

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON

**THE INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL  
MANAGEMENT OF ARMS IN PEACE  
PROCESSES**

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**ABSTRACT**

**FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

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**DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

**THE INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL MANAGEMENT OF  
ARMS IN PEACE PROCESSES**

**By Jeremy Ginifer**

This thesis describes and evaluates the attempts made by international and regional organisations to manage the arms of parties during peace processes – typically through peacekeeping deployments. It describes over 40 third-party ‘arms management’ initiatives undertaken between 1949 and 1999. The analysis which follows suggests that five principal arms management strategies, or approaches, have been utilised during this period: arms retention and delimitation; co-operative disarmament; coercive disarmament; arms control; and arms-balancing.

The overall aim of the thesis is to tease out the concepts, doctrines and thinking that underpinned these strategies, and to examine how they evolved and developed. It further seeks to determine their cohesiveness and effectiveness in stabilising peace processes, and to analyse the dynamics of peace processes, including the difficulties or predicaments faced by internal parties in demilitarising, and the impact these had on arms management outcomes. Finally, drawing upon this work, it seeks to establish what constitutes coherent and effective arms management policy in the new Millennium, and to set out policy and research recommendations.

This research fills gaps in empirical knowledge: the existing literature, mainly situated in security studies, does not provide a comprehensive and collated descriptive account of arms management over the 1949-1999 period. It also provides new conceptual and empirical insights into arms control and arms-balancing, which have been virtually ignored in the field of peace-building; and it further develops the work undertaken on co-operative and coercive disarmament in the first half of the 1990s, which has since been neglected.

It concludes that arms management is a highly problematic activity. Surrendering or accepting controls on weaponry frequently places parties, societal groups, and individuals, in a position of vulnerability or difficulty, particularly when military and political integration is sought. Further, the pursuit of power interests by ‘spoilers’ tends to lead to non-compliance, cheating, and instabilities within peace processes. These ‘internal’ difficulties, it is suggested, may have been exacerbated by the poor implementation and poorly-conceived nature of some arms management initiatives. It is concluded that confidence-building measures (CBMs), drawing on inter-state arms control methodology, along with the latest peace support operations thinking, are generally more effective in stabilising peace processes than the traditional passive peacekeeping model favoured during, and immediately after, the Cold War, which was frequently unable to alleviate security predicaments or rein in spoiler behaviour.

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## Preface

This thesis seeks to develop new understandings and thinking in the field of arms management: that is, the activity of third-party<sup>1</sup> intervention to control the weapons (particularly light weapons [LWs] and small arms) of formerly conflicting parties during peace processes.<sup>2</sup> Specifically, it aims to develop insights into what strategies have been used to counter the problems posed by armaments within peace processes; how they were implemented; the outcomes that emerged; the explanations for these outcomes; and finally, what might constitute a coherent generic arms management strategy.

Only limited work has been undertaken in these areas to date. In providing new material and insights, it is hoped to inform and improve policy, and also establish new thinking in the field of arms management.

In undertaking this task, it has drawn upon and sought to synthesise a range of material across strategic/security studies, including work within peacekeeping and peace operations, civil war causation and endings, arms control and disarmament, and a limited body of work undertaken on 'micro' and 'practical' disarmament.<sup>3</sup> This has proved a complex, and at times problematic, undertaking. Descriptions and accounts of arms management initiatives are frequently buried within the peacekeeping and related literature – only limited dedicated work has been undertaken on this subject.

Further, conceptual work in the field has tended to be poorly developed. A substantive and systematic body of work does not exist, for example, on the causal factors underpinning the parties' resistance to arms management, nor on the conceptual thinking that underpinned the arms management strategies utilised by the UN and other third-party interveners.

It should be acknowledged at this early stage that this thesis consciously confines itself to a 'traditional', policy-oriented military/security perspective. It does not seek to explore issues such as: the legitimacy of third-party intervention in conflicts; the extent to which the use of force can be ethically justified; or whether, indeed, military intervention does more harm than good<sup>4</sup> – although the work undertaken in the following chapters does suggest that without external military intervention many parties would have lacked the confidence or security to engage in peace-building.<sup>5</sup> Equally, it is recognised that military assistance in managing arms is only a preliminary step in preparing the ground for the long-term process of peace-building.<sup>6</sup> Further, as will become apparent, third-party intervention has sometimes generated, as well as moderated, peace process instabilities. Nor does this thesis seek to explore or describe the frequently intricate politics of peace processes in any detail – its descriptions of peace processes are primarily concerned with the specific issue of arms and security.

Much of the analysis is conducted at the level of the 'parties'; that is, actors represented in peace negotiations and agreements. Individuals, groups, and societal elements not represented in peace processes do have a bearing on their outcome and their role is frequently neglected in security studies. However, it was decided that the parties identified above played a demonstrably significant role in the initiatives examined, and further, a body of relevant data was available on their behaviour, actions, and motivations in the literature and documentation.

At one point in the development of this thesis, considerable thought was given to using the 'security dilemma' as an analytical tool to account for arms management outcomes. However, as discussed at some length in endnote 5 in the final chapter, it is



believed that the security dilemma is an elusive concept and one which is difficult to use in the context of internal conflicts. It was therefore concluded that a more useful approach in the context of this thesis was to identify a set of security issues (some of which necessitated a choice between two equally undesirable alternatives)<sup>7</sup> that impinge upon arms management. However, attempts to define and conceptualise security dilemmas within internal conflicts are not ruled out as a productive area for dedicated future research.

This thesis also steers clear of examining developmental issues associated with arms management – such as the demobilisation, reintegration and rehabilitation of combatants which frequently followed disarmament within peacekeeping operations – even if they have made an important contribution to settlements.<sup>8</sup> This would have required a different methodology and set of analytical tools, and an extended discussion of development. Nevertheless, work on the impact of these types of developmental programmes is an interesting area for future research, particularly given increasing advocacy of the ‘security-first’ approach.<sup>9</sup>

Last, this thesis examines most of the arms management initiatives launched by the UN and regional organisations from the first UN peacekeeping operation in the late 1940s through to the end of the Millennium. It has not attempted to analyse in any detail the arms management initiatives that emerged at the very end of the 1990s, for example in Kosovo and Sierra Leone, as, at the time of writing, these operations were still on-going and any conclusions drawn from them would have been premature.<sup>10</sup> However, where appropriate, they are briefly referred to. And in examining arms management initiatives, the thesis has focused on the activities of military personnel – peacekeepers, observers and monitors – rather than the police who have sometimes had a role, albeit it a less prominent one, in controlling weapons following conflicts.<sup>11</sup>

In describing and differentiating between arms management strategies reference is occasionally made to ‘conflict resolution’ and ‘conflict management’ approaches. Peacekeeping is sometimes referred to as a conflict resolution activity, particularly in a UN context. However, peacekeeping and conflict resolution have historically tended to be regarded as separate areas of research.<sup>12</sup> Peacekeeping, for example, has been sometimes seen as dealing with ‘symptoms’, rather than fundamental causes,<sup>13</sup> although recently there have been calls for the disciplines of peacekeeping and conflict resolution to be more synergistic. As a consequence, peacekeeping and conflict resolution are not treated as synonymous.

The term ‘conflict management’ is generally used here to denote a form of intervention in the field which draws upon more proactive intervention techniques and which implies a deeper level of involvement on the part of third-party interveners in peace processes than was usually the case with the passive forms of peacekeeping intervention during the Cold War.

The novelty of this thesis is that it provides, for the first time, a detailed account of arms management in the post-Second World War period, its implementation, and the principles that underpinned it. It attempts to contextualise these activities and put forward suggestions as to how arms management policy might be more effectively implemented and conceived in both inter-state and internal conflicts. In attempting this, it is anticipated that it will make a contribution to both the public policy and the security studies literature.

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> Arms management, although principally conducted by the military, has also been undertaken by non-military organisations, such as NGOs. A church-based group, for example, has conducted a weapons collection and destruction programme in Mozambique, while in El Salvador, a group of business persons, in conjunction with the Catholic Church and the Rotary Club, joined with the government to implement weapons collection and destruction. See Edward J. Laurance, *Dealing with the Effects of Small Arms and Light Weapons: A Progress Report and the Way Forward*, December 1997 ([www.prepcom.org/low/pc2/pc2b1.html](http://www.prepcom.org/low/pc2/pc2b1.html)), p. 5.

<sup>2</sup> The term 'light weapon' has been used as a generic term to describe all conventional munitions that can be carried by an individual combatant or by a light vehicle (Christopher Louise, *The Social Impacts of Light Weapons Availability and Proliferation*, UNRISD Discussion Paper [Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, March 1995], p. 1, citing M. T. Klare, 'Armed and Dangerous', *In these Times*, 13 June 1994, p. 17). 'Small arms' have been described as consisting of automatic weapons up to 20mm, including rifles, sub-machine guns, carbines and handguns, although small arms, in NATO parlance, embraces all crew-portable direct fire weapons of a calibre of less than 50mm and includes a secondary capability to defeat high armour and helicopters (Jasjit Singh, 'Introduction', in Jasjit Singh [ed.], *Light Weapons and International Security* [Delhi: Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, British American Security Information Council, Indian Pugwash Society, and Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 1995], p. IX). For further definitions of small arms, and a description of their characteristics, see Swadesh Rana, *Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts*, Research Paper no. 34 (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, March 1995), pp. 2-4.

<sup>3</sup> 'Micro' disarmament refers to the collection of small arms and light weapons, characteristically through the deployment of international peacekeeping forces during or following internal conflicts. 'Practical' disarmament has tended to be used to describe a broader range of measures, including supplier controls.

<sup>4</sup> After conducting a comprehensive survey of civil war settlements, Walter suggests that 'non-military intervention, although politically more acceptable and financially less costly, is unlikely to accomplish much. It may provide a temporary solution, but it does not address the more fundamental issue of insecurity' (Barbara F. Walter, 'The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement', *International Organization*, vol. 51, no. 3, Summer 1997, p. 363).

<sup>5</sup> For insights into the ethical issues associated with international intervention in conflicts see, for example, Nick Lewer and Oliver Ramsbotham, *Something Must Be Done: Towards an Ethical Framework for Humanitarian Intervention in International Social Conflict*, Peace Research Report no. 33 (Bradford: Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, August 1993); and Hugo Slim, *Doing the Right Thing: Relief Agencies, Moral Dilemmas and Moral Responsibility in Political Emergencies and War*, Studies on Emergencies and Disaster Relief, Report no. 6, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1997.

<sup>6</sup> For definitions of peace-building see Oliver Ramsbotham, 'Reflections on UN Post-Settlement Peacebuilding', in Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham (eds.), 'Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution,' Special Issue, *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 7, no. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 170-172.

<sup>7</sup> Nicholas J. Wheeler and Ken Booth, 'The Security Dilemma', in John Baylis and N. J. Rengger (eds.), *Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 29.

<sup>8</sup> The World Bank, for example, has conducted extensive research in this area. See World Bank, Poverty and Human Resources Division, 'Beyond Repatriation: The Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Namibia', and 'From Emergency to Development: The Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Ethiopia', both reports produced in 1996. See also, Jakkie Cilliers (ed.), *Dismissed: Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Africa* (Pretoria: Institute for Defence Policy, 1995).

<sup>9</sup> Holm and Eide note that a fundamental pre-condition for development is that an adequate level of security is established and maintained because development cannot take place while people fear for their lives or property. Further, a fragile security environment hampers the emergence of civil society and fuels political antagonisms. See Tor Tanke Holm, and Espen Barth Eide (eds.), 'Introduction' in 'Peacebuilding and Police Reform', Special Issue, *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 6, no. 4, Winter 1999, p. 3.

<sup>10</sup> Nor does this thesis examine the MPF deployment in Albania in spring 1997 which had a demilitarisation function. See Ettore Greco, 'New Trends in Peacekeeping: The Experience of Operation

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Alba', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 29, no. 2, 1998; and Georgios Kostakos and Dimitris Bourantonis, 'Innovations In Peacekeeping: The Case of Albania', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 29, no. 1, March 1998.

<sup>11</sup> For insights into the role of the police in peace-building see Tor Tanke Holm, and Espen Barth Eide (eds.), 'Peacebuilding and Police Reform'.

<sup>12</sup> For an overview of the linkages between peacekeeping and conflict resolution see, for example, Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham (eds.), 'Introduction' in 'Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution'; and Stephen Ryan, 'United Nations Peacekeeping: A Matter of Principles?' , pp. 27-47, in the same volume.

<sup>13</sup> Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham (eds.), 'Introduction' in 'Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution', p. 5.

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## List of Abbreviations

AA	anti-aircraft
AA	assembly area
ADL	Armistice Demarcation Line
AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
ANC	African National Congress
AP	assembly point
APC	armoured personnel carrier
BASIC	British American Security Information Council
BICC	Bonn International Center for Conversion
BMATT	British Military Assistance Training Team
BSAP	British South African Police
CBM	confidence-building measure
CSBM	confidence and security-building measure
CC	cease-fire commission
CCWG	Cantonment Co-ordination Working Group
CDS	Centre for Defence Studies
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIAV	International Commission of Support and Verification
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CISPKF	Commonwealth of Independent States Peacekeeping Force
CIVPOL	civilian police (United Nations)
CMF	Commonwealth Monitoring Force
DMZ	demilitarisation zone
DPA	Dayton Peace Accord
DTAP	Democracy Transition Assistance Programme
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council (United Nations)
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FAA	Angolan Armed Forces
FAR	former Rwandan Armed Forces
FAd'H	Forces Armées d' Haïti
FMLN	National Liberation Front Farabundo Marti
FLS	Front-Line States
FRAPH	Front pour l'Avancement et le Progrès Haïtien
FRELIMO	Frente da Libertação de Moçambique
FSU	Former Soviet Union
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
GA	General Assembly (United Nations)
GPA	General Peace Agreement
HVO	Croat Defence Council
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IANSAN	International Action Network on Small Arms
IFOR	Implementation Force (NATO)
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INPFL	Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia

IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
JNA	Yugoslav People's Army
JOC	joint operational command
JPMC	Joint Political Military Commission
JVMC	Joint Verification Military Commission
KFOR	Kosovo Force (NATO)
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
LPC	Liberian Peace Council
LO	liaison officer
LW	light weapon
MBT	main battle tank
MFO	Multinational Force Observers
MINUGUA	United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala
MINUSAL	United Nations Mission in El Salvador
MMWG	Mixed Military Working Group
MNF	Multinational Force
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	Member of Parliament
MPF	Multinational Protection Force
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola
MPRI	Military Professional Resources Incorporated
MRD	Motorised Rifle Division
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
NGO	non-governmental organisation
NISAT	Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers
NORBAT	Norwegian Battalion
NorCross	Norwegian Red Cross
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NPT	The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NR	Nicaraguan Resistance
NUPI	Norwegian Institute for International Affairs
OAS	Organisation of American States
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
ONUCA	United Nations Observer Group in Central America
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PIC	Peace Implementation Conference
PF	Patriotic Front
PfP	Partnership for Peace Programme
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organisation
PRIO	International Peace Research Institute, Oslo
P5	Permanent Five (United Nations Security Council)
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
RENAMO	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana
ROE	rules of engagement
RPF	Rwandanese Patriotic Front

RPG	rocket-propelled grenade
RR	recoilless rifle
RS	Republika Srpska
RSF	Rhodesian Security Forces
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADF	South African Defence Forces
SC	Security Council (United Nations)
SCR	Security Council Resolution (United Nations)
SG	Secretary-General (United Nations)
SOC	State of Cambodia forces
SNF	Somalia National Front
SFOR	Stabilisation Force (NATO)
SWAFT	South-West Africa Territorial Force
SWAPO	South-West Africa People's Organisation
SWP	Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
ULIMO	United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia
UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIPOM	United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPA	United Nations Protected Area
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group
UNTATET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTAES	UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation
URNG	Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca
VENBATT	Venezuelan Battalion
VRS	Bosnian Serb Army
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZNA	Zimbabwe National Army
ZCSO	Zairian Camp Security Operation
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army



# Chapter 1: The Field of Arms Management

## 1.0 Defining Arms Management

When parties that have been caught up in conflicts agree cease-fires or enter into peace processes, their continued possession of arms poses a problem. Although they may have temporarily or permanently abandoned conflict, parties remain vulnerable to attack when their former opponents are still armed. The solution to this problem would seem to be for the parties to wind down, or in some way mutually control, their military capabilities. However, in the unstable conditions of peace processes, where there is frequently an absence of trust or good intentions between the parties, this has proved problematic. Therefore it has often proved imperative to call upon the services of a third-party, such as the UN or regional security organisations, to facilitate or assist in demilitarising post-conflict transitions; characteristically through the deployment of peacekeepers. This third party intervention to control or manage arms (termed here ‘arms management’) is the subject of this thesis.

Third-parties have set about resolving the problem of arms in peace processes (either co-operatively or occasionally through coercion) through five basic strategies in the post-1945 period, each of which adopted a different approach to manipulating arms holdings:

- during the Cold War the UN utilised *arms retention and delimitation* strategies to assist in stabilising peace processes which permitted the parties to retain weaponry, but which supervised their withdrawal from areas of tension by creating demilitarised zones;
- following the ending of the Cold War the UN became more ambitious and implemented *co-operative disarmament* strategies which sought to collect the weapons of the parties, with their co-operation, at separated assembly areas as part of nation-wide disarmament programmes;
- in the 1990s the UN and regional organisations, in reaction to co-operative disarmament ‘reverses’, occasionally turned to *coercive disarmament* strategies which sought to tactically enforce disarmament within limited areas;
- the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in Bosnia in 1996 introduced the notion of *arms control* as a means of managing arms in an internal conflict by negotiating

arms limitations measures between the warring parties, by separating the parties in the field, and by introducing a rigorous confidence-building system to reassure them that arms reductions would not leave them vulnerable;

- and, last, the United States and other states in 1996 undertook an *arms-balancing* strategy supplying arms to one ‘party’ in Bosnia (the Federation) following the Dayton peace process to balance the perceived military superiority of the Republika Srpska (RS) and to strengthen deterrence.

This thesis undertakes a comparative analysis of these five types of arms management. It attempts to uncover and establish precisely the principles, thinking, and objectives that underpinned them; how they were implemented; how they evolved over time; the problems they encountered; and the impact they had on the security and stability of peace processes. At the same time, it also attempts to identify and describe the security predicaments and difficulties parties faced within peace processes when controls were placed upon their weaponry, and the impact this had on arms management outcomes. In addressing these questions, it draws upon data from over 40 initiatives undertaken in the post-1945 period.

Many of these research questions have not been comprehensively investigated in the security studies literature. While some case study and analytical work has been undertaken into co-operative disarmament, and to a lesser extent coercive disarmament, virtually no research has been undertaken into arms retention and delimitation, arms control, and arms-balancing as conflict termination initiatives. Further, a generic, integrated, and systematic account of arms management collated into one body of work, has not been undertaken before to the best knowledge of the author, particularly one that covers the past five decades of international and regional attempts to control arms.

This chapter sets the scene by first giving a brief historical account of arms management and light weapons (LWs) and small arms proliferation (said to be particularly destabilising weapons in peace processes) during the Cold War, and how this proliferation was neglected by both policy-makers and scholars for much of the post-1945 period. It then charts how arms management sprang into prominence with the changed circumstances of the post-Cold War world and then declined again as new paradigms, which concentrated more upon supply rather than intervention in the field, were conceptualised, partly in response to perceived shortcomings in previous arms

management initiatives. A brief review of the literature relating to arms management is also undertaken.

Finally, this chapter sets out the specific research questions that will be addressed by this thesis and how the research will be undertaken.

## **1.1 The Evolution of Arms Management Policy and Research**

### **1.1.1 Cold War Neglect**

During the Cold War, neither LWs and small arms proliferation, nor peacekeeping of which arms management interventions were frequently a part, were judged to be mainstream areas of policy or research in the strategic/security studies field. Policy-makers and strategic/security studies researchers were more likely to focus on arms control and disarmament relating to the 'major' weapons systems of the superpowers (macro disarmament),<sup>1</sup> particularly weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and how they should be managed so as to sustain strategic stability between the superpowers and avert the outbreak of a potentially catastrophic conflict. This was despite the fact that:

the vast majority of people...killed in violent conflict since the second world war...have been the victims of small arms, handguns and rifles, not weapons of mass destruction.<sup>2</sup>

Policy-makers and researchers largely ignored the role of small arms and LWs in international security affairs because:

Such weapons have been considered too insignificant to have an impact on the global balance of power or the outcome of major conflicts.... As a result, international efforts to reduce global weapons stockpiles and to curb the trade in arms (were) focused almost exclusively on major weapons systems.<sup>3</sup>

While researchers and policy-makers concentrated upon the proliferation of WMD the 'devastating effect of assault rifles and sub-machine guns in killing and maiming, in creating a culture of violence and militarising civil society' was virtually ignored.<sup>4</sup>

It went largely unremarked that the UN was routinely managing small arms and heavy weapons during peacekeeping operations, through weapons withdrawals and the creation of demilitarised zones.

### **1.1.2 Post-Cold War Prominence**

With the ending of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the problem of the proliferation of LWs and small arms in internal conflicts, which had multiplied during the 1980s,

assumed a new prominence in policy and research. Whereas during the Cold War the superpowers had frequently vetoed intervention, or reined in the capacity of the UN to substantively intervene in conflicts, with the collapse of bi-polarity more proactive initiatives were sanctioned by the UN Security Council (SC). A series of ambitious UN peace operations was launched during the late 1980s and early 1990s, which unlike UN Cold War peacekeeping, sought to disarm war-torn societies.<sup>5</sup> At the same time, the proliferation of LWs and small arms became, for the first time, a focus of substantive interest in security studies and they were increasingly recognised as destabilising in internal contexts. Their spread was said to have:

reached dimensions where not only is national and international security seriously threatened across the world, but the very peace and stability of civil society... undermined.<sup>6</sup>

They were said to increase tensions, alter national and regional balances-of-power, exacerbate or prolong conflicts, intensify the lethality and suffering caused, transform minor and manageable incidents into massacres demanding retaliation, and they enabled children to become lethal killers and encouraged their exploitation as child-soldiers.<sup>7</sup> They were also recognised as disrupting economic, political, and social development and creating a 'spiral of insecurity as citizens arm themselves against (their) effects'.<sup>8</sup> In the late 1990s, some 500m small arms were estimated to be in circulation – excluding 230m legally held in the United States – and small arms were said to be the only weapons used in 46 of the 49 conflicts since 1990.<sup>9</sup>

Critically, the problem of controlling LWs in internal conflicts was taken up by the UN Secretary-General (SG), Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who in 1995, after commenting on the progress made in the field of macro disarmament, chose for the first time to highlight the importance of what he termed 'micro' disarmament:

By this I mean practical disarmament in the context of the conflicts the United Nations is actually dealing with and of the weapons, most of them light weapons, that are actually killing people in the hundreds of thousands.<sup>10</sup>

He referred to the enormous proliferation of LWs and the negative consequences of their proliferation including: the economic costs of acquiring them; the dissipation of resources that could be used for development; and the human cost in casualties. And he called for the international community to take up the challenge posed by LWs noting that:

It will take a long time to find effective solutions. I believe strongly that the search should begin now.<sup>11</sup>

Prompted by the SG's comments, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the UN, and member states, began to explore ways of addressing the issue of LWs and micro disarmament.<sup>12</sup> During the 50th session of the First Committee, for example, South Africa, Argentina, Ecuador and Japan put forward a draft resolution which focused on the harmful impact of small arms and the UN Disarmament Commission discussed putting micro disarmament onto its agenda.

### **1.13 The Emergence of Micro Disarmament**

By the mid-1990s, micro disarmament and LWs had become a comparatively well populated field for research within security studies. This followed a proliferation of disarmament operations in the early 1990s. It was estimated in 1996 that in excess of 41 organisations and researchers were working on micro disarmament and LWs. This included UN organisations, such as the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD),<sup>13</sup> and states with a particular interest in LWs and conflict, such as Canada.<sup>14</sup> Also working in the field were NGOs including Saferworld; the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); Human Rights Watch; the British American Security Information Council (BASIC); and an extensive network of research and policy institutes including the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC); the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP); the Program for Arms Control, Disarmament and Conversion, Monterey Institute of International Studies; the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria; the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London; and the Centre for Defence Studies (CDS), King's College, University of London.

UNIDIR undertook perhaps the most systematic evaluation of disarmament, as part of its Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, producing a series of 'Managing Arms in Peace Processes' publications between 1996-97. These examined disarmament in Liberia, Cambodia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Somalia, Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Mozambique. A further UNIDIR study on 'Small Arms Management and Peacekeeping in Southern Africa' (1996) and a publication entitled 'Managing Arms in Peace Processes: The Issues' (1996) probed in more detail into some of the operational and conceptual issues previously raised in the Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project case studies.

Another substantive piece of work was an IISS study entitled 'Disarmament and Demobilisation After Civil Wars' by Mats Berdal (1996) which sought to provide a 'framework for thinking about the proper place of disarmament...in settling internal armed conflicts'.<sup>15</sup> And BICC produced a study in 1996 entitled, 'The New Field of Micro-Disarmament', which sought to provide:

an overview of the various components of the issue, including its history and evolution, the types of small arms and light weapons of concern, the various types of effects of the accumulation of these weapons, the scenarios and situations in which micro disarmament is applicable, and the array of policy instruments and tools that might be employed in addressing problems created by these weapons.<sup>16</sup>

The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada, also took a lead at an inter-governmental level by producing a study in April 1997 which sought to 'outline a generic model for the effective planning and implementation of the practical disarmament...aspects of the consolidation of peace processes'.<sup>17</sup>

This work, however, did not generally tend to probe deeply into the research issues raised in this thesis. Only a few organisations and researchers attempted to develop, for example, insights into the conceptual underpinnings of disarmament and its impact upon peace process stability.

#### **1.14 The Decline of Micro Disarmament**

By around 1997, work into disarmament waned before it had a chance to develop a comprehensive body of thinking and literature, in part because there was an increasing perception that the implementation of micro disarmament was overly problematic, or perhaps not even feasible in internal conflicts, following a series of inconclusive or unsuccessful disarmament operations in the first half of the 1990s.

The first comprehensive UN disarmament operation, the Namibian United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), 1989, after a difficult start which saw renewed fighting between the parties, ended with a reasonably comprehensive disarmament programme and a durable peace settlement. However, subsequent UN experiences in Cambodia, Angola and Mozambique, called into question early optimistic expectations regarding disarmament. In Cambodia, where the largest and most ambitious UN operation of the time was launched in 1992, disarmament was eventually abandoned when one party refused to disarm in contravention of the peace agreement, throwing into doubt the whole process of peace-building and

democratisation in the country. In Angola, the UN in three successive operations starting in 1989, manifestly failed to disarm the parties; indeed one of the parties – the rebel União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) movement – returned to war in 1992 after having lost the elections, but still having retained its military capabilities intact.

During the Mozambique mission, 1992-94, the UN and contributor states, supposedly drawing upon the lessons of the problematic Angolan operations, eventually turned a blind eye to the non-implementation of disarmament; in effect, as in Cambodia, accepting that the holding of elections was more important than adherence to disarmament commitments. Even the more successful disarmament operations in Central America between 1989-95 left large numbers of arms in the possession of the parties and society at large, following elections.

However, the key event that called into question the validity of comprehensive disarmament programmes was the traumatic Somalia experience, where UN and United States forces in 1994 eventually, and unsuccessfully, attempted to arrest a clan leader, Gen. Aidid, and disarm his followers, but ended up taking casualties with the mission being terminated in 1995. As the lessons of Somalia were digested, an aversion to disarmament among key contributor states and the UN became apparent; indeed the UN post-Somalia for a period abandoned the idea of ambitious peace missions with disarmament components. In 1994, for example, when the prospect of a genocide in Rwanda was drawn to the attention of the international community, the UN and key contributor states rejected the idea of proactive intervention, including disarmament, mindful of the Somalia experience. In Haiti, the United States and UN interventions between 1994-99 steered clear of any commitment to systematic disarmament, despite pleas from within Haiti to comprehensively seize weapons from the militias.

Meanwhile, largely outside the UN system, regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and Russia, became involved in disarmament initiatives with, in the main, similarly inconclusive or problematic outcomes.

### **1.15 New Arms Management Paradigms Emerge**

This reticence to undertake disarmament operations, and doubts in the second half of the 1990s as to whether it was practically feasible other than in benign circumstances,

contributed to the consideration of new approaches for addressing LWs and small arms proliferation. Practical disarmament, for example, postulated that additional preventive measures such as supplier restraints, arms registers, and border controls were required to stop arms getting into, or provoking, conflicts.

A key development in terms of practical disarmament was the passing of General Assembly (GA) Resolution 51/45 N of 10 December 1996, which stressed the importance of restraint over the production, procurement, and transfer of LWs and small arms, as well as the need for the implementation of disarmament and demobilisation. It called for 'recommendations and suggestions for an integrated approach to...practical disarmament'. Subsequently, the Report of the SG, entitled 'General and Complete Disarmament: Consolidation of Peace through Practical Disarmament Measures', 19 August 1997, presented a set of recommendations in response, drawing upon proposals put forward by member states, the UN, and regional organisations.<sup>18</sup>

Discussions on arms supplies took place under UN auspices in the 1994 and 1997 reviews of the UN Register of Conventional Arms by expert groups, while important work on LWs and small arms also took place within the UN Disarmament Commission, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, and the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms.<sup>19</sup> The UN Disarmament Commission adopted guidelines for international arms transfers in the Spring of 1996, focusing mainly on the illicit trade. There were also proposals for strengthening access to information on LWs transfers, co-operation on border and law enforcement, the development of common import and export controls, and verifiable end-user certificates. Other policy instruments, such as early warning to detect arms build-ups that might lead to conflicts or genocide,<sup>20</sup> were proposed, while transparency of production, acquisition, and proliferation of small arms and LWs was agreed to be far behind that of major conventional weapons.<sup>21</sup>

Much of this impetus for addressing LWs and small arms proliferation came from NGOs, following their successful landmines campaign.<sup>22</sup> As Laurance notes, an 'epistemic community' has developed 'around the issue of small arms, LWs and micro-disarmament' involving NGOs and academics.<sup>23</sup> In December 1997, the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) was launched to foster a coalition of NGOs and like-minded governments to control and limit the international transfer of



small arms.<sup>24</sup> Further, the biggest coalition of NGOs, since the landmine campaign, was brought together through the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), which was launched in May 1999.<sup>25</sup>

Regional, as well as international initiatives, also emerged. The Organisation of American States (OAS) instituted a Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking of Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials, signed in November 1997, and the European Union (EU) adopted a Code of Conduct in June 1998 at the General Affairs Council which set out criteria governing arms exports, including LWs.<sup>26</sup> In West Africa, ECOWAS heads of state declared a three year moratorium on the importation, exportation, and manufacture of LWs to ECOWAS member states on 31 October 1998.<sup>27</sup> A Southern Africa Regional Action Programme on Light Arms and Illicit Arms Trafficking was also put forward by the Southern African Development Community (SADC).<sup>28</sup>

Alternative approaches to arms proliferation were also emerging. By the late 1990s, 'security-sector' reform,<sup>29</sup> which could be a reactive or preventive measure, was emerging as an important instrument to demilitarise conflicts or potential conflicts, involving such measures as assisting in restructuring security forces, asserting civilian control over the military, and reining in excessive military expenditure, particularly in developing countries emerging from conflicts. While security sector reform encompassed demobilising former combatants – an activity that had been customarily attached to disarmament operations – and the use of peacekeeping forces, it also implicitly reflected a recognition that arms management policy needed to extend beyond disarmament and demobilisation to more structural areas.<sup>30</sup> Further, the 'security-first' approach gained credence following the successful Mali initiative in West Africa.<sup>31</sup>

In effect, in the second half of the 1990s the mainstream emphasis of arms management policy, internationally and regionally, had shifted away from reactive military intervention in the field, to preventive action seeking to regulate more effectively the supply of LWs to conflicts and potential conflict arenas. By the late 1990s, only a few researchers and institutes continued dedicated research into micro disarmament. In fact, arms management intervention in the field had been virtually abandoned as a topical field of study, despite the fact that operationally it underwent a resurrection with disarmament programmes being launched in East Timor, Kosovo, and

Sierra Leone at the end of the decade. This neglect was despite evidence that disarmament practice, in the view of some observers, continued to be flawed and required further study and analysis.

As Laurance noted:

Despite well-known deficiencies in UN peace operations, nothing is being done to make the required changes that would ensure a more effective disarmament process.<sup>32</sup>

As disarmament declined, a new mode of arms management in internal conflicts emerged in Bosnia, largely unanalysed, following the 1995 Dayton Peace Accord (DPA), which suggested the possibility of a more effective 'post-disarmament' approach to managing arms in the field. As part of the DPA, NATO and the OSCE implemented an arms control regime in Bosnia, which, rather than seeking to achieve nation-wide disarmament, permitted the parties to retain weapons at reduced levels as a means of stabilising the peace process. This was augmented by a confidence and security-building measure (CSBM) regime, which drew its methodology from Cold War macro, rather than micro, disarmament practice.

Further, in apparent contradistinction to this arms control regime, the United States and other countries initiated a systematic arms supply programme to Federation forces, to ostensibly stabilise the military balance in Bosnia, which was perceived by the United States as favouring the Serbs.

## **1.2 Gaps in Knowledge and Thinking**

It is clear from the above account that considerable gaps in knowledge and thinking exist in the field of arms management.

### **1.21 The Neglect of Arms Retention and Delimitation, Arms Control, Arms-Balancing, and Disarmament Strategies**

First, we do not have a generic, integrated, and systematic account of arms management that surveys all the strategies identified. Cold War arms retention and delimitation strategies, for example, have been only fleetingly described or analysed. One of the few documents to outline the thinking and philosophy behind arms retention and delimitation is the United Nations' 'General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations' (1995) which makes the observation that peacekeepers in arms retention and delimitation operations:

monitor cease-fires and by their presence enable combatants to pull back to a safe distance from each other, where passions may cool and an atmosphere conducive to negotiations may be created. By monitoring and reporting on the parties' adherence to commitments regarding, for example, a cease-fire, a demilitarised zone and area of limitation, and by investigating complaints of violations, the...operation constitutes an important confidence-building measure.<sup>33</sup>

This confidence-building, according to the UN, enables parties to be reassured that former opponents will not be able to exploit the cease-fire to gain military advantage. Confidence is built through supervision, interposition, and observation by using static posts, patrols, overflights or other technical means with the agreement of the parties.<sup>34</sup>

Other UN documents briefly refer to arms retention and delimitation. The SG's report, 'An Agenda for Peace' (1992), for example, notes that in the past, demilitarised zones have been established by 'agreement of the parties at the conclusion of a conflict' and suggests that consideration should be given to the 'usefulness of such zones as a form of preventive deployment'. However, 'Supplement to An Agenda for Peace' (1995) barely refers to arms retention and delimitation, and the comprehensive survey of UN peacekeeping operations, 'The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping'<sup>35</sup> (1996) does not directly refer to it,<sup>36</sup> although its description of peacekeeping operations offers useful data on arms retention and delimitation.

Elsewhere in the peacekeeping literature, Weber and Goulding make brief reference to arms retention and delimitation strategies.<sup>37</sup> Hillen provides one of the few non-UN accounts that probes the characteristics of what he terms UN 'interpositional buffer zones'.<sup>38</sup> He describes them as having several distinguishing characteristics. First, they are neutral zones that deny belligerents movement or transgression across them. Second, they are usually linear in shape, often ending at international borders or significant physical features. Third, they are occupied by minimal forces, whose:

low force-to-space ratio (does) not permit the force to occupy the zone as for conventional defensive operations.<sup>39</sup>

In a similar vein, arms control and its role in facilitating conflict termination has not been subject to detailed scrutiny by researchers in security studies; a surprising omission given its apparent success in stabilising the military situation between formerly warring parties in Bosnia. A few researchers have suggested that arms control theoretically has advantages over disarmament.<sup>40</sup> However, this research has not been

fully developed, conceptualised, or operationalised. Arms-balancing has been even more neglected in the literature. Nor has disarmament, as has been indicated above, been subject to as comprehensive or rigorous a scrutiny as might have been anticipated, given its key role in UN peace-building initiatives. As Wurst notes:

a peacekeeping mission succeeds or fails on how effectively the disarmament process is conducted. Yet despite the overwhelming evidence to support this proposition, disarmament in peacekeeping operations – and in conflict resolution in general – still does not receive the priority attention it deserves.<sup>41</sup>

Similarly, Gamba observes:

not only peace operations underestimate the relative importance of disarmament in the implementation of mandates, this also happens in most post-conflict reconstruction processes.<sup>42</sup>

Two main bodies of literature, in fact, have investigated micro disarmament. On the one hand, there is a large body of descriptive peacekeeping literature which has had little to say about disarmament as a discrete, rather than a peacekeeping activity, or about its conceptual underpinnings. It has tended to treat disarmament as a subset of peacekeeping or peace support operations. On the other hand, a body of more conceptual and analytical literature on coercive and co-operative disarmament has emerged from researchers undertaking dedicated micro disarmament research.<sup>43</sup> This work has mainly focused on doctrinal issues, such as the use of force, and has tended to be critical of early consent-driven and pacific disarmament initiatives.

Tanner, in ‘Consensual Versus Coercive Disarmament’,<sup>44</sup> and ‘Weapons Control in Semi-Permissive Environments: A Case for Compellence’,<sup>45</sup> provides one of the few rigorous conceptual accounts of coercive and co-operative disarmament. He argues for the option of coercion because the levels of acceptance of the parties to disarmament invariably declines during peace missions and because the ‘only viable option to deal with declining levels of consent is with a strategy of “compellence”’.<sup>46</sup> He also provides insights into arms management strategies, their objectives, and the conditions for effective disarmament. This effectiveness, he suggests, can be gauged by its capacity to bring about comprehensive settlements, build stability, and suppress conflict.<sup>47</sup>

Daniel explores the relevance to disarmament of chapter six and-a-half type peace operations (that is, operations located between traditional peacekeeping and enforcement) in ‘Is There a Middle Option in Peace Support Operations?’ He concludes

that peace enforcement can 'provide significant leverage not otherwise available for achieving disarmament',<sup>48</sup> while Cox surveys a range of consensual and coercive disarmament operations, drawing out a set of implementational/policy, rather than conceptual conclusions.<sup>49</sup>

Boulden examines the problems of using Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter in disarmament operations. She argues, for example, against using consensual mandates in 'war-like' situations.<sup>50</sup> Gamba and Potgieter also sketch out obstacles to disarmament, such as failures to execute arms management as stipulated in peace agreements, and poorly implemented arms collection;<sup>51</sup> while Berdal examines the relative merits of co-operation and coercion in a section of his Adelphi paper, 'Disarmament and Demobilisation After Civil Wars'.<sup>52</sup> Unlike a number of the above researchers, he suggests writing in 1996, that consent-based approaches to weapons control have proved, and are likely to remain, relatively more successful than those involving coercion.<sup>53</sup> He suggests looking at alternatives to coercion such as 'building confidence and consent'.<sup>54</sup> Finally, Spear briefly examines the record of coercive and co-operative disarmament in a chapter on 'Arms Limitations, Confidence-Building Measures, and Internal Conflict'.<sup>55</sup>

## **1.22 Limited Case Study Work**

The above work provides some useful conceptual insights into co-operative and coercive disarmament – for example, in terms of the perceived limitations of consent – and also into a number of other issues that will be taken up in the following chapters, such as the implementational difficulties surrounding disarmament and the use of force. However, as noted above, it does not analyse non-disarmament strategies, such as arms control and arms-balancing, nor does it draw upon a full body of case study work. The literature tends to focus on disarmament operations between 1989-95 in countries such as Angola, Cambodia, Somalia, Former Yugoslavia, and Central America. UN operations during the Cold War and the less contentious post-Cold War disarmament operations in Mali and Nicaragua, for example, have received relatively little attention. Coercive disarmament operations conducted by Russian/CIS forces have also tended to be neglected. In fact, coercive, unlike co-operative, disarmament remains a comparatively neglected topic. The only substantive volume of work undertaken on coercive disarmament is a book by Philip Towle entitled 'Enforced Disarmament: From

the Napoleonic Campaigns to the Gulf War', which offers some interesting insights into the use of coercion, or as he describes it, 'enforcement', over a period of several centuries.<sup>56</sup> However, it falls outside the remit of this thesis as it is concerned with the enforcement of disarmament following military victory, rather than as a collective tool of conflict resolution or management.

In short, an integrated body of discrete work has yet to be compiled that presents a conceptual, analytical, and operational account of how disarmament, or other arms management strategies, function and impact upon the stability of peace processes following internal and intra-state conflicts. BICC noted in September 1996 that:

So far, no comprehensive study on micro disarmament and the role of small arms in international conflict has been done. In fact, there is a great deal of conceptual ambiguity surrounding the term micro disarmament.<sup>57</sup>

This, to a large extent, still remains the case.

### **1.23 The Security Dynamics of Intra-state Peace Processes: A Lack of Conceptualisation**

Similarly, only limited systematic work has been undertaken into the security dynamics that operate within peace processes and their impact upon arms management, particularly in intra-state contexts. A few researchers have suggested that the particular configuration of peace processes following internal conflicts creates insecurities which have made parties reluctant to concede or go along with arms management initiatives. It has been suggested, for example, that unstable military balances exist between the parties following internal conflicts, and that they cannot guarantee self-defence. Posen, Hartzell, Spear, Tanner, Walter, and King,<sup>58</sup> for example, have drawn attention to 'elevated threat perceptions', security predicaments, or 'security dilemmas'<sup>59</sup> that exist in the frequently unstable circumstances of intra-state post-conflict agreements, and which hamper arms management by creating insecure environments.<sup>60</sup>

Hartzell suggests that intra-state actors do not have the options – such as the capacity for self-defence – that states have to address security dilemmas. Tanner notes that conceding arms management may:

entail the abandonment of defensive positions and the acceptance of troop movements that can be highly vulnerable to surprise attack by non-compliant parties.<sup>61</sup>

Spear suggests that where both sides are frequently armed with LWs, knowledge that the offense has advantages can lead to an acute form of the security dilemma and the danger of pre-emptive attack. Further, in internal conflicts the absence of natural borders between opposing groups, 'dictates that the security dilemma is unrelieved'.<sup>62</sup>

A security dilemma potentially exists when the parties are required to disarm. On the one hand, if a party gives up arms as part of a peace deal, and an opponent reciprocates, it might be in a position to dramatically enhance its security, as neither party would be in a position to resort to full-scale conflict. On the other hand, if a party surrenders arms and an opponent fails to reciprocate, it might be highly vulnerable and even face annihilation.

Other researchers, such as Stedman, have challenged whether the security dilemma is a significant factor in peace processes. He suggests that parties are not necessarily driven by chronic insecurity or security dilemmas, but rather by gain and power calculations.<sup>63</sup> Thus, failures to comply with arms management, by withholding arms for example, may come from a desire to secure a military advantage over an opponent.

This thesis, in the concluding chapter, seeks to further develop some of the findings of this literature and arrive at a more systematic understanding of internal security dynamics and their impact upon arms management initiatives.

### **1.3 New Strategies and Approaches**

New innovative approaches to limit the impact of arms during and after conflict have emerged in the late 1990s, but these are not primarily concerned with military intervention in the field and largely fall outside the scope of this thesis. The 'wider structural arms control agenda' postulated by Cooper, which, for example, envisages action both to squeeze the purchasing power of elites hampering demilitarisation after conflicts, and 'disincentives to supply' directed at actors supplying arms to conflicts and peace processes,<sup>64</sup> is not examined here; nor is Tanner's notion of 'normative balancing', which suggests that:

the focus on disarmament and demobilisation should be replaced by mutually agreed rules on co-operative and transparent military adjustments over time.<sup>65</sup>

## **1.4 Research Questions and Objectives**

The above literature review shows that existing research only tells us a limited amount about third-party intervention to manage arms during peace processes. It does not say a great deal about the thinking and principles that underpin arms management strategies, particularly arms control and arms-balancing; it does not tell us in a systematic fashion how the parties reacted to arms management initiatives and whether they actually increased or diminished their security and assisted peace-building; nor does the literature tell us (other than in terms of the debate over the validity of co-operation versus coercion in disarmament) what constitutes a coherent arms management strategy. For example, should third-parties, if they are to consolidate peace processes, seek to collect arms, permit the parties to retain them, limit arms; or is the answer to stabilising peace processes to inject arms into them and create military balances?

This thesis, then, attempts to provide an integrated account of arms management which fills some of these gaps in thinking and knowledge. It seeks to do so by addressing these core research questions in the following chapters:

- Precisely what objectives, principles, thinking, doctrines and concepts underpinned arms management strategies?
- How were they implemented?
- How did they conceptually and operationally evolve?
- What factors account for arms management ‘successes’ and ‘failures’ in stabilising peace processes?
- To what extent has arms management been coherently designed and conceptualised in inter-state and intra-state settings?
- How can improvement be factored into arms management?
- What constitutes an effective arms management strategy?

The objective in conducting this research is to arrive at a set of findings that both advance research knowledge in security studies and inform arms management policy thinking.

## **1.5 Methodology**

Over 40 case studies are examined in Chapters 2-5 in order to derive data for the above research questions, starting with the first post-Second World War arms management



initiative in 1949 and concluding in 1999. These chapters are broadly speaking chronologically arranged so as to give insights into the evolution of arms management thinking. They describe the principles and thinking that underpinned arms management strategies; how they were implemented; how they evolved over time; and how the parties reacted to attempts to control their weapons. Initial 'assessments' are offered in the empirical chapters assessing the impact of the strategy utilised in each case study.

Chapter 2 examines Cold War arms retention and delimitation initiatives. Two distinct modes are identified: one of which drew upon UN traditional peacekeeping practice; the other which deliberately eschewed the UN peacekeeping experience (the Commonwealth Monitoring Force [CMF] in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe). Case studies in Egypt, Kashmir, Cyprus and the Lebanon are examined before moving onto an analysis of the CMF initiative.

Chapter 3 describes the co-operative disarmament initiatives undertaken by the UN in the post-Cold War period. Three phases or 'waves' are identified commencing with the initial optimism surrounding co-operative disarmament, followed by a second phase of fragmenting disarmament missions where arms were not collected, or parties withdrew from the disarmament process, and finally, the decline and scaling down of co-operative disarmament initiatives in the mid to late 1990s.<sup>66</sup> Operations in Namibia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Mali and Guatemala are examined.

Chapter 4 charts the development of coercive disarmament. It examines the frequently different methods – ranging from conflict management through to combat tactics or war-fighting – used by regional organisations such as ECOWAS, the CIS, and also NATO and the UN to remove arms from peace processes. It starts with a description of the early, largely consensual, attempts of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to control weapons in Former Yugoslavia; moves onto safe areas and disarmament, the strategy of compellence in Sarajevo through NATO airstrikes, to failure in Somalia; and then finally charts the decline in confidence in coercive disarmament in the mid-1990s, which led to the half-hearted attempts to manage arms in Haiti and former Zaire. Finally, it describes ECOWAS's disarmament approach in Liberia, and then Russian/CIS disarmament in conflict arenas in Transdnier/Moldova, Georgia/South Ossetia, Georgia/Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Tajikistan, and Chechenia, which were sometimes informed by combat, rather than pacific peacekeeping, principles.

Chapter 5 examines two arms management strategies that were novel in peace-building initiatives – arms control and arms-balancing – and which were introduced in Bosnia following the DPA. It describes how arms control was policed by NATO and the OSCE to stabilise military relations between the Federation and the RS, and how the United States, with the support of other states, subsequently sought to balance the military capabilities of these parties by supplying arms to the Federation.

The concluding chapter seeks to draw this body of data and analysis together and systematically answer the research questions posed above. In particular, it seeks to answer the question of what methods and principles underpin a coherent arms management strategy and seeks to present a set of findings targeted at policy makers as well as researchers.

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> 'Major' refers to weapons systems such as tanks, artillery, missiles and aircraft.

<sup>2</sup> 'Small Arms Under Fire', *The Guardian*, 24 September 1999, p. 23.

<sup>3</sup> Michael T. Klare, 'The New Arms Race: Light Weapons and International Security', From *Current History*, April 1997 ([www.prepcom.org/low/pc2/pc2b3.html](http://www.prepcom.org/low/pc2/pc2b3.html)), p. 1. For an explanation of why LWs were ignored during this period see Chris Smith, 'Light Weapons and the International Arms Trade', in *Small Arms Management and Peacekeeping in Southern Africa*, UNIDIR/96/21 (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996).

<sup>4</sup> 'Small Arms Under Fire', *The Guardian*, p. 23. See also, Paul Eavis, 'Awash With Light Weapons', *The World Today*, April 1999, pp. 19-21.

<sup>5</sup> Croft, in an innovative paper, suggests that micro disarmament drew upon macro disarmament thinking and that 'by taking the disarmament school of thought as the role model for the management of intra-state conflict, the UN has been following prescriptions that simply do not work. Intra-state disarmament is just not like international disarmament' (Stuart Croft, 'Lessons for the Disarmament of Factions in Civil Wars', paper for British International Studies Association Annual Conference, University of Southampton, December 1995, p. 11). Intra-state parties, he notes, do not act like states, who have generally stayed within the terms of their international commitments, at least in the period immediately after having entered into an agreement. Further, intra-state disarmament calls for a level of external intervention not present in statist disarmament, and unlike states in disarmament processes, intra-state factions have little or no commitment to notions of good faith. See *ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> Jasjit Singh, 'Introduction', in Jasjit Singh (ed.), *Light Weapons and International Security* (Delhi: Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, British American Security Information Council, Indian Pugwash Society, and Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 1995), p. IX.

<sup>7</sup> Owen Greene, 'Tackling Illicit Arms Trafficking and Small Arms Proliferation', Paper for the British International Studies Association Annual Conference, University of Sussex, December 1998, p. 3.

<sup>8</sup> Edward J. Laurance, *Dealing with the Effects of Small Arms and Light Weapons: A Progress Report and the Way Forward*, Monterey Institute of International Studies, December 1997 ([www.prepcom.org/low/pc2/pc2b1.html](http://www.prepcom.org/low/pc2/pc2b1.html)), p. 2.

<sup>9</sup> 'Small Arms Under Fire', *The Guardian*, p. 23.

<sup>10</sup> United Nations, 'Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations', A/50/60; S/1995/1, 3 January 1995, para. 60, p. 14.

<sup>11</sup> Edward J. Laurance (assisted by Sarah Meek), *The New Field of Micro Disarmament: Addressing the Proliferation and Build-up of Small Arms and Light Weapons*, Bonn International Center for Conversion, Brief 7, September 1996, p. 7.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

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- <sup>13</sup> See, for example: Christopher Louise, *The Social Impacts of Light Weapons Availability and Proliferation*, UNRISD Discussion Paper (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, March 1995).
- <sup>14</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada, *Practical Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Measures for Peacebuilding*, April 1997.
- <sup>15</sup> Mats R. Berdal, *Disarmament and Demobilisation After Civil Wars: Arms, Soldiers and the Termination of Armed Conflicts*, Adelphi Paper 303, International Institute for Strategic Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 5.
- <sup>16</sup> Edward J. Laurance (assisted by Sarah Meek), *The New Field of Micro Disarmament: Addressing the Proliferation and Build-up of Small Arms and Light Weapons*, p. 5.
- <sup>17</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada, *Practical Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Measures for Peacebuilding*, p. VI.
- <sup>18</sup> United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General, 'General and Complete Disarmament: Consolidation of Peace through Practical Disarmament Measures', A/52/289, 19 August 1997.
- <sup>19</sup> Natalie J. Goldring, 'Domestic Laws and International Controls', in Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael T. Klare (eds.), *Light Weapons and Civil Conflict: Controlling the Tools of Violence* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), p. 108.
- <sup>20</sup> Edward J. Laurance, *Dealing with the Effects of Small Arms and Light Weapons: A Progress Report and the Way Forward*, pp. 6-8.
- <sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.
- <sup>22</sup> Jason Sherman, 'Arms Wrestling: A Campaign for a World-Wide Crusade Against Small Arms and Light Weapons is Mounting', *Armed Forces Journal International*, March 1998.
- <sup>23</sup> Edward J. Laurance, *Dealing with the Effects of Small Arms and Light Weapons: A Progress Report and the Way Forward*, p. 5.
- <sup>24</sup> NISAT consists of the following organisations: the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI); the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO); the Norwegian Red Cross (NorCross); and Norwegian Church Aid (NCA).
- <sup>25</sup> Saferworld, 'Launch of New International Action Network on Small Arms', *Update*, no. 22, Winter 1999, p. 1.
- <sup>26</sup> Paul Eavis and William Benson, 'The European Union and the Light Weapons Trade', in Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael T. Klare (eds.), *Light Weapons and Civil Conflict: Controlling the Tools of Violence* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), p. 94.
- <sup>27</sup> Joseph P. Smaldone, 'Mali and the West African Light Weapons Moratorium', in Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael T. Klare (eds.), *Light Weapons and Civil Conflict: Controlling the Tools of Violence* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), p. 129.
- <sup>28</sup> See Prep Com, 'Conclusions from the Institute for Security Studies/Saferworld Conference on Developing Controls on Arms and Illicit Trafficking in Southern Africa', Pretoria, South Africa, 3-6 May 1998 ([www.prepcom.org/low/pc2/pc2d32.htm](http://www.prepcom.org/low/pc2/pc2d32.htm)).
- <sup>29</sup> For a detailed study of security-sector reform see: Dylan Hendrickson, *A Review of Security-Sector Reform*, Working Paper No. 1, The Conflict, Security and Development Group, Centre for Defence Studies, September 1999.
- <sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 24.
- <sup>31</sup> Holm and Eide note, in relation to the security-first approach, that a fundamental pre-condition for development is that an adequate level of security is established and maintained because development cannot take place while people fear for their lives or property. Further, a fragile security environment hampers the emergence of civil society and fuels political antagonisms (see Tor Tanke Holm and Espen Barth Eide (eds.), 'Introduction' in 'Peacebuilding and Police Reform', Special Issue, *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 6, no. 4, Winter 1999, p. 3). In the context of Mali, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) along with other donors supported a precedent-setting security-first approach, in which aid and development and reintegration of ex-combatants were integrated with security assistance to improve policing and border controls and control and reduce the availability of light arms.
- <sup>32</sup> Edward J. Laurance, *Dealing with the Effects of Small Arms and Light Weapons: A Progress Report and the Way Forward*, p. 6.
- <sup>33</sup> United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 'General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations', 95-38147, October 1995, para. 15, p. 5.
- <sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>35</sup> United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, third edition (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996).

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<sup>36</sup> Its opening paragraph merely mentions that UN personnel have carried out tasks which ‘range from monitoring cease-fire arrangements while peace agreements were being hammered out to assist troop withdrawals, providing buffer zones between opposing forces and helping implement final settlements to conflicts’ (United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 3).

<sup>37</sup> Weber notes that the notion of demilitarisation and buffer zones was pushed and advocated by pacifists and peace campaigners in Britain before it was adopted by the UN. In the 1950s, a British Member of Parliament (MP) urged that the UN recruit a volunteer corps of 10,000 unarmed people to patrol and hold a 2km-wide demilitarised zone close to the Egyptian/Israeli border. He suggested that this ‘peace force’ should be ‘equipped only for passive resistance and designed to ensure that the present border is not violated by force’. (See Thomas Weber, ‘The Problems of Peacekeeping’, *Interdisciplinary Peace Research*, October/November 1989, pp. 19-20). Marrack Goulding distinguishes between three ‘sub-types’ of peacekeeping operation with arms retention and demilitarisation dimensions: ‘unarmed military observer groups as currently in the Near East, Kashmir and Western Sahara; armed infantry-based forces which are deployed in cases where the task is to control territory, as in Cyprus, Syria, southern Lebanon...and Croatia; and operations, armed or unarmed, which are established as an adjunct of, or sequel to, a peace enforcement operation, as on the Iraq-Kuwait border’ (Marrack Goulding, ‘The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping’, *International Affairs*, vol. 69, no. 3, July 1993, p. 457).

<sup>38</sup> John Hillen, *Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations* (Washington: Brassey’s, 1998), p. 100.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 102.

<sup>40</sup> Croft suggests that arms control potentially had ‘advantages over the disarmament method’ (Stuart Croft, ‘Lessons for the Disarmament of Factions in Civil Wars’, p. 14). And Dean suggests that peacekeeping has been ‘handled completely separately from conventional arms control’ and that combining ‘the separate approaches of conventional arms control and peacekeeping into an integrated program...is an approach with potentially great appeal’ (Jonathan Dean, ‘More Comprehensive Approach Needed on Conventional Arms’, *Disarmament Times* [www.igc.apc.org/disarm/deanconv.html], pp. 2-3). Berdal also makes the point that ‘the basic premise on which proponents of arms control in the 1960s and 1970s challenged advocates of “general and complete disarmament” remains valid to the contemporary challenge of conventional weaponry after civil wars – namely, that there is no inherent relationship between the act of disarming and the solution to conflicts’ (Mats R. Berdal, *Disarmament and Demobilisation After Civil Wars: Arms, Soldiers and the Termination of Armed Conflicts*, p. 38).

