University of Southampton

The Anglican Understanding of the Third Reich and its Influence on the History and Memory of the Holocaust.

Tom Lawson

Ph.D.

Department of History

September 2001

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON

ABSTRACT

FACULTY OF ARTS

HISTORY

Doctor of Philosophy

The Anglican Understanding of the Third Reich and its Influence on the History and Memory of the Holocaust.

by Tom Lawson

The thesis explores the understanding of the Third Reich in the Church of England and its impact on the history and memory of the Holocaust. As a contribution to the growing historiography of non-Nazi responses to the murder of the European Jews, the thesis argues that the Anglican church, contrary to the claims of previous historiography, did *not* engage with Nazism and the Third Reich through the prism of the persecution of the Jews. The first section of the thesis analyses Anglican understandings of Nazism and contends that English Christians commonly perceived Nazism as significant through its anti-Christianity and not through its antisemitism. When Nazi antisemitism became much more pronounced after 1938, the thesis suggests that the Anglican church incorporated this persecution into an image of Nazism as anti-Christian. Such an interpretation of Nazism created significant barriers to the full understanding of reports of the mass murder of Jews which were available to the Anglican church in war time.

The second section of the thesis assesses the impact of Anglican understanding of Nazism on the forging of historical memory in the post-war era. Noting that historiographical orthodoxy contends that the secular rhetoric of the Cold War was crucial to a perceived obfuscation of the Holocaust in this era, this thesis relates post-1945 understanding of the Nazi state to a pre-existing Christian discourse which perceived an anti-Christian Nazism alien to the traditions of European history. This perception of Nazism is shown to have fed into a concept of totalitarianism which flourished after 1945, and which prevented full cognition of the significance of Nazi antisemitism. Finally an Anglican inspired campaign against war crimes trials is considered as a concrete contribution to the formation of a publicly portrayed history which sought to reduce the significance of Nazi antisemitism and the Holocaust.

The Anglican Understanding of the Third Reich and its Influence on the History and Memory of the Holocaust.

SECTION 2: THE LEGACIES OF ANGLICAN UNDERSTANDING FOR HISTORY.

Acknowledgements.

Prior to beginning doctoral research I always believed acknowledgements to be little more than a ritualistic combination of cliché and convention. While what follows may not avoid these pitfalls, the sceptical reader should be reassured that the demands of a three year research project have taught me that thanks must be given with sincerity.

First thanks are due to the University of Southampton for the three years of postgraduate funding under their archive studentship scheme. Without such help this project would not have been undertaken. The archives of the University of Southampton and its staff are also the first institution to which thanks are due. Thanks must also go to the staff at, Lambeth Palace Library, the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Public Records Office at Kew, Churchill College Archives Centre, the University Library Cambridge, the Dean and Chapter Library Durham Cathedral, and the Borthwick Institute York, all of whom helped an often clueless researcher navigate his way through alien archives and collections.

Yet it is not simply the financial and institutional support which the University of Southampton has provided that has been crucial to the completion of this project. The Faculty of Arts, the History department, and particularly the Parkes Centre for Jewish/Non Jewish relations have provided an atmosphere in which it has been a pleasure to undertake academic research, not least because it is through these institutions that I have met many of the friends that have sustained me with good advice and company throughout the last three years. Tony Kushner has offered support which has gone far beyond his duty as my supervisor, and I thank him warmly for this and for his inexhaustible patience in the face of increasingly irrational panic. I am also particularly grateful to Donald Bloxham for his friendship and his enduring interest in this project. David Brown, James Jordan, Jo Reilly, Gemma Romain, and Graham Stevens have all, in very different ways, helped me survive the very real pressures of being a doctoral student. For those outside of the University, my thanks go to Andrew Schütte, Stephen Dawes, Nicola Hunter, Sara Thomas, Nick Kingwell, Paul Clarke, and Nick Saich, for their company and friendship. The Cavaliers Cricket Club has also been a continual source of inspiration.

My final thanks must however go to my family. To Bernadette, Michael, Joshua and Bethany; Kate, Edward and Alice, for providing a constant source of diversion from my studies which has on several occasions proved invaluable, Kate

and Edward's endless hospitality during various periods of research in London was particularly appreciated. To Elisa for her love and patience. Without her the final year and a half of this project would have been very difficult indeed. And to my parents, without whose immeasurable support, reassurance and love, this thesis would simply not have been completed. I will never be able to thank them enough, but hope that the completion of this project goes someway to justifying the faith in me that they have so lovingly and selflessly shown. It is then to Peter and Linda Lawson that this work is dedicated.

Acronyms and Abbreviations.

ARAC – Allied Religious Affairs Committee.

BCC – British Council of Churches.

CDU - *Christlich Demokratischen Union Deutschlands.*

CCG – Control Commission Germany.

CCJ – Council of Christians and Jews.

CFM – Council of Foreign Ministers.

CMJ – Church Mission to the Jews.

COPEC - Conference on Christian Politics, Economics and Citizenship. 1924.

CRE – Christian Reconstruction in Europe.

EKD – *Evangelische Kirche Deutschland.*

IMT – International Military Tribunal.

PPU – Peace Pledge Union.

SEN – Save Europe Now!

WCC – World Council of Churches.

Introduction.
Anglicanism and the Understanding of Nazism and the Holocaust.

The influence of Christianity is often denied by a modern and overtly secular historiography which attempts to convince sceptics of its ability to objectively represent the past.[1] Apart from the deliberations of a self-selecting band of church historians tied self consciously to the parameters of their faith,[2] the question of the impact of Christian rhetoric on the understanding of history in the late twentieth century has largely been ignored. In the historiography of the Holocaust conventional wisdom relates shifts in the understanding of the Nazi attack on the Jews, particularly in Britain and the USA, to secular political rhetoric and especially the influence of the Cold War, with little or no reference to Christian narratives.[3] However, because of the intuitive relationship between Christian teaching and the Holocaust, the question of how Christianity has impacted upon the understanding of Nazism and the persecution of the Jews is particularly important.[4] Concomitant to this, there also exists a growing interest in the relationship of 'bystander' nations to the Nazi genocide. Historians often highlight that information pertaining to the murder of the European Jews was available in non-Nazi nations as these murders were being carried out. This information is then harnessed in explanations of 'bystanders' contemporary understanding of what has become the twentieth century's greatest trauma. But, without asking what information such as references to Auschwitz and Treblinka,

---

[1] Maurice Cowling for example was scathing of historians' refusal to acknowledge the role of religion in the creation of secularised historical understanding, which he dismissed as the result of the inability of the historical profession to analyse its own intellectual heritage, Maurice Cowling, *Religion and Public Doctrine in Modern England Vol. 1*, (Cambridge, 1980), p. xii.

[2] John Conway, 'Coming to terms with the Past: Interpreting the German Church Struggles 1933-90', in *German History*, (Vol.16, No.3, 1998), p. 377.

[3] See Michael Marrus, *The Holocaust in History*, (London, 1998) which is a useful introduction to the development of historical understanding of the Holocaust. See also Alvin Rosenfeld (ed), *Thinking About the Holocaust After Half a Century*, (Bloomington, 1997), especially part one - 'The Holocaust in Historical Writings, Literature and Cinema' - for essays on both the development of academic and popular understanding of the Holocaust.

[4] The Holocaust occurred in the heart of Christian Europe for example, and the removal of Jews was conversant with the superficial demands of anti-Jewish Christian teachings expressed across the previous two millennia. Allan R. Brockway, 'Religious Values After the Holocaust: A Protestant View' in Abraham J. Peck (ed) *Jews and Christians After the Holocaust* (Philadelphia, 1982), p. 55, and Alice L. Eckardt, 'Post Holocaust theology: A Journey out of the Kingdom of Night', in *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, (Vol.1, No.2, 1986), pp. 229-240, Emil Fackenheim, 'The Nazi Holocaust as a Persisting Trauma for the Non Jewish Mind' in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, (Vol.36, No.2, 1975), pp. 369-71.

which have become modern metonyms for hell, actually *meant* to those identified as the contemporaries of genocide, the search for traces of the Holocaust is without either context or worth. In order to contribute to this context this thesis intends to investigate the understanding of Nazism and the Holocaust proposed by, and within, a specific form of Christian discourse dominant in Britain; Anglicanism. The significance of Christian rhetoric within British public discourse dictates that an investigation of how the Anglican community understood Nazism and genocide will be an illuminating addition to the historiography of responses to the Holocaust. Having established how the Nazi state was viewed through the eyes of the Church of England, the impact of that understanding on the historical conception of the Holocaust will be considered. By illuminating a relationship between religious rhetoric and the apparently secular art of reconstructing the past, this thesis will contribute generally to an understanding of the manner in which knowledge of the past was, and is, filtered through the cultural assumptions and heritage of historians and their present. In highlighting the impact of a religious discourse on the forging of the history and memory of Nazism and the Holocaust in the immediate post-war era (especially in Britain), this thesis will challenge orthodox interpretations of the genesis of understanding Nazism and the murder of the European Jews in the Cold War.

Before an investigation of the understanding of Nazi Germany and the Holocaust within any specific cultural setting can be usefully undertaken it is necessary to sound a note of methodological caution. Historians must be aware both of the complexities of Holocaust history, and of the cultural limitations placed on contemporary observers' knowledge and more importantly understanding, of the privations of Jews in Nazi occupied Europe. What follows is a discussion of these potential pitfalls; with specific reference to the study of Anglicanism and the Holocaust, and the impact of that discourse on the understanding of Nazism and genocide.

The discipline of history appears to become ever more aware of its status as a construct of the present in addition to being a reflection of the past. Indeed if history is constructed, nowhere is this more the case than within the historiography of the

Holocaust.[5] The concept of the Holocaust did not even exist in the immediate post-war world. Cognition of the scale of mass murder was not really available outside of the Nazi mind between 1941 and 1945. Genocide was a concept that held no meaning prior to 1945, and has been awarded meaning, despite the Armenian genocide of 1915, primarily by the Nazi attack on the Jews. Indeed in the immediate aftermath of the Nazi defeat, histories of the recent past did not reflect upon the murder of European Jews.[6] Although the liberation of Belsen for Britain, and Buchenwald and Dachau for the USA, lent retrospective moral strength to the allied war effort,[7] this did not mean an immediate understanding of the campaign against the Jews, and particularly the links between camps liberated in the west, and Soviet discoveries in the east. Survivors also constantly testify to the oppressive silence that met their arrival in the post-war world, both in former allied nations and in Israel.[8]

---

[5] It must be stated here that for the purposes of this thesis the term the 'Holocaust' is being used to refer exclusively to the destruction of the European Jews. This is not to subscribe to any declaration of the uniqueness of Jewish suffering either in the context of Nazi criminality or in a wider historical context, but simply to identify the Nazi campaign against the Jews as historically distinct from other (equally distinct) genocidal campaigns. Whilst, for example, there may be no moral difference between the campaign against the Gypsies and the Jews it is beyond contention that these were two diverse (albeit similarly murderous) political projects and were conceived as such by their perpetrators. To use the word 'Holocaust' to denote the murder of Europe's Jews at Nazi hands is obviously not without problems, the religious and sacrificial implications of the term challenge its validity, however it is now a term popularly understood and is employed here as morally neutral. It is not however interchangeable with the phrase 'Final Solution' which represents the Nazi conceived 'plan' to exterminate the European Jews. The term Holocaust is representative of a much wider historical phenomena which spans the European continent, and includes the experience of the victims which may not be crucial to an understanding of the 'Final Solution' but are absolutely central to the understanding of the Holocaust. This author also understands that a specific historiographically based understanding of the Holocaust, the progress of Nazi anti-Jewish policy and the nature of the Nazi state is being proposed within this thesis. Under these circumstances every effort has been made to provide references to the historiography that has informed this understanding throughout the thesis, even where this appears unnecessary in the referencing of the main narrative.

[6] For example Winston Churchill's monumental study of the war contains reference only to the murder of the Hungarian Jews within an appendix, at no point in the main body of the text is the campaign against the Jews commented upon. W.S. Churchill, *The Second World War(Vol IV): Triumph and Tragedy* (London, 1954).

[7] see Tony Kushner, *The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination: A Social and Cultural History*, (London, 1994), Joanne Reilly, *Belsen: The Liberation of a Concentration Camp*, (London, 1998) and Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life*, (New York, 1999).

[8] see Lawrence Langer, *Versions of Survival: The Holocaust and the Human Spirit*, (New York, 1982), the last chapter of Joanne Reilly's *Belsen* and David Patterson, 'The Annihilation of Exits: The Problem of Liberation in the Holocaust Memoir', in *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, (Vol.9, No.2, 1993), pp.208-30. For a concrete example of the difficulty surviving victims had in integrating themselves into hostile societies see Kitty Hart, *Return to Auschwitz*, (London, 1983) for the harrowing account of her reception in

Nazism was explained in the 1950s, Historiographically and popularly, through the demonic Hitler,[9] and as an example of the scourge of totalitarianism apparently in line with the ideological demands of the Cold War. It was in the 1960s that the status of the concept of the Holocaust began to change. The historiographical record of the destruction of the European Jews was revolutionised when Raul Hilberg's unsurpassed monograph was finally published after years struggling for recognition.[10] A flurry of trials in the Federal Republic in the early part of that decade, also began to re-focus German eyes on the Jewish tragedy.[11] International attention was subsequently drawn to the Holocaust through the controversial kidnap and trial of Adolf Eichmann in Israel. Televised live to Israelis,[12] and disseminated in the world's press, most notably by Hannah Arendt,[13] the prosecution of Eichmann basically took the form of a publicly articulated historical account of the *Shoah*. Following Eichmann's execution the concept of the Holocaust was firmly established in the public mind. Establishment, however, did not mean the equivalent of contemporary predominance, which can only be explained with reference to the popularisation of the Holocaust story through cinematic and televisual representation from the late 1970s onwards. In the sentimental T.V. drama *Holocaust*, screened in 1978 in the USA, Meryl Streep introduced the *Shoah* as a moral certainty to American homes, and facilitated the Holocaust's arrival into a wider public consciousness. The tradition of representing the Holocaust through narratives of redemptive heroism was continued by

---

England which she described as 'one of the unhappiest times of my life...probably the closest I ever came to total despair'. Trude Levi, *A Cat Called Adolf*, (London, 1995) is another account of oppressive silence.

[9] Described as being 'for nearly two decades...a standard work' on the Nazi era, Alan Bullock's biography of Hitler contains just ten pages on racial policy. A. Bullock, *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny*, (London, 1952). See also William L. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany*, (London, 1960) which contains little on the persecution of the Jews, subsuming the Final Solution within a broad narrative of the establishment of the Nazi 'gangster empire' in Eastern Europe.

[10] See Hilberg's account of the struggle for recognition in the post war world in Raul Hilberg, *The Politics of Memory: The Journey of a Holocaust Historian*, (Chicago, 1996).

[11] See Dick de Mildt, *In the Name of the People: Perpetrators of Genocide in the reflection of their Post-War prosecution in West Germany, the 'Euthanasia' and 'Aktion Reinhard' trial cases*, (Amsterdam, 1996), and Martin Broszat and Helmut Krausnick, *The Anatomy of the SS state*, (London, 1968) the historical volume that emerged from the expert depositions provided at the so called 'Auschwitz trial' in Frankfurt in 1963.

[12] Halina Birenbaum testifies to the fact that it was the Eichmann trial that made her record her memoir of Auschwitz and Majdanek because it was at this moment that the enforced post-war popular silence was irrevocably broken. See Halina Birenbaum, *Hope is the Last to Die, A Coming of Age Under Nazi Terror*, (New York, 1971).

Spielberg's *Schindler's List* in 1993, a film which cemented the destruction of the European Jews in the western imagination.[14] In addition, public interest in the Holocaust since the Eichmann trial has imbued survivors with a new sense of confidence to relay their stories to a *finally* receptive audience. The number of memoirs and oral history testimonies to the victim experience of the Holocaust grows exponentially and a backlash against this surfeit of memory may even be beginning.[15]

That the Holocaust is a construction of the post-war world is not necessarily problematic. The development of historical understanding across this period has ensured that post-war misconceptions of Nazi criminality have (in academic circles at least) largely been erased. The idea of the criminal conspiracy as the essential indicator of the essence of Nazi evil has, for instance, been systematically undermined in the decades since the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg sought to indict Nazism as a grand 'common plan'.[16] Although the IMT bequeathed the legacy of intentionalist historiography, this equally appears to be an increasingly untenable structure for understanding the nature of Nazi antisemitism.

Intentionalist historiography placed the fanatical antisemitism of the Nazi leadership at the heart of an analysis of the murder of Europe's Jews. Causal momentum behind the destruction process was found in the application of a worked out genocidal plan on behalf of the Nazi ruling elite, predicated simply on a hatred of the Jews.[17] But, as

---

[13] Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*, (London, 1963).

[14] See Thomas Fensch (ed.), *Oskar Schindler and His List: The Man, the Book, the Film, the Holocaust and its Survivors*, (Forest Dale, Vermont. 1995) for a number of contemporary responses to *Schindler's List*. See also Miriam Brate Hansen, 'Schindler's List is not Shoah', in Barbie Zelizer, *Visual Culture and the Holocaust*, (New Jersey, 2001), pp. 127-51, for an account of the role of Spielberg's film in Holocaust memory at the end of the twentieth century. For an account of *Holocaust* and the entry of the murder of the European Jews into popular consciousness see Tim Cole, *Images of the Holocaust*, (London, 1999), pp.12-13.

[15] See David Cesarani, 'History on Trial', in *The Guardian*, 18 January 2000.

[16] See Donald Bloxham, 'The Holocaust on Trial: the war crimes trials in the formation of history and memory', Ph.D. Thesis, Southampton University, 1998, for an analysis of the impact of the IMT on historiography.

[17] The classic works of intentionalist historiography are Lucy Dawidowicz, *The War Against the Jews 1939-45*, (London, 1975), Helmut Krausnick, 'The Persecution of the Jews', in Krausnick and Broszat *Anatomy of the SS State*, pp. 17-140, and Eberhard Jackel, *Hitler's World View: A Blueprint for Power*, (Cambridge, Mass.). Perhaps the central document in the intentionalist thesis is the speech made by Hitler in the Reichstag on the anniversary of his ascension to the Chancellorship in 1939. Hitler stated that in the

historical interest in the Holocaust developed, less intuitively satisfying explanations of the emergence of Nazi genocide have been produced, placing emphasis not simply upon genocidal rhetoric and the question of why a genocidal atmosphere emerged, but the manner in which decision making evolved across the period 1933 to 1944 in the attempt to answer the more pertinent question of how. These functional analyses argued persuasively that there did not exist a simple straight line between ideological ambition and the practice of genocide, and were based largely on observations of the functioning of authority within the Nazi state. Moreover, functionalist historians argued that mass murder policy emerged, not simply from the criminal centre, but also from peripheral initiative throughout Nazi occupied Europe. Recently, scholarly understanding has further developed, and has sought to transcend the strictures of what had become a ritualistic controversy between intentionalist and functionalist historians. Emphasising the importance of an atmosphere of centrally sanctioned local initiative development, this post-intentionalist/functionalist scholarship finds the emergence of genocide to be the consequence of various political and ideological pressures. Whilst antisemitism features within this causal explanation for the Holocaust, it is now being contextualised within a complex framework of interaction between political power bargaining, the practicalities of war-time administration, and the grand yet undoubtedly vague ideological ambitions of Nazi occupiers to make Europe more National Socialist.[18]

---

context of the next world war the Jews of Europe would be annihilated. For Helmut Krausnick for example this was the moment that the fate of the Jews of Europe was sealed, the 'day of reckoning had come'.

[18] The work of Götz Aly, *Final Solution: Nazi Population Policy and the Murder of the European Jews*, (London, 1999) and Ulrich Herbert (ed), *National Socialist Extermination Policies, Contemporary German Perspectives and Controversies*, (New York, 2000), has been important in setting the idea of Nazi anti-Jewish policy within the wider context of Nazi visions of ethnic restructuring on a European scale. In this Aly complements the work of Christopher Browning, *The Path to Genocide*, (Cambridge, 1992) where he posits a decision for the final solution in October of 1941 by connecting escalating anti-Jewish action with movements of ethnic Germans, and Deborah Dwork and Robert Jan van Pelt, *Auschwitz: 1270 to the Present*, (New Haven, 1996) in which the development of Auschwitz is convincingly situated within the development of a wider vision of ethnic restructuring of which the elimination of the Jews is simply a constituent part. Perhaps the most instructive example of the role of localities in the emergence of genocide is in the Warthegau, where the Final Solution, in terms of institutionalised mass murder, began in Chelmno in December 1941. Ian Kershaw has demonstrated the degree to which the synthesis of local initiative and central ambition was crucial in the development of genocide in this instructive case, in that mass murder began in an effort by indigenous authorities to solve problems of overcrowding caused by the shipment of Jews from Germany into the region. That these policies were centrally sanctioned is in no doubt. see Ian Kershaw, 'Improvised Genocide: The Emergence of the Final Solution in the Warthegau', *Transactions of*

Despite the growing complexity of the historiography of the destruction process, not all areas of Holocaust historiography have taken account of this sophistication. The historiography of non-Nazi responses to the Holocaust, for example, has developed ignorant of such changes in understanding. From the first published work regarding the response of the free world to the Nazi death camps in the 1960s, to recent polemical efforts to prove that the Allies could have done nothing more to aid the stricken Jews of Europe, the evolution of Nazi anti-Jewish policy has often been presented in caricature in the historiography of 'bystander' reaction to the Holocaust. The British press for example have been chastised for failing to 'understand the full meaning of the German Jewish Question' and 'appreciate...that from the beginning they [the Nazis] were putting into practice, stage by stage, a deliberately worked out plan' to exterminate the Jews.[19] More recently the case for dismissing the idea that the allies could have more vigorously pursued schemes to rescue Europe's Jews has been put forward predicated on the 'simple fact' that the Holocaust was the result of Hitler's psychopathy (and by implication nothing else) and as such all Jews under Nazi rule were the personal prisoner of Hitler, who wanted them dead. In both cases there was no reference to the crudity of such claims.[20]

Such caricatures endure in contemporary 'bystander' historiography. At the end of the twentieth century a popular history magazine reported the discovery of a document by a British academic that 'proved' that the British government knew of the existence of Auschwitz and its role in the Final Solution in December of 1942. [21] Such claims paid scant regard for the fact that Auschwitz did not assume a central role in the Final Solution until after this point, or that its contribution to the most murderous year of the Final Solution, 1942, had been marginal in comparison to the death camps in Nazi controlled

---

the Royal Historical Society, (Vol.2, 1992), pp.51-78. That the shackles of the intentionalist functionalist debate have been broken is demonstrated by the recent work of Peter Longerich that demonstrates the changing focus of anti-Jewish policy, that was consistently in line with the essentially malleable anti-Jewish ambition. See Peter Longerich, *Politik der Vernichtung: Eine Gesamtdarstellung der Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung*, (Munich, 1998).

[19] Andrew Sharf, *The British Press and Jews Under Nazi Rule*, (London, 1964), p.56.

[20] William Rubinstein, *The Myth of Rescue: Why the democracies could not have saved more Jews from the Nazis*, (London, 1997), see also the review of this work by Richard Overy in the *Times Literary Supplement*, 10 October 1997, p.9-10.

Poland. [22] Such an analysis appeared to owe more to the popular elevation of Auschwitz as a metonym for the Final Solution itself than to the detail of historical investigation. [23] Caricatures of the development of Nazi genocide, and the impulses behind the anti-Jewish project in Nazi occupied Europe, which would cause embarrassment to the crudest of intentionalist historian have not been confined to the study of Allied responses to the Jewish tragedy. In the historiography of the German churches' approach to anti-Jewish policy such generalisations and simplifications are also often evident.[24]

Nevertheless, in order that the study of a 'response' to the Holocaust from a particular group, or within a specific cultural arena, be methodologically sound and indeed historically meaningful, it is not enough simply to apply a sophisticated understanding of the murder of the European Jews itself. The problem is twofold, and as such historians must also confront the issue of the understanding of both Nazism and Nazi antisemitism within the cultural setting under scrutiny. For example the central question regarding Britain's relationship with the Holocaust is not whether or not the

---

[21] See Barbara Rogers, 'Auschwitz and the British', *History Today*, (Vol. 49, No. 10, 1999), pp. 2-3.

[22] See Yitzhak Arad, *Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka: The Operation Reinhard Death Camps*, (Bloomington, 1987) for an analysis of the Operation Reinhard camps.

[23] For example see Martin Gilbert, *Auschwitz and the Allies*, (London, 1981). Reasons for the elevation of Auschwitz as symbol for the entirety of the destruction process are manifold and complex, and ultimately undefinable. Auschwitz-Birkenau was the killing centre used for the most naked and open sphere of the Final Solution, the deportation and murder of Hungarian Jewry. Despite the fact that the majority of inmates had left Auschwitz and surrounding camps on Death Marches days before the arrival of the Red Army, Auschwitz was the largest killing centre actually to be liberated before it had been entirely raised to the ground, and with surviving victims still present. Equally it was only one of two, the other being Majdanek. This fact and the dual purpose of the Auschwitz complex as both extermination centre and slave labour installation have also ensured that the number of survivors from Auschwitz vastly outweighs the number from the other death camps combined. Equally many of these survivors were, because of the nature of Auschwitz's purpose, Western European, and as such more readily acceptable in the west. As the number of survivor accounts grew (and grows) in the West the symbolic capital of Auschwitz as the epitome of Nazi evil in the Western world was assured. However the existence of a large community of survivors can only partially explain the elevation of Auschwitz to symbolic status. Interest in survivor testimony is a fairly recent phenomena, with early accounts of the Holocaust (including Hilberg's) shunning survivors as a potential evidentiary source. Ultimately further explanations for the elevation of Auschwitz can only be speculative, however it could be suggested that the physical existence of Auschwitz and its effectiveness as a museum and an image have been crucial.

[24] See for example John Conway's dismissal of the efficacy of any protest against Nazi deportation because it would have underestimated Hitler's ruthless determination to pursue his 'goal of racial genocide', Conway, 'Coming to terms with the Past', p.388. See also Victoria Barnett's allegation that to suggest that there was no plan to murder the Jews of Europe prior to 1938 was to dangerously flirt with the rantings of Holocaust denial, nothing more. Victoria Barnett, *For the Soul of the People: Protestant Protest Against Hitler*, (New York, 1992), p.145.

government could have done more to help the Jews, for this is a counterfactual question of little importance, but to ask *why* government and officials acted in the manner they did with regard to the Jews of Europe. What, for example, did reports of antisemitism and murder mean in Britain, how were they understood, how did they challenge perceptions and beliefs? The answer to such questions not only illuminate how Nazi Germany, anti-Jewish politics and the victims of Nazi Germany, were understood in the non-Nazi world and therefore contribute to a growing sense of the Holocaust as a global historical epoch, but also investigate the ideological assumptions and self-perceptions of British politics and politicians, and consequently reveal the intellectual origins of policy and perception. It is within this historiographical tradition that this thesis is self-consciously located.

British government policy toward the Jews during the war has been characterised by a number of inter-related themes. Embodied in a policy established in the 1930s and reflected in official attitudes to Jewish refugees from Nazism, the British government was keen not to acknowledge the particular threat that Nazism posed for the Jews throughout the Nazi era. Prior to the outbreak of war such reluctance to confront the anti-Jewishness of the Third Reich justified the continued exclusion of Jews from Britain on the specious grounds that an influx of necessarily unassimalable Jews would lead to an 'explosion' of domestic antisemitic sentiment.[25] Continuing and intensifying in war time, the denial of particularity of the Nazi threat to the Jews of Europe endured, despite the Allied declaration on the Nazi campaign of extermination in December of 1942. While fear of Jewish refugees continued,[26] the war time period can also be characterised by governmental reluctance for their war effort to be branded a war on behalf of the Jews. The central plank of British policy towards Jews was a faith in the principle of unconditional surrender, and that the only possibility of rescue came through victory. This absolute commitment became the justification of all inaction on rescue policy,

[25] Tony Kushner, 'The Paradox of Prejudice: The Impact of Organised anti-Semitism in Britain During an anti-Nazi War', in Tony Kushner and Kenneth Lunn (eds), *Traditions of Intolerance: Historical Perspectives on Fascism and Race Discourse in Britain*, (Manchester, 1989), pp. 72-90.

[26] for example Louise London argues that British reluctance to entertain the idea of negotiating with Hitler, with regard to securing the release of Jews, was largely due to the fear of such negotiations being successful and causing an influx of Jews into Britain. See Louise London, *Whitehall and the Jews 1933-48: British Immigration Policy and the Holocaust*, (Cambridge, 2000), p.223.

because (the argument went) to divert any significant amount of resources may have lengthened the war. This is the same rationale that ensured the enduring application of the economic blockade, and the Allied contribution to the starving of Europe's civilians.[27] Predicated on the strength of the liberal mindset, it has been argued that the British refusal to recognise the Jews as an homogenous group, and thereby undermine the universalist war effort, was due to objections to any form of racial particularism, which could have appeared almost Nazi in their conception.[28] Combined with a the prevalence of the ethno-nationalist definition of the state, this liberal world view had no place for the particularist Jew. Liberal thinking would continue to colour British governmental attitudes to the Jews after the war. In the British Zone of occupied Germany, the authorities refused to recognise the Jewish Displaced Persons as Jews, separating all DP's only within their national groups. This enduring rejection of Jewish particularism was the post-war manifestation of the liberal failure to recognise the victims of Nazism in war, based on the fear that to recognise the Jews as Jews may have been to aid Zionist ambitions, facilitate Jewish departures from continental Europe, and complete the Nazi project.[29] Such failure to confront the anti-Jewish priorities of Nazism fed prosecution cases in the post-war trials, and contributed to much of the misunderstanding of the Holocaust in this era.[30]

Although there exists an increasingly sophisticated sense of the British intellectual relationship with the Holocaust the specific impact of Christian discourses on the dissemination of Nazi antisemitism has hitherto been excluded from historiography. Indeed, the focus of investigations into the Christian cognition of the *Shoah* has been confined to continental Europe. The issues of the institutional response of the Catholic church and the personal reaction of Pope Pius XII to the deportation and murder of

---

[27] Meredith Hindley, 'Allied Humanitarian Policy and the Holocaust', Unpublished Paper, 'Bystanders to the Holocaust' Conference, Uppsala, September 1999.

[28] Kushner, *The Holocaust*, pp.146-204. Kushner's work is the most important in stressing the need for culturally contextualising knowledge and understanding but see also Walter Laqueur, *The Terrible Secret: An Investigation into the Suppression of Information About Hitler's Final Solution*, (London, 1980) – Laqueur does put emphasis on the importance of understanding in the Allied reception of the Holocaust, but also fits into the tradition of caricature when stating that one such point of misunderstanding was that 'the fact that Hitler had given an explicit order to kill all Jews was not known for a long time' – p. 196.

[29] Reilly, *Belsen*, pp.146-184.

Europe's Jews have been the subject of a somewhat ritualised exchange between scholars and Vatican apologists over Catholic and Papal silence regarding the murder of the Jews.[31] Together with the complicity of the French and Hungarian Bishoprics,[32] the silence of German Evangelical Protestantism,[33] the picture of Christian silence and indifference inspired by the limited investigation of the role of the Catholic church has been welded into a popular image of a 'collapse of Christian leadership' during the Holocaust.[34] Yet despite the importance of Christianity, and specifically Anglicanism, to the public discourse of the 1930s and 1940s in Britain, the Church of England has been of limited interest to scholars of Britain's relationship with the Holocaust.

Despite a decline in church attendance between the wars,[35] Anglicanism retained an important cultural influence in Britain and especially in the public conversation of the Second World War. The church epitomised the hopefulness of the immediate post 1918 era, promoting new forms of social organisation and attempting to intervene in national disputes, while actively supporting the League of Nations and leading the vociferous commitment to avoiding war that dominated British politics in the aftermath of the First World War.[36] Although the latter 1920s and early 1930s found the Anglican church embroiled in a narcissistic crisis regarding the relationship of the Church and state and the

---

[30] See Bloxham, 'The Holocaust on Trial', and Chapter Six below.

[31] See for example the latest in a long line of books dealing with the silence of the Vatican: John Cornwell, *Hitler's Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII*, (London, 1999). Cornwell's book is often simplistic but it and its reception demonstrate the enduring controversy of the subject matter. The Vatican has in recent years attempted, at times with little success, to come to terms with its past with regard to the Holocaust, for example in the publication of the document 'We Remember' and the Papal apology for Catholics past (but unspecified) sins toward the Jews in March 2000. Vatican efforts at open assessment of the role of the church in the Nazi era have been somewhat hampered by the recent collapse of a Vatican sponsored panel of scholars investigating Catholicism's relationship with the Holocaust after the refusal of the Vatican to sanction the release of relevant documentary evidence. See John Cornwell, 'Something to Confess?', *The Sunday Times*, 29 July 2001 for a review of the collapse of the scholars panel. See also Michael Phayer, *The Catholic Church and the Holocaust: 1930-65*, (Indiana, 2001) for a review of the historical relationship between Catholicism, antisemitism, the Holocaust, war criminals and war crimes trials.

[32] See Susan Zuccotti, *The Holocaust, The French and the Jews*, (Nebraska, 1999), and Moshe Herczl, *Christianity and the Holocaust of Hungarian Jewry*, (New York, 1993).

[33] See Chapter One below for references and a discussion of the relationship between German evangelical Protestantism, antisemitism and authority in the Third Reich.

[34] David P. Gushee, 'Learning from Christian Rescuers: Lessons for the Churches', in the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, (Vol.548, Nov 1996), p. 153.

[35] Adrian Hastings, *A History of English Christianity 1920-85*, (London, 1986), p. 254.

[36] See Chapter Two for a discussion of the Anglican Church's intellectual relationship with the First World War.

power of government to legislate on Church affairs,[37] the European crisis of the 1930s re-established the symbiosis of the Anglican and political establishments in Britain. Fear engendered in the Church of England first by the prospect of war, and then by the mass politics of right and left in continental Europe found government and church broadly united in the later 1930s.[38] Although the uncertainty and poverty of unemployment and depression challenged the relevance of Christian sociology in the 1930s and the relevance of Christianity in British national life, by the outbreak of war in 1939 public voices in Britain were at one in their proclamation of war as a defence of both Britain and Christianity. The Churchill government continued to employ a rhetoric designed by the church in order to characterise war as Britain's appointment with destiny during the 1940s.[39]

The Church of England's position as an established church and the impact of Christian rhetoric on shaping war discourse in Britain suggests that the role of the Anglican church, and of Anglican intellectual structures more generally, in the dissemination of Nazism (and therefore the Holocaust) in Britain is ripe for investigation. Indeed superficially the impact of an Anglican interpretation of Nazi antisemitism in post-Holocaust academic theology, can already be charted and evaluated. It was a member of the Anglican church, maverick theologian James Parkes, who – in a pre-Holocaust context – developed the structures that would be employed to review the Holocaust as traumatic for Christian theology in the post-war world.

Parkes, inspired by time spent in the employ of the Student Christian Movement on German university campuses overflowing with antisemitism in the latter 1920s and

---

[37] Hastings, *History of English Christianity*, pp. 203-8.

[38] See Philip Williamson, 'Christian Conservatives and the Totalitarian Challenge 1933-40', *English Historical Review*, (Vol. CXV, No. 462, June 2000), pp. 607-42 for an account of the political establishment's fear of totalitarianism, see Chapters One to Three below for a discussion of the Anglican Communities reaction to totalitarianism, and particularly Chapter Two for a discussion of the evolution of attitudes to war.

[39] See Keith Robbins, 'Britain, 1940, and "Christian Civilisation"', in Derek Beales and Geoffrey Best (eds), *History, Society and the Churches: Essays in honour of Owen Chadwick*, (Cambridge, 1985), p. 279. For a specific examination of the religious rhetoric employed by the Churchill government, see also B.G. Worrall, *The Making of the Modern Church: Christianity in England since 1800*, (London, 1988), p. 252. See Paul Addison, 'Destiny, History, and Providence: The Religion of Winston Churchill', in Michael Bentley (ed), *Public and Private Doctrine: Essays in British History*, (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 236-50, for a more detailed discussion of Churchill's use of religious rhetoric.

early 1930s, dedicated his working life to the popular and theological study of Jewish-Christian relations. Parkes' Christian theology alleged that the centrality of Christ to Christian teaching had led to the development of the mistaken view amongst Christians that Judaism had been entirely superseded by the revelation of Christ. Such mistaken theology, according to Parkes, was the root of the historical injustices of the Christian/Jewish encounter. Parkes and his theological heirs argued that, by interpreting the resurrection as the 'somatic event' which *actually* established the Kingdom of God, Christian teaching ensured that Jewish rejection of Christ was seen also as an explicit rejection of salvation. This rejection of salvation defined the Jews decisively outside of the kingdom of God, and indeed even in opposition to it,[40] because (to put it crudely) if the Christian (through the reality of Christ) was absolutely right, then the Jew must have been wrong.[41] The centrality of Christ ensured that the relationship between Christian and Jew could only be between missionary and convert, and that the endurance of Judaism and the rejection of missionary advances was interpreted as a direct challenge to the validity of Christianity.[42]

Predicated on the thesis that in order to sustain itself Christian triumphalism required the removal of the anachronistic Jew, post-Holocaust scholars have developed the Parkesian thesis regarding Christocentrism, and argued for a direct relationship between the Holocaust and Christian theology – because the destruction of Jewry satisfied the rhetorical demands of Christian anti-Jewish teaching.[43] In order to find such a relationship the divergence between traditional anti-Jewish teaching and the modern racial discourses of antisemitism, which were fuelled by the discoveries of the colonial age, were neutralised.[44] Modern antisemitism and traditional Christian animus were

---

[40] Jürgen Moltman, *The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God*, (San Francisco, 1981).

[41] A. Roy Eckardt, 'Is there a way out of the Christian Crime? The Philosophic Question of the Holocaust' in *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, (Vol.1, No.1, 1986), pp.121-126.

[42] James Parkes, *The Conflict of the Church and the Synagogue: A Study in the Origins of Antisemitism*, (London, 1934) - This was the published version of Parkes' doctoral thesis, which as can be seen preceded the Holocaust and in its original form the Nazi accession to power.

[43] Isabel Wollaston, 'Can Christians Break the Silence? A British Response to the Holocaust', in Yehuda Bauer, Alice Eckardt, Franklin Littell, and Robert Maxwell (eds), *Remembering for the Future: Working Papers and Addenda*, (Oxford, 1989), pp.672-679.

[44] Works discussing the development of racial antisemitism are plentiful. For example see Jacob Katz, *From Prejudice to Destruction: Anti-semitism 1700-1933*, (Cambridge, Mass. 1980). One of the latest

proposed as interchangeable, and therefore the Holocaust as the removal of the Jews allegedly satisfied the logic of genocidal racism, and Christian teaching alike. To reverse this formulation, the logic of Christian antisemitism became for Parkesian post-Holocaust theologians, the Holocaust.[45]

While these analyses were problematic and overstated, they offer an interesting insight into the nature of historical reflection regarding the Holocaust, and the relationship of that reflection with both the past and the future. The rhetoric of post-Holocaust Christian theological narratives of the past has specific links to the pre-Holocaust theology of an, albeit marginal, Anglican scholar. The pre-war Anglican church provided the intellectual structure for the historical reflection on the theological significance of the Holocaust, demonstrating quite clearly the link between narratives of the past, and theological narratives designed during that past. The work of Parkesian post-Holocaust theologians also demonstrates the manner in which historical investigation can have a reflexive relationship with the future.[46] Vital to the scholarly assessment of the connections between Christian rhetoric and the Holocaust was the assertion that Christian anti-Jewish rhetoric was neither a scriptural nor historical necessity.[47] Parkes located a perversion of Christian teaching in the establishment of the church in the fourth century, and consequently it was argued that the Holocaust was not the inevitable result of Christian teaching per se, but of an historically and culturally (rather than scripturally)

---

investigations of this topic actually appears to function as a demonstration of the prejudicial basis of antisemitic ideology in and of itself. Kevin Macdonald, *Separation and its Discontents: Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Anti-Semitism*, (Westport, 1998). Macdonald has attempted to produce a comparative study of anti Jewish sentiment throughout history but seems only to have succeeded in demonstrating the enduring nature of the Christian and then racial identification of Jewish difference. Macdonald attempts to find the common denominator between distinct anti-Jewish sentiments not in the paranoia of the host societies, and that the Christian conception of the Jew provided a consistent and ready made scapegoat, but in the very existence of the Jew. As such the logic of Jewish difference can pervade secular modern scholarship in addition to early Christian writings, and later racial ideologues.

[45] Franklin Littell, *The Crucifixion of the Jews: The Failure of Christians to Understand the Jewish Experience*, (New York, 1975), pp.24-44, and Rosemary Radford Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Antisemitism*, (New York, 1974), pp. 214-25. A. Eckardt, 'Post Holocaust Theology', p.229.

[46] The following argument is in part based on observations within Emil Fackenheim, 'Concerning Authentic and Unauthentic Responses to the Holocaust', *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, (Vol.1, No.1, 1986), pp.101-120 on the connections between the Holocaust and the years 'before and after' the Nazi Final Solution.

specific 'culture Christianity'. The indicted Culture Christianity was portrayed wholly within a specific cultural and historical setting, and therefore not equivalent to eternal Christian faith. In fact based on the conviction that Christianity 'is called to be a counter-culture',[48] the very concept of 'culture Christianity' was proposed as a perversion of eternal Christian teaching. This perversion arose when, in its establishment, Christianity became 'coercive' through its identification with the state and therefore virtually *unchristian* in its character.[49] With this in mind the Holocaust is actually (within these formulations) not a product of (and therefore traumatic for) the Christian faith itself, but only for perversions of that faith or for 'culture Christianity'. As such according to this theology 'those who carry Christian antisemitism beyond the theological and cultural levels to the actively political...are products of Christianity, and a part of her sin and guilt, *but they are breakaways from her ethos*' (my italics).[50] Christianity's responsibility for the Holocaust was then confined historically and culturally; and Christianity (in its eternal rather than culturally specific sense) was set free of the Holocaust.

This example is reflective of a relationship between the Holocaust and both the past, present and future which is fluid and above all ongoing. The review of the genocidal possibilities of the pre-Holocaust relationship between Christianity and Judaism was both an attempt to find a new and post-Holocaust relationship between the two faiths and an effort to illuminate the past. If 'culture Christianity' rather than Christian teaching itself was responsible for the Holocaust, then such scholarship allows for both future interfaith interaction, and importantly for Christianity to survive intact. This is in itself something of a paradox, as by indicting an historical manifestation of the Christian faith, rather than the teaching of that faith, it *could* be argued that the degree of self reflection that may necessitate interfaith communality was missing. However, it can be stated with certainty that such scholarship is then itself a demonstration of the changing nature of understanding of the Holocaust, its relationship to the past and to the future. By redefining this relationship historians and theologians have sought to change

---

[47] see 'Judaism and Christianity' in A.F. Mcgrath (ed), *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Modern Christian Thought*, (London, 1993), pp. 284-86.
[48] Littell, *Crucifixion*, p.4.
[49] Littell, 'Inventing the Holocaust', p.9.

our understanding of the relationship of the Holocaust to 'before', and the question of Christian responsibility, in order to effect a change in the relationship of the Holocaust to the future.

Where it has been a topic for investigation, the extremely limited historiography of the Anglican church's response to the Holocaust offers a further example of the reflexive relationship between the study of the Holocaust as history, and the effort to manipulate the post-Holocaust image of Christianity. The rationale for previous studies of the Anglican response to the Holocaust has often been to propose the Church of England as an example of an authentic Christian response to the Holocaust, in the light of the well documented and popularly perceived failure of European Christianity in the face of murderous Nazi antisemitism. The 'impressive evidence of the moral concern' of the Anglican church for the sufferings of Europe's Jews, has led one historian to argue that the example of the failings of the continental churches should not be allowed to stand as representative of the Christian record. The example of the Anglican church, Andrew Chandler has implied, can help to set Christianity free of the trauma of the Holocaust.[51] Richard Gutteridge's pained exposition of the failure of the German churches' response to the Jewish crisis was predicated on his personal need to 'provide some explanation of the church's undeniable failure to do, and say, what could be expected of the representatives of Christ.'[52] Gutteridge's search for a 'truly Christian' response to the Holocaust led inevitably to a study of the reaction of British Christianity, in which he often found the Anglican response deserving of praise – perhaps even worthy of the representatives of Christ. The implication of such scholarship is clear, and echoes the impulses of Parkesian theologians discussed previously, which attempted to rescue Christianity from the black hole of the Holocaust. In the case of Anglicanism a 'culture Christianity' which appeared to dispel the gloom of uniform Christian failing in the Nazi era has been located. Similarly to the evaluation of Holocaust as trauma for perverted

---

[50] Littell, *Crucifixion*, p.112.

[51] See Andrew Chandler, 'A Question of Fundamental Principles: the Church of England and the Jews of Germany 1933-37' in *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook*, (1993), pp. 221-62 and by the same author, 'Lambeth Palace and the Jews of Germany and Austria in 1938' in *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook*, (1995), pp. 225-50.

[52] Richard Gutteridge, *Open thy Mouth for the Dumb! The German Evangelical Church and the Jews 1879-1950*, (Oxford, 1976), p.267.

Christianity, the conclusions of the historiography of Anglicanism and the Holocaust award the genocidal past a reflexive relationship with the future in which Christian morality emerged generally unscathed. Indeed, if put together post-Holocaust Christian theology and the historiography of the Anglican response to the Holocaust collectively offer Christian faith a legitimating escape from the Holocaust.

It is not the example of the ground breaking theology of Jewish-Christian relations proposed by James Parkes that has led to historians heaping praise on the Anglican response to the murder of Europe's Jews. In fact Parkes' radical theology was anathema to much of the Anglican establishment, which dismissed him accordingly.[53] The praise heaped upon the Church of England has been directed at the episcopate and chiefly at George Bell, the Bishop of Chichester throughout the Nazi era, and William Temple who was Archbishop of York, and then Canterbury, before his untimely death in 1944.

Bell's contribution to the British refugee movement in the 1930s, his consistent campaign to draw attention to the sufferings of Christians and Jews alike in Germany from 1933 onwards, his support of Christian resistance movements in Germany which engendered a fervent belief in the existence of an 'other' Germany and subsequently inspired almost pacifistic objections to the Allied bombing of German civilian targets in war-time, have all contributed to his emergence in historiography as an almost saintly figure.[54] William Temple has drawn similar praise for his public campaigning on behalf of Europe's Jews; both contemporarily – the World Jewish Congress stated that Temple's name 'will rank high in the pages of Jewish history for the sincerity and power with which he advocated the cause of justice for the Jews'[55] – and historically – Temple's biographer suggested that the plight of the Jews was his 'greatest agony'.[56] In terms of the period during which the Jews of Europe were actually being murdered, William Temple

[53] See Chapter Three below for a discussion of Parkes' relationship with senior Anglicans, including Bell and Temple.
[54] See for example Alan Wilkinson, *Dissent or Conform: War, Peace and the English Churches*, (London, 1986), p.141.
[55] Quotation from the World Jewish Congress on the death of Temple - See Temple Papers, Lambeth Palace Library, Vol.55, ff. 192-5.
[56] F.A. Iremonger, *William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury, his life and letters*, (London, 1948), p. 562.

was unquestionably the focus of Anglican dismay at what can now be recognised as the Final Solution. Actively campaigning, at governmental level, on behalf of refugee groups throughout the war, Temple repeatedly brought the government to task, both privately and in the House of Lords over their inaction. Temple famously warned the British government and people that they stood 'at the bar of history, of humanity and of God' with reference to the Jewish crisis. Temple protested 'against procrastination of any kind' in dealing with to the refugee problem in continental Europe, and urged immediate efforts to rescue Europe's Jews.[57] That this speech, Temple's finest oratorical hour, 'had next to no effect' seems to offer a neat summary of the protests of the Anglican church in this period: impassioned but largely impotent.[58]

The apparent moral concern exhibited by the Anglican episcopate has been used historiographically to lighten the gloom, the 'shame and the dread' surrounding European Christianity in the light of the Holocaust.[59] Yet this praise has been awarded with little or no reference to the question of how Nazism or the Holocaust was actually understood by the Anglican church, and the impact such understanding had on knowledge of the Holocaust both during the war, and then reflectively in the post war world. To ask such a question is automatically to critique the congratulatory tone of previous historiography, and to question the separation of the Church of England from a general perception of Christian failure, especially if the question asked of the Anglican relationship with the Holocaust is reformulated to ask how the Anglican community contributed to the understanding of Nazi genocide.

George Bell's much vaunted refugee campaigning in the 1930s, for example, offers an obvious point of departure from the dominant historiographical narrative of the Anglican response to the Holocaust. The formation of the appeal for non-Aryan Christian refugees from Nazism was designed in response to concern over Nazi treatment of the German churches rather than German Jews, but has been historiographically remembered as a response to the *Jewish* Holocaust. In fact it could be argued that Bell displayed a

[57] *Hansard* (HL), Vol. 126, (821) 23 March 1943.
[58] Hastings, *History of English Christianity*, p.378.
[59] A quotation from the Anglican *Guardian* 15 November 1935 - cited in Richard Gutteridge, 'Some Christian Responses to the Jewish Catastrophe' in Bauer... et al, *Remembering for the Future*, pp.354.

disinterest in Jewish refugees during the early Nazi period, whom he argued were not in need of Anglican support as they 'were members of a world wide community which assured them of practical help and sympathy'.[60] What then does this tell us of how George Bell and the wider Anglican community understood Nazism and the campaign against the Jews? In the 1930s at least, Bell's example suggests that it was not Nazi antisemitism that galvanised Anglican action but the perceived persecution of German Christians.

It is the question of the relationship between the suffering of Jews and churches in the Anglican perception of Nazism that will underpin the first chapter of the thesis below. It will be argued that, as the example of Bell's refugee campaigning suggests, the German Church Struggle, and particularly Martin Niemöller, were far more important in establishing the Anglican image of the Third Reich than antisemitism. Central to this understanding was an image of Nazi anti-Christianity which created the intellectual structures for the dissemination of Nazism and the persecution of the Jews in the latter 1930s. This original structure, it will be suggested, was then employed to evaluate the murderous anti-Jewish campaigns of war, and also impacted on the historical image of the Third Reich presented in Britain. Chapter One will establish the pattern of the first section of the thesis by introducing a case study – the image of Martin Niemöller – which encapsualtes the Anglican understanding of Nazism in a chronologically specific period – again in the case of chapter one 1933-38. Although broadly chronological in development and focus the first three chapters will demonstrate the forward resonance of particular elements of the Anglican interpretation of Nazism by also investigating their impact on the history and memory of the Holocaust. In the first chapter the impact of the Anglican reading of Martin Niemöller upon wider historiographical narratives of the German church struggle or *Kirchenkampf* will be considered.

Yet, if in order to establish the significance of the Anglican response to the Holocaust it is important to establish how Anglicanism conceived of the Third Reich,

---

[60] Ronald Jasper, *George Bell: Bishop of* Chichester, (London, 1963), p. 136. For an investigation and critique of the Anglican contribution to the British refugee movement, see Chana Kotzin, 'Christian Responses in Britain to Jewish Refugees from Europe, 1933-39', Ph.D. Thesis, University of Southampton, 2000.

then it is also imperative to explore the meaning of the term Anglicanism before the question of Anglican perceptions can be adequately understood. This study will not attempt an analysis of grass-roots Anglican dissemination of the Third Reich because, even if the source material were available and that is doubtful in the extreme, such an exercise would make untenable assumptions regarding the lay members of the church and their intellectual relationship with Anglicanism. The historian cannot assume that faith has a causal role in governing the actions of an individual Christian. Accordingly this study will, like those before it, undertake an intellectual history of engagement with Nazism within the Anglican community, concentrating specifically on the episcopate but equally utilising press and publications which reflected the dominant assumptions of the Anglican church established by the hierarchy.

The Church of England is to this day preoccupied by the narcissistic question of self-definition, of what exactly is Anglicanism.[61] But the application of that question to the interwar and post-1945 Anglican church; the attempt to understand Anglicanism in the 1930s and 1940s unitarily – either theologically, politically, or even generationally – is particularly fraught with difficulty. Such were the intellectual divisions of the church in this period that in 1937 the Church of England published a report on her own doctrine precisely to document the theological diversity in established English Christianity, and to discover exactly what the church actually was.[62] The Anglican Church had emerged from the First World War dominated by Christian Social radicalism committed to the psuedo-socialisation of British society. It remained inherently hopeful about the future.[63] Theological liberalism dominated across the church's political spectrum in this era. However, although significant figures such as the Bishop of Durham, Hensley Henson, and the Archbishop of Canterbury, Cosmo Lang, hailed from a conservative political tradition, the intellectual vibrancy of the interwar church was provided by the political

[61] Stephen Sykes, 'The Genius of Anglicanism', in Geoffrey Rowell (ed), *The English Religious Tradition and the Genius of Anglicanism*, (Oxford, 1992), p. 228. Sykes argues that the first refuge of those that wish to attack the Anglican church is to allege that it is little more than a hotch potch of distinct Christian traditions, failing to bridge a gap between non-conformity and Catholicism.

[62] See doc. 97 'Doctrine in the Church of England', in R.P. Flindall (ed), *The Church of England 1815-1948: A Documentary History*, (London, 1972), pp. 416-20.

[63] Wilkinson, *Dissent or Conform*, p. 88.

left.[64] But, by the time the generation of Christian social radicals had come to dominate the church in the 1940s their particular brand of incarnation theology and the effort to construct the Kingdom of God in England's green and pleasant land appeared increasingly anachronistic, and the dominance of theological liberalism was under threat. Europe was in the midst of war, and war had emerged from a period of economic dislocation which had bequeathed Mussolini, Franco, Stalin, Hitler and the politics of power. Terrified by the religiosity of political dictatorship on the continent, and mindful of the prospect of national annihilation in war, historiographical orthodoxy maintains that the Anglican church by this time had deserted the hopefulness of Christian sociology and liberal modernism.[65] In turn the Anglican laity especially had taken refuge in a pessimistic theology of redemption which emphasised the otherness of God and the sin of man, more reminiscent of the theology of Karl Barth than that of William Temple.[66]

William Temple, prior to war in the later 1930s, was himself to admit that liberal Christianity and the search for the earthly redemption of man had little relevance to modern politics or theology. The Report on Doctrine published in 1937, prefaced by Temple, charted a drift from the Victorian theology of social radicals immersed in the mindset of the nineteenth century and the inevitability of theosophical progress, to the theological uncertainties of a twentieth century beset by the pestilence of war. Temple acknowledged that 'the security of the nineteenth century' was 'already shattered in Europe' and that its crumbling in Britain had prompted the Anglican church to learn the impotence of man and 'how deep and pervasive is that corruption which theologians call original sin'. Far from hopeful for mankind, on the eve of war, the dominant position of the Anglican church appeared to be that 'man needs above all to be saved from himself'.[67] Indeed Anglican thought from the later 1930s onwards reflected this apparently pessimistic theological turn. The dominant trend in popular published theology

[64] Hastings, *English Christianity*, p. 251.
[65] For a discussion of Modernist Anglican theology see A.M. Ramsey, *From Gore to Temple: The Development of Anglican Theology Between Lux Mundi and the Second World War*, (London, 1960), pp. 60-76.
[66] E.R. Norman, *Church and Society in England 1770-1970*, (Oxford, 1976), p. 372.
[67] 'Doctrine in the Church', p. 419.

articulated the death of hope and bemoaned *God's Judgement on Europe* and the imminent threat to Christian life on earth.[68]

The second chapter of this thesis will consequently investigate the understanding of Nazism inherent within this atmosphere of theological surrender, and the impact of crisis theology on conceptions of Nazism and the attendant persecution of the Jews. Such an analysis will be based on charting the attitudes to Nazism reflected in the developing attitude to war across the 1930s as the principle of avoiding war had been a touchstone of the liberal theology of hope dominant in the post-1918 world. In 1939 the church as a whole embraced the principle of war with Nazi Germany, a conversion that was ostensibly based upon a developing conception of Nazism and attendant shifts in the prevailing theological wind. The investigation of the changing conception of Nazism will demonstrate the continuities of understanding from a picture of the Third Reich dominated by the suffering of Martin Niemöller and the German churches highlighted in chapter one. Such continuity of Anglican interpretation will in turn suggest an ambiguous legacy for the understanding of murderous anti-Jewish action in war time which was interpreted as a constituent element of the Nazi war against the churches. By exploring the perception of Nazism through the theology of the Anglican church, Chapter Two will also contribute to the understanding of the development of that theology.

The strength of the historiographical consensus, and indeed the self-perception of the Anglican church in this period, that Anglicanism turned from optimism to pessimism across the period 1933-45, suggests that the search for the understanding of Nazism will be entirely straightforward. Nazism and the war against the Jews simply contributed to the gloom and despair of the Anglican prescription for the European future. However Anglicanism is best understood not unitarily but as a discourse between differing, and often opposed, social, political, theological, and religious traditions. George Bell and William Temple, who awarded the Church of England intellectual vibrancy in the 1920s, dominated the church and the official and semi-official voice of the Church in the 1930s and 1940s. In war time, for example, a Christian press charged with the responsibility of

[68] A. R. Vidler *God's Judgement on Europe*, (London, 1940). Alan Wilkinson contends that the ultimate expression of Anglican pessimism came from Nicodemus (the pseudonym of an Anglican layman) who

interpreting the world for their Christian readership[69] relied on the likes of Temple and Bell, who were seen as encapsulating Anglicanism, for authority on matters European.[70] While neo-orthodox biblical Christianity may have reflected the fears of the laity and a popularised theology which came to dominate a post-war church fearful of political participation and preoccupied by questions of personal morality,[71] the voice of the Church in war time at least, was still dominated by the previous generation. And yet although that generation was happy to characterise itself as a part of the retreat from liberal hope, their actions suggest an enduring commitment to a political theology concerned overwhelmingly with the physical rather than transcendent future. Both Bell and Temple for example, in the context of war and despair, published theological and political prescriptions for the future, drenched in the rhetoric of liberal theology and hope.[72]

Suggestions of the dominance of the theological turn to pessimism within the Church of England may have been overstated. Although the embrace of war suggested the pre-eminence of theological pessimism and that hopes for the future lay outside of the earthly kingdom, understanding of Nazism amongst the liberal hierarchy of the Anglican church remained fixated on the worth of a Christian past and a Christian future. Nazism was through the embrace of war, and the dominant concern for Martin Niemöller and German protestants, presented as fundamentally divergent from Christian and European history, and chiefly as an attack on Christianity. The security of the present may have been removed in the mindset of Anglicans, but faith in the security of the past remained intact within a dominant and liberal episcopate. Indeed the rhetoric of Anglican support

---

described man as a 'crawling mass of corruption', see Wilkinson, *Dissent and Conform*, p. 222.

[69] Wilkinson, *Dissent and Conform*, p. 279.

[70] Temple was for example seen as an extraordinarily encapsulating leader who united virtually the entire English Christian community in admiration especially in war time. See Adrian Hastings, 'William Temple', in Rowell, *English Religious Tradition*, p. 213. Bell was unquestionably the leading Anglican authority on Europe and especially Germany in the 1930s and 1940s. See Jasper, *Bell*, for details of Bell's career long engagement with Europe.

[71] See for example Edward Carpenter, *Archbishop Fisher: His life and Times*, (Norwich, 1991) for an account of Temple's successor at Canterbury who although engaged with Europe was more concerned with the level of venereal disease amongst, and sexual mores of, British occupying forces than wider questions.

[72] See George Bell, *Christianity and World Order*, (London, 1940), and William Temple, *Christianity and Social Order*, (London, 1942).

for war had it that it was an idealised Christian past which war was being fought to protect and, indeed, to revive.[73]

In keeping with an endurance of theological and political hopefulness, members of the Anglican community contributed significantly to an ecumenical movement predicated on a belief in the ability of Christian man to shape the European future. Indeed ecumenism and the linking of international Christian brethren provided the overwhelmingly dominant context for the Anglican understanding of matters European during the 1930s, the war, and in the immediate post-war period. Developed through the Student Christian Movement and International Missionary Council in the period immediately following the First World War, ecumenism seized sections of the international protestant and orthodox Christian communities chastened by the divisions of that conflict.[74] Bell and Temple and the generation of Christian socialists they represented, were central to Anglican involvement in the movement, and the development of an internal bureaucracy which would culminate in the establishment of the World Council of Churches in 1948.[75] The significance of the ecumenical movement lay in its inherent hope for the Christian physical future of mankind, based on an enduring faith in the worth of Christian history and the assertion that 'the heavenly citizenship' could be enjoyed 'now' in a 'spiritual world' that was 'active, dynamic [and] living' even in the midst of crisis and war.[76]

---

[73] Of course there were alternative understandings of Nazism proposed in the Anglican church, including some which were sympathetic to Hitler, for example Arthur Headlam Bishop of Gloucester and Frank Buchmann of the Oxford Group Movement. Although both figures displayed (separately) public enthusiasm for Hitler, this disguised a private ambivalence. Neither was at the centre of the Anglican theological world, and as such will not be the focus of investigation in this thesis. For the Oxford Group see D.W. Bebbington, 'The Oxford Group Movement Between the Wars', in *Studies in Church History*, (Vol. XXIII, 1986), pp. 495-507. Arthur Headlam although prominent in the Anglican church as head of the Council for Foreign Relations was not representative in his sympathies for Nazism, especially in the context of reactions to the German Church Struggle. See Chapter One for details of that conflict. See also R.C.D. Jasper, *Arthur Cayley Headlam: Life and Letters of a Bishop*, (London, 1960), and E.C. Pritchard, *Arthur Cayley Headlam: A Life*, (Worthing, 1989). For Headlam's relationship with Nazism specifically see Richard Griffiths, *Fellow Travellers of the Right: British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany 1933-39*, (Oxford, 1983), pp.176-7 and Kirsty Patterson, 'The Church of England and the Nazi Regime: The Bishop of Gloucester, Sympathiser or Appeaser?', BA Dissertation, University of Southampton, 1994.

[74] Worral, *Making of the Modern Church*, pp. 203-22.

[75] Ronald Jasper, *Arthur Cayley Headlam: Life and Letters of a Bishop*, (London, 1960), p. 284.

[76] Bell, *Christianity and World Order*, p. 142.

The Anglican image of Nazism as a contribution to the picture of the sinfulness of man, may be predictable, even obvious, in the midst of a pessimistic church which defined itself unable to decipher the world. In the first two chapters below it is argued that Nazism, for the 1930s Anglican church, was simply a manifestation of Europe's turn from God, and a war being waged on Christianity by a generally perceived totalitarianism dominant on the European continent. However the enduring hopefulness of the ecumenical mainstream of the Anglican Church suggests a rather different conception of Nazism which will be tackled, both in the final chapter of section one, and in the second section of this thesis.

Building on the investigation of the understanding of Nazism inherent in the Anglican turn to pessimism proposed in Chapter Two, Chapter Three will contribute to the understanding of the Anglican appreciation of the privations of the Jews of Europe in war time. Further contributing to the historiography of the response of the free world to Nazi genocide, and the elusive question 'when did they know',[77] Chapter Three will find a sophisticated, albeit temporary, understanding of Nazism and genocide within the Anglican community. Chapter Three will take as a case study the Anglican support for war which it finds was based on an appreciation of that war as a conceptual conflict with anti-Christianity, rather than as a physical military engagement with a German enemy. This perception of the war was realised in an ecumenical conception of the perpetrators, which heavily impacted upon understanding of the Holocaust. Arguing that the Anglican image of Nazism was as an alien political force dominating the German population in league with totalitarian allies in Soviet Russia, Chapter Three will then begin to set out the structure of interpretation and obfuscation that Anglicanism left for the historical memory of the Holocaust.

The so-called 'Holocaust Industry' was inspired by and operates around an assertion that the Holocaust was a caesura in modern history. The assertion of Holocaust uniqueness springs from that fundamental beginning,[78] as does the theological notion that

[77] Yehuda Bauer, 'When did they know?', in *Midstream*, April 1968, pp. 51-58.

[78] The question of uniqueness has dogged the historiography of the Holocaust since the 1970s. Despite the best efforts of some (for example Steven Katz, *The Holocaust in Historical Context*, (New York, 1994)) to historicise these claims, which were originally political efforts to promote Holocaust history and memory,

the Holocaust is traumatic for Christianity precisely because of both the inexplicability of the *Shoah* and the relation of this tremendum to Christian teaching.[79] Yet if a specific and dominant element of a Christian community was able to maintain notions of security and progress in the midst of the Holocaust, of which they were explicitly aware, what does this tell us about the manner in which Nazism and the Holocaust were understood, and the manner in which the history and memory of the Holocaust has developed? This is the question that dominates the second section of this thesis which will then concentrate squarely on the conceptions of Nazism that were inherent in Anglican narratives of European history provided in the specific context of the ecumenical Anglican vision of the European future, in the immediate post-war period. The impact of Anglican discourse on the historical conceptions of Nazism proposed in the later 1940s will be the focus of the second section of this thesis. Such an analysis will suggest the manner in which the historiographical echoes of the original Anglican reflections highlighted in the case studies of section one, travelled into post-war historical consciousness.

Chapter Four will investigate the importance of the Anglican voice in establishing a dominant narrative of the Nazi past in Britain within the context of the degenerating western relationship with the Soviet Union and the emerging Cold War. This investigation will challenge the assumption which has underpinned accounts of the development of the understanding and historiography of the Holocaust, that the obfuscation of the Holocaust in this era was solely the result of the collapse of relations with the Soviet Union, and the need to rehabilitate Germany as ally. It will be suggested that the Anglican structures for interpretation discussed in the first section of this thesis, are directly appropriated within the rhetoric of the Cold War as a means of escaping the particularity of Nazi criminality in the context of an ongoing war against totalitarianism.

The penultimate chapter will then survey the impact of Anglican narratives of the past and future in aiding the process of coming to terms with the past in Germany. Specifically the exchange between the Anglican narratives of an ecumenical future, and

---

the idea of uniqueness remains ahistorical. See Gavriel Rosenfeld, 'The Politics of Uniqueness: Reflections on the Polemical Turn in Holocaust and Genocide Scholarship', in *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, (Vol. 13, No. 1, 1999) for a judicious evaluation of recent debates in this area.

Christian German exploration of the Nazi past will be discussed. The beginnings of an Anglican route out of a painful past for German Christianity will be highlighted, which will further demonstrate the links between the narratives of the German present proposed by the Anglican church in the 1930s, and the politics of memory in the immediate post war era.

The final chapter of the thesis will take the form of a case study of an Anglican, and Anglican informed, campaign against the memory of the Holocaust between 1945 and 1949, which further conformed with the political assumptions of the Cold War. Although the post-war Anglican church may have moved beyond the rhetoric of the past and the future provided by ecumenical liberals in war time, this chapter will demonstrate the enduring impact of such narratives on public confrontation with the Nazi past and the Holocaust in post-war Britain. It will be demonstrated that a campaign against war crimes trials which was conceived in Anglican minds, and relied heavily on Anglican rhetoric, sought, in the later 1940s, to set the murder of the Jews far from the European imagination. Within this campaign it was accused and convicted war criminals that were presented to the British public as cultural and religious allies. Such perceptions of community were based on an understanding of an idealised European and Christian past that Anglicans used to underpin the ecumenical future, and not solely on the utility of a new German ally in the propaganda war with the Soviet Union.

Historians, sociologists, philosophers and recently politicians have, with differing degrees of scepticism, reminded us how the Holocaust has changed or should challenge the manner in which we look at our world.[80] The thesis that follows is an investigation of how the Anglican community accommodated Nazism and the Holocaust in their world, how such apparently cataclysmic events challenged, shaped, and ultimately failed to impact upon the assumptions which made up that worldview. Ultimately it will demonstrated, perhaps in a reversal of what may be the expected formulation, how the

---

[79] Victoria Barnett, *Bystanders: Conscience and Complicity During the Holocaust*, (Westport, Conneticut. 1999). See Chapter 8 'A Broken World: Religious Interpretations of the Holocaust', pp. 135-152.

[80] The Holocaust Memorial Day first organised by the British government in 2000 was linked to the governmental 'citizenship initiative' to promote social participation. See Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust*, (Cambridge, 1989) for a sociological analysis of the challenge of the Holocaust for the (post) industrial age.

perceptions and assumptions of the Anglican community shaped and dictated the image of the cataclysmic events now known as the Holocaust.

SECTION 1.

THE ANGLICAN UNDERSTANDING OF THE THIRD REICH AND THE PERSECUTION AND MURDER OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS 1933-45.

Chapter One.
'The Splendid Image of a Christian Conscience Unbowed': Martin Niemöller, the Confessing Church and the Anglican Understanding of Nazism before the Outbreak of the Second World War.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Nazi racial policy dominates consideration of the Third Reich. The ubiquity of the Holocaust in academic, and even popular culture demands that German history flows through the filter of the Final Solution.[1] Yet for contemporary observers of Nazi Germany, racism, and the treatment of Germany's Jews was not of primary significance. In Britain, news from Hitler's Germany, at least before *Kristallnacht*, was not dominated by the persecution of the Jews, but by the sufferings and resistance of the church in the *Kirchenkampf* or church struggle. British fascination with the apparent privations of German Christianity crystallised around the trial of Martin Niemöller, de facto leader of Confessing Christian defiance in the Third Reich, in February 1938. The ecumenical vision of the Anglican church unsurprisingly ensured that Niemöller's trial impacted particularly heavily on her laity and clergy, who followed the trial with great interest,[2] captivated by their 'brethren in adversity'. It was the arresting image of Niemöller and the struggle he represented that formed the basis of the Anglican understanding of the Third Reich.[3]

The primary purpose of this chapter is to explore this preoccupation with Martin Niemöller and the *Kirchenkampf* and its impact on understandings of Nazism in Britain in the 1930s. Yet the chapter also has a wider function. Despite an ambiguous relationship with Nazi ideology, Martin Niemöller holds a pre-eminent place in the post-war pantheon of anti-Nazi heroes. His position as prime strategist in the resistant Confessing Church

---

[1] Norman Finkelstein, *The Holocaust Industry*, (New York, 2000) - Finkelstein's observations on the dominance of the Holocaust in contemporary public discourse are crass, nonetheless he does raise interesting questions regarding the use of the Holocaust in popular culture and education, and in the formation of contemporary morality. See also Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life*, (New York, 1999).

[2] An observation recorded in Blauenfeld to Bell, 5 February 1938, Bell Papers, Lambeth Palace Library, Vol.10, f.40 - Blauenfeld was the President of the administrative committee of the ecumenical Life and Work organisation.

[3] Andrew Chandler, *Brethren in Adversity: Bishop George Bell, the Church of England and the Crisis of German Protestantism, 1933-39*, (London, 1997).

during the Third Reich has ensured his universal acclamation as an 'anti Nazi champion',[4] as the 'heartening spectacle of Nazism defied; the splendid image of a Christian conscience unbowed before a cruel and soulless tyranny'.[5] This celebration of Niemöller as the primary dissident in the Third Reich, a twentieth century saint has, conversant with the demands of post Holocaust morality, often involved the recasting of his protest within some historiography as a defence of Germany's Jews.[6] Popularly and historiographically Niemöller's protest has become symbolic of the wider conflict between Nazism and the values of 'civilisation',[7] between the devilish Hitler and the saintly Niemöller, who was by implication of contemporary understanding of National Socialism, defending the Jews. Consequently this chapter will attempt to review this image of Martin Niemöller, which the Anglican church of the 1930s helped to mould, asking how it has developed despite Niemöller's paradoxical relationship with the Nazi state. In so doing this investigation will both illuminate the development of Anglican perceptions of Nazism in the 1930s, and beyond this, the impact of these perceptions, as articulated through the analysis of Niemöller, on historical understanding of the Nazi state and the Holocaust.

The chapter will begin with a brief investigation of Anglican engagement with Nazism in the first years of the Third Reich, and the Anglican representation of the *Kirchenkampf* and the image of Niemöller. These images of the heroic Niemöller will then be contrasted with an historical analysis of Christian protest against the Nazi state, which will note the ambiguity of his resistance. The implications of the ambiguous Niemöller for the Anglican understanding of the *Kirchenkampf* will be considered, and it shall be argued that Anglican portrayals of Niemöller as hero *did* actually accommodate the contradictions of his relationship with Nazism. Significantly this Anglican ability to circumvent the complexity of Niemöller's protest rested on an understanding of Nazism which pre-emptively regarded the German dictatorship as, along with the Soviet Union, a manifestation of a wider totalitarian movement. It will be suggested that such a view has

[4] Robert Michael, 'Theological Myth, German anti-Semitism and the Holocaust: the case of Martin Niemöller' in *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, (Vol.2, No.1, 1987), p.105.
[5] Chandler, *Brethren in Adversity*, p. 23.
[6] James Bentley, *Martin Niemöller: 1892-1984*, (New York, 1984), p.67.
[7] Daphne Hampson, 'The British Response to the German Church Struggle', D.Phil. Thesis, Oxford, 1973, p.306.

had a profound impact on the manner in which Nazism has been understood historically, and further complicates our understanding of the development of historical conceptions of Nazism after the end of the war.

1.1 Martin Niemöller: An Anglican Hero.

As for much of Britain, the appointment of Adolf Hitler at the helm of a new German government in 1933 inspired a limited concern in the Anglican community. Although such anxiety was originally tempered by the suggestion that Hitler was shackled by his conservative coalition partners, [8] by the end of 1933 members of the episcopate and the Anglican community as a whole had engaged publicly, and privately, with the new German government, and indeed with their treatment of the Jews. The suffering of the Jews dominated Anglican engagement with the new Nazi government and their march to dictatorship in 1933, but by the end of that year it was the general subject of the concentration camps and the sufferings of German protestants which preoccupied Anglican commentators.[9] Ecclesiastical press reporting of the new German government in February, March, and April 1933 focused mainly on anti-Jewish action,[10] however in the latter period of 1933 the press was focussed intently on the progress of German dictatorship. Anglican interest in the Reichstag Fire trial was for example incessant, as the trial and suggestions of manipulative Nazi control in the apparent framing of Marius van der Lubbe were portrayed as representative of the new German repression, which was compared directly with Fascist Italy.[11]

Public Episcopal comment on the new German government reflected a similar development of concern to that in evidence in the ecclesiastical press. Archbishop Lang

---

[8] See for example *The Guardian*, 3 February 1933, p. 67 – in which Hitler is described as being 'imprisoned' in a responsible conservative coalition.

[9] As an example of the shifting focus of Anglican interest in the Third Reich see *The Guardian* throughout 1933. Although originally Nazism was seen as primarily anti-Jewish, by the end of the year anti-Jewishness is just proposed as an example of the Nazis' repressive control tendencies. See *The Guardian* 20 October 1933, p. 719, and 29 December 1933, p. 903 for the beginnings of a tendency to represent Nazism through the treatment of the German churches.

[10] See *The Guardian*, 31 March 1933, p. 215, 7 April 1933, p. 246, and 28 April 1933, p. 291, for examples of representations of Nazism where anti-Jewishness is at the forefront.

[11] See *The Guardian*, 3 November 1933, p. 751 for a report on the fire and the subsequent trial which suggested that this was an indicator of the new style of government in Germany.

protested publicly in the House of Lords against the boycott of Jewish shops in April of 1933,[12] but his counterpart at York, William Temple, later set in motion a letter writing campaign against the perceived generalised brutality of the Concentration Camps as opposed to the particular privations of the Jewish community.[13] Whatever the focus of Anglican protests in the first months of the Hitler dictatorship, they there were all similarly limited. The Anglican position as the established church dictated constant consideration of the perceived diplomatic effects of their protesting against the actions of a sovereign foreign power. The Anglican church perceived itself as, and more importantly believed that others regarded it as, the official moral conscience of the British nation, and as such she often behaved as a branch of the state.[14] Before Cosmo Lang could publicly articulate concern over anti-Jewish measures in 1933 for example, he was involved in countless meetings with the Foreign Office to discuss the possible ramifications of his protest;[15] and William Temple's protest over Nazi brutality was hampered by continual procrastination while the diplomatic impact of protest from the Archbishop of York was assessed.[16]

From the beginning of 1934 the Church became *institutionally* engaged with the emerging conflict between the Protestant churches and the Nazi state. Press reporting on the privations of Germany's Christian community far outweighed that attesting to Jewish suffering,[17] and representative bodies formally articulated the church's concern from June

---

[12] See Andrew Chandler, 'A Question of Fundamental Principles: the Church of England and the Jews of Germany 1933-37', in *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook*, (1993), p. 234.

[13] For Temple's letters of protest regarding the Concentration Camps see Temple Papers, Lambeth Palace Library, Vol. 25, ff. 7-94. Temple attempted to organise a letter to be sent to Hitler, signed by notable British figures concerned with Germany. Other signatories were to include J.M. Keynes and G.M. Trevelyan. See also Alan M. Suggate, *William Temple and Christian and Social Ethics Today*, (Edinburgh 1987), p. 174.

[14] Adrian Hastings, *A History of English Christianity*, (London, 1986), pp. 252-58.

