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ASSESSING GREEK GRAND STRATEGIC THOUGHT AND PRACTICE: INSIGHTS FROM THE STRATEGIC CULTURE APPROACH

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis uses a 'strategic culture approach' to gain insights into Greece's grand strategic thought and practice. The strategic culture approach refers to the study of groups and the diachronic beliefs and values that underpin their interaction with their strategic environment. It touches upon ideas and concepts that the Cold War constraints managed to keep dormant but have renewed resonance in the new post-Cold War international environment.

Nevertheless, the strategic culture approach remains a relatively unstudied subject area. To a great extent, this is due to the methodological and ontological complexities that riddle strategic culture analysis. Moreover, those who choose to pursue a strategic culture line of academic inquiry have failed to reach a consensus over the best way to overcome these difficulties. While, this thesis acknowledges the existence of these problems, it seeks to employ the strategic culture approach in spite of them. It does so with the belief that strategic culture can offer invaluable insights into Greece's grand strategy by venturing into the realm of ideational factors, largely ignored by mainstream International Relations theories.

Hence, the theoretical aim of this research is to review the various ways strategic culture has been approached within the International Relations' literature and to evaluate the possible advantages of conducting strategic culture research. In order to achieve this aim, I put forward the case for supplementing the dominant international relations research paradigm - neo-realism - with strategic culture analysis.
The desired outcome, here, is not the formulation of law-like hypotheses that adhere to strict positivist criteria but the enhancement of our understanding of the issues at hand.

More specifically, this thesis seeks to offer an understanding of Greece's grand strategic thought and practice by examining the country's strategic culture sources: geography and resources, history and experience and political culture. After analysing these sources four major issues emerge: a) the persistent influence of a Greek national identity; b) the existence of two schools of thought that have historically defined the course of Greek society and consequently its grand strategic thought and practice; c) the intricate nature of Greece's political culture; and d) the fourth and final issue questions the impact of all of the above on the development of Greece's grand strategic thought and practice.

Contents

Acknowledgements

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
COMINFORM	Communist Information Bureau
EAM	National Liberation Front
EDES	National Democratic Army
EDI	European Defence Identity
EEC	European Economic Community
ELAS	National Peoples Army
EMU	European Monetary Union
EPC	European Political Cooperation
EU	European Union
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
ICG	Intergovernmental Conference
KKE	Greek Communist Party
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU	West European Union

Introduction

This thesis is an attempt to explore and analyse the relevance and credibility of the concept of strategic culture as applied to Greece's grand strategic thought and practice. More specifically, it is a work that seeks to explore the way Greece views itself, its role in the world, and the way this state interrelates with others in it.

Why Use a Strategic Culture Approach?

Strategic culture is treated as an imperative element in the discussion of Greece's grand strategic thought and practice for two reasons. The first of these reasons pertains to the reasons that Western academia has, ever since the end of the Cold War, been more inclined to discuss the suggestion that the strategic predispositions of modern states are affected by cultural factors deeply rooted in history and geography. Researchers have employed the concept of strategic culture to analyse the foreign and security policies of a number of states. However, the case study of a nation that traces its origins to an ancient and enduring civilisation, Greece, remains overlooked. This appears unfortunate given the fact that due to its rich and eventful historic tradition, Greece appears to serve as a fruitful and challenging empirical battleground for strategic culture analysts.

The second reason addresses the growing acceptance on the part of Greece's strategists, politicians and academics that the Greek pursuits on issues of foreign and security policy are often bound to the nation's historical and cultural experience.

A) The growing importance of cultural analysis in international relations

The need both to make sense of the new post-Cold War realities and to gain a better understanding of the way in which states act in the international arena, has led to a proliferation of the approaches used in international relations for the realisation of the aforementioned goals. For Cold War explanations of International Security problems rested predominantly on a-cultural and a-historical rationalisations that drew their explanatory use on the assumption that states are "functionally undifferentiated units that

seek to optimise their utility".[1] This in turn, led to a trend in international relations that perceived states as 'black boxes', governed by 'rational strategic men' producing value-maximising decisions and policies that in a situation of confrontation with another nation would be designed to mechanically respond to military stimuli.[2]

A significant number of scholars working within the post-Cold War research agenda, now free from the structural constraints of bipolarity, have shown a growing interest in "all aspects of cultural dimensions of world politics, such as the study of 'identity politics', the interest of normative theorists in communitarian values and apocalyptic views about the clash of civilisations".[3] In the field of Security Studies, more specifically, this growing interest has been translated into a scholarly desire to analyse the interrelation between culture and strategy and the effect of this interrelation on state behaviour. On these grounds the concept of strategic culture "opens up a promising area for both theoretical and empirical research".[4]

Alastair Iain Johnston for example, has used the concept to question the premise of China's perceived anti-militaristic strategic tradition. Indeed, many scholars have argued that the country's Confucian/Mencian heritage has historically driven China's international relations towards the pursuit of policies that disparage the use of force. Johnston's research, on the other hand, suggested the existence of both a conjectural and a practical dimension within China's strategic culture. He centred his research on the study of military classics whose effect on the Chinese strategic thinking have been diachronic and on the examination of the policies pursued by China during the Ming dynasty period (1368-1644). His findings proposed that the Confucian/Mencian tradition that values diplomacy, economic incentives and the projection of the self-perceived Chinese rectitude over military might have indeed had an influence on the country's international behaviour. Johnston, however, understands this influence to be of symbolic

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[1] for the quote see Johnston, A. Thinking About Strategic Culture. *International Security*, 12 (4), Spring, 1988, p. 6
[2] for the argument see Booth, K. *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*, London: Groom Helm, 1979, p. 23
[3] Booth, K., Macmillan, A., Trood, R., Strategic Culture in Booth, K., Trood, R. eds. *Strategic Cultures in the Asia–Pacific Region*. London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 3
[4] ibid

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importance. In particular, he argues that the Confucian/Mencian tradition has been used to substantiate China's international behaviour in culturally acceptable ways. On the practical level, Johnston's analysis of Chinese strategic discourse revealed a preference for a *realpolitik* model of behaviour in foreign affairs.

Johnston's work is valuable not only for its contribution towards the understanding of China's grand strategy but also in terms of international relations theory. More specifically, the dominant neo-realist school of thought has traditionally portrayed the international system as a structure whose function is determined by an asymmetric balance of power between its constituent parts (states). In such an anarchic realm, the power of explanation lies within the understanding of the units' placement in accordance with their relative capabilities. As state behaviour is seen to be determined by systemic constraints and guided by a constant strife for power, the analysis of the units' distinct qualities is, accordingly, deemed inconsequential. Thus, by employing the concept of strategic culture, Johnston "poses a significant challenge to structural claims about the sources and characteristics of state behaviour by rooting strategic choice in deeply historical, formative ideational legacies".[5]

However, while Johnston arrives at the conclusion that strategic culture is an important variable in the analysis of state behaviour he is careful to point out that this shouldn't necessarily discard the instructive power of the realist paradigm. He argues that there is no *a priori* reason to assume differences in the strategic choices of states with similar cultural and political disposition. Consequently, when such differences arise, the concept of strategic culture might prove unable to account for them necessitating a return to the search for the "so-called structural on noncultural reductionist variables".[6]

Indeed, it is not uncommon for 'cultural' analysts of international affairs to acknowledge the value of the realist research programme. Ronald Bleiker, for example, echoes Johnston's view by asserting that while neo-realism is based on, what he deems to be, a

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[5] Johnston, I. A. *Cultural Realism-Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, p. ix
[6] ibid, p. 259

set of subjective assumptions, its conceptual framework is not void of explanatory power.[7] Moreover, according to Bleiker, cultural analysis need not be antithetical to the canons of realism. In his own words "focusing on cultural influences is not meant to detract from the 'fact' that the powerful impact of anarchy requires attention and (realist) explanations".[8] Bleiker's argument is also in agreement with Gray's belief that "strategic cultural analysis is vital because it alone-save only for old-fashioned espionage, of course-can make sense of those material factors which realists beliefs are utterly unable to decode."[9] The aim of cultural analysis should be, as Bleiker suggests, to raise "greater awareness of unavoidable biases and the culturally conditioned construction of reality" and in doing so "help international theory to become more effective".[10]

It is with this in mind that the concept of strategic culture is approached and employed in this thesis. My analysis of the Greek grand strategic thought and practice seeks to highlight the relevance of ideational, non-material factors in international analysis but this needs not be taken as a desire to supplant neo-realism, rather as a desire to supplement it. For, in effect, the focus of this thesis meets all three criteria, according to K.J. Holsti, for the classification of a conceptual approach as a classical (realist) one. These are: a) that the proper focus of study is the causes of war and the conditions of peace/security/order; b) that the main units of analysis are the diplomatic–military behaviours of the only essential actors, nation states and c) that states operate in a system characterised by anarchy (the lack of central authority).[11]

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[7] Bleiker, R. Neorealist Claims in Light of Ancient Chinese Philosophy: The Cultural Dimension of International Theory. *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, 22 (3), 1993, p. 401
[8] ibd, p. 421
[9] Gray, C. In Praise of Strategy. Review of International Studies, 29, 2003, p.294
[10] Bleiker, R. Neorealist Claims in Light of Ancient Chinese Philosophy: The Cultural Dimension of International Theory. *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, 22 (3), 1993, p. 421
[11] Holti, K. J. *The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory*. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1985, p. 10 cited from Bleiker, R. Neorealist Claims in Light of Ancient Chinese Philosophy: The Cultural Dimension of International Theory. *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, 22 (3), 1993, pp. 402-3

B) The Relevance of Cultural Analysis for Greece

Greece's performance in strategic affairs has, all too often, been a matter of controversy and a subject of criticism among foreign observers.[12] Moreover, these criticisms are not limited to foreign observers. They also find resonance with several political analysts and practitioners within Greece itself to the extent that the former Prime Minister Constantinos Mitsotakis has referred to the country's strategies regarding foreign and security policy, as "a series of mistakes and disappointments" that are "totally counter-productive to promoting Greece's national interest".[13] His assertion is shared by the current, at time of writing, Prime Minister, Constantinos Simitis, who has been quoted scorning the nation's pursuits in the realm of international relations as "catastrophic to Greece's genuine interests".[14] The peculiarity of these two statements lies in the fact that they derive from the very individuals whose involvement was, and still is in the case of Simitis, decisive in the formulation of these policies.

It is precisely this paradox that prompts Panayotis Ioakimidis, a Greek scholar, to inquire "why do foreign policy objectives, choices and outputs meet with such severe criticism and even condemnation even by those who have contributed to bringing them about?"[15] The answer, he concludes, is that the Greek Foreign policy-making model is an

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[12] see for example Talbot, S. Greece's Defence Seems Just Silly, *Time*, 12 October 1992 also Stupid or Evil?, *The Spectator*, 9 April 1994 also Simons, M. Club Europe's Private Doubts: Greece won't play by the rules, *International Herald Tribune*, 9 April 1991 also The Seek Man of Europe, *The Economist*, 9 May 1992 also Mazower, M. Classic Errors in the Balkans, *Guardian*, 12 April 1994 also Athens on Trial, *The Times*, 8 April 1994 also Glenny, M. "The Temptation of Purgatory" in Allison, Graham T., Nicolaidis, K. eds. *The Greek Paradox*. London: The MIT Press, 1997 also Woodward, S. "Rethinking Security in the Post-Yugoslav Era" in Allison, Graham T., Nicolaidis, K. eds. *The Greek Paradox*. London: The MIT Press, 1997, pp. 117-118 also Tsingos, B. " Greece Between Yesterday and Tomorrow" in Allison, Graham T., Nicolaidis, K. eds. *The Greek Paradox*. London: The MIT Press, 1997 also Tsakaloyannis, P. "Greece: The Limits to Convergence" in Hill, C. ed. *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*. London: Routledge, 1996 also Eyal, J. " A Western View of Greece's Balkan Policy" in Featherstone, K., Ifantis, K. eds. *Greece in a Changing Europe - Between Integration and Balkan Disintegration*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999
[13] Mitsotakis, C. "Preface" in Skylakis, T. *Sto Onoma tis Makedonias*. Athens: Evroekdotiki, 1995 (in Greek), p. 2
[14] Simitis, C. *For a Strong Society, For a Strong Greece*. Athens: Plethron, 1995 (in Greek), p.157 cited from Ioakimidis, P.C. "The Model of Foreign Policy-Making in Greece: Personalities versus Institutions" in Couloumbis, T., et al. *The Foreign Policies of the European Union's Mediterranean States and Applicant Countries in the 1990s*. New York: St. Martin Press, 1999, p. 140
[15] Ioakimidis, P.C. "The Model of Foreign Policy-Making in Greece: Personalities versus Institutions" in Couloumbis, T., et al. *The Foreign Policies of the European Union's Mediterranean States and Applicant Countries in the 1990s*. New York: St. Martin Press, 1999, pp. 140-1

idiosyncratic one, "peculiar to Greece's political, cultural and historical environment".[16] His findings are echoed by a string of Greek scholars who have resorted to what can be best described as cultural factors for the analysis of Greece's grand strategy.

Panos Tsakaloyannis, for example, does not hesitate to account for Greece's behaviour within the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy by employing Anthony Smith's (a leading expert on nationalism) words: "We are thrown back on history, and specifically on political and legal traditions, and cultural heritages and symbolisms."[17] Tsakaloyannis then goes on to elaborate on this thought by stressing the fact that "such considerations can no longer be ignored by students of EPC, and certainly not where Greece is concerned".[18] On the same issue, Loukas Tsoukalis' explanation points to the interplay between foreign policy and domestic politics while at the same time emphasising Greece's strong and distinct sense of national identity, which he attributes to culture and history.[19] Likewise, Basilios Tsingos argues that Greece's fiascos in the field of foreign security policy are the result of a suboptimal strategy that ascribes high premium to cultural and historical arguments.[20] In the same vein, Spyros Economides cautions against the dangers of a Greek grand strategy that, in the absence of the Soviet threat, turns Alexander the Great into "the cornerstone of Greece's membership to the western world".[21] The reference here being to Greece's dispute with its northern neighbour FYROM (Macedonia) in which it chose to justify its stance by making allusions to its ancient history. This had the effect of diverting attention from what could have been portrayed as legitimate security qualms and thus rendered the Greek case incomprehensible to foreign onlookers.

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[16] ibid, p. 141

[17] Smith, A. D. National Identity and the Idea of European Unity. *International Affairs*, 68 (1), January 1992, p. 70 cited from Tsakaloyannis, P. "Greece: The Limits to Convergence" in Hill, C. ed. *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*. London: Routledge, 1996, p. 187

[18] Tsakaloyannis, P. "Greece: The Limits to Convergence" in Hill, C. ed. *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*. London: Routledge, 1996, p. 187

[19] Loukas, T. "Is Greece an awkward partner?" in Featherstone, K., Ifantis, K. *Greece in a Changing Europe- Between Integration and Balkan Disintegration*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 26

[20] Tsingos, B. "Greece Between Yesterday and Tomorrow" in Allison, G. T., Nicolaidis, K. eds. *The Greek Paradox*. London: The MIT Press, 1997, p. 100

[21] Economides, S. "Greece and the New Europe" in the 1990s in Carabott, P. ed. *Greece and Europe in the Modern Period: Aspects of a Troubled Relationship*. London: Centre for Hellenic Studies- King's College, 1995, p. 129

Others have extended this application of culture as an explanatory factor in Greece's external and internal political discourse by centring their arguments along the lines of the political culture research programme; the latter defined as the "values, beliefs, and emotions that give meaning to political behaviour".[22] Scholars like Victor Papakosma, Nikiforos Diamandouros, Nikolaus Wenturis and James Pettifer, have all argued that Greece's stance in world politics is corollary to the country's political culture.[23] Their belief is endorsed, at least with regards to a specific policy area, by the current, at time of writing, Greek Foreign Minister, George Papandreou, who claims that Greece's policy towards Turkey is a "question of a whole political culture", developed around the way the nation deals with its eastern neighbour. [24]

Why then, if one chooses to pursue a cultural analysis, study Greek grand strategy through the prism of strategic and not political culture? Or is it that the two are interchangeable? Whilst it would be difficult to argue that the two concepts are not associated – given the fact that both are concerned with the study of the subjective orientations held by any one society – their relationship has yet to be identified in its entirety.

