UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON

NATIONALISM AND GENDER: A STUDY OF WAR-RELATED VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis represents a feminist interdisciplinary exploration of the relationship between nationalism, war, gender and violence against women. Using the conflicts in Former Yugoslavia (1991-1995) as a case-study of recent societies at war, this thesis critiques current readings of why overt nationalisms took a hold in these societies in the late 1980s, and how these led to the conflicts of 1991 and 1992 in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. Drawing on data from fieldwork undertaken with NGO groups in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina (and correspondence with groups in Serbia), it argues that although the existing literature represents a body of knowledge on the religious, economic and political background to these wars, and the types of gendered violences that took place whilst these wars were being fought, the literature fails to examine why women experienced war-related sexual and domestic violence during these conflicts.

Whilst arguing for a change to the focus in the debate on women and war, this thesis suggests that the timing for a change to the debate is right. Attitudes to the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, when the fieldwork for this project was carried out in 1998 and early 1999, identified a shift in the way in which individuals were remembering war. The issue of war-related violence against women had become less important to many of the groups formerly working with survivors of violence than the problems associated with post-war society: the returning of displaced and refugee women and their families; reconstruction; and the inherent poverty of post-war Bosnian and Croatian society. This social phenomenon, accompanied by a growing historicisation of the war, provides a potential void/gap in the local and global debates on violence against women in war, allowing new debates and new forums to be explored.

In response to this gap in the debate, this research project breaks new ground in the literature on women and war. It argues against the continued use of survivor testimonies of violence in the analysis of sexual violence against women in the Former Yugoslavian wars. Questioning their use on ethical grounds it argues instead for a new interdisciplinary approach, which, drawing on historical, sociological, anthropological and primarily psychoanalytical discourses, scrutinises the social structures within Yugoslavia before the outbreak of the war. It contributes to this new debate with an exploration of the gendering of the public and the private in Former Yugoslavia. It argues that an examination of gendered, social identities in the public and private, and in particular in the Former Yugoslavian family, shows that the growth of nationalism and the subsequent outbreak of war, had a traumatic effect on the perceived balance of power within the Yugoslavian family, creating amongst some Yugoslavian men, a culture of hysteria and misogyny, which may have influenced their choice to be violent towards women during the conflicts.

The thesis concludes with a examination of individual public and private memories of war within NGO groups working on the issues of war-related sexual violence in Former Yugoslavia. It argues that the sensitive nature of the subject matter within a research project such as this demands a reflexivity from the researcher at all points during the research.

In summary, this thesis examines: religion, ethnicity and national identity, gender in the public realm, feminism and nationalism, gender in the private realm and the links between nationalism and misogyny, and lastly memory in post-war activist groups.

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Preface

As feminists, we can view the entire research process as situated within politics, rather than set apart from politics.

D. Millen, 1997, 1.1

The outbreak of war in Croatia in 1991, and in Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1992, and the revelation that women had been mass-raped during the violences, had a remarkable effect on many British feminists from all walks of life; from those like myself, located in grass-roots feminist groups, to those located in academic feminisms. For many of us, these wars have had a defining effect on our political identification, choice of career and friendships. The question that has driven many of us, and certainly drives this thesis is why? Why have (predominantly) men inflicted such terrible violences onto women, men and children during these conflicts? Why is women's experience of war so different to men's? And why have these wars touched the lives of many feminists in this country, in such a definitive way?

In our search for meaning, many of my feminist peer-group, mostly grass-roots *ad-hoc* gatherings of women, with radical feminist leanings, and a background in anti-nuclear-activism, tried to examine how and why the wars were happening. Somewhat tongue in cheek, two women came up with the idea of sending a bright red truck around Former Yugoslavia, painted with the slogan "War is menstrual envy". As the revelation of atrocity grew, and the wars continued, the idea for the truck (without its slogan) stayed, perceived by the group to be a way of both supplying humanitarian aid, and making links between feminist anti-war activists in Former Yugoslavia and feminists in Britain. Out of this initiative, mostly through the energy of two particular women, Siân E. Jones and Ippy, came Women's Aid to Former Yugoslavia (WATFY), a group that still exists today and supports local women's initiatives in Former Yugoslavia and acts as an information-service in the UK on issues surrounding women and war in Former Yugoslavia. My primary links with women's groups in Former Yugoslavia were forged through my involvement with WATFY.

During the eight years or so since the wars began, many of my peer-group have shifted their life-styles and careers to accommodate the war, becoming international lawyers, international human-rights group workers, working for the United Nations, Domestic Violence Units, Rape Crisis Lines, and some, like me who have made their way into academia. During my entrance into the academy I discovered a number of political shifts in my analysis of these wars, some of which I explored in an MA dissertation completed a few months before the signing of The General Framework Agreement (Dayton) in 1995. In that piece of work I argued that rape-in-war represented a 'gender-cide', and that mapping ethnicity onto a survivor elided the rape of an individual, making a special case for an international reaction to rape-in-war which has obscured the issue of rape in its own right. Since the wars ended, my political and academic analysis has again shifted, to the analysis presented in this thesis.

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This research project would not have been possible without the help of many different individuals and groups of people. The following list of people, to whom I am especially indebted is not hierarchically driven, but broadly ordered around group/ personal/ professional identity.

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Abbreviations

AWF: Antifascist Women's Front, an organisation of Second World War, Yugoslavian women war-veterans, formed in the immediate years after the Second World War. The women in this group tended to be bureaucrats, and although influential, their power was, essentially, limited.

BaBe: Acronym for '*budi aktivna, budi emancipirana*' 'be active be emancipated'. BaBe is a women's NGO based in Zagreb which concentrates on monitoring women's human rights in Croatia and elsewhere in Former Yugoslavia/Yugoslav successor states. It lobbys for change and offers practical support and advice to women's NGOs in other parts of Former Yugoslavia

BiH: Standard international abbreviation for Bosnia-Hercegovina. The 'i' in Bosnia i Hercegovina, translates as 'and'.

HDZ: Croatian Democratic Union, the right-wing political party of Franjo Tuđman.

HVO: Croatian Council of Defence. HVO forces are either Croatian or Bosnian-Croat.

ICTY: International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia.

IFOR: International Force. This was a peace-keeping force of NATO and UN troops, put together by 'Operation Joint Endeavour' to monitor the peaceful implementation of the Dayton Agreement after November 1995.

JNA: Yugoslavian National Army. When the conflicts broke out many Muslim and Croat soldiers deserted. After this the term JNA was used as a euphemism for Serbian forces.

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, an alliance of western powers.

NGO: Non-governmental organisation

OHR: Office of the Higher Representative, UN post in Sarajevo.

OSCE: Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in Europe.

PTSD: Post-traumatic-stress-disorder

SFOR: Stabilisation Force. This was a post-IFOR force, introduced after the first implementation of the Dayton Agreement. Its mandate was to oversee the stabilisation of the conflict areas.

UN: United Nations

UNPROFOR: United Nations Potection Force, a peace-keeping force used in disputed areas during the conflicts.

UNPA: United Nation's Protected Area, an area policed by UNPROFOR

WATFY: Women's Aid to Former Yugoslavia, an aid group that supports local women's initiatives in Former Yugoslavia, and acts as an information-service in the UK on issues surrounding women and war in Former Yugoslavia.

Figure 1

Figure 2

Chapter 1

Introducing the research: a case study of nationalism, gender and war-related violence against women in Former Yugoslavia[1]

Introducing the research

In 1997, when the proposal for this research project was first put together, the academic analysis of women's experience of conflict, inspired by the wars in Former Yugoslavia was probably reaching its zenith. The work in this field, as it stood, consisted largely of short articles in edited volumes, which interesting though they were, failed to provide an in-depth critique of the issues surrounding women's experience of conflict, and in particular, failed to ask why women experience war-related violence. In mid-2000, although some, new, edited academic volumes on women and war have been published in the interim, the problems of lack of depth and lack of originality persist, to the point that there is a sense of encroaching academic *ennui* on the subject of women and war. In contrast, this research project represents a substantial new contribution to the literature on women and conflict. With particular reference to the case study of Former Yugoslavia, it examines the issue of women's experience of nationalism and war from a fresh perspective. It generates new debate, not just on why men are violent to women during wartime, but also on the ethics of researching this subject area.

[1]See Glossary Section.

Aims

There are four broad aims to this research. The first is to use existing literature and data from fieldwork to examine the intersection of gender, nationalism, and ethnicity in Former Yugoslavia. The second aim is to identify a discourse for exploring the issue of war-rape, which is ethical and accessible to both the academic and the practitioner working in the field of violence against women in wartime. The third aim is to explore issues that affect the study of Yugoslavia/Former Yugoslavia and the conflicts, looking in particular at a growing reluctance amongst respondents to discuss the war, influenced in part by the demands of post-war reconstruction. Fourthly, and lastly, the project seeks to examine the possibilities of future research in the region.

Methodologies

Reviewing the literature

The methods used during this research project combine a sustained review and analysis of the available literature, alongside a fieldwork project. My exploration of the available literature on the subject of Former Yugoslavia has crossed many disciplinary boundaries, reflecting my own theoretical and political interdisciplinary perspectives. I have engaged with historical, feminist, sociological, international relations, human-rights, social-work, cultural and media studies, ethnic and racial studies, women's studies, Holocaust studies, war and peace studies, and psychoanalytical texts, which I have read before, during and after the fieldwork.

The review and analysis of the literature do not, however, reflect a multidisciplinary approach. Rather, they represent an interdisciplinary approach, which weaves together an analysis of literature from a variety of disciplines that comment on particular themes, including nationalism, feminism, identity. The result was the need to move away from the genres of, for example, theses in the social sciences. This thesis does not have one chapter on the literature, one chapter

on methods, one chapter on the data and one chapter on results. Rather, its structure is determined by the debates themselves, so that each chapter has a discrete aspect, and presents an analysis of the literature (including an analysis of relevant fieldwork data) in a certain field. Yet, the analysis in each chapter informs the next chapter, and the next debate, so that the thesis is layered and integrated to form a structural whole.

Below, I outline some of the broad debates within the different disciplines that I have engaged with and which represent the backbone of the thesis[2].

Starting points

The starting point for this research project was my own earlier work, undertaken for an MA dissertation in Women's Studies (Lindsey, 1995), which analysed media-reportage of the rapes in the recent conflicts in Former Yugoslavia. This critiqued the debate on rape-in-war, arguing that, in 1995, the world was keen to explain away rape as a product of nationalism, and a product of war, whilst women, as gendered individuals, were missing from this debate. In its insistence on bringing gender into the equation, this dissertation contributed to and embraced the international radical feminist position on rape-in-war at this point in time[3]. The dissertation lacked an analysis and understanding of the nature of nationalism, ethnicity, and other social structures, and thus partially undermined its own argument. One of the first aims of the literature review for this project was to investigate this theoretical gap and to examine the cultural background to war-rape.

Nationalism and ethnicity

The claim that rape was motivated by nationalism and/or 'ethnic-cleansing' needed to be analysed further. A key aspect of this analysis was an investigation of the role

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[2]Although this review of the literature represents a synopsis of the specific debates that I have addressed in each chapter, it is not a full representation of the reading and debates I have engaged with. I direct the reader to the bibliography for this information.

[3] During my networking with Former Yugoslavian groups at international conferences I found that my ideas were contributing to the theorisation of rape-in-war by these groups.

that history, anthropology and archaeology, in particular, have played in encouraging groups to engage with nationalism, and in defining ethnicity in the modern world. Siân Jones' recent work on The Archaeology of Ethnicity (1997) presented a sound argument here. When read in conjunction with Tone Bringa's anthropology Being Muslim the Bosnian Way (1995), the role of history in mapping and shaping burgeoning nationalism in Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia could be clearly seen. Benedict Anderson's (1991) revised edition of Imagined Communities, which maps the rapid development of nineteenth century nationalisms onto the development of the printed word, also provided a thesis which explained the sudden rise of nationalism in the Balkan states of the mid-late nineteenth century; a nationalism which was further consolidated in the twentieth century.

However the seminal text in providing both a theoretical and practical understanding of ethnicity and nationalism was Tone Bringa's work (mentioned above), which mapped the historical relationship between religion and ethnic identity. In this text Bringa illustrates significant shifts in personal and group/family identities in Former Yugoslavia over the most recent two hundred years of Yugoslavian history. Her work is even more productive when read in the context of Lenard J. Cohen's (1993) Broken Bonds, and Spyros A. Sofos' work on 'Culture, Politics and Identity' (1996) which enable a mapping of the role that recent political and economic crises have played in influencing and transmuting these identities. This material has generated a broader hypothesis woven throughout the text of this thesis, which asserts that political and/or economic crisis can create ruptures in the social framework which can fundamentally challenge established personal and group identities, whether these be religious, national, ethnic, gendered, or sexual identities.[4] Zachary Irwin (1984) and Dubravka Zarkov's (1995) work on the post-Second World War Yugoslavian census provided important corroboration of more recent shifts in national, religious and ethnic identity.

The resultant interdisciplinary analysis is presented in Chapters 2 and 3.

[4] This thesis has since been applied to personal and collective ways of remembering after social disjuncture, Lindsey (2000) (publication forthcoming).

History, gender and feminism

Historical literature on Former Yugoslavia in English and in translation, has provided a background to the development of nationalisms in the area, the various wars that have been fought, and the different ideologies that have been collectively embraced by the Balkan States which made up Former Yugoslavia[5]. There is, however, little in the standard historical literature on the differing roles of women and men in the public events which make up the history of Former Yugoslavia. Over the last seven or so years this has in some way been addressed by feminist writers, many of whom are Former-Yugoslavian women, see for example Tatjana Djurić (1995), Dubrakva Zarkov (1995), Dubravka Ugrešić (199), Slavenka Drakulić, Daša Duhaček (1993), Silva Meznarić (1994). These writers have commented on gender in the communist/socialist era, and on its role in the rise of nationalism. However, the recent wars have tended to dominate this writing, so that histories/critiques of the women's movement in Former Yugoslavia have tended to fall to one side, taking up the role of supportive material. Analysis of gender also tends to be limited to an investigation of women in the public realm.

The work of British feminist and sociologist, Cynthia Cockburn, The Spaces In Between (1998) fills the gap in the literature on the post-Second World War women's movement. Cockburn's focus is on the political negotiations made between three multi-ethnic local women's groups working in war-situations in Northern Ireland, Israel and Bosnia-Hercegovina. In her two chapters on *Medica,* in Bosnia-Hercegovina, she provides an extremely well researched and written, condensed history of the Former Yugoslavian feminist movement across the last sixty-years. Its focus, however, is on the Serbian and Bosnian feminist movement. Chapters four and five of the thesis fill in some of the gaps on feminism in Croatia left by Cockburn.

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[5] Note that I do not speak Serbo-Croat, and thus have been unable to read Serbo-Croat texts for the purpose of this thesis. This represents a gap in the knowledge/arguments presented in this thesis, that I hope are taken up and critiqued by a Serbo-Croat speaking researcher in the future.

Regarding recent developments in the Former Yugoslavian feminist movement there is some material in non-mainstream publications such as Peace News, War Report, Peace Matters, and Transitions, which tend to critique current events in Former Yugoslavia from a left-wing, sometimes pacifist, political viewpoint. There are also many references in the publications of Former Yugoslavian and international NGOs. For examples see newsletters from the Centre for Women War Victims in Zagreb; The Autonomous Women's House in Belgrade; Women in Black, Belgrade; Mardre in the US; and Women's Aid to Former Yugoslavia (WATFY), in the UK. Invaluable to piecing together a history of the Croatian feminist movement from these diverse sources, was the archive of the Centre for Women War Victims in Zagreb. This has a substantial English-language archive of translated primary sources, including letters and reports, as well as an unrivalled collection of English language newspaper and magazine articles on the issues facing feminists during the war-years. Much of my evidence comes from their archives, and is backed up by interviews with staff at the Centre.

Chapters four and five of this thesis draw on this literature and examine the broad history of feminism in Former Yugoslavia, and the role of gender in the growth of nationalism. See below for a synopsis of their main arguments.

Ethics and the value of Holocaust literature

Whilst this thesis has tried to understand the cultural background to war-rape, it has, of course, also examined the current debate on rape-in-war in Former Yugoslavia. Although the key contributors to the discussion on war-rape have been feminists, the discourses used by them are often borrowed from the field of journalism, human-rights literature and international law. This is because it was journalists, lawyers and human rights activists who sought out and recorded testimonies of rape in Former Yugoslavia. However, so far, no one has critiqued the representation of these accounts of violence, and their use by academics, lawyers and journalists for political effect.

Because there have been so many parallels made between the violences in Former Yugoslavia, and the Nazis perpetrated genocides [6] in the Second-World War, and because the testimony of survivors has become so important, an analysis of some key texts in the field of Holocaust studies seemed imperative. This revealed that although there is a debate on how to represent the unrepresentable, for example, see Lawrence L. Langer's somewhat eccentric but highly interesting, Holocaust Testimonies (1991), the issue of the ethics of using testimony is a nascent debate. Tony Kushner (1999) and Beryl Lang (2000) are among the few to raise this as an issue.

Chapter six, therefore, draws on feminist writing on war-rape in Former Yugoslavia, Holocaust Studies, human-rights literature, writing on the international laws on war, and literary theory to critique the use of rape-testimony in feminist literature, and to suggest changes in the way in which war-rape in Former Yugoslavia is studied

Feminism, gender and sexual violence

There are a variety of standpoints in the feminist literature on sexual violence, which are detailed below. The evolution of this thesis has represented an evolution of my own personal and political engagement with a variety of these standpoints and texts. My starting point was the in-house literature of both the rape crisis centre and women's refuge in which I worked. This engaged a radical feminist perspective on violence, challenging attitudes around how and why violence takes place, and the type of women who experience violence. Counselling models were based around psychodynamic counselling methods and the use of therapeutic texts such as L.Davis' The Courage to Heal Workbook (1990). Also recommended to those first starting with these organisations was one of the early feminist texts on sexual violence, Susan Brownmiller's Against Our Will (1975).

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[6]Note that in this thesis I have deliberately not engaged with the debate on whether the killing and raping in Former Yugoslavia represents a genocide. This debate represents a thesis subject in itself.

Brownmiller's text represents a powerful indictment of the global and endemic nature of rape. Despite its age, it has influenced subsequent writers and practitioners in the field of sexual violence, as well as being used as a consciousness-raising introduction to those seeking to understand sexual violence against women. Brownmiller's trans-historical approach was revised and revisited in the 1980s by a new generation of feminist writers on sexual violence, including Deborah Cameron and Elizabeth Frazer in their work Lust to Kill (1987), and Jane Caputi in her work on Sex Crime (1988). These texts expanded the terms of the feminist debate on sexual violence. For example, Cameron (both a radical feminist and a linguistic theorist) and Frazer examined the role of discourse in representing sexual murder. In so doing, they raised questions about why men perpetrate, linking these questions to the construction of male and female sexualities, and the role of power and female subjectivity in the twentieth-century developed west.

At the time that Cameron, Frazer and Caputi were writing, the general debate on sexual violence was also polarising. For example, feminists such as Catherine MacKinnon (1989), Andrea Dworkin (1981) and D.H. Russell (1993) were focusing on the links between pornography and sexual violence. MacKinnon's focus, as a lawyer, was on constructing explicit causal connections between pornography and rape. These have been open to challenge on a number of fronts, but the most convincing, and accessible argument against this type of theorising is, for me, reflected in Susan Bordo's work on anorexia (1993). Bordo, in seeking an understanding of anorexia rejects a theory of cause and effect, and instead looks for 'axes of continuity', or influences, which she describes as converging in anorexia (p.142). Her epistemology thus embraces a post-structural approach.

MacKinnon's and Russell's reliance on a reductive model of causality led me to look for other ways of theorising sexual violence and a move towards post-Freudian feminist psychoanalysis and feminist theories of identity, which take up and develop some of the issues referred to by Caputi, Cameron and Frazer. Such a move required a negotiation of the differences between the work of object-relationists such as D.J. Winnicott and Melanie Klein[7], and the work of Lacan and the *école freudienne*. Although I have researched the work of Winnicott and

Klein[8], the choice of direction was, in a sense prescribed for me, by my discovery of Barbara Creed's groundbreaking text The Monstrous Feminine (1993). Creed, a psychoanalyst and critical theorist, writing on theories of misogyny, sexual violence, identity and power, draws heavily on Julia Kristeva's text The Powers of Abjection (1982). Kristeva, in turn, is a leading, if contested (by Lacan), (post) Lacanian feminist.

This thesis does not, however, draw directly on the work of Lacan in his *Écrits* and his *Seminars*. Rather, it draws on the work of Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose (1982) whose translations of what they perceive to be key texts by Lacan are presented alongside a feminist analysis of Lacanian theory of gender and identity. Mitchell and Rose have 'a shared sense of the importance of Lacan for psychoanalysis, and of psychoanalysis for feminism' (viii). Rose, writing later in 1985, also argued that 'The question of identity is ... the central issue through which psychoanalysis enters the political field.'[9] The purpose of Mitchell and Rose's work, was to give feminists a theoretical launch-pad from which, using a feminist reading of Lacanian theories of identity, they could provide politicised, theoretical analyses of concrete problems around identity and power.

Elizabeth Wright (2000, pp.3-10) has examined the use of Lacanian theory by feminists and suggested that it represents a form of postfeminism. This label can have extremely negative connotations, in that it can seem to replace feminism, or suggest that there is no longer a need for feminism. Such a criticism might be levelled at my own use of psychoanalysis in this thesis, where for example at the end of chapter 6, and in chapter 7, I examine constructions of masculinity in the Yugoslavian family, and suggest that war-rape be considered alongside other kinds of war-related violence. My argument that the debate on rape-in-war has become dominant at the expense of other types of violence (including the killing of many civilian men) is not taken lightly. It represents a significant personal shift/departure from my previous intellectual and political understanding of war-rape. This argument, alongside my use of psychoanalytic theory, represents a new

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[7] Klein also tends to be labelled as an ego-psychologist.
[8] And the unconvincing work of Nancy Chodorow, 1978
[9] Quoted by Michael Payne in his introduction to Rose's Why War (1993), p.5. Payne is quoting from: Sexuality in the Field of Vision, 1986. London: Verso.p.5.

way of theorising rape-in-war which has so far, not been examined by the international feminist community. Although my approach may be perceived as contentious, it is my hope that others will feel motivated to critique and/or build upon my arguments, and in so-doing bring new-life and new ideas to a rapidly failing debate on how and why war-rape is perpetrated.

Reflexivity and interview techniques

Because much of the literature I have used, and much of the data I have produced, has been reliant on other people's memories of events, I have been keen to interrogate the nature of memory and the way it is produced in artificial settings, such as the interview. In particular I have been interested in the interaction between interviewer and respondent, and the effect that even a short-term, transient relationship can have on the interview process. To this end I have looked at a range of writing from different disciplines. Alessandro Portelli's 'The Peculiarities of Oral History' (1981) examines the use of psychoanalysis in oral history. Ruth Wilkins' 'Taking it personally: a note on emotion and autobiography' (1993) examines a researcher's emotional responses to doing fieldwork, and how this impacted on her research. Jonathan Boyarin's 'Space, Place and the Politics of Memory (1993) considers the effect of time and space on the memory process. This text has helped me to extrapolate a hypothesis on the effects of interviewing people on the issues of war, at a time when reconstruction was perhaps more important to those being interviewed.

The final chapter of the thesis, Chapter 8, which is largely substantive, is a reflexive look at how memory is produced during interview, what factors hinder remembering during interview, and how researching war-memories has its own set of pit-falls that the researcher needs to be aware of.

Fieldwork

I spent approximately 14 weeks in the field, between August 1998 and February 1999, visiting Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina (I originally planned to visit Serbia

as part of this fieldwork, but the escalating violences in Kosovo prevented me from doing so[10]). The fieldwork was structured to enable me to draw on and utilise a network of existing contacts with Former Yugoslavian Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) which reflected my own autobiographical position as a researcher, in the sense that I come from a grass-roots, feminist background. I have been involved in NGOs that offer a politicised and therapeutic response to violence against women, outside of official bureaucratic or governmental structures. For example, I have been a trustee/volunteer member of a British Rape Crisis Line, counselling survivors of sexual violence, and a volunteer for a woman's refuge, run by a local Women's Aid group. Of specific relevance to this research, I am a trustee and director-member of Women's Aid to Former Yugoslavia (WATFY). This is a group that was set up in 1992 to deliver aid to women refugees in Former Yugoslavia, whose remit swiftly grew, so that it became actively involved in the feminist politics of the war. It liaised with feminist anti-war groups in Former Yugoslavia, acting as a disseminator of information concerning events affecting women in Former Yugoslavia. It worked to aid local women's NGOs to develop local responses to refugee crises, in particular providing material and practical support for groups responding to the needs of survivors of gendered sexual violence. It also acted as a lobby to the British government, the European Commission and the United Nations (UN) urging them to implement international legislation on rape in war/civil conflict.

I chose not to study agencies such as the Croatian social services, although I had some opportunities to meet with social-workers. Initially I took this decision because these institutions were too difficult to map, containing many individuals who supported the government, and some that did not. However whilst I was in Osijek a respondent set-up a meeting for me, with a sympathetic social worker, who agreed to talk with me about ethnicity, mixed-marriages, domestic violence and the role of social-services in this former-front-line area. However, the respondent who set-up the meeting failed to inform me that she done so, and thus I missed the appointment. This experience typified the type of fieldwork problems I experienced in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. These types of experience

[10] The University insurance company informed me I would not be insured. Also my would-be respondents felt unable to underwrite my visa, because of fears for their own safety.

reinforced my confidence in my decision to utilise networks with which I already had some involvement. This relationship gave me some (minimal) agency thus making me less dependent on gatekeepers for access to respondents.

Choice of respondents

My decision to use some of the primary contacts that I had made through my association with WATFY seemed at the time to be a question of common sense. I had met some of the women from these NGOs, whilst I had an established email relationship with others. Utilising these contacts and my general familiarity with NGOs seemed the best way forward, given that much fieldwork time is spent persuading people to become respondents[11]. However, the decision is perhaps more complex. Hugh Gusterson (1993) writing on ethnography and militarism in the United States, observes that 'it is easier to carry through fieldwork among activists than elites' (p.59). This observation offers some insight into my choice. Instead of examining the issues of gender, nationalism, ethnicity and violence from the margins of Former Yugoslavian society, I might have tried to examine these issues from the perspective of the elite, or from the institutional/bureaucratic core of the elite.

At the beginning of the fieldwork, I rejected this option on the grounds that it would be unlikely that the elite, or the gate-keepers to the institutions of the elite, would have supported my initiative, given my existing contact with NGOs which had positioned themselves in opposition to these elites, and who were outside of the established public, symbolic order. Yet, if I am honest, what I most feared was that these elites, that is, these right-wing, predominantly male politicians and bureaucrats would actually support this research initiative. In this imagined scenario, I pictured myself spiralling into a web of lies and deceit that required me to establish a rapport with these respondents whilst observing them, and their

[11]At the time of the fieldwork the right-wing Croatian government was in the process of trying to legislate that all NGOs should be forced to register with the government. Without government approval of their activities an NGO would have been required to cease operation. The NGO groups that I was working perceived their continued existence as under threat. However, in January 2000, when a more moderate government was elected, this legislature was abandoned. The Serbian government, at the time of writing, is in the process of trying to introduce a similar legislation, and has terrorised key feminist groups who have an anti-militarist stance, to the extent that key members have had to flee the country.

institutions, for signs of nationalism, fascism, misogyny and racism. I also imagined having to listen to their justifications/lies for their acts of killing, maiming and sexual violence, and through that act of listening, feeling that I was condoning and becoming personally complicit with these crimes. Therefore I stuck with my choice to focus the fieldwork on activists, but, compromised by determining to contact some right-wing NGO groups towards the end of the fieldwork, when I was more confident, and was more informed about the situation in Former Yugoslavia[12].

Gusterson argues that it has been this sort of politicised squeamishness which has 'exempted' the elites 'from the searching inquiries of the ethnographic gaze' (p.65). Yet quoting from his fieldwork journal, Gusterson notes his own growing political disorientation as he began to establish relationships with some of the nuclear-weapons scientists whilst undertaking an ethnography of nuclear weapons laboratories:

> It's frightening to think that their view becomes more natural to me, my own (former?) view becomes more unnatural, more something to be eyed critically and from a distance. (p.65)

Gusterson's political schizophrenia resonated with my own experience, when, as the Croatian fieldwork was drawing to a close, I managed to secure interviews with two right-wing NGOs. The first interviews were with two men working with volunteer war-veterans. The second was with members of two feminist groups, working on issues of violence against women, who had aligned themselves with, and had been embraced by the right-wing Croatian government. The experience of building rapport, and listening to members of these groups, made their views seem rational, understandable. Yet, simultaneously, I was aware of a deep fear and anxiety within myself at the ease in which I could slip into endorsing and condoning their opinions.

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[12]An NGO fair held in November 1998, in Zagreb, Croatia, helped me to make an initial contact with Croatian right-wing groups, which I was able to follow-up in my next visit to Croatia in February, 1999. Note though, that my decision was still to study NGOs, rather than political and bureaucratic structures.
The length of time I spent on fieldwork in Bosnia-Hercegovina was too short to set-up this sort of contact.

What was interesting about both these right-wing groups was that they wanted input into the research project. They made assumptions that the project was just starting as opposed to ending (without actually enquiring, or listening to what I had to say) and were very firm about the amount of managerial control that they would have over the project. This contrasted to the attitude of members the oppositional NGOs with which I worked with, who, although helpful, had only a limited interest in what I was doing.

Despite the problems involved with working with right-wing groups, the experience was invaluable to the fieldwork, but, only because it acted as a balance, a counter to the information and opinions put forward by the oppositional NGOs. Thus, as an initial resource, I do not think my studying a right-wing group would have been useful. However, having gained knowledge of the field, I feel that both groups that I visited represent a resource for subsequent research, and that both would make extremely interesting case studies.

Choice of fieldwork methodology

The initial fieldwork design proposed a set of semi-structured interviews, and listed key areas that needed to be addressed during interviews. As the prospect of fieldwork became a reality, I became aware that as well as demanding an understanding of the violences that took place during the conflicts, the interview questions demanded a broad understanding of Yugoslavian/Former Yugoslavian society and culture. I needed respondents to comment on issues such as ethnicity, nationalism and sexuality, and public levels of violence before the conflicts began. In effect I was asking my respondents to comment as participant-observers of their own culture. Such a methodology is not without considerable drawbacks, for example the static nature of the interview might produce an answer that would be very different if asked at a different time/ in a different context. The choice of respondent, if restricted to oppositional NGOs, might also have produced a uniform view[13]. But perhaps more importantly, being within a culture makes it very difficult to critique that culture, because much cultural critique/ethnography is

informed by a sense of cultural difference (although using a marginalised group which might have a more defined sense of difference might provide a counter-balance to this problem).

I chose to try to off-set this problem by also becoming a participant-observer, and in Croatia arranged to spend much of my time in Zagreb with a particular group of NGOs, which included the Centre for Women War Victims and the Autonomous Women's House (against violence against women)[14]. These NGOs were housed in a suite of offices in Zagreb, which they shared with the staff of some of the projects they had initiated, and with some smaller, but related, NGOs (see figure 3, a flow chart of these organisations). In Bosnia-Hercegovina, I arranged to spend a week with *Medica Zenica*, which consisted of a variety of different, but interconnected projects (see figure 4) which offered a "w/holistic"[15] service as a trauma centre to women who had experienced violence during and after the war.

My role, particularly in Zagreb, was to help with office-work, and with the production of English-language reports and fund-raising applications. In return, I had access to the groups' substantial English-language archives. I could question members of the group about aspects of their work, about events documented in their archives, and about current events taking place in Croatia. And I was also able to identify key respondents from these groups for in-depth interview[16]. This set-up allowed me to combine formal and an informal (A. Strauss, 1969) interviewing techniques enabling me to ask the same questions of women, at different times, in different contexts, and with different wording, thus allowing me to critique their various different observations of their own culture. As I built up a rapport with several women in these groups, the nature of their answers became more complex, and were often framed through past events/past political decisions within the history of these groups.

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[13]What was surprising, was that this was often not the case, particularly regarding attitudes towards nationalism, where as I argue in chapter 3 on gender, many activists had very different views.
[14]Bearing in mind the cautions of Henrietta Moore, 1988, who points out, there are numerous pitfalls for the anthropologist/ethnographer: implicit hierarchies between the researcher and researched; racism; and ethnocentrism (pp 7-9). Having negotiated/identified these pitfalls the researcher needs then to be able to identify difference within the culture s/he is studying.
[15]This is how the group describes themselves, source, interview.
[16]In addition (extremely important for developing the fieldwork outside of these groups), I had access to all the office facilities I needed, including email, fax and telephone



Figure 3: Flow chart of some of the projects connected to Centre for Women War Victims and Autonomous Women's House, Zagreb



Figure 4: Flow chart showing the projects connected to Medica Zenica

There were, however, substantial anomalies in my role of participant-observer, which prevented me from wholly performing this role. I do not speak Croatian or Bosnian[17], thus I did not always understand what was going on, and required a translator of office 'events'. This was supplied by the office-manager who would take time to explain events to me. We would also meet, in quiet time at the end of the day, when things were less hectic to discuss the days events. However, there were a few occasions when the office was extremely busy, or when the office-manager was away at a conference, when it took a day or two to get someone to explain what was going on.

Although this scenario was frustrating, and made me seriously question my choice to observe when I could not speak the language of those I was observing, it sometimes also proved very interesting. Sometimes women deliberately chose to have English-language conversations with each other, in front of me, thus implicitly informing me that they wanted me to hear something. Often this was because the issue being discussed represented a significant external political event, or conversely, represented gossip about someone that I knew. Later on, as I started to gain a small grasp of the language, and built up a rapport with particular women, some women started to offer personalised explanations about an event in the office. Some did this because they thought that I understood more than I actually did, and wanted to offer their version of events. Others did it because they wanted me to feel included.

In contrast the difficulties around language were not so pronounced when I was with the *Medica* group in Bosnia. The group, which has often been made up of women speaking a variety of different languages, often spoke English in front of me. I was also usually accompanied by women who were fluent in Bosnian and English and who were able to translate what was going on, for me.

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[17]See Glossary section.

The ethics of observation

The experience of how and when the groups interacted with me, and chose to speak English, generated enough interesting data for me to have written a thesis on the dynamics of this group. Although in earlier drafts of this thesis I wrote up some of these events and commented on them, I always felt compelled to edit these out at a later stage, because their inclusion felt unethical. However, at the time I found it difficult to articulate why I had these ethical doubts. My assumption was that given my academic history (an MA in Women's Studies), and my political identification as a feminist, I was being guided by a feminist ethic, which was residual to the ethos of the project. Yet, whenever I examined my research methodology, although I could identify that the project was feminist in terms of its research interest, and its analysis, it was not particularly feminist in terms of its methodology. I compared my research techniques with those of Cynthia Cockburn (1998) who worked extensively with the *Medica* group, along with the *Bat Shalom* group in Israel and The Women's Support Network in Belfast:

> It was agreed that in the writing and publishing process I would refer back to the projects, showing them drafts in plenty of time for them to react with criticism, comment and suggestions. (p.3)

Although Cockburn mediates this with the comment that: 'This was not an agreement for them to censor what I wrote' (*ibid*), her methodology is clearly in the feminist tradition. This type of methodology has never seemed appropriate for this project because of the time and financial constraints inherent within it[18]. Consequently I never extended, to my respondents, an invitation to collaborate, nor did I invest them with autonomy. Rather, at times I have struggled with respondents who have tried to exert autonomy in the interview situation (see Chapter 8, on memory).

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[18]The grant from the ESRC for a proposed 21 weeks of mobile fieldwork in Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, France and Germany was £1000. This did not take into account the prohibitive cost of accommodation to internationals in Former Yugoslavia. After paying for a return ticket to Croatia or Bosnia-Hercegovina, this left me with either enough money for 10 nights accommodation in Sarajevo, or for 3 weeks accommodation in Croatia. Because of the practical problems caused by the war in Kosovo, and the fact that I funded the bulk of the fieldwork myself through credit-cards and loans, the time I spent doing fieldwork was reduced to a little under 14 weeks.

My lack of engagement with a traditional feminist fieldwork methodology was not, then, the source of my ethical qualms. On analysis, I found these to be located around an unwritten contract that I had formed with the groups I was involved with. When I originally approached these groups for help, I stated that my project brief was nationalism, gender and violence against women. What I was studying was something quite specific, and this is what the respondent-researcher relationship was built upon. To comment on the way the group worked together, or the way they viewed other groups, was not ethical unless the women flagged up that I could use this material in my study, or if it was an opinion offered during an interview. Thus I felt ethically comfortable in including, in the final analysis, the opinions of members of the Centre for Women War Victims' and the Autonomous Women's House, concerning two other NGO groups, *Kareta* and *Bedem Ljubavi*, with whom they had fallen-out, on political grounds (around perceived nationalism and racism), some years before (see Chapter 5). This choice was informed by the fact that when I told women from the Centre and the Autonomous Women's House that I had been to visit these two groups, they commented on the historical background to their disagreement with these groups, and their own personal stances within this dispute. The context of their discussion was clearly to help me to form a research opinion, and was flagged up by them for inclusion in the study. In contrast, what I did not include in this study were casual remarks, for example, about other women who had left the project. These were clearly not intended for public consumption, but rather represented material for my own private interest. The process of writing up the analysis of this project has, therefore, represented a careful negotiation of ethical boundaries considering what is an acceptable subject to write about, and what is not. My remit as participant-observer was restricted to a study of nationalism, violence and gender, and the roles of these groups in challenging nationalism and gendered violence within their societies, I was not specifically studying the groups themselves.

Confidentiality

What I noted during the fieldwork was that my increasing rapport with my respondent-groups (particularly in the case of women from the Centre and

Autonomous Women's House), made respondents feel quite comfortable about discussing a variety of issues with me. Sometimes a political opinion, or historical information was framed through personal anecdotal evidence, which I suspect, had I had less of a rapport with the respondent, would not have been volunteered. These anecdotes straddle the private and the public. Again it has been difficult to decide when it is appropriate or ethical to include them. I hope that I have made the right choices, and have not intruded into the private spaces of my respondents. However, in order to minimise the effect of any perceived intrusion, all quotes used are attributed as anonymous (this is more precaution than realism, because anyone who knows these groups could easily identify my respondents), denoted by a randomly chosen alphabetical prefix. Similarly, although the political climates in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia are relatively safe for informants at present, particularly in Croatia since the January 2000 elections, this does not preclude a deterioration of political conditions for activists. Maintaining anonymity thus seems a sensible precaution.

Analytical methods

Mixing methodology with analysis: analysing data whilst doing fieldwork

Interviews

The fieldwork began as a relatively structured process. I had a list of respondents that I wanted to interview, who had worked in NGOs dealing with war-related violence against women. I conducted pre-prepared semi-structured interviews, using a written guide to themes that I wanted to cover in the interview which were tailored to the known biography of a respondent. However, the fieldwork soon evolved a less-structured methodology as my list of potential respondents outside my principal informant groups began to snowball. Although most of my respondents were from women's NGOs, I had less known biographical information about these respondents, and so the interviews became more fluid. They were still partially structured in that I controlled/guided the interview, but my questions were thought up on the spot and were often responses to the information proffered by the respondent. As I gained in knowledge and confidence, I began to set-up interviews

with a variety of groups and individuals which I hoped would be able to comment on more specific research questions, and/or would act as observers of their own culture. For example, in Croatia I interviewed a journalist with a government-run newspaper, an ex-teacher working in the Ministry of Education, and a woman politician who was a member of the main opposition party.

At the same time in response to data emerging from formal and informal interviews (and in Croatia my simultaneous exploration of archival evidence) I began to identify themes to the fieldwork. This was aided by transcribing the first few interviews whilst doing the fieldwork, examining these in depth, and allowing them to generate tentative theories (drawing on a very loose model of grounded-theory[19]) which shaped the field of enquiry in the later fieldwork. Some of the themes/theories that were identified early on in the project have persisted/been validated, making their way into this, the final product. Others have had to be jettisoned along the way, or put aside for future research, or other forums of analysis.

Profile of respondents

Numbers

In all, I formally interviewed 50 respondents, 41 of whom were women, and 9 of whom were men. Of the women, 6 were non-Former Yugoslavs (three were British, two were Americans, and one was German). Of the 9 men interviewed, two were non-Former Yugoslavs (one was British, and one was German).

Fluency in English

Of the 42 Former Yugoslavian respondents, 23 (56%) spoke fluent English. This made the interviews relatively easy to undertake. However, even when a respondent spoke fluent English, there were cultural glitches, where occasionally

concepts did not translate easily, or where I felt nuance was lost. 3 respondents (7%) spoke English fairly well, but there were patches during the interview where we failed to understand each other. This was acknowledged by myself and the respondent when it occurred, and we although we tended to try and retrieve that part of the interview, often it was better simply to move on, as again the problem was not always purely linguistic, but also conceptual. 2 respondents (5%) spoke English less than adequately for an interview scenario. Amongst these I count Y., whose interview is analysed in Chapter 8, as an example of a contested interview. The remaining 12 respondents (28%) of respondents chose not to speak to me in English, but to use a member of the group, or a colleague, who spoke fluent English. In this scenario, there was no way of measuring the accuracy of translation, but given the translators' knowledge of idiom I felt confident that they were doing a good job. However, as with the interviews with fluent speakers, there were sometimes problems with nuance, or translating concepts. It is clear in the transcripts and interview notes where language problems occurred and this has been taken into account during analysis.

Women

Age and educational history

Of the thirty-five Former Yugoslavian women interviewed, seven (20%) were in their early twenties. These women had been adolescents/teenagers during the war. Of these, one had a degree, came from a privileged background and was politicised. The rest were highly motivated and politicised, all but one being fluent English speakers. All, except the one, more privileged woman, had lived life on the front-line during the war, and had their secondary or university education interrupted.

Seven Former Yugoslavian women respondents (20%) were in their thirties, all but one of whom spoke fluent English. All but one of these had a degree. The one woman who did not was fluent in English, and appeared relatively well educated in terms of her professional knowledge, and understanding of feminism.

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[19]Loose in the sense that I started off the project with some hypotheses which I in/validated, and thus it was not purely the data which produced the theory. Also my methods of data analysis did not follow the models laid out by Strauss and Corbin, 1990, see section on results.

Six Former Yugoslavian women respondents (17%) were in their forties. Of these only only one had a degree, whilst only two spoke fluent English. The remainder appeared to have been self-taught, and to have become politicised at a grass-roots level.

Eleven Former Yugoslavian women respondents (31%) were in their fifties. Two were Croatians with degrees who had been abroad for some time before returning to Croatia. These women spoke fluent English. 7 women from this group (64%) were professionals with degrees, and had varying degrees of proficiency in English. One was a self-taught professional who was highly politicised. The remaining three (30%) were politicised, but I was uncertain about their educational history.

Four Former Yugoslavian women respondents (11%) were in their 60s. One was a retired professional with a degree. I was uncertain about the educational histories of the remaining three women. None of these women spoke good English.

Men

Age and background

Of the 6 Former-Yugoslavian men interviewed, two had been adolescents/teenager during the war. One was a member of a pacifist organisation/conscientious objectors group, the other was a member of a Serbian human-rights NGO, based in Croatia. One spoke fluent English. The other spoke quite good English.

One man was in his late twenties and had been in the army during the war and was still a serving officer in the Croatian army. His English was not of a standard for an interview.

Two men were in their thirties, one of whom had seen active service during the war, and was a member of an NGO for ex-Volunteer soldiers; the other was a conscientious objector. Both spoke fluent English.

One man was in his forties, and was a professional psychologist who was involved in the running of the NGO for ex-Volunteer soldiers. His English was good, but not fluent.

Non-Former Yugoslavian respondents

All of the non-Yugoslavian respondents had worked for either local NGOs, or international NGOs in Croatia, Serbia or Bosnia-Hercegovina, for some time. They thus had a lot of local knowledge, but maintained an outsider's perspective.

After interview: final analysis stage

When I returned to the UK I continued with my analysis of the data, using a method of analysis that does not quite locate itself in any of the major sociological methods, but one which in effect borrowed from all (using aspects of grounded-theory, discourse analysis, psychoanalysis, biography/case-history methods). This represented an informed response to the eclectic nature of the various types of data that had emerged from the fieldwork. However, giving my analytical methodology a name has been problematic, and it is my concern the eclectic nature of my analysis may suggest a lack of rigour. My reading of this problem is that my 'borrowing' from different methodologies reflects the broadly interdisciplinary nature of the thesis and the varieties of data that I have been working with.

What I should add here is that my eclectic methodology is also informed by my previous experience of managing research projects. Prior to beginning the MA, which preceded this thesis, I was a professional field archaeologist, directing and writing up my own excavation projects for seven years, and assisting in directing research projects for two years before that. The archaeological methods ingrained into me during this time have a particular resonance with sociological methods such as grounded-theory (it would seem that there has been a borrowing between the two disciplines). My archaeological training has thus informed my management and analysis of the interview data. The methodological rigour that I

used to apply to my excavation projects was present in my later negotiation of sociological and historical methods whilst engaged with this thesis. It is a rigour defined by a preoccupation with identifying sources of evidence, and tracing relationships between different sets of data. However, my detailed knowledge of stratigraphic analysis (a key archaeological method which has many similarities to grounded-theory) was mediated, at the time, by a growing discomfort with the rigidity of this type of analysis. Its obsession with numbering, cataloguing, collating could sometimes discourage intuition and interpretation, creating rigid physical boundaries and discrete pieces of evidence rather than acknowledging the way in which the boundaries of evidence, for example a layer of soil, are enormously difficult to define, and can merge with earlier layers, or be contaminated by later 'features'. Such methods can, in effect, fail to identify the interstitial spaces between pieces of evidence. My concerns with the hermeneutics of archaeological methodology were replicated in my concerns with the hermeneutics of grounded-theory. Thus I rejected what I perceived to be the rigidity of the grounded-theory method of categorising and numbering sentences because I was concerned that such a method could obscure the relationship between earlier or later sentences used by the researcher, or respondent. Unless it was done painstakingly carefully, it could also fail to account for outside influences such as interruptions, body-language, and ultimately the personalities and interaction of the researcher and respondent. Such an undertaking would take more analysis time than was on offer, and I remained unconvinced that such a methodology was worthwhile . Instead I took up the archaeological counsel of Michael Shanks and Christopher Tilley (1992):

> The process of coming to understand the past is an extremely complicated one and not susceptible to being simply boiled down to a single procedure or set of procedures which can be reproduced by others in the manner of a rote formula or recipe (p.107).

What seemed important within this methodological conundrum was that I understood my data, could handle/manipulate it without ever losing an intellectual overview, and that I adapted my analytical methods to suit the evidence, and the needs of the project. I opted for a method of examining interview data that dispensed with numerical cataloguing, but looked at certain interviews, certain

areas of evidence with an intense scrutiny that matched stratigraphic analysis/grounded-theory methods. My interpretation of the interview data was also informed by feminist (Lacanian) psychoanalytical theory. I perceived the interview process to be informed by the relationship between the multiple identities of the respondent subject, her/his interaction with the multiple identities of me, the researcher, and the 'text' of the interview, subscribing to the Lacanian theory[20] of the fractured un/whole, self:

> For feminists this instability is a liberation, any notion of subjective identity has to be constructed within a social framework which makes this identity constantly fragile. It insists that masculinity and femininity are 'created' by society and can never be complete. (Mary Stuart, 1994, p.59.)

Drawing on psychoanalytical methods enabled me to examine not only the respondent's unspoken fears, desires, confusions in the interview process, but my own fears, desires, confusions, all of which have impacted onto the research process (see Chapter 8, which deals with this issue in detail).

Much of the theory from my archival research, and my subsequent questioning of respondents around this research, was generated by the archival data. I then compared my results with existing data from existing literature in the relevant fields. My examination and analysis of events whilst I was in Croatia took the form of an ethnography/case-history which was also informed by my archival material and interviews with respondents around these events.

Results

Structure

During the process of analysis and writing up of this thesis I would sometimes fantasise about what the final written product would look like. However, always two, not one, theses would spring to mind. The first was a largely substantive,

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[20]See Glossary.

powerful piece of sociological research, the other was a more psychoanalytic/ historical contemplative piece of theoretical research. This fantasised tension reflected my own intellectual tensions: I was trained in history and archaeology and more recently in women's studies, but I am physically located in the social sciences. The final product, as it now stands, is neither of my fantasy theses, but a piece of work that is broadly interdisciplinary in nature, reflecting my diverse intellectual background and interests. As I argued earlier, its interdisciplinary nature makes it a somewhat unusual social sciences thesis in that it does not follow the social sciences' genre of: methodology/epistemology chapter, literature review, themed substantive chapters, conclusion. Rather, it consists of discrete themed chapters, each with its own review of the literature relevant to the theme of the chapter. For example, Chapter 2 critiques the literature on religion and ethnicity in Yugoslavia, Chapter 3 critiques historical texts on the collapse of socialism/communism in Yugoslavia.

What I also need to emphasise here, is that this final choice of thesis structure and disciplinary approach is not purely a product of my intellectual background in both the humanities and social sciences. It is also a product of the fieldwork results, which have been significantly influenced by the actual timing of the fieldwork, and by my identity as a non-Former Yugoslavian researcher (and thus an outsider). Although the fieldwork set out to investigate women's experience of violence during war, my respondents, speaking in 1998 and early 1999, some three years after the official end of the wars, were largely silent on this subject, preferring instead to talk about post-war problems. In the light of this phenomenon I was faced with a choice during the course of the fieldwork of whether to stay with the war as a subject, or to pursue the subject of post-war society (where I was promised plenty of substantive evidence). Given that I was being paid by the ESRC to investigate the war, I chose to try to pursue the theme of the war, but also to engage with the themes of post-war society, thus seeking a balance that I thought would please funder, respondent, and satisfy my own intellectual curiosity in the wars themselves. During, and since the fieldwork, the wars have taken on an increasingly historical nature, so that there has been a growing sense of 'the past'

about these events[21], thus the data came to suit being organised into discrete chapters.

The thesis, then, in many ways, is a product of the war itself, modelled and shaped by the narratives of those experiencing the aftermath of war, and negotiating their needs and emotions in the presence of an outside researcher. The silences, which initially frightened me in their lack of substantive sociological material, created a stillness/silence within me, the researcher, allowing me choice, and intellectual thinking space. I have been able to mull on what these silences meant and to recognise them, in part, as a time/space conjunction: an intellectual interchange for ideas and change, allowing me the privilege of initiating change in the literature and debate on women and war. I believe that the result is a unique, original collation of intellectual material, interpretations and arguments, which combines a critique of existing literature, with recommendations for changes to the debate, and putting forward a contribution to the creation of a new debate on women in war.

