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FOR A MINORITARIAN ETHICS OF INCLUSION

A Reading of the Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari,
and its Application to Contemporary Criticism

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ABSTRACT

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Together and separately, the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze and the French psychoanalyst and critic Félix Guattari have produced a vast and, I believe, highly important body of work. This thesis examines their collaborations, which combine Deleuze's substantial work in philosophy and Guattari's work as psychoanalyst, philosophico-political writer and activist. These collaborations are extraordinarily fertile workshops for the production of concepts and distinctions — of which there is a dizzying array — and which, it is a purpose of this thesis to argue, provide an original and powerful purchase on important themes in criticism today.

   Though interest in the work of Deleuze and Guattari has been increasing steadily over the last ten years, scholarship is still at an embryonic stage. Whilst most of their work is now in English translation, at the time of writing only two English-language monographs on Deleuze and Guattari and two monographs on Deleuze have been published. With every indication that interest in the work of Deleuze and Guattari will continue to mount, this thesis sees itself as a basic exercise in the use and applicability — the power of purchase — of their work, in relation to important problems and impasses of criticism today. It is both a presentation of Deleuze and Guattari's work and an application of Deleuzo-Guattarian criticism.

   The organisation and content of this thesis is determined by two conditions: the vast conceptual apparatus of Deleuze and Guattari, and the fact that they have not, or not yet, entered the theoretical canon in the English-speaking world. The aims of the thesis are: firstly, to make the case of Deleuze and Guattari's importance and relevance for contemporary Anglo-American criticism; secondly, to name their project — as a project 'for a minoritarian ethics of inclusion'; thirdly, to isolate their main problematic — as the problematic of oppression and liberation; fourthly, to name the terms of this problematic — modernity, the people, democracy, major/minor, literature; fifthly, to select and define the main concepts that they develop in order to redefine their problematic and its terms — 'artificial territoriality', 'line of flight' or 'line of escape' (*ligne de fuite*), 'exclusive' and 'inclusive' processes; finally, to unfold the perspective that emerges as a result of the above, and to show its impact on contemporary criticism.

   The challenges that this thesis faces are therefore unusual. Instead of attempting to find its own corner in a territory worked intensively by secondary literature, it attempts to select the main elements in a large, little-explored field — it attempts to combine a wide scope and a sharp focus. And instead of taking the importance of its object for granted, it attempts to establish it in the strongest possible way: by showing what it can do.

   This thesis aspires to offer both an exposition and an application of cardinal Deleuzo-Guattarian concepts in relation to important areas in current criticism; it aspires to show the contribution that Deleuze and Guattari can make — what their work can do — in relation to contemporary criticism.

thank you very much

Pelagia Goulimari

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CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE

On the line of flight:
how to be a realist?

In this introductory essay, I invite my readers to a brief stroll through some of the topics, themes, arguments and concepts that will figure prominently in this work.

In a first section, I will discuss the postmodernism debate, to be examined in detail in my second chapter. One of the exhilarating aspects of this vast, ongoing debate has been its perceived return to political realism, as if the "minor" and "micro" politics theorised by Continental philosophy had at last come to its own and could speak for itself. At last, multiplicity and participatory democracy could be witnessed first-hand. But while the postmodernism debate had appeared to be an international forum for the participation of minorities and minor academic disciplines, it came to be so heavily dominated by identity politics that the promise of unprecedented participation was disappointed.

Everyone must participate in the postmodernism debate, all identities are welcome. Only what doesn't have an identity yet, or has lost it, fails to meet the entrance requirements, can't spell out the password. The participants have flocked in with great eagerness — thousands of books and articles written, translated into English, all resisting postmodernism with their own body and their sheer volume. What a feast! What is remarkable about the corpus of writing that has emerged is its monotonous regularity; the argument that the coherence of the identity represented is proof of resistance to postmodernism is endlessly repeated. Though the contents vary, the method of participation is compulsively the same. The threat of postmodernism is used as a device for internal disciplinary action, the participation in an international and interdisciplinary terrain is used to strengthen the boundaries of the identity represented, and the alliance of identities resisting postmodernism is used to denounce the centrifugal tendencies within every identity as morally weak elements seduced by

postmodernism. The postmodernism debate, ten years on, appears to have occasioned a gigantic exercise in identity fortification and disciplinary defence.

I will claim that the postmodernism debate, in its identity politics, is a trap — rather than a release — for minoritarian movements, concurrent with recent developments such as the rise of national and ethnic sectarianisms. Furthermore, I will claim that this trap is self-defeating because minoritarian movements are the main source of vitality of the postmodernism debate. It seems to me clear that confining minoritarian movements in identitarian political spaces is unviable, unrealistic, and leaves everyone empty-handed; on the contrary, to be a realist means to ask the right questions, the questions that work. The kind of realism that I wish to develop is indebted to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari and can be called "immanent realism". It displaces the "what?" questions of identity politics with "how?" questions. The "how?" questions relevant to minoritarian movements in the context of the postmodernism debate include: how does the postmodernism debate work (rather than what does postmodernism mean), how to participate in it, how to contribute, how to be a realist?

In the second section of this essay, I will have recourse to the work of Thomas Paine, in order to claim that the people — far from being a national or ethnic, etc. identity — is a constitutive power which takes place in the state of what can be called a "flight of reality". For Paine — unlike other Enlightenment political thinkers — the constitutive power of the people is inseparable from a migration of populations, leaking out of identitarian spaces to form new ones.

In the third section of this essay, I will turn to the work of Deleuze and Guattari, particularly the two volumes of their *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*: *Anti-Oedipus* (1984 [1972]) and *A Thousand Plateaus* (1988 [1980]). I will introduce and outline the Deleuzian-Guattarian distinction between two processes, the process of the "line of flight" or "line of escape" and the process of the "artificial territoriality", to be further discussed in my fifth chapter. I will map identity politics onto the process of the "artificial territoriality", and popular participation — as discussed in the previous section — onto the "line of flight". I will then claim — against the truism of the

postmodernism debate that identity politics is the main defensive weapon of minorities against "late capitalism" — that the identity politics of "late capitalism" is the inimical context within which, and despite which, minoritarian movements do their work. Finally, I will claim that capitalism itself can be inserted and distributed within the larger economy constituted by the two processes of the "artificial territoriality" and the "line of flight".

In the final section of this introductory essay, I will turn to the work of Kafka, and the work of Walter Benjamin and Deleuze-Guattari on Kafka. Deleuze and Guattari's work on Kafka, *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature* (1986 [1975]), is usually treated as an interlude between the two monumental volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. I think, on the contrary, that for the work of Deleuze and Guattari the encounter with Kafka is an important crossroads. For this essay, the work of Kafka is crucial as an exhibition space for "immanent realism" at work. Here — as I will argue at length in my last chapter — "the people" appears as a minoritarian reality machine, as minoritarian experimentation and invention that affects and involves everyone, and minoritarian power as the ultimate power, the power to escape final judgement by the ingenuity of active invention.

I. The postmodernism debate

The grand debate of the last decade in the Anglo-American academic world has been the postmodernism debate. With this debate the Anglo-American world can once again lay claim to the forefront of theoretical developments. This debate interrupts the fascination — the loss of self — of Anglo-American academics with Continental philosophy, and regathers the world in a terrain of their own. I believe that this terrain is defined in Fredric Jameson's Foreword to the English translation of Jean-François Lyotard's *La condition postmoderne*. Jameson here introduces a definition of "postmodernism" which recasts Lyotard's ethics of "paralogy"[1] into an objectivist terrain of global contemporary conditions of existence, and initiates a distinctive phase in the half-a-century-old history of the term "postmodernism", which I designate as

"the Anglo-American postmodernism debate". The Anglo-American postmodernism debate, conducted in the English language with unprecedented international participation, regathers the world in exemplary modern fashion: it is a debate on the present, on "our" present.

The Anglo-American postmodernism debate is a great novelty: a debate is conducted of, purportedly, universal interest and open as well as relevant to all. Why? Because, framed as a debate on our contemporary global situation, and prescribing the agency of identity politics as an antidote to this situation, it is an ideal terrain for the self-presentation of minorities, minor nations and minor academic disciplines to the widest audience possible. The Anglo-American postmodernism debate is based on two mutually corroborative articulations of "our" present:
• the articulation of a global "we", coming from the Anglo-American Humanities and the New Left and locating them at the centre of the debate;
• the articulation of a particular and autonomous "we", coming from minorities and minor nations and locating them at the periphery.
The debate demands everyone's participation, but it seems that only the major minorities and minor nations have been able to contribute with their particular identity, while many have failed the test of particularity. Indeed, the debate seems to have worked as a measure of the capacity to articulate internally coherent particular identities. Though those who do not participate "on established 'metropolitan' political ground" [2] are denounced as essentialist, it seems that many minorities fail to participate because they lack the degree of discipline that would make their particularity essential enough.

As it concerns the articulation of a contemporary global human condition, it seems that it can be achieved principally by those situated in the Anglo-American world and at the centre of the postmodernism debate. For the last decade, the Anglo-American "theory" world allows an overview for many reasons. By the mid-eighties it had incorporated Continental philosophy, while preserving its own empiricist and pragmatist traditions. Secondly, with the collapse of the Eastern bloc, the long exclusion of communist parties from the parliamentary

process in the Anglo-American world has given to the democratic principles of capitalism the semblance of a clear-cut victory, unsoured by the presence of losers in their midst. In addition, the long dissociation between Marxist academics and communist party politics in the Anglo-American world makes it possible for the Marxist apparatus of analysis to survive as a viable theoretical option. Finally, the openly imperial role of the US and their British ally in the UN allows Anglo-American academics to denounce capitalist neo-imperialism without falling into the nationalism that others risk, and with all the benefit of disinterestedness. It would seem to be historically necessary that the Anglo-American postmodernism debate should be initiated by the New Left. The clean global victory of capitalism, as it appears in the Anglo-American world, is successfully matched with a determinist Marxist analysis of postmodernism as the global human condition under "late capitalism". Simultaneously, exactly because the communist experiments have left no one untouched, the involvement in a debate framed by Marxist terms — if not by communist aspirations — allows the participants to go through a process of grief and catharsis.

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Whereas the Anglo-American postmodernism debate is staged as a crusade against postmodernism, once within this debate the emphasis shifts very quickly from contradiction to identity. The strict division of roles between contradiction and identity, and the separation of the two, involves a bypassing of "difference" — the great contribution of Continental philosophy — and the translation of the difference at the heart of identity into identities that are different. As a result, the debate has registered nothing but identities, brought them to the fore and, to a certain extent, induced them. Furthermore, this ushering of identities into the terrain of the Anglo-American postmodernism debate, instead of being acknowledged for what it is — the fact of what the Anglo-American postmodernism debate *does*, the fact of "our" present — is stubbornly staged as a moral imperative, a spiritual antidote to reality. "Postmodernism" is reinvented as a contemporary global malaise which attacks and destroys identities and leads to

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schizophrenic chaos. That is to say, identity becomes an endangered species and our moral obligation is to safeguard it. Any attempt to reassociate identity with contradiction is treated as moral ambivalence.

This scenario undeniably avails the Anglo-American postmodernism debate with a very effective device of self-legitimation. But, in making its own position unassailable and building up its defences, the postmodernism debate suffers a loss of nerve, and a loss of realism. What is more than visible today is not the dissolution of identities but the hardening of old identities and the proliferation of new hard identities. The declarations of pure new nation-states are matched only by old nation-states purifying themselves. The Anglo-American postmodernism debate is based on the denunciation of its affinity with the ominous forces that shape our present. This is the "paradox" of the Anglo-American academic world: at the historical summit of its representative power, it retreats into a flight from reality. It loses sight of Continental philosophy as well as of its own long-preserved empiricist and pragmatist traditions. It has incomprehensibly lost the realism and naïvety of the victor at the crucial moment.

The Anglo-American world appeared to have escaped the model of the nation-state, prevalent in the old European states as well as in the newer ones that emerged from the process of decolonisation. Self-constitution in the Anglo-American world has depended on foreign policy rather than on the forging of a national identity — even its minoritarian movements have an international perspective. The Anglo-American world has never failed to fascinate the most militant adversaries of neo-imperialism with its sense of vast "mental" spaces, large-scale impact and global effects, the sense that anything can be made to happen. The magic powers attributed to the Anglo-American world, paired with the grandiloquence of its own rhetoric, seemed at first to be justified by Perestroika: the USSR was spellbound to change. But the triumph of the Anglo-American world was soon overtaken by two simultaneous developments. The disintegration of the Eastern bloc opened a flood of processes of constitution which have put the Anglo-American world in the position of a passive spectator. In response, the Anglo-American world adopted a negative international role of policing boundaries, containing conflict and defending "safe havens". If

postmodernism is symptomatic of "late capitalism", "late capitalism" would be the defence of fortified identities on a global scale — as much as the resurgence of uncontrollable processes of constitution. The Anglo-American postmodernism debate would have to recognise its involvement in "late capitalism".

II. The migration of the people

The proliferation of new nation-states, the desire for new nation-states, appears, at least on the national news, to trigger a movement of populations. From the point of view of constituted nation-states, the process of constitution of new nation-states, when protracted unnecessarily, leads to the emergence of a *Hannibal ante portas*: populations fleeing, an army lacking the splendour of military apparatus, unarmed, but not less dangerous.

While the process of constitution of new nation-states takes place, a double-bound danger emerges for the community of nation-states. As new nation-states emerge from within already constituted nation-states, there is the danger that one legitimises too early; as populations become unstuck, there is the danger of legitimising too late. The challenge for the international community is to legitimise at the right moment. The singular processes of constitution of new nation-states translate, for the international community, into the right moment of legitimation, that is to say they translate into the general rules that will put an end to the processes of constitution every single time. In arresting the processes of constitution, the international community can count both the old state of departure and the new state of destination as their allies, while the common threat is that things will get out of hand, that populations will continue to flee.

Unstuck populations are fearsome because they are unstoppable, they have a momentum of their own. They are bound to leak in, they are insidious. On the national news they are threatening when, speaking in our own language, they announce: "We never thought that this would happen to us, therefore this could happen to you". Nevertheless, those who campaign for an increase in the number of

refugees we let into our national territories insist that we have nothing to fear; nothing to fear as long as the distinction between refugees and those seeking migration is maintained. This distinction that saves us from fear separates responsibility from irresponsibility and permanent will from temporary need. Refugees are not responsible for their state of flight, they are irresponsible because they are deprived of citizenship and a nation-state to fall back on. They momentarily fall into the state of animals and children, and they need not be feared but protected and embraced. Those seeking migration are citizens of another nation-state, therefore they are responsible, as citizens, for their state of flight. They don't need to be protected but judged as either deserving to be withheld (let in) or released (sent back).

But there is something that the two terms of the above distinction have in common, something underlying their distinction and affecting them both. The use of citizenship as a line of distinction transforms movements of population, phenomena of mass displacement, into spatially determined units, individual citizens, and artificially separates those who have citizenship from those who don't. As a result, both states of being are misunderstood. Those seeking migration don't move like citizens, they don't move alone, they move in waves. Secondly, within the above distinction they can only appear either as foreign bodies or as "one of us" (when they are naturalised). Similarly, being a refugee — the living proof of a great capacity for survival — can only appear as lack and as citizenship by default.

If, as it is suggested, distinguishing between refugees and those seeking migration saves us from fear, we could find out what is feared if we follow what happens when the two terms are conflated. Those who urge us to open our doors to populations fleeing have warned us that conflating the two terms will amount to refusing entrance to refugees, as if they had somewhere else to go. Let's try to imagine what happens. Populations become unstuck and fleeing, but the borders of the nation-states are closed. There is no space outside the nation-states; where are the fleeing populations? They are unlocalisable. There is no space between national borders, yet clearly such a space exists. This in-between space is not simply a transitional space — a no-man's-land

between a and b — it is an inhabited space; inhabited by those unaccounted for: the fleeing of populations takes place here.

The fleeing populations are at home, on national territory: the space that they inhabit is not to be discovered but invented. Nor do refugees and those seeking migration exhaust the fleeing of populations.

Since 1976 and the publication of *L'échange symbolique et la mort*, Baudrillard has been arguing that all representative bodies — from political parties, to social and other scientists, to the mass media — have something in common: the task to safeguard their objectivity against the treachery of their object. He has also been describing the methods that representative bodies use in order to limit and deflect the flight of reality. These methods can be summarised in the formula: put them to the test in order not to be put to the test. I will outline some of them.

• Poll the population incessantly, ask the kind of question that only takes yes/no/undecided for an answer. Ask them to decide, to choose among you, poll to polarise. Suspend judgement by the demand to choose and take sides. Separate, create sections in the population, create exclusive identities if you hope to have a political constituency.

• Another tool for representative bodies is the discourse of crisis. The population is presented with a scene of tragic beauty: centre-stage a monstrous event, a moral outrage, a "deep crisis", and in the background the population is shown — like the disciples on the Mount of Olives — as failing to keep awake. The event is invented to say: "It is because of you that I have happened. Wake up to your civic responsibilities and take sides if you want to vote against me".

• The most advanced method of representative bodies, towards which all others contribute, Baudrillard calls the "simulacrum": an objectivist version of reality purged of passion and movement; the substitution of reality, because it is fleeing, because its judgement is to be fled, with hard, exclusive and tautological identities. Baudrillard's trademark phrase, "we now no longer", captures the melancholic flight from reality of representative bodies, simulating a collectivity without qualities and plagued by lack.[3]

<center>* * *</center>

Between the 13th of March 1790 and the 16th of February 1791 Thomas Paine published *The Rights of Man*. The force of this marvellous example of English political theory lies in Paine's capacity to conjugate opposing tendencies. The intense political passion that traverses the book is constantly intertwined with down-to-earth calculations of government expenditure and taxation policy. The cosmopolitan spirit that has given Paine a place in the post-revolutionary representative bodies of America and France informs the commitment to his own nation. But his greatest achievement lies in the discovery of strong and vital links between the people and representative bodies. He postulates a continuum between the incessant reconstitution of the people and the renewal of political representation.

The Rights of Man takes us in two directions at once, progression and regression. Paine calls for the abolition of hereditary government in England as a precondition for liberty, prosperity and universal peace, and this has almost been achieved. The revolution against despotism would restore the primordial and inalienable Rights of Man. The new system of government would be representative democracy, its foundation the Constitution, its fountainhead "the people" or "the nation". So far, Paine can be seen as one of the fathers of the Free World, and gives cause for self-congratulation. However, for Paine the sovereignty of the people is far more profound and indeterminable than can be imagined today. According to Paine, the sovereignty of the people has to have primacy over the Constitution for two reasons. Firstly, nations or peoples in their present (eighteenth-century) state are nothing but side-effects of despotic government, so that the Constitutions that they forge are necessarily corrupt. Secondly, in forging a permanent Constitution, a people would exercise its sovereignty at the expense of future generations, and would cancel their own sovereignty. As a result, the sovereignty of the people, instead of being understood as an asset or support for the Constitution, becomes a threat to its integrity as well as the source of its renewal. The sovereignty of the people is defined as inexhaustible constitutive power. In this context, the assignation of representative bodies has to

be understood as delegative rather than delegated power. Legislative, executive and judiciary powers depend upon the constitutive power of the people, while the first principles of the Constitution are first only in the sense that they will be followed by others.

In 1790, Paine announces the beginning of a long process of self-constitution of the people that would lead to a cosmopolitan society, on the grounds that it is only under despotic government that the people can be identified with and contained by national territories, and separated by their conflicts and wars. Clearly this process has been stopped in its tracks. As a result, the people appears today not as irresistibly drawn together, cosmopolitan and self-creative but as caught in national territories more than ever before. While the UK has yet to have a written Constitution, in constitutional democracies the people are sovereign in name only, because the early Declarations of Rights and Constitutions have become inalienable only in the sense that they are beyond the reach of the "sovereign people". By splitting asunder the vital link between people and constitution, the representative bodies have autonomised themselves and transcended the field of constitution at great cost. In spite (or because) of their unprecedented assumed power, they have become so far removed from the people, so blunt, that they fail increasingly to register it at all. Somewhere along the line the people has been lost, it has been leaking out and, with it, reality has fled and continues to flee. Representative bodies have come face to face with the paradox of the people: the more it is caught by identitarian spaces, it slips through their fingers all the more. Therefore, revise representation instead of revising the people.

III. How to be a realist?

At first it seems clear that the fleeing of populations is a secondary phenomenon, a by-product of despotic states collapsing, and of the degeneration of representative processes in democratic states. The only area where the fleeing of populations appears as a force, sometimes with ominous undertones, is the process of constitution of new identities — for example, those who defined themselves as Yugoslav

now define themselves as Slovenian, those who saw themselves as middle-class Americans now see themselves as women, etc.). But even in these cases, the process of constitution is reduced to the distance separating an identity of departure and an identity of destination, it becomes internal to the logic of identities. Maybe, instead of thinking that the fleeing of populations and the processes of constitution are nothing (but the accessories and decorations of identity politics), we can take the above as examples of the lack of realism of our representative bodies. They fail to register movements, which are unstable states; where there is movement they can only register stages. All they can do is frame the processes of fleeing, and what they send back is this frame: from a to b, a and b, either a or b. Their (and our) lot is the pseudo-realist formalism of identity, and reality is our worst enemy. So how to become a realist? We could start by considering the implausible: that what has not registered already exists, that it is accessible, that it is real, that we are already in it and it is not fearful (and it is not "late capitalism" either).

The grand narrative, or rather the soap science-fiction, of the Anglo-American postmodernism debate is that capitalism is a system of production originating in the West and presently encompassing everything. Capitalism is the most powerful force on earth; the West, as the agent of capitalism, has conquered planet Earth; the West has been unstoppable in its enslaving mission; this mission is now almost completed. What is to be debated is whether we can resist late capitalism while being trapped inside it (the sort of rhetorical question that takes simultaneously yes and no as an answer), but the omnipotence of "late capitalism" and the diabolical powers of the West are stubbornly put beyond debate, as if they are theological credos. It must be greatly perplexing to the rest of the world that the Anglo-American academic Left are crying wolf the loudest.

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The work of Deleuze and Guattari starts from a rather different hypothesis which at first appears unreal and futuristic. Capitalism is traversed by two processes that work simultaneously: the process of the

"artificial territoriality", and the process of the "line of flight" or the "line of escape". The process of the artifical territoriality produces what could be called *exclusive* identities — such as the autonomous individual, the nation-state, the minority, the author, the masterpiece. These identities are fortresses, their role is fundamentally defensive, reactive and antiproductive. What the process of the artificial territoriality excludes, in resisting another artificial territoriality, is the process of the line of flight. What the line of flight produces is not a chaos of undifferentiation, but *inclusive* differentiations, *inclusive* identities. The line of flight includes the artificial territoriality, the artificial territoriality excludes the line of flight.

Deleuze and Guattari open up the possibility for what can be called "immanent realism", a realism that shifts "what?" questions into "how?" questions. They open up a description of reality as processes of constitution rather than as an already constituted universe. From this point of view, what matters is to distinguish between processes rather than between products. Because of the absence of a third, transcendent term, the relation between the terms of the distinction — the artificial territoriality, and the line of flight — is *asymmetrical.* On the part of the process of the line of flight, the relation with the process of the artificial territoriality is one of *inclusive* disjunction. In order to take place, it depends on the existence of an artificial territoriality, it survives and unfolds by affecting and being affected by an artificial territoriality. On the part of the process of the artificial territoriality, the relation with the process of the line of flight is one of *exclusive* disjunction or duel. The line of flight has to be exterminated as a threat to its mode of being, which is that of external opposition and internal fragmentation. A parallel can be made between the asymmetrical relation here described and "unilateral disarmament" (while the artificial territoriality keeps up the good fight, the line of flight unilaterally disarms).

These processes cannot exist without being embodied in "collective assemblages of enunciation". The illocutionary formula of the artificial territoriality is: "I am of a superior race: I am one of us". The illocutionary formula of the line of flight is: "I am of an inferior race. I am a, b, c,...". The two illocutionary formulae summon different

types of subjectivity and different types of collectivity. The formula of the artificial territoriality summons an "I" that is constant and clearly circumscribed, on the condition of its subjugation to an exclusive predicate, an eternal institution ("I belong to an eternal institution"). "Exclusive" has to be understood in two senses: firstly, subject and predicate are mutually exclusive; secondly, their relation (and disjunction) is exclusive of others. The formula of the line of flight, on the other hand, summons a subject without interiority, the subject as a field for the movement of predicates. The predicates are historical names in constitution, inclusive identities in two senses. Firstly, they depend on being affected by other predicates for their constitution. Secondly, they include in their very announcement, "I am of an inferior race", the alien environment, the majority, within which they survive, and affect this environment with a "becoming minoritarian". As a result their identity can be called partial or participatory (they might not belong, but they contribute). The "I" of the line of flight includes all participatory or "minor" identities, so that whenever and wherever it emerges it manifests a cosmopolitan minoritarian illocutionary force. The illocutionary formula of the line of flight can take the following grammatical expression: indefinite article + noun + participle of active voice and present tense. An example of this grammatical expression that will appear in the following section is: some + German of Prague + becoming Kafka.

The distinction between two processes — major and minor — of assembling collective enunciation cuts across and undermines the distinction between major and minor identities. The line of flight is not a property of minorities and minor nations. On the contrary, history demonstrates that an oppressed minor identity can become and function as an oppressive majority. Conversely, the most oppressive major identity can release lines of flight. Within any given identity — major or minor — the distinction between artificial territoriality and line of flight, as a method of analysis, discovers the coexistence of the two processes and the ways in which their workings interact.

The answer to the question, what is the benefit of this method of analysis?, depends on answering the prior question: who benefits from the exclusive disjunctions between majority/minority and major/minor

nation, and their perpetuation? Exclusive identities are endlessly threatened, incomplete, in limbo; like vampires they are not alive but they refuse to die; aggressive and expansive in self-defence, they are as lacking as they are immortal. The process of the artificial territoriality is self-perpetuating, it interminably reproduces lines of separation. It delimits identities, hardens them and empties them out because it defines by exclusion. Exclusive identities are the "facts of life" when reality is understood as a state of things; between them they divide reality and share the spoils. Such a reality has to prove itself by setting up its opposites — hallucination, delusion and deception — where it projects the line of flight as un-realistic. Such a realism is simultaneously legislator, defendant and judge.

The process of the artificial territoriality and the process of the line of flight cannot be properly compared because they don't have the same field or principles of operation. The process of the artificial territoriality operates within the major problematic of freedom. The reality of freedom is dominated by the ideal of a natural and inalienable community in bondage, to be liberated from its enemies. The sublimity of this reality guarantees that freedom's job cannot be completed before the elimination of all strife and contestation (as in Kant's *Perpetual Peace*). In the meantime, the route to freedom is strewn with carnage between superior races done wrong. Caught in a battlefield of righteous aggression, the problematic of the line of flight is that of survival, in the most active sense of the word. This minor problematic opens a field for the invention of tools of survival, routes of escape from the effects of freedom. Every small route invented somewhere, opens to a limitless field of cosmopolitan mutual aid, a field of unlimited access — not for members only. A line of flight doesn't have a proper field to belong to, but it can borrow and be borrowed. Artificial territorialities dream of international organic co-existence in a final settling of all boundaries. Lines of flight find their interdependence in a mobile continuum of erogenous zones. This field which is erotic rather than organic, and cosmopolitan rather than international, is an "unlimited field of immanence" or a "field of exteriority". It has no outside and excludes nothing. It is reinvented by every resurgence of a capacity for long-distance connection, and every

time that lines of flight cross. Unlike perpetual peace, it exists already, as a mode of being of all artificial territorialities.

Instead of being an eternal institution, capitalism is traversed by collective processes of constitution. It encounters the artificial territorialities of the superior races, and flees the lines of flight of the inferior races. The line of flight is the inventive, experimental and productive force in capitalism. If "late capitalism" is anything, it is the building of defences to be found in the West and in the rest of the world, away and at home, erected to stop the flight of reality. If it is a hostile dominant, this is because it is an enemy of invention and experimentation, "they are, to put it bluntly, enemies of production ... you never know where you are with production" (Brecht quoted by Benjamin).[4] "Late capitalism" works as an economy of resistance to production, damming up productive processes inside the tragic opposition between producer and product. It is, increasingly, a system reproducing exclusive identities, inextricably linked and deeply dependent on the continuation of their differences, inequalities and conflicts. It is an unviable economy of lack, it burns surplus.

Unlike the scenario of the postmodernism debate, resistance to "late capitalism" is beyond the point. It is nonsensical that exclusive identities would resist "late capitalism". They *are* "late capitalism". To the extent that collective machines of expression are determined by exclusive identities, we are at one with "late capitalism" in combating the flight of reality. "Late capitalism" is capitalism become eternal institution. What matters is to fabricate our escape from eternal institutions, to become inferior races in order to survive their aggression.

IV. Literature in a minor key

I have outlined a conceptual apparatus which I will now explore briefly in relation to Kafka's writings. I will be drawing on Deleuze and Guattari's *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, and Walter Benjamin's writings on Kafka.

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Walter Benjamin saw very clearly that both the psychoanalytic and the theological interpretations of Kafka's work were missing the point. He defends Kafka as an experimental writer, experimenting with gestures: gestures of the body and of the voice. Benjamin's insights on Kafka, though unacknowledged in Deleuze and Guattari's *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, offer a valuable means of access to their investigation. Deleuze and Guattari locate a formal opposition which permeates Kafka's work, the opposition between an upward and a downward curve of the body. The downward curve, burying the head in the shoulders in submission, is a "form of content" which finds its "form of expression" in the portrait. (It can be observed that portraits lead Kafka's plots to bodies bending downwards, until they are flat on the ground, while downward bodies lead the plot to portraits.) The upward curve, stretching the body and lifting the head in pride, is a "form of content" which finds its "form of expression" in music. The two forms of content — the upward and downward gestures — are as opposed as victory and defeat, and the two forms of expression that support them — the portrait and music — as incompatible as objectivity and subjectivity, but all tensions within this quadriga are cancelled by the identity of their effects on the plot. They restrict the plot to an alternation between highest and lowest, and subjective and objective; they lead the plot into an endlessly rehearsed impasse, a "swamp world", to use Benjamin's expression.[5]

Kafka's literature is an itinerary of investigation into routes of escape out of the impasses facing literature. To this effect, his writings invent a non-formalisable sonorous expressive material which avoids portraiture as well as organised music. This expressive material appears suddenly, comes from nowhere, conjured up *ex nihilo*; it is insignificant but leaves nothing untouched and holds everything under its sway. Firstly, it summons up a non-formalisable *expressive* content, a gesture of the body in diagonal movement, leaping "in slant", "knocked endways" (Kafka's expressions).[6] Voice and body, against the separation of expression and content, become mutually inclusive and join a double line of flight. In "Investigations of a Dog", the dog sings an inaudible song without opening its lips, to seduce the food into falling from the sky, while the food, falling on its lips, knocks on its

teeth to open. Secondly, the expressive material finds its way into formalised expression and content. In "Metamorphosis", Gregor explains to the chief clerk that he is alright and ready to go to work, with a "persistent horrible twittering squeak".[7] The chief clerk flees, leaps down the steps, hands outstretched, his yelling "echo[ing] through the whole staircase".[8] In *The Trial*, even the Examining Magistrate transmits a sonorous material, emanating from his bent back. Kafka's literature invents gestures of the body and voice that are intensive rather than extensive, which flee along a spectrum of degrees rather than being localisable, identifiable and meaningful in themselves. Every such gesture kick-starts the plot anew rather than confining it in internal spaces. The effect of these inventions on Kafka's literature is that they allow its investigations to continue.

While he writes, Kafka invents what Deleuze and Guattari call a "minor literature". What opens the way to "minor literature" is neither the origin of the author nor the themes of their work, but a line of questioning, a type of apprenticeship in writing. The problem of minor literature is neither the imaginary resolution of conflicts nor freedom and redemption, but how to investigate impasse and find routes of escape. Impasse defines what Deleuze and Guattari call "major literature", characterised by the double-bind between social cohesion and the freedom of the individual. Kafka's literature investigates "major literature" in its quadruple gesture of submission, liberation, objective art, subjective art. Major literature is found to perpetuate the gulf between expression and reality, between representation (subject of enunciation) and represented (subject of the statement). Kafka invents a double line of flight for content and expression in order to escape major literature. What has to be made clear is that Kafka's escape is a geopolitical affair.

As is well known, Kafka was a Prague Jew. He is situated between the migration of Jewish populations from a Czech-speaking rural space to a German-speaking urban space, and the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Though Kafka was multilingual, in his writings he adopts the German of Prague, an impoverished and vehicular German. Kafka's work is a moving site constituted by two double migrations. The first double migration is the migration of

German to Prague, and the migration of the German of Prague to the Jewish community. The second double migration is the migration of Prague to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the migration of Czech countryside Jews to Prague. In addition, the imperial edifice is "knocked endways", and the new state of Czechoslovakia (allying Czechs and Slovaks) is on the horizon. Caught between an unnatural environment and a language in flight, literature to be written in German becomes very difficult both for those for whom German is the mother tongue and for those who have acquired it. The itinerary of German as an imperial language alienates oppressors and oppressed alike. In response to the "crisis", two solutions present themselves to literature. The first solution is high German and an individual literature of great masters, whose model is Goethe. The second solution extracts an enriched idiolect out of vehicular German — such is the case of the Prague School, a school of literature for free-spirited slaves.

The position of literary master is occupied by Goethe in exemplary fashion. Goethe's name is situated between the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire and the first German Federation, marks the emergence of German nationalism, and announces one of the first alliances of exceptional individual and national identity. The literature of individual masters claims German for a natural community of speakers: though German can migrate to alien communities, they have no power over it because German is German, one's own inalienable tongue. The literary genius proves *de facto* that language is passively waiting to be fertilised by exceptional writers and is, therefore, given.

The Prague School (Max Brod, Meyerink, etc.), identifying a minority, occupies the second subject position of "major literature". The Prague School, of largely Jewish constitution, is very close to Kafka's person — Max Brod is the acknowledged friend of "Franz". It is based on the premise that German is alien, beyond reach, and mastery over German impossible. The oppressed minorities have acquired nothing but a reduced and impoverished version of German. The Prague School then attempts to create a minoritarian idiolect in German. Within the boundaries of this idiolect, which is constituted by the metaphors, symbols and archetypes of Zionism, a secret and primordial identity, a minoritarian *Volkgeist* is discovered buried in the

Austro-Hungarian Empire, and resurrected. Once again, German is German, this time an irreducibly alien tongue because "we are who we are" and our forced migration into German cannot change that. What the Prague School creates is a language that is as referential as it is removed from popular expression. It symbolically overcomes and denies oppression, and forbids escape.[9]

The writer Kafka, faced with the two roles of literary master and spiritual minority leader, escapes them both. Kafka's language is neither original nor idiolectic. It is the threadbare German shared by the imperial bureaucracy and linguistic minorities alike. It is an empty language up for grabs, full of tensions, belonging to no one. It is a "field of exteriority", without depth, unlimited in surface, swept by waves. It has multiple functions, is only too clearly assembled, a *bricolage* of the movements of heterogeneous collective and institutional bodies. Within this language which is outside all formalised German dialects, high and low, Kafka's "minor literature" allows expressive materials to survive. Minor literature releases German in an intensive state, unhinged and erogenised by migrations. Kafka's minor literature displays a collective expressive material rather than recreating collective scenes and resurrecting ghosts.

While Kafka wrote in German, the impact of Yiddish on his work should not be underestimated. As Deleuze and Guattari point out, Yiddish for Kafka is the language of a (Yiddish) popular theatre, not the language of a minority. It is a language indissociable from German and Czech, it has no grammar and lives off stolen words, so that "one cannot translate it into German without destroying it".[10] It is grafted onto Prague German and works from within. While spiritual leaders reject it as inferior (as well as abandoning Czech and elevating the German of Prague), Kafka praises it. In his lecture on the Yiddish language[11], Kafka points out that Yiddish repulses and frightens; too removed from urban respectability, too entangled with German and Czech, it undermines the community's sense of identity. Yiddish popular theatre, based on gestures rather than characters, is a source of inspiration for Kafka. Kafka's minor literature achieves a double line of flight between the German of Prague and Yiddish theatre. In the double line of flight of an intensified gesture of the voice and an

intensified gesture of the body, Kafka's literature is neither majoritarian nor minoritarian, but accomplishes a "becoming minoritarian" of identities large and small that belongs to everyone.

As the Austro-Hungarian Empire is rapidly disintegrating, reality is greatly intensified so that "the 'state of emergency' in which we live is not the exception but the rule" (Benjamin).[12] Feeling this intensification to their very core, the two subject positions of "major literature", despite their opposing contents, display a common strategy: against the flight of reality they erect artificial territorialities. Kafka's "minor literature" didn't escape this treatment. He has been read as both a metaphysical literary master and a tragic Jewish writer. As a result, his comic realism was missed. But Benjamin discovers Kafka's resilience and cunning: Kafka's Will, that all his writings are "to be burned unread and to the last page"[13], anticipates and insidiously undermines any future editorial intervention and interpretation conducted on his behalf and claiming to do justice to his work. There is something intolerable about Kafka. It seems that his apprenticeship in writing had taught him something.

Benjamin poignantly describes the attitude of Kafka's posthumous editor, Max Brod, as "the pietistic stance of an ostentatious intimacy".[14] On grounds of close intimacy with the author, Brod gives titles to Kafka's novels and puts their chapters in definitive order. Also on grounds of intimacy, Brod claims that they are unfinished and gives us their endings. According to Brod, Kafka confided many things to him: the K. of *The Castle* "was to be permitted to live and work there", and *America* "should end on a note of reconciliation". Finally, "by actual recollection" Brod decided to put K.'s execution at the end of *The Trial*.[15] What if it was not intended that the chapters should have a definitive order and role? In one of his ubiquitous Postscripts Brod writes: "Kafka broke off his work on this novel with unexpected suddenness. It remained unfinished".[16] Breaking off work abruptly could indicate that something was brought to completion. Is it intolerable to consider that Kafka's writings become accomplished by *not* being separated from preceding and following work, and the exteriority of collective expression? Is this not the intolerable rule of realism, that the *modus operandi* and the overwhelming desire of

modern expression is fulfilled not in writing itself, but in continuing (and surviving) writing?

The thought arises that, instead of being an archaism, the Austro-Hungarian Empire is an exemplary modern identity. It was both a colonial empire in the heart of Europe, and a nation-state comprised of many peoples and one official language. It differs from both in that it displayed an exceptional fragility of alliances, a lack of lasting power contracts and consolidated hegemonies. In 1914, a resurgence of Pan-Slavism further volatilised the internal and external borders of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and led to the First World War. With the Great War the situation was reversed: it was infamously grounded and entrenched, hardly any movement took place for four years, and alliances were rock-solid. The Austro-Hungarian Empire is equally intolerable to neo-imperialism, nationalism and minoritarian separatism: like oppresses like.

The Austro-Hungarian Empire, as Kafka participates in it and illuminates it, cuts across the mutually corroborative divisions of First World/Third World and nation/minority, to betray the intense reality of minoritarian becomings, the crossing lines of flight that new identities cannot exhaust. Kafka renews, invents once again, a way of being minoritarian which is in stark contrast with the way in which minorities appear in the postmodernism debate. Instead of creating a minor identity, instead of reproducing the melodrama starring identities and their dissolution, we are made to consider a less eye-catching, less moving scene requiring greater composure: the movement between escaping impasse and active invention.

* * *

In this introductory essay, I have attempted to disengage minoritarian movements from identity politics, presenting them instead as a power that concerns and involves everyone, and as a key element of popular participation. Starting off from a neglected conception of the people as constitutive power, I have argued that the people is neither an abstract Mankind nor a specific national or ethnic identity, but that it is qualified in the invention of minoritarian becomings. To the extent that

this invention is caught by identitarian spaces, popular participation is drastically reduced. Though we all belong somewhere, this is not enough and this is not all. From the very depths of our belonging arises the desire for a kind of bonding that is more artificial, more inventive and more crucial than the bonds of our identity, our pride in it, and the tedious spectre of endless confrontation with our enemies.

We repeat *ad nauseam* the words "diversity", "multiplicity" and "interdisciplinarity", and use every -ism in plural. These increasingly vacuous tokens of good will — exchanged with a certain complacency and pseudo-euphoria, as the other side of the agonistic doom and gloom — obscure and threaten to supplant the efforts and difficulty of participation. Nevertheless, international debate and participation, "diversity", "multiplicity" and "interdisciplinarity", are still essential tasks. It remains to be found out how we should go about them.

PART I

Two case studies of contemporary criticism

CHAPTER TWO

Minorities in the postmodernism debate:
the spectre of dissolution

In Part One of this work, I will be producing the evidence for a tendency towards the construction of "artificial territorialities" in the postmodernism debate and in feminism, two of the most important fields of contemporary criticism. On the one hand, my objective is to use a Deleuzo-Guattarian concept and, more generally, Deleuzo-Guattarian analysis, as outlined in the third section of the first chapter, and to use it for diagnostic purposes. On the other hand, and at the same time, I hope to illustrate, and to begin to elucidate, what is at stake in the Deleuzo-Guattarian apparatus. Deleuze and Guattari will then be discussed in detail in Part Two of this work.

From the point of view of the gradual exposition of the work of Deleuze and Guattari which this thesis attempts, this chapter makes discreet use of a Deleuzo-Guattarian analysis, while the following chapter, in addition to continuing to use a Deleuzo-Guattarian analysis, encounters the work of Deleuze and Guattari directly.

In this chapter, the first evidence of a Deleuzo-Guattarian analysis will be that instead of asking what postmodernism means, I will be asking how the postmodernism debate works. In particular I will be asking what the postmodernism debate concretely does for minorities. Using the Deleuzo-Guattarian distinction between the process of the "artificial territoriality" and the process of the "line of flight", I will show that the postmodernism debate has a tendency, so far, to appropriate them into artificial territorialities and exclusive identities.

As is well known the postmodernism debate is vast and continues to expand. My account of it will by no means be exhaustive, nor is it intended to be. Nor is it intended that the texts and authors I will be discussing be taken as representative of the postmodernism debate as a whole. Nor is it intended that my analysis be taken as generalisable to those authors and texts I will not be discussing. The above means that the evidence for the appropriation of minorities into "artificial

territorialities" has to be demonstrated anew in relation to each text and author. For the ensuing inflation in the size of this chapter I apologise to the reader in advance.

My account of the postmodernism debate will be unorthodox in that it will deviate from the standard responses to the postmodernism debate: sacred terror that we are being swamped by an invasion of the other; exhilaration that the other has spoken. In particular, my account of the postmodernism debate is intended to breath a word of caution in the ear of optimistic commentators who consider the postmodernism debate to be a great achievement, and a real break, in the process of the reconstruction of the West, and hasten to pronounce that in the postmodernism debate the other has spoken.

The participants in the postmodernism debate discussed in this chapter were selected on this basis, with the exception of a few participants who were chosen as counterexamples, as "lines of escape".

I. The postmodernism debate

The "question of postmodernism" has proved, over the last ten years, a peculiarly compelling one. It has found its way into hundreds of books and thousands of articles. The "question" or the "problem" of postmodernism, "how its fundamental characteristics are to be described, whether it even exists in the first place"[1], has become a mediating question — a question through which a variety of other questions can be approached and answered.

The fascination of postmodernism is invariably presented as interdisciplinary and international, without frontiers, so that every new contribution takes place in a terrain that can only be called global. At the same time, it is understood that postmodernism is a condition of the "contemporary West"[2], and it is more or less a statement of fact that the contributions to the postmodernism debate come from "Europe and the Americas".[3] It is widely accepted that the protagonists in the postmodernism debate — at least in the sense that they have become the established reference points of discussion — are Jean-François Lyotard, Jürgen Habermas and Fredric Jameson.[4] In particular, the

three *sine qua nons* for any student of the postmodernism debate are considered to be Lyotard's *The Postmodern Condition* (1979), Habermas's "Modernity — An Incomplete Project" (1980) and Jameson's "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism" (1984). All three texts have been so endlessly and relentlessly summarised by subsequent writers on the subject that I don't feel it necessary to repeat this ritual gesture myself. Of the three figures, my account of the postmodernism debate will focus on Jameson, who will be discussed extensively and in detail. This is because my purpose in what follows is neither to give an overview of the postmodernism debate nor to tour through its most important contributors. My purpose, as I have said, is to examine the debate's tendency towards the construction of "artificial territorialities", and this tendency, I believe, only comes or is brought to the fore by Jameson. Finally, within the West, it is notable that the debate is, statistically, overwhelmingly Anglo-American. Not only are the majority of the participants situated in the Anglo-American world; not only have other nationals participated in English and written for an Anglo-American audience; but the inflation of interest in postmodernism in the Anglo-American world has guaranteed the fast translation into English of contributions in other languages. As a result, the full scope of the postmodernism debate will only be visible to an English-speaking audience. But the argument is not simply quantitative. It is certain that what appears as the postmodernism debate in the Anglo-American world, the *particular scope* of this debate — including its centrality and relevance — would not be recognised as such elsewhere.[5] In fact it could be argued that the postmodernism debate in its explosive or expansive state, i.e. since the early 1980s, is an Anglo-American phenomenon.

It is this phenomenon — rather than "postmodernism" and what it means — that will be the object of my inquiry, and that I will designate as the "postmodernism debate". The postmodernism debate is not to be understood as the sum total of the books and articles published on postmodernism. More importantly, the postmodernism debate is not to be understood as a debate *on* postmodernism; clearly, this debate relies on the shared use of the term "postmodernism", but

finds its *raison d'être*, its dynamic, elsewhere. It will be my argument that postmodernism is the object of the debate only in the sense of a hallucinated, imaginary and highly functional object, projected as a guarantee of the internal coherence of the debate. Postmodernism might support the debate, but the object, the objective, the project that the postmodernism debate constitutes is not immediately given.

* * *

The term "postmodern" or "post-modern" has been around for a long time. It appears in Spanish, in the writings of Federico de Onis influenced by Unamuno and the generation of 1898, making its debut in de Onis's 1934 *Antología de la poesía española e hispanoamericana.*[6] It migrates to English in 1939, appearing in the fifth volume of Arnold Toynbee's *A Study of History.*[7] In 1952 it crosses the Atlantic to appear in the writings of Charles Olson.[8] So far the term appears in the context of an engagement with history, coming from ex-colonisers, and associated with the desire to spiritually reconstruct an impoverished West.

With Olson as a bridge, from the early 1960s onwards the term "postmodern" re-emerges in a different context — that of art criticism in a Western nation which is at the zenith of its power.[9] Ihab Hassan's 1971 *The Dismemberment of Orpheus: Toward a Postmodern Literature* is a landmark in the adoption of the term by US literary criticism, giving it positive connotations. Robert Venturi's and Denise Scott-Brown's 1972 *Learning from Las Vegas*, though not using the term, is a landmark in the architectural debate on postmodernism.[10] The "postmodern" here designates a perceived complete break with modernism in US architecture, while modernism's utopianism is now denounced as authoritarian and sterile functionalism. Both the literary and the architectural debate, in spite of their difference in the degree of newness that they attribute to the "postmodern" — relative in the former, absolute in the latter — have something in common. This is the new-found pride and confidence of US art that it is now at the forefront internationally. ("Abstract expressionism" in painting was the first US movement of international stature but remained heavily indebted to

Europe. Now US literature claims equal, if not superior, stature with Europe — no more Henry-James-type settlement in Europe, and Sylvia Plath is dead — while US "postmodernist" architecture can claim to be the first completely home-grown global artistic force.)

The discontinuous clusters of debate that I have outlined above acquire a link and find a principle of coherence in the grand Anglo-American postmodernism debate. Initiated in the mid-1980s, the grand debate makes these elements worthy of reproduction, and at the same time overcodes them.

The final element that the grand debate overcodes is the so-called "debate" between Jean-François Lyotard and Jürgen Habermas. It is clear to me that this supposedly inter-national debate is a fabrication of the Anglo-American postmodernism debate; its role is to position Fredric Jameson as the third term, while the wider claim is that French "poststructuralism" negates German Critical Theory and is in turn negated by the Anglo-American New Left. This movement — as we will see shortly — is explicitly made in Jameson's Foreword to Lyotard's *The Postmodern Condition* (1984), which posits a contradiction between a German and a French tradition where Habermas and Lyotard purportedly belong.

That this is a fabrication is, I believe, made clear in Habermas's *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* (1987 [1985]). Lyotard is here mentioned once:

> [Modernity's] philosophical aspects have moved even more starkly into public consciousness in the wake of the reception of neostructuralism [poststructuralism] — as has the key term "postmodernity," in connection with a publication by Jean-François Lyotard. (p. xix)

If Habermas's formidable effort in *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* has a target, this is not Lyotard, but Luhmann's "systems theory"[11]; and, to articulate his attack, Habermas mobilises the resources that French poststructuralism, especially Foucault, puts at his disposal. Habermas discusses Foucault extensively[12] and, as Thomas McCarthy puts it in his Introduction to *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, "readers might justifiably conclude that in his dialogue with French poststructuralism, Foucault is the preferred partner" (p. xiv). If I

seem to want to underplay the differences between Habermas and Foucault, and Habermas's disagreement with him in this work, this is only in the context of my strong objection to Jameson's schema of the relation between poststructuralism and Critical Theory. My point is that, to quote McCarthy again, "Habermas's disagreements with Foucault certainly do not amount to a blanket rejection" (p. xv) nor, as Jameson would have it, to an underlying contradiction between a French and a German philosophical tradition.

In particular, Habermas presents his theory of "communicative action" as involving a radical critique and a rejection of the philosophy of the subject, as disengaging rationality from the philosophy of the subject, and as taking the path of intersubjectivity that Hegel and Marx never took. [13] According to Habermas, while Hegel "remain[s] within the bounds of the philosophy of the subject" (p. 31) and while Marx's praxis philosophy "remains a variant of the philosophy of the subject" (p. 65), this radical critique was conducted by Nietzsche and the two lines of thought that emanate from him: the one leading to Derrida via Heidegger, and his preferred one leading to Foucault via Bataille.

Habermas sees his project as a modern philosophical project in the sense that, for him, philosophical modernity is indissociable from its critique. As a result of this perspective, both the French poststructuralists and "postmodernity", which according to Habermas is initiated by Nietzsche and his radical critique of modernity, belong to the philosophical discourse of modernity. (I have no objection to this argument; on the contrary, I believe that Habermas is mistaken in thinking that poststructuralists saw themselves as outside modernity.) Luhmann is then attacked for his return to and "appropriation of the philosophy of the subject through systems theory" (this is the title of Habermas's Excursus on Luhmann); for his wholesale adoption of the philosophy of the subject — embodied in his concept of the "system" — which bypasses modernity's self-critique and attempts to transcend it.

From the perspective of French poststructuralism and Lyotard, the field of intervention is rather different. To begin with, those considered as representatives of "poststructuralism" (the Anglo-American term) or "neostructuralism" (Habermas's term) do not see themselves as belonging to a school or a common project. As far as

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Lyotard is concerned, his work on the "postmodern" simply continues his long-term commitment to the artistic avant-gardes. In this respect, it is irrelevant whether or not Lyotard is responsible for the extraordinary fate of his "occasional" (*The Postmodern Condition*, p. xxv) report to the Conseil des Universités of the government of Québec in the late 1970s; similarly, that Lyotard has spent the last ten years denouncing and trying to rectify the "debacle of the condition"[14] is interesting but not the crucial point. The crucial point is this: Lyotard proposes an artistic model for science and philosophy, and uses an artistic model for their critique. Irrespective of the way in which *The Postmodern Condition* is read — and reduced to the slogan of the "end of metanarratives" — the fact remains that Lyotard discusses science and philosophy in terms of narrative, and proposes for their rejuvenation an ethics of "paralogy" routinely practised in artistic experimentation. Thus, on the path opened by Schiller, Schelling and Schlegel, Lyotard puts his philosopher's faith in the liberatory possibilities of art. But the precursors of his *specific* project are, firstly, the 1930s Frankfurt School debate on modernism versus realism; secondly, the Nouveau Roman/*TelQuel* debate on realism. My interpretation is corroborated by Lyotard's "Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?" which concludes the volume of *The Postmodern Condition*. Though this text defines the "postmodern" in a way that is thoroughly incompatible with the main text — not as a contemporary condition but as a tendency within modernism — it repeats and makes explicit both the use of an artistic model, and the artistic avant-garde solutions: the terrain is modernism, the solution is to reject realism in favour of avant-garde artistic experimentation.

I will return to Lyotard on several occasions in this work. The sole point of this brief and speedy passage through Lyotard and Habermas was to indicate that Jameson's self-appointment, in the Foreword to the *Postmodern Condition*, to the role of mediator between the purportedly contradictory positions of poststructuralism and Critical Theory is not justified by fact. It can be seen, rather, as Jameson's own active reconstruction (not to say misconstrual) of the terms of the postmodernism debate, a reconstruction which once

accepted involves the initiation of a new phase in it — a phase which I designate as the Anglo-American postmodernism debate.

* * *

The specific project of the Anglo-American postmodernism debate could not have been operating long before the English translation of Lyotard's *La condition postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir*. I will argue that this project was initiated in 1983-1984, and that Jameson's Foreword to *The Postmodern Condition*, though undated, marks the date of its inauguration. I will provisionally describe this project as a project for the reinforcement of boundaries: nationally between minorities, internationally between nations, and between faculties in the academy. In this, the postmodernism debate would appear to be a pre-eminently modern project. Secondly, if there is a consensus in the Anglo-American postmodernism debate that postmodernism is synonymous with contemporary reality in general, and if there is a consensus that it is characterised by a "crisis of History" and a "crisis of the Subject", the postmodernism debate is firmly beyond postmodernism: it is characterised by a historical periodising argument and a (modern) passion for self-definition — once again modernity is surpassing itself. So that the postmodernism debate, in its critique of postmodernism, is already outside it and pioneers its overcoming.

The postmodernism debate presents itself as the reconstructive answer to postmodernism and the postmodern condition. This is an answer of plurality within unity. But what is interesting is that postmodernism itself, as defined by some participants in the debate[15], displays the same preoccupation with or passion for history and self-definition. In which case, the phase of dissolution (crisis, fragmentation, etc.) becomes the absent or latent — in any case intractable — phase.

I wish to claim that the postmodernism debate is a project for the reattribution of exclusive qualities and properties, and the redistribution of territories within a single terrain — the postmodernism debate is *itself*, at least in principle, an inter-national, inter-regional, inter-minoritarian, inter-disciplinary debate on a single

global plane. I will call this project, a *project for a global federal cultural republic*. The gigantic discrepancy in size between an Anglo-American academic phenomenon and a global federal republic makes this claim a ludicrous one. This is where the ideology of the avant-garde comes in — and where the New Left finds a role, to be repeated by the self-appointed representatives of minorities and minor nations. In order to reconstruct itself the Anglo-American New Left posits itself as if in the forefront of global developments. As in the 1960s civil rights movement where the New Left first emerged[16], it has recourse to a global threat — nuclear catastrophe then, postmodernism now — in order to demand the alliance and participation of all minorities under its umbrella; but whereas with the civil rights movement its claims to leadership were addressed to minorities within the US, this time its call will be international. Ironically, in both cases, what gives credence and a special role to the New Left is, in the first instance, the US's superior nuclear capability; in the second, the emergence of the US as the sole superpower.

As I have already said, Jameson is the central figure in my account of the postmodernism debate. The following section will be devoted to an extensive, detailed examination of all his theoretical pieces on postmodernism.

II. The postmodernism debate and Jameson: Jameson's address to minoritarian movements

> [T]o speak in a new collective voice, never before heard on the world stage
> — and the concomitant dismissal of intermediaries...
> (Jameson, "Periodizing the 60s", p. 181)

Jameson initiated his work on postmodernism in 1982, one year after the publication of *The Political Unconscious*. In this work he does make reference to the term "post-modern", but this is more or less in the form of acknowledgement of a new term circulating out there, which Jameson is barely able to distinguish from modernism.[17] In the sixth chapter of *White Mythologies* entitled "The Jameson Raid", Robert

Young describes Jameson's project in *The Political Unconscious,* one of sublating Sartre and Althusser in a grand Hegelian gesture of transcendence, as "truly scandalous" (p. 92) and not without "delusions of grandeur" (p. 112): "by *The Political Unconscious* Jameson's territorial ambitions have become more grandiose" (p. 113). I believe that Jameson's work on postmodernism marks and allows a further substantial expansion of his ambitions. If, according to Young, "Jameson's strategy [in *The Political Unconscious*] is to empower Marxism against poststructuralism by rolling all Marxisms into one" (p. 94), I believe that in his work on postmodernism he attempts nothing less than to sublate poststructuralism, *as well as* minoritarian (feminist, postcolonial, etc.) movements and discourses, in a grand American Marxist neo-colonial utopia.

Jameson's theoretical work on postmodernism, produced between 1982 and 1984, comprises six pieces[18]: Jameson's Foreword to *The Postmodern Condition* (1984), and a cluster of five cross-referenced pieces; amongst those, the final version on the subject, according to Jameson, is "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism" (1984).[19] The four preparatory pieces are "Postmodernism and Consumer Society" (1982)[20], "Cognitive Mapping" (1988 [1983])[21], "Periodizing the 60s" (1984)[22], and "The Politics of Theory: Ideological Positions in the Postmodernism Debate" (1984).[23]

* * *

Jameson's Foreword to *The Postmodern Condition* appears to be merely presenting, for the benefit of an English-speaking audience, a fully formed Lyotard/Habermas debate. Lyotard's book is presented as "a thinly veiled polemic against Jürgen Habermas" (p. vii); the two "opponents" are presented as belonging to their respective and incompatible "national myths [which] reproduce the very polemic" (p. ix): these "myths" are "the French eighteenth century and the French Revolution ... [and] the Germanic and Hegelian tradition" (p. ix). In a second move, Jameson displaces the "conflict" (his term) between Habermas and Lyotard into one between Adorno and Deleuze (thus announcing his then forthcoming book on Adorno, as well as his well-

known ambivalence towards Deleuze — usually manifesting itself in a mixture of exorbitant praise, blatant misuse, and unacknowledged appropriation). Finally, Jameson seals off the "opposition" (his term) by recourse to national psychological characteristics: "a characteristically French affirmation of the 'decentered subject' ... against more traditional Frankfurt School defenses of psychic autonomy" (p. x). So Jameson defines the Lyotard/Habermas controversy as a French/German, inter-national debate, and positions himself as the Anglo-American third term.

In the very first paragraph of his Foreword to *The Postmodern Condition*, Jameson introduces his own main thesis on postmodernism: that postmodernism is the global superstructural symptom of a new global economic system. Whereas it is now well known that Jameson pioneered the link between "postmodernism" and "late capitalism", he introduces his thesis in strangely disguised terms. That postmodernism "involves ... a new social and economic moment (or even system)" is presented as a statement of external fact, "postmodernism as it is generally understood" in a debate that didn't yet exist.

Neither Lyotard, nor Habermas, nor anyone else, had so far taken this scenario on board. Jameson's recourse to a global system would be unacceptable both to Habermas and to Lyotard. For Habermas, Jameson's recourse to "late capitalism" as *prima causa* would uncritically adopt the philosophically and politically discredited philosophy of the subject. In fact, in the discussion to follow I hope it will become clear that Jameson embarks on a complete resurrection of the philosophy of the subject, following all four of its presuppositions. Lyotard, on the other hand, since 1972 and on not unsimilar lines, displaces Jameson's opposition between total system (as "late capitalism") and total systemic transformation (as "international socialism") from the ontological to the epistemological — to the opposition between "la figure du savoir"[24] and critique — and argues that "la grande affaire de ce temps-ci" is to elude this dualism.[25] Indeed, the Anglo-American postmodernism debate is based on Jameson's redefinition of postmodernism as symptomatic of, and even synonymous with, contemporary social and economic global reality, as we will see. With expressions such as "postmodern *period*"

("Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic...", p. 62, my italics), no distance remains between "postmodernism" and "late capitalism".

Why does Jameson have recourse to a new global system and what sort of use does he make of it? I will try to answer these questions in what follows. In brief, I hope to show that Jameson describes minoritarian movements as the new face of capitalism, and attacks them as a foe of global dimensions, threatening everyone. The second-generation New Left, the new New Left, that he envisages would unite everyone against them.

A. postmodernism as a relatively autonomous phenomenon in the arts (Jameson's use of Baudrillard)

In "Postmodernism and Consumer Society" (1982), Jameson's earliest piece on postmodernism, he already has recourse to "the new international order" (p. 113), which is never described beyond the "terrible indictment of consumer capitalism itself" (p. 117). If we want to find out what this new international order is — as if, like the Medusa's head, it is not to be looked at directly — we have to look at postmodernism instead, since:

> I believe that the emergence of postmodernism is closely related to the emergence of this new moment of late, consumer or multinational capitalism. I believe also that its formal features in many ways express the deeper logic of that particular social system. (p. 125)

Nevertheless, in "Postmodernism and Consumer Society" postmodernism is still a break exclusively in the Arts, whose characteristics are pastiche and schizophrenia. Pastiche is understood as the expression of "each group coming to speak a curious private language of its own", at the expense and to the detriment of "normal language, of ordinary speech, of the linguistic norm", as well as at the expense of "a unique personality and individuality, which can be expected [unlike groups] to generate its own unique vision of the world and to forge its own unique, unmistakable style" (p. 114). What else can the development of group languages mean but that "the age of corporate [sic] capitalism" (p. 115) destroys both public and private identities alike?

Schizophrenic art, as discussed by Jameson in relation to the "New Sentence", repeats the problem of (and the negative judgement on) group languages, now viewed from the outside, in that it consists of clusters of sentences or local articulations whose temporalities fail to merge into the great big time-continuum which is, for Jameson, synonymous with history. Again, what else can this show but that this "new moment" imposes upon us a "historical amnesia" and leaves us bereft of our "sense of history" (p. 125)?

A quick comparison with Baudrillard's *La société de consommation* (1970), to which Jameson's "Postmodernism and Consumer Society" clearly refers, will show the extent of the liberties that Jameson takes in his pronouncements on consumer capitalism. Baudrillard's "consumer society", unlike Jameson's use of it, has no dispersive or fragmentary effects. On the contrary, it is an expanded system of social reproduction, regulation and control: "Consumption is a system which assures the regulation of signs and the integration of the group[,] ... a system of meaning" (*Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings*, p. 46). What is more — in what is a properly Marxian argument — consumer society is but a response, a reaction to "the rise of new productive forces" (p. 49). With Jameson, on the contrary, such new productive forces and the micromultiplicities that they constitute are presented as mere effects of consumer capitalism. Finally, even Jameson's periodising argument is anticipated and rejected: "The ideology of consumption would have us believe that we have entered a new era ... Production and Consumption are *one and the same grand logical process in the expanded reproduction of the productive forces and of their control*" (p. 50, my underlining).

Even so, Jameson's first piece on postmodernism is quite open compared to the much harder version of "Capitalism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism". It differs from this later work in two respects. Here postmodernism is still a phenomenon in the Arts, related to the economic system and yet distinct from it. It is because of this distinction that Jameson can conclude that: "We have seen that there is a way in which postmodernism replicates or reproduces — reinforces — the logic of consumer capitalism; the more significant question is whether there is also a way in which it resists that logic" (p. 125). Later

on, Jameson will assimilate postmodernism to the logic of late capitalism; postmodernism would then have to be confronted and overcome by the postmodernism debate.

A point of secondary importance is that poststructuralism is here still considered both to be "radical" (p. 115) and to have cognitive value equal to that of Mandel's *Late Capitalism* (1975). Whereas in "Postmodernism and Consumer Society" Jameson treats Baudrillard's "consumer society" and Mandel's "late capitalism" as interchangeable terms (see pp. 113, 124), in subsequent essays he will place them on opposite sides of a distinction, made but never discussed, between the symptomatic and the cognitive. Poststructuralism will be relegated to the symptomatic, denounced as another symptom of late capitalism, and the term "consumer society" will be dropped. Jameson will make exclusive use of the Anglo-American Marxist model of Mandel's "late capitalism", promoted to the cognitive. A strange side-effect of this attitude is that in "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic..." he introduces concepts which owe a clear debt to Deleuze and Guattari or to Baudrillard as if he has just invented them himself: "feelings — which it may be better or more accurate to call 'intensities'" (p. 64) clearly refers to Deleuze and Guattari, while "this new hyperspace, as I will call it" (p. 80) clearly refers to Baudrillard.