John Duffield, for example, chooses to answer this quandary by elaborating on the differences between cultural approaches to grand strategy before proclaiming his preference in the explanatory use of political culture. He does so because, in his own words, "it is likely to apply to a broader range of cases and thus represents a more useful starting point in the analysis of foreign and security policy than do other cultural

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[22] Kavanagh, D. *British Politics: Continuities and Change.* 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 49
[23] see Papakosma, S. V. *Politics and Culture in Greece.* USA: The University of Michigan, 1988 also Diamandouros, N. "Politics and Culture, 1974-1991: An Interpretation" in Clogg, R. ed. *Greece, 1981-1989: The Populist Decade.* London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1993 also Wenturis, N. "Political Culture" in Kazakos, P., Ioakimidis, P. C. eds. *Greece and EC Membership Evaluated.* London: Pinter, 1994 also Pettifer, J. "Greek Political Culture and Foreign Policy" in Featherstone, K., Ifantis, K. *Greece in a changing Europe- Between European integration and Balkan disintegration.* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999
[24] Papandreou, G. Interview to Iordanidis, C. *Kathimerini* (Greek Daily), 5 July 1999

concepts".[25] Strategic and political–military culture approaches, though not without 'considerable applicability', are criticised for employing narrow definitions restricting their analysis to the enclosed borders of defence, security, military and nuclear strategy.[26]

However, following on from this, the same can be argued for political culture. After all political culture deals with "the classic problem of specifying how people affect their political system and vice-versa".[27] If one chooses to expand the analytical power of political culture to include issues pertaining to foreign and security policies as well as economic, social and political factors then he/she would be closer to describing a state's national or grand strategy. Consequently, strategic culture, based on a broad definition of strategy, which explores the relationship between domestic and external pressures while taking into account the growing interdependence of states in the international arena, is preferred in this thesis.

I will define strategic culture as a state's strategic disposition, deriving from the distinct interpretation of history and the socio-economic and political tradition of the state in question, with regards to the role of war in human fairs and the conditions of peace and security. In addition, I concur with Ken Booth and Alan Macmillan in their observation that "strategic culture helps but does not determine how a nation interacts with others in the security field. Strategic culture helps shape behaviour on such issues as the use of force in international politics, sensitivity to external dangers, civil-military relations and strategic doctrine".[28]

Nonetheless, the view expressed in this thesis is that assessment of a state's political culture should not be overlooked as it provides an explanation for any given population's domestic social and political environment. This is especially true because, as Ken Booth

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[25] Duffield, J. Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism. *International Organisation*, 53 (4), Autumn, 1999, p. 774
[26] ibid, p. 776
[27] Chiton, S. Defining Political Culture. *Western Political Quarterly*, 41 (3), September 1988, p. 419 cited from Almond, G., Powell, G. B. *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach*. Boston: Little Brown, 1966, pp. 51-52
[28] Booth, K., Macmillan, A. "Appendix: Strategic Culture- Framework for Analysis" in Booth, K., Trood, R. eds. *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region*. London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 372

points out, "decision-making structures, military establishments and policy-making process all operate in peculiar political cultures".[29] It is for this reason that political culture is regarded as one of the three fundamental sources from which strategic culture derives, the other two being history and geography.[30] Beatrice Heuser echoes this point by arguing that "besides geography, resources, the nature of the enemy and so on, political cultures clearly play a primordial role in determining strategy".[31]

However, while the inferences to the contributory power of political culture in discussing a nation's strategic culture are numerous, few have attempted to expound on their use of the term in a meticulous way. In this thesis, I will seek to avoid a repetition of this omission by offering a brief survey of the political culture literature, tracing its intellectual origins and development as well as pointing to the criticisms that led to the demise of its popularity in the 1980s.

Prior to this, nevertheless, analysis in this section of the introduction will conclude with the examination of Greece's strategic culture by briefly examining its main features.

What are the Main Features of Greece's Strategic Culture?

The search for the constitutive elements that define Greece's strategic culture leads to three fundamental points of reference: a) the omnipresence of a Greek nationalism that transcends the boundaries of modernity and antiquity in laying the foundations of national identity, b) the historic interference of exogenous factors and their interaction with domestic actors in shaping the Greek geo-political landscape and c) as a combination of the former two, the division of Greek society into two antithetical factions whose dynamic interaction continues to underpin the country's socio-economic and political development.

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[29] Booth, K. "The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed" in Jacobsen, G. C. ed. *Strategic Power: USA/USSR*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999, p. 126
[30] ibid, p. 121
[31] Heuser, B. *Nuclear Mentalities? Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG*. London: Macmillan Press, 1998, p. 264

i) Greek Nationalism and the Development of a Modern National Identity

Modern Greece can be best looked upon as the by-product of 17th-18th century

nationalism that swept across Europe and transformed it into a continent of nation states.

These new political entities were created partly on the basis of a shared "historic territory,

legal-political community, legal-political equality of members, and a common civic

culture and ideology"[32] and partly on the assumption of a "community of common

descent".[33] They were the result of either long international conflicts between the great

powers of the time or domestic upheavals that led to the eventual break up of Europe's

empires. The Renaissance, Enlightenment, Reformation and Industrial Revolution (which

was led by an influential bourgeoisie) gradually consolidated the existence of the nation-

state and transformed it into the archetype of socio-political organisation for the rest of

the world.

Greece, however, at the time still bound to the oriental despotism of the Ottoman Empire

and political guardianship of the Orthodox Church, whose powers extended across the

ethnic boundaries of the enslaved Christian people in the Balkans, was excluded from

these processes. Thus, at the time of the Greek War of Independence the country's

political experience and socio-economic structure was considerable divergent to that of

Western Europe. As a result, the Greek state that emerged in the 18th century was

immediately confronted with a set of challenging propositions pertaining to the nation's

identity in terms of boundaries, cultural entity and legacy as well as the structure and

form of its political, military, religious, judicial and economic institutions.

More importantly, Greece, and indeed the rest of the Balkan countries that experienced

Ottoman rule, was used to a system that granted collective rights to members of a

confessional association (millet) rather than to individuals. [34] As Victor Roudometof

explains, "in the millet system, collective rights were tied to particularistic rather than

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[32] Smith, A. *National Identity*. Reno, 1991, pp. 10-11
[33] ibid, p. 11
[34] Roudometof, V. Nationalism and Identity Politics in the Balkans: Greece and the Macedonian Question, *Journal of Modern Greek Studies,* 14 (2), 1996, p. 256

universalistic criteria [the latter being the case in Western Democracies]".[35] The immediate result of this was that there was little if any differentiation between state membership and membership of an ethnic or religious group since the latter was seen as the sole criterion for participation in the former. Put differently, only those who spoke Greek and were members of the Greek Orthodox Church could take pride in being part of the 'imagined community', the *ethnos* (nation), which in turn granted them access to state citizenship and the rights it carried. This state of affairs led to the establishment and promulgation of an exclusionary national identity that was conceived as "an integral, transcended entity, a conceptualisation that operates in an exclusive manner vis-à-vis nonethnic Greeks".[36]

Moreover, this conceptualisation of national identity tied in with the aspirations of those among the Greek elites who wished to form the new state on the platform of its Hellenic heritage and axiomatically assumed an unbroken bond between the Greek past and present. This task involved the "construction of a meaningful universe of events and narratives" that explicated the relationship between " *what came before* and *what is*".[37] And what came before, at least in terms of the exclusionary structure of this newly defined national identity, testified to the historical continuity of Greece's cultural existence.

Although by no means sharing a nationality, in the sense that this term has come to be understood in modern times, the different tribes and city-states of ancient Greece collectively saw themselves as a unique 'chosen' people whose language, culture and religious affiliations clearly distinguished them from the rest of the known world. Aristotle, for example, spoke of the one 'Hellenic people' whose shared qualities distinguished them from the 'barbarians', indiscriminately all non-Greeks, and who given its superior governance, would – if united into a single entity – be able to rule the world. Interestingly enough, Aristotle's proclamation also positioned the Hellenic civilisation at

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[35] ibid
[36] ibid, p. 257
[37] Stone, A. L. A Dialogue of Past and Present: The Construction and (Re)Presentation of Greek National Identity, *Perceptions- Journal of International Affairs*, 15 (2), 1999, p. 1?

the centre of the world between, what he thought to be, the cold and spirited but unintelligent people of the north and northwest and the languid but intelligent people of the south.[38]

Aristotle's remarks were symptomatic of the culture of his time but remarkably their influence on the way Greek people perceive the world can be seen extending to the present. It was this notion that led the prominent politician and composer Mikis Theodorakis to talk about the existence of an "opposition between the two worlds - the Greek and other. And when I [Theodorakis] say 'the other' I mean collectively the Eastern despotism, the Jewish monotheism, the Roman militarism and the Western authoritarianism".[39]

Dividing the world between the Greeks and the 'others' has significantly impacted on the formulation of Greece's grand strategy. It has done so by creating a defensive mindset, among policy makers and public alike, directed against all of Greece's perceived enemies; imagined or not. On occasion these enemies have been identified as "the neighbours, who conspire against the nation's sovereignty; ethnic and religious minorities, who are agents of the [aggressive and hostile] neighbours; the West because it speaks of minorities, because it is favourable to the neighbours and because it undermines the nation's religion and culture".[40]

Additionally, the construction of an exclusive national identity put forward the notion of Greek exceptionalism and at the same time raised questions about the links between the Greek *ethnos* and the territory it ought to occupy. For, in terms of geopolitics, modern Greece's allegiance to the glorious past of its Hellenic ancestry, implied that its rightful territory ought to occupy, for the "minimalists the Western peninsula and Western Asia Minor, and for the maximalists those regions as well as the entire Levant".[41] Thus, Greece embarked on a policy of irredentism crystallised in the form of the '*Megali*

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[38] Cartledge, P. *The Greeks*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 40
[39] Goussetis, D. National Identity and Civil Society in Greece. *AIM*, 23 May 2000
[40] ibid
[41] Breuilly, J. *Nationalism and the State*. Chicago, 1995, pp. 108-9

(Great) *Idea'*, the desire to unite all Greek speaking populations in the Ottoman Empire under a single nation whose territories would spread across two continents and touch upon five seas. It was a grand strategy that required all available resources be used for one and only one purpose: the creation of a third Greek civilisation (the previous two being the antiquity and Byzantium).

It has to be noted, at this point, that Greece was not alone in its irredentist pursuits. Contesting for the lands previously occupied by the Ottoman Empire, the majority of the Balkan states that emerged in the 18th-19th century engaged in irredentist pursuits built upon an equally irredentist state-fostered ideology that sought to "establish a connection between the particular nation and the territory it [occupied] - or the territory it should occupy - thus legitimising the possession of a territory by a particular collectivity."[42] The advance of communism in the 20th century and the Cold War that ensued put a check on these pursuits. However, the ethnic strife and anarchy that has prevailed in the Balkans ever since the end of the bipolar international system provides a fresh reminder of the enduring power of nationalist passions in the region.

Notwithstanding the above, the Greek case was unique in that the roots of its nationalistic discourses – the principles of ancient Hellas – were also claimed as major components in the socio-political identity of modern Europe. In the words of S. J. Raphalides: "Within the socio-political framework of 'Europe' and the cultural construct of 'Western civilisation', the incarnation of Hellenic culture serves the interests of Greek national identity abstractly and concretely. Viewed by the Greeks as a cultural contract, however, it obligates the world beyond Hellenism to acknowledge Greece's rightful patrimony and its political place."[43] The decline of the nation after the fall of Byzantium – itself claimed as an inseparable part of Greece's culture and history – was seen as the outcome of Ottoman domination. According to Koraes, one of the founders of modern Greece:

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[42] Roudometof, V. Nationalism and Identity Politics in the Balkans: Greece and the Macedonian Question, *Journal of Modern Greek Studies,* 14 (2), 1996, p. 257

[43] Raphalides, S. J. Sacred Symbol, Sacred Space, The New Macedonian Issue, *Journal of Modern Greek Studies,* 11, 1994, p. 104

The Greeks raise their heads in proportion as their oppressors' arrogance abates and their despotism becomes somewhat mitigated. This is the veritable period of Greek awakening. Minds emerge from lethargy, are amazed to observe this deplorable state; and that same national vanity which hitherto prevented them from seeing it, now increases their amazement and irritation, For the first time the nation surveys hideous spectacle of its arrogance and trembles in measuring with the eye the distance separating it from its ancestors' glory. This painful discovery, however, does not precipitate the Greeks into despair: We are the descendants of Greeks, they implicitly [tell] themselves; we must either try to become again worthy of this name, or we must not bear it.[44]

It soon transpired, however, that imitating the 'glory that was Greece' would be an impossible undertaking that could never yield the desired results. The efforts to expand Greece's frontiers with the eventual goal of incorporating all Greeks under one state were met with success and failure at an equal rate. The deteriorating Ottoman Empire had still enough power to repel the Greek advances and the continuous wars had drained Greece's limited resources and demoralised its population. The defining moment for Greece's irredentist programme, nonetheless, came after the end of World War I.

Having emerged victorious from the Balkans wars of early 20th century and having fought on the side of the victors in Word War I the Greek Army had secured the considerable expansion of the nation's boundaries and was invited to the negotiations that would decide the post war reality. Under the brinkmanship of the charismatic Prime Minister, Venizelos, the Greek delegation managed to secure control of a considerable part of Asia Minor and in doing so realised the goals of the *'Megali Idea'*. It was, nevertheless, a short-lived success. A combination of domestic and external factors turned modern Greece's finest hour into its worst nightmare. The Greek presence o n the shores of Asia Minor, dating back thousands of years, came to an abrupt end. Hundreds of thousands of Greeks were either put to death or were forced to flee their homes and

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[44] Koraes, A. " Report on the Present of Civilisation in Greece" in Kedourie, E. ed. *Nationalism in Asia and Africa*. NY: Meridian, 1971, pp. 153-8

migrate to the mainland in order to avoid the wrath of the Turkish forces. Greece stood humiliated and alone, the propositions of the *'Megali Idea'* irrefutably denied.

The defeat and eventual expulsion of the Greek element from the shores of Asia Minor had immense repercussions on both a practical and ideological level. Greece proper was forced to accept the myriads of Asia Minor Greeks who became refugees in their own country and integrate them into the host population. With the ailing Greek economy struggling to cope with the cost of the war this was not an easy task. In terms of ideology, Greece and its leaders had to face up to the fact that the efforts to reproduce the ancient glories had failed.

Coupled with Greece's inefficacy to establish an efficient and centrally organised state machinery, the nation's humiliation in its foreign pursuits produced a lasting feeling of frustration. It also caused a deeply rooted sense of disenchantment regarding to the role of the powerful western nations in the demise of Greece. In the eyes of the Greeks, the contribution of their ancestors to the development of western civilisation obligated the latter to the de facto acknowledgement of Greece's self-perceived, exalted role in international affairs. Failing to grasp the anarchic nature of international relations, based as this is on the pursuit of individual national interests, the Greeks focused on the rights they believed their historic patrimony should have afforded them. By refusing to unconditionally back Greece's irredentist programme, even if this often clashed with their own national interests and pursuits in the region, the Western powers were tinted as hostile and unappreciative, perpetually conspiring to deprive the former of its rightful place amongst the great nations. Lacking the resources to compete with the great powers of the world Greeks today perceive themselves as no "longer the subjects but only mere objects of history".[45]

This, in turn, has led to the self-denomination of Greece into what former President of the Hellenic Republic Christos Sartzetakis has called the 'brotherless, friendless Greek

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[45] Keridis, D. *Political Culture and Foreign Policy: Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of European Integration and Globalisation*. A Nato Fellowship Final Report, Cambridge, 1999, p. 44

nation'. As a result, Greece's strategic pursuits have often appeared to be distrustful in nature and oversensitive in the evaluation of risks that are customarily treated as threats.[46] The words of Dimitris Keridis corroborate this point:

> The resolute face-off of such threats becomes a national interest and priority. Official [Greek] policy loses the initiative and the necessary perspective to evaluate risks calmly. It becomes reactive and is driven by impulses, volatile public opinion, and demagoguery. Populist politicians and a polemical media in pursuit of sensationalist stories are ready to assume the worst and pick up insignificant 'provocations' to reinforce Greeks' reactionary defensiveness.[47]

History has shown that while the Asia Minor defeat proved to be the tombstone of the *'Megali Idea'*, the implications of its nationalistic discourse have withstood the test of time. Irredentism has been eliminated from official Greek policy and Greece has become a fervent advocate of the territorial status quo in the Balkans, but certain elements of the *'Megali Idea'* and the consequences of its downfall on the shores of Asia Minor, continue to find resonance, albeit in the different ideological form of defensive nationalism, with certain sections of the population. As Demosthenes Kourtovik puts it:

> The shock of the Asia Minor Disaster and the corralling of Hellenism within a small, backward state gave birth to the specious premise of 'Greekness', an overcompensation for the sense of inferiority to the more advanced peoples with the theory that Greek folk culture has a superior character that does not depend on material terms. And it happened [again] in the 1990s, when the rapid transitions we are all familiar with (the collapse of political ideologies, 'globalisation', the mass influx of foreign immigrants, the upheavals in the Balkans, etc.) caused many to feel that they must defend whatever they perceive as Greek individuality against the forces of alienation and levelling.[48]

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[46] ibid, p. 43
[47] ibid, pp. 43-44
[48] Kourtovik, D. A senseless dilemma: Indigenity vs Cosmopolitanism. *AIM*, 16 October, 2000

ii) The Interplay between Domestic and External Actors

The first signs of foreign interference in Greek affairs can be traced back to the years of the antiquity. For while ancient Greeks were quick to differentiate themselves from the uncivilised 'barbarians', they did not hesitate in turning to them for aid in their internal rivalries. This practice was first observed at the time of the Sparta-Athens antagonism, during which both city-states, at different times, sought the assistance of the mighty Persian Empire in defeating their domestic adversaries. The Persians perceived this as an invitation to preside over Greek affairs and underestimating the Greek city-states' ability to maintain a united front, invaded Greece. The Persians' efforts did not meet with success, Greece's victory becoming a symbol of immense pride and importance whose influence can still be felt today, but it also set a trend that was to be repeated on several other occasions in the future.