<sup>41</sup> Jim Wurst, ‘Civil Strife: Light Weapons and Land Mines’ panel, NGO Committee on Disarmament (www.peacenet.org/disarm/civilstr.html), p. 14.

<sup>42</sup> Virginia Gamba, ‘Disarmament and the Control of Light Weapons: Lessons from UN Peace Missions and Small Arms Proliferation in Southern Africa’, paper (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, undated), p. 2.

<sup>43</sup> However, Tanner notes that ‘the debate about *peacekeeping versus peace enforcement* has...been only of limited value to the question of weapons control and disarmament’ (Fred Tanner, ‘Consensual Versus Coercive Disarmament’ in Estanislao Angel Zawels, Stephen John Stedman, Donald C. F. Daniel, David Cox, Jane Boulden, Fred Tanner, Jakkie Potgieter, and Virginia Gamba, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: The Issues*, UNIDIR/96/46 [Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996], p. 16).

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 169-204.

<sup>45</sup> Fred Tanner, ‘Weapons Control in Semi-Permissive Environments: A Case for Compellence’, in Michael Pugh (ed.), ‘The UN, Peace and Force’, Special Issue, *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 3, no. 4, Winter 1996, pp. 126-145.

<sup>46</sup> Fred Tanner, ‘Consensual Versus Coercive Disarmament’, p. 170.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>48</sup> Donald C. F. Daniel, ‘Is There a Middle Option in Peace Support Operations? Implications for Crisis Containment and Disarmament’, in Estanislao Angel Zawels, Stephen John Stedman, Donald C. F. Daniel, David Cox, Jane Boulden, Fred Tanner, Jakkie Potgieter, and Virginia Gamba, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: The Issues*, UNIDIR/96/46 (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996), p. 79.

<sup>49</sup> David Cox, ‘Peacekeeping and Disarmament: Peace Agreements, Security Council Mandates, and the Disarmament Experience’, in Estanislao Angel Zawels, Stephen John Stedman, Donald C. F. Daniel, David Cox, Jane Boulden, Fred Tanner, Jakkie Potgieter, and Virginia Gamba, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: The Issues*, UNIDIR/96/46 (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996), pp. 83-133.

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- <sup>50</sup> Jane Boulden, 'Rules of Engagement, Force Structure and Composition in United Nations Disarmament Operations', in Estanislao Angel Zawels, Stephen John Stedman, Donald C. F. Daniel, David Cox, Jane Boulden, Fred Tanner, Jakkie Potgieter, and Virginia Gamba, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: The Issues*, UNIDIR/96/46 (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996), p. 168.
- <sup>51</sup> Virginia Gamba and Jakkie Potgieter, 'Concluding Summary: Multinational Peace Operations and the Enforcement of Consensual Disarmament', in Estanislao Angel Zawels, Stephen John Stedman, Donald C. F. Daniel, David Cox, Jane Boulden, Fred Tanner, Jakkie Potgieter, and Virginia Gamba, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: The Issues*, UNIDIR/96/46 (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996), p. 218.
- <sup>52</sup> Mats R. Berdal, *Disarmament and Demobilisation After Civil Wars: Arms, Soldiers and the Termination of Armed Conflicts*, pp. 24-38.
- <sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 37.
- <sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 32.
- <sup>55</sup> See Joanna Spear, 'Arms Limitations, Confidence-Building Measures, and Internal Conflicts', in Michael E. Brown (ed.), *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 403-408.
- <sup>56</sup> See Philip Towle, *Enforced Disarmament: From the Napoleonic Campaigns to the Gulf War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).
- <sup>57</sup> Edward J. Laurance (assisted by Sarah Meek), *The New Field of Micro Disarmament: Addressing the Proliferation and Build-up of Small Arms and Light Weapons*, p. 6.
- <sup>58</sup> See, for example, Barry R. Posen, 'The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict', *Survival*, vol. 35, no. 1, Spring 1993; Caroline A. Hartzell, 'Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 43, no. 1, February 1999; Barbara F. Walter, 'The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement', *International Organization*, vol. 51, no. 3, Summer 1997; Charles King, 'Ending Civil Wars', *Adelphi Paper 308* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997); Fred Tanner, 'Consensual Versus Coercive Disarmament'; and Joanna Spear, 'Arms Limitations, Confidence-Building Measures, and Internal Conflicts'.
- <sup>59</sup> See endnote 5 in the concluding chapter for a detailed explanation of the security dilemma.
- <sup>60</sup> Joanna Spear, 'Arms Limitations, Confidence-Building Measures, and Internal Conflicts', p. 379.
- <sup>61</sup> Fred Tanner, 'Consensual Versus Coercive Disarmament', p. 183.
- <sup>62</sup> Joanna Spear, 'Arms Limitations, Confidence-Building Measures, and Internal Conflicts', p. 379.
- <sup>63</sup> See Stephen John Stedman, 'Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes', *International Security*, vol. 22, no. 2, Fall 1997.
- <sup>64</sup> Neil Cooper, 'Raising the Costs of Conflict, Lowering the Price of Peace: Demilitarisation After Post-Modern Conflicts', in Michael Pugh (ed.), *Regeneration of War-Torn Societies* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 64-66.
- <sup>65</sup> Fred Tanner, 'Bargains for Peace: Military Adjustments During Post-War Peacebuilding', in Michael Pugh (ed.), *Regeneration of War-Torn Societies* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), p. 86.
- <sup>66</sup> The disarmament initiatives that emerged in Kosovo and East Timor at the end of the 1990s are not covered in the following chapters for reasons explained in the Preface.

## **Chapter 2: The First Phase of Arms Management: Cold War Arms Retention and Delimitation Strategies**

### **2.0 Introduction**

Little has been written about arms retention and delimitation strategies from an analytical or conceptual perspective, and even the descriptive literature is sparse. The UN in most of its published documents only briefly refers to arms retention and delimitation (and then as essentially a peacekeeping rather than an arms management activity) and scholars and researchers have not sought to probe arms retention and delimitation as an arms management technique, although it is described to a limited extent in some peacekeeping case study work.<sup>1</sup> This work does not tell us a great deal about the principles or objectives that underpinned arms retention and delimitation, or about its effectiveness in the contexts to which it was applied.<sup>2</sup>

UN arms retention and delimitation initiatives were undertaken as part of traditional peacekeeping or observer missions during the Cold War, characteristically in response to inter-state conflicts. Peacekeeping missions sought to create stabilising conditions on the ground to enable parties that had been fighting, typically around border zones, to enter into a political dialogue. As part of this process, UN arms retention and delimitation sought to create physical barriers to prevent renewed conflict. Once a cease-fire had been agreed, the UN would assist in separating state parties in areas where they had clashed; create cease-fire lines and demilitarised zones; and secure personnel and arms movements out of conflict arenas to demarcation lines. However, the parties were permitted to retain their weaponry and disarmament was only occasionally attempted at the tactical level. The UN was not permitted to be militarily proactive. It had to rely:

on its moral and political authority... The United Nations hoped that this...authority would be manifested in the good will of the belligerents in honouring the integrity of the buffer zone.<sup>3</sup>

A second and distinct form of arms retention and delimitation, this time applied to an internal rather than an inter-state peace process, was tested uniquely in the transition from Rhodesia-Zimbabwe to Zimbabwe in 1979-80. A Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) intervened to supervise a cease-fire in preparation for elections. Rather than adopting a UN-style demilitarised zone approach, the CMF created assembly areas

(AAs) where insurgent Patriotic Front (PF) forces gathered, while Rhodesian government forces made a commitment to confine themselves to their military bases which were geographically distant from the AAs with the aim of preventing violence or conflict breaking out before elections by keeping the parties apart. In effect, the process was controlled by the British who were in command of the CMF and the largest troop contributors, and who were also mandated, as part of the peace process, to assume temporary governance of Rhodesia-Zimbabwe during the transition to elections.

This chapter proceeds by first tracing the conceptual antecedents of UN arms retention and delimitation in traditional peacekeeping and then looks at operations in Egypt, Kashmir, Cyprus, and the Lebanon. Finally, it undertakes an analysis of the CMF initiative.

## **2.1 The Conceptual Basis of United Nations Arms Retention and Delimitation**

From the late 1940s through to the late 1980s, the UN was circumscribed in the methods and leverage it could apply to manage weapons. This was due to the fact that UN arms retention and delimitation initiatives were a part of traditional peacekeeping operations. This was a form of intervention devised during the Cold War which permitted the UN to intervene in conflicts in a non-provocative manner with the consent of state parties to supervise cease-fires and help foster political settlements. To understand the thinking behind arms retention and delimitation it is first necessary to have a grasp of traditional peacekeeping and its Cold War underpinnings.

Traditional peacekeeping<sup>4</sup> evolved in response to Cold War bi-polar constraints on UN intervention in conflicts. Within the Security Council (SC), which mandated peacekeeping operations, an impasse existed during the Cold War in respect of evoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter to preserve international peace and security. Permanent Five (P5) members routinely vetoed international attempts to intervene militarily in any substantive and forceful manner in international crises.<sup>5</sup> However, a window of opportunity arose during the Cold War in terms of the use of 'soft' power. An *ad hoc* understanding emerged that the UN might, in certain circumstances, deploy lightly-armed, or unarmed, military contingents from largely 'neutral' countries to defuse conflicts where superpower interests were not directly at stake. These contingents were deployed to supervise cease-fires, separate hostile parties, provide 'good offices', and to

stimulate the development of political solutions to conflicts. This activity became known as traditional peacekeeping.<sup>6</sup> Traditional peacekeeping supplemented :

the self-help system of international politics with an element of disinterested outside assistance that can help the parties to a conflict disengage themselves from it.<sup>7</sup>

It was underpinned by three basic principles: impartiality, consent, and minimal use of force.<sup>8</sup>

First, UN forces were required to be neutral and non-threatening when dealing with the parties in the field; they had to be mindful that they were frequently dealing with states that were sensitive to incursions into their sovereignty and that their presence was conditional on the parties' consent. The parties could insist on the withdrawal of a UN peacekeeping mission if they felt the UN was acting improperly or ineffectively, or that a mission was no longer consistent with their interests.<sup>9</sup> The need to maintain consent became a prime consideration in UN peacekeeping missions and contributed to cautious, non-provocative deployments in the field. In circumstances where consent was seriously eroded or withdrawn, the UN had to rely on 'persuasion, mediation and negotiation' to restore it.<sup>10</sup>

Second, peacekeepers were expected to be impartial: the UN and its peacekeepers were to treat parties to a dispute equally. A stance of impartiality suggested that the UN had no stake in the conflict it was attempting to resolve and that it would implement its mandate in an even-handed manner. Diehl notes that:

Impartiality...had the practical benefit that peacekeeping missions were: more likely to be accepted by the parties.... It is hard to imagine a disputant accepting or supporting a peacekeeping operation composed of troops that might be viewed as hostile to its interests.<sup>11</sup>

This principle had its origins in the fact that peacekeeping operations had originally been:

interim arrangements set up...without prejudice to the claims and the positions of the parties.<sup>12</sup>

This did not preclude the UN criticising or censoring the actions of the parties when they violated agreements, but complaints of cease-fire violations or other contraventions of peace agreements had to be investigated fairly and thoroughly regardless of whom the complaint came from and their past behaviour. The UN's role was that of a custodian of peace agreements, not that of an enforcer.



The third conceptual underpinning of peacekeeping was minimal use of force. The early UN traditional peacekeeping operations established the principle that the UN would only normally use force – most usually in self-defence – to the minimal extent necessary, although in theory, force could also be used in furtherance of a mission.<sup>13</sup> In practice, the latter was rarely resorted to; in part because it was perceived that peacekeepers would run the risk of losing the co-operation and consent of the parties.

Traditional peacekeeping was essentially a non-combatant mission carried out by military personnel. Peacekeepers were sometimes armed with light weapons (LWs), while monitors and observers were usually unarmed. In fact, more than half of the UN's peacekeeping operations before 1988 consisted of only unarmed observers.<sup>14</sup> The deployment of tanks, armoured vehicles, or artillery was seen as inappropriate and even likely to be provocative. This meant that, since peacekeepers were almost by definition:

outgunned by the disputants they (were) sent to monitor, any recourse to force must be calibrated to localise and defuse, rather than escalate, violence.<sup>15</sup>

Fetherston notes that peacekeeping tended to achieve a 'controlled impasse',<sup>16</sup> while Roberts described it as achieving:

the effective freezing (although not resolution) of certain conflicts; some reduction of risk, or extent, of competitive interventions by neighbouring or major powers; and the isolation of some local conflicts from the East-West struggle, so that the local conflicts did not exacerbate the Cold War.<sup>17</sup>

Traditional peacekeeping, in essence, was an interim measure to prepare the ground for the parties to find a resolution of the dispute themselves.<sup>18</sup> Arms retention and delimitation was a key component in this process in that it had the capacity to stabilise the military situation on the ground and avert clashes which might lead to the abandonment of the political process. It involved UN peacekeepers creating an area of separation between the parties, and demilitarised zones, in which weapons were limited or prohibited, following the establishment of a cease-fire. The UN would then mount patrols, or monitor from static positions, to check that arms did not re-enter these zones.

## **2.2 Case Studies**

### **2.21 United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO)**

In 1949 the UN became involved in stabilising the cease-fire arrangements following the Arab-Israeli war of 1948. Four General Armistice Agreements were concluded

between Israel and Jordan, the Lebanon, Egypt and Syria in early 1949, and on 11 August 1949 the SC assigned functions to UNTSO in line with these agreements.<sup>19</sup> UNTSO observers were sent in to supervise the Armistice agreements between Israel and Arab states, a key element of this being the establishment of demilitarised zones between the formerly warring parties. UNTSO was severely circumscribed in its powers and the methods it could use. Its observers were unarmed and could only report or observe violations of the demilitarisation arrangements, not directly act to prevent them. Contraventions of the cease-fire, such as firing across the Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL), overflights on the wrong side of the line, and the deployment of forces or armaments in demilitarised zones, had to be reported back to the Mixed Armistice Commission, consisting of Israeli and Egyptian representatives, for investigation. UNTSO observers:

operated...with the consent of the parties and were dependent on the co-operation of the parties for their effectiveness. Thus they had no power to prevent a violation of the truce or to enforce any decisions. There was no element of enforcement in their functioning, although their very presence was something of a deterrent to violations of the truce and...they exercised a degree of moral suasion.<sup>20</sup>

Since the late 1980s, 200 UNTSO soldiers have been operating, largely peacefully, in the Israeli-Syrian border area.<sup>21</sup>

## **2.22 Assessment**

UNTSO was a classic type of Cold War inter-state demilitarisation operation: it observed the movements of the parties and it attempted to bring to bear 'moral suasion' on the parties to abide by their demilitarisation commitments. Further, its presence acted as something of a deterrent to violations of truces across demilitarised zones. It managed to bring a degree of stability and predictability to the military relations between hostile states at volatile border areas. This approach proved effective in maintaining cease-fire stability when the parties had a common interest in avoiding renewed conflict, or were content to see a military impasse, as was the case for protracted periods during its deployment. However, its restricted and largely passive mandate meant it was unable to contain violence when parties chose to break their cease-fire commitments or resort to war, as proved to be the case on a number of occasions in the post-1948 period when the Arab-Israeli conflict re-ignited.

### **2.23 United Nations Emergency Force I, II (UNEF)/Sinai II**

UNEF, deployed in the Middle East following the Suez Crisis, was tasked with assisting to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Egypt and the withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli troops from Egyptian territory.<sup>22</sup> It interposed itself between the Anglo-French and Egyptian forces and established a buffer zone. UNEF began operating in Egypt on 12 November 1956 and was withdrawn over 10 years later on 18 May 1967 at the request of the Egyptian government.<sup>23</sup>

The operation fell into three main phases. As the Anglo-French forces withdrew from the Port Fuad and Port Said areas, UNEF I was stationed around the perimeters to prevent clashes with Egyptian troops. Similar methods were used in the second-phase Sinai withdrawal with UNEF interposing between Egyptian and Israeli forces in a buffer zone.

The final phase of UNEF I was a longer process lasting from March 1957-May 1967 in which the force acted as an 'informal buffer', once all foreign troops had been withdrawn, between Israeli and Egyptian forces along the ADL and the national frontier.<sup>24</sup>

UNEF forces, in undertaking these functions, were not authorised to use force, other than in self-defence. Further, they were not permitted to take the initiative in the use of force, but they could respond with fire to an armed attack upon them even if this 'might result from a refusal on their part to obey an order from the attacking party not to resist'.<sup>25</sup> UNEF marked a significant modification and divergence from previous arms retention and delimitation initiatives, such as UNTSO, in that while keeping the principles of impartiality and consent, it did not 'function under an absolute prohibition on force'.<sup>26</sup> Further, in the vicinity of the Suez Canal, UNEF contingents were assigned more aggressive peacekeeping duties, such as guarding key installations, providing protection for the Suez Clearance Organisation, and they had the right to apprehend violators of the armistice line.<sup>27</sup>

UNEF II was deployed following the 1973 Yom Kippur War between Israel, Egypt, and Syria. While initially it confined itself to interposing between the hostile parties and undertook observation and confidence-building measures (CBMs) in sensitive areas, after the disengagement of the parties it adopted a more activist approach. UNEF II took control of the zone of disengagement in January 1974-October 1975 and carried out weekly and later bi-weekly inspections of 'areas of limited forces

and armaments'.<sup>28</sup> By mid-March, UNEF II had a total strength of 6,814.<sup>29</sup> Buffer zones controlled by UNEF II were further established in the Sinai and the parties' military forces were prohibited in the southern areas of Abu Rudais and Ras Sudr. Arms control arrangements were also set up on both sides of the buffer zone which limited armaments and force numbers to 8,000 personnel, 75 tanks, and 72 artillery pieces.<sup>30</sup>

The Sinai II Disengagement Agreement of September 1975 between Egypt and Israel established linked verification and peacekeeping arrangements involving American, UN, Israeli, and Egyptian personnel. The agreement permitted the parties to situate early warning stations in the buffer zone, and national technical means, up to the separation zone. There was also a strong element of co-operation through a joint Egyptian-Israeli liaison committee with direct links to UNEF and the US Sinai support mission.<sup>31</sup>

A 4,000 strong UN force ran checkpoints, controlled access to the buffer zone, and undertook on-site inspections, while the US Sinai Field Mission, consisting of 200 civilians, played an important conflict resolution role:

the mission operated three watch stations in the Mitla and Gidi passes to provide tactical early warning; it also monitored three electronic sensor fields to detect unauthorised movements. In addition the United States verified Egyptian and Israeli monitoring practices at their respective national surveillance stations and undertook reconnaissance flights every 7 to 10 days over the buffer zones and arms limitation zones.<sup>32</sup>

With Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai in 1982, the Multinational Force Observers (MFO) contingent took over the task of monitoring and verifying treaty compliance; once again with United States involvement.

## **2.24 Assessment**

UNEF I assisted in bringing to an end the Suez Crisis. It was able to proactively supervise the withdrawal of foreign forces from Egypt and avert clashes between the parties, although this was simplified by the fact that France, Britain and Israel had come under considerable superpower pressure to withdraw and the parties had little interest in resurrecting conflict. An aid to conflict management was the fact that the operation oversaw a permanent separation of French, British and Egyptian forces, rather than the continued stand-offs between parties at border regions that characterised later UN arms

retention and delimitation initiatives. Further, the fact that UN forces were entitled to respond with force to armed attack and were assigned more proactive tasks, such as guarding key installations, gave UNEF I added credibility. UNEF I also made a significant contribution to stabilising military relations between Israel and Egypt.

UNEF II and the Sinai II arrangements were also more proactive than many later arms retention initiatives. Although UNEF II was initially confined to interpositioning and observation, it later took control of the zone of engagement and arms limitation measures were undertaken on both sides of the buffer zone. Sinai II was innovative in that it introduced comprehensive verification measures, such as early warning stations in the buffer zone in tandem with United States watch stations, which made a major contribution to averting fears of surprise attack, particularly in the aftermath of the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

### **2.25 United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)**

Similar arms retention and delimitation arrangements were also applied to the Golan Heights, which had experienced frequent cease-fire violations and tensions since the ending of the war, by UNDOF.<sup>33</sup> The Israel-Syria Disengagement Agreement, 31 May 1974, reflected the hostility and suspicions of the two parties, who only agreed to a monitoring regime to prevent war through surprise attacks or miscalculations. As part of this, UNDOF established static observation posts, demarcated separation lines, sent out patrols, and verified armament levels in limited force zones through routine and challenge inspections. The parties also established rigorous monitoring methods themselves such as airborne surveillance missions and electro-optical surveillance sensors, and the United States provided aerial surveillance intelligence to the UN and the parties.

### **2.26 Assessment**

The UNDOF mission proved effective in preventing the renewal of conflict between the parties in a highly insecure environment. In contrast to the more secure Israeli-Egyptian arrangements in the Sinai – the Sinai, for example, is 10 times wider than the Golan Heights (250km against 25km)<sup>34</sup> – Israel and Syria faced in the Golan Heights the prospect of considerably shorter warning times and potentially catastrophic consequences in the event of a surprise attack. Early warning and verification were

critical factors in preventing conflict outbreaks and both sides feared the consequences of unintended escalation. In these circumstances, the rigorous monitoring techniques established by Israel, Syria, the UN, and the United States, proved vital.

However, at the same time, UNDOF and the demilitarisation measures did not bring about long-term reconciliation or political accommodation. UNDOF led to a stable *status quo*, but with limited expectations regarding co-operation, it has been suggested:

In many ways, UNDOF's success has created a comfortable *status quo*, leaving the parties with few expectations about next steps in the peace-building process...this situation has only served the rivals' motivation focused on loss aversion and on reducing the risks of war rather than on the potential gains and benefits of co-operation.<sup>35</sup>

## **2.27 United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)/ United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM)**

The UN became involved in the creation of a demilitarised area around a cease-fire line, following clashes between India and Pakistan over the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir in the late 1940s.<sup>36</sup> The UN sent in a limited number of observers – 20 by early February 1949 – as part of UNMOGIP, and these were attached to both of the parties' armies to report on cease-fire violence.

Under the mission mandate, cease-fire violations included: crossing the cease-fire line; the firing and use of explosives within five miles of the line; new wiring and mining of any position; reinforcing forward defended positions; the forwarding of 'warlike' stores from outside Kashmir; and aircraft flights over the territory of the other party. Maintaining good relations and neutrality with the parties was regarded as vital and any direct intervention or interference in the affairs of the parties' armies was prohibited. The role of the observers was strictly interpreted as reporting complaints of cease-fire violations to the UN Secretary-General (SG) and to the parties.<sup>37</sup>

The fragile nature of the arms retention and delimitation arrangements in Kashmir was demonstrated with the collapse in August 1965 of the cease-fire agreement and widespread fighting across the cease-fire line.<sup>38</sup> The UN's response was the deployment of the 90-strong UNIPOM. Its function was to report on cease-fire breaches and to:

persuade the local commanders to restore the cease-fire, but they had no authority or power to order a cessation of firing.<sup>39</sup>

Arms retention and delimitation arrangements were once again put into effect and in February 1966 the UN reported that the withdrawal of troops by India and Pakistan had been completed on schedule and UNIPOM was terminated on 22 March 1966 with small numbers of observers left behind.<sup>40</sup>

However, hostilities broke out again between Pakistan and India at the end of 1971 with violations of the Karachi Agreement and exchanges of artillery and small arms fire along the cease-fire line.<sup>41</sup> The volatile situation in the Kashmir region meant that UNMOGIP continued its observation and reporting role in the following decades acting, in particular, as a conduit for cease-fire allegations and investigations. Serious violations of the arms retention and delimitation arrangements occurred once again during 1999-2000 with alleged incursions into Indian territory, attacks by Indian aircraft on rebel elements, said to be backed by Pakistan, and artillery exchanges between Indian and Pakistani troops, threatening the outbreak of a larger conflict.

## **2.28 Assessment**

UNMOGIP and UNIPOM faced severe limitations in policing the cease-fire arrangements between Pakistani and Indian forces in Kashmir. Only a limited number of observers were deployed and maintaining good relations with the parties and avoiding direct intervention in military affairs was regarded as paramount with the mission essentially confined to reporting cease-fire violations. The consequence of this mandate was that the parties were able to manipulate the cease-fire arrangements, including resuming fighting, when it suited their political and military interests. Indeed, for long periods exchanges of fire between the parties have been routine and major hostilities broke out between India and Pakistan in 1965, 1971 and in the late 1990s. The UN had few means to bring pressure on peace process spoilers other than censure. On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine how the UN could have deployed a force that acted more proactively, given that the two parties had considerable military capabilities and were sensitive to any diminution of their sovereignty. Nevertheless, despite the literal failure of the cease-fire arrangements, the presence of a monitoring force provided an early warning function and a buffer which has aided de-escalation. UNMOGIP and UNIPOM did not bring about conflict resolution or a settlement of the Kashmir problem, although they probably helped avert the outbreak of a major conflict

over it. Rather, they buttressed a relatively stable military impasse which frequently suited the parties' interests.

## **2.29 United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)**

If arms retention and delimitation proved problematic in inter-state conflicts, it proved to be even more so in internal conflicts such as Cyprus. In Cyprus, UNFICYP (1964-) adopted a series of demilitarisation measures to try and defuse the civil war that had broken out in Cyprus in 1963-64 and that remained in a state of uneasy abatement into the late 1990s.<sup>42</sup> UNFICYP instigated demilitarised zones; the dismantling of fortifications; and, on occasions, even limited disarmament. This was backed up with a robust, in traditional peacekeeping terms, interpretation of self-defence which included:

the defence of United Nations posts, premises and vehicles under armed attack, as well as the support of other personnel of UNFICYP under attack.... Examples in which troops may be authorised to use force include attempts by force to compel them to withdraw from a position...attempts by force to disarm them, and attempts by force to prevent them from carrying out their responsibilities as ordered by their commanders.<sup>43</sup>

But demilitarisation proved extremely difficult to implement in the face of a chronic lack of trust between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. By the end of 1964, the UN had had little success in persuading the parties to dismantle their fortifications -- these frequently having been the cause of incidents -- or in reducing destabilising military build-ups.<sup>44</sup> Progress was made in September 1967 when the government announced a normalisation process, including the unmanning of armed posts and fortifications and freedom of movement. The Turkish Cypriots agreed that they would not seek to occupy vacant positions.<sup>45</sup> Calls by the UN SG<sup>46</sup> for Greece and Turkey to withdraw forces from Cyprus, and for the UN to undertake the 'supervision of disarmament' and to safeguard 'internal security', met with some success. Turkey supported the enlargement of the UNFIYCP mandate to include disarmament of forces constituted after 1963 and agreement was reached on Greek troop withdrawals from Cyprus between 8 December 1967 and 16 January 1968.

However, influxes of arms into Cyprus continued despite UN arms control efforts. It was agreed in September 1964 that UNFICYP would be present at the unloading of military equipment into Cyprus, but this was undermined by the fact that military materiel was being imported secretly into Boghaz, unobserved by UNFICYP.<sup>47</sup>



In 1972 the UN managed to negotiate an agreement under which the Cyprus government kept imported arms in safekeeping and open to inspection by the Force Commander. The SG reported<sup>48</sup> on the 21 April 1972 that an improved arrangement had been agreed under which weapons and munitions were kept within a fenced area within an UNFICYP camp. Cyprus police were put in charge of the fenced area.

Nevertheless, this failed to address the underlying problem of the proliferation of weapons in Cyprus. A central problem, as one observer noted, was that UNFICYP's mandate did not authorise it to impose peace on the island.<sup>49</sup> To do this it would need to be authorised to:

stop government arms imports as well as arms smuggling by both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. It would require further that UNFICYP be licensed to disarm the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and tear down all fortifications. After this was achieved, the United Nations troops would probably have to remain as Cyprus's policemen for a long time to...preserve...peace.<sup>50</sup>

The invasion of Cyprus by Turkish forces and the outbreak of further civil unrest in 1974 presented a further demilitarisation challenge to the UN. A demilitarised security zone approach was adopted after the cessation of hostilities at the limit of the areas occupied by the Turkish forces. The UN supervised entry into the zone. At the same time, Turkish enclaves were protected by UNFICYP. Despite these more proactive measures, and the acceptance in principle of CBMs,<sup>51</sup> high levels of armaments remained a destabilising factor in relations between Cypriots and the Turkish and Greek governments in the late 1990s. Although all parties expressed their concern regarding the growth of force levels, the UN was not able to secure an agreement even on an inspection and verification regime, let alone the substantive removal of weaponry.<sup>52</sup>

During 1998, Greece and the Greek Cypriots appeared set on deploying anti-aircraft systems in their sector; a development which was greeted with alarm by the Turks and which triggered a political and military crisis until it was agreed in 1999 that deployment would not go ahead.

In essence, the mandate of UNFICYP in the late 1990s remained unchanged, although there were suggestions during 1999-2000 that a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)-led force might replace the UN force monitoring the Green Line.<sup>53</sup> It was to interpose itself between Greek and Turkish Cypriot forces; supervise the cease-fire lines that define the buffer zone; and observe and report any violations of the cease-fire and the military *status quo*.<sup>54</sup>

## **2.291 Assessment**

Unlike many previous arms retention and delimitation initiatives which essentially monitored statist peace agreements, UNFICYP sought to demilitarise an internal conflict. UNFICYP adopted an approach to the problem of demilitarising an intractable internal conflict that was considerably more proactive – indeed at times it instituted limited disarmament – and it policed the partition of Cyprus into two distinct entities. This physical partition introduced a degree of military predictability and stability into military relations between the parties. However, outbreaks of conflict, such as the invasion of Cyprus by Turkish forces in 1974, still occurred, often exacerbated by the involvement of external parties with a stake in the conflict. Further, UNFICYP was unable to control arms influxes into Cyprus which regularly destabilised relations between the parties. Notwithstanding its useful role in policing the demilitarised security zone between the communities, UNFICYP's involvement, as in other arms retention and delimitation initiatives, led to a protracted and relatively stable impasse between the parties, rather than a peace settlement.

## **2.292 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)**

The situation in Lebanon in the late 1970s posed many of the problems that were to confront later post-Cold War arms management missions: an internal war with external linkages; parties opposed to weapons control and prepared to take on or harass peacekeepers; and the presence of unpredictable non-state actors, such as militias. A complex ethno-religious civil war in Lebanon had drawn in a Syrian 'peacekeeping' intervention force in 1976, followed by an Israeli invasion in southern Lebanon in 1978.

UNIFIL was created for the purpose of:

confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.<sup>55</sup>

The Israeli withdrawal was seen as central to the UN mandate.

By mid-April 1978, over 4,000 peacekeeping troops were stationed in Lebanon. UNIFIL<sup>56</sup> was subject to the 'principles of non-use of force and non-intervention in the internal affairs of the host country'.<sup>57</sup> Within these constraints, the UN attempted to

evolve a credible response to retaining control and securitising demilitarised areas, while at the same time not becoming a party to the conflict in the face of attacks.

The problematic nature of demilitarisation was evident from an early stage. The Israelis were reluctant to relinquish the proscribed demilitarised area<sup>58</sup> and Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) armed elements also attempted to enter it. In the Tyre area in May 1978, there were a number of armed clashes between French UNIFIL and PLO combatants resulting in fatalities. UNIFIL found itself resorting to limited tactical disarmament, on occasion, in order to demilitarise zones. If unauthorised armed or uniformed personnel were discovered in a demilitarised area, UNIFIL troops 'endeavoured to disarm them and escort them out of its area'.<sup>59</sup> This proved extremely difficult to implement, particularly in areas such as the enclave controlled by Maj. Haddad. The UN also had to contend with hidden weapon caches within the demilitarised area.<sup>60</sup>

A major problem confronted by UNIFIL was its inability to fully take over the enclave from pro-Israeli *de facto* forces. In order to prevent infiltration, UNIFIL, frequently assisted by Lebanese gendarmes, checked and inspected personnel and military vehicles at checkpoints established at entry points in its area of deployment. Motorised and foot patrols were conducted and random night-time listening posts were established at selected localities to detect illicit armed movement. While Lebanese and Palestinian armed elements stopped at checkpoints generally surrendered their weapons and left the UNIFIL area peacefully, there were a number of incidents. Armed elements in some cases fired at UN forces, who then returned fire in self-defence. On a number of occasions checkpoints were attacked, when infiltrators were refused access, and peacekeepers captured and killed.<sup>61</sup> On three occasions *de facto* forces attacked the UNIFIL headquarters itself with mortar and artillery fire. At other times, infiltrators would return with reinforcements to attack UN positions, or even laid ambushes against UNIFIL personnel. Nevertheless, UNIFIL still attempted to resolve 'all incidents by negotiation'.<sup>62</sup>

In fact, given the limited size of UNIFIL and its lack of enforcement capabilities, it was virtually impossible to prevent all infiltration attempts; a situation that was compounded by the existence of many arms caches in UNIFIL's area of operations. UNIFIL managed to find and destroy a number of them, but many remained undiscovered.<sup>63</sup> It was also relatively easy for PLO personnel and their

Lebanese allies to pass through UNIFIL checkpoints unarmed and get weapons from caches inside the area. Armed elements could further infiltrate into the UNIFIL area through uncharted tracks. By July 1981, the number of Palestinian armed elements within the area had increased to about 450, according to UN estimates, and they had established some 30 positions inside it.<sup>64</sup> UNIFIL tried to have these positions removed by negotiations with the Palestinians at the highest levels, but to little effect. Nevertheless, the UN did manage to control some infiltration and most of it took place in the northern part of the area; well away from the frontier.<sup>65</sup>

The Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in June 1982, in the face of limited UN resistance, suggested that the fundamental conception of the mission, premised as it was on co-operation, was problematic or untenable. This was, more or less, conceded by the UN SG who concluded that the mission objectives and mandate had not been achieved.<sup>66</sup> He noted that UNIFIL was based on the fundamental principles of non-force, except in self-defence; that it would not engage in combat to attain its goals; and that it had a strictly limited strength being only armed with LWs. Further, it must function with the full co-operation of the parties; the parties must abide by the SG's decisions; and in the case of non-compliance, member states would ensure respect for those decisions. The latter condition, in particular, had not been met.

A subsequent series of Israeli withdrawals in 1985, which still left some Israeli troops in a 'security zone', did not alter the fundamental character of the difficulties that UNIFIL faced. The UN reacted to escalating encroachments into demilitarised zones by bringing in Lebanese security forces and seeking to negotiate with the infiltrators and their backers.

By February 1984, the Lebanese army had established two permanent checkpoints in the UNIFIL area to check for illicit weaponry. UNIFIL also attempted to disarm local militias, armed by Israel, who began to operate in its area at the end of June 1982, but this was only feasible when they were not protected or accompanied by the Israelis.<sup>67</sup> UNIFIL was, in fact, under standing orders to disarm the local militias and to contain their activities whenever they were not directly protected or accompanied by Israeli forces.<sup>68</sup> Ultimately, in the face of escalating attacks during August-September 1986, there was little UNIFIL could do other than adopt a defensive posture by improving its physical defences and shelters, and revising patrol procedures.<sup>69</sup>

However, notwithstanding these difficulties, UNIFIL fulfilled a crisis management role by negotiating between the parties, and it contained a number of potentially violent situations. Even Israel, which never formally accepted UNIFIL's presence, made use of these services.<sup>70</sup>

Similar difficulties persisted throughout the 1990s even though UNIFIL continued to oppose attempts by armed elements to operate within its area of deployment. On 3 July 1991, for example, UNIFIL apprehended three armed elements who were preparing to fire Katyusha rockets and found and destroyed six of them. The following day, the UN destroyed large quantities of assorted ammunition found in a car at a checkpoint.<sup>71</sup> However, the UN SG noted that UNIFIL was still unable to carry out in full the mandate given to it in 1978.<sup>72</sup> In particular, UNIFIL was unable to get either Israel or Syria out of Lebanon, which was its *raison d'être*.<sup>73</sup>

In fact, it has been alleged that it failed in its three mandatory missions: it did not induce peace; it failed to stop the carnage of Israeli soldiers and Lebanese civilians; and it did not achieve the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.<sup>74</sup> Further, it remained powerless to prevent attacks on its own peacekeepers, suffering a direct hit on its compound in Cana in 1996 killing dozens of UNIFIL personnel.<sup>75</sup> It was only with the Israeli withdrawal in 2000 that UNIFIL's mission became less problematic.

### **2.293 Assessment**

Arms retention and delimitation was highly problematic in the context of Lebanon. Not only did UNIFIL have to operate in a complex internal conflict where it was liable to attack from factions, it also had to contend with powerful state actors who were frequently hostile to its involvement in what was at times an on-going conflict rather than a peace process. In this context, a small, lightly-armed force operating on the basis of consent could do little but hold the line in certain critical sectors. It was not able to keep the parties apart or provide a stable demilitarised zone, particularly in the face of widespread illicit influxes of arms and incursions by military elements into the zones. However, UNIFIL was able to act as a mediating force at times when the parties were seeking compromise or a de-escalation of military activities. As in most of the UN operations surveyed, arms retention and delimitation did not directly lead to a settlement.

UN arms retention and delimitation initiatives mounted during the Cold War had a limited impact in terms of securitising peace processes. They frequently managed initially to bring fighting to a halt by creating demilitarised zones and implementing weapons withdrawals, but this rarely led to permanent stabilisation of a conflict and the end of fighting. Weapons would be infiltrated back into the zones, or the parties would simply ignore the demilitarised zone and fighting would flare up again. UN arms retention and delimitation usually lacked the capacity to either build a comprehensive system of security and confidence between the parties, which might have conceivably averted future conflict outbreaks, or to forcibly keep the parties apart. It was clearly beyond the scope of Cold War conflict management to create secure environments within demilitarised zones. Cold War arms management tended to lead to long-term inconclusive commitments of international forces in the field, and the ‘institutionalisation’ of conflict with armies confronting each other across demilitarised zones for decades, rather than conflict resolution.

UN arms retention and delimitation was constrained by Cold War conceptions of sovereignty. It was regarded as unconscionable that state parties would be required to disarm or put their weaponry under the direct control of the UN, although occasionally militia on the ground were disarmed if found in demilitarised areas. As a consequence, the parties had the capacity to re-start conflicts at will and fragile cease-fire lines and demilitarised areas were unlikely to provide a significant barrier to conflict outbreaks. This was particularly the case when militarily powerful states, such as India, Pakistan, and Israel, set their minds on breaking demilitarisation agreements. In short, there were limits as to how far Cold War arms retention and delimitation could be taken when many monitors were unarmed, deployed in small numbers, and frequently had virtually no proactive mandate to deal with demilitarisation violations or capacity to build-up comprehensive security structures that might prevent the outbreak of renewed conflict across demilitarised areas, although a few operations introduced CBMs.

Further, the conceptualisation of a geographically confined delimitation area was inherently difficult to implement when arms were moving freely within conflict arenas and were often being supplied by outside parties. In essence, UN arms retention and delimitation initiatives were temporary mechanisms to halt fighting between parties at points of tension. They were not, as in case of the CMF-managed Rhodesia-

Zimbabwe initiative, examined below, part of a process designed to dismantle armies and to move towards political and military integration.

### **2.3 The Conceptual Basis of the Commonwealth Arms Retention and Delimitation Initiative**

A civil war had been running for 15 years between the insurgent groups, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) – which were united as the PF in 1976 – and the Rhodesian government, before a peace agreement emerged in 1979. At the Lancaster House peace talks it was agreed that a Commonwealth demilitarisation force would be deployed to stabilise the military situation on the ground and permit democratic elections to take place as part of the transition from Rhodesia-Zimbabwe to Zimbabwe. Demilitarisation was not to include disarmament; rather, a novel separation process was instigated.<sup>76</sup> As part of this process, the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) were to be confined within their bases, while PF forces were required to assemble at intermediate collection points and then were to be given safe passage to more permanent assembly points (APs). These were set up in areas distant from RSF bases. The utility of this separation approach was that unlike the arms retention and delimitation operations described above:

the ground lost all tactical significance from the moment of the cease-fire. The forces themselves were not eyeball to eyeball, arrayed in battle formation; in this carefully organised melee...it would be difficult for either side to form into a military force of such overwhelming size that it could be sure of destroying the other.<sup>77</sup>

The role of the CMF was not to compel either side to maintain a cease-fire, or in any sense to guard the forces of one side or the other. Its task was to 'observe and report.'<sup>78</sup> This was reflected in the small size of the force which only had 1,319 personnel.

## **2.4 Case Study**

### **2.41 The Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe**

The demilitarisation timetable stipulated that at midnight on 21 December 1979 all military movements were to stop and a cease-fire was to commence at midnight on 28 December 1979. At this point, the RSF were required to return to their bases and the PF to report to intermediate collection points by 4 January 1980, and subsequently move

onto APs. With the separation process completed, campaigning for elections could take place which were scheduled for March 1980.

The early stages of the operation were marked by mistrust and trepidation. In order to persuade the PF to come out of the bush and congregate in the APs the CMF adopted a non-threatening posture. The monitors were ordered to show an:

overt and friendly presence on the ground so that the PF personnel will be re-assured enough to come forward.<sup>79</sup>

The Force Commander ordered that monitors should seek by personal contact and persuasion to dissuade the PF from cease-fire breaches. Monitors were not permitted to use force, other than in self-defence, nor were they to interpose themselves between hostile forces. They generally carried only personal fire arms, although CMF personnel in each AP did have a general purpose machine gun to guard against the possibility of being over-run.<sup>80</sup>

Monitoring the RSF's withdrawal from the front-lines to their bases proved to be straightforward. The CMF deployed monitors at the five joint operational command (JOC) bases that the RSF had established during its civil war operations and it also observed 17 sub-JOCs.

Establishing contact with the PF, and a measure of trust, was more problematic. The PF feared a trap.<sup>81</sup> They feared attacks by the Rhodesians and South Africans; the latter, in fact, were secretly and illicitly monitoring the movement of PF between intermediate collection points and APs. The PF's greatest fear was that:

once the guerrillas came out of the bush and were concentrated in their camps, a pretext could be found by the Rhodesians and South Africans (they were also suspicious of possible British collusion) to break the cease-fire, surround the camps and decimate the guerrillas.<sup>82</sup>

The Rhodesians also had reasons to be concerned regarding external intervention. The Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) was being aided by Tanzanian and Frente da Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) forces, while the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) had support from South African ANC guerrillas.<sup>83</sup>

A key confidence-building technique used by the CMF was the attachment of PF Liaison Officers (LOs)<sup>84</sup> to CMF contingents, while the PF used trial runs with small numbers of PF sent to test out the safety of APs. Nevertheless, the lack of PF



trust in the demilitarisation process meant that it was seriously delayed and it was extended by an extra week beyond the original deadline of midnight 4 January 1980.<sup>85</sup> In fact, neither party trusted the other or was confident that the CMF was neutral or impartial. The PF was concerned that the British, who had command and control over the force, had struck secret deals with the Rhodesians, while many in the RSF saw the cease-fire arrangements as favouring the PF and as a betrayal of white solidarity.

Maintaining separation between the RSF and PF was critical to the success of the demilitarisation process. However, although egress from APs was illicit, the CMF did not have the physical means to prevent it. Nor was it in a position to control arms within the APs. The PF regarded it as essential to retain their arms for self-defence and were not prepared to let the CMF take control of them by placing them in storage as in later UN co-operative disarmament operations. This meant that there was a constant danger of armed clashes between the PF and the RSF, who also retained their weaponry.

If the CMF's authority over the PF was largely illusory, at least the PF looked upon it to an extent to underwrite its security by acting as a deterrent or barrier against RSF attacks on APs. However, the RSF regarded itself as autonomous and capable of providing for its own security and regarded CMF interference with suspicion. Indeed, there was the perception within the RSF that the CMF was colluding in PF absences from APs.<sup>86</sup>

As the mission progressed it became clear that the AP process suffered from a structural problem. The inequality of the demilitarisation provisions, which allowed the RSF, but not the PF, to take on a 'policing' role nation-wide, thus giving them the capacity to attack PF forces, created a sense of vulnerability in the PF and encouraged desertion from the APs. Indeed, the failure to satisfy PF anxieties over:

the safety of their men...produced a situation which came close to wrecking the Lancaster House agreement in the following two months.<sup>87</sup>

At a few APs there was systematic egressing and non-compliance with the demilitarisation arrangements by the PF. At the ZANLA AP Delta, for example, it was alleged that there was constant guerrilla movement in and out to take part in political intimidation.<sup>88</sup> Further, a number of guerrillas never entered the APs. As many as 40% of ZANLA guerrillas (about 9-10,000 personnel) might have fallen into this category during the cease-fire period. Arms caches had also been established in border areas.<sup>89</sup>

The Rhodesians were convinced that the PF had a deliberate policy of breaking its AP commitments. The Rhodesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned on 29 January 1980 that departing PF would be considered 'to be in violation of the truce and (were) liable to be arrested and disarmed or shot'.<sup>90</sup> While the RSF might have had genuine security fears regarding the PF, some elements within it seemed to be intent on deliberately provoking the PF.<sup>91</sup> At one point, RSF troops surrounded the PF headquarters with armoured vehicles and artillery, and the PF were on the point of withdrawing their troops from APs when the CMF persuaded the RSF to withdraw.

The PF, in fact, developed their own techniques around APs to underwrite their security. In a number of APs the PF posted sentries, deployed anti-aircraft weapon systems, fortified their positions by digging, and occupied the 5km buffer zones that had been established at some APs.<sup>92</sup> The CMF was also regarded by the PF as a form of 'human shield' which could be used as a buffer in the event of any RSF attack on APs.<sup>93</sup>

RSF Special Forces were not permitted to be monitored at RSF bases, as part of secret arrangements made between the British and Rhodesians at Lancaster House, and as many as 65% of auxiliaries were not under effective surveillance, it has been estimated.<sup>94</sup> An illicit elite force made up from the Rhodesian Light Infantry was being helicoptered around one JOC to confront guerrillas during the cease-fire period, while special forces, such as the Selous Scouts, were attempting to destabilise the run-up to elections through assassinations.<sup>95</sup> Further, the monitoring of the Royal Rhodesian Air Force was incomplete as CMF monitors were not permitted to board the planes and could only observe the withdrawal of weapons from armouries. Rhodesian aircraft, in fact, overflew APs a number of times causing PF to egress or fire upon them.

The CMF mandate had been framed to deal with containment at APs and bases, not to address violence nation-wide, and the force was too small to achieve this.<sup>96</sup> As a result, the Governor had to increasingly call on the Rhodesians to police the cease-fire, further undermining the CMF's neutrality and damaging the equality of status built into the peace agreement. The PF also noted that the CMF was unable to prevent RSF special forces from attempting to assassinate the ZANLA leader, Robert Mugabe, and from blowing up churches in Salisbury shortly before elections in an attempt to discredit ZANLA.<sup>97</sup>

By mid-February, the mission was in crisis with contacts between the RSF and PF guerrillas outside APs running at nine or 10 a day. One estimate put the number of ZANLA guerrillas killed by the RSF during the cease-fire as high as 200,<sup>98</sup> although the CMF Force Commander estimated total PF deaths as 150.<sup>99</sup>

However, a key factor in a gradual improvement in relations between the parties and the completion of the demilitarisation arrangements as the election approached was the workings of the Cease-fire Commission (CC) and CMF mediation. The CC was not able to directly prevent clashes, but it provided an opportunity for the rival parties to discuss cease-fire breaches and alleged grievances, and ultimately, to develop a degree of trust.<sup>100</sup> Although:

the two sides remained suspicious of each other, by the time the integration period arrived, the benefits of dialogue within the CC became apparent and a degree of trust emerged between the CC representatives.<sup>101</sup>

However, the Lancaster House arrangements had not made any specific provision for integration, which subsequently proved to be a major flaw.<sup>102</sup>

ZIPRA, in particular, voiced fears regarding its security in the post-election phase in the absence of integration: the British may have separated the parties and acted as a referee in the pre-election phase, but what would happen afterwards? Would the:

winning party eliminate the other? The question...is one of life and death... We have to be certain that any agreed plan will bring about reconciliation between the two fighting forces.<sup>103</sup>

In the event, an integration process was agreed between the parties on 19 February 1980, shortly before the elections, averting a potential crisis.<sup>104</sup>

During the closing stages of the mission the CMF acted as a facilitator to bring the parties together at APs. Under CMF auspices, joint patrols and training were mounted at some APs. In the final weeks before the elections, a RSF and a British South African Police (BSAP) presence was established in all camps, although suspicions and hostilities between the RSF and ZANLA made the process problematic in some of them.<sup>105</sup>

However, the fact that disarmament was not attempted<sup>106</sup> had serious consequences in the post-election period. The British Military Assistance Training Team (BMATT), along with the parties, was faced with the prospect of disarming, demobilising, and integrating around 6,000 ZIPRA, 18,000 ZANLA, and 16,000 RSF

personnel. The new government attempted to disarm guerrillas still in APs, declared a weapons amnesty, and set about collecting ZIPRA weaponry inside and outside Zimbabwe.<sup>107</sup> However, hostilities still existed between ZIPRA and ZANLA and there were a series of tense incidents between the parties during early 1981, including a mutiny in March 1981.

## **2.42 Assessment**

The issue of cease-fire security overshadowed the transition from Rhodesia-Zimbabwe to Zimbabwe. Both parties, but particularly the PF, were concerned that they would be attacked during the cease-fire stage. The CMF relied on the parties' co-operation to achieve a stable cease-fire transition, which was a high-risk strategy given the lack of trust between the parties which had built up over the years as a result of racial tensions and a brutal 15-year civil war. Allowing the parties to retain their weaponry was also a high risk-strategy; albeit one that could not be avoided as all parties had refused to contemplate disarmament.

A further weakness of the mission was that it was not backed up by adequate resources or a more proactive mandate. The CMF did not have the capacity to protect the PF; prevent it from egressing from APs; or from engaging in pre-election violence. Thus, it was unable to fulfil a confidence-building role, either from the perspective of the PF, which had always regarded protection as essential, or from that of the RSF, which believed that the CMF was colluding in PF 'desertion', or at least was doing little to prevent it.

The efficacy of a weapons-retention approach can be seen from two perspectives. From one perspective, it at least gave the parties a minimal confidence that they could defend themselves. The PF used their weapons when congregated in vulnerable APs to defend themselves against RSF provocation and incursions, although it was doubtful whether in their dispersed positions they could have defended themselves against concerted RSF attacks. From the RSF's perspective, weapons-retention permitted them to counter military operations by the PF in the bush and gave them the capacity to defend bases in the event of attacks.

However, it can be argued from another perspective that the retention of arms led to the near collapse of the peace process; that rather than being a CBM, arms-retention was a destabiliser of the peace process. It gave the RSF the means to provoke

the PF in the vicinity of the APs and in the bush, and it allowed elements within the PF to intimidate voters in the run-up to elections. It also opened up the possibility for any party to re-start the civil war if the election outcome went against them, and there were problems with post-election violence committed with arms. Nevertheless, it also needs to be stressed that the politics of the peace process and military realities on the ground meant that a disarmament strategy, unless imposed against the will of the parties, which the British and Commonwealth forces were not prepared to undertake, was not politically feasible.

The CMF arms retention and delimitation strategy broadly succeeded in that it oversaw a peace process which did not collapse and which led to elections whose outcome was broadly accepted. This success was, in part, due to the expertise of the CMF and the forbearance of the parties, particularly the PF. The CMF proved expert in retaining a measure of largely illusory authority in its dealings with the RSF and the PF. Through personal contact and persuasion, and the mechanism of the CC, it also eventually managed to foster the beginning of co-operation.

The parties themselves went along with arms retention and delimitation for reasons largely unconnected with the validity of the cease-fire arrangements; indeed they both had their own 'agendas' and indulged in spoiler behaviour. Both the RSF and PF were probably prepared to abandon the peace process if they thought events warranted it. As the build-up to elections got underway, ZANU, in particular, used the cease-fire as a smoke screen to conceal their intimidation of the electorate and to build up political support. It was thus prepared to tolerate a temporary disadvantage in the cease-fire arrangements.

Last, and critically, the CMF initiative was underpinned by political pressures brought to bear by external actors. In 1979, there was a convergence of interest among powerful regional and international actors for a settlement. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Front-Line States (FLS) were able to bring considerable pressure to bear on the PF; and the British, the United States, and South Africa were able to pressurise the Rhodesians into bringing the conflict to an end and accepting CMF supervision of demilitarisation.

The experiences of UN and Commonwealth forces suggested that if arms retention and delimitation strategies were to be effective they needed to have a considerably greater capacity to protect the parties and perhaps would need to collect

weapons to create secure environments. This, however, seemed to be outside the compass of Cold War conflict management. It would need a structural change in the international system and in the intervention capacity of the UN for arms management to go down this path.

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> See, for example, United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 'General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations', 95-38147, October 1995, para. 15, p. 5, and also United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, third edition (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996); Thomas Weber, 'The Problems of Peacekeeping', *Interdisciplinary Peace Research*, October/November 1989, pp. 19-20; and John Hillen, *Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations* (Washington: Brassey's, 1998).

<sup>2</sup> For one of the few pieces of work that attempts to describe the principles behind arms retention and delimitation see John Hillen, *Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations*, pp. 100-104.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* p. 102.

<sup>4</sup> Despite the fact that traditional peacekeeping has been utilised for over 50 years, it has remained institutionally ill-defined, according to Findlay: 'Peacekeeping is not mentioned in the UN Charter, it has never been guided by established theory or doctrine, the term was invented long after praxis had begun and improvisation has characterised its evolution ever since' (Trevor Findlay, 'The New Peacekeeping and the New Peacekeepers', in Trevor Findlay (ed.), *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers*, SIPRI Research Report no. 12 [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996], p. 12). Berdal defines peacekeeping in terms of a 'strict adherence to the principles of consent and request; the non-use of force except in self-defence; continuous support from the SC as a mandating authority; and the willingness of member states to provide military, financial and logistical support' (Mats R. Berdal, *Whither UN Peacekeeping?*, Adelphi Paper 281 [London: Brassey's for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993], p. 6).

<sup>5</sup> The deployment of ONUC, July 1960-June 1964, was one of the few occasions during the Cold War when the UN acted forcefully during a 'peacekeeping' operation. On 21 February 1961, the UN Security Council under Resolution 161 authorised ONUC to use force, as a last resort, to prevent civil war in the Congo.

<sup>6</sup> United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 'General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations', p. 5. For an analysis of the emergence of traditional peacekeeping also see United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *United Nations Peacekeeping* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, August 1993), pp. 4-13.

<sup>7</sup> William J. Durch, 'Introduction', in William J. Durch (ed.), *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 3.

<sup>8</sup> The fundamental operational parameters of traditional peacekeeping were formulated and articulated by Canadian Foreign Minister, Lester Pearson and UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld. See Michael Pugh, Jeremy Giniifer and Eric Grove, 'Seapower, Security and Peacekeeping after the Cold War', in Michael Pugh (ed.), *Maritime Security and Peacekeeping* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), p. 16, and also Ratner who notes that Hammarskjöld defined the 'essential principles' of peacekeeping in a report written in the midst of the Suez Crisis in 1956 (Steven R. Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War* [New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996], p. 25).

<sup>9</sup> Egypt, for example, withdrew its consent to the presence of UNEF I on Egyptian territory in May 1967. See Marrack Goulding, 'The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping', *International Affairs*, vol. 69, no. 3, July 1993, p. 454.

<sup>10</sup> John Mackinlay, 'Improving Multinational Forces', *Survival*, vol. 36, no. 3, Autumn 1994, p. 152.

<sup>11</sup> Paul F. Diehl, 'Peacekeeping in Civil Wars', in Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer (eds.), *A Crisis of Expectations: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s* (Boulder: Westview Press), pp. 224-225.

<sup>12</sup> Marrack Goulding, 'The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping', p. 454.

<sup>13</sup> By 1973 the use of force was deemed to include situations where peacekeepers were being prevented from carrying out their mandate; it was not restricted to just self-defence.

<sup>14</sup> Marrack Goulding, 'The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping', p. 455.