B. minoritarian movements as an epiphenomenon of late capitalism (Jameson's use of Mandel)

Jameson develops his use of Mandel's "late capitalism" in "Periodizing the 60s" (1984). Jameson announces that the *raison d'être* of this piece is to "produce the *concept* of history. Such will ... be the gamble of the following pages" (p. 180). He concludes his pages by asserting that the "prodigious release of untheorized new forces" in the 1960s is due to "the transition from one infrastructural or systemic stage of capitalism to another", "as well as (from the hindsight of the 80s) a historical illusion", "inflationary", "devalued signifiers", an unwise "universal abandonment of the referential gold standard" (presumably, a "universal abandonment" of class). Punishment for such hubris will miraculously come from late capitalism itself, as Jameson predicts maliciously:

the 80s will be characterized by an effort, on a world scale, to
proletarianize all those unbound social forces[;] ... by an
extension of class struggle ... into the farthest reaches of the
globe as well as the most minute configurations... (p. 208)
Capitalism is "expected to unify the unequal, fragmented, or local
resistances", so that Marxism "must necessarily become true again" (pp.
208-209).

What intervenes between Jameson's "concept" of history and his
prediction that late capitalism will be Marxism's avenging angel is
Jameson's free use of Mandel to counter what is really at stake:

Such newly released forces do not only not seem to compute in
the dichotomous class model of traditional Marxism; they
also seem to offer a realm of freedom and voluntaristic
possibility beyond the classical constraints of the economic
infrastructure. (p. 208)

In pp. 206-209, late capitalism is brought in as the condition of
possibility of the new "unbound" micropolitical forces. To this effect,
Jameson borrows three points from Mandel's analysis:

• That late capitalism is the purest form of capitalism because it
extends industrialisation and mechanisation to Third-World agriculture
and First-World culture — as if technology is necessarily and
exclusively the instrument of capitalism.

• That Third-World national liberation movements are symptomatic of
the dialectic of "the 'liberation' of peasants from their older self-
sustaining village communities, and a movement of self-defense" (p.
207) against neocolonialism. Jameson takes the liberty to generalise
this point to include all non-class-based First-World movements — as if
neocolonialism precedes and fully explains the Algerian liberation
movement, Vietnamese resistance, and US feminism and Black Power
alike.

• That "with the world-wide recession of 1973-74, the dynamics" of this
transitory phase from the old to a new capitalist system "are spent" (p.
206) (*Late Capitalism* was only published in 1975). Jameson then takes
the greatest liberty of all: surely, he argues, this new exhaustion of
capitalism means that the new micropolitical forces are exhausted as
well.

"And this is finally also the solution to the so called 'crisis of Marxism'" (p. 209)!

C. Jameson adds a few touches of his own: McCarthyism and American domination

In "Periodizing the 60s", and in addition to his main argument that late capitalism is the condition of possibility of the new micropolitical forces, Jameson develops a second argument: the "'condition of possibility' for the unleashing of the new social dynamics" is McCarthyism, in that it "secured the expulsion of the Communists from the American labour movement" (p. 181). This argument, that global unrest erupted because the US communists were unwisely refused their presumably regulative role, is remarkable for many reasons: it is a statesmanlike address to an imaginary security council; it brings in communism — a word that Jameson has expelled from his vocabulary; it hints at the special global importance of events in the US.

The "dialectic" between US and the world is initiated in "Cognitive Mapping" (1982) and, passing through the above argument in "Periodizing the 60s", reaches a peak in "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic..." (1984):

> this whole global, yet American, postmodernist culture is the
> internal and superstructural expression of a whole new
> wave of American military and economic domination
> throughout the world... ("Postmodernism, or The Cultural
> Logic...", p. 57).

Indeed, Jameson in his final pronouncements seems unwilling or unable to distinguish between a global reality and a US reality, as well as between a local and a global role for the new New Left. In his quixotic imagination, minoritarian movements are to be combated as manifestations of US international domination, while US international socialism is to be the warrior to stop them in their tracks.

In "Cognitive Mapping" (1988 [1983]) and the exchanges with the audience that follow it, we can witness the beginning of this undercurrent — the US/global dialectic — in Jameson's writings on postmodernism. Jameson here oscillates between US "social totality"

and global "social totality", and between socialism in the US and international socialism.

On the one hand, the "aesthetic project" of *cognitive mapping* — more of which later — is to find its meaning in the New Left project for the legitimation of socialism in the US. On the other, Jameson claims that socialism in the US can only be achieved by a global strategy and on a global scale. This global strategy is to combat his new stage of capital: the "multidimensional set of discontinuous realities" (p. 351), the "Nietzschean world of micropolitics" (p. 355) and local struggles.

Having depoliticised minoritarian movements into a sublime and irredeemable reality making "socialist internationalism" impossible (p. 351), Jameson proceeds to depoliticise socialism itself. His version of socialism is so implicated in the "international logic of capital" that, not only it cannot exist as long as capital exists, but also "if capital doesn't exist, then clearly socialism doesn't exist either" (pp. 354-355)! Once these fabricated double binds called impossibilities are in place, all that is left — the new utopian project — is a map of "the totality of class relations on a global ... scale" (p. 353).

Jameson's maps-for-international-socialism campaign consists of:
• Mapping minoritarian movements, the aforementioned "discontinuous" and "multidimensional" realities, onto the two-dimensional terrain of late capitalism.
• Mapping other people's work on postmodernism onto the two axes of Left (+) and Right (-); this is done in "The Politics of Theory" (1984).
• Lastly, in *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (1991), comes Jameson's colossal overview, by domain, of US non-minoritarian culture as postmodernist global culture (with some European favourites thrown in).

D. Jameson makes use of Sartre to discredit collective expression

In "Periodizing the 60s", Jameson grumpily admits that what he describes as the period of late capitalism has seen the accelerated emergence of new collective voices: "some poststructuralist, Foucaultean notion [*sic*] of the conquest of the right to speak in a new collective voice" (p. 181). One of the forms of his denial of the

indisputable historical fact and the greatly enhanced importance of collective (rather than either public or private and individual) expression — expression that either contributes to a collective project or summons a collectivity anew — is to argue that only individual expression qualifies as expression:

> The very concept of expression presupposes ... the wordless pain within the monad and the moment in which, often cathartically, that "emotion" is then projected out and externalized ... as desperate communication and the outward dramatization of inward feeling. ("Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic...", p. 61)

> Those who find ways of being for collective feeling and collective expression, those like Deleuze and Guattari — as we will see — who develop concepts to describe the desires, the "intensities", the *Gemüts* of subject-groups and subjugated groups, the "collective assemblages of enunciation", are erroneously perceived as "discrediting" (p. 61) expression itself. What is generated with collective expression is then interpreted as a typically postmodern "waning of affect". It seems that the mere description of collective expression suffices to contaminate contemporary theory with postmodernism, so that it becomes "itself very precisely a postmodernist phenomenon" ("Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic...", p. 61).

> Furthermore, embracing collective expression at the expense of individual expression is strangely attributed to the poststructuralists exclusively. This is done almost imperceptibly. From the initial "poststructuralism ... is ... a very significant symptom of the very postmodernist culture" ("Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic...", p. 61), Jameson quickly slips to individual expression as no less than "a casualty of the poststructural or postmodern period" (p. 62). It comes as no surprise when Eagleton's "Capitalism, Modernism and Postmodernism" (1985) — a congratulatory response in *New Left Review* to "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic..." published in the same journal — takes it for granted that "poststructuralist" and "postmodernist" are interchangeable terms.[26]

> In "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic...", Jameson uses expressions such as the "monadic individual" and the "individual

subject" almost as often as he uses the word "postmodernism". He repeatedly states that "expression requires the category of the individual monad", that "the fragmentation of the subject", "the 'death' of the subject itself = the end of the autonomous bourgeois monad or ego or individual" (p. 63), and so on and so forth.

The use made of individual expression is presented as a reference and a tribute to the beloved Sartre. The groundwork for this dubious tribute is done in "Periodizing the 60s", where Sartre himself gets a dose of the Jamesonian medicine (praise, appropriation, abuse). Choosing, amazingly, to discuss his *Critique de la raison dialectique* (1960) — a book whose main category is the group, not the individual existential subject, and whose distinction between "groups-in-fusion" and "groups-in-series", in favour of the former, anticipates Foucault's and Deleuze-Guattari's interest in micropolitics as against class politics — Jameson admits that the *Critique* develops "a political theory of group dynamics" ("Periodizing the 60s", p. 187). But this is only to conclude in inimitable fashion:

> Suffice it to say, in the present context [*sic*], that the *Critique* fails to reach its appointed terminus, and to complete the projected highway that was to have led from the individual subject of existential experience all the way to the constituted social classes. (p. 187)

Suffice it to let Sartre himself answer to Jameson's use of the existential subject in order to boycott collective expression, and to his recourse to "late capitalism" in order to explain the special role of one group among others, the New Left:

> I thought that all we needed was for several of us to constitute a group whose goal would be to subvert the Nazis who were occupying the country, and that would lead to a veritable flood of resistance. And so we never imagined this resistance group — at least I didn't — as one out of a hundred, which it really was, but I saw it as something that was going to give rise to a whole nationwide resistance movement, with grass-root support. The only thing was, things didn't turn out this way... (*Sartre by Himself*, p. 50)

This, of course, doesn't mean that there was *no* resistance movement. But if we are to apply Jameson's logic, the diversity of the resistance movement would be symptomatic of Nazism, and as a result there would be no resistance movement properly speaking. Jameson would then spend the period of the German occupation contemplating the sublime impossibility of a resistance movement that would encompass all resistance groups.

In fact, this is Jameson's desired scenario for the present, and it is this underlying scenario that links up the theme of private expression to those of the social norm and the avant-garde in "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic...". What is desired is the "dialectic" of an evil social norm tête-à-tête with its contender, the avant-garde of exceptional individuals spear-heading the succession.

The link between the individual monad and the avant-garde (always in the singular) is postulated rather than explained; the former is presented as the condition of possibility of the latter. The "collective ideals of ... political vanguard or *avant-garde*, themselves stand or fall along with that older notion (or experience) of the so called centred subject" (p. 63) — as if collective force is nothing on its own.

Similarly, a link is postulated between national social norms and vanguard projects: the "death" of the one leads to the impossibility of the other. The "linguistic fragmentation of social life itself to the point where the norm itself is eclipsed" and "the unavailability of the older national language itself" lead to "the absence of any great [*sic*] collective project" (p. 65) — as if the nation is the only horizon for collective action. The effect of tying up "great collective project[s]" to national norms and monadic individuals is that the development of minoritarian languages is turned into an enemy of collective projects, rather than being recognised as their embodiment.

This is how Jameson comes to claim that new languages, fragmenting "the signifying chain", play into the hands of "Faceless masters [who] continue to inflect the economic strategies which constrain our existence" (p. 65), and whose norms can, presumably, only be countered by the individual and truly vanguard masters. What is implicitly at work here is a distinction within collective projects, parallel to the distinction between cognitive and symptomatic theory

discussed above. This is a distinction between collective projects that are "avant-garde" — that is, hegemonic by right, by definition, inherently — and collective projects which, unless they abide by and submit themselves to these "despotic signifiers", are seen as fragmenting the chain leading to a better society. When Jameson calls "linguistic fragmentation" — as manifested in the pastiche and schizophrenia of postmodernism — a dominant to be overcome, what he is in effect saying is that what is dominant today is that there is no dominant; that a dominant *must* be established *where today there is no dominant.*

E. Raymond Williams's labour (Williams versus Jameson)

Whereas Jameson cites Williams's distinction between the "dominant" and the "residual" or "emergent" ("Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic...", p. 57) — meant to give value to the latter — there is no hint in Jameson's work as to what the residual or the emergent might involve today. It is obvious that both the residual and the emergent are reserved for the dominant to come.

Leaving the "symptomatic" poststructuralism aside, I will turn to Raymond Williams himself for an indication. His *The Country and the City* is an eye-opener and, published in 1973, contemporary with Mandel's *Late Capitalism*. In speaking of (and for) the rural labourer, Williams wants to affirm both "a truly rural distance" and "a precarious but persistent rural-intellectual radicalism" (p. 36). In attempting to pursue this path Williams bumps against the walls of a political double bind. On the one hand, "'rural' virtues, in twentieth-century intellectual movements, leave the land to become the charter of explicit social reaction: in the defence of traditional property settlements, or in the offensive against democracy in the name of blood and soil" (p. 36). On the other hand, Williams is faced with the fixation of the Left on the metropolitan labourer, the proletarian, at the expense of other kinds of work and exploitation, which become invisible:

> How many socialists, for example, have refused to pick up
> that settling archival sentence about the "idiocy of rural
> life"? (p. 36)

Here is then Williams's insight: it is the Left's obsession with the "progressive", urban and modernising metropolitan proletariat that lies behind three tendencies: the famous "simultaneous damnation and idealisation of capitalism" (p. 37) — today replicated by Jameson; the Left's identification with "mastery-power" (p. 37); finally, a specific dream of socialism as the first-born son of capitalism that will inherit all upon its demise:

> What they say is damn this, praise this; and the intellectual formula for this emotional confusion is, hopefully, the dialectic. All that needs to be added, as a climax to the muddle, is the late observation, the saving qualification, that at a certain stage — is it now?; it was yesterday — capitalism begins to lose this progressive character and ... must be replaced, superseded, by socialism. (p. 37)

Throughout *The Country and the City*, Williams questions, ventilates and opens up the distinction between the rural and the metropolitan. On the side of the rural he includes vagrant labourers (pp. 83-86), families without fathers — since even "in the villages what was most wanted was the abstract producer, the single able-bodied man, the indoor farm-servant" (p. 85) — and Third-World labourers (see "The New Metropolis", op. cit., pp. 279-288). On the side of the metropolitan he includes land enclosures, the laws restricting mobility and, as we have seen, even a certain version of socialism.

In an analysis that is surprisingly resonant with that of Deleuze and Guattari's in *Anti-Oedipus*, Williams rejects the territorial division (country/city) of political forces (Right/Left), and discusses the sedentary ethic inextricably linked with the rise of capitalism, whose target and enemy is migrant and "unproductive" labour: poor labour. As a result, he recasts and expands the definition of labour — we can say that he recognises the labour of many others besides that of the male metropolitan proletariat — instead of putting his faith in capitalism, as Jameson does, to "proletarianize" (Jameson, "Periodizing the 60s", p. 208) them, and instead of "dissolving ... the lives and work of others into an image" (Williams, p. 77).

F. denying recognition and the "viewer of all screens at once"

Since the disintegration of the short-lived New Left hegemony in the 1960s civil rights movement, the explosion in the reinvention of group traditions, histories and agendas for the future appears to Jameson as a "weakening of historicity", in the sense of a weakening of both official "public History" and "private temporality". Exactly! But I understand this to be an effect of the strengthening of group history and temporality. Jameson, on the contrary, presents this "weakening" as a direct descendant of late capitalism.

In "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic...", the weakening of historicity is described as one of the "constitutive features" of postmodernism. At the same time, these constitutive features make a causal chain. The weakening of historicity is "consequent" upon "a new depthlessness", which in turn has a "deep constitutive" relationship to "a whole new technology", which in turn is "*a figure for* a whole new economic world system" (p. 58 throughout, my italics). Nevertheless, as we have seen, in the few instances when this new economic system is described — as a world of micropolitics, micromultiplicities and discontinuous realities — *it is itself a figure for* a society where the cultural, artistic and political initiative has passed to minoritarian movements.

In this state of affairs, whereas Deleuze and Guattari, Donna Haraway and Jane Flax, among others, look at *lateral connections* between movements, Jameson cannot conceive of the role of the new New Left as anything but hegemonic. The specifically political difficulties of an "Archimedian point" ("Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic...", p. 87), he glibly translates into a tragic impossibility (that is, a dialectical inevitability). In the meantime, he turns his aspirations to a panoptical voyeurism which *separates, isolates and derealises* minoritarian movements (pp. 75-76). The perfect metaphor for Jameson's perspective on minoritarian movements is that they are "stacked or scattered television screens positioned at intervals", which can only be viewed in either of two ways: either to "decide to concentrate on a single screen" — as for him, presumably, minorities do — or "to see all the screens at once" (p. 76).

Needless to say, it is only the second, panoptical position that will "hold to the truth of postmodernism" and "do it justice" ("Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic...", p. 92). According to Jameson, the truly postmodern *viewer* — "pedagogically" mapping the micromultiplicities that he overviews — once realised, is expected to make politics possible again. At the same time this viewer is, alas, yet again "called upon to do the impossible". Under the strain of his own brand of poetry, Jameson escapes into bad science-fiction, into:

> an imperative to grow new organs, to expand our sensorium and our body to some new, as yet unimaginable, perhaps ultimately impossible, dimensions. ("Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic...", p. 80)

"To expand our body to impossible dimensions". What starts off as a radical political enterprise changes into a cognitive enterprise and ends up as omnivorous appetite.

G. the denial of history in favour of the spatial analysis of radical differences (Benjamin and Morrison versus Jameson)

> [N]o fact that is a cause is for that very reason historical.
>
> (Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History", XVIII, A)

"Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic..." denies any relation between minoritarian movements and mainstream oppressive *doxas* — the impact, the changing influence, the sweet revenge of minoritarian expression on the aggressive stereotypes that block their path; it equally denies any lateral connections between minoritarian movements as a way out of imposed ghettoisation. How does Jameson do it? By reghettoising minoritarian movements into isolated compartments: into "material signifiers" in "schizophrenic disjunction" (p. 74), into "disjoined subsystems" (p. 75). The only relation that he recognises is that established by a collage of "all the screens at once, in their radical and random difference" (p. 76).

This "collage", the system where the "subsystems" belong, is of course late capitalism. Jameson's "*concept* of history" — as we have already seen in "Periodizing the 60s" — is that minoritarian movements are attributes of the body of late capitalism, this body of "impossible dimensions" surveyed by Jameson's Cyclopean eye. History means that

a period is responsible for whatever happens within it, with the exception of the monadic eye on its forehead.

Jameson scolds Doctorow for a "weakening of historicity" in *Ragtime*, because he "suppressed from the published text" an earlier version of its beginning: "the first sentence of the first version of *Ragtime* positions us explicitly in our own present, in the novelist's house in New Rochelle, New York" ("Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic...", p. 69). What Jameson asks for in genuinely historical novels is "an explicit narrative link between the reader's and the writer's present and the older historical reality which is the subject of the work" (p. 69). I understand this demand to mean that the narrative voice should remain clearly distinct from what it narrates; it is only when the narrative voice is established as exterior to the fictional reality — as would be the voice of the present inhabitant of a house in New Rochelle in relation to the 1900s — that this reality acquires the independent and objective existence of the "historical referent" (p. 71).

Jameson is under the impression that minoritarian movements are "dominated by space", while he flatters himself that he sides with time and has time on his side. Time for Jameson is quite simply the homogeneous course of capitalism from one phase to the next. His analysis of an extract from *Autobiography of a Schizophrenic Girl* — both in "Postmodernism and Consumer Society" and in "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic..." — is meant to demonstrate that contemporary "culture" has lost its grip on time, and therefore manifests a "breakdown of the signifying chain". The incident described in this extract — in the first-person-singular narration of the past that Jameson recommends for genuinely historical novels — is of a girl walking in the countryside. What takes place during this walk, the "schizophrenic" experience, is initiated by "I remember very well" — which again obeys the clear distinction between narrative voice and fictional reality discussed above — and closes with the girl going back "home to our garden and beg[inning] to play", as a return to reality! The structure of the incident is as follows:

1. I remember very well
2. <u>Suddenly</u> I stopped to listen
    the singing lesson, a German song, the children, the school

become, with an accompanying "sense of unreality"
barracks with prisoners compelled to sing
3. <u>At the same time</u> and "bound up with" it
a field of wheat
becomes, with an accompanying "anxiety that I broke into sobs"
"dazzling" and with "limits I could not see"
4. "home to our garden and began to play"
with an accompanying "sense of reality" returned

My understanding of this incident is that, instead of being immersed in a pleasant walk in the countryside or instead of enjoying nature as an idyllic spectacle as is customary, and instead of her habitual occupation of playing in the garden, this girl has a genuine historical experience; "To articulate the past historically doesn't mean to recognize it 'the way it was'[;] ... the true picture of the past flits by[,] ...flashes up at the instant when it can be recognized and is never seen again" (Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History" in *Illuminations*, p. 247).

Her stroll is interrupted by the unexpected sound of a German song, sung by children inside the building of the school. The expression, "Suddenly, as I was passing the school, I heard a German song; the children were having a singing lesson" suggests that the children were not expected to be at school at the time; they had a lesson during their free time, hence the surprise. This slight, for us, incident zooms her back into a time of war and concentration camps, "barracks" and "prisoners". As a result, the familiar and timeless scenery of country fields is transfigured; "bound up with" barracks and prisoners, it is traversed by an added dimension, that of history, and becomes unlimited and dazzling.

The historical time here recalled is not that of public history. This, as Benjamin tells us, is the form (continuous and present) of the history of the victors. The "tradition of the oppressed" (p. 248), on the other hand, a genuine experience, comes to us from the corner of the eye, the ear, as involuntary and irrepressible as "a tiger's leap" (p. 253). The stroll, the scenery of wheat fields to be looked at at will — as the girl would manipulate her toys in the garden (and later in the kitchen) with a "sense of reality" ensuing from an illusory sense of

freedom; the stroll and the scenery: the song draws both in, connects them laterally, and binds them up with "prisoners forced to sing". This arrest, pregnant with the girl's own unknown predicament, blasts out time itself. The prisoners forced to sing are time itself shooting at the clocks (modification of Benjamin, p. 253).

Jameson, in his own interpretation, omits — one feels tempted to say symptomatically — the song, the children/prisoners, the school/barracks, and has eyes only for the unlimited wheat field now unbound from its connections and standing in sublime isolation. He therefore concludes that "the schizophrenic is thus given over to an undifferentiated vision of the world in the present"; "an experience of isolated, disconnected, discontinuous material signifiers which fail to link up into a coherent sequence" ("Postmodernism and Consumer Society", pp. 119 and 120).

As I have already suggested, though the incident itself might demonstrate what Jameson considers to be a "crisis in historicity" ("Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic...", p. 71), the narrative where it belongs is exemplary in its overcoming. The "schizophrenic" incident is firmly lodged into a sequence initiated by "I remember very well" and completed by "I ran home to our garden and began to play 'to make things seem as they usually were,' that is to return to reality". That is to say, the narrative itself is, to use Jameson's terminology, "cognitive" rather than "symptomatic". A narrative, according to Jameson, becomes symptomatic of the "loss of the historical referent" (p. 71) only when the narrative voice of the "old monadic subject" is replaced by the narrative voice — "mental space" [sic] — of "some degraded collective 'objective' subject" (p. 71).

This is then Jameson's recipe for an undesirable contemporary historical narrative: the voice that speaks is that of a degraded collective spirit rather than that of an individual; the "historical referent" is replaced by sudden invasions of the past into the present; the (cognitive) distance of the narrative voice from narrative reality — that of the Archimedian "viewer of all screens at once" — gives way to lateral connections between voice and reality. In fact, the best example that comes to mind, of the kind of contemporary historical narrative unwanted by Jameson, is Toni Morrison's *Beloved.*

"What happened?" is and remains the unanswered, unanswerable question and the motor of *Beloved*.[27] Its two poles are the sudden appearance and the sudden disappearance of Beloved. Beloved's appearance summons a population of ghosts, a loud "pack of haunts" (p. 170), on the threshold of 124. Stamp Paid, trying to cross their wall of sound, couldn't "decipher it to save his life. All he could make out was the word *mine*" (p. 172). Finally, he believed the "undecipherable language clamoring around the house was the mumbling of the black and angry dead" (p. 198), the "people of the broken necks, the fire-cooked blood" (p. 181) — "the secret spread of this new kind of whitefolks' jungle was hidden, silent, except once in a while when you could hear its mumbling in places like 124." (p. 199). After the fleeting co-ordination of the voices of Beloved, Denver and Sethe (pp. 200-217): "You are mine. You are mine. You are mine." (p. 217), Beloved's appearance culminates and comes to an end once again on the threshold of 124, in the momentary gathering of members of the surrounding black part of the city into a people facing Beloved. "I will call them my people, which were not my people", says the epigraph of *Beloved*.

H. the denial of politics

In "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic...", the stated purpose of Jameson's work on postmodernism is to think about "the mission of political art in the bewildering new space of late multinational capitalism" (p. 58). What Jameson means by "political art" is clarified in his discussion of Andy Warhol. His paintings "*ought* to be powerful and critical political statements" because they "explicitly foreground the commodity fetishism of a transition to late capital" (p. 60). That they are not is quickly generalised into a characteristic of the "postmodernist movement": one begins to wonder "about the possibilities of political or critical art in the postmodern *period* of late capital" (p. 60, my italics).

To understand the background of Jameson's argument that the proper subject-matter of contemporary political art ought to be late capitalism, we have to go back to "Cognitive Mapping". Here Jameson "admits" (and one should be wary of Jameson's admissions) that the

"new aesthetic" that he proposes — that of "the pedagogical function of a work of art" (p. 347) — is only relevant to socialist politics:

> I am far from suggesting that no politics at all is possible in this new post-Marxian Nietzschean world of micropolitics — that is observably untrue. But I do want to argue that without a conception of the social totality (and the possibility of transforming a whole social system), no properly socialist politics is possible. (p. 355)

Jameson's second admission in "Cognitive Mapping" is that the "new aesthetic" of cognitive mapping is itself "a kind of blind" — "little more that a pretext for debating" the issue of the relation of the New Left to minoritarian movements (p. 347). "[O]ur essential function for the moment" (p. 358) is not, as he had claimed in the opening paragraph, to produce "the kind of *art*" whose concept *"we cannot imagine"* (p. 347, my italics); our essential function is in fact "pedagogical in the largest [if un-sublime, non-aesthetic] sense; it involves the conquest of legitimacy in this country for socialist discourse" (p. 358). This "conquest of legitimacy" seems to require for the New Left to reap the surplus value of the cultural, artistic and political output of minoritarian movements:

> The question is how to think those local struggles, involving specific and often quite different groups, within some common project that is called, for want of a better word, socialism. Why must these two things go together? Because without some notion of a *total* transformation of society and without the sense that the immediate project is a figure for that total transformation, so that everybody has a stake in that particular struggle, the success of any local struggle is doomed, limited to reform. (p. 360, response to Cornel West)

It is clear that Jameson has no interest in imagining anything — neither a new concept of political art, nor even socialism, which remains purged of all content. Socialism is nothing but the name for a total project, nothing but the form of a sublime hegemony. Jameson's version of socialism has the added benefit that it makes political action redundant: if only minorities were to recognise Jameson's plans for

them, the utopian total transformation would be effected automatically.

As a result Jameson's classification, in "The Politics of Theory", of theories of postmodernism into reactionary or Right, progressive or Left, and ambivalent, appears to have very little substance. What can be the meaning of such an axis of classification if all that the Left stands for is total transformation, and would those whose objectives are partial rather than total be classified on the Right?

Furthermore, as the participants in the Anglo-American postmodernism debate to follow demonstrate by their example — and as I hope to demonstrate — once inside the debate *there is no conflict.* In fact, by a remarkable coincidence, the debate seems to be the very accumulation of "radical" differences — each participant tending to their own — that Jameson attributes to postmodernism. If anything at all binds them together, this is the name of the enemy outside their borders: postmodernism.

If I can anticipate the discussion of participants to follow, the Anglo-American postmodernism debate has the semblance of a "great festival of Participation"[28], it is compulsively conflict-free. The hostility and opposition of each participant to postmodernism is nothing but a gesture, since it is routinely presumed that the relation between postmodernism and the particular terrain to be established, represented or defended is one of exteriority; as a result, conflict is impossible by definition. At the same time, each terrain represented in the debate is an island with its own hegemonic project to fulfil, and its own internal conflicts to suppress. It is not postmodernism that undermines lateral connections between participants; in the heat of "self-definition", caught in the struggle to isolate and unify their terrain, they are blind to each other.

In the section that follows, the central figure will be David Harvey. *The Condition of Postmodernity* (1989), his substantial contribution to the postmodernism debate, will be examined at some length. I have chosen to focus on Harvey's work because he participates in the debate explicitly as a representative of the New Left, on behalf of the New Left. Also, appropriately for my purposes in this chapter, he believes that a return to historical materialism will reverse the

centrifugal tendencies within the New Left, as well as helping the New Left to expand its territoriality by incorporating "gender", "race" and the like.

III. Participants on behalf of the New Left

In 1989, Andrew Ross sums up the postmodernism debate in his Introduction to *Universal Abandon?* (title referring to Jameson's "universal abandonment of the referential gold standard", "Periodizing the 60s", p. 208). He argues that though it is so far limited to those closer to the centre, "no one, this time, ought to be excluded" (p. vii). What these generous words mean is that, if those on the margins wish to take up what has been "exclusively the discursive preserve of the colonizer", they should "struggle for recognition and legitimacy on established 'metropolitan' political ground" (p. xi). If the marginals refuse to participate on metropolitan ground, then they are "essentialist" — a position which is, we are told, "theoretically untenable". Even so, Ross perseveres, postmodernist politics "must accept essentialism itself as one of the many positions that inform its radical pluralism" (pp. xi-xii). The New Left has set up an international forum and Ross is impatiently urging the participants to flock in and take up their place. This "injunction to speak", this "extortion of speech" (see Baudrillard, *Oublier Foucault*, p. 42ff.), is indifferent to what will be said; what matters is that it be said on metropolitan ground. It is equally indifferent to any "great collective projects" (Jameson). All that matters is the participants' recognition of a metropolitan ground (of a ground as metropolitan), by the very fact of their participation.

A. Harvey
Also in 1989, David Harvey publishes *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Inquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*. This book aspires to fill the gap between its title, a hardened paraphrase of Lyotard's landmark, and its subtitle promising a *de profundis* contribution to that other area of Anglo-American high development, cultural studies.

Starting from the title, Harvey asserts that "postmodernism does not reflect any fundamental *change* of social condition", and outlines two suitably opposed interpretative options. Postmodernism can be understood either as "a departure in ways of thinking about *what could or should be done*", or as "a shift in *the way capitalism is working* these days" (p. 111 throughout, my italics). Harvey opts for the latter.[29]

Starting from the subtitle, Harvey argues that the conditions of the New Left's "push into cultural politics" were inauspicious and would have to be reconsidered. While "embrac[ing] the new social movements", the New Left "tended to abandon ... historical materialism as a mode of analysis" and was left bereft of its traditional claim to understand the "social processes of transformation that underlay" such epiphenomena. While "insisting that it was culture and politics that mattered", it tended to treat the "new social movements" as "something that should be omnipresent *from the very beginning* in any attempt to grasp the dialectics of social change" (my italics). As a result, the New Left reduced itself to "compet[ing] on the same terrain", politically and theoretically unarmed, with the "new social movements" and the poststructuralists. Harvey proposes that this dip into the phenomenal world, this misadventure, be viewed as necessary, in the sense of *mediating* the New Left's rise from the "shackles of old left politics" towards "recuperating such aspects of social change as race, gender, religion, within the overall frame of historical materialist inquiry" (pp. 353-355 throughout).

For the purposes of this inquiry, Harvey embarks on an analysis of the "shift" in capitalism according to three terms: time-space compression, flexible accumulation, and the dematerialisation of money. Capitalism's technology-based tendency to reduce distance and obliterate space has now intensified, to the extent that established production spaces, from the centralised production structure of the factory to the privileged production space of the US as a whole, are under serious threat. As a result, the link between advanced capitalism, the West, and massive industrial complexes and their workers has been severed. Now that capitalism at its most advanced works flexibly, across national spaces and by "subcontracting, temporary and self-employment, etc." (p. 191), both the Western unionised worker and

the US dollar have lost their exemplary value. On the one hand, since 1973 the US dollar is no longer the sole measure of value[30]; at the same time, flexible accumulation privileges the "patriarchal (family) production systems characteristic of South-East Asia, or of immigrant groups in Los Angeles, New York, and London" (p. 192). According to Harvey, these new subjects increase "the social basis for the ideologies of entrepreneurialism, paternalism and privatism", at the expense of traditional left politics and subjects (p. 192).

In order to circumvent the argument that the West as well as class politics are in historical decline, Harvey maps the shift from modernity (Fordism) to postmodernity (flexible accumulation) onto a dialectical opposition between "the annihilation of space by time (Becoming)" standing for modernity (Fordism), and "the spatialization of time (Being)" standing for postmodernity (flexible accumulation) (p. 273); their contradiction and dynamic opposition "constitutes a structural description of the totality of political-economic and cultural-ideological relations within capitalism" (p. 339). The most obvious consequence of Harvey's recourse to this schema is that postmodernity is no longer a condition, historical or otherwise; in spite of the dialectical materialist rhetoric, once time-space compression (the annihilation of space) is relegated to modernity, modernity embodies the condition of capitalism, whereas postmodernity is in the nature of a secondary reaction to it: "under conditions of time-space compression, they attempt to spatialize time" (p. 277). Furthermore, Harvey provides by far the best defence of capitalism in that he argues that what opposes it leads to nationalism, which leads to fascism.

> [P]ostmodernism ... evidently offers multiple possibilities within which a spatialized "otherness" can flourish ... At the end of the process lies the restoration of the Hegelian notion of the state ... Marx, of course, had restored historical time (and class relations) ... as a reaction to Hegel's spatialized conception of the "ethical state"... (p. 273)

The condition of postmodernity is in fact nothing new; it is nothing but "the tragic side of the modernist project" (p. 35). "[I]n the face of the universalizing force of capital circulation", with:

social movements, respect for otherness and the like ... it is
hard to stop the slide into parochialism, myopia, and self-
referentiality ... And, it should not be forgotten, this was the
path that allowed Heidegger to reach his accommodation
with Nazism, and which continues to inform the rhetoric of
fascism... (p. 351)

Harvey allocates class to the Universal, to the political-economic
and to capitalism *per se*, whereas he allocates minoritarian movements
to the particular, to flexible accumulation as the cultural-ideological.
The class struggle is on a par with capitalism, married to it, and with a
legitimate offspring: the "distinctive 'new left' politics" of the 1960s
countercultural movements — global, antagonistic to bureaucratisation,
and for individual self-realisation" (p. 38). Contemporary culture, on
the other hand, is twice removed from consequence in that it merely
replicates what is already a superstructural phenomenon:

postmodern fiction is mimetic of something, much as I have
argued that ... [postmodern] philosophical and social thought
mimics the conditions of flexible accumulation. And it should
not be surprising to see how all this fits in with the
emergence since the 1970s of a fragmented politics of
divergent special and regional interest groups. (p. 302)

The inequality of the relation between the New Left and contemporary
culture is such that, whereas the latter is determined, by the reheated
theory of reflection, to merely follow and copy flexible accumulation,
the New Left is beyond determination because of its claims to the realm
of freedom proper to capitalism. This is the presupposition that allows
Harvey to deprecate Stanley Aronowitz and Fredric Jameson for giving
way to postmodernism; or, to turn this around, their involvement with
postmodernism is seen as a failure of the will and an abdication of
responsibility. In *The Crisis of Historical Materialism* (1981), Harvey
reminds us, Aronowitz "imported into the heart of Marxism itself" the
proposition that there are "multiple sources of oppression in society
and multiple foci of resistance to domination"; what can this mean but
that "Aronowitz is here seduced, I suspect" (p. 47)? To return to my
marriage metaphor, in withdrawing his faith from the absolute

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explanatory power of capitalism, Aronowitz is seen as an adulterer who cheats capitalism for an unworthy mistress.

Harvey's objection to Jameson is more complicated and brings forth a fundamental difficulty in the opposition of time (Becoming) and space (Being) as a means of separating the New Left from minoritarian movements. No one could accuse Jameson of pampering minoritarian movements and (in this sense) spatialising politics. On the contrary, Harvey is clear that if Jameson "loses his hold on both the reality he is seeking to represent and on the language that might properly be deployed to represent it", this is while attempting to "ride the tiger of time ... mirror and hopefully command it" (p. 351). So where does Jameson's "alarming irresponsibility" lie? In focusing too closely on the latest phase of time-space compression, he exchanges the solemn panorama of those capitalist waves breaking on the rock of class for a "frenetic" and "flamboyant" sense of movement — time accelerated in the "rush of intoxicating experience". Harvey finds that the version of time that Jameson is unwise enough to share with postmodernism — Harvey likens Jameson to Baudrillard and Virilio[31] — is small-time and nouveau riche. Speed is fancy but is not serious. It reduces "tragic sense into farce" (p. 351 throughout).

Whether Harvey's vivid profile of Jameson is accurate or not, the terms used against him end up threatening Harvey's opposition between time (Becoming) and space (Being). Time splits into speed, movement and experience (time finite and unbound by possibility) versus permanence and timelessness (infinite time emptied out of all concrete content). Both versions of time involve space, which itself splits into lived space (that is, the real space of virtual communities or movements) versus abstract space (that is, the ideal space of actual communities defined by territory). As a result, postmodernism emerges as having a strong claim to productive processes of becoming, a claim that Harvey repeatedly refuses to recognise, especially in its most contentious aspect, minoritarian movements.[32] In order to pre-empt the recognition of a productive aspect in minoritarian movements, Harvey takes the drastic step of abandoning the political-economic, and recasts the opposition between Fordist modernity and flexible postmodernity within the frame of the cultural-ideological: "each as a

distinctive and relatively coherent kind of social formation ... the 'structure of feeling' *in any society* is always a synthetic moment somewhere between the two" (p. 338, my italics). The opposition between time/the political-economic/Becoming and space/the cultural-ideological/Being then passes to the inside of each "social formation". So that modernity and postmodernity are "far from homogeneous": coupled with Becoming is "fixity and permanence"; coupled with Being is "ephemerality and chance" (pp. 338-339).

Unwilling to recognise a qualitative difference between these two positions, since it would require a deviation from his theoretical apparatus, Harvey is faced with two "distinctive" social formations which threaten to become indistinguishable. His only way out (his dialectical synthesis) is that postmodernity "merely reverses" modernity's time-space relation. Nevertheless there is, dispersed in his text, evidence both of an indistinguishability that cannot be overcome and of a more insidious kind of reversal. It is essentially the same terms that are used to describe modernity as well as postmodernity: the individual and the state. But whereas postmodernity is blamed for privatism and individualism, modernity is praised for "individual self-realization"; whereas postmodernity is accused of statism, modernity is complimented for its stable and fixed political structures. The difference is moral: that is, what is good in modernity turns into its moral opposite with postmodernity.

This is why, in Harvey's final theoretical manoeuvre, Becoming is removed from both the "social formations" of modernity and postmodernity, to become a transcendent third instance:

> the degree of Fordism and modernism, or of flexibility and postmodernism is ... subject to the restless transformative activity of capital... (p. 344)

The outcome of Harvey's "inquiry into the origins of cultural change" is that "the degree of Fordism and modernism, or of flexibility and postmodernism is bound to vary from time to time and from place to place, depending on which configuration is profitable and which is not" (p. 344).

The stated aim of *The Condition of Postmodernity* was to enable the New Left to "recuperat[e] such aspects of social organization as

race, gender", etc. within the framework of Marxism and class politics (p.355). Harvey has built *The Condition of Postmodernity* on the rejection of two interpretative possibilities: that postmodernism is "a departure in ways of thinking about *what could or should be done*" (p. 111, my italics) rather than an epiphenomenon of the activity of capitalism; and that minoritarian movements "should be omnipresent *from the very beginning* in any attempt to grasp the dialectics of social change" (p. 355, my italics). At the conclusion of Harvey's endeavours, it is clear that the price to be paid for rejecting these two options is that change ends up being as much beyond the reach of the New Left and the class struggle as it is beyond the reach of minoritarian movements. It is not possible to (at least theoretically) incapacitate minoritarian movements, without simultaneously incapacitating the New Left and the class struggle.

One of the attractions of Harvey's book is that he is able to discuss everything from money to mediaeval maps, from Marx to Matisse. Had he included feminist philosophers, he would have to confront something of vital importance. That the New Left was "forced ... to compete on the same terrain" as its opponents (p. 354), not because of the weakness and irresponsibility of its members, but because the claims of minoritarian movements can be made on the same grounds as the claims of Marxism: on the grounds of a unitary emancipatory struggle against a global force of oppression. This is certainly the case with "radical sexual difference" feminism — as we will see in the following chapter — which is as globalist and anti-particularist as Harvey could have wished for. Rosi Braidotti and Alice Jardine state that feminism needs a global horizon; only the advocates of "radical sexual difference" can provide this horizon; therefore, all other feminist strands are presented as *de facto* variations of "radical sexual difference". It is clear that their aspirations are indistinguishable from Harvey's in everything but the particulars. (In this chapter, we will see that Linda Hutcheon on the one hand accuses Jameson of totalising history in his desire to incorporate minoritarian movements within a global Marxist territoriality, on the other hand she sees minoritarian movements within feminism as potentially unruly centrifugal elements which have to be brought firmly within a global

feminist territoriality. Her justification for that, once again, is that there is a single force of oppression requiring total transformation.) At the same time, if Braidotti and Jardine were visible to Harvey, all he could say about them is "neoconservatism", and if Harvey were visible to them, all they could say is "masculinism". To conclude, the "paradox" that seems to have eluded Harvey is that the more global the ground of a territory, the more spatial its logic.

Compared to such hardened positions, Jameson's proposition that we need to "project some conception of a new systemic cultural norm ... in order to reflect ... on the most effective forms of any radical cultural politics today" ("Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic...", p. 57) appears to be uncharacteristically tentative as well as candid.

B. Harvey and Jameson

In spite of Harvey's attitude to Jameson, Harvey owes a lot to him. What Jameson twists and turns and soils his hands to establish — the link between "poststructuralism" and "postmodernism", for instance — Harvey takes for granted. (For example, when Harvey states that "Baudrillard *depicts postmodern culture* as 'excremental cultural'" [p. 102, my italics], it is largely due to Jameson that Baudrillard, who doesn't actually use the terms "postmodern" or "postmodernism", is seen as depicting postmodern culture in the first place.) What is implicit in Jameson is explicit in Harvey; what is tentative in Jameson is a truism in Harvey. Jameson begins by insinuating, not without retractions, that minoritarian movements are ineffective, Harvey states that they are conservative. This is simply because, whereas Jameson doesn't want to renege on the possibility of a dialogue with minoritarian movements, such a hope, or such a desire, is foreign to Harvey.

The one major unbridgeable difference between Jameson and Harvey is in their attitude to the US and the West. Whereas Jameson relates postmodernism to a new phase of American imperialism, Harvey relates it to the decline of a progressive US (West), and the rise of minoritarian movements, the South-East, and immigrants to the West, which he considers to be conservative. Jameson envisages a strong American Left which, as American imperialism's *alter ego*, would

counter it and save the world from it. Harvey hopes for a strong US (West) to guarantee progress. His final formulation — that capital keeps on shifting the degree of modernity and postmodernity — fails to articulate a special role for the New Left, but harbours this wish: that the apparent shift of power to the East and to minorities in the West is not going to last.

It can be suggested that Jameson's impossible international socialism for the new New Left is a neo-colonial utopia. But to Jameson's utopian leanings can be contrasted Harvey's conservatism. Both cases indicate that the New Left has now taken up the strange role of defending the universality of the West; a deeply reconstructed West in Jameson's case, a West as it was in Harvey's.

* * *

If something is beyond doubt — and beyond dialectical synthesis — in Harvey's text, this is his faith in globalism against particularism. Yet, seen as a participant in the postmodernism debate — under the terms formulated by Jameson and codified by Andrew Ross — what is striking is his particularism. He offers a good old high-quality product of unadulterated Marxism, full to the brim with dialectical oppositions.

It has to be stressed that Harvey's participation in the postmodernism debate exhausts itself neither in his choice of subject matter, nor in my own choice of interpretative horizon. In-built in his text are the very terms of participation in the debate:
• One cannot participate except on behalf of a particular territoriality (in this case Marxism). The marginals referred to by Ross should be participants coming from marginal territorialities, not marginals within their territoriality.
• Participants should invoke a global condition coupled in opposition to their respective territorialities (in this case capitalism). The position occupied by capitalism in Harvey is occupied by neoimperialism in participants on behalf of minor nations, and by patriarchy in participants on behalf of feminism.
• Postmodernism is to be projected onto those threatening the participants' respective territorialities, and be faced with a dialectic of

exclusion and expansion or appropriation. The ensuing triangle of particular territoriality/global condition/postmodernism is meant to mediate internal or external conflicts in the territoriality's favour.

In this by no means exhaustive account of the postmodernism debate, such is the nature of the solution that most of the participants examined propose to the problem of conflicts in their territorialities. The participants examined are accordingly classified on the basis of the "artificial territoriality" which they claim to represent, and *on whose behalf* they participate.

C. The postmodernism debate and the new New Left

The New Left's conflicts crystallised in the 1983 monumental Marxist conference, "Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture" (published under the same title in 1988). Harvey describes this conference as one in which "most of the authors paid far more attention to Foucault and Derrida than to Marx" (p. 354), echoing Jameson's complaint while presenting "Cognitive Mapping": "during this Marxist conference I have frequently had the feeling that I am one of the few Marxists left" (*Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, p. 347). In the discussion that followed "Cognitive Mapping" and Jameson's appeals to solidarity, the New Left's problems of self-definition were evidenced by Cornel West's intervention : "I am not so sure that the differences between your position and Perry Anderson's, and those put forward by Aronowitz, Chantal Mouffe, Ernesto Laclau and a host of others can be so easily reconciled" (p. 360).

At the same time, Cornel West gestures towards a new principle of coherence which involves not agreement, but a common exclusion: "It is important to remember that nobody here has defended a flat, dispersive politics" (p. 360). In 1985, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe — today still unrepentant in discussing Derrida more that Marx, and with Laclau avoiding the term "postmodernism" in favour of "late modernity" with one notable exception which will be discussed shortly — seconded Cornel West's motion in the Introduction of *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*: "The role of theory is not to elaborate intellectually the observable tendencies of fragmentation and dispersion, but to ensure that such tendencies have a transitory character" (p. 14).

In the process of its self-definition, the new New Left depends on overcoming the common enemy of "dispersive politics". The overcoming of dispersion takes two distinct forms:

- the form of an injunction, addressed to minorities and minor nations, to participate in the postmodernism debate (as formulated by Jameson);
- the form of a new theory of hegemony (as formulated by Laclau-Mouffe and Slavoj Zizek).

Jameson's formulation of the postmodernism debate *performs* hegemony. The participants *de facto* enter a New Left global terrain whose horizon is the dividing line between "late capitalism" and "international socialism". Even when participants attempt to rename the terrain, the mere act of their participation is sufficient to counter "present history as sheer heterogeneity, random difference, a [mere] coexistence of a host of distinctive forces" ("Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic...", p. 57), as well as random and heterogeneous, unmediated and partial, alliances between them.

The new theory of hegemony associated with Laclau-Mouffe and Zizek is a global theory of the essence of the political as pure form, dominated by the Lacanian concept of the "despotic signifier". In its initial formulation by Laclau and Mouffe in *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* — especially as seen from the hindsight of Zizek's much hardened version in *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (1989), to be discussed in my fourth chapter — Foucault's "discursive formations", seen as representing the "new social movements", are necessarily determined and acquire their identity by virtue of the activity of what Laclau and Mouffe call a "hegemonic force"; that is to say, the hegemonic force is ontologically prior to the discursive formations which it articulates, and which acquire their identity retroactively and once within the hegemonic formation. The problem, for the New Left, of this theory of hegemony is that, since it is purely formal, and in spite of the "Socialist Strategy" part of Laclau and Mouffe's title, it cannot establish a link between hegemony and the New Left (in fact it has been at its most successful as an analysis of the Anglo-American New Right); any such link would be contingent. This is why the reference to socialism has since been abandoned in favour of a reference to

democracy. Once this shift is completed with Zizek, the problems of the theory of hegemony become starkly visible. While the horizon of hegemony is oppositional politics, hegemony maximises the force of opposition; when the horizon of hegemony is that of the modern nation-state, hegemony may in practice be indistinguishable from authoritarian populist government, and the fact that it is contingent offers no consolation.

Nevertheless, the fact that Laclau and Mouffe's theory of the political as contingent articulation of collective identities can illuminate Thatcherism and Reaganism can hardly be held against it. On the contrary, following their work closely cannot but show its enormous practical benefits over the work of Jameson and Harvey as discussed in this chapter. That alliances or discursive sequences or syntagmatic combinations have to be articulated in practice, not postulated by recourse to a foundation (be it capitalism or imperialism or patriarchy), that the identity of the privileged agent or the hegemonic force in a discursive articulation is contingent and cannot be determined *a priori* because each and every identity is only relational — these two propositions alone, if requiring a weakening of the aspirations of "radical" collective actors, enable a huge amplification of possibilities for their interaction. Harvey's and Jameson's positions, on the other hand, build nothing but a "homeland" Marxism, a Marxism as artificial territoriality and, in conjunction with formally indistinguishable positions coming from "homeland" feminists and others, *lead to* fragmentation, deadlocks, the mutual exclusivity of artificial territorialities.[33]

To conclude this section, I will turn to Laclau's contribution to the postmodernism debate, "Politics and the Limits of Modernity", written in 1987 and published in Andrew Ross's collection, *Universal Abandon?* (1989). The immediate context for "Politics and the Limits of Modernity" was the hostile reception of *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* among a number of Anglo-American Marxists, a reception which was based on two presuppositions: firstly, that post-Marxism is an ex-Marxism and involves the betrayal of Marxism; secondly, that post-Marxism, like the poststructuralism to which it is indebted, is nihilistic and quietist.[34]

In the context of this section, "Politics and the Limits of Modernity" is intended to work as contrapuntal to Harvey's *The Condition of Postmodernity* (and to Ross's Introduction to *Universal Abandon?* where it was first published).[35] It will be remembered that Harvey presents us with two sets of interpretative options:

• Postmodernism can be understood *either* as "a shift in the way capitalism is working these days" *or* as "a departure in ways of thinking about what could or should be done".

• The task of the New Left is *either* to "recuperat[e] such aspects of social organization as race, gender", etc. within a Marxist territoriality based on historical materialism and class politics *or* to proceed on the basis that such aspects "should be omnipresent from the very beginning in any attempt to grasp the dialectics of social change".

In brief, we can say that Harvey chooses the first options, Laclau the second options (with the important qualification that whereas Harvey's approach, like Jameson's, is hermeneutical, Laclau's is constructivist.)

Thus, in relation to the first set of options, Laclau argues that "there has been a radical change in the thought and culture of the past few decades ... which, however, passes neither through a crisis nor, much less, to an abandonment of metanarratives [such as the supposed abandonment of Marxism by post-Marxism]".[36] This is because the change in question has been achieved not by setting boundaries between modernity and postmodernity, but through an ongoing reconstruction of the radical moments in the various traditions of modernity, conducted from within these traditions. In the case of the Marxist tradition, its genealogical reconstruction — "a living dialogue with that tradition, to endow it with a certain contemporaneity against the *timelessness* that its orthodox defenders attribute to it" (p. 339) — involves a recognition of its multiple fissures (from Lenin, to Luxemburg, to Sorel, to Gramsci), against "its myth of origins" and "the myth of its coherence and unity" (p. 339).

In relation to Harvey's second set of options, the anti-foundationalist reconstruction of radical tradition requires not only the recognition of Marxism's plurality, but also its inscription "as a historical, partial and limited moment within a wider historical line, that of the radical tradition of the West" ("Building a New Left", op. cit.,

p. 179). The task of the New Left, as Laclau summarises it in "Politics and the Limits of Modernity", is as follows:

> if we are to *reconstruct* radical tradition (because this is precisely what it is about), not as a necessary departure from a point of origin, but as a genealogy of the present, it is clear that Marxism cannot be its only point of reference. The plurality of current social struggles ... entails the necessity of breaking with the provincial myth of the 'universal class'. If one can talk about universality, it is only in the sense of the relative centralities constructed hegemonically and pragmatically. The struggles of the working class, of women, gays, marginal populations, Third World masses, must result in the construction of their own reappropriations of tradition through their specific genealogical efforts. This means, of course, that there is no *a priori* centrality determined at the level of structure, simply because there is no rational foundation of History. The only 'rationality' that History might possess is the relative rationality given to it by the struggles and the concrete pragmatic-hegemonic constructions.
> (p. 340)

Laclau brings "Politics and the Limits of Modernity" to a close with a proposition with far-reaching consequences. That the combination of anti-foundationalism and "metaphysical contingency", contingency as a transcendental *a priori*, can in itself serve as the emancipatory metanarrative of our time (p. 343).

IV. Participants on behalf of Academic Disciplines

A. Participants on behalf of Anglo-American Literary Criticism

The engagement of Anglo-American literary critics with postmodernism, as I have already said earlier on in this chapter, precedes Jameson's work on postmodernism. They have used the term since the 1960s to describe a new phenomenon in the arts, some giving it positive, some negative connotations. But post-Jameson there is a

substantial qualitative difference and a very large amplification in the scope of their engagement with postmodernism.

Jameson's definition of postmodernism as contemporary, global and cultural, in conjunction with his claim of a special role for the Anglo-American New Left, worked as a quantum leap forward in the aspirations and status of Anglo-American critics, especially literary critics, of all persuasions. Suddenly, the vast expanses of contemporary world culture were put on their plate, theirs to survey. Grasping the opportunity, they revived with a vengeance the old genre of the overview and the survey. The difference from Jameson is that whereas he surveys on behalf of the New Left, other Anglo-American literary critics survey on behalf of Anglo-American criticism itself.

Even when, unlike Jameson, they give the term a positive connotation, they tend to accept both the content and the form of Jameson's definition of postmodernism. In relation to content, they tend to accept postmodernism as global, contemporary and cultural. In relation to form, they tend to replicate Jameson's recourse to the triangle of: 1. global territoriality, global "we" 2. representative of the territoriality 3. elements threatening the territoriality, to be either appropriated or excluded.

My focus in this section will be Steven Connor's post-Jamesonian *Postmodernist Culture: An Introduction to Theories of the Contemporary*. If Connor, unlike Jameson, gives postmodernism positive connotations, this is because he casts it in the role of Jameson's "international socialism", that is in the role of a frame to encompass the diversity of the manifold. And, again following Jameson, he names "feminism" and "post-coloniality" as the elements threatening this global frame, and himself as its guardian and representative.

* * *

Just as in Maya Angelou's *I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings* and Toni Morrison's *Tar Baby* it suffices for African-Americans to go abroad to find an instantly increased status due to their US citizenship, so it suffices for Anglo-American critics to enter the postmodernism debate

post-Jameson to find the confidence to claim a position of superiority in relation to the continental *monstres sacrés.*

This is best exemplified in *Postmodernism and Contemporary Fiction* (1991), a relatively modest British collection.[37]

In "Narratives of Postmodernism", coming from this collection, John Mepham lays down the rule that postmodernist fiction can be ironical, undecidable and self-reflexive on condition that it "has not lost touch with the cognitive and ethical vocations of literature". Facing Robbe-Grillet, this object of unnecessarily rapt Anglo-American attention, he is now able to "demote such as Robbe-Grillet's [later] *Projet pour une révolution à New York* [1970] ... to the late modern", and "promote[s]" the early Robbe-Grillet to the postmodern (pp. 154-155). Mepham distinguishes between two tendencies within contemporary fiction: a progressive, reconstructive, postmodernist, tendency — that of "a literature of resistance, of witness, of inquiry" — and a regressive, destructive, late modern, tendency — that of the "sophisticated vacuity of meaning of the anti-mimetic schools".

The distinction between the "Post-Modern" and the "Late-Modern" as two contemporary tendencies, the former having positive, the latter negative connotations, is familiar to us from the work of Charles Jencks.[38] Mepham follows the letter of this distinction but disregards the content given to the two terms by Jencks. Mepham's use of Jencks's distinction is in fact more faithful to Jameson's work than Jameson himself would care for. I believe that Mepham's "promotion" of the early Robbe-Grillet is due to Jameson's 1976 article "Modernism and Its Repressed: Robbe-Grillet as Anti-Colonialist"[39], discussing Robbe-Grillet's *La jalousie* (1957) in terms made clear in the title; needless to say, Jameson would not have written this article today. The "demotion" of the later Robbe-Grillet into "vacuity", on the other hand, is in keeping with Jameson's work on postmodernism and the Jamesonian axiom of "depthlessness". Unfortunately — as I will argue in my fourth chapter — *Project for a Revolution in New York* (together with *The House of Assignations* of the same, later, period) coincides with Robbe-Grillet's own rejection of the anti-representational ethos, and can be classified as a novel of ideological inquiry.

The global surveys by Anglo-American literary critics licensed by the postmodernism debate are at their most promising when, very rarely, they adopt a comparative approach. Such is the case in Allen Thiher's *Words in Reflection: Modern Language Theory and Postmodern Fiction* (1984). In adopting a comparative approach, Thiher gives us a small breather from the gruelling alternation between the idealisation and condemnation of postmodernism.

Thiher proposes a typology of postmodern fiction along geopolitical lines. For example, he argues that German and Austrian fiction, as well as Latin American fiction, are characterised by "attempts at realism" (p. 114): "Needing history to explain the destruction of history, the writer comes to realize that the absence of history is as intolerable as a surfeit of it" (p. 200). On the other hand, Thiher makes use of the terms commonly associated with postmodernism as a whole, in order to describe Anglo-American postmodern fiction. According to Thiher, Anglo-American postmodern fiction specifically tends towards an "overt dramatization of self-referentiality" and "explicit meta-linguistic comments". His very interesting insight — not elaborated further — is that this is "*a reflexivity that might be called metaphysical*" (my italics). I believe that this is because it reproduces inside the text the division between author and text; the distance between narrative voice and narrative reality is, in fact, reinforced and greatly increased. Instead of the voice becoming indistinguishable from the reality it narrates — as is often glibly said — we are faced with a new idealism of the voice thinking itself into being through the absorption of the world.

* * *

A text-book application of this kind of "metaphysical reflexivity" is Steven Connor's *Postmodernist Culture: An Introduction to Theories of the Contemporary* (1989). Connor's working formula is, to me, clear: Anglo-American criticism = the world.

Following Jameson's path, Connor identifies postmodernism with contemporary "world culture" (p. 27). But, unlike Jameson, Connor is not troubled by the difficulty of knowing it. The contemporary is difficult to know, argues Connor, only when we believe that there is a division between knowledge and experience. Fortunately, we now have "reason to suspect this division" (p. 3). In fact, Connor is full of a self-reflective "awareness of the necessary and inescapable dependence of experience upon consciousness" (p. 4), and "[t]his self-reflexivity will be necessarily evident in what follows" (p. 5). (This discovery makes Connor a contemporary of Kant. The "now" to which he refers precedes the discoveries of Marx and Freud by a century.)

Connor's book is, mundanely enough, a survey of Anglo-American critics divided by disciplinary field. But Connor is not exhaustive even by his own standards. The only disciplinary fields recognised are those corresponding with "art forms" (architecture, art, photography, literature, performance, film, TV, video). Consequently, fields based on minoritarian movements such as Women's Studies, as well as fields based on difference within an "art form" such as Comparative Literature, are automatically beyond Connor's horizon. So how can something so limited in scope be made to stand for world culture? Connor starts off with two preliminary moves of phenomenological reduction, one reducing "culture" to art, the other reducing "global" to Anglo-American. The first reduction of culture into art is nowhere discussed. Connor simply takes it that culture is what you get when you add up the different artistic media. As a result, culture doesn't change, it increases; it increases with the addition of new artistic media into the canon of established ones. This happy view of culture — of culture that never decreases but only increases — goes hand in hand with a self-congratulatory endorsement of "popular culture", but only on condition that popular culture is understood as directly derived from the inherent properties of new media. As a result, Connor's beloved cultural diversity is a one-culture-per-medium sort of diversity. He therefore celebrates, as a victory of the progressive forces, "the increasing visibility as culture of forms [films, TV, video] that could previously be dismissed as simply not culture at all" (p. 16). Needless to say, terms such as "counterculture" and "subculture" are

firmly rejected; they misunderstand "popular" culture by unmaterialistically associating it with movements and people.

Connor's second preliminary reduction of the global to Anglo-American criticism (or, alternatively, his projection of Anglo-American criticism onto global criticism) is equally ad hoc. Connor simply takes it that, once Anglo-American criticism has absorbed the Continental theoretical movements, "contemporary academic discourse" becomes global (p. 19). No sooner is the "serious work beg[u]n of binding together those national differences into a unifying discursive frame" (p. 18) than Anglo-American critics are found to possess a "newly unified and now international academic field" (p. 18). Consequently, Connor surveys the work of contemporary Anglo-American critics, and the work of those Continentals who are important for them, as if it stands for the global "contemporary theoretical discourse in the humanities" (p. 11). He cannot imagine that even the same theoretical movements can be assembled differently in different contexts: it is as if Anglo-American criticism for Connor is this context that has no context.

There is now one major impediment in Connor's attempt to survey Anglo-American criticism as global culture: the artists. How can *they* be bypassed? Connor starts off by pointing out that critics are artists and artists are critics these days. We all know about the "self-conscious density" of postmodern theory, and the "uncertain space between art and art-theory" where postmodern art moves (p. 7). He is considerably more daring as he goes on:

> Culture [meaning art] has expanded, not because of any actual enlargement of opportunities for and varieties of cultural experience, but because of an expansion and diversification of the forms in which cultural experience is mediated. The academy may not be the only such mediating form, but it is a very important one. (p. 17)

Or, to put it more bluntly, "*the academy is not an anomaly in the field of contemporary culture but its most representative form*" (p. 16, my italics).

That is to say, not only has there been a "recasting of the relationship between the sphere of culture and the ... spheres of reception, management, mediation, transmission" but, instead of the

"apparent collapse of criticism into its object", criticism is "the most significant and central determinant" of contemporary culture (p. 201 throughout). As a result Connor's survey of Anglo-American criticism and its foreign friends offers the best opportunity "to speak simultaneously of theory about postmodernism in the cultural field and theory which mimics or evidences the qualities of postmodernism" (p. 20).

For those, like myself, who read Connor's claims for the Anglo-American humanities in amazed disbelief, Connor's trump card is none other than materialism. Connor's survey of Anglo-American critics as representatives of contemporary global culture is more than a statement of fact: it involves a "refusal to separate" postmodernism "from its contexts in the *real conditions* of academic and critical writing and publishing" (p. 10, my italics). Not only have "the power and influence of the literary and cultural institutions ... increased enormously" (p. 13); they are now ontologically prior to culture. The institution of criticism is the material base of contemporary culture. To borrow from the title of Connor's first chapter, "The Academy" is the "Context" of contemporary culture. In effect, Connor substitutes a "logic" of the academy (albeit a benevolent one) for the logic of late capitalism in Jameson's schema of postmodernism since this, he argues, is a more proper basis for left politics:

> With ... the aestheticization of the social, political and
> economic realms, as evoked by Jameson, comes the
> opportunity for a left cultural politics which would
> concentrate not so much, as traditional Marxists have done, on
> relating cultural forms to the more "fundamental" socio-
> economic foundations which determine and produce them, as on
> investigating the whole realm of culture [i.e. Anglo-American
> critics] as in itself a form of material practice. (p. 224)

Connor believes that his "materialism" of the academy should also be a lesson to idealists masquerading as cultural materialists. When Said and Eagleton analyse the academy in terms of a "progressive withdrawal from general questions and responsibility", and as "disallow[ing] in advance any radical or effective engagement with general issues", they both run the "risk [of] falling into a purely internal intellectual history

of the academy ... separate from its particular material and social embodiments" (p. 13)![40] That is to say, now that Connor has elevated the academy to the material base of contemporary culture, there is no need to venture outside it, so that Said's and Eagleton's problem is automatically dissolved.

