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BLAKE AND THE EMANATION

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ABSTRACT

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BLAKE AND THE EMANATION

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Representative of the mind/world dichotomy, the emanation in most criticism is regarded as a futile attempt to banish otherness, or to subdue the feminine, except as an aspect of male creativity. Although it is possible to adopt a view of the limitations of the emanation as a unifying element in *The Songs of Innocence and of Experience*, and the Lambeth Prophecies, throughout the later works there is a move to incorporate the feminine, so that creativity becomes possible for both men and women.

The implications of femininity are discussed in relation to the ideas of C.G Jung, and his modern interpreter, James Hillman. The argument is based upon the similarity of the anima to Blake's emanation. In his early works the emanation resembles Jung's view of anima, which is responsive to the notion that thinking is a male prerogative, while feeling is mostly confined to women. This configuration dictates the destructive tendency to think in oppositions. Later works show an increasing desire to undermine the male/female dichotomy. In these, the view of the emanation develops to resemble Hillman's description of anima as psychic structure, in which thinking and feeling operate in creative harmony, and undermine destructive conflict.

The ideas of Rousseau, in relation to the works of Godwin and Wollstonecraft, provide the contemporary context for development of the emanation. Initially a critique of the rationality espoused by Godwin, Blake's emanation develops, following the ideas of Rousseau, to accord with some of Godwin's views on the value of sensibility as a unifying moral force, despite the need to overcome its repressive social effects. Mary Wollstonecraft's denunciation of the oppressive effects of sensibility on the female, expressed in opposition to Rousseau in *Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, is echoed in Blake's concept of the female will, whilst her eventual adoption of creativity as a means of releasing both sexes from the entrapment of feeling also accords with Blake's position in *Jerusalem*.

I would like to thank Mr Frank Stack for suggesting the Hillman material as an aid to the interpretation of Blake's work, Professor Paul Hamilton, who recommended the Blake – Godwin/ Wollstonecraft connection, and Dr. Stephen Bygrave, who undertook the task of helping to weld the material into a cohesive whole, and who patiently supervised the final submission.

All Blake references, apart from when illustrations are discussed, are to the 1988 Newly Revised Edition of *The Complete Poetry & Prose of William Blake*, edited by David V. Erdman, first published in New York by Doubleday in 1965. This is the most complete version of Blake's work, and offers the most thorough and scholarly revision of his texts. Citations are given by plate, line and page number, in that order, in those of his works which have been arranged according to plates. Included amongst these are the Prophetic Books, *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell*, *Milton* and *Jerusalem*. In *Songs of Innocence and Experience* citations refer to the number of the song, followed by line and page number. In *The Four Zoas* the first number in brackets refers to the page number of the unillustrated working manuscript used by Erdman to indicate the arrangement of the work. This is followed by line and page references. For those songs and ballads which are not arranged according to plates, only line and page numbers are cited, in that order. Where there is no other means of identification, especially in the references to the annotations, there is only a page number.

References to the works of Jung are identified according to the volume number of *The Complete Works*, published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953-78, followed by the relevant paragraph number.

References to Blake's illustrations are to *William Blake's Writings*, edited by G. E. Bentley, Jr., published by the Clarendon Press in 1978.

BLAKE AND THE EMANATION

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION: THE EMANATION – ITS ORIGINS, SCOPE AND IMPLICATIONS.

The emanation is one of the most elusive aspects of a body of work famous for its complexity. From Blake's very earliest writings, we can find references to the feminine that clearly identify the emanation as a centre of struggle and conflict. An early fragment, "Then She Bore Pale Desire", parodies Pandora's unwitting release of evil into the world, as it traces the attendant deluge of sins back to the initial repression of desire in the development of consciousness, a stage with which many creation myths are preoccupied. The female progenitor of the incarnations of evil, later described as Gods, gives birth to "pale desire father of curiosity a Virgin ever young". These divine beings, or personifications of human characteristics, are strange mixtures of the masculine and the feminine, of desire and restraint, of curiosity and inhibition, and each one gives birth to another. "Pale desire" engenders "Leaden Sloth from whom came Ignorance", whilst Shame follows on, closely pursued by Pride and Ambition. All these births are impelled by fear, and culminate in what may be seen as the ultimate evil, the desire for glory and power (1,1-10, p. 446). The first few lines of the fragment, quoted above, refer to the urge to acquire knowledge and understanding of the world, and equate this with the repression of energy induced by morality, and the subsequent fear of transgressing the moral law. As in the story of Adam and Eve, the growth of self-consciousness coincides with gender divisions, and with the birth of shame and fear. Since repression separates the mind from the energy of the body, creating a disturbing sense of unease and displeasure, an understanding of the nature of evil is indissolubly linked with the emergence of consciousness, and underlies the mind world dichotomy required to make sense of matter.

The majority of Blake's succeeding works follow original creation myths linking the formation of consciousness with the evil of materiality, and apparently blaming the female for introducing such malevolence into the world. From *The Book of Thel* onwards the emanation, which encompasses all the associations of the feminine, is central to Blake's thinking, and though the concept becomes more complex in later works, it always embodies the mind/world split, which is the consequence of rationality, and how it may be reconciled. The emanation, therefore, carries paradoxical associations, sometimes assuming a divisive, and destructive outer form, and at other times a benevolent, unifying aspect. Any attempt to estimate the significance of the emanation is complicated by the variety of forms it assumes in any number of changing contexts. It includes references to nature, female subjectivity, the body, some aspects of male consciousness, and even to the church, which at first sight appears to have very little to do with the feminine.

Both the femininity of the emanation, and its evil associations, are connected with the necessity of the mind separating from the world in order to reflect upon it. This separation is the starting-point of Jungian psychology, upon which my interpretation of the works of Blake is based. According to Jung, the institution of the mind/world dichotomy coincides with the imposition of the incest ban, when the child establishes his identity in contradistinction to the mother, and subsequently to the material world.[1] Such a ban introduces moral distinctions, since any prohibited desire acquires evil associations, which to some degree become attached to the mother herself, but which are more particularly evident in the range of mythical figures who express the attraction of forbidden desires. The urge to transgress is embodied in such mythical characters as Eve and Pandora, who are associated with the allure of what is forbidden, and the fear of retribution faced by those whose behaviour challenges the moral code. These figures then become incarnations of illicit temptations, personifications of unconscious energy, with both positive and negative associations. They are the mythical originators of those embodiments of the feminine who, in the works of William Blake, take on the mantle of the emanation.

[1] A full description of how the relationship with matter is affected by the incest ban is to be found in the account of the hero myth in Volume Five of Jung's collected works, pars. 226-577.

The feminine figures in the works of Blake appear in a variety of forms according to particular states of mind, and the effects of the repression they are intended to embody: they represent the unconscious, and the effects of rationality upon the feeling function in both male and female. The following summary outlines the way the formation of individual identity affects Blake's treatment of the feminine, and therefore impinges upon the status of his emanation. In creating a version of reality, the mind separates itself from the world: there is no more interaction with it, and mental energy is then directed towards maintaining the accepted view, and suppressing any discordant details. This view, created by social and moral pressure, coincides with individual identity, and suggests why each person then experiences the need to cling onto moral orthodoxies, since the failure to adhere to them would destroy all sense of individuality. Repressed energy then accumulates within the unconscious, where it is converted into sentiment, the conscious manifestation of unconscious ideas. In this process feeling dominates the way the world is viewed by sustaining the accepted version of reality, but once the definition of reality has been reached, movements of unconscious energy, which would challenge the pervading view, are controlled by an exertion of the will in an effort to maintain habitual attitudes. This repressed energy only finds release either in sexuality, or by an expression of anger and hostility towards those in authority who inhibit the gratification of individual self-interest.

Since in Blake's early works, at least, the point of view is primarily masculine, the feminine figures embody not only the mind/world dichotomy, but also the male/female relationship, where they signal the state of masculine desire, in which particular feminine figures indicate the level of repression in the perceiving mind. At the same time they represent particular qualities in the female, which arise because of the repressive effects of the thinking process in the male. Constructions of gender, regarded in either a positive or negative light, are shown to emerge as a consequence of the repression of feeling in both sexes. Feeling renounced by the male is projected onto the female, who then enacts the passive role mapped out for her in patriarchy, by expressing sentiment, and compassion, regarded in the works of Blake as positive qualities, despite their repressive effect. When the female, however, attains power


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through the withdrawal of sexuality, according to the dictates of morality, unconscious energy in the male can only find release in violent acts, and feminine qualities are subsequently portrayed in a negative light. In their negative form the emanations have become known collectively as the female will, which signifies the separation of man from nature. This state of alienation is symbolised by the virginity, or remoteness of such female figures as Thel, Vala or Enitharmon, who indicate that natural desire has been frustrated through moral inhibition, and the subsequent attempts to confer meaning upon nature.

In *The Book of Thel*, the main character is an elusive, questioning figure, attempting to make sense of experience, but unable to separate from it sufficiently to discover her own identity in antithesis to matter. Her world is one of identity, dominated by feeling and sentiment. Natural forms express only transience, and so Thel too is "like a watry bow. And like a parting cloud. / Like a reflection in a glass. Like shadows in the water" (1, 7-8,p.3) Her reluctance to grapple with experience, in order to derive her own identity from it, leaves her prey to a world that wants only to stamp its impression upon her. Her isolation is expressed in the illustration of the title page to *The Book of Thel*, plate 2, where she appears as a pale, remote figure, sheltering under the tree of knowledge, her feet rooted to the ground, as she watches the leaping, flying figures engaged in sexual play amongst the flame-like flowers portraying the unconscious energy, which morality has taught her to fear. Her head is bowed submissively, indicating that she remains in thrall to moral precepts. In a later illustration, plate 5, as she contemplates the Matron Clay, she wraps her arms around herself, as though to fend off a hostile world, the bowed head again showing her submission to unconscious ideas. Without the participation of intellect, she can offer no challenge to the way the world imposes upon her. In her guise as the soul, Thel's experience shows the effect of separating intellect from feeling in the operations of consciousness. It submits the mind to the influence of unconscious ideas.

When Thel accepts Matron Clay's invitation to visit her own grave-plot, however, and enter into experience, her vision of the world as a place of hostility and conflict

appears to offer no easy alternative to the drawbacks of living without conscious identity. The organisation of sense impressions involved in lending shape and form to the world is only made possible by the recognition of difference. This separates the mind from the body, and distorts the senses, whilst making unconscious ideas conscious only through the recognition of antagonistic feeling. Each of the senses is transformed either into a weapon for securing individual identity, or a fault line, through which sense impressions enter consciousness to present the world as a hostile force. Thel's retreat from such conflict, however, limits her ability to escape from the tyranny of sentiment, which in later works is shown to have a destructive effect.

This effect is summed up in the figure of Vala, all those characters who assume her characteristics, and in her later manifestations as Rahab and Tirzah. Vala, in the major prophecies, represents the delusory beauty of nature, a perception also linked to the repression of libidinal energy in the male. When energy is repressed, it leads to an exaggerated perception of nature's beauty, and to the domination of unconscious energy in the mind's relationship with the world. This perception is linked with the development of sensuality in the male, which submits the female even more fully to the influence of sensibility, as she uses morality to enhance her power over the opposite sex by withholding the possibility of sexual fulfilment. The vestigial illustrations of some situations described in *The Four Zoas* show Vala either in exaggeratedly seductive poses, or with dragon-like, hermaphroditic features intended to convey the domination of unconscious impulses, and the tyranny of these impulses on determining the way the world is viewed. Luvah describes the various incarnations of Vala in Night II of *The Four Zoas*, as she changes from an "Earth-worm" to "a scaled Serpent", and eventually to "A Dragon winged bright & poisonous" (26 ,7-13, p.317) according to the level of repression in the mind's relationship with the world.

The most violent and extreme manifestations of the female will, Rahab and Tirzah, arise in reaction to unrelieved repression, and indicate the dissolution of whichever ideas hold the status quo in place, when the pressure of unconscious energy becomes

too great to be sustained. These figures materialise in Night VIII of *The Four Zoas*, where they participate in the crucifixion of the "Lamb of God" (110, 1, p.379), lamenting the cruelty and suffering in which they themselves participate, and also towards the end of *Jerusalem*, where their destructive qualities, and their hypocrisy are even more clearly delineated. They arise in reaction to a rigid morality, and reveal the unconscious impulses that such morality forbids, heightened by repression. Their presence, however, always indicates the breakdown of any established view, permitting the emergence of a new dispensation.

The figure of Vala, and the characters that develop from her, then represents the delusory effect of repressed feeling on the male's perception of the female, leading to an increase in his sensuality, whilst other manifestations of feeling, such as sympathy and compassion, are considered to be feminine characteristics, and are consequently renounced. The repudiation of these qualities in the male leads to the situation in *The Book of Ahania*, and in *The Four Zoas* when such figures as Ahania and Enion find themselves wandering in the void. Because sympathetic emotions are essentially passive, their influence is easily resisted, and though they have an essential part to play in the creation of a beneficent society, their vulnerability often means that they become associated with impotence and suffering. In Night II of *The Four Zoas* Enion identifies with all the victims of an unfeeling social system, refusing to rejoice "in the tents of prosperity" and forget "the slave grinding at the mill / And the captive in chains" (35, 9-10, p.325), although her banishment to the "margin of Non-entity" (35, 17, p.226) means that she is powerless to help those she pities. These positive, supposedly feminine qualities demonstrated by Enion are set against the more demanding characteristics of Vala, and other embodiments of the female will, who exploit the power lent to them by their physical attributes, rendered more potent by the sensuality of the male, a characteristic heightened by the repression associated with moral inhibitions. In *The Four Zoas* Enion, Ahania and Enitharmon combine these opposing attributes, all of the characters displaying on differing occasions both the intractability of the female will, as well as the ephemeral and impotent qualities associated with compassionate feeling.

Vala in her dragon phase also has affinities with the " nameless shadowy female" (1,1, p.60) from *Europe*, who is associated with the unfettered fertility of nature. This materialises in the form of the boundless energy of the unconscious, which is repressed in the attempts to confer meaning upon nature. The manifestation of the emanation as a symbolic representation of the unconscious is merely an adjunct of the mind/world split, for when the mind separates from nature, the unconscious emerges, as a result of the organising process, in which some aspects of the world are emphasised, at the expense of those that do not conform to prevailing expectations. This has the result of entrapping instinctive energy, and subduing it those unconscious ideas that dictate the nature of reality according to orthodox codes of morality. The imposition of these ideas endows the shadowy female with the potential for inciting destructive retribution, as the condensed energies explode their confines in an outburst of revolutionary energy.

The shadowy female in *Europe* is contrasted with the figure of Enitharmon who, in her many incarnations from the early Lambeth Books onwards, corresponds to nature under the aegis of a particular phase of civilisation, when historical events are dominated by a specific ideology. In this instance the inaccessibility of the emanation illustrates the difficulty of envisioning the world in a new way, against the tide of orthodox opinion. In *Europe*, the domination of Enitharmon marks the influence of sentiment upon the progress of civilisation. The work illustrates the link between sentiment and the inhibition of female sexuality, which is presented as hindering the movements of energy underlying the creativity of the male. Repressed energy is then only released through a violent overturning of the status quo. In *The Book of Urizen*, plate 19, Enitharmon is presented as a pallid, drooping figure, intent on shrinking from the embraces of Los. Her inaccessibility as an embodiment of sensibility is her primary characteristic, but in *Europe* her weakness is converted into power, as she rejoices in the domination conferred upon her by her obedience to the moral code. Her sons, Rintrah and Palamabron, are diverted from their creative role, under the control of Los, and instead they are ordered to "Tell the human race that Womans love is Sin!" (5, 5, p.62). Enitharmon gloats in the prospect that "Woman, lovely Woman! May have dominion?" (5, 3, p.62). Her intractability

incites the eventual rebellion that reinstates the power of the shadowy female, the outburst of rebellious energy, and the possibility of a new dispensation.

The feminine precedes the masculine, and has a formative influence upon the nature of consciousness, a factor that partially explains the often tyrannical nature of the female figures. In the later prophecies Enitharmon's teasing behaviour as she taunts Los about his weakness and her power illustrates the difficulty of abandoning one's preconceptions about the nature of the world. Her ambiguous nature in both thwarting and evoking desire is illustrated in plate 7 of *Europe*, where she is pictured as either removing or replacing the covering under which languishes the somnolent form of Orc, who nevertheless exudes flame-like energy threatening an explosive outburst should the teasing of Enitharmon continue with its provocation. Morality has the effect of strengthening her appeal, so that she both offers and denies the possibility of fulfilment, and it is this aspect of her nature that embodies the repressive effect of sentiment in maintaining the present dispensation, and its eventual destruction when repressed energy in the form of Orc escapes its confines. Enitharmon's announcement in *The Four Zoas* that: "The joy of woman is the Death of her most best beloved / Who dies for Love of her" (34, 63-64, p.324) is reminiscent of her similar song of triumph in Europe, and establishes the extent of her power in suppressing energy, and inciting rebellion. However, her eventual submission to the exhortations of Los in *The Four Zoas* reveals that the obscurity of the unconscious can become more transparent as a result of creativity. In the later Nights of this work Enitharmon is transformed through creativity, and becomes the means of dispelling the antagonism that leads to violent reaction. Though in this work, violent destruction is still envisaged as the only means of effecting a renewal, the unifying tendencies attributed to Enitharmon in *The Four Zoas* are later developed and given a more elaborate treatment in *Milton* and *Jerusalem*. The ideas responsible for the status quo in these final works are overturned not by violent opposition, but by the production of other ideas, which reveal the limitations of those they replace..

The complexity and scope of the emanation make it a fruitful area of study, one that has to my knowledge never been fully explored. In this section there will be some attempt to trace the origin of the emanation from Gnostic, and Neoplatonic sources, which many critics have identified as being influential in the development of Blake's thought,[2] and to outline the implications of these origins for Blake's developing ideas. Principally these origins help to put the femininity of the emanation into perspective, and explain the connection between gender and matter, a precarious relationship that has divided both long-established and more recent critics. Since the ideas of C. G. Jung, and those of his modern interpreter, James Hillman, provide the basis of the interpretation for the works of Blake, and since Jung's ideas are derived from the same Gnostic, alchemical and Neoplatonic sources as those which inspired Blake's concept of the emanation, a study of these sources will help to clarify Blake's treatment of the feminine. In particular, there is a strong resemblance between Jung's anima, and Blake's emanation, which can be explained by their having descended from the same origin. As with the emanation, the anima has feminine associations: according to Jung, it derives from the suppression of feminine traits in the male, which leads to an accumulation of energy in the unconscious, and thence to a projection of the male's unconscious femininity onto the female (CW 7, par. 297). The anima personifies the suppressed emotional life of the male and, like the emanation, it is linked with both feeling and the unconscious.

The Jungian treatment of femininity, in comparison with James Hillman's contemporary interpretation of Jung's ideas, which serves to highlight their dualistic nature, presents a theoretical approach to the age-old preoccupations about gender that were first expressed in ancient myth, and given a philosophical slant by the Neoplatonic and Gnostic writers. These theories underlie an ahistorical interpretation of Blake's works, which are placed into their historical context by references to the discussion about the role of women in society undertaken by Mary

[2] Kathleen Raine gives a fuller account of the connection between Blake and Neoplatonism in *Blake and Tradition*, a connection that she says was first suggested by Foster Damon. She argues p.73 that Blake was indebted to the writings and translations of Thomas Taylor, the well-known eighteenth century Platonist, for the foundations of his own "Christian Polytheism". George Mills Harper also traces the connection between Blake and Thomas Taylor in some detail in *The Neoplatonism of William Blake*.

Wollstonecraft, and to the implications of rationality for the status of the feminine according to the writings of William Godwin. Both of these thinkers derive many of their insights from their reaction to their ideas of Rousseau, which therefore provide the historical underpinning for this interpretation of the works of Blake, an aspect of this thesis that is discussed more fully towards the end of the introduction, and which is developed in some detail in each of the following chapters.

Though Rousseau, and the members of the Godwin circle, developed their ideas in reaction to contemporary circumstances, however, it is not possible to isolate the products of their thinking from the conclusions of earlier philosophers, which are often re-interpreted in the light of the current ideology in succeeding ages, and which therefore continue to influence the development of new ways of thinking particular to each era. Hence it becomes possible to apply the ideas expressed by Jung, and his contemporary adherent, Hillman, to the works of Blake, which were both inspired by his eighteenth-century world, with its Enlightenment inheritance, and by the same works of early philosophy as those read by Jung and Hillman. Philosophical thought appears to be incremental in nature, as philosophers in succeeding eras present earlier ideas in a new light. Blake's concept of the emanation derives from early philosophy, but he uses it to highlight the drawbacks of rationality, a major enlightenment preoccupation, and explore how these may be overcome, in response to the ideas circulating amongst the intellectuals who influenced his work.

The emanation as a representation of the mind/world split is a device for the representation of philosophical systems, and its implications are put into some perspective by the nature of the argument that has preoccupied philosophy from Plato until modern times. The argument concerns the source of human knowledge. When Descartes opined that "intelligent nature is distinct from the corporeal" (56), he identified the schism between mind and matter that is basic to our understanding of the world. He, however, placed the priority for understanding within the mind, positing its independence from the body, and identifying two separate substances, mind and matter, whose dissimilarity indicated that they could not interact with each

other. Without this schism there would be no means of subjecting our perceptions to the organisation that makes them intelligible, though the complete independence of mind and body, in the sense that Descartes apparently intended, continued to be challenged and modified by later Enlightenment figures such as Rousseau, who features largely in this thesis, and whose insistence on the primacy of the emotions suggests the possibility of some level of connection between mind and body.

The necessity of an element of separation, however, if there is to be any understanding at all has never been in question, but two main strands of philosophy, characterised by the thinking of Plato and Aristotle, underlie the debate as to whether primacy for understanding lies within the mind or within the world. Plato denied the importance of sensory knowledge as a basis for comprehension, arguing instead that the nature of the world is accessible to reason alone, in the form of what we would now call *a priori* truths. These are in the shape of mental images, representations of the material world, which appear only as a verisimilitude of its eternal counterpart. Plotinus, the founder of Neoplatonism, adapted the ideas of Plato in his anti-materialist philosophy, which explored the relationship of soul and body, and which profoundly influenced the later development of Christianity. Plato's pupil, Aristotle, however, argued that the world furnishes the truths on which the mind depends. For him reality is divided into substance and attribute, the latter being predicated upon the former. In other words, substance is the ultimate constituent of reality, though it appears to us in the form of images, just as Plato had suggested. However, Aristotle located these images in the material world, which is apprehended through characteristics that we classify for understanding. Boethius, commenting upon Porphyry's *Isagoge*, raises the question of whether these classifications exist in the mind, or in external reality, but whether they do or not, the conclusion of William of Ockham is that our knowledge of reality is dependent upon the senses rather than upon the light of reason. It is from this line of thought that the later movement of empiricism descends, a way of relating to the world that is echoed in the thinking of Locke, and to whose ideas Blake took such exception[3].

[3] The contests between the early exponents of rationalism and empiricism, and their Enlightenment successors, are described by Roger Scruton in *A Short History of Western Philosophy*, pp. 1-11.

The formative nature of the emanation aligns Blake's thinking with the philosophical descendents of Plato, the Gnostics, and Neoplatonists, and against Enlightenment supporters of Aristotelian principles, such as Locke.

Blake's reactions to Locke's thinking are encapsulated in his annotations to the works of Sir Joshua Reynolds, where he takes issue with Locke's view that there are no innate ideas. Locke's argument that "men, barely by the use of their natural faculties, may attain to the knowledge they have, without the help of any innate impressions, and may arrive at certainty without any such original notions or principles" is in direct opposition to Blake's opinion on how knowledge about the world is acquired. (49). The nature of his opposition to Locke is expressed in his annotations to Reynolds. He writes: "Reynolds Thinks that Man learns all that he Knows I say on the Contrary that Man Brings All he has or Can have into the World with him. Man is Born Like a Garden ready Planted and Sown This world is too poor to produce one Seed" (p. 656). In this extract the priority for understanding is placed within the mind, while the analogy between the mind and a garden indicates the notion that our consciousness is designed to understand the world in a certain way. Just as the forms of the plants in a garden are predetermined by the seeds from which they grow, so the psyche contains the means of classifying and ordering our sense impressions, because of its capacity of imposing shape onto the external world: the shapes of external reality correspond to the mind's shaping mechanism. It is this facility that underlies the idea of the emanation, and which furnishes the means of overcoming the distancing of rationality.[4]

Blake's views on the mind as a shaping mechanism suggest that he was in tune with the thinking of the Gnostics, the Neoplatonists, and with alchemy. These are all systems that owe their origins to Plato's notion of the mind as a container of eternal forms. The term emanation originates from these sources, where it is used to imply

[4]In *Fearful Symmetry*, p. 30, Frye identifies George Berkeley as a philosopher who was influential in the development of Blake's thought. Berkeley features in the line of philosophy that places primary for understanding within the mind. He considered that the forms of the objects of perception correspond to the shaping influence of mental "ideas". In order that the world may exist independently of our perception of it, Berkeley defined reality as an idea in the mind of God. In this his thinking resembles that of the Neoplatonists.

certain relationships between subjective and objective worlds. One useful dictionary definition of emanation, which helps identify its origins, characterises it as "a flowing out from a source, as the universe considered as issuing from the essence of God" (Chambers 1998). The whole of creation, it appears, has emanated from the mind of God in an act of self-contemplation. The term emanation then suggests that the material world is both connected to its source, the transcendent mind, and yet is simultaneously separated from it. The contemplation of the material world, in these terms, appears to offer the possibility of understanding the mind from which it has separated.

The idea of emanation, adopted by Plotinus, appeared originally in the Gnostic myths preserved from ancient times in the refutations of them found in the writings of the early Christians. According to Stuart Holroyd, Gnosticism originated in mythical form from "the Old Persian religion of Mazdaism" (8) but was rationalised and conceptualised by the Greeks. Though there were many versions of Gnosticism, all versions "espouse a radical dualism, which is aptly expressed by a symbolism of light and darkness" (Holroyd 4). A typical Gnostic creation myth establishes the transcendent God as the originator of the universe, "a male principle that existed for eternities in repose with a female principle, the Ennoia (thought)" (Holroyd 4). From these two principles emanate a panoply of male and female pairings, culminating in the appearance of Sophia (Wisdom), who conceived a passion to behold the transcendent God and who, in attempting to fulfil her desire, "projected from her own being a flawed emanation" (Holroyd 4). This projection was the Demiurge, the creator of the material cosmos, including the earth, the lowest and most degenerate of the created spheres. Sophia's desire for knowledge replicates a distortion of the divine mind in material form, through the agency of a perverted deity. Once again, as in the biblical creation myth, the responsibility of the female for the appearance of cosmic evil can be ascribed to the need to separate from the world in order to understand it.

The Gnostics primarily used the idea of the emanation to account for the problem of evil. If the world is incorporated in the divine mind, which is only capable of

conceiving what is good, how is it possible to explain the predominance of evil? The world appears to be blighted, and mankind subject to determinism. A good creator would be incapable of producing such an inexplicable result. The idea of two Gods, one of which was responsible for the creation of the lower world of matter, is an attempt to resolve this intractable dilemma. This inferior deity, or Demiurge, "is totally other and appears in the guise of either an emanation or an active hostile deity, and very frequently a combination of the two" (Floyd, 11). The Valentinian Gnostics believed that creation was preceded by a formless chaos, so that "the blame for physical imperfection was shifted from the creative agent to the intractability inherent in the raw material which he merely ordered and for which he was not personally responsible" (Floyd, 3). Readers of Blake will recognise in his writings a combination of these Gnostic beliefs: the inferior deity or Demiurge is Urizen, as he struggles to order chaos, and he is one of a group of Eternals who appears responsible for cosmic order.

Throughout the whole of his works, Blake depicts the emanation, in some of its guises, as the formative agent underlying the development of consciousness. Just as the Gnostics laid blame for the deformation of the universe at the door of Sophia-Achamoth, a fallen form of wisdom, so the emanation is often depicted in the work of Blake as the force against which the male reacts in order to subdue the material universe to order. In "The Mental Traveller", for example, it is the "Woman Old" (10, p.484) who nails the boy child to a rock, and who, from then on, determines the nature of the child's activities, as he tries to escape her influence in forging his own identity. In *The Four Zoas* Tharmas becomes entangled in Enion's weaving of the material world, and dissolves "among her filmy woof" (5, 14, p.302), whilst in *Milton* the Daughters of Albion decide which of the Sons are to be numbered amongst the Elect, for "whom they please / They take up into their Heavens in intoxicating delight" (5, 9-10, p.98). They take pleasure in their ability to dictate the behaviour of the male. Though Urizen's activities in *The Book of Urizen* appear to be directed against a material universe, these are associated with a maternal nature, against whom Urizen must struggle. The Gnostic myth describing Sophia's creation of the Demiurge, and the activities of the emanations in the works of Blake, suggests

that the principle by which order is created is found in nature, and it is this which impels the ordering process.

The Gnostic quest was to liberate the spirit from the debased order of creation, and to separate light from the darkness of matter. Salvation in Gnostic terms required an increase in understanding, by "projecting the elements of the psyche that must be positively integrated if self-knowledge and wholeness are to be achieved" (Holroyd 24). The notion that the mind projects itself into nature under the influence of unconscious ideas is a basic tenet of Jungian belief, and is, as we have seen, also fundamental to the working out of Blake's ideas. The primacy of the feminine testifies to the place of pre-existing ideas in physical nature in the works of Blake, and links his thinking to that of Jung, through the influence of Gnosticism, with which both he and Jung were acquainted. As Holroyd points out, Blake's task, as described in *Jerusalem,* is to: "To open the Eternal Worlds, to open the immortal Eyes / Of Man into the Worlds of Thought: Into Eternity / Ever expanding in the Bosom of God, the Human Imagination (5, 18-20, p.147). This, as the Gnostics would see it, is the task of guiding the soul towards knowledge and liberation. It is also the equivalent of Jung's process of individuation, in which unconscious mental contents are integrated into the wider unity of the Self.

This movement towards integration is a characteristic of alchemy, which also featured largely in the development of Jung's ideas. According to Claire Douglas, "Jung believed that alchemy was a bridge and link between modern psychology and the mystical Christian and Jewish traditions that led back to Gnosticism. He studied the belief system of the Gnostics, and placed analytical psychology firmly within their Hermetic tradition" (*Cambridge Companion* 201). The alchemical writings originate in a body of literature, emanating from the philosophical schools of Alexandria, and known as the *Corpus Hermeticum.* Though their authorship is generally unknown, they are often attributed to a legendary figure called Hermes Trismegistos, but they became more widely available during the Renaissance revival, when a court scholar of Cosimo de Medici, Marcilio Ficino, translated them from the Greek. Jung's acquaintance with this body of writing came through a study

of the work of Paracelsus, a fifteenth century scholar, whose work Blake had doubtless also encountered amongst the many summaries of his ideas to be found, according to Peter Ackroyd, in the tracts and pamphlets circulating in eighteenth-century London.[5] The Gnostic view of nature as intrinsically alien and hostile to the soul, and composed of evil forces that must be resisted and overcome, is tempered in Hermeticism by the view that there exists in nature and the world powers that can be utilised to the restoration of the soul's integrity.

In the alchemical writings sexual division is portrayed as the basis of the loss of such unity. Jung explains, in the work entitled *Psychology and Alchemy*, that in this body of knowledge even numbers signify "the feminine principle, earth, the regions under the earth, and evil itself" (Jung, CW 12, par. 26). These various embodiments of matter are personified by "*the serpens mercurii*, the dragon that creates and destroys itself, and represents the *prima materia*"(Jung, CW 12, par. 26). According to alchemy the primordial matriarchal world was "overthrown by the masculine world of the father" and this shift in the world's consciousness "is compensated at first by the chthonic femininity of the unconscious" (Jung, CW 12, par. 26). However, Jung comments that the gulf between these two worlds can be bridged, because of the seed of unity that lies hidden within the chaos of the unconscious. Jung comments that the essence of the conscious mind is discrimination: "it must", he says, "if it is to be aware of things, separate the opposites, and it does this *contra naturam*" (Jung, CW 12, par. 30). However, in a telling description that sums up the essence of alchemy and Jungian psychology, Jung adds, "in nature the opposites seek one another – *les extrêmes se touchent*" (Jung, CW 12, par. 30). According to this view, the discrimination of opposites is an artificial procedure, which may be reversed or overturned by a return to nature and the unconscious. The opposition of masculine and feminine principles is the dynamic at the heart of Blake's thinking, which pervades the whole of his work. The perception of a female will in nature belongs to this basic masculine/feminine dichotomy, but the increasingly vital role played by the feminine in modifying this opposition suggests that Blake is indebted, just as Jung is, to the hermetic modifications of Gnosticism. The union of Los and

[5] Peter Ackroyd's biography, entitled *Blake*, makes mention of these pamphlets on p. 147.

Enitharmon, of Milton and Ololon, or of Albion and Jerusalem is the movement that precedes the restitution of psychic integrity, as the unconscious penetrates conscious life. The origins of Jungian psychology in alchemical and Gnostic sources, therefore, offer fertile comparisons for the interpretation of Blake's ideas.

Jung's view of alchemy helps to explain how the feminine can facilitate this reunion with suppressed knowledge. He considered that the conclusion of the alchemists' investigations into the mystery of matter are more properly evidence of a projected psychology, with in fact very little to do with matter itself. What the alchemist experienced was "the presence of pre-existing ideas in physical matter". In other words the alchemical experiments confirmed the unconscious ideas held by the operator, who experienced "his projection as a property of matter, but what he was in reality experiencing was his own unconscious" (Jung, CW 12, par.346). This means that the unconscious, with its feminine associations, is the container of the ideas that determine one's perception of reality. As we have seen in the works of Blake, the separation from the feminine prevents the awareness of these ideas from entering consciousness. Urizen's rejection of his emanation means that from then onward his activities are all impelled by the same unconscious ideas. Psychic integration, according to Jung, requires that these should be brought into consciousness through a reunion with the feminine, and this phenomenon is consistently the means of psychic integration in the works of Blake.

Jung's version of the hero myth outlines the vacillating relationship of the conscious and unconscious mind as the hero defines his own identity by escaping from the clutches of the sea-monster in whose belly he has been confined during the night sea journey. The sea-monster symbolises the domination of the unconscious, the union with the mother, and with matter, from which containment the hero must separate through a series of aggressive acts if he is to attain the exalted spiritual status to which he aspires. Such spirituality, however, eventually loses its inspiration, and declines into a meaningless sterility, a state that marks the reunion of the hero with the unconscious, and with the repressed libidinal energies that are contained within it. If they can be harnessed through the creativity that makes conscious the images

that inhabit the unconscious psyche, these energies become the means of renewal. The cyclical movement suggested by the hero myth is replicated or implied in most of Blake's major works, where it is more famously known, according to Frye's description, as the Orc cycle.[6] Though Blake's version is normally far more complex than the summary of the hero myth given above, the elements are similar, and once again suggest that the mythic material of both writers is derived from similar sources.

The cyclical movement implied by the hero myth establishes the role of the feminine in the separation from matter, and the eventual reunion with it. As such, it corresponds to the ascent and descent of the soul, which is a major feature of the Neoplatonic ideas expounded by Plotinus in his major work, *The Enneads*. Again, this body of writing was influential in formulating the ideas of Jung and Blake. Plotinus posits a tripartite system as the basis of consciousness. The primary principle underlying thought he calls the One, or the Good, and this may be taken to represent both the principle of structure itself, and the unified subject. The second layer posited by Plotinus is termed the Nous, or Intelligence, and this only develops when The One separates from its object, when the emanation or soul, acts as an intermediary between the Intellect and a world of objects.

Hence reality proceeds from the One and finishes in the sensible world. The Soul both borders on Intelligence which, as a container of Platonic forms, is order itself, and on the sensible world, which it organises in a copy of the intelligible order. The Soul, then, is on one side in touch with the fixed and eternal, and on the other side with generation and corruption, in which lives appear and vanish. However, when the Soul becomes incarnate it cuts itself off from spiritual life. Of the human soul, Plotinus writes: "Everywhere we hear of it as in bitter and miserable durance in body, a victim to troubles desires and fears and all forms of evil, the body its prison or its tomb, the Cosmos its cave or cavern" (359). The evil of matter in Neoplatonism consists in the recognition that it is subject to mutability and decay, a fact that is continually lamented in the works of Blake, from *The Book of Thel*, to

[6] A description of Frye's conception of the Orc Cycle may be found in *Fearful Symmetry*, p.227.

Jerusalem, where the world is mourned as a cradle made of "the grass that withereth away" (56, 7, p.206).

Yet, as in Blake, this denigration of matter is not consistently applied in the thought of Plotinus. His representation of the incarnate soul in exile from the eternal world resembles the Gnostic view of matter, which Plotinus consistently attacked. In contrast to Gnosticism, he praised the beauty of the world in so far as it reflects the radiance lent by the intelligible order. His disparagement of nature and the body refers to the loss of the illumination which accompanies the ordering process, in which radiated energy is separated from its source. He appears to refer to the kind of abstraction that accompanies the duality underlying rational thought. Yet his conception of the Soul, as a union of the particular and universal, provides the means of superseding this duality. The intelligible world is in touch with the Universal soul, "that which is not itself embodied but flashes down its rays into the embodied Soul" (98). He compares the Divine to a fire "whose outgoing warmth pervades the Universe – or upon whatsoever is transmitted by the one Soul (the divine first Soul) to the other, its kin (the Soul of any particular being)" (98). This universal Soul permits a union between all created things, in so far as they reflect the Divine radiance. Matter and mind remain in contact with each other through the energy underlying the ordering process, but once this energy is sundered in the completion of any ordering, such completion being represented by the finite limits of the body, then matter once again assumes its malignant associations, and becomes a prison or a tomb.

It becomes evident from the above description that the Neoplatonic conception of the emanation combines both positive and negative associations, and bears a strong resemblance to the concept of the emanation as it appears throughout Blake's writings. The separation of the soul from matter corresponds to the loss of the emanation, but reunion with the emanation reconnects the world with the energy of the mind. George Mill Harper comments that Blake's view of eternity as a shadow of the "vegetable earth" is merely reflecting the Plotinian Theory of Emanation, according to which everything in existence must be microscopic in nature and

symbolic of the inexhaustible fountain from which it all flowed in a series of progressions"(151). The polarity, which famously underlies Blake's notion of dialectic, depends upon a union of the particular and universal, of microcosm and macrocosm, and the Neoplatonist philosophy outlines the role of the emanation in achieving such a union. This is implicit in the Plotinian concept of the soul's descent and return, the fall into division and disunity, which marks its separation from the mind's structuring principle, and its eventual reunion with the Divine Intellect. This separation and reunion underlies the cyclical vision, which in Blake both describes the workings of mind, and the movements of history.

Though Neoplatonism suggests that the soul's descent implicates it in the impurity and vices of the body, and is therefore a fall from the Good of the Intellectual existence to the evil of materiality, it is nevertheless essential for the development of mind. Communion with the One may unite rationality with energy in the experience of ecstasy [7]that accompanies such a state, but such communion cannot provide the basis of intellect. It is impossible to understand why the Divine Intellect needs to emanate, if self-knowledge can be achieved in an act of inner contemplation. This would be the equivalent of believing that self-awareness can be achieved without any interaction with the external world, a clear impossibility. Neoplatonism objects to the perception of mutability that natural processes impose upon our understanding of the world, yet the recognition that the Divine Intellect has to emanate is in itself an acknowledgement of the necessity of mutability and change for any kind of understanding. This perception makes possible the discrimination without which there would be no means of separating one's identity from a world of objects.

Blake's use of the emanation in his work marks the recognition of both the necessity of the mind's division into disunity, and of the drawbacks inherent in its separation

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[7] In *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, p 146, Émile Bréhier refers to the experience of ecstasy that accompanies the union with the One as mystical, but this process, in fact, has a psychological explanation, as becomes evident when Bréhier goes on to associate the experience of union with the Platonic Eros, which designates the attraction of all things towards the Good. There is a connection here with Jung's Eros, defined as the quality of relatedness, which he associates with the anima, is as far as it gives "relationship and relatedness to a man's consciousness" (CW 9 i, par. 33). In Neoplatonism the union with the One, disrupted by its association with matter, is rekindled by Eros. Jung's interpretation of this material ascribes the unifying property to the anima.

from matter, which principally concerns the disruption of energy that is consequent upon the perception of evil. Intuition, which is what Plotinus intends when he refers to the union with the One, clearly involves less of a separation from matter than inductive reasoning (though intuition is actually involved in the formation of any scientific theory before it is subject to experimental testing) since, in the former, separate aspects of experience are linked in a single, unified act of apprehension. Blake's attack upon the empiricism of his day not only reflects the Neoplatonic view of the evil of materialism, but also a belief in the primacy of intuition as a way of relating to the world, yet without some recognition of the separateness of matter, even intuition would be impossible.

Though its source in early philosophy helps explain the contradictions inherent in the notion, the emanation presents problems, particularly in as far as it associates the feminine with materiality, and hence with evil. Jung illustrates through his psychology that the effects of this conjunction extend to affect the female herself, as the discrimination that facilitates the identification of the separateness of matter is equated with the child's separation from the mother. Since this circumstance, from the point of view of masculine consciousness, requires the rejection of feeling, and its projection onto the female, in order to keep the unconscious at bay, the feeling function is considered to be a feminine prerogative, apart from when it makes its appearance in the male as sensuality. In Blake, too, there is a correspondence between the objective world and the female subject. In the early works, as far at least as *The Four Zoas*, the rejection of feeling in the male, and its projection onto the female, demands a passive role for women, which leads to the repression of female sexuality, and the manifestation of women in the role of the female will, in which female figures are associated with the obduracy of separated matter.

The effect of this association is to confer upon the female whatever implications are intended by the status of the emanation, and since these are positive only when matter is under the control of the shaping mind, the female remains beneficent under similar circumstances. The result is to associate the female with the malignancy that is implied by a separated nature or to deprive her of independence and autonomy.

The interaction between the mind and world correlates with the relationship between the male and female. In creativity, the view of the world would yield to the will of the creator. The association between the feminine world of matter and the female means that the latter too must submit to the will of the male, a situation suggestive of a misogyny that belies the liberal impulses evident in most of Blake's work.

However, I intend to argue that the view of the female changes between the early and later work, with *The Four Zoas* marking the stage of transition. Until then, the feminine is presented as an opposite against which definition is made for the emergence of consciousness, as in Jungian psychology, but during *The Four Zoas*, the feminine becomes more fully integrated as an aspect of the consciousness of the male, whilst increasingly in *Milton* and *Jerusalem* the idea that the integrated consciousness may be female as well as male dominates the narrative. This development has elements in common with Hillman's interpretation of anima, based upon a close reading of the writings of Jung. Hillman undermines the separation between mind and matter that subsists on the notion that matter is evil. Though the feminine images still persist as a means of ordering experience, because anima operates through personification, and it is impossible to imagine persons divorced from their gender, the associations of these images unite nature and the many levels of meanings it has acquired. Hillman wants to renounce analysis, and its myth of female inferiority, in favour of "another archetypal structure with a darker and a softer kind of light, based upon other myths, less heroic and less Apollonic, more Dionysian, where female and inferior are inherent in, and not a threat to consciousness" (*Analysis* 8). This kind of consciousness appears to be similar to the one that develops through Blake's changing mythology, though the resultant change in the status of the feminine is not recognised in most existing criticism.

The critics, nevertheless, have been far from unanimous in their reaction to Blake's treatment of the feminine. Some have acknowledged the problems presented by the emanation, and some have largely ignored them. Kathleen Raine, in her work entitled *Blake and Tradition*, published in 1969, recognises the mythic significance

of the feminine imagery, emphasising the position traditionally accredited to the feminine in the structure of thought as the material antithesis to spirit. She also recognises the feminine images as soul figures, often connected with symbols of cloud, mist or water, which she takes to represent the formlessness of matter requiring the participation of intellect to lend it shape and substance. Nevertheless, she argues that the influence of Neoplatonism is widely prevalent in Blake's work as a philosophy that sees "matter as evil and the fall of spirit into matter as the original cosmic tragedy" (1: 279). Though this idea indeed resonates throughout Blake's writings, its presence cannot be regarded as a straightforward adoption of Neoplatonist notions, as Raine's discussion at times seems to suggest. The view that matter is evil is presented in Blake's works as one of the consequences of rationality, a form of consciousness consistently undercut by irony. Plotinus, in fact, believed the beauty of the eternal world to be present in its copy, an idea which depends upon the continuing interaction of mind and the material world, a union that is disturbed in rationality.

Raine invariably places an emphasis on those aspects of Blake's work which apparently suggest a desire to affirm the spiritual dimension, whilst lamenting the influence of materialism. These two opposing tendencies, however, are in my interpretation opposite sides of the same coin, as they both maintain the mind/world split, which in Jungian thought can only be reconciled by a return to the imaginal realm. The disruption of energy occurs when images reflected from the world are transformed into concepts, which dictate the nature of reality, and so discourage efforts to envision the world in a new way. For Jung, a return to the image, and an exploration of its context, is the means by which the separation of world and mind is temporarily overcome. Though Jung emphasises that a sense of the otherness of matter accompanies the emergence of consciousness, a contrary movement towards the imaginal realm reactivates the instincts, and recovers the libidinal connection of mind and world. This means that the evil associations of matter disappear when new circumstances force existing ideas into a process of change.

The evil of materiality, in Raine's account of the influence of Neoplatonism, has no such provisional status: for her, primacy resides in the world of the spirit, exemplified in her description of Enion as "the unreasonable image or shape of a spiritual being imaged in matter" (1: 279). In her account, the descent of the soul from its eternal realm occurs with the formation of a reflected image in the body, while "the intellect energising without the image is the spiritual man at last released from the power of the spectre" (Raine 1: 305). Whilst reflecting the ambiguities only too evident in the work of Blake, Raine nevertheless emphasises the Neoplatonist and Gnostic rejection of matter, without acknowledging how far this is related to the affirmation of the spirit. The inseparability of spirituality and materialism in Blake's work suggests at the very least an ambivalent attitude to the spiritual level of existence, especially as its exaltation is just as destructive to the imagination as materialism.

The view Raine adopts requires the subordination of the feminine, for primacy is given to the intellect, and the masculine principle, while the feminine is associated with the delusive image, with formlessness, irrationality and evil. Raine does not see this association as problematic, as she regards the difference in sex as symbolic. Since the symbolic significance of the female figures in the works of Blake is often conflated with their social role, it is not possible to dismiss the implications of the anima for the female in this way. In linking the figure of Jerusalem with Boehme's Sophia, or heavenly wisdom, Raine attributes a redemptive role to the feminine, but she does not question the inferior position to which it is normally assigned, nor ask how far it is possible to prevent the long-established associations of femininity from affecting perceptions of the female herself.

Northrop Frye's interpretation of Blake's writings in his famous work of criticism, *Fearful Symmetry*, published in 1947, is likewise based upon a reading of myth. He traces the feminine images back to their mythic sources, and then places them within the wider context of the formation of consciousness, particularly as regards the development and decline of early civilisations, which he presents as analogous to the

structure of Blake's thought[8]. In his description, the cycles of history arise as the result of differing relationships between masculine and feminine principles. In this respect the mind, represented by the masculine principle, is fully active and dominant over nature or the feminine principle at the birth of each new civilisation, but as the civilisation declines, the feminine principle rises to dominance. In order to distinguish between the emanation at different stages Frye defines it "as the object world: creature in Eden, female in Beulah, object or nature in Generation, abstraction in Ulro"(*Symmetry* 128). These four states signify the quality of connection between mind and world, and the level of energy needed to maintain it. Eden is the state in which the mind is alive with creative energy. In Beulah, defined as the emanation of Eden, the mind is in a positive state of creative repose. In Generation energy is sometimes repressed, and sometimes directed towards sexuality, while in Ulro the repression of energy is complete. Frye further designates the emanation as "the total form of all the things a man loves and creates" (*Symmetry* 73). He goes on to distinguish between the fallen emanation, which is outside, and "a source of torment" and its positive aspect when, in "imaginative states it is united with man"(*Symmetry* 73).[9] Frye's definition clarifies the varying status of the emanation from the male perspective, though he appears to find no problem in the idea of conferring an objective status upon the female, while again, as with Raine, the implications of such a categorisation for the female herself are largely ignored.

Both Frye and Raine tend to emphasise the spiritual tendencies of Blake's writing, with Frye asserting that for Blake, form and image are identical: "As even chaos is only an abstract idea unless it is perceived form, the sea is the reality of chaos" (*Symmetry* 15). He ignores the necessity of interpreting symbol according to context. That the sea is synonymous with chaos is not self-evident, and such a conclusion can

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[8] Despite the difficulties of determining the structure of individual works, it is possible to relate each of them to the Orc Cycle, in so far as it is expressed through a panoply of contrary images, corresponding to the dialectic, which Blake presents as fundamental to the thinking process itself.

[9] In *Fearful Symmetry*, p.154, Frye identifies the influence of Plotinus in Blake's theory of states. According to the Neoplatonist, there are two principles in life: "Eros which is energy and heat, and Venus, which is form and light. These two principles are subject and object in this world, male and female in a higher state, creator and creature in a still higher one".

only be reached by tracing the associations of connected imagery. Frye's claim, that form and image are identical, would establish the possibility of ascertaining objective truth, and of permanently separating mind and matter, lending priority once more to the intellect, while at the same time leaving matter (and the feminine) in its customary lowly place. Likewise Raine does not always take into account the ambiguity of some of Blake's symbols. The poem entitled *AH! SUNFLOWER* apparently expresses the "aspiration of all dependent beings towards the First, the uncreated One, who is alone self-sufficient"(Raine 1: 219). This comment on the theme of the poem is based upon the notion that the sun is a symbol of the Divine Intellect. However, the ambivalence of Blake upon the subject of aspiring towards the divinity is clear from the context of the poem. The sunflower follows the sun, which if reached would signify the end of desire, the aim of all spiritual endeavour. But this state is equated with morality, and a subsequent repression of energy, as the references to "the Youth pined away with desire" and "the pale Virgin shrouded in snow" make clear (43, 5-6, 25). To associate the sunflower with a desire for spirituality represented by the sun is to emphasise just those very aspects that the symbols of the poem seek to undermine, and would establish the primacy of intellect over the feminine world of matter.

More recent critics such as Edward Larrissy, whose work entitled *William Blake* was published in 1985, and Jerome McGann writing in *Towards A Literature of Knowledge*, published in 1989, have recognised the destabilising structures of Blake's work, as it strives to inhibit closure. Larrissy discusses the conflict between Blake's need to outline definite form, and his equally strong drive to achieve an open state of energetic expressiveness, to arrive at spirituality while avoiding the permanent separation from matter that is implied by that state. He distinguishes between the "good" and "bad" bound, between "anything eternally fixed and definite", which in Blake is implicitly criticised, and "the energetic and imaginative form given to things by the creative mind" (*Blake* 88). Larrissy analyses the ways in which Blake's work suggests both freedom and structure, and extends his observations to take in the sexual relationship, where the above paradox appears to be untenable. His comment that: "the right kind of relationship still involves the

binding of women to men, one whereby their subservience is also mysteriously their freedom" (*Blake* 146) suggests the difficulties inherent in the idea of the emanation. To unite the mind with matter appears to require the complete assimilation of the emanation, which many critics interpret as evidence of Blake's desire to deprive the female of any kind of independence. McGann similarly finds problems with the sexist nature of Blake's thought, though he excuses it on the grounds that his work "displays its wilfulness, and hence its errors, on its many faces" (33). In McGann's estimation Blake's desire to illuminate the truth eventually gives rise to a body of error, in which "absences structure the conditions for a renewal of presence"(36). In other words, the limitations of the sexist viewpoint are clearly demonstrated in Blake's depiction of its deleterious effects on society.

A further group of critics, represented most famously by David Erdman, whose *Prophet Against Empire* was published in 1954, have sought to explain in historicist terms the social conditions that Blake attributes to the prevailing ideology regarding the feminine. The religious, political and commercial background of eighteenth century society is explored in relation to the many references to contemporary events occurring in Blake's work. Erdman emphasises how strongly Blake was influenced by his perception of the injustices of his own time, whether of political tyranny, moral repression, commercial exploitation, or the rapacity of empire. Erdman's discussion of these topics does not often take very much account of the emanation, except to identify certain historical personages with some of the feminine images that frequent Blake's work, a practice that tends to obscure the full impact of the feminine upon those events which the poems illustrate, and also to blur the problems inherent in the idea of the emanation since the notion of presenting the female will in the shape of a queen, for example, is rather different to the implications of identifying the same idea with the female in general. Objecting to the position of a queen is just as legitimate as desiring the removal of monarchy, but the accusation of prejudice is inevitable if every female is accused of wielding the power associated with the female will.

David Punter's *Blake, Hegel and Dialectic*, published in 1982, examines Blake's notion of dialectic in relation to Hegel, and other well-known exponents of that method of thought. Punter explains that "for Hegel and Blake, thought proceeds by negation and synthesis, by accepting that past systems have an historical importance which cannot be removed by their present invalidity" (*Dialectic* 33). Blake's perception, in Punter's words, is that "opposition is a dynamic force which generates progress" (*Dialectic* 110). The errors of any system of thought once they are recognised through creativity direct the course of human progress, and become an indispensable element in the generation of the new ideas that will replace them. The imagination illuminates the ideas underlying each particular stage in history, as it recreates the "minute particulars" related to the philosophy that has formed it. The imagination, by highlighting the connection between ideology, and the events of history, "illuminates the infinite at the heart of the finite" (Punter, *Dialectic* 214). It makes possible movement and change. Punter denies that his analysis of Blake's dialectic implies circularity, but a movement between microcosm and macrocosm, between particularity and universality, between the concrete details of history, and the idea that both gives rise to them and explains them, cannot lead to progress unless dialectic provides the means of evading the oppositions. Frye's depiction of the Orc cycle shows that history is composed of interlocked action and reaction, as each new generation strives to overcome repression. Dialectical creativity highlights the incomplete nature of any idea, by showing how the details of reality exceed it. However, the new idea supposed to highlight those details omitted from a previous ordering will similarly only have partial validity, which creativity will again expose. Thus good and evil remain locked in opposition, as the predominating idea is shown to be responsible for producing unwanted results, and is then overturned. Matter still retains its evil connotations.

This dialectical process is given a psychological slant in Christine Gallant's Jungian interpretation, *Blake and the Assimilation of Chaos*, published in 1979. Gallant takes the transposition of such terms as good and evil to be the moral position that informs the whole of Blake's work. She uses Jung's notion of enantiodromia, which may be defined as a reversal of dominants, to explain that in dialectics "everything turns

inevitably into its opposite"(46). All existence "is informed by the constant interplay of polarities" and there is no stage in which these polarities ever settle into "the final triumph of the one polar principle of goodness or order"(Gallant 44). Such polar principles as good and evil are "the terms, ends or extremities of a single whole"(Gallant 44). Gallant takes Blake's preoccupation in his early work with "the bounding line" as evidence for his struggles against the void, as he tries to order the "petrific abominable chaos" (3, 26, p.71). She argues that Blake's thought develops beyond the Lambeth prophecies under the growing conviction that "chaos may be a polarity of the cosmos after all" (38). In other words, the effort to control the unconscious by imposing order upon it is replaced by a healthier acceptance of it by the conscious mind. This facilitates the breaking down of a previous dispensation and permits the development of a new order. "Generation, death and regeneration" compose a universal process that corresponds with the cyclical concept of time. However, the polarity of which the cycle is composed indicates that psychic energy can never escape the contraries. Good and evil swap places eternally, as energy is at first released, only to be again repressed, when the new ideas are shown to be as fallible as the ones they replaced.

Gallant's work shows that if a union of opposites is achieved through enantiodromia, then male and female principles eternally strive for dominance, first one achieving priority, and then the other, but they still remain as opposites that can never be reconciled. The feminine figures may be symbolic but the associations they carry, deriving from myth, have over the centuries accrued to the female herself, and are believed by many critics to express Blake's own misogynist attitudes. Much recent criticism now recognises Blake's treatment of the feminine as the major problem presented by his work. Brenda Webster, using a Freudian analysis of his texts, highlights a deep-seated ambivalence there, which she sees as evidence of an unresolved psychosexual conflict. In her analysis of the contrary trends in Blake's work, Webster sets oppressive feelings of guilt against a "manic advocacy of sexual liberation"(*Psychology* 3), in which the son strives with the father for the possession of the mother. Webster thinks that Blake's incestuous desires are linked with his poetic aspirations, and their renunciation would be equivalent to the abandonment of

his creativity. She sees Blake's texts as a developing attempt to reconcile his illicit desires with the guilt that accompanies them, and suggests that their increasing obscurity is the result of the inhibition engendered by his feelings of guilt. Though in Webster's view he achieves some accommodation through his union with the Christ figure between his desire to create and the guilt engendered by having to compete with the father, he can only do so by establishing the female as the gratifier of male desire, and denying her the autonomy and self-expression he claims for the male.

In texts published after his exploration of Blake's dialectic, David Punter turns to psychological theory in order to examine Blake's treatment of the feminine. In both "Blake, Trauma and the Female", published in 1984, and in *The Romantic Unconscious*, published five years later, Punter comes to the conclusion that despite the liberal pretensions of much of Blake's work, his vision only culminates in the suppression of the female. Punter acknowledges that Blake's analysis of the effects of patriarchy would appear to suggest some sympathy for the plight of the eighteenth century female, who is "forced away from the agential" (*Unconscious* 80), and in consequence undergoes the repression which produces a "traumatised female consciousness" (*Unconscious* 76). Yet Punter criticises Blake's response to his own insight, which he describes as a "sophisticated incorporation of the 'feminine'"(*Unconscious* 86), "as the negative moment of dialectic, as the movement which represents plurality and perpetual change, reproduction and movement" (*Unconscious* 92). The onus of precipitating any new movement, and of thus effecting social amelioration and change, according to this view, rests on the creative insight of the male.

Similarly, in a discussion entitled "A Garment dipped in Blood: Ololon and Problem's of Gender in Blake's *Milton*", published in 1997, Betsy Bolton detects invisible assumptions about gender within the poem's structures. Although the overt movement of *Milton* may be towards gender even-handedness, with self-annihilation urged upon both Milton and Ololon, they experience this state "in strikingly asymmetrical terms"(79). Milton undertakes the creative task of humanising Urizen,

while Ololon's self-annihilation, a loss of virginity, "seems at best an experience of violence, a loss of autonomy and agency"(80). Other feminist critics also underline the inequality of the treatment of the feminine. In her analysis of Blake's treatment of gender, in a piece entitled "Blake and Women: Nature's Cruel Holiness", published in 1981, Margaret Storch goes as far as to say that "awe of women is the dominant emotion behind Blake's critique of society" since females are often presented as "active principles of evil" (237). Using Freudian psychology Storch presumes to trace what she sees as Blake's active hostility towards women back to his early experience of destructive feelings towards his parents, with a great deal of aggression reserved for the mother, in an expression of "anger at man's emotional bonds with women"(231).

A Freudian analysis might lead to such conclusions, since it encourages a literal interpretation of gender relationships based upon early feelings between the parent and child, but a Jungian interpretation, which underlies my own thesis, would emphasise the collective character of hostility towards the mother. Jung's own thinking is strongly influenced by the philosophy of the Neoplatonists, the Gnostics, and by alchemy, though he takes all these sources as evidence for the workings of mind. The masculine and feminine principles that stand for the interactions of mind and matter are represented by male and female images, whose relationships emerge through myth. Such relationships may correspond to many people's personal experience, but the figures themselves are symbolic, and their activities are intended to reveal universal ways of reacting with the world. Although Blake's own mythology combines references to the social and economic conditions of eighteenth century society with both philosophical and psychological issues, it is the latter that has priority. His criticisms of eighteenth-century society are mirrored by what is happening within the individual mind. All social ills are increasingly shown to be a consequence of the faulty consciousness associated with rationality. Jung's interpretation of early mythology is invaluable for throwing light upon the significance of Blake's mythological symbolism for the workings of mind, and provides a more convincing context for it than speculations concerning the nature of Blake's relationships with his own parents.

However, there are problems associated with Jungian psychology, which reflect upon the status of the emanation in Blake's work. Jung discriminates quite drastically between male and female psychology in a way that would, considering the similarities between Blake's early work and Jungian psychology, lend weight to the opinions of those critics who discover unwitting prejudice in Blake's treatment of the feminine, despite his radical and liberal pretensions. Jung's description of the differences in the way the male and female develop their identity shows a certain bias against the feminine, even though he, like Blake, evinces a strong desire to revaluate the feminine as a component of the male psyche. This prejudice is inherent in his account of the formation of consciousness. His view, expressed in the volume of the complete works entitled *Mysterium Coniunctionis* that as "there is no energy without the tension of opposites, so there can be no consciousness without the perception of difference" (CW 14, par. 603), underlies his account of the effects of sexual difference. Jung locates the basic and insuperable difference underlying the acquisition of identity in the male/female dichotomy. The male child achieves ego-consciousness by defining himself as opposite to the first and original influence, the mother. The female child has to separate from the mother, too, but since she is of the same sex, her sense of self originates as much in identity, as in discrimination. In Jung's view this difference affects the nature of the male and female psyche. In the volume entitled Aion, he writes: "I use Eros and Logos merely as conceptual aids to describe the fact that woman's consciousness is characterised more by the connective quality of Eros than by the discrimination and cognition associated with Logos. In men, Eros, the function of relationship, is usually less developed than Logos" (CW 9 ii, par. 29). In other words, men think, while women feel.

However, this summary does not do justice to the complexity of Jung's thought. Jung sees the psyche as a self-regulating system. His account of it relies upon the interaction of such polarities as masculine and feminine, the conscious as opposed to the unconscious mind, and eros as opposed to logos. Whenever the psyche is too one-sided and dominated by one principle such as logos, Jung believes that it contains within itself the capacity for compensation. This belief is founded upon his view of the unconscious. Unlike Freud, who describes the unconscious as the site of

repressed material, Jung sees it as a repository of a wealth of imagery corresponding to the structure of the human brain.[10] His study of mythology convinced him that the images are not just the result of individual experience or specific to any one culture, but are a fundamental component of the human psyche. In identifying these images Jung acknowledges his debt to Plato in the volume of the complete works entitled *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche*, where he describes archetypes as "active living dispositions, ideas in the Platonic sense, that preform and continually influence our thoughts and feelings and actions" (CW8, par.154). Blake, too, was acquainted with the notion of ideal forms. When he writes: "There Exist in that Eternal World the permanent Realities of Every Thing which we see reflected in this Vegetable Glass of Nature" (p.555) he is referring to the same mental images that inspired Jung's notion of archetypes. However, as Mills Harper points out, Plato's doctrine of ideal forms was "given a pessimistic reconstruction" by the Neoplatonists, who emphasised how distant were the forms from reality, and it is with this pessimistic version that Blake appears to have been familiar through the work of Thomas Taylor (79). According to this interpretation, the reflected forms are a distorted version of their eternal counterparts, unless endowed with imagination and vision.

As Jung's account in the volume entitled *Alchemical Studies* makes clear, it is through the anima that contact with the psychic images becomes possible. This is an unconscious feminine image to which the rejected feminine components of the male psyche become attached when the male identifies himself as opposite to the female in the formation of consciousness. Since this opposition leads to the damming up of libidinal energy, which separates the conscious mind from the unconscious, reconnection with this energy, and with the unconscious images themselves, becomes possible through the medium of the anima. If the anima remains in the

[10] In the *Practice of Psychotherapy*, p. 35, Jung outlines his disagreement with Freud on the nature of the unconscious. "It looks as though Freud had got stuck in his own pessimism, clinging as he does to his thoroughly negative and personal conception of the unconscious. You get nowhere if you assume that the vital basis of man is nothing but a very private *affaire scandaleuse*. This is utterly hopeless, and true only to the extent that a Strindberg drama is true. But pierce the veil of that sickly illusion and you step out of your narrow, stuffy personal corner into the wide realm of the collective psyche, into the natural matrix of the human mind, into the very soul of humanity. That is the true foundation, in which we can build a new and more workable attitude".

unconscious, the subsequent emotional blankness characterises "the anima of a man who identifies himself absolutely with his reason and his spirituality (CW 13, par. 452). This would be the effect of energising without the image in accordance with Raine's account of the Neoplatonic conception of the spiritual state, but in Jung's view such spirituality has the effect of depriving the mind of its energy, and any further means of interacting with the external world. Usually, however, the anima image is projected, which means that the repressed feeling it embodies is transferred to the outer world with the effect of blinding the perceiver to the real nature of the women who are the target of its projections. Repressed feeling endows these women with a heightened and artificial glamour. Yet is only by regaining some contact with anima, that the male can remain in touch with what Jung calls the feminine eros, the libidinal energy that connects the mind to the external world.