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- <sup>15</sup> William J. Durch, 'Introduction', in William J. Durch (ed.), *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*, pp. 3-4.
- <sup>16</sup> A.B. Fetherston, *Toward a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping*, Peace Research Report no. 31 (Bradford: Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, February 1993), p. 4.
- <sup>17</sup> Adam Roberts, 'The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping', *Survival*, vol. 36, no. 3, Autumn 1994, p. 95.
- <sup>18</sup> Between 1946-1956 the UN mainly focused on observation, fact-finding, and reporting in small-scale operations derivative of World War II situations and the process of de-colonialisation. This was followed by the more assertive 1956-1967 period of UN peacekeeping which included the launching of major operations such as ONUC, UNFICYP, and UNEF I. During the dormant period between 1967-73 no new operations were launched, until the resurgent period beginning in 1973, when the UN intervened in the Middle East following the 1973 Yom Kippur war.
- <sup>19</sup> Under UN SCR 73, 1949.
- <sup>20</sup> United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 19.
- <sup>21</sup> Ghassan Salamé, 'Without Glory', *The World Today*, vol. 56, no. 6, June 2000, p. 25.
- <sup>22</sup> In April 1956, the SC, seeing that the prevailing situation between the parties constituted a threat to international peace and security, requested the SG through SCR 113, 4 April 1956, to arrange measures to defuse tension, including: withdrawal of forces from the Demarcation Line; full freedom of operation for UNTSO along that line; and local arrangements for preventing incidents and detecting breaches of the Armistice Agreements.
- <sup>23</sup> United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 50.
- <sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 53.
- <sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>26</sup> See Elgin Clemons, 'No Peace to Keep: Six and Three-Quarters Peacekeepers', *International Law and Politics*, vol. 26, no. 107, 1993, p. 118.
- <sup>27</sup> David W. Wainhouse, *International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads: National Support - Experience and Prospects 201*, 1973, cited in Elgin Clemons, 'No Peace to Keep: Six and Three-Quarters Peacekeepers', *International Law and Politics*, vol. 26, no. 107, 1993, p. 119.
- <sup>28</sup> United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 67.
- <sup>29</sup> UN S/11056/Add. 14.
- <sup>30</sup> United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, pp. 67-68.
- <sup>31</sup> Brian S. Mandell, 'Getting to Peacekeeping in Principal Rivalries: Anticipating an Israel-Syria Peace Treaty', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 40, no. 2, June 1996, p. 251.
- <sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>33</sup> United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 78.
- <sup>34</sup> Brian S. Mandell, 'Getting to Peacekeeping in Principal Rivalries: Anticipating an Israel-Syria Peace Treaty', p. 247.
- <sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 252.
- <sup>36</sup> UN SCR 80, 14 March 1950, called for Jammu and Kashmir to be demilitarised. The need for demilitarisation was further stated in SCR 91, 30 March 1951.
- <sup>37</sup> See United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, pp. 135 and 137.
- <sup>38</sup> UN SCR 211, 20 September 1965, called for a cease-fire to take effect in Kashmir by 22 September 1965.
- <sup>39</sup> United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 138.
- <sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 139.
- <sup>41</sup> The SC in SCR 307, 21 December 1971, demanded a lasting cease-fire in Jammu and Kashmir.
- <sup>42</sup> UNFICYP was created under SCR 186, 4 March 1964.
- <sup>43</sup> UN SG Report of 10 September 1964.
- <sup>44</sup> United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 158.
- <sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 159.
- <sup>46</sup> UN S/8248, Add. 6.
- <sup>47</sup> United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 160.
- <sup>48</sup> UN S/10564/Add. 1.
- <sup>49</sup> James A. Stegenga, *The United Nations Force in Cyprus* (Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1968), p. 137.
- <sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>51</sup> The parties' acceptance in principle of CBMs was welcomed in UN SCR 902, 11 March 1994, which followed a SG report on CBMs.
- <sup>52</sup> In 1998 there were attempts to advance the agenda of a bi-communal federal state as a response to the problems of Cyprus. UN SCR 1179, 29 June 1998, for example, called for the dispute to be settled along these lines.

- <sup>53</sup> 'Anniversary of Turkish Invasion of Cyprus', *UN & Conflict Monitor*, Issue 5, Autumn 1999, p. 18.
- <sup>54</sup> United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 170.
- <sup>55</sup> UN S/425, SC 2074 meeting, 19 March 1978.
- <sup>56</sup> UNIFIL was established under SCR 425 and SCR 426, 19 March 1978.
- <sup>57</sup> UN SG report to the SC, S/12611, 19 March 1978.
- <sup>58</sup> Part of the problem was that Israel saw UNIFIL as partial (in favour of the PLO) and also as a barrier to a solution in Lebanon. Nachmias notes that Israel discovered a written agreement under which UNIFIL Norwegians would not interfere in terrorist activity in their zone. See Nitza Nachmias, 'UNIFIL: When Peace is Non-Existent, Peacekeeping is Impossible', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 6, no. 3, Autumn 1999, p. 105.
- <sup>59</sup> United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 90.
- <sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 93.
- <sup>61</sup> On 19 June 1981, for example, a Fijian checkpoint was attacked and three Fijian soldiers were captured, two of whom were murdered.
- <sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 92.
- <sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 93.
- <sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>66</sup> UN SG report to the SC, S/15194/add. 2., 14 June 1982, commenting on the Israeli invasion.
- <sup>67</sup> United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 103.
- <sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 109.
- <sup>70</sup> Nitza Nachmias, 'UNIFIL: When Peace is Non-Existent, Peacekeeping is Impossible', p. 109.
- <sup>71</sup> United Nations, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon' (S/22829), 21 July 1991, para. 16, p. 5.
- <sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.
- <sup>73</sup> Nitza Nachmias, 'UNIFIL: When Peace is Non-Existent, Peacekeeping is Impossible', p. 105.
- <sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 95.
- <sup>75</sup> Ghassan Salamé, 'Without Glory', p. 25.
- <sup>76</sup> The CMF approach was 'without precedent and there were no operational blueprints available for reference' (Capt. J.B.A. Bailey, 'Operation Agila: Rhodesia 1979-80', *British Army Review*, December 1980, no. 66, p. 19).
- <sup>77</sup> John Mackinlay, 'The Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, 1979-80', in Thomas G. Weiss (ed.), *Humanitarian Emergencies and Military Help in Africa* (London: Macmillan/International Peace Academy, 1990), p. 42.
- <sup>78</sup> Chairperson, 'Attachment to Cease-fire Arrangement', Statement by the chairperson on 11 December 1979 in Southern Rhodesia, *Report of the Constitutional Conference*, Lancaster House, London, September-December 1979, Cmnd. 7802 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1980), p. 46.
- <sup>79</sup> Brig. J.H. Learmont, 'Reflections from Rhodesia', *RUSI Journal*, vol. 125, no. 4, December 1980, p. 50.
- <sup>80</sup> Jeremy Giniifer, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe*, UNIDIR/95/41 (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1995), p. 29.
- <sup>81</sup> During the 1974 Kissinger-Vorster negotiations, it was claimed that hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of guerrillas had been killed in ambushes during a bogus cease-fire.
- <sup>82</sup> Colin Legum, 'Southern Africa: The Road to and from Lancaster House', *Africa Contemporary Record*, Annual Survey and Documents, 1979-80 (London: Africana Publishing Company, 1981), p. A15.
- <sup>83</sup> Jeremy Giniifer, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe*, p. 20.
- <sup>84</sup> All CMF teams were deployed with a PF LO. See Maj. C.M.S. Kaye, 'Mission Extraordinary: Zimbabwe-Rhodesia', *British Army Review*, no. 65, August 1980, p. 11.
- <sup>85</sup> Jeremy Giniifer, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe*, p. 31.
- <sup>86</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 33-34.
- <sup>87</sup> Colin Legum, 'Southern Africa: The Road to and from Lancaster House', p. A17.
- <sup>88</sup> Interview with Brig. R.J. Rhoderick-Jones, 5 May 1995, Milford-on-Sea, UK.
- <sup>89</sup> D. Smith and C. Simpson, *Mugabe* (London: Sphere Books, 1981), p. 180.
- <sup>90</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Salisbury, 'Weekend Background Briefings', Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, 29 January 1980.
- <sup>91</sup> Jeremy Giniifer, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe*, p. 38.
- <sup>92</sup> The Black Watch Archives, 'Operation Agila: Rhodesia, December 1979-80', BW Arch. 0637, Regimental Headquarters of the Black Watch, Perth, Scotland, p. 8.



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- <sup>93</sup> Jeremy Ginifer, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe*, p. 41.
- <sup>94</sup> Martyn Gregory, 'Zimbabwe 1980: Politicisation through Armed Struggle and Electoral Mobilisation', *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, vol. 19, no. 1, March 1981, p. 87.
- <sup>95</sup> Interview with Brig. R.J. Rhoderick-Jones.
- <sup>96</sup> It was conceded by the British that a force of around 5-7,000 monitors would have been more effective in managing APs and preventing cease-fire violations, but this would have added greatly to costs. See Henry Wiseman and Alastair M. Taylor, *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: The Politics of Transition* (New York: Pergamon Press/International Peace Academy, 1981), p. 46.
- <sup>97</sup> Jeremy Ginifer, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe*, p. 44.
- <sup>98</sup> Susan Rice, *The Commonwealth Initiative in Zimbabwe, 1979-1980: Implications for International Peacekeeping*, D. Phil. thesis, New College, Oxford University, 1990, p. 125.
- <sup>99</sup> Interview with Maj. Gen. Sir John Acland, 16 May 1995, Honiton, UK.
- <sup>100</sup> Acland came to view the CC, after initial scepticism, as one of the main factors in achieving some form of reconciliation between the parties (interview with Maj. Gen. Sir John Acland).
- <sup>101</sup> Jeremy Ginifer, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe*, p. 46.
- <sup>102</sup> John Mackinlay, 'The Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, 1979-80', p. 55.
- <sup>103</sup> Lancaster House Constitutional Conference, Minutes of 35th Plenary, cited in Stephen John Stedman, *Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1991), p. 197.
- <sup>104</sup> Acland feared in mid-February that the peace process was on the verge of collapse. See Susan Rice, *The Commonwealth Initiative in Zimbabwe, 1979-1980*, p. 172.
- <sup>105</sup> Jeremy Ginifer, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe*, p. 49.
- <sup>106</sup> Only very limited disarmament took place during the last moments of the integration process prior to elections, with the RSF and the PF agreeing to hand in some weapons before undertaking joint training. See *ibid.*, p. 50.
- <sup>107</sup> Martin Rupiya, 'Problems of Demobilisation and Integration: the Zimbabwe National Defence Forces, 1980-87: Operation Merger', The South African Service Corp., seminar, 'Any Lessons for Zimbabwe?', Pretoria/Johannesburg, 2 March 1995, p. 16.

## **Chapter 3: Arms Management Following the Ending of the Cold War: Co-operative Disarmament**

### **3.0 Introduction**

The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s opened up the possibility of more radical approaches to demilitarisation. It became possible to contemplate ‘deeper’ intervention than had been conceivable under Cold War traditional peacekeeping, with the superpowers no longer locked into a bi-polar system of confrontation, and the impasse in the UN Security Council (SC), which had stifled collective security action to address conflicts, largely overcome.

Further, there was a growing perception that state sovereignty no longer posed the barrier to UN intervention that it had, particularly with respect to humanitarian intervention in the burgeoning internal conflicts of the 1980s.<sup>1</sup> In the late 1980s/early 1990s, the UN launched a series of major humanitarian/developmental peace operations designed to regenerate and rebuild countries, particularly ‘failed’ states.<sup>2</sup> These differed from traditional peacekeeping in that they went beyond the monitoring of cease-fires into state-building, re-construction and addressing the root causes of conflict.

As Ratner notes:

Envisioned at its creation as a stop-gap measure to preserve a cease-fire between two hostile armies, peacekeeping has, since the end of the Cold War, come to include something very different – the employment of UN operations to implement an agreed political solution to the underlying conflict between antagonists.<sup>3</sup>

These peace operations sought to promote good governance, economic reconstruction, and the maintenance of law and order in war-torn states. In this context, arms management became a critical activity, as it was problematic to reconstruct with illicit arms in circulation among civilians and ex-combatants. The UN’s answer to arms proliferation was to pursue the radical option of disarmament.<sup>4</sup> It sought to:

re-establish the state’s monopoly over the domestic use of force, which required the disarmament of non-state actors. Further, without disarmament it was believed that there could be no reconciliation, and thus no recreation of social cohesion and economic well-being.<sup>5</sup>

### 3.1 The Conceptual Basis of Co-operative Disarmament

The idea of disarmament being used in conflict termination was not in itself new. As Tanner points out, procedures for disarming military units and paramilitaries had been articulated in the Versailles Peace Treaty. What was new was:

*disarmament by consent in civil war settlements* where warring parties had agreed to stop fighting and hand in weapons 'for political normalisation'.<sup>6</sup>

By disarming the parties it was hoped not only that violence would be averted between the parties, and against peacekeepers, but also that a proximate cause of conflict would be eliminated.

However, in other respects, the UN's disarmament approach<sup>7</sup> was derivative: it adopted a set of techniques that drew on the Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) separation approach in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe (see previous chapter). It involved ex-combatants being segregated and required to report to assembly areas (AAs), where they would be registered, their arms handed in to be destroyed or stored, and the process of creating a new integrated national army started. Any 'surplus' combatants would be reintegrated into society as civilians.

Further, its doctrinal underpinnings, like UN arms retention and delimitation, drew upon traditional peacekeeping and the precepts of impartiality, consent and minimal use of force. The first waves of UN disarmament operations, which were mandated under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, eschewed the use of force. It was anticipated that the parties would hand over arms of their own volition in conformance with commitments made in cease-fire arrangements and peace agreements.

The underlying assumption of disarmament was:

that the parties fully consent to the arms obligations. Peacekeepers monitor and facilitate weapons-control activities, but the actual disarmament and demobilisation is carried out by the parties themselves. Furthermore, the peace support forces in such cases are not supposed to protect disarmed combatants or the civilian population.<sup>8</sup>

UN personnel, as in traditional peacekeeping, were essentially observers or monitors of disarmament; they were not mandated to seize weaponry to procure a secure environment. Indeed, in a number of operations they were not even armed.

Further, parties undergoing disarmament were to be treated equally and neutrally; there was no question of disarmament being a punitive action.

This activity came to be known as 'co-operative' or 'consensual' disarmament; or as Tanner puts it:

the voluntary action that opposing parties agree to take in the aftermath of an armed conflict with the purpose of dismantling or constraining their military capabilities. The parties explicitly agree to the presence of peace support forces. These forces are to monitor, supervise or assist the implementation of such disarmament arrangements.<sup>9</sup> Until the disastrous Somali experience of 1994 when UN and United States forces attempted to arrest a warlord and his followers and disarm them, co-operative disarmament represented the mainstream approach to disarmament. Later, as Chapter 4 outlines, the UN and organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) began to utilise compellence and coercive strategies to effect disarmament.

This chapter considers how co-operative disarmament operations fared in the field. It describes the peace processes that co-operative disarmament was applied to; the methods that were utilised in the field; their evolution over time; the impact they had on military stability; and how the parties reacted to attempts to control their weapons.

It is suggested that three distinctive ‘waves’ of co-operative disarmament initiatives can be identified. In the first wave, starting in 1989, co-operative disarmament appeared to produce reasonably satisfactory outcomes in Namibia, Central America, and Mozambique, but failure in Angola. In the second wave, 1994-1995, co-operative disarmament came under challenge and the perception emerged that comprehensive co-operative disarmament programmes were perhaps not feasible. And in the third wave (1995-98), the UN appeared to re-adjust its sights in terms of a less ambitious approach to co-operative disarmament. At the end of the decade, there was renewed interest in disarmament with operations in East Timor, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone.

## **3.2 Case Studies: The First Wave of Co-operative Disarmament: Conceptual Coherence?**

### **3.21 United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)**

The UN’s first dedicated disarmament operation took place in Namibia in 1989 as part of the UNTAG initiative. UNTAG’s remit was to assist in de-colonising the country, which the UN had determined was under ‘illegal’ South African rule, and to create an independent and democratic state.<sup>10</sup> A mandate for the intervening force had existed as far back as 1978, but it was not until December 1988 that South Africa consented to the

Namibian peace plan as a result of a superpower sponsored package which contained a tripartite agreement between Cuba, Angola, and South Africa. This linked South African withdrawal from Namibia to Cuban withdrawal from Angola.<sup>11</sup>

The disarmament of South African military forces and various insurgency movements that had infiltrated Namibia during the apartheid struggle was regarded as central to the peace plan. It entailed the dismantling and disarmament of the South-West Africa Territorial Force (SWAFT) and commando and ethnic units allied to the South African Defence Forces (SADF), and also the repatriation and disarmament of rebel South-West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) forces. UNTAG negotiated field agreements with the South African forces which contained detailed provisions and schedules for the collection and storage of weapons during the disarmament process.<sup>12</sup> The operation was to be completed within the tight time-frame of a year with a cease-fire to be formally established on 1 April 1989 and elections to follow on 16 November 1989. The maintenance of consent was regarded by the UN as central to the functioning of the UNTAG mission. As the UN Secretary-General (SG) put it, the parties':

continuing co-operation is essential, not least because UNTAG has not had conferred upon it the power to compel them (the parties) to honour their undertakings or to enforce the provisions of the settlement plan.<sup>13</sup>

UNTAG initially ran into severe problems. In a pattern that was to become familiar in subsequent UN co-operative disarmament operations, it was deployed late despite having had years to plan for a deployment, and its peacekeeping contingent charged with implementing disarmament was reduced to a level of 4,650 soldiers. Meanwhile, heavily-armed SWAPO units moved into Namibia from Angola and clashed with South African security forces. This led to the latter demanding the right to leave their bases to counter SWAPO incursions. The UN, under pressure, reluctantly conceded that South African security forces could fulfil a temporary security role – indeed, it had no effective means of restraining SWAPO or the SADF – and did not oppose South African forces abandoning their confinement to bases.

In a climate of mistrust and insecurity, the disarmament process encountered a series of setbacks. Attempts to create Assembly Points (APs) for exiting SWAPO units ran into difficulties. SWAPO forces were to arrive at APs for safe passage to locations in Angola (north of the 16th parallel) and were supposed to hand over their arms to UNTAG. However, South African security forces frequently positioned themselves

near APs leading to SWAPO fighters largely making their own way into Namibia without UN protection and getting involved in clashes with SADF forces elsewhere.<sup>14</sup>

At the same time, attempts were made to circumvent the demobilisation of Koevoet and other paramilitary elements allied with the SADF, which was a key part of the demilitarisation plan. Koevoet forces were covertly inserted into the police, for example, who were not required to disarm.<sup>15</sup>

UNTAG assumed the role primarily of an observer and monitor<sup>16</sup> in the early stages of the peace process, and much of the disarmament process was run outside the UNTAG framework. Disarmament of SWAPO took place in Angola and Zambia, and SWAFT was disbanded in advance of the UNTAG mission.<sup>17</sup> Further, the parties agreed field agreements for the storage and collection of weaponry between themselves.

However, as the mission progressed the UN adopted a more central role and managed to put the formal disarmament process back on track and re-establish a degree of trust and co-operation between the parties that had been partially lost following the earlier clashes. In the event, it was claimed that all the 11,578 citizen forces and commandos were disarmed and demobilised by 'D-day'. This included, under pressure from the UN, the 1,600 ex-Koevoet members who were demobilised prior to the elections. Further, the 22,661 SWAFT forces were completely demobilised by the end of June 1989. Weapons and equipment belonging to the South African forces were confiscated and guarded by UNTAG and handed over to the new Namibian armed forces after independence.<sup>18</sup> The UN also managed to neutralise a number of the arms caches established in Namibia prior to elections.

However, UNTAG was aware that various parties were still receiving arms from external sources and the mission was unable to control or monitor these supply channels. Indeed, after elections and independence it became apparent that a large number of weapons outside of the formal disarmament process had not been collected as a result of the arms caches established during the transition process. These uncollected arms subsequently had a negative impact both in Namibia and in the southern African region generally.<sup>19</sup>

### **3.22 Assessment**

Co-operative disarmament ultimately proved to be a credible strategy in Namibia. Despite initial setbacks, UNTAG had 'sufficient resources and armed personnel to

guarantee the security of disarmed forces'.<sup>20</sup> The resources dedicated to the mission, and its relatively high number of armed personnel, permitted it to effectively monitor the implementation of disarmament. This was buttressed by UNTAG's authority at the political level which made a major contribution to the success of conflict resolution in Namibia.<sup>21</sup> Importantly, the UN managed to implement relatively comprehensive disarmament before elections and its departure, notwithstanding the arms cache problem.

The relative success of the mission can be further attributed to the fact that the parties had the capacity to protect themselves (both SWAPO and SWAFT, for example, were heavily armed and had military assets and resources outside Namibia) if the peace process degenerated into full-scale conflict. And the fact that the principal parties to the conflict did not have to co-exist in the post-conflict process – SWAPO and SWAFT were withdrawing – meant that many of the classic security predicaments faced by parties integrating did not have to be confronted. In this environment, the parties were in the end prepared to essentially co-operate with each other and the UN when it came to the matter of disarmament, but they still stockpiled arms in caches as an insurance policy against set-backs in the process. UNTAG's disarmament strategy, in its fundamentals, appeared to be coherent in Namibia, and its lack of a proactive capacity to ensure disarmament compliance did not prove to be a handicap, as it was in subsequent missions.

### **3.23 United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)**

In the late 1980s the UN also embarked on a set of disarmament initiatives across Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador to assist in ending the civil wars that had raged across the Central American region throughout the decade. ONUCA, established on 7 November 1989, was initially set up to conduct on-site verification in Honduras and Nicaragua of the security undertakings in the Esquipulas II peace agreement. This entailed verifying the cessation of aid to irregular forces and insurrection movements, and monitoring to check that no country was being used as a staging post for attacks.<sup>22</sup> It was a low-key, relatively small mission made up of civilian personnel and unarmed observers which did not seek to implement disarmament.

However, ONUCA's mandate was expanded after elections in February 1990. In this second more proactive phase a large increase in the size of the force was

sanctioned and the UN was given the task of organising and supervising, in conjunction with the Organisation of American States (OAS), the demobilisation of the Nicaraguan Resistance (NR) and the destruction *in situ* of the weapons and military equipment of the Contras, the rebel movement that had been fighting the Sandinista government.<sup>23</sup> ONUCA's new mandate tasked it with supervising the disarmament of the two main Contra bases in Honduras and also disarming the Contras in security zones in Nicaragua. At the same time, government forces were to be withdrawn. All the combatants were required to assemble in security zones where, protected by the UN, they would turn in their arms, uniforms, ammunition and war-related materiel. A total of eight security zones were eventually created. As a confidence and security-building measure (CSBM), the Sandinista army was required to maintain a distance of at least 20km from the security zones. This was buttressed by the presence of an armed, but 'neutral' battalion – the Venezuelan Battalion (VENBATT) – which was deployed to reassure the Contras that they would have a measure of protection in the event of an attack by the Sandinista army after handing in weapons.<sup>24</sup> VENBATT was also assigned the tasks of collecting, registering, destroying, transporting and taking custody of the weapons, ammunition, and equipment handed in. Enforcement was regarded as out of the question and no combatants were compelled to hand in their weapons to VENBATT. Although pressure was:

put on the parties from time to time to hasten the process, at no time did ONUCA face the dilemma of using the threat of force to sustain or implement disarmament measures.<sup>25</sup>

While the UN suspected at the time that secret undeclared arms caches existed, which was apparently borne out by the return of some former Contras and Sandinista to violence post-elections, the disarmament process was reasonably comprehensive. By the end of June 1990, the UN SG declared the process mainly complete with over 20,000 Contras demobilised in Nicaragua and Honduras, and more than 15,000 small arms handed in to ONUCA.<sup>26</sup> The operation was eventually considered 'a complete success' by the UN, although it took longer than originally scheduled.<sup>27</sup> With the conclusion of Operation 'Home Run', ONUCA returned to its original mandate.

### **3.24 Assessment**

The co-operative disarmament strategy brought to bear in Nicaragua was generally effective in terms of securitising and stabilising the peace process.



First, the parties shared a basic commitment to disarmament and ending the conflict, even though there were set-backs during the process. The parties themselves had negotiated the second phase of disarmament in the Managua Agreement of 19 April 1990 with a UN representative present. The disarmament process was further given momentum by the rise of the more moderate Chamorro opposition coalition in the Nicaragua election. With this development, it has been suggested, the Contras no longer had a cause to fight or a motivation to resist disarmament.<sup>28</sup>

Second, ONUCA developed an effective mix of CSBMs. A key element in this was the deployment of the armed VENBATT contingent which enhanced the security of the Contras when undergoing disarmament. Third, consent and impartiality were regarded by the parties as key attributes in third-party intervention. Initially, both parties were reluctant to regard the UN as impartial, but ONUCA managed to gain their confidence as the mission progressed, and when the process advanced to the demobilisation phase both the government and the irregular forces turned to the UN for assistance. In time, the UN became a trusted third-party, or partner, in the disarmament process. In fact, the UN was able to provide an appropriate mix of reassurance and political pressure to help along a disarmament programme that was essentially agreed between the parties by the concluding stages of the peace process.

Fourth, a further factor in stabilising the peace process was the control of external arms flows and destabilising external linkages. Neither the United States, which had historically been a major arms supplier, nor Central American states, sought to transfer arms into Nicaragua. However, within Nicaragua itself the absence of accurate arms inventories – the UN had to trust the estimates of the parties – was a deficiency of the disarmament process.<sup>29</sup> The notion that a co-operative disarmament approach could assist in peace-building appeared to be borne out in Nicaragua with the emergence of an integrated national army and the maintenance of democracy post-elections, despite less than complete weapons collection, which led to banditry and the brief re-emergence of the Re-Contras as a guerrilla movement. However, ONUCA:

did little to shed light on the dilemmas faced by the UN when disarmament agreements break down, or erode by force of events.<sup>30</sup>

### **3.25 United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)**

In El Salvador the UN supervised a transition from a war-torn and largely undemocratic country to a land of non-violent political competition and democratisation.<sup>31</sup> After

more than a decade of internal conflict, the Chapultepec Accords of January 1992 finally ended the war. They stipulated a demobilisation of the 8,000-strong National Liberation Front Farabundo Marti (FMLN) insurgency force; a purge and the reduction by about a half of the army; the abolition of the security forces; and increased civilian control over the military. The purge was predicated on the assumption that the army and the security forces were:

responsible for the country's predicament, and not the saviours of the nation as they want everyone to believe.<sup>32</sup>

But the process was bogged down until July 1993 due to resistance in the government and the army.

ONUSAL, which oversaw the disarmament process, was a smaller sister operation to ONUCA with, at its height, only 368 military observers. It was scheduled to implement disarmament over a short period between February 1992 and 18 August 1993.

The disarmament procedures were similar to Namibia and Nicaragua. The FMLN was required to progressively concentrate itself in 15 designated areas within the former conflict zones in preparation for disarmament, while the army re-deployed to its normal peace-time installations. The parties were not permitted to leave their positions without permission from ONUSAL and in each of the designated areas all weapons and military materiel, apart from personal small arms and equipment, were to be locked in deposits under the control of ONUSAL military observers. One key was held by an ONUSAL military observer and another by a local FMLN commander. ONUSAL periodically verified that the deposits had not been opened and the contents removed.<sup>33</sup> Incentive schemes, such as the exchange of weapons for land, credits, and reinsertion programmes, were also used to encourage soldiers and militia to surrender weaponry.<sup>34</sup>

However, disarmament problems were apparent from the beginning of the implementation stage and the situation 'deteriorated steadily for months thereafter'.<sup>35</sup> One of the first problems was the inventory submitted by the FMLN, which seemed to observers to underestimate the arms it held, but which the FMLN insisted was correct.

Second, the parties delayed or obstructed demobilisation. The government was slow to implement key elements of the peace process, such as land transfers and the demilitarisation of the police, while the FMLN was 'unwilling to give away its single most important bargaining chip...its combat force'.<sup>36</sup> The FMLN had become acutely

aware of its vulnerability if it disarmed, and it wanted to maintain arms as an 'insurance' policy.

The disarmament and demobilisation of the FMLN was meant to take place in five phases ending in October 1992, but it had to be rescheduled three times and it only formally ended on 15 December 1992. However, comprehensive disarmament had clearly not taken place and it was common knowledge that the FMLN's inventories under-estimated the arms they held. Comprehensive compliance with disarmament was, in effect, set aside by the UN.

For the first time, but in a pattern to be repeated in future UN co-operative disarmament operations, the international community made the judgement that a party, the FMLN, did not intend to use the weapons it had retained in contravention of the peace agreement to re-ignite the civil conflict and:

a decision was made by the United Nations, with a wink and a nod from key governments, to certify that the disarmament process had been completed...and the peace process would be kept on track.<sup>37</sup>

However, these calculations were thrown into disarray when an undeclared FMLN arms cache exploded in Nicaragua in May 1993 and created a political furore. Under enormous political pressure from abroad and within Nicaragua, the FMLN was forced to publicly concede it had cheated on disarmament and submitted an accurate weapons inventory. The FMLN offered full co-operation for dismantling in 'private' some 16 other undeclared arms caches.<sup>38</sup> Further, the FMLN submitted itself to a tripartite agreement with the Government and ONUSAL which declared that any further undeclared arms caches would lead to criminal prosecution for those involved in hiding arms. The FMLN, its image prior to elections severely damaged, appeared to wish to restore its credibility by complying with a full declaration of its arms inventory and by distancing itself from 'renegades' still holding arms.<sup>39</sup> After pressure from ONUSAL officials, all groups allowed the military observers to count their weaponry and register their serial numbers.

The UN SG certified that all items in the FMLN inventory had been destroyed during 1993.<sup>40</sup> ONUSAL's role evolved from that of a verifier to a mediator by serving as a channel of communication, a disinterested but authoritative interpreter of the accords, and a proposer of solutions when crises developed. Both sides came to accept this extended ONUSAL role as a way to prevent the process from collapsing.<sup>41</sup> At the same time, at critical turning points when disarmament and the peace process appeared

to be under threat, political pressure that the SC brought to bear also proved decisive.<sup>42</sup> Constant pressure from the UN and the United States, in fact, had been required to complete the 'purge' of government military forces, who regarded the process as humiliating, but this was a key part of the demilitarisation process.<sup>43</sup>

Despite the level of distrust between the parties, the cease-fire did not collapse. A key reason for this, it has been suggested, was that through the Chapultepec accords 'everyone went home with something'; neither side 'won' or 'lost'.<sup>44</sup> ONUSAL was terminated on 30 April 1995, after the constitution of an integrated national army, and a much smaller UN Mission in El Salvador (MINUSAL) was deployed on 1 May 1995.

### **3.26 Assessment**

For the first time, mistrust and the parties' insecurities had played a major part in the near collapse of a disarmament process, and the practicality of co-operative disarmament in civil conflicts was called into question. From the time of the negotiations in the summer of 1991, there was a recognition within the UN that the FMLN was wary of the military capability of the government. The FMLN wanted:

guarantees that, upon laying down their arms, they would neither be personally endangered nor would face a return to the exclusionary system which they were trying to negotiate out of existence. The best guarantee the rebels had been able to think of was either to do away with the military and its coercive power, or to become part of it.<sup>45</sup>

The government, for its part, wanted the rebel army to disband within two months of the cease-fire, while the FMLN wanted to keep its forces intact for two to three years to bolster its security.<sup>46</sup> The existence of the secret arms cache in Nicaragua:

revealed a root fear that the undertakings of the government coupled with international verification were insufficient to ensure compliance.<sup>47</sup>

During the disarmament process both sides accused each other of bad faith and of deliberately stalling disarmament.

Unlike the situation in Nicaragua, where the rebel Contras were protected through the deployment of an armed Venezuelan battalion and the creation of a 20km security zone to prevent government attacks, ONUSAL was unable to reassure the FMNL that its security could be guaranteed during disarmament. This contributed to FMNL cheating and non-compliance, although there were also indications that the FMLN had from the outset envisaged acting as a spoiler to slow down disarmament.

That the FMLN had to retreat from this position and restore full consent to disarmament in the wake of the arms cache explosion was fortuitous. Partial disarmament failed to stabilise the peace process; it in fact exacerbated the security concerns of the parties, and the international community appeared to have misjudged the extent to which the basis for co-operation existed between the parties in terms of the mutual surrender of weaponry. Nevertheless, the peace process ultimately held without a resurrection of the civil war and the arms issue was more comprehensively dealt with following the arms cache incident.

### **3.27 United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) I, II, and III**

While it was conducting co-operative disarmament in Central America and Namibia, the UN was also supervising a highly problematic disarmament operation in Angola with a minimalist force contingent and a passive mandate. Angola was to represent the UN's first clear disarmament failure.

The Angolan operation was carried out in three phases: UNAVEM I, II and III. UNAVEM I, January 1989-May 1991, was a sister operation to UNTAG which monitored the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Namibia following the signing of the New York Accords in December 1988. It did not contain an explicit disarmament component, but some Cuban troops were disarmed as they withdrew 'at the discretion of their camp commanders and apparently in agreement with the Angolan authorities'.<sup>48</sup> A team of 70 UN observers, operating between January 1989-May 1991, successfully oversaw the departure of 50,000 Cuban troops.

UNAVEM II, May 1991-February 1995, was more problematic. It was under-resourced considering its tasks and had an extremely restricted disarmament mandate. Whereas in Namibia, a small country with a population of around one million that had most of its bureaucracy and infrastructure intact, the UN deployed a force of more than 6,000 personnel, in Angola a force of only 50 military observers (at its lowest point in June 1994) was placed into a considerably more populated country that was devastated by a long-standing civil conflict. UNAVEM II was deployed following the Bicesse Accords, signed in May 1991, between the rebel movement União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) and the government Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) forces. The accords stipulated the disarmament of all forces and the collection and disposal of weapons.

However, critically, UNAVEM II's mandate did not include an active collection function. UNAVEM personnel were tasked with monitoring and verifying the Bicesse Accords and assisting and co-operating with the parties when required.<sup>49</sup> The onus to disarm fell principally on the parties themselves.

The process was to be overseen by the Joint Verification Military Commission (JVMC) and its monitoring groups, which came under the overall management of the Joint Political Military Commission (JPMC). The JVMC was run by the parties themselves with representatives from the United States, Portugal, and the Soviet Union also involved.<sup>50</sup> The UN's task within this framework was:

to verify that joint monitoring groups...carried out their responsibilities. Working closely with these monitoring groups, UNAVEM II verification teams provided support in the investigation and resolution of alleged violations of the cease-fire. They responded to requests for assistance and used their good offices to resolve problems within monitoring groups. In addition, UNAVEM II took the initiative in monitoring some aspects of the Accords, such as the regular counting of troops and weapons in the assembly areas, as well as monitoring of unassembled troops, demobilised troops, and troops selected to join the new Angolan Armed Forces.<sup>51</sup>

The weakness of this arrangement, in the view of critics, was that:

it failed to state or imply what they could do to get the process back in line should they notice the Angolan monitors not fulfilling their obligations effectively: what they were dealing with was simply a 'do nothing' mandate.<sup>52</sup>

The absence of effective measures to persuade, or to provide incentives for the parties to comply, and the lack of trust between the parties, meant that the mission from the outset found itself in difficulties. Few soldiers initially reported to the cantonment sites where disarmament was supposed to take place:

Commanders on both sides were unwilling to allow their units to be the first to assemble and be disarmed, due to mutual suspicion and lack of faith in the peace process.<sup>53</sup>

In fact, during UNAVEM II both parties failed to canton significant quantities of their troops. Conditions in many of the AAs were chaotic and doubts grew as to the intentions of the parties regarding disarmament. UNITA, in particular, appeared to be adopting spoiler tactics and there were suspicions that it did not intend to demobilise its soldiers; in fact, by Spring 1992 it had indefinitely postponed the demobilisation of any more troops.

Disarmament was further hampered by verification problems. It was not possible to accurately estimate the weapons inventories held by UNITA and the MPLA which created uncertainties as to the extent of disarmament compliance and cheating. Nor was UNAVEM able to monitor all the weapons collection points effectively due to its limited resources. Recognition of the lack of security UNAVEM was able to provide was reflected in the fact that the parties were permitted to 'keep minimum weapons for security'.<sup>54</sup>

It became clear during 1992 that the mission was in crisis. Neither side was fully complying with its disarmament commitments and much of the weaponry being surrendered was of poor quality or unserviceable, indicating that both sides were holding back serviceable arms, anticipating or planning a renewal of conflict. Further, UNAVEM suspected that the parties had built-up substantial arms caches, although it did not have the verification techniques to ascertain this.

The demilitarisation process unravelled as the elections approached on 29-30 September 1992 with large numbers of armed soldiers not being integrated into the national army. It was estimated that 8,800 MPLA and UNITA soldiers had been integrated into the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA): only 17.6% of the projected total of 50,000.<sup>55</sup> When the former government won the elections, UNITA withdrew from the peace process, leading to the full-scale resumption of the conflict. The UN responded by scaling down the UN mission and abandoning disarmament. It concentrated instead on mediation and good offices to secure a new cease-fire.

According to Alden:

the 'fig leaf' of UN legitimisation of the deeply flawed demilitarisation was exposed and UN credibility severely damaged'.<sup>56</sup>

However, renewed talks between the parties took place in Lusaka following military setbacks for UNITA, resulting in the signing of the Lusaka protocol on 31 October 1994.

UNAVEM III was established in February 1995, once again with a disarmament mandate to supervise the collection and storage of weapons. The operation was anticipated to last 12 months and this time a more substantial force of 7,800 police and military personnel were deployed to 14 quartering areas and eight main weapons storage locations. However, once again the UN was unable to construct a secure environment within which disarmament could take place. By as late as March 1997, large numbers of armed elements were still outside the quartering process. Of the

70,872 police and soldiers reporting for quartering, 29,381 were weaponless and 19,309 deserted. By Spring 1997, UNAVEM III had only collected in the region of 34,000 weapons. Attempts by police to collect arms from civilians were hampered by fear within the population of attacks and a 'general mistrust of each other'.<sup>57</sup> Further, UNITA was stockpiling its weapons and repairing them. According to Human Rights Watch, accounts from UNITA areas during 1996-98 talked of the replenishing and maintenance of arsenals and 'nobody believed UNITA was handing in its real weapons'.<sup>58</sup> In fact, UNITA began intensive military training for men and boys during 1998.<sup>59</sup>

During 1997-98, UNITA gained control of wide areas of Angola, and between December 1997-January 1999 shot down two UN-chartered aircraft, leading to speculation that UNITA was seeking to secure the closure of the peace mission through intimidation. The UN, in fact, withdrew around 1,000 peace monitors from battle zones in response to the situation on the ground.<sup>60</sup>

Ultimately, UNAVEM III was hampered by similar disarmament constraints encountered by UNAVEM II: a lack of a credible strategy for persuading parties to surrender weaponry and an inability to create a secure environment. Co-operative disarmament palpably failed to stabilise the peace process in Angola. The parties retained most of their weaponry during UNAVEM. This weapons retention contributed to action-reaction outbreaks of conflict which the UN was powerless to prevent. The government and UNITA had a set of strategic objectives which led them to retain their armies, but when there were possible windows of opportunity to implement disarmament, UNAVEM was not able to provide the impetus or the security-building features that might have forwarded the process. Although there was societal support for disarmament, UN passivity was:

partly responsible for a transition process fraught with fear and tension. The UN did not intervene in preventing armed UNITA cadres in civilian clothes from moving into towns across the country. Nor did it investigate widespread reports by frightened local people of UNITA arms caches. Moreover, UNITA's heavy arms were not brought into the internationally-supervised cantonments of troops, as the peace accord required.<sup>61</sup>

### **3.28 Assessment**

Angola demonstrated that co-operative disarmament strategies were likely to fail when underpinned by minimal resources on the ground, a mandate that merely permitted



observation and verification, and when a meaningful settlement had not been reached between parties. UNAVEM was not able to create a secure environment or offer protection to the parties, nor could it exert credible pressure on spoilers cheating on their disarmament commitments. The absence of a capacity to even use force in self-defence (UNAVEM observers were not armed) meant that they could not effectively protect themselves, let alone prevent weapons leaving storage facilities.

The fact that the UN allowed the elections to take place without bringing to bear any meaningful pressure on UNITA to disarm created considerable resentment and resistance within the MPLA to disarmament and the peace process. Boulden notes that:

The disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of troops from both sides was the cornerstone of the peace process. Proceeding with the elections when that process was still incomplete was a high-risk decision.<sup>62</sup>

As the UNAVEM missions progressed it was questioned whether impartiality was an appropriate response to UNITA. UNITA was singled out as the major contravener of the peace agreement and as particularly reluctant to implement disarmament. By failing to act against UNITA in a rigorous manner at an early stage – ineffective arms embargoes sanctioned by the SC against UNITA did not occur until much later in the mission and did little to change its behaviour – the UN contributed to undermining the MPLA's faith in the process, although it was also, to an extent, avoiding disarmament.

The inevitable consequence of the above was that the maintenance of consent to disarmament became increasingly problematic during UNAVEM I-III. Following the elections in 1992 and the renewed outbreak of conflict, consent to disarmament was withdrawn by both parties, and when UNAVEM III was deployed, consent once again quickly decayed. Angola raised the question of how the UN should proceed in the face of concerted defiance and rejections by major parties of a disarmament agreement. What methods could the UN adopt if the parties withdrew consent, attacked UN observers, and regarded the UN as partial, but at the same time ineffectual? It suggested that the UN needed to consider moving beyond Chapter VI as it is difficult to:

provide credible security guarantees to disarming groups as long as the peacekeeping forces are confined to Chapter VI-type rules of engagement.<sup>63</sup>

### **3.29 United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)**

In Mozambique the UN attempted to learn lessons from the failed disarmament process in Angola. ONUMOZ, 1992-94, deployed a considerably larger contingent than

UNAVEM I of 7,300 peacekeepers; it sought to fully implement disarmament before the holding of elections to rule out a full-scale return to violence as occurred in Angola; and it had a 'structured approach to demilitarisation which took into account the Angolan experience'.<sup>64</sup> The disarmament process was structured around the General Peace Agreement (GPA) that had been signed by the rebel Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) movement and the Frente da Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) government in October 1992, following a protracted civil war that dated back to the 1970s. SC Resolution (SCR) 797 of 1992 gave ONUMOZ a comprehensive disarmament remit which included: the separation and containment of forces to bases; the demobilisation and disarmament of combatants; and the collection, storage, and destruction of weapons. This mandate was subsequently enlarged by SCR 850 of July 1993. The customary UN approach of moving combatants to AAs for disarmament was adopted.

Despite the Angolan experience, peacekeepers, although armed, were mandated to facilitate disarmament in a passive manner. They were to be non-coercive, impartial, and 'supportive' to the process.<sup>65</sup> The Chapter VI framework of the mission was said to be necessitated by the government's sensitivity in upholding its sovereignty and the parties' resistance to disarmament.<sup>66</sup>

The scale of the operation and its carefully constructed disarmament and demobilisation programme suggested that it might be more effective than the Angolan operation. However, ONUMOZ failed to collect comprehensive quantities of weapons or to achieve the 'more modest goal of destroying the weapons it had collected and earmarked for decommissioning'.<sup>67</sup> Ultimately, ONUMOZ faced a similar set of problems to those encountered in Angola.

The AAs were opened five months late, conditions in the AAs were chaotic, and it was clear that many arms being handed in were old or inoperative and that many combatants along with their weapons were being kept outside the AA process. Further, although the GPA stipulated that arms should be transported from AAs to warehouses under UN control, both sides refused to comply with this.<sup>68</sup> It was not until 1994 that it was reluctantly conceded by the parties that ONUMOZ should transport arms from AAs to three regional arms depots for storage and safe-keeping, where they were guarded by armed peacekeepers. It appeared that the parties were deliberately seeking to avoid handing in substantive quantities of weaponry.

The process was further undermined by the fact that both RENAMO and the government secretly established arms caches outside the disarmament process. After the elections in October 1994, international pressure was finally brought to bear on the parties to dismantle these arms caches. The United States threatened to re-evaluate its future development assistance programme in Mozambique, unless, among other things, there was greater access to arms caches.<sup>69</sup> As the mission progressed, the UN became more proactive in terms of neutralising arms caches, but the circumspect nature of ONUMOZ's mandate stopped it from dismantling arms caches in an effective manner outside the AAs. The Cease-Fire Commission (CC) approved a mechanism to check out and verify undeclared weapons caches, but this proved a difficult process. Teams visited 744 arms cache sites, but these could not be dismantled before the mission mandate expired in 1994.

It was estimated by the UN that nearly 190,000 weapons were collected, but it has been suggested that 1.5m AK-47s assault rifles alone were distributed during the civil war, suggesting that large quantities of arms remained uncollected.<sup>70</sup>

Two key factors appeared to undermine disarmament. First, the disarmament mandate and the manner in which it was implemented appeared to be flawed. Second, the two parties were deeply mistrustful of each other, reflected in their unwillingness to disarm.

Vines observed that:

ONUMOZ's failure stemmed in large part from its weak mandate regarding disarmament. The operation's mandate failed to provide a clear definition of what disarmament should entail or the criteria for its success. In addition, it failed to address the distinctions between disarmament and demobilisation.<sup>71</sup>

Under this weak mandate, UN personnel in the field were barely able to keep order in the AAs, where there were a number of riots, threats against peacekeepers, and desertions. Nor were they able to provide a secure environment for the ex-combatants within them as the monitors stationed at AAs were unarmed. Further, many peacekeepers were deployed outside the AAs securing transportation routes and freedom of movement, and depleting the numbers of AA troops. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Resident Representative, Erick de Mul, accused the UN of being 'incredibly amateurish, totally unprofessional' in the way it handled the ONUMOZ operation, particularly in terms of late deployment and its failure to establish the 39 AAs.<sup>72</sup>

There was also evidence that some UN personnel did not accord disarmament a high priority. Vines notes that among many of the infantry units and civilian police (CIVPOL) there was little will to actively disarm former combatants. A Uruguayan peacekeeper noted:

Active disarming is dangerous. That is not why we are here. We are here to watch and if they give us their weapons then fine. ONUMOZ's mandate is not to send back bodybags to Montevideo.<sup>73</sup>

According to the aide of the head of the UN mission, Eric Lubin, a decision had been made to accord disarmament a relatively low emphasis in order to facilitate elections:

Ajello (the head of the UN mission) was a politician. He knew that neither side wanted to hand in their guns. He had seen the fight over mine-clearance and had decided that pushing this issue would only delay the peace process further. The priority was elections. Once they had passed successfully, disarmament could be safely pursued in the closing months of the mandate.<sup>74</sup>

While Synge notes that:

The collection of weapons clearly had a lower priority than other aspects of the peace process, and ONUMOZ units were given neither the responsibility nor the means to oversee comprehensive disarmament until demobilisation was drawing to a close.<sup>75</sup>

Disarmament, which had originally been the 'prerequisite for the holding of elections, eventually became little more than an afterthought'.<sup>76</sup> Demobilisation, in fact, was given a higher priority than disarmament.<sup>77</sup>

Disarmament difficulties in Mozambique were exacerbated by a lack of trust between the parties. Although Mozambique was in a state of exhaustion, and the parties had curtailed the conflict and were in principle prepared to see the peace process through, this did not coalesce into comprehensive disarmament. The parties were highly suspicious of each other and were quick to retreat from their commitments.<sup>78</sup> At the AAs, both sides were preoccupied with 'simultaneous proportionality regarding disarmament and demobilisation and wanted to be sure that their opponents were reciprocating; which led to hold-ups'.<sup>79</sup> Further, neither the Mozambican army nor RENAMO were prepared to forgo the military option in the run up to elections given their lack of confidence in the disarmament regime.<sup>80</sup>

Ultimately, FRELIMO and RENAMO ex-combatants were integrated into a national army. Nevertheless, the peace process only held because of the ultimate

‘determination of the Mozambicans’, and ‘despite the mistakes of the UN’, some observers maintain.<sup>81</sup>

### **3.291 Assessment**

In contrast to Angola, full-scale conflict did not break out again in Mozambique, but the prioritisation of the peace process impacted on disarmament. A judgement appeared to be made that it was more important to keep the peace process on track than push through disarmament. The result of this neglect of disarmament was the emergence post-elections of illicit arms within Mozambique and southern African and the mushrooming of arms-related crime. However, when the UN did attempt to press ahead with disarmament, it was unable to implement it. Soldiers handed in faulty or bogus weaponry, left the AAs, or never turned up. Many arms were outside the AA process in caches or hidden. Both RENAMO and FRELIMO deliberately delayed disarmament within the AAs by providing incomplete weapon inventories and by keeping weapons outside the process. It was mainly rioting within AAs by ex-combatants that forced the political leadership of the parties to press ahead with disarmament.

The inability of ONUMOZ peacekeepers to police disarmament raised the question of whether a more proactive mandate would have enabled the mission to provide protection and security for ex-combatants, and would have given the parties the confidence that disarmament was being taken seriously. The presence of unarmed monitors and observers in small numbers, with extremely limited powers, within AAs did not inspire confidence that disarmament was being taken seriously.

However, set against this, an attempt by the UN to force the pace of disarmament might have led the parties to withdraw from the process. While a more robust and proactive disarmament regime, with a protection scheme, might have encouraged the parties to engage in disarmament more seriously, they were extremely protective of their sovereignty and suspicious of UN intentions. In these circumstances, a consensual scheme of disarmament was probably a political prerequisite for any intervention. The principle of impartiality was regarded as extremely important by the parties, particularly the government, and underpinned their initial acceptance of a disarmament process. The sensitivity of this issue can be gauged by the fact that the

government attacked the UN for not being impartial in its dealings with it and for favouring RENAMO and:

Attempts by ONUMOZ to maintain the balance between the two parties were regularly interpreted by the government as evidence of pro-RENAMO sympathy.<sup>82</sup>

Speaking after the conclusion of the UN mission, President Chissano emphasised that:

our own experience in Mozambique underlines the need for the United Nations to bear in mind that peacekeeping forces operate on the basis of consent by the parties concerned. Therefore, they must always act with impartiality and in accordance with their mandate. Furthermore, they must respect and abide by the principles of independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference.<sup>83</sup>

### **3.3 Case Studies: Fragmenting Missions: Co-operative Disarmament Under Challenge**

#### **3.31 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)**

The UN was confronted with the decision in Cambodia in 1994 of how to respond to the unambiguous strategic withdrawal of consent to disarmament by a party during a peace process. The large UNTAC peacekeeping force, unlike the UNAVEM contingents, had, in the view of some observers and personnel within the mission, the resources and the mandate to enforce disarmament. The response of the UN to this challenge, which was to abandon the disarmament process, was controversial and once again raised questions as to the credibility of co-operative disarmament.

UNTAC, which was deployed into Cambodia in March 1992, was the UN's most ambitious and largest peacekeeping initiative at the time, with almost 16,000 military personnel at its height. Its role was to re-build and democratise Cambodia, which had experienced decades of civil war and occupation, under the provisions of the Paris Agreements negotiated with the parties. As in previous peace initiatives, disarmament was judged to be a key element of peace-building. UNTAC was charged with disarming and demobilising at least 70% of the four Cambodian parties' forces in order to create a neutral and secure environment in which free and fair elections could take place. It was judged that:

disarming the warring parties, was the 'centrepiece' since its success 'was indispensable if UNTAC is to be able to carry out its mandate in an effective and cost-efficient manner'.<sup>84</sup>

However, while UNTAC enjoyed an unprecedented authority more normally associated with governments in areas such as human rights and civil administration, its military component was mandated under Chapter VI of the UN Charter.

Under Annexes 1 and 2 of the Paris Agreement, the UN was authorised to: supervise the cease-fire and regroupment; implement cantonment; and disarm and demobilise combatants. This involved UNTAC in weapons control measures, the monitoring of the cessation of outside military assistance, locating and confiscating caches of weapons and military supplies throughout Cambodia, and storing the arms and equipment of the cantoned and demobilised military forces. All weapons and ammunition were to be secured and placed under UN control and under 24 hour surveillance, while access to weapons was only to be permitted for routine maintenance purposes and under arrangements determined by the Cantonment Co-ordination Working Group (CCWG). The UN was also charged with responsibility for keeping troops within cantonment areas and ensuring that they were not re-armed. However, the parties' forces were to remain under the command of their officers.

Disarmament non-compliance in the cantons had to be taken up by the UN with higher-level officers, or referred to the Mixed Military Working Group (MMWG). The UN was not empowered to use force, other than in self-defence, within cantons and, if control of cantons was lost, plans were drawn up for the evacuation of UNTAC.

UNTAC faced an enormous task: it was estimated it would have to disarm over 200,000 regular military forces deployed in 650 separate locations and 250,000 militia operating all over Cambodia.<sup>85</sup> In fact, in the view of some UNTAC officers, the massive regroupment and cantonment, and the effective monitoring of external weapons flows, were not implementable.<sup>86</sup>

The disarmament process soon ran into difficulties. Peacekeepers were deployed late – undermining the apparent initial good will to disarm – and conditions within AAs were poor, supervision weak, and the mission was badly prepared at the 'technical and psychological level'.<sup>87</sup> As it progressed, the disarmament mission came under challenge, particularly from the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge frequently refused to let the UN enter the areas under its control and also took peacekeepers hostage. Despite some early signs that it might agree to disarm and demobilise, in June 1992 the Khmer Rouge categorically refused to canton, justifying this by claiming that Vietnamese

forces still remained in Cambodia in defiance of the peace agreement, and that UNTAC had failed to control the State of Cambodia (SOC) forces.<sup>88</sup>

The other parties had already begun to demobilise – almost 55,000 soldiers had been cantoned and approximately 50,000 weapons taken into custody – but with the Khmer Rouge refusing to demobilise they abandoned the process. Within a short period, the disarmament process was effectively over. The UN changed its strategy in response and turned its attention towards providing security for the forthcoming elections, abandoning disarmament.

In the event, UNTAC was unable to achieve both phase one of its mandate (a cease-fire) and phase two (the demobilisation and disarmament of 70% of the military forces of the factions) and the run-up to the elections was marked by a wave of violence and spoiling tactics. The SOC, for example, engaged in attempts ‘to coerce the opposition and voters’ in the run-up to elections.<sup>89</sup> Nevertheless, elections did take place.

The Khmer Rouge’s refusal to disarm brought to a head the debate over the validity of co-operative disarmament precepts. Did the spoiler tactics of the Khmer Rouge justify a more proactive response from the UN, including the forceful collection of their arms?

The Commander of UNTAC, Lt. Gen. John Sanderson, came under pressure to use military force to disarm the Khmer Rouge, particularly from the civil component of UNTAC and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Further, his Deputy Force Commander, Gen. Loridon, advocated a more forceful approach and was quoted as suggesting that he would accept the deaths of up to 200 soldiers to end the Khmer Rouge threat, but this approach was rejected by Sanderson.<sup>90</sup>

Although the agreements were based on the good faith of the parties, Article 29 of the Paris Agreements gave the UN the authority to take ‘appropriate steps to ensure respect for these commitments’.<sup>91</sup> And under the Paris Agreements, the UN was delegated ‘all powers necessary to ensure the implementation of this agreement’.<sup>92</sup>

However, Sanderson maintained that his troops could not enforce internal security:

Could you imagine peace enforcement operations against a guerrilla force? It’s clearly a nonsense. Our role is peacekeeping, not internal security.<sup>93</sup>

He suggested that peace enforcement would have required the SC sanctioning a totally new mandate, and that if the UN had attempted enforcement there was a danger that



key contingents would have withdrawn and consensus in the SC regarding the mission would have collapsed.

Further, he noted that the peacekeeping force in Cambodia was not configured for offensive operations. It did not have a suitable force structure, artillery, combat engineering or air support capabilities; what is more, its personnel had been instructed in peacekeeping, rather than enforcement operations, and the force would have had to be several times larger and configured for a protracted conflict in order to be effective. Even if such a force had been available, it would not have succeeded, according to Sanderson, because it 'would have required a UN force to take sides in an internal conflict'; an inherently misguided approach in his view.<sup>94</sup>

Cox suggested that even if the UN had successfully implemented an 'offensive coercive disarmament programme', it would have run the risk of the:

destruction of the fragile Cambodian infrastructure, and the danger that the UN would leave the country more impoverished than when it arrived.<sup>95</sup>

### **3.32 Assessment**

With hindsight, the conflictual nature of relations between the parties was always likely to have made a co-operative disarmament programme problematic in Cambodia. It has been suggested that the parties signed up to the Paris Agreements, including its disarmament provisions, because they had 'no real option': their international patrons had cut them off.<sup>96</sup> They were also exhausted by war and internally divided. Both the SOC and the Khmer Rouge probably hoped that disarmament would undermine their opponents. The SOC saw disarmament as a means of dismantling the Khmer Rouge's greatest asset, its army, and dissolving the movement; something which the Khmer Rouge was determined to resist. The Khmer Rouge, for its part, hoped that UNTAC would control and weaken SOC's administrative structure.<sup>97</sup>

Ultimately, the parties appeared more concerned with consolidating their power interests in the run-up to elections than with preparing the ground for a demilitarised and civil state. In these circumstances, it was difficult to imagine a contract emerging between the parties to disarm.