Having lent a hand to left politics, Connor finally turns his attention to feminism in his last chapter entitled "Consequences". Does he discuss the institutionalisation of feminism, the rapid growth of Women's Studies, the feminist publishing houses, the inclusion of feminism into the catalogues of all publishing houses? No. In fact, he recognises feminism neither as a part of The Academy, nor as a part of culture. Feminism is not even politics, but an enemy of politics. Together with "post-Coloniality", it is associated with a "disastrous decompression of politics" (p. 226), so that "politics may simply dissipate itself, like a river running its propulsive strength into the marshes and rivulets of a delta" (p. 226). Having expelled the whole vast critical field of feminism from contemporary culture and its "material" conditions, he then attacks feminism for its "stance" of marginality in the space of two pages — the space Connor allocates to feminism, half of which goes to Craig Owens.[41] After his two pages, he concludes:

> We are beginning to see that this strange tendency of authoritative marginality to flip over into its own dark side, the exploited and managed Other, may in a sense be programmed by the conceptual map of centre and margin, which often lacks the particularity or flexibility to encompass all the worrying irregularities of actual political alignments and cultural practices. (p. 231)

I take this to mean that feminism is no guarantee, is in fact inimical, to particularity and diversity as Connor understands them. What Connor understands by particularity and diversity involves, it seems to me, *an implicit distinction between particularity in itself, and the recognition of particularity.* Feminism and "post-Coloniality" — seen as particularity in itself — lead to an "irrationalist embrace of the agonistics of opposition — to put it more simply, the adoption by default of the universal principle that might is right" (pp. 243-244).

The contemporary Anglo-American Humanities (as Connor understands them, i.e. excluding feminists, postcolonial critics and other "marginals", and probably excluding the left as well) on the other hand, are seen as a new vanguard defined by the *recognition* of particularity, and thus marking "an important, indeed, probably epochal stage in the development of ethical awareness" (p. 244).

Nevertheless, the insurmountable problem in the "creation of a common frame of assent which alone can guarantee the continuation of a global diversity of voices" (p. 244), of a "horizon of universal value" (p. 243), is not the "agonistics of opposition" of particularity in itself, as Connor believes. Connor's insurmountable problem is that, in order to elevate Anglo-American criticism into a global ethical consciousness recognising particularity and diversity, he withdraws any actual recognition from the *forces themselves* of particularity and diversity. The world seems to be diverse for the sole purpose of giving the ethical consciousness occasion to show itself by recognising diversity. Otherwise, (as for Jameson and Harvey the world of micromultiplicities is a sinful world redeemed once it comes under the wing of the New Left) for Connor the world in itself, diversity in itself, is unethical.

B. Participants on behalf of Philosophy

Connor's book has a performative value. It is a *de facto* proof of his argument that the Anglo-American Humanities have assumed unprecedented importance and centrality. The postmodernism debate, dominated as it is by literary and art critics, gives voice to their aspirations to undertake a central role, to occupy a central position, as Connor demonstrates. With the advent of the postmodernism debate, these aspirations crystallise no longer around the national importance of their object. They crystallise around the international role of the critics themselves as mediators between the Anglo-American academic world and the world outside. One of the backgrounds to the postmodernism debate is the role of Anglo-American critics in the dissemination — and, some Anglo-American philosophers think, bad translation — of Continental philosophy.

Postmodernism: Philosophy and the Arts (1990), edited by H.J. Silverman, attempts to "return" postmodernism to its proper context,

modern philosophy. Silverman's Introduction seems to me to call for a defence of philosophy from the barbarians descended upon it. To this purpose, Silverman rejects Jameson's periodising argument as well as all discussion of the relation of postmodernism to modernism. Postmodernism is neither contemporary nor a response to modernism in the arts. Postmodernism, Silverman tells us, "has no [one] place of origin — it can inscribe itself in different places, at various points" (p. 4). He assumes, though, that all these points belong to a common territory, that of modern philosophy. Postmodernism, according to Silverman, locates itself within modern philosophy, and is the name for all its crucial turning points. Rather predictably, he mentions the ultimate erogenous zone of Continental philosophy: Nietzsche's reappraisal of Wagner.[42]

Silverman clearly borrows a form of argument familiar to us from the work of Lyotard, Habermas and Laclau, but with considerable difference in content. Whereas postmodernism in Lyotard's "Answering the Question: What Is Postmodernism?" is modernism in its "nascent state"; whereas postmodernity in Habermas's *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* is modernity's "radical critique" conducted from within modernity; whereas postmodernity in Laclau's "Politics and the Limits of Modernity" follows the real "fissures" in the various traditions of modernity; postmodernism for Silverman is modern philosophy in a state of "self-delimitation" and "self-circumscription" (p. 5). The difference in content is that Silverman defends philosophy's independence and autonomy. Modern philosophy's postmodernist tradition provides it with a sufficient "frame" (p. 8) of its own. It "enframes, circumscribes and delimits" (p. 5) modern philosophy in a manner that allows it to develop by conducting its own self-critique, in its own court of reason, without outside interference and without needing to participate in outside frames.

Yet, it is exactly this separatist tendency in Silverman which makes him an ideal participant in the postmodernism debate, unwittingly replicating its terms as formulated by Jameson. In the debate's terms, Silverman participates as a representative on behalf of a particular "we", by territorialising modern philosophy into an exclusive identity.

That philosophy can turn to itself, that it can develop its self-critique without outside interference, is a far cry from the Husserlian dream of philosophy as the regulator of all other disciplines — the last in a long line of dreams beginning with Plato's dream of the philosopher-king. The question of philosophy's position and role — in relation to law-making, the good life, theology and, in modern times, the natural sciences, the modern state, the university, the formation of academic disciplines — is a question that philosophy, in all its reincarnations, hasn't stopped asking itself, and which overflows the postmodernism debate on all sides. Within the postmodernism debate, if the New Left or Anglo-American critics can put themselves forward as representatives of a global "we" and declare themselves occupants of the centre ground, so can philosophers.

Unlike Silverman's weak defence of philosophy, Gianni Vattimo, in *The End of Modernity* (1988), finds the means for an anything but *debole* counter-attack (see Vattimo's concept of "pensiero debole").[43] Not only is the question of "the post-modern" a properly philosophical question concerning the *Verwindung* (yielding, resignation, convalescing, accomplishment; post-war Heideggerian term) of metaphysics.[44] Capitalism itself, the cherry on Jameson's cake, has to be understood within the context of the history of metaphysics. Vattimo's "history of metaphysics" binds inextricably the history of capitalism and the history of modern Western philosophy. The "history of metaphysics" comprises three moments; three moments both in the history of modern philosophy and in the history of capitalism. The Kantian moment of stable structures of being. The Hegelian moment of overcoming and of history; the moment of *Aufhebung*. Finally, the Nietzschean-Heideggerian moment: the moment when "man rolls from the centre to X" (Nietzsche); the moment when "there is nothing left of Being as such" (Heidegger), the postmodern moment, the moment of *Verwindung* (see pp. 3, 118, 164, 171-173).[45] This last moment is the moment of accomplished metaphysics and, in this sense, the end of modernity.

The "end" of modernity does not mean that modernity is over. On the contrary, modernity has reached its *telos*, its outer limit, in that it has now come to encompass everything. This means that there can be no successor, properly speaking, to the Siamese twins of modern philosophy and capitalism. Concerning capitalism, the history of metaphysics is seen as encompassing everything, from "Europeanization", to colonialism, to the nationalisms that overthrew it. As a result, the rise of new economic powers following upon the uprise of the "natives" is seen as the final victory of capitalism and the apotheosis of the West. Adorno, Benjamin and Bloch are rejected for their misguided stance of exteriority.[46]

The exact same argument is used in Vattimo's defence of philosophy. Is it the case that modern philosophy is over, or that it is under threat of being taken over by other disciplines and transformed beyond recognition? Is it the case that the modern *role* of philosophy is over, or that this role is under threat of being taken over by other disciplines? Such questions crystallise in "Hermeneutics and Anthropology", chapter nine of *The End of Modernity*. In this chapter, Vattimo discusses and rejects Rorty's proposal, in the last chapter of *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (1979), that philosophy give way to cultural anthropology: "cultural anthropology (in a large sense which includes intellectual history) is all we need" (*Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, p. 381). Without entering into the detail of Rorty's and Vattimo's terminology, their disagreement is as follows. Rorty argues that in an encounter between cultures or communities, instead of starting from the premise that we "understand perfectly well what is happening [on the other side] but want to codify it in order to extend, or strengthen, or teach, or 'ground' it", we must start from the premise that "we do not understand perfectly well what is happening but are honest enough to admit it" (op. cit., p. 321).

In parenthesis, it is, it seems to me, perfectly consistent with Rorty's argument in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* that, when he enters the postmodernism debate, he does so on the basis that "we have to work out from the networks that we are, from the communities [nations, churches, movements, etc.] with which we presently identify" (p. 328), adding that "most of us identify with a number of different

communities and are equally reluctant to marginalize ourselves in relation to any of them" (p. 326). (All page numbers in this paragraph refer to Rorty's "Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism" (1983) in Docherty, *Postmodernism: A Reader.*) He therefore speaks variously as an American intellectual addressing other American intellectuals, or as a "North American bourgeois" addressing the North American bourgeoisie, or as an American addressing "American society", or as a "free-loading atheist", etc. (p. 324, 327). By contrast, most Anglo-American participants in the postmodernism debate will address nothing smaller than postindustrial societies as a whole and, preferably, the globe itself.

Vattimo's counter-argument is that, while the hermeneutics of cultural anthropology, as Rorty describes and defends it, is under the impression of ridding itself of ethnocentrism and Eurocentrism, it presupposes the *alterity* of other cultures. Yet it is this very alterity which has disappeared in the era of the "triumph of imperialist capitalism" (p. 153), of the completion of "Europeanization of the earth and of the very essence of man" (p. 154)[47], and of the final expansion in the political, cultural, scientific and technological "Western domination of the planet" (p. 157). In view of this condition as diagnosed by Vattimo, Rorty's faith in "[t]he ideal of an anthropology which would be the locus of an authentic encounter with the other — in accordance with a model which, in an oversimplistic and optimistic fashion, would make anthropology the rightful heir to philosophy" (p. 157) — is, Vattimo concludes, an ideological illusion.

There is a final twist in Vattimo's argument in "Hermeneutics and Anthropology" when, leaving everyone behind, he gives us his very own contribution to the postmodernism debate. The moment of accomplished Westernisation or accomplished metaphysics cannot be understood, he argues, as a moment of "total organization" of the world, nor as a moment which could potentially lead to "some sort of 'unity' which would be diametrically opposed to the former", nor, we might add, as a moment of hybridisation and interdependence, but as a moment of widespread *contamination* of the rest of the world by the West (p. 159). Contamination is a condition to which there can be no possible response, and the efforts of the contaminated to build artificial

tokens of their former difference speak of nothing but the terminal "poverty of the inapparent and the marginal" (p. 161). In short, the era of *Verwindung* is an era in which what Deleuze and Guattari call the *minor* cannot have even "the slightest implicit 'Dionysian', ludic, or (it might be added) Deleuzian meaning" (p. 161).[48] For all these reasons, the era of *Verwindung* cannot be overcome.

* * *

There is one major problem with Vattimo's argument. The logic of *Aufhebung* is both a moment in the history of metaphysics/capitalism and the overarching moment, since the relation itself between the three moments of metaphysics/capitalism is understood in terms of *Aufhebung*. The moment of *Verwindung* cannot arrive, so to speak, nor can it be considered accomplished, outside the logic of internal overcoming. That is, the Nietzschean-Heideggerian or postmodern moment of *Verwindung* only becomes the moment of accomplished metaphysics on condition that it surrenders itself to the internal logic of the modern moment of *Aufhebung*. In this respect, the fate of the postmodern moment is identical to the fate of the non-Western world and of cultural anthropology discussed above. New non-Western powers can be recognised only as internal developments of Western capitalism leading back to capitalism, cultural anthropology can be recognised only as an internal development of philosophy leading back to philosophy, and the postmodern can only be recognised as an internal development of the logic of *Aufhebung* leading back to the logic of *Aufhebung*. So that, if the era of *Verwindung* cannot be overcome, this is because of the final triumph of, and the ultimate capitulation to, the logic of *Aufhebung*.

Excursus on Zygmunt Bauman

The sociologist Zygmunt Bauman, a latecomer to the postmodernism debate, has gradually emerged as one of its main participants. With no less than seven substantial books on modernity/postmodernity since 1987, his is a Dickensian engagement with the subject — Dickensian for its scale, richness of detail, its bleakness and reforming aspirations and,

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finally, for its serial form.[49] These seven books read like instalments of the same work, but with a difference. From instalment to instalment, there is not a gradual progress towards resolution but a continual modulation of themes, with some themes added or dropped on the way. In principle, Bauman's engagement with modernity/ postmodernity is interminable. In the discussion to follow I will focus on his latest offering, *Life in Fragments: Essays in Postmodern Morality* (1995); a second point of reference will be Bauman's "A Sociological Theory of Postmodernity" (1991), his declaration of principles, his manifesto.

Bauman does not participate in the postmodernism debate on behalf of sociology, nor does he attempt to establish its privileged role in the construction of a theoretical model of postmodernity. On the contrary, he has insisted that sociology must no longer separate itself from the field of practical endeavour[50], nor from other fields of theoretical endeavour, such as modern ethical philosophy: "ethical discourse ... must be an organic part of any theoretical model of postmodernity" (p. 43). Therefore, in the context of this chapter which sets out to explore the tendency towards the construction of artificial territorialities and exclusive identities in the postmodernism debate, Bauman does not have a place, in spite of his exceptionally substantial and lengthy participation, except as contrapuntal. To remain within the parameters of this section, I will compare Bauman to its central figures, Connor and Vattimo.

The distance between Bauman on the one hand and Connor and Vattimo on the other crystallises, I believe, around the notion of modernity/postmodernity as a system with its own logic of development in the case of Vattimo; and around the notion of the ethical consciousness in the case of Connor.

• Unlike Vattimo, Bauman rejects the idea of "modern history as a *movement with a direction*" and a "*systemic character*" (p. 34). He proposes instead an image of interdependent but autonomous "habitats" containing a large number of agencies "none large enough to subsume or determine [the] behaviour of the others" (p. 37). The relation between "habitat" and agencies is itself one of continual interaction, so that "all states the habitat may assume ... could be different if the agents behaved differently" (p. 38). It is exactly to stress

that he doesn't reject the idea of a global system in favour of local systems, but rejects the idea of system *tout court*, that he replaces the term "society" — "suggestive of a sovereign totality ... capable of defining the meanings of individual actions and agencies that compose it" (p. 35) — with that of the "habitat". Indeed, Bauman argues that the whole complex ensemble is ruled by indeterminacy, randomness, contingency and ambivalence. A second, important point that sets him apart from Vattimo is that Bauman rejects the very objectivity of theories of postmodernity, including his own. Addressing his own "home" first, he argues that sociology must now see itself as a "participant" in postmodern sociality, not as an "umpire of truth" (p. 46), and its contributions as forms of agency: "agencies cannot meaningfully scan the situation 'objectively', that is in such ways as allow to eliminate, or bracket away, their own activity" (p. 38).

• Whereas Connor presents the ethical subject as a transcendent consciousness recognising the diversity of its object, in *Life in Fragments: Essays in Postmodern Morality* Bauman's moral subject is defined by sensitivity and openness to the other and by what, in Levinasian language, he calls the "being-for the Other".[51] And whereas Connor extols the essential goodness of the ethical consciousness, in *Life in Fragments* Bauman insists on the *ambivalence* of the being-for:

> I propose that the passage from the convention-ruled to the moral condition is ... marked ... by the appearance (or reappearance) ... of the emotional relationship to the Other. I also propose that the kind of emotion which colours the relationship is secondary ... The being-for, I propose, means an *emotional* engagement with the Other *before* it is committed ... to a specific course of action regarding the Other. (p. 62)
> Both love and hatred, both goodness and evil seem to be legitimate residents in the house managed by moral responsibility. (p. 66)

Consequently, Bauman describes the essays that comprise *Life in Fragments* as "studies ... in the endemic and incurable ambivalence of the primal moral scene" (p. 9).

It is, presumably, in the name of the being-for the Other that Bauman argues contentiously against abortion *and* the contraceptive

pill.[52] And that would be acceptable as long as its moral ambivalence is not forgotten. But Bauman becomes problematic whenever he comes to discuss the proper context of the being-for. His original discussion of the being-for describes it as "person-to-person", "whole", "continuous", and so all-consuming that its proper context can only be the home and its proper addressees one's spouse or child (see especially pp. 51-53). This would lead, if unintentionally, to such carelessness towards others that, instead of constantly dismissing Habermas (as he does), Bauman should recognise in his advocation of a democratic public ethos, not a lack of profundity but an antidote to the wholesale privatisation of the being-for.

When, on the other hand, Bauman attempts to expand the context of the being-for — "privatized initiatives and deregulated intervention simply will not do ... some sort of co-ordinated and concerted action is imperative" (p. 281); "a shared life of continuous and multi-faceted relationships would reinvigorate moral responsibilities and awaken the urge to shoulder the task of managing – now truly common – affairs" (p. 284) — he abandons its ambivalence. Instead, the ambivalence of the being-for is redistributed between an unequivocally good and proper collective context, and an unequivocally harmful one. The former is that of the national political space, and it is conducive to fellow-feeling, solidarity, and "the vigorous sharing of collective responsibilities" (p. 286). The latter, unequivocally harmful context is that of minoritarian sociality in all its varieties: ethnic, regional, based on gender, race, "and other shadowy and abstruse dream-communities" (p. 47). Bauman calls such communities "postulated" and "neo-tribal". He introduces them unobtrusively on page 47 as simply a trivial form of sociality — within a classification of "togetherness", in order of importance, into being-aside, being-with and being-for, he originally describes them as a form of being-aside. But they soon emerge as the leitmotif of *Life in Fragments* and, increasingly, no accusation is too heavy for them, and no quotation can sufficiently convey Bauman's antipathy towards them. (See, for example, pp. 157-158, 186-192, 220-222, 254-256.) On the whole, they are associated with violence, collective egoism and totalitarianism.

I do not want to deny that minoritarian sociality *could* territorialise itself into exclusive identities. On the contrary, in what follows I explore just such a tendency. What I object to is Bauman's abandonment of the ambivalence of the being-for, and his substantialisation of its potential for good as well as evil into an unequivocally good sociality and an unequivocally bad one. By doing this, Bauman runs the risk of relegating minorities, minor regions and minor nations to what he memorably describes as the fate of the victims of totalitarianism: "they are guilty of being accused" (p. 204).

V. The Periphery Speaks

"In a certain sense, the discourse of postmodernism — although it is a discourse established in a Eurocentred 'First' world — is the discourse *of* the periphery, a discourse which imperialism had strenuously silenced but which is now made available." (Thomas Docherty, *Postmodernism: A Reader*, p. 445)

A. Participants on behalf of minor nations and regions

In the discussion to follow I will examine contributions to *Postmodernist Fiction in Europe and the Americas* (1988), edited by Theo d' Haen and J.W. Bertens. This is a minor, and relatively unknown, collection of texts devoted to the presentation of relatively peripheral literatures. It is, therefore, the kind of project that the postmodernism debate was purportedly meant to favour and, in the rare occasions when it has materialised, deserves our close attention.

Postmodernist Fiction in Europe and the Americas is a Dutch project, announced as the first volume of a whole series to come, and aspiring to overviews of *all* national and regional literatures: "As will be clear from the contents of this first volume the editors will consider contributions on *all* literatures" (p. 9, my italics). This series to come has not yet materialised, while the contributors to the first volume only come from the periphery of the centre. Still, they tend to consider postmodernism as an alien Western phenomenon; a phenomenon that is either irrelevant to, or has no place in, the literatures that they represent.

The literatures represented in *Postmodernist Fiction in Europe and the Americas* fall into two categories: national literatures and regional literatures. There are no two contributions on the same national literature, so that no conflict of perspective arises in the "national literatures" category. The main common tendency discernible in the contributions on national literatures is to use their participation in the postmodernism debate as a means of differentiating between what should and what should not be of value in their contemporary national literary output. In the case of the three contributions on regional literatures (Slavic, Hispanic, and Latin American), not only are the territories considerably more artificial, but a conflict arises between the Hispanic terrain (defined by language and claimed by a Spanish contributor) and the Latin American terrain (defined by geographic territory and claimed by a Latin American). The main common tendency discernible in this category of contributions is to establish a terrain of inquiry by recourse to an imperialist force (whether American or Russian) that threatens it. Both tendencies are present in the two categories.

I will examine five of the contributions to *Postmodernist Fiction in Europe and the Americas*, using each one to illustrate different aspects of my analysis.

* * *

1. Stefano Tani, "La Giovane Narrativa"

Stefano Tani's contribution, "La Giovane Narrativa", does not — as might be expected from his title — discuss a new Italian literary movement, nor a general shift in new Italian literary production to be contrasted to the past. Tani's horizon is that of contemporary Italian literature in itself and as a whole. What he offers, expressly, is a "comprehensive evaluation" of Italian literary production in the 1980s. He duly divides this literary production into four groups, named after the dominant figure in each (the Calvino group, the Eco group, etc.), describes these groups' character, and lists the novelists belonging to each. It is difficult to imagine a context in which this taxonomy would not be contested, would not provoke objections as to its claim of being

comprehensive. Yet such a context is found in the postmodernism debate.

In stark contrast to Jameson, Tani is uninterested in the characteristics of postmodernism, or in its relation to primary facts such as late capitalism. On the contrary, Tani treats postmodernism as itself a primary fact, as indistinguishable from "the process of Americanization [and] ... the general and massive economic and social colonization" of Italy (p. 161). Since no traces of such colonisation are discerned in the four groups of authors discussed, the implication is that these are the ones capable of repulsing it (and counterattacking with international best-sellers).

The original objection to Tani is now displaced into a relatively minor one: that the argument that literature exists to preserve national identity is nationalistic. To solve this problem, Tani couples his anti-American rhetoric with an anti-nationalist rhetoric. He declares himself to be disdainful of the press who "pictured the giovani narratori ... as a sort of national soccer team defending the cultural prestige of Italy" (p. 161), as if nationalism is simply a matter of tone and vocabulary. Tani himself adopts a dignified tone of national pride and quiet confidence in the international stature of Italy, as if he is steering an original path between imperialism and nationalism. Some of his Italian contemporaries might object, but then he is addressing an English-speaking audience and the postmodernism debate wants minor nations to be proud of themselves.

* * *

2. Antony Mertens, "Postmodern Elements in Dutch Fiction"
The Dutch contributor, Antony Mertens, discusses the "Postmodern Elements in Dutch Fiction". Dutch literary critics have been very active in the postmodernism debate, with Douwe Fokkema and Hans Bertens leading the way. Yet, Mertens takes it upon himself to let the world know that the Dutch people consider postmodernism to be un-Dutch. This is Mertens's starting point. The objective of his essay is to use postmodernism in order to define the constituent elements of un-Dutchness, with a view to deducing Dutch national identity by contrast.

This proves to be a complicated affair. In brief, postmodernism is seen as a condensation of vulgar Americanisation, French philosophy, and elitist artistic experimentation.

• When Mertens discusses postmodernism as an imported product of American origin, his main argument is that the Americans have built postmodernism on the annexation of European themes and motifs (p. 143). That is to say, what is imported is second-rate; a fake, a reproduction of the European creative mind. The implication is that he lays claim, for the Dutch, to a European originality.

• To the extent that postmodernism is "identified with French poststructuralism", Bertens's stance is that of stout resistance. He is proud to say that "French philosophy and French literary theory have practically no influence whatsoever on the Dutch literary scene, not among academics and not among reviewers" (p. 147). Clearly, coupled with European originality, the Dutch can lay claim to an incorruptibility all their own.

• Unlike the two previous instances of postmodernism, whose threat to Dutchness is minimal — due to the derivative second-rateness of the first and the stout resistance to the second — Mertens's survey of post-war Dutch fiction reveals several manifestations of the infiltration of elitist artistic experimentation. But, facing this postmodernism's ultimate threat, the threat from the enemy within, Mertens is greatly fortified in having the Dutch people on his side. He can therefore conclude, on a confident note, that "resistance grows with the distance that such experiments put between themselves and what people usually expect a novel to be" (p. 159). Clearly, the final characteristic of the Dutch people is that they are prepared to fight for popular novels written with them in mind.

Mertens initiated his essay with a question: "Which texts can be admitted to the postmodern canon and which should be refused admission?" This proves to be a trick question, there to identify and isolate unwanted elements. The texts to be admitted to the postmodern canon are, prove to be, the texts to be repelled from Dutch literature.

* * *

3. Geert Lernout, "Postmodernist Fiction in Canada"

The Canadian contributor, Geert Lernout, participates with "Postmodernist Fiction in Canada". The difficulties of national identity, and the difficulties of sustaining a national literature as a terrain of inquiry, are here at their apex. This is why "Fiction" and "Canada" are separated in the title. "In" Canada, as will become clear, is to be understood as the "into" of invasion rather than the "within" of containment.

Postmodernism, for Lernout, takes the two forms of US power on the outside, and regional autonomy on the inside. As it concerns the former, the US threat to Canadian national identity appears to be greatly accentuated by Canada's cultural and geographic proximity to the US giant. The abstract metaphors of colonisation and annexation in Tani and Mertens are here replaced with the concrete imagery of "cultural blitzkriegs" (p. 127). The reference to blitzkriegs, as movements which in their rapidity and overwhelming force pre-empt all response, does away with gestures of stout resistance and national bravado. Nevertheless, Lernout finds increasingly strong weapons to defend the territoriality he represents, and on whose behalf he speaks, from external threat.

• Lernout's first weapon is very weak indeed: "let us not forget that Lyotard's *La condition postmoderne* was originally a report for the Québec government" (p. 128).

• His second weapon replicates Mertens's argument that postmodernism is based on the annexation of European inventions: "what is postmodernism in the rest of the world used to be called magic realism in South America and still goes by that name in Canada" (p. 129). The appeal here is to an originality of the American continent which, annexed by the US, was then exported to the rest of the world. The added dimension is that of a particularly Canadian defiance which still insists on calling things their proper name.

• Lernout's strongest weapon is called Marshall McLuhan, and permits a veritable counterattack: "few people realize that one of the first thinkers of the postmodern condition was not only Catholic but also Canadian" (p. 129). Thanks to McLuhan, Canada can claim national supremacy *within* postmodernism.

The second form that postmodernism takes is that of the regional threat to Canadian national identity. This enemy within is so much more fearful to Lernout that he writes serenely, as if in a post-apocalyptic state: "Canada ... doesn't have an identity" (p. 129), "Canada is not so much a country as a number of isolated islands" (p. 131). It is clear to me that all conflict between national coherence and regional secessionist claims, together with a sense of resignation and tragedy, has been displaced onto the "blitzkrieged" frontier between Canada and the US. As a result, Lernout is left with nothing but the vague assertion that although Canadian regional novelists are "*supremely* postmodernist" (p. 132, my italics) and "have written the most important postmodernist novels" (p. 135), they are at the same time "*supremely* Canadian" (p. 128, my italics) as well. The implication is that — as McLuhan was "one of the first thinkers of the postmodern condition" — Canada is itself a prime example of postmodernism, in that its literature is defined by regional fragmentation. That is to say, having threatened Canadian national identity, postmodernism is finally turned into its saviour.

* * *

4. Iris M. Zavala, "On the (Mis-)Uses of the Post-Modern: Hispanic Modernism Revisited"
The Spanish contributor, Iris M. Zavala — unlike the Italian, Dutch and Canadian contributors — is the direct descendant of a major international language. She has at her disposal an international, linguistically-defined territoriality, that of Hispanic Studies. The problem with this territoriality for a Spanish contributor is that, though the dictionary definition of Hispanic is that which is "relating to, characteristic of, or derived from Spain or the Spanish" (Collins, New Edition), Hispanic Studies are dominated by Latin American literature, and the early nineteenth-century Latin American liberation movements against Spain. The postmodernism debate affords Zavala the opportunity of shifting the emphasis of Hispanic Studies, from literature and the colonial past, to contemporary culture. Her contribution, "On the (Mis-)Uses of the Post-Modern: Hispanic

Modernism Revisited", "broaden[s] [*sic*] the focus from literary texts to *contemporary* culture as a whole" (p. 83, my italics). As a result, distinct national literary traditions are reassembled and projected on the territoriality of a common contemporary society, that of the "Hispanic sphere" (p. 83).

In order to achieve this shift of emphasis, Zavala defines postmodernism, firstly, as a cultural project of advanced societies, as opposed to Hispanic society; secondly, as "*pan*-global", as opposed to and threatening a distinct global Hispanic society (p. 86, my italics). Zavala's anti-Western rhetoric, based on a novel distinction between "global" and "pan-global", allows her to point the finger at those writers, mostly Latin American, associated with postmodernism. They open Hispanic society to the imperialism of the West. Zavala's appeal to a Hispanic society threatened by the West turns Latin American history on its head. Simon Bolivar's dreams for a Latin American confederation emerged against the background of liberation from the Spanish Empire, while Francisco de Miranda's plans for a resurrection of the Inca Empire appealed to the Americans, the British and the French for support against Spain.

If Zavala is ready to sacrifice Spain's indubitable present position as one of the fastest growing European nations; if, with false modesty, she resists "advanced societies", this is done in the name of a common Hispanic heritage, that of Hispanic modernism. Hispanic modernism, as what is culturally distinct about Hispanic society, is defined as embodying a spirit of revolt — and Zavala, accordingly, sings the glories of the Latin American, Basque and Catalan secessionist spirit. Identifying Hispanic society with a *spirit* of revolt — i.e. revolt for its own sake — has insidious implications. Firstly, that the Latin American revolutions are separated from their objectives; in effect, Zavala praises the Latin American revolutions as contributions to a territoriality constituted by the Spanish Empire, while refusing to recognise their success in constituting new territorialities. Similarly, the reference to the Basque and Catalan secessionist spirit, dissociated from their own aims, is meant to establish Spain's special role, within contemporary Hispanic society, in keeping the beacon of revolt aflame.

5. Wladimir Krysinski, "Metafictional Structures in Slavic Literatures: Towards an Archaeology of Metafiction"

Wladimir Krysinski (based in Montreal and one of the millions of Polish immigrants in North America) introduces the Second World to the postmodernism debate. The role in which postmodernism is cast throughout this anthology — that of a neoimperialist force — is here played by "the complex machine of communism as an expansive doctrine" (p. 79). For its liberation this "trapped" (p. 79) world can rely, according to Krysinski, on Slavic literatures. In fact, what sets Slavic literatures apart from other literatures, and what holds them together, is their very ability to overcome indoctrination: "if there is any specificity of Slavic literatures", this is that they "practice a cult of fact and irony with respect to any kind of ideological assumption" (p. 81).

At first sight, this is an interesting reversal of Pan-Slavism, historically associated with expansionist Russian foreign policy. At the same time, the question arises as to whether non-Slavic literatures within the, then, Eastern bloc — East German, Hungarian, Romanian, literature, etc. — are to be perceived as intrinsically incapable of overcoming communism. In 1988, Krysinski's claims of Slavic anti-communism seem to establish a Slavic political and cultural élite for the post-communist world of Eastern Europe.

Once within the territoriality of Slavic literatures, this impression is corroborated and further qualified. Krysinski's discussion of Slavic literatures involves three Polish, two Czech, two Russian and one Yugoslavian novel. This selection disregards the very basis of Slavic literatures, which is the group (and sub-groups) of Slavonic languages. The divisions within the Slavonic languages refer to nations to the extent that nations are defined by language, but not to states — one could talk of Serbian literature, but not of Yugoslavian literature, as Slavic literature. (This is a helpful reminder that the boundaries of Eastern European states owe more to the "expansive doctrine" than to a national spirit that would counter it.) What is remarkable about Krysinski's selection of Slavic literatures is, firstly, that it mixes nations and states — Czech in what was then Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavian

in what at the time of writing is a no-man's-land. Secondly, that among the three Slavonic sub-groups (North, West and South) the Southern group has no representation.

The omission of Bulgarian literature, as the obvious Southern candidate, further clarifies the criteria for selection in the post-communist Slavic élite: the nations or states selected have to combine advanced industrial development and internationally renowned dissident movements (in the case of Yugoslavia, the country as a whole was viewed as dissident).

Krysinski's point of departure was an interesting appeal to the "relativity of metafiction" (p. 63). He argued that, whereas the rest of the world is dominated by its relation to the US, Eastern Europe acquires its singularity from the dominance of a completely other "metafictional" horizon, that of Soviet communism. It is deeply ironic that, while claiming to move in a territoriality which is without "common denominator" (p. 63) with the West, he ends up with a selection of East-European literatures which replicates exactly the names of those East-European countries which today absorb both the attention and the capital investment of the West.

B. Participants on behalf of feminism

"few women have engaged in the modernism/postmodernism debate"

(Craig Owens, 1983)

"feminist criticism has so far largely stayed away from the postmodernism debate which is considered not to be pertinent to feminist concerns"

(Andreas Huyssen, 1986)

"almost no women have figured in the debate, even though many analysts include current feminism among the features of postmodernity"

(Jonathan Arac, 1986)[53]

In her Introduction to *The Pirate's Fiancée: Feminism, Reading, Postmodernism* (1988) Meaghan Morris uses these quotations to build the following argument: "*If* it is true that few women have explicitly inscribed their work in relation to postmodernism ... it should also be true that only male writers who *do* so inscribe their work then come to 'figure' in the debate" (pp. 12-13). As it happens, contributions to the postmodernism debate and their bibliographies have no shortage of

references to Lacan, Derrida, Foucault, and many others who have never written the word "postmodernism". So why do they not also refer to Irigaray and Le Doeuff, or to writers who are "differently placed in histories of racism and colonialism" (p. 13)? Leaving the latter aside as soon as she has taken them up, Morris concludes that under "the myth of a postmodernism still waiting for its women we can find the example of a genre, as well as a discourse, which in its untransformed state leaves a woman no place from which to speak, or nothing to say" (p. 15), and which has "pulled off the peculiar feat of re-constituting an overwhelmingly male pantheon of proper names to function as ritual objects of academic commentary and exegesis" (p. 12). (She cites "Habermas v. Lyotard" as an example of the increasingly repetitive and ritualistic nature of the postmodernism debate.)

The crux of the matter for Morris seems to be that, though Owens, Huyssen and, to a lesser extent, Arac are willing to recognise feminism as a constituent element of postmodernism, they are unwilling to recognise feminists as participants in the postmodernism debate: "Doesn't this distinction return us precisely to that division between a (feminized) object-language and a (masculine) meta-language that feminism has taught us to question?" (p. 14). So what to do? As an alternative to more nagging at the continuing exclusion of feminism, Morris proposes what she considers to be a reversal of frame: instead of discussing feminism *within* the postmodernism debate, Morris advocates the "generically feminist gesture" of discussing postmodernism *within* the "frame" or "context" of feminism (p. 16).

Whatever the merits of this alternative, it is worth mentioning that Morris doesn't attempt it in *The Pirate's Fiancée*. The brilliant essays collected in this volume do not contain sustained discussions of postmodernism, with the possible exception of "Postmodernity and Lyotard's Sublime". But the latter, a fascinating discussion of Lyotard's "sublime", is not framed by feminism. It might still be said that Morris uses this alternative in her Introduction itself. But what feminism does frame here is a discussion of the postmodernism debate, not of postmodernism.

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Almost ten years after the publication of *The Pirate's Fiancée*, the list of feminist participants in the postmodernism debate is long and illustrious. And yet, the devaluation of minoritarian movements in the postmodernism debate now appears to be considerably more profound, multifaceted, intractable than Morris had thought.

• Being named as a "feature of postmodernity" (Arac) is hardly a concession to feminism when postmodernity and postmodernism are defined as a spectre of dissolution and destruction or as at one with late capitalism, or when minoritarian movements are projected onto the harmful side of postmodernity.

• If not being named as a "theorist of postmodernism" is a form of devaluation, being named as one can be yet another form of devaluation, as Judith Butler and Drucilla Cornell have argued in relation to poststructuralism.[54]

• Finally, what happens to Morris's alternative solution that feminists discuss postmodernism from within a feminist context, if it emerges that this is exactly the kind of contribution that the terms of participation in the postmodernism debate were formulated to solicit? And what would be the impact of feminism's territorialisation on its relation to other minoritarian movements and to its own minorities?

In the discussions to follow I hope to open up these questions. My focus will be, firstly, on the literary critic Linda Hutcheon and her work on postmodernism and feminism. Secondly, on Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson and their attempt, over a number of years, to stage a philosophical debate on postmodernism and feminism *within* feminism. Linda Hutcheon, as well as Fraser and Nicholson, will be discussed extensively.

Linda Hutcheon

The Canadian literary critic Linda Hutcheon has contributed three books to the postmodernism debate: *A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction* (1988), *The Canadian Postmodern: A Study of Contemporary English-Canadian Fiction* (1988) and *The Politics of Postmodernism* (1989). I will examine the latest of the three, *The Politics of Postmodernism*. Linda Hutcheon's *The Politics of*

Postmodernism is immediately comparable to Steven Connor's *Postmodernist Culture* in that it attempts an overview of contemporary culture. Secondly, Hutcheon also divides contemporary culture into art-forms: fiction, poetry, photography, painting, installation, performance art, video art, film, television, music, etc. *including* "theory". (Her overarching term is "representation". All art-forms are "representations".) The most obvious difference between the two literary critics is that Connor participates in the postmodernism debate on behalf of literary criticism, Hutcheon on behalf of feminism.

I have found *The Politics of Postmodernism* to be a book in two movements; two coexisting and intertwining movements which combine in a simultaneous "idealisation and damnation" (Raymond Williams as quoted earlier) of postmodernism. The first movement, strongly pro-postmodernist, allows Hutcheon to undermine Jameson's definition of postmodernism and to reject his appeals to alliance and unity on New Left territory. The second movement, anti-postmodernist, allows Hutcheon to appeal to unity within a feminist territory and to reject the perceived centrifugal tendencies within it, but forces her to revert back to Jameson's definition of postmodernism. For analytical purposes, I will separate these tendencies in the discussion to follow.

* * *

First movement: Hutcheon starts *The Politics of Postmodernism* on a note of defiance. If feminism is absent from the postmodernism debate, this is because feminists themselves, "feminist artists and theorists[,] have resisted the incorporation of their work into postmodernism for fear of recuperation and the attendant de-fusing of their own political agendas" (p. 2).[55] But, having herself chosen to participate, she goes unerringly to the crux of the matter, the basic proposition, in the postmodernism debate, upon which the devaluation of minoritarian movements is built: Jameson's proposition that postmodernism is ahistorical. And, as with Jameson in "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism", she begins with architecture. But whereas Jameson discusses as exemplary the Las Vegas no-man's-land, this "landscape of schlock and kitsch" (Jameson, p. 55), Hutcheon shifts the

focus to the "motivated historical echoes found, for example, in Charles Moore's Piazza d'Italia, intended as a center for the Italian community of New Orleans" (p. 12).

Hutcheon reverses Jameson's proposition. It is modernism, not postmodernism, which "disregards the social and aesthetic values of those who must inhabit those modernist building" (p. 12). The "ahistorical purism" of the International Style, its "rejection of the historical city ... its deliberate break with history meant a destruction of the connection to the way human society had come to relate to *space over time*" (pp. 11-12, my italics). Postmodern architecture, on the other hand, is "plural and historical[;] ... it neither ignores nor condemns the long heritage of its built culture — including the modern. It uses the reappropriated forms of the past to speak to a society from within the values and history of that society" (p. 12). Hutcheon borrows her argument from Jencks and other architectural critics. But, whereas Jencks stresses the individual taste of the client for a private building and the need to cater for many tastes in a public building[56], what is at stake in Hutcheon's argument — as her reference (above) to the Italian community of New Orleans indicates — is more, much more, than a redefinition of the relation between modernism and postmodernism in architecture. What is at stake is a redefinition of history and of society.

Historical time does involve space, the space of particular communities and their traditions. Concomitantly, social space is not defined by what is dominant in it in the present. It is defined by the particular histories of its constituent parts and is therefore despatialised. Unlike Harvey who separates time (history) and space (place) and identifies the former with modernity, the latter with postmodernity, Hutcheon argues that "we now get the histories (in the plural) of the losers as well as the winners, of the regional (and colonial) as well as the centrist, of the unsung many as well as of the sung few, and I might add, of women as well as men" (p. 66). This means that the "losers" no longer concede victory to a self-proclaimed pure historical logic of the dominant, no longer believe in the zero-sum logic of winner/loser and its users.

Hutcheon extends her definition of postmodernist architecture as historical — and her definition of history as comprised of particularities — to all areas of the arts, as Jameson does, as well as to "sciences" such as historiography.[57] Her confrontation with Jameson is complete and direct: postmodernism "does not fall into either 'presentism' or nostalgia in its relation to the past it represents" (p. 71). In fact, postmodernism owes its existence and derives "its historical consciousness (and conscience) from the inscription into history of women and ethnic/racial minorities" during the 1960s (p. 10). If postmodernism is "typically denounced as dehistoricized" (p. 57) by Marxist and right-wing critics alike, this is because "the problematized histories of postmodernism have little to do with the single totalizing History" (p. 57) in which both parties take refuge.[58] In denouncing postmodernism as ahistorical, Jameson sides with the forces of reaction in order to denounce history itself. As a result, the past becomes once again "something to be escaped, avoided, or controlled — as various forms of modernist art suggest through their implicit view of the 'nightmare' of history" (p. 58).

Based on her definition of postmodernism as historical, Hutcheon confronts Jameson's second proposition, that postmodern parody is "trivial and trivializing ... nostalgic escapism" (p. 113), "a value-free, decorative, de-historicized quotation of past forms" (p.94). Against this "dominant" (p. 113) view, she argues that the postmodern "parodic reprise of the past of art is ... always critical" (p. 93). Parodic critique does introduce an element of irreducible distance between past and present — or, as Hutcheon puts it, it is "both historical and contemporary. There is no dialectical resolution or recuperation" (p. 67) — but parodic distance is a "difference induced by that very history" (p. 94) rather than opposed to it.

* * *

Second movement: Hutcheon formalises the relation between postmodernism's sense of history and its use of parody into an irresoluble contradiction.[59] This, in effect, involves nothing less than a negation of her appeal to particularised history, and an abrupt return

to the Big History detected in Marxist and conservative critics. Postmodernism's "commitment to doubleness, or duplicity" (p. 1) is, in fact, not to be understood in the sense of an involvement with minoritarian history, tense between loyalty and innovation, looking back and forth; it must be understood as a complicity with the status quo. This is why "it must be admitted [*sic*] from the start that this is a strange kind of critique, one bound up, too, with its own *complicity with power and domination*" (p. 4, my italics). That is to say, not only is "history" summarily departicularised, but "culture" and "society" as well; they become, yet again, "dominant culture" and "society as a whole". No sooner does Hutcheon condemn the "tendency to see ethnic, local, or generally popular forms of art as 'subcultural'" (p. 28) rather than cultural than she is tempted to do the same; no sooner does she embrace "the lessons taught ... of the importance of context, of discursive situation" (p. 67) than she returns to the non-context of society in general.

The prize for Hutcheon's *volte-face*, at first sight, is that she is able to distinguish between postmodernism and feminism in the clearest of terms. Whereas "postmodernism is politically ambivalent ... both complicitous with and contesting of the cultural dominants[,] ... feminisms have distinct, unambiguous agendas of resistance ... a major difference of orientation between the two" (p. 142). Whereas "Feminism is a politics ... Postmodernism is not" (p. 168); postmodernism "does not seem able to make the move into political agency" (p. 157).[60] But, if postmodernism "has not theorized agency" (p. 168), the kind of agency now evoked by Hutcheon and attributed to feminism is — indistinguishable from Jameson's — based on a definition of society as a total system of oppression and a definition of change as a total systemic transformation undoing oppression. Agency falling short of that is impotent, it brings no "*real* social change" (p. 168, my italics), it is no agency at all.[61]

Whereas in Jameson's use of this schema total systematic transformation is to come — as we have seen — from "international socialism", in Hutcheon *real* change is to come from the feminist redefinition of desire and the body. Hutcheon's argument is as follows. Postmodernism and feminism — in fact Hutcheon always refers to

feminism*s* — share a common "general problematizing of the body and its sexuality" (p. 142). But, against "the objectification of the female body" (p. 150), "[t]hey [feminisms] have *made* postmodernism think, not just about the body, but about the female body; not just about the female body, but about its desires" (p. 143); they have made postmodernism "reconsider — in terms of gender — its challenges to that humanist universal 'Man'" (p. 167). As a result, "Feminisms ... form the single most powerful force in changing the direction in which (male) postmodernism was heading but I think, no longer is. It [i.e. feminisms!] radicalized the postmodern sense of difference" (p. 142).

What this means is that difference is to be equated with sexual difference, context equated with gender, and gender equated with the psychosexual: "the feminist rethinking of Lacan ... had the greatest impact, maybe because it provided a *psycho-sexual context* for all those other destabilizing theoretical strategies" (p. 133, my italics). As a consequence, "the acknowledgement of the need to represent differences among women (of sexuality, age, race, class, ethnicity, nationality)" (p. 141) with which Hutcheon initiates her discussion of feminism[62], *turns into its opposite*. It is those feminisms whose contexts are lesbian, ethnic or national communities which need to acknowledge the ahistorical abstraction of the gendered body as their proper context, and "sexual difference" feminism as the queen of feminism. The blackmail is clear: unless they do so, feminism cannot claim to be this "*single* most powerful force" (p. 142, my italics) of real change; it doesn't even have a ground upon which to "resist incorporation" to postmodernism. It is probably a rule almost without exception that, when "sexual difference" feminists start off with their commitment to feminism*s*, they finish with feminism*s'* duty to "sexual difference" (see further my third chapter).

Similarly, those artists evoking the histories of ethnic groups or minor nations are thrown into the black hole of complicity with oppression. Whereas Hutcheon's rather supercilious judgement on Barbara Kruger is that "I think, she makes the step from deconstructive postmodernism to feminism" (p. 157), Maxine Hong Kingston is found to be at one with "(male) postmodernism". This is the closest Hutcheon comes to losing everything, to seeing her whole edifice collapse. In

expelling particularity and history from the non-patriarchal female body, she opens herself to the danger of leaving feminism empty-handed; evacuating feminism of all content and the "feminist politicization of desire" (p. 149) of all meaning. Aware of the danger of a new reversal, in favour of particularised versions of feminism and against the necessity of resorting to any notion of a feminist female body as such, Hutcheon finds refuge in the evocation of private experience. Following Jameson, she redefines particularity as individual — rather than collective — particularity, in spite of previous comments to the contrary.[63] And, again following Jameson, she now defines the "collective" as the "public". (Jameson's three main categories are the "private", the "public" and the "avant-garde" and, in her second movement, Hutcheon implicitly follows all three.)

In high-pitched tones of unjustifiable elation, Hutcheon announces feminism's "granting new and emphatic value to the notion of 'experience'" (p. 160), the "very feminist awareness of the value of experience" (p. 167), "the feminist valuation of life-writing" (p. 161), etc. So, feminism's solution to "an issue of great importance ... : what constitutes a valid historical narrative?" (p. 160), and "the particularly feminist source of inspiration for ... dealing with the private and the public" (p. 161), is that "the fictively personal becomes the historically — and thus politically — public in a kind of synecdochic fashion" (p. 161).

Hutcheon had already discussed the difficulties facing the historiography and fiction of minorities and minor nations, as well as the unsuitability of "narrative models — both historiographical and fictional — that are based on European models of continuous chronology and cause-and-effect relations" (p. 53); she has already looked down upon the kind of narrative that works as a "filler of vacuums, the dispeller of fears of the dark [sic]" (p. 56). Now, having apparently surpassed them in particularity, she offers them a "very feminist", simple and economical solution to all their narrative problems: write "[t]he story of one black family [and it miraculously] becomes the microcosmic history of an entire race" (p. 162).

* * *

A very intriguing element in Hutcheon's account of feminism is that it bypasses feminist philosophers. Hutcheon concentrates on artists, mostly novelists and visual artists, and critics — one can hardly object to that. But, in a book teeming with proper names, and given that she describes the feminist rethinking of Lacan as providing the stabilising "psycho-sexual *context*" for feminism *s*, why is it that Luce Irigaray's name is not mentioned once? (I am leaving aside, to discuss in the following chapter, the question of whether Irigaray's work would lend itself to this role in the first place.) Why is it that, while discussing Nancy Spero's "peinture féminine" (p. 160), she doesn't once mention Hélène Cixous, whose "écriture féminine" had produced no less than thirty four works of fiction or drama on Susan Sellers's last count?[64] Whatever Hutcheon's reasons for such omissions might be, their effect is that she discusses Lacan but not Irigaray, Derrida but not Cixous, Habermas but not Benhabib, etc. Whether she needs to evacuate "sexual difference" feminism of content to make it all the more suitable for its role as context, or whether she needs to bypass feminist philosophers in order the make the difference between "(male) postmodernism" and feminism all the more stark, does she not run the risk of reinforcing what Meaghan Morris has called the postmodernism debate's "male pantheon of proper names"?

Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson

In 1988 Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson published "Social Criticism without Philosophy: An Encounter between Feminism and Postmodernism".[65] This is a programmatic text, influential enough to have launched two book collections and a book series. The book series is *Thinking Gender*, edited by Linda Nicholson for Routledge. The first book collection is *Feminism/Postmodernism* (1990), inaugural publication in this series, also edited by Nicholson, and initiating a feminist debate around "Social Criticism without Philosophy" which is reprinted at the beginning of this volume, heading a long and impressive list of contributions. The second book collection is *Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange* (1995). Published in the same book series, it frames a debate between Seyla Benhabib, Judith Butler

and Drucilla Cornell with one intervention by Nicholson, two by Fraser, using their theses in "Social Criticism without Philosophy" to mediate the differences between Benhabib, Butler and Cornell.

* * *

The overall argument of "Social Criticism without Philosophy: An Encounter between Feminism and Postmodernism" appears to be remarkably straightforward and, if somewhat bland, laudable in every way. Postmodernism and feminism are probably the two most important currents of the 1980s. Both have challenged traditional philosophy "with a capital 'P'". But, whereas postmodernism tends to be politically "anaemic", feminism tends to "lapse into foundationalism and essentialism". Postmodernist feminism will "integrat[e] their respective strengths while eliminating their respective weaknesses" (pp. 415-416 throughout). It will be politically and critically powerful, on the one hand. On the other hand, instead of construing "differences among women of different classes, races, sexual orientations and ethnic groups ... as subsidiary to more basic similarities" (p. 426), and instead of "occlud[ing] axes of domination other than gender" (p. 428), postmodernist feminism will treat gender as "one relevant strand among others, attending also to class, race, ethnicity, age and sexual orientation" (p. 429). Such tendencies have cost feminism dearly. They have forced many women to "deny an allegiance to feminism" (p. 426), they have also "hinder[ed] alliances with other progressive movements" (p. 428). Postmodernist feminism can rectify all that without losing its "social-critical power" (p. 428).

Now let's have a look at the particulars: who are the postmodernists, who are the feminists, and how does postmodernist feminism, the position staked out by Fraser and Nicholson, "integrat[e] their respective strengths while eliminating their respective weaknesses"? These questions become convoluted once we take a closer look and, in trying to answer them, I will ask for the reader's patience. In brief, "Social Criticism without Philosophy: An Encounter between Feminism and Postmodernism" emerges as a shrewd political document which attempts to placate each one of its interlocutors by offering them

the scalp of another. In the process, it brands them all as extreme. It then presents itself as this middle ground that will hold and combine all extremes for the benefit of feminism as a whole.

The postmodernists are philosophers, "writers like Richard Rorty and Jean-François Lyotard" (p. 416), and if they offer postmodernist feminism the "social criticism without philosophy" of Fraser and Nicholson's title, as in the case of Rorty discussed earlier in this chapter, this is not to be taken literally. "Social criticism without philosophy" should more accurately be called "philosophy without Philosophy" or "philosophers without Philosophy". Fraser and Nicholson only examine Lyotard. He is said to be politically anaemic because he disregards "the needs of contemporary criticism and engagement" or, interchangeably, "the needs of contemporary feminist theory and practice" (p. 417). The content of the needs that Lyotard disregards is clarified in the following passage:

> his justice of multiplicities conception precludes one familiar, and arguably essential, genre of political theory: identification and critique of macrostructures of inequality and injustice which cut across the boundaries separating relatively discreet practices and institutions. (p. 419)

This takes me to my second question: who are the feminists whose needs Lyotard disregards? The brief answer to that, if only Fraser and Nicholson would say so, is that they are US mainstream essentialist feminist "theorists". Linda Hutcheon, as we have seen, concentrates on feminist artists. In Fraser and Nicholson's account of feminism, they do not figure at all. While advocating "social criticism without philosophy", they will only address feminist "theorists", preferably with a background in philosophy. Of the feminist theorists who figure in their account of feminism, French feminists are dealt with in one sentence: "feminist scholarship in the 1980s" or, interchangeably, current "US feminists" show an unhelpful fascination with them (p. 428). (Like Jameson's conflation of US socialism and international socialism, Fraser and Nicholson seem quite unable to distinguish between US feminism and feminism internationally.) Finally, among US feminist theorists, those who write on behalf of "women of colour" and lesbians are named but excluded from

discussion, by being discreetly identified as part of "the *practice* of feminist politics" (p. 427, my italics), rather than as part of feminist scholarship. If we now turn to those who are discussed, and who can therefore be taken to stand for feminism and its famous needs[66], we find that Fraser and Nicholson use Lyotard to conclude that each and all (with the exception of Gayle Rubin) are unacceptable because essentialist, and essentialist because their theories are trans-cultural.

Fraser and Nicholson's account of postmodernism and feminism leaves us with the following problems. If feminism has been essentialist, then it cannot be said to have undermined "traditional" philosophy. If Lyotard's thesis of the incommensurability of local narratives is rejected as politically emasculating on the basis of needs which are shown to be indissociable from essentialism, then Lyotard can no longer be rejected. Conversely, if feminism's "social-critical power" is shown to have been indissociable from essentialism, then essentialism cannot be rejected without loss of this power, so why reject essentialism? This takes me to my third and final question — what is Fraser and Nicholson's postmodernist feminism, and how does it "integrat[e]" feminism's and postmodernism's "respective strengths while eliminating their respective weaknesses"?

The two clues given in "Social Criticism without Philosophy" are, firstly, Gayle Rubin's formula that the oppression of women has to be studied in its "endless variety and monotonous similarity"[67] — Fraser and Nicholson are so enthusiastic about this formula that they use it as the concluding phrase in their text; secondly, that "a phenomenon as pervasive and multifaceted as male dominance ... requires an array of different methods and genres" (p. 421). Fraser is more explicit in "False Antitheses", the first of her two contributions to *Feminist Contentions*. Referring to "Social Criticism without Philosophy", she describes the "version of postmodernist feminism elaborated by Linda Nicholson and me" as an approach which, unlike Benhabib's, Butler's and Cornell's, "*does* stake out the middle position" (p. 62) and achieves the "characterization of that middle ground" (p. 61). The key to the middle position or middle ground is "avoiding the *untenable extremes*" (p. 63, my italics) and this they hold for the following reason: "because our view allows both for large historical narrative and for smaller local

narrative, it permits each to counteract the distorting tendencies of the other" (p. 62). In her second contribution to *Feminist Contentions*, "Pragmatism, Feminism, and the Linguistic Turn", Fraser presents the work of Benhabib, Butler and Cornell as "three pure, let us say 'party-line' alternatives" which, "balkanizing" and "sectarian" by themselves, can contribute towards a "feminist counterhegemony" once they are contained by a fourth approach which "encompasses the full range" of options (p. 158). This fourth approach is, of course, the Fraser and Nicholson approach.

Fraser calls this an "eclectic, neo-pragmatist approach" (p. 158), but it isn't that at all. To occupy the middle ground Fraser and Nicholson's postmodernist feminism has to construe all its interlocutors as extreme, irreconcilably opposed to each other in a "tug of war between forces which have encouraged and forces which have discouraged metanarrative-like modes of theorizing" ("Social Criticism without Philosophy", p. 422). The former lead to false unity, the latter to fragmentation. Mainstream feminism without Fraser and Nicholson is identified with false unity, postmodernism without Fraser and Nicholson with fragmentation. Or — a second pair in "Social Criticism without Philosophy" — New Left hegemony, unlike their own "feminist counterhegemony", is identified with false unity, minorities within feminism with fragmentation. Or — in *Feminist Contentions* — Benhabib is identified with false unity, Butler with fragmentation. An eclectic neo-pragmatist approach would accept that each of its interlocutors works within the context of a specific set of problems and that each uses the methods and tools that they deem appropriate to them. Fraser and Nicholson's postmodernist feminism, on the other hand, integrates all contexts and recontextualises them within the context without context of a purportedly disinterested feminist perspective.

In conclusion, Fraser and Nicholson propose a middle ground or a feminist counterhegemony whose justification is dual:
• that male dominance is itself all-pervasive and multifaceted
• that all the would-be constituent elements of this counterhegemony — Fraser and Nicholson's interlocutors —are weak, extreme and warring without it, strong, beneficial and harmonious within it.

But the "false antitheses" (Fraser's title) that Fraser detects, and that the Fraser and Nicholson approach claims to integrate, are construed by this approach in the first place, through an array of exclusions and reductions.

<p style="text-align:center">* * *</p>

I cannot discuss here each of Fraser and Nicholson's numerous interlocutors inside "Social Criticism without Philosophy", or in *Feminism/Postmodernism,* or in *Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange*; nor can I discuss the work of each in relation to Fraser and Nicholson's reading of it. I will nevertheless turn to one of them, Seyla Benhabib, in the hope that my discussion of her will illustrate the general problem of the Fraser and Nicholson approach.

Excursus on Seyla Benhabib

Seyla Benhabib is not mentioned in "Social Criticism without Philosophy", but she contributes to *Feminism/Postmodernism* with "Epistemologies of Postmodernism: A Rejoinder to Jean-François Lyotard". She also takes part in *Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange* with "Feminism and Postmodernism" and "Subjectivity, Historiography, Politics". *Feminist Contentions* is indeed a protracted philosophical exchange spanning more than four years.[68]

The debate conducted in *Feminist Contentions* is certainly heated and disagreements abound. I do not wish to dispute that. On the contrary, I take it as a sign that the parties involved take each other seriously. What I dispute is whether Fraser is justified in concluding that Benhabib, Butler and Cornell represent three extreme pure party-lines at war with each other. To turn to the case of Seyla Benhabib, I cannot hope to show here the intricacies, the flirtatious to and fro, of Fraser's and Nicholson's address to Benhabib. But, leaving this important aspect aside, Fraser and Nicholson present Benhabib as a pure Habermasian who is:
• *for* "homogeneous" narratives (Nicholson, p. 15) and for foundational metanarratives (Fraser, pp. 61-63)

• *against* "historically specific, social interpretations" (Nicholson, p. 10), overlooking that "practices of clarifying and reconstructing norms are themselves culturally and historically situated and cannot escape that condition" (Fraser, p. 64), and "marginaliz[ing] questions about motivation and desire" (Fraser, p. 161).

So, is this an accurate representation of Benhabib, or of Habermas, and is she a pure Habermasian in the first place?

* * *

Seyla Benhabib begins "Feminism and Postmodernism: An Uneasy Alliance", her main contribution to *Feminist Contentions*, with the statement that feminism and postmodernism are "leading currents" in Western intellectual and academic culture (p. 17). The question, she asks, is whether and in what sense they can be allied. In answer to this question she distinguishes between weak and strong versions of postmodernism; in spite of her polemical tone, she accepts the weak versions as compatible with feminism, but rejects the strong versions as incompatible or even harmful. The weak versions of postmodernism include, firstly, a weak version of the "death of Man" which "would situate the subject in the context of various social, linguistic, and discursive practices" (p. 20); secondly, a weak version of the "death of History" that would be "a call to end the practice of 'grand narratives' which are essentialist and monocausal" (p. 22).

Fraser objects that Benhabib fails to consider "medium-strength" versions (p. 61) but, in doing so, she misses the history of this distinction in Benhabib's work and, therefore, its import in the present context. I believe that the distinction between weak and strong versions of postmodernism has to be understood as a counterpart to Benhabib's attempt, in *Critique, Norm, and Utopia*, to distinguish between weak and strong versions of "communicative ethics", and which involves her in a critique of Habermas: "above all, his [Habermas's] program of a strong justification of communicative ethics cannot succeed" (*Critique, Norm, and Utopia*, p. 263). I believe that her objections to strong versions of postmodernism parallel her objections to a strong version of communicative ethics.

My understanding of Benhabib's argument in "Feminism and Postmodernism" in conjunction with her argument in *Critique, Norm, and Utopia* is as follows. Benhabib's objection to strong versions of both postmodernism and communicative ethics is that they shift, to use her terminology, from the "politics of intersubjectivity" to the politics of "collective singularity"[69], thus lapsing back to the philosophy of the subject. In the case of a strong version of communicative ethics we are faced with collective macro-singularity (humanity), in the case of strong versions of postmodernism we are faced with collective micro-singularity (a given culture, society or tradition). But, whether on a macro- or micro- level, the result according to Benbabib is homogenisation, low utopian content, and hardly enough emphasis on transfiguration. I will embark on a brief demonstration.

• One of Benhabib's objections to strong versions of postmodernism is that they tend to deny the "possibility of changing those 'expressions' which constitute us", reducing us to "merely extensions of our histories" (*Feminist Contentions*, p. 21). Or, alternatively, they tend to assume that "the constitutive norms of a given culture, society, and tradition will be sufficient to enable one to exercise criticism in the name of a desirable future" (p. 26). The counterpart of this objection in *Critique, Norm, and Utopia* is that a strong version of communicative ethics presents itself as "the logical and inevitable outcome of a normal sequence of development, only carrying to its conclusion what is implicit in the process itself", thereby "revert[ing] back to the philosophy of the subject". Benhabib argues that whereas the strong version of communicative ethics, involving a legal-juridical conception of public life as a community of rights and entitlements, "corresponds to the project of fulfilling the legacy of bourgeois revolutions and of the liberal-democratic tradition"; the weak version of communicative ethics, involving a democratic-participatory conception of public life as a community of needs and solidarity, "corresponds to the project of transfiguring this tradition" (p. 343 throughout).[70]

• Benhabib's second objection to strong versions of postmodernism is that they tend to assume that cultures, societies and traditions are internally "monolithic; univocal and homogeneous fields of meaning" (*Feminist Contentions*, p. 26). Its counterpart in *Critique, Norm, and*

Utopia is that a strong version of communicative ethics "shift[s] to the language of a hypostatized [collective] subject" and, once again, "Habermas reverts to the discourse of the philosophy of the subject". Benhabib asks: "who is the 'we' in the present such that reconstructions present a process of development with which all can identify? Why is it assumed that one is already facing a collective singularity — mankind as such?" (pp. 330-331 throughout).

• Finally, Benhabib's third objection to strong versions of postmodernism is that, within a given society, culture or tradition, they tend to presume that there is "a single set of criteria on which there is ... universal consensus" (*Feminist Contentions*, p. 26). Its counterpart in *Critique, Norm, and Utopia* is that "the ideal speech situation is a circular construction; it presupposes those very norms whose validity it was supposed to establish" (p. 290). More generally, communicative ethics cannot presume as given criteria for participation and consensus which have to be established by participation and consensus in the first place. Otherwise, "[w]ould this not contradict the fundamental principle of a discourse ethics that only those norms (and meta-norms) can claim validity which could meet the consensus of all participants" (p. 303)?

* * *

Seyla Benhabib cannot be represented as a pure Habermasian nor, as she demonstrates, is Habermas's work homogeneous. Her critique of Habermas is already informed by a commitment to feminism, it is therefore unclear why it would need to be mediated by a feminist perspective claiming to occupy the "middle ground". In *Critique, Norm, and Utopia* Benhabib calls her critique of Habermas an immanent critique, immanent because conducted from within the tradition of Critical Theory. I will add that this critique is immanent/transfigurative and that its motivation comes from a feminist sensibility.[71] Seyla Benhabib concludes *Critique, Norm, and Utopia* with a new distinction and a warning. The new distinction, addressed to Critical Theory, is one between "polity" and what she calls "'association' of needs and solidarity" — "formed out of the action of the oppressed, the exploited,

and the humiliated" (p. 351). The warning, addressed to feminism, is that such "associations" must themselves avoid the politics of collective singularity.