A reunion with the feminine is possible if the male becomes conscious of the nature of the anima image, and of its effects. Jung sees the first part of life as a time that is devoted towards the forging of identity, the development of ego-consciousness, while the second part of life marks a return, in part at least, to those rejected aspects of identity, associated with the feminine. The resultant union, described in *Psychology and Religion: West and* East, and termed the syzygy, or divine marriage, takes place through the agency of the Self, which Jung defines as "the unconscious prefiguration of the ego" (CW 11, par. 391). In a Freudian model of the psyche, the ego is exalted to the highest position, but Jung attributes the Self with the capacity of balancing the polarities within the psyche as a whole, and reconciling unconscious contents with conscious knowledge. He writes: "The ego stands to the Self as the moved to the mover" (CW11, par. 391). The Self mediates the movements of interiority through which the ego defines itself. For Jung, the archetype of the Self is also a God-image, a representation of an integrated and balanced psyche.

It is with the idea of the Self as a unified personality that Hillman takes issue. He argues that such a concept does not permit the union between mind and world which Jungian psychology was developed to foster. Jung's Self is an entity in which the ego is contained. The Self helps to compensate for the narrowness of ego-

consciousness by reflecting more of the surrounding world than is usually the case. It requires the restoration of all those facets of the world repudiated in the formation of identity. In this process the feminine unconscious compensates for any lack in the conscious stance. The unconscious makes itself known though projection, through creativity, and through dream analysis; the aim of such activity is the restoration of a lost balance" (Hillman, *Dream* 78). However, Hillman comments that the notion of compensation requires the interpreter to 'do something', and appeals to the dreamer 'to correct something'. He adds, "And who is this doer and corrector if not our old protagonist, the ego" (*Dream* 78). In other words, the role of the ego is to distinguish through analysis the lack in the conscious stance. Analysis requires the mind to separate from its object as it carries out its work of compensation, which Hillman says only "achieves a new literal opposition, just as one-sided as the former" (*Dream* 79). The ego is called upon to correct the imbalance in the psyche, and this results in a "literalism that takes things from one side only" (Hillman, *Dream*79). Hillman here describes the process of enantiodromia, with its inevitable movement between good and evil, when elements of the feminine unconscious assume dominance of the conscious mind.

Like Blake, Hillman is convinced of the limitations of analysis as a means of relating to the world, since it requires the ego to oppose itself to matter in a replication of Cartesian dualism. He links the view of female inferiority that has long pervaded Western consciousness with the scientific detachment characteristic of rationality. He writes: "The analytical mind is based upon 'the mytheme' of female inferiority. Misogyny would seem inseparable from analysis which in turn is but a late manifestation of the Western, Protestant, scientific, Apollonic ego" (*Analysis* 8). He adds: "Jung's unified self with its contraries merely perpetuates the superiority of the scientific ego" (*Analysis* 8). Hillman refers to the same phenomenon that characterised both Gnosticism and Neoplatonism, the view that matter separated from the Divine mind is evil. Since the discrimination necessary for the mind to distinguish itself from matter is forged in the acquisition of identity, when the child separates from the mother, the female assumes the same malignant associations as matter, though in reality the sense of evil comes not from matter

itself, but from a mind which has been divorced from the energy of the body. Both Blake and Hillman link the effect that rationality has upon the passions with the moral code, and consequently with the sense of right and wrong that underlies the notion of a fixed subject. Hillman's belief is that mind can only be reunited with matter, and male with female through imagination, or as Hillman terms it, through fantasy, which requires a psychological abandonment of the ego, and the moral judgement that sustains it.

We can see from this analysis that Hillman's reinterpretation of Jungian psychology is devoted to removing the sexism that underlies it, and it is interesting that Hillman is able to revision many of Jung's insights by changing their emphasis. In Jungian thought the anima is seen in a compensatory relationship to the male psyche, helping to make up for the missing eros, while the female is compensated by the animus, the capacity for discrimination supposedly lacking in women. Hillman sees that the development of the animus in the female is no compensation for the lack of an anima. In Hillman's words "the discrimination of spirit is not at all of the same order as the cultivation of soul" (*Anima* 59). The animus would promote the development of discrimination in the female, but without the anima she would be deprived of the means of fantasy, which Hillman sees as essential for psychological understanding, a process to which he gives the same priority as Jung does to the development of the Self. Hillman associates the anima with eros, and the animus with logos, but he does not identify either with any particular gender. In this revised version logos and eros *cooperate* in the workings of mind, whether the intellect in question is male or female. While Jung regards the anima as compensation for masculine compulsive single-mindedness, Hillman's description relates it to the structure of psyche itself, regardless of gender. He terms it "an archetypal structure of consciousness" responsible for the reflection of images, and for the movement of libido (*Anima* 21). He develops his argument to show that Jung's syzygy, the divine marriage that leads to the formation of the Self, is in reality a union of logos and eros, without any particular reference to gender. Hillman is emphatic that as "spirit is not soul, so animus is not anima, and neither can be neglected nor substituted for the other. The syzygy means both" (*Anima* 63).

This view of anima as psychic structure has far-reaching implications. Hillman places less emphasis than Jung on the anima as a projection of male fantasy, and more on its role as a projector, the factor associated with the a priori element in man's "moods reactions, impulses, and whatever else is spontaneous in psychic life" (CW9 i, par. 57). The anima expresses herself by projecting herself into consciousness, and by so doing she illuminates the psychic factor within natural life according to pre-existing ideas. In Hillman's words: "Natural life itself becomes the vessel the moment we recognise its having an interior significance, the moment that we see that it too bears and carries psyche. Anima makes vessels everywhere by going within" (*Anima* 81). This emphasis on the role of anima in constructing psychic containers in response to spontaneous impulses is reminiscent of the Neoplatonic view "that participation of matter in form is in appearance only. The decoration is a mere cloak over the destitution of matter" (Gerson, *Companion to Plotinus* 183) It also brings to mind the closed vessel of the alchemists through which the disparate elements of the psyche were brought into consciousness. The works of Blake abound in such psychic containers: buildings, garments, cities, furnaces, and even the depiction of the universe as the Mundane Shell. All accord with Hillman's account of the operations of the psyche, and the descent of his ideas and those of Blake from the thought of the ancient philosophers.

Hillman, basing his argument on a close reading of Jung, describes a process by which the natural world becomes reflected in the mirror that anima holds up to external reality. The significance lent to these reflections is an instinctive one, arising from all the associations of these reflected images, which coalesce into a particular unified pattern suggesting a particular response. Hillman quotes Jung to illustrate his point. Jung writes: "reflection is a spiritual act that runs counter to the natural process: an act whereby we stop, call something to mind, form a picture, and take up a relation to and come to terms with what we have seen. It should, therefore, be understood as an act of *becoming conscious*" (Hillman, *Anima* 87). Hillman spells out the significance of this insight. If consciousness has its roots in reflection, and "if this instinct refers to the anima archetype, then consciousness may more appropriately be conceived as based upon anima than upon ego" (Hillman, *Anima*

89). Anima thus becomes "the primordial carrier of psyche, or the archetype of psyche itself" (Hillman, *Anima* 69). This view of the role of anima is implied by the function of Blake's emanation, which is always prior in the formation of consciousness. It represents the material from which consciousness is forged, according to specific ideas, and from which the mind separates in response to the perception of the evil of materiality.

Archetypal consciousness is made possible through the personifying faculty of the anima. As a result of this propensity, the child's relationship with its surroundings becomes crystallised in "personified complexes", which in adulthood retreat into the unconscious but which still linger on in myth and fantasy. Fantasy images, says Hillman, are structured by archetypes: "We see that fantasy flows into particular motifs (mythologems) and constellations of persons in actions (mythemes) (*Psychology* 23). Jungian thought, as Hillman explains, takes its inspiration from alchemy, fairy tales and myth, as these all deal with "personified processes rather than conceptualised situations" (*Psychology* 147). The interaction of Blake's "giant forms" forms the basis of such personified processes: the origins of these figures, according to such critics as Frye and Raine, can be traced back to Greek or Biblical myth, though both are filtered through alchemical or Gnostic ideas.

Personification assumes a particular significance in Jungian thought as a means of weakening the influence of the ego, though Hillman advocates a more thorough undermining of this entity than Jung. Hillman says that "personifying is the soul's answer to egocentricity" and that the dream with its personified images is a "critique of the ego-complex" (*Psychology* 32). As suggested above, this separation of soul and ego remains Hillman's chief aim in his reworking of Jung's ideas. For Hillman, consciousness based upon anima "means nothing less than dethroning the dominant fantasy ruling our view of the world as ultimately a unity of self" (*Psychology* 41). In other words, in archetypal consciousness our world view is determined not by the ego, but by a range of archetypal figures who determine each particular viewpoint. The ego itself, often personified by the hero, is only one complex among many, and a more inclusive vision would require the recognition of many other dominants, and

an abandonment of the notion of a unified subject. Increasingly, in the works of Blake, there is a movement to undermine the dominance of the egotistical point of view. In the early works the supremacy of Urizen as a heroic figure is contested by Los, a more flexible and imaginative embodiment of the ego, but in later works the proliferation of overlapping characters further extends the range of viewpoint, thus challenging the notion of the unified subject.

Consciousness based upon anima requires the plurality of the self, and a movement through "a multiplicity of perspectives"(Hillman, *Myth* 265), each one represented by an archetype that appears in the form of a God. In Hillman's words: "A God is a manner of existence, an attitude towards existence and a set of ideas" (*Psychology* 130). However, all the gods or archetypes have attributes in common, and are all in a state of "mutual interpenetration" (Hillman, *Myth* 267). Any particular fantasy ordering suggested by a particular archetype naturally leads to another perspective through an amplification of the associative detail in which each archetype is embedded. Though each of Blake's major prophecies culminates in what might appear to be a reunion of all separated figures, such as the four Zoas, Albion and Jerusalem, in the wider unity that is Jesus, often regarded as the equivalent of the Jungian entity, called the Self, the mutual interpenetration of the archetypes works at continually dispersing the unified vision, and suggesting other perspectives that may form the basis of other ways of regarding the world.

It is anima in the guise of the personification of the collective unconscious that facilitates the movement of consciousness between each of these archetypes, since anima is mediatrix of the unknown. Anima "mediates the ceaseless movements of interiority" (Hillman, *Anima* 139), and leads as much out of consciousness as into it, for she deals in images which always possess "an unknowable, unfathomable depth" (Hillman, *Anima* 139). Hillman says of her that she brings the possibility of reflection in terms of the unconscious, suggesting how one mode of perception is necessarily accompanied by an unconsciousness of any other. Images can only be grasped through a particular relationship, but their polarity means that any one image leads into unconscious depths, the details of which emerge into significance

through a further associative contextualisation. In Blake, the activity of weaving, in which all of the emanations engage at one time or another, represents the forging of associative connections, which is a major function of anima. When this weaving is combined with the discrimination of intellect, it reveals the unconscious ideas that determine the perception of reality. Hillman spells out the significance of this continual psychic flux, the ongoing movement marking "the interpenetration of intellectual understanding and soul", which is Hillman's version of the syzygy (*Anima* 143). He writes: "Becoming conscious would now mean becoming aware of fantasies and the recognition of them everywhere, and not merely in a 'fantasy world' separate from 'reality' (*Anima* 95).

This fantasy world extends into the world of human relationships, which are supposed to grow out of the feeling function, to which anima is traditionally related. Hillman denies this traditional connection, finding that "the relation between.... eros as an archetypal principle, on the one hand, and feeling as a psychological function, on the other hand, has never been established" (*Anima* 35). He cites as evidence the existence of at least fifteen hundred different feelings, only some of which have an erotic component, though he does link anima with a range of negative emotions such as hatred, spite, suspicion and jealousy, but separates them from "the eros and the feeling function that would conform with the mediocre niceness of Christian humanism" (*Anima* 37). This concern to separate anima and feeling arises from his desire to redefine the former notion as a structure of psyche, rather than as an embodiment of the feeling function, which is supposed to be a feminine prerogative. However, the link he admits between anima and negative emotions makes it difficult to uphold this argument entirely. It looks as though these negative feelings have some link with repression, hence their proximity to the unconscious mediated by anima.

Nevertheless, Hillman goes on to argue that the anima is related to impersonal factors "archetypally prior even to human feeling" one of which is the influence of culture" (*Anima* 41). He refers to a culturally determined attitude which influences the way individuals relate to each other and to society, commenting that "work on

anima does rework the feeling function at its roots" (*Anima* 43). The movement it encourages towards archetypal events helps to put feeling into a less personal perspective. It refers to a constant process of evaluation taking place between the conscious mind and its contents, which means that one's view of the world is never dominated by one's accustomed attitude, with its often unconscious notions. This function of anima closely resembles that of Blake's emanation, especially in the later prophecies, *Milton* and *Jerusalem*, where creativity works at transforming feeling into a force that unifies society, instead of one that divides individuals by dictating the domination of prejudice upon one's perception of reality.

The emanation becomes more complex gradually, and assumes a form reminiscent of Hillman's notion of anima as Blake's work develops. Nevertheless, the Lambeth prophecies, as I hope to show, illustrate the influence of culture upon stereotypical modes of thought, though they bear more upon Jung's version of anima than Hillman's, while hinting at future developments. Hillman's analysis of the role of the feminine in myth convinces him that nature has three levels, which correspond to nature as a fertile and nourishing means of human support, to the earth as "the psychic ground of an individual or community" (*Dream 36*), and to the world's subterranean depths, which correspond to the chthonic world of the unconscious. These three levels are visible even in the early Lambeth prophecies: Ahania is associated with nature's fertility, whilst the shadowy female foreshadows the more fully realised chthonic figures of Rahab and Tirzah. Enitharmon represents the psychic element, the values that hold together the community. The opposition of mind and nature, even in these early works, is not straightforward, and suggests the change of perspective that Hillman advocates through the integration of the feminine. However, the domination of the cycle in the Lambeth prophecies suggests that the implications of this view of nature are not fully worked out until *Milton*, or even *Jerusalem*, where the three levels have a specific part to play in the formation of a unified society.

Knowledge of the psychological basis of Blake's ideas seems to me to be indispensable for an understanding of his complex works, even though they

undoubtedly also bear upon the problems of society. His dramatisations of the interactions of mind and the social sphere only make sense if the psychology is taken into account. Without such understanding, the events of his narratives lack all coherence, and it is impossible to work out the connections between the diverse tendencies represented in the text. Commentaries such as Bloom's that seek to explain the events of each work in the terms of a narrative often leave the reader perplexed as to why the characters appear at specific moments, and act in specific ways. Doubtless this perplexity has a value in keeping the mind of the reader engaged, but this will only happen if the events and characters correspond to some recognisable pattern, which lends them significance. Completely random events would soon cease to compel the reader's interest. The psychic patterns suggested by Jungian psychology, and then later by the Hillman's re-interpretation of the same ideas, in my judgement, offer the most convincing template for an understanding of the works of Blake, particularly when the origin of these ideas in early philosophy is taken into account. Since these are also a major influence on Blake, Jungian psychology offers a fuller comparison to aid the interpretation of his works than any other body of thought.

Though Blake's work, however, refers back to the works of the early philosophers, they are still strongly influenced by the thought and the events of his own time. These provide a contemporary context for the demonstration of the psychological insights suggested by the study of Gnostic and Neoplatonic ideas. In this respect, much of Blake's thinking appears to take shape either in accordance with, or in reaction to the work of the group of radicals connected with the publisher, Joseph Johnson, who hosted meetings for this group during the 1790's. Blake apparently attended the meetings on at least two occasions, while such figures as Priestley, Godwin and Mary Wollstonecraft were also frequent visitors.[11] For this group of

[11] An account of the attendances of the various intellectuals at these meetings can be found in Erdman's *Prophet Against Empire*, p. 155. In her biography of Mary Wollstonecraft, Claire Tomalin mentions that the publisher, Joseph Johnson provided the focus for those radical intellectuals connected with the dissenting academies. She comments, p. 70, that Johnson "had an interest in the advancement of women". The publisher provides the link between such radical thinkers as Godwin, with Wollstonecraft, whilst encouraging Wollstonecraft in her literary endeavours to promote the cause of women.

radical intellectuals Rousseau was very much a central figure, and it is my contention that some elements of the works of Blake derive from Rousseau, either directly, or rather more likely, through contact with those of his acquaintance whose work expressed their reaction to Rousseau's ideas, since it is usually in this form that the ideas may be recognised. Originally drawn to Rousseau because of his often exaggerated influence upon the outbreak of the revolution in France, both Godwin in *Political Justice* and Wollstonecraft in her *Vindication of the Rights of Woman* take issue with aspects of Rousseau's thought, and it is usually these criticisms that are influential in the works of Blake.

As I argue in more detail in Chapter Two, Rousseau had acquired a reputation in England as a man of excessive sensibility, and this reputation provides the impetus for the development of Wollstonecraft's criticisms, though she values his supposedly radical pretensions. Blake, too, in his writings is ambivalent about the French philosopher, both praising him for his supposed role in fomenting revolutionary fervour, and criticising him for his rationality in "Mock on Mock on Voltaire Rousseau". This paradoxical attitude is less inexplicable than might be supposed, for Blake's works display the connections between rationality and feeling, which are in a complementary relationship with each other, and not in opposition as is often assumed. Both Wollstonecraft and Godwin at some stage in their writing careers espouse an Enlightenment faith in the value of rationality in the development of the just society, but during the three revisions of *Political Justice*, Godwin comes to admit the value of feeling as the basis of moral conduct, though he recognises the drawbacks of sensibility in his novel, *Caleb Williams*, when he demonstrates its repressive and conservative effect. Though Wollstonecraft, too, sees the excessive sensibility encouraged in women as a trap that prevents their development as moral human beings, in her fictional works, and her letters she explores the connection between reason and sentiment, only sanctioning the latter when it is under the control of the former in her early works such as *Mary* and *Original Tales from Real Life*.

The relationship between reason and sentiment is also fully explored in Rousseau's work. His *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality* presents the divisive effect of rationality both upon the individual and society, when sentiment becomes attached to each person's sense of self, and promotes only selfish interests, though these may be disguised as altruism. His desire is to retain feeling as a means of uniting the individuals in society with each other, whilst avoiding the drawbacks inherent in sentimentality. His educational tract, *Émile*, is devoted to the development of a method of education that will remove from sentimentality its repressive effect, while *The Social Contract* tries to find a way of applying reason to social institutions, whilst still retaining feeling as a means of ensuring that each individual will be able to consult the good of others, rather than his own selfish interests. Godwin's criticisms of Rousseau suggest the inadequacy of the social contract as the means of uniting society, since Rousseau bases his argument for a social contract on the flawed concept of the common good. Godwin denies that a body of law will ever be able to address the disparate circumstances of each individual, and hence forestall a violent reaction to injustice.

The effect of rationality upon feeling, following the ideas of Rousseau, appears particularly in Blake's early works, the Lambeth prophecies, and *The Songs of Innocence and Experience*. Blake also throughout his writings illustrates the divisive effect of the law, though his attacks upon it reach their full ferocity in *Jerusalem*. His criticisms, though, arise out of its psychological effects, according to Gnostic and alchemical notions previously discussed. In his *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality* Rousseau points to the split in the human personality when feeling is repressed in the interests of morality, a phenomenon that accounts for all social ills. Blake's version, taken from alchemy, represents this split as a male/female dichotomy, in which the so-called feminine aspects of male consciousness associated with feeling disappear into the unconscious. The presence of unconscious knowledge and desire accounts for the inability of the law to reconcile conflicting interests. As we have seen, Blake places his reliance upon the imagination as a means of undoing conflict. In his later works, the imagination is able to override the

rift between masculine and feminine, restoring both as aspects of an integrated human being.

However, if this restoration is to be effective in uniting human beings in society, this use of the imagination cannot be restricted to the male. As well as illustrating the effect of a gendered identity upon male consciousness, Blake's works also demonstrate how constructions of gender impinge upon female identity, and his representations of the eighteenth-century female owe much of their detail to Wollstonecraft's criticisms of the inferior place reserved for the female in the thought of Rousseau, which she thinks expresses typical prejudices of the time. Though, for example, in *Émile*, the hero of that name was to be encouraged to develop his reason, as well as his sensibility, so that he might participate in the running of the ideal society, his counterpart, Sophie, was to be encouraged to concentrate upon her appearance, and to gain power only through her influence over Émile. She was to be denied independence and autonomy. In *Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, Wollstonecraft blames this situation on the moral repression that produces the heightened sensuality of the male. This leads him to value women only for their physical attributes, and accounts for women's susceptibility to feeling, which prevents them from assuming any responsible role in society. Interestingly, in her later works, *Maria* and *A short Residence in Sweden* Wollstonecraft advocates more sexual freedom for both male and female, as a means of lifting moral repression, and she encourages the use of the imagination in both sexes, in order to release the male from the domination of the senses, and the female from the imprisoning effect of sensibility. I hope to demonstrate that her writings evince a surprising measure of agreement with the ideas expressed in the work of William Blake, and lend some support to the view that Blake, in his final works, was advocating an equality between male and female to be achieved through the exercise of the imagination.

CHAPTER TWO

"THEY CALLED HER PITY AND FLED": ROUSSEAU AND THE INFLUENCE OF SENSIBILITY.

This chapter traces the influence of Rousseau upon the early work of William Blake, particularly upon the Lambeth prophecies. It is not easy, however, to distinguish how far this influence stems directly from the work of Rousseau, and how far it may have been imbibed through Godwin, Wollstonecraft, and other radical thinkers who composed the Johnson circle. Members of this group were all inspired by the Enlightenment notion that human nature, given the right conditions, was capable of making unlimited progress towards a state of perfectibility, an idea that provided much of the motivation for Rousseau's philosophy.[12] The Enlightenment generally sought to promote reason and the scientific method as a means of clearing away prejudice, and other obstacles to the development of more just and equal societies. In this sense, Rousseau was not a typical Enlightenment figure, being better known for his exaltation of sensibility than as a supporter of the undiluted application of reason to human affairs. However, Rousseau was not completely out of step with Enlightenment ideals, for during this period rationality was never valued to the complete exclusion of feeling. As Aidan Day points out, Enlightenment enquiry into the conditions most likely to promote human progress "was also conducted through asserting the value of feeling, as well as the importance of the individual subject" (71).

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[12] Rousseau finds that man is distinguished from animals by "the faculty of self-improvement, which, by the help of circumstances, gradually develops all the rest of our faculties, and is inherent in the species as in the individual" (*Inequality* 60). Wollstonecraft begins the *Vindication* by arguing that man's ability to improve himself is God-given: "Why should He lead us from love of ourselves to the sublime emotions which the discovery of His wisdom and goodness excites, if these feelings were not set in motion to improve our nature, of which they make a part, and render us capable of enjoying a more godlike portion of happiness" (*Vindication* 91). Though Godwin denies the possibility of man attaining absolute perfection, he argues that with increased experience comes greater knowledge and wisdom" (*Justice* 146).

Wollstonecraft and Godwin admired and criticised Rousseau in equal measure. Even so, both approached his ideas from different directions. Wollstonecraft began as an enthusiastic supporter of Rousseau's views on the value of sensibility as a guarantee of moral standards, and explored the effects of sentiment in her early work, such as *Mary, a Fiction,* and *Moral Tales for Children*, where it was sanctioned in so far as it guaranteed social cohesion, provided it was under the control of reason.[13] It was not long, however, before she began to see sensibility as a trap that ensured women's subjugation. Her *Vindication of the Rights of Woman* is, in part, a response to Rousseau's ideas on the education of women as expressed in *Émile*, and in the *Vindication* reason is envisioned as the means of liberation, though once again this extreme view was modified in her final novel, *Maria.*

Godwin, on the contrary, moves from a staunch advocacy of rationality to the admission that feeling has a part to play in human affairs. Basing his ideas on Rousseau's indictment of the failure of governments to procure the ideal society, because of the distortion exerted on the human psyche by legal and moral codes, Godwin at first advocates dispensing with all authority in favour of the independent exercise of reason.[14] Though he adopts Rousseau's premise concerning the malignant influence of the law upon society, he does not concur with Rousseau's solution, and argues against the adoption of a social contract, as the means of eradicating past injustices, and setting the legal framework of society on a democratic footing. In fact, he argues for a gradual abolition of all legal codes. In the first edition of *Political Justice,* in order to build his anarchist society on firm communal foundations, he insists upon the objective nature of moral truth. He was to depart from this extreme position on reason and objectivity, however, in later editions of *Political Justice* when he admitted the value of feeling in creating an

[13] I discuss Wollstonecraft's early assessment of the role of sentiment according to its treatment in *Mary* in Chapter Three, pp. 1-2.

[14] As discussed more fully in Chapter Four, the traditions of radical dissent influenced Godwin's view that, in the words of Philp, God "secures the objectivity of the ethical realm, and its immutability allows it to be grasped by reason" (*Justice* 27).

individual moral sensibility, though even then he stipulated that this feeling should always be disinterested.[15]

The works of Blake, too, display both an acceptance of some of Rousseau's ideas, and an extreme departure from others. The references Blake makes to Rousseau in his works are deeply paradoxical, and some of Blake's more notorious pronouncements on this figure seem to consign him to the gallery of villainy occupied by Voltaire, Newton, Bacon, and other powerful Enlightenment figures. The poem that begins "Mock on Mock on Voltaire Rousseau" accuses Rousseau of Urizenic abstraction, the kind of thinking that reduces the world to grains of sand.[16] Considering that Rousseau gained a reputation in England for the sensibility that produced "the tender heart" and the lively imagination" (Duffy 29), it is strange that Blake ignored the contemporary view of Rousseau as a man of feeling, and attacked him on the opposite count of being a rationalist. Erdman notes that Blake's annotations to Swedenborg "mark his relish of passages stressing the primacy of the Affections over the Understanding" (128).

This makes it all the more remarkable that Rousseau was so much vilified by Blake, though when we consider the use that appears to have been made in Blake's early prophecies of the interactions of feeling and rationality, perhaps his vacillating opinion of Rousseau is a recognition that the exercise of reason does not preclude the influence of feeling, but is wholly dependent upon it. Works such as *Émile* and *A Discourse on the Origins of Inequality* demonstrate the interdependence of these two faculties, and the aim of these works is to uncover the most productive cooperation between reason and feeling for the development of beneficent

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[15] I engage in a fuller discussion of Godwin's changing views on feeling as a moral force in Chapter Six.

[16] The poem on p.477 of Erdman's edition of *The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake*, emphasises the power of revealed religion as opposed to the theories of matter propounded by Democritus and Newton who, according to Mary Lynn Johnson in her essay "Blake, Democritus and the Fluxions of the Atom, taught that "Atoms moving in a void are the ultimate constituents of everything we see in nature" (106) Blake's objection is to the abstractions of Newtonian Science. Rousseau seems to have little connection with such a way of thinking, but he did attack revealed religion in the guise of the Savoyard vicar in *Émile*, and express the view, p. 295, that the "greatest ideas of the divinity come from reason alone". For Blake, such an opinion would be sufficient to confirm Rousseau's association with deism, and its corollary, the worship of the female principle, a tendency which Blake always condemned.

societies.[17] Rousseau's discontent with society as it then existed led to his examination of the effects of rationality, and to his enquiry into how far it was responsible for the evils that he saw everywhere around him. His work draws attention to its role in establishing a set of moral principles, intended primarily as a means of protecting the interests of society. Such principles take no account of the inclinations and passions of the individual who, in pursuit of social approbation, pays deference to them, until an explosion of repressed energy eventually sweeps away all social constraints. In his account of the normal development of societies, Rousseau describes how "the destruction of equality was attended by the most terrible disorders", as the powerless reacted against their oppressors, leading to "usurpations by the rich, robbery by the poor, and the unbridled passions of both" (*Inequality* 97).

In the Lambeth prophecies, Blake converts the interactions of reason and energy, along the lines described by Rousseau, into an elaborate cyclical pattern that seeks to explain the connection between historical events. Each one arises as an emotional reaction to a preceding situation in a challenge to the unconscious ideas that have shaped it. Although these prophecies introduce the notion of the cyclical movement of energy as a response to the development of rationality, they are even more concerned with the phenomenon of sensibility, and demonstrate its links with rationality, as an integral part of the cycle. The organising activities of Urizen, or Los, are always succeeded by the domination of Enitharmon, as the embodiment of a period coloured by conservative feeling. As far as the cycle of history is seen as a movement permitting social change, the predominance of sensibility is shown to be integral to this movement, even though it has a predominantly conservative influence, which cannot, according to the prophecies, be overturned without violent

[17] An analysis between feeling an reason is to be found on p.61 of *A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*: "Whatever moralists may hold, the human understanding is greatly indebted to the passions, which it is universally allowed, are also much indebted to the understanding. It is by the activity of the passions that our reason in improved only because we wish to enjoy, and it is impossible to conceive any reason why a person who has neither fears nor desires should give himself the trouble of reasoning. The passions, again, originate in our wants, and their progress depends on that of our knowledge: for we cannot desire or fear anything, except from the idea we have of it, or from the simple impulse of nature". Rousseau goes on to explain that living in the social state removes a man from the knowledge of his immediate desires, a fact that distorts the passions.

reaction. In the Lambeth prophecies, written between 1789 and 1895, this inevitable outcome, linked with the French Revolution, is usually associated with liberation, though an analysis of the cycle makes clear that such liberation is only a temporary stage. Hence, the influence of sensibility upon civilisation is not necessarily benign, as Rousseau showed in *A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality,* when he argued that reason in the shape of morality distorts feeling, transforming it from an outgoing impulse towards other human beings, into a covert defence of one's own selfish interests.

Jung has in his writings described the cyclical movement, which occurs as a result of the interactions of reason and feeling, and this movement corresponds closely to Blake's Orc cycle. Jungian psychology outlines the progression and regression of libido when the thinking faculty first represses the feeling function in the formation of identity, and then goes on to describe the subsequent possibility of renewal when unconscious energy exerts its irrepressible influence. If this unconscious energy is then incorporated into the conscious mind, when the individual comes to understand the ideas that have been repressed, this movement of energy has, according to Jung, a liberating effect. Most readers of Blake are familiar with his famous aphorism from *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell,* in which he declares: "Without contraries is no progression. Attraction and Repulsion, Reason and Energy, Love and Hate, are necessary to Human existence" (3, 5-6, p.34). This appears to refer to a phenomenon similar to the one described by Jung in psychological terms. The two elements of these various contraries constantly change places, when an idea that dominates the conscious mind is overturned by unconscious energy, and another one takes its place. Bearing in mind the similarities between the ideas of Rousseau and Jung on the connections between reason and energy, which also resemble the thinking of Blake on the same subject, I shall use some elements of Rousseau's thought, linked with Jungian psychology, to interpret *The Book of Urizen,* and *The Book of Ahania.*

The main difference between Rousseau and Blake, however, concerns the nature and impact of sexual identity. In this, Jung is much closer to Blake than Rousseau, and his psychological account of the construction of gender helps to throw light

upon the complex notion of the emanation as it appears in his work. Blake's ideas on this concept emerge partially in response to Rousseau's own analysis of the effects of morality on masculine identity, discussed later in this chapter but, more particularly, the emanation in some of its aspects embodies the kinds of criticisms made by Mary Wollstonecraft of Rousseau's desire to confine women to a passive role. The impact of Wollstonecraft's ideas forms the subject of the next chapter, and these, along with Rousseau's description of the effect of the feminine on masculine identity, will be discussed in relation to the psychological theories of Jung, whose discussions of the connections between reason and feeling highlight the effect of sexual identity upon the feeling function in both sexes. The distortion brought about by gender relations underlies the notion of the cycles of history illustrated in the Lambeth prophecies and, since the Orc cycle is composed of swings between repression and violent release, the imbalance is never properly rectified.

This violent eruption of energy was presumed by Blake to be responsible for the revolutionary spirit that pervaded Western civilisation during the latter years of the eighteenth century. Along with most other radical intellectuals of the time, Blake welcomed the French Revolution because of the promise of liberation it offered to nations suffering oppression, but eventually he began to find the idea of revolution as oppressive as the governments it promised to replace.[18] Instead of embracing the conflicts of experience, as he does in his early work, when his thinking resembles that of Jung, Blake becomes increasingly concerned to undermine the oppositions that lead to violent self-expression. While Rousseau seeks to lessen the effects of repression, through education and social reform, Blake eventually aims at harnessing the repressed energy itself so as to unite the mind more fully with all aspects of the world.

The Lambeth prophecies, however, which form the subject of this and the next chapter, are very much concerned with the violent overthrow of existing ideas. *The*

[18] Blake's ambivalence about violent reaction becomes increasingly evident in *Milton* and *Jerusalem*, aspects that will be discussed in Chapters Six and Seven. His changing view on the nature of revolutionary change is also made explicit in "The Grey Monk", found on pp. 489-90 of *The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake*.

Book of Urizen is an ironic version of the creation myth described in Genesis, in which the world is created according to moral precepts concerning the inferiority of matter, which must therefore be subdued to the power of the shaping mind. The separation between mind and matter that occurs in creativity is linked in both *The Book of Urizen* and in *The Book of Ahania* with gender divisions. In the former the activities of Los, in reaction to the collapse of the intellect through the pressure of unconscious energy, result in the birth of Enitharmon, which corresponds to a stage in history dominated by repressed feeling. This feeling, attached to unconscious ideas, and to maintaining notions of individual identity, remains unchallenged by Los, since its destruction would result in the loss of this identity. The preservation of his own autonomy results in the binding of Orc, which means, in effect, that the conservative effects of sensibility can only be mitigated by violent reaction, when repressed feeling exceeds the power of restraint. There appears to be no other way of breaking the hold of orthodoxy upon the way the world is viewed, and all succeeding ideas arise in reaction to the ones that preceded them.

In the *Book of Ahania* Fuzon represents the revolutionary principle, though this figure is really another version of Orc. At the beginning of the Book Fuzon's rebellion against Urizen demonstrates the eventual response to any established system of values. Erdman equates Fuzon with the revolutionary figure of Robespierre, but more traditionally he is taken to represent Moses as the leader of the Jew's exodus from Egypt in their search for the promised land. Urizen's response to Fuzon's challenge to his authority is one of violent suppression. This leads eventually to the crucifixion of Fuzon upon the Tree of Mystery, which means that he has suffered a similar fate to Orc, and has been sacrificed to current orthodoxy. In *The Book of Ahania,* however, the main victim in the battles between Urizen and Fuzon, is Ahania, described as Urizen's "parted soul" (2, 32, p.84). In order to control Fuzon, Urizen must restrain his capacity for feeling, for this would lend ammunition to his foe. Ahania represents all the sympathetic and compassionate feelings that would permit Fuzon's revival, and his continuing challenge to Urizenic supremacy. Ahania embodies an intangible, and elusive tenderness of the soul, which Urizen banishes, hiding her "in darkness in silence"

(2, 36, p.85). In this respect, she is both an aspect of Urizen's own psyche, and the feminine equivalent of these characteristics when projected onto the world. Ahania and Enitharmon represent the division of femininity into two aspects, one devoted to the pursuit of power, and the other to compassion, its impotent, unvalued contrary. Enitharmon's association with sexuality, however, is the means by which some connection with the feminine may be maintained, though the domination of the cycle in these early prophecies means that the feminine can only be subdued through reaction, and revolution: it can never persist as an aspect of psychic unity.

Hillman's revisions of Jung, particularly in regard to the anima, will be brought to the interpretation of the later prophecies, though at this stage some of Hillman's insights into the contradictions of Jungian thought are helpful in showing why Blake's ideas change between his early and later work. In Hillman's estimation, Jung's attempts to unite thinking and feeling do not entirely succeed, since they take it in turns to dominate one's relationship with the world. Hillman says that this is because any attempt to incorporate unconscious material into the conscious mind requires the intervention of the ego, which can only operate by maintaining the separation between mind and matter, and therefore the male/female dichotomy, which emerges when the child's identity takes shape in opposition to the mother. This separation dictates the movements of energy that culminate in violent reaction. Hillman argues that if the mental divisions dictating this pattern are to be overcome, there will have to be a more effective means of dealing with repressed energy, and his version of the anima has a part to play in bringing this about, though this is a subject for later chapters.

Hillman's criticisms of Jung help to emphasise the drawbacks of the kind of union of opposites achieved by enantiodromia, when one dominant psychological attitude is replaced by its opposite as previously unconscious mental contents become part of the conscious mind owing to the reactivation of the feeling function. This process implies a cyclical movement, and suggests there is never a time when feeling is unaffected by reason, and *vice versa*. The description of this process throws up a very important difference between the thinking of Blake and Rousseau, which

indicates why Rousseau's solutions to social ills are political and educational, while Blake finally repudiates political solutions as having only a temporary liberating effect. Rousseau thinks it possible to separate the meanings attached to nature from the society in which these meanings take shape, while Blake's ideas show that there is never a time when one generation emerges uninfluenced by the one that preceded it. Any attempts to make the child independent of his native culture, and early influences, the aim of Rousseau in the education of Émile, are doomed to failure. These unconscious influences are responsible for the interactions that dominate the course of history. In fact, Rousseau's own reflections on the origins of language undermine the existence of a pre-social state, though he does not let these reflections disturb his view that mankind's natural state is one of freedom and independence. He wonders how society came into being before men could communicate with each other, and paradoxically how language could emerge before men were actually living in a social state (*Inequality* 64). Language indicates an innate sociability, expressed in Larrissy's view that "Blake was not sufficiently confident that it was possible to conceive of a world or discourse without limitation and imposition, which is what true innocence would mean" (66).

Rousseau's explorations of the relationship between reason and feeling, which strongly influenced such Enlightenment thinkers as Godwin, and Wollstonecraft, take shape from his speculations on the nature of a hypothetical primitive society, which appears to resemble Jung's relatively undifferentiated state of matriarchal consciousness, in which the child's identification with the mother remains largely unaffected by rationality, and when the effects of repression are minimal. However, even though in Jung's account of the formation of consciousness, matriarchy precedes the foundation of morality and the social institutions, the mother is still the embodiment of the unconscious ideas that provide the impetus for the child's eventual rebellion.[19] Rousseau imagines that the inhabitants of this society,

[19] Jung's account of the emergence of consciousness in CW 5, par. 337, explains the effect of this development upon the instincts. "The instincts operate most smoothly when there is no consciousness to conflict with them, or when what consciousness there is remains firmly attached to instincts. This condition no longer applied even to primitive man, for everywhere we find psychic systems at work which are in some measure opposed to pure instinctuality. And if a primitive tribe shows even the

unhampered by the restrictions of the civil state, and uncontaminated by living in society, would lead lives of innocence and freedom. In a state of nature men would for the most part roam the world alone. Without the competition endemic in the social state, everyone would be content with the essentials necessary for life, and there would be no need for restrictions or restraints on behaviour. Hence in the state of nature human beings would behave well towards each other out of a natural and instinctive fellow feeling, not in obedience to moral precepts. According to Rousseau, social cohesion does not derive from a shared rationality, but from a common reaction to the universal conditions of human existence, which naturally promote feelings of sympathy and compassion between individuals, since they are all destined to share the same precarious fate. According to this view, the contemplation of the misfortune of others will arouse a compassionate revulsion in the hearts of those who observe it: they will not be able to divorce their own destiny from that of the rest of the human race.

In formulating his ideas, Rousseau takes issue with Hobbes whom Rousseau summarises as basing his political theories on the opinion that "because man has no idea of goodness, he must be naturally wicked" (*Inequality* 71).[20] This leads Hobbes to believe that in a state of nature men lived savage or brutish lives, in which there was continual hostility. The pride, which he sees as natural to man, maintains them in a state of perpetual conflict. He concludes that "during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called warre: and such a warre as is of every man against man" (88). Man's hostile passions will keep them constantly at odds with each other. Without the restraint on

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smallest trace of culture, we find that creative fantasy is continually engaged in producing analogies to instinctual processes in order to free the libido from sheer instinctuality by guiding it towards analogical ideas". These ideas, Jung argues, appear in the form of archetypes, or symbolic representations of "truths which are rooted in the very structure of the human psyche" (CW 5 par. 335) The child, according to this account, appears to develop a symbolical representation of the feminine, against which he reacts to form a masculine identity.

[20] Rousseau's view that man's natural state is one of innocence and freedom, which is then corrupted by society, leads to the conclusion that the replication of this freedom in the social state would eradicate corruption. This idea underwrites Rousseau's notion of the social contract as a guarantee of liberty, since the law would be self-made, and not imposed by a remote authority. Hobbes's view of human nature, on the other hand, suggests that only absolutism will be able to control man's wilful passions. Any loss of authority, and these destructive impulses will obliterate the least semblance of order.

behaviour exerted by the law, men would be free to follow their hostile impulses towards their fellow human beings, and would consequently dwell in a state of perpetual conflict. Rousseau, however, argues that primitive men are more virtuous than their social counterparts, and "bound to do no injury" to each other "less because they are rational than because they are sentient beings" (*Inequality* 47). They will not harm each other, he believes, except when their individual self-preservation is threatened. Where no law exists to enforce good conduct men feel for each other an instinctive compassion, which precedes any kind of reflection, and which is "at the same time so natural that the very brutes themselves give evident proof of it" (Rousseau, *Inequality* 73). According to Blake's illustration of the interactions of feeling and reason, however, such compassion is not natural, but is the result of the repression brought about by morality.

The emphasis placed by Rousseau upon the value of feeling as a medium of social cohesion often leads readers to the conclusion that he wants to renounce civilisation in favour of a return to man's natural state. In fact, Rousseau's bias is not so much against civilisation itself, as against the condition it had reached during his own lifetime. His observations suggest to him that society is too often marked by hatred, jealousy and conflict. Civilised man, he says, "pays his court to men in power, whom he hates, and to the wealthy, whom he despises" (*Inequality* 115). Living in society, Rousseau believes, fosters the competitive spirit, and sets its members against each other, leading to the gulf between classes that characterises the social state. Rousseau's main concern in the development of his political philosophy is to return society as far as possible to man's original liberty in the state of nature, and to replicate the harmonious relationships belonging to that state. Hence *Émile* is devoted to exploring the conditions best suited to the development of a free-thinking, independent, compassionate human being, one fit to take up his place in the kind of society Rousseau delineates in *The Social Contract*. His aim is to try and heal the division that occurs both within the human soul, and in society when the law dictates a mode of behaviour apparently supposed to give a greater priority to the interests of others, in spite of the existence of repressed desires that urge individual self-fulfilment.

In *A Discourse on the Origins of Inequality* Rousseau brings out the connection between selfishness, and the institution of the moral law in an argument that echoes Blake's rather more intensely emotive dramatisation of the link between reason and feeling in *The Book of Urizen*. Rousseau's characterisation of feeling as the natural medium of cohesion between individuals in the state of nature changes with the development of the social state, which Rousseau interestingly terms "the state of reason" (*Inequality* 75). This faculty develops as a consequence of becoming self-aware through contact with other members of society, when "a value came to be attached to public esteem" (Rousseau, *Inequality* 90). A desire for reputation develops the instinct for ownership and possession, for though natural gifts and talents may inspire general respect, this is bolstered by external manifestations of success. In Rousseau's estimation the very idea of possession excites passions, and provokes conflict. These passions, according to Rousseau, are heightened by the distortion exerted by society on the sexual instinct. In society this is no longer just a physical need, as it is for the savages "who quietly await the impulses of nature, yield to them involuntarily, with more pleasure than ardour, and their wants once satisfied, they lose the desire" (*Inequality* 78). Sexuality in the social state is affected by the same possessive instincts that underwrite one's self-esteem, when the imagination endows certain women with more value than others, because of their beauty, wealth or position, and "these excellencies whet the appetite while they increase the difficulty of gratifying it" (Rousseau *Inequality* 78).

This natural passion accompanies the development of reason, for this faculty enables man to reflect upon possible outcomes, and to fear the threat that other members of society present to his security and prosperity. He then becomes passionate in his own defence, and devotes all his energies to his own survival. Rousseau thus distinguishes between "amour de soi" which, moderated by compassion in the state of nature, is the natural instinct for self-preservation, and "amour-propre", the heightened compulsion towards self-protection and self-promotion that flourishes in the social state.

> It is reason that engenders amour-propre, and reflection that confirms it: it is reason which turns man's mind back on itself, and divides him from everything that could disturb or afflict him. It is philosophy that isolates him, and bids him say at sight of the misfortune of others: "Perish if you will, I am secure" (Rousseau, *Inequality* 75).

Rousseau here links the development of selfishness to the laws that are really intended to inhibit the selfish passions. He refers to the repressive effect of morality, in which the initial repression of energy demanded by the necessity of obeying the law leads eventually to an even more violent expression of passion than would have otherwise been the case.

> It must, in the first place be allowed that, the more violent the passions are, the more are laws necessary to keep them under restraint. But setting aside the inadequacy of the laws to effect this purpose which is evident from the crimes and disorders to which these passions daily give rise among us, we should do well to inquire if these evils did not spring up with the laws themselves (Rousseau, *Inequality* 77).

Thus Rousseau implicates morality with the division that he says takes place within the personality, when the human being is influenced by feelings that run counter to his professed principles. Unable to gratify his sexuality in the natural way, owing to the artificial value now attached to the sexual relationship, there is a restricted outlet for his passions, unless he resorts to the violent assertion of his own rights. A general defence of property leads to increasing disorder in society, which the law is called in to restrain, with the unforeseen effect of strengthening man's passions, which deference to the law makes him deny. His moral stance divides him from knowledge of his own true nature, though it still unknowingly influences him without his consent. Rousseau therefore links the imposition of moral and legal codes with the repression of energy that eventually increases beyond the power of constraint, and he links these unforeseen effects with the inhibition of sexuality, the conception of the female as property, and the jealous possessiveness that induces a

defence of all aspects of ownership. The Lambeth prophecies are based upon just a social phenomenon, with the difference that Blake wants to remove some of the barriers to the free expression of sexuality through a relaxation of the marriage laws, which tend to define the female as the property of the male,[21] while Rousseau, despite his analysis, appears to have no interest in changing the subservient situation of women, as Mary Wollstonecraft's criticisms, dealt with in the next chapter, make clear.

The interrelations between reason and feeling, and the effect these have upon the formation of consciousness in both men and women, are central to the thought of C. G. Jung. Although born a hundred years after the death of Rousseau, Jung's thinking reflects upon the same concerns explored in the works of Rousseau, though from a psychological point of view. As Blake's insight into the psychology underlying unjust social conditions, divisions between rich and poor, and the subordination of women, ideas that also preoccupied the intellectuals composing the circle surrounding William Godwin, resembles that of Jung, it is fruitful to apply his insights to Rousseau's philosophy and to interpret Blake's work in the light of Jung's ideas. These too show that the repression of energy in obedience to moral precepts distorts the balance of the psyche. An exploration of this imbalance, in connection with the notion of the anima, is the central concern of his ideas. In the workings of the conscious mind, Jung distinguishes four functions: thinking, feeling, sensation and intuition. The personality is determined by an interaction of these four faculties, and also by the individual's particular orientation, in the case of the extrovert towards the external world, and in the case of the introvert towards the inner world of the psyche. In his description of the interaction of these faculties, Jung maintains that "thinking is opposed to feeling, because thinking should not be influenced or deflected from its purpose by feeling values, just as feeling is usually

[21] An attack on marriage is made in *Visions of the Daughters of Albion*, discussed in Chapter Three, p. 18, in relation to the ideas on this subject of Mary Wollstonecraft. However, in the tradition of radical dissent Godwin also made criticisms of marriage as a social institution in his three editions of *Political Justice*, when reason was levelled against marriage itself. In his criticisms of the institution of marriage, Blake is clearly following in the tradition of radical dissent, even though the rationality which led the dissenters to their conclusions on its shortcomings, was responsible, according to Rousseau, for the possessive instincts engendered by the institution. Blake's conclusions follow those of Rousseau.

vitiated by too much reflection" (CW 6, par.84). The anima makes possible the division between these faculties, and also provides the means of a reunion, and is just one aspect of the mind's balancing mechanism.

The compensatory function of anima is aided by the fact that the anima "is, by and large, complementary to the character of the persona. The anima usually contains all those common human qualities which the conscious attitude lacks" (Jung, CW 6, par. 804). For example, "if the persona is intellectual, the anima will quite certainly be sentimental"(Jung, CW 6, par. 804). The male defines his own identity in contradistinction to the female, in response to moral precepts, in a process which demands the primacy of thinking, but then when the unconscious is called in to compensate for the one-sided attitude which then predominates, feeling takes priority.

In this respect, Jung's psychological account of the split between thinking and feeling adds a dimension not present in Rousseau's version, since Jung sees this as an aspect of the mind's normal working, because of its built-in mechanism for achieving a balance, in which the anima is implicated. Unlike Rousseau, who laments man's divided state, Jung regards the division within the human personality as "the energetics of the life process, the polar tension that is necessary for self-regulation" (Jung, CW 7, par. 311). The anima is a vital aspect of this process, corresponding as it does to "an innate psychic structure", which reflects the form of the world as a "virtual image" (Jung, CW 7, par. 300). Though it appears in the form of an image, it is also defined as the image-making faculty of the mind. Described by Jung, as a "semi-conscious psychic complex" (CW 7, par. 300), or at other times as "an autonomous complex" (CW 7, par. 328), it cannot be regarded as part of the conscious personality, and can only be apprehended by exploring the associations of the fantasy images in which it is embedded. These are connected through

movements of psychic energy between fantasy images, which form nodal points, and which attract energy in a network of association.[22]

The repression associated with the anima image occurs when the child comes to consciousness in separating his own identity from that of the mother. The rejected mental constituents then retreat into the unconscious, and become attached to emotions and affects. Although Jung stipulates that the emotional life is "often incorrectly described as 'feminine'", he notes that "a man counts it a virtue to repress his feminine traits as much as possible " (CW 7, par. 297). Feelings therefore are separated from the ideas that gave rise to them, and are then projected onto the external world. Jung defines projection as "an unconscious automatic process whereby a content that is unconscious to the subject transfers itself to an object so that it appears to belong to that object" (CW 9 i, par. 60). The anima is both the projector of these emotions, and the result of the projecting process, when the repressed feelings and emotions originally connected with the mother seem to have been aroused by the women who are the objects of the projection.

According to Jung: "The repression of feminine traits and inclinations naturally causes these contrasexual demands to accumulate in the unconscious. No less naturally, the imago of woman (the soul image) becomes a receptacle for these demands" (CW 7, par. 97). As Jung goes on to explain: "The first bearer of the soul-image is always the mother; later it is borne by those women who arouse the man's feelings, whether in a positive or negative sense" (CW 7, par. 314). This factor invests these women with a wholly delusory power which, according to Jung, derives from a "fear of the dark incalculable power of the unconscious" (CW 7, par.316). This factor explains why feelings tend to mislead the subject as to the nature of the objective world. Anima "intensifies, exaggerates, falsifies and mythologises all emotional relationships", thus conferring a wholly delusory nature

[22] Though deriving from his studies of aphasia in his patients, Jakobson's analysis of the structure of language, was supposed to have influenced the development of Structuralism. He identified two poles, metaphoric, based upon the detection of similarity, and metonymic, upon the observation of contiguity. This, along with Lacan's view that "the unconscious is the whole structure of language" (*Écrits* 147) suggests how psychic energy may move between images with a strong associative significance.

upon the world (Jung, CW 9 i, par. 70). It perpetuates self-division, because it is affected by the unconscious underside of conscious moral principles, and therefore is often the embodiment of illicit desires. However, these feelings, "in moments of overwhelming affectivity" (Jung, CW7 par. 321), can force a recognition of motives that are not available to the conscious mind, and through an exploration of their effects, can help to increase conscious knowledge.

Jung considers that a person's habitual attitude to experience is invariably taken too far, but that the balancing mechanism of the psyche ensures the gradual interchange between one attitude and its opposite. For example, the intuitive may disregard much of the information about the world conveyed by sensation, while the habitual thinker may pay too little attention to the emotions. Introverts may become too absorbed in their own inner world, while extroverts may lose touch with themselves because of their complete involvement with external circumstances. However, once any particular conscious attitude predominates to the exclusion of any other, the moment is ripe for the reactivation of its opposite at the point when inner conflict impedes the individual's adaptation to the external world. This is because the breaking up of pairs of opposites, the irreconcilable data presented by opposing attitudes, leads to a damming up of the libido. Jung gives the example of the train of events that follows the dominance of the feeling-attitude, which may break down in the face of a problem that can only be solved by thinking. In this case, the progression of the libido is disrupted by the recognition of the fallibility of the emotions. As Jung goes on to explain:

> The longer the stoppage lasts, the more the value of the opposed positions increases; they become enriched with more and more associations and attach to themselves an ever-widening range of psychic material. The tensions lead to conflict, the conflict leads to attempts at mutual repression, and if one of the opposing forces is successfully repressed a disassociation ensues, a splitting of the personality, or disunion with oneself" (Jung, C W 8, par.61).

In this case the repressed opposite "has an obstructive effect, thus hindering the possibility of further progress" (Jung, CW 8, par.61). Here we have the psychological explanation of the division in the human personality Rousseau associated with the operations of reason. The conflict described by Jung results from the impossibility of reconciling moral principles with unconscious desires. The urge to gratify these desires is set against the pressure to conform to social expectations. If these override the passions, because of the absolute impossibility of their fulfilment, then feeling is repressed, and the thinking function dominates.

At this point, however, Rousseau and Jung part company, since the latter considers that the unconscious, created by repressed desires, effects a union between previously separated opposites, when at the outbreak of the conflict, a process termed regression takes place. Jung describes regression as a "backward movement of libido" in which a revaluation of previously unconscious contents takes place (CW 8, par. 62). In this regressive movement, the anima is naturally involved, since it embodies material repressed by the conscious mind. Jung terms these unconscious contents "slime from the depths", since they are composed of "incompatible contents and tendencies, partly immoral, partly unaesthetic, partly again of an irrational, imaginary nature" (CW 8, par. 63). However, this so-called "slime" contains "not merely incompatible and rejected remnants of every day life, or inconvenient and objectionable animal tendencies, but also germs of new life and vital possibilities for the future" (Jung, CW 8, par. 68). Adaptation to reality demands a relatively consistent conscious attitude, in which discordant features are subject to inhibition, and excluded, or ignored. Jung insists that there is only one consciously directed function of adaptation. For example, he claims that an emphasis upon thinking necessarily entails the withdrawal of libido from the feeling function, which then becomes relatively unconscious. However, the repressed contents are reactivated by regression, and so reach consciousness, though often in a disguised and unrecognisable form.

In the interactions between Urizen and Los in *The Book of Urizen*, a similar sequence of psychological events takes place to those described by Jung.

Throughout *The Book of Urizen* reason and feeling take it in turns to control the psyche until the latter is designated a feminine characteristic, and projected onto Enitharmon, the anima figure. When Urizen applies himself to his task of creation, he is in fact establishing his own identity in contradistinction to the feminine, through the acquisition of the moral principles enforced by society. The world according to Urizen is taking shape from the *prima materia*, which is both the material of the world, and its unconscious equivalent in the mind. According to Jung, "the masculine world of the father," which represents the world of the intellect, and the laws and inhibitions that accompany the creation of the social state, is here being wrenched from the maternal world that preceded it" (CW 12, par. 23) through a reaction to the unconscious ideas represented by the mother. As the activities of Urizen involve sundering the libidinal energies that connect the mind with the body, the world that corresponds to his separated state is a devastated one, marked by "desolate mountains" (3, 11, p.70), "vast forests" (3, 23, p.71) and "bleak deserts" (4, 1, p.71), through which blow "the black winds of perturbation" (3, 12, p.70).

This desolate world has emerged from " A void immense, wild dark & deep / Where nothing was: Nature's wide womb"(4, 17, p.72). In describing his separation from the void, Urizen boasts that first he "fought with the fire" (4, 14, p.72), the libidinal energy of the unconscious itself, which intensifies in the process of repression that accompanies the thinking process. Urizen's attempts to conform to morality have decreed that he should wrestle with this fire, so that libido may be available to the thinking process. It becomes clear that individual identity develops in accordance with the moral code upon which society is founded, and which it is the duty of the socially sanctioned priesthood to uphold: in the Preludium we are informed that the subject of the work is "Of the primeval Priests assum'd power / When the Eternals spurn'd back his religion" (2, 1-2, p.70). Urizen combines both subjectivity, and priesthood, thus emphasising the influence of society, with its moral precepts, on the formation of individual identity. The connection between morality and identity supports Rousseau's analysis of the effect of rationality on the human personality, and resembles Jung's description of the emergence of the social self according to

moral precepts. Urizen is preoccupied with preserving his own holiness, his own sense of self, and to do this he inscribes the moral code into "the Book of eternal brass" (4, 32-33, p.72).

With the imposition of a strict moral code, all Urizen's efforts are aimed at keeping libidinal energy under control. His activities involve an extreme exertion of the will in order to keep at bay the energies that would threaten to swallow up all his achievements. The conflict between moral principles, and unconscious desires rehearses the division of being that Rousseau attributes to the reasoning process. Urizen "strove in battles dire" (3, 13, p.70), "unseen in tormenting passions" (3, 19, p.71), "In enormous labours occupied" (3, 22, p.71). Urizen here reminds us of the figure of the divine hero, engaged in accomplishing the *opus magnum* or victory over death in an effort to avoid being swallowed up by the dragon. The heroic figure struggles to maintain his identity in the face of the unconscious forces by which it is threatened. His struggles "With terrible monsters Sin-bred" (4, 28, p.72) mark his attempts to subdue the libidinal energy that would prompt a transgression of the "Laws of peace, of love, of unity" (4, 34, p.72). His efforts split the libido, leading to the domination of the unconscious, as "Sund'ring, dark'ning, thund'ring! / Rent away with a terrible crash / Eternity roll'd wide apart" (5, 3-5, p.73). His repressed passions overwhelm all moral imperatives.

The description of the succeeding cataclysmic upheavals of the earth and the oceans, as "The Roaring fires ran oe'r the heav'ns / In whirlwinds & cataracts of blood" (5, 11-12, p.73) suggest the turbulence of the repressed libidinal energy that composes the unconscious which, owing to the splitting of the libido, is not available to the conscious mind. We are here reminded of Rousseau's description of the effects of morality, when the repression of desire eventually leads to a more violent expression of passion than would have otherwise been the case. The repressed energies build up to create a force that cannot be held in check by moral principles.

The conflict of feeling and morality is a subject discussed in two essays entitled *Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious*. In these works Jung describes how the persona develops, according to social proscriptions, as a mask "designed on the one hand to make a definite impression upon others, and, on the other, to conceal the true nature of the individual" (CW7, par. 395). The ego is often driven into an identification with the persona, so that the individual's social behaviour may be taken to represent each person's true self when, in fact, it only represents the results of conforming to notions of propriety and the moral code. Jung notes, however, that: "A man cannot get rid of himself in favour of an artificial personality without punishment" (CW7, par. 307). He goes on to describe how the unconscious makes itself felt in "the form of bad moods, affects, phobias, compulsive ideas, backsliding, vices etc" (CW 7, par. 307). The external pressure of conforming to the social proprieties appears to create an equal pressure from the unconscious in an expression of all the suppressed tendencies that the conscious mind will not allow.

These tendencies for the most part are linked with the emotions, which become separated from the ideas that gave rise to them. Hence it is possible to lead a highly principled, spiritual existence, whilst harbouring a range of turbulent emotions of uncertain origin. The toll, however, of keeping these in check may be extreme. Jung's description of the typical reaction of the unconscious mind in the face of the will-power needed to maintain a hard-won persona is reminiscent of Urizen's collapse after his initial struggles to create his world. Blake describes how Urizen spent "long periods in burning fires labouring / Till hoary, and age-broke, and aged, / In despair and the shadows of death" (5, 25 – 27, p.73). Jung's account of the collapse of a patient after similar immense labours appears to echo Urizen's psychic condition:

> "All that had formerly been living, creative energy in him now turned against him with terrible destroying force. His creative genius rose up, as it were, in revolt against him: and just as before he had built up great organisations in the world, so now his daemon spun equally subtle systems

of hypochondriacal delusion that completely annihilated him. When I saw him he was already a hopeless moral ruin" (CW 7, par. 74)

Urizen similarly faces the retreat of his previous moral principles into the formlessness of the unconscious, on being "laid in a stony sleep / unorganiz'd, rent from Eternity (6, 6-7, p.74). The energy exerted by his will has given out, and is now represented by the "intense fires" of the unconscious (6, 5, p. 74). The world that he created in response to morality now appears as a black globe "Like a human heart struggling & beating" (5, 36, p.73). The particular form of the world is still a reflection of Urizenic morality, but the principles themselves have reverted into the unconscious, and are now experienced as instinct and emotion, the attributes of the selfish heart, created as a direct result of moral principles. Once again, Rousseau's account of the creation of amour-propre accords with Jung's psychology. Moral principles imposed with great severity eventually culminate in covert selfishness.

Urizen's law-making, and the titanic effort he makes to obey his own laws "of peace, of love, of unity: / Of pity, compassion, forgiveness" (4, 34-35, p.72) eventually lead to the repressed energy that creates the unconscious, and the domination of unconscious ideas upon the individual and society through the feelings to which these ideas are attached. Hence the passions, supposedly controlled by the law and the moral code, initially emerge in a diluted form as sensibility, but eventually under the influence of repression their power swells into a form that completely bypasses the inhibiting factor that is present in morality.

As a result of the collapse of reason, Urizen is now "laid in a stony sleep / Unorganised, rent from Eternity (6, 7-8, p.74). The intellect has no means of engaging with the world, since it is separated from the libidinal energy that now resides in the unconscious, but which nevertheless creates a sensibility that determines moral conduct. We are reminded here of Jung's description of the compensatory movements of the psyche. The collapse of Urizen is the effect of a rational attitude to the world that, in an effort to repel the feminine unconscious, is carried too far. At this point the intuition, with its connections with the unconscious

takes over, and through synthesis, as opposed to Urizen's analytical approach, Los tries to recreate the moral principles that are now enshrined only in feeling. The balancing mechanism of the mind here comes into play, when Urizen's introversion, suggested by his attempts to shape matter in accordance with unconscious principles, is replaced by the more extroverted activities of Los, who discovers the unconscious ideas held by Urizen through his attempts to order the material world. He can only recreate these principles through his own hostile reaction to the repression that Urizenic morality has imposed. Los tries to create a concrete representation of the world that is now dominated through the unconscious, and so uncover the moral principles that have so distorted it. Ironically, his attempts at synthesis are hardly more successful than Urizenic analysis, since they cannot escape the implications of the ideas to which Los is opposed, and the world they suggest is a blighted one, in which energy is repressed, leading to an even more decisive division of masculine and feminine principles than had previously been the case. Since the creative efforts of Los are so unsatisfactory, energy is withheld from the world represented by the distorted body of Urizen. As this is "cut off from life & light /Into horrible forms of deformity" (13, 42-43, p.77), it comes to represent the separated world of matter. Urizen's opposition to the feminine was unconscious, but Los, more influenced by his feelings, projects these onto "the first female now separate" (18, 10, p.78), and so seals the gender division, first created by Urizen.

Hilllman's analysis of the effect of the formation of ego-consciousness help to explain this division, and it also suggests why he finds Jung's notion of enantiodromia unsatisfactory as a means of uniting divided opposites. According to Jung, when the activity of thinking is taken too far, it is replaced by the feeling function, but in Hillman's view this merely represents the replacement of one one-sided view by another. The two faculties never cooperate in the workings of mind. They cannot do so because of the view of matter, and the feminine, that rationality imposes. Apollonic consciousness, which is Hillman's term for rationality, demands the clarity and objectivity that accompanies the view of the separateness of matter. Hillman describes the Apollonic view of the feminine as "the archetypal factor in the female inferiority theories of our time" (*Myth* 221). According to Hillman,

Apollonic consciousness "kills from a distance (its distance kills), and, keeping the scientific cut of objectivity, it never merges with, or 'marries' its material" (*Myth* 250).

The objectivity, however, is a myth, for it rests upon the assumption of "male primacy" and "the secondary, derivative nature of woman" (Hillman, *Myth* 217). The Adam and Eve story in the Genesis myth is a primary source of the theory of female inferiority. In this well-known story the male is created first in the image of God, and is superior in consciousness, whilst Eve is created from "Adam's deep sleep, from his unconsciousness" (Hillman, *Myth* 217). This mistaken notion of male primacy identifies the female as the *prima materia,* the passive and unconscious provider of nourishment for the developing embryo, as opposed to the "active, formative, generative principle" which belongs wholly to the male (Hillman, *Myth* 229). As Hillman points out:

> Theory forming is thus as free and fantastic as the imagination; it is limited perhaps even less by observational data than by the archetypal a priori dominants of the imagination, the preformation of ideas acting as preconceptions that determine how and what one observes (*Myth* 220).

The activity of Los is succeeded by a passivity that marks the dominance of the emotions, a state that is inimical to traditional notions of masculine identity, so these feelings are projected onto the female, as Jung described, and since they are accompanied by numinous unconscious associations, they lend the female a power that Blake commemorates in the figure of the female will. When Los sees in the blighted body of Urizen the effects of his creative efforts, he becomes consumed by pity, and so "suffer'd his fires to decay" (13, 44, p.77). The Urizenic world he has recreated as a result of morality shows hardly any more evidence of its original unity than when it was dominated by abstract principles. The aggression and cruelty demonstrated by Los towards the enemy who created his blighted world is succeeded by pity, as the active organising of experience is replaced by the domination of the unconscious, and the feeling attached to unconscious ideas.