[15] For Lang's prevarication see Tony Kushner, *The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination*, (Oxford, 1994), p. 149, and for a contemporary observation of Canterbury's concern for 'diplomacy' in the response to the Nazi campaign against the Jews see Samuel Rich Diaries, 30 March & 18 April 1933, MS 168/AJ217/30, Southampton University Archives.

[16] For example Temple wrote to George Bell seeking reassurances about the possible ramifications of his leading a protest against the Nazi concentration camps, see Temple to Bell, 3 March 1934, Temple Papers, Vol. 25, f. 8.

[17] Richard Griffiths, *Fellow Travellers of the Right: British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany 1933-39*, (Oxford, 1983), p. 251.

1934 in official debate.[18] George Bell's refugee organisation the *Church of England Committee for Non-Aryan Christians*, campaigned exclusively for 'non Aryan Christians', arguing that Jews had no need of Anglican support.[19] There was sporadic Anglican engagement with the subject of Nazi antisemitism, for example the Bishop of Durham's suggestion that Christianity must bear its share of responsibility for the development of racially based anti-Jewish prejudice, made in the Church Assembly in 1935.[20] But, engagement with the problems facing the German churches was consistent. The ecclesiastical press disseminated the publicly available information regarding the *Kirchenkampf* during the period after 1934, while the institutional church received constant reports on the situation of the German Protestant churches via the Anglican Council for Foreign Relations and in the later 1930s the German Church committee.[21]

In July of 1937, concern for the German Protestant church reached fever pitch as Martin Niemöller was arrested on charges of agitating politically against the authorities in the Third Reich.[22] In Britain, news of Niemöller's incarceration was greeted with outrage by the secular and religious press.[23] Niemöller was tried behind closed doors, between January and March 1938, and despite the secrecy surrounding the hearing, British press interest in the case was maintained. Niemöller was effectively acquitted of his charges, but was subsequently re-arrested by the Gestapo. This apparently arbitrary incarceration drew vigorous condemnation in Britain, particularly from the Anglican episcopate, who celebrated their growing hero Niemöller in equal measure, as a defender of Christianity itself. Hensley Henson, Bishop of Durham, described Niemöller as one of the 'leading

---

[18] *Chronicle of Convocation*, Vol. XLV, pp. 283-96, 7 June 1934. The debate concluded that the Nazi state, because of its treatment of 'revelation, race and the [relationship between church and] state' left the 'Christian faith imperilled'.

[19] R.C.D. Jasper, *George Bell: Bishop of Chichester*, (London, 1967). p. 146.

[20] For example Henson berated the Church Assembly in 1935 as to the dangers of Nazi antisemitism, and suggested that Christianity had to bear some responsibility for the development of that antisemitism. See *Church Assembly Report of Proceedings* (1935, Vol. XVI), p.464 - cited in Richard Gutteridge, 'The Churches and the Jews in England, 1933-45' in Otto Dov Kulka & Paul Mendes Flohr (eds), *Judaism and Christianity Under the Impact of National Socialism*, (Jerusalem, 1987), p. 357.

[21] Chandler, *Brethren in Adversity*, p. 14.

[22] For an account of Niemöller's arrest and trial see Bentley, *Niemöller*, pp. 131-43. See also Dietmar Schmidt, *Pastor Niemöller*, (London, 1959), pp. 101-130.

[23] See *The Times*, 2 July 1937, p.10.

spirits of the resistance' in Nazi Germany[24] and George Bell wrote of Niemöller's defence not of his church but of 'Christian ethics'.[25] A *Times* editorial praised Niemöller for having 'never compromised his conscience',[26] while the Dean of Chichester, Arthur Duncan Jones, portrayed Niemöller and Hitler as implacable foes 'struggling for the soul of Germany...the forces of ruthless domination which fears neither God nor man, [ranged against] the forces of a fearless Christian faith'.[27]

Following his incarceration in Sachsenhausen, representations of Niemöller found him symbolic of all Nazism's victims; and it was suggested that his protest against the state amounted to a universal defence of those victims. Sachsenhausen, along with Dachau, had symbolic meaning for British observers of Germany, as the concentration camps were portrayed as the representative institutions of Nazism.[28] As the most high profile victim of these iniquitous establishments Niemöller's image carried the weight of that symbolism, as he became represented as Nazism's primary, and universal, victim. George Bell for example created an image of Martin Niemöller as representative of all those who had fallen foul of Nazi ideology and control. Bell attempted to establish a 'prayer guild' for Niemöller and his 'fellow sufferers in Germany and Austria', the guild was designed for 'Christians who feel God calls them to prayer for Martin Niemöller and *those who are persecuted for their faith and their race*'[my italics].[29] Bell's characterisation of his Lutheran friend as defender of the persecuted in Germany, and victim of the same ideological conviction as the Jews, would continue throughout the 1930s and into the war. In a sermon preached on the occasion of Niemöller's fiftieth birthday Bell suggested that the basis of Niemöller's opposition to the Hitler regime was in his rejection of 'race worship', and that he embodied the very opposite principles to those for which Hitler stood.[30]

---

[24] Henson to *The Times*, 2 July 1937.
[25] Bell to *The Times*, 3 July 1937.
[26] *The Times*, 3 March 1938.
[27] A.S. Duncan Jones, 'Introduction', to Martin Niemöller, *From U-Boat to Concentration Camp: The Autobiography of Martin Niemöller with his Further Story by the Dean of Chichester*, (London, 1939), cited in Hampson, 'The British Response', p.302.
[28] Andrew Sharf, *The British Press and the Jews Under Nazi Rule*, (London, 1964), pp. 80-84.
[29] Bell to McCormick, 12 August 1938, BP, Vol.10, f.129-30.
[30] Draft Copy of Bell's Sermon for 13 January 1942. BP, Vol.10, ff.284-90.

The Anglican portrayal of Martin Niemöller was unambiguous. Following his arrest and trial he also became symbolic of all resistance to Hitler's Germany,[31] which it was accordingly suggested came only from the churches.[32] By elevating Martin Niemöller to the status of primary victim of the Nazi regime, representations of his Christian dissent also implied that the defining feature of Nazism lay in its opposition to Christianity. Dorothy Buxton,[33] for example, identified a Nazi 'war of extermination' against the Churches, suggesting that Nazism was effectively a 'war against Christian theology' and that Martin Niemöller was a casualty of that conflict.[34] Britain was then presented with a Niemöller who stood tall against the sinister forces of repression in an authoritarian Germany, something at root explicable by the identification of Nazism as the antithesis of Christianity.[35]

Dissemination of this image of the Dahlem pastor as hero was not confined to either Britain or the Church of England in 1938. The *Kirchenkampf* dominated news from Germany, and for secular commentators everywhere Niemöller was a 'martyr' the like of which were 'too scarce'.[36] For dissenting exiled Germans too, Niemöller became symbolic of an 'other German' spirit, his incarceration indicative of Nazi cruelty. German refugee playwright Ernst Toller's *Pastor Hall* was based on the life, and importantly

---

[31] Keith Robbins, 'Martin Niemöller, the German Church Struggle and English Opinion', in *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, (Vol. XXI, No. 2, April 1970), p. 167.

[32] The Berlin correspondent of *The Times* for example reported that the 'only resistance' in Nazi Germany 'came from the Churches'. *The Times*, 3 July 1937, p. 14.

[33] Dorothy Buxton was an extraordinarily active lay member of the Anglican church who had the ear of the episcopate. The files of George Bell and William Temple at Lambeth Palace are full of correspondence with her. Consistent in her interest in the affairs of continental Europe, which was facilitated by her marriage to Charles Buxton – Chairman of the Labour Party Foreign Affairs Advisory Committee – Buxton worked tirelessly to promote the sufferings of the 'non-Aryan' Christians in Germany. See Keith Robbins, 'Church and Politics: Dorothy Buxton and the German Church Struggle' in Derek Baker (ed), *Church, Society and Politics*, (Oxford, 1975), pp. 419-433.

[34] Dorothy Buxton, *The Church Struggle in Germany: A Survey of Four Crucial Years by an English Christian*, (London, 1937), p. 6.

[35] See Dorothy Buxton's introduction to *Christendom on Trial: Documents of the German Church Struggle*, published in the Friends of Europe series. The publication date of the pamphlet is unclear, for a copy see the Papers of Charles Singer, MS 94, Parkes Papers, 29/3/4, Southampton University Archives.

[36] Oswald Garrison Villard, *Inside Germany*, (London, 1939), p. 56. Villard's reflections on Germany were published in the *Daily Telegraph* and broadcast to Germany on the BBC in November 1939. Villard's lament on Niemöller's scarcity was extremely brief and as such relied on his meaning as symbol. Praise for Niemöller was combined with comparison between Germany and the Soviet Union, 'elemental forces' that were 'exactly akin'.

imprisonment of Martin Niemöller.[37] Toller offered an interpretation similar to the Anglican suggestion of the eternal opposition between Christianity and Nazism through his imaginative reconstruction of Niemöller. Toller's hero Hall (Niemöller's alias), 'defend[ed] the teaching of Christ against His opponents', while other institutions capitulated in the face of Nazi domination.[38] Niemöller's heroism and inspiration was not even confined to the European imagination. Niemöller was a hero of the Protestant American press from 1935 onwards,[39] and even became the subject of a cinematic attempt to convey the brutality of the Nazi regime when the Boulting brothers selected Toller's play as the basis for their first feature film.[40] Heavily censored in its original American release, the film version of Niemöller's fictional life prompted Eleanor Roosevelt's praise for *Pastor Hall*, and therefore Niemöller, as representing the 'the story of all men who love freedom and justice so deeply that they are prepared to live eternally for their convictions.' 'In such men' Roosevelt argued 'is the common hope of humanity.'[41] An American biographer echoed such an analysis of Niemöller's significance by allowing the Dahlem pastor to stand as representative of all men, declaring that Christ 'gave his life so that Martin Niemöller, U-Boat Captain, dynamic preacher, concentration camp prisoner, might live'.[42] Such universalisation also reflected the interpretation of Niemöller's significance by his confessional supporters. The ecumenical publicity campaign waged on Niemöller's behalf urged that his was not a parochial cause but the 'common, immediate concern of every Christian'.[43]

Throughout Anglican and non Anglican representations of Niemöller then, he was depicted as the defender of universal Christian values against Nazism, which was in turn portrayed as the antithesis of these values and therefore the common enemy of humanity. Indeed such was the success of this process of universalising Niemöller as anti-Nazi icon,

---

[37] Ernst Toller, *Pastor Hall: A Play in Three Acts*, (London, 1939).
[38] *Ibid.*, p.30.
[39] Robert Ross, 'Martin Niemöller: An American Hero', in Hubert Locke and Marcia Sachs Littell (eds), *Remembrance and Recollections: Essays on the Centennial Year of Martin Niemöller and Reinhold Niebuhr and the Fiftieth Year of the Wannsee Conference*, (Lanham, 1996), p. 29.
[40] *Pastor Hall* Directors John & Roy Boulting, (London, 1940)
[41] Cited on *http://www.milestonefilms.com/blurb/Fpastor.html* - March 2000
[42] Basil Miller, *Martin Niemöller: Hero of the Concentration Camp*, (Grand Rapids, Michigan. 1942), p. 160.

his image was selected as an appropriate symbol of Nazi persecution for British war propaganda after September 1939. A white paper of 1939 proposed using 'Aryan' victims of Nazism like Niemöller, precisely because he met with the well documented British desire to avoid the association of their war effort with a defence of Europe's Jews.[44] Yet even a cursory examination of the reality of Martin Niemöller's protest challenges both his suitability as symbolic of all Nazism's victims, and his status as unambiguous resistor to the Nazi regime. This leads us to questions regarding the nature of his protest and the manner in which the actuality of that protest interacted with the image of Niemöller, as the unambiguous hero, presented by the Anglican church and others. Were the contradictions between image and reality the result of ignorance and misunderstanding on behalf of those who constructed the symbolic Niemöller? In order to investigate this central question further, and to further analyse how the understanding of Niemöller impacted upon perceptions of the Nazi state as a whole, we first must consider the nature of Niemöller's relationship with National Socialism and authority in the Third Reich.

1.2 Martin Niemöller and the Nazi State: A Contradictory Relationship.

Like many German Protestants Niemöller was, at the advent of the Third Reich, attracted to the new regime.[45] Although institutionally and doctrinally diverse German Protestantism[46] was in 1933, broadly conservative and, through its Lutheran heritage[47] of

---

[43] Klaus Hildebrandt, *Pastor Niemöller and his Creed*, (London, 1939), p.11.

[44] Roberts to Stevens 16 Oct 1939 PRO FO 371/23105 C16788 cited in Tony Kushner, 'Different Worlds: British Perceptions of the Final Solution During the Second World War', in D. Cesarani (ed.), *The Final Solution: Origins and Implementation*, (London, 1992), p.250. See also the Introduction to this thesis for a discussion of the context of British government responses to the Nazi campaign against the Jews.

[45] Doris L. Bergen, 'Between God and Hitler: German Military Chaplains and the Crimes of the Third Reich', in Omer Bartov and Phyllis Mack (eds), *In God's Name: Religion and Genocide in the Twentieth Century*, (Oxford, 2001), p. 128. See also J.R.C. Wright, *Above Parties: The Political Attitudes of the German Protestant Church Leadership: 1918-1933*, (Oxford, 1974), p. 110. Wright places emphasis on the tension between ecclesiastical and secular visions of the relationship between church and state, rather than the uniformity of their secular political outlook.

[46] At this point German Protestantism was in no way unified, and indeed reflected the federalism of the 1871 German constitution as each state had its own, at times theologically distinctive, Protestant church. See Andrew Chandler (ed.), *The Moral Imperative: New Essays on the Ethics of Resistance in National Socialist Germany*, (Boulder, 1998), p. 5.

[47] The author is aware that assumptions such as these are somewhat ahistorical and that Luther's teaching is obviously more ambiguous than implied here. For an investigation of Luther's political theology see - M.U. Edwards, *Luther's Last Battles: Politics and Polemics 1531-46*, (New York, 1983), Jared Wicks, *Luther*

a doctrinal commitment to the two kingdoms of 'throne and altar' and attendant abdication of political participation, susceptible to the siren calls of political authoritarianism. German Protestants commonly welcomed Hitler's defence of the fatherland against the degeneracy of the Weimar Years,[48] and consequently Protestant attraction to Nazism has been commonly explained by the National Socialist commitment to 'positive Christianity'[49] which appeared to promise German Protestants the restoration of links between church and state after the secular constitution of the Weimar era.[50]

Martin Niemöller was one of the most vociferous Protestant supporters of Hitler, and clues as to the intellectual basis of, and motivations for, this support are discernible with reference to his biography. Serving in the German Navy, Niemöller had risen to the rank of U-boat captain during the Great War, a conflict which he later interpreted as the defining period of his life.[51] Niemöller's war was short on pity, and long on 'adventure', and its end brought devastation for him.[52] Spurred by his sense of a 'warrior's duty',[53] Niemöller fought till the bitter end and was left devastated by the unwillingness of those around him to follow suit. The new, republican, Germany was a desolate place for the 'nationally minded'[54] Martin Niemöller in the aftermath of war. A 'stranger in his own country'; he briefly flirted with the idea of farming in Argentina before finding solace in

---

and his Spiritual Legacy, (Wilmington, 1983).

[48] For example Otto Dibelius, superintendent of Berlin and future leading member of mainstream Protestant opposition to German Christian theology, hailed the opening of the new parliament in March of 1933 as offering a return to 'rul[e] in God's name' against 'those who bury the foundations of state order, above all against those who destroy honour with vituperative and cruel words that scorn faith, [and] vilify death for the Fatherland'. Cited in Victoria Barnett, *For the Soul of the People: Protestant Protest Against Hitler*, (New York, 1992), p. 28.

[49] See point 24 of the programme of the National Socialist German Workers Party, Doc. 3, Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, *Nazism 1919-45: Vol. 1, The Rise to Power 1919-34: a Documentary Reader*, (Exeter, 1983), p. 16.

[50] James Bentley, 'British and German High Churchmen in the Struggle Against Hitler' in *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* (1972), pp. 233-50. It would be a misrepresentation to imply that the Weimar state had been entirely secular. The constitution indeed theoretically denied the existence of a 'state church', but in practice the legislation to affirm this secularity was never put in place. As such on a practical level the Protestant evangelical church in Weimar Germany still levied a compulsory church tax, despite this being contrary to the constitutional spirit of the state.

[51] For example Niemöller wrote that he 'was one of those who unconsciously found their true selves during the Great war'. Niemöller, *From U-Boat to Concentration Camp*, p.7.

[52] *Ibid.*, p.74, see also p. 59 for a remarkable account of a battle which is depicted in almost comic book style.

[53] *Ibid.*, p.132

[54] *Ibid.*, p.159

the battle against the 'hell of communism' and assuming the command of a Freikorps battalion and continuing his defence of the Fatherland.[55] Yet this struggle against (and this is rather familiar rhetoric to students of Nazism) 'the suicidal orgy of internal strife [that had been] the great crime of 1918'[56] did not occupy Niemöller permanently. After another disappointing failure to succeed in farming, a little closer to home than South America, and despite all his hopes for the future 'rebirth of Germany [being] founded on a healthy free and pious peasantry',[57] Niemöller finally settled on a career in the metropolitan church. After training at a conservative seminary in Münster he was able to describe this rather tortuous transition from the military to the ministry as a natural one, owing to the fact that the 'foundations' of both German Protestantism and the military ethic were 'an unwavering support for state authority'.[58]

The 'myth' of Martin Niemöller's 'war experience'[59] dictated his political affiliations in the subsequent Weimar republic. The 'crime of 1918' had shattered the mythical 'community of faith', encapsulated in the cheering crowds at the outbreak of war, and spawned a state tainted by, and accepting of, a defeat which Niemöller had perceived as humiliating for both himself and his beloved German nation. Such bitterness and resentment drove Niemöller in common with general trends within German Protestantism, to embrace nationalist politics and violence in the Weimar republic, and his membership of the Freikorps could in part be explained as an attempt to recapture the masculine spirit of the U-boat. Nazism then inevitably appealed to the young Niemöller, who began to support Hitler through the ballot box in 1931. Niemöller 'avidly read' *Mein Kampf*, and again supported National Socialism in the last free elections in 1933

[55] *Ibid.*, p.193. For analysis of the Freikorps movement see Robert Waite, *Vanguard of Nazism: The Free Corps Movement in Post-war Germany*, (New York, 1969).
[56] *Ibid.*, p.148
[57] *Ibid.*, p.168
[58] Barnett, *For the Soul of the People*, p.2
[59] George Mosse, 'Two World Wars and the Myth of the War Experience', in *Journal of Contemporary History* (Vol.21, 1986), pp. 491-513 – Mosse's comparison of the political cultures emerging from the two wars highlights the development of myths of regeneration that pervaded both the left and right of German politics in the early Weimar era.

testifying to feeling 'a kind of liberation when Hitler came'[60] promising a return to the national community of 1914.[61]

Despite an undoubted enthusiasm for the new Germany in 1933, Niemöller was, along with large swathes of Protestant clergy, soon drawn into conflict with the regime he had welcomed. Ironically friction emerged over Nazi attempts to alter the relationship between state and church and unify the diverse Protestant churches under a single Reich Bishop. Discord did not centre around the issue of the unified church and the Reich Bishop *per se*, but over Hitler's decision to personally endorse one of the candidates for the position. Ludwig Müller,[62] who represented an emerging group of Christian Nazis, known as *Deutsche-Christen* or German Christians, received the public support of the German chancellor.

Protestant attraction to Nazism had, in part, articulated a desire for a state that acknowledged the existence of the Protestant churches, and indeed their role at the centre of German national life.[63] Yet the majority theological position within the churches remained equally committed to the independence of the two entities of state and church. Although independent of one another, the historic mission of state and church were envisioned to be interdependent and committed to the maintenance of personal freedoms in order to ensure the closest proximity of the individual to God.[64] The German-Christians and Müller, however, accepted 1933 as a moment of revelation and therefore essentially that the new state was divine. Formed in 1932 as a direct Christian auxiliary to the Nazi party and the logical fulfilment of the commitment to positive Christianity, the German-Christians celebrated the new German state and sought to de-judaise Christianity by removing references to its Jewish heritage, most notably of course the entire Old

---

[60] Bentley, *Niemöller*, p.43

[61] See Peter Fritszche, *Germans into Nazis*, (Cambridge, Mass. 1998) for an interesting discussion of the role of the war, and the enthusiasm for the community of war time as causal factor in Germans' essentially nostalgic support for Hitler.

[62] Müller was an army chaplain in 1933, and a personal friend of Adolf Hitler.

[63] For a brief analysis of the development of German Protestant thought and the essential unity of conceptions of the state despite the variety of theological developments since the reformation see Alastair Mcgrath (ed), *The Encyclopaedia of Modern Christian Thought*, (Oxford, 1993), pp. 489-510.

[64] See John Conway, 'The Political Theology of Martin Niemöller' in *German Studies Review*, (Vol. 9, No. 9, 1986), pp. 521-46, in which Conway discusses how Niemöller justified the subversion of the state within his theological conviction of the centrality of that state.

Testament.[65] Their attempt to design a new distinctively *German* theology in which God was perceived incarnate in the new *German* state, came close, for Martin Niemöller and the opponents of the *Deutsche-Christen*, to the doctrinal indulgences that the Reformation had originally reacted against. The elevation of the state and the concomitant denial of the validity of scriptural revelation appeared to place a barrier between the individual and God.

Friedrich von Bodelschwingh[66] stood in opposition to Müller, and represented the evangelical alternative for whom *Deutsche-Christen* incarnate theology was anathema. Hitler's decision to endorse Müller, who recognised the preordained mission of the Führer, then foisted opposition to the state's favoured candidate, and therefore the state itself, upon Niemöller and Bodelschwingh's other supporters. Hitler had effectively rejected the traditional Evangelical view of the relationship between state and church. His intervention, which proved decisive, politicised theological discord in the German Protestant churches and forced Bodelschwingh, despite an earlier endorsement, to resign. Müller was duly elected the first *Reichbischof* in September 1933.[67]

Intervention in the Reich Church elections was only the first Nazi attempt to co-ordinate German Protestantism within a wider process of *Gleichschaltung*. On 5 September 1933, simultaneous to the acclamation of Müller as head of the new unified church, the Prussian synod passed a resolution applying the 'Aryan paragraph' of the new civil service legislation to the church, and therefore denied the right of Jewish converts to Christianity to practise the ministry.[68] Whilst legislation had minimal practical impact (there were very few 'non-Aryan Christian' pastors) the church's adoption of the 'Aryan Paragraph' amounted to a racial redefinition of the Kingdom of God echoing the

---

[65] Doris Bergen, *The Twisted Cross: The German Christian Movement in the Third Reich*, (Chapel Hill, 1996), and for a specific discussion of the theology and theological perversion of the *Deutsche-Christen* see Susanne Heschel, 'When Jesus was an Aryan: The Protestant Church and Antisemitic Propaganda', in Bartov and Mack, *In God's Name*, pp. 79-105.

[66] Bodelschwingh was famous for his social work as he led the community at Bethel for the disabled.

[67] For a brief narrative of the elections see Bergen, *Twisted Cross*, pp. 5-6. See also Ernst Christian Helmreich, *The German Churches Under Hitler: Background, Struggle and Epilogue*, (Detroit, 1979), pp. 133-56.

[68] See the 'Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service', 7 April 1933, Doc. 151, in Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, *Nazism Vol 2: State, Economy and Society 1933-1939*, (Exeter, 1984), pp. 29-13.

redefinition of secular society. Such state intervention in the community of the Church challenged the central tenets of Christian doctrine by biologically defining who could or could not be regarded as Christian. For the non German-Christian majority the 'Aryan Paragraph' questioned not only the divinity of ordination, but extrapolating from this, the idea that the proselytising church could offer salvation to all through the sacrament of Baptism. Similar to objections to German Christian redefinition of the relationship between the church and state, the Aryan Paragraph provoked the objections of Niemöller and others because it placed barriers between the individual and salvation.[69]

Consequently on 21 September 1933, in response to the adoption of the 'Aryan Paragraph' Niemöller formed the Pastor's Emergency League (PEL), the kernel of ecclesiastical opposition to Hitler, which was to become the Confessing Church – the central dissenting Christian organisation in the Third Reich. Those joining the league, having been called to protest by Niemöller's invocation of Matthew xxviii,[70] were instructed to make a solemn undertaking 'to acknowledge the binding authority of the Holy Scripture' which the 'Aryan paragraph' appeared to challenge.[71] The essence of Confessing church protest against the imposition of the Aryan paragraph was then theological, in defence of baptism, and *not* a political attack on the Nazi regime, nor a defence of 'non-Aryans' or Jews. In an effort to emphasise that protest was indeed apolitical, Niemöller's call to arms also included a pledge of allegiance to Hitler which greeted 'this decisive hour for Volk and Fatherland' with 'thanks' to 'the Führer...for the manly deed and clear word which preserve Germany's honour.' Niemöller then required that anyone following him 'solemnly pledge [their] true allegiance and prayerful solitude.'[72]

---

[69] For a narrative of the passage of the Aryan Paragraph see Wolfgang Gerlach, *And the Witnesses were Silent: The Persecution of the Jews*, (Lincoln, Nebraska. 2000), pp. 8-96. See also Richard Gutteridge, *Open thy Mouth for the Dumb! The German Evangelical Church and the Jews 1879-1950*, (Oxford, 1976), pp. 91-152.

[70] Which reads 'go ye out therefore and teach all nations, baptising them in the name of the father and of the son and of the holy Ghost', Memo from George Bell to the Church of England Council for Foreign Relations in which Bell reports on a visit to Berlin 28 January – 1 February 1937 in Chandler, *Brethren in Adversity*, p.123

[71] Gutteridge, *Open thy Mouth for the Dumb*, p. 99.

[72] Cited in Wolfgang Gerlach, 'From Pirate on the High Seas to Angel of Peace: Submarine Commander, "Freikorps" Officer, Pastor, Hitler Opponent, Concentration Camp Prisoner, Conscience of the Nation' in

Niemöller's pledge of allegiance indicated the genuine anomaly of his, and ecclesiastical protest in general, during the Third Reich: that it coexisted with genuine enthusiasm for the new political era and the defence of 'Germany's honour'. As a Confessing Church pastor suggested to an Anglican observer of the church struggle in July 1933, his objection to the Aryan Paragraph and Hitler's intervention in the church elections was an expression of belief in the 'spiritual independence of the church', and did *not* temper his 'whole hearted support' for Hitler.[73] In fact, Confessing church, and therefore Martin Niemöller's, endorsement of the Nazi regime in the early years of the Third Reich included approval of measures aimed against the Jews. Some German Protestants, who would later be cast as dissidents, for example, welcomed the April 1 1933 boycott of Jewish shops,[74] while later racial definitions of German secular society such as the Nuremberg Laws drew no condemnation from apparently dissenting churches.[75] Yet the Confessing Church, and Martin Niemöller specifically have been portrayed as defenders of Germany's persecuted Jews, through their narcissistic objections to the 'Aryan Paragraph'. Martin Niemöller was contemporarily represented as a defender of the persecuted in Germany, while historians have identified the essential similarity of the sufferings of Christians and Jews in the Third Reich.[76] How then is it possible to characterise the Confessing Church's, and specifically Martin Niemöller's relationship with the Jews and the dominant language of the Third Reich, in order to provide context for the analysis of the development and presentation of his image?

By his own testimony Martin Niemöller was raised in an antisemitic household. His father, Heinrich Niemöller, was a close follower of Adolf Stöcker the founder of German political antisemitism.[77] Rhetorical and racially tinged descriptions of the Jew as

---

Locke & Littell *Remembrance and Recollection*. p. 45.

[73] From an interview with an anonymous pastor quoted by A.S. Duncan-Jones in a memo prepared for the Church of England Council for Foreign Relations, 26 July 1933. This document is reprinted in Chandler, *Brethren in Adversity*, pp. 16-19.

[74] Barnett, *For the Soul of the People*, p.35.

[75] Gutteridge, *Open Thy Mouth*, p. 153.

[76] See for example Gutteridge, *Open Thy Mouth*, p. 298, and Uriel Tal, 'Introduction', in J.M. Snoek, *The Grey Book: A Collection of Protests Against Anti-Semitism and the Persecution of the Jews Issued by Non-Roman Catholic Churches and Church Leaders During Hitler's Rule*, (Assen, 1969), p. ii.

[77] See P. Pulzer, *The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria*, (New York, 1964), for a discussion of Christian *political* antisemitism in Imperial Germany and pp. 83-97 in particular for an

'aliendrops of blood in our people's body' helped provide an image of Jewry as an 'abstract collective entity', and defined the Jew as other for the young Niemöller.[78] As Niemöller later reflected on the implications of his father's politics for his childhood: 'for the most part the Protestant religion and German nationalism went hand in hand in the household of Heinrich and Paula Niemöller.' He remembered in a chillingly familiar rhetoric, 'a person who was not either a Protestant or a catholic...didn't belong to human society'.[79]

Niemöller's definition of human society appeared to exclude Germany's Jews, and he continually flirted with racially tinged antisemitism in public pronouncements made during the Third Reich. Indeed such was the linguistic ferocity of some of Niemöller's attacks on the 'wandering eternal Jew'[80] that some historians have located him simply within the dominant culture of antisemitism.[81] But Niemöller's relationship with the Jews was far too ambiguous to simply be labelled 'Nazi'. In literally the same sermons and addresses Niemöller could combine ferocity towards the Jews with sympathy for their plight. At the Prussian synod in September of 1935, just after the passage of the Nuremberg decrees, Niemöller appeared to go beyond his ecclesiastical objections to the Aryan paragraph and challenged the moral justice of legislative discrimination against the Jews. In fact Niemöller directly criticised the self interest of Confessing Church protest when he expressed unhappiness at the failure of the synod to debate the 'Jewish Question' beyond the simple assertion of the power of Baptism. Yet Niemöller then tempered his assertions on behalf of the Jews by stating that the 'German people...had suffered much under the[ir] influence'. He acknowledged that to have been cast as champion of their cause by objecting to the Aryan paragraph, and declaring the power of baptism, required genuine 'self denial' on his part. As such, in the same speech

---

analysis of Stöcker.

[78] Gutteridge, *Open Thy Mouth*, pp. 9-12.

[79] Bentley, *Niemöller*, p.2-3.

[80] A quotation from a sermon delivered by Niemöller on 25 August 1935, and quoted in Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust*, (New York, 1996), p.112.

[81] Most notably by Daniel Goldhagen, see Goldhagen, *Hitler's*, pp. 112-15, p.433, and in notes on pp. 506-7. See also John Weiss, *Ideology of Death: Why the Holocaust Happened in Germany*, (Chicago, 1996), pp. 225-26, Weiss is content to label Niemöller as simply 'pro-Nazi'.

Niemöller both attacked anti-Jewish legislation, and echoed the assumptions underpinning that legislation by conforming to its linguistic and conceptual base.[82] Niemöller's antisemitism was, apparently, a discourse inseparable and distinct from Nazi characterisations of the Jew, which counselled against the use of violence, and perhaps even legislation against an already defined sworn enemy other, whom he often defined with familiar linguistic savagery.[83]

Despite the ambiguity and ambivalence of Niemöller's attitude to the Nazi state, and particularly its anti-Jewish mission, he was ultimately arrested for active political agitation against that state. Although his protest was apolitical, concerned only with the ecclesiastical independence of the church, his activities such as the public condemnation of both the Aryan paragraph and the attempted co-ordination of the Protestant churches, were deemed political by the authorities. As Karl Barth noted contemporaneously 'in the totalitarian state, *any* real assertion of the first commandment, *any* assertion of the freedom and sovereignty of the Gospel, *any* activity incidental to a proper and independent life of the church is bound to be given the character of political rebellion.'[84] Niemöller was tried behind closed doors at the beginning of 1938. Building his defence around a vigorous denial of the charge of being a political protester, Niemöller attempted to prove his support for Nazi politics in general by again concentrating on his hostility toward the Jews at the witness stand. Regretting the political side effects of his ecclesiastical protest, Niemöller testified that the fact that God had chosen to reveal himself in Jesus, the Jew, was a 'painful and grievous stumbling block'. He agreed that the Jew was 'alien and uncongenial', but argued that he was forced by a commitment to scripture to defend the redemptive power of baptism, which had led to his arrest. Niemöller's position then was clear, his was not a political protest, but an ecclesiastical defence of church interests which even contradicted his own political instincts, and had been politicised by the state.[85] The leniency of the sentence pronounced on Niemöller

---

[82] Bentley, *Niemöller*, p.116.
[83] For fuller discussion of Niemöller's antisemitism see Robert Michael, 'Theological Myth, German anti-Semitism and the Holocaust: the case of Martin Niemöller' in *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, (Vol. 2, No.1, 1987), p.114.
[84] Barth, *The German Church Struggle*, p.3
[85] Quoted in Michael, 'Theological Myth', p. 112.

amounted to a virtual acquittal, suggesting that he convinced the court of his political credentials. But, despite his testimony of political conformity, and his pledges of ideological sympathy, Niemöller was re-arrested and imprisoned in Sachsenhausen on the personal orders of the Führer. He would spend much of the following 8 years in solitary confinement, until he was liberated in 1945.

James Bentley, one of Niemöller's sympathetic biographers, has explained his apparent ambivalence toward the Jews as reflecting his unthinking acceptance of Christian teaching and an inability to relate this teaching to his political beliefs. Niemöller's political protest Bentley argued, effectively contradicted his antisemitism and articulated Niemöller's true position with regard to Germany's Jews.[86] But, Bentley's analysis relies on understanding the activities of the Confessing Church as a political protest against the state, whereas in fact Niemöller's organisation was formed precisely to defend the Christian tradition which Bentley portrayed him as having 'unthinkingly' accepted. In addition, Niemöller's contribution to the political discourse of the Nazi state could actually be argued to have been in line with, rather than counter to, the ambitions of the state.

Niemöller's antisemitic preaching must be viewed in a wider political and cultural context. The sermon of 1935 in which Niemöller attacked the 'blood guilt' of the Jews,[87] was preached just over a month before the Nuremberg laws were promulgated and the racial redefinition of German society was encapsulated in legislation for the first time. This set of decrees replaced the haphazard campaign of individual pieces of legislation and violence aimed at the Jews in the first two years of the Third Reich, and provided an overall racial vision for the new state, with an apparently concrete global definition of the ethnic Jew,[88] and their rights as (non) German citizen. Seen within this context of an all pervasive atmosphere of racial 'public conversation', Niemöller's 'religious' proclamation can be seen as politically important. In the wake of the Nuremberg Laws the

[86] Bentley, *Niemöller*, p. 63.
[87] Goldhagen, *Hitler's*, p.112.
[88] In fact of course the problem of 'defining' who was and who was not a racial Jew was one that the Nazis never really solved - the Wannsee conference for example deals extensively with this problem. See Jeremy Noakes, 'The Development of Nazi Policy towards the German "Mischlinge", 1933-45', in *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book*, (Vol. 34, 1989), pp. 291-354.

evangelical churches, including Niemöller's Confessing Church, demonstrated (in the context of a continuing campaign against the Aryan paragraph's application to the Kingdom of God) their ambivalence to Nazi antisemitism by co-operating as the only institution capable of proving the Aryan heritage of German citizens.[89] As such, despite the protest against the state, the church was still contributing to the racial redefinition of the body politic. In addition to this Niemöller was, admittedly in a religious context, preaching a message of antipathy toward the Jewish other.

Martin Niemöller and Nazified theologians such as Gerhard Kittel[90] helped make 'antisemitism respectable' and contributed to the dominant racial discourse of the state during the Third Reich.[91] Kittel, Niemöller and the Confessing Church were all, whatever their personal feelings towards the state, operating in an atmosphere in which racial thinking and language were beginning to dominate public discourse. In this context, Bentley's argument that Niemöller can be cast as a defender of the Jews because his political actions effectively contradicted the religious elements to his teaching appears to break down. Such religious statements must have, like the theologising of Kittel, helped to cast antisemitism as an 'acceptable social value' precisely because they conformed to the dominant political language of the period, and as such cannot be seen in their religious isolation.[92] Niemöller's protest against the state was not simply political, and can be defined by its theological character, equally his antisemitism was not simply

---

[89] See Annegret Ehmann, 'From Colonial Racism to Nazi Population Policy: The Role of the so-called Mischlinge', in Michael Berenbaum and Abraham Peck (eds), *The Holocaust in History: The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed and the Re-examined*, (Bloomington, 1998), pp. 115-133.

[90] Gerhard Kittell was an active, globally respected, academic theologian who sought an accommodation with National Socialist ideology that went beyond the German Christian rejection of the Old Testament, and effort to radically purge Christianity of all Jewish elements. Kittell achieved a position which justified the treatment of the Jewish population through highlighting apparent violence in Jewish teaching. There is significant suspicion that these specious justifications were made when Kittel was fully cognisant of the extent of the campaign against the Jews. For a discussion of Kittell's accommodation of National Socialism see Robert Erickson, 'Christians and the Holocaust: the Wartime Writings of Gerhard Kittell', in Bauer et al, *Remembering for the Future*, pp.2400-13, and Robert Erickson, *Theologians Under Hitler*, (New Haven, 1985). See also Christian Gerlach, 'The Wannsee Conference, the Fate of the German Jews, and Hitler's Decision in Principle to Exterminate all Jews;, in *Journal of Modern History*, (Vol. 70, Dec. 1998), pp. 759-812, in which he speculates as to the extent of the knowledge of men such as Kittell of the fate of the Jews.

[91] Bentley, *Niemöller*, p. 47.

[92] Sarah Gordon, *Hitler, Germans, and the Jewish Question*, (New Jersey, 1984) p. 40. Gordon's phrase is actually used with reference to Weimar Germany, but is equally applicable in this context.

religious but conformed to a political discourse. A picture of Niemöller, and the Confessing Church, then emerges in which both were politically at one with the dominant ideologies of the state, despite being in conflict with that state.

We cannot however simply characterise Niemöller's relationship with the Jews as being antisemitic. Despite the claims of many, there are difficulties in establishing the nature of the relationship at work between ideology and murder in the destruction of the European Jews, which have ensured that the term antisemitism has itself become somewhat problematic. Because of analyses such as Daniel Goldhagen's and those intentionalist historians that preceded him, such a term has implications in Holocaust scholarship which are unambiguous: antisemitism has come to infer something essentially and necessarily genocidal. As such to simply label Martin Niemöller and the Confessing Church as 'antisemitic' may be to simplify both his intellectual relationship with first the Jews, and then with the state as a whole.

Niemöller's undoubted anti-Jewish rhetoric often approached the caricature and images within Nazi propaganda and thinking. However, equally Niemöller's rhetoric diverged from, and contradicted the Nazi image. If nothing else Niemöller's defacto defence of the principle of redemption for the Jew in the campaign against the Aryan Paragraph suggested a fundamental cleavage with *racial* ideology. To employ the singular term antisemitism in such circumstances, with reference to Martin Niemöller, and by inference the Confessing Church, would be unhelpful, because his was clearly not a singular attitude towards the Jew. As the failings of the Goldhagen thesis demonstrate, references to antisemitism in pre and Nazi German politics and culture would, especially in the morally loaded world of Holocaust historiography, be more appropriately referred to as *antisemitisms*. The most obvious example of divergent antisemitisms is that of distinct Christian and racial antisemitisms. Whilst rhetorically similar, these two discourses defy a singular characterisation; which renders the stable term antisemitism inappropriate. The possibility of redemption implicit in Christian antisemitism, and indeed in the imagery employed by Niemöller, was for example, decisively absent in the

racial antisemitism of Nazism.[93]

The example of Niemöller also demonstrates that singular antisemitisms themselves were not uniform, and therefore the term may be as unsuitable for the minutiae of Niemöller's individual prejudice as it is for the labelling of anti-Jewish prejudice in the grand historical sweeps of Imperial, Weimar, and Nazi Germanys. Niemöller's attitude was unstable and fluctuating; and therefore to label this instability with such an unequivocal term would, self evidently, be unwise, even if we acknowledge that there are several versions of this discourse. Bryan Cheyette has argued persuasively (with reference to an entirely different circumstance, but the resonance for this case are clear) for the existence of various and unstable 'antisemitisms' which defy the term antisemitism because of its implications of a unitary impulse. Consequently Cheyette replaced antisemitism with 'negative Semitic discourse' because of the lack of stability within singular antisemitisms themselves.[94] That Niemöller displayed contradictory impulses towards the Jews, both counselling for and against persecution, suggests that to simply apply the label antisemitism (with its attendant implications) would be crass. The use of Cheyette's identification of an unstable 'negative Semitic discourse' within English literary representations of the Jew in application to Martin Niemöller, allows the acknowledgement of Niemöller's paradoxical attitude to the Jew, without automatically inferring a genocidal capability on Niemöller's behalf.

Although antisemitism is a difficult term, and inappropriate for the characterisation of Niemöller's position regarding the Jews, we must also acknowledge that this is not to deny the existence of any relationship between Niemöller's rhetoric and that of the state. Bentley's attempt to marginalise Niemöller's undeniable antipathy toward the Jews as irrelevant in an assessment of the *Kirchenkampf*, or in his support for Nazism, is unfortunate, especially in the context of an explanation of the significance of

---

[93] This is not however to deny any relationship between the two. Whilst Jakob Katz's view that Nazi antisemitism is simply the natural culmination of Christian exclusion of the Jew across two millennia may obscure the decisive divergences of the two discourses (see Jakob Katz, *From Prejudice to Destruction: Antisemitism 1700-1933*, (Cambridge, Mass. 1980) there simply must be some form of relationship between the two, if only in the defining of the Jew as other. The Jewish scapegoat was identified across two thousand years of history.

[94] see Bryan Cheyette, *Constructions of 'the Jew' in English Literature and Society: Racial Representations, 1874-1945*, (Cambridge, 1993), p. 268.

that conflict which is cast in terms of a reaction to Nazi anti-Jewish action. The dominant images of Niemöller's frequent characterisations of the Jews during this period were negative, and that the effect of his protest against the state's denial of scripture was to defend the Jews was evidently of some concern to him. We must then view those characterisations of the Jew within the context of a dominant negative Semitic discourse, in which Niemöller's prejudice whilst qualitatively different, was also rhetorically similar enough to be subsumed within this ideological milieu. At the very least Niemöller appears to have contributed to the negative public conversation regarding the Jews, and therefore the continuing definition of the Jew as other and apart from the German nation.

It was not only in relation to anti-Jewish discourse that the interaction between Martin Niemöller, the Confessing Church as a whole, and the Nazi state was difficult to define. Regardless of the claims Niemöller made on behalf of the Confessing Church at his trial, in some senses their activities were far from apolitical. Historically German Protestantism was attracted to the right of Germany's polarised political spectrum. Throughout the Weimar republic at least, German Protestantism's apoliticality was in fact *political* in the sense that it rejected the republic and deferred to a specific and opposite form of political decision making from that enshrined in the republic's constitution.[95] This 'political apoliticality' continued throughout the Third Reich, as the churches consistently made political gestures, in defence of their apparently non-political position. The church administrations actively co-operated with the redefinition of the political (if not spiritual) community of Germany in the wake of the Nuremberg laws. In 1936 in line with the self regulating and denunciatory atmosphere of the consensual German dictatorship,[96] the Confessing Church also invited the Gestapo to investigate the leak of a document which apparently pointed to a more fundamental opposition on the part of the church. The Jewish lawyer, Friedrich Weissler who was subsequently arrested and murdered in Sachsenhausen for the leak, became the first martyr in protection of the church's

[95] For example the 1927 Evangelical Conference at Königsberg insisted on the Christian religiosity of the German nation, a direct criticism of the secularity of the Weimar constitution. See Gutteridge, *Open Thy Mouth*, p. 42.

[96] See Robert Gellately, *The Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy 1933-45*, (Oxford, 1992), and *Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany*, (Oxford, 2001). See also Eric Johnson, *The Nazi Terror: Gestapo, Jews, and Ordinary Germans*, (New York, 2000).

apolitical stance.[97] As such the apparent embrace of apoliticality by the confessing church was of the type crucial to the control, and reshaping of the political community in the Third Reich. The decision of the 1938 confessional synod to swear an oath of loyalty to the Führer is another example of an ostentatious attempt by the confessing church to demonstrate the non-political nature of their protest. Such declarations of political loyalty, and co-operation with organisations which enforced the political homogeneity of the Third Reich can hardly be regarded of themselves as apolitical acts.[98] In fact they are acts which were laced not with political protest, or even political abdication, but with tangible co-operation in the pursuit of the goals and achievements of the Nazi regime.

If the apoliticality of the Confessing Church is something of a misnomer, of course its politicality was ambiguous and indeed ambivalent. Barth's contention that the politicality of the church protest was defined for it, by the state, because the designs of the church ran in opposition to the totalitarian designs of the regime remains valid. Yet the nature of the Nazi project demonstrates that we are unable simply to draw the sharp distinction between protest and support. Concomitant to being active in protest (as defined by the state) the confessing church was equally acting *politically* in *support* of the state. As such the ambiguity of Niemöller and the Confessing Church pervades their entire relationship with the state, not simply their intellectual relationship with the Jews. Difficulties in defining Martin Niemöller's antisemitism, and his relationship with the dominant rhetoric of the state, are echoed in difficulties in defining the political orientation of the Confessing Church.

1.3 Contradictions Acknowledged? Complicating the Anglican Hero.

Niemöller's paradoxical relationship with the Nazi state raises profound questions as to why such contradictions were not reflected in his unambiguous representation as hero both inside and outside of the Anglican church in the 1930s, and into the war years. Immediately attractive is the explanation that the Anglican interpretation of Martin Niemöller was simply based on ignorance and misunderstanding, and to expect any more

[97] For Dorothy Buxton for example Weissler is the first martyr of the war of extermination against Christianity - Buxton, *The Church Struggle*, p. 32-34.

critical analysis of Niemöller than that offered in the celebration of his heroism is the arbitrary judgement of the historian, acting under the tyranny of hindsight. However such an interpretation would be to ignore the complexity of Anglican representations of Niemöller.

Despite the frequent appearance of the rhetoric of Niemöller as representative hero, and indeed defender of the Christian faith, it was not a uniform image in the non-Nazi world. Even within the Anglican church interpretations were not entirely uncritical. Arthur Headlam, pre war chairman of the Church of England Council for Foreign Relations and Bishop of Gloucester, was for example, quick to defend the Nazi incarceration of the Dahlem minister. Headlam endorsed Nazi criticism of the 'political parsons' of the Confessing Church and argued that politics had no part in the remit of any church. In line with his general sympathies with Nazism, Headlam accepted that the activities of the Confessing Church were made political because they had taken place within the confines of a state which chose, and had every right to choose, to define those activities as political.[99] In Headlam's 1938 report for Archbishop Lang on his recent visit to Germany, during which he met members of the government in order to discuss the sufferings of the German churches, he was forced to admit that he did not talk about the Jews because he liked to avoid 'mixing up different subjects of investigation'.[100] Headlam's reluctance to discuss the Jews can probably be explained by his well documented antipathy toward the 'not altogether pleasant' Jews, who he believed were 'infecting' Germany with Bolshevism,[101] and his reluctance to think ill of the Nazi state.[102] However he also, unwittingly, displayed a more perceptive understanding of the nature of racial policy in the Third Reich, refusing to accept the contention of Bell *et al* that the campaign against the churches and the Jews were two constituent parts of the

---

[98] Gutteridge, *Open Thy Mouth*, p. 287.
[99] Cited in R.C.D. Jasper, *Arthur Cayley Headlam: Life and Letters of a Bishop* (London, 1960), pp. 296-8.
[100] 11 July 1938. Confidential. 'Visit to Germany' by A.C. Headlam. Lang Papers, Lambeth Palace Library, Vol. 320, f. 170, Lambeth Palace Library. I warmly thank Chana Kotzin for drawing my attention to this reference.
[101] Headlam to *The Gloucester Diocesan Magazine*, August 1933, see Kirsty Patterson, 'The Church of England and the Nazi Regime: The Bishop of Gloucester, Sympathiser or Appeaser?', BA Dissertation, University of Southampton, 1994.
[102] See note 73 in the introduction for a discussion and references for Headlam's relationship with Nazism.

same universal campaign, and therefore that Martin Niemöller held a general significance.

In response to Headlam, George Bell rejected the assertion that Niemöller was indeed a political protester, and contradicted other Anglican claims regarding the breadth of his protest by asking rhetorically 'What is his crime?' 'The truth' Bell answered 'is that he is a preacher of the gospel of God, and that he preaches without flinching'.[103] Bell's endorsement of the political limitations of Niemöller's theological protest logically contradicted his vociferous endorsements of Niemöller as 'out and out resistor', by suggesting that he was simply defending the Christian gospel, rather than involved in the titanic struggle for the soul of the nation. Yet it was the image of Martin Niemöller as political resistor that was at the centre of representations of Niemöller as hero. That original assertion of resistance suggested that the Anglican community was drawn to Niemöller's protest because they saw within it, a political significance beyond the simple assertion of the Gospel. However Bell's defence of Niemöller's apoliticality suggested an understanding of the limitations of the Niemöller protest.

It has been argued that this tension inherent in the Anglican interpretation of the *Kirchenkampf* belies the achievement by the Anglican church of a much more sophisticated understanding of the German church struggle than that evident in uncritical assertions of Niemöller's 'resistance'.[104] It is undoubtedly the case that the level of information available to Bell and the Anglican church in general would, and did, allow knowledge of the Confessing Church's own understanding and definition of their role in the conflict.[105] The preparation of a report by the ecumenical German Church committee, the specific purpose of which was to work toward a greater public understanding of the apoliticality of the struggle, is for example clear evidence of a sophisticated understanding of the *Kirchenkampf* being available to the Anglican church. The report

[103] Bell to *The Times*, 3 July 1937.
[104] see Hampson, 'The British Response to the German Church Struggle', pp. 275-78.
[105] The German Church papers amongst the Bell Papers at Lambeth palace comprise some 15 volumes each with over 400 folios of documents. The kind of material contained in these volumes, from Bell's correspondence with protagonists, to documents produced by the confessing church for internal purposes, and of course reports prepared specifically for Anglican eyes, would definitely allow the writing of a judicious history of the German church struggle from this source material alone.

attacked the portrayal of the Confessing Church as political opponents of the Hitler regime,[106] and pointed to the tension between the public image of the church struggle (which was largely provided by the publicity given to Niemöller) and the realities of the conflict. The report stated that '*it is a struggle that we usually misunderstand.* The German church is not consciously defending freedom against absolutism or democracy against dictatorship; it is not in political opposition to the German state in any sense we normally assume.[107] [my italics] This interpretation of the German Church struggle proposed by the Church of England's German church committee was a quantum leap from the simplistic characterisation of resistance evident in the uncritical celebration of Niemöller that dominated Anglican representation of the Third Reich. The question that now arises is how did this understanding of the *Kirchenkampf*, and therefore of the nature of Martin Niemöller's protest, coexist with the Anglican representation of the self same protest as unambiguous resistance to the political and moral basis of Nazism?

Throughout the course of the *Kirchenkampf* the criteria for response on the part of the Anglican church was predominantly the search for the reaction that would provide the most help for their German brethren.[108] As such this apparently nuanced understanding of the church struggle may owe much to the self characterisation of the conflict from within the confessing church, rather than to an actual appreciation of its ambiguity. Niemöller built his defence during his 1938 trial around the apoliticality of his own protests and the wider position of the Confessing Church. As he stated starkly in a report for George Bell the basis of his opposition to the Nazi state was in the rejection of 'the new and false meaning of salvation', nothing more.[109] As Niemöller had previously recorded his 'anger' at his characterisation as a political agitator in the foreign news media[110] it is hardly remarkable that those who stood resolutely behind him were prepared to confirm and further his claims of apoliticality. The Anglican church's response to the Jewish crisis,

[106] Hampson, 'The British Response to the German Church Struggle', p. 272
[107] 'The Lessons and Claims of the German Church Conflict', in Bell Papers, Vol. 10, f. 174.
[108] Robbins, 'Martin Niemöller', p. 157.
[109] Martin Niemöller. 'What we mean by the Confessing Church', undated, in Bell Papers, Vol.10, ff. 13-14.
[110] Gutteridge, *Open Thy Mouth*, p.131 - This is anger directed at a profile of Niemöller in the *Morning Post* in 1934.

and to events in Germany generally in 1930s has been characterised as dominated by its deference to 'diplomatic thinking', and responses to the *Kirchenkampf* can be seen within this framework. However explaining the apparent appreciation of the nuances of ecclesiastical protests in the Third Reich as simply the articulation of the self image of the Confessing Church fails to account for the contradictions in the images of Niemöller and of church protest that were presented by the Anglican church.

In reality it appears that the Anglican episcopate was involved in the deliberate manipulation of the Niemöller image. Bell's campaign of letter writing to *The Times* across the period of Niemöller's incarceration and trial was, the bishop admitted, motivated by an appreciation of 'the importance of keeping Niemöller's name and life before the public'.[111] The answer to the question of what was the 'importance' of giving publicity to Niemöller *et al*, is perhaps to be found within the nature of that publicity itself, which also reveals the intellectual schema that facilitated the maintenance of two directly contradictory conceptions of the *Kirchenkampf* within a singular interpretation of Martin Niemöller.

George Bell confronted the contradictions of the Anglican representation of Niemöller and the Confessing Church in the introduction to a book designed to re-educate the British public as to the actual nature of the theological basis of the *Kirchenkampf*. Bell acknowledged that the conflict was misunderstood in Britain, but he argued (in a spectacular effort to undermine the purpose of the publication he was introducing) that this misunderstanding was largely irrelevant. The essence of the struggle, Bell wrote, transcended the nature of the conflict itself. For George Bell, who was primarily responsible for presenting the *Kirchenkampf* to the wider Anglican church, that the protest was resistance against authoritarianism at all became the crucial factor, regardless of the actual nature of the protest. Accordingly then, the Confessing Church's assault on authoritarianism allowed, or even dictated for the Anglican Church, the necessity of manufacturing an image of Martin Niemöller barely conversant with either reality or the self image of the Confessing Church, or indeed the understanding of that image within the Anglican church. Niemöller's assertion of the 'faith of the gospel' in the face of the

totalitarian threat was enough to ensure that he became a 'counter symbol' to Hitler.[112] Duncan-Jones concurred with Bell when he wrote, in his misleadingly titled *The Struggle for Religious Freedom in Germany*, that:

> what gives it [the *Kirchenkampf*] so great an importance, *a significance that reaches far beyond the limits of the particular conflict*, is that it has been maintained when every other freedom of thought has been subdued...It is seen to be true that in the last resort the dignity of the human spirit can only be preserved by those *who are anchored in eternity and that its greatest heights are reached precisely by those who, conscious of their own infirmities, commit their cause to a higher power.*[113]

As such the coexistence of two mutually exclusive interpretations of Niemöller's protest was achieved through a process of universalising his battle. By defining protest through its most simple factor, that it was an opposition to Nazism, or more precisely the more universal authoritarian or totalitarian enemy, the ambiguities of opposition ceased to be important for the 1930s' Anglican imagination: any opposition would do. It is in the process of universalisation employed (although not exclusively) by the Anglican church to denote the significance of the Niemöller protest, that the Anglican understanding of Nazism can be fully discerned and it is to an analysis of that understanding that this chapter now turns.

1.4 The Anglican Understanding of Nazism as Totalitarian.

The process of universalising the protest of Martin Niemöller had two palpable elements. First, the Nazi enemy was found to be universal and presented as the manifestation of a general totalitarianism. Second, Niemöller was disassociated from the theological particularities of Confessing Church conflict with the Nazi state and painted as a defence

---

[111] Bell to Elmhurst, 8 April 1938, Bell Papers, Vol.10, f.93.

[112] Hampson, 'The British Response', p.301 - the book was written by the German Lutheran pastor who spent much of the Third Reich in London, Pf. Hildebrandt (although Hildebrandt, who had served under Niemöller, insisted that the book be published anonymously) in order to reverse popular misconceptions as to the nature of the struggle, although this was a purpose that was hardly served by Bell's dismissal of the actualities of the protest in the introduction. Klaus Hildebrandt, *Pastor Niemöller and his Creed*, (London, 1939).

[113] A.S. Duncan-Jones, *The Struggle for Religious Freedom in Germany*, (London, 1938), p. 269.

of general values of 'freedom and Christianity'.[114] Collectively, as George Bell consciously acknowledged, such an understanding of protest and control awarded Niemöller a 'universal' rather than local significance both for Anglican and non-Anglican commentators.[115]

The latter assumption in the picture of universality developed around the Niemöller protest rested upon an unrealistic portrayal of an eternal and homogenous Christianity. Implicit within the argument that Niemöller's significance lay in his defence of Christianity was the suggestion that this represented an eternal and definable set of values. Such an obviously problematic assumption was even belied by the fundamental difference between Anglican theology and the theology of the Confessing Church. Whilst Anglicanism was attracted by Niemöller's defence of the Gospel, the Barthian rejection of the incarnate nature of all but the gospel at the heart of Confessing Church theology was hardly an Anglican principle and in fact pre-empted the pessimistic turn in Anglican thought.[116] In fact the theology of the *German Christians* was theoretically, through its identification of 1933 as a moment of revelation, closer than the redemptive theology of the Confessing Church to a theology dominating the Anglican church that found God throughout nature and history. This simplification of the theological principle of Protestant opposition in the Third Reich has actually endured through the historiography of both the German church struggle and the Anglican response to the Holocaust and is implicit in the search for a response to Jewish persecution which achieved 'what could be expected of the representatives of Christ'.[117]

Simplified Christian values were in turn, by implication, presented as in opposition to the values and practice of Nazism in Anglican images of Niemöller and the *Kirchenkampf*. In order to achieve this, the particularity of Nazism was equally simplified and denied through its representation as totalitarianism in Anglican images of Niemöller and the Church struggle. After 1945 the concept of totalitarianism flourished as both

[114] George Bell to *The Times* cited in Andrew Chandler, 'The Church of England and Nazi Germany 1933-45', Ph.D. Cambridge, 1990, p. 61.
[115] notes for an undated sermon, Bell Papers, Vol. 10, f.164.
[116] The classic statement of Barthian theology can be found in Karl Barth, *The Epistle to the Romans*, (London, 1933).
[117] Gutteridge, *Open Thy Mouth*, p. 247.

explanatory concept for the past, and as a weapon in the ideology of the Cold War that could equate the USSR with malevolent Nazism. However, as its use in the portrayal of Niemöller as a moral and political opponent of the Nazi state demonstrates it was not a concept that was confined to the post war period. Developed as a self conscious label by Italian Fascists,[118] totalitarianism began to be applied by external commentators in the 1930s as an identification of the Nazi state.[119] Indeed, all of the three major explorations of the 'totalitarianism' thesis that emerged after 1945, were based on scholarship that had begun in the 1930s.[120] In British politics and culture the term dictatorship and totalitarianism were employed interchangeably to characterise European politics throughout the 1930s. Stanley Baldwin, and other Christian conservatives were, for example, employing the concept of totalitarianism in their articulation of the challenges of European politics in the 1930s. In common with the Anglican use of the concept in the representation of Martin Niemöller,[121] the political application of the label totalitarian rested on the provision of Christianity (and liberal democracy) as an alternative, indeed antithetical, mindset to that embodied in European dictatorship.[122]

Ecumenical Christianity deliberately defined itself as in opposition to the values of the totalitarian state,[123] but what did this rather loosely defined term totalitarianism mean to Anglican and indeed European Christians? In the aftermath of the Munich agreement,[124] Archbishops Lang and Temple set about a systematic articulation of the

---

[118] See Roger Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism*, (London, 1993), pp. 56-84, for a discussion of the development of Italian Fascism

[119] For a brisk survey of the development of the concept outside of the German, Italian and Soviet Dictatorships see Abbott Gleason, *Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War*, (New York, 1995), pp. 31-72.

[120] The three major works, which together develop the 'concept of totalitarianism' are Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, (London, 1952), J.L. Talmon, *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy*, (London, 1952) and C.J. Friedrich and Z.K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, (Cambridge, Mass. 1956).

[121] For example Dorothy Buxton described Nazism as the antithesis of Christianity in the preface to *Christendom on Trial*, p. 1.

[122] see Philip Williamson, 'Christian Conservatives and the Totalitarian Challenge 1933-40', *English Historical Review*, (Vol. CXV, No. 462, June 2000), pp. 607-42, and Philip Williamson, *Stanley Baldwin: Conservative Leadership and National Values*, pp. 294-335.

[123] This statement was made unambiguously at the Rengsdorf conference of Life and Work in March of 1933. See Jasper, *George Bell*, p. 98.

[124] See Chapter Two for a discussion of the Anglican reception of Munich and the descent into war.

essential incompatibility of the Christian faith and the totalitarian state.[125] Ultimately their definition concurred with that of American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, and the evils of totalitarianism were represented in the totalitarian state's inherent self glorification of man, as replacement for God.[126] As such totalitarian states were represented as based on both dictatorial control and the elevation of secular ideology to the status of religion. 'Power politics' were, it was argued, an essential contradiction of Christianity,'[127] because the all conquering state and dictatorial state as the organised will of man, necessarily obscured God. William Temple went on to explain this contradiction fully:

> the totalitarian state involved a conception of personality incompatible with the Christian doctrines of God, and of man, for it was bound to regard and to treat the individual man as having this meaning and value of his relationship to itself. [in the totalitarian state] man existed for the state, which was itself regarded as the community organised as a self conscious unit. Such a theory conflicted directly with the conception of man as having his ultimate meaning and value in his direct relationship with God.[128]

Such a definition of totalitarianism obviously had an inherent similarity to the Confessing Christian definition of the evils of Nazism, and as such further demonstrates the attraction of the Anglican church to the self image of Martin Niemöller as Anglicanism itself retreated into crisis theology.

The manipulation of the image of Nazism into a loosely defined totalitarianism, an anti-Christian ideology symbolised by the conflict with the German churches, demonstrates that Nazi racial policy was not at the forefront of the Anglican interpretation of Nazism. The use of a general concept of European dictatorship, of totalitarianism, as symbolic of Nazism also implies that Nazism was understood as a manifestation of a wider phenomena. Indeed those Christian conservatives, such as Baldwin, who were using the totalitarian concept in the understanding of Nazism, and as such providing the context for the Anglican use of that concept in the rhetoric of representations of Martin Niemöller, employed totalitarianism as a means to compare the Nazi and Soviet

[125] For Lang see Norman, *Church and Society*, p. 361, and for Temple see *The Times*, 5 October 1938, p. 9.
[126] Reinhold Niebuhr, 'The Christian Church in the Secular Age' in Robert McAfee Brown, *The Essential Reinhold Niebuhr: Selected Essays and Addresses*, (New Haven, 1986), pp. 79-92.
[127] Lang quoted in Norman, *Church and Society*, p. 361.

dictatorships. Prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 at least, it was a concept that was already deployed as a device for explaining and comparing the Nazi and Soviet dictatorships as representing the epitome of 'all that was abhorred in the modern world'.[129] Anglican use of the totalitarian concept was founded on a similar impulse to compare Nazi and Soviet domination.

Throughout the inter-war period the Soviet Union inspired a great dichotomy of reaction in Britain as both the object of extreme fear and the inspiration of utter devotion.[130] Reactions within the British Christian community while still diverse, were perhaps less evenly divided than in the secular sphere, with predictably a large anti-Communist majority. For English Christians the most significant feature of the Russian dictatorship was its naked atheism, and as such its anti-Christian orientation. However it would be misleading to suggest that it was simply through atheism that communism gained its malevolent image within the Anglican church. That such atheism was presented as a crusading matter was of much greater concern, as, in Anglican eyes, the Soviet Union effectively portrayed itself as a (pseudo religious) alternative to the Christian faith. Christian intellectuals warned throughout the 1930s that it was not the secularism of the communist faith that represented its challenge to Christianity but the religiosity of that secularism. As the Dean of St. Paul's wrote in unequivocal terms, the threat of Communism was born from the fact that it was a 'satanic anti-religion'.[131]

Inevitably self avowed atheism meant that the Soviet Union had few open supporters in the Anglican church, with Hewlett Johnson, the so called 'Red' Dean of Canterbury virtually alone in his enthusiasm for Stalin.[132] In fact, due to self proclaimed atheism, the Soviet Dictatorship was, for English Christians, a much less ambiguous proposition than the pseudo-Christian rhetoric of the Hitler state. Indeed, at least before the open divisions between the Nazi government and the Confessing Church, Nazism

---

[128] Temple quoted in *The Times*, 5 October 1938, p. 9.
[129] R.J.B. Bosworth, *Explaining Auschwitz and Hiroshima: History Writing and the Second World War 1945-1990*, (London, 1993), p. 21.
[130] Hastings, *English Christianity*, p. 311.
[131] See Norman, *Church and Society*, p. 350-53.
[132] *Ibid.*

inspired some praise in the Anglican church for its open anti-Communism.[133] Arthur Headlam's famed support of Nazism (which in fact endured the open breach of Church and state in Germany) was largely based on his own fears of Communism, which he represented as the 'creed of the German Jew'.[134] Less problematic Anglican figures also praised the Nazi state for its opposition to the Soviet Union, for example the Bishop of Winchester[135] praised Germany as the western bulwark against Communism.[136] Even in the wake of Anglican recognition of the apparent anti-Christianity of the Nazi state, Christian silences regarding communist opposition to Nazism were telling.[137]

Anglican celebrations of Martin Niemöller rested on this developing and pre-existing discourse surrounding totalitarianism. Indeed much of the discussion of Nazism's evil in the latter 1930s was explicitly associated with the evils of the Soviet Union, comparison with which confirmed the incompatibility of Nazism and Christianity because 'like Bolshevism, Nazism [was] a religion.'[138] The Godlessness of the Soviet Union was used as the prism through which the failings of Nazism were explained.[139] The specificities of the individual dictatorships, in the Nazi case its racial discourse, were made irrelevant in the employment of totalitarian equivalence: 'it matter[ed] nothing whether man is set up as God through an interpretation and adoption of Karl Marx, or

---

[133] Such anti-Communism was of course much less ambiguous than Nazi anti-Christianity, as the ideological touchstone of the movement. Nazism's popularity amongst German Christians and its oblique commitment to 'positive Christianity' obscured the undoubted anti-Church bent of its ideological authors. Marginal but not insignificant the youthful evangelical organisation the Oxford Group Movement celebrated Hitler as the buttress against Communism. For example their leader Frank Buchmann declared in 1936, 'I thank heaven for a man like Adolf Hitler'. See D.W. Bebbington, 'The Oxford Group Movement Between the Wars', in *Studies in Church History*, (Vol. XXIII, 1986), pp. 495-507.

[134] Cited in Norman, *Church and Society*, p. 330.

[135] Cyril Garbett was to be the Archbishop of Winchester from 1932 until 1942 when he replaced William Temple as Archbishop of York.

[136] Cyril Garbett quoted in Alan Wilkinson, *Dissent or Conform: War, Peace and the English Churches 1900-45*, (London, 1986),p. 97.

[137] For example see *Church Times*, 18 November 1938, p. 547, in which the post *Kristallnacht* appraisal of Nazism includes the observation that 'if Germany had gone Bolshevist, the Communist international may have swept the continent. Since the Hitler triumph its influence has been steadily waning.' This comes in the context of a discussion of Nazism's campaign against three 'internationals', the Communist International, the Jewish international, and the international Christianity. The second is dismissed as a figment of the Nazi imagination, while the triumph of the latter is prayed for. The silences regarding Nazi attitudes to Communism speak loudly, there is no condemnation of this international campaign.

[138] *Church Times*, 30 September 1938, p. 323.

[139] *The Guardian*, 30 December 1938, p. 865.

Nordic Man as set up by Herr Rosenberg; we must denounce it'.[140] At base such anti-God totalitarian instincts were for the English Christian, identical: the 'worship of false Gods, bowing down for example to an absolute nationalism or to an absolute communism...[bring] ruin and death.'[141] Such doctrines were both equivalent for English Christians, and absolutely crucially, were the opposite of the values of Western Civilisation.[142] Martin Niemöller, by being portrayed as defending Christianity, was represented as an advocate of the cause of civilisation. For Anglicans then the world was stringently bi-polar, divided between God and anti-God, between Western Civilisation and the Nazi and Soviet dictatorships. When George Bell wrote that 'the west could never make terms with National Socialist ideology',[143] such incompatibility was understood in terms of the Nazi threat to Christianity, which was seen as being born from the same totalitarian seed as that in evidence in Soviet Russia. Martin Niemöller was therefore understood as being inside God's alliance.

An interpretation of the Nazi and Soviet dictatorships as totalitarian and therefore equivalent was not confined either to Britain, or the Anglican Church, in the 1930s. Christian intellectuals throughout the western world employed totalitarianism as a means of comparing the Nazi and Soviet dictatorial experiences. Paul Tillich, the German émigré theologian compared the Russian and German assault on the rights of the individual, as did the English catholic Christopher Dawson, and left wing intellectuals in the USA. Significantly American Protestants too attacked both the Soviet and Nazi dictatorships as interfering in individual relationships with God.[144] Former Nazi sympathiser Hermann Rauschning followed suit with a characterisation of the Nazi state as an 'expansion of the doctrine of socialism', which found Nazism and Stalinist Communism as springing from the same well. Nazism, Rauschning argued, was a more

[140] *The Guardian*, 11 March 1938, p. 155.
[141] From a proposed ecumenical statement of peace in 1934, although this extract was in fact removed from the final draft sent to the press on 15 May 1934. See Lang Papers, Vol. 54.
[142] See for example Temple's draft document for the post Munich conference on international relations at Lambeth Palace in November 1938. Lang Papers, Vol. 54, ff. 309-18.
[143] George Bell, *Christianity and the World Order*, (London, 1940), p. 92.
[144] See Gleason, *Totalitarianism*, pp. 32-50 for a discussion of comparisons between the Nazi and Soviet dictatorships as totalitarian in the English speaking world in the 1930s.

complete form of the Communist attack on the rights of the individual.[145] In tandem both dictatorships continued, according to Rauschning 'the process of secularisation and revolutionisation of the last four hundred years...*entirely alien...complete nothingness...the absolute negation of the west, of civilisation.*[146]

It is within this understanding of Nazism as a manifestation of a wider phenomenon, and antithesis of Christian civilisation that the resistance of Niemöller was awarded wider significance as a defence of Christianity. As such the ambivalent protest of a Protestant preacher, to a large extent enmeshed in the political culture that helped spawn the Nazi devil, became nothing less than an apocalyptic battle for western civilisation itself regardless of the actual nature of that protest and its author's intellectual relationship with the Nazi state.

Christianity and Niemöller, although as we have seen the two things were becoming interchangeable in representations of the *Kirchenkampf*, were represented as *the* victims of the totalitarian vision of Nazism. George Bell wrote in 1936 that 'the most important thing happening in the world today is the process of destruction of Christianity in Central Europe'.[147] This conception of the political priorities of the time articulated an understanding of the Nazi state as an authoritarian, or totalitarian, state that thus threatened the Christian church. As such it is clear that the representation of Niemöller that universalised his protest as a defence of Christianity, the moral priorities of the Anglican church, and even democratic freedom, was reliant upon, in some form, the universalisation of the Nazi state as totalitarian threat and therefore the removal of its racial particularity.

In the immediate post-war world too, a world in which it is often argued that what we now know as the Holocaust was forgotten or obscured,[148] it was the totalitarian concept, which had been apparently been neglected after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, that was employed to ensure that the image of Martin Niemöller escaped the

[145] See the extract from Hermann Rauschning, *Germany's Revolution of Destruction*, reprinted in Neil Gregor, *Nazism*, (Oxford, 2000), pp. 24-27.
[146] Hermann Rauschning, *The Beast from the Abyss*, cited in Bosworth, *Explaining Auschwitz*, p. 22.
[147] Jasper, *Bell*, p. 231.
[148] See the introduction to this thesis for a discussion of the development of knowledge of the Holocaust, or the Nazi attack on the Jews, in the post war world.

paradox of his own relationship with the Nazi state. Initially Martin Niemöller was received with suspicion after the defeat of Nazi Germany. On 5 June 1945 Niemöller gave a press conference after he had been liberated near to the German Italian border. During the course of this address, he proudly proclaimed his Germanness, and explained his decision to offer his services to Hitler in 1939 as one based on an enduring devotion to his Fatherland.[149] Niemöller then declared his intention to seek material help for a destitute German population, which he argued was blameless in relation to the newly discovered atrocities, and of which in any case they had known very little. Suddenly Niemöller was for the English speaking world a 'hero with limitations', and that the anti-Nazi hero was willing to declare he had had no 'political quarrel' with Hitler, was clearly disturbing for, at the very least, the British and American press.[150]

May and June 1945 became months in which the correspondence pages of the serious press in Britain were preoccupied with Niemöller, the fallen idol. Debate over his desirability as a 'hero' for example dominated the published letters of the *Daily Telegraph* in the immediate post war period; with contributions reflecting his essential paradox as supporter and opponent of the Nazi state. Controversy began over Niemöller's declared intention to visit Britain to raise both awareness and practical help to ease the privations of the German population. Tom O'Brien of the TUC council led a chorus of disgruntled correspondents who insisted that the 'nationalistic' Niemöller should 'not be allowed to come'.[151] The letters responding to O'Brien's original were split between the two sides of the Niemöller paradox. For some O'Brien was slandering 'a saintly man',[152] whose 'heroic courage'[153] had inspired a 'brave and Christian'[154] protest against the evils of Nazism. Whilst others welcomed the attack on a man who had consistently sought to marry 'piety and aggression',[155] was imbued with the 'German racial spirit',[156] and of

[149] Niemöller's offer of service to the German army in 1939 did cause momentary consternation in the Anglican church amongst his defenders, see Chandler, *Brethren*, p. 155, which reprints George Bell's letter to Karl Barth in November 1939 which expressed his concern at rumours of Martin Niemöller's offer.
[150] Cited in Bentley, *Niemöller*, p.160.
[151] T. O'Brien to, *The Daily Telegraph* 21 May 1945.
[152] S.G. Cole to, *The Daily Telegraph.*, 28 May 1945.
[153] M. Roydon Shaw to, *The Daily Telegraph* 25 May 1945.
[154] A.G. Clinton to, *The Daily Telegraph* 24 May 1945.
[155] Lord Vansittart to, *The Daily Telegraph* 5 June 1945.

whom there was no evidence of his protesting against cruelty or as having 'denounced any of Hitler's crimes'.[157] Whilst in part objections to Niemöller can be explained by a predictable anti-German paranoia at the end of the war, 'the fewer Germans that visit this country the better' advised one correspondent,[158] the two sides of the debate did reflect the genuine ambivalence of Niemöller's protest. However in seeking to ask how the acknowledgement of this ambiguity, which is a feature of virtually all popular, scholarly contemporary and historiographical representations of Niemöller, can be combined with the simple acclamation of Niemöller's protest as the antithesis of Nazism; it was the final contribution to the *Telegraph's* debate which is most significant. In attempting to reconcile the paradox of Niemöller, in which he was both supporter and resistor, the concept of resistance not to Nazism but to *totalitarianism* was revived as a schema capable of achieving this reconciliation, and universalising the protest in the manner that Anglicans had previously achieved:

> he [Martin Niemöller] might approve of the Nazi regime politically, he might even, when the die was cast and war had come, be prepared to sacrifice his life for his country. But he would not and indeed never did accept the Nazis' claim to dictate what he should believe...that is why he is entitled to be regarded as an authentic enemy of totalitarian dictatorship, whose greatest ill is not the conduct it imposes so much as its insistence on rendering unto Caesar the things that are God's.[159]

Suddenly Niemöller's politics were again irrelevant. Nazism's greatest crime was entirely defined not as the expression of a particular (racial) brand of politics but the (universal) expression of the totalitarian will and its suppression of the individual.

1.6 Understanding of Nazism as Totalitarian in the Historiography of Niemöller

The celebration of Martin Niemöller as hero has endured in some post war representations of both the church struggle in general and the Dahlem pastor in particular.

---

[156] O'Brien to, *The Daily Telegraph* 1 June 1945.
[157] R.W. Keay to, *The Daily Telegraph* 28 May 1945.
[158] F.J. Young to, *The Daily Telegraph* 29 May 1945.
[159] M.L. Peters to, *The Daily Telegraph* 8 June 1945.

Some historiography of the *Kirchenkampf* has continued to celebrate an unambiguous Niemöller,[160] and the popular reception of his death included recollections which compared him to Christ.[161] In many ways the post-war representation of Niemöller has been the adoption of his own reflective narrative of his behaviour in the Third Reich. Niemöller's famous admonition of his own failings is, according to Peter Novick the most quoted statement of the Nazi era and it is certainly a constant presence in the history classrooms of Britain:

> First they came for the Communists but I was not a communist so I said nothing. Then they came for the Social Democrats, but I was not a Social Democrat – so I did nothing. Then they came for the trade unionists, but I was not a trade unionist. And then they came for the Jews – so I did little. Then when they came for me, there was no one left who could stand up for me.[162]

In addition to his poster inspiring American address, Niemöller was the author of a series of controversial confessions on behalf of the German churches, touring the nation in 1946 preaching the message of collective guilt to an unwilling audience. Famously Niemöller, in negotiation with other dissenting Protestant voices from the Nazi era, produced the Stuttgart declaration in October 1945, one of the first and only declarations of responsibility produced in the immediate post war era. Contemporaneously controversial for its dissent from a culture that emphasised the responsibility of a tyrannical few, the text of the declaration was in fact kind to both laity and clergy in the Evangelical

---

[160] For example see the arbitrary distinction drawn between the resistant Niemöller and 'supporters' of the Nazi state in Locke and Littell, *Remembrance and Recollections*, p. ix.