A note on style

In order to differentiate between a quotation from a written source, and a quote made by from a respondent during interview, I have italicised interview quotations used in the main body of the text. However, italics used in quotations at the very beginning of some of the chapters are from written sources.

Broad themes

Chapters 2 to 5, which represent the first half of the thesis, provide a critique of the literature on the background/received explanations to the war. At the same time they set out the two broad themes to be interrogated by the thesis: the construction of multiple identities in Yugoslavia and the gendering of the public and private. These themes are taken up by Chapters 6 to 8, which argue that the debate on

[21]Possibly informed/displaced by events taking place in Kosovo during the time I was in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia.

women, war and violence, needs to change. It needs to move away from descriptive narratives of violence towards an examination of identity within the social structures of the public and the private in Yugoslavia, if it is to understand why violence against women has been perpetrated during these wars.

Engaging with this argument has been difficult, because I have an innate resistance to the perception of a Yugoslavian society segregated into public and private. It is a resistance stemming both from a feminist perspective which argues against such hierarchies, and from an identification with post-structuralist epistemologies which argue against such rigid modernist definitions, and engages with Henrietta Moore's observation:

> A number of authors have pointed out that the rigid division of social life into 'domestic' and 'public' spheres owes much to the pervasive influence of nineteenth century social theory (Moore, *op cit*, p.22).

Yet, what is striking about Yugoslavian society is how rigidly segregated it is. My resistance to this reading, in favour of feminist, post-structuralist principles, would be a denial of what seems to me to be a Yugoslavian social reality[22].

Having negotiated my feminist, post-structural qualms about the division of Yugoslavian social life, I am hugely excited by the contribution that this thesis makes towards a new debate on women, war and violence. I draw attention in particular to Chapter 6, which critiques the ethics of using testimonies of violence, and suggests ways in which the debate on rape in war could change, recommending in particular a series of detailed examinations of Yugoslavian social structures. Chapter 7 initiates a change to the debate by examining the effect of nationalism on the Yugoslavian family, and potential perpetrators of violence. These chapters are nothing, however, without the introductory Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5, which act as information bases, and templates, on which Chapters 6 and 7 are hung, and Chapter 8, which examines the role of memory in post-war society, and represents a body

[22]See Chapter 7. This analysis has also made me consider the public/private segregation of my own culture, and my own upbringing, and to see remarkable parallels with those established in Yugoslavia.

of information for future research. All of these chapters are summarised in the section below.

Synopses

Chapter 2 identifies that the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina have been primarily described as religious or ethnic wars, and aims to explain the meanings of religion and ethnicity in the Yugoslavia of the late 1980s. It explores the issue of ethnic identity, and, drawing on historical and anthropological literature, argues that religion has been formative in shaping ethnic identity. It examines the way in which, from the nineteenth century, ethnic, national and religious identities began to become intertwined, so that by the twentieth century it was extremely difficult to differentiate between the three.

Chapter 3 takes up where Chapter 2 leaves off, to examine the effect of nationalism on national identity in the twentieth century. It explores the possible effect of previous nationalisms, wars and aggressions on an individual's sense of difference, and questions whether these past wars have played a role in current aggressions. It then examines the effect of nationalism in Yugoslavia after the Second World War, arguing that the Federal State of Yugoslavia elided the existence of nationalism in Yugoslavia, whilst simultaneously engaging with, and endorsing nationalism at a state level. It concludes with an examination of the role of the economy in encouraging nationalisms into the open in the 1980s and 1990s, so that nationalist discourses began to invade the public and private spheres.

Chapter 4 slots into the analysis provided by Chapter 3, looking again at post-Second World War Yugoslavia, but here, examining the role of women in the public sphere. It argues that despite the socialist state's advertisement of its equal treatment of women, the public sphere was extremely gendered, and women had little real power. It looks briefly at the growth of feminism in Yugoslavia in the 1980s, and argues that this too created an illusion of equality, being predicated upon class, ethnicity, and geographical location. The elites of the urban, sophisticated, educated feminist elided the very real lack of power that rural, non-

educated, racially 'inferior' women experienced, mirroring their own lack of power in the masculinised public sphere.

This theme is taken up and expanded in chapter 5, which, drawing on original archival evidence, examines the interaction between feminist politics and nationalism, and the way in which racism and nationalism began to infiltrate the feminist movement. However, it also argues that the complex political situation in Yugoslavia at the time created enormous confusion among women. They sought to find political strategies that suited the confusion of multiple identities, for example, feminist, Croatian, Muslim, frightened, patriotic, defensive, that were being privileged by them at this particular point in time.

The tone of the thesis then shifts from scene-setting, somewhat descriptive narratives to a theoretical critique of the data I have researched. Chapter 6 identifies that many of my respondents were not at all keen to talk about the war or their experience of counselling women survivors of violence. There was a sense that they were tired, and indeed bored, of the subject, and that it had been displaced by other needs. The original project design, which sought to generate data from respondent testimony on why violence took place, has thus been superseded by this phenomenon. But, perhaps more importantly, it has also been superseded by a growing awareness from myself, as researcher, that this type of evidence, that is, the familiar textual representations of testimonies of sexual violence that have come to signify rape in Former Yugoslavia, are not appropriate to a historical study of sexual violence in war. Rather, I argue, they are ethically suspect, dependent on a genre akin to hard-core pornography which encourages voyeurism in the reader. I also question the critical use of these testimonies, which, I argue, were used at, and represent, a single moment in the history of the wars, where rape was recognised as a human-rights catastrophe, and survivor accounts of rape represented a politicised, contemporary response to this event. This chapter argues that those researching these issues need to move away from the use of rape testimonies to find new and historically sensitive discourses with which to critique the phenomenon of sexual violence.

Chapter 7, takes up the gauntlet thrown down in Chapter 6, and examines Andrei Simić's (1999) theory of crypto-matriarchy in Yugoslavia, which argues that mothers gain power through their relationship with their sons. The chapter argues that the rise of nationalism in Yugoslavia created a national male hysteria around the role of mothers, which culminated in a wave of fascist misogyny. Drawing on Theweleit's work (1987) the chapter draws parallels between the misogynies of Yugoslavia in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the misogynies manifested by the fascist Freikorps in Weimar Germany.

Chapter 8, the final chapter before the conclusion, draws on some of the issues flagged in Chapters 6 and 7, to explore the changing perceptions of the recent wars in Former Yugoslavia, which have been informed by the respondent preoccupation with returning and reconstruction. Whilst critiquing this phenomenon, this chapter warns that this analysis is predicated upon respondent reluctance to discuss the wars, which may actually have been a tactic to avoid talking to me, the researcher, about the war. Using a case-history methodology, Chapter 8, examines the researcher/respondent relationship in this project, and explores the way in which activists have contested overtly and covertly my control of the interview, in order to avoid talking about the war. It also examines the way in which they have used their professional identities to obscure their personal memories of the war. Thus, this chapter asks whether it is ever likely for an outsider/researcher who has not experienced war to be entrusted with experiential accounts/memories of war.

The conclusion to this thesis summarises some of the main issues that have been explored in this body of work. It identifies both the broad themes that have run through this body of work, and those that are absent from it and points to the possibilities for developing future research in these areas.

Conclusion

To sum up, this thesis provides the reader with a deeper understanding of the cultural background to the violences that took place in Former Yugoslavia. It offers an interdisciplinary approach, which threads together an understanding of how and why women came to be marginalised within nationalist Former

Yugoslavian society in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and how the feminist movement in Former Yugoslavia responded, both to the marginalising of women, and to the conflicts. It critiques the current debate on rape in war, and argues, contentiously, that in this field there are fundamental problems surrounding the way academics use rape testimonies. It urges that the debate on war-rape change its focus from an emphasis on description, to a more analytical approach, which inquires what influences men to rape women during war. It kick starts this debate with an analysis which suggests that constructions of masculinity and femininity in the Former Yugoslavian family were destabilised by nationalism, creating a culture of misogyny amongst some men which may have aroused a will for them to perpetrate sexual and/or other violences against women.

The thesis ends with an examination of the nature of memory in post-war Former Yugoslavian activists, and questions whether it is ever possible for those who have experienced war to share their experience with outsiders. This analysis represents a unique examination of the interview experience, where those being interviewed may not be traumatised, but where they may share a collective feeling of trauma with those around them. It will thus be of interest to those interested not only in the issues of nationalism, gender and rape-in-war, but in the broader subject of interviewing groups of people who have gone through life-changing experiences such as war.

Chapter 2
Shifting identities: concepts of ethnicity and nation in Yugoslavia/Former Yugoslavia

[T]he crypto-Christians lived in regions near those inhabited by Muslims and professed Islam, but satisfied their consciences by practising Christianity in private, only emerging as Muslims during outbursts of anti-Christian fanaticism.

Miranda Vickers (1998, p.25) on the observations of Gregory Massarechi, a Catholic priest travelling in the Prizren district of Kosovo in 1651.

This inner dialectic quality of the sign comes out fully in the open only in times of social crises or revolutionary changes.

V.N. Vološinov (1973, p.23)

Synopsis

This chapter highlights the continuing and historical significance of local understandings of ethnicity and nation in Yugoslavia/Former Yugoslavia. In so doing it illustrates the importance of certain key terms in the public and private construction of group identities such as ethnicity and nation, whilst arguing that the meanings attached to these terms have shifted and transmuted over the last six hundred years. Whilst emphasising the complexity of group identities in Yugoslavia/Former Yugoslavia this chapter concludes that religion has had a formative influence on contemporary constructions of ethnicity and nation.

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Examining group identities

The hostilities which broke out in Former Yugoslavia in 1991/1992 have tended to be described in one of two ways: as ethnic conflict, or as a series of wars of secession. Either reading seems to work as a description of what was being fought over during these hostilities, and either conceptualisation informs the other: a war of secession inscribes a sense of nation onto the ethnicities doing the fighting, and an ethnic war inscribes a sense of ethnicity onto the violent contestation of land and autonomy between intra-national groups. However this constant conceptual linking of the term ethnicity with nation elides the complexity of group identities in Former Yugoslavia. What is required then, in order to understand the conflicts, is a detailed analysis of Yugoslavian/Former Yugoslavian group concepts of identity which teases out the meaning of Serbo-Croat terms that correspond in English to ethnicity or nation. Yet, because such an analysis of Yugoslavian/Former Yugoslavian identity will, inevitably, be informed by the meanings I, as the researcher/writer already attribute to the English words nation and ethnicity, I need, first, to clarify how I have used these terms. However, these terms do not go uncontested, and although a detailed analysis of the debates on nation and ethnicity might prove interesting and informative, such an analysis, here, would be misplaced since the primary focus of this work is not an analysis of nation and ethnicity.

Opening parameters

Ethnicity

My reading of ethnicity is deliberately quite loose, privileging the view that ethnic-identity is unique to each individual ethnic group, whilst drawing on G.C. Bentley's observation that this identity is predicated upon a group's '... symbolic construal of sensations of likeness and difference ...' (p.27). There are a number of ways in which members of ethnic groups identify themselves as similar, for example, through kinship, religion, economic practice, territory. Often group-

identity will embrace a multiplicity of similarities/ways of identifying. In my construction of a definition for ethnic/group-identity, ethnicity is seen to be located in the private realm of the family. Whilst this identity is also usually overtly displayed in public, there are times when, as in the quote from Vickers above, the family chooses to elide aspects of its identity. Thus, whilst the family acts as a reproducer of ethnicity, it may choose to hide or even change this identity (for example through religious conversion). However, the key point is that the perpetuation of ethnic identity is ensured through the family.

Whilst this reading of ethnicity sees ethnic identity to be defined through kinship, it would seek to reject the theorising of the evolution of ethnicity as primordial, that is, a romantic and passionate notion of ethnicity 'in the blood' (Jones, 1997, p.65) which has, for example, been utilised so successfully by Serbian nationalists during the recent conflicts. Rather, I work from a psychoanalytic explanation for the transmission of ethnicity through kinship. Summarised below, this explanation draws on Lacanian psychoanalytic theory to maintain that the private, cultural reproduction of ethnic-identity takes place at the site of the family during infancy[1].

Lacan argues that an infant negotiates and constructs its sense of identity as it separates from the mother and enters the Symbolic Order, that is, as it comes into contact with the world of language and signs outside of itself (Malcolm Bowie, 1979). Ethnicity is one of many identities to be negotiated by the infant.[2] It constructs these identities (which reside in the Imaginary[3]) through the way it learns about similarity and difference from the people that surround it: through their negotiation of the Symbolic Order, for example spoken language, body language, cultural practice, ritual, taboo. Initially kin-ship is integral to this phenomenon, however as the infant grows, and comes into contact with others outside the kin-group, its interaction with others also informs its ethnic, and other

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[1] Henrietta Moore, 1994b, argues that Lacan's theories are not universally applicable. I tend to concur with Moore, when considering the broad spectrum of Lacan's psychoanalytic theory. However, I believe that Lacan can be used towards an understanding of how ethnicity is constructed within the family.

[2]Lacan was influenced by the work of Sigmund Freud and Claude Lévi-Strauss. Although Lacan refers to ethnicity as an identity, he does not foreground this identity in his work.

[3]The Imaginary corresponds in some ways with Freud's subconscious. It is the site of an individual's multiple identities, and is linked to the Symbolic, the world of language and signs. See Glossary.

identities. The process of identity-formation is always on-going, even within an adult context, and subjectivities/identities are always being reformulated, re-negotiated in the light of new experience. In this model, one or more particular identities can be dominant over a multiplicity of other identities[4]. For example, a person's gendered or sexualised identities can over-ride their sense of ethnicity. Dominant identities can come to the fore through unique life-changing events, or when a particular identity is strongly contested and fought for. However, the construction and assumption of identity at any given time is not clear-cut: it is the interconnectedness of a person's many different identities that is integral to that person's sense of self. These interconnected identities will intersect, stand in contradiction to each other, representing contesting, multi-layered subjectivities.

Nation

My definition of the 'modern' nation is predicated on Benedict Anderson's (1991) Imagined Communities, which links the emergence of group-awareness to the spread of the printed medium, and a realisation of connections between 'imagined communities' across the globe. An individual's sense of nation or national identity in this context is a sense of belonging to a larger group. This is a belonging which can be, but is not necessarily, linked to geography or territory, it can also be informed by religion or 'blood-ties'. In this way the concept of nation can, in particular circumstances, resonate with the concept of ethnicity. This resonance has been illustrated in the recent growth in smaller nation states, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, (see Miroslav Hroch, 1996) after the end of the Cold War, which have emphasised the way in which national identity has become inter-twined with ethnicity. However nation/al identity is not always synonymous with ethnicity. Many individuals perceive their ethnic and national identities to be different.

These then are my working definitions for nation and ethnicity that I have used to inform my reading of ethnic and national identities in Yugoslavia and Former Yugoslavia. The rest of this chapter examines the development of group-identities in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Serbia and Croatia, arguing that an understanding of

[4]This is the attraction of Lacan to some strands of feminist psychoanalysis.

group-identities in these geographic areas is best located in an examination of the historical context of three Serbo-Croat[5] linguistic constructs: *millet, nasija* and *narod.* These three terms contain, conceptualise and embody gradual and at times imperceptible shifts in ways of identifying in Yugoslavia and Former Yugoslavia. Never fixed, transmuting and changeable according to the spatial and temporal contexts in which they have been used, these three terms signify the extraordinary complexity of Yugoslavian group-identity. An analysis of their use in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Serbia and Croatia leads to a conceptualisation of group-identity formation in Yugoslavia/Former Yugoslavia, which concludes that religion has been extremely dominant in the construction of ethnic identity. By the late twentieth century religious identity had informed Yugoslavian ethnic and national identities to the extent that these three types of identity were becoming indistinguishable from each other. My point is that, historically, religion has represented the boundary of difference between different religious, ethnic and national groups in Former Yugoslavia.

Historically situated group identities: *millet, nacija,* and *narod.*

Bosnia-Hercegovinan concepts of ethnicity/national identity in a plural society

Tone Bringa's (1995) anthropological study of Muslim lives and identities in a mixed Muslim-Catholic village in Bosnia[6] examines the concepts of *millet, narod* and *nacija* in Bosnia-Hercegovina, from an historical and contemporary Bosnia-Hercegovinan perspective. The value of Bringa's analysis, for this research project, lies not only in the analysis itself, but in its timing: she undertook her fieldwork in the late 1980s and early 1990s, both before and during the conflicts. Her study thus represents a unique record of two communities living alongside each other, on the edge of conflict, and on the edge of extinction[7].

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[5]See Glossary.
[6]See Glossary.
[7]The Muslim community of the village was displaced in 1993, after HVO (Bosnian-Croat) forces attacked the village.

However, Bringa makes it clear that although her research took place before and during a war, the focus of her research is a study of religion and community, and not a study of war. Whilst the war had an unmitigated personal and emotional effect on her, its influence on the community she has researched is not foregrounded in her work. It is, therefore, up to the reader to pull out of her ethnography, material that assists an analysis of the relationship between group identity and war. Her analysis of the terms *millet, nacija* and *narod,* which are interwoven throughout her text, provide information on this relationship, but this relationship is not foregrounded or privileged by Bringa.

Millet

Bringa's analysis of religious identity begins with an historical overview that examines the term *millet* in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Her starting point is the conquering and colonising of Bosnia-Hercegovina and parts of Croatia and Serbia by the medieval, Muslim Ottoman Empire, and the subsequent establishment of the *millet,* an Ottoman administration system for non-Muslim groups. This was modelled on the Muslim Ottoman Empire's own governmental system:

> [Which] was characterized by the integration of religious and political power in that religious laws and doctrines were the basis for regulating rights and duties between persons. (p.20)

The *millet* then, was an administrative scheme and system for:

> [S]elf -contained non-Muslim religious communities .... each with a spiritual leader at its head. (p.20)

These communities were either Jewish[8], Christian Catholic or Christian Orthodox (whilst outside of the *millet* system was the heretical Bogomil/Bosnian Church, see below). The location of power within these approved communities was the church: all the administrative and governmental functions and duties of these communities were performed by members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. In contrast, because of the size of the Ottoman Empire, and the inherent difficulties in administrating such

[8]Bringa excludes from her analysis a consideration of the role of Jewish communities in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

a large area, lay Bosnia-Hercegovinan (and Serbian) Muslims were able to play a part in the Ottoman bureaucratic or military machine, so that local Muslims tended to govern their own areas. Bringa notes that in Bosnia[9]:

> [L]ocal ("converted") Muslims were particularly involved in the civil service, a well-educated secular Muslim community evolved as a consequence (pp.20-21).

It would seem then, that there may have been inherent rewards in converting from Christianity to the Muslim faith. However, Bringa warns that the conversion of Christian South Slavs to Islam 'followed different patterns at different periods in time, and varied from one region to another' (p.14). She argues that some Balkan historians have tended to simplify this complex historical process in their analyses. These simplifications have tended to revolve around two arguments. The first is that the Ottoman Empire forced the South Slavs to convert. The second is that conversion was a ploy of the gentry/nobility to maintain and consolidate power, and its accompanying privileges.

Bringa's position is that conversion took place across a broad class spectrum. However she admits that 'the evidence suggests that the Bosnia-Hercegovinan gentry were among the first to embrace Islam' (p.15). She counter-argues that 'peasants followed suit'. This counter-argument is not particularly effective because Bringa does not examine the power-relationships between the Bosnia-Hercegovinan gentry and the peasants. What did the peasants stand to lose or gain by converting? Bringa's choice not to develop her analysis to examine issues around class, for example, the way in which conversion could open up possibilities of privilege, means that an analysis of the legacy of such power and privilege is occluded. She thus chooses, at this juncture, not to examine the way in which Balkan historians use their analyses to mobilise nationalist historical readings around class, ethnicity and origin. The historical representation of one religious group as oppressed by another, is a feature of recent nationalist discourse. Bringa's choice perhaps represents a way of avoiding becoming entangled in a politicised historical reading of this aspect of Balkan history.

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[9]It is uncertain whether Bringa is distinguishing between Bosnia and Bosnia-Hercegovina in this context.

I am dwelling on this because Bringa's resistance to a class-based analysis results in a sidestepping, yet enlightening exploration of the multifarious ways in which people changed their religion:

> [T]he evidence points to a multi-directional change of religion – Catholics accepted Islam or Orthodoxy, Orthodox believers turned to Catholicism or converted to Islam – partly because of the absence of any strong church organization in this area (p.16).

She also explores the possibility that the heretical Bosnian, or Bogomil, church represented a source of many converts. Examining the thesis that members of the Bogomil/Bosnian church converted to Islam to escape from the persecution of the Catholic and Orthodox churches, Bringa suggests that Islam represented an alternative that was recognised by all the parties concerned, and was seen as having a religious validity. She points out that although this thesis may be credible, the lack of historical sources to validate this version of history has meant that members of the Yugoslavian/Former Yugoslavian academic community have officially viewed this version as a 'dead-past' (p.17), an historical no-through-road. However, despite official historical attitudes, the lack of an 'ethnogenesis' of Bosnian Muslims' (*ibid*) has attracted the attention of nationalist scholars from all ethnicities who have tried to use the 'historical discontinuity of the Bosnia-Hercegovinian population' (*ibid*) to claim the Bosnian Muslims as historically their 'own', and therein to claim ownership to the territory of Bosnian Muslims.

However, the contestation of the 'ethnogenesis' of the Bosnian Muslims is also hindered by the same issue of religious fluidity which offers multiple pasts and histories to the Bosnian Muslims. Bringa notes that throughout Bosnia-Hercegovina certain religious shrines hold importance to all Bosnians regardless of faith. She observes that these are 'practices that are often referred to as syncretistic. But such a term assumes that there is an original version' (p.16).

This concept of no <u>one</u> starting place, no 'original version' is productive in that it <u>allows</u> nationalist historians to claim that history privileges their own particular position, yet at the same time it thwarts historical authenticity and allows multiple readings of the same history. Thus the 'dead-past' thesis works for all groups, yet works for none. What should be noted is that this religious fluidity was not solely

a phenomenon of the medieval Ottoman past, but is present in the more recent past as well. Bringa states that there are several recent examples of brothers converting to different faiths well into the nineteenth century:

> Eliot (1908:344) claims that sometimes a family divided itself between Christianity and Islam so as to have friends on the right side no matter what happened. In such cases family members recognized each other as relatives, but generally used different names conveying the same thing in Slavonic and Turkish respectively ....
>
> The decision brothers in previous generations made to retain their allegiance to a certain religious community or to convert was motivated by several factors. In addition to personal conviction, religious affiliation was often a political statement and reflected identification with certain political, social, or economic interests. (p.18)

This reveals a significant intersection between religion and ethnicity whereby ethnicity is represented by multiple identities: religious, economic, political. Whilst identifying mobile religious boundaries she illustrates how, in the nineteenth century this process became less fluid, more fixed, assuming a rigidity among later generations. What is not foregrounded within her narrative is the fact that although historically there is no obvious origin or starting-point to religious identity, by the late nineteenth century it began to take on an inherited quality, that is, it was becoming ethnicised through the family.

Nacija

This late nineteenth century shift in religious identity was accompanied by a linguistic transition in the meaning of the term *millet*, whereby it came to represent more than a non-Muslim religious community, taking on the additional Serbo-Croat meaning of *nacija*, which corresponds to the British use of religion/ethnicity/nation/folk. During this transition *millet* also became a term that could be applied to Muslim communities, a change that came about when, in the late nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire receded from Bosnia-Hercegovina, and the Christian Austro-Hungarian Empire took over. It is my contention that the Bosnia-Hercegovinan Muslim community's loss of a core, Ottoman identity

worked to make this community Other, and that this othering had the effect of making these communities hold on to their religious identity stretching it into an identification through 'nation'.

Kemal H. Karpat (1982) has argued that this historical transition in power was mirrored by secular and religious political and economic changes that were reflected within the *millet* system. The power-bases within Christian communities shifted from the church to influential members of the lay community. Karpat sees this as the beginning of a process of ossification:

> The disintegration of the traditional *millets* and communities left the family as the one unit from the old era which retained its structure intact. The family represented the religious values and the ethnic and linguistic peculiarities of the community (p.143)

So the word *nacija* began to supplant the term *millet.* The conceptual meaning of *nacija* developed and evolved around the concept of inheritance, so that in the late nineteenth century this term straddled a conceptual space between ethnicity and religion. By the late twentieth century Bringa observes, in her fieldwork, that the term *nacija* represents a way of categorising religious faith, identifying someone as Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim[10]:

> To refer to people of a different ethnoreligious background, villagers themselves used interchangeably "someone of different faith" and "someone of different *nacija"* (p.21)

She also demonstrates a definitive link between kinship and religion, describing religious identity in terms of a patriarchal ethnicity:

> [A] religious identity is also a social and cultural identity and in the Bosnian context has an ethnic aspect, since a person usually "inherits" his or her religious identity from his or her parents and above all from the father who passes on his surname to his children and thus establishes a child's ethnic identity (*ibid*).

Linking imagined nacijas

[10]This observation has been made elsewhere, see for example, William Lockwood, 1975, p.22.

The historical legacy of the *millet*, whereby religion was also invested with a community-based administrative function, meant that religion came to be synonymous with administration. The spatial nature and focus of community religious-administrative structures thus invested religion with a notional, conceptual spatiality. The development of the printed word in the nineteenth century expanded the concept of symbolic and geographic religious space to create imagined links between *millets/nacijas*. For example, the *millet/nacija* Orthodox Christian also came to represent an 'imagined' Orthodox community, which at this time linked Orthodox communities in Bosnia-Hercegovina together and linked this larger community with the Orthodox community in the geographical area of Serbia. Likewise the Catholic community of Bosnia-Hercegovina had a link to the Catholic community in Croatia; and the Muslim community of Bosnia-Hercegovina had a link to the Muslim community of Sandžak in Serbia. The conceptual meaning of *nacija,* which had earlier 'colonised' the conceptual meaning of *millet*, thus itself came to be stretched to mean something more than just religion, to something more akin to nation.

What is massively understated by Bringa is how the term *nacija* was, at the time of her fieldwork, continuing to evolve. Although the concept of *nacija* retained its religious meaning to the mature adults of the village, Bringa makes a one-sentence reference to the way in which the term *nacija* was taking on a different meaning amongst the younger generation of the village.

> In the village I worked in before the war Catholics referred to themselves (and were referred to by the Muslims) as Catholics rather than Croats. They too understood their identity primarily in terms of religious affiliation. This was, however, changing among the younger generations who used the official term Croat (which they learned at school) (p.21).

In terms of mapping the changes to identity that reflected the gradual move towards overt nationalism and conflict, Bringa's reference is significant. It indicates how, in the discourse used by younger people, the term *nacija* was starting to assume a geographical or territorial dimension[11] (starting to become *narod*), which was privileged alongside its religious meaning. This slippage in the

[11]Note that the Muslims remained as Muslims, see below.

Serbo-Croatian meaning of *nacija* is an interesting one, echoing the earlier transition in the meaning of *millet* which evolved to become *nacija.* What should be noted is that the discourse being used amongst Bringa's mature villagers was a private one, a language of family and friends, whilst the language used at school would have embraced both the public and the private, the private becoming infected by the public. My reading, which I expand upon below (and in the following chapter), is that the shift in the meaning of *nacija* amongst younger people reflects the way in which the official language of the school was informed by political changes which were seeping into the official discourses of state documents such as the census. School represented an active conduit for these official discourses.

Narod and the census.

The census that took place in 1981 would have been the census that informed Bringa's young adults. Dubravka Zarkov(1995) describes the (hierarchically organised) format and language of this document:

- First on the list are six nations (*'narodi'*): Crnogorci [Montenegro], Hrvati [Croatia], Makedonci [Macedonia], Muslimani [Muslim] Slovenci [Slovenian], Srbi [Serbian];
- Then there are the fourteen minorities (*'narodnosti'*): Albanci, Bugari, Cesi, Italijana, Madjari, Nemci, Romi, Rumuni, Rusi, Rusini, Slovaci, Turci, Ukrajinici, Vlasi
- The next option is 'the others' (*ostali*)
- ....

(footnote 2, p.117, my quotation of this list is incomplete)

In 1981, then, the census provided a categorisation process that mixed religious identity and spatial identity, transforming the concept of *nacija* as used in Bringa's village into *narod*/nation. To identify as belonging to a *narod,* for example the Serbian *narod*/nation, did not necessarily mean that you had to live in Serbia, or that your parents, or grand-parents originated from Serbia. It meant that culturally you were a Serb, that is, you were culturally Orthodox, and perceived yourself to be part of the Serbian Orthodox community. You could be culturally Orthodox, without being a practising Christian. However the spatial element to being Muslim

was obscured by the naming on the census: someone who was culturally Muslim, was part of the Muslim 'nation', but this was without a spatial location.

The significance of the census, here, is that it straddled both the public and the private realms, being both an official/public and a personal/private document, which operated at two levels. The actual filling in of the census form was a private process: the questions on a census-form required the form-filler to provide private/personal information, key to their personal identity. Yet these questions were set and prescribed by the government, and the private answers, although published as anonymous data, then became part of the public domain, so that the intensely private process of form-filling, and self-analysis, thus became a public act. There was then a certain tension in this relationship, and it is hard to see which informed the other: the public or the private? M., a respondent who is a Croatian social statistician, stated that the publication of the results of the census were awaited by the general public with great enthusiasm and was the subject of much speculation, and discussion.[12] My contention is that the census became a kind of national prism, through which national identity, and memories of past subjectivities would be viewed, whilst it helped to shape the future language and discourse on 'national identity' for the next ten years.

This language of the census penetrated the official and unofficial discourses of the school. The school's engagement with the discourse of the census can perhaps be attributed to its bureaucratic nature: Bringa describes the school as a rigid and bureaucratised system informed by official Communism (p.77). One of my respondents, a Croatian woman working for the Croatian Ministry of Education, endorsed Bringa's observations of the school system when she described current problems that she was having with teachers in the schools she liased with:

> *"They are used to the Communist life-style, when there was no freedom of speech. The teachers are narrow-minded and afraid. They have no initiative. It isn't easy to change their way of thinking and teaching."* (Interview, Zagreb, October 1998).

The children's engagement with the discourse of the census reflects the nature of the school institution. School represented a key intersection of the public/private, where official discourses and attitudes were handed down, yet where children met

and exchanged information on the differences between each other. School therefore represented a place where group/'ethnic' boundaries were both blurred, and sharply focused, where the boundaries were both crossed and carefully maintained. Identifying the route of these various inter-communications is difficult, because public and private were constantly informing each other.

What is interesting about Bringa's observation on the shift in ways of identifying amongst young adults, is that they appear to have embraced the conceptual change in identity, that is that Catholics are Croats, without overtly changing their terminology. Thus they did not incorporate the official term *narod* into their discourse, rather the term *nacija* came to take on a different meaning, becoming infected by the meaning of *narod.* This phenomenon resonates with Vološinov's model of language and ideology, flagged-up at the beginning of this chapter, which focuses on the multi-accentual way in which language works to argue that signs are material vehicles of ideology. As such, each sign can become the site of active ideological contestation of meaning. This model seems particularly appropriate in this context, and echoes the contested changes in identity and language that were taking place across the whole of pluralist Bosnia-Hercegovina at this time. These were changes that were informed by the census, but which also reflected gradual changes in political and economic circumstances (see next chapter). In many ways they also mirrored the changes that had taken place in late nineteenth century Bosnia-Hercegovina, suggesting that the changing nature of identity was not merely a contemporary phenomenon. But was this a phenomenon particular to the pluralist nature of Bosnia-Hercegovina? Or were there parallels or similarities with this model in the geographic entities of Serbia and Croatia?

Serbian concepts of ethnicity/national identity

Although the population of medieval Serbia was comprised of Muslims, Jews and Catholic Christians, the predominant religion was Orthodox Christian. Karpat states that:

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[12]Interview at Institute of Migration and Ethnicity, Zagreb, Croatia, February 1999.

> The first major *millet* the Orthodox, was established in 1454 and for the first time since the heyday of the Byzantine Empire, the Orthodox Christians were brought together under a single religious authority (p.145).

Although the Orthodox *millet* or religious/administrative community thus became homogenous and dominant within Serbia, in a way that it did not in the pluralist Bosnia-Hercegovina, there is, historically, no sense that this organising of religion inscribed a sense of religious ethnicity onto the people living in medieval Serbia. Rather, at this point in time, ethnic group-identity, particularly in rural areas, was informed through kinship. So that whilst it is tempting to inscribe the Orthodox *millet* with a sense of larger 'imagined community', that is a sense of religious, ethnic nationhood from its beginning, this reading is actually informed by recent Serbian historical discourses on Serbian origin, ethnicity and religion, which claim a sense of continuous nationhood throughout Serbia's history. These discourses look to Serbia's pre-Ottoman past, when it was an empire with a large swathe of territory encompassing Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, and Albania. The legendary *Battle of the Field of Blackbirds,* in Kosovo, on 15 June 1389, is often portrayed as a pivotal point in the fortunes of the Empire, where it finally seceded power to the Ottomans. Drawing on folk and oral tradition, which claim that oral histories and epic poems of the Serbian loss have been handed down over the centuries, they inscribe a false/imagined sense of continuity onto Serbian ethnic and national identity. In contrast, the 'reality' of the pre-Ottoman nation/Empire was that it was a concept/identity that had been fought for and imposed by large powerful families within the geographic area of Serbia. It was not necessarily an identity that was embraced, understood or prevalent amongst the majority of peasant families that worked the land[13].

My contention then, is that Serbian ethnic and national identity was not an over-arching, continuous identity. Instead, as in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Serbian sense of community and 'nation' was re/awakened in the nineteenth century. Bringa (*op cit*) draws on Braude and Lewis (1982, p.12), to argue:

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[13]Peasant families were not however tied to the land through a feudal relationship, rather, families owned and worked the land through a communal/co-operative system. What has been omitted from historical analyses is the possible relationship between autonomy, land-ownership, and the growth of national identity in medieval Serbia.

> [*M*]*illet* was a term which originally meant a religious community and in the nineteenth century came to mean a nation ... (p.20)

However, I would argue that at this point, the transition from *millet* to nation in Serbia was more defined than that of Bosnia-Hercegovina because of the homogenous nature of the majority religious community. The development of a sense of nation at this particular point in time, can be traced in part to political and economic changes taking place at this time, but it is also linked to Anderson's (1991) assertion that national identities and nationalisms were spawned through the introduction of the printed word, the homogenisation of language, the development of a 'monoglot reading public'(p.43) and a sense of community through the development of newspapers, books and periodicals.

Serbia represents a model case study for Anderson's thesis: in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries a growth in anti-Ottoman feeling, violent nationalism, and a movement for linguistic homogeneity were all occurring at a time when print was coming into its own in this region. Although Serbia's nineteenth century national hero, Kara George, holds a place in national myth for his organised uprising against the Ottoman Empire (which was quashed and followed by reprisal massacres and repression within Serbia by the Ottoman military), his associate, Vuk Karadžić, perhaps had a more transformative effect on Serbian national identity. Spyros A. Sofos (1996) examines how Karadžić lead a move to define nation through language (as opposed to religion[14]), describing how Karadžić argued that there were three main Slav dialects; the dialect you spoke defined your nationality. Thus Catholics and Muslims were Serb if they spoke the Serb (Stokavian) dialect. This had a major impact on both the desire for a territorial Greater Serbia and the creation of a nationalist Slav consciousness. Sofos argues that the development of this Slav consciousness, or as he terms it, 'Yugoslavism', counter-balanced aggressive Serb nationalism. Yugoslavism sought to unify all South Slavs against their oppressive Emperors: Ottoman, Hapsburg, Italian. Although Sofos' argument is persuasive, I counter that there was a sliding ideological scale between Yugoslavism/unification, Serb control of

[14]Karadžić's theory of language and nation challenged a move by the Greek Orthodox Church to hellenise the Serbian Orthodox Church. The latter phenomenon, whereby the Greek Orthodox Church sought to impose its primacy, and its language, on the Serbian church represents another form of nationalism arising out of the growth of print.

unification (contested by Croatia), and the Serbian desire for a Greater Serbia; Yugoslavism/unification still embodied Serbian nationalist desires.

Within Anderson's model, then, a nationalist identification as Serbian took place in the early nineteenth century. Coinciding with the development of the printed word, it developed and imposed an ethnic and national identity onto the Orthodox community in Serbia that was framed not solely around religion, but also through language and territory. But to what extent can the Serbian nationalism of the nineteenth century be linked to the nationalisms of the late twentieth century? Hroch (1996) argues that:

> The conventional view that current turmoil is the result of irrational forces that were long suppressed – 'deep frozen' as it were under communism, and are now in full revival after a lapse of fifty years is evidently superficial. Such a conception is extravagant – closer to the world of fairy tales than of historical processes. It is much more plausible to see the forces reshaping Central and Eastern Europe during the last decade as 'new national movements', whose goals offer many analogies with those of the nineteenth century, as well as some significant differences (p.89).

I argue that Hroch downplays the continuity of Serbian nationalism, and writes it off as primordialism. Historically, the Orthodox populations of Serbia have contested their sense of national community, and their Serbian-ness in a way that the populations of Bosnia-Hercegovina have not. What is less certain, however, is the continuity of the nationalist aspiration for a Greater Serbia. My contention is that this aspect of Serbian nationalism has experienced disjuncture. In particular the recent Serbian engagement with the 'history' and ethos of Greater Serbia represents an engagement with historical 'myth', which has appeared in a disjointed fashion, occasionally, as opposed to continuously, over the last two hundred years of Serbian history. Despite this disjuncture, and the fact that historically, since the nineteenth century, expressions of Serbian nationalism have waxed and waned according to the political climate, I would argue that members of the Serbian Orthodox community have perceived themselves to be a Serbian nation. Whilst some of the Serb Orthodox community have privileged their religious identity over their national identity, others have privileged their national identity over their religious identity. Yet regardless of which identity has been

privileged, by the late twentieth century the label Serb/Orthodox was (and still is) interchangeable: you cannot be a Serb without being culturally (as in not necessarily practising) Orthodox, and you cannot be culturally Orthodox without being Serb.[15]

Croatian concepts of ethnicity/national identity

The Croatian experience of group identity is somewhat different, because its roots do not lie in the *millet* system, but in a feudally based Catholicism. At the time of the expansion of the Ottoman Empire Croatia was in a political union with Hungary. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Croatia and Hungary were in continuous and brutal conflict with the Ottoman Empire. Whilst Croatia lost large tracts of land to the Ottomans, it never actually experienced direct Ottoman rule. In the early sixteenth century, when Hungary plunged into civil war, Croatia sought union with the Hapsburgs (Austrians) against the Ottoman Empire, and established a 'military frontier', *Vojna Krajina*, of garrisoned castles (Marcus Tanner, 1997, p.37) along the boundary between Croatia and the Ottoman Empire. Over time this frontier took on the nature of a separate territory, a buffer state between Croatia and the Ottomans. Tanner describes how, in the late sixteenth century, the Hapsburgs sent the Morlachs/Vlachs, Orthodox Christian soldiers (possibly from Serbia), to man these fortresses. By the nineteenth century, this Orthodox community began to identify as Serbian.[16]

The feudal Catholic tradition dictated that landowners 'earned' their income from the toil of peasants on their farms, and the bourgeois community played a part in the 'civil service'. Ethnicity amongst landowners and peasants was kin-based, and the dominant religion was Catholicism, a religious tradition handed down through the family. As the Ottoman Empire began to be perceived of as less of a threat in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the landed-gentry and bourgeois

[15]Note that minorities in Serbia can and do identify as Serbian. However their identity is linguistically moderated by the inclusion of their minority identity within their identification, for example, Hungarian Serb. Whilst that person may identify primarily as Serb and may privilege this aspect of their ethnic identity, the Serb majority may not view them in the same way, so that a process of othering takes place.

[16]Note that Serbs and Croats have contested the ethnogenesis of this community of soldiers.

communities of Croatia became quite comfortably off and their commodious way of living represented a disincentive for nationalism.

The Croatian feudal system stood in contrast to the Serbian economic system, based on the *zadruga*, a kin-based system of co-operative farming of family-owned land. Without the impediment of a powerful bourgeoisie, Serbia thus came to nationalism earlier than Croatia. Croatia's nationalism, in contrast, came to be framed through the country's political and economic relationship with Serbia, a fear of Serbian desires for a Greater Serbia, and through rivalries with Serbia over land and power. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as both Croatia and Serbia addressed their nationalist aspirations within, they looked out to their 'imagined religious communities' in Bosnia-Hercegovina, with a view to territorial expansion. For Croatia this sense of a linked identity with Catholic communities in Bosnia-Hercegovina, represented a burgeoning sense of national/ethnic identity framed through religion, so that Croatians looking out to Bosnia-Hercegovina began to see Catholicism as being synonymous with being Croatian. Thus Croatia began to perceive ethnicity and nation in similar ways to Bosnia-Hercegovina and Serbia.

By the late twentieth century, Croatians had a clearly defined sense of ethnicity and nation, which differed only slightly from perceptions of nation and ethnicity held in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Serbia. The Croatian social statistician, M. defined the Croatian terms *narod* and *nacija* with differing nuances to those employed by Bringa (*op cit*):

> *"Narod is an ethnic term ... it means populace, community, culture, still without sovereignty. Nacija is a political term, if you add political structure nacija is sovereignty and state."* (Interview, Zagreb, February 1999)

Despite their different nuances, M., Bringa and the census concur with one another in the sense that both Bringa and the census define *narod* as meaning nation. Bringa demonstrates that, historically in Bosnia-Hercegovina, although the roots of *nacija* sprung from the *millet* system, which equated religion with administration/government/power, this gradually changed, so that religion came to be equated first, with ethnic-group, and then with nation. Throughout this process of change, *nacija* still held the meaning of a politically structured group. Thus

when M. said that *narod* is without sovereignty, whereas *nacija* represents sovereignty and state, she in effect concurred with Bringa. Both terms describe a national community, but the term that embodies power is *nacija*. However, it is worth running though the finer implications of M.'s explanation, because it provides insights that Bringa's explanation does not foreground.

M.'s explanation implied that *narod* represents a community of people, linked through culture and/or kinship, that is, an ethnic/folk group. In Croatian terms it references a variety of different groups that have different folk traditions. The way in which these groups differentiate themselves is usually spatial, for example, folk-groups from Lika, or Krajina. *Narod* can also mean a larger folk-group, such as a Croat group, as described on the census. But, in M.'s terms these are groups without political power, and the religious relationship between folk, kin, ethnic-group is present but obscured. *Nacija,* on the other hand, refers to a wider community linked through a cultural similarity informed by religion. This community, in essence very similar to that of *narod,* is perceived to embody political structure.

The extended nature of narod in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Serbia and Croatia

During my interview with M., her testimony demonstrated that her definition of *narod,* as folk group, informed not only her understanding of Croatia, but her statistician's understanding of the entities of Yugoslavia and Former Yugoslavia. She added to this definition, showing it to conceptualise not just national identity but to convey meaning to the concept of smaller ethnic groups:

> *"In isolated communities it is old-fashioned to have a total network of neighbourhoods [narodi]. The network still forms the local ethnic community. This [narod] can mean bigger/larger community, almost ethnically defined. It is a lingo – a way of dressing ----."* (*ibid*).

M.'s implication here was that the term *narod* has many meanings, folk-group/ethnic group/culture, stretching to embrace spatial identity and relationships.

Her use of the term "old-fashioned" which suggests tradition, inferred that the ethnic community as a traditional structure survives, for the present, intact.

M. also described how the interweaving of space, kinship and culture within isolated communities represents a significant difference between the rural and the urban community. The rural community represents a place where ethnic boundaries are more rigid, more contained; a rigidity that is enforced through space, in terms of networks with other similar communities, and in terms of isolation. This view of isolation was endorsed and illustrated in an anecdote recounted by a women's group that I visited in Karlovac, Croatia. The group told me about a winter-project that they ran, whereby they used four-wheel drive vehicles to deliver firewood to vulnerable elderly people in snow-bound isolated rural communities in the Sinj area. One woman described how when they visited in the winter of 1997, the elderly people they visited were terrified and hid from them: they thought the war was still taking place. This level of isolation, whereby a small community thought the war was still occurring, two years after the signing of an end to the conflicts through the Dayton Agreement, is indicative of the way ideas, and ways of doing things become entrenched.

The fact that *narod* can mean small folk-group, or larger national group, implies a conceptual movement from small to large, where small distinct communities make up a larger whole (from *narodi* to *narod*). It provides a categorisation system within the concept, whereby certain small spatially organised folk-groups make up a larger community, which defines itself as Catholic, or Orthodox, or Croat or Serb. The larger category has a spatial component, for example, the group may come from the geographic area of Croatia. However, it may just as easily come from another area, in Serbia, in Bosnia-Hercegovina, or the US. Diaspora is accounted for in this categorisation, and this illustrates that although space can define *narod*, it is not definitive. There is an implication, then, that what is more definitive, in accounting for a small community's sense of belonging to a wider community, are its traditions, its culture and religion. This sense of community identity was perceived to be at its strongest in homogenous, isolated, rural communities, presumably because of their lack of contact with others, and their lack of experience of cultural difference.

Bringa's work in her Bosnia-Hercegovinan village illustrated that a sense of community, of *narod,* was also highly defined within a plural village, containing Croats and Muslims, where the members of each community were not spatially linked together, and Croats and Muslims were often neighbours. The boundaries of these two communities were not defined through space, but measured through a knowledge of their difference, which was mediated by an intimate relationship of reciprocal neighbouring with members of the other community, through the first-neighbour system:

> [W]hen you needed help in everyday life, or if you got ill, it was your first neighbours who would be the easiest to reach, while your kin may live in a different village, or hamlet. (Bringa, p.92).

The first-neighbour relationship was very important within the rural community, and asserted itself through and within the private realm. It was a practical relationship that might, or might not involve true friendship, but certainly involved dependency, and exchange. Whilst the obligation, that was woven into the neighbouring system, worked to tie together neighbours of different ethnicities, its dependence on reciprocity meant that the economic aspect of the relationship might intrude in a negative way into the private. This made neighbours vulnerable to envy and criticism, a condition that was exacerbated when the social order was disturbed.

The virulence and violence of the mass-expulsions, when they occurred in Bosnia-Hercegovina and in Croatia, supports this reading. Although the violence accompanying expulsion was presented as the 'cleansing' of 'national' groups by both the 'cleansers' and by western reportage, the localised nature of 'ethnic-cleansing' needs to be noted. People were 'cleansed' spatially/regionally: farmstead by farmstead; street by street; neighbourhood by neighbourhood. In plural communities the people doing the 'cleansing' (often outsider paramilitary groups, defining themselves by nationality) were often helped by neighbours of the victims, who defined their victims not only by religion/'nationality', but through their more intimate knowledge of their kinship groups. B.B., a respondent working for a Croatian human rights group, observed that:

> *"When I recall Pakrac, and you know when I hear what's going on in Kosovo, you have the same sentence, it's a kind of mutual sentence: "Oh my God, our neighbours are killing us". Sometimes it's not literally that your first neighbour is coming and kill you, but that the idea of neighbourhood is ... that your 'neighbour' would be the brother of your neighbour, you know, so you probably know him, even if he is living in the other part of town, or the other village."* (Interview, Zagreb, August 1998).

This suggests that in the middle of appalling violences, national/religious identity was perhaps less meaningful to the perpetrators and victims than the neighbouring relationship, and neighbours' intimate knowledge of each others' kinship groups. It also illustrates how, although all these relationships and identities were very defined, so that one could identify a person as a neighbour, cousin, Catholic, Croat, they were so intertwined, so integral to a person's individual sense of identity, that it was difficult to unpack them into separate conceptual units.

In contrast, although people in urban environments still tended to group together in communities defined through culture, religion, nation, and sometimes through kinship, there seems to have been less overt, public and private monitoring and control of ethnic identity in these spaces. These relationships were less meaningful in an urban space, where there was a metropolitan blurring of cultural and ethnic boundaries in public spaces such as work and school.

In summary, national/religious/ethnic identity was not always foregrounded in Yugoslavia/Former Yugoslavia; these could be displaced by other identities. An example of this, is the way in which Diaspora groups have perceived themselves. Throughout the history of Yugoslavia migrations of different ethnic-groups from different areas of Yugoslavia have come and gone. Some of these groups assimilated the cultures of the area they settled in, some became acculturated, whilst others kept their ethnic and cultural identity. Those that held onto their ethnic identity, within the terms defined in the previous section, did not necessarily identify through nation. For example, during the First World War there were cases of Serbs fighting for the Austro-Hungarians against the territorial entity of Serbia. Their spatial identification was bound up with the part of the Austro-Hungarian

Empire that they lived in, rather from where they may have originated from. Thus, key to their identity, appears to have been the land that they lived on.

A contemporary example of the way in which ethnic identity intersects with geographic identity is the people who identified as Orthodox/Serb who were 'cleansed' from their homes in the Croatian Krajina in 1995. These people were forcibly removed from a space which had represented home to them for many years (for some, centuries). Although culturally/ethnically these people were Orthodox Serb, their identities were also informed by the space they inhabited: the Krajina, and Croatia. Hence they were Croatian Krajina Serbs. In the history of the conflict some of these people chose to privilege their Serb identities, others had this identity thrust upon them. When WATFY visited groups of Krajina refugees, now living in refugee camps in Serbia, the principal stated desire of these groups, was *"to go home"*. For these people, their dominant identity appeared to be one that was defined through a spatial sense of belonging. Yet ironically, home in this context could not have been a wholly spatial identity. These men and women were speaking as refugees, who had undergone a traumatic expulsion from their homes, and some had seen these homes destroyed. It could be argued that they were touched by an irrational/inexplicable 'primordial' desire to go home, because home no longer existed:

> People disoriented by change seek refuge in those aspects of their shared lives that most fundamentally define for them who they are. (Bentley, *op cit*, p.26)

In this context their identity, their sense of who they were, was informed not only through their identification with 'home' but through their sense of loss, and of irretrievable identity which when reconstructed was a nostalgia for the past, rooted in place (Doreen Massey, 1994, p.171). This is the condition of many refugees, displaced and/or traumatised peoples in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, and it is a condition that serves to accentuate their sense of ethnic difference, and the boundaries between ethnic/national groups, which are still shifting and changing. For example, one respondent informed me that her previously easy-going parents would no longer countenance her marrying out of her religion, another respondent told me that a client's Muslim daughter had embraced fundamentalism, stating that "*she even prays differently now*" (Interview, Zenica, Bosnia-Hercegovina, January 1999).

Conclusion

This chapter has provided an analysis of the historical background to ethnicity and national identity in Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Serbia, and identified that religion has had a formative effect on ethnic and national identity in these areas over the last six hundred years. It has argued that religious, ethnic and national identities have transmuted and changed according to the economic and political conditions that have prevailed. Since the nineteenth century the boundaries between an individual's religious and national identities have merged to become an ethnic identity, whilst the boundaries between ethnic groups have become sharper, more rigid, and more defined.