Simultaneously, the female is born from "the globe of life-blood trembling" (15, 13, p.78). With that, the eternals, petrified at the sight of the first separated female, erected a curtain to hide the disturbing vision, as "With infinite labour the Eternals / A woof wove and called it Science" (19, 9, p.78). At the same time, "They called her Pity and fled" (19, 1, p. 78). Sensibility has sealed the perception of a separated nature, which is then renounced and projected onto the female herself.

It is significant that the separation of masculine and feminine principles coincides with Los's consciousness of the inferiority of the Urizenic body. This appears inferior owing to the effect of the cut of objectivity on the flow of libido, as the mind separates itself from the matter upon which it is focused. The results of Los's creativity are far from satisfactory. The human body only serves to confine, and enclose, as "bones of solidness, froze / over all his nerves of joy" (10, 40-1, p.75). The confining body corresponds to the narrowness of a world dominated by ego-consciousness, and an accompanying underdevelopment of the senses. One's view of the world is dominated by the selfish passions, a state represented by the connections forged in Urizen's body as "His nervous brain shot branches / Round the branches of his heart / On high into two little Orbs / And fixed into two little caves" (12, 11-14, p.76). Los's blinkered vision, dominated by his own selfish interests, merely allows him to see his own particular point of view, which corresponds to the deformed physical body. However, this sense of physical inferiority only serves to undercut the notion of masculine supremacy inherent in the idea of a separated nature. Such feelings of inferiority are therefore projected onto the female herself. In Hillman's words:

> Upon the physical body of the feminine the fantasies of female inferiority become most florid, since just here the abysmal side of bodily man with his animal passions and instinctual nature is constellated (*Myth* 219).

The female becomes associated with the instincts and the passions, just those aspects of human nature that Apollonic consciousness desires to reject, since they threaten the objectivity that guarantees a fixed identity. According to the

conventional wisdom described by Hillman, the masculine is an active category, a fiction that is only maintained through an insistence on the passivity of the feminine. Hillman shows us that reason does not present us with an objective view of the world, as is often believed, since the principles that suggest any particular conclusion are not usually overt, but reside in the unconscious, only to make their presence felt in the predominance of the particular emotion to which they are attached. In other words, feelings are the conscious manifestations of unconscious ideas. In reality, these ideas dictate our organisation of experience, producing data that may appear to be objective, but which derives nevertheless from a subjective vantage point. The myth of female inferiority emerges from the need of the male to assert his own masculine identity in contradistinction to the feminine, which in the first place is represented to the developing infant by the presence of his mother. However, the feminine principle to which the child reacts would exert an unconscious influence, of which the child would be largely unaware.

Hence it might seem as though the masculine principle was prior in determining the nature of the world, and this perception would direct the attention to the data in the environment that would lend support to such a notion. Blake's *Book of Urizen* gives an account of the birth of the female, Enitharmon, from the male in a manner reminiscent of the creation of Eve from Adam's rib, to present an ironic version of the myth of female inferiority to which Hillman draws attention. His view of the connection between misogyny and science seems apposite in explaining the misogynist implications of the male apparently giving birth to the female, and then promptly rejecting her, whilst simultaneously inventing science. The same empirical attitude is also responsible for the rejection of feeling implied by the horrified flight of the eternals from the pitiful sight of the separated female. Blake's irony also extends to this rejection, since it maintains the gulf between world and mind that is the consequence of rationality. The general dismay which greets the appearance of "the first female now separate" might support the argument that the misogyny described is, in fact, Blake's own, though it might equally well refer to the misogyny inherent in the very notion of scientific objectivity.

When one considers that the events described in *The Book Of Urizen* are so strongly coloured by Blake's irony, it seems strange that so many male critics from previous generations are moved to praise Los as an essentially active hero. They are, in fact, echoing the male illusion that the masculine is an active category as expounded by Hillman without taking into account that the active organisation of experience eventually culminates in passivity, in both male and female, while the failure to harness such passivity hinders the creative process. Bloom comments, for example, that: "Blake's crucial separation from the Romantics who followed him is centered on his increasing identification with Los, the only Romantic hero whose primary role is activity rather than passive suffering" (*Visionary Company* 75). The implication of Bloom is that all Los's troubles arose because he could not maintain his creativity, but a major tenet of Jung's thinking, which is equally vital in Hillman's adaptations of it, involves the connection between creation and destruction. Creativity cannot be maintained unless the libido is allowed to regress into the unconscious, thus dredging up "the slime from the deep", from which comes renewal. This depends upon an acceptance of passivity.

Frye, too, fails to consider the connection between creativity and passivity in his interpretations of Blake's thought. Throughout *Fearful Symmetry* he emphasises the movement towards the apprehension of an ultimate reality, which cannot escape the implication that the creative process is inspired by a goal, which will, if reached, mark the end of all creativity. Such comments as "Truth exists only in the total form which the mind makes of reality" (*Symmetry* 159) and "The real man ... is the total form of his creative acts" (*Symmetry* 247) imply a faith not so much in the creative process, as in its products. In that case, presumably, once the truth is reached, there is no option but to accede to the passive state which he condemns.

It is instructive that Los's pity, the passivity that many critics so often belabour, eventually leads to the union with Enitharmon and the birth of Orc. This union corresponds to Jung's syzygy, which he sees as representing a bid for wholeness, or "the totality formed by the royal brother- sister pair, and hence the tension of opposites from which the divine child is born as the symbol of unity" (CW 9 ii, par.

59). It seems that the union of Los and Enitharmon represents the former's resumption of those feminine qualities he had previously rejected. In Jung's terms this entails assimilating the contents of the collective unconscious, and recognising that one's view of the female is coloured by projection. Jung says that this entails separating conscious and unconscious processes, so that the latter may be observed objectively, and the unconscious component recognised, leading to "a possible synthesis of the unconscious elements of knowledge and action. This in turn leads to a shifting of the centre of the personality from the ego to the Self" (Jung, CW 9 i, par. 304).

This happy outcome is hardly suggested by the circumstances surrounding the birth of Orc, which is accompanied by the appearance of a hissing serpent, and greeted with universal dismay. The birth finally consolidates the separation of Los from eternity, since it accompanies the reappearance of the unconscious, which Urizen had created and then tried so hard to repel. Because it is surrounded by so many gloomy forebodings, the event hardly seems propitious, and the renewal of energy, which the birth of the child intimates, is short-lived. Los is consumed by jealousy, since Orc represents the experience of wholeness, which Los has renounced, and so the child is bound with the chain of jealousy. He is circumscribed by the same prohibitions as both Urizen, and Los, even though he represents a rebellious reaction to them. This very reaction consolidates their influence, and supports Hillman's contention that it is impossible to achieve a "coniunctio" by replacing one dominant with another. The effort to understand the unconscious roots of feeling merely leads to a reactivation of the thinking process, and to an imposition once again of repression. The vacillating movement between reason and feeling is merely perpetuated, without achieving the goal of unity, while the female herself, Enitharmon, receives Los's projections, identifies with the passivity that is supposedly a feminine attribute, and then exercises the power lent to her by the very situation that is supposed to ensure her submission to the dominant patriarchal ideology.

Her consciousness, which in any case "is characterised more by the quality of Eros than by the discrimination and cognition of Logos" (Jung, CW9 ii, par. 29) has absorbed the projections of Los, and so she obligingly acts out the passive and emotional role to which she has been assigned, and her passivity secures her obedience to the moral code. Her obedience to the morality that dictates chastity before marriage, and fidelity afterwards, has the effect of increasing her power over Los, since her seductive appeal is heightened by her inaccessibility. Rousseau's description of the impact of the moral code, when the repressive effects of the law is exacerbated by the female's value in the assertion of identity, is here echoed in Enitharmon's behaviour. The passivity enjoined upon her in an effort to preserve male autonomy ironically has the very opposite effect. The dependence of Los on the being that he pities is well illustrated: "He embrac'd her, she wept, she refusd / In perverse and cruel delight / She fled from his arms, yet he followed" (19, 11-13, p.79).

In *The Book of Urizen* we are thus presented with one of the earliest manifestation of the female will, a notion that Blake appears to have invented, and which does not appear fully-fledged in Jungian psychology. In his explanations of the effect of anima upon the psyche of men, however, Jung offers some explanation for the negative feelings that are inspired in the male by the anima figure in some of its manifestations. His comment that "much of the fear which the female sex arouses in men is due to the projection of the anima image" (CW9 i, par. 357) helps to put into perspective some of the hostility that appears to surround the many depictions of the female will. The numinosity of the anima figure descends directly from the mother archetype, since "to the young boy a clearly discernable anima-form appears in his mother, and this lends her the radiance of power and superiority, or else a daimonic aura of even greater fascination" (Jung, CW9 i, par. 357). Since the mother archetype can appear in either a positive or negative form, the anima too embodies such polarities. When the anima takes on the qualities of the depriving mother, as Enitharmon does in her sexual teasing of Los, then all the unconscious feelings of hostility surrounding this figure are transferred to the woman who has taken on the anima's role in the psyche of the male. According to Jung, the role of the mother as

a safeguard against the unconscious, is transferred to whoever plays out the role of the anima. This again gives the female a position of power, since the male unknowingly "plays into the hands of his wife's possessive instincts" (Jung, CW 7, par. 316). In so far as she is the conscious embodiment of the feminine qualities he seeks to reject, she dominates him through the fear that he cannot acknowledge, even though this domination may take the form of a rebellious reaction.

However, the anima has its positive aspects too, and Jung identifies this as helping "to keep our highest and most important values from disappearing into the unconscious (CW9 i, par. 173). Again, the figure is connected to the mother archetype, and "the qualities associated with it are maternal solicitude and sympathy: the magic authority of the female, the wisdom and spiritual exaltation that transcends reason, any helpful instinct or impulse; all that is benign, all that cherishes or sustains, that fosters growth and fertility" (Jung, CW 9 i, par. 158). These attributes remind us of Ahania in the Book of that name, and of the wisdom that may derive from the passive sensibility. For Christine Gallant, "Ahania's lament is a vision of the potential regeneration of human feeling" (22), which Urizen, in the repudiation of Ahania, has also renounced, while in Kathleen Raine's view "*The Book of Ahania* describes the outcast condition of Earth by a morality that regards body as evil" (1:155). The two comments are, in a sense, contradictory, for the qualities that we find in Ahania derive in part from the suppression of sexuality that results from the same morality that Raine appears to lament. Bearing in mind the role of repression in the development of feeling, is sexual morality to be condemned or defended? The answer is not straightforward: it clearly has both positive and negative effects. Without morality, there would be no possibility of developing the ability to separate from matter, and therefore to reflect upon it. Neither would the wisdom lent by sensitive feeling be available to the intellect. Yet Urizen's repudiation of feeling, and sexuality, in the attempt to attain moral purity has the consequence of affirming his own identity, and separating him from the rest of society.

Although Raine appears to suggest that morality has unfortunate effects, she is ambivalent about the place of sexuality within Blake's developing philosophy, and at one point she quotes the opinion of Yeats that Blake condemned sexual love, whilst commenting that "he gave it a very modest place in the order of things" (1: 212). She fails to note that a condemnation of sexuality accompanies the denigration of the body, as a result of the imposition of moral precepts, and she makes no attempt to reconcile the contradiction inherent in lamenting the morality that suppresses sexuality, whilst suggesting that this is of no ultimate concern. Such ambivalence admittedly is present in the works of Blake, too, in that he appears to regard the suppression of sexuality in the interests of morality as destructive of psychic harmony, while decrying the limitations of sexuality when it is divorced from the imagination as a means of regaining the lost unity. Nevertheless sexuality, along with the status of the emanation, remains a constant preoccupation at the heart of Blake's thinking, suggesting that Raine, and Yeats, simplify the situation in demoting the importance of this factor in Blake's system of ideas.

Raine's comment that "in the spiritual world natural 'love' becomes unnecessary because the same life is in all" (1: 213), perhaps explains her failure to reconcile the contradictions of her position. An emphasis upon spirituality demands the subjugation of the physical, which eventually suppresses all feeling, of whatever variety. The same life may be in everyone, but identification with the variety of forms this takes requires some separation before it can be understood, and it also requires the participation of feeling in the achievement of identity. The movement required is a continual movement between separation and reunion. Raine's comment suggests that once spirituality is attained there is no more effort to be made. It fails to recognise that the energy underlying spirituality is only sustained by the connection with the body, and if 'love' of any kind becomes unnecessary, spirituality loses its inspiration. This is the situation in *The Book of Ahania*, and it leads to the loss of the edenic state that forms the subject of Ahania's lament.

The battles between Urizen and Fuzon at the beginning of the Book involve a struggle between moral principles that lead to the suppression of sexuality. In a

conflict that is reminiscent of the son's rebellion against the father, Fuzon hurls the "Globe of Wrath" at Urizen, and so presents a challenge to his father's moral authority. This situation once again rehearses the contests between feeling and rationality, with Fuzon mounting a rebellious reaction to established moral principles. Ambiguously, the challenge seems to combine both a release and a threat to Urizen, as it both arouses "his invisible lust" (22, 29, p.84), and entrenches him more deeply in a sense of his own sin. Fuzon's rebellion, in fact, represents Urizen's own unconscious impulses. His guilt divides his feelings towards Ahania, as we can see from his "kissing and weeping over her" (2, 35, p.85). Finally he sacrifices her to his notions of morality, and she becomes "a faint shadow wandring / In chaos and circling dark Urizen, / As the moon anguished circles the earth; (2, 35-40, p.85).

In her Jungian interpretation of *The Book of Ahania*, Patricia Cramer observes that "as anima figure and moon goddess, Ahania is a personification of the feminine qualities that Urizen and masculinity has repressed" (526). In other words, he has repressed the so-called feminine aspects of his own nature, and projected them onto the female, who absorbs the projections, and who is therefore deprived of personal and social influence, because of the passivity implied by the qualities of sympathy and compassion, with which Ahania is associated. Jung's definition of gods and goddesses as "libido-symbols", and his description of the relationship of the libido with images of "sun, fire, light, sex, fertility and growth (CW 5, par.344) help to explain the implications of the qualities with which Ahania is associated. Her connections with the moon correspond to the repression of libido brought about by Urizen's strict moral code, and she embodies the qualities that have no visible influence upon the conscious mind. Ahania is compared to the moon circling the earth, since unconscious principles affect the feelings, but are not available to the intellect. The moon reflects the sun's light, the symbol of intellectual energy, but does not create it. Feelings similarly are but a dim reflection of unconscious ideas, not fully in touch with light of the intellect. Since these same principles involve the repression of sexuality, and inhibit the movement of libido, there is no means of recovering them once they have disappeared. Jung's description of the effect of the

loss of the anima applies to the state in which Urizen finds himself, when he separates from Ahania.

> The emotional state of Sophia sunk in unconsciousness . . ., her formlessness and the possibility of her getting lost in the darkness characterise very clearly the anima of a man who identifies himself absolutely with his reason and his spirituality (CW 13, par. 454).

The aridity of the state into which Urizen has been led by his spirituality is evident from the barren landscapes in which he now finds himself. If growth and fertility symbolise the strength of the libido, then the barren world he occupies represents its loss. Urizen's efforts at clinging to his own moral principles, in spite of the challenge from Fuzon, eventually lead to the hatching of "an enormous dread serpent" (3, 15, p.85). This represents the accumulation of unconscious energy, which fuels his hostility towards Fuzon, whom he first attacks with a rock anointed with the serpent's poison, and whom he finally crucifies on the tree of mystery. Jung comments that the symbol of the tree "is no longer a matter of an impossible reconciliation of good and evil, but of man with his vegetative (= unconscious life)" (Letters ii, 167). Fuzon crucified has been influenced irredeemably by the unconscious ideas against which he formerly struggled, and a new retaliatory cycle begins. The conflict between Fuzon and Urizen may appear to oppose good and evil, when the liberator takes on the tyrant, but the two are, in fact, opposite sides of the same coin. They take up a contrary stance to the same ideas, but this means neither can escape their influence.

Is there any alternative to these interminable cycles? According to Webster, Blake's work presents incest as the only way of defusing the hostility between father and son. Without the permission to commit incest, the son will have to choose between active domination, in an aggressive identification with the father, or passive submission to authority, which eventually leads to a build up of unconscious energy, and a rebellious explosion, thus ensuring the domination of the cycle. Webster attributes the sadistic and masochistic tendencies alternately displayed by Blake's

characters to continuing Oedipal conflict, while the paradise illustrated in *The Book of Ahania*, " embodies Blake's ideal of sharing between father and son without 'cruel jealousy'"(*Psychology* 173). Webster cites as evidence of incest the episode in which Ahania relates how Urizen gave her "To the sons of eternal joy: / When he took the daughters of life / Into my chambers of Love" (5, 16-18, p.89).

The interpretation of this passage depends on whether one accepts Freud or Jung's definition of incest. An adoption of Jung's version would undermine Webster's assertion that Blake sees incest as the remedy for generational conflict, since the episode linking the union of Ahania and Urizen with incest between parent and child would then be part of the cycle, and would not resolve the problems of rationality. The exact implications of incest in the Oedipal myth irredeemably divided the two psychologists. Jung's insistence on its symbolic nature was directly opposed to Freud's more literal version of events. For him, the Oedipal myth enacts the sexual basis of familial relationships, in which Oedipus's marriage to his mother represents the child's real desire for a sexual relationship with her. Jung, however, rejected Freud's view of libido as exclusively sexual, defining it as specific psychic energy, which could be channelled into sexuality, but which was otherwise the basis of mental activity.[23] According to Anthony Stevens, Jung regarded "psychological incest not as a quest for a physical goal but as a means to spiritual development" (23).

In his writings, Jung identifies two types of incest, that between parent and child, or brother and sister, though both constitute the royal marriage, or hierosgamous. Jung writes: "This endogamous mating is simply a variant of the Uroboros, which, because it is by nature hermaphroditic, completes the circle in itself" (CW 12, par.496). The Uroborus is the dragon that bites its own tail, demonstrating the circular movement of psychic energy. Jung's description of the dragon's progress corresponds to the vacillating relationship between Urizen and Ahania.

[23] For Jung's description of the possible method in which sexual energy is transformed into mental energy read CW 5 pars. 204-250. "The Transformation of Libido".

> He is the hermaphrodite that was in the beginning, that splits into the classical brother-sister duality and is reunited in the coniunctio, to appear once again at the end in the radiant form of the lumen, the stone. He is metallic yet liquid, matter yet spirit, cold yet fiery, poison and yet healing draught, a symbol uniting all opposites (CW12, par. 404)

In one of the myths recounted by Jung a sick king who suffers from spiritual sterility is cured and his land made fruitful again by means of a brother-sister incest, or in some versions, by a mother-son incest. According to Jung, "the blame for his sterility is to be sought in the projection of unconscious contents, which can neither develop nor find 'redemption' until they are integrated with consciousness" (CW 12, par.496). Hence the scene depicting the union between Urizen and Ahania really illustrates the renewal of energy made possible when the conscious mind integrates the contents of the unconscious. The intermingling of natural and human fertility, when "ripe figs" and rich pomegranates" (5, 26, p.89) take their place amongst "babes of bliss" and "bosoms of milk" (5, 19-20, p.89), represents the effect of the libido from the unconscious upon the conscious mind, as the natural world changes from a barren desert to an abundant paradise. This transformation is dependent upon a juxtaposition of opposites, in which the coincidence of beginnings and endings emphasises the domination of the cycle. Ahania remembers a time when Urizen "Walked forth from the clouds of the morning" (5, 31, p.89) to return wearied in the evening after the completion of his daily labours. The clouds that he left behind him suggest moisture, and obscurity, the heaviness and turgidity associated with the unconscious, while the reference to his "hand full of generous fire" (5, 30, p.89) alludes to the harnessing of energy for the purposes of creativity.

For most of the Book, however, Ahania remains separated from Urizen, banished to "the world of loneness" (4, 64, p.88). Patricia Cramer, in her Jungian interpretation of *The Book of Ahania,* emphasises the compensatory nature of the anima figure, by drawing attention to Ahania's separation from Urizen, as "a serious symptom of psychic disintegration because it is the first step in the development of a

dangerously autonomous female will. Urizen's continued rejection of the energies she represents will cause these energies to turn destructive" (528). In other words, repressed energy will build up until it explodes in a rebellious reaction against unconscious ideas hidden in sentiment. Separation from Ahania will prevent such ideas from reaching the conscious mind. However, this outcome, suggesting the link between destruction and renewal, is an inevitable one when the mind is affirmed through its opposition to matter. Jung describes the continual possibility of the conscious mind being assimilated by the unconscious if the "spirit, Logos, Nous – is swallowed up by Physis: that is to say, the body and the psychic representatives of the organs gain mastery over the conscious mind. In the hero myth this state is known as being swallowed up in the belly of the whale or dragon" (CW 12, par.440). At this point the cycle will begin again, as the son, in the shape of the hero, again begins his challenge to established authority, by forcing a separation from the feminine.

As Hillman has pointed out, the cycle results from the alternating domination of the conscious and unconscious mind. This configuration of forces results from the attribution of superiority to the active, masculine, spiritual aspects of existence, as opposed to the supposed inferiority of the passive, feminine, and natural levels against which definition of identity is secured. In the portrait of Ahania, Blake makes every effort to revalue those so-called feminine qualities that comprise an essential part of male creativity. In her study entitled "The Emanation: Creativity and Creation", Karleen Middleton Murphy acknowledges the contribution to creativity represented by Ahania as one of "intellectual pleasure, knowledge, and understanding", along with "the intuitive wisdom to select the appropriate method of expression" (*New Age* 105).

However, this passive contribution to creativity is powerless without the urge to self-expression, represented in Eternity in *The Book of Ahania* by the masculine attributes of Urizen, or of Los in *The Book of Urizen*, and these are, in fact, guaranteed only by feminine passivity. The perception of this active/passive dichotomy permits the assertion of masculine identity in creativity. Doubtless the

masculine and feminine could refer to particular constituents of mind without any reference to the sexual identity of the artist concerned, but the pressure in patriarchy to conform to the accepted standards of femininity probably meant, in fact, that few eighteenth-century women developed the necessary self-assertion or discrimination to aspire to creative self-expression. Hence, even if some passive attributes were valued as a necessary part of creativity in the male, there could be no proper union of the masculine and feminine, such as is professed in Jungian psychology, unless the female united these qualities also. The repressed energies in the female would ensure that she continued to exploit such power as she had, with the effect of undoing the liberating effects of creativity in the male. Similarly, the effort of ensuring male dominance, for the purposes of creativity, would have an equivalent repressive effect.

These early works recognise the effects of the repression of the feminine, and as we shall see in the next chapter in the interpretation of *Visions of the Daughters of Albion,* envisage a time when women will be able to play a more active part in society, and will not need to exploit the power gained by an adherence to a strict moral code, and to the marriage laws, that so much limited women's independence and autonomy. Social reforms such as these are clearly to play a part in the liberation that Blake envisages in his work. However, as Hillman points out, reform will not solve the problem of repression, since we shall still be left with the opposition of good and evil, when social change throws up unforeseen and unfortunate effects. Reason and feeling will still work in a compensatory relationship, ensuring a partial lifting of repression, but without the power to remove the divisive effects, described by Rousseau in his analysis of the development of societies. The changes in Blake's work, following the completion of the Lambeth prophecies begin to address the problems of the cyclical vision. However, the next chapter's discussion of other works from the same period, concentrating mainly upon the position of the female in eighteenth century society according to Wollstonecraft's analysis, will still only emphasise the domination of the cycle.

CHAPTER THREE

"NETS IN EVERY SECRET PATH": WOLLSTONECRAFT AND THE EFFECTS OF REPRESSION ON FEMININE IDENTITY.

Patriarchal pressures to ensure that women conform to a passive role are explored by Mary Wollstonecraft in her writings, particularly in her *Vindication of the Rights of Woman* where she points out some of the drawbacks of Rousseau's ideas about the value of feeling as a medium of social cohesion, particularly as regards the status of the female in eighteenth century society. The *Vindication*, published in 1791, assumes a rather different attitude to feeling than her first fictional work, *Mary*, which she came to consider a "crude production" of her earlier years. This sentimental novel is based upon some of the circumstances and incidents of her own life, particularly her close friendship with Fanny Blood, which appears to have developed in compensation for her unsatisfactory childhood. Wollstonecraft's critical attitude to her parents is perhaps reflected in the marriage of Eliza, the heroine's mother, to an officer, who is peremptorily dismissed on the first page of the novel as a "vicious fool" (*Mary* 5). Eliza, too, is condemned, but in her case for her excessive delicacy, and "relaxed nerves", which led to her becoming "a mere nothing!" (*Mary* 5). The author caustically observes that Eliza took care to preserve her own moral rectitude, while sending to the metropolis for publications that are described as "delightful substitutes for bodily dissipation" which "in the studied inelegancies of dress, and the compliments offered up at the shrine of false beauty, are all equally addressed to the senses" (*Mary* 6).

This caustic depiction of a conventionally passive female of the time is set against the portrait of a heroine who is extolled for "this quickness, this delicacy of feeling, which enables us to relish the sublime touches of the poet, and painter;" and "which expands the soul, gives an enthusiastic greatness mixed with tenderness,

when we view the magnificent objects of nature; or hear of a good action" (*Mary* 43). Here, the sensibility that accompanies a delicacy of response to the beauties of nature is linked with a feeling for virtue, and a concern for the unfortunate, as opposed to the "the depraved sensualist, who is only moved by what strikes his gross senses"(*Mary* 43). Whenever Mary's quickness of feeling leads to a descent into the depths of self-pity owing to the succession of misfortunes she is forced to endure, she resists the temptation to succumb to her feelings, and decline into inertia, by reminding herself that "virtue should be an active principle: and the most desirable station, is the one that exercises our faculties, refines our affections, and enables us to be useful" (*Mary* 46). Wollstonecraft here distinguishes between the selfishness of the sensualist, and the selflessness of the individual whose sensibility is governed by rational and moral principles.

Considering that some of Wollstonecraft's ideas in *Mary*, published in 1788, are very close to those of Rousseau, her own beliefs must have undergone a rapid revision by the time she wrote her *Vindication*, published a mere four years later. Her view, expressed in *Mary*, that feeling, governed by rationality, helps to promote social unity is not so far removed from that of Rousseau, who sets out to manage the upbringing of Émile in the book of that name so as to create in him the kind of compassion that will unite him with other members of society, and make him take pleasure in being able to help those who are less fortunate than himself. Rousseau's depiction of romantic love in *Émile*, based on the sublimation of sexuality, and the idealisation of the beloved, is similar to the romanticised relationship between Mary and the doomed hero of the novel of that name. Four years later both sensibility, and romantic love form the focus of Wollstonecraft's attack on Rousseau in the *Vindication*, when she begins to see acute feeling as a trap that helps disguise the true nature of women's subordination.

Mary Wollstonecraft's criticisms of Rousseau's ideas accord with the reputation he had acquired in England during the latter part of the eighteenth century, a reputation that wavered according to the particular emphasis placed upon the various definitions of feeling. As was evident in *Mary*, sensibility defined as an

accumulation of sentiments leading to a refinement of the individual's moral nature gains more approval than sensuality, which is concerned with sensation, and which is possibly regarded as a coarser, more selfish, expression of feeling than sentiment. Hence, on publication in 1760 of his sentimental novel, *La Nouvelle Héloïse*, Rousseau was widely praised for his advocacy of "a strenuous public and private morality" (Duffy 10), with those of more liberal tendencies even suggesting that the morality promulgated by the novel was too rigid and austere. The implications of sentiment, too, varied according to the tastes and inclinations of the interpreter. For Rousseau sentiment indicates an intuitive recognition of "moral fitnesses" but, according to Duffy, Rousseau's tendency to divinify physical beauty also led to some suggestion that "there was a great deal of sensuality lurking behind so much fine sentiment" (15).

Those who wanted to tarnish Rousseau's political reputation used the accusation of sensuality as the basis of an attack upon him. During the period following the outbreak of the French Revolution, it appeared to some that *The Social Contract* had crucially influenced the course of events leading to the establishment of the new French republic, a possibility supported by Robespierre's alleged veneration of Rousseau (Duffy 22). However, Duffy claims that *The Social Contract* had until the early 1790's made too little impact to have been a major influence on events. By that time it was assumed to have had a greater influence on the revolution than it actually did. Rousseau really came to be associated with the revolution, according to Duffy, when he was persecuted by the ancien regime, and was therefore adopted by the revolutionaries as "a martyred prophet of their own professed values" (35). This tenuous connection with the Revolution appeared to be sufficient for Edmund Burke to mount an attack on Rousseau in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, on the grounds, not of his political opinions, but of his vanity, and his personal morality: Burke levelled at him accusations of unbridled sensuality. Duffy remarks that "Burke's reflections did indeed provoke a series of distinguished rebuttals from Wollstonecraft, Paine, Mackintosh, and Priestley", but he adds that these were representative of "radical opinion in 1791" (42). In so far as Rousseau was considered to have influenced the revolution, he earned the

admiration of the dissenting radicals who comprised the circle surrounding William Godwin.

Wollstonecraft's admiration of *Émile* rested upon its claims to outline the education of a citizen of Rousseau's ideal society, but his prescriptions for Sophie, the young girl intended to be a suitable mate for Émile, led Wollstonecraft to believe that Rousseau had given up reason and "drifted into the prettiness of the sentimental novel" (Duffy 49).[24] Her opinion coincides with the view widely held in England of the 1780's that Rousseau was a slave of his feelings. An article, which appeared in *The Critical Review* dated 1783, tentatively attributed to Godwin, accused Rousseau of being incapable of reason. The article made accusations against him, observing that "every action is the effect of momentary impression, and he is at once carried away by the sentiment, without being able to reflect on the tendency of the consequences of his actions" (qtd. in Duffy 47). Duffy adds that Mary Wollstonecraft's attack upon Rousseau's sentimentality, as well as the criticisms of the Godwin circle, derive largely "from the erotic adventures scattered throughout *The Confessions*" (49). This was Rousseau's autobiography, considered rather scandalous when the book first appeared, four years after Rousseau's death in 1778. It had the effect of permanently tarnishing his reputation, and lending ammunition to all those counter-revolutionaries in England who in reality wanted to attack Rousseau for his alleged political influence. *The Confessions* was considered to exemplify the sensual underside of the sentimentality of *La Nouvelle Héloïse*, and it was this so-called failing that was seized upon by such enemies as Burke, as well as by those, like Wollstonecraft, who on the whole were more favourably disposed towards him.

Wollstonecraft condemns Rousseau's rigidly delineated notions of gender differences, which he took to be innate.[25] Wollstonecraft, however, influenced by the sensationalist philosophy of Locke, considers that the differences are imposed through social conditioning, and therefore responsive to social change. In *Émile*,

[24] Rousseau's views on the education of women appear in Émile. Book V, principally on pp. 363-377.
[25] Sexual difference in *Émile* is either assumed to be natural, or to be ordained by the creator. See p.359.

Book V, Rousseau's strictures on femininity contrive to define the female solely by her sexual role, a tendency that Wollstonecraft criticises throughout the whole of the *Vindication*. Rousseau writes: "The only thing we know with certainty is that everything man and woman have in common belong to the species, and everything which distinguishes them belongs to the sex" (*Émile* 358). In consequence, he says: "There is no parity between the two sexes in regard of sex. The male is male only at certain moments. The female is female during her whole life or at least during her whole youth"(Rousseau, *Émile* 361). Wollstonecraft, however insists that "the sexual should not destroy the human character" (*Vindication* 42) and that "there is no sex in souls"(*Vindication* 83).

Wollstonecraft's insistence that a woman's humanity should not be defined by her sexuality leads directly to her criticisms of the frivolity and indolence of many women's lives. Because they had been influenced by the kind of attitudes towards women exhibited by Rousseau, they had in Wollstonecraft's estimation never developed the independence of thought and action necessary for them to become useful and fulfilled members of society. Rousseau's insistence that there are innate differences between the sexes, that "the one should be active and strong, the other passive and weak" and that "one should have both the power and the will, and the other should make little resistance" (*Émile* 358) is scornfully rebutted by Wollstonecraft. She asks: "Should it be proved that woman is naturally weaker than man, where does it follow that it is natural for her to labour to become still weaker than nature intended her to be?" (*Vindication* 27). She refers to the pressures that are placed on women to conform to masculine definitions of femininity propounded not only by Rousseau, but also by other writers such as Dr James Fordyce in his *Sermons for Young Women* (1765), and by Dr John Gregory's *Father's Legacy to his Daughters* (1744), both of whom conveyed the message that the proper duty of women was to make themselves pleasing to men.[26]

[26] Wollstonecraft's account of Fordyce's recommendations for women's behaviour is to be found on pp. 191-196 of the *Vindication*, and those of Gregory are described on pp. 196-201.

Passivity and dependence are enjoined upon women with the purpose of rendering them graceful and delicate. Their main role in life, according to these writers, is to cultivate their attractiveness, through a preoccupation with dress and ornament. Rousseau has no interest in persuading the female to acquire either knowledge, or practical skills, and in *Émile* he even cites with approval the example of a young girl who, on catching sight of herself in the mirror while engaged in learning to write, finds a want of grace in her demeanour, and immediately abandons the project.[27] Women were supposed to study gesture and deportment, to acquire a pleasing modulation of voice, and to develop all the social graces, but they were urged to do this without appearing to flaunt their attractions. According to Rousseau, girls should be "subject all their lives to the most constant and most severe of restraints – that of the proprieties" (*Émile* 369). He refers here to the rules of conduct imposed upon women to ensure that they behave with the kind of modesty that will preserve their reputation. The constraining effect of such pressure, as Mary Wollstonecraft points out, would limit their ability to make any useful contribution to society. The passive and dependent role to which they are confined would prevent them from exercising their own judgement, and developing their understanding. Since in Rousseau's estimation women should always be docile and defer to masculine authority, they are denied the opportunity of developing into autonomous moral beings. When Rousseau insists that women "ought to learn early to endure even injustice and to bear a husband's wrongs without complaining" (*Émile* 370), Wollstonecraft scornfully retorts that "the being who patiently endures injustice, and silently bears insults, will soon become unjust, or unable to discern right from wrong" (*Vindication* 180).

Wollstonecraft here refers to the effect of repression upon the female personality. When women are prevented from exercising their own judgement, and made to defer to the opinions of others, while at the same time suffering the sexual attentions of men, who flatter them on account of their physical appeal, but who nevertheless expect from them a certain decorum and restraint, they become, in Wollstonecraft's words, "a prey of their senses, delicately termed sensibility, and

[27] This anecdote appears in *Émile on p. 369.*

are blown about by every momentary gust of feeling" (*Vindication* 152). Wollstonecraft's attack upon the elevation of sensibility to the central position it acquires in Rousseau's moral philosophy is directed at the position of power it lends to otherwise weak and dependent beings. She writes: "Yet to their senses are women made slaves, because it is by their sensibility that they obtain present power"(*Vindication* 153). She describes with pointed irony the terrified reaction of these women of exquisite sensibility to "the frown of an old cow, or the jump of a mouse," and wonders "what can save such beings from contempt; even though they be soft and fair" (*Vindication* 153). In Wollstonecraft's estimation such women remain in a state of childhood, and "might as well never have been born" (*Vindication* 153). Rousseau encourages such timidity in women, since he welcomes the power it apparently gives them over men, who then take up the superior position of comforter and protector. Wollstonecraft's reaction is, as usual, curt: "This is the very point I aim at. I do not wish them to have power over men; but over themselves" (*Vindication* 154).

This self-determination is, in Wollstonecraft's estimation, is to be achieved through reason, since she believes that it only through "the power of generalizing ideas, of drawing comprehensive conclusions from individual observations" (*Vindication* 143) that independence of thought can be guaranteed. Improvement both in individuals and in society, she considers, can only be achieved through rationality, since it makes possible the discernment of truth. Through this means one is able to arrive at judgements that are objectively valid, and that contribute to the well-being of both individuals and society. Her plea is for women to be more rationally educated; in effect, that the principles Rousseau outlined for the education of Émile should be applied to the upbringing of Sophie too. Human progress in the estimation of Wollstonecraft depends as much on the influence of mothers upon the upbringing of children, and upon the institutions of society, as it does upon the actions of men, and there can be no effective reform unless women are educated to play an active and judicious role in the workings of society.[28] Wollstonecraft, in

[28] Possible roles for women are discussed in Chapter Nine of the *Vindication*. Women, Wollstonecraft suggests on p.261, "might certainly study the art of healing and be physicians as well as nurses". She

fact, terms reason "the emanation of divinity, the tie that connects the creature with the creator" (*Vindication* 142), an observation that derives from the Neoplatonism discussed in the first chapter, and which suggests that this system of thought had a general influence upon the ideas circulating at the end of the eighteenth century.

It is interesting, therefore, that *The Book of Thel* links Neoplatonism with the effects of rationality upon the human psyche, suggesting that Wollstonecraft was not altogether out of tune with Blake in her insistence that female passivity could be attributed to the development of feeling at the expense of rationality. Raine associates *The Book of Thel* with Neoplatonist philosophy, which she says Blake encountered in the works of Porphyry, and she sees the theme of the poem as a debate between the Neoplatonist and alchemical philosophers who held opposing views about matter. According to Raine, Plotinus taught that "matter is evil and the soul's descent into the body a death from eternity incurred by sin or folly," while the alchemy of Paracelsus proposed a fundamental harmony in which "that which is beneath is like that which is above" (I: 99). Raine comments that the Book achieves a tenuous resolution between these two opposing views.

Rather than achieving a tenuous resolution, however, Blake is surely setting up one system of thought, only to undermine it with the other, a device quite common in his works from the *Songs of Innocence* onwards: through this means he is able to demonstrate the limitations of both systems. *The Book of Thel* tends to show the relatedness of rationality and feeling, while intimating that neither can be relied upon as a means of relating to the world, though both are necessary to a proper relationship with it. Thel herself may be regarded as a representative of the passive eighteenth century female, who develops a sensibility that entraps her in her own narrow world, and who is denied, or refuses, the opportunity of developing her rationality. She is a shepherdess who lives initially with her mother and sisters by the river of Adona, in a looking-glass world, which turns out to be the pastoral paradise of Blake's Beulah, his specifically feminine realm where there is mainly

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proposes also that women could well study politics, hinting on p.260 that they should have a direct share in government

identification with the world, and only an imperfect perception of difference from it. In a state where there is little conscious differentiation, Thel would be unable to develop a separate identity.

The character of Thel reminds us of Jung's view, discussed in *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, that "woman's consciousness is characterised more by the connective quality of Eros than by the discrimination and cognition associated with Logos" (CW 9 ii, par.29). Jung characterises the psyche as a structure, "something given, the precondition that is found to be present in every case. And this is the mother, the matrix –the form into which all experience is poured" (CW 9 i, par.187). In other words, the structure of the psyche naturally favours relatedness, and this quality is specifically connected to the child's early relationship with the mother, when there is no separation, only identity. As we have seen, logos is connected to the social world represented by the father, with its laws and codes of morality. According to the ideas of Jung, if the daughter identifies too closely with the mother, "it leads to identification and paralysis of the daughter's feminine initiative. A complete projection of her personality on to the mother then takes place, owing to the fact that she unconscious of both her maternal instinct and of her Eros" (CW 9 i, par.169).

This appears to be the situation in which Thel finds herself at the beginning of *The Book of Thel*. The main part of the poem establishes a world apparently dominated by maternal solicitude and self-sacrifice, which suggests that no resistance should be offered to whatever appears to be one's fate. The inhabitants of Thel's world, captured in the poem at one stage only of the changing panoply of existence, "The new-born lilly flower (1, 21, p.4), the cloud with "golden head" (3, 5, p.4) and the "helpless worm" (3, 29, p.5), all deliver the message that, although apparently composed of separate identities, the world is, in reality, completely interrelated. The lily flower celebrates her weakness and vulnerability, making no effort to ensure her own survival, whilst nourishing the lamb, reviving "the milked cows" and taming "the fire-breathing steed"(2, 10, p.4). The Cloud sheds water, which flows into the "golden springs where Luvah doth renew his horses" (3, 7-8, p.4).

This series of images recommends a passivity that fosters the renewal of erotic energy. The worm, that is so closely associated with the grave, becomes a new-born infant, totally dependent on the maternal pity of the Clod of Clay. These images fail in their attempt to persuade Thel that she should, like them, renounce her own separate identity, and yield without fear to the death and renewal that is inherent in nature. She feels that if she does so, then "all shall say, without a use this shining woman lived, or did she only live to be at death the food of worms" (3, 22-23, p.5).

The passivity and renunciation, expressed in images that link maternal tenderness and solicitude with the teachings of Christ, have led some to suggest that Thel's failure to adopt the way of self-sacrifice is a testimony to her selfishness, but Thel herself points out the futility of taking part in an eternal recurrence which has no purpose beyond its own perpetuation. Kathleen Raine comments that Thel's mistake is to identify herself with the image or reflection, which means that she is unable to separate from herself, in order to be able to derive her own identity from the significance of her experiences. In other words, if she is to will her own use, she has to become self-conscious and accept the division of her being that Rousseau considers an inevitable outcome of entering into "the state of reason", though Raine later remarks that "there is no ground for the often expressed view that Blake regarded experience as a state of equal value with innocence, or indeed of any value at all; it is a state of delusion. 'Error' or 'creation' which originates with the fall of man has no place in 'Truth' or 'Eternity'" (I: 129). Blake makes clear the delusory nature of the State of Experience in the final plate of *The Book of Thel*, when Thel accepts the invitation to inspect her own grave-plot, and retreats in horror on discovering the conditions that predominate there. The senses are just sensitive enough to perceive the opposition that everywhere prevails as a result of the distancing effect of rationality, the "Eyelids stord with arrows ready drawn" (6, 13, p.6), but they are distorted by deprivation, and so contribute to the rapacity of desire. However, it is difficult to see how Thel can follow Raine's advice and cease to identify with the image, if she never enters the State of Experience. Despite its delusory state, it has some value in fostering the development of discrimination, the

deprivation of which would condemn Thel to the passivity and introversion that Wollstonecraft depicts as the fate of the eighteenth century female. 'Truth' or 'Eternity' cannot be discovered without the insight leant by this faculty.

Helen Bruder, however, in her essay entitled "Patriarchal Criticism and *The Book of Thel*" sees the whole poem as an illustration of Blake's view that "life under patriarchy is a grave-plot" (149). The overall implication is that Thel was quite justified in rejecting it. In Bruder's interpretation both the State of Innocence, illustrated in the early plates of the poem, and the State of Experience, depicted in the final plate, develop as a result of patriarchy. She thinks that the masochism enjoined upon Thel by the lily, the cloud and the worm shows the influence of patriarchy on the kind of passive roles reserved for women, and quotes Wollstonecraft's view that in patriarchy "all women are to be levelled by meekness and docility into one character of yielding softness and gentle compliance" (150). In particular, the Clod is: "The living embodiment of Wollstonecraft's claim that 'the being who patiently endures injustice will soon become unable to discern right from wrong'" (155). Bruder seems to suggest that by rejecting the masochistic role mapped out for her by patriarchy, Thel has already developed a moral sense. However, she cannot do this, unless she enters into the conflicts of Experience, a possibility she rejects when she "fled back unhindered until she came into the vales of Har" (5, 22, p.6). Wollstonecraft's insistence that women should be encouraged to develop their understanding, to bring common sense to "the test of reason", to learn how to generalise (*Vindication* 104), and to trace back effects to their causes (*Vindication 105)* requires the development of discrimination, which is impossible without encountering opposition. As Jung insists: "Identity does not make consciousness possible; it is only through separation, detachment, and agonising confrontation through opposition that produces consciousness and insight" (CW 9 i, par. 298).

This recipe does not fit very well with Blake's criticisms of patriarchy, and his depictions of the limitations of rationality, but he never suggests that reason can be dispensed with altogether. He called reason "the bound or outward circumference

of Energy" (4, p. 34). His works are devoted to the ways in which rationality can develop as a means of relating to the world, without dictating a narrow, egotistical view based upon the supposed inferiority of the feminine. The composition of the Lambeth books aims at a restitution of the feminine, through a revaluation of such feminine attributes as sympathy and compassion, rejected in the formation of a masculine identity, even though the repressed sexuality with which these are connected lead to the development of a female will, or the domination of unconscious ideas. *Visions of the Daughters of Albion* presents us with a character, Oothoon, who appears to be a mouthpiece for the free expression of sexuality, and to represent the active and unrepressed female whom Wollstonecraft hoped would emerge "in some future revolution of time" (*Vindication 223).* However, *Visions* itself is rather ambiguous about the sexuality it appears to recommend, and suggests that free love in itself is not a solution for social problems, nor for the repression imposed by morality upon the human psyche.

Despite the pressures for her to conform to a traditional passive role, Oothoon plucks the flower of Leutha's vale, an action which openly broadcasts her desire for Theotormon, whom she seeks in "winged exulting swift delight" (1, 14, p.46). However, in an act of possessiveness she is raped by Bromion, who is described by Erdman as "a caricature of a slave-trader" (212). In Erdman's view, the rape of Oothoon represents the situation of victims of the slave trade, as well as those oppressed by unjust marriage laws. *Visions of the Daughters of Albion* represents a contribution to the reform movement, which was currently agitating for the abolition of the slave trade. According to Erdman, the Society for the Abolition of the Slave Trade was formed in 1787 (211), while Blake's knowledge of slave conditions came from "some engravings distributed from Johnson" in connection with an expedition to Guiana" (213). The rape of Oothoon also represents the situation in which women have no choice but to participate in monopolistic, affectionless marriages, devised for the settlement of property. The association of such marriages with the slave-trade reveals them as a tyranny not far removed from the ownership of slaves.

Some aspects of *Visions*, however, bring to mind the myth of the rape of Proserpina, with Bromion's cave standing both for the underworld, and the limited vision available in the state of generation. In the words of Raine: "the rape of Proserpine represents the descent of the soul and its union with the dark tenement of the body" (1: 133). She quotes Taylor's Porphyry as the source of the view that "it is the irresistible desire of sexual pleasure which draws souls downward to generation" (1: 138). Despite her comment that "Oothoon's descent into physical sexuality is a betrayal of the soul into the power of lower forces" (1: 171), Raine also notes that "the soul perfects itself through experience (1: 143). Though this view seems to contradict her previous judgement that experience is of no value at all, Raine's comments, derived from Neoplatonism, serve to sum up the ambivalence pervading the poem on the subject of sexuality. The entry into experience, with its connotations of violent initiation such as is suggested by the idea of rape, is presented as a tragic necessity on the one hand, and as a joyous fulfilment on the other, since it precedes the sexual experience, but these two opposing attitudes are never completely reconciled.

Visions presents another dramatisation of the conflicts between reason, and energy, eros and logos, but this time the feminine element demonstrates the combination of eros and logos that Jung defines as the syzygy. "Just as the anima becomes, through integration, the Eros of consciousness, so the animus becomes a Logos; and in the same way that the anima gives relationship and relatedness to a man's consciousness, the animus gives to woman's consciousness a capacity for reflection, deliberation, and self-knowledge" (CW 9 ii, par.33). The combination of eros and logos is evident in the character of Oothoon, who retains an innocent attitude towards sexuality, whilst developing, as a result of the oppression she encounters, a critical attitude to the society in which she finds herself, along with some limited awareness of how it could be ameliorated. Her understanding suggests the harmful effects of morality, but it does not detect the equally debilitating consequences of the lack of a moral code: such a deficiency would be as much an entrapment as its opposite, and without an ethical dimension there would be no possibility of developing the imagination, which is presented in

Blake's works as the only means of combining freedom of thought with understanding.

Bromion's rape of Oothoon represents the kind of tyranny that might be encountered in society, when an individual imposes his own will upon that of another, and as painful as it is, some opposition is necessary for the development of consciousness, as Jung points out, though the brutality of Bromion's action clearly exceeds that suggested by the usual conflicts of interest found within society. The rape itself represents any situation when the victim finds herself at the mercy of the oppressor, but it is an apposite image in this case, since the rape is the direct result of a repressive morality, which seeks to control the possessive instincts that may threaten the stability of society, but which, as Rousseau points out, tend to have the opposite effect. It marks the entrance into experience that stimulates Oothoon's understanding of the nature of oppression. The possessiveness and jealousy of Bromion represent the reaction to the moral requirement that we should suppress our own desires and inclinations so that others may benefit. Since morality establishes self-awareness, in which we establish our own identity in reaction to social pressure, Bromion's possessiveness reminds us of Rousseau's view that tyranny arises when mankind moves from the natural state into civil society, and then "only knows how to live in the opinion of others, so that he seems to receive the consciousness of his own existence merely from the judgement of others concerning him" (*Inequality* 116).

Since social man uses his possessions as a means of asserting his own identity, he strives to accumulate as many as he can. If he is successful, he arouses the jealousy of others who wish to be in a similar privileged position as he is, and who therefore try to steal from him the possessions he has hoarded. Laws are then instituted to protect the property of the powerful, and though they may have a restraining effect at first, eventually repressed feelings of jealousy begin to dominate, as Jung has described, with the effect of undermining the law. However, there is no such threat to the domination of the tyrant offered in *Visions of the Daughter of Albion*, despite

Oothoon's growing understanding of the nature of tyranny. She is unable to persuade her lover, Theotormon, to offer a challenge to Bromion's supremacy.

Much of the work deals with Oothoon's attempts to persuade Theortormon against adopting the narrow morality that results in Bromion's possessive jealousy, his desire for ownership that eventually culminates in the act of rape. *Visions* presents Oothoon as a woman who has learnt to grapple with social problems thrown up by society, as she expresses some possible remedies for them, suggested by her own experiences. The morality she criticises results in Theotormon's rejection of her because of the loss of her reputation, even though she has clearly done nothing to deserve her degradation, except perhaps offer a challenge to traditional notions of morality that dictated a passive role for women, a challenge that would explain her treatment, but by no means justify it.

When Oothoon asks whether Theotormon seeks only the "hypocrite modesty! / This knowing artful, secret, fearful, cautious, trembling hypocrite" (6, 16-17, p. 49), we are reminded of Wollstonecraft's indignant response to Rousseau's suggestion that an appearance of virtue was more important than its actuality. "If the honour of woman, as it is absurdly called, be safe, then she may neglect every social duty; nay ruin her family by gaming and extravagance; yet still present a shameless front –for truly she is an honourable woman!" (*Vindication* 247). Wollstonecraft is here protesting at the repressive intention underlying Rousseau's insistence that women should disguise their sexuality beneath a superficial appearance of modesty. In fact, Rousseau's view betrays a surprising double standard. His analysis linking social conflict with the desire for reputation, which divides a man from the knowledge of his own motives, clearly does not apply to women, presumably because the very repression he is advocating appears to prevent them from having much effect upon society. He thinks that the repression linked with the sentiment bequeathed by one generation to the next can be remedied by the development of independent thought in the male, a view explored in Chapter Five, and though he associates repression with conflict, he does not see

such subjugation as providing the tension through which comes renewal, a possibility revealed in the paradoxical tendencies of Blake's work.

Oothoon's arguments counter possessive ownership, such as is displayed by Bromion, with an open-hearted generosity, which unites members of society, instead of dividing them. This generosity, shown in sexual relationships, as well as in economic social arrangements, is inhibited by morality, and requires a challenge to established convention. Oothoon's suggestion, that the possessive selfishness displayed by Bromion leading directly to the deprivation suffered by the poor and unfortunate, links the "castles and high spires where kings and priests may dwell " (5, 20, p. 49) with the "labour of the farmer" (5, 17, p. 49) and with "cold floods of abstraction" (4, 19, p. 49). Just as Rousseau suggested, the powerful flourish at the expense of the weak, in defence of their own identity, and then use the law to sustain themselves in power. Oothoon's perception that the current economic structure of society favours the powerful, is linked to her criticisms of the subjugation of women through the injustice of oppressive marriage laws, and repressive codes of morality. Her protest is on behalf of the woman who is "Bound in / spells of law to one she loaths" (5, 21, 49).

The image of Bromion and Oothoon "bound back to back in Bromions cave" represents the idea that oppressor and victim are bound together by a common morality. It is in the interests of the powerful to uphold the moral standards that preserve their domination, and so prevent their own libidinal release, or that of the victim, which would threaten their superior position. Hence, at first Oothoon accepts the imputations of guilt in a display of masochism that keeps her bound to her oppressor. She releases herself from this domination, however, in her sense that she had expiated her guilt through acceding to Theotormon's perception of her as blameworthy, and accepting his punishment. He "severely smiles. her soul reflects the smile; . As the clear spring mudded with feet of beasts grows pure and smiles" (2, 19, p. 46). She identifies with Theotormon's sense that she has atoned for her misdeeds, and her guilt correspondingly vanishes. Images of defilement and renewal, of darkness and light, pervade the rest of the plate as Oothoon declares: "I

am pure. / Because the night is gone that clothed me in its deadly black (2, 29, p. 47).

The "deadly black" refers to the defilement she suffers through the accusations of immorality made by Bromion against her, and confirmed by Theotormon, when "he folded his black jealous waters round the adulterate pair" (2, 4, 46). Oothoon calls down Theotormon's eagles to "descend & rend their bleeding prey;" (2, 17, 46), an action that marks her own identification with Theotormon's view of her. Oothoon's acceptance of her guilt, even though in objective terms the blame is not hers, marks the regressive movement of libido, when the process of adaptation to the outside world is no longer possible. Paradoxically, as soon as Oothoon accepts the loss of her reputation according to current standards of morality, the morality ceases to hold her in bondage. The libido, regressing into the unconscious, is then able to throw up "germs of new life and vital possibilities for the future" (CW 8, par. 68). Libidinal freedom, as Oothoon comes to understand, thus underlies the free expression of sexuality, and the ability to throw off a repressive morality.

Oothoon tries to persuade Theotormon to accept her own values by suggesting that a movement of renewal and decay, freedom and stagnation, timid retreat and bold self-assertion marks the natural order, a momentum that he refuses by his adherence to a rigid code of sexual morality. She points out that an impulse to restrict and restrain discovered in "the expanse" measured out by "the tame pigeon" and in the "cells" formed by the bee (3, 3-4, p. 47), is balanced in nature by the impulse to soar beyond any restriction, with the "winged eagle" (3, 12, p. 47), and the "ravenous hawk" (3, 2, p.47). The urge to throw off oppression is exemplified by the "wild ass" which "refuses burdens" while the "meek camel" yields to the domination of man (3, 7, p. 47). The "blind worm" and the "ravenous snake" (3, 10-11, p. 47), both predatory and earthbound, suggest a submission to a dangerous, and possessive sexuality, which can be transformed into one that is open, and inspiriting, just as the eagle moves towards the sun. Oothoon accepts that life has to contain order, and freedom, domination and oppression, but that each can turn into its opposite, if libidinal energy is allowed to flow, instead of being

confined by morality. Although Oothoon's argument is persuasive, the movement she outlines is between liberation and entrapment, analogous to Jung's process of enantiodromia, criticised by Hillman for failing to escape the limitations of egocentricity. [29] The movement towards liberation implies the possibility of its reversal, or indeed, the necessity of once again limiting the free movement of libido, if a new order is to be discovered in the prolific chaos of the unconscious. This movement is not made explicit in Oothoon's arguments: she does not acknowledge the necessity of opposition.

Theotormon, however, fails to recognise even the limited justice of Oothoon's arguments, since he cannot separate his own identity from past events, and the feelings that these aroused in him. He does not admit that a renewal of feeling will change his perceptions. When he asks: "Tell me what is a thought, & of what substance is it made?" (3, 23, 47), he is linking his ideas with his perception of materiality, suggesting that the present reality determines his feelings, while the memories of past joys and sorrows do not offer any hope of transforming his present jealousy and frustration, since they are just as likely to remind him of this as to be of any comfort. He wonders what will happen if he gives his thoughts free rein: "If thou returnest to the present moment of affliction / wilt thou bring comforts on they wings, and dews and honey and balm; or poison from the desert wilds, from the eyes of the envier" (3, 11-13, 48). His "present affliction", he thinks, cannot be separated from previous events, and he does not concede that there might be a new way of regarding these events, that will lead to renewal, as Oothoon insists, providing that libidinal energy is allowed to flow freely and uncover unconscious ideas. He is unable to envisage the connection between his perceptions, and the repression imposed by morality.

Bromion's remarks only serve to reinforce the moral imperatives that have caused Theotormon's jealousy. Bromion asks his rival whether it is possible to escape the present moment, since our imaginings of unknown places are dominated by the senses we already possess. His question to Theotormon: "Knowest thou that trees

[29] I describe Hillman's criticisms of enantiodromia more fully in Chapter Two, pp. 48-9.

and fruit flourish upon the earth / To gratify senses unknown?" (4, 15, p.48) is somewhat rhetorical. His implication is that there is nothing new under the sun, because everyone perceives everything in the same way. There are no "senses unknown". All trees and fruit gratify the senses in the same way, hence the use of the tree of mystery as a symbol of the need to limit such gratification so as to forestall jealous and selfish desires. Joys and sorrows are only to do with money, or the lack of it. Human conflict originates in this same dichotomy, when the deprived challenge the rich and the powerful. It is only the law, and the threat of eternal punishment, that keeps these wayward passions in check.

Oothoon recognises the influence of Urizen on Bromion's impulse to restrict and confine, but insists that he is mistaken. "How can one joy absorb another?" she asks, and goes on to suggest that each person's joys are relative to their own situation, just as each individual creature perceives the world in its own particular way. "Does not the eagle scorn the earth & despise the treasures beneath? But the mole knoweth what is there, & the worm shall tell it thee" (5, 39-40, p. 49). She implies that if Bromion were more generous, he could identify with other joys, besides the ones attached to the accumulation of possessions, which is really a compensatory reaction to the libidinal deprivations wrought by morality.

The world Oothoon describes, however, is one in which each person's situation is determined by a relationship of power and powerlessness, and in which each creature preys upon another. Oothoon's attempt to illustrate the individuality of desire merely illustrates how far this is eroded in the social state. She wonders: "With what sense does the parson claim the labour of the farmer?" (5, 17, p. 49), suggesting that that the experiences of the parson and farmer are individual to each, while at the same time implying that their interests are completely at odds, since the former profits from the latter's hard work by claiming a tithe. The parson does not see the injustice of his actions, which are abundantly clear to the farmer. In the world of experience, different joys are not "Holy, eternal, infinite!" (5, 6, p. 48). To ensure coexistence there has to be some compromise with one's desires. It is therefore not possible to dispense with morality, despite the injustice it may help to

perpetrate. Even Oothoon's evocation of free love is not without some ambivalence. She offers Theotormon the freedom to pursue his own desires regardless of morality, and promises to place no jealous restrictions upon the possibility of their fulfilment. The force and passion behind the expression of her beliefs compels the assent of the reader, so that many believe the ideas to be unequivocally those of Blake himself. However, there is a great deal of disagreement amongst the critics about how Oothoon's proposals should be regarded. Are they the means of securing the just society that morality appears to threaten, or are they just as oppressive as the laws Oothoon so consistently attacks?

Diana Hume George, in her Freudian interpretation of the poem, traces the miseries inherent in the state of generation back to the civilised sexual codes arising from the Oedipal ban, "leading to jealousy and aggression in the male," and "resentment and frigidity in the female". She seeks Blake's solution as it is expressed in *Visions of the Daughters of Albion* as a "fantasy of free love so radical that it sounds peculiarly shocking in our own time" (133). Webster, too, thinks that the theme of the poem is a plea for incest. She sees this as a solution to the phenomenon of the son becoming just as sadistic as the father through his acceptance of the latter's moral values. She writes: "Oothoon replaces the repressive or frustrating mother with an ideally gratifying figure who will not only satisfy her youthful lover herself but will find him substitutes and, free of jealousy, will benignly observe their love-making" (*Psychology* 107). She does not regard this development with approval, regarding it as a "masculine fantasy of incestuous gratification" (107).

Damrosch, on the contrary, thinks it diminishes the poem to regard it as a simple plea for free love, and is disturbed by the voyeurism and sado-masochism implied by Oothoon's behaviour (197), perversions that arise in response to the civilised code of morality, the effects of which no one can entirely escape. He is also suspicious about "the silken nets and traps of adamant" with which Oothoon promises to catch "girls of mild silver or of furious gold" for Theotormon (7, 24 – 25, p. 50). As he points out: "The net is ubiquitous in the later poems as a symbol of female dominion" (197). The freedom offered to Theotormon is rather more

equivocal than is recognised by Oothoon, since his own sexual impulses have the effect of submitting him to the power of his own feelings. Sexuality only has a liberating effect, if energy is reactivated through creativity, otherwise as was noted in connection with *The Book of Ahania*, it can easily lead to the domination of the unconscious. Oothoon's proposals for sexual freedom do not promise liberation, for they merely perpetuate the ideas preserved in sentiment. Her narcissistic identification with the image of Theotormon, which she erroneously sees as "pure", even though in Oothoon's own terms, he clearly is not, hinders the workings of the imagination, which are only responsive to the change of perspective fostered by moral inhibition. If this, however, is merely embodied in Theotormon's antagonistic response to the morality upheld by Bromion, a reaction that Oothoon fails to inspire in Theotormon, there is no escape from the prevailing orthodoxy. Jung's insistence that the contents of the unconscious mind should be integrated into consciousness in order to bring about renewal,[30] does not, as Hillman points out, really liberate the mind, for it only perpetuates the antagonism of fixed contraries, fated to succeed one another interminably, a perception that is eventually addressed in Blake's major prophecies.

Considering that Webster regards *Visions of the Daughters of Albion* as a defence of incest, it is not surprising that she dismisses the idea of Mary Wollstonecraft having any influence upon the work, according to suggestions made by Erdman (228), and then taken up by Kathleen Raine (1: 168). Wollstonecraft's argument that "woman's first duty is to develop her mind and particularly her reason" suggests, in Webster's view, that Blake and Wollstonecraft have very little in common. Blake, she considers, wants to see women "devoted to 'happy, happy love'"(7, 16, p. 49), while Wollstonecraft prefers "to substitute equality based on reason for women's 'sexual character' as a gratifier of man" (*Psychology* 107).

Since, in my view, *Visions of the Daughters of Albion* demonstrates the limitations of Oothoon's vision, the work is much more than a masculine fantasy promoting incest and free love. It is certainly a plea for the sexual liberation of women, but it

[30] This aspect of Jung's thinking is expressed in CW 9 i, par.40

does not suggest that sexual freedom would, by itself, bring about an improvement in social conditions. Sexual liberation is presented as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for social progress. Wollstonecraft's emphasis, admittedly, differs from Blake's, in that he values sexual passion for its vital inspiriting role in the creative process, though this by no means guarantees creativity, as we have seen. Because creativity underlies social progress, however, Blake is really more interested in free thought, as far as it is possible, than in free love, though his work explores the connection between them. It seems that some repression of energy is essential for thought, a fact that rules out incest, and the free expression of sexuality. Reason therefore has a part to play in creativity, for otherwise it would be impossible to progress beyond narcissistic self-absorption, so there is no question of replacing reason altogether, either for men or for women.

There is little indication in the *Vindication* that Wollstonecraft recognises the importance of creativity in helping to by-pass the harmful effects of repression, though she does acknowledge that such repression prevents women from assuming an active role in society. She therefore questions the pressures in society for women to conform to a passive role, the insistence on modesty and chastity, or at least the appearance of them. This pressure to conform is the direct result of the contemporary marriage laws, which denies the female an independent existence, the right to own property, and even any jurisdiction over her own children.[31] Though there is no direct attack on these laws in the *Vindication*, in *Mary, A fiction*, the narrator concludes her story by looking forward to a world "where there is neither marrying nor giving in marriage" (*Mary* 53). Indirectly the *Vindication* attacks marriage by deploring a woman's economic and intellectual dependence on her husband, for there can be no true virtue or morality, Wollstonecraft insists, where there is no possibility of independent judgement, or freedom of action (*Vindication* 259). Only when allowed to participate fully in society, will women

[31] An implicit attack on the institution of marriage is to be found on p.259 of the *Vindication*. "But to render her (a wife) really virtuous and useful, she must not, if she discharge her civil duties, want individually the protection of civil laws: she must not be dependent on her husband's bounty for her subsistence during his life, or support after his death; for how can a being be generous who has nothing of its own? Or virtuous who is not free?"

be able to develop their true humanity. Oothoon's protest on behalf of the woman "bound in / spells of law to one she loaths" (5, 21, p. 49) links her with Wollstonecraft's campaign against the injustice of the contemporary code of morality, and the oppression of the marriage laws.

Wollstonecraft's attack is then primarily an attack upon the social and economic system of her day, which so circumscribed the lives of women as to keep them "confined, then, in cages like the feathered race" (*Vindication* 146). Blake too links an oppressive social system with the repression of women, and uses the image of the repressed female to represent all the forces that keep society in a state of stagnation. *Europe* illustrates how gender relations affect social conditions, and again some of his ideas tally with those of Wollstonecraft. She takes Rousseau's strictures on women as somehow representative of typical male attitudes, and attributes his views on the female role to "errors in reasoning" arising "from sensibility" (*Vindication* 189). As we have seen, this notion that Rousseau was a slave of his feelings was widely propagated in England during the latter part of the eighteenth century. Wollstonecraft considers that his views on the nature of women are influenced by his susceptibility towards them: "When he should have reasoned he became impassioned, and reflection inflamed his imagination instead of enlightening his understanding"(*Vindication* 189).

