August 1967, with Paul Streeten as Deputy Director, by which time the Institute had moved from the university campus to Stanmer House. Teaching too had started at IDS in 1967 with the first Study Seminar on "Aid and Trade" held from 20 February to 22 March with a group of 19 participants, mainly senior administrators, from 14 different countries.[190]

While becoming disillusioned with the machinery of government and the Labour party record, Seers was able to direct his energies into preparatory work for the Institute, a task which he found more fulfilling and wherein he had more freedom to act, compared to the confines and frustrations of Whitehall.[191] It was to prove a decisive and important turning point in his career as he became initially Director until 1972 and then continued to work at the Institute until his death in 1983.

Outline of Seers' professional activities 1967-72

When Seers left the ODM and took up his post as Director of IDS he "was more free to write"[192] - which he did prolifically throughout his time at the Institute producing official reports, articles, lectures, and journey reports, exploring ideas on development based on the work and opportunity to travel afforded by his position at IDS. The content of these papers will be considered more fully in Chapter 5 but in this section we will look briefly at the busy schedule of those first years at IDS.

The aim of the IDS, as spelled out by Seers in the first annual report he wrote as Director, was "to acquire and communicate understanding of the development process",

with the overriding objective "to contribute ... to solving the economic, social and political problems set by the great and widening disparities in human conditions between rich countries and poor".[193] As already mentioned, he was anxious that Britain should not be seen as trying to teach the world how to develop, and as such he emphasised the two-way process involved, pointing out that Britain also badly needed a deeper understanding of development processes, not only as a means to throw light on its own problems but to "help British people with jobs that affect overseas development to understand more fully the implications of their actions" - particularly government civil servants in the ODM and the diplomatic service. In addition it was anticipated that IDS could provide British academics in the social sciences with the opportunity to learn of overseas experience relevant to their special field, and that the Institute's seminars, conferences, publications and lectures would also contribute to an appreciation of development problems among a wider public.[194]

Initially there was some debate as to how far the Institute's work should be "academic" or "practical", "inter-disciplinary" or "specialised". Seers himself believed the work compelled IDS to be both practical and academic and to break from the confines of individual disciplines. Efforts were made to build up a multi-discipline staff, who had both academic and professional ability and experience in helping governments tackle actual problems, with fellowships covering political science, sociology, public administration, economics (including specialists in agriculture and manpower planning).[195]

Emphasis was put on teamwork, exemplified by the collaboration of staff during the academic year of 1967-68 in producing a multi-disciplinary book on development - the aim being "to provide a review of development problems ... and also a means of working towards a common 'philosophy' of development, at least in very broad terms".[196] Eight members of staff, together with a member of the Institute of Community Studies, presented papers which were discussed by the rest of the group before being finalised for publication. Seers himself contributed the opening and closing chapters, on development in the broad international context, and the book was eventually published as *Development in a Divided World*[197] in 1971. Staff also participated in meetings to work out priorities for work and research at IDS and these were eventually divided into four main problem areas - international, planning, human resources, and rural development. Seers, as director, was not confined to any particular area, though his own work and interests related mainly to the first three of these categories.

On the teaching side at IDS, Study Seminars were designed to enable officials from various parts of the world to study intensively problems in their own field of work and to exchange experiences with counterparts in other countries. Most participants came from overseas' civil services, the majority having been nominated by their governments and financed by British technical assistance fellowships. A wide range of countries was represented on these seminars and in the first year subjects such as rural development, population policies, planning, aid and trade were covered. In 1969 the Institute held its

first study seminar overseas, in Kampala, Uganda, on the issue of manpower and employment.[198]

Courses were also designed for British civil servants, particularly from the ODM and diplomatic service, a move which responded to the need, voiced by Seers among others, for better informed officials. At the request of the ODM, two-week aid administration courses were held for their officials (mainly Principals, Assistant Principals, and some senior members of Executive class) though officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Crown Agents, the Treasury, and the British Council also participated. The object was to discuss and analyse problems of aid policy and administration faced by officials in their everyday work, one of the main features being an exercise in cost-benefit analysis. Shorter courses on aid and development, usually of three days duration, were also held for senior officials of the diplomatic service as part of a longer training programme on commercial policy. These courses concentrated on the process of development, and on the effects of capital aid, technical assistance, trade and private investment. In January 1968 IDS also provided a short course on development problems as part of the Treasury's course for Assistant Principals in the home civil service, though Seers remarked they seemed slightly less interested in overseas problems than participants on other IDS courses.[199]

Conferences were held at IDS which Seers differentiated as of two types - one day "policy" conferences, which were held "at the request of government departments to consider topical issues of policy, off the record", and "professional" conferences, which were longer and dealt with broader fields discussed at greater depth.[200] One of the major conferences in which Seers himself became personally involved was an international ten-day conference on the "Crisis of Planning", held at IDS in June/July 1969 with the help of a grant from the ODM and the Commonwealth Foundation. This brought together about ninety planners, politicians, administrators, academics, businessmen, and trade unionists from Africa, Asia, Latin America, East and West Europe, and North America to discuss the basic issues and problems of planning in light of the experience of recent years.[201] Such was its success that the Government of Ceylon requested IDS to organise a similar event to concentrate exclusively on development planning and its problems in Ceylon. This was speedily arranged with Seers' personal involvement and held at IDS in September the same year, enabling Ceylonese planners to meet with officials from Western aid donor countries, representatives of international organisations (including the United Nations and the IMF) and academics.

As the Institute built up its reputation it also collaborated in organising conferences overseas. One in which Seers was heavily involved in 1972 was the roundtable conference on "La Via Chilena", which took place during March in Santiago, Chile organised jointly by IDS with the Chilean Ministry of Planning, and addressed by President Allende himself.[202] Initially, as will be seen in the next section, Latin America did not feature prominently in IDS's proposed field of interest but it was apparent to many, including Seers, that this region's experience of development could not be ignored and

contacts with and research on Latin America came to play an increasingly important part in the work of the Institute.

Inevitably a major feature of work at IDS involved Seers in widespread travel overseas and during his first year in office as director he visited countries in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Europe, the Middle East and North America.[203] Initially many of the short visits abroad by IDS fellows were undertaken at the request of the ODM as a form of assistance to governments, mostly in the field of planning and this work was regarded as a vital way to keep IDS in touch with the practical problems of development, enabling it to "plan its own work programme so as to help countries struggling with these problems" and to create and strengthen personal contacts in the field.[204]

Seers himself in the first two years at the Institute was involved in a number of official advisory missions to overseas governments. In Africa he went to Nairobi to discuss with the Kenyan Ministry of Planning and Economic Development its technical assistance needs, and also accompanied Michael Lipton to Khartoum in June 1968 to discuss similar needs of the Sudanese Ministry of Finance in the field of planning. In Ceylon he advised the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs on improving the statistical basis of planning and on setting up a research institute in the social sciences.

However it was in the Caribbean, where previously in the early 1960s he had already played an advisory role in setting up planning offices, that he now established a particularly strong link, especially in Jamaica and Trinidad, advising government departments in Kingston and Port of Spain, on the technical aspects of drawing up their countries' development plans. It is clear from the note he prepared for the Ministry of Planning and Finance in Trinidad in July 1968 that unemployment was now recognised as one of the most serious development problems to be tackled.[205] Seers paid a number of visits to the Caribbean area in 1968 and 1969 and, in addition to his official advisory role, he also built up a close relation with the University of the West Indies (UWI), discussing drafts of his papers on planning with UWI economists and addressing seminars on development problems at the Mona Campus in Jamaica and the St Augustine Campus in Trinidad.[206] He became a member of the University's Technical Advisory Committee, which involved him in annual meetings and further visits to the region, including one to Antigua and St Vincent before the annual committee meeting in January 1969.

In May that year, as well as meetings with ministries and the UWI in Trinidad and Jamaica, he had a varied programme elsewhere in the region. The University of Guyana invited him to advise on its research needs in development and, after a ten-day visit, Seers produced a report outlining plans for a Centre of Development Studies in the country,[207] as well as lecturing on the causes of failure in planning while he was there. In Barbados he was invited to the Multi Racial Studies Centre and spoke on "Income distribution and race". He also visited Cuba in an attempt to set up a long period research project on the Cuban experience to be based at the University of Havana, as a follow-up to his previous study of 1964. However, it became apparent that a wide ranging economic study was not feasible at that time though he did put forward a more limited proposal for a research

project on education and was hopeful this might be broadened out in time. Later in the year he visited the Universities of Miami, Yale and Harvard to investigate what research materials were available on Cuba but decided these were inadequate and often biased remarking that "besides ourselves, very few institutions in the world can contemplate an objective study of the Cuban revolution".[208] Thus official visits overseas also resulted in links for IDS with universities and other academic institutions, sometimes opening up opportunities for research studies.

In addition to his close relationship with the Caribbean, Seers also particularly maintained contact with academic and development bodies in Africa at this time. While in East Africa in 1967/8 he was invited to lecture on the problems of planning at University College, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and in Uganda delivered a paper at Makerere College, Kampala on "The Transmission of Inequality". In March and April 1969 he was invited to attend two conferences on the continent; one at Ibadan on national reconstruction and development in Nigeria, sponsored by the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER) and the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Economic Development, at which he presented a paper on planning; and another at the University of East Africa in Dar es Salaam, on the teaching of economics in Africa. Later in September 1972 he assisted in organising a conference on "Strategies for Development" at the Institut pour le developpement economique et la planification en Afrique (IDEP) in Dakar, Senegal, where he presented a paper on the lessons for Africa of industrialisation in Latin America.[209]

Active involvement in international development organisations also became a regular feature of Seers' activities and involved him in further travel overseas. As President of the UK chapter of the Society for International Development (SID)[210] he was present at the 1967 World Conference of SID in Milan, and at the following World Conference in Washington in 1968 he was made international President and Chairman of the Council for the year. In addition to chapter meetings in the UK he attended the SID European Regional Conference on rural development held in France in October 1968, and the SID North American Regional Conference on aid and development, held in New York in April 1969. It was the SID World Conference in New Delhi in November 1969, as he was retiring as President, which he used as the platform for the presentation of what was to become regarded as a classic paper "The Meaning of Development"[211] in which he suggested the need to redefine development in terms of the relief of poverty, unemployment and inequality rather than in terms of economic growth.

Another important feature of his work was his consultancy work for international agencies which involved not only travel but more writing; but he had the facility to write lengthy, detailed reports speedily, often incorporating the work of many individuals, and to meet deadlines promptly, a talent appreciated by agencies wanting quick results. During the very first months at IDS he took on two assignments, one for the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD),[212] carrying out an evaluation of its country mission reports in August 1967 and another for the International Labour

Organisation's (ILO) Expert Group on "Minimum Wage Fixing in Developing Countries",[213] acting as rapporteur at a meeting held from 25 September to 6 October 1967. This initial contact with the ILO proved a prelude to more extensive work on unemployment in subsequent years.

International concern about growing unemployment and under-employment in developing countries resulted in the setting up of the World Employment Programme (WEP) by the ILO, whose Director General, David Morse, invited Seers, in November 1969, to head a pilot mission to Colombia, in response to an invitation by the President, Lleras Restrepo. The mission visited Colombia in the early part of 1970 and the writing-up of the report and subsequent follow-up conferences and discussions, immersed Seers for the next year or so in problems related to manpower and unemployment. In 1971 he was appointed to head a similar pilot mission to Ceylon at the invitation of Mrs Bandanaraika (where the fieldwork was interrupted for three weeks by the outbreak of an insurrection in April 1971) and in 1972 he took part in the pilot mission to Kenya, which was headed by Hans Singer and Richard Jolly. The interdisciplinary nature of the teams participating in these missions were intended to provide an integrated approach to the wider issues of development in general, not just the specific problem of unemployment, and they gave Seers the opportunity to witness and compare the development problems of three continents in the early 1970s.[214]

In these early years of IDS, finance was readily available to fund development experts from many countries to take part in international gatherings in various parts of the world. As Seers remarked in 1969, "There is hardly anybody at all well-known in the economics profession who could not attend twenty conferences a year, if his taste ran that way. He hardly needs a salaried post at all now."[215] The constant travel overseas by staff to conferences and seminars and on consultancy missions led to some disruption of the Institute's work, mentioned in a number of the early annual reports. Although this was accepted as a necessary part of IDS' function, some regularisation of visits was also deemed necessary and what Seers termed a "closed season" was established, when absences from the Institute were strongly discouraged, allowing time for an annual review and joint planning of future activities.[216] The substantial fees earned by some members of IDS for missions and consultancy work also proved a cause of some concern - "This seemed both inappropriate for members of a development institution and unfair to those who held the fort in our absence," observed Seers. Eventually Fellows adopted a voluntary scheme whereby a sizeable fraction of "outside earnings" was paid into a common fund, used primarily to enable students ineligible for technical assistance to attend IDS courses.[217]

The above by no means gives a comprehensive picture of Seers' work as director during the first years of IDS for, in addition to his teaching and administrative work at the Institute, the technical assistance and advisory missions overseas, the consultancies and associations with international agencies and academic bodies, he was also involved in official consultancy work in the UK, particularly on aid, and had speaking engagements at

academic institutions and development organisations in various parts of Britain. However, it does give some indication of his busy and varied schedule, the globe-trotting nature of his work at IDS and his own stamina in keeping pace.

The "crisis" at IDS

Status and role of the Institute

In 1970 the Institute faced what Seers has described as "its first big crisis"[218] when ODM's objection to a particular study seminar brought into question the relationship of the ministry to IDS whose staff felt their academic freedom thus threatened. Prior to this, Seers had already sought to clarify "some confusion about the status of the Institute" in an appendix to IDS's third annual report of 1968-69, by explaining it was an autonomous body, and not part of either the ODM or the University of Sussex, though having close links with both.

Its links with the ODM were particularly close, however, since the ministry not only provided the major part of IDS's general budget (as well as paying the fees of most of the participants of Study Seminars and providing grants for some research projects), it was also responsible for nominating the majority of its Governing Body and two members of its Board of Studies.[219] As mentioned in the previous section, IDS ran courses and conferences for officials of ODM and other government departments and there were many informal contacts between it and the Ministry. The Institute's staff were "*not*, however, civil servants" stated Seers and the Ministry had "never ... in any way dictated to us what research we should do, what we should teach in our Study Seminars, nor how we should recruit staff or run the Institute."[220]

As far as relations with the University of Sussex were concerned, the Vice Chancellor, Asa Briggs, was Chairman of the IDS Governing Body and members of the university contributed to the Institute's programme, a number of them being Associate Fellows or Associates, while IDS staff supervised several students registered for higher degrees at the university (though at that time it accepted no students of its own for degree courses) and gave lectures and seminars for the graduate programme. But IDS was constituted in an entirely different way to a university department and its financial and academic policies were not controlled by the University. As Seers put it "we are *at*, but not *of*, the University of Sussex".[221] In fact he later reflected that, although many links were forged with the University, relations were not as close as had at first been envisaged, observing "Some members of the University may have been a little envious of the limited obligations of members of the Institute, and thought us rather standoffish."[222]

The 1970 "crisis" arose at a crucial time as the Institute was awaiting endorsement from the ODM for its second quinquennial budget. As already mentioned, IDS was originally established on the understanding that it was regarded as an experiment which would be reviewed after five years - and could be terminated if it had proved unsuccessful.

In 1967/8 IDS set up its own internal working party to discuss its future pattern of work and the subsequent report provided the basis of a discussion in December 1968 with Sir Geoffrey Wilson (who had taken over as ODM's Permanent Secretary on the untimely death of Andrew Cohen that year) and other senior ministry officials. At this meeting, described by Seers as "a key one in the Institute's history", he reported "We were able to clear up a number of misconceptions about the relevance of the Institute's activities to development problems, and, for our part, we all grasped the importance to the Ministry of work which was of practical use".[223]

There was in fact concern among some ODM officials that IDS was becoming too academic and paying insufficient attention to the practical problems which they would have found more operationally useful. What Seers termed a "constructive clash" often took place during the courses run for the ODM and diplomatic corps officials as a result of IDS staff introducing theoretical aspects as a means of providing a broader perspective on those problems faced by officials in their day to day work. Seers observed "There were problems of communication, especially between young lecturers and those who had been senior officials in the Colonial Service, bringing out vividly the difference between the 'academic' and 'practical' approaches".[224] Although he believed that on the whole both sides found the experience stimulating and useful, some officials certainly considered IDS's approach was too academic and not sufficiently policy oriented or operationally useful, and regarded some of its research as "abstruse".[225] Seers also recalled that initially there was "some opposition from ODM" to the priority given by IDS to the issues of inequality, poverty and unemployment in the late 1960s and early 1970s.[226]

Another contentious issue which arose was whether the Institute should extend its area of interest to cover Latin America, a region that, as Seers remarked "had certainly been far from the minds of the Bridges Committee", which had been solely concerned with training public servants for (former) British colonies, and an area which was still not considered of immediate concern by some officials. Although the original objectives for a training institute had been broadened, most of IDS's work during its first years was predominantly concerned with Anglophone and Commonwealth countries, especially tropical Africa and South Asia (in particular East Africa and India), and the majority of participants at courses came from Anglophone countries, so that, Seers observed, there was some danger "of IDS becoming a comfortable Commonwealth club". He and others at IDS, however, considered it essential to strengthen contacts with other parts of the world, especially Latin America, which provided examples of different development strategies and an opportunity for further comparative studies. The advantage of a British institution such as IDS, he therefore argued "lay not in our experience of administering an enormous empire" which had been more in the mind of the Bridges Committee, "but in the fact that we could - in part one must admit, because of the contacts inherited from this Empire - carry out comparative studies of a range difficult to achieve elsewhere."[227]

A working party, set up under the chairmanship of Lord Fulton, with the objective of assessing the progress of IDS's early years, recommending priorities for the future and

indicating what resources were needed, concluded in its report in September 1969 that the Institute had made a "good start"[228] and accepted the argument that Latin America was an area rich in experience, where IDS could well increase its studies. It also recommended doubling the number of core Fellows from twelve to twenty-five with corresponding increases in administrative, secretarial and library expenditures. The report was endorsed by the Governing Body in December 1969 and discussion then began with the ODM - a process that was still continuing when "the crisis" first arose in April 1970.

Study seminar 15

The occasion was a study seminar, number 15, on the theme "The State Corporation", organised by IDS Fellow, Dr Brian Van Arkadie. As usual the prospectus for the course was sent to the ODM and circulated in the normal way through IDS and ODM channels, but about ten days later, in early April 1970, the Ministry stopped distribution of the prospectus and requested certain sections of the brochure be rewritten. The offending section read as follows:

> In expanding the state sector, a critical issue that arises concerns the nationalisation of foreign owned enterprises. There is now an increasing body of evidence from a number of developing countries regarding satisfactory methods of nationalisation; the problems involved are administrative (taking over control and tackling the short-term problems of management in the initial period), financial (problems involved in minimizing compensation), and political (handling the problems of international political pressures).[229]

The ministry maintained it did not object to a seminar being held on the subject of nationalisation but that the brochure "might lead to a Parliamentary Question about the use of aid funds which the Minister might find it awkward to answer"[230] and Judith Hart, the then Minister for Overseas Development, "felt that she could not defend in Parliament the use of public funds to enable foreign officials to attend a course described in this way" though, since the Labour party was not opposed to nationalisation in principle, this did appear, as Seers commented, "slightly odd"[231] and somewhat of an overreaction.

While there was a general election in the offing which obviously made the minister and her officials particularly aware of potentially sensitive issues, it would seem the crisis arose and escalated, not just because of the wording of a prospectus, but as a result of wider issues concerning the role and independence of IDS and its relationship with the ODM. We will first trace through the sequence of events of the incident, which itself threw up some fundamental problems for the Institute and Seers as its director, and then look at the broader picture of relationship with the ODM.

Seers was, in fact, out of the country, involved in a follow-up meeting concerning the ILO mission to Colombia when the problem arose and he considered the crisis "one of the costs of the ... mission";[232] certainly some ODM officials felt that if he had been around when the problem first arose he would have been able to defuse the row so that it did not reach the proportions it did.[233] On his return Seers in fact considered the brochure was

"not one of our more brilliant efforts, especially at a time when the future of the Institute was under consideration" being the product of the "usual (not very rigorous) processes of consultation", though the ODM had apparently been "warned to look at it carefully".[234] However, he sympathised with Brian van Arkadie's refusal to change the wording because it would make the Institute look like a satellite of the Ministry, and did not suggest that he should. Seers was, however, asked by the ODM to provide a letter of assurance that IDS seminars were taught objectively, to help deal with any Parliamentary question that might arise.[235] Despite doing this, the ODM nevertheless decided to withdraw financial support from the seminar (by refusing to pay the fees of overseas participants) because the required amendments were not made to the brochure.

The ODM's reaction immediately raised the question of ministerial interference with the academic freedom of the Institute to put on what courses it chose, and highlighted an uneasy relationship between the two bodies, as well as raising a question mark over the Labour party's attitude towards nationalisation. Although the Ministry maintained it did not object to the subject of the seminar, just some specific wording, Seers remarked that Brian van Arkadie and "The Left" in the Institute, including a good number of the younger members of IDS, regarded this incident as demonstrating "the subservience of the British Labour Government to big business";[236] and Henry Bernstein, then a research officer at IDS, observed, it was unlikely that the ODM, in the interests of objectivity or impartiality, would have "withdrawn finance from a Seminar on means of *attracting* foreign private investment," rather than concerned with the nationalisation of foreign owned enterprises concluding "Obviously it was the side in question that pained the Ministry and not any generalized concern for impartiality."[237]

However it was the issue of academic freedom and IDS's relationship with ODM which was taken up vigorously by certain members of staff; and Seers observed there were some at the Institute who wanted "to use the opportunity of creating a public row, to demonstrate the Institute's independence and to expose the hypocrisy of the British aid policy".[238] Bernstein describes a division arising within the ranks of the staff between "radicals" and "institutionists" (into which latter category he evidently placed Seers) - the ensuing debate on what tactics to adopt taking on "the curious flavour of life ... in a C.P. Snow novel":[239] on the one hand there were those who wished to take a strong stand against the Ministry's action, to press ahead with the seminar and to bring discussion of the principles raised by the matter into the realm of public debate; while on the other there were others who preferred to be more conciliatory, seeking a compromise by possibly postponing the seminar or changing the brochure and certainly wishing to keep it an internal private matter. Seers was certainly anxious to play a reconciling role and keep discussion of the matter out of the public domain, but there is no indication that he actually wished or tried to postpone the seminar or change the brochure; in fact, according to one official, it appears he approached Geoffrey Wilson about the possibility of ODM providing IDS with its own independent budget to organise what seminars it wished without referral to ODM to avoid this problem arising in the future - a request that was

turned down.[240]

As a result of discussions at IDS twelve members of staff, mainly research officers, joined in writing a letter to Seers, expressing concern not only about the "academic autonomy of the Institute" but also the question of its "continued credibility as an independent institution in the eyes of foreign Governments and sympathetic parties in this country if it is seen not to take a principled stand against the Ministry's action". They urged that an immediate demand be made for the Minister to reverse her decision and that she be called on to defend her position at a meeting which could be attended by all members of staff. Whatever the minister's decision might be, the signatories made it plain they wished the seminar to go ahead as planned. While recognising that a public statement on the issue had "danger with respect to securing the amount of aid the Institute hoped to receive for the next quinquennium" they nevertheless believed "that the long term costs of not raising these questions in public outweigh such a consideration" and they urged Seers to join them in making a statement to the press.[241]

Seers allayed pressure for the public statement at this time by agreeing to write to the Minister deploring the ODM's decision to refuse assistance for the seminar and stating the position of the IDS staff on this issue. Within the text of his letter, written on 1st May, he incorporated a staff resolution protesting the ODM's action, a move he subsequently regarded as "nearly a fatal mistake" wishing he had merely enclosed the resolution with a covering letter, since it annoyed the Minister so much that it seemed to destroy any possibility of his "mediating between her and the staff".[242] Among the points in his letter was the argument that IDS would not be fulfilling its function better to understand the problems of development unless "its staff inquired into a diverse range of problems, and its policy-oriented study programme focussed on a broad range of alternatives"; if IDS was to play a constructive role, such work, maintained Seers, could "not all be based on a single set of political or ideological premises". The letter then went on to address the issue of academic independence and the position of IDS as an autonomous body in a university community.

> The Institute cannot properly fulfil its role if it is to be subjected to pressures to modify specific aspects of its activities in the light of current government policy criteria....
>
> Above all, the principle should be accepted that the content and presentation of our training activities should be independent of Ministerial control.[243]

Seers asked the Minister to come to the Institute to discuss these matters with the staff and to reconsider the decision to withdraw technical assistance from the course.

Judith Hart, however, replied on 15 May "startled - and frankly disturbed" by Seers' letter, accusing IDS of seeking "a major confrontation over something that could so easily have been settled by a little flexibility on your side" (a flexibility that could only have implied a change in the wording of the prospectus). Quoting back at Seers his argument concerning IDS's focus on a broad range of alternatives in its policy-oriented programmes, the Minister countered by stating it was on this very premise that "my people had

suggested some adjustment to the brochure to bring the prospectus into line with this balanced approach". The letter then continued with a clear indication that the Ministry itself, whatever the opinion of IDS staff, considered it had a definite interest in the content of courses run by the Institute.

> I really could not concede that the Ministry has no legitimate interest in the content of courses presented by the Institute - indeed I have to appoint two members of the Board of Studies - and I had hoped our current difficulties could well have been met by postponement of this particular seminar and its reactivation later in your programme on a basis that would take full account of the points raised by my people on the original brochure.[244]

Any serious matter of principle to be settled between the Government and IDS, stated the Minister, should be referred to the Institute's Governing Body, the Chairman of which was the person with whom she would discuss such questions in the first instance. Any direct discussion with IDS staff was obviously deemed out of the question.

Writing in confidence to four senior IDS fellows who were overseas at the time, Seers attempted to explain his own uncomfortable position, as he tried to mediate between IDS and the ministry.

> My own objectives have been to avoid compromising the Institute's independence, while at the same time making no public demonstrations which would damage our relations with the Ministry, and yet to avoid disunity and demoralisation at the Institute while preserving the machinery of decisionmaking. As you will imagine, these were not easy objectives to reconcile after the Ministry had (twice) reversed its position. The Institute's position requires a willingness on both sides not to push issues to the extreme - and in both the Ministry and the Institute there are those who would rather risk the future of the Institute than make what they consider unacceptable compromises. While some in the Ministry are completely unaware of the nature of an academic institution ... some in the Institute prefer to ignore political (and financial) reality.[245]

He confessed "I feel I must soldier on at this particular time" hinting that he might have to ask them to return if the situation deteriorated further.

Following the minister's reply it was decided the seminar should certainly take place, with participants' governments being asked to provide their fees and expenses where possible, and IDS itself assisting financially where necessary. Some members of IDS now no longer felt obliged to keep silent on the matter and Brian Van Arkadie with about a dozen co-signatories sent a letter to *The Times* protesting the withdrawal of ODM funding from the seminar. Seers, still desperately trying to contain the situation and prevent further publicity, countered with a letter of his own delivering it in person to Printing House Square on a Sunday.[246] He described Van Arkadie's letter as "misleading and damaging to our Institute", "curiously timed" and "divisive", while he stressed instead the "strength and unity of feeling" at IDS, pointing out that discussions were opening that week with the Ministry "on ways of ensuring the objectivity and independence of our Courses".[247] In the event neither letter was published, though a small article about the "row" between ODM and IDS subsequently appeared in the *Sunday Times*.[248]

Seers was equally annoyed when the ODM itself further publicised the matter by

issuing a statement to the BBC Overseas service about "the serious difficulties" that had arisen between it and the IDS. The item was broadcast on 10 June on the East African service but after speaking with Seers, who refused to be interviewed on the subject, the BBC agreed to drop the report from transmission to other areas. His concern was that the story could be picked up by Reuter's or some other agency, be spread more widely and "leak back into the British Press before the election". He protested to Sir Geoffrey Wilson,

> Could I ask that if statements are made to the BBC criticising, or even referring to, the Institute, ODM should tell us so that we can take whatever action we think necessary - in this case to kill the story. ... You did agree that we should try to keep in step in handling this pretty volatile issue.[249]

However, during the course of June the situation gradually started to improve, despite the fact the Conservatives gained a victory in the General Election. As IDS went ahead with plans to hold the study seminar, discussions started with ODM on a *modus vivendi* for the future and eventually a memorandum of understanding was signed between the Ministry and the Institute. IDS agreed to "tighten ... procedures for sponsoring courses and issuing material"[250] and the Board of Studies (to which the ODM nominated two representatives, one of whom was now to be a Chief Economist) was given responsibility for approving the "annual programme of seminars and the statements issued in connection with them"; once this programme had been approved, the ODM agreed to finance it as a whole and "not withhold technical assistance because of the details of any particular seminar".[251] Although Seers believed this clarified the question of IDS' autonomy he did admit in a further letter to the four Fellows overseas that one of the effects of the whole crisis would mean "of course we will have to control seminars more closely"[252] and the agreement "to tighten procedures" implied an element of self censorship would inevitably creep into organising such events in the future.

Study Seminar 15 itself, which had been the initial cause of the crisis, eventually took place from 16 August to 26 September 1970 with fifteen officials taking part from eight countries (Nigeria, Tanzania, Guyana, Ceylon, Congo Kinshasa, Uganda, Thailand, Brazil) and with overseas governments paying fees for eleven of them.[253] Seers was one of the IDS staff participating in the event. Using particular case studies, the seminar examined the difficulties to be overcome and the possible tactics available in using state enterprise as a means of combating foreign economic dominance. Understanding the problems and approaches of a number of countries which had recently undertaken nationalisation programmes would, commented Seers in his annual IDS report, "hopefully be of help to countries wishing to pursue such policies in the future".[254]

As it happened the very thing the ODM had originally feared occurred when Sir Roland Russell, Conservative MP for Wimbledon, asked a question in the House of Commons in early July 1970 of the then Conservative Minister of Overseas Development, Mr Richard Wood, concerning the session to be held at IDS "on methods for nationalizing externally-owned companies" and objecting to public money "being spent on teaching developing countries how to seize their assets". At this point the minister was able to

assure the house that the study seminar in question was not being sponsored by the ODM and to report that certain steps had been taken whereby he hoped "we shall not see this particular matter in this form again". Even Judith Hart herself joined in to take some credit for having made the relevant decisions before the Conservatives came to power, and to urge the minister to arrive at some understanding with the Institute, "on the one hand to protect the rights of Government in deciding how public money is wisely spent and, on the other hand, to protect the academic freedom of the Institute"![255]

Although the crisis over the seminar subsided, the question of IDS's second quinquennial budget had not yet been agreed when the Conservative administration came into power in June 1970 and it was anticipated the Institute might have to pay a heavy financial penalty for the recent dispute. However, the Ministry agreed substantially to the proposals of the Fulton Working Party for a big expansion. "So we survived, undamaged financially, and strengthened in morale and autonomy," Seers commented and "By the start of the second quinquenium, we had achieved a durable independence."[256]

It was, in fact, the future of the ODM itself that was affected by the new Conservative administration, when it was decided that "overseas aid should become the ultimate responsibility of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs" and in November 1970 the ODM was merged with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (which by this time incorporated the former Colonial Office and Commonwealth Relations Office), so finally unifying ministerial responsibility for all overseas policy.[257] Thus were shattered any illusions Seers might still have had about the ODM being an overall development ministry and pursuing an aid policy independent of British foreign policy (though his expectations were not so high in this respect under a Conservative administration). The ODM had existed for just six years as an independent ministry, and was now to be known as the Overseas Development Administration (ODA), though retaining its own minister and specialist staff dealing with aid administration.

Relationship between ODM and IDS

Although IDS's future was guaranteed on a surer footing for the next five years, the crisis of 1970 had highlighted already uneasy relations between the Institute and ODM (as well as between members of IDS staff). In his 10 Year Review of IDS in 1976 Seers remarked on the degree of hostility of some ODM officials to IDS, attributing it in part to his own clumsiness and "to lingering resentment in ODM at what some would have seen as my attempt to politicize the Ministry when I worked there".[258] But while as one close colleague of his from ODM observed "it is certainly the case that some officials mistrusted him"[259] and others doubted his leadership qualities as Director, it is clear broader issues were involved. Seers himself commented that expectations of the working relationship between the two bodies had been a trifle optimistic: "In a fairly controversial field, some estrangement is inevitable .... Indeed in most countries such a relationship would not be at all viable unless the ministry's offspring became its servant"[260] - an issue which was at

the basis of the 1970 row.

Before submitting a paper on the "Conception, Birth and the Early Years" of IDS for publication in the 10 Year Review in 1976 Seers sent a draft for comment to A.G. Hurrell, then in the Cabinet Office but previously involved in the formative stages of IDS. Hurrell confirms the cool atmosphere which developed between IDS and overseas development officials, expressing disappointment that Seers had not said more about "why ... IDS changed the original objectives of the Institute" and remarking:

> I think it might also be interesting to reflect on why so many people in ODM became anti-IDS and vice versa. To my mind the importance of the nationalisation study seminar crisis was not just the ODM reaction to a particular event but the way in which it brought to the surface the anti-IDS feeling held in many parts of the ODM. Why were and are the links between ODM and IDS not as close or at least not as warm as the founding fathers had hoped? Why do so many people in ODM rightly or wrongly regard the IDS as largely irrelevant to their work? Why did the IDS not become the clearing house for all research and training in development problems in the UK as was originally envisaged?[261]

According to R. S. Porter (who had worked with Seers in the EPS and became the ODM's Chief Economist representative on the IDS Board of Studies following the agreement to tighten procedures), "there was considerable feeling among senior staff at the ODM that the IDS was a highly privileged institution", since it was then practically "fully funded by the ODM on a generous scale", and that "in the very least the IDS should show some sensitivity to the problems which ODM was itself facing".[262] Some officials felt "there was a certain strain of arrogance permeating the attitude of the IDS towards their sponsors"[263] and a tendency "to look down its academic nose at what it regarded as short-term administrative problems"[264] of the ministry - which obviously did not elicit a warm response.

At the ODM, IDS was regarded as part of the aid effort - most obviously in respect of the training courses it provided for overseas students. However, it had also been anticipated that it would have acted as more of a "think-tank" and research wing of the ODM - keeping the Ministry abreast of all current research and training in the field, undertaking specific studies itself on problems and issues of direct relevance to development policy, and generally providing Ministry staff with the training and specialist knowledge that Seers, among others, had criticised its officials for lacking. The Institute was in receipt of large amounts of direct ODM funding and the official view was that its staff should have realised that its position was different to that of other academic bodies in the UK undertaking development training and research which did not receive such funding, and that, as such, it had certain responsibilities towards the Ministry.

However most of the staff at IDS considered themselves to be independent academics or practitioners of development who did not owe their primary responsibility to the ODM. Seers in fact in the annual report written following the "crisis" observed that the Institute had "a unique and difficult role, linking theory and practice" and that the Director and Fellows were "neither academics nor bureaucrats"[265] as they had to spend a large proportion of their time in the field.

It is clear from remarks made by Sir Geoffrey Wilson that the Ministry considered it had given IDS a "quite remarkably free hand" and what was seen as the Institute's tendency "to squeal whenever it thought that the paymaster was trying to have the slightest influence on the piper's tune"[266] or "to invoke academic freedom as a licence to attack government policy"[267] was irritating to officials. As already mentioned, its courses and research were often thought to be insufficiently practical or policy oriented and some officials regarded it as a "White Elephant" and waste of money that could be used more efficiently elsewhere.[268]

Ideologically too the IDS was regarded with suspicion by officials at the ODM; Sussex University itself had a reputation as radical and left wing and visiting ODM officials, as representatives of the establishment, sometimes met with a hostile reception from students.[269] But while there were some students who regarded IDS, funded as it was by government money, as a "centre for reactionary training and research",[270] there were some officials who regarded "the denizens of IDS ... politically as near Marxists",[271] a view enforced as far as they were concerned by the lively defence of the seminar on nationalisation. Whereas, as Seers remarked, an academic body treated "ideological pluralism as a virtue"[272] this was not necessarily the view of some at the ODM.

Sir Geoffrey Wilson dismissed the edginess between IDS and ODM as marginal and not central to the relationship, but it seems clear this was not as close as had been originally envisaged and Seers certainly felt he had a difficult time with the Governing Body in the year following the crisis. In March 1971 in a letter to Lord Balogh he complained of briefed attacks from ODM representatives in the Governing Body which was "becoming increasingly just a watchdog on behalf of the Government"[273] and indicated the situation was affecting his future plans.

Jolly has observed that "many officials of the Ministry of Overseas Development ... retained a residual suspicion of Dudley and of his leadership", in part because of his sometimes anti-establishment views and his close association with politicians regarded as being on the Left wing of the Labour Party; and that they did not appreciate that his views were in fact basically "anti-Marxist" and "anti-dogmatic".[274] Certainly, while on the one hand some officials might have regarded him with suspicion for being too Left wing, on the other hand some of his more radical colleagues at IDS were highly critical and suspicious of what they regarded as his conciliatory attitude towards the Ministry and the establishment in general. This view was particularly demonstrated in an article published by Henry Bernstein who (in Seers' words) "wanted to use the dispute [concerning Study Seminar 15] to portray us as a pawn of the British government, and 'demonstrate the poverty of liberalism'".[275]

Bernstein's argument reflected a broader critique of applied liberal social science which was regarded as "academic big business, sponsored and controlled by ... industry, finance and government". Institutions like IDS, sponsored and financed by the British government, were considered to have a propaganda function, being used to publicise the image of capitalism "with a human face" and to legitimise the government's claims of

concern and integrity in its policies towards underdeveloped countries; while essentially its busy "developmentism" activities obscured the basic contradictions of the relationship between development and underdevelopment, and served to maintain the present system. The study seminars at IDS were seen as having the dual function of demonstrating the generosity of the British government which paid for them, and of providing part of the training process of Third World elites, who would continue to maintain the status quo.[276]

While acknowledging senior staff at IDS, like Seers, held strong liberal convictions and were often critical of the government, Bernstein maintained such criticism was permitted when it was harmless and helped preserve the pretence of open-mindedness. But, "their institutional role entailed a working relationship with government based on the characteristic British compound of tacit understanding, euphemism and compromise" which resulted in their position becoming increasingly "untenable and tortuous" as tensions arose between the stated humanitarian purpose of their work and the interests of those who financed and ultimately directed it. The row over Study Seminar 15 he maintained had pierced the liberal facade of ODM and made clear the limits of IDS activity.[277]

Seers himself argued that the fact that the seminar actually went ahead vindicated the IDS from such criticism - though privately he had admitted certain limits to IDS future activity in conceding the need to control seminars more closely and tighten procedures. As his letter to the four senior IDS fellows demonstrates (see above, p.184), there is no doubt also that he found his position extremely tortuous and he experienced considerable tension and unease in his institutional role as he attempted to reconcile and reach a compromise between the Ministry and Institute and avoid issues being pushed to extremes. While concerned about defending IDS's academic independence on one hand, he obviously considered "the political (and financial) reality" of the Ministry's support could not be ignored on the other. Although preferring the role of establishment critic, when faced with the responsibility of office he found himself constrained to adopt a more moderate tone.

Bernstein's observations do raise very basic criticisms of the role of IDS and Seers' position, though Seers himself tended to turn this criticism to positive effect acknowledging IDS owed a debt to these "critical, including Marxist, currents. ... They saved us from losing professional vitality and becoming part of the establishment, which would have destroyed our credibility."[278] He was similarly positive in his comments about criticism coming from ODM officials, not wishing to stereotype them too readily as "obstructive bureaucrats". "At times the questions civil servants have raised about our work have helped us avoid losing touch with reality," he observed, adding "Up to now we have hardly had to sacrifice any autonomy for the Ministry's assistance in financial and other ways."[279]

Resignation from the Directorship of IDS

However, it is apparent that the strain of the arguments and frustrations were gradually taking their toll on Seers, and when another crisis of a different kind arose at the end of 1970 he confessed he had "little stomach for further months of politicking". The occasion, which escaped much outside notice at the time, was when a group of Fellows and Research officers proposed that the Institute should give staff paid leave to support a one day strike "called by a group of trade union militants (against the wishes of the TUC) to protest at the Government's Industrial Relations Bill." While not supporting the bill himself, Seers was concerned that the consequences of this type of action could threaten the very existence of IDS, particularly with a Conservative government now in power - "We would have got precious little support from the aid lobby, and the Conservatives had shown themselves quite capable of dismantling institutions Labour had set up." He privately decided to resign if the work of the Institute had been affected by a strike on the issue (though in retrospect he considered this a wrong decision even though he did not have to implement it). But when put to the vote at a general meeting of all IDS staff the proposal for the strike was narrowly defeated, due mainly to the opposition vote of the secretaries.[280]

Seers again faced criticism from colleagues in June 1971 in response to a letter he and Emmanuel de Kadt, the Deputy Director, had written to a professor in Chile sympathising with difficulties his institute was facing following Allende's coming to power and seemingly implying some apprehension that its academic freedom might be jeopardised by the new socialist regime. Their letter concluded "surely few would wish to see this institute which is truly unique in Latin America, emerge with a totally changed character, tied to one particular view of the world".[281] This provoked an immediate response from at least two research officers, objecting to the opinions and "political innuendo"[282] expressed in a letter which might well be interpreted as IDS policy, and one with which they could not associate themselves. As a result Seers wrote a further letter to the Chilean institute clarifying the fact that the original letter had been written "in a purely personal capacity, the institute of course takes no position on such questions."[283]

As well as the tensions that Seers, as Director, faced with ODM and IDS staff, there was the additional problem that, as the Institute expanded, far more time had to be spent on administrative work, rather than work in the field, which he obviously preferred. As early as June 1970, following the "crisis" he had inferred he might be thinking of giving up the post, commenting that "running the Institute will be clearly a full time occupation, ruling out the possibility of any professional work....You will probably be able to infer where this line of thought is leading me."[284]

His term of office as Director ran out in 1972 and although he could have stood again he had firmly decided not to, observing "After all the excitements of the birth and early years, I needed a change: so did the Institute!"[285] To find a successor the Governing Body set up a special committee which followed the advice of the Fellows and

recommended the appointment of Richard Jolly as Director. Seers stepped down as Director and assumed work as a Fellow.

Having taken up his work at the ODM at the start of the Labour administration in 1964 with optimism and enthusiasm, Seers had become disillusioned with the Labour Party's performance in government, frustrated with close proximity to Whitehall officialdom, and, as director of IDS, increasingly uncomfortable in his working relationship with the ODM. However, his work at the ODM and position as first permanent Director at IDS proved invaluable in vastly widening his experience and initiating many contacts with individuals, institutions and international agencies in Britain and overseas which not only influenced his thinking about development but opened up many opportunities for his own career within the development field.

As a Fellow he continued to have an influential role at IDS and to work with and have close liaison with the ODM but, without the burden of responsibility of the Directorship, he had greater freedom and distance to express his opinions and take a more critical stance on occasions - "teasing bureaucrats" being one of the hobbies he listed in his *Who's Who* entry.

Seers' role and work IDS after his resignation as Director will be taken up in Chapters 6 and 7, but first we need to look in more detail at his views on development during those early years at IDS, and why, by the end of the 1960s, his ideas about the meaning of development had changed considerably from those he held even in the earlier part of the decade.

CHAPTER 5: FROM GROWTH TO DEVELOPMENT

As Seers took up his post at IDS in August 1967 it was becoming increasingly apparent that the aim of the United Nations First Development Decade to reduce global inequalities and promote development in poorer countries - targeting 5 per cent growth rates in these regions by 1970, aided by the transference of capital and technical assistance from the richer industrialised countries - was failing dismally. Instead of inequalities decreasing, the gap between rich and poor countries was in fact widening and the number of people living in poverty increasing.[1] As he observed at an SID conference at the end of 1967, the economic performance of many countries receiving aid during the 1960s had been poor and disappointing, and instead of achieving the anticipated even balance of growth in the world economy, what had grown was inflation, urban unemployment and social inequalities.[2] For many developing countries the economic situation had deteriorated rather than improved and in others, where growth had occurred, its benefits had been enjoyed by a small minority in the modern sector, thus enhancing inequalities *within* as well as between countries.

Seers himself referred, in 1968, to the 1960s as a "decade of disillusion"[3] and there was, in fact, widespread recognition of the need to reappraise the aims and policies of international development and to ensure a sounder footing for the future, as proposals were discussed for a Second Development Decade. The widening gap between the developed and developing countries was "a central issue of our time" declared Lester B. Pearson in 1969 in the opening sentence of *Partners in Development*, the report of the Commission on International Development specifically set up by the World Bank "to study the consequences of 20 years of development assistance, assess the results, clarify the errors and propose the policies which will work better in the future".[4] While critical of the Pearson report in many respects (as will be seen below) Seers agreed with its author that there was still a moral obligation of richer countries to help reduce and remove the stark global divisions. However, in common with Pearson and others working in the development field at this time, Seers' initial optimism about development prospects in the early 1960s was now tempered by the disappointing record, resulting in a reappraisal of some of his earlier ideas and a different focus for his work.

This chapter will first look briefly at the reasons why Seers himself considered the 1960s a decade of disillusion, and then at how his own work experience, particularly in the Caribbean, demonstrated the inadequacy of growth as an indicator of development, prompting him to define what he saw as more relevant social indicators. While by the early 1970s it was generally acknowledged that rates of growth and purely economic indicators such as GNP were inadequate as sole measures of development unless attention was also given to social conditions and progress, it has been observed that Seers "dethroned GNP before most others".[5] In what has come to be regarded as one of his seminal papers, "The Meaning of Development"[6] delivered in 1969, he defined development in terms of social targets - specifically the elimination of poverty,

unemployment and inequality - rather than in terms of economic growth. Concentration on social indicators of and targets for development underpinned his and much of IDS's work in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as well as influencing other international agencies - the focus on unemployment playing a particularly central role - and consideration will be given in this chapter to how this affected Seers' ideas on aid and planning.

Excessive and exaggerated emphasis on growth and the economic aspects of the relationship between rich and poor countries, with aid and the transference of capital treated as a central issue, he now argued, had evaded adequate attention being given to other constraints on development, particularly what he regarded as non-economic factors, and other ways in which the rich countries affected the poor. The other factors he particularly stressed, and which will be considered in some detail in this chapter, were the transference of inappropriate consumption patterns and production techniques, which encompassed a broader range of issues and policies than those of insufficient aid or unfair trade policies on which attention had been focused in the early 1960s. His heavy involvement the ILO World Employment Programme missions to Colombia, Ceylon and Kenya further informed his opinions and the reports from these three countries experiencing very different circumstances will also be looked at briefly.

Despite a growing disillusion with the development record, he still, however, regarded the task of tackling world poverty as an international effort presenting "special problems (as well as special opportunities) for poor countries" but also "special responsibilities for the rich".[7] The general focus of his work in the later 1960s and early 1970s was therefore mainly on relations between the "poor" Third World and the "rich" "western", "capitalist" or "industrialized"[8] world. He regarded the word "'poor'... preferable to the euphemisms 'under-developed', 'developing', 'less developed', etc.," all of which he considered vague, being in some senses applicable to any country, and dangerous evasions of reality,[9] and also accepted "the Third World" as a convenient phrase to describe those areas classified as poor (basically the countries of Africa, Asia, excluding Japan, and Latin America to some degree). The "rich" were identified as North America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa,[10] with the USA dominating the world market, as Seers observed, with a per capita income in 1970 (then at nearly $4,000) more than twice that of western Europe, more than twenty times that of the Third World, and approaching 100 times that of the world's poorest countries, with the gap expected to widen during 1970s and 1980s; and in fact he observed "More than ever, the core of the world development problem is now the United States".[11]

While urging the need for international as well as national policies to address world poverty, Seers now demonstrated more awareness of the international, and also national, political power structures which tended to resist development reforms that imposed limitations on their sphere of interest, and the question of the feasibility of implementing development programmes will also be considered in this chapter, particularly with regard to the World Employment reports.

Although the main focus of his work was on the relationship between the First and

Third Worlds, he still had a particular interest in development in Cuba, partly because of his earlier study of the island and also because it presented an example of a country where economic growth had been subordinated to social targets. In 1970 this interest extended to Chile, as socialist President Allende came to power. This chapter will therefore conclude with a look at Seers' views on and assessment of the alternative socialist approach to development in these two countries.

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, he kept up a busy schedule during his time as director at IDS and was involved in many activities, writing prolifically, as he did throughout his time at the Institute. The nature of his work placed him in a position which enabled him to discuss issues and address his opinions and comments to a wide audience including international agencies of the United Nations and financial institutions such as the World Bank, the governments of developing countries, the British government, the executives of companies investing overseas, as well as to academics, specialists and students in the development field.

1960s - Decade of disillusion

Seers' disillusion with the development record of the 1960s arose partly as a result of the disappointing failure of international efforts to tackle world poverty and inequalities, due to the lack of commitment to aid and development demonstrated by the richer countries. However, he was also struck by the general failure of planning, and in particular that based on import substitution, in the developing countries themselves, a strategy in which he himself had initially put much faith. Both of these issues are explored further in this section.

In the early 1960s while working in Africa, Seers had anticipated that the virtual "enfranchisement" of the poorer countries in the United Nations would help redress international inequalities (see Chapter 3, p.135). However, it was becoming increasingly clear to him by the end of the decade that the UN was "not in fact capable of mitigating the international inequalities", since the rich countries of North America and Western Europe enjoyed heavy representation at the UN and were primarily concerned with defending their own national political and economic interests, rather than seriously supporting action against international poverty.[12] While a number of UN resolutions had focused on international development issues there was no power to compel members to comply with them. Although recognising that progress had been made in assisting poorer countries through the UN's specialist economic and social agencies such as FAO, WHO, UNESCO, UNIDO and the UNDP, when it came to international economic discussions, he observed, the delegations at the UN from North America and Western Europe were customarily on the defensive and "more concerned to sidetrack awkward initiatives than enter into serious negotiation on ways of altering the economic balance of the world".[13] Little progress had been made in favour of commodity stabilisation schemes and preferential trade agreements for developing countries, as proposed at UNCTAD I. In fact, he remarked, "the main effort

of industrial countries in liberalization [had] been devoted to trade among themselves", as exemplified in the Kennedy Round of trade concessions which ended in 1967, and were mainly concerned with the reduction of barriers in Europe within EFTA and the EEC.[14] UNCTAD II at New Delhi in 1968 brought no further positive results for developing countries as the richer countries were preoccupied with their own financial problems.

Aid targets for 1 per cent of national income to flow to the poorer countries had not been taken seriously enough or adhered to by the richer nations and by 1967 the flow of capital had been falling rather than rising, as countries in the northern hemisphere faced their own balance of payments difficulties and began to question the effectiveness of aid from the donors' point of view. Support for aid programmes had dwindled in the United States, for example, he observed, as it became apparent "aid failed to smother communism" and had been "unsuccessful in promoting either internal stability or peace" - the civil wars in Nigeria and the Congo, the Middle East war of 1967 and the ongoing war in Vietnam being cases in point.[15] Actual aid remained at a low level, usually motivated by the self interest of the donor rather than the needs of the recipient, thereby often hindering rather than helping development, he remarked, drawing attention to the words of Gunnar Myrdal:

> As [he] warned us many years ago, the establishment of the national welfare state has turned the attention of the public in the rich countries inward, making them *less* interested in the welfare of the world as a whole. The aid that does exist often plays an important economic role, but, like immigration and trade policies, it is very largely motivated by the self-interest of donors, sometimes by very short-term commercial and political interests. This often in effect leads them to support, or even help install, governments which oppose the redistribution of income and in other ways block development.[16]

In Britain itself, as was seen in Chapter 4, Seers had been disappointed in the government's record, its self-interested insularity, and lack of commitment to assisting the poorer countries through more broadly based development policies. While there were "internationalists" in every country who were supportive of more positive policies towards developing countries, he now acknowledged that their political power was usually relatively weak.[17]

But having been generally supportive of the principle of increasing aid in the mid-1960s, by the second half of the decade Seers was himself becoming a little sceptical about its effectiveness in promoting social and economic development, because of the attitude and policies of both donors and recipients, as outlined in the previous chapter (see Chapter 4, pp.165-9). Additionally, he began to observe that many countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America which had received capital investment had gained little from the inflow since it was "being echoed by a rising flow of interest, profits, dividends and private capital in the opposite direction" - with even some of the benefits of technical assistant scholarship programmes being lost in the brain drain to the northern hemisphere.[18] In the White Paper of 1965 it had already been observed that debt service payments were beginning to eat up a large proportion of aid receipts, in Latin America at least (see

Chapter 4, p.151) - though compared to the escalation of the 1970s and 1980s this was still on a relatively minor scale. What this demonstrated he argued was that aid and capital in itself was not sufficient to solve development problems, without attention to more fundamental, and often non-economic factors, which also affected development - and which will be explored in this chapter.

Carefully devised plans for capital investment programmes had in fact proved insufficient to promote development as had been anticipated, he pointed out in a paper written for the very first *IDS Bulletin* in 1968. At a seminar in Jamaica in January that year he had already outlined the dismal record of planning worldwide: Ghana's 7-year plan, prepared in 1963, had been entirely discarded; India's fourth 5-year plan had been sent back for revision; Chile's 10-year plan announced in 1960 had been virtually forgotten; and Cuba's plan to industrialise at the expense of cutting down sugar exports had been shelved and the policy reversed; and, he added, even Britain's 1965 plan had been largely put aside.[19] Of those that survived, he remarked many did "not have a great deal of operational relevance", others were "little better than fantasies" lacking in political and administrative reality, and many were often "statements of aspiration rather than of what could reasonably be expected from the economy"; most plans were only short term, allowing little time for measures to have their full effect, and nearly all contained "a great many gaps" paying inadequate attention to such issues as wages policy, the operation of overseas companies, import controls, distribution of income, agricultural policy and education.[20] As he observed in the *Bulletin*

> The 1960s could well be called the decade of disillusion. The development plans prepared in many countries, often with the help of highly sophisticated economists, have proved of limited use as guides to policy decisions. They were very largely government investment programmes. Most of us working for governments have come, however, even if slowly and perhaps reluctantly, to realise that what holds up development is usually not only, or even primarily, lack of capital, but systems of education or land tenure, politicians unwilling or unable to change the social structure, administrative systems which are archaic or nepotic, etc. etc.[21]

As indicated in previous chapters, Seers had himself insisted for some years on the importance of taking notice of social and political, as well as economic factors, in the development process (particularly after his work for ECLA) and had also, from the early 1960s in the Caribbean urged governments to adopt national planning, taking into account the activities of the private sector as well as government investment programmes. But nevertheless, he had certainly accepted the basic assumption that the promotion of growth, measured in terms of national income, was crucial for and almost synonymous with development, and had been supportive of the structuralist solution of promoting fast growth through import substitution industrialisation programmes requiring large investments of capital. However, by the late 1960s, he acknowledged the experience of the decade had demonstrated that this idea had been "misleading"[22] - together with the aid philosophy which accompanied it; and by 1970 he was distancing himself from his earlier association with what he termed "the Prebisch doctrine" - "(a logic I myself once

accepted) ... that fast economic growth based on protected industrialisation would induce the advance of other sectors of the economy and the relief of social problems, following the pattern of development in Western Europe and North America".[23]

Useful as Prebisch's analysis had been "in its time", he came to regard it as an "illegitimate transfer of experience". Whereas growth in the Western Europe and North America had brought about lower concentration of incomes, less severe geographical differences and adequate creation of employment; in developing countries, while industry had made a significant contribution, especially to larger economies, and growth rates had not been unsatisfactory, its benefits had not been spread out but had been heavily concentrated in the hands of a small minority within a modern sector, the major social problems had remained unsolved and often worsened, unemployment had increased and the gap between town and country widened.[24] The modern sector was in many ways more closely linked with overseas countries, particularly the United States, than with their own hinterlands, with consumption patterns and production techniques based on those in richer economies; the result was therefore, he observed, "a terrible hybrid - a modern imported way of life grafted onto a feudal or primitive society".[25]

He had for some years emphasised the differences in circumstance of the "special case" of Western industrialised countries, which made "conventional" economic theory of limited relevance to developing countries. However, he now further argued that the reason the growth paths of North America and Western Europe could not be repeated was that the poorer countries were attempting to develop within the context of "a divided world" where great inequalities existed and where the Western industrialised economies dominated markets for goods, ideas and manpower and influenced both production techniques and consumption tastes. During their own industrialisation process, he pointed out, Western economies had not been confronted by such a situation where richer economies set and influenced standards and they had therefore been able to develop production techniques and consumption styles suitable for their own needs. He now therefore maintained that not only was the experience of the industrialised countries inappropriate as a model for developing countries but the impact and influence of Western salaries, consumption patterns and technologies were inappropriate for poorer economies, having the effect of enhancing and aggravating inequalities, unemployment and other social problems.[26]

The first development decade had failed, he argued, because the United Nations, and economists, had misconceived the nature of the problems facing them and had been misguided in seeing development in terms of "achieving an increase in the national incomes of the 'developing' countries formalised in the target of 5% growth rates".[27] He professed he was alarmed by the prospect of a second development decade based on the same premises as the first, including targets for growth (as advocated by the Pearson report) since another decade "like the 1960s with unemployment rates and inequality rising by further large steps, would be politically and economically disastrous whatever the pace of economic growth!"[28] Rather than concentrating on the pace of growth, his concern now was that more emphasis be given to the *process* of growth and the reasons why it had

become "perverted" and "distorted".

Despite his disillusion with the development record of the 1960s, however, Seers still had a certain missionary zeal in addressing the problems of world poverty which he frequently referred to as immoral or "increasingly repulsive" as the rich became richer. The aim of the development practitioner, in fact, he argued in "The Meaning of Development" was "to change international attitudes" so that it became "impossible for the political leaders and social scientists of Europe and North America to continue overlooking and aggravating, often inadvertently, the obscene inequalities that disfigure the world".[29] The rest of this chapter examines his own analysis of the problems and some of the arguments he himself employed in the late 1960s and early 1970s in an attempt to change attitudes and reduce inequalities.

Reappraisal of economic growth as the indicator of development

Seers' critique of economic growth is usually associated with his 1969 paper "The Meaning of Development", but it was work experience in the two preceding years which initially demonstrated to him that growth (measured in terms of increase in the per capita national income) was an insufficient and inadequate indicator of development. Of projects he undertook in 1967/8 he commented:

> After jobs for the ILO (on minimum wage), IBRD (on country analysis) and Ceylon [for the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs], I began to feel that economic growth was not merely incomplete as a measure of 'development' in the sense of the ultimate aims of policy; it was in many ways irrelevant to it, sometimes even responsible for a country slipping back.[30]

He did not himself spell out the significance of these projects (and the specific relevance of the visit to Ceylon is not clear) but his work for the World Bank and ILO do give some indication of his thinking at this time, as he moved further away from a purely economic assessment of development.

His evaluation of the World Bank country reports was critical of the fact that they overstressed the financial aspects of development and were too "heavily 'economic'" in their emphasis whereas, he maintained, "development is not wholly - one could argue that for many of them it is not even mainly - a matter of economics";[31] more attention needed to be paid to manpower and educational planning, population policy and the social and political context of development. The ILO report on minimum wage fixing, for which Seers was the rapporteur, recognised the importance of economic growth in providing the means for social progress, but also observed that it was not always used for this purpose; it therefore acknowledged that policy objectives in developing countries needed to include not only economic growth but also social objectives such as the relief of poverty, improvements in health, housing and education, as well as measures such as minimum wage fixing.[32]

However, it was during visits to the Caribbean in 1968 and 1969, particularly to

Trinidad where he was involved in advising the Ministry of Planning and Finance on drawing up a development plan, that the inadequacy of economic growth as an indicator of development struck him even more forcefully. Although the domestic product of the island had risen by 8 per cent a year for 14 years, unemployment had also risen, so that by 1967 10 per cent of the labour force was unemployed - a larger percentage than in the early 1950s - resulting in a larger proportion of the population living in conditions of poverty. This, what he termed, "extraordinary combination"[33] (of a high growth rate and high level of unemployment) obviously indicated that rapid economic growth was not sufficient to promote all-round development or reduce, or even contain, unemployment which he described as "the very mark of backwardness".[34] It was necessary to look more deeply than national income trends to explain what had happened and search beyond economics for solutions, he maintained, and undoubtedly the experience of Trinidad had a significant influence on his thinking at this time.

In "The Limitations of the Special Case" in 1963 Seers had emphasised the need for more case-studies of primary producing economies and more comparative research as a means towards building up a general theory of development more appropriate for developing economies. In 1968 he spoke again of the "great need of a general theory of development, as a guide to policy", regarding Trinidad's experience as providing an example of relevance to other developing countries.[35] While acknowledging that the development process was far more complex in a country the size of Brazil or India and that in some respects their problems would be qualitatively different, Seers maintained that it was much easier to pursue a frame of analysis not confined to economic factors and to see the interaction of political and economic forces in a smaller-scale economy. Trinidad was regarded as being particularly suitable as a case-study since its statistics were unusually good and its economy relatively developed, so its experience could be a warning to others at an earlier stage along the same path.

> Certain characteristics are shared by all countries which are not industrially developed, small or large, rich or poor, exporters of agricultural or mineral products. These include foreign production techniques and consumption habits.... Perhaps most the significant common feature of such economies now is chronic large-scale unemployment. In Trinidad more than 10 per cent of the labour force are out of work (even on a restrictive definition), and those with jobs are far from being fully occupied. If there is one generalization that can safely be made about the whole of Africa, Asia and Latin America, it is that, though the nature of unemployment and its causes vary from country to country, it has become massive, chronic and dangerous everywhere, in contrast to the industrial countries, in all of which unemployment has been kept at low levels almost continuously since the war. Unemployment is the very mark of backwardness, and any opportunity to study it takes one at once to the heart of the problems of development.[36]

By 1968 therefore employment was regarded by Seers as a more crucial indicator of development than economic growth and its study was to become central to his work in those first years at IDS.

In 1964 Seers had already drawn attention to "the typical paradox" of petroleum producers where "chronic, structural unemployment" was "found side by side with high

wages" since petroleum extraction provided employment for a relatively small workforce which was highly paid - a tendency which Trinidad, as a petroleum producer, also experienced.[37] However, in Trinidad there had also been a marked increase in the manufacturing sector and "the most serious disappointment" was that, despite this, there had still been little increase in employment. This was an aspect of Trinidad's unemployment problem that was more generally applicable to other "developing" countries for it demonstrated the failure of fast growth, promoted by protected industrialisation, to stimulate more widespread development and employment in other sectors, as originally anticipated, and that Trinidad's prosperity was "still highly precarious after more than a decade of subsidized industrial development".[38]

Seers attributed this partly to a rapid rise in wages and partly to the "industrial development policy of the government", whose incentives to foreign capital and companies to invest in the economy had resulted in much of the proceeds of growth flowing overseas in payments and profits.[39] We will return to discuss these issues further in later sections, the point here being to indicate the personal working experience which provided the background to "The Meaning of Development", his criticism of economic growth as an indicator of development and his call for more social indicators.

Inadequacy of GNP as a measure of development

Seers used the platform of his Presidential address to the Society for International Development at the 11th World Conference in New Delhi in November 1969 to launch what Jolly has termed "a devastating attack on GNP".[40] Initially entitled "Challenges to Development Theories and Strategies", the paper was later published under its better known title, "The Meaning of Development", subsequently being revised and published as "What are we Trying to Measure".[41]

While recognising that the use of a single comprehensive indicator, like national income, to measure development was obviously convenient, especially to politicians, Seers argued that in relying on a such a yardstick the real problems of development - which were more difficult to measure and to solve - were being ignored. The supposition that increases in national income, if faster than population growth, would lead to the solution of social and political problems had proved to be naive and false and, in fact, he now observed, it looked "as if economic growth may not merely fail to solve social and political difficulties; certain types of growth can actually cause them."[42]

> It is even possible that, were the data available, we would find economic growth to be directly associated with growing unemployment and increasing inequality; if that has indeed been the case, there has been a negative correlation between growth and development.[43]

This had indeed appeared to be the case in Trinidad.

In addition, he maintained, taking up a point he had made before, the yardstick itself was not even reliable when applied to poorer economies. In such areas national income

was not the comprehensive, objective, value-free indicator it was often considered in Western countries, since large sections of poor economies (such as agriculture output for domestic consumption, forest products, fishing, capital investment in rural areas, domestic service, etc.) lay outside the scope of official statistics. Such statistics that were available were also not always the most reliable and, from personal experience, he could make the frank confession that income statistics for many developing countries were often irrelevant, unreliable and open to manipulation.

> the published national income series for a large number of countries have very little relevance to economic reality. In many countries, any reasonably competent statistician could produce series showing the real per capita income either rising or falling. Decimal places are fantasy.... Some national income series are in fact in a way more misleading than sets of random numbers would be, because they *appear* to have a significance.[44]

The difficulties of interpreting and assessing the national income of poor countries are reminiscent of the paper Seers had written twenty years earlier in 1952-3 on "The role of national income estimates in the statistical policy of an underdeveloped area".[45] However, whereas his initial caution about relying on such accounts had resulted in his considering more constructive and relevant methods of "social accounting" (through the use of a disaggregated income and expenditure accounts), his concern now was to identify "social indicators" of and "social targets" for the development process itself.

Social indicators/targets for development

In rejecting the notion of development as synonymous with economic growth, Seers defined what he meant by development and how this process could be advanced, assessed, and measured. Development he considered was "almost a synonym for improvement"[46] and involved value judgements.

> surely the values we need are staring us in the face, if we go back, ... to the questions raised by Gandhi's thought and life. We must ask ourselves, what are the necessary conditions for a universally acceptable aim, the realization of the potential of human personality?[47]

Answering this question he arrived at three "absolute" and "basic necessities" of life: first, enough food to eat and the capacity to buy the physical necessities of life such as clothing, footwear and shelter; second, a job, though not necessarily paid employment (it could "include studying, working on a family farm or keeping house"); and third, income distribution, since inequalities in the world were "objectionable by any religious or ethical standards".[48] The levels of poverty, unemployment, and inequality, he therefore argued, provided more useful and relevant indicators of development and targets for research, planning and aid policies, than that of national income. Research efforts, he maintained, needed to be devoted "above all to understanding the causes of poverty, and the mechanism by which unemployment emerges and inequalities grow, as a basis for genuine development plans";[49] medium-term 5 year plans already published needed to be

reconstructed "to form long-term targets for the reduction of poverty, unemployment and inequality instead of by means of achieving national income targets";[50] and aid too, he believed, would be more effective if it was "distributed with the aim of reinforcing a co-ordinated attack on poverty, inequality and unemployment".[51]

While Seers often considered the experience of Western countries irrelevant or inappropriate for the poorer economies, in this instance he drew attention to the example of the industrial countries where by 1950 "the great economic problems had been brought largely under control" in great part due to the work of social scientists like Booth, Rowntree, the Webbs, Keynes, Beveridge and Tawney who had focused attention on the elimination of poverty, unemployment and inequality. He acknowledged, however, that industrial countries had also "benefited from world economic leadership and political power"[52] (which was obviously not the case for the majority of developing countries).

For true fulfilment of human potential he agreed other requirements were also necessary including "adequate educational levels, freedom of speech, citizenship of a nation that is truly independent, both economically and politically, in the sense that the views of other governments do not largely predetermine his own government's decisions". As undernourishment, unemployment and inequality dwindled he agreed these other requirements would become increasingly important - as would later still "freedom from repressive sexual codes, from noise and pollution" - though not overriding the three basic priorities.[53]

Although recognising that political liberty, as well as education, could also provide an important *means* for achieving the social goals, Seers maintained at this point that "political liberty must be considered as an *end*, the importance of which though high is secondary, so long as a substantial fraction of the people are undernourished and unemployed".[54] Reflecting a few years later, however, in 1977 (as will be seen in Chapter 6), he observed he should have given more priority to true independence (economic and political) as a *condition* as well as an objective of development.[55] Although, as will be seen below, he did consider that developing economies would benefit from being less dependent on external links, in "The Meaning of Development" in 1969 it was the three basic necessities - adequate food, employment and equality (rather than independence or self-reliance) - which were identified as the main indicators of and targets for development. These three issues became the focus not only for his own work in the late 1960s and early 1970s but were also adopted by IDS during its early years and also had some influence on the philosophy of the pilot missions of the ILO World Employment Programmes.

The continuing need for national income measurement and growth

Although critical of using national income as the sole measure or indicator of development, Seers did not, however, dismiss it as totally meaningless. To begin with figures demonstrating international inequalities and the widening gap between rich and

poor were based on GNP data, and as he pointed out himself: "Egalitarians like myself face a theoretical paradox. If we argue that the national income is an inappropriate measure of a nation's development, we weaken the significance of a growing *per capita* income gap between rich nations and poor."[56]

An alternative international model showing the magnitude of poverty, he conceded, would be immensely difficult to construct. Despite the limitations of national income as a development measure (and the limited significance of international comparisons of incomes when life styles were so different in different parts of the world), he accepted that its demonstration of the striking differences in income of rich and poor countries *was* significant since unquestionably the majority of the population in regions with low per capita income lived in conditions of persistent poverty, unimaginable in rich countries.

At the national level too, he agreed national income was useful as a "measure of development *potential*" and that from a long-term viewpoint, an increase in the per capita national income - or growth - was for poor countries "a necessary" though "not a sufficient condition" for reducing poverty; whether growth was accompanied by development depended on policy and the process of growth rather than its rate. A country could have "little or no economic growth but be busy reshaping its political institutions so that, when growth comes, it can be turned into development"; such a country he remarked could have a greater development potential than one with fast growth where increases in income, and political power, remained firmly in the hands of a rich minority, causing greater inequality. As such he found policies adopted by certain socialist countries interesting examples of growth being subordinated to social goals, observing it would be interesting to compare, what happened in Cuba and Brazil in the remainder of the century.[57]

He in fact questioned whether a slowing down of the growth process would be necessarily disastrous and seemingly favoured a slower rate of growth if it was accompanied by policies aimed at structural reform and the reduction of inequality, poverty and unemployment. One of his criticisms of the 6 per cent growth rate targets adopted by the second development decade was that "they set up a yardstick of achievement which might well turn out to encourage criticism precisely of those countries which spend the 1970s carrying through the structural changes which are needed".[58] In this particular instance he was alluding to the then recent example of the Allende regime coming to power in Chile in 1970, committed to social reform, rather than growth *per se*. Within the perspective of a country's history, a decade or two could well be "spent in the reconstruction of the socio-economic system, by land reform, tax reform, educational reform, and working out appropriate production techniques,"[59] argued Seers, even though it might not be accompanied by fast growth. Commenting on the situation in Latin America and the Caribbean he observed:

> Surely growth rate targets are less important than social targets, whether for continents or countries. An 8% growth rate with certain patterns of growth ... may well mean less development in the sense I use the word than (say) a 4% growth rate combined with firm measures to redistribute income. Indeed, from what we know of countries in the region with even 6% long-term growth rates in the 1950s and 1960s

> (such as Jamaica, Trinidad and Venezuela) it is questionable whether really fast growth can be achieved without such a heavy concentration on modern parts of the economy as to induce still greater dependence on foreign countries, still greater inequalities, and a continued, or even accelerated, increase in unemployment.[60]

However, despite these assertions, the recommendations of Seers' own reports, though aiming at social targets, were often based on an assumed high rate of growth. For instance, the recommendations of the employment report on Colombia - in which (according to Streeten) Seers took "pride in never mentioning the word 'growth'"[61] - implied and assumed a growth rate of 8 per cent. This was a figure higher than that recommended by the Pearson Commission as a target for the Second Development Decade and a figure Seers himself considered high in a critical review of Prebisch's report on employment (which had also required a growth rate of 8 per cent). Seers' response to this apparent anomaly was included in a footnote to this review:

> It is true that in the case of Colombia, the combined implications of the targets we suggest for employment, and the guesses made about productivity imply a growth rate of 8% However, this is not a target in itself - the emphasis is on the employment targets and the policies they imply, especially for incomes and technology needed to reach it. We raise in the report the question whether Colombia can achieve such far-reaching changes without reduction (para 844) but felt we should state the full economic requirements of a full employment policy.[62]

So although growth, measured in terms of national income, might no longer be the main target of a development plan, Seers acknowledged that a high rate of growth was still necessary to achieve the employment target which had taken its place. The fundamental question was of course how and whether the proceeds of growth could or would be channelled more positively towards social targets, such as the elimination of unemployment, rather than being further concentrated on the modern parts of the economy, inducing greater dependence on foreign countries, still greater inequalities, and increased unemployment. This obviously raised questions about the feasibility of making social targets the focus of development programmes and the consistency of the development process, as discussed by Seers in "The Meaning of Development".

"The internal consistency of the development process"

Having defined development in terms of the elimination of poverty, unemployment and inequality, though at the same time recognising the necessity for growth, the challenge to the social scientists, politicians and administrators in the decades ahead, Seers observed, was to find paths of development which enabled progress to be made on *all* the criteria. While it seemed obvious that the social targets were all mutually reinforcing, and reducing unemployment, for example, would also help relieve poverty and inequality,[63] there were other areas where the criteria did not appear to be so mutually compatible; particularly those of growth and equality.

Although, as demonstrated in the previous section, he considered slower growth could bring longer term benefits if accompanied by appropriate socio-economic reforms, on the

other hand he observed "redistributive strategies" could in some circumstances "hamper economic growth and thus the more fundamental long-term solution of the problem of poverty".[64] One of the very basic questions that needed to be addressed therefore in his view was "the compatibility of equality and rising output and employment" (an issue he was interested in exploring in relation to Cuba's experience as will be seen later in this chapter, pp.245-8). For Third World countries he found unconvincing and of limited validity the classical argument that inequality was necessary to generate savings and incentives to promote economic growth and employment, since savings in such economies tended to flow abroad, being spent on goods and services with a high foreign exchange content, or go into projects, such as luxury housing, with little or no positive effect on development. Nevertheless, he acknowledged he could not totally dismiss the idea of inequality providing incentives since there was a need for "private entrepreneurial talent" - businessmen, progressive farmers, foreign companies - to stimulate development and employment and it was not clear whether these would emerge (or remain in a country where they could only earn a small fraction of what they could earn elsewhere) without financial incentives and rewards on a scale which would "make nonsense of an egalitarian policy". Could they be equally encouraged by social incentives and non-financial rewards, he queried.[65]

The previous paragraph raises only briefly some fundamental questions and inconsistencies that inevitably arose in attempting to pursue social targets and incentives within the capitalist system where financial incentives and profit were the dominant considerations; and these questions will arise again in other sections of this chapter. Seers himself observed: "I do not pretend to know the answers to this complex of questions which point to a set of 'internal contradictions' in the development processes far more severe than those to which Marx drew attention."[66]

However, what he was more certain about was the incompatibility of great *in*equality and economic growth, where such a combination was likely to lead to civil unrest. In an economy, such as that of Trinidad, where a high rate of growth was accompanied by increasing unemployment and poverty for the majority, and wealth for a few, crime was already growing with the danger of increased political disturbance particularly from young men who had little hope in the future: "Indeed if violent crime is a signal of prerevolutionary disequilibrium the symptoms are already noticeable",[67] Seers remarked. It was in fact the experience of economies such as that of Trinidad, which greatly influenced his decision to concentrate his and IDS's efforts on what he termed the "unholy and intractable trinity"[68] of inequality, poverty and unemployment.

It has been observed by Diana Hunt that, considering Seers' earlier views and endorsement of the classical structuralist definition of development, it is important not to underestimate the significance of his changed definition of development in terms of social targets, "introduced by someone who was in a position to influence both development theory and practice".[69] Hunt argues that this redefinition was in part a reaction to neo-Marxist and egalitarian demands of radical elements in academic institutions like Sussex

University in the late 1960s - which no doubt did have their influence on Seers' ideas about development (as they did on relations with the ODM, indicated in Chapter 4).

Additionally, however, his change of emphasis was very much in reaction to the threat of political and social upheaval, and potentially far more violent egalitarian demands, arising in developing countries like Trinidad where growth policies had been accompanied by worsening social conditions for a large proportion of the population - and where, as will be seen later, he did not consider a revolutionary Cuban-style solution a feasible option. The danger was that growth, unless accompanied by social reforms, would eventually produce political stresses so severe as to bring itself to an end.

The problem that Seers increasingly remarked upon, however, was that because of the relationship between the distribution of income and political power, some governments were plainly unwilling, or unable to pursue policies towards greater equality, or to tackle the social problems of poverty and unemployment, as those in privileged positions with high incomes inevitably tried to find ways of maintaining their privileges, resisting policies aimed at greater equality. In addition the vested interests of overseas governments and companies in such areas were also reluctant to contemplate any major change in the status quo which might threaten their own position. These are problems which will be returned to later in this chapter; but first consideration will be given to what implications Seers envisaged social, rather than growth, development targets had for aid policy and planning in particular.

Implications of social targets for aid policy

It was concentration on growth that had led to an exaggerated importance attached to aid maintained Seers - attributing UNCTAD's heavy emphasis on aid partly to "the Latin American origins of Prebisch and other senior staff" and the structuralist growth model.[70] However, if the perception of development moved away from financial and economic indicators and an emphasis on growth towards social indicators and targets, he envisaged the concentration on the aid relationship would be reduced.

While still supportive in principle of the moral obligation of the rich to help the poorer nations, he was in fact critical of the proposals put forward in the Pearson Report, *Partners in Development*, because they were still essentially based on the premise that equated development with economic growth, dependent on capital supplemented by foreign donors. Pearson had calculated that a 6 per cent growth rate in developing countries required a 1 per cent transfer of GNP from wealthier countries - 0.70 per cent consisting of "official development assistance" and the remaining 0.30 per cent coming from private overseas investment - and it was recommended that "Each developed country should increase its resource transfers to developing countries to a minimum of 1 per cent of its Gross National Product as rapidly as possible, and in no case later than 1975".[71] These targets were adopted by the United Nations for its Second Development Decade and were greeted by Seers as "not very meaningful" and possibly "dangerous" since, he argued, they

encouraged "the illusion that the central object of policy, including aid policies, should be to accelerate growth".[72] His attitude and reservations about the role of aid, are typified by the fact that in April 1969, he addressed the Pearson Commission Secretariat in Washington on "The Irrelevance of Aid".[73]
were "other ways in which rich countries affect development"[74] (the title of one of his papers devoted to this subject in 1970) which were often of greater significance; the foreign policy adopted by rich countries having a particularly important influence on development.[75] The reason aid attracted so much attention to the neglect of other issues, he maintained, was that it was "quantifiable ... and thus easy for the social scientist to handle"[76] - in the same way as national income was an easily measurable indicator of development. Transferring aid avoided considering more "complicated and awkward" elements in the relationship between rich and poor countries.

> There is a certain lobby for transferring money - it would be difficult to arouse the same political support for lowering tariffs, reducing shipping freight rates, limiting the immigration of doctors, stopping the sale of military equipment, or supporting less conservative political groups in recipient countries. On all these questions, there are powerful and knowledgeable forces to contend with inside the bureaucracies of donor governments, apart from strong pressure groups outside.[77]

Compared to other relationships between two countries, Seers considered aid a relatively minor influence on development and where it did have an impact this was not so much due to the resources it provided as the total "package" of which it was an integral part, linked as it often was with political and economic strings. Recipients were often required to use aid to buy goods or armaments from donors, to grant military bases or overflying rights, to comply with certain "performance criteria" or with prohibitions on trade with certain countries, like Cuba and North Vietnam, or to adopt or forgo certain policies depending on their acceptability to the donor.[78] While conceding that not all aid provided to further the interests of the donor was necessarily incompatible with the recipient's development[79] - this still meant development was a desirable side effect of such aid rather than being its ultimate purpose.

Financial aid alone, he argued, could not in any case solve development problems, as the record of the 1960s had demonstrated, and in fact it quite often only helped preserve the status quo. He pointed out, for instance, that the more industrialised countries of Latin America already had almost adequate capital, professional personnel and natural resources to develop without aid, which, rather than assisting, could be seen as "impeding their development by relieving them of the need to resolve internal differences".[80]
Dependence on aid thus not only resulted in the "loss of political independence", because of the political and commercial leverage often linked to it, but also frequently tended to "sap the self-respect of the countries receiving it", impairing the force of patriotism, weakening "the stimulus of nationalism", and preventing governments from adopting more

sap the self-respect of the countries receiving it", impairing the force of patriotism, weakening "the stimulus of nationalism", and preventing governments from adopting more

positive and dynamic development strategies.[81]

In much the same way as using charity to relieve poverty in nineteenth-century Britain had proved inadequate to bring about economic and social progress and could be said to have helped consolidate the status quo and evade the rich-poor issue, so aid was doing much the same thing in the international context, he maintained. In Britain, he observed, the creation of a fiscal system transferring finance to the poor on the basis of objective need (rather than on performance criteria applied by poor law officials), the growth of the trade union movement and the expansion of the education service had all helped bring about change more effectively,[82] though he did not elaborate on what the international equivalents might be. While in the early 1960s he had supported the idea of an international fiscal system, this was not a line of thought he now pursued. (Within the national context of developing countries, while advocating fiscal reform he seemed to regard education as being of most value in bringing about change (as will be seen more clearly later in this chapter).)[83]

But while maintaining that too much attention was paid to the aid relationship and that it could have negative effects, he did not argue that it was unnecessary, and in fact he encouraged the Wilson government to increase its aid programme, though he favoured such an increase being distributed through international and multilateral agencies, rather than bilateral channels, in order to improve its "quality", reducing the national commercial and political strings that were often attached. It was the allocation of aid that he became increasingly concerned about, maintaining, in his submission to the British House of Commons Select Committee on Aid in January 1970, that it should be used to promote development and concentrated on those governments that showed by their actions that their objectives were "the reduction of poverty, unemployment and inequality". However, all too often, he observed, aid kept in office, and was sometimes intended to do so, governments which were probably themselves the main obstacles to development, as defined in these terms.[84]

Although he was critical of the "performance criteria" attached to aid by governments and agencies, the examination of recipient governments to assess whether they were actively engaged in programmes to eliminate poverty, unemployment and inequality obviously also implied judging their performance to decide which "deserved" to be aided, and "What types of government should be refused what types of aid?"[85] - the title of another of Seers' papers produced in 1972. He acknowledged that examining a recipient's policy record might be regarded as "political bias" or "interference" and that to "sort out 'good' governments from the 'baddies'" was "fairly presumptuous", but he observed all aid constituted "interference" and involved political judgements to some degree and "one cannot avoid 'taking sides'".[86]

Whether a government was pursuing policies to relieve poverty, unemployment and inequality could be judged, he suggested, by asking questions about how far it drew its support from the rich or from the poor, what was its style of government and what sort of choices it had made - whether it spent its foreign exchange on luxuries and prestige

projects or basic essentials and public works projects providing a basic infrastructure for development.[87] In addition he stressed it was important to assess carefully the short- and long-term effects of aiding a government and the various sectors concerned. Whether a regime was "democratic" was not a major criterion; as in "The Meaning of Development" he had argued that political liberty was of secondary importance when social conditions were intolerable, similarly with regard to allocating aid, he maintained "as long as people are starving, parliamentary democracy can hardly be a priority objective" (though he acknowledged it might be important as a means of change).[88]

On the basis of his social targets and criteria, Seers concluded that there were indeed some governments which did not deserve to be aided.

> Some governments (Bolivia, Greece and South Vietnam to mention a few current examples) seem so obviously determined to prevent development that financial aid to them seems counter-productive, whatever its terms, whatever the techniques conveyed, whatever the sectors involved (with the possible exception of primary education), because the announcement and other short-term effects will out-weigh any benefits to a future regime.[89]

(By the announcement effect Seers meant the political legitimacy and prestige that was conferred on a government just by reason of the fact that it was being aided.)

He made his own stand in this respect in 1970 when he refused an invitation from the International Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development to help the Greek Government (then in the hands of the military junta) to frame long-term economic policies. "Some governments are themselves the main obstacle to development. The Greek Government is one of these, and to help it is not really a service to development," he was quoted as saying in the *Guardian* newspaper.[90]

However, there were only a few governments which he considered should be refused aid entirely at this time, maintaining that "In most other cases, whatever one thinks about the government, some types of aid at least, are on balance beneficial", though in a period when aid was scarce, he acknowledged it was better to concentrate on where it would "consolidate and reinforce existing egalitarian policies i.e. where governments are 'good'".[91] Otherwise, he observed, the only thing an aid official could do when dealing with "bad" governments would be "to steer aid into forms which have a long-term effect and do not yield much short-term political benefit".[92]

Technical aid and training were more likely to be on the whole beneficial, he believed, provided that the experts, teachers and courses were not "inappropriate" and did not adversely affect consumption tastes and patterns - a problem that will be examined in a later section (see below p.215). However, the closer any assistance was to the heart of the administration and the centre of power, such as advice to the planning office, he warned, the more carefully it was necessary to look at the announcement effect, since it might "easily provide a regime which is passively, or even actively, obstructing development, with a 'liberal' veneer"; or administrative improvements advised by the visiting expert might "make a 'bad' government efficient in carrying out 'bad' policies and prolong its life".[93]

Apart from the difficulties involved in deciding what criteria to apply to determine whether and how far a government was committed to the elimination of poverty, unemployment and inequality, there was the additional question as to how far donors would be willing to reassess their aid programmes in terms of their effect on development so defined, rather than in terms of their own political and commercial advantage. In his note to the British government in 1970 Seers pointed out it could be argued that such a reordering of priorities would in the long run *also* be in the commercial and political interest of a country such as Britain. However, he preferred to emphasise the "moral obligations" of the government, maintaining that even if such reordered priorities for aid meant assisting governments with which it was having severe arguments, this "would be an inspiring act of leadership which could help improve the whole international climate".[94]

However, in the light of past experience and his own expressed disappointment in the record not only of the British government's programme, but the international aid effort, one wonders how feasible he believed such an inspiring act of leadership might be. As he remarked in another paper on aid: "To wish for governments to behave altruistically is to wish for the world to be other than it is."[95]

Implications for planning

The redefinition of development in terms of social targets also meant "a fundamental rethinking of planning", maintained Seers, as plans had to be reconstructed to form steps towards long-term targets for the reduction of poverty, unemployment and inequality rather than increased national income targets.[96] During his first year at IDS, he was himself involved in a number of advisory missions to planning departments in East Africa, the Caribbean and Ceylon (see Chapter 4, pp.176-7), being regarded as a distinguished practitioner of the art of planning, but becoming increasingly aware of its disappointing record, already remarked upon in this chapter, and recognising that a fundamental rethink was needed.

The dismal record in fact prompted Seers to hold a conference on the "Crisis in Planning" at IDS in June-July 1969, though his own contribution approached the issue rather indirectly. In a paper entitled "The Prevalence of Pseudo Planning", he argued that part of the problem was due to the differing approaches and expectations of, as well as relationship between, the three main actors involved in planning - the politician, the planner and the public administrator.[97] This was a reflection not only on his experience of planning offices overseas, but also of experiences at the ODM in London. Politicians, he maintained, often regarded a plan mainly as a useful short-term political tool - either to display to the country that the government *intended* to make changes, or to demonstrate the foreign exchange gap to donors as an appeal for aid - using it as a substitute for real development strategy. Planners were often concerned with devising elegant economic models within short-term manageable perspectives, taking little account of the work of

other departments or social and political developments, while public administrators frequently tended to resist any new planning initiatives. The result was what he called pseudo planning and the production of documents which rarely got to grips with assisting the government to evaluate major policy decisions to promote social and economic development. However, the general response to this paper at the conference was that the "atmosphere of crisis and the feeling of frustration currently associated with planning were too common for the analysis to be couched in terms of the individual short-comings of the main actors. It was necessary to look for more fundamental causes".[98]

One of the fundamental reasons for the non-operational character of plans, Seers himself argued, was the fact that too much emphasis was put on drawing up quantitative economic growth models rather than focusing attention on basic policy issues: "Purely economic" models and planning based on sophisticated sets of mathematical projections and computer runs he considered "bad planning"[99] since it assumed no interaction between economic, social and political developments. He had in fact frequently in the past drawn attention to inadequacy of purely economic models and the need to incorporate social and political factors. Nevertheless the object of planning, as outlined by himself in the Caribbean and Africa in the early 1960s, had been to demonstrate what levels of economic growth were needed and how these could be attained. As the decade progressed, however, he gave less priority to economic growth as a planning priority and more to social targets and broader policy issues. His change of focus was already a cause for comment at the 1967 Commonwealth Planners meeting in Nairobi as it was observed: "One of the leading proponents of sophisticated quantitative techniques outlines a planning approach that focuses attention on the basic policy issues, and subordinates the statistical framework to the needs of policy making and implementation."[100] In the "The Meaning of Development" he spelled out more clearly his proposal that plans should be aimed at social targets rather than economic growth, maintaining that "a 'plan' which conveys no targets for reducing poverty, unemployment and inequality can hardly be considered a 'development plan'".[101]

Measuring social indicators and targets, however, presented problems for planning offices. While criticising the inadequacy of growth as an indicator of development using the quantifiable GNP, there were also obvious difficulties in attempting to measure and assess standards of poverty, unemployment and inequality in non-industrialised countries. Rowntree had faced problems in establishing a "human needs standard" in York at the turn of the century, he observed - and there were even more problems attached to devising official poverty lines or development indicators in areas where he had already acknowledged statistics were inadequate and a significant part of economic activity was "unmarketed" and outside the scope of official figures in any case. Data for social indicators were "very scrappy" but he suggested that collecting figures on a combination of factors such as infant mortality, incidence of diseases of undernourishment, and on the height and weight of children could all help build up a profile of the prevalence of poverty in a nation. Seers was to devote more time in the 1970s trying to devise more appropriate

social indicators (as will be seen in Chapter 7) but in his paper on the "Meaning of Development" in 1969 he suggested "regular sample surveys of households" could provide data for measuring poverty, unemployment and income distribution and that permanent sampling organisations, such as had been established in India could collect the necessary information professionally, systematically and regularly.[102]

The most important use of such development indicators, however, was to provide the targets for planning which could then be converted into policies for *relieving* poverty, unemployment and inequality and it was this which marked a profound difference in approach. Rather than extrapolating past trends and choosing investments patterns that would produce the acceptable increase in national income, he argued "Now we must try to envisage what might be a plausible pattern one day, in terms not only of production and employment structures, but of the patterns of consumer demand and job preferences, and then work backwards, to see if there is any plausible path for getting there." One way of tackling this he suggested might be "setting target incomes for various sizes of families and working out what measures would be needed to achieve these" including education, employment creation and welfare schemes, backed up by income and taxation policies.[103] Planning of necessity would therefore encompass all aspects of government policy and would need to take into consideration the activities of private enterprise as well.

While he acknowledged shorter, primarily economic, plans were still needed to provide a framework for policy decision in the immediate future, the overall change in perspective implied that there would be less emphasis on economics in planning[104] and that plans of necessity would be much longer-term as it would take many years for changes, for example in education policy, to have an impact on employment, poverty and ultimately redistribution of income.

As a realisation of the importance of social problems spread, Seers envisaged statistical offices would "put less weight on national income estimation, more on preparing appropriate social indicators",[105] and while converting social targets into policies raised many problems, its difficulties, he maintained, were "no excuse for persisting with inappropriate, even dangerously misleading, planning models designed to maximize economic growth".[106] The problem, however, remained whether governments would be prepared to accept such a shift in focus.

"Other ways in which rich countries affect development"

In challenging the central importance of growth in the development process and the aid relationship between rich and poor countries, Seers put more emphasis on other aspects of the relationship. While not denying the significance of the economic aspects, he argued there were other factors besides the purely economic causing or enhancing poverty, unemployment and inequality and therefore other factors that had to be taken into consideration when seeking a solution. For economies such as Trinidad, for example, where he considered that neither the unaided working of economic forces, nor the use of

measures to increase taxation or import and exchange controls, nor even the giving of aid, were adequate or sufficient to reduce unemployment and solve their development problems, he stressed the need to find "a frame of analysis not confined to economic factors", "to search beyond economics for possible solutions to ... unemployment" (and the related problems of poverty and inequality), bringing out "the non-economic factors which made a plausible economic solution hard to implement".[107]

In his contribution to *Development in a Divided World* he argued that too much emphasis had been placed, especially in the international organisations, on the economic and also political aspects of the relations between rich countries and poor, "Much more pervasive and at least as important for development, though less evident is the intellectual element in this relationship, an influence almost exclusively in one direction". Missionaries, settlers, traders, officials of the colonial service, high commissions and embassies, military missions, technical assistance experts, foreign company officials, tourists and particularly educational establishments (both universities teaching overseas students in the industrial world and schools and universities in poor countries modelled on counterparts overseas) had all been responsible for transferring overseas the "techniques, tastes and beliefs", and "the central economic, social and political philosophies derived from the experience of the industrial countries", which were not necessarily appropriate to the situation and needs of the recipient countries. What was harmful, maintained Seers, was not the transfer of ideas, techniques or tastes *per se* but "their *naive* transfer without adaptation in circumstances for which they were never intended".[108]

Criticism of the transfer of ideas from the Western industrialised countries to situations and circumstances for which they had not been intended was in many ways a familiar reiteration of his arguments in "The Limitations of the Special Case" concerning the inappropriate transfer of economic ideas and techniques from industrialised countries to primary producers; though as a result of a visit to the University of Dar es Salaam in 1969 he had noted that in fact profound doubts were now spreading about the relevance and propriety of much uncritically transferred Western-based courses and that there were moves towards tailoring syllabi more closely to local needs.[109] He had also previously taken note of the "demonstration effect", as it had been labelled in Latin America - the emulation of the lifestyles of richer, developed countries by poorer countries, affecting consumer spending habits and encouraging the expenditure of foreign exchange on imported goods, particularly luxury items, which thus aggravated balance of payments problems.[110] Now, however, Seers further developed these points, arguing that it was the inappropriate importation of "techniques, tastes and beliefs" from the richer to the poorer countries, which was often responsible for worsening unemployment and inequality, thereby negatively affecting development. In Trinidad in 1968 he attributed the basic problem of unemployment "partly to imported production techniques and partly to imported consumption tastes" - and argued that these conclusions could equally apply to some degree in any country that was "not industrially developed".[111]

Production techniques and the industrialisation process, with the related role played

by foreign companies, obviously had a crucial influence on development prospects in all developing countries where such programmes had been undertaken, including Trinidad, and this strand of the argument will be returned to below. But, first, consideration will be given to what Seers identified as the effects of "imported consumption tastes" on development and how as a result he considered changes in policy areas such as education and immigration legislation were as, if not more, important for development than purely economic measures and the giving or receiving of aid. In fact, though, changes in such policy areas were often essentially a reflection of, or motivated by, the economic relationship, as indeed were, more obviously, production techniques.

Imported consumption tastes

In particular Seers drew attention to the economic impact of imported consumption tastes on wages and income distribution. The "localization" of the public service in newly independent nations had entailed teachers, the armed forces and officials of public corporations taking over former colonial officials' salaries which were based on those prevalent in metropolitan countries and were beyond the means of countries with low average incomes and limited revenues and had a "marked effect on the income distribution". In the same way the salary levels paid by foreign owned companies also reflected rates in more developed economies. The result was that in some countries managerial and professional personnel enjoyed incomes fifty or a hundred times as high as those of agricultural labourers or peasants. In such a situation, he observed, while the incomes of the local elite were so much higher than that of manual workers it was also "hard for governments to get labour unions to cooperate in wage restraint ... especially where workers' organisations felt that their political power had grown, or should have grown, since independence".[112] As a result wages of urban industrial workers had also generally tended to rise - which in turn heightened the urban/rural divide and led to the migration of more people from rural areas to the cities in search of higher wages, leading to overcrowding and the growth of shanty towns, slums and the attendant social problems.

As was seen in Chapter 3, when advising Zambia in 1963/4 before its impending independence, Seers had himself taken the view that Africans taking over European jobs could not expect to receive similar salaries to those of their colonial predecessors and had recommended a policy of wage restraint (see p.126). This advice, however, had not been followed, and in 1968 Seers expressed the opinion that the first Zambian development plan had been "largely ruined" by a large wage increase to government employees.[113]

Not only did high wage levels for professional and skilled classes increase inequality, he argued, they also aggravated unemployment. For instance in Trinidad - where he noted professional earnings were at levels similar to those payable in rich countries, administrative and clerical salaries reflected those of the former colonial service, and wages of industrial workers had doubled between 1954 and 1965 - he regarded the rapid rise in wages as one of the main reasons responsible for the "sluggishness" in employment:

the high level of salaries and wages had meant the government could employ fewer people out of available expenditure; the private sector had increased mechanisation rather than looking for labour intensive methods of production; and a situation had developed where some people preferred to wait for well-paid jobs rather than taking poorly paid ones.[114]

The consumption patterns of those with high incomes in the middle and upper classes also tended to have a heavy import content "(cars, domestic durables, clothes, whisky, overseas travel, etc.)"[115] which absorbed foreign exchange, which could otherwise have been used for purchasing capital equipment. Increased local wealth therefore tended to flow out of the country and did little to support local industries (through purchases or investment) and thereby reduced the potential for long run growth of output and employment. These "imported consumption tastes", encouraged by advertising and based essentially on copying foreign standards, maintained Seers in his report on Trinidad, were thus also partly responsible for the growth of unemployment.[116]

In addition the presence of technical assistance experts provided by aid programmes often only reinforced these tendencies, he observed, since their foreign salary levels and patterns of consumption affected the expectations, salaries and styles of living of the local officials with whom they worked, encouraging elitism and making wages policies and import controls more difficult to operate. They also often brought with them and passed on foreign values, attitudes, techniques and theories evolved in and for industrial countries which were not necessarily appropriate in the local context.[117] Having emphasised the need for technical assistance as a means of relieving the great shortage of educated and skilled manpower, which was regarded as a major constraint on development, particularly in Africa and Asia, Seers acknowledged it could in fact be counter-productive if not applied appropriately (a point he had first made in relation to economists in the early 1960s in "Why Visiting Economists Fail"); a great deal depended on the individual expert concerned and how well he/she was experienced or prepared.

He expressed particular concern about the influence of teachers and educational systems, which often reflected too closely values and attitudes of richer countries thus reinforcing "inappropriate" consumption tastes and providing students with inadequate and irrelevant qualifications, rather than carefully adapting curriculum to local development needs. Technical subjects, for example, he pointed out were often not given adequate attention or status, leaving many students with unrealistic expectations of job prospects in the white-collar sector and reluctant to consider manual work or employment in rural areas. Students returning home to developing countries from studies overseas were considered even more likely to introduce inappropriate techniques and ideologies reinforcing preferences for foreign consumption patterns with a high import content.

A related problem, however, which was attracting more general attention at this time was the "brain drain" of scarce educated professional personnel (in particular scientists, medical doctors and engineers), from the poorer countries, especially of Africa and Asia, to the richer economies of the West, particularly the United States. Attracted by the higher salaries and better facilities offered, this was, in Seers' view, another reflection of the

influence of "foreign tastes" which further heightened inequality and unemployment in poor countries. It also resulted in the irrational situation where the move of trained personnel from poorer to richer countries often had to be supplemented by a flow of technical assistance in the other direction,[118] which, as observed above, was not always of the most appropriate kind.

The "brain drain"

Seers devoted a number of papers to the subject of the "brain drain" during the years 1966-71, the first, entitled "The Transmission of Inequality" being delivered at a symposium in Addis Ababa in 1966, in which he argued that the growing international market for certain professional skills was threatening to "induce greater inequality of income distribution in poor countries, a slowing down of development and an aggravation of the political crisis of the Third World".[119] Emigration of professional personnel slowed down development generally, not only by depriving the poorer countries of the scarce trained manpower and educated leadership needed for carrying out development programmes, but also in the effect it had in enhancing the unequal distribution of income, since salaries for those with professional skills were raised to international market levels in an effort to encourage them to stay. Again the consumption patterns of those with high salaries tended to have a high import content, in turn further aggravating unemployment.

The mutually reinforcing aspects of the brain drain, unemployment and inequality in causing distortions in the development process was an issue explored by Seers together with Richard Jolly, in a paper prepared for the International Economic Association Conference held at Bled in Yugoslavia, September 1970. They argued that, while the brain drain in part caused unemployment and inequality (through its biased influence on wage structures and through the constraints the loss of skilled personnel imposed on implementing education and development programmes), unemployment and inequality, by reducing the attractiveness to skilled persons of remaining in a poor country, also further encouraged the brain drain.[120]

There were, however, Seers pointed out, forces in the richer countries which were actively encouraging the brain drain. Chief amongst these was the demand for more medical and scientific personnel, particularly in the United States - which, he observed, dominated "the world market for men even more completely than it does the markets for merchandise"[121] and was in a position to offer high and rising salaries, attracting personnel from Europe as well as the developing world.[122] Despite the fact that there were still a number of obstacles to mobility, the general ease with which people could travel from continent to continent and the modification of immigration legislation, permitting professionals to enter rich countries more easily (but to keep the unskilled out), facilitated the emigration of growing numbers who were badly needed at home.

