

**UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON**

# **Recycling History:**

**Ethno-Communal Struggles for  
Recognition and Legitimation in Cyprus**

**Panayiota Yiouli Taki**

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**ABSTRACT**

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**RECYCLING HISTORY: ETHNO-COMMUNAL STRUGGLES FOR  
RECOGNITION AND LEGITIMACY IN CYPRUS**

**By Panayiota Yiouli Taki**

This research addresses the inter-communal dimension of the Cyprus problem. As a severely divided society Cyprus has received little attention, the overwhelming focus having been concentrated on international dimensions. This is reflected both in academic research as well as in the dominant political discourse of the majority community of the island, the only community internationally recognised as the representative of the Republic of Cyprus. The inter-communal dimension is approached in this research by placing the Greek Cypriot majority as its primary object.

This research has been informed by Pierre Bourdieu's category of the field and the role of agency that this implies. It frames historically the Greek Cypriot dominant political discourse through the categories of doxa, orthodoxy and heterodoxy and distinguishes those contests that emerged within the political field of this group from inter-communal disputes that depended on the doxic status of the undisputed within each community.

The process through which political categories are secured at the level of the undisputed or commonsensical is investigated through an analysis of historical appropriations which have lent themselves to the dominant political discourse of the Greek Cypriot community. Simultaneously, the political categories through which this community was substantiated over time suggests that the orthodox-heterodox relationship between the discourses of the two communities have sustained a distinct doxic realm over time even if the form through which this relationship has been reproduced would suggest the importance, as Rogers Brubaker has recently insisted, of treating the nation as an event.

The transition from tradition to modernity was marked in Cyprus by the succession of Ottoman rule which gave way to British rule in 1878. The nationalisation process of the two communities was predicated on this transformation. By the time the Greek Cypriot majority engaged in armed insurrection with the aim of uniting the island with Greece - enosis, the Turkish Cypriot minority articulated a nationalism against both enosis and majority rule. Conflict over the right to self-determination prior to independence manifested itself as a majority/minority conflict over the issue of rights in the period succeeding independence and persisting through to the present.

This research explores these manifold issues through an examination of how these processes were produced and reproduced both in the pre and post-independence period. In doing so, it is suggested, the saliency of how inter-communal conflict proceeded remains vital in any understanding of why the Cyprus problem continues to persist in the present.

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## INTRODUCTION

### CYPRUS: A DIVIDED SOCIETY OR AN EXTERNALLY MANUFACTURED CONFLICT?

Cyprus represents one example of what some political scientists have described as divided or plural societies.<sup>1</sup> These are societies prone to conflict as a direct result of the contest between two or more heterogeneous groups over the distribution of resources and power. Yet the conflict that has ensued between the two main ethnic communities on the island is hardly ever, if ever, acknowledged as such in the public realm of the Greek Cypriot community which constitutes the greater majority.

The extent of foreign intervention in determining the course of internal affairs on the island partly explains why this might be the case. It was Greece and Turkey with the approval of the United Kingdom that negotiated and agreed the conditions under which the island's population was granted its independence and the Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960. Turkey threatened to militarily intervene on the island both in 1964 and 1967. In 1974, the military Junta in Athens supported a coup against the President of the Republic. Five days later, Turkish troops landed on the island. By the time a cease-fire was called the island was partitioned and its demographic pattern radically changed. The Turkish army occupied now the northern part of the island with some 37% of the island's territory under its control. The Greek Cypriot population concentrated in the southern part of the island - around 180,000 Greek Cypriots having fled their homes in villages and towns in the north. By 1975 around 50,000 Turkish Cypriots who had their homes in the south had moved to the north.<sup>2</sup> A border manned by Turkish troops in the north, Greek Cypriot ones in the south and a UN Force guarding the peace in

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<sup>1</sup> See, for example, D. Horowitz 1994, Arend Lijphart 1995.

<sup>2</sup> These figures represented at the time over a third of the Greek Cypriot population and close to 50% of the Turkish Cypriot population.

between is hermetically sealed. For the first time, the island's population became regionally separated along clear-cut ethnic lines.

Turkey's invasion and partition of the island in 1974, the most dramatic demonstration of foreign intervention on the island, has largely overshadowed the role of the Turkish Cypriot community in the making of the Cyprus problem. Further, the fact that the pursuit of Turkey's own interests on the island has simultaneously been the vehicle for the pursuit of the Turkish Cypriot community's objectives may partly explain why the majority community has not recognised a separate Turkish Cypriot role in the unfolding of recent history. Partition, and the cataclysmic effects this had on the demographic character of the island was not an outcome of domestic machinations but an event engineered and in the first instance implemented from outside. The Turkish Cypriot community was not engaged at that point in a militant struggle for partition, nor was there, on an island where the distribution of the population did not possess an ethnic pattern, a demographic basis for partition to take place. Most importantly, by virtue of its numbers, a minority of 18% could not have imposed this de-facto situation on the overwhelming majority through neither force nor consent. The state of internal affairs in Cyprus would indeed have been very different today if the partition of the island and the creation of two ethnically homogeneous regions through external force had not taken place. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Turkey's military intervention was followed by a movement of the Turkish Cypriot community into the carved up region.

For the Turkish Cypriot community, therefore, Turkey's role in Cyprus has figured differently. Turkey has represented an important power on which it could rely in the pursuit of its own interests. Limitations arising from numerical inferiority could only be counterbalanced through collusion with other interests on the island as long as these run contrary to the national aspirations of the majority. This has been an essential characteristic of the strategies employed by this community throughout the last 100 years. This period witnessed the nationalisation of the two communities during British colonial rule, a struggle for the determination of the future status of the island, the

establishment of an independent Republic based on a bicomunal constitutional structure in 1960, the breakdown of the constitution in 1963 and the consequent institutional and territorial separation of the two communities,<sup>3</sup> and finally the partition of the island in 1974.

The minority community's strategies aimed at the prevention of two possibilities. The first was the potential dominance of the Greek Cypriot majority in the decision making processes of government and the second was the union of the island with Greece which began to acquire a broad basis of support amongst the Greek Cypriot community in the early part of the twentieth century. The leadership of the Turkish Cypriot community oscillated, during that period, between demands for the continuation of British rule and should that not be possible, the return of the island to Turkey as the last occupier of the island between the years of 1571 and 1878. Approaching de-colonisation the notion of partition was popularised amongst Turkish Cypriots. It became, for the first time, imagined once it was uttered as a demand by the Turkish government in the late 1950s. Turkey has therefore figured as a crucial and determining factor in the estimation of possibilities recognised by the Turkish Cypriot minority. As such it has played a key role in influencing the demands uttered by this community. These demands, insofar as they were simultaneously based on understandings of a shared identity between the minority and the Turkish nation, carried an emotional appeal which extended beyond issues of communal security. Turkey figured as a *homeland*.

Turkey's assertiveness in the process of defining the post-colonial status of Cyprus has been the most crucial factor in determining the status of the island. The Greek Cypriot majority's demand and militant anti-colonial struggle in the mid- 1950s for the union of the island with Greece posed security risks for Turkey. Combined with Britain's unwillingness to give up sovereignty of the island it produced a situation most conducive for the opposing minority. The outcome was a compromise agreement

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<sup>3</sup> Following inter-communal violence in December 1963, 25,000 Turkish Cypriots moved out of mixed or isolated villages into Turkish Cypriot strongholds dispersed around the island and now administered by the Turkish Cypriot 'General Committee'. See, for example, R. A. Patrick 1976.



between the two external homelands, Greece and Turkey, and the colonial power. The island would be granted an independent status guaranteed by Britain, Greece and Turkey. The Republic would have a power-sharing bicomunal structure securing the position of the Turkish Cypriot minority as a politically equal community. Along with the independent status of the island the guarantors undertook to secure the constitutional basis of the Republic either through combined or unilateral action.

This compromise agreement proved difficult for the majority community to accept. A detailed examination of the first period of independence would suggest that the formal acceptance of independence rather than union with Greece did not meet with a negative reception. But the imposition of a constitution that gave the minority rights and powers beyond what its numerical strength could justify was to become an issue of contention. So much so were the two communities' apprehensions over what constituted justice mutually exclusive that a shared understanding of the meaning of the constitutionally defined status of each community within the state was precluded. Therefore while the constitution may have spelled out certain communally based rights and powers, a contest emerged whether those rights and powers were intended as a means of protection for the minority or as a recognition that the minority constituted a separate political as well as ethnic unit irrespective of its size. This was also the gist of the conflict over the status of the island that created the subjective pre-condition for the breakout of inter-communal violence in the late 1950s. Further, it continues to sustain the two communities as distinct political and national units in the present.

However, it cannot be assumed that the form that this conflict has assumed has been the inevitable outcome of a contest between a majority and a minority divided by distinct understandings regarding the implications that should flow from being ethnically and numerically different. The outcome of this contest would have had very different implications for each community if the island did not represent a source of geo-strategic attraction. In the absence of such overt foreign interests and therefore possible alliances for the minority, and given the numerical imbalance between the two communities, the

possibilities that would have been objectively available to the minority community in the period approaching de-colonisation are likely to have been also very different. Demands would have inevitably also been different. The considerable degree of cynicism amongst the majority community regarding an intercommunal dimension of the Cyprus problem can, therefore, be appreciated.

Simultaneously, the contest over the future of the island during the period of colonial rule was neither engineered from outside nor did it lack an internal context. Discussing the choices made by ethnic groups whose social characteristics predisposed them to a fear of domination when confronted with demands for independence by advanced groups which share the same administrative territory, Donald Horowitz has argued that:

[t]imes of transition are often times of ethnic tension. When it looks as if the shape of the polity is being settled once and for all, apprehensions are likely to grow. For this reason, many ethnic groups preferred a continuation of colonial rule to independence, or, in some cases, preferred a separate independence. Groups with such preferences were more numerous than the anti-colonial rhetoric of the time has implied.<sup>4</sup>

Indeed this resonates with the situation that was developing in Cyprus as the Greek Cypriot community engaged in a campaign for the union of the island with Greece. It is a fact that the two communities in Cyprus have undergone a separate social, economic and political development which has figured as the primary driving force in the making of choice and exercise of strategy. In the late 1940s both communities rejected the constitutional proposals of the colonial government intended to offer a considerable degree of self-government. The Greek Cypriots demanded union with Greece whilst the Turkish Cypriots opposed the prospect of proportional representation of the two communities in government. In the late 1950s each community claimed the right to exercise self-determination but with diametrically different understandings of who constituted the people and what was the object of determination. In the early years of independence the two communities were locked in a contest over the meaning of the

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<sup>4</sup> D. Horowitz 1985 pp. 190-191.

constitution. By late 1963 each community pursued a policy through arms for the imposition of that meaning. Between 1968 and 1974 a process of negotiation which aimed to settle the question of each community's status within the state remained unresolved as each attempted to bargain for a constitutional formalisation of those aspects of the existing situation which enhanced its own position. The Greek Cypriot leadership demanded the greatest possible degree of unified administrative structures while the Turkish Cypriot leadership demanded the greatest possible degree of separate structures. Since 1974 the two have held diverse understandings over the meaning and implications of re-unification under a federal structure.

Cypriot history has been marked by processes characteristic of deeply divided societies. But due recognition of the fact that Cyprus represents just such a society has not been forthcoming from the Greek Cypriot majority. Dominant political discourse and policy making on the Greek Cypriot side would suggest that the substance that should flow from such recognition is far from making its impact felt. To give due recognition of the nature of Cypriot society is to go beyond a formal acknowledgement of two separate communities occupying a distinct geographical space, a fact that the border separating the two communities serves to reinforce. It is to acknowledge that these communities essentially occupy a distinct political space. A process of accommodation can only proceed on the basis of this reality.

Yet Greek Cypriots have committed themselves to a process of negotiation whose sole aim has been to define the structures through which the two communities and regions are brought together under a federal structure. A type of solution that reflects in other words the very nature of Cypriot society as a divided society.

The most basic categorisation in Greek Cypriot political discourse can be derived from the definition of the Cyprus problem that is officially and popularly propagated. This is a definition that forms the substance that informs the Greek Cypriot international campaign in relation to the Cyprus problem, the essential content communicated

through commemorative activity and other forms of public activity. In short, it represents the axis around which the Greek Cypriot community is politically constituted at present.

The categorisation embedded in this definition renders the Turkish Cypriot community invisible. The practical implications of this are nowhere more visible than in the failure to engage in policy-making that aims beyond an international campaign or a formal process of negotiation amongst the leaderships of the two sides. Most importantly, an exercise of persuasion would need to be directed towards the Turkish Cypriot community through the utilisation of resources at hand. This is an area that remains unexplored by the Greek Cypriot elite.

#### THE INVISIBLE MINORITY

This research has taken as its main object the majority community of Cyprus. More specifically, it has sought to investigate the development of Greek Cypriot political discourse through and in relation to the Cyprus problem, also commonly understood and referred to, by this community, as the *national* problem.

At an official as well as popular level, the *national* problem has always been defined in reference to foreign powers, and primarily to Turkey. In the current phase of the problem, the Turkish invasion of 1974 and the subsequent partition of the island have represented the exclusive focus of the Greek Cypriot domestic and international campaign seeking to mobilise awareness and action against the de-facto partition of the island. Asserting against Turkey a case of human rights violations and of state sovereignty, that of the Republic of Cyprus.

Simultaneously though the Cyprus problem has also depended on, involved and dramatically affected the Turkish Cypriot community. The 1974 partition of the island could not have occurred in the absence of a deliberate action by Turkey. Yet it would be

a considerable oversight to fail to appreciate that the Turkish Cypriots greeted the invasion with a mixture of relief and hope.

Its collusion with Turkish deliberations on and over partition became more and more evident as time proceeded. Having gathered in the carved up region of the Republic, it proceeded to entrench its separate administration and demanded that any solution to the Cyprus problem would have to be on a federal basis. In other words, the community utilised the Turkish intervention in Cyprus for its own immediate and future advantage. Its absence from the Greek Cypriot definition of the problem echoes therefore strangely. It figures neither amongst the enemy, in other words not amongst the 'other', but neither does it figure amongst the apprehending 'self'.

The Turkish Cypriot community is not absent from the Greek Cypriot definitional terms of the problem alone. It is simultaneously absent from the nation that defines the problem as *national* - as a violation of the sovereignty of its state, a state which constitutionally possesses sovereignty over the territory inhabited by both communities but prevented, since 1974, from exercising it over the northern territory. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots may formally be subjects of the state but the Turkish Cypriots have persistently stated that the Republic of Cyprus does not enjoy the allegiance and therefore the legitimacy of their community. Indeed, if it were otherwise partition would be meaningless.

The Greek Cypriot official position has consistently denied the claim made by the Turkish Cypriot leadership that Greek and Turkish Cypriots constitute two distinct people. This may be a position informed by political expediency, wary of the implication of that claim on the status of the Republic of Cyprus itself.<sup>5</sup> However, there is simultaneously no suggestion that the Greek Cypriot community has been in practice engaged in a process seeking to make the claim of a singular people a reality. While the

absence of the Turkish Cypriot community from the definitional terms of the problem may be read as a stance aspiring to the re-unification of the island and therefore of its people, the absence of this community from the nation being daily reproduced is not just the practical reality of partition but a daily discursive exercise too. In seeking to affirm itself both through reference to its ethnic identity but most importantly through the institutionalisation of communalised apprehensions of the problem it has, since 1963, reproduced the nation-state as a Greek Cypriot state.

It is these elements of Greek Cypriot political discourse that have clarified the task of this research as an investigation of the development of Greek Cypriot apprehensions through and in relation to the Cyprus problem. It must therefore be stressed from the start that this research is not about the *national* problem as such but about the process through which Greek Cypriot collective apprehensions as to what constitutes the Problem have evolved and been sustained. Though the Greek Cypriot approach to the Cyprus problem is a departing point, the Turkish invasion and an analysis of Turkey's role in the history of Cyprus do not constitute a separate focus.

Simultaneously, to identify the absence of the Turkish Cypriot community from Greek Cypriot collective apprehensions is to probe into another problem. Given that the progressive separation of the two communities through the modern history of the island culminated in the collusion of the Turkish Cypriot community with the Turkish invasion and partition of the island, it needs to be emphasised that the demographic structure of the island has been altered not only by the Turkish invading forces but also by the willingness of the Turkish Cypriot population to move *en masse* to the partitioned region. Yet the simple question that has never been publicly posed amongst the Greek Cypriot community is, what were the processes that militated towards this and what might this imply for the future of the two communities?

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<sup>5</sup> The implication drawn by the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktas, from a claim that the two communities represent two separate people is that of a right to separate statehood. Though the Turkish

The Cyprus problem as opposed to the *national* problem is here used to refer to a problem that has evolved and been sustained by the realm of inter-communal relations as well as that of inter-state relations. By incorporating the realm of inter-communal relations as a dimension that has significantly contributed to the development of the Cyprus problem is to break with the official and dominant definition in Greek Cypriot society. Therefore, despite the fact that the *national* and the Cyprus problem are interchangeably used by this community I employ the term 'Cyprus problem' to indicate a problem which extends beyond inter-state relations to include inter-communal relations. It is this latter dimension that is of interest to this research. The term 'national problem' is employed when referring to the problem identified by the Greek Cypriot community.

#### FAILING TO DEFINE THE FUTURE

One reality being confronted at present is that the two communities share a strong sense of victimisation evident in the communal experience that each side has accumulated and seeks to project. What characteristically differs between the two is that while the dominant Greek Cypriot political discourse identifies the imposition of foreign interests as the dynamic that fostered the community's victimisation, the Turkish Cypriot equivalent identifies the Greek Cypriot community as the perpetrator. There is therefore an asymmetry in the identification of the location within which the source of the problem lies, reflecting the differential experience of each community as the Cyprus problem unfolded. Simultaneously, this would seem to partly account for the continuing barriers to establishing a meaningful dialogue between political forces on the two sides. Because apart from past experience and the existing border, the separation between the two communities has also been entrenched by the failure to develop elements of a common political discourse.

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Cypriot society declared a unilateral UDI in 1983 the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus remains unrecognised by the international community.

It would appear that while the two communities are engaged in a process of negotiation for the determination of a mutually acceptable political arrangement, the singular identification of Turkey as the source of the *national* problem, places the Turkish Cypriot community outside immediate concerns. The Greek Cypriot *national* struggle is in that respect a struggle launched against Turkey's action that has partitioned the island and maintained it as such.

Following the invasion of the island, the United Nations Security Council called for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops and for a negotiated settlement based on mutually acceptable internal arrangements between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Twenty-seven years later these calls have not been realised. Important facts emerging from the negotiation process between the two communities and under the auspices of the United Nations have however been since established.

Some progress was achieved in 1977 when the leaders of the two communities agreed that the prospective solution of the Cyprus problem would be along federal lines. By 1986 this agreement was further elaborated. The leaders of the two communities accepted at the time alternative documents submitted by the UN Secretary General setting the parameters that would characterise a federal state in Cyprus. Much of what was accepted by both sides at the time formed the basis of successive efforts by the UN resulting in the incorporation of more elaborate vocabulary in UN Security Council Resolutions on Cyprus.<sup>6</sup> The prospective solution came to be known as a bizonal, bicomunal federation, indicating that the new state would consist of two federated states, each administered by one of the two politically equal communities. This continues to form the substance of international calls for a resolution to the Cyprus problem and represents the only common denominator between sections of the two communities.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> For the official position of the Turkish Cypriot side see, for example, Dodd 1998; N. Ertegun 1981; for the official position of the Greek Cypriot side, M. Christodoulou 1995; C. Economides 1993.

<sup>7</sup> See for example, Security Council Resolutions 649, March 12, 1990; 716, October 11, 1991.



Despite a formal agreement between the two sides that the future political arrangement will be in the form of a bizonal, bicommunal federation this has not informed Greek Cypriot public political culture. Declarations to the effect that the occupied territories will be liberated, that all the refugees will be free to return to their homes, that the de-facto situation created by the Turkish invasion will never be accepted have instead saturated public discourse. Yet it remains to be explained how a bizonal, bicommunal federation amounts to anything less than accepting major consequences of the Turkish invasion when the Turkish Cypriots remain invisible. As such the prospective solution is presented as the only realistic scenario in light of Turkey's audacity to threaten the security and undermine the interests of the island's population in order to safeguard its own geo-strategic interests.

This official position receives the support of, and indeed has been shaped by, the two largest political parties of the traditional left and the traditional right. It is however a position which by virtue of its apparent submission to foreign interests at the expense of Greek Cypriot ones has exposed itself to criticism. New political parties formed in the last decade have sought to challenge the expediency of the official position. For a bizonal, bicommunal federation to become a reality some of the outcomes of partition would necessarily have to be accepted. This is viewed by these new formations as a violation of human rights and international principles such as the respect of state sovereignty. A radical perspective is proposed insisting that the consequences of the Turkish invasion can and must be reversed and not entrenched with Greek Cypriot consent. Despite the small electoral basis that these parties enjoy, their impact is wider than the number of votes they attract would suggest. Between these two polarised positions there exist other traditional parties which have made a formal commitment to a bizonal, bicommunal federation but alternate positions with periodic suggestions for the need to redefine the content of the terms of solution as these have been so far understood. Hinting instead towards an aspiration for non-communally based regions and administrations.

Nevertheless, relative unity is still sustained through a shared platform between these otherwise diverse positions. This is the insistence that any prospective solution must guarantee the unity of the country – through a federal rather than confederal structures; the right of return of persons displaced in 1974; and must secure fundamental freedoms and rights of all citizens.

The Greek Cypriot side has persistently protested that the Turkish Cypriot official position substantially deviates on these issues which form an integral part of UN Security Council resolutions. At the same time the Greek Cypriot political elite has done very little by way of creating a domestic political culture that can sustain an unambiguous, even if not unanimous, public discourse consistent with its own official position on how the future should look like.

While official policy on the Greek Cypriot side has to legitimise itself against a discourse which opposes *concessionism*, official policy on the Turkish Cypriot side has departed from the content of UN Security Council Resolutions and seeks to legitimise itself against the *concessionism* of the opposition.

Divisions within Turkish Cypriot society take a more complex pattern than that on the other side of the divide. They emerge from distinct understandings of citizens' needs and of how the community's administrative structures could be shaped to serve them. The evolution of a separate Turkish Cypriot administration in a context where the Cyprus problem is perpetuated has undermined the process of democracy building. The relationship between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots has not been dictated by Turkish Cypriot needs alone but most importantly by the needs of the Turkish state too. The form that that relationship assumes represents a primary issue of contest amongst Turkish Cypriot political parties. It is directly related to a contest over democracy building, ultimately, also a contest over national identity.<sup>8</sup> Divisions therefore in relation to the Cyprus problem directly derive from contests on these primary issues.

Commenting on the different political trends on either side of the divide a Turkish Cypriot author has observed that:

Amongst the Greek Cypriots, the official political and opposition positions found a common ground due to the conditions created by 1974. All the Greek Cypriot political parties defend demands such as the withdrawal of the Turkish Army from the island, the return of the refugees to their homes, the unity of Cyprus, the enforcement of the UN resolutions and the holding of an international conference on the Cyprus Problem. By contrast, in the Turkish Cypriot community the official political position and that of the opposition, are in direct conflict. As a result, a political ideology in opposition to the official political line, defending the independence of Cyprus and a Cypriot identity, may not be a necessity for the Greek Cypriot opposition but a desperate one for its Turkish Cypriot counterpart. And because of all these reasons, it could be said that, the Turkish Cypriots are leading the search for cultural and political ideologies which will promote the Cypriot identity.<sup>9</sup>

Divisions on the Turkish Cypriot side over the prospective solution have crystallised in recent years in the distinction between a confederal solution and a solution along federal structures. It is precisely this diversity amongst Turkish Cypriot political factions which the Greek Cypriot side has been unable to explore.

It is true that the Greek Cypriot leadership made a historic compromise when it formally accepted that the future prospective solution would be along federal lines. This was to accept the regional autonomy of the two communities and a bicomunal state structure; both of which were issues that not only were vehemently resisted in the past but they were now much wider in scope. There is also no doubt that this compromise represented a pragmatic choice in a context where the country was de facto partitioned with the international world doing little by way of pressurising Turkey to withdraw its army and to secure the safe return of the Greek Cypriot refugees to their homes in the occupied

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<sup>8</sup> The most insightful written account which permits an insight into the nature of divisions that have separated Turkish Cypriot political parties in the post-partition period is that of C. Dodd, 1993.

<sup>9</sup> M. Yasin, 1990, pp. 71-2. Though the author does not define who constitutes the Turkish Cypriot opposition, I would classify both the Republican Turkish Party and the Communal Liberation Party as an integral part of this opposition. The latter is currently in a coalition government with the National Unity Party, a party which identifies with the official position, while the former has formed in the past a coalition government with the Democratic Party, another pillar of the official position.

region. At the same time, the Greek Cypriot leadership failed to appeal to the Turkish Cypriots.

Despite divisions over substantial issues what does unite the Turkish Cypriots is the demand that in any prospective solution the relationship between the two communities will be one of equality and not one of a majority and minority. Further that the administrative structures through which this equality is to ensue will be regionally based. Therefore the demographic consequences that emerged out of partition are for the Turkish Cypriot community at large, an irreversible outcome constituting the basis for a Turkish Cypriot administration either in the form of a federated or a confederal state.

The centrality of a demand for political equality for Turkish Cypriot political factions despite diversity, has been aptly described by M. Yasin:

For some time now, in arguments concerning political and constitutional solutions in Cyprus, the first point laid down on the table by the Turkish Cypriots is the issue of “Equal Rights” and its guarantee. Not only has it been put forward since the nineteenth century, but it has been made a priority by all the present-day Turkish Cypriot political parties and groups. This demand for equality, accepted as *a priori* by everyone, is probably the main political tendency which best voices our social sense. For equality to become such an essential issue, reflects the reality of our position as a minority and it originates from a reaction to it.<sup>10</sup>

It would be expected that by accepting that any prospective solution would be based on regional communal autonomy and on the principle of political equality for the first time the Greek Cypriot side could have sought to compete against the more extreme separatist rhetoric of the Turkish Cypriot leadership. The failure therefore of the Greek Cypriot side to establish a consistency between a formal agreement that has formed the basis of its official position on the one hand, and public political culture on the other, has inhibited any meaningful projection of political values which could compete against the Turkish Cypriot official rhetoric. The Turkish Cypriot leadership has, in this context,

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<sup>10</sup> Yasin, op. cit., p. 48.

a free hand in defending separatist politics based on the claim that the Greek Cypriot community has never been willing to accept the Turkish Cypriot community as a distinct and politically equal community but has systematically sought to dominate instead.

Therefore, it is not only that the official negotiation process between the two sides has failed to yield results of any direct practical impact. It is also the fact that no political faction has managed to establish a working relationship with a political faction of the other side, or, the fact that citizen initiative manifests itself at a dispersed rate and individual level. Any cross community political activity outside the negotiations process has been confined to declarations between individual parties on the Turkish Cypriot left with political parties in the south to the effect that both seek a solution leading to a bizonal bicomunal federal Republic. These remain formalistic and have led to no pro-active policies within Greek Cypriot society to sustain a consistency between these proclamations and wider political culture.<sup>11</sup>

The separation of the two communities dictated by partition has therefore been exacerbated by lack of consistent efforts amongst Greek Cypriots to undermine its effects and align its policy with the overall aim of re-unification under a federal state structure. A policy aiming at re-unification has been confined, in this respect, to a policy that defines unification as an aim but not as a guide to strategy. In other words, unification has been demanded but not practised. Strategy has instead been singularly

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<sup>11</sup> One recent event would serve to demonstrate the impact of the failure to provide channels through which a common political vision could be articulated. A statement made by G. Vasiliou, the President of the Republic of Cyprus between 1988 and 1993, to the effect that a new national anthem would need be introduced in the future as a symbol of the prospective federal state invited public controversy. It would appear that this statement contains nothing controversial, particularly in a context where the Greek national anthem was adopted by the Republic of Cyprus in 1966, three years after intercommunal violence put the two communities apart. The dominance of political figures that registered disapproval with this statement is one thing. The content of this disapproval which treated Vasiliou's statement as an attack on the Hellenic identity of Greek Cypriots is another. The qualified response of political figures who recognise the necessity of a neutral national anthem but argued that this was not the time to raise such an issue is, however, most indicative of the extent to which political culture has not caught up with the future.

determined by the international dimension of the problem and Greek Cypriots have not distinguished between Turkey as an important player in influencing the prospects of solution and the Turkish Cypriot community as a community that can determine much of the agenda.

Simultaneously, Turkish Cypriots may have lived, since 1974, under conditions of security against their expressed fear and distrust of Greek Cypriot politics. They have, nevertheless, failed to establish conditions of normality that should have ensued from this renewed sense of security. Twenty six years later there has been no solution and neither has there been any sign that there exist any realistic prospects for the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to attain international recognition irrespective of a solution. Whilst this situation endures, the Turkish Cypriot community continues to remain intimately dependant on Turkey for securing an international voice, for the movement of goods in and out of the northern region as well as for heavy financial subsidies. Crucially, while no solution is agreed they are depended on the Turkish army for the maintenance of a contested border.

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The absence of the Turkish Cypriot community from the definition of the Cyprus problem is reflective of and is reflected both in the political culture of Greek Cypriot society as well as in policy pursued to secure a solution. A primary question ought to be posed: how is this absence sustained?

This is the central question that this thesis seeks to address. It does so through an analysis of the dominant Greek Cypriot political discourse. History and more precisely, the use of history constitutes the substance that legitimises the manner in which reality is being named and assertions made over how the future should be shaped. Likewise the definition of the Cyprus problem is intimately connected to the dominant historical

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It may be asked, how can it ever not be the adequate time to state as a blatantly evident fact as this when

narrative. The approach through which history came to be projected as it is in the present has been identified as the central theme of analysis if a meaningful insight into Greek Cypriot political discourse is to be gained.

This thesis concentrates on an analysis of texts constitutive of what may be described as the dominant form through which history is interpreted. The use of texts to this end is reflective of a choice over presentation rather than of the process of research through which this presentation was made possible. More than two years of fieldwork in Cyprus involved an investigation into the manner through which history is animated in the public realm and the relationship of the content given to history in this realm to the processes through which major historical events unfolded. Television debates, commemorations, newspaper coverage, political speeches represented a focus of analysis. Interviews were also conducted in an effort to disclose the relationship between private and public narratives. Simultaneously, research into newspapers of the period between 1960 and 1974 sought to establish those elements of continuity and change between public responses to events that were unfolding at the time and apprehensions at present.

It was only after this process and in returning to secondary sources that a symptomatic reading of texts aiming at an exposition of the history of the Cyprus problem suggested that some of these texts represent a crucial focus for analysis. This became particularly significant since these texts have been held by some as exemplary of a new ethos that broke away from Greek Cypriot nationalism and is able instead to respond to the needs arising from the task of re-unification and of constructing a pluralist state.

Some of the authors concerned did indeed make a break from the drive to produce histories seeking to contemplate efforts towards the Hellenisation of Cypriot history. Nevertheless this did not represent a break from a framework of interpretation which constituted the political community as a Greek Cypriot one. In that respect the

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the pro-federalist political parties have been consistently receiving close to 70% of the popular vote?

distinction that some Cypriot social scientists have drawn between ethnic and civic forms of nationalism in the political space of the Greek Cypriot community may be suggestive of the diverse implications that derive from these distinct visions of the nation. But the framework through which the Cyprus problem is interpreted also acts as a principle of inclusion and exclusion.

This theme is developed in the first chapter where the main preoccupation is that of framing communal discourse. It is argued that to gain an insight into the processes and categories through which groups are constituted as national groups it is necessary to approach the nation as a 'category of practice' rather than through the distinction between its civic and ethnic forms. Despite the difference between ethnic and civic nationalism in Cyprus and differences over the interpretation of certain historical moments, these nevertheless are contests conducted within a context constituted by what remains uncontested within Greek Cypriot society. This is the context in which relative homogeneity is maintained. These distinctions are animated through Bourdieu's categories of *Doxa*, *Orthodoxy* and *Heterodoxy*.

What remains uncontested in the public sphere of Greek Cypriot society is a contested terrain between the two communities. It is argued that the significance of the absence of the Turkish Cypriot community from the terms of the Greek Cypriot definition of the Cyprus problem can only be appreciated if the contemporary political discourse is approached through the historical (national) experience of this community. This takes account of both the manner in which that experience was understood in its own context as well as the manner in which the community articulates that experience in the present. It is asserted that both a separate past as well as the reinforcement of that past in the present stands in a logical sequence with the understanding of the Cyprus problem as exclusively a problem of invasion and occupation. A definition which in international law would find much sympathy but does little by way of permitting substantive links to emerge between the two communities. As such any allusion to a Cypriot nation has the



shortcoming that this is a nation which is not, and never has been, in a process of substantiating itself.<sup>12</sup>

The two following chapters discuss what may be described as a dominant, albeit simultaneously revisionist, appropriation of the history of nationalisation of the two communities amongst Greek Cypriot authors<sup>13</sup>. These are approaches which seek to produce a history intended to inform something of the content of a potential Cypriot nation through an emphasis on coexistence and the identification of a Cypriot consciousness through history. At the same time it emphasises the role of foreign intervention in the development of Cypriot history and in the progressive separation of the two communities. As such, this history could never sufficiently contribute to the appreciation that the history of the Turkish Cypriot community was nevertheless real; a history in the course of which the community was constituted and re-constituted as a separate community. The manner through which separation was marked, or, the content through which it was sustained is as important as the recognition that separation did not overshadow all social realms. Yet, this necessitates that attention shifts away from foreign involvement.

The political concepts through which the Turkish Cypriot community was constituted would suggest that the context that made separation possible was created by the separate political development of the two communities. Political concepts emerging from the nationalisation process of the two communities could not, in other words, coexist. The positions of the two leaderships were again formed through these same concepts, or,

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<sup>12</sup> 'Substantiation' literally refers to 'acquiring substance'. It is here borrowed from Mark Beissinger who has employed the term to indicate that a group becomes a nation when it has been substantiated as a national group. As will be seen in the following chapter, Beissinger emphasises that the process of substantiation (acquiring content as a nation) does not only presuppose the existence of the ethnic group in one form or another but is rather subject to political processes involving contingency and the recognition of opportunity.

<sup>13</sup> The term 'appropriation' is used to indicate that the past is animated in the present. Terminology such as 'the uses of the past' refer to the process whereby history is appropriated rather than singularly bearing its weight on the present

what we may refer to as concepts constituting the framework through which each interpreted the world, during the first three years of independence.

Dominant appropriations of the colonial period have served to explain the outbreak of intercommunal violence as an outcome of 'divide and rule' policies. It has also been suggested that the structures through which the colonial government sought to rule account for the course of development of the Greek Cypriot community on a national course which precluded inter-ethnic tolerance.

These propositions are addressed in Chapter two. It is a discussion of the dominant appropriations of the development of Greek Cypriot nationalism during the colonial period. Specific attention is given to the argument that colonial policies have determined the course of developments within the Greek Cypriot community, therefore establishing the structures for the antagonistic separation of the two communities.

Chapter three discusses dominant appropriations of developments within the Turkish Cypriot community during the same period. Here the aim is to engage with the thesis that intercommunal violence towards the end of colonial rule was an outcome of 'divide and rule' policies and of foreign involvement.

The two following chapters are based on extensive newspaper research of the period beginning with the compromise agreement between Greece, Britain and Turkey for the establishment of an independent Republic of Cyprus. The period ends with the outbreak of violence between the two communities in 1963. Chapter four explores the Greek Cypriot political response to independence. It is argued that the political discourse which began to emerge at the start of this period, immediately reflected the ambiguity with which Greek Cypriot society was approaching independence. While Greek Cypriots appeared to adapt to that reality, the bicomunal character of the independent state envisioned by the agreements alienated a majority community which had understood itself as the historically original population of the island.

Chapter five discusses the dominant appropriation of this period through an analysis of political history authored by individuals who had been at the time amongst a privileged section of Greek Cypriot society - being at the centre of the production of meaning during that period. It is argued that this is a perspective which, like that of contemporary political discourse, places Turkey at the centre of the political process that unfolded during that period. Consequently, the political relation between the two communities is lost. Hence, the process through which the Greek Cypriot side sought to impose a decision making procedure based on majority rule, while the Turkish Cypriot side insisted on the recognition of rights which constituted it as politically equal, is lost under the shadow of Turkey's role. But this was a process that reinforced the separation of the two communities leading to what was a logical consequence of a political conflict which could no longer be contained - violence.

Though the role of history in this research is a central preoccupation in understanding the processes that sustain the Greek Cypriot dominant political discourse, it is nevertheless not intended as a history of the development of the island's two communities. It contributes to an area of research which has been invariably approached in a highly *tenuous* manner. In short, it seeks to identify some of the processes through which the two communities, directly or indirectly, defined their relationship to each other and how these have been understood in more recent times. It is this preoccupation that has defined the historical periods on which this research is focused.

The significance of the period of British colonial rule for this research derives from the fact that it has occupied an important position in efforts to present the background to the Cyprus problem and the history of inter-communal relations. Unlike the period of British rule the first three years of independence is a neglected area of research with inter-communal relations almost completely un-addressed. Yet this period witnessed a contest which ensued from the differential perceptions of each community of a just order. It was a contest predicated by conflicting attitudes towards the power sharing

system envisioned by the constitution. The culmination of this period in the breakdown of the constitution, in violence and separation on the one hand and the differential impact that these events had on each community on the other reinforced different visions of a just order. The uninterrupted process through which these distinct visions were sustained meant that by 1974 each community understood the Turkish invasion in a diametrically opposing manner.

Though the process of nationalisation to which the two communities were subject depended on the mobilisation of ethnic categories, nationalism remains a political project seeking to assert and realise claims on behalf of the group it evokes. It is, in other words, a 'political soul animating an ethnic body'.<sup>14</sup> It is the categories which contribute towards an understanding of the nature of that soul which constitute the focus of this research. Finally, it should be stressed, that the starting point here is the double absence of the Turkish Cypriot community from the Greek Cypriot definitional terms of the problem which is an abiding feature of the dominant political discourse.

Consequently, the research has concentrated on the Greek Cypriot experience. Processes which marked the development of the Turkish Cypriot community are discussed only in so far as this has been necessary in analysing Greek Cypriot appropriations of the past.

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<sup>14</sup> G. Nodia 1994 p. 15.

## CHAPTER 1

### FRAMING COMMUNAL DISCOURSE

#### INTRODUCTION

This chapter has as its starting point the double absence of the Turkish Cypriot community from the political discourse that has developed in response to the *national* problem and dominated the public realm of Greek Cypriot society. In seeking to identify the processes through which this is sustained it is necessary to look beyond the evident act of the Turkish invasion and the consequent violation of state sovereignty and human rights. Experience that has evolved through the modern history of Cyprus and contemporary apprehensions of it represent two simultaneous moments which have shaped and sustained this discourse. The *framework of interpretation* through which each of the two communities were constituted and reconstituted in the modern history of Cyprus has consolidated the premise which has deemed Cyprus a divided society while the contest that evolved between the two has entrenched communal political discourses. Historical appropriations which seek to lend substance to the dominant political discourse reflect but also seek to reinforce that which has, in the terminology of Pierre Bourdieu, historically constituted the realm of the *undiscussed*, the self evident truth.

The chapter is divided into three main sections. In the first, it is argued, that the dominant Greek Cypriot political discourse has been a defensive response to challenges posed through history to this community's assumptions regarding that which should flow from its supremacy on the island.<sup>1</sup> It has, in this respect, been moulded through historical events and processes which culminated in the tragedy of 1974. The conditions of its development are animated through the use of Bourdieu's notions of *Doxa*, *Orthodoxy* and *Heterodoxy*.

The second addresses a recent thesis which suggests that political positions in the Greek Cypriot *political field* can be classified into positions which correspond to the distinction made by social scientists between ethnic and civic nationalism. Though such a classification of Greek Cypriot political forces may be valid, the implications drawn from this proposition in particular the contribution of civic nationalism towards the incorporation of the Turkish Cypriot community within its political discourse, is questioned. In contrast, it is argued that the dominant political discourse, while constituting an *orthodoxy* in the context of the contest between the two communities, enjoys a *doxic* status in the political field of the Greek Cypriot community. As such it is not challenged by any political force participating in the community's internal political processes even if the contest amongst these forces is conducted, amongst other things, through distinct principles of *vision and division* which have different implications in the definition of the social subject.

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<sup>1</sup> A sense of supremacy derived from such objective factors such as the numerical superiority of the Greek population and its superior economic status relative to other groups on the island. However, it was

The final section develops the argument that the absence of the Turkish Cypriot community from contemporary political discourse needs to be seen as an outcome of the dual role of history. The first part identifies the sustenance of this absence through an approach to the past which seeks to identify the role of foreign powers in influencing the course of political developments on the island. Even where an historical appropriation has aimed to address the nationalisation processes and thus the processes which led to the progressive separation of the two communities, the nationalisation of the minority has been subsumed under the role of foreign powers in this process. In doing this, the reality that the Turkish Cypriot leadership was seeking to name in that process has not been treated as a meaningful realm through which the process of constitution and re-constitution of this community may be understood. Consequently, the question of what has affected change in the past has been approached through a singular concentration on external factors, failing to recognise in this process the political categories through which the constitution and re-constitution of this community has proceeded. This history becomes a history of foreign intervention and consequently the struggle of a 'small state in the modern world' but never a history of a 'a small state in a divided society in the modern world'.

The absence of the Turkish Cypriot community from the nation that defines the problem as *national* is discussed in the concluding section. The distinction between *orthodox* and *heterodox* discourses which is addressed in the initial stages of this chapter suggests the

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grounded in the process of nationalisation of the Orthodox community that deemed the history of Cyprus

process through which this form of absence is sustained. The contest between *orthodox* and *heterodox* discourses was historically sparked by a struggle to determine who possessed a legitimate right to self-determination and what the object of determination should be. In doing so, the contemporary absence of the Turkish Cypriot community from the nation is treated as a contemporary manifestation of this struggle.

### DOXA - ORTHODOXY - HETERODOXY

Bourdieu's notions of *orthodoxy* and *heterodoxy* refer to discourses formed in a contest over the distribution of power within a given field. Put differently, these are discourses which emerge in the struggle to legitimise a distinct principle of *vision and division* through which reality may be recognised and groups mobilised, thus, a distinct principle through which power is distributed.<sup>2</sup> Orthodoxy is forced into existence when actors or groups seeking to subvert the principle through which power is distributed challenge what has hitherto represented the realm of the undisputed that sustained a distinct principle of vision and division. By implication, this is a challenge with the potential to undermine dominant social groups whose position has been predicated on the principle

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as the history of its Hellenic population.

<sup>2</sup> Struggles for the imposition of distinct principles of vision and division are struggles over the classification of the social world. Bourdieu (1990, p.132) argues: "The social world may be described and constructed in different ways in accordance with different principles of vision and division – for example, economic divisions and ethnic divisions. If it is true that, in the societies that are most advanced from the economic point of view, economic and cultural factors have the greatest power of differentiation, the fact remains that the strength of economic and social differences is never such that one cannot organise agents by means of other principles of division – ethnic, religious or national, for instance." The power to impose a distinct principle of vision and division is therefore the power to constitute groups through mobilisation.



through which power is distributed. What has hitherto been undisputed is therefore forced into the public realm as this struggle for power ensues. The defence of the principle through which power has been distributed constructs an orthodox discourse brought into existence only by an opposing *heretical* act which disputes what has been undisputed and thus, the principle through which power is distributed. Orthodox discourse is, in other words, a substitute for *doxa*, the dominant position dependant on a set of beliefs that deem the distribution of power as natural and commonsensical, and therefore beyond dispute.<sup>3</sup>

Through these categories it is possible to identify the complex process out of which Greek Cypriot political discourse has developed in defence against the challenge posed to this community's status as a majority, and the benefits (rights) it assumed to accrue from this status.<sup>4</sup> Though the Greek Cypriot community has never enjoyed in any practical sense a state of *doxa*, it nevertheless had assumed an order of this kind to represent the *natural* evolution of things once the *unnatural* state of colonial rule was ended. Turkish Cypriot discourse, from the perspective of the Greek Cypriot community, has represented a *heresy* or *heterodoxy* which sought to dispute what for the Greek Cypriot community was the undisputed - that is the superiority of its sense of community arising both from its historical depth on the island and its numerical supremacy.

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<sup>3</sup> Pierre Bourdieu 1977/1997, pp. 159-183; 1991/1994, pp. 127-136.

Though Greek Cypriot assumptions had already been challenged by the colonial power's reluctance to recognise the assumed superiority of the community, it was not until the two communities were placed in a relationship dictated by the constitution that the majority was forced into a *direct* dialogue with the discourse of the minority. The challenge that was posed both by the minority and by the constitutional order of 1960 to that which for this community represented as the undisputed and evident reality, provoked a discursive response which aimed to contest the finality assumed by the establishment of a heretical constitutional order as well as the heresy of the Turkish Cypriot community.

This relied on a political paradigm which emphasised particular forms of democracy and majority rule on issues concerning the rights of minorities. In the first three years following independence, this contest took the form of a conflict over the interpretation of the constitution and a struggle over its implementation. The majority community asserted a discourse which suggested that the state was a neutral arbiter serving the interests of all its people provided that these interests were ascertained through the democratic principle of majority rule. The minority, on the other hand, understood that the state was an institution which served the interests of the identifiable groups who dominated it. The failure to negotiate this conflict through argument and compromise

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<sup>4</sup> Though this terminology has been used by Bourdieu to discuss the processes that ensue in intra-group fields of competition, I have reformulated them in a field within which two communities have been competing for the recognition of their distinct principle of vision and division. Where the ultimate authority for such recognition rests with the international world, the field within which the two

culminated, by the end of 1963, in inter-communal violence. This outbreak of violence was symptomatic of the willingness of both communities to break from the status quo and seek to assert a *just* order through force. This was a formal and mutual declaration of a constitutional breakdown.

The battle between the two communities, as this was manifested through political disputes and related discourses, was taken into the international arena where both communities sought to assert the validity of its own respective discourse and simultaneously secure international recognition of its case. Having been excluded and having excluded itself from office, the Turkish Cypriot community established separate and dispersed no-go territorial administrative units within which the majority of Turkish Cypriots gathered during the periods of intensified violence. But it failed to secure a recognition of its assertion that the breakdown of the constitution should be understood as the death of the Republic of Cyprus and that the government was to be identified as an unconstitutional Greek Cypriot government. This failure to prevent continued international recognition of the Republic of Cyprus also meant that this community became, in effect, a stateless people. This experience was apprehended as that of the powerlessness of the weak and became an essential feature reinforcing Turkish Cypriot discourse.

For the Greek Cypriot community the 1974 partition challenged its superior status which accrued from the fact that the internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus had

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communities have competed in asserting their interpretation of reality may indeed be understood to be an

been in practice the state of and for the Greek Cypriots. Following partition the ability of the state to extend its jurisdiction across the island was undermined by the presence of the Turkish army while the Turkish Cypriot community recognised the possibility of legitimising the de facto reality. A discourse which had been formed and entrenched in the preceding years, seeking to legitimise a political case for the recognition of the minority community as a community of political rights, was elaborated in the new context - the future ought to be shaped by reinforcing a territorial basis to the ethnic differentiation of the population and a recognition that if the island was to be to any degree administratively united, the Turkish Cypriot community would participate in this administration as a territorially defined as well as ethnically separate unit. The Greek Cypriot defensive response to this position centred on systematic efforts to protect the international status granted to the Republic of Cyprus, thereby eliminating any possibility that the break away region may become internationally recognised. In an effort to assert the legitimacy of the Republic of Cyprus to exercise jurisdiction over the total territory of the island, an international campaign to institute the definition of the 1974 act as an invasion and occupation of a sovereign state's territory was pursued by the Greek Cypriot side. This was compounded by efforts to prevent any form of international or domestic activity which may even informally suggest a recognition of a separate administrative status for the Turkish Cypriot community; a situation that would contradict the international recognition of the Republic of Cyprus as legitimate.

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international political field.

In summary, the Greek Cypriot interpretation of the Cyprus problem has been largely a defensive exercise aimed at the preservation of power under conditions where the Turkish Cypriot community was defending the consequences of the Turkish invasion and asserting its own claims, challenging in this way the rules which ought to guide the distribution of power. The discourse produced by the Turkish Cypriot community in its claim of rights and assertion of interests has represented a heresy or heterodoxy which implicitly or explicitly sought to subvert the international legitimacy of the Republic of Cyprus to figure as the institution which can speak on behalf of the whole of the island and its population. In this struggle the dominant Turkish Cypriot discourse sought to validate a historical interpretation in which 1974 figured as the culmination of years of threat, insecurity and the violation of the Turkish Cypriot community's constitutional rights as a distinct and politically equal community.

These are the contours of the dominant discourses within the two societies. Despite the variation of positions within the political space of each community, there is, nevertheless, a unifying thread that is defined by the assumptions shared by those who participate in the political field of either side.<sup>5</sup> These assumptions sustain different but related positions in either of the political fields. On the Greek Cypriot side, these positions reflect differences in relation to what would constitute an acceptable solution to the Cyprus problem, attitudes towards the Turkish Cypriot community, understandings regarding the relationship between ethnicity, nation and state and the

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<sup>5</sup> P. Bourdieu 1991/94 pp. 163-229.

degree of insularity through which historical appropriation proceeds.<sup>6</sup> Similar differences are sustained in the political field of the Turkish Cypriot side. However, no prospective candidate could seek office by naming a reality that does not correspond to the reality named by the discourses described above. In that respect both enjoy a state of *doxa* amongst the community that figures as the subject in that the premise upon which it is constructed

remains beyond discussion (in the field), that is beyond the reach of discourse and which relegated to the state of *doxa*, is accepted tacitly without discussion or examination by the people who confront one another at the level of declared political choices.<sup>7</sup>

In this respect, the classification of positions within the political field of a given group according to the distinct principle of vision and division which differentiates one position from another, offers an insight to that which is contested but not to that which remains uncontested. The categories through which this contest is sustained, name a distinct reality which resonates with specific groups of individuals. The struggle for the imposition of a distinct principle of vision and division is a struggle which aims at power within the unit as a whole. Amongst Greek Cypriots, naming the past through a distinct principle of vision and division has been a major issue of contention which defines distinct positions within the political field. But the past which is contested is a past that relates to power struggles within this community. Importantly, no side of the contest attempts to contest that past which has affected inter-communal relations.

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<sup>6</sup> N. Peristianis 1995, K. Mavratsas 1996, 1997.

## CIVIC AND ETHNIC VISIONS OF THE NATION IN GREEK CYPRIOT SOCIETY.

The reality that was created by the 1974 invasion came to form the basis for the assertion of competing principles of vision and division within the Greek Cypriot society. At the time, Turkey sought to justify the invasion as an act aimed at the protection of the Turkish Cypriot community and what was claimed to be an imminent change in the international status of the island. This, the Greek Cypriot leadership argued was nothing short of a pretext for the implementation of long awaiting plans for the partition of the island. However, responsibilities were to be sought within the community for the presentation of such a pretext. It was argued by the leadership and the political forces that had been aligned around it that this pretext was offered to the neighbouring aggressor through the instability created by the opposition which sought to bring about *enosis* by engaging in paramilitary activity against the government while condemning government policy as a national betrayal. Paramilitary activity had been sustained by the Greek junta through its direct control of the National Guard and reliance on local elements to infiltrate the police force and various ministries, for bombing campaigns and assassination attempts. The principle of vision and division that evolved from this, created the bi-polar categorisation of Greek Cypriot political forces into pro-government *democratic forces* and unionist *insurrectionists*. This became the immediate distinction of political orientations that largely characterised the dominant political rhetoric in the years after 1974.

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<sup>7</sup> Bourdieu op. cit., p. 132.

It was later made subservient to another principle of vision and division, that of concessionism and rejectionism. The principle of vision and division, which now made political alliances possible, were attitudes towards the future solution rather than particular conceptions of the past. Parties commanding a smaller share of support negotiate alliances with the two major parties caught in a contest for power but sharing a concessionist policy on the national problem. Therefore, as Nikos Peristianis has argued:

Only two decades after the coup and the Turkish invasion ... a series of strange and paradoxical events occur, they surprise .... Not only some third-hand observers but also at large the Cypriots themselves. Therefore the Democratic Rally (DISY), the largest party of the right, which at the beginning of the period under examination (1974) was accused for having identified with the 'great betrayal', is now in power. DISY, which is understood to follow a 'concessionist', compromising, policy on the Cyprus problem, has recently captured state power, with the assistance of the Democratic Party (DIKO) and the tolerance of the Socialist Party (EDEK) - two parties which belong in the camp of the so called 'rejectionists' (uncompromising) and which, a few years earlier, had constituted a united front with the communist party (AKEL), with exactly the opposite aim - that is the exclusion of DISY from parliamentary power. AKEL and DISY are forces of two diametrically opposed socio-political ideologies, but share a lot as far as the approach to the Cyprus problem is concerned, so that both are understood as the main party forces of 'concessionism'. This common position on the Cyprus problem is shared despite opposing....collective identifications regarding the nation-state: Disy is 'Grecocentric' while Akel is 'Cypriotcentric'<sup>8</sup>

This latter distinction has been advanced by the same author to correspond to a distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism. It has been adopted and developed

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<sup>8</sup> N. Peristianis op. cit., p.123-4. Unless otherwise stated, all quotations from Greek language sources are my translation.



further by the Greek Cypriot sociologist, Kesaras Mavratsas.<sup>9</sup> While Peristianis has sought to account for the factors and processes that made possible that which was unimaginable at a previous stage of the struggle for power possible, Mavratsas has suggested that the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism in Cyprus, or, Cypriotism and Greek Cypriot nationalism, correspond to qualitatively distinct political attitudes directed towards the Turkish Cypriot community.

Greek Cypriot nationalism, he argues, has constituted the major obstacle to the peaceful co-existence and partnership of the two communities both before and after 1974. Apart from the content of these distinct nationalisms and the character of the nation-state envisaged by each, the author supports this argument by drawing a link between attitudes towards the Turkish Cypriot community and attitudes towards rapprochement between the two communities. Rapprochement is, he argues, viewed as unacceptable by nationalists but treated by Cypriotists or civic nationalists as an urgent necessity that needs to accompany the formal processes towards a solution. The rejection of rapprochement constitutes, he states, a denial of the existence of the Turkish Cypriots. Greek Cypriots refuse to recognise the Turkish Cypriot community as anything but a minority and the main factor accounting for this is the ideological and political dominance of Greek nationalism.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> K. Mavratsas op. cit. Mavratsas has employed a slightly different terminology, replacing Greco-centric with Greek Cypriot nationalism and Cypriot-centric with Cypriotism.

