Le cognito et la transcendance dans l'ontologie et la phenomenologie de M.Merleau-Ponty
Le cognito et la transcendance dans l'ontologie et la phenomenologie de M.Merleau-Ponty
From the time of Husserl, who was both mathematician and the founder of modern phenomenology, there has been a crisis in phenomenological thought: the relation between the pour-soi and the en-soi. But no less than the phenomenologists, Kant, the Kantians and the post-Kantians have experienced the same crisis: how can one talk of knowledge or of the 'I' if in front of it stands the en-soi? At first sight analytic philosophy is in a better position. But not because it has asked the question and solved it: it is because the question has not even been asked. Popper, although opposed to a certain sort of 'Wittgensteinism' which was influenced by Carnap, did not escape entirely from the Kantian dogmatism: the existence of the en-soi.This thesis is an attempt to offer a solution to this crisis, a replyto this failure. Nothingness is impotent only the substantial can do anything. But if the ego is substantial, perception, or intentionality, which has been too much discussed, should become projection. In revealing the mystery of the Visible and the Invisible and Merleau-Ponty's notion of the internal logic of language I have shown that the 'I can' is an . 'I speak', the syntax is 'new'.But this discovery has led to another, structure; the School of Berlin, gestalt theory and formal behaviourism are refuted by experience. The failure of formalism is a victory of the cogito, for transcendence. The idea of syntax brings us to the origin of meaning. Formalism is whatLacan calls the 'pathological'. The Structure of Behaviour (Merleau-Ponty's first book) reads like the logical consequence of Visible and Invisible in respect of the philosophy of language. History is not a god or goddess; it is an act - transcendence.IaA philosopher is not Jesus Christ, he does not judge 'intentions' 'ideas', what is 'said' what is 'logical' etc. The future does not really exist; it is to be made. The Bible is the 'facts'. Truth is seeing. But transcendance has its limits, the negative exists as well as the positive.Philosophy, like perception, is 'second level objectivity'. The idea of ideas, the key of keys remains transcendence. There are no presuppositions in this thesis, no given starting point. It tries to be objective, an investigation, in a word, a piece of 'concrete participation'.For convenience I have divided this thesis into four parts: A, the cogito and the flesh, B, the cogito and the objective body, C, the cogito and historicity and D. the cogito and truth.
University of Southampton
1979
Labaki, M
(1979)
Le cognito et la transcendance dans l'ontologie et la phenomenologie de M.Merleau-Ponty.
University of Southampton, Doctoral Thesis.
Record type:
Thesis
(Doctoral)
Abstract
From the time of Husserl, who was both mathematician and the founder of modern phenomenology, there has been a crisis in phenomenological thought: the relation between the pour-soi and the en-soi. But no less than the phenomenologists, Kant, the Kantians and the post-Kantians have experienced the same crisis: how can one talk of knowledge or of the 'I' if in front of it stands the en-soi? At first sight analytic philosophy is in a better position. But not because it has asked the question and solved it: it is because the question has not even been asked. Popper, although opposed to a certain sort of 'Wittgensteinism' which was influenced by Carnap, did not escape entirely from the Kantian dogmatism: the existence of the en-soi.This thesis is an attempt to offer a solution to this crisis, a replyto this failure. Nothingness is impotent only the substantial can do anything. But if the ego is substantial, perception, or intentionality, which has been too much discussed, should become projection. In revealing the mystery of the Visible and the Invisible and Merleau-Ponty's notion of the internal logic of language I have shown that the 'I can' is an . 'I speak', the syntax is 'new'.But this discovery has led to another, structure; the School of Berlin, gestalt theory and formal behaviourism are refuted by experience. The failure of formalism is a victory of the cogito, for transcendence. The idea of syntax brings us to the origin of meaning. Formalism is whatLacan calls the 'pathological'. The Structure of Behaviour (Merleau-Ponty's first book) reads like the logical consequence of Visible and Invisible in respect of the philosophy of language. History is not a god or goddess; it is an act - transcendence.IaA philosopher is not Jesus Christ, he does not judge 'intentions' 'ideas', what is 'said' what is 'logical' etc. The future does not really exist; it is to be made. The Bible is the 'facts'. Truth is seeing. But transcendance has its limits, the negative exists as well as the positive.Philosophy, like perception, is 'second level objectivity'. The idea of ideas, the key of keys remains transcendence. There are no presuppositions in this thesis, no given starting point. It tries to be objective, an investigation, in a word, a piece of 'concrete participation'.For convenience I have divided this thesis into four parts: A, the cogito and the flesh, B, the cogito and the objective body, C, the cogito and historicity and D. the cogito and truth.
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Published date: 1979
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Local EPrints ID: 463684
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/463684
PURE UUID: 4c1531e9-f818-43bb-9e8c-e8b4c0b7bda9
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Date deposited: 04 Jul 2022 20:55
Last modified: 04 Jul 2022 20:55
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M Labaki
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