The year 1968 in fact witnessed changes in the immigration laws of both the USA and UK which could be regarded as further encouraging the brain drain from developing countries. In the USA a system of immigration quotas based very much on racial lines had

been abandoned in favour of new quotas based on the contribution the potential immigrants would make to the economy of the US. Seers remarked on what he termed the "grim paradox" of the US situation: "After abandoning a racialist system of quotas, they are now being accused of stealing the brains of the rest of the world!" - "Racial discrimination is a 'bad thing' but - whatever its form - it does discourage the professional flower of the Third World from leaving countries where they are urgently needed."[124] Similarly in Britain, amendments to the Commonwealth Immigration Act[123] (mentioned in Chapter 4), restricting immigration from the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and Asia to those whose educational qualifications were related to Britain's economic and social needs, also limited immigration to the educated minorities whose skills were also needed in their own countries. While Seers had in fact criticised the 1968 Act for being "inhumane" "inefficient" "with racial ... overtones",[125] he did not favour unrestricted entry into Britain for he also drew attention to the "anti-developmental overtones" of the legislation, arguing there was a necessity for some immigration controls to counteract these aspects which deprived developing countries of their educated manpower, as will be seen below.

* * *

In highlighting the significance of issues such as imported consumption tastes and the brain drain, Seers sought to point out that the development of poorer countries was affected by other factors than the more obvious economic relationship of aid and trade with richer economies. Imported, or foreign, consumption tastes, he argued, also had an influence, usually negative and detrimental in nature, on the development process - increasing inequality and unemployment (through inflating certain incomes), enhancing balance of payments problems (by encouraging tastes for imports), introducing inappropriate educational systems and encouraging the brain drain. He observed:

> Clearly, a new dimension has been added to development problems and policies. The development of poor countries, has, for many decades, been affected by changes in tariffs, quotas, production subsidies, excise taxes, etc. in richer countries, and by their own foreign economic policies. Now in addition it is influenced by changes in educational systems, salary structures and immigration legislation, in the rich countries, as well as by its own policies in these matters.[126]

Basically, though, it was clear that these other aspects were still part of the essential economic relationship. Educational systems and salary structures, with the cultivation of tastes for imported goods and lifestyles, and even immigration legislation, were still essentially motivated by the economic, and political, interests and needs of Western industrialised governments for extending markets - and controlling their manpower requirements.

Seers himself acknowledged that the only way to solve problems such as the "brain drain" and the other consequences of imported consumption tastes was in the long term "to reach the fundamental source of the problem and to reverse the tendencies to greater inequality *between* countries", though this required what he termed "changes of policy in the rich countries, especially in the United States, too profound to be conceivable for the

present" (on which he did not elaborate).[127] He did, however, consider certain more practical measures whereby the influence of imported consumption tastes could be combated, which are addressed in the following section.

Combating imported consumption tastes and the "brain drain"

Seers concentrated particularly on the role of education and migration policies in countering the negative effects on development of "imported consumption tastes". During his visit to Trinidad in 1968 he had suggested consumer attitudes and tastes could be modified by discouraging advertisements and inducements to buy imported goods,[128] but the "main emphasis for a viable future" he maintained had to be on education; and on a return visit in 1972 he advised "You should have your own type of techniques; your own education system; your own consumption patterns. Don't just copy things overseas."[129]

The expansion of educational systems in any poor country was obviously necessary to produce a sufficient number of trained and professionally qualified people for all sectors of the economy, both as the means to implement development programmes and also eventually to help modify the distribution of income, though this was obviously a long-term project and results of even immediate action would not be seen for several years. However, what Seers now also stressed was the role of education in altering perceptions of the country's fundamental problems and positively combating imported consumption habits. The educational systems in Latin America, for example, he remarked, had apparently failed, not only because they had not provided the skilled manpower required in various sectors but also because they had failed "to induce more appropriate consumption patterns and attitudes to work".[130] In his paper on Trinidad he therefore observed:

> In no country can a viable system be created unless education is used not only to create skill, but also to build up a social climate which would make it easier to wean the public away from inappropriate consumption habits, production techniques, income structures and attitudes to manual or rural work.[131]

Attitudes to income structures were particularly crucial, for in the case of a country like Trinidad, there was, on the one hand, the need to build up professional expertise in all sectors but, on the other, the need for wage restraint and an incomes policy to reduce the gap between the incomes of those working in the leading sectors of petroleum and manufactures and those in other sectors. Although both policies ultimately aimed at reducing unemployment and inequality, Seers acknowledged they presented apparently conflicting needs, for it was difficult to see how the professional corps and entrepreneurial talent needed for work in industry and other sectors could be encouraged to work or stay in the country without the incentive of financial gain and levels of living close to those obtainable elsewhere. While suggesting that the restructuring of wages could be accompanied by measures to reduce hours or improve facilities, a more fundamental recommendation he put forward was to alter the perception of problems by education, creating public awareness of the country's own problems, its own history, and its political

and economic position in the world - "building up patriotism", and looking at the longer-term prospects of the country, rather than expecting more immediate results and rewards.[132]

Overseas governments, he maintained, would only ease their development problems "to the extent that they provide adequate non-monetary attractions for jobs at home and adapt their educational structures to produce the types of skill required",[133] one of his own suggested solutions being that special schools should be set up, an idea he had first contemplated in 1966 when considering methods to counteract the brain drain. Poorer countries might select a few secondary boarding schools which would provide a rather spartan, even quasi-military, system of discipline and emphasise "nationalism and technical subjects" as a means to accelerate development, especially rural development, he explained, producing students who would be "less able to market their services overseas, and less interested in doing so" and "less influenced by foreign expenditure patterns and attitudes to development".[134] He developed this into a more specific suggestion in his paper for Trinidad.

> One possible solution would be to set up special schools to create leaders capable of resisting the offers of jobs overseas, and prepared to put a lower value on a car-owning urban life. One or two elite secondary schools could be set up inculcating discipline and emphasising technical subjects. The products of such schools could provide in due course recruits to the specialist corps in the petroleum, manufacturing and agricultural sectors ... and also to a civil service capable of operating objectively and efficiently as extensive a system of controls as is necessary. If this elite were recruited from all social classes and if it were taught that salaries needed to be moderate in relation to wages, then the central inconsistency in the scenario of the 1980s would be a good deal less severe.[135]

Undoubtedly Seers' suggestions about such special schools was partly influenced by Cuba's example where he observed the educational programme aimed at "creating a new man capable of resisting the temptations of material incentives".[136] However, even here, where such a programme was an integral part of socialist policy, he remarked upon the detrimental effect moral incentives alone had on efficiency and production (as will be seen below, pp.247-8). For Trinidad which was locked into a world capitalist system where overseas based companies, motivated by profit and material incentives, effectively controlled the economy, the encouragement of moral incentives seemed highly unpracticable. Seers himself remarked that reconciliation between the conflicting needs of skilled personnel and wage restraint "would be less difficult if Trinidad were not part of a world economy with high salaries paid in leading industrial countries"[137] - but the fact remained that it was very much part of that world economy. His suggested educational reforms were, however, only part of a series of recommendations, in which he also emphasised the basic underlying need for Trinidad to reduce the external constraints and pressures of companies and foreign governments and increase its own room to manoeuvre, and these will be returned to in a later section (see below p.231) - a further question then arising being how free was it to undertake such a course.

In addition to increasing educational provision, among Seers' more practical suggestions, particularly as a means to counteract the brain drain, was that poorer countries

could protect their manpower resources by "bonding" students, who went overseas to study, to return to work in their home countries for a certain number of years; and by enforcing stricter emigration policies. He did concede that restrictions of this type were difficult to enforce and often had a counter effect - since people who were not allowed to migrate were unlikely to co-operate and make a significant professional contribution to their country's development, and could well join in political opposition.[138]

But proposals for educational development and manpower controls in poorer countries (regardless of how feasible they were), he observed, would not lead to a general solution unless accompanied by complementary action in the form of education and positive immigration policies adopted by the richer economies as well. Governments of richer economies, he suggested, could improve their own educational systems so that sufficient doctors and other professionals were trained for their own needs and there was no need for the inflow from abroad, though as in developing countries increasing the corps of any profession took time and this would not provide an immediate solution. Universities in developed countries too he maintained also had a responsibility to provide training for overseas students relevant to their own country's needs and problems rather than courses which were geared to the needs of rich industrialised countries, which often encouraged students to remain overseas rather than returning home.[139]

What he also considered necessary were what he termed "constructive migration policies" to assist the development process, including inducing the industrial countries, especially the United States, "to check the immigration of those with certain professional skills".[140] Such prohibitions on immigration, however, obviously entailed enforcing a policy which would curtail and restrict the freedom of movement and choice of certain individuals and seemingly contradicted his more liberal sentiments and his own objections to the 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Act. However he justified this course of action as being the lesser of two evils, reflecting in more practical terms his assertion in "The Meaning of Development" that political liberties were of secondary importance in a situation where a substantial fraction of the people were undernourished and unemployed and that the social targets of development - the relief of poverty, unemployment and inequality - were the primary concern.

> checking the migration of professional people, raises a major issue of morality. Essentially it means not just stopping somebody from going to a country where he would earn more or do more satisfying work. In some cases it means preventing his escape from persecution because of his race or religion or political beliefs. These are very real human problems. So, too are the problems of development. To restrict migration is to interfere with individual freedom. But the prevalence of disease in the rural areas of Africa, Asia and Latin America and the lack of knowledge about contraception is a very serious restriction on the freedom of individuals to shape their own lives. Shortages of schools, roads and all the other economic and social infrastructure which cannot be either created or maintained without professional expertise are also a serious restriction. It could be argued, furthermore, that highly educated people are needed to bring about political change in their countries; and they will help to achieve this even if (perhaps especially if) they would prefer to be somewhere else.[141]

Immigration was, however, a very emotive issue in Britain at this time and debate on the subject must also be seen against the background of the race riots in Notting Hill in the late 1960s (and Enoch Powell's "rivers of blood" speech in April 1968); Britain's resources of "tolerance and fair play" had proved insufficient to cope with human flows on the scale which its role as headquarters of the Commonwealth demanded, observed Seers. Although critical of certain aspects of the 1968 Act and maintaining he was aware of the harm caused to the Commonwealth by the immigration barriers, he nevertheless regarded discussion of uncontrolled migration as a pointless exercise, observing that there were similar economic objections to freedom of movement of people as there were to free movement of goods or capital. Without some controls, inequalities would tend to become cumulative, he argued, with those countries enjoying advantages in educational and research facilities cornering professional talent, expanding these facilities and becoming still more attractive as professional centres, while poorer countries were further denuded of their educated and professional personnel. Resulting strains on the economic structure, as well as social tensions, in those countries losing manpower, as well as those accepting large-scale migration were also likely to "become catastrophic as international flows of labour accelerated" he observed.[142]

In the interests of development what he envisaged were bilateral agreements between countries "to check damaging types of migration"... "in favour of constructive migration policies (in the sense of policies which assisted rather than hindered development) - and corresponding policies in education and technical assistance".[143] Richer countries he proposed should co-operate in the enforcement of bonds, barring certain types of migration and, where this could not be checked, paying adequate compensation to those governments which lost expensively trained manpower, including in this calculation the expected total effect on national income as well as the cost of replacing the migrant. Such developments in the fields of education and immigration policies he considered would be more beneficial to recipient countries than financial aid.

Unless major changes on such issues were initiated by the more developed economies, particularly the United States, the "biggest absorber" of professionally qualified personnel from overseas, he warned "the pressures on many governments" of poorer countries might "force them to insulate themselves increasingly from richer countries so as to reduce mobility",[144] and to adopt a more autonomous development path - a question to be considered later in this chapter and also in Chapter 6.

Having now looked at Seers' arguments concerning how imported consumption tastes enhanced development problems - particularly as defined in terms of unemployment, poverty and inequality - and at some of his recommendations to counteract these tendencies, we return to the second major strand of his argument, that imported production techniques and industrial development policies were also in large part responsible for the development problems of poorer economies.

Imported production techniques and industrial policy

As was demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 3, Seers had shared the optimism that fast industrial growth - encouraging import substitution and developing exports of manufactures, in order to reduce dependence on trade in primary products alone - would help promote growth and reduce balance of payments problems, at the same time providing jobs and stimulating employment in other sectors of the economy, thus generally relieving poverty. However, the record of the 1960s had proved otherwise and, as already observed, by 1970 he was distancing himself from what he labelled "the Prebisch doctrine".

Although still accepting that the ECLA analysis regarding the need for import-substituting industrialisation was basically correct, Seers now considered it contained "two major gaps" in that attention had been focused primarily on growth of income rather than on its distribution or on relieving unemployment, and that, partly because of these gaps in analysis, "the wrong policy implications" had been drawn which had resulted in the process of industrialisation becoming distorted.[145] While regarding concentration on the growth of income as "an illegitimate transfer of experience" in itself, based on emulating the example of Western economies, he also considered that the actual production policies and techniques adopted in industrialisation programmes, again usually modelled on Western counterparts, had also proved inappropriate. The experience of the Soviet Union and Japan - "the 'late starters' who caught up" - he saw as "more relevant to the Third World especially in how they were protected from 'premature', uncritical copying of the techniques and consumption patterns of the early starters".[146] In a lecture to a UNIDO training workshop Seers stated that he put the correction of the mistakes of industrial policy as "*the* leading policy need".[147]

The context of most of Seers' comments and recommendations arose from his own practical consultancy work in the Caribbean (particularly Trinidad), Latin America (particularly Colombia because of his involvement in the ILO employment mission) and Africa.

A basic reason for the influence of foreign or imported production techniques was, of course, the fact that foreign companies had been encouraged to play a large part in the industrialisation process in developing countries - thereby also reaping the benefit of growth for themselves. As the case of Trinidad plainly demonstrated the use of incentive policies (such as "tax holidays", remissions of import duty, protection, accelerated depreciation allowances, loans, cheap or free premises etc.) to attract foreign capital and companies to develop both the petroleum and manufacturing industries - measures that Seers had himself on occasions advocated, notably in Malta and the Caribbean - had resulted in a situation where most of the assets of increased growth flowed abroad, not only in payment for purchases of equipment and components, but also in rising profits, and royalty payments to the companies concerned. This had meant that even where big rises in output of manufacturing had enabled the domestic product to rise more quickly

than the import bill, payments overseas had also climbed, often more quickly than capital inflows, so that in excess of the increase in domestic product flowed overseas. Thus even if an economy, like Trinidad, experienced fast growth, its balance of payments problems were not relieved but intensified.[148]

Excessive protection also meant that companies were, in Seers words, "allowed to exploit the very profitable markets behind high tariff walls".[149] In the early 1960s he had himself argued that protected industrialisation was essential for developing economies to encourage import substitution, but he now acknowledged that such high tariff barriers had been erected "that there was little incentive to create efficient industries".[150] This had meant that the costs of industries and products were often high by international standards and, although import substitution had gone a long way, particularly in the larger Latin American countries, export promotion of manufactured goods had been disappointing. He observed:

> The foreign exchange cost per unit of a final consumer good was in some cases raised rather than lowered when its local production started, if one allows for not only the costs of equipment, materials and semi-manufactures needed by local producers but also the outflow of dividends, royalties and licence fees, service charges, 'contribution to head office expenses', etc. ... Indeed many economies have not become *more* independent, but *less* so.[151]

Worsening balance of payments problems had also resulted in increased requests to the IMF for assistance.

Many of the new industries had continued to depend on purchases of materials, semi-manufactures and equipment from overseas and others were little more than assembly industries, especially of engineering products, which also "increased dependence on foreign trade rather than reducing it".[152] In addition many of the goods produced were luxury items which could not be afforded by the majority of the population who did not even enjoy basic necessities. At a seminar in Dakar he spoke of coca-cola plants being "established in countries which do not yet have complete systems of piped domestic water" and automobile assembly plants "set up in countries which lack the means of producing bicycles, although cars could not conceivably be afforded by most of the population for several decades".[153]

However at the heart of the deepening structural problems experienced by many countries, particularly in Latin America, observed Seers, lay a "process of industrialisation which seems to have become perverted, based as it is on the production of goods which do not require much labour".[154] Industrialisation had been based on capital intensive methods and highly mechanised techniques imported from overseas, which provided very few jobs, doing little or nothing to relieve the unemployment problem; and development had become confused not only with economic growth but with "modernisation" and the introduction of the latest types of machinery, he remarked.[155] Instead of creating widespread employment, such technology had led to the emergence of a relatively small "labour aristocracy" of industrial workers with secure employment, enjoying wages and benefits that gave them a much higher standard of living than the majority of workers,

especially compared to those in the rural areas, thereby aggravating further the inequality of income distribution.

Trade union activity and labour legislation, he argued, had further encouraged mechanisation (thereby reducing the opportunities for employment), since the guarantee not only of wages but other rights and benefits towards employees tended to make employers think in terms of a small and loyal labour force instead of opening up opportunities for employment on a large scale.[156] This was particularly remarked upon in Colombia during the ILO World Employment Programme's mission there in 1970. Labour legislation, he observed, had encouraged "the manufacturer to introduce enough equipment to keep his labour force small, thus limiting his responsibilities (for pensions, redundancy pay, etc.)"; preferring to meet any spurt of demand "by working their existing labour force overtime, rather than by hiring more labour".[157] While in Britain, therefore, Seers had cited trade union organisation as one of the factors that had helped relieve poverty and bring about a more equitable society (see above p.208), in developing countries he tended to regard it as "largely an institutional transfer"[158] from overseas - yet another imported influence, whose actions were imitative of practices in richer economies and not altogether appropriate to the circumstances of poorer economies, where increasing wages and benefits for a relatively small section of the working force tended to reinforce inequality and unemployment for the wider majority.

Industrialisation had not stimulated other sectors of the economy, as had originally been hoped for, he observed, and there had in fact been little benefit to the rural areas from such policies; in fact, industrialisation had often competed with agriculture for resources, often to the detriment and neglect of the latter. Systems of public finance had not emerged to spread the benefits of industrialisation, and revenue that was collected tended to be spent mainly in cities and on facilities for urban areas, thus aggravating inequalities, which were further exacerbated by the fact that, because of protected industrialisation, people in the rural areas now often had to pay more than before for manufactured items. As a result of these trends there had been an inflow to the cities of rural population looking for jobs, attracted by the living standards of the labour aristocracy, thus enhancing the unemployment problem and often resulting in the neglect of agriculture.[159]

In the light of these problems what was required was the political will and a good administration to correct the mistakes and introduce a "more sophisticated industrial policy",[160] maintained Seers, believing that there were positive lessons for the future that could be learned from past mistakes. In fact the title of a paper he delivered in Dakar in 1972 was on "The Lessons for Africa of Latin American Industrialisation Policies", a theme he had first adopted nine years earlier on leaving ECLA and taking up his position with ECA. Then he had initially strongly advocated policies of import substitution industrialisation (see Chapter 3, p.114), though soon realising that this was not an appropriate immediate but more long-term option for most countries in the region. Countries such as Kenya which had in fact started to industrialise were beginning to experience some of the same problems as Latin America, he observed, but since

industrialisation in Africa was still at a very early stage he believed there was still opportunity to avoid most of the mistakes made in Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s.[161] While now acknowledging more fully than before the striking economic differences between the two continents, he nevertheless considered there were sufficient similarities for Latin American experience to be useful for Africa, and that it certainly provided a more relevant example than that of the industrialised countries of Western Europe and North America.[162]

There were various measures Seers argued that most governments could adopt in pursuing a more "sophisticated industrial policy", using more appropriate imported production techniques and focusing attention less on the growth of income and more on its distribution and the relief of unemployment - the "two major gaps" he had drawn attention to in the ECLA analysis. It is to these measures that we next turn, a crucial question being how and whether the overseas companies involved, and their governments, would be persuaded or prepared to adopt the same criteria.

Towards a "more sophisticated industrial policy"

An ongoing theme in Seers' advice to developing countries, which he had already voiced earlier in the 1960s, was that they should build up their own expertise in the industrial sector, so that they could deal on more equal terms with overseas companies, which usually had at their disposal a range of legal, accounting, geological and engineering expertise, while the host country concerned often had very little, resulting in "exceedingly one-sided negotiation"[163] particularly on such matters as tax assessments. He considered the lack of expertise "one of the characteristics of backwardness",[164] recommending that what was needed was a group of engineers and accountants working with the tax department to make sure that the strategy of the country was optimal and that it got "benefits from private investment to offset the heavy cost in the outflow of interest from profits which private investments necessarily involved".[165] Until such time as countries had their own experts, he suggested consultants should be hired and an international body established to assist with information and advice.[166]

During a visit to Trinidad in 1968 he outlined four rules for the country side of the negotiation with companies; first to "avoid, signing anything in a hurry however attractive"; second to "brief one's self fully" finding out as much as possible about the company concerned, possibly with the assistance of hired experts and consultants; third to "diversify ... capital as much as possible" and improve the bargaining position by inviting in other companies from different countries; and fourth to work together with other countries which were major producers of the same commodity. In relation to the fourth point he observed "The organisation of the petroleum exporters is a big step forward in this case I think and has proved beneficial to them in negotiations with the petroleum companies."[167]

A priority in his own advice to such countries at this time was that investment

incentives to companies should be used more selectively and made conditional on performance - dependent on such criteria as the number of the workforce employed, the units of electricity consumed, or the quantity of goods exported.[168] In the case of Trinidad, for instance, he suggested that tax incentives should only be given to firms which would employ more people: "They should be labour-intensive firms, making products which are also labour-intensive".[169]

Also in pursuance of more labour-intensive industry he recommended to the African countries that they avoided the emergence of a labour aristocracy;[170] and in the case of Colombia, where it already existed, that agreements should be reached with unions to relax what were regarded as the "restrictions" of labour legislation. If the prospect of increased output and employment were made apparent he believed it would be possible to work out a package deal with the unions on issues such as reducing working hours and working out a wages policy to facilitate the employment of a larger workforce. While not making any hard recommendations to the Colombian government on this issue it was suggested a presidential commission should be set up "to recommend how labour legislation should be changed to make it compatible with an employment strategy", which, he acknowledged, touched "highly controversial questions on which strong feelings are held".[171]

African countries, in still being at a very early stage of industrialisation, were considered freer to learn from experience and adopt more appropriate production techniques. In his earlier advice to East African countries in 1963 on import substitution programmes he had warned against neglecting agriculture, or expecting full employment in industry alone, insisting too on the need for protective tariffs, and suggesting that policies of regional integration could widen markets (see Chapter 3, pp.114-16).[172] All these points he reiterated in 1972, though now with a rider that although some protection was needed, hyper-protection for finished consumer goods could be harmful and result in the sort of distorted growth patterns discussed in the previous section.[173] Whereas in 1963 the concern had been to calculate the rate of industrialisation required to achieve a 5 per cent growth rate, what he now emphasised was the need to look at the process and pattern of growth, as well as its pace.

In 1963 he had not addressed the problem of finding the means to finance industrialisation merely commenting "One has to find the capital or the capitalists, willing to undertake the job. But that is another - and much longer story".[174] However, while again not going into detail, he now stressed the need to be more selective in the acceptance of foreign investment and production techniques, remarking: "There are some types of foreign investment which are not worth receiving".[175] Equally some technology was not worth receiving, he maintained, since its transfer was unlikely to confer net benefits unless it was appropriate to the country's needs (or could be made so by special research designed to achieve this), and unless it was bought as cheaply as possible, after various possible sources had been surveyed. He particularly warned African countries to avoid the emergence of industries catering only for luxury consumption. The need to be more selective about capital and technology provided additional reasons for governments in

Africa, and elsewhere, to build up, as a high priority, their own expertise, he maintained, so they were better informed about available production techniques, as well as of the policies and resources of international companies.[176]

However, as Seers himself observed, the fundamental question that faced African, as well as other, governments was whether the political conditions existed for "a more egalitarian type of industrialisation" and whether it was "possible to design an industrialisation policy that *reduces* dependence on foreign economies?" (original emphasis)[177] and enabled a more selective approach to foreign investment and production techniques. In the case of countries like Trinidad he spoke in 1968 of the need to create a politico-economic system with more room to manoeuvre and increased local influence on policy, with more capital for investment coming from local sources for the development of local companies. Such local companies, he anticipated, were more likely to adopt more appropriate production techniques, show more determination to develop exports than the large international firms, and reinvest locally a substantial fraction of manufacturing profits.[178] But the question was how free was it to do this in light of what he had termed, the "external constraints which limit the freedom of economic action"[179] - the constraints imposed by the operation of foreign businesses and the attitude of governments where such companies were based, especially the United States. Any proposals for a development plan and industrial policy geared more towards the relief of unemployment, poverty and inequality, rather than towards growth of income, obviously required changes in the operation and attitude of the companies involved. It is therefore important to consider Seers' view of private overseas investment and how he anticipated, or hoped, such changes might come about.

Private overseas investment

In the White Paper of 1965, which Seers and the EPS team at the ODM assisted in writing, private overseas investment (POI) was presented as a positive contribution to development (see Chapter 4, p.152), and on this premise, the Labour Party's Corporation Tax, removing favourable tax benefits for companies investing overseas, was regarded by many at the ODM as an unhelpful deterrent to such investment, causing the Ministry to argue that special provisions should be made for private investment in developing countries. However, as Seers and Streeten later observed, the impact or contribution of POI depended on the sector concerned, the extent to which foreign Governments or individuals shared in the profits and control, and the amount of income and employment generated locally by purchases of materials.[180]

In his consultancy work Seers was starkly aware of the negative effect such overseas investment could have on the host countries concerned - one of his criticisms of the Pearson report being that it added private investment together with aid in a total figure for transfer of resources when they had different impacts with private investment generating "an early and big transfer of profits and interest in the reverse direction"[181] (a trend he noted particularly in Trinidad in 1968), which was accompanied by the sort of distortions

in the industrialisation process outlined above. "Sometimes the terms of which capital is obtained (in taxation, protection, monopoly, etc.) cost the country concerned a good deal," he observed, the system of tax holidays being "especially pernicious"[182] and some types of foreign investment were therefore not worth receiving - its desirability depending on the country, the sector, and the company concerned, and on the terms on which it came.

Equally he recognised that companies were primarily concerned about their own interests and profits, rather than those of the country in which they were operating.

> An international company is naturally primarily interested in the total flow of profits from its worldwide operations. It wants, therefore, as much freedom as possible in arranging its total patterns of production and sales - as well, of course, as freedom to remit profits homewards. These objectives may well not coincide with the interests of countries overseas.[183]

Despite recognising the negative and "pernicious" features of their operations, Seers however acknowledged "there would now be very few economists who would not deny that POI *can* be valuable, especially in tropical Africa, where there are few alternatives".[184] His view was, therefore, that while not always desirable, POI could be valuable, and in certain situations there was little likelihood of alternative sources of investment.

But since the acknowledged aim and purpose of companies was to pursue profit, the obvious question remained why should they co-operate in pursuing industrialisation policies geared towards distribution, employment and the relief of poverty rather than growth? Seers' argument was to appeal to the self-interest of the companies, emphasising that a "new way of operating" was necessary to protect their own long-term survival. For example he suggested the companies operating in Trinidad might take a more reasonable attitude towards labour intensive techniques and submit to higher tax rates if they were aware of the danger of impending social unrest if the government was not enabled to undertake measures to alleviate unemployment.

> It would be helpful if the officials of foreign businesses operating in Trinidad, especially in the petroleum sector, had a better understanding of the economic and political dangers implicit in the present precarious situation, which are ultimately dangers for them too. If they understood why unemployment tends to grow, their attitude on many policy questions would be affected. They might well conclude that, because of the need to protect existing investments, they ought to search much more vigorously for more labour-intensive techniques, and that they should not oppose high tax rates, or controls, as strenuously as in a fundamentally viable economy.[185]

Nevertheless, he admitted, there was a limit to "the sacrifice one can expect a company to make voluntarily", commenting "The ultimate constraint is the attitude of governments of countries where such companies are based, especially the United States"; though he seemed to indicate that, following the experience in Cuba (where US companies were nationalised following the revolution), governments too might realise that some short-term sacrifices or accommodations might be needed to avoid the possibility of total loss and ensure longer-term benefit.[186]

In assessing the British Labour government's attitude to this issue, Seers, together

with Streeten, in fact criticised Harold Wilson for putting his influence "squarely behind private companies based in this country in any conflict with overseas governments". They also observed that "diplomatic pressure in support of the interests of British companies" was "hardly compatible with development objectives or with the political philosophy of the Labour Party", remarking that the big petroleum and mining companies were well able to look after themselves, and that any industrial country really sincere about development policy would be better employed offering objective technical help to overseas governments in their negotiation with foreign companies, including their own.[187]

However before turning to the position of governments, it seems Seers believed companies would take a more responsible attitude towards the economies in which they were operating if they were more aware of the political, economic and social conditions prevailing there. In this respect he suggested development experts had a role to play, in acting as advisers and consultants not only to the governments of developing countries themselves, but also to the businessmen working for the overseas companies, enabling them to acquire a better appreciation of the problems and debate on international development.

At a conference which brought together "academics, executives of well-known companies, and officials, socialists and tories, Britons and those from overseas" Seers drew the proceedings together in a paper entitled "Have Economists and Businessmen Anything to Say to Each Other About Development Problems?" - a question to which his answer was basically Yes they do, observing "After all, economists and businessmen are working, in different ways, within the same field."[188] Professional specialists in development, actively engaged in research and consultancies, like himself, he pointed out, had a professional interest in the implications of different types of investment, its results, the attitudes of the firms concerned, and those factors which stimulated or inhibited investment; in speaking to businessmen, they could learn a good deal from managers about "some of the social realities of development (e.g., on the working of the labor [*sic*] market)".[189]

On the other hand, he maintained, businessmen could learn from economists, who were beginning to understand something about the processes of development, and thus about the factors determining the long-term prospects of business firms. While companies usually devoted great technical care to such matters as their geological and agronomic basis it surprised him how casually they often assessed the economic and political trends in the country in which they were operating. Very few businessmen had an appreciation of local problems or were aware of the influence their decisions had on the local economy: how company wage levels, trade union bargains, export policies, techniques of production, etc. affected problems such as unemployment and income distribution, and what repercussions this had on business prospects. In their own interests, Seers indicated, companies needed "a professional assessment of local problems and clear identification of their interests with those of the country in which they operate, tailoring their policies accordingly".[190] It was necessary for them to understand the need to use more

appropriate and labour intensive technology and be prepared to try new forms of organisation better suited to the political priorities of the "host" government including greater participation by local shareholders.

Development was after all "indivisible", he observed, and big international companies, with interests that were affected by economic and political developments almost anywhere in the world might be interested in "the growing body of research on trends in the world economy, on the links between growth rates of different regions, and on the causes of worldwide, and potentially very dangerous, problems, such as unemployment". From such an informed position they might then also consider trying to influence the policies of their home government[191] and encourage it "to take greater account of the needs for development" when establishing positions "on general international issues, such as monetary reforms".

> The shortsighted policies vis-a-vis poorer countries followed by the governments of all industrial countries ... reflect in large part what they conceive to be the interests of "their" companies. But interests are very narrowly interpreted ... as if companies were interested only in short-term profits. Companies with a longsighted point of view might take care to insure that government departments are aware of this.[192]

Seers thus seemed to imply here that companies operating overseas could be encouraged to act more responsibly (and with a longer-term perspective) towards developing countries and could inform and possibly influence their government to do the same.

The main thrust of his argument was the need to widen discussion of the development process with all who were involved - despite their diverging interests. As if anticipating criticism from certain Left-wing quarters Seers concluded:

> A Maoist would, no doubt, say that the more clumsily big companies (and governments) behave, and the more irrelevant the economics taught, the better: revolutions and the end of the neocolonial system will be brought that much nearer. This is a tenable viewpoint, starting from certain assumptions. But since I do not hold these assumptions, I believe that a wide discussion on development problems *is* worth while.[193]

His recommendations, however, obviously presented a difficult role for a development expert - to act simultaneously as adviser to his own government, overseas governments, and companies as well. The gist of Seers' advice was for the governments of developing countries to increase their expertise and be more selective in their use of POI; for the British government (at least under a Labour administration) to support the interest of overseas development, rather than the narrower interests of British companies; and for overseas companies to be better informed of the political and social conditions, and to take a long-term view of the development potential, in the countries in which they were operating, rather than concentrating on short-term profits. However, while this was a desirable scenario, Seers too had doubts about its practical feasibility as will be explored later in this chapter.

More independent development?

To counteract the negative effects on development of what he termed "imported consumption habits and production techniques" Seers' urged countries like Trinidad to be more independent and follow their own development patterns: "You should have your own type of techniques; your own education system; your own consumption patterns. Don't just copy things from overseas,"[194] he said in an interview in Trinidad in 1972. Pursuing such a policy, in terms of his own previous advice to the island, involved a combination of policies including changing planning to be more long term, making industrialisation more selective, creating a professional corps of experts in all fields especially in dealing with overseas companies, modifying consumer habits, restructuring wages, altering the perception of problems by education[195] - and reducing external pressures. While acknowledging that a country like Trinidad would not be able to change external constraints very much by itself, "in combination" (by which he meant both regional associations and groupings of producers of the same product) he considered "such countries could do a great deal to convince the small groups of rich countries that the continuation of existing trends must lead to political crises that will in the end be, in various ways, expensive".[196]

The prospect of more independent development had been an issue raised by Seers in an address to an SID meeting in 1967 in which he warned that the intransigent attitude of the richer economies, in reducing aid programmes and adopting protectionist trading policies, could well force the governments of poorer countries along the road of more "autonomous development" - reducing contact with the rest of the world, sending fewer people abroad for education, making technical assistance experts less welcome in central policy-making, and following the lead of the petroleum producers in combining to raise the prices of primary products and to extract more from foreign investors.[197] In 1970 he further observed that unconstructive education and migration policies might also force some countries to insulate themselves from richer countries in order to reduce mobility (see above p.221) and that some governments could even be replaced violently, by more nationalistic regimes which could "well withdraw - as Burma has done - from international contacts, seeking internally for the sources of development."[198]

This line of thinking presages the emphasis he put on self-reliance as an integral part of development which he stressed in the later 1970s and which is addressed in Chapters 6 and 7. However, in the later 1960s and early 1970s he was still supportive of a more international solution to development problems, urging, in 1971, the need for "a world-wide system of co-ordinated policies, *national* and *international*, in many different fields, to tackle the problems of world poverty" (my emphasis).[199]

In 1967, in fact, he still had a rather guarded attitude towards developing countries adopting more autonomous policies, for while acknowledging in the short term such a path might not be "necessarily calamitous" for either rich or poor economies, he warned that the cost would be felt in the longer term: "The world economy would develop into a pattern of

nearly autarchic nations and regions rather than of international specialization", resulting in the foreign policies of poor countries becoming more ruthless, "involving more frequent international crises".[200]

Thus while recommending countries like Trinidad should develop their own techniques, emphasise their own history and culture, build up patriotism and increase their room to manoeuvre, he did not advocate they adopt a policy of self-sufficiency or "intransigent nationalism", cutting themselves off from contact with the richer industrialised world. In fact in 1969 he urged countries like Trinidad to make more effort to have dialogue with the diplomatic departments of rich countries so that they were made more aware of the problems that "developing" countries were facing, and the possible consequences if changes in policy were not made to help alleviate these:

> One of the typical weaknesses in diplomacy of a "developing" country is that it makes no effort to influence the attitudes of foreign policy planning groups of industrial countries.
>
> A prime aim of the external policy of a country in Trinidad's position should be to make sure that some section of the State Department fully grasps its fundamental economic and political problems, so that this element is not lost sight of in [US] policy formulation.[201]

As a starting point towards achieving some mutual understanding he suggested seminars and conferences could be held for officials of foreign governments, including some European countries, to explain Trinidad's problems and the alternatives open to it. At the same time Seers suggested Trinidad might reduce "external pressures" and strengthen its position within a Caribbean regional grouping:

> If the political situation in South America continues to deteriorate (precisely because of growing urban unemployment, among other reasons), a buffer zone in the Caribbean might in due course hold some appeal for the State Department, with far-reaching implications for its policies towards countries in that zone, and therefore for their viability. It may fall to countries like Trinidad, which have yet to define their role in the political system of the Western Hemisphere, to play a leading part in its creation.[202]

Thus while on the one hand countries like Trinidad were urged to follow their own development patterns, resist copying overseas techniques and tastes, and increase their room to manoeuvre, it was also encouraged to take the initiative in increasing diplomatic contacts with the richer economies, particularly the USA which, it was recognised, ultimately controlled developments in the region and Trinidad's political choices.

It was envisaged that if the richer industrialised economies had a greater understanding of the threat, and expense, of political upheaval in the poorer economies, should social conditions be allowed to deteriorate, they might be encouraged to co-operate in adopting more constructive policies towards the "developing" economies in negotiations affecting trade, aid, education, migration and its companies working overseas. The threat of political upheaval as a motivating force for a change in attitude and policy by the richer economies was a theme also reflected in the World Employment reports, to which we turn next.

Although it had been in Trinidad that Seers had identified the study of unemployment as getting to the heart of the problems of development, it was the ILO's World Employment Programme (WEP), set up with the objective of making productive employment for large numbers of people a major goal of national and international development policies, which provided the opportunity to use and test the viability of social targets for development plans in the wider international context. Some of the lessons learned from the programme have already been referred to in previous sections, but a brief outline of the three missions, in which Seers was heavily involved from 1970 to 1972, will be useful before considering how feasible it was to anticipate that developing countries would be able, and willing, to pursue a more independent development path geared to more social targets - with the support and co-operation of richer economies.

The World Employment Programme

Seers headed pilot missions to Colombia and Ceylon and participated in one to Kenya, the aim being to produce reports that would be of benefit not only to the countries concerned but to all those suffering from chronic unemployment. The countries chosen provided examples of very different types of economies in three different continents. Colombia was a medium-size Latin American country, partially industrialised but also dependent on coffee exports; here underemployment at inadequate wages, as well as unemployment, was identified as a major cause of poverty. Ceylon (which did not become the Republic of Sri Lanka until May 1972 after the mission's visit) was fairly typical of a plantation economy and provided a classic case of educated unemployment, a problem emerging in many other countries. And Kenya well illustrated the problems of African countries with the overwhelming rural character of its population, and extreme inequalities of incomes.

Although unemployment was the focus of these studies it was clear it could not be studied in isolation without considering the interrelated problems of poverty and inequality. Of Colombia Seers observed

> We came to see poverty and unemployment not as different problems but as different aspects of a single problem. The most effective way to end poverty, almost the only possibility in a "developing" country, would be to induce a sharp increase in employment at adequate wages.[203]

Equally while policies in many fields could help reduce unemployment, he observed

> a real solution can only lie in removing the roots of inequality - by land reform ..., by educational expansion, by control of monopoly, and by higher and more "progressive" taxation. The very fact that unemployment and inequality are mutually enforcing implies that a cumulative reduction in them both can be induced by government action, provided it is vigorous and determined.[204]

In order to find any solutions, it was obvious that an analysis was required not only of the growth of unemployment itself but of "the whole development process" and "a fundamental rethinking of development - not just 'providing jobs' to mop up open

unemployment".[205] The broad approach of the study was reflected in the interdisciplinary nature of the ILO teams[206] and Seers himself observed that the study of unemployment opened up new horizons - and a broad spectrum of issues - involving the consideration of

> questions of justice, of equality, of literacy, of nutrition, of the political power structure which prevents unemployment being solved and (internationally) prevents the re-organisation of the world in a way that would make possible the solution of the unemployment problems, by preserving (e.g.) textile quotas and tariffs.[207]

The findings of the employment missions provided many examples of the exogenous influences on development that Seers had identified as the consequences of imported consumption habits and production techniques, which have already been discussed. In addition the teams were confronted with the internal constraints on development, including political power structures, systems of land tenure, agricultural policy and population growth - (though Seers tended to attribute population growth also to the importation of foreign techniques, in the form of more advanced medical technology[208]).

Colombia

The ILO mission went to Colombia at the invitation of President Lleras Restrepo and carried out its investigations in January 1970. It was estimated that in the towns 12 per cent of the men and 19 per cent of the women from the active labour force of 3 million were looking for work, while at least a further 10 per cent were also unemployed but too dispirited to work. In the rural areas, where the majority of the population still lived, open unemployment was less common but hundreds of thousands worked for such low wages or earned so little that they could be considered underemployed, resulting in a growing migration of people seeking work in the towns, where they only added to the numbers of the urban unemployed. With a rapidly growing population it was estimated at least 5 million new jobs were needed by the year 1985 to alleviate the situation, though it was estimated that only 1 million would be found at the then current rate of development. The aim of the ILO report, as its title - *Towards Full Employment* - indicated, was to recommend policies whereby the estimated 4 million shortfall in jobs could be found.[209]

What was demonstrated in Colombia, as in Trinidad, was that fast economic growth was not sufficient to raise employment; and where growth was concentrated in a few capital intensive industries (like mining or petroleum), employment was provided for only a relatively small number of people whose wage levels tended to be higher than other occupations could pay, especially agriculture, resulting in increasing inequalities between income levels. The mission estimated that on average the poorest half of the population in Colombia shared about one-sixth of the national income, while the richest 5 per cent took more than one-third (the disparities being even greater in rural areas).

A high degree of concentration of income in the hands of a rich minority, it was observed, also led to consumption patterns with a heavy emphasis on foreign travel,

imported luxuries and goods which required foreign exchange and did little or nothing to increase the demand for local production or encourage employment. When later reviewing the achievements of the three pilot missions, Seers, Jolly and Singer commented that "Probably the major analytical contribution of the Colombia report was its emphasis on the links between income distribution and the basic causes of employment problems"[210] - though, as we have seen, Seers had already drawn attention to the negative effects of unequal income distribution, including its effect on unemployment, in his work in Trinidad and in "The Meaning of Development". Findings in Colombia provided further evidence of this trend. Although little quantitative evidence of the links between unequal distribution of income and unemployment were produced in Colombia, this part of the report was considered to have had a significant impact at the time since it contradicted and challenged "conventional thinking" which regarded unequal distribution as a positive feature, which could increase savings, investment, growth and employment. Seers had again in fact already argued that this "conventional thinking" was "unconvincing in the Third World"[211] in "The Meaning of Development" (see above pp.205), but the employment reports gave these issues greater currency.

With employment rather than growth or income as the priority target for a development plan, it was obvious, Seers remarked, that "Minor tinkering with the labour market (vocational training, placement services, etc.)"[212] would not be sufficient to deal with the country's problems and that an integrated strategy of development was required with agricultural and land reform playing a significant part, underpinned by a system of fiscal reform and proposals to raise the rates of taxes on the rich and luxury consumption to help offset inequalities.

Agriculture, it was proposed, would have to absorb a substantial part of the rural labour force, in order to slow migration to the cities, and also increase food production for those working in the urban areas. This required a fast pace of land redistribution and new settlement, including partitioning of under-used latifundia, the implementation of large rural public works and house construction programmes, the training and provision of more teachers and medical staff, and the initiating of community development schemes in order to improve housing, education health services in rural areas. Colombia, however, was fortunate in having large areas of cultivable land and Seers recognised that this particular recommendation might not be universally applicable for other countries with no such resources.[213]

In turning to industry in Colombia, the mission report, as has been already indicated, questioned the appropriateness of imported modern technology and encouraged the adoption of more labour-intensive methods and techniques, including proposals for the reform of labour legislation, to enable the absorption of more manpower, and to offset the unemployment rate (see above p.224).

However, it was apparent that countries, such as Colombia, often had little choice in the technology they employed since capital intensive technology was frequently "tied" to aid and technical assistance programmes, which they could not afford to refuse. In other

respects too industrial economies often aggravated the unemployment problem by increasing protection of their own industries and thereby limiting the import of manufactured goods from countries like Colombia. The ILO report therefore turned its attention to considering the responsibilities of the international community in solving the unemployment problem.

> We felt that we should also explore what the United States and other rich countries could do to reduce unemployment in Colombia (and elsewhere). This was a project in an international programme; and large scale chronic unemployment is now so common in the Third World that its causes must at least in part lie in the world economy.[214]

Towards Full Employment in fact concluded with a call for international co-operation in combating unemployment and "a great effort on the part of donor countries, to match and reinforce Colombia's own efforts" - though at the same time it was acknowledged that political support from donor countries for efforts on the scale needed had dwindled and there was "little realisation of the scope or gravity of the world unemployment problem, still less of the consequences of failing to solve it".[215]

But while the report itself contained only a veiled hint at the "consequences of failing to solve" the problem, Seers was himself more direct in a subsequent commentary on the report when he pointed out the pragmatic, as well as moral, imperative for the industrialised countries and international agencies to adjust their policies, to assist the reduction of world unemployment.

> The national effort required by an employment programme is so demanding (and the danger to world order so great if this effort is not made) that there is both a moral and a hard-headed case for industrial countries (and international agencies) adjusting their policies, especially in the fields of trade and aid, to take account of the unemployment crisis of the 1970s in the Third World. It is to be hoped that they realise this in advance of, rather than after, major political upheavals.[216]

Ceylon

The occurrence of riots during the ILO's second pilot mission to Ceylon in 1971 appeared to justify these fears and added urgency to the request of the Ceylonese government for recommendations from Seers' team for a rapid reduction in unemployment. Seers had already had contact with the Ceylonese Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs in 1967/8 and arranged a conference on development planning in Ceylon at IDS in 1969, so was familiar with the situation of the island. He and the ILO team were invited there by the prime minister, Mrs Bandaranaike, and undertook the fieldwork for their study in March/April 1971.

Ceylon was experiencing some of the same problems aggravating unemployment faced by Colombia - for example a dramatic population explosion (following malaria eradication), inappropriate technology biased towards capital intensity, and the need for land reform - but did not suffer the same degree of inequality since socialist government policy had implemented heavy direct taxation and supplied extensive food subsidies and

welfare services.

The main novelty of the situation in Ceylon was the high incidence of unemployment among the younger age groups, particularly among those with "O" level qualifications, who were identified as the main proponents of the April 1971 insurrection. The expansion of the educational system had "outrun the capacity of the economy to provide the sort of jobs that those with secondary education feel they are entitled to expect - broadly speaking, office jobs"[217] observed Seers and there was a stark contrast between the work expectations of the young and actual opportunities available. Here was a classic example of what he regarded as the effect of the transference of inappropriate "intellectual influences" and "consumption tastes" imported from the richer industrialised countries. Such educated unemployment, accompanied by a contempt for manual work, was a growing problem in "nearly every 'developing' country" (and was also appearing in "developed" countries) he maintained, but the problem was "especially acute in the case of Ceylon".

> This is partly because of the particularly rapid growth of free education - from many points of view a notable achievement. Another reason is that the free rice ration (together with a second subsidised ration) - also in itself an achievement - makes it much easier for families to tolerate their members being out of work for years on end.[218]

The ILO mission took this problem as the focus and title of its report *Matching Employment Opportunities and Expectations*.[219] It criticised the educational system of Ceylon for its emphasis on examinations and further education while neglecting practical work, such as farming, which was usually the actual occupation of most school leavers. Far reaching educational reform was recommended with more emphasis being placed on practical work and aptitude tests and with young people being required to break their education with productive jobs. It was also suggested that the fascination of a white-collar job be made *much* less attractive, by reducing salaries. Realising that to cut existing salaries might cause hardship and raise further political difficulties the report recommended that "*new* entrants to the civil service should be placed on a salary scale that was lower *all the way up*".[220]

Another major group of underemployed, rather than unemployed, mentioned in the report, was the population of Indian origin on the tea and rubber estates, who received very low wages (even allowing for free housing) and often worked only part time. This was undoubtedly a reference to what is now known as the Tamil community, though this term was not used in the report, which observed there was little prospect of expansion of employment on the estates themselves and even less prospect of jobs in other sectors of the economy for this group of people since there were linguistic, social and communal barriers to labour mobility. Although a Ceylon-India agreement provided for the group to be either repatriated or given Ceylonese citizenship, the report remarked that little had been done to implement this. A full programme of repatriation, it pointed out, would in fact result in a general labour shortage on the estates, thereby exerting pressures to integrate them with

the general labour market, entailing the improvement of pay and conditions comparable to workers elsewhere, but thus reducing profitability. While outlining the possible consequences of varying degrees and combinations of repatriation and integration, the report did not recommend any specific course of action, though it did draw attention to the discrimination in this sector of the labour market observing that such dualism was not only basically inefficient, but also doubting whether it was "in the long run compatible with development".[221]

Ceylon was suffering from a chronic balance of payments deficit and lack of foreign exchange, which, it was observed, was keeping industry short of materials and spare parts. It was recommended that a big effort was required to develop new exports (both industrial products and more highly processed forms of traditional exports) and to concentrate investment on sectors with low foreign exchange requirements. The ILO report made it clear a huge effort would be required to undertake the far reaching structural reforms, and sacrifices, needed especially in regard to education, pay structure and land tenure. As in Colombia, among the measures suggested was a programme of land reform supplemented by a large-scale rural public works scheme and the necessary infrastructure. To absorb some of the secondary school graduates, a big expansion of the para-professional labour forces in education and health, especially in rural areas to back up agricultural expansion, was recommended together with a national youth service with a universal wage scale for all young workers, dependent entirely on age, regardless of educational qualifications (which it was anticipated would also make it easier to introduce the lower salary scales for new entrants to clerical and administrative jobs). Wage restraint in general was deemed necessary for a long-term employment strategy and also the implementation of a fiscal programme, to include higher taxation on the rich and an increase on the premium paid on the import of goods other than foodstuffs.[222]

One proposal, put forward with a certain amount of trepidation, was that the rice subsidy be reduced. Here is another apparent conflict of priorities in the development targets identified by Seers, for having already recognised the benefits of the subsidy in reducing inequality and relieving the poverty of unemployment, his report then recommended its reduction in pursuance of an employment programme. However, since Ceylon still depended heavily on imported rice, the reduction of the subsidy was regarded as a way to save foreign exchange. Seers admitted that anybody, especially a foreigner, making such a suggestion took on a great responsibility, but concluded that it was difficult to see how a reduction in the ration could be avoided. The welfare benefits need not be lost, it was argued, since some of the savings made could be used in "more selective measures to help the vulnerable sections of the community",[223] so raising welfare in alternative ways.

It was acknowledged by the mission that implementation of the suggested programme of measures in Ceylon, as in Colombia, was a difficult undertaking, depending on how high a priority the country gave to the reduction of unemployment, whether there existed a sufficient basis of internal political support for the necessary measures, and whether

Ceylon's trading partners were prepared to adopt a more constructive approach towards implementing more positive aid and trading policies. The burden of the measures recommended for Ceylon would be very heavy indeed, observed Seers, if the rest of the world did not make a bigger effort to help:

> Apart from all the structural measures indicated above, a country as highly dependent on imports as Ceylon needs relief from the foreign exchange constraint on growth, if large-scale unemployment is to be reduced.
>
> This is in part a matter of trade measures - achieving a proper long-term international tea agreement, selling tea in more highly processed forms, increasing exports of coconut products, exporting manufactures. While these require Ceylon herself to adopt new policies in various fields, they also require a much more constructive approach by her trading partners.[224]

Since Ceylon's economy was a relatively small, it was suggested an aid programme would also be useful in this particular case, provided it was not tied to donors' industries, was guaranteed sufficiently far ahead to provide a basis for planning, and was supported by a co-ordinated programme of technical assistance designed to support the basic structural reforms, especially in education.

Kenya

Seers participated in the ILO pilot mission to Kenya and assisted in drafting its report but was not so heavily involved as in the other two assignments since his colleagues Hans Singer and Richard Jolly headed the mission to East Africa and were ultimately responsible for producing the final report.[225] The main features of the employment problem in Kenya were identified as the overwhelming rural character of the population living at barely subsistence level and the extreme inequality between incomes in the country as a whole, partly inherited from colonial days but deepened since independence. The development strategy proposed by the report was a policy of redistribution from growth. This was based on the assumption that the rate of growth of production would remain at 7 per cent and that

> the real incomes of those in the top income bracket, i.e. the 1 per cent of the total population receiving 10 per cent of total income, can be stabilised for a number of years, and that the resources gained from this freeze of top incomes can be switched to a special labour-intensive investment package in favour of those in the bottom income bracket, i.e. the almost 40 per cent of the total population also receiving 10 per cent of total income.[226]

By such a policy of redistribution from growth it was calculated that the incomes of the poorer 35 to 40 per cent of the population could be doubled within a decade, reducing poverty. Since the characteristics found in Kenya were shared by many other African countries, it was anticipated the report's recommendations would have relevance for these other countries too.

The implementation of such a policy, it was recognised, implied a drastic change in policy measures such as "land redistribution, the diversion of credit and extension services

to help small farmers .... the use of selection quotas for government jobs and education, the promotion and careful adaptation of indigenous technologies". It also required a more selective policy in accepting private investment and aid "so that the technology used, the types of goods produced and the incomes generated would be more in line with the needs of the country."[227]

However, as Singer and Jolly acknowledged, the real issue was "the political feasibility of the strategy proposed"[228] since proposals for redistribution were likely to be resisted by local and overseas interests in positions of power and influence who were likely to lose by the implementation of such measures. Although the Kenyan government was ostensibly committed to the objective that the benefits of growth should be equitably redistributed, the question remained, "whether the changes required to achieve this objective can be set in motion before the interests inhibiting them strengthen to the point of obstructing all reform."[229] The question of the feasibility of implementation was one which was relevant and fundamental to all the employment reports, as well as to other official reports and studies with which Seers was associated.

"The implementation gap"

In an assessment of all three employment reports Seers, Jolly and Singer commented on the fact that their implementation had been "very partial, at best" and

> We now realise that the heart of employment strategy lies not in making economic projections, or finding ways of removing biases towards capital intensity, but in the balance of political forces and the capacity of political leadership in government and outside to mobilise support in ways which will make changes successful.[230]

Although the three employment missions had taken place at the invitation of the respective governments, thereby indicating a willingness to solve their unemployment problems, it was clear that there were political constraints, both within the countries concerned and from external forces, that made the recommended far-reaching changes difficult to envisage.

To begin with, as Seers pointed out in a lecture in 1972, the measures put forward in the reports included "drastic land reforms, taxes which genuinely reduce expenditure on luxuries and an education system turning out dynamic young people ready to build nations" but these reforms were extremely difficult to achieve since they were "resisted by everyone who has something to lose and normally they are precisely the people who hold or sustain political power".[231] It was equally difficult to bring about a more egalitarian type of industrialisation since the current policy tended to be "self-reinforcing", with those in privileged positions resisting changes which might threaten their status.

> Once a significant fraction of the population (and a larger fraction of the national income) is encompassed by the modern, urban economy, including industrialists and trade unionists, this sector becomes integrated with the industrial countries, rather than its own hinterland, and well capable of defending its privileged position against egalitarian policies.[232]

Was it therefore, Seers asked, possible for a government to carry out far-reaching social reform and redistributive policies without losing office?

What in fact he observed more frequently following his work on the employment missions was that governments were sometimes themselves the major constraint on development, intent on maintaining the status quo, resisting reform, and sometimes repressing by institutionalised violence the consequences of growing poverty, inequality and unemployment. This naturally led him to reflect more seriously on what the role and responsibility of the development expert should be in such a situation, and whether he should continue to work for a government that was not committed to implementing a development programme. As we have already noted, he came to the conclusion that there were some kinds of government which should be refused some types of aid, including possibly technical advice from development experts - a subject on which he expressed increasingly stronger views in the 1970s and which will be covered in the following two chapters. However, in 1972, while suggesting "the ethics of technical assistance" might need more airing, he argued that the responsibility of the expert was always to the people of the country he was working in, not to the government concerned.[233]

In addition, it was recognised that international constraints could also prevent the implementation of a far-reaching employment policy. Recommendations concerning more selective use of foreign capital and technology, and other internal reforms, were likely to be met with opposition from overseas, possibly resulting in a worsening of the situation, observed Seers:

> presumably the sort of government that carried out a thorough-going land reform of the type we felt was implied by an employment strategy would also be hostile to foreign investment, and it might evoke (to judge from parallels elsewhere) trade embargoes, possibly even military intervention. The result might be ... a decline in levels of living of the middle classes if not the rest of the population, that would create great political difficulties for the government - and make it much harder even to eliminate unemployment.[234]

While the necessity for international co-operation was emphasised in the reports, the three heads of mission acknowledged by 1973 that it was doubtful if the reports had any effect one way or the other on major aid or trade decisions of the US or EEC towards Colombia or Sri Lanka.[235] While it was then too early to judge the effects of the Kenya report, experience of the 1970s proved it was equally ineffectual.

Seers had contemplated the problem of implementation in 1968 in relation to the recommendations made to Trinidad for reducing unemployment, recognising the difficulty of gaining support and necessary understanding for essentially long-term policies from the public as well as from politicians who were seeking more immediate, short-term, solutions. "Indeed the crux of the problem" he maintained "is that the *perception* of basic issues seems too distorted to permit the right policies to be carried out" - a problem not unique to Trinidad. He was sceptical of the view that the increasing social problems might witness the emergence of political leaders with enough foresight, energy and capacity to tackle the development problems of a country and instead observed that the consequence

of growing social tension more often saw "the emergence of leaders characterized by ruthlessness rather than long-sighted sagacity."[236] The conclusion to this paper acknowledged the difficulty and almost impossibility of bringing about change, which was a somewhat pessimistic end to a paper which originally set out to make a contribution towards a general theory of development applicable to all "underdeveloped" economies.

> Is a process conceivable through which countries in the position of Trinidad would adjust policy sufficiently to avoid political developments that might well in the end make ... adjustments more difficult? When analysis is extended and economics becomes political economy, new possibilities of solution appear at first, but on deeper analysis these possibilities dwindle - apparently to zero; the future seems fully determined already. As perhaps it is.[237]

The question of practical implementation, however, Seers considered an important one, maintaining at a seminar in Bogota on the Colombia report that he did not see the task of the employment missions merely in terms of providing a hypothetical answer to a hypothetical question about how to institute a full employment programme; and that it was an evasion not to give due consideration to the political constraints, both internal and international on the government's room to manoeuvre, though acknowledging this opened up complex questions that were not intellectually easy or politically comfortable, particularly for foreign advisers.[238]

He was dismissive of those working in the development field who were not prepared to consider these questions and the practical problems of implementing an effective development programme, and especially rejected what he termed the "lines of escape" or "defence mechanisms" adopted by two particular groups of academics - economists who were only concerned with quantitative models and those who considered revolution as the only answer.

> One [line of escape] is to stick firmly to economics and to refuse involvement in discussion of social and political problems - in its most extreme form, to prepare purely econometric models as a substitute for a development plan. But the issue is precisely what social and political changes should be induced and how.... The other way of escaping from the anxieties of policy choices is to claim that the situation is so bad that there is no cure except revolution. Then one need not consider any lesser step. In fact reform would actually be dangerous: the logic of this position implies the familiar paradox that any improvement in distribution actually makes matters worse by delaying the day of "real" change.[239]

While accepting this latter "Marxist" argument might be perfectly logical, it was not a view he ever accepted; nor, he pointed out, did he share the criticism and suspicions of the entire World Employment Programme expressed by his "friends on the New Left", who basically argued that "if the World Bank and AID are in favour of emphasizing employment, then there must be something wrong with it".[240]

When confronting the problems of implementing the ILO proposals, Seers did in fact himself question the usefulness of writing such reports.

> Is there indeed much use writing reports on employment problems when the obstacles to changing the distribution of income are so formidable? Might a report proposing it even be counter productive by enabling a government to endorse a glamorous

programme as a substitute for genuine action?[241]

But, his response to the problems of implementation, as well as to more general criticisms of the employment programme, was that "So long as there is some possibility of alleviating ... social problems in the near future, it is surely at least worth exploring - especially in view of the known cost and unknown outcome of revolutions."[242]

The three heads of the ILO missions recognised that all the reports presented big political challenges and concluded that a complete change of development strategy, amounting to what the Colombia report described in one place as a "revolution by consent", could hardly be expected to be implemented in every detail, let alone to take place within a few years. However, to encourage governments to take up the challenge, they suggested greater follow-up help and support could be provided and recommended a closer partnership between the World Bank and the ILO for this purpose: "once a country has indicated a real desire - beyond lip service - to carry out any specific set of recommendations, the maximum help should be mobilised. This would signal to other 'developing' countries that not only advice but also follow-up assistance was within their grasp".[243]

In general, however, the significance of the reports was not necessarily seen to depend on their full implementation, but more on the indirect effect of their publication; in Seers' view, whatever their formal status "published documents can help in achieving a change of approach".[244] Focusing attention on social objectives, rather than growth represented a basic change of approach to development which, it was envisaged, could have a longer-term effect on influencing policy if generally adopted by academic bodies and international agencies. The reports, the authors maintained, underlined the need for fundamental changes not only in the economics of development but in the whole of the social sciences - "perhaps comparable to the 'Keynesian revolution'" (in response to the unemployment problem of the 1930s) - and fundamental changes in texts and syllabi were required "away from preoccupations with economic growth and towards a treatment combining social, economic and political analyses."[245] In this respect, the Colombia Report in particular was regarded as having a considerable impact on university teaching particularly in the United States where it frequently appeared on graduate reading lists. IDS used all the reports as the bases for a number of seminars and in several international courses on employment policy and planned to have them as set texts for its first graduate degree course planned to start in 1973.[246] Seers was especially enthusiastic about the influence the reports could have on teaching in Third World universities, and the resultant effect this could have on policy. Of the Colombia report he observed:

> If the report does nothing else, it ought to make the teaching of Keynesian economics in Colombian universities almost impossible, except in courses on the history of economic thought. It should also reduce the use of textbooks based, even in part, on models devised for industrial countries... a change in the approach of university teachers and students can and does eventually spread beyond the academic world.[247]

With the growing realisation that unemployment was becoming a world problem, it was

also anticipated that the publication of the reports might encourage a more positive response from the richer countries (who were beginning to confront similar problems) in the co-ordination of a coherent international employment strategy in fields of aid, trade, technology and private foreign investment.[248]

In addition, the authors observed, the reports were taken note of by international donor agencies, particularly the IBRD (the World Bank), which made use of the Colombia study in its own report on the country, was supportive of the report on Ceylon, and joined IDS in a joint working party to study further the issues involved in redistribution with growth.

Thus, the authors came to conclude that the main impact of the reports was indirect:

> - through the effect on the thinking and policies of international agencies and bilateral donors, and (in the longer run) by opening up research possibilities and inducing changes in the social sciences (which may in due course have some influence on the developed countries too). This is by no means a weak conclusion. Given that the reports had opted for a type of analysis and a scope of recommendations commensurate with the size of the problem rather than with what was immediately practicable, it follows that they must be judged by their impact in changing ideas about the general approach and emphasis of development strategy, influencing in due course policies in and towards the original host countries.[249]

* * *

Unless there were changes in "ideas about the general approach and emphasis of development strategy" towards more social targets, Seers warned that the consequences of the "whole perverted process" of focusing exclusively on growth could well result in "drastic political changes" as social strains became intolerable. Cuba already presented "one very interesting case of what happens after such a political change"[250] he observed in his paper on lessons for Africa of Latin American industrialisation policies - and the electoral victory of Allende's left coalition in Chile in September 1970, dedicated to opening "the road towards socialism", provided another "straw in the wind".[251] In concluding this chapter we will therefore now turn to consider Seers' view of these two economies, where priority was in fact given to reducing poverty, inequality and unemployment, rather than pursuing growth, based on a commitment to socialist principles. Seers no longer proclaimed himself a socialist (as he had done back in 1946) but he was interested in the practical outcome of pursuing more egalitarian policies. Both countries he regarded as important social experiments, from which lessons could be learned and, as mentioned earlier (p.203), he considered it would be interesting to compare the longer term record of countries like Cuba and Brazil, because of their very different approaches to growth and development. Cuba too was the subject of his contribution to the joint IDS/World Bank study on "Redistribution with Growth" which grew out of the findings of the world employment reports.[252]

"The other paradigm" - Cuba"

Following his study-visit to Cuba in 1962 and the subsequent book (covered in Chapter 2, pp.104-8), Seers had an ongoing interest in developments in the island, describing it, during a further visit in 1969 (with a view to arranging a long-period research project), as a "laboratory of ... far reaching experiments":

> The conscious and explicit attempt to achieve agricultural advances before turning to a large-scale industrialization alone would justify attention .... Above all, the combination of equalisation of incomes and a heavy emphasis on "non-material incentives" makes Cuba of unique interest.... The degree of inequality is moreover shrinking.[253]

In his lecture on the lessons for Africa of industrialisation in Latin America, Seers termed Cuba "the other paradigm", where policies pursued elsewhere in the region during the 1960s had been reversed, with emphasis put on developing agriculture and the social services rather than on industry. All productive assets had been nationalised, and industrial policy had been designed to provide basic necessities such as clothing, rather than luxuries. Salary increases had been prevented and high salaries reduced, so that the range of incomes was in fact narrowing, demonstrating, he observed, that "industrial expansion need not be incompatible with the policy of reducing income differences - between rich and poor, and between town and country".[254] Incentive payments and piece rates had been abolished with emphasis put on moral incentives rather than financial acquisitiveness. Pensions had been made universal, prices stabilised, and many services were supplied free.

Development strategy in Cuba had therefore put heavy emphasis on the elimination of poverty, through a sharp reduction in inequality and, Seers remarked, "dire poverty and unemployment were virtually eliminated" in the first few years after the revolution and the degree of equality was "probably unique".[255] It had therefore seemingly gone a long way towards achieving the social targets advocated in the "Meaning of Development", and there were aspects of policies adopted in Cuba which Seers himself advocated in other contexts - such as increased attention to agriculture, reduction of income differences, wage restraint, industrial production of basic necessities rather than luxury goods, and the adoption of moral rather than material incentives to offset the influence of foreign consumption habits. One particular development in Cuba he specifically mentioned as of special significance to African countries was the part-time employment of secondary school and university students in productive activity which not only assisted output, but also encouraged students to have a more positive attitude to manual labour and gave them practical experience;[256] though, in general he believed it was too early, in 1972, to draw positive conclusions about Cuba's achievements in social fields such as education, despite the encouraging record.[257]

Cuba's apparent success in reducing inequalities - and pursuing development policies independent of Western capitalist intervention - had inevitably aroused interest in other

"developing" countries, and when discussing the problems of Trinidad in 1969, Seers did in fact address the question

> could structural problems be drastically resolved by adopting central planning and comprehensive controls, including extensive nationalization, higher taxation, wage stabilization, mobilizing youth for work in the countryside, and by breaking away politically from the United States - what one can conveniently summarize as the "Cuban solution"?[258]

However, his conclusion was that whether such a solution was "desirable" was "not really relevant" since it was not an option open to Trinidad or most other countries, since a Cuban type of regime required "certain preconditions", mainly related to the external support and co-operation it could rely upon, which did not pertain in most other situations. His position was similar to that he had adopted earlier in the 1960s when he had expressed the opinion that the uniqueness of Cuba's position made it unlikely there would be "another Cuba" in the region (see pp.108-11). A revolutionary government, he again pointed out, faced marketing difficulties unless it inherited an export industry whose sales could be maintained despite the loss of traditional markets, and while the Soviet Union could absorb Cuba's sugar exports, it was unlikely to absorb Trinidad's petroleum, since it was a producer itself. Production and refinement of such a commodity would in any case, he anticipated, become more difficult without foreign technical personnel, whose hire was likely to exact a political price of some kind. Any regime labelled Communist in the western hemisphere, he observed, would also need "considerable financial (and political) help from outside" to counteract and neutralise the considerable pressure that would be brought to bear against it, particularly by the United States, which could force other countries to break off trade with it and even possibly intervene militarily. "The smaller the country, the more essential such help would be"[259] and the basic question arose whether Trinidad (or any other country similarly placed) could rely on such assistance from anywhere.

Finally, he maintained, the Cuban system required "a political organization permeating the bureaucracy, to ensure that controls are operated without corruption and to induce the public to accept the sacrifices required", and that such an organisation emerged "gradually during an armed struggle with both nationalist and social objectives, involving a large section of the population, ... and *only during such a struggle*"[260] (original emphasis). The electoral success of Allende's socialist Unidad Popular in Chile a year later, however, seemed to challenge this point, raising the question "Can socialism be achieved at all without a bloody revolution?", which will be returned to below.

Even though all the "preconditions" outlined here were largely fulfilled in Cuba, Seers observed, it too, by the late 1960s, was experiencing considerable economic difficulties - with the implication that this did not augur well for other governments *without* these preconditions attempting to navigate the same course. Despite the success of moves towards redistribution and greater equality, and an initial spurt forward in many productive sectors, Cuba's economic development was in fact disappointing by the early 1970s.

National income, he observed, had risen only about in line with population from 1961 to 1968, and had actually declined in the following three years. Further progress in the production of necessities, had been slow, with sugar output not exceeding pre-revolutionary levels, non-sugar agricultural output falling, and supplies of consumer goods, including necessities such as food, growing tighter. There was considerable under-utilised labour and chronic excess demand. In addition progress in rehousing those in slum or overcrowded dwellings was slow and, although teaching and medical services expanded rapidly, the infant mortality rate remained at or even above the pre-revolutionary rate at around 40 per 1,000.[261]

By the early 1970s production problems could no longer be attributed to the US trade embargo or disruption caused by the switch from trade links with the West to Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In fact, Seers argued, in some respects the trade embargo had proved an economic asset in stimulating nationalism and encouraging voluntary labour to break production bottlenecks, and the cutting of trade and other links with countries in the Western Hemisphere had reduced the "demonstration effect", whose damaging effect in encouraging inappropriate, and unaffordable, consumption habits and production techniques he had criticised in other Caribbean and Latin American contexts.[262]

Cuba's difficulties however obviously raised serious questions about the effects of egalitarian and redistributive policies on the efficient working of an economy, and the consistency of the development process, where growth was necessary to sustain development. In 1972, however, Seers remarked it was "too early to say that it shows the incompatibility of equality and growth",[263] and, he subsequently observed, it was misleading merely to ask whether redistribution had inhibited growth - the consistency of objectives could not be posed in such naive terms. "The key question" he maintained was "not whether the redistribution and the associated use of moral rather than material incentives caused the per capita incomes to rise little if at all between 1958 and 1971, but whether they contributed to the failure to make further substantial inroads into poverty"[264] - or why the initial improvement was not sustained.

While recognising Cuba's attempt to dispense with material incentives as "an important social experiment", within the context of a book review in the *New York Times* he questioned whether Cuba's special circumstances had not spoiled the experiment - as far as drawing lessons for other countries of the Third World was concerned - in that overoptimism had meant the switch to moral incentives had in fact been too rapid.[265] The abandonment of financial incentives and of financial accounting for both individual enterprises and the national economy as a whole had resulted in managers of factories and farms ceasing to keep accounts and/or unable to calculate costs of production which had caused inefficiency and made project evaluation impossible, he observed. In addition, no attempt had been made to match the general increase in income - through pensions, free public services, the levelling out of wages, as well as reductions in prices - by measures to absorb the extra purchasing power, which had resulted in chronic demand, queues, absenteeism and the growth of a black market, which, he observed somewhat impaired the

appeal to moral incentives.[266]

However, by the early 1970s Seers noted the "the sweeping change" in Cuban policy in reaction to its economic setbacks, "designed to increase material incentives as well as to restore financial balance, both overall and for production units"[267] in an effort to encourage productivity and eliminate surplus purchasing power. Wage increases were linked to productivity; TV sets, fridges and other luxury consumer goods were offered as prizes for good attendance and production; prices of non-essential goods were raised; accounting was reintroduced, with a standard system adopted in 1973; and a development plan for 1971-5 was prepared focusing on a high growth rate of 11 per cent. While early in 1973, he considered it too early to assess the impact of these new policies on equality, production or poverty, he did point out that cash in the public's hand had fallen, queues had shortened, absenteeism declined, the national income had risen and a surge forward taken place in output.

The experience of Cuba in the 1960s, in Seers' judgement, had not been a proper test of an egalitarian policy - which he now concluded did not necessarily entail the abolition of material incentives. In fact, he observed, not only had its experience demonstrated that such a policy could impede efficient production, but it also suggested "that very drastic redistribution, especially if it takes the form of abolishing material incentives, may interfere with the reduction of poverty (at least in a society which has been conditioned to expect personal rewards)." However, now that financial controls were being introduced, he concluded, "it will be easier to assess whether what is still a highly egalitarian society has the dynamic potential to complete the task of eliminating poverty".[268]

In 1970, however, "another great historical experiment" - the electoral victory of the Chilean Unidad Popular, and of Salvador Allende as president - in Seers' words, "led to Chile displacing Cuba at least temporarily from the forefront of the Latin-American scene".[269] The Unidad Popular, a coalition of socialists, communists, radicals and some left-wing groups, was pledged to carrying out far reaching social and economic reforms, including the nationalisation of US owned copper mines, prompting the question raised above as to whether socialism could in fact be achieved in the region without a revolution.

The Chilean road to Socialism?

Seers himself distrusted and was generally opposed to violent revolutionary change but the constitutional path adopted in Chile presented a new and different scenario with which he had more sympathy and which also had potentially enormous repercussions if it succeeded, affecting as he put it "the balance of possibilities in every other country, especially in the same continent".[270] Seers had been based in Chile when working for ECLA from 1957 to 1961, which no doubt also heightened his interest in developments there.

This interest led him to involve IDS in organising a conference jointly with the Chilean National Planning Office (ODEPLAN) in Santiago at the end of March 1972,

sponsored and financially supported by SIDA, the Ford Foundation, and the Royal Institute of International Affairs Chatham House. Seers himself was one of the co-chairmen of the proceedings and among the speakers at the conference were President Allende himself and other government ministers as well as the former presidential candidate of the Christian Democrats, Radomiro Tomic, who had stood against Allende. A range of participants, many of them young people, came from East and West Europe, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Latin America, including many Chileans outside the government, some "distinctly critical of its policies".[271]

Seers later commented on two noticeable absences from the conference - official representatives from either the USA or Cuba.

> I tried to get a member of Kissinger's staff to come, because the Minister of Economics, Pedro Vuskovic, wanted to establish some sort of communication with them to show them that the situation need not be considered politically intolerable by Washington. I did not get even answers to my letter.
>
> Secondly the failure of Carlo Rafael Rodriguez to nominate Cuban participants reflected, I felt after talking to him, a deep pessimism about the prospects of the Allende government.[272]

The reaction of both, he observed, became easier to understand in the light of later developments; though his expectations that either would participate were perhaps unrealistic. After trying to prevent Allende taking office, the United States was continuing efforts to destabilise the regime, while the Cuban government might well have been suspicious of the Ford Foundation's and RIIA's sponsorship.

The point of the conference, Seers maintained, was not "to praise or to bury the "Via Chilena", but to *understand* it"[273] (original emphasis). In a talk to Chatham House shortly after his return from the conference he outlined the special characteristics inherited by Allende, drawing attention to the facts that Chile was practically a one commodity exporter (of copper), most of which had been produced by two US companies; it had a developed industrial sector, highly dependent on foreign capital, its agriculture was relatively backward, but the proceeds of copper had enabled it to become a chronic food importer. It suffered the inequalities of a feudal society but, in contrast to many other Latin American countries, had a democratic tradition in that regular and genuine elections were held for the Presidency and Congress. This maintained Seers was "an inflammable mix" added to which "a growing burden of debt service, a highly volatile copper price, a fairly fast population increase ... a rising political awareness, and mass parties dedicated to more or less far-reaching social change" provided "the ingredients of high political drama".[274]

Against this background Allende had come to power with only 37 per cent of the vote in a triangular presidential election, but had been voted president by Congress since he pledged to respect the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and autonomy of the armed force. The basis of the president's programme, Seers maintained, was in fact essentially accelerating changes started under his predecessors, particularly Frei; the novelty of the situation, however, lay in the speed with which changes were being made and the objective of a socialist society, to be achieved by constitutional means and as such

its example was being carefully watched:

> there was nothing shocking to Chileans about the nationalization of copper and banks, or land reform, or an expansion of the State sector in industry. The novelty was the speed of change now proposed - and the objective of (in some sense) a "Socialist" society. The crucial question ... was whether this pace would be compatible with the preservation of the constitution - allowing for the danger of US pressures in some form or another .... It is this question which makes Chile of such interest today. If rapid and far-reaching changes cannot be made constitutionally in Chile, with her democratic traditions, would this combination be possible anywhere?[275]

The ODEPLAN-IDS conference took place at what Seers described as "a most interesting moment" - what might have been regarded as the end of the first phase of the Unidad Popular Government. The mining and banking sectors had been almost fully nationalised, big steps had been taken in agrarian reform, a large part of manufacturing industry had been taken out of private hands and a combination of wage rises and price controls had sharply shifted the distribution of income, helping to raise industrial output, employment and consumption, while restraining inflation.[276] Two days of the conference were in fact devoted to visits to mines, factories, farms, schools and hospitals so that participants were able to witness developments and conditions at first hand.

By 1972, however, the Unidad Popular seemed to be suffering a set back in that congressional opposition to further nationalisation was hardening, exchange reserves had disappeared (partly due to the fall in the price of copper), there were heavy servicing charges due on past debts, investment in industrial equipment was low, levels of imports were falling and some consumer goods were scarce, causing shortages which were being exploited by the opposition. These problems were compounded by the United States State Department "using its influence to prevent the International Bank, the IMF and the Inter-American Development from lending to Chile".[277]

"Is the Road to Socialism Blocked?" Seers therefore asked in the title of his talk to Chatham House in April 1972, his answer to which was briefly "No". While acknowledging that further large-scale structural changes were unlikely because of Congressional opposition, as well as the possibility of a military take-over, he considered there was still scope for extending government control and that the changes that had already taken place could not easily be reversed without running the risk of chronic national disunity since the trade unions and the left-wing parties were still strong. At this time it was his opinion that "The claws of the industrialists" had been clipped, each month that passed made it more difficult for them to recover their economic and political power, and that whatever happened in the near future, "a continuation of the long-term tendency towards a more egalitarian society, with more central direction" seemed "very likely".[278] Even external pressure and influence from the United States he considered "greatly reduced by the failures in Vietnam" and in many ways counter-productive since it only reinforced popular support for the Chilean government.[279] (In fact, he speculated, any limits on furthering the egalitarian society were more likely to come "from the bastions of the labour aristocracy", who had already benefited from wage increases and land reform

and might well block further such moves, than from Congressional opposition or the power of the military.[280])

The coup in September of the following year, which toppled Allende and the Unidad Popular, obviously overturned this rather optimistic view of "a continuation of the long-term tendency towards a more egalitarian society". In a letter to *The Times,* shortly after the coup, Seers paid tribute to Allende as a man of "courage and honesty", with "considerable political resource" - and acknowledged the regime had faced "strong and unscrupulous opposition". However, his letter concentrated very much on the failings of the Unidad Popular itself (rather than internal or external opposition) which had prevented it from carrying through its constitutional radical reform programme (an opinion he continued to hold throughout the 1970s and will be examined further in Chapter 7). His argument in *The Times* was that:

> In brief the Chilean government was neither popular enough nor united enough - nor efficient enough. The parliamentary road to socialism is difficult at the best of times, but much more so for an administration which lacks a majority in parliament - or in the country!

He went on to observe that "some of the constituent groups of the coalition were clearly not prepared to give a fair trial to constitutional methods" and that "partly because of lack of cooperation between the members of the coalition there was serious mismanagement".[281]

What had happened in Santiago, he went on, underlined "the difficulty of carrying out a radical programme constitutionally", though he added more optimistically "it doesn't justify anyone on the Left concluding in advance that such a strategy should not be attempted in any other country".[282]

Later in the 1970s Seers reflected further on the example of Chile when considering the constraints on a country intent on pursuing a more independent and self-reliant development strategy and this will be covered in Part III of this study, particularly in Chapter 7. While not always in sympathy with or supportive of policies adopted in either Cuba or Chile he considered broader lessons for development could be learned from their experience and often referred to their example.

Development in a divided world

As this chapter has indicated, Seers' optimism of the early 1960s that planned growth and industrialisation programmes, assisted by aid and fairer trading practices on the part of the richer economies, would stimulate development in the poorer areas of the world was dampened by the poor record of the decade, as global inequalities continued to increase rather than diminish. His response in 1969 was the rejection of growth as an adequate indicator of development, urging instead that development plans and programmes should be aimed at reducing poverty, unemployment and inequality. However, it was also increasingly clear, as his own working experience both at the ODM and on overseas

missions indicated, that the policies necessary (as outlined in the World Employment Reports, for example) were often resisted both by those in positions of power in the "developing" countries themselves and by overseas governments and companies whose interests were threatened by the implementation of such measures.

The constraints such internal and external forces placed on development were subjects Seers came to address more fully in the later 1970s (which will be covered in the third part of this study), when in fact he became far more sceptical about the feasibility of an international approach to development. But while already in the early 1970s he was aware of the failure of the international development effort and the rich countries' lack of commitment to the Third World (as well as the apparent lack of commitment of some Third World governments themselves to carrying out development programmes) Seers still retained some of his earlier idealism and optimism at this time. In 1971, for example, he still maintained that "International policy is ... a moral issue",[283] and that development was a moral imperative for which richer economies had some responsibility, arguing in his "Preface" to *Development in a Divided World* (1971) that the imbalances and inequalities of a world created "special problems (as well as special opportunities) for poor countries and special responsibilities for the rich."[284] What was needed he argued was a "world-wide system of co-ordinated national and international policies in many different fields [not just related to aid] to tackle the problems of world poverty".[285]

Later in the 1970s Seers concentrated more on the common nature of world problems, but in 1971 the main emphasis of his work was still on the special problems, as well as responsibilities, presented by a divided world of rich and poor, highlighting the fact that "the setting of the development problem" was much *different* for poorer countries than it had been for Western industrial countries. "The path of future development" of poorer countries, he recognised, was bound to reflect the heavy influence of richer economies on markets for goods, ideas and men and, as this chapter has indicated, he devoted much of his work to examining the influences of imported consumption tastes and production techniques. Nevertheless, he argued, this did not mean that prospects were necessarily worse; the problem was to find "appropriate [techniques] and transform them successfully, taking account of the differences in social and political context"; and, while he was already disconcerted at the development record of certain overseas governments, he nevertheless in 1971 still expressed a general optimism about future prospects. An increasing number of governments in Africa, Asia and Latin America, he observed, were determined to change their country's structure socially and politically, as well as economically, and despite many false starts and setbacks the general picture was "of slowly accumulating experience and improving performance in policy formation".[286]

Although his concern was still mainly focused on development in the Third World, there are, however, some indications during the late 1960s and early 1970s of Seers' growing interest in the common nature of world problems and the possibilities this presented of applying the lessons of development to the problems of the "developed" industrial countries. For example, having described Britain in 1968 as being "in deep and

chronic crisis" (Chapter 4, p.160), with the setting up of IDS he expressed the hope that development studies would not only be of help to the countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, but that they could also "throw an increasing amount of light on *our* problems too" since "comparatively well-to-do countries" faced similar structural obstacles to development to those experienced by the poorer countries.[287] He observed too that there was some disillusion with the growth process in developed, as well as developing, countries "because of an increasing awareness that it takes no account of the costs to human beings either directly ('alienation') or indirectly ('pollution')",[288] and that social scientists, notably in the United States, had "recently been rediscovering their own problems of poverty".[289] By the early 1970s he was also coming to see unemployment as a world problem, whereas even in 1968 he had remarked on the low levels of unemployment in industrialised countries, regarding it as a sign of "backwardness" in the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America (see p.199). Together with Singer and Jolly he observed "in some respects ... the employment problems of 'developing' countries are similar to those with which rich countries are struggling to cope", and following his own mission to Ceylon in 1971 he had suggested Britain itself might also benefit from a mission under the ILO employment programme.[290]

Nevertheless, while recognising such common elements, Seers still regarded the problems of industrialised countries as of a completely different and minor order altogether to those of the poorer nations of the world. For example the concept of relative poverty, employed in Townsend's study of Britain in 1970, classed as poor those who were "unable to participate in the activities and have the living conditions and amenities which are customary in that society"; Seers, however, clearly considered the social deprivation classed as poverty in "developed" societies as incomparable to the poverty experienced in a Third World country, commenting "to see one's child doomed by malnutrition to life-long physical and mental inferiority or to be unable to buy a blood transfusion to save one's wife's life is surely a different sort of poverty from being unable to afford the cakes for a children's party or to take one's wife out to the pictures".[291] And while acknowledging unemployment was becoming a world problem by the early 1970s, he still emphasised the fact that the situation was far worse in Third World areas, for where figures were available, "open unemployment" in the sense of people seeking jobs was about 10 to 20 per cent of the labour force in cities, which was some two to four times higher than in north-west Europe.[292] Although rich and poor economies might face similar problems, it was clear that their intensity differed dramatically, reflecting again the basic global divide with which Seers' work was more concerned at this time, as he advocated the need for both national and international efforts to assist in combating the worst manifestations of poverty, unemployment and inequality.

The next decade, however, brought about a dramatic shift in the focus of his concerns and it is the reasons for and substance of this change to which this study turns in Part 3.

PART III:

"THE NEW MEANING OF DEVELOPMENT"

CHAPTER 6: TOWARDS SELF RELIANCE - AND DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE

Following his resignation as Director of IDS Seers spent the next ten and half years working very actively for the Institute and producing a great deal of written material. Despite periods of illness, he continued working at an intense pace and travelling extensively.[1] He died very much "in harness" in Washington in March 1983, following a month in Fiji working with an EEC sponsored mission on employment and with plans to travel on to other commitments in Trinidad and Shanghai.[2]

As disillusion with the record of the 1960s had led to readjustments in his ideas on development, the "rapidly evolving world of the 1970s", as Seers described the decade, resulted in further reassessments of the meaning of development and the role of "experts" in the field. In 1977 he remarked of his paper "The Meaning of Development", produced in 1969:

> I cannot avoid the impression that it was written by someone else. So of course it was. It was composed by somebody living nearly a decade ago who had only recently returned to academic life after many years spent mostly in "operational" roles. Its author had naturally no foreknowledge of the rapidly evolving world of the 1970s, nor of the professional jobs that would modify once more his attitude to "development".[3]

While still holding to the view that development was best measured by the extent a country was able to eliminate poverty, unemployment and inequality, rather than by its rate of growth, Seers now acknowledged there had been a missing ingredient, or one that had been insufficiently emphasised in his earlier paper - the essential element to add to the "new meaning of development" being "self-reliance".[4]

Whereas during the 1960s, and indeed up to the early 1970s, internationalism had been a predominant theme in his thinking and he had stressed the moral responsibility of the richer countries to assist in the relief of world poverty, "self-reliance" and "nationalism" became more frequent themes in his work as the 1970s progressed, and development assistance to the Third World was portrayed as paternalistic and in many cases counter-productive. In fact by the early 1980s many of his views were diametrically opposite to those he acknowledged he had helped "proliferate and propagate" in the mid-1960s, when he had supported the view that Western industrialised countries should "provide aid and/or foreign private investment; and their markets should be opened to enable the Third World to earn the foreign exchange to buy equipment and technology"[5] as a means to relieve poverty. On the contrary by 1981 he maintained that, "poverty in the Third World would be more likely to be alleviated if aid (especially programme aid) were reduced, and the flow of private capital declined, and the markets of the industrial countries for manufacture were partially closed to the Third World"[6] - recommendations which flew in the face of the then current proposals of the Brandt Commission.

By the mid-1970s he had come to regard the very notion of the Third World and 3-world classification as meaningless and irrelevant and, as the industrialised OECD countries faced growing economic difficulties, he put more emphasis on the common

nature of world problems and the "dependency" in some degree of all countries. The second and complementary thread in his argument for a new meaning of development in 1977 was therefore "the geographical extension of development studies"[7] to Europe, since it too was experiencing what were regarded as "development" problems, and as the decade progressed he in fact became increasingly occupied with European issues.

What were the events of the "rapidly evolving" 1970s, as well as his work experiences, which caused Seers to redefine his perception of development and brought about the changing emphasis of his work, and which in the late 1970s and early 1980s led him to the express views, particularly on aid, that were increasingly regarded as "conservative" and controversial, even by sympathetic colleagues? This is a question to which answers are sought in Chapters 6 and 7.

Of all years in the decade, 1974 in particular has been regarded as a "watershed in development"[8] as the oil producing countries quadrupled the price of oil, and thereby energy costs, through a series of rises at the end of 1973 and beginning of 1974, providing the immediate backdrop for, and supplying added weight to, the demands of Third World countries for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) at the United Nations in April 1974, as well as exacerbating the economic crisis facing the major industrial OECD countries in the early 1970s, underlining there too growing concern about the limitations of the world's natural resources. The interrelationship of all these issues, as well as the easing of East-West relations, politico-economic developments in Europe and further experience of the development record of Third World countries, influenced Seers' thinking. In Chapter 6 - after giving an outline of his "professional jobs" as a fellow at IDS which in themselves both contributed to and reflected his new concerns - an indication will be given of how these issues and events modified his attitude to development and had a bearing on his redefining it in his 1977 paper in terms of greater self reliance and advocating the extension of development studies to Europe.

In Chapter 7 attention will then be given to his views concerning the more practical policy implications for, as well as constraints on, a government attempting to pursue a more self reliant development strategy, and to his own personal involvement in work on "development" in Europe, which led him increasingly to advocate a policy of collective self reliance for the region and gradual disengagement from the Third World.

While the outline of his professional activities briefly covers the whole of the period from 1972 to 1983, providing a general background for this third and final stage in his career, the rest of Chapter 6 is mainly focused on the period up until 1977/8, and Chapter 7 generally covers the period from 1977/8 to his death in 1983. To avoid unnecessary duplication, however, certain issues have been largely treated in one chapter; for example, the substance of his work on statistics and development indicators throughout this period is discussed in Chapter 7 as being more relevant to the practical policy issues discussed there.

Seers' professional roles 1972-1983

As already indicated, Seers pursued a very busy work schedule following his retirement from the directorship of IDS, demonstrated by the outline of his activities in the Appendix. A brief account of his work and main concerns will be given in this section, for, as he indicated himself, the practical experience of his professional jobs contributed to the modification of his attitude to "development". The significance of this experience and many of the issues raised will then be explored more fully later in this and the following chapter.

Very shortly after his resignation from the IDS directorship, Seers entered into an exchange of open letters with Harold Wilson and Judith Hart, prompted by the Labour leader's restatement of support for policies favourable to overseas developing countries. At this point the Labour Party was in opposition (following the Conservative victory at the polls in 1970), but Seers responded by pointing out the Party's failure to live up to its commitment to overseas development during its period in government 1964-71 (the general substance of which was covered in Chapter 4, pp.157-9).[9] Despite his differences of opinion with the party and the sharp tone of the exchange of letters, Seers received recognition of his work in the development field after Labour's return to office in 1974, by being made a Companion of the Order of St Michael and St George in the honours list of 1975. During the Labour administration his contacts continued with the ODM and the minister, in both a formal and informal advisory role, as will be outlined more fully in the next section, and referred to elsewhere in this chapter. In 1979, a Conservative government was again elected into office (led by Mrs Thatcher), which, as will be seen later below, had certain repercussions for IDS.

At IDS in the early 1970s Seers continued with research and teaching following up lines of work in which he had already demonstrated a particular interest. In October 1972 he became convenor of one of its four problem oriented research groups, INTERPAG, focusing, initially, on international problems, and dealing with issues such as the transfer of technology and standards to developing countries, the effect of international firms and investment on development strategy, the role of foreign aid and international agencies, and international and regional inequalities[10] - all areas of interest of his in the early 1970s, as discussed in Chapter 5. It was within this research group that he started a project on the world context of development in 1973 and worked with Osvaldo Sunkel on issues of dependency.

Within INTERPAG too he continued his work on the development of social indicators in planning and the statistical requirements for such a strategy, working for a time with Richard Stanton on a study "comparing subsistence levels (officially defined poverty lines) in the USA and India, with reference to their historical evolution in the UK", and also beginning a study of the political economy of national accounting, examining the statistical implications of non-orthodox economic approaches - building on the work of Kari Levitt in Trinidad and Osvaldo Sunkel in Chile.[11] In much the same way he had

previously questioned the relevance of national income as a measure of development, in the 1970s he queried the appropriateness of the UN System of National Accounts as a system of statistics for social analysis and planning in "developing" countries, and sought a more relevant framework - a concern that was raised at a conference on statistical policy in less developed countries, which he co-organised at IDS in May 1975 with Biplap Dasgupta and Richard Jolly.[12] In the later 1970s, his interest in devising more relevant social indicators of development resulted in the initiation of a study on life expectancy as an integrating concept in social analysis and planning, funded by the OECD;[13] and in the last months of his life he participated in the initial stages of a study for UNICEF, preparing a new statistical series on the state of children and looking at the human cost of the world recession on this vulnerable section of society.[14] As already mentioned, the substance of his work in the field of statistics, social indicators and national accounting will be looked at in more detail in Chapter 7.

As a follow up to the ILO employment missions in which he had been engaged, he played an active part in a joint study by IDS and the World Bank on the theme "Redistribution with Growth", based on the strategy of the Kenya report - with the aim of identifying how planning models and data collection could be adapted to support strategies focused on employment and income distribution - organising two conferences, one in Bellagio in April 1973 and another at IDS in September that year, and assisting in putting together a publication from the proceedings, to which he contributed a case study on Cuba (referred to in Chapter 5, pp.244ff.).[15]

As well as helping to organise such conferences, he also took part in the study seminar programme, directing a seminar on "Development Strategies for Mineral Export Economies" during February to April 1974 at the height of concern over repercussions of the oil crisis.[16]

In October 1975 Seers became director of the second 2-year M.Phil. course, after being prevented by ill health from directing the first intake in 1973. These courses were designed for students, from both "developing" and industrially developed countries, who intended working in government planning or other positions of central policy formulation, or running courses on development, as well as catering for a few who anticipated careers in international or developed-country agencies.[17] The syllabus aimed to be both interdisciplinary and operationally oriented, studying the adequacy of theoretical frameworks for the analysis of actual situations and tackling issues of policymaking and planning. Seers had prepared a text on "the world context of development" for the initial 1973 course and this he rewrote, in consultation with Sunkel, for use on his own course, exploring aspects of dependence and underdevelopment.[18] One of the most significant projects he undertook with the students was a case study, including a field trip to Scotland in 1976, of policy issues raised by North Sea oil, testing the applicability of development theory to a concrete situation in Britain - reflecting in practical terms his new interest in the extension of development studies to Europe (to be considered in more detail below).[19]

Seers also played a major part in strengthening IDS's contact and collaboration with

other research institutions in the UK and overseas. In 1973 a National Development Research Conference held at IDS brought together 200 social scientists (mainly from the UK but 30 from Europe) engaged in research on Third World problems. A meeting on the theme of collaboration within Europe held at the end of the main conference helped lay foundations for a European Association of Research Institutes (EADI) in which Seers became heavily involved.[20] The EADI's founding conference was held in Ghent in September 1974, the first general conference taking place in Linz, Austria, a year later, at which Seers was elected its first president, holding the office until the next triennial assembly held in Milan in 1978.[21] Through the EADI Seers pursued his work for the extension of development studies to Europe and the founding conference in Ghent gave him the platform and opportunity to outline publicly his thoughts on the future role for European institutes and social scientists, challenging and reappraising their functions and attitudes to development in a paper entitled, "What Business is it of Ours?"[22] - a process that he continued at subsequent general meetings of the association (at Linz, Milan and also Budapest in 1981). Through the auspices of EADI, too, he pursued contacts with and enlarged his experience of Eastern Europe, visiting Moscow in June 1976 to discuss the possibility of Soviet membership of EADI, and cultivating links with social scientists particularly in Poland and later Hungary. It was from EADI that the European periphery group evolved in 1977, which became a particularly significant vehicle and outlet for Seers' work on Europe in the later 1970s (to be covered in Chapter 7).

The EADI executive committee was composed not only of representatives of both West and East European development bodies, but also included representatives from the three other regional development associations - ADIPA (from Asia), CLACSO (from Latin America) and CODESRIA (from Africa)[23] - and during his presidency of EADI Seers played a large part in getting together the four regional bodies to discuss matters of common concern. At the request of the OECD Development Centre, which had been the main sponsor of earlier meetings of directors of development institutes, he convened at IDS in February 1976 a steering group of the concerned agencies to plan a joint conference of regional associations, which was subsequently held, also at IDS, the following September.[24] A decision was taken to formalise the group as the Inter-Regional Co-ordinating Committee on Development (ICCDA) to meet at the same time as the biennial conferences of each of the regional associations (i.e. about twice a year), the first such meeting being held in Cairo in November 1976 hosted by CODESRIA, the second in April 1977 in Bangalore preceding ADIPA's conference, and the third in Mexico City in November 1977 coinciding with the CLACSO General Assembly. At this point in the 1970s, Seers still had a broad international concern for development, considering meetings such as ICCDA provided useful and important mechanisms "for worldwide professional discussion of social problems".[25]

He regarded the United Nations University (UNU) in the much same way and between 1975 and 1977 took a prominent part in a number of short-term operational and advisory assignments for the UNU, which was established in Tokyo in 1975 with the aim

of engaging an international community of scholars in research, post-graduate training and dissemination of knowledge in furtherance of the principles of the UN. His work included evaluations of two institutes which were planning to become associated with the UNU - one being the Institute of Economy of Developing Countries of the Central School of Planning and Statistics, Warsaw, a task he undertook in 1976, and the other the Marga Institute, in Colombo, Sri Lanka, which he visited in 1977.[26] Participation in a UNU educational and communications programme in Tokyo, and a human and social development programme, concerning education and training, involved him in meetings in Tokyo (November 1975 and January 1977), IDS (October 1976), Cairo (November 1976), and Mexico City (November 1977).

He visited Japan also for the OECD in 1975 (from 30 June to 12 July), as one of a team of examiners of Japanese social science policy, for a Programme on Development and Utilisation of the Social Sciences aimed at developing closer association between the social sciences, the natural and engineering sciences, and those responsible for government policy.[27] Following these closer links with Japan, Seers frequently referred to it as an example of the feasibility of selective self-reliant development, as will be seen below (p.296).

The OECD also provided Seers with two short-term consultancies in Portugal, the first, under the auspices of the technical assistance programme, undertaken together with Manfred Bienefeld in 1976, the services of both men having been requested by the Portuguese Ministry of Industry and Technology. Their brief was to advise on priorities for industrial planning and to present alternative strategies to assist in the preparation of the development plan; and their report tackled this by addressing the fundamental questions, problems and dangers posed by "two ends of a hypothetical spectrum of alternatives" - on the one hand of linking more closely with Western Europe and on the other of pursuing a more autarchic policy.[28] Seers considered they adopted a non-admonitory style with a central message indicating that there could be "other options besides rushing into the bosom of the EEC",[29] but was disappointed that the results of their 1976 mission were not officially accepted by the Portuguese authorities and in fact he spoke of the report being "suppressed by the government".[30] But the trip proved useful in other respects, since it was instrumental in focusing his attention more intently on the development problems faced by countries on the European periphery (see below, p.277). When Portugal in fact applied to join the EEC in 1977, Seers returned in 1978, again under the auspices of the OECD Technical Co-operation Service, to advise on development planning, taking into account the consequences of entry into the Community.[31]

In addition to work in Europe, though, throughout the last ten years of his life, Seers continued to travel overseas extensively and to undertake consultancy work, usually sponsored by international agencies. In 1974 he was in Malaysia for almost a month (from 25 August to 23 September) on behalf of the UNDP as a short-term research consultant to the Malaysian Centre for Development Studies (MCDS) Prime Minister's Department, Kuala Lumpur, participating in and evaluating their research programme and a socio-

economic indicators project, as part of preparatory work for the third Malaysia Plan to be formulated in 1975.[32] Here, despite economic growth, violence had broken out between the prosperous Chinese and the poorer rural based Malay population reinforcing his views on the need for social, rather than growth related, indicators of development, and heightening his awareness of the importance of taking into account regional and ethnic differences in planning. He was impressed by the administrative efficiency and economic resources, including the quantity and quality of statistics, that he encountered in Malaysia, considering that the country was in a position to achieve a social content in its planning which was almost unique. In fact he was invited back in 1977 to monitor progress in this area and later chose Malaysia as one of the participants in a pilot project monitoring life expectancy as an integration concept in social and demographic planning.

In 1978 he undertook two extensive trips to Latin America - from 18 May to 4 June and from 26 November to 16 December - visiting Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. These visits were made partly on behalf of the World University Service (WUS) to help facilitate its scholarship programme for Chilean refugees and to report on human rights issues and academic repression in the region, though he also visited a number of social science centres in the region on behalf of IDS and co-operated in an evaluation, financed by the Ford Foundation, of CEDES (Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad) in Buenos Aires. He was in fact quite actively involved in work for Chilean refugees in his capacity as chairman of the Chilean Awards Committee of WUS's UK branch and expressed a wider concern about academic repression throughout the Third World, particularly in Latin America, Southern Africa and South Asia, at an IDS workshop in February 1977 - an aspect of his work to be covered in more detail in Chapter 7.

In the later 1970s, he undertook two major consultancies to Africa. At very short notice, he led an international team of experts to Uganda in May 1979, on behalf of the Commonwealth Secretariat, immediately following the ousting of Idi Amin the previous month. Their brief was to assess the rehabilitation requirements of certain key sectors of the economy, recommending priorities, with particular reference to immediate needs for technical and financial assistance. The team was in Uganda for a month but, with Seers' ability to co-ordinate and complete drafts in record time, a two-volume report was completed by the end of June for printing by the Commonwealth Secretariat in mid-July.[33]

Later the same year Seers led a team to Nigeria, on behalf of the Jobs and Skills Programme for Africa (JASPA) of the ILO, to report on the priorities for meeting basic needs, despite some reservations he had about the feasibility of a basic needs approach.[34] He paid a preparatory visit in September as chief of mission, travelling there again at the end of November with the full team for the field work. Nigeria, he observed, despite the oil boom, and an "unusual degree of democracy" (with the achievements of universal suffrage and universal primary education) had achieved little social progress, presenting a general picture of distorted development, inequities and stagnation, which he attributed mainly to the fact that priority had been put "on economic rather than social development;

on urban areas rather than rural; on industry rather than agriculture; on new works rather than maintaining and improving existing services".[35] His report, however, concentrated on health as a central requirement for basic needs approach; a draft report was submitted to the Nigerian government in April 1980 and its findings were made use of in the Third National Development Plan.