<sup>10</sup> K. Mavratsas 1997 pp. 191-198.

Major problems arises from this approach. Beyond the reservations expressed by various sociologists in regard to the extent to which a distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism is a distinction of substance,<sup>11</sup> there arises much that is inherently problematic when this distinction is mobilised in the context of severely divided societies. It is this distinction that I now turn to.

### Constructing the Civic Nation in Severely Divided Societies.

In a recent paper Anthony Smith considers the human cost born in the context of multiethnic societies where a dominant ethnic group is in control over the process of nation-building. He stresses that a remedial approach should not only target itself at relieving human cost, mainly in the form of refugee movements, but that:

the single most important programme needed ... would be to try to 'de-ethnicize' the nation and the state-nation (that is the state which strives to become a nation, where several ethnies now compete). Such a programme involves redefining the nation in more territorial, legal, cultural and educational terms, employing a more polyethnic and pluralist perspective on nationalism. In this way it may become possible to relax the more ethnic components of this bond and lay more emphasis upon a public, mass culture, a shared homeland and common legal codes.<sup>12</sup>

He warns, there are no easy solutions to achieving this. Firstly, he argues, there is the problem of the role of 'history and destiny', in other words, of social memory in the fabric of de-ethnicised nations:

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<sup>11</sup> See for example, M. Billig 1995; D. Brown 2000; R. Brubaker 1998; R. Fine 1999; G. Nodia 1994; M. Herzfeld 1992; A. Seligman 1995.

<sup>12</sup> A. Smith 1999, pp.199-200.

[w]hose past and whose future does the [de-ethnicized] nation encompass? Who can be said to belong to this community of history and destiny? And what is the cultural heritage and 'ethno-history' that can include, rather than exclude, the different ethnic communities within its territorial boundaries?<sup>13</sup>

Secondly, if presumed common origins and descent constitute a 'principle of solidarity' then it is unlikely that members of a nation will relinquish ethnicity for a 'more fluid and flexible principle of solidarity'.

The problems that Smith therefore foresees in the making of the fabric of de-ethnicised nations are derivative of his 'ethno-symbolic' approach to the origins of nations, the thesis, in other words, which seeks to lay open the ethnic origins of nations and the mobilisation of resources that consequently lend themselves for an imaginative utilisation by nationalists in the production and reproduction of nations.<sup>14</sup> This is a process which points to the centrality of social memory in the making of nations and Smiths' consequent pessimism regarding the role of memory in the fabric of a territorially defined nation which would include the poly-ethnic population of a multi-ethnic state. Consequently, there is a difficulty in substituting a principle of solidarity based on the historical depth of a nation of ethnic origins with one based on territory and citizenship. In this respect Smith considers the prospect for accommodating minorities as dependent on the ability to construct a new nation through resources such as those mobilised by ethnic nations but evidently with a renewed content. Therefore, it can no longer be the memories of the dominant ethnic nation but the memories of the

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid, p.201.

ethnic groups that should constitute the fabric of the de-ethnicised nation. And it is no longer the 'ethno-history' of the ethnic nation but an 'ethno-history' that can include rather than exclude the members of the different ethnic communities within the territory of the state. However, as others have commented, this is an unlikely scenario in severely divided societies.<sup>15</sup>

What Smith seems to have in mind when he considers the obstacles to a territorially based nationalism is the ethno-nationalism of dominant groups confronting minorities which are categorised as 'alien' to the 'historic cultural community'. Despite the fact that the examples that he has in mind include Sri Lanka, Palestine, Bosnia and Northern Ireland, Smith seems to assume that minorities are passive recipients of discriminatory policies imposed by an 'ethno-nationalising' state as well as the unofficial practices of the dominant ethnic group. Yet minorities are often *national minorities* asserting their own national project. The confrontation, as numerous examples around the world reveal, is between two distinct competing nationalisms.<sup>16</sup> Different responsibilities may pertain to dominant ethnic-nations which seek to maintain the territorial unity of the state but minorities cannot be necessarily assumed to be willing accomplices in a project seeking to establish membership to a wider community on the basis of a shared territory,

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<sup>14</sup> Smith 1998, pp. 170-198.

<sup>15</sup> D. Horowitz, 1994. Horowitz argues that: "One of the ironies of democratic development is that, as the future is being planned, the past intrudes with increasing severity. In ethnic relations, history often leads to exclusive conceptions of community." (p.40) He goes on to add: "The boundary of the political community is an issue that manifests itself in the answer to three questions: Who is a citizen? Among citizens, who has what privileges? Whose norms and practices are symbolically aligned with those of the state?" (pp.41-2) Also Kymlicka 1995.

<sup>16</sup> As will be seen later, beyond the nationalisms confronting each other within there is also the nationalism of an external state making claims of national affinity with the national minority. See for example, Brubaker 1996.

common citizenship and institutions; or what has been commonly referred to as civic nationalism.

In societies where group loyalties have represented an important resource for mobilisation around ethnic groups the transition from an ethnic to civic nation or the supersession of ethnic nationalism by civic nationalism seems hardly a possibility if what is implied by this is the introduction of some notion of the universal individual reflected through institutional practices (including the de-ethnicisation of the symbols of the state) and a form of government based on majority rule - which the notion of the universal individual implies. Where the population of a given country breaks into an identifiable ethnic majority and minority the construction of a civic nation depends on rendering ethnicity as a source of political identity irrelevant. But this depends on a range of subjective apprehensions which have, in the first place, provided the platform upon which groups were mobilised into politically polarised ethnic groups. Even where a dominant ethnic majority is willing to engage in a process of inclusion this can rarely be seen as compensation to minority demands and grievances. As Donald Horowitz has argued, in societies where

majority and minority are fixed rather than fluid, because each thinks of itself as a group defined by birth and possessing affinities and interests not shared across group lines ... majority rule is not a solution; it is a problem, because it permits domination, apparently in perpetuity.<sup>17</sup>

Put differently, majority rule

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<sup>17</sup> D. Horowitz 1994 p.46.

allows the dominant culture to impose its standards in the name of an abstract individual who is a legal fiction. The dominant group wraps itself into the cloak of universalism and ignores the fact that any 'abstract citizen' also belongs to a specific culture.<sup>18</sup>

Consequently, the redefinition of the nation may be a process which might be more likely to succeed if the state could mediate the relationship not only between individuals as the notion of the civic nation suggests but also between its various ethnic components.

The distinction between 'civic' and 'ethnic' forms of nationalism within academic discourse became widespread in the aftermath of ethnic conflict and the dissolution of federations in Eastern Europe at the end of the cold war.<sup>19</sup> However, the underlying assumptions upon which the distinction is based has received numerous critical responses from social and political theorists. Closer to critiques advanced by some political theorists and sociologists Smith himself acknowledges that civic nationalism may be intolerant to the 'communal culture of minorities'.<sup>20</sup> The consequences that may flow from the implications regarding the threat that civic nationalism may pose to national minorities remains undeveloped in Smith's work and, it would seem, in most sociological approaches. Yet, it has been debated at greater depth by political theorists broadly divided into the 'communitarian' and 'individualist' camps. In this context,

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<sup>18</sup> O. Roy 1999 56-7.

<sup>19</sup> A, distinction between political and ethnic forms of nationalism long predated the collapse of the Soviet Union. See for example the distinction made by H. Kohn between Western and Eastern nationalism. 1945/1994

arguments are articulated persuasively by these two competing approaches in a discussion which has important implications on the rights of national minorities.<sup>21</sup>

Whatever the merits of the basic argument of either approach and the implications on whether national minorities can possess collective rights without violating the essential basis of liberalism there remains one overriding fact, the very realities of those countries where ethnic differentiation leading to polarised politics and conflict has prevented the possibilities of a civic nation-state to be an immediately realisable possibility. In this respect those who acknowledged the relevance of a shared principle of solidarity as an ethical basis which enhances the pursuit of individual rights have been those inclined to address issues which flow from that and, in doing so, provide an important resource in a consideration of the challenge posed by ethnic conflict and the pressing need to consolidate democracy.<sup>22</sup>

Ghia Nodia, a Georgian political theorist, has stressed the intimate relationship between nationalism and democracy by emphasising the absence of any rational basis on which a boundary may be drawn so as to define the people whose democracy this is to be. In the absence of such a rational basis nationalism has prevailed as the mobilising force for defining 'the people'.<sup>23</sup> What may be drawn from Nodia's argument is that the

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<sup>20</sup> Smith 1999 p.201. C. Taylor (1994), for example, has stressed the need for multicultural politics which affirm the identity of national minorities.

<sup>21</sup> This debate has revolved around the question whether a collective self-understanding by a group that it constitutes a community stretching back in history is a necessary context for the pursuit of individual interests. This debate has implications which have been addressed in the same context as to the necessity to grant rights to national minorities. Another related issue raised in this debate is that of the principle of self-determination; who should possess it and what should be understood by self-determination. See for example, B. Barry 2000; M. Freeman 1999; Kymlicka op. cit; M. Walzer 1995.

<sup>22</sup> D. Miller 1995, 2000; W. Kymlicka op. cit; N. McCormick 1999; C. Taylor op. cit.

<sup>23</sup> S. Avineri 1994; F. Fukuyama 1994.

interdependent relationship that nationalism and democracy are locked in would suggest that the relationship between ethnic and civic nationalism should not be seen as one of simple, binary opposition - 'manifestations of nationalism's ugly side arise not from excessive ethnicity but from the lack of a robust political expression for national feeling'.<sup>24</sup>

However, it may be questioned as to what circumstances for the development of a robust political expression for national feeling could arise amongst groups caught in precisely the kind of conflict which poses its own limitations on any attempt to define the context within which the individual is constituted as a political rather than communal subject in his/her relationship to the state. As one author has argued, 'we need to explore how to contribute to the construction of complementary identities' and search for political formulas which 'reconcile group rights and individual rights'.<sup>25</sup> A view which is echoed by Horowitz in the following statement:

The vision of a massive shift of loyalties from the ascriptive group to the state nonetheless continues to exert a powerful pull. It is thus suggested for Cyprus that a new elite should emerge, "freed from the slogans and rhetoric of the past, an elite which will stake its claim to power and reputation on interethnic cooperation, not on rivalry.... If countries so divided could indeed produce such an elite, such a system, or such a consensus, they would not have the problems that they have. Such characteristics might appear as the effects of accommodation somewhere down the line, but they are not measures that can be adopted to cause ethnic accommodation to occur. States like Cyprus and Lebanon cannot hope just now for beautiful architecture. They will have to settle for sound engineering."<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> G. Nodia op. cit., p.15.

<sup>25</sup> A. Stepan 1998.



It is this 'engineering project' which Greek Cypriot society has been unable to address outside the parameters through which it defines the problem. This inability has not been the preserve of those who may share a vision of an ethnic-nation but extends and is reinforced by the very ideological basis of visions of a civic-nation. Further, while these visions have distinct implications for the manner in which the respective political factions aim to shape the state, neither ethnic nor civic nationalism seek to reconstitute the political categories which have rendered the state as a Greek Cypriot state. Nor can civic nationalism be the answer to the re-integration of the two communities under any formal political arrangement since a civic understanding of the world is singularly biased in favour of the majority. By treating the identity of the social subject of the state through an exclusive understanding that the citizen is constituted by territory and shared institutions it erroneously assumes a de-ethnicised subject. In effect, whether the Greek Cypriots are seeking an ethno-nationalising state or a civic-nationalising state, the communal dimension that divides the two communities is reinforced; in the former case because of the exclusion of Turkish Cypriots on the basis of cultural markers and in the latter because of their exclusion through political categories seeking to de-communalise the individual of a minority group. It would seem that there can be no way forward unless the communal division is explicitly recognised and given content as such. Only then can different groups within each community seek to freely determine that meaning.

#### Civic Nationalism in Cyprus and its Relation to the Dominant Political Discourse.

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<sup>26</sup> D. Horowitz 1985, p.568.

The differential impact of what Mavratsas calls Greek Cypriot nationalism, on the one hand, and Cypriotism, on the other, on attitudes towards a solution is in fact more ambiguous than he assumes. Equally ambiguous is the differential impact that civic rather than ethnic nationalism has had on inter-communal relations. Viewed from the perspective of the relations between the two communities, it is uncertain what it is that the Greek Cypriot political forces which constitute the Cypriotist ideological camp have achieved which may have extended beyond the disposition to view the Turkish Cypriots as an integral part of the population on the island. Whilst this is no doubt important, its significance for inter-communal relations and the possibility of affecting change in the political culture of Greek Cypriot society does not extend to providing any real dynamism towards the re-unification of the island.

The main exponents of civic nationalism identified by the author have not, in effect, addressed the Turkish Cypriots as a community, even if it is accepted that the re-unification of the island would proceed along federal lines. In other words, as with those Greek Cypriot nationalists who do accept that re-unification can only come about through a federal agreement so the Cypriotists have explained this as a result of the presence of the Turkish army in Cyprus:

A bi-regional bi-communal federation means that one part of the territorially integral and united Republic of Cyprus will be under a Turkish Cypriot administration. This reality we have never concealed from the people....And we have always stressed in all honesty that unfortunately a bi-regional - bi-communal federation is the painful solution, it is the price for ridding ourselves

of the occupation and the division which the great betrayal of 1974 inflicted on us.<sup>27</sup>

In a 36 page speech before the House of Representatives in 1992, the General Secretary of AKEL, warned against a change of policy in the pursuit of a solution. He explained, firstly, that the support that the international community has given towards a federal solution has not been determined by the fact that the Greek Cypriots have been the victims of a military operation but because the Greek Cypriots have convinced the world that they do seek a solution and are ready to coexist in the context of a federal arrangement. Secondly, he argued that this policy is precisely the policy that has placed the Turkish Cypriot leader and Turkey in a difficult position leaving them little room to manoeuvre. Thirdly, because this policy established 'to a certain degree a common language with those Turkish Cypriots who want the peaceful re-unification of the island'.

Adding, to this single reference to an inter-communal dimension, that:

[w]ithout this understanding there cannot be a solution to the Cyprus problem because let us not forget that the Cyprus problem has also an internal dimension which relates to the relations between the two communities.<sup>28</sup>

Yet this is an area which remains unexplored and fails to figure as a main influence upon policy formulation. In a document submitted by the same party to the National Council, an advisory body on *national* policy, in 1996, the General Secretary of the party sought to explain why the Greek Cypriot side should continue to pursue the same

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<sup>27</sup> Speech of the General Secretary of AKEL at a rally held by refugees from Kyrenia on 17 May, 1996.

<sup>28</sup> Speech of the General Secretary of AKEL in parliament. Parliament Minutes 23 September, 1992.

policy on the bi-communal, bi-zonal federation as it had done since 1989.<sup>29</sup> This was the year when the National Council unanimously accepted a proposal laying out the main features of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation that ought to function as a guide within the negotiations process. Seven years later, the National Council considered whether any changes should be made to the 1989 proposals. Significantly, this document reviewed the international situation and its potential influence on the negotiating position of the Greek Cypriot side but not in relation to the Turkish Cypriot community and more particularly in relation to ‘those Turkish Cypriots who want the peaceful re-unification of the island’.

That a political party commanding a substantial level of support amongst the population supports a federal solution is important, but its effect on political culture should not be overestimated. AKEL frequently claims that the party has always spoken of the interests of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. At the same time it supports a federal solution because apart from the need to act in a manner that the international community may feel inclined to offer its support to, it provides ‘to a certain degree common language with those Turkish Cypriots who want the peaceful re-unification of the island’. But simultaneously the party does not explain why these Turkish Cypriots seeking the peaceful re-unification of the island seek it through a federal arrangement.

Mavratsas’ interpretation of the contemporary political forces is symptomatic of his interpretation of the past. The course of Cypriot history, as far as inter-communal

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<sup>29</sup> The Central Committee of AKEL 23 July, 1996.

relations are concerned, is understood as the outcome of the dominance of a nationalist ideology propagating the union of Cyprus with Greece despite the fact that colonial rule had ended and independence was inaugurated in 1960. There is some truth in this in so far that declarations to the effect that the union of Cyprus with Greece was still looming on the horizon exacerbated the differences between the two communities. But Greek Cypriot society was caught between different future possibilities.

*Enosis* continued to receive legitimacy. However, a reading of the printed media of the period immediately after independence would suggest that this legitimacy derived primarily from an assertion of a Greek identity through various forms of symbolism rather than from a direct propagation of *enosis*. One form of symbolism which contributed towards the legitimation of *enosis* in public political discourse was the call for unity in order to effectively pursue struggles that remained incomplete while the emphasis always rested on the Greekness of the nation whose struggles these were. However, a declaration that the struggle was as yet unfinished was simultaneously a protest over the constitutional basis of independence rather than a positive demand for the union of the island with Greece. The constitution provided for a power sharing system.

A major power struggle unfolded not only between the two communities but also within the Greek Cypriot community itself where the most vocal exponents of unionism as well as those who recognised a political opportunity in the mobilising potential of the demand for *enosis*, were not willing to surrender unionism to the leadership. The latter

became the focus of attack, accused of pursuing a pro-independence policy and for having betrayed the nation.

The mobilisation of symbolism which legitimised *enosis* as a relevant aspiration served as a political tool through which to forge the unity of the Greek Cypriot community; but it was a supplementary tool to that of proposing that independence represented a major victory against colonial rule, albeit an independence, it was argued, that was not as yet complete. The power sharing structure of government was understood as a major impediment to democratic rule and three international treaties embodied in the constitution were said to have compromised the sovereignty of the state. The official narrative came to construct an ambiguity aimed to achieve a unity of the Greek Cypriot community. Therefore, despite the fact that independence was construed as an incomplete project which would be fully realised through a process of democratisation leading to majority rule, the emphasis on ethnic identity and incomplete national struggles was a terminology associated with the national demand under which the anti-colonial struggle ensued i.e. that of *enosis*. By implication, national identity had not been given a new meaning.

The same forces that Mavratsas identifies with Cypriotism, shared along with those he defines as Greek Cypriot nationalists an opposition to the bicomunal structure of the state. This was the driving force which informed government policy, its priority - the subversion of bicomunal structures. AKEL, as the major Cypriotist force, disagreed on tactics in that it argued that the Turkish Cypriot community ought to be mobilised to

form a united front to struggle against imperialism and therefore to abrogate the international treaties and rid the constitution of its undemocratic elements. However, how this was to be achieved or what was to be undertaken to that effect other than relying on a distinct vocabulary remained unclear. Once inter-communal violence broke out the undoubtedly excessive force used by the state against Turkish Cypriots did not provoke a protest by any Greek Cypriot political faction in relation to the manner in which the state treated some of its citizens. And, it should be added, this remains ignored within Greek Cypriot society although it lies at the centre of Turkish Cypriot discourse.

The mis-recognition of the struggle that ensued between the two communities as a struggle primarily informed by the Greek Cypriot demand for union with Greece has been sustained by what may be described as academic approaches to the evolution of the Cyprus problem. These have generally suggested a clear demarcation between a pre-1974 Greek Cypriot nationalist past characterised by a unionist ideology and a post-1974 present characterised by a pro-independence ideology.<sup>30</sup> This demarcation has simultaneously made it possible for a statement of apology to be casually made to the Turkish Cypriot side in the following terms by the current Foreign Minister of the Republic:

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<sup>30</sup> M. Attalides (1977, 1979 1993) and P. Kitromilides (1977, 1979, 1981) have been the original authors to interpret the crisis in the relations between the two communities after independence as arising out of the persistence of Greek and Turkish Cypriot nationalism in the form of *enosis* and partition. With the association of nationalism confined to those ideologies which implied the subversion of independence

Am I and all who are younger than me to be blamed because some of the grownups of the time made mistakes? Will this condemn the island and its people to permanent division because at the time someone did wrong [towards] you? I apologise to you for that.<sup>31</sup>

Similarly, Mavratsas apportions responsibility over the course of the history of inter-communal relations to Greek Cypriot nationalism:

Greek Cypriot nationalism has constituted one of the most serious obstacles in the peaceful coexistence and the partnership of the two communities, both before and after 1974<sup>32</sup>

But as he argues:

For the Cypriotists the aim is not to erase ethnic identity but its de-politicisation. Weaknesses of the Cypriotist ideology permit the nationalists to continue to define the parameters of the ideological orthodoxy on the island.<sup>33</sup>

However, that orthodoxy, it would appear, is sustained by Cypriotism as much as it is by Greek Cypriot nationalism. That is, while the population of Cyprus is defined in unitary terms, the resistance to reflect that the communalisation of Cypriot society does not permit an easy way to the re-unification of the island is reinforced. Contemporary Greek Cypriot political discourse is sustained by diverse political forces and bears a remarkable continuity with ideologies that dominated in the past.

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what has been overlooked is that a pro-independence form of nationalism was simultaneously colluding, and was indeed exclusive, even if expressed through a civic form.

<sup>31</sup> Turkish Daily News, 22 November, 1999.

<sup>32</sup> K. Mavratsas op. cit., p. 195.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., p. 206.



## RENDERING THE MINORITY INVISIBLE

The dominant political discourses of either side are reinforced by diverse daily practices whose cumulative effect serves as a reminder of that which constitutes the political community. These practices include various forms of representation in the public sphere; the images, vocabulary and issues aired by the mass media; political statements, declarations and debates on the national problem; commemorative activities; and historical appropriation.

While all these daily practices are important, contributing in different ways and with varying intensity in the reproduction of a community, historical appropriation possesses a distinct significance in revealing the process through which the continuity of the community through time is asserted. Most importantly, in the context of this research, historical interpretation is central to understanding the manner in which the Turkish Cypriot community is recognised or mis-recognised against the historical background through which 1974 finds a location.

Simultaneously, if the investigation of historical appropriation gives an insight into the manner in which past and present are made congruent, the processes which contributed to and indeed made possible the making of the two communities as these are constituted in the contemporary period cannot be revealed unless identified in their historical context. In other words, the making of political communities, bound and reproduced

through communal frameworks of interpretation, can only be understood if the processes of constitution and re-constitution of the community are approached through the historical context in which they proceeded.

Absence from the Definitional Terms of the problem.

The absence of the Turkish Cypriot community from the definition of the problem is consistent with the dominant forms of appropriation of the modern history of Cyprus. That is, there exists continuity between the manner in which the Turkish Cypriot community figures in the appropriation of history and its absence from the terms of definition of the national problem. This continuity is established by what I refer to as a tendency to de-subjectify the Turkish Cypriot community. That is, the failure to recognise that this community has developed through the modern history of Cyprus as a collective political subject with distinct understood interests and demands; a community which has come to appropriate a history which defines a social subject clearly distinct and always in opposition to the Greek Cypriot social subject. This is a history which has depended on a process of homogenisation, constituting and re-constituting the minority community according to the new realities which were unfolding in the course of the modern history of the island. It has both resisted and competed against the aspirations of the majority. The willingness to contest majority aspirations in a context where the majority understood its aspirations as an inherent right deriving from its numerical status and historical depth led to a sustained crises during the latter years of colonial rule and much of the post-colonial period.

The most obvious crisis that inter-communal relations experienced in the post-colonial period, setting the stage for the progressive physical and administrative separation of the two communities, was the outbreak of violence, which signalled the breakdown of the constitution in 1963. The period immediately preceding these events, coinciding with the first three years of independence, was characterised by a competition between the two communities whose terms of reference suggest the nature of the conflict at the time. Violence was an inherent possibility arising out of conflict already clearly revealed through the political processes of that period. But the antagonistic positions of each community as these were revealed, were again nothing new. They were already apparent as each community sought to differently determine the future of the island in the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s.

Historical appropriation both of the period that preceded independence and the period that coincided with the three years of the bicomunal republic does not pause to consider the significance of these events even if, in some cases, an acknowledgement of their significance is occasionally made. Rather, that relationship becomes overshadowed by the singular attention directed towards foreign interests and intervention which haunt the horizon against which that history has unfolded since 1956 - the year that the word partition was first uttered – proceeds. Otherwise, British colonial policy and interests in relation to the history particularly prior to 1956 predominate. So for example, one author summarising his paper in the editorial introduction of a publication of conference proceedings on Cyprus, states that his contribution

concentrates on the recent history of the Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus and their transformation from a religious minority to a strategic ethnic group. The Greek nationalist movement did play a significant role in this. But the essential root of the problem leads to colonialist exploitation of the ethnic situation in Cyprus and in the region. In this sense the Cyprus problem is truly a post-colonial one, particularly in its manifestation in the ethnic conflict which took place in Cyprus after 1964. Even so, there were strong reintegrative trends bringing the Turkish Cypriots into a new co-existence with the Greek Cypriots after this time, which were resisted by outside forces, this time with a Cold War significance.<sup>34</sup>

With the Turkish Cypriot community primarily viewed as a ‘strategic ethnic group’ what cannot be asked is the consequences which ensue from the fact that a *framework of interpretation* constructed on the basis of distrust and insecurity, and prioritising notions of ethnic identity and distinct rights, informed Turkish Cypriot perceptions of the events that were unfolding at any point in recent history. It is a question nullified not only through a ‘reminder’ that colonial policy was the essential root of the problem but also through a selective approach to what constitutes a political *community*.

Here the definition of the Cyprus problem is entrenched through its consistency with the appropriation of history. In effect the Turkish Cypriot community does not figure as the problem. The picture presented is essentially one of an ethnic community whose political content has been written by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership in collaboration with the former. As such it does not figure as a national community.

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<sup>34</sup> M. Attalides 1977 p. viii.

There is a strong reservation expressed by Greek Cypriot authors to any attempt to understand the Turkish Cypriots as a political community. This is widely shared both by those who have explicitly addressed the inter-communal context or only incidentally have described developments in the Turkish Cypriot community, in an attempt to interpret the development of the Cyprus problem. A series of snapshot images re-emerge. These centre on specific machinations within the community as well as evidence of assistance given by Turkey. Therefore, evidence of use of force in order to enforce compliance within the community is widely quoted with the high moments represented by the assassination of two journalists in 1962, the assassination of a Greek and Turkish Cypriot trade unionist in 1965, an order given to trade unionists to withdraw from the left wing Greek Cypriot trade union in the late 1950s and the employment of tactics used to provoke ethnic riots in 1957.

It may be difficult to gain a clear insight of the balance between a conjuncture of factors and dynamics that had a homogenising impact upon the minority community, but to subsume this process under foreign intervention or to assume that the nationalisation of groups proceeds in some *pure context* is to lose sight of the fact that the nationalisation process of the Turkish Cypriot community nevertheless produced a real effect. This process has depended on a variety of factors, most important of which have been the possibilities which became identified once Turkey declared its interests over Cyprus and the nationalisation process of the Greek Cypriot community.

Though the process of constitution and reconstitution of this community since the 1950s cannot be explained without appreciating the impact of the proximity of Cyprus to Turkey and the latter's willingness and interest to intervene in the affairs of the island as an essential factor influencing visions and divisions that drove this process, it was, nevertheless, not the only factor. The Greek Cypriot community was itself absorbed in nationalist claims. A matter which precluded the possibility of incorporating Greek and Turkish Cypriots into a wider *Cypriot* community. Therefore, despite the weakening factor confronting the Turkish Cypriot leadership in its effort to substantiate the Turkish Cypriot community, namely the fact that the Turkish Cypriot community was dispersed around the island, this leadership's visions faced no contest from the Greek Cypriot side. This simultaneous dependency of the nationalisation of the Turkish Cypriot community on Turkish interests, on the one hand, and majority deliberations, on the other, has sustained what Rogers Brubaker has described as a 'triadic nexus' between the national minority, the nationalising state and the external national homeland.

Brubaker's terminology was prompted by what he describes as the 'nationalisation of political space' that has emerged with the formation of new states whose territorial borders reveal a 'mismatch between cultural and political boundaries', a particularly prominent experience of Central and Eastern Europe, beginning with the end of the nineteenth century, the decay of the Ottoman empire and the collapse of the Habsburg and Romanov empires after the First World War. More recently, the nationalisation of the political space proceeded on a wider scale with the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

Many of the new states that emerged in their place have contained within their territorial boundaries groups with 'structurally ambivalent membership status, belonging by residence and (in most cases) by formal citizenship to one state and by putative ethnonational affinity to another'.<sup>35</sup> The existence of national minorities which not only understand themselves to be different from the core group/nation but are also antagonised by the latter's nationalising project, has established a triadic relationship 'linking national minorities, the newly nationalising states in which they live, and the external national 'homelands' to which they belong, or can be construed as belonging, by ethno-cultural affinity though not by legal citizenship'.<sup>36</sup>

Minorities are designated as national on the grounds of asserting demands informed by nationality; therefore demands for 'state recognition of their distinct ethno-cultural nationality, and the assertion of certain collective, nationality based cultural or political rights'. External national homelands exist only where elites of these states establish a reciprocal relationship with the national minority of another state by acknowledging the claimed affinity between the members of the national minority and the core nation of the external state and by asserting 'that this shared nationhood makes the state responsible, in some sense, not only for its own citizens but also for ethnic co-nationals who live in other states'. In other words by providing moral and/or material support to the national minority against the nationalising state within whose jurisdiction the minority resides. It should not be assumed though that the interests of the national minority and that of the

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<sup>35</sup> R. Brubaker 1996 p. 56.

external homeland are 'harmoniously aligned'.<sup>37</sup> The two represent two distinct nationalisms which define themselves in opposition to the concerned nationalising state but other interests of the state that figures as the external homeland may also come to override the interests of the national minority. Particularly so, argues Brubaker, when geo-strategic interests are at stake. In that situation the national minority may find itself abandoned.

The factors affecting the nationalisation process of minorities would suggest its highly contingent character. But for all the contingency involved the effect has nevertheless been demonstrably real both in Cyprus and in Eastern Europe. Yet it may be asked whether the constitution of a national group can ever be treated as an evolutionary outcome. Contingency, rather than evolutionary processes would seem to be the primary determinant in the process of constitution or substantiation.

While nationalism (in general) may be inevitable, the concrete materialisation of nationalism - the outcomes of its struggle and the forms it assumes - are a matter of circumstance.<sup>38</sup>

It is precisely to this 'matter of circumstance' that Rogers Brubaker points when he warns against the treatment of the nation as a real category. Nations, he has argued, should be approached not 'as real entities, as communities, as substantial, enduring, internally homogeneous and externally bounded collectivities',<sup>39</sup> but rather as an *event*,

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.; p. 67.

<sup>38</sup> M. Beissinger 1998 p. 169.

<sup>39</sup> R. Brubaker 1998 p. 292.



not as a category of analysis but rather as a category of practice, which ‘can come to structure perception, to inform thought and experience, to organise discourse and political action’.<sup>40</sup>

In an apparently contradictory manner Mark Beissinger has stressed the need to investigate the processes through which the nation becomes *substantiated*, yet the two authors share much more than this terminological incompatibility would seem to suggest.

When Brubaker protests the use of the nation as a real entity he is railing against the homogeneity and the enduring quality implied by its use. However, he does treat the nation as a category which is evoked precisely because of its mobilising potential. Nation as a category of practice provides a framework through which reality can be named in a manner which can resonate with the masses. As such it is a category capable of responding to popular imagination. He goes on to ask:

How does nation work as practical category, as classificatory scheme, as cognitive frame? What makes the use of that category by or against states more or less resonant or effective? What makes the nation-evoking, nation-invoking efforts of political entrepreneurs more or less likely to succeed?<sup>41</sup>

Whilst ‘nation’ does not constitute the reality that is claimed by nationalists it nevertheless evokes a group constitutive of a finite population which is the same population that those who evoke it seek to address in their effort for mobilisation and

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<sup>40</sup> R. Brubaker 1996.

therefore authorisation. It is also a population which is given a finite range of meanings at any historical moment. There are specific categories through which it is being addressed and it is being made effective, even if subject to internal competition.

It follows that while competition as to the future of the 'nation' may divide and reflect the division amongst the population it is nevertheless the case that this is a competition where the reality of the nation being evoked is not under question but universally accepted. Therefore, to speak of the Russians, to speak of the Hungarians may be problematic if this assumes external boundness, homogeneity and universal transhistorical experience but to examine the categories through which the group is brought into being by particular apprehensions which sustain the group as a group capable of sustaining specific forms of collective action in protecting or asserting collective interest, is to speak of a real group. And there is nothing in Brubaker's work which would suggest denial of that fact. Instead, this appears to be reserved to the category of 'nationness'. He therefore stresses the importance of approaching:

*nationness as an event, as something that suddenly crystallises rather than gradually develops, as a contingent, conjunctureally fluctuating, and precarious frame of vision and basis for individual as well as collective action.*<sup>42</sup>

In a similar manner Beissinger refers to the contingency created by a conjuncture of forces and through which the nation is substantiated and its content determined.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 19.

<sup>43</sup> The emphasis on the nation as an event or as a contingent frame of vision is what is of interest in this research. It represents an approach that seeks to disclose the specific political processes through which

A nation whose tangibility is never affirmed through its behaviours - through unimpeded and inclusive public discourse, voluntary support for state action, or autonomous mass mobilisation - can hardly be said to exist other than in name only. Elites may believe such a nation exists, and may even act in its name. But unless the nation extends into the beliefs and behaviour of society, such a farce runs a great risk of eventually being punctured. For states and elites to sit on top of society and declare that they represent the nation is without doubt a powerful influence on social behaviours, but it does not in itself make a nation. The barking of nationalism is only one dimension (and perhaps not the most critical one) of the substantiation of nations. More importantly....is whether it bites.<sup>44</sup>

Both Brubaker's and Beissinger's emphasis on the nation as a category of practice, a category evoked for the mobilisation and constitution of the group, suggests the necessity of approaching nationalism as a project conducted through the 'political field' of the group that it seeks to bring into being.<sup>45</sup> Further, that apart from the contested context within which the potential group is being addressed the success or failure of a specific nationalist call will depend on the recognition of opportunity to bring the group into being. That is, the effectiveness of a specific nationalist call to mobilise mass action would depend not only on the power of persuasion of those seeking to speak on behalf of the group but also on the ability to seize the moment of opportunity. This is what Brubaker refers to when he insists on approaching the nation as an event and Beissinger when he argues that:

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groups are substantiated. It is this, rather than an approach that seeks to address the emergence of nationalism in general (and the broader social forces that brought it into being), that lends itself to an investigation of the nature and process of evolution of inter-communal conflict. Further, for readers who may consider the absence of phraseology such as Anderson's 'imagined communities' from this research as conspicuous please refer to Y. Taki 1996.

<sup>44</sup> Beissinger op. cit, p, 173.

<sup>45</sup> Beissinger, Ibid, 174; Brubaker op. cit, p.17.

Opportunities do not in themselves create challenge. Rather, they transform the ways in which challenges manifest themselves in politics, and they become occasions by which the hitherto inconceivable, impossible and ambiguous can come to be viewed by a large numbers of people as thinkable, necessary and transparent.<sup>46</sup>

In the case of Cyprus such opportunities were clearly presented by foreign involvement as well as through internal processes. It is precisely the extent to which opportunity for the substantiation of the Turkish Cypriot community according to the discourse that came to dominate within the community that establishes a disinclination on the part of many Greek Cypriot authors to treat the process of substantiation of the minority as a national minority - a process reflecting the power of sentiment within the community. Yet the moment of opportunity could only figure as such if nationalist claims resonated with the masses, at least to the extent of making the recognition of opportunity a moment of substantiation. The processes that render one claim rather than another a real possibility occur through a contested context, or what Bourdieu has referred to as the *political field*.

In the most general terms the *field* is a metaphor seeking to capture the processes within social settings of action. More particularly, it is a site of struggle wherein participants take their position according to the relative possession of *capital*, or, *authority*. In this struggle the participants aim to maximise the capital they possess in order to maintain or improve their position within this 'structured space of positions'.

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<sup>46</sup> Beissinger, *ibid*, p. 178.

Throughout Bourdieu's work the field has been adapted to a variety of social settings, be it the pedagogical, scientific, artistic or political. It is the latter that is of interest here.<sup>47</sup> The uniqueness of this field is given by the fact that its participants have to rely upon a base which lies outside the field itself and constitutes the source of power which distributes participants in this structured space of positions. Thus, the participant in this field 'always swings between two criteria of validation: science and the plebiscite'.<sup>48</sup> Participants are caught in a struggle for the maximisation of *symbolic capital* through the creation or sustenance of a base which lies outside the field and which determines their position within the field. Symbolic capital, or, the authority to represent accrues to participants in proportion to their power to constitute groups. Consequently, it is the recognition of legitimised visions which affects the distribution of capital in this field. Thus, the attempt to affect the distribution of capital by the participants themselves depends on their power to mobilise:

The power of the ideas that he possesses is measured not, as in the domain of science, by their truth value...but by the power of mobilisation that they contain, in other words, by the power of the group that recognises them.<sup>49</sup>

The relationship between power and capital can be summarised in Bourdieu's words:

In the struggle for the imposition of the legitimate vision of the social world, in which science itself is inevitably involved, agents wield power which is proportional to their symbolic power, that is to the recognition they receive from the group. The authority which underlies the performative effectiveness of discourse about the social world, the symbolic force of visions and pre-visions aimed at imposing the principles of vision and division of this world, is

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<sup>47</sup> Bourdieu 1994 pp. 163-251 provides a most illuminating discussion of the political field.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., p. 190.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

a *percipi*, a being known and recognised (*nobilis*), which allows a *percipere* to be imposed.<sup>50</sup>

The power to constitute or sustain a group depends on the twin processes of recognition and persuasion. Attributing the constitution of a group to foreign intervention or to extremism, as is the case in the dominant Greek Cypriot approach to the development of the Turkish Cypriot community, fails to appreciate the ‘substance’ of that group, or, to paraphrase Smith, the fabric that has held and still holds the group together. In the effort to investigate the processes which have sustained the constitution of the two communities in Cyprus in a manner which has predicated that society deeply divided it is necessary that the process of persuasion, the content that reality was being given as history unfolded, is investigated.

Speaking of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities does not assume the objective existence of these groups as fixed national groups or that the attempt to understand their development assumes an evolutionary process. Nor is this to assume the unanimity of the group but rather to reflect the fact that these are groups which have been mobilised by nationalist leaders towards their substantiation through interactive processes. Finally, there is no assumption that once the group has been substantiated in one form, through a given set of political categories, the next stage of substantiation was an inevitable outcome arising from the previous act of substantiation. In referring to the Greek and Turkish Cypriot community what is instead implied is firstly, the development of a unique discourse which sought to name reality through an ‘act of categorisation’ before

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid., pp. 238-9.

the groups could be brought into being as political groups and secondly the recognition of distinct opportunities which transformed that which only figured as a possibility into an actual substantiation of the group.

The act of categorisation, when it manages to achieve recognition or when it is exerted by a recognised authority, exercises by itself a certain power: 'ethnic' or 'regional' categories, like categories of kinship, institute a reality by using the power of *revelation* and *construction* exercised by objectification in discourse. The act of calling 'Occidan' the language spoken by those who are called 'Occitans' because they speak that language....and of calling the region....in which this language is spoken 'Occitanie', thus claiming to make it exist as a 'region' or as a 'nation'....is no ineffectual fiction. The act of social magic which consists in trying to bring into existence the thing named may succeed if the person who performs it is capable of gaining recognition through his speech for the power which that speech is appropriating for itself by a provisional or definitive usurpation, that of imposing a new vision and a new division of the social world: *regere fines, regere sacra*, to consecrate a new limit. The effectiveness of the performative discourse which claims to bring about what it asserts in the very act of asserting it is directly proportional to the authority of the person doing the asserting.

However, this is not to suggest that the process of constituting a group is dependant on the words of a person who has been granted recognition but also on the power of the discourse intended to bring the group into being, to resonate with the masses:

the cognition effect brought about by the fact of objectification in discourse...also depends on the degree to which the discourse which announces to the group its identity is grounded in the objectivity of the group to which it is addressed, that is in the recognition and belief granted to it by the members of this group....The power over the group that is to be brought into existence as a group is, inseparably, a power of creating the group by imposing on it common principles of vision and division, and thus a unique vision of its identity and an identical vision of its unity.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Ibid., pp. 223-4.

### Absence from the Nation.

The absence of the Turkish Cypriot community from the nation that is being invoked in defining the problem as national is in continuity with the manner in which the Greek Cypriot community has historically related to the minority. This has been a relationship primarily influenced by the broader context associated with the processes of nation-building and state-building. It was predicated by the fact that the categories through which the Orthodox population of Cyprus was nationalised evoked an ethnic group whose cultural markers and national claims excluded a quarter of the population from the political community. By the mid-1950s two groups were claiming the right to self-determination.

More specifically, the first stage of the conflict between the two communities was an outcome of the efforts to establish congruence between the cultural (nation) and the political (the object of self-determination) in a context where more than one self-defined group (the people/nation) shared the given territory. That is, in a context where both groups on the island were engaged in equally radicalised processes of homogenisation, leading to competing claims over the political future of the same territory. While the Greek Cypriot majority assumed superiority on the basis of its numerical status, the Turkish Cypriot minority looked for assistance from Turkey in order to compensate for the weaker position its minority status implied. The distinct numerical status of each community therefore presupposed the utilisation of distinct resources in efforts to assert itself. The Greek Cypriot community, constituting 78% of the island's population, relied



on an international political paradigm which favoured a majoritarian understanding of democracy and thus of determining the will of the people but also on the claim that the island and its native population have been historically Greek and that national restoration could only be realised through the union of Cyprus with Greece. The Turkish Cypriot minority sought to emphasise its distinctiveness and initially spoke of a historical right that Turkey possessed over Cyprus by virtue of the fact that Cyprus was for three hundred years part of the Ottoman Empire. This was subsequently reformulated as a demand for the partition of the island, the creation of two ethnically homogenous regions and the union of one region with Turkey and the other with Greece. As the Greek Cypriot community was asserting its right to determine its own destiny so too was the Turkish Cypriot community. By the late 1950s two distinct claims to self-determination were being advanced.

Ambiguities entailed in the principle of the 'right of peoples to self-determination' become apparent the instance it is recognised that defining the *people* is not an objective exercise; this has been practically demonstrated throughout the last century but began to become particularly addressed after the destructive consequences following the break up of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. While the underlying assumption of the principle has been that the people residing on a particular territory of a single administrative unit constitute the prospective nation, in practice the process of nation-building has followed a different pattern whereby the nation asserted itself not according to territory alone but also through the mobilisation of an inscribed history which in many instances excluded some citizens from membership of the core nation and/or

membership of the nation was construed as extending beyond the existing state boundaries. It is the institutionalisation of a nation defined by a history centred on cultural markers that renders the notion of nation-state as problematic in such cases since the congruence of nation and state imply a state of and for the core nation and the exclusion of those who cannot recognise themselves or be recognised by the terms of reference of the nation, from effective representation and participation in the state.

In so far as the population of Cyprus consisted of two ethnic communities and the minority community contested the legitimacy of the majority to speak on behalf of a territorially defined population as if one people, while the majority claimed the right to self-determination which corresponded to the aspirations of the fixed majority, the question of who constitutes a people was, and remains, far from simple.

The problems surrounding the 'right to self-determination' have been widely addressed. It has been argued that as it stands in international law the 'right of self-determination' addresses categories rather than definitions.<sup>52</sup> As such, the category of 'the people' remains ambiguous without any real basis for judging who constitutes a people, bearing the same difficulties that the category nation has proved within social science.<sup>53</sup>

A second problem with the principle has been the object of determination. Neil

MacCormick has argued that:

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<sup>52</sup> M. Freeman *op. cit.*, p. 45-7; Turk, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

<sup>53</sup> W. Connor, 1994.

The principle of national self-determination becomes morally and practically problematic because (or when) it is coupled to the concept or doctrine of the absolute sovereign state. For in this form it stipulates that whoever constitute a nation have the right (unless they freely renounce it) to constitute themselves into a sovereign state. But the distribution of people and territory makes all the familiar problems almost inevitable once you try to implement this principle.

So, what of the 'people' who are not recognised as such?

the world being one in which there are sovereign states, which clothe themselves also in the trappings of nationality, the sense of, and the reality of, injustice to national minorities who are denied a full place in this scheme of things is obvious. Thus it appears that problems of national minorities are practically by definition injustices, but injustices of the special kind whose rectification cannot but involve the infliction of like injustices on different persons or groups.<sup>54</sup>

Yael Tamir, Michael Freeman and David Miller have similarly argued that more flexible options need to be institutionalised.<sup>55</sup>

This is not to artificially impose concerns addressed elsewhere onto processes which have brought the Cyprus problem into being. Rather, it is to place what has represented an essential issue of contention between the two communities in a wider context. It is also to serve as a reminder that what unfolded from the late 1940s onwards, leading to decolonisation and persisting after the establishment of the bicomunal republic was a contest over whose self-determination should be exercised. The 'right to self-determination' has been in more recent years subjected to scrutiny precisely because it has not been universally granted once demanded and practical experience during the course of the twentieth century has proven over and over again the problems associated

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<sup>54</sup> N. MacCormick 1999, p.85.

<sup>55</sup> M. Freeman op. cit; D. Miller op. cit; Y. Tamir, 1999.

with making the right operative without bequeathing civil wars, refugee movements, oppression of minorities and violation of the very premise upon which the right of self-determination rests - democratic rule.

It is not the assumption here that in the case of a severely divided society such as Cyprus a conflict over the definition of the 'people' would have inevitably led to the dire consequences that it has done, or, that if the Cypriots at large were granted a singular right to self-determination in the 1950s in exchange of guarantees for the protection of the minority, that this would have proved catastrophic to the welfare of the members of the minority. However, the processes that rendered this minority as a national minority utilising any means available to assert that status were never interrupted.

Addressing the intercommunal past remains of contemporary relevance. By looking at a past that lends itself to understanding part of what has produced the two communities through their history it is possible to identify patterns, to use Taylor's vocabulary, of *misrecognition*<sup>56</sup> or, non-recognition which have prevented any real communication between two groups despite their apparent commitment to the same goal - a federal democracy.

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<sup>56</sup> C. Taylor 1995.

## CHAPTER 2

### THE NATIONALISATION OF THE ORTHODOX COMMUNITY: 'DIVIDE AND RULE' POLICIES OR THE STRUGGLE FOR THE IMPOSITION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF VISION AND DIVISION

#### INTRODUCTION

This and the following chapter assess the dominant form of contemporary Greek Cypriot historical appropriation of the period which witnessed the transformation of the two religious communities of Cyprus, that by and large co-existed peacefully before and during most of the colonial period, into antagonistic political communities at arms in the years immediately preceding independence. For this purpose, I have selected the work of the three main Greek Cypriot authors who have attempted to provide a structured account identifying the process of development of each community during the period of British colonial rule as well as those processes which finally led to inter-communal violence.

The work of Michael Attalides,<sup>1</sup> Paschalis Kitromilides<sup>2</sup> and Adamantia Pollis,<sup>3</sup> although written in the 1970s, remain the main attempts to explain the relationship of British rule to the present where the present begins with the 1974 Turkish invasion and the partition of the island. Their appropriation of the past has been influential in that it has been treated as authoritative by subsequent researchers.<sup>4</sup> Further, one author has described the work of Attalides and Kitromilides as exemplary of a historical model

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<sup>1</sup> M. Attalides 1977, 1979.

<sup>2</sup> P. Kitromilides 1977, 1979, 1990.

<sup>3</sup> A. Pollis 1973, 1979.

<sup>4</sup> See for example, K. Mavratsas 1997; Y. Papadakis 1995; N. Stamatakis 1991. Despite the critique that follows in this and the following chapter, this research has otherwise been both influenced and informed by these as well as other authors.

based on the idea that the peaceful coexistence of the past must be revived. The two have been described as the primary specialists in the study of nationalism and social history of Cyprus,<sup>5</sup> while all three have participated in conferences organised by the New Cyprus Association, identified in more recent works as the primary organisation that facilitated the articulation of a civic form of nationalism in the post-partition period.<sup>6</sup> Finally, their work can be understood as an elaborate treatment of ideas that circulated within Greek Cypriot society after 1974.<sup>7</sup>

The identification of Attalides' and Kitromilides' work as expressive of the Cypriotist trend or of the post-1974 drive to stress the peaceful coexistence that has characterised much of the past of the two communities may be one means through which Greek Cypriot historiography may be differentiated into distinct bodies. But most importantly these authors' approaches represent the officially sanctioned representation of the past.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, particularly in light of the discussion in the last chapter some initial clarification is necessary.

Firstly, these authors represent a revisionist approach within Greek Cypriot historiography since they mark a break from 'ethnicised' approaches which are more concerned with the presentation of Cypriot history as the frustration of a national desire (*enosis*) emerging from a naturalised and thus diachronic national identity (Greek)<sup>9</sup>. In so far as the work of authors discussed in this and the following chapter historicizes the development of Greek Cypriot nationalism, understand Greek Cypriot identity as a social construction and recognise that Turkish Cypriot nationalism was partly a political response to the development of Greek Cypriot nationalism, it may be understood to

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<sup>5</sup> Papadakis op. cit.

<sup>6</sup> Mavratsas op. cit., N. Peristianis 1995.

<sup>7</sup> According to Papadakis (op. cit.), the work of these authors (1977, 1979) was published by the Public Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus.

<sup>8</sup> Not only has the contribution of these authors been published by the Public Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus, but Attalides' primary publication was submitted by the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Cyprus to the inquiry of the Committee for Foreign Affairs of the British Parliament to substantiate the claim that "the Cyprus problem arises out of international factors rather than out of intercommunal relationships." Foreign Affairs Committee 1987 p.58. See also chapter 2.

<sup>9</sup> See for example, K. Georgiadis 1978; C. Spyridakis 1974.

represent a revisionist tendency within Greek Cypriot historiography. Consequently, the significance of their contribution cannot be overestimated<sup>10</sup>. In this respect, the work of authors cited here, and that of others whose work is beyond the scope of this chapter, pursue questions which are still to be adequately aired in Greek Cypriot society and thus may be understood to have laid a valuable basis for a critical and nuanced apprehension of the past.

Simultaneously, histories described in this chapter as representative of a dominant historical appropriation are histories which reinforce the Greek Cypriot political discourse in relation to the national problem. These authors have written from a perspective which casts the island, its subjection to colonial rule and its geo-political position at the centre of their approach. The appropriation of history here avoids ethnicisation even if it reinforces the dominant Greek Cypriot definition of the problem. This despite those authors not necessarily sharing the implications which flow from this, that is, the political practice that arises from that definition, limiting, as it does, the scope for change.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> If a revisionist trend within Greek Cypriot historiography is understood as constituted by contributions which historicize and thus de-naturalise the emergence and development of a Greek Cypriot national identity, and implicitly or explicitly challenge the notion of a homogenous and linear Greek Cypriot historical path, then the list of authors extends beyond these names. For example, S. Anagnostopoulou 1999; G. Georgallides 1979; R. Katsiaounis 1996; P. Loizos 1972, 1974; K. Markides 1974.

<sup>11</sup> A good example in this case would be the work of Kitromilides which, as will be argued, reproduces a thesis which ultimately elevates the role of external states in the determination of inter-communal relations in a manner which has, probably the unintended effect, of significantly underplaying ethno-nationalist thinking and practice. This, despite the fact that otherwise he provides an important basis for understanding some of the dynamics which characterised the development of two distinct nationalisms in Cyprus and the relations between the two communities. In a paper delivered in 1976 he discusses the way forward and explains: "Political culture is always a crucial variable. There can be no doubt that one of the first steps away from the tragedy will involve a sincere effort to eradicate the symbols of ethnic conflict. The symbolism of national antagonism must be replaced by a cultural dialogue that will stress the heritage of common social experiences and human values, the relevance of shared expectations and motivations of coexistence. Laying the foundations for the development of such a cultural orientation should be one of the priorities of government policy and organised voluntary initiative." (1979 pp. 170-171.) Subsequent government policy has not conformed to Kitromilides' desired course. Much of this may be the result of the continued understanding that the Cyprus problem is an international problem. But equally important is the fact that it is not just a cultural dialogue that is needed but, most significantly, a political one simultaneously.

Finally it needs be stressed that the histories treated in this chapter as forms of the dominant historical appropriation are not assumed to share a conscious political project, what they have in common is a felt need to respond to the new reality marked by the 1974 invasion. That is, it is an approach which seeks to explain how things have come to be the way they are in a contested present. The contemporary concerns that motivated this approach are located in a very specific dimension of the relationship between that which may be defined as 'the past' and the present.<sup>12</sup> It is motivated, in other words, by the political problem that arose with the 1974 partition which has challenged the sovereignty of the state, and therefore, the authority of the state to exercise its power within the territorial boundary that defined its integrity in the first place but also over its authority to claim and exercise sovereignty over both communities. Consequently, since partition served to separate the two communities into ethnically homogenous regions this effort necessitated an examination of the inter-communal relations through history.

A reading of the arguments developed by Attalides, Kitromilides and Pollis reveals that these authors share an approach through which the identification of what constitutes important realms, or, thematics of the past proceeds. The narrative produced is dependant on the exploration of four main themes: 1) colonial 'divide and rule' policy; 2) the development of nationalism within the two communities; 3) the identification of a realm marked by peaceful coexistence and cooperation between the two; and 4) the role of foreign powers.

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<sup>12</sup> Kitromilides, in 1976, explained that: "The conclusions of this paper are thus no more than the product of a tortuous examination of the presuppositions of one's own thought by a Cypriot profoundly anguished over the fate and prospects of his native island". Kitromilides 1979, p. 175. Attalides, in the introduction of his book on Cyprus explains the complexity of factors that have made up the Cyprus problem and adds, "It is possible, however, to point to some relevant factors in the development of the situation which led to the invasion. This, it is hoped, will widen a little the comfortable London journalist's point of view that 'The harassment of the Turkish minority by the Greek majority in the 1960s ... was the basic cause of last year's explosion.' Such a simple attribution of causality is unsophisticated about the way in which groups of people come to define each other as enemies, and too smug to be held by people whose own society has shaped events to a great extent. This is particularly significant for an ever-present problem. An attribution of causality has hidden assumptions about 'possible' solutions, which come as secondary consequences of naïve attributions of 'responsibility'".