What this chapter has not examined is the effect that political and economic conditions have had on ethnicity and national identity in Yugoslavia in the twentieth century, nor has it examined the connection between ethnic identity, national identity and the recent conflicts. These issues are explored in the following chapter, in an analysis of the relationship between national identity and nationalism.

Chapter 3
Eliding identities: perceptions of nationalism and nation in Yugoslavia/Former Yugoslavia.

A friend of mine was born without ever knowing his father. His mother used to say that he had vanished in the whirlwind of war. What survived the whirlwind of war was a little faded photograph of his father.

Later his mother died too; later he founded a family. One day quite by chance he discovered that his father had been executed after the war, he had been one of those 'on the wrong side'. He took another look at his father's little photographs, and for the first time noticed that the picture was not only old but had been carefully touched up (in all probability by his mother's hand). A little line here, a little smudge there and his father's hated uniform blurred into an indistinct suit (p.26)

... when she was racked by the icy fever of fear - my mother despite everything kept tenaciously to her dogged ritual visits to my father's grave. I believe it was then that she looked for the first-time at the moist gravestone and suddenly noticed the five-pointed star (although it had always been there at her own request) and perhaps for the first time she had the thought, feeble and exhausted as she was, that she might be able to paint out the five-pointed star carved into stone ... (p.25).

Dubravka Ugrešić, 1999, The Museum of Unconditional Surrender

Synopsis

In the previous chapter the analysis of the historical contexts of the *millet, narod, nacija* in Yugoslavia/Former Yugoslavia identified the shifting way in which religion has informed group identities over the centuries, and the way in which,

since the nineteenth century, religious groupings have gradually perceived themselves to be part of a larger, ethnic and national whole, whose boundaries are defined by religious identity. This following chapter examines the role of national identity in the history of twentieth-century Yugoslavia. Looking briefly at the successive wars that Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Serbia have been involved in, it questions the role of previous aggressions in current aggressions. It then considers the phenomenon of Yugoslavism, and examines the ways in which communism, federalism, market-driven socialism and nationalism were imposed by Yugoslavism onto national identities within the public realm. It concludes with a brief examination of the effect of this policy on the private realm of the family.

Twentieth-century Yugoslavia: war, nationalism and national identity

The geographic entities Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Serbia (and, indeed, Montenegro, Vojvodina, Kosovo, Macedonia), have existed in some form or another, shrinking and growing, for many centuries. During this time they have been conquered, and administered by a variety of different Empires, all of which have left their cultural mark. The previous chapter has shown that the gradual growth of modern nationalisms and the subsequent shaking off of Empire by these entities did not occur until the nineteenth century. Robin Okey (2000) argues that these new nationalisms had a pivotal effect on the recent history of the area, and the creation of national enmities between Croatia and Serbia:

> The ideological seeds of later catastrophe [i.e. the recent conflicts] were sown in this period as modern Serb and Croat national enmities struggled to consolidate themselves in the face of heavy Austro-Hungarian pressure, and their own rivalries over Bosnia and incipient Yugoslavism (p.278).[1]

Okey traces the growth of these enmities, arguing that they culminated in the Second World War, which in turn has played a significant part in the revival of ethnic hatred and nationalisms during the 1980s/1990s. Although I believe that Okey is right to privilege the role of the Second World War, what I feel is missing from his discussion is an examination of the role that other twentieth century wars

have played in the most recent conflicts; for example, the Balkan War of 1912 in which Bulgaria and Serbia joined against 'the Turks' and 'Greeks', and the First World War of 1914, where many Croats and Serbs fought on opposing sides[2]. I question the exclusion of these wars from this debate because I feel that there is an argument for cultural reproduction that has not been fully explored. Here I do not mean cultural reproduction in the rather crude/obvious sense that because Croatia and Serbia fought one war in 1914 then they had to fight another in 1941, and then another in 1991. What I am referring to is a more subtle type of cultural reproduction: the reproduction of trauma encountered in these earlier wars.

Vickers (*op cit*) describes the trauma encountered during the 1912 war, when she quotes Leon Trotsky's interview with a Serbian army officer who fought in Kosovo and Macedonia during this war:

> The horrors actually began as we crossed into Kosovo. Entire Albanian villages had been turned into pillars of fire, dwellings, possessions accumulated by fathers and grandfathers were going up in flames, the picture was repeated all the way to Skopje ... For two days before my arrival in Skopje the inhabitants had woken up to the sight of heaps of Albanian corpses with severed heads... (p.77).

The officer's (very gendered/patriarchal) account describes how plundering and looting of Albanian homes was not carried out solely by Serbian soldiers, but also instigated by Serbian peasants following in the wake of the soldiers. In contrast, the violences in the First World War seem to have been inflicted on the Serbian populace by the Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian armies. R.A. Reiss[3] provides distressing evidence of mutilations, rapes, tortures and killings in Serbia by these armies. He documents how, in an interview with a Hungarian army officer who was a prisoner of war, this officer claimed that tales of Serbian atrocities had been spread by his commanding officers. He was subsequently surprised by his 'decent' treatment as a prisoner of war. Flora Sandes (1926), in her 'adventure-tale' of being a woman soldier with the Serbian army hints at the decimation of entire

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[1]This quote was taken from a final draft of the book, and thus may differ slightly from the published version.

[2]Histories of the Balkans are very unclear about Croatia's role in the First World War. This is partly due to the fact that Croatia was divided up between Italy and Austro-Hungary. Thus parts of Croatia would have fought on different sides. Croatia was also seen, and the time, to have a victim-status, whereby she needed liberating by fellow South Slavs.

[3]No date, but its style and content suggests it was published not long after the end of the First World War.

villages by the Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian troops, and the upheaval of many communities displaced by the fighting. Yet, there is no evidence of how the populations of Kosovo, Serbia, and parts of Croatia, coped with their experiences, either as witnesses, perpetrators, or survivors in either of these wars.

P., a psychologist working with traumatised women for *Medica,* commented that she would rate the occurrence of post-traumatic-stress-disorder (PTSD) within the current general Bosnia-Hercegovinan population after the recent conflicts, as being two to three percent. She identified those most likely to experience PTSD as those who have been injured, who have witnessed death, or have been tortured. Those who are more than likely to experience PTSD are children who have experienced these things (90%); and people who have been held in concentration camps (50-60%) (Interview, Zenica, Bosnia-Hercegovina, January 1999). Extrapolating *Medica's* findings onto the post-war populations of Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Kosovo and Serbia in the early twentieth century suggests that although trauma within the whole population may not have been that great, trauma amongst those who had witnessed or experienced violence would have been significant, particularly amongst children. Yet, within the historical record, there seems to be no indication of how, when and where this trauma may have manifested itself. Given the early twentieth century's lack of interest/expertise in these issues, trauma may have manifested itself as undefined physical/mental afflictions, or may have been repressed[4].

The repression of trauma to enable the subject to survive/get on with 'normal' life would have meant the suppression of memory and perhaps the attempted removal of trauma from the Lacanian Symbolic/Imaginary into the Real[5]. Silence, whether voluntary or involuntary, is not necessarily an effective tactic for hiding trauma

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[4]The psychology of trauma was a nascent subject for study at this point in time, see Paul Lerner, 2000.

[5]The Symbolic represents the world of language and signs. The Imaginary is linked to the Symbolic and houses memory/identity. The process of remembering, of constructing memory, changes the Imaginary, and the identities housed within it. The Real on the other hand is not linked to language, rather:

> 'The real is the impossible' (S11, 167) because it is impossible to imagine, impossible to integrate into the symbolic order, and impossible to attain in any way (Dylan Evans, 1996, p.160).

Thus the Real can be the site of the trauma which is unrepresentable. See Glossary.

from members of family, for example children and grandchildren. Dan Bar-On (1998) and Gabriella Rosenthal (1998) have demonstrated in their work with Holocaust survivors, that silences can take up enormous spaces in family life, and assume a symbolic presence despite the linguistic suppressions of the survivor. Anna Vidali (1996), in her work on the civil war in Greece, suggests that the children of families who repress trauma through silences are likely to interrogate those spaces by attempting to recreate those events. Returning to the argument of cultural reproduction my implication here is not that because Serb perpetrators of violence killed Albanians, that their sons or grand-sons would also have to commit these crimes, but rather that these violences were written into society. Violence, the memory of violence, and the suppressed memory of violence, informed later generations of crimes that could be committed by them, or against them. The memory of violence thus represents, in a sense, a psychic void, which future generations would be drawn to.

The Second World War

In privileging the trauma of the Second World War, Okey points out that this war seems to have represented a unique and collective trauma for all the South Slav States involved. This trauma revolved around the roles played by these various states before and after the Nazi invasion of Yugoslavia (that is, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Serbia) in 1941. But it focuses, in particular, on the betrayal of Yugoslavia by Croatia, and Croatia's active (*Ustaša*) collaboration/sympathy with the Nazi regime in return for which it was granted 'independence' and given control of the territory of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Okey documents how Croatia's notorious Jasenovać Concentration and Extermination Camp has assumed a myth like status in this collective trauma, coming to embody the role played by Croatia in the mass killing of thousands of Yugoslavians. However, many ordinary Croats were also involved in the localised massacring of Orthodox Serbs, Jews, Roma, Albanians, homosexuals and dissidents from Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia-Hercegovina.[6] Muslims though, who

[6]This echoes Nazi killing methodologies throughout Central and Eastern Europe, see, for example, Christopher Browning (1992).

had been persecuted by Serbian *Četniks*[7], were given a protected status, and some, who joined forces with the *Ustaša* played an unsolicited role in the killings (Okey, p. 265, Zachary Irwin (1984) p.439). During the Kosovo conflicts in 1999 *The Guardian*[8] ran several stories which drew on interviews with Serbs which recalled some of these earlier events. They highlighting the methodologies of many of these killings, which have clear parallels to the more recent 'ethnic-cleansings' in Bosnia-Hercegovina. These memories recalled local killings involving friends and neighbours, where men were killed, but not women.[9]

However a Manichean portrayal of this killing is misleading. Okey argues that by the end of the war the scale and growth in complexity of the killings was horrifying:

> [P]artisan reprisals reached a climax at the end of the war, when tens of thousands of *ustashi* and chetniks as well as Slovenes and non-Communists were handed over to them by the British at Bleiburg, mainly to be killed. In short the war saw a bewildering pattern of mutual massacre: between *ustashi* and chetniks, chetniks and partisans, Serbs and Muslims, partisans and *ustashi*, not to speak of the genocide of Serbian and Croatian Jews, Serb victims at the Magyar hands and the Serb-Albanian imbroglio (p.265).

It is tempting to ask if the confusion of violences of the Balkan War, the First World War, and the Second World War, and the current conflicts represent a pattern of violences, each informing the other? The nature of memory, and the way in which memory is constantly reconstructed, make this a difficult question to answer except in an abstract theoretical sense[10]. Katharina Hall (1998) draws on Hayden White's work (1987) to theorise on the nature of memory:

> [N]otions such as Nachträglichkeit are not limited to the individual. Freud's assertion that 'people's childhood memories are only consolidated at a later period .... and that this involves a complicated process of remodelling, analogous in every way to the process by which a nation constructs legends about early history',

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[7]Serbian soldiers/paramilitaries who were royalists and nationalists. See Glossary.
[8]March-April 1999.
[9]See also Zdenko Lesić's (1995) edited volume of young people's writing, where some young Serbian people have referenced the violences of the Second World War.
[10]Unanswerable in this particular context because this represents a research project in itself. Within the context of Former Yugoslavian history, this represents both a theoretical and a historical gap. There is certainly room for a combined oral history/theoretical project with

> is implicitly taken up by Lacan when he says 'When all is said and done it is less a matter of remembering than of rewriting history' (p.33).[11]

Hall points to the strength of the role of myth in the construction of narratives of memory, within public and private histories. Examining the current narratives of South Slav national groups, there is little room for an understanding of complexity, and rather more room for a Manichean version of national history.

Rebecca West ([1942] 1982) in her travels, was one author amongst several who engaged with this type of narrative construction, identifying Serbs as 'aggressive' and noting their tendency to identify as 'victims'. In the recent media reportage of the war in Kosovo, this same aspect of Serb identity has again been foregrounded, albeit, this time in a disparaging fashion. However, the linking of the identity of victim with a national mourning for Kosovo, and a validation of the quest for Greater Serbia, now casts doubt on the validity of Serb-claims to victimhood. Yet, given the more recent history of Serbia and the violences that Serbians have perpetrated, witnessed and experienced, perhaps it is unsurprising that their private and public histories should dwell on this past, constructing a narrative that elides their violences, and highlights their sufferings. In the case of the Serbs:

> The use of the narrative paradigm is shown to impose a coherence upon past events which obscures the contradictions and largely disjointed character of historical processes. (Hall, *op cit*).

However, one should note that this narrative paradigm was also used to effect by the Nazis between 1933-1945.

The new Yugoslavia

Eliding division

The defeat of the Axis powers and the ending of the Second World War saw the creation of a new Federation of Yugoslavia: a one-party centralised communist

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survivors and perpetrators, and second and third generations of survivors and perpetrators, to ascertain the role of silence, memory, myth and family in the reproduction of violence.

State with its nexus of power in Belgrade, and the former partisan, Tito, at its head. This new Yugoslavia incorporated Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia as republics, and Vojvodina and Kosovo as provinces, into its federation, and in so doing merged a variety of different national and ethnic groups with differing political aspirations. These groups also came with their own recent memories of internecine violence, and victory, betrayal or defeat. The job of its authoritarian president, Tito, was not only to physically reconstruct Yugoslavia, but to get these previously warring groups to live together without animosity. Nationalism was declared to be a Federal Crime and the (gendered) concept of 'Brotherhood and Unity' was imposed through the public, totalitarian silencing of the debate around nationalism and national identity[12]. Rigid forums and spaces for 'national things' emerged, whereby public discourse of nation was channelled into non-threatening arenas.

Ugrešić (1994) in 'Balkan Blues' describes Tito's encouragement of folk-dance, music, costume, which was presented to the people of Yugoslavia as a non-threatening celebration of Yugoslavian diversity.

> If anything in former Yugoslavia can really be described as copiously stressed (rather than repressed), then it was folklore. For some fifty years, the Yugoslav peoples had pranced and capered, twirled and tripped in their brightly coloured national costumes ... (p.8).

Her implication is that folk-activity represented a channelling and funnelling of national feeling into folk-feeling, thus prescribing and containing feelings of ethnocentricity and nationalism within the Yugoslavian community. Within this stricture came the message that identifying oneself through region, or through nation, was only possible through this conduit, and that the other, nationalist, ways of identifying were over.

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[11]Hall is drawing on Freud's 'Rat Man' case-history (1990) 'Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis' in The Penguin Freud Library, IX, Case Histories II. Richards A. (ed.) p.87; and Lacan's Seminar I. p.14.

[12]Note that at this point Yugoslavia was allied with the USSR, and under strong influence to reject nationalism since Stalinist thought equated nationalism with capitalism (see Irwin, 1984, p.444). Below, I argue that Tito's break with Stalin signalled a covert state alignment with nationalism, and a courting of capitalism.

This channelling of feelings of nationalism into events such as folk music and dance, gave credence to the idea of 'Brotherhood and Unity', where Yugoslavians were one big happy family. Yet, simultaneously, this insistence on 'Brotherhood and Unity' drew attention to what it purported to replace, its absent, darker side of ethnic, national and political rivalry and hate. Dubravka Zarkov (1995) observes that:

> The self-glorification of socialism needed the narrative of a perpetual bloodshed in the past in order, by way of contrast, to glorify its victorious past. It needed the 'pre-socialist history of ethnic hatred' in order to create and sustain the 'socialist history of brotherhood and unity' (p.107).

'Brotherhood and Unity' then, served as a constant reminder of the Četnik's violence towards Communist partisans and Muslims, the complicity of some Muslims in the Ustaša mass-killings, and, in particular, Croatia's 'bad' past: its history as a Nazi puppet state in the Second World War; its active complicity with the ethos of the concentration camp; and its historical role as a 'perpetrator of war-crimes', which stood in opposition to the Serbian status as 'official victim'. The success of the new Yugoslavia depended on keeping alive these memories.

In the same way that the ethos of 'Brotherhood and Unity' acted as a discursive reminder for the people of Yugoslavia of the bad past of many amongst their midst, the many war-memorials, which started to be erected in the late 1950s, acted as physical reminders of this past. Although memorials are perceived to assert a 'collective narrativity' (Henri Lustiger-Thaler, 1995, p.207) and 'disabuse us of the need to remember by lodging an esthetic form within a political culture that will strive to define its own truth (p.211)'.[13]

The 'collective narrativity' of 'Brotherhood and Unity' was at odds with the effect of these memorials. Built to the public memory of partisans, who died in the struggle against fascism, they served to publicly identify a 'right side' and a 'wrong side' in Yugoslavia's war. So that whilst ostensibly celebrating non-nationalism, these memorials served as a visual and corporeal reminder of the deeds done in the name of fascism, and ethnic hatred. They thus took on a dualistic nature:

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[13]Lustiger-Thaler draws on the testimony of German poet and sculptor Jochen Gerz.

metaphorically fanning the flames of nationalism, at the same time as attempting to put them out.

Whilst these memorials took up a public space, were built with public money, and carried what was seen to be a public, political message of cultural and collective memory, in a country recently violently divided by a war that was fought from radically different political standpoints, these memorials were not capable of delivering the same political message to each observer. The people who were looking at these memorials and observing this art form, would have analysed it and carried home its message in a way personal to them. Their analysis would have been informed by their personal cultural background and identity, and would have come to represent 'an act of remembering or forgetting historically constitutive of gender, class or other social difference' (Michael Rowlands, 1996, p.8).

The memorial, therefore, represented a narrative, that straddled the Yugoslav public and the private, taking up both spaces, flowing from one to the other.

Writing 'Brotherhood and Unity' into the census.

The insertion of the 'dominant fiction' (Kaja Silverman, 1992) of 'Brotherhood and Unity' into public discourse, and public memory, and its trickle-down into the realm of the private, was reinforced by Tito's use of the census to impose this message. As I argued earlier in Chapter 2, the census informed public and private ways of expressing identity, and was thus a most effective way of getting a public message through to the private. At the same time, the census also reflected private ways of identifying, and thus it operated as a multi-directional private/ public document. Its particular value to the state lay in the way that it worked as a barometer of public and private feelings towards political and economic changes, alerting the state to the private feelings of the people through their modifications to ethnic and national ways of identifying. A brief examination of the census categories used during Tito's rule illustrates the complexity of this phenomenon and gives an insight into the negotiations taking place around public and private identities in post-war Yugoslavia.

The first Yugoslavian census of 1948 invited the Croats and Serbs to identify themselves as distinct national groups, whereas the Muslims were asked to define themselves only as '"Moslem-Serbs"', '"Moslem-Croats"' or '"Moslems unspecified"' (Irwin, p.442). Irwin argues:

> Thus the Moslems were ineluctably gaining recognition as a national group, albeit a divided one, yet the 1948 census designation had been controversial. In that year Moše Pijade had insisted that the category "Moslem indicates membership in the Moslem religious faith and has no connection with any kind of national question". (p.443)

Although I agree with Irwin's acknowledgement of a burgeoning Muslim national consciousness that was reflected, in part in the census,[14] I dispute his foregrounding of Pijade's reading of religion and nation. As I argue in Chapter 2, religion had, over the previous six hundred years, already come to play a large part in the national question.

What Irwin might have more successfully considered in his analysis is the clear residue of nationalism that was contained in this particular census. The overall message of the census is unclear, but it appears to have been nationalist in all its possible ramifications. It defined Muslims through a nationalist sense of place; it alluded to an ethnogenesis of the Muslims (as discussed in Chapter 2); and it encouraged Muslims to identify solely through religion. To elucidate: in the terms 'Moslem-Croat' and 'Moslem-Serb' the word 'Moslem' acts as a religious adjective, whilst the words Croat and Serb imply nationality through place of residence: if you were a Muslim who lived in Croatia you were a Muslim-Croat. Similarly the term 'Moslem-unspecified' refers to people of Muslim religion living in any part of Yugoslavia other than Serbia or Croatia, this included a large proportion of Muslims who lived in Bosnia-Hercegovina. By not including Bosnia-Hercegovina within this category, the census privileged the Croat and Serb nationalities, and indirectly pressured Muslims to define themselves as Croat or Serb. Such a reading resonated with the theory of an ethnogenesis of the Muslims

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[14]For example, during the immediate post-war period there was a surge in Muslim nationalism. Alija Izetbegović, later president of BiH, was one of many young Muslim nationalists to be imprisoned (others were executed) for nationalist activities (Laura Silber and Alan Little, 1995, p.223).

(examined in Chapter 2), serving to remind the Croats and the Serbs that originally the Muslims could have been of Serb or Croatian origin. It thus encouraged Croatians and Serbs to view Muslim parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina as territorially/nationally theirs. At the same time, the lack of a place category for all other Muslims privileged their Muslim-ness, encouraging them to identify solely through religion and therein to perceive of themselves as a nation.

Irwin argues that the risk of a growing Muslim national consciousness was recognised by the state. The next census, in 1953, dropped any reference to Moslem in the nationality section:

> [I]n favor of the term "Yugoslav unspecified", a residual category reserved for those wishing no affiliation. The [Moslem] community responded by refusing any national category other than the unspecified group, yet it was obvious it was no more "Yugoslav" than any other nationality (p.443).

Dubravka Zarkov (1995) describes the next census in 1961 as introducing two new categories, which went some way towards recognising the special circumstances of those who lived in Bosnia-Hercegovina,[15] but did little for Muslim identities. These changes comprised:

> [T]he introduction into the census of a new category: 'Yugoslavs'. It was a separate non-ethnic category, created to strengthen identification with the Yugoslav socialist system, and hence to be a category of unity. The Yugoslav census also offered other possibilities, such as to opt out of an ethnic identification altogether, i.e. not to define oneself ethnically, or to define oneself regionally. Hence to be a Bosnian - which was clearly territorial, not an ethnic reference -was officially part of a 'nationality column' in the census, and a right guaranteed by the constitution (p.106).

As Zarkov notes, the introduction of the concept of a spatial category, Bosnian, into the census indicated a movement away from perceiving Bosnia-Hercegovina as a republic containing a population of various national identities, to perceiving it as a nation in its own right. In this way it redressed some of the problems with the

[15]Irwin's argues that the 1961 census introduced the term "ethnic Moslems" (*ibid*). However his sources and information here seem unreliable. He does not state where on the census this category was placed. He also omits mention of new categories described by Zarkov. This discrepancy signposts the need for a thorough chronological study, at primary source, of the Yugoslavian census in its own right.

previous census. However in a non-nationalist society this might have seemed a somewhat paradoxical move. Alternatively though, it could also be interpreted as a move to write over national/ethnic difference by, for example, allowing children of mixed nationality to define themselves as Bosnian, thus ensuring them a positive personal identity. Yet, the introduction of this category was not without danger. Firstly, it represented a subtle movement towards the melting-pot ideal, where nationalities were suppressed, thus encouraging the rise of a nationalist backlash. Secondly, in presenting Bosnia-Hercegovina as a national entity, it invited others to see Bosnia-Hercegovina in terms of territory: a place where there was no ethnic majority, and thus a place on which would-be nationalists were invited to inscribe their nationalist territorial desires. Despite the publicised ethos of "Brotherhood and Unity" which drenched the party bureaucracy and literature, the census reveals that even in 1961, nationality was still a complex and disputed area within the bureaucratic, public and private imagination.

Nevertheless, the 1961 census was probably the closest that the census got to in terms of "Brotherhood and Unity" . The subsequent 1971 census was affected by radical constitutional changes, originating from events in 1966, when, at the 8th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the state vice-president, chief of secret police, and notorious hard-liner, Aleksander Ranković, was forced to resign, and his supporters were purged from power. Irwin states that 'amongst other things, he was blamed for the condemned policy of "unitarism", i.e., Serbian centralism and assimilation pressure' (p.443).

The removal of Ranković cleared the way for a range of constitutional reforms, many of which were legally implemented in 1974. Amongst these was the devolution of power to the republics/provinces. Serbia lost control of Kosovo and Vojvodina which became autonomous provinces, and Bosnia-Hercegovina had its first taste of autonomy. The removal of Ranković also marked a move away from Soviet style Communism, and the introduction of a new political philosophy, which at a covert party level, embraced the ideal of a market driven economy and no longer rejected nationalism. This move has been interpreted by Lenard J. Cohen (1993) as a 'pluralist socialism', and Spiros A. Sofos (1996) as an 'economic nationalism'. Both see it as a politicised response to major economic crisis.

Cohen argues that as a result of these changes in political direction Yugoslavism came to be discredited, at a party level, as 'a reactionary notion', a centralistic and anti-reformist force that sought to undermine 'market socialism'. This discrediting of Yugoslavism is also evidenced in Mark Thompson's (1992) quote from Phyliss Auty's interview with Tito in 1968. Auty wrote:

> I asked Tito if he thought Yugoslavism had come into existence during the postwar period. He laughed and replied: "Yugoslavism? It does not exist, but maybe one day in the future it will come." Jože Smole [a federal minister], who was also present, drew in his breath with horror at such frankness (p.94, Thompson's inserts).

Although this radical change in state policy was not made public, the effect was that nationalism gradually began to seep into the public consciousness, and manifested itself through surges in public, nationalist activities throughout the late 1960s, peaking in 1971/1972. The instigators, amongst them the Croatian president to be, Franjo Tuđman, were dealt with swiftly and vigorously. Some were imprisoned, thousands of others who took part were dismissed from their jobs. It is possible to read these expressions of nationalism as a public testing of the new regime. The State's response was a very 'proper' overt repudiation of nationalism. However, Okey states that Tuđman believed that in receiving only a ten-month sentence for his role in nationalist activities that 'Tito protected him from harsher treatment' (p.272). In punishing the Croatian, after removing the Serbian Ranković from post, Tito was seen to be being ethnically even-handed (*op cit*). The inference that can be drawn from this hypothesis is that the party itself was not averse to nationalism, but it clamped down on public expressions of nationalism because it had to be seen to be in control of public order.

The rise in public expressions of nationalism may, paradoxically, account for the major change introduced into the 1971 census, where, for the first time, the term Muslim was included in the national category, thus giving recognition to the concept of Muslims as a nation. Zarkov points out that the number of people who identified as 'Yugoslavs' in the 1971 census was dramatically less than that of the 1961 census, indicating that many of those who had previously identified as

Yugoslav had also been Muslim, and were now identifying themselves as such. The introduction of religion into the 'national category' publicly opened up the whole nation-ethnicity-religion debate to the public conscious. Suddenly people were publicly invited to locate their primary identity in religion. Zarkov argues that it:

> [C]onstructed a specific link between 'ethnic' and 'religious' identity. The defining of one religious group as a separate ethnic group paved the way to defining ethnicity as synonymous with religion, and thus reducing the possibility of defining ethnic [or rather national] groups as religiously diverse. Thus, if no Muslim could be a Serb or a Croat, then no Serb could possibly be anything but Orthodox, and no Croat could be anything but Catholic (*ibid*).

This is a crucial, but contentious, observation; contentious because historically (as I argued in Chapter 2) these religious links with ethnicity have always been present. My reading is that what the census did, was officially privilege national, ethnic and religious identity, when these identities were not always necessarily privileged by the individual; for example, a Croatian could be culturally Catholic, but in practise an atheist. What the census did, then, was awaken the links between religion, nation and ethnicity. Irwin argues that this may have been a deliberate ploy by the state:

> There is compelling, if not conclusive evidence that at the time the LCY [League of Yugoslavian Communists] considered a vigorous "Moslem" national consciousness as the best long-term prophylaxis against competing nationalist claims from within the Republic [of Bosnia-Hercegovina] and from without (*op cit*, p.445).

This, possibly diversionary tactic, introduced to Croatian and Serbian nationalists, the idea that the Muslim community might be potential rivals for control of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Thus, in giving the Muslims constitutional, national rights in 1971, the state sounded a metaphorical 'death knell' for the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The assertion of a Muslim territorial right to Bosnia-Hercegovina was one of the excuses used for their enforced removal from Bosnia-Hercegovina by killing or expulsion by Croats and Serbs during the recent conflicts[16]; similarly

[16]Neither Zarkov nor Irwin comment on whether the category Bosnian was dropped at this time.

it accounts for Muslim killings and expulsions of Croats and Serbs in these conflicts.

After Tito, Tito

By 1981, the year of Tito's death, and some seven years after the implementation of constitutional changes that saw decentralisation and a (resented by the Serbs) reduction in Serb 'unitarism', the census categories on national identity were thus: (the first two sections were quoted in Chapter 2)

- First on the list are six nations (*'narodi'*): Crnogorci [Montenegro], Hrvati [Croatia], Makedonci [Macedonia], Muslimani [Muslim] Slovenci [Slovenian], Srbi [Serbian];
- Then there are the fourteen minorities (*'narodnosti'*): Albanci, Bugari, Cesi, Italijana, Madjari, Nemci, Romi, Rumuni, Rusi, Rusini, Slovaci, Turci, Ukrajinici, Vlasi;[17]
- The next option is 'the others' (*'ostali'*)
- Then those who did not opt for any of the possibilities offered, a right granted according to paragraph 170 of the Constitution; in other words those who refused to answer the question
- Then the category 'Yugoslavs' ([translation]);
- Then those who opted for the regional definition ([translation])
- Finally, 'unknown' (*nepoznato*)

(Zarkov, footnote 2, p. 117)

The categorisation of Bosnia-Hercegovina as a nation had been dropped by this point, so that people in Bosnia-Hercegovina were required to identify as Croatian, Serbian, Muslim, other, Yugoslav, or opt for a regional definition. This option was hierarchically placed below that of Yugoslavs. The message that comes across is that by 1981 the Yugoslavians were being encouraged to identify through religion and nation/*narod* (as defined in Chapter 2). There was little encouragement for personal definition through place. The 1981 census thus corroborated the changes to the 1971 census and the constitutional changes implemented in legislation in

[17]Note also the hierarchical way in which the census presents minorities. For example, the suggestion is that you are a less legitimate citizen if you are culturally Albanian, Roma, Hungarian

1974. It also accounts for the changes in identity noted by Bringa (quoted in Chapter 2), where, by the late 1980s, the effects of the changes in the census and in state policy, were so well-established that Bringa's Bosnia-Hercegovinan younger villagers perceived Catholics to be Croats, whereas Muslims were always identified as Muslims. However this shift in party policy to a more established identification primarily through nation (but informed by religion) is interesting given that nationalism was still a federal crime. The confusion and complexity of the state message to its people creates a metaphorical image of federal schizophrenia, whereby nationalism was present at a party political level, was embodied in the census, yet prohibited by state legislation[18].

How then did things change in the course of ten years, from multiple subtexts of nationalism, acceptable only in state discourse in 1981, to the overt rhetorics of nationalism that punctuated the public and the private in the late 1980s and early 1990s, moving on to violent conflict in 1991?[19]

Public discourse on nation and the roots of conflict

Amongst certain historians there appears to be a consensus that some of the roots of the recent conflicts can be traced to economic problems[20]. Although there was a boom after decentralisation, by the late 1970s there was an economic downturn. This was not helped by growing economic and political rivalries amongst the republics, which by the late 1980s under-pinned the gradual enmities of the various republics. Sofos argues:

> [G]rievances regarding the differentiational development of the country's regions were incorporated into nationalist discourses - a prominent element in the Croatian and Slovenian universe of 'public debate' was 'the burden imposed to their economies by subsidising the black hole economies of the South' whereas a

[18]Although public expressions of nationalism were still taking place. 1981 was the year that Alija Izetbegović was sentenced to fourteen years imprisonment for expounding the need for a separate Islamic State.

[19]The Croatian statistician M. stated that the April 1991 census was invalid as a statistical document, nevertheless its analysis showed an enormous shrinkage in the amount of people identifying as Yugoslavs. This is corroborated in a table published by Cohen (1993), p.175.

> dominant theme in Serbian and other 'southern' republic politics was their 'economic subordination to the North' ... (p.261).[21]

Borders between the republics, delineated and defined in 1946, and maintained till 1991, were perceived as arbitrary, thus exacerbating the competition over resources, and political and economic power. After Tito's death, the presidency was shared between the republics, each republic taking its turn at the presidency. The tension that accompanied a change of presidency, with the President's potential to favour a particular republic, embodied the political tensions of the time. Thus the national/regional became the dominant political discourse, whilst class, and other political discourses took a back seat.

The politics of diaspora

The discourse of the national/regional came to be focus principally on the politics of diaspora. Sofos argues that the segmentation of Yugoslavia along what he determines as quite arbitrary lines, in the form of borders and boundaries between republics, had a profound effect on mobility and internal diaspora, and the public's recognition of this phenomenon: 'internal migration provided a unifying issue in public debate' (p.262). His argument is validated by the statistician and sociologist, M. who stated that:

> *"The general public waited for the first results of the national composition of the State. The first tables to be published were always on social mobility and national mobility"* (Interview, February 1999).

M. also detailed what she termed a theory of "*ethno-homogeneity*" or "*early ethnic-cleansing*":

> *"Between 1981 and 1991 we drew maps of Former Yugoslavia, comparing very powerful maps of migration streams. Serbs were going to Serbia, Muslims to Europe, and Croats to Croatia. Ethno-homogeneity was not commented on until the late 1980s, it was considered too dangerous to talk about this. Because it was the pressure pushing particular groups out, not on an economic basis but on an ethnic basis, an early 'ethnic-cleansing'. Everyone was trying to reach their own*

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[20] See for example Cohen (1993) and Sofos (1996). Lydall (1989), an international relations researcher warned of a crisis to come, as a result of economic problems.

[21] Sofos quotes Martin and Tyson , 1985, 'Can Titoism survive Tito? Economic problems and policy choices confronting Tito's successors' in Ramet P. (ed.) Yugoslavia in the 1980s. Boulder CO: Westview Press. No page references given.

> *ethnic community. It was in the public consumption of magazines that this was happening, I was approached many times by magazines to comment, but I misled people. T. reminded me of this*[22]*. She said "You know you said this was not happening". I used economic reasons against the ethnic cleansing hypothesis, that the people who were leaving Bosnia were from poor areas, and under-developed".* (*ibid*).

What is particularly interesting here, is that unlike Sofos, M. claimed that economics had little to do with ethno-homogeneity. During the interview she did not offer any direct explanation for internal/external diaspora except to argue that it represented "*early ethnic-cleansing*", that is, a physical expression of nationalism, implying that migration was not a matter of choice, but a matter of emotional violence/force. However, conceptually M. linked diaspora to the census, inferring that the census had somehow informed and manipulated private constructions of identity, encouraging a fear of the 'other'. This connection between the census and forced diaspora constructs a link between the census and the growth of a discourse of nationalism, suggesting that, during the 1980s, an engagement with nationalism, or a fear of nationalism in others, was already becoming embedded in the private.

Nationalism and the private

The embedding of nationalism into the private occurred at many levels. Yet perhaps the most effective was the use of religious nationalism. B., who works in the *Centar za Žene Žrtve Rata* (Centre for Women War Victims) in Zagreb, argued that nationalists accentuated and manipulated the growing links between nation, nationality and religion in Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia-Hercegovina (which as I argue above, by 1971, were already being emphasised in the census). She claims that nation, nationality and religion were the subject of much public discussion:

> *"Suddenly in Serbia ... they were for three years walking with the bones of some Saint Sava, ...In Croatia ....there was Cardinal Stepinać, ... who died in prison...*

[22] T. was a founder of the Croatian *Anti-Ratna Kampanje* (the anti-war campaign), a politicised body of volunteers which spoke out against nationalism, and war.

> *who co-operated with the Nazis ... who is suddenly big in Croatia.... and suddenly in Croatia we have Saint Tomas...."*(Interview, September 1999)

The intrusion of public discourses of religion and their invocation by nationalists created a disjuncture in private identification in religion and nation, which was used by nationalists to their gain during elections. The intercession of nationalism into the democratic process represented the point where nationalisms began to be openly appropriated by the private individual. B. provided an anecdote which illustrated just how successful nationalists had been in creating an environment of religious and national 'othering' within the voting process:

> *"I think that many .... started playing on the card of nationality....When the multi-party system started .... in Bosnia ... you could [have] a Liberal Party, it was called Serbian Liberal, Croatian Liberal, and Muslim Liberal Party. So everything took the pre-fix of its nationality. And I remember .... this Croatian woman [Branka] was talking to this Muslim [friend], Biba, and was asked by one woman who is now in BaBe [Croatian NGO] "For whom did you vote in 1991 when they had their changes?" And Branka said to Biba "I thought you would vote for yours, so I voted for mine". So suddenly there were yours and there were mine."*(*ibid*).

B. thus blamed the intersection of religion and nationalism in multi-party public politics for the democratic debacle in the 1990/1991 elections. Andjelka Milić (1993), however, puzzles over the 'ultimate outcome' of these multi-party politics, which 'was paradoxical: pluralistic elections resulted in single-party parliamentary structures that rushed to establish sovereign national power structures' (p.110).

Given the political tradition of one party being in control, and the lack of familiarity with a 'democratic' process, perhaps this political choice is not as surprising as Milić makes out. It merely represents a variation of a known system. The state phrase used after Tito's death 'After Tito, Tito' also holds a clue to the attraction of nationalist politicians such as Tuđman, Milošević, Karadžić, Itzebegović, who as ageing nationalist patriarchs, created themselves in the image of the authoritarian father-figure of Tito.

The multi-party elections thus represented the point where communism/socialism was formally rejected, and nationalism came to be owned by the mass public; informing the private lives of the public. Both M. and B. pointed to a post-election

process: the gradual erosion of identities, of knowns, and their replacement with insecurity and gradual paranoia (echoed in Ugrešić's description of her mother, at the start of this chapter). M. stated:

> *"[When the war started] Neighbours divided along religious lines, except in urban areas where social control is not so tight, where people were not being observed..."* (*op cit*).

This arrival of conflict was preceded by gradual changes in public attitudes to the other republics and to minority groups within their own republics, whereby intolerance of 'others' grew with the employment of nationalist and racist rhetorics.

Private discourses of nationalism

What is interesting about the growth in nationalist rhetoric in the immediate pre-conflict atmosphere in Yugoslavia is the nationalist invocation of Second World War metaphors and language. Suddenly the terms Ustaša and Četnik began to punctuate nationalist discourses, reminding the people of the inter-ethnic violences of the last war, and inviting them to realign themselves along these former ideological 'front-lines'[23]. Perhaps such a phenomenon should not be so surprising given the way in which state narratives of "Brotherhood and Unity" had always contained a silent allusion to the violences of the past, maintaining a constant place in the present for the unspoken deeds of the past.

However M. argued that in Croatia:

> *"The nationalists were not the middle-classes but an unknown element, the Diaspora, who were the origin of the upsurge in nationalism" (op cit).*

The diaspora community of former Ustaši living abroad are known to have funded Tuđman's right-wing HDZ party which won the elections in 1990/1991. Thus, it could be argued that the re-introduction of Ustaša language, which in particular infiltrated military discourses (B. *op cit*), took up where the Diaspora had left off forty-five years previously. However, the people who voted in Croatia for the HDZ, and in Serbia and Bosnia-Hercegovina for the nationalist parties were not

[23]This validates Okey's argument examined earlier.

diaspora communities, but people whose national and ethnic identities had suddenly become very sharply defined. The adoption of Second World War ideologies, by these communities, was certainly heavily influenced by nationalist rhetoric. But what part did personal, private identities and histories play in this phenomenon?

Examining the nature of the violences that erupted in 1991/1992 gives some clues. As I have argued in Chapter 2, national, religious and ethnic identities were seen to be embodied and encapsulated within the family. Often the violences focused on extended family groups, who were 'outed' to paramilitaries by their neighbours, or who experienced violence at the hands of their neighbours. Although there are multiple reasons for this behaviour, some of these violences came to be perceived by perpetrators and victims as personal and historical violences linked to earlier wars, earlier violences, and earlier political and national identities.

In many family histories it was believed that the identities of the perpetrators of previous, historical violences, were known to the victim. The construction of a memory which contained a narrative of betrayal/punishment through execution by a friend, neighbour or acquaintance, often witnesssed by the victim's family, thus became a story, which was passed on, usually by women, to future generations of victims and perpetrators. Mirjana Morokvašić (1998) supports this reading when she states:

> Most of us in Yugoslavia's post-Second World War generation grew up with war stories. These stories were told by women and women were their main protagonists (p.65).

Changing with its every telling, the family story/myth of persecution or retribution would have carried with it the suspicion that others, outside the family, carried these memories too, and remembered these violences or suffering. Although these constructed memories would have been lodged in what Lacan terms the Imaginary, they may not necessarily have been foregrounded within a family history, so that a person's family identification as perpetrator, victim, witness was not necessarily key to their to their personal history or sense of self. However, these events could be readily called to mind at a time when religious, political, national, and thus family identities were threatened.

The passing on of narratives of war histories would also have had a role in defining family politics, whether the family identified as witness, perpetrator, victim. Hall (1998) argues:

> The creation of historical narrative involves 'choices with distinct ideological and even specifically political implications' [White, *op cit*, p.ix]. The simplification of historical developments through the use of narrative structure thus facilitates the communication of a political or ideological message at the expense of a more complex reality using the mechanisms of Imaginary identification.(*op cit* , p.34)

It seems possible then, that family narratives of war-history were also used to foster certain ideologies and national identities within some extended family structures. Within other families, these memories seem to have been in place, but were latent, drawn on to context the later violences only when they happened.

The people in Bringa's (1995) case-study village in Bosnia serve as a possible example. In this village, which contained a mixed but equal amount of Catholics and Muslims, people seemed able to live alongside each other quite happily. In her television documentary (1993), Bringa's camera observes this fact. But the camera also observes how the realisation of 'ethnic' hatred was extremely quick as war closed in on the village, so that suddenly ethnic/religious/national boundaries grew much wider, and more defined in this rural context. The camera focuses on the relationship between two older women, first neighbours and 'best friends' for life, one Catholic, one Muslim, who suddenly stop visiting each other. The Catholic woman stays indoors, and hides. Not long after, the Muslims flee from the village, as HVO forces begin to surround it. This type of rift was documented in many communities. Respondents who have counselled war-traumatised women have stated that one of the most hurtful, destructive emotions that their clients have felt, is the withdrawal of friends and neighbours, and a failure to 'tell' when the other's army was about to invade. They link this withdrawal of friendship with a foreknowledge of the violences to come.

Conclusion

There seems then, to have been a dichotomy in Yugoslavian perceptions of identity. The state influenced the way in which people publicly identified through religion, ethnicity and nation, yet its influence on the construction of private identities was slower and less conclusive. Nationalism seems to have been pervasive, at all levels, state, public and private, but the way in which its existence was elided, obscured and hidden at the state and public level created an atmosphere where public expressions of nationalism could not be legitimated, and where, as in Ugrešić's examples at the beginning of this chapter, private memories of nationalism were also elided from public sight.

There is, however, evidence to suggest that the constitutional changes of 1971, and the way in which nationalism was privileged within the census, enabled nationalism to seep into the public consciousness. M.'s description *of "ethno-homogeneity"* suggests that, by the 1980s, an awareness of nationalism as a movement/ideology/threat had seeped into private identities and self-awareness. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, public rhetorics of nationalism became acceptable and legitimated, whilst the discourses of past ethnic and ideological violences created an atmosphere of fear and othering, that penetrated the private. When the conflicts began, and as they penetrated villages and towns, this fear became realised as a fear of what the Other would do, at times preying on latent or not so latent memories of previous violences experienced by the private realm.

This layering of public and private identities, and the elision of the reality of nationalism, resonates with Lacan's thesis that 'what is refused in the Symbolic returns in the Real'.[24] Whilst publicly being required to identify themselves as a homogeneous group of Yugoslavians, people privately identified in very different ways, which they expressed through the forum of the census. These cut off, suppressed identities were to be found within family and kinship groups, passed on through the discourse of family stories (including photographs, and First and Second World War histories), or in some cases large silences/elisions (as in

[24]Les Psychoses, quoted by Butler (1993) p.186.

Ugrešić's example at the beginning of this chapter) took the place of family history, and as argued by Vidali (1996) creating a need for these silences to be interrogated. In a sense, the private/the family could be interpreted as representing the site of the Lacanian Real. This being the site of psychosis, of chaos, of federal schizophrenia, which was opened up and brought into the Symbolic when nationalist rhetorics invoked binary ideologies of othering, of us and them, when the conflicts entered the private realm.

Although this chapter has interrogated the elided presence of nationalism and national identity within the public and private, it has not interrogated the intersection of gender with these identities. The next two chapters seek to redress this balance. Chapter 4 examines the role of women in the public realm in post-Second World War Yugoslavia, and Chapter 5 examines the effect that nationalism had on feminism in this period, and during the recent conflicts.

Chapter 4
Women in the public realm in Yugoslavia.

To survive, we had to divide the territory. to set a border between private and public. The state wants it all public - it can't see into our apartment, but it can tap our telephone, read our mail. We didn't give up: everything beyond the door was considered 'theirs'. They wanted to turn our apartments into public spaces, but we didn't buy that trick. What is public is of the enemy. So we hid in our pigeonholes, leaned on each other in spite of everything, and licked our wounds.

Slavenka Drakulić, 1993, pp. 92-3

Synopsis

This chapter examines women's public experience of post-Second War Yugoslavism, focusing on issues such as women's access to work and education. It argues that although the ideal of Yugoslavism embraced the concept of equal opportunities for women, equality was more myth than reality, and was primarily determined by the economic health of the Federation. Moreover this ideal of equality obscured many very basic inequalities between Yugoslavian women, predicated upon their individual experience of education, class, ethnicity and geographic location, which determined their access to economic and educational opportunities. This chapter concludes with an examination of Yugoslavian women's engagement with feminism during the late 1970s, and argues that, like women's access to work and education, access to feminism was also determined by class, ethnicity and location. This chapter does not examine women's experience of the private/family realm in any detail. This is taken up in chapter 7, which looks at the phenomenon of crypto-matriarchy, and links this to the specific violences that took place against women during the conflicts.

Socialism and gender

Perceived in/equalities

Yugoslavian women's direct involvement in the partisan struggle in the Second World War created a visibility for women that resulted in their initial inclusion within the legal and social framework of post-war socialist Yugoslavia. Andjelka Milić (1993) states that:

> Many women experienced the country's liberation as their own, spontaneous, unexpected, direct emancipation from the closed world of their traditional patriarchal families and rural backwaters, where their only fate had been to marry and serve the family.
>
> They could no longer go back to this previous world, even if the new authorities had wanted them to. They went to the city, the factory, a job, education, and to all the contradictions of the newly emerging system (p.111).

The new federal state of Yugoslavia gave women access to traditional male spaces of education, the work place and the political arena. The state not only endorsed women's position in the workplace and the political arena, but also enabled women to take up these places through women-friendly policies. For example, women had the right to abortion; new mothers were given entitlement to a year's maternity leave on full pay; there was a policy of positive discrimination in the political arena through the introduction of 'a 30 percent quota for women's participation as candidates for election' (Drakulić,1993b, p.124).

Yet conceptually, although women were visible, and were included, they were not in control, and they certainly were not equal. A closer examination reveals that equality did not saturate public and private social structures. For example, Cynthia Cockburn (1998) observes that the reality of women's access to the work place through positive reproductive policies was impeded by a lack of adequate nursery-care:

> Even those women who had a job were impeded by lack of nursery provision. They normally relied on older female relatives to care for their dependants ... (p.158).

Drakulić downplays the role of women politicians arguing 'these women were tokens, without power, and unable to make their own decisions' (*op cit* p.124).

Other writers and respondents reference a Yugoslavian glass-ceiling in the work place. There is, also, a historical consensus, amongst women writers of Yugoslavian women's history, that despite perceived gains in recognition within the work place, and in terms of legal equality, women 'remained subordinated and segregated in all walks of life' (*ibid*). Notably, within the domestic sphere, women were still the home-makers. Despite their role as money-earners, women found this domestic role still endorsed by traditional patriarchies within the rural and urban family.

The place of equality within the Yugoslav political structure

Daša Duhaček pinpoints the problem with her observation that this so-called equality was a product of the particular political system in place in Yugoslavia after the Second-World War:

> Women in Yugoslavia thus entered history and linear time [that is, the public realm] only on the basis of socialism (p.133, my inserts).

The parameters of equality were thus defined by the communist/socialist system, which, as I argued in the previous chapter, was, itself, transmuting into a market-driven socialism. Although women were given a notional equality, this took the form of a contract between women and the state; equality had been earned by women and was economically useful to the state, but it could be revoked at any time.

In this relationship women had little agency or power. The lack of civil liberties and rights within the communist/socialist, or even the market-driven model of governance meant that a policy of citizenship was not foregrounded. There was no incentive for Yugoslavian citizenship in the western sense of the model. This had an effect on the way that people perceived themselves within the public realm. Although they publicly accepted Yugoslavism there was little private or personal investment in a civil community as there might have been within a western structure of 'democracy'. The effect was that people, and in particular women, were not 'pro-active', or politicised, but were passive.

Barbara Einhorn (1993) observes that this was a phenomenon particular to communist Central Eastern Europe:

> Women were 'emancipated' from above. Social (welfare) and economic rights were handed to women on a plate, so that there is no tradition of political agitation in favour of political rights, the right to work, to maternity leave or to a child-care place. Rather, there is a passivity born of taking these rights for granted - it has even been argued that there was no consciousness that these realities of women's lives embodied rights until they were taken away (p.174).

However Einhorn's own stance as a politicised western feminist is dominant here, and acts as a paradigm of the socio-cultural differences between east and west in post-Second World War Europe. Her use of the term 'rights' invokes a concept of ownership of, or entitlement to a moral truth, in this case feminism, which is a discourse particular to western structures of democracy and citizenship, where the private individual perceives themselves to have power and agency within the state. It is not a discourse that can be applied to the Yugoslav or Central Eastern European state model. In interview, the sociologist M. summed up this difference in the observation that the socialist system *"gave the illusion that regulating everything by law, solves everything"* (Zagreb, February 1999). In Yugoslavia then, the patriarchal state apparatus was the embodiment of the law, and within the legally-imposed rigid structure of 'equality' there were no perceived problems. Thus there was no call or space for women to politicise.

The development of post-war gender-equality

H., a feminist activist working for an NGO in Sarajevo, concurred with and developed this observation, when she stated:

> *"From 1943 onwards it was forbidden to speak of women as political activists, they were comrades which was gender equality. But not many women were involved in decision making"* (Interview, Sarajevo, January 1999).