Perhaps she is here thinking of a certain passage in *A Discourse on the Origins of Inequality*, which attributes the so-called moral part of love to a "factitious feeling", originating in the imagination when, because of her wealth, position or beauty, a woman acquires a value unjustified by the simple desire for sexual union (*Inequality* 77). Rousseau's comment that this unnatural feeling, "born of social usage, and enhanced by the women with much care and cleverness, to establish their empire, and put in power the sex that ought to obey" (*Inequality* 77), puts us in mind of the kind of power possessed by Blake's female will, especially when we discover that these excellencies "whet the appetite while they increase the difficulty of gratifying it" (*Inequality* 78).

Wollstonecraft links such an inflated passion with an over-strict code of sexual morality, and her remedy is surprisingly close to the one Blake puts forward as an antidote to the power of the female will. Of Rousseau, Wollstonecraft writes: "Had he given way to these desires, the fire would have extinguished itself in a natural manner, but virtue and a romantic kind of delicacy, made him practise self-denial;" (*Vindication* 189). This same balance of power between the sexes, with the female apparently assuming dominance over the male, forms the subject of *Europe*, and it is also presented as the inevitable outcome of the moral code. However, as illustrated in *Visions of the Daughters of Albion*, though libidinal freedom lifts the repressive effects of sensibility, enabling Oothoon to understand the origins of social injustice, it does not, of itself, remove such injustice, for without the change of perspective facilitated by the exercise of the imagination, the opposition of the masculine and the feminine, of mind and nature persists, thus perpetuating the conflicts in society deplored by Oothoon.

Most commentators appear to regard *Europe* as a testimony to Blake's faith in the power of revolution to bring about an apocalyptic cleansing and renewal. Christine Gallant, in her Jungian interpretation, *Blake and the Assimilation of Chaos*, comments that the prophecies "were quite within the Judeo-Christian millennial tradition" in which "the horror, violence and injustice" of the last days were to be succeeded by a "perfect and righteous world order", made possible by Christ's victory over the Antichrist at Armageddon (37). In other words, the apocalypse was to be the last battle, ushering in a new era of freedom of justice. Gallant cites this view as part of her argument that Blake's myth originally exhibited a strong desire to impose a rigid order upon chaos, but then changed after the completion of the Lambeth prophecies to advocate an acceptance of social injustice as an aspect "of present conditions under which one has to live" (38).

Though there is some justice in her argument, it seems to me that the Lambeth prophecies, when regarded in the light of Jung's ideas, do not support a view of the apocalypse as the end of history. The conflict between masculine and feminine principles which the work presents, merely confirms the dominance of the cycle,

and of a reappearance of the kind of tyranny the revolution was intended to remove. Though this may not have been evident to Blake during the writing of *Europe*, it must have become so, when the period of justice and harmony expected to succeed the revolution was so long delayed. Though his early works do indeed portray a strong desire to order chaos, this ordering is always presented as having a disastrous effect, and undercut with a savage irony. It cannot be coincidental that the longed-for revolution is presented as the inevitable consequence of a rigid desire for order, which cannot be sustained, because the thinking process is succeeded by the domination of the feeling function, and then by a rebellious resurgence of unconscious energy, which is once again circumscribed.

Europe illustrates the influence of the female principle in determining the cyclic recurrence underlying civilisations decline and renewal. However, since male and female principles in the cycle are always opposed, the renewal is a temporary one, only achieved through conflict. In this particular work the female principle becomes more complex, since it is divided between "the nameless shadowy female" (1, 1, p. 60), and Enitharmon, the consort of Los. These two figures have a fundamental connection with each other, one that is established in the first plate of the work, when we are told of the shadowy female's "snaky hair brandishing in the winds of Enitharmon" (1, 2, p60). This snaky hair links the shadowy female with the mythical figure of Medusa, whose conflict with the hero represents the struggle of the conscious mind to break free of the unconscious.

While not the unconscious itself, Enitharmon is closely connected with it, though this relationship is disguised by "the shadowy female's" apparent hostility to the emanation of Los, accusing her of purloining her children, whom she describes as "all devouring fiery kings" (2, 4, p. 61). The birth of these sons represents the beginning of a new cycle with the appearance of another manifestation of Orc. The shadowy female pleads with Enitharmon not to stamp "with solid form" her "vig'rous progeny of fire" (1, 8, p. 61). The accusation against Enitharmon concerns the circumscribing effect of civilisation upon natural energy; in effect, how unconscious ideas come to dominate the mind when civilisation renews itself

in opposition to previous ideas held in place by sentiment. In other words, the shadowy female's complaint is that the effects of morality separate her from her progeny, though her Medusa-like features suggest the suffocating nature of the relationship she has in mind for them.

The ideas of which she complains are expressed in Plate 5, when Enitharmon, in the most vigorous part of the poem, begins to exult in her new-found power, on her discovery that "Woman, lovely woman! May have dominion" (5, 3, p. 62). This power is based upon the passivity enforced by so-called Christian virtues, in particular virgin worship and the repression of sexuality, with a promise of rewards in heaven for the passively virtuous. Hence, when under the sway of passion, Los abandons his active role, his energy thwarted by Urizenic morality, whose tenets Enitharmon has, in the interests of power absorbed, the conditions are ripe for sensibility to flourish.

This reminds us of Wollstonecraft's view that women obtain power by their sensibility, and by the acceptance in men of an over-rigid morality, which intensifies their passion, for which they have no natural outlet. When morality represses sexuality, it exacerbates the sensuality of men, and heightens sensibility in women, thus perpetuating the status quo, which then, according to the many representations of the Orc cycle, is only overturned through violent reaction when the force of repressed energy in the male becomes too great to be sustained. This situation demonstrates the limitations of Jung's view of the psyche as a self-balancing organism, in which the energy repressed in the maintenance of moral principles returns with renewed force when it can no longer be subdued.

In *Europe* the repression of energy makes itself felt in the domination of conventional and traditional values, in the suppression of rebellion, and in an inhibited, sentimental culture. Rintrah and Palamabron, "the primal artists", according to Bloom, "ought to prophesy and civilise, but they are subverted by their emanations" (Notes to Erdman's Edition of *The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake* 904). In other words, their creativity deserts them, and their

artistic productions are unable to escape the domination of conventional values. The eighteen hundred years of cultural stagnation, dating from the birth and binding of Orc, is described as Enitharmon's dream, in which history is dominated by unconscious ideas.

The next section of the work undertakes an overt account of the origin of the cycles of history, which tends to confirm that these are a permanent feature of mankind's condition and will not terminate with the apocalypse. We are informed that "Thought chang'd the infinite to a serpent: that which pitieth: / To a devouring flame; and man fled from its face and hid / In forests of night; (10, 16-18, p. 63). The reference to the serpent reminds us of the uroboric snake that bites its own tail, and the opening up of the unconscious that accompanies the development of reason. It is the presence of this feature that gives rise to the cycle, and makes possible the repression, from which sentiment ensues, and which eventually yields to the libidinal explosion when the conscious mind can no longer suppress unconscious energy.

The "eternal forests" hide from man the knowledge of his true desires, and when "divided / Into earths rolling in circles of space," (10, 18-19, p. 63), they represent and disguise the divisions of the human race occasioned by the formation of identity according to moral principles. These "earths" stand for each individual world view, based upon the selfish desire to preserve one's reputation in the eyes of other people. Both Rousseau and Jung, as we have seen, gave priority to this phenomenon as the foundation of identity. This created world then "like an ocean rush'd / And overwhelmed all except this finite wall of flesh" (10, 19-20, p. 63).

Nothing remains to consciousness except the data supporting the identity that seems to be confirmed by the integrity of each individual body. In other words, matter becomes the only reality: its worship is embodied in the temple, and identified with the physical nature of the land, as "serpent-formed" it "stretches out its shady length along the Island white" (10, 3, p. 63). Materialism is thus equated with nature worship, with science, and with the dominance of the female principle.

embodied in the figure of Enitharmon. Though all these features are the consequence of "thought", they appear at this stage of the development of Blake's ideas to be inevitable, unless reason can be dispensed with altogether. Blake's insistence in *A Descriptive Catalogue* on the importance of maintaining the "wirey and bounding line" (p. 550) in art as in life, in order to cope with chaos, means that he is unwilling to dispense with order, as Christine Gallant points out (10). In this case he is stuck with the consequences of the thinking process. It seems clear enough, therefore, that revolution, as one of these consequences, is not able to bring about the liberation supposedly promised by the apocalypse. It merely represents a stage in the cycle when the dominance of the female principle, and of a repressive morality, results in an explosion of libidinal energy, against a pressure to conform that can no longer be maintained. This energy will again be circumscribed by the imposition of a new order, and the whole cycle will begin again.

This upsurge of energy begins in Plate 10 of *Europe* when Orc makes an assault upon the ancient temple, threatening with his fiery energies to shatter the hold of the temple upon the intellect. The invulnerability of the temple is established through its description. It is "form'd of massy stones," and guarded by "venerable porches that high-towering rear / their oak-surrounded pillars" (10, 6-7, p. 63). It is built to withstand any attack, and the oak-surrounded pillars, with their Druidic associations, represent the kind of insane defensiveness that will resort to any kind of sacrifice to maintain its own supremacy. The authority assumed by empiricism, as the reference to "golden Verulam", the home of Bacon, makes clear, further protects society's prevalent thought-system (10, 5, p. 63), as does the hardening of the senses, "turn'd outward, barr'd and petrify'd against the infinite" (10, 15, p. 63). The ability to perceive is limited and distorted by the thinking process, so no new sense-data becomes available to suggest another point of view.

The "ancient Guardian", too, is charged with protecting the edifice against any attack. He is aided in his efforts by the way thought has turned the intellect into "the Stone of Night", another impenetrable structure that repels the incursion of such new material as will alter the point of view. Albion itself has similarly become

a fortress, hemmed in by cliffs, just as London is surrounded by walls, and watched over by "Churches, Palaces, Towers" (12, 3, p. 64). These link priests and kings with the urge to defend their own power by upholding the status quo. However, in *Europe*, ironically, the forces of repression defeat themselves. These forces, in the forms of George 111, Pitt and the cabinet, represented as Albion's Angels, are seen by Blake as priests of Druidic religion, showing their readiness to sacrifice human life in the defence of the status quo by trying three times to go war against France, in 1787, 1790 and 1791. These historical events play their part in Blake's depiction of the struggle against repression. France, in the throes of revolutionary fervour and its aftermath, is seen as the embodiment of Orcian energy. When the forces of repression reveal their true nature, by an overt ban on free expression, issued in 1792, they incite a rebellion, which leads to the downfall of Chancellor Thurlow, the "Guardian of the secret codes" (12, 15, p. 64). The hypocrisy of his position is revealed for all to see when he "forsook his ancient mansion" (12, 15, p. 64), and when his robes of office, "his furr'd robes & false locks" (12, 16, p. 64), formerly a dignified covering that disguised his repressive role, become part of his own body.

The downfall of Chancellor Thurlow is a sign that resistance to Orc is crumbling. However, the panic-stricken defenders of the status quo increase their efforts, directly attacking Orc, and suppressing liberty on a wider scale, "with every house a den, every man bound" (12, 26, p.26). Universal oppression seems to confirm Enitharmon in her triumph, but Orc's rage is increased by the resultant injustice, and he starts to destroy the oppressors, in the shape of Albion's Guardian. Rintrah, presumably in a desperate attempt to bring a resolution through conflict, tries three times to sound "The Trump of the last doom" (13, 37, p. 65), but only the "mighty spirit" by the name of Newton is successful, in that the empirical view of nature makes clear the mistaken nature of the thought-systems defended by Albion's Angels, who "fell through the wintry skies seeking their graves" (13, 6, p. 65).

At this point Enitharmon wakes from her dream, and "calld her sons and daughters to the sports of night, Within her crystal house;" (13, 12-14, p. 65). Her sleep represented the domination of unconscious ideas, and with her awakening they are

brought into consciousness by the opposition founded upon rebellious energy, which promises to sweep them away. Enitharmon's awakening further entrenches these ideas, and heightens the sensuality induced by Urizenic morality. Hence the masculine principle is still in thrall to the feminine. Enitharmon's summons to her children makes clear that the males are still entrapped by the sexual hypocrisy of the female, their senses stimulated by a delusive and separate materiality. Ethinthus, the "queen of waters" now shining in the sky is the emblem of the domination of matter, while Leutha, "the luring bird of Eden" is the image of the sexual hypocrisy that guarantees female power (14, 1-10, p. 65). The males under female domination, such as Manathu-Vorcyon, and Antamon, show that sensuality hinders creative inspiration, while the panoply of iridescent colour, flickering movement, and images of visual beauty both appeal to the senses, whilst demonstrating the delusiveness of sensory delights.

However, this celebration of sensuality, which may not be gratified, has the effect of intensifying repression, and therefore finally releasing the energy of Orc, who appears in "the vineyards of red France" as the emblem of revolutionary energy. The end of the poem anticipates the outbreak in 1793 of the wars between England and France, in which Blake mistakenly anticipated a victory for the forces of liberation. Hence, the poem ends when an exultant Los "Call'd all his sons to the strife of blood" (14, 10, p. 66). As Christine Gallant points out, "with the final plate we are back in the chthonic world of the 'shadowy female' of the 'Preludium'" (35), with Los "in snaky thunders clad" (14, 9, p. 66), even taking on some defining aspects of her appearance. This ending is an ambiguous one, however, since the blood-letting is not in itself a sign of approaching liberation, but is rather the source of even greater oppression for those unfortunate victims crushed beneath the "red wheels dropping with blood" (15, 5, p. 66). Whether or not their sacrifice is justified depends perhaps on what follows the carnage. Some might think that no outcome can possibly justify it.

Rousseau's analysis of the development of inequality, however, tends to suggest that revolution may the only means of removing unjust rulers. In outlining the

progress of societies from a state of nature to the development of the civil state, Rousseau describes how government by a legitimate magistracy according to laws and the right of property descends into a rule of arbitrary power, in which there are only masters or slaves (*Inequality* 109). Those who accumulate property in any dispensation sustain its rulers in power, because "they come to love authority more than independence, and submit to slavery, that they may enslave others" (*Inequality 110*). This entrenched division between rulers and ruled is only healed if "the government is either entirely dissolved by new revolutions, or brought back to legitimacy" (*Inequality* 109). Rousseau's analysis may therefore support the use of revolution for the removal of unjust governments, when there is no other way of addressing the balance between the weak and powerful, or the rich and the poor. He adds: "The popular insurrection that ends in the death or deposition of a Sultan is as lawful an act as those by which he disposed, the day before, of the lives and fortunes of his subjects" (*Inequality* 66). However, he also notes that revolution can also produce despots and, in the light of Jungian psychology, which implies an inevitable reaction to an imbalance within the psyche, this appears to me to be the most likely outcome. As the Orc Cycle demonstrates, the state of the individual mind is also replicated in society at large.

Jung's analysis of the compensatory movements of the psyche suggests that when the hero is, like Los at the beginning of *Europe*, swallowed up "in the belly of the dragon" to be dominated by the unconscious, according to the regressive movement of the libido, the overcoming of the monster from within marks his adaptation to the conditions of the inner world, and "this symbolises the recommencement of progression" (CW 8 par. 68). The wording of this description of adaptation is remarkably similar to Blake's own assertion from *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell* that "Without Contraries is no progression" (3, 5, p34). In other words, for both Blake and Jung, resistance to unconscious ideas through the reactivation of energy produces new ones that ensure a better adaptation to existing conditions. Mental oppression is only removed when the feeling and sentiment holding it in place is dissolved through a reactivation of unconscious energy, and an adoption of new ideas. However, as Hillman points out, these are just as

despotic as the ones they replace, and confirm the domination of the ego, which maintains the separation between spirit and matter. Los's "call to the strife of blood", though it removes one tyranny, is therefore doomed to impose another, which can only be replaced through violent resistance. Rousseau's justification for revolution, as equivocal as it is, would not appear to answer the conditions for the removal of tyranny, which requires a dissolution of the vacillating opposition between masculine and feminine principles, as first one dominates and then the other in the cycles of history.

CHAPTER FOUR

NAILED UPON A ROCK: DEISM, THE ORC CYCLE AND THE HERO MYTH.

Blake's association with Godwin, and other members of the circle who met at the house of the publisher, Joseph Johnson, along with the artist's perfectibilist notions, which he shared with the members of this circle, suggests that much of the impetus for his achievements emerged from one of the most dominant movements of the eighteenth century, that of Protestant Radical dissent. This movement, inextricably allied with the Enlightenment, was led by professional men, many of whom came from non-conformist backgrounds. Since the Corporation Act of 1661, and the Test Act of 1673 prohibited dissenters from holding public office, the energies of these men, freed from orthodoxy, could be diverted into more unconventional spheres. Religious dissenters such as Priestley, both a scientist and a theologian, dominated the circle surrounding Joseph Johnson, while the roots of Godwin himself were nonconformist: his grandfather, uncle and father were all dissenting ministers. Godwin, following in their tradition, was educated at the dissenting academy at Hoxton, though he was later to renege on his religious views. E.P Thompson in his book *The Making of the English Working Class* emphasises the heterogeneity of the dissenting movement, showing that its members ranged from adherents of Methodism to the fanatical followers of chiliasm, who believed the doctrine that Christ will reign bodily on the earth for a thousand years. Blake's study and annotations of the works of Swedenborg, along with his attendance at one, at least, of the theologian's meetings,[32] shows the intense religious interest inherited from

[32] In his biography of William Blake, p. 102, Peter Ackroyd describes the people attending a typical Swedenborgian meeting, describing them as representative of urban radicalism among the trading classes. Blake and his wife, according to Ackroyd, attended a meeting at the Swedenborgian chapel on 13th April 1789.

his dissenting background, an interest often accompanied by the kind of political radicalism that informs Blake's work.

Kelly outlines the range of political views held in common by these dissenters. Faith in progress and social amelioration "through reason, order and self-discipline" was a core belief (11). Unsurprisingly, considering the legal attempts to suppress religious dissent, there was an emphasis on "religious toleration" along with "free inquiry" and "free enterprise" (Kelly 11). The dissenters were particularly opposed to the prejudice and superstition that maintained "fixed hierarchical social structures, economic monopolies, and oppressive institutions" (Kelly 11). They argued for egalitarian societies in which "moral, affective and intellectual sympathy" provided the social bond, and they attacked "the system of patronage and dependence, which supposedly deformed and denatured relations between husband and wife, parents and children, friends, members of a profession, and members of different social classes, nationalities, races, or even species" (Kelly 11).

Some of these preoccupations have already appeared in the works of Blake so far discussed. *The Book of Urizen* highlights the effect of an oppressive morality, such as might be imposed by an established religion, *The Book of Ahania* illustrates, among other things, the unifying effect of feeling, while *Visions of the Daughters of Albion* attacks oppressive social institutions, such as marriage, aristocracy and financial monopoly. However, Blake's work denies that social progress will ever come about through reason, in the sense that the dissenters intended since, as we have seen in relation to the works of Jung and Rousseau, rationality has a divisive effect upon the individual personality, because of the difficulty of adhering to moral principles against the pressure of repressed desire. As this chapter will demonstrate, in Blake's view this division in the personality, opened up by rationality, and the subsequent deterministic construction of gender, underlies all the social divisions that the dissenters thought could be reconciled through reason.

Godwin's inheritance from the tradition of radical dissent informs the ideas outlined in the first edition of *Political Justice*, a philosophical treatise on the foundation of

the just society, published in 1793. Despite Godwin's disagreement with many of Rousseau's political theories, particularly with regard to the validity of the social contract as a means of unifying the disparate interests of the individuals composing society, the influence of the French philosopher forms a starting-point for many of Godwin's ideas. Perhaps this preoccupation with Rousseau, whose works had gained a reputation for exalting feeling rather than reason, helps to account for the changes in Godwin's theories in later editions of *Political Justice*, when his emphasis upon the centrality of reason according to his inheritance from radical dissent is abandoned in favour of the recognition of the role of feeling in the conduct of human affairs.

In his study of the three editions of Godwin's philosophical tract, Philp accounts for this change by describing the decline of the radical societies, such as the L.C.S. and the S.C.I, with the recognition that one of the results of the revolution in France was to fuel the reluctance of King and Parliament to concede reform in the shape of the abolition of the Test and Corporation Acts (63). Rather than the encouragement of change, the central issue for Pitt and the government was the avoidance of general insurrection. Burke's counter-revolutionary argument had stressed the limitations of human reason in controlling the passions, and the radicals had yet to prove their claims that reason was an adequate basis for the maintenance of order and stability in society. According to Philp, Godwin became increasingly concerned about the effect of the activities of these radical societies, since they encouraged a tide of popular feeling against the authorities, culminating in the food riots of April 1795, when the crowd booed the king on his journey to Parliament. Godwin began to fear the destructive effects of a possible revolution, envisaging a complete social breakdown, which began to seem more threatening than the use of coercion in the maintenance of public order. These developments also appeared to suggest to Godwin that "feeling not judgement, is the cause of human actions" (Philp 140) a perception confirmed by his growing acquaintance with the work of the British Moralists, such as Hume, Smith and Butler, who agreed with Rousseau that a

capacity for entering into the feeling of others through sympathy was the foundation of ethical behaviour.[33]

The first edition of *Political Justice*, however, is still largely the product of Godwin's radical dissenting background. Both he and Priestley are inheritors of the long Enlightenment tradition linking the possibility of human progress to the scientific discoveries made during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries about the nature of the universe. The desired improvement in man's moral nature, supposedly made possible through the development of rationality, could be brought about if man aspired to emulate the nature of the creator, as far as He was made manifest in his creation. The conclusion of Descartes that it was possible to establish God as a first and sufficient cause led to the view of the universe as "the Great Machine working by rigidly determined laws of material causation" (*Background*, Willey 4). Nature viewed as a machine naturally presupposed God as the great mechanic. Much of the scientific thinking of the Enlightenment era was dominated by the implications of this mechanistic principle. Scientists such as Newton, Boyle and Bacon laboured under the assumption that, in illuminating the laws governing the workings of the universe, they were also revealing the nature of the divinity. As Willey points out, this represents a revaluation of the status of the material universe. Once regarded by the Neoplatonists as having participated in the fall of man, nature now partakes of God's divine substance.

Though both the Neoplatonists, and the scientists discover a rational order in the universe, the implications of this ordering differs, and helps to explain Blake's antagonism to Deism, which is a constant feature of his work emerging through his treatment of the emanation. Following the Neoplatonists, Blake endows the mind with the property of discovering an order in nature according to predetermined, though unconscious ideas, embodied in the emanation. The ordering process does not inhere in nature itself. To believe that the structure of the universe reveals the nature of the divinity denies the mind any role in the creative process, an idea that

[33] I engage in a fuller discussion on the changes occurring in Godwin's beliefs concerning the influence of feeling on moral behaviour in Chapter Six, pp. 202 – 205.

would be an anathema to Blake, for it would perpetuate the separation between mind and world that is represented by the loss of the emanation. For the deist, God may be discovered in the nature of the material universe, whereas for Blake, the divinity subsists in a creative relation to matter, one that is echoed in human creativity. The nature of the world is to be grasped intuitively according to the view of existence suggested by unconscious ideas, an understanding of which depends upon a recognition that the world is an emanation of the mind. In fact, the mechanistic view of nature outlined by the physico-theologians of the eighteenth century rests upon an assumption of the separateness and inferiority of matter and, as Hillman points out, such a premise is only sustainable through the suppression of the feminine, which allows feeling to be rejected as a feminine prerogative. A renewal of feeling reactivates the mind's connection with the material universe, and though it can be a delusive quality, concealing some aspects of reality, as Blake's *Songs of Innocence*, discussed towards the end of this chapter, will show, it can also, in certain circumstances prompt an active revision of the way the world is viewed.

Godwin, however, in the first edition of *Political* Justice, attributes to reason the power of freeing the mind from the shackles of the dominant ideology, propagated by those who are maintained in power by the existing dispensation. He accepts Rousseau's analysis of the development of *amour-propre*, in which self-esteem is developed only in relation to power, property, and public opinion.[34] As Godwin argues in Book One, Chapter Three of *Political Justice:* "The rich are ...directly or indirectly the legislators of the state; and of consequence are perpetually reducing oppression into a system, and depriving the poor of the little commonage of nature which might otherwise have remained to them" (*Justice* 92). Such insidious influences rob the oppressed of the power of independent judgement, which Godwin considers to be essential for the management of the just society. In explaining the nature of despotism, Godwin adopts the doctrine of necessity, which argues that

[34] The reliance upon public esteem, which Rousseau described as having a corrupting effect upon morality, is demonstrated in Godwin's novel, *Caleb Williams*, in which Falkland, one of the major protagonists, commits a crime with the direct purpose of preserving his own reputation out of concern for the social image of the self held by public opinion. I discuss this novel in more detail in Chapter Six, p.207.

men's actions are pre-determined by the causal constraints imposed by the dominant ideology. This doctrine was first propounded by such thinkers as Hartley and Priestley, who inherited the view, held by Locke, of the mind as a *tabula rasa*, which only develops its capacity for the understanding of complex ideas through its response to external stimuli. In this process, the mind merely responds passively to experience, and is therefore considered incapable of resisting external pressure to think and behave in a certain way. Godwin argues, taking his cue from the scientific assumptions of his day, that just as the universe is objective in its nature, and determined by laws which are universally true and applicable, so the laws governing human conduct embody abstract truth, and are therefore accessible to human reason which, in Godwin's system, has the power of changing the response to external stimuli.

David Hartley was the originator of the association principle, which suggests a deterministic account of the workings of mind, though he bases his necessitarian ideas on the work of David Hume, who argues that there is no necessary connection between objects in the world, but only in ideas linked through customary sensation.

> No object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the senses, either the causes which produced it, or the effects which will arise from it; nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of fact (Hume 27).

Hartley takes the idea of association from Hume, and works out a scheme whereby the faculties of the human mind, as well the evolution of our moral nature, is developed from simple sensation working upon our imagination, a process which he claims eventually culminates in reflection (*Background*, Willey 137). In the first edition of *Political Justice*, Godwin's emphasis on the centrality of reason leads him to underplay the role of sensation, insisting instead that the character of men originate in their perceptions. As Philp points out, his argument "for the ascendancy of perception over sensation" (87) is part of his exaltation of reason, which requires the suppression of emotion and feeling. Hartley, however, believes that the

pleasurable and painful associations experienced in the presence of natural objects contribute to an all-embracing notion of the divinity: these eventually combine to develop the moral sense. While recognising that it is possible to take pleasure from unworthy objects, Hartley considers that the universe works harmoniously so as to promote the most propitious development of character in individuals, a process which will in the end culminate in the most just and virtuous society: all that needs to be done is to cultivate, in Wordsworth's words, a "a wise passiveness".[35] As has often been noted, Hartley impressed both Wordsworth and Coleridge, and his ideas influenced their work.

Priestley's version of necessitarianism, which probably influenced Blake, either directly or through Godwin, exposes the dilemma implicit in the notion of necessity. What role is there for man in nature's grand scheme, if providence ensures that all things in the end will turn out for good? This is the difficulty implied in Priestley's view that whatever is, is right. This version of the doctrine of necessity also emphasises that humans need only remain passive in the face of the Divine will for good to emerge from even the most unpropitious circumstances, but this observation sits uneasily with the idea that only continual exertion will lead to the desired perfection of human character and society. Priestley thinks that a man will take more pains to improve the moral climate if he thinks that its improvement depends upon his own endeavour. Willey claims that the above paradox is reconcilable. He argues that if people's motivation changes because of a change in circumstances and this leads to an improvement in their moral nature, they are submitting themselves to higher and higher forms of necessity, which in the end demands a "complete submission to the moral law" (*Background* 180). This argument, however, still implies a passive acceptance of the existing circumstances, as it suggests that one's actions in the end will not have any effect upon the conditions emerging from the moral law, which is objectively true and universally applicable. Even though Godwin's aim is the discovery of such abstract truth, Priestley's view that it will happen through the individual's spontaneous reaction to a change in circumstances,

[35] See Lyrical Ballads, p. 103, "Expostulation and Reply", by William Wordsworth.

and not in response to human will, leaves little room for the rational analysis that Godwin considered so vital in securing the just society.

It was Priestley who contributed to the perfectibilist agenda on the overcoming of error by truth, with his insistence that "we become progressively more enlightened and mankind as a whole makes progress" (Philp 22). The idea of progressive enlightenment is familiar to students of Blake, encapsulated as it is in his memorable aphorism that "without contraries there is no progression" (3, 6, p.34). However, Blake's interpretation would differ greatly from that of Priestley for the progress envisaged by the latter entails moving ever more closely towards the truth contained in God's moral law, and this is a repetition of the mechanistic philosophy to which Blake took such exception. Both Price and Priestley argue that moral judgements are objective, and determined by God's nature. In Philp's summary of Price's view: "Abstract virtue is what we would attain if we were fully able to grasp every aspect of the immutable truths of good and evil, if we could see the universe through God's omnipotent eyes" (23). In this account progress leads to the inevitable working out of an objective truth, and according to the implications of this necessitarian view, man's efforts make very little difference as to whether the goal of truth is reached or not, if providence ensures that the same end is attained anyway. In his early work Blake appears to have adopted Priestley's optimistic view of human progress, while denying that it will happen through passive inactivity, or through the pursuit of an objective moral truth.

Priestley believed "that truth was attainable, that it should be unceasingly pursued, that it need only be declared to be acknowledged" (*Background*, Willey 170). Priestley's faith in the capacity of truth to convince with its immediacy is captured in one of Blake's aphorisms: "Truth can never be told so as to be understood, and not believed" (10, 69, p38). However, Blake is not alluding to the kind of objective truth which science will claim to demonstrate. According to Erdman, Blake made fun of Priestley in The Island in the Moon where he appears as a character called "Inflammable Gas" (96). This suggests not only that Priestley's ideas were accompanied by a considerable quantity of hot air, but also that Blake was mildly

contemptuous of his scientific preoccupations. Rather than valuing the inductive approach to experience, Blake thinks that the recognition of truth is an intuitive process, which involves the whole personality, and not analytical mental processes alone.[36] Perhaps he does not recognise that scientific method involves such an intuitive leap of faith, in penetrating the surface of experience, and uncovering a regularity there which may be expressed as a natural law or, rather more likely, he does recognise it, but deplores the fact that such an insight, established as objective truth, sets the mind in a particular pattern, and depresses further creativity.

Though Godwin's necessitarianism does not depart very much from Priestley's version in that he accepts a mechanistic account of the workings of the universe, and a view that morality is derived from sensation by association, he differs from his predecessors in that he rejects the notion of a divinity. His atheism runs directly counter to Blake's own beliefs in this respect, as does his view that nature works according to rational laws. Godwin, in Philp's words, "relies upon an appeal to truth whereas the Dissenters appeal to God " (26). Even though Godwin in his thought omits the notion of the divinity, his version of truth in the 1793 text of *Political Justice* still depends upon the idea that there is a rational structure to the world, one that is accessible to the reasoning mind. We can see why Philp comments that "we should be cautious about calling Godwin an atheist" (34), for if the world has a rational structure which is objective in its nature, it is difficult to see how it came to be that way without an agent to give it shape. Godwin's reliance on immutable truth clearly links him to a similar belief in a mechanistic universe as those who influenced him.

In *Political Justice* Godwin begins his chapter on necessity by demonstrating that natural events possess a regularity that enables us to assume that one event is always followed by another. Godwin admits, following Hume, that we cannot prove that the

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[36] Blake's opposition to scientific method is evident from his anti-materialist stance, and his parody of science in such works as *The Book of Urizen*, discussed in Chapter Two. He is more explicit in his annotations to Bacon, on p. 621 of *The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake*. "Self Evident Truth is one Thing and Truth the result of Reasoning is another Thing Rational Truth is not the Truth of Christ but of Pilate. It is the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil".

first event causes the second, but he argues that we can reasonably assume that it does, and therefore convert such a conclusion "into a general foundation of inference and reasoning" (*Justice* 339). He continues by enquiring whether we can understand the operations of mind in a similar way, and suggests that "mind as well as matter" exhibits a constant conjunction of event, and "furnishes all the ground that any subject will afford for a subject of necessity" (*Justice* 340). His argument develops to suggest that each event is connected to the one that preceded it through the laws of causation, and he concludes "that everything takes place according to necessary and universal laws" (*Justice* 343) and moreover, "were it not for the existence of general laws to which the events of the material universe always conform, man could never have been either a reasoning or a moral being" (*Justice* 344).

Godwin continues to undermine the notion of free will by arguing not only that involuntary actions are necessary, but that voluntary actions, where we appear to have freedom of choice, are actually the outcome of a situation in which "all acts, except the first, were necessary, and followed each other as inevitably as the links of a chain do when the first link is drawn forward" (*Justice* 347). He also argues that the presence of two conflicting motives for action again provides no evidence for free will, since the decision as to what is done will depend on whichever motive is the strongest. The weight of motive power again will be something beyond the control of the mind. Godwin finishes by adding the quotation from Clarke[37] that the "will is the last act of the understanding", and from Hartley that it is "one of the different cases of the association of ideas" (*Justice* 349). Just as objects in the external world, Godwin argues, make their impression upon us whether we wish them to or not, so the mind cannot help acting upon ideas which impress themselves upon our understanding. Therefore, he adds, as man is a creature governed by his understanding "nothing further is requisite but the improvement of his reasoning faculty to make him virtuous and happy" (*Justice* 350).

[37] Samuel Clarke (1695-1729). Clarke was a religious writer, and a critic of Trinitarian doctrine. He wrote *Scripture of the Doctrine of the Trinity* in 1712. Godwin was himself a Unitarian before losing his religious beliefs.

The argument contains the same paradox as the necessitarian ideas of Hartley and Priestley. Our understanding is developed without reference to our own will, via the same chain of causation that underlies the operations of nature, but comprehension may also be improved by developing the reasoning faculty, in a way presumably that by-passes nature's deterministic effects. According to Godwin, we are the victims of necessity, but we also have the power to deliver ourselves from our fate by our own actions if we learn to think more rationally. It appears that necessity is not quite necessity, after all. If a choice of two or more actions is presented to us, we have the ability to choose between them, not according to whichever impulse weighs most strongly with us, but according to whichever action is the most rational. Though it is not explicit in his argument here, Godwin is really arguing that virtuous conduct results more from willed action according to principle, than from the spontaneous feeling which might derive from an unthinking acceptance of established moral orthodoxies. He believes that our conduct should be determined by the consideration of what will most benefit society. In this he confers upon reason, rather than upon feeling, the power of freeing individuals and societies from the tyranny of the past, which he blames for their present corrupt state. He attributes reason with the power of discriminating between ideas, though as we have seen, it is dependent upon feeling, which suggests an antagonism to one idea, and therefore a reaction to it, and explains the rebellious insurrection, which Godwin found so disturbing, following the repressive activities of the Pitt government during the early 1790's. Though in later editions of Political Justice, Godwin was to admit the power of feeling as a motivating force for action, in his first edition he adheres more to the idea expressed in the heading of Book I, Chapter V "that voluntary actions of men originate in their opinions" (*Justice* 116).

Blake's Orc Cycle, as Frye termed it, demonstrates the former's opposition to Deism, though in its most basic form it is almost as deterministic as the various versions of necessity, establishing that the interactions of reason and feeling are responsible for the circularity implicit in the Orc Cycle, whilst indicating, in opposition to Godwin, that the willed action of men does not originate in their opinions. If the Orc cycle is examined in relation to Jung's exploration of the hero

myth, it becomes obvious why this structure only promises an intermittent release from oppression. Deism, the belief that matter is shaped according to God's immutable laws, to which man can only passively respond according to the promptings of sensation, leads to the conclusion, adopted by Godwin, that reason can override nature's deterministic role, if feeling is left out of account. The works of Blake, however, demonstrate the fallacy of this argument. Both the activity of the rationalist, and the passivity of the Deist are shown to be stages of Blake's Orc cycle. Reason originates in an emotional response to existing ideas enshrined in sentiment, and sensation, and so does not offer the independence of thought that Godwin attributes to rationality in the first edition of *Political Justice*. His failure to acknowledge the influence of feeling reminds us of the stalemate attendant upon Urizen's creative endeavours in *The Book of Urizen*, an impasse that can only be remedied by the more emotionally directed activities of Los. Although the efforts of Los, however, culminate in some form of psychic renewal, they again represent only a stage in the cycle, in which the active organisation of experience is succeeded by a renewed period of repression.

The interactions of reason and energy underlie Jung's account of the hero myth. His exploration of the many versions of this myth identifies certain fundamental features that each holds in common, suggesting a symbolic representation of the movement of consciousness, one that can also be discovered in the biblical account of the life of Christ. The myth, recounted in the volume of the complete works entitled *Symbols of Transformation*, tells of how the hero journeys by sea towards the east, and fights the sea-monster, who eventually swallows him whole. The monster is killed when the hero lights a fire inside him, which means that he creates life in "the very womb of death" (CW 5, par. 538). The monster dies, and drifts to land, where the hero once more sees the light of day. This struggle with the sea-monster, under the pretext of securing deliverance from the mother, must be renewed indefinitely. Unless the hero "is called forth to new dangers he sinks into slothful inactivity" (CW 5, par. 540). This inactivity corresponds to the passivity that the necessitarians considered to be implicit in man's relationship with the universe. Once the principles governing one's conduct are established, they retreat into the

unconscious, where they continue to influence conduct through feeling. Any renewal of principle occurs in reaction to this feeling, and it is this process that summons the will. Reason can only operate where there is a tension produced by antagonistic feeling to a preceding idea. If feeling is denied, then there can be no renewal of principle.

According to Jung, the dragon in the hero myth represents "the terrible mother", whose numinosity is acquired through the hero's fear of incest embodied in the "negative mother imago". Dragon and snake are the symbolic representations of the fear of the consequences of breaking the incest taboo, and reverting to incest (CW 5, par. 396). The father is the cause of this fear since he is "representative of the spirit whose function it is to oppose pure instinctuality" (CW 5, par. 396). Because of the incest taboo, the progress of the libido is blocked, and its forbidden goal, the mother is represented by symbols, "mother analogies thrown up by the unconscious", the equivalent of being born from the spirit, rather than the flesh (CW 5, par. 313). Symbols substituted for the mother are the city, the well, the cave, the church and the tree, all of which feature to varying degrees in Blake's work. The substitution of symbols for the mother imago means that a spiritual reality has been imposed upon "the sensuous and tangible actuality of the world" (CW 5, par. 336).

However, the hero's achievement in resisting "the terrible mother" has to be repeated indefinitely, for he experiences always "a deadly longing for the abyss" (CW 5, par. 533), an irresistible desire to return to his source, and recover the passivity and ease of unconscious depths. The response of the hero is to erect barriers against the loss of his hard-won achievements in the guise of "sacrosanct ideals, principles and beliefs" (CW 5, par. 533). These protect him against the spirit of evil, embodied in the serpent, which he associates with the threat of the loss of his conscious life, with "bondage to the mother, and with extinction and dissolution in the unconscious" (CW 5, par. 551). The desire to cling onto established theories and ideals underlies the notion of the objectivity of matter since, if theories become accepted as truths, the immutable structure of the universe defends them against destruction. This suggests the origins of the necessitarian beliefs of Godwin, and

his predecessors. A faith that God is to be discovered in the immutability of the laws describing the nature of the universe means that victory over "the terrible mother", and her threat to conscious life, has finally been achieved. The evil of instinctuality has been defeated by the invincibility of the spirit.

However, as we have seen in previous chapters, the instincts themselves are not vanquished, but linger in "the miasmas arising from the stagnant pools of libido", which give rise to "those baneful phantasmagorias which so veil reality that all adaptation becomes impossible" (CW 5, par. 254). We are reminded, perhaps, of the collapse of Urizen in the book of that name when, no longer able to live up his ideals, he succumbs to the pressure exerted by his unconscious desires. Jung notes that: "the determination to cling onto established attitudes leads to a mental fossilisation, evident in "moods, ridiculous irritability, feelings of distrust and resentment, which are meant to justify the hero's rigid attitudes" (CW 5, par. 458). All the accumulated emotions, repressed in the effort to attain spirituality, wreak their effects, and eventually, according to Jung's theories of psychic compensation, force a reversion to the unconscious and a renewal of the instinctive level of existence. Providing that the hero does not totally succumb to the demands of the instincts, but "defends his divinity against the animal instincts of the divine powers" (CW 5, par. 524), he achieves the experience of rebirth, which bestows upon him the experience of divinity. Jung offers the following summary of the significance of the hero:

> It seems to us . . . that he is first and foremost a self-representation of the longing of the unconscious, of its unquenched and unquenchable desire for the light of consciousness. But consciousness, continually in danger of being led astray by its own light and of becoming a rootless will o' the wisp, longs for the healing power of nature, for the deep wells of being,

and for unconscious communion with life in all its countless forms (CW 5 par. 299).[38]

The tension between mind and nature that characterises the hero myth underlies the Orc Cycle as it appears in "The Mental Traveller". The dynamics of this relationship also influences the course of history as it is illustrated in the cycle, as nature and the mind take it in turns to dominate, according to the process of enantiodromia, when energy moves from the conscious mind to the unconscious, and throws up previously hidden notions. In this respect, man has only an imperfect control over nature, since his path to progress is directed by forces of which he is largely unaware. Even though he may act in the expectation of securing a certain outcome, his desires are affected by an opposition to principles he may only recognise from the nature of his own antagonism. Godwin's suggestion that freedom of action may result from the substitution of irrationality by rational principles does not, according to Orc Cycle, hold good, since principles only emerge through hostile reaction to what preceded them. They cannot be divorced from feeling.

The tension implicit in the interactions of mind and nature is depicted in the varying relationships of male and female figures in "The Mental Traveller". These represent the connections between mind and emanation, with the female figures suggesting the quality and nature of the mind's libidinal association with the world. The male figures move in a cycle from infancy to old age, and then back again, while the female figures do the same, but they are almost always out of step with each other. Apart from the transitory encounter between youth and maiden towards the end of the cycle, there is always an imbalance between the figures: the aging and renewal of the male and female figures never coincide. Energy belongs either to the conscious mind, or to nature, which, in effect, corresponds to the unconscious, or to all those aspects of the world that have no conscious representation. Energy resides in the mind when it impels a course of action in opposition to preceding principles,

[38] In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, found in Volume XVIII of *The Complete Works*, pp 3-64. Freud also describes this dual movement of consciousness. His notion of "dual drives", the urge towards self-preservation, and the death drive, the desire "to restore an earlier state of things", the union with the mother, corresponds to the movements of consciousness in the hero myth.

but it declines when the active organisation of experience ceases, and the principles underlying the newly established view become the accepted orthodoxy, against which there will be a rebellion by the generation that follows.

In Jung's account of the hero myth, we are told that "the heroes are usually wanderers, and wandering is a symbol of longing, of the restless urge that never finds its object, of nostalgia for the lost mother" (CW 5, par. 299). In other words, the hero can never achieve wholeness in his relationship with his emanation. This tragic situation is suggested in the first stanza of "The Mental Traveller", when we are told that the narrator "heard & saw such dreadful things / As cold Earth wanderers never knew" (3-4, p. 483). The inhabitants of the land, through which the narrator travelled, are afflicted with the same sense of loss as is experienced by the hero, and one represented in the poem by the failure of the male and female figures to achieve a union. The gulf between these principles is first suggested when we are told that "the Babe is born in joy/ That was begotten in dire woe" (5-6, p. 483). The birth of the child, for a brief period, heals the divisions that are implied by sexuality. The child was conceived in woe because of these divisions, but the prospect of the renewal of wholeness accounts for the joy that attends his birth.

This renewal of integrity is instantly sundered in the third verse, when "He's given to a woman Old, / who nails him down upon a rock / Catches his Shrieks in Cups of gold" (10-12, p.484). In many of the hero myths, according to Jung, the hero underwent birth from a rock, which is another symbol of the mother "who is protected from incest by fear" (CW 5, par. 368). The rock is a representation of the mother's imperviousness to the child's desire. In Jung's words, "the world is created from the mother, i.e. with the libido that is withdrawn from her through sacrifice" (CW 5, par. 378). Jung lists gold as one of the libido symbols, while the cup is a piece of womb symbolism, associated with the unconscious. The implication is that the libido withdrawn from the mother accumulates within the unconscious, which is represented by the figure of the "woman Old". Her age tells of her accumulated experience, and of the ideas that shaped the civilisation, now declined, that she represents. These ideas coincide with the repression of mental energy, and

unconsciously influence the tender mind of the child, resulting in the dominance of the feeling function.

Further symbols associate the child with Christ, though the chronology does not conform entirely with the Christian myth, since it is the child, rather than the man, who experiences the equivalent of crucifixion, when the woman old "binds iron thorns around his head" and "pierces both his hands & feet" (13-14, p. 484). The assaults upon the child's physical nature suggest the instinctual sacrifice, which entails "giving up the connections with the mother, relinquishing all the ties and limitations which the psyche has taken over from childhood into adult life" (CW 5, par. 461)[39]. Nature, in the guise of the woman old, then tortures the child, by destroying his capacity for feeling. "She cuts his heart out at his side" (15, p. 484). She also takes sadistic pleasure in making him more sensitive to pain. These are references to the way that the child's libido is separated from his instincts, which deprives him of his natural capacity for experiencing pleasure. The sacrificed libido accumulates in the unconscious, an event that is symbolised in the increasing youthfulness of nature. The woman old becomes a virgin bright.

At this point occurs the one event that shows man taking charge of nature, as the youth "rends up his Manacles / And binds her down for his delight" (23-24, p. 484). This is the equivalent of the killing of the dragon in the hero myth, which refers to the destruction of the "dark state of union with the mother", a repudiation of the fleshly mother, and a rebirth from the spiritual one, or the anima, symbolised by the

[39] See Claire Douglas on "The Historical Content of Analytical Psychology", p. 24, as essay from *The Cambridge Companion to Jung*, edited by Eisendrath and Dawson. According to Douglas, Jung accepted matriarchy as a stage in the development of consciousness. Neuman's interpretation of the hero myth , described in *Jung and the Post-Jungians*, p. 76, establishes a phase in the infant's development when the mother is apparently all-powerful, particularly as she is in control of the food-supply. This forces the ego to play a passive role at first: there is no conscious differentiation between infant and mother. The ego develops through acts of aggressive fantasy, which force a separation between mother and child. This explanation may be compared with the theories of Lacan, lucidly explained by Anika Lamaire in *Jacques Lacan*, p.7: "In the Oedipus, the child moves from an immediate, non-distanced relationship with its mother to a mediate relationship thanks to its insertions into the symbolic order of the Family. The family institution distinguishes between parents and children giving them names and places as singular subjects. In the Oedipus, the father plays the role of the symbolic Law which establishes the family triangle by actualising in his person the prohibition of union with the mother". All these accounts reflect upon the hero myth.

"Virgin bright" (21, p. 484). It is also the stage of the Orc Cycle in which conscious rational attitudes emerge in reaction to unconscious sentiments: it corresponds to the delusory bid for independence that Godwin associates with rationality. In the hero myth, the killing of the dragon allows the hero to fetch the treasure from the dark cavern, and this treasure is life itself (CW 5, par. 580). Hence in "The Mental Traveller" the youth's act of deliverance transforms nature from a rock, to a "Garden fruitful Seventy fold" (28, p. 484). In his vengeful reaction to the depredations wrought by the woman old, the youth has become self-conscious, asserting his identity in contradistinction to the world. However, his act of self assertion is prompted by his hostility to the ideas of the previous generation, represented by the woman old. The youth appears to have no alternative but to react in this way. Godwin's suggestion that the individual has the choice of acting according to reason, rather than feeling, is not borne out according to the events of this poem, for reason is attached to feeling, and choosing between alternative rational courses of action would not nullify the effects of the unconscious, and its conscious manifestation, feeling.

The circumstances of the rest of the poem are the consequences of the youth's act of rebellion. He gradually grows older, depending upon the accumulation of treasure that accompanied his rebellious self-assertion. This produces an energy that sustains him through his prime, but which gradually seeps away, leaving him once more at the mercy of the feeling which was repressed when he established his identity. Repressed feeling is the result of a morality that forbids unbridled self-assertion, and insists on the primacy of other people's interests. It produces "the akeing heart / The martyrs groan & the lover's sigh" (35-36, p. 484). These are all signs that the libido is regressing once more into the unconscious, owing to the sacrifice demanded by morality. The youth has metamorphosised into "An aged Shadow" (29, p. 484). Other people now benefit at his expense, as "He feeds the beggar & the Poor" (37, p. 484), but deprives himself to such an extent that he becomes "A beggar at anothers door" (53, 485). His energy now resides wholly within the world, in the form of "A little Female Babe" (43, p.484). This means that the Aged shadow is completely passive, and dominated by the ideas that he developed in his prime.

though they have now lost their original impetus. Since he is passive, he is unable to utilise the unconscious energy that resides within his repressed feelings, with the result that the unconscious remains inaccessible, a condition symbolised by the statement that "none his hand / dares stretch to touch her Baby form" (46, p. 484). The female infant represents repressed unconscious energy.

The unconscious thus appears in two forms, as "the woman old" and "a Female Babe", who is "all of solid fire / And gems & gold" (44-46, p. 484). The two figures symbolise different states of libido, the former the domination of the unconscious, the latter an inability to abandon conscious notions and ideals in order to effect a reunion with unconscious energy. If we fail to do this, in Jung's words: "Our convictions become platitudes ground out on a barrel-organ, our ideals become starchy habits, enthusiasm stiffens into automatic gestures. The source of the water of life seeps away" (CW 5, par. 553). This is what happens to the "aged Shadow" (29, p. 484), who soon finds himself wandering in the desert, having lost all the accumulated wealth of his earlier years. "His guests", those ideas that had nourished his self-esteem, and which had themselves received nourishment from his success, "are scattered through the land" (61, p. 485)). They too are deprived of the water of life, the energy that once sustained them. As a result, the perception of the world becomes dominated by abstract ideas, when "The senses roll themselves in fear / And the flat Earth becomes a Ball" (63-64, p. 485)). These ideas are divorced from the sense data, which would give them life, and promise a renewal of vision. Globes, isolated units of meaning, with no connection with the sense data that lies beyond them, have replaced the expansiveness of perception represented by the "flat Earth".

Eventually, however, deprived of their roots in the physical world, and of the energy by which they might be sustained, the ideas themselves lose their grip, and the world becomes "A desert vast without a bound" (66, p. 485). This transformation indicates that the unconscious is now the dominant force, to which the passive mind offers no resistance. The boundlessness of nature indicates that sense-impressions are no longer attached to the previously held ideas. Jung comments that "every

descent (into the unconscious) is followed by an ascent; the vanishing shapes are shaped anew" (CW 5, par. 357). In "The Mental Traveller", the ascent coincides with a renewal of nature's fertility, which corresponds to the increasing responsiveness of the senses. Hence the movements of the libido are reactivated, and the mind reconnects with the body. The associations of the hero myth with Christianity are once again suggested when nature becomes transformed into spiritual nourishment, symbolised in the bread and wine imagery of the Eucharist. "The honey of her Infant lips / The bread and wine of her sweet smile / The wild game of her roving Eye / does him to Infancy beguile" (69-72, p.485). The seductiveness of nature indicates that the libido has been reactivated, bringing about renewal. As a result, the "aged Shadow" reverts to infancy.

At this stage sense-impressions are too rich and various to be encompassed by the organising mind, a state of affairs symbolised by the elusiveness of the emanation. She "flees away", too wayward to be pinned down in any particular ordering, while the increasingly infantile mind lacks the strength to force the world to conform to particular notions. In this game of tease and chase, "the wide desert" is "planted oer / With Labyrinths of wayward Love / Where roams the Lion Wolf & Boar" (82-84, p.485). The animals represent a renewal of instinct, while the labyrinths suggest a movement of libido between mental imagery according to the prescriptions of unconscious ideas. Here the mind becomes "a wayward babe" and nature "A weeping woman Old" (85-86, p.485), in a reversion to the first stage of the cycle, though one that precedes the nailing down upon the rock. Before this occurs, however, the desert begins to bloom, many cities are built, and the pastoral paradise of Beulah comes into being. The renewal of feeling, connected as it is with unconscious ideas, brings about a coniunctio, a union between the conscious and unconscious mind and, with it, a flowering of creativity. However, the fear of being dominated by the unconscious turns the weeping woman into another manifestation of "the terrible mother", who must be fought and resisted, and so the whole cycle begins again.

Though the hero myth offers a creative phase, when worn out ideas are replaced by their opposite, it does not really represent the hope of liberation. It is a psychological demonstration of the notion of necessity that Godwin supposed could be evaded by rationality, but which is actually the result of thinking in oppositions, an avoidable characteristic of the reasoning process. Godwin's account of necessity in the first edition of *Political Justice* does not take into account the influence of unconscious ideas upon the conscious mind, and so underestimates the influence of feeling. He thinks that reason can neutralise this influence, without recognising that it is wholly dependent upon it. In the hero myth, as in "The Mental Traveller", mind is opposed to matter, and as long as this division is perpetuated, there can be no means of escaping the confines of the ego, a mark of true creativity. Hillman, in his commentary upon the hero myth suggests that killing the dragon is really the equivalent of the killing of the imagination. He maintains that "the heroic ego, far from being about separation from the mother, simply leads back to her" and this has a destructive consequence for the imagination (Samuels 75). In other words, regarding the mother or matter as opposite and opposed can only suggest one particular view of reality, or its opposite, and still fails to take account of the complexity of human experience. Hillman's criticism is of the one-sided view of reality that is the main characteristic of ego-consciousness.

The movement between opposite positions that characterises the hero myth is really a vacillation between good and evil, a battle that is suggested by the involvement of the "terrible mother". Because of the incest ban, the instincts are associated with evil, while the resistance to instinctuality offered by the spirit is regarded as good. Hence, any established idea participates in the fight against evil, though eventually there will be a resistance to this dominating idea, and its opposite, once associated with evil, will be regarded in a different way, and be equated with the good. Christine Gallant, in her Jungian interpretation of the works of Blake, takes the transposition of such terms as good and evil to be the moral position that informs the whole of Blake's work. Her analysis of the dialectic that is outlined in *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell*, and which, in her view, forms the basis of the early, and later, prophecies, corresponds to the process of enantiodromia, "the state in which

everything turns inevitably into its opposite" (46). This state "sees all existence informed by the constant interplay of polarities, rather than leading towards the final triumph of the one polar principle of goodness or order" (44). In her view, such terms as good and evil are polar principles, "the terms, ends or extremities of a single whole" (44). The implication is, in Jung's words, that "there is no good that cannot produce evil, and no evil that cannot produce good" (CW 12, par. 36).

Gallant denies, however, that "The Mental Traveller" provides an illustration of the process of enantiodromia at work since, in her view, the opposites represented by the male and female figures never properly unite with each other. Yet the ingredients of the poem do not very much depart from those that compose the hero myth, with its movement between the conscious, and unconscious mind, between the spirit, and nature, while the brief flowering of civilisations towards the end of the cycle confirms that a version of the *coniunctio* does, in fact, take place. It is, as Hillman has pointed out, the effort to incorporate the new material into the experience of ego-consciousness that guarantees the dominance of the cycle. The oppositions in "The Mental Traveller" accord with Gallant's definitions of fixed polarities, in which everything turns into its opposite: night into day, wealth into poverty, youth into age, garden into desert, consciousness into unconsciousness, while male and female principles are always at variance, with the one phase of masculine activity occurring in reaction to the dominance of the feminine unconscious, and not really predominating over the feminine, according to myths of masculine superiority. It is the fixed polarities themselves that confound the experience of liberation, because the point view of the perceiver can never extend beyond the sense data that confirms his own identity. The feminine unconscious may transform itself into conscious principles, but only at the cost of creating another polarised area of unconscious knowledge, and of imposing the domination of repressed feeling.

The same entrapment that ensues upon the interactions of reason and feeling is illustrated in the cycle of poems known as *The Songs of Innocence and Experience*, though the more appealing sentiments that belong to the innocent state may have the

effect of blinding the reader to Blake's ironic illustration of its short-comings. Perhaps the conception of the two contrary states of the human soul may derive in part from Mary Wollstonecraft's *Original Stories of Real Life*, an influence suggested by the similarity of subject matter, and the coincidence of the time at which both works were written. According to Godwin, Wollstonecraft wrote *Original Stories* soon after moving to London in 1787, while *Songs of Innocence* are dated 1789. Blake certainly read these stories, as he provided the illustrations. Perhaps taking her cue from Rousseau's treatise on education, *Émile*, which she criticised in the *Vindication* for failing to take seriously the education of girls, Wollstonecraft sets up a programme intended to compensate for Rousseau's negligence. She invites the reader to participate in the lessons, though these are, as the title suggests, related to real life, rather than to interactions within the classroom.

The didactic tone of the stories is entirely missing from *The Songs of Innocence and Experience*, but nevertheless Wollstonecraft's work emphasises the relationship of children to the world around them, and explores the morality underlying this relationship. In this, her preoccupations resemble those of Blake, and it is possible to trace the influence of morality in moving the children depicted in the stories from what might be seen as Blake's state of Innocence to the contrary state of Experience. Many of the lessons delivered through the stories relate to the girls' treatment of animals, though these creatures belong to the natural world, and do not acquire the symbolic status that belongs to Blake's vision. In addition, in some instances the expressions used by Wollstonecraft very closely resemble those of Blake in a way that can hardly be coincidental. Wollstonecraft's advice in the preface to the stories, that "knowledge should be gradually imparted, and flow more from example than teaching: example directly addresses the senses, the first [inlets] to the heart" (IV: 359) reminds us of Blake's assertion that "Man has no Body distinct from his Soul for that calld body is a portion of Soul discerned by the five senses, the chief inlets of soul in this age" (4, 9-10, p.34). Wollstonecraft's emphasis on feeling is somewhat challenged by Blake's amendment, for though feeling is connected with soul, and is necessary for it to achieve the desired union between mind and nature, it can have a repressive effect, which is very much the case in Wollstonecraft's stories.

Wollstonecraft's emphasis on heart, a tender receptivity to the feelings of others, which is visible in the relationships of Blake's innocent characters with each other, links the precepts of the governess, Mrs Mason, to the repression implicit in sentimentality. She is established as a "woman of tenderness and discernment" (Wollstonecraft, IV: 361), and the illustrations depict an elegant, dignified lady in restrained and decorous postures (Wollstonecraft, IV: 357; 407). Certainly she herself appears to have absorbed the lessons of the conduct-books in which women are enjoined to behave with modesty and decorum, and her manner links her with the repression that is implied in her principles. Although Wollstonecraft was to deplore the effect of sensibility in suppressing women, Mrs Mason shows us that rational principles are connected with feeling, and can have an equally repressive effect. In all the stories we watch her commenting upon and modifying the behaviour of her charges as she attempts to "fix the principles of truth and humanity on a solid and simple foundation (Wollstonecraft, IV: 360), that of reason. The children are in the process of losing their childlike spontaneity in the interests of acquiring adult moral standards.

The influence of Mrs Mason in subduing the children's vitality is evident in Blake's illustrations. The first story reminds us of some of the *Songs of Innocence*, for the vision of the natural world is supposed to reflect the spontaneity and joyfulness of the innocent state of mind. One of the first of Blake's illustrations is accompanied by a caption quoting one of Mrs Mason's observations to the children. "Look what a fine morning it is – Insects, Birds and Animals are all enjoying existence" (Wollstonecraft, IV: 270). The implication is that the children should be enjoying existence too though, once such enjoyment becomes a moral duty, its attainment becomes increasingly difficult. The illustration lacks any of the exuberance normally associated with Blake's portrayal of the Innocent state. Everything about the represented scene suggests restraint and control. Though the birds and animals are all apparently enjoying existence (there are none in view), the children and Mrs Mason are sedate and sober onlookers, who take no part in the celebrations. Their gestures are stylised and self-conscious, and their features set in expressions of

sombre rectitude. At the end of the chapter, the children are praised for acting like rational creatures.

Though Mrs Mason transmits the moral principles that are supposed to have rationality as their foundation, the appeal is more to the sentiment. The children are reproved by their mentor for their instinctive urge to kill insect pests, and are advised that if they want to be good, they should avoid hurting anything, and give as much pleasure as they can. Mrs Mason tells them to "exercise every benevolent affection to enjoy comfort here, and to fit ourselves for angels hereafter" (Wollstonecraft, IV: 432). We are here reminded of Blake's ironic revaluation of angels as those who have absorbed the lesson that goodness consists in passive obedience to the moral code. Indeed, throughout the whole work the children are instructed to be tender-hearted, unselfish, unwilling to hurt the feelings of others, and to follow Mrs Mason in doing good. When she remarks that "Perhaps the greatest pleasure I have ever received has arisen from the habitual exercise of charity" (Wollstonecraft, IV 432), we can observe the contradiction inherent in her notions of morality. Moral precepts urge unselfish behaviour, but obedience to the moral code reinforces the self-esteem, which is the reward for repressing one's instincts, and placing the interests of others above one's own.

The stories suggest that the dichotomy between the states of Innocence and Experience, if we accept Blake's terms, is a precarious one, since the former is under a continual process of erosion. It throws into doubt the notion of a state of complete innocence, and even suggests that natural instinct may be destructive, and not always the basis of a benevolent relationship with the world. The children's urge to kill insects is replicated in the *Songs of Experience* in the actions of the thoughtless boy in "The Fly". Blake perhaps might perhaps have situated this poem within the *Songs of Innocence*, since the actions of the child appear unmotivated by malice. However, the narrator reflects upon his actions in a way that would not be possible in the innocent state. Others of the songs also suggest the ambivalence of the two states. Four of the poems, "The Little Girl Lost", "The Little Girl Found", "The School-Boy", and "The Voice of the Ancient Bard" were originally included

in *Songs of Innocence*, but were then later transferred to the later cycle of poems. As we saw from *Original Stories from Real Life*, sentiments are not natural, but are the result of the repressive effects of the moral code, and though they may accompany innocence to some degree, they also mark the influence of society upon the child's instinctive life. Hence, there is a gradual transition from the natural innocence that belongs to infancy, to the much more questionable moral sentiments that are either intended to underwrite the individual's self-esteem, or prompt the exercise of charity towards others, in a way that sets up a gulf between the charitable giver, and the recipients of his charity. In other words, moral sentiments may entrench the existing social structure, and keep the less fortunate in their place.

The introduction to the *Songs of Innocence* contains hints about the effects of the encroachment of the state of Experience upon the innocent state. The narrator emphasises the happiness of his songs, but also that in picking up his "rural pen", a phrase that associates encompassing and enclosing with the act of writing, he "stain'd the water clear" (4, 17-18, p. 7). The adult understanding, which the narrator brings to the exercise of his art, makes its mark upon his perceptions, and prevents him from achieving a true representation of the innocent state. The poems of Innocence depict the world as it might be viewed through innocent eyes, and omit the complexities only visible to those with more sophisticated knowledge. Though the innocent narrators cannot detect the limitations of their viewpoint, the evidence for it can usually be found in the works themselves. For example, in the following poem entitled "The Shepherd", the narrator describes a safe and sheltered world, one characterised by the maternal tenderness of the ewes, and the complete trust of the lambs in their protector, the shepherd. Yet we are told that, "he is watchful while they are in peace"(5, 7, p. 7), with the implication that dangers do lurk for the unwary, and the shepherd needs to be on his guard. The adult reader doubtless links the shepherd with Christ, and the poem expresses the confidence of the believer in the redemptory power of the saviour, but even religious faith would not remove from the world the difficulties and dangers omitted from the poem. Faith would help its adherents to deal with these difficulties, but it would be powerless to remove them entirely. The artificiality of the pastoral mode suggests the limitations of the

innocent state, when feeling predominates, and the childlike trust in the power of adult protection has not yet been eroded.

Not all critics, however, are prepared to give due weight to the discordant details that disturb the harmony of the innocent state, and there is considerable critical dissension on the exact relationship of the *Songs of Innocence* and the *Songs of Experience*. Frye was one of the earliest commentators to argue that the opposition between the states of Innocence and Experience generates "a double-edged irony, cutting into both the tragedy and the reality of fallen existence" (Symmetry 237). While the poems of Innocence underline the tragic effects of the development of consciousness, the poems of Experience highlight aspects of the world invisible to those who have not learned how to discriminate, and emphasise the limits of Innocence. Erdman insists, however, that on one level the songs may be taken at face value. He writes:

> In context the innocent songs are at least ironic. Yet the same songs removed from this matrix, illuminated with pictures of carefree babes and birds are plainly not satire. Their social purpose is larger ... to construct one of the foundations of an imaginatively organised and truly happy prosperity (115)

Despite the presence in this cycle of poems of details that do not accord with the innocent vision, David Lindsay, too, is loath to accept that the *Songs of Innocence* include a satirical dimension, and wants to believe that their idealism represents the unembittered vision founded upon love that the more sophisticated should try to emulate (61).