The perception that British colonial policy largely determined the nature of inter-communal relations that developed is examined, in what follows, through a critical analysis of the basis upon which this is concluded. As will become clearer below there have been two main strands to this argument. The first emphasises the role the colonial power played in establishing structures leading to the ethnic differentiation of the two main religious communities on the island; this constitutes the subject of this chapter. The orthodox community having been the first to embark on a course of nationalisation this thesis is assessed in the light of historical evidence which offer an insight to nationalisation process of the Greek Cypriot community.

The second of these strands tends to recognise the process of self-definition of the two communities as a product of factors which cannot be reduced to colonial machinations. It concentrates instead on the argument that a divide and rule policy has been the factor largely accounting for the outbreak of violence between the two communities. With inter-communal violence having been possible only because of the distinct processes of nationalisation of the two communities this argument is assessed against a discussion of the development of Turkish Cypriot nationalism.

### 'DIVIDE AND RULE'

The part played by the British in producing an atmosphere of mistrust between the two communities of Cyprus has rarely been underestimated.<sup>13</sup> There can be, however, something misleading in the treatment of a 'divide and rule' policy as an explanatory tool in the interpretation of deteriorating inter-ethnic relations. It has been employed by Pollis to suggest that British colonial policy led to two processes of nationalisation; that of the Christian and that of the Muslim communities.<sup>14</sup> Yet, as will be argued below, in the same manner that pre-nationalist ethnic differences and divisions cannot be assumed

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<sup>13</sup> See for example C. Hitchens 1984.

<sup>14</sup> A view with which Kitromilides concurs. He only makes reference to it in passing but explicitly indicates his concurrence with Pollis' thesis. Kitromilides 1979, 1990.

to be inevitably giving rise to distinct nationalisms it would be, at the same time, an oversight to fail to consider that ethnic differentiation carried the *potential*, with the transition from traditional to modern forms of social organisation, of being transformed into a contest between antagonistic nationalisms. A singular identification of colonial policy as the main dynamic leading to the nationalisation of two religiously defined communities cannot be understood as adequate. As Donald Horowitz has argued:

To a considerable extent, the differential modernisation of ethnic groups fostered by colonialism was simply an accident of location. Some groups were in the path of economic and educational development, and some were passed by. Some saw opportunity thrust upon them where they were; some rejected it when it appeared; and some were willing to migrate long distances to respond to opportunities awaiting their arrival. The disparities that emerged were as much a matter of ethnic groups using foreign rule to alter their condition as of foreign rulers using the groups. The relationship between colonialism and ethnicity cannot be captured by sweeping notions of divide and rule.<sup>15</sup>

Attalides and Kitromilides have emphasised instead that British colonial policy and subsequently Turkish policy represent the main reason for the outbreak of inter-communal violence in the 1950s.<sup>16</sup> This argument avoids treating the development of distinct nationalisms as a causal effect of colonial policies; instead, it understands the outbreak of violence between two communities which asserted antagonistic demands over the future of the same territory almost exclusively, if not solely, from the point of view of outside interference. It will be argued below that though the overwhelming role of outside powers in settling the status of this contested territory in the late 1950s should not be underestimated the actions of the 'national communities' themselves cannot be reduced to the deliberations of the colonial power and the 'external homelands' alone. The interests or willingness of external homelands to act on behalf of the two communities, thereby exerting their power in the process leading to decolonisation, expanded the platform for the pursuit of communal demands. It can be said that the willingness of external homelands to assume a role in this process determined the limits of the demands that could be posed by the respective communities. But the commitment

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<sup>15</sup> D. Horowitz 1985 p. 156.

persistently shown by the minority to resist the idea that the right to self determination belonged exclusively to the majority community by virtue of its numbers, combined with the increasing militancy with which the majority was pursuing ethnically exclusive aspirations was itself signalling the potential for violent conflict.<sup>17</sup>

The process signalled by the phrase 'divide and rule' is that of colonial domination through deliberate and divisive policies. It is a phrase that limits its emphasis to the active part of the ruler's policy. It can therefore be employed in a way that disguises the potential entailed in divisions that may have existed between the two religious communities as is the case with the argument that the national differentiation of the two communities was an outcome of colonial policies. Or, to an underestimation of the possible impact that an intensified contest over a territory could have, therefore, opening the possibility of violence as is the case with the argument which refrains from any consideration of the fact that the possibility of violence is embedded in the very reality of competing nationalisms. It invites, instead, a concentration on the ruler's needs and on the divisive strategies employed to meet those needs.<sup>18</sup> In the former case, for example, this leads to a failure to consider that the politicisation of difference was a consequence of a transition so radical as that from Ottoman to British rule which had a diverse and deep-seated impact on each community. In the latter case the question that even if violence became possible through the resources supplied by foreign involvement the question of why violence was at all an option for the Turkish Cypriot community itself remains unaddressed. Further, the threat posed by a majority nationalism upon the

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<sup>16</sup> Attalides, *ibid.* Kitromilides, 1977, 1979.

<sup>17</sup> It was not until the late 1950s that the Turkish Cypriots spoke of a distinct right to self-determination. However, the distinct political demands of the two communities were expressive of a Greek Cypriot struggle to exercise the right for self-determination (*enosis*) and a Turkish Cypriot insistence that the colonial power would not surrender sovereignty over Cyprus as this was contrary to their interests. Therefore, while the Turkish Cypriot community did not make a claim to a right to self-determination until the late 1950s it was nevertheless committed to preventing the Greek Cypriot community from exercising that right on the basis that it was against its own interests. This could therefore be seen as the assertion of a negative right to self-determination.

<sup>18</sup> It should be noted that the calculative colonial process implied by accounts relying on an argument of 'divide and rule' has been a recurring reference in the works of E. Hatzivasiliou 1997,2000 and I. Stephanides 1999 both of whom raise objections with the reductionism that this often involves.

minority becomes an oversight even if some authors, in passing, acknowledge it<sup>19</sup>. As Tom Nairn, participating in a conference on Cyprus two years after partition, observed:

representatives of the majority community here have often been tempted to over-stress external intervention in Cypriot affairs. By and large the Greeks and Turks co-existed well enough until the 1950s, they insist; the implication tends to be that they would still do so, had it not been for outside provocation by the British, the mainland Turks and Greeks, and the Americans. This is an understandable yet, in theoretical terms, almost indefensible position.<sup>20</sup>

It is precisely the coming to dominance of this general thesis described by Nairn, a thesis which has filtered through and has underpinned contemporary popular understandings of how the present has come to be, which in part makes the texts discussed in this chapter relevant. Simultaneously these texts represent interpretative approaches informed from a social and political science perspective. Ultimately, therefore, the interest here is to investigate the way in which a perspective which has been encouraged within popular discourse in Greek Cypriot society has been substantiated through academic approaches. Namely, that the progressive separation of the two communities has been the major outcome of foreign manipulation and intervention.

### 'DIVIDE AND RULE' AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF TWO DISTINCT NATIONALISMS

As it has already been argued these authors do not place the same extent of emphasis on the role of 'divide and rule'. Some emphasise the importance of British policies in

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<sup>19</sup> Attalides and Kitromilides, for example, acknowledge that the development of a nationalist movement amongst the Greek Cypriot community which was leading to an intensification of the demand for *enosis* was one of the factors contributing to the development of Turkish Cypriot nationalism but fail to consider that in the absence of a willingness of either side to revise their demands the irreconcilability of Greek and Turkish Cypriot understood interests could not be resolved but through violence.

<sup>20</sup> T. Nairn, 1979.

producing a society which became divided by distinct nationalist ideologies. Pollis, for example, claims that:

Granting a divide and rule policy...the British took *apolitical religious differences* in Cyprus between Muslims and Eastern Orthodox and through indirect rule politicised them and transformed them into nationality groups.<sup>21</sup> (My emphasis.)

It is unclear what may be meant by 'apolitical religious difference'. It may be that the author reflects the fact that religious identification never became a direct source of antagonism between the two communities. Indeed this would seem to be in line with her insistence on the bonds of members of the 'same socio-economic strata' during the period of Ottoman rule<sup>22</sup> as well as her argument that conflicts during this period 'seem to have been along class lines'<sup>23</sup>. She refers to joint peasant revolts which 'seemed to increase in frequency - 1804, 1830 and a massive one in 1833'<sup>24</sup>. But no discussion as to the nature of those revolts is offered. The 1804 revolt that is referred to, for example, was according to the historian D. Alastos, a rising by the Turks of Nicosia against the increasing authority of the Archbishop and the Dragoman and 'against the Governor who, they suspected was being too subservient to the Greeks.'<sup>25</sup> Further, though there was joint participation precipitated by economic factors, it has also been argued that the successive revolts of 1833 also 'showed the potential power of Greek nationalism in unifying town radicals and discontented peasants'.<sup>26</sup> It should be noted that the most prominent of the leaders of this revolt, Nicolaous Theseus, took part in the Greek War of Independence where he rose to the position of Lt. General.<sup>27</sup> According to some historians this latter revolt was, therefore, also the last time which members of the two religious communities rose together against the central authorities.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Pollis, op. cit., p. 52.

<sup>22</sup> *ibid.* p. 49, 50, 52.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.* p. 49, 50.

<sup>24</sup> *ibid.* p. 50.

<sup>25</sup> D. Alastos, 1976 pp. 285-286.

<sup>26</sup> Katsiaounis, op. cit., p. 20.

<sup>27</sup> Alastos, op. cit., pp. 292-3, Katsiaounis, op. cit., p. 19.

Thereafter, the development of Greek economic influence and national consciousness meant that collective action by ethnic groups in the capacity of ethnic groups was exclusively Turkish, aiming to preserve their privileges.<sup>29</sup>

Though revolts which have involved the participation of members of both religious communities evidently took place during the period of Ottoman rule, they need to be approached with caution. Poverty and indebtedness at the time was widespread. However, that Christians and Muslims participated in common revolts, though indicative that poverty cut across religious differentiation, do not necessarily indicate wider political trends let alone a clear-cut unity of interest. A consideration of various aspects affecting social relations during the concerned period, reveal a complex pattern which is largely inconclusive.

#### A Brief Background to British Rule.

Under the Ottoman Empire the principle for the division of the population was religious identification. By virtue of the Islamic foundation of the Ottoman Empire there was a strict division between Muslims and non-Muslims. The former had different rights and responsibilities than the latter. The non-Muslim monotheistic religions granted official recognition by the Sublime port were Christianity and Judaism.<sup>30</sup> However this was a recognition of inferior subjects of the Empire and while followers of Christianity and Judaism enjoyed the protection of Islamic law they had fewer rights than Muslims and were governed by different laws. The millet system organised the non-Islamic religious communities as self-governing communities treated like corporate bodies. They were permitted to function through their own structures for internal affairs whether these concerned education or non-Islamic religious and legal matters while the Ottoman state dealt exclusively with their leaders who were treated as agents of the Ottoman state.

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<sup>28</sup> Alastos, op. cit., pp. 296-7, Katsiaounis, op. cit., p. 20.

<sup>29</sup> Katsiaounis, op. cit., p. 20. See also P. Sant Cassia, 1986, p. 24.

<sup>30</sup> F. Bieber 2000.

In Cyprus, the bishops were recognised as the official guardians and representatives of the Christian population by the Ottoman state<sup>31</sup>. Amongst their functions was the collection of taxes on behalf of that state. The central authorities expected to derive a fixed revenue from taxes from the Christian millet while the clergy could allocate taxes and assume the responsibility for its collection. Therefore a stratum of tax collectors and tax farmers developed 'representing the bishops or belonging to the entourage of the bishops'<sup>32</sup>. This, permitted the Church as well as tax collectors and tax farmers to expropriate a surplus over and above the sum which the Ottoman authorities expected to receive. It laid, therefore, a rigid structure of economic power which supplemented and strengthened the political power of the clergy amongst the Christian population. As the political representative of the Christian subjects the Church had the right to make representations, on behalf of its people, directly to the Sultan. Further, since each religious community was permitted and was responsible over its own cultural institutions health and education within the Christian community came to be administered by the Church and prominent lay tax farmers.<sup>33</sup>

However, the beneficiaries of this system of organisation were ultimately leaders of a subject population. In 1821 despite the cautious attitude of the Archbishop in relation to the Greek revolution, he and other senior clergy as well as 400 lay notables were executed. This strained relations between the two communities.<sup>34</sup> Further, it seems that once reforms were introduced in the province in mid nineteenth century, as part of a wider programme for restructuring the millet system of the Empire, permitting Christian participation in local administrative affairs it seemed that Christian rural notables: 'enjoy no respect and have no voice; they are in fact subject to the contempt, and swearing and whipping of the police and the [District Commissioners]'.<sup>35</sup> Their privileged position amongst the subject population went hand in hand with the price of

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<sup>31</sup> C. Kyrris, 1985, p. 270.

<sup>32</sup> Alastos, op. cit., p. 280, also, Sant Cassia, op. cit., p. 9

<sup>33</sup> Katsiaounis, op. cit., p. 14.

<sup>34</sup> Georgallides, op. cit., p. 55.

<sup>35</sup> From the petition sent to Constantinople, dated 18 April 1878, quoted in Katsiaounis, op. cit., p. 22

maltreatment in the hands of those sections of the ruling community who occupied privileged positions in the Ottoman administrative structure.

The relationship between the leaders of the Muslim and the Christian community was characterised by a degree of cooperation created by a dependency of the Christian elite for physical protection against grassroots anger and the official support given for effective tax collection. But it was at the same time a competitive relationship:

the Ottoman and Church authorities both owed their position to the Sultan and were rivals for political domination on the island. The Church attracted the loyalty of the Christians as a protector against arbitrary acts of the Ottoman administration. The Ottoman administrative authority presented the Church as rebellious against the authority of the Sultan. And the Muslim religious authorities appealed to the Muslims on the basis of the threat to Islam posed by the dominance of the Church or the possible political equality of the Christians.<sup>36</sup>

Given that the existing system of organisation consolidated the power of the Church and lay tax farmers in all spheres of the social life of the Orthodox community any challenge to the status quo would be a challenge to the political and economic power of these agents. It should therefore come as no surprise that these privileged classes also resisted the reforms in mid nineteenth century. Consequently, the Church and those Christians enjoying the fruits of the established order were also hostile towards nationalist stirrings amongst the Christian community, indeed, any movement which threatened the status quo. The 1833 revolts were in time condemned by the Church.<sup>37</sup> Similarly, when radical literature 'inspired by references to ancient Greece and to the revolutionary texts of French socialism of 1852' circulated in Cyprus, the Bishop of Kitium wrote to the Archbishop that the persons involved deserved 'to incur God's wrath'.<sup>38</sup> But this was not the response based on a survival instinct following the massacre of 1821. Masonic

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<sup>36</sup> Attalides, 1979, p. 40.

<sup>37</sup> Katsiaounis, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

<sup>38</sup> Katsiaounis, *op. cit.*, p. 21. See also pp. 17-19 for other references to the Church declared loyalty to the Ottoman administration and opposition to persons inspired by nationalist ideas. See also Kitromilides, 1990, pp. 9-10 and Kitromilides, 1989, for an account of the Orthodox Church hostility towards aspirations of freedom and national liberation and independence.



activity, which it has been argued was linked to the cultivation of both a Greek and a Greek Cypriot nationalist project, in the port towns of Limassol and Larnaca in 1815 led the Archbishop to state that:

The aforementioned oppose the decrees of the Sovereign and deserve to be put to death for everything they preach... We ought to urge the authorities to crack down on them, to arrest them in their meetings and councils and to punish them harshly... this matter, which is pit against not only our most sacred and pure faith but also against the wishes and commands of our King....<sup>39</sup>

There is substantial evidence documented by historians which indicate that Christian society was far from being nationalised. The level of illiteracy was extremely high leading the vice-consul of Greece to comment, six years before the take-over of Cyprus by the British, that people in villages were not even aware of the existence of letters, adding that:

The prevailing mutual disfavour [...] is mostly religious rather than ethnic. The Christian is not aware of his history, his origins, his nation. He considers all Orthodox to be co-nationals [...]<sup>40</sup>

A poor communications system militated against the spread of ideas from those towns where national ideas began to circulate to villages, leaving a substantial proportion of the population in isolation<sup>41</sup>; a factor which worked in favour of the Church influence upon the population. Further, the relationship between Church and people was plainly ambiguous. The Church may have used whatever means permitted within its powers for the extraction of taxes, a matter giving rise to anti-clericalism, but it was also earning the loyalty of the labouring poor.<sup>42</sup> Katsiaounis argues that abuses and humiliations inflicted upon Christians led to endless petitions requesting the Bishop's assistance.<sup>43</sup> However, beyond its power to make representations on behalf of the Christian subjects, the Church also continued to be an important institution since religion as witnessed by

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<sup>39</sup> Encyclical note by Archbishop Kyprianos, cited in Katsiaounis, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

<sup>40</sup> Katsiaounis, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

<sup>41</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 52-53.

<sup>42</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 53-55.

the observance of religious practices, the organisation of fairs on saints' name days, the near exclusive religious content of books available for sale and the dominance of precepts of the Church in intellectual activity, played a central role in social life.<sup>44</sup> Finally, the Church charitable activities during the period, which included both the foundation and financing of schools and rudimentary care for the sick and the poor, secured it the status of a benefactor.<sup>45</sup>

The forgoing observations do not constitute anything more than a schematic presentation of factors which may have affected the relationship of the Christian subjects to the established authority of the Church. It ought to be added that the relationship between Christians and Muslims is an area much more complex than the common revolts and the restricted phenomena of inter-marriage and religious conversions may reveal. In 1856, the French Consul in Larnaca, in a dispatch to the French Ambassador in Constantinople, had this to say:

Slavery has bred slaves, who will not dare express their opinions when they realise that it is contrary to that of the Turks. This system of terror is reigning in Nicosia, a Turkish town with medieval ideas, located in the interior of the island and without the presence of Europeans. The situation is quite different in Larnaca, where civilisation and education are much more advanced. Turkish threats do not bother the Christians who are protected from fanaticism and able to act freely, when they are on the straight path.<sup>46</sup>

Georgallides explains that, especially in Nicosia, there was amongst the Muslim population

a class of persons with a considerable experience in the Ottoman administration and state affairs. These persons and their families, sometimes major landowners, did not leave Cyprus in 1878. Many of the leaders of Turkish society during the British period were to spring from these families which remembered and took pride in the special position which their community had enjoyed under Sultanic rule. As the British occupation found a

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<sup>43</sup> Ibid., p. 55.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., pp. 55-56.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., p. 60.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., p. 21.

distinct Turkish community and many Turkish Cypriots with a varied administrative experience, so it encountered a clearly defined Greek community.<sup>47</sup>

But Muslim hostility to the 1856 reforms seems to have cut across class lines. The Muslim labouring poor and religious leaders who stressed the importance of living under a Muslim government also reacted against the reforms. This was a pattern similar to other provinces of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>48</sup> It would seem that the distinct status of the two communities did offer a basis for the Muslim poor to defend its political, fiscal and social privileges. In that respect it may not appear strange that when the British occupied the island, removed all legal distinctions between the two communities and established the relative size of each community as the basis for political representation, the Muslim leaders insisted that the two communities be equally represented.<sup>49</sup> Katsiaounis has described the reaction of the Muslim community at the time:

The most obvious losers in this process of rationalisation of the judiciary were the Turks, who protested against every one of Britain's liberalising reforms. At the same time as they protested, however, both the leadership and mass of the community clung close to the benevolent rule of Britain and against the Greeks, who outnumbered them by four to one.<sup>50</sup>

But neither is this to argue, as the evidence discussed here may suggest, that the two communities' diverse development through two distinct nationalisms was a forgone conclusion. What is of importance is that religious identification may had not become a political issue between the two communities in that religion did not become an issue of conflict; however, legal status, political representation, economic burdens were defined according to membership to a religious group. The experience of life possessed a universal character for Muslim and Christian peasants who faced the harsh conditions of economic exploitation and a corrupt Ottoman administration. Yet neither the kind of class bonds that Pollis claims to have existed and exhibited by the common revolts can,

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<sup>47</sup> Georgallides op. cit., p. 54.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., p. 56.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., p. 64

<sup>50</sup> Katsiaounis, op. cit., pp. 66-67.

as has been shown, be read as unambiguous nor the intermingling witnessed, as she asserts, by the phenomenon of intermarriage.<sup>51</sup> It has, for example, been argued that one of the more important reasons for the incidence of intermarriage was the 'complementarity of two different property transmission systems'<sup>52</sup> rather than the extent of social integration that may be assumed by this phenomenon.

To take this further, beyond the conservative forces of the Church and the class of tax farmers whose accumulation of wealth depended on the Ottoman structure of administration and on the exploitation of the mass of peasants, new modernising forces were emerging in the form of merchants attached to foreign consulates. These merchants enjoyed commercial and political benefits which could not accrue to ordinary Christians. It is precisely this emerging class of Christians, who partly stood outside the rigid hierarchy of the millet system, which seems to have been the driving force to the emergence of a Greek Cypriot nationalism progressively encompassing the mass of the population once the British occupied the island. Though a Greek nationalism began to make itself felt by the last decades of Ottoman rule the pattern of relationships during this period was too complex to ascertain definitively whether class or ethnicity would become the driving force of political mobilisation and national definition. What is certain is that by the time an organised labour movement arose which derived its membership from both communities its demands remained confined to strictly labour demands. Greek nationalism had become a movement with a popular appeal amongst the Greek Cypriot population while Turkish Cypriot nationalism was in the process of popularisation. Pollis though treats these developments as a causal effect of British policies:

By adopting a particular set of educational and political policies differences were exacerbated and redefined while commonalties were relegated to insignificance. As a consequence the prospects for the development of a Cypriot nationality were nearly precluded<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Pollis, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

<sup>52</sup> Sant Cassia, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

<sup>53</sup> Pollis, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

The educational policy pursued by the British when they first occupied Cyprus is briefly discussed below. The establishment of a Legislative Council, on the other hand, which constituted the central political institution through which the colonial government organised, in the first instance, the two communities as two distinct political entities will be discussed in the following chapter.

### Educational Policy.

It was the *formalisation* of an educational system based on the separation of schooling for the members of each community that occurred with the advent of British rule rather than the *establishment* of separate schooling as such. Each community had already established its own distinct schools during the period of Ottoman rule; therefore, separate schools were not invented by the British as such: ‘whatever education existed though for the Christian population during the Ottoman period was Greek’.<sup>54</sup> By 1879, a year after the British occupation of the island, there were 65 Moslem and 83 Christian elementary schools.<sup>55</sup> The Moslem schools were under the administration of *evkaf* and depended on donations as well as a grant by the Ottoman Government.<sup>56</sup> Since the government of the Sultan did not intervene in the affairs of communal institutions,<sup>57</sup> the Christian community established its own autonomous schools which depended on ‘private fees, subscriptions and Church donations’.<sup>58</sup> Elected committees under the leadership of the Archbishop and the bishops undertook the administration of the Greek schools.<sup>59</sup> Text-books written by Greek authors were already in use before the British arrived.<sup>60</sup> Though, during that period, education cultivated loyal Ottoman subjects, “[d]iscipline in fact should be displayed in the face of all powers that be, regardless of

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<sup>54</sup> Attalides, op. cit., p. 25.

<sup>55</sup> Weir, p. 23.

<sup>56</sup> Ali Suha 1969, pp. 359-360.

<sup>57</sup> Kitromilides 1990, p. 9; Suha op. cit., p. 356.

<sup>58</sup> Georgallides op. cit., p. 49.

<sup>59</sup> G. Prodromou 1986, p. 247.

<sup>60</sup> Weir, op. cit., p. 113.

nationality”,<sup>61</sup> it also concentrated on religion and the dissemination of Greek consciousness.<sup>62</sup> According to Kitromilides, school teachers from Greece already staffed schools in the decades before British occupation.<sup>63</sup>

The colonial secretary, Lord Kimberley, rejected proposals by the new Cyprus government to introduce a unitary and anglicised system of education partly because:

any action which would excite the islanders’ opposition should be avoided. Since Worsley’s [the first High Commissioner of Cyprus] embryonic attempts in 1879 to interfere in the Greek schools so as to stop them from becoming centres of ‘Hellenic propagandism’ and Biddulph [the second High Commissioner of Cyprus, 1879] and Spencer’s [Director of Education] educational ideas and early initiatives had aroused much concern among the Greek Cypriots, Lord Kimberley [Secretary of State for the Colonies 1880-1882] emphasised that the wish of the Government was to collaborate with the local communities in school administration.<sup>64</sup>

There was therefore, in regards to separate communal education, not so much a new system imposed by the British but rather the formalisation and initially a loose centralisation of an existing communally based arrangement. It was also the case that the number of schools expanded rapidly under British rule and a sense of identification with the Greek state was freely taught. Education therefore became a central vehicle for the popularisation of national ideas. But the rudiments of a separate system of education lay in the Ottoman past, and though Greek nationalism was far from a popular phenomenon when the British arrived it appears that the leadership of the Christian community was not prepared to surrender its cultural autonomy. But neither did either community have an interest to interfere on issues of education of the other. Biddulph, the High Commissioner, reported in 1882 that ‘there is a strong indisposition, on the part of the leading members of either community to interfere in anyway with the schools of the other community.’<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Katsiaounis, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

<sup>62</sup> *ibid.* pp. 56-59.

<sup>63</sup> Kitromilides, 1976 p. 161.

<sup>64</sup> Georgallides, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

<sup>65</sup> Cited in Georgallides *op. cit.*, p. 48.

## STRUCTURAL DETERMINISM

Irrespective of the history of education in Cyprus, it seems inadmissible to argue that by maintaining distinct educational establishments the British exacerbated differences to the extent that:

In time the Cypriots came to view themselves just as the British did: separate antagonistic nationalities, Greek and Turk fighting for political power and for control over the same territory.<sup>66</sup>

Many more references couched in this tone by Pollis, suggest that the politicisation of ethnic differences occurred through a set of colonial policies imposed despite the commonalities between the two groups. This amounts to a determinism which relegates nationalism exclusively as the causal effect of a structure of organisation. The Cypriots were largely, if not simply, responsive to nationalism only because they have been predisposed to do so by those very structures. Michael Attalides has described Pollis' approach as that of a 'liberal social scientist' who in contrast to those producing nationalist historical accounts, tracing the origins of a Greek culture on the island to 2000 BC, 'may under emphasise the non-rational expressions of group national identity, or even the existence of cultural differences'.<sup>67</sup> Though this may be one way of classifying different approaches to the interpretation of the course of nationalism in Cyprus, there are wider implications involved. The approach is not characterised by an underestimation of what Attalides refers to as 'non-rational expressions' of group national identity alone, but it does so within a framework which denies any agency to the subjects concerned. It is an over-determination of the subject, its overwhelming subordination to external manipulation and imposed structures of organisation. This amounts to its objectification and pre-empts the possibility of addressing the process through which imposed structures of organisation and external interventions or

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<sup>66</sup> Pollis, op. cit., p. 55.

influences were open to subjective deliberations of the concerned community. That is, to an utilisation of what emerged independently of the subject by and for the purposes of the subject itself. Further, it would seem ungrounded to argue that the British structures prevented political cooperation as if institutional forms are to be understood as possessing a greater authority in the making of groups than political projects which can stand outside those institutions and which acquire a life of their own despite of those structures, even if limited by them.

Once the British through their policies had restructured Cypriot realities and had created the requisites for the development of dual nationalisms, Cypriots gradually became fertile ground for Greek and Turkish nationalist propaganda.<sup>68</sup>

Yet, it remains to be asked: why did Greek and Turkish nationalism reach and influence the outlook of the two communities? Why did the two communities not develop, for example, their own locally based distinct nationalisms as opposed to homeland nationalisms which identified the two communities with an external state? Was the cultural pattern of the communities in Cyprus such that the development of two distinct nationalisms, whether inspired by a belongingness to a wider tradition, or, to a local one, a potentiality just as the development of a singular nationalist vision was nothing more than a potentiality? Could it be argued that the prominence of one potentiality as opposed to another can be accounted for by a variety of factors that stretch beyond the administrative definition of the two communities as separate, given that, the administrative arrangement as such could not prevent the development of a universal anti-colonial project thereby opening the possibility for a singular nationalist movement?

Arguing against approaches to the 'nation' as a fabricated construction Smith stresses that:

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<sup>67</sup> Attalides, op. cit., p. 22.

<sup>68</sup> Pollis, op. cit., p. 56.



traditions, myths, history and symbols must all grow out of the existing living memories and beliefs of the people who are to compose the nation. Their popular resonance will be greater the more continuous with the living past they are shown to be.”<sup>69</sup>

The ‘socio-economic’ bonds which linked the Muslim and Orthodox peasantry have been stressed by Pollis as an indication of the possibility for the development of a Cypriot nationality. This lies at the centre of a thesis arguing that a colonial policy of divide and rule precluded the development of a ‘Cypriot nationality’ by establishing structures which overlooked those bonds, giving rise instead to Greek and Turkish nationalism. It is evident in her work that she privileges a shared class position and the general pattern of coexistence of the Muslim and Christian peasantry across Cyprus, often to be found in mixed villages, albeit in separate sectors. Though a shared predicament and general conditions of coexistence may have provided the potential for preparing the members of the two religious groups to develop into a singular national group this cannot be treated as anything more than a possibility to which history could be made to lend itself. But to bring such a group into existence it would have required much more than alternative structures to those set in place with the British occupation.

#### THE POLITICISATION OF ‘HELLENIC ETHNOLOGICAL’ TRADITIONS.

Paschalis Kitromilides has identified the ‘Hellenic ethnological character of Cypriot society’ as one of two factors which together were responsible for the emergence and growth of Greek Cypriot nationalism. The second, being the political programme that emerged from the aspiration of Greek nationalism to unite all Hellenic people and territories within the Greek state; known as the ‘Great Idea’. The first factor may be understood as a set of cultural characteristics, incorporating ‘language, traditions and archaic culture’, meant that the development of Greek nationalism lay in potential. But,

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<sup>69</sup> A. Smith, 1993, p. 16.

a potential that came to be realised through the process of ‘intellectual expansion’ from the centre (Hellenic Kingdom) to the peripheries (Asia Minor, Cyprus):

it was this ideological process that politicised the local ethnological traditions and turned them into dynamic elements of political change in distant and isolated regions without any direct organic ties with the independent Greek state.<sup>70</sup>

The development of a national ideology which linked the ethnological character of the Orthodox population in Cyprus to a modern Greek identity and anticipated the integration of Cyprus to the Greek state was a process comparable to the nationalisation of Hellenic communities in Asia Minor.<sup>71</sup> This relationship between the ethnological character of the orthodox population and the drive of the Greek state to politicise Hellenic ethnological traditions has been ignored by Pollis who treats the development of two distinct nationalisms in Cyprus as a derivative of colonial structural arrangements. The impact of Hellenic ideas in transforming the Christian Greek speaking population of Cyprus into a community understanding itself as Greek can only be apprehended as an indication of the impact of those ideas in people’s imagination. Or, to paraphrase Smith, ideas claiming the Hellenic character of the ‘Cypriots’ had a popular resonance amongst the Christian population precisely because they were shown to be continuous with the living past.

Demographic and political factors enhanced this process in Cyprus compared to other territories of the ‘Greek East’. Its geographical insularity created a self-enclosed community and ‘had assured its predominantly Hellenic ethnic character’. Therefore the process of politicisation of its ethnic character occurred in a context free from a perceived or actual threat from a ‘hostile alien majority’. Further, the political environment brought by the British occupation represented a marked contrast to the condition of this community under Ottoman rule. Freedom of political expression under

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<sup>70</sup> Kitromilides, 1990, p. 4.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

British rule facilitated the dissemination of ideas contributing, amongst other things, to the growth of nationalism.<sup>72</sup>

However, Kitromilides adds, the consequences of both of these factors extended beyond the impetus they lent to the growth of nationalism. The majority status of the Christian population combined with the insular environment of the island led to an oversight of both, the Muslim minority and the relevance of neighbouring Turkey.

Having presented a convincing argument for the necessity to understand the development of Greek nationalism in Cyprus in a comparative context the author adds that:

British colonial policy contributed to the preservation and politicisation of traditional corporate structures and cultures and thus laid the infrastructure of future ethnic confrontation and conflict.<sup>73</sup>

This point was elaborated further in another paper presented some years earlier.

Referring to the colonial policy to reflect the traditional system of social organisation in the Legislative Council, and thus the establishment of the two religious communities as political communities he states:

The consequence was that the horizontal interethnic bonds forged in traditional society was gradually undermined and eventually broken. Thus British administrative practices not only contributed to the gradual destruction of the potential bases of an integrated society in Cyprus but by preserving and politicising traditional power structures, most notably the Orthodox Church and its civil functions provided the leadership to potential ethnic conflict.<sup>74</sup>

Yet British policy in Cyprus introduced mechanisms which had the potential to undermine traditional corporate structures. This is an issue to which I will now turn. A few initial comments are first necessary.

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<sup>72</sup> Ibid., p. 13.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Kitromilides 1977 pp. 45-6.

Kitromilides' analysis of the background against which two distinct nationalisms developed in Cyprus is highly informative, locating as it does social, economic and political factors which colluded in enhancing the growth of Greek Cypriot nationalism. His demonstration of the comparative context in which the development of Greek Cypriot nationalism has to be investigated establishes a framework for exploring this as an outcome of a multiplicity of historical conditions. Yet both of the articles which combine to construct this framework, conclude with the argument that the basis for future ethnic conflict was laid by the preservation and politicisation of the power of the Church through British policy. This remains a statement that is left unexplored. While he recognises the importance of the interaction between the Christian community with the ideological forces unleashed from the drive of the Greek state to expand and limit its borders at the point of incorporation of those territories inhabited by communities which could be shown to possess a Hellenic culture, he also resorts to an argument which prioritises the effect of colonial policy in producing the basis of ethnic conflict. Two key issues arise from this. The first is the relation between nationalism and violence; the second, is the relation between British policies and the ascendancy of the Church.

In relation to the first; if nationalism, where it arises as a liberation movement seeking to secure the right to self-determination for the defined group residing on a given territory, is not a singular phenomenon but is contested by two ethnically defined groups, it seems evident that the more the conflicting interests of these groups contesting the future of the same territory become articulated, and, the more the modes of expression of antagonistic nationalist demands become diverse and encompass an ever expanding range of areas of social and political activity, the closer ethnic groups get to violence.

That ethnic violence broke out, as will be expanded on in the following chapter, cannot be treated as the outcome of the 'preservation' of the political power of the Church but rather as directly related to the development of contesting nationalisms.

The second issue, and as will be seen in the following sections, concerns the connection between colonial policy on the one hand, and the ascendancy of the Church as the undisputed authority of the Greek Cypriots on the other, is not plainly obvious. The success of the Church in absorbing or marginalizing secular forces appears to have derived from factors which lay, at large, outside the control of the colonial government rather than being the direct outcome of its policies. To put it simply, colonial policies alone cannot explain that outcome.

#### THE PRESERVATION OF TRADITIONAL CORPORATE STRUCTURES OR THE RE-ASSERTION OF THE CHURCH?

The establishment of a Legislative Council in its final form in 1882 brought an end to the political authority hitherto granted to the Church by the Ottoman regime over the Christian community. Political authority was to lie instead with the elected representatives of the Legislative Council. Since the population of the island was no longer organised as religious communities the preconditions were created for the emergence of secular mechanisms for organising and constituting the population. However, both the Legislative Council and the administration of the island at district, municipal and village levels was organised along the previous religious differentiation of the population. So, for example, nine members of the legislative council were to be elected by the Greek community and three by the Turkish community.

The division of the population dictated by the new administrative structures on the island has been one of the most important aspects of colonial policy which has led firstly, as Pollis asserted, to an argument that British policy gave rise to the development two distinct nationalisms. Secondly, it has also been argued by Kitromilides that it contributed to the preservation of traditional corporate structures breeding the possibility for ethnic conflict.

No doubt colonial policy established the two communities as two distinct political entities. Theoretically though this could not prevent any drive towards unity should political forces pursuing politics which opened the possibility for a singular Cypriot subject to be defined, be at work within Cypriot society. There seems to be, at the same time, no ground upon which to argue that if colonial policy had presupposed the Cypriots as one political unit then the Cypriots, Christians and Muslims, would have pursued politics which defined a singular national subject. It is unclear, for example, how a policy which may have defined the population of Cyprus as a single political community would have prevented the rise of communal politics when the Christian community was three times bigger than the Muslim equivalent while at the same time structures of differentiation included language, education, religion and a rising modern elite defined the community in national terms. Further, given the secularisation of the political space attempted through British policies, the domination of the Church as an institution which combined both the role of the political as well as religious authority of the Greek population may have been made all too easier by the fact that the boundaries of the political subject coincided with the boundaries of the religious subject. However, these boundaries cannot be assumed as given by virtue of the administrative separation of the two communities nor can the ascendancy of the Church as a national leader be assumed as a forgone conclusion arising from the coincidence of these boundaries in the administrative structure of society.

With the close of the period of Ottoman rule the Church lost many of its privileges so far granted by a regime which ruled through the differentiation of the population as religious communities. Loss of privileges ranged from the political status of the Church amongst the Christian community, its tax collection functions, central assistance (police escorts) for the collection of Church imposed obligatory dues from the Christian population, exemption of Church property from taxation to loss of power to enforce sentences against Christians who were in breach of the cannon law. Further, the principle of 'all equal before the law' was extended to members of the clergy who had

thus far been tried by the Archbishop, a matter which put the clergy on a par with their flock.<sup>75</sup> Therefore, the changes brought by the British impinged both on the political and legal position of the Church as well as on the Church fiscal rights which resulted in a diminution of its income by as much as two thirds.<sup>76</sup> One historian has gone as far as to suggest that the changes affecting the status of the Church amongst the Christians ‘in effect disestablished the Orthodox Church’.<sup>77</sup> Nevertheless the Church managed to reassert its position at the head of the Christian population, only this time, as the leader of a nationally defined Greek community homogenised under the demand for union with Greece. It therefore re-established itself as the national leader of a modern subject. But neither the demand for union with Greece nor the Church’s renewed status as the national leader of the Greek community emerged as the inevitable outcome of the administrative division of the two religious communities as political units. The political developments that occurred during the period of British rule suggest that the Church had to reassert itself simultaneously as the religious and the political leader of the Christian-Greek community.

Further, a consideration of the interaction between the political representatives of the two communities in the Legislative Council suggests that the diversity of the two communities through their combined ethnic and numerical status on the island was crucial in politicising difference. The distinct numerical status that divided the two communities has been a much neglected factor amongst those who have sought to address the emergence of two distinct nationalisms. Another important factor was the fact that though 1878 signalled the end of Ottoman rule in Cyprus the island remained an Ottoman province until 1914. This provided the basis for the Muslim elite to vest its hopes in the reestablishment of Ottoman authority and a significant incentive to maintain its loyalty to the Sultan. In other words the reorganisation of the political space was not felt as an immediate urgency for this community.

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<sup>75</sup> Katsiaounis, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-75. Also Georgallides, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-61.

<sup>76</sup> Georgallides, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 60.

One important distinction that needs to be made is that between the administrative structures established by the British on the one hand and the dominance of communally based political visions on the other. One did not presuppose the other. A second important distinction is that between those same structures and the coming to dominance of the Church as the undisputed national authority of the Greek community. The latter implies a consideration of the process through which the Church asserted itself as a national authority and is the focus of the following section. The former requires a consideration of the interaction between the Christian and the Muslim elected representatives of the Legislative Council in the first years of British rule as well as the historical context in which a Turkish Cypriot nationalism developed. These issues will be considered later, where approaches to the emergence and nature of Turkish Cypriot nationalism are discussed at length.

#### THE ASCENDANCY OF THE CHURCH AS THE NATIONAL AUTHORITY.

This period witnessed a struggle over the imposition of *visions and divisions* which for those at the head of this political struggle, involved a competition for legitimisation. In the process of this struggle the Church was forced into adopting a demand which was growing in appeal amongst the legitimisation-granting subjects. While the Church may have possessed symbolic capital which derived from and inherited courtesy its role as the head of the Christian population during the period of Ottoman rule and more generally from its position as the religious authority of the Christian population, this was by no means the only form of capital which could be mobilised. Harsh economic conditions for the mass of the population were not alleviated with British rule. More widespread education, on the other hand, was beginning to achieve increasing levels of literacy. The demand for union with Greece was finding an appeal, defining the nationalisation process of the Christians. The more the power to receive legitimisation on the basis of traditional role was being surpassed by legitimisation granted on the basis of a protest against the new regime, mediated through the anti-colonial demand for



union with Greece, the more susceptible the Church became to pursuing a national cause.

In the first years of British rule though a number of factors intervened to affect the new possibilities which were unfolding. In the first decades of this rule the basis of the lending economy had not yet been challenged and therefore sustained the vulnerability of the mass of peasants to money lenders.<sup>78</sup> This structure of dependency which acted in a subversive manner to the British efforts to introduce a modern system of representation as well as to undermine the power of the traditional leadership within the Christian community. Large scale landowners and merchant money lenders being the privileged stratum along with and closely linked with the Church in the economic sphere, were able to exert their influence amongst the Christian community on a clientalist basis.<sup>79</sup> Further, the franchise was conferred only on males over the age of twenty one who paid a property tax or rent. This excluded a substantial section of the population, unable as it was to pay the tax. In 1882 there were 58,916 male payers of property tax. Nevertheless, of these only 35.8% registered as voters. By 1886 registered voters decreased by 10%,<sup>80</sup> reflecting the apathy with which elections were received partly as a result of the extent of illiteracy in Cypriot society,<sup>81</sup> partly as a reflection of the fact that the political transformation with the transition to British rule was not a deliberate achievement by the Cypriots but brought to them from outside,<sup>82</sup> and partly as the result of the absence of any ideological content in the competition amongst competing candidates.<sup>83</sup> These factors militated towards the reproduction of the Church authority and the privileged strata of land owners which had developed along its side, in this new context. Therefore, the 'politics of the first decade of colonial rule ... being practically devoid of ideological issues, remained strongly clientalist in nature.'<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> The Christian peasant population constituted 80% of this community's population. Attalides 1986, p. 127.

<sup>79</sup> Katsiaounis, op. cit., pp. 89-90, 226.

<sup>80</sup> Katsiaounis, op. cit., pp. 84-86

<sup>81</sup> Attalides, op. cit., p. 127. Even in 1911, 33 years into British rule 75% of the population was illiterate.

<sup>82</sup> Katsiaounis, op. cit., p. 92.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., p. 89.

However, as the possibilities for new sources of symbolic capital were emerging the Church had to enter the process of political competition in a rapidly changing context. By 1900 conditions had matured enough for the Church to draw back and estimate its losses. The political impact of the developments that took place in the first twenty years of British rule became clearer after the death of Archbishop Sofronios in 1900. Senior religious representatives of the Church of Cyprus were subject to election by a body comprising both clerics and lay representatives.<sup>85</sup> Given that lay representatives with the right of the final vote for the election of the archbishop were themselves elected by the Christian population, any competition over the election of senior clerics could easily spill over society at large. Similarly, the Church was vulnerable to pressures from society at large. The competition that emerged with the death of Archbishop Sofronios was between two political factions. The traditional elite<sup>86</sup> which had along with the Church ascended to economic influence during and through the structures of the Ottoman administration and a new elite which belonged, at large, to a new generation which had come to maturity after the British occupied the island. The development of the communications system, the expansion in external trade and a developing manufacturing sector in the early years of British rule provided the basis for the emergence of a new bourgeois class whose members having also enjoyed the benefit of studying in Greek universities, 'were more numerous and more formidable in education and sophistication'. The latter consisted primarily of lawyers, doctors and merchants.<sup>87</sup> The competition that ensued amongst the two factions centred around the figures of the Bishop of Kyrenia, a man representing the faction associated with traditional authority, and the Bishop of Kitium<sup>88</sup>, a man influenced by nationalist stirrings at their strongest in his region.

That the Church did not possess a priori authority amongst the Greek Cypriot population was already reflected in the gradual gains made by the nationalists in the second decade

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<sup>85</sup> Anagnostopoulou 1999, p. 11.

<sup>86</sup> Also known as the 'old' elite, the compromising faction or 'Kyriniaki'.

<sup>87</sup> For these developments during the early years of British rule see Katsiaounis, op. cit., pp. 175-181.

of British rule. The first elections for the representatives to the Legislative Council returned the old figures of influence that dominated in the Christian community in the last years of the Ottoman period, therefore, leaving traditional political authority within this community unchallenged. There was though a marked change by 1896. Although the majority of candidates elected were drawn from the 'old' group there were now four 'national' - as they defined themselves - candidates.<sup>89</sup> They were subsequently all elected, having received the greatest number of votes within their constituencies.<sup>90</sup>

The contest over the election of the Archbishop developed into a conflict which encompassed Greek Cypriot society at large: 'Tempers ran high amongst the population which had been divided into two rival camps'.<sup>91</sup> The nature of the battle was reflected in the different principles against which each faction sought to appeal to the Greek Cypriots. While the 'old' tried to mobilise in the name of religion their contenders did so in the name of the nation.<sup>92</sup> The principle of visions and division asserted by the 'old' sought to define the social subject as Orthodox. In their effort to mobilise the population they set up a political club by the name of 'Orthodoxia' which was presided over by a preacher.<sup>93</sup> Similarly the principle of vision and division asserted by the nationalists was fundamentally predicated upon the nation while the primary name of the social subject being imposed was 'Greek'.

Each faction engaged in an effort to extend its legitimacy through the act of naming. Challenging their opponents, the 'old' charged prominent members of the nationalist faction with freemasonry. In an exercise aimed at maximising their political capital they published a denunciation which Archbishop Kyprianos had made against freemasonry in

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<sup>88</sup> The faction supporting the Bishop of Kitium also came to be known as 'Kitiaki' or nationalists.

<sup>89</sup> Katsiaounis, op. cit., p. 225.

<sup>90</sup> The emerging strength of the nationalist candidates was facilitated by the expansion of education, the emergence of an increasing number of locally produced newspapers, the establishment of voluntary clubs, the economic discontent amongst large sections of the population arising from a heavy burden of taxation and the impact of Greco Turkish war in the late 1890s. For a discussion see Katsiaounis, op. cit., pp. 193-223; Kitromilides, 1990.

<sup>91</sup> Katsiaounis, op. cit., p. 226; Attalides op. cit., p. 130; Grekos 1982 p. 24.

<sup>92</sup> Katsiaounis op. cit., p. 229.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid., p. 227.

1814. By virtue of his execution in 1821 by the local Ottoman authorities, Archbishop Kyprianos had become a national hero. Therefore his words were directed to be read as those of a heroic leader of the nation. Engaged in a similar exercise, the nationalists responded that Archbishop Kyprianos' denunciation was directed against Greek revolutionaries since the freemasons denounced at the time were in fact members of Philiki Etairia.<sup>94</sup> This was effectively a challenge to the credentials of traditional authority to speak in the name of the nation; it was also a challenge that afforded the nationalists an increasingly expanding political capital:

the appeal of religion could no longer confer sufficient *elan* upon the establishment. The nationalists refused to lay themselves open to the charges... even the most radically minded leaders of the Kitium camp would not consider themselves as religious sceptics or agnostics.<sup>95</sup>

The nationalists, therefore, were not challenging religion as such. They were not even necessarily challenging the Church authority over the Greek Cypriot population. Yet they certainly sought to determine the role of the Church amongst the population. Neither does it appear that they aimed to exclude the Church from the political domain. What was challenged was a political role which was not also a national role, as their opposition to the 'old' leadership in general suggests.

Despite the overwhelming victory of the nationalists the Holy Synod refused to accept the result and the Bishop of Kitium was not enthroned until 1910. In the meantime the position of the Archbishop remained vacant for ten years. Commenting on a memorandum of the Holy Synod, the High Commissioner wrote to the Secretary of State that:

The matter was a political aspect. The party of the Bishop of Kitium has stimulated public feeling by strongly advocating Union with Greece. The party of the Bishop of Kyrenia are not able to resist the popular cry but say union with Greece can only be brought about with the willing consent of Great

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<sup>94</sup> Attalides op. cit., p. 131.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., p. 229

Britain. I read the concluding paragraph of the representation of the Holy Synod as framed so as not to offend what they believe is the popular feeling amongst the Greek-speaking Cypriots.<sup>96</sup>

The period leading to the next elections witnessed an increase of the numbers of voters for a second time. While in 1896 there was for the first time an increase in the number of registered voters, an increase of 20.7%, in 1901 there was a 129% increase of registered voters.<sup>97</sup> The elections also resulted in the outright victory of the 'Kitiaki' who came to occupy all nine seats in the Legislative Council.

It was the victory of the nationalists which signalled the emergence of the nationalising politics of the Church as an institution. The struggle between traditional and nationalist politics was, as has been argued above, incorporated within the Church own structures. The Church was unprepared to surrender its traditional role as the political authority of the Christians; in the new circumstances this meant that the Church was to seek control over the politicisation process of the Christian community by becoming the major exponent of *enosis*. The victory of the nationalists both in the election of the archbishop, a verdict which was for ten years resisted, and the outright victory of the nationalists in the 1901 and again in the 1906 legislative council elections signalled the adoption of the demand for union by the Church as a radicalised anti-colonial demand, representing the Church as an institution rather than some of its clerics. It also signalled the incorporation of those nationalists who led the power struggle between traditional authority and the nationalists in the first place under the Church sphere of influence. While the main structure of power in Greek politics, the Archbishopric, lay in the hands of the conservatives it was now firmly secure under a unifying nationalist demand. Therefore in the 1911 elections distinctions between 'old' and 'new' political forces and thus between the compromising and uncompromising factions became obliterated as the old elite and the new bourgeois class merged under the immediate aim for the pursuit of the union of Cyprus with Greece.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> Dated December 24, 1900. Quoted in Katsiaounis, op. cit., p. 237.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid., p. 225, 239.

<sup>98</sup> Attalides, 1986, p. 131.

By definition the Church could never have appealed to the Muslim population. Therefore if the British had treated the population of Cyprus as a singular political entity the Church would have faced the limitation that it could only speak on behalf of the Christian subjects. Yet those Christian subjects constituted 80% of the population. Secondly, the challenge to the Church authority developed out of those same forces that began to take shape in the period prior to British rule. The power struggle that emerged was one between traditional authority and the nationalists who sought to homogenise that same population under the demand for *enosis*. An effort which was much aided by the educational system, the increasing dissatisfaction and disillusionment with British rule, the free circulation of ideas and the absence of any other forces capable of joining the struggle for the imposition of visions and divisions in a process seeking to name the Cypriot subject.<sup>99</sup> The limited extent of social mobilisation and significantly the continued polarisation of the Greek Cypriot community between the mass of destitute peasants, on the one hand, and the economically dominant class of the clerics and other land owners, on the other, with a small intermediary class of business men and intellectuals facilitated the ascendancy of the demand for *enosis* as an undisputed notion mediating the nationalisation of the Christians. The Greek Cypriot subject was now becoming a subject in possession of a national identity which could realise its true essence only through *enosis*.

At least so it appeared by the mid 1910s. In contrast to the optimism that emerged with the 1918 rumours that Britain had offered Cyprus to Greece in 1915,<sup>100</sup> the defeat of the Greek troops in Asia Minor in the 1920s as well as the experience of the 1919 Peace Conference following the First World War suggested that the union of Cyprus with Greece was, at least for the near future, off both the international and the Greek

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<sup>99</sup> Anagnostopoulou, pp. 8-10

<sup>100</sup> The offer was conditional and never materialised since Greece did not meet the condition of assisting Serbia which was under attack by Bulgaria. However knowledge of this offer induced a sense of optimism on the part of the Greek Cypriots as Britain was seen to acknowledge the relationship between the island and Greece. For details see Georgallides op. cit., pp. 88-102.

agenda.<sup>101</sup> Further, internal social and political pressures were undermining the unity of the ruling elite, which had been achieved and sustained during this period. The economic discontent developing in the rural sectors in the 1920s required a response other than that of *enosis*.<sup>102</sup> The class composition of Greek Cypriot society was also undergoing further changes. Beyond the expanding class of merchants, the development of a stratum of civil servants and the professional class of lawyers, doctors, teachers and journalists the development of light industry, the expansion of the construction industry, and the intensification of the mining industry led to the proletarianisation of dispossessed peasants.<sup>103</sup> These internal changes, the economic crisis, and factors emerging from the outcome of the First World War and the Greek defeat in Asia Minor became reflected in a split amongst the political representatives of the Greek community; between those who would insist that the demand for union with Greece should be the guiding policy of the Greeks and those who perceived that the possibilities to meet any improvements in the conditions of the Greek people was through the pursuance of reforms.<sup>104</sup> With the realisation that *enosis* was not an immediate prospect and that social, economic and political problems were pressing it was necessary to pursue a program of social reforms. Living under British rule could no longer be depicted as a contradiction to being Greek. The stark division was no longer between British rule and national rehabilitation which could be achieved only through incorporation into the homeland. Existing living conditions had to be ameliorated through reforms. *Enosis* was still the national aspiration but this time as the final stage of a developmental process leading towards economic and political autonomy. It was the reformist faction which proved victorious in the 1925 elections with only one of the nine elected representatives representing the old uncompromising faction. Yet by 1930 the uncompromising faction had reasserted itself with the return of all of its candidates to the Legislative Council.

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<sup>101</sup> For details on the Peace Conference see Georgallides, *ibid.*, pp. 105-166.

<sup>102</sup> See for example, Attalides, 1886, p. 132-137

<sup>103</sup> Anagnostopoulou, *op. cit.*, p. 17; Attalides *op. cit.*, p. 132; Grekos *op. cit.*, pp. 20-22.

<sup>104</sup> Georgallides *op. cit.*, pp. 167-220, Servas 1985 pp. 72-78.