[161] For example see John Prescott, 'Martin Niemöller as I knew him' in *The Expository Times*, (Vol.95, No.11, 1984). pp.328-40 - Prescott tells of how the 'Christ like' Niemöller immediately calmed his normally fractious cat, which paid Niemöller a great deal of attention despite usually fleeing from strangers!

[162] The text of this speech is taken from Ruth Zerner, 'Martin Niemöller, Activist as Bystander: The Oft Quoted Reflection', in Marvin Perry and Frederick m. Schweitzer (eds), *Jewish Christian Encounters over the Centuries*, (New York, 1994). However there is some dispute as to both the origins of the text and its exact make up. The speech that this confession was taken from was given to the American congress in 1963. However Niemöller's words were not contemporaneously recorded. As such elements have been added, and subtracted in various accounts of Niemöller's words. For example dominant in America in the 1960s was the removal of the communists, conversant with the demands of McCarthyist propaganda, and (incredibly) the addition of the Catholics – the fact that the Nazis never 'came' for the Catholics not withstanding. A recent exchange on the H-Net discussion list H-Holocaust settled upon the version given by Zerner, which was confirmed by the memories of Niemöller's widow Sybill von Sell Niemöller. See *http://www2.h-net.msu.edu/~holoweb/.*

churches, emphasising the eternal incompatibility of Nazism and Christianity, and the Christian:

> struggle [of] many years in the name of Jesus Christ against the spirit which has found its terrible expression in the National Socialist regime of violence, but we accuse ourselves for *not* being more courageous, for *not* praying more faithfully, for *not* believing more joyously and for *not* loving more ardently.[163] [my italics]

There is a remarkable continuity between the spirit of Stuttgart, and that of Niemöller's later personal, redress. In both acts of contrition repentance was sought for the sins of inaction, for *not doing* enough. The sub text was clear, the Church and Nazism were implacable and eternal foes, although the Churches should have sought to intervene further. One can see within these self representations the seeds of the historical image of Niemöller as the enemy of Nazism.

It would however be quite wrong to see the development of the image of Martin Niemöller as hero as a post-war phenomena. Martin Niemöller's post-war incarnation as a prophet preaching a message of limited German responsibility for the crimes of Nazism, soon metamorphosed into a peace campaigner advocating German neutrality in the developing Cold War.[164] For German and Western authorities alike neutrality was little more than a cover for communism, and he was consequently regarded with suspicion. Konrad Adanaeur described Niemöller as an 'enemy of [any] state',[165] while the British occupation authorities kept what can only be described as an intelligence file monitoring his activities.[166] Yet Niemöller's image in post-war historiography has often echoed the understanding of Niemöller proposed in the 1930s.

Representations of Niemöller as leading an ecclesiastical challenge to the 'essence' of the Third Reich are common in the historiography of the *Kirchenkampf*.[167] These representations rest on a conception of the universality of Nazism and its Christian

---

[163] The full text of the declaration is published in Ronald Jasper, *George Bell: Bishop of Chichester*, (London, 1967), p. 294.
[164] Conway, 'Political Theology', p. 540.
[165] Konrad Adenaur's description of Martin Niemöller as cited in Gerlach, 'From Pirate on the High Seas to Angel of Peace', Locke and Littell, *Remembrance and Recollections*.
[166] For Control Commission Germany information and intelligence folder on Niemöller see PRO FO 1050/1498.

opposition. For historians of the *Kirchenkampf*, as it was for the Anglican church, this essence is captured by Nazi expressions of the totalitarian will. Such an understanding of the Third Reich justifies the existence of acclamations of the Niemöller protest and a sophisticated understanding of the ambiguities of Christian resistance. For example John Conway found significance in the Confessing Church (despite acknowledged ambiguities) because it provided rare 'ideological free spaces' in which thinking independent of that totalitarian will could survive.[168] However such a characterisation retains assumptions about the nature of both resistance and of Nazism that are not sustainable. Nazism is, as it was in the image of Niemöller presented in the 1930s, reduced to a picture of a crude monolithic domination. But if the Nazi dictatorship is primarily a racist one in which virtually all legislation and policy, even those pertaining to societal control, developed from the shared racist assumptions of the leadership echelons of the Nazi state, or at least the knowledge of the racist vision of the Führer,[169] then assumptions underpinning the state would appear to have been shared within the free spaces identified by Conway. If in turn the Nazi state was not a totalitarian monolith, both in terms of polycratic governmental structure and through the multi-agency and even consensual establishment of political control, then this analysis of the ultimate significance of the *Kirchenkampf* is further undermined. Niemöller and the Confessing Church have been shown to have been actively contributing within a negative Semitic discourse which contributed to the acquiescence of the majority of the population in the face of anti-Jewish policy. Equally as the Weissler affair demonstrated political homogeneity in the Nazi state was enforced by the positive acquiescence and indeed co-

---

[167] Hampson, 'The British Response to the German Church Struggle', p.304

[168] This was a term developed by Eberhard Bethge, friend and biographer of Dietrich Bonhöffer, and cited in Conway, 'The Role of the Churches', p.32.

[169] See Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann, *The Racial State 1933-45*, (Cambridge, 1991), Michael Zimmerman, 'The National Socialist 'Solution of the Gypsy Question'', in Ulrich Herbert (ed), *National Socialist Extermination Policies: Contemporary German Perspectives and Controversies*, (Oxford, 2000), pp. 186-210, and Paul Wiendling, 'Understanding Nazi Racism: Precursors and Perpetrators', in Michael Burleigh (ed),*Confronting the Nazi Past: New Debates on Modern German History*, (London, 1996), pp. 66-83, as three examples of studies which place racism at the heart of all policy initiatives. See Ian Kershaw, 'Working Towards the Führer', in Ian Kershaw and Moshe Lewin (ed), Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison, (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 88-106, for a discussion of the nature of the Nazi state and the importance of perceptions of the will of the Führer in conditioning the actions of officials in the Third Reich.

operation of the (by implication, in part, non Nazi) German population, rather than simply the deployment of physical violence from the centre. Therefore these 'free spaces' can be characterised as sharing common racial assumptions with the racial state, and regulating themselves in line with the political vision of the centre.

Secular historiographical assessments of the *Kirchenkampf* are almost identical to the misconceptions at the heart of the contemporary Anglican evaluations of the Niemöller protest. For example Franklin Littell is explicitly aware of the ambiguity of Martin Niemöller's protest:

> the Nazi regime was resisted for invading the church's area of competence and for idolatry - not for breaking the law or its brutal breach of the rights of human beings. Niemöller who was at the time a religious and political conservative [!] was in any case opposed to political resistance.[170]

However Niemöller's significance for Littell was not in the ambiguity of this protest, nor his location in the ideological milieu from which Nazism grew and then flourished. As for George Bell and 1930s secular and Anglican commentators, Littell found Niemöller's significance despite the reality and ambiguity of his protest. Littell writes of his encounter in 1939 with a Dutch theological student that feared Niemöller dead:

> in his [the student] tone of voice and in his attachment, in his identification with Niemöller and with other German brethren who were resisting the Nazis, I had a sudden feeling that nothing the Nazis could do would defeat what Martin Niemöller then represented. In life or death, his message would triumph over the princes and powers of the world's darkness.[171]

In the mid 1930s Arthur Duncan Jones proposed an image of Martin Niemöller as fighting 'the oldest struggle in the history of civilisation, the struggle which raged in the Roman Empire, broke the mediaeval empire, and defeated Bismarck. The modern conception of the totalitarian state is an absolute more rigid than that of earlier dictatorships. So, too, Christianity in the last resort is an absolute which postulates a recognised sphere of freedom'[172] Exactly forty five years later, Niemöller's biographer

---

[170] Franklin H. Littell, 'Foreword', in Hubert G. Locke (ed), *Exile in Fatherland: Martin Niemöller's Letters From Prison*, (Michigan, 1986), p. viii.
[171] *Ibid.*, p. ix.
[172] Duncan-Jones, *Niemöller*, p.278.

defined Confessing Christian protest in starkly similar terms, as more than simply an ecclesiastical protest against Nazism, but part of 'the greater war against dark powers'.[173]

1.7 Conclusion: The Implications of the Myth of Martin Niemöller.

For our understanding of the manner in which the Anglican church conceived of Nazism in the 1930s then, their use of the image of Martin Niemöller is crucial. Although sporadically concerned with the Nazi attack on the Jews, Niemöller was the centrepiece of an understanding of Nazism that regarded the Hitler dictatorship as the manifestation of a wider totalitarian phenomena, also exhibited in the Soviet State. In such a formulation Nazism was understood purely through its methods of punishment and control, and Niemöller was understood as a representative victim of a Nazism defined through its attempts to control the individual. Such an understanding was achieved despite both the reality of Niemöller's protest, and indeed a contemporary understanding of the reality of that protest. Martin Niemöller's image was deliberately manipulated because the reality of his protest was irrelevant, in view of the understanding of Nazism which underpinned the formation of that image. Structurally this understanding of Nazism had little place for appreciation of the racial specificities of Nazi ideology or the nature of the Nazi racial project, and consequently in the early years of the Third Reich anti-Jewishness was not proposed as central in the definition of the iniquity of the Nazi menace. It is crucial that the historian of 'responses' to what we now call the Holocaust must be constantly aware of the haphazard development of Nazi racial policy, and avoid inflating a failure to place antisemitism at the heart of an understanding of Nazism in the 1930s into a misunderstanding of mass murder. But, it is also clear that in the early years of the Third Reich the Anglican church actively proposed an understanding of Nazism that would have been unable to adequately confront the post-1938 developments in Nazi anti-Jewish policy.

There is also a remarkable continuity of interpretation from contemporary religious and secular interpretations of Niemöller's significance through to historiographical evaluation. In all examples Niemöller's presentation as hero was not

[173] Bentley, *Niemöller*, p.135.

predicated on a misunderstanding of his ambiguity, either with regard to the terms of his protest against the Nazi state or indeed his antipathy for the Jews. As such this heroism is self consciously contradictory. Although Niemöller's attractiveness in the post-war world is partially explicable with reference to his efforts to confront the issue of collective guilt, this cannot explain the framework for the accommodation of two contradictory Niemöller's within the same representation. This framework was developed in the 1930s and is especially reflected in Anglican visions of the Niemöller image. Reliant upon the universalisation of both Nazism and Christianity, the concept of totalitarianism was employed to recruit Niemöller in a universal battle against Nazism. The Anglican understanding of Nazism in the 1930s then provided a structure which when used in the post-Holocaust evaluation of the *Kirchenkampf* can reduce the historical significance of Nazi racism, because it is incapable of placing Nazi antisemitism at the heart of a representation of the Third Reich. As such the Anglican preoccupation with Niemöller forced the design of an intellectual schema which has facilitated the post-war negation of the Holocaust.

This image of Niemöller, although continued into the war, and even the post war world, was developed prior to 1938, and the escalation of the Nazi anti-Jewish project. The questions that now present themselves are: how did the structure for the understanding of Nazism developed through, and because of, the Anglican fascination with Martin Niemöller, cope with the escalation of Nazi anti Jewish prejudice displayed to the world on *Kristallnacht*. The Anglican understanding of Nazism and of anti-Jewish violence will consequently be explored in the following chapter. Taking the Anglican conversion from anti-war appeasers to celebrators of the brave morality of the British war effort as a case study, the second chapter of this thesis will analyse the conception of Nazism within this embrace of the principle of war. This investigation will assess the Anglican ability to engage with the Nazis' murderous attack on the Jews after 1939, and suggest the potential impact of this conception of Nazism on the development of an historical narrative of Nazism after 1945.

Chapter Two.
In Defence of Christian Civilisation: The Understanding of Nazism in Anglican Justifications of War, 1938-39.

If the image of Martin Niemöller decisively informed the Anglican attitude to and understanding of Nazism in the 1930s, then the attitude to war underpinned its general perception of the wider world and the broader canvas upon which conceptions of Nazism were painted. Spurred by a genuine revulsion at the horrors of the Great War, which informed the development of Protestant ecumenism and therefore pre-empted the Anglican fascination with Niemöller, the Anglican Church formed the backbone of an apparent anti-war consensus in Britain in the 1930s. This repudiation of warfare, although encompassing several distinct traditions of pacifist discourse, culminated in a celebration of the Munich agreement both inside and outside the Anglican church in September 1938. Yet within a year this apparently unified repudiation of warfare by the Church of England, and within Britain as a whole, had fallen apart. The Anglican church, which had been at the forefront of the rejection of war as a moral impossibility, embraced war against Germany in September 1939 as a practical necessity, albeit with a heavy heart. The purpose of this chapter is to ask what informed the revolution in Anglican attitudes to warfare? Contemporary rhetoric suggests that central to the embrace of war was a development in the Anglican conception of evil, in which, during the year from September 1938 to September 1939, Nazism superseded war as the primary foe. This chapter therefore seeks to investigate what changed in the Anglican conception of the Nazi enemy between Munich and the outbreak of war in order to facilitate the requisite revolution in Anglican moral priorities, and convince the vast majority of the Anglican community of the morality of Britain's war.

Using the case study of the Anglican conversion to the principle of warfare, this chapter will further develop a picture of the manner in which Nazism was understood by the Anglican church in particular, and in Britain in general, at the end of the 1930s. First, it will be argued that the Anglican acceptance of war as moral was a post-hoc justification of a political reality rather than the pre-emptive acceptance of the dangers of Nazism. The reality of the Anglican acceptance of war will help to contrast the memory and history of

the British war effort by suggesting that the conscience of that war was developed after the event. However, it will be noted that retrospectively 'just' or otherwise, Anglicans did anchor their justifications of Munich, and then contrarily war, in understandings of Nazism. This chapter will then investigate this apparent contradiction. It will be suggested that the understanding of Nazism inherent in the Anglican repudiation of warfare and the embrace of Munich rested on a dichotomous and contradictory understanding which failed to relate Nazi foreign and domestic policy to one another. This allowed the coexistence in the Anglican imagination of an implacable opposition to Nazism regarded as alien and anti-Christian through its domestic policy symbolised in the persecution of Niemöller, and a Nazism whose Foreign policy ambitions were viewed, if not with sympathy, then as understandable. Next, in an investigation of the process and nature of the Anglican conversion to warfare which will include an analysis of its theological implications, the understanding of Nazism that underpinned justifications of war will be analysed. Anglicans, it will be suggested, even after the upsurge in Nazi anti-Jewish action in 1938 – and even because of that radicalisation – continued to define Nazism as anti-Christian. It will be noted that, even when perceived as a singular entity, Nazism was still regarded in the Anglican community as a part of the generalised phenomenon of totalitarianism.

The chapter will begin with a discussion of the Anglican anti-war consensus in the inter-war period in order to provide context for the following analysis of the Anglican reception of Munich and the understanding of Nazism therein. The rhetoric of Munich will then be compared with the rhetoric of the embrace of war just twelve months later, again concentrating on the implicit image of Nazism. Through an analysis of the Anglican understanding of *Kristallnacht*, the Nazi attack on Prague, and then the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet pact, it will be demonstrated that the understanding of Nazism as anti-Christian was reinforced by knowledge of the radicalisation of Nazi anti-Jewish policy and continued territorial expansion. It was that expansion, combined with the reality of the outbreak of war in 1939, which ultimately convinced Anglicans that Nazism lay entirely outside of their historical experience, and understanding. Finally the

difficulties that such an understanding of Nazism provided for the dissemination of Nazi barbarity towards Jews in war time will be outlined.

2.1 Anglicanism and War in the Inter War Period.

In the period immediately following the First World War, inspired by the Church's failure to react critically towards that conflict and in an effort to demonstrate the enduring relevance of Christianity, the Anglican church turned toward the highly politicised form of liberal theology embodied in the social radicalism of thinkers such as R.H. Tawney.[1] The attempt to design a 'Christian Sociology' (or Christian social principles) found institutional expression in the Conference on Christian Politics, Economics and Citizenship (COPEC) of 1924, and began to dominate Anglican thought.[2] Decisively political, the thinking institutionalised at COPEC also demonstrated the endurance of liberal and immanentist theological traditions in the Anglican church as it articulated an innate, optimistic faith in the capabilities of man and the validity of concepts of human progress. The ideals of Christian social radicalism amounted to the attempt to locate and design a just form of social organisation – theologically no less than an effort to work constructively toward the earthly realisation of the Kingdom of God.[3] Central to the achievement of this earthly justice was the repudiation of war as a means of solving international disputes. COPEC declared war, along with all forms of indiscriminate social injustice to be contrary to the principles of Jesus Christ.[4] Anglican desires for domestic social co-operation it appears were mirrored in their vision of a co-operative international future.

Practically and politically the most important intellectual and institutional development informed by the Anglican embrace of social and international co-operation in the inter war period was the progression of ecumenism. The 1920 Lambeth conference

---

[1] See R.H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, (London, 1926).
[2] See Edward Norman, *Church and Society in England 1770-1970: A Historical Study*, (Oxford, 1976), pp. 314-60.
[3] Alan Suggate, 'William Temple and the Challenge of Reinhold Niebuhr', in *Theology* (Vol. LXXXIV, NO. 702, November 1981), p. 413.
[4] Alan Wilkinson, *Dissent or Conform? War, Peace and the English Churches 1900-45*, (London, 1986) p. 88.

had redefined the terms of Christian reunion and the ecumenical goal was no longer simply the 'absorption of one communion by another, but rather the fellowship of many communions.'[5] Such amelioration hastened the development of co-operation between diverse European Protestant churches, although intellectual exchange was chiefly centred around relationship between English and Northern European or Scandinavian Protestants.[6] The ecumenical spirit of partnership was institutionalised in the aftermath of the Great War, and indeed was the one intellectual impulse that would span the inter-war period, and then dominate Protestant prescriptions for post 1945 society.[7]

The new Anglican enthusiasm for ecumenism, and indeed her disavowal of war, was born from the traumatic memories of the division and bloodshed of the First World War. The Anglican church's sense of shame with regard to that conflict was twofold. First, she was burdened by perceptions of her own failings in war time. The Anglican church had participated in the narrow celebrations of national arrogance in 1914, and urged young men to volunteer for the defence of the national honour. In the latter stages of the war the church rhetorically identified conflict with Germany as a crusade. By identifying the war as a modern crusade the Anglican church was one of many voices in Britain which counselled against negotiated peace and they perhaps even perpetuated bloodshed by beatifying belligerence. The sense of moral certainty implicit in the idea of crusade, the absolute vision of guilt and innocence, also dictated initial Anglican support for a punitive peace in 1918.[8] Second, the brutal consequences of the war itself and the undeniable horrors that had been revealed on the fields of Flanders, which the Anglican church felt retrospectively partially responsible for, also informed the Anglican embrace

---

[5] Cited in Ronald Jasper, *George Bell: Bishop of Chichester*, (Oxford, 1967), p. 57.
[6] See George Bell, *Christian Unity: The Anglican Position*, (London, 1948), for a statement of Anglican attitudes to ecumenism. Bell's collection of essays also acts as an illustration of the Northern European dominance of the ecumenical movement – the essays are the text of lectures given by Bell to the University of Uppsala in 1946. See also Norman Goodall, *The Ecumenical Movement: What it is and what it does*, (London, 1964), in which the author describes the enduring strength of ecumenism in war-time through recounting his own trips to neutral Sweden.
[7] See Adrian Hastings, *A History of English Christianity*, (London, 1986), pp. 302-10.
[8] Albert Marrin, *The Last Crusade: The Church of England in the First World War*, (Durham, North Carolina, 1974), pp. 252-59.

of co-operation.[9] The church was resolved to preventing a repeat of human suffering on such a vast scale and remained implacably opposed to the principle of warfare virtually until September 1939, clinging to the desperate faith that the Great War had indeed been the war to end all wars. In the words of Randall Davidson, the post-war Archbishop of Canterbury: the Anglican church had seen with its 'own eyes...the awful, the horrible, devil devised barrier of war...its unspeakable, unlimitable horrors' and desperately desired that there 'would be no next time'.[10]

Concomitant to informing Anglican enthusiasm for ecumenism, the international vision developed in the long shadows of the nationalist paranoia of the battlefields of the First World War is crucial in the assessment of their attitudes to international politics. As a body which appeared to institutionalise international political co-operation, the League of Nations – before the Manchurian and Abyssinian crises revealed its impotence – received the enthusiastic support of the Anglican community. The ecclesiastical weekly, *The Guardian*, declared in March of 1933 that the Anglican Church was the 'main bulwark' supporting the League in Britain,[11] and the extent of that support was manifested in the degree of political lobbying undertaken by the Episcopate, and especially William Temple, on behalf of the league.[12] Cosmo Lang openly heralded the divine potential of the league in 1934 when he declared that the 'reign of Law [of God]', was a 'practical possibility [only] if the principles of the covenant of the league...[were] seriously fulfilled'.[13] For Anglicans to reject the league would have been to ignore 'the lesson of the great war' which had been 'written large - in letters of blood.'[14]

---

[9] See Alan Wilkinson, *The Church of England and the First World War*, (London, 1978) for a discussion of the Anglican reaction to the war which includes its initial attitude to post war remembrance and memorialisation.

[10] Cited in Wilkinson, *Dissent or Conform*, p. 87. For an extensive analysis of Davidson, which must be treated with some caution because of its author, see George Bell, *Randall Davidson*, (Oxford, 1935).

[11] *The Guardian* 3 March 1933, cited in Wilkinson, *Dissent or Conform*, p. 88, where Wilkinson argues that the *Guardian's* analysis was correct, see also Andrew Chandler, 'Munich and Morality: The Bishops of the Church of England and Appeasement', in *Twentieth Century British History*, (Vol. 5, No. 1, 1994), pp. 77-99.

[12] Alan Suggate, *William Temple and Christian and Social Ethics Today*, (Edinburgh, 1987), p. 30 & 180.

[13] Lang to Lord Davies 9 May 1934 - Lang Papers, Lambeth Palace Library, Vol. 54, f. 185.

[14] Cosmo Lang, 'Disarmament', in Percy Dearmer (ed.), *Christianity and the Crisis*, (London, 1933), p. 502.

Although the belief that there would and could 'be no next time' was almost uniform within the Anglican church, and indeed reflected a national consensus, such anti-war sentiment did not actually amount to a unitary discourse. Anti-war rhetoric in Britain between the wars actually consisted of two distinct moral and political positions, pacifism, and pacificism.[15] Prior to 1914 pacifism was almost exclusively a non-conformist concern.[16] Yet after 1918 the avoidance of war equally became the moral touchstone of the English Christian mainstream.[17] But Anglican repudiation of the principle of war in the inter-war period does not allow the Church of England to be labelled pacifist. In fact to suggest that there was a *pacifist* consensus would actually be to subscribe to a contemporary confusion as to the nature of pacifism.

Christian Pacifism,[18] was a narrow and sectarian faith that had reference, and relevance, only to personal morality rather than the practical realities of international politics. Although it was a faith popularised by the Anglican Dick Sheppard in the mid 1930s through his mass 'Peace Pledge Union' movement, as a result of its scant regard for political pragmatism pacifism never took a dominant hold in the Anglican church.[19] The PPU reached a peak of subscriber numbers in the hundreds of thousands, but ultimately the threat of war in Europe, felt keenly from the beginning of 1938, caused the PPU to wither as practical political movement after 1937. Pacifism could provide no practical prescriptions to negate the aggression of the European dictators, and the PPU as a movement was also shattered by, and ultimately unable to survive, the death of its

[15] The latter term was in fact first coined by AJP Taylor, but Martin Ceadal has used it to develop a comprehensive history of anti war rhetoric in the Christian church in the period between the wars. See Martin Ceadal, *Pacifism in Britain 1914-45: The Defining of a Faith*, (Oxford, 1980), and, 'Christian Pacifism in the Era of the Two World Wars' in W.J. Sheils (ed.), *The Church and War: Papers Read at the Twenty First Summer Meeting and the Twenty Second Winter Meeting of the Ecclesiastical History Society*, (London, 1983), pp. 391-92 for a specific definition. 'Pacifism' refers to the personal moral decision that war is absolutely wrong, as is any activity contributing to war or the possible prosecution of a war. 'Pacificism' alternatively, refers to the belief that war should be politically avoided because it was an injudicious way of solving international disputes.

[16] Ceadal, 'Christian Pacifism', p. 394.

[17] Hastings, *English Christianity*, p. 330, and Ceadal, 'Christian Pacifism', p. 391.

[18] See Ceadal, 'Christian Pacifism', Ceadal, *Pacifism in Britain*, and Wilkinson, *Dissent and Conform*, pp. 101-36 for discussions of Christian Pacifism.

[19] Hastings, *English Christianity*, p. 332 and Ceadal, 'Christian Pacifism', p. 393.

charismatic leader Sheppard.[20] Many of the members of the PPU discovered, just as the Quaker 'peace society' had in 1914 - whose leadership actually endorsed the Great War[21] – that in the face of dictatorial aggression they were not pacifists at all, merely pacificists.[22] In contrast to the individual morality of pacifism, Pacificism was a self-consciously political discourse and perceived of the purpose of politics as the avoidance of war. However Pacificistic thought *did* allow the possibility of war, in that it was conceivable that there *could* exist a greater evil than warfare, and therefore that war could be just and that 'killing could be Christian'.[23] Equally pacificistic politics had no direct bearing on the morality of individual action. As the *Church Times* instructed in February of 1938 'the Christian's first concern in the world, as it is today, is the preservation of peace, we are above all things *opposed to war*' (my italics), but that political imperative had no bearing on the justifiability of the individual Christian's participation in war.[24] If Christian pacifism was the ultimate expression of theological liberalism, in that it required the personal repudiation of violence and as such the imitation of Christ, pacificism was a peculiarly Anglican version of that liberalism through the application of a political reality. Such politicisation mirrored the practical political interventionism of Anglican political theology and consequently pacificism held greater attraction in the Anglican community. However at times during the 1930s the differences between anti-war discourses were difficult to discern, most notably in the celebrations that greeted the Munich agreement as deliverance from the horrors of another conflict.

2.2 September 1938: The Morality of Munich.

2.2 i) Celebrations of the Munich Agreement.

Proclaimed as hailing 'peace in our time' the Munich agreement which secured German annexation of the Sudetenland, and a pledge that Britain and Germany would never go to

[20] For an anecdotal account of the popular grief felt at Sheppard's death see Carolyn Scott, *Dick Sheppard: A Biography*, (London, 1977), pp. 240-46.
[21] Ceadal, 'Christian Pacifism', p. 394.
[22] Wilkinson, *Dissent or Conform*, p. 248.
[23] Ceadal, *Pacifism in Britain*, p.122.
[24] Cited in Wilkinson, *Dissent or Conform*, p. 173.

war again, was welcomed in Britain as a 'great service to humanity'.[25] It was at this time when Europe had seemed on the brink of the 'extreme horror' of another general war that despite its philosophical, political and theological divisions, the anti-war consensus in Britain as a whole and especially within the Anglican church, appeared at its most vociferous and unified. Chamberlain's policy of European appeasement won general support in Britain,[26] and was awarded almost universal endorsement. *The Daily Mail* hailed the 'foundations of peace in Europe', whilst *The Times* lauded Chamberlain's service to the 'supreme interest' of the preservation of peace. Even the *Manchester Guardian*, while admitting that Czechoslovakia 'suffered ...great...injustices...under the Munich agreement' which were 'calamitous', concurred with the moral consensus regarding the absolute necessity of avoiding war. Leader comment suggested that injustices done to the Czech population of the annexed Sudetenland were irrelevant in comparison with the 'horrors that might have extinguished not only Czechoslovakia, but the whole of western civilisation' in the event of war.[27]

If anything the welcome for Munich from within the Anglican church was more emphatic than that from secular commentators. Joy was unconfined within the Church of England for a peace that was literally believed to be heaven sent. The Archbishop of Canterbury paid lip service to his 'sympathy [for] the Republic of Czechoslovakia' before ecstatically welcoming the 'God sent opportunity' of the apparently divine Munich settlement. William Temple echoed Lang's thanksgiving, hailing Munich as a 'deliverance'. In a statement which appeared to reflect the endurance of a liberal theology Temple claimed to detect the direct intervention of 'the hand of God' at Munich.[28] In order to give public expression to the spirit of celebration within the Anglican church and the wider nation, immediate plans for services of thanksgiving were made after the conclusion of the new peace. Services were to be held on the Sunday after Chamberlain's

---

[25] *The Times* 1 October 1938, p. 13.
[26] R.A.C. Parker, *Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War*, (London, 1993)), p.344.
[27] Quotations from *The Daily Mail* and *Manchester Guardian* are cited in Keith Robbins, *Munich 1938*, (London, 1968), p.327, and see *The Times*, 1 October 1938, pp. 13-14.
[28] Temple writing in a preparatory document for a conference of leading Anglican figures to discuss the international situation at Lambeth Palace on 21 October 1938, Lang Papers, Vol. 54, f.193.

return and attracted unprecedented crowds of worshippers.[29] The nation apparently united in praise for the divine act of deliverance which Chamberlain had extracted from Hitler, and with which Europe had been saved from the brink of hell.

Ecclesiastical trumpeting of the Munich agreement articulated the same moral priorities as that in evidence in the secular press. Munich was interpreted as divine, precisely because it had prevented war, which was by implication the highest imaginable evil. George Bell wrote to *The Times* prior to the confirmation of the agreement in order to set out the moral position of the Anglican church regarding the possible outbreak of war. Arguing that in his forthcoming conference with Hitler, Chamberlain's guiding principle should be the avoidance of war, the Bishop of Chichester advised the Prime Minister that 'even a defeat in negotiation...however humiliating would be better than a war'.[30] The ecclesiastical press used similar language and directly compared the evils of the European crisis, and particularly Nazism with the evils of warfare as means of evaluating the justice of a possible conflict. The *Church Times* was unambiguous in its conclusion, confirming both the impossibility of destroying the evils of the world with the greater evils of modern warfare,[31] and advising that it was 'difficult to conceive of too high a price for peace.'[32] As was the case for the secular enthusiasts for the agreement, the sacrifices of Czechoslovakia figured little in the immediate ecclesiastical commentaries on the new peace. The welcome for Munich was entirely unambiguous; modern warfare was awarded first place in a hierarchy of evil by the Anglican community and beyond.

2.2 ii) Munich as the Saviour of 'Civilisation'

Central to the rhetoric surrounding ecclesiastical enthusiasm for Munich, and the placing of war at the apex of an hierarchy of evil, was the concept of 'civilisation'. War it was consistently argued would threaten the very existence of that civilisation, a fear explicitly based on the traumatic memories of the 1914-18 conflict. The Church of England newspaper, *The Record*, celebrated Munich by arguing that 'what [was] of paramount

[29] Chandler, 'Munich and Morality', p. 80.
[30] Bell to *The Times* 27 September, cited in Wilkinson, *Dissent or Conform*, p.173.
[31] *Church Times*, 7 October 1938, p. 355.
[32] *Church Times*, 11 November 1938, p. 515.

importance to millions of people in this hour is that the dogs of war are under control.' The avoidance of war was imperative because of the memories of 1914-18, the editorial rejoiced 'that our sons and brothers are not involved in the unspeakable horrors of a war which would certainly have meant the *end of civilisation*' (my italics)[33] Alan Don, Lang's chaplain at Lambeth, recorded in his diary that Munich had given rise to the 'real chance that civilisation might be saved',[34] a chance by implication that war would have destroyed. Lang himself celebrated deliverance from a war 'that might have destroyed civilisation itself',[35] imagery which repeated the language the Archbishop was using at the beginning of the 1930s when he had stated that the ideal of peace was the basis of 'civilisation'.[36]

What then did the 'civilisation' actually mean or denote when employed by Anglican rhetoricians? The term was never expressly defined by those who used it, who, in keeping with the diversity of Anglicanism, in turn used it in a variety of ways. By 1939 William Temple could write that civilisation was not Christian in anything but a rudimentary sense,[37] and consequently presented 'civilisation' as simply the contemporary political and social reality, and not an exclusively Christian concept. Yet, for a Christian how could the term civilised, and therefore civilisation, have any meaning independent of Christianity? When Nazism and the Soviet Union were criticised, they were portrayed interchangeably as anti-civilised or anti-Christian. The nature of that threat, prior to the outbreak of war and the geographical division of the world into opposing armed camps, was often perceived as being directed at values rather than towards a tangible reality. According to Anglican commentators both dictatorships attacked 'civilisation' by attacking Christianity. But at Munich it was war rather than Nazi expansion that was seen as the aggressive threat to 'civilisation', suggesting another definition of 'civilisation' as rooted in both values and specifically in a geography outside of the sphere of Nazi expansion. Alternatively 'civilisation' was also employed within war discourse as a construct embedded in history and tradition. Declarations that civilisation had lost its

[33] *The Record*, 7 October 1938, p. 635.
[34] Don cited in Chandler, 'Munich and Morality', p. 88.
[35] Lang, 'The Deliverance and After', in *The Times*, 3 October 1938, p. 17.
[36] Lang, 'Disarmament', p. 501.

Christian basis were not uncommon in the crisis years of the 1930s,[38] and were suggestive of an understanding of 'civilisation' as both an expression of values *and* a tangible construction. The loss of civilisation was allegedly evident internationally through the growth of the Nazi-Soviet menace and domestically in a decline in religiosity.[39] Importantly the very idea that 'civilisation' once existed in the Christian sense carried with it suggestions of an historical entity, anchored in institutions, rituals *and* values associated with the Christian faith. Further still this historical definition of 'civilisation' was rather contradicted by the general tenor of the socially radical liberal theological project – the earthly realisation of the kingdom of God – which suggested that 'civilisation' was a continuing aspiration and based on the ongoing march of progress, a construct of the future rather than the past.

Within Anglican war discourse and specifically when used with regard to the Munich agreement 'civilisation' was an amorphous concept with a multitude of meanings, employed as both statement of aspiration and of faith in an historical construct. The Munich agreement it was argued was a potential agent of evangelisation that could precipitate the Christian future.[40] It was on this basis that some less generous Christian commentators on Munich issued a rather more restrained welcome than that proposed by the mainstream, arguing that unless modern society reaffirmed a Christian basis then the opportunity provided by Munich would have been lost.[41] The 1938 Lambeth Conference on International Relations also concluded that the recent peace should be used to revivify Christian life.[42] Partially escaping from the euphoria of the original welcome for Munich, the Anglican community gathered at Lambeth (including Bell, Lang, and Temple) two weeks after the settlement had been reached and concentrated soberly on the responsibility of the post Munich world.[43]

---

[37] William Temple, *A Conditional Justification of War*, (London, 1940), p. 23.
[38] See for example *The Guardian*, 24 March 1939, p. 185, where the editorial wondered whether there was any point in saving civilisation through avoiding war because presently it was 'unworthy' of 'our creator'.
[39] Hastings, *English Christianity*, p. 254.
[40] See Lang's statement in *The Times*, 1 October 1938, p.14.
[41] See Oldham to *The Times*, 5 October 1938, p. 15.
[42] Conference of Representative Members of Christian Churches in England and Scotland, *Some Principles of Christian Policy*, (London, 1938).
[43] See 'Lest We Forget', Lang Papers, Vol. 54, f. 231.

Aspirational definitions of 'civilisation' cast peace as the potential saviour because peace could facilitate a process of Christianisation or re-Christianisation. It was through the award of an evangelical purpose that the avoidance of war as the defence of 'civilisation', whatever the inherent compromises involved, became a moral act in and of itself for the inter-war Anglican church. Again within these celebrations of peace as evangeliser, 'civilisation' was both aspiration and contemporary reality. To go to war in defence of Czechoslovakia, and put all of 'civilisation' at risk would, for the majority of the Anglican community have been a supremely nonsensical act. To quote Lang again: 'it would have seemed incredible...that the calamity of war should have been inflicted upon many nations merely because of the troubles of three million people in a small district in the centre of Europe' because that very act would itself have destroyed the basis of life for the entire continent. Lang's utilitarian logic may well have been morally questionable, but it was entirely consistent with a mindset which posited war as the supreme evil, and saw the avoidance of war as the embodiment of the progress of man. As such the absolute priority of avoiding war allowed the neutralisation of the moral compromises which are (for the historian at least) retrospectively clear.

It may seem surprising that there was comparatively little consideration of the morality of peace with Hitler within the Anglican community, yet it is perhaps better understood that there was in fact no perceived need for such a consideration because the avoidance of war was seen as the supremely moral action. William Temple's assertion that 'there was a strong moral case for avoiding the outbreak of war, even at great...moral cost' offers a neat summary of the Anglican position, and equally demonstrates that there was an appreciation of the moral compromise involved. Cosmo Lang was also well aware of the compromise of allowing the annexation of the Sudetenland. During the period of negotiation he had been subject to campaigning from various organisations that wished to secure his denunciation of any potential assent to annexation.[44] But Lang refused that

[44] Lang received two impassioned telegrams to fight annexation from the Federal Council of Protestant Churches, and from the Student Christian Movement in Czechoslovakia. The Federal Council appealed to Lang in the 'name of Christ' to lobby Chamberlain not to accede to any Hitlerian demand, or revision of the boundaries of the Czech state. The SCM equally compelled Lang to 'defend liberty' and the 'independence of Czechoslovakia'. Telegram Federal Council of Protestant Churches in Czechoslovakia to

support, as demonstrated by his euphoric welcome for the agreement. In refusing representation to the Sudeten Czechs, Lang therefore effectively endorsed the moral cost of the agreement. The avoidance of war it seems was the supreme prize for the majority of the Anglican episcopate, a prize worth paying the price of moral compromise for.

2.2 iii) The Politics of Anglican Support for Munich

Despite the language of Anglican support for the Munich agreement being shrouded in the rhetoric of morality, there was also a political rationality to that support. This pragmatic vein within Anglican anti-war discourse reflected both the inherent contradictions of pacificism and the close Anglican relationship with the state. First, Anglican celebrations of the Munich agreement were an endorsement of one element of government policy and therefore one half of a political and moral debate, regarding the future of British foreign policy, which had divided the political community.[45] But equally within themselves the apparently moral celebrations of the agreement contained an element of *realpolitik* and apparent intellectual compromise. Munich brought not only the promise of peace but the promise of rearmament, and as such an increase in planning for war. There is little in the speeches and sermons of those concerned with Munich to suggest that they found this an uncomfortable association. A letter writer to the *Church Times* raised the apparent contradiction inherent in the effort to marry the moral absolute of repudiating war and the pragmatism of rearming by asking 'how it was possible to hold two such views at the same time'.[46] The *Church Times*, which largely articulated the views of the Anglican majority on matters of war, responded robustly that the 'Nations which do not threaten force because of their love of peace...[need] to be ready...to meet force with force'.[47] In the aftermath of Munich, albeit couched in the language of faith and deliverance, Anglican opposition to warfare remained pacificistic and fundamentally

---

Lang, 29 September 1938, Lang Papers, Vol. 55, f. 133. Telegram, SCM to Lang, 30 September 1938, Lang Papers, Vol. 55, f. 139.

[45] For an account of Labour Party objections to the agreement, and their contact and alliance with dissident conservatives in the Munich debate in the House of Commons in October 1938, see Ben Pimlott, *Labour and the Left in the 1930s*, (London, 1977), pp. 162-69.

[46] Griffiths to *Church Times*, 14 October 1938, p. 388

[47] *Church Times*, 28 October 1938, p. 451.

grounded in rational politics, despite its representation as a moral decision. In its representation of the agreement as divine, Anglican support of Munich also remained closely tied to an incarnation theology of hope.

2.2 iv) Dissent from the Munich Consensus.

That the church was endorsing one faction of a moral and political divide demonstrates that despite the portrayal of national thanksgiving at the conclusion of the Munich agreement there was dissent from the pro-Munich position in Britain. Such dissent was also present in the Anglican church. Criticisms of the agreement were based on the mirror image of the moral absolutes which were employed to bolster Munich. In secular terms, Clement Attlee led the Labour party's dissent from the Munich consensus by invoking the idea of civilisation, which he concretely identified as a system of values. According to the Labour leader the agreement had enshrined a 'victory...for brute force [in which] the cause of civilisation [had] received a terrible defeat'.[48] The *Jewish Chronicle* formed the only significant press questioning of Chamberlain's actions, articulating the despair of the Jewish community at the apparent pandering to Hitler. Once again this protest was proposed in absolute moral terms, but offered little practical political advice. For both the Jewish community and the Labour party the proposal of genuine political alternatives were problematic as neither could be seen as explicitly calling for war.[49]

There was some criticism of the agreement from within the Anglican church which also employed an interpretation of moral responsibility in evaluating the new peace. Whilst the support of the vast majority of the ecclesiastical press, and the episcopate ensured that Anglican opposition to the agreement was limited, it did come from formidable quarters led by Hensley Henson, the irascible Bishop of Durham. Henson, the church's most vociferous opponent of the continental dictators,[50] consistently dismissed the moral basis of the Munich agreement. Like Attlee, Henson interpreted

[48] Attlee quoted in *The Times*, 4 October 1938, p. 8.
[49] See David Cesarani, *The Jewish Chronicle and Anglo Jewry*, (Cambridge, 1994), p.164-5 for an analysis of the *Jewish Chronicle* and the Anglo Jewish response to the Munich agreement and the consensus behind it. For the problems of Labour response to the agreement see the conclusion of Keith Robbins, *Munich 1938*, (London, 1968).
[50] See Hastings, *English Christianity*, p. 326-8.

Nazism as outside the boundaries of 'civilisation'. Henson defined 'civilisation' as an ethical construct and did not accept that war was the ultimate antithesis of those ethics. Henson felt that Munich simply postponed an inevitable war between the two ideologies of 'brutal force and 'human reason'.[51] By defining civilisation and European tradition wholly as an ethical construct, Henson was unable to avoid reflection on the degree of moral compromise involved, noting in his diary: 'peace is welcome, but may be disgraceful'.[52] Similarly to Henson, Arthur Duncan-Jones, the Dean of Chichester, was uncompromising in his opposition to Munich which he described as the triumph of violence and a 'shameful betrayal'.[53]

That literally all supporters and opponents of Munich, be they secular or ecclesiastical, and indeed non-Christian, furnished their opinion with the rhetoric of morality deserves comment. For those Anglicans in support of the agreement moral compromise was avoided by the safety of the knowledge that war was the epitome of all evil. For dissenters, it was the continental dictatorships and particularly Nazism and the application of force to the international arena that symbolised the primary wrong. A year after Munich, Henson and Duncan Jones, marginalised in Anglican discussions of war at the end of 1938, would be lost in the orthodoxy which formed around the support of war. Once again we are returned to the question of what it was that shifted in order to precipitate this intellectual revolution. However through looking at the rhetoric employed in support of the Munich agreement we are somewhere closer to discerning a solution to our problem. Clearly in order to overcome the appeasement consensus there needed to be a shift in Anglican conceptions of evil, in which the evil of war was relegated below that of the potential dangers of European dictatorship. Before analysing the manner in which Nazism, which became the primary evil within justifications of the war, was understood in that context of war, it is first necessary to understand exactly how the Nazi opponent was understood in the celebration the Munich peace.

---

[51] Henson cited in Chandler, 'Munich and Morality', p. 89.
[52] Henson cited in Wilkinson, *Dissent or Conform*, p. 178.

2.2 v) The Image of Nazism in Celebrations of Munich.

Anglicans suggested in their rapturous appreciation of the Munich agreement with Hitler that as war had been avoided 'civilisation' could be saved. Yet this was despite an obsession with Martin Niemöller and the privations of German Protestantism in the 1930s, which had fostered an image of Nazism as the antithesis of that 'civilisation'. This then raises the question of how Nazism was understood within Anglican anti-war discourse, and whether or not the image of Nazism presented therein challenged the understanding of Nazism presented through engagement with Martin Niemöller.

A central trope of Anglican discussions of, and responses to, international politics in the 1930s, was the memory of the Treaty of Versailles which also had a profound impact on the understanding of Nazism as an element of international politics. The Anglican episcopate was united as one in their continual dismissal of the injustice of the treaty. For William Temple Versailles was nothing short of a 'disaster',[54] while Hensley Henson echoed the sentiments of many when he interpreted it as an allied moral failure, a 'great crime'.[55] Archbishop Lang remembered at the time of the *Anschluß* that the terms of Versailles had been 'vindictive and arbitrary',[56] a sentiment shared by press commentators.[57] George Bell also lamented Versailles as one of history's 'grievous mistakes' while justifying the German annexation of sovereign territory.[58]

Memories of the treaty it seems entirely obscured Anglican views of outward Nazi German aggression. It was as if German territorial expansion was for Anglicans not expansion at all, if (and only if) it directly revised the punitive terms of Versailles. Under the influence of this historical opinion Anglicanism used the treaty to justify the German remilitarisation of the Rhineland, the *Anschluß*, and finally the annexation of the Sudetenland. The failings of Versailles were invoked explicitly in support of the morality of Munich. For Temple the settlement in which he traced the hand of God was made

[53] Lang Papers, Vol. 54, f. 202, and Hastings, *English Christianity*, p.348-49.
[54] William Temple, 'The Conclusion of the Matter', in Dearmer, *Christianity*, p.601.
[55] Cited in Wilkinson, *Dissent or Conform*, p. 92
[56] Lang in the House of Lords 29 March 1938, and cited in Owen Chadwick, 'The English Bishops and the Nazis' in *The Friends of Lambeth Palace Library Annual Report*, (1973), p.17.
[57] *Church Times*, 30 September 1938, p. 327.
[58] Bell to *The Times*, 27 September 1938, p. 13.

'morally tolerable' only because the agreement made at Versailles was 'at best mistaken'.[59] In Cosmo Lang's statement, broadcast after the Munich agreement was signed, he berated the audience with reminders of their responsibility for the crisis that Munich had solved, asking 'can we think...without shame of the way in which, blinded by the passions of the struggle, we treated our enemies after the Great War?' Lang further instructed that Munich was in many ways 'repentance' for the sins of Britain and the other victorious powers.[60] This religious rhetoric echoed many secular commentators. In the House of Lords Munich was justified as 'putting right what was indeed a wrong' for which Chamberlain and his supporters would be well remembered 'at the bar of history'.[61] The sins of the present it seems were justified with reference to the perceived sins of the past.

There was then a contradiction at the heart of the Anglican interpretation of Nazism in the 1930s. As we have seen the symbol of Martin Niemöller was employed by Anglicans in a condemnatory interpretation of the internal politics of the Nazi state, which were essentially represented as constituting a war against the churches and the recognisable institutions of Christian 'civilisation'. In representations of the suffering of German Protestants, which obscured other victims of the regime, Nazism was presented as the antithesis of 'civilisation'. Yet in the analysis of the external activities of the Nazi state it was war that was presented as the antithesis of civilised order. The foreign policy ambitions of the Third Reich were viewed with some sympathy, rather than as a challenge to the endurance of civilisation.

German territorial expansion was justified as a revision of historical wrongs, the return of the spoils of a previous war the memory of which was peculiarly traumatic for the Anglican church. By relating German territorial expansion to the treaty of Versailles, that expansion appeared to assuage Anglican guilt for the failings of the first war. Equally Anglican commentators, by invoking Versailles in any critique of Nazi foreign policy or expansionism, intellectually located that expansion within the familiar boundaries of

[59] William Temple from a sermon given at Bristol Cathedral, quoted in the *Church Times*, 7 October 1938, p. 376.
[60] from Cosmo Lang, 'The Deliverance and After', in *The Times*, 3 October 1938, p.18.
[61] Lord Mottistone, quoted in *The Times* 4 October 1938, pp. 7-8.

historical possibility, and understandable contemporary international political processes. Within this formulation German aggression was not understood as alien to 'civilisation' but within its boundaries. Explanations for German aggression offered from within the Anglican church commonly related Nazism to German historical continuities, for example expansion was painted as a militarist revival inspired by the punitive Versailles.[62] As such it is clear that in order for the majority in the Anglican church to intellectually justify war with Nazism, a new understanding of Nazism as entirely outside of the boundaries of 'civilisation' would have to be reached.

2.3 September 1939: The Morality and Reality of War.

2.3 i) The Morality of War With Nazism

Despite the apparent absoluteness of mainstream Anglican support for Munich, and the concomitant disavowal of the utility and morality of war, by September 1939 a consensus in support of Britain's military engagement with Nazi Germany existed in the Church of England and in the nation as a whole. Throughout 1939, especially after the German invasion of Prague in March, there had been growing belief in Britain that war was both imminent and justified.[63] William Temple, speaking on the eve of war in August 1939, reflected the spread of this new consensus to the Anglican church, when he conceded that although it was still his firm belief that 'no positive good' could be done by force, he now believed it possible that evil could be 'checked and held back by force.'[64] The *Church Times*, just days before the declaration of war, concurred with Temple's revolutionary recasting of Anglican political morality and found that there was now 'no warrant in the teaching of the church or the lessons of history for the belief that war, however horrible it may be, is necessarily the worst of alternative evils.'[65] There had clearly been a profound shift in the moral priorities of Anglican commentators.

---

[62] Ceadal, *Pacifism in Britain* , p.125.
[63] Maurice Cowling, *The Impact of Hitler: British Politics and British Policy 1933-40*, (Cambridge, 1975), p. 394.
[64] Temple's broadcast address of August 1939, cited in Iremonger, *William Temple*, p. 540.
[65] *Church Times*, 1 September 1939, p. 198.

War was given a graver, but no less emphatic welcome from the Anglican community than the Munich agreement had received twelve months previously. War aims were defined in spiritual rather than territorial terms. The *Church Times*' first leader column after the beginning of hostilities for example, intoned that Britain was 'not fighting for Danzig [or] fighting for Poland, [but] for the independence of nations, [and] the liberties of mankind'. War aims presented Nazism as alien, and directly opposing the 'vital ideals of the Christian religion'. 'Europe' it was suggested was threatened with destruction not by war, but by Nazism.[66] Secular commentators echoed the revolution in the presentation of Nazism, rather than the catastrophe of war, as the primary threat to the future. *The Times* described Nazism as a 'truculent and degraded and bankrupt faith' and celebrated the fact that 'it [was] civilisation itself which is mobilising to crush it'.[67] Whereas previously war was presented only as the inevitable death knell of 'civilisation' it was at this time, paradoxically, presented as her saviour. For William Temple the potential of war with Nazism was that it could be the precipitator of the evangelism that could save an uncertainly Christian civilisation. Temple argued that the worth of 'civilisation' was that it allowed 'free course to the Christian message and to Christian experiment.' Just war Temple explained, amounted to 'fighting to keep open the opportunity of making civilisation increasingly Christian', Britain's war was in these terms just because it was being fought 'against a system ruthlessly opposed to any such enterprise'.[68]

Within Temple's formulation, Nazism had become the primary evil threatening mankind. Indeed Temple was unambiguous as to the intellectual shift that had been necessary to allow previously anti-war Anglicans to approve of Europe's descent into another conflict. War, Temple argued, had now been replaced as the principle enemy of humanity. Temple asked 'is the Nazi threat to civilisation so serious that the evil of allowing it to develop is greater than the monstrous evil of war?' 'About the answer to that question', Temple had no doubts, declaring that 'most of the elements in life which

[66] *Church Times*, 8 September 1939, p. 216.
[67] *The Times*, 4 September 1939, p. 9.
[68] Temple, *A Conditional Justification*, p. 23.

we reckon of the highest value are incompatible with Nazi rule.'[69] Temple's rhetorical question essentially provided Anglicans with a prescription for justifying war – Nazism had to replace war as the essential evil of mankind and threat to civilisation. In order to achieve this Anglicans would have to form a unitary picture of Nazism that was placed outside of the range of 'civilisation', and therefore deemed essentially incomprehensible to the Anglican imagination.

2.3 ii) The Reality of War With Nazism

How then can we explain the revolution in the relative Anglican conceptions of Nazism and of war? Mundanely it appears that the most telling factor in the recasting of Anglican appraisals of war was the actuality of that war. Although Anglican acceptance of the moral possibility of war did predate the beginning of hostilities, the image of war as a moral necessity did not emerge until after September 3 1939. Until the very last moment the Anglican community held enduring hopes for peace in Europe, reflecting the enduring pacificistic repudiation of armed conflict. Throughout 1939 the Archbishop of Canterbury continued his personal pursuit of peace. As late as August, Lang was prepared to warn against war using the rhetoric of the Munich consensus and arguing that because 'force' could not be removed from international politics 'by counter measures of force', war would be absurd.[70] In the same month the Church called for a day of prayer that 'the crime and horror of war may be averted', again using language similar to that employed before the Munich agreement averted war in 1938.[71] Had war been prevented in 1939 it may have been met with similar rejoicing to that which greeted Munich in the previous year.

The Anglican accommodation of warfare was a retrospective act, the post-hoc justification of political reality. Such a contention is rather strengthened by a comparison of the ecclesiastical press in the weeks surrounding the outbreak of war. The week before the war witnessed a chorus of anguish which included plaintive cries that 'heaven [would]

---

[69] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

[70] From a second draft of a statement that Lang attempted to get the leaders of Christianity to unite around, attempts to persuade the Vatican were continually in vain and ultimately the project was shelved. See Lang Papers, Vol. 56, ff. 62-143.

avert the suffering that man's wickedness draws upon his head and shield our hard won civilisation from a staggering blow [i.e. war]',[72] and sarcastic indictments of the 'sad reflection on our unreadiness to learn the lessons of history' as man continued to 'imagine that war' was a potential solution to dispute.[73] However the first publications after the beginning of war appeared to reflect a different set of moral priorities. War (by then a reality) was suddenly capable of defending the 'principles fundamental to Christian civilisation...[and] the right of mankind to develop according to the will of God.'[74] Elsewhere confident assurances were made that 'never has Britain engaged in a conflict with a more righteous cause...the cause of Christ is at stake.'[75] The contrast between the two attitudes to war is striking, and it is only after war began that it could become interpreted as a decisively moral act.

The pacificistic consensus had in fact, despite the language of morality that it employed to condemn war, always accepted the possibility of war. But the absolutism of Christian pacifism could not accommodate war and therefore withered even further in the face of the practical political reality of war with Nazism.[76] As it had in 1914, the onset of war in 1939 and particularly the military threat to Britain from 1940 onwards, led to a large scale reduction in the number of adherents to the pacifist faith.[77] Bertrand Russell for example – although his pacifism was not based on Christian absolutism – discovered his commitment to the pacifist cause and the PPU could not endure the aggression of the continental dictators. Shortly after the outbreak of war he wrote that he 'found at this time [that he] was not pacifist and consider[ed] the future of civilisation bound up with our victory.'[78]

Paradoxically it is easier for the historian to explain the conversion of pacifists to war than it is the conversion of pacificists, *because* pacifists had never previously

---

[71] Lang to *The Times*, 25 August 1939, p. 13.
[72] *The Guardian*, 25 August 1939, p. 541.
[73] *The Record*, 1 September 1939, p. 542.
[74] *The Guardian*, 8 September 1939, p. 571.
[75] *The Record*, 8 September 1939, p. 549-54.
[76] Ceadal, 'Christian Pacifism', p. 393.
[77] Ceadal, *Pacifism in Britain*, p. 294-97.

entertained the possibility of warfare. As such when leading pacifist C.J. Cadoux stated in 1940 that the nature of Nazism had forced upon him the realisation that war may be justified, the historian can easily accept his explanation because his original position dictated that the acceptance of war would require a fundamental revision of outlook caused by external factors. The problem for the historian is that pacificism could always envisage the possibility of war but sought to justify opposition to war in absolutist terms. This essential pragmatism suggests that despite the employment of absolutist rhetoric in support of appeasement, explanation for the intellectual accommodation of war may be sought in terms that fall short of the absolutely moral. As a Christian contemporary, James Parkes, writing under his pseudonym, John Hadham,[79] argued: the outrage that was felt at the barbarity of Nazism 'counted for little in causing the war' but counted for 'a great deal in continuing' the war.[80] It is difficult, under the weight of evidence, to disagree with Parkes' assessment that the conversion of the Anglican image of Nazism as entirely barbarous came after the beginning of war. Despite Anglican revulsion at the First World War, and George Bell's instruction that the task of the Anglican church in war time was to remain the church and not simply lend God's support uncritically to the national cause, the decisive factor in Anglicanism's acceptance of the morality of warfare was the actual existence of that war.[81]

2.3 iii) The Theology of War with Nazism.

The actuality of Anglicanism's acceptance of and enthusiasm for war may therefore have had more to do with her practical relationship with the British state, as defined through the establishment of the Church of England, than the delicacy of evaluating the morality of war as opposed to the morality of an enduring Nazi presence in Europe. But

---

[78] Cited in Ray Monk, *Bertrand Russell 1921-1970: The Ghost of Madness*, (London, 2000), p. 241. Monk also provides an ongoing commentary on Russell's intellectual relationship with pacifism. See pp. 198, 214-16.

[79] For an investigation of the reasoning behind Parkes' decision to write his theological work, which did not touch upon the cornerstone issue of Jewish-Christian relations, under this pseudonym see Robert Andrew Everett, *Christianity Without Anti-Semitism: James Parkes and the Jewish Christian Encounter*, (Oxford, 1993), pp. 96-191.

[80] John Hadham, *God in a World War*, (London, 1940), p. 94.

retrospective or otherwise, war was accepted by the Church of England. Once accepted the Anglican church also had to accommodate war theologically, as the pacificistic repudiation of war had, along with Christian social radicalism, given political expression to the liberal theological faith of the majority of the church. The Anglican acceptance of the principle of war with Nazism in 1939 seemed to be a manifestation of the Church of England's retreat from liberal theology and has been evaluated as such in previous historiography. Acceptance of war, the consensus holds, demonstrated the rejection of liberal optimism in man and the idea of progress, and crucially contained an admission of an inability to interpret or shape the contemporary world through Christian faith.[82]

Theologically this apparent rejection of liberalism appeared to suggest the influence of a continental theology of crisis, which emphasised the sinfulness of man and the otherness of God. In shaping a theological response to the apparently all pervasive atmosphere of crisis in continental Europe from the middle of the 1920s onwards, a systematic attack had been launched against the liberal theological principles of social intervention that abounded in the Anglican church. The central notion of the liberal efforts to realise the earthly Kingdom of God, that man stood on the brink of a brighter future, simply appeared ridiculous to Protestants in the midst of European dislocation, especially in the latter half of the Weimar experiment in Germany.

Liberal theology of incarnation had placed Christ at its very centre. The world that followed the revelation of Christ was then for the liberal theologian simply an attempt to achieve the perfection that the life and death of Christ had revealed. Christian sociology was the political manifestation of this liberal theological principle. The fulfilment of this perfection would concomitantly be the attainment of the kingdom of God, the perfection of Christian 'civilisation'. According to liberal theologians such as William Temple, especially in the 1920s, Christianity and the teachings of the church provided the mechanisms through which the contemporary human experience could be understood.[83]

---

[81] George Bell, 'The Church's Function in War Time', in *The Church and Humanity*, (London, 1946), pp. 22-31.

[82] Wilkinson, *Dissent or Conform*, pp. 193-231.

[83] See William Temple, *Men's Creatrix*, (London, 1917), William Temple, *Christ the Truth*, (London, 1924), William Temple, *Nature, Man, and God*, (London, 1934) which are the three major works of Temple's optimistic theology and philosophy and are essentially attempts to demonstrate that Christianity

Conversely redemptive neo-orthodox crisis theology emanating from the continent did not find the revelation of Christ to be the filter through which human history and interaction could be understood and explained. Central to this repudiation of liberal theological principle, was the rejection of the notion that man could aim for Christ like (and as such divine) perfection. Concentrating heavily on the concept of evil and the doctrine of original sin, a theology of redemption found the world largely unintelligible.[84] As such the efforts and attempts to hasten the coming of the Kingdom of God through the achievement of Christ-like perfection were seen as futile, because this both ignored the innate sinfulness of man, a sinfulness all too evident in the European power politics of the era, and the unknowable otherness of God. While man was the central agent of a liberal theological position that dominated Anglican thought, for what might be tentatively labelled Barthian theology, man was strictly impotent.[85] Equally while 'civilisation' was a practical possibility for the Anglican liberal, it was no more than a set of values for the continental pessimist. The implications of this theological shift for Anglican considerations of warfare were theoretically profound. If man could not emulate Christ and if 'civilisation' was a moral or value construction rather than a political one, then the absoluteness of the responsibility to avoid recourse to war was removed and the utility of such optimism was denied.

Anglican theological justifications of the morality of war bore the imprint of transcendentalism, and especially the American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr. Unlike Karl Barth, Niebuhr appeared aware of the degree to which theological transcendentalism had been a response to the European political crisis, and therefore had more appeal for Anglicans as he eschewed Barth's efforts to find Christianity politically irrelevant. For example Niebuhr had, throughout his career, aimed a sustained theological and political attack at the pacifist creed.[86] Theologically pacifism's liberal faith in the goodness of man aroused the transcendental Niebuhr's condemnation, in that such a position took neither account of the sinfulness of man or, perhaps more importantly, the divine otherness of

---

provided the best methods of making sense of the human experience. See also Owen C. Thomas, *William Temple's Philosophy of Religion*, (London, 1961) for a further discussion of Temple's liberal theology.

[84] Wilkinson, *Dissent or Conform*, p. 202.

[85] See Suggate, *William Temple*, p. 62.

God.[87] Niebuhr also mocked pacifism's political irrelevance. 'If we believe', wrote Niebuhr, 'that if Britain had only been fortunate enough to have produced 30 percent instead of 2 percent of conscientious objectors to military service, Hitler's heart would have been softened and he would not have dared to attack Poland, we hold a faith which no historic reality justifies'.[88] That Niebuhr's rejection of liberalism was based on interaction with the contemporary political reality made him more attractive for Anglicans than the political abdication proposed by Barth. Niebuhr, however, rejected the Anglican notion that war was the ultimate evil. He argued that the idea that the brutality of modern tyranny, which he importantly defined as both Nazi and Communist, was favourable to the 'anarchy' of war, was 'morally perverse'.[89]

William Temple, the Anglican episcopate's most comprehensive theological mind, was certainly deeply troubled by the continental political crisis, and the theological response to it. Temple's faith in the axiomatic progress of human civilisation, in which the Anglican rejection of warfare was anchored, was apparently shattered by the European political crises of the 1930s.[90] By the mid 1930s Temple's optimism had, for example in his preface to the Anglican church's report on doctrine, been replaced by a clear cognition of human impotence.[91] Temple's justifications of war also bore the imprint of this perception of crisis and impotence as he denied the relationship between Christianity and 'civilisation' in terms of contemporary political and social reality, and declared a loss of faith in man. Temple accepted that 'war [was] a monstrous evil of that there can be no doubt'. But, he argeued 'its occurrence is a manifestation of the sin of man. If there were no sin then there would be no war': a fact that the Christian had to accept. [92]

---

[86] Ceadal, 'Christian Pacifism', p. 406.
[87] For example Niebuhr wrote that the 'good news of the Gospel is not the law that we ought to love one another. The good news of the gospel is that there is a resource of divine mercy which is able to overcome a contradiction which we cannot ourselves overcome.' See Reinhold Niebuhr, 'Why the Christian Church is not Pacifist', in Robert Mcaffee Brown (ed.), *The Essential Reinhold Niebuhr: Selected Addresses*, (London, 1986), p. 103. This essay was first written in the early months of the war.
[88] Niebuhr, 'Why the Christian Church', p. 107.
[89] *Ibid.*, p. 110-12.
[90] Wilkinson, *Dissent or Conform*, p.216.
[91] See Wilkinson, *Dissent or Conform*, p. 67, 216, and Suggate, *William Temple*, p.62.
[92] Temple, *A Conditional Justification*, p. 3.

With the acceptance of war, it has been argued that the innate optimism of Christian sociology disappeared and a central tenet of the political expression of liberal theology was rejected. The example of Temple's acceptance of impotence certainly suggests that this is the case. Yet justifications of war also continued to express a liberal faith in the possibility of intervention. George Bell argued (retrospectively) that to refuse to use force 'in the world as it' was, in the face of Nazi aggression, illogical and to shun the Christian concept of order, to resign oneself to the forces of anarchy.[93] Similarly for William Temple, pacifism, although aspiring to the highest moral purpose, would have effectively meant in the contemporary international climate the 'continued obliteration of the Czech and Polish states',[94] which with the reconceptualisation of war and Nazism could no longer be a moral choice for Anglicans. In fact, Temple argued that the pacifist was undermining the cause of civilisation: 'the British pacifist is not merely taking no part [in the war]; he is weakening the British capacity to fight and so far is increasing Hitler's chance of victory', and abdicating from the political participation which was an obligation in the liberal Christian's quest for a better world.[95]

Although Anglican acceptance of war may have been an admission of personal impotence, it cannot be described as a retreat from engagement with the political process. A conception of Nazism and political responsibility was at the centre of the theological accommodation of warfare. The idea of 'civilisation', although almost entirely aspirational in Anglican justifications of war, was certainly not jettisoned altogether. Central to the admission that the world was less intelligible than previously suggested was a reinterpretation of Nazism, which then informed the redesign of a conceptual hierarchy of evil in which Nazism moved above the calamity of war. Instead of the avoidance of war holding the key to the preservation of civilisation and human progress, war itself was awarded this significance. Consequently Anglican engagement with the progress of the war, and crucially post-war global and societal organisation, suggested the maintenance of liberal hope despite the concomitant embrace of war. The only question

[93] George Bell, *Christianity and the World Order*, (London, 1940), p. 81.
[94] William Temple, 'August Broadcast', quoted in Wilkinson, *Dissent or Conform*, p. 266.
[95] Temple, *A Conditional Justification*, p. 4.

that remains unanswered in this effort to understand the Anglican conversion to war is what was the understanding, or perception of Nazism that informed it?

2.4 Anglican Conceptions of Nazism and the Embrace of War.

2.4 i) The Understanding of Nazism in the Retrospective Consideration of the Morality of War.

Over fifty years following the end of the Second World War the claim that war was righteous because of the nature of the Nazi enemy would find few detractors. Across that half a century the status of the war against Nazism as a 'just war' has remained unquestioned, and unquestionable. Commentators separated by discipline, time and purpose have continued to memorialise the Second World War by deploying a remarkable continuity of rhetoric. Geoffrey Fisher[96] declared in August of 1945 that Britain had emerged victorious from the battle of 'light against spiritual darkness'.[97] Thirty years later in 1976, AJP Taylor wrote that 'despite all the killing and destruction that accompanied it, the Second World War was a good war'.[98] A further quarter of a century on, a BBC investigation into the moral ambiguities of some of Britain's post-1945 military engagements, compared conflicts such as the Korean War and the British actions at Suez unfavourably to the enduring integrity of the 1939-45 campaign: arguing that 'even today' at the beginning of a new millennia 'children *know* what the Second World War was about'.[99]

To the citizens of what is now undoubtedly post-Holocaust Europe the basis for this lasting faith in the probity of war with Hitler appears unambiguous. The malevolence of the Nazi enemy is forever symbolised by the murderous campaign against the Jews, which, reflecting this, is so prominent in contemporary mass media. In June 2000 Britain gained a permanent reminder of the morality of its war time adventures following the establishment of an Holocaust exhibition at the Imperial War Museum. The location of a

[96] Fisher was the first Archbishop of Canterbury of the post war era, having succeeded William Temple in 1944.
[97] Geoffrey Fisher cited in Wilkinson, *Dissent or Conform,* p.306.
[98] AJP Taylor, *The Second World War: An Illustrated History*, (London, 1976), p.236.

Holocaust gallery amongst the celebration of British military achievements, and the failure of that exhibition to confront the ambiguities of the British relationship with the Holocaust, combine to cement the intimate connection of the Holocaust and the British war effort in the public imagination, and provide a perpetual reminder of the moral rectitude of Britain's war.[100]

But was it the Nazi campaign against the Jews which informed Anglican justifications of war in 1939? Conception of Nazism's evils have changed over time, and we cannot simply assume that our historical insight into Nazism is a sufficient explanation for the Anglican moral revolution.

2.4 ii) The Historiography of the Anglican Perception of Nazism in the Formation of Morality of War.

Contemporary historiographical orthodoxy contends that to those seeking to morally justify the war against Nazism across the period 1939-45 (and indeed in the immediate post-war era) the Nazi persecution of the Jews played a minimal role. Martin Niemöller was for government and church alike a more meaningful symbol of Nazism's victims than the Jews,[101] and indeed the priority of concentrating on a rather abstracted vision of Nazi criminality, which eschewed emphasis on what we now call the Holocaust, continued to colour British war propaganda throughout the Second World War. The Ministry of Information sought to use Martin Niemöller in propaganda in 1939 in order to avoid the identification of the coming war with the Jewish victims of Nazism, and five years later in 1944 sought to disassociate the unfolding Jewish tragedy in Hungary with any specific notions of Jewishness. Accordingly William Temple was instructed to broaden his appeal on behalf of the Hungarian victims of Nazism to avoid the suggestion that they could be narrowly ethnically defined, and therefore that the war could be

---

[99] BBC Radio 4, 'The Peace Time Conscripts', 27/4/2000.
[100] The Holocaust exhibition was opened to exultant press coverage. See *The Guardian*, *The Times*, *The Daily Telegraph*, and *The Independent*, 7 June 2000.
[101] See Chapter One.

portrayed as being fought on behalf of any particular ethnic group, and specifically the Jews.[102]

Despite the accepted universality of secular visions of Nazi criminality employed in the justification of war, Anglican, and specifically Episcopal, appraisal of the war as moral has hitherto remained outside of this historiographical consensus. Owen Chadwick sought his explanation for Anglicanism's embrace of war in the German 'rape of Prague'. Chadwick found that the invasion of Prague demonstrated to the British public and church that Nazism was not committed to the 'ideals of justice and freedom' which had underpinned the peace won at Munich.[103] However, writing thirty years after Chadwick, Andrew Chandler revised this interpretation of Anglicanism's conception of Nazi criminality. Chandler argued that the persecution of Germany's Jews presented to the world through *Kristallnacht* was the catalyst for the Anglican conversion to war. If Munich had begun an 'age of hope' for the preservation of European peace this age was, according to Chandler, shattered for the Anglican church in November 1938:

> it [the age of hope] ended not with the invasion of Prague...but on 10 and 11 November 1938, when Nazi party members and SA troops turned on the German and Austrian Jewish communities with unprecedented violence...*Kristallnacht* assumed an immense significance for English Christians...the pogrom represented to English Christians a horrifying and unashamed repudiation of their fundamental principles. Their hopes of European redemption were confounded. There could be no rebirth.[104]

Chandler's thesis is unambiguous, it was the persecution of the Jews that demonstrated the malevolence of Nazism to English Christianity, and confirmed for the Anglican church Nazism's separation from the ideals of Christian 'civilisation' that the preservation of peace had, momentarily, preserved.

In many ways Chandler's thesis is attractive to the historian. Post-Holocaust morality justifies the war with Nazism because of the campaign against the Jews, and to find similar justifications of the war within the Anglican church demonstrates the

---

[102] See House (Ministry of Information), to Temple, 6 April 1944, Temple Papers, Lambeth Palace Library, Vol. 55, f. 118.
[103] Paraphrasing Cosmo Lang as quoted by Chadwick, 'English Bishops', p. 18.
[104] Chandler, 'Munich and Morality', p. 94.

contemporary, not simply retrospective cognition of the justice of Britain's war. Chandler's analysis also perpetuates English Christianity's ascribed role within the historiography of the Holocaust. If, as Chandler suggests, the Anglican church fully understood the potential and implications of Nazi antisemitism after *Kristallnacht* then the image of English Christians as the antidote to the general failings of their European brethren in the Holocaust era is further confirmed. Equally such a thesis has an intuitively satisfying symmetry. Anglican justifications of the peace were grounded in a specific understanding of the Nazi menace as the result of continuities in German history. Such an understanding failed to appraise either Nazism's revolutionary or racist character, and as such the Anglican church found the morality of avoiding war to be paramount. However within Chandler's thesis the original ecclesiastical understanding of Nazism, and its role in German history, has apparently been revolutionised. It is notable, for example, that the sins of Versailles were by September of 1939 no longer invoked as justification for Nazi aggression, which could be explicable through the realisation that Nazism was a new historical phenomena, somehow divorced from German and indeed European history. As such war was justified by a realisation of the true character of the revolutionary Nazi regime, the driving force of which was seen as entirely separate from the traditions and continuities of European history. Satisfyingly the implications of such an analysis not only allow the historical Anglican church to comply with the demands of contemporary morality, but also appear to lessen the gravity of the moral failings of the Church in their support of Munich's compromises, the full degree of which only became revealed by the latter and more complete understanding of the Nazi menace available after *Kristallnacht.*

2.4 iii) The Anglican Understanding of *Kristallnacht* and the Justification of War.

Regardless of such intuitive attractiveness, the thesis that posits the persecution of the Jews at the centre of Anglicanism's moral conversion is problematic. For such a prescription to be valid, it is not unreasonable to assume that it would be possible to discern in Anglican evaluations of *Kristallnacht* the beginnings of a shift in the Anglican attitude to a potential war. However a brief analysis of Anglican attitudes to the November pogrom demonstrates a deep disquiet at Nazi barbarity, but little or no

suggestion of the wholesale rethinking of the justice of European appeasement. Despite the contentions of others, it does not appear for example that the ecclesiastical press related the orgy of violence directed against Germany's Jews to the validity of the peace secured at Munich. The *Church Times* did indeed suggest that the pogrom emphasised doubts as to the character of Nazism, suggesting that the pledges secured from Hitler at Munich were less believable post *Kristallnacht*: 'this week's events make it clear that the crisis, that the country believed had come to an end with the Munich agreement, still continues'.[105] However when one places theses sentiments in the context of the overall message of post-*Kristallnacht* leader comment, a more equivocal attitude appears to emerge. The conviction, which Temple defined as having to change before war could be morally tolerated, that 'evil cannot be destroyed by [the] evil' of war was repeated in the same editorial.[106]

The continued repudiation of war in the aftermath of *Kristallnacht* was supported by the claim that although the 'sufferings of Germany's Jews' had 'both appalled and shocked the world', such suffering 'would *not* be ended by war...which would merely mean pain piled on pain'.[107] This rejection of war despite the sufferings of German Jews directly echoed the interpretation of the potential suffering of the annexed Czech population after Munich, in that neither were evaluated as worthy reasons for provoking the chaos of war. In fact the *Church Times*' evaluation of the significance of *Kristallnacht* reflected an editorial consensus in the aftermath of the violence which urged the continuation of the 'high minded' policy of appeasement.[108] While there was also a general agreement that the risk of war still abounded and as such the pragmatism of rearmament should continue, this actually represented no significant change in the rhetoric of war, or the appraisal of Nazism from the previous month and the outbreak of peace.[109]

---

[105] *Church Times*, 18 November 1938 – Andrew Chandler uses this quotation in support of his thesis, 'Munich and Morality', p. 95.
[106] *Church Times*, 18 November 1938, p. 547.
[107] *Ibid.*
[108] *The Guardian*, 18 November 1938, p.747.
[109] See *Church Times*, *The Guardian*, and *The Record*, 18 November 1938.

Equally there appears a continuity of rhetoric employed by the Episcopate in the days before and after the pogrom, which again does not suggest a complete reappraisal of either Nazism or the principle of war. On 14 November 1938 Cosmo Lang renewed the church's 'thanksgiving that their land had been mercifully delivered from the horrors of war'.[110] Similarly in a debate on the sufferings of the Jews at the Church Assembly, while great sympathy was expressed for their plight, there was no effort to relate such suffering to the validity of Munich.[111] A second conference convened at Lambeth Palace to discuss the Munich agreement also released a statement that was decisively phrased in the language of hope, rather than despair, despite the German pogrom. The Anglican community declared that 'the recent crisis [over the Sudetenland] disclosed...a fear and hatred of war, [and] a longing for peace', the Lambeth Conference then repeated the hopes of the evangelistic potentiality of the new peace suggesting that 'the dawn of a new day may be nearer than we suppose. The opportunity is now.'[112] The enduring hopefulness of the Anglican outlook in the aftermath of *Kristallnacht* contains little hint of the partial pessimism inherent in the conversion to war and appears to contradict the notion that the pogrom constituted a fundamental cognitive turning point for the church. Similarly in ecclesiastical reviews of 1938 at the turn of the year, the press were once again united in the hope that war *would* (and indeed should) be avoided.[113]

That the plight of German Jews in November 1938 did not produce a pre-emptive and proactive support for warfare amongst the ranks of the Anglican church is not to say that there was no relationship between the persecution of the Jews and Anglican justifications of war. Much outrage was felt and articulated by the Anglican community as a consequence of the November pogrom, and this revulsion at *Kristallnacht* did contribute to an Anglican understanding of Nazi criminality. Prior to the outbreak of war this understanding may not have been crucial in determining Anglican attitudes to

---

[110] Lang speaking at the Autumn session of the Church Assembly. *Church Assembly Report of Proceedings*, (Vol. XIX, No. 3), p. 424.