The satirical nature of the songs, however, does not mean that the more positive view taken by Erdman and Lindsay is untenable. Both states may be less than ideal, but both contain elements that are necessary to existence. The tension between them once again represents the Jungian paradox of longing for "the light of consciousness", while desiring a return to nature and an unconscious communion with all forms of life (CW 5, par. 299). Experience conveys upon the individual the

capacity to reflect, and understand, attendant upon the development of logos, whilst Innocence maintains the erotic connection with the world that precedes the separation from the mother resulting from the incest ban. Though both conditions are desired, they appear to exclude one another, and as far as is visible at this stage of Blake's thinking, the best resolution of the paradox involves the replacement of one state by another, according to the process of enantiodromia. The one-sidedness of a consciousness existence can only be remedied by a return to the identification between mind and nature that is a characteristic of the Innocent state. The paradoxical relationship of Innocence and Experience returns us once again to the dichotomy between rationality and feeling already discussed in previous chapters, though the songs contribute a more fully developed social dimension than the Lambeth prophecies. The *Songs of Innocence and Experience* may be read as myth, but many of them also relate to the social conditions of the time.

Two parallel poems, one from Innocence, and one from Experience, illustrate the incompleteness of each state. "The Little Boy Lost", from the *Songs of Innocence*, tells of the ostensibly happy outcome when the lost child is found by his father and restored to his mother's protection, while in "The Little Girl Lost" from *The Songs of Experience*, the anxious mother finds the lost child, but resists the temptation of removing her from danger. On the social level the songs represent the two contrary impulses of parenthood, that of the urge to protect set against the necessity of the child eventually achieving independence. On the mythic level, Jung's observation that "the parallel to the motif of dying and rising again is that of being lost and found" (CW 5, par. 531), sets the two poems within the context of the hero myth. Being lost corresponds to the loss of consciousness associated with the impulse to return to nature, and being found represents the restoration to conscious life. However, the significance of the loss and recovery of consciousness differs according to the context of the poem. In "The Little Boy Found" the return of the child to his mother testifies to a narrowing of the child's ability to develop his understanding, whilst Lyca's continuing identification with her mother suggests that energy remains in the unconscious, because it continues to underwrite established ideas.

Of "The Little Boy Lost", Raine comments that the references to "dew", and "mire" are allusions to the non-entity of matter. The fleeing "vapour" suggests the futility of the pursuit of materialism, which is the pursuit of non-entity (Raine, *Tradition* 1:10). However, the spiritual cannot exist in isolation from the material world, even though this may take on a delusive form, so the pursuit of matter is far from futile. In psychological terms, the child at this stage represents the lack of conscious ideas by which matter would take on a definite form. The child in the illustration to the song is trying to grasp an elusive, flickering patch of light, and this suggests that the libido cannot be channelled into a particular form. However, the references to water mean that the little boy is in touch with the mother and "the source of life" (Jung CW 5, par. 288), for as Jung observes: "the maternal significance of water is one of the clearest symbols in the whole of mythology" (CW 5, par. 319). The child is eventually found by the father, and returned to the mother, which means, in effect, that the father has not intervened to separate the child from the maternal influence. In one sense this may be regarded as a propitious circumstance, since the boy will remain in the state of Innocence, of which the songs are ostensibly a celebration. In another sense, however, the return to the mother prevents the child from developing his own identity, and gaining his own independence. Larrissy finds that this "comforting end to a disturbing story" as representing "a need for security which is ...potentially debilitating and enslaving" (28). The lack of parental opposition is not necessarily the unalloyed blessing that it may sometimes appear.

The parallel song of Experience, "The Little Girl Lost", depicts the unconscious state both as precarious, and threatening, but also as the prelude to renewal. The introduction to the song associates Lyca, the heroine of "The Little Girl Lost" with the Earth of "Earth's Answer", the lapsed soul that is summoned to return by the Bard, but who is unable to answer the summons, because of effect of morality upon man's perception of materiality. Morality maintains the separation of mind and matter, a separation from which the unconscious takes shape, and "Earth's Answer suggests that this separation will persist until the two principles are once again united in the syzygy, the marriage of eros and logos that reinstitutes the superordinate personality that Jung terms the Self. Hence Lyca's desert journey

represents her search for "her maker meek" (34, 6, p. 20), whilst the aridity of the desert suggests that she is separated from her maternal origins. Lyca's fate is dependent upon her relationship with her mother, a previous incarnation of Earth, who is now associated with its desert form: the ideas that shaped it have regressed into a state of unconsciousness. Lyca takes shelter under a tree, shown in the illustration as entwined by a snake, which is, as we have seen, a maternal symbol. The tree symbolises the dependence of Lyca upon the protection of her mother, while Lyca's musings suggest her own identification with her mother's suffering over the loss of her child. With the approach of darkness, she feels free to forget her troubles, and fall asleep, since the mother would then be sleeping too. She asks herself: "How can Lyca sleep/ If her mother weep" (34, 23-24, p. 20), but then comes to the conclusion that she will not weep if her mother is sleeping. This identification with the mother tells us that the world is still in the grip of worn-out ideas, and that there will be no renewal unless Lyca can break free from the mother's influence.

The two parts of the poem, "The Little Girl Lost" and the "Little Girl Found" have been interpreted by Raine as a version of the Persephone and Demeter stories from the Eleusinian mysteries. In Blake's narrative, the sleeping child is carried off by a lion king, who takes her back to dwell with him and with the lioness in their cave. Raine associates this event with Pluto's rape of Persephone which, she says, represents the descent of the soul and "its union with the dark tenement of the body" (1: 133). Raine explains that Demeter represents the intellect, while Persephone symbolises the soul. The mother is "the higher consciousness that opposes the lapse of the soul into its temporal dream" (1: 137). Lyca herself is to make the descent into "generated life" while the mother offers no resistance to her daughter's loss, and sinks into a "phase of unconsciousness" (Raine, 1: 237). While not disagreeing with Raine's analysis in that the song illustrates the continuing domination of unconscious ideas, the higher consciousness that the mother represents is not the mind itself, but the world, in so far as it is the incarnation of the products of the intellect. In Neoplatonism and related bodies of thought, the higher consciousness itself is always masculine.

The continuing influence of the unconscious is suggested in the successful outcome of the mother's search for Lyca, when she finds her under the protection of the lion, who has now transformed himself into a "spirit arm'd in gold" (36, 36, p.22), and his cave into a palace. Instead of rescuing her daughter from the underworld king, the mother accepts the situation, and lives nearby in "a lonely dell"(36, 49, p.22). In other words, the previous dispensation no longer exerts a repressive influence, and the conditions now favour a renewal, which does not in the end take place, however, because of the acquiescence of the mother in the loss of her daughter, suggested by the unconsciousness into which the mother sinks. The presence of the lion represents the possibility of renewal. Jung links the symbols of animals, such as that of the lion king, with the instinctive energies of the unconscious, and, as such, they belong to the Great Mother (CW 5, par. 503). Jung also associates this animal with unbridled desire (CW 5, par. 425). When the libido appears in symbolic form, these energies have undergone repression, and are no longer available to the conscious mind. The child's affectionate relationship with her mother is offset by a repression of the primal instincts, which then appear in frightening form in the guise of an animal.

It is significant, however, that the lion when he first makes his appearance is an aged one, indicating the weakened libidinal basis of the old dispensation, and therefore Lyca's fear is correspondingly less than it would have been had the animal appeared in its most energetic form, a situation that favours a reunion of the world with unconscious energy. The weakness of libido is echoed in the "Ruby tears" that came "From his eyes of flame" (35, 47-48, p. 21). According to Jung, the earth in her womb hatches precious stones, and "all created things, minerals included, draw their strength from the earth spirit" which "gives nourishment to all created things" (CW 12, par.414). The spirit is nourished by the instincts, and the "lion old" (35, 43, p. 21) represents the weakened state of both at this particular stage of the cycle. At the end of the song, the lion conveys the still sleeping Lyca back to his caves, a situation that suggests the possibility of reuniting energy with conscious life, and securing its manifestation in a revitalised world.

Meanwhile, in the following poem, "The Little Girl Found", the anxious parents scour the desert for their lost child, terrified by the many dangers which might surround her. Society imagines itself threatened by a renewal of destructive energy. The fear of the future materialises in the shape of the lion, who attacks them as though they were his prey. The lion's ferocity turns out to be a mere ploy, and when the parents regard him properly, they discover a" spirit arm'd in gold" (36, 36, p. 22). The libido, renewed by the contact with Lyca, unopposed by the mother, recovered its vitality, from which ensues the promise of renewal. However, Lyca still lies sleeping, and the world at the end of the poem is still a desert, inhabited by untamed energies.

Larissy's comment on the poem does not appear to take full account of its significance as a stage in the cycle. He writes: "Just as Lyca learns to accept sexuality, she learns to accept wrath and the other 'energies' of Experience. 'The Little Girl Lost and Found' point the way forward out of Experience towards some accommodation of the two contraries: this accommodation is the discovery of a true innocence, energetic and undeceived"(64). Lyca's sleeping state suggests that the world remains unaffected by the renewal of energy, which can only occur if there is some separation between the mind, and the world upon which it operates. Lyca's continued identity with her parents, symbolised by her unconsciousness, can only be dissolved by their opposition to their daughter's loss, and to the lion who has brought it about, so that consciousness of new ideas may emerge through opposition to the old.

As in *Visions of the Daughter's of Albion*, this tension is supplied by morality, in which the unfortunate consequences of the prevalent ideology, symbolised by the mother, are associated with evil, and require the adoption of opposing beliefs. It is not coincidental that Persephone is returned to her mother for six months of the year in the original myth. She is separated from the spirit by the unwillingness of the parents to yield up their influence over their daughter, and this creates the tension from which comes renewal. "The Introduction" and "Earth's Answer" appear to express a dilemma incapable of resolution. Renewal is only a temporary stage of the

cycle, because it is impossible both to break the " heavy chain" that binds "free love" (31, 25, p. 19), and to attain a spiritual understanding. As Jung has shown, libido has to be diverted from the mother into the production of symbols, and this occurs as a direct result of the ban against incest. The mother does not willingly assent to the loss of her child.

"Little Girl Lost and Found" belongs to the songs of Experience because the energies of that state cannot be harnessed without the opposition that belongs to it. It implies the values of Innocence, which is perhaps why it was originally placed in that cycle, but these values have to be combined with those of Experience, if they are to transcend the drawbacks of the former state. Experience contributes the distancing and separation needed to achieve a deeper understanding than is possible in the Innocent state, though the marriage of the contraries suggests that the values of Innocence should somehow manage the seemingly impossible task of surviving the transition to Experience. In the first group of poems, the relationship of the innocent narrators with each other, and with the world of nature, is marked by the confident trust of the children in their parent's protection. The effects of the incest ban, discussed in relation to the hero myth, have only marginally affected the bond between mother and child and in consequence the innocent narrators have an only an imperfect grasp of the nature of the world, one that promotes an enviable relationship with it, and its inhabitants, but one which would, if it remained unchallenged, merely perpetuate injustice. Sympathy and compassion are passive mental characteristics that lack the power of eradicating the need for them, and are the result of a repressive morality which, without opposition, is powerless to discover the objective principles underlying the just regulation of human conduct. Yet this necessary opposition has the effect of distorting human relationships, and the feeling which sustains them. Morality has a deterministic effect on society, the equivalent of nailing the mind to a rock.

In effect, both the songs of Innocence, and those of Experience represent an exploration of the effects of morality, with the duality it implies, upon human society. Those songs from the earlier work that emphasise how sympathy unifies

individual members of society are marked by the separations of duality, even though these may not be visible in the innocent state. Thus sympathy is ambiguously upheld as a desirable and enviable quality, that is nevertheless insufficient for the development of just societies, and for the eradication of the injustice that makes it necessary. "The Clod and the Pebble" from the poems of Experience, outlines the divisive effects of the moral code, illustrating the social conflicts that are not apparent to the innocent mentality. According to Rousseau's ideas, discussed in Chapter Two, legal and moral attempts to restrain self-seeking conduct merely entrench social divisions by making it necessary to conceal the selfishness by which most people are motivated. The need for concealment makes self-promotion a more pressing preoccupation than it would otherwise be. In this song the Clod, which readily succumbs to the social pressures that are symbolised by the mark of the cattle's feet, represents self-denial, as a result of conforming to the prevalent moral code, whilst the pebble's invulnerability marks the individual's resistance to moral pressure, and the determination to promote one's own interests, in the face of all opposition.

Conventional morality would doubtless approve of the selflessness of the Clod, as opposed to the selfishness of the pebble, and perhaps taking convention too much into account, some critics have not recognised the ambiguity of the oppositional situation the poem depicts. "The love which seeketh not itself to please" may seem to be the moral alternative, and Diana Hume George appears to uphold that view when she states that it is "the best and tenderest way to view object love" (106). She assumes that the song displays a preference for one alternative above the other, though the ironic conclusion to the first and final verses suggests that the opposition is an artificial one. The Clod "Builds a Heaven in Hells despair" (32, 4, p.19), and if we interpret heaven and hell according to Blake's ironic reversal, we can see that this situation is no better than the one facing the pebble, who "builds a Hell in Heavens despite" (32, 12, p.19). The Clod suppresses the subversive energies of hell, through obedience to morality, and achieves the passive sterility of heaven, while the pebble is immune to moral imperatives, and gives energetic self-expression to desire. Gratified desire leads to the passivity that characterises the

outlook of the clod, which according to Jungian theory, can quite easily turn into the obdurate selfishness of the pebble when inner conflict forces the return of repressed desire. The song illustrates the impasse that results when moral pressure creates an opposition between victim and oppressor, with the choice of being either the one or the other. There is no avoiding the dilemma, according to the situation depicted in the poem. One must either obey the moral code, aspiring to acquire an artificial sense of self-righteous beneficence towards the rest of society, thus distorting the unifying sense of human sympathy, or else one ignores the promptings of sympathy, and the claims of other people, in order to fulfil one's own selfish desires.

Webster thinks that the Clod's prototype is the maternal Clod in *The Book of Thel*, who dies nourishing the infant worm. She sees the Clod as an example of female renunciation, whilst the Pebble represents the guarantee of the right to take at another's expense, like the boy in the version of "The Little Boy Lost" that appears in *The Songs of Experience*, who loved his parents only because they nurtured him. In respect to Thel, Webster comments: "The point seems to avoid being a giver, for if one gives, the other takes. Moreover, the fantasy requires women to be the givers" (*Psychology* 55). She refers to the fantasy of male gratification that she takes to be the unconscious impulses underlying the symbolism of the poetry. However, the poems merely represent the situation that emerges as soon as morality attempts to regulate human conduct, and do not recommend one of the alternatives rather than the other. The selfishness of the boy who failed to love his parents is not being recommended as a course of behaviour, and neither is the cruel punishment meted out to him by society in the guise of the priest. The poem illustrates the inevitable consequence of living in society, when moral imperatives limit natural self-expression. The references to chains and burning suggest the imprisoning effect of morality, and the damming up of the libido, which creates the unconscious. Similarly, "The Clod and the Pebble" outlines the effect of morality in creating such a reservoir of unconscious energy, and does not suggest that the female, or any member of society, should aim for the impossible goal of perpetual self-renunciation.

The moral dualism and its divisive effects, so evident in *The Songs of Experience*, is less obtrusive in *The Songs of Innocence*, but still present in the incompatible detail that undermines an otherwise harmonious world. The lack of discrimination that makes for a sympathetic identification with the world also hides its injustices from the innocent observer, but not from the experienced reader. The ideal suggested by the cycle of poems is the preservation of a sympathetic relationship with other people, in spite of a clear-eyed recognition of the injustices and inequalities that feature in all societies, and which could not be, without such recognition, in any way redressed. "The Little Black Boy" and "The Chimney Sweeper" illustrate the innocent reaction to such injustice. The former is the victim of racial prejudice, though his generous concern for the "little English boy", and his identification with him, mitigate the harm that such discrimination generally causes, without removing the dualism from which it ensues. The chimney sweeper too finds a way of transcending the evils of his situation, without affecting the exploitation that made it possible to remove small boys from their parents, and force them to work in dark and suffocating conditions that ruined their health and often led them to a premature, and apparently unlamented, death.

Both poems are founded upon the opposition of light and darkness, and question the assumptions that are built into this dichotomy. Light brings with it notions of goodness, and conscious knowledge, while darkness suggests the evil of materiality, and ultimately the unconscious itself. However, linking the innocent little black boy and the jaunty chimney sweeper with darkness naturally diffuses the power of these associations, whilst attacking the effects of the separation of mind and matter that gives rise to them. The injustice they both suffer is therefore shown to be the result of the duality that gives priority to the mind, to the light of consciousness, while matter, and with it the body, are accounted of lesser worth. The moral dualism attacked in this poem leads, as we have seen, to the rejection of the feminine, and the materiality with which it is associated, and the attack upon duality may therefore be extended to deny validity to such a rejection.

The little black boy thinks that the prejudice he suffers is of no consequence, because his black body is not a true reflection of his soul, but is only a temporary covering, which will disappear when God shows his face. However, without the possibility of a reunion with matter and the body, the spirituality to which the little black boy aspires may lead eventuality to the kind of sterility that forms one stage of the Orc cycle as it appeared in "The Mental Traveller". The rejected darkness of matter then becomes the unconscious from which proceeds the possibility of renewal, providing that the adherence to spirituality has not quenched the tender feeling expressed by the little black boy to his English friend. Otherwise, the poem's imagery suggests the black boy's confused attempts to explain his outcast state according to his mother's stories, which value the soul more than the body. He thinks that his black skin has a benefit, in that it will allow him to approach nearer to God than the English boy, just as it would also protect him from the heat of the sun. Because of this, he will be able to mediate between God and the English child, who has been separated from the creator by his sense of racial superiority, and so is unable to experience God's love for himself. The black skin, which appears to have a spiritual value transcending the white, is then to be abandoned, according to the goal of spirituality, and the black boy then thinks he will be like the English child, but whether he means that the English boy will have acquired the kind of spiritual gifts that the black boy possesses because of his own racial oppression, when the white child sees that the black boy is spiritually superior to him, or whether he means that he himself will have acquired the English boy's exalted state, to which he aspires once his is free from his imprisoning body, is by no means clear. The problems of opposing mind and body still remain at the end of the poem, despite the black boy's sympathy for the white child, which cannot remove the opposition of spiritual, and racial superiority: the mind/body dichotomy, linked as it is to the claims of morality, demands the perception of better and worse. The little black boy's sympathy for the white child prevents him from detecting the injustice of racial oppression, but the moral principles which would permit him to understand the immoral basis of his own treatment, would destroy the unifying effect of the sympathy he feels for the English child.

"The Chimney Sweep" outlines the situation of another victim of the denigration of matter. Again the darkness of the sweep's body, permanently marked by the soot amongst which he spends his days, is associated with the body, with the inferiority of matter, and with the unconscious. The implication is that the sweep's sufferings are the direct consequence of a philosophy that considers the body to be of less importance than the spirit, and on one level, this philosophy is borne out in the poem itself. The sweep comforts Tom Dacre by pointing out to him that the shaving of his head will prevent the soot from spoiling his white hair – his spirit cannot be defiled by his physical denigration. The sweep's dream of spiritual freedom comforts both him and his companions as they turn once more to their work amidst the soot. Raine accepts the surface interpretation of the poem by quoting Neoplatonic and Hermetic texts that stress the soul's transcendence of its corporeal prison, (*Tradition 1:* 20-26), yet she also notes the poem's basis of social criticism which presents the life of the young chimney sweeps "as no better than a living death" (*Tradition 1:* 21). It is no wonder then that Blake's irony undercuts the cosy message of the song. The spiritual consolation discovered by the sweep in his dream of liberty prevents him from recognising and reacting to his oppression, and the prevailing view that the spirit is able to transcend the corporeal state blunts the reactions of those who might be in a position to alleviate the sweep's sufferings. To be advised by an angel to "be a good boy" (12, 19, p. 10) is not, according to Blake's irony, an unalloyed good, since angels are the symbols of those who have been repressed by the prevailing ideology. The final line of the poem resounds with a savage ambiguity: "So if all do their duty, they need not fear harm" (12, 24, p10). If doing one's duty involves meek obedience to a cruel injustice, it is perhaps something that should be at all costs avoided. Doing one's duty might rather involve an element of angry resistance, a possibility available only to those who have entered the state of Experience. Yet this reaction would still be determined by the unconscious ideas that preceded it, and would not effect a release from the cycle.

Neither of the two contrary states represents an ideal, which rather involves some element of each. Both are affected by the duality which opposes mind to matter, and which asserts a morality that gives the former a priority over the latter. In the case of

The Songs of Innocence, the narrators still retain something of the erotic connection with the mother that fosters a sympathetic union with the world around them, but which also makes them vulnerable to oppression. Experience ruptures the connection, and presents a delusive choice between alternatives, fuelled by antagonistic energy, a situation that can only be reversed by a release of the will, and a reversion to the instinctual unconscious life. "To Tirzah", the poem with which the cycle of Experience ends, is really a summary of the ideas symbolised in the hero myth. On the surface it seems to be a bitter rejection of materialism, of the mortality and corruption it implies, of the delusive view of the world presented by the fallen senses, and of the antagonistic social relationships that develop as a result of the distortion of feeling. The final two lines of the song appear to be a wholehearted acceptance of Christian spirituality, and a renunciation of the material world symbolised by Tirzah, to whom the narrator addresses the following question:" The Death of Jesus set me free, Then what have I do with thee?" As Jung shows, the death of Jesus symbolises a movement of reconciliation towards the rejected mother. Of the symbol of Jesus, Jung writes: "As a serpent he is to be 'lifted up' on the cross: that is to say, as a man with merely human thoughts and desires, who is ever striving back to childhood and the mother, he must die on the mother tree, his gaze fixed on the past" (CW 5 par.575). In other words, the hero must renounce the ideas that confirm his own identity, and which necessitate the rejection of Tirzah, in order to renew his erotic connection with the world. The rejection of the feminine, in the guise of the emanation, in order to assert the value of the spirit, eventually leads back to the mother. This indicates that matter and spirit are not separate, but are inextricably involved with each other, an involvement that can only be maintained with the persistence of the feeling function, which nevertheless, more often than not, has a repressive effect. It helps to hide the selfishness and injustice that in the end dictate the responses of rationality, which Godwin originally believed offered a release from determinism, but which, as the Orc cycle shows, correspond to its effects.

CHAPTER FIVE

ENDLESS LABYRINTHS: "WEAVING THE WEB OF LIFE" IN *THE FOUR ZOAS*

Earlier chapters have revealed the emanation as the victim of the struggle to maintain a spiritual relationship with matter, as well as supplying the means of renewal. The hero myth demonstrates the movement towards consciousness, which aims at a spiritual level of existence, and a movement back towards the instincts, which may precede a changed awareness. In Jung's estimation, both these functions of anima have an essential part to play in regulating mental activity, and in the work of Blake both are represented in the Orc cycle, as the feminine against which definition is made, but whose eventual return is the goal of the alienated psyche. This dual movement composing the Orc cycle is originally represented by the interactions of Urizen and Los, as was noted in the discussion of the relationship between these two figures in *The Book of Urizen*, when the former character's collapse, owing to the irrepressible build up of unconscious energy as a result of an attempt to sustain a rigid spirituality, is rather inadequately redressed by the creative activities of Los. His feminine counterpart, Enitharmon, separates from him in consequence of his attempts to recreate order after the collapse of Urizen. The separation from his emanation later impels his own creative efforts, as he tries to forge a union with the rejected feminine aspects of his own nature, projected onto a female counterpart. However, as Steven Vine points out, Los's reaction to Urizenic activity merely leads to his own self-division. The chains intended to control the destructive energies of Orc, whose birth from Enitharmon can be seen as an effect of the repressive activities of Urizen, only succeed in imposing similar limitations upon Los himself (72). Since his opposition to Urizenic ideas impels his creative acts, he cannot entirely escape the repressive influence of his opponent. Such is the

implication of the Orc cycle, with its vacillating movement between reason and energy, which only allows Los a brief experience of creative freedom.

Rousseau, too, laments the connection between reason and feeling, discovering selfishness to be the effect of the morality which is really intended to suppress destructive self-regard, but which, in fact, only lends it encouragement, since it divides the soul, leading to an accumulation of unconscious energy, which often finds release either in sexual expression, or in anti-social acts. In *Émile* Rousseau expresses the hope of breaking the connection between reason and sentiment, by encouraging through education the development of the child's intellectual independence. His aim is to show that sentiment can be used as a means of unifying society, while its attendant problems, that of disguising self-interest, and entrenching social division, can be overcome. Rousseau's approach depends upon manipulating the way the child acquires knowledge about the world, so that his understanding, and his sense of self, do not become dependent on the opinions of others. The child's independence is to be guaranteed by basing his knowledge upon sense-impressions, and by postponing the development of his reason, his moral sense, and his imagination, all subject to social influences, until after the age of puberty, when he will be able to reason for himself. Sentiments then will show a concern for others, and will not merely disguise forbidden self-interest.

The Four Zoas, and Blake's Orc cycle, demonstrate why Rousseau's plan can hardly expect to succeed, and its failures concern his attitude to the feminine which, as we have seen in Chapter Three, is so roundly criticised by Mary Wollstonecraft. Though Rousseau desires to use sentiment as a medium of social cohesion, gender divisions along the lines described by Rousseau would tend to marginalize feeling, since the male is to be active and strong: the female passive and weak. This situation would repress the feminine, and leave the next generation open to unconscious influences, transmitted through sentiment. The repression of sexuality would also tend to suppress feeling in the male, leading to a destructive build-up of unconscious energy such as occurs at a particular stage of the Orc cycle. All the drawbacks of Rousseau's ideas are summed up through the status of Blake's emanation. It

illustrates the impossibility of limiting knowledge to what can be sensed, since the emanation embodies unconscious knowledge, which makes the emergence of consciousness possible. In addition, the emanation carries feeling, which if repressed, hinders movements of consciousness, and prevents the uncovering of new perceptions. It also reflects the effects of morality upon sexual relations. Repression of sexuality leads either to mental stasis, or to a forceful reaction to inhibition, destroying existing mental configurations, and only in favourable circumstances, leading to the creation of new ones. Hence Rousseau's ideas for resolving the problems of rationality are more deterministic than those expressed in the Orc cycle.

The Four Zoas is more complex than any other work discussed so far, however, and there are developments of style and content which begin to suggest a movement to undermine the domination of the cycle, although this still ultimately imposes itself as a deterministic feature. This domination may present a conceptual difficulty hindering the full expression of Blake's developing ideas. There have been several suggestions as to why this ambitious work was never completely finished or engraved. Frye considers that, as a late development in the whole scheme of the Zoas, the Spectre of Urthona could not be fully integrated into the poem" (*Symmetry* 298). Bloom suggests that Blake had begun to sense that the Last Judgement, which forms the subject of Night IX, and which is the culmination of the rest of the work, "was not so dramatic, and hardly so external a phenomenon" (*Visionary Company* 97). Instead the emphasis in the following two prophecies was of the struggle within. Though both of these observations can be supported by textual detail, my own view, which does not contradict either that of Frye or Bloom but merely changes the emphasis, is that the later prophecies indicate a change in the conception of consciousness, which is suggested by many of the developments in *The Four Zoas*, and which the final two works, *Milton* and *Jerusalem* continue to explore. This change is only accommodated with difficulty in the cyclical structure that still dominates this work.

This change is marked by a movement away from the notion of a unified consciousness, in which the ego plays a central role. Instead, the centres of

consciousness proliferate, so that each of the many figures whose interactions form the basis of the work correspond to a particular view of the world. As this chapter will later demonstrate, the cyclical outline of *The Four Zoas* is subverted by the synchronicity of many events, by the various differing versions of the same crucial moment of fracture leading to the disunity of the Zoas, and by the disruption of the normal sequence of cause and effect, as well as in the disjunction between many of the passages, when readers have to take stock of their bearings as expectations of a unified experience are completely confounded. The proliferation of viewpoint, and the disruption of causal determinants undermine the notion of a unified consciousness and the view of the world that lends the mind an illusion of integrity. It paves the way for the interpenetration of subjective and objective spheres, a revaluation of the feminine, and the matter with which it is associated.

Although the early works have given a prominent place to the feminine, this becomes even more pronounced from *The Four Zoas* onwards, and the title of the final work, *Jerusalem,* suggests that the feminine gradually gains a centrality that would accord with the notion that consciousness is now based on anima rather than upon ego, or in Blake's terms, upon the emanation. Hillman's interpretation of Jung's ideas upon the nature of consciousness when applied to *The Four Zoas* suggests that this is the case. The anima, a container of mental imagery, is involved in the process of personification, and so this entity gives the sense of personality to the ego, rather than the other way around. In Hillman's words: "consciousness may more appropriately be conceived upon anima that upon ego" (*Anima* 125). The process of personification, which underlies the individual's sense of self, according to Hillman, derives from the images of persons that inhabit the unconscious psyche. Rationality decrees the sense of a unified consciousness, confirmed by an integrated world view, based upon a belief in its objectivity, but the proliferation of personified images rather suggests the possibility of a diversification of mental contents, constructed according to a range of subjectivities.

Through the mental structure termed the anima, connections between mental images take place according to the movements of libido, and the complex

associations of these images facilitate the change of perspective that enables us to assume a new "take" upon the world. *The Four Zoas*, as we shall see, illustrates both how an association with the feminine underlies the ability to change viewpoint, and how a separation from one's feminine counterpart creates an inflexible stance, that can only be changed through a complete breakdown of one's customary approach to the world. Yet the way the mind's workings are portrayed in the work also suggests the kind of flexibility that comes about through a continual change of mental perspective, in which there is no complete breakdown, for one viewpoint leads onto the next. Each particular stance suggests another, and all may coexist, since they are not opposites, and there is no necessity for one view to invalidate the other. Such a style of consciousness brings about a more complete union with the world: one's ego does not depend upon the recognition of a difference, initially based upon gender, which must at all costs be maintained. It also puts feeling into a less personal perspective, since it derives from viewpoint, and is no longer needed to sustain the ego.

The notion of ego itself has to be abandoned, though it seems necessary for it to have developed at some point in the life of the individual, for upon it rests the ability to discriminate, an essential aspect of Hillman's notion of consciousness based upon anima. Without discrimination, the mind would chase endlessly through a labyrinth of images, each equally significant, and therefore incapable of assuming any pattern of meaning. The recognition of structure requires the penetration of the mesh of associated imagery in order to discover a unity there that confers meaning and shape. This depends upon the ability to discriminate between significant and redundant material. Jung's archetypes, the images that organise experience, may be seen as the unifying ideas that confer the experience of psychological understanding, and illustrate which particular style of consciousness is dominating the mind at any one time. Earlier chapters dealt with the mind set of the hero, which dominates Blake's early work, but Hillman uses other images of Gods and Goddesses from Greek mythology to highlight other ways of regarding the world, some of which are to be discussed later in this chapter, for they are reminiscent of the figures that inhabit the world depicted in *The Four Zoas*.

The developing view of the nature of consciousness may be contrasted with the thought of Rousseau, which according to Blake's ideas equally but unsuccessfully tries to dethrone the ego from its prominent place. The contrast marks a development from Blake's earlier work previously discussed, which for the most part validated Rousseau's ideas on the effect of rationality, but the ideas expressed in *The Four Zoas* implicitly renounce his solutions to the problems he identified. As we have seen in Chapter Two, in *A Discourse on the Origins of Inequality* Rousseau bases his social philosophy on the premise that living in society is for man an artificial state. His natural condition is one of isolation and independence. In consequence of his solitude, he exhibits only *amour de soi*, the natural self-regard that ensures his own survival. *Amour-propre*, the corrupt version of self-love emerges in a social state, as a result of the development of self-consciousness, when the individual arrives at a sense of self by comparing his own condition with that of those who surround him. Rousseau here outlines the circumstances necessary for the development of reason, a characteristic that prompts us to measure our self-worth through the reactions and opinions of others: it turns the world into a mirror filled with our own self-reflection. It is the characteristic that leads to man's divided nature, to the dependence on other men that, according to Rousseau, fractures his original unity of being. It is also the basis of the ubiquitous drive for power, of the selfish urge to accumulate the possessions that underwrite one's own self-esteem, a drive which leads to disputes over property and land, and which can culminate in the ultimate expression of destructive rivalry, the slaughter of men of a different class or race in civil unrest or war. This characteristic also prompts the jealousy that often accompanies the sexual drive, turning it into an instinct for possession, when it is distorted by morality.

Rousseau, therefore, attributes all social ills to the division of being that accompanies the development of rationality, and the movement into a civil state. The quest for unity of being set out in his educational treatise, *Émile*, requires that the child should be educated so as to avoid the drawbacks of social influence upon his developing identity. Though Blake does not, in his depiction of the forces that combine in the structure Frye calls the Orc Cycle, present a time in the life of an

individual, or of society, when one generation remains uninfluenced by the one that precedes it, his work displays a surprising measure of agreement with Rousseau over the deleterious effects of reason on the personality of the individual, and his social relationships. To this faculty are attributed the same kind of social problems that are described by Rousseau in his analysis of the effects of *amour-propre.*[40]

The main aim of Rousseau's social philosophy is to release sentiment from its dependence on rationality, so that it is no longer linked with amour-propre, and the often hypocritical adherence to a moral stance that inculcates a delusory sense of superiority, which acts to divide individuals in society from each other. Because it is impossible to isolate individuals from the social influences that shaped them, Blake does not, in his work, place the kind of reliance upon feeling as a medium of social cohesion that is characteristic of Rousseau's social philosophy. As we have seen in Chapter Four, feeling helps forge a bond of sympathy between people, but as a passive quality, resulting from a repressive morality, it also disguises the injustices that create the victims whose situation demands our pity. It also discourages the wrathful reaction to injustice that might help to bring about its removal.

In *Émile* Rousseau makes it clear that he is aware of the dangers of exalting the role of feeling as a means of uniting society,[41] but he suggests the possibility of minimising these drawbacks through education and social reform. Rousseau's programme of education in *Émile* aims to introduce the child into society in such a way as to preserve his original unity of being. Rousseau's purpose is to foster the moral and intellectual independence of the child during his developing years, to replicate the conditions one would expect to find in his hypothetical state of nature, so as to preserve Émile's *amour de soi* while discouraging the development of *amour-propre.* In this way, Rousseau thinks it should be possible to avoid arousing the child's competitive instincts, which emerge as a consequence of the need to

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[40] Rousseau describes the social effects of men depending upon each other for their own sense of worth in *A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, p. 90. He suggests that in the social state, every injury becomes an affront, and "as every man punished the contempt shown him by others, in proportion to his opinion of himself, revenge became terrible, and men bloody and cruel".

[41] In *Émile*, p. 94, Rousseau exhorts his reader to "be afraid of all sentiments anterior to the judgement that evaluates them", without acknowledging that judgement itself is attached to feeling.

establish his own identity in relation to that of other people. If Émile compares himself to other men, the birth of *amour-propre* is inevitable. Since his first sentiment, according to Rousseau, is self-love, he will learn to love those best who care for him the most, and in this way the process of comparison begins. Those who fail to consider his interests are unfavourably compared with those who do, and these preferences begin to erode a child's natural benevolence, and he becomes "imperious, jealous, deceitful and vindictive" (*Émile* 213).

The emergence of these selfish passions accompanies the development of the will, as the child begins to recognise the existence of other conflicting wills, which he has the power to affect through his own insistence. From these circumstances arises the need for a moral code, which places the interests of others above one's own, but which, as Rousseau points out in his *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality*, ultimately has the effect of strengthening the will through the force of repressed desire. As we have seen too, in previous chapters, in relation to the psychology of Jung, the energy that accompanies the development of the will provides the impetus for the emergence of consciousness, which derives from the recognition of an opposing force. Jung's ideas on the formation of consciousness would suggest that Rousseau's hope of preserving Émile's unity of being is unlikely to be achieved, since the mind without the separation enforced by the will would apparently remain in a primitive state, though Rousseau recognises that such separation is inevitable as the child matures. He just wants to delay the separation until the reasoning faculty develops, lending to the individual the power of thinking for himself. In this way, he will, according to Rousseau, avoid the prejudices that unavoidably influence the child through sentiment when he lacks the maturity to evaluate them.

Rousseau's first requirement, therefore, is that the child's early experience should entirely avoid knowledge of the existence of opposing wills. This does not mean that the child should always have his own way, but that the only opposition he experiences should come from necessity, from the conditions inherent in the natural state. The child, thinks Rousseau, will not kick against such conditions when there is no hope of changing them: he will only do so if he thinks his desires are being

thwarted by a human will, which he has the ability to bend through his own self-assertion. Only the belief that those who frustrate his will do so from malignant motives will arouse his anger and resentment. If the child thinks that resistance to him comes from inanimate nature, he will learn to accept necessity with good will and equanimity. He will only rebel if he thinks there is a chance of overcoming necessity; that is, if there is a will behind it which he thinks it is possible to change.

For this reason, Rousseau advises the tutor to "arrange it that as long as he is struck only by objects of sense, all his ideas stop at sensations: arrange it so that on all sides he perceives around him only the physical world" (*Émile* 89). Rousseau advises against trying to influence a child's behaviour directly by reasoning him with him, since "To know good and bad, to sense the reason for man's duties, is not a child's affair" (*Émile* 90). As the child does not understand the reasons underlying moral behaviour, he will pretend to be persuaded by reasoning, whilst covertly going his own way. The suggestion that he should not behave in a particular way will merely increase his desire to do so, and will reinforce his will, whilst introducing him to the notion of opposition. Rousseau advises the tutor to avoid all verbal lessons, and to arrange that the child learn only from experience. In addition, he recommends that no punishment should be inflicted for wrong-doing, but that the child should learn only about the wisdom of his own actions when he suffers the consequences of them. It is easy, however, to imagine a situation in which those consequences would be too horrific to contemplate, a possibility that in itself casts doubt upon the validity of Rousseau's suggestions.

Rousseau's views on the futility of reasoning with a child have arisen in reaction to Locke, who advocated such a course of behaviour. In fact, much of Rousseau's theory of education is influenced by Locke's ideas expressed in *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* published in 1690. The belief that our knowledge of the physical world is to be derived solely from sensation, the premise that underlies Rousseau's educational theories, is also borrowed from Locke's account of the way the mind reacts with the world in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. The first book of the essay is concerned with arguing that there are no innate ideas, and

that all our knowledge is derived from experience, a view to which Blake takes great exception, as we have seen. The argument between those who refute and those who support the existence of innate ideas is a complicated one, confused by a tendency to conflate pre-existent notions and inborn mental faculties. It is not easy to separate mental contents from the means of acquiring them. Locke's desire to distinguish content and mental functioning, it appears, was motivated by a concern to free society from the influence of authoritarian religious views, whose influence often derived from the supposition that they were god-given. Interestingly this was also a major preoccupation of William Blake, though for him innate ideas provide a means of liberation, rather than oppression. Jung's archetypes, which may be regarded as innate ideas, appear to have features in common with Blake's "giant forms". They operate to release the mind from the domination of tyrannical social tendencies, and therefore contribute a further dimension to the philosophical discussions concerning the existence of innate ideas.

The contest surrounding the doctrine of innate ideas returns us to the debates between rationalists and empiricists discussed in the introduction. Though this is a rather artificial distinction, disguising the complexity of the debate, Locke represents the empiricists' position, whilst Leibniz argues the rationalist case against him. This view, as we have seen, descends from Plato, with his concept of ideal forms, in which priority for understanding is placed within the mind, an adaptation of which is adopted by Leibniz, whilst Locke opposes this doctrine, arguing that the world furnishes us with the means by which it may be understood. Jung's psychological approach deconstructs this opposition, and suggests the illusory nature of the rational/empirical dichotomy. He says that the active thinking type draws the energy for his thought processes "from the idea, from the innate functional form which his introverted attitude has activated" (CW 6, par. 521). The extrovert, however, "can reach the idea only through the accumulation and comparison of the empirical material" (CW 6, par. 521). In the words of Jung: "The two types are opposed in a remarkable way: the one shapes the material out of his own unconscious and thus comes to experience, the other lets himself be guided by the material which contains his unconscious projections and comes to the idea" (CW

6, par. 521). According to this analysis, neither the rationalist nor the empiricist can escape the influence of the unconscious idea.

It is the nature of this idea that tends to confuse the issue. Though the idea crystallises when it reaches consciousness, it appears to originate in unconscious obscurity, and it is this factor which often remains unrecognised in philosophical speculations about the origins of knowledge. Jung's theory suggests that the relative clarity of the conscious mind is hewn from a richly textured tapestry of psychic phenomena, which precedes consciousness, but which continues to influence it in moments of affectivity. Conceptualisation is mediated: it takes shape through the simplification of a complex proliferation of mental imagery, and does not emerge directly from the objects perceived in the external world. It is not so much that the ideas themselves are innate, but that the means of their acquisition dictates their form. The mind of an infant does not, in Jung's view, "only apperceive passively but actively arranges the experiences of its own accord, and enforces certain conclusions and judgements" (CW 6, par. 312). Jung insists that the patterns of experience are not accidental. "They follow strictly preformed conditions which are not transmitted by experience as contents of apprehension but are the preconditions of apprehension. They are ideas *ante rem*, determinants of form, a kind of pre-existent ground-plan, that gives the stuff of experience a specific configuration, so we may think of them, as Plato did, as schemata, or as inherited functions which, nevertheless exclude other possibilities or at any rate limit them to a very great extent" (CW6, par. 312).

In this account, the mind is attributed with an active predisposition for forming patterns beyond the will of the perceiver. This facility is not recognised in Locke's description of mental functioning. For him, the world impinges upon the mind, and dictates the ideas by which it may be understood, in a manner that resembles the approach of the extraverted thinker, described above, and which therefore probably corresponds to his own approach to experience, as far as he is aware. Locke stipulates that knowledge of the world arrives in a two-stage process, the first passive when the mind absorbs sensations, or the raw materials of knowledge, and

the second active, when more complex ideas are constructed from the simple ones. In his belief that there are no innate ideas, he does not deny that there has to be some input from the mind in coming to an understanding of the world, but to him this rather suggests the existence of innate abilities, as opposed to innate ideas. He argues that sensation is merely the raw materials, from which the mind can abstract and then afterwards enlarge:

> The senses at first let in particular ideas and furnish the empty cabinet. And the Mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the memory and names got to them. Afterwards the Mind by degrees proceeding farther abstracts them and by Degrees learns the use of general names. In this manner the mind comes to be furnished with ideas and language (Locke 51).

Locke here attributes the mind with the ability to organise according to the classifications required in the acquisition of concepts, though there is some confusion here that needs interpretation, for the senses surely admit sensations to the mind rather than ideas. Mental images of objects reflected from the world, rather than sensations, appear to underlie conceptualisation, and it is only at this latter stage that the mind may be said to possess ideas. The faculty involved in the acquisition of concepts appears to consist in the ability to detect similarity and difference. Hence Locke's distinction between simple and complex ideas fails to convince, since his definition of simple ideas identifies them with the characteristics abstracted from reflected objects in order to form concepts, or complex ideas, as they are termed in Locke's account. These characteristics, or simple ideas, as Locke calls them, are not just sensations passively absorbed, as he insists in his description of the process involved.

> Yet the simple ideas thus united in the same Subject, are as perfectly distinct as those that come in by different senses. The coldness and hardness, which a man feels in a piece of ice, being as distinct ideas in the

> Mind as the Smell and Whiteness of a Lily, or as the Taste of sugar and Smell of a Rose (72).

The hardness of a piece of ice or the whiteness of a lily are characteristics abstracted from the object in question, or rather from the reflected image, and require some participation from the mind in order that they may be detected. The object could not in itself present its own qualities as those required to participate in any particular concept. The simple ideas are not passively given, as Locke insists, but are apparently selected according to predetermined criteria. Some innate mechanism for determining structure appears to be involved. The mind knows implicitly that such characteristics as colour, shape and texture, but not necessarily all of them at the same time, may be taken into account in the formation of a concept, which may then be regarded as a template for the correct application of a specific verbal symbol. No one actually makes an analysis of each object before deciding how it should be known, but nevertheless everyone effortlessly applies the principles involved. Hence it appears that conceptualisation grows out of the mind's innate capacity for imposing a pattern upon experience. Though the ideas themselves may not be innate, the means by which they are acquired requires the participation of the intellect, with its characteristic patterning activity.

Leibniz suggested that the mind is disposed to arrange reflected images in a certain way in his work, written in answer to Locke, entitled *New Essays on Human Understanding*. After arguing that many ideas such as Being, Unity, Substance, and Duration are innate to our understanding of ourselves, an argument that does not appear very convincing, since we may understand ourselves only through analogy with external processes, Leibniz proceeds to undermine the view of the mind as a *tabula rasa*. He points out that if the mind were a blank tablet, then by analogy it would be possible for a sculptor to take a block of marble and make of it any shape he desired. He then adds:

> However, if there were veins in the block which marked out the shape of Hercules rather than other shapes, then that block would be more

> determined to that shape and Hercules would be innate in it, in a way, even though labour would be required to expose the veins and polish them into clarity, removing everything that prevents their being seen. This is how ideas and truths are innate in us – as inclinations, dispositions, tendencies or natural potentialities, and not as actions; although these potentialities are always accompanied by certain actions, often insensible ones, which correspond to them (*par. 52*).

Here the mind, in opposition to Locke, has an active disposition to find certain principles within itself, and is denied the wax-like capacity to receive any principles whatsoever. It is pre-programmed to employ such principles in a certain way, even though they may be unconsciously applied. According to Leibniz, an example of an innate principle might be the law of non-contradiction, which states that an object cannot be both itself and something else. (par. 82). This really means, in effect, that we cannot apply the same concept to objects with the same characteristics: that a cat, for example, cannot be called a dog. The law of non-contradiction then depends upon our unconscious recognition of the principles underlying the process of conceptualisation, in which the detection of similarity and difference amongst reflected images is involved. The law would appear to evolve in accordance with the mind's patterning activity.

According to Jung, however, this patterning precedes the process of conceptualisation, and is visible in the typical configurations to be discovered in the myths and legends descending to us from ancient times. These are, in Jung's account, the conscious representation of ideas and attitudes arising out of universal experience with accretions acquired before the acquisition of concepts. Such ideas are represented by personified images, which Jung terms archetypes, and since these acquire meaning only in relation to other images, according to associations suggested by the narratives in which they appear, they lend a fluidity to mental activity which survives only with difficulty the process of conceptualisation attendant upon the acquisition of language. According to Jung, these personified images crop up continually in the myths and legends of many different cultures,

which suggest to him that they correspond to the deepest structures of the mind, and cannot be explained by any theory of migration (Samuels 24). Many of our ideas and attitudes that give shape to our own experience are embodied in these images, though we may mistakenly believe such ideas to have arisen in response to life's events. Concepts then are not absorbed from the world, as in Locke's formulation, but are forged out of a web of associated images, while still retaining some of the associations from their mythical context, which would explain the preponderance of symbol in poetic language.

Jung describes archetypes as a "possibility of representation which is given *a priori*", and insists that they "are not determined as regards their content, but only as regards their form" (CW 9 i, par.155). He compares them to the structuring mechanism of a crystal, which exists before the appearance of the crystal itself, a metaphor that is reminiscent of the analogy of the block of marble used by Leibniz to suggest the nature of innate ideas. Samuels summarises archetypal structures and patterns as "the crystallisation of experiences over time". He says that they "constellate experience in accordance with innate schemata" and act as an "imprimatur of subsequent experience" since they "involve us in a search for correspondence in the environment" (27). Jung appears to describe an innate structuring mechanism, based upon images, which is responsive to common human experiences, but which also determines the representation of these experiences to the human mind. In other words, the structure of the mind determines its contents, in the form of ideas, which then influence the way the world is seen. All the associations that surround the mother archetype, for example, constitute the ideas attached to motherhood, which then are realised in personal and individual representations of the mother herself.

The arguments concerning the nature and existence of innate ideas, make it possible in some sense to dispute the contentions of Locke, though they seem to have been accepted in outline by Rousseau, who argues that in childhood, " we are limited by our faculties to things which can be sensed" (*Émile* 125), while our capacity for ideas coincides with the later development of reason.

> Before the age of reason the child receives not ideas but images: and the difference between the two is that images are only absolute depictions of sensible objects; while ideas are notions of objects determined by relations. An image can stand all alone in the mind which represents it, but every idea supposes other ideas. When one imagines, one does nothing but see; when one conceives one is comparing. Our sensations are purely passive, while our perceptions or ideas are born out of an active principle which judges" (*Émile 107*).

The implication here is that it is possible to gain knowledge of the physical world without relating such knowledge to any preconceived ideas about it. We are, according to Rousseau, able to identify the ways in which the world affects our own survival, by noting the physical sensations it confers upon us, without using such faculties as comparison and discrimination that correspond to the later development of reason. Though Rousseau on the same page contradicts his assertion that children are not able to reason, he still insists that their "entire learning is in sensation: nothing has gone through to their understanding" (*Émile* 108). By limiting their experience to things which apparently require no understanding, Rousseau hopes to forestall the prejudicial influence of ready-made ideas upon their conception of the world. In this way, he thinks he will be able to avoid the early development of sentiment when notions of morality are imposed through a reasoning process that the child is unable to understand. Moral distinctions absorbed through sentiment lead to the distortion of the passions, and the dependence on the opinion of others that fractures the child's unity of being. Discriminations of good and bad underlie the distinctions between friends and enemies. As Rousseau points out. "With love and friendship are born dissension enmity and hate. From the bosom of so many diverse passions I see opinion raising an unshakeable throne, and stupid mortals, subjected to its empire, basing their own existence on the judgements of others" (*Émile* 214).

As well as delaying the development of reason and sentiment, Rousseau advocates discouraging the use of the imagination during the earliest stages of the child's life,

since he thinks that to this faculty is owed the many misconceptions that distort the sense of self. In particular the child must not imagine beings or places that do not exist, only the necessities that are part of his experience, arising from the sensations of pleasure and pain. The senses themselves must be protected from the errors of the imagination, which may only be devoted towards ensuring the individual's self-preservation. Any encounter with fictional heroes, Rousseau thinks, will arouse the child's competitive instincts, and present deeds that he is tempted to emulate. The sense of self will also be heightened by a knowledge of the meaning of death, and necessitate the quest for power and possessions that sustain one's self-esteem, rather than the sufficiency necessary for survival. Rousseau attributes the imagination with the power of dividing the individual from himself, so that he loses the unity of being that he thinks it so important to preserve.

With the approach of adolescence, however, when Émile's developing sexuality fills him with restless energy, Rousseau advocates that all the faculties left undeveloped until then should be allowed their place in the personality, though their growth is to be strictly managed by Émile's tutor, so as to limit the influence of the selfish passions, whose emergence now becomes inevitable. Rousseau's moral programme for Émile is based upon placing restraints upon the natural expression of sexuality, the sublimation of which will turn a selfish passion into a medium of social cohesion. Émile's repressed energy makes him sensitive to the feelings of others, and he becomes aware that he is a member of the human species, with needs and desires in common. At this point the birth of amour-propre leads him to compare himself with others, and if the comparison is unfavourable to him, he will become dissatisfied with himself, and envious of others. However, if he meets only people who are worse off than he is, he will feel pity for the sufferer. According to Rousseau: "It is man's weakness which makes him sociable: it is our common miseries that turn our heart to humanity" (*Émile* 221). Pity arouses the imagination because it puts man in the place of those who suffer. With such awareness he is able to extend out of himself, so that first the sentiments develop, and then "the notions of good and evil which truly constitutes him as a man and an integral part of his species" (*Émile 220*).

Rousseau is aware that such compassion for others may not be a virtue. As he points out: "Pity is sweet because putting ourselves in the place of the one who suffers, we nevertheless feel the pleasure of not suffering as he does" (*Émile* 221). Such pity, in effect, separates people as much as it unites them, since it may encourage the one who pities to regard himself as somehow superior to the object of his compassion, especially if a superiority in fortune enables him to alleviate his suffering. However, Rousseau uses this sentiment as a means of tempering the more dangerous selfish passions, which might accompany the unbridled expression of desire. Ideally, however, people should avoid, "relating everything to themselves alone and regulating their ideas of good and bad according to their own interest" (*Émile* 252). In this way, Rousseau aims to turn unavoidable *amour-propre* into a virtue:

> The less the object of our care is immediately involved with us, the less the illusion of particular interest is to be feared. The more one generalises this interest, the more it becomes equitable, and the love of mankind is nothing other than the love of justice (*Émile* 252).

In other words, moral sentiments should contribute to the greater happiness of all, regardless of whether or not they further one's own interests. In Rousseau's words: "To prevent pity from degenerating into weakness, it must, therefore, be generalised and extended to the whole of mankind" (*Émile* 253). This means that pity is aroused by any situation in which suffering occurs, and is regarded as an inevitable accompaniment of the human condition, and not a situation that opposes, and separates, the one who pities, and the one who suffers.

This development of generalised feeling, however, in Rousseau's representation of it depends upon the postponement of the effects of amour-propre until the child is able to reason for himself, uninfluenced by a sentimental morality. The account of the emergence of consciousness in *The Four Zoas*, examined in the light of Jungian ideas, appears to contradict such a possibility, for consciousness develops as the result of the interaction of the four mental faculties, Tharmas, the senses, Luvah, the

passions, Los, the imagination and Urizen, the intellect.[42] Their interaction suggests that it is not possible to gain knowledge of the world through sense impressions alone, nor to postpone the acquisition of sentiment until the individual is able to reason. This means that the child develops a gendered identity in opposition to the mother and the world, an opposition to the sentiment determining the culture of any existing society, in which the will-power is activated, and the imagination aroused, whilst rationality seals the sense of a unified self. In the light of this account, it is not possible to avoid the development of the will, nor thwart the workings of the imagination, which is inevitably involved in arriving at an understanding of the world.

The fall of Tharmas at the beginning of Night I deals with the way that the mind separates from the world in order to come to consciousness and shows how this separation depends upon an opposition induced by the absorption of moral sentiments. The fall is described by Frye as the production of an "automatic 'natural' cycle of life and death"(*Symmetry* 278), a cycle which both serves to represent the mind's separation from the world, and the acquisition of its capacity to do so. In this separation Tharmas is divided from his emanation, Enion, a figure described by Frye as "a mother of life, who weaves a web of life that takes on a will of its own" (*Symmetry* 278). Though not emphasised by Frye, this is an ironic representation of the influence of existent ideas upon the developing psyche. Obviously natural objects have no will of their own, but what appears to be natural is often merely an accustomed way of regarding the world, which does, in fact, have

[42] Jung outlines these faculties in *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche*. Volume VIII of *The Complete Works*, pars. 256-7. "Consciousness is primarily an organ of orientation in a world of inner and outer facts. First and foremost it establishes that something is there. I call this faculty *sensation*. By this I do not mean the specific activity of any one of the senses, but perception in general. Another faculty interprets what is perceived: this I call *thinking*. By means of this function the object perceived is assimilated and its transformation into a psychic context proceeds much further than in mere sensation. A third faculty establishes the value of the object; the function of evaluation I call *feeling*. The pain/pleasure reaction of feeling marks the highest degrees of the subjectification of the object. Feeling brings object and subject into such a close relation that the subject must choose between acceptance and rejection." " It is the fourth faculty of consciousness, intuition, which makes possible, at least approximately, the determination of space-time relationship. This is a function of perception which includes subliminal factors, that is, the possible relationship to objects not appearing in the field of vision, and the possible change, past and future, about which the object gives no clue."

the power of influencing the mind. In other words, the form assumed by the sense-data perceived by the mind appears to reside in nature itself, and to be independent of the organising process, although the accuracy of this view is consistently attacked in Blake's depiction of mental patterning. According to the situation described in Night I Rousseau's theory that it is possible to gain an independent knowledge of the world through sense impressions alone appears untenable, since our perceptions correspond to the shape of the world as it already exists, and are dictated by current ideology. Such is the implication of nature characterised as a tyrannical female will.

The notion that sense impressions precede human knowledge is also contradicted by the disruption of chronology in the depiction of the events described in *The Four Zoas*. Although the separation of Tharmas and Enion appears to be the circumstance that precipitates the fall from Beulah, it is very quickly seen to be the result of some previous occurrence that is only vaguely delineated. The nature of the world as it appears is influenced by this early event, and does not reside solely in what may be sensed. Tharmas in the opening Night of *The Four Zoas* is almost incoherent with fear and grief, mourning the loss of his emanations, and consumed by pity for Jerusalem, whom he has protected. Despite his grief, Tharmas is also riven by a sense of nature's beauty, declaring that Enion is "thus heavenly beautiful to draw me to destruction" (4, 40, p.302). The connection between feeling and perception emphasises the dependence of our view of the world on some prior factor other than the details of what may be sensed. The feelings have been influenced by some preceding event, which has sundered the flow of libido, and turned the world into either a desert or a garden according to the state of mental energy.

The event responsible for this chaos is characterised as a battle, in which we are told that: "The men have received their death wounds" (3, 15, p.301). The exact nature of this conflict only becomes clear later in Night I, where Enitharmon describes it in a "Song of Vala." This figure is the emanation of Luvah, and may be regarded as the embodiment of the natural beauty of the world, and of the physical appeal of the female. A "Song of Vala" is therefore one that triumphs in the power conferred upon the female by her sexual role, one in which Enitharmon as the emanation of

Los takes particular delight, since it signifies her power over him. The song reminds us of Enitharmon's triumph in Europe when she rejoices in woman's dominion. The event that gives her so much pleasure refers to the dissensions between Luvah and Urizen that occur because of the interdiction on desire, discussed in relation to the hero myth, but which is also an aspect of Freud's Oedipal conflict, and of the theories of Lacan.[43] At first we are told that: "Luvah seized the Horses of Light & rose into the Chariot of Day" (10, 13, p. 305), though later, the positions of these two figures are reversed, and Urizen, addressing Los, cries: "Obey my voice young Demon I am God from Eternity to Eternity" (12, 23, p.307). As we have seen, in previous chapters, morality has the effect of repressing energy, which eventually leads to more vehement self-expression. The changes in position of Luvah, and Urizen, in which Los and Tharmas are also involved, represent the effects of morality, in which Enitharmon rejoices, since they lend her power. The movements of these two figures determine how the world is seen. They eventually culminate in the domination of Urizen, which drives the energy represented by Enitharmon into the unconscious, an event which establishes the prevalence of the culturally determined view.

However, the accounts of the conflict between Luvah and Urizen only occur after we learn of its effects on the relations of Tharmas and Los with their emanations. The separation of the mind from the world occurs before we are told of the event from which this separation ensued. The implication is that some of the circumstances described in Night I are roughly synchronous, coinciding with the event that leads to the mind's separation from the world. The separation, in which some sense impressions are selected as vital determinants of the nature of the world, and some are ignored, is first expressed through the image of a labyrinth, a structure that is closely related to the incoherent confusion of Tharmas at the beginning of the night. However, this separation is attendant upon the ban against incest, whose effects are felt at a very early stage of the child's life. It is, as we have seen, according to Jung's account of the hero myth, the period when energy is diverted from the mother and is transformed into symbols that represent her. In other words,

[43] These theories are mentioned in a note in Chapter Four, p. 17.

it coincides with the development of language, when sensations are converted into images, and finally into concepts.[44] Rousseau's requirement that the child's experience should be limited to sensation thus appears to be impossible, unless he is to be deprived of this most human of all acquirements. It is difficult, in any case, to imagine how the nature of the world could be grasped through sensation alone. The capacity for discrimination that underlies the ability to select and classify, and is the basis of language development, must be required to make any sense of sensation.

Rousseau's desire to limit the child's experience to that of sensation depends upon limiting the imagination to the requirements of survival. It is to be placed at the service of *amour-de soi*, but denied to the furtherance of *amour-propre*. In *The Four Zoas* the vicissitudes of the early existence of Los and Enitharmon are bound up with the activities of the other Zoas, which suggests that the suppression of imagination is not possible, since it is implicated in the separation of mind and matter, attendant on the ban against incest, and the subsequent emergence of self-consciousness required by the development of language. Enion's weaving of the web of life shows the way that preconceived ideas create a vision of the world from certain pre-selected sense-data, whilst suppressing those that do not conform. This description of the mutilation of the world is an ironic one, with its suggestion that inanimate matter has a will of its own, when it is really only responsive to the preconceptions that formed it. Enion described her woof as "a Covering for my Sins from wrath of Tharmas" (6, 18, p.304). Her creative activities emerge from a sense of sin that originates in the incest ban, but which then extends to include all sexual relations. As we saw in relation to the hero myth, when the libido is withheld from the mother, a symbolic representation of the world is developed to replace what is lost. Such symbols first emerge as images, an occurrence that is depicted in the birth of Los and Enitharmon.

When they first appear, these two figures possess a daunting vigour and arrogance, a sense that the world was made for their sustenance, which makes them reject their mother's pity and love. We are told that they "delighted in the moony spaces of

[44] Jung's description of this process is to be found in a note in Chapter Two, p.10.

Eno", (8, 19, p.305) which appears to be an imagined vision of the world as protection, such as was featured in the *Songs of Innocence*, though Los and Enitharmon do not bear any resemblance to the compassionate narrators of many of those songs. It is as though the imagination compensates for the loss of the mother and the world, and partially maintains the libidinal connection that has otherwise been severed. The world the imagination creates in this instance is suffused in emotion, as though it were lit by moonlight: it does not have the clarity that is associated with a genuine imaginative vision. The "youthful terrors" (9,16, p.305) have begun to define themselves in opposition to the world, as we see from the rejection of Enion, but they have not yet fully established their own identity, as is suggested by the unorganised abundance of the forest, amongst which they wandered. We are told that Los "could controll the times & seasons, & the days & years" while Enitharmon "could controll the spaces, regions, desart, flood & forest" (9, 27-28, p.305). This suggests that the imagination creates the limits, which circumscribe the fallen world, and is the basis for our understanding of it. In other words, the world cannot be understood through sensation alone, as Rousseau following Locke supposed. It may supply the images, but these are combined through the activity of the imagination, which converts an awareness of change into measurement, but limits the disturbing sense of loss and eventual death by freezing change into a temporary sense of permanence through a construction of spatial limits.

Rousseau's attempts to forestall the self-division that leads to man's dependence upon those who surround him for his own sense of worth requires the postponement of the development of sensibility until after the emergence of reason. Again this requirement cannot be met, according to Blake's depiction of the formation of consciousness. While the ability to reason might be a later development, it is impossible for the child to remain unaffected by moral precepts in its earliest years. These precepts affect the child through sentiment, even though the response might well be a rebellious one, from which emerge new ideas as the basis of social change. In Night I the relationship between Urizen and Luvah determines the way that Los and Enitharmon react with each other and the world, while the form of Tharmas

indicates the condition of the senses. How the world appears depends upon whether passion predominates in the form of Luvah, or reason in the form of Urizen, which at first confers upon the world a renewed clarity of vision, but which has the eventual effect of creating a moral sensibility. The development of rationality presupposes the influence of feeling, just as feeling arises in response to rationality. The two cannot be separated according to the requirements of Rousseau that sentiment should succeed the emergence of rationality.

According to Night I of *The Four Zoas*, neither is it possible to prevent the errors of the imagination from impinging upon sensation, another requirement of Rousseau. As already intimated, the imagination has most freedom when the reasoning faculty is suppressed, and feeling is predominant, whether of love or hatred. Enitharmon's disparagement of Los, and her cold-hearted suggestions that their parents' love and care for them should be repaid by a return of "scorn on scorn to feed our discontent" (10, 4-5, p.305) corresponds to Luvah's usurpation of the "Horses of Light" (10, 13, p.305). This represents a repudiation of the world as it then appears according to the ideas that have shaped it. The world suggested by the elusiveness and intractability of Enitharmon is one in which imagination is untrammelled by accepted patterns of meaning, but which does not conform either to a new and different vision. At this stage, with passion in control, the world appears in a plethora of images, which have not yet succumbed to organisation. The sensuous richness that the imagination confers is suggested by the evocation of tastes, sights and sounds accompanying the "golden feast" (12, 37, p.307) celebrating the uneasy union of Los and Enitharmon. The musical accompaniment, in the shape of "Elemental Harps & Sphery Song (13, 45, p.308), is provided by the universe itself, while the whole world is transformed into a banqueting chamber, a place of sensual indulgence, as "The Earth spread forth her table wide (12, 36, p. 307). The chaotic imagery that will not conform to a vision is suggested by the conflicts of Los and Enitharmon, who throughout the feast "sat in discontent and scorn" (112, 19, p.308).

The dissensions between Los and Enitharmon, when Los accuses Enitharmon of promising a renewal of vision but failing to deliver it, leading to the loss of Luvah,

culminates in outright warfare between them, which is only tenuously resolved by the intervention of Urizen, who is summoned by Enitharmon to her aid. The imposition of Urizenic morality will increase Enitharmon's power, by transforming images into concepts, with the effect of sealing the world into a shape that now appears to correspond to reality. The marriage feast is an ironic celebration of a union between mind and world that is only achieved with the distortion of feeling, and the suppression of the imagination, for while the "the ten thousand thousand" (12, 22, p.308) Urizenic spirits were engaged in celebrating the victory of Urizen, Luvah and Vala were "standing in the bloody sky" "alone forsaken in fierce jealousy" (13, 4-5, p.308). Blood here denotes the warfare and conflict that is an inevitable consequence of the repression of energy, which reasserts its claims in response. Here this warfare appears to symbolise the dualism that helps to create it. Urizen's ensuing usurpation of power arises in direct response to the chaos, and marks the suppression of Luvah, and his complete control of Los, as "They melt the bones of Vala & the bones of Luvah into wedges / The innumerable sons & daughters of Luvah closd in furnaces" (16, 21-22, p.309). Energy is here repressed, but is sublimated and is used in the creation of Urizen's world, his elaborate and golden "Mundane shell" (31, 15, p.321). The separation from the world, the development of self-consciousness accompanying the imposition of morality, inevitably results in the formation of identity that enshrines one's own perceptions.