The conflict between the two factions was once again reflected within the Church establishment. The compromising faction centred around the new bishop of Kitium, the same constituency which witnessed the pressure for the pursuit of demands for national rehabilitation in the form of *enosis* in the latter years of the Nineteenth century. It was the Bishop of Kitium who in 1931 called the masses into a spontaneous uprising following the disaffection with British autarchic tendencies revealed in their most intolerant form in a meeting of the Legislative Council in October 1931.<sup>105</sup> The action taken by the Governor of Cyprus to activate a tax bill by Order in Council and therefore to overturn a majority decision against an increase of custom duties was a trump card in the hands of the uncompromising faction. The Bishop's call to an uprising under the demand for *enosis* was, according to one author, an attempt to reconcile the two positions which divided the Greek Cypriot elite. These she describes as:

“social radicalisation on the one hand, and the radicalisation of the *enosis*-pursuing policy on the other, eliminating in this manner all the centrifugal tendencies and securing, once and for all, the leading role of the Church. With the revolutionary demand to the “Greek Brothers” of Cyprus, on 17 October 1931, and the Larnaca rally he ‘blackmails’ the homogenisation of the *Cypriot* political space, declaring an uprising which, while the factors that made it possible were leading in a fundamental subversion of the terms of constitution of the *Cypriot* political space, the manner of its declaration and the prioritisation of one and single claim lead to a deep radicalisation of the existing terms of constitution of the political space”<sup>106</sup>.

Therefore, while the divergent and often parallel developments leading to the 1931 uprising were carrying the real possibility for the subversion of the Church domination of the political space, through the singular vision for *enosis*, or, of the singular vision of *enosis* through which the Church entrenched its domination of the political space, led, in fact, to the radicalisation of that demand. Prioritising, in this way, a vision which assumed the incompatibility of being Greek and not in Greece.

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<sup>105</sup> Following the uprising the colonial government withdrew the constitution, abolished the Legislative Council, placed the press under strict censorship, abolished municipal elections and political parties were made illegal.

<sup>106</sup> Anagnostopoulou, op. cit., p. 23.



## CONCLUSION

The process through which the Church established itself as the national leader of the Greek Cypriot community depended on a range of factors. The division of the population of Cyprus into two political entities, based on the religious differentiation between Christians and Muslims, did not in itself determine the fact that the secular forces which emerged challenged traditional authority through the radicalisation of a Greek ethnic identity. The establishment of Christians and Muslims as distinct political entities should not be seen as a factor preventing the majority population from defining a universal social subject but rather as conducive to the politicisation of a minority ethnic identity; a process which did not begin to make itself felt until the 1930s.

Therefore, that *enosis* was the political slogan through which secular forces challenged the political authority of the Church cannot be viewed as the inevitable outcome of colonial policies; nor can the fact that competing secular political forces were either absorbed or marginalized by the Church.

Secular nationalist forces challenged the Church authority in the early years of British rule. The Church responded to the loss of its political authority by readapting itself to the new social realities which had set a competing parameter in the definition of the identity of the *Cypriot* subject. Nationality became a competing parameter in that the political struggle that ensued was against the authority which had legitimised itself as a political authority on the basis of the religious identity of the social subject. The surrendering of the process of definition of the social subject to the Church was an outcome of struggle whose content needs to be more extensively investigated. The failure of the secular forces to head a struggle initiated by them while the content through which they asserted themselves against the Church was victorious leaves much to be explained. However, the ability of the Church to assert itself at the leadership of the process of the definition of the subject meant that religion and nationality became constituent categories in naming the *Cypriot* subject. The obstacles to integrating the

Turkish Cypriots within the parameters of the definition of the *Cypriot* subject asserted by the Greek Cypriot community were therefore final.

The questions that arise from a consideration of the process through which the Church engaged in a struggle aiming to secure its survival as the legitimate representative of the Greek Cypriot population leave much to be explained before its confirmation as a leader is reduced to the outcome of colonial policies. An argument of this kind would be in danger of establishing the British occupation of Cyprus and the colonial government's policies as the variable which determined the political choices made in defining the social subject. And it would at the same time subordinate the internal dynamics which determined the outcome of the nationalisation process of the Greek Cypriot community to the British occupation of the island. There is however no methodological basis upon which this can be sustained. It would be true to argue that Greek Cypriot nationalism developed in the context of and against British rule. But the process through which political visions and choices were made by Greek Cypriot aspiring leaders as well as the content of those choices have to be searched for within Greek Cypriot society itself. It is in that process that the ascendancy of the Church as the national authority of the Greek Cypriots ought to be located - in the internal dynamics and in those factors which affected, but did not create, those dynamics. Amongst those factors would be the policies of the colonial government. An understanding of the internal dynamics would necessitate an investigation of the social realities which deemed the symbolic capital inherited by the Church as relevant under conditions which were marking the transition from a pre-modern to modern forms of political and economic organisation.

## CHAPTER 3

### INTERETHNIC VIOLENCE: A PRODUCT OF BRITISH AND TURKISH INTERVENTION OR THE RECOGNITION OF OPPORTUNITY IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE IMPOSITION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF VISION AND DIVISION

#### INTRODUCTION.

In the previous chapter the argument that the ethnic differentiation of the two communities was a result of British policies which were said to have prevented the development of a Cypriot nationality was examined in some detail. It was contested that the nature of the relations between the two communities, as these developed in the period of Ottoman rule, cannot be deduced from a surface reading of either the phenomenon of intermarriage or of common revolts. The organisation of society into two religiously defined communities extended beyond an administrative categorisation and was reflected in a differential status. This had legal, economic, social and political implications which favoured the Muslim population and established the Christian community in an inferior position. Sections of the Muslim community felt inclined to defend that discriminatory order. Further, during the latter half of the nineteenth century nationalist ideas were beginning to make themselves evident amongst the Greek Cypriot community. Relying on the work of Kitromilides it was also argued that the development of Greek nationalism in Cyprus has to address the contribution made by the content of the Great Idea as a political programme of the newly formed Greek state in the absence of which the nationalisation process of the Greek Cypriots would, in all likelihood, have been very different. While political and social conditions during the period of Ottoman rule were not conducive to the free circulation of ideas the British occupation of the island provided an environment conducive to a nationalising project. The liberalising reforms that the British introduced established structures which asserted the equidistant relationship of the individual to the state. Political representation was

therefore no longer ascribed but subject to the authorisation of the people who were to be represented. In this new context the power to represent became subject to the power of competing factions within society to be persuasive. A consideration of the process through which the *Church* ascended to the position of political leadership reveals that the content of ideas in the struggle for political supremacy within the Greek Cypriot community was conducted through equally exclusivist categories: orthodoxy and Greekness. The end result was the nationalisation of the *Church* and through this its assumption of the political leadership.

Kitromilides' argument that colonial policies laid the infrastructure of future ethnic conflict by contributing to the preservation of the *Church's* authority was also addressed. British policies it was suggested were not contributing singularly towards the 'preservation' of the *Church's* authority. On the contrary, colonial policies created the mechanisms through which *Church* authority could be challenged and political space secularised. It was precisely this possibility that was utilised by the new political forces emerging within Greek Cypriot society which began to displace much of the political influence of the *Church*. This political challenge from nationalists led to the nationalisation of the *Church* and it was only after that process that it managed to reassert its political authority. Once the *Church* underwent nationalisation and, being the most important structure of organisation within Greek Cypriot society, it was in an advantageous position to capitalise on this new situation. The more the Legislative Council was proving an inadequate platform from which the Greek Cypriot nationalists could pursue their demand for union with Greece the more the *Church*, as an independent institution within the Greek Cypriot population, was reinforced as the central political institution in that community. However the political process through which the *Church* placed itself at the centre of Greek Cypriot politics cannot be reduced to colonial policies in any way other than first conceding that *enosis* was the constant and colonial policy the variable. Yet, it is then not possible to sustain an argument that colonial policies laid the infrastructure for future conflict given that *enosis* represented a demand which provoked the politicisation of a distinct Turkish Cypriot ethnic identity.



The assertion of a Turkish identity by the Muslim population of Cyprus and the subsequent politicisation of this identity remains an under-investigated phenomenon within Greek Cypriot historiography. However, there exists sufficient information to suggest that the direct or indirect appropriation of Turkish Cypriot history by Attalides, Kitromilides and Pollis has been overshadowed by a one sided concentration on the tripartite influences of colonial policies, the traditional elite that dominated the community in the earlier period of British rule and the role that Turkey came to play in Cypriot affairs by the late 1950s.

The incorporation and representation of the Turkish Cypriot community in the works of these authors is of utmost significance. Collectively, their work constituted the first attempt, after the war and the demographic restructuring of the island in 1974, to address the nature of the Cyprus problem as it historically evolved. It is admirable that in addressing the sensitive area of intercommunal relations these authors stressed a specific dimension, indicative of peaceful coexistence and positive cooperation between the two communities or their members. Peaceful coexistence has been traced from the period of Ottoman rule through to British rule, persisting during the period of independence until the two communities were progressively and forcefully separated on a regional basis.

It was also necessary for the official Greek Cypriot side to be able to stress the dimension of inter-communal relations. Given the vast number of refugees, the partition which supported the physical separation of the two communities, was challenged by every Greek Cypriot - almost a third of the Greek Cypriot population had been displaced. Further, the Cypriot state was prevented from exercising control over the northern part of the island which, constitutionally, was under its jurisdiction. These were effects of the Turkish invasion which the Greek Cypriots resisted. This resistance was displayed both through an understanding that the state's sovereignty and integrity as well as the citizen's human rights had been violated by an aggressive foreign army and through highly emotive representations of Cyprus feminised and raped, or, a visualisation of the very landscape shedding tears under the Turkish boot. Reversing the effects of partition would not only have required the return of the refugees to their homes, or, the power of the state to exercise its

jurisdiction over the northern region of the island but also the reintegration of the two communities.

While the Turkish army partitioned the island in violation of international law, the Cypriot government was to campaign in international forums for pressure to be exercised against Turkey to withdrawal its army from Cypriot territory. Yet both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership argued that the partition and the 'transfer' of population was a necessary outcome for the protection of the Turkish Cypriots who had, over many years, suffered abuse in the hands of the Greek Cypriot majority. It was within this context that the Greek Cypriots saw the absolute strategic necessity to address the bicomunal dimension of the problem. Further, if the Greek Cypriots were to convince others that there was no demonstrable historical reason for the two communities to be separated - that the partition of the island was related to the imposition of Turkish geo-strategic interests - it was a perceived necessity for the Turkish Cypriot community to be incorporated in the Greek Cypriot narrative; incorporated not as an aggressor but as another victim of Turkish aggression whose interests lay first and foremost in a united Cyprus. Consequently, resources were needed to construct a systematic narrative which attempted to incorporate a counter narrative to that of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

Consistent with this task the response of these authors established a framework for the understanding of the nature of historically evolved intercommunal relations which stressed the domain of peaceful coexistence and drew a distinction between the community's extremists who allied themselves to foreign interests as a means to achieve their secessionist plans on the one hand and ordinary Turkish Cypriots on the other. This framework offered hope for the future relations between the two communities. It assigned primary responsibility for the progressive segregation of the two communities to outside intervention, be it, by the British during colonial rule, Turkey from the 1950s onwards and the collusion of NATO interests in the context of the cold war with Turkish regional interests.

In many ways these were historical expositions which shared a continuity with themes that had already been constructed within Greek Cypriot society. Long before

these authors had produced their individual contributions a dominant trend within the Greek Cypriot mass media projected the optimistic interpretation that the Turkish Cypriot community was led by a group of extremists who dictated their community's conformity to separatist politics. Individual Turkish Cypriots, the press periodically commented, were resorting to their Greek compatriots to report crimes within their own community whilst fanatics within the minority community had an intimate relationship with the Turkish state, and had long awaiting plans to partition the island.

Turkey's direct or indirect involvement in the affairs of the island is dated to the 1950s, a period that coincided with the first serious violent confrontation between the two communities. It was a period that resulted in a limited movement of population leaving the overall demographic pattern unaffected. But it did result in the physical separation of the Greek and Turkish sectors of towns which though always distinct had never been physically separated. The question that is therefore implicitly addressed by these authors is how did the two communities arrive at the violence of the late 1950s which set the background for the deterioration of relations between the two communities. More specifically this was a question over Turkey's involvement in assisting the outbreak of violence between the two communities which had otherwise lived peacefully side by side.

However, in doing this there was a difficulty in representing and acknowledging Turkish Cypriot nationalism as a phenomenon which became possible through factors endemic to Cypriot society rather than merely as an outcome of the machinations of the colonial government and the involvement of Turkey. The development of Greek Cypriot nationalism during the period of British rule had not figured in this literature as a primary factor in initiating and sustaining the political separation of the two communities, though it was recognised as a factor that contributed towards the development of Turkish Cypriot nationalism. However, this recognition was confined to a descriptive level. Where analysis is offered it tends to shift to the manner in which British hostility towards an increasingly militant Greek Cypriot nationalism led to the use of the minority to combat the aspirations of the majority. Thus, Turkish Cypriot nationalism is approached through a framework

where British interests rather than Greek or Turkish Cypriot nationalism are prioritised; consciously and directly assisting the development of Turkish Cypriot nationalism, while the Turkish Cypriot leadership entertained both the colonial government's and Turkey's objectives.

What follows is a discussion of the areas of cooperation and division amongst the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders in the early years of the Legislative Council as a means to understanding the political relationship that developed between the two communities in the early years of British rule. It also seeks to open a discussion of the manner in which authors under consideration here have incorporated the Turkish Cypriot community within their historical narrative and how they have sought to explain the outbreak of open and protracted ethnic violence on the island.

#### THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL.

The Legislative Council, as this was introduced in 1882, consisted primarily of Cypriot elected members but also British appointed members. It possessed the power to enact the laws of Cyprus and to approve or reject the Government's annual budgetary estimates. Certain areas of policy had however been fixed. These included the controversial item of the 'tribute' annually paid to the Sultan, the salaries of the top government officials and the expenses of the courts. Elected members could initiate debates and pass resolutions on subjects of their interest but more significantly they did not have the right to initiate bills relating either to public revenue or to the amendment of taxation; a power reserved for the government. The High Commissioner also possessed the power to assent or withhold this in relation to any bill passed by the Council. The executive was also firmly in the hands of the British administrators, headed by the High Commissioner. The Queen possessed the right to legislate in exceptional cases through Orders-in-Council. Finally, given the status of the island as a British dependency, the Queen, on the recommendation of her government, also possessed the power to amend or suspend the constitution.<sup>1</sup>



Despite repeated protests by the representatives of the Muslim community that there ought be equal representation of the two communities on the Legislative Council,<sup>2</sup> the distribution of the elected seats were fixed at nine for the Christian and three for the Muslim communities, according to their proportion in the overall population. But there were also six ex-officio members appointed by the government including the governor who had the casting vote.<sup>3</sup>

The experience of the first twenty years of the Legislative Council was characterised by an impressive record of cooperation between the representatives of the two communities, primarily on financial issues. In practice it also revealed the limits posed by the diversity and the distinct numerical status of each of the two. It becomes difficult to separate between membership of a distinct religious group and the numerical status of that group. The representatives of the two communities cooperated on the basis of a shared interest in the improvement of conditions on the island. At the same time, they were divided over the means through which to achieve that. This disagreement was informed by a different understanding over the *means* through which more funds could be made available for the improvement of the material conditions of the island's population. But disagreement also extended to other equally substantial issues. Though both leaderships agreed that the island's population should possess greater powers in determining its affairs they were at the same time divided over the *type* and *extent* of powers necessary. The areas of cooperation between the two leaderships reveal the areas of shared concern between them whilst disagreements over the *manner* in which shared concerns could be addressed reveal the predominance of distinct communal interests.

In the early years of the Council, the Greek Cypriot perceived interests related to three primary issues. The first related to the colonial government's financial policy

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<sup>1</sup> Georgallides 1979 p. 42.

<sup>2</sup> J. Mc Henry 1987, p. 26

<sup>3</sup> The arithmetic calculations involved in this arrangement was one of the major discontent amongst the Greek Cypriot community and it represents one of the best examples of how the colonial government aimed to rule by subverting the wishes of the majority should it be seen as opportune; the representation of each of the two communities and the colonial authorities in the Legislative Council having been fixed in a manner that the Greek Cypriot votes were equal to the combined votes of the Turkish Cypriot and ex-officio members. Where the interests of the minority and the majority community were in conflict this arrangement left decision making in the hands of the governor.

including the fixed item on the annual budget of the tribute.<sup>4</sup> This was seen as an unjustifiable burden imposed on the taxpayer, whether Greek or Turkish, and limited the scope of improvements in the general standard of living. Consequently, resources were needed for other projects benefiting the taxpayer as such. The conclusion drawn was that the Tribute should be abolished. The second issue of concern to the Greek Cypriot members was the limited power Cypriots had to legislate. They wished, therefore, to extend the scope of the Legislative Council and the role of the elected representatives in this. Thirdly, they aimed to see senior administrative posts filled with Greek and Turkish Cypriots according to the population size of each community and the reform of the Administrative Councils so as to broaden their powers.

Turkish Cypriot members of the Council shared the concerns of the Greek Cypriot members in relation to the first issue. Their understanding of how this should be implemented was, however, quite different, in itself revealing a wider divergence in the understood interests of the leadership of each community. Similarly, during the first two decades from the establishment of the Council, they shared along with their Greek Cypriot colleagues an interest to broaden the powers of the Council on financial issues. However, Turkish Cypriots were unable to join forces with the Greek Cypriots in asserting demands relating to the representation of the Cypriots in senior administrative posts as well as expanding the powers of the Administrative Councils.

The tribute which posed the most controversial issue in the relation between the colonial government and the two communities encouraged cooperation between them. The extent to which the Tribute distorted the fiscal policies of Cyprus invited the collaboration of the two communities in demanding either relief from the Tribute or financial assistance from the British treasury. The government resisted those calls.

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<sup>4</sup> Cyprus was ceded to Britain under the Anglo-Turkish Convention. Under the same convention Britain undertook to pay the Porte an annual sum of £93,000, known as the Tribute. This sum was derived from the national revenue of Cyprus. The population of Cyprus at the time was 180,000 while its total revenue was £140,000. It later became known that this sum of money went towards payments for the interest of a loan which Turkey undertook in 1855 under guarantees by Britain and France but had ceased to pay for a number of years before 1878. The sum of the Tribute was reduced to £50,000

Consequently, this brought the respective leadership together in criticism which spurred joint action against the Government's management of public finances.

#### The Limits of Cooperation in the Legislative Council - the Tribute.

In 1887 a Greek Cypriot member of the Council submitted a resolution stating that since the population of Cyprus was not a contracting party to the agreement between Britain and the Sultan the obligation of paying the Tribute should not fall on the population of Cyprus but on the British Treasury. The occupation of the island by Britain, it was argued, served the interests of Britain alone. Beyond this, the Tribute also exhausted the possibilities of investing for infrastructural development. This resolution was passed with the support of all the elected members of the Council with the exception of one Turkish member who voted, along with the official members of the Council, against. During the debate an official member of the Council explained that the resolution should not be passed since the island continued to be part of the Ottoman Empire and therefore Turkey should continue to derive from it the benefits it did in the past. Still, in 1892, both elected and official members voted in support of a resolution submitted by a Greek member of the Council which expressed the hope that Britain would pay for the tribute so as to invest in development and abolish some of the taxes burdening the population. The Government nevertheless still failed to act on these resolutions. In the address of the Council to the High Commissioner on March 19 1897, the elected members denounced the imposition of payment of the tribute on the island's population. Yet, by 1899 a divergence of understood interests developed between the Greek and Turkish members of the Council.

At this point disagreements between the Greek and Turkish members of the Council resulted in a compromise over the manner in which the whole question of the Tribute would be raised in the Council's address to the High Commissioner's opening speech. What the Greek members had in mind was a formulation of objections to the Tribute similar to that made in the past. Yet the Muslim members

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in 1907 but without a corresponding decrease in taxation and was finally abolished in 1927. Alastos 1974 pp. 312-318.

now insisted that meeting the obligation of the Tribute was the responsibility of the Cypriots to the 'lawful master of the island', the Sultan, but, that the British treasury should increase the grant-in-aid for Cyprus. Some months later the Secretary of State for the colonies, J. Chamberlain, told the House of Commons that the grant-in-aid to Cyprus would not be increased and that if there was an amortisation of the 1855 loan there would be a reduction in the Treasury's grant-in-aid to Cyprus. It was in response to the persistence of this position that the Greek and Turkish members, in their May 1902 address to the High Commissioner's opening speech, jointly reverted to a statement that Britain 'should herself pay the heavy obligations undertaken by her in furtherance of her aims in the East'.<sup>5</sup>

Interestingly, only a month later, in June 1902, the divergence in the positions that the Greek and Turkish members had adopted in 1899 re-emerged. Greek members of the Council argued that since Cyprus had not undertaken to pay anything it was not obligated to make any payment. A Turkish member responded that the arguments developed by the Greek members aimed to sever the links between the Porte in the interest of *enosis*.<sup>6</sup> It should be borne in mind that much of this Turkish response appears to have been provoked by the reference to *enosis* made by the Greek speaker while developing his thesis on the Tribute.<sup>7</sup> It is also important to note that though activity within the Greek Cypriot community was exhibiting increasing levels of social mobilisation around the theme of *enosis*, this was in fact the first reference to *enosis* within the Legislative Council. It should also be remembered that in 1901 the nationalists scored an outright victory when all nine Greek candidates to the Council were drawn from the nationalist faction. The consolidation of this divergence in positions was expressed in a memorandum submitted to Winston Churchill on his

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<sup>5</sup> Cited in Georgallides op. cit., p.68.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Georgallides mentions on page 68 of his book that a Greek member of the Council, Gheorgios Chacallis, developed his thesis on the Tribute during the 18 June 1902 session of the Council. On page 72 he observes that Chacallis made reference to *enosis* on the 18 June 1902 meeting. This information Georgallides derived from the Legislative Council minutes Vol. XIV. The page numbers (194-202) of this volume referring to Chacallis' thesis on the Tribute coincide with the page numbers (192-202) where his reference to *enosis* is to be found. These preceded the speech of the Turkish Cypriot member of the council who objected to a statement that the Tribute was the responsibility of Britain and not Cyprus. Reference to the speech of the Turkish Cypriot member of the Council is to be found in the same volume (pp.207-217) immediately after Chacallis' speech.

visit to the island in 1907 by the Turkish Cypriot members of the Council who argued, in relation to the tribute, that:

As discontinuance or reduction of the Tribute of £92,000 would be an infringement of the provisions of the treaty, we absolutely repudiate this also. The illustrious British Government having just granted us in kindness an annual sum of £50,000 it is evident that a kindly assistance for the continuation and increase of that amount will be accepted and welcomed with great satisfaction.<sup>8</sup>

It is important to understand the shift witnessed in the Turkish Cypriot position against the wider background of developments on the island and more particularly within the Greek Cypriot community, it is to this that I now turn.

### Nationalising Drive.

In 1896, as has been previously observed, the Greek Cypriot community elected four 'national' candidates to the Council. By 1901 all nine Greek members of the Council were drawn from the nationalist faction. Further, the 1900 dispute over the election of a new archbishop witnessed the rivalry between traditional authority and the nationalists. It was a dispute which was to involve society at large with the mass media, social clubs, local churches, and schools being ultimately drawn upon. Further the Greco-Turkish hostilities in the late 1890s also had their toll on inter-communal relations in Cyprus.

In 1895 there were island wide Greek Cypriot demonstrations sparked by an uncertainty over the future status of the island. These were partly fuelled by reports of the ill treatment of Greeks in Crete by the local Ottoman authorities which combined with Britain's uncertainty over the value of the island for its own interests, and a statement in the House of Commons by the Chancellor of the Exchequer suggesting that if Britain withdrew from Cyprus the island would be returned to Turkey. All these contributed to the mobilisation of large sections of the Greek Cypriot population in the form of demonstrations under the Greek flag stressing that any acceptable change in the future status of the island would be union

with Greece<sup>9</sup>. During the same week, and under the leadership of the Mufti, a Turkish Cypriot delegation complained to the High Commissioner and the Executive Council that the ‘Christians had adopted a menacing attitude and that ill feeling had spread to women and boys’.<sup>10</sup> Within the year, a solidarity committee was formed by Greek Cypriots in response to the Cretan insurrection against the Ottoman government. There was no unanimity over the means through which solidarity would be expressed but the Cyprus government became aware of the fact that 75 young volunteers had been recruited in Nicosia.<sup>11</sup>

The outbreak of war between Greece and Turkey in March 1897 had an immediate and wide impact. More than 1,000 volunteers for the Greek army were drawn from all towns and some villages. Boatmen transported the volunteers without charge and town population gathered at the harbour to wish them farewell. Greek Cypriot newspapers in the meantime, published patriotic articles and collections were made for the Greek effort. This fervour was reflected in popular culture; four patriotic ballads on the theme of the ‘The Greco-Turkish War’ were published and widely circulated.<sup>12</sup> Consequently, the effect of the war generated a nationalist sentiment which was publicly displayed. It also led to inter-communal tension with various incidents having been reported in the Nicosia and Famagusta regions involving violence or abuse.

These events are likely to have had an important impact on the Muslim community which, at the turn of the century, witnessed the increasing mobilisation of the Christian community for the cause of union with Greece. This mobilisation was motivated by a developing sense of national identity and was displayed by the occasion of events such the political struggle over the election of the archbishop and the Greco-Turkish war. This was having the consequential effect of politicising the cultural markers of ethnic diversity as the experience of the late 1890s and early 1900s within the Legislative Council suggests. Therefore, despite the fact that in

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<sup>8</sup> Cited in Georgallides *op.cit.*, p. 68

<sup>9</sup> Katsiaounis, *op.cit.*, p. 209.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 210.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 210-11.

1899 the Turkish Cypriot leadership withdrew its support from what was intended to be a joint deputation to submit a memorandum to Queen Victoria, on account that the memorandum went a step beyond a demand for greater powers to be given to the Legislative Council by also raising the issue of the Tribute; they subsequently cooperated with their Greek colleagues on demanding that Cyprus is relieved of this financial burden.<sup>13</sup> By 1902, the division between the two communities over the tribute became definitive. It should be noted that this did not demolish opportunities for cooperation on issues relating to the government's financial policy, maladministration of the island or any other issue that did not compromise the understood interests of one or the other side. Hence, at the end of June 1902, the elected members of the Council cooperated to erase from the Appropriations the sum accruing to the salary of the British Chief Inspector of Schools who had been newly appointed by the government despite demands by the leaders of the two communities that a Greek and a Turk should be appointed.<sup>14</sup> A year later the elected members signed a petition demanding a formal investigation of the causes of the maladministration the island was suffering.<sup>15</sup> Other incidents of cooperation prompted by the government's fiscal policy were also recorded in the following years up to 1911.<sup>16</sup>

The issue of the tribute reveals an ambiguous position on the part of the Muslim leaders which has to be understood in light of events developing in Cyprus at the time. On several occasions the Turkish Cypriot leaders cooperated with their Greek colleagues in demanding that Britain, as the contracting party, assume the responsibility for its payment. On other occasions they appeared to be pulled in the opposite direction declaring that the Tribute is the responsibility of the population of Cyprus to 'the rightful master of the island'. Thus, asserting, on the one hand, the interests of the population of Cyprus at large and, on the other, the specific interests of the Turkish Cypriots against those of the Greek Cypriots. Though their withdrawal from the 1889 deputation suggests that their understood interests or

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 213. Elsewhere Katsiaounis explains that the ballad was the 'dominant form of literature meant for the illiterate or semi-illiterate' (p. 94).

<sup>13</sup> Georgallides op. cit., p. 69.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p. 73.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

loyalties as Muslims already informed their actions, their subsequent cooperation with the Greek Cypriot leadership may indicate that those interests were negotiable. But, as their 1899 position signalled, and its subsequent consolidation from 1902 onwards only served to confirm, they could not be negotiable in the context of a wider demand for the union of the island with Greece.

The idea often proposed by Greek Cypriot authors, that the British colonial government was guided by a divide and rule policy, and consequently recruited the Turkish Cypriot leaders to its side,<sup>17</sup> fails to consider the conduct of the elected members in the Council in the twenty years after its establishment or to reflect on the extent to which the development of a nationalist movement may have intimidated the Muslim population of the island. Most importantly, this failure has come to overshadow the fact that the Turkish Cypriot leadership may have possessed an interest in improving local material and social conditions. An equally important theme that is overshadowed by this sweeping approach is the centrality of the minority status of the Turkish Cypriot community.

#### The Limits of Cooperation in the Legislative Council - Political Powers.

It would be expected that the increasing mobilisation of the majority and its alienating effect on the Muslim population would have the very likely effect of impressing upon the leadership of the minority the need to utilise any means available which could compete against the numerical superiority and increasing mobilisation of the majority. The issue which most clearly demonstrates the relevance of the differential numerical status of each group in the early years of British rule, is the demand that developed amongst members of the Legislative Council for broadening the constitutional and administrative powers of the population of Cyprus. While during the first twenty years the issue of union with Greece was kept outside the workings of the Council the two communities made joint demands to increase the powers of the Council.

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid., pp. 74-75; K. Grekos 1982 p. 24.

<sup>17</sup> Attalides 1979 p. 41.



Public meetings sparked by a severe drought and the public discontent over this state of affairs, were held in some towns in 1887-8. In Limassol a meeting attended by members of both communities passed a resolution calling for the broadening of the powers of the Legislative Council so that their proposals could become effectively implemented. In Nicosia the Mufti made a speech before a public meeting, stating that since the British administration was established there had been only an imposition of taxes and a deterioration of local trade.<sup>18</sup> It was a series of public meetings during this period that led to the decision to send a deputation to London, from which the Muslim members were to withdraw in 1889. This withdrawal from the deputation was a consequence of the fact that their request that reference to the tribute is omitted from the set of demands that were to be advanced, was rejected by their Greek counterparts. Nevertheless they were still in agreement with the demands for broadening the powers of the elected members of the Council on financial issues.

A second deputation in 1895, three months after Greek Cypriot demonstrators protested at the prospect of Cyprus being returned to the Ottoman Empire and stressing instead that only union with Greece would be an acceptable change in status, failed to solicit the support of any of the Turkish Cypriot members of the Council who expressed their disagreement with the inclusion of reference to *enosis* in the memorandum. Yet disagreement extended beyond the issue of *enosis* and became evident in a discussion in the Council in 1897. While the Turkish Cypriots delegates were willing to support a demand for broadening the powers of the elected members of the Council on financial issues they were in disagreement with the demand for greater administrative powers on other issues as well as to the promotion of Cypriots to higher administrative positions.<sup>19</sup> A Turkish Cypriot delegate told the Council in March 1897:

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<sup>18</sup> Georgaliides op. cit., p. 70. Grekos refers to a public meeting in Nicosia in January 1888 attended by 10,000 people (op. cit., p.22.).

<sup>19</sup> For example, the following demands included in the Greek Cypriot memorandum of 1895 were not included in the insertions made by the Greek and Turkish members in the 1897 Council's address to the High Commissioner's opening speech: a) reforming and granting the Administrative Councils substantive powers and the appointment on these of Greek and Turkish Cypriots according to proportional representation; b) promotion of Cypriots to senior police posts; c) appointment of Cypriots as presidents of district courts; promotion of Cypriots to higher administrative positions. See Georgallides op. cit., pp. 70-1.

that if the higher posts were thrown open to natives, jealousy and ill-feeling between the two races, and between individuals of the same community would be the result.<sup>20</sup>

In 1897 the elected members were able to agree on a demand to extend the right to 'initiate or direct the submission of votes, resolutions and laws for the appropriation of any part of the public revenue' to the elected members of the Council. This was repeated in May 1902. However, in the same memorandum submitted to Churchill upon his visit to the island in 1907 the Turkish members of the Council stated:

Neither do we want autonomy. We particularly desire that the conduct of public affairs should in any case be presided over by impartial and just Englishmen. The granting of more extensive powers to the Legislative Council being also dangerous for the future, the preservation of the *status quo* is under all circumstances to be preferred.<sup>21</sup>

This was the position that was to guide the Muslim members of the Council from there on. The period between 1904 and 1907 coincided with a change of Turkish representatives in the Legislative Council. It would be simplistic to attribute the stance of the Turkish leadership to the change of personalities in the Legislative Council though this cannot be discounted as a relevant factor. The increasing popularisation and radicalisation of the demand for *enosis* began to become expressed through diverse channels from 1895 onwards. By June 1902 the Legislative Council became one such channel. The reaction of the Turkish members was to introduce alternative resolutions stating that if the British were to withdraw from the island the latter should be returned to Turkey. As was, for example, a resolution which was ratified in 1903 with the support of the official members of the Council. Beyond this, however, the Turkish members also refused to support resolutions or memoranda which demanded the appointment of Cypriots in senior administrative posts according to the principle of proportional representation. But they were willing to support demands for broadening the powers of the elected members of the Legislative Council over financial issues. Concern over the effects of tax burdens upon the island's population, or the minimal spending that the government apportioned towards development, was shared by Greek and Turkish

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<sup>20</sup> Cited in Georgallides op. cit., p. 71.

members alike. Increasing the powers of the Legislative Council over these central issues could not upset the balance of power between the two communities. Rather it would give them the opportunity to cooperate in making effective their joint demands over the improvement of conditions on the island.

Cooperation was not forthcoming when the Greek members demanded greater powers to be given to other bodies, such as the administrative councils, where the two communities were proportionally represented and though including ex-officio members their overall composition did not provide the same safeguards that the composition of the Legislative Council did. Therefore, while on the one hand, the Turkish Cypriot leadership was willing to cooperate for the improvement of the economic conditions it was not prepared to upset the status quo by joining the Greek members in making demands which would have granted greater powers to the Greek Cypriots. It is in this shift of positions and the persistent refusal of the Turkish Cypriots to cooperate around issues that would have the effect of upsetting the balance of power between the two communities that the minority status of the Turkish community cannot be overlooked.

The transition from Ottoman to British rule was accompanied by fundamental changes which had an important impact on both communities. The British occupation was greeted with much optimism by the Orthodox community. While a number of Greek Cypriot authors may, in retrospect, consider that proportional representation through separate electoral lists was a disservice to the Cypriot population as it amounted to the separation of the population into two distinct political entities no real consideration is given to the effect of that transition on the Turkish Cypriot community and how that may have affected their perceptions. The Turkish Cypriots, as one writer observes, were

‘[t]he most obvious losers in this process of rationalisation of the judiciary were the Turks, who protested against every one of Britain’s liberalising reforms’.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Cited in Georgallides *op. cit.*, p. 76.

<sup>22</sup> Katsiaounis *op. cit.*, pp. 66-7; see also P. Loizos 1972.

The loss of the privileged legal status that the Muslim community possessed under Ottoman rule did bring to the surface the numerical inequality of the two populations. The principle of individual rights introduced through the new structures and institutions and the reform of old ones meant that the Turkish Cypriots became a numerical minority even if the principle of proportional representation together with the composition of the Legislative Council and the limited powers of the administrative councils offered some protection against becoming dominated by a previously inferior majority. The increasing nationalist activity within the majority population had its impact as national sentiments and demands became displayed, embracing diverse sections of the Greek Cypriot population. The political development of the Turkish Cypriot community in the early years of British rule appears to have been conditioned by two main factors. Firstly, the interest to improve the conditions of the population, and secondly the intimidation suffered both by the demand of the Greek population for union with Greece and the consequent fear of domination by the Greeks. It countered the demand for union with Greece by demanding the return of the island to Turkey should the British depart; and it dealt with its fear of domination by the majority by standing in opposition to demands for greater powers to be given to the Cypriots. Means were necessary for the minority to make this opposition effective, or, put differently, means were necessary to increase the strength of the numerical minority against the natural advantage of the numerical superiority of the Greeks. It was therefore predisposed to take advantage of the British position which resisted both conceding to the Greek demand for union with Greece as well as the introduction of political reforms.

THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY DURING BRITISH RULE: GREEK CYPRIOT  
APPROPRIATIONS OF THE PAST - DEFINING THE *OTHER* SOCIAL  
SUBJECT.

The First Years of British Rule.

With the coming of British rule, the relationship of the two groups to the colonial government developed in very different directions. This inevitably influenced the relations of the two ethnic groups to each other. The experience of the Turkish Cypriots can be described as downward group mobility in relation to the Greeks. The political representatives of the Muslims were Islamic religious leaders... They attempted to maintain a privileged administrative and political position through their relation to the colonial power.<sup>23</sup>

The experience of downward mobility by the Muslim community is clearly a central issue which affected the relationship of the community to the colonial government. But the factors that contributed to this predicament were diverse. The increasing radicalisation of the demand for *enosis* was another central factor. Reducing the relationship that developed between the Muslim community and the colonial government to the drive of the Muslim leaders to maintain their status ignores the developing relationship between the leadership of the two communities. Where the relevance of the campaign for union with Greece is introduced, it is presented from a particular perspective which fails to address the mutually reinforcing relationship between the demand for *enosis* and the options which were presented to the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Attalides:

The erosion of this position also resulted in emigration and opposition to the Greek *enosis* campaign. The protests against *enosis* were on the basis of Islamic loyalty and unwillingness to be incorporated in a Christian State.<sup>24</sup>

It is demonstrably true that the elected members of the Council did exhibit an Islamic loyalty and a resistance to be incorporated in a Christian state. The best practical example where both of these elements appeared simultaneously was the demand, articulated in 1912, that if Britain was to withdraw from Cyprus ownership should pass to Egypt. This was a claim made against the backdrop of a crumbling Ottoman state, it proceeded the process of state building in Turkey and was made in light of increasing optimism on the part of the Greeks of an imminent Union with Greece.<sup>25</sup> However, the assertion that the erosion of the position of the Turkish Cypriot community led to opposition being directed towards *enosis* needs

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<sup>23</sup> Attalides op. cit., p. 40.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Georgallides op. cit., p. 76.

clarification. The relationship between the two has to be mediated through the understood threat the Muslim community may have felt by the increasing dynamism with which the demand for *enosis* was asserted. It is important to grasp this because the threat of *enosis*, by being perceived as such, also served to define the Turkish Cypriot community which, as Attalides argues, ‘contrary to what some Greek Cypriot writers imply, [Turkish Cypriots] did have a consciousness distinct from and opposed to Greek nationalism’.<sup>26</sup>

Though there is no attendant discussion as to how this distinct consciousness may have informed action, it nevertheless informed opposition to *enosis*. That opposition, no doubt also served to press the relevance of the numerical inequality of the two communities. *Enosis* was demanded by the numerically dominant Greek Cypriot community. This had the effect of practically demonstrating to the Turkish Cypriot community the vulnerability of being a minority. Consequently, opposition to *enosis* was not only an effect of the downward mobility experienced by the Turkish Cypriot community but also reinforced the community’s numerical status as politically relevant. Further, the understood vulnerability of being a minority made opposition to *enosis* an issue which also determined the minority community’s relationship to the colonial government. This in turn, influenced the relationship of the two communities to each other. Hence it is possible to conclude that the relationship of the two communities should not be understood as an effect of the asymmetrical relationship that the two communities developed with the colonial power alone but that the opposite also holds true. The two communities developed an asymmetrical relationship with the colonial government because the opportunities of marking out a shared political space began to incrementally close down. The statement that the Muslim leaders attempted to maintain a privileged position through their relation to the colonial government has to be placed within the context of the minority status of the Turkish Cypriot community since this was made politically relevant. These clarifications are important in that it becomes difficult to understand the

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<sup>26</sup> Attalides op. cit., p. 40. Attalides may have been referring to Pollis who makes the sweeping statement that: “There is little evidence that the [Greek Cypriot nationalist] movement as such antagonised the ‘Turkish’ Cypriots. In the early twentieth century, given the absence of their own national identity, it appeared that the Muslims might have been absorbed into the ‘Greek’ Cypriot nationalist movement.” Pollis op. cit., p. 58.

development of the Turkish Cypriot community otherwise. As much as it may be possible to examine the political development of the majority irrespective of the minority it is not possible to understand the development of the Turkish Cypriot community in abstraction of its relationship to the majority. At its simplest, the choices made by the minority were also affected by its understanding of the actions of the majority.

Unlike Attalides, Kitromilides acknowledges that in the 1880s and 1890s there existed general cooperation between the leaders of the two communities and states that the insistence for union with Greece served to undermine the conditions under which cooperation could proceed. However, he adds,

The important fact, in any case, is that the interethnic disagreement over the national status of the island remained academic, was confined to the elite level, and was never strained enough to cross the threshold of violent ethnic conflict.<sup>27</sup>

But there is a yawning gap in this sentence. He states that interethnic disagreement over the 'national status of the island' was confined to the elite level and elaborates that it was never strained enough to provoke violence. Yet the absence of violence cannot be assumed as an indicator of the extent of interethnic disagreement, tension and political differentiation. What exactly is meant by 'academic' is therefore in need of elaboration. He himself recognises that when he argues that:

It can be suggested, therefore, that although the dynamic of ethnic differentiation was in the making throughout the period up to the Second World War, this was still a period characterised by the absence of ethnic conflict...<sup>28</sup>

However, he avoids engaging with the significance of the political content of this dynamic. Instead he goes on to define the field of education and the differential economic development of the two communities as the basis of the social and cultural

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<sup>27</sup> Kitromilides, 1977 p. 43

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., p. 43.

change which ‘provided the internal dynamic’ to ethnic differentiation.<sup>29</sup> He adds, the ‘effective context for the process was set up by British colonial policy’.<sup>30</sup>

As it has been argued in the previous chapter, Kitromilides here refers to a politicisation of ‘traditional corporatist structures’ as an outcome of the colonial policy which divided the population into political units. Yet elsewhere he also stressed that the development of Greek nationalism in Cyprus has to be viewed in a comparative context set by unredeemed ‘Hellenic’ lands.<sup>31</sup> This is important because combined with the fact that the Greek Cypriots constituted approximately 75% of the population may suggest that the differentiation of the population into two political units may not have been the most crucial factor informing ethnic differentiation. By defining their political space in terms emerging through a process of politicisation of ethnicity Greek Cypriots were also marking a political distinction between the majority and the minority. Consequently, the division of the population into two distinct political units acquired a substantive meaning because of the diverse political development of the two communities once the process of homogenisation of the Greek Cypriot community was mediated by an increasingly radicalised demand for *enosis*.

British administration established, in other words, the structures but not the political content. That content was largely determined, as the experience of the first twenty years of the Legislative Council reveals, by the effect that a distinct political development of one of the communities was having on the relations between the two communities.

#### Late British Rule - ‘Divide and Rule’ and Intercommunal Violence.

Having given a brief outline of what may be referred to as the stages that Turkish Cypriot nationalism went through in its development, Attalides argues that,

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid., pp. 43-45.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 45.

<sup>31</sup> Kitromilides, 1990.



[r]eal intercommunal bitterness, however, only followed the escalation of violence and the involvement of Turkey in the conflict. The British government contributed considerably to both in the years between 1955 and 1958.<sup>32</sup>

He proceeds to outline various examples which demonstrate how British policy which solicited the support of Turkey and subsequently allowed the assistance offered to Turkish Cypriots by Turkey in organising to confront the Greek Cypriot movement, led to the outbreak of violence.

Like Attalides, Pollis has also identified a divide and rule policy in provoking ethnic violence at a moment which signalled a real threat to the maintenance of British rule. But she goes a step further in arguing that a Turkish identity was a phenomenon which suddenly sprang in the 1950s:

The systematic British policies engendering divisiveness in Cypriot society were reinforced by the British reaction to the EOKA movement. The British began to employ in the police force Turkish Cypriots exclusively, thus making the Turkish the target of terrorist activities and dependent on the British for protection. It was during this period that the newly emergent secular leadership of the 'Turkish' community acquired a Turkish identity; an identity further reinforced once Great Britain brought Turkey into the negotiations for independence in 1955 as an interested party... The first inter-ethnic conflict between Greeks and Turks took place in 1957 when Volkan was organised by Turkey and directed to combat the EOKA *enosis* movement. It is of significance that prior to these events there had not been a history of ethnic conflict.<sup>33</sup>

This exposition offered by Pollis, represents an extreme version of a more general trend in the interpretation of the emergence and development of Turkish Cypriot nationalism. She ultimately treats Turkish Cypriot nationalism as a movement devoid of a popular ideological and political content which might be understood by examining the development of this community. The story of the Turkish Cypriot community during British rule begins, in her account, in the early part of the century when it allegedly appeared as if the Turkish Cypriots had the potential to be absorbed by the Greek Cypriot nationalist movement. It ends with the sudden

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<sup>32</sup> Attalides op. cit., p. 47.

<sup>33</sup> Pollis op. cit., p. 58.

emergence of Turkish Cypriot nationalism in the late 1950s. This coincided, she asserts, with the application of divisive colonial policies and the direction of the underground organisation, Volkan, by Turkey. The significance of this being that violence between the two communities erupted, for the first time, only once these factors were put at play. Though neither colonial policies nor Turkish involvement in assisting the organisation of the Turkish Cypriot community in confronting the threat of the Greek Cypriot *enosis* struggle during the period should be underestimated, it is that which is missing from her account that permits her to proceed to describe the Turkish Cypriot community as in effect a community without a subject. As one which effectively comes into being at the behest of an external agent - Turkey.

In examining the consequences of previous attempt to understand these developments it is important to pay attention to the categories through which it is achieved. For example, Kitromilides describes the evolving political outlook of the Turkish Cypriot political elite through the names given to their political organisations. Cyprus Turkish Minority's organisation in 1943, Cyprus National Turkish Party in 1945 and Cyprus is Turkish Party in 1955. From that point on, he argues,

with British encouragement initially and systematic direction from mainland Turkey throughout, a group of organised extremists (known as Volkan and later TMT) managed to bring the entire Turkish Cypriot community under its firm grip and to impose a monolithic singleness in promoting the objective of ethnic separation and eventual partition<sup>34</sup>

The process through which the Turkish Cypriot community came to support the objective of national separation is not addressed. However, the 'mechanisms of the precipitation' of ethnic violence are alluded to and give some indication as to the manner in which the Turkish Cypriot community figured, according to his account, in the events that were unfolding. Four mechanisms are defined. Firstly, through colonial policy to recruit Turkish Cypriots into the police force during the EOKA struggle. Secondly, the formation of underground organisations aiming to promote

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<sup>34</sup> Kitromilides 1977 p. 48.

mainland Turkish plans. Thirdly, the support of Greece and Turkey for the respective communities on the island. Finally, the initial toleration by the colonial government of the Turkish governments' efforts to incite ethnic rioting. All these facts are indisputable in their effect. However, there is the conspicuous absence of the EOKA struggle which was the culmination of the demand for an end to British rule and the integration of the island with Greece. And although he refers to Turkish mainland support for the Turkish Cypriot community in Cyprus this community remains undefined. He concludes on this period by stating that,

[T]he long process of ethnic differentiation had finally been exacerbated enough by external factors and influences that it plunged Cyprus into ethnic conflict.<sup>35</sup>

Allowing him to conclude that:

the real conclusion of this analysis of the ethnic conflict in Cyprus should be a human protest over the lost opportunities and the injustices that the good-hearted people Cyprus have had to endure for no wrong doing of their own.<sup>36</sup>

The fundamental problem with the way in which the assertion of a 'divide and rule' policy has been employed is that despite the fact that it has been mobilised as part of a wider attempt seeking to understand the decisive factors which explain the development of distinct nationalisms culminating in inter-communal violence, it is ultimately treated as the central driving force which deems the history of the island as a history of foreign intervention. This is not to argue that there are no qualitative differences between Pollis' account which fails to offer any acknowledgement of a Turkish Cypriot movement prior to the 1950s and Attalides and Kitromilides who make suggestive comments that the *enosis* movement intimidated the Turkish Cypriots throughout the period of British rule. However, these differences dissolve once the issue of ethnic violence is raised. Both Kitromilides and Attalides acknowledge that the leadership of the two communities was lacking political

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. 60.

tolerance which could accommodate each other.<sup>37</sup> Nevertheless, they fail to consider how the Greek Cypriot nationalist movement constituted an essential element in the transformation of the Turkish Cypriot nationalism which opposed *enosis* and supported the colonial status quo to a secessionist movement with the positive demand of partition and union with Turkey.

Yet, that transformation became possible with the recognition that the status quo was fragile. Therefore, opposition to an increasingly militant *enosis* movement was itself leading to an increasing politicisation of the Turkish Cypriot community. While the Turkish Cypriots were initially content with proposing the demand for the maintenance of the status quo, the intensity of the struggle for *enosis* dictated the necessity for the assertion of a competing, positively defined, demand. At the same time, the unfolding politicisation emerging out of opposition to *enosis* had the effect of further defining the community as a community which could also be freed from colonial rule and to simultaneously determine the future of the island. Given this, opposition to an increasingly assertive demand for *enosis* had the effect of politicising its opponents to the extent of creating a conducive environment through which they could assert their own competing demand over the island's future status.

The general assertion that the roles of Turkey and Britain were responsible for the outbreak of violence between the two communities in Cyprus is widespread in both Greek Cypriot historiography and society at large. Indeed an investigation of the period during which serious and decisive violence broke out could not fail to place both Britain and Turkey as parties which directly contributed to the explosion of violence. Numerous examples such as those cited by Pollis contributed significantly towards the outbreak of inter-communal violence and involved either a British initiative or tolerance of a Turkish initiative. They contributed towards the creation of a situation where the minority recognised violence as a real possibility in that the involvement of those parties acted as a counterweight to the consequences of being a minority. Violence became an option in the sense that the estimated cost to be incurred diminished through the presence of parties able to protect it against the natural superiority of the numerical majority. However, the option of violence,

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<sup>37</sup> Kitromilides 1979 p. 167-170.

whether actual or desired, was born out of the increasing tension created by the incompatibility between communal aspirations which were resistant to revision let alone compromise. Turkish Cypriot nationalism essentialised the link between itself and an external state forty miles away. But this was essentialised precisely because it was, in the first place, possible to evoke it. There was, in other words, an anticipated link between the Turkish state born out of the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and the minority whose origins in Cyprus was the result of the Ottoman occupation of Cyprus. Therefore, the development of politics of identification with Turkey by the minority in Cyprus, was made possible both because a link between the two could be evoked and because the parties that could evoke this link as politically relevant identified their interests in this. The issue of concern here, is the process through which the Turkish Cypriot community identified its interests in a demand for the partition of Cyprus and the union of a Turkish Cypriot region, which could only be established by a substantial movement of population, with Turkey. Turkey effectively intervened by assisting in the organisation of this community against Greek Cypriot nationalism, but the possibilities for this were created by Turkish Cypriot opposition to union with Greece.<sup>38</sup> The willingness to use Turkish assistance in making Turkish Cypriot demands audible was a willingness born out of the community itself.

The relationship of the community at large with the underground organisation Volkan at the time cannot be easily ascertained. While no detailed information exists it remains unknown how the community related to the tactics and objectives of the organisation.<sup>39</sup> Neither can the relationship of various sections within the

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<sup>38</sup> As argued earlier in this chapter this process began in the early days of British rule and more particularly as the modernising reforms were being put in place. Beyond the sources utilised to support this point, George Hill's (1952) history of Cyprus also serves to reinforce this argument. He points out, for example, that in 1911 'the Moslems were so moved by a statement that if Cyprus were evacuated by Britain the Greeks would not allow it to be occupied by any other Power than Greece, that over 3000 of them met at Nicosia on 21 September and passed a resolution of protest' (p.518). In 1919 a more radical response was forthcoming: 'The uneasiness caused among the Moslems by the Greek Deputation's activities led to the formation of a small Party advocating the return of the island to Turkey .... The leaders of the party .... invented a rumour of an intended attack on the Moslems by the Greek Christians in Easter week' (p.529).

<sup>39</sup> There exists very little written in English or in Greek on the internal situation of the Turkish Cypriot community at the time. Greek Cypriot accounts of the relationship between the underground organisation of TMT (which replaced Volkan in 1958) and the Turkish Cypriot community emphasise a relationship of terror substantiating the argument through examples referring to incidences in 1962,

community to the demand for union with Turkey be clearly ascertained. The demand for union with Turkey presupposed that the Turkish Cypriots could unite with Turkey if the island was partitioned into two ethnically distinct regions; thus with the necessary transfer of populations. Whether a demand that arose for the first time in 1957 appealed to the imagination of the masses and mobilised immediate popular support remains beyond answer. However, the elected leadership of that community promoted that demand. Further, the same leadership also campaigned for Turkish assistance long before Turkey was to become an active party in the determination of the future status of the island. These are issues which need to be researched before an informed account of the nationalisation process of the Turkish Cypriot community, and its relation to the course of action pursued by the leadership, can be fully understood. At the same time, given the absence of sufficient evidence, it is difficult to argue that the choices made by the leaders of this community were choices made by 'extremists'. Or, that the secret organisations formed within the Turkish Cypriot community during this period were viewed as extremist by the community itself. Though the term may be used in order to define an organisation according to its tactics, it is nevertheless the case that an organisation is not characterised by its tactics alone but also by the role it is seen to possess within the community out of which it emerges. There is plenty of evidence of social mobilisation against *enosis* and self-rule within the Turkish Cypriot community. There is also evidence of the use of pressure to make effective a policy to pursue separate development. For example, during the 1950s Turkish members of Greek Cypriot trade unions were pressurised to withdraw their membership. What was the overall balance produced by the reception of different aspects of the outward expression of Turkish Cypriot nationalism within the community at large remains uncertain.

A concomitant uncertainty can also be extended to the Greek Cypriot community during this period. There were sections of this community which related to the EOKA organisation in different ways; in the form of silent opposition as well as outward support. And while EOKA excluded the left from the struggle the left stood,

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1963-64, 1965 and up to the 1970s when the role of the TMT was transferred to the administration established in the north of the island after partition.

at first, in marked opposition to EOKA. It has also been demonstrated that EOKA assassinated more Greek Cypriots than Britons and that the number of Greek Cypriots killed by EOKA exceeded the number of those killed by the British during the same period.<sup>40</sup> Yet 'extremism' tends to be a term reserved for the Turkish Cypriot underground organisation alone. Any opposition evident within the Turkish Cypriot community has been seized upon as evidence of the fact that foreign interests were being imposed upon an unwilling community. Presumably, because the assumption is that Turkish Cypriot nationalism was in itself not a threatening phenomenon and that only through the emergence of an extremist and intransigent faction, could foreign interests be accommodated. Yet, there was a community partly prepared to exploit the opportunity of violence and partly ready to accommodate itself in the web of violence that emerged. Further, it was a community without any options but to lean on Turkey.

In this respect, nationalism is let off lightly since the course of history is marked by the overwhelming influence of foreign involvement in the internal affairs of Cyprus. An increasingly organised Turkish Cypriot nationalist movement responding to a militant Greek Cypriot nationalism have somehow been recognised in tracing the history of the period of British rule but its substance is absent from the conclusion of that period.