A lack of professionalism, and inconsistency in implementing the mandate, also sometimes undermined the credibility of UNTAC. In the earlier stages of UNTAC, for example, many soldiers exercised their rules of engagement (ROE) in a passive fashion: UNTAC failed to resist detention of its soldiers and some contingents even handed over

weapons and their vehicles to the Khmer Rouge. There were wide divergences in what was regarded as legitimate action in self-defence by the various national contingents within UNTAC. Sanderson noted that some contingents opened fire at the slightest provocation, while others handed over weapons when a gun was pointed at them.<sup>98</sup> The canton arrangements were particularly permissive: SOC militia members were not physically cantoned 'to reduce the negative social impact of disarmament'.<sup>99</sup> Delays in the deployment of the mission raised doubts as to the seriousness the UN was according the process, and encouraged Khmer Rouge and SOC defiance. The Khmer Rouge, in particular:

quickly realised that they had more to win through unco-operation (sic) than through co-operation, and disregarded UNTAC's mandate from the beginning. They refused to observe the cease-fire and in January 1992 launched a major offensive.<sup>100</sup>

The Khmer Rouge also refused UNTAC personnel any but the most restricted access to their zones.<sup>101</sup>

UNTAC left Cambodia with the country awash with arms; precisely the 'situation which the disarmament process was intended to avert'.<sup>102</sup> The UN mission had succeeded in overseeing the holding of democratic elections, and notwithstanding post-election violence, a relatively stable post-election peace process, but this owed little to co-operative disarmament creating a secure environment or to it collecting weapons.

### **3.33 United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR)**

While the Cambodian experience undermined confidence in the validity of co-operative disarmament, events in Somalia were to have an even more profound impact. In 1994 the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) attempted to arrest a clan leader, following the killing of UN peacekeepers, but the mission ended disastrously with United States troops and large numbers of civilians being killed and the eventual withdrawal of the peacekeeping mission (see chapter 4). This failure was to profoundly reinforce scepticism within the UN and member states as to the utility of enforced disarmament or disarmament *per se*. It was in this setting that the UN proved to be extremely reluctant to commit itself to disarmament or proactive intervention in Rwanda as genocide unfolded.

Developments in Rwanda by the early 1990s were giving grounds for international and regional concern. Ethnic tensions between the Tutsi and Hutus in

Rwanda and neighbouring states, raised the prospect of a full-blown civil war. The Rwandanese Patriotic Front (RPF), a mainly Tutsi-based organisation in Uganda, was involved in a number of clashes with the government, which was dominated by Hutus. In response, the UN negotiated a peace agreement with the Arusha Accords providing for the establishment of a neutral interpositioning force under Chapter VI: UNAMIR. The principal functions of UNAMIR included:

ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali...establishment of an expanded demilitarisation zone...and demobilisation procedures.<sup>103</sup>

Weapons control was particularly important if a secure environment was to be established in Kigali. However, weapons control was likely to be problematic. The UN was confronted with demobilising 35,000 soldiers in a society with a shattered economy, famine, large numbers of displaced persons, escalating violence, and growing paramilitary groups. UNAMIR was comprised of 2,548 military personnel, only one third of what the UN had asked for a year before, and half what the force commander had recommended.<sup>104</sup>

Between autumn 1993 and early 1994, there was increased militarisation within Rwanda with arms circulating freely. The force commander, Gen. Romeo Dallaire, despite repeated appeals, never received UN permission to seize weapons,<sup>105</sup> and the Belgian government's call to permit UNAMIR to interpret its mandate more proactively was similarly rejected.<sup>106</sup> Dallaire explained that the reason why his force confiscated so few weapons was down to:

a problem of the mandate. Stopping and searching people for weapons is forbidden by New York.<sup>107</sup>

Even the parties initially envisaged a more proactive role for the force during the Arusha Accord negotiations.<sup>108</sup> Central clauses in the Arusha Accords referred to providing security, protecting civilians, and confiscating illegal arms, but these commitments were watered down. UNAMIR became a peacekeeping operation whose brief was to contribute to security in the Kigali area, monitor the cease-fire, and assist in demobilising the two Rwandan armies. Underpinning this approach was the perception that a proactive interpretation of UNAMIR's mandate to permit confiscation of illegal arms was much too close to the Somalia syndrome for comfort.<sup>109</sup>

Critics of the UN's approach claimed that even modest displays of intent to protect civilians proved extremely successful during the early stages of UNAMIR. A 'symbolic' presence of peacekeepers at key points in the Kigali area, for example,

enabled UNAMIR to provide protection for an estimated 20,000 persons at the Amahoro stadium, the Hotel Mille Collines, the Meridien hotel, and the King Faysal Hospital.<sup>110</sup> The threat to civilians mainly emanated from paramilitary gangs and mobs, not armies, and a relatively modest force would have been sufficient to have had a significant deterrent effect, it has been suggested.<sup>111</sup> Such a force could have at least implemented modest disarmament programmes at the tactical level to stabilise the situation on the ground.

On 6 April 1994, a full-scale civil war erupted and genocide commenced in Rwanda. Disarmament in these conditions became problematic given the UN's capabilities in the field. On the day the mass killings started, UNAMIR had only one working armoured personnel carrier and was 'under-manned, under-equipped and immobile'.<sup>112</sup> The UN directed its efforts to re-establishing a cease-fire with the hope that the peace process could be resurrected. But controversially, UNAMIR was subsequently reduced in size by the SC two weeks after the killing started to a force of 270 military personnel. The UN rejected complete withdrawal, but also the notion of a larger intervention force.

As the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 'Lessons Learned' Unit noted in a retrospective examination of the mission, the UN could do little other than defend itself and civilians within its defence perimeter:

With the reduction of the force during the genocide...UNAMIR adopted a self-defence posture, defending the civilian population which had sought refuge within UNAMIR's defence perimeter. It had no capacity to go out of this perimeter and protect or rescue people at risk. Even if it had decided to fight in self-defence, the force had very low levels of ammunition... In such a situation, the force could not even contemplate offensive measures.<sup>113</sup>

As the extent of the genocide became apparent, the UN changed tack and moved towards a more forceful mandate. UNAMIR II was authorised at a force level of a little more than 5,000 personnel and had a new mandate to assist in protecting civilians by establishing civilian zones inside Rwanda. In effect, a chapter 'six and-a-half' mandate, it was described as a flexible and firm response to protect civilians, and included arms seizure measures.<sup>114</sup> However, over a month passed before the SC authorised the operation, and the actual deployment took another two months. By this time it was too late to make a significant impact as the civil war and genocide were over. Further, the

French had unilaterally intervened in southern Rwanda and created a 'protected' zone, as part of 'Operation Turquoise', and had also undertaken limited disarmament.<sup>115</sup>

### 3.34 Assessment

UNAMIR had an apparent remit to undertake limited disarmament, but for the reasons outlined above, it never attempted it on a substantive basis. Even if UNAMIR had undertaken disarmament, by the time of the genocide it would have probably been a redundant arms management strategy. In contrast, early efforts pre-genocide, might have had an impact in stabilising the situation if sufficient forces had been put into the field; however, once the genocide was underway it was too late. Anyhow, the nature of the ethnic divisions within Rwanda appeared to call into question the validity of a nation-wide co-operative disarmament strategy. Little good faith or basis for reconciliation existed between the Hutus and Tutsi following the murder of the Prime Minister and members of her government. Further, bad faith pre-dated this.

There was also strong evidence that the genocide had been thoroughly planned by extreme Hutu elements<sup>116</sup> and that from an early stage extremists had decided to bypass the Arusha Accords. Further, UNAMIR I was severely hampered by the stipulation that it could only search and seize weaponry with the consent of the government, and as Hindell notes, as the 'government leant heavily towards Hutu nationalism such a request was unlikely'.<sup>117</sup>

Both parties had, in fact, consistently sought to manipulate the mission's mandate. The RPF reckoned, in the later stages of the conflict, that the mission might cheat them of victory and it sought to make UNAMIR a minimalist operation, while elements in the Hutu-led government encouraged France to make the force stronger in order to protect it. With the outbreak of genocide, the notion of the UN acting consensually or impartially was undermined once it became clear that extreme Hutus were principally initiating the killings and the genocide. The fact that much of the violence was being committed by militia and groups on a planned and *ad hoc* basis nation-wide, not by rival armies breaking out of canton processes, as had been the case in most previous co-operative disarmament initiatives, further called into question the applicability of co-operative disarmament. It was impossible to conceive of a nation-wide co-operative disarmament operation involving APs and demobilisation working, when a civil war was raging. A quite different form of disarmament strategy was

probably required; the sort that UNAMIR II was mandated to undertake, which included measures such as the creation of 'safe' or 'protected' areas within which killings might have been halted and soldiers and militia disarmed.

### **3.4 Case Studies: The Decline and Scaling Down of Co-operative Disarmament**

#### **3.41 The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Mali**

The termination of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) mission in December 1995 and the deployment of the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia (see Chapter 4) appeared to mark the end of the large multi-dimensional UN peace support mission with demilitarisation components. The notion of the UN intervening to substantively demilitarise war-torn societies appeared to have been abandoned as neither the resources nor the motivation to launch such operations appeared to exist anymore. Further, there was a trend towards utilising regional, rather than UN, forces with proactive mandates to manage intractable internal conflicts.

However, a new type of co-operative disarmament operation emerged in Mali in 1995. This set aside large-scale intervention by international forces in favour of using a developmental organisation, UNDP, to assist in disarmament and demobilisation. The role of the UNDP was conceived as largely one of a facilitator and funder of the process.<sup>118</sup> The disarmament process was to a considerable degree instigated by the parties who had over a period of time come to the belief that disarmament and reconciliation were essential to avoid a full-scale civil conflict in Mali.

The roots of the Mali conflict lay in the 'northern' problem.<sup>119</sup> The northern regions had a long-standing history of political and economic neglect and heavy-handed policing. This contributed to a number of Tuareg rebellions during 1990-95. In 1991-92, attempts were made to foster national reconciliation and a transition to democracy. This included plans to integrate rebels into the national army under the National Pact signed on 11 April 1992, which emphasised 'restoring confidence, eliminating factors of insecurity, and the installation of a permanent state of security'.<sup>120</sup> However, during 1993 the process ran into difficulties and the rebels were not integrated into the army. Violence in the north continued and by 1994 the situation had become critical.<sup>121</sup>

Public opinion, which had strongly coalesced against continued conflict, came to have a major impact on the process. The movement for peace within civil society, according to Lode, exerted considerable pressure on the parties to reach a settlement:

There is no doubt that by the end of 1994 the common people of Northern Mali had...had enough of war and manipulation. What they wanted was peace and to be able to take the initiative for the change into their own hands.<sup>122</sup>

In 1994, the government, in a confidence-building gesture, decided to reduce its military and administrative presence in the north. The president stated that there should be no new government initiatives until 'we have given time for civil society to work out a solution'.<sup>123</sup> He urged regional authorities to support, but not interfere with, the work being undertaken by civil society.<sup>124</sup> The various parties in 1995 entered into a new peace process, underpinned by a host of community meetings, and agreements were reached that encompassed a disarmament process.<sup>125</sup>

Cantonment began in November 1995, following the Timbuktu Round Table meeting of July 1995, and by the end of 1995 most combatants presented themselves at the four cantonment sites and surrendered a weapon. The UN supervised the inspection of weapons and their destruction and was also a neutral observer of the cantonment process which the Mali government had organised and conceived. However, Western donors had decided at Timbuktu to ask the Mali government to fund the cantonment phase<sup>126</sup> and with the limited funds available to the Mali government this led to poor conditions within the cantonments.

In previous disarmament initiatives, such as Angola and Mozambique, poor conditions in cantons had led to riots, the desertion of soldiers, and the virtual collapse of demobilisation. However, the commitment and good faith of the parties held the cantonment process together, with the support of local communities, who managed to convince the rebels that if they went to camps and surrendered their arms they could do so in the confidence that the peace process was sustainable.<sup>127</sup>

Following cantonment, it was envisaged that all former combatants would be integrated into the national army or uniformed organisations. In practice, a compromise was reached: 1,500 disarmed combatants were to be integrated during 1995-96 into the army, the gendarmerie, the national guard, the police, the customs, and forest guards. The integration process generally worked smoothly and the disarmament of former combatants was completed between 15 November 1995 and 15 February 1996 under the auspices of the government, the rebel movements, and the UNDP. It culminated in

the 'Flame of Peace' ceremony in Timbuktu on 27 March 1996 where 3,000 weapons collected by ex-combatants were burned.<sup>128</sup>

### **3.42 Assessment**

Co-operative disarmament proved to be a highly appropriate strategy in Mali. The parties at the leadership level and the combatants in the field had conceded the need for a settlement, not just a peace agreement. This was strongly supported at the societal level. The doubts of the parties regarding the advisability of disarmament were assuaged by both elements within society and by the UNDP. Mali demonstrated what could be achieved in disarmament terms when the parties were acting in good faith. They developed a commitment to disarmament and there were no substantive outbreaks of spoiler behaviour to damage the peace process. Consent was maintained with no serious crisis points or retreats from disarmament, and without international forces to provide security or to coerce the parties to live up their commitments. In fact, the application of force to secure disarmament was philosophically inconsistent with the developmental nature of the mission. Rather, the UNDP acted as a verifier of the process and built confidence through its presence that disarmament was being implemented equally. In this context, impartiality was vital. The Mali initiative demonstrated that when the parties and society at large had developed a degree of reconciliation and commitment to a peace process, co-operative disarmament followed by integration was a highly relevant approach.

### **3.43 United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA)**

The UN's involvement in Guatemala, 1994-, typified the decline in the scale and ambition of UN Peace-building and disarmament efforts at the beginning of the second half of the 1990s.

From November 1994, MINUGUA carried out human rights verification activities and institution-building, but with the Agreement on the Definitive Cease-Fire, signed by the government of Guatemala and the rebel Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) movement on 4 December 1996,<sup>129</sup> the UN, at the request of the parties, agreed to verify the separation of forces and the demobilisation at APs of URNG combatants, who were thought to number between 1,000-2,000 guerrillas.<sup>130</sup> The SC on 20 January 1997 authorised a group of 155 military observers to be attached



to MINUGUA. The mission was civilian-led and the military were to operate under 'civilian supervisors'.<sup>131</sup>

Both parties had strong motivations for seeing through the peace process and disarmament, notwithstanding the bitter and protracted 36 year civil war that had been fought with the loss of an estimated 140,000 lives.<sup>132</sup> Guatemala remained the sole arena for large-scale conflict in the region, following the largely successful UN peacekeeping initiatives in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras, and had become an oddity in a region where peace-building and democratisation had taken root.

The URNG in 1996, it was noted was:

Frightened of becoming an anachronism in a region where armed revolutionary movements have gone out of fashion... (and was) aware that its future depends on the end of the war.<sup>133</sup>

Meanwhile, the government was:

anxious to get the accord out of the way before anything happens to give further comfort to its hard-liners or provoke guerrilla combatants to lose their faith in peace.<sup>134</sup>

The head of MINUGUA, Jean Arnault, noted in March 1997 that there was a:

profoundly shared sense...that the war is over and that we must now move on to another stage.<sup>135</sup>

Resistance to MINUGUA's deployment among the 'elites' in Nicaragua, who claimed that it was too large and should not be permitted to investigate human rights abuses, was partly mitigated by the provision of economic incentives. Clear economic benefits could be seen to be flowing from renewed international investment including a European Union (EU) pledge of 200m ECUs on January 1997 and a financial package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Inter-American Development Bank, and the World Bank.<sup>136</sup>

In the first stage of the demilitarisation process, the UN accepted URNG's declared inventory of weapons as accurate – 1,818 small arms, approximately 100kg of explosives, 409 mines, and various heavy weapons held by 3,614 fighters – and the disarmament process formally began on 3 March 1997 with the handover of the first URNG weapons to UN monitors.<sup>137</sup>

The disarmament process was completed, without significant setbacks, and assisted in bringing to an end 36 years of internal conflict in Guatemala.

### 3.44 Assessment

Co-operative disarmament, as in Mali, proved a viable strategy in Guatemala. The parties had reached a form of accommodation, albeit with mutual suspicions, that was capable of encompassing a comprehensive disarmament and demilitarisation process. The UN was not called upon to buttress an unravelling peace process with desertions from APs, as in Mozambique, and resumptions of conflict, as was the case in Angola. Rather, it was called upon to verify a process which had a measure of political support from both parties and which required a minimal form of on-the-ground confidence-building; hence the small numbers of observers deployed. The levels of insecurity experienced by the parties were not sufficient for them to call for physical protection. Co-operative disarmament was well-adapted, with its emphasis on consent, impartiality, and minimal use of force, to supervise a process which called for reassurance rather than proactive intervention to collect weapons. In fact, co-operative disarmament in Guatemala, more resembled classic Cold War observation in its techniques, than the deeper forms of societal intervention to disarm war-torn states that were envisaged at the outset of the post-Cold War period. It appeared that in the 1995-97 period the UN had returned to its Cold War roots and it was not until the late 1990s that co-operative disarmament underwent a resurgence.

### Notes

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<sup>1</sup> Chopra and Weiss, for example, noted in 1992 that the erosion of sovereignty and the emergence of a human rights regime meant that it was finally possible to enforce growing recognition of individuals' rights of access to humanitarian aid, irrespective of their governments' permission ( Jarat Chopra and Thomas G. Weiss, 'Sovereignty is No Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying Humanitarian Intervention', *Ethics and International Affairs*, vol. 6, 1992, pp. 116-117).

<sup>2</sup> For an analysis of the problem of 'failed' or 'collapsed' states see I. William Zartman (ed.), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

<sup>3</sup> Steven R. Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Croft argues that the impetus for disarmament came from the UN and non-aligned states who historically having argued for disarmament during the Cold War, rather than arms control, had a ready-made concept when the UN started to move into the area of intra-state security in the post-Cold War period: 'In this sense there was a very important linkage between 30 years of UN debate over international disarmament and the practice of intra-state disarmament' (Stuart Croft, 'Lessons for the Disarmament of Factions in Civil Wars', paper for British International Studies Annual Conference, University of Southampton, December 1995, p. 5). However, Northern states who had most influence on peacekeeping through their presence on the UN SC and through the financing of UN peacekeeping were less committed to, or convinced of, the merits of disarmament, according to Croft. See *ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

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- <sup>6</sup> Fred Tanner, 'Consensual Versus Coercive Disarmament' in Estanislao Angel Zawels, Stephen John Stedman, Donald C. F. Daniel, David Cox, Jane Boulden, Fred Tanner, Jakkie Potgieter, and Virginia Gamba, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: The Issues*, UNIDIR/96/46 (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996), p. 175.
- <sup>7</sup> Tanner identifies three forms of disarmament or 'weapons control': demobilisation under comprehensive settlements, stability-building measures, and violence reduction measures. See *ibid.*, pp. 176-180.
- <sup>8</sup> Fred Tanner, 'Weapons Control in Semi-Permissive Environments: A Case for Compellence', in Michael Pugh (ed.), 'The UN, Peace and Force', Special Issue, *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 3, no. 4, Winter 1996, pp. 127-128.
- <sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 171.
- <sup>10</sup> South Africa was ruled to be a 'de facto but illegal occupying power' (United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, Third Edition [New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996], p. 203).
- <sup>11</sup> Nigel D. White, 'UN Peacekeeping – Development or Destruction?', *International Relations*, vol. 12, no. 1, April 1994, pp. 138-139.
- <sup>12</sup> Peter Batchelor, 'Disarmament, Small Arms, and Intra-State Conflict: The Case of Southern Africa', in *Small Arms Management and Peacekeeping in Southern Africa*, UNIDIR/96/21 (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996), p. 70.
- <sup>13</sup> United Nations Document, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 640 (1989) Concerning the Question of Namibia', S/20883, 6 October 1989, p. 17.
- <sup>14</sup> *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 218.
- <sup>15</sup> The incorporation of Koevoet into the police force had 'inexplicably, won UN approval in advance of the UNTAG mission' (Chris Alden, 'The Issue of the Military: UN Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration in Southern Africa', in Jeremy Giner [ed.], 'Beyond the Emergency: Development Within UN Peace Missions', Special Issue, *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 3, no. 2, Summer 1996, pp. 55-56).
- <sup>16</sup> The operation had no enforcement authority. See James S. Sutterlin, *Military Force in the Service of Peace*, Aurora Papers 18 (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Global Security, June 1993), p. 10.
- <sup>17</sup> UNTAG, in fact, had difficulty in gaining access to SWAFT arms stored on South African military bases to verify them. See Chris Alden, 'The Issue of the Military: UN Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration in Southern Africa', p. 56.
- <sup>18</sup> Peter Batchelor, 'Disarmament, Small Arms, and Intra-State Conflict: The Case of Southern Africa', p. 86.
- <sup>19</sup> South Africa, Botswana, and Zambia all experienced high levels of illegal weapons flows following the peace process in Namibia that contributed to rising crime rates and violence in the early 1990s. See *ibid.*
- <sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 77.
- <sup>21</sup> Duane Bratt, 'Assessing the Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations', in Michael Pugh (ed.), 'The UN, Peace and Force', Special Issue, *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 3, no. 4, Winter 1996, p. 73.
- <sup>22</sup> United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 415.
- <sup>23</sup> Paulo S. Wrobel, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Nicaragua and El Salvador*, UNIDIR/97/1 (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1997), p. 19.
- <sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 21.
- <sup>25</sup> David Cox, 'Peacekeeping and Disarmament: Peace Agreements, Security Council Mandates, and the Disarmament Experience', in *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: The Issues*, UNIDIR/96/46 (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996), p. 91.
- <sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 88.
- <sup>27</sup> Paulo S. Wrobel, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Nicaragua and El Salvador*, p. 21.
- <sup>28</sup> David Cox, 'Peacekeeping and Disarmament: Peace Agreements, Security Council Mandates, and the Disarmament Experience', p. 91.
- <sup>29</sup> Paulo S. Wrobel, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Nicaragua and El Salvador*, p. 30.
- <sup>30</sup> David Cox, 'Peacekeeping and Disarmament: Peace Agreements, Security Council Mandates, and the Disarmament Experience', p. 91.
- <sup>31</sup> Yvon Grenier and Jean Daudelin, 'Foreign Assistance and the Market-Place of Peacemaking: Lessons from El Salvador', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 2, no. 3, Autumn 1995, p. 350.
- <sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 354.
- <sup>33</sup> Paulo S. Wrobel, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Nicaragua and El Salvador*, p. 132.

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- <sup>34</sup> The UNDP was the key co-ordinator in most of the reinsertion programmes. See Yvon Grenier and Jean Daudelin, 'Foreign Assistance and the Market-Place of Peacemaking: Lessons from El Salvador', p. 355.
- <sup>35</sup> Christopher C. Coleman, *The Salvadoran Peace Process: A Preliminary Inquiry*, NUPI Research Report, no. 173 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, December 1993), p. 29.
- <sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 30.
- <sup>38</sup> Yvon Grenier and Jean Daudelin, 'Foreign Assistance and the Market-Place of Peacemaking: Lessons from El Salvador', p. 354.
- <sup>39</sup> Christopher C. Coleman, *The Salvadoran Peace Process: A Preliminary Inquiry*, p. 30.
- <sup>40</sup> Following the end of the conflict, Recontras and Recompas formed small armed bands that destabilised rural areas until they were financially persuaded to disband. A Special Disarmament Brigade, made up of ex-combatants from both sides, spent nearly two years and millions of dollars buying-back or confiscating over 142,000 weapons. See Neil M. O'Connor, *Micro-Disarming Demobilised Societies*, Monterey Institute of International Studies ([www.us.net/cip/dialogue](http://www.us.net/cip/dialogue)).
- <sup>41</sup> See David Holiday and William Stanley, 'Building the Peace: Preliminary Lessons from El Salvador', *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 46, no. 2, Winter 1993.
- <sup>42</sup> De Soto and del Castillo stress the importance of the political pressure that the SC, in particular, can bring to bear during peace processes. See Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo, 'Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreements: Staying the Course in El Salvador', *Global Governance*, vol. 1, no. 2, May-August 1995, p. 201.
- <sup>43</sup> Yvon Grenier and Jean Daudelin, 'Foreign Assistance and the Market-Place of Peacemaking: Lessons from El Salvador', p. 354.
- <sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 350.
- <sup>45</sup> Christopher C. Coleman, *The Salvadoran Peace Process: A Preliminary Inquiry*, p. 22.
- <sup>46</sup> According to Sullivan, the FMLN entered the peace process with a several-year projection for the conclusion of peace, and a firm intention to use military actions to influence negotiations. See Joseph G. Sullivan, 'How Peace Came to El Salvador', *Orbis*, vol. 38, no. 1, Winter 1994, p. 97.
- <sup>47</sup> Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo, 'Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreements: Staying the Course in El Salvador', p. 191.
- <sup>48</sup> Peter Batchelor, 'Disarmament, Small Arms, and Intra-State Conflict: The Case of Southern Africa', p. 64, citing Jullyette Ukabiala, 'Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Angola' (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1995), unpublished draft, p. 35.
- <sup>49</sup> UNAVEM observers supervised the collection and sorting of arms and assisted with security arrangements at storage sites; monitored the verification procedure for the weekly counting of collected weaponry; investigated alleged violations of agreements; and reported on the disposition of the parties' armed personnel (Jakkie Potgieter, 'The Price of War and Peace: A Critical Assessment of the Disarmament Component of United Nations Operations in Southern Africa', in Virginia Gamba [ed.], with assistance of Sarah Meek and Jakkie Potgieter, *Society Under Siege: Crime, Violence and Illegal Weapons*, Towards Collaborative Peace Series, vol. 1 [Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 1997], p. 136).
- <sup>50</sup> Jane Boulden, 'Rules of Engagement, Force Structure and Composition in United Nations Disarmament Operations', in *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: The Issues*, UNIDIR/96/46 (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996), p. 147.
- <sup>51</sup> United Nations Information Notes, *United Nations Peacekeeping* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information), May 1994, pp. 22-23.
- <sup>52</sup> Jakkie Potgieter, 'The Price of War and Peace: A Critical Assessment of the Disarmament Component of United Nations Operations in Southern Africa', p. 136.
- <sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 137.
- <sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 138.
- <sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 140.
- <sup>56</sup> Chris Alden, 'United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa: Lessons for the OAU and SADC', Accord Occasional Paper (undated), p. 4.
- <sup>57</sup> Jakkie Potgieter, 'The Price of War and Peace: A Critical Assessment of the Disarmament Component of United Nations Operations in Southern Africa', pp. 150-153.
- <sup>58</sup> Human Rights Watch interview, Paris, 1 November, 1998, cited in Alex Vines, *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process*, Human Rights Watch, September 1999, p. 34.
- <sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35.

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- <sup>60</sup> Chris McGreal, 'UN Withdraws Angola Monitors from War Zones', *The Guardian*, 4 January 1998, p. 12.
- <sup>61</sup> Assis Malaquias, 'The UN in Mozambique and Angola: Lessons Learned', in Jeremy Giner (ed.), 'Beyond the Emergency: Development within UN Peace Missions', Special Issue, *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 3, no. 2., Summer 1996, p. 93.
- <sup>62</sup> Jane Boulden, 'Rules of Engagement, Force Structure and Composition in United Nations Disarmament Operations', p. 148.
- <sup>63</sup> Fred Tanner, 'Consensual Versus Coercive Disarmament', p. 188.
- <sup>64</sup> Chris Alden, 'Swords into Ploughshares? The United Nations and Demilitarisation in Mozambique', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 2, no. 2, Summer 1995, p. 177.
- <sup>65</sup> Eric Berman, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique*, UNIDIR/96/22 (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996), p. 35
- <sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 84.
- <sup>67</sup> Alex Vines, *The Struggle Continues: Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique*, BASIC Occasional Papers on International Security Issues, no. 2, April 1998 (www.prepcom.org), p. 1.
- <sup>68</sup> It was stipulated under the GPA that 'all...weapons...should be stored in warehouses under United Nations control' (Jakkie Potgieter, 'The Price of War and Peace: A Critical Assessment of the Disarmament Component of United Nations Operations in Southern Africa', p. 147).
- <sup>69</sup> Alex Vines, *The Struggle Continues: Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique*, p. 7.
- <sup>70</sup> Jakkie Potgieter, 'The Price of War and Peace: A Critical Assessment of the Disarmament Component of United Nations Operations in Southern Africa', p. 148.
- <sup>71</sup> Alex Vines, *The Struggle Continues: Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique*, p. 1.
- <sup>72</sup> 'UNDP Head Launches Bitter Attack Against UN Peacekeeping', *Development Today*, no. 20, 1995, p. 3.
- <sup>73</sup> Alex Vines, *The Struggle Continues: Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique*, p. 3.
- <sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.
- <sup>75</sup> Richard Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-94* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 109.
- <sup>76</sup> Jakkie Potgieter, 'The Price of War and Peace: A Critical Assessment of the Disarmament Component of United Nations Operations in Southern Africa', p. 147.
- <sup>77</sup> Christopher Smith, 'Light Weapons and the International Arms Trade', in Christopher Smith, Peter Batchelor and Jakkie Potgieter (contributors), *Small Arms Management and Peacekeeping in Southern Africa*, UNIDIR/96/21 (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996), p. 37.
- <sup>78</sup> Richard Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-94*, p. 91.
- <sup>79</sup> Eric Berman, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique*, p. 68.
- <sup>80</sup> Jakkie Potgieter, 'The Price of War and Peace: A Critical Assessment of the Disarmament Component of United Nations Operations in Southern Africa', p. 145.
- <sup>81</sup> 'UNDP Head Launches Bitter Attack Against UN Peacekeeping', p. 3.
- <sup>82</sup> Richard Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-94*, p. 113. See also Eric Berman, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique*, p. 27.
- <sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 28.
- <sup>84</sup> Jianwei Wang, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Cambodia*, UNIDIR/96/17 (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996), p. 34.
- <sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 36.
- <sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 87.
- <sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 44.
- <sup>88</sup> Michael W. Doyle and Nishkala Suntharalingam, 'The UN in Cambodia: Lessons for Complex Peacekeeping', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 1, no. 2, Summer 1994, p. 126.
- <sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>90</sup> Loridon's position became untenable and he was replaced as Deputy Commander. See Jianwei Wang, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Cambodia*, p. 55.
- <sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 53.
- <sup>92</sup> Michael W. Doyle and Nishkala Suntharalingam, 'The UN in Cambodia: Lessons for Complex Peacekeeping', p. 128.
- <sup>93</sup> Robert Karniol, 'The Jane's Interview', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 2 January 1993, p. 32.
- <sup>94</sup> Jianwei Wang, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Cambodia*, p. 56.
- <sup>95</sup> David Cox, 'Peacekeeping and Disarmament: Peace Agreements, Security Council Mandates, and the Disarmament Experience', p. 107.

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- <sup>96</sup> Michael W. Doyle and Nishkala Suntharalingam, 'The UN in Cambodia: Lessons for Complex Peacekeeping', p. 129.
- <sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>98</sup> John Sanderson, 'A Review of Recent Peacekeeping Operations', presentation to PAMS 18th Conference, Dacca, January 1994, p. 8.
- <sup>99</sup> Jianwei Wang, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Cambodia*, p. 41.
- <sup>100</sup> Laurie Barber, 'Restoring Cambodia: Democracy by Injection', *New Zealand International Review*, no. 5, 1995, p. 3.
- <sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>102</sup> David Cox, 'Peacekeeping and Disarmament: Peace Agreements, Security Council Mandates, and the Disarmament Experience', p. 107.
- <sup>103</sup> United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 343.
- <sup>104</sup> Keith Hindell, 'An Interventionist Manifesto', *International Relations*, vol. 13, no. 2, August 1996, p. 26.
- <sup>105</sup> For a description of the role of Belgium forces in Rwanda and the problems they faced see Astri Suhrke, 'Facing Genocide: The Record of the Belgian Battalion in Rwanda', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 29, no. 1, March 1998.
- <sup>106</sup> Jeremy Ginifer, 'Protecting Displaced Persons Through Disarmament', *Survival*, vol. 40, no. 2, Summer 1998, p. 168.
- <sup>107</sup> Keith Hindell, 'An Interventionist Manifesto', p. 28.
- <sup>108</sup> Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, with contributions by Bruce Jones, *Early Warning and Conflict Management, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience* (Copenhagen: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, March 1996), p. 39.
- <sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 45.
- <sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 52.
- <sup>112</sup> Keith Hindell, 'An Interventionist Manifesto', p. 26.
- <sup>113</sup> United Nations, Lessons Learned Unit, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), October 1993-April 1996* (New York: United Nations, December 1996).
- <sup>114</sup> Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, with contributions by Bruce Jones, *Early Warning and Conflict Management, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, p. 52.
- <sup>115</sup> For a description of *Operation Turquoise* see Keith Hindell, 'An Interventionist Manifesto', pp. 26-27.
- <sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 28.
- <sup>118</sup> Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf, *A Peace of Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking*, UNIDIR/98/2 (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1998), p. 209.
- <sup>119</sup> Lode identifies a lack of proper representation for Arabs and Tuaregs; the absence of a policy of decentralisation; and the militarisation of the north, as key casual factors in the conflict. See Kåre Lode, *Civil Society Takes Responsibility: Popular Involvement in the Peace Process in Mali*, PRIO Report 5/9 (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 1997), p. 14.
- <sup>120</sup> 'National Pact Concluded Between the Government of Mali and the Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad Giving Expression to the Special Status of Northern Mali', Title II, signed 11 April 1992, p. 3.
- <sup>121</sup> Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf, *A Peace of Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking*, pp. XV-XVI.
- <sup>122</sup> Kåre Lode, *Civil Society Takes Responsibility: Popular Involvement in the Peace Process in Mali*, p. 50.
- <sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31.
- <sup>124</sup> The 'social capital' of the people and the 'well-thought out, comprehensive UN programme' were key factors in the peaceful resolution of the conflict (Saferworld, 'The Flame of Peace', *Update*, no. 18, Spring 1997, p. 1).
- <sup>125</sup> Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf, *A Peace of Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking*, p. 115.

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<sup>126</sup> Although the cantonment process was financed by the government, the UN Trust Fund paid \$200 each to the 3,000 combatants who had surrendered their arms and \$100 to the approximately 7,000 other ex-combatants without arms (*ibid.*, p. 116).

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 117.

<sup>128</sup> Saferworld, 'The Flame of Peace', p. 1.

<sup>129</sup> UN, SG/SM/6119 CA/124, 4 December 1996, p. 1.

<sup>130</sup> 'Signing Paves Way for Peace in Guatemala', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 25 September 1996, p. 15.

<sup>131</sup> Christopher Louise, 'MINUGUA's Peacebuilding Mandate in Western Guatemala', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 4, no. 2, Summer 1997, p. 60.

<sup>132</sup> Johanna Tuckman, 'Guatemala Steps Up Peace Talks', *Financial Times*, 13 November 1996, p. 7.

<sup>133</sup> Johanna Tuckman, 'Peace Dividend for Battered Guatemala', *Financial Times*, 1 July 1997, p. 7.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>135</sup> 'UN Monitors Disarmament in Guatemala', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 12 March 1997, p. 14.

<sup>136</sup> Christopher Louise, 'MINUGUA's Peacebuilding Mandate in Western Guatemala', p. 69.

<sup>137</sup> 'UN Monitors Disarmament in Guatemala', p. 14.

## **Chapter 4: The Second Phase of Post-Cold War Arms Management: Coercive Disarmament**

### **4.0 Introduction**

The imposition of 'enforced' or 'coercive' disarmament<sup>1</sup> by victors after wars for retributive purposes, or to prevent future war, is well-established in inter-state relations. It took place following the Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean War, the Versailles Peace Treaty<sup>2</sup> and, more recently, in Iraq under UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 687, 1991.<sup>3</sup> However, during the 1990s a new conceptualisation of coercive disarmament emerged: the tactical use of coercion by international troops within peace operations to disarm parties for 'violence reduction purposes or conflict resolution'.<sup>4</sup> This took place in the context of civil or internal wars, rather than following inter-state wars. The rationale of coercive disarmament, at least in its UN manifestation, was not retribution, but to peace-build and foster reconciliation through neutral third-party intervention.

### **4.1 The Conceptual Basis of Coercive Disarmament**

Coercive disarmament was largely a reaction to the negative experiences of a number of co-operative disarmament operations. The traditional precepts of impartiality, minimal use of force, and consent came under challenge,<sup>5</sup> were recast, or even abandoned by regional and by political organisations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), which assumed a more prominent role in demilitarisation operations as the 1990s progressed. These approaches were informed by the new 'peacekeeping' or peace support operations thinking.<sup>6</sup> This postulated that it was no longer necessarily sufficient to rely on the good faith of the parties, persuasion, or the monitoring of peace processes, if demilitarisation was to be achieved. Third-parties implementing disarmament, if they were to be effective, would sometimes have to act against spoilers to ensure compliance, and impartiality and consent needed to be re-thought. This meant, for example, that the tendency inherent in traditional peacekeeping to regard impartiality as a prohibition on action, thus providing some form of 'immunity' for breakers of peace agreements, was replaced by the notion that:

Actions will be taken against or in support of any party, depending on its compliance or non-compliance with the mandate and not because of whom it represents.<sup>7</sup>



Similarly, consent was no longer regarded as an absolute concept: international forces might sometimes act to maintain international law or a mandate without consent, particularly in the face of illicit actions by the proliferation of groups and ‘warlords’ encountered in many internal conflicts.

However, NATO and UN operations with coercive components, despite their more permissive remit to use force, were still generally underpinned by ‘minimum force doctrine’. First, they were guided by the notion that the use of force should be proportional to the threat posed, and any escalation in use of force should be measured. Second, the use of force should be restrained to specific, directly offending persons, or groups. Last, punitive use of force was illegitimate.<sup>8</sup>

Further, coercive disarmament was not usually a dedicated mission objective. Coercive disarmament, unlike co-operative disarmament, tended to be not a first step, but a last step in a series of measures in peace missions in response to a loss of control. The first UN operation with a coercive dimension in Somalia, which had explicit enforcement authority for disarmament purposes, was in part, a response to the impotency of UNOSOM (United Nations Operation in Somalia) I to attacks by armed clans, which:

convinced the UN Security Council to provide UNITAF and then UNOSOM II with Chapter VII authority to ensure that the disarmament process was *continuous and irreversible*.<sup>9</sup>

Coercive disarmament tended to be used in ‘carefully defined circumstances and not as a general rule’.<sup>10</sup> Unlike co-operative disarmament, coercive disarmament was not designed to confiscate arms nation-wide or over geographically extended areas. Its use tended to be circumscribed to designated zones (such as safe areas); it was applied to a certain type of behaviour being exhibited by parties or groups to a conflict (open display of weapons or ‘hostile intent’); and it was sometimes targeted at a specific weapons group, such as ‘crew-served’ weapons or heavy weapons.<sup>11</sup>

If the UN and NATO tended to adhere to a minimum force conception of coercive disarmament, this was not necessarily the case with regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), or Russian ‘peacekeepers’ who sometimes regarded war-fighting or combat techniques as permissible to pursue disarmament and conflict cessation strategies. As Baev notes, disarmament operations were part of peacekeeping initiatives and ‘in Russia peacekeeping remains part and

parcel of conflict-waging'.<sup>12</sup> Russian strategists tended to view minimal use of force as a trip-wire connected to the readily available use of force, and Russian units, while engaged in peace-time functions, were required to be ready to engage in combat operations, including counter-insurgency acts such as ambushing, and even combined air and ground strikes.<sup>13</sup> In addition, they might engage in the pursuit, apprehension, or destruction by fire of groups and individuals who are 'not following the rules of a given situation', including a refusal to disarm. It has been suggested that CIS agreements for the conduct of collective CIS peacekeeping operations appeared to be in accordance with UN traditional peacekeeping norms; but, in reality, practically all the Russian-led peacekeeping operations in the CIS area were decided and conducted in a way that contrasted to some degree with the agreed regulatory framework.<sup>14</sup>

Similarly, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which periodically shifted from peacekeeping to peace enforcement, used offensive tactics and air capability to engage one of the parties in Liberia, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), and to effect disarmament, following the killing of President Doe and his body guards at ECOMOG headquarters on 9 September 1990.

This chapter seeks to chart the development of coercive disarmament, its implementation by the UN, NATO, ECOWAS, Russia and the CIS, and the problems that it encountered in the field. It starts with a description of the United Nations Protection Force's (UNPROFOR) early, largely consensual, attempts to control weapons in Former Yugoslavia, through to the strategy of safe areas and finally compellence through NATO airstrikes. It then describes the emergence of coercive disarmament strategies in Somalia, followed by the decline in confidence in coercive disarmament at the UN, and in key member states, at the time of the Haiti and former Zaire initiatives. Finally, it examines the distinctive disarmament approaches of ECOWAS and the CIS.

## **4.2 Case Studies: The United Nations Moves Towards Coercive Disarmament**

### **4.21 United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)**

UN intervention in Former Yugoslavia followed the outbreak of conflict in Croatia and Bosnia after their declarations of independence in June 1991 and February 1992

respectively. Heavy fighting began in Croatia in June 1991 between Croats and Serbs assisted by the Yugoslav army. UNPROFOR was deployed into Croatia early in 1992 with the task of demilitarising the rebel Krajina Serb republic and overseeing the withdrawal of the Yugoslav national army.

Subsequently, UNPROFOR was expanded to operate in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The mission's role was to provide humanitarian assistance and security including the creation of 'safe areas' and limited disarmament.<sup>15</sup> As the mandate expanded UNPROFOR grew from an initial deployment of 10,000 troops to a substantial force of some 52,000.<sup>16</sup>

The proposal for a UN peacekeeping force in Croatia was presented by UN SG, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in February 1992. It included demilitarised UN Protected Areas (UNPAs) in Croatia (at Krajina and Eastern and Western Slavonia) where Serbs constituted a majority or significant minority, and which were regarded as likely to be Serb-Croat trouble-spots. The UN's principal role was to ensure that the UNPAs remained demilitarised and to guarantee protection to the civilian population within them. The mandate evolved to provide for: heavy weapons to be withdrawn to at least 30km from the line of confrontation; local militia to be disbanded and their equipment stored; and all armoured personnel carriers and other military vehicles to be withdrawn not less than 10km from the line of confrontation and infantry not less than 5km.

The UN forces overseeing this were more heavily armed than in previous co-operative disarmament initiatives with armoured personnel carriers and helicopters; further, they were given more proactive powers. They controlled access to UNPAs; they were entitled to search vehicles and individuals for weaponry; and they were to interpose themselves between the parties in the event of serious tensions.

Underpinning the initial deployment of UNPROFOR was SCR 743 of 21 February 1992. While it noted that the Government of Yugoslavia had requested a peacekeeping force, it left the legal basis of UNPROFOR's deployment vague. It made no specific reference to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, but stated that the situation in Yugoslavia constituted a threat to international peace and security and referenced resolution 713 which authorised a Chapter VII arms embargo.<sup>17</sup> Although SCRs 743 and 749 did not sanction a resort to Chapter VII operations, it was understood that self-defence could encompass coercive action to implement an agreement between the parties.<sup>18</sup>

Between April and September 1992, the UN had successes in the implementation of disarmament in the Croatian UNPAs. The Yugoslav army had withdrawn from the UNPAs and territorial defence units had placed their weapons in UN-supervised storage facilities. In this initial phase there was a relative de-escalation of the conflict between Serbs and Croats with the parties having partially overlapping interests in seeing UNPROFOR deployed. The subsequent inability of the UN force to underwrite the security of the parties was not yet apparent and UNPROFOR's credibility as a disarming force remained largely intact.<sup>19</sup>

In Sector East, for example, Serb militia forces had equipped themselves with armoured personnel carriers, machine guns and mortars, and re-formed themselves as special police units. UNPROFOR Russian and Belgian units, in response, took forceful action, blockading a couple of 'police' units, and after negotiations approximately 500 weapons were surrendered to the Belgian battalion.<sup>20</sup>

Troops in Sector West were particularly successful in the early months of the operation in implementing disarmament.<sup>21</sup> Between June-July 1992, the Sector West experience was:

instructive in demonstrating the value of concentrating military presence to achieve tactical disarmament objectives, and so avoiding the extremes of, on the one hand, the resort to force and, on the other, the passive acceptance of cease-fire violations.<sup>22</sup>

This concentrated military presence initially took the form of a well-armed Canadian battalion.

In fact, disarmament activities in Sector West went through two phases. During the first phase, despite the incidents eluded to above, disarmament had largely a 'voluntary' character.<sup>23</sup> Although weapons in the sector were placed under UNPROFOR control, the weapons remained the property of the parties who retained the right to carry out maintenance work on them. The UN took sole custody of weapons within the zone – after the withdrawal of heavy weapons – but with the consent of the parties. The display of uniforms was also banned.

Steps were taken to establish a secure environment conducive to preventing the seizure of existing weapons and the supply of new arms into the sector. Cox notes that:

Once disarmed...continuing co-operation with local Croat and Serbian officials was essential to sustain joint searches for illegal weapons, and to reassure both sides that the peacekeepers were both able to perform their protective function and to be impartial in their treatment of the two sides.<sup>24</sup>

Joint operations were initiated involving local police, UN civilian police (CIVPOL), and UNPROFOR to confiscate illegal weapons in the sector. Given the strong suspicions of both the Serbs and the Croats that the UN was partial, it was regarded as critical that UNPROFOR acted impartially and developed trust. A key element in Sector West in terms of developing trust was involving the local authorities of both sides in disarmament operations and in providing services for civil authorities in the sector, such as humanitarian aid and reconstruction programmes. An indication of the credibility that UNPROFOR managed to establish in Sector West came in January 1993 when Croats attacked Serb Krajina villages in Sector South and in the adjacent pink zone. The UN managed to persuade the Serbs not to reclaim their heavy weaponry in storage sites and convinced them that they would be protected.<sup>25</sup>

However, the UN's essentially co-operative approach had its critics. Cox notes that the UN unwisely did not disarm Serbian paramilitaries in 1992 when Russian and Belgium brigades were in a position to bring superior force to bear. The UN was concerned regarding the impact such an action might have on the consensual nature of the mission and the casualties that might have resulted. However, in his view, condoning the presence of illegal paramilitaries merely encouraged further violations.<sup>26</sup>

In the second Sector West demilitarisation phase, UNPROFOR sometimes implemented tactical coercive disarmament. In September 1993, for example, an Argentine battalion took action against illegal police and border posts in the south of the Sector. Having persuaded the Croats to dismantle their posts, Argentine forces dismantled Serb observation posts and disarmed a number of Serb soldiers. All weapons were seized and the Serbs given receipts for surrendered weaponry. Although the Serbs threatened to re-take their weapons by force, this action never materialised, possibly because they did not see their security as significantly affected by the removal of the posts, and further, because UNPROFOR acted as a buffer against Croat attacks. For their part, the Croats saw the UN's control of Serb weapons as lessening the risk of Serb commando attacks.<sup>27</sup>

However, the relative acquiescence of the parties to demilitarisation was always under threat. The disarmament process in the UNPAs unravelled following early successes, with the Croats taking military action to regain control of the UNPAs. Following the 22 January 1993 Croatian offensive, the Serbs removed their weapons from storage sites and the provisions of the Vance Plan were forgotten.<sup>28</sup> Disarmament

operations became impossible in the face of periodic flare-ups in fighting and UNPROFOR found itself trying to facilitate local cease-fire agreements and deliver humanitarian aid.

The cease-fire of 29 March 1994, followed by an economic agreement, allowed some resumption of disarmament in Croatia. UNPROFOR combined an interpositional role with disarmament, demilitarisation, and weapons control within a zone of separation. By the end of May 1994, hostilities had ceased, forces were withdrawn, and heavy weapons had been placed in agreed storage sites. There were 185 weapons storage sites: 136 on the Serb Krajina side and 49 Croatian sites. Controls on weapons within the storage sites were limited: the parties kept their weapons in a high state of readiness in the sites and although the UN was permanently stationed at some sites and controlled access, in others, UN soldiers were not on permanent guard and some sites were even unguarded in Sector East. This resulted in most of the heavy weapons in Sector East being re-deployed to battle lines after the attack on Ubdina airport. In fact, placing the weapons in the storage sites did not significantly affect the operational capabilities of the factions as they could easily and quickly remove weapons from storage sites if they chose.<sup>29</sup>

In the closing stages of the UNPA operations, the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR was severely hampered – for example, some UNPROFOR cars were even hijacked – and the trend was clearly towards ‘re-arming and not disarmament’.<sup>30</sup> Ultimately, UNPROFOR was neither able to offer effective protection to populations in the UNPAs, as required under its mandate, nor to carry out an effective programme of disarmament.

Ekwall-Uebelhart and Raevsky argue that disarmament in Croatia might have been achievable when the parties adopted the Vance-Owen Plan at the end of 1991 when a greater degree of trust pertained, but even by the time UNPROFOR was deployed the parties had been arming in anticipation of conflict, and trust had decayed.<sup>31</sup> The essentially consensual mode of operations pursued in Croatia by UNPROFOR was unable to bring about disarmament or contain the conflict. While UNPROFOR assisted in controlling, to a limited extent, the level of arms in UNPAs through checkpoint seizures of weapons from individuals or small units and the voluntary placement of weapons in storage facilities, ultimately this was unlikely to be

sufficient to contain the conflict given the determination of the Croats to drive the Serbs out of Krajina and create a national homeland regarded as essential to their security.

For their part, the Serbs, who were a significant proportion of the population (12% according to the 1991 census) and who constituted a majority in Krajina and parts of western Slavonia, and a significant minority in parts of eastern Slavonia,<sup>32</sup> were equally determined to retain their territory with the assistance of the Yugoslav army.

Meanwhile, in Bosnia the key disarmament event was the use of NATO air strikes to coerce the Serbs to withdraw heavy weapons from Sarajevo, and the collection of Serb and Bosnian Muslim weapons into storage sites. However, it had been preceded by a series of less proactive disarmament and demilitarisation initiatives.

During the first phase between April 1992-June 1993, UNPROFOR activities were aimed at assisting the distribution of humanitarian aid by restricting the deployment of the parties' weaponry, so that flights could land at Sarajevo airport and deliver supplies. The military enforcement capability originally intended for the force was never provided and UNPROFOR had to rely on consent to fulfil its mandate. Comprehensive disarmament of the sort envisaged in the Vance-Owen Plan did not prove to be realistic: in order to implement its manpower-intensive disarmament elements it was claimed that 50,000-60,000 peacekeepers would have been needed.<sup>33</sup>

In the second phase, the safe areas concept was introduced by SCR 819 of 16 April 1993 at the peak of the Srebrenica crisis. Subsequently, the concept was extended to Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, and Bihac. UNPROFOR military observers were mandated to monitor the withdrawal of all Bosnian Serb military or paramilitary units from the towns to a distance where they represented less of a threat, and to monitor the situation in the safe areas.<sup>34</sup> Subsequent SCRs strengthened the mandate. SCR 836, for example, extended UNPROFOR's mandate to deter attacks against the safe areas, and it was authorised to:

take necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas or to armed incursions into them or in the event of any deliberate obstruction to the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR.<sup>35</sup>

However, a lack of resources – member states failed to provide the troops and resources required – and a lack of political will meant that the UN was never able in this phase to credibly implement demilitarisation and provide security within the safe areas. Indeed, it has been alleged that at times the UN failed to implement its mandate and permitted the parties to contravene agreements.<sup>36</sup> The UNPROFOR Force Commander thought

that 34,000 additional troops, with much heavier equipment than normal peacekeepers, would have been required to ensure full respect for the safe areas.<sup>37</sup>

One of the few substantive attempts to disarm took place early during the Bosnian Serb siege of Srebrenica when an agreement was signed to demilitarise the city in an attempt to save the civilian population. A company of Canadian troops deployed to Srebrenica after the cease-fire, reported it to be successfully demilitarised on 21 April 1993. During the three week operation weapons were stored according to the standard UNPA method and remained the property of the parties handing them in. However, in reality, the disarmament was one-sided and incomplete. Under half the weapons in the area were surrendered, and armed elements entered the area. Serbs surrounded Srebrenica, and the Muslims retained their military structure and 'the weapons remained intact and were the property of the party surrendering them'.<sup>38</sup>

The fact that disarmament was incomplete subsequently gave the Serbs a pretext to attack Srebrenica and was followed by the massacre of thousands of Bosnian Muslims.<sup>39</sup> The UN was neither able to provide protection for disarmed Bosnians or deter the Serbs from attacking, even though SCRs permitted UNPROFOR to use force to implement its mandate.

In the safe areas of Gorazde and Sarajevo, the UN achieved variable results in terms of disarmament and demilitarisation. Fighting in Sarajevo, and subsequently Gorazde, stopped as a result of UN-brokered arrangements accepted by the parties. These arrangements included local cease-fires, UNPROFOR interpositioning, heavy weapons controls, anti-sniping restrictions, and greater freedom of movement of civilians. They were backed up by explicit threats of NATO air strikes in the case of non-compliance.

However, the safe area concept in Gorazde lacked credibility. First, UNPROFOR did not have the military resources to protect Gorazde. Second, it was not possible to demilitarise or disarm Gorazde reciprocally: attacks were coming from within the safe area, as well as on it. Third, UN peacekeepers involved in demilitarisation were vulnerable to hostage-taking as they were widely dispersed at weapons collection points and lacked the capacity to prevent determined effort to remove weapons.<sup>40</sup> What the safe area demilitarisation concept in Gorazde, and elsewhere, seemed to lack was a mutually acceptable agreement that met the parties'



interests, but at the same time encompassed the proactive collection of weapons in the face of non-compliance.

In the third Bosnian demilitarisation phase, the UN in conjunction with NATO compelled the Serbs to withdraw weaponry from Sarajevo and place them, along with the Bosnian Muslims' weapons, in UN storage sites. This followed the Sarajevo market-place mortar attack on 6 February 1994 which galvanised the UN to authorise NATO air strikes against artillery and mortar positions in and around Sarajevo judged to be responsible for attacks on civilian targets. The Serbs were pressurised into withdrawing heavy weapons from within 20km of the centre of Sarajevo and the Bosnian government was required to place heavy weapons under UNPROFOR control. The heavy weapons of all parties were subject to air strikes from 20 February 1994, unless controlled by UNPROFOR under SCR 836.<sup>41</sup> Heavy weapons not withdrawn from the exclusion zone were put into eight collection points under the guard of armed UNPROFOR troops. These included most of the Bosnian Muslim heavy weapons as well as some Serbian weapons.

This approach met many of the parties' mutual interests: it brought security for the Bosnian Muslims from Serbs attacks, and it allowed the Serbs to re-group after having suffered military setbacks in Croatia and having reached a military stalemate in Sarajevo.<sup>42</sup> However, the February 1994 concept of 'exclusion zones' was formulated not at the UN in New York but rather in Brussels at NATO headquarters, as was the ultimatum for the withdrawal and monitoring of Serbian and Muslim heavy weapons.<sup>43</sup>

In the final phase, February 1994 to January 1995, UNPROFOR took on monitoring of the cease-fire arrangements and an interpositional role along former confrontation lines in accordance with the Washington agreements signed by the Bosnian Croats and Muslims. On 14 December 1995, the Dayton Peace Accord (DPA) was signed apportioning NATO a prominent and proactive role in keeping the peace in Bosnia and bringing UNPROFOR to a close.

#### **4.22 Assessment**

Disarmament operations in Former Yugoslavia were frequently a secondary objective and were conducted in a piecemeal manner. The UN, other than in Sector West in Croatia and the Sarajevo demilitarisation campaign, did not generally attempt to pursue

disarmament in the face of the resistance of the parties. Indeed, the UN's mandate in Bosnia was never designed to:

impose a political solution by force of arms, to alter the balance of forces.... These are war fighting actions.<sup>44</sup>

A comprehensive disarmament programme, as originally envisaged under the Vance-Owen plan, was never put into effect. This raised the question of how, in the absence of disarmament, a secure environment and settlement stability could be brought to the region. The international community's strategy appeared to be more centred on persuading the parties to reach negotiated agreements, and to provide humanitarian aid, than to securitise the region through arms management schemes.<sup>45</sup>

The safe areas in Bosnia, in particular, were generally policed in a passive manner. It has been argued that the disarmament of civilians and militia within the safe areas should have been a priority to prevent attacks on them by the Serbs. However, SCR 819, while declaring Srebrenica, for example, a safe area, 'did not recognise the necessity of disarming the units present in the town',<sup>46</sup> although limited disarmament was carried out at one point.