One of the most striking consequences of this circumstance, resulting from the division of being described by Rousseau, concerns the fate of the emanations, particularly of Enion and Ahania, who both disappear into the void. This means, in effect, that the aspects associated with feeling, and defined as feminine, play no part in the mind's relationship with the world. Both of these figures exhibit a continually changing implication and structure, which is traced by Kathleen Raine in her discussion concerning the influence of Neoplatonism on the development of Blake's ideas. The connotations of Enion have from the beginning combined confusing allusions to both beauty and monstrosity that become implicit in the coupling of Enion and Tharmas. In this union Enion is described as "a bright wonder that Nature shudder'd at / Half Woman & half Spectre" (6, 9-10, p.162), while the result of the

union is to create a hermaphroditic creature that represents the imprisoning of the spiritual form of Tharmas in matter. Raine's analysis of these varied associations emphasises Enion's affinity with the material world, as she traces Blake's ideas back to *The Divine Pymander of Hermes Trismegitus*. From that source, she says, is derived the idea that spirit is male, and matter female, and furthermore the principle that matter is evil. In her view, "this 'wonder' is the unreasonable image or shape of a spiritual being imaged in matter, an unnatural horror according to a philosophy which sees matter as evil and the fall of spirit into matter as the original cosmic tragedy" (1: 279). From the myths she has studied Raine derives the idea that crystal, or the "reflected image in water" is the "physical body in which the light of the spirit is captured" (1: 278).

Raine suggests that Enion's disappearance into the void, following the birth of Los and Enitharmon, represents the disharmony of spirit and matter, which comes about "through an exaltation of the material principle" (1: 294). In this condition, "spirit is destroyed and matter only remains hidden in a darksome cave" (1: 294). Raine comments that: "Blake is describing the rise of scientific materialism and the desolation of a material world empty of spirit" (1: 294). Enion's lament at the end of Night "is the condition of the material world, subject to decay and destruction" (Raine 1: 297). However, as we have seen in relation to Jung's account of the hero myth, spirit is only able to define itself in relation to matter. The exaltation of the material principle is really a corollary of its debasement. When matter is subject to the ordering principle, it acquires associations of evil as a result of the severing of libido. Its exaltation is the result of elevating the results of the mind's ordering process to a principle, which then dominates all one's perceptions, and thwarts any further creativity that would guarantee the participation of spirit in matter. The debasement of matter proceeds directly from the exaltation of spirit: it is not possible to both criticise materialism, and value the spirit, since each of these positions is dependent on the other: spirituality creates materialism.

The labelling of matter as evil is a direct consequence of the separation of spirit and matter, and is a mark of the need to maintain such separation in order not to lose

one's hard-won identity, and this need is destructive of the spirit. The "Mundane Shell" is built for the specific purpose of excluding an awareness of the inevitable erosion of personal identity that accompanies the changes wrought by the ongoing movement of time. The chief characteristics of the "Mundane Shell" are those of rigidity, and division: Urizen builds "pillared roofs & halls" and "many a division immoveable" to shut out the knowledge of "the eternal wandering stars" with their fateful influence that must be denied (32, 9-12, p.321). It is an entrapment of spirit because of the denial of feeling, which appears to coincide with the emergence of consciousness. Rousseau's view of gender difference, requiring activity in the male, and passivity for the female, would ultimately have the same effect upon feeling as the creation of the "Mundane shell".

It would also marginalize the experience of sympathy and compassion, which for Rousseau is the basis of social cohesion. Enion undergoes several transformations, from a figure that represents fruitful nature, to an embodiment of tyrannical assertion in sexuality, and ends up as a mother, who is banished altogether. These first two stages represent the mind's relationship with the world of the senses, in which the initial harmony gives way to the domination of the material principle, and the institution of duality. The final phase marks the coincidence of the separation from matter, and the child's separation from the mother who, at this point in the narrative, is presented as a self-sacrificial figure, like "matron Clay", or the clod in "The Clod and the Pebble". For this reason Enion becomes the mouthpiece of the suffering poor of eighteenth century society, whose mere existence threatens the proud and rigid world that Urizen has created. She articulates the suffering of those who starve "in wintry season" (36, 1, p.325), "the slave grinding at the mill" (36, 9, p.325), "the captive in chains" and "the poor in prison" (36, 10, p.325). Pity for those who suffer would threaten Urizen's achievements, and so it is perceived as a feminine quality, identified with the masochism that belongs to motherhood.[45]

[45] Julia Kristeva's reflections on maternal masochism, on p.183 of her essay "Stabat Mater, published in *The Kristeva Reader*, edited by Toril Moi, throw light upon this incarnation of Enion. She writes of the maternal "self-sacrifice in becoming anonymous in order to pass on the social norm. In her view: "Feminine perversion is coiled up in the desire for law as desire for reproduction and continuity, it promotes feminine masochism to the rank of structure stabiliser." This turns the mother

Raine's contention, based upon Neoplatonism, that Enion illustrates the evil of materiality does not take into account the change in her condition during the first two nights. At the end of Night II, she expresses the suffering underlying the perception that matter is evil, and yet finally such a notion is responsible for the development in her of the kind of sympathy and compassion that could very well be considered an ultimate good. However, these qualities are renounced by Urizen and play no part in maintaining his own sense of identity. It is therefore not so much the spiritual element that is missing from Urizen's activities, since it played a part in the building of the Mundane Shell; it is the soul, which would enable him to remain in touch with matter through feeling. Insistence on the primacy of the spirit in relation to matter, which appears to underlie Raine's thinking, has a destructive effect upon the soul, and so ultimately upon the possibility of maintaining a spiritual relationship with the world.

How is it then possible to remain in touch with matter, whilst retaining the ability to understand it? Hillman's view that personification is "the soul's answer to egocentricity" suggests the substance of his criticism of Jung's ideas, which supply one solution to this dilemma, but which, as we have seen, ultimately insist on the primacy of the spirit, as neglected areas of consciousness are absorbed into the individual's sense of identity. While Jung insists upon the incorporation of unconscious material into the conscious mind, Hillman criticises such a move as merely substituting one one-sided view for another, owing to the impossibility of the ego simultaneously accepting two opposing views. It sustains itself only through opposition, and would be fatally undermined by ambiguity. Escaping from the trap that is imposed by oppositionalism requires the dissolution of the myth of the unified subject, so that each of the archetypes which inhabit the psyche becomes identified with the nature of the self, in so far as archetypes represent the idea which governs our subjective viewpoints.

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into "the ultimate guarantee of society" in the symbolic contract, which is based "on a sacrificial relationship of separation and articulation of difference that produces communicable meaning".

Hillman insists on the autonomy of these internal persons, attributing each of them with a will that cannot be controlled by the individual that owns them. In mythology, through personification, the archetypes are presented as Gods, which can be seen as projections, embodiments of human attributes born out of typical and recurrent events. They are fundamentally the ideas that constitute the soul. Hillman describes such ideas as perspectives, ways of regarding the objects and events that govern our world. They are "both the shape of events, their constellation in this or that archetypal pattern, and the modes that make possible our ability to see through events into their pattern" (*Revisioning* 121). They correspond to particular styles of consciousness, and undermine the literalistic myth that discovers problems and demands solutions, since a problem results from a particular way of looking at the world. A major implication of this psychology is the fictional nature of all explanations, since they express "practical and relative truths, valid only in relation to the person using them" (Hillman, *Revisioning* 151).

From the earliest of his work, Blake's use of characters with a foundation in Greek or Northern mythology suggests that they are projections of particular states of mind. In *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell* Blake describes how "the ancient poets animated all sensible objects with Gods or Geniuses, calling them by the names and adorning them with the properties of woods, rivers, mountains, lakes cities, nations, and whatever their enlarged & numerous senses could perceive" (11, 1-4, p.38). The implication of this description is that the outer world took on the shape of divine figures, as the imagination strived to personalise objective nature. These lines appear to refer to the process of projection, originally described by Jung, in order to explain how archetypes organise mental contents. They are, in fact, preconceptions that determine how and what we see. Hillman adopts Jung's view of the role of the archetypes, though his psychology requires that they are not absorbed into the Self, but retain their own independent status. The figures in *The Four Zoas*, Blake's "Giant Forms" may be regarded as the equivalent of Jungian archetypes, since each of them constitutes a certain viewpoint, a particular "take" upon the world. Urizen, for example, with his delusions of divinity, upheld by a moral sense that coincides with the development of self-consciousness, when he turned "his eyes outward to

Self" (23, 1, p.313), represents the ego, who appears in myths and legends in the guise of the hero, as we have already discovered. His world is precise and definite, of mathematical proportion, and with a certain inhuman beauty: such perceptions correspond to the Apollonic style of consciousness. Further on in Night VI, when his rigid world becomes a prison to contain the threatening spirit of Orc, he turns into a manifestation of "the devouring father" who is tied to conventional thought, and who is represented in mythology by Zeus or Uranus. The other Zoas, too, suggest their own particular spheres. Luvah, who is destroyed in the process of sublimation when Urizen creates the Mundane Shell, assumes certain features belonging to Dionysus, whose dismemberment in the original myth symbolises the dispersal of energy into matter as it takes on its particular meaning.[46]

The overlapping of many disparate viewpoints in *The Four Zoas* is particularly confirmed by the treatment of the emanations. If these were intended to represent the object world, according to Frye's definition (*Symmetry* 128), they would appear only as passive objects of perception. On the contrary, each emanation generates its own viewpoint, which implies that every perspective corresponds to a subjective ordering of experience, such as is suggested by Hillman's archetypal theory. A new way of regarding the world demands the assumption of a different vantage point. Enion, who is described by Frye as a Demeter figure, represents the effect of the changing seasons upon the human psyche, the alternations in fortune symbolised by the fruitfulness of summer changing into the aridity of the winter season. In Ahania is embodied the human response to such knowledge, an awareness and acceptance of the fragility of prosperity, and of the need to show compassion to the victims of fate: she can be regarded as a goddess of wisdom, such as Sophia. Vala carries many of the associations of Aphrodite, the Greek Goddess of Love, who is, according to Hillman, "too literalistic, too much in love with the sensate surface and visibility of things" (*Revisioning* 185). Her superficiality is suggested by her much vaunted, delusory beauty. Enitharmon combines the constellations of various Greek

[46] In *Dream and the Unconscious*, p.45, Hillman associates Dionysus with the underworld, with the unconscious, though this association highlights the" vitality in all underworld phenomenon," the link between energy and its dissolution.

figures, though perhaps her associations with Artemis are most prominent. Enitharmon's early cold-hearted teasing of Los, and her predatory nature, reminds us of the austerely chaste huntress of Greek legend, who then later takes on the role of mother-goddess, devoting herself to the care of others. After Night VIIa, according to Murphy's essay on the emanation, Enitharmon personifies caritas –love for one's fellow men (108). All the figures demonstrate some of the characteristics of Vala, at some stage of the narrative, Enion in her union with Tharmas, Ahania when her presence demands human sacrifice during the building of the Mundane Shell, and Enitharmon during the first four Nights. However, this latter character also develops an affinity with Ahania, learning "Ahania's function (wisdom) without her passivity" (Murphy 108), and with Enion when she develops maternal sympathy and compassion.

The proliferation of perspective through the merging and overlapping of many centres of consciousness undoubtedly works towards a decentring of the ego, both in the work itself, and in the reader, whose attempts to achieve a cohesive interpretation are constantly challenged by the text. Its continuity is continually subverted so as to disperse the single vision. This challenge to chronology is often ignored in some accounts of the structure of *The Four Zoas*. Frye, for example, delineates the first four Nights of the work as successive stages in the fall of man, though it is by no means clear that the Nights have a chronology such as that described by Frye. In his interpretation Night I is devoted to the fall of Tharmas, which marks the end of the Golden Age, Night II to the fall of Luvah, and the end of the Silver Age, while Night III describes the fall of Urizen, and the end of the Brazen Age (*Symmetry* 278).

This description fails to account for the many discontinuities of the text, which make their appearance at the very beginning of *The Four Zoas*. These so subvert the concept of linear time that Tharmas, who is described as "Parent power" (4, 8, p.301), takes on many characteristics of the infant too. His fear and bewildered panic seem more characteristic of a child's reaction to overwhelming events than those of maturity. The poem has already begun when we read: "Begin with Tharmas

Parent power. darkning in the West" (4, 8, p.301). The line conflates allusions to beginnings and endings, since at the beginning of the poem, Tharmas, the originator, is already in decline. The casual tone of this introductory line also implies that the actual starting-place is immaterial, and dependent on the whim of the narrator, particularly as the events causing Tharmas so much anguish are referred to only in terms of their effects. We know, in the words of Tharmas, that: "The Men have received their death wounds & their Emanations are fled / To me for refuge" (4, 15-16, p.301).

The event itself, however, is only referred to several pages later in Enitharmon's Song of Vala, already discussed, and since it is described from the point of view of one of the participants, it lacks the authority of an authorial voice, especially as so many other versions of the same event intersperse the rest of the narrative. In Enitharmon's version Luvah is responsible for the fall, when he swaps places with Urizen. In another account Los blames Tharmas for the fall when he accuses him of drawing "all the sons of Beulah" into his "Dread vortex" (50, 5, p.333). The catastrophe begins, according to Los, when his sons desert him, though nowhere in the earlier parts of the text is Los endowed with any children, for we see him as a child himself. Los then describes how he gives birth to Enitharmon, following the loss of his children, after noticing in himself the signs of sexual division, though earlier in the narrative, we are told that Enion gave birth to both Los and Enitharmon.

The text completely undermines the simple connection between cause and effect, such as would confer a linear shape to history, and underwrite the identity of the unified subject. Neither does it confirm the cyclical vision that is overtly suggested by the structure of the text. It implies, on the contrary, that the present circumstance is the result of many interrelated events, some of which can only be isolated for an interpretation from one subjective viewpoint. The strange situation of Los having children before the development of his sexuality, and the birth of his counterpart completely disrupts the natural order of events, and suggests that the fall was as much an effect of division as a cause. In other words, an imbalance in the mind's

patterning mechanism precedes the fall into disunity that results from it, and there was never a time when the mind was in perfect balance. Though Albion is a vision of a unified personality, the admission early in the poem that "a Perfect Unity / Cannot exist" (3, 4-5, p.300) sets up a paradoxical situation where circumstances force a movement towards unity that can neither be reached nor sustained.

If the text denies the existence of the unified subject, the equivalent of Jung's balancing mechanism called the Self, it tends to support Hillman's view, based on an interpretation of Jung's own descriptions of anima, that consciousness is based not upon the ego, as Jung maintains, but upon the anima as a fundamental structure of consciousness. Jung refers to the act of becoming conscious as a process in which images are reflected from the world, and his account of anima emphasises its connection with the reflective instinct and the activity of mirroring. He writes: "reflection is a spiritual act that runs counter to the natural process; an act whereby we stop, call something to mind, form a picture, and take up a relation to and come to terms with what we have seen. It should, therefore, be understood as an act of becoming conscious" (CW 11, par. 235). Hillman makes a succinct summary of the implications of this passage. "If 'becoming conscious' has its roots in reflection and if this instinct refers to the anima archetype, then consciousness itself may more appropriately be conceived as based upon anima than upon ego" (*Anima* 89). Hence the anima is essential for conferring the sense of human personality, and for projecting the archetypes which, in the form of an organising idea, give shape to human experience.

As we have seen, *The Four Zoas*, with its proliferation of figures at the centre of a particular field of consciousness, and its destabilising structure, embodies similar assumptions to those held by Hillman, which tends to suggest a different status for the feminine than is generally propounded by critics. The feminine figures do not uphold a particular view of the female as either unduly passive, or as innately vindictive, as might seem the case. Webster suggests that by the time Blake came to write *The Four Zoas*, the division between "good and bad" women depicted in early works becomes more firmly entrenched, with his imagination more strongly

stimulated by the bad ones than the good ("Women and Sexuality" 141). This focus on the female as a destructive female will has earned Blake a reputation for misogyny, and has proved problematical for those critics who cannot reconcile this apparent misogyny with his otherwise liberal and radical instincts. However, the problems presented by his treatment of the feminine tend to diminish if they are each regarded as presenting a particular view of the world, one that readers temporarily adopt when they identify with that position, as they are encouraged to do, but then abandon, as soon as another perspective appears. As Hillman insists, in relation to the adoption of his archetypal theory: "Becoming conscious would mean becoming aware of fantasies and the recognition of them everywhere, and not merely in 'fantasy world' separate from 'reality'" (*Anima* 95). The figures, and not just the female ones, present an individual imaginative construction, and do not present a particular view of the male or the female that must be attacked or defended.

In his work on anima, Hillman gathers together a compendium of the disparate features of this notion, both of structure and function, with many of his comments taking shape according to Jung's own observations on the phenomenon. Since the associations of the feminine in *The Four Zoas* have many features in common with those identified by Hillman in his description of anima, it is possible to conclude that the poem's view of consciousness is of one based upon anima, rather than upon ego, with the implication that the feminine is no longer the rejected other, but an integral part of the psyche. In this formulation, the unconscious is seen as a mediator of psychic contents, in as far as it facilitates the movement of libido from one archetypal constellation to another. The heroic ego fears the unconscious, since it threatens the hard-won sense of identity, but the Dionysian consciousness proposed by Hillman welcomes it as a means of dissolving one fictional construction of reality, in order to assume another. The result is a far more inclusive kind of consciousness, one that transcends that "of the Platonic cave, a consciousness buried in the least aware perspectives" (*Anima* 93). The passivity that is so often viewed as a feminine characteristic is thus a means of remaining in touch with the unconscious, and therefore to be accepted as an integral part of the male psyche.

Hillman's description of anima pertains to its role as a mediator of psychic contents. It both underlies the construction of identity, corresponding to a particular view of the world, and the possibility of adopting a different perspective, according to movements of psychic energy, which dissolve one configuration, but permit a penetration of the unconscious, and the adoption of another. The characteristics identified by Hillman emerge from its patterning mechanism, which unites associated images, and also from its dynamism, which works against rigidity, permitting the expression of many interrelated bodies of meaning. This means that the anima, in addition to its role of generating images, is closely related to the unconscious, in which images dissolve as quickly as they appear. Since the images may be connected through movements of psychic energy, anima is related to feeling, and is responsive to the changes in mood linked with receptivity to emotion. Hillman's descriptions of how the anima may be recognised through the figures that represent her have many parallels with Blake's emanations, and suggest the close connections of these figures with anima-consciousness.

Hillman takes Jung's definition of the anima as "the function of relationship to the unconscious" (CW 9, ii, par. 20), and points out that the unconscious psyche cannot be fully known. The unknown nature of the anima tells us of its links with the unconscious, and so the figure is often symbolised "by smoke, mist or opacity" (Hillman, *Anima* 130). Whiteness conveys her emptiness or innocence, while darkness reveals both the difficulty of understanding her, and the fear that is attached to what cannot be known. These characteristics consistently appear in Blake's emanations. In Night II Ahania, reposing on "a White Couch" is described as Urizen's "Shadowy Feminine Semblance" who "wept in mists over his carved throne" (30, 23-26, p.319). She represents the repressed aspects of Urizen's consciousness, his idealism, and the altruistic motives that he cannot admit. She is both innocent and a representative of aspects of Urizen's psyche that are barely recognisable to the conscious mind. Hillman further describes anima's behaviour as elusive, or enigmatic, a description that corresponds to the nature of Enitharmon as she appears in the early nights. Los is very often left puzzled and bewildered by her behaviour. His urgent questioning of Enitharmon during Night I testifies to a lack of

understanding of his counterpart that persists until she unites with him in creativity in Night VII. He asks: "Why is the light of Enitharmon darken'd in dewy morn / Why is the silence of Enitharmon a terror & her smile a whirlwind / Uttering this darkness in my halls, in the pillars of my Holy-ones" (10, 17-19, p.306). She remains silent and threatening, the embodiment of matter that cannot be penetrated by consciousness, since the preconceptions determining the form nature has assumed remain hidden to the conscious mind.

The movement of "deepening down", associated with caves, deeps and graves, is also characteristic of the anima archetype (Hillman, *Anima* 23). These qualities again make clear the connection of anima with the unconscious, and are to be found in association with some of the emanations, particularly Ahania and Enion, who eventually come to represent aspects of human nature, connected with feeling, which are suppressed in the formation of consciousness. At the end of Night II Enion is driven far "into the deathful infinite" (34, 97, p.324), and her lamenting voice detailing the depredations wrought by unfeeling nature comes to Ahania from "Enion in the Void" (35, 18, p.326). "The Void" embodies the qualities of depth and dissolution that might be associated with the grave. In Night III Urizen's repudiation of Ahania involves a comparison of his counterpart to "A Cavern shagged with horrid shades. dark cool & deadly" (43, 14, p.329). Urizen describes this cavern as providing welcome rest and shelter after his labours, yet his description also makes clear that for him in his present state the unconscious is also a fearsome threat to his hard-won identity. Towards the end of Night VIII the voices of both Enion and Ahania emerge from "the Caverns of the Grave", as the knowledge they represent of the inter-relation of life and death returns to consciousness after remaining hidden for many of the preceding Nights.

The loss and return of Enion and Ahania testifies to the role of anima as a mediator of psychic contents, because of the way that feeling acts to forge connections between images. Mythologically, says Hillman, anima has been represented "by images of natural atmospheres", and we often find her associated with clouds, waves and water (*Anima* 23). These images of mutability also denote the difficulty

of grasping the nature of the unconscious depths into which she leads, except through the intangibility of feeling. In *The Four Zoas* the emanations are often associated with these mood-conveying atmospheres. Urizen tells Ahania that she was once "A sluggish current of dim waters" (43, 13, p.329) within his breast, the embodiment of his own passivity and emotion. In Luvah's account of his changing relationship with Vala, he describes how his counterpart is nourished when he commanded "springs to rise for her in the black desert" and "opend all the floodgates of the heavens to quench her thirst" (26, 12-14, p.317). Water here symbolises the contribution of energy and emotion to the way nature is perceived, subdued to an Earth-worm when energy is repressed in spirituality, magnified into a Dragon form by the release of the emotions, when Luvah "commanded the Great deep to hide her in his hand" (27, 1, p.317). Feeling sweeps away all organised sense-perceptions, when the idea that unites them retreats to the unconscious. The description of anima as receptive to changes in mood establishes the fundamental connection of anima with the psyche itself, and intimates that conscious life emerges from a structure responsible for channelling feeling that permeates all levels of the mind.

Anima then precedes the conscious understanding of our world, an understanding that emerges from unconscious mental activity. For this reason, Hillman defines anima as "the archetypal structure of consciousness" (*Anima* 21). The feminine images, with which it is associated, summon eros, and in this sense can be defined as anima figures, but the notion itself is really best expressed as a structure, in which the psychic images reflected from the world take on meaning. These are "abstracted from Nature and endowed with a separate existence" and anima herself is "that archetype which both performs the abstraction through reflection and personifies the life and soul in reflected form" (Hillman *Anima* 87). In Hillman's memorable summary: "Anima is now nature conscious of itself through reflection" (*Anima* 87). Hillman describes the psychic structure itself as a labyrinth, through which energy moves between images by association, forming a kind of mesh from which a pattern emerges through abstraction. Anima therefore is described as both a vessel, "the means by which all becomes psyche" and as copula and ligament. (Hillman, *Anima*

83). It is a psychic structure, through which the images reflected from the world are combined into a pattern of meaning, according to movements of libido, "which is identical to fantasy images" (*Anima* 111).

Hillman most particularly characterises anima as a projector, the means by which the world is constructed according to unconscious ideas, which may only present themselves in the form of moods. Though anima herself is described as a vessel, it also creates reservoirs of meaning as the mind penetrates the outer world. "Anima," says Hillman, "makes vessels everywhere by going within" for "natural life itself becomes the vessel the moment we recognise its having an interior significance, the moment we see that it too bears and carries psyche" (*Anima* 81). The recognition of meaning is achieved through fantasy, which means that "becoming conscious would now mean becoming aware of fantasies and the recognition of them everywhere, and not merely in a 'fantasy world' separate from 'reality'" (Hillman, *Anima* 95). *The Four Zoas* is permeated by such vessels, from the furnaces in which Luvah was enclosed, encircled by Vala, who "fed in cruel delight, the furnaces with fire" (25, 41, p.317) to the Mundane Shell, which contains the energy repressed within the furnaces, as it is converted into the objective counterpart of Urizenic identity. The ultimate vessel, or container of psychic energy through the creative process that lends significance to matter, is the city of Golgonooza, built by Los to aid in the dispersal of energy, as opposed to Urizen, who forms the Mundane Shell into an inflexible monument to his own preconceptions. All of these vessels are intended to contain the respective emanation of their creator: the Mundane Shell satisfies the demands of the idealistic Ahania, whilst Golgonooza represents the many attempts of Los to capture the elusive Enitharmon

Hillman also identifies the function of anima as one of copula and ligament, the means by which mental contents are woven together into a pattern of meaning. The weaving of veils, which corresponds to this function, is performed by the emanations throughout *The Four Zoas*, though the associations of this activity vary according to context. Enion's weaving leads to the complete dissolution of Tharmas in torment when "he sunk down & flowd among her filmy woof" (5, 14, p. 302).

The weaving distorts and mutilates, dispersing the energies, causing pain, and sorrow. The woof also "began to animate" when it acquires "a will / Of its own perverse & wayward" (5, 5, 20-22, p. 302), and subsequently becomes the Circle of Destiny, which finally seals the separation of Enion and Tharmas. Previously the reader is informed that: "In Eden Females sleep the winter in soft silken veils / Woven by their own hands to hide them in the darksome grave", (5, 1-2, p. 302) while "The Daughters of Beulah follow sleepers in all their Dreams /Creating Spaces lest they fall into Eternal Death" (5, 35, p. 303).

As Steven Vine points out, Enion's weaving "functions as both connection and division, form and fragmentation"(100) while "Beulah's creativity is made up of saving measures against the void of formlessness, the void of 'Eternal Death'" (101). The veil, therefore, both disguises and reveals; Enion's weaving reveals the form of the natural world, but disguises the ideas by which it is determined. The influence of unconscious ideas creates the Circle of Destiny, since fate or history arises in reaction to them. In Eden the veil as disguise is seen as a blessing, when conscious ideas become hidden in the unconscious, preparing the way for renewal. The activity in Beulah reveals unconscious ideas through dreams or creativity, though these are hidden in normal waking existence. The "spaces" created by the Daughters of Beulah conform to an appearance of outer reality, but they are determined by the feeling attached to unconscious ideas, which remain hidden. The structure of anima, or emanation, contributes to creativity by facilitating the emergence of a vision, but also its destruction.

Another feature of the anima archetype, which undermines oppositions, concerns its tendency to combine opposites, in a tapestry of "bipolar complexities –old and young, frail and physical, culture and nature, innocent and vile, intimate and occult" (Hillman, *Anima 27).* The polarising of positive and negative feminine figures, which according to Webster points to Blake's desire to neutralise the baneful influence of the female will, is undercut by the swapping and merging of characteristics, so that negative figures, when the work is taken as a whole, imply positive characteristics, and vice versa. The complex of associations surrounding

each figure aid the movements of psychic energy, and the changing perspectives, which are facilitated by the anima archetype, and which work against a settled view. The separation from matter symbolised by Enion's weaving of the web of life, while Tharmas "sunk down into the sea a pale white corse / in torment" (5, 13-14, p.302), surrounds Enion in malignant associations, but her rejection by Los and Enitharmon, whose birth results from her weaving activities, leads to the development in Enion of compassion and sympathy, in which she is seen in an entirely different light. Ahania's passivity, and her fragility, which provokes Urizen's ill-fated attempts to preserve the ideals she embodies in the building of the Mundane shell, is accompanied by an intuitive insight that enables her to articulate the meaning of events, and eventually, at the end of Night VIII, to give voice to a major theme of the poem, the interrelation of creation and destruction. Vala, too, is a complex figure. She combines frailty and monstrosity, appearing sometimes as a sadistic torturer of Luvah, and at others as a pitiable victim who, as a result of encouraging repression, suffers herself when repressed energy demands the subjection of nature to the civilising urges of Urizen. When Luvah was "quite melted with woe" Vala faded like a shadow cold & pale" (38, 3-5, p.318).

Perhaps the most influential character to combine these negative and positive aspects is Enitharmon, where it appears that her role as a bloodthirsty nature goddess, in the manner of Vala, is necessary for her transformation into a compassionate maternal figure, who mostly closely resembles the final incarnation of Enion. Her cold-hearted teasing of Los, an unattractive feature of the early nights, has the effect of arousing his jealousy, an equally unappealing emotion. Yet it is this jealousy that demands the assertion of Los's will, which culminates in the appearance of the Spectre of Urthona, who at first aids Los in the subjugation of Enitharmon, but whose existence is necessary for her to cooperate fully in the true creativity of Los. The union of the Spectre of Urthona and the Shadow of Enitharmon is described by Bloom as "a marriage of time and space, ruined creator and flawed creation" (Commentary to the Erdman edition of *The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake* 960). Yet the union marks an acceptance of this flawed reality, which results in the birth from Enitharmon of "a wonder horrible" (85, 7, p.

360). The birth, in effect, separates Enitharmon from the figure of Vala with whom she had in some sense been identified since Night I, and it marks the moment when Los comes to understand how far his perceptions have been influenced by surface impressions. When his vision is not distorted by the presence of Vala, who is, like Aphrodite, "too much in love with the sensate surface and visibility of things" (Hillman, *Revisioning* 185), the way Los views the world undergoes a transformation.

The separation of Vala and Enitharmon implies that the superficial view, the current ideology, no longer dominates the creative efforts of Los, for he is able to see how far his perceptions are dominated by repressed desire, a situation that gives rise to Vala, and links her with the effects of the moral code. Once desire is satisfied, and Enitharmon is no longer impelled to provoke him, her full humanity is uncovered. We are told that Vala "burst the Gates of Enitharmon's heart with direful Crash / Nor could they ever be closed again" (85, 16, p. 360). The later union of Los with his spectre marks the acceptance of Los of his own flawed humanity, which was disguised by his efforts to adhere to moral standards. This recognition of moral fallibility culminates in a renewal of Los's creative efforts. We can see from this that the association of Enitharmon with Vala, which aroused the desire of Los, leads to the point when Enitharmon can embody the sympathy and compassion associated with Enion, the feeling that participates in Los's creativity. Both aspects of Enitharmon have their place in the scheme of things.

The creativity undertaken by Los marks the full cooperation of his emanation, suggesting a role for this figure, which closely resembles the one Hillman assigns to the anima. Los declares his intention of fabricating "embodied semblances in which the dead /May live" (98, 9-10, 370). His desire is to re-clothe ideas in the details from which they were abstracted, referring both to the return of the concept to the original image, and then to its context, in a mesh of other images, which confer significance. This suggestion culminates in the creation of the "Center we behold spread abroad" (98, 11, 370), when the focus of an idea opens out to include its

associated detail, and is suggested by Los's creation of the city of Golgonooza "From out the ranks of Urizen's war & from the fiery lake of Orc" (98, 29-30, p. 370). Urizenic ideas are returned to the concrete details from which they were abstracted. In the following Night, we are told that Enitharmon "Wove the Spectres Bodies of Vegetation" (100, 4, 372). She facilitates the connection between images, when the dead descend "thro the Gate of Pity" (99, 23, p. 372). As Hillman points out, quoting Jung, anima is called the function of relationship, not in promoting human relations, which she distorts with moods and illusions, but in forging a connection between "images, ideas, figures, and emotions" (*Anima* 39). Feeling here refers "to that function which brings object and subject into evaluative relatedness" (*Anima* 41), upon which Enitharmon's weaving depends.

Each imaginative construction of reality corresponds, in Hillman's terms, to a fantasy. The almost universal fantasy for which anima is responsible concerns the sense of personal identity, which is "given not by the ego, but to the ego by the anima" (Hillman, *Anima* 101), and is grounded in the anima's habit of personification. This means, in effect, that man is in psyche, rather than the other way around. As anima is the function that brings subject and object into "an evaluative relatedness" (Hillman, *Anima* 41), it makes meanings possible by turning events into experiences: it bestows "the feeling of personal interiority" upon external circumstances. Ahania is the emanation most clearly responsible for conferring this sense upon external events by highlighting their significance. It is she who warns Urizen of his mistake in allowing Luvah to take charge of "the immortal steeds of light" (39, 18, p.326). She realises that his urge to control the intoxicating release of energy accompanying this event led him "To forge the curbs of iron & brass to build the iron mangers" (39, 5, p. 326), which eventually leant more force to repressed energy, and destroyed the harmony of his eternal existence. Ahania represents his intuitive feeling that the "Golden and beautiful world" (39, 10, p. 327) of his creation cannot compare with "those sweet fields of bliss where liberty was justice & eternal science was mercy" (39, 10-11, p. 327). Urizen, however, cannot accept the emotional part of his own nature, represented by Ahania, since her knowledge challenges the existence of his golden world. Ironically, his

repudiation of Ahania results in his own destruction, and that of all his creations, as "The bounds of Destiny were broken" (43, 27, p. 329) and engulfed by the "swelling Sea" (43, 28, p. 329). From this point on, with the loss of Ahania, Urizen finds himself condemned to wander in Ulro, entrapped in a web of his own creation as "The Vortexes began to operate" (73, 21, p. 350). This is the perception of an entirely separate, objective world, that of Newtonian physics, and Urizen has now lost any sense of the personal significance of his experiences.

Since anima is often invisible, hidden in unconscious depths, she can only be seen in relation to some other archetype, and this phenomenon Hillman connects with Jung's syzygy, "which will always perceive events in compensatory pairings" (*Anima* 171). Hillman says that this contradistinction is usually identified with contrasexuality, in the interpenetration of logos and eros. The former penetrates the mesh of interrelated detail given by anima, and discovers its hidden unity, while the latter donates a context to this unity, by exploring its associations. Though the link with contrasexuality tends to link this phenomenon with the problems associated with the opposition of masculine and feminine as explored in earlier chapters, the definition of the syzygy used by Hillman separates logos and eros from their usual associations, identifying them only with mental processes unattached to any particular gender. In addition, tracing the associations suggested by anima through amplification, a strategy suggested by Hillman in regard to dream interpretation, enriches mental contents beyond the sterility of opposition.

The contrasexuality that seems indispensable to anima may underlie the problematical presentation of sexuality in Blake's work. Critics such as Margaret Storch have complained that, despite Blake's recognition of the "debased and exploited position of women" in *Visions of the Daughters of Albion*, "women, as emanations are subservient to men since they have no true existence except in the state of the division of men's psyche" (221). Storch relates this desire to deprive women of an independent autonomous existence to Blake's uneasy relationship with his mother, supporting her argument with the theories of Melanie Klein, which sound very similar to those of Jung, though they lack the mythical dimension. The

division of the female figures into two groups, those who are threatening and evil, and those who are totally benevolent, result from the need of the child to neutralise early feelings of aggression against the mother by fantasising a good and a bad part. Although these feelings of aggression are a normal part of the child's development, they may become extreme if the child experiences rejection from the mother. Such rejection, Storch thinks, may explain why "threatening women are such a powerful and insistent element in Blake's work" (225). She argues that: "It is not sufficient to say that his characterizations of women are simply part of the intellectual system through which he gave shape to his view of history. There is a powerful antagonism behind his depiction of women, a true resentment at man's sensuous ties with women, that arises from the deeper sources of his being" (223).

This resentment, it appears, explains Blake's desire to neutralise women's power by suggesting that true creativity demands the submission of the female to the will of the male. As we have seen, the fall at the beginning of *The Four Zoas* coincides with the development of an autonomous female will, whilst the separation between Urizen and Ahania is brought home to Urizen, when he realises that: "Two wills they had two intellects & not in times of old" (30, 48, p. 320). The problems experienced by Los at the beginning of the work result from the elusiveness of Enitharmon, and his inability to achieve a union with her until Night VII. The development of the female will represents the perception of a separated nature, but it also refers to the repressive effects of morality, which forbids the free expression of sexuality, and which therefore hinders the movement of libidinal energy. The sensuous ties with women, which Storch thinks Blake resents, represent the tendency to be blinded by external appearances. When the surface appearance is taken for a deeper reality, it discourages any desire to envision the world in a new way. As Hillman points out, the perspective one takes determines what is seen. An obsession with sexuality implies an undue emphasis on the sensuous nature of the world. However, this perspective, as delusive as it is, cannot be completely abandoned, for it permits the change of perspective that encourages a different interpretation of external appearances. Connection with the anima as vessel is achieved only through movements of libido, which are kindled by fantasy images,

each connected with a certain sphere of experience. Blake's feminine figures may be regarded as fantasy figures, archetypes thrown up in reaction to common experiences, each embodying an idea that can be detected in the mesh of associated images, which only take on form from another perspective.

The lack of independence of the feminine images is therefore, in part at least, derives from their function, their paired relationship with other archetypes, through which both acquire significance. Union with or separation from their counterpart is part of the significance they acquire. Hillman's explanation gives prominence to the perception that anima can only be seen in conjunction with its attachments. He takes Jung's dictum that: "...there can be no consciousness without the perception of differences" (CW 14, par. 603), and redefines it in relation to anima. Jung's version is intended to assert the necessity of maintaining a distinction between self and world, whilst Hillman's encourages the separation from one's own subjective viewpoint so that it may be understood. This requires an interaction between anima and animus. In Hillman's words: "We cannot take any stand regarding anima without, *horribile dictu*, taking up an animus position. There is no *other* vantage point toward either than the other" *(Anima 171)*. This means that "syzygy consciousness is of and within a tandem; it is an awareness of being in a particular pairing, the dynamics of which are best described by myths" (*Anima 179*). Animus is connected with logos, which makes "words serve critical discrimination" while anima "has been feathering those words and guiding their direction with her fantasies" (*Anima* 171). In other words, anima facilitates the perception of the detail from which the unifying idea has been abstracted, since it both embodies the mechanism underlying the change of focus, as well as the imaginative details with which the abstraction may be clothed.

In *The Four Zoas* the significance of the associative details connected with the emanation appears only when it is regarded from a different perspective. The most obvious change of perspective in this work is based on the contrasexuality of the figures. The Zoas are each equipped with an emanation, which highlights the style of consciousness represented by each masculine figure, but which also can be

reduced to a unity that provides a vantage point from which the Zoa may also be understood. For example, the association of the early form of Enitharmon with a rich, and diverse panoply of sensuous association points to a weakness of conscious differentiation in her counterpart, Los. The emotional instability of Los, as his mood switches from petulant anger, to pity, and a desire for reconciliation, accounts for the conflicting imagery composing his vision. The chaotic form of Tharmas corresponds to the complete disappearance of his emanation, Enion, for there is no unifying force behind her representation, while Enion's disappearance into the unconscious testifies to the reappearance of a plethora of sense impressions, which now dominate, accounting for the childlike confusion of her counterpart. There are, however, other relationships that perform a similar function, such as the association between Ahania and Enion, mentioned above, or of Los and Urizen, or Urizen and Orc. Hillman points out that "every archetype implies another: child-mother, mother-hero, hero-father, father-son, son –wise old man, wise old man – daughter, daughter mother, mother –child and so on" (Anima 169). These pairings, too, reflect the function of anima, each partner being used to highlight the other.

These paired relationships extend beyond those which are obviously in tandem because of their contrasexuality. They lend to the text a complexity and depth corresponding to the mesh of associations that characterises anima. We learn about Urizen mainly in relation to other figures, and the associations of these figures acquire perspective when they are related to the Apollonic style of consciousness, which Urizen represents. This style dictates a particular vision of the world, apparent in the picture that is gained of his counterpart, Ahania, but also in the correspondence between him and other figures. Urizen constellates a world of mathematical proportion, and absolute clarity, which rests upon the obscurity of everything that threatens his vision. The threat comes particularly from the emotions, for their spontaneity resists order and control. Though the emanations each embody a different order of experience, they are all responsive to emotion. Ahania is the emotion inspired by ideals, but she is continually represented as a shadowy figure, not one that he wants to acknowledge, for the failure of his vision to live up to his ideals would lead to its destruction. The Apollonic style of

consciousness also requires a resistance to the beauty of nature, since its reconstruction according to Urizenic ideals inevitably involves its deformation. In Night II we are told that "Vala like a shadow oft appeared to Urizen" (30, 56, p. 320), as though some intimation of natural beauty might have helped inspire the construction of the Mundane Shell, but then immediately afterwards Urizen beheld Vala "mourning among the Brick kilns compelld / To labour night & day among the fires" (31, 57-8, p. 320). The perception of beauty destroyed, in the shape of both the human beings forced to labour in the construction of the Mundane Shell, and in the plunder of natural resources, fails to divert Urizen from his mission. Finally, the Apollonic style of consciousness depends upon the exclusion from the vision of the poor and deprived, since it is against such people that self-definition is made. The starving poor are represented by Enion, "blind & age-bent" weeping "upon the desolate wind" (17, 1, p.310). Urizen's lack of human sympathy separates him from the knowledge of such suffering and deprivation. Each of the worlds represented by the emanations highlights the style of consciousness that Urizen represents.

Hillman also tells us that anima might be recognised because she, "like the butterfly, moves through phases, bearing a process, a history" (*Anima* 25). These phases do not imply a developmental pattern, since each implies the other, as "a series of images, superimposed" (*Anima* 25). As Hillman points out: "Our strongly evolutional approach to events and images makes us always see development first, forgetting that in the realm of the imaginal all processes that belong to a particular image are inherent to it at all times" (*Anima* 25). Though Vala is not compared to a butterfly, Luvah outlines her various forms from "within the Furnaces of Urizen" (26, 4, p.317), and these demonstrate her progress through various phases. We see her first as an earth-worm nurtured by Luvah until she becomes "A scaled Serpent" (26, 9, p.317) and then she turns into "a Dragon winged bright and poisonous" (26, 13, p.317), before she is transformed into "A little weeping Infant a span long" (27, 2, p.317). Webster sees Luvah's speech as part of the attempt to split all the figures in *The Four Zoas* into good and bad images, either tyrant or victim, with no middle ground, showing strong ambivalence about women. According to this critic, we are presented with a double view of Vala, as insatiable monster and as vulnerable

woman" (*Psychology* 214). This is doubtless the effect of Luvah's varying perceptions of Vala, but her tendency to combine opposites fits in with Hillman's description of anima. The ambivalence of her treatment encourages the adoption of different perspectives, not only of her as a female, but also towards the world. When Vala is at her most seductive and powerful, under the influence of sexuality, the mind is least conscious of the ideas that have shaped the view of reality.

Luvah's speech, if Hillman's anti-developmental view is taken into account, also undermines the domination of the natural cycle, which confirms the notion of process, of gradual evolution. The ambivalent presentation of Vala at such an early stage of *The Four Zoas* affects all of her previous and succeeding incarnations. When we see her as insatiable monster, feeding upon the torment of Luvah during his incarceration in the furnaces, walking "in dreams of soft deluding slumber" with the "Darkening Man" (39, 16, p.327), or spreading herself through the tree of mystery "in the power of Orc" (103, 23, p. 375), we also envisage her as a pile of ashes beneath the furnaces, or watch her "mourning among the brick-kilns" (31, 1, p.320). We realise that the images of her, which suggest her symbiotic relationship with Luvah, also imply her subservience, and dependency. These conflicting impressions of Vala coexist, despite their associations with the natural cycle, and they unsettle a unified view. They are part of the poem's strategy to subvert the domination of the unified consciousness.

Though the cyclical structure of *The Four Zoas* is undercut in so many ways, the cycle still re- establishes itself in Night IX, with an outburst of titanic energy, which appears to represent the beginning of a new cycle, with the birth of another Orc. In *Milton*, to be discussed in the next chapter, the cycle undergoes a more thorough subversion, when the emanation is shown to be essential in the mediation of feeling, where the unconsciousness of the archetype, which represents the "unknowable unfathomable depths of the image" (Hillman, *Anima* 139), helps to put feeling into a less personal perspective. Anima mediates unconsciousness. It leads into feeling and out of it, and in the process feeling becomes more impersonal, "a detailed sensitivity to the specific worth of psychic contents and attitudes", which place the "empirical,

personal world into a more significant frame (Hillman, *Anima 45).* As was described in Chapter Two, the cycle is the result of the need to live up to moral ideals, in which energy is repressed, only to force a return when the forces holding the repression in place can no longer be sustained. Feeling results from this repression of energy, but consciousness based upon anima lifts the repressive effects, and makes feeling an instrument of connection, when it uncovers a new perspective, and moves consciousness beyond the scope of the ego.

CHAPTER SIX

THE GARMENT AND CONSTRUCTIONS OF GENDER IN *MILTON*.

The focus of this chapter is upon the development of Blake's ideas on the feminine, in particular on the changes that were intimated in the increasing complexities of *The Four Zoas*, which suggest that the workings of mind need not be determined by gender. The modifications to the emanation also accompany changes in emphasis on the relative roles of reason and feeling in the mind's relation to the world. These developments are discussed in relation to the revisions made in the three editions of Godwin's *Political Justice*, which aim to replace reason with feeling as the foundation of moral virtue. The revisions may be seen as evidence of Godwin's retreat from radicalism, and of his adoption of ideas that mark the transition from Enlightenment to Romantic values. Bearing in mind the inheritance of the ideas of Godwin and Blake from the tradition of radical dissent, it might be argued that similar moves in *Milton* to promote the centrality of feeling also mark the influence of Romantic values. Since these, according to much contemporary criticism, demonstrate a tendency to marginalize the feminine, their adoption lends support to those who see the emanation as evidence of misogyny, and therefore as the problem area at the heart of Blake's work.

In my view, however, Godwin did not completely renounce his former preoccupations. His writings still display Enlightenment influences, equally visible in the works of Blake. Amongst these are concerns about the oppressive effects of the marriage laws, which Wollstonecraft sees as instrumental in women's oppression, in that they lead to their dependence on men, and therefore subjugate them to the entrapment of sensibility. In this chapter I shall argue that in *Milton* there are moves to release women from the repressive effects of sensibility, by redefining feeling as an indispensable element in the psyche of both men and women. If feeling is separated

from ego-consciousness, which is abandoned in *Milton*, along with the view of the female as the other against which definition is made, it promotes identification with other people, and answers Godwin's requirement, following Rousseau, that feeling should not merely serve individual self-interest.

The emphasis on feeling in *Milton* marks a change from earlier productions. Urizen has, until now, featured largely in all of the works so far discussed, suggesting the centrality of reason in the thinking that underlies the Lambeth prophecies, *The Songs of Innocence and Experience*, as well as *The Four Zoas*. Though this figure is usually portrayed as an unwitting villain, he subsists in an indispensable relationship to Los, whose creative activities are only impelled by a hostile reaction to Urizen's achievements. He supplies some of the opposition that Jung considers an essential element in the emergence of consciousness. In *Milton*, however, Urizen occupies a far lowlier place, though his role is to some extent subsumed in the figure of Satan, who provides the resistance needed for the production of mental energy. The chief difference now, however, is that Satan features amongst the sons of Los, along with Rintrah and Palamabron, and represents the division in the human personality that accompanies the repression of feeling.

Los himself is shown to have some responsibility for Satan's activities, for keeping him in his appointed station, and preventing him from assuming too great a repressive influence, but he is not seen as the enemy of Los, a light in which Urizen was very often presented. Rather Satan appears as the element that turns feeling into a repressive instrument of social control when one's sense of self-worth depends upon social approbation. However, now that he is apparently under the control of Los, the imagination is presented as that factor responsible for lifting the repressive effects of feeling, and turning it into a medium of social cohesion. No longer the representative of ideas that can only be influenced through opposition, the Urizenic element in the form of Satan is used merely as the resistance that facilitates a new perspective. In other words, *Milton* explores the development of a new style of consciousness, based upon the emanation, which has features in common with Hillman's description of anima-consciousness, discussed in the previous chapter.

The domination of Urizenic ideas can only be overcome through opposition, but the role of Los in *Milton* is to manage change without resorting to antagonism. It is, therefore, no coincidence that for many critics *Milton* represents an abandonment of the radical idealism of the early works,[47] in which revolution was seen as the prelude to renewal, though not all critics recognise the partial nature of the ensuing liberation, such as was illuminated in previous chapters by the ideas of Jung on enantiodromia. The recognition that opposition merely perpetuates itself would account for developments in Blake's ideas on the nature of consciousness in his later prophecies. Though observations of the changes in Blake's later works have become a critical commonplace, most of his commentators concentrate on the increasing interiority of his notions, without relating them to a loss of faith in the power of opposition to procure a unified society. The need to break down opposition relates to his treatment of the feminine, and implies that the emanation can no longer be regarded as the other who secures a masculine identity.

Christine Gallant's Jungian interpretation draws attention to the developments of Blake's ideas from his early to his later works. In her view, the early works are based upon a linear conception of time, later abandoned, in which the last days usher in a period of permanent order and justice. Revolution is seen as the means of liberation, when the world "controlled by agents of the Antichrist" might be cleansed by an outbreak of apocalyptic violence (Gallant 39). According to this view, when Blake saw that the revolution was not coming, however, he began to accept the possibility "that the apocalypse may be something other than a last cataclysmic event" (Gallant 38). He came to believe in the possibility of a continually recurring mental apocalypse, in which he recognised "that chaos may be a polarity of the cosmos after all" (38). Gallant's insistence on polarity, however, in which polar refers to "ends or extremities of a single whole" (44) would mean that the faith in revolution had not

[47] Marilyn Butler, for example, in *Romantics, Rebels and Reactionaries*, p. 43, characterises *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell*, *The French Revolution*, *Visions of the Daughters of Albion*, *America*, *Europe* and *The first Book of Urizen* as revolutionary works, emanating "at a particular time from a society which believes it is seeing the end of an old world and the coming of a new dawn". Erdman expresses his view, in *Prophet Against Empire*, p. 269, that the increasing obscurity of *The Four Zoas* results from Blake hiding his revolutionary tendencies behind the private symbolism of his myth. These tendencies, for Erdman, are modified in his two final works.

been abandoned, for as chaos is converted into a new order, it would oppose itself to the one it had replaced. In addition, without redefining the original gendered terms in which polar opposites are founded, revolution would always remain on the political agenda.

Gallant is not the only critic to suggest that Blake participated in the general retreat from society following the failure of the revolution to deliver its promise of securing the just society, a retreat that is supposed to have led to the instigation of Romantic ideas and attitudes. Frye, for one, considers that Romanticism reached its apotheosis in a mood of revolutionary disillusionment and despair (*Romanticism* 53), in which socio-political energy was displaced into its spiritual counterpart. Even while admitting that he was simplifying a complex phenomenon, Abrams agrees that "faith in an apocalypse by revelation had been replaced by faith in an apocalypse by revolution, and this now gave way to faith in an apocalypse by imagination or cognition" (334). This would seem to summarise the development of Blake's ideas, except that Blake used revelation to authenticate his faith in renewal through the imagination. However, it is difficult to see how Blake could both renege on his revolutionary ideals, and retain the polarity in his thought structure that demands the suppression of the feminine. The recognition that the failure of revolution is built into the system of thought from which it takes shape demands the replacement of polarity by a more inclusive mental attitude, and a move to envision the feminine as an integral part of the psyche of men and women alike. This development would necessarily accompany a feeling against the suppression of the female in society at large.

A concern for the subordinate position of the female is not always visible in the works of many of the so-called Romantic poets, such as Wordsworth and Coleridge, for the Romantic retreat from society was often accompanied by a neglect of social issues. Some of the ballads of 1798, however, are preoccupied by the way social injustice impinges upon the poor and oppressed. "The Thorn", for example, commemorates the suffering of a woman who apparently murders her child, when her lover abandons her, while "The Female Vagrant" gives voice to the afflictions of a

woman driven from her home at the whim of the aristocratic owner of her land. Later productions of Wordsworth, such as *The Prelude* of 1805, and *The Excursion* of 1814 rather display an emphasis on inner, spiritual concerns, and a neglect of social issues.

Marilyn Butler questions the terminology that sites these two poets wholly within the Romantic movement, suggesting that the ballads of 1798, with their Neoclassical primitivism, their concentration on subjects from the lower social orders, and their adherence to the precept that art should reflect nature "in metres taken from the popular culture" (58) are really a product of the Enlightenment, though Butler finds evidence of an innate conservatism that marked the later more overtly Romantic productions of both Wordsworth and Coleridge. It would appear that the development of a Romantic sensibility discourages the revelation of such issues as women's oppression, for in many Romantic works either feminine nature, or the female herself, are usually subordinated to the larger aim of validating the poet's own inner self. If Blake's later works are subsumed within the Romantic movement, as many critics suggest, it becomes easier to deny the pretensions of female equality made by the poems themselves.

Marlon B. Ross, for example, defines Romantic poeticising as "what some men do in order to reconfirm their capacity to influence the world in ways socio-historically defined as masculine" (1) It is his belief that "one of the romanticism's definitive characteristics is the self-conscious search for poetic identity" (1). As Ross points out, "the self can be established only in relation to other things on which it depends for self-definition"(15). In the case of Romantic poets, the feminine other is subordinated for the purpose of affirming the poet's identity, leading to the repression of the feminine, though "it returns with the full force of desire in many forms" (10). Blake's emanation could in these terms be regarded as the repressed feminine other, against which definition is made, and which then returns to form a union with the self, retaining the masculine as the privileged term.

This may have originally been the case, but as already intimated in the chapter on *The Four Zoas*, I hope to show that the emanation develops in the major prophecies

beyond its conception in earlier works. This view runs counter to much current opinion. Many critics see the lack of independence of the emanation as evidence that Blake shares the Romantic urge to suppress the feminine. Punter, for example, thinks that Blake was secretly threatened by the feminist attack on the traditional male hegemony when women began to provide much of the labour force for early industrialisation. His recognition, in the depiction of many passive female figures, that women are "forced away from the agential" (*Unconscious* 76), and in consequence undergo the repression, which produces a "traumatised female consciousness" (*Unconscious* 76) does not, in Punter's view, lead to a support for female independence, but merely to a "sophisticated incorporation of the 'feminine'" (*Unconscious 86),* as an adjunct to masculine creativity.

Punter argues that "the feminine is incorporated as the negative moment of dialectic, as the moment which represents plurality and perpetual change, reproduction and movement" (*Unconscious* 92). Punter appears to believe that the recognition of the women's oppression does not result in an urge to liberate them, but in a desire to make use of qualities normally associated with the feminine to fortify masculine hegemony. Because of the treatment of the emanation, this may appear to be the case, but there is much evidence to suggest that Blake was consistently moved by Enlightenment ideals, in which social injustices may be redressed, in an effort to procure the perpetual improvement that underwrites perfectibilist notions. In his case, the development in him of a Romantic sensibility does not, in my view, quench his earlier social preoccupations that were part of his Enlightenment inheritance. In *Milton*, the drawbacks of the polarised treatment of the feminine appear to have been recognised, and some compensation found for the apparent subjugation of the emanation to its masculine counterpart.

The Godwin connection, however, might confirm the view that the development of Blake's ideas coincided with the gradual abandonment of radical idealism and the adoption of a more conservative stance that later came to identified with Romanticism. In his introduction to Godwin's novel, *Caleb Williams*, Maurice Hindle writes that the emphasis of the novel on "the bourgeois-liberal Romantic self" "shows

Godwin to be amongst the first of those at the end of the eighteenth century whose focus was shifting from Enlightenment politics and philosophy to Romantic psychology and ideology" (*Williams xxvi*). Kelly, too, considers that "Godwin was one of the most important artists and thinkers of the early Romantic novel - indeed of early Romantic literature, and especially the transition from Enlightenment Sensibility to Romantic culture"(37). However, such a summary simplifies a complex phenomenon, considering that Rousseau's ideas on the self-division that ensues from living in society appear to have inspired the novel's exposure of the false consciousness that disfigures social relations. Though not a typical Enlightenment figure, as we have seen, Rousseau's ideas emerged in relation to that movement, and he preceded Godwin in locating his emphasis upon the individual's inner self, as well as upon the shaping influence of society. Considering the importance of Godwin's inheritance from Rousseau, it is by no means clear that Godwin engaged in a such thorough-going revision of Enlightenment ideals as is often suggested.

Though Godwin's revisions of *Political Justice* show an increasing scepticism about the existence of abstract truth, and about the ability of reason to discover it, his desire remains to explore the conditions that will best secure the just society founded upon anarchistic ideals. Such faith in anarchy implies the questioning of established authority, which according to Day, was a central feature of the Enlightenment (191). In addition, Godwin's radicalism had never included unequivocal sympathy for the revolution. From that point of view he did not renege on his radical notions, as did many other revolutionary idealists. Although he had originally greeted the revolution with optimism, in *Political Justice* he quickly came to repudiate the use of force, noting that:

> Revolutions are a struggle between two parties, each persuaded of the justice of its cause, a struggle not decided by compromise or patient expostulation, but by force only. Such a decision can scarcely be expected to put an end to the mutual animosity and variance (*Justice* 272).

This faith in compromise bears a conservative tinge, confusing the issue of Godwin's supposed decreasing radicalism which, according to Philp, marked Godwin's response to the collapse of the radical circles considered subversive by the Pitt Government. The Acts of November 1795 restricted the right to public meeting and discussion; as a result, support for radical societies fell away. Despite this alleged toning down of his radicalism, Godwin still appears to have been strongly influenced by the Enlightenment, and even a novel, such as *Caleb Williams*, considered a major product of the Romantic period, is imbued with Enlightenment ideals, in so far as it translates into fiction the principle ideas of *Political Justice* concerning the oppressive effects of morality.

Although discriminations between Enlightenment literature and Romanticism are not easily made, Godwin's Enlightenment inheritance is visible in many of his ideas, which underwent a process of change but which were still motivated by the same liberal impulses, the urge to secure the just society. In particular, Godwin's criticisms of the institution of marriage survived the two revisions of *Political Justice*, despite the rather more relaxed attitude towards such matters as was displayed in the third edition. The first edition favours the abolition of marriage, because it is "an affair of property and monopoly completely contrary to reason" (Philp 180). It is a contract made between two immature people, on the dubious assumption that their inclinations will persist over a lifetime. In the third edition Godwin accepts marriage "as long as it can be broken off at any time by either party" (Philp 184). His initial condemnation of the sexual impulse, considered "a very trivial object"(Philp 181) is much moderated in the third edition when he concedes that "there might be sexual attraction" if it is guided by reason and assisted by friendship (Philp 182).

Though his strictures on the subject do not specifically mention the need to liberate women from the oppression of the institution of marriage, his ideas will tend to have such an effect. In this they resemble those of Mary Wollstonecraft, whose arguments about the restrictions imposed upon women by their subjection to the sexual expectations of men, makes such an impact in *Vindication of the Rights of Woman*. The discussion in Chapter Three suggests that the ideas of Wollstonecraft concerning

marriage form the basis of Oothoon's condemnation of the misery inflicted on women by the need to conform to unjust marriage laws. Blake's work too expresses, in some of its aspects at least, the same Enlightenment concerns about marriage and women's destiny as the works of Godwin and Wollstonecraft. Though the concern about these social issues is not overt in *Milton*, it emerges, as I shall argue, in the moves to establish creativity for the female as well as for the male.

Part of this restitution of the feminine involves a new approach to the problem of feeling, envisaged in early works as a passive feminine quality, which promotes male creativity, for this requires the cooperation of feeling as a means of connecting with unconscious material, and discovering a new way of regarding the world. Such revisioning , however, merely changes the focus of the ego, but does not remove its influence upon the feeling function, which still acts to underwrite the ego with the result of maintaining the separation between mind and world, and the feminine as the repressed other. The movements of consciousness described in early works showed a vacillation between one point of view and its opposite, as feeling was used to effect a renewal and then once more repressed as the new view became accepted as orthodoxy. In *The Four Zoas* the cyclical vision implied by this movement between opposites is undermined by the need to continually change perspective in order to trace the connection between episodes that deconstruct a chronological ordering, and the links between cause and effects. The continual shift in viewpoint suggests a development of the movement to base consciousness upon anima, if we use Hillman's terms, instead of upon ego. This makes it possible to separate feeling from ego-consciousness, with which it is usually associated, and make it more responsive to a variety of different points of view. In *Milton* this process is suggested in the overall structure of the work, as well as in the motifs representing particular mental configurations.

The changes in *Milton* are to some extent highlighted by the alterations made by Godwin to the second and third editions of *Political Justice*, when rationality was abandoned as a means of securing moral truth, as he came to recognise that feeling has an undeniable influence on human behaviour. When Godwin published his two

revised editions of *Political Justice* in 1796 and 1798, his view of both truth and morality had been modified, and the disparities with Blake over the effects of rationality had diminished, particularly in the 1798 version. Godwin's ideas in these later editions are influenced by the British moralists, particularly Hume, and by the literature of sensibility. Godwin no longer insists that virtuous actions are founded upon reason, and he now doubts the value of truth as a reliable guide to good conduct: the infallibility of general principles is no longer a core belief.

The main idea that Godwin takes from Hume concerns his opinion that neither reason nor belief underlies our moral judgment. This, insists the latter, arises from our own subjective feelings. An action of which we approve is one which excites a sentiment of pleasure. If particular conduct leads to harmful consequences then our approving sentiments cease. In Hume's words:

> Extinguish all the warm feelings and prepossessions in favour of virtue, and all disgust or aversion to vice: render men totally indifferent towards these distinctions; and morality is no longer a practical study, nor has any tendency to regulate our lives and actions (172).

However, Hume does not appear to inquire too closely into the origin of pleasurable sentiments. He comments that our feeling for what is virtuous "depends upon some internal sense or feeling which nature has made universal in the whole species" (173). Hume here fails to recognise that pleasurable sentiments emerge according to assumptions concerning right conduct, which once again derive from the interests of those with power. It is evident that though moral principles impress themselves upon us through sentiment, the feelings themselves are attached to a principle, of which we may be unconscious, but by which we are nevertheless influenced. The principle itself constitutes a dominating idea, from which many of our attitudes follow. However, Godwin, according to Philp, now denies the power of reason to influence our conduct, and instead adopts Hume's utilitarian argument that virtues which are useful to society excite a sentiment of pleasure. This in itself motivates people to act unselfishly out of a desire to experience pleasure and to avoid pain.

Godwin nevertheless recognises that altruistic behaviour may not necessarily ensue for, when we consult the good of other people, our major concern might be to increase our pleasure in the contemplation of our own virtuous actions.[48] In *Political Justice* Godwin cites the example of the child who only wants to assuage the suffering of others to rid himself of the unease and discomfort that the observation of such unhappiness arouses in himself, to which "he speedily adds the idea of esteem and gratitude, which are purchased by his beneficence" (*Justice* 379). This goes to show, Godwin concludes, that "the good of our neighbour, like possession of money, is originally pursued for the sake of advantage to ourselves" (*Justice* 380). This reminds us of Rousseau's view that in the state of nature "amour de soi" is moderated by "pitié", so that what man would desire for himself, he also desires for other people. Only in society are these perverted into the one-sided qualities of "amour-propre and altruism" (Rousseau, *Inequality* 75), in which any virtuous action is performed only out of motives of self-interest.

Philp tells us that in the 1796 version of *Political Justice* Godwin recognised "that our own selfish pleasures have no intrinsic recommendation over the pleasures of others" (*Justice* 149). Though Godwin is apparently moving away from the rationalist position in this edition, he still finds some role for reason in the pursuit of moral action. Godwin's belief, evidently, is that the imagination helps to engage the passions in that it enables us to form a more realistic impression of our own self-worth, by going "out of ourselves" and becoming "impartial spectators of the system of which we are a part" (*Justice* 381). We realise that everyone's needs are at least as important as our own, which perhaps might motivate us to work towards the advantage of other people. However, according to Philp, if imagination fails, then Godwin believed it should be possible to gain pleasure by adopting rational precepts. In any case, true virtue requires disinterested motives.

In the third edition of *Political Justice* Philp argues that there is a greater movement away from reason, though it still has a role in deciding which goals we should pursue

[48] Godwin's views on the morality of sympathy follows Rousseau's perception, discussed in Chapter Five, p. 162, that compassion for others may not be a virtue, if it reinforces a sense of moral superiority.

but feeling has become all important. Godwin now believes that "our preferences are rooted in our desires" (Philp 203) and with the recognition of this principle, we can see that Godwin's ideas have now begun to resemble much more closely those of Blake, who in his early work insisted upon the sanctity of individual desire. However, Philp points out that Godwin draws a distinction between feeling when it involves sympathy, and the more selfish manifestation of pleasure involved in sensation, sensuality and the appetites. Godwin now believes that: "Virtue is nothing but kind and sympathetic feelings reduced into principle" (*Justice* 509), a modification of the view that moral principles can be derived solely from rationality. Unlike Godwin, who insists that only sympathetic feeling is virtuous, Blake demonstrates in, for example, "The Chimney Sweeper", that sometimes indignation is the only response with the potential to eradicate injustice, though such feeling also has the tendency to reinforce self-righteousness, as becomes clear in *Milton*. Godwin's view of moral behaviour insists that feeling should be disinterested, though in relating it to a principle, which would presumably be regarded as a permanent truth, and in linking it with kindness and sympathy, he retains its repressive effect. Feeling would still have the effect of validating the moral position of the individual, whose sense of self would depend upon adhering to a sacrosanct principle.