H.'s statement emphasises a subtle shift in women's power, whereby women's partisan activism was interrupted, and placed in stasis. The shift in the way women came to be named, becoming known only as 'comrades' although they had little decision-making power, demonstrates that although gender-equality was implicit to language, it was not implicit to the state-system, or to lived society. Applying

Vološinov's (1973) model of language and ideology helps to understand the linguistic point that H. was making:

> Existence reflected in the sign is not merely reflected, but refracted. How is this refraction of existence in the ideological sign determined? By an intersecting of differently oriented social interests in every ideological sign. The sign becomes an arena of class struggle. This social multi-accentuality of the ideological sign is very crucial in every aspect. A sign that has been withdrawn from the pressures of the social struggle - which so to speak, crosses beyond the whole of the class struggle - inevitably loses force, degenerates into allegory, becoming not the object of a lived social intelligibility but of a philosophical comprehension (Stuart Hall, p.1060, paraphrasing Vološinov, p.23)[1]

The giving of equality to women, withdrew gender from the 'whole class-struggle'. The eliding of women from the socialist sign system, and their replacement with the sign 'comrade', a gender neutral term that was more likely to mean man, than woman, presented a simulacra of equality to gender-relations in Yugoslavia. Gender-equality thus became more a 'philosophical comprehension' than a lived reality (although the war-memorial in figures 5a and 5b overleaf suggest that this is perhaps an overestimation, the imagery used women clearly places women in the private domain).

Drakulić (*op cit*) argues that this process could have been avoided if women had been prepared to fight the state for more power. She identifies the Antifascist Women's Front (AWF), a group of influential women war veterans, as 'selling' women out after the war:

> [I]n the immediate post-war period, the Communists built emancipatory politics into the legislation, and the "woman question" ceased to exist. Soon after the war the AWF became a bureaucratic women's organization serving to ensure the transmission of Communist power over women. No spontaneous grass-roots organization (peace, ecological, feminist, workers, etc.) was permitted; if an organisation was not institutionalised, it could not be efficiently controlled (p.127).

[1] I have used Stuart Hall's (1998) adaptation of a translation of Vološinov's work (p.1060), because in altering it slightly, Hall makes the language more accessible.



Figure 5a



Figure 5b

Memorial to partisans at Pula, Istria: a paradigm of the post-Second World War ordering of the public and private in Yugoslavia.

Drakulić also points out that when feminism arrived in Yugoslavia '[f]or women war veterans, feminism was synonymous with disloyalty with Yugoslavia' (*ibid*). The sense here is that women war veterans were complicit with the state, and the state's denial of 'real' equality for women. These women did not necessarily have 'real' power except in their own organisation, nevertheless their status as war-veterans placed them in proximity to the party, and in proximity to the benefits that the party could endow. They became comfortably 'middle-class' whilst disempowering the rest of Yugoslavia's women[2]. Their politicisation, like women's rights, was in stasis, frozen at the moment of the state's acknowledgement of their historical involvement with the partisan movement.

Intersections of gender and class in Yugoslavia.

This example of the power and privilege of women war-veterans illustrates that despite Yugoslavia's identification with socialism, a hierarchical class system operated within the social fabric of the state. The interconnections between family, education, party-links, wealth and class-position/mobility, is illustrated by M. in her claims that "*the original women partisans were from well-educated families*" (*op cit*[3]) and that by the mid-1960s there was a new class of "*very well-educated women*" in urban Yugoslavia. M. did not actually detail if these were the daughters of ex-partisans, or a new generation of women reaping the benefits of the opening up of access to higher education, in much the same way that the first generation of post-war British women did in the 1960s[4]. However, M.'s verbal linkage of ex-partisans and good education reflects an implicit recognition of both the system of privileges that came with party membership (most ex-partisans would have been party members), and of a social system whereby education also came to define class.

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[2]This is an important observation for this thesis. These women's public identities mirrored the model of the Yugoslav private family which Andrei Simić (1999) terms crypto-matriarchy, where women acquired power from their relationship with their sons, whilst dis-enfranchising younger women, principally their daughters and daughters-in-law. See chapter 7 on theories of violence.
[3]I have come across no additional evidence to corroborate this. What M. may have been inferring was that the women partisans who were influential after the war tended to be well-educated.
[4]Cockburn states that Yugoslavia had one of the highest percentages of women graduates in Europe.

This system created very real differences in the lived experience of Yugoslavian women. It cut across their broad gender-identity as 'women' and created different types of privileged and less privileged individuals[5]. Class divisions were created and maintained by family, education, ethnicity, racism[6], links to the party, and economic position. Space, that is whether one lived in a rural or urban environment, also played a defining role; the space one lived in was affected and determined by the post-war economic reconstruction of Yugoslavia.

The gendering of the urban/ rural divide.

Post-Second World War economic reconstruction privileged the towns, creating large urban populations, and encouraging population shifts, whereby people left rural villages to work in the towns. The differences in lifestyle and outlook between urban and rural women appear to have been enormous, and were in evidence even at the time of fieldwork in 1998/99. B.B. from *BaBe*, a Croatian women's human right's group, described some of these differences:

> *"You know, you speak in different languages ... and you live in different life-styles, And when it comes to that, even in the economical terms, you know, on a state level, rural people ... are quite neglected. And that is also something that really shows the social attitudes towards rural people.* " (Interview, August 1998).

Although B.B. maintained that the state bias against rural people did/does not mean that they have received poorer educations than urban people, she felt that the rural environment impacted on young women's lives:

> *"... [There are] more early marriages, you know, more domestic and fieldwork for women, you know, young women"(ibid).*

M. also underlined the strictures of rural Yugoslavian society in her statement: "*the [rural] neighbourhood meant tight control*" whereas in an urban environment "*social control was not so tight, you were not being observed*" (*op cit*). Early marriage, fieldwork, domestic work were thus pre-ordained for young women unless they moved to the city.

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[5]This chapter does not attempt an in depth analysis and categorisation of class in Yugoslavia.
[6]Albanian or Roma women tended to be less privileged than Croat, Serb or Muslim women, because they were constructed as 'racially' inferior. This racism became more pronounced and overt in the late 1980s.

There was, and is still, a difference between the perceived autonomy of urban women, and the lack of power of rural women stuck within rural, patriarchal social structures. It is worth unpacking this a little more, to look at where the autonomy/power for urban women actually lay, and how it contrasted to the lives of rural women. Initially this would seem to be an argument about space, and the way in which the city space has been/is less regulating for women, where, as M. put it, "*social control*" was "*not so tight*". Here the city appears to be a large public space where a woman can gain anonymity, whereas a rural woman is constantly policed within the so-called public spaces of her village by the private sphere of her extended patrilocal family and her neighbours.

The reality of city space is perhaps a little different. Respondents talked about the shortage of accommodation in the city. Often children in their twenties and thirties still live with their parents. Getting married does not necessarily imply getting an apartment with a new spouse, but often means moving in with your new in-laws (usually the husband's parents). One respondent described her difficulty in ever maintaining a romantic relationship because she lived with her parents, and her partners invariably lived with their parents (Interview Zagreb, November 1998). Her courtships always took place in public spaces, such as restaurants, leaving little possibility for intimacy of any kind.

Drakulić (*op cit*) also describes how state socialism and space regulated individuality. The public spaces in the city were not necessarily places where you could be different. Within the work place, fitting in with peer-groups was also essential. So that although an urban woman had many more career choices than rural women, her choice was still regulated by those around her, family, colleagues, peer-group. Drakulić perceived this to be an Eastern European phenomenon, and quotes the comments of Zsusza, a Hungarian woman who reflected on the effect of the Hungarian mode of state socialism on her family:

> "When there is no space in society to express your individuality, the family becomes the only territory in which you can form it, exercise, prove it, express it. But a family is too limiting, there is not enough space in it for self-expression

> either, and negative feelings accumulate very soon. We started to hate each other, but we stayed together because of the bigger enemy out there ...." (p.107)

So what spaces were there for women in the city? The strong impression that I gained from respondents was that the spaces that gave them any feelings of autonomy, and freedom, were not physical spaces, but emotional spaces that existed in friendship. Physical public spaces in the city represented the places where these private friendships might be carried out, without the monitoring/policing that might take place in a rural environment. The city thus represented spaces where close friendships between people of a different religion, nationality, ethnicity, were perhaps easier to form and maintain than in rural environments. The conceptual effect on Yugoslavian/Former Yugoslavian society is that these differences have placed the concepts of rural and urban in opposition to each other. This opposition appears to have become embedded within language, placing a firm binary into people's conceptualisation of space and class, and acting as a form of othering. Several respondents, who counselled women survivors of sexual violence during the conflicts, whose client base represented both rural and urban women, and who had received training on recognising and addressing prejudice within themselves, still used the term 'peasant' within their descriptions, either as a derogatory expression, or as a humorous device.

This discrepancy between urban/rural was affected by the distribution of wealth in the republics and provinces. Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosovo, were generally the poorest. Although there was some industry, their rural inhabitants relied heavily on subsistence-agriculture. Serbia was wealthier than these two regions, but it was generally perceived to be less wealthy than Croatia, Slovenia and Vojvodina. To make up for this discrepancy Serbs were traditionally given jobs in government bureaucracy and in the Federal Army. In contrast Vojvodina was agriculturally rich, being the 'bread-basket' of Yugoslavia, and Croatia and Slovenia were perceived to be the richest, through a combination of industry, export links to Europe, and tourism[7]. This distribution in wealth had a direct effect on gender. If you were a woman living in Croatia or Slovenia, you might be under-privileged,

[7]Montenegro and Macedonia were also not perceived to be wealthy regions.

however in the broad spectrum, you would be perceived as more likely to have opportunity for economically bettering yourself, than a woman from Bosnia or Kosovo. Silva Meznarić (1994) states that by 1981, when Yugoslavia was experiencing economic crisis, central Bosnia (which was perceived to have a high Muslim population) combined 'substantial population growth and considerably decreased participation in the republic's GNP' (p.90). Out of the women in Bosnia-Herzegovina, regardless of ethnicity '38 percent had less than four year's education' (p.91). The levels of education for women in Kosovo were statistically similar. If you were a woman living in a Croatian city, your chances for education, economic opportunity and for personal freedom would be perceived to be higher than a woman living in rural Bosnia.

What should be noted is that ethnicity was also reflected in these trends. M.'s description of "*ethno-homogeneity*" (quoted in the previous chapter) in Yugoslavia showed that that by the 1980s ethnicity would also have had a determining effect on women's opportunities. For example, M. argued there were many more Bosnian-Muslim women than Bosnian-Serb or Bosnian-Croatian women in central Bosnia, because of internal migration trends. Similarly many Kosovan-Serbs were leaving Kosovo, so that there were many more Kosovan-Albanians in Kosovo than Kosovan-Serbs. This implies that the overall chances of economic betterment and personal freedom for rural Muslim women in Bosnia and Kosovo were statistically less than those women migrating to Croatia and Serbia. What is not quantifiable is the extent to which a woman's status as an economic migrant in a different province or republic would have affected her quality of life.

Gendering economic crisis

The myth of equality in Yugoslavia thus masked a series of inequalities against women, and among women, which were predicated on gender, class, ethnicity, and location. The changes to the constitution in 1974, whereby political power was decentralised and given to the regions, created a new set of problems for women. Although these changes represented an attempt to create new market forces in Yugoslavia and thus stave off economic crisis, this strategy appears to have been

ineffective (or even detrimental to national economies). Harold Lydall (1989) identified 1979 as the year that economic crisis hit Yugoslavia.

> The most striking symptoms of the economic crisis of the period of 1979-85 were the sharp falls in the value of imports ... real gross fixed investment ..., labour productivity in the social sector (26 per cent). In addition the number of job seekers rose by 37 per cent to over 1 million, and the rate of inflation rose to 72 per cent. (p.25)

Lydall pointed out that a registered job-seeker could be someone about to leave school, wanting to change jobs, or someone who wanted to leave her/his job, and that 'there may be people who do not bother to register, because they see no prospect of getting a job' (p.44). Thus this percentage did necessarily represent the number of people who were unemployed at the time, and needed to be treated with caution. Nevertheless, a rise of 37 percent was significant. What is perhaps more significant is Lydall's observation:

> Because workers in the social sector scarcely ever lose their jobs, a very large proportion of the job-seekers are young people who have never had a job including a disproportionate number of young women (*ibid*)

The point, that workers in the social sector were unlikely to lose their jobs, glosses over a particularly Yugoslavian employment phenomenon, where people tended not lose their jobs, but were laid-off and removed from the payroll. [8] Thus, statistically it was impossible to demonstrate the actual levels of unemployment at this time. However the fact that there were 'a disproportionate number of young women' who were failing to get jobs during the 1979-1985 period, suggests that this reflected a broader trend where women were starting to be discriminated against in the employment field. This was, to some extent, corroborated by respondents who stated that discrimination against women in the work-place grew worse in the late 1980s. However, their testimony of discrimination lacked an economic critique and was usually placed in the context of the links between nationalism and discrimination against women, which worsened when war broke out in the early 1990s.

The beginning of Yugo-feminisms

The development of feminism in Yugoslavia took place in the late 1970s, at the time that women were beginning to be discriminated against in the field of employment. However, the birth of the Yugoslavian feminist movement was not a grass-roots response to this crisis, rather, it was borne out of intellectual curiosity in the growth of second-wave feminism developing in the west (Cynthia Cockburn, pp.159-174). The membership of the first overtly feminist groups 'Women in Society', which were set up in Ljubljana, Belgrade and Zagreb in 1979, consisted entirely of academics (mainly sociologists) and professionals.

Given the level of control that the government extended over political organisations, and given the lack of a history of public, politicised organisation (except in terms of nationalism), it is perhaps surprising that Yugoslavian women were able to engage with feminism at all. It seems likely that opportunity grew out of the 1974 constitutional changes, which opened up political arenas to the republics and the provinces. Yugo-feminists appear to have leapt into the political spaces/voids created by this opening up of regional politics. They also developed feminism within the party structure, drawing on party discourses rather than running the risk of being seen as being opposed to the party. Thus, Yugo-feminism was dominated by a school of extremely active, intellectual, Marxist feminists (particularly in the cities of Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia). Duhaček describes the driving forces of Marxist feminism:

> Marxist socialist feminism includes women in history and awards them equality only as part of a system of "higher" priorities, such as class struggle. This is quite different from an autonomous struggle for equality, for recognition of oneself as a subject, and for freedom and political authorship. If freedom and recognition are to be won and not donated it must be a struggle and a risk of life, as has been ably elaborated by Marx's predecessor Hegel (p.133).[9]

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[8]One Croatian respondent described how although she was still technically employed by her employer, she was laid-off in the early 1990s and did not work for that employer for several years, only returning after the war, when the employment situation for women was less hostile.

[9] In this article, an editorial footnote on the term Marxist socialist feminism states 'This use of the terms differs from that of the west'.

One respondent described her own initiation into Marxist feminism at University in the 1980s. Her description of this process inferred that feminism represented a gendered career route, originating at University, which allowed the women with the most brilliant minds to gain a reputation for themselves, and thus access a career within the party or through their party membership and reputations[10]. These women were able to critique the state system in a limited way, provided they simultaneously embraced the system. Thus these women were 'worked' by the system, and thus there were parallels between the feminism in the 1970s/1980s and the AWF. Within both these structures women/feminism had a place within a hierarchy of ideologies, but ideological concepts were privileged over people. Equality rather than rights, in the western sense, was still the goal of this particular feminism.

Yugoslavian second-wave Marxist feminism then, became the forum of the educated, privileged woman, mirroring the privileges earned by the AWF from 1946 onwards. Whilst it seems curious that these educated/privileged voices acted on behalf of women in Yugoslavia, an examination of the connection between class/privilege and feminism in the west reveals a number of parallels. For example, feminist theorists such as Elizabeth Spelman (1988) have pointed out that second-wave, western, white, middle-class privileged feminists were asserting themselves as representatives of a generic universal western 'woman'.

Given the urban concentration of these privileged/educated Yugoslavian women, and given the dispersal of wealth within the different republics and provinces, it is perhaps not surprising that the women's movement was not homogenous across Yugoslavia. There were no strong feminist groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro. As I argued earlier, these areas tended to be predominantly rural and thus women were generally less-educated, less privileged and more likely to be controlled by tightly knit patriarchal, family orientated social structures. Perhaps then it is not surprising that feminism failed to reach women in these areas. Yet, what is curious is that the absence of feminism in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro's has not been critiqued by

[10]Interview, February 1999.

Yugoslav feminist writers[11]. In fact it is barely mentioned. This failure of Slovenian, Croatian, and Serbian, middle-class feminists to acknowledge/recognise their positions of privilege, and their failure to realise that they did not speak for all women, further endorses Spelman's thesis on the unrecognised hierarchies within feminism.

Conclusion

Alternative feminisms

However, respondents from the Centre for Women War Victims, and the Autonomous Women's House (which works on issues of violence against women) in Zagreb, have argued that shifts in feminist outlook began to take place in the mid-late 1980s. Gradually Yugoslav feminists began to critique a range of alternative issues: compulsory heterosexuality, violence against women, discrimination against women, gender education, the reclaiming of women in history, and proactive outreach to less educated women. In so doing, some of them gradually began to take up places outside of the party, and outside of the state system. Whilst much of this work was being done by educated women of privilege, a new body of feminists were making their mark. These were women like T. (now in the Autonomous Women's House, Zagreb) who became involved as radical feminists, working at a grass-roots level against violence against women[12].

In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the growing strength of feminism, and the gradual way in which some feminists began to perceive themselves as alternative to/outside the state, were marked by a simultaneous rise in overt nationalist

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[11]Barbara Jancar (1985), a North American academic is one of the few writers to comment on the lack of feminists in these regions, whilst Tatjana Djurić, 1994, refers to the failure of feminist NGOs to reach beyond the cities (p.134). Although this critique took a long time to develop in the west, and thus one might expect a time-lag for its dissemination in Yugoslavia, the war has speeded up the way in which feminist ideas have been disseminated, and thus I am surprised at its absence. I read the lack of engagement with this particular discourse as a failure to see its relevance to Yugoslavian society.

[12]Interview, November 1998.

politics. This was accompanied by a nationalist backlash against women, which demanded the removal of women from the public realm, back to the private realm of the family. What is difficult to untangle is the motivation for the growth in alternative feminisms. Was it a direct response to the growth of nationalism, and the nationalist threat to women's role in the public sphere? Were feminists placed outside of the public/symbolic order by nationalists because they represented a threat to the new nationalist order? Or were feminists repudiated by the nationalists because of their links with the Communist/socialist party, which were portrayed by the nationalists to be the new enemies of the state? It seems likely that the rise in alternative feminism was influenced by all of these things. However, it is my contention that the strongest factor in alienating some feminists from the social/public order, was the innate misogyny of the increasingly overt nationalisms in Yugoslavia, which are described in the following chapter.

Yet, as this chapter has illustrated, the success of these misogynies in removing women from the public realm was aided by the fact that women's position in the public realm was never that secure, and as Duhaček argues, when women perceived themselves to be equal in post-Second World War Yugoslavia:

> A thin layer of ideologically based egalitarianism was superimposed on a stable patriarchy. Time did make it grow thicker, especially at certain points, as at the level of legislation ...(p.136).

However when:

> The imposed ideology [of socialism] 'started withdrawing, the egalitarian layer cracked and revealed an almost untouched patriarchy' (*ibid*).

Chapter 5
Nationalism and feminism in the public realm in Yugoslavia/Former Yugoslavia

Women were given the role of protectors of traditional values as imagined by the ethnic fundamentalists. Women, then, are divided into those who adopt the values of the national community and those who reject them.

Staša Zajović, 1994 'About cleansing', p. 66.

Synopsis

This chapter examines the way in which overt nationalisms in the late 1980s and early 1990s sought to marginalise and exclude women from the public order in Yugoslavia/Former Yugoslavia. It examines the complexity of feminist responses to nationalism, which often straddled a grey zone between endorsing some nationalist policies, and condemning others. However, this chapter concludes that, in the long-term, nationalism effectively split and divided the feminist movement in Former Yugoslavia. Some feminist groups became the mouthpieces of nationalism, mirroring women's position in the private realm (described in Chapter 7), whilst others chose to place themselves outside of the nationalist order, taking up spaces on the margins of society

Gendered discourses of nationalism in Yugoslavia/Former Yugoslavia

Women and the Other

The gradual removal of women from the work place, described in the previous chapter, began ostensibly as a response to the economic crisis of 1979. However, by the late 1980s and early 1990s women's exclusion from the workplace was not

simply a matter of economic downturn, but the result of nationalist campaigns which actively discouraged the concepts of working-women, and women taking up space in the public sphere. Instead there were demands for women to return to the private sphere of the family, and the tasks of child-care and home-making. Cynthia Cockburn (1998) observes that:

> The task of a patriotic woman was no longer to build socialism by her labour but to regenerate the nation through motherhood (Bracewell, 1996). .... The two-thirds of women who had never left home for paid employment saw their domestic roles endorsed. Professional women found ideological support for their choices draining away (p.161)[1].

The women who perceived their home-makers' roles to be endorsed by nationalist discourses were primarily rural women. The foci of the call for women's removal from the workplace were urban professional women. These were, as I argued earlier, the women with more autonomy, more privileges, more visibility, and more voice. Urban women then, were primary targets for the new nationalist order[2].

Yet the complexity of the nationalist message rapidly tied this demand for women to return to the private realm of hearth, home and baby-making into a discourse on reproductive policy and a fear of the Other, within Croatia, Serbia, and Croatian and Serbian parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Staša Zajović (1995) from Žene u Crnom (Women in Black), Belgrade, sums up the Serbian nationalist campaign:

> The development of nationalist propaganda may be divided into two phases .... the first phase starts as early as the middle of the eighties. It consisted of the preparation of various projects aimed at the "suppression" of the "white plague" (i.e. the non-Serbian population, in particular the ethnic Albanians). The second was of propaganda about child-bearing for patriotic reasons, that is, for the enhancement of national security (p.2).

The Serbian panic over the "white plague" gave rise to the notorious Kosovo rape stories. These propaganda rumours, from the late 1980s, reported the threat of "ethnic rape" of Serbian women by Albanian men in Kosovo. This was an absurdly clever piece of nationalist manipulation, which Silva Meznarić (1994)

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[1]Cockburn's reference to Bracewell's article: 'Women, motherhood and contemporary Serbian nationalism' in *Women's Studies International Forum*, Vol. 19, Nos. 1/2: 25-33.
[2]This phenomenon is examined in greater detail in Chapter 7.

sums up as a nationalist campaign to discredit Albanian men, and to instil fear 'in women of entering into the public domain because of the rape that awaits them there' (p.76). Meznarić argues that it was a way of 'disguising the opposition between men and women that inevitably accompanies the entrance of women into the public domain in traditional societies' (*ibid*). This propaganda thus served to frighten Serbian women out of the work place whilst it 'sharpened the border between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians' (pp.76-77)[3].

The build-up to the wars in 1991 and 1992, which resulted from the contested secessions of Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina[4], saw an increase in the use of nationalist discourses to demonstrate the difference between ethnic groups, and to urge the erection of rigid and static boundaries between these groups. In this atmosphere the links between nationalism, racism and misogyny became more overt and more defined. The mobilisation of misogynyies, directed, in particular at the women of the Other, became a trade-mark of nationalist rhetorics in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. These became more vitriolic once war actually broke-out.

Increased racism and misogyny in Serbia

In Serbia, in 1992, discourses of racism and misogyny peaked when the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia adopted "The Warning":

> *"The Warning"* openly points to the "threat" that minority peoples pose to the majority, that is, since "Albanians, Moslems, and Gypsies, with their higher birth-rate, deviate from rational, humane reproduction, they threaten the rights of other people". That is to say, women of these peoples (and not men, on this point) participate in "the general conspiracy against the Serbian people"; they bear children, it is claimed for separatist, fundamentalist reasons, and thus Serbian women should bear children for patriotic and moral reasons. "The will to bear children should be mobilised."(Zajović, p.2).

[3]Ironically, it resulted in the new crime of 'ethnic rape' being written into the Serbian penal code in 1986.
[4]Slovenia's secession was contested in 1991, but the war lasted only ten days.

"The Warning" thus singled out the women of the Other as being one of the greatest threats to Serbian demography, whilst accusing Serbian women who did not have children of being 'conformist and selfish'(p.3), blaming them for the Serbian demographic tragedy. At the same time, the powerful Serbian Renewal Movement stated that one of its goals was:

> [T]he restoration of the family, the return to tradition, ensuring conditions for an honest living. The Serbian Renewal Movement will place its capabilities at the service of the renewal of the Serbian character, striving for the flourishing of those virtues of the Serbian man that will soon become part of the Serbian moral code. (*ibid*)

The Orthodox Church endorsed these proposals, striking an anti-abortion stance, claiming that 'Feminists are in favour of killing unborn children' (*ibid*) and in 1993 it introduced the Mother Jugović medal which it awarded to mothers of four or more children, whilst pointing out:

> In earlier times, mothers were able to send as many as nine sons to the emperor's army, so that they could fight for the freedom of the country and of their Orthodox faith. We have such mother [sic] today too, but very few. (*ibid*)

Whilst the othering of women is generally pervasive in nationalist discourse, these Serbian policies were remarkable in their resemblance to the policies and discourses of Nazism in a number of ways. The construction of the feminist, urban, working Serbian woman as an enemy of the nation, resonates with the discourses of early German fascists and Nazis, foregrounded in the work of theorists such as Klaus Theweleit (1987). Taking up space in the public sphere, the urban working Serbian woman, like the urban, working German woman, represented a particular threat to social cohesion by undermining the nation and increasing the threat of domination by the ethnic Other. The similarities between Serbian discourses of nationalism and the discourses of Nazism are also found in the focus on procreation, which condemned childlessness, exhorting ethnically pure mothers to bear children; firstly to ensure that the nation was not engulfed by the children of the Other, and secondly in order to breed more sons to fight for the nation. The similarities also reside in the allegation that women of the Other were conspiring in the downfall of the Serbian nation through their reproduction. This

resonates with Gisela Bock's (1991) controversial, historical interpretation of the gendered dimensions of the Nazi genocide of Jewish people, when she argues that:

> 'Jewish women were killed as women, as child-bearers and mothers of the next generation of their people' (p.249).[5]

These discourses also resonate with the Nazi feminisation of the male Other through the denial of his fecundity. For example, the Kosovo rape propaganda echoes Hitler's portrayal of Jewish men waiting to 'catch Aryan girls' (George Mosse, 1985, p.134). In this scenario Albanian men are portrayed as the 'inferior race filled with lust' waiting to rape Serbian women (*ibid*). Like the Nazi portrayal of Jewish men, Kosovo-Albanian men become deviant and over-sexed, yet feminine. For, as Renata Salecl (1994) observes, the Serbian reportage of the Kosovan rapes maintained that although rapes were attempted, they were never fulfilled: 'A picture of the enemy thus takes shape as an Albanian who tries to rape Serbian girls, but is unable to do so.' (p.23). Serbian Muslim and Roma men also become part of this deviant equation. However, the Serbian Renewal Movement's plan for the creation of the 'Serbian man' represented an antidote to this deviancy, and this femininity. As with National Socialism's vision for the future of the Aryan male, the new Serbian man's hegemonic (and of course heterosexual) ethnically-pure masculinity would represent a bastion against the polluting feminisation of the Other.

Croatian nationalism

The atmosphere in Croatia regarding women and reproduction was very similar (though legislatively it was more cautious than Serbia, guarding its status as a UN protectorate, and its courtship of western Europe/NATO), with a prevalence of the same racist and misogynist voices heard in Serbia. In 1992 the nationalist, Catholic

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[5]Theresa Wobbe (1995) draws on Joan Ringelheim (1997) who has clearly drawn on Bock's work (it is very similarly worded), to argue that Jewish women represented a threat because Jewish religious identity is inherited from the Jewish mother.

Although in the context of Former Yugoslavia, ethnic lineage of all the protagonists was passed down from the father, the potential of the female Other to become a mother was clearly an issue, and one which may have influenced Serbian men's choice to rape. However because ethnicity was perceived as being passed on by the father, this might explain why Serb rapists did not always kill the women they raped, and why sometimes they insured the impregnation of the women they raped.

priest, Don Antô Baković, became head of the new Department of Demographic Renewal within the Ministry for Renewal. He wrote a draft paper for the Croatian government, entitled The Concept of Democratic Restoration which wove together his own recommendations and the recommendations of a conference held in June 1992, on The Spiritual Revival of Croatia. The tone invoked the same moral and demographic panic as that holding sway in Serbia.

Again the working woman, taking up space in the public realm, was denounced for her refusal to return to the private realm of the family, and the sanctity of her role as mother. Thus she was held to be accountable for the decreasing birth rate of ethnic Croatians in Croatia. The paper urged that the:

> Republic of Croatia should create laws and provide conditions for rendering the profession of MOTHER-RAISING CHILDREN the most sublime profession (38a)[6].

Weaving in an exhortation that the moral protection of the family was paramount, it advocated that:

> The Croatian Republic should fight against everything which is against the marriage and family, using all the legal means and political influence. (38.4b)

It condemned abortion, urging the government to erase pro-choice attitudes from the media, school-books, and the regulations 'of the period of communist simple-mindedness.'(37.5)[7]. And as in Serbia, the fecundity of the Other, Serbs, Muslims, Albanians, Roma was pinpointed as a threat to the integrity of the Croatian nation[8].

The paper mixed an eclectic range of subject matters, making connections between the re-invention of the nation, mothering, national security, the influx of alien Albanians into rural agriculturally rich regions, the police-force, the Church and the role of Croatian men in defending the republic (see figure 6 overleaf). As in

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[6]Translated by Zagreb Women's Lobby.

[7]The right-wing government legislated that women could only have an abortion in the first eleven weeks of pregnancy. *BaBe* (1994) states:

> .[A]ll state hospitals recently started the practice of obligatory counselling and questioning of women seeking an abortion by the Ethical Commission. In some cases women are made to watch a film depicting the killing of fetuses. Anti-abortion movement volunteers and clergymen form a majority on the Ethical Commission (*op cit* p.6).

B.B. from *BaBe,* stated in an interview in 1998, that the church and government were still trying to legislate for a total prohibition of abortion.

"The Warning", this paper constructed hegemonic femininities and masculinities for Croatian men and women, where women were urged to bear children, and men were urged to father children and protect the nation. It insisted on the Croatian-ising of national institutions such as Croatia's new police force, and the provision of an all-Croatian national security, so that women could procreate, safe in the knowledge that the fathers of their children were policing the literal and metaphorical borders of Croatia[9]. The paper thus acted as a paradigm of Mosse's (*op cit*) assertion that nationalism always constructs itself as masculine, removing the feminine from the Symbolic Order, and creating a clear set of gendered binaries within the new nationalist culture. It also performed Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis's (1993) concept of the nationalist 'symbolic border-guard' (p.33), which, within Mosse's model, uphold the masculinity of the nation, protecting it from feminising influences, whether these are represented by women, or by ethnic minorities.

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[8]Even some respondents, who identified as 'politically-correct' feminists, managed to put across the national stereotype of Albanian men as untrustworthy and dishonest.

[9]Women from the Centre for Women War Victims were uncertain as to how many of these recommendations were legally implemented by the right-wing government. P. stated that Centre and the Autonomous Women's House were "hoping to track down in Croatian law which of these recommendations have been implemented, because these are not necessarily done in one block, but done in bits" (interview, September 1998).

Figure 6

Medvedgrad, overlooking Zagreb: religion and militarism meet at the memorial to the unknown soldier killed during the Homeland War, 1991-1995.

Nationalism in Bosnia-Hercegovina

The picture that has emerged from Bosnia is more complicated and less complete because of the way in which the conflicts fragmented Bosnian society. Whilst it is clear that Croatian and Serbian nationalisms of Croatia and Serbia were absorbed into the Bosnian-Croat and Bosnian-Serb nationalist discourses, which were saturated with the same gendered, racist Othering, Muslim nationalism, in contrast, is less easy to define. The clearest picture that emerges is where Muslim nationalism took the form of an enhanced Muslim consciousness and a greater intrusion of the Muslim religious hierarchy into the secular realm. For example, in the 1980s, the Muslim religious authorities began to exert increasing control over women's sexuality, reproduction and access to abortion (Islamic law prohibits abortion unless the mother's life was in danger).[10]

When the conflicts took hold of Bosnia-Hercegovina many Muslim communities, such as Zenica, Tuzla, Goražde, Mostar, Srebrenica, were cut off from each other, so that geographically the imagined Muslim community became a fragmented disjuncture of geographical areas, losing its sense of imagined religious/national cohesion. Different areas and different communities had very different styles of governance. Some areas were influenced by the policies of donor countries such as Pakistan and Iran, others were influenced by the presence of Mujhadeen, fundamentalist soldiers fighting for Bosnia. Both donors and Mujhadeen demanded stricter control of women, in terms of sexuality, access to employment and the public realm. In this they echoed the Serb and Croatian nationalisms. However, Salecl (1994) argues that this image of Muslim fundamentalism, which was subsequently adopted by the western media, was promoted/inflated by Serbian propaganda because it constructed the Muslims as foreign/non-Yugoslav/Other, and preyed on a deep-rooted western fear of fundamentalism (p.18). Ironically, the process of control of women's sexuality and reproduction within Serbia, and

[10]However, religious law on access to abortion was relaxed during the conflicts, when the Imam of Bosnia stated he would allow abortions for raped, pregnant women up to the fifth month of pregnancy.

Croatia, was barely noted by the western media. Rather commentary was restricted to feminist analyses within academic and activist publications[11].

When the conflicts ended, Muslim religious law continued to exert an influence over the secular realm. For example, in 1998 the Bosnia-Hercegovinan government firmed up its legislation on abortion. A., from *Medica Zenica*, stated that this organisation no longer performs abortions, or gynaecological surgery, because the Bosnian Government has recently ruled that only licensed hospitals are allowed to perform these operations (interview, Zenica, Bosnia-Hercegovina, January 1999). All such interventions are now channelled through state hospitals, and thus are controlled by the state.

The picture that has emerged from Bosnia-Hercegovina then, is that although nationalist discourses were prevalent, before, during and after the war, these have been less penetrable, less accessible, because of the fragmentation caused by the conflicts, and because of the sheer spread of the fighting. Western media reportage on the conflicts reflected this situation in its marked inabililty to understand who has been fighting whom (Sheila Allen, p.50), and by a manichean style of reportage. The voices of alternative groups in Bosnia-Hercegovina, such as peace activists, and feminists, who have represented significant conduits of information on the political atmosphere and events in Serbia and Croatia, have been missing from Bosnia-Hercegovina. In part this is because Bosnia-Hercegovina tended to be less politically active, but also because those voices that have existed have been dissipated by the geographical fragmentation of the war, and by the exigencies of surviving the violences.

In contrast, there has been a lot of information available on the Croatian and Serbian nationalisms which swept through Croatia, Serbia, and the Croatian and Serbian areas of Bosnia-Hercegovina, in the late 1980s. As illustrated earlier, these

[11]There has been very little analysis of Muslim nationalism, perhaps because of the extraordinary role of victim that many Muslims have played in these conflicts. Media reportage of the Muslim experience has tended to caricature Muslims in either of three roles: victim, peasant, or fundamentalist. There has been avoidance in portraying Muslims in an aggressive role, despite their burgeoning national consciousness during the 1980s.

embraced misogyny and racism, and resonated with the discourses used by Nazism before and during the Second World War[12].

Feminist responses to nationalism and the threat of conflict

As these discourses of nationalism took a hold in the Croatia and Serbia of the 1980s, nationalism and racism also began to permeate the discourses of feminism. Feminist respondents, and the archive of the Centre for Women War Victims (also some Yugoslavian feminist writers, such as Daša Duhaček and Mirjana Morokvašić) reference the way in which this racism came to divide the feminist movement in Croatia and Serbia. It was, as described earlier, a racism which foregrounded ethnic identity, carefully delineating and guarding the boundaries of the dominant ethnic group, and which (as described by B. in Chapter 3) led to the election of nationalist right-wing governments throughout the Federation of Yugoslavia. Concomitant with the electorate's rejection of socialism, and the party, was the public rejection of the ideal of Yugoslavism. Feminists who had been used to intra-national links, sisterhoods, and a world of party politics found that suddenly there were those amongst them who wanted to ensure that their national feminist organisations remained national, and were not pluralist or Yugoslav. Splits appeared in feminist organisations in Ljubljana, Zagreb, Belgrade, where pan-Yugoslav feminists separated from national/ist feminists.

Secession

Feminists in Slovenia and Croatia were taxed, not only by their internal division over perceived racism, but by the question of voting for or against secession, which necessitated an individual, as opposed to a group, response[13]. Many respondents in Croatia, who had been willing to talk with me about a variety of political issues

[12]This type of nationalist discourse is common to many countries during wartime. What is unique about these discourses is that they were prevalent well before the outbreak of war. This is why I have equated them with Nazism.

[13]I do not discuss Bosnia-Hercegovinan feminist reactions to their feminist secession because there was little in the way of organised feminism in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

revolving around gender and nationalism, drew a line at talking about how they responded to the question of secession. I experienced this not as a direct refusal to talk, but as a tendency to change the subject, to discuss the issue in very general terms, or to profess a difficulty in remembering this particular chapter of Croatian history because of the rapidity of events when they took place. Their reluctance to identify the voting positions of either themselves, or of friends and colleagues, and their reluctance to provide a narrative of this event, may have been because it stands at odds 'with the latent or manifest purpose, the desire to moralize the events of which it treats' (Hayden White, 1987, p.14).

I suspect that many of them voted for secession, but have since regretted the decision, in that it is inconsistent with their later sustained radical condemnation of Croatian nationalism, and their later rejection of national identities. An analysis of this part of Croatian feminist history thus reveals an ambiguity to their narrative constructions, and a respect for the ambiguities within the narratives of their colleagues.

Feminist responses to the start of the Slovenian and Croatian conflicts

The Slovenian and Croatian peoples' decisions to vote for secession rapidly brought these two countries to war with the rump of Yugoslavia. Feminist reactions to that war, in Slovenia, Croatia, and the rest of Yugoslavia were again, very complex. Feminists reacted as individuals (for example T., of the Autonomous Women's Centre in Zagreb, who decided to fight in the National Guard), and as groups, either condemning, or aligning themselves with particular nationalist viewpoints, and negotiating a politicised response to the events of the wars.

When war broke out, the Yugoslavian National Army (the JNA), was called into Slovenia, and Croatia, to oppose secession. The JNA contained young men from all over Yugoslavia, fulfilling their military service. Women (and some men) across Former Yugoslavia organised in a spontaneous movement to recall their sons from the army. Mothers travelled to Belgrade to storm the Serbian

Parliament; to the barracks of Ljubljana; to Zagreb, to encircle the generals with a wall of love "*Bedem Ljubavi*". When these events took place they were inspirational, to the women involved, and to feminists either involved as mothers, or observing. Yet within two or three months the movement had soured into a confusion of nationalisms. Cockburn sums up some of the conflicting agendas of the mothers

> Some were fighting against fighting in principle, against 'the disgrace of civil war' ... they were against their sons being obliged to fight brother *Yugoslavs*. But what others objected to was their sons having to fight people of their *own* republics (p.167)

Morokvašić (1998) states that '[t]he movement was immediately manipulated by the nationalists in power for their own purposes.' (p.84). For example, Croatian mothers, linked with *Bedem Ljubavi*, were to be found on television stating that they wanted their sons to fight for the Republic of Croatia and not for Yugoslavia. Morokvašić describes how, in the autumn of 1991, mothers demonstrated in the town of Temerin, Vojvodina. Temerin is a town with a mixed population of Hungarians and Serbs.

> [S]everal dozen women of all nationalities, mothers of Federal Army Soldiers sent to fight on Croatian territory, gathered ... to express their solidarity with other mothers protesting in front of the army headquarters in Belgrade. This display of transnational solidarity with other mothers was soon destroyed by the arrival of Milošević's ruling party delegates and some Serb refugees from Croatia, shouting slogans which were hostile to Hungarians 'Hungarians should go to Hungary, Serb mothers have suffered enough from them in the Second World War. ..... Accused of treason and under threat, the Serb mothers then withdrew, and only the Hungarian mothers continued their protest the next day (p.85)

What started out as an anti-war movement organised by women, ended in a propaganda show, manipulated by nationalists, who had control over the mainstream media. This event is interesting because in many ways it acts as a paradigm of women's negotiation of the public sphere (exemplified in the previous chapter which described the State's limiting of the power of the Anti-Fascist Women's League, and its containment of second-wave Marxist feminists), whereby

active Yugoslavian women in the public sphere seemed to swiftly become the mouthpieces of the male/patriarchal, public order.[14]

The reality of war

The war in Slovenia was relatively un-violent, lasting a mere ten days, in contrast the war in Croatia was protracted and extremely violent. At the end of 1991 the JNA, and Serb paramilitaries shelled Dubrovnik, and lay siege to Vukovar which fell to the Federal Republic (now represented by Vojvodina, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, and nominally Macedonia) in early November of that year, accompanied by tales of atrocities perpetrated by both sides. This was followed by protracted fighting, shelling and sieges in Eastern Slavonia and areas of the Krajina, close to Zagreb. Despite the Federal Republic's opposition, Croatia was recognised as an independent state, by the international community in early 1992.

In Bosnia-Hercegovina, the 1991, multi-party elections, where all the parties presented themselves as 'ethnic parties' and were elected on the basis of ethnicity, resulted in the spatial and ethnic fragmentation of the republic. Politicised ethnic identities were strongest in rural villages with a dominant ethno-religious community, but towns were also split along ethnic lines. In some places there were islands of Muslim, Croat, Serb political ethnicities, in others large swathes of land were held by a particular party. For example, the HDZ (the right-wing Croatian Democratic Union party, headed in Croatia by Franjo Tuđman) was dominant in Herzegovina. Political game-playing by Croatia and Serbia (wanting to annex parts of Bosnia for themselves) created a multiplicity of tensions, with each group fearing that deals were being struck by the others. The Serbian party

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[14]The fact that these were mothers who were being controlled, is I feel significant, and should be read in the context of Chapter 7, which argues that the mother in the public realm represented a threat to the identity of certain types of nationalist men.
I witnessed this type of control in November 1998 at an NGO fair organised by the UN in Zagreb. A Croatian woman (a member of *Apel*, a right-wing pressure group representing the families of the disappeared from Vukovar) publicly attacked and denounced a Croatian-Serbian man who running a stall at the fair. This woman claimed that the Croatian-Serb was a war-criminal who had tortured her in Vukovar. This created a huge scene, and in a military style operation, paramilitaries and war veterans surrounded the man in question and sealed off the exits of the building where the fair was held. The atmosphere was very tense, and without the intervention of a UN official, who summoned a Croatian government minister, I am convinced there would have been extreme violence.

began a boycott of Parliament. Finally a referendum on independence, boycotted by the Serbs, was held, whilst military posturing by all groups took place. The Muslim and Croat population voted for independence. The Bosnian-Serbs held their own referendum, which voted unanimously to stay in Yugoslavia. Barricades were thrown up in Sarajevo. At the same time fighting took place on the Croatian-Bosnian border in Slavonski/Bosanski Brod. War proper broke out in April 1992.

Options for feminists faced with war

Although the escalation into these violences might, to those with hindsight, have seemed inevitable, shock at the rapidity of these events, is often referenced by feminists writing/commenting on their experience of the war. It is used to explain a feeling of a lack of personal and political agency, which prevented them from reacting to these events. Similarly, the complexity of the nationalisms that were inherent to the Yugoslavian political system meant that some political events/activities such as secession, or the defence of Croatia against Serb forces, were endorsed by individuals, or provoked little reaction. Other events, such as discrimination against women and rising levels of domestic violence against women, were perceived to be unacceptable.

The events that created politicised reactions from individuals seem to have been defining moments in shaping their political identities. Critiquing how and why these events moulded political identities is extremely difficult, and is perhaps best understood by recognising that gender identities were not always foregrounded, even by anti-nationalist feminists. There were times when events privileged other identities, for example family, national, sexual, ethnic or religious identities. The following section of this chapter examines some of the range of feminist reactions, and tries to critique the motivations for these.

Pacifists

Many anti-nationalist feminists responded to the conflicts as pacifists. Dr. Katarina Kruhonja, founder of the Osijeck Centre for Peace, Non-Violence and Human Rights describes her own arrival at pacifism:

> I think that the beginning of my personal dedication to peace work and reconciliation could be placed in the moment when I became aware of my responsibility for what was going on - it was in summer 1991. At that moment I became aware that my own passivity towards "politics" was a factor which also contributed to the outbreak of the war. And I started to take part in actions which I thought could prevent it (1998b, p.6).

Kruhonja's frames her politics through a spiritually based pacifism, engaging with reconciliation and bridge-building. Feminist politics were subsidiary to these identities.

Other activists such as those from Belgrade Women in Black, were pacifists who demanded an end to the conflicts and critiqued the politics of militarism and nationalism. Their particular brand of politics was (and still is) framed through feminism, examining the connections between militarism, nationalism, masculinity, whilst foregrounding the female experience of war. Many of these women were/are active in other political arenas, such as the Autonomous House against violence against women, SOS hotline, lesbian help-lines, conscientious objection, and feminist academic activism. They have links with the international feminist movement, and the international pacifist movement.

Yugoslavs

Other feminists, such as the Croatians Slavenka Drakulić and Dubravka Ugrešic, first and foremost writers (although in the 1980s Drakulić identified as a sociologist), critiqued the war through their writing. Their particular political positions critiqued the war, from an anti-war (but not necessarily pacifist) stance, and argued against the nationalism that had divided Yugoslavia, whilst foregrounding women's experience of nationalism and war. When the war-rape stories broke, they argued that women had been raped by men of all ethnicities. This attitude caused consternation amongst some Croatian feminists, who were arguing that the victims of war-rape were specifically Croatian and Muslim women, and that Serbs alone were doing the raping. This split in feminist politics was brought to the attention of the Croatian press, who presented Ugrešić and

Drakulić as privileged women, whose education and links to the party had allowed them the luxury of this anti-Croatian political position. The Croatian magazine Globus, in December 1992, dubbed them, along with three other feminists, 'the five witches' and in a very personalised attack, critiqued their sexual relationships, their class/party links, the size of their apartments, their children or lack of them, and their links 'abroad'. This attack was an embodiment of nationalist misogyny organised around the idea that these women were taking up space in the public realm that they clearly did not deserve.

Endorsing violence

M. who identified as a non-nationalist, anti-militarist feminist academic critiqued the pacifist stance taken by women like Kruhonja in Croatia:

> "*It takes real guts to do this .. for the original women who took this stance .. but it was not a dilemma for me, I believed we should defend the country.*"

M.'s personal observation frames a different way of conceptualising the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, which have been adopted by a number of feminists. In this conceptual framework, although nationalism (and for some militarism) was rejected, defence of the country/nation which was under attack was perceived as a necessity. Defence then, was a rationale for survival. T., of the Autonomous Women's House in Zagreb and a virulent anti-nationalist (loudest amongst respondents in her condemnation of nationalist feminist groups), fought on the front-line with the Croatian National Guard for several months. Her support, like M.'s, was ostensibly for defence rather than for nationalism. Yet, there is an inevitable tension in the relationship with anti-nationalism/defence because although these feminists foregrounded personal identities that were predicated on survival of themselves, and members of their family, their endorsement, and/or participation in the fighting could be read by outside observers as an endorsement of nationalism. Thus from an outsider's point of view, both M. and T. fit Anthias and Yuval- Davis' model of one of the 'ways in which women have tended to participate in ethnic and national processes' (p.114.)

Defence is a thorny issue. Although T. and M. were, ostensibly, foregrounding survival as their motivation for supporting the fighting, the nationalist governments

of Serbia and Croatia depended on these reactions from the public to keep them in power. In less critical individuals, including a fair number of Croatian feminists, the presentation of the conflicts as wars of defence encouraged individuals to subscribe to a discourse of national victim-hood, that elided the nation's marginalisation of, and violence to, its Others. A similar phenomenon was noted by Žarana Papić (1999), a Serbian activist and academic in Belgrade, when NATO bombed Serbia during the Kosovo conflict in 1999:

> [T]he pro-fascist collectivization of Serbians under the NATO bombs becomes an overall phenomenon, reaching in its scope further than ever even among the previously declared democrats, anti-nationalists or pacifists, and [which] therefore [has created] an indifference to the destruction of the Other, the most dominant, political, cultural, public and private, fact of today's Serbia (p.1).

The glossing over of the distinctions between people who supported defence, and people who supported nationalism, created a facade of homogenous nationalism to those looking in from the outside. Thus, at times, the boundaries between defence and nationalism were extremely blurred.

Feminist infighting

In the summer of 1992, Serb, Muslim and Croat refugees escaping from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, into Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia, started to testify to rape. At first, the stories coming out of Bosnia and Croatia had no coherent pattern to them. However under the eye of a disbelieving press, these stories started to take form. Women's organisations supporting refugees started to document unprecedented amounts of predominantly young, Muslim women as survivors of rape. As these groups struggled to support survivors, and understand these events, Roy Gutman's[15]term 'systematic' came to be employed by the world's press, who scrambled to interview 'rape victims'[16].

Within the feminist communities of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia, feminists sought an understanding, and a theorisation of these rapes, that

[15]Gutman was the first journalist to report the rapes, breaking the story on 9 August 1992, in US Sunday papers.

effectively polarised them into two camps, which have been interpreted in a somewhat manichean way by the international feminist community as either nationalist, or anti-nationalist. Below, I critique Croatia's experience of feminist division, as a case history of this phenomenon.

Case history: Croatia

In 1992, Croatia's feminist movement consisted of a loose coalition of feminists, many of whom worked together on specific issues, for example, violence against women. This coalition had already experienced several rifts over feminist national identity, and perceived racisms within the movement. The theorising of rape in war represented the issue that created an irreparable split within this coalition.

Reporting rape

The Croatian feminist group *Kareta* is documented as being the first organisation to report on, and publish details of the issue of rape in war. This was followed in September 1992, by a report written by Nina Kadić (1992a), of *Trešnjevka* women's group, on the proceedings of a Croatian conference organised by Bosnian women's groups working with women refugees. The report, which was sent out to international humanitarian human rights groups, states:

> At a time when the world was shocked by the media pictures of Nazi-style concentration camps ... [17][in] Bosnia-Hercegovina, we were finding out about the existence of rape/death camps for women and children ...The existence of rape/death camps must be understood as a strategy of genocide, of a "final solution" ... the camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina are not solely sexual abuse centres but are part of an organised system leading to liquidation, i.e., "ethnic cleansing" of those of Muslim and Croatian nationalities. Sexual abuses in this context have modern precedents only in Nazi Germany.

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[16]See chapter 6 for an analysis of discourses of war-rape in Former Yugoslavia.
[17]This is a reference to *Trnopolje* and *Omarska* Camps 'scooped' by Penny Marshall of the ITN news-team.

