Signals intelligence, the British, and the war in Yugoslavia 1941-1944
Signals intelligence, the British, and the war in Yugoslavia 1941-1944
This study explores the influence of intelligence derived from the interception and decryption of wireless messages, in the United Kingdom and the Middle East, from mainly enemy sources on British policy towards the Yugoslav resistance. After a brief review of the history of the organisation charged with obtaining intelligence from Signals Intelligence - the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park - each source is identified and analysed. The principal sources examined are wireless messages of the German Navy, Army, and Air Force, various arms of the German police, the intelligence organisations of the German armed forces and the Nazi Party (the Abwehr and Sicherheitsdienst), the Croatian military, communications between the Yugoslav and Slovene Communist Parties and the Comintern and diplomatic decrypts. The study examines which organisations and individuals received some or all of the Signals Intelligence relating to Yugoslavia and the use they made of it.
From the beginning of 1941 until January 1944 the intelligence received is studied in detail. The main areas examined are: Axis action against the resistance, relationships between the Axis powers, the activities of the competing resistance movements - the Cetniks and the Partisans - and their relationships one to another, collaboration, and the relationship between the Partisans and the Comintern. The development of British policy and the influence of Signals Intelligence, in the context of other sources of information, is examined.
The conclusion reached is that some British policy makers, particularly the Chiefs of Staff and the Prime Minister were far better informed about events in Yugoslavia than had been thought prior to the recent release of decrypts to the Public Record Office; and that policy decisions - especially that to transfer support from the Cetniks to the Partisans at the end of 1943 - were made on factual analysis of events provided by Signals Intelligence rather than as a result of the influence of politically motivated individuals on those who took those ultimate decisions.
University of Southampton
Brashaw, Nicholas Cripps
9e7760a0-5224-4abf-b4d7-03295ce70a8d
2001
Brashaw, Nicholas Cripps
9e7760a0-5224-4abf-b4d7-03295ce70a8d
Brashaw, Nicholas Cripps
(2001)
Signals intelligence, the British, and the war in Yugoslavia 1941-1944.
University of Southampton, Doctoral Thesis.
Record type:
Thesis
(Doctoral)
Abstract
This study explores the influence of intelligence derived from the interception and decryption of wireless messages, in the United Kingdom and the Middle East, from mainly enemy sources on British policy towards the Yugoslav resistance. After a brief review of the history of the organisation charged with obtaining intelligence from Signals Intelligence - the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park - each source is identified and analysed. The principal sources examined are wireless messages of the German Navy, Army, and Air Force, various arms of the German police, the intelligence organisations of the German armed forces and the Nazi Party (the Abwehr and Sicherheitsdienst), the Croatian military, communications between the Yugoslav and Slovene Communist Parties and the Comintern and diplomatic decrypts. The study examines which organisations and individuals received some or all of the Signals Intelligence relating to Yugoslavia and the use they made of it.
From the beginning of 1941 until January 1944 the intelligence received is studied in detail. The main areas examined are: Axis action against the resistance, relationships between the Axis powers, the activities of the competing resistance movements - the Cetniks and the Partisans - and their relationships one to another, collaboration, and the relationship between the Partisans and the Comintern. The development of British policy and the influence of Signals Intelligence, in the context of other sources of information, is examined.
The conclusion reached is that some British policy makers, particularly the Chiefs of Staff and the Prime Minister were far better informed about events in Yugoslavia than had been thought prior to the recent release of decrypts to the Public Record Office; and that policy decisions - especially that to transfer support from the Cetniks to the Partisans at the end of 1943 - were made on factual analysis of events provided by Signals Intelligence rather than as a result of the influence of politically motivated individuals on those who took those ultimate decisions.
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Published date: 2001
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Local EPrints ID: 464771
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/464771
PURE UUID: ba6f148e-52e4-49ad-8eb2-4b7dc44d212d
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Date deposited: 05 Jul 2022 00:01
Last modified: 16 Mar 2024 19:44
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Author:
Nicholas Cripps Brashaw
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