Turning to *Milton*, which shows similar preoccupations with the nature of morality as were discussed in *Political Justice*, we find that the self-righteousness of both wrath and pity is the topic of the Bard's song, which provides the opening for this penultimate work. This situation is presented as one that later events must redress. In this song, the ironic opposition of devils and angels of *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell* is subsumed by the presence of Palamabron, so that we now have "three classes of men" (4, 4, p.97). Rintrah is described as the reprobate, Satan as the elect and Palamabron as the redeemed: together these figures form "the Two Contraries and the Reasoning Negative" (5, 14, p.98). The reasoning negative cannot be redeemed as can the two contraries, but is continually created, either by "the cruelties of Moral law" (5, 12, p.98), the repression of energy that accompanies morality, or by the labours of Los, in his efforts to create form and vision. Satan, the reasoning negative, thus embodies the abstractions of rationality, which can only be translated into concrete

form in creativity. Energy in the form of Rintrah, however, may be transformed into feeling, under the influence of Satan, whilst sentiment can be converted into energy, if the repressive hold of Satan is released through creativity.

The Satanic rift within the personality denotes the domination of the ego which, as we have seen in the hero myth, is sustained by a self-righteous sense of virtue. The relation of Rintrah and Palamabron would still correspond to the movement between opposites that is characteristic of the process of enantiodromia, achieving in Hillman's words, "a new literal opposition just as one-sided as the former" (*Dream* 79). The ego would adopt a different stance, but the need for it to retain a sense of otherness as the guarantee of its autonomy would remain. The female would still be an embodiment of an essential difference, underwriting the identity of the male. An abandonment of the ego, and the moral high ground that sustains it, is required to remove the separation that constructs the notion of otherness. The story of Satan's usurpation of the role of Palamabron illustrates that kindness and sympathy are not necessarily virtuous, if the individual is only restraining his real feelings in order to congratulate himself on the morality of his behaviour, as Godwin points out in *Political Justice*. However, an expression of anger may equally be a selfish reaction to the demands of others, as the story in *Milton* illustrates.

When Satan "soft intreated Los to give him Palamabron's station" (7, 6, p.100), the references are, according to most commentaries, to the disagreements between Blake and Hayley, his patron, on the kind of work he would be expected to do.[49] Hayley had Blake painting miniatures, ignoring his aspirations to undertake tasks that would better suit his genius. At first Blake meekly acquiesced, out of gratitude, until he began to suspect that Hayley was not completely altruistic, but was motivated by "admiration join'd with envy / Cupidity unconquerable!"(12, 7. p.105), a jealous refusal to acknowledge the greater talents of his protégé. The unsuitability of the work Hayley had marked out for Blake is suggested by the resultant confusion in "The Mills of Satan" (8, 5, p.104) as redundant creative energies disrupt the

[49] A fuller account of the relationship between Blake and Hayley, as far as it relates to *Milton*, is to found in Frye's *Fearful Symmetry*, pp. 321-325

conventional tasks that Palamabron undertakes. Frustration over thwarted creative energies eventually culminates in Rintrah's expression of indignation "for Satans soft dissimulation of friendship!" (8, 35, p.102), and the calling down of a "Great solemn assembly" (8, 46, p.102), in order to attribute blame for the subsequent disorder. Ironically, the judgement falls on Rintrah, and the false accusation leads him to express his rage in self-justification, which Satan then answers in like form, revealing his hidden self-regard, and the jealousy underlying his apparent helpfulness.

This situation is highlighted by Godwin's exploration of the repressive nature of moral instincts in *Caleb Williams*, which shows how such repression can serve a larger ideological purpose. The novel sets the aristocratic figure of Falkland against the narrator, Caleb Williams, his servant and protégé, but then shows the behaviour of both of them to be influenced by selfish motives. Falkland is determined at all costs to preserve his reputation for honourable behaviour, while Caleb satisfies his hidden jealousy of his aristocratic master by his attempts to uncover a crime that will destroy his public reputation. His quest for knowledge proceeds from an apparently commendable desire to search out the truth, but since it will convert his own supposed inferiority into power, it is therefore no more altruistic than the outwardly noble behaviour of Falkland, described in Volume One of the novel.

According to Kelly, "Godwin's Falkland represents the chivalric traditions of the gentry, their broad, not to say cosmopolitan literary culture, and liberal Whig political values – in other words, gentry culture at its best, as celebrated in the anti-Revolutionary and anti-Enlightenment writings of the decade's outstanding defender of the gentry, Edmund Burke"(33). Falkland's actions are the outcome of the values that formed him. His notions of virtue require him to live up to them at all costs, but Caleb's urge to expose their hollowness shows the covert selfishness of the revolutionary urge to unseat those with power. Sentiment is opposed to energy, in a rehearsal of the relationship of Rintrah and Palamabron, but neither Falkland nor Caleb can detach themselves from the prevalent ideology. *Caleb Williams* exposes the fraudulent claim of revolution to effect social liberation, and highlights a similar perception in the interactions of Rintrah and Palamabron.

The opening up of the Satanic rift within the personality, when feeling is linked to self-interest, however, is addressed from a different perspective in *Milton* from that of earlier works, where it results from the ordering activities of Urizen. Following the unmasking of Satan, Leutha, his emanation, described as a Daughter of Beulah, offers herself as "a Ransom for Satan taking on her his sin" (11, 30, p.105), though eventually the failure of creativity is ascribed to the interactions of Satan and Leutha, who together become "the Spectre of Luvah the murderer / Of Albion" (13, 8, p.106). The effect of this amendment is to remove sole blame from the female for Satanic repression, and to show instead that the situation described by Leutha is the outcome of a particular interaction of masculine and feminine mental forces. It is an indication that the gender divisions, which have proved so deterministic, result in a psychic configuration that is not specifically linked to either gender, but is the result of their entanglement. It is perhaps the first sign in this work that masculine and feminine mental forces, though still imbued with their traditional associations, are both involved in the workings of mind.

The incident describing the involvement of Leutha and the Spectre of Luvah, however, illustrates the faulty interaction of these forces, for the unconscious appears when Leutha takes on the role of Elynittria, inspiring a conventional vision which does not require the harnessing of psychic energy, but which leaves it to accumulate within the unconscious. "Thick flames" and "concave fires" of "a hell of our own making" (12, 22-23, p.106) issue from the harrow "to devour Albion and Jerusalem the Emanation of Albion" (12, 27, p.106). The unconscious, a reservoir of forbidden desires, means that Leutha is associated with sin, and in order to remove the source of temptation, Satan "in selfish holiness demanding purity" (12, 46, p.106) expels Leutha from his "inmost brain" (12, 48, p. 106). It is the expulsion of the feminine that seals the division between masculine and feminine principles, a division that hinders the interaction of passive and active mental forces, in both male and female, and which makes the unconscious inaccessible to the conscious mind.

According to Hillman's contentions, consciousness in its wider sense requires the interpenetration of eros and logos in the syzygy, a continual movement of mental

energy between images, organised according to the pattern into which they fall, from any individual perspective.[50] The interaction is hindered if the female is associated with feeling, and then receives the projections of the male, so that sentiment in him is then limited to sensuality. For Jung, the division between the male and female psyche follows such a pattern. He writes:

> I use Eros and Logos merely as conceptual aids to describe the fact that women's consciousness is characterised more by the connective quality of Eros than by the discrimination and cognition associated with Logos. In men, Eros, the function of relationship, is usually less developed than Logos. In women, on the other hand, Eros is an expression of their true nature, while their Logos is often only a regrettable accident" (CW 9 ii, par. 29).

Feeling then becomes attached to femininity. It can only be experienced in the male as an adjunct of sensuality.

Hillman, however, denies that eros is specifically associated with the anima figures, pointing out that "anima is moist, vegetative, receptive, indirect, ambiguous; its consciousness is reflective and in flux" (*Anima* 19). Eros, however, is "fiery, phallic, spirited, directed, sporadic and unattached, vertical as an arrow, torch, or ladder" (Hillman, *Anima 19).* Though Hillman does not point this out, since he is moving beyond conventional gender definitions, eros has, according to its traditional associations, more to do with the masculine than the feminine, and this obviously, even in his own terms, throws Jung's characterisations of the differences of male and female consciousness into doubt. Hillman defines the anima images as "the means by which eros can see itself"(*Anima* 21), but he insists that they are not the eros. The structural element of anima is not the eros either, but the means of its transmission. It therefore makes no sense to identity women with eros, and men with logos, since both aspects are required for the functioning of psyche. The former provides the fantasies

[50] Hillman's interpretation of Jung's notion of the syzygy was previously described in Chapter Five. p. 187.

that clothe the ideas inhabiting the psyche, while the latter provides the critical discrimination that lends them unity and direction.

Hillman's perceptions contradict Jung's insistence that there is no anima in women. Jung maintains that women are compensated by a masculine element, which donates a masculine imprint to their unconscious. He says in explanation: "I have called the projection-making factor in women the animus, which means mind or spirit. The animus corresponds to the paternal logos just as the anima corresponds to the maternal Eros" (CW 9 ii, par. 29). However, Hillman challenges Jung's view that woman's psychological development means animus development. To deprive women of an anima in this way is, for him, "an erosion of the categories of mind and spirit" (*Anima* 59). Anima deprivation would rob them of the means of fantasy, and of the possibility of widening their moods and their involvement with life. As Hillman explain: "The discrimination of spirit is not at all of the same order as the cultivation of soul. If the first is active mind in its broadest sense, the second is the realm of the imaginal, equally embracing, but very different" (*Anima* 59).

In Hillman's view, the error arises because women are identified with soul. If they *are* soul, then they cannot simultaneously possess one. On the surface, this appears to be the problem with Blake's emanation. It is difficult for the emanation to be a soul image for men, a female subject, and a woman's soul, though the many associations of anima, as expounded by Hillman, have the effect of extending the associations of the soul-image beyond the limitations of gender, which have profound implications for the status of the emanation in Blake's later work. Hillman notes that: "Jung himself raises a doubt whether we can truly speak of the anima *per se* as feminine. He suggests that we may have to confine the archetype's femininity to its projected form" (*Anima* 65). Jung also makes the intriguing suggestion "that the androgyny of the anima may appear in the anima herself" (Cf. 8 June 1959, Letter to Traugott Egloff). This appears to be the case with the adaptations made to the emanation in *Milton*.

The recognition that the psyche works through an amalgam of forces, originally termed either masculine or feminine, a configuration associated with the limitations of gender, but which in reality is quite impersonal, is strongly suggested in the troping of psychic activity in *Milton*. This falls into two categories: one is a creative activity that is self-limiting, since it appears to correspond to an external reality, which is henceforth resistant to the workings of the imagination; the other reveals in itself the contingency of its creations. The image of the hermaphrodite recurs throughout the poem, figuring the interaction of gendered forces in the faulty consciousness that relies upon the perception of objectivity in nature. Its opposite appears in the relationship of Milton and Ololon, which encourages a creative transparency, a recognition that all observations proceed from a particular perspective.

The hermaphrodite in *Milton* assumes two forms: the female/male is associated with Rahab, and is described as religion-hid-in war, whilst the male/female takes on the form of Tirzah, and is characterised by Bloom in his notes to Erdman's edition of Blake's works as "sadism-hid-in-natural possessiveness" (917). These metaphors work by assigning blame for social problems to a faulty interaction of mental forces, brought about by culturally imposed definitions of gender, thus removing the individual of either sex from imputations of guilt. They suggest that the energy underlying feeling has been distorted through morality, separating the active/passive drive pattern within the individual, which corresponds to Hillman's description of Dionysian consciousness.

This mode of apprehension rests on the assumption that "the libido is double in nature with a passive constituent as well as an active one" (*Myth* 280). The release of the will in passivity aids the dispersal of psychic energy, the dissolution of one perspective, and the creation of another one as the will is once more reactivated. However, religion-hid-in-war, with the male hiding the female, suggests that visible violence results from a repressive sexual morality, whilst sadism-hid-in possessiveness, with the female hiding the male, suggests that the selfish desire to possess hides the lust for domination and power. In both configurations, the need to

adhere to moral precepts represses energy, and distorts the natural movements of libido.

Considering the masculine and feminine in *Milton* to be identical with sexual difference is clearly a mistake, and one liable to be made if images are interpreted literally, instead of metaphorically. Hillman refers to the "obtuse sort of literalism" which affects the notion of the hermaphrodite "as if it were simply a matter of joining the characteristics of two genders in one person" (*Anima* 125). The hermaphrodite is an ambiguous alchemical symbol expounded particularly in the works of Jung[51]. It either refers to the complete union of opposites, described as the syzygy, which is the alchemical goal, or to the prima materia, the tail-eating Uroboros "an hermaphrodite possessing a masculine-spiritual and feminine corporeal aspect" (CW 12. par. 447). The two versions appear in Blake: the former would be the equivalent of the union of Jesus / Milton and Ololon at the end of Book Two, while the latter appears as the equivalent of the Covering Cherub. Both are a representation of the interaction of mental forces, though only the syzygy version has positive associations. Hillman is clear about the implications of this symbol:

> Anima integration in the model of the hermaphrodite does not mean acquiring the characteristics of the other gender: rather it means a double consciousness, mercurial, true and untrue, action and inaction, sight and blindness, living the impossible oxymoron, more like an animal conscious of its actions and utterly unconscious of them ...to moralise it into a bi-sexual goal for behaviour is a move as mistaken as considering the phallus to be the biological penis" (*Anima* 125)

This tendency to associate sexual differentiation in *Milton* with the gendered terms used to suggest particular mental states makes for great difficulty in interpretation. If the emanation is the equivalent of the anima, according to Hillman's account of its role, its representation by a number of feminine images does not point to the

[51] There are many references to the hermaphrodite in Jung's *Psychology and Alchemy* (CW 12). In par. 345 Jung describes a "material earth-spirit, an hermaphrodite possessing a masculine-spiritual and feminine corporeal aspect". This configuration has negative association in *Milton* if the two principles resist each other, rather than embodying a state of mutual interpenetration.

femininity of the thing in itself, but merely to its projected form. As we have seen, anima conforms more to the notion of mental structure, present in both sexes, and not associated with any particular gender. Yet it is difficult to separate the emanation in *Milton* from the feminine form in which she appears, and from the feminine associations with which she is clothed.

Betsy Bolton refers to this difficulty in her article on the problems of gender in *Milton*. In Bolton's words, "the prophecy suggests that to confuse humanity with the sexually differentiated state in which we find ourselves is to lose an entire dimension of perception" (61). Yet she also considers that: "The poem offers a confused and confusing definition of 'The Sexual', one which moves uneasily among biological sexes, gender roles and erotic attraction" (61), since "assumptions about gender or sexuality remain invisible, part of the poem's mechanics, its material base" (62). In particular, she questions "Ololon's willingness to accept a subordinate role in relation to Milton, 'her' willingness to take on the eccentric and external role of the garment" (77). Though both Milton and Ololon accept annihilation, Bolton thinks they experience it "in strikingly asymmetrical terms" (79). Whilst Milton's self-annihilation involves "the peaceful and creative" humanising of Urizen, Ololon is required to lose her virginity, which "seems at best an experience of violence, a loss of autonomy and agency" (79).

For Bolton, the image of the garment undermines the claim of the poem to adumbrate the category of the human, which she thinks fails to transcend the troublesome gender divisions haunting the work. Instead of celebrating a marriage of the contraries, in the union of male and female, Milton and Ololon "come together only as Jesus and the garment of God" (81). The female herself seems to disappear, and "to limit women's role in revelation to the first stages of transformation: subordination and self-annihilation" (82). She remains only as "a degraded or invisible term" (83). Of the two contrasting garments, one provided by the shadowy female, and the other by Ololon, the first with negative, the second with positive associations, Bolton fails to discover any substantial difference between them. In her estimation Ololon's garment dipped in blood "is uncannily close to the garments of the Shadowy female: both

fabrics bear writing, both are named as garments of war" (93). If the garments of the shadowy female result in the human form becoming Satan, the Covering Cherub, the transformation of this female into Ololon appears to make little difference to the eventual outcome, as both become associated with war. Bolton considers that: "Blake's 'one man', his rejection of sexual duality depends upon an ever-present, ever-vanishing and devalued female term" (87). She thinks, moreover, that the device he uses to remove the blame for the conflicts he depicts, that of the hermaphrodite, seems to stigmatise women as much as the hermaphrodite, whilst men are the privileged term.

The treatment of the feminine in *Milton*, indeed in all of Blake's works, is undoubtedly clouded by ambiguity, because of the many disparate layers it is designed to suggest. The difficulty lies in deciding which particular aspect of the feminine is intended at any one time, or possibly which combination of roles each feminine figure is supposed simultaneously to fulfil. Critics, such as Punter, Storch and Bolton, argue that the very ambiguity of the emanation points to deep-seated gender problems within Blake himself, which he was incapable of resolving. It appears to me more likely, however, that the ambiguity lies in the tension generated by Blake's desire to criticise the role mapped out for women in eighteenth century society, even while valuing some of the emotional effects of confining her to a passive role, and desiring to claim some of the virtues of such feeling for the male.

His works tend to support Mary Wollstonecraft's views in *Vindication of the Rights of Woman* of the unfortunate effects of the suppression of women, in which enforced passivity is turned into an instrument for the acquisition of power. At the same time they valorise the sentiment that results from the repression of the female, and attempt to recover feeling as part of the psyche of the male, whilst exploring ways to ameliorate its repressive effects in both sexes. He both values and deplores the effects of patriarchy upon the psyche of women, even while criticising the way it distorts feeling in men, and at the same time condemning the power relations responsible for producing both positive and negative effects. It is a complicated position, and its

representation leads to the confusion inherent in the emanation, even while lamenting the conditions that give rise to it.

The representation of gender in *Milton* in some aspects tends to confirm traditional stereotypes, with the feminine displaying all the weakness and passivity of the females so roundly condemned by Wollstonecraft, while energy is reserved for the males.[52] In Blake's description of Beulah, "all the weak & weary / Like Women & children were taken away as on wings of dovelike softness, & shadowy habitations prepared for then / But every Man returnd and went still going forward thro' / the Bosom of the Father in Eternity on Eternity" (31, 1-6, p.130). However, we have to ask ourselves whether "man and woman" refer to the sexes, or whether they are metaphors for particular kinds of mental activity. In this context, the term "man" appears to refer to the movements of libido, which accompany the ordering process, whilst 'women' are the results of this process, the sentimental hold of any particular ordering, which must be dispersed in order to permit renewal. The terms "man" and "woman" are used in this context because of their particular associations, according to the prevailing culture, not because the male sex only is capable of energetic activity, nor the female of passive acceptance.

To underline the provisional nature of the terms, the weak and weary are "like Women & Children" (31,35, p.130). Again the traditional view of the female is suggested here, though it denies that women themselves take their rest in Beulah, but merely the passive, or the feminine portions, of complete humanities. The unified nature of consciousness, consisting of both active and passive elements, is confirmed when Milton gives up his selfhood, and encounters "those three females whom his Wives, & those three whom his Daughters / Had represented and contained" (17, 1-2, p. 110). He knew at once that "they and Himself was Human" (16, 7, p.110), though their appearance in the form of "the rocks of Horeb" (17, 12, p. 110) prevent them from uniting with Milton in order to assume a human form. The wives and daughters remain separate because of Milton's own apprehension of the female as an opposite,

[52] An account of Mary Wollstonecraft's condemnation of the effects of sensibility on women is to be found in Chapter Three, pp. 80-84.

rather than as a contrary. The implication is that the mere attempt to revision the female as a contrary will confirm Milton's humanity. The main requirement is for him to recognise the feminine as both the passive element of a complete humanity, and the female as the combination of active and passive elements composing the human form itself, despite the feminine appearance, which appears to confirm the female as a negation. Passivity is only destructive if it is rejected as a female characteristic, and not accepted as essential to the movements of libido.

In relation to these difficult gendered terms, Bolton finds problems in the association of the emanations with garments, which she thinks subordinates their role to the creative one assigned to men. This again is to confuse individuals with the gendered terms used to suggest the mental patterning underlying different states of mind. Weaving suggests the activity of anima, as it unites separate perceptions into a significant pattern, but anima is, according to Hillman present in both men and women. The garment is a covering that either reveals or disguises unconscious ideas, and though it is associated with the feminine, in itself it suggests the neutrality of psychic activity. Since a garment can be removed, it indicates the provisional nature of the ideas governing our understanding of experience, and the feeling which holds them in place. However, the temporary and subjective nature of the ordering of experience is only visible when the covering becomes transparent, and unconscious ideas revealed. The double nature of the garment as either revealing or disguising plays an indispensable role in the creative process.

The construction of gender is presented as having only a provisional status. The Bard's song tells us that: "Three Classes are Created by the Hammer of Los, & Woven / By Enitharmon's Looms when Albion was slain upon his Mountains. And in his Tent, thro envy of Living Form, even of the Divine Vision" (2-3, 26- 2, p. 96). Though this involves the co-operation of both Los and Enitharmon, the suggestion is that the creation of the three classes is inferior to the "living form" it aspires to replace, especially when the text emphasises shortly afterwards that "the Three Classes of Men take their Sexual texture Woven" "Where the Starry Mills of Satan / Are built beneath the Earth & Waters of the Mundane Shell" (4, 2-3, p. 97).

Enitharmon's weaving inadvertently does Satan's work, and creates a delusion, which makes an indelible mark on future constructions of reality. The creation of gender is regarded as an inferior activity since "The Sexual is Threefold: the Human is Fourfold" (4, 5, p. 97). The sexual tends to impose a viewpoint that does not easily reveal its own deceptions, whereas the human, a category beyond gender, disperses the orthodox view. Gender can be removed like a garment, but sexuality disguises the artificiality of gendered notions. Enitharmon's weaving can culminate in delusion, for the Satanic element lends the illusion of permanence to a provisional situation.

The weaving of Enitharmon demonstrates the effects of sentiment, when feeling establishes the domination of unconscious ideas. Her creation of spaces is regarded as an act of mercy, since it unifies an otherwise endless flux, which would sweep away any sense of human identity. The destructive arguments between the three classes of men are followed by the saving creation of "a Space for Satan & Michael & the poor infected " (8, 43, p. 103). This space, however, only succeeds in freezing creativity, since it acts as an enclosure from which there is no means of escape: "The nature of a Female Space is this: it shrinks the Organs / of Life till they become Finite & Itself seems Infinite" (10. 6-7, p.104). The space has the effect of "closing Los from Eternity in Albion's Cliff's" (10. 9, p. 104). It prevents him from engaging in any further creativity.

The space seems Infinite because it is self-sustaining, having lost the preconceptions that helped shape it. These are preserved in sentiment, but they cannot be retrieved because of the repressive effect of morality. The space itself becomes associated with Canaan, and with "An aged Woman raving along the Streets" 10, 4, p. 104). Canaan denotes a nation completely under the domination of morality, while Enitharmon in the shape of "An Aged Woman" represents the complete inaccessibility of the unconscious, and therefore its invisible domination. Satan, therefore, is the factor leading to the separation of the conscious and unconscious mind, and thus preventing the interpenetration of eros and logos.

History is presented in *Milton* as a series of such spaces, each one replaced, and negated, by the one that succeeds it. This rhythm of creation and destruction is the outcome of the conflict between the shaping ideas of each "Eye of God", as each of the guards sent to watch over each space, in some sense proves inadequate. They each try but fail to preserve the integrity of each space, but the effort rebounds upon itself, and in the end collapses. Lucifer "forsook his charge", The "Elohim fainted" with the effort, and Shadai's anger proved destructive (13, 17-23, p. 107). The aim is to preserve the form of history contributed by each of the spaces, held in place by the feeling attached to unconscious ideas, in order to prevent its dissolution into the unconscious, but the effort to preserve created form means that each space arises in reaction to the one that precedes it, and there is no means of escaping the influence of the shaping idea. The nature of this idea is suggested by the appearance of the final space, when "the Body of Death was perfected in hypocritic holiness / Around the Lamb, a Female tabernacle woven in Cathedron's looms / He died as a Reprobate. He was Punished as a Transgressor" (13, 27, p. 107). The Lamb escapes the confinement of the female tabernacle, the pressure to conform to conventional morality, imposed by the inaccessibility of the female, by offering no resistance to those who would accuse him of transgression. In so doing, he becomes "the Body of Death", in that he allows the dissolution of the form that affirmed him.[53]

The yielding to necessity releases the psychic energy enclosed within the anima, which returns us to Hillman's characterisation of anima as the mediatrix of the unknown, because she is "the function of relationship to the unconscious" (*Anima* 129). Many of her associations emphasise that this archetype possesses a mysterious quality, because of her "dubious or shady origins" and "associations with remote history" (Hillman, *Anima 129).* This characteristic is related to the anima's association with culture, and explains how human feeling is shaped according to traditional values, though the values themselves often remain mysterious and hidden. In this way anima exposes the impersonal origins underling the personal nature of

[53] Frye gives an interpretation of the significance of each of the seven eyes of God on p. 128 of *Fearful Symmetry*. Frye thinks they represent "seven attempts made by God to awaken Albion". In my account, the eyes of God refer more to the perception of God according to biblical myth held in each particular age. Each age is unified by the way God is viewed.

feeling. Not only is anima the archetype of psychic consciousness, she also mediates unconsciousness, manifesting a movement between different areas of knowledge, uncovering one attitude, but at the same time hiding another. This means that "anima consciousness, consciousness of anima, means first of all awareness of one's unconscious" and poses the question "in which way does this image, event, person, idea, feeling that is now the content of my reflection produce unconsciousness" (Hillman, *Anima* 137). As consciousness shifts in response to life's experiences, so we become unconscious in a new way. As Hillman points out, the answers mediated by anima are images. Tracing images into their associated patterns uncovers the secret idea that generated them, which then leads onto other images, and other ideas, thus dissolving the original pattern.

Hillman's description of psychological creativity involves an awareness that all facts and observations take shape from a set of unconscious assumptions. To study the archetypal factor that governs our interpretations of experience involves having "an exhaustive go at the assumptions in our primary notions" (Hillman *Anima* 99). Imagination in this sense removes the obligation to be objectively factual, and replaces it with the need to be subjectively aware. It therefore eliminates the antagonism that tends to accompany the recognition of otherness, upon which ego-consciousness is based, and releases the feelings "embedded in taste, styles, values, manners" (Hillman, *Revisioning* 183) so that a more inclusive identification with experience may take place. In this way, it is possible to move beyond the shaping values of any particular culture, without resorting to antagonism and rebellion.

The ability of the creative mind to penetrate the unconscious and discover the dominant perspective of any culture is a major theme of the poem. Milton's decision to accept annihilation and go to "Eternal Death" means that he abandons his identification with the ego, an act which enables him to unite with his emanation, Ololon, and so explore the psychic origins of the "black cloud redounding spread over Europe" (15, 50, p.110). This refers to the effect of the repressive and puritanical religion that Milton appeared to endorse in *Paradise Lost*. Milton's religion is considered responsible for the wars with Napoleon, and for the social and political ills

unmasked in *The Songs of Innocence and Experience*. By uniting with his emanation, and creating a context for his ideas, the ideas responsible for the current condition of Europe become clear.

On hearing the Bard's song, Milton exclaims: "I in my Selfhood am that Satan: I am that Evil one!" (14, 30, p.108). He realises his own responsibility for the condition of Europe, and accepts annihilation in order to "to loose him (Satan) from my Hells" (14, 31, p.108). His Satanic selfhood is blocking his vision and preventing him from adopting a more creative cast of mind. In order to do this, he must discover which of his unconscious ideas have produced the condition of late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century Europe. When his emanation, too, accepts the need for self-annihilation, and decides to make the descent to Earth, following Milton's example, the opportunity of exploring his works to discover the unconscious principles that motivated them then becomes possible.

Milton's relationship with the feminine has to be transformed before he can unite with Ololon and uncover his harmful unconscious attitudes. A distinction is made between the descent of Milton's "hermaphroditic shadow" (14,37, p.108), and his "real and immortal Self" which "appeared to those / Who dwell in immortality, as One sleeping on a couch" (15, 11-12. p.109). The shadow corresponds to the supposedly unimaginative aspect of his work, which upholds a puritanical view of sexuality, and which therefore prevents the psychic integration underlying true creativity. The effect of his gender problems is visible in the forms of his "Wives and Daughters" who "sat rangd round him as the rocks of Horeb round the land / Of Canaan" (16, 12-13, p.110). These rocks are proof against the shaping activities of the mind, repelling any encroachment, and resisting any effort to remove or convert them. What is more, they are subject to Milton's will, as "they wrote in thunder smoke and fire / His dictate" (17, 13-14, p. 110). There is no willing co-operation between Milton and his emanation: their enforced involvement suppresses energy, and leads to the domination of the unconscious, which cannot be accessed, for energy is condensed, as the vision narrows and encloses, while in a more expanded vision energy is released, and is allowed to flow freely. This is the implication of the

comment: "For travellers from Eternity pass outward to Satan's seat, / But Travellers to Eternity. Pass inward to Golgonooza " (17, 29-30, p.111).

Milton 's energy flow changes direction when he takes on the task of building a human form for Urizen, on his emergence "from his Rocky Form & from his Snows" (18, 51, p. 112). His efforts are continually resisted: Milton tries to mould a form for Urizen using "the red clay of Succoth" (19, 10, p.112), an action which Urizen counteracts by "pouring on / To Milton's the icy fluid from his broad cold palm" (19, 9, p. 112). Though the humanising of Urizen is not completely successful, owing to Urizen's ongoing attempts to thwart Milton's creativity through the imposition of moral precepts, the poet's efforts to humanise the law have the effect of releasing blocked energy, of penetrating the unconscious, and of facilitating the union with Ololon, which takes place at the end of Book Two.

The odds are stacked against Milton in his struggle with Urizen. The cruel feminine figures of Rahab and Tirzah assemble their forces, "their sons & daughters / In all their beauty to entice Milton across the river" (19, 21, p.112). This means that he is tempted to adopt those attitudes towards the feminine that allegedly marred his poetic achievements. If he crosses the river, he will have assumed the mode of consciousness figured in "The Twofold form Hermaphroditic: and the Double-sexed: The female-male & the Male-female" (19, 32-33, p. 113). These are forms of consciousness in which the characteristics associated with each gender are hidden by the appearance of its opposite, leading to nature worship, and the imposition of a state religion. In both cases the forces resist each other, instead of cooperating. The various incarnations of Milton vary according to the movement of psychic energy by which his mental state is determined. In *Milton*, there is a full exposition of the theory of states, which echoes the archetypal theory advanced by Hillman. We are advised to: "Distinguish therefore States from Individuals in those States. / States change: but Individual Identities never change nor cease: /You cannot go to Eternal Death in that which can never Die" (32, 22-24, p.132). The states correspond to those created forms, in which images take up a particular pattern, which is then to be dispersed by a change in viewpoint.

States are like garments, temporary constructions of reality, created in order to be annihilated. They are distinguished from "Individual Identities" which remain forever as permanent forms. We are told that: "Whatever can be Created can be Annihilated Forms cannot / The Oak is cut down by the Ax, the Lamb falls by the Knife / But their forms Eternal exist, For-ever. Amen Hallelujah" (32, 36-38, p.132). The distinction is between images, which retain their integrity, and the combination of these images into a particular pattern, which then affects the interpretation of the image through context. The image in itself cannot be altered, but its significance is created, and it can therefore be annihilated. Identities are capable of inspiring a multitude of contexts, without changing their eternal form. Milton retains his eternal identity, even while accepting annihilation, and being created into the state called "Eternal Annihilation" (32, 27, p. 132) by the Seven Angels of the Presence. His eternal form remains as the totality of all of the states into which he might fall, though each state in isolation is not his real self, and can be shed, like a garment.[54]

Any construction of reality, however, ultimately has to be abandoned, in order that another may take its place. The real humanity, which cannot be apprehended except through a covering, is hidden by "the Sexual Garments, the Abomination of Desolation " (41, 25, p.142). These are excoriated because they hinder the workings of the imagination, since they impose the delusory notion that the sexes are opposed, and have nothing in common, although if these are regarded as only temporary states, they can promote the creative experience. Milton explains to Ololon towards the end of Book Two that: "There is a Negation, & there is a Contrary /The Negation must be destroyed to redeem the Contraries /The Negation is the Spectre; the Reasoning Power in Man " (40, 33, p.142). The Spectre is described as "a false Body: an Incrustation over my immortal spirit" (40, 34, P. 142).

Both the Body, and the sexual Garments clothe a certain idea, which may only be visible through its covering. The Body is false, and the sexual garments an illusion, since the idea they cover describes the world when viewed from one perspective. The

[54] The garment as "the container of the soul" is a Neoplatonist concept. Émile Bréhier, in his work, entitled *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, p.37, quotes from the Mithraic theologians: "At each door the soul casts off, like garments, the faculties which it had received when it descended to earth".

negation, therefore, is a construction of reality that will not yield its grip upon the psyche. It cannot do so, because the preconceptions on which it is based remain hidden. The attempt to penetrate the "false Body" requires the return to images, which do not impose a particular view, but which, because they combine opposites, lead in different directions, out of one pattern of meaning into another, each of which corresponds to a different preconception. Milton's efforts at creating a body for Urizen involves re-clothing each specific idea in the imagery that affirms it, in order to reveal its provisional nature. The activity also creates the body in another sense, since it connects mind with body by re-activating the movement of libidinal energy.

This tension between the subjective and objective worlds is implied in the distinction made in Blake's work between the contrary and the negation, with most critics defining the negation as the objective world that must be transformed by the imagination before it can assimilate with the subject and be regarded as a contrary. This process is reminiscent of Coleridge's influential account in *Biographia Literaria* of the distinction between Primary and Secondary Imagination, with the Primary creating the illusion of an objectivity that is dispersed by the Secondary. He writes: "The primary imagination I hold to be the living power and prime agent of all human perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the Infinite I AM (I: 167). The primary imagination is creative in that it opposes the self to a world of objects. J.R. de J. Jackson in his essay "'Fancy' Restored to Dignity" considers that "Primary Imagination may be taken as the literary term for the unconscious (in which Reason is a tool)" (151). This seems to suggest that the discrimination of self initially proceeds according to unconscious principles, when the supposed objectivity of the world affirms individual identity, but if the Primary imagination is synonymous with the unconscious, the principles supporting identity never reach consciousness, and so ego-consciousness is founded, in the words of Blake, upon negation.

The Secondary Imagination, however, "is co-existent with the conscious will." "It dissolves diffuses, dissipates in order to recreate ... it struggles to idealise and unify" (I: 167). Basil Willey suggests that the Secondary Imagination "must dissolve and

dissipate ... the inanimate cold world of the Primary Imagination" ("Imagination and Fancy" 123). Jackson says that the Secondary Imagination belongs "somewhere between the understanding in the full sense and the unconscious" (152). It "coexists" with the conscious will, but is not identical with it. It is, therefore, not "completely under the control of the mind" and "its activity is passion" (152). Secondary Imagination involves the release of the will, the dissipation of an apparent objectivity, a renewal of feeling, and a reunion with unconscious material, which the will must struggle to idealise and unify, in an egotistical activity which once more opposes the unity of the self to the multiplicity of the world which supports it. Coleridge here describes the conversion of the negation to a contrary, and then its return to a negation. In Hillman's terms, and in Blake's according to my argument, if the ego drops out, and unity built round a specific archetype, this is a continuous process, a description of psychic functioning, analogous to the nature of consciousness itself.

Some of Blake's critics do not recognise the distinction between contrary and negation as genuine, but regard it as the point at which the theory of imagination collapses. It shows that the world is, in some of its aspects, resistant to the shaping power of the imagination. It represents a reality, which the imagination has no power to transform. Damrosch sees the development of the idea of the negation as a spurious attempt to "rescue the contraries by banishing from them whatever is irremediably corrupt" (81). He sees the negation as a device to enable Blake to "cast out corruption", and suggests that it is merely a convenient re-labelling of the contrary so that he may do this, and remain consistent in his rejection of the reality of the object world. Damrosch suggests that the attempt to distinguish between contrary and negation results only in ambiguity, for what Blake desires "whether it is symbolised in Albion or in Jesus the divine body is a whole whose parts are not parts, in which individuality can be preserved without concession to otherness" (144). The negation, therefore, is a recognition that there must always be an objective aspect of the world, upon which the imagination operates. The idea of the contrary suggests that the objectivity required to underwrite the mind's working is an illusion, but Damrosch believes that some events and experiences make an impact that cannot simply be imagined away.

McGann, too, thinks that the negation "admits the limitations of imagination itself" which has no power to change evil into good. For McGann, the absence of the idea of evil in Blake's text affirms its existence. He says:

> The 'evil' which Blake defined as an absence is not present to Blake as it is, for example, to Dante, who adhered to a similar (in his case Thomistic) concept of evil as negation. In Blake, the negation is negated, what is absent is not there. But because the absence is there, what is missing rises up before us as what has been rejected by imagination, rises up as the absent reality – rises up, finally, as objectivity and otherness without which imagination must become a hollow idea that what it is, a form of human action (*Knowledge* 36).

Since Blake rejects the existence of evil, McGann thinks that the negation itself is negated, that otherness too is rejected, but implied in the absences that the negation disguises. However, as we have seen, it is the *opposition* of good and evil that appears to be rejected, as terms that can only be defined in relation to each other. As abstractions, they fail to encompass the whole situation they are used to describe, and refer only to aspects visible to the analytical mind. These are then used to negate the past as they become the basis for a new dispensation. In this way, any idea is capable of encompassing consequences that are both good and evil. If negative consequences emerge from reformation, and vice versa, the validity of the opposition of good and evil is thrown into doubt. The absence McGann detects is simply the result of an attempt to undermine the opposition of good and evil, with its connotations of hostility and repression, so as to avoid the self-righteousness rectitude of victim and oppressor, both trying to assert against each other their own claims to the moral high ground.

For Punter, the distinction of contrary and negation underlies the account of historical progress illustrated in Blake's work. He sees the negation in Hegelian terms as a representation of the failures of history, which suggests the direction of future progress. As Punter explains: "To transcend any given society entailed, for Blake,

seeing the contradictions within that society and setting them in motion, whereas Ratio sought to keep them permanently apart" (*Dialectic 218*). The negation implies an acceptance of things as they are, and a refusal to countenance the possibility of change, since they are enshrined in the apparent objectivity of the material world, whereas the contrary seeks to use contradiction as the spur to the momentum of history. The impulse is "to allow contraries to cease to stand over against each other in mere unproductive antithesis, and to become instead the heart of each other's developing reality" (*Dialectic* 90).

The contrary in these terms includes within itself the negativity of any situation but, by creating for it a human context, we see it to be the result of conditions suggesting the direction of change. The imagination, then, does not, according to this interpretation, so much undertake the role of creating the vision of the world as it is, but suggests "the particular way in which poetry humanises the world by setting alongside the representation of the existent an imaginative representation of that which is not, and by thus prophesying the direction of progress" (*Dialectic* 17). The contrary, then, seems to affirm the possibility of progress, but the negative at the heart of any movement threatens to dismantle the whole idea of evolution, for it undercuts the sense of any kind of achievement. The negation is the admission that in any particular dispensation, some people are bound to find themselves the unwitting victims of whatever is deemed to be progress, because it is the representation of a permanent hostility between those who prosper, and those who do not.

Punter's view of the role of the negative at the heart of the positive denies the possibility of progress through opposition. However, some element of resistance is fundamental to the thinking process in a form that will not entrench social division, whilst providing the objectivity that is, as Damrosch points out, necessary in the thinking process. Jung insists, as we have seen, that "there is no energy unless there is a tension of opposites" (CW 7, par. 78). The idea of the contrary, however, suggests that opposition is a false one, and must be denied any permanent reality. In *Milton*, the idea of the contrary develops, to suggest tension without permanent opposition.

Hillman's amendments to Jung's ideas on the way consciousness operates describe how this may be achieved.

> Tandems, however, like brothers or enemies or traders or lovers show endless varieties of styles. To imagine in pairs and couples is to think mythologically. Mythical thinking connects pairs into tandems rather than separating them into opposites which is anyway a mode of philosophy. Opposites lend themselves to very few kinds of description: contradictories, contraries, complementaries, negations – formal and logical. Tandems favour intercourse – innumerable positions. Opposition is merely one of the many modes of being in a tandem.

Hillman's definition of a contrary obviously differs from Blake's, but otherwise Hillman's distinction between tandems and oppositions suggest ways in which the negation may be transformed into a contrary. Personified ideas relate to each other in ways not available to abstractions. They generate patterns of imagery, or mythologems, which may be understood when regarded from a particular perspective. Temporarily the organising idea and the pattern it constellates constitute a whole, though this unity may dissolve, on the adoption of a different perspective, when the animus detects incongruous images, which do not belong to the pattern. Imagination as "the Divine Body of the Lord Jesus" (3, 4, p.96) refers to the process of constructing an interpretive unit composed of the organising idea and the detail which supports it.

The change of perspective is clearly essential to construct and understand any particular pattern of imagery. The feminine realm of Beulah, described as a place of "terror & mild moony lustre" (2, 3, p. 96), where "Contrarieties are equally true (30, 1, 129) suggests the form of the anima, in which images are combined into a pattern through association. Contrarieties are equally true, for Beulah is a site of dream imagery, and images, as we have seen, naturally combine opposites. In Beulah, there is only identity, undisturbed by the perception of differences, so it is "a pleasant lovely Shadow where no dispute can come" (30, 3, p.129). The Emanations demand:

"A habitation & a place / In which we may be hidden under the shadow of wings"(30, 24-25, p.129), for they fear the incursion of "unbounded" energy (30, 22, p.129). Beulah protects, "under shadow of wings", the forms that have emanated from Eternity, "which are but for a time" (30, 26, p.129), and which finally pass away. These created forms would not exist, but for the change of perspective, and the creation of a new vision, that marks the movement into Eden. The emanations "who pass away in winter" (30, 26, p.129) are those forms that disappear into the unconscious, as new ones take their place. Without the tension produced by the change of perspective, however, the images composing the emanation become: "A Polypus of soft affections without Thought or Vision" (24, 38, p.120). Beulah as a state can very easily turn into Ulro, where sentiment lays its hold upon any received idea.

The contrary, which encourages a change of perspective, and the negation, which works against mental flexibility underwrite the two versions of history, the latter represented by "the shadowy female" and the former by Ololon at the end of the work, versions that appeared almost identical to Betsy Bolton in her discussion, previously outlined, about the treatment of gender in *Milton*. Certainly both figures take the form of a garment, which temporally sets aside their femininity, and emphasises their role as psychic structure. Both garments display writing, in the case of the shadowy female, "in Human words" (18, 12, p.111), and in the case of Ololon, "within and without in woven letters" (42, 13, p.143). Both garments also embody human suffering: that of the shadowy female displays the effects of oppression, whilst Ololon wears "A Garment of War" (42, 15, p143). The differences between the two figures, however, appear in their structure. "The Garment of War" is not merely external. It is written "within and without, and is folded around "One Man Jesus the Saviour" (42, 11, p.143), whilst the Shadowy Female is hidden within the garment, for she threatens "to put on the Human Form & take the Image of God / Even Pity & Humanity (18, 19-20, p.111).

The garment worn by Ololon is transparent: it is composed of a vision that reveals its preconceptions, and which therefore expresses a unity that is elsewhere termed "the

Divine Vision". It is also "dipped in blood" (42, 12, p. 143), which suggests that it derives from sacrifice, from the renunciation of the ego. It attaches historical events and the suffering that ensued from them to the ideas which gave them shape, and it therefore discloses their fallibility. The garment of the Shadowy Female acts as disguise: it hides the female herself, who represents the unconscious. All preconceptions determining the form of the covering remain hidden. The covering itself is ambiguous, suggesting the hypocrisy of those who express sympathy for the victims of history, whilst still retaining their own positions of power, for this garment disguises fallible notions. The garments of the Shadowy Female are "woven of sighs & heart-broken lamentations" (18, 6, p.111), which express sympathy for the casualties of history, "The prisoner in the stone Dungeon & the Slave at the Mill" (18, 11, p.111), even though the female herself "puts on Holiness as a breastplate & as a helmet" (18, 20-21, p.111). Expressed sympathy here defends identity, for obedience to moral precepts sustains and defends the ego. The contradictory form of the shadowy female's clothing represents the division in the human personality described by Rousseau, when morality represses the feeling attached to self-worth, as the individual attempts to conform to moral precepts, even while disguising an underlying self-interest. Though the two version of the hermaphrodite on the surface seem similar, as Betsy Bolton pointed out, in reality the one is the mirror image of the other.

The descent of Ololon, however, marks the move to unblock the repressive influence of feeling. In Eden Milton's emanation is described as "a sweet River, of mild & liquid pearl" (21, 15, p.115). With its maternal gentleness, the river is presented as a source of nourishment for "those who Milton drove down into Ulro" (21, 17, p.115), but it seems powerless to transform abstractions, and the spectres who embody them, into creative form. Feeling merely acts as a covering for otherwise unconscious ideas. Ololon's descent, though seen as a fall, is a necessary one, for in Beulah there is no way of penetrating the delusions of that state, or the obscurities of feeling, since "Contrarieties are equally true" (30, 1. p.129). There is in Beulah only identification, and no means of making any distinctions. Ololon' descent involved stepping "into the Polypus within the Mundane Shell" (36, 12, p.136), and from that moment the

"mighty Hosts" (36, 16, p.137) of Ololon appear as "a Virgin of twelve years old" (36, 18, p.137). The polypus appears to her as an eternal war between ideas, "the Divine Members", which are "slain in offering for sin" ((35,6, p.135). However, Ololon cannot "behold Golgonooza without passing the Polypus" (35, 19, p135), until she becomes "mortal and vegetable in sexuality" (35, 24, p.135). The femininity of Ololon is thus seen as an adjunct of the need to turn the single vision of the polypus into the four-fold vision of Golgonooza. With entry into the Polypus comes the tension, and the energy, generated by sexuality, but this, as we have seen, is a temporary state, which must be abandoned, if it is not to prevent rather than aid creativity.

In her final incarnation, the virginity of Ololon is subsumed into the form of a dove, and of a "Moony Ark" (42, 6-7, p.143). Both these emblems of peace and compliance disappear with "the clouds of blood" and "the streams of gore" associated with the "Fires of Intellect that rejoic'd in Felpham's Vale" (42, 9, p.143). The loss of Ololon's virginity, and the fulfilment of her sexuality, as she "divided and fled into the depths / of Milton's shadow" paradoxically destroys the sexual garments, as the feminine now appears as " Garment dipped in blood" (42, 12, p. 143). The peaceful dove is the agent of renewal, while Milton's shadow becomes the passive recipient of her sacrifice, a union that seeks to undo the usual connotations of femininity and masculinity. The loss of virginity is not figured here as "a loss of autonomy and agency" (Bolton 80), for Ololon decides to yield her virginity of her own accord. The violence does not precede her decision, but suggests the renewal of energy that results from self-sacrifice. The reappearance of Ololon as a garment implies the disappearance of her femininity, but not of the female herself. The garment marks the interaction of the active and the passive within the anima, without reference to the gendered associations of these drives.

Betsy Bolton is correct when she suggests that Milton and Ololon never touch as man and woman, for these gendered expressions are not characters in the accepted sense of the word, but mental forces. Even the term 'man' in the form of Jesus does not refer to a gendered individual, but to a unity, to the union of active and passive drives,

which permits a whole vision. The use of the word 'man' to suggest something beyond manhood is undoubtedly confusing, as is the association of femininity with the emanation, though the complexity of the symbols acts towards separating these gendered terms from their straightforward connotations. This complexity seems necessary to outline the effect of traditional notions of gender difference, while trying to present another version, for which there are no linguistic equivalents. Garments, coverings, and all other related symbols are the means used to suggest, and simultaneously deny, the effects of gendered notions.

CHAPTER SEVEN

DIVIDING AND UNITING: SOCIAL AND PSYCHIC INTEGRATION IN *JERUSALEM*

In her preface to her final novel, *Maria*, Wollstonecraft apologises for her failure to exploit fully the dramatic potential of some of her scenes by emphasising the primacy of her "main object, the desire of exhibiting the misery and oppression, peculiar to women, that arise out of the partial laws and customs of society" (*Maria* 59). Her preoccupations are then in tune with those of the thinker she both admires and criticises in equal measure. Rousseau, too, deplores the way that laws can become instruments of oppression, favouring the strong and powerful to the detriment of the poor and oppressed. Possibly his most famous work, *The Social Contract*, aims at redressing the balance, and creating the social conditions that will promote equally the interests of all. However, Rousseau's desire to achieve universal well-being fails to take account of the separate interests of women, which he subsumes in the wider concerns of the social unit created by marriage. Women are deprived of any kind of independent judgement, and in *Maria*, the narrator condemns the commonly held belief that "the husband should always be wiser and more virtuous than his wife, in order to entitle him, with a show of justice, to keep this idiot, or perpetual minor, for ever in bondage" (*Maria* 118). The caustic tones of this observation are reminiscent of those of Wollstonecraft herself, when she attacks the inferior status of women in her *Vindication of the Rights of Woman*. Wollstonecraft's criticisms of Rousseau's failure to address the concerns of women in this work concur with the more general attack mounted by Godwin in *Political Justice* on Rousseau's Social Contract, and the rule of law which he bases upon it. Both Wollstonecraft and Godwin highlight the inadequacies of Rousseau's ideas in their aim of securing social justice.

The subordinate position of women, and the folly of trying to unite society through a legal or moral framework, are themes also widely explored in Blake's *Jerusalem.* However, unlike Godwin, Wollstonecraft or Rousseau, Blake is not now concerned with social reform, but with finding ways for the individual to counteract the oppressiveness of moral judgement through the renunciation of ego-consciousness, and the adoption of a different way of relating to the world based upon the imagination. This style of consciousness, in which the emanation is profoundly involved, resembles the Dionysian one, commended and described by Hillman in his writings, based upon anima as an archetypal psychic structure in both men and women. As we have seen in the previous two chapters, the emanation develops characteristics in the later works that link the feminine figures with some aspects associated with the anima as a personification of psychic structure. The move to extend the associations of anima beyond the cultural definitions of the feminine continues in *Jerusalem.* The Dionysian consciousness requires the integration of the feminine, and no longer regards this category as an opposite against which definition may be made in the acquisition of a masculine identity. Such integration has the effect of removing the repressive influence of feeling, and converting it into a means of connecting with the diversity of human experience.

> The tendency in Jerusalem is to overturn cultural definitions of masculinity and femininity by uniting them in one integrated human being of either sex, a process that may be understood in relation to Hillman's insights on the function of anima, and the re-valued position of the feminine. Most criticism sees the recovery of the feminine as a vital part of male creativity, rather than as the means of claiming creativity for the female, though I intend to argue that this desire is implied in many aspects of the text. Wollstonecraft, too, in her later works, begins to regard the imagination as a way of transforming female sensibility, and turning feeling into a liberating rather than a repressive force in ways that support the often contested claims for gender even-handedness in Blake's work. Though in Romanticism imaginative activity is often regarded as exclusively male, it is significant that one of the most influential women of the time, whose views on

the position of women are visible in Blake's depiction of the female will, does not consider imagination to be a masculine prerogative.

The works discussed in the previous two chapters, *The Four Zoas* and *Milton*, show an increasing desire to exceed the bondage of fixed contraries, in which the masculine and feminine react with each other to dictate the course of history. The implications of such interaction form the subject of *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell*, with its ironic opposition of angels and devils, and influence the circular structure of the Orc Cycle, which culminates in a union of the opposites in the larger unity of Albion, or of Jesus. This unifying tendency appears to be inseparable from the movement between polarities that distinguishes the early works. The urge to unify can be envisaged as an example of the divine marriage or syzygy, the union of conscious and unconscious aspects of mind, which corresponds to a particular stage of Jung's version of the hero myth, as it outlines the interactions of mind and nature. *The Four Zoas* demonstrates the limitations of the cyclical vision, and intimates an impulse to escape the recurrence of the cycle by modifying the concept of the contrary. Both *The Four Zoas* and *Milton* are influenced by the movement to define the contrary as the means of unlocking opposition, and turning it to creative account, but in both these works the unifying principle still appears to dominate, suggesting that the Orc cycle remains in control of events. In *The Four Zoas* the recovery of the unity of Albion is suggested by the harmonious activity of each of the zoas as they go about their Eternal tasks. *Milton* concludes when "with one accord the Starry Eight became One Man Jesus the Saviour" enfolded in the clouds of Ololon (42, 10-12, p.143).

The final chapter of *Jerusalem* also describes the reunion of the zoas with Albion, and the identification of this figure with that of "the Universal Humanity" who is Jesus (96, 5, p. 255). In some Jungian criticism, this composite figure is compared to Jung's archetype of the Self, which he describes as a centre of consciousness, absorbing the ego, and occupying "the hypothetical point between conscious and unconscious" (CW 13, par.76). It is the balancing mechanism through which previously unconscious material is assimilated with the ego. Jung

finds that this centre is frequently expressed in quaternity symbols, such as that suggested by the Zoas, and by the circular structures he called mandalas,[55] which might be exemplified by Los's continuing efforts to build Golgonooza. At the end of *Jerusalem,* the fourfold annihilation from which emerges the new form of Albion is accompanied by a complex proliferation of quaternity symbols. These suggests that the unity of the Self has finally been realised but, if this were the case, it would also suggest a re-imposition of the cycles that mark the opposition of self and world, the contradistinction of the masculine and the feminine, and the necessity of experiencing again each stage of the hero myth, as the hero defines himself in opposition to matter.

The unifying tendency evident in the integration of Albion with his zoas is echoed in the emergence of the emanation as a Universal Female Form, while the other emanations, apart from Vala, who still has a part to play, are pushed to the margins. Though the union of Albion and Jesus has marked the culmination of the creativity of Los in all of the major prophecies, Jerusalem only appears as a major figure in the work that bears her name. She has absorbed many of the functions of the other emanations, and though they are still mentioned to a greater or lesser degree, Jerusalem, as the emanation of the giant Albion, is now the major carrier of the notion of soul. Her new manifestation points to a distinction, which has long preoccupied psychology, regarding the plurality or unity of anima.[56] Discussions so far in this work have highlighted the multiplicity of the soul figures that inhabit the works of Blake, and the figures of innumerable maidens haunting the ancient myths help to support the view of the plurality of soul. Jung identifies such plurality with "dissolution into an indefinite state, i.e., into the unconscious" (CW 12, par.116).

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[55] Descriptions of the many forms of the mandala appear in Jung's *Psychology and Alchemy.* Buildings and gardens feature prominently amongst the many forms of the mandala discussed in this work, as they do also in the works of Blake.

[56] The essence of this discussion is outlined in Chapter Nine of Hillman's work entitled *Anima - The Anatomy of a Personified Notion.*

Yet the appearance of anima as a uni-personality has also a well-recognised role, as "that particular gestalt which precisely, continually, and specifically signifies the core quality of my soul" (Hillman, *Anima* 155). In particular, according to Hillman, the unity of anima corresponds more to the Christian view of soul, which when placed in Jung's model of compensation, "may shrivel consciousness to the one-sidedness that Jung considered a definition of neurosis" (Hillman, *Anima* 163). In this way, according to Hillman, the anima merges with the Self, instead of counteracting the rigidity that may accompany an over-developed spirituality. However, finally, Hillman underplays the unity of the Self, since it is "susceptible to interfusion with other archetypal dominants" (*Anima 165*). He also denies that the unity of anima destroys the multiplicity of anima attachments, the soul-making possibilities of anima images. The relationship of the one and the many is deeply explored in *Jerusalem*, and the insights of Hillman help to reconcile the desire evident in the work to retain the flexibility of consciousness based upon anima, in conjunction with the urge to achieve a spiritual union with all aspects of experience. In this final chapter I hope to illustrate the provisional nature of any such professed unity as exemplified in the notion of the Self, and in the soul figure it constellates.

In one sense, the desire for unity in Albion corresponds to the need to harmonise the community, to find a way of minimising the conflicting interests between individuals that so often disfigure social life. This ambition appears to run counter to the tendencies of earlier works, where conflicts between individuals were seen as the spur to future progress, though the continuing influence of the cycle, still evident in the structure of *Jerusalem* suggests that these conflicts persist, against the tide of Los's creative efforts. Throughout *Jerusalem* the effects of conflict make their mark upon the land, destroying the harmony of the cities – "Cambridge & Oxford & London / Are driven among the starry wheels, rent away and dissipated" (5, 4, p.147). The effects of abstract thinking narrow the sense of the community to its representation in the workings of the law, and as a result "Albions mountains run with blood, the cries of war & tumult resound into the unbounded night" (5, 8, p.147). The dissension divides families, creating: "War and deadly contention, Between Father and Son, and light and love! All bold asperities / Of

Haters met in deadly strife, rending the house & garden" 18, 20-22, p.163), whilst the "sleeping Humanity of Albion" is divided "into Male and Female forms time after time" (5, 32, p.148). "Compelling his Spectre to labours mighty" (9, 18, p.153), Los begins the building of Golgonooza, with the purpose of reconnecting all these warring elements in the organised form of a city.

The ideal of a unified society is also central to the thinking of Rousseau, whose efforts to prevent the development of the divisions within the human soul, which separate the individual from the knowledge of his own selfish motives, are aimed at the creation of a harmonious society. Though education is supposed to play a decisive role in this, as we saw in *Émile*, the eventual aim is to produce a citizen of Rousseau's ideal society capable of the moral judgements necessary for such a society to flourish. Rousseau's description in *The Social Contract* of the legal mechanisms required to produce a fair and just social system requires its citizens to forsake their own direct interests, in order to secure the wider aim of establishing social harmony, from which they will ultimately benefit. The abandonment of selfish ambitions is supposed, paradoxically, to enhance each individual existence, for an element of loss will eventually culminate in the greater good of an ordered society.

In order to determine the nature of the sacrifice each citizen will be required to make, Rousseau postulates a notion called the general will, in which egoisms cancel each other out to produce the will of the whole society, visible in the laws each individual is required to obey. Despite his observation in *The Origins of Inequality* of the prevalence of crimes and disorders in society, which prompted him to wonder whether "we should do well to inquire if these evils spring up with the laws themselves" (*Inequality* 77), the injustices arising from social divisions may be tackled by resorting to the law. He does not, like Godwin, advocate dispensing with the law altogether on the grounds "that government is, in all cases, an evil" (Godwin, *Justice* 556). Instead Rousseau strongly defends obedience to the law and respect for those who enforce it, noting that preservation depends "on your constant union, your obedience to the laws, and your respect for their ministers" (*Inequality* 37)..

In contrast to the condemnation of the divisive effect of the "Laws of Moral Virtue" (4, 31, p.147) with which *Jerusalem* resounds, Rousseau finds a unifying role for the law, considering it to be the foundation of any well-ordered society. Without the preservation of order in society, there can be no sense of union amongst its members, for "when laws lose their force and those who defend them their authority, security and liberty are universally impossible" (Rousseau, *Inequality* 38). In *Jerusalem* the law is portrayed as the unifying principle of society, but this unity itself acts to divide and exclude. The physical features of the land mark out the jurisdiction of the law, and separate the territory from that of other nations, according to the instinct to possess and defend. As we have seen, when Albion declares that: "The Malvern and the Cheviot, the Wolds Plinlimmon & Snowdon are mine" (4, 30-31, p.147), he also proclaims the destruction of "Humanity", and the prevalence of "war, princedom & victory" (4, 32, p.147). Paradoxically the unifying principle, envisaged in the abstractions and generalisations of the law, is also the means of division, as sexes, individual members of society, and races divide from each other.

Rousseau defines the law as the expression of the fundamental principles on which social order rests, and emphasises its disregard for the interests of individuals. As he explains: "When I say that the object of laws is always general, I mean that law considers subjects *en masse* and actions in the abstract, and never a particular person or action"(*Contract* 211). He wants to reduce the variety of human acts to a conformity which may be understood, classified, and judged. Without the existence of laws of this nature, there can be, he believes, no true freedom for anyone, for licence exercised by some will mean oppression for others, leading to conflict between the oppressed, and those who are required to defend their privileges. Only the law expressed in general principles can, according to Rousseau, guarantee the security of society as a whole. Godwin, however, bases his arguments for an anarchistic society upon his criticisms of the abstracting tendencies of the law, which he thinks will have the effect of creating an unjust society. Strangely, for the apostle of reason that Godwin was in the 1793 version of *Political Justice*, he attacks general laws on the basis that "there are not so much as two atoms of matter of the same form throughout the whole universe". The law will have the effect of reducing "the actions of men,

which are composed of a thousand evanescent elements, to one standard" (*Justice* 688). His argument suggests that laws cannot be just if they take no account of the circumstances surrounding the perpetration of individual crimes. Unjust treatment will have the effect of dividing the members of society against each other, and creating the very conditions that *Jerusalem* laments.

His view also questions the possibility of finding a basis of agreement in which the conflicting interests of individual members of society may be reconciled, and undermines the notion which legitimises Rousseau's Social Contract, that of the general will. This represents Rousseau's attempt to find a means of preserving as much individual freedom as is consistent with obedience to the law. As he explains:

> The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and good of each associate, and in which, each while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone and remain as free as before (*Contract* 191).

His solution is to postulate a contract between the individuals composing the state, in which they do not hand over their liberty to any other individual, but only to themselves as a collectivity. Rousseau's version of the Social Contract is derived from a similar idea of Hobbes, though it reaches an opposite conclusion. Hobbes agrees that the contract is between the individuals composing the state, rather than between people and government, but he argues that once the people yield their liberty to the government, there is no question of them retaining any jurisdiction over themselves, since they are bound by contract to passive obedience to their appointed ruler. According to Hobbes, this creates a unity in which the multitude is represented by their sovereign's will.

Rousseau develops this idea of Hobbes, and postulates a body politic, or Sovereign which unites "the multitude in a single body" (*Contract* 194) By this means Rousseau is able to deny that the interest of the individual ever differs from the interests of the whole state, for once each person enters into a contract with his peers, he identifies so wholly with the new body, that his interests are subsumed completely by it.

> Again the Sovereign being formed wholly of the individuals who composed it, neither has nor can have any interest contrary to theirs; and consequently the sovereign power need give no guarantee to its subjects, because it is impossible for the body to wish to hurt all its members (Rousseau, *Contract* 194).

Rousseau is able to make such a claim by appealing to the common good, which is "the common element" of different interests, which brings social life into being, for as he points out, "if the clashing of particular interests made the establishment of societies necessary, the agreement of these very interests made it possible"(Rousseau *Contract* 200). There could be no society, if there was no common interest served by living in community, and the concept of the general will expresses the notion that even though there may be a clashing of interests when people try to live together in society, there is still some benefit for doing so that justifies the necessary renunciation. The general will is, however, an ambiguous concept, for Rousseau defines it as the expression of the will of the whole body, though he distinguishes it from the will of all. The general will might be different from the separate wills of the individuals composing society, but it represents what is considered necessary for the perpetuation of society, after the removal of those parts of opposing wills that cancel each other out. "The general will remains the sum of the differences" (Rousseau, *Contract* 203) between opposing and united wills.

The general will as a concept has aroused a great deal of controversy, for though it may be possible through a system of election to discover the general political will in any society, it is less certain that it will inevitably tend towards the common good, or that an understanding of the ends will automatically display the means. A theoretical notion of what constitutes the common good is no guarantee that the means will be found to achieve it. If the common good is unattained, which remains the most likely outcome of even the most unanimous decision, those who have suffered from the subsequent injustice may remain as an aggrieved party permanently opposed to the state by which they feel themselves oppressed. In this case, the society in question loses its unity, and becomes torn by conflict, as opposing sectional interests fight for

supremacy. Even if the common good is defined simply as that which is willed by the majority, those who do not benefit, those whose will must be renounced, may still resent their lack of influence, and resort to an aggressive assertion of their own self-interest. The general will cannot be validated by the notion of the common good, for how is it to be recognised, and who is to say when it has been achieved? Those who have failed to benefit from the efforts to modify society according to its dictates would probably not recognise its existence. It remains a theoretical concept only, something to work towards, but never to be finally realised.

Blake's notion of the female will suggests why it would be difficult for the general will to prevail in any society, for it is not the conscious mind that determines the nature of the individual will, but the unconscious in the form of repressed feeling. Though consciously the individual may desire to behave according to moral and legal precepts, and though he may think he desires the good of other people, his unconscious desires set him against those who would thwart him. As we have seen in relation to *The Four Zoas*, Rousseau's plan for Émile would fail to free him from the influence of his unconscious desires without robbing him of his capacity for language, and the consciousness of his own existence. In addition, the repression of the female in eighteenth-century society, which Rousseau unambiguously defends, and the association of feeling with the feminine would have the effect of depriving the male of the capacity for sympathy, which allows the individual to put himself in the place of other people, and to require for them at least as much as he would require for himself. This is the unwritten condition that defends the social contract against the influence of individual selfishness.