While in Nigeria Seers reported having detailed discussions in a "spirit of mutual collaboration"[36] with a World Bank working group then also engaged there on an economic mission. The early 1980s in fact saw his involvement in two major projects in close association with the World Bank. The first of these was chairing two seminars in London on the theme of "Adjustment Policies" sponsored jointly by the World Bank and the Commonwealth Secretariat, though with high level IMF participation, and with IDS being the only external body commissioned to prepare a background paper. Amidst growing concern about the increasing balance of payments problems facing LDCs particularly in Africa, and against the background of the recently published Brandt report calling for massive transfers through the international financial institutions, the aim was to provide an opportunity for what was emphasised as an *informal* exchange of views between World Bank/IMF staff, some academics, and government finance and banking officials from the LDCs themselves, the first seminar being held in November 1980 for representatives from Eastern and Southern African Commonwealth countries and the second in February 1981 for those from West Africa and other countries in the region.[37] Seers had by this time already voiced his criticisms of the Brandt report (though he did believe African countries merited a higher proportion of resources available) but the whole issue of aid is again one that will be followed up more closely in Chapter 7.

Further work for the World Bank followed as, together with Gerald Meier, Seers helped co-organise a series of lectures by ten pioneers of international development economics, hosted and sponsored by the Bank, also preparing a co-edited volume of the contributions, which involved him in frequent visits to Washington in 1981 and 1982.[38] It was further work in this connection that took him there in March 1983, when he was taken ill and died.

Ambassador for IDS

In the years after resigning as director Seers became a kind of roving ambassador for IDS, using the opportunities provided by his extensive travels to build up links with other training institutions, follow up contacts, recruit students for courses at the Institute, looking out for possible joint ventures and contract work. On occasions he saw himself as "a salesman" with "PR kit", showing "the IDS flag"; on a visit to Riyadh in 1975, for example, he commented "much of the time I was in the position of a salesman describing the company's lines of business, especially our two holy trinities (research-teaching-consultancy and economics-politics-sociology)".[39] He frequently complained in journey reports that he had not been provided with sufficient background literature to distribute or

briefed adequately by colleagues, that overseas institutes and British Council offices were not receiving details of IDS seminars and work programmes, and that greater effort was not being made to build up permanent contacts with overseas development agencies.[40]

He particularly enjoyed meeting former students on his travels, and took pride in the reputation IDS was building up. In a journey report from Japan he commented, "At Tokyo and Bangkok I saw how IDS looks to people overseas. We see it from inside as a ship lurching along, buffeted by shifting winds, with various officers shouting conflicting instructions. From afar it looks more like a great flagship, steaming swiftly along, well ahead of the fleet."[41] On a trip to Fiji in 1979 he remarked that IDS was very well known in the Pacific, with many graduates working there especially in the departments of planning and finance, joking that there was talk of a "'Sussex mafia'".[42] He was anxious that IDS maintain a positive image and reputation and was concerned when this was brought into question.[43] And at a time, as will be seen below, when some representatives of LDCs were debating whether European institutions should be studying development at all, Seers' efforts were directed at ensuring IDS continued to maintain a substantial role in the field.

From the earliest days of IDS it had been understood that the ODM's (or ODA's) financial support of the institute would be supplemented with funding from other sources for particular projects and research, and Seers, in his travels overseas, was often on the look-out for possible sources of funding and contract work for IDS. The sudden increased wealth of the oil producers in the early 1970s presented an obvious potential source of funds and in 1975 he explored the possibilities of joint projects in both Saudi Arabia and Venezuela; suggesting IDS could provide assistance in such areas as training students, undertaking research projects, organising seminars, conferences, exchange visits etc., while agencies within the host country provided the necessary financial resources.[44]

He found the "Saudi case ... of great professional interest"[45] and did not doubt that *if* an effort were made it would be possible "to land a 5-year contract for training several hundred young Saudi administrators ... and for joint research and advising the planning office" whereby IDS might "well become heavily involved and possibly influential, and gain a million or so net in resources". However, he advised caution about becoming too "prominently identified" with Saudi Arabia, one of his main reservations being that "It would be difficult to maintain our status as a strictly non-governmental agency" adding "I don't think this is an easy concept for the Saudis to accept" (though since his visit was organised by the British Council representative, on behalf of the British Embassy in Jedda, and sponsored on the Saudi side by the government's Department of Technical Cooperation, the misconception was perhaps understandable). However more broadly, he expressed concern that IDS's professional contribution to policymaking was "likely to be completely subordinate to the political", anticipating too that "there would be problems about our Jewish and women colleagues", and expressing scepticism about a liaison lasting in the unsettled political climate (King Faisal was in fact assassinated during the time of his visit), and in a country about which IDS knew very little.[46] As a result he

advised a "step-by-step strengthening of *ad hoc* links, ... establishing a structure of contacts and goodwill" that could be built on in the future - "the 1980s and the 1990s rather than the 1970s"; on a more personal level he did not find it easy dealing with the Saudis, commenting that anyone who worked with them needed "great resources of patience intuition, determination and tact (far greater than I possess)".[47]

In the case of Venezuela, however, which he also found "professionally interesting", he felt far more at ease, commenting "linguistically and culturally it is much more open to us than a Middle East country" and describing it as "ripe for collaboration with us. They have the resources to invest in research and training, and do not need technical assistance: there need be no resource cost to IDS (and we would gain from the diversification of financial sources)."[48] His discussions here were also more wide ranging and "non-governmental" than the mainly ministerial contacts in Saudi Arabia. During a visit to Venezuela at the end of 1975 he discussed, among other matters, plans for a joint study seminar with the University of Merida in 1977; arrangements for exchange visits between students and staff of IDS and CENDES (a training institute in Venezuela) and a joint study visit by both groups of students to Cuba; and the possibilities of training Venezuelans at IDS. He was also approached by the Banco Central to direct a research project, under the auspices of the OECD Development Centre, on the effects of the oil price rise on the Venezuelan economy, especially on employment and distribution, which he was personally interested in following up. "It is almost the research project I was contemplating putting forward myself," he remarked "and now falls into my lap with no problems about finance ... Nor about facilities: ... In fact this would bring considerable resources to us."[49]

However, while Seers expressed concern about the difficulty IDS might have in maintaining its "status as a strictly non-governmental agency" in relation to Saudi Arabia, it nevertheless still had to bear in mind its relationship with the ODM (which achieved ministry status again, though not of cabinet rank, when the Labour government resumed office in 1974). Not only did the ministry still provide IDS's basic funding and have its representatives on the governing body, but occasionally too it acted as intermediary in presenting opportunities for IDS to explore; Seers' visit to Saudi Arabia, for example, came about as the result of an enquiry through the British Embassy in Jedda to the ODM, which was then passed on to IDS.[50] While always anxious to maintain IDS's academic independence and to insist its staff were in no way civil servants, Seers nevertheless maintained close contact with the ODM, often initiated by himself, demonstrating too what was referred to in the Introduction as the "singular entanglement" of development studies and government policy.

Seers himself usually had high level contact with British ambassadors and government representatives when travelling overseas and seems to have kept the ODM at home informed of his work, sometimes supplying it with copies of his journey reports, partly as a means of gauging the ministry's reaction. On his return from Portugal, for example, as he began to see the potential for a research programme applying development

theory to Europe, he commented to Richard Jolly: "This seems an important area for development studies, and thereby IDS, although we'll need to accustom our governors to the idea. I'll tell ODM of the visit and see what their policy on Portugal is."[51] One of his stated objectives in visiting Latin America in 1978 was to put himself "in a position to advise Mrs Hart on the future of the Chile programme",[52] and on his return, in the hope of influencing official opinion, he sent an edited version of his journey report to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as well as the ODM, as he wanted them "to take some of the messages explicit or implicit on the need for new refugee policies".[53]

Journey reports were also often instrumental in eliciting a reaction from the ministry, clarifying policy or its position. The ODM, for example, registered "one slightly critical observation" on Mrs Hart's part in reaction to Seers' report on a visit to what was still Rhodesia in 1977; while acknowledging how useful it was to have "a commentary of this sort from an independent and informed observer",[54] exception was taken to a comment of Seers to the effect that a Zimbabwe Development Fund proposed by Kissinger was "to help bail out European farmers and officials".[55] This was certainly not the case, it was pointed out; while one objective of the Fund was to provide reassurances and encourage those skilled European Rhodesians willing to accept majority rule "to stay in the country and thus prevent the collapse of the modern sector of the economy", the other "complementary and even more important objective" was to provide "funds for conventional development projects designed to benefit and increase economic opportunities for Rhodesian Africans".[56] While this had not been spelled out in public, the letter continued, Mrs Hart considered it important that people like Seers should understand the true nature of the proposed fund.

The report on his 1975 Saudi Arabian visit had also drawn a response from ODM, though of a more positive nature. Seers had at one point remarked "ODM doubts whether 'development' specialists should concern themselves with countries as rich as Saudi Arabia, but in time they may come to accept the need - political if not professional - for closer contacts with the oil exporters."[57] This prompted a response from R.S. Porter at the ministry that he was not sure this was "a true reflection of the ODM position": "I think we would all accept the proposition that countries in the position of Saudi Arabia need help for their development. Our view is that they can and should pay for such help" with the added assurance that "I am sure few would quarrel with IDS undertaking co-operative ventures with the Saudis, or any of the other oil producers for that matter, provided they covered the costs."[58] Thus ODM could indicate its tacit approval for further co-operation (despite Seers' own reservations).

Later in 1979 when Seers was in Kuwait, discussing suggestions put forward by the Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) for IDS contract research, he was far more positive in his reaction to the proposals, in part, it appears, because of the affect it could have on IDS's relations with ODM. He observed: "I believe we should take this very seriously - it is a follow up to vague feelers in the past. Such work would be fully financed, would really launch IDS in the Middle East and be no bad thing for our

relations with ODM at this juncture."[59] It seems, however, that he found it no easier to deal and negotiate with his Middle East colleagues and in 1982 reported stormy discussions concerning a programme on "imported inflation" and at one point feared losing all KFAED and OPEC money, though in fact he ended up with more resources than he had anticipated.[60] One of the reasons for the disagreement stemmed from the fact that IDS was applying to many other sources for funding - due in large part to circumstances brought about by the change of government in the UK.

With the Conservative victory at the polls in 1979, and the consequent cuts in public expenditure, the need for IDS to find additional external funding assumed an even greater urgency as the institute came "under very severe financial pressures",[61] in the words of Richard Jolly in his annual report. By the end of 1979 the new government informed IDS that its support from the aid programme would be reduced to zero by 1986 (the end of the 4th quinquennium) which meant there was a danger that the institute would cease to exist, indicating the extent of its dependence on government financial support. However, following representations from the board of governors, government ministers agreed to reconsider and to postpone a final decision on the matter until a working party was able to report on alternative patterns for funding IDS activities at least cost to the government.[62]

It was an anxious time for all involved in IDS and a fair amount of behind the scenes political lobbying took place, to which Seers contributed during a visit to Washington at the end of February 1980. He was there as part of an "expert group meeting" "to advise on the expenditure of a [World] Bank research programme to spend $1.5 million on the measurement of 'living standards'",[63] but he used the opportunity to seek the Bank's political support for the continuance of IDS and its financial support in assigning it certain contract work.

> Through William Clark, I met Robert McNamara. I explained the IDS predicament - the threat of rundown, the stay of execution, the difficulties of survival with low institutional support, etc, emphasising the fact that the IDS could at present supply agencies like the Bank with support on call. McNamara made suitable noises. He said that he would see if a plausible letter to Carrington could be drafted - the IDS was "a great asset to the world", but he did not like to lay himself open to the charge of interfering in the affairs of member governments.... On the matter of contract support, he said it was difficult, because other institutions would also claim support, but would I speak to B...W... He mentioned Ford as a possible source ...[64]

On making further enquiries, Seers was told that the Bank had a policy of supporting research institutions in the LDCs, but that when progress had been made in this direction it might then be possible to support an institution, such as IDS, in a developed country too, and that "it would be possible to get IDS to run conferences for the Bank, and/or to put out work to IDS, so that the Institute could earn overheads". Later in his journey report, he related that "The position on Friday was that the letter to Carrington was lying on McNamara's desk, in draft. William Clark thought it would be sent."[65]

It is not known whether this letter was sent or not - or whether it would have had any influence had it been; but it does indicate who were regarded as the friends and allies of IDS to ensure its future survival. Despite some differences of opinion, Seers in fact

maintained a fairly close working relationship with the Bank - and IDS's involvement in the "Adjustment" seminars (mentioned above, p.262) followed this encounter.[66]

At IDS the working party put its proposals to the Governing Body in March 1980 and, after some revisions, the final report was approved in May and submitted for the Government's consideration. A small deputation of Governors met the Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, and the Minister for Overseas Development, Mr Neil Marten, who had visited IDS in May 1980. Finally in September the ODA announced the working party's proposals had been accepted and core funding would be continued throughout IDS's 4th quinquennium 1981-6, though reduced by about one-third from its previous level.

The outcome was greeted by Richard Jolly as both a "relief", in the sense that a secure base of financial funding had been guaranteed for the immediate future, and a "challenge", for IDS to build up new sources of revenue and financial support. It was recognised that the Institute would need "to give greater emphasis to topics likely to attract outside funding and commissioned work" falling within the broad priorities outlined by the Working Party, with "Britain/EEC and the Third World - interaction and policy" being one priority area in which Seers was particularly involved and for which he actively sought European based funding.[67]

Britain's joining the EEC in 1973 had presented further opportunities to diversify funding and Seers visited Brussels on a number of occasions to discuss procedures for getting EEC scholarships for applicants from African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and for possible funding for research projects in connection with the European periphery,[68] as well as for projects with which IDS personnel could become involved. His last mission in Fiji in 1983, for example, was an EEC sponsored mission on employment. As he became more involved in work with the European Periphery group, other sources of funding were sought from participating countries for joint ventures. The Banco Exterior de Espana, the Agricultural Bank of Greece and the Gulbenkian Foundation of Portugal, as well as the Commission of the EEC, for example, provided funding for a European periphery group conference at IDS in 1979.[69]

Another consequence of the incoming Conservative government in 1979 was the steep rise in fees for overseas students, which was a particularly acute problem for an institution such as IDS where a large proportion of its students came from overseas.[70] Here too Seers was actively involved in negotiating with the Leverhulme Trust to raise scholarships,[71] particularly to assist students from Poland, and later Hungary, who by the early 1980s, were being invited to participate on the M.Phil courses, partly as a result of his growing dialogue with social scientists in Eastern Europe.

* * *

While this outline has given an indication (though by no means a comprehensive picture) of Seers' many and varied activities and concerns during the final decade of his life, their significance will be better understood against the background and within the context of issues and events of "the rapidly evolving world of the 1970s" which also modified his attitude to development and to which this study now turns. Attention will be given in

particular to the oil crisis, the demands of "developing" countries for a New International Economic Order, the growing economic problems of OECD countries, as well as politico-economic developments in Europe, and the development record of overseas governments.

"The rapidly evolving world of the 1970s"

The oil crisis and the limitations to growth

The perversion of the growth process and failure of redistributional policies

"The 'oil crisis' of the 1970s really shook the conventional paradigm", maintained Seers in "The New Meaning of Development"; "It revealed starkly the cost of the continued economic and technological dependence of most countries, and underlined warnings about the limited capacity of the earth to sustain fast economic growth of the old type."[72]

However, as was apparent in the previous chapter, he had, in fact, become increasingly disillusioned with what he regarded as the "perversion" of the economic growth model, which had failed to bring about widespread development, but rather seemed to intensify poverty, unemployment and inequality, often with consequent political unrest, since the benefits of growth tended to accrue to a minority and were not widely shared. Social problems therefore tended to be more severe in certain regions, or among certain races, often resulting in an "aggravation of social tension, military take-overs, violence, and even civil war", he remarked in 1974 following his consultancy mission to Malaysia, where riots in 1969 and subsequent tension between the prosperous minority urban-based Chinese population and the poorer, more rural-based Malays "had jolted the government's confidence in economic growth as the sole solution to social problems".[73] The break-up in 1971 of Pakistan, described by Seers as "one of the fast growth miracles of the 1960s",[74] was a further case he frequently cited to prove his point of the political consequences of a perverted growth process and the 1970s supplied further examples, including, at the end of 1978, the overthrow of the Shah of Iran, whose country's oil production had indeed ensured fast economic growth, in which, though, the majority of the population had not shared.

The record of other oil producers in the 1970s only provided growing evidence of the tendency for rapid economic growth to be accompanied by widening inequalities and greater regional imbalance,[75] he observed, and on his mission to Nigeria in 1981, for example, he estimated that despite fast growth over the previous two decades and considerable government outlays from the soaring oil revenue, the majority of the population had benefited very little, and that in fact most felt themselves worse off.[76] Even in the "new industrialised countries" (NICs) - the "four little tigers" of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan, and other larger countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and the Philippines - which achieved high rates of economic growth in the 1970s with booming export markets, income and benefits were mostly concentrated in a small modern sector, social inequalities were growing (apart possibly in South Korea and

Taiwan where he observed the danger of war could account for "the degree of egalitarianism"[77]), and most were governed by authoritarian regimes.

Seers' argument, as was seen in Chapter 5, was that the process of growth had been distorted by the uncritical transfer of production techniques and styles of consumption from the industrialised to "developing" countries - an argument he used and developed more extensively throughout the 1970s. With growth concentrated very largely in a few industries using imported technology, mainly in urban areas, the benefits were not spread out but accrued to overseas companies and a small local minority, living "modern lives" greatly influenced by imported consumption tastes, and tending to protect their interests with authoritarian regimes, while poverty and unemployment increased for the majority of the population,[78] he frequently observed. "Dualism" and "dependence" became the distinguishing characteristics of such economies with vast dichotomies of income and life style between the so-called "modern" and "traditional" sectors and dependence on foreign sources of technology and finance. Whereas in the early 1960s traditional sectors had been regarded as a barrier to modernisation and development (as, for example, demonstrated by the agricultural proposals in the 1964 ECA report on Zambia - see Chapter 3, pp.130-1), in the 1970s Seers came to regard the modern sector as the problem, and the point through which inappropriate technologies, foreign values and consumption standards were uncritically transferred into poorer countries, distorting their economies.[79]

Of growing importance in this scenario, on which Seers increasingly remarked in the 1970s, were the transnational companies (TNCs), which were the source of most of the capital investment and technology being pumped into the modern sectors. Whereas in the late 1960s and the very early 1970s, he had referred in fairly general terms to the influence on development of "overseas companies" (as was seen in Chapter 5), from the early 1970s onwards it was the multinational companies (MNCs) or more often the TNCs,[80] of which he spoke and which were seen as having a considerable influence on a country's pattern of growth, its development plans and strategies. For it was observed, they not only usually brought with their capital "inappropriate capital-intensive techniques" and siphoned off much of the profits of growth, but also had "come to exercise an increasing political and economic power"[81] - demonstrated in Chile in 1970 by ITT's attempts to destabilise the position of president-elect Allende. "The dramatic emergence of the transnational corporations" was "one of the most important changes"[82] of the 1970s, commented Seers, acknowledging too that they often had a more significant influence than national governments on a recipient's room to manoeuvre, observing in 1978:

> Many TNCs have resources in expertise and bargaining strength greater than all but the biggest national governments - and deploy these with more determination and intelligence. One could make a case for saying that foreign economic policy is now more a matter of negotiating with corporations than with governments. That would perhaps be a little extreme, but instruments for such negotiation ... are increasingly important.[83]

The national capacity to negotiate with the TNCs and to cope with their technological innovations - and cultural impact - was one of the major determinants of development

policy to which he particularly drew attention (and which is followed up in Chapter 7).

During his work on the world employment programme, Seers had suggested the dualistic tendencies in growth oriented development could be offset by concentrating on social targets and redistributive measures, though, as was seen in Chapter 5 (pp.240-4), he expressed some scepticism about the feasibility of implementing such strategies, because of the determination of the modern sector to protect its interests, a scepticism that further increased in the 1970s. Governments in the Third World, he observed in 1974, were increasingly controlled by the modern sector, and defended "stubbornly the imported life style of a small minority, often oppressing egalitarian forces by police brutality, even torture".[84] He was particularly critical of the repressive and authoritarian political regimes of the NICs in Latin America, where "Some types of fast growth", such as in Brazil, "implied periodic political repression to keep exports competitive and to restrict the social distribution of benefits",[85] regarding this as yet another reflection and distortion of the growth process.

Although Seers was heavily involved in the joint IDS/World Bank study of *Redistribution with Growth* (referred to above, p.258), and it has been observed that "his intellectual influence dominated the whole project",[86] he had growing reservations about the feasibility of such an approach - and in fact declined to have his name listed as co-author of the volume that was produced, though his reason for so doing is not clear.[87] In 1977 he observed "Governments (even in countries which have received the ILO comprehensive missions - Colombia, Sri Lanka, Iran, Kenya, Philippines) have done little to change distribution;"[88] whereas, on the other hand, one government that had been committed to a strategy of greater equality, that of the Allende regime in Chile, had been overthrown in 1973. There was an "air of unreality" in "expecting those with economic and political power to yield it voluntarily" he concluded, an observation he considered also applied to the "basic needs" approach[89] - a further attempt in the 1970s, also adopted by the ILO, to concentrate development efforts on the poorest sectors of society.

Seers was also becoming sceptical about the efficacy of aid in bringing about redistribution. For one thing, he acknowledged in 1974, a strategy that relied on an "appeal to internationalism" in rich countries had never been really creditable, since it was "not likely to be a powerful force in countries where self-advancement has been the mainspring of economic progress, and there are strong currents of racialism and chauvinism".[90] What aid was given, however, he considered often only contributed to the process of polarisation within developing countries, since both capital aid and technical assistance tended to provide channels for the import of the inappropriate technologies, propping up the modern sector, and all too often authoritarian governments. This was a point he was to develop further in the later 1970s but at the end of 1973 he observed "the world would hardly be a better place if all aid donors met the DD2 [Second Development Decade] targets. (After all a not-insignificant proportion of aid could be described as a subsidy to torture.)"[91]

A further distortion or, "serious flaw",[92] in the growth process, to which he drew increasing attention during the 1970s (and which will be followed up together with his

attitude to aid in Chapter 7), was the growing burden of debt incurred, even by fast growing NICs, and the necessity to continue borrowing to service these debts.

The fact therefore that the oil crisis "underlined the vulnerability of many of the new industrial structures"[93] and the limitations on sustained fast economic growth was not therefore regarded by Seers as necessarily a "terrible disaster"; rather he considered it could present a "great opportunity" for a new approach to development.[94] In a front page article for the United Nations' paper, *Development Forum* in 1974, he greeted the oil price rises as finally sounding the death knell of the UN's Second Development Decade strategy,[95] of whose "growth-oriented" aims, obsession with "the modern sector", and focus on the "mostly irrelevant issues of aid volumes", he had long been critical.[96] While aware of the problems and dangers of the situation, he nevertheless expressed the belief in 1974 that the oil price rises necessitated a rethinking of development strategy, providing an opportunity for a fresh approach and opening up "new possibilities of international co-operation to make inroads into mass poverty".[97]

The effects and opportunities of the oil price rise

The oil price rise enhanced existing economic problems, aggravating in particular the foreign exchange difficulties of both "developed" and "developing" countries whose pattern of growth and development was dependent to a large extent on oil supplies. However, the action of the oil producers and the prospect of reduced oil supplies, also gave added weight to concerns about the physical and ecological limits to growth which had already been raised by groups like the Club of Rome in its report *Limits to Growth*,[98] published in 1972. In addition to worries about oil reserves, there was also in the early 1970s concern over food resources as famine swept across Africa and much of Asia in 1973 and prices of wheat and other food stuffs rose in 1974, again a trend exacerbated by increased fuel and fertiliser costs, caused by the oil price rises.

Seers acknowledged the oil crisis "raised the spectre of an international struggle for oil and other resources", though, in common with many others in the development field, he considered the "exaggerated style and ... tendency to raise many bogeys" had blunted the impact of the Club of Rome.[99] But while he did not endorse all their conclusions he agreed there were "certainly grounds for concern",[100] for the oil crisis "really cast considerable doubt on the previous unthinking optimism that sooner or later everyone in all parts of the world would be able to enjoy a European standard of life".[101]

On moderate population projections, he estimated, the achievement of US or even West European levels of per capita energy consumption by the whole world would have implied the exhaustion of fossil fuels within a few decades. But in fact it was becoming increasingly obvious that it was technically and economically unfeasible that the mass of the world's population could even achieve by the middle of the following century the standards of living corresponding to those of the United States in the mid-1970s.[102]

While it was conceivable that with nuclear power and other non-conventional sources, the industrial countries might be able to solve their energy problems in the 1990s - though

following "the nuclear near-disaster at 'Three Mile Island'" in 1978/9 he conceded the future of nuclear capability was also highly problematic[103] - it was difficult to see how large poor countries like India could find the necessary capital to do the same, particularly in light of the reduced amounts of financial aid likely to be forthcoming due to the economic difficulties being experienced in donor countries (to be considered below, pp.276, 280). It was becoming increasingly likely, he acknowledged, that there would still be wide international inequalities in the middle of the twenty-first century.[104]

It was in the face of this apparently pessimistic prospect, that Seers argued the oil price rises in fact presented "a great opportunity" for Third World countries to offset the distortions of development (based on growth, modernisation and technology), by turning more to the resources of the traditional sector, basing development plans on local traditions and selectively restricting foreign technology, as well as economic, political, and cultural influences. In the ILO employment reports he had supported the use of more labour intensive techniques, and the increased cost of energy, he now argued in 1974, provided the opportunity to turn attention towards technologies which saved both petroleum and capital, and provided a basis for a more plausible and desirable world.

> Techniques which require little commercial energy in relation to human labour will be favoured, if only marginally. Peasant agriculture gets a somewhat better chance to compete against the highly-mechanized farmers of the Third World (and the industrial countries). Moreover, artisans producing (e.g.) hand-loom cloth will be able to compete more effectively with textile factories. In general, traditional techniques will be favoured at the expense of the modern sector, and the advantage of scale will be reduced. Big projects of the age of technophilia will appear increasingly like dinosaurs.[105]

Schumacher's *Small is Beautiful*[106] had been published in 1973, the year following *Limits to Growth*, and had also taken up the issue of environmental pollution caused by industrial plants, but also emphasised the economic inefficiency and criticised the inhumane working conditions resulting from the policies of giant industrial organisation, proposing instead a system of Intermediate Technology (IT) based on smaller working units, communal ownership and regional workplaces utilising local labour and resources. Seers himself became Vice-President of the IT Development Group and though acknowledging he was "rather dormant" in this role and finding a good deal in Schumacher's book that was "questionable",[107] his response to the oil crisis had certain ideas in common with those of Schumacher. In general Seers concluded the shift in the price of oil would favour traditional rather than modern techniques, agricultural rather than industrial products, natural rather than synthetic materials, and as such could help promote more large-scale employment and relieve poverty.

In addition he suggested the price rises could have an egalitarian effect, offsetting some of the glaring inequalities between and within countries and acting as a kind of progressive tax, since the higher a person's income, the higher proportion was spent on petroleum products and goods, and so "industrialised countries would be hit much harder than the 'least developed' and cities more than rural areas."[108] Most significantly though

he felt it would strengthen scepticism about philosophies of fast growth based on protected industrialisation and rapid urbanisation.[109]

Another positive feature he saw in the organised OPEC oil price rise was that it demonstrated an alternative way to achieve more international redistribution of income - one he certainly found preferable to aid - though he acknowledged it remained to be seen whether price cartels could be arranged between other countries with similar effect.[110]

The increased revenues of the oil exporters he also regarded as a possible new source of aid itself for Third World countries, since he argued, there were not many ways in which the oil exporters could use their foreign exchange receipts, as there was "a limit to what they will want to import, including arms, as there is also to the monetary assets they will want to hold".[111] A big aid programme was the only way left of absorbing sizeable funds, he concluded, and would have a three-way benefit: being advantageous to the oil producers themselves in that it would diversify their assets, "increase their political power, and reduce international criticisms of high oil prices"; at the same time providing "a mighty boost to Third World development if even only 10 per cent of the proceeds of oil exports were used in this way";[112] and also benefiting developed countries as well since he envisaged the aid would be "spent largely in the industrial countries".[113]

Although, as already noted, Seers had expressed doubts about the usefulness and even dangers of aid and acknowledged it was possible that petroleum exporters could "take over the role of the present major donors, pouring capital and technique into the modern sectors of the Third World and backing authoritarian regimes", he seemed to consider that the very appearance of a major new source of aid would have a positive effect for, whatever the accompanying ideology, it would "weaken the dependence of Third World countries on their traditional sources, reducing the constraints on radical social policies".[114] He argued that oil aid would be simpler to administer, and in addition the very experience and example of the oil producers in handling multinational corporations and controlling markets could prove useful to other primary producers in the Third World.[115]

He also anticipated that aid from petrol producers would be untied, at least to equipment and technology - observing, though giving no reasons for this assertion, "(they have little motive for tying)"[116] - and could be used for balance of payments support. He did not therefore address the possibility that political ties and motives might govern the dispensation of any such aid, despite the fact that oil itself had already been used as a political weapon to restrict supply (and force up prices) in protest at Western support of Israel during the October War of 1973. Later in 1974 he did indicate some recognition of the priority of political, and cultural, ties in the allocation of Arab aid when he acknowledged that although aid was needed most urgently in south Asia and tropical Africa, it appeared from the activities of various Arab development funds that in practice the most likely direction of their economic assistance was to other Arab countries - "Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Syria and Lebanon and perhaps Morocco, Tunisia and Sudan".[117] Much debate and speculation surrounded the subject of the recycling of the increased export earnings of oil producers, in which Seers too participated,[118] but the potential

positive effect of OPEC aid was a subject to which he returned, even in the early 1980s when his attitude to aid in general had become far more negative (see Chapter 7, p.363).

In addition to the new possible sources of aid - and opportunities for more constructive methods of redistribution - the scenario that Seers envisaged in 1974 was therefore that the oil crisis could strengthen scepticism about fast growth based on protected industrialisation and rapid urbanisation and present more positive reasons and opportunities for "developing" countries to return to more traditional and labour intensive techniques. Despite, or perhaps because of the record of the 1970s, this was basically still his argument for countries of the South in the early 1980s as well.

Demands for a New International Economic Order and self-reliance

The early 1970s witnessed growing demands by Third World countries, articulated in meetings of both UNCTAD and the Non-Aligned Movement, for a more equitable world order, which were brought to international attention in demands at the UN for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The action of the oil producers provided, in Seers' words, "moral and political support"[119] to these demands and also gave additional confidence, temporarily at least, to the aspirations of other primary producers.

While the NIEO demands included many which were familiar to those who had "followed the long and sterile UNCTAD negotiations on aid, tariff concessions and commodity price stabilisation"[120] - such as "preferential and non-reciprocal treatment for developing countries ... in all fields of international economic co-operation" and "favourable conditions for the transfer of financial resources to developing countries"[121] - there was now also, he noted, "a new insistence on national sovereignty over sub-soil minerals, on monitoring the multinational corporations, and on obtaining a bigger share in world industrial output",[122] as well as on international monetary reforms with full and effective participation by developing countries in all phases of decision making. It was effectively "a demand for redistribution of economic power ... on a world scale",[123] he observed, and a change in the whole relationship between industrialised and developing countries. At the same time, there were also efforts on the part of UNCTAD and the Non Aligned Movement to decrease dependency on and interference from the "developed" industrialised countries, instil greater self-reliance, and develop greater co-operation between the countries of the South.[124] During the 1970s there was a movement towards strengthening South-South co-operation and discussion of the possibilities of "delinking" from the world economy.

The example of the OPEC cartel in raising oil prices provided a dramatic demonstration of the potential power certain primary producers could wield and the initial shock it created gave added impetus to the request of President Boumedienne, as chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, for a special session of the General Assembly to study raw materials and development problems. As a result the 6th Special Session was convened in April 1974 - the first time a session of the General Assembly had been devoted entirely to

development problems - and on 1 May it adopted the Declaration of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and a Programme of Action to establish the NIEO, followed later by a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.[125]

While Seers generally agreed *a* New International Economic Order was desirable, and had been made more necessary by the success of OPEC,[126] he did not consider this should necessarily take the form as outlined by *the* NIEO, since its demands were still essentially based on growth patterns (including greater participation in the industrialisation process and increased financial transfers) which only perpetuated a process he considered counter-productive for real development. He expressed little enthusiasm for the NIEO programme, describing it as "ambivalent" since on the one hand it stressed the rights to national ownership and greater self reliance, whereas on the other it was also concerned with the continuation of inflows of capital and technology.[127] He was later to refer to the NIEO as "vague" and "only one possible way forward (or backward?) and one of the least likely to materialise",[128] regarding it as a means to help authoritarian governments maintain their lifestyle and political control - and, as will be seen in Chapter 7, as a programme for propping up the neo-colonial system.[129]

However he did respond to and take up the notion of self reliance, which had in fact emerged from the dependency theories of Latin America - a development out of the structuralist school, with which he had become familiar in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In Seers' view it was the "dawning realisation" that instead of reducing foreign exchange problems and dependence on the export of primary products, import substitution industrialisation had in fact resulted in greater dependence on imports of foreign equipment, technology and fuel, obtained mainly through the MNCs (while foreign exchange problems remained as chronic as ever), that resulted in the emergence of the "dependency" theories in Latin America, and the origin of the doctrine of self reliance and a more selective approach to capital and technology.[130] In particular he cited the work of Osvaldo Sunkel of Chile (a previous colleague of his at ECLA in the late 1950s and early 1960s and advocate of the structuralist school) and Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil, as being particularly significant in this field.

Following the Chilean coup of 1973, Sunkel in fact took up a post at IDS and worked closely with Seers on the subject of dependence, and on preparing material on dependency and underdevelopment for use as texts on the M.Phil course.[131] Refugees were "a traditional source of new ideas", acknowledged Seers, and the residence of Sunkel and another Chilean, Jorge Mardoy, at Sussex provided direct contact with Latin American social science, as did a number of visits to Europe by Cardoso and the presence of Celso Furtado in a post at the Sorbonne.[132] Seers' own emphasis on self reliance and selectivity, and on the influence of cultural dependence, owed much to the Latin American school, as did his work on looking at Europe in terms of "core" and "periphery" (to be discussed in Chapter 7). He was, however, also critical of some dependency theorists, for paying insufficient attention to factors such as natural resources, population size, military expenditure, ethnic diversity, geographic features and political leadership in assessing a

country's dependency and room to manoeuvre[133] (again a subject to be discussed further in Chapter 7). Seers used the terminology of dependency and self reliance and acknowledged his debt to the Latin American school, but defined these concepts very much in his own terms.

World-wide economic crisis

While the oil price rises, temporarily at least, gave a certain advantage and moral support to the developing countries in their demands for the NIEO, they aggravated the economic problems facing the industrialised OECD countries. By the early 1970s, as was seen in the last chapter, it had become clear that unemployment was becoming a world problem, not just limited to "developing" countries. During the early 1970s, however, the industrialised countries of North America and Western Europe also began to experience further serious economic difficulties as inflation rose, fixed exchange rates collapsed, and recession set in. An additional crucial factor was that European (and North American) industry and export markets faced increasing competition, particularly from the mid-1970s onwards, from cheaper products from Japan and the NICs. The oil price rises of 1974 (and later of 1979 following the overthrow of the Shah of Iran) exacerbated this economic crisis, aggravating foreign exchange difficulties and sharpening social and political problems.

The oil crisis "taught the west the degree of its *own* dependence on others; ... that we live in an interdependent world",[134] observed Seers, and the effects of the energy crisis and NIEO demands, as well as the economic problems faced by the industrialised countries, resulted during the 1970s in greater emphasis being put, in international gatherings and organisations, on the "interrelationship" and "interdependence" of "developed" and "developing" countries, on North-South dialogue, and "mutuality of interests". Seers was himself a member of an advisory panel to an OECD sponsored "research project on the development of advanced industrial societies *in harmony with* that of developing countries"[135] (my emphasis), which became known as the Interfutures project.

The economic difficulties experienced by the industrialised countries, however, meant that fewer resources were available to sustain aid programmes, which became more poverty oriented, being aimed at the "most seriously affected" or concentrating on "basic needs", while the British government's 1975 aid programme was targeted at "More Help to the Poorest".[136] In addition, to the restraints on resources, the growing detente or what Seers termed "convergence" between capitalist and communist countries (see pp.282, 291, below) was also undermining the old political rationale for aid as a means to counter communism in developing countries. Thus, talk of interdependence, mutuality and harmony was accompanied by a tendency in "developed" countries to reduce their aid programmes - and also to increase protectionism and trade regulation in the face of their own balance of payments difficulties and increasing competition from overseas manufactures.

In the following sections we will look at two aspects of the economic difficulties facing Europe in particular as they affected and influenced Seers' work; first considering how it contributed to turning his attention to the extension of development studies to Europe; and secondly how, in the changed circumstances, it affected his view of the role and responsibilities of Britain's development policy.

The "development" problems of Europe

Seers observed in 1974 that "chronic inflation, recurrent foreign exchange crises, political instability, persistence of poverty and unemployment in the face of economic growth and welfare measures alike, [and] drug addiction, are no longer the problems of faraway Latin America"[137] - these were now problems faced by the supposedly "developed" world as well, which was itself becoming more aware of the social and political, as well environmental, costs of economic growth, which had proved not to be a panacea.[138]

European countries too, he noted in 1974, were also becoming more aware of their own dependence in the world context (particularly on the USA) and realising that they were no longer just the source but also the recipient, usually through the TNCs, of investment, technology, consumer fashions and professional personnel; and "new forms of dependence" had also arisen as a result of the oil price rises and accumulation of large investable funds in the hands of a few Arab governments.[139] As he remarked a few years later in 1978, "A typical European is dependent on Iranian oil to provide the electric power for Japanese television sets on which to watch programmes from the United States paid for by capital investments of the Saudi princes and the expenditures of Australian tourists."[140]

In addition, there could be found in Europe many forms of structural dualism more usually associated with Latin America, he observed in 1974, remarking that countries such as Greece, Turkey, Spain, and even Italy were "really in the same category for analysis as Argentina".[141] Following the OECD sponsored consultancy visit with Manfred Bienefeld to Portugal in 1976, Seers was even more convinced of the reality of the comparison, stating "Anyone familiar with Latin America who goes to Portugal immediately feels in recognisable territory":

> A similar structural dualism, with much lower incomes, worse social conditions and higher fertility in the (relatively large) population of the rural areas. A similar concentration in the ownership of property, especially land. A similar pattern of trade, with tourist services, primary products and textiles exchanged for arms, equipment, intermediate products and sophisticated consumer goods. A similar prevalence of transnational corporations (TNCs) in secondary industry and the services (especially big hotels). Similar inappropriate technologies and associated chronic unemployment, relieved (as in many 'developing' countries especially in Central America and the Caribbean) by large-scale migration abroad. A not very different cultural dependence on foreign styles of consumption and on imported ideologies, fed by foreign firms, television programmes, etc. The same sort of bureaucracy with a striking combination of complacency and inefficiency. Similar organised terrorism of both Right and Left and similar political manipulation of dominant powers.[142]

What Seers began to emphasise in 1974 and elaborated considerably over the next few

years was that what had been thought of as "development" problems were not peculiar to only overseas countries but were common in some degree to the so-called "developed" countries as well.

Britain too, he observed, despite its own increased oil revenue, was, at the most elemental level, also showing "the typical symptoms of 'underdevelopment'- recurring foreign exchange crises, persistent inflation and chronic unemployment",[143] causing political and social unrest, which in turn had a significant bearing on the outcome of the general elections of the 1970s; with wage restraint policies (prompting a series of strikes) and the introduction of the three day week resulting in the downfall of Edward Heath's Conservative government in 1974, while five years later in 1979 "the winter of discontent" saw the defeat of the Labour government and the victory once more of the Conservatives, this time under Mrs Thatcher's leadership.

Seers drew particular attention to Britain's increased dependence on foreign-based TNCs and their technology, especially with regard to investment in the North Sea oil fields, and the fact that, like many developing countries, Britain too had also suffered the consequences of being insufficiently prepared to deal with them, exemplified by the concessions that were granted during the first round of negotiations.[144] A further typical symptom of dependence he maintained was "the publicity given to IMF missions"[145] and the Labour government's approach to the Fund in 1976 for a loan to help offset its balance of payments problems reinforced comparisons with "developing" countries.

"Is Britain now a 'Latin American' country?" asked Seers later in 1979 as the Conservative party took office, committed to monetarist policies as a means to tackle the economic problems facing the country. Noting that many governments of Latin America had regarded the monetarist policies of Milton Friedman and the Chicago school as the path to the economic miracle - but had instead experienced increased inflation, unemployment and social deprivation, he commented, somewhat prophetically: "I cannot help feeling I am near the beginning of a film I have seen before - one that can run for many painful years."[146] The question, however, he maintained was not the trivial quasi-joke about whether Britain was a developing country but "whether the insights gained in development studies would be helpful to those working on British problems".[147]

His basic argument was that the dividing line between so-called "developed" and "developing" countries, had become increasingly blurred and artificial, and that all were dealing with "common, worldwide problems"[148] - though the form they took and their severity obviously varied. But he argued if development was "now not primarily about *per capita* income, but also about distribution, and even more about the national capacity to negotiate with transnational corporations, and to cope with their technological innovations and their cultural impact", then it was not just needed in developing countries but "in all countries"[149] - though his attention was particularly focused on the European region.

In drawing attention to the common nature of development problems, Seers now rarely referred to "rich" countries and "poor", as he had done even in the early 1970s. While the United Nations still referred to "developed" and "developing" countries, he

regarded such terminology as a diplomatic euphemism and put inverted commas around such words, though he did accept and use for convenience "the somewhat less misleading term, less-developed countries (or LDCs)".[150] Although he also eventually found the term Third World inappropriate, as will be seen below, he did occasionally use it for convenience, as he did North and South - used increasingly in international gatherings to denote "developed" and "developing" countries (though he considered the South too broad a term, covering as it did NICs, OPEC countries and the poorer LDCs).

The severity of the problems facing the North or "developed" countries in the early 1970s, in conjunction with other factors to be considered below, therefore encouraged Seers' movement towards the wider application of development studies and also considerably modified his expectations of and attitude towards British development policy.

Britain's role and interests in development

As mentioned above, shortly following his retirement from the directorship of IDS in 1972, Seers had taken the Labour Party to task for its lack of commitment to overseas development during its period in government 1964-71, and on Labour's return to office in 1974 he reiterated his arguments for administrative reform, particularly of the Foreign Office, if Labour ministers were to be enabled to carry out party policy unfettered by pressure and manipulation of foreign office officials and play a constructive part in the "new world" which was emerging.[151] However, the first half of the 1970s brought about a change in his perception of the British government's role in the development process as by the mid-1970s he was adopting a more pragmatic attitude, no longer emphasising the "moral" imperative and responsibility towards development.

His reaction to Britain's role and position in the uncertain economic climate of the mid-1970s and his recognition of the need for a changed focus in development policy is reflected in an advisory note, which he wrote, together with Richard Jolly, in 1976 for the Berrill Committee which had been set up to look into British overseas representation. While acknowledging that ten years previously their basic premise would have been the "soft" one "that there are world interests over and above national interests", and that a rich country like Britain should devote part of its resources and part of its diplomatic effort to aiding "developing" countries (partly as a way of gaining political goodwill and economic benefit, but with the main object of relieving poverty); "Few of us" they now admitted, "would take this position any more" advocating instead that "Britain must primarily be guided by her own [long-term] interests"[152] - though within an internationally focused strategy.

Although Britain was "moderately 'developed' in terms of per capita income", they argued the oil price rises had made the country more aware that its living standards depended on imported food and materials, and its terms of trade could deteriorate because of chronic shortages of primary products. In addition its trade was threatened by the policies of self-reliance and competition from other countries:

The export markets for our manufactures are likely to be further trimmed by policies

> of "self-reliance" and by Japanese and German competition (which are in fact capable of partially or completely capturing our home market as well, for electronic equipment, cars and motorbicyles, etc). This fundamental weakening is also felt by many other "developed" countries.[153]

As the 1970s progressed, the rapidly expanding exported manufactures of Japan and the NICs posed even more of a threat to the home markets of "developed" countries - and Seers himself increasingly warned of and, by the early 1980s, in fact forcefully advocated a more protectionist policy. But, in 1976 he and Jolly talked more moderately in terms of a different international system emerging, not necessarily taking the form of the NIEO, but more on the lines of a mixed "international economy", neither fully planned nor *laissez faire*.[154]

The initial point in their paper was, in fact, the effect the recent "economic trends" had had on the aid programme, for, they observed, not only was there "now only limited political support in this country, or elsewhere, for policies which simply involve sacrifice, except for those which are clearly humanitarian, such as famine and disaster relief", but the country had been deprived of "the spare resources for unilateral transfers" and been "stripped" of its "'great power' status and 'responsibilities'",[155] the latter point in particular marking a significant shift in Seers' own view. As a corollary to this, however, the point was made that there was a lessening of confidence in aid as an effective factor in development, and that the main influences on overseas development were policies in other fields: "imports, foreign affairs (eg our policy in Southern Africa), maritime law, overseas investments of British companies, immigration and culture (BBC, British Council, etc.)",[156] something Seers himself had previously stressed.

Britain's fundamental interest lay, they argued, in helping to find "viable worldwide solutions" to the common problems confronting most nations, with a greater degree of negotiated international economic agreements covering both domestic production and international trade. The traditional distinctions between internal and international policy were likely to break down as the international economy became more integrated, they speculated, the main issue now being "to achieve control of the international environment given the much more pluralist nature of the international scene, and the presence of multinational institutions", which even the more industrially advanced countries were now having to come to terms with and were in some respects "outside of all nation state control".[157]

Britain, they argued, should be in the vanguard in welcoming the "major shifts" in the world economy that had taken place and exploring new initiatives to work with them, particularly within the groupings of the EEC and the Commonwealth, though always guided by her own interests, urging particularly that greater weight be given to British consumer interests.[158]

In administrative terms, they observed, these recommendations implied a new structure within Whitehall for integrating all external policies (diplomatic, defence, intelligence, technology, trade, aid, migration, cultural, etc.) and relating them to domestic policies within a long-term but flexible strategy. As far as staffing was concerned, no

longer did they feel the need was for a diplomatic service with "a degree of Fabian commitment, willing to sacrifice national interests in order to contribute to development overseas"[159] (which had indeed been the tenor of Seers' arguments in the late 1960s and early 1970s). What was now needed, they argued, was "more detailed involvement of British overseas representatives in economic negotiations and strategy, not merely export promotion of the products of private industry" and recruits were needed with a "knowledge of the natural and/or social sciences, an understanding of the world politico-economic system and a capacity to cooperate with foreigners without condescension"[160] who could become involved in economic negotiations and strategy and be guided by Britain's long-term interests.

Whether these recommendations had any influence on the Berrill committee is not known - and certainly Seers was critical of the final report for being too economistic and growth centred, attaching too much importance to the administration of aid while neglecting policies in other fields influencing development, and paying too little attention to the role of TNCs.[161] However, the point is to indicate the change in Seers' own attitude to Britain's development role, resulting from the recent economic trends, regarding it now as being more determined by its own interests rather than any moral responsibility towards overseas "developing" countries. As he summed up in 1978, the questions for European social scientists were no longer "How can we help the rest of the world?" or "How can we convince our governments to agree to a New International Economic Order?" but instead "Are there possibilities of reconciling our long-term interests with those of other continents?" and "What sort of new international order do *we* need?"[162]

Politico-economic developments in Europe

There were two developments on the European scene in the first half of the 1970s, which had a notable effect on Seers' work in turning his attention more towards the interests of his own region; these will only be mentioned briefly here, though their consequences will be explored further later in this and particularly the next chapter.

One was Britain's entry into the EEC, which was accomplished in 1973 by Edward Heath's Conservative government and later confirmed by the referendum of June 1975 organised by the Labour Party on its return to office in 1974. Seers had been opposed to British membership of the EEC, mainly (according to Streeten) because he considered "it would make it more difficult to carry out Labour policies, that it would be deflationary, and would cause unemployment",[163] but once its entry was a *fait accompli* he in fact began to take full advantage of the opportunities this opened up for funding and research work. Seers himself acknowledged his change of mind in the early 1980s when he flatly rejected a Labour Party programme to protect British industry by imposing import and exchange controls and leaving the community: "I once favoured these policies myself," he admitted "but they would now be too late (if they were ever realistic)".[164] As already

observed, he and Jolly, in their evidence to the Berrill Commission in 1976, suggested that the EEC, together with the Commonwealth, provided the obvious international groupings or communities within which Britain could explore new initiatives in international relationships.

The issue with which Seers became particularly concerned was the proposed enlargement of the Community, with applications for membership from Greece, Portugal and Spain. The incorporation of these countries, all of which were considered severely depressed and politically unstable, he anticipated, would transform the Community "into something not only larger but quite different, subject to persistent pressures to develop the underdeveloped areas of Europe",[165] requiring a large-scale budget. His work on the subject, and the problems and opportunities this presented for both applicants and existing members, will be covered more fully in the next chapter, but his observation that such an enlargement raised "structural issues ... familiar in the development field"[166] both reflected and contributed to his assertion that insights gained in development studies could be helpful in tackling European problems.

The other significant development in the European region was the Helsinki Declaration, produced by the European Security Conference held in the Finnish capital from 30 July to 1 August 1975,[167] which Seers regarded as a symbol that "a new era" had opened in relations between Eastern and Western Europe. It was a new era which had been heralded on the broader international scene by the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT 1) between the United States and the Soviet Union in May 1972, US President Nixon's visits to Moscow and China, and the ending of the Vietnam War in early 1973, all of which contributed to an easing of East-West tension. While the Helsinki Declaration itself was fundamentally a strategic document, designed to reduce military tensions, it had a place for cultural exchange, which Seers welcomed. "This is the best time for many years in which to look for ways of increasing the interchange of experience and ideas between Eastern and Western Europe",[168] he declared at the EADI general conference held in Linz in September 1975. He anticipated this would open up opportunities not only for social scientists from East and West to learn more of each others work but also possibly to co-operate in joint research; and in fact EADI, with Seers as its first president, took advantage of the new opportunities and encouraged such co-operation.

As well as marking growing East-West political detente, Seers also regarded the Helsinki agreement as a symbol of the "growing economic integration"[169] within the region, as some Eastern European countries were coming to rely more on market forces. In a paper written in 1973, he had drawn attention to the growing diversity within the Communist bloc pointing out, for example, that Yugoslavia had developed a heavy market orientation, with reliance on foreign capital and emigration to West Germany, and that Rumania had joined the IMF.[170] After 1975 he remarked increasingly on the degree of economic convergence between the communist and non-communist world and the "growing commonality of interest between Western and Eastern Europe",[171] a view upheld by his personal observations in Eastern Europe, particularly Poland and later

Hungary. It was through this closer contact that he came not only to suggest the extension of development studies to Eastern as well as Western Europe, but to explore the possibility of a future united Europe, to be addressed in Chapter 7.

But while the effects of economic crisis and regional politico-economic developments played their part in influencing the turn of Seers' attention towards Europe, there were other external factors which at the same time also encouraged, or even necessitated, the reduction of an almost exclusive concern with overseas development which no longer seemed appropriate, as will be seen in the next section.

Challenge to European development institutes

The recognition by the United Nations of the demands for a new economic order and the action of the OPEC countries inspired in many LDCs a new sense of confidence in their own bargaining position to challenge the dominant position of the more developed countries in various international settings. One form this took, which influenced Seers' thinking and future work, was their questioning of the role played by European institutes and experts in the development field. This was plainly expressed at the SID 14th World Conference held in Abidjan 12-16 August 1974 when certain delegates demanded that European institutions "should get out of the development business".[172] A month later, as Seers submitted policy suggestions for IDS's third quinquennium, he observed "Dr Onitiri of Ibadan's NISER recently called on European institutes to 'phase out' of development studies."[173] He noted other warning signs at the founding conference of the EADI at Ghent in September 1974 when he acknowledged it was not as easy as in the past to get permission to undertake fieldwork abroad, and overseas governments were no longer so enthusiastic about sending people to Europe to learn about development.[174] The founding of the association itself was also met with limited enthusiasm by the delegates from other continents present who had in effect asked what business European institutes had in development and "issued somewhat guarded blessings"[175] for its future.

At the international Statistical Policy Conference held at IDS in May 1975, co-organised by Seers, Western universities and research organisations were criticised by participants from the LDCs for their "academic imperialism" and "cheque-book research".[176] The LDC representatives maintained that researchers from Western institutes working overseas often hired local personnel at low cost to conduct field work, while the *superior* work of analysis and interpretation was undertaken back in the "developed" country. There was a call for more mutual respect and collaboration, for researchers from the LDCs to play their full part in analysis, and for the full results of any research to be made available to the country where the study had been undertaken.[177] Seers himself noted the great change in the atmosphere of international meetings of statisticians commenting "Those of us who have enjoyed a rather exaggerated prestige as international experts will have to accept that meetings of statisticians are taking place on a much healthier basis of professional equality, and that the hearing we get will depend not

so much on our status as on the merits of what we have to say."[178]

At the first meeting of the regional associations held at IDS in November 1976 "some African participants spoke of the need for a period of 'silence' - in which they would be free to think out their own problems without too much pressure from 'developed' countries"; they also raised the issue that "research into development problems in former colonies was sometimes hindered by the fact that much archival material of value existed in the metropolitan countries"[179] and called for its return. Another major issue raised was that whereas the representative regional bodies for development institutes in Africa, Latin America and Asia (ADIPA, CLACSO and CODESRIA) dealt with their own development problems, the newly formed EADI consisted mostly of institutions set up for research and training on the problems of the other three regions. These sorts of pressures therefore also prompted Seers to consider the question of what role European institutions and personnel should now play in the field of development studies.

His reaction to what he termed "the current xenophobia of social scientists in the Third World" was to acknowledge at the EADI founding conference in 1974 that they had some reason for their criticisms, which he conceded had been stimulated by "the paternalistic assumption of many foreign social scientists that they know how to analyse and solve the problems of Africa and Asia and Latin America", whereas in fact the resulting policies had often been noticeably ineffective.[180] From early in his career and the writing of "Why Visiting Economists Fail" (when he had then, by contrast, remarked upon the "xenophobia" of certain Western visiting economists[181]) he had himself often warned of the dangers and consequences of development experts doling out possibly well-meaning, but often irrelevant, advice. In a number of papers over the next few years he again acknowledged the failings and mistakes of development economics and economists: development research had often been marked by "conceptual imprecision", lacking objectivity, and based on the assumption that "the ultimate goal of development would be European-style political institutions and levels of living within a capitalist system - basically the same goals as those of colonial governments";[182] development planning had turned out to be "something of a charade" and development economics had proved less useful than had been expected and "may well have aggravated social problems if only by diverting attention from their real causes";[183] and economists, he confessed, had often offered advice to overseas countries without much knowledge of its history or the political context and therefore with little basis for framing the questions to be studied, let alone predicting the results of their advice.[184]

In a paper entitled "European Conscience and European Social Science" Seers set out a particularly damning indictment of the "technical sins" committed by European social scientists working overseas in the post war period in "our desire to be helpful":

> We have used the tropics as testing grounds for sophisticated techniques such as inter-industry matrices and linear programming - as European governments have used them for testing new military hardware, and European pharmaceutical corporations for trying out the latest drugs. We have given currency to, even created, statistics, especially of national income, that were little better than random numbers. We have

> used these guesses as if they were real facts. We have helped concoct development plans with aggregative data that hid the real social or ethnic or regional problems. We have helped arouse expectations that processes of development, which inevitably take decades, if not centuries, can be short-cut by a few years of rapid economic growth. Moreover, we have taught students and 'counterparts' to repeat the same naive mistakes, not to say mendacities.[185]

This paper was in fact delivered in 1978 but already in 1974 Seers was insisting that the approach that "*we* have the appropriate expertise for *their* problems"[186] had to be abandoned. When submitting his suggestions in 1974 for IDS's third quinquennium, he warned his colleagues that there was no viable future for "a European institution which primarily carried out research on the internal problems of the Third World, mounting courses on these problems in Europe and offers advice to overseas governments on how to solve them"; though this was in fact, as he pointed out, "precisely what IDS was set up to do". It was becoming increasingly obvious, he continued, that any European institution that persisted in "a paternalistic role" would find it acquired "a bad reputation abroad" and faced "serious morale difficulties among its staff"[187] - it would become a professional backwater, if it survived at all. He therefore advised that IDS strengthen its position by concentrating more on comparative research and teaching on the British experience, building on the hypothesis that "development problems are *our* problems too - problems of distribution, unemployment, absorption of technology, administrative reform, 'tourist pollution', educational relevance, etc., indeed that these are international problems, caused by powerful forces running through the world as a whole".[188]

He was not, however, suggesting that all research on the problems of overseas countries should be abandoned, and as already seen, throughout the last ten years of his life, he continued to travel overseas extensively and to undertake consultancy work. As Richard Jolly has commented, "However much he might inveigh against the paternalism of Westerners presuming to tell Third Worlders what to do, Dudley could never resist a request to lead a mission to analyse yet another country situation and make recommendations for policy and action".[189] There was still a need for world models and comparative research and still "every justification for institutions in Europe to cover the problems of Africa, Asia and Latin America" as well as Europe, as they were "all part of 'development' seen as a worldwide problem", he argued, and overseas consultancy work made IDS's work less parochial.[190] It was the idea of development studies as a sort of "academic counterpart to Oxfam"[191] covering *only* the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America - a perception rooted in political expediency and paternalism - which he considered should be abandoned since it was proving harmful and hindering the professionalisation of the subject.

The challenge of Third World representatives therefore played a part in widening the focus of Seers' work to include study of the European region. But while acknowledging that "developing" countries had reason for their criticisms of development experts and institutions, there were, however, other factors, more directly related to the development record of some Third World governments themselves, that were also causing Seers to

rethink the role of European social scientists in the field, and to begin shifting the focus of his work towards Europe.

The development record of overseas governments

While admitting the "misdeeds" and "technical sins" of development experts, Seers also made the point that it was often overseas governments themselves which, while paying lip-service to the idea of development, were often the main hindrances to carrying through any effective policy - an issue he had already raised, as was seen in the last chapter, when he addressed the question "what sort of governments should be refused what sort of aid" (see Chapter 5, pp.208-10) - and refused himself to assist the military junta in Greece. Advocating policies of redistribution and sacrifice was not only paternalistic but its effectiveness was also doubtful in many settings, he observed, as well-meaning technical assistance often only served to strengthen governments which were themselves responsible for increasing poverty, inequality, and human rights abuses - the activities of Idi Amin in Uganda being very much in the public eye in the mid-1970s. Seers himself frequently remarked on the vast and growing inequalities within developing countries, and became particularly concerned about the authoritarian regimes and abuse of human rights in the NICs, especially in Latin American, gaining first hand experience of conditions there during the second half of the 1970s. "We - and I do not exclude myself -" Seers admitted, "have given the same governments our advice and allowed them to use us politically. We have supplied them with a respectable cover for their policies".[192] As a result development advisers often felt compromised and "increasingly disturbed by moral ambiguities in some types of work covered by the convenient title 'development'".[193]

When he stated of development economists: "The reality is that there is very little we can do as either officials or academics to improve social conditions in other countries - although we can perhaps make them worse!"[194] he was not therefore allocating responsibility entirely to the economists, but to governments which either failed to carry through or obstructed necessary changes. Withdrawal from working for such governments (or giving them aid) therefore had its positive advantages and avoided "moral ambiguities" for social scientists, some of whom, he noted, were already leaving the development field in the light of this "complex of intellectual and moral uncertainties".[195] In 1974 in his recommendations for IDS's third quinquennium he observed that his personal inclination was for IDS to do little work "for foreign governments on internal matters of policy", though this did not preclude work overseas for international agencies or with research and training institutions in overseas countries.[196]

Despite the mistakes and failures of development experts, Seers argued in 1978, European social scientists needed to abandon their post colonial guilt complex - "over exploitation, colonial wars and the repression of nationalism" as well as "over the growing gap between our average incomes and those of the poor countries, and over our using up more than our share of the world's brain-power and natural resources, especially oil" -

which often lay at the root of their pretensions to solve other people's problems. While conceding there was some reason for guilt (though he did think future historians might be so harsh in their judgement) he maintained it was not only the big European capitalists who were guilty, but whole populations who benefited from the terms of trade with the Third World or consumed the world's oil in private motoring etc., including most of the citizens of Japan, the United States, Canada and Australia, as well as "all the classes in Africa, Asia and Latin America, including sections of the proletariat, which have benefited from the fast-growth policies followed since the war. Almost everyone, in fact, except most landless labourers, some workers in the informal sector and some peasants - and of course their families". And, he sweepingly concluded, "if practically everyone is guilty, nobody is guilty"; generalised political guilt was most unproductive, and having got rid of this complex "we shall be able to see the problems here on our doorstep"[197] - turning his attention towards the European region.

* * *

The effects of the oil crisis, the growing economic problems faced by the industrialised OECD countries, the demands from developing countries for self reliance and a New International Economic Order with the related challenge to European development institutes, as well as political developments in Europe, were all interrelated parts of the rapidly evolving 1970s which in varying degrees influenced or provided the rationale for Seers' new meaning of development, underlining his own growing disillusion at the record of development policies, and turning the emphasis of his work towards self reliance (initially in relation to "developing" countries, though it also a assumed a more universal application) and the extension of development studies to Europe.

While the new stress on self reliance could be regarded as a positive response to the demands of developing countries, there were other circumstances, in Seers' view, dictating a more independent role for "developing" countries and less involvement by the North. The resource limits, highlighted by the oil crisis, and the distorted growth pattern whereby inequalities continued to widen, made it increasingly evident that the majority of Third World countries would be unable to follow the same development pattern as Northern industrialised countries, thereby necessitating the adoption of a more traditional and self-reliant path to development, particularly since the prospects of external aid were diminishing. At the same time financial constraints facing Northern (or Western) governments meant they no longer had the resources, in Seers' words, "to sustain big aid programmes or paternalistic roles", or "play the role of either strict father or benevolent uncle"[198] (which in any case were no longer so necessary because of growing East-West detente) - while there were new opportunities for development opening in Europe, avoiding the moral ambiguities of being too closely involved in the affairs of authoritarian overseas governments. This aspect of his argument, requiring a certain disengagement from the Third World and concentration on European problems, was expressed more strongly in the later 1970s and will be addressed in Chapter 7.

However, first it is necessary to follow Seers' own rationale for a new meaning of

development for, against the background of the events discussed above, by the mid-1970s it was apparent not only from the dismal record of development but also the world economic crisis that conventional thinking had failed and there was a need for new models, approaches and theories.

Necessity for a new meaning of development

Limitations of conventional economic theories and models

No body of theory was equipped to deal with the chronic economic and social problems facing the world in the 1970s, maintained Seers, and recent developments "especially the rise of the transnational corporations and the oil price rise" had exposed the irrelevance and failure of "Marxist, Chicago and Keynesian" doctrines to explain what was happening or offer a credible solution. The problem was, he argued, that these doctrines had been developed in different circumstances and in answer to earlier needs - Marxists and the neo-classical school sharing common roots in the *expanding* European economy of the previous century and Keynesianism developing in reaction to unemployment and depression in the 1930s, but being unable to reconcile the high rates of inflation with unemployment in the 1970s. Theories were proving unable to adapt to the changing reality; and there was what he termed a cultural lag in economics.[199]

But whereas in the past his criticism had mainly been directed at the irrelevant and inappropriate application of "Anglo Saxon" economic theories to "developing" countries in other continents; the widespread social and economic problems now experienced on a world scale prompted him to query their relevance for the "developed" countries too. The question of whether conventional economic analysis was relevant to western industrialised countries had been one that had been raised at the Manchester conference in 1964 by Joan Robinson and others, though at that time Seers himself had not pursued this line of criticism, considering it a battle that was "less obviously winnable" (see Chapter 3, pp.140-1).[200] Ten years later, however (as he observed that the original battle to discourage the adoption in Third World countries of textbooks and syllabuses modelled on those of Europe and North America had to a considerable extent been won[201]), he had serious doubts about the world-wide relevance of the major capitalist and socialist theories, when it was increasingly apparent that the "developed" countries too had failed to solve their own social and economic problems.

In fact Seers often now referred to the "congruence" or similarity between Marxism and Western based neo-classical economic doctrines, a point he elaborated upon at a symposium entitled "Towards a New Strategy of Development" held in Houston Texas from 3 to 5 February 1977.[202] Here he was struck by the fact that a contribution written by Bill Warren, from a supposedly Marxist position, reached policy conclusions similar to those of what he termed the neo-classical school reflected in papers by Goran Ohlin (from the World Bank) and Richard Cooper (Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs in

the US State Department).[203] Warren too, he remarked, was also in complete agreement with writers such as Peter Bauer, whom he quoted with approval, but who was usually associated with the Chicago school - neo-classicism "in its purest form".[204] While accepting that Bill Warren was far from a typical Marxist (particularly in his view that capitalism still had decades of constructive life) Seers considered his position was not far different from other Marxists, particularly the Soviet ideologues.[205]

The similarities between the two positions, was not surprising, he maintained, since they shared a common origin in classical eighteenth-century economists, like Adam Smith and Ricardo, and developed in Europe in the nineteenth century. While recognising there were very important differences, he drew attention to the common ground: both treated development essentially as a matter of economic growth and technical progress, due primarily to capital accumulation, assuming competitive markets and the overriding importance of material incentives; both were basically internationalist and optimistic, with present sacrifices being regarded as a justification for a utopian future.

It is not intended to examine the veracity of these assumptions and Seers later observed that this paper "was in part a tease", achieving its objective of annoying some people while amusing others.[206] But the "common ground" he drew attention to provided the very reasons why he considered both positions inadequate. The basic failing of Marxist, Chicago, and also Keynesian theory (all of which he categorised as various forms of neo-classical economics), he maintained, was that they considered development purely in terms of economic growth and modernisation, ignoring crucial socio-political, cultural, geographical and other non-economic factors. Most mainstream economists, for example, he argued, were generally indifferent to the source of capital, using an aggregate concept of investment, adding together capital from foreign and domestic sources, unconcerned about the implications of its entry via the TNCs.[207]

As in the past he was critical of the fact that fashionable economic models tended to be mainly mathematical and quantifiable, which he suggested often gave economists "a trained capacity for irrelevance" since social problems could not be simply reduced to algebraic functions.[208] Equally he considered purely financial policies - such as treating the removal of inflation as an end in itself (as advocated by monetarist theories which were gaining ground in Britain in the 1970s) rather than considering it as one condition for curing social problems - were likely not only to be ineffective but also to cause further economic and social distress.[209]

There was a need for new world models and alternative development strategies, he maintained, which took into account the many non-economic factors not normally stressed by economists. But first it was necessary, he argued, to reassess conventionally accepted models, and as he put it later "let go" of much of the inappropriate "theoretical luggage".[210] In the mid-1970s, one particular concept he believed should be discarded was the 3-world classification model, while the conventional Left-Right political axis also needed amending.

Irrelevance of the Three-World classification and Left-Right axis

The political and economic trends of the early 1970s had eroded and made obsolete the convenient classification of the 3-world system, maintained Seers, since the two criteria on which it rested - first, on whether a country was communist, and second, whether it was "developed" or "developing", depending on its level of income and industrialisation - had become irrelevant.[211]

The "Third World" was, in fact, a term he had previously considered useful to describe areas overseas classified as poor and preferable to what he regarded as euphemisms such as "under-developed", "developing" or "less developed". Even in 1973, while having some reservations about the classification of certain countries, he still believed "that a category of predominantly dependent non-Communist countries, normally called the Third World, is useful", and within this category he included the oil producers because of their dependency on foreign companies.[212] However, by the following year he observed "The old convenient classification of the world into First, Second and Third World has no meaning any more"[213] and in 1975 one of his "set pieces" for lectures was "The end of the 3-world system" - "on how our world models, and therefore development plans and social sciences, are being reshaped by a dawning awareness of the dystopian implications of resource constraints".[214] By 1979, following the fall of the Shah of Iran and the ensuing concern over further oil supplies he stated categorically "there is no longer a Third World",[215] - though he did still occasionally use the term for those countries that were chronically dependent on imports.

At the basis of his argument for discarding the 3-world model was the failure of its growth-oriented basis which had assumed that Third World countries could become more developed by raising their per capita national income and increasing industrialisation programmes (with the assistance of transfers of aid, private capital, and resolutions on tariff preferences, commodity prices etc.). The evidence of the late 1960s and early 1970s, as he frequently pointed out, demonstrated this failure, and the oil crisis had further undermined the assumptions and weakened the model in a number of ways, primarily by exposing the vulnerability of growth strategies based on highly-mechanised industrialisation and casting doubt over the possibility of the world population ever reaching a "modern standard" and becoming "developed". The increased revenue of the oil producers, he observed, had also demonstrated that per capita income could not be regarded as a measure of development, for a country like Kuwait now had the highest per capita income in the world, though it was absurd to regard it as more developed than the USA, since it was still highly dependent on imported food, technology, and manpower; and it was thus impossible to categorise the oil producers within the 3-world system. The fact too that they had demonstrated that there were other ways for "developing" countries to obtain resources than waiting for the developed countries to provide the capital, had also challenged the assumptions of the system.[216]

In addition the boundary between the "developed" and "developing" countries (or

First and Third worlds) was becoming more indistinct, he argued, as Western Europe showed signs of becoming a "developing area", with characteristic chronic balance of payment difficulties, unemployment and inflation, and increasingly importing technology and capital via TNCs. The so-called "developed" countries no longer saw themselves as paradigms for emulation; and no longer had much spare capital for aid programmes after meeting the demands of their own populations for higher consumption levels.[217]

Finally the "degree of 'convergence'", which he had noted developing between the communist and non-communist worlds, and the fact that "China and one or two other Communist countries had broken their political alignment with the Soviet Union and increasingly diverged in political behaviour"[218] undermined the notion of an identifiable, homogeneous Second world, and thereby further demonstrated the growing irrelevance of the three-world model. Though he acknowledged it still had some organisational and ideological reality since countries "remained grouped into military alliances (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) and politico-economic organizations (OECD and COMECON)".[219]

His examination of the "congruence" between Marxism and Western based neo-classical economic doctrines also led him further to question the relevance of placing theories, people and governments within a conventional Right-Left dimension - locating Communists and progressive egalitarian tendencies on the extreme Left, and Fascists and reactionary anti-egalitarian tendencies on the extreme Right, with Social Democrats, Liberals and Conservatives at various stages in between (see Figure 6.1a, p.297). This too, he observed, was a fundamentally European way of looking at politics rooted in the 1920s which was inadequate to explain or encompass many of the current situations and countries in the world; the Left-Right axis, for example, could not make sense of the economic and political co-operation of East European Marxists and TNC officials - or classify many non-European political leaders like Peron, who pursued "progressive" fiscal policies, planning and industrialisation, but whose civil liberties record and nationalistic foreign policy placed him much further Right along the scale.[220]

There was a need for new world models, maintained Seers - "transnational systems", that were more universal in application, but which did not ignore specific national contexts and the various determinants of the national room to manoeuvre, including taking into account the many non-economic factors not normally stressed by economists.[221]

With Europe now experiencing what were considered development problems, and the apparent failure of "conventional" theory to explain or remedy the situation, particularly growing inflation and unemployment, Seers suggested that social scientists from the "advanced capitalist and socialist countries could learn much from their colleagues elsewhere" and that "some of the theories developed in Third World countries, for example *dependencia* might be relevant" in Europe, including Britain.[222] So while from 1963 onwards he had objected to the irrelevant transfer of theories from "developed" to "developing" countries, he now took his argument a stage further and recommended a transfer of theories and experience back in the opposite direction. There could, as he expressed it in the title of one of his 1979 papers, be "Latin Lessons for us All".

While he did not think that dependency theory had yet provided universally applicable answers, he nevertheless believed it raised "the right questions", paying more attention than "orthodox neo-classical economists" to the external economic constraints on policy, such as the origin of capital and key imports, and to non-economic factors, drawing attention to the significance of cultural dependence. There were certain important determinants of policy (particularly of a demographic nature) to which he considered dependency theory paid insufficient attention but in general he believed it contained "far more of relevance than neo-classical economics".[223]

Seers himself did not claim to put forward a fully worked out alternative world model but sought more appropriate frameworks to encompass contemporary problems and to suggest more positive ways forward. He came to consider that a more relevant classification of countries within a global context, than that of 3-worlds, was one based on their degree of dependence.

Towards a new framework - "dependency" classification

Dependency was a subject he initially explored in his 1973 work on the world context of development for the M.Phil. course. Rather than grouping countries by quantitative measures such as per capita income, he suggested they could be classified "roughly and respectively as 'dominant' and 'dependent'" depending on whether they were mainly *sources* or *receivers* of external "common influences", which affected not only technologies and consumption patterns, but also the decisions of those in power.[224] The three main "general influences" were identified as - "*political* (diplomatic pressures and military threats), *economic* (trade flows, private investment and financial aid) and *cultural* (such as textbooks, films and technical assistance)"[225] - all of which were interrelated and inextricably bound up together.

The point again emphasised was that attention should not be focused exclusively on economic links and in particular he maintained "I shall continually emphasise the cultural linkage between rich countries and poor",[226] partly because it was an aspect given insufficient attention by other economists. What had earlier been referred to as the "demonstration effect", "intellectual influences", "imported consumption tastes" was now identified as cultural dependence and described as having a more fundamental influence than economic dependence. It was, Seers observed, "of a different, higher, order of importance than economic dependence, just as mental illness is of a higher order of importance than a physical disease"[227] since it determined in large part economic choices, the pattern of consumption, choices of technology, and, in some degree, the shape of government development policy. But since the TNCs played a large part in influencing consumption patterns and choices of technology, there was obviously a close interrelationship between the cultural and economic aspects of dependency.

When in 1976 Seers devised a classification to assess the dimensions of dependence, cultural and political dependence, although listed as important influences, did not,

however, feature among the determinants, mainly because he wanted to devise "a manageable system of classification in a limited space"[228] - selecting a few factors of key importance that could be measured. He chose to gauge the nature and degree of dependence of a country by simulating a situation in which it was cut off from the outside world, assessing its self-sufficiency in, or dependency on, three key commodities - oil, food, and technology. An additional key factor taken into consideration was population size, in part because this determined the size of the market, and affected what manpower was available for production, research and development, but a further reason being that it affected "the numbers in the armed forces, and (more important and more directly) the numbers available to be mobilised in time of war".[229] Since dependence was not only an economic concept, he argued, the power a government exercised depended also on its military force as well as the capacity to produce its own weapons, which was also related to its technological capacity and dependence.

The emphasis on population size (and also military capacity) was somewhat controversial, particularly at a time when population control was an integral part of many development programmes, highlighted particularly in 1973 by the UN sponsored World Population Year. Although Seers added, in a footnote, "Of course to say that a large population is an asset to a country is not to imply that population growth strengthens it",[230] elsewhere he made it clear that he did not believe that the Malthusian arguments "eagerly espoused by European liberals" necessarily applied to all national circumstances, and even argued that in certain circumstances a country's military vulnerability could be reduced and its room to manoeuvre increased by raising the birth rate (as will be seen in Chapter 7). Population policy needed conscious choice in the light of national circumstances, he maintained, and one of his criticisms of some dependency theorists was that they did not pay adequate attention to policy issues such as population and the size of the military.[231] In addition there were other factors affecting a country's degree of dependence - such as its location, resource base and ethnic composition - to which he also considered insufficient attention was devoted by both dependency theorists or more conventional economists.[232] However, although recognising their significance, he too was unable to incorporate these factors into the simplified frame of his table.

Choosing eleven countries as examples, Seers used the four criteria (oil, food, technology and population size) to assess their assets and liabilities and indicate their degree of self-sufficiency or dependency (see Table 6.1a, p.295). This demonstrated, not surprisingly, that the USA, the Soviet Union and China were the "least dependent", since they had large populations, were militarily more powerful than other countries and none of them entirely lacked any of the three resources - though they were all a net importer of one of them (the USA importing oil, the Soviet Union cereals, and China technology). Japan and the countries of Europe were classified as semi-dependent mainly because of their high dependence on imported oil and partial dependence on food imports. The petroleum exporters themselves were also classified as semi-dependent, for although there were significant differences between the larger and smaller countries as far as population base

and agricultural resources were concerned, they were all dependent on the importation of manufactured goods, technology, arms and equipment. Finally, nearly all countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America were classified as "dependent", being entirely dependent on imported cereals, oil, technology, equipment and arms, in return for which they offered less essential commodities such as coffee, tea, bananas, cocoa, sugar and cotton.

A revised version of this classification was published three years later, at the time of the second oil crisis following the revolution in Iran, and contained a slightly revised version of the table (see Table 6.1b, p.296) with the population size criteria appearing only in the appendix, not on the main table. By this time, Seers had become more involved in working on patterns of dependence in Europe, and Portugal was included in the group of dependent countries (instead of Costa Rica) - while Argentina, Thailand and Nigeria were included in the semi-dependent category. Classifying Cuba, Brazil and Portugal together produced "a very mixed bag" of dependent countries - and a large country such as Brazil with a varied resource base obviously had greater possibilities for autonomous action than the other two - but, he maintained, the "mixed bag" nevertheless had more in common than the old category of Third World "developing countries".[233] He continued to find the table a useful framework, and a further revised version also appeared in *The Political Economy of Nationalism* in 1983, the most significant revision being that China was now classed as "heavily dependent", rather than "least dependent".[234]

There were "other ways of dividing up the world" observed Seers, recalling his earlier "economic classification based on stages of imported substitution" of 1963 which had been greatly influenced by the Latin American "structuralist" theoretical approach (see Chapter 2, pp.99-100). While still considering this was "more useful for many purposes than the 'three-world' classification" he agreed it no longer seemed "the most appropriate".[235]

In his early work on the subject he observed there could be certain "potential dangers" in any theoretical framework stressing dependence since it could be taken to imply that the world system was solely responsible for social problems and that individuals or governments in dependent countries could do little except wait for it to change, but he regarded this line of thought as a convenient excuse for failure, providing academics in particular with a justification for taking no part in political action.[236] He himself considered classification based on dependence theory provided "starting points for studying what determined the national room to manoeuvre", what policies were feasible and how techniques of planning needed to be altered to decrease dependency.[237] By 1978, in fact, he was also using another dependency classification, derived from one of the sources of dependence - location - and based on a series of core-periphery systems, which will be looked at in more detail later in Chapter 7.

In adopting national development policies compatible with the dependency approach there were, maintained Seers, "no fundamental differences in the strategies appropriate to the governments of 'centrally planned', 'developed' and 'developing' countries" the crucial task being "to develop technical expertise and control consumer aspirations" and aim at greater national self-sufficiency.[238]

	Technology	*Cereals*	*Oil*	*Size*
USA	***	***	*	***
Soviet Union	**	*	***	***
China	*	**	**[1]	***[2]
Japan	**	*	0	***
West Germany	**	*	0	**
East Germany	**	*	0	**
Kuwait	0	0	***	0
Iran	0	*	***	**
Brazil	*	*	*	***
Cuba	*	*	0	***
Costa Rica	0	*	0	*

Key:
1 Apparently turning into an export surplus.
2 Considerably larger than the others (c. 700m.)

First three columns (resources)
*** Net exporter
** Approximately self-sufficient
* Net importer
0 Virtually zero capacity

Fourth column (population)
*** >100m.
** 10-100m.
* 1-10m.
0 <1m.

Table 6.1a An early version of Seers' dependency table (1976) - originally entitled "The assets and liabilities of various countries"
(*Source*: Seers, "A New Look at the Three World Classification", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 7, No. 4, 1976, p.10)

	(1) *Oil*	(2) *Cereals*	(3) *Technology*
A *Least dependent countries*			
(net importers of only 1 key import)			
USA	X		
Soviet Union		X	
China			X
B *Some semi-dependent countries*			
(net importers of 2 key inputs)			
(i) *Net exporters of technology*			
Japan	X	X	
East Germany	X	X	
West Germany	X	X	
(ii) *Net exporters of oil*			
Iran		X	X
Kuwait		X	X
Nigeria		X	X
(iii) *Net exporters of cereals*			
Argentina	X		X
Thailand	X		X
C *Some dependent countries*			
(net importers of all 3 key inputs)			
Brazil	X	X	X
Cuba	X	X	X
Portugal	X	X	X

Table 6.1b A further version of the dependency table (1979) - originally entitled "Illustrative profiles of dependence on key inputs"
(*Source*: Seers, "Patterns of Dependence", in J. Villamil (ed.), *Transnational Capitalism and National Development: New Perspectives on Development*, Harvester, 1979, p.104)




Figure 6.1a Traditional Left/Right, Egalitarian/Anti-Egalitarian axis
(*Source*: The range from Communists to Fascists above the axis is that used by Seers in an original version of his paper, "The Congruence of Marxism and other Neo-classical Doctrines", *IDS Discussion Paper* 136, 1979, p.10. The range below the axis, from Anarchists to Fascists, is the revised version used in Seers, *The Political Economy of Nationalism*, Oxford University Press, 1983, p.46.)




Figure 6.1b Seers' ideological map including a nationalist axis
(*Source*: Seers, "The Congruence of Marxism and other Neo-classical Doctrines", *IDS Discussion Paper* 136, 1979, p.16.)

Self reliance, selectivity - and nationalism

It is now clearer to understand the reasons why in 1977 when Seers was invited by the editor of the *International Development Review* to "revisit" "The Meaning of Development" which had originally been published in its pages in 1969, he put such emphasis in his new interpretation on the need for greater self reliance. In his original paper, as was discussed in Chapter 5 (see p.202), political and economic independence had been regarded as of "secondary" importance to social indicators and targets, and as an *end* or *objective* of a country's development programme. However, increasing acknowledgement of the influence of external links and dependence on a country's pattern of development now led him to the conclusion that "true independence was not merely one of the intrinsic objectives, but also a *condition* [original emphasis] (though insufficient in itself) for achieving the rest"[239] of the objectives of development - the relief and elimination of poverty, unemployment and inequality.

Self reliance, however, he added, did not necessarily mean aiming at autarchy and cutting off foreign influences completely, for he acknowledged there were constraints on how far it was desirable or even possible for a country to reduce its dependence. For countries that were already integrated into the world economy, especially small ones, relying heavily on inputs from abroad for food, technology, energy and armaments, the adoption of a "closed door" policy and severance of external links with the major powers could mean "painful social costs in the form of increased unemployment and lower real incomes for large sections of the population", which would hardly gain wide political support. As an example he quoted the failure of the insurrection in Sri Lanka in 1971 (that he had partially witnessed when there with the World Employment Programme), which had been "based precisely on a policy of achieving autarchy by converting the tea estates to food production", but which never gained widespread support.[240]

Even where a country had been more successful in severing external links and following a more autarchic policy, this did not mean that it had no more development problems; Burma, for example, he pointed out, still suffered from its basic weaknesses: "scarcity of natural resources, inadequacy of technical skills, ... a labour aristocracy and a rich peasantry"; and some governments, found that the ending of dependency on one country could have the effect of increasing dependence on another, as they attempted to relieve the severe problems resulting from the original breaking of links, and he cited Cuba as a case in point.[241]

In addition to the internal problems likely to occur as a result of adopting a more independent policy, there was the possibility of external opposition from governments (including military intervention) and TNCs, which did not easily tolerate the loss of their economic and political interests and influence, such as had happened in Chile and Cuba. (The constraints on adopting a more autonomous path towards development will in fact be addressed in more detail in Chapter 7.)

However, these reservations did not mean that a less dependent scenario was

unworkable, maintained Seers, but that any such strategy "would need to allow scope for foreign links for some decades at least", particularly small countries which would find it difficult to insulate themselves politically, culturally or economically.[242] The key to a development strategy based on self reliance was "not to break all links, which would almost anywhere be socially damaging and politically unworkable, but to adopt a *selective* approach to external influences of all types" (original emphasis).[243] This meant judging each proposition, such as investment projects and types of technology, on the basis of an objective appraisal of their social costs and benefits - a strategy that applied equally to "developed" as well as "developing" countries.[244]

In arriving at this formulation of self reliance and selectivity, it appears Seers had been influenced by the example of Japan, which he had visited on a number of occasions between 1975 and 1977 on missions for both the OECD and the UNU. If not actually drawing his inspiration from the Japanese experience, he certainly used it frequently as an example of the methods developing countries could adopt.

> Selectivity has been and still is the Japanese practice. It is now implied by the very elastic term 'self-reliance'. It means training cadres capable of deciding what foreign inputs are necessary for national development; how high a price should be paid for them (in cultural and political as well as economic terms); and which country is the best source, taking account of the need for technology appropriate to national circumstances - and of the intrinsic advantage of diversification. It also means avoiding being politically dependent on any single great power.[245]

> Japan has succeeded in achieving a diversified economy, with a low unemployment, and high standards of consumption, despite limited natural resources; having started with a relatively low level of industrialisation and technology at the end of the last century; and great wartime destruction of both human and physical capital. Moreover, this has been achieved in a world containing countries which were (until recently) much more powerful economically and politically, without ceding control of any part of the economy to foreign companies or incurring massive foreign debts - nor entirely sacrificing traditional cultural patterns. While there have been great environmental and social costs, this achievement is rightly admired by the rest of the world, and in particular *it shows the feasibility of self-reliant development, which is exactly what the governments of "developing" countries are trying to achieve*.[246] (my emphasis)

However, Japan's long history as an independent and expansionist imperial power, which had previously built up a strong industrial base before its defeat in the Second World War, did not perhaps make it the most useful comparative model for most Third World countries to follow. Seers himself acknowledged there was a question about how far it was possible to generalise from the Japanese experience and that the degree of autonomy each country was able to achieve and its room for manoeuvre would depend on the specific national context and the combination of a number of economic, political, social and geographic factors, some of which will be explored more fully in the next chapter.

While observing in 1977, "We do not yet understand much about what self-reliance implies for development strategies"[247] he did outline some of the basic implications of such a strategy. Reducing dependence on imported goods, especially basic foods, petroleum and its products, and capital equipment and expertise were the obvious economic implications (derived from the three main determinants used in his dependency

table), which also thereby involved changing consumption patterns, negotiating with foreign firms and governments, and increasing internal productive capacity. Parallel to this was the need for export-oriented economies (both of minerals and manufactures), oil producers included, to seek to diversify, bearing in mind the limited nature of natural resources and the increasing protectionist policies of the "North" towards manufactured goods.[248]

"On this approach", he maintained, "'development plans' would henceforward not put the main emphasis on overall growth rates, or even new patterns of distribution", the crucial targets being for "ownership as well as output in the leading economic sectors"; consumption patterns that economised on foreign exchange; improving the capacity for research on and negotiation with the TNCs; and reducing cultural dependence on one or more of the great powers.[249] Planning offices should therefore be primarily concerned with building up the cadres capable of evolving and implementing such a strategy and undertaking the effective negotiations. Adequate armed forces were another requirement, and a development plan also needed to indicate their optimal size in relation to other safeguards of independence[250] (a measure related to the fourth determinant in his dependency table).

Although in "The New Meaning of Development" he maintained the emphasis of development plans would not be on distribution, he did admit it would help and attached more importance to it elsewhere as a necessary means to counteract poverty and inequalities to achieve the national unity necessary to back policies.[251] In his report on basic needs in Nigeria in 1981, for example, he observed that distribution was obviously relevant, and there was a fundamental consistency between satisfying basic needs (properly interpreted)[252] and national self-reliance since

> A country which leaves large sections of the population destitute is hardly going to be able to count on national unity in a crisis, still less on military strength if the necessity arose. Conversely, unless a country is self-reliant in essentials such as food, the satisfaction of people's needs is bound to be in a degree precarious.[253]

To support strategies of self reliance, Seers put particular emphasis on the need to devote substantial resources to "reinforcing nationalism" and reducing external cultural links through such measures as "increasing the use of national languages in schools, allotting more television time to programmes produced locally (or in neighbouring countries), raising the proportion of higher degrees obtained at home", strengthening national and religious organisations, preserving and developing shrines and monuments, supporting traditional crafts, and encouraging interest in local archaeology, songs, stories and customs.[254] Rather than regarding nationalism, including separate languages, traditional crafts and customs as obstacles to modernisation and development - as neo-classical economists and conventional Marxists did - he maintained they should be seen as "shields" against those modern consumption styles and technologies[255] which increased a country's dependence and could only be afforded by a minority of the population.

In the mid-1960s, Seers had himself in fact regarded the principle of national

economic sovereignty an obstacle to moving towards a more global and internationally oriented aid and development programme and had been critical of European intellectuals and politicians allowing nationalism to dominate their thinking (see Chapter 3, p. 138, in particular). However by the late 1960s he had begun to speak of the importance of national identity as a means to counteract "imported consumption habits" (see Chapter 5, pp.218-19), and from the mid-1970s nationalism assumed a more prominent position in his work, as he came to regard it as on the whole as a healthy trend.

An appeal to nationalism Seers considered might encourage the local elite in developing countries to co-operate in implementing a more self reliant development strategy, making it more feasible politically than those strategies based on social targets or "redistribution with growth". Although a degree of self reliance would still deprive them of many of the goods and services they had until now considered essential, the strength of nationalism he suggested was a stronger force than social conscience and "may be more likely to outweigh short-term material interests, as is shown by wartime experience in many countries";[256] though, considering his views on the record of some Third World governments, this did seem to be an overly optimistic assumption.

Nationalism too was the added ingredient which he considered made more sense of the old Left-Right axis; adding a nationalist axis at right angles to it (see Figure 6.1b, p.297) presented a more useful contemporary framework for positioning individuals - and countries. Each quadrant could be seen to contain a major power with the top right hand quadrant (AN,AE) broadly compatible with the interests of the TNCs and local capitalists who looked to the USA or Western Europe for military support, technology and cultural inspiration; and anti-clockwise from there could be placed Russia, China and Japan. The revised map made it easier to relate Warren's paper to that of Cooper and Ohlin since they would both be in the anti-nationalist sector, but to the left and right respectively of the vertical axis and could be perceived as not being far apart; and it also helped to explain the cooperation of East European Marxists with the TNCs. Equally at the other end of the nationalist scale it assisted the understanding of tactical alliances such as that of leftist sections of the British Labour party with Enoch Powell and other right-wing conservatives in opposing membership of the EEC.[257]

Nationalism became a key issue for Seers and, speaking from hindsight in 1982, he maintained that it had become the "connecting thread"[258] in his work, though, as will be seen in Chapter 7, it was the idea of a broader, regional, extended nationalism that he later embraced.

Reassessing the role of European development institutes

In addition to the increased emphasis on self reliance and nationalism, the other major suggestion put forward in the new meaning of development was the geographical extension of development studies to Europe, which meant disposing of the conventional view of "development economics" as only applying to overseas countries, and Seers in fact

spoke of the "death"[259] of the subject as it was conventionally perceived. This he realised had implications for the future work and roles of European social scientists and development institutions, like IDS, which was touched upon earlier in this chapter (see pp.285-6). Faced with their own social and economic problems, it was time, Seers argued, for European social scientists to cease offering to solve other people's problems, and for development to be studied as a universal issue, involving work on "*common* worldwide problems by one and all while, paradoxically, keeping national interests (long-term of course) firmly in mind".[260] By accepting that they and their own countries were part of the field of study, they would be relieved of charges of paternalism and would also be enabled to assume a role which was both "diplomatically and professionally more defensible".[261]

Within this context, at a time when "new political tides [were] running", Seers considered the establishment of the EADI in 1974 had a particularly significant role, since as a new association it was unencumbered by a "paternalist", "'Western'", "neo-colonial" or "pro-capitalist" image, and presented opportunities for European social scientists to reach a new relationship with colleagues overseas.[262] The fact that it had been partly inspired by CLACSO (the representative regional body of Latin American development institutes) - as a result of contact with its former Secretary General Enrique Oteiza - displayed, he maintained, "a rare case of Europe emulating Latin America" and a positive indication that Europe was prepared to receive and learn from regions formerly considered recipients of European influences.[263]

Treating Europe as a case-study for development was not a new idea, he observed -"the first two development studies in the modern sense were written by Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and Martin, né Mandelbaum (1947)" who dealt with the post-war development needs of Eastern and south-eastern Europe and whose work he had come across when working at the Oxford Institute of Statistics in the 1940s and 1950s (see Chapter 1, p.37). Further studies had followed until work on Europe had in time been "submerged in the swelling torrent of research on Africa, Asia and Latin America."[264]

What was more novel was the suggestion that theories developed in Third World countries, such as dependency, might be usefully applied to the European situation. However, despite the relevance of such theories to European problems, Seers observed there was still widespread ignorance in Europe of the Latin American school;[265] the same parochialism persisted that he had previously observed in the early 1960s when the structuralist school of thought had received similarly scant attention from British economists. In this respect, he maintained, the European development institutes, like IDS, had a positive role to play since they were the logical centres for initiating the shift to the new approach, providing "the bridges across which development concepts could be imported into European universities, stimulating research on European problems within a developmental frame of analysis".[266] Seers himself implemented this policy with his M.Phil course, participating with the students in a study on the relevance of development theory, particularly dependency theory, to Scotland as an oil producer.[267] In 1977 he

became very involved in initiating the European Periphery Group applying dependency core-periphery models to Europe, as will be seen in the next chapter, and in the early 1980s he explored the "lessons" that Europe could learn from Latin American experience of inflation, and the application of structuralist and monetarist policies.[268]

It was important, he insisted, that European case studies should be included in development research and courses on development held in Europe should include European students, avoiding a situation in which Europeans appeared "to be telling non-Europeans how to run their country".[269] Such measures would not only provide an answer to criticism from the regional bodies (that while institutes in Africa, Latin America and Asia dealt with their own development problems, European institutes were more normally concerned with research on other regions) but studying European examples could enrich development studies by throwing fresh light not only on the region's own problems, but also broader worldwide issues. After all, he observed: "Europe provides the classic case study of a clash between modern technology and tradition",[270] which he considered the basic problem and reason for dualism and dependence in many developing countries.

European centres would in fact still have certain advantages in the field, he considered, since Europe was "the home of many of the multinational corporations, government agencies, educational establishments, media systems, etc.",[271] which influenced and often restricted the development possibilities of other countries, and there seemed every justification for centres in Europe to study these "interface" issues - and provide facilities for overseas social scientists to do the same. Equally, though, he acknowledged, there was also a need for institutions in Africa, Asia and Latin America to have the opportunity to study Europe for themselves, and in December 1980 he attended a steering committee in Lima, Peru to set up a programme of Latin American studies on Europe, sponsored by the OECD and CLACSO.[272]

At the same time, as we have seen, Seers considered there was every justification for European social scientists to continue their research on the problems of LDCs as part of the universal approach to development. The fact that European countries were becoming more aware of their own dependency gave them now an added source of strength, he argued, since "we can understand more clearly than ever the problems of dependent countries".[273] What was important was the *style* of work - "that one should limit one's role to that of a friend who can point to some considerations which may have been overlooked, rather than offering solutions, especially solutions based on European models",[274] and often in his overseas reports he made a point of saying that it was no business of an external or international mission to advocate some particular ideology - "egalitarian or otherwise".[275]

Seers envisaged that his new definition of development would be met with resistance from many quarters. The extension of development studies to Europe, he anticipated, would not be welcomed by some academics, since it would require changing and modifying training courses - which likewise meant that lecture notes might have to be torn

up if no longer appropriate, reading lists revised, and inventories of textbooks written off. In addition, the increased emphasis on self-reliance and nationalism as essential conditions of development, would also be more difficult for aid officials and members of aid lobbies to accept since it implied that "the main way in which they could improve the world" was not through increasing aid (though this was still needed in some countries), or even channelling it to people in greatest social need, but "by curbing the power of the transnational corporations and limiting cultural pressures" of which they were a part. Many he thought would "find uncomfortable the implicit scepticism about the power of humanitarian motives and the endorsement of nationalism, including our own" which was no longer regarded as an "obstacle" to development but an integral part of it.[276] Professional innovation, however, he observed, was always "painful and strenuous".[277]

Having now outlined in this chapter how a combination of economic and political developments at international, regional and national level (both in "developing" and "developed" countries) during the "rapidly evolving world of the 1970s" contributed towards the change in Seers' approach to development, the following chapter considers more closely how "the new meaning of development" - the emphasis on self-reliance and the application of development studies to Europe - was reflected in his own professional work in the final stage of his career.

CHAPTER 7: TOWARDS DISENGAGEMENT AND A REGIONALIST SOLUTION

The eradication of poverty, unemployment and inequality were still regarded by Seers as the fundamental objectives of development but to this, in his "new meaning of development", had been added two new elements he now considered essential for working towards these objectives - greater emphasis on self-reliance and the extension of development studies to Europe. Having outlined in Chapter 6 many of the factors which contributed towards this redefinition, Chapter 7 will examine how he incorporated these ideas into his own work, first examining his views on the feasibility of, and constraints on, more self-reliant and less dependent development and second examining his own involvement in the application of development studies to Europe. His European based work in fact led to his increasing support for the application of a strategy of greater self reliance to the European region itself with a consequent greater degree of disengagement from the countries of the South, a move which, he argued (contrary to the views of the 1980 Brandt report), would in fact be to their mutual benefit.

In the latter part of the 1970s Seers became more reflective about the whole post-Second World War period, which by the late 1970s he was referring to as the neo-colonial period (a term he had not used before), often discussing within lectures and articles, the role of development studies and position of Europe, particularly in relation to the USA, within a broader historical perspective than he had previously done. By the early 1980s - as he wrote *The Political Economy of Nationalism*,[1] against the background of the Reagan and Thatcher governments holding office in the USA and Britain, committed to strict monetarist principles and unlikely to adopt a sympathetic attitude towards assisting Third World development - he argued that the flaws in the functioning of the international system were of such serious proportions that a universal solution to the world's problems no longer seemed possible. By this time Seers himself had come to regard a stronger European Community and a world of partially self sufficient regional blocs as a possible way forward to ensure a safer and more peaceful world. This chapter will indicate some of the factors leading him to this conclusion.

Towards self-reliance?

For Seers, as was seen in Chapter 6, self reliance implied building up nationalism and pursuing policies that reduced dependence on imports of oil, food and technology, and while he was not supportive of what he regarded as radical autarchic policies involving cutting off all foreign influences, a self reliant strategy obviously implied a certain degree of "delinking" from the world economy. However, while arguing that self reliance was the essential element to add to any definition of development and an integral objective of development policy, he acknowledged not only that the time before this definition was accepted was "likely to be particularly long",[2] but also that there were many constraints on policy options for any government attempting to pursue a more independent path. The

"possibilities of 'delinking' from the world economy" were "in practice usually very limited, at least in the short term",[3] he observed, particularly for smaller economies, and attempts to do so often proved unsustainable because inadequate attention had been paid to the constraints on policy. It was therefore vital, he argued, to identify and study the factors that shaped the boundaries to policy, and examine the constraints on the room to manoeuvre - or what he termed the "constraints on nationalism" in *The Political Economy of Nationalism.*[4]

Dependency theory, he believed, threw "much needed light on some of the most important determinants of a government's room to manoeuvre",[5] since it paid attention to external factors, such as the origin of capital, technology, imports and even cultural influences, all of which were usually ignored by neo-classical economists. "[N]o government", however, he maintained, was "entirely free to shape its policy without regard to external influences"[6] and those which failed to take adequate account of these constraints (amongst which he included that of President Allende in Chile, Michael Manley in Jamaica and the Portuguese Revolutionary Government of 1974) usually encountered growing economic misfortunes, increased social tensions, political setbacks, and sometimes military coups, which reversed their efforts at more independent development. Chile in particular he considered provided a "casus classicus" of external foreign intervention when the Unidad Popular undertook a programme implying "a considerable measure of delinking":

> ITT made an abortive attempt to stop Allende even taking office, and following the expropriation of the subsidiaries of United States mining corporations, there were United States interventions of various types as part of a deliberate policy of 'destabilisation'. Attempts were made to block exports of copper and hold up supplies of essential imports. Banks (including the World Bank) were pressed not to lend to Chile. Strikes were supported, especially of copper miners and lorry drivers.[7]

However, while acknowledging that these external pressures from the TNCs, the United States government, and the banks "aggravated the economic chaos" of Chile, he also argued that this chaos was "partly due to the government undertaking very ambitious social and economic development programmes without the backing of the Chilean Congress and to serious mistakes and weaknesses in administration, especially financial"[8] (as was already indicated in Chapter 5, p.251). Although, therefore, finding dependency theory helpful in highlighting the constraints imposed on policy by external influences, he did not consider this exonerated governments from taking responsibility for their own administrative mistakes, which he argued, as will be seen below, often contributed as much as, or even more than, external influences to their failure to become more self reliant - but to which less attention was paid.

In addition there were other "important determinants of policy", often ignored by dependency theorists as well as other economists, "such as a country's population, its distance from a great power, its ethnic and linguistic homogeneity and its natural resources",[9] which also imposed constraints on policy options, Seers argued. The size of country had been included in his table assessing dependency and his own work in fact

often brought him into contact with the problems and constraints faced particularly by smaller economies.