This report, like Gutman's article, acted as a discursive template for the discussion of rape in Former Yugoslavia. The *Trešnjevka* report was used by journalists and humanitarian organisations alike, and precipitated a rush of internationals from hundreds of different aid groups, and human rights groups into Slovenia and Croatia. Each group had their own political or religious messages to get across, and each group was looking for verification: for facts, numbers, statistics, and victims. Some of these groups had money to spend, beginning an NGO 'trade war' where numerous Croatian NGOs competed with each other for international funding, and were required to jump through international hoops in order to get this money. Each humanitarian group published its findings, and put out press releases. Many groups subscribed to the 'Gutman' and *Trešnjevka* discourse.

The *Trešnjevka* group was made up of several radical Marxist feminists, with experience in counselling women survivors of gendered violence, and a familiarity with radical feminist discourses on violence. Their political rationale of the violences they saw coming out of Former Yugoslavia was to identify its gendered and sexualised nature, but at the same time to identify it as a deliberate policy of genocide/"ethnic cleansing". As such it had a place alongside the many other violences, including sexual violences against men, that were taking place in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. From a Marxist feminist perspective, sexual violence took its place within a hierarchy of violences and oppressions. The group clearly identified Serbs as the perpetrators of the violences, and Croatian and Muslim women as the victims.

Other members of the feminist community were uncomfortable with some of the politicised discourses being used by this group. In particular they were uneasy with the placement of sexual violence against women in the context of other violences, and the clear ethnic-naming of perpetrators and victims[18]. These women argued that Croats and Muslims were also raping women in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, and that the victims/survivors of rape included women of all ethnicities, and thus the feminist coalition fell apart.

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[18]Note that there is no word/concept that means survivor in Yugoslavian, there is only the concept of victim.

The women opposed to *Trešnjevka's* discourses formed The Zagreb Women's Lobby, and liaised with women working on the same issues in Belgrade. They set up The Autonomous Women's House, an organisation to counsel and support survivors of domestic violence, which has a sister-group in Belgrade. They also set up the Centre for Women War Victims which initiated refugee-support projects, with the aim of supporting women regardless of their nationality, with an emphasis on trust-building and self-help, leading towards counselling for sexual violences when survivors felt ready.

The *Trešnjevka* group continued with the work on domestic violence that had been the project of the feminist coalition. They also continued to work with refugee women. However, after the fall of Vukovar in 1992, and the continued fighting in Eastern Slavonia and the Krajina, this group started to frame the experiences of Croatian and Muslim women within the context of the war that was still taking place in Croatia. Their relationship with the Zagreb Women's Lobby, their trauma at the war-violences and devastation in parts of Croatia, and their abhorrence of things Serbian, heightened the group's personal sense of marginalisation, so that it came to perceive itself as distinctively Croatian. It identified Muslim women as similarly oppressed, and liaised with Muslim's women's groups such as *Biser,* whilst making links with other Croatian groups that identified primarily through a Croatian national identity. One of these was *Bedem Ljubavi,* the Mothers of Peace who had earlier surrounded the generals with a 'wall of love'. *Bedem Ljubavi* embraced Catholicism, supported the Volunteer Defenders of the War, and endorsed the politics of the HDZ . There is a sense, then of *Trešnjevka* moving (perhaps) unintentionally 'right', towards a radical feminist nationalism, and towards the embrace of the Croatian right-wing. Its political slippage resembles the way in which radical feminists (such as anti-pornography campaigners in the United States) sometimes seem to unintentionally become the tools, or mouthpieces of the extreme right.

The focus of *Trešnjevka's* increasingly right-wing feminism was located in the group's analysis of ethnic sexual violence, and its movement away from a critique of women's rights within the nation. *Trešnjevka* thus appears to have engaged with the Croatian 'national project', thereby performing Anthias and Yuval-Davis'

(1993) thesis on 'ways in which women have tended to participate in ethnic and national processes':

1. as biological reproducers of members of ethnic collectivities;
2. as reproducers of the boundaries of ethnic or national groups;
3. as participating centrally in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and as transmitters of its culture;
4. as signifiers of ethnic or national differences, as a focus and symbol in ideological discourses used in the construction, reproduction and transformation of ethnic or national categories;
5. as participants in national, economic, political and military struggles (p.114).

Throughout late 1992 and 1993, the group attracted a variety of maverick radical feminists, located at the edges of right-wing politics. Catherine MacKinnon's name stands out amongst these. Her disturbing, and poorly referenced article 'Turning Rape into Pornography: Post-Modern Genocide' which was published in the July/August edition of Ms., acknowledges *Trešnjevka's* help in its writing[19].

Widening the split with international feminists

In Zagreb in February 1993 a symbolic trial of war-rapists, *in absentia*, was organised by a German women's group "PERSPEKTIVE". The trial could not take place without the permission of the President, and this opened the event up to the manipulation of the Croatian government. A very angry farce ensued, with the domination of the speaking platform by Croatian women sympathetic to the government, including *Bedem Ljubavi;* the absence of the Serbian women's delegation (who were refused visas); and a fight over a banner erected by a Vienna feminist group, with the slogan 'Rape is not a question of nation'. This event served to widen the political rifts between the two factions of women, and to further alert the Croatian media's attention to the issues being disputed (by this time the Globus article had been published). Media reportage condemning Zagreb Women's Lobby and the Autonomous Women's Centre continued. The type of accusations levelled, chiefly at the Autonomous Women's House were that they

[19]See chapter 7.

were unpatriotic, un-Croatian, unprofessional, radical feminists. The Zagreb Women's Lobby, and the Autonomous Women's House wrote letters of outrage, denial, clarification.

In March 1993, women from all over Yugoslavia were invited by MADRE, a feminist group in the US, to a peace tour, entitled Mother Courage Peace Tour II. Women from *Trešnjevka* were not invited, whereas women from the Zagreb Women's Lobby were. The *Trešnjevka* women asserted their non-presence through faxing their outrage to key members of MADRE. By this point, however, the authoritative voices on rape, within the international community, were the women from Zagreb Women's Lobby, the Autonomous Women's House in Zagreb, and their sister group in Belgrade. The voices of *Trešnjevka* were fading out, in an international condemnation of nationalism, and an insistence within the feminist community in perceiving the rapes as gender crimes, perpetrated mostly by Serbs, but also by men from all the factions (including the UN) in the war. Sexual violence was perceived as a crime that stood out on its own.

The split was complete. The *Trešnjevka* was isolated from the global feminist community, and thus had no feminist voice. The Zagreb Women's Lobby had a feminist voice, and international feminist backing, but no voice, and no status within Croatia.

Reflections on feminist infighting

Respondents in the Autonomous Women's House, and the Centre for Women War Victims talked about the split between themselves and *Trešnjevka* in 1992. Some, such as T., were very clear that *Trešnjevka* were nationalists. T. was still enraged by their politics. Others, such as P., were more reflective, and stated that perhaps the differences between the groups were not really as great as they had been perceived at the time. P. was quite open about her respect for some of the women that work in these groups, and she described how at the time of our conversation in February 1999, some members of The Autonomous Women's House were working with women from *Kareta*, a sister group of *Trešnjevka*, on an SOS hotline.

However, when I interviewed V. from *Kareta,* along with women from *Bedem Ljubavi,* she was not as generous as P.. When asked about the 1992/93 split, V. became extremely angry to the point of near hysteria, shouting, and slamming her fist on the table. She accused the Centre for Women War Victims of naming *Kareta* and *Bedem* as nationalists, and thus ruining their reputations:

> *"The Centre for Women War Victims have everything, all the money, we have nothing. There is more sympathy for those destroying the regime in Croatia .. they are outside [of Croatia] ..."*

She continued a lengthy diatribe against the Centre for Women War Victims. However, when she had cooled down a little, she began to describe some of the projects that *Kareta* hoped to work on in the future. There were enormous similarities between this work, and the work of the Autonomous Women's House and Centre for Women War Victims. Both groups, at this point in time, were very concerned about the levels of violence against women; both groups supported women experiencing violence; and their actual working methods were similar enough for individual members of both groups to work on the same telephone counselling line.

Feminist discourses on war in Bosnia-Hercegovina

In contrast to the histories of *Kareta, Trešnjevka,* the Autonomous Women's House, Zagreb, and the Autonomous Women's House, Belgrade (which experienced very similar disputes to those in Croatia), the words of A. of *Medica* in Zenica, Bosnia-Hercegovina, stood out as an example of an organisation that saw its strengths as rooted in its initial lack of feminist ideology.

> *"Medica differs from some of the other organisations for example in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, or in Croatia, because it was based on need, and was a reaction to need. Some of these organisations were based on political activism, whereas Medica, was born out of response to crisis and need. This is Medica's strength. A lot of other organisations have fragmented, split up into smaller groups, or have been divided by political problems".* (Interview, January 1999.)

Given the histories of the other groups, which despite their similarities, were fundamentally divided and opposed to each other, the foundations of Medica

appeared to make it a stronger organisation. The members of this group seemed to have gained from their experience rather than to have lost; a marked contrast to the Croatian feminist experience. V.'s comment that the women of the Centre for Women War Victims 'are outside' has a particular poignancy, for this group seemed to have lost their national identity, or rather, they opted for an identity that excluded nationality. In contrast, Cockburn's (1998) work on *Medica Zenica* has shown that the *Medica* women negotiated, found, and reclaimed their differing national and cultural identities, in a very positive way.

The politics of obscuring or privileging national identities

The women at the Centre for Women War Victims and the women in the Autonomous Women's Houses in Zagreb and Belgrade, and Women in Black, Belgrade presented themselves as women who were trying to obscure their national identities, because of their rejection of their country's politics. This policy publicly placed these women outside of the national symbolic order, freeing them to critique the pervasive nationalism of their countries. Thus they were able to condemn their countries' racism and discrimination against women and ethnic minorities, and make public the political links between militarism, nationalist masculinities and violence against women. The price that they paid was that they were perceived, by those inside the Symbolic Order, to be outsiders. In this way their voices were perhaps not that effective in terms of being heard by those within the nationalist order[20].

In contrast those groups such as *Kareta* and *Trešnjevka* perceived themselves to be part of the national Symbolic Order. Yet on analysis this was perhaps a self-

[20]In my last visit to the Centre for Women War Victims in Zagreb, I noted a gradual slippage in this group, back towards the symbolic order. The group had begun engaging with patriarchal structures such as the government and the police-force, in an effort to change these structures. This change in policy and attitude can be explained by a number of factors. The group were encouraged by a slight decrease in nationalism in Croatia in 1999. Funding for the group was becoming increasingly elusive. And the group was involved in a campaign to establish a provision of government policy for survivors of domestic violence in Croatia,. Although maintaining their non-national identities, this group voluntarily entered, and was being allowed back into the Croatian Symbolic Order.

delusion. When I interviewed men from the politically powerful Volunteer Defenders of the Homeland War (Zagreb, February 1999) they referenced these and other women's groups, such as widows of the Volunteer Defenders, as part of a family grouping, employing terms such as sister-group. The sense I got from this familial referencing was that these political groupings mirrored the patriarchal structure of a Yugoslavian extended family. In this nationalist allegorical model of the family, the men's groups had public power, whereas the women's groups focused on private issues, such as domestic violence, mourning and bereavement, and were perceived by the men's groups from a fond yet paternalistic perspective.

This allegorical construction could be extended to argue that male nationalist control of the public order, and the subsequent control of women and feminist groups, brought the familial private realm into the public, and *vice versa.* This thesis is examined in greater detail in chapter 7, where I assess the influence that the family may have had on male choices to be violent to women during these conflicts.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the effect of nationalism on public perceptions of women in Former Yugoslavia, and explored feminist reactions and responses to these nationalisms. What emerges from this analysis is that perhaps it is irrelevant whether a feminist group identifies through nation or through a rejection of nation, because patriarchal nationalisms will always place women outside the Symbolic Order. However, the experience and work of groups such as Women in Black, Belgrade, whose exclusion from the Yugoslavian symbolic order has increased over the last few years, has given them a voice within the international feminist community. It has enabled them to clarify the links between nationalism, militarism, conflict and women's exclusion from the public realm:

> Every war makes social and private relations more patriarchal and legitimises the military, which means that the status of women decreases and hate against women increases (Women in Black, 1998a).

Since the January 2000 elections, my email links with this group have shown that they are now embracing the current government and emergent new, Euro-orientated state-system.

The relationship between war, nationalism, misogyny and sexual violence against women is examined in Chapter 7. This is preceded by Chapter 6, which examines the current debate on war-rape in Yugoslavia. It critiques some of the key literature on this subject, and argues for a new socio-historical approach within the literature, which is less dependent on testimony, and more dependent on social enquiry.

Chapter 6
Time and the politics of testimony.

Synopsis

Although there is some medical evidence for the raping of women during the Former Yugoslavian conflicts, the main bulk of evidence for these crimes lies in witness and survivor testimonies. This chapter examines the nature of survivor testimonies of rape, the contexts in which testimonies have been given, and their use by academic and populist writers commenting on the phenomenon of war-rape. It observes that, during the conflicts in Former Yugoslavia, journalistic methods of gathering testimony (such as those found in the work of Alexandra Stiglmayer) and human rights testimonies have influenced the way in which academics and practitioners have been writing about rape. It argues that these types of testimony are limited sources of evidence in that they reflect the time-line and contexts in which they were given. They are specific to a point in time during the war when rape was recognised as a human rights catastrophe, and when survivors needed to tell the world about this terrible phenomenon. The continued dependence on this evidence, by academics and practitioners, and the continued dominance of the journalistic and human rights genres within academic writing, now seems inappropriate.

This chapter suggests, then, that although the academic and practitioner community should never forget the experience of survivors, those commenting on these violences need to find new sources of evidence, and new avenues of enquiry, in their quest to understand why these violences occurred. The rapid changes taking place in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, where war is coming to be seen as a past event, similarly demands this change in outlook. This chapter concludes with a brief analysis of how the debate could shift, suggesting that an examination of Yugoslavian social structures for theories of perpetration, may represent one avenue of enquiry.

A 'lack' of evidence

One of the original, driving questions of this research project was: how and why could ordinary individuals murder/ rape/inflict terrible injuries onto others (including former friends and neighbours), in the most gruesome, inventive and sadistic ways, during the wars in Former Yugoslavia? It was originally anticipated that interviews with respondents would provide some of the answers to this question. The respondents whom I had expected to comment on violence were Former Yugoslavian women, working in NGOs, who had counselled women survivors of war-related violence (some were still doing this). They had previously been very vocal on these issues, initiating and contributing to feminist debates on violence against women in wartime. I had hoped that these respondents would provide a politicised overview of some of the reasons for violence, based on the evidence that they had encountered during their work with survivors. However, when I began to interview these women, it transpired that many amongst this group of respondents were no longer prepared to talk about their professional experience of war-related violence. Thus the interview process could not provide material, substantive answers to the thesis questions.

My initial reaction to the reticence of my respondents was a feeling of intense frustration, and a fear that the research project was compromised by this silence: for without material from respondents it seemed that the main research question could not easily be answered. Yet, a more subconscious reaction to this reticence, which I have not, until now, been completely honest about, is that in spite of my frustration, I was also relieved that my respondents did not want to talk about their professional experiences of war, because subconsciously, for a variety of complex reasons (which I examine later in this chapter), neither did I.

Yet, my first response to my respondents' silence was to ignore these inner feelings of relief and to interpret this event in terms of personal failure, that by undertaking the fieldwork as late as 1998, I had 'missed the moment'. In an attempt to make the best of a bad job, I attempted several drafts of this chapter, drawing on archival evidence and testimony from human rights literature. Each successive rewriting of this chapter was marked by large voids in the text where I told myself I would wait

till later to insert the evidence backing up a theoretical argument on perpetration. Finally I was forced to admit to myself that I was deeply unhappy about my 'use'[1]of testimony, and that I needed to address this situation.

My subsequent analysis of this problem recognises that the silence of my respondents was not necessarily a negative event in the course of the fieldwork, but rather, it represented an unfamiliar form of evidence. My preoccupation with 'solid'/substantive evidence[2] resulted in an inability to recognise the silence of my respondents as a social phenomenon that needed further analysis, and a failure to examine my own reservations about the appropriate use of testimonial evidence. The analysis that follows links the silence of my respondents with my inability to use testimony, and perceives these two phenomena as part of the same event. It argues that the silence of my respondents indicated a sea-change in their social, political and historical outlook. By 1998/1999, people in the Yugoslav successor states were beginning to conceptualise their wars as past events, necessitating the use of different discourses to those previously employed when discussing the conflicts. Their silence was also an indication, to researchers such as myself, that the academic discourses of the war, with their focus on discrete testimonies of violence, also needed to change.

In terms of social context, the resistance to speaking about the wars was, for many respondents, (apparently) located in a need for closure; a phenomenon which I examine in chapter 8 (which deals with closure, trauma and memory amongst activists). From a political, historical perspective, their silence reflected the fact that the fieldwork was being undertaken at a time of massive change and social transition in the Yugoslav successor states; a time when the compelling nature of testimony of war-crimes was being over-written by the force of this change, and where the need for a practical reaction to events related to post-war phenomena, such as returning, and reconstruction, was becoming more compelling. The transformation in collective social recognition, and the need for a whole new range

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[1]The term 'use' is evoked by Tony Kushner (1999), in his examination of Holocaust testimony. There are distinct parallels between Kushner's arguments relating to Holocaust testimony, and Former Yugoslavian testimony. These are explored later in this chapter.

[2]This was driven, in part, by my assumption that hard evidence was required by the academic bodies examining me, in order to demonstrate a rigorous analytical methodology

of human rights issues to be addressed, had impacted on respondents' willingness and ability to remember the war, and shifted the focus and methods of human rights based activism to post-war related activity.

Testimonies of violence

The silences of my respondents were usually very specific. These were silences around their professional war-memories of work with survivors and witnesses of war-violence and/or war crimes. In the course of their work these women had heard hundreds of different spoken testimonies of war-violence. Some had documented these testimonies for legal and research purposes. Others had dealt with physical testimony, for example the bodily injuries that occur when women are raped. These were documented, to form part of a survivor's medical record, and contributed to statistical evidence of the prevalence, and types of force used in certain types of violences during the war. Thus many of my respondents were professional women who had been highly active, during the war, in informing the world about these war crimes. They often represented the conduit through which a woman's testimony was heard, and thus, in a sense were the original gatekeepers of these testimonies. The survivors who gave their testimony to these women invested in them a trust and responsibility for the safekeeping and use of their testimony.

At the time in which survivor testimonies were being publicised, the reasons given by survivors, and by my respondents, for their publication were:

- so that the 'outside' world would know what was going on;
- so that the 'outside world' would try to stop what was going on;
- so that perpetrators would be identified and brought to justice;
- so that these events should never happen again (echoing the messages of social commentators on the genocides of the Second World War);
- and as a part of the clinical process of working on relieving their trauma.

These testimonies were specific to a particular time within the history of the war. Mirjana Morokvašić (1998) states that:

> The issue of rape was focused on by the media for a relatively short period of time in 1992-3. It stopped being an issue while the war was raging and women were no less and probably more raped. (p.82)

But perhaps more importantly for the survivors, these testimonies were specific to a particular point in a survivor's personal history[3], where a woman publicised her testimony as part of a therapeutic process (note, that in the list above the needs of the survivor are clearly under-represented).

The work that respondents undertook in informing the world and lobbying for changes to international legislation on war crimes was groundbreaking. Their lobbying brought the claims of indiscriminate killing of civilians, concentration-camps, and the mass-raping of women, to the attention of the media[4]and human rights groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch[5]. In turn, these groups inspired the involvement of various governments, and international

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[3]As I write this a Human Right's Watch Report (Vandeburg, 2000) on rape in Kosovo is just about to be released into the public domain. It publishes testimony from 96 survivors of rape, whose reasons for testifying echo the reasons given by survivors from Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia. These survivors are in a similar time-line to that of Bosnian and Croatian survivors, when they gave their testimonies.

[4]The story of mass-rape and mass-rape camps lagged behind the story of killing-camps and concentration camps. In part this was to with media agendas and a disbelief in the rape stories exemplified in Penny Marshall's (recently awarded libel damages from LM magazine) comments on the issue. Marshall, the ITN journalist who sprung to fame because of her reportage on the concentration camps, which broadcast the famous 'still' of the skeletal Fikret Alić behind barbed wire at *Trnjoplje*, stated that when she visited *Omarska* and *Trnjoplje* Camps:

> I have to confess sadly that it never occurred to me that they [the women in the camp] might have a story of mass-rape to tell. I think this is because I inherited a news agenda that has subsequently changed. (Saunders, 1993, p.13)

Nik Gowing (1996, p. 85) argues that the reportage of the camps forced the international political community into action, when they had already known about the existence of the camps some two months at least beforehand. Although the ITN scoop had positive political consequences, it is my opinion that Marshall's failure to think through the issues reflects a certain type of tabloid mentality, where enquiry and integrity can be displaced by the 'scoop'. I maintain that Marshall's failure to see beyond the wire of the camp, to the atrocities that might be occurring to women, reflects a complicity with the 'news agenda' that she blames.

See also Lindsey, 1995, for a discussion of the media resistance to, and disbelief of the rape-stories.

[5]Who were already in the process of examining allegations of human rights abuses in Former Yugoslavia.

Enloe (1993) hints that in 1992, Amnesty's began to investigate gender issues in war-areas, as a result of pressure from female staff inside Amnesty (thus hinting at broader political issues around power-holding and political agendas within this organisation). She does not reference a source for this, but my personal knowledge of some of the circles that Enloe moves in, suggests that although she did not reference her sources, that there is some substance to this claim. The NGO gossip-network suggests that gender is still a contended political issue in Amnesty.

bodies such as the UN, and the EC, who funded investigative missions to gather evidence[6]. Their work also inspired feminists activists and academics to re-examine issues around ethnic and gendered sexual violence last written about in any detail by Susan Brownmiller in 1975. The result was the publication of a whole swathe of edited volumes, articles and occasional books, on the issue of war-rape, being published between 1992 and 1998. However, what should be noted is that the framework and language of the initial discourses used by feminist activists, investigators, and human rights and legal experts, to examine the rapes in Former Yugoslavia, has dominated the discourses used in all these subsequent publications.

A brief history of feminist activist discourses on war-rape in Former Yugoslavia

When the international debates on war-rape began in the autumn of 1992, they were located in human rights literature, in the media, international political forums such as the EC and the UN, in the literature of Former Yugoslavian women activists, and in the literature of the international feminist community supporting these activists. The predominant arguments on this type of violence focused on the dynamics and practice of rape, with an emphasis on evidence and proof. The focus appeared to be firstly on persuading the international community that many women were being raped, and secondly in trying to seek some legal response to the raping of women.

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[6]See Lindsey (1995 pp.3-44) for a detailed account of this process. What is interesting about these investigative missions, is the replication involved. The same survivors were interviewed by each investigative mission (causing, in some cases, a re-traumatisation of the survivor giving testimony). This curious practice was a waste of both time and resources. Ostensibly it would seem to have represented a lack of trust between different organisations. However, if one was being more cynical, one could interpret this duplication as a way of biding time, and of raising the profile of the different organisations involved.
There was, also, duplication in the tone and interpretations of the ensuing reports of these investigative missions. These followed a 'reading formation' (Bennett, (1983) 1989) that had been initially set by Bosnian Muslim government spin-doctors, and subsequently by the western tabloid and broadsheet press.
This duplication was also evident in some of the testimonies drawn on by human rights organisations. Note however that in post-war Kosovo, groups such as Amnesty, Human Rights Watch and OSCE, have shared testimonies with each other, showing that within these particular organisations, some lessons have been learnt from the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina.

One of the first issues to be discussed by international investigators and Former Yugoslavian feminist activists, was the need to find out what number of women had been raped, and to prove that a 'significant' number of women were involved. Statistical extrapolations, based on testimony and an increase in the number of registered abortions and live births amongst Bosnian-Muslim and Bosnian-Croatian women, projected how many thousands of women might be keeping silent about being raped. These numbers ran into thousands. As more testimonies began to be trickle out of the refugee camps in Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Montenegro and Western Europe, a new dimension was added to these narratives of rape, whereby women claimed that Serbian soldiers were deliberately impregnating women, so that they would give birth to Serbian babies. Again, numbers were discussed by investigators. However the international feminist community dithered over the validity of these claims. Radical feminist political mores insisted on the need to believe a woman when she said she had been raped. Yet, radical feminists were also suspicious that testimony, and numbers, were being manipulated by a patriarchal war-machine, in order to increase support for the Bosnian Muslims, and lift the arms-embargoes asserted by the international community. The issue of identifying the number of women who had been raped/been impregnated began to be contested by groups of activists, such as The Centre for Women War Victims, Zagreb, on the basis that an intense focus on numbers reduced the meaning of individual experiences of rape, and obscured the real victims who were women.

Many survivors of rape by Serbian soldiers testified that the men raping them had said they were given military orders to rape. The conclusion amongst human rights groups, the international feminist activist community, the international media, and bodies such as the UN and EC, was that the evidence of numbers, and the repeated reports from survivors of orders to rape, proved that the rapes were 'systematic'[7](a phrase that has punctuated the text of many articles and books on the issue[8]), and that this was part of a Serb military strategy. Potential principal perpetrators such as Mladić, Karadzić, Milošević began to be identified.

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[7]See footnotes in previous chapter, which discuss Roy Gutman's introduction of this phrase.
[8]It is now also punctuating the discourses on rapes during the recent conflicts in Kosovo, and is being used by feminist Kosovo-Albanian women working with survivors, and by members of the international political community.

This insistence on the systematic nature of the rapes created a new debate on war-rape, which involved the international legal community who were already responding to the allegations of mass-killing in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. In the spring of 1993, the UN Security Council signalled its intention to set up an International Criminal Tribunal, where perpetrators of mass-killing, and mass-rape would be tried for crimes against humanity[9]. The term 'crime against humanity' specifically referred to crimes inflicted during the 'persecution of a political, ethnic or religious group', and was a legal term adopted by the Nuremberg Charter (Article 6c), for use in the Nuremberg Trials after the Second World War. Control Council No.10, which made provision, after the show trials of the Nazi leadership (that is, the Nuremberg Trials), for the prosecution of less infamous war criminals[10], incorporated rape into its definition of a crime against humanity. This then was the legal framework on which the indictments of the future Tribunal were to be hung.

Many activists and human rights groups who had lobbied for a legal recognition of the criminality of these rapes welcomed this move. The less cynical amongst the survivor community also welcomed this move (the more cynical believed that most of the perpetrators would never be prosecuted), because it recognised their experience of violence, not as an inevitability of war, but as a criminal act. David Becker (quoted in an interview conducted by Erika Fischer 1997a) argues that this type of legal recognition is especially meaningful to survivors:

> "In our societies, injustices are no longer redressed by bloody revenge; instead, it is left to the justice system to establish social truth, like giving victims a recognized status as victims. The public rehabilitation, the way society is coping with the past, is often more decisive than therapeutic care. The confirmation that, for instance, rape in war is a crime means to the individual that she will be socially rehabilitated. The punishment of the perpetrator as a task of the legal system is

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Robin Cook's 'breaking' of the story of Kosovo rape-camps, after the public-relations disaster when NATO bombed a civilian Serbian train, is perceived by many international feminists to be cynical spin-doctoring, which detracts from survivors' testimonies. The story has created confusion because those who are aware of being manipulated have wondered whether they should believe the rape stories.

[9]See Lindsey, 1995, pp.74-75.

[10]Chinkin, 1995, p.7.

> certainly important, but maybe not the most important thing for the victim herself. The most important thing for her is the establishment of public truth." (p.11)

The legal status, crime against humanity, given to these incidences of rape in war projected a specific, ethnicised identity onto the victim/survivor. From the point of view of rehabilitation it identified the survivor as a victim precisely because she was a member of a particular ethnic group. This signalled to the group that a survivor should not be stigmatised by them, but welcomed 'back' into the group. However, despite the intervention of religious leaders, who urged the social rehabilitation of survivors of rape, this was not a social reality. Survivors who spoke out often experienced stigmatisation and social rejection by their immediate communities[11], and by their kin[12].

The international feminist community began to critique the specific focus on ethnicity in the legal apparatus being used to criminalise rape. Although there was a consensus that many women were being raped because of their ethnicity, it was noted that this perception endorsed ethnicity as a 'marker' of women (Silva Meznarić, 1994), identifying them, or rather objectifying them, as the possession of a particular man, family or group. Recognising rape as a crime against a given ethnicity gave weight to the perception of raped women as 'damaged goods', leading to the perception of rape as a weapon of war and therein a patriarchal reading that rape in war is inevitable. Gabi Mischkowski (1997a) summarises the effect on the discourses that were used to describe rape:

> Once the extent of sexual violence in the war in the former Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, became known, it was practically only its function in war that was recognised, i.e., its use as a "weapon in genocide" or a "means of ethnic cleansing". Just like the attempt to "adjust" the statistics, right from the start this type of scandalisation threatened to result in a hierarchy of crimes. For many publications in the US, for example, the term in use was "genocidal rape".

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[11]See for example Mischkowski 1997a, p27.

[12]Some of the families of the Kosovo-Albanian women who were raped during the recent escalation of conflict in Kosovo in 1998-1999, have testified that their rape has brought shame on the family and that the woman is better off dead. Although this is not the case for all families of survivors, social rehabilitation of survivors in Kosovo would seem to be an alien concept. See for example, Williams (1999) and Igrić (1999).

> Basically this interpretation adopts the pereptrator's view. But for the victim, any rape, any form of sexual assault is a form of sexualized violence, a crime. (p.26)

In short, the legal focus on ethnicity obscured both the sex/gender of the victims, and the victims themselves, and as Mischkowski points out 'set the standards for all future administration of justice'[13].

The focus on ethnicity also inspired a manichean reading of rape in Former Yugoslavia, which was propagated primarily by the media, but also endorsed by some feminist groups, and some academics. The victims of rape were perceived to be Muslim or Croatian, and the perpetrators Serbian. When this view was contested by some feminist groups, for example, The Autonomous Women's Centre Against Sexual Violence in Belgrade (see Mladjenović, 1993), and the Autonomous Women's House, and Centre for Women War Victims in Zagreb, who argued that Serbian women were also being raped, and that Muslim and Croatian men were doing the raping (and that not all rapists were concerned with the ethnicity of their victims), a huge split occurred within the former Yugoslavian feminist networks (see previous chapter). Although the split is not generally reflected in the positioning of international feminist academics commenting on the debate, to those who know the history of the split, it is clearly recognisable in the work of some academics. For example, it can be seen in the work of Catherine MacKinnon (1993, 1994) and Beverley Allen (1996), whose respondents were

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[13]International law dictates that rape in war can be prosecuted on a number of other legal grounds, as violations of:

- Geneva Conventions on laws and customs of wars. Individual nations sign up to these. However Geneva Conventions are not effectively legally binding if a country has not signed up to them. In this case the Nuremberg Charter, Article 6b, may deal with this loophole. Yugoslavia signed up to the four Geneva Conventions, including the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, and Protocols I and II which deal specifically with rape, in 1979. Violations are known as 'grave breaches';
- The Nuremberg Charter Article 6b, on the laws or customs of war (as set out in Geneva Conventions). Violations are known as war-crimes;
- UN based laws, on Slavery, 1953, Torture, 1975, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment, 1984.

Sarah Sharratt (1997 p.20) points out that there is a hierarchy of criminal categorisation in the ICTY, where a grave breach is perceived to be a lesser crime than a crime against humanity, thus endorsing Mischkowski's argument.

drawn solely from the groups who perceived rape to be perpetrated by the Serbs[14]. What is noteworthy about their work is that they do not reference this polarisation within the discourse of rape in the Former Yugoslavian conflicts, indicating either a poor research methodology, or a deliberate elision of this debate. This omission is misleading to those who are not familiar with the range of published material.

Discourses of rape and the western researcher

Although a large number of western feminist writers have commented specifically and intelligently on the practice of war-rape since the rape-stories broke in Former Yugoslavia, few writers appear to have visited Former Yugoslavia for the purposes of their research, and few have reflected this methodology in their analyses. Most of those who have spent time in Former Yugoslavia are lawyers commenting on issues of jurisprudence, or counsellors, writing specifically for a practitioner, or funder, audience. MacKinnon (a lawyer, but commenting on causation rather than jurisprudence), Allen, and the writer Alexandra Stiglmayer (1994), are unique in that their research does not focus on jurisprudence, or counselling-based issues, but on evidence of the practice of rape. Stiglmayer's research, which appears to have been widely used as a core text by feminist writers, evolved out of an existing involvement as a journalist in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia. Her work, although less polarised than Allen's and MacKinnon's is, nevertheless, not unproblematic.

Stiglmayer's journalistic background permeates her work in terms of style and hard-nosed investigating. In the introduction to a 77 page-long 'article' in her edited volume on mass-rape (1994), she describes her need to find out if women were being raped in Former Yugoslavia:

> In order to get to the bottom of the matter, my friend and colleague the American journalist George Rodrigue and I set out for Bosnia-Herzegovina, to find other women with similar stories. Psychiatrists had told us that raped women in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the danger is more immediate, would be more likely to speak about what they had suffered than women who had escaped to the "safe haven" of Croatia. (p.83)

[14] *Tresnjevka* and *Kareta*, the Croatian groups discussed in Chapter 2.

Here Stiglmayer appears to set herself up as an arbitrator of truth. Although earlier in the text she briefly refers to the work being done by 'women's groups' in Former Yugoslavia, Stiglmayer does not use these groups as a resource for approaching survivors, but sets off alone (except for a fellow journalist), a female 'Indiana Jones' in pursuit of truth and testimony[15]. There is no mention of a concern for, or understanding of the mental health of her respondents, or of a consideration of the ethics in gathering testimony (this is very much in keeping with many of the journalistic methods that were being used in Former Yugoslavia during the wars[16]). Although she later describes herself as feeling traumatised by women's testimony, Stiglmayer appears to mistake empathy for ethical engagement, which is singularly missing from her research methodology.

A question of style

Stiglmayer's use of the testimony she persuaded women to give her employs journalistic devices, where the portions of testimony used are usually those that refer to graphic descriptions of sexual violence, or shocking descriptions of the conditions women endured during imprisonment. The context of a woman's life history, her individuality, the pieces of narrative that make it her story, are missing, so that only her sex remains, which is juxtaposed to that of the perpetrators of her rape/s. The story then becomes more the perpetrator's story than the survivor's, imbuing the text of the testimony with a voyeurism that is akin to the genre of hard-core pornography.

In this context Stiglmayer and MacKinnon (1994) have much in common. MacKinnon's analysis of the links between pornography and rape in Former Yugoslavia, which appears in the same volume as Stiglmayer's article, employs similar devices to those used by Stiglmayer. MacKinnon's sources, unlike

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[15]Slavenka Drakulić (1994) description of the methods she used when visiting to refugee camps to find rape victims, has parallels with Stiglmayer's methods.

[16]B.B. who used to work for the Centre for Women War Victims in Zagreb, recalled the tactics of CNN journalists:

> *"In a way CNN made it bloodier and bloodier, and more awful and more awful stories. You know, I'm sure the Centre still has the fax, you know that says "Can you find us a woman with really horrible, bloody story, preferably speaking English, for an interview."*

Stiglmayer's, were not drawn from first-hand testimony, but were based on second-hand and third-hand reported testimony, from two Croatian women's groups. MacKinnon describes in horrific detail, the pornographic scripting of rapes, the positions women were made to adopt by the perpetrators, the language used, and the filming of rapes. Like Stiglmayer the effect is one of voyeuristic hard-core porn, ironically closer in style to the pornography that MacKinnon lambastes, than to an academic text.

Yet, when Stiglmayer's and MacKinnon's texts were published in English in 1994, they was not critiqued as journalistic, voyeuristic, or ethically suspect. Rather, they were academically accepted as evidenced-based articles that formed part of a volume edited by Stiglmayer herself, to which several renowned and academically respected western feminist academics contributed (for example, Ruth Seifert, Susan Brownmiller, Rhonda Copelon and Cynthia Enloe). During the early days of researching this project I found myself 'taken in' by both texts. The testimonies quoted by both writers, but particularly by MacKinnon, were so appalling, that I was moved to quote from them. The audience I inflicted this on to was a 'captive' two supervisors. I now struggle to understand my reasons for doing this. My feeling is that time has much to do with this. The immediacy of these events, the fact that very little time had elapsed between these events happening, their publication, and my reading of them, pressured me into engaging with them. This feeling of pressure was located in part, in my identification with an historical guilt of British complicity with the long lead-up to the events of the Holocaust, and a failure to act quickly enough[17]. Contrarily, the time that has elapsed since these events, the fact that the wars and therefore the rapes, seem to be over, gives a sense of distance from these events that now allows me to reflect and criticise their treatment by Stiglmayer and MacKinnon. However, my justification for originally engaging with these texts was clinched by the juxtaposition of other, seemingly academically respectable texts, next to Stiglmayer and MacKinnon's articles. It was this juxtaposition, acting as an endorsement of MacKinnon and Stiglmayer's work, which persuaded me that their work must be academically credible.

[17]Note that the immediacy of events in Rwanda has not inspired this reaction in western audiences, presumably Rwanda is too far away, too African, too Other, for western audiences to identify with.

This issue of academic credibility needs examination. Again, time is a central issue. There are no historical precedents for the academic investigation of contemporary mass-rape, because the case of Former Yugoslavia represented the first time that mass-rape has been publicly reported by survivors, and come to the attention of the global media[18]. The study of the testimony of mass-rape in Former Yugoslavia is thus a historical first. It is the unique overarching sexual theme of rape-testimony that is problematic, because how does one present a graphic testimony of sexual violence without subscribing to voyeurism, and without privileging the perpetrator? The closest parallel to this academic dilemma is probably the study of the Holocaust, where in some academic, as well as populist, accounts of killings, sexual slavery, and dehumanisation of victims and survivors, authors have used testimony to create voyeuristic narratives of perpetrator violence. Daniel Jonah Goldhagen's (1997) internationally acclaimed, recent work on the Holocaust, represents a case of voyeuristic writing where 'Jewish voices, either from sources or more often as imagined by the author, are there purely to show the full horror of Jewish mass murder' (Tony Kushner, 1999, p.9).

The text, as Kushner points out 'verges on the pornographic' (*ibid*). But the use of 'imagined' voices by Goldhagen is not only pornographic, it is manipulative to the extreme. Although it is impossible to accuse Goldhagen of actually lying, his use of imagined testimony invalidates the 'real' voices of survivors, who (it would seem) have been far less accommodating with their narratives than Goldhagen's imagined victims, whilst simultaneously privileging the actions and voices of the perpetrators.

Kushner's criticism of Goldhagen raises a broader problem surrounding the purposes for which testimony is used, which is embodied in MacKinnon's, Stiglmayer's and Goldhagen's work. All three of these writers are driven to

[18]The First World War rapes in Belgium, and the Turkish rapes in Armenia perhaps contend this thesis. However, the post-war accusations of propaganda, which are still attached to the reportage of the Belgian rapes makes this a contentious and difficult case-study. It does, though, have remarkable parallels to the footnote above, on Robin Cook's use of the 1999 Kosovo rape-stories. The Armenian rapes seem to have been lost/written out of history.

convey horror, to shock their audience. There is an implication in their texts that they, as keepers of testimony, have a duty to do this, that testimony must be used for political ends, primarily to re-educate. However this feels like extremely suspect political territory. Should a writer be using testimony to shock? Is this not, as Kushner argues in reference to Goldhagen, akin to pornography? What are the limits of representation? Indeed should there be limits? My personal reaction to this question is that the limits are breached when I begin to feel manipulated by the use of testimony, when I find myself so uncomfortable that I resist the testimony itself, when I start to feel that the testimony has been implicitly damaged. But this is an informed, critical academic response, and my concern is that whilst academia sets itself up as an authority, it is out of touch with the 'real' world, and is at times too apolitical, too uninvolved. Reilly *et al* (1996) observe, with regard to the Holocaust that 'Many survivors fear, not without reason, that the Holocaust could, in the hands of insensitive academics, lose its human dimension' (p.209). This observation bears equal weight to the future study of the recent conflicts in Former Yugoslavia.

What then, of the testifiers themselves? Stiglmayer writes of her respondents, 'When they faltered and began to cry, I myself often had a lump in my throat ...' (*ibid*). It is possible that at this particular point in time, these women needed to give their testimony, and that Stiglmayer's lack of intellectual engagement, and her empathy, made her more accessible, more spontaneous, more human, than a counsellor, a UN investigator, or feminist academic. It is also possible that if these women were to read Stiglmayer's article, the horror would be acceptable to them, because the political purpose of their testimony was based on a need for the world to know the horror of what had happened to them. Perhaps then, this is what respected feminist writers also saw in Stiglmayer's work, when they chose to collaborate with her. Yet this analysis is written in the conditional tense, giving a sense of vagueness to these observations. This reliance on supposition reflects a huge uncertainty around the feelings and experiences of survivors when giving testimony. The only given that emerges from the analysis, is the way that survivors

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The rape of Chittagong women in Bangladesh in the 1970s was reported in the news media, but did not receive the type of coverage, and international outrage accompanying the rapes in Former Yugoslavia.

Pages 143 & 144 are missing from the volume

demonstrated in the section below) is stuck at this particular temporal juncture, and is based on a type of testimony that is limited by the original purpose for which it was given.

The current debate on rape in war

Darius M.Rejali, writing in 1998, summarises the state of the American feminist debate on rape in Bosnia:

> Analysts have distinguished three kinds of rape in Bosnia: rapes that occur when Serbs first occupied a village; rapes committed by prison guards in detention camps; and rape camps or houses temporarily commandeered by Serbs to keep women expressly for that purpose. Reports have also emphasized that rapes often took place publicly; and that often the victims knew the aggressors.
>
> In assessing this information, American feminists agreed that wartime rape could not be reduced to the psychological attributes of the individual aggressors or their mere aggregate in war. Rape must be understood in relation to social structures and practices. Mass rape also cannot be understood by emphasizing its unique or exceptional wartime character; rather it can only be comprehended in terms of everyday forms of violence which are considered legitimate. Finally, a rape account must identify the interrelationship between ethnicity and gender.
>
> Rejali (1998) p.27

Rejali's text references a clear established process in the analysis of rape in the Bosnian conflicts. Firstly evidence/testimony is examined, secondly the evidence is arranged into categories based on different types of practice of rape, thirdly, and there is a clear, paradigmatic demarcation in Rejali's own text that demonstrates this point, rape is theorised. There is a dialectic relationship between the categorisation of testimony/evidence of the practice of rape, and the theorising of rape.

This dialectic is evident in Stiglmayer's edited volume. In her article on the practice of rape, Stiglmayer collates the evidence into discrete groups, for example rapes in internment camps, rapes at home, rapes to impregnate a woman, rapes in Croatia, rapes by paramilitaries, rapes of Serbian women. In an essentially

descriptive text, she uses testimony to validate this categorisation. The academics writing in this volume theorise the reasons for rape. The juxtaposition of their theoretical arguments, to Stiglmayer's evidence, echoes the dialectic evidenced in Rejali's text.

Categorising evidence

Although, in her text, Stiglmayer does not state how many people she has interviewed, the back-cover of the edited volume informs the reader that Stiglmayer's essay 'presenting the core of the book' (thus affirming the role of evidence) details 'interviews with 20 victims of rape as well as interviews with three Serbian perpetrators'. It is not clear if the number referred to is representative of the amount of testimonies that Stiglmayer quotes, or whether she interviewed a total of twenty women. If the latter is the case, then twenty is a surprisingly small number on which to base her categories. Rejali's summary of the debate (which draws heavily on Stiglmayer's work, although Stiglmayer does not claim that only Serbs were raping) uses a similar categorisation system. My suspicion is (irrespective of the number of women interviewed) that the categories employed by Stiglmayer and Rejali echo, and have been drawn from, the discourses of human rights literature. These are to be found in the publications of human-rights groups who have become the principal trustees of archived and published testimonies of violence, and which, from the outset, have dominated the way in which violence is perceived.

In their attempts to give voice to collections of testimony on war-crimes, editors of human rights literature on Former Yugoslavia have collated atrocities into discrete categories[23], so that at times, the most horrible violences read rather like a shopping list, in a disturbing neutralising of the voice of the survivor. An example of this modification of atrocity into data is illustrated in the Index to Helsinki Rights Watch's (1993) Volume II on War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina which sorts evidence into the following groups:

[23]See Lindsey R., 1994., where I examine the way in which media-reportage of war-rape in Former Yugoslavia and human rights literature impacted on each other. Many of the 'findings' of the various investigative bodies (e.g. the UN, EC, Council of Churches) borrowed specific phrases and specific readings of war-rape from early news reportage.

> abuses by Serbian/Croatian/Muslim forces; abuses in detention; rape; mutilation; reported castrations; forced displacement; other abuses; killings; human shields; siege warfare; hostage taking ....

The testimonies, of some witnesses/survivors quoted in this volume, include evidence of multiple abuses, for example: being raped; being beaten; being used as a human shield; being starved; denied access to water; denied medical attention; denied access to toilets; subjected to mock-executions. This results in the need for substantial cross-referencing within the text. In this cross-referencing, the testimony of the informant is cut-off, edited, out of context, and thus is only partial, so that the voice of the survivor is never entirely heard. Instead testimony becomes a collection of episodic memories of specific physical acts of violence. These memories are static, frozen at the time of their remembering, and at the time of the abuse. The literature is not explicit about what happens to people's minds when the violence stops, and after testimony is given (its responsibility to survivors appears to end once testimony has been given). Instead, the genre focuses and edits testimony into a temporal narrative that identifies perpetrators, victims, types of violence, and spaces in which violence occurs.

This method of categorising and organising memory reflects the purpose of the literature: to provide coherent evidence of crimes during the Former Yugoslavian conflicts. It also reflects the audience for which it is intended, primarily, politicians, legislators and prosecutors. Although, in these contexts, the way in which memory/testimony is used is meaningful, in that it reflects the way in which international law perceives violence, the application of lists and cross-referencing to testimony, renders that testimony meaningless in all other contexts. Its presence in feminist analysis, where testimony is being used to try to provide meaning, understanding, to a survivor's suffering, damages testimony, and damages the messages that they give.

Changing evidence and changing theory

The clear relationship between existing, published evidence (primarily testimonies of rape) and theory in the feminist analysis of war-rape in Former Yugoslavia, suggests that without a change to the evidence being used, this feminist theory will

fossilise. The dearth in feminist based academic research in Former Yugoslavia, the reliance still, on the debates initiated by Former Yugoslavian activists , and the subsequent borrowing of evidence from other types of literature (journalistic, legal and human rights based), has resulted in a tendency for feminist analysis of war-rape to be reactive, static, and to continually circle the same issues.

These analyses are noted for their similarity in discourse and content. Most have a primary focus on the gender of a survivor, and critique the way in which the ethnicity of a survivor has been privileged above her gender, by mainstream commentators, family and community members, and ethnicised political commentary. Sometimes there is an analysis of the intersection of nationalism, and militarism within Former Yugoslavian society, and the resulting eradication of women's rights, and objectification of women. There is often reliance, by implication or direct quotation, on testimony, which has usually been lifted from published sources, and which is often, third, fourth, or fifth-hand by the time it reaches the pages of the 'new' analysis. Sometimes there is a critique of the actual practice of rape, which draws on the discourses of the radical feminist school which usually comments on 'peace-time' sexual and domestic violence against women (see for example Kelly, 2000). The overwhelming effect is that feminist criticism of war-rape may be original in its ability to see new angles within these commentaries, but these commentaries never reach out further than the existing debate.

However, it is my feeling that in the Yugoslav successor states, the passage of time is bringing this debate to a close. During the fieldwork for this project, this sense of closure was embodied in a respondent-silence surrounding the discussion of war-issues, particularly in interviews with Former Yugoslavian NGO workers who had originally contributed so much to this debate. Although there are a multiplicity of reasons for their silence, my belief is that in part, their silence represents a withdrawal of their tacit approval for the continuation of this debate[24]. My own

[24]Whether or not this is short-term or long-term is uncertain. For example, although the workers in *Medica* were reluctant to talk about the war, they were in the process of examining the long-term effects of rape on the gynaecological health of clients. They reported a significant link between rape and uterine and cervical cancers. *Medica's* emphasis on a woman's mental/emotional and physical health may mean that they return to the issue of rape testimony in the future.

feelings of relief, when respondents resisted talking about the war, echoed this sense of a need for closure. These feelings were foregrounded (principally) in a personal discomfort with the ethics of using testimony at this point in the debate, and a personal desire not to have to have to become emotionally engaged with the trauma within testimony, at a time when my emotional resources were already low[25].

The reality of change

Despite the fact that the feminist debate on gender-violence appears relatively static, for example, Liz Kelly (2000), there is evidence that change may be taking place. Sabrina P. Ramet's (1999) recent editing of a volume of essays on gender in the Balkans indicates a connection with the principle of change. This volume draws on the research of an eclectic group of American, Yugo-American, and Former Yugoslavian scholars who examine a range of social structures within Former Yugoslavia, including 'cryptomatriarchy' (Simić), homosexuality (Tatjana Pavlović), constructions of gender in Serbia (Žarana Papić), religion and gender in rural Croatia (Mart Bax). Although an eclectic grouping of material, the combination of research methods and subject matter creates an original, and novel interrogation of the Former Yugoslavian social order, looking particularly at the private, and the family, where gender and sexuality are first negotiated, and at the positioning of feminism and women within this order. Curiously, the dissonant voices in this collection, are those of Dorothy Q. Thomas and Regan E. Ralph, who write on rape in Bosnia. Written in 1994, their article is framed within the familiar feminist discourse on rape in war. Its inclusion within this edited volume implicitly links together the various themes, and focuses attention on the links between gender, ethnicity, family, sexuality and rape, but the article itself does not make these links, but rehashes the same arguments of feminist analyses of rape *circa* 1992-1998, whilst drawing on the same body of evidence. However, despite the problems surrounding the use of Thomas and Regan's dated text, Ramet's initiative is exciting, and suggests that the feminist dialogue on war-rape and

[25]In earlier drafts of the thesis I used the introductory chapter to discuss the emotional effects of the research on me, the researcher. This gave the chapter a very reflexive feel. After much consideration I decided that it had a negative effect on the chapter. It is my intention to discuss

gender-violence may be turning a dialectic corner, heading towards a more inclusive/expansive, holistic theoretical debate.

Building on Ramet's initiative and theorising gender-violence

Written before the publication of Ramet's volume, Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 of this thesis resonate with Ramet's initiative, in that they examine social structures in Yugoslavia. They provide a broad and, I hope, comprehensive background to Yugoslavian public and private identities as framed through religion, ethnicity, feminism and nationalism, which has been lacking in most other literature on the subject; this is the first work that I know of, which links together all this material. Although these previous chapters also examine gender in the public realm, what is missing, so far, is an analysis of gender in the private realm. This separation is deliberate, because it is my belief that a focused investigation of gender in the private informs the debate on war-rape. However, before I go on to examine this issue, I want to pause, briefly, to context this discussion within the debate on war-rape as it now stands.