More importantly for modern Greece, this trend manifested itself during the Greek War of Independence, when the invited intervention of the major European powers (France, Britain and Russia) impacted decisively on the successful ending of the nation's struggle against the Ottoman Empire as well as on the formation and conduct of its future domestic and external politics. For as Theodoros Couloumbis notes:

> The three [great] powers retained the role of the 'protector' of the Greek state throughout the nineteenth century. Acting either individually or in concert, they controlled both domestic political developments and the foreign policy initiatives of alternate Greek governments. Great power intervention was facilitated by Greece's financial and military dependence on the great powers.[49]

This interplay between Greece and the great powers originally served the interests of all parties involved and reaffirmed the patron–client form of association that had permeated all level of Greek activity in the country's domestic affairs. Acknowledging Greece's geo-strategic location, each of the great powers vied for the country's cooperation in enhancing or confirming their respective dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean. With

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[49] Couloumbis, T. "Defining Greek Foreign Policy Objectives" in Couloumbis, T. Iatrides, J. eds. *Greek – American Relations: A Critical Review*. NY: Pella, 1980, p. 22

regards to Greece, the protection of the great powers cancelled out the Ottomans' military superiority.

Greece's weakness, however, ensured that the partnership between the nation and the great powers would never be a balanced one. Indeed, it soon transpired that maintaining equilibrium between relying on the great powers for aid and retaining an independent national strategy, that best served Greece's interests, was unfeasible. The rivalries of the great powers and the pursuit of their individualistic interests became so embroiled in the Greek political scene that the country's political parties came to represent each one of the great powers. This had a threefold effect.

Firstly, the increased level of foreign intervention in Greek affairs impacted negatively on the aspiring independent image of the country's embryonic parliamentarian political system and in doing so eroded its legitimacy in the eyes of its electorate. Secondly, it averted the creation and promulgation of a strong, indigenous elite that could form the basis of a centrally controlled state exercising absolute political control over its domain.[50] Thirdly, as a result of the above, disunity intensified in a Greek polity already plagued by fragmentation.[51] Slowly but surely, a great split emerged among the Greek public and leaders alike between those who developed the habit of exaggerated defiance toward the foreign powers and those who demonstrated excessive subservience toward them.[52]

The influence of foreign interference in Greek affairs continued throughout the 19th century, albeit at a varying degree of intensity. Things, however, began to change on the eve of the 20th century when the end of Greece's irredentist dream forced Greeks to question the foundations of their society, the nation's standing in the world of states, and, as a consequence of this, their relationship with the foreign powers. Having relinquished their hopes of national greatness, the Greeks were left feeling frustrated and disillusioned. Their frustration was vented both inwardly and externally. Inwardly the finger was

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[50] Couloumbis, T. et al. *Foreign Interference in Greek Politics*. NY: Pella, 1976, p. 73
[51] ibid, p. 46
[52] ibid

pointed at the decision makers, be they political or military leaders, who were seen as responsible for the state's politico-economic failures and military defeats. Externally, the blame was directed against the great powers that were seen to have failed in their role as Greece's patrons.

The immediate result of the above was that in the interim period between the two great wars of the 20th century Greece's interface with the great powers receded. Having adopted a *status quo* stance in its Balkan policies Greece's reasons to turn to them for help were eclipsed and Greek politics were allowed to develop with a degree of unprecedented independence. In this respect, the contribution of the League of Nations was also valuable for it "offered a measure of protection, imperfect as it might have been, from blatant foreign pressures. It [the League] also offered a vehicle to channel external assistance, thus reducing the possibilities of domination by a single foreign power".[53]

Things changed, nevertheless, in the aftermath of the second World War. A configuration of domestic and international developments resulted in a renewed protracted period of intense foreign interference in Greek affairs. Within Greece, the various political actors and factions that emerged in the struggle for power between the communists and the democratic forces requested outside support to help them surmount their domestic foes. At the level of international developments the onset of the Cold War found Greece at the epicentre of super-power (USA–USSR) rivalry in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean.

Due to its geo-strategic location Greece acted as the West's buffer zone in the region. Accordingly, the country's political freedom of choice was circumvented by the tactical need of the hegemonic power in the West – the USA – to aid and abet successive 'friendly' regimes that would exercise firm control of the country and avert a communist takeover. The USA's interference in Greek affairs reached its apogee with its overt support for the military junta that ruled Greece for seven years between 1967-1974. Former United States president, Bill Clinton, has recently acknowledged his country's

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[53] ibid, p. 99

role at the time by declaring that, "When the junta took over in 1967 here [in Greece] the United States allowed its interests in prosecuting the Cold War to prevail over its interest, I should say its obligation, to support democracy, which was, after all, the cause for which we fought the Cold War."[54] It proved one of the most troubled periods of modern Greece's history and led to the imprisonment, torture and/or marginalisation of a significant number of Greeks with liberal and left wing political beliefs. It also led to the particular configuration of events that culminated in the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and the protracted occupation of the island's northern part that continues to this day. Democracy was restored in 1974, and the newly elected democratic government of Greece under Constantinos Karamanlis sought and finally achieved the country's entry into the EC in 1981. While joining the EC was seen as an ideal opportunity to nurture Greece's institutions in the democratic traditions of Western Europe, it was also intended as leverage against the influence of the USA in Greek affairs.

The consolidation of Greece's path to democracy continued with the 1981 election victory of Andreas Papandreou's left to the centre PASOK (Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement). Papandreou's rise to power had a normalising effect on Greece's political system as it incorporated back into the mainframe of Greek society the losing side of the civil war "thus healing the entire post civil war trauma and putting an end to the disenchantment of left-of-centre citizens". [55] However, in order to enlist the support of the Greek Left, Papandreou campaigned on a populist platform, with inherent nationalist overtones, that tended to picture the USA, NATO and the EC as the main perpetrators in a long list of foreign interventions that carried detrimental consequences for Greece's national interests. PASOK's ideology was to a great extent, as George Pagoulatos notes, "symbolic politics of defiance to the 'directorate' of the North European metropolitan countries combined with an intense and vociferous Anti-Americanism [that] served to affirm a (long-denied) sense of national/popular sovereignty and pride"[56] within Greece.

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[54] Source: CNN.com, 21 November 1999
[55] Pagoulatos, G. *Greece, the European Union and the 2003 Presidency*. Research and European Issues, Study Number 21, December 2002, p. 12
[56] ibid

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Papandreou's anti-American, anti-Western rhetoric remained at a symbolic level. Under his leadership Greece retained its status as a member of both NATO and the EC. This, however, did not avert the creation of a highly negative image of Greece among Western European public, press and political elites. A negative image that was in practice aided by the country's highly idiosyncratic stance on issues of foreign policy and its inability, or lack of will, to implement EC legislation and carry out the required structural adjustments to its ailing economy. As a result, Greece was marginalised within the EC decision-making mechanisms and set the foundations for a two-way confidence gap between the country and its European partners.

The situation has slowly but steadily been reversing ever since the beginning of the 1990s when the right wing government of Constantinos Mitsotakis embarked on a programme of macro-economic adjustments. Notwithstanding the above, while Mitsotakis' impeccable pro-European credentials ware never doubted by his European counterparts, the imbroglio surrounding the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia clouded Greece's relations with its Western allies once more. Greece's allies could not comprehend the country's refusal to allow a small, poor, landlocked state (FYROM) the right to choose its name. The Greeks, on the other hand, attributed this bewilderment to a conspiracy aimed at the annihilation of the nation's identity and history.

The Greek public and a large section of the political elite, aided by a sensationalist press, used the country's historical experience of malignant foreign interference to justify this position. Invariably, the argumentation centred along two poles that have been, as shown above, ubiquitous in Greek history:[57] a) the belief that Greek foreign policy is always at the behest of one super-power or another, and b) a sense of resentment at the arrogance of the West which does not even disguise its view that it has a divine mission to bring democracy, progress and enlightenment to the world, and that it is the arbitrator of what constitutes those virtues. This exasperates the Greeks for it ignores Greece's rightful

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[57] For the argumentation see Nordin, J. P. The Kosovo War and Greece, *Philhellenic Perspective*, 10, June/July 1999

patrimony to the ancient democratic ideals that provided the foundations of western civilisation.

iii) The Traditionalists vs Modernisers or Achilles vs Odysseus Debate

The accumulative effect of the aforementioned dynamics has been the genesis and promulgation of a "deep conceptual polarisation"[58], that omitting class and gender politics has dominated the agenda setting in both Greece's internal and external policy pursuits. This conceptual polarisation was first expressed in the manner of the disagreement over the appropriate strategy in achieving the aims of the '*Megali Idea*'.

The newly founded Greek state found itself torn between the opposing traditionalist and modernising camps. The former advocated that the pursuit of the aims embodied in the '*Megali Idea*' ought to be the driving force of the young state. They campaigned for a relentless and concerted programme of territorial expansion followed by, almost invariably, military conflict.

The modernisers shared in the desire for the achievement of the '*Megali Idea*' but believed that this should not take priority over Greece's political, economic and social modernisation. This, Greece's modernisation achieved, the state could then proceed with the pursuit of its goals in a more confident way that would inevitably increase the chance of success.

This division persisted throughout the 19th century and in fact outlived the end of Greece's irredentist programme on the shores of Asia Minor in 1921. The polarised nature of the nation's political dialogue, both in terms of domestic and external political affairs, continued in the form of a confrontation between the "conservative populist

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[58] Couloumbis, T. "Defining Greek Foreign Policy Objectives" in Couloumbis, T., Iatrides, J. eds *Greek – American Relations: A Critical Review*. NY: Pella, 1980, p. 21

forces on the one hand, which represent clientelistic politics, populism and introversion [and nationalism in foreign policy], and modernising European forces on the other".[59]

In the realm of foreign affairs, this debate has most recently been manifested in the partition of Greece's international relations community along two predominant schools of thought: the Achilles and the Odysseus followers.

The Achilles school of thought is heavily influenced by the teachings of realism/neo-realism and acknowledges that the ordering principle of the international system is anarchy. Following on from that, the best way to secure Greek interests is the pursuit of a balance of power between the state and its enemies (mainly Turkey) as well as the timely deterrence of any revisionist or aggressive action through any achievable means. In practice this translates into the pursuit of unilateral policies whose purpose and substance should be guided solely by the egotistic evaluation of Greece's national interests. It also necessitates a high level of defence spending that should take priority over other considerations in the designing of the nation's economic forecasts.

The Odysseus school of thought, on the other hand, accepts the anarchic nature of the international system but believes that Greece's interest are best served by adopting multilateral approaches that promote cooperation and peaceful dialogue. The argument being that the increasing interdependence of the world favours the existence of multinational organisations that act as a forum for negotiating interests in a mutually beneficial way. This alleviates the need for high defence spending, thus allowing investment in the nation's infrastructure, which in turn boosts Greece's leverage within the international community and enhances the country's diplomatic credentials.

This division cuts across the traditional political lines, with representatives of both schools of thought found throughout Greece's political spectrum. In terms of official policy, history has shown us that parties and politicians adopt a nationalist, Greek-centric

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[59] Keridis, D. *Political Culture and Foreign Policy: Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of European Integration and Globalisation.* A Nato Fellowship Final Report, Cambridge, 1999, p. 32

glossary in issues of foreign affairs while in opposition, but quickly resort to a more mainstream, multilateral approach while in government.[60]

The Conceptual Domain of Political Culture: Context and Problems

Numerous definitions of political culture have been produced throughout the years, but scholars have failed to reach a consensus over its meaning and definition. Whilst this presents a formidable challenge to those wishing to engage in the research of the concept, it is also indicative of the ambiguity of the term 'culture' and its versatile use within the social sciences milieu.

Huntington and Dominguez, for example, defined political culture as applying to "the empirical beliefs about expressive political symbols and values and other orientations of the members of the society toward political objects".[61] Kavanagh defined it as "a shorthand expression to denote the emotional and attitudinal environment within which the political systems operates".[62] Brown saw political culture as the "subjective perception of history and politics, the fundamental beliefs and values, the foci of identification and loyalty, and the political knowledge and expectations which are the product of the specific historical experience of nations and groups".[63] Finally, for Pye political culture could be interpreted as the "set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments that give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behaviour in the political system. It encompasses both the political ideas and the operating norms of a polity. Political culture is thus the manifestation in aggregate form of the psychological and subjective dimension of politics."[64]

[60] Couloumbis, T. "Defining Greek Foreign Policy Objectives" in Couloumbis, T,. Iatrides, J. eds. *Greek – American Relations: A Critical Review*. NY: Pella, 1980, p. 22
[61] cited from Greenstein and Polsby. Handbook of Political Science, vol. III: Macropolitical Theory, p. 15 cited in Brown, A. *Political Culture and Communist Studies*. London: Macmillan Press, 1984, p. 2
[62] Kavanagh, D. *Political Culture*. London: Macmillan Press, 1972, p. 10
[63] Brown, A., Gray, J. eds. *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States*. London: Macmillan Press, 1977, p. 1
[64] International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, New York: Macmillan Co. and the Free Press, 1961, vol 12, p. 218

Although by the mid to late 1970s interest in the concept of political culture had dwindled it had not altogether disappeared. While the literature on political culture focusing on the western world now turned its attention to highlighting the approach's shortcomings and possible ways of eradicating them, the use of this concept in the communist bloc was actively encouraged and explored.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s changes in the way culture was studied – influenced by innovations in the discipline of anthropology and echoed throughout the social sciences spectrum – led to a renewed interest in political culture.

Political Culture: Origins and Development

Academic work on political culture as an alternative to the conventional comparative study of political systems started emerging in the late 1950s[65]. It was not, however, until 1963 with the publication of Garry Almond and Sydney Verba's *Civic Culture*, that the concept of political culture begun to play a key role the debate regarding political change in non-western states on their way to economic modernisation and national unification.

Political culture, as a term, was defined as referring to "the specifically political orientations–attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes towards the role of the self in the system".[66] Additionally the political culture of a nation was seen as the "particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation".[67]

At a time of widespread agreement within western academia of the inevitability of the advances towards technology, rationality and uniformity, civic culture was portrayed as the link between modernity and tradition. Active citizen participation, access to information regarding public affairs and a sense of civic responsibility were accordingly

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[65] Amongst the most influential works produced at the time was Almond, G. Comparative Political Systems. *The Journal of Politics*, 18 (3), August 1956, pp. 391-409

[66] Almond, G., Verba, S. *The Civic Culture, Political Culture and Democracy in Five Nations*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963 quoted from the 1989 edition published by Sage Publications Inc: London, p. 12

[67] ibid, p. 13

typified as the cornerstones of the success enjoyed by the democratic states in the west; democracy being accepted as the prerequisite on the road to modernisation. In view of that, Almond and Verba's book sought to explain why some states were receptive to democracy while others were not. Their research, influenced by the ideas of Talcott Parsons,[68] focused on survey data pertaining to the political beliefs and attitudes of five nations: Italy, Mexico, Britain, USA and Germany.

Correspondingly, Almond and Verba's work believed the success enjoyed by Britain and the United States, as opposed to the findings regarding the rest of the case studies, was the result of a civic culture that promoted democracy and hence modernisation and development.

Thus, strong links were developed between political culture and development theories. These links were further enhanced with the publication of *Political Culture and Political Development* in 1965.[69] Its authors put forward the notion that "analysis which focuses on the phenomenon of culture may be peculiarly well adapted for comparing and classifying political systems in terms that are relevant for understanding the character of political development and change".[70] Drawing on the work of Almond and his definition of political culture the contributors of this edited volume attempted to highlight and critically examine the peculiarities inherent in the political systems of a number of nations[71] with different historical experiences and political structures. Being part of a wider behaviourist[72] twist in the realm of social sciences, political culture was portrayed as the bridge between "the level of micro-analysis based on psychological interpretations of the individual's political behaviour and the level of micro-analysis based on the variables common to political psychology".[73] This was to be achieved using political

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[68] see Parsons, T., Shils, E. et al. *Toward a General Theory of Action*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962
[69] Pye, L., S. Verba, S. eds. *Political Culture and Political Development*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965
[70] Pye, L. "Introduction: Political Culture and Political Development" in Pye, L., S. Verba, S. eds. *Political Culture and Political Development*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 6
[71] The nations studied were: England, Germany, Japan, Turkey, India, Egypt, Italy and Mexico
[72] see for example Polsby, N., Dentler, R., Smith, P. eds. *Politics and Social Life: An Introduction to Political Behavior*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963
[73] ibid

culture as the premise that would bring together and exemplify concepts such as "political ideology, national ethos and spirit, national political psychology, and the fundamental values of a people".[74]

In so far as political development was concerned, it was seen to necessitate a chain of requirements. To begin with, it required an involved and participatory population. With that criterion fulfilled what then became invaluable was an efficient government structure able to integrate and act as an intermediate between the different and often conflicting interests within any given polity. A governmental structure of this type would have to perform its duties with due regard and consideration to the needs and demands of the public it represented. When all the above conditions were met and in order to be competitive and prosperous, this polity would have to be outward looking and adherent to universalistic laws. Political development as such touched on the "roots of people's beliefs and politics and hence the process of development had to be profoundly affected by the character of the political culture of a society".[75]

Bearing striking resemblance to the prerequisites for the existence or promotion of a civic culture, the message was again clear if less explicit this time. The road to successbeing synonymous with political development and modernisation called for the adoption of a democratic political system like the ones most commonly found in the states of Western Europe and North America.