As one author has put it:

The zealots of Enosis throughout the long and turbulent history of this movement failed to consider the potential for negating Enosis in the seemingly quiescence and docile Turkish minority. Engrossed in their own political rivalries over which faction was to be at the helm of the Enosis movement, the Greek Cypriots failed to reflect upon the magnitude and potentialities of Turkish opposition. More importantly, they underestimated or ignored the dominant position and demonstrated military strength of Turkey only forty miles to the north.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Nancy Crawshaw 1978.

<sup>41</sup> Kyriacos Markides 1977 p.21.

It would seem that intercommunal violence could erupt under certain conditions if the political relation between the two communities continued to fuel antagonism. As Kitromilides acknowledges but fails to pursue to an adequate conclusion;

[t]he culmination of the process of ethnic differentiation in the consolidation of structurally and culturally distinct and often antagonistic communities, deeply conscious of their primordial attachments, sets, of course, the preconditions of ethnic conflict. In this context, the drift to ethnic violence can easily begin once antagonism and suspicion are created in view of certain events, policies and choices. This was essentially the pattern developing in Cyprus in the aftermath of the Second World War.<sup>42</sup>

### Turkish Cypriot Nationalism

It should be apparent by now that the political outlook of the Turkish Cypriot community in the early years of British rule was very different from that of the Greek Cypriot one. It is to that difference that Attalides points when he argues that 'the British Government regarded the Turkish Cypriots as 'loyal' in a way which the Greek bourgeoisie and the Orthodox *Church* were not'.<sup>43</sup>

Simultaneously, the colonial government did not view the Turkish Cypriots as an undifferentiated mass. It expected greater loyalty from some groups within the community rather than others. Heterogeneity was an issue of concern to the colonial government which sought to tighten its control over the administration of this community. With the nationalistic fervour increasingly asserted by the Greek Cypriot community and the resistance of the colonial government to concede to its demands, maintaining the loyalty of the Turkish Cypriot community was seen as strategically necessary. During the first years of tentative cooperation between the leaders of the two communities the colonial government expressed its concern over the alliance of interests between the two. As late as 1910, the High Commissioner of the island explained to the Secretary of State the difference between the stance of the two leaderships on the issue of the Tribute but simultaneously emphasised the fact that both effectively demanded an increased monetary contribution from the British

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<sup>42</sup> Kitromilides 1977, p. 47.

<sup>43</sup> Attalides op. cit., p. 41.



treasury. He warned the Secretary of State that if the Greeks intensified their agitation it was unlikely that the government could depend on the Turkish members of the council for support since '[t]he Moslem members have shown themselves quite unable to resist popular pressure and have always been quite unreliable as supporters of the Government'.<sup>44</sup>

The Turkish Cypriot community was not in the early period of British rule any more homogenous than the Greek Cypriot community. But divisions within the two did not have an equivalence. Opposition within the Turkish Cypriot community centred around demands for relative communal autonomy and not for national sovereignty; the nationalisation process of the Turkish Cypriots having proceeded much later than that of the Greek Cypriots. In the early years of British rule individuals who had risen to power during the late years of Ottoman rule came to dominate the political space of the community. They were willing to accept British involvement in their communal institutions, their dominant position within the community at large, remaining intact. Opposition from some sections of the community to British involvement in communal institutions and requests for change were already evident in the early years and continued until the annexation of Cyprus by Britain in 1914. This early opposition did not develop into an effective contest for leadership until the 1920s, coinciding with deliberate colonial policies centralising all communal institutions under the power of one man, the formation of the Turkish Republic and an uncertainty over the future of the island. By 1930 the strength of the opposition was marked by its victory over the traditional leadership in the contest for the Legislative Council seats. It would seem that the shared opposition by the Turkish Cypriot community and the colonial government to *enosis* combined with privileges accruing to sections of the Turkish Cypriot community, provided an important basis for cooperation between the leadership of the minority, on the one hand, and the colonial government, on the other. But it should be stressed that here there was more than one issue involved. Opposition to *enosis* was one factor marking the dependency of the minority community on the colonial government. The distinct self-interests of the traditional leadership was a second and separate factor, enhancing the dependency and loyalty of this leadership to the British. The former

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<sup>44</sup> Georgallides op. cit., p. 75.

involved a contest between the majority and the minority community, while the latter involved a contest between the traditional leadership and the colonial government, on the one hand, and the new political forces developing within the Turkish Cypriot community, on the other. It is this latter form of contest that has been overlooked by Attalides.

*Enosis* appeared all the more intimidating since the nationalising drive of the majority meant that it exhibited greater social activity manifested through diverse means such as the publication of an increasing number of newspapers and books, public representations of national sentiment, the institutional dominance of the *Church*, the strong control exercised by the community's elite over its education system and, most importantly, through its dominance over the financial, commercial and the small industrial sector of the economy. Given this context, Attalides' description of the Turkish Cypriot community as vulnerable seems to be a well observed characterisation particularly apt when the areas of education, literary production and the economic position of the Turkish Cypriot community is compared to the equivalent status of the Greek Cypriot community.<sup>45</sup>

As he explains, the Turkish Cypriots did not possess any autonomous political organisation and their communal institutions came partly under the control of the colonial government. Similarly, Turkish Cypriot education was brought under the control of the government. Further, unlike Greek Cypriot education, the Turkish Cypriot equivalent could not be put at the service of a nationalising project since there was no national subject; instead, strictly communal cultural needs were met through religious teaching and through the Arabic language.<sup>46</sup>

It would also appear, he adds, that the Turkish Cypriots were less 'touchy'<sup>47</sup> in that they did not resist colonial involvement in their communal institutions. Further, he argues that those affected by the first nationalist stirrings within the community in the late 30s maintained a loyalty to the colonial government.<sup>48</sup> Even as late as 1955,

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<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 43.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 40-43.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 43.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 45.

following the establishment of political organisations which first emerged in the 1940s, the main Turkish Cypriot organisation circulated pamphlets which contained the following demands:

the removal of Greek teachers from Cyprus, the separation of the *Church* from politics, the forbidding of the raising of the Greek flag and also demanding that the British stay in Cyprus.<sup>49</sup>

But, Attalides argues, from the 1930s onwards, this community was affected by a series of significant events. Intellectuals became influenced by Kemalism in the 1930s though the leadership and the masses were not receptive. However, improved relations between Britain and Turkey after 1936, the civil war in Greece which harboured the perceived danger of communist rule, allegations of discrimination against the Turks of Kos and Rhodes and the existence of Turkish Cypriot intellectuals influenced by 'political and social ideas of the Turkish republic' prepared the context for 'the eruption of Turkish Cypriot nationalism' in the post Second World War period. In the process Turkish Cypriots established autonomous political structures through cooperation and assistance from the British government. Consequently, it acquired secular representation but still alternating its demands between Cyprus becoming part of Turkey and the continuation of British rule.<sup>50</sup>

Attalides' account of this community's history can be summarised through the following periodisation. For the first fifty years of British rule the community expressed 'fears of domination by the Greeks through loyalty to the British administration and Islamic solidarity'.<sup>51</sup> By the end of the first sixty years 'nationalist elements' made their appearance but nationalism did not become a widespread phenomenon until after the Second World War. And, unlike Greek Cypriot nationalists Turkish Cypriot nationalists continued to cooperate with the colonial government. Consequently, after the war the community established independent political institutions through a process of cooperation with the colonial government. If nationalism as a liberation movement is treated as the yardstick for

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid., p. 47.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., pp. 45-46.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., p. 41.

the periodisation of the Turkish Cypriot history then it would be roughly accurate to distinguish between the period up to the Second World War and the period that followed from 1943 to the late 1950s.

Following Kitromilides, Attalides summarises developments during this later period through the names given to succeeding political organisations. As a reminder, these were, in 1943, the 'Cyprus Turkish Minority Association'; in 1945, the 'Cyprus Turkish National Party'; and in 1955, the 'Cyprus is Turkish Party'. That was the historical moment that the Turkish Cypriot community transferred its dependence to the Turkish state and was able therefore to break the cycle of dependency on the colonial government and assert instead a demand which challenged the continuation of British rule:

They were initially completely dependant on the colonial government. It would be quite easy for this dependence to be transferred without internal resistance to the Turkish state. Particularly so at times when they might feel that they were in danger from the Greek Cypriots.<sup>52</sup>

Therefore, by the time a Turkish Cypriot nationalist movement becomes a reality, it did so through an act of transferral of the community's dependency on Britain to a dependency on Turkey. Though the minority position of the Turkish Cypriot community was to compromise choice and affect the course of its actions, there seems to be no basis upon which to view the relationship between the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey as simply functional. And even though the periodisation of the history of the Turkish Cypriot community during the period of British rule that is implied in Attalides' account may be correct, it is at the same time devoid of any content that may enable the reader to understand those processes unfolding within the Turkish Cypriot community in a similar way that his account of the history of the Greek Cypriot community during the same period does. It is of significance that a predominant characteristic of his account of the Turkish Cypriot community is that it sets one community in comparison with the other. While the Turkish Cypriots, for example, were seen as loyal by the British the Greek Cypriots were not. While the Greek Cypriots engaged in publishing activity as early as the arrival of the British

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid., p. 49.

the Turkish Cypriots failed to do so. While the Greek Cypriots resisted any governmental involvement in their communal affairs the Turkish Cypriots offered no such resistance. These are necessary and important comparisons in understanding the differential development of the two communities. But they do not tell us anything about the processes that were at play within the Turkish Cypriot community. This is particularly so when what is stressed instead is the role of the Turkish Cypriot community as a strategic minority from the point of view of the colonial government.

In this respect the approach cannot contribute towards an understanding of those processes which went towards the making of the social subject. Instead what appears is a non contemporaneous community, an anachronism arising out of the Ottoman past, which lacked the resources - the class composition, the political structures and a national centre - to mark its own transformation into a modern community. It was bound, instead, by an Islamic solidarity and reproduced itself as such through uncontested structures imposed upon it by the colonial government. But the transfer of Cyprus into British hands also provided the basis for a challenge to traditional forms of leadership within the community. Therefore despite the absence of a bourgeois class and a national centre, the existence of structures that provided the basis for the determination of leadership through political contest was in itself an important resource; signalling a contest over the imposition of visions and division. But the absence of representative communal institutions, or rather, the fact that communal institutions were partly administered by the colonial government and partly by government appointed members of the Muslim community undermined the potentialities of this contest. It was therefore consequential that the major contest that ensued within the community represented an effort to bring the communal institutions under the direct control of the community and be administered by and for the community. After the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1922 it became possible for a contest to ensue within the political space of the Turkish Cypriot community comparable to the 1900-1910 contest that unfolded amongst the Greek Cypriot nationalists and the traditional elite. And just as that struggle led to the defeat of the *Church* as the exclusive institution authorised to define the social subject so in the Turkish Cypriot community, this process developed from the late

1920s and was completed by 1943 with the victory of the nationalising forces. This was the process that marked the transition from traditional forms of communal organisation to nationalising ones. And just as the *Church*'s defeat led to its reassertion through the unity of the traditional elite and the nationalists, so did the defeat of the traditional Turkish Cypriot elite lead to the unity of the traditional and modernising forces within the community. In other words, what was marked in both cases, was, both the reconstitution of the community on a new nationalising basis and the transformation of communal institutions into nationalising institutions. The major difference between the two processes was that the victorious principle of vision and division within the Greek Cypriot community defined the difference between the Greek Cypriot community and colonial rule as its object. Within the Turkish Cypriot community this defined the difference between undemocratic and democratic institutions and that between an Islamic and a Turkish identity. At the same time, the contrast between Greek and Turkish Cypriots already figured as a presupposition on both sides of this contest. However, given everything else, an inevitable consequence of the drive towards relative communal autonomy of a community now defined through its Turkish identity, was the radicalisation of ethnic distinctiveness. Therefore, while the unity of those contesting voices within the Greek Cypriot community led to the radicalisation of the demand for *enosis*, within the Turkish Cypriot community it led to a radicalisation of the assertion of communal distinctiveness and established the basis for a politics of separatism which developed progressively from 1943 onwards.

To treat therefore the political identification of the Turkish Cypriot community with Turkey as a matter of a transfer of dependency, is to overlook the fact that the political identification of the Turkish Cypriot leadership with Turkey was all the more significant given that it understood itself as Turkish while at the same time felt threatened by a nationalising majority. Therefore, 'transferring dependency upon Turkey' was simultaneously an assertion of identity not simply as distinct from the Greek Cypriots but also as identical to the Turkish nation. The consequences that could therefore flow from a transfer of dependency to Turkey were all the more significant because Turkey was not seen just as a strategically useful ally but also as a homeland. The opposition to demand for *enosis* was acquiring a positive

expression in the demand for *taxim* – the partition of the island between Greece and Turkey.

#### FROM A RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY TO A NATIONAL MINORITY

An important point which recurs in Attalides' account is the lack of an autonomous political organisation within the Turkish Cypriot community. Unlike the role of the *Church* as a political representative of the Greek Cypriots during Ottoman rule, the Turkish Cypriots, as part of the ruling group, possessed no independent political structure. With the establishment of British rule the Turkish Cypriots inherited certain institutions, confirmed through the Cyprus Convention, which had previously been under the jurisdiction of the Ottoman authorities: the two primary institutions were the *evkaf*<sup>53</sup> and the Sheria Courts<sup>54</sup>

With the Cyprus Convention the British accepted the Sheria Courts as an integral part of the judicial system which could coexist alongside civil courts. The Sheria Courts operated through the offices of four judges. Three local judges who were under the authority of a Chief Judge (Bas Kadi) were designated by the Ottoman government, a system of judicial administration on communal family issues which continued until 1927. Conflicts over areas of jurisdiction between the Bas Kadi and the colonial government began to emerge from the First World War, continued through the 1920s and culminated in the reforms of 1927<sup>55</sup>. These abolished the position of the Bas Kadi but maintained the regional Sheria religious tribunals. Subsequently the British Governor assumed the authority to appoint the three judges and reduced the jurisdiction of the tribunals.

The eventual fate of the *evkaf* was not dissimilar. The Cyprus Convention placed the *evkaf* under dual control. While the *evkaf* Directorate was to be administered by two

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<sup>53</sup> The Evkaf was a religious foundation generating income through the management of the Muslim community's pious endowments. It oversaw and contributed to the expenses of schools and mosques on the island.

<sup>54</sup> These were religious courts dealing with family matters such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc.,

<sup>55</sup> For details see McHenry op.cit., pp. 119-123.

delegates, one would be appointed by the Ottoman ministry of *evkaf* and the other, a British official, by the colonial government. Following the annexation of the island by the British in 1914 the colonial government introduced legislation transferring the power to appoint the delegates of *evkaf* exclusively to the High Commissioner.<sup>56</sup> Subsequent government policy placed *evkaf* at an even further distance from the community and eventually turned *evkaf* into a government department in 1928. While the Governor was to appoint the two delegates they in turn were granted the power to appoint staff to the department and to select and monitor trustees.<sup>57</sup>

The colonial government then proceeded to bring under the jurisdiction of the *evkaf* department all matters concerning the community. For example, after the retirement of the Mufti in 1927, who appears to have been the single elected representative within the community, the Governor appointed the new Mufti thereby bypassing existing procedures. By 1929 the post was abolished altogether and in its place the government created the new position of Fetva Emini (Superintendent of Religious Opinions). While the duties of the Mufti included the supervision of religious preachers, the maintenance of mosques and advising people and the government on religious issues, the duties of the Fetva Emini were reduced to issuing religious decrees. Beyond this, however, the colonial government proceeded to place the Fetva Emini under the control of *evkaf* while the Turkish Cypriot delegate of *evkaf* was given the powers previously held by the Mufti but removed from the Fetva Emini. In the same spirit the colonial government declared that the Sheria Court judges would serve as *evkaf* agents, paid from the *evkaf* budget, and that the tribunals would be held in the *evkaf* offices.<sup>58</sup>

The growing power of the Turkish Cypriot *evkaf* delegate had become evident even before the reforms which centralised control over the community in the hands of one man. His influence was reflected through his election<sup>59</sup> and the victory of his nominees to the Legislative Council.<sup>60</sup> Opposition both to the increasing power of

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid., pp. 123-24.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., pp. 126-27.

<sup>58</sup> For details see McHenry op. cit., pp. 127-129.

<sup>59</sup> Georgallides op. cit., p. 75.

<sup>60</sup> McHenry op. cit., pp. 124-25.



the *evkaf* delegate as well as to colonial policies which undermined communal autonomy, was already evident in the 1920s. For example, in 1922 a Turkish Cypriot petition demanded that a Muslim Council is established and become responsible for Turkish Cypriot education, the Sheria Courts and the administration of *evkaf*. It also demanded that if there was to be a change in the status of the island this should be returned to Turkey. In addition it declared its opposition to self-rule.<sup>61</sup> In 1924 a newly established organisation, the Cyprus Moslem Association, put forward the suggestion that the *evkaf* is administered by an elected committee.<sup>62</sup> The subsequent centralisation of control of Turkish Cypriot affairs in the hands of the *evkaf* delegate and the designation of the *evkaf* as a government department however, enhanced the organisation of oppositional forces within the Turkish Cypriot community.

McHenry has argued that the drive of the government towards the centralisation of Turkish Cypriot communal institutions was partly a response to the increasing opposition, emerging out of a Turkish Cypriot nationalist movement, against colonial policies and partly informed by the drive of the colonial government to bring about efficiency where resources were minimal.<sup>63</sup> Whether Turkish Cypriot opposition during these years could be described as nationalist or not is debatable, and will be subject to further discussion; its demands for communal autonomy nevertheless represented a necessary step towards the eventual nationalisation of the community. Another author has argued that the governments' policy was a response 'motivated by the wish of the British not to put at stake the loyalty of the Turkish Cypriot community, the "pillar" of the colonial domination apparatus'.<sup>64</sup> Ultimately, both authors seem to agree that the minimum the British recognised as strategically necessary was to secure the basic loyalty of that community. Any opposition to British practices was seen as a threat as long as it carried the potential to affect social mobilisation in opposition to wider colonial policies. Centralising power in the hands of traditional authority, which despite the fact it had not always proven loyal, was safer than permitting new modernising forces the opportunity to accumulate political capital which could potentially threaten the government's legitimacy in a

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid., p. 132.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., p. 125.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., p. 115.

<sup>64</sup> J. Choisi 1993 p. 13.

context where the majority community already organised in opposition to British rule. Despite the fact that the colonial government explained the emergence of an opposition as a result of a variety of factors, at the same time it understood this opposition as an opposition to the most loyal member of the community - the British appointed delegate of the *evkaf*. It was this loyalty that the colonial government felt it could rely on. The terms through which the High Commissioner described the two sides of this opposition in 1922 is indicative of the threat with which any change in the political space of the Turkish Cypriot community may have been anticipated:

Irfan Bey, who is a man of humble origin (...) had never swerved in his loyalty to the Government. Throughout the late war and crisis, his influence has sufficed to keep the Moslem population of the island quiet at times of acute national feeling, and has naturally acquired not a few enemies among those Turks of advanced ideas or fanatical tendencies.<sup>65</sup>

By 1930, this opposition was able to assert itself over the traditional elite, known as '*evkafcilar*'; an appellation for those who supported the colonial government's policies. Those who opposed them were known as '*muarizlar*' (the opponents); later they were renamed as '*halkcilar*', an appellation for those who supported Ataturk's Republican People's Party.<sup>66</sup> During the contest for the 1930 Legislative Council elections the struggle for power was fought by the populists on the platform of Turkish Cypriot autonomy and thus through a strong opposition against British control of the communal institutions.<sup>67</sup> Upon their election the new members visited the acting Governor and submitted a declaration critical of the British reforms of 1927-30. In the same spirit, and in an attempt to assert their basis of legitimation, the new leadership called a National Congress in May 1931. The invitation to the National Congress called for the election of representatives on a district basis who would then be empowered to discuss and vote on issues concerning the *evkaf*, Sheria Courts, education and the office of the Mufti.<sup>68</sup> The resolutions passed by the Congress demanded greater community control over education, the restoration of the office of the Mufti and the powers accruing to it prior to the reforms; that the Sheria Courts be declared independent and the salaries of the judges be paid from the

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<sup>65</sup> Cited in Choizi op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>66</sup> E. Erginel 1994, p. 18-19.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 26-28.

general budget. In respect to *evkaf* it demanded that all religious duties undertaken by the *evkaf* officials be transferred to the Mufti and that *evkaf* deal exclusively with financial issues. Further, that a committee of six members be elected by the National Congress to run the *evkaf* together with one British official.<sup>69</sup> The Congress also elected a new Mufti and a nine member central committee; six of whom were lawyers, two were doctors and one was a merchant. The government refused to recognise the Congress.<sup>70</sup> Similarly, the *evkafcilar* responded by questioning the authority of the Congress, supporting the instituted reforms in the administration of the communal institutions and declaring that the duty of the Turkish Cypriots was to protect and improve their conditions through cooperation with the government.<sup>71</sup> It also accused the *halkcilar* of imitating Greek activities.<sup>72</sup> The *halkcilar* responded by stating that the position expressed by the *evkafcilar* was equivalent to saying ‘don’t disturb our peace with your words and actions and be patient with our tyranny and oppression’.<sup>73</sup>

In the meantime other developments within the Turkish Cypriot community signalled that the demand for control over communal institutions was part of a wider process which involved a struggle over the definition of the community.

Print media reporting by newly launched newspapers in 1919, ‘Dogru Yol’ (The Correct Way) and its successor, ‘Soz’ (The Word), gave substantial coverage to the Turkish War of Independence and initiated fund raising campaigns for Turkish refugees.<sup>74</sup> There were minor intercommunal clashes in 1922 after the defeat of the Greek armies were received with joy by Turkish Cypriots who displayed the Turkish flag in an expression of identification with the victorious party. Further, in the same year there were reactions by Turkish Cypriots when the Greek Cypriots formed a National Council. Certain sections amongst the community petitioned the government on three issues. Firstly the return of the island to Turkey - ‘our national

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<sup>68</sup> Summary of information published in Soz 7 May 1931, Erdem Erginel op. cit., pp. 28-29.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., pp. 30-36.

<sup>70</sup> McHenry op. cit., pp. 137.

<sup>71</sup> Erginel op. cit., pp. 37-39.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., p. 41.

<sup>73</sup> Soz 14 May 1931, cited in Erginel op.cit., p. 41.

<sup>74</sup> McHenry op. cit., p. 131. I. Tenedios 1986.

desire and the aspiration of our heart' - and reassurances that if this was unattainable the island should 'not be handed to any Government excepting Turkey' without the 'consent of the Turkish Government and the Moslem people'. Secondly, that the communal institutions be overseen by a Muslim Council. Thirdly that the Greek demand of self-rule must be opposed as it might 'lead our preservation and entity to positive danger'.<sup>75</sup>

It is interesting to note that these demands simultaneously combined the return of the island to the Ottoman Empire, greater communal autonomy, and opposition to Greek Cypriot demands for self-rule. In that respect, what separated the requests made in this petition and the position of the traditional leadership, the *evkafçılar* was the demand for communal autonomy; but always within parameters set by British rule.

In 1925 a Turkish consulate opened on the island. The Turkish consul was described by the colonial government in 1930 as a man who involved himself in efforts to foster a Turkish national consciousness amongst the Turkish Cypriots. These efforts were understood to have had effect as this was witnessed by newspaper articles, characterised by the government as Turkish propaganda; the government's evaluation concluding that the consul's actions encouraged 'disaffection among Cypriot Moslems'. Following representations by the British Ambassador in Turkey to the Turkish Foreign Office the consul was recalled.<sup>76</sup> Of further significance was that from 1925 sections of the community began to celebrate the Turkish Republic Day. Further, in 1928 the Latin script introduced in the writing of the Turkish language was immediately adopted by the Turkish Cypriot community.<sup>77</sup> Newspapers reported extensively on developments in Turkey, including, issues relating to foreign policy, education, political speeches.<sup>78</sup> In Turkish Cypriot schools 'nationalist speeches' were delivered during school celebrations, Turkish national holidays were celebrated and the busts and photographs of Atatürk were displayed.<sup>79</sup> By 1938 *Soz* was subject to censorship. It was understood, by the colonial

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<sup>75</sup> Ibid., p. 132.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., pp. 175-179.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., pp. 134-35.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., p. 140.

<sup>79</sup> Choizi op. cit., p. 16.

government, to be interested 'in practically no publications other than news of Turkey or articles either in praise of Kemalism or derogatory to Evkaf'.<sup>80</sup> The newspaper has been described by one author as 'the most important forum for the dissemination of Kemalist ideas and anti-British protests'.<sup>81</sup> In the late 1930s the first two history books locating the history of the community on the island were published. The first, was published in Istanbul in 1938 under the title *The Turkish Cypriots*. The second, under the title *History of Cyprus*, was published in Nicosia in 1939.<sup>82</sup>

When a Turkish Naval Training Ship paid a two day courtesy call in 1938 the Governor wrote, in a report to the Colonial Office, that 'continual streams of Moslems such as have not been seen for many years poured in Famagusta from all parts of the island to see the vessel'. He also commented on 'the new sediment of Turkish national sentiment which has been left behind by this visit.' A police intelligence report stated that the leading figures of the opposition 'behaved throughout as if they were Turkish nationals of some standing, particularly Necati Ozkan'<sup>83</sup> who assumed the attitude of the authorised head of the Cyprus Moslem community'.<sup>84</sup> In early 1939 another police report mentioned that copy books which bore the Turkish emblem and a photograph of Necati Ozkan appeared in Turkish Cypriot schools and that a year after Ataturk's death a book under the title 'Our Greatest Loss' was sold from a merchants' shop; with all copies disappearing within an hour.<sup>85</sup>

It would therefore appear that by the late 1930s there was an increasingly bolder and more widespread display of identification with Turkey. At the same time the presence of the leading figures of the opposition within this movement of identification with Turkey was pervasive. The British reaction to these developments was to view them as the outcome of three main factors. Firstly, the unpopularity of

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<sup>80</sup> McHenry op. cit., p. 148.

<sup>81</sup> Choizi op. cit., p.16.

<sup>82</sup> P. Oberling 1982 p.54.

<sup>83</sup> Necati Ozkan was the leading figure of the *halkcilar* and was elected to the Legislative Council in 1930.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., p. 150.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., p. 151.

the Turkish Cypriot delegate of *evkaf* as well as the wider struggle of the opposition to break up the political power of the traditional leaders. Secondly, an attempt to react to the Greek Cypriot *enosis* movement and finally, a drive to take control of the community's finances through control of *evkaf*.<sup>86</sup> As a response, the British attempted to contain the opposition through financial support to the *evkaf*, hoping to entrench the influence of the institution by enabling it to improve the deteriorating economic conditions within the Turkish Cypriot community.<sup>87</sup> This did not succeed in bringing about any change in the welfare of the community while at the same time the British government acknowledged that the Turkish Cypriot community did not have faith that the government cared for its interests and the role it could play on the island; further, that the establishment of the Turkish Republic had its effect on Cyprus. It was recognised, that the government had to respond to the new realities and make an appeal to the younger and more progressive Turkish Cypriots.<sup>88</sup>

McHenry concludes as follows on this period of Turkish Cypriot history:

Cultural ties to Anatolia and a pervasive fear of *Enosis* were not the only springs feeding the growing Turkish nationalist movement in Cyprus. There also existed widespread dissatisfaction with British administrative policies, particularly the government's decision to centralise the community's institutions in the *evkaf* and then to rule the Turkish Cypriots through the Turkish delegate of *evkaf*. Turkish Cypriot kemalists agitated constantly for greater community control over their own institutions, managed by representatives popularly elected rather than appointed by the British. By the late 1930s the British could no longer ignore the obvious failure of government policies aimed at reducing the appeal of Kemalism among the Turkish Cypriots...the colonial office now suggested a policy designed to stir Kemalism into ....channels [which] involved lining up the Turkish Cypriots behind government policies aimed at improving local administration while at the same time stemming the *enosis* tide.<sup>89</sup>

Colonial policy from there on concentrated on bridging the gap that had opened up between the government and the Turkish Cypriot community. Reforms leading to communal autonomy were not initiated in the first instance. Following the demonstration of the power of reformism within the community, the Turkish Cypriot delegate of the *evkaf*, so far a target of the reformist faction, mediated between the

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<sup>86</sup> Choizi op. cit., p.11, 12, 17.

<sup>87</sup> Choizi op. cit., p. 18. McHenry op. cit., pp. 145-149.

<sup>88</sup> McHenry op. cit., 1985 p. 144.

reformist leaders and the government.<sup>90</sup> In 1943 a new political organisation KATAK (Association of the Turkish Minority of Cyprus), was formed arising out of a meeting held in the *evkaf* offices<sup>91</sup> by prominent members of the community including supporters of the Turkish Cypriot delegate of *evkaf*. Evidently this was an attempt to unite the community under one organisation thereby overcoming the divisions that had so far characterised its political space. An executive committee was elected which although dominated by the reformists drew also members from the old *evkaf* faction. Following the election of the executive, the president and vice-president of the party visited the District Commissioner of Nicosia to declare that this was a law abiding party with two primary aims; the establishment of a united front for the improvement of conditions in the Turkish Cypriot community and opposed to the Greek Cypriot demand for union with Greece.<sup>92</sup>

The new party acted as a vehicle for the coordination of activities leading to stronger cohesion within the community. A few days after the establishment of the party the Turkish Cypriot elected councillors of Larnaca and Limassol sent separate telegrams to the British government complaining that the Greek mayors and the municipal councils which were under the control of the Greek Cypriots had put forward the demand for *enosis* as if speaking on behalf of the whole population of Cyprus, ignoring the fact that one fifth of this population consisted of Turkish Cypriots.<sup>93</sup> Within a month the new party promoted the establishment of Turkish Cypriot trade unions. This resulted in the withdrawal of many Turkish Cypriot members from the old trade unions. On 1 May 1943 the Turkish Cypriot trades unions (LTAB) sent memorandums to the Colonial Secretary stating that the Turkish Cypriot community was suffering under the oppression of the Greek Cypriot community; that the Greek Cypriots in government departments used their positions to discriminate against the Turkish Cypriots and that the Greek Cypriots were exploiting the municipal councils to promote union with Greece. Suggestions were also made for rotating the position of the mayor between the two communities. It also raised objection to the

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<sup>89</sup> McHenry op. cit., p. 154.

<sup>90</sup> Erginel op. cit., p. 65

<sup>91</sup> Katsiaounis 2000 p. 180.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., p. 181.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid. p. 182.

governments' control over Turkish Cypriot communal institutions such as the secondary schools and the *evkaf*. The secretary of the Turkish trade unions in Larnaca also stated:

In the whole world religion constitutes something different than the ethnos. Our ethnos is the Turkish one, just as our religion is the Muslim religion. An institution, to whichever people it may belong, is not characterised by the religion but by the ethnicity of that people. For example, we speak of the English school, the French School, but not of the Christian School. Therefore, when we speak of a Muslim school it is possible that we speak of the school of the Arabs, the Persians and of whatever nation observes Islam. Since this is the way things are, we wish that schools belonging to the Turkish community of Cyprus, beginning with the Lycee, be named Turkish Schools.<sup>94</sup>

He also demanded that the Turkish language be used in all official announcements and the Arabic alphabet on currency notes be replaced with Latin. That just as the Greek Cypriot public and private employees observed the Greek Day of Independence as a bank holiday, so Turkish national days need be declared as holidays for the Turkish employees. Further, the community's family law needed to be modernised according to the Turkish model.<sup>95</sup>

If, at this point we return to Attalides' appropriation of Turkish Cypriot history it soon becomes evident that the linear and almost unchanging reproduction of the Turkish Cypriot community in the period from 1878 to the 1930s he portrayed, simply cannot allow for these developments. His observation of this period is sketched out in his own words:

National consciousness of being Turks came to the intellectuals in the thirties and became widespread after the Second World War. During the 1930 uprising by the Greek Cypriots against British rule both the leaders of the Cypriot Turks and of Turkey welcomed the repressive measures taken by the British Government against Greek Cypriot nationalists. In spite of this the Turkish Cypriots were not exempted from the measures. By 1939, though still loyal to the British, the Cypriot Turkish intellectuals were strongly influenced by the political and social ideas of the Turkish Republic.... The Civil War in Greece and the possibility of Greece

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<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 186.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid*



becoming communist was an alarming prospect for a community with a religious, conservative leadership.<sup>96</sup>

This reflects neither the developments that took place nor the potential they entailed when viewed from the perspective of a possible change to the island's status. Though it would be inappropriate to use the descriptive category of nationalism to describe the projection of a Turkish ethnic identity and the political demand for greater communal autonomy Attalides' statement seems quite unrelated to the developments that actually unfolded. It is in this respect that a strict binary opposition between 'nationalism' and the absence of 'nationalism' is unhelpful. The Turkish Cypriot community cannot be simply defined as nationalist until the mid 1950s, when it asserts, for the first time, its demand for the partition of Cyprus and the union of a Turkish Cypriot region with Turkey. At all times before that the Turkish Cypriot leadership opposed self rule. But neither can the period of opposition to British rule be treated as simply non-nationalist. As already stated this was a necessary step - even if not in itself sufficient - towards the nationalisation of the community. But more importantly the Turkish Cypriot community could not demand self rule if it feared Greek Cypriot domination. Opposition to self-rule was an understood necessity rather than an indication of the full potential arising from the politicisation of this community. British rule had to be maintained if the community's understood interests were to be served. In that respect loyalty to the British has to also be understood from the perspective of the understood interests of the community. As a representative of a Turkish Cypriot Trades Union explained in 1948:

We are not against progress. In answer to some Greeks, who have declared that we constitute an obstacle to their advancement, I state that we want good relations with the Greek element, based on equal terms and freedoms. As the Greeks struggle to get rid of the British administration, so we make sure not to be drowned by a Greek administration. Their interpretation of democracy would mean the enslavement of the minority. If the government of Great Britain offers Cyprus to any other country, this will have to be Turkey.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> Attalides op. cit., p. 45.

<sup>97</sup> Eleftheria 22 May 1998, cited in Katsiaounis op. cit., p. 448.

Similarly, Rauf Denktas, an emerging figure in the community during this period, posed this challenge:

My Greek colleagues speak of a 'foreign government'. If by the word 'foreign' they mean us, the Turks, I would like to remind them that we are not foreigners, but instead more likely to possess a greater right than them to this island. If by the word 'foreign' they mean the British officials it is enough for them to consider for a minute and conclude that we, as citizens to whom the British Government has promised a lot, do not feel that they are foreigners.<sup>98</sup>

These were speeches made during the 1947 negotiations between the government and the two communities for the introduction of a constitution leading to a degree of self-government. The offer was rejected by the Greek Cypriot leadership in a context where the *Church* and the nationalist faction organised around it were engaged in the final struggle for political supremacy - this time directed against the left.<sup>99</sup> The struggle was defined by two opposing demands: a constitution now and *enosis* deferred, the line favoured by the left and some liberals, against the demand of the *Church* - *enosis* and only *enosis*. It was only in the course of this struggle that the Greek Cypriot national policy became eventually unified even if the leadership of the struggle remained contested. Following the participation of the left in the negotiations for the return to a constitutional order, with the ultimate aim, said to be, that of *enosis*, and the collapse of these negotiations, the left competed with the *Church* for legitimacy by espousing the same national demand - *enosis* and only *enosis* - through which the *Church* had secured its ascendancy as the legitimate authority of the Greek Cypriots in the first place. This defeat of the left could not be more obvious than with its marginalisation following the outbreak of the armed anti-colonial struggle for union with Greece which brought the division between the left and the right to a most bitter and polarised expression. In the meantime the *Church*

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<sup>98</sup> Ibid.

<sup>99</sup> Following the suspension of the Council, the Greek Cypriot community observed a period of relative silence on the national issue. It should be noted that the Greek government's reaction to the 1931 riots was unfavourable (for details, see Terlexis p. 79). On the other hand, trade union organisation and activity flourished to the extent that by 1941 the gains made by the left led to the establishment of a new political party - AKEL. This caused a counteraction from the *Church* and the right wing nationalists who went on the offensive; similarly declaring the formation of a party and trade unions, known as the new trades unions. The gains made by the left during this period became evident in the 1943 municipal elections, the first elections to be held since the suspension of the Council (for details see Servas op. cit., pp. 121-3).

took the leading role in taking over a plebiscite initiated by the left in 1950 as a means to make the desires of the Greek Cypriots known to the world. The internationalisation of the Greek Cypriot demand for union with Greece became actualised only with the cooperation between Greek governments and the Greek Cypriot leadership from 1954 onwards.

With the collapse of the negotiations in 1948 the Governor established the 'Committee for the Turkish Affairs'. The committee was to investigate and make proposals regarding the reorganisation of the *evkaf*, the reinstatement of the post of the Mufti, the modernisation of family law, the reorganisation of Turkish Cypriot education and the modernisation of the Sheri Courts.<sup>100</sup> Of its six members two had also participated in the negotiations. The Governor's opinion of the community's feelings towards the appointed committee was that the community at large, with the exception of the traditional conservatives and those influenced by communism, were particularly satisfied with the appointments.<sup>101</sup>

Sectional and class interests within the Turkish Cypriot community were apparent, at least through the positions expressed by different publications towards the emerging leadership. As Choizi observes,

[a]ll these political groupings, whether they were left or conservative, had something in common; they demanded the maintenance of the colonial status for the island. The conservative and progressive forces of the Turkish Cypriot society were linked together, despite their differences, as a result of Turkish nationalism. Even though there were differences the essence of that nationalism was its opposition to the *Enosis* movement and its effort to upgrade the status of the Turkish Cypriot community.<sup>102</sup>

There is evidence of a mass rally organised in October 1948 by Turkish Cypriot political parties and other organisations which could be taken as an indication of the unity amongst the leadership. Six thousand Turkish Cypriots participated, many of whom had travelled from rural areas. This was 'the largest gathering in the history of

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<sup>100</sup> Katsiaounis op. cit., p. 508.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> Choizi op. cit., p. 23.

the community' and it underscored that 'the Turks of Cyprus were against both to *enosis* and self- government'.<sup>103</sup>

At this point the leadership of the Turkish Cypriot community began to actively engage in a campaign against communism and, as a consequence, against those members of the community that cooperated with the Greek Cypriot left whether through the old trade unions or Akel. These were expressions of a secessionist policy firmly emerging out of a changing political outlook amongst the leadership. A policy that was to become both more generalised and ultimately systematically pursued, culminating in the late 1950s.

The important issue which emerges here is the increasingly sharply defined possibilities emerging from developments within the Turkish Cypriot community. The demand for *enosis* was becoming intensified and consolidated as the unitary demand of the Greek Cypriot community while the accompanying developments in the Turkish Cypriot community were leading to the homogenisation of the community under an increasingly articulated definition of the 'self' as a minority community threatened not only by *enosis* but also by majority rule. Each step in the intensification of the Greek Cypriot struggle was accompanied by a qualitative response by the Turkish Cypriot community. Seeing these developments from the perspective of the colonial government, as Attalides does, does not permit an appreciation of the political forcefulness with which the Turkish Cypriots opposed Greek Cypriot nationalism and the extent to which that opposition was accompanied by an increasingly articulated definition of the Turkish Cypriot social subject. The process of the homogenisation of the Turkish Cypriot community was slower than that of the Greek Cypriot community, but the outcome was no less dynamic for that. This aspect of the nationalisation process of the Turkish Cypriot community is lost by authors who view the period leading to ethnic violence primarily from the perspective of British policies which contributed to the strengthening of the Turkish Cypriot community and British reactions to the internationalisation of the Greek Cypriot demand for union with Greece.

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<sup>103</sup> Katsiaounis op. cit., p. 513.

The effort to internationalise the Greek Cypriot demand for union with Greece centred around appeals to the United Nations. The British reaction to this focused on creating the conditions for the effective recognition of Turkey as an interested party in Cyprus. This was perceived to represent the best guarantee for securing the continuation of British rule in Cyprus. Whether Turkey would have effectively asserted itself over the settlement of the Cyprus question in the absence of British initiatives is uncertain. But the effort to internationalise the Greek Cypriot demand for union with Greece did in itself provide a platform through which Turkish interests could be heard. There is substantial evidence to suggest that the British government encouraged the articulation of a Turkish demand for partition. There is also evidence to suggest that the British permitted easy access for a Turkish input in assisting the effective organisation of the Turkish Cypriot community against the demand for union and for the assertion of the demand for partition. The EOKA armed struggle for union with Greece that broke out in 1955 was met with an intensification of these British efforts. The British policy which sought to establish an auxiliary police force which was staffed by Turkish Cypriots clearly carried the potential of sparking an armed conflict between the two communities. These developments cannot be overlooked. They all entailed the potentiality for intercommunal violence. However, they cannot overshadow the fact that the British reaction to a threat posed to its interests was effective only in a context where there was a corresponding subject ready to exploit the British resistance to concede the union of Cyprus with Greece. The Turkish Cypriot drive to oppose the union of the island with Greece was nurtured by the community itself over a long period. The process through which the community was able to effectively resist it was assisted by both Britain and Turkey. It is the latter that has overwhelmed the appropriation of the period of British rule by almost every Greek Cypriot author who has written on the subject.

Consequently, while Attalides and Kitromilides may recognise that Turkish Cypriot nationalism was becoming widespread after the Second World War it appears that British and Turkish initiatives have been privileged over the potentialities of the Turkish Cypriot process of homogenisation which even if incomplete has depended on the political underpinning of the opposition to *enosis*. It was this shared interest

between the British and the Turkish Cypriot community that provided the real basis for an interdependency between the two. But it was not the colonial government that was imposing the rules. The Turkish Cypriot community was also asserting its own conditions. As Choizi has argued,

Faced with external and internal pressures, the British found themselves forced to support the Turkish Cypriot community in every area.<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> Choizi *op. cit.*, p. 23.

## CHAPTER 4

### THE GREEK CYPRIOT RECEPTION OF INDEPENDENCE: VISIONS OF THE FUTURE

#### INTRODUCTION

It has been observed that a predominant characteristic of the Greek Cypriot anti-colonial nationalist movement was the separation of demands for national restoration - *enosis* - from demands for social, economic and political reforms.<sup>1</sup> This tendency, it may be argued, matured during the period of colonial rule through two main processes. Firstly, the assumption of a radicalised demand for *enosis* by the church which, in its bid to reassert itself as the sole political authority of the Greek Cypriot community, pursued a monolithic unionist policy and succeeded in imposing a *vision of divisions* which deemed the pursue of a reformist policy in the context of colonial rule as irreconcilable with being Greek. The separation between demands for national restoration from demands for reform became evident as early as the 1920s and was dependent on an eschatological understanding: 'all problems, primarily economic ones, would be solved in the next life - that which would follow *enosis*'.<sup>2</sup> In a context where the hope for an immediate union with Greece appeared more and more remote, sections of the political elite recognised that any possibility for an improvement in the well being of the Cypriots could not be surrendered to what increasingly appeared as unattainable. This division within the political elite was not settled until the late 1940s when a major and final attempt was made by the reformist elements, including the left wing party AKEL, to reach an agreement with the colonial government for the introduction of a new constitution. From there on the church, strengthened by the withdrawal in 1948 of the

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<sup>1</sup> S. Anagnostopoulou 1999 p. 16; M. Attalides 1986 p. 140, P. Kitromilides 1981 p. 452.

<sup>2</sup> Anagnostopoulou op. cit., p. 16.

reformist elements from these negotiations and the election in 1950 of the Bishop of Kitium, Makarios III, whose candidacy had been supported by the church establishment at large, as the new Archbishop, led to an energetic and focused pursuit of *enosis*.

The second process which enhanced the progressive separation between demands for social reforms and national restoration was established by the persistent British resistance to the liberalisation of the decision making process. Simultaneously the failure on the part of the colonial government to accurately appraise developments within the Greek Cypriot community often led to the imposition of policies that became instruments of mobilisation in the hands of uncompromising unionists against the reformist factions.<sup>3</sup> In this respect it may be argued that the policies of the colonial government contributed towards efforts by the church to impose a vision of divisions which recognised that only an organic link with Greece could lead to salvation, whether national, economic or political.

These processes led to a methodical campaign aimed at turning world opinion against Britain's resistance to grant freedom to the *Cypriots*. This included an intense effort in the period between 1950-1954 to pressurise succeeding Greek governments to take the Cyprus case to General Assembly of the United Nations. The Greek official resistance to jeopardising its relations with Britain was met with a successful campaign by Archbishop Makarios to mobilise Greek public opinion by appealing to the Greek citizens through channels such as the Greek Orthodox Church, the mass media and other non-governmental institutions.<sup>4</sup> Combined with Britain's adamant resistance to hold any bilateral negotiations with Greece on the future of the island and an underestimation of the strength of the Turkish position regarding Cyprus, Greece made the first Cyprus appeal to the UN in 1954.<sup>5</sup> Karamanlis, elected Prime Minister of Greece in the following year, described the appeal at the time as 'justified, but unfortunate'.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Hatzivasiliou 1997 p. 5, 9.

<sup>4</sup> E. Hatzivasiliou 1997 pp. 10-18; G. H. Kelling 1990 pp. 123-125; I. Stephanides 1999 pp. 1-32, 256-262; P. Terlexis 1971 pp. 84-102; A. Vlachos 1980 pp. 39-59.

<sup>5</sup> Terlexis op. cit., pp. 107-157.

<sup>6</sup> Hatzivasiliou 1997 p.18.



The combination of British interests in Cyprus,<sup>7</sup> Turkish Cypriot opposition to *enosis* extending to efforts to mobilise Turkey's involvement to counterbalance the Greek Cypriot demand,<sup>8</sup> and Turkey's concerns over security around its borders<sup>9</sup> meant that any step towards the internationalisation of the Cyprus case would be simultaneously a step towards the assertion of Turkish interests in Cyprus. The internationalisation of the Cyprus case, first and foremost as a policy asserted by the Greek Cypriot leadership, combined with the simultaneous pressure exerted by the outbreak of the armed struggle, dictated a new course of policy if Britain was to retain its place on the island. Indeed, the policy pursued by Britain was one of securing its own interests by virtue of the irreconcilable interests of the rest of the parties - Greek Cypriot and Greek interests on the one hand and Turkish Cypriot and Turkish interests on the other.<sup>10</sup> It was understood that British interests could be best served through an international solution:

From now on, the issue would not be regarded as a colonial issue with an international perspective, but an international question with a colonial aspect. The difference was crucial: if the issue was seen as a colonial one, the views of the majority of the population would be taken into account much more than if it were an international question; in an international question the views of the most important ally for Britain would be more likely to prevail. This ally was Turkey, so Turkey was now firmly established as part of the dispute. From now on, the [colonial office's] influence on future policy diminished dramatically, as Britain dealt with what was becoming more and more a complicated Greco-Turkish dispute.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> For a comprehensive account of British interests on Cyprus in the 1950s see B. O'Malley and I. Craig 1999 pp.1-8, 32-44.

<sup>8</sup> Hatzivasiliou op. cit., p.11: 'Turkish Cypriot pressure was applied on a reluctant Turkey to resist Greek Cypriot moves. Again, the pressure came from Turkish Cypriots, not from Turkey'.

<sup>9</sup> Terlexis explains that the Turkish government issued subtle warnings before its active involvement in the settlement of the Cyprus issue suggesting that the understanding in Ankara was that Britain did not intend to surrender the sovereignty of the island. See Terlexis op. cit., pp. 134-148.

<sup>10</sup> The first formal recognition of Turkey as an interested party in the Cyprus case was made when the British government, in 1955, almost a year after the Greek appeal to the UN, invited both Greece and Turkey to discuss 'political and defence issues, concerning the Eastern Mediterranean, including Cyprus'. See, for example, Terlexis op. cit., pp. 218-231.

<sup>11</sup> Hatzivasiliou op. cit., p.41.

The dispute was finally resolved but only after a series of annual appeals to the United Nations between 1954-1958;<sup>12</sup> a four year armed struggle;<sup>13</sup> the failure to arouse joint Cypriot, Greek and Turkish support for constitutional proposals submitted by the British government;<sup>14</sup> the outbreak of inter-communal violence;<sup>15</sup> and the threat of partition. The failure of Greek appeals to the UN to mobilise effective support for the Greek Cypriot case,<sup>16</sup> the inter-dependency between Turkish Cypriot and Turkish interests, the British position that it could now meet its own military and intelligence gathering interests through sovereign bases, and the US stance for a mutually acceptable solution based on a guaranteed independence<sup>17</sup> led to a series of meetings between the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers organised on the fringes of the NATO council meeting in Paris in December 1958. The possibilities that opened up resulted in the first high level meeting in February 1959 between the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey in Zurich. The emerging consensus resulted in a meeting in London where all interested parties, including the leaders of the two communities, were invited to sign the Zurich and London Agreements.<sup>18</sup>

This chapter explores the process through which the Greek Cypriot leadership sought to reconstitute the Greek Cypriot community, having understood thus far that its political future laid in union with Greece. It was now necessary to enter into a process of persuasion whereby authorisation could be earned anew. In a society where an armed struggle for enosis resulted, instead, in a guaranteed and bicomunal independent Republic the difficulties were potentially manifold. Not only was a process of persuasion necessary but armed militants needed to be transformed into citizens. Further, not only did independence have to compete with the old aspiration of enosis

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<sup>12</sup> The most detailed account of these appeals is that of S. Xydis 1967.

<sup>13</sup> The most engaging accounts of developments during the armed struggle include: Nancy Crawshaw 1978, Charles Foley 1962, Robert Holland 1998.

<sup>14</sup> For an account of these proposals see Holland op. cit.; E. Hatzivasiliou 1998 pp. 67-110; S. Kyriakides 1967 pp. 26-52; Terlexis op. cit., pp.217-295.

<sup>15</sup> For details on the circumstances surrounding the outbreak of intercommunal violence see Crawshaw op. cit., pp.288-293; Holland op. cit., pp. 251-53.

<sup>16</sup> Terlexis op. cit., pp. 159-213; Xydis op. cit.

<sup>17</sup> B. O'Malley and I. Craig op. cit., pp. 68-70.

but the bicomunal character of the would be Republic conjured notions alien to a community which constituted 78% of the population.

## THE AGREEMENTS

The Agreements represented a compromise determined by the respective negotiating power of the three main external parties, Britain, Turkey and Greece. Given that *enosis* was opposed by the Turkish side on account of its own geo-strategic interests and that partition was, for obvious reasons, rejected by the Greek side, the two parties agreed to bring an independent Republic into being through two international treaties which aimed to guarantee and defend the independent status of the Republic. British interests were to be secured through a third international treaty which brought the total territory of the island with the exception of two areas which were to contain British bases and remain under the sovereignty of Britain. Consequently, the Republic was to be brought into being by three international treaties: the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Establishment.<sup>19</sup> Secondly, the two main interested parties, Greece and Turkey, sought to define the status of the two main communities within the guaranteed Republic. Given the Turkish Cypriot resistance to a system of majority rule the Agreements established the framework for a bicomunal republic through a range of provisions which were to be built into the constitution as basic articles.<sup>20</sup> These

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<sup>18</sup> For details on the developments in these meetings see Averoff, 1986 pp. 305-362; Hatzivasiliou 1997 op. cit., pp. 153-166; Holland op. cit., pp. 295-317; Vlachos op. cit., pp.235-272; .

<sup>19</sup> The Treaty of Guarantee was and remains an agreement between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the UK. The Republic of Cyprus undertook the obligation to maintain the state of affairs established by this treaty. Both union and partition were prohibited while Greece, Turkey and the UK undertook, in the event of a breach of the treaty, to consult in regard to the measures necessary and take action. If joint action is not possible each could take unilateral action with the aim of restoring the status quo.

The Treaty of Alliance is a defense agreement between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. It provides for the stationing of a Greek and a Turkish military contingent on the island, consisting of 950 and 650 officers respectively. These were to participate in the Tripartite Headquarters which would be under the rotating command of a Cypriot, Greek and Turkish General Officer.

The Treaty of Establishment defines the territory of the Republic of Cyprus as the island of Cyprus with the exception of two areas that were to remain under the sovereignty of the UK.

<sup>20</sup> According to article 182 par. 1 of the constitution, 48 articles, or sections of them, referred to in annex 3 of the constitution, all of which had been incorporated in the Zurich and London Agreements could not be amended. Cyprus Constitution 1960.

provisions defined the function of each community in the decision making process within the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the state as well as their representation within state institutions. Communal autonomy was confirmed, firstly, through a provision for the establishment of Turkish Cypriot municipalities in the five major towns where Turkish Cypriot residents were concentrated in and around an identifiable sector;<sup>21</sup> and secondly, through a provision for the establishment of two Communal Chambers consisting of elected representatives and having competence over exclusively communal matters such as religion, education, the establishment of communal courts dealing with ‘civil disputes relating to personal status and religious matters’ and the imposition of taxes in order to provide these services.<sup>22</sup>

Following a list of criteria for determining membership to one or the other community,<sup>23</sup> the Agreements defined the language of each of the two groups as the official languages of the state.<sup>24</sup> Members of the two communities were constitutionally permitted to fly the Greek and Turkish flags on private or communal premises and each community could celebrate Greek and Turkish national holidays.<sup>25</sup>

In practice, bicommunality was secured through a range of articles which fixed communal participation in all spheres and levels of government irrespective of the numerical proportion of the two communities. In the Council of Ministers, the House of Representatives, the public service and the police force, for example, the two communities would be represented according to a 70:30 ratio.<sup>26</sup> The Agreements secured a presidential regime with a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice-president each separately elected through universal suffrage by the respective

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid., Article 173.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., Articles 86-111, 152.