[111] See the debate initiated by Canon Guy Rogers, *Church Assembly Report of Proceedings*, (Vol. XIX, No. 3), pp. 543-46, Wednesday 16 November 1938.

[112] Extract from 'Some Principles of Christian Policy' the agreed statement from the conference which took place on the 1 December 1938, see Lang Papers, Vol. 54, ff. 350-53.

[113] See *Church Times*, *The Guardian*, and *The Record*, 30 December 1938. The latter contends that while the European situation remained obscure war could be prevented.

warfare, and indeed *Kristallnacht* was not the crucial factor contributing to such an understanding, however it is clear that after September 1939, the malevolent nature of the Nazi enemy was vital to (post-hoc) Anglican justifications of war. As such it is important to understand the nature of such versions of criminality and indeed the role of the persecution of the Jews within such conceptualisations.

Although not leading to a desire for war with Germany, Britain did greet *Kristallnacht* with some anxiety, as it raised further questions about the integrity of the Nazi leadership and its ability to keep to the promises made at Munich.[114] That a large amount of newspaper coverage was devoted to the violence, if not its aftermath, further demonstrates the considerable impact of the pogrom.[115] The English Christian community too reacted with vocal outrage. Archbishop Lang wrote to *The Times* in order to give 'immediate expression to [his] indignation'.[116] Hensley Henson attempted to articulate his 'moral repugnance.'[117] These vociferous Episcopal condemnations were echoed in the ecclesiastical press, who with one voice condemned the 'orgy of savagery',[118] which had left English Christians 'appalled and shocked'[119] struggling to 'find anything with which to compare the persecution of the Jews in Germany' which appeared to be a return to the 'dark ages'.[120]

Paradoxically however the pogrom, and the generally escalating persecution which provided its context, was not interpreted by English Christians as an expression of the racial character of Nazism and its particular threat to the Jews. Although *Kristallnacht* does indeed contain many clues pointing to the post war and post-Holocaust understanding of Nazism and the centrality of the Nazi racial project, the historian should not of course assume that such an event revealed the future significance of Nazi antisemitism to contemporary observers.[121] In fact *Kristallnacht* was interpreted in the

---

[114] Parker, *Chamberlain and Appeasement*, p. 182.
[115] Andrew Sharf, *The British Press and the Jews Under Nazi Rule*, (London, 1964), p. 58.
[116] Lang to *The Times*, 12 November 1938, p. 13.
[117] See *The Times*, 14 November 1938, p. 9.
[118] *The Record*, 18 November 1938, p. 728.
[119] *Church Times*, 18 November 1938, p. 547.
[120] *The Guardian*, 18 November 1938, p. 747.
[121] In many ways *Kristallnacht* can be seen, along with the *Anschluß*, as *the* major turning point in 1930s' Nazi anti Jewish policy. It was after *Kristallnacht* that German Jews were first in actual physical danger, a

Anglican community within the intellectual schema employed to interpret the significance of Martin Niemöller and the *Kirchenkampf* and other domestic policies of the Nazi dictatorship. Accordingly the vast majority of English Christians were only able to interpret the campaign against the Jews as an element of an ongoing, and more general campaign against the Christian faith. The metaphors employed by the ecclesiastical press invoked images of a savage and pre-Christian era. The Anglican episcopate concurred with such imagery and situated *Kristallnacht* not within the boundaries of Nazi racial teaching, legislation and violence, but the continuing Nazi affront to Christian civilisation.[122]

English Christianity viewed the Nazi threat in exclusively parochial terms. The anti-Jewish pogrom was placed within the framework of an interpretation of Nazi domestic policy as an anti-Christian ideology and government. Antisemitism simply became viewed as the new disguise for the anti-Christ.[123] In fact there was some concern articulated amongst English Christians that vocal anti-Jewish actions should be prevented from obscuring the actual nature of diabolic Nazism; which it was suggested was a 'crusade against culture...[in which] the Jewish Question is of small importance.'[124] Equally behind the press outrage at the violence in November of 1938, was a barely disguised desperation that such actions should not be allowed to distort the true nature of

---

threat that was sponsored by the state. It was equally the first time that physical reprisals had been enacted against the entire Jewish community for the perceived misdemeanours of some of their co-religionists. Retrospectively *Kristallnacht* demonstrates the existence of the possibility of a physical solution to the Jewish question in the Third Reich. Equally as the impetus behind *Kristallnacht* appeared to come from Goebbels, the pogrom demonstrates the radicalising effect that the warring polycracy of the Third Reich could have on anti-Jewish policy, as what appears to have been the propaganda minister's attempt to gain some influence over Jewish policy led to an acceleration in the process of aryanisation and ultimately the economic solution of the Jewish question in Germany through the eradication of all Jewish input into the economic life of the Third Reich. Concomitantly that Goebbels' pogrom was independently initiated but immediately met with the approval of the *Führer* also demonstrated the radicalising impact on the antisemitic policies of the regime of the vaguely formulated ideology of National Socialism, and the effort to satisfy the (unprescribed) ideological ambitions of the *Führer* through the design of ever more radical policies.

[122] See an account of a speech Temple gave attacking Nazi racial policy – 'Racial and Religious Persecution: A London Protest Meeting', in *The Guardian*, 9 December 1938, p. 816. See also Temple and others to *The Times*, 22 November 1938, p. 10. I thank Chana Kotzin warmly for these references.

[123] *The Guardian*, 30 September 1938, p. 627.

[124] *Church Times*, 25 March 1938, p. 339.

Nazi depravity: 'the calculated and spectacular savagery towards the Jews must not lead us to forget the suffering of others. There are Christians in the concentration camps.'[125]

2.4 iv) The Anglican Understanding of the 'Rape of Prague'.

A further problem with the identification of *Kristallnacht* as the turning point in the Anglican attitude to the morality of war is the degree to which it ignores the contemporary invocation of the German invasion of Prague as the moment that the hope of a lasting European peace died. In what was the most vigorous investigation of the ethics of war by an Anglican, William Temple referred directly to the 'rape of Prague', but not to the persecution of the Jews, as forcing a reconsideration of the relative evils of Nazism and the war.[126] A less reflective or retrospective example is provided by Cosmo Lang's immediate response to the Czech crisis of spring 1939, which unambiguously related the contemporary developments in international relations to the celebration of Munich the previous Autumn, in a manner conspicuously absent in Anglican comment on *Kristallnacht*. The unequivocal nature of Lang's stance justifies the use of a lengthy quotation:

> the clouds which we hoped had rolled away last September, have reformed in even more menacing form...plainly challenge has come to the whole basis of the civilised order of mankind...plainly if such a challenge were to go unanswered we should never be able to be assured of peace again...We all know that the people of the world is (sic!) longing for peace, but it cannot be had when there is let loose among us this assertion of force...They [the Nazis] must be made to learn that in the hands of those who value the sacred principles of justice and freedom there is force enough to meet them...our nation and like minded nations are prepared to put sufficient might on the side of right.[127]

The contrast between Lang's response to Prague, and his response to the November pogrom could hardly be more marked. While the invasion revealed the profound threat of

[125] *The Guardian*, 18 November 1938.
[126] Temple justifies war because, and this is admittedly a rather oblique phrase, 'what is happening in Bohemia and Moravia' demonstrated the perils of Nazism. Temple, *A Conditional Justification*, p. 21.

Nazism to the values of civilisation, and challenged any absolute commitment to the avoidance of war, the pogrom evoked no such response, and the outrage it inspired was articulated in the context of continuing thanksgiving for peace.

Lang's response, and Temple's retrospective justification were echoed (or foreshadowed) in the reaction of both the secular and ecclesiastical press to the invasion of Prague. *The Times*, for example, declared that the German invasion of Prague actually was beneficial in that it had revealed the full extent of Nazi depravity 'in all its cunning and ruthlessness' as a 'revolting system' which was a genuine threat to the 'hard won gains of civilisation'.[128] The *Church Times* repeated this sentiment when it recognised that 'Czechoslovakia's fate [was] a solemn warning that nothing [would] stop Nazi aggression unless it is faced by overwhelming military strength' – a stance only justified by the fact that the 'rape of Czechoslovakia [was] the most important and menacing event...since the end of the Great War'.[129] For *The Guardian*, after the events of March 1939, war with Nazism was the only way to 'save our race and make it worthy of our creator'.[130] This tendency was further emphasised in December 1939 when the *Church Times* recognised retrospectively the importance of this particular act of aggression: 'the hope of a rational...solution was restored [at Munich]. But in March...this hope was seen to be illusory.'[131] Perhaps what is most notable is not simply the fact that Anglicans began to reappraise the international system after Prague rather than *Kristallnacht*, but it was after Prague that the rhetorical tone which characterised the Anglican defence of war began to be heard. From March 1939 war was not painted as the only antithesis of civilisation, but was joined by Nazism.

Prague was then contemporarily acknowledged as a turning point in the Anglican notion of what Nazism represented in the later 1930s. The treaty of Versailles could no longer be used by Anglicans as a sufficient explanation for the German outward expansion. In part this is simply explicable as the Anglican realisation that German

---

[127] Lang, from a sermon delivered in Folkestone on 19 March 1939, quoted in *The Guardian*, 24 March 1939, p. 187.
[128] *The Times*, 17 March 1939, p. 17.
[129] *Church Times*, 17 March 1939, p. 271.
[130] *The Guardian*, 24 March 1939, p. 185.
[131] *Church Times*, 29 December 1939, p. 348.

aggression may not have stopped with the revision of Versailles and the righting of historical wrongs, but that this expansion had a force and a logic of its own. Of course as soon as territorial expansion ceased to be explicable with reference to Versailles then it began to challenge the notion that the external behaviour of Nazism was within the frame of Anglican experience of international politics in the civilised world. Coming after *Kristallnacht* had further confirmed the alien anti-Christian injustice of Nazi domestic politics, Prague appeared to the Anglican church to challenge the increasingly untenable notion that they could separate the internal and external behaviour of authority in the Third Reich. Once the dichotomous understanding of Nazism was undermined then Nazism began to be viewed by the Anglican church as wholly incomprehensible and antithetical to a civilisation which, in line with the lip service to theological pessimism, was increasingly defined in terms of aspirational values rather than objective reality. As such it was Prague that appeared to begin the process of reconceiving Nazism, and therefore justifying war, because it forced consideration of Nazi Foreign policy within the same rhetorical framework as Nazi domestic policies which were already considered to be alien and beyond the Anglican historical experience.

2.4 v) Anglicanism and the Nazi Soviet Pact.

The understanding of Nazism held in the Anglican church after Prague and *Kristallnacht*, as a negation of Christian value and entirely outside of civilisation, dictated that the Hitler state was not perceived purely as a singular phenomenon and was generalised to the neglect of understanding its specifically racist ideology. The example of the Anglican interpretation of *Kristallnacht* demonstrates that the development of an image of Nazism as primarily anti-Christian explicitly involved the reduction of the significance of Nazi racism. This process was continued in the presentation of an image of Nazism entirely outside of European history and politics which facilitated the Anglican justification of war. Indeed within those justifications of war Nazism was presented as one element of a generalised totalitarian foe, the definition of which specifically included Soviet Communism. An example of the generalisation of Nazism and Communism was provided by the Anglican evaluation of alliance with the Soviet Union, first in terms of a potential

British compact with Sovietism, and second through the reception of the actual Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement.

Religious opinion of alliance, or potential alliance with the Soviet Union remained entirely sceptical in the later 1930s. The *Church Times* again acted as an exemplar of Anglican opinion, and lampooned objections to the Munich agreement based on the suggestion that an alternative coalition including Soviet Russia, directed at Nazi Germany, would have been preferable to the appeasement of Hitler. Military co-operation with either totalitarian, it was suggested, would have involved Britain in a 'war in hell, with one devil pitted against another.'[132] Such understanding of the essential similarity of the twin totalitarian devils dictated that the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact was greeted by an almost tangible relief in the Anglican community. Anglican understanding of the absolute division in a bi-polar world was awarded political legitimacy by the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement, which appeared to range the totalitarian states in unambiguous opposition to the forces of western civilisation, and crucially Christianity.[133]

The belief that Nazism gained its evil from totalitarian control, and repression of religious (specifically Christian) freedom was central to the Anglican understanding of the Second World War, and decisively informed moral justifications of their acceptance of the political reality of war. This conceptualisation of the Nazi evil also appeared to be confirmed by the impression that Nazism and Soviet Communism were equivalent expressions of Godless totalitarian sentiment. Anglicanism found such totalitarianism to be entirely alien to the Christian (or western) way of life. Concomitantly, war became a defence of that civilisation. Although *Kristallnacht* and its attack on the Jews was not used by Anglicans to justify a potential war with Nazism, it was used to cement the image of Nazism as malevolent as due to its anti-Christianity. Although primarily retrospective, Anglican justifications of war owe much more to the German invasion of Prague than they do the November pogrom against the Jews. After March 1939, as German aggression seemed to go beyond the revision of the Versailles treaty, the outward, in addition to inward, actions of the Nazi state were portrayed as the repudiation of a Christian order,

[132] *Church Times*, 7 October 1938, p. 355.
[133] *Church Times*, 25 August 1939, p. 171.

and therefore potential threat to civilisation. However decisively important in the Anglican justification of war was the beginning of that war itself, which then allowed an image of Nazism as anti-Christian to come to the fore and dominate all public consideration of the Hitler regime. Anti-Christianity was then utilised in the projection of an image of Nazism as the primary threat to civilisation.

The impact of that understanding of Nazism was of wider importance than simply the obfuscation or distortion of the significance of *Kristallnacht* for the Anglican imagination, and the underscoring of the retrospective Anglican justification of war. The broad understanding of Nazism as the primary threat to civilised order through the alleged Nazi negation of Christian value provided a structure through which Nazism would be interpreted throughout the war.

2.5 Conclusion: Anglican Justifications of War and the Understanding of the Holocaust as History.

In and of themselves these appear potentially important observations. First in terms of the history of the Anglican church itself, it has been demonstrated that its attitude to warfare articulated an enduring commitment to optimistic liberal theology until a moment of political conversion when presented with the stark realities of war in 1939. Anglicans then abandoned the political manifestation of a liberal understanding of the world by accepting the necessity of war and therefore the sin of man. But even this conversion to war contained an ongoing faith in civilisation as aspiration rather than reality which suggested the endurance of a liberal hope in the Anglican episcopate. The acceptance of the need for war once war had begun, engendered a post-hoc justification of warfare, continued by historians, which explained the conversion of the Anglican church in terms of the immorality of the Nazi menace. There is no doubt that by the outbreak of war the Anglican church did clearly conceive of Nazism as a menace, but the definition of that menace as anti-Christian reveals a stark contrast with the contemporary conceptualisation of Nazism and the campaign against the Jews as the central indicator of Nazi barbarity and criminality. This tells us much of the manner in which the war was morally appraised in Britain, and the degree to which popular memorialisation and mythology of the Second

World War reflects the demands of contemporary morality and understanding of the nature of the Nazi state, rather than the intellectual realities of the day.

Such conclusions also have profound implications for the manner in which Nazism, and specifically the Holocaust, was then understood during war time, and in the post war world. Understanding of the Holocaust in the immediate post-war era was scant and erratic. While the nature of the contribution of the Anglican churches, and the rhetoric of ecumenical Christianity to this (lack of) understanding will be investigated in detail in chapters below, we are able to identify from this early conception of Nazism some of the inevitable pressures brought to bear on the conception of the Third Reich and the Jewish tragedy in war time. Nazism was understood as a specific threat to Christianity and to a loosely defined Christian Civilisation, rather than as a racist discourse. The continual invocation of Nazism as anti-Christian provided a ready made structure for the development of an exaggerated understanding of the profundity of Christian resistance in the Third Reich which had emerged from the promotion of the Niemöller image. The idea of Christianity as the only resistant force to Nazism predominated throughout the war, with several books published to highlight the ongoing opposition of Christians to the Nazi menace.[134] Most significant of all however, was the implications of the Anglican understanding of Nazism for their dissemination of reports of the escalating privations of the Jews in Nazi occupied Europe. Understanding anti-Jewish polices as evidence of Nazism's essential opposition to Christianity dictated that at the very least the Anglican church would struggle to conceive of reports of Jewish suffering as important in and of themselves.

[134] See Wilkinson, *Dissent or Conform*, p. 254 – works included Eivind Berggrav, *With God in the Darkness*, (London, 1943), Hugh Martin (ed.), *Christian Counter Attack: Europe's Churches Against Nazism*, (London, 1943), Henry P. Van Dusen, *What is the Church Doing?*, (London, 1943).

Chapter Three.
The 'war of ideals': Anglican Understanding of the Second World War and the Murder of the European Jews.

Although after 1939 the Anglican community wholeheartedly supported Britain's war with Nazism as moral, this revolutionised understanding of both Nazism and war did not signal an end to engagement with the probity of the British war effort. In this chapter it is intended to review the ongoing Anglican intellectual engagement with the war in order to provide the necessary context for understanding Anglican 'responses' to, largely in terms of their intellectual accommodation of, the Nazi campaign of extermination against European Jewry. It will be argued that it is only through the Anglican conceptualisation of the Second World War as a battle between ideologies, between Christ and the anti-Christ, that one can seek to understand Anglican perceptions of the Jewish tragedy.

This chapter will begin by assessing the Anglican discourse of war between 1939 and 1945. An analysis of the understanding of Nazism in the first years of the war will argue that prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union, Nazism was understood by the Anglican community to be a generalised form of anti-Godism, and as such collectively with Soviet Communism. But central to the concerns of this chapter are changes within the Anglican discourse of war across the period 1939-45, which were largely, like the justification of war itself, enforced reactions to the shifting external political situation. The most profound of the changes in Anglican engagement with the war was provided by the Nazi invasion of its Godless ally the Soviet Union, and the subsequent Anglo-Soviet alliance. This alliance issued a profound challenge to an Anglican understanding of the war which had been predicated on the cognitive division of the world into opposing blocks: God and anti-God, democratic and totalitarian, European and alien. With this in mind we shall survey the impact of the Nazi invasion of the USSR on Anglicanism, and specifically Anglican attitudes to the newly complex war; asking how this global political shift changed Anglican attitudes to the Soviet Union, and, more importantly for our present purpose, the now singular Nazi enemy. The assessment of the Anglican conception of the enemy will also investigate the divergence which emerged between the conceptualisation of Nazi and German in Anglican thought. It will be argued that the changing concept of the righteousness of Britain's war and the emergence of a more fluid understanding of a 'war of ideals' provided the context within which the Anglican church understood,

and indeed misunderstood, the Nazi campaign against the Jews, within the already extant understanding of Nazism as anti-Christian. Yet it will be noted that some members of the Anglican community did achieve a greater understanding of the murder of the Jews, but even this apparent sophistication will be shown to have masked an enduring failure to engage with the significance of Nazi antisemitism. Finally James Parkes' understanding of the murder of the European Jews will be briefly explored in order to demonstrate that a more sophisticated understanding of the Holocaust was open to the Anglican church, but was eschewed. It will be argued that Parkes' understanding of the Nazi anti Jewish project was fed by and fed into, his willingness to understand and engage with the concept of Jewishness and the nature of the Christian Jewish relationship. That the Anglican church refused to follow Parkes' lead demonstrates the lack of self-reflection that the murder of Europe's Jews engendered in the Anglican church.

3.1 Anglican Understanding of War with Nazism after 1939.

3.1 i) Anglican Understanding of Nazism and the Soviet Union 1939-41.

Prior to the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, consistent with its justification of war, the English Christian imagination universalised and generalised its enemy as the totalitarian threat to the Christian world. Betraying the limits of the Anglican conversion to the theology of pessimism, liberal democracy was presented as essentially divine within Anglican rhetoric supportive of the war. Although the claim that Anglican justifications of war identified the Allied cause as divine and therefore a Christian crusade would have been denied by Bell and Temple, the principal contributors to Anglican war discourse,[1] war was implicitly presented by Anglicans as a defence of the Christian faith. As George Bell himself wrote, the Second World War was 'the war of the barbarian tyrant against civilisation...order and liberty' and consequently 'this was a moment in history when it was impossible for the just man to be neutral'.[2]

Consistent with characterisations of Nazism that had been proposed throughout the 1930s and especially since the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet pact, in

[1] George Bell, *Christianity and the World Order*, (London, 1940), pp. 78, 85. See also for Temple's denial of the notion of crusade Alan Suggate, *William Temple and Christian and Social Ethics Today*, (Edinburgh, 1987), pp. 156-62, Frederick Temple (ed.), *Some Lambeth Letters*, (London, 1963), pp. 25-27.

the first years of the war Anglicans continued to find Nazism and Soviet Communism equivalent or even identical. For English Christian commentators the Nazi enemy continued to be conceived of in universal terms, defined through the 'German war against religion'.[3] This rhetoric condemning the irreligious Nazi state was matched by criticism of Stalinist contempt for religious freedom.[4]

The belief that the Nazi and Soviet governments were essentially the same was confirmed for the Anglican imagination by the Soviet invasion of Finland, which had a generally destructive impact on the image of the Soviet Union in Britain.[5] The Anglican community was outraged by the Soviet attack on 'Christian Finland', which it alleged revealed the full depravity of the Communist regime[6] and could be directly compared with the Nazi actions in Poland. The Third Reich and the Soviets it was consequently suggested were 'partners in international crime' and the war against freedom.[7] Indeed the *Church Times* became, after the Soviet invasion, fixated with the idea that 'the blood brothers' in wickedness, Stalin and Hitler, were engaged in a diabolical alliance to destroy European civilisation and culture.[8] Repeating a commentary by Cardinal Hinsley[9] which had awarded the Nazi-Soviet pact a biblical or even apocalyptic significance, this unholy partnership of identical ideologies was argued to have been 'anticipated by the pact between Pilate and Herod before the crucifiction of Christ.'[10] The noticeable silences in the British war in 1939 and the early part of 1940 dictated that for Anglicans it was Soviet guns in the Baltic that heightened their sense that the 'grim shadow of Stalin and Hitler [was] darkening the

---

[2] Bell, *Christianity*, pp. 81-83.
[3] *The Church Times*, 17 January 1941, p. 30.
[4] *Church Times*, 10 January 1941, p. 15.
[5] See P.M.H. Bell, *John Bull and the Bear: British Public Opinion, Foreign Policy, and the Soviet Union*, (London, 1990), pp. 25-33. Bell argues that the invasion of Finland seriously weakened the standing of the USSR in public eyes in Britain. The British government's view of the Soviet union was also seriously challenged, and as a consequence there was half hearted consideration of military engagement with Russia. See also Martin Kitchen, *British Policy Towards the Soviet Union During the Second World War*, (London, 1986), p. 11 – where Chamberlain's concern that the government would have to publicly condemn the Soviet actions in the Baltic is recorded, Chamberlain felt that the Soviet invasion was the same as German aggression in Poland.
[6] See for example *The Record*, December 8 1939, 'Russia Unmasked', p. 705 which described the 'mask' having been 'torn off' Stalin in the course of the invasion.
[7] *The Record*, 15 December 1939, p. 721.
[8] See any edition of the *Church Times* after the invasion of Finland from November 1939 for examples of the fixation with Nazi and Soviet alliance in *Church Times*. For the specific quotation describing Hitler and Stalin as 'blood brothers' see *Church Times*, 1 December 1939, p. 459. See also 8 December 1939, p. 479, and 15 December 1939, p. 507.
[9] Arthur Hinsley was the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Westminster from 1937 until his death in 1943. See John Heenan, *Cardinal Hinsley*, (London, 1944).
[10] *Church Times*, 15 December 1939, p. 507.

decent everyday lives of all the European peoples' in the first days and weeks of war.[11]

Anglican perceptions of the Nazi-Soviet equivalence and co-operation also awarded the Finns the rhetorical status of allies in the just war against Hitler and in defence of Christian civilisation.[12] Cosmo Lang beseeched Anglicans to pray for the 'brave' Finnish defence of the 'cause' of civilisation.[13] Leader comment in *The Record* sought inspiration from the Finnish defence of 'freedom' against Sovietism, in order to bolster the Anglo-French efforts to deliver Europe from the 'hateful nightmare' of totalitarianism in their battle with Hitler.[14] Celebration of the bravery of the Finns demonstrated Anglicans' enduring faith in their own war as righteous and suggested an understanding of war that went beyond the existing military fronts.

The universality of Anglican visions of the collective criminality of Nazism and Soviet Communism did little for the understanding of Nazism as a specific ideology at the beginning of the war. Such universality paid no attention to the campaign against the Jews as an indicator of Nazi barbarity or criminality. It was the general forces of the 'anti-Christ' that it was again argued were amassed against Christian Europe.[15] In fact in reducing Nazism to the construct of anti-Godism Anglicans commonly found that the inspiration for the alleged attack on Christian culture was often found, in a manner that echoed later historiographical controversy regarding the roots of the Nazi menace, in Moscow, rather than Berlin. For the more contemplative ecclesiastical press the 'persistent uprooting of Christian tradition' embodied in the German fall from grace, was simply the continuation of the 'process which [had] been going on in Russia for twenty years.'[16] Indeed according to the Christian press 'Hitlerism' was, along with the Soviet invasion of Finland, argued to be the potential precipitator of the communisation of Europe.[17] Such aversion to the Soviet Union reflected secular suspicions of Communism. For example elements of ecclesiastical and governmental opinion were united in a campaign for the internment

[11] *Church Times*, 10 November 1939, p. 395.
[12] *The Record*, 9 February 1940, p. 67.
[13] Lang quoted in *The Record*, 29 December 1939, p. 749.
[14] See *The Record*, 9 February 1940, p. 69, also for an account of Lang's sermon at a service of intercession for Finland in St Pauls on 1 February 1940 which praised the Finnish defence of the cause of civilisation.
[15] *Church Times*, 3 November 1939, p. 375.
[16] *Christian News Letter*, No. 16, 14 February 1940.
[17] See *Church Times*, 1 December 1939, p. 459, and *The Record*, 8 December 1939, p. 705.

of leading British Communists, which would then reflect the treatment of Mosley's fascists.[18]

3.1 ii) The Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union as a Challenge to the Anglican Justification of war.

Even after Operation Barbarossa had enforced a common enemy on the Soviet Union and Britain, suspicions of communism abounded in British politics and culture. In the aftermath of the German invasion of Russia Winston Churchill was prepared to declare, with an emphasis that suggested an enduring faith in the originality of the Soviet menace, that the 'Nazi regime was indistinguishable from the worst features of communism'.[19] Churchill's apparent displeasure at the prospect of alliance with the Soviet Union,[20] was matched in the ecclesiastical world as the moral certainties of Britain's war appeared to evaporate over night. The editorial pages of the *Church Times* crackled with disbelief and resentment that 'Hitler's genius for treachery' had made 'Britain with its jealous regard for personal liberty and an inheritance traditionally Christian' the unwilling, 'associate in arms of the Godless and persecuting Soviets'.[21]

By enforcing an apparently incongruous alliance between Christian civilisation and the Godless Soviet Union, the Nazi invasion was interpreted as little less than a direct challenge to the Anglican view of the world. The church, chastened by its self-perceived moral failure in the Great War, had designed a justification of war that was ultimately very simple; based around the arbitrary division of the world into Christian and anti-Christian blocks. After the launch of Operation Barbarossa this division of the world logically appeared to collapse. The Anglican community was suddenly faced with a new war, and was forced to confront the uncomfortable question as to whether a war that involved alliance with one of the already defined forces of anti-Godism could any longer be 'the kind of war in which a Christian

---

[18] See *The Church Times*, 10 January 1941, p. 15, and for a summary of pressure within the government for the internment of communists, Ian Maclaine, *Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War II*, (London, 1979), p. 187-94.

[19] Winston Churchill broadcast 22 June 1941, cited in Angus Calder, *The People's War: Britain 1939-45*, (London, 1969), p. 260.

[20] In fact Churchill had the day previously privately asserted that if Hitler attacked the devil then he would be prepared to form an alliance, as such it may be assumed that his assertion of the incongruity of British alliance with the Soviet Union was largely a rhetorical defence of Churchill's previous claims that Britain's war was a defence of Christian civilisation. For the remarks on alliance with the devil see Calder, *People's War*, p.259.

[21] *Church Times*, 27 June 1941, p. 367.

could take part without violating the dictates of his own conscience' since the 'Christian citizens of Britain [were] called to stand as allies alongside the atheist citizens of Soviet Russia'.[22] Britain and the Soviet Union had common enemies and yet, incongruously, 'Bolshevism as a creed [was] as unacceptable to Britain...as...Fascism'.[23]

How then morally could the British war effort, which appeared to have moved outside of the boundaries of a just war fought against Godless totalitarianism and in defence of Christian civilisation, have remained in tact for the Anglican Church? As ever the essential pragmatism, and diplomatic mindset, of the Archbishoprics signalled a way out of the 'confusion'[24] which had begun to surround Anglicanism's war. Lang accepted that the prospect of alliance with 'Bolshevist Russia' was met with 'not unnatural misgivings' within the church, but ultimately found such unease 'misplaced'.[25] Lang's justification, albeit couched in the language of morality (for the experience of the Great War had dictated that for the Anglican Church to support the war it *had* to be moral), was essentially based on the lines of military rationality, and also required a subtle redefinition of Christianity's now singular Nazi enemy. Lang wrote that 'the first and essential aim of the whole widespread struggle [was] to overthrow the tyranny of evil embodied in the rulers of *Germany*, and *all* engaged in *the cause* must needs be our allies' (my italics).[26] Lang's justification of the new war in alliance with the Soviet Union rested on the seamless transformation of Nazism from an element of the anti-God alliance into the specific (although this does not mean that it was specifically understood) and singular 'supreme enemy of mankind'.[27]

Lang's immediate recasting of Nazism as a singular enemy in response to the invasion of the Soviet Union reflected the Anglican church's propensity for the tendentious translation of political reality into moral certainty. But although the moral consensus behind the British war effort may have been retrospectively designed, it was not *simply* a thinly veiled defence of political reality. There is no doubt that the righteousness of the war with Nazism was keenly felt within the Anglican church, and this was a righteousness that was awarded by the image of Nazism as anti-Godism. As

[22] See for example *Church Times*, 1 August 1941, p. 442.
[23] *The Record*, 27 June 1941, p. 233.
[24] see *Christian News Letter*, 1 July 1941, No. 88, which commented that 'the participation of Russia brings a new confusion into the issues of war'.
[25] Cosmo Lang in the Canterbury Diocesan Gazette, cited in *The Record*, 1 August 1941, p. 287.
[26] Lang in *The Record*, 1 August 1941, p. 287.

such, the argument that Soviet Russia was a justifiable ally simply because it was an ally, could not endure if the moral basis of the war was to survive. Consequently, writing before the formal conclusion of an Anglo-Soviet alliance the *Church Times* effectively set out a blueprint for the adoption of the Soviet Union as a political ally. An editorial instructed that the British war was for Christianity, and therefore unless the Soviet Union accepted such principle, *alliance* was viewed as being impossible.[28] Such criteria act for the historian as a signpost of the more comprehensive, and enduring route out of the fog that had descended over Anglicanism's formerly clearly conceived war. Longer term appraisal of the Anglo-Soviet alliance recast Russia as a moral ally also, through the employment of rhetoric regarding the Soviet Union that was to transform the former totalitarian foe into a (moral as well as effective political) defender of the Christian tradition.

3.1 iii) Anglican Understanding of the Soviet Union as Ally.

In order to understand Anglican perception of alliance with the Soviet Union it is crucial to establish that Bolshevism (as the culturally specific form of Communism recognised as being dominant in Russia) remained an alien force for Anglicans, and was therefore regarded as opposed to the defence of Christianity. Government propagandists also consciously recognised that Britain regarded Soviet Communism with some suspicion, and resolved that in order to 'sell' the new alliance, 'it would be well to suggest that Russia is a communist country in name only; and that it is essentially a Russian patriotic, nationalist country'.[29] In line with this propaganda tactic secular authorities in Britain attempted to concentrate attention on 'pre-revolutionary Russian cultural achievement'.[30] In the broadcast to the nation in which Churchill sought to justify the Anglo-Soviet alliance, a distinct effort was made to 'Russianise' the former 'Soviet' foe:

> the past with its crimes, its follies and its tragedies, flashes away...I see the ten thousand villages of *Russia*, where the means of existence was wrung so hardily from the soil, but where there are still primordial human joys, where maidens laugh and children play...the cause of any

[27] *The Record*, 27 June 1941, p. 233, see also the latter half of the leader comment of the *Church Times*, 27 June 1941, p. 367.
[28] *Church Times*, 27 June 1941, p. 367.
[29] Memo by Alexander Werth (Ministry of Information), undated, PRO INF/1/913 cited in Maclaine, *Ministry of Morale*, p. 198.
[30] Maclaine, *Ministry of Morale*, p. 197.

> Russian fighting for his heart and home is the cause of free men and free peoples in every quarter of the globe.[31]

Churchill's immediate efforts were then continued by the Ministry of Information as they sought to justify potential alliance with the Soviet Union. It was decided to place emphasis on 'Russia' in the propagandistic education of the British people, in order that the image of Britain's war as a defence of Christian civilisation could be preserved.[32] Yet again drawing its inspiration from the state, the Anglican church equally set about justifying alliance by concentrating on the construct of Russia rather than the Soviet Union in its accommodation of the apparently incongruous alliance: 'Russia' wrote the *Church Times*, 'is fighting Hitler, the avowed and inveterate public enemy of Christian civilisation'.[33] 'Russia' was then drawn into the alliance for civilisation, whereas the Soviet Union had previously been portrayed as its primary foe. A vital part of this concentration on Russia was an effort to christianise Russian history. Russia was a concept that was understood by English Christianity as entirely distinct from its Bolshevist dominators, *Russia* was the 'cradle of Christianity'.[34] While Bolshevism remained an 'atheistic philosophy' and one of the forces of 'irreligion' for Anglicans, the 'Christian tradition' which was the 'heritage' of the Russian people, ensured the essential redeemability of the Russian nation and its suitability as an ally in the defence of Christian values.[35]

The christianisation of Russia was not confined to the idea of Russia as an historical construct; the process was equally employed with reference to the, in reality Soviet but portrayed as Russian, present. The easing of restrictions on Christian worship in the Soviet Union were vociferously celebrated within the Anglican church.[36] Cosmo Lang defended the incongruous alliance in the House of Lords, and sought justification exclusively with reference to the Russian adoption of policies of religious freedom.[37] The actuality of these religious freedoms was largely irrelevant,

---

[31] Cited in Calder, *People's War*, p. 260.
[32] Bell, *John Bull*, pp. 40-56 for an investigation of the initial development of the propaganda image of the Soviet Union after the invasion of June 1941 foisted a common enemy on Britain and 'Russia'.
[33] *Church Times*, 4 July 1941, p. 383, see also *The Record*, 11 July 1941, p. 248, and 18 July, p. 261.
[34] *Church Times*, 29 August 1941, p. 493.
[35] *Christian News Letter*, 26 November 1941, No. 109.
[36] For a wide ranging review of changing policies toward religion and religious groups in the Soviet Union see Richard Marshall (ed.), *Aspects of Religion in the Soviet Union 1917-67*, (Chicago, 1971).
[37] *Hansard* (HL) Vol. 120, (389-92), 23 October 1941 See also Lang's more immediate reactions, which noted that on 'the outbreak of war thousands flocked to the Churches in prayer in Moscow' as a basis for the future alliance (on moral grounds) between Britain and the Soviet Union, in *The Record*, 1 August 1941, p.287.

Lang's purpose was to christianise the former Godless enemy and he was supported in his efforts by an ecclesiastical press which continually sought to draw attention to a resurgence of Russian religiosity.[38] Also, implicit within this recognition of contemporary religious freedom was the hope for the christianisation of the Russian future.[39] By pointing to the possibility of an evangelised future, the acknowledgement of religious freedom in Russia allowed the moral integrity of the war as a war for the Christian future to endure in the Anglican church. Emphasis on Russia's Christian tradition similarly ensured that the concept of the war as in defence of a Christian past remained viable.

A further element of the christianisation of the Russian present within Anglican thinking was to attempt an intellectual rapprochement between Christianity and the ambitions, if not the practice, of communism. Although for Christian commentators Bolshevism remained an alien and essentially Godless ideology (and implicitly a form of the totalitarian menace), there was an effort made to christianise at least the inspiration of that ideology. William Temple, reported after the invasion of the Soviet Union that in fact he had 'always thought Bolshevism preferable to Nazism, because its goal of universal fellowship is part of the Christian hope.'[40] Temple's ameliorative tone toward the utopian ambitions of communism, rather than its totalitarian governmental form, was typical of the revolutionised moral assessment of the Soviet Union within the English churches. Others noted that the attempt to raise the material expectations of the Russian proletariat provided a moral challenge to the manifest inequalities of the Christian west.[41] Mainstream Christian commentators, for whom before the actuality of alliance the communist state had been simply part of the Godless block, were able, only after June 1941, to find good in the intentions, if not the practice, of Russian communists and the 'greatest experiment in social reconstruction known to history.'[42]

This attempt at Christian accommodation of Communist utopia did not, however, mark a fundamental shift in the attitude toward the Bolshevist ideology, or indeed the Bolshevist state. While the communist concern for social justice may have conformed with elements of the Anglican design for the earthly kingdom, the

[38] see *Christian News Letter*, 1 April 1942, No. 127, and 20 May 1942, No. 134.
[39] See *Church Times*, 15 May 1942, p. 279, *The Record*, 22 January 1943, p. 30, *The Record*, 15 December 1944, p. 511.
[40] William Temple writing in the York diocesan leaflet and cited in *The Record*, 1 August 1941, p. 287.
[41] *Christian News Letter*, 1 July 1941, No. 88 and 12 January 1944, Supplement to No. 109.

exclusivity of Communist concern for man's material well being and its direct repudiation of the concept of spiritual wealth still dictated that the practical manifestations of communist ideology were regarded as antithetical to the spiritual ambitions of Christianity. It was the communist's exclusive concentration on the material well being of man that Anglicans identified as evil in line with their rejection of 'totalitarian ideologies'. This was the 'doctrine of man', that denied the revelation of God through the promotion of man *as* God, and the potentiality of the earth as paradise.[43] For Anglicans, although social reconstruction and the redistribution of wealth and opportunity was of crucial importance, they were ultimately secondary concerns when compared with the principle of evangelism and conversion in the newly pessimistic Anglican church.[44] The maintenance of communism as a 'doctrine of man' ensured, over and above the avowed atheism of the Soviet state, an enduring faith in the incompatibility of Christianity and communism for Anglicans. Such continued aversion to the communist creed suggests that attempts to build limited bridges between the two were simply a rhetorical shift on the part of the Anglican church, designed to maintain the integrity of war aims.

Anglican fixation with the image of communism as the doctrine of man demonstrated the continuing Anglican intellectual characterisation of communism as a part of the totalitarian block, despite the practical embrace of the Russian ally. Nazism, through its race thinking and its Führer, had been portrayed as promoting the idea of man *as* God, in terms of both adulation of an earthly leader and Nazism's belief in the ability to establish a racial utopian paradise. Communism it was alleged similarly exalted man by envisioning the establishment of a purely economic utopia. Although the presentation of the Soviet Union may have been manipulated, in order to morally justify the Anglo Soviet alliance, into an appreciation of Russia as a Christian concept and the fundamentally Christian heritage of the Russianised soviet state, the Christian view of the world as dichotomy (god and anti-God, democratic and totalitarian, white and black, good and evil) did appear to endure within Anglican thinking and the embrace of alliance.

---

[42] *Church Times*, 15 May 1942, p. 279.

[43] For an example of this characterisation of the Soviet Union, after the invasion and Anglo-Soviet alliance, see Bell Papers, Lambeth Palace Library, Vol. 75, f. 100.

[44] See for an example William Temple, *Social Witness and Evangelism*, (London, 1943) – although Temple does seem confused as to which is the Christian priority and in fact is unwilling to sacrifice either, there is consensus among commentators that part of Temple's conversion to a less optimistic

Similar to the dichotomous understanding of the Nazi state evinced by the Anglican church in the 1930s, which had separated understanding of Nazi foreign and domestic policies, there was a fundamental paradox within Anglican thinking regarding the Soviet Union after the Nazi invasion of June 1941. This paradox is most easily denoted by the use of the terms, which were simultaneously both exclusive and identical, 'Russia' and the 'Soviet Union'. Russia was both moral and political ally in the defence of Christian civilisation, whereas the Soviet Union was subsumed within the concept of a totalitarian enemy which underpinned the Anglican justification of war. And yet this paradox did not it seems trouble the Anglican imagination, for example at the same time as condemning the Soviet doctrine of man, George Bell could invite his congregation to 'pray with [him]...for our nation...its forces and its cause for God, for Russia...that we may be so prospered that the principles for which we stand may be granted victory'.[45] In this we can see the importance of the process of christianising Russia in Anglican rhetoric and in unifying the idea of the Allied 'cause'. Although the geographical certainties of the divided world evaporated with the Nazi invasion of Russia, the concepts employed to justify the war remained in tact through the use of an entirely new rhetorical portrayal of the Soviet Union. Through the application of this new rhetoric, the war, more so than ever before had become a 'war of ideals'. That the 'war of ideals' was a defence of Christian civilisation dictated to the Anglican church that their new ally *had* to be re-conceived in Christian terms. If a link could be provided with a Christian past in Russia then the war for a Christian future remained a viable concept, bolstered further by the contention of Russia's christianised (Soviet) present in order to bridge the gap between Christian past and future.

3.1 iv) Anglican Perceptions of the Enemy as German and Nazi.

Although it had been implicit in the Anglican belief in the bi-polar world of God and anti-God, the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union then forced Anglicans to adopt an understanding of the war as a 'war of ideals' that superseded the geographical boundaries of the physical war. Such an understanding of the war had manifest

---

theology dictated his insistence of conversion as the starting point for any Christian future. See also Alan Suggate, *William Temple and Christian and Social Ethics Today*, (Edinburgh, 1987).

[45] George Bell, 'A War of Ideals', in *The Church and Humanity 1939-46*, (London, 1946), p. 218 - this taken from a sermon delivered in Chichester in September 1941.

implications for the manner in which the Nazi enemy was perceived by the Anglican community. Because of alliance with the Soviet Union, Nazism had become the singular and 'supreme' enemy within the Anglican imagination. Yet as the Anglican definitions of communism have demonstrated, that enemy was still conceived of within the same interpretative structures of the dichotomous Anglican world view as it had been prior to the war in the east. A singular enemy, it would appear, did not mean an understanding of that enemy as a singular force. The apparent contradiction inherent in the Anglican conception of Nazism as part of a generalised atheistic phenomenon[46] despite the occurrence of war within the anti-God block was supported by the concept of the 'war of ideals' because it allowed an intellectual rather than a physical or geographical definition of the Nazi enemy.

As the war progressed Anglicans increasingly applied their dichotomous world view to Germany itself and conceived of a very definite division between Germans and Nazis, as they had between the alternative constructions Russia and the Soviet Union. Perceptions of the divisions between Nazis and Germans rested on a definition of Nazi criminality that relied almost exclusively on the concept of totalitarian control. Anglicans understood 'as a simple matter of fact that Germany was the first country in Europe to be occupied by the Nazis',[47] leaving the German population at the mercy of the tyrannical Gestapo.[48] With the Nazi state portrayed as the bastions of totalitarianism, their German victims were portrayed by the Anglican community as Christians, and as such within the constructed Christian civilisation that the war was being fought in defence of. Such an understanding of the German population as apart from and dominated by a totalitarian government demonstrates the practical legacy of the Anglican obsession with Martin Niemöller. Niemöller was understood and presented by the Anglican church as the representative victim of Nazism in the 1930s, a construct which relied on the definition of Nazism purely through their dictatorial methods of authority and control.[49]

A further legacy of the Anglican use of Martin Niemöller in the understanding of Nazism was reflected in the firm belief that it was the Christian churches which

---

[46] See Chapter Two above, and for a further example *Christian News Letter*, 7 May 1941, No. 80, which described Nazism as a part of an 'organised rebellion against our common inheritance'.

[47] George Bell. 'Germany and the Hitlerite State', in *Church and Humanity*, p. 99. This article was in fact a speech made by Bell in the House of Lords on 10 March 1943. This was a claim that was made continually by Bell, see also 'The Unifying Forces of Europe', in *Church and Humanity*, p. 163 - from a speech 19 December 1944.

[48] George Bell. 'German Atrocities', in *Church and Humanity*, pp. 86-87.

offered the only hope of resistance in Nazi Germany during the war. Viewed as entirely and inevitably divergent from the ruling ethos Christianity was portrayed as the only light in the darkness of war time Germany by the Anglican church,[50] and Christians in Germany remained the eternal opponents of the Nazi menace, necessarily oppressed,[51] and silently hateful of the Nazi crimes.[52] Such a promotion of the myths which would continue to prevent the realistic appraisal of the role of German Christianity in the Nazi era in the post-war world was not simply confined to the Anglican evaluation of German Christianity and Christian institutions. Within Germany any institution perceived as being linked to a traditional Christian past was praised by the Anglican Christian community as apart from the alien Nazi dominators. Infamously, for example, the Wehrmacht was praised as apart from the 'party' and as an element of the Christian tradition celebrated as signalling a clear divergence from Nazism.[53]

The process of dividing the Nazi German present in war time echoed both the rhetorical reconstruction of the Russian past, and the endurance of the contradictory understanding of Nazism from the 1930s when the foreign policy ambitions of the Third Reich were viewed as somehow within the traditions of European political history. Although within justifications of the war as moral Anglicans portrayed Nazism as entirely outside of the traditions of European history and culture, elements of German state and society were still conceived of as inside European cultural traditions. Such an analysis relied upon the identification of Nazism as an alien creed which did not emerge from the traditions of European Christendom. The Wehrmacht and the Christian church were institutions steeped in those traditions and therefore were understandable for the Anglican community which viewed them with sympathy, and entirely divergent from the Nazism that was alien and incomprehensible for Anglicans. In this the Anglican community rejected an entirely pessimistic view of Christian civilisation, finding such a construction in an idealised past and future.

The tendency to find Nazi dominators and indigenous populations entirely separate and Christian institutions as resistant was reflected in Anglican assessments

---

[49] See Chapter One above.
[50] *Christian News Letter*, 23 April 1941, No. 78.
[51] Gorge Bell, 'A Christmas Broadcast to Germany', in *Church and Humanity*, p. 67 - Broadcast originally made in December 1941.
[52] Cyrill Garbett quoted in *Christian News Letter*, 13 October 1944, p. 545.

of the Nazi domination of all of occupied Europe, especially, and significantly in Western areas. Dutch and French Christians were continually praised (especially within the ecclesiastical press) as the bulwark of resistance to the totalitarian state.[54] Although the news values of these publications was set by their Christian remit, it is nonetheless significant that the majority of reportage concerned with continental Europe at this time focused on the idea of Christian resistance. The factors conditioning understanding (and therefore Christian memories) of the war and occupation of Europe allowed only a specific and glorious role for European Christianity, reflection on the failings of Europe's Christian institutions was noticeable only in its rarity.[55]

Anglican obsessions with the idea of Christian resistance cemented the picture of a fluid and geographically non-specific conception of the war as 'war of ideals' in the Anglican church. The assumed struggle of Christians in Germany (the enemy) was portrayed by the Anglican church as the same battle as that of the British war effort.[56] Despite the entry of the Soviet Union into the war on the side of righteousness, Communism remained excluded from the increasingly European wide 'war of ideals'. Comparison between the aforementioned Christian assessment of Christian resistance and continental Communist resistance demonstrates such enduring antipathy to Communist ideology. In the main such a comparison is one between silence and noisy celebration. The ecclesiastical press made no reference to the Communist 'other' Germany. Where indeed such activity warranted a mention within Anglican reflections on Europe, it was portrayed in negative terms. For example in 1943 Gerhard Leibholz and William Temple lamented in correspondence that the communist threat to Nazi power within Germany was 'not a very comfortable thought' as it may precipitate the formation of a 'solid' Central European 'anti-Christian block'. Such language is reminiscent of the definition of Nazi barbarity and

---

[53] See *Christian News Letter*, 1 April 1942, No. 127. This is a judgement of the Wehrmacht that is maintained throughout the course of the war in Christian circles, see also *Christian News Letter*, 5 May 1943, Supplement to No. 181.

[54] *Christian News Letter*, 8 April 1942, No. 128 and 20 May 1942, No. 134 and 16 September 1942, No. 151, and 3 May 1944, No. 207. Similarly the church in Poland is continually portrayed as resistant see *Church Times*, 14 August 1942, p. 444

[55] Although there was sustained criticism of the *Deutsche-Christen* movement in ecclesiastical circles, there is very little focus on the less prominent of Christian failings. In this regard the Bishop of Chelmsford's condemnation of 'the behaviour of so-called Christian nations in Europe' as 'not a very edifying example of Christianity in action' is remarkable in its isolation. See *The Record*, 25 July 1941, p. 279.

threat, and also further demonstrates the enduring suspicion of communism, despite alliance with 'Russia'.[57]

In the early part of the war Anglican attitudes to the German Nazi dichotomy were in direct contrast to the official attitude of the British government. Lord Vansittart, the Foreign Office's chief diplomatic advisor in the first two years of the war, famously set the tone for governmental attitudes with his broadcasts on the Germans' 'Black Record'. Vansittart's picture of the Germans and their history was the inverse of the Christian assessment of alien Nazism divorced from German or European historical tradition: a nation raised on 'envy, self pity and cruelty' whose historical development through various forms of violent governance had 'prepared the ground for Nazism' which had finally given expression to the blackness of the German soul.[58] For Vansittart, Nazism was a movement rooted firmly in the *German* past as indeed Anglicans had conceived of Nazi foreign policy ambitions prior to 1939. Although Vansittartism was an extremist creed, it was manifested in certain government policies, most notably the principle of unconditional surrender and as a constituent element of the anti-alien motivations for the mass internment of enemy nationals.[59] Christian objections to government policies born of Vansittartism, articulated notoriously by George Bell,[60] were indicative of the gulf of secular and ecclesiastical thinking in this area.[61] The differences between Anglican and governmental views of the German during at least the first years of the war, do serve to demonstrate further the development of a fluid understanding of the righteousness of the war in which geographical boundaries were irrelevant to the church. While government propaganda was concerned with a tangible enemy, the church conceived of the war as a battle between mindsets, and such attitudes were not viewed as geographically contained:

> it would be a fatal mistake, which would defeat our hopes, to equate the spiritual struggle between the forces of death and life with the armed conflict between the two groups of powers. The mistake would

---

[56] Gorge Bell, 'A Christmas Broadcast to Germany', in *Church and Humanity*, p. 69 - Broadcast originally made in December 1941.
[57] Leibholz to Temple, 23 February 1943, Temple Papers, Vol. 51, f. 90.
[58] Sir Robert Vansittart, *Black Record: Germans, Past and Present*, (London, 1941), pp. 4, 20.
[59] Calder, *A People's War*, p. 489.
[60] R.C.D Jasper, *George Bell: Bishop of Chichester*, (Oxford, 1967), pp. 147-54.
[61] For a discussion of further evidence of this gulf, most notably in the attitudes displayed by the government, and then in comparison, the churches, towards German resistance efforts see Chapter Four, which also confronts the importance of such ideas in the shaping of plans and policy in the post war world.

> be fatal, because it would be completely unrealistic. Good and evil in life are inextricably mixed; they never separate themselves out into two sharply opposed camps. The forces of life are not extinct amongst those with whom we are at war.[62]

For the Anglican church the German population, and specifically the Christian and traditional institutions in Germany were the 'forces of life', and the potential hopes for the Christian future, Nazism the alien 'forces of death'.

3.1 v) Anglican Understanding of Britain's War.

The understanding of the war as 'war of ideals' and of the divergence between the Nazi state and the German population that this dictated also precipitated a limited critical engagement with the prosecution of Britain's war within the Anglican community. In his reactions to the British policy of obliteration bombing George Bell remained true to his original prescription of the church's function in war time. Bell had argued that 'the church must guard and maintain [the] moral principles [that Bell found in the Gospel] in the war itself. It must not hesitate...to condemn the infliction of reprisal, or the bombing of civilian populations.'[63] Anchored in an understanding of the German past that emphasised its (Christian) cultural achievement, Bell then vociferously condemned the bombing of German cities as undermining the cause of civilisation for which Britain (and her allies) fought. For Bell, in the 'war of ideals', to attack German Christian traditions and peoples, was to attack one's own alliance, and indeed undermine the morality of that alliance.[64]

Bell's condemnation of the actions of 'Bomber Command' as essentially attacking fellow Christians, were hardly met with universal praise in the wider Christian world. Other sections of the Anglican community were less willing than Bell to participate in a comprehensive engagement with the internal morality of the British war effort.[65] Many others felt that the most moral course of action was to win

---

[62] *Christian News Letter*, 17 December 1941, No. 112.
[63] George Bell, 'The Church's Function in War Time', in *Church and Humanity*, p. 28 - the essay was originally published in November of 1939.
[64] George Bell, 'Obliteration Bombing', in *Church and Humanity*, pp. 129-141 - this is the text of a speech delivered in the House of Lords on 9 February 1944. See also Jasper, *Bell*, pp. 256-270, and Andrew Chandler, 'The Church of England and Obliteration Bombing of Germany in the Second World War', in *English Historical Review*, (Vol. 108, No. 429, 1993), pp. 920-46.
[65] For example see *The Record*, 18 February 1944, p. 61 which declared that 'it may be taken for granted that British Airmen have never deliberately attempted to terrorise the population [of Germany], their one purpose has been to destroy Germany's war potentials'.

the war (by any means) and therefore further the cause of civilisation.[66] However, that such an open discussion of the morality of the British prosecution of the war effort took place[67] was precipitated by, and is further evidence of, the existence within the Anglican community of a discourse of war that understood, through the employment of the concept of the 'war of ideals', the defence of civilisation to be both a physical and a moral process: 'the present war is not a war of nation against nation it is a revolutionary war, it is a war of faiths' argued George Bell.[68] Those faiths were decisively 'Christianity and anti-Christ.'[69]

At first glance the growing complexity of the concept of the 'war of ideals' and its employment by Anglicans in appraisal of the Allied war effort would appear to militate against the previously emphasised Anglican view of Nazism as an alien force. Equally, a more general implication is that the idea of Anglicanism's unitary understanding of an alien totalitarianism imposed on Europe could also be belied. For example the defence of civilisation appears to have been directed against internal as well as external enemies: 'the tendencies which have culminated in Nazism are common to western civilisation...a spiritual evil which has infected the whole of civilisation has found its supreme manifestation in Germany'.[70] Furthermore, George Bell's challenge to the policy of obliteration bombing also appears to have been part of general understanding of the failings which produced the totalitarian menace as being manifested in both totalitarian and liberal societies: 'Civilisation has been disintegrating before our eyes, because it denied its maker. And out of the abyss or the terrible denial leap up barbarity, persecution, falsehood, disregard of human life and war'.[71] As such the sophistication of the Anglican world view, the fluidity of the concept of the dichotomous world appears to suggest a degree of hitherto absent self-reflection in the assessment of both Nazism and the internal morality of the British war effort.

---

[66] This was the position reluctantly held by William Temple. See Temple's introduction to Stephen Hobhouse, *Christ and Our Enemies: An Appeal to Fellow Christians*, (London, 1944), and Temple to Davies, 7 August 1944, Temple Papers, Vol. 51, f.171.

[67] For an evaluation of the whole debate see Alan Wilkinson, *Dissent or Conform: War, Peace and the English Churches 1900-45*, (London, 1986), pp. 260-70.

[68] George Bell, 'Germany and the Hitlerite State', *Church and Humanity*, p. 108

[69] George Bell, 'The Basis of Christian Co-operation', *Church and Humanity*, p. 222.

[70] *Christian News Letter*, 16 April 1941, No. 77. See also *Christian News Letter*, 21 February 1945, No. 228.

[71] George Bell, 'The Pope's Five Peace Points', *Church and Humanity*, p. 49.

However the growth of the idea that Nazism was not simply external to civilisation but had emerged from within it, should not be mistaken for critical self-reflection in the face of the European crisis. The driving force behind Anglican justifications of war remained to save 'Europe' from barbarism.[72] The concept of 'Europe', reliant on ideas of Christian tradition and heritage as employed in the concepts of Germany and Russia analysed above, remained fundamentally divergent from the totalitarian menace. A typical example is the understanding of Nazism as a 'suburban' phenomena:

> if anybody should doubt the statement that the Nazi movement is suburban and therefore out of touch with any traditional element of our civilisation, let him read Mein Kampf. There you will find the wild verbosity of a half educated man, fed on newspapers and swayed by headlines. There is in a whole book not a glimpse of any conviction nourished by tradition.[73]

'Suburban' was employed in this context to denote modernity and the rejection of tradition of which Nazism was the gravest symptom. Although the sophistication of the concept of the 'war of ideals' allowed the application of the dichotomous understanding of the world within specific objective realities, this did not alter the fundamental belief in the worth of Christian tradition. Civilisation, Europe, Germany and Russia were all understood as Christian concepts. Totalitarianism (as the concept of anti-God) may have emerged from within, but only from within already bastardised forms of civilisation and the internal rejection of God. As such the totalitarian spirit may not have been absent from the actual objective entities of the modern world, but it could and would not be found by Anglicans within their idealised conceptual constructions of either Christian past or future.

3.1 v) Anglican Understanding of the Eastern Front.

The final element to the context that the 'war of ideas' provided for Anglican perceptions and understanding of the prosecution of the Jewish tragedy is the potential effect of this understanding of the war on the conceptualisation of the Eastern Front. Such an understanding is crucial for our purposes, in that it is within that theatre that the murder of European Jewry was perpetrated, something which the Anglican church was fully aware of. Anglicans were also aware that their rhetorical

[72] George Bell, 'The Church and the Future of Europe', *Church and Humanity*, p. 111.
[73] *Christian News Letter*, 7 May 1941, No. 80.

understanding of the war as battle for civilisation, and for Europe, echoed the rhetoric of the Nazi war in the East against Godless Judeo-Bolshevism.[74] While the manner in which the Anglican church justified the alliance with the Soviet Union, through its replacement with the Christian concept of Russia, allowed the dismissal of Nazi claims as a 'hollow pretension'[75], the wider ramifications of the concept of the 'war of ideals' do seem to raise problems regarding the manner in which the Anglican church understood the war in the east. Anglican conceptions of the enemy, and the clear division of German and Nazi, and indeed the location of the Wehrmacht within the former category would all appear to award theoretical ambiguity to the Anglican understanding of the Eastern front. Communism remained a Godless ideology, and therefore an enemy (if an unspoken one) within the 'war of ideals'.[76] Christian Germans, subjugated by their Nazi tormentors, were within this concept allies in the battle for civilisation. Theoretically then the Eastern front, which pitted communism against morally allied Christian Germans, would appear to have been awarded a fundamental ambiguity by the Anglican conception of the war. There is no doubt that Anglicans unanimously supported Russia's war in the east. Nazism had after all become the singular and supreme enemy of mankind. However, the concept of the 'war of ideals' did allow an understanding of war which circumvented the military fronts. As such Anglicanism had designed a conceptualisation of the war in which a guiltless memory of participation could flourish for Germans, an Anglican contribution to the prevention of the German process of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*[77] and crucially to the potential obfuscation of, at the very least, the context of the Holocaust.[78]

The Anglican concept of the 'war of ideals', which became increasingly amorphous as the war progressed, provided the essential context within which Anglicans understood the Holocaust. The concept of criminality and barbarity of the

---

[74] For example see *The Record*, 15 August 1941, p. 297, and *Christian News Letter*, 10 December 1941, No. 111.

[75] *Christian News Letter*, 23 February 1944, No. 202.

[76] For example Anglicans continuously invoked the possibility that the war would have a further evangelistic effect in the Soviet Union, and would precipitate the reintegration of Russia as a European, Christian nation. See *The Record*, 1 August 1941, p. 287, *Christian News Letter*, 23 July 1941, No. 91, and 5 November 1941, No. 106, and 28 January 1942, No. 118.

[77] The process of coming to terms with the past.

[78] For example an unnamed former member of the Confessing Church explained that it was possible to maintain a self image as resistant to the Nazi regime whilst fighting on the Eastern front against the Soviet Union, because that war was not regarded as a war for Hitler, and as could be 'justified...before

enemy remained generalised and located within the idea of a totalitarian and anti-Christian threat, even after the entry of the Soviet Union into the war. The eastern front, and all Nazi criminal behaviour, would then have to be understood, for Anglicans, through this prism. This chapter will now assess how such structures affected Anglican understanding of the Holocaust in the context of the mass murders.

3.2 Anglican Understanding of the Extermination of Europe's Jews 1941-45

3.2 i) A Methodological Note on the Analysis of Responses to the Murder of the European Jews

Any consideration of the understanding of the Holocaust in Britain, whether general, or confined to one sphere or sector, *must* acknowledge the limits set on imagination within any one specific cultural setting. First a general point can be made: that the experience of the First World War had left Britain a nation suspicious of any stories of atrocity,[79] and left the language of barbarity tired and overused in propaganda which pointed to the bestiality of the enemy.[80] Both had the effect of obscuring tales of Jewish persecution emanating from the east. More specifically, Tony Kushner has demonstrated that understanding of the Holocaust in Britain was often ideological, and, in his opinion, determined by a liberal mindset which prevented both full conception of either the racial nature of Nazism, or the accommodation of Nazism's Jewish victims. It is with this thesis in mind that Anglican understanding of the Final Solution will be considered. Previous chapters have demonstrated how the persecutory pre-cursors to the Final Solution were understood within the Anglican church as an element of a more general Nazi campaign against Christian culture. Such an understanding, it has been argued, developed from a specific conception of Nazism as an anti-Christian totalitarian foe. The following analysis of the dissemination of mass murder is predicated on the understanding of Anglican conceptions of the enemy enduring within the structures of totalitarianism previously explained, even despite the apparent breakdown of the totalitarian block.

A further note of caution should be sounded regarding the specific understanding of the language employed to represent Jewish suffering during the

---

[one's] own conscience.' See Victoria Barnett, *For the Soul of the People: Protestant Protest Against Hitler*, (New, York, 1992), p. 300.

[79] Wilkinson, *Dissent or Conform*, p. 246

[80] Calder, *People's War*, p. 501. Maclaine, *Ministry of Morale*, p. 166.

period 1933-45. The organic nature of language ensures that meaning is not constant, and in view of this we must avoid falling victim to hindsight. For example the term 'extermination' (*Vernichtung*)[81] has a specific meaning in the post-Holocaust world. The 'extermination of the Jews' is a concept that is established in language and meaning, conjuring images of both industrial mass murder and of bloody and bestial violence. Genocide was however not conceivable in the pre-Holocaust world. Reports of extermination had no such specific anchors in meaning, and therefore when we consider the failings of imagination regarding such reports we should (as the historian always should) do so with due consideration for the leap of understanding that the full perception of reports of phenomena such as extermination may have involved. However one must also remember that figures such as Eleanor Rathbone, Victor Gollancz, James Parkes,[82] and to a more limited extent William Temple, do demonstrate that the cognitive leap to sophisticated understanding was possible.

3.2 ii) Barriers to Anglican Understanding of the Jewish Tragedy.

The Anglican church perceived and understood Nazi barbarity in terms of its anti-Christianity. As such on the eve of the intensification of the persecution and murder process through the deployment of the *Einsatzgruppen* on the Eastern front,[83] Anglican Christianity had in place a structure for the dissemination of reports of anti-Jewish activity from the East (and indeed the West) which still conceived of Nazism not as threat to the Jews, but to Christianity. Typical of this is an understanding of the occupation of Poland which emphasised not the murder and ghettoisation of the Polish Jewish community, but the attack on the Polish Catholic clergy.[84] This is not to say that the persecution of Catholic clergy was not a significant feature of the occupation regime, but it is consistent with an Anglican conception of Nazism as anti-

[81] Literally translated as 'to make nothing'.
[82] Johanna Alberti, *Eleanor Rathbone*, (London, 1996), p. 136. See also Ruth Dudley Edwards, *Victor Gollancz: A Biography*, (London, 1987). See this thesis for a discussion of Parkes' understanding of the Holocaust.
[83] The *Einsatzgruppen* were SS units deployed to carry out security policy on the Eastern Front. Originally their remit involved the concentration of the Jewish community and the elimination of all political Jews, which effectively meant any male Jew of working age. A few weeks into the campaign this operational plan was expanded and these men, although not acting alone, were then employed in the wholesale murder of the Soviet Jewish community. See Ronald Headland, *Messages of Murder: A Study of the Reports of the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Service 1941-43*, (Cranbury, New Jersey. 1992), and 'The Einsatzgruppen: The Question of their Initial Operations', in *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, (Vol. 4, No. 4, 1989), pp. 401-12, and Yitzhak Arad, 'The Holocaust of Soviet Jewry in the Occupied Territories of the Soviet Union', in *Yad Vashem Studies*, 1991, pp. 1-47.

Christian that it is this feature that was highlighted rather than the sufferings of the Jews. Even where the sufferings of Jews were highlighted, it was often as a constituent part of a more profound Nazi attack on Christianity. For example it was reported that apart from the persecution of Jewry, there had as yet been no attack on Christianity in occupied Belgium.[85] As such there was, through Christian understanding of Nazism, an immediate barrier placed on dissemination of the Jewish plight. Anglican understanding of Nazism as anti-Christian inevitably obscured the persecution of the Jews, which Anglicans could simply *not* conceive of as one of Nazism's imperatives.

3.2 iii) The Allied Declaration and the Limits of Understanding.

Despite this inability, or indeed unwillingness, to perceive the Jewish tragedy on behalf of the Anglican church, and consistent with reports emanating from Eastern Europe, leading members of the Anglican episcopate did begin to talk of the attempted extermination of the European Jews in Autumn 1942.[86] Although perhaps ahead of any of his Episcopal colleagues, William Temple referred openly to a campaign of extermination in October 1942, at a time when the British government continued to deny the existence of an organised attempt to annihilate the Jews.[87] However, Temple's voice was a lonely one at this point, supported only by James Parkes who had been engaged in efforts to highlight the specific plight of the Jews in the east since 1939.[88] The isolation of Temple and Parkes' efforts in the Anglican church dictates that such campaigning should not be taken as necessarily representative of the entirety of Anglican opinion. But as the Church's most important

---

[84] *Church Times*, 14 August 1942, p. 444.
[85] *Ibid.*
[86] It is difficult to establish a chronology of allied knowledge of the Final Solution, but it appears that unambiguous information was available to both the British and Americans from May of 1942 at the earliest. See Yehuda Bauer, 'When did they know?', in *Midstream*, April 1968, pp. 51-58. By June of 1942 the Daily Telegraph was reporting the use of poison gas in extermination, although this information must be treated with reservation as it is definitely an isolated example. *Daily Telegraph*, 25 June 1942.
[87] Herbert Morrison doubted the existence of an extermination plan in a meeting with Temple to discuss the fate of Jewish refugee children from Vichy France. See Temple Papers, Vol. 54, ff. 129-45. Temple publicly declared that the Nazis are attempting to exterminate the Jews the day following Morrison's rejection of the idea in a speech delivered at the Albert Hall, 29 October 1942. See Temple Papers, Vol. 69, f. 107.
[88] See below for a discussion of Parkes' relationship with the information regarding the Holocaust.

figure Temple's acknowledgement of the Jewish tragedy received considerable attention.[89]

However that Temple could perceive the particular threat to the Jews does not necessarily mean that he achieved a specific understanding, or promoted a specific understanding of the Nazi threat. For example in a speech made on behalf of a group of *Jewish* refugee children in November of 1942, Temple voiced an enduring commitment to the understanding of the Nazi threat as universal. Temple was reluctant to stress the Jewishness of the refugees, and concomitantly the anti-Jewish nature of the Nazi enemy. Although he drew attention in his speech to a 'special section of sufferers' and did use the word Jew once, Temple's emphasis was hardly geared towards a representation of Nazism as anti-Jewish, or of the victims as Jews. Jewish suffering was subsumed within the 'suffering that afflicts so many', and stress placed on the generality and universality, rather than the specificity, of the Nazi threat.[90] However criticisms of Temple should not be too harsh. The anger displayed at the lack of a humanitarian basis for British refugee policy, he described the reasons provided by the government for not admitting refugees as an 'so trifling as to be almost profane', demonstrated his genuine anguish at the fate of the Jews.[91] Before the allied declaration on the extermination of the Jews,[92] however, Temple's anguish was the articulation of a conception of Jewish suffering within a framework of Nazism as universal, that was provided by Anglican understanding of the war as the 'war of ideals'.

Prior to the Allied declaration on the Nazi campaign of extermination which was delivered simultaneously in London, Moscow, and Washington on 17 December 1942, there had been little comment within the Anglican church other than that from Temple.[93] Eden's statement in the House of Commons then focused Anglican attention, briefly, on the sufferings of Jews. In the period following the declaration British concern for continental Jewry reached its zenith, both in terms of a wider

[89] The meeting was reported in *The Times*, 30 October 1942, p. 2. The publicity drawn by the Archbishop of Canterbury's involvement dictated that the Prime Minister send a notice disavowing the 'systematic [Nazi] cruelty' to the Jews, a sentiment that rather contradicted the message of the Home Secretary from the previous day.
[90] *Hansard* (HL), Vol. 125, (21-24), 11 November 1942.
[91] FA Iremonger, *William Temple: Archbishop of Canterbury*, (London, 1948), p. 564.
[92] *Hansard* (HC) Vol. 385, (2082-87), 17 December 1942.
[93] It is difficult to footnote silences. However the preoccupation of the ecclesiastical press with the sufferings of European Christianity, and indeed the resistance of Christianity to Nazism is notable. Otherwise a review of the ecclesiastical press in the months prior to December 1942 reveals little or no comment on the privations of the Jews.

public[94] and the organised Christian community. In January 1943 the Bishops of England and Wales published a collective statement of protest at both the Nazi persecution of the Jews, and the government's refusal to accommodate more refugees.[95] Equally Temple's protests over government failings toward the refugees continued unabated,[96] and he was joined by fellow Bishops in expressions of anger, in which the Jewish tragedy appeared to finally have been understood in its full horror. Cyrill Garbett, and Cosmo Lang recognised a crime 'that had no precedent in human history',[97] and was 'unique in its horror.'[98] Interestingly, however, Episcopal opinion was not it seems echoed by the laity. Accordingly Temple blocked any debate in the Church Assembly regarding the refugee question, because he feared that it would portray a church that was not united in anguish.[99] Equally despite the flurry of secular and ecclesiastical concern for the Jews in the first months of 1943, the *Church Times*, a paper which devoted its first pages every week to a survey of international political developments, made no mention of Jewish suffering.[100]

3.2 iv) The Jewish Tragedy and the Anglican Understanding of Nazism.

The question for our purposes remains; had the new cognisance of the Jewish tragedy, of systematic mass murder affected Anglican understanding of Nazism? Superficially at least the answer to this question appears to be positive, rhetorical recognition of the uniqueness of Jewish suffering suggests a new conceptualisation of Nazism as particular racial creed, in which the threat posed was *specifically* aimed at Jews. But further investigation of Anglican understanding suggests that the deployment of terms which apparently referred to the particularity of anti-Jewish horror displayed only a superficial revision of Anglican conceptions of Nazism. For example, protests

---

[94] An example of public concern are the sales of Victor Gollancz's account of the suffering of the Jews, *Let My People Go*, (London, 1943), which was published hastily after the declaration and had sold out of its first print run (100,000 copies) by the end of January 1943. See Tony Kushner, *The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination*, (Oxford, 1994), p. 177.

[95] Copy of the statement 'The Empire as Refuge From the Massacre' can be found at Temple Papers, Vol. 54, f. 225. For a general review of the British government and their attitude towards Jewish refugees see Louise London, *Whitehall and the Jews 1933-48: British Refugee Policy and the Holocaust*, (Cambridge, 2000).

[96] Hansard (HL), Vol. 126, (811-821) 23 March 1943. Temple famously delivered a devastating attack on Government refugee policy.

[97] Lang speaking at a Prayer meeting at Westminster Central Hall, March 3 1943, quoted in *The Record*, March 19 1943, p. 90.

[98] Garbett speaking in Leeds 14 March 1943, quoted in *The Record*, March 19 1943, pp. 90-91.

[99] Temple to Bell, 25 February 1943, Temple Papers, Vol. 54, f. 274.

[100] See *Church Times*, January to March 1943.

coincided with, and perhaps reacted to, the public outrage at the persecution of the Jews and a clamour for government sponsored rescue. Indeed Episcopal rhetoric regarding the uniqueness of Jewish suffering appears to have been employed for a specific political purpose, to apply pressure on the government to act over refugees.[101] After government inaction had crushed the impetus behind the refugee movement, the deployment of the rhetoric of particularity by Anglicans appeared to cease and did not endure beyond the Bermuda conference or independent of public outrage.[102] In view of this it can be argued that such language was employed simply for purposes of political protest, and therefore did not denote a profound change in the understanding of the Nazi menace, but more the Anglican predilection for reactive political rhetoric.

In fact even running through the appreciation of the particularity of Jewish suffering by Anglicans in the aftermath of the Allied declaration were signs of the cognitive heritage of Anglican dissemination of Nazism. For example Cyrill Garbett berated the Nazi criminals as 'pagan conquerors',[103] imagery which relied heavily on the understanding of Nazism as anti-Christian, and apart from Germany's and Europe's Christian heritage. Furthermore such statements of particularity have to be situated within a general secular and ecclesiastical culture which refused to recognise the pre-eminence of Jewish victimhood. For example the secular and ecclesiastical press were united at this time in a universal understanding of Nazism. *The Times* explained that the Jews were simply the first victims of the 'doctrine of violence', and as such not ideologically imperative for the Nazis.[104] Similarly in February 1943 the *Christian News Letter* instructed its readers not to be confused by the Nazi persecution of the Jews which was 'not a crime against the Jews alone, but against mankind; in this act of calculated inhumanity human nature itself is degraded and desecrated.' In the light of this, it was argued that 'the sufferings of Jews [could not] be isolated from the sufferings of the peoples of Europe as a whole'.[105]

In April 1943 the British Council of Churches (BCC) passed the resolution 'Relief for Jewish and Other Persecuted Peoples' which stated that 'anti-Semitism of any kind is contrary to natural justice, *incompatible with the Christian doctrine of men*

[101] See for example George Bell, 'The Refugee Problem', in *Church and Humanity*, pp. 123-128. This is the text of a speech delivered in the House of Lords on 28 July 1943.
[102] London, *Whitehall and the Jews*, p. 222.
[103] Garbett in *The Record*, 19 March 1943, p.91.
[104] cited in Calder, *People's War*, p. 499.
[105] *Christian News Letter*, 17 February 1943, No. 173.

and a denial of the Gospel' (my italics).[106] Therefore the BCC defined Nazi antisemitism purely within the structures that had previously been employed to characterise the divergence between Nazism and Christianity. Furthermore the Council of Christians and Jews (CCJ),[107] formed expressly in response to the crisis of European antisemitism and to promote Christian Jewish understanding, employed the idea of Nazism as principally an anti-Christian doctrine as a founding assumption. The Council's aims to promote Christian-Jewish understanding were motivated by 'the Nazi attack on Jewry' which they alleged had 'revealed that antisemitism is part of a general and comprehensive attack on Christianity and Judaism'.[108] In the face of intensifying persecution the council later refined this interpretation of Nazi antisemitism and argued that 'in the forefront of efforts to create division within every community the Nazis have always placed antisemitism, which is repugnant to the moral principles common to Christianity and Judaism.'[109] As such even an organisation founded upon the principle of the need for Christian self-reflection precipitated by the Holocaust, remained locked within a cultural interpretation of the Jewish tragedy as a universal or (for this is what universality meant to the war time Anglican) an anti-Christian, crime. The idea, present within the limited historiographical acknowledgement of the existence of the CCJ, that its formation embodied the kernel of an understanding that the fundamental injustices of the historical Christian-Jewish relationship somehow had prepared the seed bed for the murderous excesses of Nazism, is rather belied by the situation of the Council within a Christian culture of understanding Nazism as essentially opposed to Christianity.[110]

Christian responses to Jewish suffering during this period also contained traditionally negative portrayals of Jewish victims in an effort to interpret persecution. Tony Kushner and Louise London have both observed the difficulty that the liberal political establishment had in escaping their traditional understanding of antisemitism as the result of Jewish difference. Both Kushner and London have argued that liberal

---

[106] See resolution of the BCC April 1943, 'Relief for Jewish and Other Persecuted Peoples', Temple Papers, Vol. 69, f. 205.

[107] The CCJ was formally constituted with a written declaration in the national press on 1 October 1942. The Archbishop of Canterbury was one of six joint presidents, although this was largely a symbolic role. See Marcus Braybrooke, *Children of One God: A History of the Council of Christians and Jews*, (London, 1991), pp. 17-18.

[108] Minutes for a meeting to work toward the formation of a Council of Christians and Jews, 20 March 1942, Parkes Papers, Southampton University Archives, MS 60/15/22, file 4 (of 37).