This section will therefore first examine Seers' views on the various constraints on policy options, looking first at the external influences, particularly of the TNCs (and their governments) and the international financial institutions, and also briefly touching on cultural constraints, before turning to what he saw as internal constraints - the administrative, particularly financial, mistakes and weaknesses of the governments themselves - and to the demographic and geographic features which he argued equally determined policy. Despite the fact that some countries appeared to have little room to manoeuvre, he maintained there were ways in which even small economies could lessen their dependence and some consideration will be given to how he envisaged the various constraints could be lessened or overcome, although it became increasingly apparent that he considered general theorising had limited validity and that solutions had to be worked out that were country specific.

One way in which Seers himself became more practically involved in what he termed "shoring up"[10] the independence of colleagues overseas was in his work on devising more appropriate and relevant accounting systems and social indicators for governments whose fundamental objectives included economic self reliance and a greater measure of control over their own destinies, as well as - and as a means towards - the elimination of chronic poverty, massive unemployment and inequality. This aspect of his work will therefore also be covered before turning to his interest in extending development studies to Europe.

Constraints and room to manoeuvre

The transnational corporations

In "The New Meaning of Development" Seers had indicated that "In many countries, self-reliance would ... involve increasing national ownership and control, especially of sub-soil assets, and improving national capacity for negotiating with transnational corporations"; in fact he spoke of "curbing the power" of the TNCs and limiting their cultural pressure, making one of the "crucial targets" for development plans "ownership as well as output in the leading economic sectors".[11]

However, although such sentiments seemingly indicated the adoption of a tough line towards the TNCs and even support for a policy of nationalisation, when it came to considering the practicality of such actions, Seers' advice was often far more tempered and circumspect. This was particularly true in relation to small economies, where he recognised the room to manoeuvre was usually severely limited, and it is in lectures to audiences in Lesotho (in 1977) and Fiji (in 1979), two small economies, that his pragmatic approach to the TNCs and the question of national ownership can be more clearly seen. For example, while, in an address to a seminar on investment in Fiji, he acknowledged that the advantages of public investment, from the viewpoint of a government intent on development, might suggest the best policy was "to dispense with the private sector

completely, especially foreign corporations, at least in key industries", he also advised there were "several reasons for caution" when contemplating such a move, observing "The power for good can also be a power for bad."[12]

Although he regarded an open-door policy towards the TNCs undesirable, particularly as exemplified by a country such as Puerto Rico (which he saw as a "*casus classicus* of a development strategy based on open-door foreign financed industrialisation" and an "ultimate illustration of dependent development", displaying many of the social problems and distortions he identified with growth-oriented development),[13] he considered a closed door approach impracticable. Even Cuba, he remarked, had not been able to detach itself completely and was beginning to open its door to foreign investment, particularly having been hit by the 1976 collapse in the world sugar price, and he described being present "at a meeting when Fidel Castro was speaking to representatives of General Electric, Westinghouse, Citibank, etc. and saying to them: we have no objection to foreign private capital even to direct investment inside the country".[14]

For the great majority of countries already part of the transnational system it was even more difficult to contemplate closing the door on the TNCs, he argued, for, on the basis of past experience, if a government threatened expropriation or even adopted pro-labour legislation or raised taxes, it could expect retaliation in the form of reduced "output, employment and perhaps exports",[15] increased outflow of capital, and the aggravation of internal divisions as TNCs wooed the support of local groups, such as manufacturers, farmers or trade unions, which depended on them economically. In addition the "political dimension" to the transnational system meant the TNCs could expect help from their own governments, particularly in the case of the USA, which was able to use further retaliatory measures at its disposal ranging from cutting off aid, to trade embargoes, military force or covert action, when faced with a regime considered hostile to the government or its companies[16] (as had been the case in Chile).

Most governments, particularly of small and dependent countries, were unable to resist such pressures and in any case, he maintained, the social cost of "closing the door" would be very heavy, "indeed politically unacceptable, in practice", since the majority of small economies had insufficient national expertise, capital or marketing skills to set up their own corporations; most countries needed "technology and capital" which they could get "only from the transnational system via one channel or another and in the short run mainly from the TNCs. This may be unpleasant," he remarked, "but it is a reality of life."[17]

However, even if dispensing with foreign capital and increasing national ownership was possible, he still advised caution, observing that practically all leaders of the Latin American Left had reason "to rue the extent of nationalisation".[18] He observed in his lecture to the Fiji seminar that ministerial discretion in public appointments often reflected political discrimination and opened the door to patronage, providing a means to control political opposition, so that in certain countries, such as Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay, it was almost impossible for professionally qualified people, whose political

views were disliked by the government, to get employment in the public sector.[19] Such a situation was detrimental to development, he argued, for the suppression of dissent inhibited discussion of alternative policies so that in a country with a large public sector, development strategy was "likely to be inflexible". In addition, efficiency and production could be seriously affected when people were appointed for their personal loyalty, friendship or family attachments, rather than for their ability - or where state corporations were used as "dumping grounds for the awkward or even the incompetent".[20] Efficiency was also undermined by corruption, which could "spread easily in a large public sector", he maintained, and public corporations often wasted large sums of money and required perpetual and heavy subsidies, often for predominantly prestige projects (such as the Anglo-French Concord), which were "kept alive to save political face, long after a profit-making private company would have abandoned it".[21]

Nationalised industry often drifted along without clear guidance on the country's development needs and its role in meeting them, he observed, - pointing to the example of the industries taken over by the Allende administration in Chile in 1971-2, and by the Portuguese revolutionary government in April 1974 - and a state enterprise could become a power in itself taking little notice of the needs of national development.[22] National ownership, Seers therefore concluded, was only one possible instrument of a development strategy, depending on the specific political and administrative context of the country, its size and location:

> In small open economies ... with limited technological capacity, already locked into the world trading system, especially if it is dominated by a powerful neighbour, the context is less favourable. What would be a constructive policy of public ownership in India or Sweden might well prove disastrous in Malta or Puerto Rico.[23]

In light of what he saw as the drawbacks of both open and closed door type policies, what Seers himself advocated, as was mentioned in Chapter 6, was the need for a *selective* approach - for a government to retain as high a degree of self-reliance as possible, and "to take from the transnational system what it needs at the price it can afford, and not to take any more than that".[24] Such an approach could then be suited to the circumstances of each country within the framework of a long-term development strategy; the key being to select those industries and techniques which seemed appropriate to the country, maintaining the initiative in negotiations and not just responding to whatever suggestions came from foreign businessmen. Cuba, for example, he pointed out, was not opening the door wide, but was prepared to discuss "attractive propositions",[25] looking at every project on its merit.

Selectivity could and indeed, he believed, should be exercised by governments of all countries, including large economies like Nigeria,[26] "developed" industrialised ones like the UK (which he observed had singularly failed to do this in relation to the oil companies in the early 1970s[27]) and even small economies, whose room to manoeuvre was restricted by other factors, such as Lesotho, which was "severely restrained in policy choice by its geographical position as an enclave completely surrounded by South Africa".[28] Lesotho

was dependent on the Republic not only for its power supplies but also for most of its finances from the remittances of its migrant workers employed there and from the income of visiting South African tourists, and was wide open to trade (as well as "cultural") penetration by its neighbour, and to the possible threat of military invasion. However, "a selective policy" and a sense of "nationalist realism"[29] was what he suggested Lesotho needed in dealing with the TNCs when he addressed a conference at Maseru in 1979, held in fact for the purpose of attracting more foreign investment.

His own lecture at this conference reflected a very pragmatic, almost at times defensive, attitude towards the TNCs and their representatives present - as opposed to what he termed "a very dogmatic, inflexible line"[30] taken by some students present from Lesotho University. Within the context of an address entitled "Can a TNC Enterprise be Socially Responsible?", he argued that it was necessary to go beyond the question of whether TNCs were "good" or "bad".[31] It had to be recognised that any local TNC manager was "bound to be loyal to his employer and to respect the worldwide pattern of the company's interests, rather than the social progress of the country in which he happens to be working" - except in so far as this was also to the company's own advantage, he maintained, and as such the question of social responsibility was in fact neither "appropriate" nor "fair". However, he went on, repeating a point he had previously made in relation to overseas companies, TNCs were generally concerned to maintain political stability and avoid social unrest in their own long-term interest, and were therefore likely to act in a socially responsible way, "to protect their own interests", observing "One should not ask more than that".[32]

But, while their interests were normally better served by democratic regimes where policies were more predictable and the decision-making machinery "more comprehensible and more accessible to outsiders", he acknowledged that TNCs needed a "favourable" as well as stable political atmosphere within which to operate, and "as second best", might well prefer "a repressive regime to one that was unstable or hostile" and that the transnational system had "in fact been accompanied by a growth of political repression, often including the use of torture". But even so, he argued, "their power, especially to overthrow socially responsible governments, is limited. Even what happened in Chile in 1973 cannot be put down primarily to the activities of the TNCs, but to internal developments."[33] Thus he downplayed the significance of the external intervention of the TNCs in the overthrow of Allende, considering "internal developments" more significant.

Within the context of another paper produced in the same year as the Lesotho conference (1977), he also advised against exaggerating the role of the CIA in its covert support for American TNCs, considering its impact was probably less than was generally assumed. While agreeing it was professionally indefensible for social scientists to ignore the role of the CIA and conceding that its "essentially marginal influence" could "perhaps" have been decisive in Chile, he again made the point that it could not achieve much unless strong local forces shared the same objectives.[34] The significance of these internal factors will be returned to below; but this does demonstrate that Seers in no way considered the

TNCs as the only, or even, main constraint on development options.

Within the context of the Lesotho conference his attitude to the TNCs was in fact quite accommodating compared to some of his more generalised remarks - evident in other points raised. For example, whereas he was frequently critical of the profound damage that could be caused by TNCs to a country's economy, through imported consumption tastes, inappropriate technology, and expensive capital with the outflow of profits, he argued in Lesotho:

> politicians have to accept demands for higher consumption created by the transnational system as a fact of life. In any case, imported technology and capital satisfy very real needs in countries which are poor, especially for nutrition. Moreover, not all modern technology is inappropriate and not all of it need be expensive.[35]

For a country, like Lesotho, with high unemployment rates and attendant social problems, which had already been drawn into the TNC complex through its migrant workers working in the South African mines, Seers implied there was no alternative but to leave the door partly open to the TNCs - and as such seemed anxious to point out their influence was not necessarily entirely negative.

He recognised, however, that TNCs always had a great deal of expertise at their disposal and were able to "manipulate market forces to a considerable extent" so that "governments - including 'their own' - find them hard to monitor or tax, let alone control";[36] whereas many governments where they operated were still often inadequately informed about the various possible sources of capital and technology, and lacked the necessary expertise and capacity to supervise or monitor foreign corporations, to ensure that the costs of inviting them in (in social and political, as well as economic terms) were not overly high. He therefore continued to reiterate his advice that governments should inform themselves as much as possible about the companies with whom they were likely to do business and critically assess the consequences of the possible linkages with the transnational system, the new element being that he now often illustrated his argument with the example of Japan (see, e.g., Chapter 6, p.299). Governments needed a "corps of experts" with technical capacity and knowledge and what he termed "mean and hungry" attitudes: "Mean in the sense of not giving away anything unnecessarily and not paying a cent more than one has to for what he needs. Hungry for jobs, tax revenues, local purchases and exports";[37] though not ruthlessly negative; the important thing being to ensure any contracts undertaken were designed to suit the national interest.

While conceding it would be more difficult for small and heavily dependent countries to adopt such an approach he insisted "Even the government of a small country can study ... the TNCs in a few industries" -"if necessary with the help of foreign consultants", pointing to the recently set up UN Centre on Transnational Corporations as a potential valuable source of information. However, having been critical of the inappropriate and patronising advice offered by some foreign advisers in the past, he added by way of a proviso "any government inviting technical advice on a major policy decision should

check up in advance on any consultant - and this includes those offered by UN agencies."[38]

Although the room to manoeuvre of smaller economies dealing with the TNCs did seem limited, bargaining power obviously varied from country to country and by the early 1980s Seers observed that some governments had been so successful at bargaining and monitoring foreign investment that it was no longer possible for European companies to make large profits in the South (which at that time he used as a reason for greater disengagement from the Third World and more investment in Europe - see below pp.342, 344-5, 352). This would tend to indicate that governments could not afford to let their corps of experts become too successful or "mean and hungry" in their bargaining positions, or the TNC investment was liable to be moved elsewhere, where conditions might be more profitable - selectivity ultimately being the prerogative of the TNCs, rather than of the governments where they chose to operate.

What this section has tried to indicate, however, is that although Seers in general agreed the operation of the TNCs constituted one of the main external constraints on a government's room to manoeuvre, he in no way regarded them as entirely responsible for a government's failure to pursue a more effective development strategy. He accepted them as a fact of life, favouring the adoption of a pragmatic "selective" approach towards these corporations, whereby governments would attempt to retain as much self reliance and independence as possible, without adopting a wholesale programme of nationalisation. For small economies in particular he suggested that it was worthwhile considering various forms of joint ventures with outside companies, already adopted by some governments, requiring the participation of citizens in ownership and/or management[39] - though, as has been pointed out elsewhere, he was in fact often critical of the international elite that developed in such circumstances.

International financial institutions

There was "some tendency, because its 'missions' are so visible, for the [International Monetary] Fund itself to be blamed for the economic constraints on policy",[40] Seers observed, and indeed both the financial assistance granted by the IMF (for balance of payments relief) and from the World Bank (which was more project oriented) were widely regarded by countries of the South, as presenting serious constraints on policy options because of the conditions attached to their loans. While recognising the problems, Seers was again more circumspect in his interpretation of the situation.

Governments attempting to delink a country closely integrated into the world economy and to pursue more radical strategies often faced foreign exchange difficulties, he acknowledged, and those forced to turn for assistance to the IMF were often put under pressure to drop the delinking strategy and associated internal reforms and adopt a more open door policy, thereby reversing the changes they had sought to bring about. Portugal after the 1974 coup provided a case in point:

> tourist arrivals dropped sharply ... Portuguese workers abroad held back their normal

> remittances, foreign banks insisted on prompt payment of obligations, and the inflow of private capital dropped while capital outflows rose, contributing ... to serious unemployment and a foreign exchange deficit.... in due course the government had to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for financial help. This was given on terms that in effect reinforced the reversal of the earlier egalitarian policies which was already in train (for example, in the distribution of income) and a steady rightward shift in the composition of the government.[41]

The influence of the IMF was considerable, not primarily because of the money it lent but mainly because of the confidence it instilled in other financial institutions, he observed, for until it had endorsed a government's policies as creditworthy, many other banks and governments were unwilling to make loans. But its criteria for soundness - including limits to the money supply and "ideological preferences against import, exchange and price controls, etc.", formalised in "letters of intent" and monitored by the application of performance tests[42] - ruled out the pursuance of "radical strategies".

However, while Seers himself was critical of the strict monetarist controls and conditions required by the IMF - as well as the accounting procedures on which it insisted (see below p.324) - he did not accept that the "blame" for constraints on policy lay with the Fund itself. Even in the early 1960s, it will be recalled, while highly critical of its insistence on monetarist policies in Latin America, he had suggested "we should hesitate before judging the IMF too harshly"[43] (see Chapter 2, p.88); and in the late 1970s he described the recourse to blaming the Fund as "immature",[44] since it was the major capitalist governments controlling the Fund which were ultimately responsible for imposing conditions. The IMF was "merely the front office of governments (those of the United States, Britain, West Germany, France and Japan) that determine policy under its weighted voting system", he observed, and it was the economic and political interests of these countries that ultimately set the boundaries on the policies of those governments approaching the fund for assistance. Not only did "Powerful and articulate bankers, industrial capitalists, etc., have a direct interest in the development strategies pursued overseas", but workers too in the major capitalist countries were concerned to protect jobs at high wages, which required that overseas countries (as markets and as sources of food and industrial inputs) were not taken out of the world system. "Reforming the IMF", he therefore argued, "would not in itself be a decisive step in changing the world balance of power."[45]

In fact, he took this argument further, maintaining that it was neither the IMF *nor* the capitalist powers which necessitated the financial controls but again "internal developments" or the "objective situation" within countries, particularly those with socialist governments:

> the need for a strict financial policy does not arise, fundamentally, because of the prejudices of the IMF (useful though this may be as a whipping boy), nor even because of the strength of the capitalist power. It arises out of the objective situation, especially the inconsistency between the aspirations of a socialist government's supporters ... and the inevitable drop in living standards, ... Indeed much of the what the Fund imposes in 'conditionality' governments would have to carry out anyway, even if it did not exist. To my knowledge, Finance ministers, including socialists, who are at the end of their tether, and more so their officials, often secretly welcome

> powerful outside pressure on their cabinet colleagues to behave at least in ways more consistent with financial equilibrium.[46]

Again it is the administrative weaknesses and impracticality of internal policies that are presented as being in large part responsible for the failure of governments to pursue a more autonomous strategy, rather than external pressures of financial institutions such as the IMF (or as was seen above the TNCs) and Seers did not join in general wholesale of the Fund.

His position was demonstrated at the South-North Conference on "The International Monetary System and the New International Order" held in Arusha (from 30 June to 3 July 1980), where the IMF was the target of much criticism. Seers acknowledged the conference papers were well prepared and relevant and "The case was established that IMF 'conditionality' is arbitrary, crude and often reflects political motives (though disguised as technical)",[47] which was substantiated by the evidence of a "leaked" internal IMF memorandum read out at the Conference by the Jamaican Minister for Finance. However, he recorded in his journey report "I played my usual conservative role, stressing that it was wrong to blame the Fund for everything, and urging that the 'initiative' to be prepared should focus mainly on a few major issues such as the volume and terms of balance-of-payments support."[48] Although having some reservations about the mixture of proposals which emerged during the meeting, he considered the final document of the conference contained "some useful substance", but did not put his name to it, requesting "not to be counted a signatory in view of the forthcoming seminars at Marlborough House"[49] - i.e. those he was chairing on "Adjustment Policies", sponsored by the World Bank and the Commonwealth Secretariat, and with high level participation by the IMF (see Chapter 6, p.262). One of the basic questions these seminars needed to address, Seers recognised, was in fact what conditions were likely to be imposed on any possible increases in transfers to African governments. As he put it himself, while "the rich country governments" would not agree to a massive increase unless conditions were imposed, this was "precisely what the African governments were worried about"; and these seminars were therefore "*inter alia* exploring informally the possibility of common ground", though he added parenthetically "('Objectively' we are being asked to help save the world capitalist system!)".[50]

Seers in fact had a close working relationship with the World Bank (as was indicated in Chapter 6, pp.262, 266-7) and although his association with the Fund had not been close in the past, because of his outspoken criticism of monetarism, he spoke of "mending fences with the IMF"[51] during a visit to Washington in May 1980 as preparations were made for the seminars. He was not, however, uncritical of the methods employed and the political and commercial biases reflected in both agencies, particularly of the IMF, and in concluding remarks to the adjustment seminars he recommended that the IMF and World Bank modify their positions, make changes in their operations and "continue to strive for flexibility, display greater imagination and exhibit greater tolerance".[52] These were, however, rather vague and generalised exhortations and in any case, as was seen above, he

did not personally believe that reforming the IMF would in itself be a decisive step in "changing the balance of world power" or removing the more fundamental constraints on policy, which were more determined by the economic and political interests of the major capitalist governments.

For governments of LDCs who needed assistance, he observed, there were alternative sources of finance available for development other than the IMF or the World Bank, such as the governments of Japan and several West European countries as well as commercial banks.[53] This observation, however, as will be seen later below, was inconsistent with the encouragement he was then giving to Western European countries to decrease their overseas aid programmes and his criticisms of the consequences of Third World borrowing from commercial banks - all of which in any case imposed some conditionality on their loans.

What he increasingly argued, in fact, was that aid and loans, rather than assisting a country, were often further obstacles or constraints on it pursuing a more self- reliant development strategy. Seers' views on aid will be discussed more fully later in this chapter, but his advice to LDCs, which regarded IMF terms and conditions on funding as obstacles to the development policies they wished to pursue, was, as he suggested at the Arusha conference, "that governments which were likely to get a rough deal from the Fund might just as well carry out a tough policy voluntarily"[54] - and thus pursue a truly more self-reliant and independent course. During the course of the "Adjustment" seminars too he observed there were several areas in which governments themselves could take action to rectify defects and mistakes in government policies.[55]

As it was, he pointed out, there were often many in positions of influence within the LDCs themselves who, for their own self interest and because of "cultural" influences, co-operated with the TNCs, their governments and the international financial institutions, thereby only reinforcing dependence on these external bodies.

Cultural constraints

"Foreign governments or international agencies that wanted to stop delinking" he observed, could "usually find allies high in the national power structure, among politicians and senior officials"[56] of the very governments that were apparently trying to delink. Even the CIA, he argued, could "hardly achieve much unless strong local forces share the same objectives" and equally "Foreign companies, military missions, technical assistance programmes, etc."[57] could not operate either without compliant local counterparts.

While not ignoring the existence of external political influences, what Seers put more emphasis on was the pervading influence of "cultural dependence" as being responsible for moulding such local counterparts - an international elite of official and professional classes, many of whom had been educated overseas or "to some extent shaped by foreign contacts". The adherence of this elite to conventional growth-oriented strategies of modernisation, their dependence on (even addiction to) foreign technology, and their emulation of American-type lifestyles (increasingly encouraged by the spread of television

and films) he regarded as a "form of denationalisation" and a "serious obstacle to adopting a thoroughgoing radical strategy".[58]

It was its influence on patterns of consumption and choice of techniques, thereby to a great extent determining government development policy, which made cultural dependence, in Seers' estimation, of "a different, higher, order of importance than economic dependence";[59] for a transnational elite whose minds were "stuffed with foreign values and theories", he observed, might "be unable to understand even the need for national development, let alone frame a development strategy in the national interest".[60] The elites in the NICs and oil exporting countries, "closely linked to foreign firms" (and quite often supported by aid programmes) were also, he maintained, "the most notorious for corruption and repression",[61] and could hardly be said to have the overall development needs of the country at heart, or represent the interests of the majority of its people.

It was to counteract these transnational cultural influences that Seers stressed the importance of national cultural traditions, widely disseminated among the population, arguing that the capacity of a government to adopt an independent strategy might lie not so much in its productive structure, technology, or military capability (a subject covered below), important though these were, "as in the strength and homogeneity of its culture which can help it and its leadership avoid cultural dependence" on an imported way of perceiving the nation's own needs.[62]

But, while acknowledging the significance of external "cultural" influences, Seers also indicated he considered these were often only reinforcing internal political forces, which had their own reasons for holding back on implementing a more egalitarian development policy aimed at eliminating poverty and unemployment, and reducing dependence:

> one danger of discussing external links is that one seems to be 'blaming' them for all the social problems of a country. In many parts of the world corruption and repression were endemic long before the arrival of TNCs (or even the colonial trading corporations). Powerful political forces inside a country prefer, for obvious reasons, a pattern of development that reinforces inequality and cooperate spontaneously with foreign governments and corporations to preserve it, if need be by force.[63]

As he increasingly remarked in the last ten years of his career, he considered national governments were themselves often the main obstacle to their own country's development - either because of their compliance with foreign governments and corporations - or because of their administrative failures, particularly with regard to financial management, when trying to break away from these and become more self reliant.

Internal administrative failures

Socialist governments which had taken power, dedicated to decreasing dependence on the TNCs and the international financial institutions, and to implementing more socially oriented and egalitarian policies, he considered, bore a large part of the responsibility for their own failures, which, he argued (as was seen above), could not be attributed entirely to the external constraints of the TNCs and their governments or the conditions imposed by the IMF, but were often due to "internal developments" or the "objective situation".

Taking the example particularly of Chile (though also indicating his remarks could also apply to Portugal, Jamaica and even Cuba), he observed that in post revolutionary euphoria, socialist regimes tended to raise wages, subsidise food prices, launch housing schemes, increase social services, build schools and hospitals, and take over large fragments of the private sector in order to fulfil promises made when in opposition and to retain the support of the working class, trade unions, and left-wing intelligentsia.[64] Socialist governments, however, he argued, had to learn that big gains could not be made in the early years since they usually "only [took] power at a time of national crisis", which normally left a legacy of "financial disequilibrium" - a state of near-bankruptcy, low assets, heavy debts, and a trade deficit. In addition the civil service, inherited from the earlier regime, was unlikely to be willing, or even able, to implement far-reaching reforms, while structural changes, such as land reforms and nationalisation, were likely to cause, in the first instance at least, disorganisation and declines in output, fuelled by the retaliatory measures of local capitalists thus affected and the TNCs cutting investment and exporting capital. In such circumstances the economic situation only deteriorated, inflation gathered pace and the inevitable result was political crisis and reversal of policies and social gains.

In the case of Chile he considered Allende's economists had made simplistic errors, which had contributed to the economic chaos, into which the country collapsed. Ambitious social and economic development programmes had been undertaken, without the Unidad Popular having a majority in the Chilean Congress and thus the ability to raise taxes and adequate government revenue. Finance had been treated as of secondary importance to structural reforms, and the administration had lacked the necessary skills for the envisaged far-reaching change. As such, in his estimation, serious administrative, especially financial, mistakes had been made; high public sector wages had fuelled price inflation which, without an adequate rationing policy, had led to shortages and the proliferation of black markets, prompting widespread public demonstrations. At the same time industrial production declined because of dwindling supplies of raw materials and spare parts, resulting in strikes and further unrest; - and setting the stage for the coup and reversal of policy.[65]

Socialist political leaders, Seers argued, needed to work out in advance, while still in opposition, proper financial policies, especially an incomes policy, to cover the inevitable period of disorganisation when they took power and should not promise more than they could actually deliver, making it clear that much depended on the price of oil and other factors outside their control. While no supporter of strict monetarist policies such as those undertaken by Allende's successor, Pinochet, in Chile, Seers advocated the need for stricter attention to financial policy by governments attempting to "delink". Even Cuba he pointed out had eventually been obliged to enforce tighter budgetary controls, insist on balanced books, and adopt monetary incentives (as noted in Chapter 5, p.248).[66]

While he acknowledged "It would be a great over simplification to claim that financial imprudence in the 'Southern Cone' of Latin America (Argentina and Uruguay as well as Chile - and also, earlier, Brazil) caused the subsequent political coups", agreeing that "one

would have to analyse the interactions between all the main forces, including property-owners, trade unions, ambitious generals, and the foreign interests conspiring to overthrow the governments concerned", he nevertheless considered "financial imprudence" played its part in the failure and fall of such governments. Certainly, he argued, "inflation undermined support for populist governments there, especially among the professions and the bureaucracy, and opened the door to the military plotters."[67] If the crucial error of the Right was to make a fetish out of ending inflation, that of the Left, he maintained, was to brush it aside as unimportant.[68]

Governments needed to remember that "expectations of various classes constitute one of the most important constraints on the room to manoeuvre",[69] observed Seers, indicating it was impractical to raise these expectations too high only to have them dashed by incompetent economic policy, which he believed had been the fate of governments such as that of Allende.

Geographic and demographic factors

There were, however, Seers argued, other fundamental factors affecting a government's room to manoeuvre (in addition to those already mentioned), to which far too little consideration was given by any social scientists, dependency theorists included. These were geographical and demographic constraints, including a country's size (both in terms of area and population), the ethnic and linguistic composition of its population, the nature of its natural resources, its location in relation to other better endowed countries, and its vulnerability to military invasion. As indicated above (pp.309-10), he considered Lesotho to be one such country severely restrained in its policy choices by its size and geographical position.

These additional elements had political implications, he maintained, for while most economic and cultural constraints could be described "as features specific to world capitalism" this was untrue of geographic and demographic features; as such, he argued, this ruled out treating dependence as purely a phenomenon of the capitalist system and a condition which would disappear if the system did.[70] Geographical determinants did not change significantly and limited the range of feasible scenarios for any country whether it was "ruled by a conservative military dictatorship or a revolutionary junta",[71] he observed - though demographic features in particular could obviously alter, or be altered by policy, over time.

Size he considered as "perhaps the most important determinant of the room to manoeuvre"[72] including it - together with oil, food, and technology - as one of the major determinants of a country's dependence. For a country with a limited population, such as Montserrat or even Mauritius, he concluded "there are not many development options for *any* government" and "No room for manoeuvre at all" seemed left to a government with several of the following liabilities: "a small population, ethnic divisions, location next to a superpower, few natural resources, a culturally subverted bureaucracy, high consumer expectations and a narrow technological base."[73] As such the choice facing many

governments of small countries, was bleak, he acknowledged, the development options being "constrained by realities".[74]

One way of escaping the constraints of a country's size, he argued, lay in some form of political and economic integration, which could take various forms "from free trade association through common markets and federations to monetary and political unions".[75] Linking up with others would add resources, widen the market, strengthen the technological base, increase military potential and open up a greater variety of strategic options for planners.[76] While previous attempts to co-ordinate policies of governments with varying cultural and political histories, geographical sizes, and economic interests had met with difficulties (as he well knew from personal experience of the West Indian Federation, for example; see Chapter 1, p.71-3), he nevertheless came to consider that "Collective self-reliance" covering the whole South" held out on paper more promise. This is a suggestion which was influenced very much by his European based work and will be returned to again later in this chapter.

No individual government, however, he believed was completely without policy options, though for smaller economies wishing to pursue a more self-reliant strategy certain factors (not usually given adequate attention by social scientists) assumed more significance, particularly, in Seers' view, the linked issues of population and military policy, and political leadership.

Escaping the constraints - population, military policy, and leadership

If size of population affected a country's dependence, as Seers argued, then population policy formed an important part of strategic planning, and, as was mentioned briefly in Chapter 6 (see p.293), he considered that in certain circumstances, particularly for a small country, this could entail endorsing pro-natal policies (as a means to enlarge the internal market and increase the productive workforce, particularly if migrant labour was having to be imported) and encouraging the build-up of military strength. While recognising both pro-natal policies and recommendations for military mobilisation would shock many of those working on development problems, he was by no means advocating their universal implementation. If a small country was experiencing chronic emigration because of shortage of resources, and military threats were remote, then he agreed an anti-natal policy was indicated, as it was in many larger Third World countries, such as Nigeria, for example, though, he insisted, this was "a major political question with many aspects" on which a visiting mission could not advise.[77]

He acknowledged too the dangers of increasing military capacity, observing - in relation to the internal factors to be taken into account by a government attempting to carry out widespread social and economic reforms - "one has to add to the list of constraints 'What would the armed forces tolerate?'"[78] He was himself often highly critical of the repressive military regimes that had appeared in many Third World countries, and agreed that there was a danger that increasing military strength could increase an army's power to

overthrow the government in a coup or be deployed against local citizens instead of invaders. In addition it could increase other forms of external dependency - in the form of debts to foreign governments and banks, and political and technological dependence on foreign arms supplies and military training schemes. But, he maintained, it was "naive to ignore the importance of defence capabilities" since "ultimately the possibility of an autonomous economic policy depends on military strength, i.e. the size, skill, and loyalty of the armed forces and the state of their equipment"[79] - to counteract external threats. Very few social scientists seemed willing to tackle the question of the level of military expenditure, but an optimal development strategy covered all types of policy, he observed, and policy in the military sphere needed integrating with those in other areas of development.

In any case, while admitting there were global dangers in both fast population expansion and excessive military expenditures, he argued these were "not relevant questions for policymakers or planners in small countries which have to concern themselves with their own national interests"[80] - since there was no world political authority, including the United Nations, that could yet provide for their security and economic needs. In a period of struggle for resources, he observed, a small country risked attack from a great power simply for the strategic use of its airfields, ports, etc. - though the question of whether the armed forces of a small country would in any case act as a deterrent or be capable of resisting those of a great power determined on invading it, he did not address.

Political leadership was the other major factor, Seers maintained, that could prove of vital significance particularly for a country limited in its policy options by size. Exploiting what room to manoeuvre there was, he argued, required "a high level of leadership", which for a small country was "a more important factor than in a large country".[81] It required "rare skills" not only to frame an optimal set of policies but "to mobilise an adequate coalition of diverse political forces to support it; to present it persuasively to the world outside; and of course to implement it"[82] - while retaining continuing domestic support. A condition of political success in a complex world full of shifting constraints was for a leader to be "pragmatic rather than dogmatic" he argued, and, in addition to having intelligence and political skills, to be "patriotic" and capable of developing and controlling the public's patriotism, so that they were prepared to tolerate short-term material deprivations and the possible hardships of retaliation that might result from more self-reliant policies.[83] No amount of leadership was going to transform Lesotho or Jamaica into a dominant country or even one capable of much independent action within a few decades, he agreed, but there were always "certain possibilities of penetrating the curtain surrounding any country" for leaders to exploit what assets even a small country did have, including taking advantage of differences between and within dominant powers.[84]

As an example, he often drew attention to the record of Dom Mintoff in Malta, for demonstrating "remarkable ability to sustain economic development" in a small country, singularly lacking in cultivable land and other natural resources and experiencing heavy

demographic pressure relieved only by emigration, though having a harbour of considerable military and civil importance. Mintoff had apparently once told him that the government of a small country had to decide what trump cards it held and then play them for all they were worth and, in Seers' estimation, he had "brilliantly exploited the military advantages of Valetta harbour, and his political base among the dockyard workers, as well as the sympathies of Britons such as Lord Mountbatten, to extract payment not only from Britain and NATO in support of the public finances of Malta, ... but also (for a time) from Libya".[85] While observing he "would not necessarily endorse all of Dom Mintoff's policies",[86] the Maltese premier was in fact the one and only example Seers ever quoted of the sort of leadership he had in mind.

In stressing the importance of leadership Seers himself admitted to "an apparent inconsistency"[87] in his argument, for if cultural dependence was so strong and political leaders could no longer be considered autonomous agents since their minds were moulded by foreign perceptions, how could they be expected to see the need for a strategy of national development. His argument that the "complexity of politicians" and the growing crisis in the world economy would "permit their latent nationalist tendencies to grow"[88] seems rather unconvincing, particularly as he was himself extremely critical of the authoritarianism and corruption of much Third World leadership at this time.

In a review of *The Political Economy of Nationalism*, Douglas Rimmer observed of Seers' argument that the room to manoeuvre could "be enlarged by increasing national self-sufficiency in food and energy, building up military power (sometimes implying the encouragement of population growth), fostering patriotism, and excluding foreign influences":

> It is astonishing that advice so closely resembling the prescriptions of Mussolini's Italy should have been thought constructive. Seers deplored the growth of repressive government in developing countries ... yet the association of authoritarian rule with the promotion of nationalist ideology and military power appears not to have occurred to him.[89]

Seers was to some extent aware of these inconsistencies, as his comments on the military and leadership indicate, though he by no means adequately resolved or even attempted to resolve these; his main concern being, apparently, to draw attention to certain factors (usually ignored by other social scientists, especially economists), which he believed could affect and improve the room to manoeuvre, particularly of governments of small economies. However, policy options stressing the importance of nationalism, strong political leadership and building up the military, assumed more ominous overtones, when advocated on a more general and widespread basis, including, as will be seen later in this chapter, to the European region.

Seers did, however, stress that the possibilities for generalisations on development were limited. While, he observed, there was "a tendency to make categorical ideological statements about the overriding virtues of social control (or private enterprise); industrialisation (or rural development); foreign capital (or self-reliance)", the choice of

development strategy was "to a considerable extent determined by the particular characteristics of each country, including its external context and the strategic objectives open to it". What would be correct in a fairly large country with considerable natural resources like Malaysia, might be quite unsuitable for a government of a small country with a narrow resource base, such as Singapore.[90] In some countries, a strategy aiming at a more self-reliant and egalitarian society would imply a heavy emphasis on rural development, including agriculture and rural industrialisation; in others, it might require the establishment of a sufficient industrial base for producing the capital goods needed. Similarly he considered a basic needs approach was "country-specific and time-specific", there being "no such thing as 'the' basic needs strategy".[91]

What he thought still useful, however, were country studies, which, if framed comparatively could help development theories which covered *types* of country, such as small petroleum producers, or large economies based on peasant agriculture, a suggestion he had first put forward back in 1963.[92] In addition what he considered necessary, especially for smaller countries, was the need for planning basic structural changes, incorporating some of the elements of conventional plans but with additional dimensions, with particular attention being given to distributional issues and non-quantitative methods,[93] to which in fact we turn in the next section. While some of his general remarks and theorising about self reliance is rather inconclusive and inconsistent at times, his work in the statistical field is more tangible and concrete.

Statistics for self-reliance

The increasing evidence that growth *per se* failed to bring about widespread development, and that social problems and economic dependence often increased in fast growing economies, Seers observed, "forced a reconsideration not merely of theories and policies, but also of the statistics devised to quantify them".[94] In a paper entitled "Statistical Needs for Development" (1977), taking as his premise that economic self reliance and the elimination of poverty, unemployment and inequality were the two main objectives of most developing countries, he spoke of the need to devise statistics which would be useful in dealing with the problems of both "poverty *and* dependence" (my emphasis).[95] The scale and novelty of problems in the mid-1970s challenged "both national and international statisticians to think imaginatively" and statisticians could "do a great deal to help or hinder official and public understanding of change", he maintained, since views of the world and the possibilities of research on its problems depended very much on the statistics available and on what system was adopted for presenting them.[96]

As has become apparent in previous chapters, Seers regarded purely quantitative data, such as national income, inadequate measures or indicators of welfare or development, a view reflected once more in a report to the Malaysian government in 1974 when he observed that it generally took "no account of the social costs of modernisation, whether in the environmental sense (pollution and depletion of the nation's fuels, metal ores and soil

fertility) or the human (national and social disintegration, urban slums, crime and traffic accidents), nor of the real welfare contribution of social services."[97] Nevertheless a great deal of effort was still expended in collecting such quantifiable data since it was often demanded by the UN and other donor agencies, and while not regarding this as worthless, he considered it constituted only a small part of a real analysis (especially in light of the very poor quality of statistics in most countries). In the development field, he maintained, the important issues were qualitative and institutional, concerning "not *how much* growth of income but *whose* income has grown; not *how many* school-years of education, but *what sort* of education" (original emphasis).[98]

While continuing his work on social indicators of development during the 1974 consultancy to Malaysia, to be discussed below (pp.326-7), and in work at IDS (see Chapter 6, pp.257-8), discussions at the conference on statistical policy held at IDS in May 1975, in which he was heavily involved as co-organiser and co-author of the final report, also influenced the direction of his work towards devising more appropriate national accounts for measuring development and focusing his critique on reform of the UN SNA (System of National Accounts).

Although the tone of much of his work in the later 1970s was sharply critical of, and even cynical about, the development record of many Third World governments, and he often advocated the disengagement of European social scientists from work overseas to concentrate more on their own region, even criticising the basic needs strategy as paternalistic, it is in fact his work on national accounting and social indicators that continues to reflect more clearly his ongoing humanitarian, even moral, concern for the welfare of the poorer sections of society and their real basic needs, as he sought more appropriate measures of development as a means to devise and implement practical policies to relieve poverty.

Reform of the SNA

The conference of 1975 brought together 62 participants from 26 countries, including senior officials of Statistical, Census and Planning Offices, academics from various social science disciplines engaged in analysing and interpreting data, and representatives of international organisations (UN, ILO, UNCTAD, OECD and FAO), thereby providing a forum for both producers and consumers of data. The main objective of the conference was "to reconsider the priorities of statistical work, ... to provide better measures of the economic and social health of a nation, such as measures of poverty, unemployment and inequality" and "to see how far the needs for international comparability of data (through GNP, standardization of classification and definitions, etc.) [were] in conflict with the local statistical needs of a less developed country".[99]

The challenging tone of some of the LDC participants at this conference has already been mentioned (see Chapter 6, p.283) and much lively and sometimes heated debate was generated as LDCs asserted what Seers termed their "statistical sovereignty".[100] There was in fact a high degree of agreement on "the need for better and disaggregative

measures" of economic and social conditions in LDCs indicating, for example, "the proportion of the population below poverty level, the distribution of income and wealth among various income and ethnic groups and regions, the degree and pattern of labour utilization, and the nature and extent of malnutrition"[101] and also the need for more resources to be devoted to statistical work as an aid to development planning. However, the discussion on how to reconcile these needs of individual countries with the data requirements for international comparability generated more controversy, as many LDC officials claimed that international agencies, such as the IMF and the World Bank, distorted statistical priorities, by putting pressure on national statistical offices to spend much of their scarce professional manpower collecting data to fill in returns or provide information to back aid requests, rather than devising accounting systems that suited national needs. Their complaints were two-fold, observed Seers:

> that they were forced to produce data which they would not otherwise compile and which in many cases they felt were too unreliable to justify publication, and that they were induced to adopt statistical standards and conventions ... which seemed to be devised primarily to suit the needs of developed, industrial countries.[102]

As someone, who had himself frequently criticised the distortions caused by the uncritical transfer of standards and techniques inappropriate to the needs and circumstances of LDCs, Seers considered these complaints had sufficient basis in reality to be taken seriously by the agencies.

A special target of attack, however, was the SNA (System of National Accounts) generally adopted by the UN and other agencies for international comparability and based particularly on GNP and aggregative maintables, turning Seers' attention, both during the course of the conference, and in a number of papers over the next few years,[103] to considering how it could be reformed, building on and further developing his previous arguments concerning the need for more relevant accounting systems. Its basic limitation, he argued, was that it was another inappropriate transfer of a system which had evolved in the industrial countries (originally being used to estimate the effects of changes in demand on income and employment, particularly in circumstances of heavy pre-war unemployment) and, despite the addition in 1968 of a supplementary chapter on "Adaptation of the full system to the developing countries", it was still not suitable for the needs of LDCs in a number of ways.

One of its main defects, he pointed out, was that it was "*monistic*, treating the whole nation as an appropriate object of analysis and of policy prescription"[104] dealing in totals of income, consumption, etc., and thus throwing together people of different classes, areas, races, degrees of modernisation and taking no consideration of the urban/rural, modern/traditional, regional and racial divisions experienced by most developing countries. For example, there was little significance in figures for Brazil that averaged out the household consumption of rich states like Sao Paulo with those of the poverty-stricken north-east, and little sense in adding together and averaging out all household incomes and consumer expenditures of Malays and Chinese in Malaysia, where the government was

committed to a policy enabling the former to catch up economically and socially with the latter.[105] The most significant economic characteristic of a country was quite often he maintained, "not its average income but the income of the poorest group",[106] as there was usually some social group, such as tea estate workers in Sri Lanka, for example, which was obviously deprived and, he observed, "anyone moved at all by social morality, or even political expediency, will feel the need to measure the nature and extent of its deprivation, as a basis for action to remove it, whether official or otherwise".[107]

The SNA was also basically designed for a country which was *economically independent*[108] and the accounts of companies under foreign control were not considered significant enough to require separate treatment; whereas the economies of many LDCs were heavily dependent on foreign companies, particularly the TNCs, for trade and investment. LDCs, he argued, needed statistics on the activities of the main multinational corporations operating within their territory or proposing to do so, including details of their world-wide operations, which the SNA did not encompass.

In addition, the SNA, as previously frequently remarked of GNP, gave only cursory treatment to the often significant non-marketed production of LDCs; it also assumed that reliable statistics existed for a large fraction of economic activities, whereas, as Seers observed, in developing countries there was "a degree of fantasy about most published national accounts in the sense that any competent statistician could easily justify doubling or halving many items, by just making different assumptions".[109] One implication of the difficulty presented in measuring income distribution, when available data was unreliable or irrelevant, he maintained, was that published estimates in fact tended to exaggerate inequality and the extent of poverty, and overstate international inequalities several fold (again a point he had first explored in the early 1950s).[110] They also, he now argued, often exaggerated regional inequalities and the urban/rural divide - an opinion which resulted in a certain disagreement with Michael Lipton's argument in 1977 that patterns of economic growth since the Second World War had benefited urban communities in terms of social services and income whereas rural poverty had been aggravated.[111] While Seers himself frequently commented on the dualism in countries and the urban/rural divide, urging the adoption of more rural, rather than urban, development programmes, he also argued that the urban/rural contrast had been greatly exaggerated precisely because many rural products and non-agricultural income in rural areas were not included in official statistics, and it was therefore extremely difficult to produce meaningful estimates of income or relative deprivation in rural areas.[112]

Despite its many drawbacks, however, Seers did not consider that the SNA should be discarded but reformed, the practical issue being how to develop and adapt it to make it a more appropriate and useful system to meet the circumstances and needs of individual "developing" countries, while at the same time "preserving as much as possible of existing conventions and definitions".[113] Relevant measurements could be "grafted onto" the system, he suggested, depending on which entities or activities were sufficiently important in the national context to justify accounts being prepared for them; but since key areas for

policy and analysis varied one could not expect a set of universally applicable answers.

At the 1975 conference a number of characteristics considered "crucial in determining a country's accounting needs" had been identified: "its size; its economic diversity; the proportion of the population living in rural areas; the importance of foreign trade and investment; the degree and nature of government involvement, especially its commitment to social change and to economic independence;" and the capacity of the administration to collect and process statistics, particularly bearing in mind the small number of qualified statisticians most LDCs had at their disposal.[114]

An accounting system was needed, Seers agreed, that provided for the interaction between activities in the modern, "marginal" and traditional economies, distinguishing within the modern between the activities of the multinational firms, and those which were in public and private control, and as such he suggested preparing accounts for the foreign, state and private parts of the formal economy; while developing within each productive sector an account, however rough, showing the scale of the informal economy. In addition, depending on the circumstances of the country concerned, he suggested the need for a household account, divided geographically or by race, to gain a greater understanding of regional and racial differences.[115]

Poverty-oriented policies, however, he observed, needed primarily "non-economic statistics on housing and health; and egalitarian policies data on property and differential social statistics".[116] It was the need for non-economic statistics that continued to stimulate Seers' interest in the development and use of social indicators to measure the determinants and symptoms of poverty and inequality and indicate policy needs.

> More adequate clues for poverty-oriented planning consist of measures of the *determinants* of poverty - e.g. size, conditions and facilities of housing (especially the availability of clean water), access to hospitals - or the *symptoms* of poverty - weight of children, incidence of rickets, tuberculosis, etc. Apart from being better guides to the scale and whereabouts of poverty, such measures also point much more directly to the type of policy that is needed.[117]

From socio-economic indicators to active life profiles

A short-term (one month) UNDP consultancy attached to the Malaysian Centre for Development Studies Prime Minister's Department in 1974 provided Seers with practical insight into the subject as one of his main tasks was to evaluate the country's socio-economic indicators project (as part of preparatory work for the Third Malaysia Plan to be formulated in 1975). Here official policy was focused on promoting national unification and redistribution, following the racial disturbances, and channelling more of the benefits of growth to the lower income groups in an attempt to reverse the tendency of racial groups to accumulate in particular areas, industries and income brackets.

In the course of his report discussing criteria for poverty-oriented planning, Seers recommended indicators be selected "to yield targets for eliminating the elements of poverty (ill-health, undernourishment, illiteracy, overcrowding, etc.) and to permit monitoring progress towards them". One major indicator suggested at this time was "the

weight of children at a specific age",[118] since this was not only something that could be easily and accurately measured, but also a body of usable and significant data already existed (which could also be improved), progress could be studied, and international comparisons made with other countries. Additionally a child's weight was not only a measure of its own nourishment, resistance to disease, and physical and mental capacity, but also a reflection of its mother's nutrition and health, of the household's income and food consumption, and the efficacy of the health services; and the nourishment and health of children was an easy concept for the public to grasp and one with which they were likely to co-operate, he maintained. Adopting such an indicator required establishing norms and collecting continuous and detailed records, which, it was anticipated, would not only provide material for research into the causes of poverty, but, as results became apparent, enable targets to be set for generally improved standards and increased health care to be directly aimed at the most vulnerable sections of the community where children were severely underweight. His interest and concern for children's welfare, as a broad social indicator, was later also demonstrated by his participation in the early 1980s in the initial stages of a UNICEF statistical study of the human cost of the world recession, Seers' suggested title for which was "Children - Main Victims of Recession".[119]

In addition to weight of children, it was recommended in the Malaysia report that a set of indicators be selected to monitor areas such as housing (persons per room, sanitary facilities); education (literacy, enrolment ratios, distribution of educational resources); distribution of government services (proximity of hospitals, clinics, schools, fire services, public transport, etc.). In this way, concluded Seers, a set of social targets could be established and built into the plan, which could aim at achieving targets in the future, "for example, at seeing that by 1980 severe undernourishment was virtually ended, nearly all houses had latrines and 'safe' water, 80 per cent (say) of children stayed at school until Grade III, illiteracy was reduced and 90 per cent of the population would live within 5 miles (or 1 hour) of a clinic manned by a doctor."[120]

The importance attached to social targets and planning, rather than national income, was later also evident in the basic needs report on Seers' mission to Nigeria where he again identified health as a central and comprehensive indicator and target for development, since it reflected and affected not only the adequacy of health facilities but also water supplies, food production, housing, education, and work. There was an essential circularity of needs and once improvements took place they could become cumulative, he maintained, observing "One of the surest routes to sound economic growth in Nigeria would be improved health, through improved nutrition, water supplies, etc."[121]

The success of such poverty-oriented planning, however, obviously depended not so much on the statistical resources available as on the commitment of governments to follow up with the implementation of policies and necessary measures to bring about change and improvements. In Seers' estimation Malaysia was one country whose quantity and quality of its statistics, administrative efficiency and economic resources put it in a position to achieve a social content in its planning which was almost unique, and he often referred to

it as one conspicuous example of a country where a serious attempt was being made to concentrate on issues of distribution between social classes and ethnic groups.[122] In fact it was further work on the social and demographic statistics of Malaysia, during a visit there in 1977, that first led him to explore the possibility of developing a more comprehensive additive framework - using life expectancy and life profiles as an integrating concept in social and demographic analysis and planning, as a supplement to national income accounting.[123]

The length of life and its distribution in various activities, of which productive paid employment was only one element, he considered an important dimension of welfare, referring to the central concept of time as the "neglected numeraire".[124] Life expectancy was "a better indicator than income of the 'gap' between nations", he argued, and, in sharp contrast to national income, the experience of the poor had a greater impact on life expectancy than that of the rich - since it was unlikely that the national average life expectancy would rise without any reduction in the mortality of the poor, since they were more numerous and their lives were more easily lengthened by improvements in social and health conditions.[125] He did not suggest this should displace but rather supplement monetary analysis, since income partly determined the quality and length of life.

What he had in mind in 1977 was a framework which could be based on the expected time that someone born in a certain year would spend in educational activities, in employment, in retirement, etc., based on the rates of mortality, school enrolment, employment, etc. for that particular year;[126] and in his first dummy table he had categories for Pre-school, Primary school, Secondary school, Absence from school, Technical college, etc., University, Incapacitation, Prison, Unemployment, Employment, Economically inactive (Unpensioned and Pensioned).[127] Drawing on social statistics from many different fields, a network of tables could be drawn up, he believed, all of which could be fitted into an additive framework enabling comparisons between the sexes, regions, races, social classes, etc., facilitating analysis of regional and ethnic inequalities, and providing background material for government planning for social change.

Other economists were also attempting to draw up a unified system of social statistics at this time and Seers acknowledged the "major step"[128] towards this important goal made by Richard Stone, whose 1975 UN report had outlined a system of social and demographic statistics (SSDS) that would match that of the SNA in economic statistics - though he was not uncritical of certain aspects of this report.[129] Seers, however, maintained his own initial work on life profiles in Malaysia in 1977 was carried out independently and in ignorance of profiles built up by Stone (related to an age-specific technique for educational and employment phases), and though, as a result of learning of this other study, he did not claim to have pioneered a completely new technique, the originality of his own work was that it applied to the total active life span, not certain phases.[130]

But, while suggesting that a life profile system would be a useful new statistical tool and urging that it be tested in different types of country, Seers took no steps to initiate such a programme at the time, partly because it was outside his normal line of work and also

because of the expense involved. But, in 1979, his paper came to the attention of two officials at the OECD who "offered some contribution to financing an international programme to test the system" [131] including some travel costs and funding for a workshop, which was held at IDS in June 1981 to give those doing the research in each selected country the opportunity to discuss the problems they had encountered and look at first results.

The countries chosen for the programme - Brazil, Britain, Hong Kong, Kenya and Malaysia - were representative of the four continents, ranging "from an industrial one with well developed statistics to one where the population [was] mainly rural, and the statistical system ... rudimentary" and including "countries with different ethnic and social structures and of great diversity in size (both in area and population)" [132] - though, as Seers acknowledged, the selection mainly reflected his personal contacts with the directors of the respective statistical offices.

Those carrying out studies were asked to make use of existing data to produce active life profiles for the country as a whole (as shown in Table 7.1, p.330) and also to make comparisons between different areas, ethnic groups, social classes, etc. relevant to the country concerned, also making comparisons over time. In Malaysia, for example, life profiles were compared for each ethnic group (Malay, Chinese, Indian); in Britain profiles were drawn up for main social classes (manual workers, and professionals, managers and employers); while in Brazil regional comparisons demonstrated a striking difference in mortality rates as males in the south had an average life expectancy 18 years more than their compatriots in the north-east states. Other types of life profile were also undertaken in the British study, estimating time spent in various inactive states (absence sick from work, in hospital, in prison) and drawing up a housing profile for different social classes and a health profile by gender. Time comparisons were also made (for example in Malaysia for males born in 1970 and 1979, which gave an indication of changing trends in life tables), and other experiments were conducted to demonstrate the effect lower mortality rates would have on life profiles in certain regions, though most of these were largely hypothetical exercises.[133]

While Seers considered such studies produced useful and valuable material for academic social scientists, his main interest was to explore the possible practical applications for planning of these life profiles. In principle, he maintained, it should be possible not only to analyse past social progress but also express social targets in development plans in terms of lengthening and improving life profiles, not merely in increasing total life expectancy or school attendance, but also in terms of reducing "time spent in undesirable states, e.g. unemployment and ill-health, etc., whether we are speaking of nations or particular social classes or age groups or areas where such problems are serious",[134] and producing equal opportunity targets for ethnic groups and regions, as well as the sexes. But, as he had acknowledged when first outlining the system in 1977, its usefulness to a statistical office for planning purposes depended very largely "on the strength of government commitment to solving social problems".[135]

	Expected duration (years)							
	Brazil (1970)		Peninsular Malaysia (1970)		Hong Kong (1971)		England and Wales (1971)	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Pre-school[a]	4.6	4.7	5.7	5.7	6.2	6.3	4.8	4.8
Of school age, not at school	2.2	2.2	0.8	0.9	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Primary school	5.3	5.2	5.3	5.0	7.1	7.0	6.4	6.4
Secondary school	2.1	2.1	2.7	2.0	3.1	2.7	4.3	4.3
Post-secondary education	0.33	0.26	0.16	0.14	0.32	0.19	1.45	1.25
Employer/ self-employed	16.0	2.1	16.0	4.8	6.7	1.6	4.1	1.1
Employee	17.5	5.9	18.4	6.4	34.2	18.3	37.2	23.6
Unpaid family labour	1.9	0.7	3.2	5.0	0.5	0.9	-	-
Unemployed	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1.8	1.0	2.3	1.2
Inactive	9.7	38.5	8.0	34.2	7.4	37.0	8.3	32.5
Total life expectancy at birth	57.5	61.6	60.1	64.1	67.4	75.0	68.9	75.2

a Including nursery school

Table 7.1 Active life profiles for each sex, in Brazil, Peninsular Malaysia, England and Wales, and Hong Kong (1982)
(*Source*: Seers, "Active Life Profiles for Different Social Groups: a contribution to demographic accounting, a frame for social indicators and a tool of social and economic analysis", *IDS Discussion Paper* 178, September 1982, p.16; taken from the findings of the country studies in the Life Profile Programme.)

When assessing the progress of the research programme in 1982, he considered the biggest drawback of the system was the possibility of misinterpretation, since the central issue posed was hypothetical - what *would* the life profile be if mortality remained unchanged - and tables had to be constructed indirectly by applying hypotheses to partial data from censuses and surveys, with death registration records in particular often proving to be incomplete, especially in rural areas.[136] On the whole, however, he concluded that active life profiles were worthwhile, wherever usable life tables existed or could be constructed. Among the anticipated advantages of the framework was that it forced those using it to rethink definitions and concepts in order to make them mutually consistent, which in turn led to improvement in official statistics and compelled different sections of a statistical office to work together. The profiles were flexible, could be extended when new data emerged and they also facilitated direct and more meaningful comparisons between countries; they provided "a system of social accounts, somewhat analogous to the system of national accounts"[137] and carried further the increasing emphasis on social factors in statistical development, which he had always maintained was vital, particularly for LDCs.

The significance and innovation of Seers' work in this field was recognised by one reviewer following his death who commented: "His work on life profiles for different social groups and different countries as a method of social accounting was probably his most innovative and ... most lasting contribution,"[138] though it is not clear to what extent this work has been continued or taken further since his death.

The inclusion of Britain in the life study programme was indicative of the trend in Seers' work in the later 1970s to extend the study of development to European countries and emphasise the common nature of problems facing "developed" and "developing" countries. Earlier work in the field of statistics had already reflected this growing concern; at the 1975 Conference on Statistical Policy, for example, Biplab Dasgupta had remarked that although discussions mainly centred on the statistical problems of the LDCs, many of these problems were shared by the developed countries as well[139] and Seers had observed that the need for "specially designed mutations of the SNA in 'developing' countries" might also "help statisticians in 'developed' countries to explore the full potential of the UN system".[140] The extension of development studies to Europe was the second essential element of Seers' "New Meaning of Development" and it is to this aspect of his work to which we now turn.

The extension of development studies to Europe

Working Group on the European Periphery

Following the publication of "The New Meaning of Development", in which Seers had advocated the extension of development studies to Europe, a workshop was held at the University of Sussex from 24 to 26 November 1977 to enquire whether theoretical insights obtained from work in the field conventionally called development studies could be

applied in Europe. To facilitate in-depth discussion attendance was limited to thirty participants but these included social scientists from several European countries including Britain, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, West Germany and Yugoslavia. The meeting, jointly sponsored by IDS and the Centre for Contemporary European Studies at Sussex University and partially financed by the Nuffield Foundation and the EEC, concentrated on the relevance of such concepts as dependence and under-development within the region and the implications of applying to Europe a core-periphery framework, drawn up by Seers, whose work in this field grew out of his study on the world context of development and, as was mentioned in Chapter 6 (see p.275), reflected the influence of Latin American colleagues at IDS.[141]

A particular reason for adopting this approach at this time, however, Seers acknowledged, was the prospect of the further enlargement of the EEC since the three countries then applying for membership - Greece, Portugal and Spain - were considerably poorer and more economically depressed than the current members (as were two possible future applicants, Turkey and Cyprus) and displayed many of the problems associated with "underdevelopment", which he had particularly noted during his visit to Portugal in 1976 (see Chapter 6, p.277). In addition they were generally considered politically unstable, including governments, in Seers' words, "with strong interests in correcting continental imbalances".[142] At a time when most of Europe was feeling the effects of economic recession, the incorporation of these countries on the "periphery" of the region into a predominantly "core" organisation raised both economic and political anxieties for the existing members of the Community and "structural issues" that were "familiar in the development field", he observed.

> If unemployment in them were not so great and so chronic, if they had no severely depressed regions, if wages were as high in the candidates as in the core of Europe, if their economies were diversified and political systems stable, enlargement would not raise the profound difficulties it does for the existing members of EEC.[143]

It was anticipated that the admission of the three "would transform the Community from a core club into something not only larger but quite different, subject to persistent pressures to develop the underdeveloped areas of Europe" which would prove "very expensive, and require a Community budget with a very different scale and composition".[144] If steps were not taken to develop the periphery after admission then he feared the freedom of movement clauses in the Treaty of Rome would lead to migration on a scale that would be hard for core countries to accommodate or tolerate, or that growing tensions due to continuing inequalities could lead to political unrest in the new member countries, posing a threat to the stability of the region.

The initial meeting at Sussex formed the basis for setting up a research group under the aegis of the EADI (of which Seers was then chairman), entitled the Working Group on the European Periphery, with the purpose of investigating these and related issues. Over the next few years the Group undertook various studies not only on the effects of enlargement on the prospective and existing members of the EEC, but broadening its

scope to cover the history and record of the Community, relations with the rest of Europe, including Scandinavia and Eastern Europe, and European relationships with the LDCs and the rest of the world. Four further major gatherings of the Group were convened over the next four years: the first during the EADI assembly in Milan in September 1978, followed by two meetings in 1979 (one at IDS in May-June and the other in Madrid in October) while in February 1981 the Group held its conference at the University of Lulea in Finland.

Seers took a very active part in the Group's activities - assisting in setting up and organising the meetings, preparing papers, participating in the sessions, and co-editing most of the final reports. Interest in the subjects discussed was such that most of the material from these meetings was published and Seers, together with Constantine Vaitsos (then Professor of Political Economy at the University of Athens), became joint general editors of a new series on "Studies in the Integration of Western Europe" published by Macmillan.[145]

As a result of broadening its area of study, Seers announced at the EADI general meeting in Budapest in November 1981 that the Working Group was changing its name to the European Group, to stress its concern with the region as a whole, not just the periphery, and that it could now move forward and "contemplate the application of self-sufficiency, increasingly discussed in the Third World, to regions, to nations and perhaps increasingly to Europe as a whole. Then", he continued, "we would not need to intervene in the outside world politically, militarily, by aid, by trade, as much as we do at present".[146]

However, in the very first meeting of the Working Group on the European Periphery in 1977 there was already an indication of Seers' interest in extending the concept of self reliance to Europe and support for greater disengagement from the Third World, and, in fact, he also touched on most of the issues he was to develop more fully, and articulate more strongly, over the next few years. In his paper prepared for this meeting, after outlining a European core-periphery model and the lessons that could be learned from Third World social scientists, he emphasised the need for reform of the EEC to prevent further polarisation in Europe, pointing out that the means needed to counter continental imbalances might well have to be acquired at the expense of international aid - with a greater priority being given to using the limited resources available "on the ramparts of Europe itself".[147] Already in 1977 too he envisaged a less outward-looking and more integrated Community, pursuing a policy of "collective self-reliance", with the possibility of further enlargement through expansion into Eastern Europe, contemplating that "The effect of self-reliance in Europe could be to stimulate national and continental self-reliance elsewhere."[148] The development of these ideas and their effect on, and interrelationship with, his views on overseas development, particularly aid policy, will be followed through in the following sections.

European core-periphery model

Western Europe, Seers observed when outlining his model of the region, really had two cores - in the sense of being "suppliers of capital and technology, centres of political, military and cultural dominance; providers of tourists and absorbers of migration"[149] - these being the United States and Central Europe, the core of which was judged to comprise of leading member West Germany, together with France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. While recognising that Central Europe was itself partly dependent on the US - particularly militarily (relying heavily on US armed forces and arms supplies) and culturally (with the US being the predominant source of films and TV) - it was the core position of Central Europe on which he concentrated.

Nearly all the big European TNCs (including banks), as well as the TV studios, newspaper offices and publishers, had their headquarters inside the core, which was closely knit together by systems of transportation and communications and had a good deal of cultural similarity, he observed. Rates of employment, as well as the degree of industrialisation and technological capacity, were on the whole higher than outside it, and it provided most of the tourists to, and nearly all the jobs for migrants from, the periphery; in fact economic growth and prosperity in the core had been facilitated by migrant labour taking on unattractive jobs and helping to restrain wage increases. Spatially, Seers observed, the core formed "an incomplete egg, partially upside-down, with its centre just north of Kassel in West Germany" (see Figure 7.1, p.335).[150]

Portugal (which had until 1974 been regarded as a metropolitan core of a colonial periphery) and Greece were now considered two obvious members of the underdeveloped periphery of Europe - being "short of technological capacity and capital goods industries" with "much of the local manufacturing foreign-owned",[151] militarily weak, and subject to considerable outside political pressure. Spain and Yugoslavia too were classed as peripheral countries, though it was recognised their industrial structures were relatively larger, better integrated and more nationally owned. However all demonstrated problems of dualism with striking regional inequalities, and had, during the past twenty years, "become heavily dependent on migration and/or tourism to purchase the basic necessities without which their publics could not be employed, fed or defended".[152] Seers drew particular attention to the extent and significance of emigrant labourers' remittances and tourist receipts to the foreign exchange income of these countries,[153] and the fact that they had all experienced large rises in foreign indebtedness and debt service payments, particularly since 1973, as a result of the oil price rises, inflation and the general recession in Europe. Many migrant labourers had lost their jobs in recent years and tighter migration controls had been imposed as "core" countries too faced the consequences of economic recession and had less financial resources and need for the recruitment of foreign workers.[154] This was therefore a key concern of the prospective new members of the EEC.




Figure 7.1 Seers' map of the core and periphery countries of Western Europe (1979) indicating the core forming "an incomplete egg, partially upside-down".
(*Source*: An amalgamation of 2 maps produced in D. Seers, B. Schaeffer and M-L. Kiljunen (eds), *Underdeveloped Europe*, Hassocks: Harvester, 1979, pp.17 and 21.)

The further from the core a country was, the poorer and more technologically dependent it was likely to be, he observed, though it might preserve more political and cultural autonomy than those closer to the cultural core of Europe. Turkey, Cyprus, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, although "neither geographically nor culturally part of Europe",[155] were considered an "outer periphery" since they too depended on Europe for tourism and migration, as well as trade and technology.

Britain and Italy were labelled semi-periphery since they were weak in government R&D, and both had shown more clearly than other EEC members (except the Republic of Ireland) "the characteristic symptoms of 'under-development' - chronic inflation and periodic foreign exchange problems especially since the shock of the price rises in 1973-4 in oil and other commodities";[156] though in 1977 Seers still thought it possible that Britain could become more like the core countries as it felt the effect of increased revenues from its own oil production.

A core-periphery model could also be applied to Eastern Europe, he observed, with East Germany at the core since not only did it export equipment and technology (typical of a core country), it employed migrant labour (though not in great numbers) from countries further east and was a net exporter of tourists to them; in addition, its social conditions and average income were "not much inferior to those of West Germany, at about the Austrian level".[157] As with the West European model the further a country was from East Germany, the worse the social conditions were likely to be - Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland were considered intermediate between core and periphery, whereas Bulgaria and Romania were more clearly peripheral in economic structure, income levels and social conditions, and more dependent on imported technology (mainly from E. Germany), though showing greater cultural and political independence.

Russia was regarded as standing in somewhat the same relation to Eastern Europe as the US did to Western Europe, being the chief supplier of arms, providing strong military and economic links through the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), and exporting energy and technology, though sending few tourists and accepting very few migrants. However, compared to the US, it was not deemed able to act as a major core since its income levels and consumer technology were inferior and its cultural influence weak - though its dominant influence was still recognised.

In view of the crisis that many peripheral countries were facing with the general slowing of growth and halt to net migration, Seers believed the core-periphery analysis could yield insights into their problems and that "the social sciences of Europe, especially in the periphery and semi-periphery, would benefit from drawing on those of the 'Third World', especially Latin America" which experienced somewhat similar problems (though usually on a larger and more serious scale), and that, overall, this would be more useful than the economic schools of the "core" countries "(e.g. US functionalism and neo-classical economics, or the variety of Marxism taught in Russia)".[158]

The main lesson the "rich experience" of Third World governments demonstrated, he argued now for Europe, as he had done for several years in relation to developing

countries, was that economic growth *per se* might well do little to relieve, and in fact often aggravated, social problems. In fact, he further pointed out, a combination of fast growth, with growing dependence, dualism and heavy unemployment had contributed to the spread of authoritarian regimes, especially in South America, and the same danger existed throughout the European periphery.[159] The criterion for judging policy was not therefore whether it would accelerate growth, but rather structural change, especially reduction of regional inequalities.

He made the further observation that almost any social scientist of the Third World recognised that nationalism, though "(not necessarily autarchy)" was, "on the whole, a constructive force for peripheral countries, indeed necessary for the preservation of a degree of economic, political and cultural autonomy".[160] However, at times he also noted the more negative aspects of nationalism, observing that failure to reduce regional inequalities (at both national and Community level) could outrage nationalist feeling, resulting in political upheaval, which he frequently presented as a threat rather than a constructive force that "could lead to the emergence of highly nationalist governments led by Euro-communists".[161] As will be seen below, he did in fact come to modify his thoughts on nationalism, putting more emphasis on the need to cultivate an "extended" European nationalism, as opposed to a narrow national nationalism.

His own European based work was very much focused on issues related to the reduction of regional inequalities and the formation of an integrated Community.

Problems and opportunities of the second enlargement of the EEC

For the three peripheral countries Greece, Portugal and Spain, observed Seers, membership of the EEC was regarded as a possible solution to their problems, guaranteeing the right of migration into core countries, opening up new sources of official and private capital, and providing a degree of political stability; all three had recently had repressive governments and joining a democratic Europe was perceived as "reinforcing democracy" as well as "strengthening forms of economic organisation".[162] For existing members of the Community too, admitting new members not only had the economic advantage of enlarging their market, but there was also a "political imperative" to bring the three "into the fold", to ensure the continent's southern flank was more fully under their influence, thus "reducing political instability and strategic risks".[163] However, he maintained, the implications, requirements and repercussions of enlargement had not been properly studied or widely appreciated by either the existing members or the new applicants; hardly anyone had grasped the magnitude of the project, apart possibly from W. Germany, and few were ready for sacrifices, even of a short-term nature, that enlargement might entail.

The applicants' justifications for membership, he argued, were vague and largely speculative and they seemed insufficiently aware that membership would involve considerable sacrifice of sovereignty and that parts of their existing manufacturing and

agricultural sectors were hardly capable of survival inside the Community as it currently operated. Opening up their markets to competition in the EEC could destroy many small businesses in the periphery, he warned. In Portugal, for example - where he had undertaken a survey for the OECD and in fact suggested the government gave some consideration to alternative more self-reliant options to joining the EEC (see Chapter 6, p.260) - a large fraction of the manufacturing labour force was employed in small firms which could hardly face the full competitive power of the giant corporations of the core, despite differences in wage levels. EEC membership might therefore "lock a country like this into dependence on exporting labour", and lead to greater dependence on TNCs and increased foreign political and cultural penetration, which could in fact reinforce existing dualism. In turn this could increase "the likelihood of genuinely left-wing parties taking power ... or only being prevented from doing so by right-wing repression" - as exemplified in certain Latin American countries - and neither process, he observed, "would necessarily stop at the Pyrenees".[164]

Further polarisation of Europe could, in principle, be mitigated by a number of measures, acknowledged Seers, in particular by the introduction of a European fiscal system institutionalising the transfer of incomes from the richer areas of the Community to the poorer, with bigger resources being made available to the Regional Fund, the Social Fund and the European Investment Bank. In addition, structural changes in the manufacturing sectors of the core would be required "to accommodate supplies of steel (from Spain), or textiles (from all three)" as would the transformation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to accommodate the new members' agricultural products, such as wine and olive oil, produced also by French and Italian farmers.[165] But since enlargement was coming at a time when most of the existing members of the Community were already confronting mounting economic difficulties - slow growth, rising inflation and unemployment - the general climate indicated that both capital resources and political will to finance the reconstruction of the agricultural and industrial sectors of the new prospective members of the community, as well as to institute a reformed fiscal system with a much larger budget, were in short supply.

In any case, Seers pointed out, the EEC had so far conspicuously failed to reduce the inequalities between the nine existing member countries, an issue discussed at the conference on "Integration and unequal development", held at IDS in 1979, whose findings demonstrated that inequalities had in fact often been enhanced since the Community was founded, with standards of living in areas like Sicily very far removed from that of West Germany. While at a national level fiscal systems had mitigated social contrasts within member countries up to a point, this had not happened at Community level. Not only had poorer regions fallen behind the richer in terms of economic growth, and the peripheral members become increasingly dependent on the technologically advanced core, but these tendencies had been reinforced by the Community's fiscal mechanism which, in Seers' words, had been revealed as "perverse",[166] being very weak and far from egalitarian, with substantial fractions of the outlays of the CAP and the

Regional and Social Funds going to the richest members. This too, remarked Seers, had been the experience of other regional groupings such as LAFTA (the Latin American Free Trade Association), where again the most advanced partners had benefited. The record of the EEC budget in reinforcing, rather than relieving, inequalities was therefore ominous in view of the prospective entrance of three relatively poor members.

On the wider global level too, he observed, EEC policies had reinforced international inequality as well, with a highly autarchic agricultural policy virtually excluding the import of many competitive products from overseas. Although special trade concessions were made to ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries (the great majority of them former British and French colonies) there were virtually no concessions to the large countries of Asia, the "cradle of world poverty". It was also not clear that the ACP overseas partners actually benefited from the concessionary association which was generally geared towards safeguarding the EEC's "'sensitive' agricultural and industrial sectors, at the same time securing its sources of raw materials and oil". Much of EEC aid had gone into STABEX, which partially stabilised ACP export earnings from primary commodities, while "'food aid'" was "*inter alia* a way of getting rid of embarrassing surpluses acquired through the price support elements of the CAP". These forms of aid, Seers maintained, could "actually inhibit the development of the associated countries" which were partially integrated into the Community, without a vote on policies that concerned them.[167]

The prospect for distributive reform, therefore, seemed to be "politically inconceivable" and prevented by the political leaders at the core who benefited from the concentration of power in their hands. Member governments put their own national needs above Community interests (and even more so above global interests) and, Seers concluded at a meeting in 1979, "Even if a Lloyd George were to appear on the European scene determined to mitigate inequality, he would be impotent."[168]

However, he insisted, the prospect of the second enlargement increased the urgency to consider some degree of distributive reform for the sake not only of political stability, but for self-preservation. The concentration of economic power in the core countries (especially Germany), described by Seers as "in some ways comparable to that in the Hapsburg Empire, where it was one of the causes of the latter's downfall",[169] and the experience of other nations and regional economic groupings, seemed to bear this out. "The question posed here [was] pragmatic", he therefore concluded, for whereas mechanisms of redistribution appeared to have helped preserve many nations, several in which such mechanisms had been non-existent or weak (such as in Iran) had disintegrated or undergone social revolutions, and "integration schemes with only limited redistributive elements [had] collapsed (East Africa) or languished (LAFTA)" - the latter resulting in the Andean governments breaking away to form their own group.[170]

He had in fact warned the first meeting of the European Periphery Group that if the three candidates were refused entry or were admitted to an unreformed organisation unable to develop the periphery, the consequent tensions could lead not only to the emergence of

"highly nationalist governments led by Euro-communists", but also possibly to their partial detachment from the European system, and their linking up with countries suffering similar structural problems in the Third World or with the Soviet Union thereby "involving a partial encirclement of the core".[171] There were therefore impending dangers if the EEC did not make efforts to improve the living standards and conditions of its three new members, which, if they remained relatively backward, partially dependent on supplying low-wage labour and receiving tourists for long after their admittance, he maintained, "would represent a perpetual threat to its economic and political stability".[172]

Seers had indicated his response to this dilemma at the 1977 meeting, when he had suggested that the additional resources needed to counter continental imbalances might have to be at the expense of international aid. He later rationalised this argument further in a paper in which he maintained that egalitarian policies at national, Community and global levels appeared in fact to be mutually incompatible, and that the redistributive reform necessary in the Community required the withdrawal of financial and technical aid and trade concessions from parts of the Third World, diverting them towards the periphery of Western Europe, especially the prospective new members. After all he argued:

> Aid had always been partially commercial and political in orientation, and assistance to these areas would benefit more directly the core's own exports, while political instability is much more dangerous within or near the Community than further afield.[173]

Thus, while in the past Seers had often frowned on political and commercial motivations for development aid, when it came to tackling the problems of Europe and its periphery, his arguments for aiding the region were quite clearly based on mainly political and economic motives rather than humanitarian concerns.

The nature of his arguments also required and provided an opportunity for the Community to redefine its role *vis-à-vis* the Third World, for the more Western European capital invested in or lent to the new members, the less would be available for purposes overseas. This, he argued, would in fact reflect more honestly "the declining weight of humanitarian motives in external policy"[174] of European governments as well as be seen as a positive response to the calls for self reliance and delinking in the South. He therefore concluded:

> Perhaps the most constructive European policy in the 1980s would be increasingly to allow the countries of the Third World to solve their own development problems - in sharp contrast to the paternalistic self-interest of European Third World policy in the past three decades. *One of the most significant implications of the second enlargement is that it permits, and may compel, a certain degree of disengagement.* This would assist the "delinking" now being increasingly espoused in the Third World. As a corollary, a more autonomous Western Europe could play a positive role in establishing a viable world economic order, with international taxation gradually taking the place of aid.[175] (my emphasis)

There were a number of factors contributing to Seers' call for "a certain degree of disengagement" from the Third World - some of which were discussed in the previous chapter - and, as he acknowledged, the prospect of EEC enlargement and greater

disengagement could not be viewed just in terms of the problems presented by three new members, but also needed to be seen in a broader historical perspective. In relation to his Euro-centred work, however, what he argued in increasingly strong terms in the late 1970s and early 1980s was that the neo-colonial-type links that had been built up overseas in the post-war years had not only often proved harmful to Third World countries, frequently enhancing rather than relieving global inequality, but that these links were also beginning to prove more burdensome than beneficial to the instigators of the system - an issue to be discussed in the next section. There were thus both moral and pragmatic reasons for disengagement and concentration on building up an integrated Europe, a move which, he maintained, was ultimately in the interests of the Third World as well.

The burden of the neo-colonial system

Prompted by the economic crisis overtaking Europe, aggravated particularly by the oil price rises of 1978/9, Seers attempted to explore the broader issues surrounding the enlargement of the EEC, outlining his interpretation of developments in Europe in the post-Second World War period. During this period the United States had become the dominant power with an interest in "opening the old colonial empires to international competition" and "establishing a worldwide arena for its clear technological superiority". However, the founders of the European Community too, he observed, had also had aspirations of catching up in technological terms and re-establishing "the economic foundations of hegemony and thus comfortable life-styles" enjoyed by the former colonial powers "without relying on the United States" (in addition to their aims of preventing further German attempts to snatch hegemony and checking the penetration of Russian influence in Western Europe). In fact, with its combined resources and markets and capacity for further expansion, he observed, it had seemed possible that the Community could achieve its aspiration, based on a *laissez-faire* system which ensured its industrial structures were made more efficient by exposure to competition and contributed "to the re-establishment of international free trade ... an essential element in this neo-colonial scenario".[176]

Indeed, in the 1960s, Seers commented, "all the immediate political and economic objectives seemed to have been brilliantly secured" (though with the continued strategic presence and support of the United States); a policy of economic liberalism prevailed for manufactured products (though this had not extended to the Community's agricultural policy) and TNCs and individual governments re-established "colonial-type patterns of trade and investment",[177] which in the Community were institutionalised in the EEC Lomé agreements. So "To a considerable extent the old colonial economic links were preserved, or re-established" and, he acknowledged, the core countries of Western Europe, including Britain, had reaped the benefits and vast profits of investments abroad, access to markets, and the supply of cheap primary products, as they experienced fast economic growth, increased wage levels and rising living standards.[178]

However, the world economic crisis of the mid- to late 1970s had changed this scenario, he argued, and while the first enlargement of the EEC had successfully taken place in 1973 (with the entrance of Britain, Ireland and Denmark), the applications of Greece, Portugal and Spain were being considered at a time when the Community was confronted by severe economic problems and new challenges, which required a new approach. Industries such as shipbuilding, steel, textiles and clothing faced increasing competition from Japan and the NICs, which had attracted heavy TNC investment, while some of the new dynamic sectors in Europe were dominated by TNCs based in Japan and the United States. Such pressures, he observed, were resulting in the virtual abandonment of *laissez-faire* principles and the erection of barriers to protect not only agriculture but traditional industries, while subsidies were used to assist European electronic and communication industries to catch up with those of Japan and the US, as it became clear that the aspirations of the Community's founders to recreate technological leadership had not succeeded, apart from in a few industries mainly in West Germany.[179]

European involvement overseas was meeting with more resistance from countries in the South and leading to growing tension, he pointed out. The first generation of post-colonial political leaders and officials, who had been willing to acquiesce in trade and investment projects, were being replaced by "a new cohort" who were "more acutely aware of historic grievances and determined that they will not remain the world game's biggest losers"[180] (a further reflection of the more independent and strident tone he had noted being adopted by representatives of the South in international gatherings). As a result, he argued, the sheer expense of maintaining a hold on the neo-colonial system was becoming more burdensome than beneficial, both for individual countries and the Community as a whole.

In practical terms, he drew attention to the fact that programmes of industrialisation in the South were cutting into European export markets, as European manufactures ran into increasing competition from local producers. In several countries tax-free and subsidised industrial zones were being established (in some cases with the assistance of aid) to promote the penetration of European domestic markets too; and although many of the firms that benefited were European, he queried whether this was the best use of capital in view of the unemployment problems in Europe itself.[181] By the early 1980s he also maintained that as governments in the South were becoming more sophisticated in commercial policy, European mineral and plantation companies were finding it increasingly difficult to make profits abroad adequate to cover the risks of operating there,[182] while bank loans too had become more precarious as the possibility of default loomed. What he latterly termed "rising nationalism in the South", he therefore concluded, made the neo-colonial system more of a liability than an asset, "just as the colonial system became a liability after the Second World War"[183] - also as a result of rising nationalism.

Northern military intervention, used in the past to protect investments, was also becoming more expensive, and less likely to succeed, as political co-operation in the South grew and governments bought more arms. The war over the Falklands in the South

Atlantic in 1982, for example, he observed, demonstrated the expense of the system to Britain in both human and financial terms.[184] Whereas in the first two decades after the war the United States had carried the main military burden of policing the system - and helped Western European governments in the past, particularly Britain and France, to "overthrow a number of nationalist politicians (e.g. Lumumba, Mossadeq and Soekarnoe)" - its continuing assistance had "become not only more expensive, but much less certain",[185] he argued. The deterioration of US competitive economic power *vis-à-vis* Japan, combined with growing welfare expenditures, and the rising costs involved in overseas intervention he believed would undermine internal US support for its government to play a leading international role (particularly after Vietnam) and a firm and consistent external policy could not be relied upon - (though subsequent US military intervention in Granada, Panama, and the Gulf War obviously proved him wrong in this).

The main thrust of his argument was, however, that the system was becoming too dear for its presumed beneficiaries, particularly Britain, especially when Europe's own economic and social infrastructure was starved of capital, and "To establish a viable and geographically comprehensive system in Western Europe", he therefore concluded, seemed "cheaper than attempting the same task on a world scale, in military as well as economic terms".[186] Thus he presented the prospective entry of the three new members into the Community as providing an opportunity to construct that viable system:

> we need to approach the new members of the Community not in a grudging or mean spirit, with the implied intention of keeping them in a second-class status, but as part of the construction of a viable peaceful, more symmetrical world system to replace the neo-colonial one.[187]

His vision of what that world system might be will be covered in the very last section of this chapter, but it very much evolved from his focus on Europe and the positive part he believed "a more autonomous Western Europe" could play in establishing a viable world economic order. The following two sections will therefore look at how he considered an enlarged Community could further the building up of a more integrated and self-reliant European region; before attention is then given to the consequences this held for relationships with countries of the South and Third World development policy in general.

Collective self-reliance and extended nationalism in Europe

What Seers envisaged was the creation of a "truly integrated Community" with a reformed fiscal system and a much larger budget, regulating industrial activity and "setting limits to the penetration of European industrial sectors, without losing access to overseas markets or sources of supply", and developing a policy of increasing self-reliance.[188] This he saw as not only the logical counterpart of South-South co-operation and collective self reliance, frequently advocated in the Third World, but as a means of strengthening European bargaining power, reducing dependence on outside powers, particularly the United States (whose interests, he argued, diverged greatly from those of Western Europe in a number of

ways), and lessening the risk of Europe being drawn into war.[189]

The circumstances of the last quarter of the twentieth century was "making mercantilists of us all", he remarked, the only question being what to protect; "the nation or the continent".[190] Seers himself came down firmly in favour of the continent, considering the "siege economy" advocated by the Labour Party for protecting British industries and withdrawing from the Community, as "a recipe for national decline if not disaster".[191] Protection of the Community was necessary, however, he argued, to fend off Japanese and US competition and also the threat from South Korea and other NICs. Whereas, therefore, in the 1960s he had encouraged primary producers to adopt industrialisation programmes with the ultimate aim of reaching a stage of "expert diversification", and had encouraged the richer "industrialised" economies to relax their trade barriers to facilitate this development, now that some of these former "underdeveloped" economies had successfully reached a stage of "export diversification", Seers too regarded them as posing a threat to "home" markets and joined in calls to put up barriers (which in earlier days he had referred to as a means adopted to "force an underdeveloped country back to an earlier stage in its development" see Chapter 2, p.99).

Exchange controls were also needed, he argued, to prevent European capital flowing out, especially when it set up industrial plant overseas that competed with European industry, and to detach European interest rates from those of the US. The inflow of foreign capital, particularly from Japan, needed to be monitored and prevented where it threatened to capture strategic sectors.

The entry of Greece, Portugal and Spain, Seers believed, would not only enlarge the Community but would considerably strengthen it, enabling it more easily to contemplate greater integration, providing enlarged markets for European production and a new and more flexible labour force: "Not only would the Community market be bigger, the population would be younger, with a high proportion of those more capable of adjusting to political changes and to the rapidly shifting pattern of the demand for labour."[192] A Community of twelve would also "have less need for the resources of the Third World"[193] and would be able to meet more of its own requirements in the way of semi-tropical fruits and vegetables, such as citrus and tomatoes. Although key industrial materials, such as copper, wood, cotton and wool, would still need to be imported, he considered the Community's increased economic size would help strengthen its bargaining power, and there were, additionally, considerable possibilities of further mineral development in the three new entrants. While acknowledging a larger Community would be more dependent on the Middle East for its oil, again he maintained its economic size would "facilitate agreements with the oil producers of the Middle East that could cover guaranteed supplies at stable (indexed) prices in return for greater technological support and closer political cooperation"[194] (thus indicating the need for ongoing economic and political engagement at least with overseas oil producing countries).

The stability of an enlarged community might well then be attractive to core business and persuade the TNCs to invest *inside* the Community rather than outside, he further

argued, the return on such investments being more secure. In turn, if the European TNEs invested less overseas, the EEC would be less intent on their defence and be more likely to develop an interest in monitoring the behaviour of those TNEs based in the United States and Japan.[195] In a more homogeneous Europe he also envisaged the European Currency Unit could become "the strongest of currencies", impervious to dollar fluctuations, with EMS eventually developing some of the functions of a European Central Bank with its own reserves, capable of reinforcing Community economic policies.[196]

What was therefore needed in Europe he maintained was a co-ordinated development strategy with many dimensions including not only economic policy towards banks and TNCs, to ensure greater investment inside the Community, improved distributive measures, and an energy programme, but also changes in the fields of education, population and military policy - thus similarly applying to the region his recommendations whereby dependent LDCs might overcome the constraints on their room to manoeuvre (see above, pp.319-22). For instance, he argued, strengthening the Community might mean "stimulating a mild population growth, so as to raise the ratio of teenagers to pensioners";[197] and, while he was in favour of negotiations for the removal of nuclear missiles, he insisted on the importance of ensuring the region had adequate *conventional* armed forces and a greater self-sufficiency in non-nuclear arms, notably military aircraft and tanks, under a joint European command.[198] Again too he stressed the role of European political leadership for strengthening the Community and, while acknowledging this could raise the spectre of German domination in the region, he believed the strength of other members as well historical memories would ensure politicians would keep a watchful eye on any such developments.[199] What he envisaged was that a reformed European political system would further help integrate the community, obviating the emergence of any one dominant country.

His vision of an integrated Europe in fact brought about a modification or further development of his views on nationalism, which he had presented as "a constructive force for peripheral countries" and even in his last book referred to as on balance a "a healthy trend".[200]

However, he also acknowledged that the emergence of highly nationalist governments in either the core (e.g. Germany) or the periphery could be dangerous and disruptive for the Community, as indeed could *internal* nationalist movements "with deep historical roots and ... cultural identities",[201] such as the Basques and Catalans in Spain and the Scots, Welsh and Northern Irish Catholics in the UK. A fully integrated community, however, he considered could resolve this problem since it presented the opportunity to inculcate and develop a sense of what he termed "extended nationalism" based on European, rather than narrow national, cultural and historical traditions. One advantage of shifting power towards the Community, he then maintained, was that "it could help meet the needs of its cultural minorities" making it less likely that they would remain chronically disaffected: "Such minorities could be better served by a continental political system than a national one: the Basques or Northern Ireland Catholics might well be more peaceful if governed

from Brussels rather than Madrid or London".[202]

But this scenario obviously raised the fundamental and crucial question, still very much at the forefront of debate in 1993, as to what extent people felt themselves to be Europeans and willing to transfer their loyalties to a central European institution. Recognising that a Community of nine, let alone twelve or more, included an amalgam of national patriotic loyalties, linguistic barriers, traditional enmities and cultural variety, Seers himself acknowledged his intuitive reaction was that "the sense of being a European does not seem, anywhere in the continent, nearly strong enough to carry a big political and economic superstructure" and he could "only speculate about the possibilities" of limited nationalism being overcome.[203] He did, however, consider there were some optimistic indications - in that a distinctively Community policy and voice was being adopted on issues such as the Middle East, Central America, Southern Africa and the South Atlantic.

In addition he believed the sense of being a European would be greatly strengthened in reaction to economic and political threats coming from other continents, with competition from Japan and the NICs stimulating joint action in defence of what could be seen as common European interests, and violence and unrest in Third World countries, often spilling over into acts of terrorism, forging "a realization of European identity".[204]

There were, however, also ways in which European identity could be actively fostered, he suggested, by employing similar cultural measures to those recommended for encouraging self reliance and nationalism in LDCs (see Chapter 6, p.300): "through stressing European history in the schools; through language instruction, especially in English, French and German, and organising many more exchange visits between schoolchildren", and through increased links between national television networks.[205]

In any case, he maintained, because of "common legacies and experience in Europe", shared by the Community, as well as the three prospective members, the national cultural differences were really quite marginal relative to those separating it from other continents (including the United States). A visitor from another continent, he observed, was likely to be struck by the similarities in European lifestyles "brands of consumer goods, clothing fashions, architectural design, popular music and (by comparison with the rest of the world) values and attitudes, including a lingering belief in the rule of law".[206] At the EADI meeting in Milan in 1978, he spoke of "an ease of communication" among the European participants transcending deep ideological differences, and having "its roots in the common history and culture of Europe, especially in a basic humanism".[207] Elsewhere he argued (as was seen in Chapter 6, p.289) that the main European ideologies (Marxism and economic liberalism) had in fact derived from a common nineteenth-century root; but in any case he maintained that ideological differences between European Communists and Conservatives were less striking when compared to "the values and attitudes of (say) Iranian mullahs or the cadres of the Khmer Rouge or Argentine generals or many of the African dictators".[208] Such a comparison, however, seemed to ignore the fact that Europe too had also produced its own fanatics and dictators in recent history, responsible for large-scale atrocities (which in 1993 are yet again tragically taking place

within the region in the former Yugoslavia). While Seers insisted he was not implying European culture was superior, only different, and acknowledged that it did display tendencies to violence, the tone of some his comments do have an air of chauvinism about them - as well as giving little recognition to the range of ethnic and cultural diversity already present within the region.

Seers' vision of an integrated European Community, with common interests, presenting a united front to the world, in fact extended beyond its proposed enlargement incorporating just three new members. The "least unfeasible route" to a viable world system, he argued, lay in achieving a true integration of Western Europe, "undertaking successive and successful enlargements"[209] - a prospect which obviously made the forging of a European identity even more complex. It is to his thoughts regarding the possibilities of such further enlargements that we next turn.

Further enlargement into Eastern Europe?

Cyprus and Turkey were generally considered potential candidates for membership of the EEC after the three new applicants had been admitted, but it was the potential extension to Eastern Europe, with a united Germany at its core, in which Seers himself expressed more interest. At the first meeting of the working group at IDS in 1977 he suggested that:

> Eastern Europe might also be co-opted in time. There are already signs of its penetration, by West German TNCs, especially through joint ventures, and also by West German tourists. Many Eastern Europeans, especially Poles, work in West Germany as temporary migrants.
> A further shift eastwards in the core in the future is not inconceivable, involving the consolidation of Europe as a whole, with the Rhine-Ruhr at its heart, under the leadership of an economically reunited Germany - i.e. the peaceful achievement of the German government's political and economic aims in the 1939-45 war, the "new order" in Europe.[210]

On a number of occasions in the early and mid-1970s, as was seen in Chapter 6, Seers had commented on the growing convergence and economic integration of Western and Eastern Europe, with TNCs extending their operations eastwards, and his visits to Eastern Europe, particularly on behalf of EADI, brought him personal experience of this. For instance, during a visit to Poland in 1977 for an EADI conference in Warsaw, he remarked not only on the Polish migrant workers in West Germany, but also on the presence of British businessmen, and their Japanese and US associates (whom he met at a dinner at the British Embassy) who were involved in building a £180 million complex to make PVC in Poland.[211]

However, his interest in the possibility of a reunited Germany at the hub of an enlarged Community is an innovation in his thinking at this time, and although it was a subject that was being discussed more widely (since, for example, he quoted an article from *The Times* of August 1976, discussing reasons for a possible reunification[212]) he appears to have been the major protagonist of this cause within EADI's Working Group on the European Periphery. In an EADI paper produced even before the setting up of the

Group he raised "a number of intriguing questions" which European social scientists needed to consider if development studies were extended to Europe including "can we speak of a continental dependence system (a 'new order'?) in Europe based on Germany, West and East? Does this suggest an eventual integration of Eastern and Western Europe?"[213] But having then tabled the idea at the IDS meeting in 1977, it was not for another two years that he addressed the subject again.[214]

It was at the Madrid Conference in October 1979 that he returned to "some personal speculations about future patterns in Europe",[215] by which time he had paid two further visits to Poland - one in June 1978 for a two-day seminar at Cracow University and an IEA/Polish Economic Society conference on "The relevance of economic theory" and the other, immediately preceding the Periphery Group meeting, for a joint IDS-Polish symposium, hosted by Warsaw University from 8 to 12 October 1979, on "Dependence and self-reliance",[216] a subject he regarded of increasing relevance for the European Periphery Group itself to consider.

Bringing Eastern Europe into a broader European economy would help decrease the region's dependence on the United States, he maintained, and attract further membership from countries of northern Europe, making the region more self sufficient.

> An economic grouping on this scale - not necessarily taking the form of a mammoth Community - would naturally be much more independent of the United States, and could more easily protect distinctive European interests. Indeed without close affiliation to either power it could attract Austria and Finland too, and the governments of Norway and Sweden might, some time in the coming decades, find remaining outside a more united Europe unsafe - as might a future Labour government in Britain.[217]

An economy of this size, which would have a combined product greater than that of the United States or Japan, could be far more self-sufficient than a community of twelve, especially in iron ore, copper and wool, he argued, and the total population would be younger and more dynamic. Moreover, Eastern Europe would, "because of its unsuccessful farming record, provide a natural outlet for the agricultural surpluses of the Western countries" especially meat and dairy products and wine, while helping to "meet Western Europe's needs for maize."[218]

A broader Community, he believed, could also assist world stability, contributing to world peace by breaking the United States/Soviet polarity and lessening the danger of a war between the two powers with Europe as the battlefield. In due course, if there was a parallel political convergence in Europe, starting with a non-aggression pact, then, it was anticipated, NATO and the Warsaw pact would become obsolete, medium-range nuclear weapons would be eliminated, with both American missiles and Soviet SS20s removed, and much of the need for arms expenditure would vanish; though he did concede the need might arise to revive the European Defence Community to cope with external threats, and to develop a greater self-sufficiency in some arms, notably military aircraft.[219]

Although the ideological constraints to such an integration seemed great, Seers again remarked that this was in many ways already slowly happening, with the TNC joint

ventures in East Europe and the governments of COMECON "borrowing heavily from the private banks of the West". Much Western currency was circulating in Eastern Europe, West European (especially West German) goods were increasingly visible, and tourist and student exchanges were growing. While the economies of the EEC were being increasingly "managed", "free" markets and decentralised decision making were spreading in East Europe, despite the proclaimed ideology, all of which implied, he observed, "ultimately political changes that would in turn reinforce this trend. Otherwise the internal contradictions of socialism seem irresolvable".[220]

His own visits to Eastern Europe, provided further examples of the increasing convergence and during a visit to Budapest in 1981, where he had discussions with a number of Hungarian economists, he reported that about half Hungarian foreign trade was already with Western Europe and rising. In addition he commented that the Hungarian economy was "much more 'Chicagoan' than any of us had realised"[221] and that the most important task for any manager was to make a profit, while firms that made consecutive losses ceased to exist. The private sector was growing, especially with the conversion of farm land from co-operative to individual use and allowing small businesses to appear in manufacturing and services, which had proved so efficient that another wave of privatisation was planned (while big public corporations which behaved in a monopolistic way were broken up into smaller units and forced to compete with each other).

During visits to Poland he also remarked on the political disaffection he encountered, recording his impression in 1977 that the majority viewed Marxism with "something between boredom and hatred" and that the Polish Communist Party had "lost pretty well this whole generation".[222] On a later visit in 1981 he had extensive discussions with Solidarity members and recorded "the widespread disgust" he found at the corruption and incompetence of the Communist bureaucracy and the growing number of people within Solidarity who were "so distrustful of any sort of socialism that they long for a return of capitalism".[223] What in fact was at stake behind the strikes and complaints over meat queues, he argued, was the social system itself.

While formal affiliation of Eastern Europe to the Community posed difficulties, he maintained, various stages of association were possible for gradually developing the relationship and closer economic and political links, such as permitting access to the European Investment Bank before full membership was considered.

In any case, he believed that the gradual and peaceful convergence of the two Germanies seemed inevitable and that there was, in fact, a certain logic in a reunified Germany becoming "the geographical hub of an integrated Europe, with its internal trade stimulated by the new Rhine/Danube Canal".[224] While the Nazis' plan for a New order had been politically unacceptable and attempts to enforce it immoral and inefficient, he acknowledged that *economically* it had had a "certain rationale". Any fears about further German attempts to snatch hegemony by force, could be allayed, he argued, by creating adequate mechanisms for "spreading the profits of the core in Europe, and also truly democratic controls, especially a considerable strengthening of the European Parliament".[225]

The Soviet government, he conceded, might view these suggestions with some anxiety, but it was "clearly not completely in control of developments in Eastern Europe" and was unable to provide the capital, technology and markets needed by these countries to meet consumer aspirations. If integration was gradual he believed the Soviet government would find the costs of intervening by military action too high - and in any case it might not feel threatened by the presence of a European bloc which was neutral - which would also permit, he observed, greater concentration of Soviet military power along its border with China. Additionally he anticipated the possibility that the European Community might in time extend its links even further east, observing "Is it anyway quite inconceivable that political developments within the Soviet Union will ultimately lead to links between the Community and the European Soviet Republics?"[226]

Despite the diversity of the countries of Eastern and northern Europe, he again maintained there were more similarities in the cultural patterns of all these countries, reflecting common religious origins and their former shared membership of Central European kingdoms, than there were, for example, with Turkey (another prospective EEC applicant). Turkey's integration into the Community he considered would present formidable problems, in part because its cultural traditions were so completely different to the rest of EEC members[227] (though obviously this could also be said of some of the Soviet states as well).

Seers' consideration of the possibility of a reunited Germany and the potential benefits of an enlarged Community encompassing both West and East Europe takes on added significance in the light of the upheavals in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin wall and the turmoil of events in the region since 1989. Certainly he himself did not anticipate the imminence and speed of such events, considering even the reunification of Germany unlikely for "some decades",[228] and seeing it as a *gradual* convergence. Even in 1983 following his death, this aspect of his work did not elicit comment from obituarists or reviewers.

But although the truth of his observations concerning political disaffection in Eastern Europe, the economic infiltration there by Western companies, and the actual reunification of East and West Germany has been borne out by the course of events since then, his optimism about the cultural homogeneity of an extended Europe and the possibility of developing a sense of extended nationalism in the region have proved disastrously unfounded, as the break-up of the Soviet bloc has seen the emergence of aggressive "narrow" nationalism, accompanied by ethnic cleansing, and further "balkanisation" of the region. Even on the more modest scale of Western Europe, moves towards greater integration are resisted in defence of "national sovereignty".

However, Seers himself, while arguing that an "expanding Community, with growing internal homogeneity, self-sufficiency and bargaining power", provided "one coherent answer to the historic challenge which the loss of empire ... posed for Europeans", had in fact also acknowledged its political feasibility depended on "whether the necessary leadership and a sense of European identity" were summoned into being by the deepening

world crisis, noting in the early 1980s that these were still "notably absent",[229] as indeed they still appear to be in the 1990s.

Seers' speculations about the possibility of a viable world system, and the role of an integrated European Community within it, will be returned to at the very end of this chapter. But to round off this survey of his European focused work it is necessary to return to the subject that initially prompted his train of thought towards further enlargement of the Community - the prospect of the three new members - Greece, Portugal and Spain. One of the most significant implications of this initial enlargement, he had argued, was that it permitted and might compel a certain degree of disengagement from the Third World, including the reduction of aid. We will therefore look briefly at how, in his assessment, this would be of mutual benefit, not only to the Community, but to Third World countries as well; as a prelude to examining in more detail his rationalisations for disengagement, which became a predominant theme in his approach to overseas development in the early 1980s.