In *Jerusalem* the divisive influence of the female will upon society is shown in the increasingly tyrannical figures that represent her, and this is seen to be a direct consequence of the need to obey the moral imperative, since it gives rise to the reservoir of unconscious energy in which these figures are embedded. They represent both matter, and the feminine principle embodied in the mother, from which the child separates in order to form a masculine identity, though the principles upon which it is based are not consciously realised. In *Jerusalem* the female will is embodied in the

Daughters of Albion, who at first unite in Vala, and then eventually materialise as Rahab and Tirzah. Morality turns Vala into a remote and inaccessible figure of delusory beauty, which lends her power, and it separates her from her full humanity, visible in the form of Jerusalem, from whom she divides early in Chapter 1. This division corresponds to the separation of body and soul – "For Vala produced the Bodies, Jerusalem gave the Souls" (18, 7, p.163). As we have seen in earlier chapters of this work, this is the equivalent of the female being judged solely on her appearance, whilst qualities of sympathy and compassion are confined to motherhood, and have no influence in society.[57] The horrendous forms of Rahab and Tirzah, the ultimate incarnations of the female will, which dominate *Jerusalem* as they do no other work, are symbols of "the terrible mother" encountered in Jung's account of the hero myth, whose numinous influence stems from the unconscious need to keep them at bay.[58] These figures appear when the pressures of unconscious energy build up because of the increasing resistance to them of the conscious mind. Their emergence accompanies the attempts to impose a rigid morality, which it is impossible to sustain.

The Daughters of Albion first make their presence felt early in Chapter I, when Los forces his spectre to labour with him against the divisive activities of the Sons of Albion, who have separated from their emanations. The twelve Sons are absorbed into "the mighty Hand", Blake's symbolic representation of the Hunt brothers, controllers of *The Examiner*, who criticised his work.[59] This tyrannical figure "Condensed his Emanations into hard opake substances; / And his infant thoughts & desires, into cold, dark, cliffs of death" (9, 1-2, p.152). His actions destroy all the energies of life, with "Every Emanative joy forbidden as a Crime: And the Emanations buried alive in the earth with pomp of religion: /Inspiration deny'd; Genius forbidden by laws of punishment" (9, 14-16, p.152). Moral inhibitions have repressed sexuality, and driven the emanations into the darkness of the unconscious,

[57] The powerlessness of these emotions to affect society is embodied particularly in the figure of Enion, whose significance is discussed in Chapter Five, p.171.
[58] Jung gives a full account of the origin of these chthonic female figures in his section entitled "The Negative Mother Complex", found on pp.99-109 of *Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious* (CW 9 i)
[59] These historical figures are mentioned on p.112 of Bloom's *The Visionary Company*.

from where they are powerless to animate existence, and provide the inspiration for imaginative thought. A repressive morality has robbed the Sons of vitality and energy, so that every human weakness is preserved and intensified, health destroyed, and the social bonds extinguished in hostility, and warfare. The separation of masculine and feminine principles, the creation of a gendered identity, in which feeling has been renounced as a feminine quality, is responsible for the devastation described, for the Sons have no means of reconnecting with the energetic sources of life.

The repression of feeling accompanying the imposition of the law, and the moral code, leads to the domination of the feminine principle, since whatever ideas are enshrined in sentiment thereafter become the motivating force for change, and in that sense there is no escaping from them. Any new movement is only a reaction to what came before, and then when this loses its momentum, only to be preserved in sentiment, it is replaced by the original dispensation. The idea that man is born and lives under female domination persists from the Lambeth Prophecies, and is a prominent feature of *The Mental Traveller*, where man is pictured reacting to the feminine in order to create a masculine identity[60]. In *Jerusalem* Los investigates the relationship between the sexes, by asking: "What may man be? Who can tell! But what may Woman be? / To have power over Man from Cradle to corruptible Grave" (30, 25-26, p.176). Los, nevertheless, implies that Albion is complicit in his own oppression when he asks: "O Albion why wilt thou Create a Female Will" (30, 31, p.176).

The domination of the feminine principle grows increasingly more destructive and malevolent in *Jerusalem*, as the male succumbs to the domination of the female will.. The rather disturbing tableau of the female weaving the body of the male is introduced intermittently throughout the work. The Daughters of Albion are described as being "united in Rahab and Tirzah" from whom they divided "into many lovely Daughters to be counterparts / to those they Wove, for when they Wove a Male, they divided / Into a Female to the Woven Male" (67, 8-10, p.220). The figures of Rahab

[60] I discuss "The Mental Traveller" in Chapter Four, pp. 123-127.

and Tirzah first made their appearance in *The Four Zoas* respectively as emblems of the constricting effects of established religion, and of nature's cruelty. The Daughters are identified with these figures, since their weaving grows out of the male's sense that nature is separate and opposed, a state perpetuated by the morality enshrined in religion and the law. The females undertake the weaving because the identity of the male arises in response to the ideas enshrined in repressed feeling, whilst femininity is viewed as the opposite of this woven identity. The question of a gendered identity is represented as a complex process of action and reaction, in which nature, morality and the law are all involved. Repression is responsible for producing both the notion that the masculine is an active category, as opposed to the passivity enjoined upon the female. The separation leads to social division, to the perpetuation of social injustice, and culminates in the ultimate expression of hostility, the ritualistic slaughter of other races in war. This is the condition embodied in the sadistic form of Tirzah, "weeping to hear the shrieks of the dying:" (67, 24, p.220). Both she and the Daughters of Albion relish the suffering of those martyred in the espousal of some deeply felt cause.

Though the opening up of the unconscious leads to the divisions described, paradoxically it also is the means of achieving a unity within the mind and in society. The much-lamented condition of Albion contains within itself the possibility of liberation. If the figures conceived as emblems of malevolence are regarded from a different perspective, the unconscious energy with which they are associated is released and becomes available for continuing mental activity. Figures that emerge through the detection of opposition become symbols of renewal when they are no longer seen as antithetical to each other. Hillman's view that order can be recovered from psychic phenomena if psychic images are returned to their imaginal background[61] is apposite in describing the process undertaken by Los when he begins his creative activity. The continued effort at creating a context for each of the archetypal figures inhabiting the psyche releases the repressed energy that each of them holds in place, and by moving sentiment beyond its established confines, turns it

[61] Hillman describes this method of thinking as "reversion through likeness". He gives a full account of its operations on p.4 of *The Dream and the Underworld.*

into a unifying rather than a divisive force. Mental patterns, established by the archetypes, continually emerge and overlap, so that details belonging to one configuration are disturbed and dispersed when regarded from a different perspective. The constant creation of the details suppressed in the formation of moral judgement has the effect of uniting the mind with all aspects of experience.

Relentless condemnation of the effects of the "wastes of moral law" resounds throughout *Jerusalem,* and the efforts of Los are directed continuously at undermining their divisive effects. His labours in building "the great city of Golgonooza" (12, 46, p.156) are for the purpose of creating and containing Albion's emanation, Jerusalem. Any hope of uniting the members of a community, according to the activities of Los, lies not in the imposition of morality, either ethically or legally, but in the kind of imaginative activity which works against the abstracting principles of rationality and the law. Time and again Golgonooza materialises in the midst of Ulro, and Jerusalem is briefly glimpsed as the city takes shape, only to disappear almost on the instant, as the world once again succumbs to the activities of the Sons and Daughters of Albion. Paradoxically, the community can only be united, if this unity is also subject to destruction. *Jerusalem* is permeated by a rhythmical ebb and flow, as form is created, only to be destroyed. The elusiveness of the emanation Jerusalem is inseparable from her function, which is to create a unity even through the psychic pressure which desires its dissolution. The rhythms of *Jerusalem* bring to mind Hillman's description of the Dionysian form of consciousness, in which clarity and permanence are abandoned in favour of a deeper and darker form of awareness, in which the inferiority of the feminine is valued as an aspect of the consciousness of both men and women, and in which the dismemberment of Dionysus represents "the fragments of consciousness strewn through all life" (*Myth* 279). According to Hillman: "A Dionysian ego must express bisexuality" (*Myth* 279), which makes itself felt as the libido comes and goes.

The solution envisaged in *Jerusalem* to the problem of social disunity involves using the imagination to break down the oppositions that create mutual hostility. In that sense, Jerusalem is both the soul of the community when its members are united in

mutual understanding, and it is the means of achieving such unity. Jerusalem is a soul figure, which materialises as a result of imaginative activity. Hillman notes that anima means both psyche and soul, though there is a distinction between them. The soul carries the connection between the outer world and its interior significance, the connection between mind and body, whereas psyche refers to all mental activity. Hillman defines soul as "that unknown component that makes meanings possible, turns events into experiences, is communicated in love and has a religious concern" (*Revisioning x*). Basing consciousness upon anima is the equivalent of soul-making, and this would appear to be the purpose of Los's perpetual building of the city of Golgonooza. Golgonooza is described as "Becoming a building of pity and compassion" (12, 29, p.155). The separate components of the city are joined together through beneficent feeling: "The stones are pity, and the bricks, well wrought affections: Enameld with love & kindness" (12, 30, p.155). As was noted in Chapter Five, feeling is that "function which brings object and subject into an evaluated relationship" (Hillman, *Anima 41*). It joins together the disparate members of the community, and reconciles the mind to the world from which it has previously separated. The activity of Los briefly succeeds in creating Jerusalem: "Lambeth! the Bride the lambs wife loveth thee: Thou art one with her & knowest not of self in thy supreme joy" (12, 41-42, p.155).

However, almost immediately following this moment of joyous reunion "Jerusalem wanders far away, Without the gate of Los: among the dark Satanic wheels" (12, 43-44, p.154). Golgonooza is always in the process of "Becoming a building of pity and compassion". Its completion is the moment of its destruction, and the beginning of a process of continual renewal. The elusive nature of Jerusalem is an integral part of her function. If she were to remain as a monument to the creative activities of Los, these would upon the instant cease, for "pity" and "well-wrought affections" would repress any further activity, and transform Los into an impotent embodiment of suffering and compassion. Unity, both of the mind and the community, consists in its constant dispersal, and Jerusalem as an anima figure, aids in this process. She is the incarnation of a "relatively constant process of assessment and valuation going on between consciousness and its contents" (Hillman, *Anima 41*). A fixed moral code,

such as that adopted by the Sons of Albion, would impede this process, for it would impose the conventional view, and there would be no means of progressing beyond it. Anima, however, "mediates psychic unconscious beyond reach or knowledge" (Hillman, *Anima* 133). "By leading whatever is known from off its solid footing, she carries every question into deeper waters, which is a way of soul-making" (Hillman, *Anima* 135). Weaving together the associative connections of fantasy images, an integral function of anima, leads the mind into obscure regions, where moral judgements no longer apply, and where feeling loses its capacity to impose a particular view. Anima "mediates the ceaseless movements of interiority" (Hillman, *Anima* 139). "She does not lead into human feeling, but out of it" (Hillman, *Anima* 47). Her contribution to soul-making principally involves distinguishing feeling from its human context, and establishing its impersonal origins in, for example, one's cultural and historical background.

The law inhibits this kind of mental flexibility, since it imposes a fixed view of human behaviour, and maintains the mind/world dichotomy, which is entrenched by gender divisions. The pressure for women to conform to a passive role links feeling with the impotence of sympathetic feelings, and denies to men the opportunity of moving beyond conventional values. *Jerusalem* echoes with the condemnation of "sexual organisation", the effect of the cultural definitions of masculinity and femininity upon consciousness itself, and upon social institutions. The repression of sexuality in the female is one effect of this kind of "sexual organisation", and the descriptions of its effects in the works of Blake find echoes within Wollstonecraft's most polemical work, *Vindications of the Rights of Woman*, discussed in Chapter Three. The later works of Wollstonecraft, *Maria* and *A Short Residence in Sweden*, return to the subject of women's oppression, where her earlier ambivalence about feeling, and her exaltation of reason, give way to a view of the liberating effect of the imagination, if it is combined with an acceptance of women's sexuality. Jerusalem's outcast state, which reflects the repression of feeling, and the impotence of such virtues as sympathy and compassion, is linked with the perception of her as a harlot. The Sons of Albion celebrate the triumph of Vala in her victory over Jerusalem. They acclaim her as "the Goddess Virgin-Mother" and label Jerusalem as their "harlot

sister" (18, 28-29, p.163). In a reversal of the standards of sexual morality held at the time, the woman who freely expresses desire, though the Sons call her a harlot, wins unalloyed approval. Wollstonecraft's unfinished novel, *Maria,* also presents with approval the actions of the heroine, who freely admits to her violation of the marriage laws, because her unfaithful and depraved husband had lost the right to her fidelity and respect. Society condemns her for failing to govern her emotions, and for disregarding the legal and moral principles that demanded her obedience, even though her submission to the law condemned her to servitude worse than imprisonment. The treatment of the heroine in the novel attacks the notion that feeling is only sanctioned in women when it accompanies a stifling of natural instinct.

Maria strenuously denies that "women can love their husbands because it is their duty, and condemns those "novelists or moralists who praise " as a virtue a woman's coldness of constitution, and want of passion" (Wollstonecraft, *Maria* 114). She adds that such women "may possess tenderness; but they want that fire of the imagination, which produces *active* sensibility, and *positive* virtue" (Wollstonecraft, *Maria* 114). Here a direct connection is emphasised between the imagination, and feeling as the basis of virtuous conduct, for it will permit an active identification with the situations of other people. Maria refuses to believe that virtue consists in passively adhering to the letter of the law on marriage, against all inclination and all self-interest. She maintains that such a dutiful liaison "is a mere affair of barter" somehow bound up with "the secrets of trade" (Wollstonecraft, *Maria* 114). Her disparagement of the mercenary element in such loveless marriages is echoed in *Jerusalem,* when the question is asked: "What is a Wife & What is a harlot?" (57, 8, p.207). The division between the wife and the harlot is undermined by the implication that they are both the same thing. A woman who marries for material gain sells herself like a harlot, while a woman who marries from desire expresses the sensuality that society condemns in the so-called fallen woman. The condemnation of the latter represents the pressure of social forces to enforce female passivity, which means that a woman had no choice but to marry for material gain. In both *Jerusalem,* and *Maria,* repression of woman's sexuality results in an undeveloped imagination, which ultimately guarantees that feeling will remain a repressive force.

In *A Short Residence in Sweden*, the dramatic northern landscape in which Wollstonecraft finds herself inspires musings upon how the imagination animates the world and preserves the connection with it through sentiment. Like Blake, Wollstonecraft attributes to the imagination the capacity for discovering in nature the form and shape that will endow meaning upon an otherwise inhuman landscape. On first sighting the shore of a small island at the beginning of her northern journey, she describes the appearance of some "huge, dark rocks, that looked like the rude materials of creation forming the barrier of unwrought space" (Wollstonecraft, *Residence* 65). We are reminded of the representation in *Jerusalem*, and in other works of Blake, of rock as the material that underlies the form of the world, though it remains the one most resistant to the imagination. As part of Albion's disintegration "every little particle of light & air, became Opake / Black & immense, a rock of difficulty & a Cliff / Of black despair" (39, 44 p.186). Later on in the same passage Wollstonecraft regrets that those who live "so near to brute creation ... have little or no imagination to call forth the curiosity necessary to fructify the faint glimmerings of mind which entitles then to rank as lords of creation. – Had they either, they would not contentedly remain rooted in the clods they so indolently cultivate" (*Residence* 65). She sees the immersion of the inhabitants in the soil of their homeland as evidence of their inability to endow nature with any meaning beyond that of the provider of their basic needs. She thinks that they lack the imagination to aspire beyond the clods of their native soil. It is as though they are, like the Sons of Albion, formed by nature, instead of making it conform to their own perceptions of it.

These perceptions, however, are also predetermined, as can be seen from Wollstonecraft's own observations. Her emotional response to the landscape is linked with her imagination: "Whatever excites emotion has charms for me; though I insist that the cultivation of the mind, by warming, nay almost creating the imagination, produces taste, and an immense variety of sensations and emotions, partaking of the exquisite pleasure inspired by beauty and sublimity" (*Residence* 123). It is difficult to distinguish here the place of feeling in her appreciation of the surrounding landscape. Do the feelings create the imagination, or is the imagination the progenitor of the capacity to respond to the landscape's beauty and sublimity? We may be reminded

here of the incessant weaving carried out in *Jerusalem* by the Daughters of Albion, as they create the bodies of the Sons. The identity of the sons arises in response to the sentiments that give a meaning to nature.

As in *Jerusalem*, feeling in Wollstonecraft's view creates the imagination, whilst simultaneously hindering its workings. In Wollstonecraft's words: "When a warm heart has received strong impressions thy are not to be effaced. Emotions become sentiments; and the imagination renders even transient emotions permanent by fondly retracing them" (*Residence* 100). Permanent sentiments would usurp the imagination's function yet, on the other hand, the imagination also releases the hold of sentiment: "I must fly from thought, and find refuge from sorrow in a strong imagination – the only solace for a feeling heart. Phantoms of bliss! ideal forms of excellence! again enclose me in your magic circle, and wipe clear from my remembrance the disappointments which render the sympathy painful, which experience rather increases than damps; by giving the indulgence of feeling the sanction of reason!" (Wollstonecraft, *Residence* 129). Though here Wollstonecraft identifies the imagination with an escape from experience, rather than with its ability, in Blakean terms, to confer significance upon it, she still sees it as the means of release from the oppressive influence of feeling.

Imagination and feeling, according to Wollstonecraft, participate in a pattern of entrapment and release that accords with the effect of the creativity of Los in *Jerusalem*. She sees imagination, and the momentum attached to feeling, as integral to the activity of the mind, and not something that affirms the identity of the creative male artist. As Wollstonecraft insists in her *Vindication*, it cannot be proved that "there is sex in souls" (*Vindication* 151), and for that reason "the sexual should not destroy the human character" (*Vindication* 142). Though there are contradictions in Blake's work in the subject of sexuality and gender, often because of the many layers of meaning he tries to combine at any one time, his expressed intention is to reveal that: "Humanity is far above sexual organisation" (79, 73-74, p.236). Despite the difficulties of interpretation, this relatively clear statement on the matter, which closely resembles Wollstonecraft's views and mode of expression, should be taken

seriously. The connection between imagination and sentiment that Wollstonecraft discloses in her descriptions of nature is echoed in the interactions of wrath and pity, the movement that permeates *Jerusalem*, and which combines the active and the passive drive, the characteristics that are separated in the acquisition of gender, but which can cooperate to keep the imagination constantly on the move.

Jerusalem, therefore, more than any other of Blake's works, exemplifies the Dionysian style of consciousness, which Hillman thinks would remove the stigma attached to the feminine, and re-establish it as an integral part of the psyche. Union within the community depends upon a continual psychic movement aimed at the dispersal of any fixed, oppressive view, and such flexibility requires the breaking-down of gender divisions. The ebb and flow of Dionysian consciousness, in which conscious contents become subject to a continual process of destruction, appears to inform the dynamics of *Jerusalem*. Androgyny, or bi-sexuality, is the main characteristic of the Dionysian mode, for the male and female "are primordially united", as they are in alchemy, "where consciousness was united with matter from the start" (Hillman, *Myth* 247). According to Hillman, "One of the names for Dionysus was 'The Undivided'" (*Myth* 266), and in one of his forms, he is "man and woman in one person" (*Myth* 258). Dionysus is connected with underworld depths, and represents the backward flow of libido, which dismantles the consciously held view, and opens the way for renewal. As "Dionysus is the God par excellence of comings and goings" (Hillman, *Myth 284)*, he represents the movements of libido, which the ego cannot control, and which are "natural and necessary to the libido itself" (Hillman *Myth* 285). The libido was often considered masculine and active, but Dionysian consciousness is "double in nature (as Dionysus) with a passive constituent as well as an active one", which corresponds to the tidal momentum, as Dionysus "is again destroyed and again reborn" (Hillman, *Myth* 280).

The surging momentum of *Jerusalem*, as the libido ebbs and recedes, is rehearsed in the tension between wrath and pity, a conflict that pervades each new movement of the text. Los appears to sanction the healing and emollient power of pity. He says of Albion's sons: "They have divided themselves by Wrath: they must be united by

Pity:" (7, 57-58, p.150), and he wishes that he "could abstain from wrath!" (7, 59, p.150). However, it is the energy generated by his antagonism to "the terrible sons & daughters of Albion" (5, 26, p.147), the list of whose names echo resoundingly through the text, that stimulates the continual building of Golgonooza. The building becomes possible primarily because he diverts this anger against himself, and instead of desiring to destroy his enemies, he uses it as the means to undo its divisive effects. Hence it is the Spectre, the sign of his own self-division, who bears the brunt of his anger. After dividing from Los, the Spectre "sought by other means to lure Los" (7, 6, p.149) away from his obsession with Albion's fate, telling him that his "deceitful friendship" to Albion had only succeeded in destroying him. "Wilt thou still go on to destruction? / the Spectre asks" (7, 9, p.149). The Spectre questions the dubious nature of a friendship that originates in terror and contempt, which has divided Los, and reduced him to the same state as the terrible Sons he deplores.

He, however, is not taken in by the Spectre's argument, which represents, in effect, Los's own reluctance to undertake self-sacrificial creativity. "Thou art my Pride & self-righteousness:" (8, 30, p.151), Los declares. "Take thou this Hammer & in patience heave the thundering Bellows" (8, 39, p.131). The building of Golgonooza demands an effort of the will, which Los exerts against his own inertia, and in the fierce melting-pot of his furnaces, Los beholds "the soft affections / Condense ... into forms of cruelty" (10, 26-27, p.153). Paradoxically the process of building destroys the hold of sentiment on established ideas. Creativity implies destruction: they both inhere in each other. Los's intention to "Create a System" lest he be "enslaved by another man's" (10, 20-22, p.153) exposes the limitations of that system, and means that "he who will not defend Truth, may be compelld to defend / A lie" (9, 29- 30, p.152). The lie is only revealed when the system exceeds those portions of experience it attempts to explain, and itself counters its own claim to represent the truth. In this way, any oppressive unity may be dispelled.

Though destruction and creation coincide, the creation of a system is deemed an act of pity, as though the attempts to forge a unity through synthesis animate the psyche, permitting identification rather than division. As Los explains: "Pity must join

together those whom wrath has torn in sunder, / and the Religion of Generation which was meant for the destruction / of Jerusalem, become her covering, till the time of the End" (7, 62-64, p.50). Pity and forgiveness coincide with the regressive movement of libido, in which mental imagery unites into a pattern through association, without any intervention from the will. This movement stimulates "'the natural mind' where we do not think but are thought" and "where judgement and flashes of insight are transmitted by unconscious activity" (Hillman, *Anima* 85).

Hence the decision to "Create a system" as an act of will is aided by a release of the will, in which connections between mental imagery endow natural life, the Religion of Generation, with meaning, and create a covering by which the meaning can be perceived. This covering corresponds to a story - "the phenomenon before us is given a narrative, and all explanations whatsoever may be regarded as narrative fantasies and examined as myths" (Hillman, *Revisioning* 139). As Hillman implies, once the covering has been created, all but the sentiment to which it is attached can easily dissolve, and become lost in the recesses of the mind, a movement aided by anima in its role of mediating consciousness. At this point, as we have seen, sentiment becomes repressive, and the covering Jerusalem has helped create appears to be that of nature, or "Generation", in the words of Los. This perception would precipitate the fall from Beulah to Ulro, if it were not for the active aspect of libido, which is prompted to create another system, building upon those aspects of experience excluded from the previous one held in place by repressed feeling. In this sense, Jerusalem as a personification of soul can only be apprehended through a covering, through continual creativity, which reveals that only parts of nature can be apprehended at any one time.

Frye describes the kind of creativity exemplified in *Jerusalem* as building "the Body of Divine Analogy" (49, 58, p.199). The use of the word body implies the discovery of a unity, but once again this is achieved through dispersal. Jehovah, who is Blake's Jesus, out of forgiveness builds "the body of Moses in the Valley of Peor" (49, 57, p.199). In *Milton* Urizen and Milton struggled there as Milton attempted to humanize the law. Frye defines the analogy as "the conception of the world of experience, as a

parody or an inverted form of the imaginative world" (Symmetry 338). The analogy is like a reflection in a mirror, "a surface which reveals reality in fewer dimensions than it actually has" (Symmetry 382). Frye cites for illustration some of *Jerusalem's* recurring symbols: "history and the law are the analogy of the word, Canaan the analogy of the Promised land, Antichrist the analogy of Christ" (Symmetry 383). The analogy represents the world simplified for understanding by the operations of reason, and the effects of language. Any idea which seems to describe reality is regarded as a vantage point for the elaboration of the complexity from which it is derived. The impulse is to open out what rationality conceals.

The analogy's reflected surface corresponds to the negation, "a distorted & reversed Reflexion in the Darkness (17, 42, p.162), which Los insists does not exist: "Exceptions & Objections & Unbeliefs / Exist Not" (17, 34-35, p.162). The vision exists in its entirety, and any element that does not belong to it, any exception or objection, destroys the vision's integrity, and therefore does not exist. Existence is only affirmed by participation in an imaginative whole. Another version of the idea of analogy declares that: "There is an Outside spread Without, & an Outside spread within / Beyond the Outline of Identity both ways, which meet in One: / An orbed Void of doubt, despair, hunger & thirst & sorrow" (18, 2-4, p.162). The details visible in the outer world point back to the preconception that brings them into being. In Hillman's words: "Seeing is believing, but believing is seeing" (*Myth 221*), for theory-forming "is limited even less by observational data than by the archetypal *a priori* dominants of the imagination that determine how and what one observes" (*Myth* 220).

Those in Great Eternity in Chapter 2 of *Jerusalem* express the same idea, but rather more succinctly: "What seems to Be: Is" (32, 51, p.179). Observational data, which validate one's preconceptions, draw attention to this same data in the first place. Such preconceptions inhabit the "orbed Void of doubt", a collection of general notions that mislead us about the nature of the world, and create "An outside shadowy Surface superadded to the real Surface" (83, 47, p.242). A creation of the details composing this shadowy surface reveal the preconceptions holding it in place, and because there

are more data than is suggested by our preconceptions, show how these underplay the richness and complexity of experience. The "Outside spread Without" corresponds to the "Outside spread Within", but opening what is within beyond the "Outline of Identity" through creative activity changes the perception of what is without. This process involves the creation of a unity, "a body", for without this experience of unity, it would not be possible to see what lies beyond it. As the Voice Divine proclaims of Satan: "You cannot behold him till he be reveald in his System" (43, 10, p.190). However, this unity is dissolved as soon as Satan, or the Spectre, is revealed, for he points to the delusive nature of any unified ordering, which is more poetically described in *Jerusalem* as "Giving a body to Falshood that it may be cast off for ever" (12, 13, p.155).

Creating and destroying such false bodies in *Jerusalem* is aimed at undermining the validity of moral judgements, thus working against the hostility and antagonism so destructive of any sense of community. In particular, this mental activity is aimed at the sense of self-righteous rectitude that excludes all who do not conform to the accepted code of moral values. Rousseau's codification of the law, according to the general will, might be intended to unite the community by the encouragement of fellow-feeling, and by the renunciation of individual wills for the good of the whole community, but it will not prevent people from acting on unconscious principles, transgressing against the law, and earning the disapprobation of the moral majority. It will, according to the ideas encountered in *Jerusalem*, and other works of Blake, divide the community, rather than unite it.

Against the moralising judgement that reduces all human behaviour to the same standard, a tendency underlined in the operations of the law, *Jerusalem* advocates the creation of the contexts of individual behaviour, so that the inapplicability of standardised moral judgements become visible. This is the implication of the doctrine of states. The Divine voice is heard from the furnaces declaring: "I go forth to Create / states: To deliver Individuals evermore!" (31, 155-16, p.178). Simultaneously "a Man was seen in the Furnaces: / Saving those who have sinned from the punishment of the law. / (In pity of the punisher whose state is eternal death)" (31, 5-7, p.177).

The creation of states produces a unity, a system, in which Satan is finally revealed, as an exception, leading to the destruction of the prevailing state. The emphasis is not so much upon saving the sinner, however, as upon rescuing the judge from the repressive consequences of his own judgement, from "eternal death".

The doctrine of states in many ways resembles Hillman's notion of psychological creativity, in which creating an imaginative context for one's own state of mind reveals its archetypal dominant. Since "archetypal psychology envisions the fundamental ideas of the psyche to be expressions of persons" (Hillman *Revisioning* 128), the process of personification highlights the idea conditioning each state of mind. However, as we have seen in Chapter Six, personifications are not seen in opposition to each other, but in tandems, which highlight, rather than contradict each other. The archetype loses its unifying function when the continuing amplification of its context moves imagery beyond the scope of one archetype, and into the realm of another. This movement is made possible by the archetype's "almost limitless wealth of reference, which makes any unilateral formulation impossible" (Hillman, *Revisioning* 157). Hillman calls this process "seeing through" and describes it as "dissolving the identification with one of the many insistent voices, that fill us with ideas and feelings, steering fate on its behalf" (*Revisioning* 139). As soon as the provisional nature of any idea becomes clear, it loses its hold upon our psyche, and releases us from its influence. The effect is that "we begin to see ideas, rather than seeing by means of them" (*Revisioning* 140). According to this view, moral judgements become visible as the ideas dominating our vision, when we can trace them back from their effects.

Jerusalem itself proclaims the foundation of archetypal theory.

> All things acted on Earth are seen in the bright sculptures of
> Los's Halls & every Age renews its powers from these works
> With every pathetic story possible to happen from Hate or
> Wayward Love & every sorrow & distress is carved here

Every affinity of Parent's Marriages & Friendships are here

In all their various combinations wrought with wondrous Art

All that can happen to a man in his pilgrimage of seventy years
(16, 61-67, p.161).

These lines indicate that all of life's experiences relate to fundamental patterns which pre-exist the events themselves, and with whose aid they can be understood. Life's events act out the many varieties of human relationships, and "the bright sculptures of Los's Halls" display the personified figures, the archetypes, "in all their various combinations", whose interactions act as a blueprint for the imaginative interpretation of human life. The archetypes may foreshadow experience, but they are only responsive to creative expression. The building of the city of Golgonooza brings them into being, and though they remain "permanent, & not lost nor vanished" (13, 59-60, p.158), "to those who dwell not" in the buildings of Golgonooza, they exist only in the form of "meer possibilities:" (13, 64, p.158). The possibility remains of recreating "All that has existed in the space of six thousand years" (13, 59, p.157), but only through the constant creation and destruction of the many patterns to which everything belongs.

The status of the feminine remains inseparable from these imaginative possibilities, both as the feminine qualities indispensable for creativity, according to cultural definitions, and as the personification of the figure who represents the soul. Both of these functions are embodied in the form of Jerusalem. In this sense the feminine underlies the possibility of social harmony. The two figures, Jerusalem and Vala respectively, represent the aspects of the feminine that, on the one hand, create, and on the other hand destroy, the possibility of a unified society, though the destructive aspects of Vala, as we shall later see, eventually participate in the psychic disintegration that leads to renewal, the movement underlying social harmony. As Los points out, nothing is lost. In *Jerusalem*, however, the feminine is no longer presented as a the opposite against which definition of identity may be made, but an integral part of identity itself, whether of the male or of the female. This is the

implication of Mary's words as she addresses Jerusalem: "Man in the Resurrection changes his Sexual Garments at will" (61, 52, p.212). Though the use of the word "sexual" confuses the issue, its association with garments suggests that Man changes his gendered identity, in order to bring about renewal, not necessarily so that "he could enjoy the pleasures of being made love to by a male" (*Psychology* 283), as Webster suggests in her sometimes over-literal interpretation of the text.

The change of perspective implied by the swapping of sexual garments returns us to Hillman's ideas on the feminine. He shows how a flexibility of viewpoint can dispel the usual opposition between the organising mind, and inert matter through the "simultaneous perception by the perspectives of life and death, the natural and the psychic" (*Dream* 79). The conjunction between masculine and feminine as envisaged in Jung's syzygy, discussed in earlier chapters, " is replaced by "a peculiar union of inner viewpoints. Through this union, identity of opposites becomes apparent. We see the hidden connection between what had hitherto been oppositions" (*Dream* 79). In analysing the feminine, Hillman draws an attention to the union of the psychic and the material in the feminine figures used to represent nature. This approach to the feminine has particular relevance for *Jerusalem*, with its explorations of the meaning of national identity. Hillman distinguishes between three spheres of influence that may pertain to the feminine, though he emphasises the impossibility of distinguishing each one clearly from the others. These are:

> "Demeter's horizontal green plain with its activities of growth and Ge, the earth below Demeter. This second level, Ge, may be imagined as the physical and psychic ground of an individual or community, its 'place on earth,' with its natural rights, rituals and laws (Ge-Themis). Here, Ge serves as a fundament in which human life depends even more deeply than on food and fertility. Ge would be like the rituals and laws that guarantee fertility, like a governing maternal principle that makes material fertility possible and is its spiritual ground, and beneath these the third, chthon, the depths, the dead's world (Hillman, *Dream* 36).

In *Jerusalem* Vala, Jerusalem, and the figures of Rahab and Tirzah represent the three layers of significance, though just as Hillman suggested, it is not possible to divide the levels equally between them. Rahab and Tirzah *are* chthonic figures, but Vala and Jerusalem between them embody the characteristics of Ge. Vala is both nature, and the legal and moral foundation of society, whilst Jerusalem is the natural ground of the community held together by a fostering, maternal spirit. In *Jerusalem*, the law is not envisaged as an adequate basis for social unity, and so Vala is deprived of maternal associations. The text, however, presents the possibility of the union of these two figures. Jerusalem reminds Vala of the time when she "redounded from Albion's bosom" to be received into the arms of the "Lamb of God", whilst he simultaneously gave Vala to Albion (20, 38-40, p.165). This suggests that the land itself can become the basis of national identity when this is based upon imaginative activity, which acts against the divisiveness of the law. In this sense the feminine, which Hillman associates with "the imaginatively fertile" (*Dream 45*), as well with nature's fertility, is the basis of a unified society.

The potential for imagination lies within nature itself: in *Jerusalem*, the two realms are not presented as oppositions. The sons and Daughters of Los "have a beautiful golden gate which opens into the vegetative world", as well as "a gate of rubies and all precious stones", and "a gate of iron dreadful and wonderful" which again connects with the world of nature" (14, 16-23, p.158). Though "the western gate in them (the Sons and Daughters) is clos'd (14, 26, p.158), which indicates that nature in itself can never be fully apprehended, the three other gates permit the absorption of images that reflect the natural world. Imagery enters and leaves the mind as material for imaginative activity: images can only be perceived with the imagination, and as Hillman points out, they are not sense images, but "images as metaphors" (*Dream* 54). When images are taken as literal representations of the natural world, instead of the means by which nature is apprehended, they impose a view that prevents the movement of libido upon, which the imagination depends. The imposition of moral laws leads to a literal, one-sided view of human behaviour, for it again represses libidinal movement, and separates nature from its imaginative form, to create an illusory identity between the physical features of the land and the unity of the nation,

as though the nation were merely the territory it claims as its own. Vala's "Veil of Moral Virtue, woven for Cruel Laws" (23, 23, p.168) is the illusion that surface is all, and that the nation is only visible in what can be seen, the land itself. The veil also hides secret and hidden impulses, and represents the repression which forbids that they should be brought into the light. Obedience to the law creates the illusion of moral virtue, but actually conceals the urge to transgress, which is the hidden underside of an overtly self-righteous posture.

To reinforce the delusory nature of moral rectitude, the figure of Vala is made to exude false righteousness, sham sincerity, and secret cruelty. Her hypocrisy comes to light in her relations with Jerusalem, for whom Vala exhibits a sympathy that is obviously insincere. She addresses Jerusalem as "my sister and my daughter", and consoles her in her outcast state, by offering to share in her degradation: "thy shame is mine also! / Ask me not of my griefs! Thou knowest all my griefs" (20, 19-20, p. 165). Vala leaves unspoken her own part in the sorrows she feels bound to share through her imputations of sin, as Jerusalem's tearful attempts at defending herself make clear. "Oh, if I have Sinned / Forgive & pity me! O! unfold thy Veil in mercy & love!" Removing the veil involves revealing the sinful impulses that are hidden behind a rigidly moralistic exterior, an action which would encourage genuine rather than simulated sympathy. It is the movement that leads to reconciliation between individuals in society through sincere and mutual feeling.[62] Later in Chapter 2 Vala's deluded notions about her role in perpetuating the unity of Albion are also revealed when she declares that she "was Albion's Bride & Wife in great Eternity" (29, 39, p.175). She paints a picture of herself as a "City & a Temple built by Albion's children" (29, 36, p.175), and "a Garden planted with beauty" (29, 388, p.175), the inspiration for the River of Life, which she says used "to flow against my walls & among my trees" (29, 37, p.175). Again she fails to mention that her role in presenting the inspirational attractiveness of external appearances is only creative if it leads others to move beyond an identification with the external, and therefore achieve

[62] The emphasis on sincerity as a means of uniting society is a feature of Godwin's social philosophy, expressed in *Political Justice*, pp. 312-13, with the difference that Godwin's sincerity involves censorship, rather than sympathy.

a greater knowledge and understanding than would be otherwise possible: in other words, if Vala and Jerusalem are one.

The unpleasantness of simulated sympathy, and the folly of taking the surface appearance for reality, is fully revealed in the battle scene described in Chapter 3: "Now: now the battle rages round thy tender limbs O Vala / Now smile among thy bitter tears: now put on all thy beauty / Is not the wound of the sword sweet! & the broken bone delightful?" (65, 29-31, p.216). The hostility towards others underlying the false expression of sympathy, and the assumption of a self-righteous posture, culminates in outright and brutal warfare, in this case, as Erdman makes clear, in the Napoleonic wars, which are elided with the wars of early European history. Erdman considers that the effect of allusions to battles "scattered without regard for chronology is to ...extend the war over time and space and erase any finality from the concept of victory" (431). In the presentation of the battles, nevertheless, Erdman detects disapproval of England's role in opposing French ambitions, on the grounds that: "Albion and his league of robbers deny the legitimacy of revolutionary government" (431). These comments appear to validate the antagonism underlying revolution, whilst undermining the hostility expressed in war. However, both revolution and warfare are presented in *Jerusalem* as the outcome of the opposition of mind and matter, which produces the circular movement attached to history, the effect of investing a faith in surface appearance. Vala, as we have seen, demonstrates the delusory element in the notion of opposition. It is based upon a false belief in one's own moral rectitude, and in the kind of certainty that justifies violent reaction. Vala's hypocritical expressions of sympathy for the suffering that she herself has justified through the maintenance of her own rectitude here destroy the moral pretensions attached to the pursuit of warfare. Though she appears to lament the suffering involved in battle, she does not detect that the divisions created by the moral position she upholds are its direct progenitors, nor that her lamentations hide a covert enjoyment of the suffering of others, because of the release of repressed energy brought about by her observation of their anguish.

Vala's divisive influence is evident in the perception of the physical features of the land, in so far as it is an expression of national unity. This aspect of *Jerusalem* acquires more significance than in earlier works, where physical nature was treated as a symbolical representation of particular states of mind. This element is still present in *Jerusalem*, but now it assumes a greater impact in its influence on the formation of national identity. Descriptions of Ulro, the "Vegetative Universe," pervade the work, though quite early on in Chapter I, this world is described as the mirror image of Eternity, given creative impetus by interactions with the Satanic Wheels, the "Abstract voids between the Stars" (13, 37, p.157), with their potential for sabotaging any oppressive and divisive unity. A unity of apprehension, once it freezes into actuality, leads to a world of separated and ominous objects: "There is the Cave; the Rock; the Tree; the Lake of Udan Adan;" (13, 38, p.157). As was noted in Chapter Four, in relation to Jung's account of the significance of the hero myth, these are all mother analogies thrown up when the progress of libido is blocked by the incest prohibition, and assume numinous associations because they become embedded in a mesh of inhibited energy. The world of separated objects suggests the domination of the spiritual, symbolic level of existence, instituted by the patriarchal principle, and denotes the subjugation of maternal values of nurture and care. The whole of nature then appears in an oppressive form, "when winter rends the hungry family and the snow falls:" (20, 12, p.165).

Attempts to unify these separated objects according to general principles only succeed in trapping energy just as effectively as the rock, the cave and the tree. The activities of the sons of Albion produce "A mighty Polypus growing over the whole Earth" (15, 4, p.159). "The veil of moral virtue, woven for Cruel Laws" (23, 22, p.168) creates the perception of the domination of natural processes, of the cycle of existence, of the rhythms of growth and decay, and effectively deprives man of any role in determining his own fate. The triumphant song of the Daughters of Albion as they celebrate their "power over Man from Cradle to corruptible Grave" (56, 3, p.206) pictures the world as "all a cradle for the erred wandering phantom" (56, 8, p.206). The Daughters' self-delusion enables them to present themselves as agents of nature's nurturing and protective role, but the cradle is made "of the grass that

withereth away", and their promises to nourish and shelter can never be fulfilled. The notion of the world as a cradle merely indicates the Daughters' desire to preserve nature's dominance by keeping the male in a state of dependence, but this has the opposite effect to the one intended. The male reacts by instituting a moral code, intended to overturn nature's dominance, but this in the end leads him back into nature's hands, when repressed energy returns in the form of violent self-assertion. Sacrifices to the angry god Jehovah whom nature maintains in power are the price of the attempts of the nation to define itself by the aid of the law. As Los declares: "Albion is the Tabernacle of Vala & her Temple / And not the Tabernacle & Temple of the Most High" (30, 29-30, p.176). Attempts to preserve the land as a holy place consecrated to nature worship rebound and instead turn nature into "Druid Temples" characterised by "Patriarchal Pillars & Oak Groves" (27, p.171). The bloodshed of warfare supposedly assuages vengeful nature and ensures her continuing fertility.

The creative efforts of Los are aimed at restoring nature's maternal role, which is embodied in the figure of Jerusalem. This he does by discovering the human meaning attached to the physical ground. The territory that unifies the nation is defined not by its features alone, but by an understanding of the mythical history enacted there according to written and oral records. Divine Analogy not only creates, from the point of view of Los, a cultural identity for the Jewish people, animating the inanimate features of the landscape of Canaan, but it also creates a similar identity for Albion, by relating British myth, and the land it occupies, to its supposedly Jewish equivalent. The work of Los begins in the process of division, as his furnaces reduce Albion to its separate identifiable regions, so that these may be inserted into Biblical myth. Each of the counties of England, Scotland and Wales are identified with one or several of the Sons of Israel, and Reuben himself, the natural man, takes up residence in Albion, and in Canaan, between "the Limit Noah to the Limit Abram" (15, 26, p.159). These limits correspond to the natural cycle, the "Water-wheels of Newton" (15, 16, p.159) and the "Loom of Locke" (15, 15, p.158), and highlight the common element in both countries that leads to the destruction of Jerusalem. By exploring the associations of Reuben, Los recreates the "minute particulars" of Albion's present situation, and in

this way he undertakes the kind of activity that will restore the nurturing spirit of Jerusalem, and therefore begin the process of Albion's recovery.

As Christine Gallant points out, the void of earlier works, such as *The Book of Urizen* has now been replaced by another form of chaos. In *Jerusalem* "characters endure the horrors of modern warfare, industrialism, and the revolutionary political climate of early nineteenth century England" (155). Gallant attributes the increase in these horrors to "Albion's resistance to the descent into the unconscious, and his struggle to deny its existence in himself" (155). His insistence on the rigid application of the law is the direct result of his efforts to keep the unconscious, with its illicit desires, at bay. Los, on the other hand, connects with the unconscious when he accepts the conditions he sees all around him, and discovers "Every Minute Particular hardened into grains of sand" (45, 20, p.194). His attempts to search "the interiors of Albions / bosom" (45, 3-4, p.194) uncover the extent to which the richness of individual existence has been narrowed and confined by the moral judgements the members of the community impose upon each other. He explores the circumstances responsible for the chaotic conditions he is forced to endure, and as Gallant observes, "though Los dos not turn away from this chaos, neither does he succumb to it, for he always sees its 'minute particulars' and then goes on building" (164). The building of Golgonooza recreates the details appertaining to his vision, and sites them within a particular archetypal structure, which reveals the perspective from which his judgements have taken shape. This process is similar to the method Hillman advocates for the exploration of the contents of the unconscious. He describes it as "reversion through likeness ... a method which connects an event to its image" and which "offers to psychological understanding a main avenue for recovering order from the confusion of psychic phenomena" (*Dreams* 4).

Jerusalem as the means of connecting together the separate individuals in society, as the individual and collective soul, is created, therefore, by an imaginative expansion of the conditions that prevail in Albion, though the order in these details, detected by a flash of intuitive insight, is necessarily destroyed by the effects of further expansion, as we have seen. The nurturing and protective qualities associated with

Jerusalem can only be preserved as a bi-product of creative activity, and not as its main aim. Throughout *Jerusalem*, the character herself always appears as an impotent, and elusive embodiment of suffering, of feeling, which would, without creativity, permanently separate the oppressor and the oppressed, the observer and what is observed. A vivid portrayal of Jerusalem "closd in the Dungeons of Babylon" (60, 39, p. 210) testifies to the vulnerability of the sympathetic emotion she invariably expresses. It leaves her always at the mercy of the conditions in which she finds herself. At this point of the narrative we are told that: "She sat at the Mills, her hair unbound her feet naked / Cut with the flints: / her tears run down, her reason grows like / The Wheel of Hand (60, 50-52, p.210). She is permanently oppressed by her identification with Albion's suffering and her own sense of guilt, despite the reassuring words of the Saviour intended to restore her self-belief. Compassion promotes identification, but this unity must be transcended, if it is not to culminate in separation from all those aspects of experience not included within it.

The figures of Rahab and Tirzah appear to assume this destructive, and therefore creative role. Though closely connected with the Demeter – Ge configuration, these two figures show signs of the chthonic influence that Hillman associates with the feminine, and which he ascribes to the mythological figure of Hekate. She is the "Goddess who makes sacred the wastes of life, so that it all counts, it all matters" (*Dream 40*). Associated with the underworld realm of Hades, which is also the dream-world, or the 'dayworld' turned upside down, she presides over the chaos that remains when consciousness begins to disintegrate and lose its distinctive pattern. Hillman describes day remnants as "the junk of the soul" and affirms that "the messy life is a way of entering her domain and becoming 'a child of Hekate'" (*Dream* 40). Hillman emphasises that the chthonic level of the psyche should not be seen from a literal perspective, and translated "with naturalistic ethics into a moralized world" (*Dream 42*), for the worship of Hekate was originally without morality. The underworld has its Dionysian perspective, and the fantasy presided over by Hekate, the underground world of images, reflects the "pornographic desires of the psyche" (Hillman *Dream* 45), as the hidden psychic effects of how everyday life is lived. The world of Hekate, in other words, arises in reaction to the need to conform to morality.

and provides a psychic release for repressed energies. The images of this world are "not fertile in the natural sense, but in the psychic sense, imaginatively fertile" (*Dream 45*).

In *Jerusalem* the Daughters of Albion unite in the figures of Rahab and Tirzah, as the repressive influence of morality, embodied in Vala, eventually takes on an increasingly gruesome and horrific form. The chaos over which the two chthonic figures preside turns out to be that of warfare, in which the feminine figures exult in the suffering of their male victims in a display of chilling sadism. Though the warriors are intent upon mutual destruction, sacrificing each other "on the Druid altars" (65, 63, p.217), the participation of the female is implied, for "lovely sport the Daughters round their Victims; / Drinking their lives in sweet intoxication" (65, 64-65, p.217). All the destructive activities of the Daughters in their final reincarnation as Rahab and Tirzah emphasise their disintegrative effects. The divesting of their garments, their use of "the knife of flint" (66, 20, p.218) to torture their victim, and to "take off his vesture whole" (66, 26, p.218), the mutilation of his body all point to the notion that a destructuring of the soul is taking place. This factor highlights the symbolic meaning of the crucifixion, as outlined by Jung in his account of the hero myth, discussed in Chapter Four, in which the cross is the symbol of the deadly mother, to whom in death the hero offers no resistance. He carries himself to the grave, from which he will ultimately rise again: in the same way the destructuring of the soul implies renewal.

The implications of the depredations of Rahab and Tirzah are disturbing, however, and seem to suggest the existence in the world of a vast pool of malevolent feeling in which both the female herself, and the poet are implicated, and in which they both take open and perverse delight. Margaret Storch points to the unequal treatment meted out to the male and female in sequences such as these. She thinks that his depiction of female malevolence indicates some profound disturbance in Blake's own relationship with the opposite sex, suggesting that "fear and awe of women is the dominant emotion behind Blake's critique of society" (237). It may appear that the

cruelty depicted in his feminine figures is the cause and condition of all the misery human beings inflict on each other. Storch writes:

> Apart from Urizen, the male figures suffer while female figures in the fallen state are often active principles of evil. The mother against whom Blake feels such rage for the frustration of love and desire exerts her influence in every aspect of his experience: in her withholding of maternal comfort; in her withholding of sexual gratification which for the adult male is the counterpart of maternal consolation; and in her associated suppression of sensuous response to the natural world, which is an extension of herself" (237).

This analysis ignores the mythological basis of the figures inhabiting Blake's work. Although the existence of such images as Rahab and Tirzah testifies to a difficult relationship with the feminine, because of the repression that accompanies consciousness of self, they do not necessarily tell us very much about Blake's own personal feelings, stemming from his relationship with his own mother. If mythological evidence is to be believed, the difficulty is universal, and as Hillman points out, it necessarily accompanies the kind of Western, scientific consciousness, otherwise termed Apollonic, which places a cut between the mind and the material upon which it operates. To reduce a critique of Western society, based upon well-established psychological and philosophical foundations, to an attack upon the mentality of the writer, fails to do justice to the complexity of the material.

In Hillman's analysis of Jungian ideas, though archetypal figures are feminine, they should not therefore be taken automatically for images of women. Chthonic figures, such as Hekate, belong to the underworld, "which is the mythological style of describing a psychological cosmos" (Hillman, *Dream* 46). They are, according to this view, psychological phenomena, inhabitants of myth, which are connected to real life events, but which do not pertain to actual individuals. Hillman spells out the implications:

> Put more bluntly: underworld is psyche. When we use the word *underworld*, we are referring to a wholly psychic perspective, where one's entire mode of being has been desubstantialised, killed of natural life, and yet is in every shape and sense and size the exact replica of natural life (*Dream* 46).

This means that the events depicted in the underworld cannot be interpreted from the point of view of everyday life, but only in terms of the psyche. The activities of Rahab and Tirzah, and the Daughters of Albion, spell out a psychic process, and do not depict an actual way of being or behaving in the natural world. Though the scenes in which these figures are involved depict the effects of torture and warfare upon the physical body, the cruelties enacted in them are representations of psychic processes, which should militate against the build up of repressed energy, and therefore against the likelihood of the activities in the scenes taking place in actuality. Accompanying the descriptions of dismemberment in Chapter 3 of *Jerusalem* are representations of the effect of the cruelty of the Daughters of Albion upon the senses. "They pour cold water on his brain in front, to cause. / Lids to grow over his eyes in veils of tears: and caverns / To freeze over his nostrils, while they feed his tongue from cups" (66, 30-32, p.218). In proportion as the perception of the dayworld diminishes and retreats, according to hidden principles, the underworld increases in power and vibrancy.

In Hillman the feminine as a category does not necessarily coincide with the female, but is an aspect of their psyche, just as femininity may also belong to the psyche of men. Hillman discovers that the many "roles which Jung assigns to the anima", such as the enactment "of the good fairy, witch and whore", appear "frequently and validly in the psychology of women" (*Anima* 57). It is just as possible for women to form and dissolve identifications with the archetypal figures composing the psyche as it is for men. Women as well as men can utilise these figures as a means of organising psychic phenomena, and can therefore acquire psychological creativity as a means of counteracting the narrowing effects of ego-consciousness. As the feminine is a cultural construct, it is possible to distinguish it from denotations of gender, attached to the individual's sexual role. Though this normally cannot change, it can be

divested of its traditional associations, which may instead be diverted to some of the fantasy images of persons who, according to Hillman, inhabit the psyche. In this case the particular perspective dictated by gender does not circumscribe individual identity but instead widens it to include aspects that would normally be suppressed. It may be noted that the repressive effect of such chthonic figures as Rahab and Tirzah becomes liberating when they are accepted as an integral part of the psyche. This aspect is implicitly acknowledged when the weaving activities of the Daughters of Los are praised for creating Rahab and Tirzah so that they "may exist & breathe & love" (59, 43-44, p.209).

The attitude to gender and sexuality in *Jerusalem* is, however, a complex one, encompassing apparent contradictions, and though the frequent denigrations of "sexual organisation" (30, 58, p.177) suggest an urge to transcend the limitations of gender upon individual identity, this is not always supported by other tendencies in the text. On the one hand we are told are told that: "Humanity knows not of Sex: wherefore are Sexes in Beulah" (44, 33, p.193), and on the other hand Jerusalem is described as "a Tent & Tabernacle of Mutual Forgiveness Male and Female Clothings" (54, 4, p.203). Since we are also told that: "In Great Eternity, every particular Form gives forth or Emanates / Its own peculiar light, & the form is the Divine Vision / And the Light is his Garment. This is Jerusalem in every Man" (54, 1-3, p. 203), it is difficult to decide whether sexuality and/or gender exist in Eternity or not. On the one hand sexuality belongs only to Beulah, and on the other hand Jerusalem, who is illuminated by the Divine Vision, and who therefore is a manifestation of Eternity, unites male and female garments. The apparent contradiction recognises the desire to abandon gendered categories, whilst retaining them as a means of organising the diversity of psychic phenomena. The psyche is integrated by the possibility of identifying with both masculine and feminine positions, and such identification recreates the unity of the garment that is a feature of Eternity. This unity, whether it takes on a male or female outer form, is represented by Jerusalem.

It might also be noted that Los's efforts in Chapter 3 are devoted towards the separation of masculine and feminine principles so that he can identify the problems associated with gender, and then turn gendered notions to creative account. His labours "To create a World of Generation from the World of Death" involve "Dividing the Masculine & Feminine" since "the commingling / of Albion's & Luvah's Spectres was Hermaphroditic" (58, 19-20, p. 207). In Chapter 4 when Rahab appears as a "Dragon red & Hidden Harlot / Each within other, but without a Warlike Mighty-one" (89, 54, p.249), and they "become One with the Antichrist & are absorbed in him" (69, 62, p.249), this composite figure is presented as the result of acquiring a gendered identity: "The Feminine separates from the Masculine & both from Man / ceasing to be His Emanations. Life to Themselves assuming!"(90, 1-2, p.249). The separation of the masculine and the feminine reveal to Los the effects of a gendered existence, and inspire him to proclaim that: "No individual ought to appropriate to Himself / Or to his Emanation, any of the Universal Characteristics" (90, 28-29, p. 250). In other words the femininity or masculinity of any archetypal figure should not be appropriated by the individual, but should be abandoned with the disappearance of the vision it generates.

The continual creation and destruction of a gendered identity appears to participate in the general movements between these two polarities in *Jerusalem.* Identity is always in the process of creation, and is subsequently always being destroyed. Creation is necessarily destruction. Hence a gendered identity is necessary for creation, but it also has an inevitable role in undoing whatever has been achieved. In Ulro the two principles are disguised by taking on the characteristics of the opposite sex. Female modesty, as deplored by Mary Wollstonecraft, and as commended by Rousseau, is disguised by its corollary, masculine power, or conversely feminine power hides the domination of sensuality in the male. The separation of the masculine and the feminine is necessary for the detection of opposites in Experience, which then become united through identification in Beulah. The destruction of this identity through creative expansion, and thus through the production of another identity is a characteristic of Eternity. Each body, or form, when clothed by the minute particulars that constitute its integrity, assumes an identity called the "Divine Vision". Each form

itself is the equivalent of an archetype, with a masculine or feminine appearance, for as we have seen, "Man in the Resurrection changes his sexual garments at will" (61, 51, p.212). Identification may involve a masculine or feminine figure, as creative amplification leads from one to another, but individuals should not confuse their identity with any one of the positions they assume. This is the implication of Los's attempts to clarify the situation: "When the Individual appropriates Universality / He divides into Male & Female: & when the Male and Female, / Appropriate Individuality, they become an Eternal Death (90, 52-54, p.250).

The ending of Jerusalem confuses this repudiation of a gendered identity, when the four Zoas are described as walking "To and fro in Eternity as One Man" (97, 39, p.258), as a consequence of Albion throwing himself in the "Furnaces of affliction (96, 35, p.256), and afterwards uniting with Jesus. Barbara Frieling interprets this final assimilation of all the separated figures in *Jerusalem* as the equivalent of Jung's process of individuation, when each aspect of the personality represented by the Zoas – rationality, feeling, the senses, and intuition – combines in the fully integrated personality that Jung terms the Self. This notion was defined earlier, in Chapter One, p.26, as the entity responsible for balancing the polarities within the psyche, and reconciling the unconscious with the conscious mind. However, this Jungian interpretation would once again, according to Hillman, establish the primacy of the ego, and would lead to the archetypes being appropriated by the individual, in the manner that Los condemned. Hillman considers that if unity is given priority it is at the expense of "the lower, outer and multiple events of the soul" (*Anima* 163). In this case, "individuation becomes insulation, introversion becomes introspection, and insights are replaced by inspirations, as soul merges with the spirituality of a logos Self, so that the enigmas of life are resolved *in vitro* by means of internal dialogue with an oracular priestess, 'my anima'" (Hillman, *Anima* 165). The idea of the overall unity taking on the appearance of "One Man" may add to the sense of the suppression of the female, which again would reinforce the domination of the introverted kind of spiritual superiority that Hillman condemns.

Such spiritual superiority would indicate the subordination of the feminine, despite the apparent restoration of the female at the end of the final chapter of *Jerusalem*. Feminist critics, such as Storch and Webster, point to the fact that the restitution of the female depends upon her accepting the domination of the male. Storch considers that the male figures united with their emanations in the composite figure of Albion remove the "monstrous union of the hermaphrodites" and restores the normal perspective of men and women (246). However, in her view, this restoration implies that "the females have now returned to the male bosom and have ceased to be threatening because they no longer have independent existence. Women are benevolent only if they are under male domination" (246). Webster highlights the characteristics of Beulah as a place "Where every Female delights to give her maiden to her husband" and where "the female searches sea and land for gratifications to the / Male Genius" (16, 15-17, p.223). These lines establish, according to Webster, the male as creator, the female as gratifier, which mean that the female has no independent existence, and that she must accept the male's "Fibres of dominion" (*Psychology* 286). Despite her recognition that Blake "anticipates the modern recognition of bisexuality, and its special importance for creativity, which seems to arise as part of an inner dialogue between male and female parts the self" (*Psychology* 286), she still believes that Blake did not extend the right to express the traits of the opposite sex to his females, and that, for him, the active female would be the phallic female will.

The difficulty of interpretation lies in the ambiguity attached to the notion of the emanation. It appears to combine references to the female herself, to the personification of mind as psychic structure, and to the archetypal figures who represent different aspects of femininity. Jerusalem, for example, embodies both the compassionate feelings that belong to motherhood, and the mind unified through sympathetic feeling. Representing Jerusalem as both city and woman suggests that the merging of mind and emanation restores both the sense of community, and the role of the female within it. In this case, the woman is identified with a unified consciousness. The desire to establish the woman as wholly human requires the existence of the female category, otherwise there would be no way of describing her

transformation. There are, as we have seen, many overt expressions of the desire to transcend a gendered identity, and the emanation itself is presented as the means of overcoming the divisions of gender, thereby creating social cohesion: "Man is joined to Man by his Emanative portion:" (39, 38, p.187), and "Man cannot unite with man but by their Emanations" (88, 10, p.246). Here the emanation changes its role. These statements would make no sense if the emanation were to be regarded as a female counterpart, as opposed to the creative aspects of male consciousness. It is difficult to see how women themselves would have this unifying effect, though the male view of the feminine does apparently affect creativity. Many of the critical judgements that accuse Blake of denying independence to the female arise because the emanation is considered to be a representation of woman, when some of its other associations may be more apposite. As we have seen in relation to Rahab and Tirzah the emanation is quite often a psychic phenomenon. The female in Beulah, for example, represents a view of femininity as nurturing and beneficent, because of the implications of her sexual role. These deeper implications are uncovered by, and are fundamental to the creative process. This creative role is opposed to the sadistic malevolence of Rahab and Tirzah: the former view unifies, while the latter destroys and disperses.

A further difficulty for interpretation arises from the use of the word "Man" to describe each complete humanity. Even if the term is intended to include women too, it manages to suggest the inferiority of the female, while giving primacy to the male. The preservation of femininity in the notion of the emanation is also confusing, even though the parallels between emanation and anima suggest that the emanation may be a neutral mental structure, only feminine in its projected form. The pairing of 'Man' and emanation appears to set the masculine element against the feminine, and therefore man against woman, with the effect of contradicting the claims for the perception of a unified human being combining the characteristics of both genders. A desire to suggest independence for the female as well as the male would require a neutral term that includes both sexes. At times the word 'humanity' is used, but it does not invariably replace 'Man', probably because the longer word would often destroy the rhythm of the sentence in which it appears.

The answer doubtless lies within the expressed desire of Los to use language as a liberating rather than a confining medium. We are told that: "Los built the stubborn structure of the language, acting against / Albion's melancholy, who must else have been a Dumb despair" (36, 58-59, p.183). Stephen Vine suggests that the language of *Jerusalem* "puts identity into play at the same time as it puts it into question" (171). In his analysis spatial descriptions subvert the very positions they suggest, confounding "inside" and "outside", "within" and "without" "above" and "below" (171), so that the "Outline of Identity" becomes the "center", and the "center" itself is displaced into "non-center" with the suggestion of both identity and difference which must be continually maintained. Identity subsists at the very moment of its dispersal, and this precarious unity appears to extend the word "Man" far beyond its usual gendered confines. In Chapter 2 we first encounter "the Divine Similitude! / In loves and tears of brothers, sisters, sons, fathers and friends" (33, 11-12, p.180), with its implication that these archetypal figures are all identified with each other at the emotional level, though there is diversity in the manner of their relationship. Such diversity permits the breakdown of the repressive unity of feeling. Unity and diversity is emphasised in the words of the Divine Family: "We live as One Man: for contracting our infinite senses / we behold multitude; or expanding; we behold as one, / As One Man all the Universal Family; and that One Man We call Jesus the Christ" (33, 17-20, p.180). Jesus is also called "the Divine Body" (33, 11, p.179). The suggestion is that a movement towards identification, the creation of a unified vision, its elements connected through feeling, recreates the "Divine Body" of Jesus, who is at the same time "Man". At the centre of this unified vision there may be any one of the "Divine Family", just as each of the archetypes constellates its own universe. These members may be masculine or feminine, but a vision may cohere around each of them at any one time. In this sense "Man" does not mean male or masculine, but the individual who perceives, and identifies with, a vision in its entirety.

This interpretation means that a unity subsists in diversity, for if "Man" means the person who is able to identify with the "minute particulars" of each vision, then these particulars are also "Men" through identification: "for Cities are Men, fathers of multitudes, and Rivers & Mountains / Are also Men; every thing is Human, mighty!

Sublime!" (33, 46-48, p.180). The same idea is expressed in Chapter 4: "But General Forms have their vitality in Particulars: & every Particular is a Man; a Divine Member of the Divine Jesus" (91, 29-30, p. 251). "Man" is therefore a term that combines both the particular and the universal, the person who identifies, and the individual objects he or she finds to form a unity. It might be noted that, though Jerusalem appears in feminine form, in her other incarnation as a city, in which a unity is naturally expressed, she is also a "Man". Albion, then, is united by the process of continually creating a unity to destroy the one that preceded it, so that the Self, Jung's centre of consciousness, is like "Man", an expression of psychic unity, discovered through the creation of a complete vision, and expressed in the four-fold activity of the four zoas, who are also "Men" since they each form the concentric point in the process of discovering such unity.

However, the idyllic harmony of the ending of *Jerusalem* with "All Human Forms identified even Tree Metal Earth & Stone" (99, 1, p.258) is still predicated upon its dissolution, upon "going forth and returning wearied / Into the Planetary lives of Years Months Days & Hours reposing / And the Awaking into his bosom in the Life of Immortality" (99, 2-4, p.258). The "Life Of Immortality" suggests the moment of identification, when the perception of the ongoing movement of time ceases, and when there is complete sympathy with life as it is lived, but the "going forth and returning" establishes this as part of a perpetual process, in which identification cannot be separated from dissolution. The identification celebrated at the end of *Jerusalem* is not static but progressive, and the union of some particulars, such as "Tree, Metal, Earth & Stone" is only achieved through the loss of unity of others. The "Life of Immortality" is paradoxically the result of the envisioning of "new Expanses" (98, 30, p.258), and of "Creating Space, Creating Time according to the wonders Divine / Of Human Imagination" (98, 31-32, p.258). It suggests a continual exploration of the meaning of history, as the view of the past is changed from the perspective of new events. It suggests, however, that opposition and dissension must still be recognised before this can be turned into the moment of identity that will transcend it, and that this opposition is a necessary part of the creation of Albion's emanation, Jerusalem.

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