Investigating rape in war

Looking back on this chapter, what stands out for me, is that I have not, so far, commented on where the current debate on war-rape stands in relation to the debate on the other violences enacted during these conflicts. In my analysis of the literature, what has occurred to me is that war-rape now dominates the debate on war-violence in Former Yugoslavia (ironically at the expense of men's experience of violence). It has become so established, and has become such a genre, that it tends to obscure, or drown-out, other critiques of violence. One of the areas excluded by this debate, is an examination of the motivation for the perpetration of sexual-violence in the Former Yugoslavian wars[26].

Although those writing on the debate on war-rape perceive themselves to be examining the issue of why war-rape occurs, my feeling is that their sources

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the issue of emotionality and research in a forum outside the thesis, as I believe a discussion of my experience might be of interest to researchers of disturbing material.

[26]This differs in some ways to studies of the Holocaust, where it seems that only now, survivors are becoming the focus of interest and study. However, the academy needs to ensure that the

actually limit them to a stylised debate that is dependent on a particular type of evidence-source, that is, the short, edited-down chunks of testimonies of rape described above, given by survivors at a particular point in time during the wars. As demonstrated earlier, the subsequent categorising of this evidence into an epistemology of the geographies of rape, and broad perpetrator identities (for example, neighbour, soldier, paramilitary) limits the debate to an analysis framed around these categories. Given the very generalised nature of these categories of analysis, it is perhaps unsurprising that those theorising on perpetration tend to explain rape in broad terms (often framed around a notion of hegemonic masculinity and/or patriarchy). The evidence invites a dialectic that is grounded in relatively uncompliant and uninformative categories of information.

This type of analysis follows a broad positivist tradition where evidence is used as a building block: with each block, one builds a bigger conceptual construct. Although I have no problem with this method of analysis, my contention is that the building blocks that we start with when theorising sexual and other types of violence, are too large. In the case of war-rape in Former Yugoslavia these have been pre-determined by the flawed ordering of information, but also by the premise, within these categories, that most rapes are the same. My argument is that war-rape cannot be seen as one explicit type of violence, because although the physical act of rape may seem to be a 'specific type of violence'[27] against women (in that often the same physical scripts/choreographies of rape are followed), the motivations for sexual violence are numerous, and have multiple contexts[28].

Jeff Hearn (1998) in his recent study of 'men's violence to known women' (p.vii), makes a similar point. He argues convincingly that male violence, and the study of male violence, tends to be seen as a construct, an entity in itself:

> [V]iolence is not a discrete area of study nor is it a separate object 'caused' or explained by some other subject or cause. Instead violence is multiple, diverse

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study of the wars in Former Yugoslavia does not go the same way as the study of the Holocaust: becoming perpetrator-led.

[27]This is a term that was used by Medica Zenica, in a regular report that they used to publish during and after the war.

[28]In terms of survivor experience, the experience of rape is similarly diverse, despite the similarities in the physical act. Each survivor's experience is framed through, and negotiated by, that survivor's multiple identities.

> and context-specific; it is also formed in relation to and in association with other social forms, such as sexuality, family, marriage, authority. It is not a separate phenomenon, less still a separate thing; it is constructed in discourse. (p.34, my emphasis)

Hearn's argument that violence is not a 'thing', leads the reader to the conclusion that violence does not have agency in and of itself. Although this may seem obvious, Hearn's comment that '...[violence] is constructed in discourse' highlights the way in which language has constructed violence as an object, and thus invested it with a notional agency, which has been absorbed by broader mainstream/populist discourses. The English language is peppered with examples of violence as an instrumental construct, which lead the user to see violence as separate, and distinct from those who do violence. In denying that violence has an agency of its own, Hearn draws attention away from the event of violence, back to those who perpetrate violence. In so doing, he highlights both the multiple influences to be violent/ feel violent, and the multiple contexts in which a man can be violent. In this way, Hearn leans towards a post-modern engagement with 'the violences of men', which scales down the building blocks that constitute evidence of manifestions of violence, to incorporate a study of a huge and diverse range of contexts to violence, and a diverse range of influences to violence.

Inscribing this argument onto an analysis of war-rape takes away the emphasis on rape as an event, or a subject with agency, disengaged from the perpetrators, to focus on the contexts and influences surrounding men's perpetration of sexual violence during the conflicts in Former Yugoslavia. At the same time, however, this conceptualisation of rape demands that rape be identified and considered as part of a broader grouping of manifestations of violence, including other war-violences against men and women, and violences that are not necessarily considered to be a part of war, such as domestic violence[29]. The argument that war-rape does not exist in isolation, but must placed in context with the many other types of violence that have taken place, represents a stand-point that is contested by many feminists debating war-rape. Their debate consistently warns against this

[29]But which women's groups in Former Yugoslavia have been claiming have a great deal to do with war. However, without statistical evidence, their testimony of these links is perceived to have no weight.

move because of a fear that rape, as 'a specific type of violence' against women, will be subsumed by the weight of so many other violences against men/ a particular ethnic group (where any violence against women is perceived to be a violence against men, because women are obectified, and seen as the property of men). Although I recognise this danger, my counter-argument is that the recent global recognition of the debate on rape in war, means that the specificity of rape-in war can now probably hold its own against the study of other violences[30]. The work of feminists on this debate, during the war in Former Yugoslavia, now allows the focus to change, so that examining these violences does not necessarily have to be done at the expense of the study of rape-in-war. Rather, there is a danger that by privileging rape-in-war, and failing to come to an understanding of how and why these other violences have been perpetrated, it will never be possible to truly and accurately context rape-in war within Former Yugoslavian militarism, masculinity, sexuality, society.

Having argued for a deconstruction of the act of war-rape (for it to be contexted within the society which 'produced' the men who committed war-rape and other acts of violence against women; and for it to be contexted alongside other acts of violence by men, against men and women;), it has been difficult to find a personal starting point. In opening up the debate, suddenly there was too much information, or too many possible sources of information. My reaction, within this body of work, to the pressure of so many avenues of potential information, was to limit my contribution to the debate to one area, mentioned above, which focuses on the formation of male gender-identity within the private realm of the family[31]. This issue, which is examined in the following chapter, resonates with the themes of identity and gender, public/private, borders and boundaries that run throughout this body of work.

Conclusion

[30]Arguments that rape is not examined in the contexts of conflicts such as Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Rwanda, could be considered to represent a continued marginalisation of the issue of rape during conflict. But the main issue in these cases is western disinterest in these geographic areas, which constitutes a hegemonic western-centrism, skimming over anything more than a superficial analysis of conflicts in 'less-developed' countries.

This chapter has argued against the continued use of rape narratives in the study of sexualised violence against women during the wars in Former Yugoslavia, on the grounds that the continued use of these narratives is ethically suspect. It also argues that the growing historicisation of the war demands the use of a different discourse to investigate war-rape. Whilst examining the literature on the Former Yugoslavian war-rapes it made suggestions for change, for example, it argued that there may be a need to revisit survivors, and to sympathetically examine their longitudinal experience of war-rape. Similarly, but controversially, interviewing perpetrators might also inform the debate.

The chapter concludes that, in the context of this thesis, an investigation of gender in the private realm will be revealing of the way in which, from early infancy, gender identities are constructed. In this way, it will be possible to examine how Yugoslavian men may feel towards women, and how these feelings might be altered by the introduction of nationalism into the public domain.

[31]In the context of this body of work, I have, however, researched and theorised a number of other areas. The scope of this research project, its specific interest in violence against women, and the limitations of word length, necessitate a specific focus on the issues discussed in this chapter.

Chapter 7

Slipping boundaries: crypto-matriarchy, nationalism, misogyny, and the blurring of the public and the private.

Synopsis

This chapter begins by examining Andrei Simić's work on the mother-son relationship within the Former Yugoslavian family, which appears in Sabrina Ramet's (1999) recent edited volume which brings together, in one volume, a range of critiques of social structures in Yugoslavia/Former Yugoslavia. Using psychoanalytic theory as a critical tool, this chapter examines how the mother-son relationship has affected the construction of public, masculinised identities within Yugoslavia/ Former Yugoslavia, and measures the private mother-son relationship against public perceptions and expectations of the role of the mother within the broader patriarchal Yugoslavian/Former Yugoslavian social order. In so doing, it questions broader global perceptions of patriarchy and the intrusion of the boundaries of the public/private into the family, whilst arguing for a change in ways of conceptualising the boundaries of patriarchy and authority within the family.

It concludes by arguing that the Yugoslavian family model was particularly vulnerable when confronted with rapid ideological, economic and social change. The imposition of public, proto-Nazi ideologies into the private has had a seminal effect on the power struggle between mother and son, awaking, in some men, latent misogynies and an accompanying will to be violent towards women. However, despite arguing that nationalist discourses encouraged the insertion of misogyny into the public and the private, this chapter does not claim that this, then, is the reason why men were violent; rather, it suggests that this represented one amongst a number of possible influences, which may have converged in men's violence against women. Thus this study of mother-son relationships represents a small

building block of evidence, as recommended in the previous chapter, which contributes towards a more general understanding of war-related sexual violence against women[1].

Mothers and sons in the Yugoslavian family. Or, Lacan, Kristeva and the castrating mother

Simić on mothers and sons in the Yugoslavian family

> *First in contrast to the West European and North American variants, The South Slav family is not as isolated in regard to kinship ties or patterns of residence, and thus the family processes must be viewed within a framework transcending the nuclear household. Second, the apparent patriarchal nature of the family and society as a whole is more a public than a private fact and, because of this, the important affectual power of women is obscured. And third, women achieve this power not by virtue of being wives but as the result of becoming mothers and, eventually grandmothers. In this way ... women legitimate their status within their husband's kinship groups by giving birth to sons, and through the influence they exert over their children in general. (Simić, 1999, p.14)*

Andrei Simić's anthropological work on rural and urban Yugoslavian families ((1983) 1999) examines the relationship between women and power in the South Slav family in Yugoslavia and Former Yugoslavia. Simić's observations are extremely interesting, but there are two over-arching flaws within his data, which Simić himself readily points out, and which indicate the need for further research in this field. Firstly, Simić's article is an updated revision of work published in the early 1980s, and is based on research carried out between 1966 and 1978, over twenty-years ago. Although he argues that trips to Yugoslavia and Former Yugoslavia in 1988, 1993, 1996 and 1997 have shown his fieldwork results to have a continued validity, his inference is that these later trips may not have been taken

[1]Although my preferred tool of analysis is psychoanalytic theory, the concepts I employ are transferable to other disciplinary languages/discourses.

for fieldwork purposes. Whilst he supports his conclusions with evidence drawn from the work of other anthropologists, who have written on Yugoslavia between the 1950s and the early 1980s, there is an underlying suspicion that Simić's work may be somewhat dated. This is marked, for example, by a lack of attention to contemporary generational difference in familial relationships [2], which indicates that a further research project is needed to test the contemporary validity of his conclusions. Secondly, Simić also points out that a large body of his data originates from observations of, and interviews with Serbian Orthodox families. Fieldwork with ethnically Muslim and Croatian families represents a smaller part of his sample. However, he is sure enough of his sample sizes to assert that his model is representative of many South Slav families, including rural, urban, internal-migrant and diaspora families[3]. Although, he admits that inevitably, as with any model, there will be variations, differences and diversities that contradict the model that is being sanctioned.

Likening his model of the Yugoslavian family to Mediterranean and Middle-Eastern family models, Simić argues that the Yugoslavian family nurtures 'three dyadic relationships .... husband/wife, mother/son, daughter-in-law/mother-in law'. (pp.22-23). Focusing on the experience of newly-married wives in Yugoslavia/Former Yugoslavia, where marriage tends to conform to, and maintain, the traditions of a patrilocal system, Simić traces the contestation of power within these dyads. He describes how a young wife begins married life with no power. When she enters marriage, particularly in rural areas, the newly married young woman enters her husband's extended family as an outsider. When she bears children, these children are perceived to be members of her husband's family, whilst the wife remains effectively Other[4].

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[2]Although his work maintains a validity in that it probably paints an accurate picture of constructions of masculinity and manhood in men over the age of 40.

[3]In this article, Simić does not mention class as a possible variant, although this would seem to be a crucial variable.

[4]Tone Bringa (1995) in her glossary of terms, identifies that the wife's father and mother are *'punac'* and *punica'*. The Bosnian village that Bringa describes is patrilocal, and there is little reference to a wife's birth-father and mother. Within the main text Bringa explains that the mother-in-law takes on the duties of a mother (in terms of authority) to the wife when the new wife enters the household, so it would seem that these terms refer to the wife's in-laws. Here then she echoes Simić's model.

Simić argues that traditionally the wife's relationship with her husband was not particularly contested, yet nor was it particularly affectionate: 'the open expression of affection and other overt signs of solidarity between a husband and wife were perceived as a threat to the unity of the household' (p.18)[5]. Although he identifies that times have changed, Simić maintains that these attitudes have persisted in the husband/wide dyad in contemporary rural and urban marriages:

> [T]he stylized ritual and romantic idealizations which typify South Slav courtship quickly give way to emotional indifference in marriage (p.19).

Thus leisure time is not spent with one's spouse, but rather with 'family members, kin, or friends of the same sex' (p.20)[6]. The absence of deep affection between husband and wife encourages the wife to seek affection through her relationship with her children, with whom she forms a strong bond. Yet, because she knows that any daughters she bears will marry, and move (as she has) into a powerless marriage-relationship as Other in their future husbands' families, her lasting relationships will be with her sons. As adults, her sons will have power, thus a mother's relationship with her sons also represents a personal investment in their power.

Within the public framework of marriage, it is the husband who is perceived to hold the power, whilst the wife has little power. Yet, privately, the husband/wife power-dynamic is interpolated by the wife's mother-in-law, who asserts her authority within this relationship; so that the husband/wife dyad, rather, resembles a triad of husband/wife/mother-in-law, where the person with the most power is the wife's mother-in-law. As their children grow up, and the husband and wife enter middle-age, an equilibrium in their power-relationship begins to take root, and the woman gains more power. However, she must wait till her son marries, when she assumes a place in the family hierarchy as a mother-in-law, before her power is overtly recognised within the family.

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[5]Although Bringa (1995) does not focus on the husband/wife dyad, her portrait of Muslim village life in central Bosnia in the late 1980s and early 1990s, shows that the village household was, at this time, still seen as a functioning economic unit. Much care was taken to ensure the smooth running of this unit by attention to ritual and routine in everyday relationships.

[6]Simić argues here, that this resonates with other family models, for example Bott's (1957) study of working-class families in London (Family and Social Network, London: Tavistock.)

When the mother's son marries, the person who will hold the most power in his marriage will be his mother. When a woman enters marriage with the mother's son, she represents an intruder into the mother/son dyad, and she will not be able to penetrate their relationship, until the mother's death. Simić argues that this private mother/son relationship bestows power and privilege upon the older woman in public society:

> [A]s a son becomes an adult, he gradually assumes, within the limitations of his family's reputation and his own attributes, the prestigious and authoritative position which society formally bestows on a man, and it is through him that his ageing mother can exert influence and power both within the family and in the external world, drawing on the affectual and moral levers that are not only condoned but overtly encouraged by the culture. (p.22).

Within this model, although a son may mentally contest his mother's influence, he is tied to his mother until she dies. However, Simić maintains that:

> [T]he death of a mother leaves the son with an effectual and authoritative void which must somehow be filled. Thus a middle-aged wife is frequently able to assume the role previously occupied by her mother-in-law. (p.27)

In this model, the son thus never truly escapes his mother, because over-night his wife takes on his mother's role. The death of a wife's mother-in-law represents the wife's rite of passage, where she comes into power of her own.

Paradoxes of authority: machismo and the madonna

Although the role of the mother is authoritative, Simić argues that this role is masked by a conceptualisation of the mother with the other-worldly attributes of a madonna:

> .[T]he young wife cultivates unusually strong reciprocal links with her children, validating these attachments through the inculcation of supportive moral imperatives and appeals to her children's guilt, phrased in the idiom of her own ostensible dedication to parental duty, self-sacrifice, and martyrdom (p.21)

Within this framework the mother takes on the stereotypic role of 'sacredness, devotion, sublime altruism, and martydom' (p.26). This contrasts to the father's role which is seen to be in opposition to that of the mother. Simić quotes the folk-saying frequently used by his respondents:

> Mothers earn love and devotion, fathers our respect!

> Our mothers are angels, our fathers are devils,
> Mothers advise and console, fathers command.
> Mothers suffer for their children, fathers fight for them (p.26).

The dichotomy in this stereotyping asserts a particular type of construction of femininity and masculinity, where the female role is loving and nurturing, whilst the male role is authoritative, patriarchal, assertive, machistic. What is absent from view in this stereotype is the mother's authority over her son. Simić explains this as a public/private phenomenon, where there are distinct geographies of maternal authority:

> [T]he strict segregation of incompatible roles and behaviour makes it mandatory for a man, who may spend large sums of money brawling in the local honky-tonk, to act only with the greatest decorum in the quasi-scared context of his mother's home, respecting the fact that he may never openly compete with his mother, towards whom he is prohibited from expressing any form of open hostility or antagonism (p.27).

Despite the insistence on a son's *decorum* within the maternal home, the brawling of the son does not necessarily go unnoticed. Rather, this behaviour is endorsed by the mother of a brawling son, in her failure to judge it (perhaps in part because public manifestations of power and machismo in her son, invest her with a public, feminised machismo by proxy). This anomaly allows the son to assert his machistic masculinity in public, whilst occluded from public vision is the fact that in the private realm of the family, all sons/fathers give way to the matriarch, a societal form which Simić labels 'crypto-matriarchy'. This phenomenon is read by Simić as a vent for the son's frustration with his mother's authority, and a way of maintaining a macho image in the face of the reality of his mother's authority. Simić asserts that a similar paradox of elision occurs in sexual matters. A mother may encourage a system of double-standards where she '... tacitly encourages her sons to associate with "profane" women outside the home' (p.24), whilst ensuring sexual propriety in the home, where first and foremost the image of her, as mother (and thus also the conventional expected image of the son's future wife/mother of his children) is maintained in the eyes of the family as asexual, the embodiment of sexual morality and purity.

Applying psychoanalysis to Simić's model of the Yugoslavian family.

The conclusion that can be drawn from Simić's work is that the Yugoslavian/Former Yugoslavian family, and in particular the mother/son dyad, is the site of a public/private paradox. Elisions and occlusions inscribed onto this relationship mask from public view the fact that the mother/son dyad represents, in many families, the site of a contestation of power. The tension in the mother/son relationship, if examined from a psychoanalytic perspective, drawing on both Lacanian and Kristevan theory[7], raises some interesting questions about the effect of this tension on the formation of gender-identity in a (male) child's early years. When this analysis is juxtaposed to a consideration of the quite strenuous shifts in public and private gender-roles in Yugoslavia in the 1980s and early 1990s (as documented in Chapter 3), it introduces a potential context for violence against women, possibly within the realm of Elaine Showalter's (1997) theory of 'mass hysteria/epidemics'.[8]

Lacanian theories on gender

Juliet Mitchell's and Jacqueline Rose's (1982) feminist readings of Lacan's theories on gender-identity focus on the role of the mother in the formation of identity (see Chapter 2 and Definitions Section on Lacanian theory). They argue that the 'mirror-stage' (where the infant sees its Self reflected back in the mirrored gaze of the carer, or in the literal mirror) represents the point when the infant starts to perceive of its 'self': a frighteningly multiple and fragmented entity. Its knowledge of self coincides with its realisation of the mother as separate to itself, therein the infant begins to experience loss/lack, and an overwhelming desire to

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[7] Lacan and Kristeva tend towards a universalism in their approach. I do not necessarily concur with this, but believe that in the context of Yugoslavia their work has certain validity. The work of the Former Yugoslavians Renata Salecl and Slavov Žižek in Lacanian theory supports my application of Lacanian and Kristevan theory to Yugoslavian culture.

[8] This suggestion may seem to go against my argument for smaller-building blocks of evidence, because it puts forward a theory of mass-context for violence. However there are two counter-argument. Firstly, the thesis that mass-hysteria influenced men to be violent against women during the conflicts, does not explain the perpetration of individual violences. The perpetrators of violence will all have had individual influences, and contexts for being violent. Secondly, this suggestion represents a new theoretical position, and as with many new ideas is intended to begin a debate. It is anticipated that there will be inevitable theoretical holes that need to be contended, considered, amended.

recapture the feeling that the mother is one-with-itself. With this knowledge of separateness/the loss of the mother and the coinciding feelings of desire for the mother, comes an acknowledgement of the symbolic father, and a realisation that the infant/mother dyad is contested by the interaction of the father, who also desires the mother, and asserts that the mother does not belong to the infant. The symbolic father is personified/signified as the phallus, and represents a point of rupture in the infant's life, when the separated mother is taken away from the infant by the father. The mother is not seen as complicit with this violence, rather the power of the phallus, the father, has demanded it. It is as this juncture that the mother is seen to be without power/without a phallus, she is perceived to be symbolically castrated by the father.

Within Simić's model of the Yugo-family, the castration of the mother is less straightforward than in Lacan's model of familial relationships outlined above. In Simić's Yugoslavian family there is still a triad of mother/infant/father, where the young mother is perceived by the infant to have less power than the father, to have been symbolically castrated by the father, and thus she is without the phallus that signifies power. However, in the private context of the family, the power that the grandmother asserts over the father means that the grandmother will be seen to acquire, or to wear the father's phallus (but not to own it entirely). The inter-changeable nature of the phallus in the Yugo-family, raises the questions: Who owns the phallus? Is the phallus really removed from the mother? And if so who is the symbolic father? Is the Yugoslavian family a patriarchal or a matriarchal social structure within a broader patriarchal society? How representative or individual, is the Yugoslavian family form, of other family forms in other developed countries? Does it inform our conceptualisation of western patriarchy?

The problem with Mitchell and Rose's readings of Lacan .....

These questions demand a further foray into Lacanian theory. However, at the same time they also raise the question as to the validity of Lacanian theory in an analysis of the Yugoslavian family. The following section examines Lacan's theory of gender-formation and power-negotiation within the private realm of the family, focusing in particular on stage three of the Oedipus Complex, and asks

whether Lacan's theory of gender can be applied to the model of the Yugoslavian family.

The Oedipus Complex is seen by Lacan to be represented by three stages (the third stage of which is different for the male and female child). The Oedipus Complex, which negotiates the incest taboo, incorporates the mirror-stage and the separation of the infant from the mother (as outlined above, and in Definitions), within its first stage. At this stage the discovery of desire for the mother is marked by the infant's growing realisation of the desire of the mother for the father, and for the symbolic phallus, which the infant, no longer part of the mother, cannot satisfy. The second stage is represented by the symbolic castration of the mother, by the person with authority, the imaginary/symbolic father, and by the interpolation of the authority figure into the mother/infant dyad, effectively denying the infant their desire for the mother. These first two stages are purely symbolic as Rosalind Minsky (1996) explains:

> Lacan argues that even in the absence of an actual father, the child experiences the place of the father and the Oedipal crisis through cultural substitutions, that is primarily language and cultural representations. These symbolically represent an intrusion by culture into the fused, bodily world of the mother and child and, crucially, a severing of the child from its object of desire. (p.149)

In the third stage the phallus again becomes a signifier of power, where the infant (boy) fears castration, or perceives itself (girl) to have been castrated, by the father. However, within this signification, the phallus also takes on a parallel, more literal meaning, which is anatomical. Lacan argues that the emotional/mental well-being of the infant hinges on a successful negotiation of this stage of development.

In the context of the female child, the child's initial realisation of her physiological lack of a penis, is perceived as a both a symbolic and a physical lack. Lacan argues that the female child believes that she has been symbolically and physically castrated, robbed of her penis. She blames the mother for this lack but perceives her father to have been the agent of her castration. Lacan draws on Freud, to argue that the girl looks to the father to provide her with a child 'as a symbolic

substitute for the penis she lacks' (Freud, 1924[9]). Dylan Evans (1996) describes the girl's negotiation of these feelings:

> Even though the girl may at first be resentful of her mother for depriving her of a penis and turn to the father in the hope that he will provide her with a symbolic substitute, she later turns her resentment against the father when he fails to provide her with the desired child (p.151).

Once she has negotiated the incest taboo, the desire for the father's child becomes a heterosexual desire to procreate. Lacan's theory of castration works quite well in the case of the female Yugo-child, if one combines the concept of the guilty mother/castrating father with the concept of the castrating paternal-grandmother, whilst acknowledging the female child to be in contest with both her mother and her grandmother for her father's affections. Although the power of the father within the Yugo-family is questionable (because it is transient and shifting), the fact that the female child understands her complete lack of power and sees her only recourse to power/access to the phallus being for her to have her own male child means that Yugoslavian female child fits, somewhat haphazardly, into Lacan's model.

In the case of the male child, Lacan argues that as the child realises his mother's lack/ symbolic castration by his father, he realises a fear for his own physical member. The father, who has both the symbolic phallus, and the anatomical phallus, is seen as having the power to castrate the child who contests his father in the desire for the mother. The application of Lacan's theory to the male Yugo-child is difficult. In Lacan's model the father wields the power to castrate mother and son, whereas in the Yugo-family, the grandmother's acquisition of the father's phallus suggests that it is the grandmother who has castrated the mother, and possibly, the grandmother who will castrate the boy. Although the Yugoslavian boy is driven to contest his father for his mother, this contest is not as forceful as in Lacan's model, because the father's affection/desire for the mother is not particularly strong, and because separation between mother and son is not complete. In many ways the Yugo-model is an antithesis of Lacan's model.

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[9]Quoted by Dylan Evans, 1996, p.151.

In Lacan's model the failure of Simić's male Yugo-child to adequately separate from the mother is represented as a negative experience. Evans (1996) describes Lacan's extrapolation of a failure to separate:

> [T]he child must detach itself from the imaginary relation with the mother in order to enter the social world. Failure to do so can result in any one of various peculiarities ranging from phobia to perversion. Since the agent who helps the child to overcome the primary attachment to the mother is the father, these peculiarities could be said to result from a failure of paternal function. (p.117)

The peculiarities that Evans refers to are possible anxieties rooted in physiology, from a basic anxiety/fear of the devouring mother, to a fear of castration, fragmentation, dismemberment, perhaps precipitated by the thought of separation. In this scenario, Simić's model Yugoslavian men become a nation of phobics, with the potential to become psychotic/neurotic. This, in my opinion is evidence that Lacan's theory fails to work in this context.

What is patriarchy? The law of the father versus Creed, Kristeva and the all-castrating mother.

What I perceive to be wrong with Lacan's theory, is the notion that the father oversees the son's (and daughter's) potential castration, and through this represents the law within the family[10]. The rigidity of Lacan's thesis on the third stage of the Oedipus Complex, unlike the flexibility of his theorising of the other stages, allows no room for power-sharing or for anything other than an absolutist patriarchal model. This is illustrated by Dylan Evans' summary:

> The third 'time' of the Oedipus complex is marked by the intervention of the real father. By showing that he has the phallus, and neither exchanges it or gives it (S3, 319), the real father castrates the child, in the sense of making it impossible for the child to persist in trying to be the phallus for the mother; it is no use competing with the real father because he always wins (p.129).

This rules out many family models even within what are seen to be ostensibly patriarchal societies. My contention is that the rigidity of Lacan's thesis does not allow for the power-sharing, or power-devolution (women's work) that marks private, family life within traditionally publicly patriarchal societies: where the

father may be the head of the family, but the mother wields considerable power in matters surrounding the functioning of the family. Drawing on the work of feminist psychoanalytical theorists such as Barbara Creed and Julia Kristeva, my argument is that within patriarchal societies, and patriarchal family forms, the mother has a significant role, alongside the father, as a potential castrator of the son and daughter, and that this role is crucial to the development of the child. What is more, a revision of Lacan's theory can be applied, with a *modicum* of success, to Simić's model of the Yugo-family, which represents an exaggeration of, or tangential deviation from, this revised model.

Barbara Creed (1993), a cultural theorist who draws on the work of Karen Horney and Erich Fromm (protagonists of Lacan), argues that the male child fears castration by the mother, and that this fear is part of the natural process of separation. Creed uses a close reading of Lacan's interpretation of Freud's Case of Little Hans ([1909] 1977) (on which Freud based his theory of the castration complex which was subsequently reworked by Lacan), to argue her thesis: Hans was diagnosed by Freud as a phobic child, who feared, amongst other things, that he would be bitten by a large white horse and, that someone, possibly his mother, would cut off his penis. Lacan's interpretation of Hans' phobia is that Hans is phobic because of his father's failure to intervene (until urged by Freud) between Hans and his mother. The relationship was marked by the boy's desire for his mother, a desire that he manifested through infantile masturbation.

On discovering that the boy was masturbating, the mother threatened to call the doctor to cut off the boys' penis. Lacan blames the boy's phobias on the mother's threat to castrate the child which represents both, an inappropriate use of what was really the father's power/role, and an over-involvement with the child. Evans paraphrases Lacan's reading:

> [T]he child is completely prey to the arbitrary desire of the omnipotent devouring mother. Hans was only saved from this deadly game by the intervention of the

[10]This is not a novel concept, Lacan's theory that the father castrates the son has been contested by a range of feminist psychoanalytic theorists, for example, Karen Horney.

> father who rightly claims possession of the phallus on the basis of symbolic law (p.150[11]).

Creed disputes Lacan's interpretation. She argues that Hans' phobia does not stem from his omnipotent mother, but from his parents' failure to adequately explain sexuality to their child, so that he is driven to imagine the genitalia of his mother, on the basis of his observation of his baby sister's genitalia, and the genitalia of large animals such as horses. Creed is convincing, in her counter-argument concerning the omnipotence of Hans' mother, when she maintains that the mother's role in the threat to castrate her child represents a normal and appropriate process.

My own observation on Creed's reading of this event is that although she is right to assert that Hans' mother's power over her child was appropriate, what was perhaps problematic for Hans was her threat to get the doctor to castrate Hans: 'If you do that, I shall send for Dr. A. to cut off your widdler'. Perhaps what was at stake for Hans, was not necessarily the fear of castration, but the intrusion of public power, the power of the doctor, into his mother's threat. Here, perhaps, the mother has stepped out of bounds, both in independently linking herself to public-power, and through linking herself with the doctor. In a scenario where the doctor threatens to take on the role of symbolic father, the mother usurps a role that should have been taken up by his real father.

Implicit in Creed's argument with Lacan, is an argument about the role of the mother and the power of the mother within the private bounds of the family. Creed acknowledges that within the realm of the family, and the care of children, the mother asserts a great deal of power, and it is this power, in balance with the father's more public power, that ensures the son's safe emotional passage through his gender-and -sexual-identity-formation. When applied to Simić's model Yugo-family, Creed's is a more flexible theory than that of Lacan. The deviation of the Yugo-model from Creed's model is not so radical as to infer that the result will be a nation of perverse/phobic men, rather, it allows for a binary reality, where the contested relationship of mother/son has alternative meanings in the public/private spheres. In private, the Yugoslavian son is continually threatened with castration

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[11] Lacan, Seminar 4, 69, 195.

by the mother, this brings him under the mother's authority, and separation is incomplete. However in the public sphere, where the son assumes power, the potential to castrate lies with the father, or other male authoritative/powerful figures. This binary model of castration resonates with Creed's model, where the mother and the father both have the power to castrate. Despite the failure of mother and son to completely separate in private, and despite the son's contestation of the mother's power, this binary model appears to have balance. Provided these social forms allow the public and the private to exist alongside each other, and allow both male and female access to power in their separate spheres, then the emotional and mental health of the son, and the rest of the family, should be maintained.

Mapping out the public and private spheres: public = patriarchy/private = matriarchy.

Overlaying Creed's thesis onto Simić's model of Yugo-society, and through this, conceptualising the dynamics of patriarchal power within Yugoslavian society, imposes a gendered binary of thought onto the dialectic of power. The power of the Yugoslavian father is public, male, masculine, articulated as a machistic force to the public gaze, and communicated through overt displays, through language, embodied in the Symbolic Order where symbols and signifiers are tropes of communication. The power of the Yugoslavian mother is private, female, feminine, un-articulated, hidden from public view, wielded and communicated synchronically since the birth of the son through an authority, and language, which are described by Julia Kristeva (1982) as being, like the mother herself, outside of the Symbolic Order, whilst paradoxically perhaps, providing meaning:

> [M]aternal authority is experienced first and above all, after the first essentially oral frustration, as sphincteral training. It is as if, while having been forever immersed in the symbolics of language, the human being experienced an *authority* that was a - chronologically and logically immediate - repetition of the *laws* of language. Through frustrations and prohibitions, this authority shapes the body into *territory* having areas, orifices, points and lines, surfaces and hollows, where the archaic power of mastery and neglect, of the differentiations of proper-clean and improper-dirty, possible and impossible, is impressed and exerted. It is a "

> binary logic", a primary mapping of the body that I call semiotic to say that, while being the precondition of language, it is dependent on meaning, but in a way that is not that of *linguistic* signs nor of the *symbolic* order they found. Maternal authority is the trustee of the mapping of the self's clean and proper body; it is distinguished from the paternal laws within which, with the phallic phase and acquisition of language, the destiny of man will take shape (pp.71-72).

Within Kristeva's model, the law of the mother exists as parallel to the Symbolic Order, and thus the 'language' of her authority is different to that of the Symbolic Order. In a Lacanian sense (of hierarchy/value) it becomes sub-standard, castrated, the language of the body. The child is taught that this language is not as important as that of the phallic order, which is both public and symbolic. The sub-standard feminine order becomes em-bodied: communion/communication with the mother is experienced through the body, so that the lessons the child is taught are based on a dialectic of physical, bodily experience. The mother's physical control of her son, and her threat to castrate him, are perhaps perceived by the child as a physical possibility. The male child however, is removed from the mother, by his being placed, by the law of the father, the public law, into the phallic order, and is taught that this early feminine language is not masculine[12]. Whilst his father threatens to castrate him, he also removes him from his mother's threat. From his position with his father in the masculine Symbolic, the feminine takes on the sense of masculine pollutant, a pervading but removed threat to the male child's masculinity.

In the Yugo-family, where the mother refuses to entirely separate from the male child, this feminine pollutant is contested, yet always present. For the male-Yugo-child there is a duality, or rather, perhaps a schizophrenia in its relationship with its parents: a splitting of identity imposed by the tension between the male child's experience of the masculine public and the feminine private, and his parent's contestation of his power. The father threatens to castrate him in public, his mother threatens to castrates him in private; she almost achieves this by the sharing of the phallus. Whilst the law of the father is Symbolic, the law of the mother is physical. Thus the physical power of his mother carries with it a sub-text that her

[12]Unless it is violent? Female children are stereotyped as being demonstrative, nurturing, passive. Male children are stereotyped as physical, using their bodies to assert, or play at asserting, power. Both stereotypes employ the language of the body/the language of the mother. The bar-room brawls in Yugoslavia, and other expressions of violence, are these a masculinised yet infantile/feminine mode of communication?

threat to castrate could be quite literal should she require it. The mother's continued power in the private realm of the family may mean that the son's fear of castration/usurping/absorption of the phallus may represent a quite literal yet residual fear (but not phobia) in the adult male's Imaginary.

Castration as reality

Within the hypotheses above, which engage with a 'standard' Kristevan/Creed model of separation and a Kristevan/Creed reading of the Yugo-model of separation, the mother is seen as inhabiting a physical world, and a physical language, where the threat to the phallus may be quite literal, if residual. These hypotheses are reinforced by an examination of global metaphors of female power, which portray an image of woman/mother as castrator.

The devouring, castrating mother is an image that endures in western psychoanalytic literature, for example, Dylan Evan's use of this imagery to describe Little Hans' mother (quoted above) which he drew from Lacan's own analysis. Within western literate cultures it is an image that has comes into its own in the medium of the horror-film; Ridley Scott's Alien (1979) and its sequels being classic examples. However the devouring mother is not merely an image of the western imagination, but an image that mediates images of women in many other cultures throughout the world. Creed points out, drawing on anthropological writing, that it is an image that is closely linked to the myth of the *vagina dentata*, the toothed vagina, that can devour or castrate a man who places his penis in this orifice. This connection between the mother as a devouring mouth/ devouring vagina is reinforced by the secretion of menstrual blood from the lips of the vagina, resembling in itself the wound of castration, which contains a gaping, bloody hole, with unknown powers, in which a man might get lost. The *vagina dentata*, then, is the embodiment of the devouring castrating mother/woman who wields too much power, who wishes to take away the potency and power of men. This allegorical image was conjured up by Lacan himself, whom Creed quotes as saying, in his February 11 Seminar:

> 'Queen Victoria, there's a woman ... when one encounters a toothed vagina of such exceptional size' (cited in Heath, 1978, 61) p.106.

Mothers in the public sphere.

> *Patriarchal ideology works to curb the power of the mother, and by extension all women, by controlling women's desire through a series of repressive practices which deny her autonomy over her body. The most violent of these include domestic assault, rape and female genital mutilation.*
>
> (Creed, 1993, p.162)

Simić's analysis of the power dynamic between the Yugoslavian mother and son asserts that the power of the mother exists within the private realm of the family. Outside of the private, in the public realm, the mother has no power of her own, instead she draws on her son's public influence and reputation. The application of feminist psychoanalytic theory to this relationship suggests that this relationship allows a normal development of the male child (that is a development without phobias, or subsequent psychoses or neuroses), providing that a balance is maintained within the familial relationship, where the mother keeps to her own sphere of the private, and adheres to the rules of that domain.

Chapter 4's analysis of the role of women in the public face of Yugoslavian society identified that, in the post-war years, there were a number of women who held public positions of relative (allowing for the glass-ceiling) power, or prominence. In a Lacanian sense, these women were a part of the Yugoslavian Symbolic Order, and thus could be said to have taken on masculine identities, in that they were operating according to the rules of a masculine, public, patriarchal order. However, despite their public roles, when economic crisis hit Yugoslavia, it seems that women were the first to experience unemployment, with many women losing their access to these masculinised identities. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 argue that this economic crisis, timed as it was alongside Tito's death, created a void, which allowed an extant nationalism to take hold of the public imagination in the late 1980s, and early 1990s. The sudden popularity of this nationalism further marginalised women when it argued that they should be excluded from the workplace, and should return to hearth and home to resume/take-up their role as mothers. It is my contention that the nationalist discourses that othered women, arguing for them to return to being mothers, created an imbalance between the

public and the private spheres, which acted to create what could be termed a national psychosis, a phobic prejudice against the mother, whilst simultaneously demanding that all women be mothers[13].

Expleting the mother: a public ambivalence to the private ideal of the mother

Before nationalism took hold, the mother in her private sphere was an asexual being, the embodiment of purity and goodliness, a mythic ideal. Women who were not mothers, or future mothers, were either sexualised 'profane' women who represented potential sexual adventure to men, within men's space, or masculinised powerful women, who took up space in the public to become honorary-men. The biologically-determined similarity between profane women/power-women and mothers was largely glossed-over, and elided, creating an occluded duality of women, mothers in the private, and non-mothers in the public. The recognition and bracketing together of all these identities through the sexualising of the mother only entered into the national conscious and the Symbolic Order in the form of profanities.

Women at the Centre for Women War Victims commented on their use of expletives within the Croatian language, stating that the genitalia of mothers is one of the most used profanities in Croatia. Translated, these expletives, "cunt of my mother" and the imperative "fuck your mother's cunt", transgress British codes of acceptable swear-words in their use of 'the C-word' (or P-word, in Croatian[14]), and invocation of the incest taboo. The latter resonates with the North American "mother-fucker", which also invokes the incest taboo, whilst being less biologically explicit. Beyond a humorous observation from the women using these expletives that they were 'reclaiming' their P-word (demonstrating their knowledge of my British discomfort with the C-word), these expletives were an integral and

[13]The loss of the big father figure, Tito, from the public realm, might have also have influenced male fears of a public/private imbalance.
[14]The Croatian word for cunt is *pica* (pronounced as pitsa).

unremarkable part of their everyday speech. However, given that the purpose of the swear-word is to bring transgressive images into the vernacular in order to express disruption of the every-day by an event or an emotion, such as anger, annoyance, fear, sorrow, the voicing of the transgressive is often the voicing/acknowledgement of what is hidden from social view. Here what was being expressed was the reality of the sexuality of the mother. "Cunt of my mother": the mother has a sexual organ. In comparison, the imperative to "fuck your mother's cunt" is quite aggressive. Unlike the North American variant, which invokes a transgressive personality type, it invokes an image of the incestuous defloration of the mother, a command to have active, aggressive sex with the mother, to force her to submit to the will of the child.

These expletives thus unmask the unstated undercurrent of public hatred, or devaluing, of the Yugoslavian mother that runs parallel to the love of the mother. Stiglmayer (1994) echoes this ambivalence towards the mother when she observes that:

> In Serbo-Croatian the mother of a person who is the butt of anger is frequently the object of insults. (footnote 18, p.166)

In the insult against a person's mother, the role of the mother is contradictory, both valued and hated. The way to offend someone is to denigrate her/his mother, as in the North American "son-of-a-bitch"[15]. Yet although the intention may be to question someone's mother's honour, that is her public asexual status, what is simultaneously being denigrated is the generic ideal of mother.

Denigration of the mother is conceptually linked to the concept of undervaluing the mother, a phenomenon that is evident in Tone Bringa's (1995) glossary of terms accompanying her study of a Bosnian-Muslim village. This indicates that there are many gendered familial terms in the Bosnian language: girl-child, boy-child, young-wife who is not a mother, bachelor, woman/wife, mother of the wife (see earlier footnote). Yet there is no reference to someone who is 'simply' and specifically a mother. All the terms which refer to the mother are relational, placing her in the context of her relationship to another member of the family. What perhaps can be inferred from this is that there is little value attached to the status of

a young-mother, and that the all-inclusive term *žena*, woman/wife will do. The linguistic undervaluing of mothers, the use of expletive and insult in the Yugoslavian languages all indicate an elided contestation of the ideal of the mother within the public (male) Symbolic Order, which suggests that even before nationalism took a hold there existed a national ambivalence towards mothers.

Mothers and nationalism

It is my contention that the rise of nationalism and the accompanying intrusion of the nationalist demand that all women should become mothers, exacerbated this ambivalence. It drew attention to the presence of women in the public order, and demanded that they take up their place in the private. Thus, in theory, there was a demand that all these non-mother women should become mothers, and take up their proper place in the private. The enforced entrance of the profane woman and the power-woman into the private, meant that suddenly mothers were no longer carefully bound within the private as asexual other-worldly madonnas, but took on the potential to be devouring sexual monsters, or he-women, who, as masculine entities, might threaten to break out of the private sphere into the public. Accompanying the fear that mothers could step out of the boundaries of the private into the public, came another fear: that the power of women/mothers might bring about the public symbolic castration of their sons/lovers/husbands. The nationalist/proto-Nazi discourse thus created a social upheaval in the public/private that meant that instead of existing in symbiosis with their menfolk, mothers suddenly represented a threat to them.

The power of the proto-Nazi/fascist discourse to create voids and upheavals, foregrounding the latent male fear of castrating women, is examined in Steve Pile's (1996) eclectic thesis on psychoanalysis, the body and space. Pile summarises Klaus Theweleit's two-volume work (1987) on the Freikorps in Weimar Germany[16]:

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[15] Although son-of-a-bitch can also be a term of affection, of homo-social bonding.

[16]The Freikorps were a group/brotherhood of irregular/paramilitary soldiers, which Pile describes as '.. a kind o underground, army-in-waiting in inter-war years in Germany, who were involved in fighting on the side of a number of fascist causes. The majority of officers were drawn from the urban and rural middle-classes, and many were to become prominent Nazis'. (pp.199-200)

> For Theweleit, fascist discourse is primarily mobilised through its ambivalent relationship with women, femininity and sexuality. Indeed, he argues that 'one of the primary traits of fascism is assigning greater importance to the battle of the sexes than to the class struggle'. (Volume 1: 169 and 258) (p.206).

Pile draws attention to Theweleit's review of the fascist literature that described events at 'Sythen Castle, near Haltern which had been occupied by the Red Army in April and May 1920' (*ibid*). Theweleit examines the Freikorps attitudes towards Red Army nurses who accompanied the Red Army in their occupation of Sythen. The literature inculcates an image of the Red nurses as '*proletarian* whores', who, with the men of the Red Army lay 'waste to the *aristocratic* body of the mother" (Vol.1, p. 87). The fact that the Freikorps were often fighting against communism explains their preoccupation with the oppositional concepts of proletarian *versus* aristocratic. Yet the investing of all proletarian women with the vices of a whore, whilst all aristocratic women were invested with the qualities of the mother, suggests that class was not the only issue, the Freikorps also used these class concepts in an allegorical sense. Women in their view were either whores or mothers. Attaching the concept of working-class to the notion of whore, meant that the whore was perceived to have agency, and took-up a place in the public, Symbolic Order: the world of men. The whore was ' a sensuous women armed with a penis' threatening to castrate the men of the Freikorps (Theweleit, Vol.1., p.89) . Attaching the concept of aristocratic to the notion of mother created distance, a sense of specialness. Untouchable and untouching, the mother, as aristocrat, took on a distant, nurturing, wholesome role in the private, outside of the world of men.

Yet, drawing on Freikorps literature, and in particular, on the example of Rudolf Herzog's novel Wieland der Schmied (Wieland the Blacksmith) Theweleit notes, that:

> The role of the mother seems ...to be deeply divided within itself. Even she harbours an evil side that is better concealed and becomes a target for her son's aggressive impulses. (Vol.1, p.106)

(Under the category of mother, Theweleit includes the fictional and actual wives or sisters of the Freikorps men). Theweleit's observation resonates with my own observation concerning the ambivalence within Former Yugoslavia around the

public notion of mother, and the elision of the fact that the mother can be a sexual as well as an asexual being.

Theweleit pathologises the men of the Freikorps. Drawing on the work of Margaret Mahler[17] on individuation and the work of Michael Balint on 'the field of the basic fault' he argues that many of the Freikorps had experienced a problematic relationship with their mothers in infancy. This is perceived to be either a failure for their mother to separate from them as an infant, or a failure in their mothers to initially bond with them as infants. Theweleit quotes Balint:

> The main characteristic [sic] of the field of the basic fault are: (a) that all the events occurring in it belong to an exclusive two-person relationship - there is no third-person on hand; (b) that this two-person relationship is very peculiar, entirely different from the familiar human relationship on the Oedipal level; .... (p.207) [18].

Rejecting an Oedipal reading, and opting instead for the Anti-Oedipus reading of Deleuze and Guattari[19], Theweleit observes that such problematic infancies could result in what a Lacanian theorist would term phobic/psychotic/neurotic personalities, marked by their deep-rooted misogyny, an inability to feel, almost overt, obsessional, incestuous desires and a fear of/desire for castration[20].

Although Theweleit's engagement with Deleuze and Guattari is somewhat at odds with my own engagement with Lacan, Creed and Kristeva in this chapter, there are congruities within our particular positions. In using Balint's 'field of the basic fault' Theweleit highlights the notion of the infant's exclusive two-person relationship, which he uses to pathologise the Freikorps. This resonates with the mother-son dyad described by Simić. In the Yugoslavian social order, theoretically what prevents the sons within this mother-son dyad from becoming mentally unstable is the perceived separation of the public from the private, where the sons have specific spaces to be non-sons, to be men. Whereas the already psychotic Freikorps, with their fear of the woman with agency in the public order, had to

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[17]Theweleit's reference: The Psychological Birth of the Human Infant: Symbiosis and Individuation. New York: Basic Books, 1995.
[18]Theweleit's reference: The Basic Fault: Therapeutic Aspects of Regression. London: Tavistock publications, 1968, p.26.
[19]Theweleit's reference: 1983, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
[20]Note though, that Deleuze and Guattari reject the labels castration and incest. Although they agree that these phenomena exist, they interpret them very differently to Lacan or Freud.

create this space for themselves, in the form of homosocial units/brotherhoods of men.

Reading Theweleit in Former Yugoslavia

The rise of nationalism and the exhortation to women to become mothers in Croatia and Serbia resulted in the appearance of cults of the mother (as described in chapter 5), endorsed by the nationalist governments, and written into public nationalist discourse. It is my opinion that the ratification of the mother's entry into the public conscious as a public Other, rather than as an elided Other, represented a cathartic shift in the balance of the dualistic social order. The upheaval which saw the spilling of women out of the private and into the discourse of the public, created a misogynistic hysterical outburst[21] amongst men supporting the newly elected fascist governments, creating a symbolic and at times literal psychosis on a par with those experienced by the Freikorps[22].

Dylan Evans' description of the physical and fantasised perversions that could be expected if the separation process is disrupted or fails to be successfully negotiated, includes: the fear of/ desire for castration; the fear of being devoured by the mother; fragmentation; and dismemberment. These resonate with the fears, fantasies and violences perpetrated by the Freikorps, they also match many of the

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[21]Here I engage with Showalter's (1997) theory of epidemics, and also the history of hysteria-theory which can be located back to Charcot and Freud's theses of the late nineteenth century, which came into their own after the First World War (Paul Lerner, 2000)

[22]Mart Bax's (1999) work on hysterical women in the Catholic Croatian parish of Medjugorje resonates with this thesis. In Bax's case-history in a time-line that coincided with the rise of nationalism in Croatia, the parish of Medjugorje became the site of pilgrimage, after a 'visitation' from the Virgin Mary. The effect of these pilgrimages was for the area to receive an influx of outsiders, who wanted places to stay and food, increasing the incomes of the people of the parish whilst substantially increasing women's work load, and requiring women to move from the private domain, to the public. The result was a massive increase in claims from women that supernatural phenomena were talking place in the area: possessions, and accidents and bad events that were perceived to be the result of possessions. The women were taken hold by a hysteria which Bax interprets as a reaction to their entrance into the public.
The use of the supernatural to explain, or 'work-out' disturbing events in Former Yugoslavia is an interesting phenomenon. In one of the testimonies of war-rape used by Stiglmayer a Muslim woman reported hearing the screams of women being raped in a brothel near her home. When she spoke of this to Serbian women neighbours they told the Muslim woman she was hearing ghosts "Ghosts, and all they time they knew exactly what was going on!" (p.107). This resonates with the interpretations, or emotional reactions, given to disturbing events in less-developed countries such as India (discussion with Kathinka Sinha-Kerkhoff of the Asian Development Research

violences enacted by a variety of different types of men during the Former Yugoslavian conflicts, supporting my contention that the blurring of the boundaries between the public and the private represented a hysterical revival of the castration complex in Former Yugoslavia.