Political Culture: Critique and Decline

Soon the advocates of political culture faced a wave of criticism.[76] Its critics focused their objections on, largely, two points. The first criticism challenged the reliance of political culture on the study of beliefs and values that form the basis of any given society. They argued that if this were the case, its use as the explanatory force behind the understanding of political systems and people's behaviour towards them would have a twofold result.

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[74] Pye, L. "Introduction: Political Culture and Political Development" in Pye, L., S. Verba, S. eds. *Political Culture and Political Development*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 8

[75] ibid, p. 13

[76] for an elaborate discussion on the matter see Kaase, M. *The Concept of Political Culture: its Meaning for Comparative Research*. EUI Working Papers, 31, 1982

Not only would it bring the latter to the centre of attention to the detriment of the former but it would also lead to the progressive abating of others factors, traditionally used in the study of politics, most notably economic and social factors. Both conditions, it was claimed, could cause any findings produced using the concept of political culture to be unreliable and unable to withstand serious scientific inquiry.

The second criticism centred around the manner "in which its elaboration has been intertwined with dubious theories of political development and with systems analysis".[77] Political culture's association, even if indirectly, with Samuel Huntington's influential but as ever controversial work in the late 1960s,[78] served to highlight its critics' points. In that respect Huntington was used as a prime example of the ethnocentric way in which western political analysts viewed the political systems of the underdeveloped and developing states. Portraying the western, if not the US's alone, political system as the ideal stage of modernisation and development, the concept of political culture was used to advance and even impose the perceptions of western academia. In doing so, it bore resemblance to Marxist literature on development and modernisation particularly in its "tendency to disguise political and moral judgements in quasi-theoretical language".[79]

In addition to the above, a series of questions raised about the methodology used in the study of political culture served to deliver additional blows to the approach's popularity. The most pressing questions pertained to what was originally seen as political culture's saving grace: namely its association with positivist, more scientific research methods in politics that referred to elaborate survey techniques: "content analysis, depth interviews, projective and semi-projective methods, and use of the Parsonian pattern-variables".[80]

[77] Brown, A., Gray, J. eds. *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States*. London: The MacMillan Press, 1977, p. 3
[78] Huntington, S. P. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. London: Yale University Press, 1968
[79] Brown, A., Gray, J. eds. *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States*. London: The MacMillan Press, 1977, p. 3
[80] Kavanagh, D. *Political Culture*. London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1972, p. 49

It has to be remembered that the development of a political culture approach in political science, during the 1950s and 1960s coincided with the ascendance of behaviourism[81] as the dominant explanatory force in psychology and the rest of the social sciences.[82] In view of that, the introduction of the new research methods not only fitted in with the current trend in social sciences but also allowed the focus of enquiry to be moved away from political institutions and closer to the beliefs and attitudes of individuals. Psychological evaluations and especially the work of Freud found their way into the study of politics. If the centre of attention and unit of analysis was to be the act, then the actions of institutions were the result of choices made by individuals. These choices were, in turn, the result of thought processes occurring in the individual's mind and in this way the ideas of Sigmund Freud entered the debate.[83]

It was not long though before the deficiencies of such approaches became visible. As one of those who pioneered the use of political culture as an explanatory force in political science noted:

> The opportunities soon proved to create problems for the discipline because the linkages between individual action and collective action remain obscure and have not been centrally dealt with by psychology.[84]

Following on from his point, the association between attitudes and behaviour would dictate an analysis of the way individuals formulate their attitudes and reach decisions; no matter how elaborate the survey techniques one uses are, no perfect positivist analogy can be drawn from them or faultless conclusions reached.

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[81] "Behaviour is formed in response to previous behaviour, and to the rewards or reinforces of the environment which condition it, so that the self-consciousness of the subject plays no immediate part of the process of social development. Hence political activity should be directed towards creating the conditions which reinforce the behaviour that is desired." Cited from Scruton, R. A. *Dictionary of Political Thought.* London: The Macmillan Press, 1982, p. 38

[82] see for example Eulau, H. *The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics*, NY: Random House, 1963

[83] Pye, L. "Culture and Political Science: Problems in the Evaluation of the concept of Political Culture" in Bonjean, C. *Culture in the Social Sciences.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973, p. 69

[84] ibid

In addition, the question of how to project individual socio-psychological evaluations of political preferences to reflect the behaviour of collective polities could not be satisfactorily answered.[85] The process by which individuals reach decisions is a complex one that can reflect more "subtle sentiments and attitudes than does the political system as a whole".[86] That being the case, assigning individuals roles and preferences on the basis of their membership to a larger grouping can only produce inconclusive and misleading evidence. An aggregation of this kind can also be deceptive when used to compare the formulation of political preferences in different societies "whose members are undergoing differential rates of change".[87]

Subsequent studies on political attitudes provided fresh challenges to the research programme advocated by Almond and Verba in *Civic Culture*, as well as to all those who shared their views on the use of culture in political analysis. These studies[88] suggested that there was in fact a level of deference, participation, trust and interest in the political system that was much lower than the one put forward by the authors of *Civic Culture*. Thus, with much of the empirical evidence that it had used to justify its proposed research method contested, the civic culture modus operandi had, by the late 1980s, effectively lost much of its enthralment.

The only notable exception was its use in the field of Communist Studies.[89] The superimposition of the Soviet political system to a wide range of societies with diverse

[85] for a more recent discussion on culture and political preferences see Laitin, D. Political Culture and Political Preferences. *American Political Science Review*, 82 (2), June 1988 also Vidalsky, A. Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preferences. *American Political Science Review*, 81 (1), 1987

[86] Pye, L. "Culture and Political Science: Problems in the Evaluation of the concept of Political Culture" in Bonjean, C. *Culture in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973, p. 72

[87] Kavanagh, D. *Political Culture*. London: Macmillan Press, 1972, p. 63

[88] see for example McKenzie, R., Silver, A. *Angels in Marble*, London: Heinemann Educational, 1968 see also Nordlinger, E. *The Working Class Tories*. London: Macgibbon and Kee, 1967 also Lipset, S. M. *The First New Nation*. London: Heinemann, 1964 also Rogin, M. *McCarthy and the Intellectuals: The Radical Specter*. Cambridge Mass: MIT, 1967 also Christoph, J. Consensus and Cleavage in British Political Ideology. *American Political Science Review*, 59, 1965, pp. 629-42 also Mann, M. *Consciousness and Action Among the Western Working Class*. London: Macmillan Press, 1973

[89] there was a plethora of books articles written on the subject. For example see Brown, A. *Political Culture and Communist Studies*. Oxford: Macmillan Press, 1984 also Brown, A., Gray, J. *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States*. London: Macmillan Press, 1977 also Tucker, R. C. *Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia: From Lenin to Gorbachev*. Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1987

historical, political, ethnic and religious backgrounds was seen by a significant number of political scientists as the ideal laboratory for the examination of political culture. They interpreted the failure of the Soviet political system (a system based on the development of a single, uniform and unresponsive to change or outside interference political entity), to completely erase the former political characteristics of the Eastern European states as evidence for the analytical value of political culture.

The most influential attempt to redefine the concept of political culture and respond to its critiques came from Ronald Inglehart.[90] He saw the failure of the previous research exercises as a result of their inability to take into account the emergence since World War II, especially in western countries, of new political, economic and social realities, and how these had affected the way in which younger generations observe political processes. The end of war in the West, he argued, was accompanied by a prolonged period of relative peace and persistent economic growth that had had a threefold result on political behaviour. These he noticed were "the decline of class alignments in political party choice, the emergence of new political movements like feminism, and the growth of lifestyle and consumer issues in modern politics".[91]

Pre-war generations, Inglehart argued, had developed their political beliefs and outlooks in periods of material need and physical insecurity, and had thus tended to prioritise money or other materialistic-orientated values that would ensure their security and well-being. Younger generations, on the other hand, with their basic needs secured, favoured a new set of values that placed the emphasis on education, and a more socially-prone life style as well as stressing, for the first time, the importance of environmental needs and consumer attitudes. According to Inglehart, the results of his own research pointed towards the emergence of a new post-material era. An era that would witness new shapes of political manifestation in which "values, orientations, allegiances, alignments and

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[90] see Inglehart, R. Values, Objective Needs and Subjective Satisfaction amongst Western Publics. *Comparative Politics*, 9 (4), 1977, pp. 429-58 and also Inglehart, R. Changing Values in Japan and the West. *Comparative Politics*, 14 (4), 1982, pp. 445-79 also Inglehart, R. *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990
[91] Gibbins, J. R. " Contemporary Political Culture: An Introduction" in Gibbins, J. R. ed. *Contemporary Political Culture: Politics in a Postmodern Era*. London: Sage Publications, 1989, p. 9

political groupings would be fluid, the shock of the new would be a permanent feature of the new world as one generation replaced another and as 'period' effects were absorbed".[92] Notwithstanding the above, Inglehart's work did not appeal to political scientists in the same way that the civic culture model had, and the field of inquiry remained, to a large extent, stagnant.

So, why was interest in the use of political culture revitalized in the late 1980s? Was it that all the issues mentioned before had been dealt with? Although serious efforts[93] had been made to readdress the deficiencies in the use of the concept, these alone cannot provide a satisfactory explanation for the approach's revival. The re-emergence of political culture has in fact been attributed to two factors. The first of these was the retreat of competing ideologies, namely Marxism and rational-choice theory.[94]

Marxists have viewed the concept of political culture with distrust, accepting its value only as a dependent variable or dismissing it altogether as a part of capitalist ideology. However, the collapse of the Socialist Bloc and the ensuing disintegration of the USSR at the end of the decade left the advocates of Marxism in consternation.

The development of rational-choice theory[95] coincided with the development of political culture and, it too was the result of the application of assorted social sciences disciplines onto political science. Nonetheless, whereas in the case of political science the contribution came mainly from psychology and sociology, rational-choice theory owed its development to tenets used in the field of economics. According to these tenets, which were to be applied on a universal basis, decision-makers, regardless of national origins, should be considered as rational actors whose principal concern is the maximisation of their gains, as those pertained to their interests, and/or the gains of the state/organisation they represent. The appeal of such an approach to political science was to be found in the

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[92] ibid, pp. 10
[93] see for example Almond, G., Verba, S. *The Civic Culture Revisited*. London: Sage Publications, 1989
[94] see Diamond, L. *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*. Boulder: Rienner Publishers, 1993
[95] see Elster, J. *Rational Choice*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986

fact that it eliminated the need for a cultural factor analysis while at the same time being closer to the positivist paradigm of research.

The emergence of a plethora of new states, however, following the collapse of the Socialist Bloc and their unconventional behaviour in terms of Western political norms and practices proved to be more than a challenge for rational choice theorists. If, as they proposed, the application of their ideas was to be universal in nature since all actors' motivation is the same, then how could they account for the non-conformist behaviour of these new states and the actors involved? The answer has been troubling rational choice theorists ever since with no apparent conclusions being drawn.[96]

The second reason for the renewal of interest in political culture was the ability of its advocates to accumulate innovations occurring at an interdisciplinary level thus not only enhancing their own research agenda but also keeping up to date with the current trends in the social science field. A prime example of the above is the work of the anthropologist, Clifford Geertz.[97] Inspired by his arguments, emphasis was taken away from the study of individuals and directed towards the examination of postulations and value systems prevalent among large groupings in any given community or society. This new approach brought together "cognitive and symbolic approaches to the study of politics". Hence, it expanded the explanatory use of political culture beyond the "level of behaviour to deeper, underlying patterns of basic assumptions-invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problem of external adaptation or internal integration".[98]

In short, it is of little surprise that the disenchantment with the use of political culture should coincide with the realisation that the 'cure' was not providing the desired results. The multitude of critiques that drew attention to the problems surrounding its explanatory power – especially when evaluated by rigid positivist criteria – combined with the

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[96] for a critique of rational choice theory see Hauptmann, E. L. *Putting Choice before Democracy: A Critique of Rational Choice Theory*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996
[97] see for example Geertz, C. *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*. London: Fontana Press, 1993
[98] For the quotation see Diamandouros, N. "Politics and Culture in Greece, 1974-91: An Interpretation" in Clogg, R. *Greece, 1981-1989: The Populist Decade*. London: Macmillan Press , 1993, p. 2

increasing popularity of alternative explanations of politics, proved enough to curb the original enthusiasm for the usefulness of the concept. While some of these criticisms were restricted solely to the way political culture was employed by its early advocates (for example, the Ethnocentrism label was attributed to the majority of early works on political culture) others have had more far-reaching implications. Far-reaching in the sense that they addressed issues that can have varied inputs to discussions about the use of culture within the Political Science discipline as a whole. They raised questions concerning issues of methodology and ontology; namely how to define and demonstrate the roles and effects of culture on political behaviour. When solutions to these concerns were sought within the stringent confines of a positivist epistemology, the answers failed to materialise.

Later works on political culture addressed these criticisms by dropping the earlier positivist aspirations and adopting a less rigid set of evaluative standards. Without rejecting the value of hard evidence in the pursuit of social scientific inquiry, they contended that its absence should not, *de facto*, render research implausible. For a positivist, this notion is an anathema. Others, however, would readily subscribe to the proposition that a hermeneutic approach can captivate the "essence of a culture of a society in a way that piecemeal, hypothesis-testing, analytical methods never can".[99]

Despite the criticisms encountered by the political culture approach and the subsequent importance given to competing approaches and though "its popularity has waxed and waned", it still "remains an enduring feature of political studies".[100] Richard Wilson has ascribed its timeless appeal to the "need in political analysis to account for values and beliefs".[101] Similarly, Macmillan sees political culture's refusal to go away as proof that

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[99] for the quotation see Miller, J. "Political Culture - Some Perennial Questions Reopened" in Brown, A. *Political Culture and Communist Studies*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984, p. 41. For a detailed description of the 'Hermeneutic' approach see Wilson, R. The Many Voices of Political Culture- Review Article. *World Politics*, 52, January 2000 especially p. 251 "The hermeneutic approach looks to uncover constraint in the form of myth, ritual, and discourse, largely through immersion in community life (where possible) and by 'thick' description, relying heavily on semiotic analysis."
[100] Wilson, R. The Many Voices of Political Culture- Review Article. *World Politics*, 52, January 2000 especially p. 246
[101] ibid

"it provides a means of referring to forces thought important, even though no agreed means of studying the concept can be found".[102] In both instances, this confirmation of the usefulness of the political cultural approach offers an encouraging message for the study of strategic culture. At the same time, the study of political culture can also serve as a reminder of the difficulties facing cultural analysis as a whole. More importantly, it is hoped that valuable lessons can be inferred for the study of strategic culture from the disenchantment with the use of political culture – blamed for its over ambitious analytical scope that sought to tackle a wide range of issues in political science and failed to produce the desired results. In the words of Alan Macmillan, "if we are careful not to ask too much of strategic culture, we can avoid disappointment when it does not deliver as much as we have hoped".[103]

The Conceptual Background of Strategic Culture?

The first recorded reference to the term strategic culture in the International Relations literature, has been attributed to Jack Snyder. In his 1977 RAND Report, he defined strategic culture as "the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy".[104] Accordingly, the boundaries of strategic culture analysis were seen as involving the "body of attitudes and beliefs that guides and circumscribes thought on strategic questions, influences the way strategic issues are formulated and sets the vocabulary and conceptual parameters of strategic debate".[105]

Ever since then, a small but growing number of scholarly works referring to strategic culture has emerged. It was not, however, until the post-Cold War period that these works really began to gain ground in a noticeable way, prompting Michael Mazarr to observe that cultural explanations have become the "newest fad sweeping the literature on

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[102] Macmillan, A. *Strategic Culture and British Grand Strategy, 1945-1952.* PhD Thesis, University of Wales- Aberystwyth, 1996, p. 117
[103] ibid, p. 8
[104] Snyder, J. *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options.* Santa Monica- California: Rand Report R-2154-AF, 1977, p. 8
[105] ibid, p. 9

international relations and security studies".[106] Whilst Snyder's conception of strategic culture became the point of reference for future studies published on the subject, one that few theorists have tried to rebut, later conceptions have both expanded and narrowed his formulations.[107]

While the interest in strategic culture has increased, this has not yet been translated into the development of a coherent and unanimously accepted way in which the concept is employed. Hence, as Macmillan eloquently put it, the "list of those who have tackled strategic culture includes some strange bedfellows in Colin Gray, Ken Booth, Charles Kupchan and Bradley Klein".[108] While this serves as an indication of the increasing attention paid to the concept of strategic culture, it is also indicative of the broad way in which the concept has been used in the International Relations and International Security literature. Scholars have disagreed over the way strategic culture is to be studied, its analytical foci and its instructive objective. This disagreement has resulted in a research programme with a diverse agenda.