Sector West offered an initially encouraging conceptualisation of tactical coercive disarmament. Troops within the sector managed to concentrate military presence to achieve tactical disarmament objectives and sometimes take control of weaponry from both Croats and Serbs, when they were in violation of their disarmament commitments. This disarmament approach was underpinned by impartiality, credible protection for both sides, and rudimentary forms of confidence-building, such as access to weaponry in storage and joint patrols. However, with the breakdown of the UNPA policy and a Croatian offensive in January 1993, the mixture of self-interested compliance with disarmament and the credibility of the UN to provide security broke down and weapons were withdrawn from storage sites and fighting broke out again.

At the heart of the demilitarisation problem from the beginning were the conflicting goals of the parties. The Croatian government intended to control what it regarded as its territory, including the UNPAs, while the Serbs took advantage of UNPROFOR's presence to keep the Croats out and maintain a 'Republic of Serbian Krajina' in UNPROFOR's area of responsibility.

Last, the Sarajevo bombing campaign against the Serbs demonstrated what could be achieved in demilitarisation terms with the application of credible force and

political pressure. Spoiler activity was reined in and security and stability were restored in Sarajevo and Bosnia, which still pertained in the late 1990s.

UN operations in Former Yugoslavia exposed the difficulties of implementing coercive disarmament in civil wars, particularly when commitment was lacking on the part of the international community. The trials and tribulations experienced by UNPROFOR forces in Former Yugoslavia suggested that demilitarisation forces intervening in civil wars would need to be more proactive if they were to stabilise conflicts: a lesson that subsequent NATO forces in Bosnia took on board.

#### **4.23 The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) I, II/Unified Task Force (UNITAF)**

Disarmament initiatives in Somalia in the early 1990s had to contend with an extremely complex situation. The country was without central government, banditry was rife, and there was heavy fighting in the capital, Mogadishu, particularly between two clans leaders (Ali Mahdi Mohamed and Mohamed Farah Aidid) who had rival aspirations in Somalia. Elsewhere in Somalia, there was fighting in Kismayo, the main port in the southern part of the country, and the deposed president Siad Barre was marshalling his forces. In the north-west, local leaders were seeking to create an independent 'Somaliland'. At the same time that clans and sub-clans 'operating in loose alliances without central control' were caught up in fighting, a serious drought was taking place, with, by 1992, almost 4.5m people estimated to be threatened by starvation, malnutrition and related diseases.<sup>47</sup> All institutions of governance and at least 60% of Somalia's basic infrastructure had disintegrated. The only security available was:

provided by armed groups, sometimes outside any command structure and subject to no political control.<sup>48</sup>

The international community's first priorities were to: facilitate humanitarian aid to civilians; to halt the conflict; and to reconstruct the basic institutions of a viable state. The UN Security Council (SC), under resolution 733, 1992, imposed an arms embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, citing regional stability and the threat to international peace and security. Talks between Aidid and Ali Mahdi between February-March 1992 led on 3 March to the signing of an 'Agreement on the Implementation of a Cease-fire'. Even at this early stage, it became apparent that the parties had differing perceptions of what form a peace-building intervention should take, particularly in terms of disarmament:

Ali Mahdi had pressed unsuccessfully for a United Nations peacekeeping force to implement the cease-fire agreement, disarm civilians and protect...humanitarian aid. General Aidid only agreed to a United Nations security component for humanitarian aid convoys and military monitors – in civilian clothes, with blue berets and arm bands – for the cease-fire.<sup>49</sup>

In the event, UNOSOM I, established under SCR 751, 1992, created four zones where a consolidated UN operation would monitor the cease-fire and maintain security while helping combatants to disarm and demobilise. Initially, the prognosis for disarmament appeared to be good in Somalia. The UN SG reported that elders and political leaders had requested UN assistance in disarming the population and demobilising irregular forces. In some parts of the country, programmes along these lines had already been started up through the initiative of local leaders. However, as the UN was to find out, this was not the case in Mogadishu.

The late deployment of UNOSOM I, consisting of 500 Pakistani peacekeepers and 50 UN observers to Mogadishu on 14 September 1992, proved problematic from the outset.

First, Aidid believed the soldiers to be ‘anti’-Aidid and he did not trust the UN, particularly when the number of peacekeepers deployed was subsequently raised without consulting him.<sup>50</sup>

Second, the small number of peacekeepers, and the mandate, were clearly inadequate to disarm in the chaotic conditions pertaining in Somalia. The Special Representative of the SG in Somalia, Jonathan T. Howe, noted that the UN:

had neither the strength nor the authority to deal with Somali obstructions, which confined it to the airport. Even the 3,000 additional troops authorised by the UN were unlikely to prevent this kind of interference with the mission.<sup>51</sup>

The force remained encamped at the airport, hampered by restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) which only allowed peacekeepers to fire in rigidly-defined cases of self-defence and only to move when granted permission.<sup>52</sup> Even as the situation in Somalia deteriorated, there were still voices within Somalia calling for urgent disarmament:

In the security committee, the Somalis vigorously urged disarmament, acknowledging that the lead must be taken by Somalis, because any externally led disarmament effort would generate armed confrontation with the Somalia factions.<sup>53</sup>

With humanitarian conditions worsening on the ground, attacks on peacekeepers, and a general climate of violence, the SC concluded that the situation was intolerable and it was decided that it was time to move to Chapter VII of the Charter.<sup>54</sup>

On 9 December 1992, UNITAF, operating under UN authority, but under United States command, entered Somalia.<sup>55</sup> It consisted of 37,000 troops from 25 countries at its peak, including 26,000 from the United States.<sup>56</sup> UNITAF was called upon to assist in the implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 8 January 1993, signed by the parties on 15 January, which included a comprehensive disarmament plan. Under Annex III (Part I) it stated that:

- all heavy weaponry under the control of political movements to be handed over to a cease-fire monitoring group for safekeeping until such a time as a legitimate Somalia Government could take them over;
- the militia of all the political movements to be encamped and disarmed throughout Somalia;
- all other armed elements, including bandits, to be disarmed immediately.

Disarmament was to be comprehensive, impartial, and transparent.<sup>57</sup> The parties committed themselves to complete disarmament throughout Somalia to be substantially completed within 90 days. Under the 1993 Cease-fire and Disarmament Agreement, the factional militia would pass through assembly areas (AAs), while other armed elements were to be disarmed immediately. As UNITAF's deployment was mainly confined to the south, simultaneous disarmament throughout Somalia was out of the question; a phased approach was envisaged, starting in the south and working gradually northwards.<sup>58</sup>

UNITAF faced a formidable task in disarmament terms. There were several thousand Somali troops in Mogadishu, for example, and in south Mogadishu alone there were in the region of 150 'technical' vehicles, each of which carried heavy machine guns or 106mm recoilless rifle (RR) anti-tank guns.<sup>59</sup> Accordingly, UNITAF's mandate was robust. UN SCR 794 of 3 December authorised the presence of the international force to guarantee a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid and the use of 'all necessary means' to do so.<sup>60</sup> The ROE that UNITAF troops operated under were the most permissive yet sanctioned in a UN operation. They were authorised 'to use all necessary force to disarm individuals in

areas under the control of UNITAF'. Crew-served vehicles were regarded as a threat whether or not they demonstrated hostile intent.

However, differences in interpretation emerged between the UN and the United States over what disarmament entailed. The UN SG wanted UNITAF to establish a demilitarised Somalia with substantial quantities of arms collected, and he further stressed that the heavy weapons of the organised factions should be neutralised and brought under international control, and that irregular forces and gangs should be disarmed before UNITAF withdrew.<sup>61</sup> UNITAF argued this was not feasible: how could, for example, 'house-to-house, hut-to-hut searches' be carried out in the lawless conditions that pertained in Somalia?<sup>62</sup> The Americans, in fact, saw disarmament in more restricted terms than the UN.<sup>63</sup> Disarmament had not been an integral component of United States military planning in Somalia. The United States Commander of UNITAF, Lieu. Gen. Robert Johnston, asserted that:

People will need to change the terms of my mission before I get into a wholesale disarmament.<sup>64</sup>

Washington's view was that disarmament was not a priority, but it could be undertaken as deemed necessary according to conditions on the ground. Disarmament was seen by the Bush administration as an 'operational decision' to be made by the field commander, and allowances were made for the possibility that disarmament might be taken on as a secondary objective.<sup>65</sup>

UNITAF, in fact, envisaged disarmament as being specific and limited. The strategy was to seek the co-operation of the factional leaders and obtain their 'agreement to the cantonment of heavy weapons – especially the technicals'.<sup>66</sup> It was argued that a policy of full-scale disarmament would have needed a much larger force and it would have become caught up in clashes with the proliferation of large and small militias in Somalia. The United States Secretary of Defence, Lawrence Eagleburger, commented that it was 'impossible to imagine' how United States forces could ever totally disarm Somalia.<sup>67</sup>

The UNITAF approach, in fact, represented a:

middle ground between doing nothing about disarmament and expending too much political and military capital on disarmament.<sup>68</sup>

However, although UNITAF did not attempt comprehensive disarmament, it was sometimes robust and proactive at the tactical level, particularly in the Mogadishu area,

in implementing weapons control in an attempt to create localised secure environments. UNITAF ROEs stipulated:

- no technicals;
- no banditry;
- no roadblocks;
- no visible weapons.<sup>69</sup>

Technicals were perceived as particularly threatening:

Crew-served weapons are considered a threat to UNITAF forces and the relief effort whether or not the crew demonstrates hostile intent. Commanders are authorised to use all necessary force to confiscate and demilitarise and crew served weapons (and) armed individuals may be considered a threat to UNITAF and the relief effort whether or not the individual demonstrates hostile intent.<sup>70</sup>

In effect, this meant that deadly force could be used if weapons were not voluntarily surrendered. These robust ROE appear to have contributed to the lessening of the threat to UNITAF forces. There was very little violence directed at United States forces during the first five months of UNITAF. The crew-served weapons that were classified as a threat were 'withdrawn or hidden by their owners in response to the overwhelming show of force by UNITAF'.<sup>71</sup> Further, UNITAF forces were rarely challenged when confiscating weapons.

However, instabilities in Somalia were heightened between late January and mid-summer 1993, when a series of violent confrontations broke out between Gen. Morgan and Aidid's ally, Col. Jess. When Morgan's forces in January attacked Jess's troops 35 miles outside Kismayo, where they were guarding their heavy weapons in a UNITAF-designated compound, United States helicopter gun ships and Belgium armour destroyed a number of technicals and artillery pieces belonging to Morgan's Somalia National Front (SNF). UNITAF's proactive arms control tactics in Mogadishu appeared to be having an impact. By mid-January 1993 there were almost no visible light weapons (LWs) on the street in Mogadishu, there was very little nocturnal shooting, and deaths by gun shot virtually ceased.<sup>72</sup>

However, a loophole in UNITAF's 'tactical' approach became apparent. As long as Somalis did not openly brandish weapons, they were able to keep them at home, or carry them hidden. In fact:

Somalis took advantage of UNITAF's...posture and disarmament policy. The organised militia merely pulled back to the villages and outlying districts, waiting for

an opportune time to return to the streets. Surprisingly, UNITAF authorities considered this outcome to be evidence of the success of their disarmament policy.<sup>73</sup> Further, UNITAF's tactical approach did not accord the control of technicals high priority, as long as they did not impact on the security of the mission. In fact, in mid-February 1993, Ali Mahdi had turned over all his cantoned technicals to UNITAF, but by this time most of Aidid's technicals had disappeared from cantonment points. This, however, was not seen as highly problematic; given the:

limited UNITAF mandate, which deliberately excluded general disarmament, it seemed unnecessary to confront Aidid over the disappearance of stored weapons so long as they posed no threat to UNITAF forces...and so long as UNITAF was able to confiscate weapons found in the course of its operations without setting off a fight with the faction that owned them.<sup>74</sup>

Further, weapons caches still existed in the major cities, as well as the countryside, and although the factional militias were not fighting (apart from in and around Kismayo) they were not disarmed or demobilised either. UNITAF focused on:

putting weapons out of circulation rather than on comprehensive disarmament, which would have required a much larger force and generated much greater friction with the Somalia population and the militia.<sup>75</sup>

In this uncertain climate, with the absence of nation-wide disarmament, and little sense of a concerted drive to facilitate disarmament, the factions stalled on giving up their weapons:

The factions, each watching and waiting for the other to disarm, were either too suspicious and frightened to do so, or in some cases, had no real intention of doing so. They feared both serious attacks from their enemies and the loss of future power and position, and Aidid's SNA prepared to challenge the UN peacekeepers as soon as US forces had departed.<sup>76</sup>

Little progress was made in implementing the Addis Ababa agreements and as the mission came to a close with a UN-led operation to follow, disagreements continued between the United States and the UN over who was responsible for implementing disarmament. The UN was concerned that not enough disarmament had been achieved. According to Oakley:

There is little doubt that most heavy weapons could have been removed from control of the factional militias and organised 'bandits' throughout Somalia by UNITAF, probably with minimal combat, had it maintained momentum. Tactical assistance, retraining, and other assistance could have been set up to support the voluntary



program of demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration of militias as had been agreed by the Somali factions at Addis Ababa.<sup>77</sup>

However, United States officials told the Somali 'warlords' that they could keep their weapons if they moved their arms out of Mogadishu or into their respective cantonments. According to Clarke and Herbst:

The failure to disarm the warlords was a tragic mistake because a concentrated effort to remove and destroy the Somalis' heavy arms was possible... Many Somalis fully expected to be disarmed and were surprised at the inaction of the US-led intervention force. Ironically (given the parties' agreement on the Addis Ababa accords)...the United States could have argued that, as an impartial force, it was helping to enforce an accord among the Somalis themselves.<sup>78</sup>

In fact, the United States political and military leadership were mindful of what they saw as the operational lessons of Lebanon: do not take sides and proceed carefully.<sup>79</sup> It was agreed that UNITAF should not 'pick a winner'; it should be impartial and downplay coercion where possible. This was regarded as particularly important in Somalia with its complex system of clans, power competition between rival warlords, and 'the great pride and prickly independence of the Somali people'.<sup>80</sup> The appropriate strategy, it was thought, was to maintain a dialogue and be ready to respond if attacked, but also to ensure that this did not lead to long-term hostility with any group.

The UNOSOM II mission succeeded UNITAF on 4 May 1993 with some United States/UNITAF soldiers remaining to bolster the force.<sup>81</sup> It took on an even more ambitious mandate. UNOSOM II was expected to disarm the warlords and their militias and take charge of the 60% of Somali territory previously outside international control.<sup>82</sup> It was to do this with an initial force of 16,000 UN troops that were lightly armed – there was a shortage of armoured personnel carriers, for example – while UNITAF had been a 37,000 strong, more heavily armed force.<sup>83</sup>

The disarmament plan for UNOSOM II was presented to the SC in a SG report of 3 March 1993. It called for a continuous process of confidence-building between the UN and the factions through contacts and meetings; and it also envisaged that political pressure would be put on factions that sought to delay or failed to comply with disarmament. At the same time, UNOSOM II would 'seek to provide a sense of security for the factions complying'. This was to be combined with incentives. The thinking behind this was that economic or material incentives might provide the resources for Somali warlords to 'effectively bankroll the retrenchment of their largely

undisciplined and potentially mutinous militia' during the voluntary disarmament process.<sup>84</sup> However, coercion was envisaged where factions or individuals failed to comply with disarmament. UNOSOM II was mandated to confiscate and/or destroy weapons and equipment in these circumstances. But no detailed plan for disarmament, demobilisation, and the reintegration of militia into civil society was prepared, unlike in previous UN operations.

UNOSOM II was established under Chapter VII by expanding the size and mandate of UNOSOM I, but this radical step had not been followed up in terms of agreement among contributor states on precise ROE, and moreover:

there was a fair amount of conceptual carryover from traditional peacekeeping, and when the confrontation came, there was no clear idea of how to deal with Aidid because of the implicit contradiction between his threat of force and the disposition of UN forces to go to great lengths to avoid using it.<sup>85</sup>

Following the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II in May 1993, the security situation in Somalia deteriorated. The warlords appeared to have 'little intention of implementing the Addis Ababa accords'.<sup>86</sup> Clashes between UNOSOM II and Aidid seemed inevitable given that there was a widespread perception in Somalia that UNOSOM II would prove weaker than the United States-led UNITAF, and given that Aidid not only saw Boutros Boutros-Ghali as biased against him, but also Admiral Howe. There were sporadic outbreaks of violence across the country from May 1993 onwards, including clashes between militia and UN forces which led to a revision of the disarmament concept.

The UN claimed that 'voluntary' disarmament succeeded to 'some extent' during UNITAF and the early weeks of UNOSOM II and that it was only necessary after 5 June 1993 for the UN to resort to 'coercive methods'.<sup>87</sup> UNOSOM II to begin with essentially adopted the same ROE that had been used by UNITAF, but as conditions deteriorated, particularly in Mogadishu, and armed confrontation increased, UNOSOM force commander Gen. Bir issued the more permissive 'Frag Order 39,' which stipulated that organised armed militias, technicals, and other crew-served weapons 'may be engaged without provocation.' UNITAF snipers began to engage crew-served weapons, whether or not they showed hostile intent; local Somalis knew, for example, that they were likely to be shot if they moved a crew-served weapon within sight of the UNOSOM/United States Forces compound in Mogadishu.

However, on 9 January 1994, a United States sniper allegedly shot a pregnant Somali woman which led to a re-assessment of the ROE.<sup>88</sup> On 14 January, the ROE were moderated and by 15 January machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) were openly displayed in Mogadishu outside the UNITAF/UNOSOM compound as the local population became aware of the less stringent ROE.<sup>89</sup>

However, the critical incident which ultimately led to the disintegration of the UNOSOM II mission occurred on 5 June 1993. UNOSOM forces made a forced entry into weapons storage facilities controlled by Aidid, and two Somalis loyal to Aidid were killed. Shortly afterwards, Pakistani peacekeepers entering a weapons storage facility were attacked by Aidid's forces and 25 of them killed. In response, UN SCR 837 of 6 June 1993 condemned these attacks, named the SNA as responsible, and sanctioned all necessary means to arrest Aidid. The SNA and Aidid subsequently became an 'enemy' of the UN and the United States forces. On 12 June, UNOSOM II conducted a series of air and ground actions and disabled or destroyed militia weapons and equipment in a number of storage sites and facilities. This was followed up by the UN calling on Aidid to surrender and his followers to give up their arms. However, attempts to achieve this were unsuccessful.<sup>90</sup>

Following this, UNOSOM II pursued a largely coercive disarmament programme in south Mogadishu. Aidid's militias and depots were targeted through 'active patrolling (and) weapons confiscations'. These policies led to numerous clashes with the SNA. On 12 July, the United States Quick Reaction Force (QRF) mounted a helicopter gunship raid on Aidid's command and control centre. According to an independent commission which looked into the attack, 'the July 12 operation was intended to eliminate the SNA command centre and its occupants, therefore no warning was given in advance'.<sup>91</sup> In a series of incidents between 5-15 September, hundreds of Somalis were killed and there were dozens of UNOSOM casualties. Meanwhile, paradoxically, the UN was also seeking to implement a voluntary disarmament programme, while United States forces attached to UNOSOM (but not under UN command and control) – the QRC and United States Rangers – stepped up their attempts to arrest Aidid.

In an operation on 3 October 1993, United States forces succeeded in arresting a number of Aidid's aides, but in the fighting two helicopters were shot down and 18 United States soldiers killed. The United States subsequently reinforced its forces,

including the deployment of tanks, but at the same time announced its intention to withdraw from Somalia by 31 March 1994.

UNOSOM II had reached a critical juncture with the United States' decision to withdraw and a number of options were set out for a revised disarmament mandate for UNOSOM:

- Option one envisaged a disarmament process in which UNOSOM hoped that the factions would co-operatively implement disarmament themselves; but it would retain the option for coercive disarmament and retaliation should UN forces be attacked.
- Under the second option, UNOSOM would not utilise coercive disarmament anywhere in Somalia and it would rely on the parties' co-operation to implement disarmament. Disarmament would be 'entirely voluntary' and the UN would only resort to force in self-defence.
- The third option ruled out disarmament. The UN would be limited to helping secure airports and ports in Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia in order to maintain humanitarian supplies.<sup>92</sup>

These options were debated against a deteriorating security situation with banditry continuing in parts of the country and outbreaks of localised inter-clan fighting. In the event, the SC approved option two, under SCR 897 of 4 February 1994. The UN had, in effect, abandoned coercive disarmament and was reverting to co-operative disarmament under the Addis Ababa Agreement

On 24 March 1994, Aidid and Mahdi signed a declaration on national reconciliation and committed themselves to implementing a cease-fire and voluntary disarmament. But in June-July 1994, clans and sub-clans again clashed, especially in Mogadishu, and there was a further increase in banditry. The UN noted there was little progress on national reconciliation:

The Secretary-General expressed the view to the Security Council that some leaders did not yet seem ready to subordinate their personal ambitions for power to the cause of peace and stability in Somalia.<sup>93</sup>

UNOSOM II, with its limited mandate, could only have a small impact on the peace process and security in the face of continued inter-clan fighting and banditry. In fact, it was subsequently recommended that UNOSOM II troop levels should be reduced and the SC voted to terminate its mandate on 31 March 1995. On February 1995, Aidid and Mahdi signed a peace agreement which included provisions to confine technicals to

designated areas and which discouraged the open carrying of arms in Mogadishu, but this fell well short of disarmament. The SG noted in relation to Somalia that:

the international community could only facilitate, prod, encourage and assist. It could neither impose peace nor coerce unwilling parties into accepting it.<sup>94</sup>

UNOSOM II kept coming under attack as the mission wound down and by mid-July 1994 almost as many technicals were back on the street as before UNITAF arrived and elements of the SNA had begun to ambush UN convoys. By the end of September, UNOSOM forces were only deployed in Baidoa, Mogadishu and Kismayo.

As the mission came to an end, factions were aggressively seeking to expand their sphere of influence leading to further UN withdrawals from key towns such as Bardera, Merka and Belet-Wein. This created a:

very strong sense of insecurity in most communities as they prepared for aggressive attacks from opposing clans.<sup>95</sup>

In this climate, many of the groups and communities involved in the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Demining Division of UNOSOM abandoned attempts to disarm the militia, arguing that such a move would be suicidal.<sup>96</sup> Suggestions that any arms collected should be lodged with clan leaders and elders, so that they would be available if clan security was threatened, or alternatively, that Somali police should be available for defence of communities under UNOSOM's police training programme, were never progressed and were described as problematic anyhow.<sup>97</sup>

Following the UN pull-out in 1995, fighting in Somalia continued and a sustainable peace settlement still had not emerged by the end of the decade.

While the UNITAF and UNOSOM II missions in their generality appeared to be disarmament failures, within UNITAF a sectoral operation pointed towards a possibly more effective conceptualisation of coercive disarmament at the tactical level. This was implemented by the Australian contingent operating in the Baidoa Humanitarian Relief Sector. A similar approach by the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) to collect arms in the Bakara Market in central Somalia was also claimed to have achieved encouraging results.<sup>98</sup>

The first UNITAF force to arrive in Baidoa was the 15 Marine Expeditionary Unit which had secured the area by 22 December 1992.<sup>99</sup> On 17 January 1993, the 1st Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment took control of the Baidoa sector. The security situation in Baidoa resembled that of Mogadishu in a number of respects.<sup>100</sup> After some initial heavy weapons disarmament and the retreat of gunmen, violence was

re-asserting itself by mid-January 1993, and United States marines became targets of Somali ambushes and shootings, while humanitarian organisations were subject to widespread intimidation. After moving into Baidoa, the Australians determined that creating a secure environment through robust action was essential if the mission was to succeed. The Commander of 'Operation Solace' positioned himself as the 'military governor' of Baidoa and adopted a counter-insurgency style operation.<sup>101</sup> It was deemed important to establish a credible military posture which involved responding to Somali gunmen challenging the Australian presence.

The Australians, unlike the Americans, took a permissive view of SCR 794, which called for a secure environment so that humanitarian assistance could be delivered, and supported the UN view on active disarmament. It was felt that for there to be a long-term solution in Somalia, the population had to be disarmed. This was recognised as a high-risk strategy, but one that was justified. From an early stage, the Australians 'served notice that arms could not be tolerated on the streets'.<sup>102</sup> Troops maintained a highly visible presence and patrolled around the clock throughout the sector. This was backed up by enforced disarmament through cordon and search operations, house-to-house searches, counter-ambush actions, and pursuit after contact. The only weapons permitted to be carried were those of Somalis working for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and undertaking essential tasks in the sector, and these were registered under a weapons registration scheme. All other weapons were confiscated on sight and destroyed. This approach led to the collection of over 1,000 weapons during Operation Solace: nearly half of the 2,250 weapons collected by UNITAF in its first 90 days of operation.<sup>103</sup>

A central disarmament strategy was to build up local support and the Australians held frequent meetings with local clan leaders. The Australians had also made the effort to develop an understanding of Somali culture.<sup>104</sup> With considerable input from clan leaders, attempts were made to set up a law and order structure in Baidoa, a 200-strong local police force was recruited, and a judiciary system set up. This acted as a counter-weight to intimidation by criminal and militia elements, helped create a secure environment, and facilitated local support for disarmament. According to the Operation Solace Commander, elders:

would sometimes walk as far as 90km to report weapons which they felt the Aussies would have to deal with.<sup>105</sup>

An NGO humanitarian representative noted that:

The Australians...worked into the community; they got to be friendly with the community; they got to know the community...agencies said that the Australians provided something that had never been seen by military forces in a peacekeeping role.<sup>106</sup>

When the Australians left in May 1993 it was claimed that the surrounding villages were no longer intimidated by armed gangs; the warlords had lost their control of the city; and armed militia had disappeared. However, this was not to last and by 1994 violence had re-asserted itself in the sector.<sup>107</sup>

The disarmament approach utilised in Baidoa was, in many respects, contrary to the methods customarily used by UNITAF forces. UNITAF, it as been suggested, worked with the main clan leaders, gravitated towards maximum consent, and implicitly accepted that ‘active disarmament of the warring parties constituted an infringement of Somali sovereignty’.<sup>108</sup> However, Operation Solace took the view that there was no sovereignty to offend in Somalia and placed itself above the belligerents; it asserted itself, with local support, as the ‘local leviathan’.<sup>109</sup> Further, it took a non-permissive view of disarmament, refusing to tolerate low-level armed criminality or any illicit displays of weaponry. It patrolled rigorously and established a community-oriented approach, unlike UNITAF, which tended to establish strong-holds such as the UN compound in Mogadishu, and which left most of the streets in south Mogadishu under the control of the armed factions or criminal elements. This lack of a community-based conception of disarmament tended to undermine the confidence of the local population, as did UNITAF’s apparent unwillingness to disarm the war-lords and factions, despite its considerable military capability. This led Somalis to question the motives of the force. As one observer put it:

Unless they are going to disarm on a nation-wide basis, they might as well pack their bags and go home.<sup>110</sup>

#### **4.24 Assessment**

An effective disarmament process in Somalia required the establishment of a comprehensive security system.<sup>111</sup> Arriving at a disarmament strategy that could persuade, or compel, the various factions and clans to holistically forego arms was always likely to be highly problematic given their military prowess, the structure of the clans, and their positioning within society. As many as 15 clan and sub-clan groups existed in Somalia.<sup>112</sup> Further, they were militarily formidable – the clans had defeated



the army of Siad Barre, one of the most heavily armed and best organised armies in Africa – and they were embedded in society. A common perception among clan members was said to be that society owed them a living because they had risked their lives in defence of the clan and its interests, and they had little hesitation in holding society to ransom. Whatever their feelings about these factions' violent activities, communities were obliged to call upon them for protection. Insecurity in Somalia was further compounded by the existence of a large population of unemployed armed young men engaging in banditry.<sup>113</sup>

In the first substantive phase of the Somali operations, UNITAF was not prepared to systematically disarm the clans; it only engaged in coercive disarmament when it was under attack, or in response to some specific crisis event. The determination was made that disarmament was not a primary mission role and that a comprehensive disarmament programme was not feasible, except at a high cost. The war lords were ultimately seen as holding the answer to a settlement in Somalia. This led to a mission that was moderately successful in creating localised secure areas and assisting in the delivery of humanitarian aid, but tended to leave the problem of widespread weapons proliferation unaddressed, as weapons were merely kept out of the sight of UNITAF. The operation had the most permissive ROE ever sanctioned in a UN peace operation, but failed to take advantage of them in a way that might have systematically diminished the capabilities of the clans.

UNOSOM II was faced with the impossible task of nation-wide disarmament with fewer resources. It was mandated to take on coercive disarmament with essentially the same ROE as the UNITAF operation. When it attempted, with the assistance of United States forces, to disarm and apprehend Aidid and his followers it was unable to follow the policy through in the face of casualties. It was further suggested that the UN misunderstood the clan system and made a political mistake in targeting one clan, and would have done better to try and maintain the traditional clan equilibrium and power-sharing.<sup>114</sup>

The failure of this policy led to a reversion to co-operative disarmament. This, it was alleged, in turn strengthened the warlords, and led to a heightened sense of insecurity among society at large, which finally made disarmament unrealistic. The general population and pacific elements within Somali society saw the warlords



negotiated with and generally allowed to keep their weaponry while their own security was diminished.<sup>115</sup>

The Australian Operation Solace initiative carried out a more effective community-based approach to coercive disarmament which comprehensively seized weapons from militia and criminal elements, and which bolstered the power of traditional elders and civil society in localised areas at the expense of disarmament spoilers. However expertly carried out and well conceived this approach was, it could not solve the wider problem of disarming and bringing peace to Somalia, although a series of such operations might have contributed significantly to peace-building. In the event, conflict persistently re-erupted during the various Somalia missions; no viable confidence-building measures were established; spoiler behaviour was virtually unchecked; and no lasting peace settlement emerged. The UN and United States forces had managed to help avert a humanitarian catastrophe, but eventually left Somali society heavily militarised.

### **4.3 Case Studies: Missed Opportunities and Passivity in Chapter VII Operations: Haiti and former Zaire**

#### **4.31 United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) and the Multinational Force (MNF)**

The rationale for the international community's intervention in Haiti in 1994 was to return to power the deposed president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and halt human rights abuses and refugee outflows from Haiti.<sup>116</sup> In December 1990, a democratisation programme had been put into effect in Haiti with Aristide being elected and taking office on 7 February 1991. This brought to a close 186 years of 'non-democratic, dictatorial rule'<sup>117</sup> and an 'almost unbroken history of revolutions, coups, assassinations and other such bloody upheavals'.<sup>118</sup> However, in September 1991 he was deposed by a military coup with Gen. Raoul Cedras seizing power. The dictatorship remained in place, despite widespread condemnation, the establishment of a human rights observer mission in Haiti, and a General Assembly (GA) resolution calling for the cessation of supplies of arms and petroleum.

Following Resolution 841, which imposed a mandatory oil and arms embargo under Chapter VII, the way was apparently paved through the Governor's Island

Agreement of 3 July 1993 for the return of Aristide to office, which was to be supervised by UNMIH. However, when the first UNMIH contingents attempted to land in October they were forced to retreat by armed gangs. In response, the SC mandated the formation of a multinational force to return the legitimately-elected president and establish a secure and stable environment, acting under Chapter VII (SCR 940 of 31 July 1994). In the event, a diplomatic agreement was reached, paving the way for the return of Aristide, and on 19 September 1994, United States troops were able to land unopposed in Haiti as part of the United States-led MNF. The MNF was sanctioned under Chapter VII and was permitted to use:

all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership...the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the government of Haiti.<sup>119</sup>

It also called for the creation of a secure and stable environment, a form of wording which by 1994 was understood to encompass scope for proactive measures to take arms out of circulation.

The disarmament task facing the MNF was considerable, given the extensive nature of LWs proliferation within the military and within society in general:

Generations of systematic arming of private militias in support of corrupt regimes left the poorest nation in the Western hemisphere saturated with military-style weapons. The movement of such armament was fluid and unchecked, allowing even the most common Haitian access to guns, many of which were...used in common crime, extortion and violent acts of revenge.<sup>120</sup>

Criminal elements, militia, and other factions represented a threat to both the MNF and society. However, the MNF's ROE stated that:

deadly force is not authorised to disarm Haitians, enforce crews curfews, or stop looting, unless those individuals involved engage in hostile acts or demonstrate hostile intent...disarmament is authorised when acting in self-defence.<sup>121</sup>

The MNF was tasked with: implementing the disarmament of the Forces Armées d'Haïti (FAd'H); a voluntary weapons collection programme ('gun-buy back'); the confiscation of weapons found in vehicles during routine stops; the disarmament of attaches; and the seizure of weapons caches. But the disarmament mandate of the MNF did not extend to the general disarmament of the citizenry, although some weapons were in fact collected from them.

The mission encountered little resistance. In the initial stages, the MNF gained control of 14 areas within Port-au-Prince including the control of the heavy weapons of the armed forces from Camp Application. With the departure of the military leadership, the Haitian armed forces quickly collapsed and the MNF collected arms from other locations. It operated checkpoints on main roads and searched people and vehicles for weaponry; it also searched police stations in Port-au-Prince, seizing all weapons other than hand pistols, and secured control over weapons turned in by the demobilised FAd'H.<sup>122</sup>

However, despite the fact that the MNF was a Chapter VII operation, it was unable to disarm Haitian irregulars, and as beatings took place on the streets it was forced to look on, prevented from intervening by its ROE.<sup>123</sup> The emphasis on collecting large crew-served weapons and weapons being carried on the street, and the fact that the MNF was not under an obligation to disarm the Front pour l' Avancement et le Progrès Haïtien (FRAPH), led to a 'don't see, don't disarm' policy. This decision not to undertake wide-scale disarmament created friction between the MNF and Haitian citizens, and lessened public support for the force, particularly as with its overwhelming military superiority – around 20,000 troops – it was in a strong position to impose its will on small numbers of poorly-trained and armed Haitian troops.<sup>124</sup> In response to criticisms, the SG noted in 1994 that the population might be developing 'unrealistically high expectations' of what could be achieved.<sup>125</sup> Aristide, for his part, warned the United States that the democratisation process might collapse if the MNF withdrew without disarming 'terrorists'.<sup>126</sup>

However, the MNF strategy was to sensitively and gradually disarm those Haitians not supposed to have weapons and to arrive at a society that had less and less capacity for violence, but not a 'disarmed society'.<sup>127</sup> The MNF did not engage in policing duties, and tried to get Haitian officials to use existing gun-control laws to reduce weapons in circulation. In the view of many Haitians, the MNF withdrew with its mission not fully accomplished as wide-scale disarmament had not been achieved and public security was doubtful.<sup>128</sup> This was despite the fact that the weapons control programmes of the multinational forces were quite successful with over 30,000 weapons being seized or bought back.<sup>129</sup> As the MNF left, it was apparent that a security void had emerged with the collapse of the FAd'D, the lack of a functioning

police force, the continued existence of paramilitary networks, and the widespread availability of arms.<sup>130</sup>

The MNF was replaced by UNMIH in April 1995 which operated under a Chapter VI mandate with the use of force only permitted in self-defence. It was to:

- sustain the secure and stable environment established by MNF;
- professionalise the Haitian armed forces and create a separate police force;
- assist in providing an environment conducive to the organisation of free and fair legislative elections.<sup>131</sup>

The UNMIH force was from the outset perceived as a weak mission. It was lightly-armed and was not permitted to arrest militia or other elements unless they were committing illegal acts at that moment. The UN SG, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ruled that the UNMIH contingents were not to carry out disarmament activities because their Chapter VI mandate did not allow peacekeeping forces to use force except in self-defence.<sup>132</sup>

Critics have suggested that the MNF and UNMIH, shaped by the disastrous Somalia experience, sought a ‘soft invasion scenario’. By coupling this with an emphasis on political and economic reconciliation, rather than disarmament, they failed to reverse the balance of forces established at the time of the coup which, it was suggested, constituted a major threat to stability and security in Haiti.<sup>133</sup> In fact, Somalia-type clashes with the population were kept to a minimum, ‘casualties were practically non-existent’ during the missions, and the ‘disarmament process stopped before it actually started’, in the view of some observers.<sup>134</sup> Only 30,000 weapons were confiscated and many of these were heavy artillery which had not been used against the population, or were arms of ‘questionable operability garnered through a “buy-back” program’.<sup>135</sup> As a result, military and paramilitary forces remained armed and were able to continue to intimidate an unarmed population during the peace process, despite the fact that disarmament was described as a straightforward task:

There would have been nothing easier than to disarm the macoute-military system, because the UN Civilian Observers Mission...had all the names of the FRAPH, the *attachés*, the soldiers – and the US soldiers themselves had all the information. Nothing would have been easier than to cull, quietly, those macoutes and soldiers who...were not particularly courageous individuals.<sup>136</sup>

Further, it was a perception of many Haiti civilians that the UN had actually protected the Haitian military. The emergence of a societal movement against the military and

militia could be discerned, with some Haitians allegedly waiting for the UN to leave so that they could carry out disarmament themselves.

Following assassination attempts against two deputies on 7 November 1995 the security situation deteriorated rapidly and Aristide called for:

immediate and total disarmament and accused the international community of complacency in this regard.<sup>137</sup>

He called upon the public to give their support to the police, and to carry out their own disarmament operations, and homes of former soldiers and FRAPH members were searched and dozens of weapons retrieved.<sup>138</sup> The failure to implement disarmament, and popular discontent, led to a number of incidents where civilians took revenge on individuals believed to be associated with armed criminality.<sup>139</sup>

#### **4.32 Assessment**

The opportunity presented itself to achieve comprehensive disarmament in Haiti in 1994 with the deployment of large numbers of international troops under United States leadership and a proactive mandate. However, the lack of comprehensive disarmament meant that Haiti went through a period of insecurity and instability during the peace process, with continuing endemic arms proliferation within society at large, and the discredited former militia and police still retaining many of their arms. The MNF had the capability to implement coercive disarmament and create a secure environment in Haiti given the country's small population, the large numbers of military forces deployed by the international community, and the military weakness of the army, police and militia. Further, there was societal support for such operations.

It appeared that the Somali experience had undermined the United States' and the international community's confidence in its ability to proactively collect arms. However, the situation in Haiti appeared to bear little resemblance to that of Somalia with the militia and police palpably lacking the capacity, or the will, to engage international forces in combat.

#### **4.33 The Abortive Zaire Mission**

In 1994 the issue of disarmament was on the international agenda again with the humanitarian crisis in eastern Zaire and the refugee camps that had sprung up there following the genocide in Rwanda. By the summer, the situation in refugee camps such as Goma had become a matter of concern, with groups of armed Hutu militia and

soldiers, who had been driven out of Rwanda by the Tutsi, controlling food supplies and preventing refugees from leaving.<sup>140</sup> Humanitarian organisations called for urgent disarmament within the camps to protect refugees and their own personnel who had been subject to attacks. Although some militia and soldiers heading to the camps were disarmed at the border by Zairian troops, they were usually able to re-arm. The international community was once again confronted with a decision as to whether it should intervene in a complex internal setting to restore order and disarm civilians, militia, and troops.

Initially, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which was the lead humanitarian organisation in the camps, brought in Zairian troops to police them, backed by international technical expertise. The Zairian Camp Security Operation (ZCSO) had by mid-1995 established a degree of order in the camps. Small arms were sometimes seized, but 'systematic searches were not conducted or envisaged'.<sup>141</sup> Further, many of the Zairian troops were not paid and they 'often engaged in arms trafficking to raise funds'.<sup>142</sup> The substantive tasks of separating soldiers and militia from refugees, preventing new arms flows into the camps, and introducing a systematic disarmament programme were not addressed.

Pressure mounted during 1996 for the international community to intervene and in the autumn the UN mandated a multinational, Canadian-led force to be deployed into eastern Zaire under SCR 1080 of 15 November. The mission was given a Chapter VII mandate and was permitted to use 'all necessary means' to ensure delivery of humanitarian aid and to facilitate refugee repatriation. An inherent injunction of the mission was to improve security in the camps, which implied using force to disarm the Hutu militia and soldiers running many of the camps and controlling food supplies, but this was rejected by key contributor states who were unenthusiastic about seizing arms:

The Americans were in favour of disarming the Hutu militias and ex-FAR (former Rwandan Armed Forces) but the Somalia experience loomed too strongly for there to be a strong determination. The French were outright against such plans.<sup>143</sup>

Instead, the mission's role was seen as providing a corridor for refugees to return to Rwanda. As agreement over the mission fragmented – by 27 November it was being suggested that it be limited to air drops – refugees in Zaire started returning to Rwanda. In the event, the only forces deployed were a limited number of United States troops to clear the ground for the main force that was never deployed.<sup>144</sup> As in Haiti, the international community had declined to pursue a systematic coercive disarmament

strategy; the Somalia experience had seemed to foreclose proactive disarmament for the foreseeable future during UN missions.

#### **4.34 Assessment**

The Canadian-led multinational force was not deployed to undertake disarmament in the camps as had been hoped by many advocates of humanitarian intervention. Therefore, it can only be speculated what impact it might have had on security within them. However, the relatively limited task of establishing control within the confines of a camp, where ingress and egress could be controlled, should not have been beyond the means of an appropriately sized and mandated force, particularly given that there was unlikely to be the risk of attacks on the camps by substantive units, as was the case, for example, with the safe areas in Bosnia. It should have been within the capabilities of an international force to establish control of security within the camps and supervise the return of refugees to Rwanda. In the event, this occurred without international intervention.

### **4.4 Case Studies: Coercive Disarmament, ‘War-fighting’, and Enforcement: the Experience of Regional Organisations**

#### **4.41 Russian/Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Operations**

Following the break up of the Former Soviet Union (FSU), Russian and CIS troops became involved in ‘peacekeeping’ missions with demilitarisation and disarmament components in Transdnier/Moldova, Georgia/South Ossetia, Georgia/Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Tajikistan, and Chechenia.<sup>145</sup> To these conflicts, Russia and CIS states brought a new set of perspectives and strategies to the task of disarmament and demilitarisation. Unlike the UN and many UN member states, which usually drew upon traditional peacekeeping or conflict management norms, the Russians sometimes adopted combat or war-fighting principles. Russian ‘peacekeeping’, which sometimes embraced disarmament, was regarded as ‘part and parcel of conflict-waging’.<sup>146</sup> While Russian peacekeeping forces were sometimes mandated and initially deployed with a fairly benign posture, Russian strategists tended to view minimal use of force as a trip-wire connected to the readily available use of force. Russian peacekeeping doctrine, for example, sometimes envisaged the option of ‘deterrence by punishment’, with powerful

groupings of forces available nearby in the event of a serious violation of a cease-fire.<sup>147</sup> Russian units, while engaged in peace-time functions, were required to be ready to engage in combat operations, including counter-insurgency acts such as ambushing, and even combined air and ground strikes,<sup>148</sup> or the pursuit, apprehension, or destruction by fire of groups and individuals who were not following the rules of a given situation.<sup>149</sup>

From a Russian military perspective, 'linear peacekeeping' (securing a cease-fire between two parties along a specific dividing line) was preferable to 'territorial peacekeeping' (securing order over a wide territory), this being reflected in the strategy of taking full control over a demilitarised zone, disarming it where appropriate, but leaving the territories bordering it mainly under the control of the parties.<sup>150</sup> Baev has noted that Russian planners have tended to consider overkill a lesser problem than operating from a position of weakness in operations launched before a cease-fire is established.<sup>151</sup>

One of the more significant initiatives in terms of revealing the underpinnings of Russian demilitarisation and disarmament strategies was the intervention in Abkhazia. A civil war broke out in Abkhazia following attempts by separatists to establish an entity independent of Georgia. In mid-1993, Russia brokered a cease-fire between the Georgians and the Abkhaz. It agreed to act as a guarantor of the cease-fire and to deploy monitors to ensure that disarmament and encampment provisions under the cease-fire were respected by the parties. In addition, in late summer 1993 the UN deployed a small observer force, the UN Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). However, the cease-fire failed to hold, and the Abkhaz, benefiting from North Caucasian assistance, ejected Georgian forces from Abkhazia.<sup>152</sup> The disarmament provisions proved largely ineffectual. While the Georgians did slowly remove heavy equipment restricted under the agreement out of Abkhazia, disarmament was ineffective in the case of the Abkhaz.<sup>153</sup> The Abkhaz did not disarm and Russian observers failed to report these violations, nor did they interfere with, or report, the re-consolidation of Abkhaz forces in 'demilitarised' zones prior to the resumption of war in September-October 1993. Thus, Russian inactivity played an important part in the collapse of the Georgian position in Abkhazia.<sup>154</sup> In fact, insurgents used Russian equipment thought to come from Russian military bases in Abkhazia to push the Georgians back. This asymmetrical quality of monitoring of the Sochi Accord suggested Russian partiality.<sup>155</sup>



With the subsequent virtual collapse of the Georgian state in the face of an internal rebellion, the Russians intervened to hold together Georgia and secured concessions that allowed them to develop a long-term military presence in Georgia and which also led to Georgia signing the CIS Accord.<sup>156</sup> Under a protocol to the Moscow Agreement of 14 May 1994 between Georgia and Abkhazia, a further agreement was reached in terms of a cease-fire and the separation of forces. This involved the establishment of a security zone in which there would be no armed forces from either side. Adjacent to this zone on both sides was a zone where weapons were restricted or were collected and placed in storage areas:<sup>157</sup>

Heavy military equipment originating in the zone was to be stored in designated areas. Georgian forces were to withdraw from the Kodori Valley. Volunteer formations from outside Abkhazia assisting Abkhaz forces were to be disbanded and removed.<sup>158</sup>

The task of CIS peacekeeping force (CISPKF) units deployed to oversee the agreement was to maintain the cease-fire and see that it was 'scrupulously observed' and to supervise the implementation of the security and weapons-free zones. UNOMIG adopted a confidence-building role in the process.<sup>159</sup> It monitored and verified the disarmament provisions and observed the work of the CISPKF.

Despite these interventions, the conflict in the border area along the Inguri river during 1998 continued to be waged and:

Russian and UNOMIG personnel have been unable to prevent a determined Georgian guerrilla campaign.<sup>160</sup>

This increased the incentives for Abkhaz retaliation and the stepping-up of counter-strikes within the security zone and, in fact, Abkhaz units occasionally infiltrated into Georgia. According to previous agreements, military units from both sides were not permitted within the 12km security zone along the Inguri river border. However, this was circumvented by well-armed police units from both Georgia and Abkhazia operating in the security zone.<sup>161</sup>

Both UN and Russian forces were accused of having cast aside neutrality. Abkhazia was suspicious of the UN mission, suspecting that it supported the Georgian position of maintaining its territorial sovereignty, and accusing it of having failed to protect or prevent attacks on Abkhazia. This prompted Abkhazia to restrict UN observation of disarmament. UNOMIG found the heavy weapons storage site in Ochamchira frequently closed to inspection and its patrols restricted from sensitive Abkhaz military locations in the Gali sector.

Many Georgians, for their part, blamed Russia for the loss of Abkhazia and wanted to see all Russian units removed from Georgian territory.<sup>162</sup> In late 1999, Western Georgia continued to be heavily militarised and armed, with no real progress towards disarmament, and the underlying causes of the conflict remained unresolved.<sup>163</sup> It has been suggested that:

The presence of Russian peacekeeping forces and UNOMIG observers may provide minimal assistance, but they certainly will not solve the security problems. Thus it is likely that western Georgia will remain a battleground for some time.<sup>164</sup>

A key weakness of demilitarisation efforts in Abkhazia was an inability to securitise the cease-fire. Although UNOMIG and CISPKF had successes at various points in restricting heavy weapons – their ‘remonstrations with local military authorities have minimised the reintroduction of heavy weapons into the weapons restricted zone’ – they failed to fully provide the security or protection role envisaged in the mandate.<sup>165</sup> UNOMIG, as an unarmed observer force, was never in a position to seriously underwrite security; the CISPKF, which had the military capacity, refused to do so.<sup>166</sup>

In Transdniester and Tajikistan, Russian troops found themselves in the line of fire and quickly became parties to the conflict, despite orders to remain neutral. In Tajikistan, the Russian presence evolved from a position of relative neutrality when the civil war broke out in May 1992 to a position of increasing military presence, accompanied, it is alleged, by a gradual turning of the republic into a Russian protectorate with the backing of the government of Tajikistan.<sup>167</sup> The 201st Motorised Rifle Division (MRD) even allegedly became involved in arming one faction in the conflict.<sup>168</sup>

In Moldova, where Transdniester was attempting secession, the 14th Army more or less openly took sides with ethnic Russians. There were soon allegations of partiality with Moldovans suggesting that insurgents of the ‘Dniester Republic’ were permitted to maintain armed units and munition stockpiles in the disengagement zone.

Similarly, large groupings of Russian forces in Ingushetiya and North Ossetia seemed to favour<sup>169</sup> Ossetians against Ingush militias following their military intervention in November 1992.<sup>170</sup>

The Russian intervention in Chechenia in December 1994 was undertaken by the Kremlin under the ‘pretext’ that it was:

just another ‘peace’ operation aimed at ‘restoring constitutional order’ and ‘disarming illegal formations’.<sup>171</sup>

However, as the operation progressed, some Russian troops unofficially sold their weapons to Chechen soldiers.<sup>172</sup> Russian troops left with the Chechens still holding substantial stocks of arms and ammunition and refusing to disband or demilitarise their forces. Indeed, following Russia's departure, Chechenia formed its own regular military forces. Chechenia's refusal to disarm and demilitarise gained much of its force from the perception that Russia was likely to be a potential aggressor for some time to come, despite the phrasing of the May 1997 peace treaty.<sup>173</sup> This was borne out with a second Russian intervention in 1999.

During Russian and CIS 'peacekeeping' operations there was little interest in comprehensive disarmament. Disarmament was only generally undertaken insofar as it advanced military and political objectives, or where it would assist in protecting CIS troops, and then only to a limited extent. These partial demilitarisation interventions left unaddressed the proliferation of LWs and did little to promote lasting solutions to conflict outbreaks. Indeed, they tended to merely freeze or even perpetuate conflict,<sup>174</sup> but this was not a matter of primary concern to Russian intervention in the 'near abroad', which was largely driven by national interest.

#### **4.42 Assessment**

Russian/CIS disarmament initiatives, then, were not necessarily intended to achieve conflict resolution. It has been suggested that their rationale was more often to advance Russian national interests in the near abroad, such as economic interests (especially in relation to oil); to advance strategic interests, such as forward military basing;<sup>175</sup> to protect the rights and interests of the Russian diaspora; to bolster Russian security against the 'Islamic threat' or against instability in the Caucasus which might spill over into the Russian federation; to limit the sovereignty of other CIS states; and to promote Russia as a regional hegemon.<sup>176</sup> Further, they were limited in scope: Russian/CIS troops rarely attempted to achieve comprehensive disarmament or a secure environment. Indeed, it often suited Russian national interests to maintain a state of insecurity which created a continued need for the deployment of Russian troops. Disarmament was limited to zones, and even within delimited zones it was frequently incomplete, or parties were allowed to keep arms, or were supplied with them to manipulate political and military outcomes. In most conflict zones where Russian/CIS forces intervened, they had the capacity to achieve at least tactical coercive

disarmament, but the potential utility of acting proactively – for example, to act against parties breaking mandates and create secure environments in the hope of encouraging settlements – was lost through the partisanship of Russian intervention, or through inertia.

In Abkhazia, for example, Russian intervention led to a situation where the state of Georgia was ‘saved’ from collapsing and the conflict was frozen with neither side able to prevail, but low-intensity conflict continued with both sides still heavily armed. The quantities of arms seized were negligible and were not sufficient to demilitarise the conflict. The Russians had the capacity to rein in spoiler behaviour in Abkhazia/Georgia, but chose instead to manipulate it at times for strategic benefits. The Georgians, for their part, had to agree to a Russian military presence as part of the cost of maintaining Georgia as an independent state.

However, although disarmament was not structured in a manner that was likely to create confidence between the parties,<sup>177</sup> it has been suggested that Russian/CIS interventions have sometimes led to the termination of violence. The deployment of Russian troops resulted in the cessation of violence in hot spots, such as South Ossetia, and North Ossetia, for a protracted period following summer 1992;<sup>178</sup> and also violence reduction in the Transdniester region, where the carnage in the town of Bendery was ended by the Russian 14th Army before the formal peacekeeping units were set up.<sup>179</sup>

#### **4.43 Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)/United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)**

A civil war had broken out in Liberia following the overthrow of President Doe and his government by rebels led by Charles Taylor.<sup>180</sup> By July 1990, ‘all semblance of civil authority within Liberia had ceased to exist’.<sup>181</sup> Rebel forces, which had split into opposing factions, had taken all of Liberia, apart from the capital Monrovia. Widespread killings were taking place and a humanitarian catastrophe was in the offing. Into this chaotic situation, ECOWAS deployed ECOMOG to demilitarise and disarm the various heavily-armed factions, which not only perpetuated the fighting but also foreclosed any attempt to address the humanitarian problems that Liberia faced.

‘Operation Liberty’, which commenced with the landing of ECOMOG troops in Monrovia on 24 August 1990, was unusual in that it was undertaken without the consent of all the warring parties in the Liberian conflict and without a prior cease-fire

agreement. Further, it had a mandate that encompassed both peacekeeping and peace enforcement.<sup>182</sup>

The mission was problematic from the outset. The disembarking troops came under a barrage of artillery fire from the leading rebel force, the NPFL, which had opposed the deployment of a peacekeeping force.<sup>183</sup> In contrast, the two other main factions – the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) – saw the value of co-operation with ECOMOG; not least because of the protection it could offer them.<sup>184</sup> Initially, ECOMOG's commander saw the force's role as that of a peacekeeper rather than a peace enforcer, but following the killing of President Doe and his body guards at ECOMOG headquarters on 9 September 1990, and other violent incidents, ECOMOG shifted to peace enforcement using offensive weaponry and air capability to engage the NPFL.

On 28 November, Taylor and other combatants signed a cease-fire at Bamako in Mali. With the Bamako cease-fire, ECOMOG returned to peacekeeping. The cease-fire lasted for two years, but this period of relative peace saw the parties rebuild and re-arm and little progress was made in terms of demilitarising Liberia.

The Yamoussoukro Accords, negotiated between July and October 1991, raised expectations that the disarmament issue would be addressed. They provided for a cease-fire, disarmament, and encampment, to be followed by elections. However, it proved to be a tenuous agreement. Although the cease-fire between the NPFL and ECOMOG was maintained throughout the country, Taylor refused to disarm. ECOMOG's Field Commander of the time concluded:

I now realise that I was wrong about Taylor's intention. It is quite clear that Taylor is not sincere about disarmament.<sup>185</sup>

Taylor's resistance to disarmament and the ECOMOG intervention stemmed largely from the perception that he had earned the right to rule Liberia having defeated Doe and ending up controlling 95% of the territory of Liberia.<sup>186</sup>

In November 1992, ECOWAS imposed sanctions and barred arms shipments from member states into NPFL-held territory. The ECOWAS heads of state also sanctioned ECOWAS to implement the encampment and disarmament of all combatants of the warring parties and to use force against the NPFL. ECOMOG started bombing NPFL strongholds and supply lines.<sup>187</sup> ECOMOG was once again embarking upon an aggressive peace enforcement campaign, which saw Taylor lose territory, and

which was followed by the Cotonou peace agreement. At a July 1993 meeting in Cotonou, Benin, the parties agreed to another cease-fire.

Disarmament was central to Cotonou, as was later explicitly expressed by SCR 5793 of 25 February 1994. A critical element of the process was for the parties to submit a full inventory of their weaponry. Under the Cotonou agreement, all weapons and war-like materiel was to be handed over to ECOMOG and stored in armouries. Combatants were to pass into encampments to serve as transit points to demobilisation and rehabilitation. ECOMOG had the authority to disarm any combatants or non-combatants, including the right to resort to force under its enforcement powers of Article 8.<sup>188</sup> However, this raised:

NPFL fears that ECOMOG might forcibly implement the Accord and one day attack with a view to eliminating them from the Liberian equation.<sup>189</sup>

In an attempt to deal with Taylor's concerns regarding the partiality<sup>190</sup> of the strong Nigerian contingent within ECOMOG, extra East African troops were incorporated into ECOMOG; and UNOMIL was deployed to fulfil a confidence-building role.