<sup>23</sup> The Greek/Turkish community comprises all citizens of the Republic who are of Greek/Turkish origin and whose mother tongue is Greek/Turkish or who share the Greek/Turkish cultural traditions or who are members of the Greek-Orthodox Church/who are Moslems. Ibid., Article 2.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., Article 3.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., Articles 4 and 5.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., Articles 46, 62, 123, and 130 respectively.

communities.<sup>27</sup> The same procedure was also established to determine parliamentary representation.<sup>28</sup>

If the foregoing represented a reflection of bi-communalism in the composition of government, a range of other articles defined bicommunalism in function. Briefly, the 30% participation of the Turkish Cypriots within the House of Representatives was matched by a constitutional provision which introduced the decision making method based on a separate majority vote over key areas of legislation. Modification of the electoral law, the introduction of any law relating to the municipalities and any law imposing duties or taxes required consent through a separate majority vote.<sup>29</sup> A similar function as that served by the provision of separate majority vote was introduced to the Council of Ministers where all decisions were taken on the basis of a simple majority vote except in the areas concerning foreign affairs, defence and security where the president and vice-president separately or conjointly possessed the right to veto.<sup>30</sup>

The Prime Ministers of Britain, Turkey and Greece and the leaders of the two communities, signed the Agreements in London on 19 February 1959. The task that laid ahead was the drafting of the constitution which would have to incorporate the provisions written into the Zurich and London Agreements. It was understood that a transitional period of one year would suffice for completing this task and thus progressively transferring power to the Cypriots. As might have been anticipated difficulties arose as this process unfolded. They derived from the different understanding of the Greek and Turkish sides regarding the meaning and extent of bicommunality as well as the degree of autonomy that the Turkish Cypriot community would enjoy. A major disagreement arose over the exercise of executive power. The provision for separate municipalities also proved a major obstacle in the negotiations between the two sides as the Greek Cypriots increasingly opposed this provision arguing that it was unworkable and would lead to unnecessary inefficiency. Heated negotiations

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid., Articles 1 and 39.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., Article 62.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., Article 78.

also ensued over the area that the British bases were to be permitted to extend. These and other points of conflict led to an extension of the transition period until August 16, 1960 when Independence was finally declared.

#### POSITIONS AND OPPOSITIONS DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

An immediate political task confronting the Archbishop as the presumed leader of the Greek Cypriot community was the mobilisation and confirmation of popular consent over his decision to sign on behalf of the community. If Makarios possessed any mandate to represent and act on behalf of the Greek Cypriot community this was by virtue of having been, nine years earlier, elected as archbishop. Yet this would have been a mandate committing him to the pursuit of the union of Cyprus with Greece.<sup>31</sup> Despite the fact that witness accounts of the London meeting unfailingly report Makarios' hesitance to sign the Agreements and an unsuccessful last minute effort to minimise the elements that were understood as detrimental to the Greek Cypriot people, he was eager to present the Agreements to his people not only a success but a victory.<sup>32</sup> In this context he requested from one of his closest advisors a prepared speech for the occasion of his return to Cyprus which would project a celebratory mood.<sup>33</sup>

There was relative peace on the island in the first few months after the signing of the Agreements, even if some strong sentiments were immediately vocalised by the Bishop of Kyrenia who accused Makarios for having betrayed the national cause.<sup>34</sup> However, as one author has commented:

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid., Article 57.

<sup>31</sup> Servas 1991 pp. 235.

<sup>32</sup> Initially Makarios verbally accepted the details of what was agreed in Zurich. A few days later while in London for the signature of the agreements he expressed ambivalence and made a last minute attempt to alter certain points entailed in them. Averoff op. cit., 346-355.

<sup>33</sup> Kranidiotis 1981 pp. 385-6

<sup>34</sup> Papageorgiou 1980 pp. 84-6; Servas op. cit., pp. 206-12

The early criticisms came from people who objected to the idea of an **independent Republic** as such. The full realisation that the Constitution of the Republic was a means by which the Government and the resources of the island would, be shared with their arch-enemies had still to come.<sup>35</sup>

However, within a few months from the signing of the Agreements Makarios was to face opposition from the only elected representatives amongst the Greek Cypriot community, the mayors of the six main towns, who took issue with his handling of the decision making process regarding the Greek Cypriot community's position in the Joint Constitutional Commission which commenced its work on April 13, 1959.<sup>36</sup> At the same time there emerged reactions from some quarters over Makarios' choice of ministers for the transitional cabinet. The relative youthfulness of the members of the first cabinet reflected Makarios' strategic choice of appointing EOKA fighters in ministerial positions and displacing veteran politicians such as Themistoklis Dhervis, the mayor of Nicosia and his predecessor Ioannis Clerides.<sup>37</sup> By July 1959, five months after the signing of the Agreements, more serious and disruptive opposition preoccupied Makarios. Grivas, a Greek Cypriot who had been residing in Greece but returned to Cyprus to head EOKA, and, therefore potentially commanded a considerable degree of influence amongst the Greek Cypriot community, had withdrawn his support for the Agreements and accused Makarios of allegedly having made secret deals at the meeting in London.<sup>38</sup>

The significance of Grivas' intervention was witnessed by the split that emerged within EDMA (Unified Democratic Front for Reconstruction), a broad political organisation

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<sup>35</sup> Zenon Stavrinides 1976 p. 37.

<sup>36</sup> Three committees were set up during the transitional period with the aim of giving effect to the Agreements. The Joint Committee which met in London dealt with the details of the international treaties, the Joint Constitutional Commission met in Cyprus in order to draft the constitution and the Transitional Committee which was to see through the transfer of power. The mayors' discontent with Makarios' handling of negotiations at the Joint Constitutional Committee is evident from the newspaper coverage of the meetings between Makarios and the mayors over the formal establishment of separate Turkish municipalities. More starkly, it became expressed in a memorandum submitted to Makarios on 22 October 1959.

<sup>37</sup> For a discussion of the social composition of EOKA see Markides 1977.

<sup>38</sup> The split between Makarios and Grivas is only of interest here in so far as it throws some light on the sources that exercised any influence in forming positions towards the newly agreed independence. For details on this dispute see Droushiotis 1998 pp. 307-329; Papageorgiou op. cit., pp. 111-122.

set up with the joint agreement of Grivas and Makarios in an attempt to unite the EOKA fighters under a single organisation.<sup>39</sup> Following Grivas' intervention some of the fighters withdrew from EDMA to join forces with the opposition. The tension between Makarios and Grivas appeared to subside following a meeting between the two in October 1959, two months before presidential elections. Closer to the election date AKEL also vocalised its opposition following Makarios' refusal to establish a united front reflecting all political factions.<sup>40</sup> Presidential elections were planned for the 13<sup>th</sup> December and the opposition forces formed a joint front to nominate a single candidate against Makarios.

This was a coalition of diverse forces. The election manifesto of its candidate did not seek to abolish the Zurich Agreements or achieve anything other than express views already apparent in that section of the mass media which had aligned itself to Makarios. However, it appealed to the electorate to demonstrate its condemnation of Makarios' choice to sign agreements which represented, as it was argued, a national humiliation.<sup>41</sup> AKEL, on the other hand, expressed its discontent primarily around the issue of the three international Treaties which were seen as constituting an imperialist enclosure of Cyprus. *Haravgi*, its newspaper, projected the Agreements as a *fait accompli* and that despite the negative elements entailed in them it was also understood that they opened the way for improvement. It was necessary to do away with the imperialist military bases and the rights that Turkey acquired in relation to Cyprus. Therefore, the main aim of the struggle, it was argued, should be the demilitarisation of the island but also the democratisation of the constitution.<sup>42</sup> AKEL was numerically the most important and organised faction of the opposition.

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<sup>39</sup> There exist contradictory accounts as to whether EDMA emerged out of an initiative by Makarios or Grivas. There is agreement though that the formation of this organisation was welcome by both. See A. Fantis 1999 pp. 23-24; Kranidiotis op. cit. pp. 410-413; Papageorgiou op. cit., pp. 94-95; Servas op. cit., pp. 213-15.

<sup>40</sup> Droushiotis op. cit., 335-36. Servas op. cit., 228-30.

<sup>41</sup> *Ethniki* 27 November 1959.

<sup>42</sup> *Haravgi* 08 March 1959, 01 July 1959, 07 August 1960, 16 August 1960.



The mayors of the six main towns, three of whom were elected in 1952 as AKEL candidates, began to increasingly assert a consistent opposition to Makarios' handling of Greek Cypriot affairs during the transitional period. They did not constitute a distinct political union and considering their diverse political outlook and affiliations their cooperation was not likely to develop into an all encompassing political position. However, in their capacity as mayors they articulated their opposition against Makarios long before AKEL unambiguously defined its opposition closer to the presidential election campaign of December 1959. It was a provision entailed in the Zurich and London Agreements that first brought them into head to head conflict with Makarios.<sup>43</sup> It soon extended to an attack against Makarios' alleged dictatorial leadership. This was the only section of the opposition constituted by elected representatives; by virtue of the fact that they stood united on issues that extended to the manner in which the affairs of the Greek Cypriot community were conducted it represented an opposition with a potential mobilising character. The newspaper coverage of exchanges between Makarios and the mayors reveal a tension which had its source in a distrust of Makarios' will to stand by Greek Cypriot rights in spite of the Agreements. It was understood that the decision making process over affairs which were detrimentally affecting the Greek Cypriot community was monopolised by Makarios and his close associates and thus extended their attack, declaring him as an undemocratic leader.<sup>44</sup> Not only was there a strong and organised party, AKEL, as a ready base for mobilisation but Dervis, the mayor of Nicosia, has been described by one of the most important emerging politician of that period, Glafkos Clerides, as 'a strong personality of the right who for many years dominated the political life of the town'.<sup>45</sup> This is also echoed by another author who has described Dervis as a man who was able to draw with him those sections of the professional class and shop owners who had been faithful followers.<sup>46</sup> Dervis headed, since the 1940s, the Cyprus National Party, KEK, formed at the time as a response to the increasing power of AKEL. He was, as were the rest of the mayors, amongst the delegation of advisors which met Makarios in London in February 1959, a day before

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<sup>43</sup> The provision concerned the establishment of separate Turkish municipalities in five towns.

<sup>44</sup> Cyprus Mail 31 October 1959; Ethniki 03 November 1959.

<sup>45</sup> Clerides op. cit., p.96.

the signing of the Agreements. He advised in favour of the Agreements because he saw that their rejection would be 'mad' and would 'lead to deadlock'. But, he had also argued, that the Greek Cypriots could deal with the situation after the new regime is established.<sup>47</sup> His subsequent opposition to the Agreements was formulated in terms of the exclusion of *enosis* on the one hand and the disproportionate rights that were granted to the Turkish Cypriots on the other.<sup>48</sup> As such his position represented a complete U-turn from the position he adopted in London.

However, Makarios' oldest and, as it proved, a lasting and dangerous opposition was organised around the bishopric of Kyrenia. Reactions first became apparent when it had already appeared, in 1958, that Makarios might accept a solution short of direct and immediate *enosis*. The position of this section of the opposition could be described as the only unambiguous anti-independence position articulated within Greek Cypriot society at the time. They have been referred to as unreformed unionists. The central figures associated with this group were the Bishop of Kyrenia and the secretary of the Kyrenia bishopric, Polykarpos Ioannidis. The former conducted his unionist anti-Makarios campaign through his sermons in the Kyrenia district while the latter was a regular contributor to a unionist opposition newspaper. Glafkos Clerides has described Ioannides as a hard-core unionist, anti-communist, anti-Makarios and pro-Grivas.<sup>49</sup> This faction ultimately attracted those EOKA fighters who were in opposition to independence and, of course, to Makarios.<sup>50</sup>

Only AKEL placed a fundamentally anti-western emphasis in its opposition to the Agreements. There was at the time, as Greek Cypriot newspapers reveal, a widespread discontent with western powers for allowing the violation of Greek Cypriot rights in favour of Turkey's and their own interests. However, this did not develop into an anti-western ideological predisposition. AKEL, therefore, stood in a distinct position given

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<sup>46</sup> Servas op. cit., pp. 210-11.

<sup>47</sup> Papageorgiou p. 58.

<sup>48</sup> Clerides op. cit., p. 96.

<sup>49</sup> Clerides op. cit., p. 95.

<sup>50</sup> M. Chrisodoulou 1995 p. 122.

its inherently anti-NATO and pro-Soviet philosophy. While AKEL may have possessed a unique position in this regard, the Kyrenia faction and ex-EOKA fighters stood apart from the rest of the opposition factions given their uncompromising unionist stance. A unionist aspiration may have implicitly or explicitly characterised the stated position of most vocal pro-Makarios as well as opposition factions, simultaneously though, with the sole exception of the Kerynia faction, independence as such was not attacked.<sup>51</sup>

However, the type of independence that Cypriots were about to inherit was disputed.

The positions of AKEL and the Kyrenia faction may be said to have represented the two extreme poles marking the space of a diverse opposition; a shared position could be found between the two so as to sustain these diverse forces together against Makarios.

The common denominator was of course a general position orientated against the Zurich and London Agreements which Makarios had chosen to sign.

Four weeks before the elections Dervis, the Nicosia mayor, and Ioannis Clerides, who subsequently became the presidential candidate of the anti-Zurich faction, declared the formation of the Democratic Union which drew its support from all anti-Zurich forces with the exception of AKEL. The latter nevertheless supported the candidate of the Democratic Union, Ioannis Clerides. The Democratic Union was to struggle for the 'preservation of the national morale'; but having understood the Agreements as a fait accompli it was unable to offer an alternative to the electorate. Its candidate explained his nomination in these terms: 'I want to give the people the chance to express their feelings about the London and Zurich Agreements'.<sup>52</sup> The elections were fought by the opposition under the slogan: 'A vote for the candidate of the Democratic Union, is a vote of disapproval of the Agreements, a vote for the archbishop is a vote of approval'.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Even a personality such as Dervis, for example, had, a year earlier, sent a telegram in support of Makarios' statement on independence, to the British Prime Minister. Dervis' opposition to Makarios has been widely accounted as a response to the latter's reliance upon influential EOKA fighters to the exclusion of old politicians of the right such as himself. See for example, Clerides op. cit., Papageorgiou op. cit., Servas op. cit.

<sup>52</sup> Cyprus Mail 15 December 1959.

<sup>53</sup> Ethniki 27 November 1959.

Makarios' response to accusations of national betrayal and to characterisations of the Zurich and London Agreements as constitutive of national humiliation was to stress that the Agreements freed the *Cypriots* from foreign rule, adding that from this new position the *Cypriot* people would enter a new stage of struggles.<sup>54</sup>

There was a 91% turn out for the elections which took place on 13 December 1959. Makarios emerged as the victor with 67% of the vote. Upon the announcement of his victory he evaluated the public sentiment displayed by a large crowd of supporters who had gathered outside the archbishopric in the following words:

I realise that your manifestations constitute an expression of national happiness because for the first time after eight centuries the administration of Cyprus reverts to Greek hands.

Yet, he also went on to say that:

Greeks and Turks must cooperate in a spirit of sincerity, with absolute respect of each other's natural rights and with a deep understanding of the identity of our interests and rights. Bigotry and antagonism must disappear, the barriers must be removed and the spirit of unity must prevail in all expressions of our life.<sup>55</sup>

But as one newspaper commented the 'Archbishop made no reference to what was the main controversial issue of the elections, the Zurich and London Agreements'.<sup>56</sup>

In the meantime the Joint Constitutional Commission in Nicosia was drafting the constitution. It confronted a range of problems on issues contested by one or the other community. The most intense of these conflicts was over the exercise of executive power.<sup>57</sup> Other problems included the formal establishment of separate municipalities and the provision for separate majorities.

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<sup>54</sup> *Ethniki* 28 November 1959.

<sup>55</sup> *Phileleftheros* 15 December 1959.

<sup>56</sup> *Cyprus Mail* 15 December 1959.

<sup>57</sup> Averoff op. cit., p. 384, Clerides op. cit., p. 109

Of these, only the final agreement for formalising separate municipalities remained outstanding though the relevant articles of the constitution were drafted. It was therefore stated in the constitution that separate municipalities would be established in the five main towns. The question was how to implement this. The practical implementation of this provision depended on an agreement between the two sides as to how separate municipalities could realistically be formed. However, another provision which also awaited implementation was that of the 70:30 employment ratio in the civil service. During the transitional period both of these issues were widely aired through the mass media and Greek Cypriot reactions registered. Despite the fact that the definition of the source of executive power was the problem that has been described as the thorniest of that period, it did not, nevertheless, invite the same degree of mass media attention that these issues did.

These major issues were of a different kind of significance in so far as they invited reactions intended to pressurise Makarios to act according to the understood interests of the Greek Cypriot community. Though Makarios did come under serious pressure in relation to issues relating to the international treaties the municipalities issue and that regarding employment in the civil service jobs represent the only examples where he appears to have experienced significant public pressure in relation to matters exclusively relating to the sharing of power and resources between the two communities. These issues have a dual significance. Firstly, they invited public opinion pressure on Makarios and therefore throw some light on the process of policy formation in relation to specific aspects of the constitution. Secondly, they opened the way for reactions towards the Agreements on the basis of their component elements rather than as a reaction to Turkey's involvement or the exclusion of *enosis*. In other words, they engaged people with the impact of the Agreements on matters relating to internal organisation.

The Joint Constitutional Commission completed its work on April 6, 1960 and the constitution was signed by the elected leaders of the two sides. However, this did not prevent tense exchanges between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot newspapers. Editorials in the Greek Cypriot press did not pass on any opportunity to declare that the Agreements constituted the first but not final stage towards a future settlement. Turkish Cypriot newspapers promptly reacted to warn the Greeks off any attempt to overturn the Agreements reminding them that Turkey stood at their side.

When on the 16th August 1960 Greek and Turkish Cypriots set out on the new course of independence Greek Cypriot society was characterised by an absence of an unambiguous encouragement to value, authorise and legitimise the newly achieved status of the island. In their majority Greek Cypriots voted for Makarios as their leader. There is nothing to suggest that they were doing so in approval of the bicomunal Republic. Makarios' election as president of the Republic took place in a context of newspaper reactions against the Agreements even if it was simultaneously felt that these constituted a better basis to pursue the next stage in a drive to the future. It was also argued that the Agreements were imposed upon the Greek Cypriots by western powers for their own interests. The political language disseminated, conjured the 1960 status of the island as but a station on the road to national fulfilment.

#### THE DAY OF INDEPENDENCE: MARKING THE FUTURE

##### Newspapers.

That no political faction expressed an unambiguous commitment to independence would have been evident to anyone observing the celebrations over the proclamation of independence. The front page editorial of a main pro-government newspaper precisely project one form through which a dominant public discourse began to be cultivated soon

after the Agreements were signed. Under the title 'Faith in the Future' it stressed the necessity of unity amongst the Greek Cypriot population in the following terms:

Whatever the reasons are for the divisions among Cypriot Hellenism, they must be eliminated. Let us forget the past. The present and the future are what must constitute the centre of our attention. Because, *the future is in the hands of the four fifths of the population of Cyprus, who are the masters of life, in all its manifestations, of this place.* The Agreements do not shape the future. It is the duty of all the Greeks of Cyprus to be conscious and appreciate this reality. Feelings of defeatism and pessimism have no place here. They simply make bolder the *intruding partners*, expose us to greater danger and hinder the *historical route of Cypriot Hellenism* towards the desirable end, which will confirm centuries of struggles and sacrifice. If we all look to the Cyprus Agreements not as an end, but as a breathing station, we will find the essential ways to *forge our unity for the purpose of realising our historical aim*; only this unity, rather than feelings of bitterness, melancholy and insecurity, could restore life breeding hope and faith in the future.<sup>58</sup> (My emphases.)

A cursory reading of the Greek Cypriot press commentaries in the early years of independence suggests that similar appeals were frequent.<sup>59</sup> The appeal for unity in the name of 'realising our historical aim' was explicitly addressed not the citizens of the new republic but the Greek 'four fifths of the population'. As the editorial elsewhere states this was the 'indigenous population of the island, more Greek than mainland Greeks'. The 'holy right' of self-determination was denied to them by the leaders of western powers who despite the fact that they 'declare themselves to be the champions of the principles of freedom and democracy' in this case sacrificed the right of self-determination in favour of 'their own military and political expediencies'. However, a divisive regime such as the one imposed 'is doomed to collapse under the burden of the blunders of its instigators'.

Nevertheless, the new situation was not to be treated pessimistically since the Agreements were not to be understood as the final chapter in the history of Cypriot

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<sup>58</sup> Eleftheria 16 August 1960.

<sup>59</sup> Examples of newspaper editorials which treated the Republic as a mere stage to further struggles even before the Republic was proclaimed included: Dimokratia, 22 August 1960; Haravgi, 01 July 1960; Alithia, 15 August 1960; Phileleftheros, 16 August 1960.

Hellenism but as a the starting point for further struggles, this editorial stressed. It was, in other words, a historical moment which represented the need for the reconstitution of the struggle for national realisation from a new base. The Republic brought about through the Agreements did not represent the will of the Greek Cypriot people, it was argued, but it was nevertheless born by the struggles of the Greek Cypriot people only with foreign interests having been imposed over and above that will. Yet this could not bring Hellenic domination in Cyprus to an end since the overwhelming majority population of the island were Greeks and no matter how many rights the 'intruding partners' were given, the will of this majority could utilise new opportunities to realise its duty to history. Since Cyprus belonged to the Greeks who were 'the masters of life, in all its manifestations, on the place', Cyprus itself was Greek. Given that new opportunities presented themselves to re-claim the future of Cypriot Hellenism the critics should, it was argued, put an end to their pessimism and fatalism. Unity around a sense of hope and optimism could restore future prospects.

Similarly, on the same day another pro-government newspaper confidently declared that independence constituted the 'starting point of the second phase of our struggle'. Adding that 'People's struggles do not end as long as a People survives'.<sup>60</sup>

These observations may be briefly summarised in a sequence which reflects the process through which the Greek Cypriots were encouraged to experience and articulate their relationship to the Agreements: the indigenous population of Cyprus was Greek. Its right for self-determination had been violated by western powers. Yet the divisive elements of the constitution carried the seeds of its collapse. The Greeks of Cyprus had to remain united on the basis of an understanding that the state of affairs established by the new regime was only a transitional stage to self realisation. Finally, that further struggles lay ahead along 'the historical route of Cypriot Hellenism towards the desirable end'.

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<sup>60</sup> Phileleftheros 16 August 1960.



This was the dominant form in which the relationship between past, present and future was being constructed. While the present - the Agreements - appeared as a violation of the past struggles and the will of the Greek Cypriots, they were, nevertheless, also treated as a possibility for establishing a future which was to reflect the will of the island's historic and majority population. However, what remained unclear was the content of that will. After all, a historic turn had been made. Independence became the reality and despite criticisms levelled against the content of the Agreements it did not extend to independence as such. It was not in any way being suggested that to settle for independence constituted a national disaster. Attitudes towards independence were if anything unaddressed. And though independence was not explicitly defined as a problem, the undemocratic character of the Agreements was.

But even if the content of the struggle went largely undefined, the language that was launched against the Agreements was nevertheless speaking to a familiar social subject. Or, more appropriately, it was seeking to reaffirm the familiar social subject. The least that the readers could understand was that the settlement reached in Zurich and London was not a settlement that the leading voices within their community were willing to accept.

It is possible to elaborate further. Beyond the general rhetoric around the Agreements, newspapers also provided a means through which the readers could gain some insight into the specificities. This process of familiarisation emerged through a drive to popularise the practical problems that emanated from the Agreements. During the transitional period a collusion between the mass media and interest groups potentially affected should certain constitutional provisions be implemented, was evident. The common-sensical interpretation of constitutional provisions regarding the representation of the two communities within the civil service and the establishment of separate municipalities seems to have been the most important channel for familiarising the masses with the Agreements. There were two main interest groups that can be identified. The first was constituted by those Greek Cypriot residents of the five main

towns who could have found themselves residing in a Turkish Cypriot municipality if these were to be physically separated. The second interest group was constituted by civil servants who could have found their prospects of promotion affected if the constitutional provision for a 70:30 communal representation in the civil service was to be implemented. The latter was an organised group with institutional representation; the trades unions. The former was organisationally less defined in that it was brought into existence by a reaction to the potential effects of the related constitutional provision and the mass media coverage of the negotiations that ensued in an attempt to implement the concerned provision. Their protest was registered through demonstrations and mass meetings organised by the town councils, while newspapers published articles carrying expert opinion as well as editorials against the establishment of separate municipal councils.

This was an issue against which Greek Cypriots at large were invited to form their opinions through media coverage, the mayors' influence upon the population of the towns and the relative vocalisation of that part of the population which was to be potentially affected by the separation of municipalities. Newspaper titles intended to stir public feeling were frequent:

“In Limassol the Turkish municipality will be two thirds Greek.”<sup>61</sup>

or,

“The voice of Neapolis, a Pancyprrian voice of protest against Turkish municipal imperialism.”<sup>62</sup>

And,

“The municipal council of Famagusta rejects the partition of the town.”<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Ethniki 28 April 1959.

Terms such as partition and imperialism were emotive given that since 1956 Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots demanded the partition of the island between Greece and Turkey, between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Imperialism on the other hand was part of the standardised vocabulary through which the process that prevented the Greeks of Cyprus from completing their course to national restoration was interpreted. The prospective municipalities envisioned by the Agreements were not referred to as municipal authorities in the mass media. They were instead commonly described as partition:

Most probably the Greeks exaggerated the similarities between separate Turkish municipalities and having the island actually partitioned.... On the Greek logic, Cyprus is a Greek island, and the Republic of Cyprus a Greek-dominated State; and any Turkish municipalities would amount to a Turkish 'state' within the official (and Greek dominated) State. Of course, if it were accepted that the official Republic is a bicomunal, Greco-Turkish State, then the existence of Turkish-controlled municipalities would be no more of an aberration than the existence of Greek-controlled municipalities.<sup>64</sup>

The provision regarding the representation of the two communities within the civil service was contested by all trade unions which organised at least one general strike action within the civil service and forwarded a letter of protest to the United Nations Assembly.<sup>65</sup> Newspapers reiterated this theme through an endless number of editorials that appeared in the period between independence and the breakout of inter-communal violence by the end of 1963.

The discontent expressed by newspapers evoked the nation, the will of the majority and the rights of the individual in the case of the municipalities issue. The notion of individual rights was also the primary basis on which the case against the ratio of communal representation in the civil service was articulated. It was likely that a

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<sup>62</sup> *Ethniki* 09 May 1959.

<sup>63</sup> *Ethniki* 19 April 1959.

<sup>64</sup> Stavrinides *op. cit.*, pp. 49-50.

<sup>65</sup> *Eleftheria* 22, 27, 28 May 1959.

campaign framed around these assertions were successful enough to have provoked an identity of views between the readers and those with the power to disseminate ideas. The language was familiar and made sense. Whether approached through notions invoking the interests of the ethnic group or by reference to individual rights, the Agreements could be interpreted as a violation of some principle which could arouse Greek Cypriot public opinion against the said provisions, in effect the Agreements at large. As one author has observed, the 'average Greek probably felt that the Turks should only have been given jobs in proportion to their ratio of the population'<sup>66</sup>

### Makarios' Speeches.

President Makarios gave four speeches on the day independence was proclaimed. The first was in the context of the official ceremony in the parliament room, where during the first hour of 16th August the president, the vice-president and the departing British governor, Hugh Foot, signed the Agreements along with the three international treaties. The second was the message to the Cypriot people broadcast by the mass media. Thirdly, there was an address at a Te Deum service at Faneromeni Church in Nicosia, the place where Makarios first took the EOKA oath making a life commitment to *enosis*. The fourth was a short speech at the mass gathering organised to welcome and honour the EOKA fighters.

On that same day the two communities of Cyprus held separate and quite distinct celebrations. The separate arrival of army contingents from Greece and Turkey were met by members of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities respectively, with equal exhibitions of joy.<sup>67</sup> The event that appears to have received the greatest attention amongst Greek Cypriots was the arrival of EOKA fighters who had been released from prisons in Britain but were barred from entering Cyprus before independence was established.<sup>68</sup> They were received by the Greek Cypriot public with a grand and very

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<sup>66</sup> Loizos 1974 p.124.

<sup>67</sup> Cyprus Mail, Eleftheria, Phileleftheros 17 August 1960

<sup>68</sup> See Eleftheria and Phileleftheros 17, 18 August 1960.

public welcome. Makarios' welcoming speech to the fighters stressed the significance of the newly achieved freedom after centuries of enslavement:

With tears of gratitude....the Cypriot people recognise again in your heroic faces the sacred symbols of the struggle and salute the founders of those principles which have now been attained through superhuman sacrifices under the leadership of Digenis<sup>69</sup> and yourselves, the glorious EOKA fighters....You made years of struggle, labour and sacrifice for ideals which today have become a reality.... You, more than anyone else, are the carriers of the supreme value of freedom, you are the incarnation of the spirit of this Greek virtue which has been inculcated in your heroic and powerful souls through a long tradition... But your work has not been completed. In front of us now stands a new stage of struggles, a new stage of ventures. These we must undertake collectively, no longer through the use of the hand grenade and guns, but with the power of our souls, in order to build our Republic upon a firm basis, to secure the happiness, progress and peace of our people. I am certain, that with the same faith that you have struggled in the battlefield you will now struggle in the field of peace. With this exhortation I welcome you again in the holy Cypriot land, which has become free through the sacrifices of its people.<sup>70</sup>

This presidential speech represented a clear break with the narrative of the *enosis* aspiring past. Makarios referred to freedom as a Greek virtue but he did not reveal an aspiration for the union of Cyprus with Greece. Greekness may have been an underlying reference point in his speech but Greece was not. Neither was there a projected nostalgia about the just surrendered dream of *enosis*. On the contrary, *enosis* may not have materialised but Cyprus was now free. Freedom, not *enosis*, was retrospectively cast as the real object of the EOKA struggle. And the *Cypriot* people were now free. Yet, a number of questions could be posed in an effort to further understand how Greek Cypriot society was being encouraged to prepare for the new realities as well as the limitations that existing realities within this society may have posed upon its leadership.

#### *The Bicomunal Republic and its Social Subject.*

Clearly this was no ordinary moment in either the history of the communities or of the relationship between the two. Makarios' speech seeks to define the meaning of that

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<sup>69</sup> This was the pseudonym by which Grivas, the leader of EOKA, was known.

<sup>70</sup> Phileleftheros 17 August 1960.

moment in the history of the Greek Cypriot community but not in the history of the relation of the two communities. While the end of colonial rule, which marked the beginning of the new era of freedom, became possible through an agreement over the form that the post-colonial future would take, this form remained unaddressed. There was no reference in his speech which could be construed as a positive acknowledgement of the responsibilities implied by the very reality that the newly established state was a bicomunal state. Yet, its survival depended on a recognition that the population of Cyprus was composed of two political communities. This was a crucial fact upon which the ability of the two communities to establish a constructive working relationship and a positive spirit about what they could jointly achieve, depended.

Yet while this was a bicomunal state it was also a state of and for the *Cypriot people* as a whole. Yet, this was only a potential people. It was still to be underwritten with meaning. Most importantly, to be brought into existence, a social subject constitutive of the *people* had yet to be defined. And though Makarios referred to the *Cypriot* people it was unlikely that this was intended as an allusion to a universal Cypriot subject. The past struggles of the *Cypriot* people evoked in his speech were no doubt those of the Greek Cypriots. Simultaneously, his call ‘to build *our* Republic upon a firm basis’ did not suggest the social subject which constituted the ‘we’. It stressed the need for a collective effort in the new struggles that lay ahead. But whose Republic was this? And what was the constitutive subject of the collective that was to undertake the struggle for building ‘our Republic’?

Though the significance of these omissions becomes most apparent when examining the events that were to unfold in the first years of independence it is possible to discern something more in relation to the manner in which the Greek Cypriot community was being encouraged to understand the new era of independence. On the same day Makarios released his public message to the *Cypriot* people. This was a message intended both for a Greek and a Turkish Cypriot audience. Amongst other things, he said:

The Cypriot people has already proven that it possesses all those virtues which constitute the good citizen and the free person. A *long historic tradition*, deriving from one of the most *ancient and noble civilisations*, has distilled in the souls of our people the *duty towards freedom*, love for justice, faith in moral law, a dedication to the ideals of peace, love for the noble values of life<sup>71</sup> (My emphasis.)

The long historic tradition of an ancient and noble civilisation which cultivated a duty towards freedom was by then a conventional language referring to the Hellenic tradition, civilisation and its precious values. In that context, reference to the Cypriot people as a people possessing those virtues constituting the ‘good citizen’ could reinforce a habitual understanding of the ‘free person’ as the confirmation of Cypriot Hellenism but could not provoke any consideration of the non-congruent relationship between citizenship and Hellenism. Given this and insofar as this vocabulary became an integral part of the developing official political discourse, the Greek Cypriots were encouraged to understand the project of independence as, first and foremost, a Greek Cypriot project.

*The President's Immediate Tasks: The Preservation and Centralisation of Symbolic Capital and the Transformation of Fighters into Citizens.*

Placed in the wider context of political divisions within the Greek Cypriot community these speeches delivered by the president need to be seen as an exercise aimed at the preservation of the symbolic capital which Makarios had accumulated in the course of his ten year career as the political leader of the national struggle. Yet, the fact that from 1955 *enosis* was being pursued through two simultaneous processes, both the armed and the political struggle, meant that by the time of independence other potential claimants to capital arising from participation and contribution to the national struggle, had emerged. It was, therefore, also necessary to insure the centralisation of this capital. To centralise it was to engage in a process of persuasion aiming to unite and simultaneously be authorised by the people and by those who could potentially be recognised (that is, by

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

the people) to possess capital arising from their participation in the national struggle. There were a number of obstacles on the way to securing this.

Factions of the opposition attempted to utilise the fact that Makarios had signed the Agreements as their primary platform for contention. It was evident that each faction, with the exception of AKEL, competed for the support of the EOKA fighters. While Makarios' opponents accused him of national betrayal, claiming for themselves a purity of national ideals, he responded through an attempt to discredit some sections of the opposition in a like fashion. In a public statement he argued that during the armed struggle some of his critics were repudiated by the leader of EOKA.<sup>72</sup> With the already demonstrated destabilising potential of Grivas' intervention in Greek Cypriot politics and the subsequent defection of some EOKA fighters to the opposition camp, what figured as a priority was to secure the loyalty of the most influential as well as of the greater number of EOKA fighters.

But another simultaneous factor confronting Makarios at the time was the transformation into citizens of men who had for five years been living with the gun. Recruiting the EOKA fighters to his side in a context where the opposition contested the Agreements, an event which marked the end of the armed struggle, was an important task facing the head of the newly founded state if the legitimacy and effectiveness of the state to monopolise violence was to be secured.

Commenting on the tasks that confronted Makarios on his return to the island after the Agreements were signed, the reappearance of the fighters in everyday life and the difficulty of reintegrating the fighters into civil society, Clerides explains,

The guns held by EOKA were gathered by EOKA itself and stored in specific places. The pendulum was returning to normality, but a specific mentality created in the five years of the struggle, the mentality of living with the gun,

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<sup>72</sup> Phileleftheros 25 October 1959.



would create certain problems during the first years in the life of the Republic.<sup>73</sup>

For this reason it was crucial that Makarios was able to persuade the fighters that he, as the president of the Republic and leader of the Greek Cypriot community, could be trusted to utilise the means available for achieving a better future. Despite the general discontent projected by the newspapers towards the Agreements there was also a consensual public view that even if the Agreements had not led to national restoration as such they nevertheless provided an important basis for new struggles. It was from this new basis, constituted by the Agreements, that the future would be pursued and no longer through force of arms. That was precisely why an act of faith towards him as the head of the new state who could lead the community to the realisation of its hopes was necessary. That was why guns should be cast to one side. Therefore, having praised the fighters he went on to state that from this new platform, as free subjects, they would be conducting a struggle for peoples' happiness, peace and progress through a new set of rules. Freedom, he asserted, was inculcated through a long tradition in their 'heroic and powerful soul'. The fighters, in other words, did not fight their own struggle but the struggle of a wider collective whose tradition inculcated in them the value of freedom. And the collective was now free; the ideal had become reality in the form of 'our Republic'. On the basis of these understandings, he appealed to them to continue to act through the same spirit and therefore through a new set of methods, reflecting the new conditions. Since the Cypriot people were now free, hand grenades and guns were now to be put aside. To fight for freedom was one thing, to honour that freedom once it had been achieved was another. This was therefore, also an exercise in persuasion for arms to be laid down and the state to be authorised to monopolise the means of violence.

But more than that was necessary. Makarios appeared to have employed two main methods in his twofold effort to preserve and centralise political capital deriving from the national struggle and the transformation of armed men into citizens. One method

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<sup>73</sup> Clerides Vol. 1(Greek ed.), p.92.

was the introduction of ambiguity through political discourse; the other was to offer rewards to a substantial number of ex-fighters.

Ambiguity is evident in his effort to demonstrate and persuade that despite having settled for independence he could appeal for legitimacy from the EOKA fighters even if what they had fought for was *enosis*. Makarios' attempt to present the newly achieved independence as the realisation of freedom left much to be explained given that the mass media at large engaged in a daily exercise of presenting the constitution as an expression of a mutilated independence. In a speech earlier on that day at a Te Deum service at Faneromeni church he attempted to do precisely that. He explained:

Today is a landmark in our national history. After hard struggles, sacrifices, blood and toil we have reached this stage from where we can look back with pride and forward with confidence, hope and faith. The difficulties have been many. In the face of these difficulties the achievement has been very great and as such must be appreciated by all those who bear political responsibility and an understanding of the problems facing us. A disregard of reality would constitute an act of undermining what has been achieved and would lead to destruction and ruin. It is now an undisputed fact that Cyprus is now freed of the colonial yoke and though still bleeding from the bonds of slavery, is capable of following with its powers the uphill way forward... The helm of the Cyprus vessel is now in our hands. It is up to us to lead it firmly forward and reach the distant horizons of our hopes and desires - or smash it on the rocks of discord and negation.<sup>74</sup>

This offers some insight into the manner in which Makarios was seeking to explain the present and its relationship to the past and the future. The struggle that had been pursued confronted many obstacles; in light of this the outcome was no small achievement. A failure to understand this, he argued, would be to disregard the potential problems that lay ahead, a course which would lead to destruction. What was of greatest importance was that 'Cyprus is now freed of the colonial yoke' and 'the helm of the Cyprus vessel is now in our hands'. In other words, the end of colonial rule gave the *Cypriots* control of the state through which they could 'reach the distant horizons of our hopes and desires'. But this on the condition that reality, that is, the limitations confronting the

*Cypriot* people, were not disregarded. Here Makarios was arguing for both realism and hope to inform the current perspective - but hope and desire for what?

Similarly, he told the fighters that the ideals for which they had fought had become a reality, but that 'our work has not been completed'. Struggles and ventures lay ahead. Therefore, the fighters had fought for freedom even if they had done so under the name of *enosis*. Independence was freedom but new struggles lay ahead. In the context of a gathering to welcome the heroes who had fought for *enosis*, the failure to define the object of new struggles would have at least entertained understandings that this was *enosis*. More generally, viewed from the perspective of the negative reception of the Agreements, Makarios' discourse would have had the effect of entertaining hopes of a future free of the limitations posed by the Agreements. But this future was not named. This was the ambiguity which set in from the beginning, legitimising diverse interpretations as to what the content of the future would be. In any case independence was being met with hope but the Cyprus Republic was not being presented as a cause for celebration.

But persuasion did not depend on appeals promising new but peaceful struggles alone but also on the willingness to reward. Simultaneously this was a practical demonstration that the struggles would reflect the spirit, if not the methods, of EOKA. Granting political power to ex-EOKA fighters was one way of institutionalising individuals who could potentially threaten the political stability and unity of the community. But the wider impact of forming a government which was to be widely represented by ex-EOKA fighters was likely to be crucial in also demonstrating the link between past and present.

The appointment of fighters to ministerial positions was the highest amongst a variety of rewards which included appointment into the civil service and other state controlled

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<sup>74</sup> Phileleftheros 17 August 1960.

enterprises, offer of scholarships to study abroad and as it is often silently but widely argued within Greek Cypriot society, the distribution of land and other properties:

EOKA militants were naturally prominent in the first years of independence. Several such young men were included in Makarios' first cabinet, and many others exercised influence from further off, often in organised forms, through the ex-fighters' associations which were formed. For a few brief years former militants seem to have acted as informal duplicate government, able to intervene in areas of decision which would normally have been left to civil servants. Appointments to civil service posts, granting of educational scholarships, building permits and import franchises were all subject to such intervention. That is, in a situation of competition over scarce resources, a key criterion was the individual claimant's history of militancy, or in default of this, his personal links with militants.<sup>75</sup>

The end result was a split amongst the fighters some of whom remained adamant supporters of union and unpersuaded by Makarios' rhetoric or otherwise simply dissatisfied with the distribution of rewards. However, Makarios managed to achieve relative unity around his leadership.

#### *Beyond Makarios' speech.*

Yet, if recruiting the EOKA fighters to his side represented an important means to maximising the political capital he could command it was simultaneously the case that the mobilising power that Makarios possessed represented for the fighters an important opportunity for establishing themselves as an influential political force.<sup>76</sup> Makarios' power to mobilise derived from the historical relationship between the church and the people.<sup>77</sup> The church had effectively acted as the political representative of the ethnic group for three centuries even if there was a break of a few decades in between. As such it acted during the period of Ottoman rule as the guardian of the group. During British rule it assumed a leading position in asserting demands for national liberation. In the 1940s the church's authority was reconfirmed after the elimination of the left as a potential leader of an anti-colonial struggle. In the 1950s, Makarios, as the religious

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<sup>75</sup> Peter Loizos op. cit., p.122.

<sup>76</sup> Servas op. cit., p. 214.

representative, pursued the demand for *enosis* militantly. Following his return to the island after having signed the Agreements he was greeted, according to one newspaper, by 200,000 Greek Cypriots, half of the Greek Cypriot population, who filled the streets from the airport to the archbishopric.<sup>78</sup> The procession was led by motorcyclists who wore EOKA armbands.

Makarios declared the outcome as a victory. His subsequent election as the first president of the Republic secured him 65% of the vote. Of the 35% who stood in opposition, a considerable proportion shifted its support to Makarios following rapprochement between Akel and the newly elected president. It was the case that the political manoeuvres of Makarios were accepted through an act of faith in his judgement and national drive which brought the best that could be achieved. His authority, while having been initially dependant on the symbolic capital that would have accrued at the time - that is, at the time of his election as archbishop - to any head of the church due to the traditional relationship of the latter with the people, became confirmed through his nationalist career in the 1950s. The drive with which he pursued *enosis* between 1950 to the moment of his exile served to confirm that under the limitations that became obvious by the late 1950s, Makarios brought the best that could be delivered. As such Makarios was being authorised to assume the leadership of his community. As Markides has put it:

Although his signing of the agreements was motivated by expediency, the outcome of which was the creation of an unwanted republic, his authority suffered relatively little.<sup>79</sup>

In summary, despite the fact that Makarios' return to the island was marked by an exhibition of popular support and his intention to define the outcome of the Greco-Turkish negotiations on the Cyprus Question as a victory, he ultimately fell short of asserting a clearly discernible content to the future. Initial accusations by the opposition

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<sup>77</sup> See also K. Markides 1977 p. 36.

<sup>78</sup> Eleftheria 3 March 1959, cited in Droushiotis 1998 p.280. See also Clerides Vol. 1 p.90; M. Christodoulou 1987 p.286-87.

of his betrayal of *enosis*, combined with the eventual coalition of a diversity of forces declaring their discontent with his leadership, the need to reintegrate the EOKA fighters into civil society as well as to mobilise their support for his leadership, all contributed to the construction of a discourse which was potentially reaffirming *enosis* as a desirable aspiration even in the context of independence. In this respect, both Makarios and the opposition mutually reinforced a platform which legitimised an aspiration for *enosis*. At the same time, as revealed by the stance of pro-Makarios press, institutions and influential figures, the basis of his support was also dependant on the rejection of the Agreements as a viable and just arrangement for the future of the island. Therefore, even where independence was not perceived as a negative outcome, the Agreements were. This general dissatisfaction with the form of independence received, was also a contributing factor in establishing a fundamentally ambiguous political discourse. This ambiguity that characterised declarations over the meaning of the present, left the future open to interpretation. It was possible, in that context, to authorise Makarios from a platform of a continued demand for *enosis* as well as from a platform which accommodated independence. The failure of this political leadership to explicitly define the future must be understood as a fundamental factor accounting for what one writer has described as:

the persistence of a particular political platform in the affairs of Cyprus since her independence in 1960. The platform is the demand by sections of the Greek Cypriot community for Enosis.<sup>80</sup>

### Other Perceptions

Reservations over the form of independence established by the agreements was shared across the entire political spectrum of the Greek Cypriot community. What brought the left and the dominant right in collaboration for the first time was a shared understanding that while independence freed the *Cypriots* from foreign rule, the form of independence

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<sup>79</sup> Markides op. cit., p.36.

<sup>80</sup> P. Loizos 1974 p.115.

that emerged from the Agreements was unacceptable. In a formal announcement on the occasion of independence the left wing trade union PEO stated that:

The creation of an Independent Cyprus State had never been the aim of the Cyprus people... Independence especially in the restricted form which we will acquire tomorrow constitutes an unexpected development... Our hailing of tomorrow's change is reserved with the knowledge of all the negative and restraining points of the Agreements and of the fact that after this settlement the Cyprus Question continues to exist and seek a just solution.<sup>81</sup>

Though the statement acknowledged that the aim of the *Cypriot* people was not independence it nevertheless did not reject independence. What is clearer is the positive identification of the problem, 'the negative and restraining points of the Agreements'. In conclusion, the Cyprus question continued to exist because of those negative and restraining elements of the Agreements. While some major pro-government newspapers explicitly presented the constitution as falling short of Greek Cypriot interests, whether in majority or national terms, left wing organisations presented the shortcomings of the constitution through a language which did not mobilise the national symbolism but nevertheless projected that the only legitimate interests were those interests identified by the majority. But, as mentioned previously, the problem with appeals of this kind was that in a context where the majority was fixed, they implied the Greek Cypriot subject. AKEL's announcement on the day of independence gave a more detailed exposition of the problems lying ahead than its affiliated trade union PEO:

With the inauguration of the Republic of Cyprus one chapter of Cypriot history ends and another begins. The absolute colonial government in our country is replaced by a Cypriot one with all the limitations, of course, that have been imposed by the Zurich Agreement. Cyprus will apply to become a member of the United Nations, to occupy its position in the official international councils. Further, it is given the opportunity to establish diplomatic relations with all countries. These are the new positions and starting points, which with correct and skilful utilisation can considerably contribute to the promotion of Cypriot interests and the Cyprus issue.

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<sup>81</sup> Cyprus Mail 16 August 1960.

Having gone on to explain the limitations imposed on its international status and the sovereignty of the new state by the international treaties, it then explained:

These, *combined* with the serious restrictions on the *democratic rights of its people* which the Zurich Agreements have imposed, constitute a mutilation of the independence and democracy of Cyprus... For the Cypriot people to be able to successfully confront all these problems and to open the road forward, it is necessary that an anti-imperialist unity of the people with a minimum plan for struggle is established.<sup>82</sup> (My emphasis.)

Though AKEL, as a parliamentary party, went on to call for cooperation with all members of parliament, Greek and Turkish, there would be no mistaking that this announcement, apart from its anti-imperialist rhetoric, constituted an attack against those constitutional provisions which defined the rights of the Turkish Cypriot community. That is, the 'serious restrictions on the democratic rights of its people'.

It was indeed the case that AKEL's policy during the first years of independence was defined in relation to imperialist domination and the need it recognised in revising the constitution. But it did, at the same time, recognise that this could be best achieved through cooperation with the Turkish Cypriots. Yet it is unlikely that cooperation with the Turkish Cypriots would have been possible from a position which declared its outright aim as altering the constitution even if it called for cooperation between the two communities.

For the Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, the constitution was adopted as a sacred text; the Republic was construed as a 'monument of liberation'. Halkin Sesi, the newspaper owned by the Turkish Cypriot vice-president, Dr Kuchuk, wrote in July 1960, that:

It is doubtful that the Greeks will cooperate with the Turks for the benefit of the Republic given the repeated reference to the continuation of their struggle from the new position they have attained. A matter which reveals their

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<sup>82</sup> Haravgi 16 August 1960.



intentions... But the Turks regard the establishment of the Republic as a monument of liberation.<sup>83</sup>

With the daily practice of the Greek Cypriot mass media, presenting the Agreements as a violation of democratic and sovereign rights, the two communities were to mark the limits of their tolerance before the new Republic formally came into being.

The dominant stance amongst Greek Cypriots was partly a symptom of the fact that the communities had not reached agreement through their own political will. The constitution defined the relationship through which the two communities were to build the state. They entered into a partnership as a result of a constitutional dictation and not out of a voluntary impulse. To the Greek Cypriots, no recent or distant past nor democratic principle provided the basis to this partnership. In the absence of a mutual understanding of the past and of political will, the establishment of the bicomunal Republic and the meaning of the constitution were understood differently by the political leadership of the two communities.

There were alternative perspectives being offered through the media which were unambiguous and prescient given the immediate development after independence. The author of an article, 'Wither Cyprus', published in the Cyprus Mail on the day of independence, explained that:

[e]ver since the Zurich and London Agreement was signed it has been the target of repeated attacks, which have had a bad psychological effect on many people in Cyprus - especially amongst the Greek community. This has to a certain extent undermined the belief in the workability and even the viability of the Agreement, which brought bloodshed to an end and the Independent Republic of Cyprus into being. This disillusionment, if left unchecked, could weigh heavily against Cyprus during the first stages of her independence and could possibly wreck the ship of state... it must be realised that the Agreement is now a very real thing, and has been signed sealed and delivered... To participate in and witness the birth of a nation - which is actually what is happening - is an exciting, fascinating and stimulating experience.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> Halkin Sesi 06/07/60 quoted in Eleftheria 07/07/60.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid. Article by N. G. Dimitriou.

These views may have found a resonance with a wider body of opinion within Greek Cypriot society than might first appear. Attalides, for example, refers to a body called the 'Social Progress Society' which was established after the Second World War. This organisation expressed support for the constitutional offers made by the British in the period after the war as well as in establishing close cooperation with the Turkish Cypriots.<sup>85</sup> Attalides specifically refers to N. G. Lanitis as having been one of the prominent founders of the Society. Like Dimitriou, in 1960, Lanitis published a series of articles in the Cyprus Mail in 1963. In these, he addressed the dangers that were facing the state given the stalemate that was being reached through disagreements between the two communities over the implementation of certain of its provisions. Lanitis advised, amongst other things, that the Greek Cypriots had to respond to their constitutional obligations as well as to distinguish between their cultural and political identity. Simultaneously he stressed the need to separate between ethnic and political identity insisting that the state should become a symbol of devotion. In that respect he shared an important position with Dimitriou who, despite the overwhelming assertion of communal identities, considered it possible that a nation was in the process of construction, presumably, on the basis of a political identity which should derive from loyalty to the state.<sup>86</sup> However, to what extent this was a body of opinion which had a recognisable presence amongst the Greek Cypriot elite remains unclear. The dominant and overwhelming message projected by newspapers at the time was that justice had not yet been done. The majority of the newspapers treated this as the task that lay ahead. The Zurich and London Agreements represented a commitment only in so far as they were the means through which national restoration could be achieved. Further, Dimitriou's approach has remained, with few exceptions, unrepresented in the relevant literature.<sup>87</sup> It can safely be assumed that even if such a recognisable body of opinion

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<sup>85</sup> Attalides 1979 p.78.

<sup>86</sup> It should be stressed that insofar as this vision was asserted together with an unambiguously expressed commitment to the constitution, these two men's views represent the sole reminder that history could have followed a different course.

<sup>87</sup> Apart from Attalides, M. Christodoulou (1995) states that "There were of course, a few persons who believed that there was a need to adopt and implement the Agreements as the definite - at least for the foreseeable future - regime..." (p. 124) Lanitis' views have more recently been appropriated by some

existed, it did not pose any form of challenge to the Greek Cypriot leadership's policies nor has it, most importantly, left its lasting imprint.

#### ETHNIC ORIGINS, NATION AND STATE.

What can be undoubtedly concluded, on the basis of an examination of the political discourse developing during the transitional period, is that even where independence may have been imagined as the form through which the future would be shaped, the process of state-building under the conditions established by the Zurich Agreements was not imagined as simultaneously a process of nation-building.

The representation of two ethnic groups in all institutional structures often with an effectively equal constitutional power, precluded a process of nation-state building as Greek Cypriots may have imagined this. The Cyprus Republic could not become a Greek Cypriot nationalising state as long as two ethnic communities shared constitutional power. In other words, the newly elected president of a multi-ethnic state had two choices. Either, to be the leader of the ethnic community of which he was a member or the man at the forefront of communal reconciliation, accommodation and cooperation seeking to establish compatibility between citizenship and membership to distinct ethnic groups. It appears that the latter was not recognised as an option even if Makarios called at various moments for cooperation. But since the discourse he elaborated, in so far as it avoided the definition of a *new* social subject emerging from the constitutional arrangement of 1960, was reflective of the policy he was to pursue, any calls for cooperation could not have been understood as anything short of

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authors who recognise an equivalence between his and Akel's position at the time. Both have been understood to be expressive of a developing form of civic nationalism. What is missed in this treatment is that the significance of Lanitis' position, like that of Demetriou's, recognised the necessity not only of de-ethnicising political discourse and behaviour but crucially the need to implement the constitution. As such, a classification of his position as one of civic nationalism does not do justice to the fact that his was a position which sought to contextualise the Agreements rather than treat them as a violation of natural or democratic rights. As such their views remain to this date unprecedented. For Lanitis' position at the time, see Cyprus Mail 03-07 March 1963.

cooperation on Greek Cypriot terms. These were none less than the aim to free *society* from the understood constraints posed by the Agreements.

The day following the proclamation of independence, a foreign journalist asked Makarios as to whether any 'deeper significance' should be attached to the fact that the two communities of Cyprus celebrated through separate events the establishment of Independence. His reply was:

Primarily yesterday's celebrations were held for the establishment of the Republic. Of course, owing to the fact that the Greeks have special ties with Greece and the Turks have special ties with Turkey, the character of the celebrations was different as far as the arrival of the Turkish troops on the one hand, and the arrival of the Greek troops and the E.O.K.A. fighters on the other hand, were concerned.<sup>88</sup>

The inevitability entailed in Makarios' words was to remain a constant feature of his vision during the first years of independence. In this particular case, the special ties of Greeks and Turks of Cyprus to Greece and Turkey respectively, meant that the two communities celebrated independence separately, occupying not only a different physical but also rhetorical space. However, the Republic of Cyprus established a communal dependency for shaping the future. The two communities were embarking, through an arrangement largely characterised by power sharing, on a joint exercise of state building. The proposition that the two communities were, on independence day, more attached to their ties with wider nations and that this overshadowed what was pragmatically necessitated by virtue of the multi-ethnic state was highly significant. In short, it signalled an absence of a shared proactive support for the new Republic. Speeches and greetings on that day suggested that for the Greek Cypriots the celebrations were for independence; the new Republic, as the structural representation of independence, was relevant only insofar as it provided the platform for new struggles to be engaged in.