To conclude this section on participants in the postmodernism debate on behalf of feminism, let me ask: does Nicholson and Fraser's version of postmodernist feminism as a middle ground integrating extreme tendencies — or does Hutcheon's version of "sexual difference" feminism as a context for all feminisms and as an antidote to "destabilizing" tendencies — avoid the politics of collective singularity?

VI. The postmodernism debate as the UN of the academic world

The current phase of the postmodernism debate, as I have presented it in this selective account, marks a general shift in the use of the term "postmodernism": from the limited terrain of the arts to the limitless terrain of contemporary reality; from postmodernism as a new force determinant in the arts, to postmodernism as a contemporary second-order phenomenon determined by a prior and higher reality (be it capitalism, neoimperialism or patriarchy; Western metaphysics or global culture). In summary the term "postmodernism" has shifted from a "new" particular phenomenon to a "contemporary" global epiphenomenon.

The role of the term "contemporary" in the debate is as central as it is obscure.

• The "contemporary" has a periodising role. It is suited to the purposes of a definition of differences outside time as spatially coexistent. So the contemporary hypostasises differences and captures them in a single moment.

• The "contemporary" is a value. On the one hand, the participants' denunciation (or enthusiastic endorsement) of postmodernism is a denunciation (or enthusiastic endorsement) of the contemporary. Simultaneously, the contemporary is a door that not everybody is able to cross; access to the contemporary is automatically granted to those — and those only — who participate in the postmodernism debate.

Once the postmodernism debate is entered, and under its guidance, the contemporary is miraculously transformed from sublime hell to sublime paradise; it is transubstantiated to a brave new postmodernism snatched from capitalism, neoimperialism, patriarchy, etc. Jameson's "late capitalism" opens to the salutary territoriality of "international socialism". Connor's "dissipative politics" finds a "common frame of assent which alone can guarantee the continuation of a global diversity of voices". Hutcheon's patriarchal status quo turns inside out into the "psycho-sexual context of the feminist female body". Lernout's "blitzkrieged" Canada is transfigured into a "supremely" postmodernist Canada. Western neoimperialism turns to a Hispanic spirit of revolt. Annexation turns to Dutchness.

We can therefore distinguish between two postmodernisms: one before, one after the postmodernism debate; one outside, one inside the postmodernism debate. The first postmodernism is a spectre of dissolution; the second postmodernism is a spirit of peace and harmony. It is my belief, and I cannot stress it enough, that the contents of these two postmodernisms, as defined by most of the participants examined, are in fact identical: they are minorities, *and minorities within minorities.* As I have argued, Jameson's late capitalism is a figure for a world in which the initiative has passed to minoritarian movements, whereas international socialism is a figure for their appropriation by the New Left. Harvey's postmodernity is indistinguishable from the proposition that race, gender, etc. "should be omnipresent from the very beginning in any attempt to grasp the dialectics of social change", whereas its antidote is to be found in "recuperating such aspects of social organization within the overall frame of historical materialist inquiry". Outside the postmodernism debate, Connor's "feminism and post-Coloniality" lead to dissipation and "disastrous decompression"; inside its frame they are a fetishised "diversity of voices". Hutcheon's "differences among women (of sexuality, age, race, class, ethnicity, nationality)" are both a threat to feminism's radicalism, under suspicion of complicity with the patriarchal status quo, and the constituent parts of the radical feminist female body.

In summary, most of the participants enter the postmodernism debate on behalf of a territoriality and defend this territoriality from its minorities which, before and outside the postmodernism debate, are demonised for having a centrifugal itinerary of their own; inside the debate, and after forced landing, they are spatialised — and only then celebrated — as provinces of this territoriality. That is, both in the apocalyptic/catastrophic and in the euphoric/reconstructive versions of postmodernism, what is at issue is minorities; in crossing the door from the former to the latter, nothing changes but something is added, a ground. Or, as Andrew Ross has put it, a "metropolitan ground": "everyone" must participate on metropolitan ground. The participants' celebration of difference, diversity, heterogeneity — and so on and so forth ad nauseam — is a celebration of this ground, whose prime example is the ground of the postmodernism debate itself.

* * *

I have already discussed the terms of participation in the postmodernism debate. They are set out by Jameson, codified by Ross, and liberally used by most of the participants discussed above. One must participate on behalf of a particular territoriality and in favour of its integrity. In order to do this, a number of conditions have to be fulfilled. A territoriality has to be established in the first place, its external boundaries set, its internal space divided into metropolitan (or representative or majority) ground and provincial (or represented or minority) ground, the provincial ground fragmented into sections. There is no territoriality without minorities; there are no minorities outside this territorial logic. If we compare David Harvey and Linda Hutcheon as discussed above, they only differ in the particulars. Harvey argues for an external boundary between the New Left and poststructuralism; Hutcheon argues for an external boundary between feminism and "(male) postmodernism". Harvey's metropolitan ground is historical materialism; Hutcheon's is "sexual difference" feminism. Both historical materialism and "sexual difference" feminism represent but versions of the New Left and of feminism respectively. Nevertheless Harvey treats the former as a territoriality on which to map not only

other versions of the New Left, but also non-class-based movements
such as feminism; Hutcheon, in turn, treats the latter as a territoriality
on which to map other versions of feminism, including socialist
feminism. That is to say, Harvey treats feminism as a minority on New
Left territory, while Hutcheon treats socialism as a minority on feminist
territory.

It is clear that the establishment of such territorialities involves
aggression, directed equally at those excluded (those placed on the
other side of the external boundary) and those appropriated (those
internalised as a section of the territoriality). This aggression is
justified — nay, hailed as salutary — by recourse to a prior aggression
of the highest and mightiest order. As we have seen, the names vary —
capitalism, neoimperialism, patriarchy, etc. — the thing is the same: it
is the spirit of destruction itself. This sublime "dark" (Hutcheon, p. 56)
thing is consistently associated with minorities — if they don't summon
it, they are unwittingly complicit with it — whereas the territorialities
that appropriate them are consistently associated with the forces of
light (peace, pluralism, diversity, etc.) as, indeed, is the postmodernism
debate itself.

The archetypal twentieth-century formulation of the opposition
between territorial integrity and global destruction is the Charter of the
United Nations of June 26, 1945. Its opening statement is as follows:
"*We the peoples of the United Nations determined* to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has
brought untold sorrow to mankind". The core solution it offers is in
Article 2.4: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state". In order to do this, the Charter
translates peoples into territories. For example, it formulates the
problem of colonised peoples, "peoples [who] have not yet attained a
full measure of self-government", in terms of "Non-Self-Governing
Territories". That is to say, on the one hand the Charter — contrary to
the postmodernism debate — is explicit that threats to the territorial
integrity of a Self-Governing Territory come from other Self-Governing
Territories (other Member states), *not from Non-Self-Governing
Territories*. On the other hand, it cannot recognise minoritarian

movements and their claims unless they translate into territories and territorial claims. Otherwise, minoritarian groups are disassembled into individuals and come under the category of individual rights.

To return to the postmodernism debate, it is an attempt to extend the territorial logic to minoritarian groups or peoples whose claims cannot have a properly territorial basis. On the one hand, it is obvious that, for example, feminist movements and the demands they articulate are not to be redeemed in the creation of an Amazon state, nor with a State-of-Israel-type solution. As for those representing minor states and regions, their inferior position internationally and within the UN itself cannot be addressed or rectified by recourse to the territorial integrity principle either. The extension of the territorial logic to minoritarian (in the two above senses) groups translates them into aggressive majorities — metropolitan grounds with appropriations and exclusions of their very own. It is an indisputable fact that, though "territorial integrity" is the main UN principle for peace among its Members, the territorial integrity of every single existing UN Member state is itself historically based on the aggression of appropriation and exclusion. The question arises as to whether the territorial logic is not only the solution but also the problem, and whether its extension is not a step further away rather than closer to peace.

* * *

The link between the UN and the postmodernism debate is brought to the fore in Charles Jencks's article, "New World Order" (1991).[72] Jencks, as we have seen, pioneered the introduction of the term "post-modernism" in architectural criticism in 1975 and has, since, contributed a large number of books and articles on postmodernism in architecture and other visual arts.[73] "New World Order" marks a shift in Jencks's work on postmodernism: under the influence of the current phase of the postmodernism debate, he now comes to address much larger issues.

Jencks describes the "New World Order", in which all international disputes would be mediated by the UN, as typically postmodern, a world governed by a "typical post-modern heterarchy"

(p. 18). In particular, this world, according to Jencks, is characterised by:

• The explosion in supranational organisations; "David Held ... mentions no less than 4,980 ... If this keeps up by the year 2050 nation-states will disappear" (p. 17).

• The acceleration of the trend towards democracy: "According to surveys, the number of democracies and quasi-democracies has more than doubled since 1945 ... and more than one-fifth of the world's population ... is trying to become democratic" (p. 15).

• The decline of "Nation-states, the great creation of the modern world" (p. 14); "Nations and nationalism were the twin products of modernity and we are seeing their slow eclipse with the rise of the post-modern world" (p. 16).

In describing the New World Order, Jencks gets entangled in a whole cluster of contradictions. A first contradiction emerges around the relation between the 4,980 supranational organisations and the UN. On the one hand, such organisations contribute to a postmodern heterarchy, "against the habitual view of power structures as overarching hierarchies" (p. 18). At the same time, the New World Order, according to Jencks, marks the coming to pre-eminence of a single supranational organisation, the UN — clearly at the expense of all others. The New World Order is a "world system" (p. 14), a "system of world government" which "should be brought, as intended by the world in 1945, within the purview of the UN" (p. 18). (Already — and having advocated non-hierarchical heterarchy — Jencks had classified supranational organisation on a scale between "blue-chips" and "underperformers" (p. 17).) There is, certainly, nothing new or "typically post-modern" in arguing that the UN should be the context of heterarchy, and not one of its constituent elements. This principle is embodied in the UN constitution: "Where obligations arising under international agreements are in conflict with the obligations of Members of the United Nations under the Charter of the United Nations, the obligations under the Charter shall prevail".[74]

Now to Jencks's second contradiction. On the one hand, he argues that the New World Order is made possible by developments that leave modernity behind. He grants his unconditional support to a

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New World Order under the aegis of the UN because of its postmodern heterarchical structure, its "heterarchical balance of powers". This is a balance between UN resolutions, US military force, and coalitions of nation-states in support of the UN. According to Jencks, this novel system gives the final blow to the nation-state because it guarantees that no nation-state will be on top of another; as he puts it, this "hybrid system ... is all the more effective and enjoyable to play because everyone can win". At the same time, modernity is anything but left behind in that the very model for this system is the exemplary modern constitution: "The heterarchical structure is enshrined in the US constitution ... and it is my argument that just such a form has emerged as the outer structure of the NWO" (p. 18 throughout).

This takes us to Jencks's main contradiction. On the one hand he argues that, in the New World Order, the nation-state is in irreversible decline and on the path to extinction. Jencks insists that democracy, together with the UN, will save us from the nation-state. At the same time he describes a "system of world government" whose constituent parts are nation-states, and which is itself modelled, according to Jencks, on an exemplary national Constitution. Furthermore, there is nothing in the constitution of the UN which could be construed as against the nation-state. On the contrary, UN documents invariably describe national unity and national identity as inalienable rights.[75] As it concerns the relation between democracy and nation-state, it is anything but antagonistic: democracy is practically indissociable from the nation-state form, as against all other state forms. A spread of democracy — an "advancement", in the UN terminology — only *follows upon* an advancement of the nation-state.

Jencks would not have embroiled himself in such difficulties, had he not attempted to present the New World Order as a novel idea. Indeed, the New World Order is modelled on illustrious (if here strangely ignored) modern philosophical precedents — such as the global federation of states that Kant imagines as the precondition of peace, and as itself based on the advance of the modern nation-state. It is the *Foedus Amphictyonum* of modern states in Kant's seventh proposition on the "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan

Purpose". It is the *foedus pacificum* of states in his "Second Definitive Article" of *Perpetual Peace*.[76]

If something is novel today, this is that the nation-state is increasingly perceived as assembled of bits and pieces, rather than as the crowning moment in the development of a people that was there in the first place.[77] From Cornelius Castoriadis's *The Imaginary Institution of Society* to Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* to Ernst Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism* to Homi K. Bhabha's "DissemiNation: Time, Narrative and the Margins of the Modern Nation", contemporary scholarship starts from the premise that national communities are not homogeneous, do not cohere naturally, and have to be forged. (Gellner, nevertheless, seems to think that Western-European nation-states are exempt from this otherwise universal condition.[78]) Secondly — as the explosion of scholarship on "new social movements", "subaltern groups", "neo-tribes", etc. indicates — to this can be added the perception that the major threat to, or deliverance from, nation-states comes not from their likes, but from minoritarian movements. Yet at the same time, and whether one is for or against them, there is a tendency to treat minoritarian movements — which I believe to be cross-boundary phenomena — as entities obeying a territorial logic.

Hence the relevance and usefulness of the postmodernism debate which, in its euphoric vision of a *global federation of minorities*, builds their co-operation on the basis and on condition that they are separated and kept distinct, and assimilates them into a representational territorial logic as if to save them from themselves.

The postmodernism debate is reconstructive, but what does it reconstruct? To begin with, it reconstructs minoritarian movements into a sublime repository of its own dark spirits. But in this process, as well as in the process of transforming them into majoritarian representative grounds with minorities of their own, something is excluded. The question is this. Does peace require stable boundaries containing substances that remain foreign to each other, or is the cry for peace — a war cry against "unreconstructed" minoritarian movements — there to distract us from our best chance for peace: the

lateral connections, the "unnatural" couplings and the outlandish bridges that are the stock in trade of minoritarian movements?

VII. Conclusion

In 1982 Lyotard revives the debate — and the attack — on realism in "Réponse à la question: qu'est-ce que le postmoderne?".[79] Lyotard proposes a distinction, within modernism, between realism and postmodernism. Realism unifies subjectivity and totalises reality. Postmodernism, on the other hand, experiments with new rules "of what will have been done" (p. 81), inventing an "increase of being" (p. 80), so that "postmodernism thus understood is not modernism at its end but in the nascent state, and this state is constant" (p. 79). In brief, for Lyotard postmodernism experiments with and invents new forms, realism adheres to and codifies established forms. Since forms originate from postmodernism, postmodernism always precedes realism and makes it possible — realism always follows postmodernism to arrest it; it is an endlessly re-enacted limit to the experimentation of postmodernism.

On the one hand, Lyotard's attack on realism appears to provide us with the tools for a critical reading of two prevalent tendencies in the postmodernism debate: the tendency to periodise postmodernism and the tendency to treat minoritarian movements as unruly and in need of appropriation. On the basis of his definition of realism, these two tendencies can be described as realist for "rounding off diachronies as organic wholes" (p. 74). (In fact, Lyotard explicitly denounces the former tendency to periodise postmodernism in "Note on the Meaning of 'Post-'" (1985); he describes it as "perfectly 'modern'" and comments that "[w]e now suspect that this 'rupture' is in fact a way of forgetting or repressing the past, that is, repeating it and not surpassing it".[80]) As to the latter tendency towards minoritarian movements, it can be described as realist for the additional reason that it attempts to "put an end to experimentation" ("Answering the Question: What Is Postmodernism?", p. 71).

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On the other hand, what Lyotard means by experimentation/ postmodernism revolves around two terms that will have a prominent role in the postmodernism debate. These two terms are the "avant-garde" and the "sublime", and I believe that they lead Lyotard himself to a "realist" (by his own definition) account of experimentation/ postmodernism.[81] Lyotard's "avant-garde" refers overwhelmingly to the artistic avant-gardes, to the towering figures of the modern art canon, with occasional references to thinkers, scientists and intellectuals. To establish the value of the artistic avant-gardes Lyotard presents them, without exception, as opposed to "the social community", to a general public, a general culture, a bourgeois society out there whose members wallow in "mass conformism" and crave for redemption.[82] That is, the artistic avant-gardes are "not of this world", and this world is an undifferentiated soup of lethal impulses.[83] Within this context, Lyotard describes the present as an "epoch" or a "period" embodied in a "contemporary general culture" expressing "the general demand for slackening and for appeasement", so that, once again, "from every direction we [the avant-garde] are being urged to put an end to experimentation".[84] In effect, Lyotard stages his distinction between realism versus experimentation/postmodernism in a present veering towards, if not already displaying, all the characteristics of the desperate historical circumstances surrounding the 1930s Frankfurt School debate on realism versus modernism. (For those who didn't get the hint, he provides a number of references to Adorno, Benjamin and Nazi terror.) I conclude that Lyotard makes it inconceivable to associate minoritarian movements with experimentation because his insistence on society, community, culture as an undifferentiated whole (black hole, dark pit) denies their very existence; secondly, by associating experimentation with an "avant-garde" of exclusively male great individuals at war with society as a whole, he denies the very possibility of an experimentation that is collective and partial in its aims (a quick comparison with Linda Hutcheon's account of feminist artists can roughly illustrate both points).

Lyotard's account of the "sublime" varies from text to text, but is always intimately linked to the "avant-garde": "it is in the aesthetic of the sublime that ... the logic of the avant-gardes finds its axioms".[85] In

"Answering the Question: What Is Postmodernism?" Lyotard offers a Kant-inspired account of the sublime and of the task of avant-gardism. The sublime — which according to Kant is "the name given to what is *absolutely great ... what is beyond all comparison great*"[86] — can be conceived, but "does not allow itself to be made present" (p. 80). The task of the avant-gardes is, accordingly, to "bear witness to the unpresentable" (p. 82), and the emphasis must be placed on the power of the faculty of concepts rather than on the powerlessness of the faculty of presentation (pp. 79-80). In "The Sublime and the Avant-Garde" Lyotard's account of the sublime and its relation to avant-gardism is a concoction of his own, mixing readings of the sublime in Edmund Burke's *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful* (1757) and Barnett Baruch Newman's "The Sublime is Now" (1948) with references to the Levinasian "il y a" and the Heideggerian "Ereignis" (event). In brief, "a very big, very powerful object threatens to deprive the soul of any 'it happens'" (p. 205) by blocking the arrival of the now. In their search for the indeterminate and inexpressible "artwork event" (p. 209) the avant-gardes avert the non-arrival of the now (p. 205). They fulfil the ongoing task of "witness[ing] ... the indeterminate" (p. 207) and "welcom[ing] the *now*" (p. 209). Finally, in "Note on the Meaning of 'Post-'" Lyotard offers a psychoanalytic account of the sublime and the avant-garde. Rather than giving way to the universal compulsion to repeat the sublime primal scene of modernity, "avant-gardism" instead "elaborates an initial forgetting": its task is a continual "*anamnesis ...* a working through performed by modernity on its own meaning" (pp. 49-50).

All three accounts of the sublime, in spite of their differences, have exactly the same double outcome. Firstly, they justify and give credence to the role that Lyotard attributes to the avant-gardes — that of rescuing society from its endemic persistent tendency to plunge history into terror. Secondly, they guarantee the temporal unity of the avant-gardes as a consecutive series predicated on genuine and constant self-surpassing:

What space does Cézanne challenge? The Impressionists'.
What object do Picasso and Braque attack? Cézanne's. What

presupposition does Duchamp break with in 1912? That
which says one must make a painting, be it cubist ... In an
amazing acceleration, the generations precipitate
themselves. ("Answering the Question: What Is Postmodernism?",
p. 79)[87]

(One could even make the point that the avant-garde is seen by Lyotard
as performing a synthesis of past and future in the now, without which
history itself would come to a standstill.)

To return to Lyotard's distinction between experimentation and
realism, Lyotard's experimentation, as I understand it, is never
sufficient unto itself and to a specific situation, it doesn't accomplish
anything in and for itself. It finds its *raison d'être* in a sublime object,
and only exists as a step in the impossible — yet constant and
inevitable — progression towards it. One could comment on the
ultimate banality of Lyotard's understanding of experimentation. But
the crux of the matter is, for me, elsewhere. Lyotard's anchoring of
experimentation to the avant-garde and the sublime emerges as an
exclusive, hegemonic account of experimentation, relying on a unified
notion of history and society that he himself attacks as realist illusion
whose price is terror.[88] In effect, he separates experimentation from its
critical operation on realism and, by blocking its dissemination,
preserves the distinction between victim and saviour.

* * *

The postmodernism debate, according to my account of it, balances
upon a dialectic between an apocalyptic and catastrophic sublime and
an euphoric and reconstructive avant-garde. Starting with Jameson, in
the postmodernism debate it is contemporary reality which is sublime
in its very multiplicity and dispersion, while the avant-garde agent
performs a salutary synthesis of space. The avant-garde agent rescues
the micromultiplicities of contemporary reality from themselves by
spatialising them onto an "artificial territoriality" and appointing
him/herself as its representative.

Jameson introduces the Kantian version of Lyotard's sublime in
"Cognitive Mapping" and returns to it in "Postmodernism, or The

Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism". Contemporary reality, he tells us, has been adequately conceived, it is *knowable*, but remains *unimaginable*.[89] This is because it is without "markers" and without "dramatic boundaries".[90] The antidote needed is a global social map that would reintroduce dots of identity and lines of difference and, according to Jameson, it can be provided if minoritarian movements were to come under the aegis of the New Left. The chaotic reality of minoritarian movements is the justification for the role that Jameson envisages for the New Left, that of an international avant-garde.

In Connor, the dissipation of diversity in itself will be overcome once Anglo-American criticism is recognised as the avant-garde of global culture, once diversity in itself gives way to the recognition of diversity by a global ethical consciousness. In Harvey, the reactionary paternalism of the East and of immigrants to the West should give itself up to the progressive leadership of the Western industrial worker, minoritarian movements should give themselves up to the New Left, and the New Left should give itself up to historical materialism. In Hutcheon, a version of "sexual difference" feminism, as the avant-garde of feminism, will save non-Western, non-white, non-middle-class, non-heterosexual, etc. women from complicity with the patriarchal status quo. In Krysinski, the élite of Slavic literatures will save the Eastern bloc from communism. In Ross, the postmodernism debate will save non-Westerns from silence, including those "essentialist" ones who don't want to be saved.

<p style="text-align:center">* * *</p>

I would say in conclusion that contemporary reality, as it emerges out of the postmodernism debate, is the reverse of the sublime. Everything is imagined and nothing is conceived, all is imaginary and nothing is real, having the following consequences:
• the apparition of a global catastrophic force raging against identities, used as an alibi, and as a common ground, for united action;
• minoritarian movements being viewed as the victim, if not the accomplice, of this catastrophic force;
• the participants' efforts to rescue minorities from themselves.

CHAPTER THREE

Feminism's encounter with Deleuze and Guattari:
Alice Jardine and Rosi Braidotti

The academic field of feminist writing is perhaps much more vast than the academic field of writing on postmodernism, "feminism" at least as much of a floating signifier as "postmodernism", and any attempt to represent this field in its entirety would be at least as much a case of "presenting the unpresentable" as any attempt to survey the postmodernism debate in its entirety. In the context of a thesis which attempts a gradual exposition of Deleuze and Guattari, particularly their work on the minor, by staging a series of encounters, the encounter between Deleuze and Guattari and the postmodernism debate has been deliberately *partial* and necessarily *indirect*. I will share the feelings of Judith Butler and Drucilla Cornell[1] in saying that Deleuze and Guattari were happily largely spared the title of "theorists of postmodernism", even though this is due to the fact that, unlike Foucault, Derrida or Baudrillard, they remain relatively unread. I have, nevertheless, brought the postmodernism debate in contact with Deleuze and Guattari by using on the figures and texts discussed an analysis of Deleuzian-Guattarian provenance — from the question "how does it work rather than what it means", to the study of the tendency towards the construction of artificial territorialities, to the study of the triangle: artificial territoriality/representative of the artificial territoriality/ harmful centrifugal minoritarian elements to be either excluded or appropriated. If this has been done a little too discreetly, my reasons are these. On the one hand, at this early stage, I didn't want to burden the reader with extensive nomenclature and long definitions of concepts; on the other hand, and most importantly, I believe that the meaning of Deleuzo-Guattarian concepts emerges best in their use and that using them is not a matter of straightforward application.

In this chapter I will continue with the use of Deleuzo-Guattarian analysis, and I will continue to ask the question of minorities. But the

encounter between Deleuze and Guattari and feminism will now also be direct, in that I will focus on the two feminists who have engaged with their work, Alice Jardine and Rosi Braidotti.

Feminism is perhaps the most influential minoritarian movement of the century. Within feminist academic writing, the major tendency now is perhaps what Braidotti calls "radical sexual difference" feminism — major in the sense that it aspires to undertake general tasks, to represent feminism as a whole. "Radical sexual difference" feminism recognises its main source in the work of Luce Irigaray, whether or not — a question that needs to be asked — Irigaray's work lends itself to such general tasks and to the centre/periphery relation to other versions of feminism that ensues. In this chapter, I will examine the response of two "radical sexual difference" feminists, Alice Jardine and Rosi Braidotti, to the work of Deleuze and Guattari, particularly to their concept of *becoming minoritarian*. I will also discuss the consequences of the Deleuzo-Guattarian concept of *becoming minoritarian* for "radical sexual difference" feminism.

* * *

In 1984 Alice Jardine publishes "Woman in Limbo: Deleuze and his Br(others)" in the *SubStance* special issue, "Gilles Deleuze". This is the first special issue on Deleuze in English. It is only preceded by the 1977 issue of *Semiotext(e)*, "*Anti-Oedipus*", edited by Sylvère Lotringer, which is heavily based on translations of articles originally written in French, including two important articles by Jean-François Lyotard and Jacques Donzelot that I will return to at a later stage.[2] The issue editor of "Gilles Deleuze", literary critic Charles J. Stivale, is an enthusiastic pioneer of the long and frustrating effort to introduce Deleuze and Guattari to an Anglo-American audience. He had already published "Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Schizoanalysis and Literary Discourse", a presentation of Deleuze and Guattari's works in the 1970s.[3] Published in 1981, also in *SubStance*, the purpose of this article, in Stivale's words, was on the one hand to:

> provid[e] some initial access to these works ... on the other hand, to remain faithful to the mode of discourse and terminology

advanced by Deleuze and Guattari, thereby indicating to potential readers what difficulties one must expect to encounter in approaching these works. (*SubStance* 29, p. 47)

Stivale's intentions were no doubt laudable, but "being faithful to" Deleuze and Guattari's terminology, especially in the short space of an article, is, I believe, an impediment to the dissemination of their work. The reader is thrown into a sea of strange neologisms, without a clear idea of what is at stake in their invention, or of the possibilities opened by their use.

In his Introduction to "Gilles Deleuze", Charles J. Stivale presents Deleuze and Guattari's work as a "particularly eccentric field", and claims the reader's attention on grounds that are external to it: "we hope that this access to the works by and on Deleuze and Guattari will allow our colleagues to (re)consider one philosophical and political alternative (of many) to the current critical hegemony" (p. 6). The articles that Stivale assembles — with one or two exceptions[4] — similarly fail to demonstrate Deleuze and Guattari's relevance, even their expository value is limited.[5] What is shown very clearly is that back in 1984 the US academic world didn't have much use for Deleuze and Guattari. In 1989, another literary critic, Ronald Bogue, publishes *Deleuze and Guattari*, the first monograph on Deleuze and Guattari in English. And, like Stivale, he is at a loss to say why Deleuze and Guattari merit attention in themselves:

> In Deleuze's view, Nietzsche's major goals are to overturn Platonism ... to replace Hegel's "negation of negation" with a philosophy of affirmation; and to complete Kant's project for a critical philosophy ... These, too, are the ends that Deleuze pursues... (p. 15)

So, according to Bogue, Deleuze and Guattari's project is Nietzsche's project according to Deleuze.

Alice Jardine's article in the *SubStance* special issue, "Woman in Limbo: Deleuze and his Br(others)", is mainly an application of her concept of "gynesis" to the work of Deleuze and Guattari. This article marks the last stage in the development of a project initiated with her 1982 "Gynesis" article in *Diacritics*, and completed with the 1984 publication

of her book, *Gynesis: Configurations of Woman and Modernity*. Jardine's thesis is that, in response to the "crisis of modernity" and the ascent of feminism, male contemporary thought turns to "becoming woman". But, whereas radical feminism, as with Irigaray, resolves the "crisis of modernity" in creating a genuine "female feminine" space of sexual difference, the male contemporaries — Lacan and Derrida — only mystify and falsify "woman" and obscure the "crisis of modernity".[6] In order to demonstrate her thesis, Jardine has to provide evidence that "male contemporary thought" does indeed rely heavily on "becoming woman", but such evidence is lacking in the case of Deleuze and Guattari, whence her last minute *SubStance* article in order to defend the general applicability of this thesis.[7]

In "Woman in Limbo: Deleuze and his Br(others)", Jardine claims that Deleuze and Guattari have no female followers in the US, presents Rosi Braidotti as "the only one feminist in France who has made extensive use" of Deleuze and Guattari's work (p. 47), and thanks her for her "guidance though the Deleuzian corpus" (p. 59, note 1). According to Jardine, Braidotti's Ph.D. thesis (1981) is "a thorough presentation of the possible interactions between their [Deleuze and Guattari's] work and feminism" (p. 59, note 4). Braidotti's 1991 book, *Patterns of Dissonance*, based on her doctoral thesis, devotes considerable space to Deleuze, singles him out for praise from the other poststructuralist males, and is liberally strewn with Deleuzo-Guattarian terminology. In 1994, in an article discussing Braidotti's *Patterns of Dissonance* and Michèle Le Doeuff's *Hipparchia's Choice: An Essay Concerning Women, Philosophy, etc.*, Sabina Lovibond presents Braidotti as a disciple of Deleuze, and Deleuze as an irrationalist. She perceives Braidotti as an enemy of Le Doeuff's reformist project, and sides with Le Doeuff.[8] (I will return to Le Doeuff's *Hipparchia's Choice* on several occasions in this chapter.)

Braidotti and Jardine take great pride in their radicalism, but I would disagree that this radicalism is indebted to Deleuze and Guattari. Both Braidotti and Jardine recognise Irigaray as their main source, and cast themselves in the role of Irigaray's twin daughters.[9] (I will return to Irigaray on several occasions in this chapter.) Braidotti reciprocates Jardine's acknowledgement — quoted above — in the

Acknowledgements page of her book: "I owe warm-hearted thanks in particular to Alice Jardine whose book *Gynesis* intertwines with my own, each echoing the other, in a way unique to collective feminist research and writing". Nevertheless, when it comes to Deleuze and Guattari they differ considerably. The two main points of their divergence are as follows. Whereas Jardine examines Deleuze and Guattari for the false instances of "becoming woman" to be found in all male poststructuralists, Braidotti proposes that Deleuze and Guattari be examined in their own terms, specifically as to the consequences of their concept of "becoming minoritarian" for feminism. As a result, whereas Jardine accuses Deleuze and Guattari (together with all their "brothers") of false genderisation, ideological mystification, and the appropriation of feminism, Braidotti accuses Deleuze and Guattari of avoiding genderisation. She objects that the Deleuzo-Guattarian concept of "becoming minoritarian" undermines the specificity of woman as well as the special role of feminism. Though Jardine and Braidotti have a common point of departure, "radical sexual difference" feminism, their conclusions in relation to Deleuze and Guattari appear to be antithetical.

I. Alice Jardine's "Woman in Limbo: Deleuze and his Br(others)"

Alice Jardine's "Woman in Limbo" is announced as exploring "the conceptual arrangement between" the work of Deleuze and Guattari and feminism.[10] What we get is something rather different: "the contemporary feminist's approach-avoidance relation with D+G" (p. 47), with approach turning into avoidance. Jardine's article comprises three parts: a first part on US academics' relation to Deleuze and Guattari; a second part on feminism's relation to Deleuze and Guattari (the "limbo" of her title); and, finally, a part where, abandoning Deleuze and Guattari, Jardine attacks Michel Tournier's 1967 novel, *Vendredi, ou les limbes du Pacifique*, and argues Deleuze and Guattari's guilt by association (the "brothers" of her title).

In a first part, Jardine's scenario is that US students have a cult — rather than a serious — interest in Deleuze and Guattari, while US academics try to minimise their impact by the use of terms such as "utopian", "anarchistic" and "perverse" (p. 46). But Jardine uses the very terms, "anarchical" and "perverse", to describe their work (p. 48), and claims that the US students who "fervently worship" Deleuze and Guattari are male (p. 47). Jardine suggests an incompatibility between their work and feminism by stylistic means. For example, Deleuze and Guattari are described as "*virulently* anti-academic academics" (p. 47, my italics), belonging to the tradition of "the (male) *chevalier de la foi*: they are the faithful and vigilant keepers of the future" (p. 48, my underlining).

The reference to the future suggests, on the one hand, that Deleuze and Guattari are blocking the future for (female) feminists; on the other hand, that they are outlandish and irrelevant to present political struggles. They have an "aura of futurity" (p. 47), their work is about "an *era* of post-signification" (p. 48, my italics). Whereas Jardine presents Deleuze and Guattari's work as futuristic, I agree with Raymond Bellour who insists on Deleuze's *realism* — as I have argued in my first chapter, and as I will continue to argue. In particular, Bellour presents Deleuze's work as "le cheminement d'un philosophe appliqué à décrire le monde ... une philosophie qui ne laisse aucune place au manque, et qui est en même temps une réele description du monde".[11] In the work of Deleuze and Guattari I find a rigorous pursuit of tracks, of virtualities in the present, without the guarantees for the future offered by the imposition of a moral first principle, such as Jardine's and Braidotti's "specificity of woman". (Michael Hardt's excellent *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy* (1993), though devoted to Deleuze's early work — prior to his *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense*, and prior to his collaborations with Guattari — makes the following important point which has to be born in mind in the present context. Faced with the philosophical distinctions, virtual/actual, possible/real, Deleuze proposes that the virtual is real and that the notion of "realisation" of the possible, which treats reality as a reduced copy of an ideal model, should therefore be abandoned in favour of the notion of "actualisation" of the virtual-

real.[12]) There is nothing unreal or ideal about Deleuze and Guattari's ethics of inclusion. In their work there is a confident belief that migration, transfusion and hybridity are facts, "habits", of life. [13]

At the same time Jardine tries to suggest that there is nothing really new about Deleuze and Guattari's concepts and invites the reader to think of the "arrangement" (*agencement*) "as a 'screening' of a large urban city" (p. 49). Nevertheless, Jardine continually praises Deleuze and Guattari for their "radicality" (see, for example, p. 50). The only serious shortcoming in their radicality, according to Jardine, is "their idealistic posture towards the U.S." (p. 47). But Deleuze and Guattari are, if anything, anti-American and strongly pro-Arab, and they would sit quite comfortably in Sartre's chair. I don't believe that I need to refer to Guattari's well-known political activism. As to Deleuze, allow me to quote from his intervention against the Gulf War in *Libération* (February 21, 1991), "La guerre immonde", co-written with René Schérer:

> sous prétexte d'abattre Saddam Hussein ... c'est la destruction d'une nation ... un patrimoine historique prestigieux qui se trouve menacé ... Si cette guerre n'est pas arrêtée, par des efforts auxquels la France reste singulièrement étrangère, ce n'est pas seulement l'asservissement du Moyen-Orient qui se dessine, mais le risque d'une hégémonie américaine qui n'a plus de contre-partie, la complicité de l'Europe et, une fois de plus, toute une logique du reniement socialiste qui pèsera sur notre propre régime.

Perhaps Jardine should comment on the "masculinism" of "patrimoine" (see above) instead.

The seeds of the second part of Jardine's article are sown in the first. Deleuze and Guattari "have no or few women disciples" (p. 47). But Jardine is not deterred, and proceeds to apply her concept of "gynesis" to them: male contemporary thought (Lacan, Derrida) turns to woman and makes use of "becoming woman" only to mystify, stereotype and deny woman's real specificity. Her initial reaction to Deleuze and Guattari is not much of a surprise: they also "put forth some surprisingly stereotyped genderizations and images of women" (p. 47). But this is easier said than demonstrated. Rosi Braidotti takes

the risky approach of admitting freely that, if Deleuze and Guattari are of relevance to feminism, this is not for their sporadic remarks on "becoming woman" but for their concept of "becoming minoritarian", and consequently names the Deleuzo-Guattarian threat as "the 'becoming-minority' of women".[14] (In fact, every Deleuzo-Guattarian passage on "becoming woman" involves and implies a critique of "radical sexual difference" feminism, its own processes of genderisation and the monstrous abstraction of the "specificity of woman".) Jardine, on the other hand, having to defend the universal applicability of "gynesis" to all male contemporaries, has the graceless task of insisting that the Deleuzo-Guattarian concept that is of relevance to feminism is the widespread and widely-shared concept of "becoming woman". This is how Deleuze and Guattari's specificity slips through her fingers, and they become "difficult to sort out" and "intangible". But this will not do, and a compromise is reached: Deleuzo-Guattarian spaces are "*less often* explicitly genderized" (p. 47, my italics). "For all of these reasons and more", she gives a mere two pages to the work of Deleuze and Guattari, "so as to arrive at <u>that which has</u>, from D+G's overall work, <u>most interested French feminist thought</u> ... the imperative of *le devenir femme*" (p. 48, my underlining). This, of course, is incorrect because, as Jardine herself has already said, Braidotti is the one and only feminist to have seriously considered Deleuze and Guattari, and she concentrates on their "becoming minoritarian".

The second part of Jardine's article is a rather desperate effort to prove that "gynesis" is at work in Deleuze and Guattari, to prove a point already made previously: if "gynesis" is not apparent in the case of Deleuze and Guattari, this is because "the genderization process of gynesis works silently" (p. 47). Jardine argues that "gynesis" is at work in the Deleuzo-Guattarian concepts of the "desiring machines" and "the body without organs". But her eagerness to prove the point draws her into inconsistent claims. Firstly, that "desiring machines" and "the body without organs" stand for "the female body as imagined by men". Secondly, that they "take the place, in part, of woman and the feminine", that they usurp as it were the rightful place of women. Thirdly, that they are "nothing other than the historical condition of

woman". (Jardine here refers to the only passage in Irigaray's work addressing Deleuze and Guattari (as far as I know):

> And doesn't the "desiring machine" still partly take the place of woman or the feminine? Isn't it a sort of metaphor for her/it, that men can use? ... Since women have long been assigned to the task of preserving "body-matter" and the "organless," doesn't the "organless body" ["body without organs"] come to occupy the place of their own schism ["schiz"]? (*This Sex Which Is Not One*, pp. 140-141)

The form of this argument is ubiquitous in Irigaray's work: from the Platonic cave, to matter, to the sensible, to the unconscious, to the other, she either asks rhetorically or states that they stand for woman. As to the content of Irigaray's argument which refers to Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus*, in *Anti-Oedipus* (as I will argue in my fifth chapter) the relation between "desiring-machines" and "body with organs" or "artificial territoriality" is modelled on the relation between labour and capital in Marx: the "body without organs" appropriates the labour of "desiring-machines" to appear as their mysterious cause.) Jardine then turns to the Deleuzo-Guattarian concept of the "line of flight" or the "line of escape" which suffers a similar fate: "These 'escape lines' ... of Western culture, are consistently connoted as 'female' — partially through their connections with the unconscious" (pp. 50-54 throughout).

<p style="text-align:center">* * *</p>

Jardine tries to open her way into the Deleuzo-Guattarian body of work with the key of a false question: "Why then do D+G privilege the word woman?" (p. 53) Raking *Mille Plateaux* for evidence she finds the following quotes concerning the "becoming woman": "particular introductory power", "first quantum", "all becomings begin and pass through the becoming-woman" (p. 52-53). All three quotes come from the tenth chapter of *A Thousand Plateaus*, "1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible...".[15] This chapter seems to be of special interest to both Jardine and Braidotti. This is also where Jardine's veiled accusation that Deleuze and Guattari are in the

tradition of "the (male) *chevalier de la foi*" comes from. On page 282 of *A Thousand Plateaus* there is a brief discussion of Kierkegaard's "knight of faith", and I am not aware that Deleuze and Guattari discuss *Fear and Trembling* anywhere else.[16] Finally, the title of Braidotti's book, *Patterns of Dissonance*, seems to come from this chapter, in particular from its description of a "musical machine of dissonance" (p. 268). The reason why this chapter is of special interest to Braidotti and Jardine is that, besides a few references to "becoming woman", the terrain of this chapter is the private person; the "artificial territoriality" here is the self, the "fascinated self" (p. 245).

The tenth chapter of *A Thousand Plateaus* outlines two modes of being of the "fascinated self", or two modes of being of the desire for otherness. The first mode of fascination expresses a desire for the other in his/her otherness, i.e. a desire for the other to remain other. The second mode of fascination expresses a desire of becoming other. The first mode of fascination is the material for building "artificial territorialities", and the architectural design that corresponds to it is what Deleuze and Guattari call the "arborescent" or the "majoritarian" schema of identity — a "punctual system" comprising five points: Man (central point), male (dominant point), adult (dominant point), woman, child. This is a universal schema without any geopolitical, historical, etc. specifications. But the "majority" is universal too, and not less real for that reason. From the point of view of the "arborescent" or the "majoritarian" schema of identity, feminism is self-expression and critique of domination, coming from one of its own subordinate points. From the point of view of feminism, the "arborescent" or "majoritarian" schema of identity provides it with a ready-made referent or political constituency, "woman" — in spite of "her" diversity and multiplicity. To the extent that feminism relies on this universal referent to support the validity of its claims, it corroborates the "arborescent" or "majoritarian" schema of identity, and blocks the way to the desire of becoming other. The desire of becoming other, on the other hand, is building "lines of flight" or "lines of escape" in-between points; it makes a "linear", "rhizomatic" and "minoritarian" mobile system grafted onto the monumental punctual system and turning it away from itself.[17]

As an example of the desire of becoming other, see Aki

Kaurismäki's 1989 film, *Leningrad Cowboys Go America.* Some
Leningrad men are caught by the desire to become a rock-and-roll
band. They migrate to the US but this is not enough and their imitation
of rock and roll is poor. As they cross the US travelling south, two
things happen simultaneously and by degrees. On the one hand they
become more and more of a rock-and-roll band, on the other hand they
inject increasingly alien elements into it. By the time they are on the
verge of becoming an original rock-and-roll band (a new paradigm or
point of reference), they cross the border instead and migrate to
Mexico. To use the grammatical formula that I have described in my
introductory chapter, this is: some + Leningrad + rocking and rolling,
some + rock and roll + Leningrading, some + Leningrad rock and roll +
Mexicoing.[18]

I understand Deleuze and Guattari's description of the "becoming
woman" as "*introductory* power" and as "*first* quantum", and their
comment that "all becomings *begin and pass through* the becoming-
woman" (my italics), as a recognition and a reminder. A recognition of
feminism's success in opening the way to the desire of becoming other:
other than one's "self", other than a branch on the tree of Man, other
than a subordinate referent of Majority Rule. And a reminder of
feminism's historic responsibility to keep this way open to its own
minorities, its own subordinate points, so that "woman" sheds its
quality of universal referent to become a multiplicity of collective
reference-machines and machines of expression. Jardine's
understanding of the Deleuze and Guattari quotes is rather different.
Woman's "introductory power" is understood as a malicious injunction
on women to shed their woman's identity before their counterpart
beings, men, shed their own man's identity — "might that not mean
that she must also be the *first* to disappear?" (p. 54). Jardine's scene is
a duel between two gunmen (gunpersons?). If one of them drops her
gun in an act of good will, what will prevent the other gunman from
shooting? Therefore, stick to your guns — your woman's identity.

* * *

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The last part (pp. 54-59) of Jardine's article performs a breakdown of relations between Deleuze-Guattari and feminism. Jardine breaks off with Deleuze and Guattari and displaces the discussion to Michel Tournier's novel, *Vendredi, ou les limbes du Pacifique* (1967). Jardine's reason for this displacement is that, as "for Derrida, Blanchot understood his writings *with him* inseparably" (my italics), and as "Duras understood and repeated [Lacan's] teachings *without him*" (my italics), Tournier's novel exemplifies Deleuze and Guattari. Jardine's account of *Vendredi...*, which is based on *Robinson Crusoe*, is that an accomplished white male, a male savage and a sailor boy are all alike in mistreating, raping and generally "foreclosing" the island Speranza, which is female. The three men — covering the spectrum of middle class, third world and working class — form a perverse brotherhood which "forecloses" woman. Jardine then projects her account of the novel onto the author Tournier, from Tournier onto Deleuze (who has written on *Vendredi...* and is a friend of Tournier since their school days at the Lycée Carnot) and, by extension, onto Guattari, and finally from Deleuze onto Foucault (Deleuze's "friend and master" according to Braidotti, p. 67). *They* are the perverse brotherhood that condemns Woman to Limbo.

Deleuze had written on *Vendredi...* in his 1967 article "Une théorie d'autrui (autrui, Robinson et le pervers)".[19] Deleuze's and Jardine's readings of Tournier's novel diverge so widely that it would be difficult to find points of contact between them. Though I am unable to attempt it at present, a comparison between the two readings of *Vendredi...* would nevertheless be very interesting. For the moment and in brief, let me say that Deleuze's reading proposes a distinction between *l'Autre* and *l'Autre qu'autrui* which can be seen as a predecessor to Irigaray's distinction between *l'autre du même* and *l'autre de l'autre*. Irigaray's distinction appears for the first time in *Speculum of the Other Woman*, p. 335.[20] But by *This Sex Which Is Not One*, "the other of the same" becomes synonymous with the woman of man and of philosophy as a monolithic entity, while "the other of the other" becomes synonymous with, and is swallowed up by, the woman of woman to be psychoanalytically recovered by "difference" feminism.[21] In Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus*, perversion as the

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exclusion of others is seen as a function of "artificial territorialities". Maybe the artificial territoriality of "radical sexual difference" feminism should start to look at its own perversion.

Foucault is quoted in the first of two epigraphs heading Jardine's article, referring to the void that makes thought possible again.[22] The second epigraph is a highly selective extract from the Webster's Dictionary entrance on the word "limbo". I quote from this epigraph: "border; 1) an abode of souls ... barred from heaven through no fault of their own; 2a) a place or state of restraint or confinement; b) a place or state of neglect or oblivion; c) an intermediate or transitional place or state". Jardine conveniently omits that "limbo" is the state of being of "infidels" and unbaptised children. In conjunction with Jardine's title, what the two epigraphs tell us is this: the inhabitant of Limbo is Woman, Limbo is the void that makes thought possible again, therefore Woman is the agent that makes thought possible again.

Woman's state of Limbo is her greatest strength. All Jardine has to do to safeguard this strength is to block the question of whether the miraculous state of Limbo is an address exclusive to Woman. This she achieves by attacking Deleuze and Guattari for their supposed insistence on "becoming woman". She refers to the "line of escape" or "line of flight" as the way to the void where thought is produced, only to add with mock indignation: "It will not be surprising that the potential for finding that way will depend, in essence, upon the potential for becoming woman" (p. 51). Jardine's scenario can be reconstructed as follows. The perverse brotherhood blocks and simultaneously longs for the way to the site where the omphalos of thought is to be found. This site is the natural (and exclusive) habitat of the ("radical sexual difference") sisterhood. I believe that the role of the perverse brotherhood in Jardine's article is to prove by contrast that the radical sisterhood is the only alternative for thought. Though it is a fact that feminism is by far the most successful minoritarian discourse at present, I want to argue that in order to become a true state of "Limbo" — a truly "transitional space" — it has to allow rights of way to other minoritarian discourses, whether emerging or yet to be invented and assembled. Feminism, as a transitional space making

thought pass, as a good conductor of thought, has to allow its own others to cross the border of being, disguised as women.

II. Rosi Braidotti's *Patterns of Dissonance*

I will now turn to Rosi Braidotti's *Patterns of Dissonance*.
This book is double-edged: it is, on the one hand, a survey of Derrida and Deleuze addressed to feminism; on the other hand, an ambitious, highly sophisticated, state-of-the-art survey of contemporary feminist thought. In the following section I will discuss the latter. Then, in a second section, I will turn to Braidotti's discussion of Deleuze.

Contemporary feminist thought is staged in a setting of crisis, "the crisis of rationality", with the (male) poststructuralists — Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze[23] — cast as feminism's counterparts. Feminism itself is surveyed under three headings: "Radical Sexual Difference" feminists, "Tacticians in Philosophy", and "Critical Epistemologists". The first two categories of feminism — Braidotti tells us — are already present, the third is now emerging. Without sufficient reason, Braidotti treats the emerging "critical epistemologists" as an appendix of "radical sexual difference" feminism. The discussion of "critical epistemologists" is placed within a disproportionately long chapter on "radical sexual difference" feminism, and is initiated as follows: "a general direction of thought is emerging in feminist theory, that situates the embodied nature of the subject ... at the heart of the matter" (p. 263). I understand this to mean that emergent feminist work recognises "radical sexual difference" feminism as central to feminism as a whole.

For Braidotti, the most prominent representative of the "tacticians in philosophy" is Michèle Le Doeuff. Le Doeuff is highly praised for her "theoretical *finesse*" (p. 197) *and* rejected. It is clear enough that Braidotti sides with "radical sexual difference" feminism, though this taking of sides remains, for some reason, implicit. Braidotti considers that the one fully satisfactory representative of "radical sexual difference" feminism is Luce Irigaray. Her discussion of "radical sexual difference" feminists, passing through Julia Kristeva and Hélène Cixous to find them both deficient, culminates in the figure of Irigaray.

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Braidotti's third category, the "critical epistemologists", includes names as diverse as those of Donna Haraway and Jane Flax, and is condescendingly embraced as representing all the newest developments in feminism. Nevertheless, her choice of the term "epistemologist" is rather peculiar. I believe that it is explained by Braidotti's insistence that the emergent feminist work emanates out of "radical sexual difference" feminism. I reconstruct Braidotti's argument as follows: "radical sexual difference" feminism lays the ontological foundation of feminism, whereas emergent feminism deals with the secondary issues. Yet, the ontogenetic aspect of both Haraway's and Flax's work is very strong, their desire for the creation of mixed spaces and hybrids very clear, and I begin to suspect that Braidotti suppresses this aspect with her choice of the name "critical epistemologists".

I have similar problems with Braidotti's choice of the term "tactician in philosophy" in that it already presupposes the monolithic view of philosophy that Le Doeuff rightly attributes to Irigaray:

> The works of Luce Irigaray, for example, propound the idea that since philosophical discourse lays down the law to all other forms of discourse, it is the first that must be overthrown and disrupted ... I do not know myself that philosophical discourse lays down the law to anything at all.[24]

Le Doeuff, on the other hand, insists that there is no "'philosophy' as a single entity. Even if I achieve nothing more than the establishment of that idea, I shall not have totally wasted my time" (*Hipparchia's Choice*, p. 53). Instead, as we will see, Le Doeuff distinguishes between philosophies which actively or passively collaborate with the particular system of "domination", "oppression", "subjugation" in which they are written, and philosophies which, throughout the ages, are connected with the concrete forces of liberation that traverse any such system. Le Doeuff sees her work as an attempt to contribute to this latter tradition.[25]

Braidotti's rejection of Le Doeuff, at least in Braidotti's terms, is self-explanatory and mutual: Le Doeuff is a "reformist", while she is a "radical". But a difficulty arises from the fact that Braidotti juggles with two very different uses of the term "radical". It is important to demonstrate this point because it begins to show a strict parallelism

between Braidotti's rejection of Le Doeuff and her rejection of Deleuze to be discussed later.

• In brief, the term "radical" is, firstly, attached to an expanded definition of "poststructuralism", including Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze, as well as the "sexual difference" feminists. According to this use, the "reformist" feminists are anti-poststructuralist in general, not simply anti-"radical sexual difference".

• Secondly, the term "radical" is attached to an expanded definition of "sexual difference", including all feminisms, while the poststructuralists (now only the male Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze) are described as lacking in radicalism — because they fail to recognise that subjectivity is gender-based — and as anti-feminist.

What emerges in Braidotti's main discussion of Le Doeuff (pp. 191-200) is that Le Doeuff is a reformist because she believes that feminists can operate within the institution of philosophy. According to Braidotti, Le Doeuff believes that after "the deconstructions of rationality accomplished by modern philosophy, it is now possible to free Reason from its links with Power" (p. 196) and "masculinism" (p. 198). This means that Le Doeuff "doesn't assimilate the whole of philosophy to it ["masculinism"], arguing for the possibility of new ways of philosophizing" (p. 198) now that philosophy recognises its incompleteness. By contrast, what seems to make a radical feminist is the belief "in a specifically female or even feminist way of actually doing philosophy" (p. 198), and in "the evolution of a different femininity" (p. 196), the "female feminine". The difference between philosophising that is free of "masculinism" and philosophising that is "female feminine" is a fine one, and makes Braidotti's claims that Le Doeuff rejects "sexual difference" feminism — and must in turn be rejected — difficult to understand. Braidotti's objection is that Le Doeuff is not radical because she is not separatist enough, she doesn't take enough distance from male philosophy.[26] You will note that the second sense of "radical" — as defined above — is here mobilised not against "male counterparts", but against feminist counterparts. That which allows the radical specificity of feminism to shine through the confusion of feminism with poststructuralism — i.e. the expanded definition of "sexual difference" feminism as a common ground for all

feminisms — is in effect a measure of sublimity in relation to which all other versions of feminism are deemed lacking.

The first sense of "radical" — which splits feminists into radical poststructuralists and reformist anti-poststructuralists — is operating in the areas of Braidotti's discussion of Le Doeuff where she attempts to substantiate her claim that Le Doeuff rejects "sexual difference". Braidotti's strategy comprises five moves. She starts off with the statement that Le Doeuff hardly ever engages in a critical evaluation or even discussion of the radical feminists (pp. 197-198). As Braidotti herself puts it rather more strongly, Le Doeuff "refuses to situate herself as a reader of theoreticians such as Irigaray, Kofman, Cixous and many other contemporary French women philosophers" (p. 198). She interprets what is a blatantly fallacious statement of her own as an act of "real denial" on Le Doeuff's part (pp. 198-199). She expands: "[a]lthough on several occasions Le Doeuff refers to the poststructuralist generation (Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida) ... the substance of their position is ignored" (p. 199). The first sense of "radical" is brought in: "Le Doeuff is a stated opponent of radicalism in philosophy ... Le Doeuff's position [is] incompatible with the post-structuralist project ... [and] fits the mood of neo-humanism that has taken over French thought" (p. 199). Conclusion: "the *entire* post-structuralist generation is dismissed by Le Doeuff as a misguided episode" (p. 199, my italics).

Michèle Le Doeuff might not have written a survey of feminism like Braidotti's *Patterns of Dissonance*, but she does discuss "difference" feminism and "theoreticians such as Irigaray [and] Cixous" throughout her work.[27] Luce Irigaray, on the other hand, throughout *Speculum of the Other Woman* (1974), *This Sex Which Is Not One* (1977) and *An Ethics of Sexual Difference* (1984)[28], does not once see fit to mention another feminist's name. In Irigaray's entire work, as far as I am aware, there is one instance when she discusses another feminist. In "Égales ou différentes?" (1987), a short text written/published on the occasion of Simone de Beauvoir's death, Irigaray has this to say about de Beauvoir and about "equality" feminism:

> Trying to suppress sexual difference is to invite a genocide more
> radical than any destruction that ever existed in History ... What

is at stake is clearer today than it was when *The Second Sex* was written. Unless it goes through this stage [of difference], feminism may work towards the destruction of women, and, more generally, of all human values. (*The Irigaray Reader*, p. 32)

But this stage seems to require a ban on naming women generally, unless they are legendary Classical figures called Antigone or Diotima. In Irigaray's entire work there are two exceptions to this rule (as far as I know). The first one, "Psychoanalytic Theory: Another Look", includes a section on women analysts. Originally an entry for the volume on Gynaecology of the *Encyclopédie médico-chirurgicale* and reprinted in *This Sex Which Is Not One*, this text avoids the experiments with narrative voice characteristic of Irigaray's work in favour of conventional exposition. That Irigaray discusses women analysts here — while completely avoiding them in the directly comparable long text on Freud which opens *Speculum of the Other Woman*[29] — can also be seen as a concession to the conventions of encyclopaedia entries rather than as Irigaray's choice. The second exception is "Misère de la psychanalyse" (1977) published in *Critique* 365. It is a demolition of the psychoanalyst Eugénie Lémoine-Luccioni on the grounds that psychoanalysis has led to the suicide of an unnamed female friend, and that "[i]n accordance with the conventions of *Critique* ... examples had to be given".[30]

Le Doeuff does object very strongly to "difference" feminism", but only to the extent that:

> [i]t starts by assuming that the existence of difference is valued, but then, by concentrating on one particular difference, it turns against its original programme, suppressing all differences which might exist on either side of the great dividing line which is drawn. The only consistent way to give value to the fact of difference is to uncover differences by their thousands...
> (*Hipparchia's Choice*, p. 228)

Le Doeuff, therefore, objects not to the unprecedented novelty and radicality of "difference" feminism, as Braidotti would have it, but to its capitulation to the unoriginal tendency of excluding others and according privileged status to oneself: "there is nothing more difficult to reach than the pole of disturbance in thought ... no one is

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predestined to occupy that place" (p. 50). Unlike a large number of feminists, Le Doeuff is genuinely interested in other minorities and other forms of oppression, and tends to discuss them in conjunction with feminism rather than as an aside, or as part of a rhetorical gesture leading back to feminism.

Finally, I disagree with Braidotti's statement that "Le Doeuff's position [is] incompatible with the post-structuralist project" and "the entire post-structuralist generation". If there is such a thing as a poststructuralist *generation*, Le Doeuff is certainly part of it, but is there such a thing as *the* poststructuralist project?[31] As far as Deleuze and Guattari are concerned, I believe that their work resonates with that of Le Doeuff. Michèle Le Doeuff can still be called a "reformist", if by that we understand that, unlike Irigaray, she is keenly interested in the reform of French laws and state institutions, and acutely aware of the different concrete contexts in relation to which the various feminist movements make their interventions and articulate their demands.[32] If Le Doeuff is acutely aware of the French state, the fact that she was born a Breton, a member of the non-Gallic minorities of the French population, might have helped. (Le Doeuff provides this information discreetly, her numerous references to the Bretons usually appear in conjunction with references to other minorities, and she makes it clear that she will not side with the exponents of "'natural' groupings" (p. 310) and the "Toquevillian ... horror of mixing" (p. 304), whether the "natural" communities in question are the Bretons, the French, or women.) I take Le Doeuff's choice of the figure of Hipparchia, a Thracian female philosopher, as an oblique reference to her Breton origin. Thrace was the disreputable outer edge of the Classical Greek world and, today, one of the most neglected outer provinces of the Greek state.

In the background of Braidotti's character analysis of feminism, a sort of family saga of modern thought is unfolding throughout *Patterns of Dissonance*. According to Braidotti, to begin with there was the father, René Descartes, whose "*cogito*" forges the unholy alliance between rationality and masculinity, based on the repression of woman. As long as this repression is not fully recognised, modern thought will be in crisis. Then comes the phallic "mother of us all" (p.

170, modified), Simone de Beauvoir, who starts to undo the repression but remains Cartesian. The radical brothers, Foucault, Deleuze and Derrida, take "un-Cartesian routes" but continue the repression of woman. Their new materialism constitutes an important progress, but they don't go far enough because their bodies are genderless, and remain symptomatic of the crisis. Finally, the radical sisters go beyond the radical brothers in that they rediscover the "sexual specification" of thought, and thus progress "much further" in the dissociation of modern thought from power and domination. Sexual difference lays the foundation for the reversal of the crisis of thought.[33]

Braidotti's perverse history of modern thought is modelled on the nuclear family, with man/woman incestuously redoubled and progressing ominously towards us. Besides being blatantly Francocentric, this history of thought makes "radical sexual difference" the organising principle of all feminist thought, and makes gender-based experience encompass all other variations of experience. (Simultaneously, Braidotti denounces the gender-based writings of the French non-feminist Edmée Mottini-Coulon and the celebrated American feminist Mary Daly as inauthentic.[34])

* * *

I will now turn to Braidotti's discussion Gilles Deleuze. Deleuze has a special place in *Patterns of Dissonance*. Not only is he Braidotti's favourite among the brothers, the whole book is interspersed with both strictly and loosely Deleuzo-Guattarian and Deleuzian terminology, especially at the beginning and end where promises are made. Braidotti announces her intentions in "The Female Feminist" (pp. 12-15). She wants to argue for feminist thought as "singular multiplicity", "discontinuous lines", "multiple points of intersection", "discontinuous variations" and "creative drifting". She proposes "a nomadic project, aiming to exhaust its premises by following them". In her concluding piece, "A New Nomadism", she reiterates her promises but, though these promises persist throughout her text, they do not come to fruition.

The Deleuzianism and the kind of feminism promised in "Female Feminist" outline a tendency for a "minor" or "minoritarian" rather than marginal, "partial" rather than fragmented, feminism which interbreeds rather than being separatist. But a second tendency takes over in the main text, that classifies, delimits, hierarchises and excludes: "Feminism(S)" as the only radicalism, the only counterculture, on the margins, and sole guardian of the doors of hell. This tendency is disavowed and remains unsaid, but we can take a glimpse of it in the distance between Braidotti's "nomadic project" and her self-congratulatory tone when she says: "this work ... has followed its course, often turning away from its initial objectives, taking new and unexpected paths" (p. 15). Braidotti's project is to bring about a genuine encounter between Deleuze and "radical sexual difference" feminism. Her "unexpected path" is a rather uncreative drift towards an institutional defence of the superiority of feminism. At her most "unconscious", Braidotti becomes a feminist commissar.

There are two main points of divergence between Braidotti and Deleuze-Guattari. Deleuze and Guattari have consistently avoided the discourse of "crisis", and the exclusive disjunction between radicals and reformists is alien to them. In addition, I do not think that the term "radical" is well-suited to Deleuze and Guattari. Despite their attacks on "artificial territorialities" in *Anti-Oedipus*, there is a pragmatic awareness that "artificial territorialities" are omnipresent, and their elimination or the rejection of their rationality rather beside the point. These monsters are neither all-powerful nor alien, and can be close to one's heart. What really matters is what sweeps through the "artificial territorialities" and their processes of segregation. What does matter, what is powerful, is the desire for inclusive encounters that moves territorialities to "becoming minoritarian". Though Deleuze and Guattari recognise different degrees of "artificial territoriality", it is never a question of substituting a good new territoriality for a bad old one. The practical question is rather: how will any given territoriality "constitute a sufficiently nomadic circuit?"[35] Their concept of "rhizome" — which appears in *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, and is discussed at length in the first chapter of *A Thousand Plateaus*, "Rhizome", as part of the distinction root/rhizome in favour of the

latter — can be seen as an attempt, at a linguistic *and* conceptual level, to get away from the idea of the "radical".

Braidotti's main discussion of Deleuze takes place in her fifth chapter, "The Becoming-Woman of Philosophy". The title of the section on Deleuze, "Deleuze and the Becoming-Minority of Women", indicates Braidotti's recognition that the Deleuzo-Guattarian concept relevant to feminism is the "becoming minoritarian". She acts upon this recognition in two different ways. Firstly, she treats the "becoming minoritarian" as a synonym of "becoming woman" (p. 108). Secondly, she examines the consequences of the "becoming minoritarian" for feminism, and finds them objectionable on the grounds that, "moving beyond gender dichotomies" towards "multiple desire", they will "finally result in women's disappearance from the scene of history, their fading-out as agents of history" (p. 119). Both tendencies are fed by a dogged determination to salvage the gender dichotomy (and its strategic value for feminism), and, in the face of the "becoming minoritarian", it is disturbingly clear that the enemy (and the threat to the gender dichotomy) is the minoritarian movements emerging outside the feminist territoriality, rather than the male conspiracy.