Originally, research on the application of strategic culture focused on the US and the USSR and their respective nuclear policies, thus restricting the limits of inquiry within the narrow confines of the nuclear strategic debate. When, at a later stage, the scope of strategic culture transcended these confines, the end result was, and still is, the publication of numerous articles on several states and/or regions, albeit without any major theoretical breakthroughs. This is due to the fact that most of these publications privilege the use of the strategic culture concept for empirical purposes. They add limited and varied input to the theoretical base upon which strategic culture rests with no serious endeavours to bring forth a coherent and universally accepted conceptual framework.[109]

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[106] Mazarr, J. M. Culture and International Relations: A Review Essay. *The Washington Quarterly*, 19 (2), p. 177
[107] Poore, E. S. *Strategic Culture and Non-Nuclear Weapons Outcomes: The Cases of Australia, South Africa and Sweden*. PhD Thesis, University of Southampton, 2000, p. 18
[108] Macmillan, A. *Strategic Culture and British Grand Strategy, 1945-1952*. PhD Thesis, University of Wales- Aberystwyth, 1996
[109] The only notable exception to this is to be found in the work of Alistair Johnston see Johnston, I. A. *Cultural Realism - Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995 and in the edited volume by Ken Booth and Russell Trood see Booth, K., Trood, R. eds. *Strategic Cultures in the Asia–Pacific Region*. London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 3

Notwithstanding the above, there are certain points that are common to the ontology of scholarly works that deal with strategic culture. The first of these holds that Strategic Cultural analysis concerns itself with the study of groups and the assumptions, beliefs, values, ideational mindsets and norms that these groups share, "whether that be military establishments, policy communities or entire societies".[110] The second point follows on from this by adding that those collectively shared characteristics come into force as a result of the group's interaction with its geographical setting, historical experience and preferred mode of political association.[111] The final point of agreement in the use of strategic culture is the focus on "continuities and discernible trends across time and contexts".[112] Change is not ruled out but rather perceived as a linear and slowly paced process, unless interrupted by "dramatic shocks and trauma".[113]

It is these commonly accepted notions of strategic culture that I will draw upon in this thesis in order to gain a better understanding of the whys and wherefores of Greek grand strategy. Thus, the task of these pages and those that follow is a modest one. This thesis is about ideas, and identity: Greek identity and its relationship to Greek behaviour in the realm of grand strategy. It will not, however, seek to point towards a deterministic conceptualisation of this relationship that would involve establishing rigorously set causal linkages. Within this thesis, strategic culture will instead be used in order to understand Greek attitudes and behaviours. Hence, I do not claim to offer any methodological breakthroughs in the sense that, though I am aware of the problems and limitations of the strategic culture analysis (and these will be dealt with at a later stage in this thesis), I seek to use the existing literature on strategic culture to offer an alternative, original outlook from which Greek grand strategy can be examined. It is an immense subject matter encompassing many fields of study from history to social science to anthropology and

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[110] Hoffmann, A., Longhurst, K. German Strategic Culture in Action. *Contemporary Security Policy*. 20 (2) August 1999, p. 31
[111] see Macmillan, A. *Strategic Culture and British Grand Strategy, 1945-1952*. PhD Thesis, University of Wales - Aberystwyth, 1996, p. 1
[112] Hoffmann, A., Longhurst, K. German Strategic Culture in Action. *Contemporary Security Policy*. 20 (2) August 1999, p. 31
[113] ibid

geopolitics. For, while time can be cooperative in locating long-term social beliefs, it does not lessen the complexity of a scholarly field riddled with intangibles.

The Question of Structure

My effort to provide an explanation of Greece's grand strategic thought and practice will take the following structure. Chapter One will commence by seeking to offer a brief overview of the dominant neo-realist paradigm. I will then proceed with a review of the literature on strategic culture with a twofold objective. Firstly, to provide a more comprehensive introduction than the one already offered into the meaning of strategic culture, by looking at the origins and development of the concept as well as surveying the different ways in which it has been approached. Secondly, to refer to the outstanding issues that dog the strategic culture research agenda, highlighting the strengths and weakness of its available conceptualisations. Analysis will pose questions pertaining to the way in which strategic culture is defined and studied, its analytical foci and its instructive objective. The task here will not be to resolve these issues but rather to raise them in the hope of providing a more coherent understanding of what, as already stated, is otherwise considered as a disparate collection of scholarly works on the subject. For as Colin Gray warns, "just as cultural awareness can enlighten, so the 'fog of culture' can restrict understanding".[114]

That achieved, Chapter Two will proceed by examining the elements that form the basis of Greek strategic culture. This will be realised in two stages. The first of these will focus on Greece's geography and resources and the way in which these have affected the country's security structures. What, for example, is the effect of Greece's mountainous landscape and vast coastline (13,676 km long) – encompassing hundreds of islands and rocky islets – on the nation's strategic outlook? In addition to this, while in terms of its political and economic resources Greece is thought of as a Western European state, geographically speaking it is a Balkan country. With regards to the former, Greece is a member of both the EU and NATO, the "bright object of desire for virtually every

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[114] Gray, C. Comparative Strategic Culture. *Parameters*, Winter 1984, p. 26

country of Central and Eastern Europe".[115] With regards to the latter, Greece finds itself in a region marked by economic weakness[116] and plagued by a state of affairs that due to the resurgence of ethnic nationalism, resembles the conditions that prevailed in Europe after the end of World War I.[117] Here it must be asked what effects does this dualism exercise on the perceptions of Greek policy makers and by extension on Greek strategic culture?

Stage two will be dedicated to the examination of Greek history and experience. With a history that goes back five thousands years, Greece prides itself in being one of the oldest nations in the world. The course of Greek history has been defined, as the President of the Republic Constantine Stephanopulos points out, by a "long series of battles that sometimes resulted in glorious victories and sometimes in disastrous defeats".[118] How are the events leading to these glorious victories and disastrous defeats remembered in Greek historiography and how have they affected collective Greek memories and persuasions about war and peace? In order to answer this question, I will seek to pin down occurrences that, due to their persistent appearance in Greek history, may have taken on the character of a tradition, habit or norm.[119] The importance of this exercise lies in its potential to reveal the "the rhetorical frames that emerge as dominant at critical junctures in the history of the group or a nation", thus allowing for an understanding of the "nature and dynamics of political identity and collective identity more broadly".[120]

In Chapter Three, I will turn to the analysis of Greece's political culture. This will be achieved by using a macro-historical perspective that defines culture as a complex and dynamic characteristic of a whole system, constantly negotiated by the continuing and

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[115] Tsoukalis, L. Conclusion: Beyond the Greek Paradox in Allison, Graham, T., Nicolaidis, K. eds. *The Greek Paradox*. London: The MIT Press, 1997, p. 170
[116] Nye, J. Greece and the Balkans: A Moment of Opportunity in Allison, Graham, T., Nicolaidis, K. eds. *The Greek Paradox*. London: The MIT Press, 1997, p. 148
[117] Veremis, T., Thuman, M. *The Balkans and the CFSP: The Views of Greece and Germany*. Centre For European Policy Studies, Paper 9, p. 2
[118] Stephanopoulos, C. "Issues of Greek Foreign Policy" in Allison, Graham, T., Nicolaidis, K. eds. *The Greek Paradox*. London: The MIT Press, 1997, p. 135
[119]Booth, K., Macmillan, A., Trood, R. "Strategic Culture" in Booth, K., Trood, R. eds. *Strategic Cultures in the Asia–Pacific Region*. London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 10
[120] see Cruz, Consuelo, Identity and Persuasion - How Nations Remember Their Pasts and Make their Futures. *World Politics*, April 2000, 52, p. 276

multifaceted interaction between state and society.[121] By following the historic evolution

and development of Greek political culture, emphasis will be given to the factors that

shape it. The desired outcome of this study is the understanding of Greece's domestic

political institutions and arrangements. Pertinent issues to be discussed here will include

the projection of these political institutions and arrangements onto Greece's international

behaviour. To what extent, for example, does political structure and ideology affect the

country's choice of allies and enemies?[122] Similarly, what lessons do the domestically

accepted and preferred form of political associations, yield for the nation's foreign

relations? Strategic culture, as Keith Krause observes, has "both a 'societal' or domestic

and an international or externally-orientated dimension".[123] Accordingly, the inquiry into

Greece's political culture helps in the explanation of the former thus yielding invaluable

lessons for the nation's strategic culture.

Chapter Four will then proceed by surveying Greece's contemporary grand strategy in

evidence for traces of strategic culture. This will be accomplished by referring to the

major issues facing Greece in the realm of grand strategy and the country's reactions to

them. Specific issues to be raised in the course of this analysis include the country's

conventional military strategy. Has there been an expressed preference towards the use or

the threat to use force by means of military intervention? Or, has the debate on defence

matters considered more serene and co-operative approaches? A further point of

deliberation pertains to Greece's stance concerning regional policy and whether it

promotes unilateral or multilateral action. Ultimately, the goal of this chapter is to

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[121] see Diamandouros, N. "Politics and Culture in Greece, 1974-1991: An Interpretation" in Clogg, R. Greece, 1981-1989: The Populist Decade, London: MacMillan Press, 1993, p. 2 cited from Moschonas, A. European Integration and Prospects of Modernisation in Greece. *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 15 (2), 1997, p. 325

[122]Booth, K., Macmillan, A. "Appendix: Strategic Culture- A Framework of Analysis" in Booth, K., Trood, R. eds. *Strategic Cultures in the AsiaPacific Region*. London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 366

[123] Krause, K. "Cross-Cultural Dimensions of Multilateral Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Dialogues: An Overview" in Krause, K. *Culture and Security: Multi-laterism Arms Control Dialogues and Security Building*. London: Frank Cass, 1998, p. 11

investigate the way Greece defines its security interests and to analyse how this investigation relates to Greece's strategic culture.[124]

Accordingly, once the examination of Greece's grand strategy is completed, the foci of examination will turn to case studies in which the influence of strategic culture can be detected. These case studies will look at the way Greece has responded to the FYROM (Macedonia) entanglement as well as the country's decision to adopt a common defence area with Cyprus.

The closing chapter will serve to recap on the conclusions drawn throughout this thesis on the application of strategic culture to Greek grand strategic thought and practice while reiterating the limitations of such a process. It will also evaluate the findings of each chapter and establish whether they have fulfilled the tasks assigned to them in this introduction. The aim of this thesis is twofold. On the one hand, it is hoped that the application of a Strategic Cultural analysis to Greek grand strategy will provide us with a fresh understanding of this area. On the other hand, the expectation is that the empirical gains attained through this process will cater to the need of the strategic culture research programme for "empirical flesh".[125]

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[124] for the arguments in this paragraph see Booth, K., Macmillan, A. "Appendix: Strategic Culture - A Framework of Analysis" in Booth, K., Trood, R. eds. *Strategic Cultures in the AsiaPacific Region*. London: Macmillan, 1999, pp. 367-368
[125]Booth, K. "The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed" in Jacobsen, G. C. ed. *Strategic Power: USA/USSR*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999, p. 126

Chapter 1

Strategic Culture – Approaches and Critiques

Introduction

This chapter sets out to define the theoretical framework upon which this thesis is based. The main argument is that strategic culture has a significant contribution to make in the understanding of international politics. Strategic culture, however, should be seen as supplementing rather than supplanting the dominant paradigm in the study of international relations – neo-realism. As such this chapter will begin by offering a brief presentation of neo-realism and the caveats within it that call for the use of strategic culture.

Having fulfilled this task, analysis will then turn to the exploration of the strategic culture approach, the complexities that surround its use within the international relations literature and the major areas of contention. This will be achieved by reviewing key texts on strategic culture and by assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the various conceptualisations before concluding on the way strategic culture will be used in this thesis.

1.1 Parsimonious Neo-Realism?

Neo-realism has long been the dominant paradigm in the study of international relations. Its intellectual roots can be found within the broader confines of classical political realism. Traditional realist thinking, though not unitary in expression, rested on several commonly accepted assumptions.[1] The first of these assumptions concerns the subject of inquiry, which is defined to be the causes of war and the conditions of peace. Another assumption deals with the issue of the structure of the international system, which

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[1] Holsti, O. R. "Theories of International Relations and Foreign Policy: Realism and its Challengers" in Kegley, C. W. Jr. ed. *Controversies in International Relations Theory*. London: Macmillan Press, 1995, pp. 36-7

accounts for the majority of issues in world affairs. Given the absence of a centralised higher authority that would dictate actions and resolve contentious issues, the nature of the international structure is deemed to be anarchic. As a result, and given humankind's inherently egotistic tendency to prevail over others, competition and conflict is the normal state of affairs in inter-state relations. Realists perceive nation-states to be the principal actors of world politics and believe that their behaviour is guided by the logic of survival and the pursuit of national interest. Moreover, due to the anarchic nature of the international system, states vying for power have to depend on their own resources for the achievement of their goals (self-help).

In relying on philosophical assumptions about human nature and using them as potent explanatory factors, classical realists have often been criticised for averting the pursuit of a theoretical approach that can withstand scientific testing. It is precisely this potential caveat that prompted neo-realist thinkers to seek a new approach. Building on the realist principles on state, power and conflict, neo-realists searched for a refined theoretical version that a) incorporated the growing importance of economic considerations in inter-state competition and b) had the methodological credentials that would allow the formation of law-like hypotheses that could be tested according to rigorous scientific criteria.[2]

Waltz and Neo-Realism

While there is no shortage of neo-realists approaches, arguably the most learned work on the subject has been that of Kenneth Waltz. His first contribution came with the publication of *Man, State and War* in 1959. In it, Waltz argued that there are three levels or images of analysis in the examination of the causes of war. The first level, or image, looks for answers in the realm of the individual and as such focuses on human nature. The second one scrutinises the domestic configuration of states whilst the third and last positions the international system at the centre of attention.

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[2] Halliday, F. *Rethinking International Relations*. London: Macmillan Press, 1994, p. 31

Previous attempts to theorise international relations, Waltz argued, focused on the first and second level and were thus prone to being "waylaid by the contingent, the transitory and the unforeseen".[3] In addition, theories at the first and second level are unsuccessful not because they cannot predict specific wars but because they fail to answer why the phenomenon of war has persisted as an endemic feature of international affairs throughout history.[4]

Waltz's neo-realist approach, on the other hand, centred on the observation of third image explanations of the causes of the war. These explanations look for answers at the workings of the international system. The argument here is twofold. It begins by recognising that the nature of the international system is anarchic and lacks a governing authority that will discipline those states that choose not to conform to its ordering principles. This lack of systemic guarantees breeds uncertainty into interstate relationships and generates security dilemmas in which suspicion over the motives of competitors leads to aggression and strife. As Waltz put it:

> War occurs because there is nothing to prevent it. Among states as among men there is no automatic adjustment of interests. In the absence of a supreme authority there is then constant possibility that conflicts will be settled by force.[5]

In order to produce a falsifiable theory of international relations and the causes of war, Waltz compartmentalised the possible explanatory approaches into three distinct and definitively separated categories before rejecting the first two on the grounds that they fail to produce answers at a wide-ranging level. These answers, he argued, could only be found at the level of the international system. However, in so doing Waltz's argument was left too exposed to methodological and ontological criticisms. The most fundamental of these criticisms regarded the vagueness, or absence, of the criteria used in determining the instances that state action is guided by nature of the international system and those in which action is dictated by the internal disposition of states.

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[3] Waltz, N. K. *Man, State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. NY: Columbia University Press, 1959, p. 66
[4] Hibden, S. *International Relations and Historical Sociology*. London: Routledge, 1998, p. 47
[5] Waltz, N. K. *Man, State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. NY: Columbia University Press, 1959, p. 188

In reality, the criticisms of Waltz's work reflected a deeper concern within the international relations community: that of the relationship between individual actors (states) and the system in which they operate. This conjectural conundrum was the focal point of Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*, published two decades after his first book came into circulation. His stance on the issue proceeded on a theoretical platform that combined his prior work with two new suppositions. Firstly, Waltz argues, states are functionally undifferentiated units. Thus, what is important in analysing international relations is the distribution of power (capabilities) across the system and not the capabilities of individual states.[6] Secondly, what defines the interaction of states in the international system is its structure. By "structure he means a set of constraining conditions and he exemplifies this in the international realm by reference to two processes: socialisation (i.e. the acceptance by states of certain behaviour) and competition".[7]

The new theoretical approach that emerges, according to Waltz, offers superior explanations to the riddles of the international relations on several accounts. The most significant of these is that it avoids the pitfall of those theories, which ponder on cause and effect explanations at the individual and/or national level (first and second image explanations). Waltz rejects the expounding power of these theories, which he terms as reductionist, on the grounds that they fail to explicate the regularity and similarity of international outcomes caused by states with diverse esoteric characteristics.[8] Reductionist theories fail, he argues, because they try to explain wholes (outcomes at the level of the international system) by focusing on their constituent parts (actions and/or characteristics of individual states and/or their elites).