[109] Statement of the aims of the CCJ on formation, released to the press 1 October 1942, CCJ Papers, SUA, MS 65/2/1.

[110] Wilkinson, *Dissent and Conform*, p.161, and Braybrooke, *Children*, p. 13.

problems with Jewish difference led to perceptions of antisemitism as in part the responsibility of the Jews themselves. Such a tendency was equally evident within the ecclesiastical community, especially in calls for the Christian community to escape innate prejudice and embrace the concept of aid for the stricken Jews of Europe. Christians were for example asked to provide for Jews despite feeling 'irritation at the distinctive ways of the Jews of our own country'. William Temple argued that ill feeling should not be allowed to 'quench the flame of burning indignation' at the Nazi treatment of Europe's Jews.[111] In so doing Temple appeared to legitimate prejudice.

George Bell did recognise the particularity of the Jewish plight in the light of the government declaration. In a Lords' debate on the refugee question in July 1943, Bell berated the government for lack of action following the Allied declaration on the plight of the Jews. Bell commented that the enduring worth of the allied declaration, and subsequent debates, was in focusing attention on the Jewish victims of Nazism alone, and therefore eschewing the principle of universality.[112] Bell stated sympathy with all victims of Nazism, but argued that 'none of these people have been singled out by the Nazis for mass murder because of their race, as the Jews have been.'[113] For Bell the subsequent retreat from understanding the particularity of the Jewish plight had caused a 'deterioration in determination' to provide aid for Nazism's victims.

Bell's acknowledgement of the specific anti-Jewishness of the Nazi enemy displayed little self knowledge as regards his own and the general Anglican contribution to the development of understandings of Nazism which obscured Jewish victimhood. Bell's campaigns for the refugee movement in the 1930s had been anchored in an understanding of the Nazi threat cognitive only of its anti-Christian nature which contributed greatly to the structure in which Nazism was presently understood.[114] Equally Bell's critique of the war had contributed further to an understanding of the enemy that would prevent perception of Jewish victimhood through the employment of the concept of the 'war of ideals'.

In addition to lacking self-reflection Bell's commitment to an understanding of Nazism that acknowledged anti-Jewishness was also rather short lived. In the latter period of the war Bell endorsed a rhetoric of Christian reconstruction that had an

---

[111] See William Temple's new year address of December 1942, Temple Papers, Vol. 69, f. 141.
[112] George Bell, 'The Refugee Problem', in *Church and Humanity*, pp. 123-128. This is the text of a speech delivered in the House of Lords on 28 July 1943.
[113] Bell, 'The Refugee Problem', p. 125.

immediately obfuscatory impact on the historical conception of Nazism. Bell's plans for the peace were entirely monocultural and indeed excluded what was left of European Jewry. While the 'spirit of Christian fellowship' that was to abound at the end of the war did not envisage proselytising between denominations, there was simply no concept of plans encompassing non-Christian faith groups, or people of no faith at all, in any terms but as the potential focus for conversion.[115] Peace plans were aggressively evangelistic and called for 'nothing less than a crusade, by all the churches working together, for the conversion, the re-christianising, of Europe'.[116] The concept of re-christianisation was central to the Anglican post war vision, as it had been for Anglican justifications of war. While this was a concept which applied to the acceptance of certain values that the church deemed conversant with the teachings of Christ on a societal and global level, there can be little doubt that such rhetoric of reconstruction also envisaged the conversion of individuals. For example George Bell represented Anglican enthusiasm for the Pope's Christian peace proposals when he wrote that 'nothing can do more to save mankind from barbarism than the preaching and acceptance of the cross as salvation of the world', and called for a 'crusade of conversion' as the only way to safeguard the European future.[117] In promoting the monocultural Christian peace Bell, and the Anglican church, continued to subscribe to a vision of Nazism as primarily anti-Christian.

It was in common with general perceptions of the extermination of the Jews in Britain that Anglican focus waned after the relative intensity of 1942 and the first half of 1943. With a government clearly unlikely to act, clinging to the policy of unconditional surrender as the only manner to aid Europe's stricken Jews, Anglican focus turned to the organisation of the post-war world. Even the assault on Hungarian Jews, knowledge of which was explicit,[118] caused only minor ripples in the English Christian community. The Hungarian crisis really only exercised the imagination of

---

[114] For example Bell's response to the *Kristallnacht* pogrom had been to increase efforts to bring German Jewish *Christians* to Britain.

[115] See for example *Christian News Letter*, 10 March 1943, Supplement to no. 176, which argued that reconstruction must be based on the spirit of 'Christian fellowship – unselfish and unconditional sharing between those who acknowledge each other as members of one and the same body...there can be no place for competition between Churches or...proselytism among Christians of another denomination'.

[116] George Bell, 'A Visit to Sweden', in Bell, *Church and Humanity*, p. 77.

[117] George Bell, 'The Church and the Future of Europe', in Bell, *Church and Humanity*, p.121.

[118] Tony Kushner, 'The Meaning of Auschwitz: Anglo-American Responses to the Hungarian Jewish Tragedy', in David Cesarani (ed.), *Genocide and Rescue: The Holocaust in Hungary 1944*, (London, 1997), pp. 159-78.

William Temple, who had been consistently at the forefront of Anglican campaigning regarding the European Jews. Even Temple's understanding of this crisis betrayed the universal (Christian) focus of Anglican understanding of Nazism. Temple originally complied with government advice to avoid mention of the Jewishness of Nazism's Hungarian victims in an appeal made to Hungarian Christianity.[119] Temple's appeal to Hungary bears direct comparison to his interpretation of *Kristallnacht* which saw anti-Jewish action as an attack on Christianity.[120] Temple pleaded that Hungarians should not 'allow themselves to be turned away from the path of Christian discipleship by order given to you from German sources or a government set up by Germans'. On the contrary Temple impeached them to 'play the part of the Good Samaritan, and be sure that for every such act of kindness and mercy the Lord will bless you.'[121] Although emphasising the incompatibility of Nazism and Christianity, Temple's appeal made only oblique reference to the Jewishness of the Nazi victims: as 'people whose only fault is the race from which they were born, or the independence of their minds and the constancy of their convictions.'[122] Taken as a whole then the essence of Nazism within the appeal was portrayed in its anti-Christianity, racial policy was again subsumed in a general indictment of political punishment policy, or the application of totalitarian control.

That Temple's appeal was also issued under the auspices of the CCJ further suggests the breadth of the Anglican failure to entirely embrace the nature of Nazi murder policy.[123] This is confirmed by a review of commentary on the deportation and murder of Hungary's Jews in the ecclesiastical press. When comment was passed at all,[124] it fitted seamlessly into the tradition of Anglican interpretation that interpreted the persecution of Jewry as 'a contradiction of Christian morality'[125] and as 'flouting the basic principle of civilisation'.[126]

---

[119] Temple issued a broadcast to Hungarian Christians in April 1944 which pleaded with them to help Nazism's victims - see Temple Papers, Vol. 55, f. 117. This appeal did not mention the word Jew following the advice of the Ministry of Information – see House to Temple, 6 April 1944, Temple Papers, Vol. 55, f. 111.

[120] See Chapter Two.

[121] See text of the speech appended to minutes of the Executive Committee of the CCJ 4 April 1944, CCJ Papers, SUA, MS 65/2/2.

[122] *Ibid.*

[123] The CCJ response to the Hungarian crisis was to request the appeal from Temple, see minutes of the Executive Committee of the CCJ 4 April 1944, CCJ Papers, SUA, MS 65/2/2.

[124] Astonishingly in 1944 there is no mention of the Jews in the *Church Times* again despite their constantly European focus.

[125] *The Record*, 14 July 1944, p. 285.

[126] *The Record*, 21 July 1944, p. 293.

The image of Nazism as the repudiation of Christianity, and the embodiment of the totalitarian evil, was confirmed by the discoveries of the liberating forces who entered the western concentration camps in the latter stages of the war. The images and descriptions that returned from Belsen, Buchenwald, and Dachau were interpreted within the framework provided by the developing concept of the 'war of ideals' as confirming evidence of totalitarian cruelty. As with secular society such discoveries lacked context, and were not related to the knowledge of extermination that surfaced in 1942 and 1943.[127] For the Christian world the lessons contained within the liberated camps were unambiguous, these were the 'brutal facts of the *secular* twentieth century' (my italics),[128] which demonstrated the righteousness of the 'war of ideals', despite the growing ambiguities of that construct:

> the lesson which these horrors ought to burn into our minds is that the real fight is against Satanic powers that possess and corrupt the soul of man and seek nothing less than universal dominion...the difference between the votaries of unbridled power and those who cherish the democratic values of liberty, law and toleration is so fundamental that even this war [has not been] too high a price to pay to decide the issue. But it is sheer delusion to suppose that the dividing line in the real struggle runs straight and clear between the embattled forces. Each cause has allies in the opposing camp...All pride, selfishness and callous indifference to the needs of others, wherever they are found, are a siding with the enemies of Christ.[129]

Although William Temple, and briefly George Bell, wrestled with a clear vision of the scope of the Nazi anti-Jewish crimes they were ultimately unable to entirely escape the strictures of the Christian understanding of Nazism. Yet in James Parkes, both men corresponded with an Anglican who did manage to escape parochialism in his interpretation of Nazism. Analysis of Parkes' understanding of Nazism will reveal some of the fundamental precepts underpinning mainstream Anglican dissemination of the Third Reich, and will demonstrate how it would have been intellectually impossible for the majority of the Anglican church to reach an understanding of Nazism which took full account of the significance of its anti-Jewishness.

3.3 James Parkes and the Possibilities of Understanding.

---

[127] *Church Times*, 18 May 1945, p. 278. See Joanne Reilly, *Belsen: The Liberation of a Concentration Camp*, (London, 1998) for a general survey of British reactions to liberation.
[128] *Church Times*, 27 April 1945.
[129] *Christian News Letter*, 2 May 1945, No. 233.

Sarah Pearce wrote that it took the horror of the Holocaust to 'jolt Christian consciences thoroughly [and] to open Christian eyes'[130] to the historical injustices of Christian Jewish relations, and therefore Christian responsibility for antisemitism and the sufferings of Jews. In the long term Pearce's observation is correct. Post-Holocaust theology has attempted to design an equanimous relationship between Christians and Jews, and this has indeed been institutionally adopted by the Anglican Church.[131] Yet it is clear that the process of the murder of the European Jews did little to jolt the Anglican world view during the Second World War and the time at which those murders were being prosecuted. The murder of the Jews was simply rationalised within a dichotomous view of the world as a manifestation of the battle between Christ and anti-Christ. In this, far from being interpreted as connected to the historical injustices of the Christian Jewish encounter, the Nazi attack on the Jews was seen simply as a consequence and confirmation of the Nazi repudiation of Christ.

That what we now call the Holocaust did not engender self-reflection within the Anglican community during the Second World War would amount to a rather ahistorical observation if it were not for James Parkes, who campaigned within the Anglican church for a redesign of the Christian Jewish relationship throughout his career, and especially during the Nazi era. Parkes centred this campaign around an attempt to place the Jews at the heart of any plans for the post-war European future and an effort to create a world in which it was safe for a 'Jew to be a Jew'.[132] Consequently Parkes sought to persuade his fellow Christians to abandon the principle of mission to the Jews which he argued was the root cause of the historical problems of the Christian Jewish encounter. 'The Missionary attitude' Parkes argued was 'inevitably coupled with...the denigration of Judaism' and the accusation that the Jews had been responsible for the death of Christ.[133] This denigration of the Jews was, according to Parkes, the seed bed of the contemporary sufferings of Jews in Nazi

---

[130] Sarah Pearce 'Attitudes of Contempt: Christian Anti Judaism and the Bible', in Sian Jones, Tony Kushner, and Sarah Pearce (eds), *Cultures of Ambivalence and Contempt: Studies in Jewish-Non-Jewish Relations*, (London, 1998), p. 69.

[131] The Lambeth Conference, *The Truth Shall Make You Free: The Reports, Resolutions and Pastoral Letters from the Bishops*, (London, 1988), see appendix 6, 'Jews, Christians and Muslims: The Way of Dialogue', pp. 299-308. See also the Introduction to this thesis for a brief discussion and bibliography for post Holocaust theology.

[132] quoted in Tony Kushner, 'James Parkes, the Jews and Conversionism: A Model for Multi-Cultural Britain?', in Diana Wood, (ed.), *Studies in Church History 29: Christianity and Judaism*, (London, 1992), p. 457.

occupied Europe. The 'church's persistence in teaching its anti-Jewish tradition from the pulpit' had according to Parkes, 'kept the masses of Europe conscious and suspicious of the Jews even in the modern period,'[134] and had left a 'still unbroken' line between the pulpit and the death camps.[135]

In the midst of the murder of European Jews Parkes challenged his fellow Anglicans to reform their attitude to Judaism, partially in the light of growing information on the Jewish plight in Europe. Parkes circulated a document amongst the Anglican intellectual elite which called for a discussion of the endurance of the missionary attitude to Judaism in the light of the Nazi murder programme and its antisemitic inspiration. Parkes argued that Christian responsibility for such antisemitism emerged from their commitment to the concept of mission, and therefore that the principle of the missionary relationship must be revised.[136] Inspired by recent discussions for the formation of the CCJ, Parkes argued that if the church was to formally commit itself to combating antisemitism then it could not simultaneously promote the idea of the Jews as in need (in a divine sense) of conversion to Christianity, and therefore inferior.[137] Parkes' views inspired disbelief and derision amongst his correspondents. William Paton[138] felt Parkes 'barely Christian' and remained committed to the principle that whatever may be said about the Jews they 'did miss the way', which had been provided by Christ.[139] John Mcleod Campbell[140] was equally dismissive of Parkes suggesting that his was an overemotional, and irrational response to the Jews' present plight.[141] The monoculturality of George

---

[133] James Parkes 'Christianity and Judaism: Conversion or co-operation', April 1942, p. 2, Parkes Papers, Southampton University Archive, MS 60 17/10/02.
[134] quoted in Robert Everett, *Christianity Without Antisemitism: James Parkes and the Jewish Christian Encounter*, (Oxford, 1993), p. 239.
[135] quoted in Robert Everett, 'James Parkes: A Model for Christians in the Time After the Holocaust', in Bauer et al, *Remembering for the Future*, p. 330.
[136] See Parkes Papers MS 60/17 which contains various versions of Parkes' memo 'Christianity and Judaism - Conversion or Co-operation', and the response of those correspondents that Parkes invited comments from. These included George Bell, William Temple and William Paton.
[137] See page 1 of the April 1942 version of 'Christianity and Judaism - Conversion or Co-operation', Parkes Papers MS 60/ 17/02.
[138] William Paton was active in the Student Christian Movement, and became instrumental in the creation of the World Council of Churches. See Eleanor M. Jackson, *Red Tape and the Gospel: A Study of the Significance of the Ecumenical Missionary Struggle of William Paton*, (Birmingham, 1981).
[139] Paton to Parkes, 19 May 1942, Parkes Papers, SUA, MS 60/ 17/02.
[140] John McLeod Campbell was the General Secretary of the Missionary Council of the Church Assembly.
[141] McLeod Campbell to Parkes, 8 May 1942, Parkes Papers, SUA, MS 60/ 17/02.

Bell's plans for the post-war European future equally suggest that he rejected Parkes' call for inclusiveness with regard to Judaism.[142]

Although not actually positive, the least negative response to Parkes within the Anglican establishment came from William Temple. Temple engaged in lengthy correspondence with Parkes over the issue of mission, in which he was constantly receptive to the validity of Parkes' thought – something which contrasted sharply to the condescension that Parkes drew from other quarters.[143] Temple was even willing to entertain the idea that certain passages of scripture had antisemitic potentiality, although he could not accept that any Christian teaching was at root prejudicial toward the Jews.[144] Although Temple could not fully accept Parkes' theological arguments he did feel the need for some thought, that went some way beyond the perpetuation of mission and the recommendation of conversion, to be given to the issue of Jewish affairs in the post-war world. Indeed at his most fanciful Temple even suggested that Parkes be admitted to the House of Lords and made Minister for Jewish Affairs in any post war administration![145] Temple was at pains to dismiss the validity of a more aggressive attitude to the Jews, and desperate that mission be conducted in a 'Christian spirit'.[146] But even William Temple was unable to see the fundamental incongruity of Christian concern at the growth of antisemitism and the endurance of missionary attitudes. Responding to Parkes' request that Temple resign his commission at the head of the Church Mission to the Jews because it appeared to contradict, according to Parkesian theology, Temple's endorsement of the Council of Christians and Jews and the fight against antisemitism,[147] Temple replied that on the contrary he felt mission to the Jews to be a 'Christian obligation.'[148] Temple's sympathy for Parkes would then not allow his criticism of the practise of mission. When the Church Mission to the Jews produced their 1943 pamphlet, *The Jewish*

---

[142] See Parkes Papers, SUA, MS 60/16/051 for Parkes' correspondence with Bell.
[143] For example see the exchange of correspondence in Temple Papers, Vol. 31, ff. 282-96, from 1944.
[144] For example Temple to Sherman, 6 April 1944, Temple Papers, Vol. 31, f. 397, in which Temple states that he 'does not think that the reading of the passages in the New Testament describing he crucifiction can themselves without comment create ill feeling against the Jews...I think the damage comes entirely from the way in which people have treated them'.
[145] See Parkes to Temple, 31 January 1942, Temple Papers, Vol. 54, f. 61.
[146] Temple's message of support for the 1942 summer school of the Church Mission to the Jews suggested that it 'is no doubt possible to conduct missions to the Jewish people in such a way as to alienate those we do not win, but this will not result from an approach [that] is truly Christian in spirit.' Taken from a letter from W.W. Simpson to Parkes, 15 October 1942, Parkes Papers, MS 60 17/10/02.
[147] Parkes to Temple, 16 April 1942, Parkes Papers, MS 60 17/10/02.
[148] Temple to Parkes, 19 April 1942, Parkes Papers, MS 60 17/10/02.

Expellees in our Midst,[149] a guide to coping with Jewish refugees from Nazism, Temple refused to dismiss the document as offensive.[150] Temple's support for the CMJ publication was offered despite its description of the Jews as a people suffering from a 'disease of the soul' which could only be solved by conversion. Such rhetoric may have borne Jews no actual ill, but it appeared to be anchored in a negative conception of the Jew reflected in the enduring commitment to the principle of mission throughout the Anglican church.

The argument that Parkes' repudiation of mission was an humanitarian and emotional response to awareness of Jewish suffering in Europe was to misunderstand James Parkes' own prescription for Christian Jewish relations. Parkes' was a theological argument, based on Christian principle rather than an humanitarian response based on empathy with the persecuted Jews. Parkes' life in the church had been devoted to the investigation of Christian Jewish relations since he first took employment with the Student Christian Movement in the 1920s. The entire thrust of Parkes' theology was geared towards exposing what he saw as the profound theological error of Christian anti-Judaism. Christians, Parkes argued, fundamentally misunderstood Christ's relationship with the Jewish community from which he came, by failing to appreciate that the objections to religious orthodoxy that he voiced were a dialogue within a community rather than a break from it. Consequently Parkes argued that Christianity and Judaism were different forms of a single faith. This original mistake had, according to Parkes, distorted Christian theology by spawning the understanding that each successive stage of God's revelation superseded that which had preceded it. Conversely, according to Parkes, the theological reality was that 'the stages of God's revelation, once revealed are never lost.'[151] Parkes' view of the historical relationship between Christianity and Judaism inevitably impacted upon his perception of the contemporary relationship between the two faiths. If Christianity and Judaism were both equally valid stages of God's revelation then the idea of Christian missions to the Jews was supremely illogical. According to Parkes, far from

[149] J.H. Adeney, *The Jewish Expellees in our Midst*, (London, 1943), see Temple Papers, Vol. 31, ff. 273-78, for a copy.
[150] Temple to CMJ, 16 April 1943, Temple Papers, Vol. 31, f. 279.
[151] John Hadham, *Good God: Sketches of his Character and activities*, (London, 1940), p. 92.

having superseded Judaism Christianity, without the Jewish faith, was missing a part of its revelation.[152]

Dominant conceptions of Jewish Christian relations were for Parkes both cause and consequence of a much wider theological error within Christianity. Assumptions as to the death of Judaism in the light of Christ had encouraged an overt reliance on one element of the trinity, which had rather than enhanced, obscured the Christian relationship with God. Parkes held that mission perpetuated this theological travesty because it prevented Christians access to the revelatory power of Judaism, which provided a complement to Christian theology of the individual's relationship with the divine by exploring the relationship of a community to God. Judaism, Parkes contended, was a religion in which man as a social being reached fulfilment, Christianity a religion in which the individual could come closer to perfection.[153] Parkes' attraction to Judaism can also be seen as a part of his general theological liberalism, and conversant with his search for a socio-political relevance for Christianity. For example Parkes wrote in praise of Judaism and also a barely disguised sideswipe at Barthian transcendentalism, 'one did not desire to be saved from the world in Judaism; rather, one was taught the proper way in which to live in the world'.[154]

Taking account of the basis of Parkes' objections to Christian mission to the Jews, the accusation that he was simply applying an humanitarian impulse to the theology was misplaced. This was a theology that Parkes designed prior even to the ascent of the Hitler government in 1933.[155] While the Holocaust confirmed the logic of Parkes' claims as to the evils of Christian antisemitism, it was not a necessary cause of the evolution of Parkes' thought. This is a misunderstanding of Parkes' response to the Holocaust that has endured in the limited historical investigations into Parkes' life and thought. Robert Everett has described Parkes as an 'intellectual path finder' because he designed what is commonly held to be a post-Holocaust theological position before the Holocaust.[156] While the obvious homage paid to

[152] See Everett, *Christianity Without Antisemitism*, pp. 45-6, for a deeply personal statement of his theology of the Jewish Christian relationship, from the post-war period see James Parkes, 'A Theology of the Jewish Christian Relationship', in James Parkes, *Prelude to Dialogue: Jewish Christian Relationships*, (London, 1969), pp. 188-201.
[153] James Parkes, 'A Christian Looks at Christian Mission to the Jews', May 1944, Parkes Papers, MS 60/9/5/16.
[154] Quoted in Everett, *Christianity Without Antisemitism*, p. 184.
[155] *Ibid.*, p. 169.
[156] Everett, *Christianity Without Antisemitism*, p. 277.

Parkes through American post-Holocaust theology appears to concur with Everett's judgement, such a view point is in some ways to distort Parkes' position and adopt that of his contemporary Anglican detractors. Parkes' theology was not, as his Anglican contemporaries alleged, designed as a response to the Holocaust. That contemporaries suggested it was, must have been the cause of much annoyance to Parkes himself.

Although his repudiation of mission was not a response to the murders of European Jews on the continent, Parkes (and William Temple as his most sympathetic ear in the Anglican hierarchy) did it appears achieve a far more sophisticated and consistent understanding of the privations of the European Jews than their counterparts. Clearly Parkes' design of a theological accommodation of Jewishness cannot be coincidental to this achievement of a more sophisticated understanding of the Jewish tragedy. Parkes displayed little or none of the failure of Anglican Christianity and British society in general to cope with Jewish otherness, either in the context of the Holocaust or its aftermath. Although William Temple often was unable to escape the strictures of a conventional understanding of Judaism and the Christian obligation to mission, he was sympathetic to Parkes and his views of Jewishness. Parkes and Temple consistently sought to draw attention to the plight of the Jews on the European continent from the beginning of the war onwards.[157] Parkes was also able to understand the significance of the Nazi campaign against the Jews, both during the enlightened period of the winter of 1942 and 1943 and beyond. Crucially Parkes' cognition of the specifically anti-Jewish nature of Nazism endured beyond the period of government-sponsored angst after the UN declaration, as did William Temple's despite his enduring battle with the conventional interpretation of Nazism. In 1943 Parkes remarked that 'Hitler was not only threatening but actually carrying out the policy of destroying the whole Jewish population within his power.'[158] Parkes also engaged with Christian 'responsibility for the whole thing' at this time,[159] a response light years away from the stock narcissistic Christian interpretation of the attack on the Jews which accepted not only the centrality of Nazi antisemitism but also the complexities of the relationship between Nazism and the supporting German

[157] James Parkes, 'The Fate of the Jews', in *Christian News Letter*, 6 December 1939, No. 6, Supplement.
[158] Quoted in Tony Kushner, 'James Parkes and the Holocaust', in John K. Roth, Elisabeth Maxwell, Margot Levy, and Wend Whitworth (eds), *Remembering for the Future : The Holocaust in an Age of Genocides*, (New York, 2001), p. 581.

population and ideologies. In 1946 Parkes produced a remarkably sensitive understanding of the prosecution of anti-Jewish policy for publication, which continued to emphasise Jewish suffering, an issue which by that time had long been forgotten by his Christian contemporaries.[160]

Tony Kushner has written that Parkes' attitude to Judaism provided a model for a multi-cultural Britain, through its emphasis on understanding and cultural equality.[161] In their rejection of Parkes, and their interrelated preparation of culturally exclusive visions for the post-war world, the Anglican church rejected this model, and with it the principle of cultural equality. As such the limited understanding that the Anglican church achieved of the persecution of the Jews in Europe can be further problematised. Conversant with an understanding of Nazism as a whole, and in particular the Nazi attack on the Jews, as an attack on Christian values and culture, Anglican Christians effectively refused to entertain any notion of Christian responsibility for antisemitism by refusing in the later war years and immediate aftermath of the war to countenance any change to the Christian Jewish relationship. In fact the response to the Jewish crisis, was, through the design of aggressive and evangelistic peace plans the acceleration of the missionary relationship, effectively an endorsement of the culture that Parkes identified as contributing to the antisemitic cultural milieu.

Such perpetuation of the image of Jewish inferiority was employed as a response to the Jewish crisis across the ecumenical community. Robert Ross has noted the 'perverse' response of American Protestantism to Jewish refugees and the attempts at conversion as an expression of sympathy for their suffering in Europe.[162] Equally one of Parkes' major critics was the American Conrad Hoffman, who even disapproved of efforts to build cross cultural co-operation through groups such as the CCJ because they undermined the 'basic task and responsibility of the church...to win

---

[159] James Parkes, 'Christianity and Jewry', 22 July 1943, Unpublished, Parkes Papers, MS 60 9/5/4.
[160] See James Parkes, 'The German Treatment of the Jews', in Arnold Toynbee and Veronica M. Toynbee (eds), *Survey of International Affairs 1939-46, Vol. 4: Hitler's Europe*, (London, 1946), pp. 153-46. Although over reliant on hindsight, for example Parkes alleged that it was clear in 1939 that 'Nazi fury showed no sign of intending to stop short of anything but the total destruction of Jewry within its control', Parkes' understanding of the Holocaust is sensitive and far beyond other post-war evaluations. See Chapter Six for other Anglican evaluations of the Holocaust.
[161] Kushner, 'James Parkes, the Jews and Conversionism'.
[162] Robert Ross, 'Perverse Witness to the Holocaust: Christian Missions and Missionaries', in Jack Fischel, and Sanford Pinsker (eds), *The Churches Response to the Holocaust*, (Florida, 1986), pp. 127-140.

all men to faith in Christ.'[163] Wolfgang Gerlach and John Conway have also identified the endurance of the missionary attitude in the German Protestant churches in the post war era,[164] perpetuating the original objections of the confessing church to Nazi racial legislation in its denial of Christianity's missionary purpose.[165]

The case study of James Parkes is of great significance to the study of the Anglican response to the murder of the European Jews during the period 1939-45. Parkes engaged intellectually with Jewishness and Judaism and asked his brethren to do the same. In a limited fashion William Temple followed Parkes' lead and set about an extremely limited engagement with the problems of the Christian Jewish relationship but struggled to escape the fundamental touchstones of the Christian view of the Jews as inferior. Simultaneous to developing an equanimous view of Judaism, Parkes engaged consistently with the suffering of European Jews, and therefore the nature of Nazism. Temple did engage with the sufferings of Jews but again, at crucial points, struggled to convey the full significance of Nazi anti Jewish action publicly and to escape the strictures of embedded Anglican understanding of Nazism. Other Anglicans rejected Parkes, and the idea of engagement with both Judaism and the nature of the Christian Jewish encounter. Concomitantly there was a failure to engage either with the sufferings of Jews, or the significance of antisemitism to Nazism, borne in part of a fundamental inability to understand Judaism.

3.4 Conclusion: Anglicanism and Understanding the Holocaust 1941-45.

Apart then from a brief period immediately prior to and then following the Allied declaration on the Nazi extermination of the Jews, the concept of the 'war of ideals', as developed, and employed by the Anglican church, directly prevented their understanding antisemitism as a Nazi imperative. Such an understanding of Nazism in turn shielded the Nazi attack on the Jews from Anglican eyes. Despite there being examples of Anglican and ecclesiastical engagement with the Final Solution, the general picture is one of comparative silence. A review of the ecclesiastical press, and the writings of leading Anglican figures during the war years, demonstrates that the priorities of the Anglican gaze lay elsewhere, chiefly in the emphasis on Christian

[163] Hoffman to Parkes, 5 March 1942, quoted in Parkes to Temple, 16 April 1942, Parkes Papers, MS 60 17/10/02.
[164] Wolfgang Gerlach, *And the Witnesses were Silent: the Confessing Church and the persecution of the Jews*, p. 211, and John Conway, 'The German Church Struggle and its Aftermath', in Abraham J. Peck (ed.), *Jews and Christians After the Holocaust*, (Philadelphia, 1982), p.48.

resistance, and in designs for post-war Europe. That anti-Jewish policy was not employed as the chief indicator of Nazi criminality is again important, and from the current standpoint appears almost incredible. Chiefly however, the importance in this observation resides not in the comparative silences surrounding the Final Solution, but in the discernment of the priority of Anglican focus. This focus in turn created the prism through which the Final Solution when interpreted at all was understood, and also erected structures which perhaps counselled against understanding. Those figures within the Anglican church who could conceive, to differing degrees, of the importance of the attack on the Jews to understanding the Nazi menace did so from a standpoint of a more sophisticated theological vision of Jewishness. This theological sophistication allowed consideration both of Nazism and the implications of the murder of the Jews for the traditionally anti-Jewish Christian faith. Self-reflection was eschewed by the majority of the English Christian community.

The search for Christian resistance, the allies in the war of ideals, itself produced an ambiguous structure within which reflection on the war would have to be undertaken. The stress laid on the centrality, and otherness of totalitarian control clearly constructed an alibi and escape route from guilt for those outside of the pre-identified controlling criminal clique in the Anglican mind. Equally the development of an amorphous sense of the 'war of ideals' which could transcend the objective and geographical boundaries of the physical war created structures for the understanding of criminality which reduced all atrocity to a single common denominator, the repudiation of Christian value. Such reductionism then allowed the interpretation of 'allied' criminality within the same framework as that which had misunderstood the Nazi campaign against the Jews.

The process of reducing criminality to a single common denominator continued into the post-war world. For example, in common with the German Christian churches, the English Christian community was able to conceive of the westward expulsion of ethnic Germans from Soviet occupied Europe after May 1945 in exactly the same manner as the crimes of the Holocaust: as a 'violation of the principles of humanity'[166] which allowed Nazi crimes to metamorphose into Soviet crimes and be obscured. By interpreting all criminality as the result of the same impulse, the crimes of the Soviet Union became pre-eminent as the most recent

[165] See Chapter One.
[166] *The Record*, October 19 1945, p. 519.

example of the logic of totalitarian rule. The sentiment that 'overtopping all other tragedies in scale and intensity is the misery of the expelled Germans' was common.[167]

The process of Christianising Russia, in order to integrate the Soviet Union into the alliance of the 'war of ideals' began to be reversed immediately after the physical destruction of Nazism. The significance of this is not the reorientation of the Christian community against the Soviet Union, whose enduring atheism made this somewhat inevitable, but the language employed to characterise Soviet criminality and barbarity, which appeared to allow for a seamless transition of enemy. For Anglicans there was a continuity of European tyranny: 'anybody tuning in to Radio Berlin may hear the same announcers who worked under Goebbels now working under...Stalin and mouthing out the propaganda familiar with the Asiatic brand of totalitarianism [which is] the reverse of the western system.'[168] The enemy of the 'war of ideals' remained for the English Christian community in tact, 'Soviet Russia' was branded 'a police state, which is the very denial of Christian principles. The wicked and barbarous terrorism in concentration and labour camps was copied by Hitler from the Bolsheviks.'[169]

The Anglican concept of the 'war of ideals' then created a structure for the misunderstanding of the Holocaust, and prevented reflection on the criminal excesses of anti-Jewish policy because it necessarily demanded the interpretation of Nazism as anti-Christian. In turn it was a concept that applied the dichotomous understanding of the world to both German and Soviet Russia, finding enemies and allies alike within each. As such for manifold reasons the end of the physical war did not bring the end of the 'war of ideals', the endurance of which prevented reflection on the Nazi crimes against the Jews. First the concept of a 'war of ideals' had created a structure within which, through the concentration on totalitarian domination, acquiescent complicity, and indeed involvement in the Eastern theatre of genocide, could be avoided by protagonists. Second, the understanding of barbarousness and cruelty as simply the repudiation of Christian value allowed, in keeping with the developing polarity of pre-Cold War Europe, any new atrocity to supersede the last as the new manifestation of the totalitarian anti-Christian spirit. Within such a formula the specificities of the Nazi

[167] *Christian News Letter*, 31 October 1945.
[168] *Church Times*, 1 June 1945, p. 307
[169] *Church Times*, 22 June 1945, p. 347.

racial crime were inevitably obscured. In the following section the legacy of such inability to conceive of the full import of Nazi antisemitism will be investigated.

SECTION 2.

THE LEGACIES OF ANGLICAN UNDERSTANDING FOR HISTORY.

Chapter Four.
Redeemable or Damned? Secular and Ecclesiastical Narratives of the German Past and Future in Britain 1943-48.

It is commonly asserted within the growing historiography concerned with the lack of post-war engagement with what we now call the Holocaust, that the Cold War was the primary cause of the wilful suppression of the memory of the Jewish tragedy in the Western world in the later 1940s. According to this consensus the Nazi campaign against the Jews was abandoned by the west as an indicator of the evil of European dictatorial alternatives to liberal democracy precisely because the Nazi enemy had been destroyed. Germany was strategically vital in the west's new, Cold, War with the Soviet Union after 1945, and therefore – the argument goes – concentration on a specific German form of racial terror was eschewed in favour of highlighting the depravity of a generalised totalitarianism which could include the new and principle Communist enemy. The Holocaust was not relevant to Cold War warriors because it was a crime specific to the ideology of yesterday's enemy, whereas the general barbarity of totalitarian domination could be used to indict an emasculated Nazism portrayed as the forerunner to the, by 1948, primary Soviet danger.[1]

Logically the idea that Cold War suppressed the history and memory of the Holocaust appears flawed. To award the march of global power politics causal priority in the suppression of memory of the Holocaust in the later 1940s rather rests on the

---

[1] See for example John H. Herz, 'Denazification and Related Policies', in John H. Herz (ed), *From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism*, (Westport, 1982), p. 28, and Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life*, (New York, 1999), p. 85. Ian Turner, 'Denazification in the British Zone', in Ian Turner (ed), *Reconstruction in Post-War Germany: British Occupation Policy and Other Western Zones*, (Oxford, 1989), pp. 239-67, and David Welch, 'Priming the Pump of German Democracy: British "Re-education" Policy in Germany After the Second World War', in Turner, *Reconstruction*, pp. 215-38. Robert Cherry, 'Holocaust Historiography: The Role of the Cold War', in *Science and Society*, (Vol. 63, No. 4, 1999), pp. 459-477.The suppression of memory was not however confined to the west, and the Jewish tragedy was equally eschewed in what was to become the Soviet bloc, due to a complex amalgam of ethnic tensions and dogmatic Marxist-Leninist interpretations of fascism. See Mary Fulbrook, *German National Identity After the Holocaust*, (Cambridge, 1999), and Jeffrey Herf, *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanies*, (Cambridge, Mass. 1997), pp. 106-200, for a discussion of the suppression of the history and memory of the Holocaust in the GDR. See D. Romanovsky, 'The Holocaust in the Eyes of Homo-Sovieticus: A Survey Based on North Eastern Belorussia and North Western Russia', in *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, (Vol. 13, No. 3, 1999), pp. 355-82, and Jay Bergman, 'Dissidents on the Holocaust, Hitler and Nazism: A Study of the Preservation of Historical Memory', in *Slavonic and East European Review*, (Vol. 70, No. 3, 1992), pp. 477-504, Zvi Gitelman, 'History, Memory and Politics - The Holocaust in the Soviet Union', in *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, (Vol. 5, No. 1, 1990), pp. 23-67 for similar discussions for the Soviet Union. Recent controversies regarding Jan Gross's investigation of indigenous involvement in the massacre of Jews in the village of Jedwabne in Poland in 1941 demonstrate the continuing problem of confronting the Holocaust in central and Eastern Europe. See Jan T. Gross, *Neighbours: The Destruction of the Jewish Community of Jedwabne, Poland*, (Princeton, New Jersey. 2001).

assumption that in the immediate post-war era there was substantial understanding and engagement with the plight of the European Jews. Yet, in terms of the understanding of the campaign against the Jews in war time, there is also a growing body of historiography that contends that part of the failure of the west to respond adequately to the murder of the Jews during the Second World War was a failure of imagination and understanding. Understanding of the ongoing Nazi campaign against the Jews in the period 1939-45 was diluted by various groups through the filter of equally diverse cultural and political assumptions which produced understandings of the Holocaust broadly conversant with the world views originally employed to interpret Nazi anti-Jewishness.[2] This development in historiography has been supported by the first section of this thesis, which found an Anglican church, across the life-time of the Third Reich, unwilling and unable to understand the Jewish tragedy in any way other than as a further example of Nazi anti-Christianity.[3] Furthermore, in the immediate post war era the liberation of the concentration camps, programmes of relief for displaced persons, and the trials of Nazi perpetrators appeared to contribute to, rather than challenge, the misconceptions regarding the nature of the Nazi state and the campaign against the Jews that had been proposed in war time.

The purpose of this chapter is to begin to investigate the continuities of engagement with German history in Britain across the caesura of May 1945, and therefore to further probe the, at first glance shaky, foundations of the suggestion that the Cold War was the external agent which caused the suppression of the memory and history of the Nazi era and the Holocaust in the post-war world. In working toward an alternative explanation for the lack of engagement with the Holocaust in the years immediately after 1945 – which shall subsequently be expanded in Chapters Five and Six – it shall be proposed here that those wider narratives of German history within which the understanding of the Nazi state and the Nazi attack on the Jews had to be placed, had been extant prior to the existence of global political imperatives to revolutionise the idea of Germany and German history. Although there can be no doubt that the 'new' narratives of the German present and past came to the fore in

[2] See for example for a discussion of the manner in which Israel has confronted the Holocaust, often through the partial viewpoint of wishing to celebrate Jewish resistance and power, Tom Segev, *The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust*, (New York, 1993).
[3] See Section 1 of this thesis, 'The Anglican Understanding of Nazism and the Destruction of the European Jews 1933-45'.

Britain in the context of, and legitimated by, the degenerating relationship with the Soviet Union, it will be argued that the concept of the external suppression of the past is too simple because it ignores the existence of constructive (rather than destructive) narratives of the German past through which the Third Reich could be understood.

In this chapter it will be argued that crucial to the understanding of the Nazi state in the Cold War west were perceptions of the prehistory of the Third Reich, which are most easily detectable in the visions of the German future proposed inside and outside government during the period 1943-48. This chapter will first explore the changing attitudes to the German future in British government policy toward Germany across the later years of the war, demonstrating the manner in which specific and changing narratives of the past were inherent in these visions of the future. Marginal and ameliorative narratives of the German past proposed in government during the course of the war will then be compared to the understandings of the German past inherent in the Anglican world view. These coinciding visions of the past, it will be contended, emerged to dominance as the British relationship with the Soviet Union degenerated. The Anglican narrative of the past will be gleaned through the rhetoric of the German future proposed in the Church of England. Moreover, it will be suggested that it is in affecting the ideas of the prehistory of Nazism that the Anglican community had a genuinely powerful voice in shaping a culture through which the more specific Nazi past was then understood, or indeed not understood, in early Cold War Britain.

4.1 Readings of the German Past in British Policy Towards Germany 1943-45

At the inception of the war in 1939, the British government appeared to draw a sharp contrast between the German people and their Nazi dominators, for example foreign secretary Lord Halifax and Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain both declared that the war was 'a war for the liberation of the German people'.[4] After the German invasion of France and the Benelux countries, however, the propagandistic portrayal of the German nation was transformed.[5] The idea of the German population as victims of

[4] Halifax quoted in Kurt Jürgensen, 'British Occupation Policy after 1945 and the Problem of 'Re-educating' Germany', in *History*, (Vol. 68, No. 223, 1983), p. 226, which also notes the consensus between members of the government over this interpretation of the nature of the war.
[5] Jill Jones, 'Eradicating Nazism from the British Zone of Germany: Early Policy and Practice', *German History*, (Vol. 8, No. 2, 1990), p. 146.

Nazism was abandoned, and propagandists sought refuge in the certainties of the First World War portrayals of the savage, cultureless Hun in the grip of the Prussian Militarist conspiracy for world domination.[6] Lord Vansittart's radio broadcasts, which were subsequently available in print, were both the most extreme and the most widely disseminated of these accounts of the 'Black record' of the German people available in Second World War Britain.[7] Vansittart explicitly sought to relate the Nazi devil to its alleged Prussian militarist forebears, and portrayed the previous century as a continuous battle against various forms of German aggression.[8] Such aggression, Vansittartism contended, was an expression of the essential German national character. In such a formula, Nazism was simply the newest and indeed the ultimate manifestation of innate German hatefulness.[9] That the government, publicly at least, subscribed to this interpretation of the development of German history was confirmed when the House of Lords was informed that British war aims were the 'extermina[tion] of this horrible and hateful system from the world. By that system [the government meant] not only Hitler, *but the whole Prussian regime*' [my italics].[10]

Propagandistic loathing for the German nation, and the irredeemability of the German soul, was reflected in the rather vague notion of the German future anchored within the concept of unconditional surrender declared by Churchill and Roosevelt at Casablanca in January of 1943.[11] Implicit within the idea of unconditional surrender which informed all policy towards the German enemy until May of 1945 (none more so than the Allied attitude to the rescue of European Jewry), was a vision of an entirely occupied, politically subjugated, Germany. The adoption of unconditional surrender dictated that there would be no negotiation with any shade of *German* government, a policy which rested on the assumption that the German nation and population was entirely at one with the Nazi state. Such a policy, directed as it was towards complete subjugation, implicitly denied that there could be any anti-Nazi force in Germany at all, and therefore represented the effective reversal of the view of divergent Nazi government and German population adopted in government rhetoric in 1939. Concomitant to, and informed by, the policy of surrender, the British

---

[6] See Niall Ferguson, *The Pity of the War*, (London, 1998), pp. 231-35 for a discussion of the portrayal of Germany and the Germans in First World War propaganda.
[7] See Chapter Three above for a discussion of Vansittartism.
[8] Lord Vansittart, *Lessons of My Life*, (London, 1943), p. 208.
[9] Sir Robert Vansittart, *Black Record: Germans Past and Present*, (London, 1941).
[10] Viscount Simon, Lord Chancellor, *Hansard* (HL) Vol. 126 (580) 10 March 1943.
[11] Angus Calder, *The People's War: Britain 1939-45*, (London, 1969), p. 493.

government refused to undertake any negotiations with non-Nazi military or political resistance in Germany prior to the achievement of that surrender, and indeed deliberately refused requests that they give some propaganda boost to any resistance groups contemplating an attack on the state.[12] All such notions were anchored in a reading of the German past as an unrepentant journey through various forms of authoritarianism, and crucially of a German population who embraced such government. The logic of Allied policy had it that popular enthusiasm for governmental authoritarianism in Germany dictated that 'ordinary Germans' were worthy only of subjugation and as such were incapable of redemption. The reading of the German past inherent in unconditional surrender also appeared to be implicit within plans for the division of occupied Germany confirmed in November 1944. The absolute sovereignty envisaged by the occupiers highlighted a conception of both the German present and past which concurred with Vansittartist assumptions about the oxymoron of a *German*, non-Nazi or democratic administration and therefore relied upon a conception of Nazism as the natural expression of the German national character.[13]

Although the Vansittartist conception of the German past apparently dominated British government policy towards Germany and indeed was interpreted as being given a new resonance by the allied discoveries in Belsen and Buchenwald,[14] alternative narratives were proposed and discussed within the British government and the wider anti-Nazi alliance during the war. Ever unpredictable, Stalin gave impetus to the idea of separation between German population and government by referring to his belief in the 'other Germany' and its divergence from the Nazi State as early as 1943. Stalin's simultaneous recommendation that some 50,000 Germans be liquidated as an alternative to any post-war trials, [15] suggests that these sentiments are perhaps best explained as an attempt to politicise the German future, and reorientate Eastern

---

[12] Rainer A. Blasius, 'Waiting for Action: The Debate on the "Other Germany" in Great Britain and the Reaction of the Foreign Office to German Peace Feelers in 1942', in F.R. Nicosia and Lawrence D. Stokes (eds), *Germans Against Nazism: Non-Conformity, Opposition and Resistance in the Third Reich: Essays in Honour of Peter Hoffman*, (New York, 1940), pp. 279-304.

[13] Alfred Grosser, *Germany in Our Time: A Political History of the Post War Years*, (London, 1970), p. 41.

[14] Michael Balfour, 'In Retrospect: Britain's Policy of Re-Education', in Nicholas Pronay and Keith Wilson (eds), *The Political Re-education of Germany and her Allies After World War II*, (Worcester, 1985), p. 140.

[15] F.J.P. Veale, *Advance to Barbarism: How the Reversion to Barbarism in Warfare and War Trials Menaces our Future*, (Appleton, Wisconsin. 1953), p. 141.

Germany towards the Soviet Union.[16] However, Soviet engagement with a non-Nazi Germany, whatever its inspiration, was based upon and implied a specific reading of the past that diverged from that implicit within the concept of unconditional surrender. The separation of government and population within Soviet propaganda suggested a conception of the Nazi state as a dominant and tyrannical force foisted upon Germany rather than the essential expression of the black German soul.[17]

Stalin's alternative reading of the German past was not in actual fact confined to the Soviet Union. At the same time as publicly pursuing a policy of unconditional surrender, the British Foreign Office appears to have been more than prepared to countenance the possibility of a more nuanced reading of German history. As Stalin was extending the olive branch to the non-Nazi Germany, the British Foreign Secretary prepared a report which, in its recommendations for the German future, displayed considerable faith in the German population and a desire to divorce the understanding of Nazism from specifically German historical continuities. Anthony Eden questioned the idea that Nazism was the manifestation of 'local' German tendencies toward authoritarianism, and therefore embedded in a specifically German tradition of Prussian militarism. As an alternative, Eden proposed that Nazism was the result of a new 'ideological' turn in the European politics of power. Whilst Eden argued the specific German form of this ideological reorientation was only explicable through the German 'worship of strength' and was therefore connected to the German past, such ideology was not proposed as necessarily the result of specifically German historical continuities.

By challenging the notion of Nazi connections with German history, Eden's reading of Nazism was essentially a variant of the vision of the separation of the German population and Nazi government embodied in Stalin's courting of the 'other

---

[16] Political parties were re-established in the Soviet zone in the immediate aftermath of the German defeat on 9 June 1945. By 1946 all political parties were synthesised into an anti-fascist block. While this was evident an element of the attempt to create Germany's communist future such planning did involve a conception of the past that recognised the possibilities for (communist) redemption among the German population, and therefore did not necessarily view Nazism as the collective expression of German national longing. See Grosser, *Germany*, p. 89.

[17] See Aleksei M. Filitov, 'Problems of Post-War Construction in Soviet Foreign Policy Conceptions During World War II', in Francesca Gori and Silvio Pons (eds), *The Soviet union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943-53*, (London, 1996), pp. 3-22, in order to place the existence of the National Committee for a Free Germany and attendant rhetoric in the context of Soviet policy ambitions towards Germany. For the reaction of the west to the national committee, which was perhaps beyond the significance of the committee and the Free German movements that it legitimised, see Heike Bungert, *Das Nationalkomitee und der Westen: Die Reaktion der Westallierten auf das NKFD und die*

Germany'. However, Eden's recasting of the image of the German past was inspired by, and indeed self fulfillingly justified, fears of a future alliance between Germany and the Soviet Union. Through the use of the universal concept of 'ideology' in the definition of Nazism, Eden found that the two states – Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union – were fundamentally similar. While this is an interpretation of the German past and future that was conversant with the Anglican 'war of ideals', it is hardly a position that was recognisable in publicly articulated government opinions of either the German enemy or the Russian ally.[18] Eden's was a narrative of the German past that suggested the possibility of the redemption of Germany – a process that was ultimately facilitated by the Cold War. By removing Nazism from specifically German historical continuity, Eden, like Stalin, allowed for the rehabilitation of the German nation. That Eden's report was produced in March 1943 undermines the notion that the Cold War and the collapse of the anti-Nazi alliance produced the portrayal within western historical memory of Nazism as a previous constituent of the anti-western totalitarianism that was believed to be located in the Soviet Union.

Research into the nature of Nazism and its German historical roots conducted by the Foreign Office in the later war years continually displayed a curious relationship with Vansittartist rhetoric, both contradicting and supporting this apparently dominant historical narrative. In January 1944 the Foreign Office's Advisor on Germany, John Troutbeck,[19] counselled that Nazism was the product of the forces of 'reaction' and traditional industrial power in Germany and as such was an element of German historical continuity. However this reading of the German past also emphasised Nazism's alienation from the Western historical tradition, from Christianity and (rather paradoxically) the roots of German *Kultur*, Troutbeck advised that 'the real foundation of the Nazi system has been the teaching of...people who have gradually diverted German thought away from the Western and Christian traditions.' Troutbeck's narrative both concurred with the Vansittartist outlook, and equally echoed the understanding of Nazism that was proposed in the Anglican 'war of ideals' which would become the basis of the Cold War narrative of Nazism as totalitarianism. Although specifically German, Nazism was portrayed as the embodiment of the German embrace of alien, anti-Western and even anti-German

---

Freien Deutschen Bewegungen 1943-48, (Stuttgart, 1997) and for a review of this volume see Diethelm Prowe in *The International History Review*, (Vol. 21, No. 2, 1999).

[18] Eden's report is dated 8 March 1943, PRO CAB 66/34 WP (43) 96.

historical forces, a prescription that clearly could, at the very least, accommodate the possibility of the later subsumation of Nazism within a Soviet inspired totalitarianism.[20]

By 1945 Foreign Office research was seeking to undermine not only the location of Nazism within German historical continuity but also the related assumptions within the Vansittartist prescription regarding the relationship between the Nazi state and the German population. Implicit within the concept of unconditional surrender was an opinion of the majority German population which found them incapable of supporting or sustaining a democratic form of governance (and which therefore justified the continued refusal to countenance negotiation with any future non-Nazi German administration). In August 1945, however, a Foreign Office report on the failure, and essentially the possible future, of German democracy, concluded that the collapse of Weimar had not been the inevitable result of the failings of the German character and the German predilection for vicious authoritarianism. In fact, the report argued, the collapse of the Weimar system had been the result of a 'particular constellation of contemporary political, economic and cultural factors' which did not therefore suggest that the 'Germans are by nature incapable of self government.'[21] Troutbeck's rejection of the report, which failed to convince him 'that there [was] the faintest possibility of their [the Germans] succeeding in a second attempt [at democracy]...even in the somewhat unlikely event of their trying to do so',[22] demonstrated the marginality of this rather more ameliorative narrative of the German present, past and future when compared to the dominance of the rhetoric of unconditional surrender. Nevertheless it is clear that as the war came to a close, and as external events appeared to confirm the Vansittartist appraisal, alternative versions of the German past were flourishing within government agencies.[23]

4.2 The Anglican Church and the German Past in War Time.

The marginal narratives of the German past proposed within government during war time substantially echoed the Anglican world view implicit within the concept of the

---

[19] Appointed in October 1943, with responsibility for the co-ordination of policy.
[20] Troutbeck, 'The Regeneration of Germany', 3 December 1943, PRO FO 371 / 39093.
[21] E.R. Dodds, 'The Failure of Democracy in Germany', 14 August 1945, PRO FO 371 / 46880.
[22] Troutbeck's notes accompanying the Dodds report, PR0 FO 371 / 46880.

'war of ideals'. Anglican views of the German past, and especially the role of Nazism within and as a development of that past, were most clearly articulated through the Anglican vision of the German future. But there were also attitudes to the past implicit within the Anglican rhetoric of war. The generalisation of the Nazi foe, its absorption into an analytical framework which concentrated on totalitarian domination, and the opposition of totalitarianism to the Christian view of man, all suggested a view of Nazism as apart from, and alien to western historical traditions. Coupled with Anglican unease at the prosecution of the Allied war effort and attacks on German civilians, the dominant Anglican view of Nazism implicit within the war itself was of an alien domination imposed on an unwilling, and terrorised German population.[24] As with its Vansittartist polar opposite, such a view of Nazism's relationship with the German population rested on the interpretation of the relationship between National Socialism and the progress of German history. But for Anglicans, far from being the product of historical continuity, Nazism had emerged from outside of Christian European tradition, and therefore its relationship with German tradition was that of discontinuity. The narrative of the past implicit within Anglican attitudes to the war then became explicit within the Anglican rhetoric of the future.

For Anglicans at war the European future was conceived simply as the re-establishment of Christian Europe. Central to Anglican ambitions for a Christian Europe, as it had been to the formulation of the conceptual 'war of ideals', was the concept of the 'other Germany', which was separated from the Nazi state. The idea of victory in the 'war of ideals' was dependent on there being a distinction between Germany, the German population, and Nazism: 'if Germany and National Socialism are completely identical' George Bell wrote, then 'the "resurrection of Christendom" in Europe is no more than a...dream, but if they are not then that ideal may not be altogether utopian.'[25] Bell equally described the 'vital importance of the distinction' between Germans and Nazis for 'the whole pattern of Europe after the war', and ensuring reconciliation between former belligerents.[26]

On what then was this faith in the 'other Germany' and the absolute distinction between Germans and Nazis based? Largely the answer to this question can be sought

---

[23] Jürgensen, 'British Occupation Policy', p. 230.
[24] See Chapter Three.
[25] *Christian News Letter,* 20 March 1940, No. 21. See also *Christian News Letter*, 1 November 1944, No. 220.
[26] George Bell, *Hansard* (HL) Vol. 126 (537) 10 March 1943.

in analysis of Anglican understanding of certain institutions (and indeed individuals) within German society, specifically in their conception of the historical significance of such institutions. Individuals, such as Martin Niemöller, who had been labelled resistant, carried Anglican hopes for the German future. For example in a critique of the principle of 'unconditional surrender' the *Church Times* assured readers that 'Pastor Niemöller [demonstrated] there was another Germany' upon which Germany and Europe could be reborn.[27] Following on from this, predictably, foremost amongst the institutions which made up the 'other Germany' was the German Protestant church. The idea of Christianity as resistant to the Nazi menace was the founding assumption of all (the admittedly rather vague) Anglican plans for Germany in the aftermath of the war. Anglicans envisaged the rebirth of the German church which had stood firm while 'the once proud institutions of Germany, her press, her trade unions, her universities had all gone down in the Nazi cataclysm'. It was because of the links the German church provided with the German past that it was the churches 'to whom Germany [would] look to bring back the country from Nazi domination.'[28] Anticipating this faith in German Christianity, as the war drew to a close the Anglican church, and the English churches in general, made plans for the resumption of ecumenical contact with the (necessarily resistant) German churches. In September of 1944 the British Council of Churches (BCC) passed the following resolution:

> the British Council of Churches gives thanks to Almighty God for the courage and steadfastness with which their fellow Christians in Europe have maintained their faith during days of oppression, persecution and suffering and it rejoices that the day is drawing near in which mutual consultation and common action will again be possible between Christians in Britain and on the continent.[29]

Faith in the ecumenical future in turn heralded the creation of the Committee for Christian Reconstruction in Europe in 1944, which would later become simply Christian Reconstruction in Europe (CRE). An agency of the British Council of Churches, CRE in both its creation and later administration involved significant figures in the Anglican church. William Temple was central to the establishment of CRE, while George Bell became its driving force after Temple's death. The

---

[27] *Church Times*, 11 May 1945, p. 263. See also Chapter One for an analysis of the Anglican portrayal of the resistant Niemöller.
[28] *Church Times*, 27 October 1944, p. 575.
[29] Resolution dated 27 September 1944, Temple Papers, Lambeth Palace Library, f. 377.

institutional manifestation of the ecumenical faith in the regenerative powers of European and specifically German Christianity, the remit of CRE was both practical and moral. Practically the organisation was dedicated to raising money to support the material reconstruction of German (Protestant) Christianity.[30] This aid to the literal rebuilding of church institutions was to provide practical impetus to the CRE's moral and spiritual raison d'être: the establishment of ecumenical contact in Germany as a precursor to the re-christianisation of Europe.[31] As such the CRE was founded upon myths which were an explicit echo of the assumptions of the 'war of ideals':

> Christian churches throughout Europe have been in the forefront of the fight against Barbarism. Their struggle has not been for themselves but of the Church of Christ and as guardians of human values of justice liberty and truth...God, our shepherd, give to the Church a new vision, and a new charity, new wisdom, and fresh understanding, the revival of her brightness and the renewal of her unity; that the eternal message of thy son undefiled by the traditions of man may be hailed as the good news of the new age.[32]

At the heart of the CRE's envisioned Christian revival lay the resistant German church which it was argued had proved to be almost 'the only bulwark against the penetrating influence of National Socialist ideology' in Germany. This resistance was, argued the Anglican church, a 'living reminder to the nation that there exist forces which have deeper roots and greater permanence than National Socialism.'[33] The historical narrative at work was unmistakable, the German past was rooted in the Western tradition, which alien Nazism had failed to destroy.

The German Protestant church was not the only bulwark against the totalitarian menace perceived by Anglicans, and therefore was not the only institution on which Anglicans based their hopes for a Christian future. For some Anglicans, the Wehrmacht too remained an institution in which the 'other Germany' flourished.[34] Famously, George Bell held intimate knowledge of the Wehrmacht conspiracy, which ultimately ended in the failed assassination attempt of 20 July 1944. Gained from a

---

[30] See *The Record*, 26 May 1944, p. 215.
[31] See the BCC submission to the Foreign Office for official recognition of CRE, February 1944, PRO FO 371/40752.
[32] Pamphlet of the CRE in Temple Papers, Vol. 7, ff. 383-6.
[33] from a report prepared for CRE (unattributed), 'The Situation of the Protestant Church in Germany', Temple Papers, Vol. 7, ff. 209-216.
[34] There are exceptions within the Anglican communion to the positive assessment of the Wehrmacht. Lord Lang for example argued that the barbarity of Hitler's army led to questions regarding the separation of the Nazi state and the German population. See *Hansard* (HL) Vol. 126 (537) 10 March 1943.

meeting with Dietrich Bonhöffer in Sweden in 1942, Bell lobbied the Foreign Office to act on, and publicly welcome, Bonhöffer's blueprint for a post Hitler Germany. Bonhöffer's vision of the German future saw the Wehrmacht joining the church as the agent through which Germany could be morally regenerated.[35] In efforts to draw attention to the divergence between Germany and the Nazi state in March 1943 Bell deliberately attempted to distinguish between the army and the Nazi state in order to bolster the image of an honourable Christian, anti-Nazi, Wehrmacht.[36] The Christian press too sought to identify the cultural continuity between the Wehrmacht leadership and the traditions of Christendom, which again was argued to hold hope for the German future.[37]

The notion of an 'other Germany', which held the key to the German and indeed the European future for the Anglican church, was based upon a specific reading of the past. Institutions which the Anglican church felt to be historically allied with Christianity were identified as the potential agents of European regeneration purely on the basis of this apparent and presumed relationship with Christianity.[38] The 'other Germany', was for the Anglican church, the result of German historical continuities, while Nazism as we have seen was understood as alien to the German historical traditions: 'the experience of history' claimed Bell (quoting his unlikely ally Stalin), 'shows that Hitler's come and go, whereas the German people...remain'.[39]

Such faith in the regeneratory potential of *German* institutions found the Anglican church at odds with governmental notions of the past as articulated through rhetorical concepts such as 'unconditional surrender', at least during war time. Nevertheless the idea of a potentially morally acceptable Germany did echo the more marginal narratives of the past employed within government agencies and departments. As such the Anglican church publicly provided a narrative of the German past which foretold the rehabilitation of Germany within the dominant narratives of the past proposed after the emergence of the Cold War

---

[35] See Blasius, 'Waiting for Action', p. 290.
[36] George Bell, 'Germany and the Hitlerite State', in Bell, *The Church and Humanity*, (London, 1946) p. 95-109. This is the text of a speech originally made in the House of Lords in March 1943. Previously Bell had corresponded on the need for him to draw a distinction between the resistant Wehrmacht and the Nazi SS and SA in any speech. Bell to Schutz, 22 January 1943, Bell Papers, Vol. 51, f. 93.
[37] For example see *Christian News Letter*, 5 May 1943, No. 181.
[38] *Christian News Letter*, 21 February 1945, No. 228.
[39] George Bell, *Hansard* (HL) Vol. 126 (537) 10 March 1943, cited in Bell, 'Germany and the Hitlerite State', p. 96.

4.3 Readings of the German Past in British Policy Towards Germany 1945-48

After the end of the war, in accordance with both the practical demands of the post-war administration of the subjugated Germany and the cessation of the burden of war upon government rhetoric, a 'new' narrative of the German past began to take shape within British policy toward Germany. The Potsdam agreement of July 1945 gave expression to a developing nuance in allied conceptions of the German future, as it became increasingly clear that Vansittartist propaganda was of little practical use. The rhetoric of Potsdam remained harsh, stressing the necessity of 'convinc[ing] the German people that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves' and equally the absolute priority of 'destroy[ing] the National Socialist Party'.[40] But, the agreement did introduce the possibility of redemption for the German soul – missing in the Vansittartist formulation – in suggesting that the elimination of 'Nazi and militarist doctrines' would make possible the 'successful development of democratic ideas' in Germany.[41] Yet this altered view of the possibilities of the German future inherent in Potsdam did not present an entirely new version of the German past. The dominant narrative of that past remained so: Potsdam interpreted Nazism as anchored in German historical continuity but simply suggested that 1945 could be Germany's new zero hour.

Potsdam set in motion the process of denazification by establishing the principle that all Nazi officials would be removed from office as a mechanism for redeeming the German future. Although the principle of denazification was applied across the entirety of occupied Germany, the practical machinery of removing former Nazi officials differed from zone to zone.[42] Equally, each occupying force and administration proposed its own narrative of the German past which informed conceptions of the purpose of the respective denazification programmes. For the Soviets, Nazism was the product of monopoly capitalism. The purpose of Soviet denazification was therefore to enact the necessary social revolution which within that formulation would remove the possibilities of Nazism's rebirth.[43] For the French,

---

[40] Cited in Grosser, *Germany in Our Time*, p. 49.
[41] Cited in Arthur Hearnden, 'Education in the British Zone', in Arthur Hearnden (ed), *The British in Germany: Educational Reconstruction after 1945*, (London, 1978), p. 11.
[42] Ian Connor, 'Denazification in Post War Germany', *European History Quarterly*, (Vol. 21, 1991), p. 397.
[43] Grosser, *Germany in Our Time*, p. 59.

Nazism was an expression of German, or specifically Prussian power. Similarly for the British – Nazism remained anchored in the specifically German past or national character, although practicality dictated the possibility of a non-Nazi German future, once denazification had been enacted.[44] Denazification was to be the most extensive in the US zone, paradoxically because it was the Americans who envisaged the earliest rebirth of a free Germany.[45]

In line with dominant interpretations of Nazism, the purpose of the denazification programme in the western zones was to entirely transform the German ruling elite. In essence then the principle of denazification, for the western powers at least, was an expression of the dominant conception of past and future as expressed through the Potsdam agreement. Nazism was a definitively German phenomenon, but in a slight alteration of Vansittartist rhetoric, the German future could be rescued. Denazification, and the constituent War Crimes trials, were the mechanisms through which redemption could be attained. Yet paradoxically, denazification also implied movement away from the vision of the past upon which it was based. As the programme was required to remove a ruling elite making way for a redeemable population, the clear inference of the logic of denazification was of an understanding of the past which found Nazism not the expression of the national soul, but reflecting the ambitions of the elite. Logically then, denazification reintroduced the idea, absent from war time rhetoric of the past, of the separation between the German population and the Nazi rulers.

The logical undermining of the Vansittartist narrative was confirmed in the uneven application of the denazification programme. It saw the immediate rehabilitation of those officials deemed useful to the occupation apparatus, the introduction of economic rationale to occupation in the aftermath of Potsdam[46] and ensured the re-appointment of previously 'Nazified' economic officials.[47] That denazification rested on a new version of the past was confirmed by the establishment of indigenous denazification panels in the British zone in January 1946, which

---

[44] Ian Turner, 'Denazification in the British Zone', in Turner, *Reconstruction in Post-War Germany*, p. 242.

[45] James F. Tent, *Mission on the Rhine: Re-Education and Denazification in American Occupied Germany*, (Chicago, 1982), pp. 1-13, Michael Balfour, *Germany: The Tides of Power*, (London, 1992), pp. 87-91.

[46] Turner, 'Denazification in the British Zone', p. 246.

[47] See Grosser, *Germany in Our Time*, p. 74, and Tom Bowyer, *Blind Eye to Murder: Britain, America and the Purging of Nazi Germany, A Pledge Betrayed*, (London, 1981), pp. 22-5.

institutionalised an interpretation of the Nazi state as having been distinct from the mass of the population It also revised the thesis that saw Nazism emerge from a specifically German historical continuity.[48]

Historiographical orthodoxy has it that the shift in the conception of the Nazi past, demonstrated by the shifting application of the process over time, which ultimately resulted in the decision to abandon the policy of denazification as quickly as possible by 1947, can only be understood if the programme itself is understood as an element of British security policy. The prime intention of security policy in 1945 and 1946 was to prevent Germany from waging another war. The programme of denazification was crucial to this as, according to the mindset of British officials, the expunging of Nazism from the national character was the only manner of ensuring the docility of a future German nation. The impetus behind denazification was then lost when security policy required Germany to become a protective barrier against the Soviet Union, after which concerns over the German past appeared irrelevant and consequently an end to the denazification programme was sought.[49] Such a view is however problematic because it assumes that the causal impetus for the revision of the German past was entirely external and imposed by wider foreign policy concerns, a viewpoint which ignores the contradictions inherent within the conception and purpose of the denazification programme and the existence of alternative narratives of the past in government prior to the change in the demands of security policy.

In addition to denazification another British occupation programme that rested on a different reading of the German past to that inherent in notions of unconditional surrender, was the 're-education' scheme. Similar to the plans for denazification, the concept of re-education was predicated, originally, on Vansittartist notions of the German character. Yet from the very beginning,[50] as with the denazification programme, such notions were rather contradicted by other fundamental assumptions inherent within the 're-education' plan. Described as a unique political experiment to fundamentally change the political behaviour and outlook of the German population, and in tandem with denazification, neutralise the German threat to a European future,

---

[48] Ian Turner, 'Denazification in the British Zone', in Turner, *Reconstruction in Post-War Germany*, p. 253.
[49] *Ibid.*
[50] The idea of 're-education' was born in a report, produced by the 'Post Hostilities Planning Committee' chaired by Troutbeck, 'Regeneration in Germany' in October of 1943. See David Welch, 'Priming the Pump of German Democracy: British 'Re-education' Policy in Germany After the Second World War', in Turner, *Reconstruction*, pp. 215-38.

the concept of 're-education' regarded the German population as essentially redeemable.[51] Such possibilities of redemption and re-admission to the European community seemed to logically contradict the idea that the German nation itself was fundamentally malevolent.

That the inspiration for 're-education' was practically divorced from the assumptions inherent in unconditional surrender was institutionally confirmed by transfer of control of education to the Länder governments of Germany and the appointment of Robert Birley as educational advisor to the British Control Commission in Germany (CCG) in April 1947. Birley was handed responsibility for restructuring of German education in the British zone.[52] From the outset Birley rejected the term 're-education', arguing that the task of the occupiers was not the imposition of a new mindset on the vanquished but in fact the recovery of lost intellectual and cognitive traditions within that nation.[53] Birley sought to satiate the 'spiritual and intellectual famine' in Germany[54] by restoring the 'cultural links between Germany and the civilised world'.[55] Echoing the rhetoric of the 'war of ideals' Birley's emphasis on cultural similarity between Britain and Germany, and indeed the concept of western civilisation,[56] allowed re-education policy to develop with the changing demands of the global political situation. As the Grand Alliance fell apart, and the Cold War emerged, re-education's new narrative of the past, which found Germany far from the irredeemable savage but in fact part of the European cultural community, allowed a revolution in the emphasis of this policy. With the need for the eradication of Nazism forgotten, re-education became part of the policy to transform Germany into a 'potential bulwark against the USSR'.[57]

4.4 The Anglican Church and the German Past 1945-48.

Pre-empting the amelioration of the British occupation policies in the post-war years, the Anglican church after 1945 continued to hold, and a further developed, a vision of the European future that implied a positive reading of the German past. Central to Anglican ambitions for this European future was the ecumenical movement. The

---

[51] Welch, 'Priming the Pump', p. 215.
[52] *Ibid.*, p.223.
[53] Robert Birley, 'British Policy in Retrospect', in Hearnden, *The British in Germany*, p. 46.
[54] Robert Birley, 'Memo on Re-education', PRO FO 371 / 64386.
[55] Birley quoted in Welch, 'Priming the Pump', p. 223.
[56] Robert Birley, 'Memo on Re-education', PRO FO 371 / 64386.

Anglican vision was of a Europe based upon Christian co-operation, which reasserted the Christian commonality of formerly belligerent nations. European Protestantism's post-war ecumenical drive began immediately following the cessation of hostilities when the pre-war structures created to work towards the institution of the World Council of Churches (WCC) were reinvigorated. The inaugural meeting of the WCC eventually took place in Amsterdam in August 1948.[58] The Anglican embrace of the WCC was predicated on the belief that ecumenism offered a unified future which avoided the divisions of the past – the ecclesiastical equivalent of the United Nations.[59] The Church Assembly praised the WCC's ability to avoid the national divisions of the immediate past, passing a resolution that described a procedural meeting toward the establishment of the council as 'moving [because] the churches of our Lord could meet without any distinction between victor nations, vanquished nations and neutral nations'.[60] The provisional committee of the WCC similarly celebrated its 'ecumenical fellowship in Christ' rejoicing that Christians had 'been able to come together again after the trials of [the war] years and...found [that their] hearts [were] knit together in Christian love'.[61] Regarded self-consciously as the dominant and most important Christian concern in the post-war world,[62] ecumenism provided Christians with a narrative of the future which placed its emphasis not on German difference but on the commonality between Christian nations.

Anglican understanding of the 'other Germany', Christian commonality and unity did not only prefigure the cultural narratives implicit within the Cold War through its implied understanding of the German past. The Anglican vision of the future, in line with their 'war of ideals' was avowedly political and indeed anti-Soviet. For Anglicans the arrangement of post-war Europe was essential to victory in the conceptual 'war of ideals'. The idea of a communist Germany, it was held, constituted a similar 'break from the whole European tradition' and the possibility of a Christian

---

[57] Birley to Robertson (Military Governor in the British Zone, 24 July 1948, PRO / FO 371 / 70716.
[58] George Bell, *The Kingship of Christ: The Story of the World Council of Churches*, (London, 1954), pp. 35-50, for an account of the creation of the World Council of Churches in the aftermath of the Second World War.
[59] See Chapter Six below for a brief discussion of the Anglican reception of the United Nations Organisation.
[60] 27 February 1946, *Church Assembly Report of Proceedings*, Spring 1946, Vol. XXVI, p. 75.
[61] The declaration of the WCC is printed in *Church Assembly Report of Proceedings*, Spring 1946, Vol. XXVI, p. 75.
[62] The leading article in *The Guardian*, 12 April 1946, p. 175, complained that the decisive 'import [of ecumenism] does not seem to have been appraised by the rank and file of Christian people in this country'.

future, as a National Socialist Germany had done.[63] The concepts of Christianisation, and Europeanisation, which underpinned the Anglican vision of the future and were implicit within the 'war of ideals', excluded the Soviet Union. When Anglican commentators wrote of the need to 'reconcile the German people to Europe',[64] Europe was employed as a concept that rested on a Christian past.[65] Ronald Jasper, the biographer of George Bell, has commented that Bell's purpose in promoting the German church and the Wehrmacht as potentially western cultural institutions was to turn Germany away from the Soviet Union.[66] As such the search for Christian institutions in Germany, and the attempt to understand the German past as separate from the pre-history of Nazism can be seen as the articulation of a narrative of both the past and the future that pre-empted the dominant narrative provided in the Cold War.

The Anglican narrative also reflected and indeed fed into marginalised secular narratives of the German past. For example the idea of redemption for the German people was central to Anglican planning, which depicted the separation between the general population and the Nazi state. The concept of redemption was equally central within the narratives of the past that emerged from the practical reality of occupation. Re-education plans constantly laid emphasis on the potential role of Christianity,[67] while for the Anglican church the concept of re-education was little more than a euphemism for evangelical re-christianisation.[68]

Despite the official position of 'unconditional surrender', Anglican attitudes to Germany received some encouragement from government during the war and the church was at the very least allowed to contribute to the debate over Germany's future. For example William Temple met with the Foreign Secretary in May 1944 in order to gain official sanction for the early, post-war establishment of ecumenical contact through the deployment of representatives of the CRE in occupied Germany.[69] The CRE plans were approved, and consultative meetings between agencies

---

[63] See George Bell, 'Memorandum on the National Committee of Free Germany', Bell Papers, Vol. 75, f.113.
[64] *The Record*, 22 September 1944, p. 376.
[65] See George Bell, 'The Unifying Forces of Europe', in Bell, *The Church and Humanity*, pp. 158-64 - this is the text of speech made by Bell in the House of Lords on 19 December 1944.
[66] R.C.D Jasper, *George Bell: Bishop of Chichester*, (Oxford, 1967), p. 288.
[67] Hearnden, 'Education in the British Zone', p. 17. See also Welch, 'Priming the Pump', p. 217.
[68] See *The Record*, 21 July 1944, p. 293. See also the text of a speech written by George Bell for delivery in Basel but intended for Bell's visit to Germany in October 1946. Bell Papers, Vol. 46, f. 14.

responsible for the planning and direction of future re-education policy and representatives of the Anglican church continued throughout the latter stages of the war.[70] Although some individual personalities, notably Bell, were at first distrusted by government officials – primarily because of public criticism of the morality of British methods of warfare – institutional co-operation between government and church regarding the future of Germany continued in the post-war era. Anglican leaders were routinely consulted over the appointment of personnel within the education and religious affairs branches of the British Control Commission,[71] which in turn facilitated the direct exchange of personnel between government and ecclesiastical organisations.[72] Such was the meeting of minds between the Anglican church and the administration of the Education authorities in Germany that George Bell's 1946 report, *The Task of the Churches in Germany*, which contained a specific statement of the Anglican narrative of the past, and particularly the separation of the Churches from Germany's Nazi past, was described as a 'model statement' with which the Chief of Staff in the CCG was 'in full agreement'.[73]

During the course of the war then the Anglican narrative of the German past rested on the concept of the 'other Germany' and was discernible mainly through a rhetoric of the future that, consistent with the 'war of ideals', excluded the Soviet Union. This version of the past provided a counterweight to the dominant readings of the past implied through publicly articulated government policy toward Germany. Despite this marginality, the Anglican reading of German history and consequent plans for the German future did find echoes within government post-war planning most notably with regard to the concept of 're-education'. The coincidence of rhetoric and indeed the degree of intellectual exchange between government and church regarding the idea of re-education in the later stages of the war established the

---

[69] Temple to Eden 13 March 1944, Temple Papers, Vol. 7, f. 260. See also the notes on the meeting, PRO FO 371/40752.

[70] See Gayre (Chair of the Education and Religious Affairs Subsection) to Temple, 1 May 1944, Temple Papers, Vol. 7, ff. 307-8.

[71] See Bell Papers, Vol. 43, ff. 1-43 - Various documents attesting to the involvement of George Bell and Geoffrey Fisher in the internal organisation of the Religious Affairs branch of the CCG. See also Bell to Fisher, 18 March 1946, f. 37, Bell to Fisher, 19 March 1946, f. 37, Bell to Fisher, 23 March 1946, f. 45, and Fisher to Bell, 30 March 1946, f. 46 - for an extended exchange regarding the appointment of personnel to occupied Germany. See also correspondence at PRO FO 945/180 regarding consulting George Bell over Religious Affairs policy.

[72] For example Iain Wilson who worked in Occupied Germany both for the CCG and the World Council of Churches Department of Reconstruction. See Bell Papers, Vol. 54, f. 523.

[73] Major General W.H.A. Bishop (Deputy Chief of Staff Control Commission Germany) to Bell, 6 March 1947, Bell Papers, Vol. 46, f. 263.