On the other hand, it is true that in the work of Deleuze and Guattari, in spite of the overabundance of concrete examples, there is a marked lack of *general* distinction among "artificial territorialities" or indeed among "minoritarian becomings", and a lack of opposition between "artificial territorialities" and "minoritarian becomings". Any given territoriality is analysed as a process with two tendencies: one towards exclusive encounters with other territorialities, the other towards inclusive encounters. This is then Deleuze and Guattari's ethics of inclusion: to invent, within a particular territoriality, the practical procedures which will enhance or accelerate the second tendency.

Braidotti outlines the "becoming minoritarian" in pp. 116-118, "follow[s] the sequence of Deleuze's ideas closely" and concludes that "a consciousness that is not specifically feminine[, t]he *nomadic* nature of women's thinking[,] is the only key to the becoming-minority" (my italics). She claims that a comparison between Deleuze, "certain psychoanalysts" and Derrida "reveals the obvious advantages of Deleuze's stance". She does put forth two negative reasons — that "[b]y

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not granting women exclusive revolutionary status Deleuze does not pour out extravagant eulogies", and that "Deleuze's universe ... harbours no mystification as it concerns femininity", both clashing directly with Alice Jardine's position in "Woman in Limbo" — but she fails to spell out the "obvious advantages". Instead, she breaks off for a vague discussion of power, domination and war. In the closing section of chapter five, "The Feminine between Scylla and Charybdis", which is a comparison between the two male philosophers most relevant to feminism, Deleuze and Derrida, Deleuze becomes "the lesser of two evils" (p. 125). Why Deleuze is singled out for such dubious praise remains unclear. I believe that Braidotti singles out Deleuze and the "becoming minoritarian" exactly because it presents a challenge to her separatist credo.

Throughout *Patterns of Dissonance*, Braidotti advocates multiplicity, diversity and nomadism; she even condemns the "Oedipal struggles" within feminism! But in the course of her confrontation with Deleuze (pp. 119-123) her position becomes quite clear: multiplicity, diversity and nomadism are just the icing on the cake, the bottom line is autonomy and unity. As Braidotti puts it: "Can feminists, at this point in their history of collective struggles aimed at redefining female subjectivity, actually afford to let go of their specific forms of political agency?" (p. 120). Obviously not. Another rhetorical question, "The stake is clear: can there be a 'multiple sexuality' without sexual difference?" (p. 123). (Can anything besides feminism and men be desired? Cannot the Professor of Women's Studies learn anything from her antagonists, Lesbian and Gay Studies?) In spite of Braidotti's emphasis on Deleuze, the two hot spots of *Patterns of Dissonance* are on page 150 where she talks of her "intellectual passion", and on page 166 where she talks of the "question close to my heart". This question is: "how can she [woman] come to a subjectivity of her own?" Her intellectual passion is for every individual woman to speak "each in her own name".

In her libertarian "female feminist" universe, Braidotti does not envisage any need for synthesis (p. 15) — besides, presumably, the synthesis of the female feminist universe itself — or for justice. Braidotti takes these positions against synthesis and against justice in

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the name of Deleuze, and particularly insists that Deleuze has gone beyond justice and towards an "astonishing freedom".[36] In fact, these are the only two perceived aspects of Deleuze that she embraces fully and on several occasions. And both of them are in effect positions against Le Doeuff, directed against her reformism. But Braidotti's interpretation of Deleuze is incorrect. For Deleuze and Guattari's rejection of "freedom" in favour of the "line of escape", and for their distinction between "transcendent law" and "immanent field of justice" in favour of the latter, see my last chapter.[37]

Rosi Braidotti, as well as Alice Jardine, both assume that there is a necessary special link between Deleuze and Guattari, Foucault, Derrida, and "radical sexual difference" feminism, at the exclusion of other versions of feminism. In relation to Deleuze and Guattari, this is misguided. From a Deleuzo-Guattarian perspective — as I will argue in the fifth and sixth chapters of this work — what matters is not to determine which sub-territoriality of feminism one comes from or belongs to, but the way one occupies a given territoriality and the way one relates to territorialities outside it. For example, the way that Donna Haraway relates to the territorialities of feminism and the New Left, and her desire for other more inter-bred and heterogenetic sites to come, has more affinities with the Deleuzo-Guattarian *inclusive* method than Braidotti's and Jardine's canonical defence of "radical sexual difference" feminism.[38] We might rather have to look for affinities between Braidotti, Jardine and, for example, Jameson; affinities in their exclusive relation to their respective territorialities.

If, on the other hand, we turn to Deleuze and Guattari's and to Le Doeuff's perspectives on philosophy, we will find them to be mutually resonant. Both sides believe that "[t]he precedents of philosophy are varied enough to allow anyone always to find what they want and to draw nourishment from it" (Le Doeuff, *Hipparchia's Choice*, p. 50). Both sides believe that philosophy is not self-generative but that it emerges out of its connections with multiple outsides which Le Doeuff calls "polygenesis" (p. 170). Both sides reject the distinctions between thought and action, high and low thought, individual and collective thought. Both sides distinguish between philosophy connected with a system of oppression and philosophy connected with the forces of

liberation in that system. Deleuze, with and without Guattari, distinguishes between "state philosophy" and "nomad thought"[39], Le Doeuff distinguishes between philosophy of passive or active collaboration and what she calls "'migrant' rationality" (p. 50) and "migrant's creativity" (p. 215).

The main argument in Le Doeuff's lengthy analysis of Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* is that here was a philosopher whose motto was "I shall follow no one" (p. 138), and whose "assumption of hegemonic privilege ... at the imaginary level of the system" (p. 139) led to the reproduction of the most widespread stereotypes and the most widely accepted exclusions: "Might not the great echo which Sartre's philosophy found in the collective consciousness arise from the fact that, far from displacing the models of social relations, it recycled" them (p. 195). Le Doeuff's argument against "difference" feminism is essentially the same. In promising to provide woman with an identity she was lacking throughout history, it is an "extreme form of voluntarism" (p. 226) which, while widely overestimating its own importance and the importance of writing, reproduces the most widely accepted divisions and exclusions. Brushing aside one of the holiest of "difference" feminism dogmas, woman's lack of identity, she proposes that women have on the contrary "suffered from ... an overloaded identity" and calls on them to "unfind" themselves (pp. 206-207).[40]

* * *

In *Patterns of Dissonance*, the "other" becomes synonymous with feminism:

> at times of crisis every culture tends to turn to its 'others' ... the thought, speech and actual agency of these same 'others', namely, feminist theory and practice... (p. 11)

Everything else that can be constructed as "other" is either translated into an inert *context* for feminism, or it passes inside feminism as its (Third-World, ethnicity, sexual preference, etc.) *axes*. The first strategy is at work on page 218. Braidotti comments on Françoise Collin's parataxis of "Women, foreigners or strangers, the young or the working class" as follows: "in some strange yet historically bound *context* the

evolution of feminist thought is *coextensive* with the breaking up of the ideal of rationality" (my italics). Braidotti translates the emergence of minor rationalities into a crisis of rationality, feminism's others into a "strange context", and claims that feminism on its own can resolve the crisis of rationality.

Braidotti's only admission that feminism is not the *only* minoritarian movement is to be found in the context of an injunction on men to be silent on page 145. "They may have no alternative after all: it must be very difficult and uncomfortable to be a male, white, middle-class intellectual at a time in history when *so many* minority movements are claiming their right" (my italics). She fails to see, in this situation, any difficulty arising for her own work.

Braidotti has a vision of feminism as a "singular multiplicity". This is an expression condensing the Deleuzian and Deleuzo-Guattarian concepts of "singularity" and "multiplicity". Throughout his own work and in his collaborations with Guattari, Deleuze stresses that a multiplicity doesn't constitute a whole and that it is untotalisable. It can be described as an atopic site of partial lateral connections in-between territorialities. Braidotti's vision of feminism as "singular multiplicity", by contrast, seems to be a vision of an autonomous and unified feminist territoriality incorporating many semi-autonomous sub-territorialities.

The women's movement is celebrated by Braidotti for its rich diversity, and exorbitantly praised as the fountainhead of feminist thought. This lavish praise makes me suspicious. I believe that a Kantian model underlies Braidotti's generosity. Within the economy of woman's abstract specificity, the women's movement occupies the role of the people, source of all sovereignty, whereas feminist thought occupies the role of the legislator. She refers to "black, ethnic, developing and lesbian" only as sub-sections of the women's movement, as if these adjectives are only suitable for real women members of the movement. Feminist writers belong to a higher realm, to the idea of Woman. In all, there are four references to "black, ethnic, developing and lesbian" in *Patterns of Dissonance*, all of them very disturbing.

• On page 129 Braidotti uses "black, ethnic, developing and lesbian" as a lever against "equality" feminism and for "radical sexual difference" feminism. She claims that the decline of the former and the shift to the latter is a response to popular demand. "Particularly significant in determining this shift were the demands of ethnic ... black ... developing ... lesbian." See also page 158: "Women from minorities have not hesitated to criticize the second ['equality'] wave".

• On page 159 the bone of constant/variables is thrown to minorities: "the importance of *variables* like race and sexual preference, especially the lesbian experience, was late in coming to the fore in feminist debates" (my italics). See also page 170: de Beauvoir's work should be criticised for neglecting "differences *among* women, on the basis of race, class and lifestyles" (my italics).

• Finally a tragicomic moment. The only use Braidotti makes of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak in this exhaustive survey of feminism — and the only reference to her work — is to attack Kristeva for "ferocious Western Europeanism", quotes Braidotti, "without going as far as Gayatri Spivak's devastating criticism" (p. 238). As a result, Braidotti discredits two non-Western birds with one stone: Kristeva emerges as suspiciously pro-West, Chakravorty Spivak emerges as an extremist.

While proposing an ethics of multiplicity and nomadism for feminism, which she detects in emerging feminist thought (for example, in Haraway and Flax), Braidotti comes to reject Deleuze and Guattari's "becoming minoritarian", as well as Le Doeuff's advocacy of recognition and respect for different *intellectual* priorities within the women's movement. Why? Is it because feminism needs to be defended from fragmentation and appropriation? I believe that *Patterns of Dissonance* succumbs to the fear that a hellish legion, a monstrous regiment of new pretenders is amassing at the door that feminism has opened. When Braidotti complains that feminists are not read by "the male counterparts", does she try to divert attention from the geopolitical map gathering outside the doors of spirit, and does she address herself to the male counterparts in order to turn her back on the new pretenders and close the door behind her? Has this invasion not happened already? A scene of tragic beauty: guarding the doors of hell, unaware that the damned are already in.

Braidotti is successful in showing that feminist ideas are compelling. Since feminist ideas are compelling, Braidotti argues, the fact that they are ignored by the male counterparts proves nothing less than the symbolic "foreclosure" of women.[41] You will recall that Braidotti directs the same accusation at Le Doeuff for her "denial" of "radical sexual difference" feminism. Furthermore, Braidotti treats the capacity to take on other protagonists as a criterion of intellectual value. Her underlying argument against Le Doeuff and Deleuze is that they fail to take on their competitors and are, therefore, of lesser value. Braidotti, on the other hand, excels in this respect. She sees feminism as the self-consciousness of poststructuralism and of modern thought in general — "feminism is THE discourse of modernity" (p. 10). Within feminism, she sees "radical sexual difference" feminism as the self-consciousness of "female feminist" destiny. Finally, *Patterns of Dissonance* occupies the position of the self-consciousness of "radical sexual difference" feminism.

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In *Patterns of Dissonance*, Rosi Braidotti drifts to the rigid position of defending an Eastern-bloc (Second-World) version of feminism, with the Third World, and the fourth, and the fifth, excluded. This position forces her to adopt a very hard version of "radical sexual difference" feminism, and alienates her from other versions of feminism and from Deleuze. As a result, her "new nomadism" fails. Most feminist political projects acquire their sense from the national and social context where they intervene, and are irreducible to a global feminist project. Any attempt to impose global sense to partial feminist struggles misunderstands them, and delegitimises collective creativity.

The "specificity of woman" defended by Alice Jardine and Rosi Braidotti — the "specificity of woman" threatened by Deleuze and Guattari's "becoming minoritarian", according to Braidotti — is an *empty form*, a *general equivalent*. If the "specificity of woman" is defended, the different instances of the women's movement, in different political situations and national contexts, are forced to enter a

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closed economy whose international currency is "radical sexual difference".

Deleuze and Guattari's "becoming minoritarian" can be used by minorities within feminism, or by minorities emerging without feminism. At first it might seem that the Deleuzo-Guattarian concepts of "artificial territoriality" and "becoming minoritarian" ignore the concrete particularity of very different institutions, that they are totalising. My counterargument would be that any "particular" territoriality, whether major or minor, is already an abstraction. Particularity manifests itself in action, in the various exclusive and inclusive processes at work within a given territoriality. Particularity itself becomes process and invention: invention of artificial territorialities and minoritarian becomings. Accordingly, the creation of a "female feminist" separatist space — and the "specificity of woman" — has to be seen as only one of the particularities at work in feminism, rather than as the universal ontological ground for particular feminisms. As Irigaray herself has put it:

> For my part, I refuse to let myself be locked into a single "group" within the women's liberation movement. Especially if such a group becomes ensnared in the exercise of power, if it purports to determine the "truth" of the feminine, to legislate as to what it means to "be a woman," and to condemn women who might have immediate objectives that differ from theirs.
> (*This Sex Which Is Not One*, p. 166)

Part II

Intermezzo

CHAPTER FOUR

The victim, the executioner, and the saviour:
a modern triangle

In "Renverser le Platonisme" (1966)[1] and in *Différence et Répétition* (1968), Gilles Deleuze discusses a Classical triangle in the context of Plato's theory of Ideas. Plato distinguishes between the Idea as the model, the true representative or claimant of the Idea as the good copy of the model (the *icon*), and the false representative or claimant of the Idea as the bad copy of the model (the *simulacrum*). Deleuze argues that what is at stake in this triangle is not to distinguish between model and copy, but to distinguish between good and bad copies, representatives, claimants. As he puts it, "[t]he function of the notion of the model is not to oppose the world of images in its entirety but to select the good images ... Platonism as a whole is erected on the basis of this wish to hunt down the phantasms or simulacra" — it is a "test that decides between claimants".[2] The claimants are rivals for the governance of the city, and the triangle is devised by the philosopher, who occupies the position of the *icon* and establishes his right to be the proper statesman by excluding all other rivals as fraudulent and harmful to the world of Ideas.

The Platonic triangle was an anti-democratic triangle in the heart of Classical Athenian democracy. In this chapter I will advance and explore the hypothesis that there is a modern version of this triangle; an anti-democratic triangle in the heart of modern democracy. The artificial territoriality of the world of Ideas is now occupied by a modern invention, a modern Idea, the people; whether as humanity or as nation or as minority, the people is constantly under threat and in need of being saved. The position of the simulacrum is now occupied by the enemies of the people, while the position of the icon is occupied by the representative of the people. I will call this modern triangle the triangle of the victim, the executioner, and the saviour.

The hypothesis explored in this chapter is meant to be a bridge between the first part of this thesis, with its Deleuzo-Guattarian studies

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of tendencies in the postmodernism debate and in feminism, and the second part to come, with its reconstruction of Deleuze and Guattari's "theory" of modern oppression and liberation in *Anti-Oedipus* and *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature.* In the first part of this thesis, I have already "discovered" — at work in most of the participations in the postmodernism debate examined, as well as in Braidotti's and Jardine's versions of "radical sexual difference" feminism — a tendency towards the construction of triangles whose elements are the artificial territoriality, the enemies of the artificial territoriality, the representative of the artificial territoriality. I now propose that these triangles be seen as variations of the modern triangle of victim, executioner, saviour. In the second part of this thesis, I will call this triangle the "oppressor triangle" and, giving a detailed account of Deleuze and Guattari's analysis of the processes constitutive of modern oppression, I will describe it as the end product of these processes.

Here and now, I will explore my hypothesis of an anti-democratic triangle in the heart of modern democracy, with particular reference to Alain Robbe-Grillet's novel, *Project for a Revolution in New York.* I will also draw on a number of other texts. I will start off with Hannah Arendt's *On Violence,* I will pass through René Girard's *Violence and the Sacred,* Georges Bataille's *Eroticism,* and Robbe-Grillet's first novel, *A Regicide.* I will stay for a while with Slavoj Zizek's *The Sublime Object of Ideology,* and I will finish with a brief return to Lyotard's "Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?".

* * *

Project for a Revolution in New York was written between 1968 and 1970, and published in 1970. In 1970, the wave of urban riots that broke over the US was violently suppressed. New York's own story of civic unrest had culminated in the Harlem arson attacks, crowds burning down their own ghetto. In the same year, 1970, Hannah Arendt chronicles the New York civil rights movement, as well as the events of public disorder, in *On Violence.*

The analysis that underpins Arendt's document is that the civil rights movement — what she calls "the new movement" (p. 22) or "the

New Left" (p. 23), the "white rebels" (p. 18) — was betrayed by the separatism of the Black Power movement. According to Arendt, the withdrawal of the Black Power movement on the one hand undermined the "white rebels"' claim to represent everybody. On the other hand, the use of violence by the Black Power movement ended up contaminating the "white rebels". Hannah Arendt's analysis is based on a set of two distinctions: between interest and disinterestedness, and between violence and non-violence.[3] The "white rebels" are truly revolutionary in that they are disinterested and non-violent, both in their means and in their end — "participatory democracy" for all. That is to say:

> every revolutionary movement has been led by the disinterested ... Still they too had to espouse ... interests ... And this is precisely what the modern rebels ... have been unable to find despite a rather desperate search ... [T]he complete collapse of any co-operation with the Black Power movement ... was the bitterest disappointment for the white rebels. (p. 24)

So the white revolutionary movement — and in this context the term "revolutionary" is synonymous with "political" and "democratic" — disintegrated because of what can be called a failure of hegemony; in Arendt's terminology, because it failed to lead interests to the disinterestedness or to the general interest of "participatory democracy".

The Black Power movement — and, by extension, every minoritarian movement — in being interested and violent, is a fake revolution: it is non-political and non-democratic.

> Sit-ins and occupations of buildings are not the same as arson and armed revolt, and the difference is not only one of degree. (p. 91)

That is to say, whereas "white rebellion" is political and democratic, "black rebellion" is simply criminal. Faced with ethnic crowds ransacking their own neighbourhoods, Arendt's response is that these incidents took place because black representative bodies separated themselves from the general interest as embodied by the "white rebels". Arendt casts the "white rebels" in the role of Reason. As it is in abiding by Reason that one becomes truly one's self, it is in abiding by the

"white rebels" that the Black Power movement would truly represent the black community.

That Arendt is aware of the weakness of her argument is, I believe, clearly indicated by her recourse to the global horizon of the "nuclear threat" as the ultimate justification of the "white rebels". Arendt's argument to end all argument is that within the context of the US, the (white) civil rights movement — unlike all minoritarian and identitarian movements — alone understands the essence of contemporary reality. This is the reality of the nuclear threat, the indiscriminate threat of global annihilation that dominates everyone and can only be countered by peaceful participation and democratic coexistence. Therefore, the ultimate justification of the "white rebels" is their realism. It is *this* realism which allows them to articulate a higher interest, and simultaneously disarms and, ultimately, excludes all minoritarian political movements.

Arendt establishes two chains of equivalence: firstly, between realism, humanity, democracy, politics, peace, alliance, hegemony, and what she calls "moral character" (p. 23); secondly, between minorities, violence, criminality, and nuclear catastrophe. I consider this to be a blackmail, a false dilemma. But I want to bring to your attention something else: the paradox — and I use the term ironically — of the first chain of equivalence, the chain of realism, humanity, democracy, politics, peace. In spite of its claims of universality, it is based on exclusion. Hannah Arendt makes use of the threat of nuclear holocaust, and transforms the planet into an immense sublime victim, not only in order to command obedience to common interest, but also in order to delegitimise, criminalise and effectively exclude minoritarian movements from the democratic political process.[4]

A summary of Robbe-Grillet's *Project for a Revolution in New York* — though those who have read it might be doubtful that it can be summarised — shows this novel to be a very interesting commentary on Hannah Arendt's by no means original version of realism and democracy. An "organization" plots the revolution in New York. The operational logic of the organisation is that of the "metaphorical act". To prevent the generalisation of violence, the revolutionary agent elaborates the principles of a substitution; that is, a formal, exact,

murder, to be repeated an unknown amount of times. The revolution then takes place in the form of this substitution; it appears that the revolution *is* this substitution. But, in the absence of any other form of political activity or social life, the organisation that performs the revolution in the "metaphorical act" is coextensive with politics and monopolises the collective field. As a result, the victim of the metaphorical substitution which separates this organisation from violence comes from its own inside. The victim is split off from the body of the organisation, in order to allow the organisation to survive.

The TV set in Joan's apartment reproduces a documentary on ceremonial sacrifice in Central Africa. Her fascination distracts her from her own ceremonial sacrifice which has arrived in the form of a revolutionary executioner. She is a black girl from Puerto Rico, working for the revolutionary organisation in New York (pp. 63-65). Throughout *Project for a Revolution in New York*, this scene is re-enacted by different characters, and replayed in differently accented variations; these variations span from the statement "I am a victim", to staging one's own sacrifice, to being a voyeur of one's own sacrifice.

What is called "metaphorical act" in *Project for a Revolution in New York* René Girard will call the "mechanism of the surrogate victim" in *Violence and the Sacred. Violence and the Sacred* (published in 1972, two years after *Project for a Revolution in New York*) analyses the sacrificial substitution of ceremonial murder as a function constitutive of closed — that is, according to Girard, savage or barbaric — social systems.[5] For Girard, who addresses himself primarily to ethnologists, the sacrificial victim proper is the tribal king; this element both central to the closed system and exterior to it, transcendent. The king's transcendence is an exemplary displacement (and a constant reminder) of the spectre of a negativity that cannot be exorcised; that has to be exorcised, if the king is not to be killed, in the sacrifice of a copy. The system's weakest, most peripheral, element, best representing the king's exteriority, will be the sacrificial victim. If this false copying is repeated *ad infinitum*, this is not because of the inadequacy, the lack of equivalence between the substituted and the substituting. The sacrifice has to be repeated in order to postpone what is the impossible dénouement of a paradox: that the king cannot be killed because he is

the system's condition of possibility, and that this fundamental failure of closure of the system is the very embodiment of its immortality.

Whereas Girard argues that savage and barbaric societies show us something that we have long forgotten, it could also be argued that his projection of the "mechanism of the surrogate victim" and its logic of exclusion onto savage and barbaric societies is itself an act of sacrificial substitution. In any case, we would, at least, have to consider that there is a "barbaric" element in our modern democracies, and that our "sacrifice of sacrifice" has not as yet been concluded.

The benefit of Robbe-Grillet's first novel, *A Regicide* — written in 1949 and published in 1978 — is that it situates the triangle of the king, the victim, and the executioner in an explicitly modern political environment. *A Regicide* is the story of Boris, a murderer without victim; a dead king without murderer; and Red, a victim that comes to life. In an isolated island, no political party has a real majority. The king is an integral part of the ensuing fragile but inexorable balance. Then, the impossible happens: one of the parties appears to mobilise real support and gains a majority. Simultaneously, Boris, an insignificant man of the crowd, attempts to assassinate the king, and "[s]ubitement, tout s'était embrouillé" (p. 116). Suddenly everything becomes confused. What happened? Boris doesn't know. He finds himself sucked into a nebulous world where everything becomes possible. His only hope of escape is to read the next day's newspapers. Boris: "Un troupeau de moutons, immense, léger, floconneux, est entré dans mon dos. Ils se pressaient les uns contre les autres, sans pourtant parvenir à se fondre en une masse commune. Il n'y avait avec eux ni berger ni chien" (p. 159). Instead of killing the king, Boris is as if stabbed in the back by a crowd that has all the nebulosity of the Idea.[6]

His attempt was inspired by the inscription, "Ci-gît Red", on the tomb of a foreign student called Red; the anagram of the inscription is "Régicide" (pp. 40-41). The next day the king is on the radio. Boris is arrested for the murder of Red who is alive and takes Boris's place. The verdict is that Boris has murdered Red but is innocent. The king had in fact died, but of an illness. All this information emerges when the governing party has lost the real support that it appeared to have gained. With a loss of majority, and a new king, normality has returned.

Boris himself returns in *Project for a Revolution in New York* as Roi Boris, king Boris.

* * *

Project for a Revolution in New York is considered to belong to a second phase of Robbe-Grillet's work; a phase considered so far removed from realism, and of such accentuated formalism, as to merit the name *Nouveau Nouveau Roman.* Initiated by *La maison de rendez-vous* (1965), this new phase includes the films *Trans-Europ-Express* (1966) and *L'homme qui ment* (1968). At the same time, *Project for a Revolution in New York* is considered to have more than enough content to provoke extreme repulsion. In 1975 Michael Spencer refers to the reaction "de mes étudiants dans un séminaire de maîtrise: devant de scènes comme celles du supplice de la belle Joan, ils ont réagi ou par le fou rire ou par des manifestations d'horreur".[7] Recently, Jameson wondered whether this novel has become unreadable since feminism, because of its "sadoaestheticism".[8] In brief, *Project for a Revolution in New York* is considered to be both unbearably formalist and indecently pornographic. Though this *is* an experimental novel, and though I have myself found it deeply upsetting, I believe that the two critical attitudes that I have outlined — informed as they are by the false but undying oppositions between experimentation and realism, and violence and politics — obscure what is most upsetting about this novel: namely, its political insight into the state of modern democracies.

Jameson's term "*sado*aestheticism" is meant to relegate torture to the realm of sexual aberration. But, for those who survived the Second World War, a political dimension became discernible in the writings of de Sade. The "rehabilitation" of de Sade as a political thinker was initiated by Blanchot in 1949[9], and then seconded by Bataille. Bataille himself, I believe, politicises sexuality, and is as such a precursor of poststructuralist and feminist work to come. Most interesting in this respect is Bataille's book *Eroticism.* Eroticism, according to Bataille, is an operation which attempts to overcome rationality — the "restricted economy" of Capitalism, its institutions, and political systems — in

order to attain a state of excess, a "general economy" involving the totality and unity of Being. Bataille considers that the highest moment of "eroticism" is ceremonial sacrifice. The sacrificial scene is staged in his horrific short piece, "The Sacrifice of the Gibbon" (in *Visions of Excess* [1985]). It is clear that Bataille, unlike Girard, perceives an important point about ceremonial sacrifice: that the symbolic violence of the sacrificial substitution attacks not the victim but the circle of participants — the witnesses, the survivors. According to Bataille, this attack has a transgressive role in that it belongs to the quest for an absolute destitution of the self, for an absolute denial of the autonomous self-interested paranoid.

Bataille makes high claims for his concept of "eroticism": eroticism is "the supreme philosophical question", "a universal problem", "eroticism is the problem of problems" (*Eroticism*, pp. 273-276). The problem of eroticism, if we can give it a name, is, I believe, the problem of "absolute sovereignty" — a sovereignty which is beyond exchange and equivalence.

But the problematic of "absolute sovereignty" is not pre-democratic. On the contrary, the formulation of this universal problem only becomes possible "after the revolutionary denial of the monarchic principle" (p. 165). "Absolute and sovereign liberty", I would argue, becomes conceivable only from *within* the modern democratic principle; and I would stress this "within" against Bataille's "beyond". Ceremonial sacrifice becomes universal and absolute only from within the bourgeois revolution and the modern nation-state. The bondage that it involves does not refer to the actual victim, it is in fact blind to it. Bondage is a force applied to the circle of survivors. Its desired effect is the ecstatic emergence of a people. "Absolute sovereignty" is this modern democratic piece of magic called "a people". (This is what Girard simply takes for granted: according to his *Violence and the Sacred*, at the beginning of time, there was "a single solitary group".[10])

In view of what I have said so far, the Lacanian theory of democracy that Slavoj Zizek develops in *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (1989) can be considered to start off from a sound premise. *Democracy is based on a logic of exclusion* — in full, democracy according to Zizek is hegemonic, exclusive, and inescapable. That is to say, democracy is

sexist, racist, xenophobic, etc. by definition. One would be wrong to assume that this is meant as an accusation. On the contrary, Zizek is an enthusiast. His faith in democracy is such that he describes elections as "the moment of dissolution of the sociosymbolic bond, the moment of eruption of the Real" (p. 147), when "the whole hierarchic network of social relations is in a way suspended" (p. 148).

What, according to Zizek, allows for the eruption of the Real — the voice of the people, as it were — in democracy as well as in Lacanian theory is that they both acknowledge the "'death drive', this dimension of social negativity ... [which] defines *la condition humaine* as such" (p. 5). (They both recognise *la condition humaine* in the philosophy of Hegel.) Again according to Zizek, totalitarianism and "poststructuralism", on the other hand, both labour under the illusion that there is a radical outside to the "negation of negation". The "totalitarian laughter" (see pp. 27-28) of Zizek's poststructuralism — whose main reference points are Derrida and Foucault — as well as Nazism's extermination of the Jews, and Stalinism's extermination of the "enemies of the people", misrecognises the *interiority of negativity*. In democracy, the interiority of negativity is embodied by the "rigid designator" (despotic signifier, hegemonic force) and its artefact, the "sublime object". So — to state the obvious — democracy for Zizek cannot but take place under the auspices of the "rigid designator" and its artefact, the "sublime object".

To sum it all up, democracy — "the best of all possible systems" — cannot totalise itself *and* it has no outside; that is to say, democracy is "impossible" *and* there is no end to democracy. But if this is the case, and this is my argument, the rigid frontier between democracy and totalitarianism that Zizek attempts to establish is impossible to sustain, untenable.

It is known that two of the three exemplary manifestations of modern totalitarianism — the Nazis and the Italian Fascists — were appointed to government by democratic procedure, and enjoyed popular support. Stalinism itself ruled in the name of the ultimate democratic fantasy, the people, which was realised in the persecution of "the enemies of the people" — in the sense that whoever is not an "enemy of the people" emerges as the people. If we add to this the

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Stalinist's recourse to the transcendent laws of historical materialism, the triangle of modern democracy is here uncannily reproduced: the Constitution of the state, the nation, the enemies of the nation. Ironically, it is exactly because of the function of "the enemy of the nation" in democracy that the Fascists gained power in Italy. In order to end one and a half years of political instability and "[t]errified by the threat of a Communist revolution, King Victor Emmanuel III appointed Mussolini Prime Minister in October 1922" (*The Penguin Dictionary of Modern History*, p. 207).

The figure of the "enemy of the people" or the "enemy of the "nation" is that of the conspirator. A conspiracy is a collective activity against the people, and against the state. It is (and I quote from *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*) "an agreement between two or more to do something criminal ... evil or unlawful[;] ... murder ... sedition ... treason". The conspiracy aims at what is both eternal and intractable, and therefore has to fail by definition, even when it succeeds. Politics is also a collective activity, albeit a benevolent and lawful one. It is itself this original art or science or faculty that the conspiracy is aiming to imitate and falsify. It is (and I quote from the *Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary*) "the art or science of government", or "the faculty of nationmaking" according to Gladstone. If we are to follow the logic of the above distinction, we must accept that only two collective activities are possible: a good one, politics, that obeys transcendent principles, gives birth to the nation and preserves it; and an evil one, the conspiracy, that cannot realise itself anyway. So there is one collective activity possible, politics; and — to paraphrase Zizek — its interminable output is punctuated by elections.

* * *

My provisional argument in relation to Zizek's *The Sublime Object of Ideology* has been that there is an apparent antinomy between his theory of the interiority of negativity in democracy (that democracy is "impossible" and has, properly speaking, no outside), and the frontier he attempts to establish between democracy and totalitarianism. If we choose to attack the second term of Zizek's antinomy — that is, the

frontier between democracy and totalitarianism — a wealth of vacuous arguments is opened to us. We can argue that totalitarianism, as well as democracy, recognises its impossibility only too well in the figure of the Jew, the "enemy of the people", etc., and that the Russian Revolution failed exactly because it was conducted according to the modern democratic principles of hegemony and exclusion. Or we could reverse the argument: democracy, as well as totalitarianism, consistently fails to recognise its own impossibility, as the persistence of the "external threat/enemy within" function demonstrates.

But I will take a different path. I will now use Zizek's antinomy as a stepping stone towards the reformulation of his theory of democracy. Democracy can realise itself only insofar as, and to the extent that, it recognises in totalitarianism its own social fantasy, its own "sublime object", and identifies with it (see Zizek, pp. 124-128).

I suggest that totalitarianism, in its persecution of the Jews, the enemies of the people, the degenerate, recognises only too well the fragility of its hegemony and the certainty of its death. It is parliamentary democracy, in its "liberté, égalité, fraternité", that misrecognises the hegemony that underlies it, or — to use Zizek's terminology — its "impossibility". This "misrecognition" — if we can call it that — manifests itself in an operation splitting democracy's "sublime object" into two: a totalitarian conspiratory organisation and its victim. Parliamentary democracy will then "save" the victim in order to close its own circle of "misrecognition".

My hypothesis is that democracy — to the extent that it is a hegemonic discursive practice — displaces its own "metaphorical act" (the sacrificial exclusion performed by its "rigid designator") in a splitting of its "sublime object" between the subject and the object of a persecutory apparatus.

Zizek proclaims loudly that the universal figure of the conspirator, the very model of displaced negativity, the "sublime object" in its pure and distilled form, is the Jew (p. 114). But what he in effect does — by his denunciation of totalitarianism as non-political, and by his emphasis on the criminal totalitarian leader — is to cast totalitarianism on this very model. That democracy's "sublime object" incorporates both totalitarianism and its victim leads me to the

conclusion that, to the two terms of Zizek's theory of democracy, the "rigid designator" and the "sublime object", a third term must be added.

I can now complete my hypothesis. Democracy's self-perpetuation is based on a triangle. This triangle comprises three positions which I will call the "victim" (first "sublime object"), the "executioner" (second "sublime object"), and the "saviour" (the "rigid designator").

This is democracy's sacrificial scene, to be re-enacted *ad infinitum*. This is also how elections come to be perceived as "the moment of eruption of the Real". They are the moment of the re-enactment of the scene of the victim being saved from the clutches of its enemies. The irony is that for the victim to continue to be saved it has to remain a victim. (This is an action-film scenario of democracy, and in turn suggests why action films are especially prone to sequels.)

* * *

In order to explore my hypothesis, I will now return to Robbe-Grillet's *Project for a Revolution in New York*. The conspiratory "organization" that is articulating the revolution in New York has three distinguishing features. The organisation is:

Ethnic: Ben-Said, an agent of the organisation, "speaks twenty-three languages". "'But not English?' 'No. It's not an indispensable dialect for an American revolutionary.'" (pp. 84-85)

Bureaucratic: "'Where did you get those details, about her [Joan's] bath, her perfume, the green dress... ?' '... It's all written on her punch card, in the office files.' 'Even the little gold cross?' 'Yes, of course.'" (p. 61)

Crowned by a totalitarian leader, the mysterious Frank. Frank said to Ben-Said that "everything was set, he should be on his way there now. Ben-Said left without asking for an other word of information, even forgetting to say good-bye to me". Then Frank "spoke to me about Laura. I listened without answering. *When he finished*: 'That's it, you take it from there,' *I finished* my Bloody Mary and went out" (pp. 38-39, my italics). (Note the expression, "when he finished ... I finished".)

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The conspiratory organisation, in its features, condenses the weakest and the strongest: disenfranchised ethnic minorities, authoritarian and oppressive government. In brief, the conspiratory organisation conflates victim and executioner.

The organisation performs "metaphorical acts" (p. 28) based on the principle of the "color red" (p. 27). Metaphorical acts are "as murderous as [they are] cathartic" (p. 28), and "exact as hell" (p. 146). The participants of the metaphorical acts are the executioner, the victim, and the observer. The executioner follows a complete scenario, to be rehearsed exactly, "without a slip" (p. 27), on severe penalty. The observer writes a full report to Frank; accuracy is essential. The executioner observes the scenario, the observer executes orders. The actors "know their parts down to the last comma, and the whole scenario is articulated like a piece of machinery, ... in an absolute perfection" (p. 27).

The "empty lot" (p. 148) is the space or the stage of the central act of the play that is the metaphorical act. The empty lot is limited and infinite.[11] It is a rectangular set, clearly circumscribed by high walls and fenced in; but it is lost in twilight, "I know it is lost", a hole of destiny, sortilege and chance. The "very visible cracks" of the asphalt and the "unwanted objects", the executioner describes as a "chess game ... 'play'; ... rather, ... theatrical performance, ... the entire representation" (p. 148). The executioner must collect his tools by "cross[ing] the smallest number of squares possible", and he must avoid "the interstices, on which the feet must never be set" (p. 154). He makes a mistake, finds himself in front of an object which he didn't aim at, and has "to count to a thousand, so as not to have to pay the penalty" (p. 155). In a renewed effort to reach his instrument of torture through a suspended door, as prescribed by the scenario, he leaves the empty lot by mistake.

The "metaphorical act" emerges from within a ruthless repetition, a relentless circularity. If Frank is the writer of the originary scenario that is rehearsed in the particular scenario of a metaphorical act, which is rehearsed in the metaphorical act that is rehearsed in the report, it is Frank who "finishes writing what interests him in the report I have just made" (p. 35).

Project for a Revolution starts off with just such a rehearsal, and the repetition of the rehearsal, mediated by a mysterious gap. This gap, "a blank space, a pause of indeterminate length during which nothing happens, not even the anticipation of what will come next" (p. 1), would then be that of Frank's will which alone — very much like Zizek's elections — can set the circle in motion once again. But here a problem arises, because Frank's will is unattainable. If the scenario of the metaphorical act is unknown to the observer, how does he know that it has been performed accurately; how can he report that its performance has been exact? Also, if the punishment for the executioner's mistakes doesn't come — and it doesn't — how does he know that the scenario is to be performed accurately. Finally, how can the observers know, how can we know, that there is a scenario. (I will come back to the significance of this question.)

If there were not a scenario, the executioner would be writing it in his very performance of raw violence, and the "metaphorical act" would be the zenith of an ascending curve of violence, mostly against women, whose objective is control. That control is the defining factor in acts of violence emerges in four vignettes that I will now present to you.

• "Discerned" in the curves and knots of a door's wood, a half-caste girl is bound, then gagged, then anaesthetised, by a mad white scientist working for the organisation (pp. 2-4).

• An ethnic man immobilises and rapes white blond underage Laura. "When she seemed dead, I released my grip" (p. 11), or "[a]t least this is what Laura imagines" (p. 7). She is gagged on page 144.

• "Young punks" in the underground throw women on the track: "tied to the train by a rope ... which tears off all your clothes, mutilates the body, breaks all the limbs and inflicts so many wounds that the corpse is unidentifiable". This is confessed during an interrogation after the command: "Don't move so much, or I'll tie you up ... And try to invent details that will be exact and meaningful" (pp. 86-87).

• The fourth vignette comes in variations. "Numberless examples" of a poster are seen in an underground station: the huge face of a blindfolded woman (p. 91). The poster is re-viewed on page 146, in splendid isolation and with "the dimensions of a drive-in movie screen". Six black girls, "each furnished with a long steel T square", are

seen advancing towards their blindfolded youngest, in a savage ritual game of blind man's buff (pp. 98-99). They reappear on page 181, doubled: twelve black girls blindfolded, etc., etc.

Violence is seen, "discerned" or imagined to be the focal point of a generalised struggle for control, whose terms rotate:

insane-white-male	versus	sane-ethnic-female
ethnic-male	versus	white-underage-female
underage-white	versus	adult-ethnic-male
underage-white-female	versus	adult-ethnic-female
ethnic-male	versus	ethnic-female
underage-ethnic-female	versus	underage-ethnic-female

Whereas the victim is mostly female and ethnic, the position of the executioner seems to be open to all indiscriminately.

The above encounters take place within what can be called a *pendulum* of violence. Its axis of oscillation is the martyrdom of the sacrificial victim in the "empty lot" which I will discuss shortly. The amplitude of the oscillation is set by two poles: the pole of a singular event, and the pole of a universal fact. The singular event, escaping the law of variation and repetition that reigns over the above encounters, is the cold-blooded shooting down of a white newly wed man — his bride by his side — by semi-legal development contractors possibly linked to the "organization" (pp. 136-140). Here there is neither a struggle for control, nor even an encounter properly speaking. The death of the white, newly wed man is instantaneous and certain, guaranteed by the survival of the bride who thus becomes a witness, the one who remembers and saves in memory. Finally, unlike all other incidents, the division of roles between victim and executioner, and between male and female, is here absolute.

The second pole of the pendulum, the universal fact, is the alliance of a repertoire of miraculous or horrific objects and scenes, with mass replicative media. These objects and scenes are monstrous in that they combine the extraordinary and the stereotypical — from the Venus de Milo to the Statue of Liberty to the Niagara Falls, from genocides to Roman orgies. They reproduce frantically, they circulate from one medium to another, they form their nebulous, kitsch-sublime point of convergence. Books, tapes, posters and knick-knacks become

the memorabilia of a citizen become tourist.[12] Here, the "avant-garde" is a style based on sensational miraculous gadgets: "a kind of boudoir where the seats and little tables were inflated by pressing on electric buttons" (p. 44), the time clock that opens the door and speaks (p. 54).

Within the pendulum of violence, the reservoir of stereotypical or classic disjunctions is mobilised in civil war: white/ethnic, male/female, adult/adolescent, sane/insane, married/fortune-hunter, etc. In addition, any alliance of terms — for example, ethnic-female — generates new disjunctions. As I have already observed, the positions of executioner and victim are open to all and occupied by rotation, or what Robbe-Grillet calls "circular permutation" (p. 27). It is therefore noteworthy that one alliance, that of the white-adult-sane-married-couple is exempt from the position of the executioner, and seen to be violence-free.

* * *

We will now come, as announced, to the axis of oscillation of the pendulum of violence, the sacrificial victim in the "empty lot". But before we do, let me ask once again: is there or is there not a scenario? As I have already argued, if there were not a scenario, there would be no metaphorical substitution and no sacrificial victim; there would only be unmediated raw violence, illegitimate and criminal, rather than political, violence. But, as we know, the sacrificial act is performed by a conspiratory organisation, and should therefore also be considered illegitimate, criminal and extra-political. It appears at first that, whether or not there is a scenario, the effects are the same. What in fact happens is that, in the absence of democratic politics and communal life, the difference between the political and the criminal is decided with a new distinction: that between directed and random violence. This distinction transforms the conspiratory organisation into a political community, while the sacrificial act emerges as the founding moment of this community, and the organising principle of all encounters.

The sacrifice of Joan in the empty lot consists in the repetition thrice of a fire torture. It is an exemplary directed act, and displays a

ritual observance of written or unwritten rules. As we have already seen, violence is directed by an imperative to control. But there is a surprise in store for us: the sacrificial victim, Joan at the beginning of the sacrifice, is an inanimate being, a "mannequin, made of some flesh-colored elastic substance" (p. 148). The primary aim of the sacrificial act is not to kill her but *to bring her to life*. In this exemplary moment, it becomes clear that control itself belongs to a prior imperative: that of bringing the victim to life, that of *creating a victim*.

In the first stage of the fire torture, set ablaze and "[r]evived by this cruel method", Joan "pulls as hard as she can on her chains, producing a silvery clatter of barbaric bracelets" (p. 151); this is not enough. The second time, "the body ... moves more, in the reddening explosions of the living torch ... A kind of rattle emerges from her throat, with gasps and increasingly frequent screams, until the long, final harsh moan" (p. 152); not there yet. In the third stage, the "victim" finally "utters words, a mixture of supplications and avowals" (p. 153).

A parallel development takes place when the vignette of a half-caste girl anaesthetised by a mad white scientist, "discerned" on a door, reappears later on the cover of a pulp book. What is now discerned is that the half-caste girl is not in fact anaesthetised but injected with a "hallucinogenic substance, a nervous stimulant" (p. 72). Inside the pulp book, a further step: the ethnic girl is injected with a "truth serum" (p. 74). As with the sacrifice of Joan, the mad white doctor's shady operation doesn't *aim at* control. Control is in the service of an intensification of the victim's body. Furthermore, this intensification will make the victim speak *in her own voice*, will lead to "avowals", will give rise to a "forbidden narrative" (p. 74): the "terrible secrets ... bound to unleash irreparable catastrophes for herself as well as for the whole world" (p. 73). In Joan's sacrifice, we move from the silver of chains ("the silvery clatter of barbaric bracelets"), to the red of fire ("the reddening explosions of the living torch"), to the gold of the victim's voice — a ventriloquist voice imitating a collectivity: "We have suffered. We are in danger."

The sacrificial act brings to life a victim which posits a totalitarian conspiratory organisation. The birth of the victim proves

the existence of an ethnic conspiracy that endangers the survival of humanity. It is important to observe that the participants of the sacrificial act only emerge once it is concluded. The metaphorical substitution itself only becomes possible after its performance. If the sacrificial act and its replicas were to fail, the totalitarian ethnic conspiracy would be unable to constitute itself, and the threat to humanity would be dissolved. This is exactly what happens. The executioner, as we have seen, abandons the game by mistake, then unwittingly interrupts the replicate operation of doctor Morgan — "The day of the injection was also that of JR's [Joan's] execution" (p. 161). The "organization" disintegrates as the executioner, an N. G. Brown, chases the mad doctor, while terror bursts in in the form of "a giant poisonous spider" (p. 163). The dissolution of the organisation unleashes the monstrous.

Spiders and rats make regular appearances in *Project for a Revolution in New York*. To begin with, their role is limited: they are locked in pulp books, in the labyrinths of demented imaginations, or they are trained to obey orders. But certain gaps, certain failures, "deduce" them into existence, and they burst forth. Nevertheless, in Robbe-Grillet's memorable phrase (*Un régicide*, p. 153), "les bêtes elles-mêmes perdent pied", the beasts themselves lose their footing. The stray giant spider falls into the service of a higher order. In killing the revived victim, the spider substitutes for the executioner and concludes the metaphorical act. Further, in killing the victim after she announces the terrible secret and before she spells it out, with one fell swoop humanity is rescued and the power of the secret preserved.

Nevertheless, what the beast cannot do is answer the question that is burning on our lips. When N. G. Brown and Dr Morgan leave the scene, a man of the crowd, a humble myopic locksmith, hears a terrible scream that summons him to the victim; he witnesses her death and rapes a warm corpse. But the victim was gagged. Who screamed? Whose game are we in?

* * *

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As we have seen, the characters in *Project for a Revolution* have no interiority, no individual properties, but — as if in a comedy — they are highly stylised types, distributed among the positions of victim, executioner, and saviour. But in addition — and this is why this novel is not a comedy — the characters circulate and rotate around these positions: from persecutor and murderer to guardian and saviour, from victim to criminal, from public enemy to agent of public order. As a result, different characters become indistinguishable, while the same character becomes two or more — slipping from guardian to persecutor to criminal to victim, etc. In effect, names — such as Laura and Ben Said — are widely shared; secondly, the same general position, or even particular posture, is shared or claimed by different names and makes them indistinguishable; finally, the same name moves from position to position and ends up traversing the whole spectrum of action.

The stylisation of characters is replicated in objects. The whole movement to which the novel subjects its characters — from the moral abstraction of the triangle of victim, executioner, saviour, to the intensive circulation and communication of names — is equally applied to objects and stages. Ladders and stairs: up and down to kill or to save; doors, French windows: in and out, open and close, in safety or breaking in to threaten or breaking out to the streets; underground train, underground galleries: getting lost and trapped or hiding and escaping; the empty room, the empty lot: where in the executioner's house is the entry to the ominous empty room, where in the ominous empty lot is the executioner's way out? These objects and stages combine to make paradoxical spaces — finding the front by going upstairs, or reaching the top floor by going sideways. But though paradoxical — though defying *doxa* — these movements in space open routes and points of contact between narrative terrains that appeared isolated, sealed-off, and self-contained. At the heart of such developments is the juiciness of transitive structures: from the vertical of ladders, and the horizontal of corridors and rails, to the diagonal of interior and exterior staircases.

My hypothesis is that the point of departure of *Project for a Revolution in New York*, that is the matter on which the novel's experimentation is applied, the matter around which this

experimentation finds its *raison d'être* and its impetus, is the triangle of the victim, the executioner, and the saviour. This triangle is the stuff dreams are made of: from new ethnically cleansed nation-states, to Hollywood action films. (From Arendt's nuclear threat to humanity / Black Power movement / "white rebels"; to Jameson's world under "late capitalism" / minoritarian movements / US "international socialism"; to Braidotti's modern "crisis of rationality" / "black, ethnic, developing and lesbian" women / "radical sexual difference" feminism.) This triangle defines what, I believe, is the contemporary face of realism: self-definition. Or rather the *kind* of self-definition announced by the war cry: "We have suffered. We are in danger." This war cry is the voice of a fourth, transcendent, term that performs the triangulation; in narrative terms an "omniscient narrator" who, though apparently outside the field of action, infiltrates it in the guise of the saviour. This voice forecloses the rest of the world — the *hors cadre* — which can only appear in the deformed and defamed guise of the executioner.

Project for a Revolution in New York engages with this "realist" narrative — this anti-democratic moment within democracies, this majoritarian moment within minorities, this moment of stasis and abstraction within movements. It takes us, from this anti-democratic narrative, to the lateral movements within and between characters and objects discussed above. Thus narrative democracy is at the same time displayed and shown to be defamed. I believe that the critical function is here at its apex. Instead of denouncing what is to be avoided — "realism" as defined by the *TelQuel* group and later by Lyotard, and as exemplified by Arendt's *On Violence* — the critical function, as I understand it, employs experimentation to take us from this realism to what, according to it, does not exist, and back again.[13]

Lyotard's unforgivable mistake in "Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?" is to deprive experimentation of its critical function. In his ominous determination to preserve the notions of the avant-garde and of sublimity — which, in spite of the references to Kant, is the sublimity of the victim — Lyotard devoids experimentation of all practical import. Experimentation — what he calls postmodernism — always comes first and as if *ex nihilo*. It is then soiled by the fallen world of realism. How, as he claims, his postmodern avant-garde always

rises again is a mystery only to be explained by its communion with the divinity of the victim.

* * *

What I have called "the triangle of the victim, the executioner, and the saviour" is a function constitutive of internally centralised and externally aggressive collectivities: collectivities that preserve themselves at the expense of others. There is no doubt that real victims exist. But they are neither unpresentable, nor ontologically prior. They come last. In fact, once these collectivities have constituted themselves, they always come.

The processes that construct what I have called "the triangle of the victim, the executioner, and the saviour" elevate *exclusion* — in its inextricable aspects of "internal" appropriation and "external" opposition — to a categorical imperative. In what follows, this is the challenge: to describe a collective constitution which is based on *inclusive* relations with others.

PART III

Deleuze and Guattari

CHAPTER FIVE

Exclusive and inclusive encounters

Deleuze and Guattari's unique collaboration spanned a quarter of a century and was only cut short by death. The fruits of their collaboration include four books: *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1972), *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature* (1975), *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1980), and *What is Philosophy?* (1991).

In the second and last part of this thesis, I will focus on the first two of these collaborations: *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* and *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*. The whole of this chapter, and a large part of the following chapter, will be devoted to *Anti-Oedipus*, by far the lengthier and more difficult of the two. My purpose will be to highlight what I consider to be the essential project of these works; or maybe, put differently, to highlight what in these works is essential to my own project. It is not my intention to offer extended summaries of *Anti-Oedipus* and *Kafka*. Nor is it my intention simply to reproduce or "to be faithful to"[1] Deleuze and Guattari's vast terminology — a terminology verging from Dadaist neologisms such as "desiring-machines" and (combining Kant and psychoanalysis) "paralogisms of the unconscious", to well-known terms such as "schizophrenia" recontextualised and redefined beyond recognition.

Instead, my use of Deleuze and Guattari's terminology is selective and, in the rare instances when I have thought it necessary, I have combined their terminology with terminology of my own. Needless to say, all terms appearing in quotation marks are Deleuze and Guattari's. As to my "own" terminology — whose main examples are the distinction between exclusive and inclusive encounters in this chapter, and what I call oppressor triangles in the following chapter — it is meant to be descriptive, and I have taken care to select and combine terms which are already present in the work of Deleuze and Guattari, even if I assign to them tasks different and more general than those originally intended for them.

On many occasions Deleuze and Guattari have invited their readers to treat their books as "tool-boxes" that they may plunder at will, according to their own purposes. If in rejecting emphatically the option of attempting a "total" account of *Anti-Oedipus* and *Kafka* I seem to verge towards their advice, this is not a sophisticated gesture of allegiance or fidelity on my part. Nor have I learned from the mistakes of others. I might as well say that what I now emphatically reject I have already attempted in earlier drafts, with very unsatisfactory results.

Before embarking on my discussion of *Anti-Oedipus*, let me state briefly what I consider to be the essential in *Anti-Oedipus* and *Kafka*. Deleuze and Guattari's main project is to pose the problem of modern oppression and liberation. They pose this problem as a problem of differential relations, of encounters, and distinguish between two formations of differential relations — the one oppressive and exclusive, the other liberating and inclusive. The purpose of Deleuze and Guattari's conceptual apparatus is to distinguish between these two formations of differential relations, and to analyse their constituent parts.

* * *

Deleuze and Guattari's first collaboration, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, came out in 1972 and quickly brought about a tempest in the Parisian coffee-cup. Embraced as the first philosophical work to emerge out of the events of May 1968[2], it was immediately granted cult status, and was later to be described as a "succès de scandale".[3] In addition to this uncertain and possibly unwanted privilege, *Anti-Oedipus* had the good fortune, just as quickly, of becoming the object of substantial articles. I will single out Jacques Donzelot's "Une anti-sociologie" in *Esprit*[4], Jean-François Lyotard's "Capitalisme énergumène" in *Critique*[5], and René Girard's "Système du délire", also in *Critique*.[6] Almost twenty five years later, Girard's "Système du délire" and Lyotard's "Capitalisme énergumène" are still probably the most interesting articles to have been written on *Anti-Oedipus*. I will discuss them extensively, the former in this chapter, the latter in the following one.

Anti-Oedipus was first published in English in 1983 and, on its back cover, it was greeted by Jameson as "a major philosophical work, by perhaps the most brilliant philosophical mind at work in France today"; this characterisation of Deleuze echoes Foucault's judgement in 1977: "Une fulguration s'est produite qui portera le nom de Deleuze. Une nouvelle pensée est possible, de nouveau la pensée est possible ... Un jour, peut-être, le siècle sera deleuzien".[7] In 1977 *Anti-Oedipus* had already been presented to an English-speaking audience by the special issue of *Semiotext(e)*, "Anti-Oedipus". This issue included translations of Donzelot's "Une anti-sociologie" and Lyotard's "Capitalisme énergumène". Girard's "Système du délire", on the other hand, was probably deemed too polemical to serve the purposes of an introduction.

Nevertheless, Girard's "Système du délire"[8] — written clearly in defence of Girard's own 1972 book, *La violence et le sacré* — has the advantage of bringing into sharp relief, by way of contrast, the element of *Anti-Oedipus* which is at the centre of my interest in Deleuze and Guattari, as well as at the centre of this thesis: *the attempt to describe an inclusive relation with the other — a relation that requires neither annihilation nor appropriation and conquest — together with the hypothesis that the conditions for the emergence of such a relation can only be fulfilled among the "inferior races".*

Girard, though an opponent, can see this much more clearly than the sympathisers, the defenders, and the cult followers. In saying this, I put in brackets — and will ignore in the discussion to follow — those passages in Girard's article which are particularly sarcastic in tone and which seem to be addressed, not to *Anti-Oedipus*, but to its cult followers and to what they made of it. One such passage is as follows:

> Penser logiquement contre la logique des autres, voilà qui est de bonne guerre pour Deleuze et Guattari, mais ... on ne peut pas leur demander d'être logiques jusqu'au bout, puisque c'est la schizophrénie qui parle par leur bouche, puisqu'ils possèdent le *copyright* du vrai délire. Ah! la belle invention que cette schizo-analyse là! (p. 974)

But there is not a single passage in *Anti-Oedipus* that opposes schizophrenia to logic (or reason). The distinction in *Anti-Oedipus* is

between on the one hand the "schizophrenic breakthrough", and on the other hand neurosis, perversion, paranoia and catatonia (the schizophrenic breakdown where schizophrenia as a clinical entity belongs).[9] Bearing in mind that all these psychoanalytic terms are redefined and used to describe sociopolitical phenomena and not personal pathology, I will add that Deleuze and Guattari do use the Kantian term "paralogism", but they reserve it for neurosis, perversion, paranoia and catatonia. I can therefore only conclude that Girard's passage addresses itself to *Anti-Oedipus*'s cult followers, and gives *us* an anecdotal account of the time, the place, and of their way of thinking.

Deleuze and Guattari themselves, in attempting to clarify what they saw as misunderstandings around *Anti-Oedipus*, target not their critics, but the spurious revolutionary zeal of some of their most enthusiastic readers. Exemplary in this respect is a passage from Deleuze's "Politics"[10]:

> Stalins of little groups, neighborhood dispensers of justice, the micro-fascisms of gangs, etc. ... We have been interpreted as saying that for us the [clinical] schizophrenic is the true revolutionary. We believe rather that [clinical] schizophrenia is the collapse of a molecular process into a black hole [catatonia]. Marginal groups have been the object of fear, and sometimes of horror. They are not so clandestine ... The marginals are not those who create the lines; they install themselves on them, and make of them their property. It's perfect when they have the curious modesty of "men of the line," and the prudence of an experimenter, but a catastrophe when they slide into a black hole, from which emerges only the micro-fascist speech of their eddying dependency: "We are the avant-garde!" or "We are the marginals!" (pp. 97-98)

I. René Girard's encounter with *Anti-Oedipus*

Girard tells us that *Anti-Oedipus* attempts to "short-circuit" (p. 960) and "renonce donc à toute attaque frontale" (p. 959). *Anti-Oedipus*

describes "l'utopie d'un univers sans conflits" (p. 976). Instead of aiming to fight and defeat the forces of oppression, *Anti-Oedipus* "assiste donc à une réaffirmation sournoise" (p. 960); instead of "excluding Oedipus" — "Oedipus" in this book is a shorthand for oppression in all its forms — it attempts "lui ôter toute portée par inclusion excessive" (p. 958). Girard pretends to speechless exasperation: "Que reste-t-il donc à nier?"

In spite of Girard's characterisation of the Deleuzo-Guattarian method as utopian — literally, as "of no place" — not only does he recognise that it *does* come from somewhere, he is also able to identify exactly where it is coming from. Deleuze and Guattari, Girard tells us, play "le rôle du type contraint d'assister passivement au viol de son épouse" (p. 961). That is to say, the Deleuzo-Guattarian method comes from those faced with overwhelming power, those without power (*pouvoir*) but not without a force (*puissance*) of their own.[11] This is a force which, according to Girard himself, only rejects frontal attack in favour of guerilla tactics (p. 959); a force, I wish to argue, which "avoids" frontal attack in the most dynamic and active sense of the word.

But whereas *Anti-Oedipus* outlines a world of "partial connections", "inclusive disjunctions", and "polyvocal conjunctions"[12], Girard is so committed to a battle-like model of social relations that he cannot help thinking of the mobile, "guerilla", position of *Anti-Oedipus* as a position of cowardice. In that this "guerilla" position undermines clear demarcation lines, Girard considers that it is nothing but an unhappy farrago, a "vaste nuage d'encre destiné à dissimuler une capitulation sans conditions" (p. 976). In that it doesn't lead to a clear and definitive outcome — either victory or defeat — Girard believes that it is an idle project: "Les excursions dans les flux ne sont qu'un coup pour rien" (p. 959); even worse, "une méthode défaitiste" (p. 977), "une véritable paralysie" (p. 975).

Girard shows a masculine disdain for *Anti-Oedipus*. He considers it to be weak, irrelevant, ineffectual — in other words, it has the *wrong approach*. In addition, *Anti-Oedipus* for Girard is either too celestial and ethereal or too subterranean — in other words, it is at the *wrong place*, it is not where the real action is.[13] According to him, the proper

approach is confrontation; the proper terrain is civilisation which he translates as "society"; whereas the foe to be confronted is the well-known "malaise dans la civilisation" (p. 959) or the "crisis of society". The "crisis of society" is the tendency of society towards its own dissolution, towards "la perte de cet espace au sein duquel nous communiquons et dont nous ... croyons disposer en commun avec nos proches"; whereas the battle, "[l]a vrai bataille", is, so to speak, a battle of society against itself, a battle between its forces of unification and its forces of dissolution (p. 958).

Any other way of posing the problem of human misery is an evasion, and a futile one at that: "on retombe, soit un peu plus tôt soit un peu plus tard, dans la problématique qu'on voulait court-circuiter" (p. 960). Why? Because, according to Girard, his problematic is the only one that can pose human misery in a *concrete* way. To ignore *the* problem, the problem of the self-destructive sickness of civilisation, can only result in "l'escamotage de toute problématique concrète du désir"; "[l]a vraie bataille ne peut se situer que sur le terrain abandonné", that is the terrain of society (p. 958). What this means, in effect, is that any other way of posing the problem of human misery is automatically at one with the forces of destruction, and contributes to the sickness of civilisation and the crisis of society. That is to say, any intellectual opponent of Girard's is also an enemy of civilisation and of society.

The contrast between Girard and *Anti-Oedipus*, at this point, is instructive. *Anti-Oedipus* deals with *cross-border* encounters between heterogeneous entities of differing scale and dynamic, the kinds of relations — "connection", "disjunction", "conjunction" — that they enter into, as well as the quality of these relations — "partial" or "global", "inclusive" or "exclusive", "polyvocal" or "segregative". That is to say, *Anti-Oedipus* poses the problem of human misery as a problem of relations or rather as a problem of encounters, encounters with an other. Even though Girard, carried away by his own model, sets these encounters in a context of war, I will stress that they also describe "peacetime" phenomena — cultural, artistic and political phenomena ranging from dissemination and influence, to imposition and oppression. Girard, by contrast, in his combative exaltation, his thirst for real action and his stance of bravery, manages to avoid all

encounters *between* existing collectivities, cultures and ways of life, and recedes to the ideal terrain of society's internal struggle with itself.

In *Violence and the Sacred*, Girard develops a theory of "society" which he summarises and defends against *Anti-Oedipus* in "Système du délire". Society oscillates between a state of peaceful unity based on the symbolic differentiation of its members within a hierarchical system, and a Hobbsian state of war of all against all based on the undifferentiation brought about by imaginary identifications. The latter state or stage Girard describes as one of "mimetic rivalry" or "mimetic desire" or "desiring mimesis". Even though this mimesis appears "à quiconque l'observe du dehors, comme une configuration triangulaire dont les trois sommets sont occupés respectivement par les deux rivaux et leur objet commun" (p. 964), it is in fact "en deçà de toute représentation et de tout choix d'objet" (p. 963). It is, in essence, the mimesis of another subject and his desire, serving as a model for a pretender, a "disciple", who wants to take his master's place.[14] What we must add is that in a state of generalised mimetic rivalry, in a society in "crisis" in Girard's sense of the word, it is the distinction itself between rightful owner and pretender that comes to naught, since no desire is original and every desire is already the mimesis of the desire of another.[15]

Once a society is in a state of crisis, the "mechanism of the scapegoat" or of the "surrogate victim" intervenes, to bring about an instantaneous reversal of society's fortunes, a return to the other extreme of peaceful unity. The mechanism of the scapegoat — "mécanisme unificateur et fondateur" (p. 979) — redoubles the mimetic character of the crisis; it is itself mimetic. The formal simplicity of Girard's theory is startling — even if, as Baudrillard would say, "its index of refraction in any reality is nil" (*Simulations*, p. 127). The dissolution of the sociosymbolic bond[16],

> la perte violente du culturel[,] soit la condition nécessaire de sa restauration ... Ce que la *mimesis* a fragmenté et divisé à l'infini, elle peut d'un seul coup l'unifier à nouveau, dans un transfert collectif que l'indifférenciation générale rend possible... (p. 978)

That is to say, society is framed by two apparent movements that repeat themselves and follow each other forever in a void. With the certainty of a natural law, unity is followed by civil war, which in turn seems to be opposed to unity for the sole purpose of restoring it.