As well as the disarmament provisions, ECOWAS and the UN were mandated to impose military embargoes on the warring parties, preventing the importation of arms, and it was determined that importing arms and ammunition and the recruiting and training of combatants constituted violations of the cease-fire agreement. UNOMIL's role was to monitor the UN/ECOWAS arms embargo and to 'assist in the disarmament and demobilisation of combatants'.<sup>191</sup>

Cotonou was, in its linkage with UNOMIL, substantially different to the Yamoussoukro process. Whereas under the Yamoussoukro IV accord, ECOWAS was solely responsible for implementation of the accord, under Cotonou it had to work with UN observer teams, which, in theory, conferred a 'more convincing impartiality'.<sup>192</sup> The hope was that this would encourage the NPFL to:

submit themselves more readily to the conditions relating to disarmament and encampment. Although the parties were to hand over weapons to ECOMOG (in its expanded form) this process was now to be monitored and verified by the UN Observer Mission in a way that went far beyond the Yamoussoukro IV Accord.<sup>193</sup>

The accord was seen by the parties as a step forward, with the NPFL, in particular, encouraged by the limited authority wielded by ECOMOG.

However, the implementation of Cotonou was poor. AAs were not opened in all the agreed locations and ECOMOG soldiers failed to deploy in a comprehensive

manner. As a result, after an initial flow of arms from the factions, disarmament was largely halted by June 1994, with the exception of the Liberian Peace Council (LPC). Also, the factions' declarations of numbers of combatants and arms appeared to be false.<sup>194</sup> A central flaw in the Cotonou disarmament process was the inability of ECOMOG to establish a secure environment at sites where disarmament was to take place. ECOMOG was supposed to deploy an infantry battalion to protect UNOMIL observers and the disarmament process, but it was slow in doing this. A particular problem was looting and extortion by local gangs at disarmament areas. When ECOMOG did deploy, armed elements interfered in the sites, but ECOMOG infantry failed to protect ex-combatants within them.<sup>195</sup>

Without effective nation-wide security, disarmament was not possible, and partial disarmament only led to insecurity and the emergence of armed, lawless sub-groups. ECOWAS during the Cotonou process did not have:

sufficient forces in Liberia to maintain a reasonable level of security and deploy to all the proposed encampment areas for disarmament.<sup>196</sup>

However, some observers maintained that disarmament could have been more comprehensive – there were sectors where disarmament and reconciliation appeared to be emerging – with 'more aggressive funding at an earlier stage and a more intrusive mandate'.<sup>197</sup>

Attempts to disarm were particularly undermined by factionalism among the parties. Although the leaderships of the factions ensured some conformity to Cotonou within Monrovia, outside Monrovia neither they nor ECOMOG could necessarily maintain tactical consent to disarmament. The behaviour of 'sub-factions' was unpredictable and tended to be determined more by local circumstances than by the dictates of the peace process. Further, many of these fighters were poorly disciplined, did not receive salaries, and were compelled to live off the land. Control over disarmament, in effect, passed out the hands of the parties' leadership to autonomous gangs and individuals in the field.

In addition, UNOMIL found in April/May 1994 that even where there was a will to disarm:

widespread exhaustion and...local fears for individual security and the need to stay armed in a weapon carrying environment proved stronger than the dictates of the Cotonou peace plan and in some cases even stronger than orders to disarm from faction leaders themselves.<sup>198</sup>

Civilians were heavily armed in the absence of a secure environment. Without arms, civilians were likely to be robbed by sub-factional elements. In a lawless society, and after four years of civil war in which weapons had proliferated, arms were essential to individual security. This suggested that a necessary condition of security was a disarmament programme that removed power from the factions and sub-factions, and prevented gangs from terrorising and extorting the civilian population, but ECOMOG was unable to achieve this.<sup>199</sup>

Cotonou concealed underlying difficulties between the factions, who started to undermine the agreement, and fighting broke out again. It continued in mid-1994, despite the formation of a new government and ECOMOG's attempts to demobilise the factions.

The peace process was once again renewed with the Abuja Accord signed on 19 August 1995. Disarmament was factored into the accord and was due to start in December 1995. ECOMOG was to carry out comprehensive disarmament under the accord, supervised by UNOMIL, according to procedures laid down in the Cotonou Accord. Taylor announced that the Liberian war was over and that he would tell his soldiers to lay down their arms.<sup>200</sup> By August 1995, 8,000 former fighters had been effectively demobilised.<sup>201</sup> But the disarmament process once again stalled. Within three weeks of the Accord, fighting between the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (Ulimo)-Hrahn and Ulimo-Mandingo had broken out, and in early October 1995 it was claimed that the Mandingo faction of Ulimo had attacked Taylor's base in Bbrango. The process of disarmament was 'indefinitely suspended' by ECOMOG in January 1996 after fighting broke out between Nigerian soldiers and Ulimo-J over diamond mining areas in December 1995, with several Nigerians being killed and over 100 taken hostage.<sup>202</sup>

The lack of proactive action from ECOMOG encouraged the parties to increasingly try to undermine and limit disarmament prior to elections. Taylor refused to disarm and suggested that it was best to implement disarmament following elections, in direct contravention of the Abuja agreement. He also sought to bring ECOMOG forces under the control of the Liberian Council of State, which he dominated. Ulimo-J's leader, Roosevelt Johnson, in a speech on 31 January 1996, claimed that total disarmament was unknown in modern world history and was probably dangerous for the sovereignty of Liberia:



We are not going to give our arms to ECOMOG. You have become a faction already...

We don't know what will happen next. Maybe they will colonise us.<sup>203</sup>

Johnson and other factional leaders called for a Liberian military force to be established alongside ECOMOG before disarmament. Taylor also appeared to be trying to control the disarmament process by demanding 'partial' disarmament in declared 'safe havens', such as Monrovia, and other places with high population densities. This, it was suspected, was to avoid disarmament of the NPFL which had heavy concentrations of troops in rural areas.<sup>204</sup>

Following Taylor's attempts, with the connivance of the Council, to arrest Johnson on murder charges, warlords went on the rampage in Monrovia. One serious mistake made after Abuja had been to:

allow the militias of the warring factions to enter Monrovia in large numbers, rather than secure speedy disarmament and demobilisation outside the capital. Indeed, like other warlords, Johnson...had managed to turn his home into an arsenal of weapons.<sup>205</sup>

The Nigerians, however, instructed ECOMOG to remain neutral and to treat the matter as an internal affair. In fact, it was alleged that ECOMOG soldiers participated in the looting of Monrovia.<sup>206</sup>

Notwithstanding these difficulties, a revised version of the Abuja Accord was signed on 17 August 1996 and a new disarmament and demobilisation timetable was set out to be completed by 31 January 1997, along with the dissolution of all warring factions by 28 February 1997. However, little disarmament planning had been carried out and issues such as who would disarm the combatants (ECOMOG or UNOMIL?) and where disarmament would take place were unresolved.<sup>207</sup>

The disarmament process began on schedule on 22 November 1996 and by January more than 12,500 fighters had been disarmed and demobilised, according to the UN.<sup>208</sup> By February 1997, 30,058 fighters were said to have been disarmed with 14,156 guns and 1.65m rounds of ammunition turned in.<sup>209</sup> ECOMOG claimed that the 'remaining military capability and command structure of the country's warring factions had been removed'.<sup>210</sup> Nevertheless, despite the collection of thousands of weapons, it was widely thought that the militias had kept weapons hidden, and arms caches still remained to be discovered, and only half of the estimated 60,000 militia had been disarmed.<sup>211</sup> Disarmament, however, was 'progressively implemented in spite of the United Nations, not because of it', according to critics.<sup>212</sup> A major factor in cementing the peace and disarmament process appeared to be the goodwill that developed between

Charles Taylor and Nigeria's former military ruler, Gen. Sani Abacha. In its final manifestation,<sup>213</sup> disarmament was described as an effective component of the peace process.<sup>214</sup>

#### **4.44 Assessment**

The Liberian conflict was extremely complex with multiple factions and sub-factions engaged in fighting, and the absence of central authority and order. Further, there was no cease-fire in place when ECOMOG intervened, and as the mission unfolded it was clear that there was little consensus between the parties that could coalesce into a durable peace settlement. In these conditions, implementing a disarmament strategy was always likely to be problematic. Further, ECOMOG was hampered in terms of its size. With a maximum of 12,500 peacekeepers, and sometimes as few as 2,700, it was frequently unable to act proactively – to protect parties prepared to disarm and demobilise, for example – although it could hold onto, and maintain some kind of security within, Monrovia. It has been suggested that its constitution tended to prolong the conflict, rather than force a resolution<sup>215</sup>

In fact, ECOMOG could not determine whether to impose coercive disarmament or facilitate co-operative disarmament.

It simultaneously attempted impartial peacekeeping (without a peace to keep) and biased peace enforcement. ECOMOG's title – 'Cease-fire Monitoring Group' – suggests the former interpretation, but the active NPFL antagonism sometimes forced the latter.<sup>216</sup>

Further, there appeared to be differences in opinion or interpretation between ECOMOG officers as to what extent their 'peace enforcement' mission was a limited activity or more akin to war.<sup>217</sup>

Part of ECOMOG's dilemma lay in how to deal with Johnson. ECOMOG's intervention cut across the interests of Johnson, who was on the verge of taking control of Liberia before ECOMOG deployed. In the event, it adopted a 'half-way house' strategy. By acting partially, and indeed, at times actively targeting Johnson and engaging in war-fighting, ECOMOG made little progress in achieving settlement stability in Liberia, as it was unable to defeat him, and could only retain Monrovia. Attempts to mitigate ECOMOG's partiality through the deployment of UNOMIL had limited success. It has been suggested that the ECOMOG/UNOMIL linkage was flawed in that many Liberians saw UNOMIL as subordinated to ECOMOG and unable to

verify or monitor ECOMOG activities, particularly when they saw UNOMIL vehicles being stopped and searched at ECOMOG roadblocks.<sup>218</sup> UNOMIL was not seen as a credible confidence-builder and counter-balance to the perceived partiality of ECOMOG, and consequently lost the trust of local factions and also the confidence of contributor states. By Spring 1995, UNOMIL had been shrunk from 303 observers to only 77.

The switching between coercive disarmament and co-operative disarmament, and the partial disarmament it brought about, probably heightened insecurity in Liberia. A secure, disarmed environment was not achieved for much of the mission and there was an 'absence of adequate confidence-building mechanisms', despite the fact that a general war-weariness existed in Liberia in the mid-1990s, even among enthusiastic fighters. The war-lords were generally mistrusted, and the population wanted a national leader of reconciliation and post-war reconstruction.<sup>219</sup> The eventual emergence of what appeared to be a durable peace settlement could not be attributed to an informed disarmament strategy during the protracted course of the ECOMOG mission.

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> Philip Towle, *Enforced Disarmament: From the Napoleonic Campaigns to the Gulf War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).

<sup>2</sup> It is well-known that, following Versailles, Germany was subject to restrictions on the size of its armed forces; less well-known is the fact that Germany suffered a serious small arms proliferation problem following the First World War, as German soldiers were not systematically disarmed. In 1920, it was estimated that 1.9m rifles were being held illegally, along with 8,452 machine guns. See Richard Bessel, *Germany After the First World War* (Oxford: 1993), pp. 81 and 261, cited in Niall Ferguson, *The Pity of War* (London: Penguin, 1998), p. 390.

<sup>3</sup> Fred Tanner, 'Consensual Versus Coercive Disarmament' in Estanislao Angel Zawels, Stephen John Stedman, Donald C. F. Daniel, David Cox, Jane Boulden, Fred Tanner, Jakkie Potgieter, and Virginia Gamba, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: The Issues*, UNIDIR/96/46 (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996), p. 191.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> Some scholars have suggested that the 'newness' of peace operations is questionable: the UN had already attempted similar operations during the Cold War. See, for example, Alan James, 'Is There a Second Generation of Peacekeeping?', *International Peacekeeping*, September-November 1994.

<sup>6</sup> These new types of peacekeeping have also been referred to, for example, as 'second generation peacekeeping', 'peace operations', and 'peace enforcement'. They marked a reaction to the fact that parties engaged in peace processes following internal conflicts were frequently not adhering to commitments signed up to in peace agreements; peacekeepers were finding themselves under attack; and UN operations suffered from a general lack of authority in the field. For insights into the new 'peacekeeping' thinking and how it evolved over time see, for example: Elgin Clemons, 'No Peace to Keep: Six and Three-Quarters Peacekeepers', *International Law and Politics*, vol. 26, no 107, 1993; Steven R. Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the Cold War* (New York: St. Martin's Press for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1995); Trevor Findlay, 'The New Peacekeeping and the New Peacekeepers', in Trevor Findlay (ed.), *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers*, SIPRI Research Report no. 12 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Michael Pugh, *From Mission Cringe to Mission Creep? Implications of New Peace Support Operations Doctrine*, Forsvarsstudier 2 (Oslo: Institutt for Forsvarsstudier, 1997); Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes

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(eds.), *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995); British Army Field Manual, *Wider Peacekeeping* (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1995); Jasjit Singh, 'United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: The Challenge of Change', *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 19, no. 4; John Gerard Ruggie, *The United Nations and the Collective Use of Force: Whither – or Whether?* (New York: the United Nations Association of the United States of America, June 1996); John Gerard Ruggie, 'The New US Peacekeeping Doctrine', *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 17, no. 4, Autumn 1994; John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, *A Draft Concept of Second Generation Multinational Operations 1993* (Providence: Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 1993); Shashi Tharoor, *Peacekeeping: Principles, Problems, Prospects*, Research Report 9-93 (Newport: US Naval War College, 1993); British Army Field Manual, *Peace Support Operations* (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1997); Mats R. Berdal, *Whither UN Peacekeeping?*, Adelphi Paper 281 (London: Brassey's for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993); Charles Dobbie, 'A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping', *Survival*, vol. 36, no. 3, Autumn 1994; Jerzy Ciecchanski, 'Enforcement Measures Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: UN Practice After the Cold War', in Michael Pugh (ed.), 'The UN, Peace and Force', Special Issue, *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 3, no. 4, Winter 1996; Marrack Goulding, 'The Use of Force by the United Nations', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 3, no. 1, Spring 1996; Timothy Wallace Crawford, 'Why Minimum Force Won't Work: Doctrine and Deterrence in Bosnia and Beyond', *Global Governance*, vol. 4, no. 2, April-June 1998; John Hillen, *Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations* (Washington: Brassey's, 1998); and Tom Woodhouse, 'The Gentle Hand of Peace? British Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution in Complex Political Emergencies', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 6, no. 2, Summer 1999.

<sup>7</sup> Philip Wilkinson, 'Sharpening the Weapons of Peace: Peace Support Operations and Complex Emergencies', in Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham (eds.), 'Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution,' Special Issue, *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 7, no. 1, Spring 2000, p. 77.

<sup>8</sup> Timothy Wallace Crawford, 'Why Minimum Force Won't Work: Doctrine and Deterrence in Bosnia and Beyond', p. 240.

<sup>9</sup> Fred Tanner, 'Consensual Versus Coercive Disarmament', p. 190.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 192.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> Pavel Baev, 'Peacekeeping and Conflict Management in Eurasia', in Roy Allison and Christoph Bluth (eds.), *Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998), p. 216.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 221.

<sup>14</sup> Ettore Greco, *Delegating Peace Operations: Improvisation and Innovation in Georgia and Albania*, UNA-USA International Dialogue on the Enforcement of Security Council Resolutions, March 1998, p. 12.

<sup>15</sup> Espen Barth Eide and Per Erik Solli, *From Blue to Green: The Transition from UNPROFOR to IFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Working Paper no. 539 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, December 1995), pp. 9-11.

<sup>16</sup> Dick A. Leurdijk, 'Before and After Dayton: the UN and NATO in the Former Yugoslavia', in Thomas G. Weiss (ed.), *Beyond UN Subcontracting: Task-Sharing with Regional Security Arrangements and Service-Providing NGOs* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), p. 55.

<sup>17</sup> James B. Steinberg, 'International Involvement in the Yugoslavia Conflict', in Lori Fisler Damrosch (ed.), *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), p. 40.

<sup>18</sup> David Cox, 'Peacekeeping and Disarmament: Peace Agreements, Security Council Mandates, and the Disarmament Experience', in *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: The Issues*, UNIDIR/96/46 (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996), p. 117.

<sup>19</sup> Barbara Ekwall-Uebelhart and Andrei Raevsky, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina*, UNIDIR/96/7 (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996), p. 37.

<sup>20</sup> David Cox, 'Peacekeeping and Disarmament: Peace Agreements, Security Council Mandates, and the Disarmament Experience', p. 113.

<sup>21</sup> Four sectors were created in Croatia: Sectors West and East in Slovenia and Sectors North and South in Krajina.

<sup>22</sup> David Cox, 'Peacekeeping and Disarmament: Peace Agreements, Security Council Mandates, and the Disarmament Experience', p. 114.

<sup>23</sup> Barbara Ekwall-Uebelhart and Andrei Raevsky, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina*, p. 106.

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- <sup>24</sup> David Cox, 'Peacekeeping and Disarmament: Peace Agreements, Security Council Mandates, and the Disarmament Experience', p. 115.
- <sup>25</sup> Barbara Ekwall-Uebelhart and Andrei Raevsky, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina*, pp. 108-109.
- <sup>26</sup> David Cox, 'Peacekeeping and Disarmament: Peace Agreements, Security Council Mandates, and the Disarmament Experience', p. 117.
- <sup>27</sup> Barbara Ekwall-Uebelhart and Andrei Raevsky, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina*, p. 112.
- <sup>28</sup> The Vance-Owen peace plan included an ambitious disarmament programme, but this was not adopted by the international community.
- <sup>29</sup> Barbara Ekwall-Uebelhart and Andrei Raevsky, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina*, pp. 47-48.
- <sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 53.
- <sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 33.
- <sup>32</sup> James B. Steinberg, 'International Involvement in the Yugoslavia Conflict', p. 36.
- <sup>33</sup> Barbara Ekwall-Uebelhart and Andrei Raevsky, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina*, p. 73.
- <sup>34</sup> Under UN SCR 824, 6 May 1993.
- <sup>35</sup> United Nations Reference Paper, *The United Nations and the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 15 March 1994), p. 15.
- <sup>36</sup> Nordland alleges that when Bosnian Serbs violated their own agreements and blocked a British convoy on its way to the Gorazde safe haven, the UN's Special Representative, Yasushi Akashi, agreed that the Serbs could move at least five tanks across the 20km zone around Sarajevo from which heavy Serb weapons were banned under threat of NATO airstrikes, in exchange for letting the convoy in. See Rod Nordland, 'The Mouse Ate the Cat', *Newsweek*, 16 May 1994, p. 18.
- <sup>37</sup> Barbara Ekwall-Uebelhart and Andrei Raevsky, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina*, p. 83.
- <sup>38</sup> David Cox, 'Peacekeeping and Disarmament: Peace Agreements, Security Council Mandates, and the Disarmament Experience', p. 119.
- <sup>39</sup> Jan Willem Honig and Norbert Both, *Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime* (London: Penguin, 1996).
- <sup>40</sup> Barbara Ekwall-Uebelhart and Andrei Raevsky, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina*, p. 94.
- <sup>41</sup> For a detailed examination of the UN and NATO use of airpower in Bosnia see Carsten F. Rønnfeldt and Per Erik Solli (eds.), *Use of Air Power in Peace Operations*, Peacekeeping and Multinational Operations report, no. 7 (Oslo: UN Programme, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1997), pp. 94-114.
- <sup>42</sup> Simon Jenkins, 'The Real Catastrophe', *The Times*, 24 March 1999, p. 20.
- <sup>43</sup> Dick A. Leurdijk, 'Before and After Dayton: the UN and NATO in the Former Yugoslavia', p. 57.
- <sup>44</sup> Michael Rose, *Military Aspects of Peacekeeping and Peace Support Operations: Lessons from Bosnia*, Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar Och Tidskrift, Symposium, 3 October 1996, p. I-31
- <sup>45</sup> Ekwall-Uebelhart and Raevsky maintain that the effective implementation of disarmament in Croatia and Bosnia was dependent upon two considerations. First, on the 'presence of a real or perceived superior UNPROFOR strength, and with a credible threat of forceful implementation' (Barbara Ekwall-Uebelhart and Andrei Raevsky, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina*, p. 152). Second, on a situation where the interests of the parties were advanced, particularly in terms of security. They suggest that disarmament was impossible without the international community being able to give credible security guarantees. See *ibid.*
- <sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 151.
- <sup>47</sup> United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, third edition (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), p. 287.
- <sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 288.
- <sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 289.
- <sup>50</sup> Clement Adibe, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia*, UNIDIR/95/30 (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1995), p. 44.
- <sup>51</sup> Jonathan T. Howe, 'The United States and United Nations in Somalia: The Limits of Involvement', *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 18, no. 3, Summer 1995, p. 51.
- <sup>52</sup> John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1995), p. 27.
- <sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 33.

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- <sup>54</sup> For a critique of UN policy in Somalia by a former UN Special Representative see Mohamed Sahnoun, *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994), pp. 51-57.
- <sup>55</sup> In UNOSOM II the QRF and the Rangers were also outside UN command and, in fact, all the major SCRs on Somalia, including the nation-building resolution of UNOSOM II, were written by United States officials and 'handed to the United Nations as faits accomplis', it has been suggested (Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, 'Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention', p. 73).
- <sup>56</sup> Christopher Clapham, 'Problems of Peace Enforcement: Some Lessons from Multinational Peacekeeping Operations in Africa', in Jakkie Cilliers and Greg Mills (eds.), *Peacekeeping in Africa*, vol. 2 (Pretoria: Institute for Defence Policy, 1995), p. 138.
- <sup>57</sup> Stated in the clause dealing with disarmament and security, 'The Addis Ababa Agreement of the First Session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia', March 1993, cited in Margaret A. Vogt, 'Demobilisation in Somalia: Problems and Prospects', *Life & Peace Review*, vol. 8, no. 4, 1994, p. 27.
- <sup>58</sup> John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, p. 95.
- <sup>59</sup> United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 293.
- <sup>60</sup> Key questions included what constituted a secure environment, the extent to which it involved disarmament, and what 'all necessary means' meant in disarmament terms.
- <sup>61</sup> United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 295.
- <sup>62</sup> John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, p. 105.
- <sup>63</sup> United States reluctance to disarm had its basis in the perception that disarming Somalia would involve the United States in the Somali political process; it would involve significant United States casualties; that the security situation was too complex; and that active disarmament would have been too expensive. See Robert G. Patman, 'Disarming Somalia: The Contrasting Fortunes of United States and Australian Peacekeepers during United Nations Intervention, 1992-1993', *African Affairs*, vol. 96, October 1997.
- <sup>64</sup> *The Age* (Melbourne), 15 December 1992, cited in Robert G. Patman, 'Disarming Somalia: The Contrasting Fortunes of United States and Australian Peacekeepers during United Nations Intervention, 1992-1993', p. 511.
- <sup>65</sup> Clement Adibe, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia*, p. 73.
- <sup>66</sup> John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, p. 104.
- <sup>67</sup> *Reuters*, 17 December 1992, cited in Robert G. Patman, 'Disarming Somalia: The Contrasting Fortunes of United States and Australian Peacekeepers during United Nations Intervention, 1992-1993', p. 512.
- <sup>68</sup> Clement Adibe, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia*, p. 77.
- <sup>69</sup> Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), p. 36.
- <sup>70</sup> F. M. Lorenz, 'Rules of Engagement in Somalia: Were They Effective?', *Naval Law Review*, May 1995, p. 64.
- <sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 64-65.
- <sup>72</sup> John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, p. 81.
- <sup>73</sup> Clement Adibe, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia*, p. 77.
- <sup>74</sup> John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, p. 59.
- <sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 83.
- <sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 99.
- <sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 154.
- <sup>78</sup> Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, 'Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention', pp. 75-76.
- <sup>79</sup> The United States contingent in the MNF deployed in a complex civil conflict in Beirut, found itself caught up in war-fighting with factions, rather than peacekeeping, and withdrew in 1984 in the aftermath of a suicide car-bomb attack on the United States battalion landing team headquarters in October 1983. For insights into the predicaments faced by the MNF, see Anthony McDermott and Kjell Skjelsbaek (eds.), *The Multinational Force in Beirut, 1982-1984* (Miami: Florida International University, 1991).
- <sup>80</sup> John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, p. 156.

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<sup>81</sup> The transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II (March 1993-July 1994) went unanimously through the SC under SCR 814, 26 March 1993.

<sup>82</sup> Jonathan T. Howe noted in respect to the ambitious UNOSOM II mandate that if disarmament had been avoided by UNITAF was it 'realistic to assume that the UN could accomplish it with more limited means?' (Jonathan T. Howe, 'The United States and United Nations in Somalia: The Limits of Involvement', p. 52).

<sup>83</sup> Robert G. Patman, 'Disarming Somalia: The Contrasting Fortunes of United States and Australian Peacekeepers during United Nations Intervention, 1992-1993', p. 519.

<sup>84</sup> Clement Adibe, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia*, p. 81.

<sup>85</sup> John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, p. 113.

<sup>86</sup> Robert G. Patman, 'Disarming Somalia: The Contrasting Fortunes of United States and Australian Peacekeepers during United Nations Intervention, 1992-1993', p. 518.

<sup>87</sup> United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 303.

<sup>88</sup> F. M. Lorenz, 'Rules of Engagement in Somalia: Were They Effective?', p. 69.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 70.

<sup>90</sup> According to John Drysdale, a senior political adviser to the UN in Somalia, who had fought with the Somalis in the Second World War, they had a 'kamikaze tradition' and a resistance to foreign intervention which he had warned the UN would render their continued presence in Mogadishu untenable following the UN's retaliation after the Pakistani incident (Richard Ellis, 'UN Aide Blasts "Incompetence" in Somalia', *The Sunday Times*, 10 October 1993, p. 18).

<sup>91</sup> John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, p. 121.

<sup>92</sup> United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, pp. 303-305.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 310.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 315.

<sup>95</sup> Margaret A. Vogt, 'Demobilisation in Somalia: Problems and Prospects', p. 27.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 28.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>98</sup> The approach of the Zimbabwe forces was to seek to 'dominate' the Bakara market area through cordon and search, patrolling, conducting sweeps, and establishing short- and long-term road blocks as well as searches. A robust style of patrolling was adopted, and despite the operation taking place in the dangerous area of Bakara, there were no shooting incidents, which was put down to the preponderance of force exerted by the patrols. See Martin R. Rupiya, 'The Bakara Market Arms Clearance Operation of 1993: The Zimbabwe National Army in Somalia', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 4, no. 1, Spring 1997, pp. 117-118.

<sup>99</sup> Commander, Australian Forces Somalia, Post Operation Report, *Operation Solace (CAFS POR)*, 28 May 1993, p. 10, cited in Australia Army, 'Lessons-Learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)', United Nations Lessons Learned Unit seminar, Plainsboro, New Jersey, 13-15 September 1995, p. 3.

<sup>100</sup> For a description of the security conditions and clan politics in Baidoa see *ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

<sup>101</sup> Robert G. Patman, 'Disarming Somalia: The Contrasting Fortunes of United States and Australian Peacekeepers during United Nations Intervention, 1992-1993', p. 521.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 523.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>104</sup> Tamara Duffey, 'Cultural Issues in Contemporary Peacekeeping', in Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham (eds.), 'Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution,' Special Issue, *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 7, no. 1, Spring 2000, p. 157.

<sup>105</sup> Telephone interview with Colonel Hurley, 25 January 1994, cited in Robert G. Patman, 'Disarming Somalia: The Contrasting Fortunes of United States and Australian Peacekeepers during United Nations Intervention, 1992-1993', p. 526.

<sup>106</sup> I. Harris, Testimony to Joint Standing Committee Inquiry into Australia's Participation in Peacekeeping', Official Hansard Transcription, 9 November 1993, p. 281, cited in Australia Army, 'Lessons-Learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)', p. 9.

<sup>107</sup> Robert G. Patman, 'Disarming Somalia: The Contrasting Fortunes of United States and Australian Peacekeepers during United Nations Intervention, 1992-1993', p. 526.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 527.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 531.

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<sup>110</sup> A Somali agriculturist quoted in Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, *Somalia Operation Restore Hope: A Preliminary Assessment* (London: African Rights, 1993), p. 20, cited in Robert G. Patman, 'Disarming Somalia: The Contrasting Fortunes of United States and Australian Peacekeepers during United Nations Intervention, 1992-1993', p. 531.

<sup>111</sup> As Vogt notes: 'For as long as the United Nations is not in the position to provide the disarmed communities with effective defence against attacks from the rival factions, it becomes difficult to implement a credible programme of disarmament and demobilisation' (Margaret A. Vogt, 'Demobilisation in Somalia: Problems and Prospects', p. 28).

<sup>112</sup> According to Vogt, the fighting forces in Somalia could be divided into three groupings: the factional militia groups; the clan or community militia groups; and militiamen who joined the factional or clan militia whenever their services were required (*ibid.*, p. 26).

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>114</sup> Tamara Duffey, 'Cultural Issues in Contemporary Peacekeeping', p. 158.

<sup>115</sup> It has been argued that a policy that allowed unarmed Somalis to emerge as political players and changed the Somali power balance should have been in effect from the start and would have been a means of countering the war lords. See Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, 'Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention', p. 80.

<sup>116</sup> For the first time, the UN was evoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter to restore a democratically elected president. The UN also stressed the importance of the state of the Haitian economy to the success of the UN mission and how poverty in Haiti required sustained international attention. See United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 635.

<sup>117</sup> Justin Morris, 'Force and Democracy: UN/US Intervention in Haiti', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 2, no. 3, Autumn 1995, p. 394.

<sup>118</sup> A. Parsons, *From Cold War to Hot Peace: UN Interventions 1947-1994* (London: Michael Joseph, 1995), p. 208, cited in Justin Morris, 'Force and Democracy: UN/US Intervention in Haiti', p. 392.

<sup>119</sup> See UN SCR 940, 31 July 1994.

<sup>120</sup> Neil M. O'Connor, 'Micro-Disarming Demobilised Societies' ([www.us.net/cip/dialogue/9601in02.htm](http://www.us.net/cip/dialogue/9601in02.htm)), p. 2.

<sup>121</sup> See footnote 22, p. 17, in Marcos Mendiburu and Sarah Meek, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti*, UNIDIR/96/48 (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996).

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25.

<sup>123</sup> 'Police Beat To Death Aristide Supporter', *The Times*, 21 September 1994, cited in Justin Morris, 'Force and Democracy: UN/US Intervention in Haiti', p. 398.

<sup>124</sup> Marcos Mendiburu and Sarah Meek, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti*, p. 32.

<sup>125</sup> UN SCR 1180, 1994.

<sup>126</sup> Justin Morris, 'Force and Democracy: UN/US Intervention in Haiti', p. 399.

<sup>127</sup> Peter Grier, 'Wringing Violence Out of Haiti Keeps US Soldiers on Their Toes', *Christian Science Monitor*, 21 September 1994, p. 6.

<sup>128</sup> Marcos Mendiburu and Sarah Meek, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti*, p. 34.

<sup>129</sup> See S/1995/211, 20 March 1995.

<sup>130</sup> United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 626.

<sup>131</sup> Marcos Mendiburu and Sarah Meek, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti*, p. 16.

<sup>132</sup> See Jean-Michel Caroit, 'L'ONU ne fera pas régner l'ordre en Haiti', *Le Monde*, 1 April 1995, p. 3, cited in Marcos Mendiburu and Sarah Meek, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti*, p. 29.

<sup>133</sup> Laurie Richardson, 'Disarmament Derailed', *NACLA Report on the Americas*, vol. 29, no. 6, May/June 1996, p. 12.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>137</sup> United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 631.

<sup>138</sup> Laurie Richardson, 'Disarmament Derailed', p. 13.

<sup>139</sup> Phil Davison and David Osborne, 'UN May Be Forced Into Haiti Pull-Out', *The Independent*, 13 June 1996.

<sup>140</sup> Jeremy Ginifer, 'Protecting Displaced Persons Through Disarmament', *Survival*, vol. 40, no. 2, Summer 1998, p. 170.

<sup>141</sup> Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, with contributions by Bruce Jones, *Early Warning and Conflict Management, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience* (Copenhagen: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, March 1996), pp. 60-61.



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- <sup>142</sup> Wm. Cyrus Reed, *Refugees and Rebels: The Former Government of Rwanda and the ADFL Movement in Eastern Zaire*, Issue Brief (Washington DC: US Committee for Refugees, April 1997), p. 5.
- <sup>143</sup> Margareta Sollenberg and Lars van Dassen, 'The Intervention that Never Was: Crises and Politics Round the Refugees in Eastern Zaire', paper presented at the 'Preventing Conflicts: Past Record and Future Challenges' 1997 Executive Seminar, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Uppsala, 20 August 1997, p. 12.
- <sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.
- <sup>145</sup> For an elucidation of Russia's motivations and intervention strategies in response to secessions see Pavel K. Baev, 'Russia's Stance Against Secessions: From Chechnya to Kosovo', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 6, no. 3, Autumn 1999.
- <sup>146</sup> Pavel Baev, 'Peacekeeping and Conflict Management in Eurasia', p. 216.
- <sup>147</sup> Russian demilitarisation initiatives also largely bypassed Western conceptions of consent and impartiality. In fact, impartiality was seen as damaging in that it meant, in many of the conflicts that Russia intervened in, according equal status to parties seeking secession; in effect, legitimising the 'quasi-independence' of a rebellious province. Russia pressurised Moldova in Summer 1992 and Georgia in summer 1994 into giving consent to the deployment of CIS forces. See *ibid.*, p. 217.
- <sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 221.
- <sup>149</sup> Roy Allison, 'Peacekeeping in the Soviet Successor States', *Chaillot Papers*, no. 18 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, November 1994), p. 26.
- <sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 220.
- <sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>152</sup> S. Neil MacFarlane, 'The CIS and the OSCE in Georgia's Civil Wars', in Thomas G. Weiss (ed.), *Beyond UN Subcontracting: Task-Sharing with Regional Security Arrangements and Service-Providing NGOs* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), p. 122.
- <sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 131.
- <sup>154</sup> S. Neil MacFarlane and Albrecht Schnabel, 'Russia's Approach to Peacekeeping', in 'Peacekeeping's New Look', *International Journal*, vol. L, no. 2, Spring 1995, p. 315.
- <sup>155</sup> Russia, for example, did little to enforce the blockade on Abkhazia or to stop Russian citizens participating in the final offensive in Abkhazia.
- <sup>156</sup> S. Neil MacFarlane, 'The CIS and the OSCE in Georgia's Civil Wars', p. 132.
- <sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 125.
- <sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>159</sup> Abkhazia was the first essentially Russian-led CIS initiative legitimised by the SC. See Ettore Greco, *Delegating Peace Operations: Improvisation and Innovation in Georgia and Albania*, p. 4.
- <sup>160</sup> Dodge Billingsley, 'Truce Means Nothing in Western Georgia', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, vol. 10, no. 6, June 1998, p. 14.
- <sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.
- <sup>162</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16.
- <sup>163</sup> Factionalism was also rife with the Mingrelians, a sub-ethnic group in western Georgia, having fought both on the side of the Georgians and the Abkhazia. The Svans were also another independent sub-ethnic group. See *ibid.*, pp. 13 and 16.
- <sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.
- <sup>165</sup> S. Neil MacFarlane, 'The CIS and the OSCE in Georgia's Civil Wars', p. 125.
- <sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 127.
- <sup>167</sup> Lena Jonson, 'Russian Peacekeeping and Tajikistan', in Geir Flikke (ed.), *Russia and International Peacekeeping*, NUPI Report no. 206 (Oslo: Centre for Russian Studies, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, May 1996), p. 70.
- <sup>168</sup> Astrid von Borcke, 'Russia and the Civil Wars in Tajikistan and Afghanistan', in Geir Flikke (ed.), *Russia and International Peacekeeping*, NUPI Report, no. 206 (Oslo: Centre for Russian Studies, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs), May 1996, p. 47.
- <sup>169</sup> See Peter Jarman, 'Ethnic Cleansing in the North Caucasus', *Moscow News*, 11-17 February 1994, p. 13, cited in Roy Allison, 'Peacekeeping in the Soviet Successor States', p. 11.
- <sup>170</sup> On the other hand, Russian spokesmen claimed that the Russian intervention had successfully disengaged conflicting groups and enforced a state of emergency. See *ibid.*
- <sup>171</sup> Pavel Baev, 'Peacekeeping and Conflict Management in Eurasia', p. 221.
- <sup>172</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 254.

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- <sup>173</sup> Roy Allison, 'The Chechenia Conflict: Military and Security Policy Implications', in Roy Allison and Christoph Bluth (eds.), *Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998), p. 271.
- <sup>174</sup> There were suspicions that Russia was not interested in a solution to the Abkhazia/Georgian conflict as it thought it would reduce Georgian dependence on Russia.
- <sup>175</sup> See Suzanne Crow, 'Russia Asserts its Strategic Agenda', *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 50, December 1993, cited in Pavel Baev, 'Peacekeeping and Conflict Management in Eurasia', in Roy Allison and Christoph Bluth (eds.), *Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998), p. 217.
- <sup>176</sup> See S. Neil MacFarlane and Albrecht Schnabel, 'Russia's Approach to Peacekeeping', pp. 312-315.
- <sup>177</sup> Efforts to confer legitimacy on Russian intervention and assuage some of the doubts of warring parties as to Russian impartiality by launching parallel or 'shadow' UN observer missions have not been notably successful and have been hampered in Tajikistan and in Georgia by their small size and limited powers.
- <sup>178</sup> Pavel Baev, 'Peacekeeping and Conflict Management in Eurasia', p. 222.
- <sup>179</sup> Roy Allison, 'Peacekeeping in the Soviet Successor States', *Chaillot Papers*, no. 18 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, November 1994), p. 27.
- <sup>180</sup> As in Somalia, claims of impartiality were undermined in Liberia by the fact that states which made major contributions to disarmament operations had previously backed a party. As Adibe notes, the Doe regime, for example, had been shored up by American and Nigerian supplies of armaments and ammunition. See Clement E. Adibe, 'The Liberian Conflict and the ECOWAS-UN Partnership', in Thomas G. Weiss (ed.), *Beyond UN Subcontracting: Task-Sharing with Regional Security Arrangements and Service-Providing NGOs* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), p. 68.
- <sup>181</sup> David Wippman, 'Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War', in Lori Fisler Damrosch (ed.), *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), p. 158.
- <sup>182</sup> Herbert Howe, 'Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping', *International Security*, Vol. 21, no. 3, Winter 1996/97, p. 151.
- <sup>183</sup> Clement Adibe, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Liberia*, UNIDIR/96/32 (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996), p. 32
- <sup>184</sup> Herbert Howe, 'Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping', p. 154.
- <sup>185</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 158.
- <sup>186</sup> Clement E. Adibe, 'The Liberian Conflict and the ECOWAS-UN Partnership', p. 71.
- <sup>187</sup> David Wippman, 'Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War', p. 173.
- <sup>188</sup> Clement E. Adibe, 'The Liberian Conflict and the ECOWAS-UN Partnership', p. 68.
- <sup>189</sup> John Mackinlay and Abiodun Alao, *Liberia 1994: ECOMOG and UNOMIL, Response to a Complex Emergency*, Occasional Paper no. 2, United Nations University, 1995, p. 10.
- <sup>190</sup> The various factional leaders also came to distrust ECOMOG, regarding it as partial in the conflict, a view which increased their reluctance to disarm. On a number of occasions, ECOMOG found itself fighting alongside two warring factions against the NPFL. In late 1992, for example, ECOMOG fought with ULIMO and the AFL to resist a NPFL assault on Monrovia (David Wippman, 'Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War', p. 172). ECOMOG increasingly found itself supporting factions opposed to Taylor which it was unable to control. These factions frequently undermined the various peace accords and the implementation of disarmament. It was claimed that ULIMO's attacks on the NPFL helped undermine the Yamoussoukro Accords; and the LPC's attacks against the NPFL damaged implementation of Contonou (Herbert Howe, 'Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping', p. 166). However, even if ECOMOG had sought to be impartial, it would be extremely difficult to put into practice as complex ties and 'friendships' existed between Samuel Doe, Charles Taylor, Ibrahim Babangida and Jerry Rawlings, some of the principal actors in the conflict, which complicated the presumption of impartiality by ECOWAS.
- <sup>191</sup> 'UN Observer Mission in Liberia', UNOMIL advertisement in *The Eye*, Monrovia, 23 June 1995, p. 6, cited in Herbert Howe, 'Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping', p. 159.
- <sup>192</sup> John Mackinlay and Abiodun Alao, *Liberia 1994: ECOMOG and UNOMIL*, p. 10.
- <sup>193</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.
- <sup>194</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.
- <sup>195</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35.
- <sup>196</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 42.
- <sup>197</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 36.
- <sup>198</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14.

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- <sup>199</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.
- <sup>200</sup> Charles Taylor interview, 'Focus on Africa', BBC World Service, 19 August 1995, cited in Max Ahmadu Sesay, 'Politics and Society in Post-War Liberia', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 34, no. 3, 1996, p. 401.
- <sup>201</sup> *Ibid.* (Max Ahmadu Sesay), p. 406.
- <sup>202</sup> BBC World Service, 'News Hour' reports, 6 September and 3 October 1995, cited in *ibid.*, p. 402.
- <sup>203</sup> 'Refusal to Disarm Threatens Liberia Accord', *Reuters NewMedia*, 16 January 1996.
- <sup>204</sup> 'Partial Disarmament: A Prescription for Disasters in Liberia', editorial, *The Perspective*, 1996 ([www.mindspring.com/~perspective/disarmament.html](http://www.mindspring.com/~perspective/disarmament.html)), p. 1.
- <sup>205</sup> Max Ahmadu Sesay, 'Politics and Society in Post-War Liberia', p. 404.
- <sup>206</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>207</sup> See Fiona Terry, 'Liberia: Just Another 'Ethnic Conflict'', *Pacific Research*, May 1996, p. 50.
- <sup>208</sup> 'Liberia', *United Nations Chronicle*, vol. 34, no. 1, 1997, pp. 17-18.
- <sup>209</sup> 'ECOMOG Says Command Structure of Warring Factions Ineffective', *Panafrican News Agency*, 14 February 1997 ([www.nando.net/ans/pana/FEED/97B14067.html](http://www.nando.net/ans/pana/FEED/97B14067.html)), p. 1.
- <sup>210</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>211</sup> Claudia McElroy, 'Chaos Threatens Liberia Poll', *Guardian Weekly*, 29 June 1997, p. 5.
- <sup>212</sup> Clement E. Adibe, 'The Liberian Conflict and the ECOWAS-UN Partnership', p. 80.
- <sup>213</sup> However, with Taylor being the main player in Liberia following elections, it has been questioned whether ECOMOG's non-neutral intervention against Taylor and the NPFL – it was only ECOMOG that prevented him taking Monrovia at the outset of the mission and again in 1992 – was a wasted effort and that peace and disarmament might have been achieved earlier had he emerged victorious. Berman argues that if Taylor had been allowed to assume power in 1990 suffering in Liberia would have been lessened. See Eric G. Berman, '“Successful” Elections in Liberia: Hold the Applause', draft article, 6 August 1997, p. 1. Also see Fiona Terry, 'Liberia: Just Another 'Ethnic Conflict'', p. 51.
- <sup>214</sup> Eric G. Berman, '“Successful” Elections in Liberia: Hold the Applause', p. 1.
- <sup>215</sup> See Herbert Howe, 'Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping', p. 168.
- <sup>216</sup> Herbert Howe, 'Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping', p. 165.
- <sup>217</sup> 'Funmi Olonisakin, *Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa: Conceptual and Legal Issues in ECOMOG Operations* (London: Kluwer Law International, 2000), p. 224.
- <sup>218</sup> John Mackinlay and Abiodun Alao, *Liberia 1994: ECOMOG and UNOMIL, Response to a Complex Emergency*, pp. 22-23.
- <sup>219</sup> See Max Ahmadu Sesay, 'Politics and Society in Post-War Liberia', p. 411.

## **Chapter 5: Arms Management: The ‘New’ Agenda of Arms Control and Arms-Balancing**

### **5.0 Introduction**

Two novel demilitarisation strategies were tested in Former Yugoslavia following the Dayton Peace Accord (DPA), signed in Paris on 14 December 1995, which brought to a conclusion the Bosnian civil war. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) put into effect an arms control regime that sought to stabilise military relations between the Bosnian-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska (RS). This was followed by the controversial ‘Train and Equip’ programme, master-minded by the United States, which sought to balance the protagonists’ armaments through supplies to the Federation, which was judged to be at a military disadvantage. Both these strategies had novel elements.

### **5.1 The Conceptual Basis of Arms Control and Arms-Balancing**

The arms control regime was the first that had been systematically implemented during a peace process following an internal conflict. Previously, arms control had been predominantly a statist activity. The Bosnian approach introduced techniques, many derived from statist arms control,<sup>1</sup> that sought to deal with issues of insecurity, military balances, and the protection of parties, that had proved so problematic in many previous arms management initiatives. The Bosnian arms control arrangements had two principal components: confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs), such as information-sharing, verification, and restrictions on military manoeuvres; and a process of arms reductions and military personnel cuts.

Arms-balancing represented a further innovation in a peace process following an internal conflict. It did not involve intervention in the field by international forces to delimit, collect, or manage arms as had been the case with previous demilitarisation strategies; rather, it involved the contrary approach of supplying arms to a party to balance military capabilities. Advocates of the ‘strategic manipulation’ of arms believe that transferring weapons into conflict arenas can re-establish balances and bring fighting to an end, and, ‘at worst’, ensure that parties are able to defend

themselves.<sup>2</sup> Posen has suggested that in certain circumstances groups should be given the means to defend themselves.<sup>3</sup>

The practice of states supplying arms to parties during peace processes was not new: a number of countries had allegedly done this illicitly in Bosnia, Rwanda<sup>4</sup> and elsewhere; what was new was for it be done openly, systematically, and as part of a strategy with articulated goals.<sup>5</sup>

This approach offered a possible solution to the difficulties encountered in previous arms management strategies. There would be no need to wrestle with the difficulties of collecting arms from parties who were frequently intransigent, hostile, or opposed to international intervention, and it held out the prospect of alleviating the security predicaments and dilemmas experienced by some parties following internal conflicts. On the other hand, arms-balancing was contrary to, or potentially in tension with, Security Council (SC)-mandated international and regional arms embargoes on weapons passing into conflicts. It also tended to have an illicit connotation: it was seen as contrary to good conflict resolution practice. Further, the arms control and arms-balancing arrangements were not initially regarded as synergistic by a number of states involved in the Dayton process, including a number of key European states.<sup>6</sup> The Train and Equip programme was viewed with alarm by the Serbs.

This chapter first examines arms control and then arms-balancing in Bosnia outlining how they were implemented; the reaction of the parties to these interventions; and finally it attempts to determine what impact they had on the security of the parties during the Bosnian peace process.

## **5.2 Case studies**

### **5.21 The Dayton Arms Control Arrangements: NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR)/ Stabilisation Force (SFOR)**

In the aftermath of the conflict in Bosnia, the international community sought to put in place new demilitarisation measures that would prevent further outbreaks of conflict in a still volatile region. A peace agreement was signed in Paris on 14 December 1995 following negotiations in Dayton, Ohio. At the Proximity Peace Talks in Dayton, the parties – the RS, the Federation, the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina – agreed to a radical

set of proposals. Under Annex 1-B, Article I, of the DPA, the ‘Agreement on Military Stabilisation’, they endorsed new forms of security co-operation aimed at building confidence and transparency, and achieving balanced and stable defence force levels at the lowest numbers consistent with the parties’ respective security. They also acknowledged the need to avoid an arms race in the region.<sup>7</sup>

Article I of Annex 1-B stated the general obligations that the parties had adopted. This consisted of two main commitments: to adopt CSBMs, so that none of the parties would fear surprise attacks; and to agree on a process of arms reductions and military personnel cuts. The OSCE was given responsibility for conducting the negotiations on CSBMs and also arms reductions. This was described as the:

first time in history that former warring parties switched from war to arms control within weeks.<sup>8</sup>

Article II of Annex 1-B on CSBMs further stipulated: the restricting of military deployments and exercises; restraints on the re-introduction of foreign forces; the withdrawal of heavy weapons and forces to cantonment areas and barracks; notification of planned military activities; the identification and monitoring of weapons and manufacturing capabilities; and the exchange of data on holdings of heavy weapons. Negotiations under Article II were based on the methods used in the 1994 Vienna Document of the Negotiations on Confidence and Security-Building Measures of the OSCE for the post-Cold War reductions of conventional Warsaw Pact and NATO forces.<sup>9</sup>

Article III, on regional confidence-building, committed the parties not to import heavy weapons, such as armoured vehicles, tanks, artillery, and anti-aircraft (AA) weaponry, for six months, while Article IV set numerical limits on holdings of artillery, tanks, combat aircraft, helicopters, and armoured combat vehicles.<sup>10</sup>

Two further agreements emerged from negotiations in Vienna and Florence. First, the Agreement on Confidence and Security Building Measures was signed by the parties on 31 January 1996 in Vienna. This stipulated that the parties would: exchange information on their manpower and major weapons systems; give notice of manoeuvres and unusual military movements; limit the size and frequency of military exercises; avoid military deployments in sensitive areas; and allow observation of military manoeuvres and visits to bases.<sup>11</sup> The CSBM arrangements contained ‘detailed and intrusive verification procedures’.<sup>12</sup> The Bosnian CSBM agreement was unique in that it was the first to be instituted in conjunction with a multinational peace enforcement

operation.<sup>13</sup> It also fell outside traditional CSBM regimes in that it went beyond monitoring, notification, and the exchange of military information into ‘restraining’ measures, such as the withdrawal of forces and heavy weapons to cantonments, and restrictions on military deployments.<sup>14</sup>

Second, the Agreement for Sub-regional Arms Control was signed by the parties in Florence on 14 June 1996 under Article IV of Annex 1-B of the DPA. This reduced, by a substantial margin, the amounts of armaments the parties could hold by setting verifiable limits; it also involved the destruction of heavy weaponry.<sup>15</sup> Its overall purpose was to:

create a numerical balance of heavy armaments between the armed forces in the Region and thereby create a stable military situation.<sup>16</sup>

Article IV set numerical limits on holdings of artillery, tanks, combat aircraft, helicopters, and armoured combat vehicles. The deadline for agreement on these numerical limits was 180 days after the signing of the DPA, and it was established that if agreement had not been reached by that time, arbitrary limits would be set on a ratio of 5:2:2 based on the approximate ratio of the FRY, Croatian, and Bosnian populations. The baseline for determining weapons levels was the ‘determined holdings’ of the FRY. FRY was allowed to retain 75% of that baseline; Croatia 30%; and Bosnia and Herzegovina 30%. Weapons reductions were to be phased, with the first wave of reductions to be achieved by 31 December 1996, and the second by 31 October 1997 when all reductions were to be completed. Partial reductions of weapon types were permitted in each phase: for example, 20% of tanks had to be reduced by the first deadline. Voluntary limits on military manpower were also agreed by the parties in Florence, which were to be effected on 1 September 1996, with the RS to have 56,000 personnel; Bosnia and Herzegovina, 60,000; Croatia 65,000; and the FRY, 124,339.<sup>17</sup>

IFOR was charged with implementing the military aspects of Dayton under Annex 1-A and was required to:

- maintain a cessation of hostilities;
- separate the armed forces of the Federation and RS by mid-January 1996;
- transfer areas between the Federation and RS by mid-March;
- move the parties’ forces and heavy weapons into approved sites;
- regularly inspect sites containing heavy weapons and other equipment, and patrol the demilitarised Inter-Entity Boundary Line.

By 19 January, 30 days after IFOR had taken over authority from the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the parties had withdrawn their forces from the zone of separation on either side of the cease-fire line. By 3 February, all forces had withdrawn from areas to be transferred, and by 19 March the transfer of territories had been achieved and a new zone of separation was established along the inter-entity boundary line. The parties were not able to complete the withdrawal and demobilisation of heavy weapons by the 18 April deadline due to technical problems, but the revised deadline of 27 June was met.<sup>18</sup>

IFOR patrolled along the 1,400km demilitarised Inter-Entity Boundary Line and regularly inspected over 800 sites containing heavy weaponry and other equipment.<sup>19</sup>

It implemented one of the most effective international demilitarisation initiatives to date. It managed to bring 'about a...secure environment'<sup>20</sup> and the parties 'generally complied with the major milestones in the Peace Agreement'.<sup>21</sup> The International Crisis Group (ICG) noted in April 1996 that IFOR had been 'remarkably successful' in establishing a stable and militarily secure environment.<sup>22</sup> Further, Sir Michael Jackson, IFOR Ground Forces Commander in Bosnia, claimed on his departure on 20 November 1996 that IFOR:

did supervise the separation of the armies, it did cause people to stop fighting, it did bring the absence of war.<sup>23</sup>

However, early spoiler behaviour in terms of the arms reductions, due to end on 31 December 1996, was apparent with the parties disagreeing over the interpretation of the provisions and making attempts to manipulate them:

The main problem was that Republika Srpska took maximum advantage of the possible exemptions in the counting rules, assigning a wholly improbable number of weapons to museum displays, bulldozing..and the like. This accentuated the continuing doubts about the comprehensiveness of the Repblika Srpska baseline figures. In addition, the Bosniac and Croat components of the Federation military establishments were squabbling about weapons holdings throughout the first phase: that is, of the permitted heavy weapons, how many would be under Bosniac and how many under Croat control?<sup>24</sup>

And Dayton did not establish substantive controls on light weapons (LWs): seizures of LWs were conducted on an *ad hoc* basis. Indeed, Dayton permitted LWs to be imported into Bosnia again from 13 March 1996.<sup>25</sup> This led to calls for progressive demilitarisation of LWs to take place.<sup>26</sup>



By the time of the Peace Implementation Conference (PIC) of the Contact Group, 4-5 December 1996, which convened shortly before the Phase One reduction deadlines, none of the parties were in full compliance with the arrangements, and the 'spirit and intent' of the SR in terms of compliance was in doubt.<sup>27</sup> One factor in the non-compliance of the RS was concern over the United States' Train and Equip programme which appeared to the Serbs to open up the possibility of the Federation acquiring an offensive military capacity.<sup>28</sup> The parties were warned that unless compliance was speeded up, SFOR<sup>29</sup> would refuse to allow them to withdraw equipment from cantonment sites or to hold training exercises. In the event, the RS was unable to fully meet its commitments by the deadline, but SFOR exerted continued pressure in terms of compliance throughout the winter through strict controls on troop movements and training.

Finally, faced with the threat of a special OSCE audit of all weapon-holding sites in spring 1997, RS acknowledged a 'reduction liability' of about 850 previously undeclared weapons.<sup>30</sup> This restored some confidence at the OSCE and SFOR that the RS was seeking to meet its commitments. However, although the parties were assessed as being 'substantially compliant' with the military provisions of the agreement, illegal movements and unauthorised training and inventory shortages continued to be discovered.<sup>31</sup> On 18 June, SFOR confiscated a tank, two infantry fighting vehicles, and two 76mm mountain howitzers which had been detected in a non-declared Bosnian army site. During the period 23 May-22 June 1997, SFOR conducted 588 site inspections. As a result of these inspections, along with inspections of police stations, the monitoring of illegal checkpoints, and routine patrolling, sniper rifles, other small arms, a tank destroyer, infantry fighting vehicles, armoured fighting vehicles, and mortars were collected from the parties.<sup>32</sup>

By the approach of Phase Two on 31 October 1997, the arms reduction regime was considerably more comprehensive. The parties had destroyed close to 6,600 armaments at the end of the Agreement's Reduction Period on 31 October 1997.<sup>33</sup> According to the OSCE, the parties had:

reduced a total of over 700 battle tanks, 80 armoured combat vehicles, 60 combat aircraft and more than 5,700 pieces of artillery.<sup>34</sup>

Finally, following the end of Phase Two, the OSCE announced that all four parties had met their reduction commitments and that slightly more weapons had been destroyed than had been required under the agreement. The FRY and the RS had destroyed the

most weapons, as they had most weapons at the start of the process; the Federation was only required to destroy artillery.<sup>35</sup> Although the probability remained that a number of heavy weapons remained hidden, it was thought that these did not exist in sufficient quantities to give a military advantage, that they would not be easily deployable, and that they were likely to degrade over time.<sup>36</sup>

At the second Vienna review conference of the Agreement on Confidence and Security Building Measures, 15-19 March 1999, it was noted that there had been a 'marked improvement in the overall implementation of the Agreement'.<sup>37</sup> Revised protocols had improved the completeness and accuracy of information exchanged between the parties and strengthened verification, according to the OSCE. Military liaison missions, previously a contentious issue, had been established by the Joint Command of the Federation Army within the headquarters of the RS Army and *vice versa*. The military activities of the parties had also been minimised.<sup>38</sup> Further co-operation was instituted with the parties agreeing a new notification format for transfers in conventional armaments and equipment, and also a format for exchanging information on defence-related matters, including all foreign military support provided to the parties and budget outlays.<sup>39</sup>

Nevertheless, peace in Bosnia in 1999 remained heavily dependent on the deployment of large numbers of international forces and there were:

simply too many weapons and hostile armies in both Bosnia and the region for anyone to be confident that peace will hold in the absence of NATO troops. As a result, it is critical to work towards, on the one hand, further and substantial reductions in existing military stockpiles and, on the other, the construction of an inclusive, multilateral political framework, such as Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP).<sup>40</sup>

## **5.22 Assessment**

The post-Dayton arms control arrangements were appreciably more effective than most previous arms management initiatives. Although there were initially some non-compliance problems such as: cheating on exemption rules for counting armaments; undeclared weapons and weapons sites; and illegal checkpoints mounted by the parties, these were largely overcome and the reduction commitments were met. At the end of the Agreement's Reduction Period on 31 October 1997, the parties had destroyed close to 6,600 armaments.<sup>41</sup> At the end of Phase Two, the OSCE announced that all four

parties had met their reduction commitments and that, indeed, slightly more weapons had been destroyed than had been required under the agreement.