Anglican church as an important cultural voice in this period. As such when the dominant narrative of the age shifted with the onset of the Cold War, at the very least the Anglican Church was a part of a communion of voices that provided a narrative of the past that was ready made to accompany the new narrative of the future.

4.5 Conclusion: the past, the future and history.

The pre-eminent causal factor in the change in the dominant political reading of the past in the post-war world was the reorientation of global political thinking and the emergence of the bi-polar world. The dominant Vansittartist notion of the German past evident in war time rhetoric of the peace was apparently transformed, or indeed simply forgotten, within the machinations of the post-war settlement. Between 1945 and 1947 negotiations continued between the Grand Alliance for a solution to the problem of Germany. Publicly at least these negotiations articulated a commitment to the concept of a united Germany, although privately and practically the cementing of the division of Germany was becoming an objective reality during the period of negotiation. By the end of 1947 the myth of a four power controlled but unitary Germany was beginning to unravel. The British and American zones were, with the creation of the 'bizone', progressing towards becoming a single economic entity by the time the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) met in Moscow in March and April 1947. The withdrawal of the Soviet delegation from the meeting of the CFM in March 1948, the enactment of Marshall aid for the economic regeneration of the west and the establishment of the West's new currency simply served to cement the reality that four power co-operative control of Germany was at an end.[74]

The revolution in the situation of Germany within the new and emerging Cold War required a cognitive as well as political revolution on the part of the British government, and indeed society as a whole. The Cold War dictated that those narratives of the past that had been previously dominant and had emphasised the blackness of the German soul, had to be fundamentally revised. Germany had to be rehabilitated as friend. After the failure of the CFM in London in November of 1947, the British government declared that they were charged with the leadership of the

[74] See Anne Deighton, *The Impossible Race: The Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War*, (Oxford, 1990), and 'Cold War Diplomacy: British Policy Towards Germany's Role in Europe 1945-49', in Turner, *Reconstruction*, pp. 15-34. See also David Pike, *The Politics of Culture in Soviet Occupied Germany*, (Stanford, 1992), pp. 3-9, in which he infers that Stalin envisaged the permanent division of Germany from the very beginning of the occupation regime.

Western world against Communism.[75] Such open acknowledgement of a divided world, and the public endorsement of a westward looking Germany on the part of British government, implied a fundamental revision of the perception of German history. The divisions between Germany and the West, the ideal for which the war had been (rhetorically) fought, were forgotten. In their place came the divisions between Communism and the West. The implications of such a transformation were clear, Germany (and as such German history) was placed *inside* the Western European cultural block, which necessarily jettisoned the Vansittartist understanding of Nazism as an expression of the German character.

This change in the cognition of the former German enemy was finally cemented by the Berlin Crisis, and subsequent air lift, of the summer of 1948. As the world appeared once more on the brink of war, the image of Germany was transformed. Berlin, the physical destruction of which had symbolised the triumph of the Alliance over Nazism, and importantly in the Vansittartist formulation also over the Prussian and authoritarian past, was suddenly recast as a symbol not of oppression but of liberty, and indeed the West. With this Germany's history could be cut adrift, Berlin, no longer portrayed as the centre of anti-culture, was now presented as the outpost of Western civilisation bravely defending Europe against the totalitarian hordes.[76] But although these narratives of the German present were new, they were based upon versions of that past that had been extant inside and outside government prior to the breakdown of the relationship with the Soviet Union. Accounts of German history that emphasised not German, but totalitarian, otherness from western traditions were extant, if marginalised in government, and openly evident in the Anglican church before the existence of a political imperative for their emergence.

The formula which explains the revolution in the dominant portrayal of that past as the result of the forging of new political alliances in the Cold War is then a gross simplification of a complex process of interaction between those overarching political imperatives, extant marginal narratives of the past and contradictions within dominant visions of the past. That the degeneration of the western-Soviet alliance legitimated the emergence of previously marginal narratives of the past is in no doubt,

---

[75] *Hansard* (HC) Vol. 445 (1874-82) 18 December 1947, quoted in Anne Deighton, 'Cold War Diplomacy: British Policy Towards Germany's Role in Europe 1945-49', in Turner, *Reconstruction*, p. 32.

[76] Grosser, *Germany*, p. 115. See also, Avi Shlaim, 'Britain the Berlin Blockade and the Cold War', in *International Affairs*, (Vol. 60, No. 1, 1984), pp. 1-14.

but this takes little account of the conversation and exchange between constructions of the past in the forging of Germany's new historical status. The versions of the German past proposed at Potsdam theoretically relied on the Vansittartist prescription of German evil. Yet outside of war time, and under the pressure of the practicalities of occupation, prescriptions for the German future crucially contained, in the denazification and re-education programmes, chinks of light for the German nation. As the western relationship with the Soviet Union deteriorated the German pasts inherent in the programmes aimed at the cultural transformation of Germany, which interacted with less ambiguous anti-Vansittartist pictures of German history produced by the Anglican church, transformed themselves in line with developing notions of the western German future. Originally the denazification programme was aimed at the destruction of the German elite. Inherent within that programme was a vision of the German past which dictated that the authoritarian elite was the most important continuity of German history. Yet the self fulfilling redemptive opportunity provided by the denazification programme meant that it became an exercise in self purging for the German nation in which the dominant continuity became Germany's Christian and European population which had previously been dominated by the alien authoritarian elite. A nation with the black anti-European soul became a European nation.

Such a study of the dominant and marginal narratives of the German past proposed in Britain during a period in which the idea and understandings of the future were in perpetual flux, suggests more general lessons for the understanding of the manner in which the past is constructed. The constantly interacting conversations regarding the German past in Britain were involved in a process of exchange with both one another, the present, and crucially the future. Simply put, the past was harnessed for the present and the future, and in the act of creating that new future, a new past was formed. The relationship between the politics of the future and the history of the past in later war time and immediate post-war Britain was therefore concrete. The question that now presents itself for investigation is how did the politics of the present and the future affect the understanding of the Nazi past, and particularly the history of the Nazi attack on the Jews, in the immediate post-war and early Cold War era. This will be investigated through an analysis of both the Anglican construction of the Nazi past, and the wider resonances of that version of history.

Chapter Five:
'Coming to Terms with the Past': Anglicanism and the Nazi Past in the Immediate Post-War Era.

As the Anglican gaze turned beyond the end of the physical war with Nazism, the idea of forcing the soon to be vanquished German nation to face the reality of its recent past was explicitly identified by Anglican commentators as one of the imperatives of the coming peace.[1] In doing this the Anglican community pre-empted and contributed to a process of 'coming to terms with the past' that began in 1945 and has dogged European society ever since.[2] According to William Temple the specific purpose of forcing the German nation to face her past was to ensure recognition of the crimes committed in the Nazi era and specifically those perpetrated against the Jews.[3] In the light of both Temple's assertion, and the widely proposed notion that the German nation should atone for her past, this chapter will analyse the success, or otherwise, of the Anglican church's provision of structures for Germany to address the working through of her Nazi past.

Concerned with the specific picture of the history of the Nazi state that was painted upon the wider canvas of perceptions of the German past reviewed in the previous chapter, this chapter will investigate both the narratives of the Nazi past constructed by the Anglican church, and other versions of the past proposed in the immediate aftermath of war that bore the hallmarks of the Anglican world view. Such an investigation of perceptions of what was recent history in the later 1940s will be based upon a previously established foundation and will further explore the assertion that it is a simplification to indict only changes in global political alliance and the Cold War in explaining the post-war neglect of the Nazi past. The continuity of cultural narratives across either side of 1945, which counselled against specific concentration on the Nazi past, will again be investigated in pursuit of a more nuanced account of the negation of memory in the post-war era.

This chapter is concerned mainly with the historical narrative of the Nazi murder of the European Jews provided after the end of the war and in the aftermath of liberation.

---

[1] *The Record*, 13 October 1944, p. 397.
[2] Dan Stone, 'The Domestication of Violence: Forging a Collective Memory of the Holocaust in Britain 1945-6', in *Patterns of Prejudice*, (Vol. 33, No. 2, April 1999), pp. 13-30. See also Nancy Wood, *Vectors of Memory: Legacies of Trauma in Post War Europe*, (Oxford, 1999).

Yet, as in war time, the Jewish victims of Nazism were not the primary focus of Anglican narratives of recent history, or of plans for the future proposed after 1945. The purpose of this chapter is then to analyse both those narratives of the Nazi past that *were* provided by the Anglican church, and those narratives of the past designed by indigenous German institutions that were implicitly and explicitly legitimated by the Anglican church. Constantly in focus will be the central question of how accounts of Nazism that did not directly confront the murder of the European Jews impacted upon historical reflection on the Holocaust, and therefore the process of coming to terms with the past.

This effort to gauge the Anglican contribution to the formation of historical memories of the Nazi era will be divided into two sections. First, the most prominent post-war Anglican narrative of the Nazi German past, that of Christian German resistance to Nazism, will be discussed. The degree to which the uncritical praise the Anglican church heaped upon mainstream elements of the German Protestant community facilitated the construction of a mythic past will also be investigated. Subsequently the structure that myths of Christian resistance provided for understanding the Holocaust is analysed. The second section of the chapter will be more roundly focused on the Jewish victims of Nazism, and asks how Anglican efforts to conceptualise the Nazi past and the European future accounted for these victims. Chiefly it will be argued that both the growing predominance of Soviet criminals and their victims in the Anglican imagination worked toward the obfuscation of antisemitism and Jewish victims in historical narratives of Nazism. Ultimately this chapter explores the concrete impact that Anglican narrative strategies had on the perception of what we now call the Holocaust in the period immediately following the war.

5.1 Denazification, Reconciliation, and the German Protestant Past.

Despite the Anglican commitment, articulated in war time, to facilitating German confrontation with the past, in the immediate post-war era the Church of England was a vigorous critic of the denazification programme and therefore of the mechanism provided for public confrontation with the Nazi past in Germany. According to the Anglican church, denazification potentially endangered the German future and the entire Anglican

[3] *The Record*, 26 March 1943, p. 97.

post-war project of reconciliation embodied in the ecumenical model. George Bell, for example, argued that the process of denazification was obsessed with the German/Nazi past and therefore contributed nothing to the European or German future.[4] As such in the months and years immediately following the cessation of hostilities with Hitler's Reich, the Anglican commitment to confrontation with the Nazi past was abandoned.

Why did the Anglican church so swiftly abandon its commitment to the process of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*? In personality terms the death of Temple, the most senior member of the Anglican hierarchy fully engaged with the criminality of Nazism, was of great importance, as was the consequent further marginalisation of James Parkes. But Temple's engagement with Nazism, and specifically the anti-Jewish element of the Nazi project was unusual. In fact the logic of the Anglican conceptualisation of Nazism in war time dictated that the Church of England would struggle to accept the denazification programme and the principle upon which it was originally based. In the Anglican formulation the German people had been separate from the Nazi state, and as such the idea of denazification was itself flawed or even pointless. There was for Anglicans literally nothing to denazify, and the suggestion that there was (or even could be), it was argued, would simply give rise to justifiable feelings of indignation and injustice on the part of the German populace. Denazification could – for Anglicans – have only been a 'festering source of bitterness',[5] and was 'contrary to all Christian principles'.[6] One of the Christian principles violated was that which had been used by Anglicans to justify war with Nazism. The Church of England's war had been a 'war of liberation' but denazification was interpreted as the action of conquerors, not liberators, because it failed to recognise the ordinary Germans' status as first victims of the Nazi regime.[7] The

[4] See George Bell, *The Task of the Churches in Germany*, (London, 1947). The text of the report, and correspondence pertaining to its preparation and reactions to it can be found in, Bell Papers, Vol. 46, ff. 233-82. See also Bell to Gwynne, 30 December 1947, Bell Papers, Vol. 50, f. 243, in which Bell articulates his increasing concern at the enduring process of denazification.
[5] Bell, *The Task of the Churches*, p. 18.
[6] Guy Clutton Brock (Field Officer of CRE) to John Hynd (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster), 16 June 1946, PRO FO 1050/1579.
[7] Stewart Herman, *The Rebirth of the German Church*, (London, 1946), pp. 95-7. Although Herman was an American Protestant, he worked for the World Council of Churches with responsibility for the establishment of ecumenical contact with the German churches and had a close intellectual relationship with the Anglican church.

Anglican attitude to denazification did not therefore seek to justify the jettisoning of the past in Germany, but instead argued that there was *no* past to remove.

By objecting to denazification because of its potential threat to the post-war project of reconciliation, and as such the advance of ecumenism, the Anglican church demonstrated the uniformity of the ecumenical mindset in the aftermath of war. Revulsion at the public engagement with the Nazi past displayed by the Church of England replicated almost exactly the objections of German Protestant leaders to the same process. Theophil Wurm[8] laid out his objections to the denazification process in a meeting with George Bell. Wurm agreed with, and indeed fed, Bell's 'misgivings' over denazification on the basis that proceedings could only inspire bitterness within the German population.[9] Central to German Protestant objections to denazification, and indeed Anglican reservations, was a revulsion at the possible application of the process to the German churches. In the Anglican account of Nazism designed in war time the church had remained the central institution of the 'other Germany' and therefore could not be tarred with the implication of complicity inherent in denazification. As such a natural complement to the criticism that denazification took no account of the German populations' status as the first victims of Nazism, was the argument that to apply the process to the churches took no account of their position as the first opponents of the Nazi state. The very idea that the clergy of the German Protestant churches should have to account for their activities during the Third Reich by answering the denazification questionnaires or *Fragebogen*[10] was anathema to both the Anglican church and the German churches, precisely because it failed to conform to a narrative of the Nazi past

[8] Wurm, from 1945 onwards, was the Chairman of the newly unified German Protestant Church.
[9] See PRO FO 1050/1455. The report is dated 14 January 1946. See also Connor, 'Denazification in Post-War Germany', pp. 400-401. See also C.E. King, 'German Reactions to the Nuremberg Trials' Foreign Office Report, 22 January 1947, PRO FO 371/66559 U 95. This report concluded that the IMT and Nuremberg had provided the German population with an intellectual alibi for the crimes of Nazism by placing all guilt on the 'shoulders of the twenty two men in the dock', and that denazification challenged that narrative.
[10] Name given to the denazification questionnaires, see PRO FO 1050/40 for a copy of those questionnaires directed at the German clergy.

that emphasised, even mytholigised, the role that the church had played in resisting Nazism.[11]

Fears regarding the treatment of the post-war Protestant Churches in Germany were actually unfounded. The British government was, in comparison with their treatment of other groups, extraordinarily accommodating toward the Protestant Churches, which in the aftermath of the war unified themselves in the *Evangelische Kirche Deutschland* (EKD).[12] The Allied Religious Affairs Committee, for example, actively encouraged the formation of a unitary and nationally organised Protestant church,[13] while all other indigenous trans-zonal organisations were rejected. The fostering of a national Protestant church by the British occupation authorities can be contrasted with the degree of political organisation sanctioned by the western powers. The rapid formation of political parties in the Soviet zone was not mirrored in the west. Political activity in the western zones was confined to localities until elections were held at land level in April 1947. By the same time the Soviet zone had a solid structure of zonally organised politics.[14]

Western reluctance to allow anything but local political activity was based on a profound distrust of the prospect of national or even zonal indigenous German organisations, which in turn articulated a Vansittartist conception of the German past and

---

[11] See Bell, *The Task of the Churches*, p. 9. See also Herman, *The Rebirth of the German Church*, p. 108, Herman berated the occupation forces for not showing 'any indication or appreciation of the fact that the church had stood alone as the only national institution which successfully resisted Nazism'.

[12] Wolfgang Gerlach, *And the Witnesses Were Silent: The Confessing Church and the Persecution of the Jews*, (Lincoln, Nebraska. 2000), pp. 222-25, on deliberations on guilt towards the Jews within the formation of the new church constitution. See also Frederic Spotts, *The Churches and Politics in Germany*, (Middletown, Connecticut. 1973), pp. 9-21.

[13] The Allied Religious Affairs committee approved the creation of the singular EKD (within the western zones) as 'the sole responsibility of the qualified German ecclesiastical authorities'. See Allied Religious Affairs Committee to Wurm, 26 February 1946, PRO 1050/1455. This was an approval that had been suggested before the end of the war. A report prepared within the Foreign Office on 'Allied Policy towards the Church in Germany after the War' 20 June 1944, stated that 'the Allied intervention [in Germany] would be confined to such political action as implied in the liquidation of the Nazi regime, it being left to the evangelical church to determine its future.' This paragraph was ultimately rejected, resonant of an alternative reading of the German past as it was, only to be adopted as policy after the war. See PRO FO 371/39094 C8257.

[14] Political parties and 'mass organisations' on a zonal level were permitted in the Soviet zone from 9 June 1945 in the Soviet Zone. By the Spring of 1946 the communist and social democratic parties had merged to form the *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (SED – German Socialist Unity Party) which heralded the de-facto inauguration of the one party state. See David Pike, *The Politics of Culture in Soviet Occupied Germany*, (Stanford, 1992).

the ability of Germans to participate in a mature democracy.[15] Conversely the approval given to EKD autonomy reflected the fact that the clergy had already been identified as essentially exempt in the denazification programmes. The clergy were given their own particular *Fragebogen*,[16] the returns of which were to be regulated not by the occupation authorities but by the Church itself in order to 'avoid upsetting the sensibilities of church men'.[17] The self regulation of the EKD was confirmed by the instruction to denazification officials that they must 'take no action against any member of the German clergy'.[18] Why then were German Protestants and Protestant organisations treated so differently to other indigenous organisations, most notably political parties? The military governor of the British zone, Brian Robertson, declared in June 1946 that 'the churches in Germany are unquestionably capable of giving considerable assistance to putting *our* ideas across to the German people'[my italics].[19] Indeed as early as May 1944 German Protestantism had been identified by the Foreign Office as a 'constructive element in social and political life in Germany'.[20] The Ministry of Information had, also in war time, similarly instructed that the Protestant Churches in Germany were potentially important to any future occupation because they would 'help people to find their bearings again and devote themselves to constructive effort.'.[21] While the EKD was instructed to confine itself to church matters,[22] the implication of the portrayal of the German church as ally and the policy it informed was clear. German Protestantism was regarded by the occupation

---

[15] Barbara Marshall, 'British Democratisation Policy in Germany', in Turner, *Reconstruction in Post War Germany*, p. 194.

[16] It is notable that the *Fragebogen*, for the clergy at least, entirely rejected the possibility of nuance in the attitudes to the Nazi regime they were employed to investigate. Individuals were asked: 'Did you ever in speech or writing lend active support to National Socialism' and 'Have you ever been imprisoned, dismissed from your post, prevented from freely exercising your calling or had your movements restricted for active or passive resistance to the Nazis or their ideology'. This arbitrary division between support and resistance displays little awareness of the method of the National Socialist dictatorship or its relationship to the German church, in which resistance and complicity were not distinct categories. See Chapter One above for a discussion of the fluidity of resistance and complicity in the Nazi state.

[17] Riddy to Halland (Public Safety Branch Director) 5 July 1945, PRO FO 1050/1267.

[18] 'Appendix J', 'Notes by the Secretariat of the Control Commissions Conference: Removal From Office of Nazis and German Militarists', PRO 1050/1267.

[19] Robertson to Street, 12 June 1946, PRO FO 945/180.

[20] Briefing for the Secretary of State: 'The Re-Establishment of Contact Between British Churches and Christian Organisations on the Continent of Europe', PRO FO 371/40752 U3788. The briefing was a response to the request from William Temple that the CRE be able to establish contact with the German churches.

[21] Memo from the Religious Division of the Ministry of Information, 3 May 1944, PRO FO 371/40752 U3788/32-36.

[22] ARAC to the EKD, 6 Feb 1946, PRO 1050/1455.

authorities as apart from Nazism, and even culturally equivalent to those occupying forces. The occupation authorities accepted the Anglican conceptualisation of the German Christianity, and reading of the past, by agreeing that ultimately the Protestant church could be the agent of the west in Germany.

Encouraged by a culture of occupation which, with reference to the German church, reflected the Anglican understanding of the German past, the EKD was able to construct its own narrative of the Nazi past largely unhindered and indeed with the tacit approval of occupying authority in the British zone. The practical impact of ecumenical thought dictated that the appraisals of the past written by the EKD demonstrated an incredible coincidence with those offered from without by the Anglican church. Reflecting an understanding of Nazism as anti-western and the antithesis of 'civilisation' for example, the EKD was able to paint a picture of itself as a flawed agent of 'civilisation' within Germany.[23] Martin Niemöller concurred entirely with Anglican rhetoric when he wrote that 'to my mind there is just one institution which never wholly yielded up faith and which, though without practical results kept alive in people their recollection of morality and hope for a better world' during the lifetime of the Nazi state. Accordingly Niemöller identified that institution as being 'the Christian church.'[24]

In the event the German Protestant community actually went much further in engaging with the Nazi past than was required of them by either the British occupation authorities, or the Anglican narrative of the Nazi past which those policies often reflected. The EKD provided several laments of German 'guilt' for Nazi misdemeanours across the immediate post-war period. The common theme of these confessions was the emphasis laid on the failure of German Protestants to act against the Nazi state. Hans Asmussen[25] stated in a sermon delivered in June 1945 that 'our guilt lies in the fact that we have remained silent'.[26] Similarly the founding conference of the EKD at Treysa in August of 1945, berated German Christianity's failure to condemn loudly enough what was

[23] A letter in which Bishop Wurm accused the Nazi state of 'violating the fundamental principles of all western thought and practice' was celebrated by the English Christian Community, see *Christian News Letter*, 'The Church in Germany', Supplement to No. 241.
[24] Martin Niemöller, 'Introduction', in Herman, *The Rebirth of the German Church*, p. 7.
[25] Asmussen was President of the Chancellery of the EKD.
[26] The text of Asmussen's sermon can be found at Bell Papers, Vol. 43, ff. 195-201.

'manifestly sinful' during the lifetime of the Third Reich.[27] And in October 1945 the famous Stuttgart declaration of guilt also 'accused' German Protestants that they 'did not confess more courageously, did not pray more faithfully, did not believe more joyously, and did not love more passionately' during the Nazi era.[28]

Although contemporarily unpopular and politically unnecessary because the assumptions of the occupation authorities inferred no responsibility on the part of the church, German Protestant acknowledgement of responsibility was hardly a candid assessment of Christian failings in the Third Reich, and has been described as morally inadequate.[29] The emphasis laid on 'inaction' within confessions required no reflection on the active participation of the churches in the racial redefinition of the state after the Nuremberg Laws, or their contribution to the creation of an antisemitic milieu which identified the victims of Nazi extermination policies, or indeed their rather ambiguous support of the war in the east as a war for Germany rather than for Hitler.[30] Equally none of the confessions suggested particular responsibility to the Nazi's Jewish victims, and as such further avoided the church's chequered record on race.

A further controlling trope of EKD admissions of guilt was the use of the caveat that German Protestants were indeed victims of the Nazi regime. Asmussen ended his confession with the acknowledgement that Christians had been 'the victims of a fearful nightmare' in the Third Reich, and as such offered justification for the inaction he had just condemned. Later in his career Asmsussen would go on to describe 'what happened to the churches under Adolf Hitler' as 'a methodical, well planned, persecution of Christians', and consequently provide further exculpatory context for the already inadequate acknowledgement of Christian failings of inaction.[31] Similarly Martin Niemöller commonly diluted the acceptance of Protestant failings during the Nazi era

---

[27] See Grosser, *Germany in Our Time*, p. 367 for the text of the declaration made at Treysa.
[28] The full text of the Stuttgart declaration can be found in Victoria Barnett, *For the Soul of the People: Protestant Protest Under Hitler*, (New York, 1992), p. 209.
[29] See John Conway, 'The German Church Struggle and its Aftermath' in Abraham J. Peck (ed.), *Jews and Christians After the Holocaust*, (Philadelphia, 1982), p. 40.
[30] Barnett, *For the Soul of the People*, pp.155-96, – Barnett utilises oral testimony from former Confessing Christians in the Third Reich in which they detail the degree to which the war in the East was (and indeed still is) supported in good conscience.
[31] From the text of a lecture given by Asmussen on 12 January 1947, which can be found at Bell Papers, Vol. 43, ff. 290-311.

with the reminder that the Third Reich had been an age 'of suffering' for the church, in which Christians had 'passed through a sea of affliction and persecution'.[32]

EKD narratives of guilt were also undermined by the German Church's rhetorical constructions of the past outside of acknowledgements of guilt. As we have seen the German Church rejected denazification, especially if directed towards itself (which it was not). As such simultaneously to proclaiming guilt, the EKD could also declare themselves against denazification on the basis that the resistant church had 'carried the struggle against [the] influence' of National Socialism.[33] The narrative of the past provided by the EKD, which the Anglican church, and the British occupation authorities implicitly provided a platform for, far from encouraging reflection on the Nazi past undermined any such process. This was based on two assumptions, shared and promoted by the Anglican church. First, that Nazism had been essentially a negation of Christian value; and second, that Christians had been both the victims of, and resistant to, the Hitler state.

In addition to providing an atmosphere in which the EKD narrative of the German Protestant relationship with Nazism was designed and could flourish, the Anglican church also worked at directly promoting the inherent understanding of the role of Protestant Christians in the Third Reich. When the English ecclesiastical community dwelt upon the German past at all in this era, something which the rhetoric of reconciliation and objections to denazification effectively counselled against, the focus was continually upon the 'martyrdom' of the Christian church as a resistant organisation.[34] The most explicit example of this can be found in the reactions of the ecclesiastical press to the Nuremberg trials. Even after the verdicts had been passed, and the focus of the world was on Nazi criminality, the ecclesiastical press chose to concentrate upon the glories of Christian resistance.[35] Such emphasis reflected the foundation myths of Anglican concern for the German churches, for example CRE had argued that its goal of physical rehabilitation was driven by the 'gratitude' felt for the 'war time record of the Christian

[32] Martin Niemöller, 'Introduction', in Herman, *The Rebirth of the German Church*, p. 7.
[33] EKD declaration on denazification, 2 May 1946, PRO FO 1050/1456.
[34] see 'The Churches Stand in Hitler's Germany', in *The Record*, 24 January 1947, p. 49.
[35] *The Record*, 4 October 1946, p. 562.

churches' and 'for the constancy of the [Christian] witness during the holocaust of war and resistance'.[36]

Anglican faith in the Christian future was entirely dependent upon subscribing to the self styled resistance narratives of the EKD. Such a particular version of the Nazi past in fact echoed the Anglican rhetoric of the 'war of ideals', and importantly cast Christianity as Nazism's victim: 'it is the example of the resisting church in Germany which helped phrase a world wide prayer that the church of Jesus Christ may become the cornerstone of the next world community.'[37] As Geoffrey Fisher declared it was that the German church had come through the 'fire of...persecution' that gave Anglicans faith in the future of Europe.[38] As such while Anglicans appreciated the 'acknowledgement...of guilt concerning the war' made by the EKD, it was an acknowledgement that the logic of Anglican rhetoric found unnecessary as the record of resistance clearly demonstrated that no German Christian 'harboured any doubts that the Weltanschauung for which National Socialism stood was the very opposite of Christianity'. Equally Anglicans were confident that no German Christians had 'approved of Hitler's war'.[39]

The acknowledged complicity of some, non confessing, German Protestants did, however force the Anglican church to confront the possibility of a non-resistant Christian past in Germany. But through the deployment of specific scapegoats the ambiguity of the evangelical record in the Third Reich was not allowed to affect the narrative superstructure within which the German Protestant past was considered. Anglican figures protested against government failure to distinguish between *Deutsche-Christen* groups and other Protestant affiliations. Responding to the official recognition of the *Deutsche-Christen* as an element of the EKD, George Bell berated occupation authorities for tolerating 'Nazis in disguise'.[40] In doing so Bell once again demonstrated the uniformity

---

[36] see 'Renewal in Church Life in Europe' a 1946 CRE pamphlet, in Bell Papers, Vol. 54, f. 227.
[37] Herman, *Rebirth of the German Church*, p. 17.
[38] Geoffrey Fisher broadcast to Christians in Germany on the occasion of the arrival of a delegation of the BCC in Germany 28 November 1945. Reprinted in Herman, *The Rebirth of the German Church*, pp. 251-53.
[39] George Bell, 'A Letter to my Friends in the Evangelical Church in Germany', in *Church and Humanity*, p. 188.
[40] Bell to Gwynne, 1 August 1947, Bell Papers, f. 231.

of ecumenical opinion by echoing the rhetoric employed by Wurm to protest over the same matter.[41]

Further to the scapegoating of the *Deutsche-Christen* vigorous protests were made by the Anglican church, chiefly through Bell, regarding the continued involvement of August Marahrens[42] in the EKD. Marahrens was felt to have had too ambivalent a relationship with the Nazi ideology to be a suitable figure to rebuild German Protestantism. According to Bell, Marahrens had, 'especially in 1939, said some terrible things for a churchmen to say in favour of the Führer'.[43] Bell's assessment of Marahrens was indeed correct. His welcoming of the German invasion of the USSR in which he called upon 'God to give our hearts a ruthless determination' in order to 'fight devoid of all sentimentality' was certainly unfortunate, especially considering the nature of that conflict.[44] However, the question arises as to why it was Marahrens in particular that was problematic for the Anglican church. Martin Niemöller was an Anglican hero, despite acknowledged antisemitism and of course his offer to fight for Germany in 1939. Bishop Wurm was equally celebrated by the Anglican church despite publicly welcoming the Führer in 1933 as the saviour of the (racially conceived) German Volk and his enduring employment of antisemitic rhetoric throughout the Third Reich.[45] Bell objected to Marahrens' silence over the Jewish issue,[46] yet those statements of guilt that had been so enthusiastically welcomed (most notably Stuttgart) had almost entirely failed to appraise the Christian failings with regard to the Jews and their murder.

Ultimately Anglican use of Marahrens and the German-Christians as scapegoats was tactical. The British government raised questions regarding the suitability of Marahrens' prominence within the EKD and considered arresting him before resorting to

---

[41] Wurm to Robertson, 30 April 1947, Bell Papers, f. 234.
[42] Marahrens was the Lutheran Bishop of Hanover during the Third Reich, and although he professed loyalty to Müller in the church struggle, he did resist efforts to incorporate the Hanoverian church into the single Reich Church.
[43] Bell to Macready (Regional Commissioner in the Military Government), 17 June 1946, Bell Papers, Vol. 45, f.377.
[44] Gerlach, *And the Witnesses Were Silent*, p. 203.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 230.
[46] Bell to Macready, 17 June 1946, Bell Papers, Vol. 45, f. 377. Richard Gutteridge also notes Marahrens' rather grudging statements of guilt regarding the treatment of the Jews made in the post-war period, and speculates that these statements – which include the caveat that 'a succession of Jews may have caused grievous harm to our people' – thinly veiled an enduring antipathy to the Jews. Richard Gutteridge, *Open*

a passive policy of pressurising him to resign through the Anglican church.[47] Anglicans duly applied this pressure because of their desire to promote the EKD as an institution which could be prominent in the shaping of the German future. Equally the process of coming to terms with the past appeared to be fulfilled by campaigning for the removal of Marahrens. Having lobbied for the right of the EKD to both regulate itself, and to carry out a comprehensive purge of Nazi elements, such scapegoating appeared to be the fulfilment of this faith. For the Anglican church this was the very process of 'coming to terms with the past' in action. Unfortunately it could act, as has been seen in the evaluation of guilt narratives, against the realistic appraisal of the wider role of the Churches in the Third Reich. In focusing anger on the *Deutsche-Christen* and Marahrens the ecumenical community promoted an analysis of the history of German Christianity in the Third Reich which conformed to the division of the world inherent in the Anglican 'war of ideals'. Eschewing nuance, and failing to understand either ambivalence or ambiguity, a vision of German Protestantism dichotomously divided, between black and white, Christian and Nazi, was dominant.

The Anglican church as a part of the ecumenical community both presented narratives of the Nazi past, and encouraged the development of narratives within other communities and institutions. These narratives found the significance of the Nazi era not in racial criminality but in the resistance of the Christian community to the Nazi state. Objections to denazification were based on the contention that the process, especially if applied to the Christian church, misread the past and created an unfortunate legacy for the future. In turn, government treatment of the German Protestant church reflected this narrative, and further demonstrated the growth of a narrative of the past that echoed Anglican understanding of history. Such impetus from the church and the occupation authorities provided a culture within which the institutions of the 'other Germany' could provide narratives of the Nazi past which, reliant on the dichotomous division of the world, emphasised Christian resistance. As such the ecumenical community in the immediate post-war era, supported by the drift of government understanding of the past

---

thy Mouth for the Dumb! The German Evangelical Church and the Jews 1879-1950, (Oxford, 1996), p. 300.

[47] See memo on the *Kirchenkampf* prepared for the CCG in September 1945. PRO FO 1050/1454, in which the ambiguity of Marahrens is emphasised, see also Spotts, *The Churches and Politics*, p. 110.

away from Vansittartism, actively promoted a version of the Third Reich which did not concentrate on Nazi criminality. When criminality was acknowledged in any sphere wider than the Nazi clique, it was seen as a passive sin, and no specific mention was made of the crimes perpetrated against the Jews.

During the immediate post-war period then the Anglican church, and indeed the EKD, were engaged in a project of specific memory formation. The concentration on the Nazi past and criminality implicit within the concept of denazification and the trial process[48] was rejected by both the Anglican church and the EKD[49] because of its potential effect on the formation of a Christian future. Conversely the concept of Christian resistance, and Christian victimhood at Nazi hands, were continually emphasised because of an assumed positive relationship with the potential formation of a Christian future. It was Christian resistance that had an important historical legacy, not Nazi criminality. As such in this we begin to see that the Anglican church, in tandem with the EKD, despite the rhetorical commitment to facing the past, allowed this process to be consumed by the priority of building a Christian future. In turn this prioritisation of the future simultaneously rested on a specific interpretation of a mythologised past, and the active prevention of critical reflection on that past.

Within a past in which Christian resistance was all significant, and therefore Christian victims of Nazism similarly crucial, what of the Jewish victims of Nazism and the role of anti-Jewishness within the historical conception of the Nazi era? It is to that question that we now turn.

5.2 Nazism as Totalitarianism and the Abandonment of the Victims of Nazism.

Although the Anglican church had briefly faced the specificity of Nazi anti-Jewishness in the winter of 1942 and 1943, in the latter half of the war the Jews were cognitively abandoned by the Church of England as particular victims of the Nazi regime.[50] This process of marginalising the Jewish victims of the Nazi regime continued in the immediate post-war era. Although the Anglican community did focus on the past, it was a

[48] See Chapter Six below for a discussion of the Anglican assessment of the War Crimes trial process and the Anglican influence on an anti-trial campaign.
[49] In fact George Bell was thanked by Martin Niemöller for his assistance in the campaign against denazification, see Jasper, *George Bell*, p. 305.

past which emphasised Christian resistance and had little room for Jewish suffering. In a 1946 report into the possibilities of the German and European future commissioned by CRE, George Bell concentrated on the German and European peoples as victims. The Jewish victims of Nazism literally did not feature in Bell's survey of what was the European present.[51] Part of the raison d'être for the report on the church's task in Germany was the thirst of English Christians for information about those suffering on the continent after the end of hostilities.[52] Indeed Anglican activists satiated this thirst with a steady flow of information; yet as James Parkes had presciently commented to William Temple, things 'were carefully silent on the Jewish side'.[53]

Concern for the spiritual and religious well being of Displaced Persons in the British zone provides another anecdotal example of the silence surrounding Jewish victims within the Christian mindset. A large number of DPs in the British zone were Jewish but the concept of spiritual wealth was employed as an entirely Christian one. There was literally no mention made of the possibility of other faith groups existing amongst this population, and as such the provision of non-Christian spiritual support was non-existent.[54]

Jewish victims and survivors did not in fact entirely disappear from Anglican and ecumenical rhetoric after the war. Curiously the notion of the specificity of Jewish suffering was employed in negative terms by the Christian individuals concerned with issues of reconstruction in Germany at this time, in a direct attempt to appropriate the Jewish status of primary victim for Christian victims of both the Nazis, and importantly of the post-Nazi regimes in Europe. As Victor Gollancz suggested with reference to his diminishing concern for Jewish victims of Nazism in later 1945, one reason that Jews disappeared from view was simply that they were replaced with new victims, and as such new objects of sympathy and outrage.[55] The civilians that had so affected Gollancz, and

---

[50] See Chapter Three above.
[51] See George Bell, *The Task of the Churches in Germany*, (London, 1947). The text of the report, and correspondence pertaining to its preparation and reactions to it, can be found in Bell Papers, Vol. 46, ff.
[52] Report of the Church of England Commission on Christian Reconstruction, October 1945, Bell Papers, Vol. 54, f.170.
[53] Parkes to Temple, 25 January 1942, Temple Papers, Vol. 54, ff. 59-60.
[54] For example see W. Lack (Religious Advisor on DP's in the Religious Affairs Branch) to L.W. Hartland (Secretary of CRE) 23 June 1948 in which religious provision is discussed with no reference to Jews.
[55] See Ruth Dudley Edwards, *Victor Gollancz: A Biography*, (London, 1987), pp. 404-464, for a discussion of Gollancz's post-war campaign to highlight the plight of German civilians through the organisation Save

had been left starving and homeless by apocalyptic conflict, were in the post-war era continually augmented by the literally millions of ethnic Germans being deported from the East by the new Polish, and Soviet regimes.[56] This undoubted human tragedy caused indignation within the Anglican community, a 'grave shock to a great body of Christian opinion'[57] who sought to compare contemporary German suffering with the historical privations of the Jews.

George Bell lamented that 'no humane person could [have] fail[ed] to be stirred to the depths by the cruelties done to the Jews, to displaced persons, the political prisoners in their millions' during the war, which he then compared directly to the sufferings of the deported *Volksdeutsch*. Bell intoned that 'we are [similarly] deeply stirred by the cruelties now proceeding in the East, the deportations, cruel unjust inhuman both in themselves and in their manner of their carrying out.'[58] Bell emphasised this comparison when he rhetorically asked German Protestants 'how can the victors, who have so consistently condemned the mass deportations of civilian populations of both the Western and Eastern countries by the German government, refuse to condemn mass deportations of millions of Germans into a reduced Germany?'[59] That Bell employed this rhetoric at the Stuttgart conference of the EKD in October of 1945 further demonstrates the enduring Anglican commitment to the elevation of the burden of German guilt as a contribution to the process of coming to terms with the past. Concern for the deported Germans was a tendency evident across the international ecumenical Christian community. American Protestant Stewart Herman, like Bell, also sought to compare deportations directly with the fate of the Jews by writing that 'the Poles were deliberately starving the Germans into emigrating.' Herman remarkably claimed that 'not even the Jews in Germany had been so

---

Europe Now! (SEN) to promote reconciliation with Germany. Members of the Anglican church were prominent in SEN.

[56] See James Bacque, *Crimes and Mercies: The Fate of German Civilians Under Allied Occupation 1944-50*, (London, 1997) for an account of the sufferings of the German population under four power control. The partiality of the Bacque narrative is however disturbing and as such the book, which is an effort to shift focus from the crimes of the Holocaust and thereby reduce responsibility, should be treated with caution.

[57] George Bell to Wurm, quoted in *The Record*, 21 September 1945, p. 475.

[58] Bell's address to the conference of the EKD in Stuttgart which spawned the famous Stuttgart declaration of guilt. 18 October 1945, Bell Papers, Vol. 45, ff. 311-16.

[59] George Bell, 'A Letter to My Friends in the Evangelical Church in Germany', in *Church and Humanity*, pp. 191.

badly treated' and that 'there was not a great deal of difference discernible between the Nazi measures and the Polish measures later.[60]

The attempted appropriation of the moral capital of the Jews' status as victims was also employed at an institutional level by both governmental and Anglican organisations in occupied Germany. Instructions were issued to field officers of the Religious Affairs Branch working in Germany that they should avoid giving special dispensation to any Jewish victims of Nazism that they may encounter. A draft directive to officials advised that 'there will probably be some professing Jews in your region, whom it is your duty to help in the same way as Christians'. Although these people were victims of Nazism, the directive admitted, officers should not 'afford them undue privileges...[as] they are already receiving material assistance' which should have been taken into 'consideration as well as their past sufferings'. Christian victims, however, needed to be given special attention because their influence (unlike the Jews) would work against the dominance of Russia and the undermining of religious life in Europe.[61] This was not an isolated example. In July of 1946 a CRE report on the situation in Germany sought to borrow the Jewish status as Nazism's primary victims for the non-Aryan Christians of the British Zone: 'steps necessary to give relief to non-Aryan Christians should be taken at the earliest possible [opportunity, they] should have the same privileges as Jews.'[62]

Jewish victims were then either ignored by the ecumenical community, or their image was employed in order to bring into focus not Jewish suffering but the sufferings of other victims which it was felt the Jewish experience should not be allowed to obscure. In these rare considerations of the Jewish victims of Nazism, there was something of a paradox at work. Implicitly the specificity of the Jewish victims, and as such the Jewish experience at Nazi hands was recognised in the effort to borrow the assumed power of the Jewish status as victims. The cry appeared to have been that Christians were victims also, but this point was emphasised with the implicit recognition of specifically Jewish suffering. Coupled with silence, this apparent jealousy of the status of victimhood awarded to Jews, suggested a fundamental inability on the part of the English Christian community to cope intellectually in the post-war era with the anti-Jewish nature of

[60] Herman, *Rebirth of the German Church*, p. 219.
[61] Draft Directive to Religious Affairs Regional Officers, undated, PRO FO 945/180.

Nazism. Anglicans also demonstrated an inability to cope with the Jews as victims, consistent with pre-war interpretations of Nazi anti-Jewishness.[63]

Why then did the Anglican community fail to cope with the Jewishness of victims of Nazism? The various elements that made up the Anglican world view were intimately interconnected and indeed interdependent. Justifications of war had depended upon a specific interpretation of the evils of Nazism as an element of anti-Christian totalitarianism, which in turn informed plans for the Christian future, which then added further justification to war. Recognition of the idea that Jews were the primary victims of Nazism would have challenged the basis of this entire mindset by introducing the idea that Nazism was something other than simply the negation of Christianity, and the denial of God. Although implicitly present this recognition of Jewish victimhood was, in the context of campaigns to elevate the status of the Christian victim, played down. Such an interpretation was entirely consistent with the Anglican view of Jewish victims during the war itself. Despite the brief interregnum of the winter of 1942 and 1943, Jewish victims of Nazism had been consistently marginalised within Anglican rhetoric in favour of the promotion of Christian victimhood. Interpretations of the immediate past then reflected the intellectual values that had been inherent in Anglican strategies of interpretation throughout the war.

Anglican attitudes to Jewish survivors, and the apparent difficulty Anglicans had in interpreting and embracing such unfortunates also needs to be considered within the context of the ease with which Anglicans embraced the 'new' German victims of the post-war era.[64] Throughout the period of 1933-45 the Anglican church had been fixated with the privations of German Christians, over and above the sufferings of the Jews of

---

[62] Report of Guy Clutton Brock's visit to Germany, PRO 1050/1579.

[63] See Joanne Reilly, *Belsen: The Liberation of a Concentration Camp*, (London, 1998) on the struggle of DPs in the British zone to achieve recognition as Jews. See also Arieh J. Kochavi, 'Britain's Image Campaign Against the Zionists', in *Journal of Contemporary History*, (Vol. 36, No. 2, 2001), pp. 293-307, Kochavi awards too much significance to the political imperative of countering Zionism in his analysis of the British refusal to acknowledge Jewish DP's as Jews in that he fails to acknowledge the influence of the deep-seated understanding of Nazism as *not* primarily anti-Jewish. Nevertheless Kochavi clearly demonstrates that to regard Jews as somehow privileged among DP's or general post-war victim populations is the stuff of myth.

[64] To make comment on the rhetorical use of the German victims of the post war European crisis by the ecumenical community in this period is, importantly, not to doubt the severity of the experience of expulsion but simply an effort to discern the (conscious or unconscious) purpose behind the employment of their image.

Europe. Nazism was understood as being significant only through its negation of Christian tradition and through its apparent anti-Christian character. In this context it was entirely consistent that Bell, and the Anglican church, were in the aftermath of war drawn to the contemporary suffering of people whom they viewed as within the community that totalitarian anti-Christianity (in what ever its guise) was perceived as threatening. German expellees simply added fuel to the campaign, underway throughout the war, that Germans were victims too. Perhaps most importantly however, with reference to the perception of the past, the direct promotion of the experience of German expellees, in addition to furthering the campaign of articulating German victimhood, added to the concomitant negation of the historical significance of Nazi criminality. As the victims of Nazism were obscured then the crimes of Nazism also receded from view.

Equally with the appearance of new victims came the arrival of another form of criminality. By interpreting the experience of German deportees within the continuum of suffering resulting from war we can see that the ecumenical community considered such an experience within the overarching context of the 'war of ideals'. Leader comment on the Nuremberg trial for example, spoke of the disappointment that it was only the 'vanquished that have been put on trial'. During this lament an unbroken continuity of suffering which had not been halted by the end of the war was presented: 'the destruction of Nazi power has not brought to an end the deportation and enslavement of vast populations, or political, racial or religious persecution...Sauckel' the *Church Times* contended 'is not the last employer of slave labour, nor Frank the last exploiter of a subject population.'[65] The German victims of Communism pouring over Germany's eastern borders were employed as symbols of the enduring criminality of dictatorial regimes despite the judicial accounting at Nuremberg. German deportees were viewed as victims of the same struggle as the victims of Nazism and the war, a conflict that had never been entirely perceived by the Anglican community as simply the physical war against Nazism.

The Anglican understanding of the enemy in war time in intellectual rather than geographical or physical national terms, as the totalitarian opposite of Christianity, ensured that there always existed the potential for the return of the Soviet Union,

[65] *The Church Times*, 4 October 1946, p. 596.

portrayed as an ideological power, as an enemy of Christian civilisation. Such a reorientation of the rhetorical image of the Soviet Union, as portrayed by the Anglican church, did indeed begin in the immediate aftermath of German surrender and the disappearance of the shared Nazi enemy which had cemented alliance with Russia. This reorientation was contemporary with the attempted recasting of the image of the German population and their portrayal as victims, often as in the case of the deportees, at the hands of the Soviet totalitarian foe. Importantly the intellectual structure provided by the dichotomous Anglican world view dictated that the reorientation of the Soviet Union was a process that required no reconceptualisation of the concept of the enemy. 'Stalin', it was argued, moved quickly into the 'throne compulsorily vacated by Hitler'.[66] The defeat of Hitler had in some areas of the world brought no victory in the Anglican war: 'the spread of Russian power has reinforced the hold of authoritarian government in Eastern Europe', and therefore although 'the actors in the political drama had changed', fundamentally for the Anglican church 'the roles [were] the same'. Christian civilisation faced totalitarian evil in Europe.[67] The similarity between the former and present enemy was such for the Anglican church that their emblematic institutions were directly compared, as the Soviet State, it was contended, rested on the 'methods of the Gestapo'.[68]

The 'evil' of the Soviet Union was defined by post-war Anglicans on two basic levels, which echoed previous characterisations of Nazism. First that the state was involved in the active persecution of the churches: 'the muscovite [attempt] to crush out all Christian faith'.[69] Second, the Soviet disregard for individual liberty was interpreted as demonstrating the innate opposition of the Communist and Christian views of the world. The Soviet Union, it was argued, practised a 'view of personal value' that 'differ[ed] radically from that which springs from Christianity.'[70] The Soviet state, Anglicans declared, was actively participating in the 'denial of God', and was therefore rejecting the values of 'civilisation'.[71] In the context of the degenerating international relationship with the Soviet Union and the Berlin crisis, Cyril Garbett declared that whereas 'western

[66] *The Record*, 28 November 1947, p. 731.
[67] *Christian News Letter*, 9 July 1947, No. 289, p. 3.
[68] *Church Times*, 27 June 1947, p. 379.
[69] *Church Times*, 21 March 1947, p. 155.
[70] *The Church Times*, 11 April 1947, p. 204.
[71] *Christian News Letter*, 9 July 1947, No. 289, p. 3.

civilisation teaches the value of the individual; Marxian Communism holds [the individual] has no rights except those which the state confers upon him.'[72] Such a campaign against the individual and their relationship with God was, for Anglicans, the post-war equivalent of that which had been pursued by 'the other totalitarian, Hitler.'[73]

While the idea of an ideological battle with Communism was an ever present image within Anglican rhetoric in the post-war period,[74] it was in the context of the Berlin crisis that the 'war of ideals' was wholeheartedly launched anew. George Bell, using the imagery deployed against Nazism during the war, argued that the 'western powers must not leave Berlin but resist Soviet pressure [as] the...conflict was a reflection of the universal struggle between light and darkness'.[75] Similarly his colleague at York, Cyril Garbett, revived the rhetoric of the war in defining the new conflict as between the 'forces of those who deny the value and the rights of an individual, and deny therefore, that he has any freedom' and 'the democracies which believe that every individual is of value and therefore should have freedom [and who] recognise there are absolute moral laws.'[76] On this issue the ecumenical community was united. Reinhold Niebuhr, a theologian who had exercised profound influence on William Temple, characterised the Berlin crisis as part of an historical continuity that began with the battle against Hitler and was now manifested in the battle over Berlin. These two conflicts were according to Niebuhr, part of a bitter world 'civil war' between the forces of Christian civilisation and those of totalitarian oppression.[77]

The similarity between the rhetorical characterisation of the Soviet Union and the previously presented image of Nazism provides further context for the Anglican view of the irrelevance of the Nazi past, discerned through the objections of the Anglican community to the process of denazification. In part the Nazi past became irrelevant for the Anglican community because of the logic of its own rhetoric regarding the institutions

---

[72] Cyril Garbett addressing the York Diocesan Conference 22 June 1948, quoted in *The Record*, 25 June 1948, p. 373.
[73] *Church Times*, 21 March 1947, p. 155.
[74] See for example *The Record*, 28 November 1947, p. 731, for a characterisation of the battle with communism which is familiarly titled, 'From Belief into Action: How the Ideological Conflict Works in Practice'.
[75] Cited in Jasper, *George Bell*, p. 306.
[76] Cyril Garbett, *Hansard* (HL) Vol. 158 (285) 24 September 1948.
[77] Reinhold Niebuhr, 'The Christian Witness in the Social and National Order', in Niebuhr, *The Essential Reinhold Niebuhr: Selected Essays and Addresses*, (New Haven, 1986), p. 94.

and individuals of the 'other Germany', whose status seemed to undermine the need for any working through of the past. However the Nazi past equally became irrelevant because the enemy in the 'war of ideals' was still extant, despite the physical destruction of Nazism, and was embodied in the Soviet Union.

Such a definition of Sovietism did not simply have an abstract effect on reflection on the criminality and victims of Nazism. When allied soldiers entered Belsen and Buchenwald the horrors which greeted them were, for the Christian community, confirmation of the evils of secularism as embodied by the Nazi regime.[78] Such evils continued then, rhetorically at least, for the Anglican community to be practised in the post-war era by the new totalitarian enemy: 'these [communists] are the barbarians that a thorough going secularism has bred and nurtured for the destruction of everything that Europe has hitherto secured.'[79] Such employment of the concept of the Christian European ideal, and the new Soviet antithesis further impacts on the previous analysis of Christian readings of Nazi violence, especially toward Jews. Such violence was traditionally interpreted as a regression to barbarism, and as such alien to the Christian tradition. That the same formula was then applied to the interpretation of Sovietism appears to highlight the chronic lack of self-reflection on the part of the church on considering the relationship between Christian scapegoating and Nazi ideology, and indeed the reflection on the racial particularity of the Nazi crime.

The idea of an enduring conflict between light and darkness, Christianity and totalitarianism reflected the manner in which the Anglican conceptualisation of the Soviet threat related to the general problem of the way in which the Anglican imagination perceived German history. By finding a continuity of enemy the ecumenical community understood the secular twentieth century as a continuous battle against a continuous anti-Christian, totalitarian foe.[80] While there is nothing empirically to connect such a view of the European civil war against nihilism to the silences regarding the Jewish Holocaust and the Jewish victims of Nazism, it is clear that neither the event of Jewish mass murder

---

[78] See *Church Times*, 3 August 1945, p. 435, which reflected on the fact that Nazism had 'only been made possible by the complete secularisation of society'.
[79] *The Record*, 5 December 1947, p. 739.
[80] For an explicit definition of this understanding of European history see *The Record*, 7 November 1947, p. 680, which understands Europe from 1917 to have been a battle between Christianity and various (but ultimately similar) forms of Godlessness.

nor the idea of the primary status of Nazism's victims conform to this interpretation of history. By obscuring the Jewish victims, in order to promote the victim status of Christians and Christianity, Anglican interpretations of German and European history inevitably discouraged focus on the Holocaust. By finding a continuous enemy for the European tradition, symbolised by the anti-Christianity of totalitarian doctrines supported by the Christian victims of Nazism, the particularity of Nazism (and indeed Soviet Communism) as murderous dictatorial systems were inevitably removed from focus. The lack of focus on the particularity of Nazi criminality further reduced the attention given to the historical significance of the Jewish victims of Nazism. As such this circular interpretation had no room for the understanding of the Jewish tragedy.

5.3 Conclusion: The Anglican Church and Coming to Terms with the Past.

Jeffrey Herf has argued that previous historiography has laid too much emphasis on the imposition of new political narratives on post-war Germany from external forces in the context of the Cold War, suggesting that the political discourses which became dominant in both the East and the West were in fact latent German political traditions revived.[81] In the light of Herf's investigation of the historical continuities of German politics in the post-war era it is impossible to award causal impetus to the Anglican narrative of the past, and its effect on the process of coming to terms with the Nazi past in post-war Germany. However the close relationship between the narratives proposed by the Anglican community, and ecumenical Christianity in general, and the platform that this provided for the construction of indigenous narratives of the past suggests that simply to view this process as purely a German one would also be mistaken.

The Anglican perception of history had a very real effect on the process of 'coming to terms with the past' in Germany, by providing a legitimacy (this is not to imply a causal impetus) for an understanding of the past that allowed both the re-entry of Germany into the Western political tradition, and importantly the creation of a self image within certain German institutions which depicted themselves as elements of a western, Christian, historical tradition. The narratives of the Nazi past that the Anglican church

[81] Jeffrey Herf, 'Multiple Restorations: German Political Traditions and the Interpretation of Nazism 1945-6', in *Central European History*, (Vol. 26, No. 1, 1993), pp. 21-59.

provided in the post-war era, and those narratives provided elsewhere that the Anglican church legitimated, failed to account adequately for the Jewish victims of Nazism. Jews either failed to feature in this rhetoric, or contrarily were only employed jealously in an attempt to appropriate their status as victims to enhance the legitimacy of an historical narrative that placed Christian suffering at its centre. Such abandonment of the Jewish victims of Nazism was further justified by the appearance of new victims of (Soviet) totalitarianism in the shape of the German expellees from Eastern Europe. New victims brought with them a new enemy, and in the context of the failing Western relationship with the Soviet Union, the Russian foe assumed the Hitlerian mantle and the specificities of the Nazi crime – in addition to their victims – were further obscured. Yet this sequence of developments does not legitimate the view that it was the Cold War which obscured the Nazi crime. The Soviet Union was presented in the Nazi colours by the Anglican church, but this was a process that although legitimated by external events was entirely consistent with an Anglican world view which painted the secular twentieth century as an ongoing battle between Christian light and totalitarian darkness. The ambiguity of the German role in this twentieth century European civil war was highlighted in the British campaign waged against further trials of war criminals after the conclusion of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1946. The following chapter will analyse Anglican involvement in the anti-trials campaign as a further example of their contribution to a process of memory formation that negated the significance of the Holocaust.

Chapter Six.
A European Community? The Anglican Church, War Criminals, Opposition to the Post War Trials and the Negation of the Nazi Past.

Allied and German court rooms, however problematic, did provide the most significant public forum for confrontation with the Nazi past in the post-war era.[1] Despite original Anglican support for the principle of trials, the day after the conclusion of the Nuremberg tribunal a sustained campaign against further war crimes trials began in Britain. In addition to being supported by members of the Anglican church, this apparently secular political and legal campaign relied heavily on a Christianised rhetoric in the design of moral historical objections to the trial process.[2] After the conclusion of the IMT, Christian engagement with war crimes trials in Britain was almost exclusively articulated through this very public opposition to the ongoing trial process as an element of the denazification programme. Leading Episcopal figures in the Church of England condemned the continued judicial investigation of Nazi crimes, and George Bell, reflecting his passion for matters continental, was central to the concerted and co-ordinated political campaign against the post IMT trials. There were no other significant voices engaging with trials in the Anglican community.

By investigating Christian engagement with the trials the notion of the primacy of the Cold War in the evasion of Nazism, and indeed the very idea that the Nazi past was *suppressed* in the post-war era can be further problematised. Central to the proposition that the Cold War caused an avoidance of the memory of Nazism and the Holocaust is the fact that efforts of the western Allies to hold former Nazis accountable for their crimes were brought to a premature end because of the need to orient West Germany against the Soviet Union.[3] With the ending of the trials public confrontation with the Nazi past throughout the west was abandoned. However the ending of the trials, and the incremental early release of Nazi war criminals across the 1950s, corresponded with the desires of Christianised anti-trial campaigners. Although apparently legally formulated, the objections raised to the trial process were

---

[1] For a discussion of the problems of the court rooms as a mechanism for engagement with the Nazi past see Donald Bloxham, 'The Holocaust on Trial: The War Crimes Trials in the Formation of History and Memory', PhD Thesis, Southampton University 1998. This thesis will be published as Donald Bloxham, *Genocide on Trial*, (Oxford, 2001).

[2] Tadeusz Cyprian and Jerzy Sawicki, *Nuremberg in Retrospect: People and the Issues of the Trial*, (Warsaw, 1967), p. 149.

based on the assertion of a principle which rejected the essential desirability of the trials, and concomitantly disputed the narrative of the Nazi and European past inherent within them. By linking anti-trial rhetoric with the discourses of the past already identified as extant within the Anglican community, it will be demonstrated that the narratives of the past legitimated by the Cold War had roots far beyond the post-war degeneration of the Western relationship with the Soviet Union.

This chapter will be organised into two main sections. The first will discuss the appraisal of both the principle of war crimes trials within the Anglican church, and then the early trials up to and including the IMT. This analysis will survey the Anglican desire to see trials at the end of the war, and the understanding of the past that that desire was based upon. The Anglican understanding of the past will then be contrasted with the narrative of the past implicit within the trials process itself. It will be noted that in addition to supporting the theoretical prospect of post-war trials, there was a positive Anglican reception of the Belsen and Nuremberg trials. Subsequently, however, the precise nature of this 'support' for the IMT will be analysed, and it will be suggested that support for trials conversely provided a structure for opposition to any further trials. The second section of the chapter will analyse that opposition to war crimes trials which emerged after the conclusion of the IMT. First the employment of Christian morality in the rhetoric of this opposition will be investigated, followed by an analysis of the narratives of the Nazi and European pasts presented by trial opponents.

Despite relying heavily on conceptions of the past, there can be no doubt that the objections to the trial process equally rested on a narrative of the future which deemed the Nazi past less important, chiefly because of the endurance of the Soviet totalitarian foe. As such the utopian ambitions of trial opponents will also be considered. Nevertheless, it will be contended that these narratives of the future were constantly interacting with constructive narratives of the past. In the light of this, investigation of narratives of the future will both highlight the nature of opposition to the trials and allow some more general observations regarding the interaction of perceptions of both the future and the past in the construction of the history and memory of the Holocaust during the Cold War. It will be argued that through specific narratives of the European past and future, trial opponents discovered their

[3] Donald Bloxham, 'Punishing German Soldiers During the Cold War: The Case of Erich von

communion with those accused of 'Nazi' crimes. Trial opponents' empathy with defendants then formed the basis of their defence of the accused. This conception of commonality was based upon an exclusive occidental definition of Europe which excluded the Soviet Union and harked back to the Anglican definitions of civilisation inherent in the justification and understanding of the Second World War. Opposition to the trials therefore represented the Anglican contribution to a narrative of European history which found Nazism unimportant.

6.1 The Anglican Church and the War Crimes Trials.

6.1 i) The Anglican Church, the Principle of War Crimes Trials and the Nazi Past.

As the Second World War approached its conclusion the Anglican church was prominent among voices in Britain calling for the judicial investigation of war crimes. George Bell was at the forefront of this Anglican campaign for judicial recompense for Nazi misdeeds. From 1943 onwards Bell had been vociferous in his desire that the 'Nazi men of terror',[4] be brought to justice in 'properly appointed tribunals.'[5] Bell's was not a lone voice among the episcopate. Cyril Garbett, the Archbishop of York, echoed Bell's sentiments, consistently demanding for the 'sake of justice' that Nazi 'criminals receive their punishment'.[6]

Christian support for the principle of trials rested on a specific reading of the nature of the Nazi menace, its relationship with the German population and therefore of German history. The rhetoric of calls for punishment from within the church placed emphasis on the guilt and responsibility of the Nazi leadership corps which was consistent with the church's continual efforts to draw a distinction between the Nazi criminal clique and the German population.[7] George Bell even defined the utility of any possible or forthcoming trials as being they might allow the allies to 'plainly fix

---

Manstein', in *Patterns of Prejudice*, (Vol. 33, No. 4, 1999), pp. 25-45.

[4] George Bell, 'A Visit to Sweden', in *The Church and Humanity*, (London, 1946), p. 77.

[5] George Bell, 'The Future in Europe: Germany' - A memo for the International Round Table 'Commission to study the bases of a just and durable peace', held USA July 8-11, 1943. This Memo can be found in Liddell Hart Papers, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Kings College London, 1/58, f. 41.

[6] Cyril Garbett, in *Hansard* (HL) Vol. 135, (672), 20 March 1945. This speech reflected Garbett's long held conviction in the justice of punishing Nazi War criminals, for example he also called for punishment in the York Convocation of October 1944, quoted in the *Church Times*, 13 October 1944.

[7] See chapter 4 for a discussion of Anglican interpretations of the relationship between the Nazi state and the German population.

[the] guilt' for Nazi atrocities on the shoulders of the criminal elite and, therefore, draw attention to the fact that the allies viewed the German population wholly differently and removed from the Nazi leadership.[8] Thus Anglican support for the ambition of war crimes trials during the war, envisioned those trials as being predicated on an Anglican understanding of the past and the nature of the Third Reich. Anglicans appear to have believed that the trials could be used to bolster their understanding of the Nazi state and therefore to undermine the narratives of the past inherent in the policy of 'unconditional surrender' to which they were implacably opposed.

In reality, however, the trial processes that emerged after 1945 relied on understandings of the immediate Nazi past that were rather different to that proposed by Anglican enthusiasts for the idea of trials. The London Agreement, signed on 8 August 1945 by all four prosecuting powers, produced the Nuremberg charter which proposed the version of the past that would be presented in, and investigated by, the court room of the IMT. This version of the past was most notably encapsulated in the charges levelled against the accused.[9] The offspring of a limited group of American legal minds morally committed to exposing the horrors of Nazism,[10] the four charges – the common plan or conspiracy, the waging of aggressive war, war crimes as already understood (for example the mistreatment of POWs), and crimes against humanity[11] – drew on the tradition of attempts to limit the extremities of warfare which had informed the half-hearted efforts at prosecution at the end of the Great War.[12] However these charges (especially the conspiracy, crimes against the peace and crimes against humanity) were in part novel as they gave expression to an understanding of Nazism as a specifically insidious historical phenomena and presented a specific version of the Nazi past to the court.[13]

---

[8] George Bell, 'German Atrocities', in *Church and Humanity*, p. 92. This article is the text of a speech given in the House of Lords, 11 February 1943.
[9] For a discussion of the charter, and the manner in which the charges were framed within it, see Anne and John Tusa, *The Nuremberg Trial*, (London, 1983), pp. 85-90.
[10] Telford Taylor, *Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir*, (London, 1993), p. 41.
[11] Anthony Glees, 'The Making of British Policy on War Crimes: History as Politics in the U.K.', in *Contemporary European History*, (Vol. 1, No. 2, 1992), p. 178.
[12] Alan S. Rosenbaum, *Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals*, (Boulder, 1993), p. 29.
[13] Taylor, *Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials*, p. 626.

What then was the understanding, or the understandings, of the past proposed in the attempt to expose 'the truth about the cruelty, atrocities and Nazi rule'[14] at Nuremberg? The priority given to the individual charges by the prosecuting authorities further institutionalised the specific rendering of the past at stake. At the heart of the American vision of Nazi criminality (and the Americans appear certainly to have been the driving force behind the design of the charges) were the intertwined allegations of the conspiracy, and 'crimes against the peace' or the waging of aggressive war. The latter was proposed as the ultimate crime, and it was contended that all other charges flowed from this fundamental beginning.[15] The centrality of the charge of aggressive war implied a traditional understanding of Nazism as a consequence and culmination of German traditions of Prussian militarism. Thus the version of the past inherent in the IMT prosecutions was an interpretation of Nazism which could be broadly located within the boundaries of interpretation symbolised by Lord Vansittart and the concept of unconditional surrender.[16] Vansittart's declaration that the term Nazi was obsolete because it was simply a modern euphemism for German was essentially reflected by the IMT effort to indict such 'German' institutions as the Armed Forces and industry.[17]

---

[14] Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, 'Foreword', to G.M. Gilbert, *Nuremberg Diary*, (London, 1948), p. ix. Fyfe was the British Deputy Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg, and his contention that the purpose of the trial was to expose the realities of the Nazi past and hold the Nazi authorities accountable for their crimes reflects a consensus among trial protagonists and historians that for the prosecution teams at least Nuremberg was a moral project. The charges contained within the Nuremberg charter gave expression to the moral outrage of its authors. The assistant to Chief Prosecutor Robert Jackson at the IMT and then head of the American prosecution team at the so called subsequent proceedings, Telford Taylor, reflected that the makers of trial policy were motivated by the 'perceived evil of Nazism'. (Taylor, 'Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials', p. 21.) Telford Taylor has argued that ultimately Nuremberg as a moral if not legal project was a success – see Taylor, 'Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials', pp. 626-4. Peter Calvocoressi, *Nuremberg: The Facts, the Law and the Consequences*, (London, 1947) is a contemporary account of the trials that endorsed this view. This is an argument that appears to be supported by more distanced historical assessment, see Geoffrey Best, *Nuremberg and After: the continuing history of war crimes and crimes against humanity*, (The Stenton Lecture, University of Reading, 1983), p. 25-6, and Bloxham, 'The Holocaust', pp. 15-20. Such a desire to expose the truth of the Nazi era of course presupposed a specific rendering of that past on the part of the prosecutorial authorities. Taylor for example stated that Nazism was understood as an 'avowed repudiation of the libertarian, humanitarian, and internationalist ideals' of the west, a sentiment in keeping with the christianised vision of Nazism that had misunderstood the attack on the Jews in war time. See Taylor, 'Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials', p. 21.

[15] Michael Marrus, 'The Holocaust at Nuremberg', in *Yad Vashem Studies*, (Vol. 26, 1998), p.7.

[16] See Chapter Four above for a discussion of the Vansittartist vision of the past as an inspiration for and inherent in the concept of unconditional surrender. Of course in a way the entire Nuremberg project was dependent on the concept of unconditional surrender, in that it was this and the lack of indigenous German authority that provided the necessity for the extraordinary legal creation of the IMT.

[17] Lord Vansittart, *Lessons of My Life*, (London, 1943), p. 204.

The attempt to indict the entire organised community, the so called 'military industrial complex', as complicit in this crime of aggression at Nuremberg was articulated in the second central charge of conspiracy or 'common plan'. Those accused at the IMT included representatives from the military – the OKW or army high command was indicted as one of the criminal organisations[18] – and had originally intended to include a representative from German private industry.[19] This range of defendants reflected prosecution vision of an extensive conspiracy. Implicitly the idea of the conspiracy paradoxically situated the locus of Nazi criminality simply within the leadership and governmental corps and as such concurred with the Christian understanding of Nazism and bequeathed the intentionalist legacy for the historiography of the Third Reich.[20] But the attempt to indict diverse German elites at the IMT articulated an understanding of Nazism as born of the continuities of German history and as the latest manifestation of the shared ambition of the historical power elites of the German past.

If the charges brought at the IMT and the subsequent proceedings reflected largely the American understanding of the Nazi past, the British relationship with that trial, and Britain's subsequent involvement in trials where she was the sole prosecutorial authority, equally reflected specific attitudes to the Nazi past. It appears that British officials, Churchill included, were reluctant to assent to the concept of the IMT and the trial of the 'major war criminals'.[21] This reticence toward the breadth of criminality as defined in the charges of the IMT was in turn reflected in British trial policy. The purely British trials never went as far as the IMT in the definition of Nazi criminality and therefore proposed an alternative narrative and understanding of the Nazi past.

---

[18] Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel – Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces – was sentenced to death and executed at Nuremberg. Alfred Jodl – Chief of operations staff of the Army High Command – was also hung although he was posthumously exonerated by a German court in 1953. Erich Raeder and Karl Dönitz – both of the Command Corps of the Navy – were sentenced to prison terms by the IMT. The Army High Command (OKW) was declared not to be a criminal organisation by the tribunal, on the basis that the prosecution had failed to demonstrate that it was homogenous.

[19] Gustav Krupp was originally supposed to stand trial, but did not because he was declared unfit. Ultimately there was therefore no representative from the German industrial community at the IMT. Rosenbaum, *Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals*, p. 19.

[20] Bloxham, 'The Holocaust', p. 209.

[21] Bloxham, 'The Holocaust', p. 17. Churchill had originally suggested retribution not in the form of a trial but in the arbitrary selection and execution of the Nazi leadership corps.

British trials in post-war Europe were governed by the Royal Warrant issued in June 1945, prior to the London agreement.[22] Royal Warrant trials only sanctioned the trials of those accused of crimes against British nationals,[23] and equally only those directly responsible for the carrying out of brutality. The Royal Warrant reflected the British desire *only* to deal with war crimes as traditionally understood, that is behaviour outside of the established conventions of warfare, which had been evident in the British intellectual relationship with war crimes prosecution since they were first proposed in 1942. The Foreign Office had, for example, after the establishment of the United Nations War Crimes Commission sought to confine the commission's investigations to this limited vision of Nazi criminality.[24] The narrow British definition of criminal action precluded the investigation of individuals indirectly responsible for the commission of crimes for example in the creation or administration of policy.[25] Suspects accused of crimes against foreign nationals could also not be investigated in British courts. The only action the British could or would take against those accused of crimes against persons other than British nationals was extradition. The commitment to extradition was in line with the provision of the Moscow declaration, the original tripartite commitment to war crimes trials signed in November 1943, which had envisaged that Nazi criminals could simply be returned to the theatre of their crimes and tried there by national governments accounting for their national victims.[26]

What does this then suggest as to the vision of the Nazi past implicit within British trial policy? Clearly the concentration on traditional definitions of war crimes in British trials reflected the understanding of Nazism as a German historical phenomena tied to the traditions of Prussian militarism which had dominated British propagandistic renderings of German history in war time.[27] But the concentration of the Royal Warrant trials on the lower level foot soldiers of criminality, by insisting that direct evidence of the carrying out of criminal violence be proven, did not concur with the IMT's, or Vansittart's, indictment of German elites.

---

[22] Glees, 'The Making of British Policy', p. 178.
[23] Priscilla Dale Jones, 'British Policy towards German Crimes Against German Jews 1939-45', in *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book*, (Vol. 36, 1991), p. 348.
[24] Ariel J. Kochavi, *Prelude to Nuremberg: Allied War Crimes Policy and the Question of Punishment*, (Chapel Hill, 1998), pp. 4-6.
[25] Bloxham, 'The Holocaust', p. 53.
[26] Tusa, *Nuremberg Trial*, pp. 23-24 for the text of the Moscow declaration.
[27] Aaron Goldman, 'Germans and Nazis: The controversy over "Vansittartism" in Britain During the Second World War', in *Journal of Contemporary History*, (Vol. 14, No.1, 1979), p. 163.

The Royal Warrant also limited the perception of Nazism further by essentially denying Nazism was a racist project. While British officials' concern to limit prosecutions to crimes involving British subjects may have been chiefly jurisdictional, it also expressed an understanding that national trials *could*, if carried out by all nations affected by Nazi criminality, theoretically offer complete judicial accounting for Nazi misdeeds. As such this vision of Nazism defined her victims only in national terms, and reflected an understanding of Nazism that failed entirely to account for its attack on members of its own population, and indeed stateless persons. Of course the majority of these victims of Nazism were Jews.[28] That the British either through the Royal Warrant trials or through extradition had no mechanisms in place for the accounting for crimes perpetrated against Jews reflected the ambivalence of the British government, and prominent elements in British society (which included the Anglican church) towards the Jewish victims of Nazism displayed since 1933. Nazism continued through the medium of British trials to be presented as somehow dangerous but, crucially, not as a specifically antisemitic, racist movement or political project.[29] This became abundantly clear at the Belsen trial, which began in September 1945,[30] when the charges related only to victims of specific nationalities and did *not* deal with the Jews,[31] despite the proliferation of Jewish victims in the camp that had been the final stopping point for many death marches.[32] The failings of the Belsen trial to deal effectively with the scope of Nazi anti-Jewish ambition were arguably repeated in the American inspired prosecution at the IMT. The centrality of the aggressive war charge dictated that the 'Final Solution' was simply seen as a consequence of the aggression rather than as a project in and of itself.[33]

---

[28] Jones, 'British Policy towards German Crimes Against German Jews', p. 348.

[29] For discussions of British understanding of Nazism see above in all chapters of this thesis and also Tony Kushner, *The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination: A Social and Cultural History*, (Oxford, 1994).

[30] For an account of the Belsen trial see Tom Bower, *Blind Eye To Murder: Britain, America and the Purging of Nazi Germany – A Pledge Betrayed*, (London, 1981), pp. 197-201. For an account of the limited impact of the Belsen trial on the memory of the Holocaust see Tony Kushner, 'The Memory of Belsen', in Jo Reilly et al (eds), *Belsen in History and Memory*, (London, 1997), pp. 181- 205.

[31] Bloxham, 'The Holocaust', p. 115.

[32] See Yehuda Bauer, 'The Death Marches, January-May 1945', *Modern Judaism* (Vol. 3, No.1, 1983), pp. 1-21 and Daniel Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust*, (New York, 1996) as two of the only attempts at historical investigation of the death marches.

[33] Bloxham, 'The Holocaust', pp. 110-266. Bloxham's position does not however represent an historiographical consensus. Michael Marrus for example has argued that the IMT prosecutions left an admirable legacy for Holocaust historiography in interpretative as well as documentary terms. See Marrus, 'Holocaust', p. 41. Jeffrey Herf too has referred to a 'Nuremberg interregnum' as a zenith of understanding of the Holocaust and levels of education in Germany regarding the recent Nazi past in

Both the IMT and the British trials then, articulated a somewhat limited, and at times contradictory, understanding of the nature of Nazism through their respective judicial processes. Such narratives of the past rested partially on variations of the Vansittartist opposite to the Anglican understanding of German history and Nazism. Versions of the past in trials dissented from the Christian narrative which Anglican support for punishment had been based on. That narrative had envisaged only a narrow guilt and responsibility embodied in the elite ideological clique and called for the indictment of only 'Adolf Hitler and his co-assassins'.[34] Yet in part the Royal Warrant did offer a more palatable version of the Nazi past than the IMT for the Anglican imagination, because it confined the idea of Nazi criminality rather than attempting the indictment of large swathes of German society or culture. The limited Anglican vision of Nazi criminality rather problematises the notion of Anglican support for the trials at the end of the war as it is clear that the possibility of opposition to trials was inherent within ecclesiastical endorsement of a specific form of trials which concurred with a narrow vision of Nazi criminality.

6.1 ii) The Anglican Church and the Belsen and Nuremberg Trials.

Although the intention to try was supported throughout the Church of England, the beginning of the trials themselves were received rather more ambivalently within the Anglican community. The trial that bore the name of Belsen, the most symbolic of concentration camps for the British, was, for example, impatiently welcomed by the Anglican community in September of 1945. Although there was apparently no doubt as to the justice of the trial, there was unease at the length of the proceedings which was viewed as an impediment to the pressing task of reconstruction. Anglican commentators contended that there was no need for extended investigation of the Nazi past because the 'facts' of the 'hell' of Belsen were 'not in dispute'.[35] Accordingly it was urged that convictions should be speedy in order that the hell be left behind.[36]

The established facts of hellish Belsen for the Anglican community were, at the time of the trial, understood in the manner that those same horrors had been

---

the post-war years, that was subsequently undermined. See Herf, *Divided Memory*, for a discussion of this concept with reference to both East and West Germany.

[34] George Bell, 'German Atrocities', p. 92.