I call these movements apparent for two reasons. Firstly, because between them they pre-empt all external influence; the world outside the boundaries of a society becomes so irrelevant that it might as well not exist. Secondly, because they describe a society that is so completely devoid of qualities, of positive characteristics, that it could not possibly change or be replaced by another one. In brief, these movements describe a society that is immutable and immortal. The heightened sense of alarm that Girard conveys in his descriptions of a society in crisis is only matched by the superior knowledge that the crisis will be transitory. In "Système du délire" (if not in *Violence and the Sacred*) Girard is full of apocalyptic predictions for "us", for "our" society, and "our" time. We live in the midst of "une crise culturelle aggravée ... Et c'est le spectacle des *Bacchantes* qui recommence parmi nous" (p. 987). "C'est le destin de la culture moderne, de la fin moderne de toute culture au sens historique ... déboucher sur une véritable mort du culturel" (p. 994). Yet, at the same time — and on the same page — he asserts confidently that "[c]et état de choses devrait être temporaire[;] ... l'identité des *doubles* deviendra manifeste et la pensée se dirigera vers les nouvelles formes de totalisation qui déjà s'offrent à elle".

Of course, in spite of it all, Girard likes to pose as a hard-hitting critic of society and of human nature.[17] Girard presumes that all human relations take place among members of one and the same society, that all relations are relations of inequality, and that a society works well when in a state of unequal equilibrium — that is, when it has artificially stabilised these relations of inequality into a pseudo-destiny for its members. The justification for this artifice lies in Girard's conception of human nature as inherently evil. In particular, human beings have a natural and irrepressible desire for "mimetic rivalry"; their natural disposition towards their superiors and masters is hostile, vengeful — "maléfique" (p. 979). As a result, Girard calls "mimetic rivalry" or "desiring mimesis" — *which, though coming under the*

heading of human nature, is in fact Girard's judgement on the inferior members of a society — "la mauvaise *mimesis*" (p. 980).

There is, on the other hand, no human desire for unity. The mimesis of the mechanism of the scapegoat that brings unity about — the periodic performance, in times of crisis, of a unanimous act of aggression against the scapegoat, what Girard calls "la bonne *mimesis*" — relies not on desire but on an unaccountable residue of common sense and rational calculation. "La *mimesis* rituelle unanime ... constitue un préventif réel à l'égard de la *mimesis* vagabonde et conflictuelle. Contre la mauvaise *mimesis*, donc, le culturel ne connaît pas d'autre remède qu'une bonne *mimesis*" (p. 980). But where does this remedy come from? Girard can only say that it came about accidentally during an original crisis, and that it was adopted because it was successful in resolving it and in restoring unity. Still this doesn't explain where the impulse to repeat it came from, if human nature as Girard describes it only desires conflict and disunity.

* * *

I have been discussing Girard with the intention of elucidating Deleuze and Guattari, and I will shortly continue to do so. In the meantime, I will briefly turn to Deleuze and Guattari, Baudrillard and Benedict Anderson with the intention of shedding some light on Girard.

Underlying Girard's theory of "desiring mimesis" is the assumption that aggression, rivalry, hostility, and the "crises" of society that they bring about, emanate from the inferior members of society whose nature it is to desire their masters' place. At the beginning of the previous chapter, we have seen that Deleuze, in his reading of the Platonic triangle, starts from the opposite assumption. It is the rightful owner of power who fears and resents pretenders and claimants. It is the master who is aggressive and hostile towards the slave. This perspective is carried over in *Anti-Oedipus*. For example, Deleuze and Guattari argue that, if there is such a thing as the Oedipus Complex, it is on the side of the father, not the son:

> Oedipus itself would be nothing without the identifications of the parents with the children; and the fact cannot be hidden that

everything begins in the mind of the father: isn't that what you want, to kill me, to sleep with your mother? It is first of all a father's idea: thus Laius. It is the father who raises hell and brandishes the law... (p. 273)

To turn now to Baudrillard, the state of rivalry and undifferentiation that Girard identifies with a society in dissolution, with the "crisis of society", is notoriously described by Baudrillard in "Moebius — Spiralling Negativity" [18], where "[a]ll the hypotheses of manipulation are reversible in an endless whirligig" (p. 30). But Baudrillard sets "spiralling negativity" not in the context of society at large, in Girard's "common space which we all share and in which we communicate", but in the context of representative power. The rivals are political parties as well as scientific institutions, and the apparent object they are fighting over is us.

Baudrillard reverses every single point of Girard's scenario.

• He stresses the complicity underlying the rivalry of adversaries: "the work of the Right is done very well, and spontaneously, by the Left ... For the Right itself also spontaneously does the work of the Left" (p. 30).

• He attributes rivalry and undifferentiation not to human desire and its destructive nature, but to a systemic rationality:

> Everything is metamorphosed into its inverse in order to be perpetuated in its purged form. Every form of power ... speaks of itself by denial, in order to attempt to escape, by simulation of death, its real agony. Power can stage its own murder in order to rediscover a glimmer of existence and legitimacy. (p. 37)

• Finally, he argues that, far from this being a state of real crisis, it is there to preempt real crises. So that, whereas Girard threatens us with the death of "the modern", Baudrillard announces its ascendancy to the immortality of vampirism:

> In olden days the king (also the god) had to die — that was his strength. Today he does his miserable utmost to pretend to die, so as to preserve the *blessing* of power. To seek new blood in its own death, to renew the cycle by the mirror of crisis ... this is the only alibi of every power, of every institution attempting to

break the vicious circle of its irresponsibility and its fundamental non-existence, of its deja-vu and its deja-mort. (p. 37)

Lastly, I will turn to Benedict Anderson and to an insightful section of his *Imagined Communities*, brilliantly entitled "The Reassurance of Fratricide".[19] Anderson argues that a crucial element in the shaping of modern national societies is the fabrication of mythic fratricidal events of which we are "unceasingly to be 'reminded'", even though we are being constantly told that we must forget them.[20] Such events have a privileged position in the history textbooks of national educational systems. Yes, these massacres did happen; what is mythic about them is the appropriation of those involved by "national genealogies" which transform them into brothers-members, and founding fathers, of a present-day national society, and which "occlud[e] killers and killed", "victims and assassins", into an undifferentiated British, French, etc., ancestral stock. "Norman William and Saxon Harold thus meet on the battlefield of Hastings, if not as dancing partners, at least as brothers". Or, in one of the French equivalents, the thirteenth-century "massacres du Midi", the "murdered Albigensians [who] spoke Provençal or Catalan" and "their murderers [who] came from many different parts of Western Europe" meet and merge in "the pure Frenchness of 'Midi'". Anderson claims that, while modern nation-states have systematically deployed the myth of fratricide since the nineteenth century, what is at work here is "a deep reshaping of the imagination of which the state was barely conscious" (pp. 201-202 throughout).

To put Girard's theory in perspective, I have turned briefly to Deleuze and Guattari, Baudrillard and Anderson. Girard himself turns to Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche.

* * *

In "Système du délire" Girard presents his theory of "mimetic rivalry" as based on a reading of the relation between "will to power" and "ressentiment" in Nietzsche. The reference to Nietzsche serves the purpose of focusing and crystallising Girard's rejection of *Anti-Oedipus*. The edge of Girard's self-comparison to Deleuze in terms of Nietzsche

comes from Deleuze's reputation as the Nietzschean of his generation. With two books on Nietzsche already behind him by 1972 — *Nietzsche et la philosophie* (1962) and *Nietzsche* (1965) — Deleuze is considered to have introduced a return to Nietzsche in France.

Girard tells us that, whereas Deleuze believes that there is a real difference (*vrai différence*, p. 988) between "will to power" and "ressentiment"[21], their difference is circumstantial and depends solely on the outcome of their contest. The victorious party, the winner of a mimetic rivalry is retroactively seen to have possessed a "will to power", while the loser, once he has lost, is found to have been possessed by "ressentiment":

> la volonté de puissance et le ressentiment n'ont qu'une seule et même définition. L'une et l'autre se ramènent à la *mimesis* désirante ... Tant qu'un désir émerge triomphant des rivalités où il s'engage, il peut croire qu'il ne doit rien à l'autre ... Il ne peut pas rencontrer la défaite, par contre, sans se révéler à lui-même comme ressentiment ... Il n'est de volonté de puissance que victorieuse. Et la victoire n'est elle-même qu'un mythe. (p. 965)

Anti-Oedipus advances what I call an "ethics of inclusion". Girard's response to relations of inclusion is that they are neither possible nor real. Only relations of reciprocal exclusion, only "la réciprocité ennemie" (p. 966) is real, and the one alternative to it is the unanimous exclusion of the scapegoat. The only choice is between two forms of exclusion: reciprocal exclusion and unanimous exclusion. Non-exclusive relations are all in the mind of the victor who, once he has won, falls into a state of false consciousness. He imagines himself beyond rivalry in the hope of conjuring away the reversal of his fortunes, in the hope of remaining the master.

This is how Girard concludes that there is no real difference between "will to power" and "ressentiment", and that Deleuze's espousal of a real difference (in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* and in *Anti-Oedipus*) is wrong.[22] But Girard's conclusion is based on a fundamental misreading. Girard states that in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* "Deleuze a traduit volonté de puissance et ressentiment par forces actives et forces réactives" (p. 966). Deleuze does maintain that there is a real difference between "will to power" and "ressentiment", but he

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defines them as *two different principles determining the nature of the relation between forces.* That is to say, the real difference in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* passes not between the active and the reactive, the dominant and the dominated, the master and the slave, but between a synthetic, plastic and creative principle, and a principle of opposition, negation and falsification.

In *Nietzsche and Philosophy,* Deleuze describes the "will to power" as "the principle of the synthesis of forces": "[i]f ... the will to power is a good principle ... this is because it is essentially a *plastic* principle that is no wider than what it conditions, that changes itself with the conditioned and determines itself in each case along with what it determines" (p. 50). Under the second principle of "ressentiment", on the other hand, reactive forces emerge as superior for not doing what they can't do, and for preventing active forces from doing what they can do. In particular, under "ressentiment" force is "neutralised [and] moralised": "[a]s soon as forces are projected into a fictitious subject this subject proves to be blameworthy or deserving — blameworthy if active force performs the activity which is its own, deserving if reactive force does not perform the activity which it ... doesn't have" (p. 124). "Ressentiment" involves "the fiction of a super-sensible world in opposition to this world ... In and through this fiction reactive forces *represent themselves as superior*". In "ressentiment", "the difference between forces seen from the side of reaction becomes the opposition of reactive forces [as superior forces] to active forces [as inferior forces]" (p. 125). In effect, under "ressentiment" it is as if "*[e]verything takes place between reactive forces*" (p. 114).[23]

From the point of view of such a distinction between "will to power" and "ressentiment", we could say that all the relations that Girard describes in his theory develop under the principle of "ressentiment". Yes, of course there is no fundamental difference between rivals, but this is because in their reciprocal exclusion their forces have become reactive. And this is also the case with the univocal exclusion of the scapegoat. Because, in spite of what Girard thinks, there is no real difference between "mimetic rivalry" and the "mechanism of the scapegoat". There is no real difference between what Girard calls the crisis of society and what he calls the resolution of

the crisis. A resolution that depends on "lynchage" and "pogrom" (p. 981) cannot be a real alternative to the suicide pacts of mimetic rivalry.

Once in his article, Girard points to another alternative. In a few lines which come out of nowhere Girard speaks of:

> la rivalité qui se refuse ... l'adversaire qui se dérobe, celui que Proust nommera "l'être de fuite" ... l'indifférence sincère, absolue, des autres êtres, pas même invulnérables, simplement fascinés par *autre chose.* (p. 966)

What is this "something else"? Since fascination with an other in Girard — both in "mimetic rivalry" and in the "mechanism of the scapegoat" — is inseparable from the desire to oppose, negate and annihilate this other, we could say that being fascinated with "something else" means being fascinated in a different way, with a different kind of fascination. Being fascinated, not with the annihilation of the other, but with the refusal of enmity itself (the "fuite" of the extract above), with "undressing" and laying down one's guns (the "dérobade" above).

Let us imagine an encounter between two parties, the one in a state of "mimetic rivalry", fascinated with annihilation, the other in a state of flight from rivalry, fascinated with "undressing". In this encounter, we have what I have called an *asymmetrical relation* (see my first chapter). The two parties do not relate to each other in the same way. There is a difference of intention, or rather of will, between them. From the perspective of the one whose will is a "will to nothingness", a "will to annihilation", this is an encounter of reciprocal enmity under the principle of "ressentiment". From the perspective of the other whose will is a "will to power" (as defined above), this is what I will call an *inclusive encounter*. It is only the former party that "represents itself as superior" (see above), that strives for superiority, that announces itself as "of a superior race".

In *Anti-Oedipus*, the truly subjugated groups are not those who have been conquered and defeated, but those whose members define themselves as "belong[ing] to the master race"; as "'indeed being one of us,' ... being part of a superior race threatened by enemies from outside" (pp. 104 and 103). Exemplary of the *modus operandi* of such groups is the "Jewish conspiracy" in the eyes of the Nazi.

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II. The components of exclusive and inclusive encounters

"the fundamental problem of political philosophy is still precisely the one that Spinoza saw so clearly, and that Wilhelm Reich rediscovered: 'Why do people fight *for* their servitude as stubbornly as though it were their salvation?'"
(*Anti-Oedipus*, p. 29)

"Why are the people so deeply irrational? Why are they proud of their own enslavement? Why do they fight 'for' their bondage as if it were their freedom?"
(Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, pp. 9-10)

"I would say that *Anti-Oedipus* (may its authors forgive me) is a book of ethics, the first book of ethics to be written in France in quite a long time ... one might say that *Anti-Oedipus* is an *Introduction to the Non-Fascist Life*."
(Michel Foucault, Preface to *Anti-Oedipus*, p. xiii)

Deleuze and Guattari's distinction between two syntheses of differential relations is analysed in detail in *Anti-Oedipus*, the two syntheses broken down into a number of constituent elements which I will reassemble in the discussion to follow.

This distinction is, nevertheless, already present in Deleuze's earlier work. It is especially present in what Deleuze "discovers" in the work of the two thinkers most important to him: Spinoza and Nietzsche. (Before the publication of *Anti-Oedipus* Deleuze had already published two books on Nietzsche, which I have already mentioned, and two books on Spinoza: *Spinoza et le problème de l'expression* (1968) and *Spinoza: Philosophie pratique* (1970).)

We have already seen that Deleuze describes the distinction between "will to power" and "ressentiment" in Nietzsche as a distinction between two "principles" for the relation between forces — an immanent, "good ... *plastic* principle that it no wider than what it condition, that changes itself with the conditioned", etc. and a transcendent principle which involves "the fiction of a supra-sensible world", under which forces are "neutralized [and] moralised" (quoted above). This distinction resurfaces in Deleuze's discussion of the

difference between morality and Spinozian ethics in *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*. Following the distinction between "will to power and "ressentiment", Deleuze's argument, simplified, is that whereas morality distinguishes between *the a priori* Good and Evil, Spinozian ethics distinguishes between good or beneficial and bad or harmful "encounters". From the point of view of Spinozian ethics and its distinction between good and bad encounters, an encounter governed by morality would be a bad encounter, harmful for the parties involved.[24] Needless to say, my distinction between inclusive and exclusive encounters in this chapter is indebted to Deleuze's distinction between good and bad encounters in *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*.

I will now discuss five components of exclusive and inclusive encounters and, as with *Anti-Oedipus* itself, my emphasis will be on the analysis of the components of the exclusive encounter or of the exclusive use of encounters.

(Before I begin, allow me one last paragraph of caution on *Anti-Oedipus*'s terminology. The synthesis of differential relations that Deleuze calls "ressentiment" in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* and "bad encounter" in *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, and that I will be calling exclusive encounter or exclusive use of encounters, bears a variety of names in *Anti-Oedipus*. In the context of *Anti-Oedipus*'s lengthy critique of modern capitalist societies, it is called the capitalist "régime", "axiomatic" or "formation of sovereignty". In the context of *Anti-Oedipus*'s equally lengthy critique of psychoanalysis and its "disgrace in history and politics" (p. 102), it is called "paralogisms of psychoanalysis" or "illegitimate uses of the syntheses of the unconscious". In addition, though *Anti-Oedipus*'s two main reference points are psychoanalysis and Marxism, it moves through a large number of registers, from painting to linguistics to biology, modifying its terminology accordingly. Yet, as I hope will become clear to the reader, the overarching distinction is between two different uses of differential relations, whatever their latest name, and I will be consistently calling them exclusive and inclusive.)

1.

A first component of the exclusive use of encounters is that it projects encounters onto a "mythical locale": the "projection of all the break-flows onto the same mythical locale, and all the nonsignifying signs into the same major signifier".[25] Girard's "society", Jameson's "global social totality", Lernout's Canada, or Braidotti's feminism can be seen as such "mythical locales". Such fields are called "mythical", not in the sense that they don't really exist, but in the very sense that Marx calls capital a fetish and a "quite mysterious being".[26] In the same way in which — as Deleuze and Guattari, following Marx, point out — capital appropriates labour and "appears as its natural or divine presupposition ... arrogating to itself both the whole and the parts of the proccess, which now seem to emanate from it as a quasi cause"[27], such fields retroactively appropriate encounters as their own.

The concept that *Anti-Oedipus* invents in order to capture mythical locales is the concept of the "artificial territoriality", which I discussed and have been using since my first chapter. The choice of the word "artificial" is polemical, and requires some clarification. Far from opposing the falsity of an "artificial territoriality" to a genuine and therefore non-artificial territoriality, it is meant, on the contrary, to stress that mythical locales are historically produced rather than natural and eternal, and concretely real rather than divine and transcendent. That is to say, the concept of the "artificial territoriality" emphasises that a given field is inseparable from the encounters that constitute it, that it is assembled — and continues to be assembled — out of encounters. If anything is opposed, this is the idea that beyond a mutable field of encounters there is, not a world of other such fields, but a higher self of this field where, and only where, it finds a coherence and a reason for being. This is the "apparent movement", or the "basic illusion that makes us believe that real desiring-production is answerable to higher formations that integrate it, subject it to transcendent laws, and make it serve a higher social and cultural production" (p. 74.). If anything is opposed, this is the idea that a field of encounters is overseen by its essence, in relation to which encounters are judged only to be found lacking, so that "everything is played out from the start" (p. 72). In fact, this is more than an idea, it

is a process: "everywhere we encounter a process that consists in extrapolating a transcendent and common something, but that is a common universal for the sole purpose of introducing lack into desire" (p. 72).

Let's take as an example Dizzy Gillespie's collaboration with Cuban musicians and the jazz-Latin compositions that came out of it. These compositions can be called inclusive encounters between jazz and Latin elements (and jazz and Latin music themselves seen as fields of encounters). If one were to refer these compositions to an essence of jazz, or to an essence of Cuban music, or to the essential Gillespie, it would only be in order to find them lacking, and to discourage such collaborations in the future. One would also be missing the point, which is that the force of an encounter lies in constituting a field of its own, with its own immanent criteria and values.

To conclude, *the exclusive use of an encounter involves, firstly, a "transcendent use" of the encounter itself.* That is, a use in which "we pass from detachable partial objects to the detached complete object, from which global persons derive by an assigning of lack" (p. 73, italics removed). What is meant by "partial objects" and "global persons" I hope to make clear in the following discussion of the second component of the exclusive use.

2.

The exclusive use of an encounter involves, secondly, a "global use" of its constituent parts.
Once an encounter is projected onto an "artificial territoriality", the parties involved in the encounter acquire a fixed identity as divisions or provinces of this "artificial territoriality", in the manner that Kant "posits God as the a priori principle of the disjunctive syllogism, so that all things derive from it by a restriction of a larger reality (*omnitudo realitatis*)" (*Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 75-76), with the "artificial territoriality" cast in the role of God.

In this context, the encounter becomes an external relation, a foreign affair, between two fully constituted subjects or "global persons". "Global persons", Deleuze and Guattari insist, only arise once an encounter is mediated — in the terminology of *Anti-Oedipus*,

"triangulated" — by an "artificial territoriality": "global persons — even the very form of persons — do not exist ... prior to the triangulation into which they enter" (p. 70). But this mediation, far from bringing the parties together, separates them along the lines of an abstract binary classification, an "exclusive differentiation". One *is* either a woman or a man; in Girard's society in peace one is either a slave or a master; in Jameson's "global social totality" one is either on the side of late capitalism or on the side of international socialism; in Zavala's "Hispanic sphere" one is either on the side of Hispanic modernism or on the side of postmodern American neoimperialism, etc.

What happens to an encounter once it is triangulated is that it is suspended. For all intents and purposes it is *as if there was no encounter* to begin with, simply because no encounter is possible between the two sides of an exclusive differentiation. And what happens to the desire which had brought that encounter about, once it finds itself in a world of exclusively differentiated "global" entities, is that, in desiring the other, it appears to desire what it lacks and is constitutionally unable to have:

> desire at the same time receives a fixed subject ... and complete objects defined as global persons ... In reality, global persons — even the very form of persons — do not exist prior to the prohibitions that weigh on them and constitute them, any more than they exist prior to the triangulation into which they enter: desire receives its first complete objects and is forbidden them at one and the same time. (p. 70)

In brief, desire becomes "impossible".

To conclude, whereas in the "partial" use of the constituent parts of an encounter these parts enter into a synthesis of particular potentials within a field constituted by the synthesis itself; whereas in the inclusive differentiation between these parts their encounter lacks nothing but, instead, creates an excess of being; when the constituent parts of an encounter are used globally and differentiated exclusively, there can *no longer* be an encounter, and the desire for it is reduced to a desire for the impossible.

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3.

The exclusive use of an encounter involves, thirdly, a false dilemma between an exclusive differentiation between the parties which makes the encounter impossible, and an undifferentiation between the parties which turns the encounter into a murderous duel.

Once within the global use of the parties of an encounter, the only way out, the only alternative to their exclusive differentiation is undifferentiation or — as Deleuze and Guattari call it poignantly — "murderous identification" (p. 80). Murderous identification *is* Girard's "mimetic rivalry" *avant la lettre*, and its anticipation and contextualisation in *Anti-Oedipus* fully explains Girard's polemical mood in "Système du délire".

In "Système du délire" Girard claims that "mimetic rivalry" is a novel concept, and a key to the resolution of the crisis of modernity. But *Anti-Oedipus* reminds us where "mimetic rivalry" is coming from, as well as showing that Girard's solution to it, "the mechanism of the surrogate victim", is part of the problem: "the problem is not resolved until we do away with *both the problem and the solution*" (p. 81); until, that is, we pose the problem differently.

The following passage from *Anti-Oedipus*, obviously written before the publication of Girard's *La violence et le sacré*, reads as an illuminating commentary on Girard's work:

> when Freud elaborates the entire historico-mythical series: at one
> end the Oedipal bond is established by the murderous
> identification, at the other end it is reinforced by the
> restoration and internalization of paternal authority ("revival of
> the old state of things at a new level"). Between the two there is
> latency ... this society of "brothers" who forbid themselves the
> fruits of the crime, and spend all the time necessary for
> internalizing. But we are warned: the society of brothers is very
> dejected, unstable, and dangerous, it must prepare the way for
> the rediscovery of an equivalent to paternal authority, it must
> cause us to pass over to the other pole. In accord with a
> suggestion of Freud's, American society — the industrial society
> with anonymous management and vanishing personal power, etc.
> — is presented to us as a resurgence of the "society without the

father." Not surprisingly, the industrial society is burdened with the search for original modes for the restoration of the equivalent... (p. 80)

A usual objection to the use of psychoanalysis in political theory is that it is inappropriate because it deals with the private person. Deleuze and Guattari, on the contrary, object to it exactly because it can be so compatible, at crucial junctures, with the mainstream of modern philosophy — with what Deleuze has been calling "state philosophy" (see my third chapter). Deleuze and Guattari's objections to Freud are carried over to Lacan and his disciples. Yes, "it was inopportune to tighten the nuts and bolts where Lacan had just loosened them" (p. 83). But if the first and, especially, the second generation of Lacan's disciples

> were tempted to reclose the Oedipus yoke, didn't they do so to the extent that Lacan seemed to maintain a kind of projection of the signifying chains onto a despotic signifier, lacking unto itself and reintroducing lack into the series of desire on which it imposed an exclusive use? (p. 83)

This passage not only anticipates Girard, but — what is more important today — it anticipates the Lacanian Zizek (see the discussion of Zizek's *The Sublime Object of Ideology* in my fourth chapter).

* * *

"Murderous identification" reopens the way to encounters, but no sooner are they made possible than they are shown in a negative light as conflictual and destructive. That is to say, encounters do emerge as the alternative to exclusive differentiations, but not before they are defamed as something to be feared. So that one is left with a stark choice: either you know your place in an exclusive differentiation and you are a good slave or, if you desire encounters, you seek chaos and destruction. The modern process of subjugation that Deleuze and Guattari call Oedipus "creates both *the* [exclusive] *differentiations that it orders and the undifferentiated with which it threatens us*" (pp. 78-79):

the exclusive relation introduced by Oedipus comes into play not only between the various disjunctions conceived as [exclusive] differentiations, *but between the whole of the* [exclusive] *differentiations that it imposes and an undifferentiated (un indifférencié) that it presupposes.* (p. 79)

This nightmarish dilemma, where you loose whichever path you take, Girard elevates into a universal "*double bind* comme rapport du désir" ("Système du délire", p. 970). *Anti-Oedipus*, on the other hand, tries to find a path between the Scylla of symbolic differentiation and the Charybdis of imaginary identification:

> we are unable to posit any difference in nature, any border
> line, any limit at all between the Imaginary and the
> Symbolic, or between Oedipus-as-crisis and Oedipus-as-
> structure, or between the problem and its solution ... The
> true difference in nature is not between the Symbolic and the
> Imaginary... (p. 83)

Deleuze and Guattari call this path, this itinerary, the "line of escape" or the "line of flight". They also sometimes call it the "schizophrenic voyage". On occasion they multiply their terminology even further with composites such as the "schizophrenic line of escape" (see, for example, p. 316). But the overabundant use of the terms "schizophrenia" or "schizophrenic" in *Anti-Oedipus* cannot be explained by reference to the well-known clinical entity. The "schizophrenic voyage" is the path of inclusive differentiation, of the inclusive encounter, where — instead of "abolish[ing] disjunction by identifying the contradictory elements" (exclusive differentiation) or, alternatively, "reduc[ing] two contraries to an identity of the same" (murderous identification) — "the differential positions persist in their entirety". But if the "schizophrenic voyage", what I call the inclusive encounter, "is and remains in disjunction", this is exactly because it "affirms their distance as *that which relates the two as different*", and "affirms it through a continuous overflight spanning *an indivisible distance*". This indivisible distance is the field constituted by the inclusive encounter, a field where things happen rather than finding their proper place. And if this field has a subject, this is not a transcendent spirit of the field but

rather a "transpositional subject" following events within it. (pp. 76-77 throughout, my italics).

4.
The exclusive use of an encounter involves, fourthly, a "biunivocal" relation between artificial territoriality and global person.
Deleuze and Guattari define the inclusive encounter as an encounter between *active groups*: "it is no longer a matter of re-forming cadres of familial and social adaptation or integration, but rather of instituting original forms of active groups" (*Anti-Oedipus*, p. 94). What is at stake in inclusive encounters is neither utopia nor dystopia, but to reclaim reality in a small "venture outdoors" (p. 2). So that every inclusive encounter is a small "*mise-en-scène* of a machine to produce the real" (p. 87). Inversely, the production of reality is seen as based on inclusive encounters between active groups — not on the self-realisation of a subject in a dialectical relation with the world. Let's pause to look at what happens to the two notions of "reality" and "production" once they are brought within the field of the inclusive encounter.

The notion of "reality", on the one hand, takes a clear distance from the abstract and static formalism of Kant's concept of "space":

> reality has ceased to be a principle. According to such a principle, the reality of the real was posed as a divisible abstract quantity, whereas the real was divided up into qualified unities, into distinct qualitative forms (p. 87)

as well as from Kant's alternative of the unknowable and impossible to experience, the noumenal "thing in itself". Put differently, the notion of "reality" in *Anti-Oedipus* treads a path between this Kantian "double bind". This is why the potentials released and coupled in an inclusive encounter are sometimes called "intensive quantities": "But now the real is a product that envelops the distances within intensive quantities" (p. 87; see also p. 84). This reference to the "intensive magnitudes" in *The Critique of Pure Reason* is meant to bring forth the only element of the first Critique that hints at a borderline area between Reason and the "thing in itself", at a third impure field of interaction between the two.[28]

The notion of "production" in *Anti-Oedipus*, on the other hand, takes a clear distance from the early Marxian/Hegelian notion of production as the "objectification of human essence", the "self-creation of man", and "the activity of men in pursuit of their ends" (*Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*).[29] It equally takes a distance from Marx's later writings, where the "real foundation" of production moves from man and his "material productive forces" to the "existing relations of production".[30] As Marx's work develops, there is a constant shift in the balance of power between man-the-producer and the objective world in favour of the latter. This tendency culminates in *Capital*, in the famous nightmarish passage about the "mutilation", "fragmentation" and "distortion" of the labouring man, and of his wife and child, "beneath the wheels of the Juggernaut of capital".[31] Nevertheless, the opposition remains, and the oscillation between its two poles permeates not only Marxism but modern thought at large.

The vocabulary that Deleuze and Guattari use to describe what they call "desiring-production" and "desiring-machines" is apparently similar to that of the early Marx: desiring-production is "at grips with" reality (pp. 99-100); the desiring-machine "seize[s]" reality, and "extract[s] ... this always-surplus reality" (p. 87). But — instead of the dialectic between "forces of production" and "relations of production", between Man as the "realm of freedom" and social reality as the "realm of necessity", between "unalienated" and "alienated" labour, between authentic self-expression and "reification" — what, for *Anti-Oedipus*, is required in order to grasp reality is, in plain words, not to express your authentic self but to be capable of being affected by others. The terrain is one of interaction between groups, not between Man and the World, and active groups are not those striving for self-realisation — striving to project their essence onto the external world — but those capable of, those that can tolerate, interaction, impurity, artificiality and inauthenticity. To stress its distance from the ideals of authenticity and self-expression, *Anti-Oedipus* describes the production of reality as "simulation", in a passage that addresses both Kant and Marx at the same time:

> But now the real is a product that envelops the distances within
> intensive quantities. The indivisible is enveloped, and signifies

that what envelops it does not divide without changing its nature or form ... [S]imulation ... carries the real beyond its principle to the point where it is effectively produced by the desiring-machine. The point where the copy ceases to be a copy in order to become the Real *and its artifice.* (p. 87)[32]

The inclusive encounter does not simply address reality, it is itself a small reality-machine, a "desiring-machine". Once "global persons" enter into it, they change their nature or form (see quote above), they are in a different state: that of potentials traversing the "desiring-machine". So that the reality that the inclusive encounter "simulates" no longer refers to or takes its meaning from the "artificial territorialities" where the parties encountering each other came from. Nor can this reality be attributed to an externalisation of the essence of these parties, since their essence only appears, since they only acquire an essence, within the context of the "artificial territoriality" which they left behind when they crossed the threshold of the inclusive encounter. At best, the essence of the parties can be understood as a stimulus or an inductor, as long as it is equally understood that the "language (*langage*)" of the inclusive encounter is "on the side of the response, not the stimulus" (p. 98). Global figures are:

inductors or stimuli of varying, vague import that trigger processes of an entirely different nature, processes that are endowed with what amounts to an indifference with regard to the stimulus ... the true organizer is elsewhere — on the side of what is induced, not on that of the inductor. (pp. 91-92)

The exclusive use of an encounter, on the other hand, refers the encounter to "global persons", and refers the "global persons" themselves back to the "artificial territorialities" where they came from. Or, in the language of *Anti-Oedipus*, the exclusive use of an encounter refers the encounter to a "biunivocal" relation between global person and artificial territoriality. The "biunivocal" relation is a relation between an interior and an exterior, between a closed microcosm (private or mental space) and a closed macrocosm (public or social space), where the former *expresses* the latter.[33] What the "biunivocal" relation *does* is that it displaces concrete practical problems — such as the problem of "instituting original forms of active groups": *how* to

build a modern collective self that doesn't involve the exclusion of the other, *how* to avoid this modern propensity. The "bi-univocal" relation, and the pseudo-problem, *par excellence* is the relation between Man and the World.[34] And it displays very well:

> the magic formula that characterizes biunivocalization — the flattening of the polyvocal real in favor of a symbolic relationship between two articulations: so *that* is what *this* meant. (p. 101)

So that Man, private space, "a microcosm, an *expressive* milieu[,] ... however capable of expressing the action of the alienating forces — 'mediates' them precisely by suppressing the true categories of *production* in the machines of desire" (p. 95).

Throughout *Anti-Oedipus*, over and over again, Deleuze and Guattari discuss the distinction between the "what" question and the "how" question — "What does it mean?" as against "How does it work?" (see my first chapter) — as a distinction between two different ways of posing the problem of human misery, wielding different solutions, and argue in favour of the latter.[35] Girard does not discuss this distinction, but the rejection of the "What does it mean?" question in *Anti-Oedipus* is at the centre of his problems with it. This is for the simple reason that his method — in "Système du délire" as well as in *La violence et le sacré* — consists in establishing a "biunivocal" relation between the delirium of the "mimetic rival" (the disciple, the slave) and the "crisis of society"; that is, it consists in finding the meaning of this delirium in "society", in order to claim that this knowledge will enable society to overcome its crisis and to reconstitute itself on a higher level ("Système du délire", p. 994). As a result, Girard's central thesis in "Système du délire" is that of "L'expressivité du délire": "Contrairement à Deleuze et Guattari, je pense donc que le délire *veut dire* quelque chose" (p. 970).

According to my account of the postmodernism debate, the "what does it mean?" question is omnipresent in it, as the main weapon of the participants-representatives against their respective minorities. In Jameson, unless minoritarian movements find their meaning within the context of the "international socialism" of the new New Left, they will be understood as symptomatic of postmodernism, which is symptomatic of late capitalism. In Mertens, the surplus elements of

Dutch fiction are symptoms of the unwanted American second-rateness of postmodernism. In Hutcheon, those trends of feminism which do not recognise themselves as sub-sections of "sexual difference" feminism are symptomatic of "(male) postmodernism", etc., etc. All such cases involve a blackmail which runs as follows. If those surplus elements do not find their place in the symbolic differentiations of the territory represented by the participant-representative, and if they don't develop a biunivocal relation of interior/exterior with this territory, they are projected into a no-man's-land, into a "chaos of undifferentiation" (discussed above). Such a "chaos of undifferentiation" is Jameson's identity-bashing postmodernism, Hutcheon's ambivalent postmodernism, Mertens's plagiarist postmodernism.

5.

Fifthly and finally, the exclusive use of encounters involves a "segregative" use of artificial territorialities.

In the context of the biunivocal relation between a global person and an artificial territoriality, the "desiring-production" generated by the inclusive encounter is displaced into the "interior" of the global person; whereas the boundary between the exclusive and the inclusive use of encounters, and that between the respective "global" and "partial" states of being in which the parties involved appear, is displaced with the boundary between global person and artificial territoriality:

> Schizophrenia or desiring-production is the boundary between the molar organization and the molecular multiplicity of desire; this limit of deterritorialization must now pass into the interior of the molar organization, and it must be applied to a factitious and subjugated territoriality [the global person]. (p. 102)

It is in this context, a context in which reality is reduced to a "frame of social integration" (quoted above), that "[e]verything has been said about the paucity of reality, the loss of reality, the lack of contact with life ... Dark world, growing desert: a solitary machine hums on the beach, an atomic factory installed in the dessert" (pp. 86-87). And it is also in this context that the figure of the "Great Man" is "made to appear" (p. 102).

Deleuze and Guattari's thesis is that the global person and its figurehead, the great Man, is "a factitious and subjugated territoriality": *"the ultimate private and subjugated territoriality of European man"* (p. 102, my italics). It is to the global person that we must turn if we want to understand what *Anti-Oedipus* identifies as the "fundamental problem" of modern political philosophy: "Why do people fight *for* their servitude as stubbornly as though it were their salvation?" (p. 29). Originally posed by Spinoza and then by Wilhelm Reich in *The Mass Psychology of Fascism* (pp. 29, 385 note 31), the project of *Anti-Oedipus* is to recall and reformulate this problem: "to show how, in the subject who desires, desire can be made to desire its own repression" (p. 105).

But the global person is itself based on a precondition, which is that of the "segregative" use of artificial territorialities — "desire can be made to desire its own repression ... through the segregative use of the conjunctive syntheses", "the segregative use is a precondition" (pp. 104-105) — and which is encapsulated by the modern European invention of state-nationalism. Whether the king is dead or not, the modern nation-state finds its principle of coherence elsewhere; in an entity which is far more intangible, mysterious, "spiritual", and superior. From the king's direct descent from God, we move to the absolute transcendence of the "spirit of the race":

> an enormous archaism, an incarnation of the race in person or in spirit: yes, I am one of you. (p. 104)

It is the segregative use of artificial territorialities that creates the conditions for the aberrations of European history and the misadventures of the European spirit, since:

> it is this use that brings about the feeling of 'indeed being one of us,' of being part of a superior race threatened by enemies from outside. (p. 103)

The modern spiritual struggle against the paucity of reality, and the modern tragic consciousness of the loss of reality, are inseparable from this "archaism": inseparable from its intense, if pernicious, passional life, from its impossibility, and from its particular Sisyphean movement between fall and redemption. Whereas the largest-scale extermination of perceived enemies is but a small step towards redemption, the

slightest inclusive encounter, the slightest trace of "them", is perceived as a fall, as an obstacle to the global person's expression of the essence, and tortures the global person. These are thorns in the global person's flesh, keeping his passion for the divine "archaism" alive. And all the while, what is kept alive first and foremost is the modern European invention of a new type of slave. Oedipus, the dialectic between the global person and the segregative use of an artificial territoriality "flourishes in subjugated groups, where an established order is invested through the group's own repressive forms"; the "*segregative use* ... does not coincide with divisions between classes, although it is an incomparable weapon in the service of a dominating class" (p. 103).

The global person *is* the European master-slave that conquered the world. And the dialectic between global person and segregated artificial territoriality *is* the Danaan gift of the modern nation-state to the rest of the world and to its own minorities.

The conditions for inclusive encounters, on the other hand, develop in the perspectives both of "the struggle against our culture" (p. 85) — the struggle that "leads Nietzsche to say, I'm not a German, I'm Polish" (p. 86) — and of those who came face to face with European aggression. Their perspective, their experience, is an experience of "remain[ing] stuck to the agents of oppressive social reproduction" (p. 169):

> always grappling with other agents that they express all the less as they are increasingly at grips with them... (p. 100)

That is to say, instead of experiencing "transcendent" laws, they experience an immanent aggression. Instead of experiencing the "biunivocal" relation between an expressive "global" person and the spirit of a "segregated" artificial territoriality, they experience a direct encounter between private and public — their "pairing" and "their locking embrace similar to that of wrestlers", which keeps their private microcosm from "closing up ... and from claiming to express and represent" (p. 96). Instead of experiencing a "double bind" between order and disorder, they experience an organising force that is deadly for them. And instead of experiencing internal suffering (the tortured world of their interiority), they only experience facts, harsh facts:

we had to wait for the dreams of colonized peoples in order to see that, on the vertices of the pseudo triangle, mommy was dancing with the missionary, daddy was being fucked by the tax collector, while the self was being beaten by a white man ... When Frantz Fanon encounters a case of persecution psychosis linked to the death of the mother, he first asks himself if he has "to deal with an unconscious guilt complex following on the death of the mother, as Freud had described in *Mourning and Melancholia*." But he soon learns that the mother has been killed by a French soldier, and that the subject himself has murdered the wife of a colonist... (p. 96) [36]

CHAPTER SIX

From superior and inferior races
to becoming minoritarian

In the last chapter, I assembled a number of distinctions and concepts, developed in *Anti-Oedipus*, around what I called the distinction between the *exclusive* and the *inclusive* use of encounters. In doing this, I was assisted by René Girard's reading of *Anti-Oedipus*, and by his own theory of "mimetic rivalry" which served sometimes by way of simple contrast, sometimes as background, sometimes as an example of those philosophical and political habits that Deleuze and Guattari grapple with and fight against.

This chapter could be subtitled: "From the Problematic of Oppression to the Problematic of Liberation". It comprises two sections. The first section, "Superior and Inferior Races", continues and concludes the discussion of *Anti-Oedipus*, focusing on two Deleuzo-Guattarian distinctions — "superior races" versus "inferior races" and "subjugated groups" versus "subject-groups". It goes through a lengthy encounter with Arnold Toynbee, a brief encounter with Benedict Anderson, and a not so brief encounter with Jean-François Lyotard. The aim of this first section is to repose the problematic of oppression in terms of the *exclusive* relation with others. The second section, "Becoming Minoritarian", turns to a discussion of Deleuze and Guattari's *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, encountering Kafka, Kafka's K., and, briefly, Edward Said's reading of Kipling's Kim. The aim of the second section is to repose the problematic of liberation in terms of the *inclusive* relation with others.

I. Superior and inferior races

In this section, I will discuss the distinction, made in *Anti-Oedipus*, between "superior races" and "inferior races", as well as the related distinction between "subjugated groups" and "subject-groups". The two

distinctions are not to be conflated, nor are their terms interchangeable. In brief, the relation between the two distinctions can be understood as follows: subjugated groups enounce themselves as superior races, subject-groups enounce themselves as inferior races.

To prepare this discussion and give it a background, I will turn to two texts by Arnold Toynbee, both dealing with the encounter between the West and the non-Western world in the modern period. The first text is *The World and the West* (1953), originally delivered as the BBC Reith Lectures of 1952. The second text is *Change and Habit: The Challenge of Our Time* (1966), originally delivered as a series of lectures to American college audiences in 1965.

Toynbee is little read today. Wanting to become acquainted with one of the pioneers of the term "postmodern", I was surprised to discover an ambitious and creative theoretician, writing at a time and in a discipline which, according to the opponents of theory today, were free from its onslaught. Among many reasons for turning to Toynbee at this point, I will start by mentioning three. First, he cannot be immediately identified with one of the camps in his field (in the way that A.J.P. Taylor would be). Second, Toynbee's theories are dream-like, in that they are as vividly clear as they are immediately incomprehensible, and in that they have a fascinating automatic quality — in the sense that "automatic writing" was found to bring forth not originality but deep-seated stereotypes. Third, his perspective is antithetical to that of Girard's.

Girard's perspective, as we have seen, is that encounters — which for him are always hostile — are only possible *within the confines* of a society; there can be no encounters across or between different societies. In Girard's terminology, the crisis of modernity, the new eruption of "mimetic rivalry" in modernity, is synonymous with the "crisis of society". For Toynbee, on the other hand, modernity is defined by the encounter between Western and non-Western societies. His starting point in *The World and the West* is that "[t]he encounter between the World and the West may well prove, in retrospect, to be the most important event in modern history" (p. v).

The other point around which Girard and Toynbee are antithetical is that of the identity of the aggressor. For Girard, the

aggressor, and the enemy within, is the pretender — the slave who wants to take his master's place. (Though it has to be said that what Girard calls society is set at such a level of abstraction that the title of the aggressor — of the "mimetic rival" — need not only apply to the inferior members of an actual society. It would also be in keeping with what Girard calls "society" to consider the liberation struggle in Algeria, for example, as a mimetic rival of the French master, and the independent Algeria as *still* an enemy within of the French Empire from which it has seceded.) For Toynbee in *The World and the West*, on the other hand, "the arch-aggressor of modern times" is the West (p. 2).

My main reason for turning to Toynbee's *The World and the West* and *Change and Habit* is that the former addresses the problem of oppression — the linchpin of *The World and the West* is a straightforwardly anti-Western stance; the latter addresses the problem of liberation — *Change and Habit* calls upon the West to change its ways and take the lead in an epochal fight for a better humanity (in a manner which, as I will argue, anticipates the postmodernism debate). My main argument in relation to Toynbee, and the main point of his comparison to Deleuze and Guattari, will be this. Underlying both *The World and the West* and *Change and Habit* is Toynbee's belief in the superiority of the West.

A. Toynbee's *The World and the West*

In the midst of the Cold War, two years before Stalin's death, Toynbee breaks off from his multi-volume *magnum opus*, *A Study of History*, to address his countrymen with *The World and the West*. His objective is to bring historical knowledge to bear on the prejudices and Cold War paranoia of the common man. Toynbee's argument is that for centuries Russia, together with the rest of the non-Western world, has had to arm itself, simply to save itself from "Western assailants" (p. 5), whose "chronic" (p. 8) technological revolution in warfare threatened it with extinction. It must not be forgotten that:

> Stalin's tyrannical course of technological Westernization was eventually justified, like Peter's, through an ordeal by battle. The Communist technological revolution in Russia defeated the German invaders in the Second World War... (p. 10)

Present Russian might is the outcome of a stark choice between autocratically enforced technological Westernisation on the one hand, disappearance from the map on the other.[1]

Toynbee doesn't ask why the West made the use it did of its technological revolution. Instead, parallel to the theme of the evils of Western warfare technology, he develops a second theme, that of the evils of the Western invention of nationalism. He quickly moves from his original tentative description of nationalism as a "doubtful blessing" and as divisive (p. 30), to "the gospel of Western Nationalism spell[ing] ... not a call to a new life but a condemnation to death" (p. 32). Throughout *The World and the West*, nationalism is described as "disastrous" (p. 73), "blaz[ing] a trail of persecution, eviction and massacre" (p. 70). It is important to note that Toynbee at no point understands nationalism as a sentiment, or a prejudice, or an excess or aberration of personal feeling. He explicitly refers to nationalism as an institution, the Western political institution of sovereign and independent nation-states.[2]

This second theme of the evils of nationalism in fact proves stronger than the theme of the evils of Western warfare technology. In *Change and Habit*, whereas the theme of nationalism is carried over, the theme of warfare technology effectively disappears. In its absence, the whole burden of guilt falls on nationalism. Nationalism is now by itself the very "antithesis of world-mindedness" (*Change and Habit*, p. 115). Technology does reappear in *Change and Habit* but, having miraculously shed all links with warfare, it is a force in the service of global peace and unity, the very embodiment of "world-mindedness", and the enemy of nationalism.[3]

* * *

The link between nationalism and what Toynbee calls "the Western aggression against the World" is ripe to be made in his texts. But, that this link is never explicitly made, that he always falls short of making it, is not simply an oversight on his part. On the contrary, Toynbee is resourceful in *not* making this link.

In *The World and the West*, Toynbee's position in brief is that nationalism is not dangerous in the context of the West. And he develops not one but two arguments which support it from two different, if incompatible, sides. His first argument is that, though nationalism is disastrous by itself, in the West it has always been part and parcel of a whole organic culture counteracting its harmful effects. Western civilisation, like "any civilization ... is an indivisible whole in which all the parts hang together" (p. 26). Nationalism only becomes dangerous:

> when it is disengaged from the system within which it has been functioning hitherto and is set free to range abroad by itself[;] ... it was kept in order by its association with other components of a pattern in which the divers participants were in equilibrium. (p. 70)

Toynbee's second argument is that nationalism in the West is not dangerous *at all*. On the contrary, it is "a spontaneous native growth" (p. 71), "a natural product of the local linguistic map" (p. 73), expressing and corresponding with a spontaneous division of populations and languages across territorial boundaries. On the other hand, nationalism is unnatural in the world — whose "linguistic map is not like a patchwork quilt; it is like a silk-shot robe" (p. 73) — conflicting with its "social environment" and "historic local pattern of social life" (p. 74). This means that nationalism could not have been introduced to the world except " *by the methods of barbarism* ... with devastating results" (p. 74, my italics). Toynbee's second argument, shifting the burden of blame from the nature of nationalism to the methods of its introduction to the world, simultaneously shifts the burden of blame from the West to the world (which, in this context, looses its charming name, to be rather unflatteringly called "foreign arena" (p. 73)).[4]

Both of Toynbee's arguments assume that nationalism originated in the West. Against this widespread assumption, Benedict Anderson's genealogy of nationalism in *Imagined Communities* identifies the first "wave" of nationalism in the Latin American independence movements against the Spanish Empire, and describes it as creole republican

nationalism. In the Preface to the second edition of *Imagined Communities*, Anderson remarks that he was:

> startled to discover, in many notices of *Imagined Communities*, that this Eurocentric provincialism [of European scholars, accustomed to the conceit that everything important in the modern world originated in Europe] remained quite undisturbed, and that the crucial chapter on the originating Americas was largely ignored. (p. xiii)

He goes on to identify a second, European, wave, which he describes as popular or populist ethnolinguistic nationalism directed against dynastic states. Finally, he identifies a third wave, that European wave responsible for giving nationalism a bad name and a disgraceful history. This is the wave of European state-nationalism or "official" nationalism[5] — the one that Toynbee describes as a natural product of the Western soil, and the only one that he recognises. Anderson variously describes it as reactionary, dynastic, upper class, imperialist, and racist.

> The key to situating "official nationalism" — willed merger of nation and dynastic empire — is to remember that it developed *after*, and *in reaction to*, the popular national movements... (p. 86)
> These ["official"] nationalisms ... were *responses* by power-groups ... threatened with exclusion from, or marginalization in, popular imagined communities ... Such official nationalisms were conservative, not to say reactionary, *policies*... (pp. 109-110)
> Colonial racism was a major element in that conception of "Empire" which attempted to weld dynastic legitimacy and national community. It did so by generalizing a principle of innate, inherited superiority ... [T]he colonial empire ... permitted sizeable numbers of bourgeois and petty bourgeois to play aristocrat off centre court... (p. 150)

Instead of conflating European state-nationalism and Third-World anticolonial nationalism, as Toynbee does, Anderson argues that the three waves of nationalism that he identifies soon crystallised into models which could be "pirated" and combined. He duly describes the "last wave" of nationalism, that of anticolonial nationalist movements,

as a reaction against the "official" nationalism pursued by the colonial states — a reaction enabled by the availability of the earlier models of republican nationalism and ethnolinguistic popular nationalism.

To return to Toynbee, neither of the two arguments that he advances in support of Western state-nationalism's harmlessness at home is satisfactory to him. The real challenge for Toynbee is to develop a formulation which, while exculpating the West, preserves his anti-Western stance; and which, while making the world responsible for the ills that befell it in its contact with the West, continues to view it as a passive victim bereft of the capacities that belong to an agent. This acrobatic task Toynbee performs with his theory of encounters in *The World and the West*, presenting us with nothing less than the "'laws' ... appl[ying] to all encounters between any civilizations" (p. 60).

In a nutshell, Toynbee's theory is that, when a civilisation of inferior potency encounters a civilisation of superior potency, it is the resistance itself of the inferior civilisation which splits the atom of the superior civilisation and poisons the inferior civilisation. A number of elements have gone into Toynbee's equally atomic theory which I will myself split up in turn. In doing this, I will be guided by his own vivid description of the world-view emerging out of this theory:

> [T]he reception of a foreign culture is a painful as well as a
> hazardous undertaking; and the victim's instinctive repugnance
> to innovations that threaten to upset his traditional way of life
> makes the experience all the worse for him; for, by kicking
> against the pricks, he diffracts the impinging foreign culture-ray
> into its component strands; he then gives a grudging admission
> to the most trivial, and therefore least upsetting, of these
> poisonous splinters of a foreign way of life, in the hope of being
> able to get off with no further concessions than just that; and
> then, as one thing inevitably leads to another, he finds himself
> compelled to admit the rest of the intruding culture piecemeal.
> (pp. 81-82)

• To begin with, this passage alone amply demonstrates that, wittingly or unwittingly, Toynbee draws his audience to the point of view of a sadistic voyeurism.

• Now, the first assumption that Toynbee takes for a law is that, in the encounter between a superior and an inferior culture, the superior culture, the "potent culture" (p. 82), is the one that remains unaffected by the encounter and impenetrable to the other party. Throughout *The World and the West* the West does not bat an eyelid in response to the world, if only because straightaway Toynbee puts an embargo on such things: "The world, not the West, is the party that, up to now, has had the significant experience" (p. 1).

• Toynbee's second assumption is that human nature is conservative. It is against innovations and against encounters: "The natural response is the negative one" (p. 82). Consequently, in conjunction with his first assumption, only superior civilisations live in accordance with human nature in that they are unaffected by encounters, whereas inferior civilisations inevitably fall to an unnatural and alienated life of artificiality.

• Toynbee formulates one of his laws governing encounters as: *one thing leads to another* (p. 75).[6] This "law" is supported by the elements of his theory already discussed. If human nature is conservative and if the superior are wholly unaffected by other cultures, the adoption of even the most superficial alien habit betrays a morally weak culture on its way to perdition. On the assumption of this moral weakness in the inferior races, he predicts that:

> in the game of cultural intercourse, one thing is bound to go on leading to another until the development of Western weapons, drill and uniforms will inevitably bring in its train not only the emancipation of Muslim women but the replacement of the Arabic by the Latin alphabet and the disestablishment of the Islamic church... (p. 79)

• The basic assumption in Toynbee's theory is that the modern encounter between the world and the West is an encounter between two fully home-grown cultures wholly alien to each other, that is between two cultures that had had no previous experience of encounters, as if the modern encounter between the world and the West were the first encounter in history. This encounter is unfailingly described as an encounter between "a native and an alien" (p. 47), a "traditional" and a "foreign" (pp. 81-82), culture; between "the whole

of one's own traditional culture ... and the whole of the foreign culture"
(p. 55). Toynbee's lengthy discussion of the Graeco-Roman world duly
avoids reference to the Graeco-Roman world marching North through
Western Europe, or to the Graeco-Roman world being swamped by
barbarians from the North, treating it instead as a metaphor. As a
result, like the birth of Venus, the modern West emerges fully grown,
yet miraculously untouched by the world and without history.

As to the West's future, Toynbee will address it through the
metaphor of the *Pax Romana*:

> The Graeco-Roman offensive has spent its force; a counter-
> offensive is on its way; but this counter-movement is not yet
> recognized for what it is, because it is being launched on a
> different [spiritual] plane. (p. 94)

Nevertheless, when it comes to naming those responsible for this
spiritual "counter-offensive", those opposed to "the Greek and Roman
dominant minority that had devastated the world ... and were now
patrolling the ruins as self-commissioned gendarmes" (p. 97), they are,
in fact, none other than this very minority. It is "this disillusioned ...
minority" (p. 98) — having "*seen* the tragedy of a time of troubles
followed by the irony of an oecumenical peace" (p. 96, my italics) —
that propels the spiritual counter-offensive, because of its own
"weariness of the clash of cultures" (p. 94). This obscure dream will be
fully developed in *Change and Habit*.

• Finally, permeating Toynbee's theory is the Cold War, and the Cold
War paranoia that he set out to dispel in his audience. He describes his
"laws" of encounters as "the 'laws' of cultural radiation" (p. 68),
elaborating in the manner of a scientist in a 1950s science-fiction film:

> when the culture-ray of a radioactive civilization hits a foreign
> body social ... [t]he assailed foreign body's resistance diffracts
> the culture-ray into its component strands, just as a light-ray is
> diffracted into the spectrum by the resistance of a prism. In
> optics we also know that some of the light-strands in the
> spectrum have a greater penetrative power than others, and ... it
> is the same with the component strands of a culture-ray. (pp. 67-
> 68) [7]

The paranoia in Toynbee's theory arises when he asks *the* crucial question in cultural encounters, the question that each and every culture never stops asking itself: in our encounter with another culture, what could we take and what should we not take? What is good and what is bad for us? Toynbee's first answer — already glimpsed in the displayed quote above — is that a distinction can be made between particles of a greater and particles of a lesser penetrative power, and that, if a culture excludes the more penetrative particles, it will be reasonably safe from danger. The question then becomes one of deciding which "loose strand of cultural radiation ... may prove deadly" (p.70), and which not. It is in answer to this particular question that Toynbee's theory becomes unmistakably paranoid. He argues that the most potent particles are not necessarily the most penetrative. The "most trivial" (p. 69) particles could far exceed the potent, the important, the significant ones in penetrative power. In fact, "the penetrative power of a strand of cultural radiation is usually in inverse ratio to this strand's cultural value" (p. 68). This effectively means that one simply cannot decide, that every single particle of a foreign culture is potentially dangerous, and that, if danger is to be avoided, all particles should be excluded.

Toynbee is now one step away from the position that foreign cultural particles, irrespective of their "potency" and "penetrative power", are harmful *as* particles, *because* they are particles — that they are harmful *a priori* and by definition. This step he does take with what he calls "the game's worst point" (p. 69):

> the particles composing an atom of some inoffensive element cease to be innocuous and become dangerously corrosive *so soon as they have been split off* from the orderly society of particles of which an atom is constituted... (p. 69, my italics)

* * *

As we have seen, the "particles" that compose Toynbee's theory of cultural encounters are as follows: the West is unaffected by encounters; human nature is against encounters; in cultural encounters, one thing leads to another; cultures are organic and home-

grown; and, finally, in cultural encounters it is not the cultures themselves but their particles that are dangerous.

This last "particle" seals off Toynbee's theory but, at the same time, puts the whole construction of his edifice in reverse. Toynbee's starting point in *The World and the West* has been that "the West is the arch-aggressor of modern times", while the relation of the world to the West has been conceived as that of "a society which is under fire from the radiation of a more potent foreign culture" (p. 82). But if, in the encounter between two cultures, penetrative power belongs to that culture which is in a state of particles, irrespective of their individual or collective potency, then the higher potency or the superiority of a culture as a whole or in part is irrelevant, and the distinction between superior and inferior, potent and impotent cultures nonsensical.

What this means is that the West's aggression, high potency, and superiority do not make it impervious to foreign cultural attack. Furthermore, the possibility is opened up that the less atomic, organic and home-grown a culture is — that is, the more it has already been penetrated by foreign particles — the more penetrative it becomes. So that, if — as Toynbee has argued — the West is now the one culture that is unaffected by encounters, it would be all the less penetrative and all the more vulnerable to penetration from the world.

That the Western masters should now be in danger from inferior cultures takes us back, surprisingly, to René Girard's argument: the masters have now become the object of a new wave of "mimetic rivalry". Toynbee himself, on three different occasions, asks obliquely but clearly if the time for the world's revenge on its masters hasn't now come.[8] In conjunction with this anxiety for the West's future, Toynbee's position that the West is the potent aggressor and the world the hapless victim appears now to be far less of an anti-Western stance, and far more of a gesture of reassurance to the Western "mind and soul" (p. 26).

Toynbee's theoretical edifice is further undermined from the peripheries of *The World and the West*. A number of cursory remarks and secondary arguments combine to give us a glimpse of a different view of cultural encounters. This is a view of cultures built on the assemblage and the composition of heterogeneous parts — "partial

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objects", as Deleuze and Guattari would say — rather than of cultures growing naturally out of their native soil. Cultural parts, rather than being inflicted upon a victim-culture, are actively desired. It is the receiving culture's desire that picks, detaches and reattaches cultural parts to itself. As to desirability, it is dissociated from military superiority. The claim to desirability of the victorious is not higher than the claim to desirability of the defeated.

Such a view of cultural encounters in *The World and the West* can only be extrapolated from scanty evidence.

• The Russians "picked up" technology and Communism from the West and "coupled" them in a "new and potent combination" (p. 61).

• The only evidence that the West itself has been involved in picking, coupling and combining comes in relation to Christianity. On the whole, Christianity is described as the "ancestral religion" of the West (p. 59), and as inherently "aggressive" and "fanatical" (for example, pp. 57-60), in keeping with the aggressive spirit of the West. But, while discussing the initial success of the Jesuits in China and India, Toynbee remarks that:

> The Jesuits *stripped* Christianity of its *accidental and
> irrelevant Western accessories*, and offered the essence of it to
> China in a Chinese, and to India in a Hindu, intellectual and
> literary dress in which there was no *incongruous Western
> embroidery* ... This experiment miscarried ... through the fault of
> *domestic feuds* within the bosom of the Roman Catholic Church
> ... which had *nothing to do with ... Christianity*... (p. 64, my
> italics)

I take this to mean that Christianity — instead of being the "ancestral religion" of the West — was adopted by the West, and combined with its own aggressive spirit. Once this combination of Christianity with "aggressive Western Powers" (p. 64) was effected, the missionaries were bound to fail in their efforts to represent pure Christianity. They were, in fact, so inextricably involved in this combination that the experiment in undoing it "was wrecked ... by unfortunate rivalries ... between the Jesuits and other ... orders" (p. 63).

• All three elements of the view of cultural encounters that I have outlined — the heterogeneity of cultures, the desire for encounters, and

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the dissociation of cultural force from power — are united once, in a cursory remark that Toynbee makes while talking of something else. This is a remark on page 23, about the Russian "military officers who had been infected with the Western political ideas of the day in 1814, when they had been serving in the international army of occupation in France"!

B. Toynbee's *Change and Habit*

In *Change and Habit: The Challenge of Our Time* Toynbee makes a dramatic volte-face on most of his positions in *The World and the West*. This volte-face is initiated with a reversal of his position on human nature. Human beings are now not conservative and against encounters, but constitutionally curious. Curiosity, "though stable" in itself, makes "not for permanence, but for change" (p. 15). Instead of feeling an "instinctive repugnance" (quoted above) towards encounters, "homo sapiens is inter-fertile" (p. 144).[9] Instead of being home-grown, cultures are assembled from parts that come from far and wide, in space as well as time: "[i]ndirect relations may affect us more deeply and more dynamically that any personal relations" (pp. 11-12); so that in the life of a culture "submerged cultures re-emerge" (p. 156).[10] Instead of a culture being a harmonious and balanced whole, it contains parts that contradict rather than counterbalance each other. Western nationalism and Western technology:

> are proving incompatible with each other; and, since it is certain that modern technology is not going to be renounced ... we can predict with some assurance that Western nationalism is going to go to the wall. (p. 87)

Finally, instead of home-cultures being penetrated by alien cultures against their will — instead of being raped — they take what is on offer and make a creative use of it: "[i]f anything was transmitted from the one society to the other, what was transmitted was not a ready-made product; it was a stimulus to perform an independent act of creation" (p. 76).[11]

These positions and sentiments appear to be commendable in themselves but, once we start paying attention to the use to which they are put in *Change and Habit*, we find that their role is to enable

Toynbee to reverse the relation between the world and the West. To be exact, in *Change and Habit* the world moves from the position of the victim to that of the aggressor; while the West moves from the position of the aggressor to that of the saviour. In brief, Toynbee's argument in *Change and Habit* is as follows: the non-Western world has now opted for full-scale Westernisation, it is therefore left to the West to articulate — and rescue — the spiritual "counter-offensive" of the world. In other words, the West will save the non-Western world from itself by rescuing the heritage that the non-Western world has abandoned, and by raising to the surface the "submerged" (quoted above) wreckage of the non-Western world's culture.

Toynbee's new positions on curiosity, the desire for encounters, and the freedom and responsibility of the receiving culture, combine to build his notion of "non-Western converts to the West":

> The missionaries of [Western] culture had won converts, and, of the two roles, *the converts' role had proved the most important in the end*. (p. 150, my italics)
>
> Almost everywhere the missionaries ... were met — and this *more than half-way* — by ... converts who voluntarily took it upon themselves to play the part of interpreters... (p. 151, my italics)

Based on this notion of converts, Toynbee is able to argue that the non-Western world gave itself to the West of its own accord and that, in the process of Westernising itself, it showed a zeal that went further and beyond what the West had intended. But there is another side to Toynbee's argument. Once the role of the West is limited to that of "missionaries" in the broad sense, the West is completely dissociated from the aggression so graphically described in *The World and the West*. The Western revolution in warfare, the military might, the military conquest, occupation and oppression, are so thoroughly erased from the picture that the colonial empires would have to have been built on the contemporary equivalents of the British Council and the Alliance Française.

In order to avoid discussing colonialism, Toynbee hastens to give the converts — those who "voluntarily took it upon themselves to play

the part of interpreters" — a name and a definition which will keep them firmly outside the historical frame of colonial relations:

> In our present-day world we have a name for this interpreter-class. We call it "the intelligentsia" ... It means a class of Russians, or any other non-Western *nationality*, that has had the wit to master the alien culture of the West and to introduce this culture to the intelligentsia's *compatriots.* (p. 153, my italics)

Toynbee defines the converts or the "intelligentsia" as a national class, pertaining to sovereign and independent nation-states. In this context, aggression between the West and the non-Western world would take place between equivalents (nation-states). It would presumably no longer make sense to view the non-Western world as the helpless victim of Western aggression.