To facilitate his solution to the problem of reductionism, Waltz restates his belief in the exactness of a systemic theory that abstracts the international system from the wider socio-political realm. By using a theory that abstracts from the characteristics of the

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[6] Hibden, S. *International Relations and Historical Sociology*. London: Routledge, 1998, p. 54
[7] Halliday, F. *Rethinking International Relations*. London: Macmillan Press, 1994, p. 32
[8] Waltz, N. K. *Theory of International Politics*. NY: Random House, 1979, pp. 37-9

"units, their behaviour [and] their interactions", the analyst becomes able to "distinguish between variables at the level of the units and variables at the level of the system".[9] Having achieved this social abstraction, what is then required is the precise definition of the structure of the international system. For Waltz the structure of the international system is distinguished from the structure of domestic political constraints according to three criteria: a) the ordering principle (anarchic nature of the international system as opposed to the hierarchy of the domestic political systems that allows them to enforce their laws and discipline those that break them); b) the character of the units; and c) distribution of capabilities (polarity). [10] If a theory is to be systemic, "all of these must be defined without reference to individual units".[11]

The first two features in Waltz's definition of the structure of the international system are deemed to be relatively stable. Any adjustments "would mean a complete change to the system, and the only change Waltz can envision is from the anarchical order to a hierarchical one through the emergence of a world government".[12] Thus, by deduction, what affects the international system most is the distribution of power across it. According to Waltz a bipolar system (dominated by two great powers as was the case throughout the Cold War) is more likely to produce a stable international environment than a multi-polar system (with power shared by three or more powers).

Waltz has argued that this approach offers the parsimony lacking in other theories of international relations. His methodology was designed to offer the possibility of a more 'scientific' approach to the study of world affairs. However, the ability of Waltz's 'parsimonious neo-realism' to deliver on its promise has been severely questioned, especially since its failure to predict the forces that brought about the collapse of the USSR, the end of the Cold War and the cataclysmic changes that ensued.

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[9] ibid, p. 79
[10] Booth, K., Smith, S. eds. *International Relations Theory Today*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995, p. 244
[11] Hibden, S. *International Relations and Historical Sociology*. London: Routledge, 1998, p. 54
[12] ibid

Waltz's Critics

Going through the literature that criticise Waltz's work certain subjects of contention appear with great prominence. Critics have argued that Waltz's theoretical approach is unable to deal with issues of change within the international system. They argue that the root of the problem lies within the readiness of neo-realism to accept the prevailing realities of the international system and cloak them with attributes of a trans-historical continuation that provide the basis for Waltz's 'elegant' and parsimonious theory of international relations.[13]

Robert Keohane, for example, values the contribution of neo-realism in the development of theory of international relations but points out that Waltz's analytical framework omits the analysis of the institutional context against which state interaction takes place. He claims that there are instances and factors that have the ability to reduce the implications of anarchy for states and thus their need to resort to self-help solutions. [14]

Moreover, John Gerard Ruggie has argued that Waltz's assertion that the structures of the international system have remained intact for tens of eons fails to consider the "most contextual change in international politics in this millennium: the shift from the medieval to the modern international system".[15] Fred Halliday echoes the above point when he criticises Waltz's analysis for being "ahistorical, in the sense that it takes as transhistorical, or permanent, features of the system that are the product of, and hence specific to, distinct phases of international relations".[16]

It was this omission, according to his critics, that have permitted Waltz to assume that the intensity of regularity and continuity of outcomes in the workings of the international system permits the dropping of unit-level analysis. As already mentioned, Waltz believes that since states operate within an anarchical international system they have no option but

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[13] see Waltz, N. K. *Theory of International Politics*. Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979, p. 66
[14] Keohane, O. R. "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond" in Keohane, O. R. ed. *Neo-Realism and its Critics*. NY: Columbia University Press, 1986, pp. 193-6
[15] Ruggie, G. J. "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity" in Keohane, O. R. ed. *Neo-Realism and its Critics*. NY: Columbia University Press, 1986, p. 141
[16] Halliday, F. *Rethinking International Relations*. London: Macmillan Press, 1994, p. 33

to perform the same basic tasks. Ruggie believes this to be a mistake because Waltz's thesis has depended on an "infelicitous interpretation to the sociological term 'differentiation' taking it to mean that which denotes *differences* rather than that which denotes *separateness*".[17] Following on from Ruggie's assertion, the examination of the level that states are constituted as separate entities becomes essential in the definition of the international system's structure. In his own words:

> If anarchy tells us that the political system is a segmental realm, differentiation tells us *on what basis* the segmentation is determined. The second component of structure, therefore, does *not* drop out; it stays in, and serves as an exceedingly important source of structural variation.[18]

However, despite the intensity of the criticisms targeting his work, Waltz has maintained his belief in the explanatory power of his theoretical approach, albeit with certain concessions. He argues, for example, that unit level analysis should be pursued when there is a deviation from the expected in individual international outcomes.[19] But, at the same time he insists that neo-realism cannot account for specific state actions in the international arena and it should not, accordingly, be used in order to explain foreign policy choices.[20] By implication, Waltz acknowledges that his parsimonious neo-realism cannot account for the domestic sources of decision-making and their impact on international outcomes. What is more, he readily accepts that "any theory of international politics requires also a theory of domestic politics, since states affect the system even as it affects them".[21] Yet he also states that:

> To achieve 'closeness of fit' would negate theory. A theory cannot fit the facts or correspond with the events it seeks to explain...A theory can be written only by leaving out most matters that are of practical interest. To

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[17] Ruggie, G. J. "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity" in Keohane, O R. ed. *Neo-Realism and its Critics*. NY: Columbia University Press, 1986, p. 142
[18] ibid
[19] Waltz, N. K. *Theory of International Politics*. Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979, p. 71
[20] Waltz, N. K. International Politics is Not Foreign Policy. *Security Studies*, 6, 1996, p. 57
[21] Waltz, N. K. "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to my Critics" in Keohane, O. R. ed. *Neo-Realism and its Critics*. NY: Columbia University Press, 1986, p. 331

believe that listing the omissions of a theory constitutes a valid criticism is to misconstrue the theoretical enterprise.[22]

Waltz believes that the omissions from his approach, characterised as it is by its social abstraction, are justified as his "intention is not to explain everything, but to explain the most from the least amount of theory".[23]

The case for Supplementing Neo-Realism

Nevertheless, narrowing the focus of analysis in order to produce a plausibly constructed theory of international relations, as Waltz professes to have done, often results in an inability to account for a significant part of international interactions. Neo-realism cannot, for example, ascertain that peaceful change is more difficult to achieve in the international realm than it is within well-organised and law governed societies, but it does not however, attempt to produce an explanation for the possibility of peaceful change.[24] As such, it cannot account for the co-operation between the major European powers that gave rise to the European Community (now the European Union) at the aftermath of WWII.

Waltz has tried to answer this conundrum by arguing that the cooperation of the major European powers, and especially that between France and Germany, is the by-product of the change in their international position that occurred since they ceased to be great powers.[25] However, as Halliday notes, there are several medium and small powers in the world, whose international position is not that much different from that of France and Germany, that choose conflict over co-operation like Iran and Iraq or India and Pakistan.[26] Halliday observes, "What determines their option is not structural position as

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[22] Waltz, N. K. "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory" in Rothstein, R. L. ed. *The Evolution of Theory in International Relations: Essays in Honour of William T.R. Fox.* Columbia SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1991, p. 31 cited from Hibden, S. *International Relations and Historical Sociology.* London: Routledge, 1998, p. 57

[23] Hibden, S. *International Relations and Historical Sociology.* London: Routledge, 1998, p. 57

[24] Keohane, O. R. "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond" in Keohane, O. R. ed. *Neo-Realism and its Critics.* NY: Columbia University Press, 1986, p. 197

[25] Waltz, N. K. "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to my Critics" in Keohane, O. R. ed. *Neo-Realism and its Critics.* NY: Columbia University Press, 1986, pp. 332-3

[26] Halliday, F. *Rethinking International Relations.* London: Macmillan Press, 1994, p. 36

such, but the combination of this with internal factors - the kind of historic experience they have had in the twentieth century (not least the two world wars), the kind of political and socio-economic regimes they maintain, and the consequent alliances they have developed."[27] Nor can neo-realism account for, and this brings us closer to the subject of this thesis, Greece's stance on the issue of FYROM (Macedonia), the country's insistence on defending Cyprus when in military terms this is not feasible and a series of other issues in Greece's behaviour in the international realm.[28]

What is needed, as Keohane points out, is a "modified Structural Realism that retains enough of the hard core to generate a priori predictions on the basis of information about the international environment".[29] In order to achieve this, Keohane continues, what is needed is "better theories of domestic policies, decision-making, and information processing, so that the gap between the external and the internal environments can be bridged in a systematic way".[30]

1.2 Strategic Culture

The concept of strategic culture was initially introduced to the International Relations literature during the late 1970s to explain the variations in the preferred nuclear strategies of the two main Cold War adversaries, the USA and the USSR. It has since been used more broadly to account for the differences in the interaction of states with their security environments and their chosen responses to security problems. Theorising about strategic culture has involved an attempt to break strategic theory out of the 'black box' of ethnocentrism and, as Desmond Ball points out, to provide the conceptual means for the avoidance of misperceptions in international relations.[31] In that respect, strategic culture holds that the strategic preferences of different states are distinct. As such they derive their substance from the early formative experiences of the state in question and are

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[27] ibid
[28] Both of these issues will be addressed at a later stage of the thesis
[29] Keohane, O. R. "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond" in Keohane, O. R. ed. *Neo-Realism and its Critics*. NY: Columbia University Press, 1986, p. 191
[30] ibid
[31] Ball, D. Strategic Culture in the Asia–Pacific Region. *Security Studies*, 3 (1), Autumn, 1993, p. 45

influenced to a greater or lesser extent by the political, cultural and cognitive qualities of the state and its elites.[32]

Few, if any, advocates employing the concept of strategic culture in their analyses would argue that in doing so they have broken new ground. Indeed, the idea that the 'cultural' characteristics of national and international security policies are worth examining can be traced back to ancient times to the writings of such distinguished thinkers as, for example, Sun Tzi in China and Thucydides in Greece. In Thucydides' history of the Peloponessian War, culture gains centre place in the Corinthians plea for help to the Spartans.[33] Here, there is a clear connotation between the risk-taking nature of the seafaring Athenians on one hand, and the conservative and cautious nature of the Spartans on the other, and the effect these conflicting cultural characteristics have had on their respective strategies. Similarly, Sun Tzi pointed out the importance of culture in the formulation and execution of strategy by writing that the only way to minimise the risks involved in a battle is to know oneself as well as one's enemy. Working on the same principle the more contemporary, British military historian, Basil Liddell Hart, spoke of a distinctly "British practice of war, based on experience and proved by three centuries of success".[34] Liddell Hart's idea for a 'British way in warfare' has since been duplicated by a host of other scholars who have produced similar analyses for a number of states, such as the USA, the USSR, Japan and China.[35]

However, although these works sought to integrate the 'cultural characteristics' of strategy into mainstream academia, they displayed an array of faults that provided fodder for their critics and resulted in their marginalisation. Cardinal among these faults was the

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[32] Johnston, I. A. Thinking About Strategic Culture. *International Security*, 19 (4), Spring, 1995, p. 34
[33] see *Thucydides' History* (translated into modern Greek by A. Vlahos) Athens: Estia, sections A 70, A 84, A 118, Δ 55, E 54-55, Θ 24, 1998 (in Greek)
[34] Liddell Hart, B. *The British Way in Warfare: Adaptability and Mobility*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1935 quoted from in Booth, K., Trood, R. eds. *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region*. London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 5
[35] see for example Benedict, R. *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989 (first print 1946) also Weigley, R. *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973 also Kierman, F. Jr., Fairbank, J. *Chinese Ways in Warfare*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974 also Baxter, W. *The Soviet Way of Warfare*. London: Brassey's, 1986

way the majority of these works viewed culture. Many of the scholars working within this conceptual framework defined culture as a tangible thing, a commodity possessed uniformly by every member of the community in discussion.[36] Based on such a rigid definition of culture, the literature on national approaches to warfare offered analyses that were occasionally interesting and insightful, but on the whole impressionistic and intuitive, while at the same time being bound to the ethnocentrism of their authors.[37]

Hence, when the concept of strategic culture was first developed in the late 1970s, it represented not only a sustained scholarly effort to analyse the cultural elements of strategy by explicitly referring to them but also an attempt to do away with the flaws of the research designs that had asked the same questions in the past. Accordingly, scholars such as Jack Snyder and Colin Gray defined strategic culture as deriving from the micro-environmental features of states, such as geography and history. The focus of analysis was mainly restricted to the societal structures of the USA and the USSR and the effect of these on the perceived differences in the external behaviour of the two adversaries. This last point, the deterministic linkage between the cultural elements of strategy and state behaviour, came to identify the majority of these scholarly works and left them open to criticism.

Since then, the intellectual history of strategic culture from the perspective of 2002 has evolved to the extent that it is now possible to identify two additional waves, phases or generations of strategic culture theorising. The second generation, dating back to the mid 1980s, adopted a Gramscian perspective and used strategic culture to explain how strategic elites reinforce their hegemony and authority within society. At the same time, the literature that was produced along these lines recognised the possibility of a disjuncture between a symbolic strategic cultural discourse and operational doctrines.[38] In view of that, strategic cultural discourses are seen as being manipulated by elites in order

[36] Cohen, R. "Conflict Resolution Across Cultures: Bridging the Gap" in Jacquin-Berdal, D., Oros, A., Verweij, M. eds. *Culture in World Politics*. London: Macmillan Press in association with Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 1998, p. 117
[37] Booth, K., Macmillan, A., Trood, R. "Strategic Culture" in Booth, K., Trood, R. eds. *Strategic Cultures in the Asia–Pacific Region*. London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 6

to draw support for declamatory strategies that are in turn used to mask actual operational policies.[39]

The third, and relatively contemporary generation, has evolved since the end of the Cold War and focuses on the role of the strategic and organisational cultural norms in strategic choices. As Michael Desch points out, it represents a broad research programme with a wide range of research foci, looking at cultural traits from an organisational, political, strategic and global perspective.[40] It differs from earlier works on the cultural elements of strategy by regarding strategic culture not as "deeply rooted in distant social and political history but as the product of recent military-strategic experience".[41] Broadly speaking the scholarly work that comes under the aegis of the third generation represents an effort to elucidate strategic choices that do not fit within the predominant neo-realist explanations. At the same time, it holds on to the idea of a possible separation between attitudes and behaviours that were evident in the second wave of theorising about the subject.

The division of the strategic culture literature into three generations serves as a reminder of the diverse way the concept has been approached and applied. Scholars agree on the usefulness of culture in explaining strategy but fail to reach a consensus on an array of issues. As Stuart Poore notes: "(…) it appears that there is only a very loose association between these [three] generations of research with writers pursuing disparate aims and objectives."[42] The range of these issues is far-reaching, reflecting not only uncertainties about the role of culture and whether it should be considered as a cause or context of strategic action but also essential practicalities pertaining to the way strategic culture ought to be understood, defined and studied.[43] Accordingly, Macmillan suggests a

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[38] Johnston, I. A. *Cultural Realism-Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998, p. 15

[39] Basrur, R. J. Nuclear Weapons and Indian Strategic Culture. *Journal of Peace Research*, 38 (2), 2001, p. 182

[40] Desch, M. Culture Clash – Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies. *International Security*, 23(1), Summer, 1998, p. 142

[41] Basrur, R J. Nuclear Weapons and Indian Strategic Culture. *Journal of Peace Research*, 38 (2), 2001, p. 182

[42] Poore, S. What is Context? A Reply to the Gray-Johnston Debate on Strategic Culture. *Review of International Studies*, 29, 2003, p. 284

[43] Farrell, T. Culture and Military Power. *Review of International Studies*, 24, 1998, p. 408

distinction between strategic culture minimalists and maximalists.[44] Minimalists, while still working within the premises of other international theories, most notably neo-realism, see strategic culture as a useful analytical tool that can account for the inefficiencies of these theories. In their writings, culture is perceived as a supplementary factor with a moderate influence in explaining world politics. Conversely, strategic culture maximalists take a more uncompromising stance. For them, strategic culture supplants competing international relations explanations and culture is seen as the overriding and determinant feature of international relations.