A strengthened Community and the Third World

A strong Community would in fact be welcomed by much of the Third World, he believed, since the appearance of a third "superpower" could offset the weight of the United States and the Soviet Union and play a more constructive role in world affairs, especially on disarmament, demonstrated by the fact that it was already developing its own voice, often quite distinct from that of the United States, and asserting its own interests in politically explosive areas, such as the Middle East and Southern Africa, as well as South Atlantic.[230]

By reducing its political, military and economic contacts with overseas countries and giving up the temptation to meddle in their affairs, the Community would also be respecting the South's own calls for self reliance, Seers maintained. A greater degree of disengagement would in fact be welcomed there, he argued, since such contacts had often brought only deleterious results. EEC agricultural and trade policies (as pointed out above, p.339) had often reinforced rather than relieved international inequality with many forms of supposed economic concessions and aid seemingly inhibiting rather than helping development, while political support for some governments that fitted into the neo-colonial system had often seriously upset development in other neighbouring countries. As an example he drew attention to the fact that a "good deal of European capital" (including $10 billion in loans from EEC banks and their subsidiaries during 1972-8) "and covert political support" had been given to South Africa, thereby seriously affecting the whole of the southern part of the continent.[231] Without such interference, not only were the risks lowered of becoming involved in a major war, but countries in the South would be "more free to work out their own destinies and learn from their own mistakes".[232]

"Strengthening the EEC" in fact he argued "could have the moral content that can no longer be found in overseas aid"[233] (to be considered more fully in the following

sections), though his reasoning was occasionally rather contradictory in this respect. For example, at one point he argued that encouraging the TNCs to invest inside the European periphery, rather than overseas, could be "to everyone's benefit" since overseas governments were "much less capable of protecting the national interest by rejecting socially undesirable projects put forward by the TNEs, or by controlling their operations ... or by ensuring that technology, of the right kind is gained".[234] On other occasions, however, he observed (as mentioned above, p.342), that governments in the South were "becoming less inept at bargaining and at monitoring foreign investment"[235] so that European companies were finding it increasingly difficult to make adequate profits there. It is possible he considered both observations were true of different types of country, the former being more true of LDCs, and the latter of NICs, though Seers does not make this clear; the main purpose of both arguments, whether moral or pragmatic, seemingly being to encourage the diversion of investment into Europe.

Equally, there appeared an anomaly in his statement that an enlarged Community "would have less need for the resources of the Third World",[236] but that a more heavily protected Community would not spend any less on imports. He did explain, however, in one paper that whereas protection would "reduce imports of manufactures from Japan and the United States"[237] and the NICs, imports could be increased from the LDCs, for whom an expansion of trade would provide a source of foreign exchange preferable to aid - depending, of course, on the terms of the trade agreements with the Community - whose past record he had in fact criticised for enhancing inequalities (see above pp.339).

This was obviously, however, a rather simplified view and Seers recognised there were many practical dilemmas facing the Community in deciding how to reconcile the fundamental needs of Western Europe - the maintenance of access to cheap raw materials and the protection of industrial output and employment - with the needs of developing countries. Nonetheless, the general thrust of his argument was that a degree of disengagement or delinking was necessary, though this was by no means a view generally shared by most of his colleagues at the time, or the one promoted by the Brandt report. His vigorous reaction to this report in fact sharpened the tone of his observations on and reasons for disengagement, which are examined more closely in the following sections.

Towards disengagement

In arguing for a degree of disengagement from the South and for concentrating available resources in the European region Seers' position was directly opposed to that of the Brandt Report, published in 1980. From a paper written in 1978 it appears Seers had anticipated more of the report and that it would address some of the problems facing Europe and tackle questions such as how compatible the development of the Third World, especially the NICs, was with "the economic growth needed in Europe to cut down unemployment"; what *modus vivendi* could be worked out with the NICs; which of the demands in the NIEO could the industrial countries afford to concede; and did the richer members of the

EEC have the resources to enlarge and change the community and also to continue investment in other continents. "It is safe to predict" he observed, "that the report of the Brandt Commission will deal with these topics, not primarily with aid."[238]

If indeed these were his expectations, then his criticism of the published report is not surprising for, basing its recommendations on a moral imperative to relieve the world's inequalities, the Brandt Commission endorsed the need for "massive" transfers from the developed countries to the South, maintaining that it was in the mutual interest of the North to create purchasing power in the South which would flow back as demand for Northern goods, and thus help halt recession - a line of argument, which, as has been indicated, was contrary to Seers' view of the situation. In addition the report's expectation that TNCs should invest more overseas and continue to make technology available to the South, while the governments of the North were to open their doors even wider to manufactures from the NICs, also ran very much contrary to Seers' views, as did its endorsement of proposals that the South's share of industrial production should double before the end of the century and its share in research and development increase 6-fold.[239]

To find fault with the Brandt Report, he confessed, "must look as ungenerous as attacking the work of the International Red Cross", anticipating that his criticisms would offend many colleagues and provide "material to the hardliners, who would oppose any genuine international cooperation". Although he found it "humanitarian and, in places, imaginative", he described it as "a sort of *Petit Larousse* of human problems", attempting to tackle too many issues based on too little hard evidence and data, assuming the nature more of an evangelical manifesto than a serious independent investigation, and adopting an overly deferential tone towards the South - while misrepresenting the interests of the North.[240]

Although agreeing that the inequalities of the world were obscene, he strongly disagreed both with the Commission's call for substantial or "massive" transfers and with its analysis of the mutuality of interests. There were no moral grounds, he maintained, for a general and massive increase in aid to the South, which could not in any case be treated as a single entity for aid targets, consisting as it did of NICs and members of OPEC as well as the poorest countries in Africa and Asia; and what in particular he found objectionable was that a great deal of Brandt's recommendations seemed directed towards the NICs. Aid was not the international welfare benefit it was purported to be, he argued, but was a political and commercial tool, often propping up authoritarian regimes to maintain the neo-colonial system, which was neither in the South's nor the North's mutual interest, and counteracting more positive attempts at self-reliant development.

Whereas in 1964 he had looked forward to the 1980s as a time when international planning might become a possibility and redistributive measures and machinery introduced on a world scale, based not only on a moral imperative for the rich nations to assist the poor, but also because this would be of mutual economic and political benefit (see Chapter 3, p.139), by 1980 his own views had changed so drastically, that he not only

regarded this as unrealistic but actively opposed the Brandt proposals which to a large extent reflected the general tenor of his own earlier arguments. As was referred to in Chapter 1 (p.61 and p.413, n.197), he regretted some of his earlier advice on aid and even found himself in some sympathy with the views of Peter Bauer at this time.

His highly critical review of the report sub-titled "Muddling Morality and Mutuality", was followed by a number of papers (one written in association with Gunnar Myrdal[241] and published in the *Guardian* newspaper), in which he argued that the recommendations of Brandt would "hinder not help the reform of the international economic order",[242] and there were more mutual benefits to be gained from the reduction of aid. In practical terms, Seers favoured a reduction of official aid to 0.1 per cent of GNP by the end of the century, rather than the 0.7 per cent recommended by Brandt, and its targeting on the more severely deprived countries. During a trip to Washington in 1980, he recounted, with some delight that his review was "circulating like a chain letter and breaking the mindless euphoric reception of the Report";[243] his criticisms of the report and arguments for the reduction of aid are traced in the following sections.

The "muddling morality" of the Brandt Report

The Brandt Commission's statement that "The South needs above all finance" was, Seers maintained, "simply untrue";[244] in most countries of the South the needs were "political and/or administrative" and the experience of some countries, such as oil producing states had demonstrated that excess finance had enhanced polarisation and aggravated social problems. The Brandt Commission, he argued, had fallen (repeatedly) into the "usual trap of 'Third Worldism'" - "confusing governments and countries" - believing that if a country's people were poor and needed help this automatically justified transfers to its government. But aid to governments of "poor" countries and aid to the poor people of these countries were two different, and often inconsistent, propositions, he observed, for providing money to governments did not necessarily help the poorest classes "any more than payments to the Mafia would necessarily help the peasants of Sicily".[245]

Resources were "quite adequate to end destitution immediately or quite soon, if those in power were determined to do so, in most of the countries of the South", Seers argued, especially in the NICs, taking the view that if their governments did not wish, or were unable to raise the necessary revenue, or to spend it in an appropriate way, then there was surely not much that a foreign government agency could or should do about it. In fact he went further and argued that the North's aid programmes, by helping to install and keep in power authoritarian governments that were hostile or indifferent to the alleviation of poverty, were often responsible for furthering the destitution that the aid was supposed to relieve.[246]

His criticism that aid was often directed at authoritarian and repressive governments was a concern he had also raised in the early 1970s in papers such as "What sort of governments should be refused what sort of aid?". Then, however, he had considered

there were very few governments to whom aid should actually be refused. His attitude had been that whether a regime was democratic was not the prime issue and that so long as people were starving, whatever one thought about the government, in most cases "some types of aid at least, are on balance beneficial". The solution, when dealing with "bad" governments, he then maintained, was to steer it into forms which had a long-term effect rather than yielding short-term political benefit, and to concentrate on technical rather than financial assistance (see Chapter 5, pp.209-10).[247] By the end of the 1970s, though, he took a tougher line, as the incidence of authoritarian regimes in receipt of aid appeared to be on the increase.

"Whereas the characteristic form of Third World government in the 1950s and 1960s was fairly democratic", by the early 1980s, Seers observed, it was "(especially in Africa and Latin America) highly authoritarian"[248] yet nearly all these governments were heavily supported by aid programmes or loans (or both). Such authoritarianism was not accidental in the case of the NICs, he remarked, since "in order to open their economies and attract foreign capital" they "had to suppress the trade unions and those political parties that favoured higher social expenditure".[249] Rather than meeting the basic needs of their people and concentrating on development, the ruling elites in such regimes were increasing military spending, importing tanks, fighter aircraft and missiles, and much aid trickled away in bribes and corruption, benefiting big farmers and merchants, rather than the poor.[250] "Thus those who have been lobbying in favour of the Brandt Report may find they have become accomplices of executioners and torturers",[251] he warned before the North-South summit held in Cancun, Mexico in 1981, suggesting that anyone genuinely concerned about poverty might pray that the monetarists (arguing against any increase in Bank or Fund lending since it would fuel world inflation) would prevail, and the conference end in harmless platitudes, rather than sanctioning more aid.

Hans Singer, a colleague at IDS, questioned whether there was not "a slight element of romantic recollection" in the argument that governments were better and more democratic 20-30 years previous (and hence enthusiasm for aid more justified) and cast some doubt on whether the assumption "that things were better in the past" could be maintained on a more detailed analysis.[252] Subsequently Seers quoted research findings to show that military regimes were in fact much commoner and more vicious in the Third World than they had been 20 years previously and that the majority were classed as "repressive" displaying a consistent pattern of violation of human rights,[253] making most of them clients of Amnesty International. He even drew up a table to demonstrate the number of military governments supported by aid and loans (see Table 7.2, p.356). In such circumstances, he observed together with Myrdal, "Someone living through one of the reigns of terror in the South might well hope that the local dictator (say Pinochet or Mobutu or Marcos) receive no financial help whatever from abroad".[254] What he termed "Propaganda" like the Brandt Report, that treated aid "just as a sort of international welfare benefit", he therefore regarded as "dangerously misleading".[255]

While he acknowledged greater efforts could be made to direct aid at "good"

	Moderate to high aid[c]	Heavy debtor[d]		Moderate to high aid	Heavy debtor
Latin America (12)			*Africa* (20)		
Argentina		x	Algeria		x
Bolivia	x	x	Benin	x	
Brazil		x	Burundi	x	
Chile		x	Cameroon	x	
El Salvador	x		Central Af Rep	x	
Guatemala			Chad		
Haiti	x		Congo	x	
Honduras	x		Eq Guinea		
Nicaragua	x	x	Liberia	x	
Panama	x	x	Madagascar	x	
Paraguay		x	Mali	x	
Uruguay		x	Mauritania	x	
			Niger	x	
Asia			Rwanda	x	
			Somalia	x	
Bangladesh	x		Sudan	x	x
Burma		x	Togo	x	
Indonesia			Uganda		
Jordan	x		Upper Volta	x	
Korea		x	Zaire	x	x
Pakistan	x				
Philippines					
Taiwan		x			
Thailand					
Turkey	x	x			

Sources: Country classification: Ruth Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures*, 1981, (World Priorities, Leesburg, Va.);
Aid: *Development Corporation: 1981 Review* (Development Assistance Committee, OECD, Paris);
Population, debt service and exports: *World Development Report 1982y* (World Bank, Washington).

a/ So-classed in the source. Those affiliated to the Soviet block are excluded here.
b/ Other than those affiliated to the socialist bloc.
c/ Aid net receipts more than $12 per capita.
d/ Service on public and public-guaranteed debt more than 10% of value of exports of goods and services.

Table 7.2 Military dominated governments[a] in developing countries,[b] by continent, and their support by aid and loans, 1980
(*Source*: Reproduced from Seers, "The Necessity and Possibility of Establishing a New International Economic Order", 28 January 1983, unpub.)

democratic governments or "good" projects where it would be spent responsibly without too much corruption, the adoption of such a policy he described as "deeply paternalistic".[256] Selectivity, in choosing "good" or "deserving" governments "opened the door to donor policies of very doubtful morality indeed"[257] and was a more subtle neo-colonial version of the way in which colonial service officials had always had opinions about which politicians were to be trusted and which projects would do people good. The temptation "to use the people of poor countries overseas as the objects of well-meaning social experiments" was one to be resisted, he maintained, for this type of "neo-paternalism" bore "much responsibility for the deterioration in world conditions";[258] applying or imposing "our own criteria" on which leaders and projects were good, in ignorance of the whole context, involved impossible judgements and attempts to do so had led to disaster.

As an example he cited the hundreds of projects grouped under the umbrella of the "Green Revolution", which had been regarded as "beneficial" by most agencies, but had provided "an object lesson on the dangers of technical experts arrogantly setting themselves up as judges of how to feed people without knowing much about them".[259] It had led to increased land speculation, inequality and hunger, the destruction of effective peasant systems of cultivation, and had had little effect on food supplies - yet aid agencies had continued to advocate and finance the introduction of "high-yielding varieties" of cereals for years after their damage had been evaluated and widely circulated. The consequences of aid could therefore be harmful whether assisting oppressive dictatorships or well-meaningly aimed at seemingly "good" projects.

Far from humanitarian motives of international solidarity governing the dispensing of aid, it was "political and commercial motives" which continued to play a leading part in official aid, argued Seers and Myrdal in their joint paper, with transfers usually determined by northern governments trying to maintain influence overseas "especially in former colonies, partly to secure markets and sources of raw materials, partly for strategic reasons".[260] The fact that large-scale aid was "necessary to shore up the present international system", whatever the social cost to those who lived under the dictatorships, was something the Brandt Report had not addressed, yet it was this rather than altruism that was reflected in the size and pattern of aid programmes, maintained Seers.[261] Most aid went to governments that co-operated in the economic and political strategies of the donors, he observed, and in particular much aid from all sources went to governments that co-operated "in the economic and political strategies of the US State Department - Egypt, Indonesia, Morocco, South Korea, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and Zaire, to name but a few".[262]

He now also acknowledged that multilateral aid, at one time considered and recommended by himself as being more independent than bi-lateral aid (see for example, Chapter 4, pp.151-2, 167), was equally influenced by the political and commercial interests of its donors, especially the United States.

We once believed multilateral assistance was less subject to political and commercial

> bias, but the World Bank and the IMF increasingly follow the lead of the big donors, especially the US. Multilateral support, like bilateral, has been withheld from elected governments like those of Allende and the younger Manley, which were set on social change and it is unlikely the Government of Nicaragua will get much [following the Sandinista victory in September 1980].[263]

The World Bank and the IMF could, however, be counted on to lend "disproportionately large factions of any available money" to governments which provided markets for large imports from the North or were "supporters of the anti-communist stand of the Reagan administration" "rather than to really poor countries where despite corruption ... [and] patronage, some good might be done."[264]

Another aspect of the "muddling morality" of the Brandt report to which Seers drew particular attention was the fact that its proposed transfers, far from assisting the countries in greatest need, would in fact largely benefit the transnational banks, such as the Bank of America, Chase Manhattan, and Citibank, based in the United States, and their counterparts in Western Europe, which had incautiously lent more than $100,000,000,000 to oil-importing Third World governments in the second half of the 1970s. Following the second oil crisis of 1978-9 and rising interest rates, the debtor governments, mainly NICs, were finding it increasingly difficult to service or refinance their debts, but massive transfers would enable the continued servicing of these debts and thereby bail out the banks:

> The Brandt Commission's proposals for 'massive transfers' ... increases the capacity of the World Bank and the IMF to make big 'programme loans' i.e. loans of foreign exchange not linked to projects - apparently the real reason why the Commission was set up was to facilitate this.[265] Granted the political power of the governments of the NICs and the industrial countries, and the motivation each would have, there can be little doubt that massive transfers would enable these massive debts to be serviced and repaid.
>
> In effect public money would be used to bail out incautious private banks: to put it more sharply the taxpayer in the rich countries - including the unemployed - would have his or her money passed to the richest of private bankers, who, not surprisingly, are calling for such assistance. An unkind critic would compare it to a charity scandal, but on an immense scale.[266]

The debtor governments, which would benefit, in addition to the banks, were those of countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, South Korea, Philippines and Turkey, all of which provided markets for large imports from the North and all (apart from Mexico) could be regarded as supporters of Western interests.

The type of aid advocated by the Brandt report in the name of international solidarity, Seers therefore argued, was far from being in the humanitarian interests of the Third World, and there were in fact moral reasons for opposing any such increase of transfers if they were used to bail out banks, foster American foreign policy and prop up repressive governments to the disadvantage rather than assistance of the poorest populations. In addition, however, he maintained there were more positive reasons for a decrease rather than increase in aid, in the interest of both North and South - since it interfered with self-reliant development in the South, and was in fact no longer needed to foster the political and commercial interests of the North - arguments that are traced in the next two sections.

The contradiction of aid and self reliance

Aid was basically an "instrument of control to keep economies more firmly tied to the international financial system", which was "even more obviously true of schemes to stabilise commodity prices, allow trade preferences, etc."[267] argued Seers, drawing attention to the incompatibility of demands from the South for increased aid and trade concessions, as summed up in the demand for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), and demands for greater self reliance. The NIEO, he maintained, was "essentially a programme for the elite of the South to get a bigger share of the neo-colonial system",[268] those benefiting being the "bureaucrats and those with professional skills [who] ... had their minds moulded in part by foreign education", whose lifestyles and tastes were dependent on imported goods and technology, to the detriment of national culture and skills, and who were responsible in large part for increasing their countries' dependence and hindering opportunities for more self-reliant development (see above pp.315-16). Aid programmes gave them "opportunities for corruption and possibilities of patronage", and further aid, he argued, would only reinforce their dependency.[269]

In more practical terms he also regarded increased transfers as thwarting positive steps towards more self reliant development which had already been made in some countries as a result of the oil price rises. As was mentioned in Chapter 6 (p.272-3), in 1974 he had already regarded the oil price rises as an opportunity favouring "traditional rather than modern techniques, agricultural rather than industrial products and natural rather than synthetic materials".[270] By the early 1980s he observed that the foreign exchange crises faced by many Third World governments, as a result of the increased energy prices, had compelled many to undertake a shift in development patterns - tightening exchange and import controls, rationing petrol, accelerating the development of new energy sources (such as natural gas, coal, hydro-electricity and even solar and wind power), reducing foreign exchange spent on food, diverting investment into agriculture, and adopting more labour intensive techniques. As a result of these moves, he claimed, self-sufficiency policies in food were "becoming more than just rhetoric" and a country like India, instead of being a chronic importer of food, had been able to withstand a poor harvest without resorting to purchases from abroad. The alternative development style meant a country was made "more self-reliant and better integrated", social differences were reduced and there was an opportunity to raise employment opportunities.[271]

He paints an almost idyllic picture of alternative development in some rural areas where the high prices of motor fuel had led to "Old crafts being revived, traditional, labour-intensive, agricultural techniques based on animal traction and natural fertilizers ... returning ... [and] a shift back to sailboat fishing where the arts of making and using sails have not been forgotten".[272] Such economies, especially those with farming sectors that did not depend heavily on imported inputs, were extremely resilient, he observed. It seems he was influenced to some extent in this view by his mission in 1979 to Uganda, where despite the destruction of industries and most urban services as a result of Amin's

mismanagement and the war, he noted, the population could fall back on the traditional rural economy.[273]

Further plans for oil-intensive industrialisation in the Third World, as encouraged by the Brandt report, Seers considered, would only perpetuate a damaging and inegalitarian pattern of growth and further increase dependence on oil imports and technology in the South, rather than encourage further moves towards self reliance. In the joint paper with Myrdal, they commented adversely on aid agencies, committed to concentrating resources on the poorest countries, using foreign exchange to support large-scale industrial development. Hans Singer, however, took issue with this point, observing that they had seemingly equated investment in large-scale industry or even in industry in general as wrong *per se*, putting it on the same level as armaments, corruption etc. He himself did not agree that "industrial investment or even large-scale industrial development" was "necessarily less developmental or less effective in raising income levels and reducing poverty than agricultural or infrastructure or other types of investment," and, although acknowledging a lot of industrial investment had been wrong, so too he pointed out had lot of other investment including much in agriculture. Singer in fact argued that industrialisation was "a necessary part of development and that industrial investment *can* be so organised as to be beneficial and effective".[274]

The main thrust of Seers' argument, however, was that those positive structural changes towards more self-reliant development which had already taken place could be thwarted if oil importing Third World governments were provided with enough foreign exchange to enable them to pay off their short-term debts and maintain the "highly divisive and dependent oil-intensive patterns of growth", of which he was so critical. Those who were "so callous as to want to facilitate this and leave the social problems of the Third World unrelieved", he argued, were members of the aid lobby who supported the Brandt Report.[275]

While forcefully arguing that, far from being in the South's interest, aid was in fact often actively damaging development potential, Seers equally challenged the claim that aid was ultimately in the North's interest too.

The North's interest and aid

To begin with, he regarded the Brandt Report's appeal to the North as naive and impractical, since none of the governments in power in the North were likely to respond to demands for redistributive measures (except perhaps the French), or to make concessions to the South on the basis of "human solidarity or an assumed interest in global Keynesianism; still less in a desire to institute a world system of 'just' rewards".[276] One of the main reasons for this naive approach he attributed to the choice of the five northern politicians on the Commission who were all out of office because of a rightward shift in each of their countries. They were known for their strong internationalist positions, which, he observed, meant they belonged "to tiny minorities in northern publics",[277] who were

more concerned about producing a supposedly pro-Southern report rather than analysing the real mutual interests including those of the North.

The truth, he maintained, was that aid - even if governments could or wanted to afford it - was of diminishing use to the North and could even be counter-productive. It was doubtful, he argued, whether aid was either effective or necessary any longer for political purposes; the fall of Somoza in Nicaragua and the Shah of Iran in 1979, to take only two instances, seemed to indicate that "Western support of various kinds (including aid)" could not ensure the survival of pro-Western political leaders. More significantly, though, he observed, it was becoming more obvious that the whole system would not be threatened if such aid was reduced. The Soviet government, because of its own need for foreign exchange, now lacked the capacity for large-scale overseas support, as Allende in Chile, among others, had discovered to their cost and the revolutionary government of Nicaragua was also learning; while East European governments were being allowed, "if not encouraged, to look westward for loans, technology and markets". Aid could therefore no longer be justified on grounds of political necessity, he argued, since there was really nowhere a government of the Third World, however Marxist, could turn for the capital and technology it needed, except to the United States and Western Europe (or Japan) - though he accepted it might be "risky" for the donor governments to cut it too drastically.[278]

He also acknowledged it would be difficult to cut out all commercially motivated aid for "As long as the governments of the United States and Japan use aid for promoting their exports we are bound to do the same."[279] But he considered such transfers to promote exports should not be regarded as aid at all, and in any case could be reduced. In relation to British aid, for example, he had suggested in 1978 that transfers for political and commercial purposes should be administered in a different way to humanitarian aid, with the motives for such assistance being made clear - that it was given primarily in the interests of the donor, rather than the recipient. His suggestion then had been that the administration of aid be reorganised to meet the changing world situation with commercial and political assistance being handled by the appropriate ministry, with "CBI" aid programmes going to the Department of Trade "(and the few 'Chatham House' ones to FCO)", leaving the humanitarian aid programme to the ODM.[280] Thus financial transfers to promote exports to a middle-income country (such as exports of steel to Mexico) should not be considered aid at all; and in any case such loans could well be reduced, he argued, to the advantage of both donors and recipients.[281]

Seers had little sympathy for the Brandt Report's claim that massive transfers would create purchasing power in the South which would flow back as demand for northern goods and halt the recession. This not only seemed a rather "roundabout and slow way of tackling Northern unemployment"[282] and one in which, he observed, Britain might not get much of a share because of the lack of competitiveness of many of its products, but it also posed an impending threat, since "an aid operation that allowed the NICs to continue to import oil on the present scale would mean less oil at a higher price for the donors than they would get otherwise".[283] More importantly though the transfers advocated meant

that capital needed at home was departing to the Third World, and was further enabling the NICs to raise their productivity, "creating there capacity to manufacture products that penetrate our own markets or replace our exports to third parties".[284]

Thus we return to the nub of his argument in the European Periphery Group, that aid not only deprived Europe of capital for its own development but transfers sent overseas, particularly to the NICs, rather than stimulating demand for European goods, could well help stimulate further competition and intensify the economic recession.

* * *

As has been indicated by Hans Singer's comments, Seers' critique of the Brandt report and the issues it raised was not generally shared by or representative of opinion at IDS. Robert Cassen, for example, a colleague and self-confessed admirer of Seers, disagreed with "almost every particular" of his comments on the report, expressing his opinion publicly in a letter to the *Guardian*.[285] While Richard Jolly, a long-term friend of Seers, considered his attack on Brandt one of his "least credible efforts, ... limited and illogical, at times bitter and sour ... a sledgehammer being used to smash a whole report, rather than to drive home some important points of criticism".[286] Seers' views on aid were also very much contrary to those of the Labour Party, whose Shadow Spokesman on Overseas Development, Frank McElhone, also took him (and Myrdal) to task for their "demoralised" view on aid in a letter to the *Guardian*, outlining his party's commitment to doubling the aid budget, among other measures, once they returned to office; in response to which Seers maintained he was "not encouraged ... to work for Labour's return to power if this is what they are plotting".[287]

Despite his general scepticism about overseas aid (and his arguments that it could be "better spent nearer home"[288]), Seers did not, however, argue that it should be abandoned altogether; there was, he recognised, a need to continue supplying certain types of aid in certain circumstances.

A place for real aid

A sudden withdrawal of aid, he acknowledged, might in some cases result in greater government repression and worsening social conditions - as well as entail increased costs or loss of suppliers and markets for Northern manufacturers - and he agreed there was a case for some financial response by Northern governments.[289]

His cautious attitude to aid, though awareness of its necessity in certain circumstances, is well illustrated in the report produced following his participation in the Commonwealth Secretariat's sponsored mission to Uganda in May-June 1979 to assess the rehabilitation requirements of certain key sectors of its economy. While papers on specific topics were written by individual members of the mission, as team leader Seers was largely responsible for drafting the general body of the report. This did in fact recommend

that official aid was needed for temporary balance of payments support to facilitate the import of necessary supplies into the country until increased quantities of coffee could be sold and other exports re-established. However, it also included the warning that

> the role of foreign aid is subsidiary. Capital is certainly needed and there is a natural tendency to believe even on the part of donors - that a vast inflow of money, accompanied by technical experts, would in itself solve a country's problems. This is not so, especially for Uganda in 1979. Aid of the wrong type at the wrong time could easily aggravate matters: for example, big investment projects this year that used scarce resources could cause a renewed acceleration of inflation. Certainly foreign aid is an indispensable element, first in relief and then in rehabilitation.... In appropriate form and appropriately timed, it could greatly ease and speed the recovery, but it should be seen as just one of the facets of the total cumulative process. However appropriate, even however well-timed, aid will not achieve much - nor will much probably be offered - unless effective policies are adopted and implemented by the Government of Uganda.[290]

Certain countries too, he agreed, needed aid more than others, and in his paper with Myrdal he went even further, acknowledging "we would even be in favour of increasing aid if there were some way of ensuring that it would reach those who need it"[291] - among those being countries of Africa and South Asia where poverty was rife and the social costs would be exceptionally severe if aid was reduced. In 1978, for example, he spoke of the "recognised obligation arising out of past associations"[292] of Britain to continue to aid twenty poor Commonwealth countries, like Bangladesh, where poverty was severe and aid was a source of foreign exchange which could not easily be foregone. At the "Adjustment" seminars in 1980/81 too he acknowledged that Africa in general "had special financing problems, and meritted [*sic*] a higher proportion of available resources, particularly those under Bank and Fund control".[293]

What was needed were mechanisms to reduce the damaging effects of aid. as well as ensure that it would not benefit the NICs, he argued, suggesting this might be achieved if it were provided for support of long-term sectoral or social targets on a continental or worldwide basis, aimed, for example, at self-sufficiency in energy, or access to pure water or primary health care throughout Asia and Africa[294] (the sort of targets that he had in fact first suggested in 1964 (see Chapter 3, p.136). A further way of reducing its damaging effects, he suggested, returning to an argument he had first put forward in 1974 (see Chapter 6, pp.273-4), was "if OPEC Governments rapidly increased their aid programmes", regarding this as "less politically or commercially oriented"[295] than that provided by Northern governments - though he had to admit they had "not in practice made a large portion of their capital available to fellow members of the South"[296] and could not meet the need for technology. (It is also probably more true to say that OPEC's motives for giving or withholding aid were not any "less politically and commercially oriented" but based on different political and commercial criteria to those of the North.[297]) However, the fact that he welcomed another source of aid indicated that he was not opposed to all aid *per se*.

A particular area where Seers and Myrdal agreed there was a definite need for aid was for relief to the victims of catastrophes such as floods, famines, and earthquakes, though

they recommended this should be administered by "new international institutions committed to supplying these without any political discrimination", which would be able to build up the necessary expertise, make advance arrangements for the immediate availability of aircraft, food, etc., and also undertake research on the basic causes of such calamities.[298] They in fact seemed to suggest that voluntary agencies, such as Oxfam and the missionary societies - formerly regarded as "non-professional 'do-gooders'" - might possibly be best placed to take over the administration of such humanitarian aid since their officials, not being civil servants, were "less vulnerable to diplomatic pressures". Voluntary agency officials, it was anticipated, would be better able to "turn down projects like modern factories", which were related more to the interests of the capital goods exporters than the relief of poverty, and to "deal directly with local authorities, farmers' associations, etc., by-passing recipient governments" - though it was recognised that working independently of governments also had its risks and problems.[299]

Education was another area where Seers himself felt the UK and Europe particularly could and should still play a positive role in providing assistance, arguing:

> as long as democratic institutions survive in Europe we can provide facilities for education vastly superior to what is available abroad, not in the sense that our techniques are suitable abroad, but because we can make available opportunities for discussion and study impossible now in most of the world. We also still have a role as a haven for political refugees.[300]

Education and care for political refugees, and defence of human rights in general, was a field of activity where he maintained the North still in fact had an obligation to intervene in the affairs of the South, and where, as will be seen in the next section, he believed certain types of aid - targeted at specific groups rather than channelled through governments - still had a positive role to play, even in certain Latin American NICs.

Human rights - the exception for disengagement

While generally arguing for greater self reliance on the part of both North and South and for a corresponding reduction of "meddling" by the North in the affairs of overseas countries, Seers explained his "one major exception ... in favour of human rights" in the following terms:

> There is little doubt that outside intervention, whether in the form of resolutions, deputations, or letters, has some influence in encouraging the application of proper legal process to political prisoners. If one can do anything to lessen, even marginally, the torture, inhumane imprisonment, and execution of people for political reasons (often personal vendettas) which continues on a massive scale in the Third World, then the obligation to do this seems to me to over-ride the arguments against intervention in the affairs of other countries, especially since administrations that behave in this way are often supported from Europe and cannot ignore European delegations.[301]

The abuse of human rights, and particularly repression suffered by academics, was an issue with which he became more involved as Chairman of the World University Service's

(WUS) Chilean Awards Committee, which administered the British government's programme of aid to academic refugees from the Pinochet regime in Chile, following the 1973 coup. His concern, however, extended beyond Chile to other parts of Latin America, and indeed to other parts of the world, in the second half of the 1970s, indicated by in his involvement in an IDS workshop, held in February 1977, entitled "Academics under political threat in Third World countries". Focusing on three areas of the world which had been the main sources of academic refugees to Britain in recent years (apart from Uganda) - the southern cone of Latin America (Argentina, Uruguay and Chile), Southern Africa (South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia) and South Asia (India, Bangladesh and Thailand) - the workshop discussed the nature, causes and effect of academic repression and Seers himself produced a shortened version of the final report as an IDS discussion paper.[302]

During the course of his report it was observed "the responsibilities of the international academic community are especially great in the case of refugees",[303] a responsibility in which Seers himself considered Britain shared. When Malcolm Muggeridge, for example, suggested in the letters page of *The Times* in 1976 that Chilean refugees might seek refuge in Cuba rather than the UK, Seers responded, not only by pointing out Cuba had already taken many refugees but also drawing attention to Britain's "great tradition of providing haven to the persecuted" commenting:

> The real question is whether we are doing enough not only for those in the prison cells and torture chambers of Chile but also of Argentina and Uruguay. The need in the "southern cone" of South America is now comparable to that in Central Europe before the war - and for similar reasons (including anti-Semitism - but the response is very different.[304]

His observation that not enough was being done is in sharp contrast with his comments of the same year that economic difficulties had stripped Britain of its responsibilities as far as aid was concerned (see Chapter 6, p.280).

During two extensive trips to the Latin America in 1978,[305] partly on behalf of and funded by WUS for the purpose of investigating the position of refugees in the region and advising on the organisation of future programmes, he in fact became personally involved himself in taking up the cases of some of the victims of repression. In Chile, for example, he pursued the specific problems of a number of students who had been awarded WUS scholarships (*becarios*) but had been unable to leave the country due to refusal of exit visas, imprisonment or disappearance, personally bringing these cases to the attention of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice, and visiting one student in gaol.[306] In Argentina (a regime he found far more repressive than Chile), Paraguay and Uruguay he also had wide-ranging meetings with human rights and refugee organisations, British and USA embassy officials, and academics who suffered the consequences of living under authoritarian regimes, discussing issues such as the position of political prisoners, *desaparicidos* and their families, and investigating specific cases which had been brought to his attention. In Paraguay, for example, he followed up the cases of twelve political prisoners whose names had been provided by Amnesty International, and in Uruguay

investigated various cases and problems put to him by the Uruguayan Human Rights Committee in London.[307]

But while regarding such intervention as a responsibility particularly incumbent on those free from such repression, his concern was not only based on humanitarian motives, for he regarded the abuse of human rights and academic repression in particular as a further factor enhancing dependence and another constraint on self-reliance. His support for some intervention was therefore also partly justified by the belief that the removal of repression would ultimately result in increased self reliance and more independent development.

The argument, outlined in his report of the 1977 workshop, commenced by pointing out that the "combination of massive injustice in the Third World and growing authoritarianism" was an "important structural cause of academic repression" as totalitarian regimes (especially in Latin America and Thailand) were not prepared to tolerate the emergence of a politically critical intellectual elite, particularly social scientists whose analyses often "concentrated on the embarrassing issues of internal inequality and foreign dependence".[308] The effect of the subsequent control of higher education, apart from the often tragic restriction on the lives of those personally concerned, thwarted the development of intellectual creativity, resulting "in low productivity, poor quality or irrelevant work". In turn, the reduction of the small cadre of highly qualified academics led to greater dependence on imported knowledge and technology, especially via the multinationals, and to the "stifling of scientific research designed to meet local needs in favour of transfer of knowledge and technology from the outside". Thereby, it was argued, dependence on foreign financial and technical sources increased, while research and teaching were focused "on a sort of social management irrelevant to the economic, social and political problems"[309] of the country.

To counteract authoritarianism of all kinds Seers' report recommended that broad support be given to research and action on human rights. It put forward a number of practical recommendations for action both inside and outside Third World countries "to protect and reconstruct academic life"[310] and assist the victims of academic repression, the tone of which reflects concern that such actions should not result in further dependence on external assistance, but underpin local academic independence and be attuned to the needs and problems of the area concerned. It was argued, for example, that the main front for the defence of academic freedom should, where possible, be in the country or region where it was threatened, with research grants, scholarships and exchange arrangements being provided by the international community to help maintain existing regional networks of research institutes, or create new independent institutes to replace those closed or dismantled - with "local academics and institutions ... allowed to play a leading role" in all such arrangements, since they were best placed to judge which programmes were socially relevant.[311]

Where academics or students were forced to leave their own country, however, and had to be relocated, then again the emphasis was on the need to help them develop their

capacity for effective future academic or professional work "feasible in their region of origin, or in some other part of the Third World, and one day in their own country". The British government's WUS programme, dealing mainly with Chilean refugees, was regarded as being "well-conceived"[312] in this regard, aiming as it did to provide relevant training with a developmental objective. By 1978, Seers observed, WUS had operated a good programme with "immense humanitarian and educational impact, enabling more than 500 to acquire the means to make a major contribution to the development of Chile".[313] However, the question then arose whether they would be able, or wish, to return to make such a contribution, particularly if the regime had not changed - a dilemma faced by many of the Chileans in Britain - and if they did not return but remained in Britain, this defeated the developmental objective of the scholarship programme.

One of Seers' objectives in visiting Chile in 1978, in his capacity as chairman of WUS, was in fact to assess the prospects for the return of Chilean exiles following the general amnesty declared in April that year. From his observations he concluded the amnesty was largely a public relations exercise in response to international pressure, for there were still instances of arrests and disappearances (as the experience of the WUS *becarios* whose cases he pursued demonstrated), and although refugees were free to return, the prospects of their finding employment were known to be practically non-existent. However, while strongly recommending that international pressures on Chile should not be relaxed and acknowledging that there was still a need to accept some refugees in certain circumstances, his own opinion by this time, was that urgent consideration needed to be given to "reducing the emphasis on helping Chileans to leave and increasing it on helping them to return".[314] What he therefore suggested was that a programme of support, funded from British government sources like the scholarship programme, be set in motion to provide income and employment for those who did return, adding by way of incentive that its cost could be set against "the cost to the Exchequer of supporting them in this country on social security (some almost indefinitely)".[315]

Seers' preference, particularly in the later 1970s as he became increasingly conscious of the problems arising from the position of Chilean refugees, was very much that the main front for the defence of academic freedom should, where possible, be in the country or region where it was threatened. His proposal concerning assistance to returning Chilean exiles was in fact part of a broader conclusion, drawn from his 1978 visits to the region, on "the need for HMG to develop support to Latin American institutions, especially in the social sciences, so as to help protect the autonomy of research centres and provide means for their expansion that are not dependent on local political whims or economic vicissitudes".[316]

This recommendation arose as a result of visits to a number of social science institutes in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay,[317] where he became personally more aware of the hardships faced by academics working in countries governed by authoritarian regimes and impressed by the high professional standard of work still possible in such difficult circumstances, remarking on the "new realism and flexibility"[318] of approach he

encountered. All these centres, however, were short of funds, he observed, since they received no support from their own government departments (which were usually hostile towards work in the social sciences), and were therefore dependent on external support coming then mainly from the USA, Canada and Sweden.[319] Such outside funding he regarded as positive since, as well as meeting financial needs, it provided evidence of international concern about the situation and thereby affording some protection to the recipients.

On his return to the UK, as well as sending an edited version of his Latin American journey reports to the ODM and the Foreign Office, Seers submitted a paper outlining possible British responses to repression in the Southern Cone, recommending that the general emphasis of the British programme should be changed from supporting refugees to supporting academics and institutions under threat in their own home countries:

> I suggest that aid would now be better employed in supporting the work of these groups than in helping people leave the Southern Cone (though this is often still necessary), especially if one thinks of long-term development. These will be the sources for the eventual reconstruction of the university departments of economics, sociology, political science, social and public administration and international affairs. The time is ripe for such a change of emphasis.[320]

Supporting these centres was "a far better long-term investment than a refugee programme" he argued since the reality was that many refugees never returned home (as the Chilean programme indicated), and the formal education they received overseas, "though much better than nothing", was "bound to be more or less inappropriate to their national needs",[321] despite, it would seem, the well conceived programmes of organisations such as WUS. The indigenous social science centres on the other hand were looking to the future development needs of their countries - and could provide a possible channel through which refugees already overseas, such as the Chileans, could eventually return to their own country. The scale of help, he considered, need not be expensive, being in terms of six rather than seven figures - and would not need to amount to the sort of sums required for the long-term support of refugees in the UK.

The channelling of funds, however, presented difficulties as means had to be found to send British government funds directly to academic centres overseas and not through their governments. What was needed, he suggested, was the setting up of a sort of development research (and training) council, including prestigious academic members, to demonstrate that the object was "not political interference, but co-operation between professional colleagues".[322] Once set up, he anticipated academic institutions in other countries with repressive regimes (such as Thailand, Cambodia, Uganda and Zimbabwe in 1978) could benefit from such a body, though he believed the main need would continue to be in the Southern Cone. As such some of the beneficiaries would be centres in the authoritarian NICS, such as Argentina and Brazil, whose receipt of official government and multi-lateral aid he had strongly criticised. The direct funding of the centres, however, was regarded as one means of sustaining academic independence with a view to improving prospects for the future development of the country.

Thus while the general tenor of Seers' advice in the late 1970s and early 1980s was that the North give up the temptation to meddle in the affairs of overseas countries - arguing "who are we to judge what is, and what is not, a justifiable intervention? - we really lack the knowledge, no less than the right, to do this",[323] - intervention in favour of human rights and, more specifically, to assist academics under repression in their own country, was an acknowledged exception. However, there was obviously still an element of selectivity involved in deciding which institutions in which countries should benefit from such a programme, with at base a political motivation. Seers himself acknowledged this, for while suggesting a development research council should be set up in such a way as to demonstrate that the object was "not political interference, but co-operation between professional colleagues", he nevertheless drew to the attention of the ODM and the FCO, as a "point of blunt national interest", that it could also well be a means whereby the British government could cultivate potential future friends among those who were currently "politically submerged":

> As and when the political wheel turns, our posts abroad (not to speak of British social scientists) will become in need of friends among those who are at present politically submerged; inevitably we are at present somewhat identified with the existing regimes, rightly or wrongly. (Think of Iran!) Besides, because of Britain's historic, commercial and political links, we would be particularly able to play a positive role in the long process of democratisation, provided we can find the right way of doing so.[324]

He suggested that IDS call a small meeting early in 1979 with government officials from the ODM and FCO, academics with Latin American expertise, officials of voluntary agencies, and officials of foreign agencies already working in the field, to discuss the needs and possibilities for British action. It is not known whether there was any follow-up to these recommendations, and certainly with Conservative victory at the polls later that year, it is unlikely it was taken any further, particularly since IDS itself was then fighting for its own survival.

However, the abuse of human rights, particularly as it affected academics and students, was an issue that continued to concern him and plans were in fact made with WUS for him to visit and report on the situation at Bir Zeit University and educational provision for Palestinians in the West Bank - a trip he never made because of his untimely death. In his European based work too there were occasions when he considered action needed to be taken. For example in December 1981, following the proclamation of martial law in Poland, the internment of Solidarity leaders and mass arrests at the University of Warsaw, he wrote to Douglas Hurd, then Minister of State at the FCO, suggesting the Conservative government might make provision to help students and teachers who were likely to flee the country. Places could be offered at British universities to those in prison as a means of inducing their release, he suggested, reminding the minister of the Labour government's similar response in the case of Chile[325] (indicating there were still circumstances where he considered a scholarship programme for refugees could be useful).

There were, therefore, in the early 1980s still occasions when Seers acknowledged overseas intervention could be beneficial, as well as certain types of aid useful and necessary. However, the more general overall thrust of his arguments by this time was for greater disengagement of the North from the affairs of the South, and the building up of a stronger more integrated and self-reliant European community, which he envisaged could "stimulate national and continental self-reliance elsewhere".[326] This was the conclusion he reached in his final book *The Political Economy of Nationalism*, published posthumously, and it is his thoughts on the possibility of continental self reliance and a world of regional blocs which are discussed in concluding this chapter and the final stage of his career.

A world of regional blocs?

In a paper entitled "The Necessity and Possibility of Establishing a New International Economic Order" which Seers prepared for a meeting in Shanghai in 1983 but, in the event of his death, was unable to deliver, he referred back to the third quarter of the twentieth century (i.e. 1950-1975) as the "heyday of the well-intentioned intervener, abroad as well as at home", when "the 'scientific' approach to social problems was in the ascendant" and it was believed "Social problems only had to be properly specified and analysed for them to be solved". This was a time when the globe had been regarded as being divided into three worlds, and such intervention, as well as having a certain humanitarian motivation, was regarded as one way of ensuring "underdeveloped" areas did not fall under the influence of Soviet domination. It had been anticipated that research could help raise economic and social conditions in developing countries to the levels of those in the developed capitalist world which were then regarded as basically satisfactory and "A cosy philosophy of internationalism reinforced modernization." There had been a feeling that "There were ultimately no unmanageable conflicts of interest within or between countries", he observed, and "in the ever-expanding world made possible by scientific discoveries, all could advance - those furthest behind, indeed, the quickest" - towards both high material standards and democratic systems - the main obstacles being cultural traditions that (temporarily) stood in the way of progress.[327]

This was essentially Seers' own view up until the late 1960s (demonstrated in the first part of this study) and while he was one of the first to argue conventional economic theory devised for industrial countries (whether capitalist or communist) was inappropriate for developing economies and saw the need for a general theory of development appropriate to modern economic conditions, he was hopeful in the 1960s that "a major revolution in doctrine" was indeed "looming ahead",[328] to which he anticipated staff at the new IDS could contribute.

By the early 1970s he expressed increasing concern about the deteriorating social conditions which had resulted from equating development with growth and modernisation (indicated in Part II, especially Chapter 5), and also voiced some disappointment that IDS

had "not yet made the contribution to development theory of which such a powerful team of Fellows should be capable".[329] But he urged a greater concentration on social targets for development and continued to see a need for a "world-wide system of co-ordinated policies, national and international ... to tackle the problems of world poverty", maintaining a certain optimism that governments of developing countries would be enabled and willing to adopt more appropriate techniques to develop their countries, economically, socially and politically.[330]

By the early 1980s, however, he observed "academic progressives have become disillusioned"[331] particularly with the record of Third World governments themselves, where he had increasingly remarked during the previous decade that dictatorship had become the characteristic form of government and corruption rampant. The events of what he termed the "rapidly evolving world of the 1970s", discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, in fact brought about a radical change in his thinking and his view of the world in general. The flawed workings of the economic growth model and the effects of the world economic recession, enhanced by the oil crisis and concern about resources, as well as by increasing competition from NICs, brought "development" and social problems to the countries of Europe (and North America). As a result, he maintained, conditions in Northern countries could no longer be regarded as satisfactory and the categories of developed and developing countries were no longer so distinct. This trend, together with what he saw as a growing "convergence" between the systems of capitalist and socialist countries, thus undermined the traditional 3-world classification. While he put forward an alternative classification based on dependency, by the end of the 1970s he observed "we still lack a credible framework of theory covering political, social and economic change" and was coming to the conclusion that it might not be possible to devise "a universal development ideology".[332]

By the time of writing *The Political Economy of Nationalism* in the early 1980s, he was a long way from considering there were "no unmanageable conflicts of interest within or between countries" and he observed in the opening sentence of his introduction: "We are entering a period in which resource limits can no longer be ignored, nor can the interests of different sections of the world be assumed compatible: to solve one country's problems may well be to aggravate those of another".[333] While he anticipated that some economic recovery was inevitable in the 1980s his opinion was that this would be only temporary and in any case insufficient to reduce unemployment substantially. Fundamental crises in every part of the world were aggravating international tensions and the world was in a "new historical era", he maintained. Far from believing in the possibility of an "ever-expanding world" where "all could advance", he observed there was "a ceiling on world economic activity, and each government - and social group - is being forced to seek its own salvation as best it can. Unpalatable though it may be to ideologists," he concluded, "a universal solution to social problems has now become obviously impossible".[334]

As outlined in the last two chapters, he argued that both the Capitalist and Socialist

orthodoxies had failed to explain what was happening in the world or offer a credible solution; conventional theories, which he had previously criticised for being inappropriate for developing countries, he now argued were equally irrelevant and inappropriate for the "developed" areas where they had originated. He also made it plain he did not now "espouse any of the varieties of internationalism nor even an environmentalist 'alternative development'".[335] The proposals for a New International Economic Order on the agenda of many international gatherings in the 1970s and the recommendations of the Brandt report he regarded with scepticism and opposed as attempts to maintain the workings of a neo-colonial system which he now argued was essentially burdensome for the economies of both the South and the North (particularly Europe). The decade of the 1980s "forces one to question all types of conventional ways of thinking" he remarked in his Preface to *The Political Economy of Nationalism* - the initial working title for which had in fact been "*Letting Go* - of Archaic Economics, of Romantic Politics, of Mechanistic Planning, of Paternalistic Intervention".[336] He therefore questioned and urged the "letting go" of both old orthodoxies and the more recent attempts to outline a solution to the world's problems.

Seers himself did not pretend to have fully worked out an alternative system, but he considered it was time to strike a new note and, as has been detailed in this chapter, believed "the least unfeasible route to a viable world system" to replace the neo-colonial one, was to build up a strengthened, enlarged, fully integrated and more self-reliant European Community, which could play a more positive role in maintaining world peace and, by gradually disengaging from and adopting less paternalist policies towards the Third World, "create the conditions for the easing of poverty and oppression elsewhere".[337] As the Falklands War came to an end - a war which, as already mentioned, he considered demonstrated the expense to Britain, in terms of both manpower and finance, of trying to maintain the neo-colonial system - he wrote in July 1982 an article entitled "A Different Kind of Fortress Mentality"[338] (as opposed to that of fortress Falklands). However, he was not only referring to fortress Europe; for "the logical successor of the neo-colonial system", he argued in the early 1980s, was not merely a stronger European Community but "a world of partially self-sufficient regional blocs", which would enjoy the advantages of size (economic, political and military) without waiting for population growth.[339]

Europe could well prove to be "the first of a series of regional blocs", he speculated, for "While the world crises encourage self-sufficiency" (and he had himself from 1977 onwards emphasised the importance of self reliance as an integral part of development), by the early 1980s he acknowledged "this can hardly be achieved on a national basis, indeed this is more implausible overseas than in Europe. Only a handful of the nations states have markets big enough for manufactures such as aircraft."[340] What was therefore needed, he argued, was greater collective self reliance.

Rather than a more interdependent world or one consisting of autarchic nations he envisaged "a world of large regional economies, each big enough (with a minimum of 200 million people) to be largely self-sufficient"[341] and also culturally homogeneous.

Regional blocs would in fact only be viable, he maintained, if they displayed some "cultural cohesion - in terms of common ethnic origins, language, customs, and historical experience" - at least sufficient to communicate and understand each other's problems.[342] A central authority would be needed in each region "to represent it in commercial and political negotiations, to organise its defence, to provide a framework for investment and technology policies that would increase its self-sufficiency, and to spread the benefits of economic progress to its poorer areas, if only for the sake of political unity."[343]

While it was politically uncertain whether even Europe would develop into the type of bloc envisaged, Seers acknowledged the prospects of regional blocs emerging elsewhere in the world were even more problematic where the gap in standards of living between core and periphery were even wider than in the Community, and the means to overcome the disparities less. Brazil and Argentina in Latin America, Japan in East Asia, and Australia in the South Pacific all presented examples of highly advanced cores surrounded by weak rings. While admitting the whole idea might seem far fetched and regional groupings in the past had not achieved a great deal of success, he believed there were already some indications of progress towards a degree of regional co-operation as Arab oil producers concentrated their aid programmes on the Middle East, and Mexico and Venezuela were supplying cheap oil to countries of the Caribbean. As an example of the sort of institutional development he had in mind he cited SELA (Sistema Economico Latino Americano), a Latin American organisation for regional co-operation which had emerged without US membership, was based in Caracas and was working on food self-sufficiency and energy development.[344]

Seers admitted he did not have the knowledge to discuss the appropriate membership or organisation for regional systems in other parts of the world, which in any case he now considered would be an impertinence for a European social scientist; those blocs which had a realistic basis would "appear and shape themselves"[345] and might be quite different from the existing regional systems of trade. However, he did indicate that the United States and the Soviet Union provided prototypes of the sort of grouping he had in mind, and that China, India and Latin America could follow in due course, with other possible blocs based on South East Asia, the Arab region and tropical Africa.[346] In such an arrangement, some regions, such as Africa, would obviously have far fewer resources than those of Latin America (let alone Europe or North America), but while acknowledging that "some would be stronger than others", Seers nevertheless envisaged "none would be dominant", anticipating "There would be little need for intervention in each other's affairs, whether by military or political means or economic aid" making it a more symmetrical system.[347] Although there was no certainty about such a system coming into being, and he agreed there might be conflict between groups, on the whole he regarded the prospect of a world system based on large regional economies as being more stable, peaceful and secure than the neo-colonial world divided between two superpowers.

For Seers put forward these proposals for a regionalist solution at time when the

world was still seen to be dominated by the USA and the Soviet Union, presenting a situation in which he believed a strengthened European regional bloc could provide a third force to offset the danger of conflict between the two. However, since 1989 with the break up of the Soviet bloc it has become increasingly obvious that there is only one superpower, the USA, a dominant regional grouping which is not above intervening in other regions, either in an overt military capacity, demonstrated by its active involvement in the Gulf War in the Middle East, or in the role of self appointed international policeman, such as its sending of troops to Somalia in Africa. Had Seers lived another ten years it is possible that in the changed circumstances he would have argued even more strenuously for a strengthened European region, though, in the light of events, particularly in Yugoslavia, he might well have turned his attention to examine more closely the issues of nationalism and ethnic diversity within the region. However, it is not intended to consider the feasibility of his views on regional blocs, which is purely a speculative exercise.

What his arguments of the early 1980s do indicate though is a change of focus from an optimistic, outward, international and interdependent view of world development which he held up until the early 1970s to a more sceptical and Eurocentric approach, based on a philosophy of self reliance and regional self interest. As has already been indicated, his opinions on a number of issues at this time, particularly those related to aid and the Brandt report, were not shared by friends and colleagues who tended to regard his later views as "increasingly perverse" and, in Paul Streeten's words, he "came near to becoming a radical conservative".[348]

But having said this, his work and activities were not always consistent with his more conservative and regionalist views. For example, he still continued his own work overseas, spending the last weeks of his life actively engaged on an employment mission in Fiji. Colleagues recall him arguing "passionately against the paternalism of studying Third World countries, saying that we should concentrate more on our own back yard", and then immediately leaving for Heathrow airport to fly off on a Third World mission.[349] Equally, while in general arguing for disengagement and a reduction of aid and subsidies to overseas governments, from Fiji he wrote to Brussels emphasising the vital importance to the island's economy of the continued implementation of the EEC's Sugar Protocol (as part of the Lomé convention). Seers himself was the first to acknowledge that his attitude in this respect was "somewhat inconsistent" with his position *vis-à-vis* the Third World as a whole; adding in part by way of explanation a quotation of Georges Sorel "I write from day to day, following the need of the moment".[350]

A further instance of apparent inconsistency arose in his response to one of the recommendations of the second Brandt report which implied there was a need for an international research centre on the world economy, concentrating on the relations between the three "worlds". Despite his disagreement with this view of the world and his general rejection of the recommendations and "internationalism" of the Brandt reports, he nevertheless suggested "international relations" might become the theme for IDS's fifth quinquennium, observing "Whatever one thinks of the quality of the Commission's work

and the motives behind it, this would appeal to the political backers of IDS."[351]

Thus Seers' position in this last stage of his career cannot be oversimplified to that of a sceptical regionalist intent on disengaging Europe from further involvement in the affairs of overseas countries in pursuance of its own development. In many respects his attitude was pragmatic "following the need of the moment", taking advantage of opportunities as they arose, ensuring a future for IDS; while his work on social indicators and life profiles demonstrated an ongoing commitment to finding better ways of measuring, with a view to improving, the living conditions of the poorest sections of society overseas, as well as at home, and his involvement with human rights issues and organisations indicated a continued interest in humanitarian concerns. A general appreciation of his work and contribution to the development field will, however, be attempted within the concluding remarks to this study.

CONCLUSION

The preceding chapters represent the first major study of the work of Dudley Seers, who, it has been said, "left his unique and indelible mark on development studies"[1] and to whom, since his death, many colleagues (quoted later in this conclusion) have paid tribute as a pioneer in the field. This study, however, has focused particularly on the changes in his ideas on and approach to development. It was based very much on his own writings, including much previously unpublished material, and supplemented by comments and observations of colleagues, both sympathetic and unsympathetic, many of whose views are quoted here for the first time. The gradual change from the "well intentioned intervener" of the 1950s and 1960s to the "disillusioned academic progressive" of the later 1970s and early 1980s (to use Seers' terminology[2]) was traced by dividing his career into three major phases.

Following a summary of these phases and the ground covered in this study, an assessment will be made of Seers' work and contribution to the development field. Although being thought of as very much a provocateur, consideration will be given to whether any wider lessons or conclusions can be drawn from his work and how far it indicates or presages the direction of current and future work in the field.

The first part "From Colonial Economics to Development Studies" covered his work in the post-war years, including his own early consultancies in British colonies preparing for independence, up to 1964, by which time the majority of such territories had become independent, development and aid were on the political agenda in Britain, and courses in development studies were starting up at British universities.

After outlining his academic background in economics and statistics, it described his initial work overseas in the 1940s and 1950s in New Zealand, Burma, the Gold Coast, Malta and the Caribbean and how his horizons were also broadened beyond the British sphere of interest by a spell at the United Nations in New York, followed by an influential period in Latin America, where he himself maintained he first really learned about development and came into contact with the structuralist school. A time of reflection at Yale was followed by a period working in Africa in the early 1960s when he had the opportunity to experience at close quarters the "wind of change" sweeping through the continent as the majority of former colonies achieved independence. By 1964 he had therefore already had a wide experience in the development field in operational roles and academic circles.

During this phase of his career Seers shared the prevailing view that economic growth and mechanisation were the means whereby "underdeveloped areas" would be enabled to raise living standards and bring about widespread development. However, while the early Gold Coast report suggested that emulating European work practices and standards might assist the move towards rapid economic growth, from an early stage in his work in the early 1950s Seers strongly argued that European or Western taught economic analysis was usually inappropriate for addressing the circumstances and

problems of such areas, which were mainly primary producers, economically dependent on the production and sale of one main commodity. This view was endorsed and further influenced by his association with the Latin American structuralist school, whose ideas and policies he came to consider had more relevance for primary producers than those of conventional Anglo-Saxon economists, as he began to turn his thoughts towards the need for more appropriate training of development economists.

As a result of his time in Latin America it was demonstrated how he came to support the idea that planned programmes of import substitution industrialisation were required by primary producers to raise economic growth to satisfactory levels to sustain more widespread development. Here too he became more acutely aware of the external factors, impinging on a primary producer's room to manoeuvre (particularly from Western governments and companies) and the need for protective policies, fairer trading patterns, and in some circumstances external aid to encourage development, regarding the strict monetarist policies advocated by certain Western governments and advisers at this time as entirely inappropriate. Although from the 1950s he viewed development very much in terms of government investment programmes, by the early 1960s he increasingly acknowledged the influence of overseas companies and private investment on the economies of primary producers; his response being to encourage primary producers to improve their bargaining position and to advocate a "marriage of convenience" between government and companies, such as that recommended to Zambia with the copper mining companies, which was considered to be in their mutual interest. His experience in Africa, and the dire lack of an educated and skilled workforce encountered there, heightened his awareness that needs and priorities were different in different areas of the world - and while trade concessions were a priority for many countries in Latin America, technical assistance was often a more pressing requirement in Africa and Asia. However, at this stage he believed that these were not incompatible and all needs could be met within the framework of an international effort towards a more integrated world economy which would be to the mutual interest and benefit of both "developing" and "developed" countries.

Seers' own initial interest in overseas development issues was largely motivated by humanitarian concerns - a reflection in part of his adherence to the post-war Fabian vision of working towards an egalitarian povertyless society. He was not unaware, however, of the political and economic motivations behind Western governments' interest in development programmes - raising living standards being regarded as one way of preventing internal political unrest and securing ongoing and increased access to raw materials and markets in former colonies and other underdeveloped areas, and preventing them falling under Communist control. While this was already of some concern in the 1950s, and is discernible in the Gold Coast report, it became increasingly evident by the early 1960s as the Cold War intensified, particularly following the Cuban revolution, which, as Chapter 2 indicated, had a major impact on ideas and policies in Latin America as Seers was working in the region.

While Seers himself often appealed to the enlightened self-interest of governments to support fairer trade and increased aid programmes and the mutual benefits to be gained from a more fully integrated world economy, he tended himself to stress above all the moral imperative and responsibility of richer economies to assist the poorer. At this stage he supported and advocated the need for a combined international approach to development problems, rising above narrow national interests, and considered that multilateral aid programmes and agencies such as the United Nations had an important role to play in fostering this international, and assumed more impartial, approach to development. Seers had a genuine optimism at this point that planned growth and industrialisation programmes, assisted by fairer trading practices and increased technical and financial assistance on the part of the richer economies, would stimulate economic growth and bring about widespread development in poorer areas.

The second part of the study - "The Meaning of Development" - covered the period 1964 to 1972, as Seers returned to development related work based in the UK and became involved in two major initiatives of the newly elected Labour government - first being recruited as Director of the Economic Planning Staff in the new Ministry of Overseas Development, and then being appointed Director of the new Institute of Development Studies in 1967. It described his work and experience at the ODM, as he confronted the practical reality of what development meant in terms of British government policy, and then as IDS Director, at a time when it was becoming increasingly apparent that development programmes worldwide were failing to bring about the expected improvements, forcing him to rethink his ideas about the more general meaning of and approach to development.

While initially optimistic that a Labour government, through its new Ministry, would embody the Fabian principles that many of its members had advocated in opposition and adopt an overseas development policy dictated more by a sense of international moral responsibility to eliminate world poverty rather than narrow national commercial and political interests, Chapter 4 indicated his increasing disappointment both in the Ministry and the government for its lack of commitment to this cause.

As he became more frustrated at the bureaucracy and disillusioned with Labour's record, Seers' appointment to the directorship of IDS opened up new opportunities for an academic career where he could put into practice some of his ideas for making more relevant the training of administrators, planners and policymakers in the development field. In addition it presented further opportunities for widening international contacts and consultancy work overseas. However, it also brought tensions and problems as a result of the "entanglement" of development studies with government policy referred to in the Introduction. As a largely government funded body, officials at Whitehall regarded IDS as part of the aid effort and in large part answerable to and at the service of the ODM, while the majority of IDS staff asserted their academic independence, a difference of outlook and opinion which surfaced in the conflict over Study Seminar 15 - and which in large part contributed to Seers' decision to resign from the directorship. Although the

"crisis" was overcome and no further major protests over infringement of academic freedom surfaced, the fortune of IDS was very much bound up with the ministry. While Seers continued to have contact with the ODM he had more freedom to be critical and outspoken unrestrained by the responsibility of office.

Seers' disillusion with the British Labour government's record on development was in part only a reflection of the general lack of commitment to the issue displayed by most richer economies and the failure of the international initiative as the end of the UN's first development decade witnessed an increase rather than decrease of global poverty and inequalities. His own experience overseas demonstrated that planned growth models and industrialisation programmes had not only failed to bring about a general improvement of living standards in "developing" countries but had in fact often worsened them. The benefits of growth had usually accrued to overseas companies, which had siphoned off excess profits, and to a small local modern sector or elite linked closely with their overseas counterparts, whereas for the majority of the population, however, poverty, unemployment and inequality had usually increased.

This marked a significant change in Seers' thinking and approach as he now criticised the excessive and exaggerated emphasis on growth as an indicator and target of development, distancing himself now from "the Prebisch doctrine" of the structuralists, as being on the whole an "illegitimate transfer of experience" into primary producers and insisting that more attention needed to be given to the process rather than the pace of growth. Development he maintained should be defined in terms of social targets - the elimination of poverty, unemployment and inequality - with planning, aid and research geared towards these goals rather than growth *per se*. He was already beginning to have some doubts about the effectiveness of aid, though he still considered at this point that it could have a useful function.

However, he now argued there were other more important ways in which richer economies affected the poorer, maintaining that the import and emulation of inappropriate consumption patterns and production techniques had in large part been responsible for what he saw as the perversion of the growth process in the Third World. He urged developing countries to pursue a more independent path, taking a greater pride in their own culture and adopting their own production techniques more appropriate to local conditions and requirements, aimed at reducing poverty, unemployment and inequality rather than increasing growth - an approach which he attempted to adopt in the recommendations of the World Employment Reports; though this still obviously required a constructive response from international trading partners as well as governments concerned.

While Seers continued to be conscious of the external restraints on policy options exercised by both overseas companies and governments, however, he now also increasingly observed that the implementation of the required reforms were often resisted and blocked by governments and those in positions of power in the developing countries themselves, who considered their interests threatened by the adoption of more egalitarian

measures. This raised serious questions about the feasibility of implementing the desired programmes but, nevertheless, Seers still maintained a certain optimism that a worldwide system of co-ordinated national and international policies aimed primarily at social targets and covering many fields, including social issues such as education and immigration, as well as aid and trade, could still bring about more widespread development.

At this point he suggested the development adviser could play a significant role in explaining the reality of the situation to both companies and governments involved. But while still referring to the moral responsibilities of the richer economies, he now also employed more direct political arguments himself in pointing out the dangers of deteriorating social conditions on a poorer country's stability, and thereby the advantages of a more responsible approach in supporting programmes aimed at improving standards of living. While interested in the example and the lessons that could be learned from of a country like Cuba, Seers never considered a revolutionary answer feasible or desirable for the majority of developing countries. If nothing else, he was hopeful that the recommendation of reports such as those of the World Employment programme, in being adopted and studied by academic bodies and international agencies, could have a longer term effect in influencing the climate of opinion and future policy and policymakers.

The third part of the study "The New Meaning of Development" covered Seers' very full and active career as a fellow at IDS from 1972 until his death in 1983, a period which witnessed more dramatic changes in his attitude to development as he put greater emphasis on the need for self reliance in developing countries and called for the extension of development studies to Europe, the logic of which eventually resulted in his advocating greater disengagement of Northern industrialised countries from the affairs of the South, including the reduction of aid, a move which, in direct contrast to the views he held during the first phase of his career, he argued was in their real mutual interest. He now came to believe that an international approach to world problems was no longer feasible and while considering nationalism had a positive part to play in encouraging more independent development, he eventually came to the conclusion that the future lay in an extended nationalist or more regionalist approach to problems.

His change of focus he maintained was influenced by the experience of his professional jobs and the "rapidly evolving world of the 1970s" and in Part III an attempt was to identify the various interrelated strands and combination of factors which brought about this change.

Of prominent significance was the world economic recession - enhanced by the oil price rises and increasing competition from NICs - which Seers observed was resulting in the industrialised countries themselves facing economic difficulties and what had previously been regarded as development problems. There were even fewer resources available for overseas aid and for maintaining a neo-colonial system, for which in any case there was less political motivation as East-West tensions eased, while at the same time there were opportunities and a growing need for more resources to develop the

European periphery in which Britain, as a member of the EEC, had an interest.

The limited world resources, highlighted by the oil crisis, Seers now concluded, demonstrated that growth on the scale comparable to that in the "developed" industrialised world was not in fact possible for the vast majority of countries and presented a practical reason for a return to more self-reliant traditional means of production. In any case the perversion of the growth process, already noted in the previous phase of his career, had only intensified with disparities and inequalities growing within and between countries. Overseas companies had become transnational in their operation and were highly influential in often determining government policy of the countries within which they operated, as indeed did the multilateral aid agencies, such as the World Bank and IMF, whose assistance, he now noted, had proved as politically determined as that of bilateral aid. Such bodies, he observed, tended to keep in power authoritarian and corrupt governments which were generally opposed to the implementation of more egalitarian development policies. External intervention in overseas countries, he therefore came to the conclusion, had frequently not only been patronising, even when it had been well intentioned, but had often proved more harmful than beneficial.

This line of argument was also partly a response to the increased calls for self reliance and less external interference then emanating from the countries of the South themselves, though, as was indicated, Seers did not support calls for the New International Economic Order. He argued that it would be in the best interests of the countries of the South if aid and outside interference was reduced and urged overseas governments that were committed to development to be more selective in their acceptance of the external assistance of TNCs and aid agencies. Using Europe as an example, he suggested both TNCs and aid could be less harmfully, as well as more usefully, employed in their own region.

While Seers maintained that because of the economic crisis, and the easing of East-West tension, it was no longer feasible to view the world as being divided into three and that all countries were encountering the same type of problems and in varying degrees dependent, he no longer pursued, and in fact was highly critical of, the idea of global interdependence and the need for international aid to inculcate a more integrated world economy, which was now taken up by Brandt. As was outlined in the final section of Chapter 7, Seers no longer considered a universal solution or international approach feasible, particularly with right-wing governments in power in the USA and Britain, but instead urged the adoption of policies that would lead to greater self reliance and regionalism.

The breadth of Seers' career and the multi-disciplinary nature of his concerns provides an insight into the history of development, from a basically British viewpoint, in the post-war years and touches on many related subjects and issues in the field. This in itself has made his career a fascinating subject for study.

The progression of his thinking, however, required considerable changes of opinion along the way. In his willingness to "let go" of previous held views Seers had little in common with those academics he criticised for reproducing throughout their career theories learned as a student - either because of their own inertia and unwillingness to rewrite lectures and texts or because of the degree of theoretical conservatism imposed by institutions, bureaucracies and publishers.[3] Indeed, as has been demonstrated, he clearly documented his changes of opinion and focus, candidly acknowledging on occasion the complete reversal of his opinions on certain issues.

What seems clear, and has been noted by his colleague Hans Singer, is that he "developed his views not theoretically, but as a result of field experience ... moving from policy and reality to theory rather than the other way":

> Dudley Seers, in his move from concentration on growth and then employment in the era of the ILO Employment Missions, to basic needs, to poverty, to income distribution, was ... influenced not so much by theoretical thinking but by his life experience, by what he observed. He then turned to revise the models with which he worked.[4]

His ideas were moulded by experience of the countries he visited, the jobs he held - both in the UK and overseas - the missions he led and participated in, and as was mentioned in the introduction "by changing relations with underdeveloped countries, changing UK governments and policies, and changes in the wider world".

While this may reflect a flexible approach on Seers' part it does, however, raise questions as to whether his concerns were constantly changing in reaction to his personal and particular experiences, or whether in fact there was any ongoing consistency in his work and ideas or a fundamental "ideology" underlying his approach to development.

Seers himself maintained that had he undertaken research in other countries, for example, China, India, the United States, and the Soviet Union, his "approach would without doubt be very different",

> I would, for example, be less aware of the special problems of small countries (especially *vis-à-vis* the great powers), and more conscious of the importance of regional differences within countries - and of the economic, political, and social costs of central bureaucracies."[5]

Although his work was by no means confined to small countries, and he did in fact demonstrate awareness of the need to take into account regional differences within larger countries (particularly in his work on national accounting), his career did lead him to a particular interest in the workings of smaller economies such as the islands of Malta, the Caribbean and South Pacific (Trinidad and Fiji in particular) and in countries like Lesotho. In the 1970s, he listed size as one of the four main determinants of dependency, and addressed the problem of how a small country's room to manoeuvre could be enhanced. It was in fact in generalising ideas about the advantages of nationalism and patriotism and the need in some circumstances for policies encouraging increases in the population and the military - ideas originally discussed particularly in relation to the

needs of smaller economies - that some of his later views aroused such controversy; and in this respect his overall view could be said to have been influenced, and distorted, by the limitations of his particular experience of or interest in smaller economies.

In addition it should perhaps be noted that, despite the breadth of his concerns, there were certain areas of development in which Seers took very little personal interest. For example, although always mentioning the importance of agriculture and rural development, it was not an area of research he pursued with any interest himself.

It is of course impossible and pointless to speculate how or whether Seers' approach would have been different had he undertaken research in other countries - or on other issues. It is, however, helpful and necessary to consider whether, despite his flexible approach and changing opinions, there is an ongoing consistency in his work and ideas or a fundamental "ideology" underlying his approach to development. The question also arises as to how far or whether his views and the changes in his perspective can in fact be regarded as reflective of more "mainstream" thinking on development, particularly in the light of his reputation as a "provocateur", and whether any more generalised conclusions can be drawn from his work. Some of these questions will be explored below, following a short general appreciation of his contribution to development studies.

The fact, however, that the silver jubilee conference held at IDS in 1992 to celebrate its 25th anniversary was actually entitled "The Meaning of Development" after Seers' famous paper, and that during the proceedings there was ongoing recognition of the failures of development, ongoing discussion of the need for social targets, and ongoing debate concerning the merits of an international or regionalist approach to development seems to indicate that Seers' work highlighted many of the fundamental issues and problems still being discussed today in development circles. In Jolly's estimation certainly it is "oversimplistic" to describe or dismiss Seers "as a dissident of development studies. Rather, he was something of a prophet: mainstream thinking on development often moved towards positions he had first put forward".[6] Consideration will therefore be given to those areas in which Seers can be said to have demonstrated some foresight and where there is ongoing opportunity for research.

Since his death many of his colleagues have paid tribute to Seers' contribution to development. Hans Singer for example has paid him "the high compliment of comparing his ideas with those of Keynes"[7] - drawing attention, for example, to a similarity in their ideas about nationalism and partial delinking from the world economy at certain stages in their careers (Keynes in the 1930s and Seers in his latter years), their search for a middle or third way between capitalism and socialism, and their shared interest in quantification and national accounting systems. Seers, however, as has been noted in this study, frequently emphasised his differences rather than similarities with Keynes, particularly as he moved on to link national accounting more directly to poverty and standards of living rather than GNP and capital accumulation. But in Singer's estimation Seers "complemented Keynes' work" with his emphasis on life cycles and social indicators

representing "an essential further development and correction of the Keynesian approach".[8] Seers' work in the area of national planning and statistics, in fact, has been regarded as some of his most innovative and creative, as well as being rigorous and professional, and "perhaps more constructively radical than in any other area of his work".[9]

In fact Seers earned a reputation as a careful and skillful empirical economist, reflected in the thoroughness of his country studies, such as those of Zambia, Cuba, Colombia, Ceylon, Nigeria, and Uganda, undertaken on behalf of various international agencies, and it has been said he was "at his best when he focused on the study of individual national economies and their links with the world economy".[10]

However, as this study has clearly indicated, although by training an economist and having a reputation for "exceptional professional competence" in this field, he had a healthy disrespect for purely quantitative and economic models. His own work was very much based on what his biographical entry in *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics* has described as his "instinctive ability to see the subject in terms of real people" - reflected in the concentration of his statistical work on social indicators and life profiles - and his own "willingness to step into 'real life'" - demonstrated by his concern for refugees and human rights issues and the general multi-disciplinary nature of his interests.[11] His work at the ODM and then key role at the IDS, as both director and fellow, earned him a reputation as an institution builder and were again reflections of his interest in linking academic thinking with more practical government policy.

It has been said that Seers worked largely within a "structuralist paradigm"[12] but he himself, however, never defined his position and outlook quite so precisely and, while acknowledging the importance of the Latin American structuralist and dependency schools and their influence on his work, he did not entirely identify himself with either school, distancing himself from the former in the early 1970s, when he disagreed with the emphasis still placed on the pace rather than the process of growth, and finding the dependency school lacking in its failure to take into consideration geographic and demographic factors. He was never in fact tied to any particular economic ideology, eventually finding them all lacking in some way (as was seen in Chapter 6). While he frequently observed there was a need for a credible theory of development, he came to the conclusion in the later stages of his career that a universal theory was not possible.

Seers was very much a pragmatist and not a theorist and, as Toye has noted, although as a policy adviser he gained "many shrewd insights into the ways in which governments work", he himself "never tried to fashion a systematic political economy"[13] and it is generally recognised that he did not make a major theoretical contribution to the field himself. A close colleague of Seers for many years, Paul Streeten, has observed that "he did not have the deductive, analytical ability prized so highly in academia" but instead "had a freshness, vividness and originality in viewing situations and problems, which made the analytical prowess appear grey by comparison," and "had a good sense of how to stir up inert minds, get people to reflect, and put new

ideas into circulation".[14]

Seers thus gained a reputation as a "provocateur", "provo" or iconoclast - a persistent questioner, someone who challenged orthodoxies - stimulated debate, provoked the established order and teased bureaucrats, and in fact it has been said that "Although not a writer where it is easy to identify 'seminal contributions', his role as *agent provocateur* was truly original and of great value".[15]

Jolly too, while expressing regret that Seers never contributed a definitive piece on "the structural theory of development" or presented "a more comprehensive theory or approach" even in his last book, has observed that he was by inclination and craftsmanship at best analysing real-life situations, describing him as "essentially the critic not the creator, the demolisher of theoretical structures which failed to fit the facts rather than the painstaking builder of alternatives". Consequently, his wide experience and criticism of other approaches "left him with few building blocks for erecting alternative structures"[16] - except in the field of statistics where Jolly in particular regards him as very much a constructive and creative builder.

Seers' work in the field of statistics and national accounting is in fact one practical area where he maintained an ongoing interest from his time at Oxford in the late 1940s until the early 1980s. From those early days in Oxford and then in the Caribbean in the 1950s his interest was focused on distributional issues and a growing concern, particularly as he began to work overseas, that not only should the quality of statistical information be improved but that it should be made more relevant to planning and development requirements. His insistence on social indicators, rather than GNP, as measures of development and his later work on life profiles, were put forward not only as a more relevant means of analysing past trends but also as a means to express more practical social targets for the relief and reduction of poverty, unemployment and inequality - which always remained his stated ultimate goal for development.

Although he became more sceptical in later life about some governments' commitment to implementing the necessary policies to achieve such goals, he himself maintained a commitment to their desirability, expressed even latterly in his continuing support for welfare aid to relieve poverty, and a strengthened concern for human rights issues. In Jolly's opinion it was Seers' "continuing focus on inequality and injustice" reflected in such commitments, which demonstrates "the connecting thread" of his professional work over his lifetime more clearly than the moves in his final decade "from internationalism to a European-centre nationalism".[17]

However, a certain consistency can, perhaps surprisingly, also be seen in his attitude to Europe - which can be traced back to the time of his allegiance to the Keep Left Group. Although his youthful advocacy of "socialism" waned in later life, there were some fundamental principles expressed by the Keep Left group in the later 1940s to which he continued to adhere - or to which he returned. For example he displayed an ongoing resentment of Britain being regarded as "the junior partner and the advance outpost of an American-dominated system"[18] (a Keep Left phrase) - particularly when

this directly affected British foreign policy, for instance in reaction to the Korean and Vietnam wars, and involved additional expense on armaments to the detriment of welfare budgets - and he frequently expressed concern that Britain should take a more independent stand. While his views on Britain's place within Europe did vary and change (as initially he opposed its entry to the EEC), his later interest in and vision of a united region of Western and Eastern Europe, are similar in many ways to the views held by the Keep Left group in the post war years, which saw a united Europe as a way to assert independence from American influence, renounce nuclear weapons, assist in defusing ideological warfare between the USA and USSR and ensure world peace. Although in the early 1980s Seers was by no means talking in terms of a united Socialist Europe (as Keep Left were in 1947) the common elements are there to see.

Despite his disillusion with most politico-economic theories, is it in fact possible to identify any basic political motivations influencing his view of development? Seers himself was aware that his own background imposed its own limitations and influences on his outlook and in his last book confessed, as he maintained he did before any lecture, the "inevitable biases on almost every serious issue" he held as a result of being "a white English, Christian male":

> To have been brought up in the family of an executive of General Motors, educated at a preparatory school and Rugby, then at Cambridge, and to have served as an officer of the Royal Navy and in the civil service at home and abroad, is to be a lifetime captive of these institutions, even (perhaps especially) when one is reacting against the attitudes they attempt to instil.[19]

In many ways he did react against this conservative British background. A self-confessed "socialist" in the post-war period in New Zealand and a member of the Keep Left Group of the Labour Party in the late 1940s and early 1950s, he owed his early appointment to the ODM to his political affiliation and was mentioned in the honours list in 1975 after Labour's return to power, though he became disillusioned with the performance of the Party in office (both in the 1960s and the 1970s). Although displaying an interest in socialist development experiments overseas, he was also ultimately disappointed in and critical of the end result there too. However, even during his youthful advocacy of socialism he retained a very pragmatic political approach to issues and problems (initially demonstrated in his work in New Zealand), eschewing what he saw as the impractical dogmatism of the far Left and Marxism. Although in later years his views on issues such as aid became more conservative - leading to further disagreements with the Labour Party's commitment on this issue - and he became more sceptical about the feasibility of tackling inequality on an international scale, he nevertheless, as was pointed out above, maintained a basic concern for defending human rights and relieving deprivation. While he personally rejected the old Right-Left axis as no longer being of relevance, it could be said that he maintained on the whole a liberal slightly left of centre stance throughout most of his career - though in later life moved further down the nationalist horizontal in terms of the representation of ideologies which

he himself drew up (see Figure 6.1b, p.297). Whether Seers himself would have accepted this assessment is not certain, however, for as one of his colleagues has observed, in relation to his concern for human rights, "One would not have dared to tell him to his face that ... he represented British liberalism at its best".[20]

In many ways though he in fact maintained close links with the establishment which he at times criticised. Throughout his working career he acted at various times as adviser and consultant to the British government, overseas governments, and international organisations (including multilateral agencies like the World Bank and the IMF), as well as entering into dialogue with Western companies investing overseas (latterly the TNCs) - positions that clearly brought to his attention the inevitable conflicting and contradictory economic and political interests that arose in the various relationships between these bodies and their approaches to development. Although he "took many positions critical of the status quo, whether of capitalism, of transnational corporations, of communism, of the establishment in general, of administrators and of bureaucracy"[21] both at home and overseas and his views were often contentious, his criticisms were, however, always made from a position within or in continued close proximity to, if not always harmony with, the "established order" or organisations criticised. This can be seen in the relationship he maintained with the British government and also the World Bank. For example, despite his criticism of the Brandt report, the allocation of multilateral aid, and certain conditions attached to aid, he continued to work with and for the World Bank (also building fences with the IMF). Here too pragmatism reigned and Jolly has commented that "a healthy respect for power ... almost always conquered in the long love-hate relationship between the IDS and these institutions [the World Bank and IMF], even if the full passion of unqualified love has been lacking".[22]

In simplistic terms it could be said that the first two stages of his career were spent in attempting to find pragmatic ways of resolving or reaching a compromise between the various conflicting and contradictory economic and political interests arising - between and within governments and bureaucracies of North and South, TNCs, and multilateral agencies - in the process of trying to implement a development strategy aimed at alleviating human deprivation but operating within the parameters of a capitalist oriented system motivated by growth and profit. While his retreat into self reliance and nationalist regionalism in the third phase of his career was an acknowledgement that such a universal compromise or solution was not possible.

While Seers' opinions and solutions may not be considered entirely representative of mainstream thinking, particularly in his later conclusions, certainly development studies as a whole could be said to be dealing with the intricacies of these same fundamental economic and political relationships and as such a study of his work can only but add to the debate in a field in which in any case two recent directors of IDS have noted "there are as many opinions as there are people to express them".[23] Seers' readiness to deal with "real life" issues and to link theory with practice addressed many of the fundamental issues and problems still being discussed in development circles.

As already mentioned, Jolly in fact maintains that "mainstream thinking on development" often moved towards positions Seers had first put forward[24] and Louis Emmerij, his successor as President of the EADI, has observed that "Dudley Seers was usually a step ahead of everybody else when it came to identifying emerging issues".[25] Certainly his early move to "dethrone" GNP and concentrate on social indicators, for example, not only influenced the focus of the work of IDS and other international agencies, but also helped open up new critical directions in the field.[26] In addition his claim that "analysis originally designed for underdeveloped countries finds application in the most developed" has also been increasingly recognised.[27]

Since his death, however, there have been two major developments and areas of concern in particular where it could be said Seers demonstrated a certain prophetic note and where there is an ongoing interest in further work and research. One is obviously on the European front with the realisation of the reunification of Germany and the breaking down of the old political divisions between the East and West Europe. It has been observed that Seers was "one of the few" in the late 1970s who in fact "saw the need to make a move towards closer relations with the Eastern European countries";[28] and the "opening up" of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have indeed, as he discussed, presented TNCs and governments with new choices as they weigh up the pros and cons of investment, trade and aid within Europe compared to allocating resources elsewhere overseas.

Already in 1989 Toye and Emmerij made reference to this trend. Toye, for example, observed that trade had already "been diverted wholesale from Third World suppliers like India to the newly incorporated countries of the Southern European periphery"[29] - and the removal of old political divisions in Europe obviously now provides even more opportunities for such diversion within the region. While Emmerij observed that there were pointers in the direction of collective self-reliance in Europe, as envisaged by Seers, reflected in three very different movements: the tendency among the economic and financial orthodoxies in power in the 1980s to call for economic restructuring behind protectionist barriers; the calls by various Green movements in European countries for more a more employment-intensive (as well as environmentally friendly and energy extensive) production process; and the arguments of a smaller group in favour of European nationalism, focusing on their own region and disengaging from the rest of the world.[30] Since then there has been an increasing trend towards regionalism and protectionism and more serious discussion of the formation of regional blocs, particularly the possibilities for an enlarged EEC, but also proposals for a Western Hemisphere Free Trade Area and the possibility of East Asian regional bloc linking Japan and East and South Asia. However, while Seers regarded a movement towards regionalism as a desirable trend, it is not so regarded by many of his former colleagues who continue to strive for an international and multilateral solution (as will be seen below).[31]

In addition to presaging the increasing trend towards regionalism Seers' concern with nationalism has also proved to have become an issue of crucial and rising topicality.

The break-up of the Soviet bloc has produced huge problems unforeseen by Seers, whose vision of extended nationalism appears increasingly unrealistic in the present climate, but he raised key issues of nationalism and sovereignty in the early 1980s which have since increasingly emerged as problems and become subjects for serious ongoing debate in the region.

The second area where Seers displayed a certain foresight was in the fears he expressed in the early 1980s, based on his experience of Latin America, that the imposition of strict monetarist policies being adopted by the multilateral agencies, as well as the Reagan and Thatcher governments, would result in "many painful years" of increased inflation, unemployment and social deprivation of the poor - fears which have certainly materialised during the decade, not only in the domestic record of the USA and Britain, but even more so in the "developing" world, where the situation has been exacerbated by the crippling and mounting debt crisis, resulting in many Third World countries becoming net contributors of funds to the developed countries rather than net recipients. Even the multilateral agencies - the World Bank and IMF - the propagators of such policies acknowledge in official reports that in many developing countries poverty is on the increase and the prospects for a sustained improvement in growth remain in doubt.[32]

Nigerian professor Akin Mabongunje[33] has observed that the worsening state of indebtedness experienced by underdeveloped countries during the 1980s in fact constrained some to adopt policies and programmes based on the "concept of selective closure", or selective self-reliance, as advocated by Seers, drawing particular attention to Nigeria's decision in 1985 to reject an IMF loan, rather than submit to some of the structural adjustment programmes and conditions insisted upon, and preferring instead to seek solutions to the country's social and economic problems through its own efforts, at its own pace and on its own volition, consistent with its own long-term national interest - much in line with Seers' recommendations at 1980 North-South Conference at Arusha. Mabogunje also refers to the increasing recognition of the "imperative of regional organisations" for fostering self-reliant development (again a move envisaged as necessary by Seers) and there have been various forms of regional integration recently revived in the Third World - notable examples including ASEAN, SADCC, and an agreement between Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay to seek full economic integration by 2000.[34]

The trend towards regionalism in both the "developed" and Third World regions of the world was one of the issues raised within the context of a key debate on the poor record of "international" or "global governance" and the ways in which it might be improved, raised at the IDS conference held to mark IDS's 25th Anniversary. At this Jubilee Conference, already referred to, entitled "The Meaning of Development", the current director, John Toye, remarked that Seers' spirit was invoked as discussions proceeded in the presence of three other ex-directors.[35]

Certainly the poor record of development so far and the limitations of development studies, first mentioned in the introduction and constantly referred to by Seers, was a major focus and cause for reflections by the development experts present. Louis Emmerij, for example, acknowledged:

> On observing the world economic scene, it becomes obvious that we have failed on many fronts. We have failed in our development assistance policies; in our trade policies, which are still too protectionist; and in our international financial policies, which have led to the international debt problem. The result has been hugely uneven world economic development. It is only in a few East Asian countries, and in one or two South East Asian countries, that success stories can be noted. But even there, the sustainability of the East Asian development model is not necessarily secured.[36]

Even elder statesmen in the development field like Hans Singer also expressed the opinion that over the past twenty years or so "much of development studies has in fact amounted more to damage limitation rather than genuine development".[37]

Looking back at development studies during the 1980s Toye observed that the limitation of a narrowly economic approach to the subject had become increasingly clear and that - "The meaning of development has been extended beyond the rather materialistic litany of basic needs, to include gender equality, demilitarisation, the absence of social delinquency, and the promotion of a broad conception of human rights"[38] - with the renewed concern for the human condition being reflected in such recent publications as *Adjustment with a Human Face*, and the UNDP's *Human Development Report*.[39] There as also reference to the "new thinking" that had emerged in response to the generally poor development performance of the 1980s, illustrated by "a remarkable convergence" of views on development contained in the reports of the World Bank, UNDP and South Commission of 1990 and 1991 which put "poverty eradication, human development and good governance at the centre of attention".[40]

As has been recorded in this study, Seers had since the late 1960s emphasised the need to take into consideration non-economic factors affecting development and to focus greater attention on broader social and political issues, including latterly human rights. Although gender equality *per se* did not feature among his own list of priorities, a general commitment to equality, as well as to the reduction of poverty and unemployment, did and he certainly came to embrace the other factors now listed above as "new thinking" and the current meaning of development. While acknowledging there are strong echoes in current thinking of the employment and basic needs strategies of the 1970s, Emmerij maintains it is not just a resurrection of previous ideas but also incorporates lessons of the 1980s. The question remains, however, whether restating such strategies will in fact have more success than previous efforts or bring about any significant change in or improvement of standards of living. Jolly has expressed the opinion that "if there had been a more concerted effort within the ILO and the United Nations to maintain a focus on the central issues of basic human needs, employment and income distribution, the harsh economic approaches of the 1980s could have been

moderated significantly and an important part of the human setbacks and suffering avoided".[41] The fact however remains that there was no such concerted effort made and the question still remains whether it will it make any difference, now that the multilateral aid organisations - the IMF and the World Bank - are also taking these type of strategies more seriously.

While Seers might well have endorsed the renewed concern for "human development" one cannot help thinking that had he lived to be present at this conference he would have regarded this as yet another instance of "cultural lag" - the tendency of attitudes and perceptions to lag behind changing reality - and that he might well have had more in common with the dissenting voice raised at the conference by his old colleague Manfred Bienefeld.

Describing the so-called "neoliberal" policies pursued throughout the 1980s as "analytically indefensible, morally repugnant and politically and economically destructive", Bienefeld maintained they had contributed in a major way to the destruction of the "dream of development"[42] as in large parts of the world welfare conditions had deteriorated sharply, with most Latin American and sub-Saharan countries entering the 1990s poorer, more polarised and no nearer to economic viability than they were a decade earlier. While, he observed, the advocates of these policies, in particular the IMF and World Bank, acknowledged these failures, they were not abandoning their commitment to "neo liberalism", but proposed the way forward was to continue to implement the "right policies" though introduced more pragmatically and accompanied by complementary welfare policies designed to ameliorate their transitory effects on the poor and vulnerable. Posing the question whether the outcome was likely to be any different from the earlier basic needs strategy, his answer was "yes, it is likely to be far worse!", in part, he argued, because "the implosion of the Soviet bloc has created a world in which the pursuit of these neoliberal policies can be further intensified both in the developed and developing world because those who are benefiting so massively from this process have less need to compromise when there is no reason to fear the emergence of a coherent political response".[43] As already mentioned, the implosion of the Soviet bloc also opens up alternative venues for the capital available and the exercise of neo-liberal policies.

John Toye observes that "the Jubilee Conference failed to end in agreement on the future of development studies",[44] but is convinced that IDS's collective endeavour is worth pursuing. Despite the poor record of the past and the uncertain developments of the present, optimism was in fact expressed for the future. Emmerij, for example, maintained that "if one adopts a dynamic viewpoint... the 1990s could well prove an exceptional decade for growth and development on a truly global scale".[45] Optimism too was reflected in Hans Singer's speculative look to the future of development studies over the next 25 years, as he stated he was "optimistic enough to assume - and certainly hope" that the subject would be "helped by a more favourable tide - a world in which global solidarity" supported by concern for the environment and including economic and

social solidarity, "becomes more of a reality and less a piece of rhetoric".[46]

It remains to be seen, however, whether these and other "hopes" for the future expressed at the conference materialise any more successfully than the "dream of development" or Seers' "vision" of a land and world of plenty, or whether, without more radical change, the situation is likely to get much worse, as envisaged by Bienefeld. Certainly the lessons of Seers' career and would seem to indicate that there can be little grounds for optimism that international development will be any more successful than in the past.

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APPENDIX

Brief Outline of Dudley Seers' Career and Professional Activities

This chronology has been built up from a number of sources, including Seers' own curriculum vitae and journey reports, IDS annual reports, and references found in various other papers. It is by no means a comprehensive survey of his professional activities, and some years are more fully covered than others, but it does provide an overall framework within which to view the context of his work discussed in this study, giving an indication of the range of activities in which he was involved and the hectic schedule he followed.

Precise dates for events and activities are used where possible, though for the earlier period at IDS it was occasionally only possible to indicate the year. Square brackets indicate that, although Seers' participation in this particular project is documented, the precise date was not entirely clear, though, based on the context of the references, it had been inserted in the chronology at the most likely date.