Change and Habit, as I have said, attempts to detach the role of the aggressor from the West, and to attach it to the non-Western world. Toynbee uses the notion of non-Western converts to the West or "intelligentsia" in order to accuse the non-Western world of recklessly reproducing aggression by propagating the perilous institution of the nation-state. "The current policy of the intelligentsia is the same everywhere ... It is producing nation-states standardized on the Western pattern" (p. 155). As to the relation of the intelligentsia to the non-Western world, it is one of complete correspondence: "*[i]n all the non-Western countries* ... the intelligentsia is in power today" (p. 154, my italics). Toynbee defines the intelligentsia as the national governing class of non-Western countries, avoiding all reference to colonialism and national liberation movements, in order to dissociate the West from its past aggression. But, in doing this, he unwittingly undermines the basis of his accusations against the non-Western world. It becomes nonsensical to accuse the intelligentsia of "producing nation-states" when the intelligentsia, according to his definition, already presupposes the existence of non-Western nation-states.

A second, remarkable, point about converts and intelligentsias as Toynbee understands them is that they do not exist in the West. This is not because he believes that the non-Western world has nothing to offer, and the West nothing to take from "the rest of the World" (p. 85).

On the contrary, he argues that the non-Western world has had a 5,000-years-old tradition of "world-mindedness" which is now indispensable to the West (p. 115), and calls on the West to adopt it in order to safeguard its own future, as well as the "peace and welfare of mankind" as a whole (p. 85). He describes "world-mindedness" as striving "for a coming world-society", for global "reunification" (p. 81), and "towards replacing" the "local national states" (pp. 84-85) and their "divisive-mindedness" (pp. 116-117) with a single world-state.

So, if Toynbee advocates to the West a non-Western world-mindedness, why does he refuse to see himself and like-minded people as converts to the world? My own explanation would be that his version of world-mindedness smacks of his local tradition of imperialism (and presages the neoimperialism that will later permeate the postmodernism debate). Toynbee reasons are rather different. Firstly, since the non-Western world is completely Westernised, rather than being converted to its tradition of world-mindedness, the West has to unearth and rediscover it. Secondly, once the ideal of world-mindedness is identified as the institution of a world-state, the non-Western world emerges as a failure since "[u]ntil now there have only been would-be world-states" (p. 115). Were the West to succeed, it would accomplish what the non-Western world has been failing to achieve for 5,000 years. [12]

* * *

In 1965 Toynbee addresses his American college audiences to announce the coming of a new West. "[D]own to the present moment" (p. 137) the West has had bad habits, but time is ripe for a big change. He builds the image of the new West piece by piece, and projects its negative onto the non-Western world:

the new West	the non-Western world
inheritor of the world	convert to the West
original innovator	imitator
global in outlook	local in outlook
technological	nationalist
saviour	aggressor

world-minded	divisive-minded
unifier	divider
peace-maker	war-maker

With historical hindsight, we might want to say that, in his vision of a coming global unity under the aegis of the West, Toynbee could not have been more wrong (or less influential on his audience). Instead, 1965 initiated the West to a new phase of internal strife. Only three years later Enoch Powell speaks of "that tragic and intractable phenomenon which we watch with horror on the other side of the Atlantic ... coming upon us here by our own volition".[13]

On the other hand, the opposite could be said. Toynbee's vision of global unity under the wing of a benevolent power saving the world from itself anticipates, as we have seen, not only Arendt's *On Violence*, not only the aspirations of the New Left, but also a strong tendency in the postmodernism debate. In this respect, Toynbee is indeed prophetic and, though unread today, very contemporary.[14]

* * *

As I have said, whereas in *The World and the West* the West is cast in the role of the aggressor and the world in the role of the victim, in *Change and Habit* the world is recast in the role of the aggressor, while the West is recast in the role of the saviour.

When Toynbee casts the world in the role of the victim of Western aggression, he simultaneously withholds from it the ability to act to save itself — the world's resistance is tightly confined to "kicking against the pricks". It is only when he casts the world in the role of the aggressor that he grants it the ability to act, to be effective, to have an impact on the West. The exact opposite is the case with Toynbee's treatment of the West. When he casts the West in the role of the aggressor, he simultaneously extricates it from all responsibility for the effects of its actions on the victim; what harms the world is not the West, but its own blunders — in "kicking against the pricks" it diffracts the West and unwittingly poisons itself. Responsibility for and control over its actions is returned to the West only when Toynbee casts it in the role of the saviour; when itself threatened with aggression, the West

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is quite capable of results: it is able to save, not only itself, but the world as well.

In spite of all the disparities between *The World and the West* and *Change and Habit*, the two books have a lot in common. To begin with, historical misadventures are attributed to the world in both its roles as victim and aggressor, while the West emerges, from both books, as historically well-intentioned — when it is not a benevolent saviour, it is an innocent aggressor. But essentially, in both cases, the West is the active party, the world the passive party; the West is the master, the world the slave. Whether the world is being conquered or converted, the world is passive and, in both cases, a slave to the West. Whether the West unfolds its powers by conquering or by discovering the "submerged cultures" of the world, the West masters the world. In all these senses, the West is superior to the world.

C. Superior and inferior races in *Anti-Oedipus*

For Deleuze and Guattari, if the West is anything at all, it is the master slave of *exclusive* encounters. *Anti-Oedipus* questions Toynbee's criteria for the allocation of superiority and inferiority; the distinction — rather the "exclusive differentiation" — between the West and the world; the organic unity of the West — Toynbee's use of the West as an "artificial territoriality"; and his "double bind" between catastrophic divisive-mindedness, and global unification under the guidance of the West.

Yes, the West is the birthplace of modern aggression, of a "superior" oppression and an "unrivaled slavery"[15], but its first and last victims are here at home. And if we still survive it, this is because of the resources and the forces of the "inferior races".

1. The West as the first conquered territory and the last exhausted colony[16] of modernity

For Toynbee the West is a self-evident entity. This entity is geographically and historically circumscribed — the West is "about forty sovereign independent national states"[17] in modern times. It emerged naturally in the native soil, complete with a spirit, a "whole mind and soul". The main attributes of the Western spirit are

technological innovation, nationalism, and individualism.[18] For Deleuze and Guattari, on the other hand, the West is an ensemble of processes — processes combining to build a new "formation of sovereignty": the modern or capitalist "formation of sovereignty".[19] These processes, rather than being discovered or invented by Westerners, fell upon the Western populations which served as a raw material and as an object for their application. So that — we can say — the West is both a new regime of domination and the first victim of this regime. I have already described this ensemble of processes as the constitutive elements of the *exclusive* use of encounters.

In this new "formation of sovereignty", the sovereign is the "nation" or the "people". That is to say, the "nation" or the "people" are now the very source from which the state draws its legitimacy. The state becomes a nation-state by becoming an embodiment of the spirit of the nation. The nation-state is an artificial territoriality:

> Civilized modern societies ... *deterritorialize with one hand, they reterritorialize with the other.* These neoterritorialities are often artificial, residual, archaic; but they are archaisms having a perfectly current function, our modern way of "imbricating," of sectioning off... (p. 257)[20]

"[S]uch a field remains defined by a transcendence" (p. 207)[21] — the "detached complete object" (p. 73) discussed in the previous chapter. But this is "[a] transcendent object that is more and more *spiritualized*" (p. 268, my italics).[22] It is because of the *ideal* nature of the "nation" or the "people" that, in the modern formation of sovereignty, "transcendence [is] an absence or an empty locus" (p. 207). It is because of the role of the *spirit* of the nation in the nation-state that — as said by Lefort and repeated by Zizek — "the locus of power is empty".[23] It is as if today "there are no longer ... any masters" (p. 254). Even the bonds or the fetters that tied a person to a particular group are unbound. Persons are now privatised, they become individuals or "global persons": "a subject ... had nothing to say in his own name"; now that he is disassociated from his particular group, he finds himself in a society at large, and "situat[es] himself personally in his *own* society" (p. 170, my italics).[24]

But, the more populations are formed into a "people" or a "nation", and the more institutions embody the "spirit of the people", refer to the "people" and function on behalf of the "people", the more the people are cut off from actual social production and reproduction, the more they are dissociated from actual involvement with the institutions that embody their spirit (this is referred to as the "paradox" of the people in my first chapter).

> The more social reproduction escapes the members of the group, in nature and in extension, the more it falls back on them [it turns them into private persons who "express" it] ... [This] is always colonization pursued by other means, it is the interior colony, and we shall see that even here at home, where we Europeans are concerned, it is our intimate colonial education. (pp. 169-170)

The more the state and its institutions are established as the objective Signifier of the sovereignty of the people, the more the people are splintered into private, subjective and insufficient signifieds, in a process that is part and parcel of "modern imperialism" (p. 207):

> The imperialism of the signifier does not take us beyond the question, "What does it mean?"; it is content to bar the question in advance, to render all the answers insufficient... (p. 208)

The more the people situate themselves privately and individually in a society and relate to it as their own, the more their new-found subjectivity is in the service of the divine immortality of this society and its institutions:

> individual fantasy is itself plugged into the existing social field, but apprehends it in the form of imaginary qualities that confer on it a kind of transcendence or immortality under the shelter of which the individual, the ego, plays out its pseudo destiny ... [T]he immortality conferred on the existing social order carried into the ego all the investments of repression, the phenomena of identification, of "superegoization" and castration, all the resignation-desires ... whereas the [death] drive itself is projected onto the outside and turned against the others (death to the foreigner, to those who are not of our own ranks!). (p. 62)

And the more the boundaries of a society are held sacred, and the more a society becomes a divine macrocosm whose boundaries are the last outposts of divinity, the more the people are ripe for a descent to hell. What Robert Jaulin describes as "the condition of the colonized" in *La paix blanche: introduction à l'ethnocide* (1970) is the very condition that befell the Western nation-states and their peoples.

> The condition of the colonized can lead to a reduction in the humanization of the universe, so that any solution that is sought will be a solution on the scale of the individual and the restricted family, with, by way of consequence, an extreme anarchy or disorder at the level of the collective: an anarchy whose victim will always be the individual — with the exception of those who occupy the key positions in such a system, namely the colonizers, who, during this same period when the colonized reduce the universe, will tend to extend it. (quoted in *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 169)

Colonisation and "modern imperialism", understood in this sense, involve — rather than a superiority in warfare technology — a "transcendent" and "segregative" use of artificial territorialities, a "global" use of persons, and a "biunivocal" relation between artificial territoriality and global person. Colonisation and imperialism did fall upon the world, but not before being inflicted upon the Western populations themselves. It is in this sense that, in the modern formation of sovereignty, if "there are no longer any masters", this is because of the "unrivaled slavery" and the "unprecedented subjugation" of the masters themselves. They are "only slaves commanding other slaves"; slaves for whom "there is no longer any need to burden the animal from the outside, it shoulders its own burden" (p. 254). The Western master slave is the very model of *ressentiment* and its "double direction" — "the turning back against oneself, and the projection against the Other":

> let me deceive, rob, slaughter, kill! but in the name of the social order ... [T]he father is dead, it's my fault, who killed him? it's your fault, it's the Jews, the Arabs, the Chinese, all the resources of racism and segregation... (p. 269)

<p style="text-align:center">* * *</p>

For Toynbee in *The World and the West* the encounter between the West and the world is predicated on the moment of violence, war and conquest. It is exactly because Toynbee fixes upon the moment of conquest — and repeats it in different contexts in every new chapter[25] — that the relation between the West and the world emerges so clearly and distinctly as a relation polarised between an aggressor and master, and a victim and slave. As a result — and while Toynbee's tone throughout is one of disapprobation for the West and vague glorification of the world — Toynbee is also able to ignore (or deny) the reality of the colonies and their institutions: all those continual everyday processes that kept them in place and kept them working.

For Deleuze and Guattari, on the other hand, colonisation is defined not by military conquest, tempered by the peaceful conversion work of missionaries, but by an extension, and an imposition on the colonised, of processes already applied to the West. Colonisation is a matter of putting in place and enforcing policies that will transform collectivities into "global persons"; microcosms all the more private and expressive for being forcibly cut off from social interaction. The colonised are "dispossessed" of their social reproduction, to be "subjected to a new order of reproduction" that no longer involves them — except, that it, as "a material": "The colonizer, for example, abolishes the chieftainship, or uses it to further his own ends (and he uses many other things besides: the chieftainship is only the beginning)" (pp. 168-169).

In this role, the missionaries are practically indistinguishable and indissociable from the other elements of the colonial edifice. To give a small example, while discussing Jaulin's *La paix blanche* and his analysis of the civilising role of the Capucines in moving Indians from collective houses to "small personal houses", Deleuze and Guattari comment:

> In the collective house the familial apartment and personal intimacy were based on a relationship with the neighbor defined as *ally*, so that interfamilial relations were coextensive with the social field. In the new situation, on the contrary ... the restrictive family closes into an expressive

> microcosm where each person reflects his own lineage, while the
> social and productive destiny (*devenir*) escapes him more
> and more. (p. 169, footnote)[26]

But at the same time, and while this was taking place, "the colonized remained a typical example of resistance" in the sense and to the extent that, precisely, they "*remained stuck* to the agents of oppressive social reproduction, either in struggle or in complicity" (p. 169, my italics). It is because of such resistance that the formation of the "global person", and of the "biunivocal" relation between "global person" and "artificial territoriality", both in the colonies and at home, emerges for what it is — "a pure oppression":

> It is colonization that causes Oedipus to exist, but an Oedipus
> that is taken for what it is, a pure oppression, inasmuch as it
> assumes that these Savages are deprived of the control over their
> own social production, that they are ripe for being reduced to
> the only thing they have left, the familial reproduction imposed
> on them being no less oedipalized by force than it is alcoholic or
> sickly. On the other hand, when the requisite conditions [the
> ensemble of exclusive processes] are realized in capitalist society,
> it should not be thought on that account that Oedipus ceases to
> be what it is... (p. 178)

"Pure oppression", in brief, is this: in the modern formation of sovereignty, when all the different *exclusive* processes are realised, "desire desires its own repression" (p. 346). What is at stake in this argument — the crux of the matter — is not to understand oppression as subjective but, on the contrary, to understand desire as objective, as part of the infrastructure of the modern formation of sovereignty:

> [A]ffects or drives form part of the infrastructure itself. (p. 63)
> [D]esiring-production produces the real ... desire has little to do
> with fantasy and dream. (pp. 380-381)

A desire that desires its own repression is the "intimate colonial formation" that "the capitalist formation of sovereignty will need" in order to establish itself (p. 179). Such a desire has as its subject an ego which "conforms to the exclusive use". Though it presents itself as individual fantasy, it is a group phenomenon — a phenomenon

pertaining to "subjugated" groups — with a real function: that of supporting an "enormous [institutional] inertia" (p. 63 throughout).

> [T]here is no individual fantasy. Instead there are two types of groups, subject-groups and subjugated groups ... It is therefore all the more disturbing to see to what extent Freudian analysis retains from the fantasy only its lines of exclusive disjunction, and flattens it into its individual or pseudoindividual dimensions, which by their very nature refer the fantasy to subjugated groups... (p. 64)

The desire of subject-groups, on the other hand, escapes oppression in that it is *inclusive* — "[t]he group fantasy *includes* the disjunctions, in the sense that each subject, discharged of his personal identity but not of his singularities, enters into relations with others following the communication proper to partial objects" (p. 63). And by being inclusive, the desire of subject-groups displays "a veritable institutional creativity": "the power [puissance] to experience institutions themselves as mortal, to destroy or change them" (p. 63).

> The West is the "soft centre" (p. 269) of *exclusive* processes, the "stronghold" of subjugated groups, and the "strongest point", the "strongest link" (p. 175), in the chain of a desire that desires its own repression:

> in our patriarchal and capitalist society at least, Oedipus is a sure thing ... our society is a stronghold of Oedipus ... [I]t is not at the weakest point — the primitives — that Oedipus must be attacked, but at the strongest point, at the level of the strongest link, by revealing the degree of disfiguration it implies and brings to bear on desiring-production, on the syntheses of the unconscious, and on libidinal investments *in our cultural and social milieu.* (pp. 174-175)

> Everywhere else ... even in the peripheral zones of capitalism ... the colonizer's efforts ... find themselves contradicted by the breakup of the family along the lines of social exploitation and oppression. But it is at the soft centre of capitalism, in the temperate zones of the bourgeoisie, that the colony becomes intimate and private, interior to each person... (p. 269)

2. The West is deprived of its unity
(Lyotard and Donzelot in relation to *Anti-Oedipus*)

For Toynbee the West and the world are and remain separate, in spite of what is exchanged between them. They remain separate while the world is being converted to the West, as well as when the West unearths and adopts the world's tradition of world-mindedness. Additionally, in the movement from *The World and the West* to *Change and Habit*, the West moves from an externalisation of itself in the world — with the world itself becoming an aggressor — to a supersession of the world and of itself in its new role as a saviour. Throughout this movement, the West remains the active party, the world remains passive. The relation between the West and the world is cast in the mould of the "biunivocal" relation between Man and World discussed in my previous chapter (II. 4), recalling the opening sections of Hegel's master and slave dialectic.[27]

I have argued that, for Deleuze and Guattari, the West is the master slave of exclusive encounters — the first conquered territory and the last exhausted colony of modernity. Are we then to understand that Deleuze and Guattari preserve the division between the West and the non-Western world, continue to hold them "strictly apart" (*Phenomenology of Spirit*, section 178), keep their master/slave relation intact, but reverse the hierarchy of their relation in favour of the non-Western world? Jacques Donzelot addresses this question in his essay on *Anti-Oedipus*, "Une anti-sociologie" (*Esprit*, December 1972). He answers it in the negative, through a comparison with Baudrillard's then recently published *Pour une critique de l'économie politique du signe* (1972) — Baudrillard's last book as a staid and scholarly sociologist working within Marxism. Donzelot's argument is that whereas Baudrillard posits two non-communicating orders — on the one hand, the order of primitive societies, of real desire, of symbolic exchange; on the other hand, the order of capitalism, of equivalence, of false exchange, where "[o]n n'échange plus que des simulacres" (p. 845) —

> [l]a faiblesse du capitalisme est donc dans ce qu'il *implique*
> pour Deleuze et Guattari, à savoir un développement
> inéluctable de la production désirante, et non dans ce qu'il

exclut, comme le pense Baudrillard, c'est dire l'échange symbolic primitif. Le changement pour les premiers découle de la logique même du développement, alors qu'il est pour Baudrillard subordonné en quelque sorte au retour du refoulé. (p. 846)

Jean-François Lyotard, in his own essay on *Anti-Oedipus*, "Capitalisme énergumène" (*Des dispositifs pulsionnels*, 1973), addresses the same question through the same comparison with Baudrillard's *Pour une critique...*, and comes to the same conclusion. *Anti-Oedipus* tells us that "[i]l ne faut donc pas opposer le capitalisme et la sauvagerie comme ce qui cache et ce qui exhibe la castration" (p. 35).

In spite of the apparent unanimity between Donzelot and Lyotard, their readings of *Anti-Oedipus* diverge widely. Donzelot's contention that, for Deleuze and Guattari, change "découle de la logique même du développement" is contemptuously dismissed by Lyotard. This is a belief fit only for "révisionnistes et réformistes qui attendent tout du développement ... ou plutôt qui n'attendent plus rien que 3% de plus et mieux distribués" (p. 18). Capitalism's logic of development, "son 'développement organique intrinsèque' ... ne conduit à rien qu'à elle-même" (p. 17). Furthermore, Lyotard points out that there is, for *Anti-Oedipus*, "nulle raison de privilégier (sous le nom d'infrastructure) celui qui règle la production et la circulation des *biens*, le dispositif dit 'économique'" (p. 29). This is because:

> à suivre l'hypothèse infra/super, il faudrait ... découper les structures dans une macro-structure, commencer par le tout, supposer le tout donné ... Alors que toute l'affaire est que *le tout n'est pas donné*, que la société *n'est pas* une totalité unifiée... (p. 29)

This point is for me Lyotard's only important contribution to understanding *Anti-Oedipus* in this essay. His involvement with *Anti-Oedipus* in "Capitalisme énergumène" is, on the whole, unclear and convoluted (though not less interesting for that).

Lyotard, in prose which combines grandiloquence and imprecision, presents his essay as a modest crusade in defence of a grand book. But this crusade consists in "giving voice to Deleuze and Guattari's silences", and even speaking for them by speaking against them:

> la gauche intellectuelle va faire du livre un gadget, une
> marchandise quaternaire, et le neutraliser ... Sa véritable
> virulence n'est-elle pas dans son silence? En branchant ce
> petit travail-ci sur le grand travail du livre juste à l'endroit où ce
> dernier se tait, on désire faire partir par là quelques flux non
> échangeables par les marchands et/ou les politiques. On
> réaffirme ainsi ce qu'affirme le livre. (p. 13)[28]

Finally, having discarded "artificial territorialities", "global persons", "biunivocal relations", "exclusive differentiations", etc. as both irrelevant and absent in capitalism, and having decreed that the only "repressive mechanism" in capitalism is equivalence and exchange value, Lyotard concludes: "C'est ce que veulent dire Deleuze et Guattari" (p. 45).

Lyotard champions *Anti-Oedipus* by appointing it to a leading role in the transition from capitalism to a new post-capitalist era:

> La force fuse à travers la trame organique, énergie
> perfusante. Or c'est cette virtualité d'une altérité qui est en
> train de se multiplier au sein de l'"organisme" capitaliste et du
> dispositif de la valeur, qui est en train ... d'*oublier* la loi de
> l'échange, de la tourner et d'en faire une illusion désuète et
> grossière, un dispositif désaffecté ... C'est une autre figure qui se
> lève, la libido se retire du dispositif capitaliste, le désir se dispose
> autrement, selon une autre figure ... Que peut le capitalisme
> contre cette désaffection qui lui monte du dedans ... contre cette
> chose qu'est le nouveau dispositif libidinal, et dont l'*Anti-Oedipe*
> est la très grande production-inscription dans le language?
> (p. 46)[29]

But this transition is of Lyotard's own device, and it involves pronouncements on capitalism which not only "give voice to the silences" of *Anti-Oedipus* but — to speak like Lyotard — systematically *forget*[30] the concepts, the distinctions, the analyses that *Anti-Oedipus* does develop.

For Lyotard, capitalism is undifferentiation and equivalence — "ce système tout d'*indifférence* et d'equivalences" (p. 35); in Deleuze and Guattari's terminology, deterritorialisation or the "decoding of flows" ("flows" of people, products, etc.), and the decoded,

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deterritorialised flows themselves. Its only "rule" or "repressive mechanism" is exchange value:

> capitalisme ... qui est l'indication, sur la surface du socius, d'une liquidité profonde des flux économiques ... nous fait saisir en quoi lui-même, rapporté à lui-même seulement, *index sui*, bloque et canalise cette liquidité dans la loi de la valeur. La loi de la valeur, seul axiome de ce système tout d'*indifférence* et d'equivalences ... aussi seule *limite...* (pp. 35-36)[31]

For Deleuze and Guattari, on the other hand, capitalism is based on the encounter and the differential relation of decoded flows — a "differential relation ... a direct relation between decoded flows whose respective qualities have no existence prior to the differential relation itself. The quality of the flows results solely from their conjunction" (p. 249). Secondly, capitalism involves an "axiomatic" or "régime" governing the encounters between flows (see, for example, p. 246): "the conjunction of the decoded flows, their differential relations, and their multiple schizzes or breaks require a whole apparatus of regulation" (p. 252). As we have seen, Deleuze and Guattari call this "régime" or "axiomatic" the modern or capitalist "formation of sovereignty" and they devote a large part of *Anti-Oedipus* to the analysis of the processes at work in it, and of the relations and entities to which they give rise. I have been describing and I will continue to describe this ensemble of processes, relations and entities as the constituents of (the) exclusive (use of) encounters.[32]

If, for Lyotard, the relation between capitalism and "savage" societies is not a relation of exclusive differentiation, this is because *nothing is now different from anything else*, and everything is capitalism, modernity, the "théâtre total de l'Occident" (p. 50).[33] If there is a distinction to be made, this is between "bourgeois society" which obeys the law of exchange, and a pure capitalism unfettered from this law. For Deleuze and Guattari, on the other hand, the exclusive differentiation between the West and the non-Western world is an effect of the exclusive processes of the capitalist "formation of sovereignty". The distinction to be made is between two different syntheses of encounters, two different syntheses of differential

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relations: between the ensemble of *exclusive* processes and the ensemble of *inclusive* processes — processes which are coextensive and cannot be localised along the boundaries of artificial territorialities. For Lyotard, if there is no "macro-structure" (quoted above), this is because capitalism is an undifferentiated totality. So that Lyotard, from the perspective of *Anti-Oedipus*, falls into the false dilemma between exclusive differentiations and the chaos of undifferentiation (discussed in the previous chapter).

Lyotard installs himself on the undifferentiated and elevates it into a principle of division between a past pre-capitalist era, capitalism in the present, and a new post-capitalist era to come. All differentiations are pre-capitalist, so that the pre-capitalist era is a structured totality; capitalism is an undifferentiated totality under the rule of exchange; while the new post-capitalist era is a pure undifferentiated totality unbound from the fetters of exchange value. But, in describing what is in fact his own theory as "ce que veulent dire Deleuze et Guattari", Lyotard's reading of *Anti-Oedipus* projects the exclusive processes of the modern "formation of sovereignty", and the entities to which they give rise, to a superseded pre-capitalist era. For example, Lyotard relegates the private person, the nuclear family and what Deleuze and Guattari call "Oedipus", entities which they describe as emerging out of the modern "formation of sovereignty", to a pre-modern era; he also conflates premodern territorialities and modern "artificial territorialities" to consign them both to the pre-capitalist past.[34]

Even so, the principal casualty in Lyotard's reading of *Anti-Oedipus* are inclusive processes. For inclusive differentiations and partial objects as small routes of escape under the continuing conditions of modern oppression, Lyotard reads a new undifferentiated totality that "ruins bourgeois society".

In announcing the coming of pure capitalism, of a new undifferentiated totality as "ce qui ruine effectivement la société bourgeoise" (p. 16), Lyotard plants the seed for his future writings on the postmodern, the sublime, and the avant-garde. For example, Lyotard's thesis of the postmodern incommensurability of language games in *The Postmodern Condition* and elsewhere can be derived from

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Lyotard's description of the post-capitalist era as capitalism *unfettered from the law of exchange*. See also Lyotard's remark in "Capitalisme énergumène" — seminal for *The Postmodern Condition* — that it is "la figure du savoir, qui est le véritable *dispositif* régissant l'économie libidinale dans le capitalisme" (p. 39). Finally, his distinction between the avant-garde and society in general (discussed at the end of my second chapter) can be mapped onto the distinction between pure capitalism and bourgeois society in "Capitalisme énergumène". In fact, Lyotard himself makes this link in "The Sublime and the Avant-Garde":

> Yet there is a kind of collusion between capitalism and the avant-garde. The force of scepticism and even of destruction that capitalism has brought into play, and that Marx never ceased analysing and identifying, in some way encourages among artists a mistrust of established rules and a willingness to experiment with means of expression, with styles, with ever-new materials. There is something of the sublime in capitalist economy.
>
> (*The Lyotard Reader*, p. 209)

Lyotard's later writings in turn open the way to Jameson's "late capitalism" which adopts the notion of a new undifferentiated totality but reverses its significance: late capitalism is a sublime "global social totality" predicated on dissolution, but it is the very triumph of bourgeois society.

Lyotard attributes the coming of a new era — "Le temps vient ... le temps vient", cries Lyotard — to a disembodied revolutionary negative will: "révolutionnaire au sens du ... volutionnaire au sens de la *Wille*"(p. 10). This negative will inherits and concludes what Lyotard considers to be the proper tendency of capitalism, modernity and the West (used without distinction): the tendency towards absolute undifferentiation. So that this negative will is in essence that of capitalism, modernity and the West as *one* "global subject" unbound and unleashed on the world ("à travers le monde", p. 46). Having shown disdain for Donzelot's argument that change emerges out of the logic of capitalist development, what Lyotard proposes instead is that capitalism's true self — true free negative will — shall rise above bourgeois society and, waging a war against it and "effectively ruining" it, shall save the world from it.

* * *

Having rejected the exclusive differentiation between the West and the non-Western world in Baudrillard's *Pour une critique de l'économie politique du signe*, Lyotard moves to the position of an undifferentiated totality, and ends up with a "biunivocal" (subject/object) relation between a new freed Capitalist will and a new undifferentiated world. Toynbee, on the other hand, starts off from an exclusive differentiation between the West and the world but equally ends up, in his dream of a New West that will rescue the world, with a "biunivocal" relation between the two. In both cases the West not only preserves its unity but rearticulates it on an even higher ground.

For Deleuze and Guattari the *desideratum* is not a *new* and radically different will, set of intentions, objectives and purposes for the West in its relation to the world.[35] In other words, the *desideratum* is not a new and original interpretation of the repertoire of *exclusive* processes — exclusive differentiations, undifferentiations, biunivocal relations — starring new artificial territorialities and new global persons. The real alternative is not a choice between old and new artificial territorialities and global persons; the real alternative lies with an altogether different kind, "form", "formation" of differential relations: with *inclusive* processes and entities which are already in place across the West/world divide and which the West need neither will, nor invent, nor discover, nor spearhead, but simply tolerate.

It is Toynbee, not Lyotard, who gives us a glimpse of inclusive processes and entities from the margins of *Change and Habit*, where he comes across an alternative to his main opposition between divisive-mindedness and global unification. In seven erratic pages without precedent or follow-up, he discusses the reality of "diasporá":

> A diasporá, like a local community, is a splinter of mankind;
> but, unlike a local community, a diasporá does not occupy
> exclusively any particular patch of the Earth's surface as its
> domain. A diasporá is a minority locally, wherever it may be. At
> the same time, a diasporá, unlike a local community, is
> ubiquitous. (p. 81)

Though the Western ideology of nationalism has been potent enough to create the local Jewish state of Israel, it has not been potent enough to liquidate the Jewish diasporá in the World. (p. 86)

To return to *Anti-Oedipus*, we could say that "subject-groups" constitute themselves as diasporas in the following senses. They are diasporic in that they are ubiquitous. They are diasporic in that, instead of reforming into artificial territorialities, they are a minority everywhere. Finally, "subject-groups" are diasporic in that, caught in the distance that separates artificial territorialities — whether they are coexisting or consecutive — they endow this distance with positive determinations: with a capacity to sustain a surplus of being which survives and escapes the choice between masters as opposed in the content of their superior aims, as they are indistinguishable in the form of their subjugation.

A "*subject-group* investment", no less that a "*subjugated group* investment", is "collective, it is an investment of a collective field ... and in this sense a position of reality" (*Anti-Oedipus*, p. 280). There is nothing utopian about subject-groups. But whereas the subjugated group:

> invests the formation of central sovereignty; overinvests it by making it the final eternal cause for all the other social forms of history; counterinvests the enclaves or the periphery; and disinvests every free "figure" of desire — yes I am your kind, and I belong to the superior race and class

the subject-group:

> follows the *lines of escape* of desire; breaches the wall and causes flows to move; assembles its machines and its groups-in-fusion in the enclaves or at the periphery — proceeding in an inverse fashion from that of the other pole: I am not your kind, I belong eternally to the inferior race... (p. 277 throughout)

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3. The relation between "subject-groups" and "subjugated groups" is one of inclusion

The distinction between "subject-groups" and "subjugated groups" is not a means of classification of actual groups into either one type or the other — "the simple opposition between two groups is inadequate" (p. 125). I have argued that groups and the collective fields that they constitute are not (pre)determined by objectives (*final causes*) but formed by the way in which they function. It shouldn't follow that groups and the collective fields that they constitute are, therefore, preformed by their adherence to either one or the other of two possible models (*formal causes*) — "subject-groups" and "subjugated groups" — whose ideal opposition would be endlessly re-enacted by actual groups.[36] If there is opposition at all, "it is the two kinds of use made of synthesis that are in opposition" (p. 124), as long as it is understood that both "uses of synthesis" are involved in the on-going constitution of "historico-social" (p. 340) collective entities:

> Nor is there any molecular chain that does not <u>intercept</u> and reproduce whole blocks of molar code or axiomatic, nor any such blocks that do not <u>contain or seal off</u> fragments of molecular chain ... [E]verywhere there exist the molecular *and* the molar: their disjunction is a relation of included disjunction... (p. 340, my underlining)[37]

The criterion that makes the distinction between two types of groups — "molar blocks" and "molecular chains" — in this passage is the way in which they act upon each other: molar blocks *contain or seal off* molecular chains; molecular chains *intercept* molar blocks.

Throughout *Anti-Oedipus*'s dizzying variations in terminology — molar and molecular, preconscious and unconscious, "fascisizing" and revolutionary, paranoiac and schizophrenic, etc. — a subjugated group *excludes* subject-groups, and, in being exclusive, bases its superiority on an "escape in advance of the escape" (p. 341)[38]; while a subject-group, in its lines of escape, rather than "withdrawing from the social", is "always coupled directly" to subjugated groups which it intercepts and *includes* (p. 341). In effect, *to affirm the inclusive relation between subject-groups and subjugated groups is tantamount to affirming the perspective of subject-groups.*

Such an affirmation is not abstract, nor is such a perspective a matter of mental disposition. They are inseparable from the practical question of posing jointly together the problem of subjugated groups and artificial territorialities, and the problem of subject-groups and lines of escape, as the two sides or the two poles of the same problem. In starting from the inclusive relation between subject-groups and subjugated groups, the problem of subjugated groups and artificial territorialities would be posed as the problem of "What molar unit will constitute a sufficiently nomadic circuit?" (pp. 319-320). While the problem of subject-groups and lines of escape would be posed as the problem of whether, given the context of an artificial territoriality, "there is, and how there comes to be, a formation of subject-groups" (p. 380) within it. That is, the problem is:

> if, on this socius as a full body, there is thus the possibility for going from one side to another, i.e., from the side where the molar aggregates of social production are organized, to this other side, no less collective, where the molecular multiplicities of desiring-production are formed; *whether and to what extent* such a socius can endure the reversal of power such that desiring-production subjugates social production and yet does not destroy it, since it is the same production working under the difference in régime... (p. 380, my italics)

Such problems come to modern thought from the outside, if thought turns to them, "invests" them, they require the minimum theoretical specification, and cannot be answered in advance.

<p style="text-align:center">* * *</p>

While outlining a method which addresses questions such as "which one?", "how?", "to what extent?", *Anti-Oedipus* quite appropriately abounds in quick sketches of concrete cases ranging from the Russian Revolution, to the gay liberation movement, to surrealism, to the work of Proust and Turner — since even "in the same people the most varied kinds of investment can coexist ... the two kinds of groups can interpenetrate" (p. 378). Every concrete case is a singular articulation

of the *variables* of subject-group and subjugated group. Such is the case of "Artaud-the-schizo" in the surrealist group, "with its fantastic subjugation, its narcissism, and its superego ... It can happen that one lone man functions as a flow-schiz, as a subject-group" (p. 349). Such is also "[t]he case of Kerouac ... who took revolutionary 'flight', but who later finds himself immersed in dreams of a Great America, and then in search of his Breton ancestors of the superior race" (p. 277).

II. Becoming minoritarian

The movement from "superior" subjugated groups and "inferior" subject-groups to the "becoming minoritarian" of everyone, which I have announced in the title of this chapter, takes place in Deleuze and Guattari's second collaboration, *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature* (1986 [1975]). This movement marks a transition in their work to a different problematic: from the problematic of oppression in *Anti-Oedipus*, to the problematic of liberation.

The broad terms in which the problem of liberation is going to be posed in *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature* are already established in *Anti-Oedipus*. The problem of liberation is going to be posed in terms of the *relation* between exclusive and inclusive processes. But the shift of emphasis from the question of what constitutes oppression to the question of the means of liberation from oppression requires a rearticulation of the relation between inclusive and exclusive processes. In *Anti-Oedipus* inclusive processes serve the effort to define modern oppression, the oppression pertaining to the modern formation of sovereignty, and therefore remain a counterpoint to exclusive processes. Inclusive processes are defined to the extent and in a manner that makes them highlight the exclusive processes that constitute oppression. Concretely, in *Anti-Oedipus* inclusion remains locked into an abstract distinction between inclusion and exclusion, and broken into constituent parts whose role is to shadow closely and bring into relief the constituent parts of exclusion. Abstract distinction and the analysis of constituent parts prove to be well-suited to posing the problem of oppression, which is defined exactly as a process of

abstraction and formalisation establishing a limited set number of universal invariable entities and relations, but they are ultimately inappropriate to posing the problem of liberation from oppression. This doesn't mean that *Anti-Oedipus* fails where *Kafka* succeeds, so that *Kafka* should be considered a progress, nor does it mean that the two problems of oppression and liberation that the two books respectively address are separate and non-communicating. In his Preface to the English edition of *Anti-Oedipus*, Foucault was right in saying that *Anti-Oedipus* is "an *Introduction to the Non-Fascist Life*" and "the first book of ethics to be written in France for quite a long time" (p. xiii). *Anti-Oedipus* opens the way for *Kafka* in that it liberates liberation from exclusion, opening the way to liberation as a practical ethics of inclusion. The two books make a continuum.

In advancing the *inclusive relation* between exclusive and inclusive processes, *Anti-Oedipus* is already looking in the direction of *Kafka*, in that it moves from abstract distinction to concrete syntheses. In addition *Anti-Oedipus* is propelled, from section to section and from chapter to chapter, by innumerable examples echoing the coexistence and variable combination of exclusive and inclusive processes. (Its detailed Contents pages could be rewritten in terms of proper names — names of events, movements, groups, individuals, and texts.) In turn, *Kafka* inherits and feeds upon the conceptual apparatus of *Anti-Oedipus*, but starts from one concrete case and stays within its parameters: Kafka, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Jewish minority of Prague, Kafka's work. In lodging *Anti-Oedipus*'s concepts into one concrete case, an instantaneous transformation befalls them: they are caught in history, in the perspectives and conditions of empirical subjects. These conditions are the hard facts of a state of oppression. If in *Anti-Oedipus* Deleuze and Guattari have been tempted on occasion to present inclusive encounters as ontologically prior, once within a concrete situation they are faced with the empirical "priority", the givenness of exclusive processes. Now, positing the coexistence of inclusion and exclusion is not enough, and the luxury of affirming the inclusive relation between exclusion and inclusion evaporates: the declaration of principles is suspended mid-air between exclusion as an absolute beginning, and the expectation of actions yet to take place,

steps yet to be taken, itineraries yet to be traced. In short, liberation from oppression, the line of escape, is still to come.

A. From oppressor triangles to the minoritarian line of escape

I will describe the modern state of oppression as a triangle which assembles the component relations and entities of exclusion into its sides and points. In the fourth chapter of this work, I have called this triangle "the triangle of the victim, the executioner, and the saviour".

The points of this triangle are: the transcendent and segregated artificial territoriality threatened by its enemies; the external obstacle or enemy of the artificial territoriality; and the global person or representative of the artificial territoriality, who expresses, voices, speaks for the artificial territoriality. The central point or the peak of the triangle is the representative, and its two sides are: the representative's biunivocal relation with the artificial territoriality — where the representative is the "subject of enunciation" and the artificial territoriality the "subject of the statement"; and the exclusive differentiation, the binary opposition between the representative and the external obstacle or enemy — where the representative is the privileged or superior term, and the external obstacle or enemy the inferior term. This triangle is in full evidence in Kafka's letters, particularly his correspondence to Felice which Kafka used to kick-start his career as a writer, as it is in evidence at the beginnings of his novels, in *The Trial* for example. But while in his letters to Felice Kafka assumes the position of the subject of enunciation or the representative, K. starts *The Trial* by assuming the position of the external obstacle.

Kafka was an author before writing his work. He dreamt of lifting himself out of his situation by becoming a great author, a new Goethe, but how could someone in his situation become a great author? Mephistopheles would never pick him as his Faust, nor will Goethe come to him to pronounce him his son. So Kafka goes to the Goethe museum in Weimar and there he meets Felice, the daughter of the museum's concierge, and he uses all his powers of deception to extract from her an endless stream of letters which his desire will transform

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into a heavenly stairway joining him to the spirit of Goethe, the greatest spirit in the German language.[39] His own letters to Felice show the real impact of Kafka's imagined encounter with Goethe: he has simultaneously found an authorial voice and a hero, his very own essential Faust constantly striving, failing, and striving again. (If Goethe's Faust suffers an initial fall, the initial loss of his soul in his pact with the devil, it is this very fall which creates the conditions for a progressive ascent culminating in his final redemption by angels who apply to him the divine law that "He who exerts himself in constant striving, / Him we can save". If we are to follow this judgement, what defines Goethe's Faust is constant striving, not the pact with the devil.)

Kafka has made himself into a subject of enunciation, a representative of his own fictional double, recounting in letter after letter the saga of his double's heroic mission to overcome the series of external obstacles that bar his way to Felice.[40] In his letters to Felice, Kafka becomes an author by acquiring or stealing a narrative voice and a hero for himself, but once he starts writing his work, he doesn't want to be an author and doesn't want a hero.[41] His brief apprenticeship in an "author's or master's literature", instead of rescuing him from his situation and giving him the tools of his trade, takes him straight to the lion's den. He becomes an author to free himself from his situation, and in so doing he discovers the exact position that the likes of him have in the scheme of things: he and his like are the external obstacles that the hero overcomes on his way to freedom. The choir of angels that comes to announce Faust's redemption simultaneously spells Kafka's damnation.

In his letters to Felice Kafka discovers a triangle — the triangle of the subject of enunciation or the representative, the hero or the spirit of the artificial territoriality striving for redemption, the external obstacle or the enemy — that holds no promise for him. He discovers that the hero's freedom is a dead-end, but this discovery enables him to define his writer's task: to trace with his work a line of escape from this triangle, as an antidote to the hero's freedom and as the only hope of a liberation for everyone. "No, freedom was not what I wanted. Only a way out; right, or left, or in any other direction; I made no other demand."[42] In his novels the triangle, as well as the duo of the subject

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of enunciation and the subject of the statement, will reappear, but only as a point of departure.[43] At the beginning of *The Trial* the position of the subject of enunciation is occupied by the representatives of the Law, the position of the subject of the statement or the spirit of the artificial territoriality or the hero is occupied by the Law, while the position of the external obstacle or the enemy of the artificial territoriality is occupied by the accused. But even while the triangle is reproduced as a point of departure for *The Trial*, it is already being transformed by a shift of emphasis. The spotlight has shifted from the progress of the hero to the itinerary of the external obstacle or the accused K. Still, K.'s own point of departure is a complete endorsement of this triangle and a complete acceptance of his position in it. K. begins *The Trial* by relating to the Law and to its representatives in a manner that is exemplary of and instrumental to the operation of the triangle. He sees himself "on a stage", as one of a crowd, the crowd of the accused; and he sees this crowd as "a party opposed to another party", the representatives of the Law; and between "the two sides", "govern[ing] their distribution and their combination", he sees "a superior law"; and he sees the opposed parties both referring to it (*Kafka*, p. 50 throughout).

> It is in this way that K still thinks of justice at his first interrogation ... But K notices that it isn't really like that: the important thing is not what happens in the tribunal or the movements of the two parties together but the molecular agitations that put into motion the hallways, the wings, the back doors, and the side chambers ... abolish[ing] all spectacle and all representation ... From this point on, it is even more important to renounce the idea of a transcendence of the law. (p. 50)

* * *

The Trial begins at the end of a *bildungsroman* that Kafka never wrote, in which K. would have been the hero: K.'s dramatic ascent in the Bank until he has just overcome his last obstacle, the Deputy Manager. Similarly, *The Castle* begins at the end of what could have made

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another grand finale: having finally broken free of the city, K. has just arrived in the country, never to return.

In *Culture and Imperialism* (1993), and during his discussion of Kipling's *Kim* (1901), Edward Said contrasts the itinerary of its hero, Kim, to those of heroes in a number of broadly contemporary novels whose plot is European. Whereas Kim's itinerary overcomes successfully a number of obstacles to end in victory and fulfilment, the itineraries of Frédéric in Flaubert's *Sentimental Education* (1869), Isabel in Henry James's *The Portrait of a Lady* (1881), or Jude in Thomas Hardy's *Jude the Obscure* (1894), end in the failure of their aspirations, in defeat. For example, Kim and Jude are both young men of "unusual pedigree" aspiring to an attractive place in the world — "Kim is an Irishman in India, Jude a minimally gifted rural English boy who is interested more in Greek than in farming" — but the similarity ends there (p. 189). Kim saves the British rule in India by defeating the machinations of Russian spies, and gains a "full time" (p. 165) position in the Great Game (the British Secret Service in India). Jude, on the other hand, fails to become a scholar: "Escape from being a social nonentity holds out the promise of relief, but that is impossible" (pp. 189-190). In Kafka's novels, written not long after the publication of *Kim*, K.'s itineraries diverge from both of the alternative itineraries of the hero as outlined by Said, forging a third path which avoids both victory and defeat.

Said's fascinating reading of Kipling's *Kim* in pages 159-196 of *Culture and Imperialism* is particularly illuminating as a counterpoint to K.'s itinerary in Kafka's novels and Deleuze and Guattari's reading of it, to be discussed shortly. According to Said, though India was "well on its way toward a dynamic and outright opposition to British rule" when Kipling was writing *Kim*, Kipling "resisted this reality" (p. 163) — Kipling "could not imagine an India in historical flux *out* of British control" (p. 185). As a result, on the one hand, "in *Kim* no one challenges British rule" (p. 179) while a number of "native" characters defend it (pp. 177-180); on the other hand, "[d]otting *Kim*'s fabric is a scattering of editorial asides on the immutable nature of the Oriental world" (p. 181). (On both counts *Kim* qualifies as a typical example of an all-pervasive "Orientalism", as defined in Said's 1978 seminal work,

Orientalism.) Finally, in agreement with official thinking, Kipling presents India as divided into a large number of airtight and non-communicating groups: "Everyone in Kim is equally an outsider to other groups and an insider in his" (p. 187).[44] It is in this context that Kim's adventure takes place.

Within a rigidly segregated environment, Kim moves across boundaries, into and out of territories, dialects, values, beliefs, identities, hindered by none, at home in each one, and leaving them all behind.[45] Yet, Kim's apparent wanderings are unfailingly in the service of superior powers and purposes. Kim, throughout his adventures and "boyish pleasures" (p. 166), is jointly and inextricably in the service of the superior spiritual quest of an Oriental holy man representing the spirit of India and in "search for redemption from the Wheel of Life" (p. 168), as well as in the service of the Great Game and its head Colonel Creighton, and "everlastingly responsible to British power" (p. 195).

Kim's two quests merge and find resolution in a big crisis which begins when Kim encounters the Russian spies. While he exposes their plans, they assail the holy man, tear apart his map of the Wheel of Life, and "the defilement is metaphorically of India itself" (p. 193). Out of the deep spiritual malaise that ensues, Kim emerges with superior restorative powers which, transferred to the holy man, enable him to finally grasp and transcend the Wheel of Life in a vision of freedom. As a result, on the one hand, "[c]learly the Abbot-Lama regards Kim as his saviour" (p. 168); on the other hand, the defilement of India is undone in a:

> vision of freedom [which] strikingly resembles Colonel Creighton's Indian Survey, in which every camp and village is duly noted ... Everything is now held together. At its centre resides Kim, the boy whose errant spirit has regrasped things... (p. 172)

To conclude, this is how Said summarises Kim's itinerary: "what Kipling has Kim go through is a ceremony of reappropriation, Britain (through a loyal Irish subject) taking hold once again of India" (p. 174).

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I will now turn, as announced, to K.'s itinerary. When K. is arrested, he is at the centre of a small world — top functionary in the Bank, favoured lodger in a house in the centre of the city, and in between, at regular intervals, he visits the public spaces of Elsa and the beerhouse. The limits of his world are immediately made apparent: if there is a case against him, he expects it to be named, he expects it to be staged in court, and expects the stage to be "the Court in the Palace of Justice"[46]; none of this happens. The Palace of Justice is nothing but a name for countless non-communicating Law Courts strewn in the peripheries of the city, housed in the tenement buildings of the urban ghettos — "Didn't you know that there were Law-Court offices here? There are Law-Court offices in almost every attic" (p. 125). And K.'s case, instead of referring to an offence, consists in this alone: a naked command which summons him to one of these Law Courts, assigns him to it, and drafts him into its service. On the Sunday of his interrogation K. leaves the centre of the city for the alien periphery, yet he goes there as if he were going to the Bank, aiming to arrive at the start of business, promptly at 9 o'clock; and even though his destination is not the central Court of the Palace of Justice that he had imagined but one among many peripheral courts in one among many spaces of a tenement building, he solemnly goes to its centre, the main courtroom, and to the stage of the main courtroom, as if he were going before the Law. Then "K notices...".

If the Law Court to which K. has been assigned is one among many peripheral non-communicating Law Courts, it is itself nothing but an assemblage of many peripheral non-communicating offices, its main courtroom one, probably the most insubstantial, among them. (The main courtroom is hastily improvised for its rare sessions and has no existence independent of these sessions; otherwise it is the home of the Court Attendant and his family.) If the absence of a real centre between the peripheral Law Courts as well as between the peripheral offices of a Law Court were in doubt, the "organization"'s inability to reach final verdicts of acquittal or condemnation should be ample proof.[47] This is the situation of the accused: "'Ostensible acquittal and indefinite postponement,' said the painter. 'It lies with you to choose between them...'" (p. 120).

If the "organization" has any use for the Law, this is not to decide the guilt or innocence of the accused, but *to prevent the communication of its segments*: what keeps the peripheral Law Courts and their peripheral Law Offices non-communicating and disconnected is their common reference, their common biunivocal relation to the Law, and what sustains the reference to the Law are the accused, striving for their ostensible acquittal almost without exception. During his first interrogation K. has already unknowingly opted for indefinite postponement: he is no longer addressing the Law, his attention turns to his audience, made up of functionaries, and is caught by the flares of promiscuity that permeate it, the sideways glances and whispers that the audience exchange instead of watching the spectacle, and then the couple who fall on the floor in front of the exit. The next Sunday, it is these "molecular agitations" that draw him to the Law Court and, once he is there, it is such "molecular agitations" that carry him away from the empty courtroom to the "hallways, the wings and the side chambers".[48] Along the hallways that K. crosses, its regulars, seated on benches, proud despite their apparent subservience, keep a vigilant eye over their cases by observing the lowly clerks in their offices as if they are visitors in a zoo observing caged animals:

> the offices ... had an open frontage of wooden rails, reaching, however, to the roof, through which a little light penetrated and through which one could see a few clerks as well, some writing at their desks, and some standing close to the rails peering through the interstices at the people in the lobby. (p. 53)

K. has joined the crowd of those "peering through the interstices" of the block to which they are assigned; he is attracted, propelled by their promiscuous communication and himself becomes promiscuous. Whether they are representatives of the Law or accused is irrelevant. Or rather, the opposition between representatives and accused is the off-spring of the marriage, in the name of the Law, between representatives striving for the ostensible segmentation of their Law Court and accused striving for their ostensible acquittal in this Law Court. While this majority alliance imposes the discontinuity of contiguous blocks in the name of the infinite transcendence of the Law, K.'s itinerary traces the contiguity of distant blocks.

Nowhere is this more clear than in K.'s changed relation to the Bank. When K. goes to the peripheries for his first interrogation, he leaves the Bank as a top functionary working in the centre of the city. When K. returns to the Bank, he returns as a distracted functionary who treats the Bank as if it were indistinguishable from the peripheral Law Court. What he leaves is the centre of the city, what he returns to is one peripheral centre among many, in relation to which indefinite postponement and lateral communication are just as appropriate. Instead of passing judgement on the clients' cases in his capacity as the Assessor, K. is now increasingly looking out of his window. Instead of working in his office, K. is attracted by the far-away offices of the Bank's lowest clerks. Having crossed long corridors, "[h]e sat down for a few moments, for the sake of their company, shuffled through some duplicates, hoping to give the impression that he was inspecting them" (p. 72). Wandering in the Bank late at night, he finds the "contiguity of two far-away segments" (*Kafka*, p. 79): he opens the door of a back room to find that it doubles as a back room for the Law Court. While during work-hours a client leads him to Titorelli whose back door opens to another peripheral Law Court, in a direction diametrically opposed to that of the Law Court to which he is assigned.[49]

It can be surmised that this client, "the manufacturer", is a fellow accused. Titorelli's business comes from two sources: he receives commissions from the judges to paint their portraits, and he sells his landscapes to the accused; K. leaves Titorelli having had to buy a number of them. The manufacturer describes Titorelli as an artist who sells him landscapes. It can also be surmised that the manufacturer has equally opted for indefinite postponement. While the accused who have opted for ostensible acquittal and who spend their days in the hallways of the Law Offices are described as absorbed in their individual concern — "An individual here and there may score a point in secret, but no one hears it until afterwards, no one knows how it has been done. So there's no real community, people drift in and out of the lobbies together, but there's not much conversation" (p. 133) — the manufacturer approaches K. and tries to assist him.

While following the contiguity of far-away peripheral centres and the lateral communication of the blocks within them, K. has no use for

the distinction between officials of the Law and accused. Instead, his itinerary depends on and measures the difference between what Deleuze and Guattari call the "connectors", and those, whether officials or accused, who represent and guard a peripheral centre by "separat[ing] that which is contiguous" and "cut[ting] it off from all its connections".[50] The Law — "the transcendent imperial law" (p. 73)[51] — "sweeping along in almost the same movement servants and victims, chiefs and subalterns" (p. 60), has no existence outside those who summon it to a peripheral centre. And if it "never stops agitating a finite segment and making it into a complete object" (p. 59), this is because, rather than being served by those who appeal to it, the Law is itself in the service of their immanent power.

> The segments are simultaneously powers and territories — they capture desire by territorializing it, fixing it in place ... giving it a mission, extracting from it an image of transcendence to which it devotes itself to such a degree that it comes to oppose this image to itself ... [The segments, the peripheral centres are] a concretization of power, of desire, of territoriality or reterritorialization, regulated by the abstraction of a transcendent law. (p. 86)[52]

The "connectors" turn their backs to all this. Instead of being "caught in this or that segment" (p. 59), the connectors move in the distance that separates them: "each one at the turning point of several segments ... finds the service door ... reveals the contiguity of that which one had thought to be faraway ... restores or installs the power [puissance] of the continuous" (pp. 63-64). In his itinerary K. crosses the segments and their representatives, avoids their false assistance, to follow the connectors from segment to segment. K. is not a character but a function:

> which possesses the power [puissance] of the continuous and which overflows all the segments and sweeps up all the connections ... unites all these [connector] points, arranges them in his own specific machine which extends across the whole field of immanence... (p. 69)

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Ultimately, it is less a question of K as a general function taken up by an individual than of K as a *functioning of a polyvalent assemblage...* (p. 85)

* * *

From one connection to the next, K.'s indefinite postponement is "perfectly positive and active" (p. 52) and, from *The Trial* to *The Castle*, it is the cursor that moves, the "unlimited motor force" (p. 83) that drives Kafka's novels. K. in *The Castle* discovers two options parallel to K.'s options of indefinite postponement and ostensible acquittal in *The Trial*. Either to prolong his stay indefinitely by developing real connections with the village, or to strive for the ostensible confirmation of his status as official Land Surveyor:

> He was much more inclined to read into them a frankly offered choice ... whether he preferred to become a village worker with a distinctive but merely apparent connection with the Castle, or an ostensible village worker whose real occupation was determined through the medium of Barnabas ... Only as a worker in the village, removed as far as possible from the sphere of the Castle, could he hope to achieve anything in the Castle itself ... then all kinds of paths would be thrown open to him... (*The Penguin Complete Novels of Franz Kafka*, p. 201)

If *The Trial* and *The Castle* are unfinished, this is because they can be extended indefinitely.[53] And if they can be extended indefinitely, this is because they are *themselves* generated by a method of unlimited postponement.

K.'s line of escape assembles a "whole underground network" (p. 10) — what Deleuze and Guattari call a "rhizome"[54] — of *inclusive* encounters. Deleuze and Guattari call this underground network — this "functioning and polyvalent assemblage" — the *immanent field of justice.*[55] K.'s line reassembles the blocks, the partial objects comprising the peripheral Law Courts, away from their orbit around the transcendent Law, into a different composition — "the transcendent law can only regulate pieces that revolve around it at a distance from it and from each other. It is an astronomical construction ... the

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discontinuous wall will find its only finality in a tower" (p. 72). Onto this construction — the field of the transcendent Law — held together by each Law Court's biunivocal relation to the transcendent Law, will be grafted the syn-phonic composition of the field of justice:

> these blocks, instead of distributing themselves around a circle in which only several discontinuous arches are traced, align themselves on a hallway or a corridor: ... each block-segment has an opening or a door onto the line of the hallway — one that is usually quite far from the door or the opening of the following block — it is also true that all the blocks have back doors that are contiguous. (p. 73)[56]

The field of the Law and the field of justice "function in each other, and in the modern world" (p. 75), but whereas the Law functions by means of the "infinite-limited-discontinuous", justice functions by means of the "finite-contiguous-continuous-unlimited" (p. 55). The Law descends from an infinite transcendence to limited Law Courts, to discontinuous blocks caging everyone in their individual concern; justice is stretched from finite encounters, to contiguous blocks, to a continuous line of composition, to an unlimited field. Not only as realities but as methods, the field of the Law is what a dominant majority imposes on everyone — as Titorelli points out, everyone or rather "every *thing* belongs to the Court"[57]; the field of justice is what a minority proposes: "'Contact' with justice" (p. 52), that everyone become a functionary of justice, "agents, connective cogs of an assemblage of justice" (p. 55).

B. The minoritarian expression machine

> "Art is a mirror, which goes 'fast,' like a watch — sometimes."[58]

Instead of writing to overcome his situation, Kafka finds in his situation the very conditions of his literature and feeds on these conditions. This is what Deleuze and Guattari find in Kafka, and this is why they turn to him.[59]

Kafka comes from a minority within a peripheral centre of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This minority attempts to *overcome* its oppression to the extent that it attempts to become itself a peripheral centre with its own representatives, its own reference to a transcendent spirit, and its own accused; "we must note the dangers of a minority

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struggle — to reterritorialize, to redo the photos, to remake power and law, to also remake a 'great literature'" (*Kafka*, p. 86). This is according to Deleuze and Guattari the function of the Prague school: to represent the spirit of the Jewish minority; to enhance the representative power of the poor German of Prague, in the service of the subjective expression of the objective spirit of the Jewish minority.[60]

> "Grasp the world," instead of extracting impressions from it ...
> Kill metaphor. Aesthetic impressions, sensations, or
> imaginings still exist for themselves in Kafka's first essays
> where a certain influence of the Prague school is at work.
> But all of Kafka's evolution will consist in effacing them to the
> benefit of ... a hyper-realism ... [S]ubjective impressions are
> systematically replaced by points of connection that function
> objectively... (p. 70)

But to the extent that this minority is able to *experience* its oppression, it experiences the German of Prague as language stripped bare to its essential function: not to represent but to command, not to refer but to order. The "ordinary use of language can be called extensive or representative — the reterritorializing function of language" — and it is based on "the distinction and the complementarity of a subject of enunciation, who is in connection with sense, and a subject of the statement, who is in connection, directly or metaphorically, with the designated thing" (p. 20). But what underlies representation is the "imperative system of language as a transmission of orders, an exercise of power or of resistance to this exercise" (p. 23).[61] To the extent that this minority is able to *experience* its oppression, instead of treating expression as an interior or subjective reproduction or imitation, a "representation of the transcendent law" (p. 47), instead of going back from expression to a content that precedes it and lends it legitimacy, *it grasps the function of an expression that appeals to the spirit of a closed macrocosm of external reality and claims to represent it as an essential gear in a system of oppression.*[62]

The ability to experience oppression opens the way to the liberation of expression — "[a]n expression freed from its constricting form and bringing about a similar liberation of contents" (p. 61). It

actively detaches expression from the private person, the private concern, and its recourse to a given state of things, to connect it to a developing situation, a "political immediacy" (p. 18). Under these conditions, individual expression is no longer *private* — it "takes on a collective value" and "already constitutes a common action" (p. 17). Secondly, under these conditions, individual expression becomes a "mirror that goes fast"; it "precedes or advances — it is the expression that precedes contents" (p. 85). Finally, under these conditions, individual expression "tend[s] toward the assemblage (*agencement*) of a collective enunciation" (p.18). Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari tell us, finds in these conditions, and in the reconstruction of expression that they make possible, the very tools of a minor literature.[63]

Minor literature is a machine of expression that grasps the world — "art and life, are opposed only from the point of view of a major literature" (p. 41). Rather than reflecting life, it is an experimental investigation that dismantles a closed social field to see how it works.[64] In doing so minor literature bypasses — and deflects — the social field's forms, its islands of representation, its "oppressive quality", to follow and compose its living connections, its points of formation, its "points of nonculture and underdevelopment", its "oppressed quality" (p. 27 throughout). Minor literature "begins by expressing itself and doesn't conceptualize until afterward" (p. 28); and it expresses itself in joining experimentation and realism, dismantling and composition, function and formation, the marginal and the popular. This is how the minoritarian expression machine comes to embody not only "that which a minority constructs within a major language" (p.16) but also "the revolutionary force for all literature" (p. 19), and comes to hold a promise and a challenge, a "problem" and a "dream", for everyone: becoming minoritarian.[65]

Conclusion to the work

In this thesis I have attempted to define a Deleuzo-Guattarian method of analysis, its conceptual apparatus, its "characters", its perspective, its ethics.

In the first, introductory chapter, I provided the reader with a brief sketch of this method and with working definitions of main concepts, such as "artificial territoriality", "line of flight", "becoming minoritarian", and introduced the "characters": modernity, the people, the individual, democracy, minorities, minor nations, the West, oppression, liberation, realism, experimentation, literature, criticism.

In the first part of this thesis I attempted to demonstrate this Deleuzo-Guattarian method of analysis by bringing it in contact first with the postmodernism debate, then with radical feminism. My hope was that this would begin to elucidate the method itself by showing what it can do, while at the same time shedding some light on important tendencies in two important fields of contemporary criticism.

By the beginning of the second part the reader is in possession of the outline of a method, familiarised with a conceptual apparatus, faced with well-known "characters" beginning to be redefined, addressed by a perspective and ethics half-emerged. The purpose of the second part was to elaborate on and define the above as fully as possible. This I attempted to do, firstly, through detailed comparisons of crucial aspects of Deleuze and Guattari's work to relevant work by others. Secondly, through detailed reconstructions of what I considered to be Deleuze and Guattari's most crucial arguments.

I will not ask the reader to believe that the Deleuzo-Guattarian method, perspective and ethics that I have attempted to define are *the only* Deleuzo-Guattarian method, perspective and ethics possible. At best, that is if I have done my job well, this thesis would be a mixture of selection, fidelity and some originality.

Whatever its exact status might be, this is the Deleuzo-Guattarian world that emerges out of my thesis. We live in a world dominated by artificial territorialities large and small, old and new, opposed in content but indistinguishable in form, whose rule is the law of

exclusion. There is no other world and what the future holds for us is more of them. Modern thought is instrumental in building them and supporting them. This "major" world attempts to capture everyone within a hierarchy of positions high and low, and yet it imposes on everyone, from its lowest victim to its highest functionary, the conditions of a generalised servitude. If there is difference between them, this is a difference that comes from the degree to which they are able to escape their positions to form lateral connections in inclusive encounters. And if artificial territorialities are different, this difference comes only from the degree to which they are reworked from within by a practical and experimental ethics or art of inclusion.

Modern thought joins the assemblage of this minor art of inclusion and becomes one of its gears, sometimes the first one, to the extent that it gives itself to inclusive encounters in order to follow and to keep on formulating the exigencies, the instructions, and the rigours of this art. "'Grasp the world' to make it take flight".[66]

Notes

CHAPTER ONE

1. See Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, "Legitimation by Paralogy", pp. 60-67.

2. Andrew Ross, Introduction to *Universal Abandon? The Politics of Postmodernism* (1989), edited by Ross, p. xi; see following chapter.