The supplant/supplement dichotomy offered by Macmillan is, however, refuted by scholars such as Keith Krause and Ole Elgstrom who see it as simplistic and meaningless. Instead, they believe that the line of inquiry should be moved towards the conditions and extent that culture matters in shaping international relations.[45] This lack of consensus has translated into the absence of a commonly accepted methodology and epistemology for the study of strategic culture. Correspondingly, the term strategic culture has often been taken up in idiosyncratic ways that fail to offer any definitions of its intended meaning and function, with essayists using it as a mere label for work that would otherwise be academically homeless. In order to avoid a repetition of this pitfall the purpose of this chapter is threefold. Firstly, this chapter will seek to offer a conceptualisation of the way culture is perceived and applied in this thesis. It will then proceed by offering a selective survey of the literature on strategic culture by reviewing the works of several thinkers in the field, who represent the three generations of theorising as mentioned above. Finally, it will consider some of the issues that reflect the controversy surrounding the application of the concept of strategic culture. The hope being that having completed these three tasks conceptual clarity will be attained.

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[44] Macmillan, A. *Strategic Culture and British Grand Strategy, 1949-1952*. PhD Thesis, University of Wales – Aberystwyth, 1996, p. 170 for another contribution on the same subject by the same author see Macmillan, A. Strategic Culture and National Ways in Warfare. *Journal of The Royal United Services Institute*, 140 (5) October 1995

[45] for the argumentation see Krause, K. "Cross-Cultural Dimensions of Multilateral Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Dialogues: An Overview" in Krause, K. *Culture and Security: Multi-laterism Arms Control Dialogues and Security Building*. London: Frank Cass, 1998, p. 3 see also Elgstrom, O. National Culture and International Negotiations. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 29 (3), 1994, p. 295

Culture in International Relations

The concept of culture was brought to the fore of social science by anthropologists who sought to explain the "astonishing variety of the human spectacle, the many answers that different societies have evolved to meet the same existential problems".[46] Appropriately, it refers to "enormously complex accumulations of theoretical speculation about human affairs".[47] In that way, culture acts as a compass for a wide spectrum of issues, often diverse, that confound academic inter-disciplinary boundaries. As such, its scope is vast and its content the subject of scholarly, age-old contention. This contention is apparent if we observe the distinct manner culture has been approached and adopted by various academic disciplines. It is this, which led Raymond Williams to describe culture as "one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language".[48]

In the field of international relations, culture is used to highlight the differences "among states or, more precisely, among societies as they are reduced to the shorthand of states".[49] Cultural approaches seek to point out the perspectives of international actors on a range of pertinent matters bound to their "preferred way of organising social relations, their conceptions of time and space, their system of allocating honour and blame, their favoured way of dealing with conflicts, and so on".[50] Yet, as Jongsuk Chay notes, the cultural dimension of international relations is "perceived as too broad and its boundaries too vague, with the result that one's energies can easily be wasted in this uncertain territory".[51]

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[46] Cohen, R. "Conflict Resolution Across Cultures: Bridging the Gap" in Jacquin-Berdal, D., Oros, A., Verweij, M. eds. *Culture in World Politics*. London: Macmillan Press in association with Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 1998, p. 116

[47] Walker, R. B. J. "The Concept of Culture in the Theory of International Relations" in Chay, J. *Culture and International Relations*. London: Praeger, 1990, p. 3

[48] Williams, R. *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*. Fontana: London, 1983, p. 87

[49] Black, P., Avruch, K. "Culture, Power and International Negotiations: Understanding Palau-US Status Negotiations" in Jacquin-Berdal, D., Oros, A., Verweij, M. eds. *Culture in World Politics*. London: Macmillan Press in association with Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 1998, p. 34

[50] Verweij, M., Oros, A., Jacquin-Berdal, D. "Culture in World Politics: An Introduction" in Jacquin-Berdal, D., Oros, A., Verweij, M. eds. *Culture in World Politics*. London: Macmillan Press in association with Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 1998, p. 6

[51] Chay, J. *Culture and International Relations*. London: Praeger, 1990, p. xi (preface)

Indeed, cultural variables are not easy to identify and locating the effects of culture on state action, while relating them to other, for example, material or structural considerations is even harder. For the positivist political scientists whose research rests on hard, quantifiable data and law-like observational procedures in model-building case studies, culture appears as too much of an independent variable. Correspondingly, its analytical value is circumscribed, if not cast away, to be used only in situations that cannot be accounted for by existing theories of international relations. This, according to Snyder, turns culture into a "residual label that is affixed to 'explain' outcomes that cannot be explained in any other way".[52] In this way, he continues, "Culture, including Strategic Culture, is an explanation of a last resort to be used only when all else fails." However, explanations of the last resort, as Pye observes, are almost indiscriminately never explanations at all. [53]

Much of these criticisms derive from earlier works on the national character of states, produced in the 1940s and 1950s under the influence of behaviourism. National character studies perceived culture in a tautological way suggesting that all human activity, the conduct of international relations not excluded, is both a cause and an effect of culture.[54] In addition, they determined state action in the realm of international relations on the basis of a deterministic causal linkage that saw the latter as the dependent variable with culture acting as the independent variable.[55] But the effects of culture, as noted above, are not easily, if at all, amenable to quantification. National character studies attempted to bring culture under the guise of behaviourism, by appropriately adhering to behaviourist evaluative criteria and perceiving culture as a rigid determinant of state behaviour. In doing so, they exposed themselves to criticism on several grounds: methodological,

[52] Though Jack Snyder coined the term strategic culture in 1977, he has subsequently opposed its use expressing harsh criticisms of its analytical value and use. For this specific comment see Snyder, J. "The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emptor" in Jacobsen, G. C. ed. *Strategic Power: USA/USSR.* Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999, p. 4
[53] Pye, L. *The Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Cultures.* Ann Arbor: Centre for Chinese Studies – University of Michigan, 1988, p. 6
[54] Hudson, V. "Culture and Foreign Policy: Developing a Research Agenda" in Hudson, V. ed. *Culture and Foreign Policy.* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997, p. 3
[55] ibid

theoretical and moral.[56] Unable to address their critiques, national character studies soon faded into academic obscurity.

Does this mean then, that all efforts to find a crossing point that would bridge cultural analysis with international relations need be doomed? The volume of support for cultural analysis on the international relations literature suggests otherwise. In the words of Yosef Lapid, "A swing of the pendulum towards culture and identity is strikingly evident in post-Cold War IR theorising."[57] Strategic Culture is part of this post-Cold War theorising and here the shortcomings of national character studies provide useful lessons. The first of these lessons is to avoid resorting to deterministic definitions of Strategic Culture. The second one calls for the adoption of a less unbending research design that will be able to accommodate subjective cultural differences. As Johnston puts it, in understanding the ideational sources of strategic choice "we cannot but be somewhat arbitrary, though explicit, when trying to rigorously define and test a notion of Strategic Culture".[58] This is in agreement with Gray's warning that one looks to Strategic Culture not for rigid determinants but discerning tendencies.[59] Hence, attention should be re-directed from the cause–effect line of cultural analysis in which strategic outcomes are seen as both a cause and an effect of culture, to a contextual one in which cultural variables act by "shaping an understanding of what constitutes 'normal', 'appropriate', or 'desirable' practices and responses"[60] in strategic choices.

In this contextual framework of strategic culture analysis, defining culture becomes essential. For the purposes of this thesis then, culture will be perceived as the property of communities rather than the individuals that constitute them. As Mark Ross has written,

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[56] ibid, p. 4

[57] Lapid, Yosef. "Culture Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory" in Lapid, Y., Kratochwil, F. eds. *The Return of Culture and Identity in International Relations Theory.* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 3

[58] Johnston, I. A. *Cultural Realism – Strategic Culture and Chinese Grand Strategy in Chinese History.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 33

[59] see Gray, C. *Nuclear Strategy and National Style.* Lanham: Hamilton Press, 1986, p. 35

[60] Krause, K., Latham, A. "Constructing Non-Proliferation and Arms Control: The Norms of Western Practise" in Krause, K. ed. *Culture and Security: Multi-lateralism Arms Control Dialogues and Security Building.* London: Frank Cass, 1998, p. 24

(...)culture is an emergent concept, something which appears on the aggregate, but not individual level in the sense that a single person cannot have culture; rather culture is those things, which many people living in a society share.[61]

The referent points of culture become, then, those collectively shared meanings that define the collective's worldview. Those shared meanings also provide a lens for the understanding of the way groups, and the individuals within them, interpret social reality by expounding on the groups' affective and cognitive beliefs. Culture, therefore, is not tangible: a 'thing'. It is not a commodity possessed uniformly by every member of a community (as the erroneous research design of national character studies held) nor is it a traditional way of behaving, a set of quaint customs to be learned before a trip abroad.[62]

For the use of culture within the framework of international relations studies, an additional point to be made isthat this process takes place amid people integrated under a commonly understood and expressed identity that distinguishes between the group and outsiders.[63] Under this perspective, "behaviours, institutions and social structure are understood not as culture itself but as culturally constituted phenomena".[64] In short, culture finds expression through specific behaviours, be it customs or rituals, both sacred and profane, that mark the daily, yearly and life cycles of a group's members, and that depict the way those people view past, present and future events and how they tackle the choices that confront them.[65] Furthermore, culture is not perceived as being fundamentally static, like an entity hovering above society, directing behaviour, while it

[61] Ross, H. M. "The Cultural Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict" in Jacquin-Berdal, D., Oros, A., Verweij, M. eds. *Culture in World Politics*. London: Macmillan Press in association with Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 1998, p. 160

[62] for the argumentation see Avruch and Black cited in Cohen, B. "Conflict Resolution Across Cultures: Bridging the Gap" in Jacquin-Berdal, D., Oros, A., Verweij, M. eds. *Culture in World Politics*. London: Macmillan Press in association with Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 1998, p. 117

[63] Ross, H. M. "The Cultural Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict" in Jacquin-Berdal, D., Oros, A., Verweij, M. eds. *Culture in World Politics*. London: Macmillan Press in association with Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 1998, p. 160

[64] ibid

[65] for the argumentation see Kertzer, D. I. *Ritual, Politics and Power*. London: Yale University Press, 1988 cited in Ross, H. M. "The Cultural Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict" in Jacquin-Berdal, D., Oros, A., Verweij, M. eds. *Culture in World Politics*. London: Macmillan Press in association with Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 1998, p. 161

remains immune to social, economic and political developments and forces.[66] On the contrary, culture, Thomas Berger observes, is transmitted through the "imperfect mechanisms of primary and secondary socialisation" and is "under constant pressure from both external developments and internal contradictions".[67] It is generally assumed however, that culture constrains the effects of these external developments and internal contradictions, to the effect that if culture changes, it does so slowly, lagging behind changes in the more 'objective', for example material, conditions.[68]

Perceiving culture in such a way does not exclude or deny the existence of individual differences within the community itself. Nor does it, by extension, deny the possibility of various sub-cultures. However, when the scope of analysis opens up to include not only 'a' culture but also the total sum of the sub-cultures it incorporates, "references to the creative capacities of human beings in general" (culture), turn "into either the celebration of, or consternation about, the sheer diversity of human communities" (sub-cultures).[69] In a thesis that seeks to define the relation between culture and strategy such an eventuality would translate into infinite lines of inquiry that would have little, if anything, to contribute to the discussion. For example, one can talk of the sub-culture of urban taxi drivers in Greece, but how pertinent would that be to a discussion about the nation's strategic culture? The eventual outcome would justify the words of Brian Barry who, in rejecting the contributory value of culture in political science, described the "characteristically sloppy logic and flabby prose" of cultural analysis while referring to its "deeper problems of circularity" and inherent "vacuousness".[70]

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[66] Berger, T. "Norms, Identity and National Security in Germany and Japan" in Katzenstein, P. ed. *The Culture of National Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, p. 326
[67] ibid
[68] Johnston, I.A *Cultural Realism – Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 1
[69] Walker, R.B.J. "The Concept of Culture in the Theory of International Relations" in Chay, J. ed. *Culture and International Relations*. London: Praeger,, 1990, p. 4
[70] Barry, B. "Sociologists, Economists and Democracy" cited in Katzenstein,. P. J. "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security" in Katzenstein, P. J. ed. *The Culture of National Security – Norms and Identity in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, p. 1

The Three 'Generations' of Strategic Culture Theorising

The original impetus for the conceptualisation and development of the strategic culture concept came from within the context of the Cold War and the need to understand the intentions of the two main adversaries, the USA and the former USSR, in the likelihood of a nuclear confrontation. The dominant views of the American strategic community held that the prose and thoughts of the nuclear age ought to be dictated by a universalistic logic, almost indiscriminately seen through a Western lens. As a result, the perceptible Soviet disposition towards the contemplation of the use of nuclear weapons, left Western analysts at sea. In response to that, a group of American defence authorities put forward the notion that Soviet strategic thinking was indeed unique in that it found its inspiration in the nation's historical and geographical circumstances and the particular defence problems these have given rise to. They therefore suggested that these circumstances have produced a unique "military culture or pathology" that affects the "whole range of the nation's broad security and more narrow military policies".[71]

The First Generation: Discerning Strategic Culture

The vanguard of these strategic thinkers was spearheaded by Snyder who, as noted earlier in this thesis, coined the concept of strategic culture in his 1977 RAND report.[72] Snyder argued that the experiences of the Soviet leaders, as their country struggled to repel the Nazi invasion, had to a noteworthy extent influenced the Soviet understanding of their strategic environment and their policies in the field. In trying to explain the professed Soviet disposition towards the use of nuclear weapons, he pointed to the realities of the Eastern front, emphasising the ruthless tactics of the invading Nazi army and the devastation they caused to the Soviet heartland. Having experienced a 'total' version of war, Soviet leaders saw in the use of nuclear weapons the opportunity not only to increase their influence over others but also the opportunity to secure their land from future aggressors even if that meant all out nuclear confrontation. The experiences of the war, he claimed, had also taught the Soviet leaders a lesson of self-sufficiency and a

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[71] Jones, R. D. "Soviet Strategic Culture" in Jacobsen, G. C. ed. *Strategic Power: USA/USSR*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999, p. 35
[72] Snyder, J. *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations*. Rand Report R-2154-AF, US: Rand Corporation, September 1977

preference for pro-active strategies that would initiate circumstances rather than merely respond to them. In addition, Snyder stressed the paramount importance of the military as an institution in the Soviet Union and its subsequent dominance in the conception and development of strategic doctrine with the concurrent scaling down of political and diplomatic considerations. Hence, emphasis on Soviet strategic planning was not on intra-war deterrence but fighting and winning a war.[73]

The closest the war had come to the United States, on the contrary, was Pearl Harbour and the influence of the defence establishment in the Unites States was, to a large degree, moderated by civilian input and demands. Therefore, it was the logical conclusion, according to Snyder, that the USA and the USSR approached strategic issues in disparate ways. Understanding those disparate ways, and the reasons that gave rise to them, was then crucial for the American nuclear planning apparatus and the formulation of a strategy that would deter the Soviet Union.