In fact, the Bosnian arms control arrangements seem to have been informed by lessons learnt from previous UN and NATO operations.

First, NATO had a clear idea of how the arms management arrangements were to be implemented; it had considerable resources it could bring to bear; and it possessed competent command and control.

Second, IFOR and SFOR were mandated and acted proactively, seizing illicit weapons, while still retaining some credibility with the parties. In particular, NATO appeared to have absorbed lessons from previous demilitarisation operations that were insufficiently robust in their separation and demilitarisation arrangements. In Bosnia, large numbers of heavily-armed IFOR troops were deployed to supervise the separation of Federation and RS forces; to transfer them to areas stipulated in the peace arrangements; and to place heavy weapons into approved sites. By rigorous patrolling and proactive force dispositions it was made clear that penetration and attacks across the demilitarised areas would not be tolerated. The cantonment sites were also well guarded and inspected in contrast to much previous practice. Where parties were judged to be in non-compliance, NATO acted decisively. In August 1996, for example, NATO seized and blew up a huge cache of Bosnian Serb explosives and ammunition in Margetici, eastern Bosnia, outside an authorised site, despite protests from the Serb authorities that the munitions were legal. NATO tanks, armoured cars, and 2,000 troops sealed off the area to prevent any attempts by Serbs to disrupt the operation, and to protect local people.<sup>42</sup>

Third, most of the deadlines for accomplishing the various phases of demilitarisation were met and there were only minor tactical contraventions. The parties in the field felt, to a large extent, that they were unlikely to be subject to surprise attack by overwhelming force dispositions, unlike in many previous demilitarisation operations. Nor were they permitted to engage in the kind of spoiler behaviour that had consistently hampered UNPROFOR's demilitarisation efforts in the safe areas and elsewhere.

Fourth, the provision of protection for parties and groups undergoing demilitarisation and the notion of a systematic confidence-building regime was addressed for the first time. Confidence-building had been neglected during UN

disarmament missions: verification was generally weak, and the lack of trust between parties tended to be addressed through mechanisms such as UN mediation and cease-fire commissions, which were not always effective. The CSBM arrangements in Bosnia included considerably more rigorous measures such as: the restricting of military deployments and exercises; restraints on the re-introduction of foreign forces; the withdrawal of heavy weapons and forces to cantonment areas and barracks; notification of planned military activities; the identification and monitoring of weapons and manufacturing capabilities; and the exchange of data on holdings of heavy weapons. The parties agreed to: exchange information on their manpower and major weapons systems; give notice of manoeuvres and unusual military movements; limit the size and frequency of military exercises; avoid military deployments in sensitive areas; and allow observation of military manoeuvres and visits to bases.

This CSBM approach seemed to address some of the difficulties that had dogged co-operative and coercive disarmament initiatives. During previous disarmament operations, the parties had little idea whether the weapons holdings declared during peace negotiations were accurate, or to what extent significant numbers of weapons were being collected. This encouraged even potentially compliant parties to cheat to make sure that they were not being 'double-crossed' during the peace process and to guard against surprise attack. Verification of the sort practiced in Bosnia opened up the possibility of introducing stability into the arms management process as the parties could accurately determine the state of the military balance between them.<sup>43</sup>

Fifth, the fact that it was recognised that it was potentially stabilising to allow the parties to retain weaponry for defensive purposes marked a learning curve in arms management strategy. In reality, parties in most disarmament processes had retained arms for protection or to further their power interests, but this had been uncontrolled and unverifiable and, consequently, frequently destabilising. Previously, parties had either been permitted to retain all their weaponry or had been expected to hand over all their weaponry. Both these approaches had their flaws as the previous chapters have shown: they either, in a sense, gave the parties 'too much' security – the parties kept their weapons and they could maintain the *status quo* – or the parties were faced with 'all-or-nothing' scenarios under which giving up their capacity for self-defence might place them in an extremely vulnerable position.

Arms limitation of the sort instituted in Bosnia held out the possibility of reducing weapons to a verified level where both parties had some confidence that they could defend themselves, or deter attack, but which also avoided dangerous arms-racing.

### **5.23 'Train and Equip' and Arms-Balancing**

While the post-Dayton arms control provisions were being implemented, the United States administration was pursuing a separate track of building-up the military capabilities of Federation forces. During the Dayton negotiations there had been concerns that the Bosnian Serbs still posed a military threat. This was particularly felt by the Bosnian Muslim delegation which had:

even threatened to withdraw if the US administration did not sign a Memorandum of Understanding...stating that they would undertake to both re-equip and re-train the Bosnian Army to face that continued threat.<sup>44</sup>

Further, the Clinton administration was coming under considerable pressure internally to underpin Dayton with arms supplies to the Bosnian Muslims. After much negotiation, the Senate passed the Dole-McCaib Joint Resolution on 13 December 1995, permitting United States troops to be deployed to Bosnia in support of Dayton, but it was only passed on the understanding that the Federation army would be re-equipped and re-trained.<sup>45</sup> To the alarm of some European governments, it was determined in January 1996 that a United States military contractor, Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI),<sup>46</sup> would negotiate a train and equip contract with the Federation.<sup>47</sup> The United States' contribution was set at \$100m of equipment, which was authorised by Congress for the 1996 spending bill.

It was estimated, after the arms cut-back provisions of Dayton, that the Federation required 50 more tanks, along with similar numbers of armoured personnel carriers and artillery, to properly balance military capabilities in the region. At the same time, additional assistance of a further \$149m was secured from countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Brunei, and Malaysia.

The Train and Equip programme was not confined to just arms supplies. It also set out to:

- reform Federation forces according to Western standards;

- establish a single Federation Ministry of Defence and joint operational and logistical commands in order to fuse Bosnian Muslim and Croat Defence Council (HVO) units;<sup>48</sup>
- remove from Bosnia so-called ‘negative’ foreign influences, such as the Iranians;
- train the Federation army in the use of the donated equipment.<sup>49</sup>

In July 1996, two Turkish flights carrying small arms ammunition and light anti-tank rockets arrived in Sarajevo – claimed to be part of a previously-agreed bilateral agreement – with American deliveries starting on 21 November 1996. Over four days the United States delivered: 46,100 M16A1 assault rifles; 1,000 M60 general-purpose machine guns; 6,592 pieces of communication equipment; 45 M60A3 main battle tanks (MBTs); 80 M113 armoured personnel carriers (APCs); 840 AT-4 light anti-tank weapons; and 15 UH-1H light utility helicopters. This was followed by further shipments from other countries including: 36 M56 105mm light howitzers; 51 Panhard APCs; 40 AMX-30 MBTs from the UAE; 12 D-30 122mm and 12 130mm howitzers; and 18 ZU-23-2 AA cannons from Egypt.<sup>50</sup> It was decided not to supply aircraft or create a Federation airforce, but air defences were bolstered.<sup>51</sup>

Proponents of the programme were influenced by the fact that at the start of the Bosnian conflict the military balance overwhelmingly favoured the Bosnian Serbs, who drew upon Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) military resources, and a perception that this balance was locked into place by the 1991 UN SC embargo on arms imports to all of Yugoslavia. This was supported at the time by the United States; an action it later regretted.<sup>52</sup> The absence of an organised Bosnian Muslim military force during the conflict:

not only made it impossible to deter or suppress the Serb and Croat secessionist drives, but left Bosnian cities such as Sarajevo and Bihac defenceless and unable to break sieges until the final months of the war.<sup>53</sup>

At the beginning of the war, there was no Bosnian army and the defence of Sarajevo was undertaken by self-defence units and volunteers. It was contended that the Bosnian army was never really an effective military force.<sup>54</sup>

The rationale of the Train and Equip programme, according to the White House, was:

The stabilisation of the military balance at the lowest level of forces...to bring peace and stability to Bosnia.<sup>55</sup>

Train and Equip would assist Bosnia in 'self-defence' and would help ensure when IFOR departed that a 'military balance exists among the former antagonists, such that none of them are encouraged to resume hostilities'.<sup>56</sup> It was also described as providing the Federation with a 'credible deterrent capability'<sup>57</sup> in that it would provide the Federation army with sufficient military capabilities to deter the Bosnian Serb army or defend Federation territory should deterrence fail. It would also provide leverage for continued compliance with Dayton.

In reality, it has been suggested, a complex set of considerations, in addition to the defence of the Federation, underpinned the Train and Equip programme.

First, by equipping and training the Federation, the United States probably hoped to avoid risking American lives in Bosnia in the defence of the Federation.

Second, prior to the signing of the DPA, military assistance was seen as a 'carrot' to persuade the two sides to co-exist within the Federation and make common cause against the Serbs.

Third, it was a means of countering foreign influence in Bosnia, principally that of the Iranians.

Fourth, it helped mitigate pressure from Congress to break the arms embargo, which the United States administration was reluctant to openly do.

Fifth, it helped win over the Bosnian Muslim delegation to the territorial division that left them in control of less than half the country.

Last, it could be presented to Congress as a means of strengthening the Federation into a free-standing entity and preparing the way for a United States exit.<sup>58</sup>

The core equipment – refurbished United States surplus stock – under the \$100m draw-down authorised by the United States Congress was followed by training and equipment valued at about \$400m by the end of 1997. This arms build-up was claimed not to exceed the agreed ceiling on Federation heavy weaponry under Article IV of the Florence arms reduction agreement, and it was described as not threatening to the Serbs:

the equipment is well below the arms control ceilings established at Florence, although it is far better than the equipment held by the Federation at the end of the war and is superior in quality and condition to most of the Bosnian Serb arsenal.... Republika Srpska will maintain numerical superiority in most categories of weaponry unless international deliveries continue indefinitely.<sup>59</sup>

Even with Train and Equip, the Federation in 1997 had no air force, very little air defence, limited mobility, and insufficient logistical capability to sustain an operation beyond two to three days, according to Ambassador James Pardew, United States Special Representative for Military Stabilisation in the Balkans, who was in charge of the Train and Equip Programme.<sup>60</sup> Further, by 1998 the forces of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina had been reduced from over 250,000 to 45,000.<sup>61</sup> Some weapons were held back by the United States pending key organisational steps, such as the approval of the joint Federation force structure in January 1997, the adoption of a joint Federation military strategy, and the location of a major unit headquarters in May.

One of the further purposes of the programme was to build a civilian-controlled, 'NATO-style' military. This meant not only the use of:

NATO standard weapons, but tactics and doctrines that are standard in advanced western countries: for example, indoctrination in the principle that in a democracy the military is subordinate to civilian command, and that soldiers must not meddle in politics.<sup>62</sup>

The Croats and Bosnians initially appeared to want to just receive the weapons and divide them up, but under pressure from the United States there was movement towards creating unified force structures.

A new dimension to Train and Equip emerged during 1997 when the prospect was held out of the RS joining Train and Equip.<sup>63</sup> The Bosnian Serb President, Biljana Plavsic, expressed some interest in Train and Equip, although this appeared to be more centred on receiving equipment than on its training elements. The President commented on 4 November 1997:

Regarding preservation of peace and stability, I think that equal treatment of the Republika Srpska and Federation armies may only contribute to that. Of course, without conditioning, since the Federation is not presented with any conditions either.... We accepted Dayton as it is, and we can neither reduce it nor add anything'.<sup>64</sup>

However, there were fears on the Serb side that membership of Train and Equip would be a step towards its incorporation into a unitary state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Europeans expressed fears that supplying arms to the Federation would encourage further conflict outbreaks. The UK and other countries initially refused to participate in the scheme with either equipment or training, although by 1998 there were signs that some countries were changing their position.<sup>65</sup> The German



Ambassador, Michael Steiner, stated that since the programme was a 'tool for welding the Croats and Muslims together, it can be a stabilising factor on the country'.<sup>66</sup>

IFOR and SFOR also appeared to have reservations regarding the arms delivery part of the programme at a time when it was attempting to ensure compliance with the weapons control provisions of the DPA. IFOR Command insisted on 21 days notice of any weapons deliveries and the right to monitor their off-loading and storage. On 2 January 1997, SFOR actually confiscated 474 imported MBT gun rounds that had been delivered as part of Train and Equip, saying they were being stored in an unauthorised facility.<sup>67</sup>

In part, concerns regarding the destabilising impact of Train and Equip had their origins in previous experience of United States military assistance to Croatia. The Democracy Transition Assistance Programme (DTAP) had been signed in September 1994 with the approval of the State Department. This was described as a venture to reorganise the Croatian army to prepare it for entry into NATO's PfP programme.<sup>68</sup> However, it has been claimed that:

Washington's assistance to Croatia under the cover of MPRI was made conditional on Croatia's agreement to the creation of the Bosnian-Croat Federation, acceptance of a CIA-built base on Krk island operating 'Predator' spy-drones and support for a series of secret airdrops of supplies to the Bosnian Muslims.<sup>69</sup>

There were also similar concerns regarding the training of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) by American intelligence agencies.<sup>70</sup>

The Croat programme was said to involve contracting American trainers, who arrived in Croatia in November 1994 to teach military organisation, management, and discipline to the army in the context of a democratic society. MPRI also at a later date helped re-organise the Croatian Ministry of Defence and provided personnel to monitor border crossing points between the FRY and the Bosnian Serbs during 1994-95.<sup>71</sup>

However, there were suspicions that MPRI assistance had been somewhat more wide-ranging and may have run to tactics and use of weaponry when two months after the beginning of MPRI's contracts the Croats launched two successful military operations, previously reckoned to be beyond the ability of the Croatian army. 'Operation Flash' in May and 'Operation Storm' in September saw the re-capture of Western Slavonia and the defeat of Serb forces in Krajina. The new tactics used and the success of these operations led to speculation that MPRI tactical thinking had been

‘decisive in the preparation of these military operations’.<sup>72</sup> Although MPRI denied involvement, Operation Storm was said to utilise:

typical American operational tactics, including integrated air, artillery and infantry movements, and the use of manoeuvre warfighting techniques to destroy Serbian command and control networks.<sup>73</sup>

## **5.24 Assessment**

The Train and Equip arms-balancing programme was highly contentious, not least because of its potential to undermine the Dayton arms control regime. However, concerns as to its destabilising nature were not borne out. Up to 1999 there had been no major resumptions of fighting since the inception of Train and Equip. The Croats and Bosnian Muslims had not shown any inclination to attack the Serbs and resume conflict since the importation of new military equipment. Despite initial Serb fears that Train and Equip was designed to bolster Federation forces to enable them to attack the RS, this had not happened and the Serbs made a request to join the programme, although they appeared to be more interested in acquiring equipment than undergoing training or integration.<sup>74</sup>

Proponents argued that by building up Federation military capabilities to a point where they were similar to, but did not appear to exceed RS forces, a rough military parity had been established which did not encourage the offensive. In fact, the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) continued to have quantitative and qualitative advantages over Federation forces, even though Train and Equip had narrowed the gap in some key areas.<sup>75</sup> The programme put organisation and shape into the Bosnian army, but even by 1998 it was no more ready for comprehensive operational action than it was ‘while struggling on the Prijedor front in the autumn of 1995’.<sup>76</sup> Further, it was constrained by the fact that new equipment was kept in depots under SFOR storage and the Bosnian Muslim army was not able to use it for training without permission, and also its forces were said not to be capable of strategic planning and action:<sup>77</sup>

there is no reason to think the scope and quantity of the assistance offered through Train and Equip has crossed the line. But substantial numbers of tanks and other weapons with clear offensive potential would be problematic.<sup>78</sup>

It has also been suggested that Train and Equip was stabilising because it forced former enemies (the Croats and Bosnian Muslims) to work together and become mutually dependent in ensuring the survival of the Federation.<sup>79</sup>

However, critics have suggested that the medium or long-term impact of bolstering Federation forces might be destabilising.

First, it has been suggested that the restraining presence of NATO troops, rather than the balancing of military capabilities, is primarily responsible for the peace in Bosnia since Dayton. If NATO departed prematurely, Train and Equip could serve as a 'trigger for a new war'.<sup>80</sup>

Second, previous United States military assistance intervention in Croatia points to future problems with Train and Equip. The Croatian offensive in Krajina, following the DTAP, led to the exit of the majority of the Serb civilian population and the destruction of more than 13,000 buildings belonging to Croatian Serbs, according to Amnesty International.<sup>81</sup> The skills:

supplied by MPRI to give Croatia a more professional and 'Western' armed forces seem to have been exploited by Zagreb in a very different way.<sup>82</sup>

There are fears that Train and Equip might be exploited in a similar way by the Federation at some point in the future.

Third, trust and goodwill do not underpin relations between the former protagonists. The Bosnian Muslims, in particular, have been said to have a number of motivations which might encourage them to take advantage of their enhanced military capabilities.<sup>83</sup> As the war came to an end in 1995 they were in a favourable position:

the Serbs in western Bosnia were isolated and virtually surrounded by a relatively well-equipped army, largely based on the entry of Croatian troops and equipment into Herzegovina and north-west Bosnia between August and October 1995. The Bosnian Serb forces were demoralised by the NATO bombing campaign.... Indeed, in the period between the Dayton Peace Conference, the Bosnian Serbs were falling back in disarray, and it appeared that, if the war continued for a few more weeks, they might lose the entire Banja Luka region and the vital Posavina Corridor.<sup>84</sup>

This opens up the possibility that Bosnian Muslims might still regard themselves as cheated of victory and that they might seek at a later date to resurrect the conflict.<sup>85</sup> It has been suggested that it is conceivable that the Federation, with an increased military capability, might attempt to reverse territorial divisions, particularly taking into account the failure of the RS to fully comply with the Dayton agreement in terms of the return of displaced persons and freedom of movement; or, alternatively, renewed fighting is possible between Bosnian Muslim nationalists seeking to create a centralised Bosnia and Bosnian Croats and Serb nationalists with separatist agendas. A balance of forces

may provide temporary stability, it has been suggested, but 'true stability' is more likely to come with a 'change of ruling regimes towards non-nationalist attitudes'.<sup>86</sup>

Further, the geographic vulnerability of RS, particularly in the event of a NATO withdrawal, might encourage an attack which has a greater 'chance of success as the military capability of the Federation armed forces improves'.<sup>87</sup> In addition, any outbreak of fighting in the area would have drastic regional consequences with the possibility of Croats attempting to breakaway from the Federation and reclaiming territory, and the possibility of the FRY being drawn into the conflict.

Fourth, despite the co-operation forced upon the parties as part of the condition for arms supplies, the Federation in 1999 remained largely divided into Croatian and Bosnian Muslim territories<sup>88</sup> and differences between Croat and Bosnian Muslim hard-liners remained great.<sup>89</sup> In the absence of a unitary Bosnian state and with large numbers of soldiers and weaponry in the region it has been argued that it is vital for the RS to be incorporated in some manner into Train and Equip if it is to function properly. James Pardew has suggested that the RS army should at least participate in the training element of the programme and that for Bosnia 'to be viable, the country should have only one Ministry of Defence'; otherwise, any withdrawal of NATO forces might trigger a resumption of fighting.<sup>90</sup>

Last, arms-balancing requires judicious assessments of the balance of military power between the parties if it is to avoid military instability, and raises questions of partiality and legality, particularly with reference to how it inter-acts with arms embargoes and supplier controls. For these, and other reasons, arms-balancing programmes are unlikely to be endorsed by the international community, even when there is clear evidence that a party has been the subject of aggression and lacks the capacity to fully defend itself. As Posen comments, it may be reasonable for outside powers to sometimes provide armaments to help groups protect themselves, but:

this kind of hard-bitten policy is politically difficult for liberal democratic governments...dominating world politics to pursue, even on humanitarian grounds.<sup>91</sup>

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> The Bosnian CSBM agreement differed in some respects from 'traditional' CSBM regimes in that it went beyond monitoring, notification, and the exchange of military information into 'restraining'

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measures, such as the withdrawal of forces and heavy weapons to cantonments, and restrictions on military deployments (Sami Fournier, Tasos Kokkinides and Daniel Plesch, with research assistance from Richard Thomas, *Implementing Dayton: Arms Control and Intelligence in Former Yugoslavia*, Basic Papers, no. 15, 11 March 1996 [www.basicint.org/bpaper15.htm], p. 3).

<sup>2</sup> Joanna Spear, 'Arms Limitations, Confidence-Building Measures, and Internal Conflict', in Michael E. Brown (ed.), *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict* (London: MIT Press, 1996), p. 390.

<sup>3</sup> Barry R. Posen, 'The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict', *Survival*, vol. 35, no. 1, Spring 1993, p. 44.

<sup>4</sup> There were reports, for example, of the French supplying arms within Rwanda, and the United States was also alleged to have air-lifted arms into Bosnia in July 1995. For details of the latter see 'Plane Slips into Bihac with Supplies', *Washington Times*, 28 July 1995, and also a Nic Gowing report, *Channel Four News*, UK, 17 November 1996, cited in Sami Fournier, Tasos Kokkinides and Daniel Plesch, with research assistance from Richard Thomas, *Implementing Dayton: Arms Control and Intelligence in Former Yugoslavia*, p. 13.

<sup>5</sup> A number of publicly available United States government documents have articulated Train and Equip goals; see, for example, 'Train and Equip Program', *White House Fact Sheet* (Washington DC, 9 July 1996).

<sup>6</sup> Spear suggests that for external manipulation of arms supplies to be effective there needs to be considerable international co-operation. There needs to be 'international consensus about which side deserved external support, and this consensus would have to be maintained over time...this will be hard to achieve in most instances' (Joanna Spear, 'Arms Limitations, Confidence-Building Measures, and Internal Conflict', pp. 394-395).

<sup>7</sup> Dayton Accords, 'Agreement on Regional Stabilisation', Annex 1-B, Article I, 14 December 1995.

<sup>8</sup> The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Press Release, no. 7/96, January 1996.

<sup>9</sup> International Crisis Group, *A Peace, or Just a Cease-fire?* (www.crisisweb...objects/bosnia/reports/bh28rep1.htm), p. 12.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> Sami Fournier, Tasos Kokkinides and Daniel Plesch, with research assistance from Richard Thomas, *Implementing Dayton: Arms Control and Intelligence in Former Yugoslavia*, p. 5.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> State Department, 'US Statement on Bosnian Arms Control Agreement', 14 June 1996 (www.usis.usemb.se/bosnia/arms.htm).

<sup>16</sup> Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Official Website, 'Regional Stabilisation' (http://oscebih.org/regstb.htm), p. 2.

<sup>17</sup> International Crisis Group, *A Peace, or Just a Cease-fire?* (www.crisisweb...objects/bosnia/reports/bh28rep1.htm), pp. 13-14.

<sup>18</sup> NATO, 'NATO's Role in Bringing Peace to the Former Yugoslavia', *NATO Basic Fact Sheet*, no. 4, March 1997, pp. 8-9.

<sup>19</sup> NATO, 'History of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina', *NATO Fact Sheet*, 16 November 1998 (www.nato.int/sfor/docu/d981116a.htm), p. 1.

<sup>20</sup> This secure environment did not fully extend to the societal level: individuals and groups of civilians were attacked and forced to leave certain areas, despite the efforts of NATO to prevent this. However, a 'strategically' stable environment at the level of the parties could be said to exist throughout the Bosnian region.

<sup>21</sup> NATO, 'NATO's Role in Bringing Peace to the Former Yugoslavia', pp. 8-9.

<sup>22</sup> International Crisis Group, *Military Security post-IFOR*, 15 April 1996 (www.crisisweb...rojects/bosnia/reports/bh04rep.htm), p. 5.

<sup>23</sup> Office of the High Representative (Sarajevo), *IFOR*, Bulletin, no. 26, 22 November 1996 (www.ohr.int/bulletins/b961122.htm), p. 4.

<sup>24</sup> International Crisis Group, *A Peace, or Just a Cease-fire?* (www.crisisweb...objects/bosnia/reports/bh28rep1.htm), p. 14.

<sup>25</sup> Sami Fournier, Tasos Kokkinides and Daniel Plesch, with research assistance from Richard Thomas, 'Implementing Dayton: Arms Control and Intelligence in Former Yugoslavia', p. 2.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>27</sup> International Crisis Group, *A Peace, or Just a Cease-fire?* (www.crisisweb...objects/bosnia/reports/bh28rep1.htm), p. 14.

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<sup>28</sup> The Serbs feared that this might parallel the aggressive and highly effective operations mounted by the Croats in Krajina after American military advisers had been sent to Croatia. See International Crisis Group, *A Peace, or Just a Cease-fire?* ([www.crisisweb.org/projects/bosnia/reports/bh28rep1.htm](http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/bosnia/reports/bh28rep1.htm)), p. 15.

<sup>29</sup> Under UN SCR 1088 of 12 December 1996, SFOR was authorised to implement the military aspects of the peace agreement and like IFOR operated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter allowing for the robust use of force. According to NATO, the 'primary mission of SFOR is to contribute to the secure environment necessary for the consolidation of peace' (NATO, 'The NATO-led Stabilisation Force [SFOR] in Bosnia and Herzegovina', p. 2).

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14.

<sup>31</sup> United Nations, UN SG, 'Sixth Monthly Report by the Secretary General of NATO to the United Nations Security Council on SFOR Operations', S/1997/602, 31 July 1997, p. 1.

<sup>32</sup> For details see *ibid.*, p. 2.

<sup>33</sup> The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, The Secretariat, Press Release, 'Reduction Period Ends for Parties to the Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control', ([www.usis.it/wireless/WF971124/97112408.htm](http://www.usis.it/wireless/WF971124/97112408.htm)), p. 1.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> International Crisis Group, Bosnia, *A Peace, or Just A Cease-Fire?* ([www.crisisweb.org/projects/bosnia/reports/bh28rep2.htm](http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/bosnia/reports/bh28rep2.htm)), p. 15.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 'Article II Review Conference Takes Place in Vienna', *OSCE Newsletter*, vol. 6, no. 2/3, February/March 1999 ([www.osceprag.cz/docs/newsletr/nl-99-02/n10299e.htm](http://www.osceprag.cz/docs/newsletr/nl-99-02/n10299e.htm)), p. 8.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>40</sup> International Crisis Group, *Working Towards Security Within a Political Framework*, 23 April 1998 ([www.crisisweb.org/projects/bosnia/reports/bhxx17.htm](http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/bosnia/reports/bhxx17.htm)), p. 9.

<sup>41</sup> The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 'Reduction Period Ends for Parties to the Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control', p. 1.

<sup>42</sup> Julius Strauss, 'NATO Ignores Serb Anger and Destroys Munitions,' *Electronic Telegraph*, Issue 455, 20 August 1996 ([www.telegraph.co.uk/et/access?ac=132897050451&pg=/196/8/20/wbos20.html](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/et/access?ac=132897050451&pg=/196/8/20/wbos20.html)), p. 1.

<sup>43</sup> Stabilisation was probably more easily achieved in Bosnia than in many previous arms management processes due to the fact that the two military entities (the Federation and the RS) functioned as quasi-state entities with roughly comparable military capabilities and their own territorial jurisdictions, rather than the chaotic security milieu of many peace processes where groups and sub-groups were pitted against each other, and where it was more difficult to ascertain the military balance.

<sup>44</sup> Enis Dzanic and Norman Erik, 'Retraining the Federation Forces in post-Dayton Bosnia', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, vol. 10, no. 1, January 1998, p. 5.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>46</sup> For a description of MPRI's activities see: [www.mpri.com/international/home.html](http://www.mpri.com/international/home.html).

<sup>47</sup> The fact that a private company was hired to oversee Train and Equip, and it was detached from and remained outside the formal co-ordination activities of the other organisations associated with Dayton implementation, complicated matters. See George A. Joulwan and Christopher C. Shoemaker, *Civilian-Military Co-operation in the Prevention of Deadly Conflict: Implementing Agreements in Bosnia and Beyond*, A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, December 1998 ([www.ccpdc.org/pubs/joulwan/joulwan.htm](http://www.ccpdc.org/pubs/joulwan/joulwan.htm)), p. 21.

<sup>48</sup> The goal in creating an integrated Federation Army with a joint Ministry of Defence and JOC was to create an accountable and Western-style army which 'eliminates(s) the possible aggressive use of these forces' (Enis Dzanic and Norman Erik, 'Retraining the Federation Forces in post-Dayton Bosnia', p. 8).

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> The Bosnian Serbs, unlike the Bosnian Muslims, had significant air assets. See *ibid.*

<sup>52</sup> International Crisis Group, Bosnia, *A Peace, or Just A Cease-Fire?* ([www.crisisweb.org/projects/bosnia/reports/bh28rep2.htm](http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/bosnia/reports/bh28rep2.htm)), p. 6.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>55</sup> United States government, 'Train and Equip Program', p. 1.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

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<sup>57</sup> United States government, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 'To the Congress of the United States', text on United States Information Service, *USIS Washington File*, 5 February 1999 ([www.eucom.mil/europe/ba/usis/99feb05.htm](http://www.eucom.mil/europe/ba/usis/99feb05.htm)), p. 2.

<sup>58</sup> International Crisis Group, Bosnia, *A Peace, or Just A Cease-Fire?* ([www.intl-cris....objects/bosnia/reports/bh28rep2.htm](http://www.intl-cris....objects/bosnia/reports/bh28rep2.htm)), pp. 10-11.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>61</sup> James Gow, 'Ready for the Long Haul', *The World Today*, vol. 54, no. 5, p. 122.

<sup>62</sup> International Crisis Group, *A Peace, or Just A Cease-Fire?* ([www.crisisweb....objects/bosnia/reports/bh28rep2.htm](http://www.crisisweb....objects/bosnia/reports/bh28rep2.htm)), p. 7.

<sup>63</sup> When Plavsic became President, and with the arrival of Milorad Dodik as Prime Minister of RS, a new phase of co-operation was apparent: 'His government did more to co-operate in implementation in its first twenty days than its predecessor had done in the previous twenty months' (James Gow, 'Ready for the Long Haul', p. 121).

<sup>64</sup> International Crisis Group, Bosnia, *A Peace, or Just A Cease-Fire?* ([www.intl-cris....objects/bosnia/reports/bh28rep2.htm](http://www.intl-cris....objects/bosnia/reports/bh28rep2.htm)), p. 12.

<sup>65</sup> See Enis Dzanic and Norman Erik, 'Retraining the Federation Forces in post-Dayton Bosnia', p. 7.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>68</sup> Yves Goulet, 'MPRI: Washington's Freelance Advisors', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, vol. 11, no. 7, July 1998, p. 38.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>70</sup> CIA officers were cease-fire monitors in Kosovo during the KFOR operation and allegedly gave American training manuals and field advice to the KLA on how to fight the Yugoslav army and Serbian police. However, the Belgrade assertion that the CIA armed the KLA has been denied by the KLA and agency sources. See Tom Walker and Aidan Laverty, 'CIA aided Kosovo Guerrilla Army', *The Sunday Times*, 'World News', 12 March 2000, p. 28.

<sup>71</sup> Enis Dzanic and Norman Erik, 'Retraining the Federation Forces in post-Dayton Bosnia', p. 6.

<sup>72</sup> Yves Goulet, 'MPRI: Washington's Freelance Advisors', p. 39.

<sup>73</sup> Roger Cohen, 'US Cooling Ties to Croatia After Winking at its Build-up', *New York Times*, 18 October 1995, p. 1, cited in David Isenberg, *Soldiers of Fortune Ltd: A Profile of Today's Private Sector Corporate Mercenary Firms*, Center for Defense Information Monograph, November 1997 ([www.cdi.org/issues/mercenaries/merc1.html](http://www.cdi.org/issues/mercenaries/merc1.html)), p. 13.

<sup>74</sup> It was suggested that if Train and Equip was extended to the Serbs, it might build confidence and transparency, and 'over time build a military bridge between the Federation and Republic Srpska' (International Crisis Group, Bosnia, *A Peace, or Just A Cease-Fire?* [[www.intl-cris....objects/bosnia/reports/bh28rep2.htm](http://www.intl-cris....objects/bosnia/reports/bh28rep2.htm)], p. 21).

<sup>75</sup> United States Government, 'To the Congress of the United States', p. 2.

<sup>76</sup> James Gow, 'Ready for the Long Haul', p. 121.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>78</sup> International Crisis Group, Bosnia, *A Peace, or Just A Cease-Fire?* ([www.intl-cris....objects/bosnia/reports/bh28rep2.htm](http://www.intl-cris....objects/bosnia/reports/bh28rep2.htm)), p. 21.

<sup>79</sup> Enis Dzanic and Norman Erik, 'Retraining the Federation Forces in post-Dayton Bosnia', p. 9.

<sup>80</sup> International Crisis Group Bosnia, *A Peace, or Just A Cease-Fire?* ([www.intl-cris....objects/bosnia/reports/bh28rep2.htm](http://www.intl-cris....objects/bosnia/reports/bh28rep2.htm)), p. 21.

<sup>81</sup> Yves Goulet, 'MPRI: Washington's Freelance Advisors', p. 41.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>83</sup> In contrast, it has been suggested that the Bosnian Serbs had a greater incentive in maintaining the *status quo*, having received, in some eyes, a favourable settlement during Dayton (control of 49% of territory although they constituted a third of the pre-war population) and were thought to be unlikely to resume hostilities. Similarly, Bosnian Croat nationalists did not seem to have much to gain from renewed conflict, as they: 'although in theory absorbed into the Federation, still maintain *de facto* independence in most of Herzegovina and benefit from a secure economic position due to their control of major trade routes to the Federation and to their open border with the Republic of Croatia, which provides significant economic assistance. Moreover, Croat separatists understand that in the event of war, Croat enclaves would be at immediate risk' (International Crisis Group, *A Peace, or Just A Cease-Fire?* [[www.crisisweb....objects/bosnia/reports/bh28rep1.htm](http://www.crisisweb....objects/bosnia/reports/bh28rep1.htm)], p. 9).

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

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<sup>85</sup> There have been fears that a re-trained and equipped Federation army might seek revenge or expansionist policies in revenge for Serb attacks during the conflict in Bosnia. See Enis Dzanic and Norman Erik, 'Retraining the Federation Forces in post-Dayton Bosnia', p. 9.

<sup>86</sup> International Crisis Group, *Military Security post-IFOR* (www.crisisweb...rojects/bosnia/reports/bh04rep.htm), p. 5.

<sup>87</sup> International Crisis Group, *A Peace, or Just A Cease-Fire?* (www.crisisweb...ojects/bosnia/reports/bh28rep1.htm), p. 9.

<sup>88</sup> Co-operation or integration in military terms had not been achieved. By February 1999, for example, Entity Armed Forces remained substantially divided along ethnic lines and integration of the Federation Army did not reach down to corps-level or below. See United States Information Service, Washington File, *Clinton Report to Congress on Bosnia*, 5 February 1999 (www.eucom.mil/europe/ba/usis/99feb05.htm), p. 2.

<sup>89</sup> International Crisis Group, *A Peace, or Just A Cease-Fire?* (www.crisisweb...ojects/bosnia/reports/bh28rep1.htm), p. 9.

<sup>90</sup> International Crisis Group, *Working Towards Security Within a Political Framework* (www.crisisweb.org/projects/bosnia/reports/bhxx17.htm), p. 9.

<sup>91</sup> Barry R. Posen, 'The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict', p. 44.



## **Chapter 6: Conclusions**

### **6.0 Introduction**

This thesis has described over 40 arms management initiatives, identified the conceptual basis of five core arms management strategies, and provided some preliminary insights and findings into their comparative performance and impact upon peace process stability. It is now in a position to synthesise this work and systematically answer the research questions posed in the introductory chapter. It does so by addressing them in three clusters.

### **6.1 Research Questions (1-3)**

- Precisely what objectives, principles, thinking, doctrines and concepts underpinned arms management strategies?
- How were they implemented?
- How did they conceptually and operationally evolve ?

### **6.2 Findings**

#### **6.21 Contrasting Approaches to Arms Management**

UN arms retention and delimitation was a somewhat conservative Cold War arms management strategy that had the limited objective of keeping parties – often state entities involved in border disputes – geographically distanced following cease-fires, through creating cease-fire lines and demilitarised zones from which weaponry was to be withdrawn. It did not seek to seize the parties' weaponry or even reduce weapons holdings; instead, it sought to achieve localised secure zones that reduced tensions and introduced predictability into military relations in disputed areas so that the parties could pursue negotiated settlements. UN arms retention and delimitation was imbued with traditional peacekeeping thinking: the parties could not be compelled to comply with demilitarisation arrangements and it was regarded as essential that the UN was neutral and operated with consent. This was a reflection of both the practical limits of UN intervention during the Cold War and a belief that third-party interveners should be facilitators or monitors, rather than active participants or enforcers of demilitarisation.

The Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) arms retention and delimitation strategy was distinct from its UN counter-part. It was directed at internal, rather than inter-state, conflict; further it was part of a process which sought to achieve political and military integration between the parties, rather than merely a cease-fire and political negotiations aimed at alleviating a dispute, as had commonly been the case during UN initiatives. Accordingly, its methods differed somewhat. Separation was achieved through the creation of assembly areas (AAs) for rebel forces and the confinement to bases of government troops. Nation-wide, rather than tactical demilitarisation, was the goal as the precursor to the creation of a national army and the demobilisation of surplus combatants. The CMF initiative was, in effect, unilaterally directed by the British, who also assumed temporary governance of Rhodesia-Zimbabwe during the transition period. However, like UN initiatives it did not have the power to impose its will on the parties. The CMF sought to monitor, supervise, and persuade the parties to comply with arms management. It also, like the UN, avoided the issue of disarming parties or reducing armaments as a means of securing military stability during peace processes.

Co-operative disarmament marked a radical departure in arms management terms as it introduced the notion that collecting arms, rather than geographically dispersing them, would enhance military stability during peace processes. As part of integrative peace processes, the UN supervised the gathering of ex-combatants in AAs where they were supposed to give up arms; a process which owed much to the CMF approach. However, while disarmament was a novel conflict termination approach in internal conflicts, particularly because it potentially challenged the parties' 'sovereignty' over weapons, the methods used to bring it about (in co-operative disarmament at least) once again drew upon traditional peacekeeping. It was anticipated that the parties would abide by commitments in peace agreements and that the UN would supervise and monitor the hand-over of weapons; it was not anticipated that UN peacekeepers would seize weapons or act as protectors or guarantors of the disarmament processes.

Coercive disarmament, in contrast, sought to address the challenge of disarmament by using conflict management, or even war-fighting or combat principles, rather than the traditional UN methodology. A perception emerged in some quarters, particularly among regional organisations, that if peace agreements were to be

implemented, third-party intervention sometimes required a proactive capability to seize weapons when parties were in non-compliance. Further, compliant parties needed some protection from attack by spoilers if peace break-downs were to be averted. At the same time, the traditional peacekeeping precepts of impartiality and consent were recast in more permissive terms, or even on occasion dispensed with. Impartiality, for example, was re-interpreted as not a prohibition on action against parties, as had frequently been the case during Cold War arms management, but rather as action applied equally to the parties in order to secure mandate compliance. However, coercive disarmament as conceived by the UN and regional and political organisations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), was a tactical activity designed to help create military stability or zones of peace in contested areas; it did not seek to bring about nation-wide disarmament as was the case with co-operative disarmament.

The Bosnian arms control strategy drew upon Cold War statist arms control thinking and practice, and differed considerably from previous arms management strategies. Arms control, in this context, was premised on the notion that military stability could be achieved by reducing weapons levels, rather than eliminating weapons. The objective of arms control in Bosnia was to permit the parties to retain sufficient weapons to maintain a credible defence, and to establish separation zones between the parties' weapons to discourage offensive military behaviour. In order to further mitigate the impact of weapons retention, a comprehensive and rigorous system of confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) was instigated, including information-sharing, verification, and restrictions on military manoeuvres. This was backed up by a NATO peace support operation which rigorously enforced the Dayton mandate using effective separation techniques and which sometimes seized illicit weapons. The Bosnian arms control approach did not seek integration between the parties in the form of shared governance and a unified army, as a means of resolving the dispute. It permitted the three parties to remain independent entities, each with its own defence capabilities, although military and political co-operation was encouraged within the Federation to off-set the perceived threat of the Republika Srpska (RS). Efforts were also made to encourage greater co-operation between the Federation and the RS. In essence, arms control sought to achieve security for the parties through:

preserving a residual military capability; proactive third-party intervention; and a CSBM system.

Arms-balancing was antithetical to previous arms management strategies in that it added arms to conflicts, rather than reducing them, or leaving them intact. There was little new about countries supplying arms to favoured parties during or following conflicts to further political objectives; what was novel about the United States' sponsored 'Train and Equip' package in Bosnia was that it was a systematic programme whose objectives were publicly articulated, and which ran alongside the Dayton arms control provisions. It was described as attempting to redress the perceived imbalance in military capabilities between Federation forces and those of the RS in order to achieve military deterrence between the parties, while at the same time not encouraging military instability. Arms-balancing suggested that security within peace processes lay in bolstering military capabilities to achieve military parities.

### **6.3 Research Questions (4-5)**

- What factors account for arms management 'successes' and 'failures' in stabilising peace processes?
- To what extent has arms management been coherently designed and conceptualised in inter-state and intra-state settings?

### **6.4 Findings**

The case study work shows that a consistent set of difficulties have stymied arms management processes. Most failed to manage arms effectively as they were not fully collected, or when they were retained by the parties were not monitored effectively; the parties and their arms were not kept apart; and peace processes were consequently punctuated by violence, even though the peace agreements reviewed tended to hold. It is apparent, after examining over 40 operations, that the problematic nature of arms management in the field can be primarily accounted for at two levels:

- internally, in terms of the frequently unstable military relations and dynamics that existed between parties during peace processes, particularly following internal conflicts; and
- externally, at the level of third-party intervention. Arms management interventions were poorly implemented and frequently poorly conceived and designed.<sup>1</sup> These

factors meant that arms management initiatives often could not build confidence among parties attempting to comply with arms management in good faith, nor could they act effectively against spoilers attempting to undermine arms management initiatives.

#### **6.41 Internal Factors: The Problematic Security Milieu and Dynamics of Peace Processes**

A number of the arms management processes reviewed entailed parties foregoing the military structures, strategies, and arrangements that had sustained them during conflict – such as defensive lines, buffer zones, the capacity for independent military action, external military assistance, and control of territories and ‘homelands’ – in exchange for a new form of insecurity: integration or political accommodation where their capacity for self-defence was diminished. Arms management involved parties moving into cantonment areas or leaving areas of strategic and tactical importance. This frequently placed parties in a position of vulnerability, particularly in the case of co-operative disarmament when, once they laid down their weapons and began to integrate their separate assets into a new united state, it became extremely difficult to either ‘enforce future co-operation or survive attack’.<sup>2</sup> ‘Non-party’ actors at the societal level, such as civilians and groups, also frequently found themselves facing severe security predicaments.<sup>3</sup>

The case study work undertaken has shown that in the absence of a strong third-party protector, parties during integrative peace processes sometimes faced insecurity in some ways as pernicious as that faced during conflicts; what Walter describes as ‘domestic co-operation under anarchy’.<sup>4</sup> Parties undergoing arms management in many of the case studies examined were confronted by predicaments regarding the degree of compliance that could be expected from their opponents, and also regarding the role of any third-party intervener. Could they trust their former opponents to reciprocate in terms of arms management after bloody and bitter conflicts in which betrayal and cheating had frequently become accepted modes of behaviour? If they did lay themselves vulnerable and open to attack by accepting controls on their weapons and movements, how would they be protected? What fall-back positions did they have in the event of a collapse of a cease-fire or peace agreement? How could demilitarisation commitments be checked and verified? Further, could any third-party military force be

trusted to be neutral, or would it have its own agenda: perhaps aiding a favoured party to the detriment of another? Last, did it actually have the capacity and determination to carry out its mandate?

Handing in weapons, if reciprocated, opened up the possibility that the parties could reach a mutually more secure disarmed environment within which a political accommodation might be more readily reached. However, in giving up arms, parties faced the prospect of being overwhelmed or even eliminated if an opponent failed to reciprocate; a predicament that has been referred to as the 'security dilemma'.<sup>5</sup>

On the other hand, the case study work shows that parties during peace processes following internal conflicts were not just helpless victims, powerless to overcome a set of security predicaments. In some of the arms management initiatives reviewed, parties that had signed up to demilitarisation obligations were intent on seizing power during cease-fires or post-elections. They were essentially spoilers with little, or no, commitment to finding a settlement or honouring agreements. Further, in some instances, their military position was relatively secure and they did not face a set of pressing security threats or annihilation; in fact, they were quite capable of defending themselves or projecting power. This seemed to be the case with some parties during UN operations in Angola and Cambodia.

The case studies show that most parties engaged in peace processes took the plunge and signed up to arms management, but frequently in bad faith. Some had an opportunistic attitude to implementation, while others approached it with a high degree of caution. It was rational and prudent, given the insecurity of many peace processes, and the contest for power that frequently emerged prior to elections, for parties to: hold back arms; build 'fail-safe' mechanisms in the event of the collapse of cease-fires; and even acquire fresh supplies of arms.

In El Salvador, the National Liberation Front Farabundo Marti (FMLN) resistance movement was acutely aware of its vulnerability if it disarmed or demobilised and it wanted to retain its arms as an 'insurance' policy, and also as a bargaining chip, which it did through secret arms caches. It was wary of the military capability of the government and wanted guarantees of safety if it was to lay down its arms. The government, for its part, had a root fear that the FMLN would cheat and to avoid this wanted disarmament carried out as quickly as possible.

In Mozambique the parties were in a state of exhaustion following decades of conflict and consequently, at least in part, had vested interests in seeing the peace process work. However, they were still highly suspicious of each other and were quick to retreat from their disarmament commitments. Both the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) and the Frente da Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) were pre-occupied with simultaneous proportionality regarding disarmament and demobilisation. They wanted to be sure that their opponents were reciprocating and this led to hold-ups. Further, they were not prepared to forego the possibility of the military option until the later stages of the peace process.

In Angola there were particular suspicions that the reluctance of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) to disarm was not so much a consequence of security predicaments, but part of a plan to gain military advantage and ultimately to resume conflict. Neither UNITA nor the government handed in many serviceable weapons or committed many of their troops to AAs, such was their mistrust of each other and their determination to retain their military capacity during the peace process. Similarly, in Cambodia the Khmer Rouge refused to disarm despite the commitments it had made under the Paris peace agreements.

The United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) found in April-May 1994 that even where there was a will to disarm, widespread exhaustion and local fears for individual security and the need to stay armed in a weapon-carrying environment proved stronger than the dictates of the Cotonou peace plan; and in some cases, even stronger than the orders to disarm from faction leaders.<sup>6</sup> During the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) operation in Somalia in a frequently uncertain security milieu the Somali factions stalled on giving up their weapons. The factions, each watching and waiting for the other to disarm, were either too suspicious and frightened to do so or, in some cases, had no real intention of doing so. They feared both serious attacks from their enemies and the loss of future power and position.<sup>7</sup> Finally, during the transition from Rhodesia-Zimbabwe to Zimbabwe the parties refused to even contemplate disarmament, such was their distrust of each other and their determination to retain military structures to protect themselves and project power and intimidation in the run up to elections.

However, in a few instances, as in the later stages of the Namibian operation, and most notably in Mali, the demilitarisation process was less insecure and

characterised by a higher level of trust. In Mali, encouraged by society and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), most combatants reported to AAs and gave in their arms. In fact, on the evidence of this thesis, disarmament appeared to be generally more problematic, and cheating more pervasive, in 'failed' state contexts involving multiple parties, than in 'bi-lateral' conflicts between governments and resistance/guerrilla movements.<sup>8</sup>

The situation faced by state parties undergoing arms management was somewhat different to that faced in internal conflicts. From the limited case study work undertaken on inter-state arms management here, it appears that insecurity was a less significant factor in arms management outcomes. Most state parties had the capacity to engage in demilitarisation, while still retaining the capacity to defend themselves. In agreeing to arms retention and delimitation, for example, they were not generally significantly endangering their survival or security. State parties, unlike parties in internal conflicts, did not have to face the consequences of integration following demilitarisation or of 'sharing' territory with former adversaries. States, as Walter notes, unlike groups in internal conflicts, potentially have a number of military strategies they can resort to in order to encourage co-operation at times of insecurity, even when trust is limited, including early warning systems, and sophisticated monitoring and verification procedures to check each other's behaviour. Further, they can more readily build military defences, set up alliances, and create buffer zones. In short, as 'sovereign' actors, states tend to have options that enable them to address their security predicaments in ways that intra-state actors cannot<sup>9</sup> and they are more likely to co-operate because they can limit the damage caused by cheating and bad faith.<sup>10</sup>

As has already been suggested, part of the answer to the arms management predicaments faced by internal parties lies in 'third party guarantees'.<sup>11</sup> Third-parties can guarantee:

that groups will be protected, terms will be fulfilled, and promises will be kept (or at least they can ensure that groups will survive).<sup>12</sup>

A third party intervener has the capacity, Walter suggests, to ensure that pay-offs from cheating do not exceed pay-offs from compliance, and once cheating become costly, co-operation becomes more likely.<sup>13</sup> Only when an outside 'enforcer' steps in to guarantee the terms do 'commitments to disarm and share political power become believable'.<sup>14</sup> However, as will now be explained, third-party intervention frequently lacked credibility.



#### **6.42 External Factors: The Poor Design and Conceptualisation of Arms Management**

A key conclusion of this thesis is that third-party intervention to manage arms had conceptual failings in two critical areas over the period surveyed: in confidence-building and in spoiler restraint. First, arms management strategies, such as co-operative and coercive disarmament, and arms retention and delimitation, lacked an adequate conceptualisation of confidence-building measures (CBMs) to inject transparency, good faith, and security into peace processes. Second, conversely, with the exception of some coercive disarmament initiatives and the Bosnian arms control process, they did not have the capacity to counter-act spoilers. It was only with the emergence of the arms control initiative in Bosnia that adequate CBMs and spoiler restraint was combined in an arms management mission. This lack of CBMs was particularly surprising in disarmament initiatives, given, as has been noted, that a precedent existed in the long-standing practice of using them in international arms control activities.<sup>15</sup>

During much of the Cold War period and immediately following it, there appears to have been a low level of comprehension among policy-makers of the difficulties and insecurities parties faced in accepting controls on their arms and of the lengths that some parties would go to in order to derail arms management processes. Consequently, the need for a credible third-party intervener to act as a confidence-builder through protecting and enforcing agreements, and facilitating co-operation, was neglected. These shortcomings in arms management, particularly in terms of CBMs, become apparent if the methods used in the five arms management strategies identified are reviewed.

UN arms retention and delimitation was underpinned by a generally weak conception of separation, which was a key element of any arms management process if renewed fighting between the parties was to be averted. Demilitarised zones, which were designed to fulfil a confidence-building function by acting as a buffer zone, were easily penetrated by regular or irregular forces, and UN monitors were able to provide little confidence that they would stay demilitarised. Due to their passive mandates and rules of engagement (ROEs), UN contingents were generally unable to provide a protective function<sup>16</sup> on areas bordering demilitarised zones, although they were able to

report violations and at least provide an early warning function in the event of attack. However, the latter was often not realisable due to the narrowness of many demilitarised zones. Tactical disarmament of small groups was occasionally attempted – by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), for example – but this was not generally part of any systematic attempt to rid demilitarised zones and cease-fire lines of weapons.

More credible CBM arrangements were to be found in a few operations. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) II, for example, established effective buffer zones, and rudimentary arms control arrangements were set up that limited armaments and force numbers on both sides of the buffer zones. Sinai II established linked verification and peacekeeping measures with the parties permitted to situate early warning stations in the buffer zone and the United States played a key supporting verification role. These operations, with their greater emphasis on confidence-building and verification, and somewhat more proactive force dispositions, pointed the way to a more effective demilitarisation model. However, they were not the norm: most arms retention and delimitation operations were observational and passive with weak CBMs.

The fact that the parties were permitted to retain their weapons under arms retention and delimitation – they had only to withdraw them from demilitarised zones – gave them the capacity to defend themselves, but it also meant the parties retained an undiminished capacity to launch attacks across the zones, particularly in the absence of systematic early warning and verification of weapons holdings.

Last, the doctrinal underpinnings of arms retention and delimitation, drawing as they did on traditional peacekeeping, were not usually conducive to building the confidence of vulnerable parties in peace processes or checking spoiler behaviour. A stance of minimal use of force was insufficiently robust to permit peacekeepers to effectively police demilitarised areas in the face of contraventions by determined state parties, as occurred when the Israelis advanced into south Lebanon, or to prevent infiltration by groups and militias. Peacekeepers and observers could do little other than report breaches of arms retention and delimitation agreements. It has been suggested that the presence of a neutral and impartial force in a buffer zone had the capacity to foster trust among belligerents,<sup>17</sup> but this was rarely the case following internal conflicts.

Cold War arms retention and delimitation was essentially a strategy designed to halt or defuse inter-state, rather than intra-state conflicts, and allow a breathing space within which political negotiations could take place. The passive nature of most arms retention and delimitation arrangements and their failure to secure conflict resolution was not necessarily a problem from the perspective of many state parties. In fact, they frequently had little interest in a peace settlement; they often had the military capacity to defend themselves; and a protracted impasse suited their national interests. However, when applied to internal contexts the limitations of arms retention and delimitation became more serious: issues of protection, the capacity for self-defence, and conflict termination, assumed critical importance. In internal conflicts, where the stakes involved in arms management failing were frequently higher, the credibility of separation arrangements was extremely important. This was demonstrated in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, for example, where the frequent attacks on Patriotic Front (PF) guerrillas around AAs, which the CMF was unable to prevent, almost led to the abandonment of the peace process on several occasions.

Co-operative disarmament strategies attempted to directly address the potentially destabilising impact of arms within peace processes by collecting them; in this sense they were considerably more ambitious than arms retention and delimitation strategies. If arms were comprehensively removed from peace processes the parties would not be in a position to attack each other. However, like arms retention and delimitation, co-operative disarmament lacked a credible set of CBMs and the authority to rein in spoilers.

At the most basic level, organisations implementing co-operative disarmament failed to secure credible arms inventories from the parties. Although this was not an easy task, as many parties made deliberately misleading statements regarding their arms inventories or refused to provide them, it was essential for the credibility of the disarmament process, because if the parties were unable to accurately determine whether their opponents were giving up arms as agreed their own commitment was likely to waver. Further, the UN needed to gauge disarmament compliance.

As in many arms retention and delimitation initiatives, co-operative disarmament was underpinned by a poorly conceived and implemented separation process. Parties in AAs either felt vulnerable – in Mozambique, Angola, and Namibia ex-combatants feared that they would come under attack – or routinely ignored

separation arrangements and exited to engage in banditry or intimidate civilians. UN soldiers were generally unable to either protect or compel soldiers to stay in AAs due to the small numbers of troops deployed during co-operative disarmament operations and the nature of their mandate. This tended to create a sense of insecurity in the countryside, where most AAs were situated.

Attempts were made to introduce CBMs by, for example, permitting parties access to weapons storage sites in exceptional circumstances, such as when attacks seemed imminent, but this did not generally prove to be a sustainable policy as arms were frequently pre-emptively removed once relations between the parties started to deteriorate.<sup>18</sup>

One of the few successful confidence-building regimes established within a co-operative disarmament operation was in Nicaragua where the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) required the Sandinista army to maintain a distance of at least 20km from the security zones. This was buttressed by the presence of an armed battalion – the Venezuelan Battalion (VENBATT) – which was deployed to reassure the Contras that they would have a measure of protection in the event of an attack by the Sandinista army after their handing in of weapons.

