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India, Sri Lanka and the Tamil crisis, 1976-1990

India, Sri Lanka and the Tamil crisis, 1976-1990
India, Sri Lanka and the Tamil crisis, 1976-1990

This thesis explores the dynamics of what Professor Buzan calls the `regional security complex' of the Indian subcontinent, with particular reference both to the domestic politics of Sri Lanka and the political interrelationship between India and Sri Lanka since 1976. This relationship gained momentum after 1983, with the growing involvement of external powers in Sri Lanka and also of India in the Tamil crisis in Sri Lanka. India could not ignore these factors, both due to domestic compulsions in Tamil Nadu and the potential threat to regional security this crisis posed.

This involvement culminated in the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord in July 1987, between Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, and the Sri Lankan President, J.R. Jayewardene and the subsequent deployment of the IPKF (Indian Peace-Keeping Force), in Sri Lanka. It is argued that the terms of the Accord and `Exchange of Letters' firmly established the strict parameters within which Sri Lanka could conduct its foreign policy. The Accord therefore was successful in reinforcing and consolidating Indian regional hegemony in the short-term, with the acquiescence of President J.R. Jayewardene.

However, the lasting solution was severely compromised by the long-term deployment of the IPKF in Sri Lanka until 1990, which provided the impetus for the JVP uprising in the South. The IPKF was in turn constrained by a lack of clear guidelines for strategy and confusion over its aims and goals. India also succeeded in undermining its own regional security, by conducting a twin-track policy from the early 1980s, consisting both of overt mediation and the covert arming and training of Tamil militants. This was to have dire consequences for the politics of both states, and led to the assassination of one of the main architects of the Accord, Rajiv Gandhi, in May 1991 and one of its main opponents, Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa, in May 1993.

University of Southampton
Bullion, Alan James
Bullion, Alan James

Bullion, Alan James (1994) India, Sri Lanka and the Tamil crisis, 1976-1990. University of Southampton, Doctoral Thesis.

Record type: Thesis (Doctoral)

Abstract

This thesis explores the dynamics of what Professor Buzan calls the `regional security complex' of the Indian subcontinent, with particular reference both to the domestic politics of Sri Lanka and the political interrelationship between India and Sri Lanka since 1976. This relationship gained momentum after 1983, with the growing involvement of external powers in Sri Lanka and also of India in the Tamil crisis in Sri Lanka. India could not ignore these factors, both due to domestic compulsions in Tamil Nadu and the potential threat to regional security this crisis posed.

This involvement culminated in the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord in July 1987, between Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, and the Sri Lankan President, J.R. Jayewardene and the subsequent deployment of the IPKF (Indian Peace-Keeping Force), in Sri Lanka. It is argued that the terms of the Accord and `Exchange of Letters' firmly established the strict parameters within which Sri Lanka could conduct its foreign policy. The Accord therefore was successful in reinforcing and consolidating Indian regional hegemony in the short-term, with the acquiescence of President J.R. Jayewardene.

However, the lasting solution was severely compromised by the long-term deployment of the IPKF in Sri Lanka until 1990, which provided the impetus for the JVP uprising in the South. The IPKF was in turn constrained by a lack of clear guidelines for strategy and confusion over its aims and goals. India also succeeded in undermining its own regional security, by conducting a twin-track policy from the early 1980s, consisting both of overt mediation and the covert arming and training of Tamil militants. This was to have dire consequences for the politics of both states, and led to the assassination of one of the main architects of the Accord, Rajiv Gandhi, in May 1991 and one of its main opponents, Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa, in May 1993.

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Published date: 1994

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 462781
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/462781
PURE UUID: 2445c4ed-b725-465d-806d-b040583f03a8

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Date deposited: 04 Jul 2022 20:02
Last modified: 04 Jul 2022 20:02

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Author: Alan James Bullion

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