Like the Freikorps the reaction of some Former Yugoslavian men to the blurring of these boundaries, was to search for authenticity (a resumed search for desire/to be one), through the forming or joining of paramilitary organisations which excluded the mother/the feminine, an insistence of the application of rigid moral values onto the social order, whilst ironically, simultaneously transgressing these in fantasy or reality. These moral values ranged from an immersion in religion to the imposition of strict moral codes onto women, a return to traditional values and a perception of the city (amongst some) as being the site of decay. Pile (1996), drawing on Theweleit's thesis on the Freikorps, argues that: 'The city represents the masses and, like the earth, it threatened to engulf soldiers (p.208)'. Both Pile and Theweleit compare the city to the gaping body. This resonates with a fear of dissolution, engulfment, of not being-one where the city takes on the metaphor of the body, of the castrating, castrated mother. Here Cynthia Cockburn's (1998) observation on the role of the city in the Former Yugoslavian conflicts takes on an additional meaning:

> Many people felt it was a war raged by barbarians from the hills on urban civilization, on the cities and towns where people had gone to leave tradition behind, where they had mingled and where, not incidentally women were most free (p.205)

The growth of paramilitary organisations, and the infusion of militarism into the social order (and in Croatia the reclaiming of fascist military language), represented the creation of new public spaces in which to escape the threat of the feminine. The fascistisation of the public order alongside the start of the conflicts represented the opportunity to symbolically and literally obliterate feminised spaces (the feminised ethnic Other, the city, the body/vagina of the mother), and therein to forge new more masculinised identities.

Institute, Ranchi, and Paramjit Rai of the University of Sussex, at Memory of Catastrophe Conference., University of Southampton).

Conclusion

This chapter has drawn on psychoanalytic theory to argue that the rise of the nationalist discourse in Former Yugoslavia created an imbalance in the symbolic gendering of the social order: women in the private, men in the public. Using the example of the fascistisation of the Freikorps in Weimar Germany and its subsequent links to Nazism, I have argued that Former Yugoslavia experienced a temporary male hysteria amongst some men, creating an identity crisis (effectively catapulting them back to the identity crises of their infancy) and an environment of misogyny. Although I do not claim a direct causal link between this event, and the mass-raping of women, it is my opinion that that this event provided one of the influences on perpetrators and their decision to rape, and on the surge in domestic violence documented, particularly in Serbia, during the conflicts (see Chapter 1).

This argument represents an introduction to a debate that draws on psychoanalysis to interpret the events in Former Yugoslavia. What is missing from my analysis is testimony from perpetrators, and a psychoanalytic analysis of the links between identity crisis, misogyny, aggression, sexual violence and other violence against women (and other men). Here I direct the reader, as a starting point to Jacqueline Rose's (1993) work concerning the links between aggression and violence:

> For psychoanalysis, the subject's own aggression is an object of fear, and the child has two ways of preserving his fantasised world from its attacks. Either the aggression can be transformed into conscience, or it can be neutralized by the erotic drives. But both these solutions have their dangers. The first can lead to suicidal impulses if the aggression is turned against itself, and the second can lead to sexual murder if the sexual impulses find themselves eroticizing the very violence they were meant to control (p.54).

Rose's work points to a way forward in the study of perpetrators in post-war societies, which I suggest should focus on war-veterans (as potential perpetrators) and include an analysis of the reported increase in violence by veterans against women (public and private) in the Yugoslav successor states, often using the weapons of war, knives, guns, hand-grenades[23].

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[23]This has been reported by a variety of women's groups in Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. This needs statistical verification for it to be accepted in academic circles, although

Regarding sexual violence, it is my opinion that the specific and fantasised targets of the perpetrators of rape, sexual assault, and domestic violence were often mothers, or young virgins who represented the mothers of the future, and that in some contexts this identity was paramount to the perpetrator. Lepa Mladjenović's argument in her article Universal Soldier supports this thesis when she describes how woman of all ethnicities were being raped by men of all ethnicities, and often by men of the same ethnicity as themselves. In Mladjenović's argument any woman would do. My addendum to this is that this is because all women were mothers (regardless of how they saw themselves).

I have not discussed violence against women of differing ethnicities, which could be perceived as violence against the Other's Other, and it is my opinion that this is also an area that requires further analysis. Such an analysis should have significant links with theories of neighbouring (briefly examined in Chapters 2 and 3) as well as theories of gender and ethnicity. Here my starting points would be Jacques Alain-Miller's work on 'television' (1985-6), where he develops the links between racism, envy, desire and pleasure.

> [I]t is the jouissance of the Other that makes the Other truly Other. Racism as a hatred of difference, is thus founded on the kernel of this difference; the fact that the Other takes his jouissance in a different way from ours. (Dylan Evans, 1998 p.21)

Slavov Žižek's (1991) analysis of the concept of nation:

> What is at stake in ethnic tensions is always possession of the national Thing: the 'other' wants to steal our enjoyment (by ruining our way of life) and/or it has access to some secret, perverse enjoyment. (p.165).

and Kristeva's analysis of taboo and defilement, where the assertion of difference is at once othering, and annoying:

> In short what really gets on our nerves, what really bothers us about the 'other', is the peculiar way he arranges his enjoyment.(*ibid)*

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it is accepted by international practitioners working in the field of violence against women. The Centre for Women War Victims in Zagreb has responded to this demand, and been measuring this phenomenon statistically over the last two years. At the time of my last visit, February 1999. it was also undertaking a statistical analysis of media reports of legal cases involving violence against women.

It is my belief that an analysis of the gendered nature of the public and private of the Other is essential to a critique of sexual violence against women of differing ethnicity to their perpetrators. What is also essential is an analysis of both the perpetrators and the survivors/Others own view of their ethnicity, and how ethnicity is passed down to future generations.

My view is that there is a tremendous amount of work still to be done on the analysis of war-violence in Former Yugoslavia, and a tremendous amount of analytical possibilities (interviews with perpetrators, survivors, longitudinal studies of communities). However, if this work is to be undertaken, it is vital that it is begun now, because, as I argue in the final chapter and the conclusion to this thesis, the Yugoslav successor states are beginning to experience radical change in their perceptions of the war. There is a growing demand for closure amongst the people of Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, which is being encouraged by the recent election results in both Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Yet with this demand for closure comes a creeping historicisation of the war, which demands a different type of analysis of the conflicts. The question of closure, and historical, post-war analyses by outsiders, is examined in the following chapter.

Chapter 8

Closure and the memory of war amongst activists in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The research experience is primarily an existential and not a cerebral matter. The researcher is active in the making of the moment, and a rich sophisticated sensibility is engaged. I noted that anxiety was a dominant emotion in my own observational fieldwork and this had some important cognitive consequences. I became highly sensitised to the emotional undercurrents of the exchanges I observed; spotting distancing techniques, intended and unintended manipulation, engagement and disengagement, love, affection, support and anxiety to name but a few. I doubt that I would spot them so well in a more confident mood, even though my interest in the substantive area (emotion) remains.

Ruth Wilkins, 1993, p.99.

Nevertheless, the control of the historical discourse remains firmly in the hands of the historian: it is the historian who selects the people who are to speak; who asks the questions and thus contributes to the shaping of testimony; who gives the testimony its final published form ...

Alessandro Portelli, 1981, pp.104-5

Synopsis

This chapter examines the experience of interviewing activists about their experience of war, three to four years after that war has officially finished. Drawing on data from interviews it raises two questions: Is war an experience that cannot be shared outside of the experiential community? And, what factors bring about a need for closure in a community that has experienced war? This chapter concludes that there are a number of factors that influence the way in which the

activist/practitioner community remembers war, which are built around public/professional and private identities, experience of front-line fighting, or individual trauma located around working with people affected by war, and an individual's sense of national identity. Although this chapter explores these questions, it does not come up with firm answers, but signposts the need for further study of these issues. Such a study would aid the work of international funders, practitioners, researchers, and policy makers, working with post-war societies.

Memory and denial: the effects of the interview process on disclosure

When I began the fieldwork for this research project, I had an expectation that a considerable part of each interview would focus on a respondent's memories before, during and after the war in Former Yugoslavia. However, during the course of the fieldwork, this expectation was effaced when it became clear that a number of respondents were unwilling to divulge their personal memories of their individual or professional experience of war. This realisation altered the nature of the fieldwork, in terms of the structure and focus of interviews. This in turn has resulted in a different focus to the fieldwork-analysis than that originally intended. Unravelling the context, and origins of this resistance to remembering the war, has taken up much of the analysis process, and involved considerable thought about the researcher/respondent relationship in the context of research around the memory of war.

The methodological aspects of this problem are discussed in detail in Chapter 1. The particular focus, in this chapter, is on identifying how the interaction between the respondent and myself as researcher has affected my perception of what constitutes meaningful data. I have had to ask myself, to what extent has my own identity (for example, my own fear of intruding on a person's sense of trauma) impacted upon the research process, and to what extent has a respondent's resistance or engagement with war-memory has been located around her/his perception of me as researcher? During the post-fieldwork analysis there has been a growing realisation that these two processes are interconnected, and that these

have had an overarching effect on a respondent's testimony. A refusal to acknowledge this relationship would negate the analysis of the body of fieldwork as a whole.

The problem with exploring this relationship, and defining potential prejudices, is that this whole process is subjugated by the interposition of many other types of identity being wielded by the researcher, and the respondent. In turn this introduces the question of who has agency and control within the interview itself? For example, there have been interviews where I have felt that the respondent has led, or dominated the conversation, exemplified in my interview with B. (from the Centre for Women War Victims in Zagreb, see case study below). Conversely, in my interview with Y. (from *Medica* in Zenica, see case study below), although it initially appeared that I, the researcher, was the person in control, after a particular incident in the interview, Y.'s responses became quite narrow, closed and regulated, suggesting that control of the interview was being contested by Y., creating a tension between respondent and researcher. Identifying whose agenda has been followed in an interview, is key to understanding the data produced by the interview. At the same time the analysis of other criteria which affect the researcher/researchee relationship, for example, the influence of multiple identities and perceived personalities (in both parties), the presence of prejudice, the effect of recent events on the construction of identity, all need to be taken into account.

Sifting through all these possibilities represents a somewhat nebulous task, because prejudice, constructed identities, power-struggles cannot be proven, as they reside in that one moment of time: the actual interview. Karl Figlio (1988) illustrates the complexity and difficulty of exploring the dynamics of an interview, when he argues that the researcher must look to the unspoken, and the unconscious for clues:

> As in the clinical relationship, the oral historian at work is well-placed to notice ambivalences, absences and inconsistencies; and like the psychoanalyst, to use these lapses in the account as guides into the implicit yet unexpressed story. Passerini[1]draws attention to transference and countertransference and to 'the psychological dimension which allows us to stress the subjective element in

[1]'Memory' in History Workshop Journal 15, Spring 1983, pp.195-6.

> memory, including the unsaid, the implicit, the imaginary, that "shifting sense of self which is represented through speech" (Sally Alexander) which does not coincide with consciousness' (p.126)

Psychoanalytical techniques of oral history, such as those developed by Dan Bar-On and Gabriella Rosenthal (working on survivor testimonies of the Holocaust), where the smallest piece of syntax, the starting point of a story, the silences are all meaningful, and receive in-depth analysis, represent an exciting and rigorous methodology. However, within the limitations of this research project, in terms of resources, time, methodological approach, difficulties with people talking in a second language or being translated, it is difficult to apply such a stringent form of analysis.

Instead, the method of analysis of the issue of the memory of war, within this chapter, is to highlight the diversity of issues underlying a resistance to, or engagement with remembering. At the same time this chapter draws on Figlio:

> We are led to focus upon the nature of the informant's participation in his or her own reference group and its activities, and on that of the oral historian in the informant's life. The oral historian's capacity to judge these factors will also be influenced by his or her own phantasized participation in the events reported by the informant (p.129).

The analysis will take into account the type and length of relationship that I have had with the respondent, my own (as researcher) perceptions of the respondent, both conscious and unconscious, and will draw on these perceptions when examining a respondent's testimony.

Categorising interview-responses

My starting point for analysis of the issue of war-memory was to categorise the type of responses that were made by interviewees, either around the issue of war-memory, or the hypothesis that the war was over. The emergent pattern of responses resulted in the following: some respondents denied that the war was over; some insisted on 'forgetting' the war, focusing instead on the problems of the

present; some barely seemed to have noticed the war[2]; others, during interview, provided carefully constructed narratives concerning their roles in the war.

Drawing on Figlio's theory of the unconscious in oral history, I then examined the circumstances and emotions surrounding the interviews, exploring the relationship between myself and an interviewee, whilst drawing on other seemingly extraneous information about a respondent, for example my impression of their personality type, their stress levels, their politics. The result was a set of data which listed not only which respondents were enthusiastic or reluctant to talk about the war, but which respondents proved difficult or easy to interview. A distinct correlation emerged between 'problem' respondents and an unwillingness to talk about the war during an interview. Rather than leap to a conclusion as to why this had happened, I spent some time deconstructing what had happened in each interview, looking for linking patterns in either my own attitude, or those of the respondent.

Overtly contested interviews: inclusion/exclusion.

There were some 'cold-start' interviews where, from the beginning, respondents made it quite clear that they were reluctant to talk to me. Their reluctance was framed in different ways: some claimed that they could not see why I was interested in them, either through the construction of a 'false modesty', or a more genuine failure to see the links I had constructed between their work and my research project; some wondered what was 'in it for them'; some professed to being very busy, and could give me only limited access to time; others were initially overtly hostile to me because of my perceived national identity, accusing me of 'academic tourism' and asking me why I wasn't studying my 'own' war in Northern Ireland. My job, as researcher, was to win these reluctant respondents over, and earn an interview.

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[2]This was a phenomenon I noticed in a non-activist group of respondents. I have not developed an analysis of this reaction in this chapter, because its focus is the activist community. This reaction though, merits an analysis, and it is my intention to do this outside of the broad structure of this thesis.

I discovered that winning over a respondent often required me to validate my position both as an academic, and as a practitioner. I was required to make links between a respondent's work and my own work, and to 'name-drop', drawing on my close relationship with other women's groups (for example, in Croatia I would mention my relationship with the Centre for Women War Victims). Many groups (in particular women working against violence against women) had experienced visits from academics who had no practical knowledge of the type of work that these groups were involved in and had no knowledge of the political and social conditions in which their respondents had been living. Women from these groups also found that such academics were unlikely to disseminate their subsequent 'findings' in anything other than an academic forum. These experiences had left some Former Yugoslavian women's' groups distrustful, drained of emotional resources, whilst feeling they had gained no benefits from these experiences. The groups that tended to be the most wary and the most distrustful were those who were under-funded and overworked, or who were in some way isolated from the international feminist or practitioner communities[3].

I was thus required to describe my research interests and my practical experience in detail, underlining my interest in feminism, activism, and the issue of sexual and domestic violence against women[4]. This then changed the nature of the responses I was given during an interview. After I had gained the trust of a group their focus tended to be on events and issues that interested them, and which they thought would particularly interest me. These tended to concentrate on the problems of post-war society, rather than events that occurred during the war. Although many events of the war were perceived to be real feminist, or women-centred issues[5] (for example, the mass-raping of women was at the forefront of many groups' consciousness), activism and feminism were, of necessity, equated with an interest in the problems of the present, as opposed to the past, even the very recent past of the war.

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[3]For examples, Karlovac Women's Group, Croatia, who were under-funded and very isolated; *Bedem Ljulblavi*/Wall of Love and *Kareta* groups, Zagreb, Croatia (see Chapter 5) isolated from international feminists because of their links with right-wing politics, despite their, at times, excellent practice-work with survivors of domestic violence.

[4]In the instance of *Medica* in Zenica, this group was reluctant from afar. They used off-putting tactics to discourage me from coming. After I persisted, they asked me to send a *Curriculum Vitae* (*CV*). After scrutinising my *C.V.* they finally sanctioned my visit to the project.

This phenomenon was voiced by U. from *Žene Ženama* in Sarajevo, when in a hurried interview she stated that the main bulk of her group's work focused on helping women returnees (interview in Sarajevo, January 1999). For many of these groups, there was and is no space for the luxury of dwelling on past violences, past injustices, because the injustices of the present are so pressing. Even in *Medica*, which specialises in treating women survivors of sexual and other violence, the focus has turned from war-rape to domestic violence, which it now perceived to be the most threatening event occurring to women. A., from *Infoteka*, the public-relations wing of *Medica* Zenica, stated that for her the war is over, her job, now, is to investigate and draw attention to the domestic violences against women in post-war Bosnian society (interview in Zenica, Bosnia-Hercegovina, January 1999). This, despite the fact that the 'psycho-team' of Medica still treat survivors of war-related sexual violence, and at the time of my visit, the whole Medica Team were caring for and counselling traumatised young women from Srebrenica.

The impression that these groups gave was, not that they had forgotten the war, because the war was ever-present in their work and social-fabric, but rather that they were politically displacing their individual and group-memories of war, in order to enable themselves to deal with the present in their professional lives. This phenomenon was occurring not only within women's groups but within some other activist groups who were extremely busy in challenging injustices. The influences involved in displacing personal memory within a professional setting seemed to centre on how busy a group, or an individual was. In turn, work-pressure also manifested itself in a reluctance to talk to me, with respondents often presenting themselves as highly stressed. Their reluctance was often framed within the discourse of their stress, and a discourse of contestation: in these circumstances I was given the role of 'outsider', projected as unlikely to understand their particular circumstances, whether these were pressure of their work, their group resources or the history of their region. I also noted that the groups that were most likely to overtly contest an interview, and to displace their personal/group-memories when

[5]Not all groups perceived themselves to be feminists.

talking to me, were those who were living and working in former war-zones, an issue I discuss further on in this chapter.

The actual mechanism of placing the emphasis on the present, as opposed to the past, during the interview process was not wholly one-sided. My winning over of respondents through describing similarities in practical knowledge and experience had a profound effect on agenda-setting within the interview, so that feminism and praxis were the dominant themes. In some interviews I felt that this agenda precluded my asking questions about the war, either because of the urgency of the post-war problems inscribed on the interview by the respondent (as with U. in Sarajevo), or because, having set and agreed an implicit agenda with a respondent, reneging on this agenda by talking about the war without an invitation or a lead-in, would have represented the breaking of a verbal contract. However, in other cases, for example, my interview with A., the respondent clearly warned me off asking questions about the war.

When groups and individuals framed their reluctance to speak to me about the war, through the pressure of their work, this glossed over other reasons why they did not want to talk about the war. Some of these reasons, discussed below, centred around a simple inability to talk to an outsider about these issues, through fatigue, trauma, and other more personal reasons[6]. Constructing their identities around work made memory-displacement easier to validate for many of these activists. In this way they had a public identity, that obstructed and prevented an unknown, and thus not trusted, researcher from prying into the private spheres of their lives.

Covertly contested interviews: prejudice between researcher and researched

In contrast to overtly contested interviews, some interviews seemed loaded with a tension that has been hard to isolate and define, but nonetheless, the direction of the interview was implicitly contested by myself or the respondent. Tension can

[6]Including the outsider's lack of shared experience of war.

originate from a number of sources, discomfort with the subject-matter being discussed, poor, or insensitive handling of an issue, or 'phantastic' (Figlio, *ibid*) projections by myself or the respondent, whereby one or other of us fantasises/makes assumptions about the identity of the other. The introduction of a fantasised identity into the interview situation can exert a negative influence on the researcher/respondent relationship, disrupting established rapport, and impacting on a respondent's willingness and ability to discuss issues around memory and the war.

During the process of interviewing respondents, I found it difficult to challenge a contested interview, because I was not always certain that the contestation was not simply a figment of my imagination, or that it was the result of one of us breaching an unknown cultural rule or norm. Given that cultural rules are so intrinsic to a person's identity and social environment, these rules tend to go unnoticed by those that use them. When they are breached it is extremely difficult to explain how a person's behaviour/speech has become offensive, because there is a feeling of disruption that it is hard to pinpoint. Instead the offender is perceived as rude, or unlikeable[7]. My focus in this scenario was always to try and claw back some rapport between the respondent and myself, rather than to ask the respondent if a question had upset them, or to attempt to deconstruct a question/ answer with a respondent. With hindsight, there would have been a great deal of value in doing this, in particular, in the example of Y., see case study below.

The problem with an analysis of the origins of tension within an interview is that without further discussion with a respondent, any accusation of prejudice/projection on the side of a respondent can never be more than conjecture. However, in an attempt to negotiate and counter-balance this problem, I have found it useful to look at some of the prejudices and fears that I unwittingly, or even consciously, brought to my interviews. By identifying my own prejudices, I can at least see how these were negotiated or contested by a particular respondent.

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[7]In the example of Former Yugoslavia, it is possible that new post-war cultural taboos are emerging. Isolating and defining these would be useful in understanding post-war Former Yugoslavian society. These new cultural rules may also have parallels with taboos in other post-war societies.

Most of the prejudices/fears that I brought to the interviews resided in the way I perceived and dealt with respondents. The most prominent of these included: a fear that a person would not want to talk to me about their experience of war, because having never experienced war, I would not be able to understand their trauma; a paranoia that my comfortable rich western identity would be resented by a respondent; a worry that, given my own nation's domestic policy in Northern Ireland, and its foreign policy in The Falklands, and Iraq, a respondent would think that my reasons for studying the wars in Former Yugoslavia smacked of neo-imperialism; and a concern that a respondent would resent me because of my country's involvement in NATO, which has had a protracted and contested role in the politics of Former Yugoslavia.

Although it was irrational to presume that a respondent might have been thinking these things, all these prejudices/fears have some grounding. As I discuss further on in this chapter, there was a real issue around respondents' resistance to remembering in the presence of 'outsiders', that is, those who have not experienced war. Regarding privilege, some respondents have vocalised the differences between them and myself in terms of ability/freedom to travel, and access to material wealth. And as already mentioned, some respondents have challenged me about not studying my own war in Northern Ireland. However, my fear that a respondent would make links between my national identity and my country's involvement in NATO is a prejudice that requires further consideration. This particular prejudice, whether located within me or within the respondent, underscores a whole range of other issues around unequal relationships, and the west's failure to understand the political situation in Former Yugoslavia. Its presence within an interview situation, as in the case study described further on, has stood in the way of establishing a rapport with a respondent.

Outsiders and Insiders: why thinking about NATO and The General Framework Agreement (Dayton Agreement) [8] *in an interview can be destructive.*

The Poreč Conference

In September 1998 I attended a week-long series of workshops at a conference of War Resisters International, held in Poreč in south-west Croatia. The workshops were thematic, and the same people were required to attend them every day. The theme of the work-shop I attended was 'Reconstruction and Democratisation', and the group consisted of about forty or so people. By day two a clear split had arisen within the group, between members of Former Yugoslavian countries, and members of other countries. The majority of non-Former Yugoslavians were from NATO countries. During discussion times a sense of frustration divided the two groups. The Former Yugoslavians felt that the non-Yugoslavians did not understand the situation in Former Yugoslavia, and resented their intrusive 'help' (and Former Yugoslavian dependency on their 'aid', creating unequal working relationships), whilst many of the non-Yugoslavians appeared to believe that as 'outsiders' they were the best people to 'help'. By the end of the week, because of the division in the group, the number of people attending the work-shop had halved, leaving a hard core consisting of members of Former Yugoslavian NGOs and western NGOs (and two western academic observers, myself and a lecturer in Peace Studies at Bradford University).

Within the subtext of this division was an innate belief, held by many of the non-Yugoslavians, that the war was over, and that this closure was provided by and embodied in the Dayton Agreement signed in December 1995. This was paralleled by the refusal of the Former Yugoslavians to see the significance of Dayton. This was given voice, on the final day, by a man from Bosnia-Hercegovina who persistently, and angrily argued *"the war is not over"*, implying that for the Bosnians there was no sense of closure. The western group appeared not to understand him, writing-off his attitude as perverse, dogmatic and entrenched,

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[8] See Definitions.

originating from a personality problem as opposed to reflecting a valid political viewpoint. For the Former Yugoslavians this was a fundamental sticking point. The failure of the non-Yugoslavians to perceive or acknowledge this impasse accentuated, for the Former Yugoslavians, a western failure to try to understand, and thus validated their opinion on western unsuitability for the task of helping with reconstruction and democratisation. Within the subtext of Former Yugoslavian distrust was a recognition of western prejudice towards Former Yugoslavian people, even within a so-called politically-sensitive environment of left-wing NGOs[9].

At the time I found the whole scenario so frustrating that I questioned whether there had been any point in my going. However, the value of the conference lay precisely in my experience of group division. It alerted to me to some of the prejudices that exist between Former Yugoslavians and westerners, and alerted me to the problems surrounding the issue of Dayton, namely, the resistance of many Former Yugoslavians to this piece of policy.

Martina Belić, writing in 1995, envisaged these problems and prejudices when she wrote:

> The Dayton Peace Agreement, signed late in November 1995 [sic], has on one hand stopped the war, but on the other, has frozen the shaping of the map of Bosnia-Herzegovina in accordance with its divisions occurring through armed conflict. In this way it has justified bloodshed in the country, and the process of normalization (not even to mention reconciliation) will be long and painful. ... The Peace Agreement has suggested, however, a different reality to the outside world...

Belić accurately predicted the many problems that were to face the communities of the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and the failure of the international community to address the two different perceptions of the Dayton Agreement, the western viewpoint and the Former Yugoslavian viewpoint.

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[9]Left-wing NGOs tend to present themselves as 'politically-correct'. The reality, as exemplified in a 'gender-day' during the conference, is that many left-wing NGOs are a hotbed of bias and prejudice. The 'gender-day' resulted in many 'closet' misogynists outing themselves, accentuating the precarious border between left-wing and right-wing politics.

Case study: Interviewing Y.

Although, as I have stated, the conference was useful in highlighting these different viewpoints, and allowed me to consider the problems surrounding Dayton, this knowledge did not prevent me from bringing Dayton into an interview scenario. In my interview with Y., who works as a psychologist for *Medica*, my introduction of the subject of Dayton into the interview created an implicit west/east boundary between myself and Y., which challenged the researcher/respondent relationship.

> Interview setting: Approximately fifteen minutes into the interview, Y. revealed that she had experienced a professional 'burn-out' five months previously. This was framed within the context of post-traumatic-stress-disorder (PTSD), and looped into a conversation about the way in which, the symptoms of PTSD can emerge after a client has established emotional and personal safety for themselves. The telephone rang, and Y. answered it. When the call was over, there was a small silence in which we tried to remember what we were talking about. I re-introduced the subject with the following question:
>
> Rose: *Do you think that the uh, actual signing of Dayton Agreement,*
> Y.: [at the same time as Rose] *mmhmm*
>
> Rose*: and the stopping of violence has allowed people to think about their experiences? Has that changed.. has it allowed them to think about*
> Y.: [at the same time as Rose] *No/But they all ...*
> Rose: [at the same time as Y.] *their experiences* [repeats because not heard] *about*
> Y.: [at the same time as Rose] *ohhh*
> Rose: *their own experiences*
>
> Y.: I think, uh, [quite firmly] *it's no question of allowing*
> Rose: [at the same time as Y.] mmhmm

Y.: [lowered voice] *Ja* [affirming]. [voice pitch much higher] Dayton is a [laughs] is a political act. Uh, psychological acts are different from it. Uh, I [laughs] maybe I uh, maybe I didn't understand you.

Rose: I was thinking about [two or three words indecipherable] the violence within the area stopping,

Y.: uhuh.

Rose: and people are beginning to rebuild their lives in a small way ..

Y.: mmhmmm

Rose: that this allows them to think about healing themselves

Y.: Uhhuh . During the war you think that they had no time to think about their own psychological state? Ja?

Rose: Uhhuh

Y.: I can talk about our experience for example, and during the war and after, people who are engaged with surviving things, uh, they cannot, they have no time for to think about how they are. And usually women ask us "How come I have *now* problem, when I have all ...[pause] ..Why now?". And we explain it to them, we tell them: "Our minds are very clever, we cannot be involved in thinking about what we survived when we *need* to survive [laughs] ..

Rose: Yeah

Y.: .. when we are engaged in this." Then I think times for symptoms is when most problems are solved. When there is safety ..

When I introduced the subject of Dayton outside of the context of a discussion of the politics of western intervention, or of a discussion of the relationship between people and politics, it seemed to me that, for a moment, Y. believed that I was engaged and complicit with the politics of Dayton; and that my understanding of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was framed through Dayton (note that this is my 'phantastic' projection). Although we established that there was a misunderstanding, the mention of Dayton introduced an un-vocalised tension into the interview. On tape this tension is not obvious through voice intonation, except that the interview pace quickens, as Y.'s answers become more closed and regulated.

The interview continued for a further fifteen minutes. We discussed how clients deal with trauma, how men with post-traumatic-stress-disorder can be aggressive and become violent in family situations, the percentage of trauma among the general population in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and the positive effects of spirituality, or ideological belief, on the healing process. During this time Y. also received and made another phone-call. This was a short interview of about 35 minutes length. In contrast, most of the other interviews that I conducted tended to be at least an hour long

Analysis

Although Y. did not present any overt emotions after we had established that she had misunderstood my Dayton question, my memory of the interview is that through body language, and facial expression, Y. withdrew her emotional consent for the interview. As I describe above, she also became less voluble, and appeared to regulate her answers. The speed in which the interview was concluded suggests that Y. hurried things along, contesting control of the conversation. At the same time, I felt chronically embarrassed at having briefly angered Y.. I also felt that control of the interview was slipping away from me, but was not certain how and why this was happening. Quite possibly, my body own language and facial expression betrayed my emotional discomfort, creating the effect that it was me that was withdrawing from the interview.

Although this can only remain conjecture, I have come to the conclusion that there was an unspoken sub-text within the interview, that at the time was not acknowledged by myself or Y.. I suspect that, subconsciously, I wanted to test Y.'s reaction to the subject of Dayton (because of the reaction to Dayton in Poreć, and because of the Bosnian delegate's insistence that the war was not over). I also suspect that Y. gave an almost Pavlovian response. Somehow I pressed an emotional trigger in her with the word 'Dayton', whereby she became agitated, and started to reply to the question with a vehemence that did not really match the question itself, but perhaps reflected her personal feelings around Dayton, although she quickly back-tracked from this confrontational stance. Y.'s brief flare of anger appeared to echo the anger that I witnessed in Poreć the previous autumn (thus Y. 'passed my test').

If this was the case, then despite the brevity of this exchange, both my question and Y.'s response were loaded with some quite complex political messages. My question was ambiguous, and (despite my awareness of the volatility that a discussion of Dayton can create) carried with it some western assumptions, namely that Dayton has brought with it a relative peace, that has given people space/time/stability in which to begin to recover from the war. Whereas, as I outline later in this chapter, in many areas of Former Yugoslavia, the poor quality of the space and time introduced by Dayton means that space and time are enemies of the recovery process: there is no physical space for people to recover, and temporally, people are not ready to recover, but are merely enduring. Just to mention Dayton, was a very, very western thing to do. Y.'s response saw my assumption, my linking of Dayton with a perceived peace, and the tumble of associated western assumptions. She may also have made her own assumption, that my identity, as a visitor to Former Yugoslavia was framed through Dayton, and the peace-agreement, and that my 'belief' in Dayton was quite literal and uncritical. Hence her denial that Dayton could be linked to the psychological recovery process.

Trying to redress the balance

In destroying the rapport between myself and Y., I effectively precluded myself from asking questions about the war, leading to a similar situation as in some of the overtly contested interviews. Discussion was limited to professional issues only, and any references to the war converged in a discussion of these professional issues. In an attempt to re-establish rapport (and to restore some of my own dignity) I attempted to rescue the situation with a more personal discussion after I had asked the last question of 'the official interview'. I switched off the tape and asked Y. if she felt that there were any problems associated with researchers visiting *Medica.* In other interviews this question has sometimes given the respondent the forum to critique things that have been problematic about researchers. Sometimes a respondent has warned me off certain areas, or clarified a point that they had problems in vocalising during the interview. However, Y. stated that she had no problem with researchers.

I then moved the discussion onto families, and we both established that we had children. In the subsequent conversation the subject of the war seemed to hang in mid-air, as we both approached and veered off from this subject. Y. appeared to waver about talking about the war, I had the impression that if I had pushed for a personal history she might have given it to me, but at the same time there was no invitation or lead-in to such a discussion. Rather, I came away with the impression that Y. may have been quite vulnerable over this issue and that her wavering was not an invitation to continue, but a warning to desist. My experience of reducing a respondent in Karlovac, Croatia, to tears, through an insensitive question about her experience of the war, made me wary of trespassing on Y.'s potentially raw emotions. I also sensed that I might, just as easily, have received a strenuous refusal to talk about the war.

Professional boundaries: the grey areas between public and private.

When I looked at the way in which Y. had presented information during the interview, and in our conversation afterwards, there seemed a clear split between her private life, her experience of being a psychologist, and the case-histories of

her clients. She was much more forthcoming about her clients' histories than her professional history, and similarly more forthcoming about her professional life than her personal life. This suggests that, like the respondents who overtly contested their interviews, the identity that Y. presented to me was a public identity, constructed through her work, effectively curtaining off her private identities from 'outside' view. Thus like these other respondents, Y. constructed quite clear and distinct boundaries between her public and private. All the information that she gave me was in the public domain.

However, a renegade piece of information residing in the public domain was Y.'s experience of 'burn-out', which straddled the boundaries between her public and private identities. And it is perhaps at this point in the interview, that Y.'s contestation of the interview really began, as she struggled to maintain her public/private boundaries, so that the private aspects of her public-professional identity remained intact.

The issue of ''burnout' in professionals represented a sessional strand of a conference on War and Trauma (*Krieg, Geschlect und Traumatisierung*) organised by *Medica Mondiale* (since 1996, the German wing of the Medica organisation), which I attended in Bonn, in October 1998. Although I did not attend the sessions on 'burnout', I attended a feed-back session, where the main issues were summarised. This session described how, during the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina, 'burnout' represented a real threat to individuals and teams within *Medica* at Zenica. Since client/professional relationships were stretched to their limits, 'burn out' represented not just a threat to individual staff members, but to the service that Medica was providing. Writing in the autumn of 1995, the Medica Psycho Team described the conditions in which they had been working:

> At the beginning of our work, over two years ago, we often felt helpless. We had no knowledge about trauma and how to deal with it. Often, we ourselves didn't know how we should cope with our own traumatic experiences or how we could protect ourselves internally against the terrible stories we heard each day. In retrospect we ask ourselves where we got the strength and the courage to do this work. But we can't answer that ourselves: we were needed and we couldn't and

> wouldn't sit around doing nothing surrounded by this madness. Who was going to help these women if we didn't? (Psycho Team, p. 13)

These sentiments were echoed by all the *Medica* team within this publication. In response, Medica introduced a range of interventions, whereby staff were required and encouraged to receive counselling around personal and professional problems that they encountered, in order to prevent 'burn out'.

The constant witnessing of trauma, and traumatic testimony in others, can and must have a traumatising effect on the individual acting as witness. Monika Hauser, a German gynaecologist and founder member of *Medica* wrote in the same publication:

> Our professional neutrality reached its limits when confronted by the indescribable suffering the women had been through (p.23)

It is perhaps not surprising then, that when client numbers gradually began to reduce after the war 'officially' ended, that members of *Medica's* staff began to experience the symptoms of professional 'burn out', which in effect was an activists/practitioner term for PTSD.

Monika Hauser's testimony is particularly succinct in describing the problems faced by the staff of *Medica.* The professional boundaries of these women were stretched and broken down by the testimonies, and physical conditions of their clients. In this situation the public and the private were entangled, impacting on the personal as well as professional identities of those working at *Medica.* Perhaps then it is not surprising that Y. resisted my attempts to get her to divulge more personal information, and that her professional testimony was so regulated. Although my Dayton question destroyed the rapport of the interview, that rapport was already challenged by the nature of Y.'s professional memories, and by the raising of the issue of 'burnout'. I suspect that it was unlikely that I could have persuaded Y. to divulge more personalised professional information if I had not asked the 'Dayton question'. In order to achieve this degree of confidence I would have had to have spent considerable time in getting to know her, on a professional and private basis.

Excluding the researcher

That there is a strong relationship between trust and information sharing is hardly a novel observation. One of the more obvious, and scarcely original conclusions that could emerge from this analysis, is that the closer the relationship between the respondent and the researcher, the more trust is built up, and the more likely a respondent is to divulge personal information.

E., an American volunteer working at *Medica* in Zenica, observed that even after three months of working with women at *Medica*, she had felt excluded from their personal memories of wartime. However after a year of working with these groups, she had got to know some of their personal histories, as both she and they had grown to know and trust each other. In contrast, C., a British volunteer working at the Osijek Peace Centre (in Eastern Slavonia, Croatia), noted that, in her experience, war memories were only exchanged amongst people who had shared the same war experiences, thus effectively excluding those from outside this circle.

It is possible that C. had not been with the Centre for long enough to become trusted as a confidante, and that there were implicit hierarchical structures in place, which made trust-building more difficult. However this difference may also have been linked to the way in which women activists have been perceived by the communities in which they live and work. Although *Medica* had experienced occasional problems with rogue male elements harassing clients[10], generally, the community have thought highly of their work. This contrasts sharply to the experience of members of Osijek Centre for Peace, Non-Violence and Human Rights, who have worked within a divided, isolated and embittered community. Katarina Kruhonja, a founder member of the Centre, wrote that (as an organisation based in Croatia, on the border of the UN protected area of Eastern Slavonia), in making links with people of differing ethnicities living in Serb-held territory in Eastern Slavonia 'We had to overcome the fear that we would be stigmatised as

[10]A. described some problems with men lingering outside the Medica buildings, harassing clients, and calling them *'Četnik darlings'* (conversation, Bonn, October 1998). See also Mischkowski,

'traitors'. Given the suspicion of Kruhonja's community is perhaps not surprising that the Centre's remembering was confined to a private and trusted inner-circle of people with shared or similar experiences.

There is of course a difference between confiding to a confidante, and confiding to a researcher. Within the context of ***researching*** the effects of war, it is uncertain how strong the relationship has to be, before trust is gained. There are a number of other factors/influences that come into play that can affect the respondent/researcher relationship: personality, identities, and level of trauma within the respondent. Perhaps one of the strongest factors that can prejudice a respondent against a researcher is the researcher's ***need to know***, that is, the researcher's very lack of knowledge makes her/him untrustworthy, Other, and thus excludes her/him from the knowledge they seek[11].

Cynthia Cockburn's recent research experiment (1998), where she visited groups of activists in Israel and Palestine, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Northern Ireland, then arranged exchange groups between activists, succeeded in breaking down this trust-barrier. It allowed her, as researcher, access to the thoughts of her respondents, through their interaction with other groups of women activists who had recently experienced, or were still experiencing war. Cockburn's strong feminist methodology acted as security for those taking part in this experiment. Each respondent knew that although she did not have the right to censor Cockburn's work, that she would have the opportunity to comment on the book that evolved from the project, and that Cockburn was open to negotiation as to what went into the final version. However the feminist strengths of this exercise also became, in some way, its weaknesses. Cockburn states that 'the result was a great deal of interaction over the writing' (p.3), which suggests that the book was costly in terms of time, money and energy. She also states that in one case she felt obliged to 'omit material at the project's request '(p.4) which she owns 'was a loss to my analysis'.

1997a, p.27, who states that 'Residents at Medica Zenica are frequently being verbally abused by men calling them "Chetnik darlings.

[11]This contrasts to the clinical relationship, where it is the client's need to tell that drives the relationship.

It is interesting to note that in publication of this project, the closest Cockburn gets to a public assessment of the effect of war on these individuals, in terms of memory, personal experience of trauma, and closure, is in her 'biopic' of Rada from *Medica* Zenica, whose story explores Rada's post-war identity as a Bosnian-Serb woman within *Medica.* Rada describes personal feelings of anger and forgiveness, located around her identity as Bosnian-Serbian in an organisation dealing with the consequences of violences of Bosnian-Serbs (p.202.). Yet, during several conversations with two of the Northern Irish respondents from Cockburn's study[12], these respondents made it clear that the issues of memory, trauma, closure had all been discussed when these groups met together. However, the public identities, claimed and asserted by all these groups within the context of Cockburn's book, were identities that drew on their activism, or the way in which women of different ethnicities could work together. The public construction of these groups' identities was again located through their work, and rarely through their personal experience, or memory. It is uncertain whether the remit of Cockburn's research was influential in this presentation of identity, whether it was 'organic', or perhaps a mixture of the two.

The seemingly strong links between intense work identities and constructed-forgetting does not necessarily mean that these represent a template for identifying activists who are likely to deal with war-memory in this way. As stated earlier there are a number of other influences that impact on the way that a person remembers. What is perhaps consistent, is that activists who manifest a form of denial, or rather, a constructed-forgetting, within the researcher/respondent relationship, appear to have some level of trauma or stress related to both the war and their work, which needs to be displaced by them in order to deal with the present. This does not preclude respondents who have not worked in a former war-zone. For example K., who works for Rosa House, a Zagreb based refuge for women traumatised during the war, was extremely difficult to interview, and placed a variety of unspoken barriers into the interview that prevented me from discussing the war. K.'s job during the war was to go to refugee camps and select the most traumatised women in need of one of the very limited number of places within the hostel. Women from the Centre for Women War Victims stated, at the

[12]Conversation in Bonn, October 1998.

time, that those responsible for this selection process found it extremely traumatic. K.'s role as co-ordinator of the refuge meant that she was responsible for the emotional and physical well-being of the women in her care, responsible for what happened to them after they left her care, whilst at the same time being responsible for the general management of the refuge and its finances. Somehow she also found time to be involved in the Centre's domestic-violence counselling service. Despite the fact that Zagreb was not a war-zone, both the current and past stress levels imposed on K. by her job appeared to have impacted upon her ability or desire to look back.

The act of forgetting may be a constructed subconscious form of emotional self-preservation. Recently publicised work by psychologists working on trauma[13]has shown that intensive counselling after trauma can exacerbate rather than prevent PTSD, suggesting that there is a link between active remembering and exacerbation of trauma. During my interview with Y., we discussed the time-lag between remembering, and the traumatic event itself. In some cases people will not want/need/decide to remember until years after the event. Y. also observed that a strong sense of spirituality, or ideology can help a person to recover from trauma. In the case of activists who actively refuse to remember, this refusal may represent a method of self-protection. They may not be ready or willing to remember within a structured, interview environment because they perceive that this process will be detrimental to their emotional health. A strong work ethic, accompanied by feminist politics, means that damage to emotional health will also damage their capacity for work. This does not necessarily mean that they do not remember, but rather, they may have a protected space in which to do this[14].

Protected spaces in which to remember: H. a case-history.

H. whom I interviewed in Sarajevo, is a feminist activist in her early twenties. She worked with an women's activist group, spoke fluent English, had been active in

[13] Radio 4 report on research presented to the British Psychological Association Conference in Brighton January 2000 by researchers from Birbeck College and University of Sussex. See also Hall, 2000.

Bosnian politics, and had researched a history of feminism in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In short she is a young woman of diverse experience. My interview with H. was very rushed, and like many of my respondents, she presented as over-worked, and stressed. Yet she was very generous with her information. Despite this generosity, H. did not tell me that she had been an under-age soldier during the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina. I found this out later.

The people who told me about H.'s war experience assumed that this knowledge was in the public domain, and within the context of Bosnian activist circles this information is certainly widely known. However, this information came as a surprise to me. The fact that H. did not tell me about this event in her life made this feel like an omission on H. 's behalf, which is perhaps an irrational feeling on my side. There was no real reason why H. should have divulged this information to me: the initial remit of the interview had been to discuss the history of feminism in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Yet, because the nature of the interview changed, so that by the end we were discussing issues of trauma and its effect on H. and H. 's 'generation', I was surprised that H. had not been more forthcoming about the particular context of her trauma.

My surprise stemmed from two different directions. The first derived from my ego and identity as a researcher. H. 's 'omission' made me feel that I had failed, both to sense and 'dig out' this piece of information, and to gain the trust of my respondent. In short, I felt stupid when I learnt from someone else that H. had been a soldier. However, my surprise also derived from a more professional basis, from a gut feeling that there was an anomaly in H. 's testimony. When H. reflected on the issue of trauma both at a national level, and within the parameters of her own, current experience of trauma, I felt that she had created a silence around the issue of her war experience. If H. chose to maintain a silence around this issue, it is difficult to identify whether the tone and pace of the interview were responsible, or whether H. 's silence resonates with the patterns of silence used by other respondents, that is, whether H. actively withdrew certain memories, certain parts of her personal history, from the scrutiny of the interview scenario.

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[14]This may be a particular social, emotional or physical environment.

Despite, or perhaps because of this possible anomaly, H. came across as self-aware, and was, to the extent described above, relatively open about her feelings of trauma:

> *"I look at the misery in which we are still living. There is a lack of understanding [from those outside]. The war .... still exists in our minds. The war is still fresh. We push emotions deep inside ourselves. Sometimes they are exploding. You need to work on inside yourself. But the boundaries are inside and outside. You are constantly reminded of what happened - who did what . I usually (when I am like this) get drunk. My generation do this. It does not solve anything long-term, it is a short-term solution. Three years is not enough - we need ten years before we can forget. There is a silence - we are all pretending that we are happy, but inside we are not."* (Interview, Sarajevo, January 1999)

In her use of the word 'you', 'our', 'my generation', H. spoke for a group of people, although the identity of the group named as 'my generation' was not obvious. My reading is that she was referring to an age-specific friendship-network, which given H.'s age were probably young people whose adolescence had been interrupted by the war. H's statement that the war is ever present in the minds of her group was startling when compared to the refusal of other respondents to even talk about the war. Yet her statement now appears aberrative when placed in the context of her final point on this matter: "*There is a silence - we are all pretending we are happy*". At what cost to her emotional health did H. break this silence to explain this to me?

H. described a pervasive feeling of depression which could escalate into intense feelings of trauma. Her use of an authoritative communal voice suggested that she had evidence that others felt as she did, that these issues had been discussed amongst the group. Speaking for the group, she stated that when things got bad they used alcohol to deal with these feelings. Alcohol provided a safe environment in which to let out, what she described as 'exploding' feelings. She did not describe how this process worked, but the implication was that alcohol has a cathartic effect, and that there was a temporary sense of release.

H.'s testimony, of the way in which her group use alcohol to deal with living with the war which *'.... still exists in our minds'*, contains an inherent tension. Her explanation that alcohol allowed her group to let out 'explosive' emotions related to living with the memory of war in their heads, stands alongside her comment that: '*Three years is not enough - we need ten years before we can forget*'. This suggests that whilst the group actively engaged in trying to obliterate their memories of war whilst drunk, this involved a process of active forgetting whereby they were forced to remember what it was that they wanted to forget. As Jonathan Boyarin (1992, pp.1-8)) observes, forgetting and memory cannot be oppositional, without memory there is no forgetting. Rather, these activities are two closely related parts of the same concept, and the apparent tension in H. 's testimony reflects this relationship.

H. contextualised the problem of silence and forgetting as being partly spatial, bringing us to discuss the landscape of Sarajevo, and its effects on memory. In this city there are constant visual reminders of war. To an 'outsider', such as myself, the immediate visual impact is stunning and deeply disturbing: NATO/SFOR[15] troops on street corners, bombed-out buildings, burnt-out buildings, shell and bullet marks in the walls, small craters in the pavements, the rebuilt old Muslim quarter of the city which looks so new, that it reminds the observer that it replaces what was previously razed to the ground. The internal/private landscapes of my (temporary) landlady's home mirrored the external/public landscape: an obvious, war -induced poverty restricting access to heating and hot water, a male relative's slippers still by the door, telephone directories from 1991, a magazine collection that stopped in 1991, and the public intrusion of a balcony-view of bombed-out buildings, and the blaring television coverage of Kosovo atrocities acting as a constant reminder of past violences in this country. Although I could not ask, I wondered whether the crater I walked over each morning, represented the death or maiming of someone during the siege of Sarajevo, and whether the slippers my landlady was making me wear belonged to her dead husband or son.

[15]See Definitions.

For those living in Sarajevo, and other former war-zones, the effect of these visual reminders is perhaps residual, so much the norm, so much part of the everyday social fabric that it appears to go unnoticed. Yet at the same time the very fact of its presence reminds, representing a kind of peripheral consciousness. As Boyarin (1992) argues, the acts of forgetting and remembering may relate to a temporal event, but they take place within a spatial dimension. The space around those forgetting has to be contiguous with the act of forgetting. This is observed in the nature of H.'s imagined antidotes to the post-war traumatic condition, voiced as "*What we need is some luxury*", or the chance "*to leave Bosnia-Herzegovina*" (*op cit*). Neither of these were foreseeable in the near future: poverty is endemic, and the borders enforced by Fortress Europe preclude the possibility of escaping the country, prompting H. to comment:

> "*The boundaries that encircle Bosnia-Herzegovina: they're like a wall. Many friends say that it is impossible to get out.*" (*op cit*)

This last, particular complaint was echoed by several other respondents in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Space and forgetting

The effect of post-war borders and boundaries on remembering and forgetting

H. 's assertion that Bosnia-Hercegovina was surrounded by impenetrable, wall-like boundary lines, is an accurate description of the border controls that prevent Bosnia-Hercegovinans from exiting their country, creating a sense of national claustrophobia. This is exacerbated by the very radical way in which the land available to those living in the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina has officially shrunk because of the war. The effective dividing of Bosnia-Herzegovina into two entities, as agreed by the signing of the 'Dayton Agreement' in December 1995, has not just resulted in a shrinkage in terms of overall land available to each entity, but a more localised shrinking through the permanent division of smaller communities. A classic example of this localised shrinkage is that of the towns of

Slavonski Brod and Bosanski Brod (see figure 1). These two towns are divided by the river Brod, but, before the war, functioned as two connected and symbiotic communities. People who lived in Slavonski Brod might work in Bosanski Brod, walking across a bridge connecting the two towns in order to do so. People in Bosanski Brod were similarly connected to Slavonski Brod. Now the two towns are permanently divided by the international boundary line that separates Croatia from Republika Srpska. A trip to the other side requires a passport, visa, money to bribe border guards, and for the person crossing to be of the 'right' ethnicity[16]. The river, bridge, and the opposing town on the other side of the water, now represent physical reminders of the war, and of a lost community, to both these towns.

Shrinkage is not completely monitored and controlled by the Dayton Agreement. NATO/SFOR/UN has turned a 'blind eye' to the drawing up imaginary boundary lines which separates the Croatian controlled parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina (the so-called Herceg-Bosna and Bihać), from the Bosniak controlled areas[17]. It also ignores the *de facto* dividing of communities in this area, so that a small, town like Gorni Vakuf, has an unofficial border running through its middle. Until recently, few inhabitants of 'opposing' ethnicities, that is Bosnian-Muslims and Bosnian-Croats, had dared to cross this line[18].

Even these unofficial areas have been mapped by NATO, the UN, and local bureaucrats in Bosnia-Hercegovina, so that unofficial zones are perceived to have some permanence in the imagination of the international community (despite the relative silence of NATO on the anomaly of Herceg-Bosna). However, the method of mapping reflects the nature of the changes that have taken place. New maps have not been drawn up. Rather, lines, and shaded areas, denoting territorial control of a particular group, have been superimposed onto old maps of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The effect is anarchic, intransient, and dissatisfying: a historical palimpsest, a constant reminder of what was there before. The physical landscape

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[16]Women at the Centre for Women War Victims, Zagreb, explained that visas to Republika Srspka or Serbia were less likely to be issued to people who identified as Croatian. A Croatian application was also more likely to be delayed by several months.