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<sup>88</sup> A press conference Makarios to representatives of foreign and local press 17 August 1960.

If the distinct loyalties of the two communities were perceived as inevitable, the ambiguity in political discourse simply served to confirm those loyalties. In the absence of any effort to define a future in which important sections of both communities could recognise themselves, the newly established state received the loyalty of its citizens on condition that it reflected the understood interests of the community they belonged to. This is not to argue that those interests were understood in an identical manner by all members of the community, whether Greek or Turkish Cypriot. But it could be argued that on the basis of the experience of the period immediately preceding independence there must have been evident certain minimal expectations that were shared by most members of the community. Any discourse and policy aiming to mobilise cross-community support would need to have established a balance between those minimal interests of both communities. Otherwise, society was likely to become polarised between the two communities even if variations characterised the political space of each community. Considering that the Turkish Cypriot community represented a minority whose constant political feature over a period of some decades was an opposition to Greek rule - whether through *enosis* or majority rule - it was the majority that carried the responsibility of introducing a discourse which could be seen to address the security concerns of the Turkish Cypriot community. Attacking the Agreements on the basis of the rights granted to the Turkish Cypriot community under the guise of the interests of the universal citizen was not likely to mobilise cross-communal support. The universal citizen had to be created before any such discourse could be granted legitimacy by both communities. That is, the act of naming could bring into existence the group which it sought to name - the Cypriot people - only if the social subject it sought to construct resonated with the individuals it sought to appeal to. Though Greek Cypriot political factions sought to appeal in the name of the 'Cypriot people', in practice nothing had been done to persuade even the most willing Turkish Cypriots that the 'Cypriot people' was an entity within which they could recognise themselves. It is precisely this kind of balance that different political factions, left and right, failed to strike.

The inevitability conveyed by Makarios' words is suggestive of an absence of hope and imagination that the state could become a source of primary allegiance. If ethnic origins were understood as inevitably constituting the source of primary allegiance, in practice, they were also to be confirmed.

## CONCLUSION

It was evident from the first reactions to the Zurich and London Agreements that the preclusion of *enosis* coupled with a Turkish guarantee of Cyprus' independence would constitute one of the main sources around which opposition to the new state of affairs would mobilise. The extent and meaning of bicommunality potentially constituted a second such source. Yet, while the exclusion of *enosis* became a major theme through which opposition to Makarios was formulated, the bicommunal character of the state that emerged out of the Zurich and London Agreements was not a defining feature through which pro-government and opposition forces could be differentiated.<sup>89</sup>

Discontent with bicommunal provisions was expressed from the beginning by pro-Makarios and opposition factions alike. Beyond these, the distinguishing mark between the opposition and pro-Makarios factions was established by the dissatisfaction of certain factions with Makarios' choice over the distribution of political power within the community.<sup>90</sup>

The apparent exclusion of *enosis* as a realisable future nevertheless had a sentimental appeal. But it would appear that the ambiguity introduced through political discourse was something more than a response to the emotional appeal of *enosis*; it was also a

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<sup>89</sup> Opposition to Makarios during the presidential elections should be differentiated from subsequent opposition. While some leading figures remained the same, most importantly, AKEL cooperated with the Patriotic Front during the parliamentary elections. The 'Patriotic Front' succeeded EDMA following the split between the fighters into the pro-Grivas and pro-Makarios camps. With AKEL having joined pro-government forces, opposition to Makarios became exclusively formulated through a passionate commitment to *enosis* and a condemnation of Makarios for having signed the Agreements, as well as for allegedly promoting a Cypriot identity.

mode through which opposition to the bicomunal republic was being suggested. There seems to have been a tacit agreement that the Turkish Cypriots ought not to be provoked. When the presidential candidate of the opposition, Clerides, was accused by the Turkish Cypriot leader of aiming to deprive the Turkish Cypriots of their constitutional rights he replied by stating that the Democratic Union had no interest to alter constitutional articles which related to the rights of the Turkish Cypriot community.<sup>91</sup> In any case, ambiguity served to support two different approaches to identifying the problem with the constitution; the exclusion of *enosis* and the violation of majority will as a permanent feature of the new state.

Given confidence in the virtues of their own aspirations - whether *enosis* or majority rule in a state that would possess true sovereignty - the Greek Cypriot community at the time of independence would have been too sensitive should any fundamental problems be confronted in the applicability of the constitution. It was understood, by this community, that Turkish Cypriots entrenched their position through constitutional privileges and that their own formal legitimacy to determine the future of the island by virtue of their numbers had been side-stepped. They were constitutionally barred from reclaiming it and taking matters into their own hands was potentially suicidal. Turkey possessed the right to unilaterally intervene for the sole purpose of defending the constitutional order. Other opportunities nevertheless were sought.

Seen from the perspective of the Turkish Cypriot community the 1960 constitution was an outcome of the struggle of a community unwilling to accept that the fate of the island depended on the aspirations of the numerical majority simply by virtue of that status. The history of the period preceding independence demonstrated that whatever the role

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<sup>90</sup> Both AKEL and the alliance of Dervis and Clerides were dissatisfied with the favourable treatment of the EOKA fighters at the expense of other political forces.

<sup>91</sup> Ethniki, 18 November 1959. Even in declaring the Democratic Union's election program Ioannis Clerides, the presidential candidate of the opposition, declared: 'The position of the Democratic Union is not to abrogate the Zurich and London Agreements or to overthrow the constitution... It will not seek to affect the rights that the Turkish Cypriot community has come to acquire... The only reason for my candidacy is so as to offer the opportunity to the Cypriot people to express its opinion against the

Turkey came to play in the establishment of Cyprus as an independent state there was an important element of continuity in the position of the minority. It opposed any efforts or changes that it feared could have resulted in its social and political domination. It therefore consistently opposed, during British rule, union with Greece but also reforms which would have placed the Greek Cypriot community in an advantageous position relative to its own; so were for example Greek Cypriot demands for self-government. The perceived threat posed by *enosis* developed into a more positive articulation of itself. This community was no longer merely based around opposition to the aspiration of the 'other' with colonial rule being treated as the best sanctuary of Turkish Cypriot interests but consequently also around an aspiration to determine its own affairs - whether this exercise of determination meant partition or, as it occurred in 1959, by becoming a constitutionally distinct community - a partner in the establishment of the new state. This was and remains a position which the Greek Cypriot community has been unable to recognise, still less address and act upon; a general failure to recognise that the Turkish Cypriots understood that they constituted a community distinct from Greek Cypriots and at the same time fearing domination. Therefore, as one commentator has observed, they were unwilling to be ruled as a minority dominated by the Greek community:

It is striking that since the beginning of British rule in 1878 to our day ... the paramount political aim of the Turkish Cypriots has remained constant: no to Enosis and simple majority rule... This is the defensive position of a threatened community which, having been overtaken by a more activist and affluent community, fears a worse fate if they became the subject peoples of the majority nation. At no time in their history have Turkish-Cypriots ever considered the possibility that they would be treated fairly by the more numerous Greek Cypriots or under a Greek administration in the event of Enosis.<sup>92</sup>

It was not only the claim of the inadmissibility of Turkey's involvement which proved an obstacle for the Greek Cypriot community but also the fact that they could think of

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Archbishop who has accepted the dishonest and damaging, to the Cypriot people, Zurich Agreements without giving the opportunity to the people to express its opinion.' *Ethniki*, 29 November 1959.

<sup>92</sup> Tonzun Bahceli 1990 p. 24.



the population of Cyprus only arithmetically. That Turkey possessed a primary role in determining the form of solution which enabled the numerical minority to gain the constitutional status of a political community did not help to understand what lay at the core of Turkish Cypriot self assertion. The claim by the Turkish Cypriot community that it constituted a distinct entity with the consequent argument that it possessed as much as the Greek Cypriot community the right to self-determination did not inform considerations over their claim to an absolute right to self-determination. The Agreements, as far as the Greek Cypriots were concerned, violated the very core of justice, democracy and sovereignty. The Turkish Cypriots, a minority community, could never have bargained for a position which resulted in the violation of majority rule if it was not for the 'unorthodox' role of Turkey in the settlement of the Cyprus question. If left alone to negotiate a solution based on independence, each possessing the strength of their numbers and virtue of their position, the result would have been very different. Yet this was precisely the fear that constantly fed Turkish Cypriot nationalism and its claim to a distinct right to self-determination. It was, therefore, also a fear that along with the sense of national ties with Turkey, strengthened the dependency of the Turkish Cypriots to Turkey. Nevertheless, the Greek Cypriot community was unable to discuss and consider the issue of rights beyond the parameters of the principle of equality based upon the individual.<sup>93</sup>

The notion of 'community' entailed in the constitution remained therefore unexplored. Consequently, the population of Cyprus was presumed, in so far as the right to self-determination was concerned, as a single entity even when the majority remained attached to a political discourse that defined the population of Cyprus as Greek. The fact that the Turkish Cypriot community constituted a numerical minority combined with the fact that this minority did not inhabit a clearly defined region of Cyprus but was

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<sup>93</sup> The distinction between individual and collective rights still remains unaddressed within the Greek Cypriot community. This despite the fact that in the post partition period the Greek Cypriot leadership has accepted that one of the central characteristics of the solution being sought will be the bicomunal character of a new federal state. It would appear that this is partly due to the fact that this kind of a prospective solution has been treated as an unavoidable necessity in a context wherein Turkey has set the parameters through the force of arms. This has arisen not as a voluntary act.

dispersed across the island, caused apprehension before a claim over separate rights. That there may have been appropriate limitations to the right of self-determination was not considered, let alone taken seriously and engaged with creatively.

The Greek Cypriot inability to recognise that more than one reality and set of interests were simultaneously confronting them seems to have been an outcome of influences which have already been outlined: the unacceptable role accorded to Turkey, the minority status of the Turkish Cypriots and the demographic pattern of this population. These influences are here expressed in the form of what constitutes perceptions of the *other* and can be traced in the form of perceptions of the *self*. In other words the perceptions of the self have a correspondence in perceptions of the other through a comparison of the other to the self. Greek Cypriot discontent with Turkish involvement concealed the inability to accept the Turkish Cypriots as a distinct community and was in itself a symptom of a resistance to recognise the nationalism of the other, or more appropriately, of an assumption that the other could not legitimately possess nationalist aspirations. Turkey's involvement in securing the Turkish Cypriot position was seen as an exertion of power which aimed to compete with the power deriving from the 'real' status of the island and its population when it came to determining the future of the island. So unnatural did the constitutional status of the Turkish Cypriot community appear to the Greek Cypriots that Turkey was to dominate the horizon of their understanding. The resistance to recognise the Turkish Cypriot community apart from Turkey's deliberations may be seen as part of a process of interpretation that was in effect de-subjectifying the Turkish Cypriot community.

In other words the Greek Cypriots refused to recognise Turkish Cypriot demands as ones that derived from and expressed the understood interests of that community even if Turkey was seen to have acted instrumentally in its own favour. This, it may be argued, was predicated by two identifiable and complementary elements constitutive of a *framework of interpretation*, each of which exerted influence in constructing and sustaining Greek Cypriot perceptions of justice.

Firstly, the conviction that the population of Cyprus was, from the dawn of history, nothing but Greek, gave the Greeks the historical right to determine the fate of the island as the original population of Cyprus. In other words the historical depth the community could claim on the island deemed it as the authentic population of Cyprus and in effect the 'natural owners' of it. As Makarios stated upon his election: 'for the first time after eight centuries the government of Cyprus returns to Greek hands'. Secondly, given that the Greeks represented the overwhelming majority population they possessed the democratic right to determine the future of the island.

These may be seen as the two primary sources, exerting their influence, constituting the Greek Cypriot framework of interpretation that dominated at the time. The manner in which they exerted their influence can be seen in the expression of practical politics during the post-independence period and it is in that that the contradictory relationship between the two becomes most evident.

The Agreements were presented to the Greek Cypriot public as unjust but also unworkable. With the exception of a few individuals there was no single political faction which projected the view that the constitution could be made to work. Early disagreements between the two sides over the implementation of the constitutional provision for separate municipalities and for communal representation in the civil service led to a mass media response that the minority was granted rights beyond its fair share and that its insistence to exercise those rights was in violation of both individual human rights as well as of the will of the majority. In short, certain provisions of the Zurich and London Agreements, in practice, reflected the incompatibility of two unequal communities sharing power as if they were equal parties.

However, there was a paradox involved in this in that the ambiguity cultivated through political discourse tied the future to the will of the Greek Cypriot community and not to the will of the great majority of citizens irrespective of ethnicity. This ambiguity was not

a reflection of an attempt to define a Cypriot social subject anew but the future of the Greek Cypriot community under new circumstances. It was precisely because of this that a popular symbolic system dependent on a reaffirmation of the relationship between Cyprus and Greece was to dominate through daily practice for many years following independence.

It was evident that Greek Cypriot claims to the democratic principle of individual rights and therefore of the will of the majority did not primarily derive from a universal understanding of the principle of individual rights but from an ethno-centric position which could afford to recognise the population of Cyprus through those categories precisely because of its own majority status. By arguing for the rights of the majority a case was in actuality being made for the rights of a fixed (ethnic) group and not of a majority constituted on a basis with the potential to transcend ethnicity as a primary means of political constitution and mobilisation. What this meant to Turkish Cypriots, in practice, was the prospect of becoming ethnically overridden and socially and politically dominated.

Political discourse based on notions of individual rights and majority will, on the one hand, and the implication that the future would be closer to Greek Cypriot interests on the other, contributed to the confirmation of a framework of interpretation which was dependent on the same notions which had sustained the separate political development of the two communities in the past. In the context of a multiethnic society the notion of majority rule and a claim to an ethnically shaped future were mutually exclusive, particularly so where the minority possessed collective rights and an external homeland was ready to defend these. The failure of the Greek Cypriot leadership to understand what bound the minority community together at a time when major political and structural changes were necessarily calling for its reconstitution as a group was probably the most tragic of errors. Rather, along with the mass media and other institutions it insulated the political space of the majority community with notions of *group justice*

thereby reproducing a static subject in times that called for substantial and necessary transformation. Or, as one writer referring to the post-independence period has put it:

Nobody, of course, not even AKEL itself - which persistently underscores the need for cooperation between the Greeks and the Turks of Cyprus (but of the Turks as a minority) - do not realise that the Turkish Cypriots, in their turn, historicising their myths and mythologising their history, even to a greater and more extreme degree than the Greek Cypriots, legitimise their national claims historically. If the craftiness of the weak is to copy the strong, the Turkish Cypriots are 'nationalised' by copying the Greek Cypriots.<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>94</sup> S. Anagnostopoulou op. cit., p. 41

## CHAPTER 5

# CONSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN: THE SUBSTANTIATION OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES OF CYPRUS IN THE EARLY YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE

### INTRODUCTION

The contest that ensued between the two communities over the claim to self-determination did not subside with the proclamation of Cyprus as an independent bi-communal Republic in 1960. It again manifested itself this time as a contest over the meaning and spirit of the constitution; ultimately a contest over control over the state. In a practical sense this contest was driven by the urgency felt by each community to exert control over the implementation of the constitution.

For the Turkish Cypriots, the constitution represented the fundamental condition which allowed them to greet independence with relative ease; though suspicion regarding the intentions of the Greek Cypriot majority was also a predominant feeling. This dual sense of satisfaction and suspicion was expressed through a political discourse which projected both a commitment to the new state of affairs as well as the willingness to bring the whole edifice to the ground should that commitment not be reciprocated.

Greek Cypriots greeted the 1960 arrangement as representing an end to colonialism and marking the beginning of an era of new struggles. Despite its limitations, the 1960 arrangement was received with a sense of hope; with colonialism brought to an end, the *Cypriots* could now gain control of their situation. Since the constitution itself was seen as a hindrance to this, the emerging political discourse primarily projected the view of an open future. All that was needed was faith in the ability of the leadership to transform what had just been gained into a platform for new struggles; but that necessitated the

unity of the community. Consequently, the precise object of the new struggles remained undefined. In a context where independence was greeted as the positive outcome of the struggles of the *Cypriot* people and the constitution as a matter limiting the ability of that community to determine its affairs, a call for unity in the name of future struggles - framed through a language which reinforced the *Greek* social subject - served to produce a fundamental ambiguity.

Its power to affect unity was most clearly demonstrated by the fact that the forces which aligned around Makarios included both a party such as Akel which called for an anti-imperialist united front aimed at the national liberation of the *Cypriot* people through the abrogation of the international treaties and the revision of the constitution as well as diverse personalities of the right, some of which later lent their support to the subversion of independence as such.<sup>1</sup>

This ambiguity was to find a practical expression in the years that followed. While the Greek Cypriots entered into a struggle aimed at securing the understood interests of the community, culminating in the submission of a proposal for the revision of the constitution to the Turkish Cypriot leadership, the symbolic system which emerged from the unionist campaign of the previous period was being reinforced:

this meant that services could be held for EOKA heroes, at which ministers of the government of the Republic could be heard speaking on the continuation of the struggle for *enosis* until its successful conclusion. Radio, television and newspapers could report these and other nationalist events in full. This had not been possible with the state-run radio and censored newspapers of the last period of British rule.<sup>2</sup>

The contradiction entailed in this ambiguity which dominated political discourse dissolves if what is understood by implicit or explicit references to a struggle for *enosis* is the drive of the Greek Cypriot leadership to do away with the power sharing structure

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<sup>1</sup> For a discussion of the diversity of social groups which aligned themselves with Makarios, see K. Markides 1976 pp. 59-75.

<sup>2</sup> M. Attalides 1979 p. 55.

but also, by doing so, to institutionalise the identity of the social subject of the state as a Greek subject. In other words, to transform the bi-communal state into a Greek nationalising state, separate from the Republic of Greece.

Miltiades Christodoulou, who in 1965 was appointed as the first Government spokesman and Director of the Press and Information Service of the Republic, explained what mattered for Makarios was 'to maintain and secure people's Greek consciousness, their history, their culture and customs as these were contained in and confirmed through the Enosis ideal.'

Makarios understood that:

Enosis was unrealisable. But it was not to be renounced. The renunciation of enosis by him would constitute a diversion and would lead to the destruction of national consciousness, of national identity...<sup>3</sup>

While he was to pursue independence, he would simultaneously strive

for the creation of a second small Greece, unanimous and with a union of hearts with Acropolis and Thermopylae and united in the international arena as a second, lively, beautiful voice and positive vote.<sup>4</sup>

The call for *enosis* had been an inseparable part of the process of nationalisation of what had been, first and foremost, a religious community.<sup>5</sup> *Enosis* was the central focus of imagination in the process of its constitution and reconstitution as a Greek community throughout the colonial period. Therefore, the call for *enosis* did not simply represent a political demand but was the central axis around which the Greek identity of the

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<sup>3</sup> M. Christodoulou 1987 p. 286. Similarly, P. Persianis (1995 p. 111) argues that: 'This [nationalist] ideology has constantly succeeded in finding other legitimate grounds for its existence. When political union of Cyprus with Greece was abandoned, other aims were espoused, such as the cultivation of national identity and the maintenance of cultural ties with Greece, the maintenance of national dignity, the ensuring of national survival, and the building of confidence in the national capacities by the activation of the national intellectual and spiritual strength.'

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. p. 285



community was confirmed. To transform Cyprus as a territorial space into a distinct political space had not been part of the nationalist claims or imagination of this community, national identity had never been imbued with such meaning. Yet it became a concrete reality. In a context where the constitutional arrangement left much to be desired the question now posed was how to pursue independence while simultaneously sustaining the integrity of that community's national identity as well as the mobilising potential that its evocation afforded.<sup>6</sup>

As the Greek Cypriots set off on the course for new struggles, the leadership began to evoke *enosis* only implicitly. What initially became asserted was a call, imbued with Hellenic symbolism, for unity in the name of future struggles. Explicit calls for *enosis* only became heightened in the context of political crisis. It was not until 1963 that direct calls for *enosis* began to be asserted again, but even then not unambiguously. This, at the conclusion of a period which had forced upon the Greek Cypriots that the Turkish Cypriot leadership was unwilling to concede anything short of the full implementation of the constitution. As stalemate was reached, violence between the two communities was recognised as a real possibility.<sup>7</sup> Once inter-communal violence broke out in December 1963, and the future of the island's status became once more a significant international issue, the Greek Cypriot foreign minister declared that:

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<sup>5</sup> For the social characteristics of the Orthodox community during late Ottoman Rule see R. Katsiaounis 1996.

<sup>6</sup> P. Loizos (1974 p.130) explains that in the first ten years of independence 'there have been two quite different meanings to calls for Enosis. For most people most of the time (and this includes the majority of political leaders) support for Enosis-Eventually is a statement of Greek cultural identity in a plural society. It serves to rally the 'Greeks' in opposition to 'Turks'. It is hard for any leader to openly abandon it because after a hundred years of nationalist education it has become impossible to separate the notion of Greek culture from that of wanting union with Greece'.

<sup>7</sup> A memorandum prepared in the early months of 1963, in the midst of constitutional deadlock, by MPs elected as candidates of the Patriotic Front acknowledged that violence would be a real possibility if the Greek Cypriots were to effectively pursue their opposition to separate municipalities and impose unified ones. The real question was 'whether the aim should be to achieve agreement with the Turks or not, because on this policy decision would depend the type of proposal which should be made to the Turkish side.' The memorandum is reproduced in G. Clerides 1988 pp. 401-6.

we are realists and we recognise that enosis is not achievable. In our view the solution of the Cyprus problem is for people to learn to live happily together in an independent state.<sup>8</sup>

The same view was echoed at the time by President Makarios who declared that *enosis* was not achievable.<sup>9</sup> Similarly, in 1965, Makarios came under attack by the unionist opposition when in the midst of heightened international activity to settle the international status of the island once and for all, he supported recommendations for an independent Cyprus. These were made by the U.N. mediator Galo Plaza, as the basis for any solution, rather than an American plan for the union of Cyprus with Greece in an exchange of a military base for Turkey or NATO.<sup>10</sup>

The leadership sought, from that point onwards, to outmanoeuvre its opponents as well as to deal with the inherent danger involved in the persistence of a demand for *enosis* in a context where suspicion for the imposition of a solution from outside was heightened, by drawing a distinction between *pure* and *corrupted enosis*. The former coincided with the demand that had proven, in the first place, to be unrealisable. But while a *corrupted* independence had been accepted, somehow a *corrupted enosis* was unacceptable and was indeed cast as equivalent to a national betrayal. This was superseded by a later distinction; *enosis* as the *desirable* goal but independence as the *realisable* one became the dominant attempt to negotiate the incongruity between the public identity nurtured up to this point and the political structure through which the settled future of the Greek Cypriots would be pursued.

In approaching the first years of independence it needs to be remembered that the noisy moments of communal celebration through the implicit or explicit evocation of *enosis* have represented first and foremost a means of mobilising the community by an

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<sup>8</sup> Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou quoted in The Times 31/12/63.

<sup>9</sup> The Times 06/01/64. But even before intercommunal violence broke out Makarios declared “The EOKA struggle ... was of course a struggle for the union of Cyprus with Greece... There exists of course a difference between the desirable and the realisable” Eleftheria 31/07/63.

<sup>10</sup> Ethniki April 1965, for example, 11, 18, 24/04/65. For details on both the Plaza report and the Acheson Plan see M. Christodoulou 1995.

assertion of familiar identity directed towards a specific purpose. The project that lay ahead - that of affecting change by transforming the newly received *limited* independence into a *real* independence - was the essential driving force. Obviously, the struggle for power within the Greek Cypriot community constituted another such force. But if independence had provided structures which did not render the distribution of power a variable of communal considerations, it is very likely that the tension and conflict within the Greek Cypriot community would have manifested itself through different forms and most certainly would have involved a more visible struggle over the definition of the social subject. In a context where the opposition accused the leadership of national betrayal while the latter was to embark in an immediate struggle to improve on that which the former described as betrayal, direct or indirect references to *enosis*, became a symbolic expression that what the latter was striving for was the interests of the Greek community.

Simultaneously, it is remarkable that during the transitional period the only public protests that emerged were in opposition to specific constitutional provisions but never an opposition to independence as such. There is no evidence to suggest that in the 1960s the Greek Cypriots in their majority wanted political *enosis*, nor is there anything to suggest that they did not want independence. The absence of a political discourse which deliberately identified independence with the future did not therefore simultaneously imply a rejection of independence.<sup>11</sup>

In that respect the persistence of *enosis* was not as paradoxical as it may be assumed. *Enosis*, as a means of mobilising Greek Cypriots by the leadership in the construction of a nationalising state was not a paradox. Given this, *enosis*, as a means through which the leadership sought to objectify Greek Cypriot identity, needs to be separated from *enosis*

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<sup>11</sup> At no time did Makarios' pro-independence stance appear clearer than during the period when Greece and Turkey became involved in a dialogue over the future of the island. At no time did the Cypriot government come into as much tension with democratically elected Greek governments than during the course of this dialogue. It was in that period that the origins of Greek involvement on the island seeking to undermine Makarios and exert control over internal processes can be found - the Greek coup of 1974 was the culmination of that process. An engaging presentation of the period is to be found in Miltiades Christodoulou 1995.

as a political demand for the union of Cyprus with Greece. This form was simply a symptom of the recognition that the Agreements had to be done away with.

It has often been implicitly or explicitly suggested that the persistence of *enosis* in political discourse and thus, the absence of a declared commitment towards independence prevented, on the one hand, the 're-integration of the Turkish Cypriots' and explains, on the other, the contribution the Greek Cypriot side made towards the creation of a context where violence could erupt.<sup>12</sup> This interpretation stems primarily from academic approaches and effectively prevents an engagement with the political process affected by the two communities in the effort to define the relationship between the state and the constitution. Though *enosis* was only the form of national expression, symptomatic of the recognition that the Agreements had to be done away with, it has been treated as the central issue affecting inter-communal relations.

There is no doubt that the implicit or explicit persistence of *enosis* did not only have a mobilising effect on the Greek Cypriot community but it also facilitated the reconstitution of the Turkish Cypriot community. But its power in this was only an outcome of the fact that the policy of the Greek Cypriot leadership could be seen to pursue was in practice the revision of the constitution. Implicit or explicit references to *enosis* could not have possessed this power if the experience of the first years of independence did not reinforce that which was after all only being alluded to.

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<sup>12</sup> Attalides (ibid) implicitly suggests this by treating the persistence of an *enosis* ideology as one of the 'most explosive ingredients' in the tense situation that was developing between the two communities. At the same time, in discussing communal conflict over the implementation of constitutional provisions, he does not engage with its impact on communal relations. See for example, his descriptive account of the conflict over the implementation of the constitution (pp. 50-55) and his analytical approach towards the persistence of *enosis* (pp. 55-56, 104-137). Simultaneously, in the chapter devoted to the relations between the two communities (pp. 80-103), the early 1960s are conspicuously absent. Mavratsas (1996), on the other hand, argues this explicitly when he states that: 'Notwithstanding that independence became a way of life, with a Cypriot elite in control... *Enosis* continued to be the dominant Greek-Cypriot ideological orientation from 1960-1974. In conjunction with Turkish Cypriot nationalist extremism, as well as the intervention of foreign interests, Greek Cypriot nationalism fueled intra- and inter-communal strife, culminating in the Turkish invasion of 1974.' (p. 77).

Along with academic interpretations of this period there is another body of literature consisting of what could be best described as political history in the form of memoirs. In these, the early years of independence receive minimal attention relative to other periods. There are, however, clearly identifiable parameters within which the appropriation of the period proceeds. It is in this body of literature that the substantiation of a dominant appropriation symptomatic of the contemporary Greek Cypriot political discourse on the Cyprus problem can most readily be found.

This chapter discusses the dominant appropriation of the early years of independence within Greek Cypriot society. As in previous chapters the interpretation offered by these authors is set against a discussion of the conflict that ensued between the two communities during that period. This was a conflict which arose out of a confrontation between the two communities over the status of the constitution, more precisely over the status of the minority within the Republic. In selecting events through which this conflict was conducted the primary concern is to demonstrate the categories through which positions were articulated and a distinct reality named. The question considered is how did the leadership of each side sought to assert the meaning of the conflict which ensued between the two? How, in other words, did it seek to both legitimise its deliberations in that conflict as well as to cast the actions of the other side as detrimental to the interests of the concerned community or the state? Ultimately, how did the process of mobilising the community for future action and thus the process of persuasion proceed?

### DOMINANT APPROPRIATION

The early years of independence do not figure as an important subject in public discourse, yet this period is important in so far as it occupies a unique place in the recent history of Cyprus. It was the only period during which the two communities shared institutional structures under conditions of independence, structures which were

dependant on a power sharing arrangement. So forcefully was this reality contested that the period concluded with the progressive separation of the two communities, both institutionally as well as territorially. The period culminated with the first Turkish Cypriot Administration being established.

Greek Cypriot dominant appropriations may be apprehended through the short accounts provided in state sponsored publications including school history books, mass media responses to relevant commemorative dates, political memoirs and the internet. They represent dominant representations of the past in that they offer depth and legitimation to the Greek Cypriot political discourse on the Cyprus problem in its contemporary phase.

A general four part synopsis derived from these sources would assert that in 1959, Makarios was forced to sign the Zurich and London Agreements which were drafted by Greece, Turkey and Britain. In that respect the constitution which was drafted under the severe restrictions posed by the Agreements was also imposed:

On the basis of the Zurich and London Agreements, which were in fact imposed on the people of Cyprus, a constitution was drafted and Cyprus was declared an independent state on 16 August 1960.<sup>13</sup>

Secondly, the constitution was unworkable.

As a result of the Zurich and London Agreements ... the proper functioning of the state became virtually impossible through a constitutional structure conceived at a time of tension and suspicion and based on notions aiming at divisions rather than cooperation and unity.<sup>14</sup>

Thirdly, three international treaties incorporated in the Agreements compromised the sovereignty of the republic.

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<sup>13</sup> P.I.O. 25/1999 - 5.000 p. 9.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

Fourthly, the period that intervened between the inauguration of independence and the Turkish Cypriot 'insurrection' in December 1963 was characterised by the severe limitations imposed on state and government affairs by the Republic's constitution. In this context the Greek Cypriot President of the Republic submitted a proposal for the amendment of the constitution to the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President. In response to this the Turkish Cypriot leadership under the guidance of Turkey, pursued a long-prepared secessionist plan:

the people of Cyprus did their best to ensure the smooth functioning of the new state, but their efforts were doomed to failure. In November 1963 the then President of the Republic, Archbishop Makarios in his sincere desire to improve the situation, suggested thirteen amendments to the Constitution - amendments not involving any radical changes but designed rather to remove some of the most obvious causes of friction. Those amendments were submitted to the Turkish Cypriot minority in Cyprus, but before they had a chance to consider them the Turkish Government - to which they had been communicated simply for information - said they were unacceptable, thus compelling the Turkish Cypriot leadership to follow suit... [Turkey] used the President's proposals for amending the Constitution as an excuse for putting into effect her long-prepared plan for the partition of Cyprus.<sup>15</sup>

That this plan guided Turkish and Turkish Cypriot policy throughout the early years of independence is said to be evident from admissions made by the Turks themselves.

**New York Times, 31.12.1963:** Vice President Fazil Kutchuk said today that the Cyprus Constitution no longer existed because there was "no possibility" of the Turkish and Greek communities living together on the island. Dr. Kutchuk, leader of the Turkish Cypriots, declared: "the Cyprus Constitution is dead".  
**New York Herald Tribune, 31.12.1963:** "The Cyprus Constitution is dead", Dr. Kutchuk... Told reporters. Asked if he wanted Cyprus partitioned between the Turkish Cypriot minority and Greek majority, he relied: "Call it partition if you like."<sup>16</sup>

This represents the basic outline established by the dominant appropriation of this period. At a formal political level the Greek Cypriot side does not need to appropriate

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid. p. 10.

this period. After the constitutional breakdown and the breakout of violent conflict in 1963, the government, now composed only of its Greek Cypriot members, continued to receive international recognition as the government of the Republic of Cyprus despite the protest of the Turkish Cypriot leadership. A confirmation of this recognition came by implication in the form of a United Nations resolution in 1964. This constituted the first post-independence victory, even if it was not outright, of the Greek Cypriot community. What happened, and how it happened, in the period preceding this event has failed to be an important part of the dominant Greek Cypriot political discourse. The relevance of this period has been asserted instead by the heterodox discourse of the Turkish Cypriot community.

With its leadership having withdrawn and having been excluded from government in 1963, Turkish Cypriots sought to defend their separate political status, formally acknowledged in the Zurich Agreements and reflect this in any new arrangement that would emerge, enduring eleven years of isolation to this end. In this unsettled context, following Turkey's invasion in 1974, the Turkish Cypriots moved *en masse* to the partitioned northern part of the island. The unification of the Turkish Cypriots within a single territorial unit was the immediate achievement for a community that had hitherto been dispersed across the island. The next task was to legitimise the new *de facto* situation not only by relying on its substantially enhanced negotiating power but also through the mobilisation of the past. It is precisely in this effort that the appropriation of the 1960-64 period has been central to the Turkish Cypriot political discourse.<sup>17</sup>

The Turkish Cypriot case has rested on the argument that in 1960 it was recognised as a community possessing political rights. However, so the narrative proceeds, Greek Cypriot failure to respect those rights and in a drive to reduce the status of the community to that of a minority refused to implement the constitution. At the same time, Greek Cypriots prepared and put into operation a plan aimed at the declaration of *enosis*. As the plan was put into operation the Turkish Cypriots were forced out of



government and civil servants prevented from returning to their posts. In defence, the Turkish Cypriot community barricaded itself into its strongholds while Greek Cypriot gunmen forced masses of Turkish Cypriots into these territories.

### Substantiating Contemporary Dominant Appropriations

Literature addressing this period has tended to be derived from individuals who make a claim that their interpretation is authenticated by virtue of the fact that it is a product of a direct experience of the period. These authors occupied, during that period, a privileged position which permitted them a relatively high degree of access to information regarding national policy or direct participation in the production of meaning.<sup>18</sup>

A symptomatic reading of these authors' work suggests that their narrative differs substantially on issues internal to the Greek Cypriot community. Indeed something more than a binary typology in order to classify these authors may be necessary in assessing the different positions, or, vision of divisions which guide their accounts on matters concerning the manner in which Greek Cypriot politics proceeded. Some differ substantially from others in that they offer a detailed engagement with Greek Cypriot political decisions and actions during this early period of independence. For example, some have taken issue with the form of rule pursued by Makarios in relation to his

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<sup>17</sup> See for example R. Denktas' speeches in 1964, 1965, 1978, 1983 at the UN Security Council, in M. Moran 1997. Also, N. Ertegun 1981; Necatigil, Z. 1989.

<sup>18</sup> M. Christodoulou (1987, 1995, 1996) worked as a journalist and in 1961 founded the Cyprus News Agency. In 1965 he was appointed the director of the Press and Information Service and held that position until 1981. He was also the first government spokesman. G. Clerides (1988) the current president of the republic was the leader of the House between 1960 and 1976. From 1968 to 1976 he was the Greek Cypriot negotiator in the inter-communal talks. A. Fantis (1999) was an assistant secretary general of AKEL between 1960-86 and the director of Haravgi, the newspaper of the party, during the years of 1962-1977. N. Kranidiotis (1985) became the ambassador to Greece in 1960 and had been the General Secretary of the Ethnarchic Council. Spyros Papageorgiou (1980) a journalist who also belonged to the anti-Zurich faction became appointed as the director of the PIO during the illegal government installed with the 1974 coup. A. Pavlides (1993) worked from 1968 as a director and producer for the Cyprus Broadcasting Cooperation. Ploutis Servas, an ex member of AKEL, was expelled from the party in 1949 and worked as a journalist. In 1959 he was in the anti-Zurich faction and continued as a critic of Makarios. Vanezis (1974, 1979) worked for the High Commission of Cyprus (UK).

community.<sup>19</sup> This has included his unilateral decision to sign the Agreements and the manner through which he governed after independence. But they also extend their criticism to what is said to be the shortsightedness of Makarios' proposal for the amendment of the constitution. Others, have maintained an uncritical approach on these issues.<sup>20</sup> However, the central tendency shared by the overwhelming majority of these authors is the exclusion of the Turkish Cypriot subject from their narrative. This is not to claim that they have reproduced the same narrative which is identical in detail but rather that they collectively sustain a meta-discourse which reinforces the established parameters of a dominant Greek Cypriot appropriation of this period.

Much of this literature acknowledges that Makarios' objective was, from the start, to overturn the Zurich Agreements.<sup>21</sup> But the orthodoxy established through these accounts is on the basis of a claim that the Zurich and London Agreements led to a constitutional arrangement which was intended to be merely a transitional stage to partition as part of an expansionist policy pursued by the Turkish state; a comprehensive and far reaching plot for the destruction of the republic and the termination of its territorial integrity.<sup>22</sup> This movement towards partition, it is argued, was assisted by the deliberate obstructionist stance of the Turkish Cypriot leadership which acted as the catalyst in this scenario. That partition was eventually forcefully imposed in the first instance by the Turkish army appears to confirm the validity of the proposed thesis.

While acknowledging that, from the start, Makarios' aim was to overturn the Zurich Agreements, the effect of the processes that were set in motion in the attempt to overturn them remain, in most accounts, unaddressed.<sup>23</sup> The Turkish Cypriot community finds a place in this narrative only as a means to confirming the overall thesis. It is cast as constitutionally over-privileged and that for the state to function

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<sup>19</sup> Papageorgiou op.cit; Servas op. cit.

<sup>20</sup> Christodoulou op. cit; Kranidiotis op. cit; Vanezis op. cit.

<sup>21</sup> Christodoulou op. cit; Clerides op. cit; Fantis op. cit; Papageorgiou op. cit; Vanezis.

<sup>22</sup> Fantis, Kranidiotis, Papageorgiou, Pavlides, Vanezis.

<sup>23</sup> Clerides probably constitutes the only exception in addressing the conflict that ensued between the two communities. His primary attention has been on formal negotiations between the two leaderships, clearly in a context where he reflects the reality of the problem that needed to be resolved.

smoothly the community needed to surrender those excessive privileges. However, its leadership prevented any genuine cooperation towards this end; it identified the community, instead, with Turkish interests.

In greater detail this dominant interpretation asserts that this breakdown was symptomatic of a deeply flawed constitution. Judgement is made which claims that it was impracticable in that a range of its provisions were impossible to implement without undermining the rights of citizens as well as the efficiency of the state and consequently the interests of its citizens. Further, that the bicomunal, structure it entailed offered the possibility for the minority to abuse its excessive rights, allowing it to act in an obstructionist manner which brought the state to a standstill. In short, so the account goes, constitutional breakdown was embedded in the very nature of the constitution itself.<sup>24</sup>

However, this statement needs to be qualified. Constitutional breakdown was embedded in the constitution itself in so far as it granted to the minority powers which under specific circumstances could prevent the smooth functioning of the state. This position the minority exploited in order to push for the faithful implementation of the constitution. That is, the constitutional rights granted to each of the two communities on the basis of their status as separate communities, did not determine the breakdown of the constitution. Rather, the conflict over the implementation of the constitution meant that while the majority carried a natural advantage by virtue of its numbers in imposing its own meaning of the constitution, the minority possessed the power to disrupt decision making processes in an effort to impose the felt need to implement the constitution. By virtue of that fact the minority could be cast as simply destructive and the political conflict that led to the utilisation of constitutional powers explained away as a conflict ultimately engineered by Turkey.

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<sup>24</sup> Christodoulou, Kranidiotis, Vanezis.

This approach has characterised dominant appropriations of the period at large. But it has also formed the framework through which individual issues that emerge from this period have been addressed. For example, in addressing the conflict that emerged from the start of this period over the constitutional provision for separate municipal councils Vanezis has argued:

It was the insistence of Ankara on the creation of such municipalities that was directly responsible for the gradual break down of the constitution of 1960 which, in turn, obliged the Archbishop to approach the Turkish leader with his proposals, which were made in order to carry on the government of the Republic. The rejection of these proposals by Ankara in the first instance, made the continuation of the constitutional government in Cyprus impossible. This fulfilled Ankara's plans to begin the partition of Cyprus.<sup>25</sup>

While Ankara is held responsible for the failure of the two communities to reach an agreement *not* to implement the constitutional provision for separate municipalities the direct and immediate processes that led to an unbridgeable rift between the two communities remain unaddressed. The interpretation the reader is presented with is based on a historical understanding which takes as its starting point and ultimate conclusion the role of Ankara. This despite the fact that in the five pages Vanezis devotes to the period he comments that:

The more the Turkish Cypriot minority became apprehensive of the ultimate aim of the Greek majority, the more the two communities drifted apart, and the more the constitution became unworkable.<sup>26</sup>

Though there is an explicit suggestion that there was a causal connection between the nature of the relationship that was developing between the two communities, on the one hand, and the unworkability of the constitution, on the other, it nevertheless is suspended. What could be drawn out from this argument is ignored and the reader is invited to accept another interpretative statement which sets up an inevitable chain of events arising from actions intended to lead to constitutional breakdown:

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<sup>25</sup> Vanezis 1979 p. 59

<sup>26</sup> Ibid. p. 56

[The Turkish Cypriots] also insisted on the implementation of the Constitution in the establishment of five separate Turkish municipalities, which was the first logical step on the road to a partition designed by them.<sup>27</sup>

In this way the Turkish Cypriot subject which sought to assert itself is excluded from the story. An argument could be made that the Turkish Cypriot community was acting within the limits of its constitutional rights even if at times in a disruptive way, when it insisted 'on the implementation of the constitution'. However, the true intention, Vanezis argues, was the implementation of partition; separate municipalities was simply a logical step towards this goal. By implication, this ulterior motive overrides the constitutional issue<sup>28</sup> and the Greek Cypriot community is, in effect, absolved of responsibility.

During this period a fear of partition played an important role in shaping perceptions about the Turkish Cypriot leadership and its intentions. While the Greek Cypriots insisted that the Agreements as unworkable and undemocratic, they also feared that the Turkish Cypriot demands for a strict adherence to the constitution was part of a wider plan for partition:

they [Greek Cypriots] soon came to regard them [separate municipalities] not only as unworkable in practice but as a politically dangerous step towards partition. For the Turks, on the other hand, they became the main test of how far the Greeks genuinely accepted the separate identity of the Turkish community.<sup>29</sup>

A Greek Cypriot fear of partition was rooted in the initial Turkish Cypriot as well as Turkish demand for partition in the late 1950s. Now it was enhanced by the insistence of the Turkish Cypriot community for the implementation of provisions which were still outstanding. In the meantime Turkish Cypriot newspapers persistently warned Greek

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> For a similar approach see Kranidiotis op. cit., pp.19-20.

<sup>29</sup> S. Roberts 1966 p. 176.

Cypriots that a failure to implement all provisions of the constitution would lead to partition.

The relationship between the Agreements and partition has not necessarily been assumed as a given. The implementation of the Agreements would structurally strengthen the Turkish Cypriot community, as, for example, in the case of the separate municipalities; but partition was not an inevitable outcome. Christodoulou comments that:

The agreements were not directly implementing partition. But through their provisions and directions they were becoming a laboratory for its elaboration, incubation and maturity and defined new points of departure for a systematic course to partition, and the extended implication of the imposition of a general Turkish control all over Cyprus.<sup>30</sup>

Therefore, while the Agreements did not in practice immediately implement partition they nevertheless provided a surrogate mother to partition. Its birth could be avoided only through constitutional revision. Since this was not in the offing Christodoulou goes on to place the sole responsibility for the intractable difficulties that were confronted on the Turkish Cypriot side, or 'more specifically on Denktas'.<sup>31</sup>

While all authors agree that the Greek Cypriot leadership pursued a policy which aimed to subvert the Agreements the implications that arise from this are not explored. Therefore, what amounted to a political conflict is treated as a constitutional inconvenience exploited by Turkey. However, this is not convincingly demonstrated. The evidence that is submitted to substantiate this claim relies on Turkey's role in the constitution of the Republic and Turkey's position after the breakdown of the constitution. With regard to the period under question no evidence is mobilised to demonstrate Turkish involvement aimed at the destruction of the Republic and the partition of the island.

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<sup>30</sup> Christodoulou 1995 p. 127.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 128

Paradoxically enough the primary piece of evidence that is customarily used to substantiate the same argument of a premeditated plan for partition, only this time by the Turkish Cypriot leadership, supports but also contradicts this argument.<sup>32</sup> The plan dated September 1963 and whose authenticity has not been confirmed spells out the stages for the implementation of partition. However, it places this plan of action in the context of the Greek Cypriot unwillingness to implement the constitution and the expectation that 1964 would be the year that Makarios would take the major initiatives towards its revision.<sup>33</sup>

At the same time a Greek Cypriot plan of equivalence, dating from 1963, and made public in 1966, has become commonly acknowledged by Greek Cypriot authors in the past 20 years.<sup>34</sup> Both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot plans of action implied the termination of the Republic as this was established in 1960. However, whilst the Greek Cypriot plan aimed at the unification of government and the exercise of the right to self-determination through a referendum the Turkish Cypriot plan aimed at establishing a separate administration.

Turkish Cypriot fears that the Greek Cypriots did not accept their 'separate identity' were sustained and intensified by the resistance of the Greek Cypriot leadership to implement constitutional provisions relating to their distinct status. Subsequent disagreement over those provisions combined with the Greek Cypriot resistance to implement the constitution and the Turkish Cypriot insistence for a faithful implementation transformed itself into an armed conflict resulting in the physical and administrative separation of the two communities. But as Vanezis already suggests, Turkish Cypriots became increasingly apprehensive of the ultimate aim of the Greek majority. Turkish Cypriot fears were entertained by the response of the Greek Cypriot

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<sup>32</sup> Christodoulou; Fantis; Kranidiotis; Papageorgiou.

<sup>33</sup> The plan is reproduced in Clerides *op. cit.*

<sup>34</sup> Clerides, Christodoulou, Fantis, Papageorgiou.

side to the constitution. The effects of increased Turkish Cypriot apprehensions over Greek Cypriot aspirations may have been more significant than allowed for by Vanezis:

“The Archbishop’s frequent declarations for the continuation of the EOKA struggle have constituted a basic reason of Turkish Cypriot mistrust and certainly enhanced Denktas’ efforts to mobilise his co-nationals in a struggle for partition.”<sup>35</sup>

While Turkish Cypriots secured an important constitutional position enhanced by the Treaty of Guarantee the mobilisation of the community around the demand for partition cannot be a given but rather a process which was reinforced by Greek Cypriot attitudes towards the Agreements as well as an ethno-nationalist leadership. A significant argument proposed in the previously quoted passage remains unexplored in favour of the claim that the most important reason for the breakdown of the constitution was that the two communities treated the Agreements as a means to an end. It is this that establishes the main focus of the author’s concern and the Turkish conspiracy is then explored at length.

Developments during this period suggest the crucial and determining role played by the two communities which ought not to be overlooked. However, any allusion to the subject is confined to a few sentences which are often found scattered in a thesis setting out an inevitability arising from the role of Turkey and of the Turkish Cypriot leadership. This approach is implicitly justified through a distinction made between the ‘Turkish Cypriot leadership and other fanatics’ on the one hand and the ordinary Turkish Cypriots on the other:

The Turkish Cypriot community in its vast majority, contrary to the chauvinist tendencies of its leadership and of a narrow circle of fanatical and uncompromising nationalists, had serious reasons to be happy with the new regime... Their standard of living began to steadily increase, and amongst the liberal circles of the Turkish population there existed - at least during the initial period of the Republic - an explicit feeling of optimism and of genuine

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<sup>35</sup> A. Athanasiou 1984 p. 101.



cooperation with their Greek co-patriots. But these moderate elements became later the target of the uncompromising Turks. Therefore... in April 1962 the Turkish Cypriot journalists, Aihan Hikmet and Ahmet Gusafer Gurkan who were in support of cooperation between the two communities were murdered by members of the Turkish nationalist organisation, TMT.<sup>36</sup>

Yet this material should have opened the way to explore the manner in which Greek Cypriot politics reacted to opportunities that may have occurred in a context where the Greek Cypriot community was confronted with an important split within the Turkish Cypriot community. Further, the manner in which this assumed, clear-cut bipolarity within the Turkish Cypriot community is questionable. While the author argues that the majority of the Turkish Cypriots had 'serious reasons to be happy with the new regime', this might suggest the importance that the Zurich and London Agreements had for this vast majority of Turkish Cypriots. The meaning and the political implications of this division within the Turkish Cypriot community are never explained. In the absence of this the implication suggested through a narrative of this order is that Turkish Cypriots, in their vast majority would have been happy to interpret justice and democracy in shared terms with the majority. As another author referring to the 1962 assassinations elaborates:

The Turkish Cypriot Popular Party was founded by Hikmet and Gurkan immediately after the parliamentary elections. At a press conference on 4 August 1960, Gurkan stated that his party offers its full support to the Zurich and London Agreements and to Kuchuk's foreign policy, but it opposes the latter on issues of domestic affairs and particularly his 'dictatorial and monokommatikes tendencies' in the National Front party.<sup>37</sup>

In summary what the dominant Greek Cypriot approach reveals is an argument that the constitution was unworkable. It was moreover, according to this general analysis, the obstructionist attitude of the Turkish Cypriot leadership which turned the unworkability of the constitution into an unsurpassable problem for state affairs. This made the revision of the constitution all the more urgent. However, there is some passing

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<sup>36</sup> Kranidiotis op. cit., pp. 20-21.

<sup>37</sup> L. Ierodiakonou 1970 p. 365.

acknowledgement that the Greek Cypriot leadership contributed to this unworkability by fanning Turkish Cypriot fears that the Greek Cypriots were not convinced the constitution, as it stood, should be accepted. Nevertheless, this does not form part of the fundamental understanding of the way history took its course since the Turkish Cypriot position is understood as simply the position of Turkey.

In this way, the dominant Greek Cypriot approach consistently fails to address the fact that the communal problem did not arise out of the constitution but rather predated it and that communal politics had failed to establish a common form of communication. The constitution established structures which were never utilised to contain communal politics. The Greek Cypriot community did not accept these structures first and foremost as they were considered to be unjust. This sense of injustice was translated, at a practical level, into a firm belief that the constitution was unworkable.

While, at the time, the fear of partition was one factor that influenced Greek Cypriot actions the appropriation of that period through the same perceptions that guided action at the time seems to be a symptom of the continued relevance of the past as a means to both justify contemporary aspirations as well as to challenge the aspirations of the other.

#### DETERMINING THE FUTURE

Makarios' call for hope and pragmatism on the day of independence was based on the understanding that though the bi-communal state may have been the condition through which independence was granted, it nevertheless gave the *Cypriots* a platform from which they could determine their future. As an independent people with an internationally recognised state they could now represent themselves in international fora and pursue their foreign policy according to their needs and interests.

We will follow a policy of equal friendship towards all countries, and we will aim, from within the context established by the signed Agreements, to promote

the interests of the Cypriot people through genuine cooperation with all the states of the world.<sup>38</sup>

A policy of equal friendship was in continuity with the policy pursued by the political wing of the anti-colonial unionist movement in the 1950s. Despite its staunch anti-communist spirit Makarios informed a mass gathering in 1953 that 'In our attempt to gain our freedom we will stretch out our right hand and our left hand in order to accept any help which is offered from East and West'.<sup>39</sup> Similarly, in 1955 he attended the Bandung conference which gave voice to the new policy of non-alignment through such leaders as Nehru and Sukarno. The appeals to the United Nations between 1954 and 1958 were pursued on the understanding that the efforts of the vast majority of the population of the island to free itself from colonial rule would have met with the support of states which had emerged out of a colonial rule. These, in combining their voting power could command effective working majorities in such organisations. Similarly, in 1961 he attended, as the President of the Republic of Cyprus, the Belgrade Conference of the non-aligned Movement.

Various writers have suggested that a non-alignment policy aimed at the creation of a diplomatic context which could be utilised for the success of future Greek Cypriot appeals against the Zurich and London Agreements.<sup>40</sup> It was with this consideration in mind that an editorial published in a Greek Cypriot pro-government daily two days after the establishment of independence explained the utility of a policy of equal friendship:

Equal friendship and genuine cooperation with all member states of the UN, as long as this is reciprocal, must necessarily guide the Cypriot Government's foreign policy, in order that the newly constituted State is internationally appreciated and assisted for the completion of its freedom... Through a brave and honest expression of opinions, and by invoking the UN Charter on the part of the Cypriot Government, the dream could transform itself into reality in order that real freedom flowers in Hellenic Cyprus, the only context in which the country would experience well being and happiness in all fields.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Eleftheria 18 August 1960.

<sup>39</sup> Attalides 1979 p. 61.

<sup>40</sup> Clerides p.134. Vanezis 1974 p. 123.

<sup>41</sup> Eleftheria 18 august 1960.

Initial Turkish Cypriots reactions against a non-aligned foreign policy argued that in such an event Cyprus would be placed outside the West and closer to the East. It soon emerged that a non-aligned policy was also interpreted as a Greek Cypriot attempt to secure support in the UN Assembly for the right to self-determination.<sup>42</sup> When the Vice-President protested against a statement made by the President suggesting that he would be attending the conference of the non-aligned states, he also referred to commitments arising out of the 'special circumstances' of Cyprus. Makarios replied that:

if the policy of non alignment is contrary to any provision of the constitution or of the Treaty of Establishment then such a provision would be absolutely unacceptable since above everything is the interests of the Cypriot people.<sup>43</sup>

A Turkish Cypriot newspaper replied that the evocation of the 'interests of the people' was nothing other than Makarios' 'lifejacket for the realisation of his own cunning aims'.<sup>44</sup> These were understood to be the mobilisation of resources for the subversion of the Agreements and the exercise to self-determination.<sup>45</sup> These interpretations were not groundless.

#### Right to Self-determination.

On the eve of Cyprus' confirmation as a member of the UN, a group of Greek Cypriot representatives, including two mayors who had been elected with the backing of Akel, sent a telegram of protest to the UN Secretary General explaining that:

The present regime of Cyprus, a product of an agreement between three countries - Britain, Greece and Turkey - has not been placed before the Cyprus people for approval in a direct and concrete way. On the contrary, not only was it imposed upon them, but they (the people) have been prohibited from

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<sup>42</sup> Halkin Sesi, Bozkurt see Eleftheria 29 July 1961.