3. See, especially, Jean Baudrillard's *Simulations* and *In the Shadow of Silent Majorities*. For example, see "Political Incantation" and "The Tactile and the Digital" in *Simulations*, pp. 26-30 and pp. 115-138 respectively.

4. Walter Benjamin, "Conversations with Brecht" in *Aesthetics and Politics*, p. 97.

5. Walter Benjamin, "Franz Kafka. On the Tenth Anniversary of His Death" in *Illuminations*, p. 126.

6. For "in slant" see "Investigations of a Dog", for "knock him endways" see "Metamorphosis"; p. 115 and p. 10 respectively in *Metamorphosis and Other Stories*.

7. See "Metamorphosis", op. cit., p. 11.

8. See "Metamorphosis", op. cit., p. 24.

9. See my last chapter.

10. Deleuze and Guattari, *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, p. 25.

11. "An Introductory Talk on the Yiddish Language", trs. Ernst Kaiser and Eithne Wilkins, in *Dearest Father*, pp. 381-386.

12. "Theses on the Philosophy of History" in *Illuminations*, p. 248.

13. *The Penguin Complete Novels of Franz Kafka*, p. 173.

14. "Max Brod's Book on Kafka" in *Illuminations*, p. 136.

15. *The Penguin Complete Novels of Franz Kafka*, pp. 181, 639 and 176 respectively.

16. *The Penguin Complete Novels of Franz Kafka*, p. 639.

CHAPTER TWO

1. Fredric Jameson, "The Politics of Theory: Ideological Positions in the Postmodernism Debate", *New German Critique* 33 (fall 1984), p. 53.

2. See, for example, Jane Flax, *Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and Postmodernism in the Contemporary West* (1990), pp. 5 and 6: "Something has happened, is happening, to Western societies. The beginning of this transition can be dated somewhat arbitrarily from after the First World War in Europe and from after the Second World War in the United States", etc.; p. 14: "Profound yet little comprehended change, uncertainty, and ambivalence seem pervasive in the contemporary West", etc. Lyotard in *The Postmodern Condition* refers to "the most highly developed societies" (p. xxiii), and also to "societies [that] enter what is known as the postindustrial *age*" (p. 3, my italics). Jameson, as we will see, will further stress the latter, periodising argument, at the expense of localisation.

3. See, for example, Theo d' Haen and J.W. Bertens (eds.), *Postmodernist Fiction in Europe and the Americas* (1988). This anthology, itself based in the Netherlands, promises the widest participation; in fact, as the title indicates, the participants as well as the literatures discussed come from what can be described as the periphery of the West. Nevertheless, a lot of contributions, as we will see, discuss postmodernism as something that comes from the outside; some perceive postmodernism as a neo-imperial device coming from what can be called a core West.

4. This point is most strongly made by Andrew Ross, editor of *Universal Abandon? The Politics of Postmodernism* (1989). In his Introduction, Ross claims that the postmodernism debate "followed upon" the debate between Lyotard, Habermas and Jameson (p. xi). I object to this construction, and I will develop my reasons later on.

5. It is indicative that, whereas French philosophy provided a lot of the themes, the material, for the Anglo-American postmodernism debate,

such debate never really took off or became meaningful in France. In this respect, Lyotard's move to the University of California in 1989 might not be of purely anecdotal interest. If I may provide an anecdote of my own, in 1990, after a conference at the Collège International de Philosophie, a group of young philosophers invited me for a drink to ask me this: what is all the fuss about postmodernism; their own debate was on democracy, the internal conflicts of "liberté, égalité, fraternité", etc.

6. Iris M. Zavala, "On the (Mis-)Uses of the Post-Modern: Hispanic Modernism Revisited" in Theo d' Haen and J.W. Bertens (eds.), *Postmodernist Fiction in Europe and the Americas*, p. 84; Charles Jencks, *What is Post-Modernism?*, p. 3.

7. Thomas Docherty, *Postmodernism: A Reader*, pp. 1-2, 27 note 2. According to Iris M. Zavala, the postmodern is "invented" by de Onis and "adopted" by Toynbee; Zavala, op. cit., p. 84. As we will see, the form of this argument — that Toynbee, a "Western" historian, "adopted" the term from a Spanish writer — is typical of quite a few contributions in this anthology, and it invariably goes hand in hand — not paradoxically — with an anti-Western rhetoric and a denunciation of postmodernism as a Western ploy.

8. See Andrew Ross, *The Failure of Modernism: Symptoms of American Poetry* (1986), p. 95.

9. Irving Howe in 1963 and Harold Levine in 1966 were the first US literary critics to use the term, giving it negative connotations; Charles Jencks, *What is Post-Modernism?*, pp. 2-3.

10. The first to use the term in architectural criticism was Charles Jencks according to himself: "Except for an occasional slip here and there, by Philip Johnson and Nicolaus Pevsner, it wasn't until my own writing on the subject which started in 1975 [that the term "Post-Modernism" entered architecture]"; *What is Post-Modernism?*, p. 14.

See also note 17 on same page: "Subsequently Eisenman and Stern started using the term and by 1977 it had caught on".

11. Luhmann's "systems theory" is discussed in the concluding Excursus, pp. 368-385.

12. Habermas discusses Foucault in Lectures IX and X, pp. 238-293.

13. On the philosophy of the subject, see Seyla Benhabib, *Critique, Norm, and Utopia*, p. 213:

> The four presuppositions of the position described as "the philosophy of the subject" were: (a) a unitary model of human activity defined as "externalization" or "objectification"; (b) a transsubjective subject; (c) the interpretation of history as the story of transsubjectivity; and (d) the identity of constituting and constituted subjectivity.

See also pp. 54 and 330. Benhabib argues that Habermas, whose work she examines up to 1984, only disengages himself fully from the first two presuppositions (p. 330 ff.).

14. See Peter Osborne, "Avant-tarde", *Radical Philosophy* (summer 1993), p. 42.

15. See, further on, the discussion of John Mepham's "Narratives of Postmodernism" in *Postmodernism and Contemporary Fiction*, edited by Edmund J. Smyth; Allen Thiher's *Words in Reflection: Modern Language Theory and Postmodern Fiction*; and Linda Hutcheon's *The Politics of Postmodernism*.

16. See my fourth chapter.

17. See, for example, *The Political Unconscious*, p. 17: "a modernist (or more properly postmodernist) conception of language".

18. I leave aside Jameson's massive 1991 book, *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, which is in the main a parataxis of

up-to-date surveys of the different domains of US culture. The two theoretical chapters of this book, "The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism" and "Theories of the Postmodern" are, respectively, a reproduction of Jameson's "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism" (1984) in *New Left Review*, and a version of his "The Politics of Theory: Ideological Positions in the Postmodernism Debate" (1984) in *New German Critique*.

19. In *New Left Review* 146 (1984), pp. 53-92.

20. In *Postmodern Culture*, edited by Hal Foster (London: Pluto Press, 1985 [1983]), pp. 111-125. A note informs us that "[t]his essay was originally a talk, portions of which were presented as a Whitney Museum Lecture in fall, 1982; it is published here essentially unrevised" (p. 111).

21. In *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, edited by C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1988), pp. 347-360. This book is — with some additions — a transcription of the 1983 US conference of the same title.

22. In *The Sixties without Apologies* (1984), pp. 178-209; special issue of *Social Text*, edited by S. Sayres.

23. In *New German Critique* 33 (fall 1984), pp. 53-65.

24. Lyotard, "Capitalisme énergumène" (1972) in *Des dispositifs pulsionnels* (1973), p. 39.

25. "Capitalisme énergumène", op. cit., p. 50; see also chapters I and V of Lyotard's *Rudiments païens* (1977). See further my sixth chapter.

26. Throughout this triumphalist article Eagleton displays an ad hoc conflation of the terms "late capitalism", "post-structuralism" and "postmodernism". For example, late capitalism is interchangeable with

the "post-structuralist epoch" (p. 63) and poststructuralism is interchangeable with "postmodernist theory" (p. 69).

27. See chapter eight of Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus* entitled "1874: Three Novellas, or 'What Happened?'", especially p. 193.

28. Jean Baudrillard's ironic expression in *Simulations*, p. 139.

29. See also p. 98, my italics: "How is it, then, that the prevailing mood takes the form it does? To answer that question *with any power* requires that we first take stock of the mundane realities of capitalist modernity and postmodernity".

30. Through the fixed convertibility of the US dollar into gold, the space of the US production system was the guarantor of international value. But since 1973 "money [the US dollar] has been 'dematerialized'". "That may have something to do with the competitive economic position and power of different national systems." "[F]iercer international competition ... had much to do with undermining the power of the US economy to operate as an exclusive guarantor of world money" (pp. 296-7).

31. Harvey does not give references to particular works by Baudrillard and Virilio.

32. Harvey discusses postmodernist "fragmentation" only in terms of its function "in the *reproduction* of social life" (p. 98, my italics). See, for example, p. 345: "the reproduction of the social and symbolic order through the exploration of difference and 'otherness' is all too evident in the climate of postmodernism"; see also p. 303: "racial minorities, colonized peoples, women, etc. ... become a part of the very fragmentation which a mobile capitalism and flexible accumulation can feed upon".

33. The expression "homeland Marxism" is indebted to Laclau. See "Building a New Left" in Laclau's *New Reflections on the Revolution of*

Our Time (1990), p. 178: "I have never been a 'total' Marxist, someone who sought in Marxism a 'homeland' ... The 'language games' I played with Marxism were always more complicated, and they always tried to articulate Marxism to something else." Interview with Laclau originally published in *Strategies* 1 (fall 1988).

34. This reception crystallised in Norman Geras's "Post-Marxism?", published in *New Left Review* 163 (May-June 1987).

35. Edward W. Said proposes a method of "contrapuntal reading" in *Culture and Imperialism* (1993). On "contrapuntal reading" see, for example, pp. 36-37, 78-79, 97, 176, 195.

36. Thomas Docherty, *Postmodernism: A Reader*, p. 329. "Politics and the Limits of Modernity" is reprinted in pp. 329-343 of this work. Page numbers will be given in the main text and will refer to *Postmodernism: A Reader*.

37. In the first part, British contributors survey contemporary literatures in the following order: British, US, French, Italian, Latin American — is this an order of importance? In the second part, contributors of different nationalities (Canadian, Dutch, British, US, Irish) propose their "critical agenda".

38. See Jencks's *Late-Modern Architecture* (1980); see also his *What is Post-modernism?* (1986), pp. 35-42.

39. In *Diacritics* (summer 1976).

40. Connor refers to Said's "Opponents, Audiences, Constituencies and Community" (1982) in *Postmodern Culture* (1985) and to Eagleton's *The Function of Criticism: From the Spectator to Post-Structuralism* (1984). See Connor, p. 22, notes 15-17.

41. Connor refers to Owens's "The Discourse of Others: Feminists and Postmodernism" in *Postmodern Culture* (1985). See Connor, p. 245, notes 12 and 14.

42. In *The Case of Wagner* and in *Nietzsche Contra Wagner*. See Walter Kaufmann's Introduction to *The Case of Wagner* in *The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of Wagner*, pp. 147-151.

43. See Vattimo's contributions to *Il pensiero debole* (1983), co-edited by Vattimo and Pier Aldo Rovatti; see also Vattimo's "Le deboli certezze" (1984), *Alfabeta* 67.

44. Heidegger develops the term *Verwindung* in *Holzwege* (1950), *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (1954) and in *Identity and Difference* (1974 [1957]).

45. Vattimo discusses Nietzsche and Heidegger "in their 'continuity'", accepting nevertheless that this continuity "can be recognized only by an explicit 'distortion' of the Heideggerian interpretation of Nietzsche" (p. 176); Vattimo refers here to Heidegger's *Nietzsche*. Nor does Vattimo address Deleuze's two books on Nietzsche, *Nietzsche* and *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, which have been seminal in the poststructuralist engagement with Nietzsche. On the basis of the continuity between Nietzsche and Heidegger, Vattimo argues that "[t]he first philosopher to speak in terms of the possibility of *Verwindung* — even if, of course, he doesn't use the word itself — is not Heidegger but Nietzsche" (p. 164). According to Vattimo, this takes place in *Human, All Too Human, Daybreak* and *The Gay Science*, and is prepared in the time that separates them from the second of the *Untimely Meditations*. This, once again, is the time of Nietzsche's reappraisal of Wagner.

46. Vattimo refers, not always explicitly, to Adorno's *Negative Dialectics*, *Minima Moralia*, and *Aesthetic Theory*; Benjamin's "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" and "Theses on the Philosophy of History" in *Illuminations*; and Ernst Bloch's *Geist der*

Utopie and "Differenzierungen im Begriff Fortschritt" in *Tübinger Einleitung in die Philosophie*.

47. Vattimo paraphrases Heidegger's "complete Europeanization of the earth and man"; "A Dialogue on Language" in *On the Way to Language*, pp. 15-16.

48. This argument is so unpalatable that, in his Introduction to *The End of Modernity*, Jon R. Snyder attempts to soften it discreetly by claiming that the West itself now becomes marginal: "all cultures, Western or not, tend to become marginal" (p. xlvii). I don't think that this interpretation is supported by Vattimo's text.

49. Bauman's books on modernity/postmodernity are: *Legislators and Interpreters: On Modernity, Postmodernity and Intellectuals* (1987), *Modernity and the Holocaust* (1989), *Modernity and Ambivalence* (1992), *Mortality, Immortality, and Other Life Strategies* (1992), *Intimations of Postmodernity* (1992), *Postmodern Ethics* (1993) and *Life in Fragments: Essays in Postmodern Morality* (1995).

50. "A Sociological Theory of Postmodernity", *Thesis Eleven* 29, p. 40. All page numbers in the main text will refer to the same work until otherwise indicated.

51. In the discussion to follow, the reader should bear in mind a terminological peculiarity. In *Life in Fragments: Essays in Postmodern Morality* Bauman maps his long-standing distinction between obeying laws and following rules on the one hand, and individual responsibility on the other, onto a distinction between ethics and morality. This, in spite of the fact that to build his notion of individual responsibility he leans heavily on modern ethical philosophy.

52. On abortion, see *Life in Fragments*, pp. 160 and 178; on the contraceptive pill see p. 280.

53. Craig Owens, "The Discourse of Others: Feminists and Postmodernism" (1983) in *Postmodern Culture* (1985), p. 61; Andreas Huyssen, *After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism* (1986), pp. 198-199; Jonathan Arac, Introduction to *Postmodernism and Politics* (1986), edited by Arac, p. xi.

54. See Judith Butler, "Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of 'Postmodernism'" in *Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange* (1995), pp. 35-37. Butler asks: "Who are these postmodernists? Is it a name that one takes for oneself, or is it more often a name that one is called ... warning against an impending nihilism" and predicting "dangerous consequences"? Butler argues that the postmodernism debate conflates "poststructuralism" and "postmodernism" and reduces the work of various poststructuralists to a few caricatural catch phrases meant to incite fear and disdain.

     See also Drucilla Cornell, "Rethinking the Time of Feminism", op. cit., p. 145: "Judith Butler and I share a dream — a dream that clichés strung together, purportedly to give meaning to 'something' called 'postmodernism' will be disassociated from the diverse thinkers who have been branded as 'postmodernists'".

55. See also: "Feminisms have resisted incorporation into the postmodern camp, and with good reason: their political agendas would be endangered or at least obscured ... their historical particularities and relative positionalities would risk being subsumed" (p. 152).

56. See, for example, Jencks, *What is Post-Modernism?*, p. 19, on James Stirling's extention to the Staatsgalerie in Stuttgart which accommodates all tastes.

57. See "the historical and social grounding of postmodernist fiction and photography" (p. 27); "Postmodernist film and fiction is, if anything, obsessed with history and how we can know the past today" (p. 114); postmodernist art forms "want to (or feel they have to) speak to a culture from inside it ... believe this to be the only way to reach that culture and make it change" (p. 13); both historiography and

fiction involve "particularized [though obfuscated as such] uses of language ... postmodernism refuses such an obfuscation of its context of enunciation".

58. See also p. 113: "The problem for Jameson may simply be that they don't deal with Marxist History"; in fact, he is the one nostalgically "lament[ing] the loss of a sense of his particular definition of history". In this context, Hutcheon reverses Jameson's argument against Doctorow's *Ragtime* discussed above: "it could be argued that a relatively unproblematized view of historical continuity and the context of representation offers a stable plot structure to Dos Passos's *USA* trilogy. But this very stability is called into question in Doctorow's ... *Ragtime*" (p. 95).

59. "This is the confrontation that I shall be calling postmodernist: where documentary historical actuality meets formalist self-reflexivity" (p. 7); postmodernism "juxtaposes and gives equal value to the self-reflexive and the historically grounded" (p. 2); "What is common to all these postmodern challenges to convention is their simultaneous exploitation of the power of that convention" (p. 43); "postmodernism ultimately manages to install and reinforce as much as undermine the conventions" (p. 1); "it takes the form of self-conscious, self-contradictory, self-undermining statement" (p. 1); "there is never any resolution of the ensuing contradictions" (p. 72).

60. This is in spite of previous declarations to the contrary, such as that "Postmodern photo-graphy is political art of the first order" (p. 130), etc.

61. "Feminisms will continue to resist incorporation into postmodernism, largely because of their revolutionary force as political movements working for real social change" (p. 168); Both postmodernism and feminism "clearly work towards an awareness of the social nature of cultural activity ... But I would argue that feminisms want to go beyond this and work to *change* those systems" (pp. 152-153).

62. Chapter Six, "Postmodernism and Feminisms", pp. 141-168.

63. Comments such as that "as Adorno argued, the pretence of individualism ... is in fact proportional to the 'liquidation of the individual'" (p. 13).

64. Susan Sellers, Introduction to *The Hélène Cixous Reader*, edited by Sellers, p. xxvi.

65. "Social Criticism without Philosophy: An Encounter between Feminism and Postmodernism" appeared in three different publications in 1988: *Communication* 10.3-4 (1988), pp. 345-366; *Theory, Culture and Society* 5.2-3 (June 1988), pp. 373-394; and *Universal Abandon? The Politics of Postmodernism* (1989), edited by Ross, pp. 83-104. It is included in *Postmodernism: A Reader* (1993), edited by Thomas Docherty, pp. 415-432. In the discussion of "Social Criticism without Philosophy" to follow I will be quoting from *Postmodernism: A Reader*.

66. Fraser and Nicholson refer to Shulamith Firestone, Gayle Rubin, Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo, Nancy Chodorow, Ann Ferguson and Nancy Folbre, Nancy Hartsock, Catherine MacKinnon, and Carol Gilligan.

67. Gayle Rubin, "The Traffic in Women" in *Toward an Anthropology of Women* (1975), edited by R.R. Reiter, p. 160.

68. The chronological sequence of *Feminist Contentions* is as follows. First text by Benhabib, first text by Butler, and first text by Fraser mediating the two, delivered in September 1990 at a "Feminism and Postmodernism" symposium. First text by Cornell added to the first round. Second texts by Benhabib, Butler (part of her second text is dated September 1994) and Cornell, responding to the first round. Second text by Fraser mediating the response texts. Introduction by Nicholson mediating the whole exchange. *Feminist Contentions* was published in December 1995.

69. On the distinction between the "politics of intersubjectivity" and the politics of "collective singularity" see, for example, *Critique, Norm, and Utopia*, p. 351.

70. See also *Critique, Norm, and Utopia*, p. 277: "the difficulty with Habermas's concept [of utopian reason] is that it seems like such a natural outcome of the present that it is difficult to see what would constitute an emancipatory break with the present if communicative rationality were fulfilled"; and p. 278: "I question the extent to which communicative ethics can fulfill the function of serving as anticipatory-utopian critique of the present".

71. Benhabib discusses questions of "motivation and affect" especially in pp. 316-327. Fraser, it will be remembered, claims that Benhabib "marginalizes questions about motivation and desire".

72. In *Marxism Today* (February 1991). This article is "abridged from Charles Jencks, *New World View — The Post-Modern Era*, in manuscript" (p. 18, note 2).

73. Most notably, *The Language of Post-Modern Architecture* (1977), *Post-Modern Classicism: The New Synthesis* (1980), *What is Post-Modernism?* (1986), *The Post-Avant-Garde: Painting in the 1980s* (1987) and *Postmodernism* (1987).

74. This is the conclusion to the Preamble of the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations of October 24, 1970.

75. For example, "the territorial integrity or *political unity* of sovereign and independent States" is sacrosanct (pp. 10-11); "to deprive peoples of their *national identity* constitutes a violation of their inalienable rights" (p. 9); "any attempt aimed at the partial or total destruction of the *national unity* and territorial integrity of a State ... is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter" (p. 8, my italics

throughout). All quotations from the Declaration on Principles of International Law, in *International Human Rights* (1993), eds. F. Ermacora, M. Nowak and H. Tretter.

76. "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose" [1784] and *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* [1795]; in *Kant: Political Writings* (1991); see pp. 47-49 and pp. 102-105 respectively.

77. For example, it will be remembered that the distinction between civilised and savages in Kant's *Perpetual Peace* is one between peoples who have already formed a state and peoples would have not yet formed a state.

78. In *Nations and Nationalism* Gellner argues that the modern nation-state, which he calls "industrial society", was the first form of social organisation in history to *require* internal homogeneity in the first place, and stresses throughout that this homogeneity has to be "invented", "artificially produced" and "artificially sustained" (see, for example, pp. 51, 56). Yet, in the case of Western Europe, he presents this homogeneity as inherited: "only very occasionally, by accident, [agrarian society] produced a dynastic state which corresponded, more or less, with a language and a culture, as eventually happened on Europe's Atlantic seaboard" (pp. 39-40).

79. "The fantasies of realism" (p. 74) involve "a common way of speaking" (p. 71), "the referent" (p. 72), "a unitary end of history and of a subject", "a desire for unity, for identity, for security, or popularity" (p. 73), "rounding off diachronies as organic wholes" (p. 74), "the free union of faculties" (p. 78); all quotations from "Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?", in the Appendix to *The Postmodern Condition*. This text was originally published in *Critique* (April 1982).

80. "Note on the Meaning of 'Post-'" (1985) in Thomas Docherty, *Postmodernism: A Reader*, p. 48; this text was originally published in

Lyotard's *Le Postmoderne expliqué aux enfants: Correspondance 1982-1985* (1986). I will be quoting from *Postmodernism: A Reader*.

81. In the discussion of the "avant-garde" and the "sublime" to follow, I will be referring to three texts by Lyotard: "Answering the Question: What Is Postmodernism?" (1982), op. cit.; "The Sublime and the Avant-Garde" (first published in *Art Forum* 22 (April 1984)) in *The Lyotard Reader*; and "Note on the Meaning of 'Post-'" (1985), op. cit.

82. "The Sublime and the Avant-Garde", op. cit., p. 206, and "Answering the Question: What Is Postmodernism?", op. cit., p. 75, respectively.

83. "The Sublime and the Avant-Garde", p. 201.

84. "Answering the Question: What Is Postmodernism?", pp. 76, 72, 76, 82, 72, respectively.

85. "Answering the Question: What Is Postmodernism?", p. 77.

86. Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*, p. 94.

87. Variations of this passage also appear on pages 207-208 of "The Sublime and the Avant-Garde" and on pages 49-50 of "Note on the Meaning of 'Post-'".

88. "The nineteenth and twentieth centuries have given us as much terror as we can take. We have paid a high enough price for the nostalgia of the whole and the one" ("Answering the Question...", p. 81).

89. See "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism", pp. 89-92.

90. See "Cognitive Mapping", p. 353.

CHAPTER THREE

1. As quoted in my second chapter, note 54.

2. These two articles are Lyotard's "Capitalisme énergumène" and Donzelot's "Une anti-sociologie", and they will be discussed in the sixth chapter of this thesis.

3. Stivale has also been involved in the Odyssean, because plagued by long delays, project of translating Deleuze's *Logique du sens* (1969); *The Logic of Sense* eventually came out in 1990.

4. Notably Paul Patton's "Conceptual Politics and the War-Machine in *Mille Plateaux*". Paul Patton, another pioneer, had already published "Notes for a Glossary" (1981) in *I and C* 8. He has since translated Deleuze's *Différence et Répétition* (1968, English translation 1994) and written a number of articles on Deleuze and Guattari. These include "Deleuze and Guattari: Ethics and Post-modernity" (1986), "Marxism and Beyond: Strategies of Reterritorialization" (1988) and "Anti-Platonism and Art" (1994).

5. For a collection of excellent expository articles on Deleuze and Guattari see the "Dossier Deleuze", edited by Réda Bensmaïa, in *Lendemains* 54 (1989). Réda Bensmaïa has published a number of short pieces on Deleuze and Guattari, mainly on the former. These include "L'effet-Kafka" originally published in English translation ("The Kafka Effect") as a Foreword to Deleuze and Guattari's *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature* (1986) and then published in French in 1989, "Un philosophe au cinéma" (1988), "Gilles Deleuze ou comment devenir un *Stalker* en philosophie?" (1989), and "On the Concept of Minor Literature: From Kafka to Kateb Yacine" (1994).

      See also J. Furtos and R. Roussillon's very helpful "*L'Anti-Oedipe* — Essai d'explication" (1972).

6. See *SubStance*, p. 47: "'gynesis': the necessary yet mystifying problematization and putting into discourse of 'woman' and 'the feminine' in contemporary thought".

7. In fact, a version of "Woman in Limbo" will appear as a chapter in *Gynesis*.

8. Sabina Lovibond, "Feminism and the 'Crisis of Rationality'", *New Left Review* 207 (September-October 1994), pp. 72-86. Lovibond's intellectually powerful text — and my objections to it — was the starting point for this chapter.

9. Significant details: "Irigaray" is the only feminist's proper name that figures in the Contents pages of Braidotti's book, and Jardine begins the feminism part of her article with "Luce Irigaray..." (p. 50).

10. Editor's Introduction, p. 5. The term "arrangement", which Jardine uses several times in her article, is Jardine's translation of the term "*agencement*" which appears in Deleuze and Guattari's *Kafka: pour une littérature mineure* and *Mille Plateaux*. In the 1986 English translation of *Kafka* and in the 1988 English translation of *Mille Plateaux*, the term "*agencement*" will be translated as "assemblage".

11. Raymond Bellour, "Gilles Deleuze: un philosophe nomade", *Magazine Littéraire* 257 (September 1988), p. 14.

12. See Michael Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy*, pp. 16-17.

13. This is how we can understand Deleuze's phrase in the Preface to the English translation of his *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, "We are all made of habits" — living on habits rather than on principles. This is also why Deleuze and Guattari are unlikely to become popular in Greece. The Greek nation-state is too weak, too artificial. One doesn't want to be reminded that their grandmother is from Albania or Bulgaria, their grandfather from Turkey or Egypt. The price to pay has

been a false dilemma: one is anti-West if they are aligned to the Left, anti-East if they are aligned to the Right.

14. To avoid confusion, please note the following discrepancy in translation. Whereas the English translations of Deleuze and Guattari translate the Deleuzo-Guattarian concept of *devenir minoritaire* as "becoming minoritarian", the English translation of Braidotti's book translates this concept as "becoming-minority".

15. See *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 248, 277, 279.

16. In his own work, Deleuze discusses Kierkegaard and *Fear and Trembling* quite extensively in *Difference and Repetition*.

17. See *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 292-296 and notes 82, 83 on pp. 544-545.

18. For a discussion of this grammatical formula see, especially, *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 263-265.

19. Published in *Critique* 241. Translated as "Michel Tournier and the World without Others", this article is included in the Appendix of Deleuze's *Logic of Sense*.

20. See also *Speculum of the Other Woman*, p. 340.

21. See *This Sex Which Is Not One*, pp. 152, 169. See also p. 177 of *An Ethics of Sexual Difference* where Irigaray speaks of "the repressed-censored of another sex that asks to come into being", and p. 199 where she speaks of "a mystery she [woman] must reveal under pain of ethical dereliction".

22. Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things*; page reference is not given.

23. On the whole, "Deleuze" in Braidotti is a synecdoche for Deleuze and Guattari. She only names Deleuze even when referring to works co-

written and concepts — most notably the "becoming minoritarian" — developed jointly by Deleuze and Guattari. For example, she attributes to Deleuze two pieces co-written by Deleuze and Guattari: *Rhizome* and "Bilan-programme pour machines désirantes" (p. 292, notes 24 and 32). (*Rhizome*, published by Les Éditions de Minuit in 1976, reappears as the first chapter of *Mille Plateaux*. "Bilan-programme pour machines désirantes", originally published in *Minuit* 2 (January 1973), reappears as an appendix of the undated new and augmented edition of *L'Anti-Oedipe*.)

24. Michèle Le Doeuff, *Hipparchia's Choice: An Essay Concerning Women, Philosophy, etc.*, p. 56. This is a close paraphrase of Irigaray's statement that "it is indeed precisely philosophical discourse that we have to challenge, and *disrupt*, inasmuch as this discourse sets forth the law for all others, inasmuch as it constitutes the discourse on discourse" (*This Sex Which Is Not One*, p. 74); see also *This Sex Which Is Not One*, pp. 151, 159, 169.

25. I myself think that Le Doeuff's *Hipparchia's Choice* is a splendid example of this tradition, and one of the most inspiring books of philosophy I have ever read.

26. Braidotti's objections become very clear if they are seen as an implicit defence of institutionally autonomous Women's Studies as the privileged locus of feminist scholarship. The problem with Le Doeuff would then be her institutional links with philosophy.

27. In *Hipparchia's Choice* alone see, especially, pp. 220-230 on "difference" feminism; see, especially, p. 115 on Irigaray and Cixous; see also pp. 224-225 on Irigaray.

28. The dates given are the original dates of publication in French.

29. I am referring to "The Blind Spot of an Old Dream of Symmetry", pp. 11-129.

30. *The Irigaray Reader*, edited by Margaret Whitford, pp. 103-104, note 2.

31. As Judith Butler has put it: "It may come as a surprise to some ... that Foucauldians rarely relate to Derrideans, that Cixous and Irigaray are fundamentally opposed, and that the only tenuous connection between French feminism and deconstruction exists between Cixous and Derrida" (*Feminist Contentions*, p. 37).

32. For a comparison between the British and the French women's movements of the 1970s, see *Hipparchia's Choice*, p. 124; for a comparison between the US and the French women's movements of the 1970s, see pp. 193-194.

33. Compare with the opening page of Irigaray's *An Ethics of Sexual Difference*:

> Sexual difference is one of the major philosophical issues, if not the issue, of our age ... Sexual difference is probably the issue in our time which could be our "salvation" if we thought it through ... Think of it as an approach that would allow us to check the many forms that destruction takes in our world ... Sexual difference would constitute the horizon of worlds more fecund than any known to date — at least in the West ... the production of a new age of thought, art, poetry, and language...

34. See pp. 201-204 and pp. 204-208 respectively.

35. *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 319-320.

36. For example: "Deleuze gives up the quest for ideas which are just, which would conform to the dominant system of signification ... The activity of thinking thus acquires an astonishing freedom" (pp. 111-112); "Deleuze turns the body into a 'duty-free' area, where the quest for pleasure and the realization of desire prevail" (p. 114); Deleuze:

> finally puts a stop to the traditional search for ideas or lines which are "just" (in theory and in politics alike) ... and it is in

this sense that the becoming-minority is of interest to women. It restores to thinking the creative freedom it needs ... and thus provides a theoretical and political support for the feminist project. (p. 125)

37. See also Deleuze's *Pourparlers* (1990), pp. 229-230:
Ce qui m'intéressait, c'était les créations collectives plutôt que les représentations. Dans les "institutions", il y a tout un mouvement qui se distingue à la fois des lois et des contrats. Ce que je trouvais chez Hume, c'était une conception très creatrice de l'institution et du droit. Au début je m'intéressais plus au droit qu'à la politique ... Aujourd'hui encore, le travail de François Ewald pour restaurer une philosophie du droit me semble essentiel ... C'est la jurisprudence qui est vraiment créatrice du droit: il faudrait qu'elle ne reste pas confiée aux juges.

38. I am referring to Donna Haraway's "A Manifesto for Cyborgs" (1983) published in the *Socialist Review.*

39. For a brief history of this distinction in the work of Deleuze and Guattari, see pp. ix-xiii of Brian Massumi's Introduction to *A Thousand Plateaus.*

40. On woman's lack of identity, see for example Irigaray's *An Ethics of Sexual Difference*, pp. 102-104.

41. In her concluding pages Braidotti compiles an alternative honours list for males who have taken feminism on board. She makes several recommendations, "[t]he top prize must go, however, to Hal Foster who, in *The Anti-Aesthetic* not only raises the issue of feminism, but allows a feminist woman, Alice Jardine, to write on the issue" (p. 275).

Chapter Four

1. "Renverser le Platonisme", originally published in *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* (October-December 1966), is included in the Appendix of *The Logic of Sense*, translated as "Plato and the Simulacrum".

2. *Difference and Repetition*, p. 127.

3. For the connection made between violence and interest, see pp. 18, 96; for the connection of non-violence to disinterestedness to rebellion, see p. 23; for the opposition: violence + interest (false rebellion) versus non-violence + disinterestedness (true rebellion), see pp. 19, 21-22.

4. See "The Peace Movement and the Avant-garde", the remarkable tenth chapter of Russell A. Berman's *Modern Culture and Critical Theory* (1989).

5. By contrast, see Jean Baudrillard's "La passion de la règle" in *De la séduction* (1979). Though it is the "cultures primitives qu'on a décrit comme closes sur elles-mêmes et sans imaginaire sur le reste du monde" (p. 182), Baudrillard asks if the "forclusion du reste du monde" is not, in fact , "la règle culturelle de la classe bourgeoise" (p. 184).

6. The expression "nebulosity of the Idea" refers to section 10 of Nietzsche's *The Case of Wagner*; see *The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of Wagner*, tr. Walter Kaufmann, p. 178.

7. In *Robbe-Grillet: Colloque de Cericy*, vol. 1 (1976), p. 81.

8. *Postmodernism or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (1991), p. 131.

9. In *Lautréamont et Sade*.

10. *Violence and the Sacred*, p. 249, my italics:

> Ritual violence is intended to reproduce an original act of violence ... The original violence took place within a single solitary group ... *It can be stated as a principle that violence precedes ... the association of two groups of strangers...*

11. On the couple "limited-infinite" versus the couple "unlimited-finite" in Deleuze and Guattari's *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, see my last chapter.

12. On the tourist as exemplary contemporary figure, see Zygmunt Bauman, *Life in Fragments*, pp. 95-98.

13. To the *TelQuel*'s praise of Robbe-Grillet for his anti-realism, he responds as follows in 1973:

> Le groupe de *TelQuel* abandonne pratiquement tout rapport avec ce qu'on peut appeler "roman". Mais je crois, moi, que le problème des rapports des sociétés actuelles avec cette tendance à reproduire du romanesque n'est pas liquidé, et comme ce n'est pas liquidé, il ne faut pas le passer sous silence.

In R.O. Elaho, *Entretiens avec le Nouveau Roman* (1985).

CHAPTER FIVE

1. Charles J. Stivale as quoted at the beginning of my third chapter.

2. See Catherine Clément, "Postface 1980: De *L'Anti-Oedipe* aux *Mille Plateaux*", *L'Arc* 49 (1980, new edition), p. 94:

> *L'Anti-Oedipe* connut le succès qu'on sait parce qu'il récoltait intimement — dans la pensée conjointe, mêlée, des deux auteurs — les fruits de Mai 68, sans que cette brèche soit la référence explicite. Il n'empêche: *L'Anti-Oedipe* apparut comme le premier livre théorique issu du mouvement de Mai.

See also Raymond Bellour and François Ewald, in their interview with Deleuze for *Magazine Littéraire* 257 (September 1988), p. 20: "Et pourquoi *L'Anti-Oedipe* fut-il le premier grand livre philosophique de la conjoncture mai 68, peut-être son premier vrai manifeste philosophique? Ce livre dit bien, [etc.]".

By way of contrast, see Robert Young's opening statement in *White Mythologies*: "If so-called 'so-called poststructuralism' is the product of a single historical moment, then that moment is probably not May 1968 but rather the Algerian War of Independence" (p. 1).

3. Ronald Bogue, *Deleuze and Guattari* (1989), p. 83.

4. *Esprit* (December 1972).

5. *Critique* (November 1972). Also published in Jean-François Lyotard's *Des dispositifs pulsionnels* (1973). I will discuss "Capitalisme énergumène" as it appears in *Des dispositifs pulsionnels*.

6. *Critique* (November 1972).

7. In "Theatrum Philosophicum"; quoted in Deleuze's *Pourparlers* (1990), pp. 121-122. Deleuze is asked by Robert Maggiori to comment on this notorious statement.

8. Its English translation, "Delirium as System", appeared in Girard's *"To Double Business Bound": Essays on Literature, Mimesis, and Anthropology* (1978). I will discuss and quote from the French text published in *Critique* (November 1972), pp. 957-996.

9. See the diagram on page 282 of *Anti-Oedipus.*

10. In Deleuze and Guattari's *On the Line* (1983), pp. 67-115. This text is an extract from the last chapter of *Dialogues* (1977) which Deleuze co-wrote with Claire Parnet. On the format of *Dialogues*, see Deleuze's Preface to the English language edition, pp. ix-x, and the Translator's Introduction, p. xi.

11. Deleuze and Guattari consistently use the distinction between *pouvoir* and *puissance* in several of their works.

12. See *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 68ff., 75ff. and 84ff.

13. For Girard, the Deleuzo-Guattarian world is either too high or too low. On the one hand, it is "particulièrement éthérée, en dépit des apparences"; "si supérieur et si lointain qu'il n'est pas besoin d'en tenir compte" (p. 961). On the other hand, it is so low down that Deleuze is "l'avare qui enterre si bien son trésor qu'il ne peut plus le retrouver" (p. 967).

14. In Girard's terminology, "[l]a *mimesis* désirante précède le surgissement de son objet" (964); "[c]e que le désir 'imite', ce qu'il emprunte à un 'modèle', en deçà des gestes, des attitudes, des manières ... c'est le désir lui-même ... Ce désir du désir de l'autre" (p. 963).

15. "La *mimesis* constitue une source inépuisable de rivalité[,] ... chacun cumulant à chaque instant les rôles de modèle et de disciple. C'est toujours sur une première *mimesis* que portera la *mimesis*" (p. 964).

16. "[C]rises aiguës où se défait, littéralement, la trame culturelle" (p. 978).

17. Unlike Baudrillard who, in his hyperbolic use of apocalyptic doom and gloom, is in my opinion a comic writer.

18. This piece can be found in the first chapter of Baudrillard's *Simulacres et simulation* (1981), entitled "La précession des simulacres". It is translated into English in *Simulations* (1983), which contains this first chapter together with the second chapter of Baudrillard's *L'échange symbolique et la mort* (1976), entitled "L'ordre des simulacres". My references will come from the English translation.

19. This section only appears in the 1991 revised and extended edition of *Imagined Communities*, pp. 199-203; *Imagined Communities* was originally published in 1983.

20. Such is the case with Ernest Renan's celebrated "What is a Nation?" (1882) which is the starting point for "The Reassurance of Fratricide".

21. "L'entreprise de Deleuze peut se définir comme un nouvel effort pour différencier la volonté de puissance du ressentiment" (p. 966).

22. "Quand un des partenaires est en haut l'autre est en bas ... un échange de représailles ... Celui qui a frappé le dernier coup emporte avec lui la différence sacrée" (p. 968).

23. It seems to me that we can map the Deleuzo-Guattarian distinction between *puissance* and *pouvoir* onto the distinction — as defined by Deleuze — between *volonté de puissance* and *ressentiment*. Unfortunately, the link between *puissance* and *volonté de puissance* on the one hand, and between *pouvoir* and *ressentiment* on the other hand, is obscured by the English translation of *volonté de puissance* as "will to power".

24. See chapter two of *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, entitled "On the Difference between the *Ethics* and a Morality", especially pp. 22-25; see also pp. 71-73.)

25. See *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 73.

26. In the so-called "sixth chapter" of *Capital*, see *Karl Marx: Selected Writings* (1977), edited by David McLellan, p. 516.

27. See *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 10-11. From now on page references will appear in the main text and will refer to *Anti-Oedipus* unless otherwise indicated.

28. See *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (1993), pp. 201-208.

29. Marx is here explicit about his debt to Hegel's *Phenomenology*:
> Hegel conceives of the self-creation of man as a process, objectification as loss of the object, as externalization and the transcendence of this externalization. This means, therefore, that he grasps the nature of labour and understands objective man, true, because real, man as the result of his own labour. (in *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*, p. 101)

30. I refer to the famous passage in the Preface to *A Critique of Political Economy*:
> In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite state of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, *the real foundation...*
> (in *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*, p. 389, my italics)

31. See *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*, pp. 482-483.

32. This passage on "simulation" follows on Deleuze's work on Plato in *Différence et Répétition* and "Renverser le Platonisme". It is in turn, among other passages in *Anti-Oedipus*, seminal for Baudrillard's work from the mid-1970s onwards. See, for example, *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 335, 337-338, 364, 366 and 372. Though Baudrillard's reading of *Anti-Oedipus* could be best described as a creative misunderstanding.

33. See *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 95-96:

> Likening the living to a microcosm is an ancient platitude. But ... the comparison between microcosm and macrocosm was ... a comparison between two closed figures, one of which expressed the other and was inscribed within the other ... Bergson completely alters the scope of the comparison by opening up both ends. If the living being resembles the world, this is true, on the contrary, insofar as it opens itself to the opening of the world...

34. See *Anti-Oedipus*, p.107:

> Nietzsche makes a remark completely akin to those of Marx and Engels: "We now laugh when we find 'Man *and* World' placed beside one another, separated by the sublime presumption of the little word 'and.'" Coextensiveness is another matter entirely...

35. The first reference to the subject comes already on page 3 of *Anti-Oedipus*:

> Given a certain effect, what machine is capable of producing it? And given a certain machine, what can it be used for? Can we possibly guess, for instance, what a knife rest is used for if all we are given is a geometrical description of it [in Beckett's *Molloy*]? Or yet another example: on being confronted [in *Molloy*] with a complete machine made up of six stones in the right-hand pocket of my coat ... five stones in the right-hand pocket of my trousers, and five in the left-hand pocket ... with the remaining pocket of my coat receiving the stones that have already been handled, as

each of the stones moves forward a pocket, how can we determine the effect of this circuit of distribution ... ?

36. Deleuze and Guattari here refer to Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* (1968 [1961]), p. 262.

Chapter Six

1. From the Ottoman Empire to China and Japan, Toynbee paints a vivid picture of the world's utter helplessness and resourcelessness when confronted with the Western revolution in warfare. See, for example, pp. 51-52 on China and Japan: "A Far Eastern hermit kingdom that tried to meet the new technological challenge from the West by ignoring it would soon see its closed doors battered in by Western heavy guns". See also pp. 8-9:

> Peter is a key figure for an understanding of the world's relations with the West ... for Peter is the archetype of the autocratic Westernizing reformer who, during the last two and a half centuries, has saved the world from falling entirely under Western domination by forcing the world to train itself to resist Western aggression with Western weapons.

2. See, for example, nationalism as the "Western political institution of 'national states'" (p. 70), as "sovereign independent national states" (p. 30), as "mutually independent national states living in so many water-tight compartments" (p. 32), as "the Western institution of clear-cut, compact, homogeneous national states" (p. 73).

3. See *Change and Habit*, p. 87: "With the continuing advance of technology, we can imagine a world in which Man's first allegiance is to mankind"; p. 82: "In an age in which the progressive advance of technology has at last succeeded in 'annihilating distance' ... We may expect — and hope — to see the local states 'demythologized'"; p. 87: "Besides this Danaan gift, the West has given to the World the Promethean gift of modern technology. Western nationalism is a divisive force; Western technology is a unifying force".

4. See, for example, pp. 32-33:

> Our Western Nationalism stayed on in India ... to split a previously united sub-continent into two bickering successor-states ... [M]illions of Hindus and Indian Muslims have found themselves living on the wrong side of the new frontiers...

See also p. 81:

> Gandhi has made an immense and perhaps permanent mark on the history of India and of the world; but the irony of history has condemned him to make this mark ... through leading her triumphantly to the Western political goal of national self-government.

5. Anderson borrows the term "official nationalism" from Hugh Seton-Watson's *Nations and States* but changes its reference. "Official nationalism" in Seton-Watson only refers to Russia.

6. See also pp. 77, 81.

7. Toynbee makes liberal use of such language. I single out the expression "loose electrons working havoc" (p. 70) for its dark poetry.

8. The first oblique reference to a reversal of the West's fortunes comes in the opening statement of *The World and the West*: "In the encounter between the world and the West ... the world, not the West, is the party that, *up to now*, has had the significant experience" (p. 1, my italics). The second and third references emerge, unsurprisingly, in relation to Russia: "Russia has been able to pass from the defensive into the counter-offensive" (p. 18); Russian Communism "is now being offered ... as a rival way of life to ours" (p. 62). The fourth reference I have already discussed. Toynbee speaks of "the challenge of the world's counter-offensive ... the world's answer to its rulers' previous offensive" (p. 97).

9. This volte-face is made possible by recourse to a natural lack of difference: the "ever present physiological possibility of inter-breeding proves that the varieties of homo sapiens are not different races in reality" (p. 144).

10. "[W]e have seen submerged cultures re-emerge through the Western cultural veneer after having lain concealed under this for more than four centuries" (p. 156).

11. This point is repeatedly made in Toynbee's discussion of the Sumero-Akkadian world which serves as yet another metaphor for the contemporary Westernised world (pp. 63-70). In their contact with the Sumerians, their Akkadian and other ex-slaves, as well as those who came under their field of influence, were stimulated, "not to take over the Sumerian civilization itself ready-made, but to create for themselves a counterpart of it" (p. 67).

12. Toynbee projects the desire for a global dominion onto ancient civilisations and religions. That they didn't expand beyond a certain limit is then seen as a failure: "Just as the Sumerian civilization failed to become *the* civilization, so the Egyptian world-state failed to become *the* world-state" (p. 72); "Why did Buddhism ... fail to take advantage of its 500-years-long opportunity?" (p. 74).

In effect, Toynbee accuses them of not being powerful enough — a peculiar accusation from a self-proclaimed advocate of the "spiritual".

13. Quoted in Anna Marie Smith, *New Right Discourse on Race and Sexuality* (1994), p. 151.

14. Even his enthusiasm for technology as a means of bringing people together — which at first appears to be at odds with current feeling — is in fact reflected in our own enthusiasm for the Internet and interactive technologies.

15. See *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 254: the "capitalist field of immanence" or the "bourgeois field of immanence ... institutes an unrivaled slavery, an unprecedented subjugation: there are no longer even any masters, only slaves commanding other slaves; there is no longer any need to burden the animal from the outside, it shoulders its own burden".

16. I borrow the expression "the last exhausted colony" from page 316 of *Anti-Oedipus*, where Deleuze and Guattari make a distinction between "the schizo out for a walk in a deterritorialized circuit", and the reterritorialised and reterritorialising neurotic "as an ultimate and

sterile land, the last exhausted colony"; I read this in conjunction with: "Oedipus ... is the ultimate private and subjugated territoriality of European man" (p. 102).

17. *The World and the West*, p. 30.

18. The West has given rise to "substitute religions — Nationalism, Individualism" (*Change and Habit*, p. 170).

19. *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 179.

20. On the function of the modern state see *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 257-262. For example, "one of the principal aspects of this function [the function of the modern State] consists in reterritorializing" (p. 258). See also p. 260 on "the Urstaat that they [modern societies] would like to resuscitate as an overcoding and reterritorializing entity". See also p. 261: "what it [the modern immanent machine] doesn't allow to subsist it rediscovers through its own original means; it reterritorializes where it has lost the territorialities, it creates new archaisms where it has destroyed the old ones"; "the imperturbable modern axiomatic, from the depths of its immanence, reproduces the transcendence of the Urstaat as its internalized limit".

21. This quotation refers to modern linguistics but does not only apply to it. Deleuze and Guattari refer to modern linguistics in the first place exactly because, together with other modern sciences, it "bears witness for a vanished despot who still functions in modern imperialism" (p. 207).

22. The text continues: "A transcendent object that is more and more spiritualized, for a field of forces that is more and more immanent, more and more internalized ... The extreme spiritualization of the despotic State, and the extreme internalization of the capitalist field".

23. Claude Lefort, *Democracy and Political Theory* (1988); and Slavoj Zizek, "The King is a Thing", *New Formations* 13 (spring 1991).

24. M.C. and Edmond Ortigues, *Oedipe africain* (1966), p. 305; quoted in *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 170.

25. Russia and the West, Islam and the West, India and the West, the Far East and the West, etc.

26. The vignette of the Capucines moving Indians from collective to individual houses is, in my mind, an ironic precedent to the contemporary, and supposedly novel, "help the world to help itself" attitude.

27. *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1977), p.111, my underlining:
    178. Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another ... The Notion of this its unity in its duplication embraces many and varied meanings. Its moments, then, must on the one hand be held strictly apart, and on the other hand must in this differentiation at the same time also be taken and known as not distinct...
    182. Now, this movement of self-consciousness in relation to another self-consciousness has in this way been represented as the action of *one* self-consciousness...

28. See also p. 39: "Il faut soutenir Deleuze et Guattari contre eux-mêmes"; p. 12: "Contrairement à toute attente ... ce que le livre *subvertit* le plus profondément est ce qu'il ne *critique* pas, le marxisme"; p. 20: "Très profonde et très peu profonde subversion du marxisme, jamais dite"; p. 24: "Autre thème refoulé, celui de la dissolution des illusions subjectives-objectives du produire et du consommer"; p. 26: "Le silence du livre sur la lutte de classes ... Le mutisme sur la plus-value".

29. See also p. 13: "On montre que celui-ci [*L'Anti-Oedipe*] est l'un des produits les plus intenses de la nouvelle figure libidinale qui 'prend' à l'intérieur du capitalisme".

30. See p. 11: "la négation de l'adversaire ne se fait pas par Aufhebung, mais par oubli".

31. See also p. 37: capitalism is "cette circulation de flux réglés par la seule loi de la valeur d'échange", capitalism's "seul axiome est ... l'échangeabilité des parties de flux en quanta égaux"; pp. 39-41: capitalism is "soumis à la règle de l'équivaloir ... Voilà tout le secret de sa 'répression' ... la seule loi de la valeur ... la loi de l'échange ... C'est la *seule* question. Cette question partout la même"; p. 44: capitalism "obéit à un seule principe de branchement énergétique qui est la loi de la valeur".

32. For example, see the following passages in *Anti-Oedipus*:
> the capitalist formation of sovereignty ... is filled with images and with images of images, through which desire is determined to desire its own repression (*imperialism*); an unprecedented decoding and deterritorialization, which institutes a combination as a system of differential relations between the decoded and deterritorialized flows, in such a way that social inscription and repression no longer even need to bear directly upon bodies and persons, but on the contrary precede them... (p. 372)
> Capitalism is inseparable from the movement of deterritorialization, but this movement is exorcised through factitious and artificial reterritorializations. Capitalism is constructed on the ruins of the territorial and the despotic, the mythic and the tragic representations, but it re-establishes them in its own service and in another form... (p. 303)
> The fascist State has been without doubt capitalism's most fantastic attempt at economic and political reterritorialization ... It is the very conjunction of the deterritorialized flows that delineates archaic or artificial neoterritorialities. (pp. 257-258)

33. See p. 9: "Si avec l'inscription moderne, c'était la limite extérieur/intérieur qui se trouvait disqualifiée, enjambée?"; see also p. 18:

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il n'y a pas d'extériorité, pas l'autre du Kapital ... mais qu'à
l'intérieur même du système les régions de contact et de
guerre ne cessent de multiplier entre ce qui est fluidité et
presque indifférence, développées par le capital lui-même, et ce
qui est "axiomatique", répression, blocage des flux ... sous une
seule identité: Kapital.

34. On the conflation of modern and pre-modern territorialities and on
the relegation of the private person to the pre-capitalist era, see pp. 22
and 30. Capitalism is:

Investissements voyageurs, qui font disparaître dans leurs
périples tous les territoires bornés et marqués par des codes —
non seulement du côté des *objects* ... mais du côté des *"sujets"*
individuels ou sociaux... (p. 22)

C'est le capitalisme ... balayant ... les régions les plus
interdites ... au moment même où il les fait tomber en
désuétude. (p. 30)

On the relegation of "Oedipus" and the nuclear family to the pre-
capitalist era, see pp. 37-41:

Pourquoi et comment cette circulation de flux réglés par la
seule loi de la valeur d'échange aurait-elle besoin, en
supplément, en prime de répression, de la figure de l'Oedipe,
c'est-à-dire, pour Deleuze et Guattari, de celle de l'État? ...
Allons plus loin: l'institution familiale elle-même, pourquoi le
capitalisme devrait-il la préserver ... Il faut soutenir Deleuze et
Guattari contre eux-mêmes ... Cette question partout la même
n'est pas celle de la castration, de l'Oedipe.

By contrast see, for example, p. 177 of *Anti-Oedipus*: "For Oedipus to be
occupied, a certain number of conditions are indispensable ... These
conditions ... are realized in the capitalist formation".

35. See, for example, pp. 345-348:

Libidinal investment ... does not bear upon the social means
and ends, but upon the full body as socius, the formation of
sovereignty, or the form of power for itself, devoid of meaning
and purpose, since the meanings and the purposes derive from

it, and not the contrary ... The fact remains that there exists a disinterested love of the social machine, of the form of power, and of the degree of development in and for themselves ... The officer of "In the Penal Colony" demonstrates what an intense libidinal investment of a machine can be, a machine that is not only technical but social, and through which desire desires its own repression ... A revolutionary preconscious investment bears upon new aims ... The preconscious revolutionary break is sufficiently well defined by the promotion of a socius as a full body carrying new aims ... The preconscious revolution refers to a new régime of social production that creates, distributes, and satisfies new aims and interests ... [T]he break is between two forms of socius, the second of which is measured according to its capacity to introduce the flows of desire into a new code or a new axiomatic of interest; in the other case [of "unconscious" revolutionary investment] the break is within the socius itself ... A revolutionary group at the preconscious level remains a *subjugated group*, even in seizing power, as long as this power itself refers to a form of force that continues to enslave and crush desiring-production. The moment it is preconsciously revolutionary, such a group already presents all the unconscious characteristics of a subjugated group...

I must stress that the distinction between "preconscious" and "unconscious" investments in this passage is not a distinction between manifest and latent meaning. Instead, it is an elaboration on the distinction between the "what does it mean?" and the "how does it work?".

36. See, for example, p. 375: "Subjugated groups are continually deriving from revolutionary subject-groups ... So true is it that the various investments, even when opposed, can coexist with one another ... But the reverse is also true".

37. The distinction between "molar" and "molecular" refers not to the difference in size between the two but to the qualitative difference

between the laws applying to molar phenomena, which are still those of classical mechanics, and the laws applying to molecular phenomena.

38. In my first chapter I referred to "the escape in advance of the escape" as: "fleeing the flight of reality".

39. This is how Kafka describes Felice's letters: "The whole staircase was littered from top to bottom with the loosely heaped pages I had read. That was a real wish-dream". Letter to Felice, 17 November 1912; quoted in *Kafka*, p. 31.

40. See *Kafka*, pp. 30-31:
> let us distinguish a subject of enunciation as the form of expression that writes the letter, and a subject of the statement that is the form of content that the letter is speaking about ... Instead of the subject of enunciation using the letter to recount his own situation, it is the subject of the statement that will take on a whole movement that has become fictive or no more than superficial ... [T]he desire of the letters thus consists of the following: it transfers movement onto the subject of the statement; it gives the subject of the statement an apparent movement, an unreal movement, that spares the subject of enunciation all need for a real movement ... That which is the greatest horror for the subject of enunciation will be presented as an external obstacle that the subject of the statement, relegated to the letter, will try at all costs to conquer, even if it means perishing.

41. See *Kafka*, p. 18:
> Undoubtedly, for a while, Kafka thought according to these traditional categories of the two subjects, the author and the hero, the narrator and the character, the dreamer and the one dreamed of. But he will quickly reject the role of the narrator, just as he will refuse an author's or master's literature, despite his admiration for Goethe.

42. Kafka quoted in *Kafka*, p. 13. See also *Kafka*, p. 6:

> it isn't a question of a well-formed vertical movement toward the
> sky or in front of one's self, it is no longer a question of breaking
> through the roof, but of intensely going *"head over heels and
> away"* ... it isn't a question of liberty as against submission, but
> only a question of a line of escape or, rather, of a simple *way out*,
> "right, left or in any other direction"...

See also pp. 7-8: "The problem is not that of being free but of finding a
way out, or even a way in, another side, a hallway, an adjacency"; p. 13:
"if it is a question of finding an escape (an escape and not 'liberty'),
this escape doesn't consist in fleeing — quite the contrary"; p. 41: "A
line of escape, yes — but not a refuge. The creative line of escape". See
also p. 35 where Deleuze and Guattari object to Bachelard's comparing
Kafka's animalistic stories to Lautréamont's *Maldoror* to find Kafka
lacking. Bachelard "assumes above all else that the dynamic essence of
the animal lies in freedom and aggression: Maldoror's becomings-
animal are attacks that are all the more cruel in being free and
gratuitous", whereas "for Kafka, the animal essence is the way out, the
line of escape, even if it takes place in place [même sur place], or in a
cage. *A line of escape, and not freedom. A vital escape and not an
attack*".

43. See *Kafka*, p. 54:

> the doubles and the triangles that remain in Kafka's novels
> show up only at the beginning of the novels; and from the
> start, they are so vacillating, so supple and transformable,
> that they are ready to open into series that break their form
> and explode their terms.

44. Said points out that the so-called Warrant of Precedence, originally
dividing the Indian population into fourteen groups, had increased the
number to sixty one by the end of the nineteenth century (p. 187).

45. See *Culture and Imperialism*, pp. 191, 192, 195.

46. *The Penguin Complete Novels of Franz Kafka*, p. 81. Further page numbers will refer to the same edition and appear in the main text.

47. The "organization" is Kafka's own term in *The Trial* and in *The Castle*. It is also Robbe-Grillet's term in *Project for a Revolution in New York*. I think that there is a profound affinity between Kafka and Robbe-Grillet. This is one of the reasons why I turned to Robbe-Grillet in this thesis.

48. K. follows the Court Attendant who follows his wife who has allowed herself to be carried away by the Law student.

49. See *Kafka*, p. 73: "This is the most striking topography in Kafka's work: ... two diametrically opposed points bizarrely reveal themselves to be in contact".

50. *Kafka*, p. 80, p. 61. From now on, page numbers in the main text will refer to Deleuze and Guattari's *Kafka* unless otherwise indicated.

51. The English translation of *Kafka* consistently mistranslates *transcendant(e)* as "transcendental"; in this instance — it translates "loi transcendante impériale" as "imperial transcendental law" — as in other instances, I have taken the liberty of correcting the translation.

52. See also p. 45: "it is not the law that is stated *because* of the demands of a hidden transcendence; it is almost the exact opposite: it is the statement, the enunciation, that constructs the law in the name of an immanent power of the one who enounces it".

53. Max Brod himself concedes this point in his Epilogue to *The Trial*: "since the trial, according to the author himself, was never to get as far as the highest Court, in a certain sense the novel was interminable; that is to say, it could be prolonged into infinity" (*The Penguin Complete Novels of Franz Kafka*, p. 176).

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54. I have already referred to the "rhizome" in my third chapter. The "rhizome" appears for the first time on page 3 of *Kafka* and is fully developed in the first chapter of *A Thousand Plateaus* entitled "Rhizome". In "Rhizome" Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between two models of social field: the "rhizome" and the "arborescent schema". The "rhizome" connects partial objects through a horizontal underground network of roots; in the "arborescent" model the partial objects have no lateral communication but, like the branches of a tree, find their connection through a vertical axis, in a common root.

55. See, for example, p. 55: "an assemblage of justice"; p. 51: "*the immanence of the machinic assemblage of justice*"; p. 73: "an immanent justice ... an immanent assemblage of justice"; p. 86: "*an unlimited field of immanence* ... the field of justice".

56. See also p. 45: rather than being "hidden by its transcendence", the law is "denuded of any interiority: it is always in the office next door ... Law, guilt, interiority ... [are] points of undoing, of dismantling, that must guide the experimentation to show the molecular movements and the machinic assemblages".

57. *The Penguin Complete Novels of Franz Kafka*, p.115, my italics.

58. Kafka quoted by Gustave Janouch in *Conversations with Kafka*, quoted in *Kafka*, p. 28.

59. As I have said at the beginning of "Exclusive and Inclusive Encounters", what it at the centre of my interest in Deleuze and Guattari as well as at the centre of this thesis is the "attempt to describe an *inclusive* relation with the other — a relation that requires neither annihilation nor appropriation and conquest — together with the hypothesis that the conditions for the emergence of such a relation can only be fulfilled among the 'inferior races'".

60. See *Kafka*, p. 19. The "approach" of the Prague school is:

to artificially enrich this German, to swell it up through all the resources of symbolism, of oneirism, of esoteric sense, of a hidden signifier ... a desperate attempt at symbolic reterritorialization, based in archetypes, Kabbala, and alchemy, that accentuates its break from the people and will find its political result only in Zionism and such things as the "dream of Zion."

61. This is further developed in *A Thousand Plateaus*. The fourth chapter of *A Thousand Plateaus*, "November 20, 1923: Postulates of Linguistics", is wholly devoted to the proposition that the imperative function is "a function coextensive with language" (pp. 77, 78).

Deleuze and Guattari's analysis is greatly indebted to Austin's *How to Do Things with Words*. It will be remembered that Austin starts off with a distinction between the "constative" (representative) and the "performative" functions of language but, upon examination, he finds that this distinction will not hold and "[i]t is time ... to make a fresh start" (*How to Do Things with Words*, p. 91). He then recasts his classification of the functions of language within the performative sphere, distinguishing between the "locutionary act ... which has a *meaning*", "the illocutionary act which has a certain *force* in saying something", and "the perlocutionary act which is *the achieving of* certain *effects* by saying something" (p. 120). Finally, he comes to the conclusion that the illocutionary act is first and foremost, the minimum requirement of linguistic performance, and recasts his classification anew, this time within the field of "illocutionary force".

62. See pp. 13-14: "never a reproduction or an imitation ... not the reproduction of an image"; p. 78: "a cartography that is certainly not interior or subjective"; p. 84: "a process that leaves no assignable place to any sort of subject but that allows us all the more to mark the nature and the function of the statements". See also p. 28:

> A major, or established, literature follows a vector that goes from content to expression ... That which conceptualizes itself expresses itself.

63. See *Kafka*, pp. 16-17:

> the first characteristic of minor literature in any case is that in it language is affected with a high coefficient of deterritorialization ... Prague German is a deterritorialized language, appropriate for strange and minor uses. (This can be compared in another context to what blacks in America today are able to do with the English language.) The second characteristic of minor literatures is that everything in them is political. In major literatures, in contrast, the individual concern (familial, marital, and so on) joins with other no less individual concerns, the social milieu serving as a mere environment or a background ... The third characteristic of minor literature is that ... there are no possibilities for an individuated enunciation that would belong to this or that "master" and that could be separated from a collective enunciation.

64. "Kafka attempts to extract from social representations assemblages of enunciation and machinic assemblages" (p. 46); " *the dismantling of the assemblages makes the social representation take flight in a much more effective way than a critique would have done*" (p. 47, my italics); "Since the assemblage functions really in the real, the question becomes: how does it function? What function does it have?" (p. 49).

65. "Since the history of the world is already established, not out of an eternal return but out of the pressure of always new and always harder segments", and "[s]ince one can't count on the official revolution", "one will have to count on a literary machine" to connect " *the finite, the contiguous, the continuous, and the unlimited*" (pp. 58-59). This is "the problem of a minor literature, but also a problem for all of us: how to tear a minor literature away from its own language" (p. 19):

> There is nothing that is major or revolutionary except the minor ... How many styles or genres or literary movements, even very small ones, have only one single dream: to assume a major function in language, to offer themselves as a sort of state language, an official language ... Create the opposite dream: know how to create a becoming-minor. (pp. 26-27)

66. *Kafka*, p. 60.

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