[17]Bosniak is a post-war term, generally applied by the international community, which refers to people who view themselves as part of the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Although Bosniaks can be of any ethnicity, generally they tend to be either Bosnian-Muslims or Bosnian-Croats.

[18]Conversation with S.E. Jones, WATFY.

of these towns matches the maps. Despite the domination of a particular group, and the eradication of the Other through forced removal, killing, burning of the Other's houses and mosques, or churches, the physical void left behind, the space that was Other, remains, and thus reminds. Both cartography and landscape represent a mapping of exclusion, a physical silence, permanently reminding those complicit in excluding, of those they have excluded.

Despite the presence of new maps drawn onto old maps, which can tell the visitor who has control of which town, the actual experience of moving around within this landscape is very different to the clarity of reading a map. This is in part because not all territorial differences are necessarily contained within a map. The anarchic influence of local war-lords (usually local business men with considerable power) and the seemingly arbitrary results of protracted local battles, mean that ethnic territorial control can differ from town to town, and from village to village. But the complexity of moving around within this 'new' landscape comes from the difficulty in fixing new types of maps onto the Imaginary. The drawing up of new physical borders and boundaries in seemingly arbitrary places, and the aggressive, contested nature of these boundaries can be frightening, isolating, and difficult to negotiate, for both the visitor, and those who live in these areas. The parallels between this post-war situation and the drawing up of borders and boundaries in the aftermath of the other twentieth century wars in Former Yugoslavia should not go unnoticed[19]. After both these wars, the re-mapping of this part of Europe meant that whole towns and villages were made to assume new national identities, and suppress old identities, over-night.

Milena Marković, a Serb journalist visiting the Federation of Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1996 with a colleague, described the confusion of a journey between Zenica, Mrkonjic Grad, Travnik, and Vitez.

> All roads towards Travnik, Vakuf, and Jajce are open only during the daytime. By the way, one drives very fast on these roads. All depends on number plates.

[19]There is a notable absence of inquiry into the links between the First and Second World Wars and post-war ethnic population movements in Former Yugoslavia.

> Croats, who had been expelled from Travnik, drive through this city as fast as an arrow. Muslims do the same when they drive through Vitez or Jajce.[20]

Muslims were not welcome in Vitez, which is under Croat control. However, the Serb journalists were welcomed by Bosnian-Croat and Serb residents. Marković quoted a conversation with a Bosnian-Croat shop-keeper :

> The merchant says "There are 35,000 inhabitants in Vitez, of whom at least 5 percent are Serbs ... You'll only find Croats and Serbs here. No others; I mean there are no muslims [sic, lower-case]. We don't even mention them .. There's a village out there but we've managed to isolate it.

The Symbolic borders and boundaries encircling the Vitez area were exclusively non-Muslim (the effect of this isolation/exclusion on the lone Muslim village cannot be guessed at). Yet the testimony of this merchant contests these boundaries at the same time as asserting them. Like H. who wanted to remember and forget at the same time, the absence/ denial of Muslims, and the silence on the subject of Muslims, "We don't even mention them", is both a remembering and a forgetting. The linguistic silence of Vitez, is a linguistic void. Its very silence maintains the concept, and memory of Muslim people, so that whilst excluded and othered, Muslims maintain a residual presence in the Symbolic of the Vitez Croats and Serbs.

Closure and remembering

Active forgetting and active remembering

So far, the focus within this chapter has been on different types of forgetting, and the suggestion that the constructed-forgetting of some respondents can be closely linked to a structured-remembering, where an individual might reach for a personal war memories within a safe environment (with people who have the same experience of war). However the nature of memory is such that it is difficult to regulate and structure. Rather it can be spontaneous, flighty, invasive. As H. reflected, recall is affected by one's surroundings, so that space and memory are

[20]Note that the situation has altered since 1996. The number-plate system has changed, and there is now more freedom to move around (enforced by the implementation of Dayton's 'freedom of

intrinsically linked. Visual reminders of war exist throughout Bosnia-Hercegovina and much of Croatia, threatening always to bring the war to mind. Yet it is not just solid structures or their absences that inspire recall, but the light, sounds and smells within the spaces around us, supporting Boyarin's observation (*ibid*, p.1) that memory is 'the free-association counterpart of forgetting'. Within a Lacanian reading of trauma and memory, the existence of a 'free-association' memory, the seemingly unbidden surfacing of some memories, is regulated by the need to remember, which represents a need to deal with/heal emotional wounds[21]. Remembering can help those remembering to let go of their memories and start to forget. If a person is emotionally unable to deal with a particular memory, the regulation of memory allows that person to efface a problematic remembrance from her/his conscious, relegating it to the Real, to be dealt with later, or not, depending on the individual.

Denial of memory has been referenced by respondents as a type of forgetting, used by their clients, in order to deal with surviving and enduring difficult situations, such as flight, living in refugee camps or poor temporary accommodation. H. 's testimony alluded to yet another type of forgetting: where because life in Bosnia-Hercegovina was so miserable, she and her group sought oblivion. This type of forgetting was not a need to deny memories, but rather, the desire to obliterate these memories. In a sense then, this desire for oblivion was not really a desire to forget, but a need, either for the event of war to have never taken place at all, or for H. 's identity to be substantially changed, altered, removed from the constant reminders of war. H.'s fantasised oblivion was both internal and external, oblivion contained strong spatial, temporal, and identity-based components. Her need for oblivion highlights the links between memory and forgetting, and the various stimuli that encourage remembering. Her assertion that space can influence memory is borne out by the way in which some activists, in areas/spaces less affected by the war, such as Zagreb in Croatia, have been actively remembering, as opposed to actively forgetting.

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movement' clause) within Bosnia-Hercegovina.

[21]Flash-back symptoms of PTSD, which result in a person being trapped within a memory, where recall can be so strong that if feels to that person that they re-experience an event, are different from those described here. PTSD represents a clinical condition, where in Lacanian terms the Real

Zagreb war narratives

B., a case history

B. works as a lecturer in Finland, and returns to Croatia in between semesters, to work with the Centre for Women War Victims. She is the Centre's media-star, a flamboyant, gregarious and garrulous personality, with a lot to say. I had understood B.'s apparent accessibility as a respondent to be linked to my established relationship with the Centre for Women War Victims. My interview with B. was agreed in advance of my arrival at The Centre, and she had a good idea of what the research project was about. Despite the fact that she had agreed to an interview in principle, she proved incredibly difficult to pin down, and it took several days of waiting before she let me interview her. The decision as to when I finally got to interview her was entirely spontaneous, and made by B. alone.

I started the interview off with a request for some background information on B.'s involvement with the Centre. From there the interview took off, at break-neck speed, with B. barely pausing for breath. Although the content of the interview was fascinating, and the information given has proved extremely useful, the roller-coaster nature of the interview was problematic. It was so difficult to intersperse B.'s speedy and assertive monologue with questions or comments that I felt as if I had no control over the content or direction of the interview. Although B.'s testimony appeared passionate, open, politicised, angry, loud, engaged with her professional memory of war, and contrasted with the reticence and more guarded speech of respondents living in former war-zones, an analysis of the nature and format of the interview challenge this reading. Although there were elements of generosity within B.'s testimony, the amount of time I was kept waiting, the assertive nature of B.'s delivery, and the substance of her testimony suggests that perhaps B.'s testimony was more contrived, contested, less spontaneous than I had originally thought it to be.

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converges in the Symbolic, creating a series of neuroses and mental symptoms that intrude on an

The effects of space and identity on B.'s memories

B.'s high-speed monologue comprised a stream of consciousness, with interesting leaps from and to different subjects, alongside a more formulated narrative of B.'s professional role and experiences during the war, and her political reaction to these. The substance of B.'s narrative of her war-memories was located around her experiences within the Centre for Women War Victims, and her politicised reading of the causes and effects of the war. She drew on client anecdotes, observations, and case histories, to paint a picture of quite terrible trauma and suffering within the displaced and refugee women with whom she had worked. At the same time she also built up a picture of these women as incredibly strong, enabled by their own strength and the work of the Centre for Women War Victims.

On analysis, this part of her testimony seemed rehearsed and formulaic, with an element of organisational-propaganda[22]. Although engaged with all aspects of the Centre's work, primarily B. dealt with journalist enquiries to the Centre. She also travelled for the Centre, to events and conferences. Thus B.'s testimony reflected this function, and this identity. Her engagement with her war-memories was very much part of the public domain, and on analysis there seems to be little of the personal within this part of her testimony, except for her passionate delivery. Thus, when considering the way in which respondents have maintained their public/private boundaries within an interview situation, the difference between B. and the respondents from former war-zones, is perhaps not as great as it initially seemed.

Rather, the difference was located in the rehearsed elements of B.'s testimony, underlying which was an implicit sense of closure, a sense that this part of her life was over, and the trauma of events worked through. The effect was to leave the

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individual's ability to live a 'normal' life.

[22]This also points to a difference in counselling techniques across Former Yugoslavia. Although Zagreb drew on the same body of literature when drawing up a counselling system, there was more emphasis on a feminist reading of gendered violence. In Zenica the approach was more psychoanalytic, and holistic, with less emphasis on feminism.

listener with the feeling that whilst this aspect of B.'s life had been traumatic, it had also been the most incredible adventure. At the same time her testimony stood out as being quite firmly rooted to the past, projecting a feeling of stasis, that B. had not moved on. When contrasted to the testimony of many of the other women from the Centre in Zagreb who wove their testimony around the present as well as the past, this sense of a finite past is somewhat startling.

B.'s identity, as someone living both in Croatia and Finland, may account for this anomaly. When she was in Croatia, and working as an activist, she was a huge part of the life-force within the Centre: engaged, driven, inspiring, so that when she left for Finland, to be an academic, there was always a sense of lull in the Centre. However the act of moving between these spaces, from a post-war environment to a country with a relatively healthy economic, environmental and social fabric, appears to have created for B., a sense of here and there, now and then. The enormous differences between these spaces also required a transition in identity. In Croatia she was an activist, yet always slightly exotic, slightly Other, impermanent and exciting (compared to the dreariness of day-to-day living in Zagreb) because of her alternative academic identity in Finland. In Finland she became Other: a real, live war-activist with a story to tell (to Finnish journalists and friends) to a post-Second World War generation that has not experienced war. Thus, when in Finland, B. appeared to experience a sense of temporary closure to events in Croatia, which affected the way in which she remembered her Croatian experiences. This also appeared to impact on the way in which she remembered whilst in Croatia. B.'s sense of time, the present and the past, was constantly disrupted, so that an almost nostalgic fossilisation of memory had crept in. The fluid and changing memories of her own activist community in Croatia, with its own 'reading-formation' (Tony Bennett, [1983] 1989) of the past, was often not accessible, leaving her to construct her own Croatian memories, fragmented and disrupted by the anomalies of the times and spaces in which she lived.

B.'s seeming lack of trauma may also have been related to her transitional identity. B. came across as having less of a national identity than some of the other women that I spoke to. Her apparent lack of investment in being Yugoslav, or Croatian suggested that her sense of trauma was not tied to her national identity, or to a core

sense of *heimat*, but rather it was politically rationalised, and tied to her gendered identity. She seemed to perceive the trauma of war in universal terms, as a trauma to women, to which she was witness. Thus in a sense she appeared less engaged, and her own identity seemed less traumatised than that of other respondents. At the same time it points to the extent in which the trauma of activists counselling women survivors of war-violence has been wrapped up in their experience of war within their *heimat*, and the way in which witness-trauma and national identity can be inextricably linked[23].

B.'s considerable experience of talking to internationals (journalists, researchers and friends alike) about her professional memories of war, had made her very aware of what they wanted to hear, to the extent that on occasion she could be seen to be overtly manipulating her testimony for her audience. Her ease with westerners originated not just from personality, but from her accessibility to, and contact with, westerners, which in turn derived from her freedom to travel (contrasting with H. 's lack of freedom to travel), and from the popularity of Croatia as a venue to westerners wanting to visit Former Yugoslavia, before, during and after the war.

B., and many other women activists in Zagreb, exuded a sophistication that many of the activists from Bosnia-Hercegovina (excepting perhaps H.), and from Karlovac and Osijek in Croatia, lacked. This sophistication manifested itself, in particular, as a politicised understanding of feminism and nationalism. This supports the thesis expounded in Chapter 5 where I argued that class, education, and place in Former Yugoslavia are interlinked, and have had a profound effect on women's access to jobs, and politicised identities.

Closure and remembering in Zagreb

[23]This observation represents a potential issue for further study. It acts as an inversion of Y.'s observation that a strong ideological or spiritual identity can help a person recover from trauma, pointing to a potential model where the less national 'investment' a witness has in an event such as war, the less traumatising that event might be. I had hoped to interview German members of

Although B.'s testimony differed in some fundamental ways from that of many of the Zagreb respondents, the rehearsed elements to her testimony were not unusual, but rather, more pronounced and more advanced. Rehearsal was also noticeable, for example, in the testimony of M. (the Croatian statistician). Like B., M. has many links with western academics and political activists. The narrative devices that M. employed appeared less rehearsed than B., giving the impression that she was still working these through. Her testimony came across as a combination of crafted and contradictory, a jarring between the rehearsed and the spontaneous, and, unlike B.'s testimony, still connected to the present.

The difference between M. (and B.'s) testimony and those of women in former war-zones, in terms of her sophistication and politicised understanding, appears to be linked, in part, to issues around class, education and access to western influences. This supports Maurice Halbwach's thesis (paraphrased by Henri Lustiger-Thaler, 1996) that we use '... social constructs such as class, ethnicity, and race as frameworks of remembrance ...' (Lustiger-Thaler, p.208). But it is also linked to the lack of visual reminders of war in Zagreb's architectural fabric, and to the city's relative affluence, compared with other parts of the country. C. from Osijek Peace Centre, who spent part of the war in Zagreb, observed that in Osijek her experience of war in Zagreb did not 'count' as war experience. She claimed that Zagreb, with its minimal experience of shelling, was perceived by those in the former 'war zones' as being the city where 'there was no war', a kind of magic, rich, international community, that reaped the benefits of war, without the suffering. Although Zagreb had reminders of the war, in the form of constant media references to the war, war memorials[24], desperate poverty amongst its unemployed, elderly, and single-mother/widowed women citizens, these are all contextualised by respondents as related to the recent past. Amongst the activist communities of Zagreb, there appears to be a movement towards closure that is connected both to the present and to the space that these communities occupy: a closure that is influenced by an interweaving of temporal and spatial identities.

Medica, now living in Germany, to test this hypothesis, but due to work pressure they withdrew their consent for me to interview them.

[24]The very fact that Zagreb has memorials suggests it is a city in recovery. War memorials tend to come some time after wars, when a community perceives itself as in mourning, a process further on from being in trauma.

Linking the past to the present: P., a case-history.

P. was a key respondent from The Centre for Women War Victims, whom I did not formally interview, but with whom I spent time each day, discussing events, national and international news items, office gossip, and the context to perplexing pieces of information that I gleaned from respondents, or from the media. P. represented a balanced and informed repository of knowledge of the history of the women's movement in Croatia, a history of the Centre, and a history of the (at the time) current nationalist government in Croatia. Her informal testimony echoed most of the testimonies that I heard from women at the Centre.

Although P. was willing to discuss details of the war with me, referencing these as past, her activism, like those of the other women in The Centre, was clearly located in the present. The difference between P. (and also her colleagues at the Centre and women from Karlovac and Osijek) and respondents from Bosnia-Hercegovina, was that she was prepared to publicly and overtly make politicised links between the war and current social problems in Croatia, in particular, the problem of domestic violence. The reason for this difference seems to have been located in the nature of activism in Croatia. During the war, activists like P. (and also women in Osijek) opposed the war, at considerable cost to themselves, and opposed the nationalist State which was responsible for the war. Linking the events of the war to current social problems, in particular domestic violence, was an extension of their opposition to the violence of their State.

Spelling out these problems, and their links to the war was seen as important. Some areas such as Istria, saw no fighting, and very few men in Istria fought on the front-line (interview with G., from Poreć Human Rights/Women's Centre). Yet Istria has a refugee community from Eastern Slavonia, which is deeply affected by the war. Other areas of Croatia, such as Eastern Slavonia, Pakrac, Karlovac, Dalmatia, saw front-line fighting, and the general populace still experiences related problems: violence, domestic violence, unemployment, alcohol and substance

abuse[25]. Because of this disparate war-experience, the Centre for Women War Victims saw a need to point out the links between war, continuities of violence, and other social problems across the country. The rationale was that in areas like Istria, war-related social problems needed contexting to be understood. In areas like Eastern Slavonia, people working on these issues needed wider public support and understanding. This part of the Centre's work linked in with their general and national consciousness-raising programmes around domestic violence, and sexual violence against women.

In contrast, many social problems in Bosnia-Hercegovina are so clearly a product of the war, that the issue amongst Bosnian activists has been to tackle the problems, rather than remind the populace of the links between the war and these problems, which would simply excacerbate their misery. These links are only really made explicit to international funders, who want to hear these links being made for their own political/ideological reasons. The political stance of Bosnian activists has also been, to an extent, to work with the state on reconstruction. There is a sense of a unity of 'victims' within Federation of Bosnia-Hercegovina, a 'reading-formation' in which activists perceive themselves as part of a wider community of victims (or survivors). Thus, bringing home an anti-war message has not been perceived as necessary. For example, Cynthia Cockburn's work with women at *Medica*, which made explicit the links between nationalism, masculinity and militarism within the Federation of Bosnia-Hercegovina was taken on board, empathised with, and understood by these activists, but their focus concentrated on reacting to war-related problems as opposed to challenging war, militarism and state-violence.

Personal closures

Over a period of time P. gave me snippets of personal information: for example, I learnt that she used to live in Dalmatia, on the southern-eastern coast of Croatia. One week-end at the beginning of November 1998 [26] P. travelled with a friend, by car, to a conference of Former Yugoslavian activists, being held on an island off of Split, in Dalmatia (I was invited, but had decided to go to an event being held in

[25]But not statistically proven.
[26]Catholic Feast of All Souls, a festival that commemorates the dead.

Zagreb at the same time). When P. returned she told me she had had a terrible time. On the way she had to ask her friend to stop the car so she could vomit. When she got to the conference she had "*no spirit to party*" (conversation in November 1998) with the other activists . (This is a 'cardinal sin' amongst activists, who, when they get together like to party 'hard'; women at *Medica* later told me about P.'s behaviour, and showed me a video of P. sitting alone at a table, whilst everybody else danced and sung around her). Instead, she had sat on her own and felt very depressed, but could not explain why she felt like this.

Later, P. came back with photos from the week-end. Amongst these were images of a destroyed village. Telling me "*This is where I grew up*", P. explained that she and her friend had made a detour to stop at her former home and look around. Whilst deeply shocked at the damage to her village, she had felt the need to take copious photographs. Although she did not overtly connect her vomiting with this experience, instead blaming it on something she ate, the clues that P. gave me suggested that subconsciously she knew that these two events were connected.

The past in the present

P.'s need to see her former home, and the need to take photographs suggest that P. had wanted to physically see the destruction of her past, and therein to remember, to place the past into her present. Lustiger-Thaler (drawing on Halbwach's thesis), observes that:

> [M]emory becomes part of a system of conflicting frameworks about the present, and it becomes most evident in the passage from one societal form to another, through processes of cultural selectivity and social distortion (p.208).

This thesis resonates with the concluding section of Chapter 5 on gender, where I examined the decision amongst the women from the Centre to become less isolated from the rest of Croatian society, and to work from within Croatian society as opposed to without it. This implication of this decision, along with the Centre's interest in the results of the, then, forthcoming Croatian elections[27], meant that the women of the Centre were considering re-integrating with Croatian society, and reassuming, or taking up national identities that they had previously discarded.

Perhaps the timing of P.'s mourning and remembrance of her village, slots into this coming transition[28], and the Centre's hoped for broader transition of Croatian society from a nationalist, to a more moderate political identity.

What is interesting when comparing P.'s attempts at closure, with the 'denial' of respondents deeply affected by war, is that all these testimonies resonate with Halbwach's argument that '.... memory becomes part of a system of conflicting frameworks of the present' (*ibid*). Most of these respondents have explicitly used the present as a marker, an overt tool, for measuring their forgetting or remembrance of the past, so that their past has come to be constructed through the present. At the same time this has required them to draw on 'reading-formations' within their particular communities, so that although they have constructed their past through the present, this present has been a shifting and fluid reality defined by the communities that they live or work in.

When contrasting B.'s seemingly anomalous static construction of the past to these other testimonies, this sense of stasis seems to derive from the fact that she had not constructed her memories from the 'reading-formation' of her activist community. Thus it seemed that she was the exception to Halbwach's model. Yet, this is perhaps a little misleading. B. had drawn her memories from fixed points within the political history of the Centre for Women War Victims. Her transient and transitional national and professional identities, Croatian and not-Finnish, activist and academic, meant that she was denied access to subtle changes to the way in which The Centre's readings of past events changed. She was forced to construct and remember these for herself, taking them from a fixed point in time (her last visit) and thus they appeared more static, more contrived, the product of one person's remembering, rather than a group's remembrance. Although B.'s memories appeared to exclude the present, what they excluded was other people's

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[27]Held in January 2000, with an overwhelming majority against the nationalist HDZ.

[28] P.'s timing to visit her village coincided with the Feast of All Souls, a Catholic festival that commemorates the dead. In 1998 there was much public hype for this commemoration, and the national media made clear links between the festival and the war. This is an example of how, although P. maintained her position as a member of a group outside of Croatian society, the broader national/collective memory of war, may still have been assimilated by her group.

present. B.'s own reality, her own present, had in fact stamped itself quite permanently onto her memories.

Conclusion

Memory in the broader community

This discussion on remembering and forgetting has concentrated on the testimonies of activists in the Federation of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, and has focused on the way in which war, trauma, space and time, political, personal and national identities have impacted on a respondent's desire/ability to remember or to forget. Although there have been indications, at times, that the experience of some activists also resonates with the 'reading-formation'/interpretations of the past of the communities in which they live, unless I have had firm evidence, I have avoided making these connections explicit and universal, in order to avoid accusations of essentialism. But what has come across from this analysis is that Bosniak respondents have tended to have more in common with the larger community of Bosniaks, because they perceive themselves to be part of that community, which presents itself as victims of both a genocide, and a war. This sense of belonging exists despite the fact that this community has failed to include women into its constitutional model of citizenship, and has failed to address a broad spectrum of problems around the status and rights of women, from issues of violence, to issues of education.

In contrast, Croatian respondents have had less in common with the larger community of Croatians because they have stood in opposition to this community, and its support for the state. They perceive the broader Croatian community to be complicit with the violences, and genocide of this war. In contrast to this perception, the broader Croatian community, and the media that inform it, also project themselves as a nation of victims. However, for many this perception of victim is mediated by a concept of heroism, so that they perceive themselves to be

heroic victims, a perception that resonates with the public identities of the Bosnian-Serbs, and Serbs.

Because of the limitations of space and time, this chapter has not examined the way in which identity and memory has shifted in the Yugoslav successor states over the last five to six years. For example, I have not included in this analysis a consideration of the effect that the 1999 Kosovo conflict has had on the need for closure in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. Neither have I examined the impact of the recent elections in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina on the different ethnic and political communities in these regions. Although some of these issues have been considered in other work, for example Lindsey, 2000, which examines Croatian national identity and collective memory since the Croatian elections, outstanding are many other issues, which represent potential work for the future.

Conclusion

> *Other forms of difference, notably class and race, are crucial in the formulation of discourses on social identity, and thus will be constitutive of modes of subjectivity in the same way as gender. It follows that these forms of difference will be strongly implicated in the relationship between fantasies of power and fantasies of identity. Whenever that relationship is called into question, violence, or the threat of violence may result.*
>
> Henrietta Moore, 1994a, p.154.

Reflecting on a process: a thesis of two halves

First half

When I introduced the research project in Chapter 1, I stated that this body of writing was split into two halves, the first being an historical analysis/narrative, and the second being a more critical and theoretical piece. During the writing of this work I have been aware that the theoretical half of the thesis could not exist without the historical analysis, and that the first four, historically based chapters (2-5) form a core of solid analysis upon which the theoretical material is framed. However, there have been a number of times, during the writing, in which I have felt enormously frustrated at having to plod at writing this background material, because what I really wanted to do was get to the cut and thrust of the debate. Similarly, during the editing of this final draft, I have felt frustrated at having to lose more theoretical material, to make room for the solid core of informative, socio-historical analysis.

Having got to the long-dreamed of point where I am actually writing a conclusion, I can now see how necessary these first four chapters are, and how they represent a body of work which frames the history of ethnicity, nationalism, gender and war in Yugoslavia, from a particular angle which is lacking in other work on this subject.

I believe that this body of writing captures and consolidates the tone of an, as yet, unacknowledged new debate on Former Yugoslavia, which is evident only in Sabrina Ramet's recent work (1999): a collection of writing by feminists, sociologists, historians, cultural studies critics and anthropologists commenting on Yugoslavian social phenomena[1]. The methodology of this research project, which gathered its data by examining society from the margins, has assisted this process of looking at war from a new perspective, and has moved the project away from both the populist mainstream and the feminist mainstream, to an analysis that examines life amongst groups facing marginalisation because of their gender and their political orientation. This methodology was thus ideally suited to examine the growing impact of nationalism on some of the groups most likely to be othered by nationalism.

Although I claim that these first four chapters represent a new type of commentary on the wars in Former Yugoslavia, a narrative and analysis of the political events leading up to the wars, and of the violences of the wars themselves are clearly, and intentionally, missing from my work, which has focused instead on the social background to these conflicts. My examination of the social structures, hierarchies, and phenomena that informed gender, ethnicity and national identity in the backdrop to and build-up to war, provides a new understanding of how and why the wars took place. By looking, not at the broad political events that affected Yugoslavians, but focusing on shifts in collective and individual ways of perceiving self, and difference in others, these chapters represent an investigation of the role of religion, ethnicity, nation, gender, the state and the family (that is, the public and the private) in shaping identity in Yugoslavia. They have thus provided a framework on which to hang the latter half of the thesis, part of which theorises some of the possible influences for violence against women.

The broad themes which have emerged from these four chapters: the focus on identity, the analysis of insiders and outsiders, public and private, masculine and feminine, provide an examination of opposition, and the oppositional, which has explored not just the boundaries between concepts such as the public and the

[1]Ramet does not contextualise these phenomena within the background to the conflicts.

private, but also examined the grey zones, the interstitial spaces between these oppositions. These chapters, are then, very much an analysis of social identity, and of the shifting boundaries of social identity. Thus they represent a core on which it is has been possible to build a body of theory, not only within this thesis but beyond it.

Second half

During the writing of this thesis there have many theoretical avenues that I have either begun to explore, or been tempted to explore, but have abandoned because the focus of the project on nationalism, gender and violence against women in war has guided my choices. The three chapters which constitute the second half of this thesis, Chapters 6, 7 and 8, represent my first steps towards a theoretical analysis of this phenomenon. Chapter 6, which critiqued the current state of the debate on sexual violence against women in war, challenged the now established and almost casual use of testimony on sexual violence, and examined the domination of media and human-rights based testimony in the late twentieth century as a resource for academic and practitioner study. This chapter urged two changes to the debate on sexual violence in war. Firstly, it argued that the theoretical focus of the debate needs to shift away from an analysis of short survivor narratives of rape, to the generation of new testimonies, gathered from both survivors and perpetrators. These should not necessarily be an attempt to represent the arguably un-representable, but rather should be used to: provide some insight and understanding into the long-term experience of being a survivor or perpetrator; to shed new light on the social and personal contexts and background to violence; and to examine how the sharing of these narratives, nationally or in the private realm of the family, may or may not influence future violences/conflicts. Secondly, this chapter urged that the debate on rape-in-war shift its focus onto a study of the public and private social structures that were in place before war started, because it is these that hold some of the clues to understanding the influences to violence.

Chapter 7 took up the challenge that Chapter 6 lay down. Drawing on psychoanalytical theory, it examined Andrei Simić's (1999) evidence of crypto-matriarchy in Yugoslavia, and argued that the power of mothers over their sons in

the private realm came to be perceived as a threat to the public male order during the rise in overt, aggressive nationalism in the late 1980s. Nationalism thus came to create a misogynist hysteria amongst some groups of Former Yugoslavian men. The use of psychoanalysis as an analytical tool in Chapter 7 offers a new exploration of the relationship between constructions of masculinity, maternal identities, and the possible will to do sexual violence to women. The publication of an updated version of Simić's work rather late on in the course of the thesis (towards the end of 1999), provided evidence for a theory on masculinity and mothering that I had already mapped out, but its use is tentative and there is clearly more work that could be done.

My choice of analysis in Chapter 7 was influenced by an overriding intellectual interest in what Barbara Creed (1993) describes as the 'monstrous feminine', the male fantasy/nightmare of a castrating, polluting female body, often that of a mother, which will devour the male, or the male organ. There were, however, a number of other possible analyses that would have provided some understanding of the influences to violence. What I hope has been foregrounded in the theoretical half of this thesis is that there cannot be one sole, core explanation for the violence enacted against women during the war, rather, there are multiple influences to violence. Whilst endorsing this argument, I also concur with Moore, quoted above, that identity is key to an analysis of these influences, because violence is often, but not always, linked to a threat to identity.[2]

Chapter 8, which represents the final chapter of this thesis, moved away from an analysis of violence, to an examination of activist memories in post-war Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. This chapter is perhaps the most substantive chapter of

[2]With this hypothesis in mind, there are a variety of research projects which would shed light on some of the influences to violence. Jettisoned from this project, but certainly not forgotten is a project on militarism in Former Yugoslavia which examines a variety of issues around identity, including: an analysis of identity, order-taking and homo-socialism in the military; altered identities and the use and supply of drugs and alcohol during military offensives (recently highlighted by Human Rights Watch, 2000, report on rape during the Kosovo conflict); the local/global influences on leader-identities and associated regional, militarised violences during the wars, looking specifically at the case history of Ratko Mladić and the Srebrenica massacres; and the links between individual acts of violence and militarised identities, and fictional representations of violence in war-films, which have been flagged up as potential influences to violence by Joanna Bourke (1999) in her recent work on the military and face-to-face killing in the twentieth-century.

the thesis in terms of its focus on the interview data from the fieldwork, but its tone and subject matter is broadly consistent with the rest of the thesis. It continued with the theme of identity and the public/private by examining the nature of professional activist memories of the war. It questioned why some respondents were unwilling to share their memories, and asked whether the outside researcher is ever likely to be party to experiential memories of war, without first building an extremely trusting relationship with a respondent. This chapter thus acts as potential guide for future researchers interested in studying the issue of war. My own feeling, now that the project is concluded, is that a researcher might manage to persuade a respondent to share war memories through persuasive and forceful tactics, but such a method would be highly unethical. My recommendation to future researchers in this field would be to build enough time into their research projects for them to get to establish a relationship with their respondents. As my respondent E., who is not a researcher, but 'merely' an outsider (and thus not necessarily seeking/demanding something from those around her), observed it took her almost a year to gain the trust of those who had experienced the war, to the point in which they would mention events of the war in her presence.

This chapter picks up a number of threads and issues flagged up throughout this body of work. In particular its analysis of the historicisation of the war links it to Chapter 6 on testimony, whilst its examination of the activist community links it to Chapter 5, on nationalism and feminism. From a time/space consideration, its examination of post-war society makes it fit neatly onto the end of a thesis which has a broadly chronological feel; whilst in terms of reflexivity, its gaze back at the fieldwork and the researcher-respondent relationship loops the analysis back to the introduction of this body of work, as well as acting as a bridging chapter for future work/research on Former Yugoslavia.[3]

[3]My plans for my next piece of work (not actually included in this thesis) include an examination of the changing nature of memory since the elections in Croatia[3]. I have already written and presented an exploratory paper on this issue (Lindsey, 2000).

Concluding remarks

There are a number other themes and directions which have been raised by the thesis which I have been unable to expand on, because of the pressures of time, and word-length. Similarly there are a number of potential future projects that are flagged up by this thesis, which would aid an understanding of why the violences of these wars were perpetrated. In particular Mirijana Morokvasić's comment (1998):

> Most of us in Yugoslavia's post-Second World War generation grew up with war stories. These stories were told by women and women were their main protagonists (p.65).

This implies that Yugoslavian women have been the replicators of testimonies of war, both, positive/heroic and negative/victim-centred, suggests that there is a body of potential research on Yugoslavian family narratives of war and violence, and the role of women in transmitting these narratives. Maternal authority, as I have argued in Chapters 2 and 7, ensures that it is initially women who imbue their children with a sense of familial culture, ethnicity and religion, and thus become the figurative 'border guards' of nation (Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis, 1993, p.33). There is also the potential for a longitudinal study of the replication of trauma in future generations of Former Yugoslavians, which would feed into a project on family narratives and the changing nature of post-war memory. Of particular interest to such a study, would be the experience of marginalised families, for example, families of mixed-ethnicity living in former front-lines, right-wing families in the now left-of-centre Croatia, and Serb families living in Croatia.

What also stands out through its absence in this thesis, is a critique which compares the conflicts of Former Yugoslavia with the many other wars and conflicts in which women have recently experienced sexual and domestic violence, for example, the partition of India, conflicts in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Liberia, Rwanda. Although I have failed to make explicit comparisons, it is my hope that the analysis in this body of work will provide a new way of critiquing women's experience of war, which does not focus, in a singular fashion, on their experience of violence, but on an analysis of the social structures which provide some of the

influences to violence. Although some of the Lacanian/Kristevan components of my analysis might not be applicable, for example, to a Punjabi community, the analysis of community, and constructions of masculinity and femininity would be applicable, and it is these which, in my opinion, shed light on violence against women in war.

Glossary

Apel: An NGO formed by relatives of the Vukovar disappeared, which successfully campaigned for the exhumation of a mass-grave at Ovcara. The group also constructed the Vukovar wall outside the UN headquarters in Zagreb, each brick in the wall bears the name of a member of the disappeared. The group has links with many right-wing and paramilitary organisations, and was viewed in a favourable light by the right-wing Croatian government.

Autonomous Women's House: There is an Autonomous Women's House in Belgrade, Serbia and in Zagreb, Croatia. These 'Houses' are NGOs run by women activists for the purpose of working on issues of domestic and sexual violence against women. In many ways these NGOs are comparable to Women's Aid in the British Isles. Although these two groups were set up individually, the groups setting them up liaised with each other when setting them up, thus they have many similarities and could be said to be sister-groups.

Bedem Ljubavi: Literally this means wall of love. *Bedem Ljubavi* is a Croatian NGO, which aligned itself with the politics of the Croatian State and thus has been seen by many international feminists to be right-wing. It works on many of the same issues as the Autonomous Women's House and Centre for Women War Victims in Zagreb. See Chapter 5 on feminism and nationalism.

Bosnia: Bosnia is a region within the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, which lies to the west of Hercegovina. Parts of eastern and northern Bosnia have been incorporated into the post-Dayton entity known as Republika Srpska.

Bosniak: Bosniak is a term that has taken hold since the end of the war, and seems to be an international intitiative to give a sense of identity and difference to those who identify with the territorial entity of the Republic of Bosnia Hercegovina. Although Bosniaks can be of any ethnicity, generally they tend to be either Bosnian-Muslims or Bosnian-Croats

Centre for Women War Victims: The Centre for Women War Victims is a Croatian NGO which was set-up in Zagreb in the autumn of 1992. Its remit was to work with women who had experienced war-related violence. It offered a variety of services, including sheltered housing for severely traumatised women, face-to-face counselling, group-workshops, and humanitarian and financial aid to displaced and refugee women in distress. It still works on many of these issues, but acknowledges an overlap in the services it provides, where it finds itself supporting women who are experiencing war-related domestic violence in peace-time. For details of its relationship with other related NGOs see figure 3.

Četnik: A term originally used during the Second World War. Literally translated it means 'irregular' and referred to 'a faction of Serbian soldiers loyal to the king' (Tepavać, 1995, p.57). The Četniks were violently opposed to Communism and the partisan movement.

During the recent conflicts the use of the term Četnik has encompassed several meanings: paramilitary, ultranationalist, an abusive way of referring to Serbian people. The stereotypic image of a Četnik, is a bearded paramilitary, wearing an Orthodox crucifix.

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: A term that refers to the group of states that remained part of Yugoslavia after the conflicts. The Federal Republic comprises Serbia, Vojvodina, Kosovo, and Montenegro.

Federation of Bosnia-Hercegovina: The Federation of Bosnia-Hercegovina comprises the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Republika Srpska, and the unofficial Bosnian-Croat entity of Herceg-Bosna. See map on Figure 2.

Former Yugoslavia: A term that refers to the geographic area that used to be Yugoslavia. This term is fixed in time, from the start of the conflicts to the signing of the General Framework Agreement. However, within this thesis, the term is sometimes used to denote the Yugoslav successor states, when the time-frame straddles the conflicts, and the period after the conflicts.

General Framework Agreement: The General Framework Agreement is otherwise known as the Dayton Agreement, and was a peace-settlement agreed in Ohio in November 1995 by Croatia, Serbia, Republika Srpska, and Bosnia-Hercegovina. It was signed by all the warring parties, in Paris, France, in December 1995. The General Framework Agreement agreed not only issues such as borders and boundaries between the opposing parties, but provided socio-legal agreements, and a constitution for the Federation of Bosnia-Hercegovina

Herceg-Bosna: The unofficial Republic of Herceg-Bosna that borders Croatia to the east, and Bosnia to the north and west, sees itself as an extension of Croatia. It has until the Bosnia 2000 elections been run by hard-line HDZ politicians.

Imaginary: A Lacanian term, the Imaginary forms part of Lacan's theory of the Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real. See Lacanian theory.

Istria: Istria is a region in Croatia, which has had several national identities over the last few hundred years. More recently it has been part of Italy. However since the Second-World War it has been officially part of Croatia.

Although it was part of Italy before and during the Second World War, it also purports to have a strong partisan history. During the recent nationalist period in Croatia, it was one of the few areas to hold onto the public memory of its partisan past, and to maintain its anti-fascist war monuments.

It repudiated Croatian nationalism during the 1990s, and consistently elected a more moderate local government, which contested its relationship with Zagreb. Its repudiation of Croatian nationalism was not a repudiation of nationalism *per se*, but rather a repudiation of right-wing politics and a Croatian identity. Istria has a strong regional identity, which is influenced by Italian. Respondents reported that the first language of many Istrian families is Italian. The local government flaunted the right-wing Croatian government's insistence on Croatian street-signs, by erecting bilingual Croatian/Italian street signs.

Since the 2000 elections in Croatia, certain factions in Istria have been pushing for independence from Croatia.

Kareta: Kareta is a Croatian NGO that is a sister group of *Bedem Ljubavi.* It aligned itself with the Croatian State and thus is thought to have right-wing tendencies. The situation is rather more complex. See Chapter 5 on feminism and nationalism.

Lacanian theory: In this thesis I draw on Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose's (1982) feminist readings of Lacan's theory of the Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real. My use of Lacan's theory has been in my analysis of the construction of identity, which Lacan argues is formed as the infant separates from its mother .

Lacan argued that separation involves a complex set of negotiations between the infant and the world outside the infant. As it starts to perceive itself as separate from the mother, the infant starts to perceive of its 'self'. This notion of self is negotiated and formed through its encounters with the differing gazes of those it forms relationships with, as it separates. Multiple selves/identities are constructed, many of these predicated on notions of similarity, or difference, and placed in the subconscious, which Lacan terms the Imaginary, to form an illusory 'whole': the psychic sense of self. The infant's loss of its previous self, of the singular entity that was mother/child/world, represents a loss or lack that it always seeking to replace. Although the reconstructed psychic-self consists of multiple identities, including ethnic identity, these must be presented as a whole entity, as a way of dealing with this lack. The sense of self, and the acquisition of language, and the infant's entry into the Symbolic, the world of language and sign, are linked. I use Lacan's theory of identity in Chapter 2, which examines constructions of ethnic identity.

The theory of the Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real also aids a conceptualisation of the formation of gender identity. However, there are certain inherent difficulties both within Lacan's work, and in the concept of gender itself, that make the process of understanding considerably more complicated than that of understanding the formation of ethnic identity. Lacan's theories of gender which

represent a rewriting and clarification of Freud's theories of gender, have, over the years, been keenly contested by a body of psychoanalysts such as Jones, Winnicott, Klein. His writing style, which is often obtuse, punning, and difficult to understand, opens his theories up to the additional problem of misinterpretation. Thus there are a variety of Lacanian/post-Lacanian theories of gender in psychoanalytical literature.

Mitchell and Rose (*op* cit) argue that the problem with conceptualising the formation of gender identity is rooted in the fact that gender is essentially an artificial construct, that has tended to be predicated on, and articulated through, physiological difference (and eventually a confusion with sexuality). They argue that both Freud and Lacan have tried to foreground the fact that identity and physiology are not the same thing. The problem with conceptualising gender identity is that its entrance into the Symbolic Order (the world of language and signs) represents a harnessing, naming, mapping, of gender that ties it down to a set of binary oppositions: masculine and feminine.

> For Lacan, the unconscious undermines the subject from any position of certainty, from any relation of knowledge to his or her psychic processes and history, and *simultaneously* reveals the fictional nature of the sexual category to which every human subject is none the less assigned. In Lacan's account, sexual identity operates as a law - it is something enjoined on the subject. For him, the fact that individuals must line up according to an opposition (having or not having the phallus) makes that clear (Rose, p. 29).

There is therefore a discrepancy, a tension, between the unconscious and the part of the self that places gender-identity into the Symbolic Order. This tension originates in the linguistic mapping of identity onto physiology.

The Lacanian theory of the mirror stage argues that the infant forms its identities through the way its sees itself reflected in the gazes of the people surrounding it. The articulation and representation of gender identities, within the Symbolic Order, represents the identification, articulation and mapping of extremely complex, structured concepts. Although the mapping process is continuous, and the infant is constantly forming and restructuring these identities, the infant at the mirror-stage, does not begin by naming these identities, and is not as yet, ordering them into

oppositional identities. Yet, at another level, the infant is noting physiological difference, that is whether its body is similar or different to the other bodies surrounding it. It is this particular physiological mapping process, which states that the body is either male or female. This is the template that is given to the infant (by those already in the Symbolic Order) for the mapping of gender identities. Sexual identities, which like gender identities are multiple, and constantly shifting, also come to be mapped as oppositions for the infant by those surrounding it: women have sex with men, men have sex with women. Anything else tends to be constructed as a perversion.

Lacan argues that this process of gendering, of slotting experience, feelings, identities into identity-binaries, maps out the way in which the individual deals with its first experiences of loss. The loss of the first self, the self that saw its identity as part of/bound in everything surrounding it, and in particular as being one with the primary carer, is an extremely traumatic loss, from which stems *desire:* the desire to recreate the lost sense of unity. This desire is observed, and can be sexualised, by those within the Symbolic Order, watching the infant's negotiations. The interaction of the primary carer with those in close relationships to the carer, such as the father, or lover, can be a contested source of love-hate tension to the infant, giving rise to the oedipal or castration complex, a complex rooted in binary opposition. The close other person in the primary carer's life can be seen as the source of the infant's loss of their primary carer:

> In Lacan's account, the phallus stands for the moment of rupture. It refers mother and child to the dimension of the symbolic which is figured by the father's place (Rose, p.38).

The phallus in Lacan's account is symbolic, of the thing that takes away, that creates loss:

> The mother is taken to desire the phallus not because she contains it (Klein), but precisely because she does not (*ibid*).

The mother is thus seen by the infant as not complicit in its separation but that the law, the power of the phallus, the father, the patriarch, has demanded it:

> The phallus therefore belongs somewhere else; it breaks the two relation and initiates the order of exchange. For Lacan, it takes on this value as a function of the androcentric nature of the symbolic order itself. But its status is in itself false,

> and must be recognised by the child as such. Castration means first of all this - that the child's desire for the mother does not refer *to* her but *beyond* her, to an object, the phallus, whose status is first imaginary (the object presumed to satisfy her desire) and then symbolic (recognition that desire cannot be satisfied).

Lacan's linguistic choice of the word phallus engages with an acknowledgement of a binary world in which patriarchy influences women's place in the world, and the juxtaposition of women to men. The sexual connections to desire are also present in the metonym of the phallus. In a later work (God and the *Jouissance* of The Woman. A Love Letter. Mitchell and Rose, pp.137-148.), Lacan argued that 'The woman does not exist':

> In relation to the man, woman comes to stand for both difference and loss: 'On the one hand, the woman becomes, or is produced precisely as what he is not, that is, sexual difference, and on the other, as what he has to renounce, that is *jouissance*.' (Rose, translating and quoting Lacan, p.49)

Lacan places women outside the Symbolic Order, she 'is excluded by the nature of words' (*ibid*), and by the way in which she is constantly measured against the template of man, in terms of her difference. Woman is object, is Other, excluded by the law of patriarchy.

The complexity of Lacan's theories on gender can detract from his basic premise that gender identities are multiple. Despite this premise, when these identities attain meaning through language, that is, through the Symbolic, they are perceived as being located in a binary sliding scale between masculine and feminine. In the language of modernity, masculine is hard, aggressive, thrusting, feminine is soft, giving, loving. Sexuality also operates on a sliding binary scale between heterosexual and homosexual, bisexuality being somewhere in the middle. Sexual identity, in the symbolic, is required to be named and measured, and above all static.

Chapter 7 examines the issue of gender, and draws on Julia Kristeva (1982), and Barbara Creed (1993) to critique Lacan's theories on gender identity.

Medica: An NGO that runs a trauma centre for women and children in Zenica, in Bosnia. The idea for the centre was conceived in 1992, by Monika Hauser, a German gynaecologist responding to the mass-raping of women during the conflicts, and it was founded by a group of German and Bosnian women. It offers a range of services to women, including gynaecological medical aid, counselling, obstetrics, theological counselling, psychoanalysis, psychiatry. During the war it kept an archive of the medical records of rape-survivors, and an archive of survivor testimony of rape. After the war the NGO split into two parts: the centre in Zenica, and a campaigning office in Germany. The German office offers support, but the Zenica centre is now autonomous. Both groups sent workers to Kosovo during the 1999 conflicts. Some of these have remained to support survivors during the post-war period.

Medica Infoteka: This is the public-relations arm of *Medica* in Zenica. It worked to publicise the mass-raping of women and the need for an International Criminal Tribunal, as well as fund-raising for *Medica.* Since the war it has been working on issues of domestic violence, and sexual violence in a post-war environment, and the inclusion of gender issues into the Federation's constitution.

Millet: A non-Muslim system of administration, established by the medieval Muslim Ottoman Empire, which devolved the administration of the conquered populace to their religious leaders, provided the community was Jewish or Christian. The use of religious hierarchies to administrate and uphold the law meant that communities came to identify primarily through religion. Power and bureaucracy became synonymous with religion.

Nacija: A term that tends to imply religious faith, for example Catholic, Muslim, Orthodox. However during the late 1980s, its meaning started to change so that, for example, the term Croat began to be referred to as *nacija.* In this way the term *nacija* began to take on the meaning of nation, or *narod.*

Narod: A term that generally denotes nation, that is Muslim, Croat, Serb. It can also mean community, and homeland.

Partisan: The partisans were a group of anti-fascist, anti-Royalist, predominantly communist paramilitaries, fighting during the Second World War. One of their leaders Tito, came to power in 1944.

Public order/public realm: See Symbolic Order.

Real: Malcolm Bowie (1979) states that:

> The Real is that which is there, already there, and inaccessible to the subject. whether this be a physical object or a sexual trauma; (p.133)

The Real is not linked to the Symbolic Order, the place of language and representation, and thus what is in the Real is unrepresentable. There are however times when the Imaginary forces something out of the Real, to enter the Symbolic and the Imaginary Orders. It is at this point that the client will experience neurosis or psychosis.

Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina: The Republic comprises the territorial area to the south and west of Republika Srpska, and to the east of Croatia. It also comprises the unofficial Republic of Herceg-Bosna, run by Bosnian-Croats, to the south-east, although this is contested by this group.

Republika Srpska: Formerly part of Bosnia, the separate Republic of Srpska signed the Dayton Agreement to agree to become part of the Federation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. This identity is contested by the Republic, which sees itself as being more closely linked to Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Republika Srpska is a semi-autonomous Republic to the north and east of the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, to the west of Serbia, and to the south of Hungary. It is territorially divided into a northern half, and an eastern half. Each has its own 'capital', Banja Luka in the north, and Pale in the east. Brcko, the contested town, which was under UN 'protection' was officially returned to the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1999.

Serbo-Croat: Serbo-Croat was the term used in Yugoslavia to describe the language spoken. It included regional/national variants. The claim to a 'national language' was one of the first overt, public manifestations of nationalism. Since

the conflicts began Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia all claim to have their own national languages, and have worked at reintroducing antiquated terms, and imposing national variants onto the official language. In Serbia, the Cyrillic alphabet is favoured over the Latin alphabet, and public notices, street signs written in Latin script have been replaced with Cyrillic script.

Symbolic: Although the Symbolic is a term originating from Lacanian theory, it has been accepted and woven into the discourses of critical theory and post-modernism. The Symbolic refers to the realm of language and signs, which are used by human beings to communicate. The world of language is perceived to be masculine/patriarchal. In a symbolic sense it excludes women/the feminine. I draw on these concepts throughout the thesis, but particularly in Chapter 7. When I use the terms 'public order/realm' this also usually means the Symbolic Order.

Vojna Krajina: *Vojna* translates as soldier/military, and *Krajina* translates as frontier/boundary. The *Vojna Krajina* was a military boundary, which exploited inhospitable terrain, such as mountains, marshland, for its military benefits.

Women in Black (*Žene u Crnom):* An international, grass-roots, activist-women's movement, which began in Israel. It identifies as anti-war, anti-nationalist and anti-militarist (although not necessarily pacifist), and draws its membership from a variety of different classes of women. Typically Women in Black protest against war through silent vigils on a Wednesday afternoon in a prominent part of a city/town/village, where they may hand out anti-war literature to passers-by. Although the vigil is silent they will engage in debate with passers-by, unless they are protesting an atrocity (for example the bombing of Iraq). Women in Black, Belgrade (Serbia), have become international feminist icons of resistance to war and nationalist regimes, because of their steadfast anti-war, anti-government stance, and their feminist politics, despite the hostility of the regime towards them, and despite their individual fears of harassment and arrest.

Žene Ženama: Translated means: women together. *Žene Ženama* is a mixed ethnicity, woman's NGO based in Sarajevo. It campaigns and lobbies around women's rights, and at the time that I visited the group its focus was on the rights

of women returnees. Some of its members are former members of *Medica*, some are former members of Belgrade Women in Black.

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