Chief dates in life and career

1920 (11 April)	Born
1932-6	Rugby School
1938-41	Pembroke College, Cambridge
1941-5	Royal Navy
1945-6	Research assistant in Prime Minister's office - New Zealand
1946-53	Research officer and Lecturer (later Senior Lecturer) - Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics
1953-4	Research Economist, United Nations - World Economic Survey
1954-5	Research Officer/Senior Lecturer - Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics
1955-7	Statistical Adviser to Barbados, Leeward and Windward Islands, United Nations Technical Assistance - based in Barbados
1957-61	Chief of Survey Section, Economic Commission for Latin America - Santiago, Chile
1961-3	Visiting fellowship - Yale University
1963	Director Economic Development Division, Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
1964-7	Director General of Economic Planning Staff, Ministry of Overseas Development, London
1967-72	Director, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex
1972-83	Fellow, Institute of Development Studies
1983 (21 March)	Death

Other professional activities

1951	Mar.-Apr.	Burma - report on economic problems with an Oxford team
	July 25-	Gold Coast - report on financial and physical problems of development with
	-Sept.	C.R. Ross
	Sept. 5-8	Nigeria - comparison visit for Gold Coast report
1955	Apr.& Aug.	Malta - visits for report on economic problems with Thomas Balogh
		Adviser to Dom Mintoff, Maltese PM on integration talks
1956	July-Sept.	Singapore - lectures at an International Economic Association course for economists from South-East Asia
	Nov.	Tour of Dominica, Grenada, St Lucia and St Vincent - statistics survey
	Dec.-Jan.'57	Tour of Antigua, St Kitts, Jamaica - statistics survey
1962	Feb.	Cuba
		Trinidad and Jamaica - advisory visits on planning
	Aug.-Sept.	Cuba - head of study mission, preparing *Cuba: the Economic and Social Revolution*
1963	Jan.	Rio de Janeiro - Conference on Structuralist/Monetarist Debate
	Mar./Apr.	Ghana - seminar on 7-year development plan
	June	Corfu - Conference of the International Association for Research in Income and Wealth - paper on accounting systems adopted by planning offices in Trinidad and Jamaica
	Sept.	Kampala, University of East Africa - Conference on Public Policy: The Making of Planning - paper on the role of industry in development
	Nov.-Mar.'64	Zambia - head of UN/ECA/FAO economic survey mission - report on economic development
1963/4		South Africa - ECA economic survey report
1964	April	University of Manchester - Conference on Teaching Economic Development - background paper "The Limitations of the Special Case"
	Sept.	Dar es Salaam, University of East Africa - Conference on Foreign Aid - paper on international aid
	Sept. 20-23	University of Edinburgh - international seminar on African primary products and international trade - paper on international trade and development
1965		Work on ODM's first White Paper
		Chair of IDS Formation Committee
1966	June 3-6	Ditchley Park - Ditchley Foundation/ODI international conference on effective aid
	Oct.	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia - Haile Selassie I Prize Trust Conference - paper on the transmission of inequality and the brain drain
1967	May 24	Nairobi - Commonwealth Planners Meeting - paper on designing a planning
	-June 5	strategy
	June	Milan - SID Conference - paper on technical assistance
	Aug.	World Bank - evaluation of country mission reports

	Sept. 25- -Oct. 6	ILO expert group on wage fixing in developing countries - rapporteur
1967/8		Colombo, Ceylon - advice to Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs on setting up social science research institute and on improving statistical basis of planning Nairobi, Kenya - discussions with Ministry of Planning and Economic Development on technical assistance needs Nairobi - lecture to Economics Club on prospects for the Third World Dar es Salaam, Tanzania - lecture to University College on problems of planning Kampala, Uganda - Makerere College - paper on transmission of inequality Canada - Centre of Developing Area Studies at the University of McGill - lecture on the teaching of development economics Maynooth, Ireland - biennial conference of the International Association for Research in Income and Wealth - organised sessions on accounting in the field of manpower African Studies Centre, Edinburgh University - lectures Royal Institute of International Affairs, London - lectures Oxford University - paper to Cerberus Society on "The Theory of Advice" and lecture to graduate seminar on economic development
1968	Jan.	Kingston, Jamaica - advice to Ministry of Finance and Planning on technical aspects of drawing up a development plan; Mona Hotel - talk on planning
	Jan.	Port of Spain, Trinidad - advice to Ministry of Planning and Development on technical aspects of drawing up a development plan St Augustine, Trinidad - meeting of Technical Advisory Committee of University of West Indies (UWI)
	March	Washington, USA - SID World Conference - address on "The Future of the Society", appointed president of SID 1968-9
	June	Khartoum, Sudan - Ministry of Finance - discussions on technical assistance needs
	July	Trinidad - preparation of a note for the Ministry of Planning and Finance - "A Step towards a Political Economy of Development" FRED seminar - spoke on taxation of foreign companies
	Oct.	France - SID European regional conference on rural development
	Oct.	SID UK Chapter - paper on "The Usefulness of Advisers in Africa"
1969	Jan. 18-26	Antigua, St Vincent and Trinidad - visit in connection with the meeting of the Technical Advisory Committee of the UWI Trinidad, St Augustine Campus UWI - took seminar on The Unemployment Problem in Trinidad
	March	Ibadan, Nigeria - NISER/Nigerian Federal Ministry of Economic Development Conference on National Reconstruction and Development in Nigeria Presented paper to Ibadan chapter of SID on "Can Planning Really Help an African Government?"
	April	Dar es Salaam, University of East Africa - Conference on The Teaching of Economics in Africa
	April	New York - SID North American regional Conference on Aid, Development and the New Administration
	April	Washington, Pearson Commission Secretariat - spoke on "The Irrelevance of Aid"

	May	University of Guyana - advice on research needs in development; production of report "A Centre of Development Studies in Guyana"; lectured on "Causes of Failure in Planning" and talk on "Unemployment"
	May	Trinidad - staff meeting of the Ministry of Finance and Development and the Industrial Development Corporation of Trinidad - spoke on "Criteria for Selection of Private Investment Projects for Tax Relief"
	May	Jamaica, Mona Campus UWI - took seminar on Political Economy of Development
	May	Barbados, Multi-Racial Centre - spoke on "Income Distribution and Race"
	May 15-22	Cuba to discuss long-term research project
	May 27-29	Marlborough House, London - ICS/Trade Policy Research Centre Conference on Problems facing Commonwealth Countries - presented paper on "New Policies for Commonwealth Migration"
	June	University of Reading - seminar on International Economics and the Developing Countries - paper on "Personnel Problems of Planning"
	June 29- -July 10	IDS - Crisis in Planning Conference - paper on "The Prevalence of Pseudo Planning"
	July	IDS - first conference of post graduate Latin American students in the social sciences
	Sept. 12-14	IDS - conference on development planning in Ceylon
	Sept.	SID, UK Chapter - conference on private foreign investment and the developing world - paper on "Have Economists and Businessmen anything to say to each other about Development Problems"
	Oct.	Miami, Yale and Harvard to discuss Cuba research
	Nov.	New Delhi, India - SID World Conference - presidential address "The Meaning of Development" paper
	n.d.	ODI - meeting to enable Lester Pearson and Sir Edward Boyle to obtain views of British experts on the task of the Commission on International Aid and Development
1970	Jan./Feb.	Colombia - head ILO World Employment Programme mission Geneva - writing up ILO Colombia report
	Feb.	USA, Columbia University - Conference on Development Strategies in the 1970s
	April	Oxford, Ditchley Park - Conference on The International Civil Service
	April	University of Leeds, School of Economic Studies - lecture on "The Rich Labour Potential of a Poor Country"
	April	Geneva - follow up meeting on ILO Colombia report
	May	Cologne, Germany - SID European Conference
	June	Oxford, Queen Elizabeth House - led seminar on Unemployment in the Third World: The Case of Colombia
	July	York University - SSRC Conference on The Role of the Social Scientist in Action Research
	July	Oxfam-WEA Summer School - lecture on "The Unimportance of Aid"
	July 13-17	Montebello, Canada - OECD meeting of directors of development training and research institutes
	Aug. 3	UNIDO Training Workshop in Methods of Industrial Surveys - paper on "Economic and Industrial Development"
	Aug. 8-12	Jamaica, UWI - Human Resources Seminar
	Aug. 12-14	Bogota, Colombia - SID meeting, talk on Colombia report; discussion with the President and Director of the Planning Office

	Aug. 14-17	Lima, Peru - talk on unemployment problem
	Aug. 17-28	Santiago, Chile - ILO/ILPES seminar on development policy and employment in Latin America
	Sept. 1-2	Bled, Yugoslavia - International Economic Association conference - paper with R. Jolly on "The Brain Drain and the Development Process"
	Sept.	Cambridge - Overseas Studies Committee conference on employment opportunities in 1970s - talk on Colombia
	Dec. 10-12	Paris
	Dec. 12-15	Geneva
	Dec. 15-16	Rome
	Dec. 16	Casablanca
	Dec. 17-31	Agadir
	n.d.	University of Newcastle upon Tyne - public lecture on "The Brain Drain and the Level of Salaries"
		ODM - seminar on unemployment
1971	Jan. 1-2	Barbados
	Jan. 2-9	Port of Spain
	Jan. 9-16	New York - SID Chapter, paper on aid; Washington and Illinois University
	Jan. 17-21	Tokyo, Japan
	Jan. 21-24	Hong Kong
	Jan. 24-25	Manila, Philippines - Asian Development Bank
	Jan. 25-27	Bangkok, Thailand - ILO
	Jan. 27- -Feb.3	Colombo, Ceylon - preliminary visit for WEP mission
	Jan. 30	Lecture on "Unemployment in Developing Countries, with Particular Reference to Latin America" to Ceylon Association for the Advancement of Science
	Feb. 4-5	Geneva, ILO
	Mar. 22-23	Geneva, ILO
	Mar. 25- -30 Apr.	Ceylon - head ILO WEP mission
	May 13-19	Ottawa, Canada - SID World Conference on Jobs and Justice (16-19) - concluding paper on justice
	July 11-25	Colombo, Ceylon - follow up to ILO WEP mission
	Aug. 22- -Sept. 2	Santiago, Chile - seminar on the use of demographic data and studies in planning; discussions with Center of National Planning Studies, Catholic University of Santiago
	Sept. 27-29	IDS Conference on Development Research for UK social scientists - concluding remarks
1972	Jan.	Cuba - research liaison visit
	Jan. 2- -Feb. 6	Trinidad - co-director of study seminar on employment and income distribution
	Feb. 6-9	Jamaica
	Mar. 23- -Apr. 1	Santiago, Chile - ODEPLAN-IDS Roundtable Conference: La Via Chilena
	Apr./June	Kenya - ILO WEP mission - participant and involvement at editorial stage
	July	Colombo - Ceylon Association for the Advancement of Science Conference with Ministers and Permanent Secretaries on problems of implementing ILO WEP report

	Sept. 4-18	Dakar, Senegal - IDEP Conference on Strategies of Development: Africa versus Latin America (co-organiser) - paper on "The Lessons for Africa of Latin American Industrialisation Policies"
	Nov. 3-5	ODA/IDS seminar on The Implications of Unemployment for Aid Policy - (organiser)
	Nov. 5	Kuwait
	Nov. 5-	Indonesian Study Group at IDS - Government administration for manpower and
	-Dec. 2	employment policy (director)
	Dec. 4	University of Bilbao - lecture on "Unemployment as a World Problem"
1973	Feb.	Bogota, Colombia - seminar on implementation of ILO/WEP Colombia report
	Apr. 12-18	Bellagio, Italy - IDS/IBRD Conference on planning models (co-organiser)
	Sept. 9-15	IDS/IBRD Conference on planning models (co-organiser)
	n.d.	Oxford - Wolfson College Lecture on development and population growth
		National Development Research Conference - discussed foundation of EADI
1974	Jan.	Oxford Conference, Christ Church - paper on the world context of development
	Feb. 25-	IDS study seminar on Development Strategies for Mineral Exporting Economies
	-Apr.5	(director)
	Aug. 12-16	Abidjan, Ivory Coast - SID 14th World conference
	Aug. 25-	Malaysia - short-term research consultancy for Malaysian Centre for
	-Sept.23	Development Studies, PM's Department
	Sept. 26	Ghent - Founding Conference of EADI - address "What Business is it of Ours?"
1975	Feb.	Dakar - IDEP - preparatory discussions for study seminar
	Mar. 15-22	Tehran - Iran-Europe Colloquium
	22-25	Riyadh - exploration of ways in which IDS could work with Saudi Arabia.
	Apr. 2-3	Oil Conference - sponsored by IDS in association with the SSRC Advisory Group on Research into the Social Impact of North Sea Oil Developments in Scotland
	May 12-16	IDS Conference on Statistical Policy in Less Developed Countries (co-organiser)
	June 30-	Japan - examination of Japanese social science policy - OECD project
	-July 12	
	Sept. 11-13	Linz, Austria - EADI General Conference
	Sept.	[Tokyo - UNU meeting on World Hunger]
	Oct.	IDS Director of studies for M.Phil. course 1975-77
	Nov. 8-18	Tokyo - 2nd UNU meeting on Human and Social Development (HSD)
		Bangkok - discussions with social scientists at ADI research centre and Thammarat University; lecture to ADI staff; meeting with British Council
		Rome - Istituto per l'Assistenza allo Sviluppo del Mezzagiorna - discusssion re. sponsoring M.Phil study tour of Italy
	Nov. 29-	Committee meeting of EADI (organiser)
	- Dec. 1	
	Dec. 8-21	Venezuela - UN inter-regional seminar on national accounting - presented paper on statistical need for development
		Discussions re. possible IDS/Venezuelan joint projects - e.g. study seminars, training, research programmes - through agency of CENDES
1976	Jan. 28-31	Caracas, Venezuela - further discussion of possible collaboration with government and CENDES

		Preparation of report "Oil and the Venezuelan Economy"
	Jan. 31-	San Juan, Puerto Rico - SSRC Conference on The Lessons of China's
	-Feb. 5	Development Experience for Developing Countries
		University of Puerto Rico - lectures and seminars
	Feb. 6-7	IDS - chaired steering group meeting of regional associations of development institutes (ADIPO, CODESRIA, CLACSO, EADI)
	Feb.	Evidence to Berrill Committee
	Mar. 29-	Portugal - OECD Technical Assistance Programme - with M. Bienefeld
	-Apr. 3	
	May 31-	Paris - first meeting of advisory panel of the OECD long-term project on The
	-June 1	Future Development of Advanced Industrial Societies in Harmony with that of Developing Countries (Interfutures)
	June 3-4	Moscow - meetings about Soviet membership of EADI
	June 7-11	Tokyo - UNU expert group Social and Human Development
	June 14-15	Paris - examination of Japanese delegation on social science policy, for OECD Science and Technology Committee report
	Aug.	Scotland - on field trip for North Sea oil study with M.Phil group
	Sept. 12-16	IDS - joint conference of associations of development institutes on Development Research Communication and Education at IDS (organiser) - formation of ICCDA
	Nov.	Cairo - first meeting of ICCDA - hosted by CODESRIA
		Advisory committee meeting of UNU HSD Programme
	Dec. 19-23	Warsaw - UNU evaluation of Institute of Economy of Developing Countries of Central School of Planning and Statistics (with Henrique Oteiza)
1977	Jan. 6-9	Sri Lanka - UNU evaluation of Marga Institute
	Jan. 10-14	Tokyo - UNU communication conference
		Meeting of UNU programme advisory committee to review research proposals - paper on UNU policy in advanced education
		Peking - 48 hour transit visa
	Feb. 3-5	Houston, Texas - Rothko Chapel Conference: Towards a New Strategy for Development - paper on "The Congruence of Marxism and other Classical Doctrines"
	Feb.	IDS workshop on academics under political threat in Third World countries
	Mar. 18	France
		Rhodesia - seminar on What is Development at the university
	Mar. 22-28	Maseru, Lesotho - conference on TNCs and foreign investment - paper on "Can a TNC be Socially Responsible?"
	Apr. 4-13	Tokyo - International Symposium on Population
	Apr. 13-15	Tehran
		Bangalore - ADIPA assembly hosts second ICCDA meeting
	Sept. 14	Brussels - Discussions re. EEC scholarships and research projects/funding
	Sept. 15-17	Ghent - Conference at the university on "Planning for Basic Needs in Portugal"
	Oct. 9-11	Dakar - Advisory Board meeting of IDEP
	Oct. 12-15	Paris - Interfutures Project - OECD
	Oct. 17-19	Lodz, Poland - Conference on labour productivity
	Oct. 15-17 &	Warsaw - EADI meeting
	Oct. 19-23	General contact meetings (e.g. visit to Polish Economic Society, Polish Academy of Science, Planning Institute); discuss possible IDS-Warsaw conference 1979; lectured to development course at Central School

	Oct. 28- -Nov. 2	Stanford - general discussions and seminar
	Nov. 2-16	Mexico
	Nov. 3-5	Advisory Committee of the UNU Human and Social Development (HSD) Programme Visits to Third World Centre, FLACSO office, Centre for Transnational Studies, and general discussions
	Nov. 7-11	HSD programme seminar for Latin American social scientists
	Nov. 10	Chaired meeting to revise HSD programme on higher education
	Nov. 13 & 15	3rd ICCDA meeting
	Nov. 14-16	CLACSO General Assembly
	Nov. 16-19	Cuba - general discussions re. Cuban economy and Chilean refugees in Cuba;attended a conference organised by Business International Corporation for mainly US businessmen
	Nov. 21	Toronto
	Nov. 24-26	IDS Conference on Development Processes and the European Periphery (co-organiser) first meeting Working Group on the European Periphery
1978	Jan. 15-20	Paris
	Jan. 16	Preparatory meeting of Energy Working Party for Trilateral Commission (USA, Japan, EEC)
	Jan. 17-20	Interfutures - OECD
	May 18- -June 4	Latin America
	May 18	Quito - Ecuador (one day only) meeting with social scientists at FLACSO; discussions re. WUS programmes
	May 19-31	Santiago, Chile - discussions re. WUS programmes; attended CIEPLAN seminar on "Research Needs in International Economics", sponsored by Ford Foundation; discussions re.IDS links with ILPES and PREALC
	May 30- -June 2	Argentina - discussions re. position of Chilean refugees and other foreign nationals; reorientation programme with CLACSO; and study needs of Argentinian nationals
	June 2-4	Rio de Janeiro - Brazil - meetings with social scientists, including IBGE economists and statisticians
	June 9	Paris - discussions re. presidency of EADI; called at OECD Development Centre
	June 9-11	Vienna - EADI executive
	June 11-25	Warsaw - 2 day seminar at Cracow University IEA/Polish Economic Society Conference on The Relevance of Economic Theory Discussion re. projected IDS/Warsaw conference 1979
	June 26- -July 1	Madrid - Joint CIC-IDS seminar on dependency theory at Centro Ibero-americano de Cooperacion (CIC); discussed links with EADI and IDS
	Sept. 19-21	Milan - EADI Conference (presidential address on "European Conscience and Social Science") and meeting of European periphery working group
	Sept. 28- -Oct. 1	Washington - committee meeting to make award in honour of Paul Hoffman
	Oct. 15-24	Lisbon - (on behalf of OECD) to advise on the methodology needed for long-term planning Discussions re. links with IDS, including IDS conference on enlargement of EEC; visit to Gulbenkian Foundation

	Oct. 29-	Paris - Economics and Statistics Directorate (ESD) of OECD meeting to discuss
	-Nov. 4	a paper on policies towards the NICs
		Interfutures meeting
		Discussions re. EEC enlargement and conference.
	Nov. 23-25	Madrid - seminar at CIC - re. implications of Spain's joining EEC
		Meetings with Banco Exterior de Espana.
	Nov. 25	Latin America - investigating position of refugees and systems of repression in the Southern Cone particularly in academic circles for WUS
		Contact with social science centres for IDS
	Nov. 26-28	Brazil
	Nov. 30-	Argentina - evaluation of and for CEDES, financed by Ford Foundation
	- Dec. 11	Visit to 3 other groups of social scientists: at Bariloche Foundation, Instituto Torcuato di Tella, and IDES
		Paraguay - visit with social scientists
	Dec. 11-14	Uruguay - visits with social scientists in 4 institutions CIESU, CIEDUR, CINVE, and CLEH
	Dec. 14-16	Brazil - visited planning institute; conducted seminar on The Role of Quantification at IBGE; and visited other social studies institutes
	Dec. 17-18	Portugal - various discussions re. IDS links including with Ministry of Industry; discussions re. possible Gulbenkian support for EEC enlargement conference in UK
1979	Jan. 1-4	Dublin - conference of BIDSA on British and Irish development
	Mar. 10-16	Tokyo - lecture to Institute of Developing Economies
		Conference on New Directions in Asian Development Strategies
		Discussions with UNU staff
	Mar. 17-18	Sydney - discussion with academics from various Australian universities
	Mar. 17-23	Suva, Fiji - UNIDO sponsored seminar on investment organised by the government of Fiji and the Tripartite Forum of Fiji - lecture and various discussions and visits
	Mar. 23-25	Hawaii - Visit East-West Center organised by the Culture Learning Institute and Polynesian Cultural Centre (run by Mormons)
	Mar. 26-28	Ford Foundation re. fund for the Southern Cone
	May 14-18	Kuwait - seminar on The Life Cycle of an Oil Economy sponsored by Kuwait Economic Society
		Visited Kuwait University and Kuwaiti Fund - giving seminar on European periphery and discussing possible IDS contract research
	May 18-20	Damascus - conference
	May 23-	Uganda - head of Commonwealth team of experts to report on rehabilitation of
	-21 June	the economy
	29 May	Conference on Integration and Unequal Development: the Experience of Western
	-June 2	Europe; IDS European periphery group meeting (co-organiser)
	Aug. 1-4	Dublin - 2 lectures on the context and experience of foreign direct investment for Industrial Development Authority
	Aug. 26-27	Madrid - discussions re. planning second European periphery group conference
	Aug. 27-29	Oviedo, University of Asturias - conference on structuralist theories in Latin America and Spain
	Aug. 31-	Lagos, Nigeria - preparatory visit for ILO Basic Needs mission
	-Sept. 4	
	Sept. 12-14	UNU Taskforce meeting (co-organiser)
	Sept. 18-20	IDS Conference on The Teaching of Development Studies (organiser)

	Sept. 20	Rome - FAO Consultation on the Scheme of Agricultural Credit Development - lecture on the relation between the balances in oil and in food
	Sept. 25-29	Lisbon - Gulbenkian conference on Portuguese economy
	Sept. 29	Madrid - discussions re. forthcoming European periphery group conference
	Oct. 8-12	Ojrzanow, nr. Warsaw - conference on dependency theory for IDS fellows and Polish social scientists (co-organiser) - paper on "Development Options"
	Oct. 15-20	Madrid - Conference on Integration and Unequal Development: the Enlargement of the EEC and the Developing Countries (co-organiser) European Periphery Group meeting
	end Nov.- -Dec. 21	Nigeria - head of ILO/JASPA Basic Needs mission
1980	Jan. 3-7	IDS Conference on The Teaching of Development Studies (organiser)
	Feb. 23-24	Houston - discussions with Foundation Board about financing a post-Brandt programme with IDS input
	Feb. 25-29	Washington - World Bank expert group meeting Meeting with McNamara re. IDS predicament Meeting re. IBRD-IMF Marlborough House conferences
	Mar. 5-6	Louvain - 2 seminars on development theory and Europe
	Mar. 12-16	Luxembourg - seminar with EIB officials
	Mar. 21-22	Aberdeen - colloquium for experts in Africa
	Apr. 13-17	Bellagio - joint Makerere-Rockefeller initiative for rehabilitation of Makerere
	May 5-18	Washington, IBRD - planning Marlborough House seminars for African officials
	June 10-12	Paris - ICCDA meeting; discussions at Development Centre
	June 30- -July 3	Arusha - South-North Conference on The International Monetary System and the New International Order
	July 20-28	Rio de Janeiro - to set up Brazilian project of International Comparative Programme on Life Cycle Methodology
	Sept. 3-4	North Portugal - discussion with an economist from the University of Oporto and tour of region
	Sept. 4-8	Lisbon - discussion re. EEC volumes and conference
	Sept. 8-9	Madrid - discussion re. EEC volumes with Vaitsos
	Sept. 11-12	Trivandrum, India - visits to Kerela Statistical Institute, the Centre of Development Studies and Kerela Bureau of Statistics to assess statistical sources for life cycle project
	Sept. 13-16	Kuala Lumpur - to interest Department of Statistics in the life expectancy project - meeting with INTAR, the national centre for training in administration and management
	Sept. 16-24	Jakarta - SEANZA course for central bank officials Seminar on Life Cycle of Petroleum Economies
	Nov. 18-21	Marlborough House, London - Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank Seminar on Adjustment Policies (chairman)
	Nov. 29- -Dec. 1	Caracas, Venezuela - discussions at CENDES and with various individuals
	Dec. 2-5	Lima, Peru - steering committee of a programme of Latin American studies on Europe, sponsored by the OECD Development Centre and CLACSO
	Dec. 5-10	Santiago, Chile - various meetings (CIEPLAN; PREALC)
	Dec. 10-16	Rio de Janeiro - visit to IBGE to review results of life cycle programme Visited IPEA, research institute of Planning Ministry

	Dec. 16-17	Lisbon - lecture on enlargement of EEC at National Institute of Administration
	Dec. 17-18	London - meeting with Rockefeller Foundation to discuss their proposal for new international centre mainly to provide advice on energy planning
1981	Jan. 9-10	Beirut - meeting with Arab Development Institute - discuss possible IDS/ADI collaboration
	Jan. 10-13	Kuwait - recruiting for IDS Planning and M.Phil courses - discussions at Ministry of Planning, Civil Service Commission, Arab Institute of Planning, and with Kuwait Fund
	Jan. 11-18	Kuala Lumpur - recruitment for IDS courses - discussions with Science University Penang and University of Malaysia; discussions with Department of Statistics on life cycle programme
	Jan. 22-23	Canberra, Australia - discussions and seminar at Research School of Pacific Studies
	Jan. 24-	Fiji - commissioned by Commonwealth Secretariat to advise government on
	-Feb. 1	team to produce employment report on Fiji, sponsored by EC funds
	Feb. 1-4	Stanford, USA - various seminars and meetings First discussion with G. Meier of possible "Pioneers in Development" project with Bank funding
	Feb. 4-5	Boston - visit to Paul Streeten
	Feb. 5-7	New Haven - seminar and discussions
	Feb. 24-27	Marlborough House, London - Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank seminar on Adjustment Policies (chairman)
	Mar. 16-19	Finland - short tour with meetings and lectures in Helsinki, Lysebu and Tempara; visit to Institute of Development Studies, Helsinki
	Mar. 19-26	Sweden, Stockholm - seminar at Institute of International Economic Relations on need to "delink"; discussions with SIDA on IDS projects
	Mar. 22	Lulea - meeting of European Periphery Group on Regional Development in Europe (co-director)
	Apr. 19-25	Notre Dame - lectures on world inflation
	Apr. 25-28	Washington - plans for "Pioneers" in development conference
	June 2-5	London - Conference on Small Economies - paper on "New Role of Development Planning"
	June	IDS Workshop on Active Life Profiles
	Aug. 27-31	Washington - delivered "Rich Country Interests" material to ODC Meeting at World Bank about Nigeria Plans for "Pioneers" in development lectures
	Aug. 31-	Mexico
	- Sept. 8	
	Sept. 2	Conference on New International Democratic Order
	Sept. 4-7	Morelia - conference on Mexican development strategy
	Sept. 8-11	Noresand, Norway - Nobel Symposium on Population Growth and World Economic Development
	Sept. 11-12	Stockholm, Sweden - spoke on "Europe and the Third World" to Swedish Institute for International Affairs
	Sept. 26-	Villa Serbelloni, Bellagio - Residency report for Rockefeller Foundation -
	-Oct. 24	convalescing and writing first draft of *Political Economy of Nationalism*
	Nov. 10-14	Budapest, Hungary - EADI 3rd general conference; meeting with Hungarian economists

	Nov. 15-21	Warsaw, Poland - interviews with Solidarity officials and advisers, economists etc.; discussions re. planned joint conference (?Sept. 1982) on Capitalism and Socialism in Rapid Transition
	Nov. 26-	Kuwait - discussion on research programmes, including "imported inflation"
	-Dec. 2	
	Dec. 2-3	Doha, Qatar - lecture at the university on measurement of development in an oil-exporting country; discussion with economists
	Dec. 13-19	Kampala, Uganda - discussions with Obote and various ministries re. economic problems and proposed Commonwealth consultative mission to assist government produce its own investment and development programme
1982	Feb. 8-9	Washington - Peter Bauer's opening lecture for "Pioneers" series
	Mar. 15-16	Paris - participation in advisory group to discuss book designed to show limitation of purely economic analyses
	Mar. 31-	Washington - Prebisch lecture for "Pioneers" series
	-Apr. 5	Attended seminar at Brookings Institute
	Apr. 4-12	Caracas - discussion re. imported inflation project
	Apr. 12-17	Bogota, Colombia - Conference on Education Employment and Wages - lecture on the effect of oil prices on development
	Apr. 18-20	ISS, The Hague - seminar on monetarist vs. structuralist controversy in LA.
	Apr. 28-	San Diego - Conference of the American Association on Population
	-May 3	Visit to Tijuana, Mexico
	May 15-16	Kuwait - to discuss funding of the imported inflation programme by the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED)
	June 4-5	Oxford - Political Economy Club dinner
	June 7-8	Swansea - to discuss Directorship of Centre of Development Studies
	June 16-18	IDS Conference - Europe and the South in the 1980s
	July 5	London - Leverhulme Trust discussions re. Trust's funding of imported inflation studies of Argentina and Brazil, and fellowships for Polish students
	July 5-9	Cambridge - Conference of Cambridge Journal of Economics
	July 12-18	Washington - Hans Singer's lecture for "Pioneers" series; discussion with G. Meier re. editing and publishing the series
	July 19-24	Baltimore - SID 25th Anniversary World Conference Chaired meeting on Case Studies of Development Alternatives in Western Europe
	Sept.	IDS Workshop with Warsaw University to discuss proposed joint conference on the World Crisis in Historical Perspective
	Oct. 13-25	Fiji - Plans for mission on unemployment - or labour absorption
	Nov. 24-27	Modena, Italy - Conference on the European Recovery in the New International Economic Order organised by the Instituto Economico at the university
	29 Nov.-	USA - UNICEF workshop on impact of recession on children
	-Dec. 3	Washington - Hirschman's "Pioneers" lecture Gave seminar on life profiles at World Bank
1983	Jan. 10-13	Paris - workshop at OECD Development Centre on technique of life profiles
	Jan. 17-19	Brussels - discussion of Lomé III
	Jan. 28-	Suva, Fiji - advisory mission on employment - financed by European
	-Mar. 13	Development Fund
	Mar. 13	Flight Los Angeles to Washington
	Mar. 21	Died in Washington

NOTES AND REFERENCES

Introduction

1 Wolfgang Sachs, "Introduction", in W. Sachs (ed.), *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power*, London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1992, p.1. Susan George, on the cover of this volume, refers to the contributors as "A brilliant cluster of unconventional scholars", who examine, in a radical and challenging way, key concepts in the development discourse.

2 President Harry Truman (20 January 1949), quoted in Gustavo Esteva, "Development", in W. Sachs (ed.), *The Development Dictionary*, op.cit.

3 David Lehman, "Introduction", in D. Lehman (ed.), *Development Theory: Four Critical Studies*, London: Frank Cass, 1979, p.3.

4 Akin L. Mabogunje, *The Development Process: A Spatial Perspective*, London: Unwin Hyman, 2nd edn 1989 (1st edn 1980), p.11.

5 Richard Jolly, "Dudley Seers (1920-1983)", in P. Arestis and M. Sawyer, *A Biographical Dictionary of Dissenting Economists*, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1992, p.491.

6 Seers, "The Birth, Life and Death of Development Economics", *Development and Change*, Vol. 10, 1979.

7 Editorial comment in D. Seers, *Political Economy of Nationalism*, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1983, p.vi.

8 Entry by Richard Jolly in *A Biographical Dictionary of Dissenting Economists*, see above note 5. The obituary in *The Times*, 23 March 1983 noted "Always Seers challenged orthodoxies - even if he had himself created them"

9 Seers, "The Meaning of Development", *International Development Review*, Vol. XI, No. 4, 1969 and Seers, "The New Meaning of Development", *International Development Review*, Vol. XIX, No. 3, 1977, see pp.3 and 5. ("'Development' still carried much goodwill and political force; besides, it had been incorporated in the titles of research institutes and international and national agencies", he observed (p.3).

10 Seers, "The Changing Definition and Measurement of Development", 26 June 1978 (translated as "Prioritäten für eine Welt mit mehr Gleichheit", for publication in *Neue Zurcher Zeitung*, 24 August 1978).

11 Seers, "The Birth, Life and Death of Development Economics", *Development and Change*, Vol. 10, 1979, p.717, see also pp. 712, 715.

12 Seers, draft Preface, p.2, attached to *Journey Report*, 26 September-24 October 1981, Villa Serbelloni, Bellagio; and Seers, *Political Economy of Nationalism*, p.vii.

13 Seers, "The New Meaning of Development", p.2.

14 Darrell Jackson, "The Development of Development Studies: A Brief History of the Institutional Background of Development-Related Courses", in Seers (ed.), *Courses on Development at Graduate Level in Britain*, background papers from the Conference on the Teaching of Development, IDS 1980, pp. 3-4.

15 Seers, "The Birth, Life and Death of Development Economics", p.708.

16 John Toye (ed.), *IDS Bulletin* "Dudley Seers: His Work and Influence", Vol. 20, No. 3, July 1989.

17 Richard Jolly, "Dudley Seers (1920-1983): His Contributions to Development Perspectives, Policy and Studies", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 20, No. 3, July 1989, p.31.

18 Rosalind David, "The Writings of Dudley Seers: a Provisional Bibliography", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 20, No. 3, July 1989, pp.64-70. There are two United Nations papers on systems of national accounts in R. David's bibliography which, in fact, I have not included in mine as I have not been able to trace them directly to Dudley Seers' authorship.

19 Mike Faber, "Dudley Seers' Last Journey", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 20, No. 3, July 1989, p.60.

20 Seers, "From Colonial Economics to Development Studies", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 1, No. 1, June 1968.

21 An exception here are two articles by Barbara Ingham on Seers' early work in the Gold Coast including a brief reference to his work in Malta; see "Shaping Opinion on Development Policy in Africa: The Lewis and Seers and Ross Reports of the Early 1950s", *Manchester Papers on Development*, Vol. III, No. 3, November 1987 and "Dudley Seers as a Development Adviser in Ghana and Malta", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 20, No. 3, July 1989.

22 Seers, "The Meaning of Development", op.cit., note 10.
23 Seers, "The New Meaning of Development", op.cit., note 10.
24 Seers, "The Transmission of Inequality", in R.K.A. Gardiner, M.J. Anstee and C.L. Patterson (eds), Africa and the World, Addis Ababa: Oxford University Press, 1970. One of Seers' contributions to the volume *Development in a Divided World* (eds Seers and L. Joy, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971) was entitled "Rich Countries and Poor".
25 Seers, *The Challenge to New Zealand Labour*, Christchurch (New Zealand): Christchurch Co-operative Book Society Ltd, 1946, p.45.
26 P.D. Henderson, letter to M. Lipscomb, 25 June 1991; R. Jolly, "Dudley Seers (1920-1983)", p.42.
27 Hans Singer quoted by Mike Faber in "Dudley Seers' Last Journey", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 20, No. 3, July 1989, p.63.

Chapter 1: Vision of a Land, and World, of Plenty

1 Seers, unpublished "Preface to 'Structural Development'", 1969, p.4 (henceforth referred to as: unpublished "Preface"); this was a preface to a collection of Seers' papers which was never published.
2 Ibid., p.1.
3 Seers, "The Applications of Development Theories within Europe", in István Dobozi and Péter Mándi (eds), *Emerging Development Patterns*, Selected Papers of 3rd General Conference of EADI, 11-14 November 1981, Budapest, Hungary, p.517.
4 Seers, unpublished "Preface", p.1.
5 Seers, *The Political Economy of Nationalism*, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1983, p.xii.
6 He remarked after leaving university: "Personally I feel that a University Course is so interesting that one would expect to be paid not more but less than one's fellows for the remainder of one's life, in return for these early privileges. So far as ability is concerned, the typical University Course is not very difficult to pass. This is shown by the easiness of the entrance examination and by the high percentage of passes in degree examinations." (D. Seers, *The Challenge to New Zealand Labour*, Christchurch (New Zealand): The Christchurch Co-operative Book Society Ltd, 1946, p.32; commenting on professional salaries in the context of discussing a national wages policy.)
7 Seers, unpublished "Preface", pp.2 and 7.
8 Ibid., p.7.
9 Seers, *Political Economy of Nationalism*, p.xi.
10 Seers, unpublished "Preface", p.7.
11 Ibid.
12 Manuscript note by D. L. Bunn, quoted by C. Gilbraith, Treasurer and Bursar of Pembroke College, in letter to M. Lipscomb, 6 June 1990.
13 C. Gilbraith to M. Lipscomb, 6 June 1990.
14 Seers, quoted by C. Gilbraith to M. Lipscomb, 6 June 1990.
15 C. Gilbraith to M. Lipscomb, 6 June 1990. (M. H. Dobb had recently published his *Political Economy and Capitalism*, in 1937.)
16 Seers, "Lessons of a Master Marxist", review of C. H. Feinstein (ed.), *Socialism, Capitalism and Economic Growth*, Essays presented to Maurice Dobb (Cambridge University Press, 1967); and M. Dobb, *Papers on Capitalism, Development and Planning*, (Routledge, 1967), *Guardian*, 1967 n.d.
17 Seers, *Political Economy of Nationalism*, p.xi.
18 G. C. Harcourt, "Joan Robinson (1903-1983)", in P. Arestis and M. Sayer, *A Biographical Dictionary of Dissenting Economists*, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, pp.455-6; Harcourt remarks on the fact that especially in the 1930s and 1940s Joan Robinson was regarded as "an outstanding teacher" and "exemplary supervisor of research students" (ibid., p.455).
19 Seers, quoted by C. Gilbraith to M. Lipscomb, 6 June 1990.
20 Seers, Curriculum Vitae, 1982.
21 Seers, unpublished "Preface", pp.2 and 7.
22 Seers, *The Challenge to New Zealand Labour*, The Christchurch Co-operative Book Society Ltd. (New Zealand), 1946.

23 C. Morgan Williams, MP, "Preface", in Seers, *The Challenge to New Zealand Labour*, p.7.
24 Seers, *The Challenge to New Zealand Labour*, p.10.
25 Ibid. pp.33-4.
26 Ibid. p.9.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid. pp.12 and 10.
29 Ibid. pp.10 and 11.
30 Ibid. pp.18 and 14.
31 Ibid. pp.17-18.
32 Ibid. pp.18 and 37.
33 Ibid. pp.18-19.
34 Ibid. p.20.
35 Ibid., p.21.
36 Ibid., p.24.
37 Ibid., pp.24-5.
38 Ibid., pp.37-8.
39 Ibid. p.40.
40 Ibid. p.48, emphasis in original.
41 C. Morgan Williams, "Preface", in Seers, *The Challenge to New Zealand Labour*, p.7.
42 Seers, *The Challenge to New Zealand Labour*, p.9.
43 Ibid., p.47.
44 C. Gilbraith to M. Lipscomb, 6 June 1990.
45 Paul Streeten, who was then a Fellow of Balliol and first met Seers at this time, suggests that his exclusion from Oxford's inner circle was one of the reasons why he later opted for the IDS to be located at Sussex rather than Oxford a subject to be discussed in Chapter 4 (see P. Streeten, "Dudley Seers (1920-83): A Personal Appreciation", IDS *Bulletin*, July 1989, Vol. 20, no. 3, pp.26 and 28).
46 Seers, unpublished "Preface" p.1. F.A. Burchardt, as well as being Director of the Institute was a University Reader in Social and Economic Statistics and Fellow of Magdalen College; David Worswick was a member of the Institute and a Fellow of Magdalen College; and Kurt Martin a Senior Lecturer in Economics at Manchester University.
47 Kurt Mandelbaum (with an introduction by F. Burkhardt), *The Industrialisation of Backward Areas*, Oxford Institute of Statistics Monograph, Oxford: Blackwell, 1945.
48 See Seers,"Back to the Ivory Tower", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 9, No. 2, December 1977, p.8, n.4 and Seers, "The Birth Life and Death of Development Economics", *Development and Change*, Vol. 10, 1979, p.708.
49 Seers, unpublished "Preface", pp.1-2.
50 Seers, "The Coal Shortage", *Bulletin of Oxford University Institute of Statistics* henceforth referred to as *BOUIS*, Vol. 9, No. 2, Feb. 1947; Seers, "The Coal Shortage - Part II. Future Prospects", *BOUIS*, Vol. 9, No. 5, May 1947; "Coal Developments, 1946-7", *BOUIS*, Vol. 9, No. 10, Oct. 1947; also see Seers, "A Note on Further Coal Developments", *BOUIS*, Vol. 10, No. 5, May 1948.
51 Seers, "The Coal Shortage", p.28.
52 Seers, "The Coal Shortage - Part II", p.176.
53 Ibid.
54 Seers, "National Income, Production and Consumption", in G.D.N. Worswick and P.H. Ady (eds), *The British Economy 1945-50*, Oxford: Oxford University Press/Clarendon, 1952, p.39.
55 See Seers and Henderson, "The Technique and Progress of Czechoslovakia's Two Year Plan", *BOUIS*, Vol.9, No. 11, Nov. 1947
56 Ibid., p.274
57 Ibid.
58 Suffering the consequences of drought and a bad harvest in 1947, popular sentiment hardened against the communist dominated coalition government of Klement Gottwald when, under Soviet pressure, it reversed an earlier decision to accept aid from the Marshall Plan. The prospect of defeat for the communist party in the elections planned for May 1948 prompted Gottwald to carry through what has become known as the Prague coup, in February 1948, with the backing of a workers' militia and the police force, and to establish a rigidly Stalinist state in 1954, using forced labour camps among other

methods of control.

59 P.D. Henderson letter to M. Lipscomb, 25 June 1991. At the time of making this comment P.D. Henderson was Head of the Economics and Statistics Department of the OECD in Paris.

60 Seers, *Changes in the Cost-of-living and the Distribution of Income since 1938*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1949; Seers, *The Levelling of Incomes since 1938*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1951; for a list of all Seers' *BOIUS* papers see Bibliography.

61 Seers, "The 1947 National Income White Paper", *BOUIS*, Vol. 9, No. 7, July 1947, p.228.

62 Ibid. pp.238-9.

63 Ibid. p.251.

64 Seers, "The National Product Before and After the War", *BOUIS*, Vol. 10, No. 10, Oct. 1948, p.319.

65 Seers, "Income Distribution in 1938 and 1947", *BOUIS*, Vol. 11, No. 9, Sept. 1949, p.263.

66 Seers, "National Income, Production and Consumption", p.60.

67 Ibid., p.33.

68 Ibid., pp.60-1.

69 Seers, *The Levelling of Incomes since 1938*, pp.4-5.

70 Seers, "Has the Distribution of Income Become More Unequal?", *BOUIS*, Vol.18, No.1, Feb. 1956, pp.73-86

71 Seers, "The Limitations of the Special Case", in K. Martin and J. Knapp (eds), *The Teaching of Development Economics*, London: Frank Cass & Co., 1967, p.23.

72 Seers, "National Income, Production and Consumption", pp.33, 34. On the other hand he also remarked "excessive cynicism about statistics is sometimes used as an excuse for ignoring the unpalatable" (ibid.).

73 Seers, unpublished "Preface", p.2.

74 R.H.S. Crossman, M. Foot and Ian Mikardo, *Keep Left*, London, New Statesman Pamphlet, April 1947; also signed by Geoffrey Bing, Donald Bruce, Harold Davies, Leslie Hale, Fred Lee, Benn W. Levy, R.W.G. Mackay, J.P.W. Mallalieu, Ernest R. Millington, Stephen Swingler, George Wigg and Woodrow Wyatt.

75 Ibid., inside cover.

76 Ibid., p.35.

77 Ibid,, p.41.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid., p.47 point 19 and p.44.

80 Ian Mikardo, *Back-Bencher*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988, p.119

81 Ibid., p.118

82 John Campbell, *Nye Bevan and the Mirage of British Socialism*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987, p.254. Campbell draws attention to the fact that a second pamphlet *Keeping Left* published in January 1950, endorsed by a different group of signatories including Barbara Castle, appears to have taken a softer line on some points made in the earlier pamphlet; "in the shocked aftermath of the Berlin crisis and the Prague coup, *Keeping Left* explicitly accepted the necessity of the American alliance to contain Communism in Europe" (ibid.).

83 Ibid., p.254; and Seers, "The Crisis of 1951", *BOUIS*, Vol. 13, No. 10, October 1951, p.317.

84 Mikardo, *Back-Bencher*, p.120.

85 Seers, unpublished "Preface", p.2.

86 Ibid.

87 Campbell, *Nye Bevan*, p.282.

88 *One Way Only - a Socialist Analysis of the Present World Crisis*, Tribune pamphlet, 14 July 1951, p.4, col.3: "The under-privileged colonial peoples have a right to complete their social revolutions. It is the task of British Socialism to persuade our Western allies to assist those revolutions by economic and technical aid, instead of collaborating with counter-revolutionary forces in order to suppress them and so driving them into the arms of Soviet Russia."

89 Campbell, *Nye Bevan*, p.255.

90 Richard Crossman, diary entry 17 December 1951, *The Backbench Diaries of Richard Crossman*, (ed. Janet Morgan, London: Hamish Hamilton & Jonathan Cape, 1981), p.51. Crossland observes there was "a great deal of tension between Balogh and Wilson" and Ben Pimlott refers to Wilson "sparring with" economists Seers and Balogh at this meeting (since Wilson refused to accept that a cut in the

arms programme would remove the dollar gap (see Ben Pimlott, *Harold Wilson*, London: Harper Collins, 1992, p.177.

91 Richard Crossman, diary entry for 17 June 1952, *The Backbench Diaries of Richard Crossman*, (ed. Janet Morgan), p.111.

92 Mikardo, *Back-Bencher*, p.120.

93 D. Worswick, "Introduction", in *Conference Papers on Current Economic Problems of Burma 1951*, Ministry of National Planning, Government of the Union of Burma, Rangoon, 1951, p.2.

94 Ibid.

95 Seers, "Suggestions for an Economic Survey of Burma", in *Conference Papers on Current Economic Problems of Burma 1951*, op.cit., p.9.

96 Ibid., p.11.

97 Seers, "The Sector Accounts of Burma", in *Conference Papers on Current Economic Problems of Burma 1951*, op.cit., p.79.

98 Ibid.

99 Ibid., p.81.

100 Ibid., p.79.

101 Ibid., p.81.

102 Worswick, "Introduction", p. 2.

103 Seers, "The Sector Accounts of Burma", p.81.

104 Ibid.

105 See Seers, "Suggestions for an Economic Survey of Burma", p.12, and Worswick, "Introduction", pp.3 and 7.

106 Seers, "Suggestions for an Economic Survey of Burma", pp.12 and 13.

107 F. A. Burchardt, "Some Aspects of Fiscal Policy in a Period of Economic Development", in *Conference Papers on Current Economic Problems of Burma 1951*, pp.58-9.

108 Kurt Martin produced the conference paper on "Problems of Industrialisation".

109 Worswick, "Introduction", p.1.

110 Ibid., p.4.

111 Ibid., p.6.

112 Ibid., p.5. Frank Burchardt briefly discussed external aid and loans in his conference paper "Some Aspects of Fiscal Policy in a Period of Economic Development", p.68.

113 The Honourable Minister of Finance and Revenue, *Economic Survey of Burma 1951*, presented to Parliament, 30 August 1951, Rangoon, Government Printing and Stationery, p.19.

114 Because investments by domestic business and foreign companies was likely to be low, the question of controlling the volume of private investment might not arise, observed Burchardt, though he added "it may become desirable to influence the direction of this investment by fiscal measures (taxes, tariffs and subsidies) or by direct controls (raw material allocation, licensing, etc.)" (Burchardt, "Some Aspects of Fiscal Policy in a Period of Economic Development", p.59).

115 Worswick, "Introduction", p.6. G.D.N. Worswick produced the main conference papers on "The Control of Inflation" and "The Reform of the Currency System".

116 Minister of Finance and Revenue, *Economic Survey of Burma 1951*, p.1.

117 Ibid., p.16.

118 Ibid., p.17.

119 In 1952 Seers wrote a paper entitled "The Role of National Income Estimates in the Statistical Policy of an Underdeveloped Area" (*Review of Economic Studies*, vol. XX, 1952-3) which referred to the experience of Burma and the Gold Coast; this is considered in more detail below.

120 D. Seers and C. R. Ross, *Report on Financial and Physical Problems of Development in the Gold Coast*, Office of the Government Statistician, Accra, July 1952, p.i.

121 I am grateful to C.R. Ross (pers. comm., 2 July 1990) for pointing out the link between Seers' work on housebuilding costs in the UK and his selection to undertake the mission to the Gold Coast.

122 Seers and Ross, *Gold Coast Report*, p.ii.

123 While estimating that cocoa produced 30-40 per cent of the total value of what was produced in the Gold Coast and about three quarters of the value of exports, Seers and Ross maintained this understated its importance since much of the income earned in transport and distribution depended on handling cocoa or the goods brought in by the cocoa farmer, and taxes on cocoa and on imports bought

from its sale were the mainstay of the administration. (See *Gold Coast Report*, p.4. pars.9-10).

124 Seers' and Ross's analysis of the plan, according to the type of economic expenditure, is as follows: building and construction £40m, water supply £3.7m, roadmaking £8.1m, industrial development £1.5m, railway building £11m, development not involving capital works £9.7m (ibid., p.92, par.229).

125 See *Gold Coast Report*, pp.i and ii.

126 Ibid., p.170, par.410.

127 Seers, *The Political Economy of Nationalism*, p.187, Ch.2., n.3.

128 B. Ingham, "Shaping Opinion on Development Policy in Africa: The Lewis and Seers and Ross reports of the early 1950s", *Manchester Papers on Development*, Vol.III, No. 3, November 1987, p.74.

129 Ross, pers. comm.

130 Seers and Ross, *Gold Coast Report*, see Appendix A. p.1, par.4 and Appendix B, pp.4-5, par.5. An additional point made within the report was that the undistributed profits, sent out of the country, acted as a counter inflationary factor since they subtracted from the public's spending power (see ibid., table, p.42, par.92).

131 Ibid., p.1, par.1; p.3, pars 6-7; p.5, par.12.

132 Ibid., p.5, par.11.

133 Ibid., p.3, par.6.

134 Ibid., p.53, par. 124.

135 Ibid., p.2, par. 4; Barbara Ingham has challenged this analysis and suggested Seers and Ross were mistaken in their view that the marginal propensity to save in the Gold Coast was low, and that they did not understand the traditional West African economy, being unaware of the subtle complexities of an apparently uncomplicated peasant based economy. See B. Ingham, "Shaping Opinion on Development Policy in Africa", op.cit. pp.71-5; and B. Ingham, "Dudley Seers as Development Adviser in Ghana and Malta", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 20, No.3, July 1989, p.45.

136 Seers and Ross, *Gold Coast Report*, pp.2-3.

137 Ibid., p.46, par.103 and p.60, par.149.

138 Ibid., p.67, par.167.

139 Ibid., p.60, par.145.

140 Ibid., p.70, pars.173-4.

141 Ibid., p.85, par.212 and pp.65-6, par 162. In fact Seers noted a few years later that it was the progressive export duty that effectively became the price stabiliser in the Gold Coast in Seers, "An Approach to the Short-Period Analysis of Primary-Producing Economies", *Oxford Economic Papers*, February 1959, p.31, n.1.

142 Seers and Ross, *Gold Coast Report*, p.166, par.400.

143 Ibid., p.118, par.282.

144 See figures produced in note 117 above (ibid., p.92, par.229).

145 Seers and Ross, *Gold Coast Report*, p.144, pars.341-3.

146 Ibid., p.145, par.345.

147 Ibid., p.122 par 292 and Appendix D, p.44, par.40. Seers and Ross did consider such profits to be too high to be fair.

148 A substantial share of these activities was in the hands of the United Africa Company, which, in addition to its importing concerns, also ran the Accra Ice Company, the chain of Kingsway retail stores, a timber company, and the Gold Coast Machinery and Trading Company (the main importer of building materials and inevitably a major beneficiary of a development programme which was planning to spend half its budget on building and construction). It also undertook vehicle sales and service, ran harbour lighters, ferries and road transport, bought cocoa as an agent of the Marketing Board and owned two of the lines in the shipping conference. (See ibid., pp.12-13, par.27.)

149 A structure where imported goods passed "through a shipping monopoly and an importing 'oligopoly' at one end" to tens of thousands of street traders doing intermittent business at the other - was "the source of many of the country's problems, political and economic", (p.15, par.31) the report remarked. Suspicions of European shipping firms manipulating their freight charges, and importing firms exploiting the shortage of goods (raising prices as soon as there was a rise in the income of civil servants) was seen to be an important factor in recent political disturbances (ibid., par.32).

150 See note 124 above.

151 Ibid., pp.152-3 pars.367-8. Seers and Ross acknowledged that food could be imported, rather than

home produced, but they held the view that "a Development policy that turned the Gold Coast into a food-importing country, would ... be contrary to the country's own interests" (par.367).

The government of the Gold Coast demonstrated more concern about industrialisation in the year following the Seers/Ross report when W. A. Lewis was invited in 1952 to examine the potential for industrial development in the country. He too, however, also emphasised the fact that agricultural development, especially food production, required equal priority with, and was in fact an essential requirement for, industrial development. (See W. A. Lewis, *Report on Industrialisation and the Gold Coast*, Accra, Gold Coast, Government Printing Office, 1953.)

152 See Seers and Ross, *Gold Coast Report*, pp.158-9, pars.379-83; quotation from p.159, par. 383. Improving communications they also considered was a more immediate concern than industrialisation (see p.146, par.348).

153 Ibid., pp.160-1, pars.385-6.

154 Ibid., p.143 pars.339-40.

155 Ibid., p.132, par. 310. On this issue Seers and Ross maintained that the Gold Coast had a moral as well as an economic claim to dollars since half the cocoa exports went to the US making substantial contributions to the sterling area dollar pool (ibid., n.1).

156 Ibid., p.90, par.225

157 Seers, *The Political Economy of Nationalism*, p.187, Ch.2., n.3.

158 Ibid.

159 Seers and Ross, *Gold Coast Report*, p.87, pars.216-17.

160 Ibid., p.133 par.311.

161 Ibid., p.132 par.310.

162 Ibid., pp. 96-7.

163 Ibid., p.110, par.264.

164 Ibid., p.172, par.417.

165 Ibid., p.99, par. 242.

166 Ibid., pp.102-3, par.246.

167 See, Worswick, "Introduction", in *Conference Papers on Current Economic Problems of Burma 1951*, op.cit., p.5.

168 Seers and Ross, *Gold Coast Report*, pp.103-4, par.248.

169 Ibid., p.105, par.254.

170 Ibid., p. 105, par.255.

171 Ibid., p.106, par.257.

172 Ibid., p.157, par.376.

173 Ibid., p.157, par.378.

174 Ibid., p.131, par.308.

175 Ibid., p.130, par.307 and p.129 pars 304-5.

176 Ibid., p.130, par.307 and p.148 par.354. This latter remark was made in relation to housing standards (which it was recognised were likely to remain low for Africans for some time to come), though it could equally have applied to wages and other conditions of work.

177 Ibid., pp.168-9, pars.405-7.

178 Ibid. p. 170, par.410.

179 Ibid., p.134, par.313.

180 Ibid., par. 314.

181 Ibid. pp.134-5, par.315.

182 Ibid., p.135, par.316.

183 Ibid., p.152, par.366.

184 Ibid., p.135, par.316.

185 Ibid., p.135. par.317.

186 Ibid., pp.162-3, pars.391-5; Ross considers this to have been one of the more forward looking features of the report.

187 Ross pers. comm.

188 Ingham, "Dudley Seers as a Development Adviser", op.cit., p.45. See also Ingham, "Shaping Opinion on Development Policy in Africa", op.cit., p.74.

189 Ingham, "Shaping Opinion on Development Policy in Africa", p.86 n.86 and p.87 n.51.

190 *The Gold Coast Legislative Assembly Debates*, 1953, Issue no. 2, col. 502; I am grateful to Dr Alfred Sant (Malta) for bringing this reference to my attention (letter from Sant to Lipscomb, 22 March 1991).

191 Ingham, "Dudley Seers as a Development Adviser", pp. 45-6; see also Ingham, "Shaping Opinion on Development Policy in Africa", pp.73-4.

192 Ross pers. comm.

193 P.T. Bauer, *West African Trade*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, second impression 1965, p.338-9; first published in 1954 by the Cambridge University Press.

194 P.T. Bauer and F. W. Paish, letter to the editor, *The Times*, 23 January 1953, in response to letter by Dudley Seers to the editor, *The Times*, 12 January 1953 (commenting on papers written by Bauer and Paish, in the *Economic Journal* 1953); see also Bauer, *West African Trade*, op.cit., p.339.

195 Bauer and Paish, letter to *The Times*, 23 January 1953, op.cit. Here they argued:
"The tonnage of exports is several times the tonnage of imports, so that there must be a considerable amount of unused railway capacity for inward freights, while at the ports a small proportional reduction in exports would, if really necessary, reduce congestion sufficiently to permit the entry of large proportional increase in imports.

If Dr. Seers's statements about the effects of port congestion had indeed been correct they would have constituted a devastating indictment of Government policy. That it should be impossible, seven years after the end of the war to permit a rise in the standard of living of a part of the Commonwealth a great deal poorer than Britain, on the ground that port facilities were inadequate to handle the imports they had earned enough to pay for, would inevitably have looked like either ineptitude or a breach of trust."
See also Bauer, *West African Trade*, op. cit., pp.339-40 and n.1

196 Seers and Ross, *Gold Coast Report*, p.169, n.1; controlling inflation by price control and rationing, they considered equally disastrous.

197 Seers, *Journey Report*, Washington, 8-9 Feb. 1982, 12 February 1982; this comment was made following a lecture given by Peter Bauer in Washington for the *Pioneers in Development* volume (eds D. Seers and G. Meier, Washington, DC/New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1983; mentioned further in Chapter 6). Seers also observed that he felt it a pity that Bauer had been virtually ostracised by the development profession.

198 Seers, *The Political Economy of Nationalism*, p.187, ch.2, n.3. In the journey report on which this comment is based he expressed himself even more bluntly "in an egotistical mood I could blame myself for the failure of development policy in Ghana - and thus elsewhere in Africa. (A shout from the crowd: 'And in other continents!')" (Seers, *Journey Report*, Washington, 1982)

199 Seers and Ross, *Gold Coast Report*, p.169, par.408.

200 Ross, pers.comm.

201 Seers, unpublished "Preface", p.2.

202 Seers, "The Role of National Income Estimates in the Statistical Policy of an Underdeveloped Area", *The Review of Economic Studies*, vol. XX, 1952-3, p.159 and n.2.

203 See ibid., p.159, n.1.

204 Ibid., p.160.

205 Ibid., p.159. Had the amount going out of the country been insignificant Seers said it could have been ignored as it was in developed countries, where he maintained the distinction between "geographical" and "national" income was not important since there was little difference in the size of the two aggregates, and what difference there was could be ignored (ibid., p.159).

206 Seers, "The Role of National Income Estimates", p.160.

207 Ibid., p.162.

208 Seers, "The Role of National Income Estimates", p.168. He cited the example of building a factory which "permits an increase in national income when the factory is ready for production, but it also provides experience for the building industry during construction, and leads to new industrial and technical jobs, raising the technical level of the local population, and at a further remove it reduces the dependence on imported supplies.... But it may make the shortage of housing and other social amenities more acute, particularly if the factory attracts to a town more workers than it can employ and urbanisation helps to destroy the existing social structure. In brief, many of the main effects of development are on variables which are conventionally excluded from the national product, but, nevertheless, are of great, perhaps overwhelming, importance."

209 Ibid., p.163 and Seers, unpublished "Preface", p.3.

210 See D. Seers, "The Uses of National Income Estimates", in Robert W. Crandall and Richard S. Eckaus (eds), *Contemporary Issues in Economics: Selected Readings*, Boston: Little, Brown & Co. Inc. 1972.

211 See Seers, "The National Product before and after the War", *BOUIS*, Vol. 10, No. 10, October 1948, p.309.

212 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *World Economic Report 1953-4*, New York: United Nations, 1955, pp.iii and p.78.

213 Seers, "The Cultural Lag in Economics", *IDS Discussion Paper* 137, 1978, p.3.

214 Seers, unpublished "Preface", p.3.

215 Seers, "Defeat of an ideal", letter to *New World* (UNA Journal), January 1974.
Seers' letter was prompted by a book review of Shirley Hazzard's *Defeat of an Ideal* (Macmillan, 1973) in *New World* (May-June 1973) followed by a letter from Shirley Hazzard (who had herself worked at the UN for ten years) and an editorial comment in *New World* (August-September 1973). The book in question had commented critically on the way in which the US State Department gained administrative control over the UN Secretariat during its formative years and continued to do so when Hammarskjold assumed office, with, for example, FBI agents retained on UN premises throughout his first year; the UNA journal review was critical of the book and editorial comment sought to defend Hammarskjold's reputation; Seers, however, considered the editorial comment "misled" readers on how the Secretary General handled the situation.

216 Hans Singer, pers.comm. Another "close colleague" Seers himself particularly mentioned at this time was Sidney Dell (Seers, unpublished "Preface", p.3).

217 Balogh and Seers, *The Economic Problems of Malta* an Interim Report, Malta, 1955, p.i.

218 Dom Mintoff, letter to M. Lipscomb, 4 July 1990.
Dr Rita Henden, an official of the Fabian Society and editor of *Socialist Commentary*, is also mentioned as a person who brought Mintoff into contact with Balogh and Seers (Dr Alfred Sant (colleague of Mr Mintoff's) letter to M. Lipscomb, 20 February 1991).
It is possible Seers' work on the Gold Coast report and its cool reception by the colonial office, may also have brought him to the attention of Mr Mintoff, though it is not clear whether he [Mintoff] was aware of this in 1955 when Seers and Balogh were invited to Malta or if it came to his attention later; recollections vary slightly in Mintoff to Lipscomb, 4 July 1990 and Sant to Lipscomb, 20 February 1991.

219 Sant to Lipscomb, 20 February 1991.

220 Balogh and Seers, *The Economic Problems of Malta*, p.I.

221 Sant to Lipscomb, 20 February 1991. According to Sant, Sir Wilfred Woods' *Report on the Finances of the Maltese Government* (London: HMSO, 1945) "dealt with the problems of war reconstruction and social and economic development in Malta", and Sir George Schuster's *Interim Report on the Financial and Economic Structure of the Maltese Islands* (London: HMSO, 1950) was "another follow-up from the British government to the ongoing problems of devising an economic development policy for Malta". (Sant observes, however, that Shuster "although initially a British colonial officer expert" did develop a good working relationship with Mintoff, gaining his confidence, and in 1956 and 1957, helping to mediate between the British Treasury and the Maltese government on budgetary requirements.)
General background relating to these matters can be found in P. Gauci, "Planning for development in a post-colonial small-scale island economy: the Maltese experience", MA thesis, University of Waterloo,Ontario, Canada, 1981.

222 Sant to Lipscomb, 20 February 1991. Sant relates that Mintoff, through his Fabian friends in the UK, "was aware that the colonial office had excluded certain economists among whom Balogh and Seers, from too close participation in the consultancy projects they would be commissioning in the colonies"; being distanced from, and even frowned upon by the Colonial Office, was thus viewed as a positive advantage since they were not regarded as "establishment"-type figures, or British government officials.

223 Balogh and Seers, *The Economic Problems of Malta*, p.XXIII, par.89; they observe: "most of what follows ... was recognised and pressed by Sir Wilfred Woods" and "Sir George Schuster's recommendations follow almost identical lines and could be taken over almost word for word in our report".

According to Sant, it was due to "a period of sloppy administration in Malta" that most of the project ideas mentioned by Schuster in 1950 had not been put into effect by 1955 (Sant to Lipscomb, 20 February 1991).

224 Sant to Lipscomb, 20 February 1991.

225 This in fact proved to be the only and final report; there is an indication (see *The Economic Problems of Malta*, p.XXIII, par.88)a second was planned dealing with suggestions for specific industries, but this was never produced .

226 R. Crossman, *Backbench Diaries of Richard Crossman* (ed. Morgan), pp.439-40; this is confirmed by Mintoff himself who described the discussions as a "skirmish with the experts of the British Treasury and Colonial Office".

227 Mintoff to Lipscomb, 4 July 1990.

228 Seers, unpublished "Preface", p.3.

229 Seers, "A Fertility Survey in the Maltese Islands", *Population Studies*, Vol. X, No. 3, March 1957. The strength of the Catholic Church on the island opposed and deterred the implementation of birth control policies.

230 Balogh and Seers, *The Economic Problems of Malta*, p.XXXIV, Concl.2; p.VIII, par.25; p.XVI, par.57; and p.XXXIII, par.150.
Mintoff has summed up Malta's plight in 1955 thus: "Their George Cross notwithstanding, our people were still living in a super-fortress which since time immemorial had been changing hands from one conqueror of the Mediterranean to the next; what was even worse their social life was dwarfed, their human dignity was depraved by the most obscurantist wing of the Catholic Church whose whims and excesses the alien rulers including the British Government had to tolerate as the price for law and order in an imperialistic world" (Mintoff to Lipscomb, 4 July 1990).

231 Balogh and Seers, *The Economic Problems of Malta*, p.II, par.7

232 Ibid., p.XXXIV, Concl. 4. By Malta Balogh and Seers meant the Maltese Islands, including Gozo and Comino.

233 Ibid., p.XXIX, par.124.

234 Ibid., p.XXVIII, par. 116.

235 Ibid., p.XXIII, par.88.

236 Ibid. p.XXIX, par.125.

237 Ibid., p.XXXIV, Concl. par.4.

238 Ibid., p.XXV, par.100.

239 Ibid., p.XXVI, par.105.

240 Ibid., p.XXVI, par.104 and n.1.

241 Ibid., p.XI, par.41 and p.XVI, par.57.

242 Ibid., p.XXII, par.83; see pp.xvi-xxiii.

243 Ibid., p.XV, par. 56 and p.XIV, par.51.

244 Ibid., p.XXXI par. 137.

245 Ibid., p.XXXV, Concl.12.

246 Ibid., p.XXXV, Concl.12.

247 Ibid., p.XXX, par.128.

248 See pp.XXX-XXXI, pars 131-5.

249 Ibid., p.XXXIII, par. 151; see also p.XXXII, par. 144.

250 Sant to Lipscomb, 17 July 1990 and 29 February 1991. The two reports referred to were drafted by the economists G. Schuster and Scott.

251 Seers, unpublished "Preface", p.3.

252 Sant to Lipscomb, 20 February 1991: "Mintoff insisted on guarantees that financial assistance would be given to compensate for the closure of the base, over and above the amounts written into the integration agreement. Violent disagreement also erupted on the financial allocations to be made to Malta by Britain for financial year 1958. The Treasury and Colonial Office reduced by £1 million the amount already agreed before the discharges at the base were contemplated. Dom Mintoff's government resigned, the British governor took over the civil administration, there were riots in most towns and villages, the British suspended the Maltese constitution and introduced a crown colony regime."

253 Ibid.

254 Balogh and Seers, *The Economic Problems of Malta*, p.VII, par.20. A particular problem and dilemma to which the report drew attention was that a development programme that raised hopes of better living conditions and more secure jobs could discourage emigration, thus putting a greater burden on the economy and making the objects of development more difficult to attain.

255 Seers, *Political Economy of Nationalism*, p.93.

256 Seers, unpublished "Preface" p.3-4.

257 Seers *The Statistics of the Windward Islands* December, 1956; *The Statistics of the Leeward Islands* January, 1957; *The Statistics of the Windward and Leeward Islands - a Joint Supplementary Report* February, 1957; *The Statistical Basis of Financial Policy in Jamaica*, February 1957; *The Statistics of Barbados* April, 1957 - all produced by the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration (UNTAA).

258 The proposals for the regional grouping, which had been encouraged by the UK Development and Welfare Organisation and the Colonial Office, had originally anticipated British Guiana and British Honduras might also join the grouping but they had declined.

259 Seers, *Establishment of a Statistical Service in Barbados and Statistical Work in the Small Islands of the British West Indies*, UNTAA, 1958, p.4. The average income in Trinidad was estimated at 3 times that in the Leeward and Windward islands according to Seers "Federation of the British West Indies: Economic and Financial Aspects", *Social and Economic Studies* (Jamaica), Vol. 6. No.2, 1957, p.206.

260 Seers, *Establishment of a Statistical Service in Barbados*, p.4.

261 Seers, "Federation of the British West Indies", p.198. Seers made the point in that this paper was written in his personal capacity (i.e. not as a representative of his employer, the UNTAA).

262 Ibid. p.199.

263 Ibid. p.197.

264 Ibid. see pp. 201 and 212.

265 Ibid. p.204.

266 Ibid. p. 213.

267 The federal government was also considered extremely weak since large areas of control still rested with the British government (see P. M. Sherlock, *West Indian Nations: A New History*, Macmillan/Jamaica Publishing House, 1973, pp.292-5).

268 Seers, "Economic Planning in a Country Newly Independent", *Social and Economic Studies* (Jamaica), Vol. 11, No. 1, March 1962. The paper also had in mind Barbados and British Guiana which were to achieve independence in 1966.

269 Seers, "The Cultural Lag of Economics", *IDS Discussion Paper* 137, 1978, p.3.

270 The paper based on these lectures was not published until 1959 (Seers, "An Approach to the Short-Period Analysis of Primary-Producing Economies", *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol. 11, No. 1, February, 1959).

271 Ibid., p.2.

272 Ibid., pp.19-20.

273 Ibid., p.36.

274 Hans Singer has pointed out that there were other economists at this time, such as V. K. R. V. Rao (in a paper published in 1950), Paul N. Rosenstein-Rodan and R. Nurkse who were also arguing that the situation was different in developing countries and what was needed was a more complex and difficult policy than the largely monetary and financial policies which Keynes suggested (H. W. Singer, "Keynes, Seers and Economic Development", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 20, No. 3, July 1989, p.6). Seers himself in his 1952 paper "The Role of National Income Estimates in the Statistical Policy of an Underdeveloped Area" (p.160 and n.3), also refers to the work of Professor Kuznets on national income.

275 Ibid. p.2; however, interestingly, he also attributed his interest in short- period analysis to Keynes' influence: "At this time I was thinking then (under Keynes' influence) still very much in short period terms" (Seers, unpublished "Preface", p.2).

Chapter 2: Lessons from Latin America

1 Seers, "Latin America and U.S. Foreign Policy", *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 2, April-June 1963", p.200. For Seers' description of conditions in Latin America see also: Seers, "Inflation and Growth in Latin America: the Heart of the Controversy", in W. Baer and I. Kerstenetzky (eds), *Inflation and Growth in Latin America*, Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin Inc., 1964, p.95; and Seers, "Preface" in Seers *et al.*, *Cuba: The Economic and Social Revolution*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964 p. vi.

2 Seers, "Preface", in *Cuba*, p.vi.

3 Seers, "Latin America and U.S. Foreign Policy", p.200.

4 Seers, unpublished "Preface", to "Structural Development", 3 October 1969, p.4.

5 C. Kay, *Latin American Theories of Development and Underdevelopment*, London: Routledge, 1989, p.25; Kay's book provides a very clear account of the structuralist school and the structuralist/monetarist debate, and gives some attention to Seers' role at this time.

6 Seers, "A Theory of Inflation and Growth in Underdeveloped Economies Based on the Experience of Latin America", *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol. 14, No.2, June 1962, p.194; Kay speaks of the ECLA economists' "profound dissatisfaction with prevailing orthodox and neoclassical theories" (Kay, *Latin American Theories of Development and Underdevelopment*, p.25).

7 Seers himself summarised the structuralists' perspective as follows: "The starting-point of the theory of structuralism is that today in the middle of the twentieth century, when markets for export commodities are chronically depressed, economic development has to be increasingly directed to satisfying domestic markets. Moreover, development is an inescapable necessity in a period when unemployment is already serious and yet the population is growing rapidly (in fact, increasingly rapidly), and when the agitation for improved living standards grows daily more clamorous. Industrialisation is needed, therefore, to substitute local products for the manufactures previously imported, thus releasing foreign exchange to purchase the goods, especially capital equipment, which simply cannot be produced at home" (Seers, "The Great Debate on Inflation in Latin America", *The World Today*, Vol. 19, No. 3, April 1963, pp.140-1

8 Seers, unpublished "Preface", p.4.

9 Ibid.

10 Seers, "Inflation and Growth: A Summary of Experience in Latin America", *Economic Bulletin for Latin America*, Vol.7, 1962, pp.23-51.

11 In Seers' opinion the reason that the report was not published was because Prebisch "was wary of the controversial issues it raised, especially since he was by then negotiating hard for place for ECLA in the Alliance for Progress; besides he didn't have time to study it in depth" (Seers, unpublished "Preface", p.4). For further details on the Alliance for Progress see p.81.

12 Seers, "Inflation and Growth: A Summary of Experience in Latin America", p.50.

13 See ibid., p.34; and Seers, "A Theory of Inflation and Growth in Under-Developed Economies", pp.184-6. Bolivia and Paraguay, Seers acknowledged, structurally and in size had more in common with the Group O countries; but because they had followed unorthodox financial policies and also suffered high levels of inflation they were included in Group U.

For further details of then current rates of inflation, see note 56 below.

14 The 1953/4 report, on which Seers worked, contained a special section on inflation in Chile; see *World Economic Report 1953-4*, UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New York, 1955.

15 Seers, unpublished "Preface", p.5. The debate was aired at a conference on "Inflation and Growth in Latin America" held in Rio de Janeiro in January 1963, which Seers attended. Kay's observation is that while structuralists favoured an "inward-oriented and, to some extent, a self-reliant development strategy", the monetarists advocated an "outward-oriented development strategy driven by a closer reliance on the international market" (Kay, *Latin American Theories of Development and Underdevelopment*, p.48).

16 See Seers, "A Theory of Inflation and Growth", p.194. Klein-Saks was a firm of US consultants contracted by the Chilean (and Peruvian) governments to devise a stabilisation programme to deal with increased inflation.

17 Seers, unpublished "Preface", p.5.

18 Seers, "Structuralism vs Monetarism in Latin America", ISS, The Hague, 20 April 1982, p.2.
19 Seers, unpublished "Preface", p.5.
20 Seers, "Latin America and U.S. Foreign Policy", p.205.
21 Seers, "Inflation and Growth: the Heart of the Controversy", p.97.
22 Seers, "Latin America and U.S. Foreign Policy", p.202
23 Ibid., p. 209
24 Seers, unpublished "Preface", p.6. Joe Grunwald later in the 1970s became US Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, during the Carter administration. Seers obviously kept in touch with him and mentioned being hosted by him during a visit to the Brookings Institution, Washington in early April 1982 (*Journey Report*, Washington, 31 March-5 April 1982).
25 Seers, unpublished "Preface", p.6.
26 Ibid.
27 Seers, in Kurt Martin and John Knapp (eds), *The Teaching of Development Economics*, London: Frank Cass and Co., 1967, p. 156.
28 Seers, "The Limitations of the Special Case", *Bulletin of the Oxford Institute of Economics and Statistics* (*BOUIS*), Vol. 25, No. 2, May 1963, p.77.
29 Ibid., p.97.
30 Seers, "A Theory of Inflation and Growth", Appendix, p.192.
31 Seers, "Preface", *Social and Economic Studies* (Jamaica), Vol.12, No.3, September 1963, p.231. As an indication of the economic climate in Britain, for example, at this time, it was in 1960 that conservative prime minister Harold Macmillan was able to say to the British people "You never had it so good!"
32 Seers, "The Limitations of the Special Case", p.78.
33 Ibid.
34 Seers, "A Theory of Inflation and Growth in Under-Developed Economies", Appendix, p.175
35 His paper on "A Theory of Inflation and Growth in Under-developed Economies based on the Experience of Latin America", for example, he delivered to the Economics Club in Geneva, the Department of Applied Economics at Cambridge and a seminar at the University College of the West Indies before it was actually published ("A Theory of Inflation and Growth in Under-developed Economies based on the Experience of Latin America", p.173 n.3).
36 Seers, "The Limitations of the Special Case", p.77.
37 Seers, in Martin and Knapp (eds),*The Teaching of Development Economics*, p.192, referring to his paper "Why Visiting Economists Fail" (Yale University Economic Growth Center, *Center Paper* No. 10, 1962; reprinted from *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. LXX, No. 4, August 1962) which was written before "The Limitations of the Special Case" (1963).
38 Seers, "Why Visiting Economists Fail", p.325.
39 Ibid., p.326. In addition to the pitfalls of applying unsuitable models and inappropriate techniques (explored below), most economists were usually unaware of the dangers of too much or too little involvement in the local political scene, Seers observed, and some had more "personal deficiencies", lacking *savoir-faire* so that they never discovered "who is the real decision-maker or the right way to influence him", or proving bad administrators or "incapable of the more delicate tasks of supervising foreigners" (ibid.).
40 Seers, "Why Visiting Economists Fail", p.331.
41 Seers, in Martin and Knapp (eds), *The Teaching of Development Economics*, p.156.
42 Seers, unpublished "Preface", p.7.
43 Seers, "A Theory of Inflation and Growth", p.191.
44 Seers, in Martin and Knapp (eds), *The Teaching of Development Economics*, p.192.
45 Seers, "The Limitations of the Special Case", p.78.
46 B. Hettne, *Development Theory and the Three Worlds*, Harlow: Longman, 1990, p.55; and Kay, *Latin American Theories of Development and Underdevelopment*, p.2.
47 I. Oxaal, in Oxaal *et al.* (eds), *Beyond the Sociology of Development*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p.43 (quoting I. Livingstone (ed.), *Economic Policy for Development*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1971, p.10 reference).
48 Seers, in Martin and Knapp (eds), *The Teaching of Development Economics*, p.156.
49 Seers, "Limitations of the Special Case", p.80. Page references continue to refer to the version of this

paper in *BOUIS* cited in note 28 above, though this paper is also reproduced in Martin and Knapp (eds), *The Teaching of Development Economics*.

50 Ibid., p.83.

51 Ibid., p.84.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid., p.85.

54 Ibid., p.84.

55 Ibid.

56 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Chile were then considered the worst cases since each had known years in which the cost of living had doubled and price rises of 20 per cent or more per annum had continued for many years. In Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay the rate of inflation had been more moderate but was still considered unacceptable with price rises of at least 5 per cent a year being the rule and rates of inflation of more than 10 per cent not uncommon. (See Seers, "The Great Debate on Inflation in Latin America", p.139.)

57 Ibid.

58 Seers, "Inflation and Growth the Heart of the Controversy", p.100.

59 Seers, "A Theory of Inflation and Growth in Under-Developed Economies", p.191- 2; see also, p.100.

60 Ibid., p.191, n.2.

61 See, Seers, "Structuralism vs Monetarism in Latin America".

62 Seers, "Inflation and Growth: The Heart of the Controversy", p.93.

63 Seers, "The Great Debate on Inflation in Latin America", p.140.

64 Ibid.; by way of example he added in a footnote "The deficit in the United States budget in 1963-4 will be more than the whole national income of Chile" (ibid., n.1). And, he added, the IMF had in fact been set up to make it unnecessary for countries to adopt retrenchment policies when suffering balance of payments difficulties.

65 Seers, "Inflation and Growth: The Heart of the Controversy", p.94.

66 Ibid., p.100.

67 Seers, "A Theory of Inflation and Growth in Under-Developed Economies", p.192.

68 See Seers, "Latin America and US Foreign Policy", p.202 and Seers, "Inflation and Growth: The Heart of the Controversy", p.101.

69 Seers, "Inflation and Growth: The Heart of the Controversy", p.94.

70 Ibid.,p.103.

71 Seers, "The Great Debate on Inflation in Latin America", p.143.

72 Seers, "Inflation and Growth: The Heart of the Controversy", pp.101-2 n.18.

73 Ibid.,p.102; see also p.102 n.19.

74 Ibid. pp.101-2.

75 Seers, "The Stages of Economic Development of a Primary Producer in the Middle of the Twentieth Century", *The Economic Bulletin of Ghana*, Vol., VII, No. 4, 1963, p.65.

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.

78 "All the industrial countries protect their own farmers from imports of livestock products, cereals, and sugar ... The United Kingdom and France discriminate by tariff preferences and quotas, in favor, respectively, of British Commonwealth countries and most former members of the French empire. The arrangements agreed upon for achieving economic integration in Europe compel other west European countries, notably West Germany, to offer similar special treatment to primary producers which are competitors of Latin America (affecting especially bananas and coffee), as well as to each other's farmers. The United States applies quantitative restrictions on imports of petroleum, lead, zinc, sugar, and wool and uses subsidies and/or tariffs to help domestic producers of these and a number of other items, for example, cotton an copper". (Seers, "Inflation and Growth: The Heart of the Controversy", p.98.)

79 Ibid.

80 Seers, "A Theory of Inflation and Growth in Under-Developed Economies", p.192.

81 Seers, in Martin and Knapp (eds), *The Teaching of Development Economics*, p.157.

82 Seers, "Why Visiting Economists Fail", p.338.

83 Ibid.

84 Seers, "The Limitations of the Special Case", p.89.
85 Ibid. p.91.
86 Ibid. p. 94-5.
87 Ibid. p.80.
88 Seers, "Why Visiting Economists Fail", p.337.
89 Seers, in Martin and Knapp (eds), *Teaching of Development Economics*, p.158.
90 Seers, "The Limitations of the Special Case", p.98.
91 Seers, "The Stages of Economic Development of a Primary Producer in the Middle of the Twentieth Century", and "The Mechanism of an Open Petroleum Economy", Yale University Economic Growth Center, *Center Paper*, No. 47, 1964.
92 Seers, "Why Visiting Economists Fail", p.337; see also "The Limitations of the Special Case", p.96. At the Manchester Conference in 1964 Seers suggested economists should be given the opportunity to combine work overseas with a university post at home, since a career working wholly overseas eventually put one out of touch with current professional thought, whereas a wholly academic career in a developed country meant "work divorced from economic reality". (Seers, in Martin and Knapp (eds), *The Teaching of Development Economics*, p.224).
93 Seers, "The Limitations of the Special Case", p.78.
94 Seers, "The Stages of Economic Development of Primary Producer", p.57.
95 Walt Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960. Rostow argued it was possible to identify all societies as lying within one of five categories: the traditional society; the preconditions for take-off; the take-off; the drive to maturity; and the age of mass consumption.
96 Seers, "The Stages of Economic Development of a Primary Producer", p.57.
97 Ibid.
98 Seers, "A Theory of Inflation and Growth in Under-developed Economies", Appendix pp.192, 193, 195.
99 Ibid., pp.192-3.
100 Ibid., p.193 n.1.
101 Seers, "The Great Debate on Inflation in Latin America", p.141. By way of evidence he added, "Dr. Prebisch .. is, whatever the State Department and the IMF might think, a conservative at heart, though a conservative who believes that certain changes must be made if the existing fabric of civilization is to be preserved" (ibid.).
102 Seers, "The Limitations of the Special Case", p.98.
103 Seers, "A Model of Comparative Rates of Growth in the World Economy", *The Economic Journal*, Vol. LXXII, March 1962.
104 Ibid., p.53.
105 Seers, "The Limitations of the Special Case", p.78.
106 Seers, "A Theory of Inflation and Growth in Under-Developed Economies", p.185.
107 Ibid., p.192.
108 See Seers, "Inflation and Growth: a Summary of Experience in Latin America", p.24.
109 Seers, "Comparative Rates of Growth", pp.76-7.
110 Seers, "Inflation and Growth in Latin America: The Heart of the Controversy", p.95.
111 Seers, "Comparative Rates of Growth", p.45.
112 See also Seers, "The Limitations of the Special Case", p.84 and Seers, "The Stages of Economic Development of a Primary Producer" pp. 58-9.
113 Seers, "A Theory of Inflation and Growth in Under-Developed Economies", p.190.
114 See "Inflation and Growth: a Summary of Experience in Latin America", p.49. Seers in fact used the term in 1959 to explain why statisticians continued to use techniques and analysis developed for industrial economies when working in primary producing countries; it was because the "'demonstration effect' of industrial countries is so strong" (Seers, "An Approach to the Short-period Analysis of Primary-Producing Economies", p.36).
115 Seers, "Comparative Rates of Growth", p.70.
116 Seers, "Latin America and US Foreign Policy", p.201.
117 Seers, "Comparative Rates of Growth", p.70.
118 See Seers, "Inflation and Growth: a Summary of Experience in Latin America", p.40.

119 Seers, "The Terms of Trade Myth and Development Strategy", 7 October 1964; in support of his views, Seers cites the study of Professor Theodore Morgan "The Long-run Terms of Trade between Agriculture and Manufacturing", in *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, October 1959.

120 Ibid. p.4. He demonstrated that between 1928 and 1962 there had been only a 5% decline which was not statistically significant and commodity prices had since risen between 1962 and 1964.

121 Seers, "Rich Countries and Poor", in *Development in a Divided World*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1971, p.23. For some members of the Latin American elite, he maintained, it provided a convenient substitute for the excuse "We can't do anything because we were ruined by colonial rule".

122 "The real clue for policy-makers, international and national is that trends in the terms of trade are swamped by trends in volume" (ibid. pp.9-10). He demonstrated that whereas between 1928 and 1960 the total consumption of primary products rose by 70% (including petroleum), the total consumption of manufactures rose by 193%, equivalent to annual average increases of 1.7% and 3.4% (see ibid., p.6).

123 Ibid. pp.10-11.

124 Seers, "Comparative Rates of Growth", p. 76.

125 Seers, "The Terms of Trade Myth", p.5.

126 Seers, "Comparative Rates of Growth", p.71.

127 Seers, "The Stages of Development of a Primary Producer", p.59.

128 Seers, "The Role of Industry in Development, Some Fallacies", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1963, p.462.

129 Seers, "Comparative Rates of Growth", p.71.

130 Ibid., p.72.

131 Ibid., pp.72 and 73.

132 Seers, "The Role of Industry in Development", p.465.

133 Seers, "Normal Growth and Distortions: Some Techniques of Structural Analysis", *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol.16, No.1, March 1964. p.103.

134 Seers, "Comparative Rates of Growth", p.76.

135 Ibid.

136 See, Seers, "Big Companies and Small Countries: a Practical Proposal", *Kyklos*, Vol. XVI, Fasc.4, 1963, pp.599-600. As Seers commented "The day may have passed when one could get land from a chief by offering him a pair of sunglasses, but some modern transactions do not seem much fairer" (ibid. p.602).

137 Ibid., pp.601-2.

138 Ibid., p.606.

139 Seers, "The Stages of Economic Development of a Primary Producer", p.59.

140 Ibid., p.60

141 See ibid. pp.61 and 61

142 Seers, "Comparative Rates of Growth", p.71; "To advocate effective progressive taxation is to advocate a radical social reform, if not social revolution" Seers maintained (ibid.). Though he observed that he believed the more responsible companies would not object to fairer taxation in Seers, "Big Companies and Small Countries", p.607.

143 Seers, "The Stages of Economic Development of a Primary Producer", p.64.

144 Ibid. p.65.

145 Ibid., p.66.

146 Ibid., p.68.

147 Ibid., pp.64-5.

148 Seers, "Economic Programming in a Country Newly Independent", *Social and Economic Studies* (Jamaica), Vol. 11, No. 1, March 1962. British Guiana and Barbados achieved independence in 1966.

149 The Treaties of Rome (signed by Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) brought the EEC into being on 1 January 1958, and the British government, headed by Harold Macmillan applied to join in August 1961. The application was in fact vetoed by the French in January 1963, but in 1962, when Seers was in the Caribbean, the future was still uncertain. Britain's eventual entry to the EEC in 1973 is dealt with in Chapter 6.

150 See Seers, "Preface" to "Projections of West Indian Economies", *Social and Economic Studies* (Jamaica), Vol.12, No.3, September 1963, pp.232-4.

151 Seers, "Preface" to "Projections of West Indian Economies", p.232-3 and Seers, "Economic

Programming", p. 35.

152 Seers, "Economic Programming", pp.34-5.

153 Seers, "Preface" to "Projections of West Indian Economies", p.231.

154 See Seers, "Economic Programming", p.41 and Seers, "Preface" to "Projections of West Indian Economies", p.234.

155 Seers described this accounting system in an unpublished paper "An Accounting System for Projections in a Specialised Exporter of Primary Products" prepared for the International Association for Research in Income and Wealth Conference held at Corfu 1963. See Seers, "The Use of a Modified Input-Output System for an Economic Program in Zambia", *IDS Communications* No. 50, p.1 and n.1.

156 Seers, "Economic Programming", pp.35-6.

157 Seers, "Preface" to "Projections of West Indian Economies", p.231.

158 Seers, "Economic Programming", p.35.

159 Ibid., pp.34-5.

160 Ibid., p.43.

161 Seers himself makes the link between his visit to the Caribbean and producing the paper on "Big Companies and Small Countries", in his unpublished "Preface", p.7.

162 Seers, "Preface" to "Projections of West Indian Economies", p.234.

163 Seers, "Economic Programming", p.43.

164 Seers, "Why Visiting Economists Fail", p.336. Johr, Singer and das Gupta were three economists he cited that felt it was their duty to recommend certain policies.

165 D. Seers, "Preface", in *Cuba: The Economic and Social Revolution*, ed. D. Seers, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1964, p.vi. As he put it in his unpublished "Preface" (1969), "It dawned on me (belatedly) that the Cuban revolution was extremely interesting. Here was a country with many features (geographical and social) similar to other Latin American countries trying to develop in an entirely different way" (pp.7-8).

166 Seers, "The Economic and Social Background" in *Cuba*, p.6. The emphasis of this remark is in fact somewhat misleading since it seems to imply that Cuba was following the example set by the Charter of Punta del Este, whereas in fact, as already mentioned, the Alliance for Progress, set up by the Charter, was established very much in reaction to the Cuban Revolution in an attempt to provide the means to stimulate growth and social reform in order to avoid the prospect of a similar upheaval occurring anywhere else in the region.

167 Seers, "Preface", in *Cuba*, p.v.

168 Seers, "The Economic and Social Background", in *Cuba*, p.20.

169 Ibid., p.25.

170 Seers, "Preface", in *Cuba*, p.vi.

171 Ibid., p.vii.

172 Ibid.

173 Ibid., p.viii.

174 See ibid., p.ix.

175 Richard Jolly, pers. comm. I am grateful to Richard Jolly for relating this and giving permission to reproduce it on the understanding that the team's independence and freedom in pursuing its work was made clear.

176 Seers, "Preface", in *Cuba*, p.xi.

177 Seers, "Economic and Social Background", in *Cuba*, pp.42-3.

178 Ibid., p.36.

179 Walter Schwartz, "End Papers", *New York Times*, 20 April 1964, quoting ibid., p.36. This was no doubt a figure Seers had become aware of as a result of his work on national income and living standards at the Oxford Institute of Statistics after the war.

180 Seers, "Economic and Social Background", in *Cuba*, p.43.

181 See, ibid., pp.5 and 6.

182 See, ibid., pp.28, 29 and 6.

183 See, ibid., pp. 30-2.

184 Schwartz, *New York Times*, 20 April 1964.

185 Seers, "Economic and Social Background", in *Cuba*, p.49.

186 Ibid., p.53. Seers remarked "No single error in Cuba's planning seems comparable to that of Brazil in

setting up ten motor vehicle manufacturing plants when it is doubtful whether the market was big enough for three" (ibid).

187 James O'Connor, Review of *Cuba: The Economic and Social Revolution*, in *American Economic Review*, September 1964, p.802.

188 Seers, "Preface", in *Cuba*, pp.xi and xii.

189 Seers, "Economic and Social Background", p.59, 60 and 61.

190 Seers, "The World Context of Development" (based on World Context of Development Unit of M. Phil course) 17 December 1973, draft distributed for discussion at Christ Church Oxford Conference January 1974, p.30.

191 Richard Jolly, pers.comm.

192 Schwartz, *The New York Times*, 20 April, 1964.

193 Robert Freeman Smith, Review in *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, August, 1964, pp.428, 430.

194 O'Connor, Review of *Cuba*, p.801.

195 M. Diaz-Rey, Review of *Cuba*, in *The Economic Journal*, March, 1965, p.219.

196 O'Connor, Review of *Cuba*, p.802.

197 A condensed version of Seers' contribution to the *Cuba* book appears as "Cuba: The Economic and Social Revolution: A Non-Marxist View" in H.G. Shaffer (ed.), *The Communist World: Marxist and Non-Marxist Views*, New York: Meredith Publishing Co. 1967.

198 O'Connor, Review of *Cuba*, p.802. From the perspective of 1992, Richard Jolly has himself commented that this early analysis still has contemporary relevance: "stressing the success of progress in education and health but raising many questions about the realism of Cuba economic strategy - seems only too relevant a perspective for today" (R. Jolly letter to M. Lipscomb, 3 January 1992)

199 Seers, "Latin America and U.S. Foreign Policy", p.205.

200 Ibid., p.203.

201 Ibid., pp.204 and p.203.

202 Ibid., p.205.

203 The nine structural characteristics were as follows:

> (i) a high proportion of the island's economy (including sugar) in the hands of foreign companies; (ii) a great contrast between quite highly developed cities and a very primitive countryside, especially Oriente; (iii) within each area, great income inequality; (iv) chronic stagnation (average income had changed little in purchasing power between 1925 and 1958); (v) high and growing unemployment, which was regularly over 20 per cent ... (vi) a notoriously corrupt and incompetent bureaucracy; (vii) close contact with the United States through tourism, etc., so that Cubans were in the position of beggars looking in on a feast; (viii) a revolutionary tradition, born in the nineteenth-century struggles against Spain, and nurtured by United States military intervention and by a series of dictatorships; (ix) virtually no participation of the bulk of the public in political decisions. (ibid., p.204)

204 Seers, "Economic and Social Background", in *Cuba*, p.25.

205 Seers, "Latin America and U.S. Foreign Policy", p.205. Only in Bolivia and Mexico did he consider there were revolutionary traditions comparable to Cuba and in both cases these had been "incorporated in the machinery of government" (ibid.).

206 Ibid., p.206.

207 Ibid. p.206-7. Seers did in fact raise some basic questions in relation to United States policy such as: "can foreigners really decide what is a desirable programme of economic development?", "can one really impose them from outside?", and "is it proper to do so?" but these remained basically rhetorical.

208 Ibid., p.207. He remarked that the US faced special difficulties since it could "hardly intervene openly in Latin American politics, as a colonial power can" and it had to work through governments which were often not at all amenable to pressure. (However, the attempted invasion of Cuba in 1961 had obviously indicated the United States did not rule out open and direct military intervention.)

209 Ibid., p.208. Examples of interference he cited were "subsidising journals, promoting frontier incidents or bribing senior military officer". However, he appeared to have little faith that the required degree of perception and skill for a successful outcome of any interference would be exercised - if the previous record was any guide.

210 Ibid., pp.208-9.

211 G. E. Cumper, "Dependence, Development, and the Sociology of Economic Thought", *Social and Economic Studies*, Vol.23, No. 3, 1974, pp.466-7. See also Magnus Blomstrom and Bjorn Hettne, *Development Theory in Transition*, Zed Press, 1984, pp.119 and 121 n.14.

212 John Toye, "Nationalism and Structuralism: Two Themes in the Work of Dudley Seers", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 20, No. 3, July 1989, p.56.

213 Seers, "Structuralism vs Monetarism in Latin America", The Hague, ISS, 20 April 1982, p.1.

214 Seers, "A Theory of Inflation and Growth in Under-Developed Economies", Appendix, p.175.

Chapter 3: The Lessons of Africa and the Argument for International Aid

1 Seers, "International Aid: The Next Steps", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1964, p.478.

2 Seers, "Birth, Life and Death of Development Economics", *Development and Change*, Vol. 10, 1979, p.708; and Seers, "Time for a Second Look at the Third World", *Development Policy Review*, Vol. 1, 1983, p.42.

3 Seers, unpublished "Preface", p.9. Although authorship of the ECA Survey of South Africa is not attributed to any individual and Seers does not include it in his own bibliography, he nevertheless claims in his unpublished "Preface" that he produced this section of the ECA economic survey himself. Enquiries to the ECA to confirm this have received no response but Richard Jolly recalls Seers speaking of his visit to South Africa for this purpose and producing a purely economic assessment of the apartheid regime (R. Jolly, pers. comm.). It has therefore been assumed that Seers was involved in compiling the report, though it was published in 1966 after he had left ECA.

4 Seers, in K. Martin and J. Knapp (eds), *The Teaching of Development Economics*, London, Frank Cass & Co., 1967, p.224.

5 Seers, "The Role of Industry in Development: Some Fallacies", *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 1, 4 (1963), p.463; based on a paper read at the first University of East Africa Conference on Public Policy: The Machinery of Planning, Kampala, September 1963.

6 Ibid., pp. 465 and 463.

7 Ibid., p.463-4.

8 B. Ingham, "Dudley Seers as a Development Adviser in Ghana and Malta", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 20, No. 3, p.48.

9 Seers did make a passing reference to Ghana's 7-year plan much later in the 1980s when he observed that it had been inappropriate since the phases of the Volta River Project defined quite different periods for the national economy, though it is not clear whether he raised this objection at the time. He observed: "In the early 1960s, I was in a meeting with Kwame N'Krumah, who had just returned from the Soviet Union. He said that Khrushchev had told him that they had changed to seven-year plans. 'I said that this was a good idea and we would do the same'. (This in spite of the fact that the phases of the gigantic Volta River Project defined quite different periods for the national economy.)" Seers, *Political Economy of Nationalism*, 1983, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.99.

10 B. Ingham, "Dudley Seers as a Development Adviser in Ghana and Malta", p.49, col. 2.

11 Seers, "The Stages of Economic Development of Primary Producer", *Economic Bulletin of Ghana*, Vol. VII, No. 4, 1963, p.68.

12 Seers, "International Trade and Development - the Special Interests of Africa", in Ian Stewart (ed.), *African Primary Products and International Trade*, Edinburgh University Press, 1965, p.21; he observed that tables in the report of the Secretary General of UNCTAD demonstrated this point.

13 Seers, "A Theory of Inflation and Growth in Under-Developed Economies Based on the Experience of Latin America", *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol. 14, No. 2, June 1962, p.195.

14 Seers, unpublished "Preface", p.8.

15 Economic Commission for Africa, *Economic Survey of Africa*, United Nations Publication E/CN./14/370, 1966 pp. xii & xiii.

16 Richard Jolly, pers. comm.

17 Ibid. pp.171 & 181.

18 Ibid. pp.171 & 177.

19 Ibid. p.178.

20 Ibid., p.171. While on the one hand the report conceded unequal distribution of income could facilitate development to a certain extent by permitting a high rate of saving out of which investment in heavy industries could be financed, on the other hand it recognised that excess saving and lack of demand for goods produced acted as a chronic obstacle to long-period growth.
21 Ibid., p.228.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., p.230.
24 Ibid., p. 171.
25 Ibid. p.214.
26 Ibid., p.229.
27 Ibid., p.180 quoting *Report of the Vilhoen Commission* (U.G. 36/58).
28 Ibid., p.181.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., p.171; see also ibid. p.181.
31 See ibid., pp.180-1.
32 Ibid., p.171.
33 Ibid. p.229.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid. p.230.
36 The report remarked that by importing more from the UK and USA than it exported to them (and by remitting dividends and interest), South Africa thus enabled these countries to acquire gold, which they used in part settlement of import surpluses *vis-à-vis* other countries (ibid., p.206).
37 Seers, unpublished "Preface", p.8.
38 United Nations, Economic Commission for Africa, Food and Agriculture Organisation, *Report of the UN/ECA/FAO Economic Survey Mission on the Economic Development of Zambia*, Falcon Press, Ndola, 1964, Appendix L, p.CXXXIII.
39 Ibid.
40 Richard Jolly, "The Seers Report in Retrospect", *African Social Research*, No. 11, June 1971, p.4. See also R. Jolly, "Dudley Seers (1920-1983): His Contributions to Development Perspectives, Policy and Studies", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 20, No.3, July 1989, p.38 for a description of the mission's discussions with Kaunda.
41 Jolly, "Dudley Seers (1920-1983): His Contributions to Development Perspectives, Policy and Studies", p.38. Jolly's more critical observations are made in "The Seers Report in Retrospect", which he wrote in 1971 assessing in retrospect how clearly the Zambian report had identified the major policy issues and whether its analysis, forecasts and recommendations stood the test of time; though even then he still considered it "the most comprehensive and professional analysis of the workings of the Zambian economy" (p.1)
42 *Economic Development of Zambia*, p.1 par.1.
43 Ibid., p.7 par.8 and p.8. par.11. Richard Hall in *The High Price of Principles* (Penguin African Library, 1973) states that in the year of independence (i.e. 1964) copper amounted to 92% of Zambia's exports, contributing 53% of the total government revenue and supplying 47% of the net domestic product (p.90).
44 *Economic Development of Zambia*, p.8 par.9.
Richard Hall estimated that in the 10 years leading to independence £260 million was sent abroad by the coppermining industry in dividends, interest and royalties (Hall, *High Price of Principles*, p.94).
The copper ores were mined by two main company groups, Rhodesian Anglo-American Ltd (Rhoanglo) controlled by the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa Ltd., and Rhodesian Selection Trust Ltd (RST), in which the U.S. corporation American Metal Climax had 46% interest. The third largest company involved was British South African Company Ltd (BSA) whose main source of income came from royalties on the minerals produced by others (see *Economic Development of Zambia*, p.39 pars 5-7).
45 *Economic Development of Zambia*, p.8 par.12.
46 Ibid., par.13.
47 Ibid., p.7 par. 1-5.
48 Ibid., par. 6.

49 Ibid. p.11 par. 41.
50 Ibid. p.12 par.56.
51 Ibid. p.13 par.62.
52 See ibid., pp.12-13, pars 56-7.
53 Seers, "The Use of a Modified Input-output System for an Economic Program in Zambia", *IDS Communication Paper* No. 50, 1966, p.5.
54 Ibid., p.6.
55 *Economic Development of Zambia*, p. 7, par.7. "Economic and social power has been abruptly divorced from political power. Since the great majority of the population are impatient for economic and social change, this dichotomy could prove dangerous."
56 Ibid. p.12, par.45 and p.12, par.44.
57 Ibid. p.12, par.44.
58 Ibid., p.27 par.1.
59 Ibid., p.39 par.1.
60 Ibid. p.13 par.63-5.
61 Ibid. p.27, par. 4.
62 Ibid. p.169.
63 Ibid. p.49 par.94 and p.27 par.5.
64 Ibid., p.13 par.58.
65 Jolly, pers. comm. and Jolly, "The Seers Report in Retrospect", p.10.
66 See, C. Lanning with M. Mueller "Copper, Labour and Underdevelopment in Zambia" in *Africa Undermined*, Penguin, 1979, p.211.
67 *Economic Development of Zambia*, p.169 par.5 and p.30, par. 25. See n.44 above for role of BSA.
68 See, J. H. Chileshe, "Zambia", in A. Adedeji (ed.), *Indigenization of African Economies*, London: Hutchinson, 1981.
Richard Hall has described the last minute negotiations whereby BSA's royalty rights were transferred to the Zambian government on the eve of independence. However, BSA still retained its investments worth £70 million (including £10 million of copperbelt holdings, comprising 23% of the Anglo-American share of the mines) (see Hall, *High Price of Principles*, Ch. 5, pp. 73-87 and p.88).
69 *Economic Development of Zambia*, p.49, par.88.
70 Jolly, "The Seers Report in Retrospect", p.6.
71 In 1962 and 1963 the price had been £234 per ton 1963; for 1970 the Seers' reported estimated £240-260 per ton, whereas in fact it sold for £615-750 per ton; in 1974 the price was over £1,400 per ton; however in 1975 it dropped to less than £500 per ton. Ibid.; and Lanning with Mueller, "Copper, Labour and Underdevelopment in Zambia" pp.119-200.
72 See *Economic Development of Zambia*, p.169 par.5 and p.171 par.29.
73 Ibid. p.21 par.16.
74 Seers, *The Use of a Modified Input-output System for an Economic Program in Zambia*, p.2.
75 *Economic Development of Zambia*, p.151, par.115.
76 Ibid., p.33, par.53.
77 Ibid., p.33, par.59.
78 Ibid., p.33, par.58 and p.169, par.6.
79 Ibid., p.34, par.64.
80 Ibid., p.33, par.59.
81 Ibid., p.169, par.7.
82 Ibid., p.33, par.61.
83 Ibid., p.164, pars 76-7.
84 See, Hall, *High Price of Principles*, p.176.
85 Seers, talk recorded at the Mona Hotel, Jamaica, January 1968.
86 Jolly "The Seers Report in Retrospect", p.14.
87 Ibid., p.15.
88 *Economic Development of Zambia*, , p.91, par.6; this included over half the men and four-fifths of the women; according to a 1963 census 75% of males and 93% of females over 16 were considered illiterate.
89 Ibid., p.14, par.71.

There is conflicting emphasis in the report as to the relative importance of foreign exchange or qualified manpower for development in Zambia which may well reflect the multi-authored nature of the report. While here it is maintained "lack of skilled and professional manpower" was "the main obstacle to growth for the next few years, not shortage of foreign exchange" elsewhere in the report it is stated: "The basic problem of an undeveloped country is always foreign exchange. It may have other serious problems, such as too few factories and insufficient tractors. It may face (as Zambia does) an acute shortage of professionally and technically trained personnel. But if enough foreign exchange is flowing in, the things or people needed can in the end be bought or hired. At the heart of any strategy for economic development lies the maximation of the earnings of foreign exchange and their careful use"(ibid. p.27 par.10).

From comments elsewhere it seems Seers himself considered lack of skilled manpower rather than foreign exchange the dominant constraint on development in most African countries; see above p. x).

90 Ibid., p.91, par.2.
91 Ibid., Chap.VI, pp.91-120.
92 Ibid., p.161, par.47.
93 Jolly, "The Seers Report in Retrospect", p.17-18.
94 *Economic Development of Zambia*, p.91, par.3.
95 Ibid., p.161 par.49.
96 Ibid., p.24, par.140; see also p.35 pars 76-83 and Chap.IX.
97 Martin and Knapp (eds), *The Teaching of Development Economics*, p.224.
98 Jolly, "The Seers Report in Retrospect", p.19.
99 *Economic Development of Zambia*, p.35, par.84.
100 Ibid., p.36, par.88.
101 Ibid., p.36, par.92.
102 Ibid., p.75, par.1.
103 Ibid., p.37, par.97.
104 Ibid., p.37, par 98.
105 Jolly, "The Seers Report in Retrospect", p.21.
106 Kaunda quoted in R. Hall, The High Price of Principles, p.245.
107 *Economic Development of Zambia*, p.126, pars 65-7.
108 Ibid., p.127, pars 71-2 and p.173, par.48.
109 R. Hall, The High Price of Principles, p.246. This report, which was not made public apparently "argued that trade between Central and East Africa was negligible, so that even if the line carried all the copper traffic outwards, the trains would have little to bring back. Moreover, the harbour facilities at Dar-es-Salaam were not capable of taking extra cargo without expensive improvements. Finally, the gauge of the existing Tanzania railway ... was different from that of the system in Zambia; so either some track would have to be relaid or goods would have to be reshipped."
110 Jolly, "The Seers Report in Retrospect", p.21, and pers. comm.
111 Barbara Castle, entry for 5 March 1965, *The Castle Diaries 1964-70*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1984, p.18 plus n.1.
112 *Economic Development of Zambia*, p.53, par.1.
113 Settlement of twenty thousand families and the creation of 50 Chombwa units was the target for 1970 (ibid., pp.71-2 par.171).
114 Ibid., p.54, par.8.
115 3,000 tractor units was the target for 1970 (ibid., pp.71, par.171).
116 See ibid., p.170-1 section IV for summary of proposals; Chap.IV, pp.53-74 contains full proposals.
117 Jolly, "The Seers Report in Retrospect", p.22.
118 Hall, *The High Price of Principles*, p.176
119 *Economic Development of Zambia*, inside front cover.
120 Jolly, "The Seers Report in Retrospect", p.25. Jolly observes that a report should not be commissioned unless those who commissioned it were going to take time to consider its recommendations; though in this case it should perhaps be borne in mind that Kaunda's cabinet had not commissioned the report - they had inherited it.
121 Ibid., pp.23-4.
122 Ibid., p.24.