Disarmament theoretically held out the prospect of injecting confidence into peace processes. However, this was rarely put to the test as disarmament was rarely implemented.<sup>19</sup> The parties in most of the processes surveyed eventually realised there was little prospect of comprehensive disarmament taking place, or of the UN policing it, and therefore took their own CBMs, including retaining weaponry, holding back troops from the demobilisation process, and establishing secret arms caches. They also frequently felt free to engage in intimidation and violence with the weaponry they had retained.

Last, co-operative disarmament faced familiar difficulties in applying traditional peacekeeping principles to the problem of demilitarisation, particularly in the context of internal conflicts. In circumstances where violence frequently continued during the cease-fire process and where antagonistic power-relations still existed between the parties, minimal use of force to check spoiler behaviour was unlikely to be effective. Further, consent was difficult to establish on the ground, although it was enshrined in peace agreements, and was a shifting commodity where a multiplicity of armed groups and sub-groups existed. A ‘diplomatic’ conception of impartiality, which tended to

translate into a reluctance to attach blame to or act against spoilers, proved to be unhelpful in many internal conflicts where arms management was taking place. Nevertheless, in some peace processes, particularly bi-lateral ones such as Mozambique and Nicaragua, consent and impartiality were regarded as key conditions for acceptance of disarmament and third-party intervention, and without a perception that the UN was neutral the parties would have been unwilling to even contemplate passing through a vulnerable disarmament processes.<sup>20</sup>

Coercive disarmament drew upon conflict management principles. Coercive disarmament permitted proactive action against parties failing to adhere to demilitarisation agreements. The envelope of the use of force was extended from one of self-defence to one of actually seizing weaponry in the face of resistance, or even occasionally using lethal force if disarmament was resisted. Following the freeing of hostages held by the West Side Boys in Sierra Leone in September 2000, the UN was reported as saying that it would pursue and shoot any members of the group who refused to disarm.<sup>21</sup>

A prime function of coercive disarmament was to be more proactive in reining in spoiler behaviour. However, its poor implementation – missions frequently failed to make full use of their mandates or reverted to co-operative disarmament – meant it rarely fully utilised its powers in the field. And one of the major limitations of coercive disarmament was that it could only be utilised tactically given the reluctance of the international community to implement nation-wide disarmament, which was widely seen as highly risky, or even impossible. Creating demilitarised ‘areas of peace’ was not likely to hold together peace processes as such; it was more a holding process to avert humanitarian catastrophes, or reduce the prospect of conflict at points of tension.

The more successful tactical coercive disarmament initiatives in terms of creating secure environments, building confidence, and checking spoiler behaviour tended to adopt a local ‘leviathan’ approach, as in Baido, Somalia. Troops would regularly patrol, conduct stop and search, and generally establish policing authority over an area. Where the intervening authority had the trust and consent of the local population and the military capacity to carry out this function, local stability and security could sometimes be achieved.

Other tactical attempts to establish contested secure areas in internal conflicts, such as the safe areas in Former Yugoslavia, tended to falter because organisations such

as the UN did not have the capacity or the will to mount a credible defence of areas, nor were they able to collect weapons within them which might have removed the pretext for attacks by external parties.

Attempts by the CIS and, on occasions, ECOMOG to use coercive disarmament as an instrument to advance national policy by, for example, forcibly disarming some parties and giving arms to other favoured parties, generally did little to advance political accommodations or to build confidence. Taking sides during a coercive disarmament initiative, as ECOMOG did at certain points in targeting Johnson during the Liberian peace process, proved counter-productive, notwithstanding the mission's eventual success. Further, attempts to counter the perceived partiality of these regional organisations by involving impartial UN observation missions, such as the United Nations Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and UNOMIL in Liberia,<sup>22</sup> did little to reassure parties who felt that they were being discriminated against. As Allison notes, scepticism regarding Russian-led interventions was fuelled by 'failure to maintain credible impartiality'<sup>23</sup> as well as the 'predisposition to blur the distinction between combat and "peacekeeping"'.<sup>24</sup>

The Bosnian arms control model suggested a new and more efficacious approach to the problem of stabilising military relations between parties in peace processes.

First, a regime of arms limitations was put in place in Bosnia. This went beyond previous arms retention schemes, which had left the military capabilities of the parties intact and potentially destabilising, by securing arms reductions. These reductions still theoretically left the parties with the capacity to defend themselves, but seemed to avert arms-racing and fears of pre-emptive attack.

Second, the Bosnian initiative was underpinned by a systematic confidence-building regime, which had previously been lacking, including such measures as: the identification and monitoring of weapons and manufacturing capabilities; the exchange of data on holdings of heavy weapons; the exchange of information on manpower and major weapons systems; the giving of notice of manoeuvres and unusual military movements; limits on the size and frequency of military exercises; the avoidance of military deployments in sensitive areas; and the observation of military manoeuvres and visits to bases.<sup>25</sup> These measures introduced considerably greater transparency and

predictability into military relations between the parties and helped avert renewed outbreaks of conflict.

Third, the separation arrangements and the transfer of heavy weapons into approved sites, which formed part of the arms reduction arrangements, were proactively and effectively implemented, unlike past disarmament operations. By rigorous patrolling and proactive force dispositions, it was made clear that penetration and attacks across the demilitarised areas would not be tolerated. The cantonment sites were also well guarded and inspected, and there were no major weapons break-outs, in contrast to much previous practice.

Fourth, where parties were acting in contravention of the demilitarisation arrangements – by holding illicit weapons for example – NATO acted to seize arms and destroy them. NATO troops adopted the methodology of peace support operations which advocated more proactive interpretations of use of force and more permissive interpretations of impartiality and consent, to counter spoilers in internal conflicts. Further, they were deployed in large numbers and were heavily armed.

Last, critically, NATO acted as a guarantor of demilitarisation, rather than as a third-party facilitator.

In effect, the Bosnian arms control approach embraced a form of partition: the three parties held distinct territories and retained national forces (notwithstanding co-operative structures such as the Federation), unlike the integrative approach adopted in co-operative disarmament.<sup>26</sup>

Arms-balancing represented a radically different approach to stabilising peace processes. In the context examined, it involved the addition, rather than the reduction or retention, of arms to a favoured party. Further, it was not undertaken as part of a formal peace agreement or a conflict resolution/management process, it was undertaken bi-laterally by the United States and a group of states who thought that one party had an unfair military advantage post-Dayton, which required balancing if peace was to be maintained.

Arms-balancing had the capacity to be a highly destabilising approach, as it was generally believed that:

Putting more weapons into the theatres of conflict will generally intensify rather than dampen hostility.<sup>27</sup>

In particular, by supplying arms to one side, arms-balancing had the capacity to undermine the confidence of the Serbs in the Dayton agreement and the CSBM regime

that had been carefully crafted, and encourage them to illicitly strengthen their military capabilities in response. In the event, the military assistance given did not seem to fundamentally alter the balance-of-power between the parties. However, the notion that peace processes might be stabilised by increasing the deterrence capabilities of parties suggested a fundamentally different approach to the conflict resolution/management strategies that have been at the forefront of the international community's demilitarisation efforts; albeit one whose validity and efficacy is likely to be questioned as a model for future arms management initiatives.

#### **6.43 External Factors: Implementational and Operational Failings**

As well as being poorly conceived, many arms management initiatives were beset by implementational and operational problems, which further undermined the confidence of the parties in arms management and hampered the collection or management of arms. These included such factors as: poor command and control; problems of interoperability between national contingents; delayed deployments; mandates which were not implemented, or were implemented in different ways by national contingents; failures to adhere to arms management timetables; inefficiencies due to under-resourced missions; and a general failure to collect comprehensive numbers of weapons as agreed under peace agreements, or to implement separation and delimitation arrangements.

In many of the operations examined, the UN and regional organisations encountered difficulties in getting troops onto the ground in accordance with terms set out in peace agreements, and on time. In Namibia, United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) forces were deployed late, despite the fact that the UN had had years to plan the mission. Similarly, in Cambodia peacekeepers did not arrive on time, undermining the impact of what was the largest and best resourced peacekeeping mission at the time. Many combatants in Somalia were prepared to disarm initially, but this good faith eroded as peacekeepers failed to deploy promptly and the disarmament process was slow to get off the ground. Oakley argues that:

There is little doubt that most heavy weapons could have been removed from control of the factional militias and organised 'bandits' throughout Somalia by UNITAF, probably with minimal combat, had it maintained momentum.<sup>28</sup>

When a more proactive United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) II was eventually set up to act to protect civilians in response to the genocide, it took the SC a month to authorise the operation and actual deployment took two months; by then



it was too late. United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONOMOZ) peacekeepers were late and failed to establish the 39 AAs required for disarmament.<sup>29</sup> Similarly, in Liberia during the Cotonou process, AAs were not opened at the agreed locations and ECOMOG soldiers failed to deploy comprehensively.

These late deployments meant that the parties and individual combatants would frequently lose faith in the ability of third-party intervention to underwrite cease-fire security and would start to take their own security measures; or anticipating failure, would even start to work to undermine demilitarisation arrangements. Inaction or delay also tended to lead to fragmentation within the parties with factions defecting from the cease-fire process. Protracted demilitarisation processes, frequently due to ineffective implementation, also tended to lead to failure or breakdowns.<sup>30</sup>

Further, operational problems arose from differences in approach between national contingents once troops were positioned: some national governments were more eager to implement disarmament than others.<sup>31</sup> This hampered a concerted approach and further confused parties undergoing arms management or encouraged them to cheat. It was alleged that in Mozambique some national contingents had little enthusiasm for disarmament, seeing it as dangerous, and that they adopted a passive stance accepting weapons for collection if they were offered to them, but making little attempt to go out and collect them.<sup>32</sup> Peacekeeping contingents in Cambodia interpreted ROE in differing ways, or even ignored them. According to the Force Commander, some national contingents in Cambodia opened fire at the slightest provocation, while others handed over their weapons if guns were pointed at them.<sup>33</sup> During UNITAF and the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) missions there were serious differences in interpretation between the UN and the United States over what disarmament entailed. The UN Secretary-General (SG) wanted the American-led UNITAF to establish a demilitarised Somalia with large quantities of arms collected, while the Americans saw disarmament in more restricted terms.<sup>34</sup> Washington's view was that disarmament was not a priority, but it could be undertaken as deemed necessary according to conditions on the ground.

The parties' confidence in arms management was further eroded, because frequently, few resources were devoted to operations in the field. Troop deployments were often too small to provide credible security for those disarming, either in transit to AAs or assembly points (APs), or once *in situ*. It even proved problematic for

peacekeepers to effectively guard or destroy weapons that had been handed in. Peacekeepers rarely had the resources to track down illicit arms caches or to encourage elements holding back from AAs to enter them. Collection points were not even monitored in some operations because of limited resources. In Angola in June 1994 a force of only 50 military observers were in place in a country which had been racked by civil war and in which the parties had palpably failed to develop the trust or good will to proceed with disarmament.

The small numbers of military personnel deployed during many arms management initiatives meant that they were barely able to keep order in AAs and there were a number of riots, threats against peacekeepers, and desertions. UNAMIR had 2,548 military personnel, only a third of what the UN had asked for, and half what the force commander had recommended. The total size of the UN forces in Mozambique was only 5,914 at its height; well short of the target figure of 6,979.<sup>35</sup> And the UN SG, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, had to work hard to convince member states to contribute the additional \$6.5m per month from November 1993 to cover the costs of the Mozambique operation, and, in fact, by July 1994, 35% of the UN's costs of the operation (\$153.2m) were still outstanding from member states. These cost pressures led the UN to pressurise RENAMO to accept new reduced disarmament figures in May 1994.<sup>36</sup>

Further, peacekeeping troops were sometimes poorly equipped, particularly those from the poorer developing countries, and were not given the weaponry and capabilities to deal with spoilers in countries where the parties were often heavily armed. In Sierra Leone in September 2000 there were fears that the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) would collapse because of 'poor quality troops and equipment'.<sup>37</sup>

Arms management programmes frequently lacked effective command and control, in part because they were frequently under-resourced and staffed for peacekeeping operations, and in part because of obstructive behaviour by national contingents. Many national contingents tended to consult their capitals before obeying orders, or placed national interests ahead of the orders being received from UN headquarters. There were also often tensions between national contingents within peacekeeping missions which tended to undermine a cohesive approach. The Indians, for example, threatened to withdraw their 3,000 soldiers from UNAMSIL following

disagreements with the Nigerians, whom the Indian Commander, Gen. Vijay Jetley, accused of 'sabotaging peace' in favour of national interests.<sup>38</sup> There was also sometimes a proliferation of chains of command within peacekeeping operations. In Somalia during the last two months of 1993, for example, UNOSOM II reported to UN Headquarters in New York; while three independent American commands reported to separate headquarters, which made co-ordination difficult.<sup>39</sup>

Partly as a consequence of these operational and implementational failings, most UN disarmament operations failed to collect comprehensive numbers of weapons. In El Salvador, the disarmament programme had to be rescheduled three times and when it formally ended in December 1992 it was common knowledge that full disarmament had not taken place. This was confirmed with the explosion of a FMLN arms cache in May 1993. Disarmament had to be abandoned in Angola in 1992, only to be taken up again several years later, but by the end of the 1990s comprehensive disarmament had still not been achieved. In Cambodia, disarmament was formally abandoned in 1994, when the Khmer Rouge refused to disarm, while the large numbers of small arms smuggled out of Mozambique, following the elections, demonstrated that disarmament was also far from complete. Coercive disarmament programmes also tended to leave large numbers of arms uncollected, while troops tasked with implementing arms retention and delimitation initiatives found themselves unable to maintain the integrity of demilitarised zones. In south Lebanon, Kashmir, and Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, demilitarisation zones were persistently infringed because small numbers of observers or monitors were unable to adopt a meaningful policing role.

Higher levels of operational and implementational competence were to be found in a few arms management initiatives. NATO-policed arms control arrangements were generally regarded as operationally competent because of their effective command and control, well-equipped troops, and the considerable resources that NATO contributor states could bring to bear. Stabilisation Force (SFOR) troops in Bosnia, for example, were generally able to police demilitarised zones, establish weapons collection points, and confiscate illegal weapons. Further, they were deployed in a timely manner. This had a significant impact upon the peace process and the management of arms.

The UN arms management operations in Namibia, Nicaragua, and Mali also had effective components. VENBATT proved effective in bringing about disarmament in Nicaragua, while UNTAG, after initial shortcomings, evolved into an effective force,

which was able to assist in dismantling the citizen and commando forces that had proved so problematic and in locating arms caches. The CMF operation in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, although arguably too small, demonstrated a high level of organisational competence in arriving on time; having an effective command and control system; and effecting its mission within an extremely short time span of several months – attributes that have been attributed to it being under the control of a competent lead state rather than a multilateral organisation.<sup>40</sup>

However, these competencies were the exception rather than the rule in arms management initiatives. Poor implementation and operational shortcomings played a major part in the erosion of confidence in arms management missions and their eventual dissipation, collapse, or inconclusive outcomes.

## **6.5 Research Questions (6-7)**

- How can improvement be factored into arms management?
- What constitutes an effective arms management strategy?

## **6.6 Findings**

What insights, then, do the above findings give us into the formulation of effective arms management policy?<sup>41</sup>

### **6.61 The Need For Implementational and Operational Coherence**

First, it is evident that arms management needs to be more effectively implemented. The UN and contributor states increasingly recognised in the late 1990s that peacekeeping capabilities and implementation needed improving if continuing difficulties in peace operations were to be avoided. At the UN Millennium Summit, September 2000, the UN Security Council (SC) agreed to strengthen peacekeeping operations and capabilities. A resolution was adopted to support an upgrade of the UN's capacity for planning, establishing, deploying, and conducting peacekeeping operations. As a first step, the SC agreed to adopt 'clearly defined, credible, achievable and appropriate mandates', and a permanent UN high command responsible for the planning, deployment, and conduct of peacekeeping operations would be created.<sup>42</sup> These reforms, if implemented, hold out the prospect of more effective peacekeeping operations and could be usefully carried over into arms management. Specifically, the

case study work undertaken in previous chapters suggests that improvements in arms management are required in the following areas:

- Arms management would considerably benefit from the timely deployment of troops and the drawing up of realistic and detailed timetables setting out when arms management phases are due to be completed. Failures to get military contingents into the field on time has been a recurring problem that has led to the parties abandoning or losing confidence in arms management. Unrealistic timetables are likely to lead to similar problems.
- Greater resources need to be released for arms management. Troops will frequently need to be more heavily armed than has been customary in traditional peacekeeping operations; further, poorer contributor states will require assistance in terms of equipment and training. Weak, poorly equipped troops tend to encourage spoiler behaviour and suggest a lack of commitment to arms management.
- Inter-operability between national contingents undertaking arms management requires considerable improvement, and command and control generally needs to be strengthened, if mandates are to be effectively implemented. In particular, it would be desirable if national contingents adopted common interpretations of arms management mandates and ROEs.

### **6.62 Matching Strategies to Contexts**

Second, policy-makers might consider looking more closely into matching strategies to contexts. Thus far, there has been a tendency on the part of policy-makers to apply arms management strategies in a 'blanket' fashion to peace processes, without an appreciation of their differences. Co-operative disarmament, for example, was the favoured UN strategy between 1989-94 for a whole range of post-conflict arms management processes, despite their fundamental differences. It may make better sense, where politics permit, to tailor the strategies used to the specific contexts in which they are applied.

Co-operative disarmament, for example, tended to perform well, or acceptably, when the parties realised, to a greater or lesser extent, that conflict was no longer productive or sustainable, and, however grudgingly, were seeking a cessation of conflict, political accommodation, or even reconciliation. In these circumstances, the parties realised that there were mutual interests in building peace and a degree of good

will, comprehensive CBMs were not necessarily required, nor did the UN require a proactive capacity to restrain spoiler behaviour. Rather, what the parties required was a trusted and impartial third-party facilitator and monitor who could be called upon to adjudicate, or ease the process on when it ran into difficulties. In these contexts, cooperative disarmament was often an appropriate strategy.

Similarly, arms retention and delimitation had the capacity to be an effective strategy if the objective of intervention was to prevent border disputes escalating into major conflicts, and if the expectations were not too high regarding conflict resolution, although arms retention initiatives did sometimes assist in bringing about lasting settlements. The Sinai demilitarisation zone, for example, has proved to be of critical importance in anchoring Israeli-Egyptian relations.<sup>43</sup> However, UN arms retention and delimitation was not generally a suitable approach in internal conflicts, where the demilitarised zone approach was hard to maintain due to the intermingling of populations and combatants.

Coercive disarmament, in its NATO and UN peace support operation manifestations, had the capacity to be effective in internal conflicts where central authority had eroded or disappeared and where there was a requirement to build zones of peace within which humanitarian aid, development, and other forms of assistance could be delivered, or vulnerable populations protected. Conflicts such as Liberia, Somalia, and Sierra Leone, where order had fragmented, were arguably contexts where tactical coercive disarmament had a contribution to make. However, coercive disarmament was difficult to apply comprehensively, rather than in prescribed areas. How could a third-party disarm the proliferation of groups or sub-groups within Liberia, for example, let alone civilians who kept arms for self-defence. Further, coercive disarmament had little utility in inter-state conflicts. It was virtually inconceivable during the Cold War, or even afterwards, that the UN or any other organisation would seek to coercively disarm a state or states, although victorious states in the past had sought to do so following wars; most notably the Allies with the disarmament provisions of the Armistice following the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles 14 months later.<sup>44</sup> The UN, when it intervened in Iraq following its enforced withdrawal from Kuwait, was unable to fully dismantle or control Iraq's weapons of mass destruction under UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 687 of 3 April 1991, despite its disarmament mandate.<sup>45</sup> The problems presented by the forcible

collection of small arms and light weapons (LWs) nation-wide following an inter-state conflict seem almost insurmountable for a third-party; indeed, states find it difficult enough to disarm citizens and criminals within their own domestic jurisdiction, despite their frequently considerable law enforcement powers.<sup>46</sup>

Arms control arrangements of the sort practiced in Bosnia<sup>47</sup> seemed to work in internal conflicts where the parties have some of the attributes of states, such as jurisdictions over distinct territories, armies, and forms of territorial governance. Whether arms control involving systematic arms limitation and CBMs would be practical in more anarchic contexts remains open to question. How could the multiple and fragmented parties in Somalia and Liberia, for example, have been persuaded, or even compelled, to declare accurate weapons inventories? How would verification have taken place? And could the methods applied in Bosnia to arms limitations on 'major' weapons be applied to small arms and LWs which constituted the main threat to stability in these conflicts? However, it is conceivable that the Bosnian arms control model may have relevance following more structured, bi-lateral conflicts – for example between a government and an insurgency movement – in circumstances where parties require systematic CBMs before they will contemplate integration or political accommodation, but this has yet to be tested in the field.

### **6.63 Constructing Coherent Arms Management Policy**

The research undertaken suggests there are core generic principles that tend to underpin effective arms management following internal conflicts. These do not necessarily conform with Cold War and immediate post-Cold War arms management thinking.

First, doctrinally, arms management strategies will, in other than benign circumstances, almost certainly require a capacity to act in defence of peace-building with proportionate force to restrain spoilers. It will also need to protect parties and non-combatants in compliance with their demilitarisation commitments. Traditional UN peacekeeping conceptions of use of force in self-defence will sometimes need to be extended. The need for more forceful UN responses has been recognised by the UN, and by SG, Kofi Annan, who in August 2000, commented:

Unless we are prepared to counter force with force, there is very little we can do. The problem is that you have countries like the US that will not accept a single casualty. And that philosophy is spreading.<sup>48</sup>

A peacekeeping report commissioned by the UN the following month suggested that ROE should be 'robust and not force United Nations contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers'.<sup>49</sup> However, at the same time:

*reliance on coercion alone is insufficient, partly because the effect of coercion will erode over time, and also because it is better to attempt to influence the behaviour of people in conflict situations by the use of the carrot rather than the stick.*<sup>50</sup>

How precisely the use of force is defined in arms management operations will to an extent be contextual, but it is likely to be seen to embrace the option of the use of measured and proportionate force to, for example, control or take arms from parties refusing to give them up in line with demilitarisation commitments, and the use of force to protect compliant parties who have surrendered weapons or accepted controls on them. The use of force may also be regarded as justified to protect civilians. What conditions, if any, justify the use of lethal pre-emptive force requires careful framing.<sup>51</sup> In Somalia, for example, crew-served weapons were considered a threat to UNITAF forces and the relief effort whether or not the crew demonstrated hostile intent, and commanders were authorised to use all necessary force. In effect, this meant that deadly force could be used if weapons were not voluntarily surrendered. Under Frag Order 39 issued during UNOSOM II, organised militias and technicals could be 'engaged without provocation'.<sup>52</sup> Whether this constituted an efficacious or legitimate approach remains questionable and a matter of debate seven years after the closure of the Somalia mission.

Second, arms management will need to be impartial or neutral if it is to retain legitimacy and the confidence of the parties.<sup>53</sup> Mandates should be applied even-handedly, but this should not prohibit, on occasion, measured action against parties contravening agreements, as was frequently the case in early initiatives.<sup>54</sup> Partiality, or perceptions of partiality, as shown in a number of the arms management initiatives examined, was an extremely sensitive issue for parties entering into arms management and tended to undermine confidence and damage the capacity of intervention forces to stabilise peace processes.<sup>55</sup> UNIFIL troops, for example, were accused of being partial by Israel when, during the 1982 invasion, Israeli troops discovered a written agreement between the commander of the Norwegian Battalion (NORBAT) and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) allegedly promising 'non-interference by the Norwegians in any terrorist activity that took place in their zone'.<sup>56</sup> Russian troops were known, on a number of occasions, to have illicitly given weapons to parties during



demilitarisation.<sup>57</sup> The perceived partiality of ECOWAS in Liberia, and the inability of ECOMOG to counter this, was a significant factor in the erosion of confidence in the mission among many of the factions and the population in general.

For practical and legitimacy considerations, strategic consent will normally be required prior to third-party demilitarisation interventions. However, it is clear that consent needs to be re-interpreted in internal conflicts where there are multiple parties whose consent cannot necessarily be secured, or where entities may have 'de-legitimised' themselves by having committed extensive human rights abuses, for example.<sup>58</sup>

Third, effective arms management requires a set of confidence-building techniques that go beyond the *ad hoc* and poorly developed measures contained within most arms retention and delimitation and co-operative and coercive disarmament initiatives. These might include techniques that enable: accurate and reliable arms inventories to be compiled; the destruction, or safe-keeping of LWs, and small arms (rather than the weak storage arrangements that were a feature of many co-operative disarmament operations); the comprehensive verification of military contingents and weapons levels; weapons reductions and limitation measures; and restrictions on foreign forces. As Gallagher notes:

Rivals are unlikely to accept constraints on their military activities unless they have confidence in assessing compliance.<sup>59</sup>

However, verification and confidence-building, although valuable enabling techniques to encourage co-operation between suspicious parties, will not necessarily be panaceas in terms of effective arms management.<sup>60</sup> It has been suggested that decades of frustration over superpower verification of macro weapons systems, for example, have convinced many participants that 'agreement on verification is most likely when it is least necessary'.<sup>61</sup>

Fourth, an effective arms management policy will probably require scope for both arms retention and disarmament. Disarmament in some contexts will be destabilising: for example when the military balance between parties is unstable; where they distrust each other; and where third-party intervention is perceived as weak. A prudent approach, in these circumstances, may be to permit the parties to retain their weaponry for a transitional period, or at least to retain stabilising armament levels which allow the parties to protect themselves, but at levels which do not pose an overt threat to opponents. As Hartzell puts it:

striking a balance between antagonists may involve allowing opposing sides to remain armed or retain their own security forces.<sup>62</sup>

This approach might be tried in future demilitarisation operations where, up to now, disarmament would have been the preferred option. It is interesting to speculate what might have happened in some post-Cold War co-operative disarmament operations had there been a transitional arms retention scheme, followed by arms reduction, and then perhaps eventual disarmament, rather than attempts to effect immediate and comprehensive disarmament.<sup>63</sup>

Fifth, arms control and arms reduction schemes offer the potential advantage over disarmament that they set:

less demanding...targets, and would remove many of the disincentives to the parties to fulfil their obligations. It would leave open longer term political differences – a political settlement and the future of the state – in favour of developing a deep and internationally monitored armistice. Centrally, it gives all incentives to remove violence from the political agenda.<sup>64</sup>

On the other hand, it also needs to be borne in mind, as Croft notes, that arms control leaves large quantities of arms at large; it might legitimise spoilers; it might ‘simply store future trouble’; and it tends to require long-term and costly commitments to conflicts by third-party interveners such as the UN.<sup>65</sup>

Finally, it seems imperative that third-parties, when they have a legitimate mandate, adopt an authoritative stance in managing arms where anarchy, or near anarchy, has broken out in order to stabilise peace processes. In the absence of an authority around which the parties can coalesce and seek reassurance, or be brought back into line, reciprocal cheating, arms-racing, and even renewed conflict are likely with frequently disastrous humanitarian consequences. As an examination of civil war endings concludes:

tests confirmed the strong correlation between outside security guarantees and successful settlement.<sup>66</sup>

Stedman suggests that:

international consensus about norms, co-ordination behind a strategy of aggressive management of spoilers, and unambiguous signals to peace supporters and spoilers provide the difference between successful and failed implementation of peace agreements.<sup>67</sup>

However, it is also clear that third-parties implementing arms management, if they are to act authoritatively and as guardians of peace, need to develop a greater awareness

and sensitivity to local cultures, politics, and the security predicaments faced by parties, groups, and individuals in war-torn societies and states.

As this thesis has shown, implementing arms management is an extremely problematic task. However, the experiences of arms management, particularly post-1995, have provided policy-makers with the basis for a more sophisticated understanding of the dynamics of arms management processes and the kind of pitfalls to be avoided. It has been suggested that more effective arms management policy might be formulated: if international and regional organisations develop a better appreciation of the internal dynamics of peace processes; if they attempt to match strategies to contexts more closely; if implementation is improved; and if doctrine is more proactive in addressing spoiler behaviour and protecting parties acting in good faith, while still maintaining overall consent and legitimacy. However, whether these lessons will be fully learnt or absorbed into future operations remains to be seen.

## **6.7 Final Reflections**

It has been established that there are no straightforward answers to one of the core research question addressed in this thesis (namely, what constitutes an effective and coherent arms management strategy?) although there are areas where international and regional policy can be improved. Arms management is ultimately contextual. It is most likely to prove efficacious when it designed and implemented bearing in mind the circumstances of specific peace processes. Thus, it might be concluded that the blanket policy of using co-operative disarmament during UN peace-building in the late 1980s and early 1990s was likely to lead to difficulties given the differing characteristics of the conflicts and subsequent peace processes being addressed.

However, what also emerges from this research, notwithstanding the policy recommendations made in the previous section, is the sheer difficulty of implementing effective arms management policy. Political, security, and even economic, factors situated at the level of the parties and at third-party intervention consistently work against the effective control of arms in peace processes. As has already been noted, arms are frequently guarantors of the parties' continuing survival, or instruments to project power in the critical transitional stage of peace processes and to influence future outcomes, and as such are unlikely to be lightly discarded. Similarly, at an individual or societal level, arms are cultural symbols of status, prestige, and power, and in many

war-torn societies a means of earning a living through extortion and banditry; consequently, individuals and groups have been reluctant to concede arms management. It has been suggested that in some parts of the world:

For the majority of those taking part in violence, the purpose of war may not be to win it so much as to make money while it lasts and, moreover, to ensure that it lasts long enough to make serious money.<sup>68</sup>

Calculating or calibrating the appropriate response to persuade the parties and other actors to fulfil their demilitarisation obligations therefore requires considerable judgement of, and sensitivity to, the cultural and societal context within which demilitarisation is taking place, the military balance between the various parties, and the impact controls on arms will have on security during peace processes. It also requires an understanding of local politics. A number of arms management initiatives have been deficient in these areas. Duffey notes that many military contingents arrived in Somalia, for example, without knowledge of Somalia, its history, or its culture.<sup>69</sup>

There has also been a tendency in arms management, as in peace-building generally, to see, as Woodhouse puts it, people within a conflict as the problem, with outsiders the providers of the solution.<sup>70</sup> Sometimes, it could be argued, the converse was the case. Only when the parties have determined that political accommodation is the way forward and have recognised that this entails mutual concessions on arms is the difficulty of arms management ultimately mitigated.

Further, the difficulty of arms management has been exacerbated by political factors at the level of third-party intervention. A barrier to good arms management policy has not necessarily been just a poor appreciation of its fundamentals by policy-makers, as has been argued at times above, but also political factors. Arms management mandates, for example, have been formulated through discussions and negotiations between the SC, the UN Secretariat, contributor states, and parties in the field, and have consequently been compromises between competing interests. The politics of peace processes have also frequently come before weapons control: arms management has been sacrificed or compromised to prevent parties from defecting from peace processes. This was claimed to be the case in Mozambique where a blind eye was eventually turned to non-compliance.

Also, formidable problems remain in terms of resource shortfalls and structure in the UN and other security organisations' intervention capacities.

All this suggests that it is perhaps too easy to be critical of the shortcomings of arms management initiatives, particularly those undertaken by the UN. It has been noted that many co-operative disarmament initiatives were deployed late, were undermanned, and were powerless to maintain order. However, this had as much to do with prevarication by SC members and contributor states, an unwillingness to contribute troops, and mandates, which, out of necessity, were compromises between contending interests, as it did with the incompetence of the UN Secretariat, particularly given its extremely limited resources.

From the vantage point of the new Millennium it appears that arms management based on traditional peacekeeping precepts was unlikely to work in fragmented internal conflicts, such as Former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia, for reasons that have already been explained, but this was by no means apparent at the end of the 1980s when the UN first started to disarm warring parties. The international community had no experience of militarily intervening in internal conflicts to systematically disarm and demilitarise societies ravaged by civil war. In the late 1980s/early 1990s the jury was still out on whether traditional peacekeeping, essentially a statist construct, could be adapted to work in the complex conditions of internal conflicts, although some researchers were beginning to question its validity in this context.<sup>71</sup> The UN conceivably maintained too great a belief, and for too long, in traditional peacekeeping precepts in these types of conflict,<sup>72</sup> but it is worth bearing in mind that in Somalia, for example, it was the UN pressing the United States to adopt a more proactive approach to disarmament. Further, during the Cold War, the UN had little alternative but to pursue a form of arms management that eschewed disarmament. It would have been inconceivable for the UN to seek to disarm sovereign states, even within demilitarised border zones, or to compel the parties to comply with mandates, even if it had wanted to.

To conclude, the many difficulties identified in this thesis regarding implementing arms management strongly suggest that third-party military intervention in the field may not necessarily be the most efficacious way of demilitarising conflicts. Indeed, in a few instances, it could be argued that international and regional interventions exacerbated, rather than alleviated, conflicts. Further, intervention in internal conflicts remains a source of angst for the international community. While NATO has, in effect, assumed a protectorate role in Bosnia, elsewhere there continues to be a

reluctance to become involved. A body of thought is emerging that there are other less risky and perhaps more efficacious ways of manipulating arms in the pursuit of peace than putting peacekeepers into the field. These include: acting preventively to forestall supplies of arms to conflicts through embargoes, arms registers, and supplier controls; reforming and civilianising the military and bolstering civil society to avert conflict outbreaks or reverse militarisation; and developmental approaches which have the capacity to create prosperity and good governance and help avert grievances breaking out into conflict.<sup>73</sup> Arms management researchers, such as Cooper, have formulated incentive and disincentive-based approaches, such as the ‘wider structural arms control agenda’, which envisages both action to squeeze the purchasing power of elites hampering demilitarisation after conflicts, and ‘disincentives to supply’ directed at actors supplying arms to conflicts and peace processes.<sup>74</sup> The linking of overseas aid to agreements to disarm in conflict-ridden countries has also been put forward as an arms management instrument.<sup>75</sup>

Third-party arms management interventions following conflict clearly have a role to play in stabilising some peace processes in that physical restraints on weapons will sometimes be required to prevent the renewal of fighting. However, holistic strategies, including non-military components, are ultimately required if arms proliferation and continued conflict outbreaks are to be averted.

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> Some arms management initiatives were not only poorly designed, they were also proceeded with for bureaucratic or political reasons, even though it was clear that they were unlikely to succeed.

<sup>2</sup> Barbara F., Walter, ‘The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement’, *International Organization*, vol. 51, no. 3, Summer 1997, p. 336.

<sup>3</sup> Threatened or attacked by armed gangs, militias, and armies from rival factions, individuals frequently had to call upon, or seek protection from intimidation, within armed groups. This tended to mitigate against societal participation in, or pressure for, demilitarisation. Further, the fragmented gangs and factions present in many post-conflict peace processes complicated peace-building by creating a climate of insecurity and unpredictability, particularly in contexts such as Somalia and Liberia where allegiances and alliances frequently shifted.

<sup>4</sup> Although anarchic conditions exist both during civil war and within the international system they tend to be more pernicious within civil wars: ‘no central government exists to insure order, no police or judicial system remains to enforce contracts, and groups have divided into armed camps’ (Barbara F., Walter, ‘The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement’, p. 338).

<sup>5</sup> A conceptualisation of the security dilemma has not been fully developed in the context of internal conflicts, and even less so in terms of arms management. It has been more commonly applied to inter-state relations. The security dilemma had its origins in attempts by realists to explain the behaviour of states by emphasising the self-help measures states had to take to provide for their survival and security in an anarchic international system. According to Hertz, writing in the 1950s, whenever an anarchic system has existed there has arisen: ‘what may be called the “security dilemma” of men, or groups, or

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their leaders' (Caroline A. Hartzell, 'Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 43, no. 1, February 1999, p. 5). Groups or individuals living in such a constellation must be, and usually are, concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated or annihilated by other groups and individuals. Striving to attain security from such attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to 'prepare for the worst' (*ibid.*).

More specifically, it has been suggested that states, in trying to increase their security – by acquiring more arms for example – have actually ended up decreasing it, as other states have mirrored their actions by acquiring more weapons themselves. Thus, states have faced the predicament of not increasing their physical security and risking falling behind. On the other hand, if they acquire more arms they risk triggering an arms race, or even preventive attack. As Posen notes: 'what one does to enhance one's own security causes reactions that, in the end, can make one less secure. Co-operation among states to mute these competitions can be difficult because someone else's "cheating" may leave one in a militarily weakened position. All fear betrayal' (Barry R. Posen, 'The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict', *Survival*, vol. 35, no. 1, Spring 1993, p. 28). In the 1990s, a few scholars started to look into the security dilemma, internal conflicts, and LWs. Hartzell suggested that intra-state actors did not have the 'options' – for example, the means of self-protection – that states had to address the security dilemma (Caroline A. Hartzell, 'Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars', p. 5). This vulnerability characterisation was taken up by others. Tanner, for example, notes, in relation to the security dilemma in internal conflicts, that conceding arms management may 'entail the abandonment of defensive positions and the acceptance of troop movements that can be highly vulnerable to surprise attack by non-compliant parties' (Fred Tanner, 'Consensual Versus Coercive Disarmament', in Estanislao Angel Zawels, Stephen John Stedman, Donald C. F. Daniel, David Cox, Jane Boulden, Fred Tanner, Jakkie Potgieter, and Virginia Gamba, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: The Issues*, UNIDIR/96/46 [Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996], p. 183). Spear suggests that in internal conflicts where both sides are frequently armed with LWs, knowledge that the offense has advantages can lead to an acute form of the security dilemma, and the dangers of pre-emptive attack can be very great (Joanna Spear, 'Arms Limitations, Confidence-Building Measures, and Internal Conflicts', in Michael E. Brown (ed.), *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict* [Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996], p. 380). Further, in internal conflicts, at least one of the parties is trying to overthrow the *status quo*, making the operation of the 'security dilemma more intense', and in the absence of natural borders between opposing groups, 'geography dictates that the security dilemma is unrelieved' (*ibid.*, p. 379). King notes that: 'Both sides may actually feel that ending the fighting would be in their own best interest, but with no overarching institutions to guarantee their security, they have no alternative but to retain some residual war-fighting capability. These reserve forces, however, present a security threat to the opposing side.... Because of the institutional anarchy of civil war, belligerents may be encouraged to hedge their bets and refuse to negotiate even when they agree that ending the fighting would be preferable to continuing' (Charles King, *Ending Civil Wars*, Adelphi Paper 308 [Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997], p. 51).

A possible security dilemma may exist in terms of disarmament. On the one hand, if a party gives up arms as part of a peace deal, and its opponents reciprocate, it might be in a position to dramatically enhance its security, as no party would be in a position to resort to full-scale conflict and they could all proceed with a political dialogue or accommodation. On the other hand, if a party surrenders arms, and opponents fail to reciprocate, it might be highly vulnerable and even face annihilation. Further, Hartzell suggests that internal parties face a particular security dilemma relating to what happens when, or if, they subsume themselves into a common government with their former opponents. Unable to resort to self-help, they are vulnerable to the capture of power by another group or groups (see Caroline A. Hartzell, 'Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars', p. 20). Walter notes that security dilemmas can emerge in any anarchic situation. Its damaging effects are not limited to states in the international system. In fact, in the face of a completely anarchic transition period, incumbent governments and rebels act exactly like states in the international system: they resist collective security and rely instead on their own self-help systems. See Barbara F. Walter, 'The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement', p. 360.

This thesis concludes that it is extremely difficult to pin-point exactly what the nature of the security dilemma is in internal conflicts. Are there, in fact, several different types of security dilemma operative in internal conflicts and peace processes such as: the disarmament security dilemma; the security dilemma faced by parties entering integrative arrangements following demilitarisation once they give up their autonomy (as identified by Hartzell); or does the security dilemma describe the general security predicaments parties face in complex and fractured internal conflicts? Or, as Stedman suggests,

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is the security dilemma characterisation misinformed? In contrast to many other scholars, Stedman suggests that the vulnerability/security dilemma characterisation is exaggerated and that power-seeking more accurately characterises many peace processes (see Stephen John Stedman, 'Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes', *International Security*, vol. 22, no. 2, Fall 1997, pp. 9-10).

Because of the uncertainties surrounding the security dilemma, this thesis identifies a number of security predicaments and difficulties, rather than a specific security dilemma. However, it is suggested that formulating a cohesive conceptualisation of the security dilemma in internal conflicts is a substantive area for future research. For further insights into the security dilemma, particularly in statist settings, see, for example: John H. Herz, 'Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma', *World Politics*, vol. 2, no. 2, 1950; Nicholas J. Wheeler and Ken Booth, 'The Security Dilemma', in John Baylis and N. J. Rengger (eds.), *Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); Jason Ralph, 'Security Dilemmas and the End of the Cold War', *Review of International Studies*, vol. 25, no. 4, October 1999; and Alan Collins, *The Security Dilemma and the End of the Cold War* (Edinburgh: Keele University Press, 1997). Finally, Cerny has suggested that a new security dilemma has emerged in the post-Cold War period, with its new sources of uncertainty, which alters the underlying logic of the traditional conception. He argues that a reconfiguration of power is going on, arising from globalisation, which involves different sources of insecurity and which makes traditional balances-of-power, along with the 'old' security dilemma, increasingly redundant. See Phil Cerny, 'The New Security Dilemma: Divisibility, Defection and Disorder in the Global Era', *Review of International Studies*, vol. 26, no. 4, October 2000, p. 625.

<sup>6</sup> John Mackinlay and Abiodun Alao, *Liberia 1994: ECOMOG and UNOMIL, Response to a Complex Emergency*, Occasional Paper no. 2, United Nations University, 1995, p. 14.

<sup>7</sup> John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1995), p. 99.

<sup>8</sup> Arms management processes with a bilateral dimension where powerful insurgent movements were pitted against government forces, as in Mozambique and Namibia, while frequently characterised by cheating and prevarication, also had a certain stability: the two sides had frequently fought each other to a standstill or reached a kind of military equilibrium. In contexts where conflicts had been between multiple, frequently fragmenting groups, arms management was more problematic. In Liberia and Somalia, for example, it was never entirely clear how to disarm or control the weapons of all the groups; what the military situation was on the ground; and how the parties would react to demilitarisation. Such conflicts tended to generate complex security scenarios in which groups and sub-groups would compete for domination or survival and where cheating was endemic and difficult for third-parties to police.

<sup>9</sup> Caroline A. Hartzell, 'Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars', p. 5.

<sup>10</sup> Barbara F. Walter, 'The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement', pp. 337-338.

<sup>11</sup> It has been noted by Walter that when a third-party stepped in to guarantee a peace treaty, a successful settlement emerged in a number of instances. However, at the same time, peace agreements that allowed adversaries to retain as much independent strength as possible through the military balancing of forces generally required 'only weak external security guarantees in order to succeed' (see *ibid.*, pp. 349 and 351).

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 340.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 336.

<sup>15</sup> Croft notes that intra-state disarmament mandates within peace agreements did not utilise all of the tools developed in international arms control, particularly verification. See Stuart Croft, 'Lessons for the Disarmament of Factions in Civil Wars', paper for British International Studies Association Annual Conference, University of Southampton, December 1995, p. 8.

<sup>16</sup> In a few UN arms retention and delimitation operations, peacekeepers were able to act more proactively. UNEF marked a significant modification of the UN peacekeeping model, in that, while keeping the principles of impartiality and consent, it did not have an absolute prohibition on the use of force. UN peacekeepers, unlike peace observers, were entitled to respond with force to armed attack, including attempts to force them to withdraw. In the vicinity of the Suez Canal, they were assigned more aggressive peacekeeping duties, such as guarding key installations and providing protection for the Suez Clearance Organisation, and they had the right to apprehend violators of the armistice line. UNEF, in fact, established a precedent that UN peacekeepers could use force in furtherance of a mission, although in practice this was rarely resorted to.

<sup>17</sup> See: John Hillen, *Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations* (Washington: Brassey's, 1998), p. 102.

<sup>18</sup> Whether this sort of 'confidence-building' built or diminished confidence was a moot point.



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<sup>19</sup> Mackinlay and Alao suggest that disarmament planners should not sanction disarmament 'until they have organised effective state wide security or at least the guarantee of achieving it. In the uncertain period after the reduction of hostilities, a failed or half successful disarmament can encourage a proliferation of smaller groups at local level' (John Mackinlay and Abiodun Alao, *Liberia 1994: ECOMOG and UNOMIL Response to a Complex Emergency*, p. 49).

<sup>20</sup> Further, some governments were reluctant to concede a loss of sovereignty or were sensitive to third-party intervention. Following the conclusion of the ONUMOZ mission in Mozambique, President Chissano emphasised the need for the United Nations to bear in mind that peacekeeping forces require the consent of the parties: 'they must always act with impartiality and in accordance with their mandate. Furthermore, they must respect and abide by the principles of independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference' (Joaquim Alberto Chissano, 'Statement by H. E. Mr. Joaquim Alberto Chissano, President of the Republic of Mozambique, Special Commemorative Session of the United Nations', Permanent Mission of the Republic of Mozambique to the United Nations, 24 October 1995, p. 6, cited in Eric Berman, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique*, UNIDIR/96/22 [Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996], p. 28).

<sup>21</sup> Chris McGreal, 'West Side Boys Leaders are Held and Face Trial', *The Guardian*, 11 September 2000, p. 2.

<sup>22</sup> The impact of 'neutral' UN observer missions was undermined by the perception that they were frequently too small. For example, UNOMIL by Spring 1995 had shrunk from 303 observers to only 77.

<sup>23</sup> Roy Allison, 'Peacekeeping in the Soviet Successor States', *Chaillot Papers*, no. 18 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, November 1994), p. 32.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 56.

<sup>25</sup> Negotiations under Article II were based on the methods used for the post-Cold War reductions of conventional Warsaw Pact and NATO forces through the 1994 Vienna Document of the Negotiations on Confidence and Security-Building Measures of the OSCE. See International Crisis Group, *Bosnia, A Peace, or Just A Cease-Fire?* ([www.crisisweb...objects/bosnia/reports/bh28rep2.htm](http://www.crisisweb...objects/bosnia/reports/bh28rep2.htm)), p. 12.

<sup>26</sup> Partition, it has been postulated, is a viable approach 'for adversaries wishing to settle since it... circumvent(s) the fatal problem of military disengagement. The intense security dilemma that undermines co-operation should not hold in cases where the combatants retain their armed forces' (Barbara F. Walter, 'The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement', p. 355).

<sup>27</sup> Joanna Spear, 'Arms Limitations, Confidence-Building Measures, and Internal Conflicts', p. 409.

<sup>28</sup> John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, p. 154.

<sup>29</sup> 'UNDP Head Launches Bitter Attack Against UN Peacekeeping', *Development Today*, no. 20, 1995, p. 3.

<sup>30</sup> British negotiators during the Lancaster House talks that led to the deployment of the CMF force in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, for example, calculated that a long demilitarisation process was potentially destabilising and thought that the longer the duration of the cease-fire the greater its chance of breaking down.

<sup>31</sup> Arms management was not necessarily implemented in good faith by intervening third parties; nor was it necessarily purposeful or accorded a high priority. Indeed, in some peace process, arms management was a minor element in the overall strategy to build peace. As has been noted, in UN missions in El Salvador and Mozambique a political decision was made to turn a blind eye to non-compliance with disarmament: it was judged more important to keep the consent of the parties intact and the peace process on track than to persuade the parties to fully comply or to bring them to account for cheating. This may well have been a prudent approach. And, indeed, whatever the shortcomings of co-operative disarmament initiatives in terms of comprehensively collecting weapons, they were part of peace processes which have been generally durable. Nor should it necessarily be assumed that in assisting in drawing up a set of arms management commitments between the parties, the UN and regional organisations necessarily believed that they were achievable or even thought this was desirable. By persuading the parties to agree to demilitarisation agreements – however insincerely – a judgement may have been sometimes made that this permitted progress to be made in other more important areas. Or, alternatively, they may have been informed by the thinking that some form of arms management was preferable to none.

<sup>32</sup> See Alex Vines, *The Struggle Continues: Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique*, BASIC Occasional Papers on International Security Issues, no. 2, April 1998 ([www.prepcom.org](http://www.prepcom.org)), p. 3.

<sup>33</sup> John Sanderson, 'A Review of Recent Peacekeeping Operations', presentation to PAMS 18th Conference, Dacca, January 1994, p. 8.

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<sup>34</sup> American reticence to disarm had its basis in the perception that disarming Somalia would involve the United States in the Somali political process; that it would involve significant American casualties; that the security situation was too complex; and that active disarmament would have been too expensive. See Robert G. Patman, 'Disarming Somalia: The Contrasting Fortunes of United States and Australian Peacekeepers during United Nations Intervention, 1992-1993', *African Affairs*, vol. 96, October 1997.

<sup>35</sup> Stuart Croft, 'Lessons for the Disarmament of Factions in Civil Wars', p. 9.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> Chris McGreal, 'Indian Troop Recall Shifts Onus to NATO', *The Guardian*, 22 September 2000, p. 16.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>39</sup> F. M. Lorenz, 'Rules of Engagement in Somalia: Were They Effective?', *Naval Law Review*, May 1995, p. 67.

<sup>40</sup> Jeremy Ginifer, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe*, UNIDIR/95/41 (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1995), p. 54.

<sup>41</sup> It should be noted that arms management outcomes were not necessarily primarily determined by the design, the effectiveness of implementation, or security dynamics on the ground; in fact third-party diplomacy played an important part. A critical factor in the holding together of arms management, and peace processes generally, was the influence of power brokers, or states with influence over the parties capable of using persuasion and sanctions to bring spoilers back in line. The United States, for example, had a major influence in this respect in peace processes in Central America, Bosnia, and Mozambique; and the FLS brought considerable pressure to bear on the PF in the transition from Rhodesia-Zimbabwe to Zimbabwe to stick with the peace process.

<sup>42</sup> Ewen MacAskill, 'UN Tries to Curb Peace Disasters', *The Guardian*, 8 September 2000, p. 2.

<sup>43</sup> For a description of the Sinai demilitarisation arrangements (under UNEF I and II), see United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, third edition (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), pp. 51 and 70.

<sup>44</sup> See Philip Towle, *Enforced Disarmament: From the Napoleonic Campaigns to the Gulf War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 66-92.

<sup>45</sup> SCR 687 called upon UNSCOM to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities and to destroy any weapons that came under UN prohibition. The IAEA was given far more sweeping powers than under the NPT to inspect Iraq's nuclear capabilities and to destroy any equipment which might be related to the production of nuclear weapons. All the banned weapons were to be destroyed within 45 days of the establishment of the Special Commission by the SC. This, however, proved to be unrealistic. See Philip Towle, *Enforced Disarmament: From the Napoleonic Campaigns to the Gulf War*, p. 188.

<sup>46</sup> Britain, for example, despite some of the most stringent gun laws in the world following the Dunblane massacre on 13 March 1996, still has a gun control problem in parts of the country.

<sup>47</sup> The arms control arrangements of the sort practiced in Bosnia have not been tested elsewhere so these conclusions are speculative.

<sup>48</sup> Jane Martinson, 'US Blamed for Peacekeeping Failures', *Guardian*, 28 August 2000, p. 10.

<sup>49</sup> Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 'Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations', Executive Summary ([www.un.org/peace/reports/peace\\_operations/docs/summary.htm](http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/docs/summary.htm)), September 2000, p. 2.

<sup>50</sup> Tom Woodhouse, 'The Gentle Hand of Peace? British Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution in Complex Political Emergencies', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 6, no. 2, Summer 1999, p. 27.

<sup>51</sup> Some of the ROEs used in Somalia, for example, appeared extremely permissive. UNITAF snipers in 1993 began to engage crew-served weapons, whether or not they showed 'hostile intent'. It is claimed that Somalis knew that they would be shot if they carried a crew-served weapon within sight of the UNOSOM/United States Forces compound in Mogadishu. See F. M. Lorenz, 'Rules of Engagement in Somalia: Were They Effective?', pp. 68-69.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 66.

<sup>53</sup> The United Nations 'Lessons Learned Unit' notes that the impartiality of monitors 'must be beyond question' and is necessary to ensure that disarmament and demobilisation are evenly matched on both sides (United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Lessons Learned Unit, *Multidisciplinary Peacekeeping: Lessons From Recent Experience* [New York: United Nations, December 1996], p. 48).

<sup>54</sup> As the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (p. 2) comments: 'Impartiality for United Nations operations must...mean adherence to the principles of the Charter: where one party to a peace agreement clearly and incontrovertibly is violating its terms, continued equal treatment of all parties by the United Nations can in the best result in ineffectiveness and in the worst may amount to

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complicity with evil. No failure did more to damage the standing and credibility of United Nations peacekeeping in the 1990s than its reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor’.

<sup>55</sup> For example, even though airstrikes were directed against the Bosnian Serbs to lift the siege of Sarajevo, the demilitarisation arrangements that followed were required to be complied with by both the Bosnian Muslims and Serbs; in this sense they were even-handed.

<sup>56</sup> *The Jerusalem Post*, 9 July 1982, cited in Nitza Nachmias, ‘UNIFIL: When Peace is Non-Existent, Peacekeeping is Impossible’, *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 6, no. 3, Autumn 1999, p. 105.

<sup>57</sup> Some Russian troops, for example, sold their weapons to Chechens during Russia’s intervention in Chechnia in 1997.

<sup>58</sup> Criminal groups or organisations might also be regarded as illegitimate.

<sup>59</sup> Nancy W. Gallagher, ‘The Politics of Verification: Why “How Much?” is Not Enough’, in Nancy W. Gallagher (ed.), ‘Arms Control: New Approaches to Theory and Policy’, *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 18, no. 2, August 1997, p. 138.

<sup>60</sup> Confidence-building has limitations. Hartzell notes that CBMs do not constitute guarantees that mitigate security concerns, as parties realise that these are frequently beyond their control, and subject to failure. And, centrally, CBMs do not address in integrative processes the question of who will ‘control the coercive powers of the state once central authority has been reconstructed’ (Caroline A. Hartzell, ‘Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars’, p. 7).

<sup>61</sup> Nancy W. Gallagher, ‘The Politics of Verification: Why “How Much?” is Not Enough’, p. 138.

<sup>62</sup> Caroline A. Hartzell, ‘Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars’, p. 8.

<sup>63</sup> Conversely, it might be argued that delays in disarmament led to insecurity and spoiler behaviour, and that time is of the essence in arms management.

<sup>64</sup> Stuart Croft, ‘Lessons for the Disarmament of Factions in Civil Wars’, p. 14.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

<sup>66</sup> Barbara F. Walter, ‘The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement’, p. 357.

<sup>67</sup> Stephen John Stedman, ‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes’, p. 53.

<sup>68</sup> David Keen, ‘When War Itself is Privatized: The Twisted Logic That Makes Violence Worthwhile in Sierra Leone’, *Times Literary Supplement*, 29 December 1995, p. 13.

<sup>69</sup> Tamara Duffey, ‘Cultural Issues in Contemporary Peacekeeping’, in Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham (eds.), ‘Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution,’ Special Issue, *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 7, no. 1, Spring 2000, p. 151.

<sup>70</sup> Tom Woodhouse, ‘Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping: Critiques and Responses’, in Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham (eds.), ‘Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution,’ p. 24.

<sup>71</sup> Researchers, such as John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, suggested that the new circumstances of the post-Cold War period had led to the emergence of ‘second generation’ operations which were qualitatively different to past peacekeeping, while Alan James, for example, questioned whether the ‘new’ peacekeeping was fundamentally different to some Cold War peacekeeping. See, respectively: John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, ‘Second Generation Multinational Operations’, *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 15, no. 3, Summer 1992; and Alan James, ‘Is There a Second Generation of Peacekeeping?’, *International Peacekeeping*, September-November 1994.

<sup>72</sup> A number of UN member states remain wedded to traditional peacekeeping style operations in the post-Cold War period. During the 1995 ‘Comprehensive Review of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects’ at the General Assembly, for example, a number of delegates emphasised that peacekeeping should be of a non-intrusive, non-interventionist and impartial nature, and that the principle of full consent of the parties for the establishment of peacekeeping operations should be observed in all cases. Further, some delegates suggested that the mention of intra-state conflict was outside the authority of the SC in its function to take measures to maintain international peace and security. See United Nations, General Assembly, ‘Comprehensive Review of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects’, A/50/230, 22 June 1995, para. 15.

<sup>73</sup> For insights into the use of development to avert conflict outbreaks see Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, *Development Assistance as a Means of Conflict Prevention* (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, February 1998).

<sup>74</sup> Neil Cooper, ‘Raising the Costs of Conflict, Lowering the Price of Peace: Demilitarisation After Post-modern Conflicts’, in Michael Pugh (ed.), *Regeneration of War-Torn Societies* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 64-66.

<sup>75</sup> Fran Abrams, ‘Cash to Disarm Offer by Britain’, *The Independent*, 8 March 1998, p. 8.

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