[35] *The Record*, 28 September 1945, p. 417.

perceived at the time of liberation. Belsen, and the cruelty exposed therein, had been interpreted as the worst excesses of a criminal totalitarianism and as a result of the Nazi regime's brutal control and punishment policies.[37] Throughout the trial, Belsen remained within this framework. The ecclesiastical community interpreted the revelations of the practices of the camps as an 'indictment of civilisation'. The cruelty exposed at liberation and then in the courtroom was not understood as due to the specificities of a racist Nazism, but the general moral collapse that the 'war of ideals' had been waged against and of which Nazism was considered a constituent part.[38] Christian interpretation of the Belsen trial then reflected the interpretation of Nazism exhibited within the Anglican church throughout the life of the Third Reich. The welcoming of the Belsen trial perpetuated Anglican understanding of the Nazi era. Nazism was seen as a brutal totalitarianism, the scope of which was limited.

By the time the IMT at Nuremberg began, three days after the conclusion of the Belsen trial,[39] interest in war crimes trials within the Anglican community had begun to wane. However, at its inception, the Nuremberg trial was given a limited welcome by the British Christian community. Conversant with the ambitions of the trial protagonists, Nuremberg was interpreted as a 'noble' exercise in its effort to provide a moral dimension to international politics.[40] Yet, this welcome should not be overstated. The dominant reaction of the ecclesiastical community to the IMT, despite the vociferous endorsement of the principle of trials in war time was, publicly at least, one of silence. The trial proceeded from indictment to judgement without comment from press or public figures in the ecclesiastical community;[41] a silence which reflected the broad disinterest that it has been argued characterised British public

---

[36] See for example the interpretation of the French trials of Petain and Laval in *The Record*, 24 August 1945, which wished such trials over as soon as possible in order that France could concentrate on the 'rebuilding of her national life'.
[37] *Church Times*, 28 December 1945, p. 746.
[38] *The Guardian*, 28 September 1945, p. 375.
[39] For details of sentencing see Raymond Phillips (ed), *Trial of Josef Kramer and Forty Four Others (The Belsen Trial)*, (London, 1949).
[40] *Church Times*, 23 November 1945, p. 667.
[41] A review of the *Church Times*, *The Guardian*, *The Record* (latterly *The Church of England Newspaper*) and *Christian News Letter* between 1945 and 1953 revealed no substantial engagement with the issue of trials after the inception of the Nuremberg trials in 1945. Although there was comment on the judgements delivered at Nuremberg this was an isolated break in the curtain of silence regarding the issue of trials and is discussed below. Trials did inspire some historical reflection on the Nazi state within the ecclesiastical community, but this was often directed at celebration of the extent of Christian resistance. See Chapter Five above. Isolated commentaries on the Manstein trial of 1949 will also be discussed below.

reactions to the proceedings of the tribunal.[42] Silence and unease at the prevarication of the early trial exercises further problematise the notion of Anglican support for war crimes trials. Despite the original endorsement of the IMT by the ecclesiastical community, the assent generally given to the principle of trying Nazi war criminals was, if not unravelling during the course of the tribunal, at the very least being offered conditionally.

Such conditionality reflected a constant tension in the Anglican appraisal of war crimes and punishment, which in turn reflected the paradox of Christian theologies of punishment and forgiveness. For a Christian to live in an orderly society dictated the acceptance of the principle of punishment and atonement, but for the liberal Christian – and despite the crises of the 1930s and war time it was the liberal tradition which predominated in the elements of the Anglican church concerned with matters European – the purpose of life was the attempted imitation of Christ, which involved the aspiration of forgiveness rather than punishment. Anglican pacifist Stephen Hobhouse[43] engaged with this very problem in war time, and considered the relationship of Christian ideals of 'forgiveness' to possible post-war trials. Hobhouse wrote that whatever the principle behind judicial retribution it was not a 'fitting task for the Christian' because it did not promote Christian love. Retribution, he argued, was only the responsibility of the divine; the aspiration of the Christian had to be toward unconditional forgiveness.[44] There was not necessarily significant support for Hobhouse's view in the Christian community, clergy or lay. The Archbishop of Canterbury William Temple, was, for example, a reluctant supporter of the retributive function of area bombing, a position far removed from Hobhouse's essential pacifism.[45] But the extent of war time agreement with Hobhouse's position is largely irrelevant. The significance of the tension between punishment and Christian ambition, reflected in war time and post-war reflection on the punishment of Nazis is that it points to the problems of punishment for the Christian conscience. As such

---

[42] Bloxham, 'The Holocaust', p. 257. See also Calvocoressi, *Nuremberg*, p. 123, and David Cesarani, *Justice Delayed*, (London, 1992), p. 170.

[43] Stephen Hobhouse was a leading pacifist in the inter war period, and had been a contemporary of Temple's at Oxford. Vacillating between the Church of England and the Society of Friends, Hobhouse returned to the Anglican fold in 1944 but remained absolute in his pacifist faith. See Alan Wilkinson, *Dissent or Conform: War, Peace and the English Churches 1900-45*, (London, 1986), pp. 271-2.

[44] Stephen Hobhouse, *Retribution and the Christian*, (London, 1942), pp. 1-12.

[45] On Temple's reluctant support for the area bombing campaign see Andrew Chandler, 'The Church of England and the Obliteration Bombing of Germany in the Second World War', in *English Historical Review*, (Vol. 108, 1993), pp. 920-46.

there existed a rich vein of theological interpretation within the Anglican community that could be employed in opposition to the trials.

The ready made theological and philosophical structure for Anglican criticism of the trial process was even evident within the positive appraisal of the principle of trials in war time. The *Christian News Letter* in November 1943 while confirming the righteousness of the principle of punishing war criminals, argued that forgiveness, no matter what the crime, remained the highest ideal for the Christian, although it was noted that this could not be adopted to the detriment of societal order. However it was proposed that forgiveness had a 'creative' contribution to make in the design of future harmony by promoting reconciliation between belligerents.[46] In arguing that forgiveness was 'creative', the *Christian News Letter* implied that retribution, and therefore potentially war crimes trials, had a destructive potential.

Reflecting this unease at the possibilities of retribution in the trial process, Christian commentators began, toward the end of 1945 if not to criticise the trials, then at least find the process problematic. In September 1945 while open criticism was not detectable within the Anglican community, the proposal that war crimes trials might fall some way short of a Christian ideal was beginning to be articulated in the ecclesiastical press. *The Guardian*, for example, sought to highlight the tension between the Christian aspiration of 'mercy' and war crimes trials as a retributive expression of hate.[47] Prior to the announcement of the Nuremberg judgement, a correspondent of the *Church Times* also criticised trials using the Christian concept of mercy, he warned that the duty of the Christian in the aftermath of war was to eschew 'retribution' and seek meaningful 'reconciliation' as a 'creative' contribution to the future.[48] Finding the process of trials as problematic, Christian 'support' for war crimes trials in 1945 not only dissented from the narrative of the past proposed by the trial exercise, but questioned the ability of trials to meet one of the central moral motivations of the authors of the project, the creation of a better future.[49]

It was not simply through an interpretation of the past that Nuremberg and the trials were understood, and indeed that we can understand them, as a moral project. Equally anchored in morality was the vision of the future articulated through the trials process. Like the discipline of history generally, the past was analysed in allied

---

[46] *Christian News Letter*, 'Punishment of War Criminals', Supplement to No. 194, 3 November 1943.
[47] *The Guardian*, 7 September 1945, p. 345.
[48] *The Guardian*, 6 September 1946 p. 420 – letter from C.A. Littler.

courtrooms not simply for posterity's sake, but also with one eye on the future.[50] In literal terms of course the trials had an obvious relation with the latter. Exposing the dangers of Nazism would have destroyed that political movement and safeguarded the future. As Peter Calvocoressi contemporaneously argued, the purpose of Nuremberg was to attack the tradition of German militarism and as such ensure the peace of Europe.[51] In so doing Calvocoressi exposed the interaction between visions of the past and the future in the trial project. Telford Taylor was also candid in describing the utility of the Nuremberg trials in the building of a utopian global future. Taylor explained that parallel with the motivation behind the Nuremberg trial of exposing the horror of Nazism, and again this reflects on the centrality of the aggressive war charge, was the motivation of attempting to build an international legal code and outlaw war.[52]

It has commonly been argued that the Nuremberg project needs, in terms of its vision of the future, to be seen as one element of a project also involving the establishment of the UN.[53] According to this interpretation Nuremberg attempted to give expression to a global set of values for the regulation of international politics, while the UN was established to institutionalise those values for the future.[54] The links between the UN and Nuremberg were not lost on contemporary observers, or indeed the protagonists in the drama. Calvocoressi, again, viewed Nuremberg as having demonstrated the necessity of the union of nations,[55] while reflexively the UN 'affirmed unanimously' the principle of Nuremberg.[56] The faith in global commonality and the desire to end war implicit in the utopian ambitions of the UN were also reflected in the Nuremberg indictment. The charge of 'crimes against the

---

[49] *Church Times*, 11 October 1946, p. 378.
[50] See Michael Biddiss, 'The Nuremberg Trial: Two Exercises in Judgement', in *Journal of Contemporary History*, (Vol. 16, No. 3, 1981), p. 610, where Biddis argues that the authors of the trial project were involved not only in an interpretative judgement on the past, but also in the subscription to a philosophy of history in that Nuremberg was seen as a filter through which history could progress to a utopian future.
[51] Calvocoressi, *Nuremberg*, p. 113.
[52] Taylor, 'Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trial', p. 41.
[53] Best, *Nuremberg and After*, p. 5. Best cites Connor Cruise O'Brien and Felix Topolski, *The United Nations: Sacred Drama*, (London, 1968), pp. 281-2. See also Tom J. Garer, 'The UN and Human Rights: More than a Whimper, Less than a Roar', in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, *United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Roles in International Relations*, (Oxford, 1988), pp. 98-9 on the relationship between the IMT and the UN, and the definition of Human Rights in the post-war era.
[54] See for example Evan Luard, *A History of the United Nations, Vol. 1: the Years of Western Domination, 1945-1955*, (London, 1982), p. 3, which states that all those involved in the establishment of the UN shared the hope that it would be a 'means of abolishing war from the earth'.
[55] Calvocoressi, *Nuremberg*, p. 117.
[56] Cyprian and Sawicki, *Nuremberg in Retrospect*, p. 215

peace' reflected the international community's theoretical repudiation of force, while the equally novel 'crimes against humanity' asserted ambitions of global community and the existence of eternal standards of behaviour.[57]

The post-war churches, however, were engaged in their own future-oriented project, which, unlike Nuremberg, proposed that the key to the future was in the jettisoning rather than embracing and understanding of the past. It was the post-war ecumenical movement that envisioned a future of Christian co-operation which reasserted the Christian commonality of the formerly belligerent nations and provided the context for Christian contemplation of the IMT. Consequently the Anglican appraisal and welcome for the verdicts delivered at the IMT in October 1946[58] reflected a growing ambiguity and ambivalence of Christian support for the trials because they contradicted the increasingly dominant assumptions of the worth of ecumenism. Ecumenism urged the abandonment of the past and the embrace of a united future.[59]

Despite the problems retribution engendered for the Christian conscience and ecumenical pressure to forget the past, there is no doubt that the judgement at Nuremberg was welcomed. But the nature of that welcome reveals further the ambiguities of the Anglican relationship with the trials. Leading articles greeted the end of the IMT with palpable relief, reflecting, in line with the Anglican turn toward the future, the faith that the end of the trial equally heralded the end of the Nazi project and was the final act in the drama of the Second World War:

> and so ends the greatest and most deliberately planned and the most foul conspiracy against civilisation that history has yet recorded...with the end of the trial the curtain falls upon a tragedy worked out relentlessly to its climax.[60]

---

[57] Indeed there is some conflict regarding whether or not the concept of 'crimes against humanity' was actually novel at all. Geoffrey Best lauded what he saw as the 'resounding affirmation of humankind's revulsion from such a systematic reversal of its highest values'. Yet those seeking to justify the legitimacy of the IMT serially sought (and seek) to deny the novelty of the Crimes against humanity charge in order to avoid challenges regarding the extent of the tribunal's jurisdiction. See Calvocoressi, *Nuremberg*, p. 58, for a later attempt to justify the legitimacy of the trial on the same basis see Rosenbaum, *Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals*, p. 23, and for a review of the debate see Dale Jones, 'British Policy Toward German Crimes', pp. 342-46.

[58] For details of the verdict see *The Judgement of Nuremberg*, (London, 1999) – a published abridged version of the judgement.

[59] See Chapter Five above for a discussion of the impact of ecumenism on the Anglican reflection on the past.

[60] *The Guardian*, 4 October 1946, p. 469. See also *The Guardian* 25 October 1946, p. 507, which intoned that as 'the curtain falls and the last act of the long drama has come to its close. The crisis...has reached its climax, and dissolved.' and *The Record*, 11 October 1946, p. 578, in which Dulwich vicar and regular commentator D.R. Davies declared that there was literally 'no more to be said'.

Nuremberg was therefore welcomed because it achieved closure. The past had been faced and accounted for. The Nazi leadership corps had been dealt with, the Nazi era, as defined by the Anglican imagination, was over. The *Church Times*, for example, welcomed the judgements at Nuremberg but called for an end to the preoccupation with the past in order that the challenges of the future, chiefly the continuing need for the eradication of totalitarianism, could be met head on.[61] The decisiveness of the Anglican embrace of hope and the future further highlights the partiality of their turn to theological pessimism. Karl Barth, in contrast to ecumenical Anglicans, denied the possibility and utility of planning for a Christian future.[62]

The Anglican community's relationship with the trials project up to the end of the IMT was ambivalent. Although Anglican clergy and newspapers had been active in calling for the institution of war crimes trials in the aftermath of the war, the vision of criminality that they envisaged had been quite different and indeed more limited than the version of Nazism inherent in the trials emerging from the London charter and even the British Royal Warrant. Trials were originally welcomed (if impatiently) within the Anglican community, although the most significant feature of Christian comment on the early part of the trials was its scarcity. Such commentary that was made contained clear indications of the structures in place through which Christian support for war crimes trials could become Christian inspired opposition. Finally, although the Nuremberg judgements were welcomed, it was with a tangible expression of relief which reflected both an increasing unease at the version of the past proposed in the trials and the limitations of the Anglican understanding of the Third Reich and the Second World War. Such relief at the ending of the IMT retrospectively highlighted the weaknesses of the Anglican vision of Nazi criminality for fostering support for a lengthy judicial accounting for the Nazi past. Within the Anglican imagination the passing of the Nuremberg judgement heralded the destruction of the last vestiges of the Nazi criminal clique, and as such the moral imperative behind further investigation was removed. Within this appraisal of the trials the Anglican church continued to refuse to award any priority to the understanding of Nazi antisemitism.

Such ambivalence and faith in the finality of the proceedings of the IMT provided the platform from which open opposition to the trial process within the

[61] *Church Times*, 4 October 1946, p. 596.

Anglican community could grow, while the structures of Christian understanding provided moral impetus for criticisms of the trials ostensibly coming from outside of the Christian community. It is to the detailed analysis of that opposition that we now turn. Of particular focus will be the rhetoric employed by the trial opponents and the assumptions regarding the past, present and the future that such rhetoric betrayed.

6.2 British Opposition to War Crimes Trials.

The conditions upon which Christian approval for the IMT judgements were predicated, that they brought the Nazi era to a close and were the final acts of the war, were not met. Although there was no second collective tribunal, trials continued.[63] The Americans enacted the 'subsequent proceedings' at Nuremberg to facilitate their continued pursuit of the German 'military industrial complex',[64] and through the Royal Warrant trials, the British too continued to indict their more limited vision of Nazi criminality. Despite the growing ambivalence of the British government to the continuation of the trial process from the end of 1946,[65] the last British trial, that of German Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, took place in 1949.[66] For our purpose, the hail of criticism that greeted the decision to try von Manstein dictates that, in addition to being the last, his trial was also the most significant of all British trials. Immediately following the conclusion of the IMT a campaign of criticism had been aimed at the trials process. This international protest united British, American and indeed German, legal, religious and political figures in attacking both the jurisdiction

---

[62] Wilkinson, *Dissent or Conform*, p. 202.

[63] See Donald Bloxham, 'The Trial That Never Was: Why There was no Second International Trial of Major War Criminals at Nuremberg', forthcoming in *History*, January 2002.

[64] Bloxham, 'The Holocaust', p. 44.

[65] The British government had decided in 1946 to bring the trials process to a close. 1 September 1948 became the deadline for extraditions of suspects from British jurisdiction, after which only persons against which there was prima facie evidence of responsibility for murder under German law would be considered. After the constitution of the Federal Republic in 1949 trials did become an unwelcome burden for the western alliance, and the release of criminals and the ending of trials was sought. Releases were contrived through various parole boards and clemency proceedings in the Western zone, the net result of which was that by the mid-1950s British and American jails were clear of German war criminals. For details of the ending of the trials and the progression of clemency see Kochavi, *Prelude to Nuremberg*, pp. 242-246.

[66] That the British government was extremely reluctant to bring about this prosecution can be seen in J.H. Hoffman, 'German Field Marshals as War Criminals? A British Embarrassment', in *Journal of Contemporary History*, (Vol. 23, No.1, 1988), pp. 17-35. For an example of the dilemma the government found itself in regarding the prosecution of Manstein see Hynd to F.J. Bellenger (War office) 2 January 1947 in which the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster agonises over the problem of prosecution explaining that the government had to marry 'public opinion [which would not] tolerate the continuance of trials' and its own reluctance that 'serious criminals [could] escape retribution.' PRO FO 371/66559 U52.

of Allied courts, and in challenging the moral principle behind trials.[67] Despite the internationality of protest our interest will be focused upon the British campaign against the trials which crystallised around the Manstein trial. This criticism, although aimed at Manstein's prosecution, was intended as a general indictment of the practice and principle of all post-war trials and therefore the concept of judicial investigation of the Nazi past. British opposition to the trial came either from prominent Anglicans or employed an interpretation of Christianity in moral opposition to the idea of war crimes trials.

6.2 i) The Morality of Opposition to War Crimes Trials.

The campaign against war crimes trials in Britain was fought privately and publicly, in press, parliament and print. Individuals railed against further prosecutions in the chambers of both houses at Westminster, and continually lobbied government departments over the fate of specific individuals. Letters to the press decrying both the principle of prosecutions and the justice of individual investigations were common. Detailed book length anti-trial tracts were numerous, and when the trial of von Manstein was announced a fund raising campaign was launched in the House of Commons to finance the independent defence of the German general. Prominent in campaigns, particularly against the Manstein trial, were members of the military establishment, parliamentarians of various party affiliations, and even members of the Episcopate.

---

[67] American opponents to the trials centred around lawyers writing in the *American Journal of International Law*. See for example George A. Finch, 'The Nuremberg Trial and International Law', in *American Journal of International Law*, (Vol. 41, No. 2 1947), pp. 153-171. Josef L. Kunz, 'Revolutionary Creation of Norms of International Law', in *American Journal of International Law*, (Vol. 41, No. 1, 1947), pp. 119-126. F.B. Schlisk, 'The Nuremberg Trial and International Law of the Future', in *American Journal of International Law*, (Vol. 41, No. 4, 1947), pp. 119-126. Some U.S. politicians most notably Senator Robert Taft also opposed the prosecutions. Taft's opposition to the trials was originally deeply unpopular but it drew more and more sympathy on the Republican right as the Cold War developed. From 1948 onwards for example Senator Joe McCarthy was alleging that the trials were a communist inspired plot. See Bloxham, 'The Holocaust', p. 72, and Bower, *Blind Eye to Murder*, p. 287-89, the latter for the genesis of McCarthy's objections to the trials. The German Evangelical church were vociferous defenders of convicted and accused war criminals, with an entire department given over to providing relief for prisoners which acted essentially as a focus for protest against convictions. See notes from Ronald Webster, 'Opposing Victor's Justice: German Protestant Churchmen and Convicted War Criminals in Western Europe After 1945', in *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, (Vol. 15, No. 1, 2001), pp. 47-69. The German Catholic episcopate were also quick to defend convicted war criminals (although Cardinal Faulhaber was an exception). See the analysis of the 'bleak' record of the German Catholic Bishops with regard to war crimes prosecution, Frank Buscher and Michael Phayer, 'German Catholic Bishops and the Holocaust 1940-52', in *German Studies Review*, (Vol. 11, 1998), pp. 463-485.

Most vociferous among anti-trial activists was Maurice Hankey. Hankey had been secretary to the 1914-18 war cabinet and briefly Minister without Portfolio in the war time Churchill government and has been described as a 'part of the furniture of the British establishment'.[68] Other significant individuals within anti-trial campaigns were George Bell, Richard Stokes, a right wing and even antisemitic labour MP,[69] historian and military strategist Basil Liddell Hart, Reginald Paget another Labour MP who ultimately was Manstein's defence counsel, the journalist and former German prisoner of war Montgomery Belgion, and the author F.J.P. Veale.[70] Ultimately current, former, and future members of government such as Lord Pakenham and Winston Churchill could be added to this list of publicly active trial opponents. Figures on the extreme right of politics such as the Duke of Bedford were also engaged in attacks on war crimes trials, although in the case of Bedford and his *British Peoples Party* opposition to trials was a part of a general nihilistic rejection of the present.[71] Such a collective appeared at first-glance to be an ideologically and socially a diverse group. However there is little doubt that regarding the issues of war crimes, this collection of individuals formed an homogenous group of political campaigners, with the exception of those operating from the lunatic fringes of the political spectrum. Campaigns on behalf of specific war criminals were, for example, closely co-ordinated,[72] while campaigners corresponded regularly, discussing the tactics of their bid to undermine the trials, and were often scarcely able to conceal their admiration for one another.[73] From 1946 onwards the 'Gentleman's Clubs' of

---

[68] Cesarani, *Justice Delayed*, p. 171.

[69] See Tony Kushner, *The Persistence of Prejudice: Anti-Semitism in British Society During the Second World War*, (Manchester, 1989), p. 85.

[70] Montgomery Belgion was a journalist who worked variously in Britain and America from 1915 until the outbreak of war in 1939. During that conflict he served in the Royal Engineers and was imprisoned by the Germans from 1943. In addition to campaigning vigorously against war crimes trials in the aftermath of the war, he became secretary of the Westwood House Trust in 1951.

[71] For an introduction to the war time activities of Bedford see Kushner, *Persistence of Prejudice*, pp. 24, 32, 35, 85.

[72] For example the campaign on behalf of von Neurath in which tactics were discussed between a range of correspondents. See Bell Papers, Vol. 45, for a sample of that correspondence. The ultimate example was provided by the Manstein trial in which there was, for example, a fund raising campaign for his defence. See Bloxham, ''Punishing German Soldiers During the Cold War'. Perhaps the definitive example of the collegiality of British anti-war crimes trials campaigners was provided by Montgomery Belgion's 'dinner on war crimes' held 20 February 1952. Those invited were: Lord Hankey, Bishop Bell, Major General Fuller, Captain Russel Grenfell, Reginald Paget, F.J.P. Veale, Lord Pakenham, Basil Liddell Hart, and Lord Winster. See Belgion to Hankey 4 February 1952, Hankey Papers, Churchill Archives, Churchill College, University of Cambridge, 18/1.

[73] It appears for example that George Bell and Maurice Hankey who corresponded for over 15 years, did so only with regard to the issue of war crimes. See various volumes Hankey's correspondence with Bell, the Bell Papers, and Hankey Papers, 18/4. For examples of the mutual admiration between the

post-war London were employed as the ad-hoc committee rooms of a co-ordinated attack on the post-war trials.[74]

Following the example set by American legal critics of the IMT, the British band of trial opponents attempted to anchor their protest in the perceived legal and political flaws of the post-war trials project.[75] While publicly there appears to have been little criticism of the trials prior to the conclusion of the IMT, objections do not appear to have been retrospective. As early as 1942 it seems that George Bell, despite his public endorsement of the principle of trying war criminals, harboured grave misgivings regarding the practical, and jurisdictional problems that an international court may have to face.[76] Central to these perceived flaws in 1942 was the concern that any post-war trials could amount to 'victor's justice', and, indeed after 1945 the primary allegation levelled at the trials was that Germans were being punished for losing the war.[77]

The allegation of 'victor's justice' centred around the contention that allied 'war crimes' would not be investigated.[78] According to Montgomery Belgion this broke with a central plank of Anglo-American jurisprudence and suggested that all were no longer equal in the eyes of the law.[79] Although objections were raised as to the non investigation of British and American crimes,[80] the focus for this objection was the presence of the Soviet Union at the IMT and the failure of the trials process to take account of the allegedly criminal Soviet invasion of Finland,[81] or the emblematic murder of Polish soldiers in the Katyn forest.[82] For her critics, this failure to account

---

group see Veale's dedication to Hankey in his anti-War crimes tirade, F.J.P. Veale, *Advance to Barbarism: How the Reversion to Barbarism in Warfare and War Trials Menaces our Future*, (Appleton, Wisconsin. 1953), Liddel Hart and Bell's correspondence – Liddell Hart Papers, 1/58. Bell and Belgion's correspondence, Belgion Papers, Churchill Archives, Churchill College, University of Cambridge, 7/3. Belgion and Hankey's correspondence, Hankey Papers, 18/1. This mutual appreciation was in fact not confined to British trial opponents, George Bell for example informs H.A. Smith, author of American anti-trial tract H.A. Smith, *The Crisis in the Law of Nations*, (London, 1948), that his is a most 'valuable book', see Bell to Smith, Bell Papers, Vol. 49, f. 253.

[74] The Athenaeum Club on Pall Mall appears to have been at the centre of anti-war crimes trials activity, see for example Bell Papers, Vol. 48, f. 34 for Bell's notes on a meeting held there on 22 February 1949. .

[75] Veale, *Advance to Barbarism*, p. xiv.

[76] Bell to Cecil Hurst, 25 September 1942, Bell Papers, Vol. 69, f. 2.

[77] Field Marshal Montgomery, cited in Hofmann, 'German Field Marshals as War Criminals', p. 31.

[78] Lord Hankey, *Politics, Trials and Errors*, (Oxford, 1950), p. 4.

[79] Montgomery Belgion, *Epitaph on Nuremberg*, (London, 1946), p. 21.

[80] Belgion, *Epitaph*, p. 64., Smith, *Crisis in the Law of Nations*, p.86.

[81] Undated memo by Lord Hankey which notes that the Soviet invasion of Finland was illegal. Hankey Papers, 18/1.

[82] Belgion, *Epitaph*, p. 61.

for Soviet criminality exposed the hypocrisy of the IMT, as perceived Soviet deviance was ongoing, and demonstrated by the westward deportation of ethnic Germans.[83]

Allegations of the hypocrisy inherent in the trying of Nazi war criminals were augmented in the rhetoric of opposition to the trials with the contention that the charges contained in the London Charter had no basis in law. For example, the central charge of crimes against the peace, or waging of aggressive war, was decisively rejected by opponents of trials as meaningless.[84] Although a matter of interpretation of international law, the rejection of the aggressive war charge demonstrated that the dissent from the pro-trial consensus hinged on the provision of an alternative narrative of the past to that proposed by the prosecution. The concept of aggressive war rested on the assumption that the Kellogg-Briand pact of 1929 had effectively outlawed aggression as a tool of international politics, and that the signatories had agreed that in the future they would only wage war defensively. The German invasions of Poland, France, Norway and the northern European nations, and finally the Soviet Union were then interpreted as aggressive and therefore illegal actions.[85] Objections to this reading of the past proposed by those campaigning against the trials, centred around two major contentions. First, as reviewed above, that it singled out Nazi violations of international order without condemning similar Soviet actions. Second, and rather contrarily, that the Kellogg-Briand pact was in fact being misinterpreted by the prosecutorial authorities, and that it contained no outlawing of the uncodifiable crime of aggression.[86]

Trial critics also argued that the Kellogg-Briand treaty had not been regarded by the allies as having outlawed war prior to 1939. Allied failure to deal effectively with Italian aggression in Abyssinia, and their confirmation of the fruits of German aggression in the Munich agreement, demonstrated to the trial opponents that the Nuremberg interpretation of the 1929 agreement as the basis of international law was a post-hoc justification for the prosecution of victor's justice. By denying the validity of the Nuremberg interpretation of previous international agreements, Hankey *et al* alleged that the crimes of which the German war criminals were accused actually had no basis in law at the time of their commission, and that therefore the law was being

[83] Veale, *Advance to Barbarism*, p. 156. See also Chapter Five for a discussion of the affect of new German victims of totalitarianism on the perceptions of the Holocaust.
[84] Cyprian and Sawicki, *Nuremberg in Retrospect*, p. 150-52.
[85] *The Judgement of Nuremberg*, (London, 1946), p. 54.

applied in a retrospective manner.[87] It was in turn contended that this 'ex post facto' application of a new law further undermined central tenets of Anglo-American legal tradition and rejected the assumption that without an extant law there could be no crime. For the trial opponents it was another indication of war crimes trials' lack of legal legitimacy.

Apparently then, objections to war crimes trials were based simply on the contention that they were bad law. Indeed campaigners against war crimes trials sheltered behind the idea that there would be a moral imperative for punishing Nazi crimes if only suitable legal mechanisms had existed. By paying lip service to the theoretical desirability of prosecution, emphasis was constantly laid on the fact that objections to the trial process were not an effort to minimise or deny Nazi brutality.[88] Yet, as has been observed, criticisms of the trial process commonly rested on the extravagant detailing of crimes by the western allies during the war[89] and the enduring crimes of the Soviet Union,[90] while it was often claimed that enough had been written of Nazi 'crimes'.[91] This can be contrasted with the self avowedly moral arguments proposed in support of the trials, which rested on the continual invocation of Nazi barbarousness. For supporters of the trials it was precisely the 'enormity' of the Nazi crimes that morally justified trials.[92] The amoral elevation of the law within the rhetoric of trial criticism suggested that whatever the probity of war crimes prosecution it was the inadequacy of extant legal mechanisms that precluded the acceptability of prosecution, regardless of the moral imperatives behind such a prosecution.[93] George Bell's campaigning activities act as a case in point regarding trial opponents' lack of concern for Nazi crimes.

George Bell was central to the effort to oppose war crimes trials. Bell's status as a famed humanitarian awarded the campaign moral capital. Consequently Bell was

---

[86] Smith, *Crisis in the Law of Nations*, pp. 85-88, Viscount Maugham, *U.N.O. and War Crimes*, (London, 1951), pp.64-83.
[87] Hankey, *Politics, Trials, and Errors*, p. 16.
[88] Hankey, *Politics, Trials, and Errors*, p. 124, Veale, *Advance to Barbarism*, p. 124, George Bell in the House of Lords, 23 June 1948, Hansard, House of Lords Debates, Vol. CLVI, p. 1166.
[89] *Advance to Barbarism* for example has a photograph of the destroyed city of Dresden on the inside cover. There is no such graphic illustration of Nazi brutality.
[90] Hankey , *Politics, Trials and Errors*, p. 128., Veale, *Advance to Barbarism*, p. xv.
[91] Veale, *Advance to Barbarism*, p. xiv.
[92] G. Schwarzenberger, 'The Judgement of Nuremberg', *Yearbook of World Affairs*, (1948), p. 101, see also Eric Fletcher, MP for Islington East, who savaged Richard Stokes' criticism of the IMT and the general trials process with details of the Nazi crimes, *Hansard* (HC) Vol. 445 (684-87), 4 December 1947.
[93] Willard N. Hogan, 'War Criminals', in *South Atlantic Quarterly*, (Vol. 45, 1946), p. 417.

pre-eminent in active public and private lobbying on behalf of the accused and convicted. In common with the stated desire of trial opponents to see criminals tried if the legal basis had existed, Bell never actually withdrew his support for the principle of trying Nazi criminals. In a November 1946 address to the Church Assembly Bell emphasised his apparent belief in the punishment of 'those who committed crimes against [international] law'.[94] Yet Bell's lobbying on behalf of accused and convicted Nazi war criminals was literally tireless. The Bishop of Chichester transmitted demands from individual convicts and alleged criminals in Germany and elsewhere to the Foreign Office, and where appropriate the American occupation authorities, while publicly addressing the general issue of trial policy through his seat in the Lords and in correspondence with the press.[95] Bell's campaigning demonstrated a disregard for the crimes of which his causes were accused, or indeed had been convicted of. For example Bell, in conjunction with his hero Martin Niemöller, lobbied the Foreign Office on behalf of Erich Koch. Koch the former Gauleiter of the *Reichskommissariat Ukraine* has been described as 'one of the most brutal of all National Socialist politicians' and was personally responsible for the commission of genocide in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union.[96] Indeed Bell was ultimately forced to regretfully abandon his campaign for Koch because of the weight of evidence attesting to his activities in the former occupied territories.[97] It is, however, instructive that such a weight of evidence did not preclude original enquiries on behalf of Koch, and nor did Bell make any effort to avail himself of the nature of the crimes of which Koch was accused.

The case of Erich Koch can be seen as an instructive example. Throughout all of Bell's various enquiries on behalf of Nazi criminals, it appears that he regarded the facts of any particular case irrelevant. Bell wrote to the Foreign Office on behalf of

---

[94] George Bell, 14 November 1946, Church Assembly, *Report of Proceedings*, Autumn 1946, Vol. XXVI, No. 3, pp. 382.

[95] See Vols. 48 & 49 of the Bell Papers for the majority of Bell's surviving correspondence objecting to War Crimes Trials.

[96] see Christian Gerlach, 'German Economic Interests, Occupation Policy, and the Murder of the Jews in Belorussia, 1941-43', in Ulrich Herbert (ed.), *National Socialist Extermination Policies: Contemporary German Perspectives and Controversies*, (London, 2000), pp. 210-239. For Bell's correspondence on behalf of Koch see Bell to Henderson, Bell Papers, Vol. 49, f. 269, Henderson rebuffed Bell's efforts on behalf of Koch because there was substantial evidence of his involvement in mass murder. Henderson to Bell, 22 December 1949, Bell Papers, Vol. 49, f. 270.

[97] Bell replied to Henderson that he regretfully understood the decision to proceed with Koch's extradition, Bell to Henderson, 2 January 1950, Bell Papers, Vol. 49, f. 271. Yet Bell simultaneously wrote to Niemöller that although there was no hope for Koch because of the substantial evidence

Solms Wittig who had been convicted in a British Military court (charges unknown). In the course of his enquiry he admitted that he did not 'know anything of the facts of the case'.[98] Bell lobbied the Foreign Office on behalf of Eberhard von Mackensen, the German military commander in Rome sentenced to death by a British military tribunal, but freed in 1952.[99] Von Mackensen was implicated in the reprisal actions of the German army for which Field Marshal Keselring was also sentenced to death. The victims of these actions included Jews.[100] Bell equally campaigned on behalf of von Neurath,[101] Ewald von Kleist, head of Panzer 1 of Army Group South who was, at the bare minimum, responsible for the administrative upkeep of Einsatzgruppe C,[102] Wily Lages, an SD official in Amsterdam who co-ordinated the Nazi relations with Dutch Jewish Groups in the administration of the Final Solution in the Netherlands,[103] Schwerin von Krosigk a Finance Official, released in 1951 who was privy to the pre-war expropriation of Jewish capital in Germany,[104] and Ernst von Weizsäcker of the German Foreign Office whose co-operation with the Final Solution earned him an SS rank.[105] In all of the enquiries made on behalf of these men, Bell made no reference to their alleged crimes.

According to Bell's biographer Ronald Jasper, his sympathy for war criminals was based on his universal objection to injustice.[106] However Bell's lack of concern for the substance of any case against his charges, or indeed the solidity of any conviction, suggests that Jasper's explanation hardly goes far enough.[107] Despite regular subscription to the principle of punishing the worst and most Nazified of

---

attesting to his involvement in mass murder, he remained 'heartily opposed' to *all* war crimes prosecution. Bell to Niemöller, 2 January 1950, Bell Papers, Vol. 49, f. 273.

[98] Bell to Henderson, 28 June 1950, Bell Papers, Vol. 49, f. 428.

[99] See Bell to Wurm, 24 May 1947, Bell Papers, Vol. 49, f. 15.

[100] Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, (New York, 1985), p. 677.

[101] von Neurath was sentenced to 15 years by the IMT, released 1954. See Bell Papers, Vol. 45, f. 218, and Vol. 49, ff. 285-326..

[102] Kleist was extradited to the USSR from Yugoslavia in 1949, where he died in 1954. See Hilberg, *Destruction*, p. 1098. See Bell Papers, Vol. 49, ff. 265-66, for Bell's correspondence on behalf of Kleist.

[103] See Hilberg, *Destruction*, p. 580. See Bell to Molderije (Netherlands Minister of Justice) 5 June 1952, Bell Papers, Vol. 49, f. 277.

[104] See Charles Snydor jr, 'Reinhard Heydrich and the planning for the Final Solution', in Michael Berenbaum and Abraham Peck (eds), *The Holocaust and History: The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed and the Re-examined*, (Bloomington, 1998), p. 163. See Bell Papers, Vol. 48.

[105] See Gerald Reitlinger, *The Final Solution: The Attempt to Exterminate the Jews of Europe 1939-45*, (London, 1968), pp. 100, 332. See also Bell to President Truman 19 May 1949, Bell Papers, Vol. 49, f. 379.

[106] R.C.D. Jasper, *George Bell: Bishop of Chichester*, (Oxford, 1967), p. 309.

[107] See Chapter Four for example for Bell's opposition to the denazification programme

offenders,[108] it appears that Bell viewed the very idea of war crimes trials as essentially an injustice which dictated that the particularities of any example were largely irrelevant. As he wrote to Montgomery Belgion, anyone interested in 'justice' was necessarily, according to Bell, an opponent of the trials.[109] Bell often portrayed his objections to the trials as purely practical. For example in June 1948 Bell began an attack on war crimes trials in the Lords by directing objections against the idea of extraditing alleged criminals to the Soviet Union or her sphere of influence because, he argued, it would have been impossible for the extradited to receive a fair trial.[110] It could be argued that such sentiments, as they were expressed in June 1948, were a symptom of the emerging Cold War and reflected a growing distrust of the Soviet Union and her satellites. Nevertheless, Bell went on to list his objections in *principle* to war crimes, and as such to suggest that there could in his eyes have been no such thing as a 'fair' war crimes trial. The example of George Bell suggests that opposition to the war crimes trials process was one of general principle and cannot simply be explained either as reducible to arcane legal quibbling or as a response to the growing conflict with the Soviet Union.

In fact the language and rhetoric of the criticism of the trials process was steeped in the conception of morality and principle. Despite Lord Hankey's efforts to portray his criticism of the trials as objectively legal, he could scarcely avoid reference to the 'immorality' of the entire process.[111] Attempting to expose the Nuremberg project as a set back for the rule of law, and objectively wrong, Hankey tellingly claimed to have 'morally demolished the validity of the Nuremberg sentences'.[112] Perceptions of Christianity were central to principled and moral objections raised against the trials. After 1946 the theological structure that had been employed to problematise the IMT, the idea of the Christian's first duty to forgiveness, was turned decisively against the trial exercise. According to Belgion Christians *had* to find the trial process 'deplorable' precisely because of their theological commitment to 'mercy' both for themselves and for others.[113]

---

[108] Bell to Hankey, 23 February 1952, Hankey Papers, 18/4. Bell argued that he still wanted to see 'extreme' Nazis prosecuted, but as Bell was prepared to defend someone like Erich Koch it is difficult to identify who was regarded as 'extreme'.
[109] Bell to Belgion, 4 April 1949, Belgion Papers, 7/3.
[110] *Hansard* (HL) Vol.156 (1168), 23 June 1948.
[111] Hankey, *Politics, Trials and Errors*, p. xiii.
[112] *Ibid.*, p. 131.
[113] Belgion, *Epitaph on Nuremberg*, p. 7. Belgion also claimed in a letter to George Bell that the trials were actually motivated by a spirit of revenge. Belgion to Bell, 29 April 1949, Belgion Papers, 7/3.

A continuing and generally employed trope of criticism of the trials was to contrast them with the ideal of Christian mercy.[114] The idea of revenge was deliberately employed against the trials, usually without contextualisation, in, one must assume, an effort to portray the trials as an exercise antithetical to Christianity. Justice, it was commonly argued, was not being served in Allied courtrooms, rather, simply the satiation of a desire for revenge.[115] Trial critics commonly quoted scripture to support their case and to deny the moral validity of war crimes prosecution: 'vengeance is mine saieth the Lord'.[116] Even critics who attempted to confine their criticism to the purely legal sphere could scarcely avoid mention of trials' proximity to revenge and therefore essentially anti-Christian nature.[117] American trial opponents also employed the trope of revenge, and the attendant allegation that the trial project was anti-Christian.[118] For the ecclesiastical press in Britain meanwhile, the failure to end the trials after the IMT meant that, by the time of the Manstein trial, the entire trial exercise could be retrospectively labelled as vengeful. The conditionality of Anglican support for the verdicts of the IMT was therefore fulfilled.[119]

In addition to trials being regarded as anti-Christian, they were also portrayed as antithetical to the idea of 'Britishness'.[120] The Manstein trial was criticised in parliament as 'repugnant to [the British] sense of fair play', as 'unworthy of the great country' of Britain and offending the British sense of good taste.[121] For George Bell the trial undermined the British reputation for 'justice and humanity',[122] a sentiment with which Lord Hankey concurred.[123] Hankey later argued in print that the British, as a 'race' were not 'good haters', and that the implicitly hateful trials undermined this proudly held tradition.[124] The employment of the idea of Britishness was a further

---

[114] Rosenbaum, *Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals*, p. 20.
[115] A.R. Blackburn (MP Birmingham, Kings Norton), *Hansard* (HC), Vol. 445 (688), 4 December 1947.
[116] This was a favourite tactic of Lord Hankey's, see *Hansard* (HL) Vol. 162, (404) 5 May 1949, and Hankey, *Politics Trials and Errors*, p. 69.
[117] P.F. Gault, 'Prosecution of War Criminals', in *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, (No.1, 1945), pp. 180-3. Gault's arguments were entirely legalistic, but then ended with the accusation that trials 'exhibited the spirit of revenge'.
[118] Smith, *Crisis in the Law of Nations*, p. 97, see also Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life*, p. 90.
[119] *The Record*, 23 December 1949, p. 2 – criticism of the Manstein trial was contained in an article: 'To Whom Vengeance Belongeth'.
[120] See Bloxham, 'Punishing German Soldiers During the Cold War', p. 32.
[121] Richard Stokes, General Sir George Jeffreys (M.P. for Petersfield), and Reginald Paget in the debate on the proposed trial *Hansard* (HC) Vol. 457, (57-84), 26 October 1946.
[122] *Hansard*, (HL) Vol. 162, (377), 5 May 1949.
[123] *Hansard*, (HL) Vol. 162, (404), 5 May 1949.
[124] Hankey, *Politics, Trials and Errors*, p. 6.

manifestation of the importance of Christianity for arguments employed against war crimes prosecution. For all these men the idea of Britishness which the trials undermined was an essentially Christian entity. According to the trial opposition the British loved justice, and war crimes trials were not just, but were anti-Christian vengeance. Montgomery Belgion argued that the British involvement was anomalous precisely because Britain was a Christian country: 'Britain' he wrote, 'has an established Christian church [and] the [British] government is committed more than any of its great associates to some acknowledgement of Christian standards of justice and decency.'[125] These Christian standards were, of course, contrasted with the unchristian trials.

While the backdrop for this opposition was undoubtedly provided by the degenerating western relationship with the Soviet Union, that objections to trials were anchored in perceptions of morality and principle suggests that to explain trial opposition as simply a cold war narrative would be an exaggeration. The ideas of the trials as un-British and un-Christian employed Christian theological structures that were existent in war time and were tentatively employed to problematise the idea of war crimes trials in the later war and immediate post-war years. As such, trial opposition appears to be based on a conception of Christian morality, independent (in a creative and causal sense) of external global political factors, which was then employed against the judicial investigation of the Nazi past.

However there is no doubt that in virtually all cases opposition to war crimes trials were also underpinned by, and interacted with, a strongly held anti-communism. But this was not an anti-communism born of political expedience, or reactive to the decline of the grand alliance, but an element of a Christian world view that had supported the war against totalitarianism. For the Anglican community the realisation that their 'war of ideals' had not ended with the fall of Berlin came rapidly in the winter of 1945. It was argued in the ecclesiastical press that a 'mighty totalitarian power' in the Nazi state had been defeated in the war and yet 'totalitarian tyranny, with its police state' remained existent in the world, in the shape of the Soviet Union.[126] For opponents of the trials, live Soviet tyranny was, as it had been for inter-

[125] Belgion, *Epitaph on Nuremberg*, p. 36.
[126] *The Guardian*, 21 December 1945, p. 515.

war conservatives and Christians,[127] a more disturbing and deep rooted tyranny than the recently defeated Nazism. In a 1948 debate on the war criminals question, it was contended that preoccupation with the trials *had* to be ended because of the Soviet enemy facing Europe, which with a silence pointedly directed at the Nazi past, was declared to be 'a form of tyranny the like of which Europe has not seen since the dark ages'.[128]

The anti-communism of trial opposition allows further understanding of the principle behind the apparently objective legal criticisms of the trial process. The employment of the imagery of Soviet, rather than Nazi crimes within anti-trial literature had a political imperative in addition to supporting the legal claim that all may no longer have been equal in the eyes of Nuremberg law. The understanding of the trials as anti-Christian also interacted with an understanding of Soviet Communism as an attack on Christian traditions, just as Nazism had been previously understood. Readers of anti-trial tracts were reminded that not only were the trials the repudiation of British, Christian justice but that the Bolsheviks 'recognise[d] no Christian...standards of behaviour.'[129] The similarity of rhetoric was of course no coincidence, war crimes trials were interpreted as essentially Soviet exercises conversant with the 'Marxist' conception of justice.[130] With imagery employed to invoke the purges of the 1930s, F.J.P. Veale informed his readers that the IMT had been a 'mock trial'.[131] Hankey took these objections to their logical conclusion in arguing that the trials were in fact a vehicle heading towards the communisation of the world.[132]

Obsessive anti-communism was in fact just one element of the rhetoric of war crimes trial opposition which flirted with a much darker political language. Mainstream anti-trial campaigners commonly employed the aforementioned imagery of 'vengeance' in order to portray trials as the tool of a dangerous alien force. Such language was not conceptually far removed, especially when in concert with anti-bolshevism, from contemporary anti-Jewish discourses, and indeed those of what was

---

[127] See Chapters Two and Three above for a discussion of inter-war views of the Soviet Union within the Anglican church and their effect on the understanding of the Holocaust.
[128] Earl of Selbourne, *Hansard*, (HL), Vol. 156, (1156), 23 June 1948.
[129] Belgion, *Epitaph on Nuremberg*, p. 34.
[130] Smith, *Crisis in the Law of Nations*, p. 88.
[131] Veale, *Advance to Barbarism*, p. 163.
[132] Hankey, *Politics, Trials and Errors*, pp. 124-29.

the recent past.[133] Indeed, on the self-consciously extreme political right that anti-trial rhetoric was explicitly linked with a racially informed 'negative semitic discourse' while using the language of mainstream objections to the trial process. The Duke of Bedford, for example, combined an opposition to war crimes trials based on the same moral, philosophical and legal arguments as the Hankey set, with an unpleasant anti-Jewishness. War crimes trials were, for Bedford, one element of the hypocrisy of the contemporary world underscored by conspiratorial 'financiers'. Bedford's prescription for a better world included the racial cleansing of the British nation, and, using language familiar to the ecumenical critics of the war crimes trials, the adoption of 'real Christianity' and reconciliation with former belligerents.[134]

Mainstream critics of the trial process also used language related to the rhetoric of the racist right. The anti-Jewishness of anti-trial campaigns was demonstrated by the continual contrast between justice and revenge in the language of trial critics. Equally they were often efforts made to downplay the profundity of the Jewish experience under Nazi occupation. Reginald Paget doubted the numbers of Jewish dead from the *Einsatzgruppen* massacres in a paradoxical effort to deny the crime of which he argued Manstein was anyway unaware. Montgomery Belgion was to retrospectively endorse rhetoric which denied the Jewish experience in 1959, when he attacked the Federal Republic of Germany's own war crimes investigations. In doing so Belgion praised the father of French Holocaust denial, Paul Rassinier, who Belgion claimed had thrown into doubt the revelations of the Nazi concentrations camps.[135]

British opposition towards the process of war crimes trials was morally and politically rather than legally conceived. Active within that opposition were prominent English Christians, and most importantly objections to the trials used interpretations of Christianity and fed into Christian theological structures. Trials were portrayed as

---

[133] Lord Hankey for example, noted, for reasons unknown, that Douglas Reed had argued that as judgement and execution at the IMT coincided with Jewish New Year this demonstrated that 'the executions [were an act of] tribal vengeance under Old Testament law', see note dated 17 July 1949, Hankey Papers, 18/1.

[134] The Duke of Bedford's work is replete with allusions to the 'financiers' and their control of the Nuremberg trials process. The financiers, surely a less than subtle reference to mythical organised Jewry, wanted an 'international police force' according to *The Financiers Little Game or The Shape of Things to Come*, (Glasgow, 1950). Bedford directly tackles the connections between the IMT and the international financial system in *Hope: Not Dope*, (Glasgow, 1950). See the Wiener Library for more on Bedford and the British People's Party

un-Christian, and concomitant to this they were portrayed as communist in inspiration. Apparently legal objections to the trials were often politically underpinned, and further suggestive of the anti-communism of the trial opponents. Christianity and opposition to trials was even employed within the language of post-war British fascism. As such the rhetoric of trial opponents provides an example of a decisive Anglican contribution to a movement dedicated to ending investigation of the Nazi past, partly because, due to perceived links with communism, war crimes trials were not seen as a suitable vehicle for reaching the future. However the trials project was designed to, in various ways, uncover and indeed bolster specific narratives of the past. Effective opposition to the trials needed also then to engage with that Nazi past. In arguing that that past should be left behind,[136] it was incumbent upon trial opponents to offer an alternative version and understanding of that past.

6.2 ii) Opposition to the trials and the rhetoric of the European Past.

Trial processes, for example those born in the London Agreement and the Royal Warrant, proposed specific versions of the Nazi past. The understanding of the past inherent in these trials contradicted the Anglican understanding of Third Reich, central to which was the belief that Nazism was a force separate from, and imposed upon, the German people. Symbolised by their opposition to unconditional surrender, and its inherent reading of the German past and future, Lord Hankey and the British critics of the trial process essentially proposed an identical reading of the separation of the German and Nazi pasts to those put forward in war time by Anglican commentators.[137] Conditional Anglican support for the IMT had similarly been based on an understanding of Nazism as embodied only in the Nazi leadership corps. Anglicans argued that leading Nazis were removed at Nuremberg which thus negated the need for further trials.[138]

---

[135] Belgion to *The Manchester Guardian*, Undated 1959, Belgion Papers, 7/3. For an analysis of the work of Rassinier and his disciple Robert Faurisson see Pierre Vidal-Naquet, *Assassins of Memory: Essays on the Denial of the Holocaust*, (New York, 1992).

[136] Earl of Perth, *Hansard*, (HL), Vol. 156, (1160), 23 June 1948. See also George Bell, 'The Future in Europe'.

[137] Lord Hankey was the most vociferous critic of unconditional surrender in his anti-trial writing and speeches – Hankey, *Politics, Trials and Errors*, p.24. Hankey's, and the Anglican church's, attacks on the principle of Unconditional Surrender echoed the rhetoric of the extreme right, for example see Duke of Bedford, *Why Blunder on? First Steps in an Emergency Programme to End War, Disease and Poverty*, (Glasgow, 1942) and for post-war attacks on unconditional surrender see Duke of Bedford, *In a Nutshell*, (Glasgow, 1951).

[138] See George Bell in *Hansard*, (HL) Vol. 162, (379), 5 May 1949.

Faith in the existence, even dominance, of another Germany underpinned much criticism of the legal basis of the trial programme. A recurring theme of trial criticism in the USA was to attack the removal of the defence of obeying orders from defendants in war crimes trials. It was by denying this defence that the accused had been ordered to commit a crime, that trial critics alleged, the Nuremberg Charter had invented a new law that had not been extant at the time any offences were carried out.[139] British trial critics soon followed suit,[140] proposing the twin arguments that first obeying orders was not and never had been a crime,[141] and second that the Third Reich had been a 'police state' and therefore the pressure to obey orders had been enormous.[142] This objection was not just legally formulated but based on a reading of the Nazi past by trial critics which suggested that the 'ordered' had been fundamentally separate from the coercive in the Third Reich.[143] Again, legal premise was supported by moral historical principle.

The reading of the past based on a faith in the validity of the defence of deference to orders dictated that Christianised trial critics found the indictment of members of the German military particularly offensive. Trial opponents argued – and in this they contributed to an enduring popular and historiographical myth that had not fully dissipated by the turn of the twentieth century[144] – that the German military had been absolutely separate from the Nazi state: a body of professional soldiers obedient to their political masters. Dissenting from the Nuremberg narrative which pointed to the role of the German 'military industrial complex' in developing and sustaining Nazism, members of the Wehrmacht convicted in allied courts were celebrated by critics of trials as 'professional soldiers' whose only crime was loyalty. The idea of the depoliticised military, which was employed quietly within the muted criticism of

---

[139] See Smith, *Crisis in the Law of Nations*, p. 47, and for a further example see Freda Utley, *The High Cost of Vengeance*, (Chicago, 1949), pp. 162-181.
[140] Hankey, *Politics, Trials, and Errors*, p. 59. Maugham, *U.N.O. and War Crimes*, pp. 43-46.
[141] For example Brigadier Head (M.P. for Carshalton) questioned in the Commons 26 October 1948, the proposed trial of Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, who had issued the infamous 'commissar order' which directed German ground troops to ignore the normal conventions of warfare and as such did much to promote a genocidal atmosphere on the Eastern Front, on the grounds that he had been forced to obey orders. Brauchitsch died awaiting trial. *Hansard* (HC) Vol. 457 (64).
[142] Bell, *Hansard*, (HL) Vol. 162, (379), 5 May 1949.
[143] See Chapter One for a discussion of the problems of the interpretation of the relationship between consent and coercion in the Third Reich.
[144] See for example Hannes Heer, 'The Difficulty of Ending a War: Reactions to the Exhibition "War of Extermination: Crimes of the Wehrmacht, 1941-44"', in *History Workshop Journal*, (Vol. 46, 1998), pp. 187-203, which outlines the controversy caused by the German exhibition attesting to the role of the ordinary German armed forces in the perpetration of genocide.

the verdicts of the IMT,[145] became central to the rhetoric of opposition to the Manstein trial. These 'honourable' men, it was argued, had had no executive role and therefore could not be found guilty for simply obeying the orders of their criminal, and civilian, superiors. In fact, trial opponents promoted the separation of the Wehrmacht from the Nazi state to such an extent, that within anti-trial rhetoric, all German army officers and soldiers became fused with the ambiguously resistant men of 20 July. Reginald Paget, in justifying his defence of Manstein, assured his readers that the German army had 'despised the SS, and in return the SS had hated the army'.[146] Contradictorily it was contended, despite the claim that the army had resisted the criminal excesses of Nazism, that Manstein, and by implication the Wehrmacht as a whole, knew nothing of the criminality of the Nazi regime, confirming, in the minds of trial critics, the separation of army and state.[147] Manstein's membership of the Wehrmacht was for George Bell and Theophil Wurm also enough to suggest his opposition to the Nazi state.[148]

Claims that Manstein had hated Nazism were made despite clear evidence available within the public domain which suggested that Manstein had supported, both practically and ideologically, the designs of the Nazi racial war.[149] Paget even had to acknowledge that the Wehrmacht did have a practical interaction with the Einsatzgruppen forces of the SS through the provision of supplies and equipment in the occupied territories,[150] but contrarily accepted Manstein's claims that he knew nothing of the activities of the SS and the SD.[151] The question that then presents itself is why was it that trial opponents felt such a desire to protect and support the claims of men such as Manstein, despite the existence of evidence attesting to their guilt?

---

[145] For example Veale, *Advance to Barbarism*, p. 4 – which described the sentence passed on the 'professional soldier' Keitel at the IMT as a 'reversion to primitive practice'.
[146] Paget, *Manstein*, p. 9.
[147] Paget, *Manstein*, pp. 11-12.
[148] See PRO FO 371/6659 for the report on Manstein that Wurm forwarded to Bell, that he then passed to the Foreign office.
[149] For example Peter Calvocoressi quoted Manstein: 'this struggle is not being carried out against the Soviet armed forces alone in the established form laid down by European rules of warfare' – Calvocoressi, *Nuremberg*, p. 52. See also Omer Bartov, *Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis and War in the Third Reich*, (Oxford, 1992), p. 130.
[150] Paget, *Manstein*, p. 28. See for example the order by von Brauchitsch, dated 28 April 1941, which detailed the institutional co-operation between the Wehrmacht and the Einsatzgruppen – the latter were to be 'subordinated to the armies as far as movement, rations and billets are concerned', reprinted as document 812, Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham (ed), *Nazism 1919-45: Vol. 3, Foreign Policy, Wehrmacht, and Racial Extermination: A Documentary Reader*, (Exeter, 1988), p. 1088.
[151] Paget, *Manstein*, p. 11.

One answer of course is that the entire process of war crimes trials was held to be repugnant and therefore guilt or innocence was essentially irrelevant to opponents of that process. It is clear that trial opponents rejected not only the legal guilt of military war criminals because of the perceived inadequacy of the trial mechanisms but also both their moral guilt and the morality of their being tried at all. In part this doubting of the morality of trying German military war criminals was predicated on a desire to jettison the past, and to build for the future, and, in that sense was a rejection of the trial authors' vision of Nuremberg's role in that future. Post-war trials were understood as a mechanism for prolonging the war, whereas, trial critics suggested, if 'people were able to forget what happened' then there was the possibility of a 'happier future'.[152] George Bell intoned that, conversant with the institution of the UN, future peace and prosperity rested on leaving the past behind and former belligerents joining together.[153] Ecumenical Christian leaders also used a narrative of the future to criticise the verdict delivered at the Manstein trial. Jacques Courvoisier, of the World Council of Churches, confided in George Bell that he was 'deeply shocked' at the Manstein judgement because it did not reflect the reconciliatory 'spirit' which 'should [have] reigned amongst the different peoples of Western Europe'.[154] Again it is clear trials contradicted a theologically liberal vision of progress to the future.

Calls for the ending of the trial programme were made within an atmosphere of crisis due to the collapsing relationship with the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly then, the advocated end to the trials programme was an element of a wider desire for reconciliation between Germany and the west. Historians and protagonists alike have identified that government decisions to bring the trials process to an end (despite the Manstein trial) were then conditioned by the Cold War. Lord Pakenham, for example, stated in the House of Lords in March 1948 that the preoccupation of the West was no longer the Nazi past but to solve the question of 'how the western world would be saved from communism without war'.[155]

Concern for the future does not however explain the specific nature of trial critics objections to the indictment of military war criminals. For campaigners against trials this vision of the future was also based on a reading of the past. Lord Hankey

---

[152] *Hansard* (HC), Vol. 445, (687), 4 December 1947.
[153] Bell, *Hansard*, (HL), Vol. 156 (1166), 23 June 1948.
[154] Courvoisier to Bell, 7 January 1950, Bell Papers, Vol. 49, f. 148, Bell later replied on 21 January that he too was 'staggered by the harshness of the sentence on von Manstein'. See f. 152. Courvoisier was Chair of the 'Ecumenical Commission of the Chaplaincy Service to Prisoners of War'.

argued robustly that trials must end to allow the essential Anglo-German reconciliation for the defence of the 'civilisation', which he contended was their 'joint birthright'.[156] Hankey's location of Germany within a historical notion of 'civilisation' is crucial. Central to the trial opponents' defence of German officers, which reached a crescendo around the Manstein trial, was an interpretation of the role of the Wehrmacht in not only the Nazi past but also within a broader sweep of European history. It is within this narrative of European history that we can find the explanation for trial opponents' almost pathological attraction to the Wehrmacht. We can also begin to detect the obfuscatory legacy that Christian interpretation of the trials had for the history and memory of the murder of Europe's Jews.

Geoffrey Best has rationalised the defence of military war criminals by anti-trial campaigners as due to a 'transnational sense of affinity' between these two establishments. This was an affinity based upon an interpretation of the past. Paget's account of Manstein, endorsed by his fellow campaigners, included a location of the Field Marshal and his counterparts within the traditions of European rather than simply German history. For example Paget suggested that Manstein was a 'representative of the oldest and purest military caste' of Europe.[157] Similarly Allen Welsh Dulles' account of the military resistance in the Third Reich demonstrated the faith of American conservatives in the Wehrmacht as agents of European (or western) values.[158] Indeed the religious and historical concept of 'Europe' was central to the imagery and rhetoric of attacks on trials, as it was to the general Anglican conception of the past.[159]

'Europe' was however employed as interchangeable with terms such as the west, Christendom, and civilisation in anti-trial rhetoric and was therefore never adequately defined.[160] Owing to the ambiguity inherent in that lack of definition, we

---

[155] See *Hansard*, (HL), Vol. 154, (326), 3 March 1948.
[156] Hankey to *International Affairs*, 2 November 1950.
[157] Paget, *Manstein*, p. 2.
[158] See Allen Welsh Dulles, *Germany's Underground: The Anti-Nazi Resistance*, (New York, 1947). George Bell enthusiastically endorsed Dulles' narrative, see Bell to Pakenham, 6 June 1947, Bell Papers, Vol. 47, f. 290.
[159] See Chapter Five above for the role of Europe in Anglican rhetoric of the past.
[160] American trial opponents for example employed the idea of the west or civilisation in the place of Europe. This reflected a general promotion of ideas of the west in the USA, for example the growth in Universities of courses on the history of western civilisation. See Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The 'Objectivity Question' and the American Historical Profession*, (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 281-316. The rhetoric of those attacking the post-war trial programmes could be used as a case study to illustrate Norman Davies' observations that the idea of Europe has for the 'best part of two hundred years [been]

have to turn elsewhere in order to understand the conception of the past that the image of Europe was employed to evoke. Political and historiographical accounts of the development of the concept of Europe continually point to the lack of fixity of such an intellectual construction.[161] Attempts in the 1930s to define Europe historically largely employed the term as a direct replacement for Christendom whose antithesis was proposed as Soviet Communism.[162] Echoing such sentiments in 1945 T.S. Eliot, himself opposed to the trials process, informed a German audience that Europe was culturally unified through its common Christian faith.[163] The post-war English Christian community and proponents of the idea of European unity[164] concurred in their definition of the European past, and future, as ethically Christian.[165] Institutionally the Anglican church also defined the concept of Europe in mono-cultural terms as 'a spiritual inheritance...embodied in the belief in the sacredness of the human personality and the absolute claims of truth justice freedom and love,'[166] or, in other words, the embodiment of Christian teaching. Such contemporaneous definitions of an idealised Christian conception of Europe point to the intention of trial opponents to employ Europe as an exclusively Christian construction. Although it apparently eschewed national chauvinism,[167] in fact 'Europe' was employed as a decisively ideological and exclusive term embodying Christian tradition. Recalling the trial opponents' construction of Britishness, 'Europe' it appears was employed as a wider manifestation of Christian heritage, a 'spiritual conception' resting on Christian values.[168] Anglican trial opponents looked forward to 'the liberation of the

---

frequently confused with the heritage of "western civilisation"'. See Norman Davies, *Europe a History*, (Oxford, 1996), pp. 1-46 for a discussion of ideas of Europe.

[161] For a discussion of the development of the idea, and the difficulty of defining this process as an event see Ezra Talmor, 'Reflections on the Rise and Development of the Idea of Europe', in *History of European Ideas*, (Vol.1, No. 1, 1980), pp. 63-66.

[162] See H.A.L. Fisher, *A History of Europe, Vol. II: From the Beginning of the Eighteenth Century to 1937*, (London, 1949), p. 1246 – originally this volume was published in 1938.

[163] T.S. Eliot, 'The Unity of European Culture', in *Notes Toward the Definition of Culture*, (London, 1948), cited in Davies, *Europe*, p. 9.

[164] For example Winston Churchill who also opposed war crimes trials after 1946, and contributed to Manstein's defence fund.

[165] *The Guardian*, 21 May 1948, p. 246.

[166] Taken from the text of a motion passed by the Church Assembly, 21 June 1951, *Church Assembly Report of Proceedings*, Summer 1951, Vol. XXXI, No. 2, p. 266.

[167] Jan van der Dussen and Keith Wilson (ed.), *The History of the Idea of Europe*, (Milton Keynes, 1993), p. 152.

[168] *The Record*, 27 June 1947, p. 369.

soul of Europe',[169] something which the wider Anglican community dictated was only achievable with the re-establishment of the Christian faith.[170]

By seeking to locate the Wehrmacht and those accused of war crimes within the history of Europe, anti-trial campaigners were again attacking the Vansittartist and Nuremberg narratives of the historical insidiousness of Nazism as the ultimate manifestation of Prussian militarism. The Wehrmacht was, for trial opponents, a Christian organisation,[171] and an element of the traditions of a perceived 'other Germany'. The German people, conversant with Anglican understanding of the Nazi past, were, it was argued, predominantly Christian, necessarily non-Nazi and non-Communist.[172] This cultural heritage allowed the German nation to be understood as a part of the 'west':[173] therefore military war criminals were placed within a culturally homogenous European past which included the trial opponents themselves. George Bell's defence of von Manstein was, for example, predicated on an identification of Manstein as a Christian and therefore based on Bell's sense of commonality with the accused.[174] In rhetoric reminiscent of the Anglican 'war of ideals', Prussia was even cast as the final barrier of Europe against Asia, rather than as her premier danger.[175] Within this reversal of the traditional image of Prussia by trial critics, the inheritors of the mantle of the Prussian military tradition, German soldiers, far from being viewed as Nazi totalitarians were portrayed as part of those very traditions which were perceived as being under attack from the trials.

Norman Davies has argued that the question of the eastern boundary of Europe has been *the* historic problem of Europe's self-definition.[176] For post-war Christians, and those attacking the exercise of war crimes trials however this was not a problem

---

[169] Bell, 'A Letter to my Friends in the Evangelical Church', in *The Church and Humanity*, p. 192.
[170] See for example *Church Times*, 4 July 1947, p. 395, which declares that Christianity 'alone' has the answer to the future of Europe.
[171] Paget, *Manstein*, p. 4.
[172] Lord Hankey, Hansard, (HL), Vol. 174, (469), 21 November 1950.
[173] Bell, *Hansard*, (HL) Vol. 154, (351), 3 March 1948.
[174] See Bell to Mayhew (Foreign Office), 4 February 1947. Bell pleaded that Manstein not be extradited to the USSR (this was prior to the public knowledge of proposals that the British try von Manstein themselves), because he came with the recommendation of Bishop Wurm of the EKD - who as a perceived anti-Nazi was regarded by Bell as unimpeachable. Wurm's defence of Manstein was, in turn, based on an account given by another German Protestant who Wurm regarded as having been resistant to the Nazis, who professed Manstein's Christianity. All those involved subscribed first to an acknowledgement of their common Christian or European heritage, and second relied on myths of Christian resistance to justify the release of a war criminal because 'evidence' of Manstein's Christianity was enough to disqualify the possibility of his being a war criminal. PRO FO 371/6659.
[175] Veale, *Advance to Barbarism*, p. 131.
[176] Davies, *Europe*, pp. 11-16.

at all. While the Anglo-Jewish community, who broadly appeared to support the trial exercise,[177] defined Nazism as the antithesis of the European dream, Christians employed the concept of totalitarianism that had been utilised to justify the Second World War, as the opposite to their conceptual rather than geographic 'Europe'.[178] A.R. Blackburn, MP, for example, argued against the extradition of Wadyslaw Dering, a Polish doctor who had assisted in selections on the ramp at Auschwitz, because this would have been to undermine the war that 'Europe' had fought against totalitarianism, a 'disease' which was still extant in the Soviet Union and her satellites.[179] Even Lord Vansittart, scourge of German militarism, urged the Lords to 'recognise that all totalitarian states were the same in their aims, their methods and in their cruelties'.[180] Such a definition of the European antithesis could then be used to attack the idea of trials. It was suggested that it was 'common knowledge that' the crimes investigated in Allied court rooms were 'characteristic of any totalitarian power', a power that was alive and well east of Germany.[181]

Although theoretically identifying totalitarianism as Europe's conceptual antithesis did not identify her eastern boundary, after the defeat of Nazism that conceptual opposite was perceived as being geographically confined to the Communist east of Germany. Although Christians had been reluctant to particularise the Nazi threat to civilisation before 1945 there was no such reluctance to name Communism as Europe's primary foe in the aftermath of war. Indeed the threat of Nazism seemed to be forgotten by the Anglican narrative of the present and the past which found Christianity as more under threat from 'organised atheism than at any other period in human history' in the immediate *aftermath* of the Second World War.[182] In the atmosphere of cold war crisis, Anglicans and opponents of war crimes trials enthusiastically embraced bi-polarity, finding the world divided between 'two

---

[177] Cesarani, *Jewish Chronicle*, p. 204.
[178] For an Anglo Jewish analysis of Europe and her antithesis, which is significantly particularised as Nazi, see J.A. Lauwreys, *The Idea of Europe*, (London, 1951) – this is the text of a lecture given to the Jewish historical society of England. Cyrill Garbett however defined the external challenge to the European ideal in tellingly universal terms around the same time. See Cyril Garbett, *In an Age of Revolution*, (London, 1952), p. 155.
[179] A.R. Blackburn M.P. *Hansard*, (HC), Vol. 445, (687), 4 December 1947.
[180] Vansittart, *Hansard*, (HL), Vol. 154, (353), 3 March 1948.
[181] P.F. Gault, 'Prosecution of War Criminals', in *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, (No. 1, 1945), p. 182.
[182] Garbett, *Age of Revolution*, p. 155.

opposing philosophies'.[183] At the 1948 Lambeth Conference the Anglican episcopate took the opportunity to declare the institutional opposition of the Church of England to communism, and the essential and eternal incompatibility of the Christian and communist ideals.[184]

The defence of German military war criminals, and the general conception of the Wehrmacht as culturally 'European', could then - and indeed has been - explained as simply an expression of the new priorities of the Cold War. In fact there is much evidence which apparently confirms the thesis that opponents of the trials were simply waging the early battles of that Cold War. Christianised trial opponents were self avowedly anti-Communist, and the embrace of Germany was evidently crucial to the new alliances of the bi-polar world. Hostility to communism provided the context for the Christian appraisal of the trials, for example the *Church Times* ran a regular series on the Marxist 'War Against Religion' at the time of the Manstein trial.[185] War crimes trials were regarded as antithetical to the traditions of Europe, in part because they failed, in the eyes of their critics, to live up to the traditions of Anglo-American, or Christian, legal practice and were an expression of Soviet justice.[186] For critics of trials then to try members of the German military was necessarily to investigate members of their 'European' community using both co-operation with the Soviet Union, and the methods of the Soviet anti-Europeans.

Yet to argue that trial opponents were simply articulating the faith that 'the future was more important than the past' is to ignore the narratives of the past provided within these visions of the future.[187] The use of the concept of Europe in anti-trial rhetoric points to the provision of an alternative narrative of the past operating within trial criticism. Europe was a construct of the past, being undermined by the actions of the trials. As far as this narrative of the past concerned the future, according to this rhetoric, the present needed to embrace, rather than undermine, the historical ethical foundations of Europe through the cessation of the trials process and thereby create a future which restored this constructed European past.

---

[183] Cyril Garbett in the House of Lords 25 September 1948, reported in *The Church Times*, 1 October 1948, p. 549.
[184] For a summary of the Lambeth Conference resolution on Christianity and communism see *The Record,* 20 August 1948, p.480.
[185] For example see *Church Times*, 19 August 1949, p. 545.
[186] Veale, *Advance to Barbarism*, p. 142.
[187] Hans Erhard, 'The Nuremberg Trial Against the Major War Criminals and International Law', *American Journal of International Law*, (Vol. 43, No. 2, 1949), p. 244.

Anti-communism and the narrative of past European cultural unity provided by the Christian opponents of trials inevitably affected the portrayal of the Nazi past. George Bell, for example, in 1948, echoing the war time rhetoric of the 'war of ideals', actively sought to recast the period 1914 to 1945 as the 'thirty years war of the twentieth century' between civilisation and totalitarianism, although he was unsure, because of the enduring enemy, as to whether that war was in fact over.[188] Others went further than Bell. By assuming commonality with Manstein, Paget implied that Manstein's war and Britain's war were indeed equivalent. His conception of Manstein's Soviet foe also allowed Paget to entirely reverse responsibility for the brutal war in the east, declaring that Manstein's army had behaved as well as they could when faced with Soviet brutality.[189] Liddell Hart concurred with Paget, writing to George Bell that Manstein had done more than could be expected when faced with an enemy, in the Red Army, 'who did not keep to the rules.'[190] Veale equally was happy to award the Red Army rather than the German invading force responsibility for the brutality of the Eastern Front: 'this struggle' he wrote 'had commenced on the first day the German armies crossed the Russian frontier and Stalin announced that the "war was not only a war between two armies but at the same time a war of the entire Soviet people against the Fascist German troops"'.[191] It was therefore the Soviet defence against the Nazi invaders which, according to anti-trial rhetoric, was the causal impetus behind the brutality of the Eastern front, and had caused the form of partisan warfare which forced the German security forces in to taking the extreme measures that war crimes trials were holding them to account for.

It was then, according to critics of trials, the entry of the non-European Soviets into the war which changed its character and caused the commission of crimes outside of the conventions of warfare.[192] The similarity between the trial critics' account of the Nazi past, and the Nazi account of that past is striking. The idea that the Soviet Union provided the impetus behind the brutality in the East, closely followed the justification of invasion and mass murder as a 'pre-emptive strike' against Soviet aggression that was employed by Otto Ohlendorf in his defence at the Einsatzgruppen trial.[193] Further cementing this rhetorical similarity William Ralph Inge, the former Dean of St Paul's

[188] Bell, *Hansard*, (HL), Vol. 154, (349), 3 March 1948.
[189] Paget, *Manstein*, p. 182.
[190] Liddell Hart to Bell, 26 January 1950, Vol. 49, f.149.
[191] Veale, *Advance to Barbarism*, p.223.
[192] *Ibid.*, p. 128.

Cathedral, articulated an Anglican version of the past which echoed the Nazi narrative and made an aggressive call for the recasting of popular narratives and understanding as portrayed in the war crimes trials. Describing the Soviet Union as a 'polar despotism, a tyranny such as the world has not yet known', Inge pleaded that 'in times to come...it may not be so readily forgotten that this was the enemy against who the Germans fought.'[194] Discussing the Soviet inclination to forgo trials, and simply liquidate 50,000 Germans, an opponent of the war crimes trials tellingly described this as the proposed 'mass murder of 50,000 Europeans'![195] Lord Hankey suggested that the destruction of Hitler had destabilised the security of Europe.[196]

Inevitably such a version of the Nazi past had little room for the specific crimes of the Nazis, and as a consequence the murder of the European Jews was almost entirely marginalised within the narrative of the past provided by critics of the trials. Montgomery Belgion instructed that those concentration camps discovered by the Allies were echoed by similar institutions in the Soviet bloc, apparently ignorant of the specificities of elements of the Nazi camp structure and the death camps in the East.[197] Other critics boldly stated that they were not interested in the crimes against the Jews, of which too much had already been said, confident that when the historical record of the period were complete it would be Soviet crimes that would dominate.[198] George Bell argued that judicial investigation of Nazi crimes was absurd when the *same* crimes were still being perpetrated by the Soviet Union.[199]

Why then did Anglicans, and secular anti-trial campaigners informed by Anglican rhetoric, campaign against the investigation of the Nazi past? Manstein and Germans generally were understood by opponents of the trials as part of a European historical and cultural continuum, which was central to both their understanding of the past and the future as a restoration of that past. Within such a formulation there was no room for the Nazi crime, especially the murder of the Jews, because accepting its primacy would have inevitably meant the re-interpretation of the past and with it Christian ambitions for the future. By accepting the criminality of men influenced by trends from within the lauded conception of the past which, through the ecumenical

---

[193] Bloxham, 'The Holocaust', p. 211.
[194] W.R. Inge, 'Introduction', to Veale, *Advance to Barbarism*, p. vii.
[195] Veale, *Advance to Barbarism*, p. 141.
[196] Hankey, *Politics, Trials and Errors*, p. 48.
[197] Belgion, *Epitaph on Nuremberg*, p. 24.
[198] Veale, *Advance to Barbarism*, p. xv.
[199] Bell, quoted in Hankey, *Politics, Trials and Errors*, p. 54.

movement for example, provided such hope for the future, that narrative of the future would have been fatally undermined. The degree of trial critics' identification with military criminals such as von Manstein suggests that unease surrounding the investigation of a traumatic past was predicated on the threat that that past contained for myths of occidental superiority.