123 Ibid., p.23.
124 Jolly, pers. comm.
125 Jolly, "The Seers Report in Retrospect", p.3.
126 Seers, "International Aid: The Next Steps", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1964, pp.471-2. Based on an address to the University of East Africa Conference on Foreign Aid, Dar es Salaam, September 1964.

Seers maintained he felt "ashamed that our generation has sunk to such primitive depths that it has produced instruments , which are kept ready for use, capable of human extermination" (ibid., p.472, n.2). For his earlier views on this subject see Chapter 1, pp.43-4.

127 Seers, "International Trade and Development - the Special Interests of Africa", in Ian Stewart (ed.), *African Primary Products and International Trade*, Edinburgh University Press, 1965, p.22. Seers made a calculation that per capita income in Africa and Asia would have to grow at 3% per year even to reach by the end of the century the average income levels found in Latin America in 1964.
128 Seers, "International Trade and Development", p.21.
129 Ibid., p. 23; and I. G. Stewart, "Introduction", in I. Stewart (ed.), *African Primary Products*, p.xi.
130 Seers, "International Trade and Development",p.21.
131 Ibid., p.23.
132 Ibid., p.25.
133 See Seers, "Comparative Rates of Growth", p.76.
134 Seers commented, "Given that the purpose is to check the growing inequality of world income, there is little point in exacting high rates of interest. What is indicated is that the bulk of capital should be cheap and long-term" (ibid., p.77).
135 Seers, "International Aid: The Next Steps", p.477.
136 Ibid., p.478. The number 76 should, of course, have been 77; it was corrected in another version of the paper published in a report of the conference proceedings, *Problems of Foreign Aid*, Oxford University Press.
137 Seers, "International Aid", pp.475-6.
138 In Latin America he had even been cautious about borrowing "in view of the political strings ... always attached to loans" (Seers, "A Theory of Inflation and Growth", p.192).
139 Seers, "International Aid", p.476 and 484
140 Ibid., p.477.
141 Ibid., pp. 474 and 478. However he did remark he did not wish to hold up the British experience as a model or something to copied uncritically on the international plane.
142 Ibid., p.477.
143 Ibid., p.479.
144 Ibid., pp.479-80 and n.2 (p.480). The doctrine of "picking the winners" he attributed to Paul Rosenstein-Rodan. Seers observed that the problem of accepting "aid to the needy" as a criterion could involve some wastage ("just as there is waste when old age pensions are spent on football pools"), but this was part of accepting the idea of the social right to relief as opposed to the old charity approach.
145 See ibid., pp.480-1.
146 Ibid. p.482. He commented "A far larger transfer of human beings is now necessary than has ever been envisaged in the past, involving arrangements under which fractions of each profession in the developed countries spend at least part of their careers overseas" - after receiving sufficient training to understand the problems of under-developed countries (ibid.).
147 Ibid., pp. 480 and 482-3.
148 He had mentioned the possibility that "the contributions of the developed countries could be 'tied' to be spent on each country's own products" (though he personally did not favour this solution since it reduced the power of primary producers to shop in cheaper markets) and also remarked that the more quickly import substitution was achieved in primary producers, the less capital would be needed in the long run, implying that the more quickly assistance was given, the less ultimately would be needed. See Seers, "Comparative Rates of Growth", pp.77 and 78.
149 Seers, "Comparative Rates of Growth", pp.77 and 78.
150 Seers, "International Aid", p.483.
151 Ibid., p.484.
152 Ibid., p.487.

153 Ibid., pp.483-4.

154 Ibid., p.484 "an automatic machinery for redistributing income is the only alternative to redistribution of territory by military force".

155 Ibid., p.483. He used Australia as the clearest example of a country where the advantages of specialisation plus compensation operated.

156 Seers, "International Aid", p.485.

157 He maintained that the charge of Julien Benda's *La Trahaison des clercs* which "drew attention in the 1920s to the way in which European intellectuals allowed nationalism and political doctrine to dominate in their thinking" could be made with still greater force in 1964 (ibid., p.485).

158 Commenting on what was required for international fiscal system he stated, "The long-term ideal would be a single framework, each country's needs being assessed, and then met as can best be managed out of all the resources available. This can never be completely achieved as long as the principle of national sovereignty continues to be accepted" (ibid., p.487).

He spoke of the integration of the world economy as analogous to the integration of the German states in the nineteenth century, in terms of how "the elimination of economic sovereignty of separate principalities changed quite quickly from the unthinkable to the inevitable" (ibid., p.487).

159 Ibid., p.486.

160 Ibid., p.488.

161 Seers, "International Trade and Development", p.25.

162 Seers, "The Birth, Life and Death of Development Economics (Revisiting a Manchester Conference)", *Development and Change*, Vol.10, 1979, p.708.

163 Seers, "International Aid", p.478.

164 Seers, "'The Other Road' Is autonomous development possible?", *International Development*, December, 1967, p.2.

165 In December 1961 a "Committee on Training in Public Administration for Overseas Countries" was appointed by the Department of Technical Co-operation under the chairmanship of Lord Bridges. The Committee's report published in January 1963, which will be considered further in Chapter 4, recognised the need for a stronger focus on development studies in Britain and called for the setting up of a special centre for this purpose (*Report of the Committee on Training in Pubic Administration for Overseas Countries*, Department of Technical Co-operation, HMSO, 1963).

166 Seers, "The Birth, Life and Death of Development Economics (Revisiting a Manchester Conference)", pp.707 and 708.

167 "Mrs. Robinson had asked whether Mr. Seers was not tacitly accepting models in use, especially the neoclassical models, as accurate and useful for those working in *developed* economies. As a former pupil of her, Mr. Seers felt he must have been successfully inoculated against doing this; he simply preferred to fight one battle at a time. There is a very strong case against the application in Latin America of traditional financial policies. This case should not be confused with the issue of whether or not such a policy had any function in developed countries" (K. Martin and J. Knapp (eds), *The Teaching of Development Economics*, London: Frank Cass, 1967, p.158).

Martin and Knapp, in their introduction to the report of the conference, include Thomas Balogh, Paul Streeten, Dudley Seers and John Knapp among those with Joan Robinson "who denied that conventional textbook analysis was relevant for development *anywhere*, western countries included" (ibid., p.xi); but it is clear this did not become a dominant concern of Seers at this time.

168 Seers, unpublished "Preface", p.6.

169 Seers, in Martin and Knapp (eds), *The Teaching of Development Economics*, p.222.

170 Labour Party Manifesto 1964, quoted in Seers and Paul Streeten, "Overseas Development Policies", in Wilfred Beckerman (ed.), *The Labour Government's Economic Record: 1964-1970*, Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1972, p.120.

171 Barbara Castle, letter to M. Lipscomb, 30 April 1990.

172 Seers, "Conception, Birth and the Early Years: a Personal Interpretation", in *1966-76 Ten Year Review and Annual Report 1976*, IDS, January 1977, p.17, n.8.

173 Seers, unpublished "Preface", p.9.

Chapter 4: The Ministry and the Institute

1 Seers and P. Streeten, "Overseas Development Policies", in W. Beckerman (ed.), *The Labour Government's Economic Record: 1964-1970*, London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1972, p.152. Seers' and Streeten's paper provides a useful overview and critique of the Labour government's development policy, 1964-70.

2 See Streeten, "Dudley Seers (1920-83): A Personal Appreciation", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 20, No. 3, July 1989, p.26. Very shortly after his own appointment as Director General of the EPS, Seers had invited Paul Streeten, then a fellow at Balliol College, Oxford, to be his deputy. He had known Streeten during his time at the Institute of Statistics in Oxford.

3 Barbara Castle, *The Castle Diaries 1964-70*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1984, pp. ix and xii.

4 The three other new ministries to which the Labour manifesto had committed itself to were ministries for economic planning, technology, and Wales.

5 Seers, "Conception, Birth and the Early Years: a Personal Interpretation", in *1966-76 Ten Year Review and Annual Report 1976*, IDS, p.18.

6 Seers and Streeten, "Overseas Development Policies", p.118. Ben Pimlott has observed that *War on World Poverty* was an argument for an International Development Authority (responsible to a proposed popularly elected World Assembly) with funds staff and power, with the objective of raising support for underdeveloped areas by 2 per cent per head each year, requiring a contribution by advanced countries of 3 per cent of their national income. "Nothing much came of these proposals, which their author played down in later years," remarks Pimlott (Ben Pimlott, *Harold Wilson*, London: Harper Collins, 1992, p.182).

7 See Seers and Streeten, "Overseas Development Policies", p.120.

8 See D. J. Morgan, *The Official History of Colonial Development Vol. 4: Changes in British Aid Policy 1951-1970*, London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp.18-19.

9 House of Commons debate, Vol.688, col.1382, speech by Harold Wilson, quoted in Morgan, *Official History of Colonial Development, Vol.4*, p.20.

10 Seers and Streeten quote Mrs Castle who pointed out there were seven different departments with some responsibility for aid: the Treasury, the Board of Trade, the Colonial Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office, the Central Africa Office, the Foreign Office and the Department of Technical Co-operation, as well as other departments which oversaw special relationships with special agencies such as the Ministry of Education with UNESCO and the Ministry of Agriculture with the FAO. (See Seers and Streeten, "Overseas Development Policies", pp.121-2.)

11 Ibid., p.122.

12 D. J. Morgan outlines the reaction of the three overseas departments to Labour's proposals, observing that "The Foreign Office did not foresee difficulties on the scale feared by the CRO, largely because only a few foreign countries received substantial amounts of British aid and the Foreign Office was, therefore, only beginning to embark on aid as a major subject. Also, virtually all Foreign Office aid took the form of Section 3 loans which were administered by ECGD [Export Credits Guarantee Department]" (*The Official History of Colonial Development, Vol. 4* pp.15-16).

13 Castle, *Diaries 1964-70*, pp. xiii and xvi.

14 Ibid., 16 June, p.40.

15 See Seers and Streeten, "Overseas Development Policies", p.122.

16 Castle, *Diaries 1964-70*, p.xvi. The large frame of the Permanent Secretary, particularly compared to the slight figure of the minister resulted in their partnership being nicknamed "the Elephant and Castle".

17 W.A.C. Mathieson, letter to M. Lipscomb, 23 January 1991. Mr Mathieson was transferred from the Department of Technical Cooperation to become Under-Secretary at the ODM 1964-8 and Deputy Secretary 1968-74.

18 Seers and Streeten, "Overseas Development Policies", p.123.

19 Among those recruited were Miss Peter Ady (a previous colleague of Seers at Oxford and on the Burma mission) now put in charge of the EPS commodities division, Bob Porter, John Wilmshurst, Robert Cassen, Michael Sharpston, Penelope Newsom and John Healey (P. Streeten, letter to M. Lipscomb, 17 May 1991).

20 Seers, unpublished "Preface", p.9.

21 As D.J. Kirkness, then head of the Finance Department in the Colonial Office, explains "We saw the need for the ODM to pull together the aid programme & make some sense of UK aid to independent countries. But we were concerned to limit the ODM's role in relation to the territories we administered, & as they wished to have as big a role there as they had in relation to independent countries this led to much friction and bad feeling. Our main motive was that we regarded financial & development aid as an integral part of general policy towards the Colonial territories, & we opposed the division of responsibilities." (D. Kirkness, letter to M. Lipscomb, 21 February 1991)

22 See Morgan, *Official History of Colonial Development, Vol.4*, pp.21ff.

23 These observations are based on personal reminiscences of various officials at the ODM and Colonial Office in the mid-1960s particularly Douglas Williams (who was Assistant Secretary in the Colonial Office from 1961 and transferred to the ODM in 1967, becoming under Secretary in 1967 until 1973), D.J. Kirkness (see n.21 above) and W.A.C. Mathieson (see n.17 above). I must emphasise, however, that these views are not necessarily those held by the individuals themselves but are observations on the general climate of opinion at the time.

24 Maurice Smith, pers.comm. 26 February 1991. M. Smith joined the ODM from the DTC and was initially head of the department responsible for officers overseas; in 1968 he was appointed Under Secretary and Principal Finance Officer at the ODM.

25 Kirkness to Lipscomb, 21 February 1991.

26 Mathieson to Lipscomb, 23 January 1991.

27 Streeten to Lipscomb, 17 May 1991. Streeten in fact comments that "One candidate we wanted, who achieved later great distinction in the civil service, was barred on grounds of communist sympathies".

28 Streeten, "Dudley Seers (1920-83): A Personal Appreciation", p.27 col.1.

29 Mathieson to Lipscomb, 23 January 1991.

30 See I. M. D. Little and J. M. Clifford, *International Aid*, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1965, p.324; also see Seers and Streeten, "Overseas Development Policies", p.123. Seers and Streeten agreed more expertise was needed in British embassies and high commissions overseas but considered the first task was to create a nucleus in London big enough to affect policy.

31 See Streeten, "Dudley Seers (1920-83): A Personal Appreciation", p.27 col.2.
Streeten further comments "Rex Browning, then a Principal (eventually Deputy Secretary) on the administrative side, was a great help in advising us how to overcome red tape and civil service obstructions. In the early days, when the administrators wanted to trim our power, we were classified as 'economic advisers to the administrators.' In order to establish that we, the economists, were not just advisers but fully operational, like the administrative civil servants, we established Rex as the 'administrative adviser to the economists.'" (Streeten to Lipscomb, 17 May 1991)

32 Streeten, "Dudley Seers (1920-83): A Personal Appreciation", p.27 col.2.

33 Recalls W.A.C. Mathieson, "I remember that Barbara decreed that all draft replies to Parliamentary Questions involving any economic issue (a matter itself of contentious judgment) must reach her through the EPS. The first one I channelled through Dudley seemed to be stuck, so I telephoned. He said that it would take a week to review the problem and form a considered opinion. I said that the Minister had to give an oral reply in the House the next day. The rhythm of action seemed foreign to them." (Mathieson to Lipscomb, 23 January 1991)

34 Castle, *Diaries, 1964-70*, December 1965, p.75.

35 Streeten, "Dudley Seers (1920-83): A Personal Appreciation", p.28, col.1.

36 Castle, *Diaries, 1964-70*, 12 February 1965, pp. 12-13.

37 Sir Richard King, in Streeten, "Dudley Seers (1920-83): A Personal Appreciation"; and pers. comm. 8 February 1991. Sir Richard King was Under Secretary at the ODM 1964-8, Deputy Secretary 1964-8, and Permanent Secretary 1973-6. Douglas Williams also acknowledged the EPS made a valuable contribution to the work of the ministry.

38 Mathieson to Lipscomb, 23 January 1991.

39 Richard Crossman, *The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister: Vol.I Minister of Housing 1964-66*, London: Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, 1975, p.614.

40 Seers and Streeten, "Overseas Development Policies", p. 124. ODM, *Overseas Development: The Work of the New Ministry*, Cmnd. 2736, London: HMSO, August 1965.

41 R. S. Porter, letter to M. Lipscomb, 23 April 1991. R. S. Porter became Deputy Director-General of Economic Planning at the ODM in 1967 and Director-General of the same department in 1969.

42 Streeten to Lipscomb, 17 May 1991.
43 Seers, "Conception, Birth and the Early Years: a Personal Interpretation", p.25; Marris (pers. comm.)
44 Seers and Streeten, "Overseas Development Policies", p.124.
45 ODM, *Overseas Development*, Cmnd. 2736, p.6, pars.1-2.
46 Ibid., par.2.
47 Ibid., p.7, par.7.
48 Streeten recalls that when he wrote "we do not give aid in order to win friends" it was Cohen who would add "but we are glad to give it to our friends" (Streeten to Lipscomb, 17 May 1991). Barbara Castle too recalls a row with Andrew Cohen as officials agreed to more watering down of the White Paper and her insistence on some cuts being restored (Castle, *Diaries, 1964-70*, 26 July 1965, p.50).
49 Seers and Streeten, "Overseas Development Policies", p.124.
50 Ibid.
51 Porter remarks that although there might have been argument over the details, the general philosophy of the paper was that of Seers and his colleagues, and also reflected that of Mrs Castle and Andrew Cohen (Porter to Lipscomb, 23 April, 1991).
52 ODM, *Overseas Development*, Cmnd. 2736, "Preface", p.5.
53 Ibid., p.7, par.8.
54 Streeten to Lipscomb, 17 May 1991.
55 Figures and statistics demonstrated that by 1960 the average income in poor countries was less than £50 per head, whereas in developed countries it was slightly over £500 per head and the rate of disparity continued to grow (ibid., p.9, pars 11-12).
56 See ibid., pp.20-1, par.45 and p.18, par. 37. As was mentioned in Chapter 3 (p.115) debt was regarded as mainly a problem affecting Latin America and not Africa in the early to mid-1960s.
57 ODM, *Overseas Development*, Cmnd. 2736, p.10, par.16.
58 Ibid., p.13, par.21.
59 Ibid., p.32, par.88.
60 Ibid., pp.32-3 pars 89-91.
61 Ibid., p.35, par.98.
62 Ibid., p.39, par.112.
63 Until the introduction of the Corporation Tax, British companies were able to offset foreign taxes fully against British income tax and profits tax liabilities.
64 ODM, *Overseas Development*, Cmnd. 2736, pp.37-8, pars 101-8. "Private investment can help (and is increasingly helping) to remove the fears of some newly-independent countries that their economies may become dominated by foreign capital or that foreign private enterprise may pay insufficient attention to wider social and political considerations. Such fears can be removed by training local staff to take an increasing share in management, and by encouraging the participation of local capital. New forms of joint enterprise, involving co-operation between British private firms and local entrepreneurs or development corporations may help remove suspicion and to increase co-operation" (par.105).
65 See ibid., pp.40-4, pars 115-29.
66 Ibid., p.48, par 143, ff.
67 Seers and Streeten, "Overseas Development Policies", p.124-5.
68 Ibid., p.6, par.2; p.7, par.8; p.6, par.3.
69 Castle, *Diaries 1964-70*, p.55 n.1.
70 Crossman, *The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister: Vol.I*, 17 July 1965, p.274-5.
71 Seers, "Conception, Birth and Early Years", in *IDS 1966-76 Ten Year Review and Annual Report*, IDS, January, 1977, p.19.
72 Seers and Streeten, "Overseas Development Policies", p.127, n.5. This interpretation of the timing of the two White Papers is borne out by Barbara Castle and Richard Crossman; Castle maintains it was her "bright idea that we must produce the WP at the same time as the Immigration WP in order to take the bad taste of the latter out of our people's mouths)" (*Diaries, 1964-70*, 20 July 1965, p.50); while Crossman recalls he "helped make sure her White Paper appears at the same time (as the immigration paper). It was obviously sensible to publish them together as a defensive operation in order to prevent the Tories winning too many votes on the race issue" (*Diaries of a Cabinet Minister: Vol. I, 1964-66*, 27 July, p.292).

73 The White Paper on *Immigration from the Commonwealth* (Cmnd 2739), (London: HMSO, 1965) announced a cut back of entry permits for category A (those with a specific job to come to) and category B (those with special qualifications such as nurses, teachers, doctors) from 20,800 to 8,500 per annum while entry for unskilled labour was abolished.

74 Seers, "Conception, Birth and Early Years", p.19.

75 Seers and Streeten, "Overseas Development Policies", p.124.

76 Castle, *Diaries, 1964-70*, 3 August 1965, p.54.

77 Seers and Streeten, "Overseas Development Policies", p.126-7 (quoting *The National Plan*, Cmnd. 2746, 1965, p.71, par.16).

78 Ibid., p.127.

79 ODM, *Overseas Development*, p.27, par.71.

80 Seers and Streeten, "Overseas Development Policies", p.149.

81 See Morgan, *Official History of Colonial Development, Vol.4*, pp.13-20.

82 Responsibilities of the Ministry listed in the memorandum are as follows:
"(a) The Aid Programme as a whole, and its make-up as between bilateral and multilateral aid and technical assistance.
(b) Terms and conditions of capital aid and the principles on which technical assistance is granted.
(c) The size and nature of the aid programme for each country.
(d) The management of capital aid and technical assistance.
(e) Relations with international aid organisations.
(f) The United Kingdom interest in United Nations programme of technical assistance.
(g) Liaison with voluntary bodies operating in the same fields."
(Minister of Overseas Development: Personal Minute No. PM(64)1, 21 October 1964, to the Prime Minister, quoted in Morgan, *Official History of Colonial Development, Vol.4*, p.21.)
This was practically repeated word for word in the 1965 White Paper, see ODM, *Overseas Development*, Cmnd. 2736, p.27, par.71.

83 ODM, *Overseas Development*, Cmnd. 2736, p.22, par.56.

84 See p.147 and Morgan, *Official History of Colonial Development, Vol.4*, pp.25-8.

85 ODM, *Overseas Development*, Cmnd. 2736, p.27, par.71.

86 See Seers and Streeten, "Overseas Development Policies", pp.149-50.

87 Ibid., p.131.

88 Ibid., p.149.

89 Ibid., pp.143-4.

90 Mathieson to Lipscomb, 23 January 1991.
Sir Andrew Cohen's successor as Permanent Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Wilson, also later spelled this out though couched in more diplomatic terms: "The Ministry of Overseas Development, in spite of its title, has always been basically concerned with capital aid, technical assistance and training. It is, of course, also interested in trade and finance and all aspects of economic relations between rich countries and poor, but it has no responsibility in those areas which are dealt with by other departments in Whitehall" (Sir Geoffrey Wilson, "IDS: The First Ten Years", in *IDS 10 Year Review*, p.31).

91 Observed Mr Mathieson: "This [i.e. the fact that ODM was basically an aid ministry with no responsibility for broader development issues] when it sank in, disillusioned some of the economist recruits, who could not find a satisfying role. They were keen to analyse the objectives of projects and do complicated cost-benefit computations. But these were largely theoretical, since they largely ignored the mechanics of managing development; effective management over time determines success or failure, and this is vulnerable to unquantifiable and unpredictable external factors. The economists were questing for certainty; the beaucrats [*sic.*] were hoping for luck" (Mathieson to Lipscomb, 23 January 1991). The remark that the EPS was "obsessed with the macro-economic framework" comes from the same source. Mr Williams also observed that most officials from the Colonial Office were mainly interested in micro-economic project work and did not understand the concern for macro-economic schemes (pers.comm.) Mathieson makes a clear distinction between the practical management of development undertaken by officials and what was obviously regarded as rather irrelevant theoretical planning undertaken by the EPS, observing, "Let them [i.e.the EPS] get on with planning, a harmless activity, while we managed the shop".

92 See Little and Clifford, *International Aid*, p.323.

93 See Morgan, *Official History of Colonial Development, Vol.4*, pp. 28-9 and Little and Clifford, *International Aid*, pp.322.

94 Crossman, *Diaries of a Cabinet Minister: Vol. I*, p.246. His main objection to the new ministries was that he believed the Labour government would have been able to achieve far more if the effort put into the ministries had been devoted to changing key personnel in the Civil Service.

The Plowden Report (Cmnd 2276) had in fact recommended in February 1964 the merger of the Commonwealth Relations Office and Colonial Office, and this was accomplished in 1966 when both were merged in the Commonwealth Affairs Office, followed in turn in 1968 by amalgamation into the Foreign Office to form the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

95 Seers and Streeten, "Overseas Development Policies", p.150.

96 Seers, "Dudley Seers Replies" (open letter to Judith Hart), *Third World*, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 1973, p.13.

97 Crossman remarked on 14 November 1965 on the affect Barbara Castle's comments on Rhodesia had on Wilson's conscience and that although her influence had not prevailed that she "got under his skin in a quite extraordinary way"; on her removal to the Ministry of Transport he observed on 22 December that year: "I am sure Barbara has paid the price for her pertinacity in taking the black African point of view and in being the one member of the Cabinet prepared to prevent a settlement in Rhodesia. She was moved because he [Wilson] didn't want her formidable, old-fashioned, left-wing conscience there preventing him finding some kind of settlement with the Smith regime" (Crossman, *Diaries of a Cabinet Minister: Vol. I*, pp.378 and 419).

98 Castle, *Diaries 1964-70*, 7 and 22 December, p.80-1. When suggesting to Barbara Castle that Tony Greenwood should be her successor, Harold Wilson remarked "You've set the pattern for him to follow and he's got Dudley Seers" (p.80); and Barbara Castle herself recalls "I pleaded with Dudley Seers and Robin Marris: 'You must stay. The Economic Planning Section is my great creation'."

99 Seers and Streeten, "Overseas Development Policies", p.128.

100 Ibid. p.129.

101 See Castle, *Diaries, 1964-70*, 20 April 1965, p.30; 4 July 1965, p.45; 20 July 1965, p.49; 29 July 1965, p.53. She records opposition from George Brown (Department of Economic Affairs), James Callaghan (Chancellor of the Exchequer), Frank Cousins (Technology) and Anthony Crosland (Education), the last of whom made the comment about the wasting of aid.

She records support for aid from Anthony Greenwood (Colonial Office) Arthur Bottomley (Commonwealth Relations Office), and Frank Longford (Lord Privy Seal).

102 Seers, "Dudley Seers Replies", p.13. Challenged by Judith Hart to say whether he had told ministers while he was at ODM that aid was not a serious foreign exchange burden, Seers recalled Robin Marris originated research in this area which was not then published because of the Treasury's objection but was later completed by Bryan Hopkin, and published in 1970. See also Seers and Streeten ("Overseas Development Policies", pp.129-30) who also draw attention to similar research by the EPS - showing policies beneficial to development could also be beneficial for the British balance of payments - to which the Treasury and Department of Economic Affairs objected.

103 Seers and Streeten, "Overseas Development Policies", p.148. See also Seers, "Open Letter to Harold Wilson", *Third World*, Vol. 1, No.3, November 1972, p.11.

104 The positive attitude towards private overseas investment adopted by the ODM in the White Paper met with something of a contradiction from the Labour government when a Corporation Tax was introduced which removed the favoured treatment of overseas investment, in an endeavour to retain more capital in Britain. Together with other exchange controls on private foreign companies the result was that private foreign investment declined. Although recognising the tax might make good economic sense as far as Britain was concerned the ODM argued that special provisions should be made for private investment in "developing" countries. (See, Seers and Streeten, "Overseas development policies", pp.146-7.)

105 Ibid. pp.138 and 144. See also Seers, "Open Letter to Harold Wilson".

106 Seers, "Open Letter to Harold Wilson", p.11.

107 Seers and Streeten, "Overseas development policies", pp.150 and 152.

108 Ibid., see also p.120.

109 Seers, "Modernizing the Machinery", in *Matters of Principle: Labour's Last Chance*, pp. 119-20 and 128.

110 *The Times*, 16 June 1970. Letter also signed by John Boulting, Campbell of Eskan, the Bishop of Cirencester, Arthur Gaitskell, Bishop Charles Grant, Duncan Oppenheim, Leslie Rowan, Michael H. Rowntree, Ritchie-Calder, Bishop Kenneth Sainsbury, Richard Titmuss and Donald Tyerman. They argued that British politicians should be more actively involved in world development issues for both moral and pragmatic reasons; not only was global inequality, poverty hunger, lack of medical care, absence of work, etc. an offence against humanity and a moral issue, but also Britain's own economic future was closely bound up with the success or failure of the international development effort: "As one of the world's leading trading nations we must be concerned about the future purchasing power of three-quarters of our potential customers.

111 Seers, "Open Letter to Harold Wilson", p.11.

112 Seers, unpublished "Preface", pp.9 and 10.

113 Ibid. p.9.

114 Quoted in Seers, "The Structure of Power" in Hugh Thomas (ed.), *Crisis in the Civil Service*, London: Anthony Blond, 1968.

115 James Cronin has drawn attention to Thomas Balogh's "The Apotheosis of the Dilettante", in Hugh Thomas (ed.), *The Establishment* (London: Anthony Blond, 1959) and remarked that this 1959 volume "marked the emergence of a new genre of political writing that located the source of Britain's economic and political decline in its archaic ruling class and the institutions through which they governed" and was a critique which inspired a series of efforts to undertake structural reform, especially in the mid-1960s, one example of which was the volume to which Seers contributed - *Crisis in the Civil Service* (a sequel to Hugh Thomas's earlier volume). (See James Cronin, *The Politics of State Expansion*, London and New York: Routledge, 1991, pp.228-9.)

116 Tyrrell Burgess, "Introduction", in *Matters of Principle: Labour's Last Chance*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968, p.10. Other contributors to the volume as well as Seers were Peter Calvocoressi, John Grieve Smith, Michael Lipton, John Rex, and John White.

117 One reason Seers was opposed to Britain's entry to the Common Market, according to Streeten, was that it would make "it more difficult to carry out Labour policies"; in addition he thought it would be deflationary,and would cause unemployment (Streeten to Lipscomb, 17 May 1991).

Seers also observed elsewhere that "One reason for opposing British entry into the European Economic Community is that it reduces the possibility of influencing United States' policy" - though this seems to accept the fact that there was a special relationship between Britain and the US of which he was critical elsewhere (see p.162). He was usually more concerned about US influence on the UK rather than the other way around.

As already mentioned he was also critical of the fact that the consequences of entry on Commonwealth countries had not been adequately considered (see above p.158).

118 See Seers, "The Structure of Power", pp.83-6.

119 Ibid., p.84.

120 Ibid., p.93. Seers makes it clear that he is not using the word "conservative" in a party political sense but in a broader context.

121 Seers, "Modernizing the Machinery", p.117.

122 Seers, "The Structure of Power", p.93.

123 Ibid., p.85.

124 Ibid., pp.100-1 and p.104 and "Modernizing the Machinery", pp.118-19. Illustrating the lack of professional expertise displayed by some Foreign Office officials Seers remarked: "Files, particularly those marked to economists, are full of phrases such as 'take-off' or 'self sustaining growth', as if Walt Rostow's work had never been the object of devastating professional criticism. A dispatch from a notoriously unsophisticated ambassador actually contained an attack on 'econometrics', which he clearly was unable even to define"("The Structure of Power", p.95).

125 Ibid. p. 102.

126 Ibid.

127 Seers and Streeten, "Overseas Development Policies", p.120.

128 Ibid., p.121.

129 Crossman, *Diaries of a Cabinet Minister: Vol. I*, 13 June 1965, p.246.

130 Seers, "Modernizing the Machinery", p.118.

131 Seers, "Open letter to Harold Wilson",

132 Seers, "Can Labour Control the Foreign and Commonwealth Office?", *Third World*, January/February 1975.
133 Seers, "The Structure of Power", p.87.
134 Ibid., p.103 and Seers, "Modernizing the Machinery", pp.121-5.
135 Seers, "The Structure of Power", p.104. The need for professional expertise, especially economists was "particularly great in the Foreign Office, as it is in overseas posts", remarked Seers.
136 Seers, "Modernizing the Machinery", pp.117-18.
137 Seers, "The Structure of Power", p.108. Its accounting functions he suggested could be looked after by a budget bureau, establishment matters by a secretariat attached to Civil Service Commission and the rump of the Treasury could be merged with the Department of Economic Affairs and made into a Ministry of Development and Finance with the specific responsibility of promoting development as its highest priority.
138 Ibid., pp.105 and 109; see also Seers "Open Letter to Harold Wilson", "Dudley Seers Replies", and "Can Labour Control the Foreign and Commonwealth Office?"
139 Seers, "Modernizing the Machinery", p.121. See also Seers, "The Structure of Power", pp.106-7.
140 Seers, "The Structure of Power", p.103.
141 Seers, "Modernizing the Machinery", p.128.
142 The Duncan Committee recommended the division of the world into two - an "Area of Concentration" where British diplomatic representation was to continue strengthened (in Europe and North America, together with Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Africa) and an "Outer Area" (effectively Africa, Asia, and Latin America) where representation was to be reduced and commercial activity left to private entrepreneurs (*The Report of the Review Committee on Overseas Representation 1968-69*, Cmnd, 4107, HMSO, 1969). See also the special issue of the *IDS Bulletin* on the Duncan Report, (Vol. 2, No. 1, October 1969) which contains a number of critical comments on the report by Seers and his colleagues. As one of them remarked, "This again displayed an emphasis on British interests alone, against the best elements of international concern for the growing inequalities and violence in the world" (Guy Hunter, p.17).
143 Seers and Streeten, "Overseas Development Policy", p.134.
144 Seers, "Modernizing the Machinery", pp.125-8.
145 Seers, "The Prevalence of Pseudo-planning", in D. Seers and M. Faber, *The Crisis of Planning*, London: Chatto & Windus, 1972, pp.19-34.
146 Seers, unpublished "Preface", p.10.
147 Streeten to Lipscomb, 17 May 1991.
148 A report of the proceedings can be found in *Effective Aid*, Report of an international conference held jointly by the Ditchley Foundation and the Overseas Development Institute, 3-6 June 1966, Overseas Development Institute Ltd, 1967. Very few of the papers and none of the discussion are attributed to named individuals, so it is not possible to identify Seers' personal contributions to this meeting from the report of the proceedings.
149 Seers, unpublished "Preface", p.10.
150 Seers, "Aid: Positive and Negative", *Cambridge Opinion*, issue on Development Opinion, p.19, n.d. but from the context probably end of 1967 or early 1968.
151 The IDS paper had recommended "at least one full-time aid administrator, with overall responsibility for aid policy, should be appointed to each of the posts where the aid programme was over £1 million a year, with more for larger programmes, and that as an absolute minimum there should be one official per thousand British technical assistance personnel working in a country." It was suggested the extra staff required could be provided by reducing the number working in London, since while only 120 personnel of executive officer rank were working overseas, 700 of the same grade were based at the ODM in London. See Seers, "The Duncan Committee's Views on Aid Administration", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 2, No. 1, October 1969.
152 Seers, "Aid: Positive and Negative", p.19.
153 Seers, "Note for the House of Commons Select Committee on Aid and the Allocation of Aid", January 1970.
154 Ibid.
155 Seers, "Aid Positive and Negative", p.19.
156 Ibid., p.20. Examples of "performance criteria" he particularly mentions here are demands for a

devaluation of the exchange rate and cuts in government expenditure. He considered such criteria reflected the interests of the donor rather than recipient.

157 Ibid. Seers maintained that unlike performance criteria, his suggested tests reflected the interests of the recipient rather than the donor - but even so they obviously still involved some value judgements on the part of the donor.

158 Seers, unpublished "Preface", p.10.

159 Seers, "Aid: Positive and Negative", p.24.

160 Ibid., p.19.

161 Ibid., p.24.

162 Department of Technical Co-operation, *Report of the Committee on Training in Public Administration for Overseas Countries*, HMSO, 1963, p.10, par.23.

163 Ibid., p.27, par.88.

164 Department of Technical Co-operation, *Policy on Recommendations of the Committee on Training in Public Administration for Overseas Countries*, Cmnd 2099, London: HMSO, July 1963, p.3.

165 O. H. Morris (of the DTC), contribution to the "Conference on Problems of Teaching Development Economics", in K. Martin and J. Knapp, *The Teaching of Development Economics*, London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, 1967, p.221.

166 Seers, "Conception, Birth and the Early Years", p.17.

167 Ibid., pp.17-18.

168 As well as being discussed at the Manchester conference, the case for a large interdisciplinary development institute in the UK was discussed by I.M.D. Little in his books *Aid to Africa* (1964) and *International Aid* (written with J. M. Clifford; 1965). He considered such an institute was needed to conduct research, supply research teams to work in underdeveloped countries, provide a home base for government employed experts, and run courses for administrators, operational personnel and researchers in specialised fields from underdeveloped countries, etc.

169 Hans W. Singer, "Prehistory of the IDS - Some Selective Reflections", 1991. Paper written for inclusion in the IDS Annual Report 1991; I am grateful to Hans Singer for providing me with a pre-publication manuscript copy of this paper.

170 Mathieson to Lipscomb, 23 January 1991.

171 Kenneth Wheare, the Vice Chancellor of Oxford, and Lady Ursula Hicks (member of the Maud Council) wrote papers in support of Oxford University, offering Queen Elizabeth House as a site. John Fulton, Vice-Chancellor of Sussex, together with Professor Low and Professor Supple supplied papers in support of Sussex. See Seers, "Conception, Birth and the Early Years", p.18 and Singer, "Prehistory of the IDS", pp.4-5.

172 Seers, "Conception, Birth and the Early Years", pp.18-19.

173 Streeten, "Dudley Seers (1920-83)", p.28.

174 This point is made by both Seers and Streeten. See Seers, "Conception Birth and Early Years", p.19 and Streeten, "Dudley Seers (1920-83)", p.28.

175 Mathieson to Lipscomb, 23 January 1991.

176 Seers, "Conception, Birth and the Early Years", p.18.

177 Kirkness to Lipscomb, 21 February 1991.

178 Seers, "Conception, Birth and the Early Years", p.18.

179 ODM, *The Work of the New Ministry*, Cmnd.2736, p.48, par.144.

180 Ibid., p.49, par.145

181 The Committee included Thomas Balogh, William Clark, Lord Fulton, Guy Hunter, Arthur Livingstone, Tony Low, C.H. Phillips, with, O.H. Morris, now at the ODM, as secretary.

182 Seers, "Conception, Birth and the Early Years", p.20.

183 Seers, *Second Annual Report* 1967-1968, pp.3 and 4.

184 Seers, "Conception, Birth and the Early Years", pp. 18 and 21-2.
The Institute was to be financed primarily from a government grant in aid, fixed for a five year period up to and including 1971/2 and paid through the Ministry of Overseas Development - the ODM grant for the year ending 31 March 1967 being £46,957 and £79,949 for the following year. IDS was expected to derive a proportion of its revenue from tuition fees (mostly funded by ODM technical assistance grants) with additional funding from other sources. In 1966/67, the Rockefeller Foundation provided funds for a visiting fellowship, while the Ford Foundation assisted in bringing some of the

overseas participants to the Founding Conference. The following year, with the establishment of the Institute and the commencement of research work, additional funding was made available for fellowships and specific areas of research, with, for example, the Shell International Petroleum Company and the Ford Foundation each funding a research fellowship in Economics and UNCTAD providing a large sum for a lengthy study on private overseas investment. (See IDS, *First Annual Report 1966-1967*, pp.13 & 20 and IDS, *Second Annual Report 1967-1968*, p.15)

185 Streeten has commented that Seers was instrumental in shifting the emphasis of IDS's role as a training institute "to include research, with a strong emphasis on economics" - (though Seers himself was always anxious to highlight the multidisciplinary nature of the institute, maintaining that development was not just a problem for economists but for sociologists, political scientists and other disciplines as well).

Singer remarks on Seers' putting on record his dislike of the word training at the Formation Conference in 1966 and particularly his dislike of the idea of concentrating on training Third World nationals with its paternalistic and colonial implications; IDS was thus moved towards teaching and sharing experiences and "more emphasis on research, consultancies, and the development of new ideas about development rather than 'training'". (See, Streeten, "Dudley Seers (1920-83): A Personal Appreciation", p.28 and Singer, "Prehistory of the IDS".)

186 Richard Symonds had previously worked at the UNDP Regional Office in Lusaka. Seers mentions that Colin Leys was initially offered but declined the post of Acting Director. Seers. Conception etc. p.20

187 IDS was established as a Company, limited by guarantee and not having a share capital. Its objectives were spelled as: "the advancement of education and learning and in particular to establish, maintain and conduct in any part of the world an institute or institutes (with teaching and research staff) to identify and study problems arising both within the United Kingdom and abroad concerning economic and social development administration". (IDS, *First Annual Report*, IDS, p.7)

188 Seers, "Conception, Birth and the Early Years", p.21.

189 Among the participants were "Dr. Thomas Balogh, Sir Alec Cairncross, Sir Andrew Cohen, Lord Fulton, Professors Kari Levitt, Paul Clark, Ali Mazrui, Gerald Meier and Gunnar Myrdal, Dr. Hans Singer, Dro Osvaldo Sunkel, Mr. Nurul Islam, and Mr. Francois Van Hoek," many of them previous colleagues of Seers. (IDS, *First Annual Report*, p.10 and Seers, "Conception, Birth and the Early Years", p.21.)

190 IDS, *First Annual Report*, IDS p.9.

191 One ODM official remarked that the concept of the IDS "was welcomed by many members of the EPS, including Dudley, as a wonderful refuge from the tedious realities of the ODM. The flood of refugees was spectacular. They no longer had to be involved in getting anything done. Somebody said the new professors were happy to get into their wheel-chairs" - a comment which again indicates the uncongenial relations that existed in the Ministry between some officials and the EPS.

192 Seers, unpublished "Preface", p.10.

193 IDS, *2nd Annual Report*, pp.3 and 45.

194 Ibid., p.3. He did, however, point out that this did not mean the Institute was an aid lobby "conclusions on the need for aid can be drawn from the Institute's work, but the end in view is to create understanding, not political pressures.

195 Ibid., pp.5-6.

196 Ibid., p.33.

197 Oscar Braun, Harold Caustin, Richard Jolly, Leonard Joy, Colin Leys, Michael Lipton, Paul Streeten (all of IDS) and Peter Marris (of the ICS) were the individuals who contributed together with Seers to *Development in a Divided World*, (eds Seers and Joy), Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971

198 See IDS, *2nd Annual Report*, pp.22-3 and IDS, *3rd Annual Report*, p.25-7.

199 See IDS, *2nd Annual Report*, pp.26-7 and IDS, *3rd Annual Report*, pp.30-1.

200 IDS, *2nd Annual Report*, pp.27-9.

Policy conferences held at the request of the ODM covered such topics as training for development, universities and aid in developing countries, and development administration, and following discussions with the Board of Trade a conference was held in May 1968 to evaluate the New Delhi UNCTAD meeting.

During 1967-68 three professional conferences were held; on planning in India, on private overseas investment and on the politics of development.

201 Seers not only presented a paper on "The Prevalence of Pseudo Planning" but also assisted Michael Faber in editing a two-volume report of the proceedings, eventually published in 1972, *The Crisis of Planning* (2 vols), Chatto & Windus for Sussex University Press.

202 Seers, "Report on the ODEPLAN-IDS Roundtable: La Via Chilena", Santiago, 23 March to 1 April, 1972. For a full report on the conference see Ann Zammit, *The Chilean Road to Socialism*, University of Sussex: IDS, 1973. This conference is addressed in more detail in Chapter 5.

203 Details can be found in IDS, *2nd Annual Report*, pp.36-40; also see Appendix of Seers' professional activities during this period.

204 IDS, *2nd Annual Report*, p.36 and IDS, *3rd Annual Report*, p.41.

205 The paper based on this note is Seers, "A Step Towards a Political Economy of Development", in *Social and Economic Studies* (Jamaica), Vol. 18, No. 3, Sept., 1969.

206 Ibid., p.218, note a; a tape recording is held in the IDS Dudley Seers' archives of one of his talks on "Economic Development Plans - Planners, Public Administrators and Politicians", recorded at the Mona Hotel, Jamaica, January 1968.

207 Seers, "A Centre of Development Studies in Guyana", report to the Acting Vice- Chancellor, University of Guyana, May 1969.

208 Seers, Report on a "Visit to Cuba", 15-22 May 1969, 27 May, 1969.

209 See, Seers, "The Lessons for Africa of Latin American Industrialisation Policies", paper presented to IDEP conference, Dakar, September, 1972.

210 The Society for International Development is an international, non-profit, educational and scientific organisation founded in October 1957 and incorporated in the District of Columbia, USA. Its patrons, sponsors and the majority of its institutional members (in 1967/8 at least) were international and national banks and finance institutions.

211 Seers, "The Meaning of Development", *International Development Review*, Vol. 11, No. 4, December 1969. See chapter 5 for further discussion of this paper.

212 Seers, "The Bank's Country Reports" report to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1 August 1967.

213 *Minimum Wage Fixing and Related Problems with Special Reference to Developing Countries*, (MEMW/1967/D.1) Geneva, ILO, 1967.

214 The three ILO WEP reports were: *Towards Full Employment: A Programme for Colombia*, Geneva, ILO, 1970; *Matching Employment Opportunities and Expectations: A Programme of Action for Ceylon*, 2 vols, Geneva: ILO, 1971; *Employment Incomes and Equality. A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya*, Geneva: ILO, 1972. The missions will be discussed further in chapter 5.

215 Seers, "The Brain Drain from Poor Countries", *IDS Communication Series*, No. 31, p.5.

216 Seers, IDS *5th Annual Report* 1970-71, p.2.

217 See Seers, "Conception, Birth and the Early Years", pp.25-6.

218 Seers, "Conception, Birth and the Early Years", p.23.

219 The Governing Body was composed of the Institute's Director, the Vice Chancellor of the University of Sussex, 12 members appointed directly by the Minister of Overseas Development with a further 3 appointed by the Minister after consulting with the Governing Body, 3 were appointed by the Senate of the University of Sussex, and 2 by IDS's Board of Studies (IDS 3rd Annual Report 1968-9, Appendix 2, p.67).

The Board of Studies was composed of the Institute's Director and Librarian, 4 members from the Governing Body (2 appointed by ODM and 2 appointed by the Senate of the University), 6 members elected by Fellows of the Institute, 2 members elected from among the Associates, and other co-opted members (IDS 3rd Annual Report, Appendix 4, p.71).

While Seers does not comment on the ODM's nominations for the Governing body, it is clear there was official concern about its membership for in later years he recalled that when he was involved in setting up the IDS an Under-Secretary of Trade had come to his office specifically to warn him "against giving the 'wrong impression' by inviting Prebisch to join the Institute's Governing Body." Seers continued, "the reason he put forward, Prebisch's radicalism - convinced me that his presence was essential". (Seers, *Political Economy of Nationalism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983, p.52)

220 Seers, IDS, *3rd Annual Report 1968-1969*, Appendix 1, p.65.

221 Seers, *IDS 3rd Annual Report*, Appendix 1, p.66.
222 Seers, "Conception, Birth and the Early Years", p.28.
223 Seers, *IDS 3rd Annual Report*, Appendix 1, p.62.
224 Seers, *IDS Second Annual Report 1967-1968*, pp.7 and 27.
225 Sir Geoffrey Wilson, "IDS: The First Ten Years", in *IDS Ten Year Review*, p.31; at the same time he does admit research was wide-ranging, much of it high quality. In conversations, a number of ODM officials commented that IDS became too academic, engaging in research which was not seen as operationally useful.
226 Seers, "Conception, Birth and the Early Years", p.26. In later years though Seers remarked "the Ministry itself came to give priority to aid projects and policies that would relieve poverty".
227 Ibid., pp.22-3. See also see Seers, *IDS 3rd Annual Report*, pp.63-4. Seers was fond of quoting Osvaldo Sunkel's remark that Latin America provided "a 'horrorscope' for the countries of Africa and Asia".
228 Ibid. Other members of the working party were Lord Balogh, Lord Blackett, Sir Edward (later Lord) Boyle, Mrs. Sally Chilver and Professor Anthony Low.
229 "The State Corporation" - prospectus for 15th Study Seminar, 16 August to 26 September 1970, IDS.
230 Seers, letter to R. Dore, T.W. Gee, A. R. Jolly, and P. Selwyn (with copy to the Vice Chancellor), 2 June 1970.
231 Seers, "Conception, Birth and the Early Years", p.23.
232 Seers to Dore *et al.*, 2 June 1970.
233 Porter to Lipscomb, 16 January 1991.
234 Seers to Dore *et al.*, 2 June 1970.
235 Ibid.
236 Ibid.
237 Henry Bernstein, "The Institute, the Ministry and the State Corporation", in Trevor Pateman (ed.), *Counter Course*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972, p.31.
238 Seers to Dore *et al.*, 2 June 1970
239 Bernstein, "The Institute, the Ministry and the State Corporation", p.31.
240 Philip Hayes, pers. comm. (Philip Hayes was Deputy Director General of Economic Planning at ODM 1969-71 and was one of the ODM officials who had close contact with IDS during this period, making periodic visits to the Institute.)
241 Letter to the Director, Dudley Seers, 29 April 1970, signed by 12 members of staff (Zoe Allen, Brian Van Arkadie, Henry Bernstein, Paul Collins, Philip J. O'Brien, Ron Brigish, George Irvin, Raphael Kaplinski, Barry Peters, Liz Thompson, Fiona Wilson, Geoff Wood)
242 Seers, "Conception, Birth and the Early Years", p.24.
243 Seers, letter to the Right Hon. Judith Hart, 1 May 1970 (in confidence).
244 Judith Hart, letter to Dudley Seers, 15 May 1970.
245 Seers to Dore *et al.*, 2 June 1970, op.cit.
246 Seers, "Conception, Birth and the Early Years", p.23-4.
247 Seers, letter to the Editor of *The Times*, 31 May 1970 (unpublished).
248 *Sunday Times*, 14 June 1970.
249 Seers, letter to Sir Geoffrey Wilson, 11 June 1970.
250 Seers, in *IDS 4th Annual Report*, p.5.
251 Seers, "Conception, Birth and the Early Years", p.24; see also Seers in *IDS 4th Annual Report*, p.5.
252 Seers, letter to Professor R.P. Dore, Dr. A.R. Jolly, Mr. P. Selwyn, Mr. T.W. Gee, cc. Vice Chancellor, 11 June 1970.
253 Seers, in *IDS 4th Annual Report*, pp.5 and 47-8.
254 Ibid., p.48.
255 *Weekly Hansard*, no.832, 3-9 July, col.828, 1970, HMSO; quoted in Bernstein (op.cit. p.25) who first made this point. See also *The Times* 27 August 1970.
256 Seers, "Conception, Birth and the Early Years", p.24 and 29.
257 Morgan, *The Official History of Colonial Development*, Vol. 4, p.29. This had been the solution favoured by many Whitehall officials from the beginning, though no unified external affairs ministry then existed. (See also above n.94.) Later in 1974 the next Labour government was to alter its status again detaching ODA from the FCO to form a Ministry of Overseas Development again, though without a Minister of Cabinet rank (see Chapter 6).

258 Seers, "Conception, Birth and the Early Years", p.28.
259 Porter to Lipscomb, 16 January 1991. Mathieson has also commented that although he admired Dudley in his evangelical mode he "distrusted him in any action situation" (letter from W.A.C. Mathieson to M. Lipscomb, 7 April 1993).
260 Seers, "Conception, Birth and the Early Years", p.28.
261 A.G. Hurrell, letter to Dudley Seers, 12 April 1976.
262 Porter to Lipscomb, 16 January 1991.
263 Mathieson to Lipscomb, 23 January 1991.
264 Geoffrey Wilson, "IDS: The First Ten Years", p.31.
265 Seers, IDS *5th Annual Report*, 1970-71, p.3.
266 Geoffrey Wilson, "IDS: The First Ten Years", p.31.
267 Mathieson to Lipscomb, 23 January 1991.
268 Ibid. and Kirkness to Lipscomb, 21 February 1991.
269 Philip Hayes, who used to visit IDS frequently, remarked on the abuse from students, and the fact that some of the activities at IDS were frowned upon as ideologically unsound by some at the ODM.
270 "IDS - centre for reactionary training and research" was the title of an article which appeared in *Sussex Student* vol. 3, no.3, 1969 cited in Bernstein "The Institute, the Ministry and the State Corporation", references, p.37.
271 Mathieson to Lipscomb, 23 January 1991.
272 Seers, "Conception Birth and the Early Years", p.28.
273 Seers, Personal and Confidential letter to Lord Balogh, 9 March 1971.
274 Jolly, "Dudley Seers (1920-1983) "p.34.
275 Seers, "Conception Birth and the Early Years", p.23.
276 Bernstein, "The Institute, the Ministry and the State Corporation", pp.26 and 34-5.
277 Ibid. p.28.
278 Seers, "Conception Birth and the Early Years", p.24.
279 Ibid., p.28.
280 Ibid., pp.24-5.
281 Seers and Emmanual de Kadt, letter to Prof. Edgardo Boeninger, Instituto de Estudios Internacionales, 28 May 1971. "It would be a sad day if the basis of its operation were to be changed, and a variety of independent critical research ceased to be possible," they observed.
282 Philip O'Brien, memo to Seers and de Kadt, 22 June 1971; (also Ann Zammit, memo to Seers and de Kadt, 17 June 1971).
283 Seers, letter to Prof. Boeninger, 8 July 1971.
284 Seers to Dore *et al.*., 11 June 1970.
285 Seers, "Conception, Birth and the Early Years", p.29.

Chapter 5: From Growth to Development

1 Seers maintained that the ratio of the average income of rich and poor countries increased from 12:1 to 15:1 during the first development decade. (Seers, "What are we Trying to Measure", *Journal of Development Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 3, April 1972, p.34.)
2 Seers, "The Other Road: Is Autonomous Development Possible?", *International Development Review*, December 1967, Vol. IX, No. 4, p.2.
3 Seers, "From Colonial Economics to Development Studies", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 1, No. 1, June 1968, p.4.
4 Lester Pearson (chairman), *Partners in Development* - Report of the Commission on International Development, New York: Praeger Publishers Inc., 1969, p.vii.
5 Louis Emmerij, "Has Europe Fallen out of Love with the Rest of the World?", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 20, No. 3, July 1989, p.9.
6 Seers, "The Meaning of Development", *IDS Communication Series*, 44, 1969.
7 See Seers "Preface" (p.7) and "The Total Relationship" (p.347) in Seers and Leonard Joy (eds), *Development in a Divided World*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971.
8 This is in fact a point made about the book *Development in a Divided World*, op.cit. to which several

staff members of IDS contributed, including Seers who also co-edited the volume with Leonard Joy. The point is made that little attention "was given to the world roles of the Soviet Union or China, and none to the internal relationships of the Communist group" (Seers, "Preface", in ibid., p.8). It is generally indicative of the focus of Seers' work and concerns in the late 1960s and very early 1970s, though, as will be seen at the end of this chapter, he did demonstrate an interest in developments in Cuba and Chile. By the mid-1970s, as will be seen in the next chapter, his interest also extended to the countries of Eastern Europe as he developed a broader world view.

9 Seers, "The Transmission of Inequality", in R.K.A. Gardiner, M.J. Anstee and C.L. Patterson (eds), *Africa and the World*, a Haile Selassie I Prize Trust Symposium 1966, Addis Ababa: Oxford University Press, 1970, p.158; see also "Preface" in *Development in a Divided World*, p.9.

10 Seers, "Rich Countries and Poor", p.14, in table 1.1 demonstrating average incomes in different regions.

11 Seers, "Graduate Migration as an Obstacle to Equality", in Paul Streeten (ed.), *Unfashionable Economics: Essays in Honour of Lord Balogh*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1970, p.104

12 Seers, "Rich Countries and Poor", in Seers and Joy (eds), *Development in a Divided World*, p.26.

13 See ibid., p.27.

14 Seers, "The Other Road", p.3.

15 Ibid., p.2.

16 Seers, "The Meaning of Development", p.25.

17 See Seers, "Rich Countries and Poor", p.27.

18 Seers, "The Other Road", p.2.

19 Seers, "Economic Development Plans - Planners, Public Administrators and Politicians", transcript of talk recorded at the Mona Hotel, Jamaica, January 1968. This was a point he later repeated at the IDS conference on planning in 1969, see Seers, "The Prevalence of Pseudo Planning", in M. Faber and Seers (eds), *The Crisis in Planning*, London: Chatto & Windus, 1972.

20 See Seers, "The Prevalence of Pseudo Planning", p.19; Seers "Designing a Planning Strategy", *Development Digest*, Vol. VI, No. 4, October 1968, p.3; Seers transcript of talk, recorded at the Mona Hotel, Jamaica, January 1968.

21 Seers, "From Colonial Economics to Development Studies", p.4.

22 Seers, "From Growth to Development", *Venture*, Vol. 22, No. 10, Nov. 1970, p.19.

23 Seers, "Growth or Development? A Review of the Prebisch Report on Latin America", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 3, No.2, January 1971, p.41.

24 See ibid., p.42. As Seers observed elsewhere "one cannot really say that there had been development for the world as a whole, when the benefits of technical progress have accrued to minorities which were already relatively rich" (Seers, "Rich Countries and Poor", p.13).

25 Seers, "Unemployment as a World Problem", lecture at the University of Bilbao, 4 December 1972; see also Seers, "From Growth to Development".

26 This is a point Seers frequently makes at this time. See particularly Seers, "Rich Countries and Poor", p.32; Seers, "The Lessons for Africa of Latin American Industrialisation Policies", lecture at IDEP, Dakar, September 1972, p.10; and Seers, "Unemployment as a World Problem".

27 Seers, "Meaning of Development", p.1.

28 Ibid., p.24.

29 Ibid., p.26.

30 Seers, unpublished "Preface", p.10.

31 Seers, "The Bank's Country Reports", 1 August 1967, p.6. Despite the criticism in general Seers acknowledged the World Bank country reports usually provided the best available assessments of the position and prospects of the countries concerned.

32 ILO, *Minimum Wage Fixing and Related Problems with Special Reference to Developing Countries*, (MEMW/1967/D.1) ILO, Geneva, 1967, see p.9.
A two volume document resulted from the ILO expert group on minimum wage fixing. The report suggested that "too little is as yet known about the effects of minimum wage-fixing and other decisions relating to wages, particularly in developing countries, to provide a firm basis for policy decisions in many circumstances" (p.1) and it was recognised that only a relatively small proportion of the economically active population in developing countries was in wage earning employment. However the study did provide a forum to consider the many causes of poverty, of which low wages

were as much a symptom as one of the causes, and the related problems of unemployment and underemployment, which were to involve Seers in major studies for the ILO in the near future.

33 Seers, unpublished "Preface", p.11.

34 Seers, "A Step towards a Political Economy of Development" (Illustrated by the case of Trinidad/Tobago), *Social and Economic Studies* (Jamaica) vol.18, no.3, Sept. 1969, pp.219.

35 Ibid., p.218. In the absence of such a general theory Seers maintained "all sorts of strange views flourish, from a belief that a conservative monetary policy is a sufficient condition for development to a trust in wholesale nationalisation. Until we make substantial progress towards it, universities in 'developing' countries will continue to base their social science syllabuses on those of countries which are 'developed'."
He still had little time for what he termed "the many simplistic economic doctrines that pervade the scene - from Rostow's 'stages of growth' to naive theories of imperialism" (Seers, "The Debate on the Teaching of Economics in Africa", *IDS Communications*, No. 60, 1971, p.1).

36 Seers, "A Step towards a Political Economy of Development", pp.218-19.

37 Seers, "The Mechanism of an Open Petroleum Economy", Yale University Economic Growth Center, *Center Paper*, No. 47, 1964, pp.233 and 237.

Seers is attributed with having identified what has become known as the "Dutch disease" in his studies of Venezuela in 1964 and Trinidad 1968 (while Sir Arthur Lewis did the same in Jamaica in 1964). Dutch disease has been dubbed "unemployment caused by success" - where an export industry can afford to pay wages 2 or 3 times higher than other sectors of the economy can pay, causing greater unemployment in other sectors, but with no shortage of foreign exchange and no pressure to devalue. It was in the late 1970s and early 1980s it became known as the Dutch disease and its Europeanisation raised its academic standing. (See, Sir Arthur Lewis "Development Economics in the 1950s", in G.M.M. Meier and D.Seers (eds) *Pioneers in Development*, New York/Washington: Oxford University Press, for the World Bank pp.125-6; and also P. Streeten, "Dudley Seers (1920-83): A Personal Appreciation", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 20, No. 3, July 1989, p.29.

38 Seers, "A Step towards a Political Economy of Development", p.223.

39 See ibid.

40 R. Jolly, "Dudley Seers (1920-1983): His Contributions to Development Perspectives, Policy and Studies", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 20, No. 3, July 1989, p.35, col.1.

41 There are a number of condensed and edited versions of this paper, but the references here, unless otherwise stated, are taken from a full version appearing in *IDS Communication Series*, No. 44 and based directly on Seers' original address. See bibliography of Seers' works for other versions of this paper and also "What are we Trying to Measure", *Journal of Development Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 3, April 1972.

42 Seers, "Meaning of Development", p.2.

43 Ibid. p.9.

44 Ibid. p.11.

45 Seers, "The Role of National Income Estimates in the Statistical Policy of an Underdeveloped Area", *The Review of Economic Studies*, Vol.XX, 1952-3. In fact, as already pointed out, it was part of this *earlier* paper on "The uses of national income estimates", rather than Seers' more recent work, that was reproduced in an American textbook of readings on economics in 1972 to demonstrate some of the problems of using such national income accounts (see "The Uses of National Income Estimates", in Robert W. Crandall and Richard S. Eckaus (eds),*Contemporary Issues in Economics: Selected Readings*, Boston: Little, Brown & Co. Inc., 1972).

46 Seers, "The Meaning of Development", p.2.

47 Ibid. p.3. The fact that the paper on which "The Meaning of Development" was based was first delivered in India, no doubt explains the reference to Gandhi. It was not a reference that was repeated in subsequent versions of the paper.

48 Ibid. pp.4 and 5.

49 Ibid., p.9.

50 Ibid., p. 23.

51 Seers, "What Types of Government should be Refused what Types of Aid", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 4, No. 2/3, June 1972, p.7.

52 Seers, "The Meaning of Development", p.7.

53 Ibid. and p.6
54 Ibid., p.20.
55 See Seers, "The New Meaning of Development", *International Development Review*, Vol. XIX, No. 3, 1977.
56 Seers, "What are we Trying to Measure?", p.26.
57 See Seers, "Meaning of Development", pp.6-7 and Seers, "What are we Trying to Measure", pp.24-5.
58 Seers "From Growth to Development", p.20.
59 Ibid.
60 Seers, "Growth or Development? A Review", p.46.
61 Streeten, "Dudley Seers (1920-83): A Personal Appreciation", p.28.
62 Seers, "Growth or Development? A Review", p.46 n.2.
63 See Seers, "The Meaning of Development", p.16. The Colombia Report in particular emphasised the closely interrelated problems of unemployment, poverty and inequality.
64 Seers, "What are We Trying to Measure", p.33.
65 Seers, "Meaning of Development", pp.17-18.
66 Ibid. p.18.
67 Seers, "A Step towards a Political Economy of Development" (Trinidad), p.239.
68 Seers, "Conception, Birth and Early Years: A Personal Interpretation", in *1966-7 Ten Year Review and Annual Report 1976*, IDS, January 1977, p.26.
69 Diana Hunt *Economic Theories of Development: An Analysis of Competing Paradigms*, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989, p.260; "It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this new definition of development was stimulated in part by the ferment of debate in development economics in the late 1960s and early 1970s, not least at IDS, Sussex itself. This debate in turn was largely stimulated by the neo-Marxist school and other sympathetic radicals, chiefly among the younger, rising generation of students of development and underdevelopment, who were outspoken in their condemnation of what they saw as the inequity of the contemporary patterns of change in the non-socialist Third World."
70 Seers, unpublished "Preface", p.10.
71 L. Pearson *Partners in Development*, Report of the Pearson Committee, Praeger, 1969, p.152. As the title of the report implied, this was seen as a "new partnership based on an informal understanding expressing the reciprocal rights and obligations of donors and recipients" (p.127) and resting "firmly upon the performance of the developing countries themselves and the sustained commitment of the richer countries"(p.14). Stress was laid on the moral obligation of the richer countries to help reduce and remove the global divisions between "the haves and the have-nots, the privileged and the less privileged", by helping the poorer countries to move forward, in their own way, into the industrial and technological age"(pp.7-8).

In fact it advocated an integrated strategy of aid, trade, and investment policies and included recommendations for equitable international trade, technical assistance, population policy, education and research, as well for the volume of aid to be increased and made more effective; but the specific proposals for which it became generally known were for the growth and aid targets adopted for the Second Development Decade.
72 Seers, "From Growth to Development", p.20.
73 IDS, *3rd Annual Report*, p.48.
74 Seers, "Other Ways in which Rich Countries Affect Development" *Journal of World Trade Law*, Vol. 4, No.2, May 1970. (Another version of this paper appears in Seers, "The Total Relationship", in Seers and L. Joy (eds), *Development in a Divided World*, (1971) Chap. 15; all quotations and references here are from the earlier version, unless otherwise stated.)
75 As Seers remarked "Thus Tanzania and Zambia would probably benefit more, *even economically*, from Anglo-American pressure on Portugal to concede independence to Mozambique than from any feasible quantities of financial assistance" (ibid., p.379).
76 Ibid. p.381.
77 Ibid.
78 Seers, "Other Ways in which Rich Countries Affect Development", p.380-1. Particular examples quoted by Seers of excluded policy options for a country receiving aid from the US were "expropriating American companies (the Hickenlooper Amendment) or recognizing the government of

East Germany (the Hallstein Doctrine)" (p.380).

79 Seers, "What Types of Government should be Refused what Types of Aid? Revisited", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 4, no. 4, 1972, p.43.

80 Seers, "The Other Road", p.4.

81 Ibid., and Seers, "Other Ways in which Rich Countries Affect Development", p.380.

82 See Seers, "Other Ways in which Rich Countries Affect Development", pp.381-2. Here was another example where Seers apparently *did* consider the example of industrial countries was of relevance to "developing" countries.

83 He rarely found occasion to champion trade unionism in developing countries, tending rather to regard its activities to push up wages as being counter productive to overall development (see pp.224).

84 Seers, "Note for the House of Commons Select Committee on Aid: The Allocation of Aid", January 1970, p.2.

85 Seers, "What Types of Government should be Refused what Types of Aid?", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 4, No. 2/3, June 1972.

86 Ibid., p.7, and Seers, "What Types of Government should be Refused what Types of Aid? Revisited", p.44.

87 See, Seers, "What Types of Government should be Refused what Types of Aid?", pp.7-8.

88 Ibid., p.7, n.2 (though he did acknowledge parliamentary democracy "may be important as a *means* of change").

89 Ibid., p.11. Seers defined the announcement effect as "the political consequence of the knowledge that a government is being aided by a foreign government" which often reinforced its legitimacy and prestige.

90 "Greeks snubbed over economy", *The Guardian*, 6 May 1970.

91 Seers, "What Types of Government should be Refused what Types of Aid?", p.11.

92 Ibid., pp.14-15.

93 Seers, "What Types of Government should be Refused what Types of Aid?", p.12. An expert could thus find himself in a difficult position, wondering whether to resign from a particular position, though Seers maintained the expert's prime responsibility was to the people of the country not to whoever happened to be in government, or even to the national state (p.12 n.1). An expert could only decide that a government was "bad" "if he was convinced that its fall would lead to an improvement in development prospects - and a stranger to the country would rarely come to such a definite conclusion, unless he were politically bigoted": "perhaps the ethics of technical assistance need more airing", he observed.

94 Seers, "Note for the House of Commons Select Committee on Aid: The Allocation of Aid", p.3.

95 Seers, "What Types of Government should be Refused what Types of Aid? Revisited", p.43.

96 Seers, "Meaning of Development", p. 23.

97 See Seers, "The Prevalence of Pseudo-Planning", and Seers, transcript of a talk, recorded at the Mona Hotel, Jamaica, January 1968.

98 "Discussion of Professor Dudley Seers' Paper", in *The Crisis in Planning*, op.cit. p.36. The conference was also inclined to attribute more of the burden of responsibility for poor planning to the planner if plans failed to reflect political requirements; even though administrators had a great talent for sabotaging results "a major factor that allowed him to brush aside the plan was its non-operational character" (ibid., p.37).

99 See Seers, "The Prevalence of Pseudo-Planning", p.26 *inter alia*.

100 Introduction to Seers, "Designing a Planning Strategy", Commonwealth Planner meeting 24 May to 5 June 1967, p.3.

101 Seers, "The Meaning of Development", p.5.

102 See, ibid., pp.9-16; and "What are We Trying to Measure", pp.26ff.

103 Seers, "Meaning of Development", p.23 and Seers, "What are We Trying to Measure", pp.32-3.

104 See, Seers, "A Step towards a Political Economy of Development", p.245.

105 Seers, "What are We Trying to Measure", p.27.

106 Ibid., p.33.

107 Seers, "A Step Towards a Political Economy of Development", pp.219, 239, 240.

108 Seers, "Rich Countries and Poor", pp.29 and 30.

109 See Seers, "The Teaching of Economics in African Universities", proceedings of a conference held

at the University College, Dar es Salaam, April 1969 and "Reflections on Conferences", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol.1, No.4, May, 1969.

110 See Chapter 2, p.94; see also Seers, "New Light on Structural Unemployment: Lessons of a Mission to Ceylon", *International Labour Review*, Vol.105, No.2, February 1972, footnote p.103.

111 See, Seers, "A Step Towards a Political Economy of Development", pp.228-9.

112 Seers, "Graduate Migration as an Obstacle to Equality", in P. Streeten (ed.), *Unfashionable Economics: Essays in Honour of Lord Balogh*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1970, p.99; see also Seers, "Rich Countries and Poor", pp.31-2.

113 Seers, transcript of a talk recorded at the Mona Hotel, Jamaica, January 1968, p.2.

114 Seers, "A Step Towards a Political Economy of Development", pp.221 and 228; see also Seers, "Graduate Migration as an Obstacle to Equality", p.99; these were themes, he acknowledged, which had also been addressed by his friend Thomas, by then Lord, Balogh, particularly in *The Economics of Poverty*; see also Seers, "Rich Countries and Poor", pp.31-2.

115 Seers, "Graduate Migration", p.99.

116 Seers, "A Step Towards a Political Economy of Development", p.228.

117 See Seers, "What Types of Governments should be Refused What Types of Aid", p.12.

118 Seers, "The Brain Drain from Poor Countries", *IDS Communication* 31, 1969, an address to the Centre of African Studies at the University of Edinburgh in May 1968.

In fact he and Jolly maintained that rather than offsetting the negative effects of the "brain drain" it could be argued that the "'reverse' flow of brains" (of foreign technical assistants and returning nationals) reinforced them, raising local salaries, reinforcing preferences for foreign consumption patterns with a high import content and bringing with them inappropriate techniques. (See Richard Jolly and Seers, "The Brain Drain and the Development Process", *IDS Discussion Paper* 3, June 1971, p.14).

119 Seers, "The Transmission of Inequality", paper delivered at the Haile Selassie I Prize Trust Symposium, Addis Ababa, October 1966, in Robert K. A. Gardiner, M. J. Anstee and C. L. Patterson (eds), *Africa and the World*, Addis Ababa: Oxford University Press, 1970, p.157.

120 Seers and Jolly, "The Brain Drain and the Development Process". Also in G. Ranis (ed.), *The Gap Between Rich and Poor Nations*, London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1972. The paper was prepared for the International Economic Association Conference held at Bled in Yugoslavia, September 1970. Seers also observed that "the general political deterioration in the Third World" weakened "the patriotic incentive for professionally qualified people to serve their own countries." (See Seers, "Graduate Migration", p.103.)

121 Seers, "Graduate Migration", p.103.

122 Britain too, Seers observed, was displaying some of the problems of an "underdeveloped" country in this respect in experiencing the inflationary effects of trying to avoid a brain drain (Seers, "The Brain Drain from Poor Countries", p.5).

123 As far as Commonwealth migration to Britain was concerned there had been no restrictions until the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act had limited entry to those with qualifications or a job (as already noted in relation to the West Indies, see p.100). Although the 1962 Act was attacked by the Labour opposition at the time, the Wilson government when in power in fact reinforced these tendencies with amendments to the act in 1965 and 1968 reducing numbers more sharply by only issuing vouchers to those whose educational qualifications were related to Britain's economic and social needs. (Seers, "New Policies for Commonwealth Migration" in Paul Streeten and Hugh Corbet (eds), *Commonwealth Policy in a Global Context*, 1971; based on a paper "Commonwealth Migration of High-Level Manpower" prepared for a seminar on World Problems Facing Commonwealth Countries at Marlborough House, 27-29 May 1969.)

124 Seers, "The Brain Drain from Poor Countries", p.6.

125 See, Seers,"New Policies for Commonwealth Migration", p.192; and Seers and Streeten, "Overseas Development Policies", p.151.

126 Seers, "Graduate Migration", p.104.

127 Ibid. He rejected the neo-classical remedy of waiting for the market to induce the increased supply of the necessary professional skills as "quite implausible" since they had not even worked in the richer countries.(ibid.)

128 Seers, "A Step Towards a Political Economy of Development", pp.246-7.

129 Seers quoted in "Young nations advised to follow own development paths", *Trinidad Guardian*, 7 February 1972, p.1.
130 Seers, "Growth or Development", p.44.
131 Seers, "A Step Towards a Political Economy of Development", p.250.
132 Ibid., see also Seers, "The Other Road", pp.3 and 4.
133 Seers, "Graduate Migration", p.104.
134 Seers, "The Transmission of Inequality", p.175.
135 Seers, "A Step towards a Political Economy of Development", p.248.
136 Seers, "Visit to Cuba" journey report, 15-22 May 1969.
137 Seers, "A Step towards a Political Economy of Development", p.244.
138 Seers, "The Brain Drain from Poor Countries", p.9, *inter alia.*
139 See Seers, "Graduate Migration", p.104.
140 Seers, "Commonwealth Migration of High-Level Manpower", p.4 and Seers, "Graduate Migration", p.104.
141 Seers, "New Policies for Commonwealth Migration", pp.193-4. Thus Seers made a distinction between the negative results often achieved by a government refusing permission to one of its citizens to emigrate (see p.220), with the more positive results achieved if the refusal to immigrate came from the potential host government.
142 See, Seers, "New Policies for Commonwealth Migration", pp.191-2. "Apart from any reasons of racialism or nationalism, a completely free movement of people would imply a near equalisation of the wages of unskilled labour which would not be permitted by the trade unions of the richer member countries" - he also observed (ibid.).
143 Seers, "New Policies for Commonwealth Migration", p.195; and Seers, "Commonwealth Migration of High-Level Manpower", p.4.
144 Seers, "Graduate Migration", pp.104-5.
145 Seers, "The Lessons for Africa of Latin American Industrialisation Policies", paper prepared for the Conference on Strategies of Development, Dakar, September 1972, IDS Staff paper, pp.9-10.
146 Ibid., p.10 and n.1; the "crucial difference was that today's industrial countries did not confront during their industrialisation phases richer countries setting the standards in production techniques and consumption styles" (ibid.).
147 Seers, "Economic and Industrial Development", lecture to UNIDO Training Workshop in Methods of Industrial Surveys, 3 August 1970, p.4.

Those "mistakes" he highlighted included: "excessive protection; inadequate control over monopoly profits; labour policies which mean the emergence of a high-wage sector (at the cost of very low wages, insecure employment, unemployment, for the rest of the wage-earners); indiscriminately subsidising the importation of foreign capital, relying just on France, or Britain, or the United States, for techniques that automatically come with the available capital, and failing even to be aware of the problem of technique."

The workshop itself was concerned with methods of industrial surveys, which Seers acknowledged could not cure mistakes themselves - though he considered surveys were an important element in providing a comprehensive picture as a basis for industrial strategy and that they should be tailored to meet policy needs.

148 See Seers, "A Step towards a Political Economy of Development", p.223. In the case of Trinidad Seers pointed out outflows in profits were double that of capital income in 1966. "In 1955, factor payments on external account equalled 'capital inflows' (to business and government) at £35m.; by 1966 the factor payments were £100m. and capital inflows £56m."
149 Seers, "The Lessons for Africa", p. 10.
150 Seers, "Economic and Industrial Development", p.2. Excessive protection was one of the primary "mistakes" of the industrialisation process to which Seers drew particular attention, listing it above that of the influence of foreign capital and inadequate control over monopoly profits; see above n.147.
151 Seers, "The Lessons for Africa", p.11; "the industrial structure was inadequate as a proper base for attacks on foreign markets, even those of neighbouring countries. Costs were too high, firms were satisfied with the easy profits to be made at home; foreign subsidiaries had little inclination to compete against the parent firm or its affiliates in neighbouring countries - prospects of following in the footsteps of the industrial countries dwindled" (ibid., pp.11- 12).

152 Seers, "Economic and Industrial Development", p.2.
153 Seers, "The Lessons for Africa", p.13.
154 Seers, "Growth or Development?: A Review of The Prebisch Report on Latin America", p. 44.
155 See, Seers, "New Approaches Suggested by the Colombia Employment Programme", *International Labour Review*, Vol. 102, No. 4, October 1970, p.382.
156 Seers, "Economic and Industrial Development",UNIDO, p.2 .
157 Seers, "The Employment Missions to Colombia", in Ronald Robinson and Peter Johnston (eds), *Prospects for Employment Opportunities in the Nineteen Seventies*, London: HMSO, 1971, p.30; see also "New Approaches Suggested by the Colombia Employment Programme", p.383.
158 See Seers and R. Jolly, "The Brain Drain and the Development Process", p.8.
159 See Seers, "From Growth to Development", p.20 and Seers, "Economic and Industrial Development", pp.3-4.
160 Seers, "Economic and Industrial Development", p.5.
161 Seers, "The Lessons for Africa", pp.17 & 19.
162 Although Latin American economies were "mostly richer and more highly industrialised" than African, where a much larger section of the labour force worked in agriculture, in 1950, Seers maintained, most Latin American countries had also been more agricultural so their earlier patterns were therefore not much different.

He further observed: "there are still many basic structural similarities between Africa and Latin America which are true only to a very limited extent, or not at all, of industrial countries. Both regions are heavily dependent on the exportation of primary products (usually one or two per country) to the North Atlantic area; their economies are fed by big inflows of capital, and drained by heavy outflows of profits and interest on this capital; foreign subsidiaries account for a substantial share of industrial output; techniques of production are imported, especially (but not only) in manufacturing; consumption patterns of the rich are based on foreign models; the increase in the whole population, and in the labour force, is rapid; open unemployment and various forms of underemployment are high; levels of income and welfare are usually much lower than those of the industrial countries, and more heavily concentrated in the hands of a few; economies are generally fragmented geographically, showing big differences between regions, and between town and country, in both income and social services." (ibid.p.7)

163 Speech given by Dudley Seers to the FRED seminar, July 1968, p.2. The context of this seminar appears to apply to the Caribbean islands of the West Indies. The acronym, FRED, is not spelled out within the paper and it is not clear whether it refers to sponsorship of the seminar by the Canadian Fund for Rural Economic Development (FRED) or whether it refers to a regional association or grouping within the Caribbean whose full title is not known.
164 Seers, "A Step towards a Political Economy of Development", p.250.
165 Speech given by Dudley Seers to the FRED seminar, p.10.
166 Seers, "A Step towards a Political Economy of Development", p.250.
167 Speech given by Dudley Seers to the FRED seminar, pp.5-7.
168 Seers, "Criteria for investment incentives" (draft), 27 May 1969, pp.4-5.
169 *Trinidad Guardian*, Monday 7 February 1972, front page.
170 Seers, "The Lessons for Africa", p.18.
171 Seers, "Towards Full Employment in Colombia: Summary of an Employment Programme for Colombia", Geneva: ILO, December 1970, p.17.
172 See Seers, "Industry in Development: Some Fallacies", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 1, No.4, (1963).
173 Seers, "The Lessons for Africa", p.17
174 Seers, "Industry in Development: Some Fallacies", p.465
175 Seers, "The Lessons for Africa", p.18
176 Ibid.
177 Ibid., pp.18-19
178 Seers, "A Step towards a Political Economy of Development", p.242.
179 Ibid., p.248.
180 Seers and Streeten, "Overseas Development Policies", in W. Beckerman (ed.), *The Labour Government's Economic Record: 1964-70*, London: Gerald Duckworth, 1972, p.145.

181 See Seers, "The Total Relationship", pp.339 and 345.
182 Seers, "Have Economists and Businessmen Anything to Say to Each Other about Development Problems?", Foreword in Peter Ady (ed.), *Private Foreign Investment and the Developing World*, New York and London: Praeger, 1971, p.viii.
183 Ibid.
184 Ibid
185 Seers, "A Step towards a Political Economy of Development", p.248.
186 Ibid., p. 249. "While the position of governments will naturally take account of the interests of their companies, they will take account of other considerations too. After the experience with Cuba, State Department officials can have little doubt that a political breach over the treatment of foreign companies (*inter alia*) may prove vastly more expensive than any loss of property income".
187 Seers, "Open letter to Harold Wilson", *Third World*, Vol. 1, No. 3, November 1972, p.11; and Seers and Streeten, "Overseas Development Policies", p.145.
188 Seers, "Have Economists and Businessmen Anything to Say to Each Other About Development Problems?", pp.viii and v.
189 Ibid., p.viii.
190 Ibid., p.x, see also p.ix.
191 In Britain, for example, he remarked they might have an interest in putting pressure on the textile lobby. Access to British markets for textiles and other manufactures was controlled by quotas and tariffs, but little counterpressure had so far been "exerted against the textile lobby by companies concerned in one way or another with the economic development of overseas countries, even by the companies that export to them" (p.xi).
192 Ibid., p.xi.
193 Ibid., p.xi.
194 *Trinidad Guardian*, 7 February 1972 under a headline "Young nations advised to follow own development patterns".
195 See Seers, "A Step Towards a Political Economy of Development", pp.245-50.
196 Ibid., p. 250.
197 Seers, "The Other Road", p. 3. The subtitle of this paper is "Is Autonomous Development Possible?"
198 Seers, "Graduate Migration", pp.104-5.
199 Seers, "The Total Relationship", p.347.
200 Seers, "The Other Road", p.4.
201 See Seers, "A Step Towards a Political Economy of Development", p.249; see also p.250.
202 Ibid., p.249.
203 Seers, "New Approaches suggested by the Colombia Employment Programme", *International Labour Review*, Vol. 102, No. 4, October 1970, p.378.
204 Seers, "Income Distribution and Employment: A Note on Some Issues Raised by the Colombia Report", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 2, No. 4, July 1970, p.4.
205 Ibid. p.380.
206 Participating agencies, besides the ILO, were the Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Commission for Latin America, Food and Agriculture Organisation, the Inter-American Development Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Organisation of American States, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, United Nations Development Programme, and United Nations Industrial Development Organisation. Although members of the mission all co-operated in producing the report, the final responsibility for the document rested with the mission leader, Seers. This was the procedure adopted by the ILO for the three WEP reports in which he was involved. Seers was responsible for *Towards Full Employment: A Programme for Colombia* (Geneva: ILO, 1970) and *Matching Employment Opportunities and Expectations: A Programme of Action for Ceylon* (Geneva: ILO, 1971), while Hans Singer and Richard Jolly were responsible for *Employment, Incomes, and Equality. A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya,* (Geneva: ILO, 1972).
207 Seers, "Summing up the Conference: Justice", in *International Development - Development Targets for the 70s and Jobs Justice*, papers from the 12th World Conference of the Society for International Development, Ottawa, 16-17 May 1971, New York: Oceania, p.102.
208 See Seers, "The Cultural Lag of Economics", *IDS Discussion Paper* 137, 1978, p.3 *inter alia*.

209 See ILO, *Towards Full Employment*, A Programme for Colombia prepared by an inter-agency team, ILO, Geneva, 1970.
210 Richard Jolly, Dudley Seers. and Hans Singer, "The pilot missions under the World Employment Programme", in *Strategies for Employment Promotion*, ILO Employment Research Papers, Geneva 1973, p.23.
211 Seers, "The Meaning of Development", p.16-17.
212 Seers, "New Approaches Suggested by the Colombia Employment Programme", p.380.
213 Ibid., p.381; see also, Seers, "Towards Full Employment in Colombia: Summary of an Employment Programme for Colombia", p.21.
214 Seers, "The Employment Mission to Colombia", p.31.
215 ILO, *Towards Full Employment* p.350 pars 1060-61. "This problem is the first real test of international economic and social co-operation since the wartime supply requirements of the Allied countries and the subsequent needs for relief and reconstruction".
216 Seers, "New Approaches Suggested by the Colombia Employment Programme", p.389.
217 Seers, "New Light on Structural Unemployment: Lessons of a Mission to Ceylon", *International Labour Review*, Vol. 105, No. 2, February 1972, pp.101-2.
218 Ibid. pp 102-3.
219 ILO, *Matching Employment Opportunities and Expectations. A programme of action for Ceylon*, ILO, Geneva, 1971.
220 Seers, "New Light on Structural Unemployment", p.104.
221 Ibid. See also *Matching Employment Opportunities and Expectations*, p.241 and pp.121-5.
222 Seers, "New Light on Structural Unemployment", pp.104-7.
223 Ibid. p.106-7.
224 Ibid., pp.107-8.
225 ILO, *Employment, Incomes, and Equality. A strategy for increasing productive employment in Kenya*, ILO, Geneva, 1972.
226 H. Singer and R. Jolly, "Unemployment in an African Setting", *International Labour Review*, Vol. 107, No. 2, February 1973, p.114.
227 R. Jolly, D. Seers, H. Singer, "The Pilot Missions under the World Employment Programme", in *Strategies for Employment Promotion*", op.cit., pp.27-8.
228 H. Singer and R. Jolly, "Unemployment in an African Setting", p.115.
229 Ibid.
230 Jolly, Seers and Singer, "The Pilot Missions under the World Employment Programme", p.28.
231 Seers, "Unemployment as a World Problem", lecture at the University of Bilbao, 4 December 1972, p.4.
232 Seers, "The Lessons for Africa", p. 15.
233 See Seers, "Summing up the Conference: Justice", in *International Development: Development Targets for the 70s and Jobs Justice* from the 12th World Conference of SID, Ottawa, May 16-19, 1971, p.102. See also above note 93 and Seers, "What Types of Government should be Refused what Types of Aid", espec. p.12, n.1. He was more cautious in his judgements, than he was to become later, reflecting that a foreigner could rarely come to a definite conclusion a government was "bad" unless he was "politically" bigoted.

Seers, together with Jolly and Singer, however, did recommend to international agencies that: "Considerable resources should not be devoted to helping governments that will predictably be unwilling or unable to make much use of the advice tendered. This applies especially to those which are really not seriously concerned about employment problems or income distribution, and more especially still, to those which prevent the interests of the poor being politically expressed. Once international agencies become involved in a country they inevitably provide support to the government in power, and this could well be a major obstacle to the solution of employment problems." (Jolly, Seers and Singer, "The Pilot Missions under the World Employment Programme", p.42.)

234 Seers, "The ILO Mission to Colombia: Implementation Gap?", p.10.
235 Jolly, Seers and Singer, "The Pilot Missions under the World Employment Programme", p.35.
236 Seers, "A Step Towards a Political Economy of Development", p.252.
237 Ibid., p.253.
238 Seers, "The ILO Mission to Colombia: Implementation Gap?", Bogota Seminar, Feb. 1973, pp.9-10.

239 Seers, "A Note on Some Issues Raised by the Colombia Report", pp.7 and 8. He made the same point in another paper: "One is to reduce the great issues of development to algebra and leave out all the real problems - income distribution, political power, justice. Another way in which one can work on development with a reasonably clear conscience while drawing a large income is to be a Marxist professor and take the position that what it needed (and sufficient) is a revolution, so that it is out of the question to talk about reforms, still less to do anything actually concrete about them" (Seers, "Jobs Justice: Summing up the Conference", pp.103-4).
240 Seers, "Summing up the Conference: Justice", p.102.
241 Seers, "A Note on Some Issues Raised by the Colombia report", p.7.
242 Ibid., p.8.
243 Jolly, Seers and Singer, "The Pilot Missions under the World Employment Programme", p.41 and n.2, see also p.40 n.1.
244 Seers, "A Note on Some Issues Raised by the Colombia Report", p.9.
245 Jolly, Seers and Singer, "The Pilot Missions under the World Employment Programme", p.36.
246 Ibid.pp. 36-7. See also, Seers, "The ILO Mission to Colombia: Implementation Gap?", p.7.
247 Seers, "A Note on Some Issues Raised by the Colombia Report", p.10.
248 Jolly, Seers and Singer, "The Pilot Missions under the World Employment Programme", p.38.
249 Ibid., p.37.
250 Seers, "The Lessons for Africa", p.16.
251 Seers, "From Growth to Development", p.20.
252 The conferences on "Redistribution with Growth" were in fact held in 1973 and, since Part II of this study is mainly concerned with Seers time as director of IDS until 1972, they really belong to Part III (and in fact will be mentioned again there). However, Seers' contribution on Cuba is an overview of its record of development in the 1960s and early 1970s and as such it is appropriate to cover the subject matter here. His paper appears as a country report in Hollis Chenery *et al.* (eds), *Redistribution with Growth* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974) and also as "Cuba Quizas" (IDS *Discussion Paper* 45, April 1974).
253 Seers, "Report on a visit to Cuba", May 1969.
254 Seers, "The Lessons for Africa", p.16.
255 Seers, "Cuba Quizas", IDS *Discussion Paper* 45, p.3, April 1974.
256 Seers, "The Lessons for Africa", p.17, n.2.
257 Ibid., p.17.
258 Seers, "A Step towards a Political Economy of Development", p.238.
259 Ibid., p.239.
260 Ibid.
261 See, Seers, "Cuba Quizas", p.3.
262 Ibid., pp.7-8.
263 Seers, "The Lessons for Africa", p.17.
264 Seers, "Cuba Quizas", pp.3-4.
265 Review of Bertram Silverman (ed.), *Man and Socialism in Cuba: The Great Debate* (New York: Atheneum), in the *New York Times Book Review*, 20 February 1972, p.6. He opened this review with the question "How fast could and should moral incentives replace material incentives?"
266 See, Seers, "Cuba Quizas", pp.8-9.
267 Ibid., p.10.
268 Ibid., p.11.
269 Seers, review of Regis Debray, *The Chilean Revolution*, conversations with Allende, in *The New York Times Book Review*, 20 February 1972, p.6.
270 Ibid., p.30.
271 Seers, "Report on the ODEPLAN-IDS Roundtable: La Via Chilena", Santiago, 23 March-1 April 1972, p.1.
272 Seers, "Political Fiction in the Cinema", review article of the film *Il pleut sur Santiago*, *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 8, No. 2, September 1976, p.31, n.2. (The film reviewed was a Franco-Bulgarian production about the fall of the Allende government in Chile; directed by Helvio Soto, produced by Jacques Charrier (Marquise Films), 1976.)
273 Seers, "Report on the ODEPLAN-IDS Roundtable: La Via Chilena", p.3.

274 Seers, "Chile: is the road to Socialism blocked?", *The World Today*, May 1972, pp.202-3. Paper based on talk given at Chatham House, 11 April 1972.

Looking back at Seers' 1964 classification of various causes of revolution in Latin America (see above p.110), Chile suffered from five of his nine main indicators: dominance of foreign capital in its export sector, great rural- urban contrast, great income inequality and chronic stagnation.

It was not thought to suffer from a weak administration, strong envy of US living standards, a revolutionary tradition, or undemocratic popular machinery. In fact it was the latter factor, which made the position of Chile unique. The Unidad Popular was attempting to undertake what was regarded as a radical change of society, normally associated with a revolutionary scenario.

275 Seers, " Chile: Is the Road to Socialism Blocked?", p.204.

276 Seers, "Report on the ODEPLAN-IDS Roundtable: La Via Chilena", p.1.

277 Seers, " Chile: Is the Road to Socialism Blocked?", p.206.

278 Ibid., p.208.

279 Ibid., pp.206, 208, 209.

280 Ibid., p.209.

281 Seers, letter to *The Times*, 21 September 1973.

282 Ibid.

283 Seers and Streeten, "Overseas Development Policies 1964-1970", in W. Beckerman (ed.), *The Labour Government's Economic Record 1964-70*, London: Gerald Duckworth & Co Ltd, p.118.

284 Seers, "Preface", in *Development in a Divided World*, p.7.

285 Seers, "The Total Relationship", in *Development in a Divided World*, p.347.

286 Seers, "Rich Countries and Poor", in *Development in a Divided World*, pp.32-3.

287 See Seers, "From Colonial Economics to Development Studies", p.6 - the context of the full quotation is as follows: "Other nations often show recognisable symptoms of strain in the development process - for example, chronic difficulties in foreign payments, shortages of engineers or racial frictions. Many comparatively well-to-do countries face familiar structural obstacles to development such as somewhat antiquated educational or administrative systems - Britain is a case in point! The trade of every country, especially Britain, suffers from the lurching and uncertain progress of the world economy, and the failure of large parts of it to show any significant progress at all. The development of development studies will, therefore, throw an increasing amount of light on *our* problems too."

288 Seers, "From Growth to Development", p.19.

289 Seers, "The Meaning of Development", p.8.

290 Seers, with R. Jolly and H. Singer, "The Pilot Missions under the World Employment Programme", p. 38; and Seers, "New Light on Structural Unemployment: Lessons of a Mission to Ceylon", *International Labour Review*, Vol. 105, No. 2, February 1972, p.102, n.2. This is in comparison to his comments in 1968 when he had remarked on the low levels of unemployment in industrial countries compared to levels in Africa, Asia and Latin America which he had described as a mark of backwardness. (See p.199.)

291 Seers, "What are we Trying to Measure", p.23. Seers was referring to Peter Townsend, *The Concept of Poverty*, London: Heinemann, 1970.

292 Seers, "Unemployment as a World Problem", lecture at the University of Bilbao, 4 December 1972.

Chapter 6: Towards Self Reliance - and Development in Europe

1 Seers was suffering from cancer in the last years of his life though, as can be seen from the list of his activities in the appendix, his pace of work rarely slackened. In 1973, however, ill health prevented him from becoming director of studies for the first M.Phil. course at IDS, though he assumed directorship of the second M.Phil entry in 1975. It was a period of convalescence after an operation in 1981 which provided him with the opportunity to assemble and rewrite the papers which formed the basis for his posthumous volume *The Political Economy of Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).

2 Seers had gone to Washington to work with Gerald Meier on editing the World Bank volume *The Pioneers of Development Economics* (Washington, DC/New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1983); in Trinidad he was to have given a lecture commemorating the life of Eric

Williams, and in Shanghai a lecture at a conference on "The International Economic Order"; on his way back to the UK he was also "contemplating calling in 'at Kuala Lumpur and other places'" (Mike Faber, "Dudley Seers' Last Journey", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 20, No. 3 July 1989, p.59).

3 Seers, "The New Meaning of Development", *International Development Review*, Vol. XIX, No. 3, 1977, p.2.

4 Ibid., p.5.

5 Seers, "Time for an End to Neo-Paternalism", 1981, p.1.

6 Ibid. Brandt Commission, *North-South: A Programme for Survival*, London: Pan Books, 1980. Seers' views on the Brandt report are discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.

7 Seers, "The New Meaning of Development", p.6.

8 A phrase used by Richard Jolly in IDS *Annual Report*, 1974, p.3, though a sentiment which echoes and reflects a widespread reaction at the time.

9 Seers, "Open Letter to Harold Wilson", *Third World*, Vol. 1, No. 3, November 1972; Judith Hart, "Reply to Dudley Seers", *Third World*, Vol. 1, No. 4, December 1972; Seers, "Dudley Seers Replies", *Third World*, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 1973. Seers was particularly annoyed by what he regarded as Judith Hart's "sneers" and "snide remarks" about his "academic accuracy" on certain issues.

10 See IDS *6th Annual Report*, 1971-2, p.17. In addition Seers participated in the work of the planning and government problem area group, PGPAG.

11 IDS *Annual Report*, 1974, p.19.

12 See, Seers and B. Dasgupta (eds), "Statistical Policy in Less Developed Countries", *IDS Communication*, No. 114, 1975.

13 See Seers, "Active Life Profiles for Different Social Groups: a contribution to demographic accounting, a frame for social indicators and a tool of social and economic analysis", *IDS Discussion Paper*, No. 178, September 1982.

14 See, Seers, *Journey Report*, Baltimore, 19-24 July 1982.

15 Hollis Chenery *et al.*(eds), *Redistribution with Growth*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974.

16 IDS *7th Annual Report*, 1972-3, p.18.

17 IDS *6th Annual Report*, 1971-2, p.7. There were 22 students in the 1975 intake - 5 from Latin America, 3 from Asia, 3 from Africa, 3 from the USA, 2 from the UK and one each from Australia, Fiji, Finland, New Zealand, Poland and Switzerland.

18 Seers, "The World Context of Development", distributed for discussion at Christ Church Oxford conference, January 1974, 17 December 1973. He had originally intended to revise the draft for a book, which, however, did not materialise.

See, IDS *7th Annual Report*, 1972-3, p.16 and IDS *Annual Report*, 1974, p.18. As an offshoot of this work an internal working seminar was organised to discuss the relationship between Marxist and structuralist analyses of dependency.

19 Seers with M.Phil. faculty and students, "North Sea Oil: the application of development theories", *IDS Communication*, No. 121, 1977.

20 See IDS *7th Annual Report* 1972-3, p.5.

21 Seers handed over the presidency in 1978 to Louis Emmerij from the Institute of Social Studies in the Hague.

22 Seers, "What Business is it of Ours?", introductory remarks in *Towards a European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes*, summary report of preparatory work at First Conference at Ghent, 26-27 September 1974, EADI, pp.54-62.

23 ADIPA = Association of Development Research and Training Institutes of Asia and the Pacific (Bangkok); CLACSO = Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (Buenos Aires); CODESRIA Council for the Development of Economic and Social Research in Africa (Dakar).

24 The number of development institutions had become so numerous that meetings had become cumbersome, which was why it was suggested meetings of regional associations, covering between them the majority of countries, would be more suitable (Seers, "Some points arising from the first meeting of regional associations and its follow-up", 5 November 1976). A preliminary document for such a meeting, entitled "Collaboration between Rich and Poor Country Research Institutes", had been drafted in 1973 by Samir Amin, Enrique Oteiza and Pona Wignaraja of the African, Latin American and Asian associations together with Richard Jolly and Guilio Fossie of OECD (IDS *7th Annual Report* 1972-3).

25 Seers, *Journey Report*, 30 November 1977, section on ICCDA 13 and 15 November 1977. Of both ICCDA and UNU meetings in Mexico City, he said "it can be said that in a stumbling, imperfect way, mechanisms are coming into being for worldwide professional discussion of social problems".

26 With Enrique Oteiza, "The Institute of Economy of Developing Countries of the Central School of Planning and Statistics (Warsaw)", an evaluation of a proposal for association with the United Nations University, December 1976; the Marga Institute evaluation is mentioned in *Journey Report*, January 1977, Sri Lanka.

27 With an OECD team, *Social Sciences Policy: Japan*, Paris, OECD, 1977. The programme was sponsored by the OECD Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry.

28 Seers with Manfred Bienefeld, "Industrial Planning and the Use of External Assistance in Portugal", a report to the Ministry of Industry and Technology under the OECD Technical Assistance Programme, 14 April 1976.

29 Seers, memo to Richard Jolly, 23 April 1976.

30 Seers, *Journey Report*, Lisbon, 15-24 October 1978. Despite the official rejection of the report, Seers derived some satisfaction from the fact that in 1978 it was "still talked of and has been much quoted in the press", adding that "An economist at the Ministry of Industry and Technology said he could recommend a good critique of Portuguese planning - the Bienefeld-Seers Report, every word of which still applies today!"

31 Seers, "Development Planning in Portugal", Report of a Mission under the OECD Technical Co-operation Service, November 1978. "The shock of entry could be brutal", he remarked (p.6).

32 See Seers, *Short-term Research Consultant for the Malaysian Centre for Development Studies (MCDS) Prime Minister;s Department, Kuala Lumpur*, United Nations, New York, 1975.

33 Seers with a Commonwealth team, *The Rehabilitation of the Economy of Uganda*, 2 vols, London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1979.

34 Seers, with an ILO Mission, *First Things First: Meeting the Basic Needs of the Nigerian People*, Addis Ababa, JASPA, ILO, 1981. For his reservations on basic needs, see n.252 below.

35 Seers, "What Needs are Really Basic in Nigeria? Some thoughts prompted by an ILO mission", *ILO Review*, Vol. 120, No. 6, Nov.-Dec. 1981, p.10.

36 Seers, with an ILO Mission, *First Things First*, p.viii.

37 The proceedings are recorded in Commonwealth Secretariat, *Papers and Proceedings of the Seminars on Adjustment Policies*, Marlborough House, London, 18-21 November, 24-27 February 1981, London: Commonwealth Secretariat, Economic Affairs Division (Restricted). The first seminar (18-21 November 1980) was attended by representatives from Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe; and the second (24-27 February 1981) by officials from Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Mauritius, Nigeria, and Seychelles.

38 The pioneers in question were Lord Bauer, Colin Clark, Albert O. Hirschman, Sir Arthur Lewis, Gunnar Myrdal, Raul Prebisch, Paul N. Rosenstein-Rodan, Walt Whitman Rostow, H. W. Singer, and Jan Tinbergen; *The Pioneers of Development Economics* (eds Gerald M. Meier and Dudley Seers) was published for the World Bank by Oxford University Press in 1984.

Seers' journey reports refer to visits to the World Bank in connection with the pioneers' project in April and August 1981 and February, April, July and November 1982.

39 Seers, *Journey Report*, Riyadh, 22-25 March 1975; as a result of his efforts he reported he "met with a good deal of interest in cooperation with a British institution - evidenced by some proposals".