<sup>43</sup> Phileleftheros 26 July 1961.

<sup>44</sup> Halkin Sesi, cited in Eleftheria 29 July 1961.

<sup>45</sup> Bozkurt, on the same day, stated that both the Greek Cypriot left and the right are engaged in an effort to subvert the Agreements. Cited in Eleftheria 29 July 1961.

expressing a different desire in the future. Thus, the right of self-determination was violated. In addition, the Constitution which was also imposed, violated democratic principles: increased rights and privileges were granted to the small minority in Cyprus, thus preventing the people from taking decisions on major internal and external matters. These restrictions, placed upon the people, are confirmed by the presence of the troops of the three nations, which signed the agreements, in Cyprus. No-one can foresee the dangers to international peace from such a regime which is based on the violation of inalienable rights and fundamental principles, and for this reason we submit through you this reservation for the purposes of the United Nations Organisation's archive.<sup>46</sup>

This telegram consisted of three fundamental points all, of which were claimed to represent a violation of some principle or right: the right of self-determination, democratic principles and inalienable rights. This argumentation came to explicitly dominate Greek Cypriot political discourse not long after the two communities embarked on independence. Greek Cypriots took the first step in presenting their communal policy against which Turkish Cypriot policy became increasingly solidified in a maximalist attitude expressed through hostile intolerance to anything short of the full implementation of the constitution. The exchanges that took place immediately after the publication of the telegram contain the essential elements that characterised the approach of the leadership of each community to the other throughout the first three years of independence.

In response, the Chairman of the Turkish Communal Chamber, Rauf Denktaş, sent a message to the Secretary General. He explained that in the general elections most Greek Cypriots endorsed the Agreements by electing Archbishop Makarios as their representative. Then a number of points were made, each with its own significance:

Opposition to Archbishop Makarios has been raised by Leftists with the sole object of leaving the door open to further discord... Turkish Cypriots are united in their opposition to any attempt by the Greek Cypriots to undermine the Agreements which created the Cyprus Republic. Peace and the equilibrium of the two communities can only be maintained as long as both parties respect each other's rights within the letter and spirit of the Agreements. If this equilibrium is upset by attacking the Agreements, or by taking political steps

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<sup>46</sup> Cyprus Mail 21<sup>st</sup> September 1960.

towards enosis or so called one sided self-determination, the result will be chaos and civil war<sup>47</sup>

Denktas' understanding was that the Agreements were not imposed since the Greek Cypriots have been seen to endorse them at the time of the general elections which led to the overwhelming victory of Makarios. The statement that 'increased rights and privileges granted to the small minority' were a violation of democratic principles, was challenged by Denktas' claim that the Agreements established an equilibrium between the two communities. Consequently, the claim put forward by the Greek Cypriot group over the right to self-determination was understood to represent a one sided self-determination which would disturb the equilibrium between the two communities and lead to civil war.

One of the Greek Cypriot signatories to the original cable took issue with Denktas' warning of 'chaos and civil war' should the Greek Cypriots embark in a struggle against the Agreements or attempt to pursue a 'one sided self-determination'. In a telegram to the Secretary General he stated:

Mr Denktas' telegram leaves the impression that the Turkish minority may embark on civil war even if the Cypriot people use only political means in the framework of the United Nations Charter for the right of self-determination.<sup>48</sup>

The use of political rather than violent means could hardly be a consolation for a community that was at pains to demonstrate that Cyprus represented a unique example where the right of self-determination could not be singularly granted since its two communities had historically been two separate people.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Cyprus Mail 22<sup>nd</sup> September 1960.

<sup>48</sup> Cyprus Mail 23<sup>rd</sup> September 1960.

<sup>49</sup> For example in his speech to the UN Security Council Denktas in February 1964 stated: "The question is: are we entitled to live in human dignity as free people in a land where we have lived for 400 years, or are we to be put at the mercy of the Greek Cypriots and to be treated as a mere minority when we have never had that status in 400 years?" In Michael Moran 1997 p. 137

While Denktas issued a warning against any actions contrary to the constitution, sections of Greek Cypriot society reacted passionately suggesting that the Agreements produced a state of affairs which were by no means to be considered as permanent given that inherent rights were still unfulfilled.

Cypriots will pursue their demand by political means. The right to self-determination is inalienable even when declarations are expressly made that it will not be pursued. Inherent rights cannot be abolished through declarations whether written or verbal and no declaration can be binding on future generations.<sup>50</sup>

This was but one example that demonstrated the unwillingness to consider that even if Greek Cypriots understood the Agreements as unjust the Agreements had nevertheless created a reality and had granted to the Turkish Cypriots a given status.<sup>51</sup> Given the reactions of the Turkish Cypriots to any suggestions for change, the Greek Cypriots would have needed to persuade the Turkish Cypriots that their fears were unfounded or otherwise pursue their policy irrespective of the Turkish Cypriots.

It was not too long before the demand for the right to self-determination re-emerged to become a prominent feature of editorials of most newspapers.<sup>52</sup> By 1961 it became customary for newspaper editorials to refer to the UN Charter as the basis upon which the Agreements ought to be judged; the Agreements, it was claimed, stood in contradiction to the UN Charter. Only by nullifying the related international treaties could Cyprus be said to possess true sovereignty and be free to exercise the right to self-determination. Therefore, the means for achieving true sovereignty was understood to be the UN Assembly:

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<sup>50</sup> Eleftheria quoted in Cyprus Mail 24th September 1960.

<sup>51</sup> Even at a time that the negotiating power of the Turkish Cypriot community appeared to be at its weakest an official document of the Turkish Cypriot provisional administration stated: "No self respecting community which has acquired and enjoyed a degree of self government can be expected to sacrifice this status and submit to the absolute will of a hostile group" Turkish Information Centre 1970 p. 10.

<sup>52</sup> The repeated vocalisation of a demand to self-determination led to a statement made by the Greek government warning against any action in this direction. Eleftheria 01 September 1961.

But this recognition could only be bestowed on an orderly constituted state, and this therefore, necessitated a smooth working of the constitution. Hence, the intimate tie-up between the constitutional position in Cyprus and its foreign policy.<sup>53</sup>

Indeed, the Greek Cypriot leadership attempted to establish an ‘orderly constituted state’. It seems however that this effort was inhibited by a mis-recognition of the Turkish Cypriot community, or, put differently, a mis-recognition of the mobilising power of its leadership. This mobilising power, it would seem, depended on whether the compromise reached in Zurich and London would be honoured by the Greek Cypriot majority. It would appear that the Greek Cypriot leadership fundamentally underestimated the meaning that the Agreements had for the Turkish Cypriots at large. Considering that the Turkish Cypriot community had been politically nurtured through an opposition to self-rule as well as to *enosis*, the Agreements represented an important condition of security; they were an expression of the conditional manner with which the Turkish Cypriots accepted an independent state. It guaranteed a status to the community which was vested with such constitutional power so as to expel the fear of domination. The constitution in its integrity represented for the Turkish Cypriots the finite ‘rules of the game’. It was precisely those rules that the Greek Cypriot community appeared to question before independence was even formally declared.

The failure to recognise what may have been an understanding widely shared amongst the Turkish Cypriot community extended to the left. As Attalides has put it:

It (AKEL) also, together with all other Greek Cypriot political factions, seems to have underestimated the degree to which the Zurich Agreements had a real significance for the Turkish Cypriots as a guarantee of some degree of power-sharing in the Cypriot State...<sup>54</sup>

#### Initial Tensions: Municipalities and 70:30

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<sup>53</sup> Vanezis op. cit., p.123.

<sup>54</sup> Attalides op. cit., p. 112.



The competition between the two communities centred initially around the implementation of constitutional provisions relating to the communal composition of the civil service and the establishment of separate municipalities.

Negotiations which ensued for the establishment of separate municipalities had not yielded any results by February 1961. Temporary municipal legislation promulgated on 12 October 1959 authorised the Turkish municipal councils, which had been established *de facto* in the midst of inter-communal violence in June 1958,<sup>55</sup> to 'exercise all rights and powers and perform any duties expressly or by implication conferred or imposed on a Municipal Council in regard to the collection and recovery of revenue...'<sup>56</sup> The temporary legislation expired in February 1961 by which time it was hoped that the President and the Vice-President would be able to come to an agreement over the exact area of jurisdiction of the Turkish municipalities.<sup>57</sup>

In the course of periodic negotiations between October 1959 and February 1961 the Greek Cypriot leadership proposed plans which aimed to reduce the functions of the municipal councils, transferring them instead to other state departments - a matter which would do away with the need to define a geographical area of jurisdiction for the Greek and the Turkish municipalities.<sup>58</sup> The Turkish Cypriot side rejected these proposals.<sup>59</sup> The Greek Cypriot side, in turn rejected Turkish Cypriot counter proposals aimed to maximise the functions of the Councils and make the geographical area under their jurisdiction relevant.<sup>60</sup> Both sides understood that the provisional 'Turkish Municipal Committees' law would have to be extended. New legislation approving this extension was approved by the Council of Ministers by simple majority with all Turkish Cypriot ministers having voted against it. This disagreement between the Greek and the Turkish

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<sup>55</sup> D. Markides provides a convincing argument that the Turkish Cypriot riots in June 1958 were encouraged by Turkey as a means to establishing clearly separate Turkish Cypriot regions in the towns where the minority was more concentrated. D. Markides 1999 pp. 3-5.

<sup>56</sup> H. Faustmann 1999 p.296.

<sup>57</sup> Cyprus Mail 10 February 1961.

<sup>58</sup> Cyprus Mail 20 May 1959.

<sup>59</sup> Etniki 26 May 1959.

<sup>60</sup> Cyprus Mail 13 April 1959.

ministers was transferred to parliament where voting for legislation on the municipalities was subject to separate majorities. Differences between the two sides were bridged by the deletion of a provision in a bill proposed by Cabinet which stated that 'houses, buildings or places belonging primarily to Greeks would be under the administration of the Greek municipalities and those primarily belonging to Turks would be under the administration of the Turkish municipalities'.<sup>61</sup> The Turkish Cypriot opposition to this provision was, it seems, informed by its position on the type of separation that was to be established by the relevant constitutional provisions which would be geographically rather than areas defined by population. The extension of this law secured the two communities a further two months before the temporary law would again expire.

Following failed negotiations on the establishment of separate municipalities in March 1961 the temporary municipalities law was extended in April 1961 for another three months. The period between April and July 1961 when the temporary municipalities law would expire yet again, saw an intensified campaign by sections of the mass media and the mayors of the major towns directed against the establishment of separate municipalities as well as another extension of the municipalities law. By the end of June 1961, in the context of heightened references to self-determination and a conflict over foreign policy, the Greek Cypriot media announced that a political, legislative and constitutional stalemate had been reached.<sup>62</sup> In this context the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President insisted that:

Geographical separation is inevitable because only through this will the integrity of the 120,000 Turks of Cyprus will be guaranteed and will become known that there is on this island an independent and separate Turkish community.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Eleftheria 17 February 1961.

<sup>62</sup> See Eleftheria, Haravgi and Phileleftheros 30 June 1961.

<sup>63</sup> Halkin Sesi, Eleftheria 8 July 1961.

The provision concerning communal representation in the civil service was also a constant source of friction between the two communities and subject to public opinion pressure.<sup>64</sup> Public employees expressed their opposition to the provision through their trade unions. Other related activity ranged from public statements to meetings, demonstrations and strike action.<sup>65</sup> These initial reactions centred around an opposition to the immediate implementation of the provision which would have discriminated against public employees whose promotion prospects would have been affected by any attempt to promote and recruit under the criteria of the concerned provision. Instead the Greek Cypriot side demanded a piecemeal approach. A Joint Consultative Committee was set up during the transitional period to draw up recommendations for the implementation of the communal proportions in the civil service. It suggested that the ratio could be implemented within five months from the establishment of the Republic. However, by the close of 1960, the President announced that this would have to be extended to the end of February 1961.

The Greek Cypriot community carried an advantage in the competition over the communal ratio in the civil service by virtue of its numbers and therefore had effective control over the state. Consequently, it could assert its will despite the provisions of the constitution. However, with regard to the municipalities circumstances were more complicated. While the constitution provided for the establishment of separate municipalities this depended on a joint agreement between the President and the Vice-President as to the area under the jurisdiction of the Turkish municipality; an agreement which could not be reached. Amongst Greek Cypriot there was outright opposition to the creation of geographically defined municipal authorities. But separate municipalities already functioned and unified municipalities could not be brought into being unless with the consent of the Turkish Cypriot community, yet separate municipalities functioned only under a temporary law which could only be extended through separate majorities in parliament. Unlike the question of the communal ratio in the civil service, the municipalities issue was more complicated in that none of the communities could

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<sup>64</sup> For reactions to separate municipalities amongst Greek Cypriots see chapter 4.

get what it wanted without the consent of the other. However, while separate municipalities could practically function as long as the two communities failed to reach agreement, they could not be taken over unless through physical confrontation, a possibility the Greek Cypriot side was willing to consider.<sup>66</sup>

In the meantime Turkish Cypriot newspapers pursued both issues with considerable anger. Warnings were issued against the Greek Cypriot leadership which was accused of violating the Zurich and London Agreements and of exhibiting no will to respect the constitutional rights of the Turkish Cypriots.<sup>67</sup> Any reference in the Greek Cypriot media or by political representatives to further struggles and claims to the right to self-determination desires was met with an even more aggressive response in the form of a warning that the Turkish Cypriots had not surrendered the partition aspiration and that Turkey would militarily intervene in Cyprus should the situation deteriorate.<sup>68</sup> And as the Greek Cypriot mass media demanded that the Turkish Cypriot community understood its status as a minority the Turkish Cypriot media demanded a strict adherence to the constitutional provisions which defined the rights of the Turkish Cypriot community and an end to the talk for change.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> See for example daily newspapers 10, 11, 12, 13, 18, 21, 22, 28 May 1960; 5, 6, 8 June 1960.

<sup>66</sup> The 'National Organisation of Cypriots' formed in 1963 and whose General Staff included three Greek Cypriot Ministers as well as the Leader of the House (Fantis *op. cit.*, p. 54) produced in 1963 a plan codenamed Akritas Plan. This aimed at defining the aims and tactics that the Greek Cypriot side should employ in light of the constitutional deadlock. Amongst other things this stated: 'Before our right for a unilateral amendment of the constitution is established and accepted, actions and decisions which require positive dynamic action by our side, for example, should be avoided. Such a decision necessitates for the government to intervene dynamically for the realization of the unification and the seizure of the municipal property by force, something which makes it probably imperative for the Turks to resort to dynamic reaction. On the contrary, it is easier for us through lawful action to amend, for instance, the provision for 70:30 when it will be the Turks themselves who will need positive dynamic action, whereas for us the act will not be action but refusal. The same for separate majorities relating to taxation. The measures have already been examined and a series of measures have been decided upon for their application. After our right in connection with the unilateral amendment of the constitution is confirmed *de facto* through such actions we can then proceed according to our discretion and power, in a more dynamic way.'

<sup>67</sup> Nacak/Cyprus Mail 04 August 1959; Halkin Sesi/Eleftheria 02, 29 January 1960; Bozkurt/Eleftheria 10 January 1960; Halikin Sesi/Eleftheria 08 January 1961.

<sup>68</sup> Bozkurt/Eleftheria 07 January 1960, Halkin Sesi/Eleftheria 08 January 1961.

<sup>69</sup> Halkin Sesi/Eleftheria 03 July 1961.

In this situation there existed the impatience of the Turkish Cypriot community over the implementation of the constitution which would have entrenched the status on condition of which it accepted independence. On the other hand, there was a resistance by Greek Cypriots to understand the constitutional rights granted to the Turkish Cypriot community as binding. As long as the will of Greek Cypriots was contrary to the specific constitutional provisions the Turkish Cypriots were expected to oblige. The more the Turkish Cypriots protested the more the Greek Cypriots clarified their position through the mutually reinforcing categories of 'majority' and 'ethnos'. While the Greek Cypriot side relied on its numerical dominance for the imposition of its will the Turkish Cypriot side was to rely on any possible constitutional channels in order to pressurise the majority to comply with its demands. Such opportunity was presented by the constitutional provision for separate majorities in specific areas of legislation. If the two issues around which the contest between the two communities initially centred, were treated by the Turkish Cypriots as the crucial test of Greek Cypriot intentions, another provision - that of separate majorities - was treated as the means through which the resolution of these issues would cease to be subject of intent but rather of necessity.

### Separate Majorities

The enactment of legislation affecting municipalities, be it in relation to election law, imposing duties or taxes etc, was subject to separate majority votes. By March 1961 the Turkish Cypriot members of parliament took advantage of this provision in a situation where Parliament was expected to renew the extension of a provisional tax law.<sup>70</sup> The majority of the Turkish Cypriot members voted against the extension of this provisional law while all of the Greek Cypriot members voted in favour. The outcome being that the state was left with no power to collect import and export taxes.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> Since there was no new tax law by August 1960, Article 188 (2) of the constitution stated that the existing law imposing duties or taxes would continue to be valid until December 1960. See Stanley Kyriakides 1967 pp. 83-84.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 83-92. The debate that ensued in parliament at the time has been presented by Stanley Kyriakides in an effort which introduces detail into issues customarily presented unisightfully.

A Turkish Cypriot proposal for a compromise which would have extended the tax law for a period of two months was unanimously rejected by the Greek Cypriot MPs. Turkish Cypriot opposition to a three-month extension of the law was rationalised on two main grounds. The first was that the law had already been extended once in December 1960. A three-month extension in December 1960, it was argued by one member, had been supported with hesitance by the Turkish Cypriot side; it was the understanding at the time that new laws would be passed in the meantime. The Turkish Cypriot member proposed that a two-month extension was to be approved instead and noted that some of the Turkish Cypriot members were willing to support this alternative proposal.

The second reason was given by the fact that the Greek Cypriot side failed to work towards the implementation of those constitutional provisions affecting the separation of municipalities and the appointment of Turkish Cypriots to the civil service at the proportion established by the constitution. It was claimed that when the law was extended for three months in December 1960 Turkish Cypriots had been assured that issues outstanding from the concerned provisions would have been remedied in the space of that period. It was argued that in practice nothing had been done. A Greek Cypriot member responded by arguing that since there was no 'connection between the seventy-thirty and the extension of the tax law' then the issue did not concern parliament and should be kept out of the decision-making processes at that level.<sup>72</sup>

The Turkish Cypriot approach to this issue served to confirm to the Greek Cypriot leadership that the rights granted to the minority had a suffocating effect on the ability of the state to conduct its affairs. The Greek Cypriot refusal to show any flexibility before an ultimatum meant that the compromise proposal made by a section of the Turkish Cypriot MPs was not even considered. The Greek Cypriots in the House felt that their community was being blackmailed.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> S Kyriakides, p. 87.

The following day President Makarios gave a press statement suggesting that customs and other government officials would be instructed to continue to collect taxes and duties. The unity maintained by Greek Cypriot MPs against the Turkish Cypriot counter-proposal was met with approval of the mass media. The understanding that the Turkish Cypriot members sought to blackmail the Greek Cypriot community dominated the press coverage of this issue and opinion was united behind the policy signals sent by Makarios through his statements the day after the vote. In these, Makarios emphasised that the constitution existed for the sake of the state and its people and not the state for the sake of the constitution. He instructed government officials to collect taxes because in the circumstances it was the only way to render a 'high service to the Republic of Cyprus'. The Turkish Cypriot MPs, he argued, abused their rights under the constitution; they used this particular right, which was intended as a safeguard against the introduction of taxation which discriminated against them, for completely unrelated reasons.<sup>74</sup>

In response, Turkish Cypriot members issued a statement which placed the responsibility for the crisis created on Greek Cypriot members of Parliament who rejected a proposal for a two-month extension. It went on to dispute the claim that the Turkish Cypriot side sought to blackmail, it also took issue with the Greek Cypriot interpretation of the constitutional provision which necessitated separate majorities in the passing of tax and duties laws. This provision, it was argued, was not intended as a preventative measure to block potential discriminatory policies, this other constitutional provisions effectively did. Rather, the statement went on to say,

“the real purpose of the right and power given to the two communities in connection with the passing of taxation laws is to ensure compliance with Constitutional provisions. These rights must be taken to be political.”<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Ibid., p. 88.

<sup>74</sup> Cyprus Mail 02 April 1961.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

In practice certain constitutional provisions granted Turkish Cypriots were not just a means of protecting themselves against discriminatory tax policies but also giving them an effective say over policy. To define the *purpose* of the specific right as anything less than what it could be utilised for was to engage in a competition over the meaning of the right. The Greek Cypriot assertion that Turkish Cypriot rights represented an instrument for the protection of the minority community was an understatement of the position that the Turkish Cypriot community was granted. Taken together, the establishment of two communal chambers, the provision for 70:30 representation in Parliament, the Council of Ministers, the police force and in public service employment; the veto powers granted to the Vice-President and the provision for separate majorities in relation to both taxation, foreign affairs and security issues reflected more than an attempt to provide a minority with sufficient means to protect itself against potential discriminatory practices by the majority. The competition that ensued between the two communities over state resources was therefore expressed through a competition which involved a Greek Cypriot effort to define a minority position for the Turkish Cypriot community on the one hand and the concentration of Turkish Cypriot efforts to bring about the faithful implementation of relevant articles of the constitution on the other.

This competition defined the position around which each unified. It meant that the Greek Cypriot side's reluctance to understand the rights granted to the Turkish Cypriot community as ones that *defined* rather than *protected* its status had a unifying effect upon the Turkish Cypriot leadership around a position which aimed to test the limits of their power within the constitutional arrangement.

The voting behaviour of the members of the two communities in March 1961 exhibited certain differences which suggested that the Turkish Cypriot side of the house was not unified around the same strategy. While Greek Cypriot representatives had voted in a monolithic fashion, their Turkish Cypriot colleagues did so only in opposing an extension of the tax laws for another three months. 'four or five' members amongst the Turkish Cypriot group supported the counter-proposal for an extension of the tax law by



two months. The Deputy Leader of the House, Halit Ali Riza, argued that he was speaking on behalf of the remaining Turkish Cypriot members when he was stating that he was against any extension in the tax law. It is interesting to note that eight months later the Turkish Cypriot parliamentary group split in two when the majority of the Turkish Cypriot representatives formed a separate group under the name 'national front' led by the Deputy Leader of the House. They declared that they held the Vice-President responsible for the implementation of relevant constitutional provisions which were still outstanding. They added that Kucuk showed extreme tolerance towards the Greeks.<sup>76</sup> None of the Turkish Cypriot members who had supported a two-month extension was amongst those who joined this group. No Greek Cypriot newspaper or politician commented on the various distinctions that could be made on the basis of the positions exhibited by the Turkish Cypriot members in March 1961. Yet, there was something potentially significant in the divergence of positions amongst the Turkish Cypriot representatives.

A two-month extension would simply have postponed the threat of separate majorities for as long. Simultaneously, there were no signs of a meeting of minds on the municipalities issue. The temporary municipalities law was due to expire seventeen days later. Negotiations over the issue had ensued in March and came to a halt when the Turkish Cypriot side rejected Greek Cypriot proposals.

For the Greek Cypriots the others had placed communal interests above the interests of the state and the population at large, in relation to both the tax issue and in their insistence on the formation of geographically separate municipalities. Their action served to demonstrate the sheer crudity of the constitution in granting the minority the power to disrupt the will of the majority and the smooth functioning of the state. It was for the Greek Cypriots a problem which had obvious financial ramifications but was also generating political instability.<sup>77</sup> The problem was understood to be so fundamental

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<sup>76</sup> Cyprus Mail 06 December 1961.

<sup>77</sup> Two main political problems were anticipated: The worsening of relations between two communities each possessing substantial constitutional power, and the perceived threat of communism. It was a

that it could not be rendered as merely political. Hence, it was a problem that had to be dealt with at its root for the higher good of the state through a reformulation of minority rights would permitted the state to function smoothly and the minority to protect itself.

The Greek Cypriots treated the relationship between the state and the constitution conditionally. While the constitution established the defining structures of the state the Greek Cypriots were hesitant to accept those structures provided they did not impinge on the 'interests of the state'. Therefore, if the constitutional process failed to serve the interests of the state, as the majority understood these interests, then the will of the people would have to be respected through extra constitutional means. In other words, the structures established by the constitution were tolerated up to the point where the majority could tolerate them, beyond this, decisions had to be made with the interest of the state in mind. That is, the state which the majority sought to define.

A similar problem was to re-emerge nine months later. On 18 December 1961 the House failed to enact new income tax legislation. This time members on either side of the House approved the income tax law a dispute emerged between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot members when the latter proposed a bill that income tax rates would be subject to the approval of the House on an annual or a two yearly basis. The Turkish Cypriot members submitted two proposals. The 'national front' group proposed that the House approved the tax rates annually<sup>78</sup> while the remainder proposed that tax rates be submitted for the approval of the house every two years; failure to do so meant they would still be valid for another three months. The response from the Greek Cypriot side centred around three main themes.

Firstly, that the annual review of tax rates would inhibit the coordination of state activity. If income tax rates were to be made subject to the annual approval of Parliament the executive branch which was responsible for drafting the annual budget

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common occurrence to read in the Greek Cypriot press editorials the opinion that the Zurich and London Agreements were causing so many disagreements and potential hardships that a political space was opening up which communists could exploit.

would not know what the annual income of the state deriving from income tax would be. It was also added that a system which could not guarantee financial stability would act as a disincentive for foreign companies to invest in Cyprus.

A second major theme was the interpretation that the Turkish Cypriot members were seeking, as a minority, to secure the ability - separate majorities - for continually blackmailing the Greek Cypriot members.

Finally, Greek Cypriot members insisted that the provision of separate majorities was intended as a means for the minority to protect itself against a potential discriminatory policy. Since the Turkish Cypriot members did not have any opposing views on the tax law it was argued that they were essentially abusing their constitutional rights. Two members sought to reassure their Turkish Cypriot colleagues that they would never permit the violation of the rights of the Turkish Cypriot minority and urged them to act on the interests in the population at large.

The immediate reaction of the political leadership of the two communities, both of which were detrimentally affected by the failure of the House to approve the tax bill, was to resort to their own Communal Chambers to pass separate legislation for the collection of income tax. Commenting on the effect of these actions, Stanley Kyriakides has argued that:

Characteristically, this action dramatised the importance of the Communal Chambers. Thus the Chambers played an increasingly active role in the affairs of the Republic and contributed to further separation.<sup>79</sup>

By the end of 1961, the constitutional provision for separate majorities was proving a great irritant to the majority community which already understood the Zurich and London Agreements as a considerable injustice. The constitutional provisions relating to communal representation within the public service and on separate municipalities may

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<sup>78</sup> The House of Representatives Minutes 18 December 1961.

have been considered as impinging on the interests of the Greek Cypriots but that of separate majorities was plainly preventing the majority from exercising control over key functions of the state. Shifting tax legislation to the communal chambers represented an immediate solution but it was also depriving the state of one of its principle functions; a state over which the majority sought to exercise control was therefore being undermined. It was a choice which served to make it abundantly clear that the majority community was unwilling to work out a compromise within the bounds of the constitution:

A statement made by Makarios two days after the failure of Parliament to approve the tax law further removed the prospects of constitutional government,

Despite the fact that the Greek tax payer will be much relieved as an outcome of the situation created by the Turkish action, the Public Fund will be deprived of some of its resources. Due to this there will be a necessary delay in the implementation of some Constitutional provisions as the 70:30 representation in the public service and the formation of the army.<sup>80</sup>

It is difficult to ascertain the public sentiment that dominated in the Turkish Cypriot community over the significance of these provisions. The history of the period that immediately preceded independence suggests that a community which understand that it was threatened by Greek Cypriot aspirations would have been predisposed to understand the significance of these provisions not so much according to the practical and material benefits which an individual would have gained from their implementation but rather as *representative* issues.<sup>81</sup> In other words, they were symbolic issues, their resolution or otherwise would be understood as an expression of a more general intent. The prospects of the overall well being of *individuals* was dependent on the prospects of a Greek Cypriot respect for what was communal. Put differently, the non-implementation of those constitutional provisions which were understood, in the first place, as the condition on which the Turkish Cypriot community accepted independence, was

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<sup>79</sup> Stanley Kyriakides op. cit., p.92.

<sup>80</sup> Eleftheria 21 December 1961.

representative of Greek Cypriot attitudes towards Turkish Cypriots. This is certainly the message that was projected through Turkish Cypriot newspapers at the time, or at least, through those editorials translated and published in the Greek Cypriot press.

Two weeks later Makarios went a step further when he announced his intention to revise the constitution. This served to confirm the lines of division between the two communities; the declared intention to overlook or revise the constitution when no political channels of communication between the two communities had been sought was one that could only unite the Turkish Cypriot leadership in defence of the Agreements and thus their status as an independent and autonomous community.<sup>82</sup>

#### Defining the meaning of the agreements

Seventeen months into the life of the Republic and following what had been a severely troublesome experience, Makarios made his views and intentions on the constitution explicit. In early January 1962 he delivered a speech to a Greek orthodox youth organisation where, for the first time, he publicly and explicitly stated his intention to revise the constitution. His speech served to make the link between the state of affairs that dominated - the present - and what needed to be done in order to move forward - the future.

In this speech Makarios went through what was by then recognisable and familiar motions to a Greek Cypriot audience. Firstly, he explained that the Agreements were a landmark but also a starting point for new struggles. Secondly, that those who stood amongst, what he referred to as, a minute opposition of defeatists and pessimists 'seated' themselves outside the 'field of our struggle' and hurled abuse towards those fighting to overcome the obstacles on the route to the future. He urged that those inside the field must simply look forward and not be distracted by those seated outside it. He went on,

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<sup>81</sup> I borrow this formulation from Frank Wright's use of the term 'representative violence'.

The Zurich and London Agreements brought the colonial regime in Cyprus to an end and for the first time in our history the helm of the Cypriot ship is in our hands. But we do not ignore the shortcomings of these Agreements which by the end of this last year have been used, apparently as a constitutional right, against the interests of the overwhelming majority of the Cypriot people by a group of Turks.

Intending his words as a reply to an attack often launched against him by the opposition, he added:

I personally signed the Agreements and not for a moment do I regret or doubt, that I have done the right thing. The argument that the Agreements should not have been signed is naive, to say the least.

But the real problem was not that the Agreements were signed but that the Agreements had granted the Turkish Cypriots

certain rights beyond what would be just, with the sole purpose of *protecting their status as a minority*. We do not wish to do wrong to, or harm, the interests of the Turkish minority, with which we wish to have good cohabitation and co-operation.

Makarios' understanding, was that the aim of the Agreements was to protect the status of the Turkish Cypriots as a minority. The Agreements were not understood as an arrangement whereby decision making on important affairs of the state was to be jointly determined. In essence, Makarios treated the spirit which guided the Agreements as that of protecting the minority. Thus, the real objective of the constitutional provisions was not to define those rights and privileges which the Turkish Cypriot community was to enjoy but to offer sufficient protection to the minority, not as a means through which the minority's status was being constitutionally defined. Consequently, any disagreement between the decision makers of the two communities on issues necessitating joint consensus was simply categorised as an obstruction by the minority which was utilising

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<sup>82</sup> Clerides (op. cit., pp. 137-160, 439-464) demonstrates this point well.

those rights and privileges to disrupt the processes of the state rather than to protect itself:

But since the Turkish minority abuses its constitutional rights and creates impediments to the smooth functioning of the state, I have to overlook or ask for the revision of those constitutional provisions which either prevent the functioning of the state mechanism and its progress or which when ill used threaten the foundations of this state. The constitution is a means to the smooth functioning of the state and not for its prevention.

Two methods were recognised as possible means to remedying the situation that arose as a result of the Turkish Cypriot leadership's abuse of rights; to overlook the constitutional provisions which established areas of power sharing or to revise those provisions. The first method, as will be seen below, had already been in operation. The second, was still being devised.

Overlooking certain provisions may have been unconstitutional but there was no finality in taking that action. But to declare an intention to revise the constitution was to signal an unambiguous policy which was likely to bring confrontation not only between the two communities but potentially between the Greek Cypriot leadership (and community) with the guarantors of the independence of Cyprus, specifically Turkey. Therefore,

I wish to emphasise and not disguise the difficulties which we will be confronting in our course. But those of us who have faith in the future and fight for the future will be victorious and will conquer, because we struggle with faith. We will be victorious, because we struggle with will. We will be victorious because we are determined to win.<sup>83</sup>

The Turkish Cypriot response to this came through the mass media as well as the Turkish Communal Chamber. *Halkin Sesi*, a newspaper owned by the Vice-President stated that Makarios

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<sup>83</sup> Phileleftheros 05 January 1962.

has no right to refer to the Turkish Cypriots as a minority, because, according to the constitution, there are in Cyprus two communities independent of each other; the Greek and Turkish ones. The President of the Republic has to recognise that the suspension or revision of the constitution would mark the end of the Republic. We call upon the president to speak out more clearly. What is he trying to tell us when he refers to the 'new struggles' and the 'starting line'?'<sup>84</sup>

The weekly publication of the Turkish Communal Chambers 'News Digest' accused Makarios

of dictatorial tendencies and of using the excuse of Turkish 'abuses of right' only as a thin cloak for his persistent policy of using the Agreements as a starting point for further struggles, and subjecting the Turks to Greek rule...the president has taken it upon himself to decide on the action he might take to counter the alleged Turkish abuses... The Turkish reaction from now onwards shall be decided and acted upon in the light of the Greek campaign to bring to an end the present regime.<sup>85</sup>

These reactions quite clearly suggest the forms through which the Turkish Cypriot community was being encouraged to understand the Agreements. The reaction voiced by Halkin Sesi drew a distinction between a minority status and the constitutional status of a separate community. So much so was the Republic understood as primarily bi-communal that a revision along the lines suggested by Makarios would have meant the end of the Republic whose existence depended on two separate and independent communities. The Republic, in other words, would cease to exist once one of its independent communities was deprived of its rights to be as such. The News Digest, on the other hand, stressed the fact that Makarios was seeking to use the Agreements as a means to ferment new struggles and this, it was argued, was what informed his statements, and that the Turkish Cypriot side would determine its policy accordingly. This message unambiguously projected the Turkish Cypriot understanding of the situation and delivered a very clear warning to the Greek Cypriot leadership.

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<sup>84</sup> From the Cyprus Mail 07 January 1962.

<sup>85</sup> From the Cyprus Mail 9 January 1962.



Both, Makarios' speech and Turkish Cypriot reactions to it were the culmination of a process already apparent during the transitional period but became intensified after the establishment of independence. That was a process, as one of Makarios' close associates has put it:

characterised by an intense antagonistic effort by each of the two communities, to secure and extend its constitutional advantages and minimise its constitutional disadvantages. In time this effort took a militant nationalist character.<sup>86</sup>

This struggle emerged in relation to a limited number of constitutional provisions. As Clerides remarks, beyond the specific problems that arose as a result of this struggle, the day-to-day activities of the state went on uninterrupted even where administrative and judicial cooperation was necessary.<sup>87</sup> Yet this was a fragile state of affairs given that that which was being contested was at the heart of the constitutional structure, it could potentially threaten all areas of cooperation. As has been mentioned in the previous chapter, the constitutional provisions for separate municipalities and proportional employment in the civil service became areas of contest following the protests by sections of the Greek Cypriot community. In the absence of alternative political opinion within the Greek Cypriot community the government's actions seemed to be aligned to those who did make public demands. By contrast, the Turkish Cypriot side was exerting pressure in the opposite direction. The faithful implementation of the constitution was persistently presented as the ultimate test of the ability of the two communities to live together.

### Defining Policy

As in the previous year, 1962 drew to a close with a crisis. Further negotiations between the two sides over the establishment of separate municipalities led to stalemate in December, only one day before the temporary law concerning the Turkish municipalities

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<sup>86</sup> Kranidiotis op. cit; p.12.

<sup>87</sup> Clerides op. cit; pp. 137-140.

was due to expire. It was a combination of the failure of each side to reach agreement during these negotiations and the Greek Cypriot leadership's determination not to approve another extension of the temporary law that led to a series of events that precipitated constitutional and political chaos. Given the fact that separate municipalities were already functioning, their dissolution could occur only if the Turkish Cypriots conceded to their dissolution. But, for the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriot insistence that separate municipalities would have to remain in place and entrenched through a law of some permanency was the source of the problem in the first place.

Following the breakdown of the negotiations and the refusal by Greek Cypriot members of Parliament to support a proposal by their Turkish Cypriot counterparts for the extension of the temporary law, the Turkish Cypriot municipalities formally ceased to exist constitutionally. There was no immediate constitutional channel to resolve the situation. The only legislation concerning municipalities that was now in place was legislation under which Greek Cypriot municipalities functioned. In these circumstances, both communities resorted to unconstitutional means to enact legislation that suited their respective positions on the issue. The Greek Cypriots resorted to the Council of Ministers where a decision could be passed by simple majority. This effort was to establish Improvement Boards to 'bring both Greek and Turkish sections of the Municipalities under unified control'.<sup>88</sup> The Turkish Cypriots resorted to their Communal Chamber in an effort to approve new municipal legislation in support of separate Turkish municipalities. This was a situation in which there was a complete breakdown of communication over the issue; a breakdown which was reaching dangerous levels.

It was decided that an agreement with the Turkish Cypriots could not be reached when so much divided the two sides. Makarios proceeded, in November 1963, to submit a proposal for constitutional revision. This, addressed all areas of effective powers and

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<sup>88</sup> Kyriakides *op. cit.*, p. 101.

rights granted to the Turkish Cypriot community and affecting majority rule. What was retained was the separate communal chambers which would have given Turkish Cypriots the power to continue to exercise control over its own education and other strictly communal affairs. The position of the Vice-president was also maintained, though this time as a symbolic position stripped of the power of veto. The proposed revisions included the establishment of unified municipalities, the abolition of separate majorities and veto powers. These were proposals to revise all constitutional provisions which had proved a source of conflict.<sup>89</sup> In proposing this the Greek Cypriot President was in effect seeking to abolish all those areas that related to the central categories of Turkish Cypriot nationalism.

The foregoing has been an attempt to schematically present the conflictual principles of vision and division that each community projected in the contest over the implementation of the constitution, the intensity with which this conflict was pursued is evident by the persistence of these positions.

Both sides, Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike, seemed to have had some reasonable proposals, but it seems that neither side ever listened to the other. Their positions were fixed and no amount of reasoning could change each view.<sup>90</sup>

The persistence of these views could easily degenerate into violence as the only possible means for imposing a vision of divisions in a context where the principle of social divisions entailed in the constitution could not be accepted by the majority while the minority was adamant that its status extended beyond that of an ethnic minority, that it constituted a separate people. Given its faith in the willingness of the external homeland to intervene, violence figured as a realistic option for both the minority as well as the majority.

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<sup>89</sup> For a reproduction of the document submitted at the time see Clerides *op. cit.*, pp.

<sup>90</sup> Kyriakides *op. cit.*; p. 100.

Violence was conceived as a real option for the minority in a context where its constitutional status was being eroded. Neither the right to separate municipalities was enforced by virtue of the constitutional provision nor a decision making process based on separate majorities figured as an effective weapon of blackmail when the majority could simply seek other avenues for imposing its will.

In this context the Turkish Cypriot interpretation that the outbreak of violence in December 1963 was the outcome of a Greek Cypriot effort to bring about union with Greece, while first eliminating the Turkish Cypriot community remains as problematic as the Greek Cypriot claim that violence broke out as the outcome of a premeditated plan for partition; in short, an insurrection against the state.

There was a basic conflict between the two communities which rendered both the category of the people and that of the state as areas of severe contest. To sustain the argument that the outbreak of violence was the result of an insurrection by Turkish Cypriot 'fanatics' is to fail to root the state and to pose the question of legitimacy. That question becomes the more stark in a context where conflict between the two communities was transformed, by December 1963, into a conflict between the state and the Turkish Cypriot community.

By far the most insightful account of the forms through which the conflict was sustained was the report of a British liaison officer stationed in Cyprus in the period between January and June 1964. This was a period which witnessed, according to Richard Patrick, the movement of Turkish Cypriots out of 70% of the total number of mixed or Turkish Cypriot villages that were evacuated during the period between December 1963 and August 1964, into separate administrative territorial units.<sup>91</sup> Discussing indiscriminate actions by elements within the Greek Cypriot community against Turkish Cypriots at a time when the government of the Republic was exclusively under Greek Cypriot control Packard argues:

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<sup>91</sup> R. Patrick 1976 pp. 47-73.

To the Greek public it was presented that at Christmas their police had been in the forefront of a struggle to maintain the rule of law. The Turks, on the other hand, knew that that Christmas the Greek police had as a force lost its respect for the law and committed many atrocities and that now it was highly biased against them...The government had one way, and one way only, to restore a general confidence in itself; that was publicly and clearly and with every medium at its disposal to condemn every single act of violence and lawlessness, and openly to pursue through whatever legal processes were available to it those who had broken the law. The government made no real attempt to act in this way, and claimed in private that it lacked sufficient control over even the Greek community to make such a course possible. In fact it seems likely that the leaders of the 'Organisation', who also controlled the government, decided towards the end of this period to adopt a specific policy of *laissez faire*: to wait for the incidents to happen (sometimes having specifically engineered the appropriate climate) and then to exploit them as seemed most apt in the pursuit of their goal, which was a unitary and independent state under Greek control.<sup>92</sup>

It is against the background of intercommunal violence in this period that the institutional separation between the two communities became entrenched and interpreted by the Greek Cypriot community as part of a pre-meditated plan to partition the island. Though the actual number of people killed during that period has been estimated at 350 Turkish Cypriot casualties and 170 Greek Cypriots,<sup>93</sup> (thus seriously undermining the Turkish Cypriot interpretation of that violence as genocide) the policies of the state only served to confirm that the political paradigm which privileged an order based on majority rule alluded to a Greek Cypriot order which could not respond to the basic needs of Turkish Cypriot citizens. This is a period that remains beyond the reach of public discussion despite the fact that its impact has, in all probability, been the single most important factor which secured the homogenisation of the Turkish Cypriot community around the discourse which came to dominate in the early years of independence. As such, the interpretation of this period has been monopolised by the Turkish Cypriot side which casts it singly and unproblematically as witnessing genocide. As such, it directs attention away from the fact that the Turkish Cypriot

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<sup>92</sup> M. Packard 1964 pp. 147-8.

<sup>93</sup> Patrick op. cit., p. 46.

leadership did consider violence as an option in a context where its rights were being eroded and faith in a Turkish intervention given this violent scenario was absolute.

## CONCLUSION

The Greek Cypriot community asserted itself during the period of British rule as a Greek community whose very existence was inseparable from the call for *enosis*. By 1960 it entered a new process of substantiation as a Greek community whose expression of the demand for *enosis* was devoid of an immediate political meaning; by 1974 it was substantiated as a Greek *Cypriot* community. A community, in other words, that asserted itself above all as a distinct nation even if understanding itself as ethnically Greek. When the Greek Cypriot community was beginning to assert a distinct *national* identity, invariably with a strong affinity with the Greek state, the Turkish Cypriot community substantiated itself as a distinct and separate group possessing political equality with the Greek Cypriot majority. While this relationship had already been secured in the Zurich and London Agreements, it remained precarious as the Greek Cypriot majority protested against what it understood to be the violation of the principle of majority rule. The 1974 experience presented itself as the opportunity for the final and irreversible confirmation of the Turkish Cypriot community as both a separate political and ethnic unit.

In the absence of the Turkish invasion the opportunity for that categoric substantiation would not have been available in that it would have been impossible for a minority of 18%, confined to a total of 3% of the Republic's territory and without independent economic resources to sustain a separate administration. The recognition of possibilities and consequently, of meaningful action would have been, in all likelihood, very different. But what may be asserted is that possibilities, and by extension opportunities, figure only because they are *recognised* as such. In other words, the realm of the possible is limited or determined by the objective and subjective conditions of the group in question.

That foreign interests affected the possibilities recognised and the opportunities seized by that community would have to be partly explained by processes intrinsic to the community itself and in part by developments and positions within the Greek Cypriot community. To render the Turkish Cypriot leadership's position as 'extremist' is to ignore that the manner in which reality was being named and visions and social divisions were delineated were simultaneously sustained by the very reality that was being named and acted upon by the Greek Cypriot community.

The vision the Greek Cypriot community has had of itself as a political community has over the years undergone substantial change, suggesting both the contingent nature of *enosis* as a political demand and the contingent character of the national group which made *enosis* its primary vision. But if this describes change and reconstitution other realities have sustained continuity.

It has been argued in this research that a debilitating situation has been predicated by the assertion of conflicting understandings as to who constitutes a legitimate rights-bearing people. For the Greek Cypriots as the overwhelming majority on the island the rights-bearing people were territorially defined, for the Turkish Cypriots this was ethnically defined. The *heterodoxy* posed by the Turkish Cypriot community formed the object through which foreign involvement sought to legitimise itself. It was through that challenge posed in relation to the assumed rights of the Greek Cypriot community as a majority that the Greek Cypriot *orthodox* discourse subsequently evolved.

This *orthodox* discourse was and continues to be reinforced through dominant historical appropriations, indeed the only permissible appropriations, which seek to disclose the background to the Cyprus problem by locating the role of the two communities in a historical context. But the role of the two communities was and remains, in this discourse, subservient to foreign involvement, whether in the form of British colonial policy or Turkey's role before and after independence. The role that Turkey came to play cannot be ignored as a highly significant factor, the 1974 invasion and partition of



the island depended in the first instance on a Turkish military initiative. Nevertheless, this approach is fundamentally incapable of defining the contours of the conflict between the two communities which has continued to sustain Cyprus as a deeply divided society.

The absence of categories through which the long term development of the two communities may be adequately recognised sustains the invisibility of the Turkish Cypriot community within Greek Cypriot political discourse. When the presence of that community is occasionally felt, mis-recognition invariably follows. An approach to history which proceeds with an idea that *real* nationalism is subject to authentic - purely internal – processes, fails to recognise that nationalism is first and foremost a political project taking shape out of interactive processes. The real issue, as Beissinger has commented, is whether the group that is called into being by nationalist leaders obtains substance.

Here we also face the abiding problem of how we know whether categories of nationhood have obtained substance. Anyone can declare a nation into existence. Contrary to Renan, nations are not daily plebiscites; rather they are punctured and irregular plebiscites whose timing is largely determined by the rhythms of political authority. The nation may be the largest community to which we pay allegiance when the chips are down. However, in politics the chips are usually not on the table, and it is only in uncommon circumstances that the choice between competing allegiances must be made. Certainly, the resonance of nationalist claims and identities within populations varies considerably over time and is always subject to evolution and change. But in most contexts it is rare when a plebiscite is actually conducted - when categories of nationhood are actually put to the test. The nation usually exists as a form of state or elite discourse, while nationalist frames gain resonance within larger segments of the population only at critical junctures in time.<sup>1</sup>

While those critical junctures are approached through the role of foreign powers in affecting internal processes, the ‘nationalist frames’ which come to have resonance with Turkish Cypriots are lost.

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<sup>1</sup> M. Beissinger op. cit., p.173.

In the dominant Greek Cypriot historical approach, the history of the Turkish Cypriots disappears under the weight of four main themes. Peaceful co-existence, divide and rule policies, Turkish involvement and intra-communal violence are themes under which evidence is organised and a cynical approach to Turkish Cypriot history proceeds. In the absence of any consideration of the likely impact that the principle of vision and division that was being asserted within this community had under the given historical circumstances, these themes combine to project Turkish Cypriots as nothing more than an amalgamate of individuals. Peaceful co-existence as well as the use of violence within the community is implied as evidence of at least an embryonic form of Cypriotism. While the use of violence in an intra-communal context was a method through which uniformity was imposed, the absence of any evidence regarding the resonance that a separatist political discourse had with any sections of the Turkish Cypriot population would go towards an interpretation that Turkish Cypriots consented to the leadership only through fear.

Similarly the themes of a divide and rule policy and the involvement of Turkey are pursued from the perspective of the interests of the colonial government on the one hand and Turkey on the other. As such the mobilisation process of the Turkish Cypriot community is treated as inauthentic, unlike the Greek Cypriot mobilisation for *enosis*.

The effect that the organisation of these themes under one narrative produces is to undermine any suggestion that Turkish Cypriots may indeed have possessed legitimate claims in the course of their own history. Or, that Turkish Cypriots would be willing to fight and die in pursue of their own vision of themselves.

It may be that by virtue of its minority status, the Turkish Cypriot community could not have reasons for optimism of the success of any potential struggle unless outside support was forthcoming. It can also be asserted that if such support were not forthcoming the aspiration of the Greek Cypriots for majority rule would have been

most likely accommodated. But this cannot detract from the fact that despite the means through which Turkish Cypriots were able to assert themselves there existed nevertheless a domestic dynamic that deemed violence as an option.

The power sharing arrangement envisioned by the Zurich and London Agreements was not seen by this community as a privilege but as a right. In constitutional terms the Turkish Cypriots had never been willing to be a minority. This can be at least partly accounted for by the nationalisation process of the Greek Cypriot community which precluded the possibility of the creation of a unitary nation. This along with the insecurity that emerged from the reality of being minority are issues which are overshadowed by the manner in which the above mentioned themes dominate the framework through which the history of the Turkish Cypriot community is approached in the dominant Greek Cypriot narrative.

Likewise, the outbreak of violence in 1963 is also treated in this narrative as the outcome of Turkish plans to partition the island. In this case a unique opportunity to explore the processes through which each of the two communities opted for violence and destruction during the only period that power-sharing was in place continues to be surrendered to a series of assertions regarding Turkey's interests.

Yet, as has been extensively argued in this thesis, the political conflict that characterised the relationship between the two communities throughout the three years of the bicomunal republic would suggest that the two possessed antagonistic understandings as to the principle that should guide the distribution of power and resources. Conflicts ensuing from diametrically opposed understandings of the rights-bearing people, of the principle that should guide the distribution of power, of the meaning of a constitution that established power-sharing and of the nature of the state cannot but stem from deeply seated divisions.

A policy seeking to establish majority rule, predicated by the very majority status of the Greek Cypriot community, sustained the categories through which the Turkish Cypriot leadership was seeking to impose a principle of vision and division. The Greek Cypriot elite, both left and right, lacked the imagination to assert a principle of vision and division which might have resonated with Turkish Cypriots. The absence of this imagination may have been dependent on the very nature of the political struggles amongst the Greek Cypriot community. As has already been argued in the foregoing pages the struggle for power within the Greek Cypriot community centred on the issue of *enosis*. But as has also been elaborated the content through which that struggle ensued should not be identified as the sole reality that was being produced and reproduced during the period. The demand for *enosis* was a contentious issue but it did not drive the process of conflict between the two communities. Turkish Cypriots vehemently protested against that prospect but what *enosis* symbolised for them was not only the union of Cyprus with Greece but also the domination of Turkish Cypriots by the majority. Further, *enosis* was only the form through which Greek Cypriots, directly or indirectly, spoke of change. The project of affecting change was practically pursued through a strategy to do away with the power-sharing features of the constitution. The inter-communal struggle that ensued can only be understood as a majority-minority struggle fuelled by a contest over the distribution of power. Therefore, the definite break with a pro-*enosis* past that was marked in 1974 was unambiguously signalling the shift in Greek Cypriot orientations over the status of the island. However, perceptions over the status of the two main communities on the island remained unaffected.

The reluctance to understand the processes that shaped the Turkish Cypriot community, and thus the nationalist frames through which the community has been substantiated, has a practical impact at present. Greek Cypriot society has persistently failed to reflect through public political culture that which has been officially accepted through the negotiations process, at the heart of which is the recognition of the minority community as a separate community of rights. Yet such recognition would in effect be dependent on acknowledging that the conflict between the two communities took the form of a

majority-minority conflict over the distribution of power. The failure to contain it entrenched the two communities as distinct political entities.

The stated aspiration of the Greek Cypriot side continues to be the re-unification of the island. It is however unlikely that a Greek Cypriot official acceptance for a new power-sharing system will ever lead to any greater integration of the two communities unless the content through which Cypriot history is appropriated becomes simultaneously filled with the role of the Turkish Cypriot community in shaping the course of developments on the island. Singularly subsuming internal processes under foreign deliberations perpetuates mis-recognition and sustains the invisibility of the Turkish Cypriot community from the terms of definition of the Cyprus problem. The significance of this reality is that its impact extends beyond the realm of definition and is perpetually reflected in the making of Greek Cypriot policy and the failure to build any meaningful political alliances between sections of the two sides. A stated aspiration for a Cypriot nation, and claims made in its name, cannot act as a catalyst in the political conflict that has divided the population of Cyprus, and therefore cannot bring the nation it seeks to create into being unless qualified *in practice* as simultaneously a plural one.


TABLE 1				
Population by Ethnic Group in 1960 and 1973				
	1960 (Census)		1973 (Census)	
	Number	%	Number	%
Greek Cypriot Community (*)	447,901	78.20	498,511	78.9
Turkish Cypriot Community	103,822	18.13	116,000	18.4
Others	20,984	3.66	17,26	2.7
Total:	572,707	100.00	631,778	100.00

(\*) According to the 1960 Constitution, the small religious minorities of Maronites, Armenians and Latins opted to be classified demographically within the Greek Cypriot Community.


Source: Census of Population and Agriculture 1961, Vol. 1, Population by Location, Race and Sex, and Demographic Report 1987, Department of Statistics and Research.

TABLE 2		
Economic Activity by Ethnic Group Prior to December 1963		
	Greek Cypriot	Turkish Cypriot
	%	%
<b>Ownership</b>		
Land	61-81%	18-38%
<b>Production</b>		
Gross value of agricultural products (1963)	87.4%	12.6%
Gross value of manufacturing output (1962)	91.8%	6.1%
Gross value of mining output (1962)	24.1%	1.2%
<b>Trade</b>		
Gross value of imports (1963)	85.4%	2.8%
Gross value of exports (1963)	71.3%	0.2%
<b>Industrial and Personal Taxes (1958-1959)</b>	29.7%	1.8%

Source: R. A. Patrick (1976). These figures are based on statistics released by the Republic of Cyprus and the Provisional Turkish-Cypriot Administration formed in 1964.



MAP 1 Cyprus in August 1974



MAP 2 Distribution of the Population by Ethnic Group Prior to 1963

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