The understanding of Nazism and Nazi criminality inherent in the Anglican-inspired opposition to the process of war crimes trials fed directly the 'etiological myth of western civilisation' and the belief in the inevitability of human progress.[200] Countering the Anglican acceptance of theological pessimism of war time, post war planning and the faith in the Christian future embodied in the attack on war crimes trials retained the central tenets of liberal optimism, and an enduring faith in the status of civilisation and the concept of human progress. In combination with faith in the goodness of the German churches, and German (rather than Nazi) historical institutions such as the Wehrmacht, faith in the Christian future necessarily obstructed frank reflection on the Nazi past. The crimes of Nazism were alien to, and therefore not viewed as the concern of the western tradition, and as such simply could not have been perpetrated by an individual or institution inside 'civilisation'. Raul Hilberg's eloquent contention that the Holocaust demonstrated that 'our evolution has outpaced our understanding; we can no longer assume that we have a full grasp of the workings of our social institutions, bureaucratic structures or technology'[201] would have been met with incredulity by the Anglican church and the opponents of war crimes trials. The structures that English Christians erected in order to interpret the nature of Nazism were not capable of relating that crime to any of the traditions identified as anti-totalitarian. Finally those structures in place for understanding also foreshadowed the pressures exerted on the interpretation of the Holocaust in the Cold War era, in which the theoretical equivalence of the totalitarian spirit gained increasing political legitimacy and dictated a failure to confront the Nazi crimes through overt concentration on the Soviet Union, the continuous anti-Western foe. Although external political developments actually brought the trial process to an end, and allowed the jettisoning of the past, they could do so because Christianity and the opposition to war crimes trials provided a constructive narrative of the European past that marginalised Nazism and promoted Soviet evil.

---

[200] Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust*, (Cambridge, 1989), p. 13.

6.3 Conclusion: An Anglican Contribution to Memory.

At the time of the war crimes trials George Orwell wrote that the 'really frightening thing about totalitarianism [was]...that it attack[ed] the concept of objective truth: [and]...claim[ed] to control the past as well as the future'.[202] Anti-totalitarian opponents of the trials proposed a similar relationship between past and future. The future, Hankey *et al* told us, lay in the restoration of a constructed past. War crimes trials they pleaded undermined that future not because they investigated the past per se, but because the narrative of the past they proposed was the wrong one and undermined that vision of the future. Although the future was more important than the past, both constructions were inextricably intertwined.

British opposition to war crimes trials in the later 1940s and early 1950s was then an Anglican contribution to the negation of the Nazi past. Anglicans were active in the public face of war crimes trials opposition after the continuation of trials post the IMT signalled the rejection of the bargain upon which their original support for trials had been based. The rhetoric of opposition to the trials, even when coming from secular sources, was infused with Anglican morality. In addition to attacking the only mechanism through which the Nazi past was being publicly examined at this time, trial opposition proffered a different narrative of the past in which the perpetrators of Nazi crimes were subsumed within the culture, history and traditions of an idealised Christian Europe. The trials themselves were, along with the victims of the Nazi crimes, defined within this prescription of the past as anti-Christian and indeed anti-European. The explanation of the marginalisation of the Nazi past in the era of the burgeoning Cold War must accommodate this constructive negation of Nazism, rather than assuming that the Nazi past was simply forgotten.

---

[201] Cited in Bauman, *Modernity*, p. 83.
[202] Quoted in Novick, *That Noble Dream*, p. 290.

Conclusion and Epilogue.
Recurring Pasts.

Central to understanding the manner in which the persecution of the Jews was understood within the Anglican church, as both politics and history, was the question of how the Nazi perpetrators were conceived, as both political threat during the lifetime of the Nazi state and then historically after 1945. The Anglican understanding of Nazism, through which consciousness of the Holocaust was distilled, was established firmly in the ecumenical gaze of the 1930s church. In an era dominated by the challenge of a theological pessimism engendered by the failure of post First World War politics and economy, Martin Niemöller was central to both the Anglican understanding of the Third Reich and to Anglicans' maintaining a liberal hope in the goodness of mankind in the face of the crisis of the 1930s. Niemöller embodied the significance of the Nazi era for Anglicans, in that his arbitrary imprisonment in 1938 became the pre-eminent symbol of the perceived totalitarian war against religion which awarded Nazism importance. The bright light of Niemöller's 'resistance' against the Nazi state in turn embodied Anglican hopes for the post-totalitarian Christian future. The dominance of Niemöller as a universal symbol in the Anglican imagination dictated that Nazism was only understood generally and in tandem with Soviet Communism.

The Anglican struggle with the theological implications of the political crisis of the 1930s was encapsulated in developing Anglican attitudes to war in the latter part of that decade. Changing conceptions of the justice of war in the Anglican church reflected both developing theologies and shifting understandings of the Nazi state. Nazism was, prior to the outbreak of war and despite the identification of the Nazi contribution to the totalitarian war against religion, still interpreted within the Anglican imagination as explicable through recourse to the traditions of European history and civilisation. In line with the enduring liberality of the Anglican theological interpretation of the physical world, Nazi foreign policy was commonly depicted in Anglican rhetoric embedded in the continuities of the European past. The sins of the Treaty of Versailles were deployed to justify German expansion and to relate the ambitions of Nazi foreign policy to European and German history, and to suggest that German aggression was correcting an historical injustice. The depiction of an 'understandable' Nazism underpinned a continued Anglican

opposition to the principle of war as the articulation of the liberal faith in the enduring progress of man and of history.

The acceptance of war with Nazi Germany in 1939 as righteous and just by the Anglican hierarchy, articulated particularly by William Temple, signified the dominance of a new interpretation of Nazism that apparently gave way to theological pessimism. Post-hoc or otherwise, Nazism was re-conceptualised as entirely outside of the boundaries of civilisation and history and therefore alien to the Anglican imagination. In common with the interpretation of Martin Niemöller and *Kirchenkampf*, Nazism was depicted as entirely anti-Christian and subsumed within a conception of an alien totalitarianism, the definition of which included and was inspired by, a fear of the Soviet Union. Civilisation was equally re-conceptualised as aspirational, and the idea of the inevitability of progress appeared to have been abandoned in the embrace of war.

Nazi antisemitism was interpreted within these broader structures of understanding Nazism as antithetical to *Christian* civilisation. Prior to 1939, antisemitism was perceived in tandem with the *Kirchenkampf* as a constituent of a broader attack on *Christian* culture. Parochial interpretations of the significance of Nazi antisemitism culminated in Anglican outrage at the violence of *Kristallnacht*, which, for example, precipitated George Bell's aggressive campaign for 'non-Aryan' Christian refugees and the jealous insistence within the Anglican press that Jewish victims of the Nazi totalitarians should not be allowed to obscure the anti-Christianity of that dictatorship.

Although challenged by the occurrence of war within the totalitarian alliance, the Anglican view of Nazism as representative of an alien and totalitarian anti-Christianity endured throughout the conflict. The Soviet Union's membership of the perceived totalitarian alliance was suspended after June 1941, and the concept of *Russia* was promoted within Anglican rhetoric and imagery in order to justify the Anglo-Soviet alliance against Hitler. Yet Nazism, although perceived singularly after June 1941, continued to be viewed in general terms by the Anglican community. The nefarious practices that had been highlighted by Anglican rhetoricians as the links between differing examples of political authoritarianism, such as punishment and control mechanisms and the disrespect for the individual, were still employed to characterise the singular Nazism. Equally although the embrace of war had appeared to signify the

dominance of a profoundly pessimistic view of man within the Anglican hierarchy, continuing confidence in the aspirational construct of civilisation suggested that it was simply a brief interregnum in the Anglican faith of the onward march of mankind. Faith in Martin Niemöller became generalised within the Anglican imagination into a fervent belief in the goodness of the 'other' German population who were understood as carriers of Christianity, and with their Anglican brethren, the hope for a post-war future, as demonstrated by George Bell's tireless lobbying on behalf of the Christian military resistance in Germany.

It was within these apparently universal, but deeply parochial intellectual structures that reports of Jewish suffering at Nazi hands were disseminated during the war. The particularity of Nazi persecution of the Jews gained a fleeting general recognition in winter 1942 and 1943, but such perception of the Jewish tragedy was short-lived and superficial. Although members of the Anglican church who were able to engage with Jewishness more sympathetically achieved, to varying degrees, more sophisticated understandings of the significance of Nazi antisemitism, in the main the Anglican church subsumed Jewish suffering within a generalised picture of the Nazi war on Christianity and universal morality. The geographical amorphousness of the Anglican 'war of ideals' also provided an ambiguous legacy for the historical understanding of the Jewish murders in the east. The absolute divergence of Nazi state and the 'other German' population and the identification of ideological alliances which transcended military fronts dictated that Anglicans implicitly regarded the Eastern theatre of war as a battle between both Christian Russians and Nazi devils, *and* atheist Communists and 'Good' Christian Germans. The ambiguity of the Anglican interpretation of the Eastern Front would contribute little to the understanding of the emergence of genocide in the Nazi war of aggression.

By the latter stages of the war the Anglican gaze had become fixed firmly on the European future, and the aspirations articulated were based on a specific narrative of the past which undermined both the significance of Nazism and the Holocaust. The ending of war also brought the pessimistic hiatus in Anglican theology to an end, and the ecumenical vision of the post-war world allowed George Bell and Anglican observers of Europe to re-assert notions of progress. The Soviet Union was re-conceived as within the

totalitarian block as Christian Russia disappeared from Anglican conversation after the cessation of hostilities; while the defeat of Nazism brought the readmission of Germany into the boundaries of a Christian civilisation.

Such rhetoric of reconstruction awarded the Anglican church an important cultural voice in later war-time and early post-war Britain. The British government had, through espousal of the principle of unconditional surrender during the war, mainly provided an historical reading of Nazism as embedded within German history. Anglican fixation with the 'Other Germany' and the essential Christianity of German historical tradition provided an alternative narrative. In conversation with marginal accounts of the German past surfacing in government in the latter part of the war, Anglican narratives of the Nazi break with German history proposed Germany as the European, Christian ally and victim of the Nazi totalitarians which, in their amalgamation of the Nazi and Soviet devils, prefigured the narratives of the past sponsored by the political machinations of the early Cold War.

The narrative of the Nazi past proposed in the immediate post-war era also made a self-conscious contribution to the German process of coming to terms with that past. The Nazi era was portrayed as the anti-western interruption in the process of German and European history, a narrative which echoed the exculpatory readings of the past proposed by the German evangelical Protestant church. Within the Anglican escape route from the Nazi past, the new German victims of the Soviet expulsions in the east were actively endorsed as victims over and above the Jewish victims of the Holocaust, whose status as victim was denied and contradictorily borrowed by Anglican rhetoricians. Nazism was understood using the resurgent Anglican notions of progress, and confined to history.

The Anglican provision of Cold War narratives of the German and European pasts, which although legitimated by bi-polarity, simply were the logical consequence of the perceptions inherent in the 'war of ideals', rather complicates previous conceptions of the role of the Cold War in the undermining of the memory of Nazism and the Holocaust. The Anglican church proposed constructive narratives of the German past which were later adopted in government policy and rhetoric. Within such narratives the significance of the Nazi era was proposed as being evident in the similarity of the Nazi and Soviet methods of control, and in their attack on the Christian churches, which was perceived as

being both literal and temporal. The specificities of particular ideologies were therefore lost within such readings of the past. As such the foundations of the process of marginalising the Nazi past that has been identified as the intellectual legacy of the Cold War, were in place prior to the degeneration of the relationship between the Western and the Soviet powers.

It was not simply in the coincidence of Anglican war-time and early post-war versions of the German and Nazi pasts with dominant politically sponsored narratives of the past in the Cold War that the rhetoric employed by the Anglican community made a contribution to post-war memory formation. In the Anglican inspired campaign against the morality of the post-war trials, and then more specifically the Manstein trial, a specific and palpable effort was made to re-orientate public conceptions of the Nazi era. Theosophical notions of progress were employed alongside rhetorical visions of European history, community, and commonality in an effort to recast Nazi criminals as Europeans, guilty of little more than defending God's heritage from the atheistic eastern hordes. As Jewish victims had been replaced by the German and European victims of Soviet totalitarians in Anglican rhetoric, so Nazi and German criminality was removed from Anglican and Anglican-inspired historical consciousness and, in the rhetoric of opposition to trials, replaced with Soviet barbarity.

Historians should often be reminded that they have no monopoly on insightful and judicious interpretation of politics and culture, such is the similarity of some of their judgements to contemporaneous commentary. Yet those, such as William Temple, who were scornful of the tyrannical presence of posterity in the judgements of history and historians, may equally have considered that history equally has no monopoly on the partial interpretation or memory of events. The structures and devices established by the Anglican church for the parochial interpretation of the Nazism and the Holocaust, have been consistently repeated in the reading of the Nazi era and the Holocaust in the post-war, and even post-Holocaust world. The significance found by the Anglican church in the German church struggle remains a trope of contemporary *Kirchenkampf* historiography and historical biographical investigations of Martin Niemöller, which depict the apparent opposition of Nazism to Christianity as the key to the historical

significance of both the Third Reich and the Holocaust.[1] The Holocaust, Franklin Littell wrote, could only be 'effectively studied...in tandem with the crisis of Christendom (especially as exposed in the *Kirchenkampf*)'.[2] The claims as to the morality of the war with Nazism, as the saviour of civilisation, have been repeated ad infinitum across popular and scholarly cultures, while the universalisation of the symbol of Jewish suffering at Nazi hands continues unabated, in Britain at least, to this day.[3] The interpretation of the past inherent within what has been perceived as German conservatism's historical amnesia also echoed the narratives of the German past proposed by the Anglican community. Konrad Adenauer's efforts to revive German conservatism, rested on the attempt to paint this discourse as traditionally and historically western.[4] In common with a self-identity of westernism German conservatism and the CDU interpreted the Nazi past as embodying the evil of historical materialism, an evil which was argued still to be extant in the Soviet Union. Conservative historical rhetoric in post-war Germany equally emphasised the revolutionary secularity of a rootless Nazism imposed on German society.[5]

Indeed the historiographical echoes of Anglican readings of the German past are many and various. In the immediate post war years the judgements of British historians on the Nazi past echoed the Vansittartist prescription of the invidiousness of the German national character and the judgement 'that it was no more a mistake for the German people to end up with Hitler than it is an accident when a river flows into the sea'.[6] But,

---

[1] See for example Dietmar Schmidt, *Pastor Niemöller*, (London, 1959), which seems to offer a critical biography of Niemöller, for example declaring he is 'no suitable object for uncritical hero worship'. Yet Schmidt's analysis, much like that of the Anglican community in the 1930s, combines crass characterisation of the significance of Niemöller's protest with sophisticated understanding of his ambiguity, finding Niemöller representative of a German population separated from their Nazi dominators and 'glad' at the defeat of their dictators.

[2] Franklin Littell, 'Inventing the Holocaust: A Christian Retrospect' in *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, (Vol. 9, No. 2, 1995), pp. 173-91.

[3] Perhaps one of the most recent efforts to borrow the moral power of the Holocaust was also one of the least perceptive: Tony Parsons' spectacularly crass comparison of a photograph of a calf from the British 2001 'Foot and Mouth' crisis and the famous photograph of a small boy in the Warsaw ghetto taken from the Stroop report was an attempt to label veterinary culling the 'animal Holocaust', see Mick Hume, 'On the Moral High Ground', *New Statesman*, 9 July 2001.

[4] Jeffrey Herf, *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanies*, (Cambridge, Mass. 1997), p. 226.

[5] Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 297, and Maria Mitchell, 'Materialism and Secularism: CDU Politicians and National Socialism 1945-49', in *Journal of Modern History*, (Vol. 67, No. 2, June 1995), pp. 278-308.

[6] A.J.P. Taylor, *The Course of German History: A Survey of the Development of Germany Since 1815*, (London, 1951), p. 7. For a discussion of the post-war development of the historiography of Germany see, J.C.G. Rohl, *From Bismarck to Hitler: The Problem of Continuity in German History*, (London, 1970), and

as with the Vansittartist narrative in war time, such an extreme version of the *Sonderweg* thesis was soon undermined by previously marginal versions of the German past which emerged and rose to dominance in the early years of the Cold War. Historical prescriptions of the Nazi past produced in Britain and especially the USA after the 'Truman doctrine', began to insist on Nazi and Soviet similarity.[7] It was the relationship between the individual and the state in Nazi and Soviet societies that held the key to the understanding of those states for proponents of the totalitarian thesis, as it was the barrier that the state placed between individual and God that was central to the understandings of Nazism and the Soviet Union proposed in Anglican discourse during the war.[8]

Although debunked during the 1960s after the development of greater self awareness in the discipline of history, totalitarianism has been periodically revived as a method of understanding the Nazi past. Accounts of German military resistance to the Nazi state have, for example, since the 1940s remain mired in the Anglican style discourse on totalitarianism in an effort to understand both the resistant and the oppressive. In the Anglican imagination such an intellectual tendency culminated in the reorientation of the image of Nazi military war criminals, and similarly resistance historiography has continually reflected an understanding of the German military as anchored in the traditions of European history, and as such eternally separate from the Nazi state. This understanding of the past is evident in historians' acceptance of the self-definition of the men of the 20 July,[9] and through the regurgitation by historians of the more general narratives of the trial opponents.[10] Central to less nuanced investigations of the military resistance against Hitler has been the understanding that the expression of resistance to Nazism was an element of a 'war of ideals' between Europe and

---

Richard Evans, *Rethinking German History: Nineteenth Century Germany and the Origins of the Third Reich*, (London, 1987).

[7] See Abbot Gleason , *Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War*, (Oxford, 1995), p. 73.

[8] R.J.B. Bosworth, *Explaining Auschwitz and Hiroshima: History Writing and the Second World War 1945-90*, (London, 1993), pp. 22-28.

[9] See for example essays in Andrew Chandler (ed), *The Moral Imperative: New Essays on the Ethics of Resistance in National Socialism, 1933-1945*, (Boulder, 1998). This volume even acknowledges the impact of George Bell on resistance historiography in the dedication which reads: 'Dedicated to the memory of George Kennedy Allen Bell, Bishop of Chichester 1929-58, Friend and advocate of those who resisted National Socialism in Germany, 1933-45'.

[10] The republication of Allen Welsh Dulles' *Germany's Underground* acts as a case in point here. The original volume was written in 1947, but the new edition contains an introduction written in 2000 by Peter

totalitarianism which after 1945 was embodied in the struggle against the Soviet Union. As Anglicans found the 'other Germany' the validation of notions of historical progress, and the inspiration for a vision of war which circumvented military reality and left an ambiguous legacy for the memory of the Eastern front, so resistance historiography has continued this process in the common identification of a 'front beyond the frontiers'. This conceptual alliance closely reflects the understanding of the war proposed in the Anglican 'war of ideals', and amalgamated the memories of 20 July and the Nazi war against the Soviet Union. Accordingly the 'German opposition to Hitler' is given 'its special meaning' and the 'problem of resistance itself its far reaching and undiminished importance' because the 'world [was] still threatened by totalitarianism'.[11]

The infamous revisionist narratives of the past proposed in the West German *Historikerstreit* also reflected a coincidence with Anglican understanding of the significance of the Third Reich and the Holocaust. Helmut Kohl and Ronald Reagan's disastrous appearances at Bitburg and Belsen were arranged under the maxim of a choice between 'Freedom and Totalitarianism'.[12] And, in the ensuing intellectual melee European history was rewritten by rightist German historians employing the familiar concept of a European Civil War (civilisation versus totalitarianism) in order to cast Nazism as a reactive force to the insidious and original Soviet Communism. Such a narrative revised the German Soviet Eastern front into the last frontier of European Christianity, and, like the opponents of war crimes trials, awarded causal impetus for the brutality of that front to the Red Army. Ernst Nolte even revived the notion of the invasion of the Soviet Union as the pre-emptive strike against the anti-European communist evil.[13] Even the most recent and nuanced attempts to revive the concept of totalitarianism around the insightful observation of the comparable secular and politicised

---

Hoffmann that celebrates the Europeanness of the Military resistance. Allen Welsh Dulles, *Germany's Underground: The Anti Nazi Resistance*, (New York, 2000).

[11] Hans Rothfels, *The German Opposition to Hitler: An Assessment*, (London, 1961), p. 9.

[12] Geoffrey Hartman (ed), *Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective*, (Bloomington, 1986) for a collection of reflections on the Bitburg controversy.

[13] See Ernst Nolte, 'The Past that will not Pass', 'Between Historical Legend and Revisionism? The Third Reich in the Perspective of 1980', and 'Standing Things on Their Heads: Against Negative Nationalism in Interpreting History', all in J. Knowlton and T. Cates (eds), *Forever in the Shadow of Hitler? Original Documents of the Historikerstreit, the Controversy Surrounding the Singularity of the Holocaust*, (New Jersey, 1993). For an evaluation of the significance of the *Historikerstreit* see Charles Maier, *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity*, (Cambridge, 1988).

religiosity of both the Soviet Union and the Nazi state dangerously flirt with an ideologised harnessing of the history of the Third Reich in an attack upon the totalitarian tendencies of the ideological left wing.[14] Proponents of the twenty-first century incarnation of the totalitarianism thesis should also be mindful of the case study that the Anglican understanding of Nazism provides of the potential impact of a comparative understanding of dictatorship on the history and memory of the specific victims of any political religion.

While Nolte and Hilgruber's campaign of relatavisation sought to reduce the significance of the Holocaust and Nazi criminality,[15] the techniques and rhetoric used by Anglicans, especially in their opposition to the trials process, have also been employed in a much more explicit move against the memory of the Holocaust: by those wishing to deny the existence of the Nazi campaign of mass murder.[16] That anti-trial literature could be used in this manner is a retrospective testament to the desire of the opponents of trials to downplay Nazi brutality. In the David Irving libel case, the most recent effort to put the Holocaust on trial, Irving consistently used Allied transgression of international military morality to undermine the significance of the Nazi attack on the Jews. Irving's was a contrary and illogical argument as the substance of his case was that the Holocaust had not occurred.[17]

The essence of arguments employed by Anglicans, and those that employed the central tenets of Anglican rhetoric, in opposition to war crimes trials in the 1940s and

---

[14] See for example Michael Burleigh, *The Third Reich: A New History*, (London, 2000).

[15] See for example Andreas Hilgruber, *Zweierlei Untergang: Die Zerschlagung das Deutschen Reiches und das Ende des europäischen Judentums*, (Berlin, 1986) - Never published in English Hilgruber's book which has been variously translated as 'The Twofold Fall', and 'Two Kinds of Downfall', compares the Holocaust to the defence of the Reich on the Eastern Front against the Soviet invasion. Implicitly the comparison of criminality between two dictatorships is unmistakable.

[16] Christianised anti-trial literature has been latterly adopted by the Holocaust denial movement for example F.J.P. Veale's *Advance to Barbarism* has been republished by the infamous Institute for Historical Review. See Best, *Nuremberg and After*, p. 7. See Deborah Lipstadt, *Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory*, (New York, 1993), for a discussion of the development of the Institute for Historical Review. In addition, British Holocaust denier Richard Harwood in a published attack on the war crimes trials process used many of the arguments proposed by the anti-trial campaigners, whilst claiming that Paget's *Manstein* was 'the best book' published on the subject of war crimes. See Richard Harwood, *Nuremberg and Other War Crimes Trials: A New Look*, (Chapel Ascote, 1978). N.B. This is an example of denial literature, and not a serious or judicious investigation of the problem of war crimes.

[17] See D.D. Guttenplan, *The Holocaust on Trial: History, Justice and the David Irving Libel Case*, (London, 2001), p. 27.

1950s were repeated in a 1980s campaign against the War Crimes Act in Britain.[18] Objections to the new legislation in press and parliament followed a familiar line when suggesting that such legislation would be at its root both anti-British and anti-Christian.[19] Ideas of the European past and future were also central to the rhetoric employed against further war crimes trials in the 1980s and 1990s, as conservative Europeans echoed their forebears in proposing that war crimes legislation and the investigation of the European past would be 'infinitely damaging at a time when...Europe [was] looking to the future.'[20] Notions of the future had been important in recasting the Nazi past in the later 1940s as they were in the later 1980s. But equally in both cases the employment of the demands of the future as justification for avoiding the past was an act of sophistry, because it masked the fact that the disavowal of the investigation of the past was based on an already existing conception of that past. To British anti-trial opponents at the end of the twentieth century, as it had been for their mid-century counterparts, to investigate the Nazi or genocidal past in which the victims were Jews and implicitly non-Europeans, was to investigate the criminality of the *European* past. Such an exercise was partly illogical, Europe had fought against the totalitarian devil, and in part dangerous as investigation may have unmasked the devils within that Christian European history.

The removal of Nazism, and as a consequence the Holocaust, as significant singular phenomena from narratives of the European, German and Nazi pasts, returns us to the original premise of this investigation: that of the Holocaust as (particularly as Christian, or in this case Anglican) trauma. The murder of the European Jews, as

---

[18] Prompted by the identification of several alleged war criminals resident in Britain, who had emigrated under the cover of British need for immigrant labour immediately following the conclusion of the Second World War, the legislative changes envisaged in the war crimes bill extended the jurisdiction of British courts to try those accused of crimes committed in Nazi occupied Europe. Such legislation, devised in an increasingly Holocaust conscious age, massively extended the British vision of Nazi criminality previously embodied in the Royal Warrant trials. The war crimes act allowed the trial of anyone for which evidence existed of their being guilty of murder during the war years. By no longer nationally confining their vision of either Nazi perpetrators or victims the British legal vision of Nazi criminality was thus extended beyond the universalist understanding of Nazi malevolence evident from 1933. However the war crimes bill ultimately only became law through the use of the Parliament Act to force legislation through the House of Lords and was the culmination of five years of tortuous debate as to the necessity and desirability of the legislation. For a survey of both the entry of War Criminals into Britain and the passage of the War Crimes Bill in the 1980s and early 1990s, see David Cesarani, *Justice Delayed*, (London, 1992), pp. 190-267.

[19] *Hansard*, (HC), Vol. 163, (869-909), 12 December 1989. Several M.P.s, including Ivor Stanbrooke (Orpington), and Winston Churchill (Davyhulme) invoked the idea of Christian justice, and Britishness against prosecution. Churchill, following Hankey's lead some 40 years previously used the biblical quotation 'Vengeance is mine saith the Lord' to bolster his case.

significant in and of itself, simply did not impact upon the Anglican community other than as an alien attack on Christianity. The terrifying religious secularity of European politics in the 1930s dictated that the significance of Nazi evil was found in a notion of Nazi anti-Christianity which laid the foundation for a partial interpretation of the significance of Nazism. From the dominance of Martin Niemöller onwards nuanced and critical reflection on the importance of the Third Reich became impossible. Ideas of the interaction of the Nazi state and ideology with the extant structures and assumptions of European politics and culture were inevitably eschewed within such a mindset, and accordingly the potentially arresting anti-Jewish crime was obscured. The obfuscation of the Holocaust was both the consequence of this partial interpretation of Nazism and its cause, in that without the Holocaust the vital notions of progress and European civilisation remained undisturbed. The murder of the European Jews did not challenge watching Anglicans, it simply confirmed what they already knew.

[20] Edward Heath, M.P. (Old Bexley and Sidcup), *Hansard*, (HC), Vol. 169, (926), 19 March 1990.

Bibliography.

(A) Primary Sources:

1) Unpublished Materials and Manuscript Collections.

Borthwick Institute, University of York

Temple Papers

Churchill College Archives, University of Cambridge:

Belgion Papers

Hankey Papers

Dean and Chapter Library, Durham Cathedral

Henson Diaries

Lambeth Palace Library, London.

Bell Papers

Fisher Papers

Headlam Papers

Lang Papers

Temple Papers

Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Kings College London.

Liddell Hart Papers

Public Record Office, Kew

Cabinet Papers CAB

Foreign Office Papers: Classes 371, 945, 1050.

University of Southampton Archives.

Parkes Papers.

CCJ Papers.

Samuel Rich Diaries.

Charles Singer Papers.

2) Official Publications:

Hansard:

House of Commons Debates 1933-1991.

House Of Lords Debates 1933-1991.

Chronicle of Convocation. 1933-53

Church Assembly Report of Proceedings. 1933-53.

The Judgement of Nuremberg, (London, 1999)

The Lambeth Conference, *The Truth Shall Make You Free: The Reports, Resolutions and Pastoral Letters from the Bishops*, (London, 1988)

Conference of Representative Members of Christian Churches in England and Scotland, *Some Principles of Christian Policy*, (London, 1938).

3) Newspapers and Journals: 1933-1953.

The Church of England Newspaper

The Times

The Daily Telegraph

Expository Times

Ecumenical Review

The Manchester Guardian

The Guardian

The Church Times

The Record

Christian News Letter

The Jewish Chronicle

4) Published Primary Material.

J.H. Adeney, *The Jewish Expellees in our Midst*, (London, 1943).

Yitzhak Arad & Abraham Margaliot (eds), *Documents on the Holocaust: Selected Sources one the Destruction of the Jews of Germany and Austria, Poland and the Soviet Union*, (Nebraska, 1999).

Karl Barth, *The Epistle to the Romans*, (London, 1933).

Karl Barth, *The German Church Struggle: Tribulation and Promise*, (London, 1938).

Duke of Bedford, *The Financiers Little Game or The Shape of Things to Come*, (Glasgow, 1950).

Duke of Bedford, *Hope: Not Dope*, (Glasgow, 1950).

Duke of Bedford, *Why Blunder on? First Steps in an Emergency Programme to End War, Disease and Poverty*, (Glasgow, 1942).

Duke of Bedford, *In a Nutshell*, (Glasgow, 1951).

Montgomery Belgion, *Epitaph on Nuremberg*, (London, 1946).

George Bell, *Christianity and the World Order*, (London, 1940).

George Bell, *The Church and Humanity*, (London, 1946).

George Bell, *The Task of the Churches in Germany*, (London, 1947).

George Bell, *Christian Unity: The Anglican Position*, (London, 1948).

George Bell, *The Kingship of Christ: The Story of the World Council of Churches*, (London, 1954).

Eivind Berggrav, *With God in the Darkness*, (London, 1943)

Alan Bullock, *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny*, (London, 1952).

Dorothy Buxton, *The Church Struggle in Germany: A Survey of Four Crucial Years by an English Christian*, (London, 1937).

Peter Calvocoressi, *Nuremberg: The Facts, the Law and the Consequences*, (London, 1947).

H.S. Chamberlain, *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, (London, 1910).

Percy Dearmer (ed.), *Christianity and the Crisis*, (London, 1933).

A.S. Duncan-Jones, *The Struggle for Religious Freedom in Germany*, (London, 1938).

Hans Erhard, 'The Nuremberg Trial Against the Major War Criminals and International Law', *American Journal of International Law*, (Vol. 43, No. 2, 1949), pp. 223-245.

George A. Finch, 'The Nuremberg Trial and International Law', in *American Journal of International Law*, (Vol. 41, No. 2 1947), pp. 153-171.

R.P. Flindall (ed), *The Church of England 1815-1948: A Documentary History*, (London, 1972).

Cyril Garbett, *In an Age of Revolution*, (London, 1952).

P.F. Gault, 'Prosecution of War Criminals', in *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, (No.1, 1945), pp. 180-3.

G.M. Gilbert, *Nuremberg Diary*, (London, 1948).

Victor Gollancz, *Let My People Go*, (London, 1943).

John Hadham, *Good God: Sketches of his Character and activities*, (London, 1940).

John Hadham, *God in a World War*, (London, 1940).

Lord Hankey, *Politics, Trials and Errors*, (Oxford, 1950).

Kitty Hart, *Return to Auschwitz*, (London, 1983).

Richard Harwood, *Nuremberg and Other War Crimes Trials: A New Look*, (Chapel Ascote, 1978).

Stewart Herman, *The Rebirth of the German Church*, (London, 1946).

Klaus Hildebrandt, *Pastor Niemöller and his Creed*, (London, 1939).

Stephen Hobhouse, *Retribution and the Christian*, (London, 1942).

Stephen Hobhouse, *Christ and Our Enemies: An Appeal to Fellow Christians*, (London, 1944).

Willard N. Hogan, 'War Criminals', in *South Atlantic Quarterly*, (Vol. 45, 1946), pp. 415-424.

Josef L. Kunz, 'Revolutionary Creation of Norms of International Law', in *American Journal of International Law*, (Vol. 41, No. 1, 1947), pp. 119-126.

Trude Levi, *A Cat Called Adolf*, (London, 1995).

Basil Liddell Hart, *The Other Side of the Hill: Germany's Generals their rise and fall, with their own accounts of military events, 1939-45*, (London, 1951).

Hubert Locke, *Exile in the Fatherland: Martin Niemöller's Letter's from Moabit Prison*, (Michigan, 1986).

Kevin Macdonald, *Seperation and its Discontents: Toward and Evolutionary Theory of Anti-Semitism*, (Westport, 1998).

Hugh Martin (ed.), *Christian Counter Attack: Europe's Churches Against Nazism*, (London, 1943).

Viscount Maugham, *U.N.O. and War Crimes*, (London, 1951).

Robert McAfee Brown, *The Essential Reinhold Niebuhr: Selected Essays and Addresses*, (New Haven, 1986).

R. Niebuhr, *Christianity and Power Politics*, (New York, 1941).

Martin Niemöller and A.S. Duncan-Jones, *From U-Boat to Concentration Camp: The Autobiography of Martin Niemöller with his Further Story by the Dean of Chichester*, (London, 1939).

Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, *Nazism 1919-45: Vol. 1, The Rise to Power 1919-34: a Documentary Reader*, (Exeter, 1983).

Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, *Nazism Vol 2: State, Economy and Society 1933-1939*, (Exeter, 1984).

Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham (ed), *Nazism 1919-45: Vol. 3, Foreign Policy, Wehrmacht, and Racial Extermination: A Documentary Reader*, (Exeter, 1988).

James Parkes, *Anti-Semitism: A Concise World History*, (Chicago, 1963).

James Parkes, *The Conflict of the Church and the Synagogue: A Study in the Origins of Antisemitism*, (London, 1934).

James Parkes, 'A Theology of the Jewish Christian Relationship', in James Parkes, *Prelude to Dialogue: Jewish Christian Relationships*, (London, 1969), pp. 188-201.

James Parkes, 'The German Treatment of the Jews', in Arnold Toynbee and Veronica M. Toynbee (eds), *Survey of International Affairs 1939-46, Vol. 4: Hitler's Europe*, (London, 1946), pp. 153-46.

Raymond Phillips (ed), *Trial of Josef Kramer and Forty Four Others (The Belsen Trial)*, (London, 1949).
John Prescott, 'Martin Niemöller as I knew him' in *The Expository Times*, (Vol.95, No.11, 1984), pp. 328-330.

F.B. Schlisk, 'The Nuremberg Trial and International Law of the Future', in *American*

Journal of International Law, (Vol. 41, No. 4, 1947), pp. 119-126.

G. Schwarzenberger, 'The Judgement of Nuremberg', *Yearbook of World Affairs*, (1948).

William L. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany*, (London, 1960).

H.A. Smith, *The Crisis in the Law of Nations*, (London, 1948).

R.H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, (London, 1926).

Frederick Temple (ed), *Some Lambeth Letters*, (London, 1963).

William Temple, *Men's Creatrix*, (London, 1917).

William Temple, *Christ the Truth*, (London, 1924).

William Temple, *Nature, Man, and God*, (London, 1934).

William Temple, *A Conditional Justification of War*, (London, 1940).

William Temple, *Christianity and Social Order*, (London, 1942).

William Temple, *The Hope of a New World*, (New York, 1942).

William Temple, *Social Witness and Evangelism*, (London, 1943).

William Temple, *The Church Looks Forward*, (London, 1944).

William Temple, *Religious Experience and Other Essays*, (London, 1959).

Ernst Töller, *Pastor Hall: A Play in Three Acts*, (London, 1939).

Freda Utley, *The High Cost of Vengeance*, (Chicago, 1949).

A. R. Vidler *God's Judgement on Europe*, (London, 1940).

Oswald Garrison Villard, *Inside Germany*, (London, 1939).

Henry P. Van Dusen, *What is the Church Doing?*, (London, 1943).

Sir Robert Vansittart, *Black Record: Germans, Past and Present*, (London, 1941).

Lord Vansittart, *Lessons of My Life*, (London, 1943).

F.J.P. Veale, *Advance to Barbarism: How the Reversion to Barbarism in Warfare and War Trials Menaces our Future*, (Appleton, Wisconsin. 1953).

(B) Secondary Sources:

1) Published Sources.

i) Britain, the Second World War and the Holocaust.

Johanna Alberti, *Eleanor Rathbone*, (London, 1996).

Yehuda Bauer, 'When did they know?', in *Midstream*, April 1968, pp. 51-58.

P.M.H. Bell, *John Bull and the Bear: British Public Opinion, Foreign Policy, and the Soviet Union*, (London, 1990).

Rainer Blasius, 'Waiting for Action: The Debate on the other Germany in Great Britain and the Reaction of the Foreign Office to German Peace Feelers', in F.R. Nicosia and Lawrence D. Stokes (ed), *Germans Against Nazism: Nonconformity, Opposition and Resistance in the Third Reich*, (New York, 1990), pp. 279-304.

Heike Bungert, *Das Mationalkomitee und der Westen: Die Reaktion der Westallierten auf das NKFD und die Freien Deutschen Bewegungen 1943-48*, (Stuttgart, 1997).

Angus Calder, *The People's War: Britain 1939-45*, (London, 1969).

David Cesarani, *The Jewish Chronicle and Anglo Jewry*, (Cambridge, 1994)

David Cesarani, 'Reporting Antisemitism: The Jewish Chronicle 1879-1979' in Sian Jones, Tony Kushner, and Sarah Pearce (eds.), *Cultures of Ambivalence and Contempt: Studies in Jewish Non-Jewish Relations*, (London, 1998), pp. 247-82.

David Cesarani, *Justice Delayed*, (London, 1992).

W.S. Churchill, *The Second World War(Vol IV): Triumph and Tragedy* (London, 1954).

Maurice Cowling, *The Impact of Hitler: British Politics and British Policy 1933-40*, (Cambridge, 1975).

Niall Ferguson, *The Pity of the War*, (London, 1998).

Martin Gilbert, *Auschwitz and the Allies*, (London, 1981).

Aaron Goldman, 'Germans and Nazis: The controversy over "Vansittartism" in Britain During the Second World War', in *Journal of Contemporary History*, (Vol. 14, No.1, 1979).

Richard Griffiths, *Fellow Travellers of the Right: British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany 1933-39*, (Oxford, 1983).

Martin Kitchen, *British Policy Towards the Soviet Union During the Second World War*, (London, 1986).

Arieh J. Kochavi, 'Britain's Image Campaign Against the Zionists', in *Journal of Contemporary History*, (Vol. 36, No. 2, 2001), pp. 293-307.

Tony Kushner, *The Persistence of Prejudice: Anti-Semitism in British Society During the Second World War*, (Manchester, 1989).

Tony Kushner, 'Ambivalence or antisemitism? Christian Attitudes and Responses to the Crisis of European Jewry During the Second World War', in Yehuda Bauer, Alice Eckardt, Franklin Littell and Robert Maxwell (eds), *Remembering for the Future: Working Papers and Addenda*, (Oxford, 1989), pp. 404-14.

Tony Kushner, 'The Paradox of Prejudice: The Impact of Organised anti-Semitism in Britain During an anti-Nazi War', in Tony Kushner and Kenneth Lunn (eds.), *Traditions of Intolerance: Historical Perspectives on Fascism and Race Discourse in Britain*, (Manchester, 1989), pp.72-90.

Tony Kushner, 'James Parkes, the Jews and Conversionism: A Model for Multi-Cultural Britain?', in Diana Wood, (ed.), *Studies in Church History 29: Christianity and Judaism*, (London, 1992), pp. 451-62.

Tony Kushner, 'Different Worlds: British Perceptions of the Final Solution During the Second World War', in D. Cesarani (ed.), *The Final Solution: Origins and Implementation*, (London, 1992), pp. 246-67.

Tony Kushner, *The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination: A Social and Cultural History*, (London, 1994).

Tony Kushner, 'The Meaning of Auschwitz: Anglo-American Responses to the Hungarian Jewish Tragedy', in David Cesarani (ed.), *Genocide and Rescue: The Holocaust in Hungary 1944*, (London, 1997), pp. 159-178.

Walter Laqueur, *The Terrible Secret: An Investigation into the Suppression of Information About Hitler's Final Solution*, (London, 1980).

Lousie London, *Whitehall and the Jews 1933-48: British Immigration Policy and the Holocaust*, (Cambridge, 2000).

Ian Maclaine, *Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War II*, (London, 1979).

Ray Monk, *Bertrand Russell 1921-1970: The Ghost of Madness*, (London, 2000).

R.A.C. Parker, *Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War*, (London, 1993).

Ben Pimlott, *Labour and the Left in the 1930s*, (London, 1977).

Joanne Reilly, David Cesarani, Tony Kushner and Colin Richmond (eds), *Belsen in History and Memory*, (London, 1997).

Joanne Reilly, *Belsen: The Liberation of a Concentration Camp*, (London, 1998).

Keith Robbins, *Munich 1938*, (London, 1968)

Barbara Rogers, 'Auschwitz and the British', *History Today*, (Vol. 49, No. 10, 1999), pp. 2-3.

Andrew Sharf, *The British Press and the Jews Under Nazi Rule*, (London, 1964).

AJP Taylor, *The Second World War: An Illustrated History*, (London, 1976).

William Rubinstein, The Myth of Rescue: Why the democracies could not have saved more Jews from the Nazis, (London, 1997).

ii) Christianity and the Holocaust.

Frank Buscher and Michael Phayer, 'German Catholic Bishops and the Holocaust 1940-52', in *German Studies Review*, (Vol. 11, 1998), pp. 463-485.

John Conway, 'Catholicism and the Jews During the Nazi Period and After', in Otto Dov Kulka & Paul Mendes Flohr (eds.), *Judaism and Christianity Under the Impact of National Socialism*, (Jerusalem, 1987), pp.435-52.

John Cornwell, *Hitler's Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII*, (London, 1999).

John Cornwell, 'Something to Confess?', *The Sunday Times*, 29 July 2001.

A. Roy Eckardt, 'Is there a way out of the Christian Crime? The Philosophic Question of the Holocaust' in *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, (Vol.1, No.1, 1986), pp.121-126.

Alice L. Eckardt, 'Post Holocaust theology: A Journey out of the Kingdom of Night', in *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, (Vol.1, No.2, 1986), pp. 229-240.

Emil Fackenheim, 'The Nazi Holocaust as a Persisting Trauma for the Non Jewish Mind' in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, (Vol.36, No.2, 1975), pp. 369-71.

Emil Fackenheim, 'Concerning Authentic and Unauthentic Responses to the Holocaust' (Vol.1, No.1, 1986), pp.101-120.

David P. Gushee, 'Learning from Christian Rescuers: Lessons for the Churches', in the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, (Vol.548, Nov 1996), pp. 138-155.

Richard Gutteridge, 'Some Christian Responses to the Jewish Catastrophe' in Bauer...et al, *Remembering for the Future*, pp. 352-62.

Moshe Herczl, *Christianity and the Holocaust of Hungarian Jewry*, (New York,

1993).

Ian Kershaw, 'The Churches and the Nazi Persecution of the Jews - A Review', in *Yad Vashem Studies*, (Vol. 19, 1988), p.434.

Otto Dov Kulka & Paul Mendes Flohr (eds.), *Judaism and Christianity Under the Impact of National Socialism*, (Jerusalem, 1987).

Franklin Littell, 'Inventing the Holocaust: A Christians Retrospect' in *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, (Vol. 9, No. 2, 1995), pp. 173-91.

Michael Phayer, *The Catholic Church and the Holocaust: 1930-65*, (Indiana, 2001).

Richard Pierard, *Varieties of Antisemitic Responses to the Holocaust Within American Conservative Protestantism*, in Bauer... et al, *Remembering for the Future*, pp. 447-60.

Robert Ross, 'Perverse Witness to the Holocaust: Christian Missions and Missionaries', in Jack Fischel and Sanford Pinsker (eds.), *The Churches Response to the Holocaust*, (Florida, 1986), pp. 127-140.

Isabel Wollaston, 'Can Christians Break the Silence? A British Response to the Holocaust', Bauer... et al, *Remembering for the Future*, pp. 672-679.

Susan Zuccotti, *The Holocaust, The French and the Jews*, (Nebraska, 1999).

iii) English Christianity.

Paul Addison, 'Destiny, History, and Providence: The Religion of Winston Churchill', in Michael Bentley (ed), *Public and Private Doctrine: Essays in British History*, (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 236-50.

D.W. Bebbington, 'The Oxford Group Movement Between the Wars', in *Studies in Church History*, (Vol. XXIII, 1986), pp. 495-507.

James Bentley, 'British and German High Churchmen in the Struggle Against Hitler' in *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* (1972), pp. 233-49.

Marcus Braybrooke, *Children of One God: A History of the Council of Christians and Jews*, (London, 1991).

Edward Carpenter, *Archbishop Fisher: His life and Times*, (Norwich, 1991).

Martin Ceadel, *Pacifism in Britain 1914-45: The Defining of a Faith*, (Oxford, 1980).

Martin Ceadal, 'Christian Pacifism in the Era of the Two World Wars', in W.J. Sheils (ed.), *The Church and War: Papers Read at the Twenty First Summer Meeting and the Twenty Second Winter Meeting of the Ecclesiastical History Society*, (London, 1983), pp. 391-408.

Owen Chadwick, *Hensley Henson: A Study in the Tension Between Church and State*, (Oxford, 1983).

Owen Chadwick, 'The English Bishops and the Nazis' in *The Friends of Lambeth Palace Library Annual Report*, (1973), pp. 9-28.

Owen Chadwick, *The Christian Church in the Cold War*, (London, 1992).

Andrew Chandler, 'Munich and Morality: The Bishops of the Church of England and Appeasement' in *Twentieth Century British History*, (Vol.5, No.1, 1994), pp. 77-99.

Andrew Chandler, 'A Question of Fundamental Principles: the Church of England and the Jews of Germany 1933-37' in *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook*, (1993), pp 221-262.

Andrew Chandler, 'Lambeth Palace and the Jews of Germany and Austria in 1938' in *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook*, (1995), pp. 225-50.

Andrew Chandler, 'The Church of England and Obliteration Bombing of Germany in the Second World War', in *English Historical Review*, (Vol. 108, No. 429, 1993), pp. 920-46.

Andrew Chandler, *Brethren in Adversity: Bishop George Bell, the Church of England and the Crisis of German Protestantism, 1933-39*, (London, 1997).

Robert Everett, 'James Parkes: A Model for Christians in the Time After the Holocaust', in Bauer...et al, *Remembering for the Future*, p. 328-338.

Robert Andrew Everett, *Christianity Without Anti-Semitism: James Parkes and the Jewish Christian Encounter*, (Oxford, 1993).

Norman Goodall, *The Ecumenical Movement: What it is and what it does*, (London, 1964).

Richard Gutteridge, 'The Churches and the Jews in England, 1933-45' in Otto Dov Kulka & Paul Mendes Flohr (eds), *Judaism and Christianity Under the Impact of National Socialism*, (Jerusalem, 1987), pp. 353-80.

Adrian Hastings, *A History of English Christianity*, (London, 1986).

Adrian Hastings, 'William Temple', in Geoffrey Rowell (ed), *The English Religious Tradition and the Genius of Anglicanism*, (Oxford, 1992), pp. 211-26.

F.A. Iremonger, *William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury, his life and letters*, (London, 1948).

Ronald Jasper, *George Bell: Bishop of Chichester*, (Oxford, 1967).

Ronald Jasper, *Arthur Cayley Headlam: Life and Letters of a Bishop*, (London, 1960).

Eleanor M. Jackson, *Red Tape and the Gospel: A Study of the Significance of the Ecumenical Missionary Struggle of William Paton*, (Birmingham, 1981).

John Kent, *William Temple*, (Cambridge, 1992).

Albert Marrin, *The Last Crusade: The Church of England in the First World War*, (Durham, North Carolina, 1974).

W.R. Matthews, *William Temple: An Estimate and Appreciation*, (London, 1946).

Alastair Mcgrath (ed), *The Encyclopaedia of Modern Christian Thought*, (Oxford, 1993).

Edward Norman, *Church and Society in England 1770-1970: A Historical Study*, (Oxford, 1976)

E.C. Pritchard, *Arthur Cayley Headlam: A Life*, (Worthing, 1989).

A.M. Ramsey, *From Gore to Temple: The Development of Anglican Theology Between Lux Mundi and the Second World War*, (London, 1960).

Keith Robbins, 'Britain, 1940, and "Christian Civilisation"', in Derek Beales and Geoffrey Best (eds), *History, Society and the Churches: Essays in honour of Owen Chadwick*, (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 279-301.

Keith Robbins, 'Martin Niemöller, the German Church Struggle and English Opinion', in *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, (Vol. XXI, No. 2, April 1970), pp. 149-69.

Keith Robbins, 'Church and Politics: Dorothy Buxton and the German Church Struggle', in Derek Baker (ed.), *Church Society and Politics*, (Oxford, 1975), pp. 419-433.

Carolyn Scott, *Dick Sheppard: A Biography*, (London, 1977).

Alan Suggate, 'William Temple and the Challenge of Reinhold Niebuhr', in *Theology* (Vol. LXXXIV, NO. 702, November 1981), pp. 413-20.

Alan M. Suggate, *William Temple and Christian and Social Ethics Today*, (Edinburgh 1987).

Stephen Sykes, 'The Genius of Anglicanism', in Geoffrey Rowell (ed), *The English Religious Tradition and the Genius of Anglicanism*, (Oxford, 1992), pp. 227-42.

Owen Thomas, *William Temple's Philosophy of Religion*, (London, 1961).

Alan Wilkinson, *The Church of England and the First World War*, (London, 1978)

Alan Wilkinson, *Dissent or Conform: War, Peace and the English Churches 1900-45*, (London, 1986).

Philip Williamson, *Stanley Baldwin: Conservative Leadership and National Values*, (Cambridge, 1999).

Philip Williamson, 'Christian Conservatives and the Totalitarian Challenge 1933-40', *English Historical Review*, (Vol. CXV, No. 462, June 2000), pp. 607-42.

B.G. Worrall, *The Making of the Modern Church: Christianity in England since 1800*, (London, 1988).

iv) German History and Historiography.

Richard Evans, *Rethinking German History: Nineteenth Century Germany and the Origins of the Third Reich*, (London, 1987).

Diana Forsyth, 'German Identity and the Problems of History', in Tonkin et al, *History and Ethnicity*, (London, 1989), pp.137-56.

Peter Fritzsche, *Germans into Nazis*, (Cambridge, Mass. 1998).

Mary Fulbrook, *German National Identity After the Holocaust*, (Cambridge, 1999).

Geoffrey Hartman (ed), *Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective*, (Bloomington, 1986).

Jeffrey Herf, 'Multiple Restorations: German Political Traditions and the Interpretation of Nazism 1945-6', in *Central European History*, (Vol. 26, No. 1, 1993), pp. 21-59.

Jeffrey Herf, *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanies*, (Cambridge, Mass. 1997).

J. Knowlton and T. Cates (eds), *Forever in the Shadow of Hitler? Original Documents of the Historikerstreit, the Controversy Surrouding the Singularity of the Holocaust*, (New Jersey, 1980).

Charles Maier, *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and the German National Identity*, (Cambridge, 1988).

Maria Mitchell, 'Materialism and Secularism: CDU Politicians and National Socialism 1945-49', in *Journal of Modern History*, (Vol. 67, No. 2, June 1995), pp. 278-308.

George Mosse, 'Two World Wars and the Myth of the War Experience', in *Journal of Contemporary History* (Vol.21, 1986), pp.491-513.

P. Pulzer, *The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria*, (New York, 1964).

Hermann Rauschning, *Germany's Revolution of Destruction*, reprinted in Neil Gregor, *Nazism*, (Oxford, 2000), pp. 24-27.

J.C.G. Rohl, *From Bismarck to Hitler: The Problem of Continuity in German History*, (London, 1970).

A.J.P. Taylor, *The Course of German History: A Survey of the Development of Germany Since 1815*, (London, 1951).

v) Historiography.

Maurice Cowling, *Religion and Public Doctrine in Modern England Vol. 1*, (Cambridge, 1980).

Richard Evans, *In Defence of History*, (London, 1997)

Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The 'Objectivity Question' and the American Historical Profession*, (Cambridge, 1988).

vi) Holocaust Historiography.

M.G Ash, 'American and German Perspectives on the Goldhagen Debate: History, Identity, and the Media' in *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 11, no. 3, (1997), pp.396-411.

R.J.B. Bosworth, *Explaining Auschwitz and Hiroshima: History Writing and the Second World War 1945-90*, (London, 1993).

Robert Cherry, 'Holocaust Historiography: The Role of the Cold War', in *Science and Society*, (Vol. 63, No. 4, 1999), pp. 459-477.

Nathan Eck, 'Historical Research or Slander' in *Yad Vashem Studies*, (No. 6, 1967), pp.385-430.

Michael Marrus, *The Holocaust in History*, (London, 1998).

Alvin Rosenfeld (ed), *Thinking About the Holocaust After Half a Century*, (Bloomington, 1997).

Gavriel Rosenfeld, 'The Politics of Uniqueness: Reflections on the Polemical Turn in Holocaust and Genocide Scholarship', in *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, (Vol. 13, No. 1, 1999), pp. 28-61.

vii) The Idea of Europe.

Norman Davies, *Europe a History*, (Oxford, 1996).

T.S. Eliot, 'The Unity of European Culture', in *Notes Toward the Definition of Culture*, (London, 1948).

H.A.L. Fisher, *A History of Europe*, (London, 1936).

J.A. Lauwreys, *The Idea of Europe*, (London, 1951)

Ezra Talmor, 'Reflections on the Rise and Development of the Idea of Europe', in *History of European Ideas*, (Vol.1, No. 1, 1980), pp. 63-66.

Jan van der Dussen and Keith Wilson (ed.), *The History of the Idea of Europe*, (Milton Keynes, 1993).

viii) Jewish-Christian Relations.

Robert Chazan, *Medieval Stereotypes and Modern Antisemitism*, (Berkely, 1997).

Bryan Cheyette, *Constructions of 'the Jew' in English Literature and Society: Racial Representations, 1874-1945*, (Cambridge, 1993).

Robert Andrew Everett, 'James Parkes: A model for Christians in the time after the Holocaust', in Bauer...et al, *Remembering for the Future*, pp. 328-38.

S.H. Hendrix, 'Toleration of the Jews in the German Reformation: Urbanus, Rhegius, and Braunschweig (1535-1540)' in *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte* 81 (1990), pp. 189-208.

Jules Isaac, *Has Antisemitism Roots in Christianity?*, (New York, 1961).

Sian Jones, Tony Kushner, and Sarah Pearce (eds.), *Cultures of Ambivalence and Contempt: Studies in Jewish Non-Jewish Relations*, (London, 1998).

Jacob Katz, *From Prejudice to Destruction: Anti-semitism 1700-1933*, (Cambridge, Mass. 1980).

Franklin H. Littell, *The Crucifixion of the Jews: the Failure of Christians to Understand the Jewish Experience*, (New York, 1975).

H.A. Oberman, *The Roots of Antisemitism in the Age of Renaissance and Reformation*, (Philadelphia, 1981).

Sarah Pearce 'Attitudes of Contempt: Christian Anti Judaism and the Bible', in Sian Jones, Tony Kushner, and Sarah Pearce (eds), *Cultures of Ambivalence and Contempt: Studies in Jewish-Non-Jewish Relations*, (London, 1998), pp. 50-71.

Rosemary Radford Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Antisemitism*, (New York, 1974).

J.M. Snoek, *The Grey Book: A Collection of Protests Against Anti-Semitism and the Persecution of the Jews Issued by Non-Roman Catholic Churches and Church Leaders During Hitler's Rule*, (Assen, 1969).

ix) Martin Niemöller, the German Church Struggle and German Christianity.

Victoria Barnett, *For the Soul of the People: Protestant Protest Under Hitler*, (New York, 1992).

James Bentley, *Martin Niemöller: 1892-1984*, (New York, 1984).

Doris L. Bergen, 'Between God and Hitler: German Military Chaplains and the Crimes of the Third Reich', in Omer Bartov and Phyllis Mack (eds), *In God's Name: Religion and Genocide in the Twentieth Century*, (Oxford, 2001).

Doris Bergen, *The Twisted Cross: The German Christian Movement in the Third Reich*, (Chapel Hill, 1996).

Andrew Chandler, 'The Death of Dietrich Bonhöffer', in *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, (Vol. 45, No. 3, 1994), pp. 448-59.

John Conway, 'The German Church Struggle and its Aftermath', in Abraham J. Peck (ed.), *Jews and Christians After the Holocaust*, (Philadelphia, 1982).

John Conway, 'The Political Theology of Martin Niemöller' in *German Studies Review*, (Vol. 9, No. 9, 1986), pp. 521-546.

John Conway, 'Coming to terms with the Past: Interpreting the German Church Struggles 1933-90', in *German History*, (Vol.16, No.3, 1998), pp. 377-97.

M.U. Edwards, *Luther's Last Battles: Politics and Polemics 1531-46*, (New York, 1983).

Robert Erickson, 'Christians and the Holocaust: the Wartime Writings of Gerhard Kittell', in Bauer...et al, *Remembering for the Future*, pp. 2400-13.

Robert Erickson, *Theologians Under Hitler*, (New Haven, 1985).

Wolfgang Gerlach, 'From Pirate on the High Seas to Angel of Peace: Submarine Commander, "Freikorps" Officer, Pastor, Hitler Opponent, Concentration Camp Prisoner, Conscience of the Nation', in Hubert Locke and Marcia Sachs Littell (eds), *Remembrance and Recollections: Essays on the Centennial Year of Martin Niemöller and Reinhold Niebuhr and the Fiftieth Year of the Wannsee Conference*, (Lanham, 1996), pp. 39-51.

Wolfgang Gerlach, *And the Witnesses Were Silent: The Confessing Church and the Persecution of the Jews*, (Lincoln, Nebraska. 2000).

Richard Gutteridge, *Open Thy Mouth For the Dumb! The German Evangelical Church and the Jews 1879-1950*, (Oxford, 1976).

Ernst Christian Helmreich, *The German Churches Under Hitler: Background, Struggle and Epilogue*, (Detroit, 1979).

Susanne Heschel, 'When Jesus was an Aryan: The Protestant Church and Antisemitic Propaganda', in Bartov and Mack, *In God's Name*, pp. 79-105.

Hubert G. Locke (ed), *Exile in Fatherland: Martin Niemöller's Letters From Prison*, (Michigan, 1986).

Robert Michael, 'Theological Myth, German anti-Semitism and the Holocaust: the case of Martin Niemöller' in *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, (Vol.2, No.1, 1987), pp. 105-122.

Jürgen Moltman, *The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God*, (San Francisco, 1981).

Sybil Niemöller von Sell, 'Who was Martin Niemöller', in Hubert Locke and Marcia Sachs Littell (eds), *Remembrance and Recollections: Essays on the Centennial Year of Martin Niemöller and Reinhold Niebuhr and the Fiftieth Year of the Wannsee Conference*, (Lanham, 1996), pp. 15-27.

Phillip Potter, 'Death of Martin Niemöller', in *Ecumenical Review*, (Vol. 36, No. 3, 1984), pp. 342-43.

Robert Ross, 'Martin Niemöller: An American Hero', in Hubert Locke and Marcia Sachs Littell (eds), *Remembrance and Recollections: Essays on the Centennial Year of Martin Niemöller and Reinhold Niebuhr and the Fiftieth Year of the Wannsee Conference*, (Lanham, 1996).

Dietmar Schmidt, *Pastor Niemöller*, (London, 1959).

Frederic Spotts, *The Churches and Politics in Germany*, (Middletown, Connecticut. 1973).

Jared Wicks, *Luther and his Spiritual Legacy*, (Wilmington, 1983).

J.R.C. Wright, *Above Parties: The Political Attitudes of the German Protestant Church Leadership: 1918-1933*, (Oxford, 1974).

Ruth Zerner, 'Martin Niemöller, Activist as Bystander: The Oft Quoted Reflection', in Marvin Perry and Frederick m. Schweitzer (eds), *Jewish Christian Encounters over the Centuries*, (New York, 1994).

x) The Memory of the Holocaust.

Victoria Barnett, *Bystanders: Conscience and Complicity During the Holocaust*, (Westport, Conneticut. 1999).

Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust*, (Cambridge, 1989).

Jay Bergman, 'Dissidents on the Holocaust, Hitler and Nazism: A Study of the Preservation of Historical Memory', in *Slavonic and East European Review*, (Vol. 70, No. 3, 1992), pp. 477-504.

Halina Birenbaum, *Hope is the Last to Die, A Coming of Age Under Nazi Terror*, (New York, 1971).

Allan R. Brockway, 'Religious Values After the Holocaust: A Protestant View' in Abraham J. Peck (ed) *Jews and Christians After the Holocaust*, (Philadelphia, 1982), pp. 53-62.

David Cesarani, 'History on Trial', in *The Guardian*, 18 January 2000.

Tim Cole, *Images of the Holocaust*, (London, 1999).

Thomas Fensch (ed.), *Oskar Schindler and His List: The Man, the Book, the Film, the Holocaust and its Survivors*, (Forest Dale, Vermont. 1995).

Norman Finkelstein, *The Holocaust Industry*, (New York, 2000).

Zvi Gitelman, 'History, Memory and Politics - The Holocaust in the Soviet Union', in *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, (Vol. 5, No. 1, 1990).

Abbott Gleason, *Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War*, (New York, 1995).
Jan T. Gross, *Neighbours: The Destruction of the Jewish Community of Jedwabne, Poland*, (Princeton, New Jersey. 2001).

D.D. Guttenplan, *The Holocaust on Trial: History, Justice and the David Irving Libel Case*, (London, 2001).

Miriam Brate Hansen, 'Schindler's List is not Shoah', in Barbie Zelizer, *Visual Culture and the Holocaust*, (New Jersey, 2001), pp. 127-51.

Hannes Heer, 'The Difficulty of Ending a War: Reactions to the Exhibition "War of Extermination: Crimes of the Wehrmacht, 1941-44"', in *History Workshop Journal*, (Vol. 46, 1998).

Raul Hilberg, *The Politics of Memory: The Journey of a Holocaust Historian*, (Chicago, 1996).

Mick Hume, 'On the Moral High Ground', *New Statesman*, 9 July 2001.

Steven Katz, *The Holocaust in Historical Context*, (New York, 1994).

Clayton R. Koppes & Gregory D. Black, *Hollywood Goes to War: How Politics, Profits and Propaganda Shaped World War II Movies*, (New York, 1987).

Lawrence Langer, *Versions of Survival: The Holocaust and the Human Spirit*, (New York, 1982).

Deborah Lipstadt, *Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory*, (London, 1993).

Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life*, (New York, 1999).

David Patterson, 'The Annihilation of Exits: The Problem of Liberation in the Holocaust Memoir', in *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, (Vol.9, No.2, 1993), pp. 208-30.

D. Romanovsky, 'The Holocaust in the Eyes of Homo-Sovieticus: A Survey Based on North Eastern Belorussia and North Western Russia', in *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, (Vol. 13, No. 3, 1999), pp. 355-82.

Tom Segev, *The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust*, (New York, 1993).

Jeffrey Shandler, *While America Watches: Televising the Holocaust*, (Oxford, 1999).

Dan Stone, 'The Domestication of Violence: Forging a Collective Memory of the Holocaust in Britain 1945-6', in *Patterns of Prejudice*, (Vol. 33, No. 2, April 1999), pp. 13-29.

S.J. Wiesen, 'Overcoming Nazism: Big Business, Public Relations, and the Politics of Memory, 1945-50', in *Central European History*, (Vol. 29, No. 2, 1996), pp. 201-26.

Nancy Wood, *Vectors of Memory: Legacies of Trauma in Post War Europe*, (Oxford, 1999).

xi) Nazism and the Holocaust.

Gotz Aly, *Final Solution: Nazi Population Policy and the Murder of the European Jews*, (London, 1999).

Yitzhak Arad, 'The Holocaust of Soviet Jewry in the Occupied Territoroes of the Soviet Union', in *Yad Vashem Studies*, 1991, pp. 1-47.

Yitzhak Arad, *Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka: The Operation Reinhard Death Camps*, (Bloomington, 1987).

Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, (London, 1952).

Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*, (London, 1963).

Omer Bartov, *Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis and War in the Third Reich*, (Oxford, 1992).

Omer Bartov, 'The Conduct of War: Soldiers and the Barbarisation of Warfare', in *Journal of Modern History*, (Vol.64, Supplement, Dec 1992), pp.532-45.

Martin Broszat, 'A Reply to David Irving', in *Yad Vashem Studies* 13 (1979).

Martin Broszat and Helmut Krausnick, *The Anatomy of the SS state*, (London, 1968).

Christopher Browning, *The Path to Genocide*, (Cambridge, 1992).

Christopher Browning, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland*, (London, 2001).

Michael Burleigh, *The Third Reich: A New History*, (London, 2000).

Michael Burleigh, 'Psychiatry, Society and Nazi Euthanasia', in Omer Bartov (ed), *The Holocaust: Origins, Implementation Aftermath*, (London, 2000), pp. 43-62.

Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann, *The Racial State: Germany 1933-45*, (Cambridge, 1993).

Lucy Dawidowicz, *The War Against the Jews 1939-45*, (London, 1975).

Deborah Dwork and Robert Jan van Pelt, *Auschwitz: 1270 to the Present*, (New Haven, 1996).

Annegret Ehman, 'From Colonial Racism to Nazi Population Policy: The Role of the so-called Mischlinge', in Michael Berenbaum &Abraham Peck (eds), *The Holocaust in History: The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed and the Re-examined*, (Bloomington, 1998).

Saul Friedlander, *Nazi Germany and the Jews: Vol 1, The Years of Persecution*, (New York, 1997).

C.J. Friedrich and Z.K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, (Cambridge, Mass. 1956).

Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust*, (New York, 1996).

Robert Gellately, *The Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy 1933-45*, (Oxford, 1992).

Robert Gellately, *Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany*, (Oxford, 2001).

Christian Gerlach, 'German Economic Interests, Occupation Policy, and the Murder of the Jews in Belorussia, 1941-43', in Ulrich Herbert (ed.), *National Socialist*

Extermination Policies: Contemporary German Perspectives and Controversies, (London, 2000), pp. 210-239.

Christian Gerlach, 'The Wannsee Conference, the Fate of the German Jews, and Hitler's Decision in Principle to Exterminate all European Jews' in *The Journal of Modern History*, (Vol.70, Dec. 1998), pp. 759-812.

Sarah Gordon, *Hitler, Germans, and the Jewish Question*, (New Jersey, 1984).

Roger Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism*, (London, 1993).

Ronald Headland, *Messages of Murder: A Study of the Reports of the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Service 1941-43*, (Cranbury, New Jersey. 1992)

Ronald Headland, 'The Einsatzgruppen: The Question of their Initial Operations', in *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, (Vol. 4, No. 4, 1989), pp. 401-12.

Ulrich Herbert (ed.), *National Socialist Extermination Policies, Contemporary German Perspectives and Controversies*, (New York, 2000).

Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, (New York, 1985).

Andreas Hilgruber, *Zweirlei Untergang: Die Zerschlagung des Deutschen Reiches und das Ende des europäischen Judentums*, (Berlin, 1986).

Eberhard Jackel, *Hitler's World View: A Blueprint for Power*, (Cambridge, Mass. 1981).

Eric Johnson, *The Nazi Terror: Gestapo, Jews, and Ordinary Germans*, (New York, 2000).

Ian Kershaw, 'Improvised Genocide: The Emergence of the Final Solution in the Warthegau', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, (Vol.2, 1992).

Ian Kershaw, 'Working Towards the Führer: Reflections on the Nature of the Hitler Dictatorship', in *Contemporary European History*, (Vol.2, No.2, 1993), pp.103-118.

Peter Longerich, *Politik der Vernichtung: Eine Gesamtdarstellung der Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung*, (Munich, 1998).

Tim Mason, 'Intention and Explanation: A Current Controversy about the Interpretation of National Socialism' in Michael Marrus, *The Nazi Holocaust Vol. 3, The Final Solution: The Implementation of Mass Murder, Vol. 1*, (London, 1989), pp 3-20.

Hans Mommsen, 'The Realisation of the Unthinkable: The Final Solution of the Jewish Question in the Third Reich', in Mommsen, *From Weimar to Auschwitz*, (New Jersey, 1991).

Jeremy Noakes, 'The Development of Nazi Policy towards the German "Mischlinge",

1933-45', in *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book*, (Vol. 34, 1989), pp. 291-354.

J.L. Talmon, *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy*, (London, 1952).

John Weiss, *Ideology of Death: Why the Holocaust Happened in Germany*, (Chicago, 1996).

Paul Weindling, 'Understanding Nazi Racism: Precursors and Perpetrators', in Michael Burleigh (ed), *Confronting the Nazi Past: New Debates on Modern German History*, (London, 1996), pp. 66-83.

Michael Zimmerman, 'The National Socialist 'Solution of the Gypsy Question'', in Ulrich Herbert (ed), *National Socialist Extermination Policies: Contemporary German Perspectives and Controversies*, (Oxford, 2000), pp. 186-210.

xii) Resistance to Nazism.

Andrew Chandler (ed.), *The Moral Imperative: New Essays on the Ethics of Resistance in National Socialist Germany 1933-45*, (Boulder, 1998).

John Conway, 'The Role of the Churches in the Resistance Movement', in Andrew Chandler (ed.), *The Moral Imperative: New Essays on the Ethics of Resistance in National Socialist Germany*, (Boulder, 1998), pp. 25-34.

Allen Welsh Dulles, *Germany's Underground: The Anti Nazi-Resistance*, (New York, 2000).

Michael Geyer and John Bowyer, 'Resistance Against the Third Reich as Intercultural Knowledge', *Journal of Modern History*, (Vol.64, Supplement, Dec 1992), pp.51-57.

Peter Hoffmann, *German Resistance to Hitler*, (New York, 1988).

Klemens von Klemperer, *German Resistance Against Hitler: The Search for Allies Abroad*, (Oxford, 1992).

David Clay Large, 'A Beacon in the German Darkness: The Anti-Nazi Legacy in West German Politics', *Journal of Modern History*, (Vol.64, Supplement, Dec 1992), pp. 5173-186.

Alf Lüdtke, 'The Appeal of Exterminating 'others': German Workers and the Limits of Resistance', *Journal of Modern History*, (Vol.64, Supplement, Dec 1992), pp.546-68.

Hans Mommsen, 'The German Resistance Against Hitler and the Restoration of Politics', in *Journal of Modern History*, (Vol.64, Supplement, Dec 1992), pp.112-127.

Hans Rothfels, *The German Oppostion to Hitler: An Assessment*, (London, 1961).

xiii) Post-War Germany, Denazification, and War Crimes Trials.

James Bacque, *Crimes and Mercies: The Fate of German Civilians Under Allied Occupation 1944-50*, (London, 1997).

Michael Balfour, 'In Retrospect: Britain's Policy of Re-Education', in Nicholas Pronay and Keith Wilson (eds), *The Political Re-education of Germany and her Allies After World War II*, (Worcester, 1985), pp. 139-150.

Michael Balfour, *Germany: The Tides of Power*, (London, 1992).

Geoffrey Best, *Nuremberg and After: the continuing history of war crimes and crimes against humanity*, (The Stenton Lecture, University of Reading, 1983).

Michael Biddiss, 'The Nuremberg Trial: Two Exercises in Judgement', in *Journal of Contemporary History*, (Vol. 16, No. 3, 1981), pp. 597-615.

Robert Birley , 'British Policy in Retrospect', in Arthur Hearnden (ed.), *The British in Germany: Educational Reconstruction after 1945*, (London, 1978), pp. 46-63.

Donald Bloxham, 'The Trial That Never Was: Why There was no Second International Trial of Major War Criminals at Nuremberg', forthcoming in *History*, January 2002.

Donald Bloxham, 'Punishing German Soldiers During the Cold War: The Case of Erich von Manstein', in *Patterns of Prejudice*, (Vol. 33, No. 4, 1999), pp. 25-45.

Tom Bowyer, *Blind Eye to Murder: Britain, America and the Purging of Nazi Germany, A Pledge Betrayed*, (London, 1981), pp. 22-5.

Ian Connor, 'Denazification in Post War Germany', *European History Quarterly*, (Vol. 21, 1991), pp. 397-402.

Tadeusz Cyprian and Jerzy Sawicki, *Nuremberg in Retrospect: People and the Issues of the Trial*, (Warsaw, 1967).

Anne Deighton, *The Impossible Race: The Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War*, (Oxford, 1990).

Anne Deighton, 'Cold War Diplomacy: British Policy Towards Germany's Role in Europe 1945-49', in Ian Turner (ed), *Reconstruction in Post-War Germany: British Occupation Policy and Other Western Zones*, (Oxford, 1989), pp. 15-34.

Dick de Mildt, *In the Name of the People: Perpetrators of Genocide in the reflection of their Post-War prosecution in West Germany, the 'Euthanasia' and 'Aktion Reinhard' trial cases*, (Amsterdam, 1996).

Aleksei M. Filitov, 'Problems of Post-War Constuction in Soviet Foreign Policy Conceptions During World War II', in Francesca Gori and Silvio Pons (eds), *The Soviet union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943-53*, (London, 1996), pp. 3-22.

Anthony Glees, 'The Making of British Policy on War Crimes: History as Politics in the U.K.', in *Contemporary European History*, (Vol. 1, No. 2, 1992), pp. 171-198.

Alfred Grosser, *Germany in Our Time: A Political History of the Post War Years*, (London, 1970).

Arthur Hearnden, 'Education in the British Zone', in Hearnden, *The British in Germany*, pp. 11-46.

John H. Herz, 'Denazification and Related Policies', in John H. Herz (ed), *From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism*, (Westport, 1982), pp. 15-38.

J.H. Hoffman, 'German Field Marshals as War Criminals? A British Embarrassment', in *Journal of Contemporary History*, (Vol. 23, No.1, 1988), pp. 17-35.

Kurt Jürgensen, 'British Occupation Policy after 1945 and the Problem of 'Re-educating' Germany', in *History*, (Vol. 68, No. 223, 1983), pp. 225-44.

Priscilla Dale Jones, 'British Policy towards German Crimes Against German Jews 1939-45', in *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book*, (Vol. 36, 1991), pp. 339-66.

Jill Jones, 'Eradicating Nazism from the British Zone of Germany: Early Policy and Practice', *German History*, (Vol. 8, No. 2, 1990), pp. 145-62.

Ariel J. Kochavi, *Prelude to Nuremberg: Allied War Crimes Policy and the Question of Punishment*, (Chapel Hill, 1998).

Evan Luard, *A History of the United Nations, Vol. 1: the Years of Western Domination, 1945-1955*, (London, 1982).

Michael Marrus, 'The Holocaust at Nuremberg', in *Yad Vashem Studies*, (Vol. 26, 1998).

Barbara Marshall, 'British Democratisation Policy in Germany', in Turner, *Reconstruction in Post War Germany*, pp. 189-214.

David Pike, *The Politics of Culture in Soviet Occupied Germany*, (Stanford, 1992).

Connor Cruise O'Brien and Felix Topolski, *The United Nations: Sacred Drama*, (London, 1968).

Alan S. Rosenbaum, *Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals*, (Boulder, 1993), p. 29.

Avi Shlaim, 'Britain the Berlin Blockade and the Cold War', in *International Affairs*, (Vol. 60, No. 1, 1984), pp. 1-14.

Telford Taylor, *Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir*, (London, 1993).

James F. Tent, *Mission on the Rhine: Re-Education and Denazification in American Occupied Germany*, (Chicago, 1982).

Ian Turner, 'Denazification in the British Zone', in Turner, *Reconstruction in Post-War Germany*, pp. 239-69.

Anne and John Tusa, *The Nuremberg Trial*, (London, 1983).

Ronald Webster, 'Opposing Victor's Justice: German Protestant Churchmen and Convicted War Criminals in Western Europe After 1945', in *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, (Vol. 15, No. 1, 2001), pp. 47-69.

David Welch, 'Priming the Pump of German Democracy: British "Re-education" Policy in Germany After the Second World War', in Turner, *Reconstruction*, pp. 215-38.

2) Unpublished Material:

Donald Bloxham, 'The Holocaust on Trial: The War Crimes Trials in the Formation of History and Memory', Ph.D. Thesis, University of Southampton, 1998.

Andrew Chandler, 'The Church of England and Nazi Germany 1933-45', Ph.D. Cambridge, 1990.

Daphne Hampson, 'The British Response to the German Church Struggle', D.Phil. Thesis, Oxford, 1973.

Meredith Hindley, 'Allied Humanitarian Policy and the Holocaust', Unpublished Paper, Presented at 'Bystanders to the Holocaust Conference', Uppsala, 1999.

Chana Kotzin, 'Christian Responses in Britain to Jewish Refugees from Europe, 1933-39', Ph.D. Thesis, University of Southampton, 2000.

Kirsty Patterson, 'The Church of England and the Nazi Regime: The Bishop of Gloucester, Sympathiser or Appeaser?', BA Dissertation, University of Southampton, 1994

Markku Ruotsila, 'The Racialist Origins of the Totalitarian Image: The First World War Discourse', Unpublished Paper presented at the 68th Anglo-American Conference of Historians, Institute of Historical Research, London 1999.

3) Websites

http://www.milestonefilms.com/blurb/Fpastor.html.

http://www2.h-net.msu.edu/~holoweb/.