He explained a visit to Jakarta in 1980 for a seminar on the life cycle of petroleum economies as "partly to show the IDS flag a bit, especially in view of the possible research contract". (Seers, *Journey Report*, Jakarta, 16-24 September 1980)

40 For example, during a trip to Venezuela in 1975, he visited the Directora Nacional de Cooperacion Tecnica at CORDIPLAN, describing it as "one of the most important training departments in the Western Hemisphere for IDS", and expressed surprise that they had no advance notices of IDS seminars and that no one from IDS had been there, during the course of visits to the country, since his previous visit 3 years earlier. "I can't carry these contacts single- handed - and frankly don't propose to continue to be (apparently) the only IDS Fellow working at it... The failure to build up permanent links with overseas agencies, especially in training, remains the biggest failing of IDS, and one which we hardly try to remedy." (Seers, *Journey Report*, Venezuela, 8-12 December 1975)

While attending an SSRC conference in Puerto Rico on "The Lessons of China's Development

Experience for Developing Countries" in February 1976, he commented: "I kept my eyes and ears open, as requested, for possible Fellowship candidates. My capacity to cast the net around was somewhat hampered by the fact that nobody thought to put in my briefing kit any details of the Fellowship which I was supposed to promote." (Seers, *Journey Report*, Puerto Rico, 31 January - 5 February 1976)

On a visit to Mexico (and Cuba) for meetings with several international and regional groups he complained: "Here was one series of glorious opportunities to spread information about IDS and our seminars - but I received ... zero; no SS brochures, no annual reports, no application forms, nada." (Seers, *Journey Report*, November 1977, p.16)

41 Seers, *Journey Report*, Tokyo, 8-18 November 1975. He continued: "Many asked about 'what IDS thinks', and one lecturer told me that the only British institutions that interested him were the BBC and IDS! (It's not going too far to say that, for some people now, UK meant IDS). This view is of course greatly oversimplified and highly flattering - but it is nice to be flattered sometimes! And in our self-criticism, we shouldn't lose sight of the total scene."

42 Seers, *Journey Report*, Suva, Fiji, 17-23 March 1979.

43 For example, he was concerned to hear a story circulating at the IMF that IDS was too expensive: that "we asked the Commonwealth Secretariat to pay more than a quarter of a million dollars for a study on small countries and that for this reason alone we were turned down! Can this be true? If not, it had better be denied, because there is some feeling that we are too expensive" (Seers, *Journey Report*, Washington, 5-18 May 1980).

44 Seers, *Journey Reports*, Riyadh, 22-25 March 1975, and Venezuela 8-12 December 1975 and 28-31 January 1976.

45 Seers, *Journey Report*, Riyadh, 22-25 March 1975, p.5; the professional interest lay in the fact that "The very low ratio between population and oil output and the virtual absence of other resources provide the setting for the fascinating impact of a dynamic 'modern' sector tearing apart a strongly traditional social structure." Work on Saudi Arabia, he added, would complement that on other oil producers - Venezuela, Trinidad, Nigeria - and Scotland.

46 Ibid., pp. 4-5. He observed "the political scene must be a field of mines and we'd be likely to touch one off before long. If we did our job we'd be bound to say unpopular things, and 'young turks' would gravitate towards us".

47 Ibid., pp.5 and 2.

48 Seers, *Journey Report*, Venezuela, 8-21 December 1975, no page numbers, but first page. He found Venezuela "professionally interesting, because not only does it face the task of creating a viable socio-economic structure with oil revenues, but does so with more experience, a bigger professional cadre, more open and informed public discussions, better analyses of problems and more and better statistics than any other oil producer."

49 Ibid., point 4, 7th page.

50 Following the study seminar on "Development strategies for mineral exporting economies" in early 1974, there had apparently been a discussion between Seers and one of the Saudi Arabian delegates about the possibility of IDS participating in a research conference in Riyadh later that year on economic aspects of industrialisation in petroleum exporting countries, to be sponsored by Petromin, but nothing eventually came of these discussions. In December 1974, however, the UNDP representative in Riyadh, wrote to the Chargé d'Affaires at the British Embassy in Jedda, following previous discussions between the two of them, suggesting that IDS "might play a useful role in Saudi Arabia.... Not too many universities and institutes are so organized and inclined to embark on practical, policy-oriented research and seminars which are of direct relevance to the needs of government". This was passed on with a covering letter from the British Embassy to the Ministry of Overseas Development, from where Eric C. Burr passed all on with a furthering covering letter to Richard Jolly with the comment "It seems to be that such an idea as this might provide an occasion for the employment overseas of a core Fellow or Fellows," which in turn initiated Seers' visit. (Correspondence in Seers' archives, IDS: A. Succar (UNDP Regional Representative for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Area) to H. B. Walker (Chargé d'Affaires, British Embassy, Jedda), 14 December 1974; H. B. Walker to J. E. Rednall (ODM), 2 January 1975; E. C. Burr (ODM) to R. Jolly, 7 February 1975; draft from R. Jolly to E. Burr, 27 February 1975).

51 Seers, memo to Richard Jolly, 23 April 1976.

52 Seers, *Journey Report*, Latin America, 18 May-4 June 1978, p.11.

53 Seers, memo to Tommy Gee, 27 July [?December] 1978, attached to edited Journey Report "Repression in the Southern Cone and possible British responses",dated 22 December 1978. The report was also sent "partly because I owe them some return for the official assistance they provided throughout my journey".

54 Miss A. P. Hunn (Private Secretary) ODM to Seers, 15 April 1977, in confidence.

55 Seers, *Journey Report*, Rhodesia, 19-28 March 1977, p.3. The report comments on his visit to the university and contains general observations on the security position. (His assessment of the political situation, however, proved erroneous since he implied Bishop Muzorewa and his party enjoyed more popular support than the Patriotic Front and would get majority support if there was a referendum.) During his visit he proposed that IDS should convene conferences on the problems that would face Zimbabwe after the change of power (whatever form that took) since, he observed, not much thought seemed to have been given to post-liberation problems.

56 Miss A. P. Hunn to Seers, 14 April 1977.

57 Seers, *Journey Report*, Riyadh, 22-25 March 1975, p.5.

58 R. S. Porter to Seers, 23 April 1975.

59 Seers, *Journey Report*, Kuwait, 14-18 May 1979, p.2. One of the projects suggested was the construction of a national accounting system suitable for an oil producer, using Kuwait as a case study, in which Seers was personally interested, and the other was a review of the Kuwait fund experience, demonstrating the impact of a selection of projects.

60 See Seers, *Journey Report*, Kuwait, 15-16 May 1982

61 Richard Jolly, "Director's Report", *IDS Annual Report 1979*, p.6.

62 Richard Jolly, "Director's Report", *IDS Annual Report 1980, Handbook 1981*, p.9

63 Seers, *Journey Report*, Washington, 25-29 February 1980, p.3.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.

66 On a visit to Washington in May 1980 Seers reported of the seminars, "We [IDS] are offered $20-21,000 to cover the paper preparation (including fares to Washington and part per diem, my time as organiser and chairman and hiring of ... a consultant ($1,000) to attend the seminar" (Seers, *Journey Report*, Washington, 5-18 May 1980)

67 Richard Jolly, "Director's Report, *IDS Annual Report 1980*, pp.9-10. Other broad priorities identified for the fourth quinquennium by the Working Party were: international recession and the emerging world economy of the 1980s; the crisis of development policy: national strategies in the new context; and rural development and poverty - mechanisms, institutions and policy. This resulted in 2 major new areas of commissioned work - one on Southern Africa supported by SIDA, and the other on the EEC and Third World, evaluating the costs and benefits of EEC food aid, supported by the EEC. Other measures for restructuring included a programme of priority and economy and the annual additional intake of M.Phil students, instead of every 2 years.

68 For example see Seers, *Journey Report*, Brussels, 14 August 1977.

69 Seers and C. Vaitsos, "Preface", *Integration and Unequal Development: The Experience of the EEC*, Macmillan, 1980, p.xv.

70 While making efforts to recruit students in Kuwait and Kuala Lumpur in 1981, Seers commented "The general picture is bleak. Malaysian Cabinet Ministers are incensed by the sharp rise in fees in UK institutions ... it is seen as a slap in the face to a country which had built its whole training programme on long-run ties to British institutions" (Seers, *Journey Report*, Kuala Lumpur, 11-18 January 1981).

71 Seers, *Journey Report*, London, 12 July 1982.

72 Seers, "The New Meaning of Development", p.5.

73 Seers, *Short-term Research Consultant for the Malaysian Centre for Development Studies (MCDS) Prime Minister's Department, Kuala Lumpur*, United Nations, New York 1975, p.2.

74 Seers, "Development Studies in Western Europe", Oviedo, 13 August 1979, p.?

75 Seers observed: "Regions like Oriente in Venezuela or Baluchistan in Iran ... remained stuck in their age-old poverty with largely illiterate and unhealthy populations, unable to articulate effectively their needs for a due share of the proceeds of oil. The governments, under the slogan of 'modernisation' invested heavily in big and prestigious projects which provided little employment. Cities built on the oil revenue (Caracas, Teheran, Kuwait, Port of Spain, etc.) had attracted a big flow of migrants,

overwhelming their services, such as water supplies, sewage and refuse disposal, causing enormous increases in land prices and rents, and setting the scene for urban crime which was already prevalent in some of them." (Seers, *First Things First: Meeting the Basic Needs of the People of Nigeria*, ILO JASPA, Addis Ababa, 1981, pp.3-4; he remarked though that the observation about regional imbalance did not apply to the Gulf States, which were too small to have a hinterland.)

76 It was estimated that more people were living in poverty than before the oil boom had started and that the state of nutrition was probably worse, in spite of increasing imports of food, with large numbers of people being harmed and killed by preventable diseases; and even those people whose buying power had increased considered standards of living had declined since they had lost facilities such as "regular supplies of water, continuous electricity, telephones that worked, uncorrugated roads with good surfaces, and the ability to walk or drive around without an ever- present fear of road accidents and armed robbery." (Seers, *First Things First*, pp. iv and v; and Seers, "What needs are really basic in Nigeria? Some thoughts prompted by an ILO mission", *ILO Review*, Vol. 120, No. 6, November-December 1981, p.741)

77 Seers, *Political Economy of Nationalism*, p.5

78 See Lecture "Characteristics of Developing Economies", Jakarta 1980.

79 This is a general point often referred to by Seers at this time but it is made specifically by C. M. Brand, in "What is Development", compiled from a seminar given by Seers at the University of Rhodesia, March 1977, p.4.

80 Seers did not distinguish between MNCs or TNCs; in the early 1970s he more often the term MNC but by the late 1970s always referred to TNCs; in the index of *The Political Economy of Nationalism* (1983), for example, the entry for Multinational corporations says *See* TNCs. On other occasions in the early 1980s Seers also used the term TNEs - transnational enterprises.

81 Seers, "Changing Perceptions and Priorities", in B. Dasgupta and Seers (eds), *Statistical Policy in Less Developed Countries*, based on discussions at the Conference on Statistical Policy in LDCs, 12-16 May 1975, p.6.

82 Seers, "Development and British Overseas Representation: A Review of the Berrill Report", 1978, p.6.

83 Ibid.

84 Seers, "Here Lies the Strategy", *Development Forum*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1974, p.1 (United Nations Centre for Economic and Social Information/OPI).

85 Seers, "The Birth, Life and Death of Development Economics", *Development and Change*, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1979, p.711.

86 John Toye, "Nationalism and Structuralism: Two Themes in the Work of Dudley Seers", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 20, No. 3, July 1989, p.57.

87 It is Jolly who remarks that while helping to originate the study Seers declined to have his name listed as a co-author of the volume (see R. Jolly, "Dudley Seers 1920-1983: His Contributions to Development Perspectives, Policy and Studies", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 20, No.3, July 1989, p.35).

88 Seers, "The New Meaning of Development", p.4. IDS's director Richard Jolly, commented in the Institute's *7th Annual Report* "Major changes of policies specifically to tackle problems of poverty, employment and income inequality have been rare and even when formally adopted by some countries, implementation has been disappointing" (p.3).

89 Seers, "The New Meaning of Development", p.4 and Seers, "The Cultural Lag in Economics", *IDS Discussion Paper*, No. 137, 1978, p.8.

90 Seers, "Here Lies the Strategy", p.1.

91 Seers, "Comment and Controversy", *International Development Review*, Vol. XV, No. 4, 1973/4, p.43.

92 Seers, *Political Economy of Nationalism*, p.2.

93 Seers, "The Changing Definition and Measurement of Development", p.4.

94 Seers' paper "The Rise in the Price of Oil: Terrible Disaster or Great Opportunity?" (*IDS Discussion Paper*, No. 46, April 1974) comes down in favour of great opportunity. This is essentially the same paper as "Here Lies the Strategy" under a different title.

95 Seers, "Here Lies the Strategy", p.1: "The International Development Strategy of the United Nations, adopted for the decade of the 1970s is dead, like the Pearson Report and the UNCTAD resolutions on which it was based. It has been killed before the scheduled mid-term review, by the rise in oil prices from about $3 to $11 a barrel."

96 See, Seers, "Comment and Controversy", p.43.

97 Seers, "Here Lies the Strategy", p.1.

98 Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers and William W. Behrens III, *The Limits to Growth*, A Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind, London: Earth Island Ltd, March 1972. This report had focused attention, with the assistance of hypothetical computerised models, on the physical limits of the world system, if rates of population growth, food production, consumption of non-renewable natural resources, industrialisation and pollution continued at current levels.

Such anxieties about the depletion of finite global resources, like oil, and the damaging consequences for the environment of further growth and industrialisation coincided with and can in part be seen as a response to the growing demand by governments of "developing" countries for greater participation in the industrial process (see section on the NIEO below).

99 Seers, "The Changing Definition and Measurement of Development", p.4. Seers acknowledged "There could come a point at which the governments of industrial countries, separately or together, would invade petroleum countries (or organise coups d'etat) and seize oilfields, risking the consequent short-term disruption" when the danger of world war would become severe, ("Here Lies the Strategy", p.2) but did not dwell on this scenario, rather looking at the opportunities the oil crisis provided.

100 Seers, "Development and Population Growth in Poor Countries", in *Population and its Problems: A Plain Man's guide*, The Wolfson College Lectures 1973 (ed. H. B. Parry), Oxford: Clarendon Press, p.107.

101 Seers, "The Changing Definition and Measurement of Development", p.4.

102 See, Seers' arguments in "Alternative Scenarios for Developing Countries: The Fundamental Issues", *IDS Discussion Paper*, December 1977.

103 See Seers, "Conflicting and Mutual Interests in the 1980s", *Links*, No. 9, (Third World First (TWI) publication); based on a talk at "The Wastemakers", national conference of TWI, April 1979.

104 Seers, "Alternative Scenarios for Developing Countries: The Fundamental Issues", p.15.

105 Seers, "Here Lies the Strategy", p.2.

106 E. F. Schumacher, *Small is Beautiful*, London: Abacus edition, 1975 reprint; first published by Blond and Briggs, 1973.

107 Seers, memo to Richard Jolly, 24 September 1979. He does not spell out what he found questionable in Shumacher's book, nor why.

108 Seers, "Here Lies the Strategy", p.2.

109 Ibid., p.3.

110 Seers, reported by Brand in "What is Development", p.4

111 Seers, "Here Lies the Strategy", p.2. While they could tie up their increased income in direct investments or equities in the industrial countries he anticipated they might consider this "would leave them exposed to the threat of expropriation, which would reduce the political leverage they would otherwise enjoy"; while on the other hand governments of industrial countries "would naturally look askance at rising foreign ownership of their productive systems" (though neither of these considerations in fact proved such great disincentives). While Communist countries were in need of capital, governments of petroleum producers had "their own good reasons" for not investing in COMECON or China, stated Seers though he did not elaborate (ibid.).

112 Ibid.

113 Seers, "The Rise in the Price of Oil: Terrible Disaster or Great Opportunity", summary title page.

114 Seers, "Here Lies the Strategy", p.3. The last point was of particular concern since he estimated "Nearly all countries of the Third World where oil accounts for more than 25 per cent of their import bill are military dictatorships" (ibid.).

115 Ibid.

116 Ibid.

117 Seers, "A Common Market for Oil Producers?", *National and Grindleys Review*, August 1974, p.5

118 See ibid. In this paper he differentiated between those oil producers with large populations (Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria and Venezuela) and those with small populations (Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar and Saudi Arabia), and it was the second group which he considered posed "a fascinating professional puzzle to economists". Though apparently free from economic problems, such as shortages of savings and foreign exchange, which constrained economic growth in other "developing" countries, in the long term it was hard to envisage any viable scenario for them since their markets and

were so small. Such countries, he suggested should aim to convert their export surpluses into a strong and permanent power base, and he envisaged the most likely outcome would be a mix of strategies.

"There will, of course, be heavy Arab investment in the industrial countries, but also more bilateral agreements under which west European manufactures and technology will be exchanged directly for Arab oil. At the same time, oil surpluses will be increasingly invested within the Arab world. This combination of strategies would provide the oil exporters with a quick route to a power base, but because of its precariousness, the pan-Arab component could come to dominate the mix in due course" (p.5).

119 Seers, "The Changing Definition and Measurement of Development", p.4.

120 Ibid.

121 "Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order", United Nations, (3201 S-VI), 2229th plenary meeting of UN General Assembly, 1 May 1974, points (n) and (o), quoted in Lars Anell and Birgitta Nygren, *The Developing Countries and the World Economic Order*, London and New York: Methuen, 1980, Appendix 1, p. 190.

The final declaration on "preferential and non-reciprocal treatment for developing countries" was in fact modified with phrases such as "wherever feasible" and "wherever possible".

122 Seers, "The Changing Definition and Measurement of Development", p.4.

123 Ibid.

124 Lars Anell and Birgitta Nygren, *The Developing Countries and the World Economic Order*, London and New York: Methuen, 1980 provides a general historical background to the demands of the developing countries for a New International Economic Order.

The Non-Aligned Movement, meeting in Lusaka in 1970, attached particular importance to increasing co-operation between developing countries and reducing dependence on industrialised countries, and introduced the concept of self- reliance. At further meetings, notably at the 1973 summit meeting in Algiers, the Movement adopted a declaration and action programme for economic co-operation including the principle of a country's unconditional right to command its natural resources, while nationalisation of those resources under foreign ownership was regarded as a legitimate means of protecting them. It also called for the extension of the general system of preferences for developing countries and a new monetary system that would guarantee the participation of the developing countries on the same terms as the industrialised countries. The operational methods of TNCs were rejected as unacceptable and the adoption of an international code of conduct to regulate the transfer of technology to, and to stop the emigration of qualified manpower from, developing countries was demanded. A request was made to the Secretary General of the UN for a Special Session to be convened to discuss development problems.

The UNCTAD III meeting in Santiago, Chile in 1973 continued in the same vein, demanding full and equal participation in discussions and decisions concerning international monetary reforms, global supervision of multinational companies, and a UN Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.

125 United Nations, "Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order", and "Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order" 3201 (S-VI), 2229th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 1 May 1974, reproduced in Anell and Nygren, *The Developing Countries and the World Economic Order*, Appendix I, pp.187-209.

126 Seers, "The Changing Definition and Measurement of Development", p.4. Seers also made the distinction between *a* and *the* NIEO in a memo to John Oxenham, a colleague at IDS, who had asked for his advice when preparing an issue, as guest editor, of the *International Review of Education* on "Education and the New International Economic Order". Part of Seers' reply read "Can't you change the subject to 'Education and a new international economic order', i.e. not tying it specifically to the particular 'order' bandied about in international politics?" (Seers, memo to John Oxenham, "Education and the NIEO", 27 March 1981).

127 Seers, "A New Look at the Three World Classification", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 7, No. 4, p.12, n.13; he adds "One might put it that underlying a cry of 'rape' is a low murmur: 'But for God's sake don't stop yet'."

128 Seers, memo to John Oxenham, "Education and the NIEO", 27 March 1981.

129 Seers, *The Political Economy of Nationalism*, p.146 While agreeing "it would doubtless benefit some of the poor, too," he considered this would be "at the cost of perpetuating their subjugation".

130 Seers, "The Changing Definition and Measurement of Development", p.4.

131 See IDS *7th Annual Report*; *8th Annual Report*, p.17; *Annual Report* 1975, p. 38. Seers also drew on Osvaldo Sunkel's work on national accounting in Chile for some of his own work on national accounting.

132 Seers, "Development Studies in Western Europe", paper prepared for a conference at Oviedo, 1979, p.5.

133 See particularly Seers, "Development Options: The Strengths and Weaknesses of Dependency Theories in Explaining a Government's Room to Manoeuvre", in Seers (ed.), *Dependency Theory: A Critical Reassessment*, London: Frances Pinter, 1981.

134 Seers, reported by Brand, in "What is Development", p.3.

135 Seers came to join this panel through an invitation channelled through his old colleague Dick Ross (the co-author of the 1955 Gold Coast Report), who in 1976 worked on the Central Policy Review Staff of the Cabinet Office and was to be the UK representative on the proposed Steering Group of the project. (Ross to Seers, 7 April 1976 and accompanying documentation from the OECD; held in the Dudley Seers archives, IDS Brighton.)

136 It was the United Nations response to the NIEO demands to set up a special programme to provide emergency relief and development assistance to the "most seriously affected" countries, and the ILO concentrated on a programme of "basic needs"; see also Ministry of Overseas Development, *The Changing Emphasis in British Aid Policies: More Help to the Poorest*, October 1975, London, HMSO.

137 Seers, "What Business is it of Ours?", address to the founding conference of EADI, Ghent, 26 September 1974 p.6.

138 See Seers, "The Cultural Lag in Economics" (1978), p.6 where in 1978 he commented that "Far from economic growth being a panacea" it seemed to be associated with growing crime, drug addiction, alcoholism" "and "had created a society difficult to administer ... but easy to sabotage by strikes in key sectors, kidnapping of leaders, etc."

139 Seers, "What Business is it of Ours?", p.5.

140 Seers, "European Conscience and European Social Science", September 1978, mimeo, p.7.

141 Seers, "What Business is it of Ours?",p.6.

142 Seers, "Back to the Ivory Tower? The Professionalization of Development Studies and their Extension to Europe", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1977, p.6. There were two basic politico-economic patterns which characterised developing countries, Seers maintained, and Portugal had demonstrated both of these before and after the 1974 military coup; first a dictatorship maintaining a strong and stable currency by creating a favourable climate for foreign capital, involving the suppression of trade union activity and political opposition; and secondly a "soft" government unable to resolve internal class conflict, resulting in chronic inflation and foreign exchange difficulties relieved only by periodic devaluation.

143 Seers, "Development and British Overseas Representation: a Review of the Berrill Report", p.8. An IDS Bulletin of 1977 described Britain as being unable to deal with "unemployment, stagnation in key sectors, regional imbalance, low productivity and decline or collapse in the social services". In addition to the economic problems, it maintained, the recession had sharpened social and political problems and there had been "difficulties of coming to terms with Scottish, Welsh and Irish nationalism; racial conflict; political violence; persistent poverty; the erosion of the welfare state; and corruption and decay in our police and local government bureaucracies" (Editorial, *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1977, p.1).

144 See ibid., p.6. Another instance he referred to of dependence on foreign based TNCs was the fact that Harold Wilson had also had to negotiate with the American Chrysler company when it threatened to withdraw its plant from Britain.

145 Seers, "Back to the Ivory Tower?", p. 7.

146 Seers, "Latin Lessons for us All", *Built Environment*, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1979, p.90.

147 Seers, "Back to the Ivory Tower?", p. 7.

148 Seers, "What Business is it of Ours?", p.4.

149 Seers, "The New Meaning of Development", p.6.

150 Seers, "Introduction", in Seers, De Bandt and Mándi, *European Studies in Development*, London and Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1980, p.xv.

151 Seers, "Can Labour Control the Foreign and Commonwealth Office?", *Third World*, January/February 1975.

152 Seers and Jolly, "British Overseas Representation", evidence to the Berrill Committee, pp.1 and 5.

153 Ibid., p.1.
154 Ibid., p.3.
155 Ibid., pp. 2 and 3.
156 Ibid., p. 2.
157 Ibid., p.4. The different international system they anticipated emerging "probably" implied "a greater degree of negotiated international economic adjustment over the medium and possibly long-term" with "more international agreements ... covering planned shifts in domestic production and international trade, transfers and investment between blocks of countries, balanced by bilateral trade agreements linked to phased changes in the structure of ownership, production, and distribution and consumption within countries". In terms of foreign policy this implied the development of more effective international institutions, requiring a more positive attitude to the reform of the United Nations; and the restructuring of Britain's own economy in ways which would take more account of developments elsewhere.
158 Ibid., p.5. International interests of direct importance to the consumer, they maintained, included securing stable supplies of raw materials and food supplies, at predictable prices, thereby indicating Britain's interest in "ensuring self-sufficiency in food among ... Third World countries" and "an efficiently functioning system of international and monetary arrangements" (ibid., pp.5-6).
159 Ibid., p.1.
160 Ibid., pp. 4-5 and 7.
161 Seers, "Development and British Overseas Representation: A Review of the Berrill Report", 26 April 1978. Prepared as the basis for discussion of the development related implications of the Berrill Report for a meeting convened at IDS, at which were present members of the Central Policy Review Staff (Sir Kenneth Berrill, Tessa Blackstone, and Kate Mortimer) as well as senior civil servants and MPs (IDS *Annual Report* 1978, p.9).
162 Seers, "European Conscience and European Social Science", presidential address at the EADI Triennial Assembly, Milan 19-23 September 1978, IDS staff paper.
163 Streeten to Lipscomb 17 May, 1991.
Seers himself also remarked at one point that one reason for opposing British entry into the EEC "is that it reduces the possibility of influencing United States' policy"; in this context he was speaking of trying to influence the United States to adopt more positive immigration controls (Seers, "Graduate Migration as an Obstacle to Equality", in Paul Streeten (ed.), *Unfashionable Economics: Essays in Honour of Lord Balogh*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1970, p.107, n.18).
164 Seers, "Time for a Second Look at the Third World", *Development Policy Review*, Vol. 1 (1983), p.43.
165 Seers, "The European Periphery", draft for BBC broadcast, 1 February 1978, p.7.
166 Seers, "Introduction", in Seers, B. Schaffer, and M-L. Kiljunen (eds), *Underdeveloped Europe*, Hassocks: Harvester, p.xix.
167 The 1975 conference and declaration was the culmination of a series of meetings, which had begun in Helsinki in July 1973, and continued intermittently in Geneva over the next two years, aimed at reducing international tension. Agreement was reached on methods to prevent accidental confrontations between the power blocs, proposals for economic and technological collaboration and an understanding on closer contacts between peoples of the different nations.
168 Seers, "Address by Elected President of EADI", *The New International Economic Order - Economic, Social and Political Implications*, Report on the 1975 General Conference of EADI, Linz/Austria, 11-13 September 1975, p.13.
169 Ibid.
170 Seers, "The World Context of Development", p.11, par.15.
171 Seers, "A New Look at the Three World Classification", p.11.
172 Seers, "Some points arising from the first meeting of regional associations and its follow-up", 5 November 1976, p.1.
173 Seers, "The 1980's and Third Quinquennium Strategy", 10 September 1974 (WP3), p.1.
174 Seers"What Business is it of Ours?", p.1
175 Ibid.
176 Biplab Dasgupta, "Introduction", in Dasgupta and Seers (eds), "Statistical Policy in Less Developed Countries", *IDS Communication Paper* No. 114, p.4.
177 Seers had in fact himself been "guilty", in the past at least, of suggesting that not all research findings

should necessarily be passed on to the country being studied. In his report for the World Bank on their country reports in 1967 he had stated: "It would also be useful to distinguish more clearly between what should be said to various types of user - the Bank's staff, the government of the country under study and Board members. Points appropriate for the client government, but not others, can already be made by special letter or by a return visit of the chief of mission. However, there may well be points which the chief of mission would make for staff consideration or for the records, if he were not constrained by the knowledge that governments would read his report. This suggests the need for the chief of mission to prepare a special memorandum *for use of Bank staff only*, dealing with political or highly controversial points." (Seers, *The Banks's Country Reports*, 1 August 1977, p.14)

178 Seers, "Statistical Sovereignty", in Dasgupta and Seers (eds), "Statistical Policy in Less Developed Countries", p.42.

179 Seers, "Some points arising from the first meeting of regional associations and its follow-up", pp.1 & 4.

180 Seers "What Business is it of Ours?", pp.3-4.

181 Seers, "Why Visiting Economists Fail", *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. LXX, No. 4, August 1962, p.326; he observed that there were those who were "incapable of the more delicate tasks of supervising foreigners. (Xenophobia is always present, either actually or potentially.)"

182 Seers, "Back to the Ivory Tower", p.8.

183 Seers, "Birth Life and Death of Development Economics", p. 712.

184 Seers, "Back to the Ivory Tower", p.8.

185 Seers, "European Conscience and European Social Science", p.2. The quotation continued: "When acting as propagandists for the aid lobby, we have used concepts like 'aid' or even 'resource transfers' too heterogeneous to have much meaning. We have not spent much time studying whether aid of various types aggravates inequalities, stifles political change or inhibits technological autonomy. We have even encouraged the adoption of global 'aid' targets." However the evolvement of Seers' views on aid will be considered more fully in the next chapter.

186 Seers, "What Business is it of Ours?", p.8.

187 Seers, "The 1980's and Third Quinquennium Strategy", 10 September 1974 (WP3), p.1.

188 Ibid. p.2.

189 Richard Jolly, "Dudley Seers 1920-1983: His Contributions to Development Perspectives, Policy and Studies", IDS Bulletin, July 1989, No. 3. Jolly adds "Nor should he have resisted: he was at his most creative on such occasions, and produced to my mind some of his best work".

190 Seers, "Some Points Arising from the First Meeting of Regional Associations", p.3.

191 Seers, "Back to the Ivory Tower", p.6.

192 Seers, "What Business is it of Ours", p.1.

193 Seers, "European Conscience and European Social Science", p.2. He also added "We have also - unconsciously - encouraged Anglophone, Francophone and Hispanic elites in the rest of the world to look primarily to Europe for patterns of intellectual consumption."

194 Seers, "Back to the Ivory Tower", p.9.

195 Ibid.

196 Seers, "The 1980s and the Third Quinquennium Strategy", 10 September 1974, p.5.

197 Seers,"European Conscience and European Social Science", p.7.

198 Seers, "Back to the Ivory Tower", p.9; and Seers, "Introduction", in de Bandt, Mándi, and Seers (eds), *European Studies in Development*, p.xviii.

199 Seers, "The Cultural Lag in Economics", IDS *Discussion Paper* 137, August 1978, abstract. A paper prepared for the opening session of a conference on the relevance of economic theories organised by the International Economic Association (IEA) in collaboration with the Polish Economic Association at Warsaw in June 1978.

200 See Seers, unpublished "Preface" (1969), p.6; see also Chapter 3, note 166; and Seers, "The Birth Life and Death of Development Economics (revisiting a Manchester Conference), *Development and Change*, Vol. 10, 1979.

201 Seers, "What Business is it of Ours", p.7.

202 See Seers, "The Congruence of Marxism and other Neo-Classical Doctrines", in *Toward a New Strategy for Development*, a Rothko Chapel Colloquium, New York, Pergamon Press, 1979. Also produced as IDS *Discussion Paper* 136, August 1978. Page numbers here from the 1979 book version.

203 See Warren, "The Postwar Economic Experience of the Third World"; Ohlin, "Development in

Retrospect"; and Cooper, "Developed Country Reactions to Calls for a New International Economic Order", all in *Toward a New Strategy for Development*, op.cit.

204 Seers, "The Congruence of Marxism and other Neo-Classical Doctrines", p.2. Like Peter Bauer, Warren argued that the dynamism of capitalism should not be impeded by the "garbled liberal-populist outlook" advocating egalitarian policies which, although appearing benevolent, were ultimately reactionary and likely to aggravate poverty (Warren, "The Postwar Economic Experience of the Third World", p.168).

205 See Seers, *Political Economy of Nationalism*, pp.29-30.

206 Ibid.

207 See Seers' arguments in "The Cultural Lag in Economics"; also Seers, "Development Options: The Strengths and Weaknesses of Dependency Theories in Explaining a Government's Room to Manoeuvre", in *Dependency Theory: A Critical Reassessment*, London: Frances Pinter, 1981, p.138; papers presented at a conference attended by IDS staff and Polish social scientists, held at Ojrzanow in Poland in 1979.

208 Seers, "Introduction", in Seers (ed.), *Dependency Theory: A Critical Reassessment*, 1981, p.15.

209 See Seers' arguments in "Latin Lessons for Us All".

210 Seers, *Political Economy of Nationalism*, p. 9. In fact an earlier title he had in mind for this book was "*Letting Go* - of Archaic Economics, of Romantic Politics, of Mechanistic Planning, of Paternalistic Intervention".

211 This classification had been convenient to all groups concerned, maintained Seers: "Governments of 'developing' countries use it as means of pressure on the 'developed' to obtain commitments such as the generalisation of preferences and aid targets, etc. It is also convenient to the Communist bloc that the main division encouraged the former colonies to address their demands to the former metropolitan countries. While the government of 'developed' countries found these demands irksome, they accepted, for various reasons, that they did have some interest in helping the 'developing' countries to become 'developed', in the foreseeable future, without passing through a Communist phase." (Seers, "A new look at the three world classification", p.8.)

212 Seers, "The World Context of Development", p.14. "Petroleum economies show high income levels and limited agricultural sectors, but many characteristics of dependent countries, both externally and internally, especially dependence on foreign companies. Still since our main criterion is dependence, rather than income, these can clearly be included in the Third World" (p.14, section II par 24).

213 Seers, "What Business is it of Ours", address to founding conference of EADI, 26 September 1974.

214 Seers, *Journey report*, Tokyo, 8-18 November 1975. This lecture he delivered, amongst other venues, to a consultative meeting of the United Nations University in Tokyo in November 1975 and used as the basis for seminars at the Universities of Harvard and Puerto Rico, before it was published in 1976 ("A New Look at the Three World Classification" *IDS Bulletin*, vol. 7, no. 4, 1976; see *note on p.8).

215 Seers, "Conflicting and Mutual Interests in the 1980s", *Links*, No.9 Third World First publication 1979, p.19

216 Seers, "A New Look at the Three World Classification", p.8-9.

217 Ibid.

218 Ibid.

219 Seers, "Patterns of Dependence", in *Transnational Capitalism and National Development*, (ed. José Villamil), Hassocks: Harvester, 1979, p.101.

220 See Seers, "The Congruence of Marxism and other Neo-Classical Doctrines", pp. 12 and 9.

221 See Seers, "The Cultural Lag in Economics", pp.13-14.

222 See ibid., p.13; see also transcript of interview with Seers in M. Blomstrom and B. Hettne, *Development Theory in Transition*, London: Zed Press, 1984, p.200, n.1.

223 Seers, "Introduction", in Seers (ed.), *Dependency Theory*, pp. 16 and 17. See also arguments in "Development Options" in same volume.

224 Seers, "The World Context of Development", p.11 par.II.12 and p.9 par II.6.

225 Ibid., p.9 par. II.7.

226 Ibid., p.5, par.I.16. Maintained Seers in a paper entitled - "How important is cultural dependence?" (*IDS Bulletin*, Vol.7, No.1, April 1975, pp.1 and 2): "Imported films, imported television programmes, imported novels, imported magazines and imported educational systems, have a greater significance than has been accorded to them in the past by economists. In all countries consumer demand is

influenced in some degree by emulation of foreigners. But in countries where markets and research facilities are limited, patterns of consumption, and therefore of production, are not so much influenced as determined by foreign example. So is the choice of technology" (p.1).

227 Seers, "Development Options: the strengths and weaknesses of dependency theories", p.140.

228 Seers, "A New Look at the Three World Classification", p.10. He went on to explain "I could ... go a step further and suggest that while political and (especially) cultural determinants of a government's room to manoeuvre, are important, there is a greater long-term reality to a country's population and resource base" (p.10) which obviously subordinates the importance of cultural dependence to other indigenous factors.

229 Ibid.,p.9.

230 Ibid., n.2.

231 See Seers, *The Political Economy of Nationalism*, pp. 57, 68-9 and 108-9.

232 Seers, "A New Look at the Three World Classification", p.10; see also Seers, "Patterns of Dependence", p.100.

233 Seers, "Patterns of Dependence", p.108.

234 See Seers, *Political Economy of Nationalism*, p.83. In this later version of the table, countries were categorised as "least dependent", "moderately dependent", "heavily dependent" or "most dependent". Whereas in earlier versions of the table, China had been classed as a net importer of only one key import, technology, in this later version it was classified as being a net importer of two key imports - cereals, in addition to technology.

235 Ibid., p.111 n.18. The earlier classification is contained in Seers, "The Stages of Economic Development of a Primary Producer in the Middle of the Twentieth Century", *The Economic Bulletin of Ghana*, Vol. VII, No. 4, 1963.

236 Seers, "The World Context of Development", pp.15-16, par.II.31.

237 Seers, "Patterns of dependence", p.109.

238 Ibid. and Seers, "A New Look at the Three World Classification", p.12.

239 Seers, "The New Meaning of Development", pp.4/5.

240 Seers, "Alternative Scenarios for 'Developing' Countries", pp.17-18 & n.20

241 Seers, "The World Context of Development", p.16 pars II.33 and II.34

242 Seers, "Alternative Scenarios for 'Developing' Countries", p.18. Even China, he argued, had found it could not sever itself off completely from the rest of the world.

243 Seers, "The New Meaning of Development", p.6.

244 Seers, "Alternative Scenarios for Developing Countries", p.18.

245 Ibid.

246 Seers to Prof. Kinhide Mushakoji, "Comment on 'Technology transfer, transformation and development: the Japanese experience' (UNU project proposal by Takeshi Hayashi)", Dec. 1977, p.1.

However, it seems Seers did not consider Japan was so self sufficient in its social science programmes, which he commented were still "in the grip of overseas models". At the OECD meeting in Paris on 15 June 1976, reviewing the social sciences in Japan, Seers' main contribution to the discussion was to advise more interdisciplinary interaction in order to encourage and facilitate Japanese social scientists to build their own models drawing on social phenomenon in Japan itself and so reduce reliance on overseas models. It seems then that *despite* reliance on overseas models, which Seers discouraged as irrelevant for most developing countries, Japan had nevertheless been successful in pursuing a self reliant strategy. (See *Social Sciences Policy: Japan*, OECD, Paris, 1977, p.189)

247 Seers, "The New Meaning of Development", p.5.

248 See Seers' arguments in "Export-Oriented Development Strategies", mimeo, 29 March 1979.

249 Seers, "The New Meaning of Development", p.5.

250 Seers, "A New Look at the Three World Classification", p.12.

251 See ibid.

252 There were dangers in the basic needs approach, he maintained in a draft article (prepared for but not published in the *IDS Bulletin*) in 1978, in that it could encourage paternalism and public passivity, divert attention away from the more fundamental task of distribution and the problems of all save the poorest countries - and implied interventionist aid policies. This did not mean, however, that emphasis on basic needs should be opposed - some such intervention he believed was justified particularly where the welfare of children was concerned - but he felt social scientists would make a greater contribution

towards satisfying basic needs if they focused attention less on generalisations about policy objectives and instruments, and more on the forces in specific countries, including external forces, that prevented constructive policies being implemented. (See Seers "Some problems with the concept of basic needs", mimeo, 13 January 1978.)

253 Seers, *First Things First*, p.19, par.40; in fact he continued "There are some crucial requirements common to both basic needs and self-reliance, for example, rural development, the avoidance of inappropriate foreign technology, and inhibiting the cultivation of tastes for luxury goods."

254 Seers, "A New Look at the Three World Classification", p.12; see also Seers, "New Meaning of Development" p.5, and Seers, "The World Context of Development" p.36.

255 Seers, "A New Look at the Three World Classification", p.12. Both Marxists and conventional Anglo-Saxon economists were united in belittling the influence of nationalism and treating it as evil, he maintained.

256 Seers, "The New Meaning of Development", p.6.

257 Seers, *The Political Economy of Nationalism*, p.viii.

258 Seers, "The Congruence of Marxism and Other Neo-Classical Doctrine", pp.13-15. Seers acknowledged that the use of two dimensions of ideology was not original - Eysenck had used tough-mindedness with the Left-Right dimension; and others had used democracy as the second dimension.

259 The title of one of his articles was "The Birth, Life and Death of Development Economics" in *Development and Change*, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1979.

260 Seers, "New Meaning of Development", p.6.

261 Seers, "What Business is it of Ours?", p.5.

262 See Seers, "Address by the Elected President of EADI", in *The New International Economic Order - Economic, Social and Political Implications*, report on the 1975 General Conference of EADI, Linz, Austria, 11-13 September 1975,

263 Seers, "Development Studies in Western Europe", p.6. This was another example, said Seers, of refugees providing sources of new ideas since Oteiza was then exiled from his home country.

264 Seers, "Back to the Ivory Tower", pp.11 and 8n.4; the early work Seers was referring to were Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, "Problems of the Industrialisation of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe", *Economic Journal*, June-Sept. 1943, and Kurt Mandelbaum, *The Industrialisation of Backward Areas*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1947.

265 See Seers, "Introduction", in Seers (ed.), *Dependency Theory*, pp. 13 and 15.

266 Seers, "The Birth, Life and Death of Development Economics", p.715. By taking note of theoretical developments in other areas of the world, Seers maintained, European institutions could also put forward alternative views of development when addressing their own politicians and officials to counteract some of the negative influences and "naive ideologies" flowing out of Europe (Seers, "Some Points Arising from the First Meeting of Regional Associations").

267 M.Phil. Faculty and students, "North Sea Oil: The Application of Development Theories", *IDS Communication* 121

268 See, for example, Seers, "Latin Lessons for Us All", *Built Environment*, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1979; "Inflation: the Latin America Experience" and "Inflation: a Sketch for a Theory of World Inflation", *IDS Discussion Papers* 168 and 169, November 1981; "Structuralism vs Monetarism in Latin America: A Reappraisal with Lessons for Europe in the 1980s", ISS, The Hague, 1982.

269 Seers, "Some Points Arising from the First Meeting of Regional Associations", p.3

270 Seers, "What Business is it of Ours?", p.8

271 Seers, "Some points arising from the first meeting of regional associations", p.3

272 Seers, *Journey Report*, Lima, 20-25 December 1980.

273 Seers, "What Business is it of Ours", p.6.

274 Seers, "The International Context within which European Experts Work", in J. C. Stone (ed.) *Experts in Africa*, Aberdeen, Aberdeen University African Studies Group, p.156.

275 See, for example, *First Things First*, p.17, par.29; here in the context of discussing equality and distribution, he observed it was no business of an international mission to advocate some particular ideology, egalitarian or otherwise.

276 Seers, "The New Meaning of Development", p.7.

277 Seers, "The Cultural Lag in Economics", p.16.

Chapter 7: Towards Disengagement and a Regionalist Solution

1 Seers, *The Political Economy of Nationalism*, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1983.
2 Seers, "The New Meaning of Development", *International Development Review*, Vol. XIX, No. 3, 1977, p.7.
3 Seers, "The Choice of Strategy", Lecture 3 to 13th SEANZA Central Banking Course, Jakarta, 19-24 September 1980.
4 In Seers, *The Political Economy of Nationalism*, Section B discussing these issues is entitled "The Constraints on Nationalism".
5 Seers, Abstract of "Development Options: The Strengths and Weaknesses of Dependency Theories in Explaining a Government's Room to Manoeuvre", in *IDS Discussion Paper* 165, September 1981. Seers first delivered this paper, giving general consideration to the constraints on policy, at a conference on dependency held in Ojrzanow, Poland, in October 1979, organised jointly by Warsaw University and IDS. Unless otherwise stated, page references from now on refer to the version which appears in Seers (ed.), *Dependency Theory: A Critical Assessment* (London: Frances Pinter, 1981) which contains the main papers presented at this conference.
6 Seers, "Development Options", p.143.
7 Ibid., p.137.
8 Ibid.
9 Seers, Abstract of "Development Options", in *IDS Discussion Paper* 165, September 1981.
10 Seers, "Statistical Sovereignty", in B. Dasgupta and Seers (eds), *Statistical Policy in Less Developed Countries*, based on discussions at the Conference on Statistical Policy in Less Developed Countries, 12-14 May 1975, IDS, p.42.
11 Seers, "The New Meaning of Development", pp.5 and 7.
12 Seers, "Public Sector Investment and Development Strategy in a Small Open Economy", in *Investment in Fiji*, proceedings of a seminar organised by the Government of Fiji in conjunction with the Tripartite Forum of Fiji, 19-23 March, 1979, Suva, Fiji: South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation, p.6. The advantages of public investment, he argued, was that a government could impose its own strategic priorities on public corporations, for example, by choosing where and what technology to buy in the interests of job creation, avoiding too much concentration of economic activity in a particular area to prevent regional disparities, and ensuring that profits remained in the country and flowed to public bodies - ultimately the government.
13 Seers, "Can a TNC Enterprise be Socially Responsible?", in Roger Gurr (ed.), *Transnational Corporations and Developing Countries*, proceedings of a conference organised by the Lesotho National Development Corporation on behalf of the Government of Lesotho, Maseru, 23-25 March 1977, p.50. As a small country, highly dependent on a dominant neighbour, Seers referred to Puerto Rico as a particularly relevant example for an audience in Lesotho, to whom this paper was addressed. He pointed out that its rapid growth rate, encouraged by capital intensive foreign investment, had resulted in dramatic unemployment levels and emigration, a government heavily in debt, and a country immersed in mainland cultural values, which had resulted in "demoralisation and denationalisation" (ibid., p.52).
14 Seers contribution to the Fiji seminar in *Investment in Fiji*, p.16; from the context it appears he was referring to a visit to Cuba in November 1977.
15 Seers, "Development Options", p.137; "...the very existence of the TNCs raises the penalties of delinking (one of the usually ignored costs of inviting them in)" he remarked (ibid.)
16 Seers, "Can a TNC be Socially Responsible?", p.49.
17 Ibid., p.53.
18 Seers, "Latin Lessons for Us All", in *Built Environment*, Vol. 5, No. 2, p.89.
19 Remarked Seers, "In Uruguay, it will shortly be impossible to remain an employee in the public sector without a letter from the police - to certify, incredible though it may seem, that the bearer believes in a 'democracy'!" (ibid. p.89). He also mentioned the example of West Germany where the policy of "Berufsverbot" had been used to prevent Leftists getting employment, even in menial posts; and East Germany where it was hard for dissidents to get any employment at all (Seers, "Public Sector Investment and Development Strategy", p.6).
20 Seers, "Public Sector Investment and Development Strategy", pp.6, 7 and n.1. Patronage could even

be formalised, remarked Seers, pointing out that "in Sri Lanka, the candidate for a public sector post has to obtain a letter of recommendation from his MP" (ibid. p.7).

21 Ibid. p.7. While agreeing that nepotism could also be found in the private sector, along with "corruption, trade union power, featherbedding, prestige projects and other forms of inefficiency, not to speak of political discrimination", Seers maintained that "the discipline of the market imposes some check on maladministration in the private sector - except in the case of monopolies" (ibid.).

22 Ibid. Whereas nationalisation of the Portuguese banking system could have provided an opportunity to rationalise it and channel more credit to the backward rural areas, in fact each bank had retained its own identity and continued much as before, he observed.

23 Ibid., p.9.

24 Seers, "Can a TNC be Socially Responsible?", p.53.

25 Seers, contribution in *Investment in Fiji*, p.16. Seers recounted that Castro allayed the fears of businessmen about possible appropriations by pointing out "if you are thinking of a country like Brazil or Venezuela as a source for investment, you had better be careful; there might be a socialist revolution" but in Cuba the revolution had already taken place, the worst was already passed (ibid.).

26 In his report on Nigeria, he observed, there had been grounds for hope in the 1960s that social problems would be relieved "provided selective industrialisation" were adopted "combined with heavy emphasis on food production backed by an expansion of essential services properly balanced geographically"; which meant adopting a strategy not of economic growth in general, but of a pattern of growth, concentrating on particular sectors and areas, combined with social development. But the Federal Planning Office (mainly staffed by expatriates) had been more concerned with accelerating growth rather than development, which had resulted in increasing dualism and social problems.(With a JASPA, Basic Needs Mission, *First Things First*, Addis Ababa, ILO JASPA, 1981, pp.2-3)

27 Seers, "Can a TNC be Socially Responsible?", p.54.

28 Seers, "Development Options", p.142.

29 Seers, "Can a TNC be Socially Responsible?", pp.53 and 54.

30 Seers, *Journey Report*, 19-28 March 1977, p.5. The conference, organised by the Lesotho National Development Corporation on behalf of the Government of Lesotho, took place in Maseru from 23 to 25 March 1977, and was attended by Lesotho officials, five representatives from IDS, other foreign academics, members of Lesotho university and representatives from the TNCs. Seers himself remarked that there developed some resentment between the TNC representatives present and the university students.

31 Seers, "Can a TNC be Socially Responsible?", p.47. This might seem a strange question, commented Seers, like asking "Can a lion be a domestic pet? Can it be toilet-trained and allowed around the house?"; however, since the purpose of the conference was to attract more foreign investment it is not surprising that his answer was "yes" but with a proviso that though "Lions are beautiful beasts,... perhaps one would be slightly cautious about letting them into one's home" (ibid.).

32 Ibid. p.49.

33 Ibid.

34 Seers, "The CIA and the Social Sciences: The Contribution of Mr Agee", review of Philip Agee, *Inside the Company: CIA Diary* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), in *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 8, No. 3, March 1977, p.57.

35 Seers, "Can a TNC be Socially Responsible?", p.53.

36 Seers, "The Cultural Lag in Economics", *Discussion Paper* 137, p.9.

37 Seers, "Can a TNC be Socially Responsible?", p.54.

38 Ibid. pp.54 and 56, n.9.

39 Seers, "Public Sector Investment and Development Strategy", p.9. See also Seers, "The New Role of Development Planning, with Special Reference to Small Countries", paper delivered to Conference on Small Economies", London 2-5 June 1981, p.17.

40 Seers, "Development Options", p.140.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Seers, "Inflation and Growth in Latin America: the Heart of the Controversy", in W. Baer and I. Kerstenetzky (eds), *Inflation and Growth in Latin America*, Richard D. Irwin Inc., 1964, pp.101-2.

44 Seers, "The Tendency to Financial Irresponsibility of Socialist Governments and its Political

Consequences", *IDS Discussion Paper*, 1981, p.8.

45 Seers, "Development Options", p.140.

46 Seers, "The Tendency to Financial Irresponsibility of Socialist Governments and its Political Consequences", p.8.

47 Seers, *Journey Report*, Arusha, 30 June-3 July 1980, p.1.

48 Ibid. p.2.

49 Ibid. (Although the IMF was not an official sponsor of seminars, Seers had in fact initially referred to the planned "IBRD-IMF conference" (Seers, *Journey Report*, Washington, 25-29 February 1980, p.4)).

50 Seers, *Journey Report*, Washington 5-18 May 1980, p.4.

51 Ibid., p.1: "I worked on mending fences with the IMF (whose resentments over the Rio Conference of 1962 still linger)". The Rio Conference referred to was the Structuralist/Monetarist Debate (see Chapter 2, p.84) held in fact in January 1963, a time when Seers embraced the structuralist arguments against monetarism.

52 Chairman's conclusions in Commonwealth Secretariat, *Seminars on Adjustment Policies*, p.38; see also p.19. He suggested they should explore the possibility of setting up a technical committee on the application of conditionality to shoulder some of the responsibility currently resting on desk officers.

53 Seers, "Development Options", p.145.

54 Seers, *Journey Report*, Arusha, 30 June-3 July 1980, p.1 n.1.

55 Chairman's conclusions in Commonwealth Secretariat, *Seminars on Adjustment Policies*, p.38; "failure to alter exchange rates; agricultural pricing; unrealistic interest rates; the large resources absorbed and often wasted by parastatals; and project selection based on political and other non-economic considerations" were all areas in which governments themselves could take action, maintained Seers.

56 Seers, "Development Options", p.140, and pp.147-8 n.18.

57 Seers, "The CIA and the Social Sciences: The Contribution of Mr Agee", review of Philip Agee's *Inside the Company: CIA Diary* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), in *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 8, No. 3, March 1977, p.57 and n.17.

58 Seers, "Development Options", p.140.

59 Ibid., p.141.

60 Seers, *The Political Economy of Nationalism*, p.72.

61 Seers, "Time for an End to Neo-paternalism", p.4.

62 See Seers, "Development Options", pp.145-6 and Seers, *Political Economy of Nationalism*, p.72.

63 Seers, "Time for an End to Neo-paternalism", p.5.

64 See his argument in Seers, "The Tendency to Financial Irresponsibility of Socialist Governments and its Political Consequences", op.cit. This was first written as a preface to Stephany Griffith-Jones, *The Role of Finance in the Transition to Socialism* (London: Frances Pinter, 1981) - a study of the early years of the Communist government in the Soviet Union, the Leftist coalition in Czechoslovakia and the Unidad Popular administration in Chile - but was reproduced as an IDS Discussion paper.

65 Ibid., and Seers, *Political Economy of Nationalism*, pp.124-5.

66 Seers, "The Tendency to Financial Irresponsibility of Socialist Governments and its Political Consequences", pp. 7 and 5. Even Britain he considered had a lesson to learn; for while the Labour government of 1974-9 could hardly be called "socialist" it had attempted "to shield the working class from the consequences of the post-colonial economic decline, at the cost of budgetary discipline", but when wages policies collapsed, here too the government was replaced by one dedicated to "financial respectability" (though at the cost of rapidly rising unemployment) (ibid. p.6).

67 Seers, *Political Economy of Nationalism*, pp. 60-2, 126.

68 Seers, "Latin Lessons for Us All", p.89.

69 Seers, *Political Economy of Nationalism*, p.61

70 Seers, "Development Options", p.143.

71 Seers, "The New Role of Development Planning, with Special Reference to Small Countries", paper presented to a Conference on Small Economies, London, 2-5 June 1981, p.14.

72 Seers, "Development Options", p.141.

73 Ibid., pp. 141 and 144.

74 Seers, "The New Role of Development Planning", p.13.

75 Seers, "Development Options", p.142.

76 Seers, "The New Role of Development Planning", p.20.

77 See ibid., p.15, and *First Things First*, p.37.
78 Seers, *Political Economy of Nationalism*, p.63.
79 See Seers, "Development Options", p.143 and Seers, *Political Economy of Nationalism*, p.102.
80 Seers, "The New Role of Development Planning", p.15 and n.1
81 Ibid., p.22.
82 Seers, "Development Options", p.145. "Conventional historians" he remarked, "may not have been so wrong in focussing attention on the talents of monarchs and prime ministers!" (ibid.).
83 Ibid. Cf. his comments in "The New Meaning of Development" (Chapter 6, p.301) where he seemed optimistic that an appeal to nationalism was stronger than social conscience and might outweigh short-term material interests even among the elite.
84 Seers, "Development Options", p.144. Even liabilities could be turned into assets, he remarked, for example, "a government heavily in debt may be able to take advantage of the fact that the creditor could not stand default".
85 See, Seers, *Political Economy of Nationalism*, p.93; also Seers, "Development Options", pp.148-9 n.32.
86 Seers, "The New Role of Development Planning", p.22 n.1.
87 Seers, *Political Economy of Nationalism*, p. 96.
88 Ibid., p.97; "Whatever the foreign elements in a leader's education and career, and whatever lip-service is paid to economic liberalism, or Marxism, he may actually have some perception of, even a degree of dedication to, his country's needs", maintained Seers (ibid.).
89 Douglas Rimmer, "On Their Own Feet", review of *Political Economy of Nationalism*, in the *Times Higher Education Supplement*, 3 April 1983.
90 Seers, "The Choice of Strategy", lecture 3 to 13th SEANZA Central Banking Course, 19-24 September 1980, pp.3 and 4.
91 Seers, *First Things First*, p.12.
92 Seers, "Development Options", p. 146.
93 Seers, "The New Role of Development Planning", p.11.
94 Seers, "Statistical Needs for Development", *IDS Communication* 120, 1977, p.2.
95 Ibid., p.1.
96 Ibid., p.14.
97 Seers, *Short-term research consultant for the Malaysian Centre for Development Studies (MCDS) Prime Minister's Department, Kuala Lumpur*, "Project findings and recommendations", United Nations for the United Nations Development Programme (DP/UN/MAL-74-002/1) (Restricted), 1975, p.3; (henceforth called *Malaysia report*).
98 Seers, "Statistical Needs for Development", p.1.
99 Biplab Dasgupta, "Introduction", in Dasgupta and Seers (eds), *Statistical Policy in Less Developed Countries*, *IDS Communication* 114, 1975, p.3; this edition of *IDS Communication* is based on the discussions at the Conference on Statistical Policy in LDCs held at IDS, 12-16 May 1975.
100 Seers, "Statistical Sovereignty", in Dasgupta and Seers (eds), *Statistical Policy in Less Developed Countries*, pp.42-3.
101 Seers, "Summary", in Dasgupta and Seers (eds), *Statistical Policy in Less Developed Countries*, p.1.
102 Seers, "Statistical Offices of International Agencies", in Dasgupta and Seers (eds), *Statistical Policy in Less Developed Countries*, p.37.
103 Seers produced a paper the month following the conference - "The structure, content and uses of the revised SNA, in the light of the requirements and circumstances of 'developing' countries" (IDS Staff Paper, 19 June 1975), which he then presented at the United Nations regional seminar on national accounting in Caracas, in December 1975. This later formed the basis for "Statistical Needs for Development", *IDS Communication* 120. Seers also wrote in 1976 a fuller critique of the SNA in "The Political Economy of National Accounting" which was produced in a volume of essays in honour of Hans Singer (Alec Cairncross and Mohinder Puri (eds), *Problems of the Developing Countries: Essays in Honour of H.W. Singer*, Macmillan, 1976).
104 Seers, "The Political Economy of National Accounting", p.196.
105 Seers, "Statistical Needs for Development", p.6.
106 Seers, *Malaysia report*, pp. 2-3.
107 Seers, "Statistical Needs for Development", p.7.

108 Seers, "The Political Economy of National Accounting", p.196.
109 Ibid. p.200.
110 Ibid. pp.200-1. Even in the Burma report of 1951 he had observed that though the average Burmese income was 40 times less than the USA, this did not mean that their welfare was 40 times less, since there were other considerations to be taken into account (see Chapter 1, pp.46-7).
111 Michael Lipton, *Why Poor People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in World Development*, London: Temple Smith, 1977.
112 See Seers, "'Urban Bias' - Seers versus Lipton", *IDS Discussion Paper* 116, August 1977. Seers himself frequently drew attention to the "dualism" experienced in many LDCs but tended to identify the fundamental divide as being between the "modern" sector dominated by foreign techniques and tastes and the more "traditional" sector, rather than concentrating on the urban/rural divide.
113 Seers, "Political Economy of National Accounting", p.204; the task was one of "rearranging bricks rather than pulling the structure down and building another with quite different materials," maintained Seers. As he put it elsewhere it was a question of "effecting continual compromises between the ideal and practical" (Seers, "Statistical Needs for Development", p.4).
114 Seers, "Statistical Needs for Development", p.5.
115 Seers, "Political Economy of National Accounting", p.204.
116 Seers, "Statistical Needs for Development", p.13.
117 Ibid. p.8. See also p.9.
118 *Malaysia Report*, pp.29 and 7.
119 The UNICEF study, "Effects of World Recession on Children", was only completed after Seers' death but a special volume of *World Development* (Vol. 12, No.3, 1984) devoted to is findings was dedicated to Seers and his contribution acknowledged (ibid., p.169).
120 *Malaysia Report*, p.17.
121 Seers, *First Things First: Meeting the Basic Needs of the People of Nigeria*, ILO JASPA, Addis Ababa, 1981, p.13. Diagrams indicated the main linkages in satisfying basic needs in Nigeria and the role that could be played by public sector policy and resources (ibid., pp.22 and 23).
122 Seers *Political Economy of Nationalism*, p.99.
123 Seers, "Active Life Profiles for Different Social Groups: a contribution to demographic accounting, a frame for social indicators and a tool of social and economic analysis" *IDS Discussion Paper* 178, September 1982, p.7.
124 Seers, "A Note on Time, the Neglected Numeraire", 16 June 1981. Prepared as a basis for a Sussex seminar, revised for the life cycles workshop.
125 Seers, "Active Life Profiles for Different Social Groups", pp.4-5; "income is not welfare, not even a proxy;" he argued, "it is one input into welfare, whereas the pattern and length of life are its dimensions" (ibid., p.33).
126 Seers, "Life Expectancy as an Integrating Concept in Social and Demographic Analysis and Planning", *Review of Income and Wealth*, No. 3, September 1977.
127 Ibid., Table 2, p.197.
128 Seers, "Active Life Profiles for Different Social Groups", p.6.
129 See Seers' review of Richard Stone's *Towards a System of Social and Demographic Statistics* (Studies in Methods, series F, no.18, United Nations, 1975) entitled "A System of Social and Demographic Statistics: a review note", *The Economic Journal*, 86 (September 1976) pp.595-8. Seers considered its advice invited similar criticism to that levelled against the SNA, regarding the report as highly Eurocentric using data from England and Wales for most of its empirical applications and giving little recognition to the varying suitability of concepts in different social contexts; it also made little provision for exploring the causes of social inequality, had no indicators to assess foreign influences, and made the incorrect assumption that there existed usable statistics in most countries for constructing social matrices. Seers also commented that Stone's system made no mention of indicators of anomie in society (e.g. suicide rates, drug taking, psychiatric illness).

In a review of a book attempting to construct a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Sri Lanka, Seers again drew attention to the difficulty of constructing such a matrix when relevant and reliable statistics were not available. Although he recognised that a SAM had advantages for the kind of structural analysis increasingly demanded in development economics, particularly with its treatment of the interaction of income distribution with other variables, including household consumption patterns

by social group, estimates of data were often wildly wrong but were often treated as concrete reality. Contrast, said Seers, "the practice of good carpenters, who do not use flawed materials in a frame designed to carry a heavy weight, and adjust the design if need be to the characteristics of the wood." (See Seers, Review of Graham Pyatt, Alan R. Roe *et al.*'s *Social Accounting for Development Planning. With Special Reference to Sri Lanka* (Cambridge University Press, 1978), in *The Economic Journal*, December 1978, pp.880-2.)

130 Seers, "Active Life Profiles for Different Social Groups", p.9.

131 Ibid.

132 Ibid.

133 An outline of the various studies undertaken is described in Seers, "Active Life Profiles for Different Social Groups".

134 Ibid., p.32.

135 Seers, "Life Expectancy as an Integrating Concept in Social and Demographic Analysis and Planning", p.200; "The basic assumption behind official use of the system proposed here would be that the length and pattern of life of a human being is in some degree the responsibility of the government of the country where he or she lives. The preparation of variants showing data separately for different races, for example, would carry a tacit assumption that if some section of the population was significantly worse off than the national average in some respect, this would justify special corrective policies. A social development plan based on such a system would convey the powerful message that the official intention was to achieve specific improvements in the quality of life" (ibid.).

136 Seers, "Active Life Profiles for Different Social Groups", pp.28-9.
In 1977 he had pointed out that for countries where the legitimacy of the government was in question, it might be considered a further weakness of the framework that it focused attention on the social service aspects of state-individual relations, and that other important social experiences, such as participation in decision-making, and the incidence of corruption, police brutality, and bureaucratic power, could not easily be expressed within the scheme; but he still nevertheless concluded that on the whole it provided "an articulated frame for so many types of socially relevant data which could be broken down to fit particular social models" (Seers, "Life Expectancy as an Integrating Concept in Social and Demographic Analysis and Planning", p.200).

137 Seers assesses the benefits and advantages of active life profiles in "Active Life Profiles for Different Social Groups", pp.29-30.

138 FS, "Dudley Seers, an Appreciation", *Third World Quarterly*, 5(3), July 1983, p.657. Richard Jolly agrees that Seers' work on social accounting was "certainly innovative" though is not sure "to what extent this innovation has been taken up or taken further". His own impression is that not much has in fact been done on life profiles since Seers' death "in part because composite indices like the human development index or the earlier PQLI distract attention from more serious efforts like Dudley's" (R. Jolly, letter to M. Lipscomb, 14 February 1993).

139 Biplab Dasgupta, "Introduction", in Dasgupta and Seers (eds), *Statistical Policy in Less Developed Countries*, p.5. For example, Dasgupta maintains, "the problems of measuring poverty and income distribution, the contribution of the self-employed to national income, or the problem of transfer pricing and interference of politicians are no less serious in the developed countries of Western Europe and North America".

140 Seers, "Statistical Need for Development", p.13.

141 Papers presented at the first conference 1977 were revised in the light of discussion, edited by Seers, Bernard Schaffer and Marja-Liisa Kiljunen and published under the title *Underdeveloped Europe: Studies in Core-Periphery Relations*, (Harvester, 1979).

142 Seers, "The Periphery of Europe", in Seers, Schaffer and Kiljunen (eds), *Underdeveloped Europe*, op.cit., p.29.

143 Seers, "Introduction", in *Underdeveloped Europe*, p.xix.

144 Seers, "The European Periphery", draft for BBC broadcast, 1 February 1978, p.7.

145 At its second meeting in Milan in September 1978 held during the (EADI) Assembly, the Group considered the implications of EEC enlargement not only on Europe but also on the lesser developed countries and the wider effect of Europe's external policies. (A selection of papers from this meeting was reproduced in Jacques de Bandt, Peter Mándi and Seers (eds), *European Studies in Development*, Macmillan and EADI, 1980; a complete report *Europe and World Development* (edited by Sergio

Bortolani) containing plenary session speeches was published separately by FINAFRICA (the host organisation).)

The meeting at IDS in May-June 1979 (organised with financial assistance from the Banco Exterior de Espana, the Agricultural Bank of Greece, and the Gulbenkian Foundation of Portugal, as well as the EEC) looked critically at the working record of the EEC, in order to provide a background to the issues raised by the prospective enlargement, discussing in particular whether the Community tended to increase or reduce inequalities within and between its member countries and in the world as a whole. (See Seers and Constantine Vaitsos, with M-L. Kiljunen, *Integration and Unequal Development: The Experience of the EEC*, Macmillan, 1980 (the first in the new series entitled "Studies in the Integration of Western Europe").

The conference in Madrid (15 to 20 October 1979) considered the prospective enlargement from the viewpoint of the nine existing and three prospective members including case studies of Greece, Portugal and Spain, examining their economic characteristics, motives for joining, and the problems and opportunities posed by membership. This resulted in 2 volumes: Seers and Vaitsos (eds), *The Second Enlargement of the EEC: The Integration of Unequal Partners* , Macmillan, 1982; and José Luis Sampedro and Juan Antonio Payno (eds), *The Enlargement of the European Community: Case Studies of Greece, Portugal and Spain*, Macmillan, 1983.

During 1980 the work of the European Periphery Group encompassed a wider range of countries including Sweden and Finland which led to their 1981 conference being held in February at the University of Lulea, Finland, as part of the university's 10th birthday celebrations. The meeting was particularly concerned with the regional disparities in Western Europe, the effects of recession and policies adopted to deal with these problems in Finland, Sweden, Yugoslavia, Portugal and Spain. Papers presented at the meeting were collected in Seers and Kjell Öström (eds), *The Crises of the European Regions* Macmillan in association with EADI, 1983.

146 Seers, "The Application of Development Theories within Europe", in István Dobozi and Péter Mándi (eds), *Emerging Development Patterns*, selected papers of Third General Conference of EADI, Budapest 11-14 November 1981, p.519. By 1981 Greece had joined the community, though Spain and Portugal had another 5 years to wait before admission.

147 Seers, "The Periphery of Europe", in *Underdeveloped Europe*, p. 29.

148 Ibid., p.31; see ibid., pp. 27-31 for the substance of his argument in 1977.

149 Ibid., p.8.

150 Ibid., pp.18-19.

151 Ibid. p.3.

152 Ibid. p.6.

153 Tables were produced to demonstrate the impact of migrant labour and tourism on foreign exchange receipts in peripheral countries (ibid., Tables 51-55, pp. 311-17). Seers maintained that in 1970, for example, the receipts from tourism and migration as proportions of total exports of merchandise in Greece, Portugal and Spain were 86%, 80% and 88% respectively (see ibid., Table 1, p.6) and produced diagrams of the flow of migrants workers and tourists between core and periphery countries (see ibid., pp. 4 and 5).

154 Ibid., pp.23-4. As Seers pointed out, West Germany announced the *Gastarbeiterstop* in 1973; France a year later announced a temporary halt to all immigration (having previously already taken steps to tighten the regulation of immigrant workers with measures such as the Franco-Portuguese protocol of 1971 and further general controls in 1972) and in 1977 offered cash payments of 10,000 francs to unemployed workers on public assistance if they gave up their rights to social benefits and left France; while Switzerland, in 1975, adopted a policy of reducing the immigrant labour force, following a referendum.

155 Ibid., p.7.

156 Ibid. p.16. Seers also classified Finland as semi-peripheral; after debating the similarities between the situations of Finland and Ireland (which he had categorised as in the periphery).

157 Ibid., p.20.

158 Ibid., pp. 25 and 27.

159 Ibid., pp. 25 and 26. Third World experience also indicated, he argued, that purely financial policies were not likely to be effective even in the short term and it was dangerous to treat symptoms - such as inflation - as if they were basic problems, rather than identifying its structural causes.

At the later meeting of the group in Milan in 1978 he commented "It is perhaps easier for development specialists based in Europe to grasp the limited relevance of economic growth than it is for their Japanese or United States colleagues" though even in Europe, he observed, some economists and politicians still assumed resumption of growth was a sufficient cure for the chronic unemployment and social problems that afflicted the continent. (Seers, "Introduction" in de Bandt, Mándi and Seers (eds), *European Studies in Development*, p.xvii.)

160 Seers, "The Periphery of Europe", in *Underdeveloped Europe*, p.25.

161 Ibid., p.30.

162 Seers, "The Periphery of Europe", p.27; there was Seers observed "an *a priori* expectation that it would benefit capitalists and workers who are linked with TNCs, and the professional class, including the state bureaucracy"; also Seers and C. Vaitsos, "Introduction", in *Integration and Unequal Development*, p.1.

163 Seers and C. Vaitsos, "Introduction", in *Integration and Unequal Development*, p.1.

164 Seers, "The Periphery of Europe", p.27. See also Seers, "The Second Enlargement of the EEC", pp.8 and 11.

165 Seers, "The Periphery of Europe", in *Underdeveloped Europe*, p.28.

166 Seers, "Conclusion: the EEC and unequal development", in Seers and Vaitsos (eds), *Integration and Unequal Development*, p.310.

167 Ibid., p.313.

168 Ibid., p.312.

169 Seers, "The Second Enlargement", p.10.

170 Seers, "Conclusion: the EEC and unequal development", p.315.

171 Seers, "The Periphery of Europe", in *Underdeveloped Europe*, p.30.

172 Seers, "Introduction", in *Integration and Unequal Development*, p.1.

173 Seers, "Conclusion: The EEC and Unequal Development", p.316.

174 Ibid.

175 Seers, "The Second Enlargement in Historical Perspective", p.13.

176 Ibid., pp.3-4.

177 Ibid., p.4.

178 Ibid., p.5. See also Seers, "Time for a Second Look at the Third World", pp.42-3.

179 Seers, "The Second Enlargement in Historical Perspective", pp.5 and 6.

180 Ibid., p.8.

181 Seers, "Wanted - a New Map of the World", *Guardian*, 28 May 1982.

182 Ibid., and Seers, "Time for a Second Look", p.42, where he remarks large profits and high investments had become rare "in part because of the increased sophistication of Third World negotiators and tax inspectors - especially in extracting bribes".

183 Seers, *Guardian*, 28 May 1982. The "main economic expression of nationalism", which was undermining the neo-colonial system, was industrialisation he argued in the *Political Economy of Nationalism* (p.15) which the developed countries were helping to maintain.

184 Seers, *Guardian*, 28 May 1982.

185 See Seers, "Time for a Second Look", p.42.

186 Seers, "Conclusion: the EEC and unequal development", p.316.

187 Seers, "A Different Kind of Fortress Mentality", *Guardian* 16 July 1982.

188 Seers, "Second Enlargement", pp.11-12 and Seers, "The Periphery of Europe", p.29.

189 Seers itemised a number of ways in which United States interests diverged from those of Western Europe:

1) US military power was much greater making coercive intervention more feasible as a policy option which could embarrass European associates.

2) Ideologically it was more doctrinaire, dividing nations into free and communist and having an automatically hostile response to the emergence of Left-wing governments.

3) It was committed to alliance with Israel, for internal political reasons, and therefore determined opposition to the PLO involving (possibly growing) friction with oil-exporting governments in the Middle East.

4) The US was more self sufficient in almost every resource, having comprehensive R&D capacity, being a net exporter of cereals and many metals, and being less dependent on overseas markets for

manufactures, and being able to survive a cessation of oil inputs more easily than Western Europe.
5) The geographical pattern of its interests in the Third World was different with a much greater emphasis on Latin America.
6) Its manufacturing capacity, especially in dynamic areas such as electronics, was powerfully competitive with the industries of Western Europe in world marketing, not least in the markets of Europe itself.
As such he rejected the idea of the OECD organising a programme of Northern self reliance because of the leading role in it of the United States. ("Time for an End to Neo-paternalism", pp.22-3.)

190 Seers, "The Second Enlargement", p.15.
191 Seers, *Guardian* 16 July 1982.
192 Seers, "The Second Enlargement", p.8.
193 Ibid., p.12.
194 Ibid., p.13.
195 Ibid., p.13. See also Seers, "Time for a Second Look", p.44.
196 Seers, "The Second Enlargement", p.12.
197 Seers, "The Necessity and Possibility of Establishing a New International Economic Order", p.6.
198 Seers, *The Political Economy of Nationalism*, p.177.
199 Ibid., p.174.
200 Ibid., p.12; see also Seers, "The Periphery of Europe", in *Underdeveloped Europe*, p.25.
201 Seers, "Preface: Regional Problems and Development Theory", in Seers and Öström (eds), *The Crises of the European Regions*, 1983, p.xii.
202 Seers, *The Political Economy of Nationalism*, p.171.
203 Ibid., p.171.
204 Ibid., p.173.
205 Ibid.; and Seers, "The Second Enlargement", pp. 14-15.
206 Seers, *The Political Economy of Nationalism*, p.171.
207 Seers, "Introduction", in De Bandt, Mándi and Seers (eds), *European Studies in Development*, p.xviii.
208 Ibid., pp. 172. See also Seers, "The Second Enlargement", p.14.
209 Seers, "Conclusion: the EEC and Unequal Development", p.316.
210 Seers, "The Periphery of Europe", *Underdeveloped Europe* p.30.
211 Seers, *Journey Report*, 9-23 October 1977: Warsaw 15-17 and 19-23 October, p.5.
212 Seers refers to and quotes from an article by Michael Shanks in *The Times*, 9 August 1976, which observed that the reunification of West and East Germany was becoming more of a possibility since West German industry was buying its way back into Eastern Europe and the Balkans (Seers, "The Periphery of Europe", p.33, n.33).
213 Seers, "Back to the Ivory Tower?", EADI *Information Paper* No.2 1977, p.4
214 At the Milan meeting in 1978 delegates from eastern Europe contributed papers and took part in the EADI discussions and Pétér Mándi, Head of the Department for Development Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Institute for World Economics, was one of the co-editors with Seers of the published volume of selected papers; but speculation on the future of eastern Europe did not appear in the published proceedings of the conference.
215 Seers, "Introduction: The Second Enlargement", p.15.
216 The conference at which Seers presented his paper on "Development Options: The Strengths and Weaknesses of Dependency Theories in Explaining a Government's Room to Manoeuvre", produced in Seers (ed.), *Dependency Theory: A Critical Reassessment*
217 Seers, "Introduction: The Second Enlargement", p.16.
218 Ibid.
219 Ibid. and p.18.
220 Ibid., p.18.
221 Seers, *Journey Report*, Budapest, 10-14 November 1981.
222 Seers, *Journey Report*, 9-23 October 1977: Lodz, Poland, 17-19 October, pp.4-5. Joan Robinson (who had given a lecture on Kalecki at a conference on labour productivity in Lodz) had prompted this comment from Seers, after she had addressed her audience as if they were all Marxists; Seers thought that in doing so "she seemed terribly out of touch".
223 Seers, *Journey Report*, Warsaw, 15-21 November 1981, Seers observed that there was considerable

misunderstanding in Britain about the nature of Solidarity since it could not be considered a socialist revolution; while it might be socialist "in some ancient, William Morris, sense" the word itself had become "so tainted by association with bullying, imprisonment, torture and even assassination, and with some massive inequalities, corruption and incompetence, that it could not be used".

224 Seers, "Introduction: The Second Enlargement", p.19.
225 Ibid., p.21, n.20.
226 Ibid. p.19 and p.21 n.22.
227 Ibid., pp.15-16. Turkey's population size (of 40 million) and rate of population growth could not be considered assets in view of the very low social and economic standards in some provinces (which even made north Portugal seem highly developed), it was politically unstable and its cultural traditions were completely different to the rest of the members of the EEC, observed Seers. The only reason he could see for considering its application was "on military grounds."
228 Ibid., p.19.
229 Seers, "Introduction: The Second Enlargement", p.20.
230 See Seers, "Time for a Second Look", p.44, *inter alia*.
231 Seers, "The Necessity and Possibility of Establishing a New International Economic Order", 28 January 1983, pp.8 and 14 n.2.
232 Seers, "Time for an End to Neo-paternalism", p.30.
233 Seers, "Time for a Second Look", p.44.
234 Seers, "The Second Enlargement", p.13.
235 Seers, "Wanted - a new map of the world", *Guardian*, 28 May 1982.
236 Seers, "The Second Enlargement", p.12.
237 Seers, "Time for a Second Look", p.44.
238 Seers, "The Changing Definition and Measurement of Development", p.6.
239 Brandt Commission, *North-South: A Programme for Survival*, London: Pan Books Ltd, 1980 hereafter referred to as the Brandt Report. See also Seers, *Political Economy of Nationalism*, p.155.
240 Seers, "North-South: Muddling Morality and Mutuality", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 2, No.4, p.681.
241 Seers acknowledged that his and Myrdal's views were not identical but there was an interchange of letters before a draft was agreed upon, entitled "The Withering of Aid", though in the *Guardian* (2 July 1982) it appeared as "The Bucks Stop Here". In 1980 Myrdal was still in favour of an increase of Swedish aid to over 0.7 per cent GNP, though for relief purposes rather than development aid.
242 Seers, "Muddling Morality and Mutuality", p.684.
243 Seers, *Journey Report*, Washington, 5-18 May 1980.
244 Seers, "Muddling Morality and Mutuality", p.683 (quote from the Brandt Report, p.43).
245 Ibid., p. 684; and Seers and Myrdal, "The Buck Stops Here", *Guardian*, 2 July 1982.
246 Seers, "Muddling Morality and Mutuality", p. 684. See also Seers, "Development and British overseas representation: a Review of the Berrill Report", April 1978, p.9 par.22.
247 See Seers, "What Types of Governments should be Refused what Types of Aid?", *IDS Bulletin*, June 1972.
248 Seers, "Time for a Second Look", p.36.
249 Seers, "Will Cancun be the King Con?", *Guardian*, 23 September 1981.
250 See Myrdal and Seers, "The Bucks Stop Here", *Guardian*, 2 July 1982.
251 Seers, "Will Cancun be the King Con?", *Guardian*, 23 September 1981.
252 Hans Singer to Seers and Myrdal, 7 July 1982.
253 Seers, "Time for a Second Look", p.36; using Ruth Leger Sivard *World Military and Social Expenditures*, (Leesburg Va.: World Priorities, 1981).
254 Myrdal and Seers, "The Bucks Stop Here", *Guardian*, 2 July 1982.
255 Seers, "Wanted - a New Map of the World", *Guardian*, 28 May 1982.
256 Ibid.
257 Seers, "Time for a Second Look", p.38.
258 Seers, "Time for an End to Neo-paternalism", p.7.
259 Ibid. p.6.
260 Myrdal and Seers, "The Bucks Stop Here", *Guardian*, 2 July 1982.
261 Seers, "Time for a Second Look", p.40.
262 Myrdal and Seers, "The Bucks Stop Here", *Guardian*, 2 July 1982.

263 Ibid.

264 Seers, "Will Cancun be the King Con?", *Guardian*, 23 September 1981.

265 In his review of the Brandt report Seers commented on the curious lack of information regarding the origin and aims of the Commission and the fact that the World Bank was "conspicuously not among the long list of institutions which provided money or hospitality" (Seers, "Muddling Morality and Mutuality", p.681), though the report mentions that the suggestion for creating an independent commission on international development issues under the chairmanship of Willy Brandt first came from Robert McNamara (Annex 2, p.293). Following a visit to Washington in May 1980, however, Seers argued, on the basis of various conversations he had had, that the suggestion had been made and the commission set up with the basic aim of increasing the Bank's lending capacity.

McNamara told Brandt that he was planning to get member governments to double their contribution to the Bank's capital, and also to double the ratio of borrowing to capital (effectively raising lending capacity from $40-billions to $160-billions). This would enable him to create a really powerful institution in his last 3 years in the Bank (and finally obliterate the memory of his involvement in Vietnam). He wanted a report showing the need for "massive transfers". But he did not want the Bank to *appear* to be behind propaganda in its own interest. So he would discreetly tip off other agencies on the need for support - Brandt need not worry about finance.

According to Seers, the eventual report did not in fact meet with McNamara's approval since in a addition to proposals to improve and increase lending through international financial institutions, particularly the Bank, another suggestion was that a World Development Fund might be set up *outside* the Bank. However, Seers reported, McNamara had "been assured by Brandt" that the report could serve its purpose: for while there was little chance of recommendations concerning the World Development Fund or world taxes getting off the ground, by comparison proposals to increase the Bank's lending capacity seemed moderate, and far more likely to be accepted - and the Germans would "back the idea of large-scale bank borrowing after their election" (Seers, *Journey Report*, Washington, 5-18 May 1980, p.3).

266 Seers, "Time for an end to neo-paternalism", p.14. Seers drew attention to the warnings of Willard Butcher, President and Chief Executive of Chase Manhattan that "both the World Bank and the IMF will need additional financing in the relatively near future on a hitherto unprecedented scale" and to his calls for "the partnership of the world; private banks as well as the political and financial mechanism of the world's international institutions and the sovereign governments themselves ... Are we willing to wait until a specific country cannot meet its debts before we take action?" (ibid., p.14 n.1).

267 Seers, "The Necessity and Possibility of Establishing a New International Economic Order", January 1983, pp.6-7.

268 Seers, "Wanted - a New Map of the World", *Guardian*, 28 May 1982.

269 Seers, "The Necessity and Possibility of Establishing a New International Economic Order", pp.6-7. By contrast to the elites calling for the NIEO and more resources, he maintained, it was the local capitalists and their workers in Southern countries who favoured more autonomous policies, such as import and exchange controls, though he acknowledged this was an over-simplification (ibid.)

270 Seers, "The Rise in the Price of Oil: Terrible Disaster or Great Opportunity", *IDS Discussion Paper*, no. 46, April 1974.

271 Seers, "Massive transfers and mutual interests", *World Development*, 9 (6) p.557-9. See also Seers, "Time for an End to Neo-paternalism", pp. 8 and 13.

272 Seers, "Massive Transfers and Mutual Interests", p.558.

273 Ibid., p.561, n.4. Sponsored by the Commonwealth Secretariat, Seers had led a team of experts to Uganda in May-June 1979; their findings were published in a 2 volume report *The Rehabilitation of the Economy of Uganda*, produced by the Commonwealth Secretariat in July 1979.

274 Hans Singer, letter to Seers and Myrdal, 7 July 1982.

275 Seers, "Time for an End to Neo-paternalism", pp. 13 and 14.

276 Seers, "Muddling Morality and Mutuality", pp.690-1.

277 Ibid., p.689. Four of the Commissioners were socialists - Willy Brandt, Olof Palme, Edgard Pisani, Jan Pronk - and the fifth, Edward Heath, although a Conservative, was distanced from the mainstream of his Party.

278 Seers, "Time for a Second Look", pp.41-2.

279 Seers, "Wanted - a New Map of the World", *Guardian*, 28 May 1982.

280 Seers, "Development and British overseas representation: a Review of the Berrill Report", April 1978, p.9. With regard to "48 'intermediate' aid recipients" whose income levels he considered were already high enough to relieve poverty if they so wished, he commented:

> This is not to say that there should be no aid to such countries, but it should be recognised as being primarily not in *their* interest but *ours*, an interest which is essentially commercial (or political in a few cases, such as loans to Jordan and the Rhodesian scholarships). It therefore hardly counts as "aid" at all: statistics of aid should omit what goes to countries of this type - which would permit a genuine shift, within a limited budget, towards those which are really poor. (ibid.)

281 A point made by Seers in "The decline in the merits of aid", p.6 - Seers' draft for his joint paper with Myrdal, but not included in final article.

282 Seers, "Will Cancun be the King Con?", *Guardian*, 23 September 1981.

283 Seers, "Time for an End to Neo-paternalism", p.16. In addition he warned, "Big capital transfers to the Third World help to drive up interest rates at home" (ibid).

284 Seers, "Time for a Second Look", p.42.

285 Robert Cassen, "Slow Progress is Better than None", letter to *Guardian* Third World Review, 14 October 1981. Cassen was Professorial Fellow in Economics at IDS at the time and paid tribute to Seers as "one of the most eminent and creative of development experts, with a distinguished record of contributions in many Third World countries, and in the development literature", though strongly disagreeing with his views on Brandt.

286 R. Jolly, "Dudley Seers (1920-1983): His Contributions to Development Perspectives, Policy and Studies", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 20, No. 3, July 1989, p.39.

287 See Frank McElhone "Cheering up the Third World", letter to *Guardian*, 7 July 1982; and Seers, "Poverty of Simple Solutions", letter to *Guardian*, 19 July 1982.

288 A phrase used by Seers in his letter responding to Frank McElhone, *Guardian*, 19 July 1982.

289 Seers, "Time for an End to Neo-paternalism", pp.17-18.

290 Seers with a Commonwealth team of experts, *The Rehabilitation of the Economy of Uganda*, a report vol. 1, p.4.

291 Seers and Myrdal, "The Bucks Stop Here", *Guardian*, 2 July 1980.

292 Seers, "Review of Berrill Report", p.9.

293 Seers, Chairman's conclusions in Commonwealth Secretariat, *Seminars on Adjustment Policies*, p.38.

294 Ibid., 18n.2; and see Seers, "*Guardian*, 2 July 1982.

295 Ibid., and Seers, "The Second Enlargement of the EEC in Historical Perspective", p.13.

296 Seers, *Political Economy of Nationalism*, p.93.

297 The fact that most OPEC aid from the Arab producers, assists other Arab countries, reflects a general political orientation; and as was exemplified only recently by the experience of the Yemen, whose aid from Saudi Arabia was completely cut off after it abstained from the UN vote in 1991 supporting armed intervention in Kuwait to expel Iraqi forces, aid from oil producers can equally be used as a political weapon.

298 Seers and Myrdal, "The Bucks Stop Here", *Guardian*, 2 July 1982.

299 Ibid. As Myrdal pointed out in a letter to Seers, although "missionary societies and semi-private organisations had shown greater ability in reaching down to the poor than have governments or the World Bank.... such organisations, trying to be independent of governments, meet great difficulties" (Myrdal to Seers, 8 April 1982).

300 Seers, "Wanted - a New Map of the World", *Guardian*, 28 May 1982.

301 Seers, *Political Economy of Nationalism*, pp.182-3.

302 See Seers, "Academic Repression in the Third World", IDS *Discussion Paper*, No. 118, August 1977. Twenty participants from nine different nationalities were present at the workshop.

303 Ibid., p.4.

304 Malcolm Muggeridge to *The Times*, 10 December 1976; Dudley Seers to *The Times*, 17 December 1976.

305 From 18 May to 4 June Seers visited Ecuador, Chile, Argentina and Brazil, spending the greater proportion of his time, 12 days, in Chile; and from 30 November to 16 December he visited Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and Brazil.

306 For details see Seers, *Journey Report*, 18 May-4 June 1978.

307 Seers, *Journey Report*, Latin America, 25 November-18 December 1978; see Annex B Country notes: Paraguay and Uruguay. Of the twelve political prisoners in Paraguay, he reported that four had been released, one was to be transported, two had been charged, and the other cases were being discussed with the authorities.

Among the academics he met were the rector of a university in Argentina, whose daughter had disappeared, and a professor in Uruguay whose son was detained and tortured because the regime had not liked remarks made by the father.

Brazil, which he also visit during 1978, he found a far less repressive regime, though unable to take any Chilean *becarios* into its universities.

308 Seers, "Academic Repression in the Third World", p.2. The situation was considered worse in Latin America and Thailand, where many members of the intellectual elite had been victims of dismissals, prison, torture and exile; whereas in Southern Africa, it was observed, academic repression was concentrated on a relatively few high-level opponents of apartheid, since the inferior education system for the black majority had restricted access to university education and obstructed the development of a large and critical intelligentsia.

309 Ibid. p.3.

310 Ibid., p.4.

311 Ibid. p.6

312 Ibid. Preference was expressed for academics to be relocated in a country neighbouring their own, but since this was not always possible, the conference also addressed the problems of relocation and scholarship programmes in Third World regions and "developed" industrialised countries.

313 Seers, *Journey Report*, 18 May-4 June 1978, p.27.

314 Ibid., p.2.

315 Ibid., p.27.

316 Ibid., p.2.

317 Among the groups visited by Seers were - in Argentina: Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad (CEDES), Instituto de Desarrollo Economica y Social (IDES), Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, the Bariloche Foundation; in Uruguay: Centro de Informaciones y Estudios del Uruguay (CIESU); Centro Interdisciplinario de Estudios Sobre el Desarrollo Uruguay (CIEDUR), Centro de Investigaciones Economicas (CINVE), and Centro Latinoamericano de Economia Humana (CLEH); in Paraguay: Centro Nacional de Computacion, Centro de Estudios Sociologicos; Chile: Corporacion de Investigaciones Economicas para Latinoamerica (CIEPLAN); Brazil: Centro Brasileiro de Analise et Planejamento (CEBRAP), (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE).

318 Seers, "Repression in the Southern Cone and Possible British Responses", 22 December 1978, p.2.

319 Funding in 1978, he observed, came from three sources - the Ford Foundation (USA), the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) (Canada) and the Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries (SAREC) (Sweden) - with some project money coming from other agencies especially the Tinker Foundation (USA) and three Latin American regional programmes (ibid., p.3).

320 Ibid., p.3. It might still be necessary to accept some refugees from countries where repression was severe, he argued, mentioning in particular Argentina and Uruguay, and he had also acknowledged the need to take some from Chile.

321 Ibid., p.2.

322 Ibid., p.4.

323 Seers, *Political Economy of Nationalism*, p.182.

324 Seers, "Repression in the Southern Cone and Possible British Responses", 22 December 1978, p.4.

325 Seers to Douglas Hurd, 23 December 1981. He argued: "You may think that a public statement on some such action would be an appropriate part of the Government's response to events in Poland. Can the Government do less for the victims of the Communists in Poland than its predecessor did for those of the military junta in Chile? Such operations need not in fact cost much, in relation to their impact in various senses."

326 Seers, "The Periphery of Europe", p.31.

327 Seers, "The Necessity and Possibility of Establishing a New International Economic Order", 28 January 1983, p.3. This paper was partly based on sections from Seers, *The Political Economy of Nationalism.*

328 See Seers, "The Limitations of the Special Case", *Bulletin of the Institute of Economics and Statistics*, Oxford, Vol. 25, May 1963, p.78.
329 Seers, *IDS 5th Annual Report* 1970-71, p.1.
330 Seers, in Seers and L. Joy (eds), *Development in a Divided World*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971, p.347, see also pp.32-3.
331 Seers, "The Necessity and Possibility of Establishing a New International Economic Order", p.5.
332 Seers, "The Birth, Life and Death of Development Economics", *Development and Change*, Vol. 10, 1979, p.713; and Seers, "Development Options", p.146.
333 Seers, *Political Economy of Nationalism*, p.1.
334 Ibid., p.2.
335 Ibid., p.9.
336 Ibid., p.xii; the initial title for the book was found on an early manuscript version of the book in Seers' office at IDS.
337 Ibid., p.18.
338 Seers "A Different Kind of Fortress Mentality", *Guardian* Third World Review, 16 July 1982. The war had effectively ended in June 1980 with the retaking of Port Stanley by British troops.
339 Seers, *Political Economy of Nationalism*, p.17.
340 Seers, "The Necessity and Possibility of Establishing a New International Economic Order", pp.10-11.
341 Seers, *Guardian*, 16 July 1982.
342 Seers, *Political Economy of Nationalism*, p.185.
343 Seers, *Guardian*, 16 July 1982.
344 See *inter alia*, Seers, *Political Economy of Nationalism*, p.185.
345 Ibid.
346 Seers, "Time for a Second Look at the Third World", p.45.
347 Seers, *Guardian*, 16 July 1982.
348 Paul Streeten, "Dudley Seers (1920-83): A Personal Appreciation", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 20, No. 3, July 1989, p.29.
349 Louis Emmerij, "Has Europe Fallen Out of Love with the Rest of the World?", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 20, No. 3, July 1989, p.10.
350 Seers to Edgard Pisani (EEC Commissioner for Development), 11 March 1983 drafted at Grand Pacific Hotel, Suva, sent from IDS 15 March 1983. The Sugar Protocol, Seers explained, allowed Fiji to sell the EEC "30 % of the sugar crop at more than twice the free market price (supplemented by smaller long-term contacts with New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore)".
351 Seers, *Journey Report*, Suva, Fiji, 28 January/12 March 1983. The second report of the Brandt Commission, *Common Crisis North-South: Co-operation for world recovery* (London: Pan Books Ltd) was published in 1983.

Conclusion

1 Richard Jolly, "Dudley Seers (1920-83): His Contributions to Development Perspectives, Policy and Studies", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 20, No. 3, July 1989, p.42.
2 Seers, "The Necessity and Possibility of Establishing a New International Economic Order", 28 January 1983; as quoted in the last section of Chapter 7.
3 See for example Seers, "The Cultural Lag in Economics", in J. Pajestka and C.H. Feinstein, *The Relevance of Economic Theories*, London: Macmillan, 1980, p.3.
4 H. Singer, "Keynes Seers and Economic Development", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 20, No. 3, July 1989, p.8.
5 Seers, "Preface", *The Political Economy of Nationalism*, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, p.x.
6 R. Jolly, "Dudley Seers (1920-1983)", in P. Arestis and M. Sawyer (eds), *A Biographical Dictionary of Dissenting Economists*, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1982, p.491.
7 These are the words of John Toye in "Nationalism and Structuralism: Two Themes in the Work of Dudley Seers", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 20, No. 3, July 1989, p.53; the paper in which Singer makes this comparison is "Keynes, Seers and Economic Development" in the same issue of the *IDS Bulletin*.
8 Singer, "Keynes, Seers and Economic Development", pp.7 and 8.

9 An opinion expressed by Richard Jolly in "Dudley Seers (1920-83): His Contributions to Development Perspectives, Policy and Studies", p.35.

10 Ibid.

11 Rosemary Thorp, "Seers, Dudley 1920-1983", in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman (eds), *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics*, London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp.284 and 285.

12 Jolly has observed that Seers worked largely within a "structuralist paradigm" - focusing "on key structural relationships in the countries or situations under review (for example, the pattern of exports, the linkages between imports and production, the structure of ownership and of international and national political influence), relating these key relationships to the type of economy being analysed, the nature of its links with the international economy, and the phase or time-period in relation to broader world developments" - and argues that it was this that led him to "a multi-disciplinary style of analysis that was, in many respects situation-specific rather than universal" (Jolly, "Dudley Seers (1920-1983)", in P. Arestis and M. Sawyer (eds), *A Biographical Dictionary of Dissenting Economists*, p.491). John Toye also writes of "structuralism" as being one of two main themes in Seers' work; see John Toye, "Nationalism and Structuralism",

13 J. Toye, "Nationalism and Structuralism", p.54.

14 P. Streeten, "Dudley Seers (1920-83): A Personal Appreciation", pp. 27 and 28.

15 R. Thorp, "Seers, Dudley 1920-1983", in *The New Palgrave Dictionary*, p.285.

16 R. Jolly, "Dudley Seers (1920-83): His Contributions to Development Perspectives, Policy and Studies", p.33. Jolly adds he does not consider Seers should be dismissed for not writing a general theory, observing: "Is the high point of the profession the construction of yet more theoretical models, or is it, as Maynard Keynes put it, 'obtaining a wide knowledge of *relevant* facts and exercising skill in the application of economic principles to them, (and) expounding the elements of (the economist's) method in a lucid, accurate and illuminating way, so that, through his instruction, the number of those who can think for themselves may be increased'" - which is how he regarded Seers' role. (Ibid., quoting from Keynes "Introduction to the Series, *Cambridge Economic Handbook*.)

17 R. Jolly, "Dudley Seers (1920-83): His Contributions to Development Perspectives, Policy and Studies", p. 41.

18 R. H. S. Crossman, M. Foot and I. Mikardo, *Keep Left*, May 1947, p.35. See also section on "The Unity of Europe", p.38.

19 Seers, "Preface", *Political Economy of Nationalism*, p.xi.

20 H. Singer, "Dudley Seers 1920-1983", p.5.

21 R. Jolly, "Dudley Seers (1920-1983)", in P. Arestis and M. Sawyer (eds), *A Biographical Dictionary of Dissenting Economists*, p.494.

22 R. Jolly, "Reflections on the IDS from within the UN", *IDS Jubilee Papers*, No.8, 1992, p.1.

23 John Toye, "Director's Message", p.5, repeating a phrase used by Mike Faber in the *IDS Annual Report 1986/Handbook 1987*, p.1.

24 R. Jolly, "Dudley Seers", in *Dictionary of Dissenting Economists*, p.491.

25 L. Emmerij, "Has Europe Fallen out with the Rest of the World?", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol., 20, No. 3, July 1989.

26 Toye, for example, has remarked that Seers' critique of GNP for its exclusion of non-marketed activity - such as household and domestic work and unappropriated environmental factors - facilitated the opening up of new critical directions in the field - such as the feminist critique of development theory and policy and the "green" critique of development - though, as Toye acknowledges, Seers himself never followed either of these paths "with any great interest or vigour himself" (Toye, "Nationalism and Structuralism", p.57.)

27 P. Streeten, "Dudley Seers (1920-83), p.29. Streeten gives a few specific examples here as does L. Emmerij concerning applicability of the recommendations of the ILO WEP reports to Europe in "Has Europe Fallen out of Love with the Rest of the World?" p.9. *The New Palgrave Dictionary* too makes the point that his claim that "the study of the underdeveloped world provides much insight into the structural problems of the developed countries", "increasingly finds echo" (p.284).

28 L. Emmerij, "Has Europe Fallen out with the Rest of the World", p.15.

29 Toye, "Nationalism and Structuralism", p.53.

30 See, ibid., p.11.

31 The trends towards regionalism are discussed by Emmerij in his "Worlds of Difference", in

International Governance, IDS Silver Jubilee Papers 1, 2 and 3, 1992, and mentioned by Hans Singer in his "Introduction" in the same volume, who observes "Like the rest of us, Louis Emmerij is in two minds whether to welcome or to deplore such regional blocs. Depending on circumstances, they could be either a stepping stone towards multilateralism or else they could be a stumbling block ('Fortress America', 'Fortress Europe' and 'Fortress Asia')" (p.v).

32 For example the 1988 World Bank's World Development Report noted that "For developing countries - despite considerable stabilization and adjustment efforts - the outlook remains worrying, especially for those with acute debt problems. These countries face the risk of prolonged stagnation in real per capita income, greater poverty and social unrest" (p.13). This is just one of many quotations used by M. Bienefeld from the World Bank and IMF reports in "Rescuing the Dream of Development in the Nineties", *IDS Silver Jubilee Papers*, 1992.

33 Akin L. Mabogunje, *The Development Process*, 2nd edn, London, Unwin Hyman, 1989, see "Postscript", especially pp.346-51. Earlier in this volume Mabogunje quotes from Seers' "The New Meaning of Development" at some length on the implications of self-reliance in which he interprets Seers call for "a selective approach to external influences of all types" as "the concept of selective closure", pp.322-3

34 L. Emmerij, "Worlds of Difference", p.41. India had become a regional power in itself, he observed, and the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) could become a vehicle for regional economic co-operation.

35 J. Toye, "Director's Message", p.3.

36 L. Emmerij, "Worlds of Difference", p.62.

37 H. Singer, "What do you think Development Studies will be concerned with over the next 25 Years?", 25th Anniversary *IDS Annual Report 1990/Handbook 1991*, p.122.

38 J. Toye, "Director's Message", in *IDS Annual Report 1991/Handbook 1992/93*, p.4.

39 A. R. Jolly and F. Stewart, *Adjustment with a Human Face*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987; UNDP, *Human Development Report*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, 1991, (providing a statistical basis for evaluating human progress).

40 L. Emmerij, "Worlds of Difference", p.51.

41 R. Jolly, "Reflections on the IDS from within the UN", *IDS Silver Jubilee Papers*, 1992, p.8.

42 M. Bienefeld "Rescuing the Dream of Development in the Nineties", *IDS Silver Jubilee Papers*, 1992. Bienefeld talks of the "the early dream of development" in the following terms: "The dream was human liberation - from poverty and want, from oppression, from violence, from the drudgery of monotonous and stultifying work.... As the developed societies became post-industrial, post-scarcity leisure societies, the developing world would become modern, industrial, affluent, stable and liberal democratic" (ibid., p.3).

43 Ibid., pp. 17 and 1.

44 J. Toye, "Director's Message", op.cit., p.5.

45 L. Emmerij, "Worlds of Difference", p.62. Emmerij, now President of the OECD Development Centre, explains his optimism for the 1990s was fuelled by the fact that "new political generations are coming to the fore, new political institutions are being introduced, and new, different, economic and financial policies are spreading throughout the developing world and the former Socialist countries" (ibid., pp.62-3).

46 H. Singer, "What do you think Development Studies will be concerned with over the next 25 Years?", 25th Anniversary *IDS Annual Report 1990/Handbook 1991*, p.122.

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