Notwithstanding the above, Snyder warned against the dangers of over-reliance on culture as an explanatory factor in explaining strategy as the conclusions reached rested on circumlocutory evidence. In his latter writings, this warning gave way to the denunciation of the strategic culture as "an explanation of the last resort", one that is to be "used only when all else fails".[74] He also distanced himself from the way strategic culture came to be understood and used, claiming that by employing 'culture' as a factor in his analysis, he did not refer to the conventional definition of the term but to the specific differences in the domestic or international circumstances in which the Soviet strategic planning took place. [75] Using the term culture in its conventional form, according to Snyder, raises a series of question pertaining to the helpfulness of a strategic culture notion whose effects are difficult to locate and verify in empirical terms. At the

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[73] ibid, p. 30-31 On the issue of the Soviet Strategic Culture see also Twining, D. T., Soviet Strategic Culture – The Missing Dimension. *Intelligence and National Security*, 4 (1), January 1989
[74] for the quotations see Snyder, J. "The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emperor" in Jacobsen, G. C. ed. *Strategic Power: USA/USSR*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999, pp. 3-9
[75] ibid

same time a strategic analysis along those lines runs the risk of exaggerating the behavioural differences that are ascribed to it.[76]

Nonetheless, others have approached the study of strategic culture with a keen interest.[77] Among them the names of Booth and Gray feature prominently. Booth's first contribution in the field came in 1978,[78] two years after Snyder's RAND report. However, while the latter indicated the way in which distinctive strategic cultures could develop within states, the former argued that strategists frequently fail to appreciate this point, often with deadly consequences.[79] Ethnocentrism, according to Booth, can and recurrently does interfere with the strategist's world-view and consequently his decisions. For the purpose of his study, ethnocentrism was defined as a term that describes feelings of group centrality and superiority. It was used as a synonym for being 'culture bound', and consequently ethnocentrism was viewed as a technical term used to describe a faulty methodology in the social sciences. [80] As such ethnocentrism distorts the surrounding realities of those involved in the formulation of strategy and leads to the subjective perception of intentions of others. In his own words:

> Governments do conceive themselves to be locked into strategic competition and do sometimes respond directly to each other's threats. But they do not necessarily respond to military stimuli and they do not respond in a mechanical way. If they respond at all, they respond according to personal styles and personal idiosyncrasies.[81]

The answer to the dangers of ethnocentrism lies always, according to Booth, in the observance of cultural relativism. This necessitates the ability to transcend the narrow

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[76] Booth, K. "The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed" in Jacobsen, G. C. ed. *Strategic Power: USA/USSR.* Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999, p. 123
[77] other works that are not mentioned here include Carnes, L. American Strategic Culture. *The Washington Quarterly*, 15 (1), Winter 1992 also Kincade, W. "American National Style" in Jacobsen, G. C. ed. *Strategic Power: USA/USSR.* Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999, p. 10
[78] Booth, K. *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*, London: Groom Helm, 1979
[79] Booth, K., Macmillan, A., Trood, R. " Strategic Culture" in Booth, K., Trood, R. eds. *Strategic Cultures in the Asia – Pacific Region.* London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 5
[80] Booth, K. *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*, London: Groom Helm, 1979, p. 14
[81] ibid, p. 23

confines of one's own culture thus providing him/her with the opportunity to see things more objectively. Ideally, cultural relativism should connote the "perception and description of cultural phenomena in terms of scientific detachment from the perspective of the participants or adherents of a given culture".[82]

Following on from the above point, Booth in one of his later written works outlined the reasons that, according to him, make cultural analysis essential in any discussion concerning strategy.[83] To begin with, cultural analysis assists in the erosion of ethnocentrism's negative impact. It does so by providing strategists with a comprehensive conceptual framework that leads to a deeper understanding of one's self as well as one's enemy. Focusing on culture also allows the acknowledgement of the role of historical analysis in explaining the motivation of states as they interact in the international arena. What is more, cultural approaches break down the artificial boundaries between the domestic environments in which policy-making takes place and the external security environment of a state. They also help clarify the professed 'irrationalities' in the actions of states and act as a lens for the observance of their cultural traditions thus adding to the understanding of policy makers in matters of threat perception and threat assessment.[84]

The ideas of Snyder and Booth provided the impetus for the work of Gray. His first contribution came in 1981 in the form of an article that proceeded from the assumption that there is a discernible American strategic culture, which he identified as "modes of thought and action with respect to force".[85] He traced the roots of these modes of thought and action back to such factors as the American political culture, geography and way of life. These factors have contributed to a unique historical experience that has in turn culminated in the adoption of a uniquely American style in matters of strategy. As such, strategic culture shapes the "milieu within which strategic ideas and defence policy

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[82] ibid, p. 16
[83] Booth, K. "The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed" in Jacobsen, G. C. ed. *Strategic Power: USA/USSR*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999, p. 126
[84] see for example Rosen, S. P. Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters. *International Security*, 19 (4), Spring 1995
[85] Gray, C. National Style in Strategy: The American Example. *International Security*, 6 (2), Fall 1981, p. 22

decisions are debated and decided".[86] Accordingly strategic culture can give valuable insights into one's culture, as well as the culture of others, thus opening up new channels of communication and leading to better-informed policy making decisions.

Gray reiterated his views in 1984, also referring to what he saw as potential caveats in the study of strategic culture.[87] More specifically, he acknowledged the possible existence of strategic-cultural traits that can be common to more than one "supposedly, and even truly, distinctive, cultures".[88] The existence of a dominant strategic culture shouldn't, and doesn't according to him, discard the parallel existence of several other strategic sub-cultures. Furthermore, the essence of these assorted sub-cultures may, possibly, be diametrically opposed to that of the dominant strategic culture. Another potential caveat was that of perceiving the thought processes that define strategic culture and their derived behavioural outcomes as the result of individual psycho-cultural phenomena. On the contrary, many, he argued, "and probably most, alleged strategic cultural traits are fully rational, in strict realpolitik terms" and derive from the historical experiences of the nation in question.[89] Finally, Gray commented on the issue of continuity and change within a strategic culture by acknowledging the probability of state action that from time to time is at odds with the dominant features of the traditional strategic culture.

The aggregation of these points was further developed in 1986 within a book that highlighted Gray's belief in the explanatory power of a strategic culture approach, especially when applied to the nuclear strategies of the USA and the USSR.[90] His argument proceeded from the assumption that the two adversaries exhibit distinct differences in the conception and formulation of their nuclear policies. He believed that the inability of American policy-makers to grasp these differences was due to their lack of appreciation for the Soviet, as well as their own, strategic culture. American nuclear policy, Gray stressed, centred on the belief that a nuclear confrontation could not be won, as the guaranteed high level of human casualties would nullify any military victory.

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[86] ibid
[87] Gray, C. Comparative Strategic Culture. *Parameters – US Army War College Quarterly*, Winter 1984
[88] ibid, p. 27
[89] ibid

Thus, American policy focused on the promotion of an arms-control dialogue that intended to bring the Soviet policy-makers in line with American nuclear thinking. This, coupled with the sense of security obtained from their geographical isolation and their belief in the infinite abilities of their professed technological superiority, laid the basis of this distinct American strategic culture.

According to Gray this strategic culture relied overtly on the mobilisation and utilisation of the nation's vast resources as the answer to America's security concern which inevitably removed the need for sophisticated strategic thinking.[91] The pitfall of this approach, as Gray saw it, was the powerlessness of the US, in sharp contrast with the USSR, to produce policies for fighting and winning a nuclear war. To reverse this tactical disadvantage, he concluded, America had to adopt a strategic style that would cancel out the Soviet threat by calling attention to war-fighting security doctrines and policies.[92]

Gray described his analysis of the Soviet and US strategic styles as an "inductive–empirical" one that sought to surmise the different cultural tendencies of the two states through the observation of their strategic behaviour.[93] By stamping out the ethnocentric misconceptions that distort strategic realities and produce moot conclusions about the nature and intentions of the adversary, strategic culture, he felt, could lead to a more thorough understanding of oneself as well as of the 'other's', thus offering a more meticulous analysis of military behaviour and eventually, better policy outcomes. This, however, did not dissuade him from offering a note of caution by pointing out the need for cautiousness in the pursuit of a strategic culture discourse.[94] Elaborating further on the possible shortcomings in the study of strategic culture, Gray advised against a reductionist approach that sees the latter determining state behaviour. Strategic culture, he claimed, generates strategic tendencies but in understanding and explaining a state's action other factors have to be taken into account, the most notable example provided by

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[90] Gray, C. *Nuclear Strategy and National Style*, Lanham, US: Hamilton Press, 1986
[91] for an overview of Gray's ideas on the issue see Gray, C. *Nuclear Strategy and National Style*. Lanham, US: Hamilton Press, 1986, especially pp. 30-65
[92] ibid, pp. 311-319
[93] ibid, p. 34
[94] ibid, p. xiv

structural pressures that could force states to act in ways that contradict their traditional cultural predisposition.

Second Generation: Broadening and Narrowing the Conceptual Horizons of Strategic Culture

With a small literature coalescing on strategic culture around the ideas of Booth and Gray, Bradley Klein's work in 1991 represented a departure from the way the concept was understood and applied.[95] Klein toyed with the concept of Gramscian hegemony and the ways in which it could be utilised within the context of international relations. He drew from the ideas of Richard Cox to point out that the focus of inquiry ought not to be restricted to the study of military institutions and government bureaucracies but expanded to include social struggles within states. While for those subscribing to the realist international relations' theory hegemony is seen as denoting world dominance by the most powerful state, Klein understands it in terms of class war and domination within a state. In particular, he is interested in the ways hegemonic social classes or regimes legitimise their existence through the generation of political discourses and ideologies that justify both their existence and their dominant role. [96]

Klein then employs the concept of strategic culture with a twofold, inter-connected objective. He does so firstly in explaining the way a modern hegemonic state, America, exploits its internationally deployed forces to project its leadership both within the Western alliance and the rest of the world. He then proceeds by probing into the tactics of states as they try to legitimise their use of force over their nations. His findings draw clear correlations with the way national (internal) hegemonic social classes or regimes act; they draw upon "political ideologies and discourses that help define occasions as worthy of military involvement".[97] This, he argued, often leads to a disjuncture between rhetoric or declaratory policies and operational ones. With these thoughts in mind the context he saw for strategic culture was one that would "historicize what was laid

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[95] Klein, B. Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defence Politics. *Review of International Studies*, 14 (2), 1988
[96] ibid, p. 134-5
[97] ibid, p. 136

implicit in realist theories of hegemony" and "render palpable the political production of hegemony articulated at a theoretical level by the Gramscian conception of hegemony".[98]

Applying his analysis to the American strategic culture, Klein reached a dual conclusion. On the one hand, elites venture into the realm of ideas in order to obtain support for their strategic pursuits. On the other hand, the ideas and perceptions of these elites were shaped under the influence of the American history and geography. Along these lines the security policy of the US, though offensive, according to Klein, as it is centred on nuclear capabilities that have the potential to annihilate potential enemies, is masked as defensive and discussed in abstract terminology that highlights its politically defensive objectives. Abstractness in security thinking, he stresses, is made possible due to the fact that geography has spared America from direct experience of war fought on its soil. The security policy of the US in that way turns, he alleges, into a vehicle used by the ruling elite to maintain its hegemonic position within American society. Implicit in this supposition is Klein's belief that elites propagate and control strategic culture for their selfish ends.

Following on from that, having secured national predominance the American ruling elite can subsequently expand their influence worldwide. "It would appear," Klein notes, "that to become hegemonic a state would have to found and protect a world order which was universal in conception, i.e. not an order in which one state directly exploits others but an order which most states could find compatible with their interests...A world hegemony is thus in its beginnings an outward expansion of the internal (national) hegemony established by a dominant social class."[99]

Klein's work offered a new and useful interpretation of the US security policies that often challenged the way strategy, and strategic practice, was viewed in the West. He also offered new insights into the sources of American strategic culture. However, the context in which he dressed his analysis suggests that his use of the term was rather idiosyncratic

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[98] ibid
[99] ibid, p. 135

and did not follow the same lines as the rest of the bibliography on the subject. Indeed, his work seems to be an effort to apply ideas most commonly found within critical theories of international relations to strategic studies.

The role of elites in strategic decision-making is also the focus of inquiry in Kupchan's work.[100] More specifically, Kupchan looks into the ideational horizons that guide elites and the constraints placed upon them by the broader national configuration of public forces. For him strategic culture reflects the "deeply embedded conceptions and notions of national security that take root among elites and public alike".[101]

His study suggests that great powers, and the elites that guide them, indulge in self-defeating behaviours as a result of their failure to adjust their policies in accordance with changes in the international balance of power.[102] Elaborating on his argument, Kupchan stresses that this leads to a sense of state vulnerability that ensnares elites within a self-created strategic culture that seeks to legitimise their actions and incite the support of their publics.[103]

However, even if strategic culture achieves the above said goals, the original sense of vulnerability that created it steers state behaviour towards extreme and ultimately self-defeating policies. One example of such policies is strategic over-expansion, he deduces. To substantiate his argument he points to the exaggerated politics of competition practised by Japan during the 1930s-early 1940s and at the other end of the spectrum, the extreme inclination of France and Britain in the 1930s toward co-operative and conciliatory policies.

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[100] Kupchan, C. *The Vulnerability of Empire*. New York: Ithaka(Ithaca?), 1994
[101] ibid, p. 5
[102] On this point see also Snyder, J. *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*. New York: Cornel University Press, 1991
[103] It has to be noted that Kupchan's analysis contradicts Klein's belief in the invulnerability of elites to the strategic culture they create.

Third Generation: Conceptual Maturity Through Diversity?

The third generation of strategic culture theorising emerged in academic realms in the 1990s. Freed from the conceptual constraints of the Cold War, the strategic culture scholars of this generation appeared more thorough in their methodology. They tried to both limit and clarify the scope of strategic culture as the independent variable in their analysis, whilst narrowing down the search for dependent variables to specific strategic outcomes. More specifically, the majority of these works criticise realism for its inability to account for strategic choices that challenge its theoretical canons. The clearest example of this was its failure to predict the end of the Cold War and its aftermath. They look at cultural traits from a political culture perspective and an organisational or military culture point of view.[104]

Elizabeth Kier's work, for example, is an informative illustration of the effects of culture on the formation of military doctrines.[105] Her analysis focuses on the assumptions held by domestically dominant political actors with regards to the military's role in society and the way these assumptions steer civilian decisions toward certain doctrinal developments. Her case studies look at France and Britain in the inter-wars period. For France, in particular, she focuses on the factors that decided its military doctrine by studying the debate between those who argued for an offensive one and those who professed their preference for a defensive military doctrine. Kier's findings refutes the neo-realist claim that the outcome of the aforesaid debate had been decided by the anarchical structure of the international system and France's relative weakness against its prime enemy and arch rival, Germany. Had that been the case, France should have opted for an offensive strategy, she argued. Instead, according to Kier, "civilians address their concerns about the domestic distribution of power before they consider the structure of the international point".[106] It was this domestic distribution of power, coupled with

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[104] For an overview of literature analysing the links between culture and military power see Farrell, T. Culture and Military Power. *Review of International Studies*, 24, 1998
[105] Kier, E. *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrines Between the Wars.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997 also by the same author Culture and Military Doctrine: France Between the Wars. *International Security* 19 (4), Spring, 1995 and "Culture and French Military Doctrine Before World War II" in Katzenstein, P. J. ed. *The Culture of National Security.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1996
[106]Kier, E. "Culture and French Military Doctrine Before World War II" in Katzenstein, P. J. ed. *The Culture of National Security.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1996

broader cultural and organisational traits that, to a great extent, decided France's
defensive military doctrine during the time in question, she claims.

More specifically, she puts forward the idea that the military forms policies on the basis
of an organisational culture that reflects the quest for a compromise between the interests
and beliefs of the wider society and its own. In other words, organisational culture within
this context is seen as a catalyst for action. "Domestic politics set constraints," Kier
notes, "the military's culture interpret these constraints;" and organisational culture takes
action as the "intervening variable between civilian decisions and military doctrine".[107] In
view of that, attention, according to Kier, ought to be redirected towards the sources and
outcome of this compromise.

Kier approaches culture from a narrow perspective. Her focus is on military institutions
and not civilian decision-making processes and policies. Organisational culture acts as
the armed forces' interpretive lens of the world. Within this context, military institutions
and their participants are not impervious to the wider society's ethos. However, their
introvert and assimilating code of practice, in many cases, circumnavigates civilian
culture. An additional point she makes, is that organisational culture is not governed by a
universalistic logic. The circumstances that define it arise within distinct national
environments and thus vary from one military organisation to the other. Consequently,
different military organisations hold different doctrinal preferences.

In similar fashion, Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff's edited volume focuses on the
interaction between culture and military change. The belief here is that norms "make
meaningful action possible by telling military actors who they are and what they can do
in given situations. In this way, cultural norms define the purpose and possibilities of
military change." [108] Accordingly, the pursuit of cultural analysis can yield positive

[107]Kier, E. Culture and Military Doctrine: France Between the Wars. *International Security*, 19 (4), Spring
1995, p. 68
[108] Farrell, T., Terriff, T. "Introduction: The Sources of Military Change" in Farrell, T., Terriff, T. eds. *The
Sources of Military Change – Culture, Politics, Technology.* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, p. 7

results by explaining, "why militaries continue to act in ways that are incongruous with prevailing strategic and operational circumstances".[109]

Similarly, Jeffrey Legro inquires into the different levels of restraint demonstrated by the adversaries during Word War II, especially with regard to the bombing of civilians, use of chemical weapons and sub-marine attacks on merchant vessels. [110] This apparent variation of restraint, Legro claims, confounds realist expectations of uniform behaviour by states faced with similar structural constraints. His analysis instead focuses on the organisational culture of the military; the "patterns of assumptions, ideas, and beliefs that proscribe how a group should adapt to its external environment and manage its internal structure".[111]

Conversely, Berger discussed the nature of national security from a political-culture point of view.[112]He studied the states of Germany and Japan, as they were re-integrated into the international community post World War II, to point out that the neo-realist paradigm was mistaken in its assumption that within the realm of anarchical society, states choose and implement national security policies with the view to maximise their power status. He defended this by accentuating the unwillingness of both Japan and Germany, ever since the 1960s and particularly during the 1970s, to couple their financial strength with analogous military capabilities. He attributed this unwillingness to Germany's and Japan's distinct political military cultures; the "subset of the larger political culture that influences how members of a given society view national security, the military as an institution, and the use of force in international relations".[113] The German and Japanese militaristic predisposition, or political-military culture, strong in the first half of the 20th

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[109] ibid
[110] Legro, J. *Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War II.* New York: Ithaca, 1995 for another contribution by the same author see Legro, J. Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II. *International Security*, 18 (4), 1994
[111] ibid, p. 115
[112] Berger, T. "Norms, Identity and National Security in Germany and Japan" in Katzenstein, P. J. ed. *The Culture of National Security.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1996 see also by the same author, From Sword to Chrysanthemum – Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism. *International Security*, 17 (4), Spring, 1993 and Japan's National Security – Structures, Norms and Policies. *International Security*, 17 (4), Spring, 1993
[113] ibid, pp.325-6

century, declined in the post World War II era and was subsequently replaced with democratic processes that sought to prevent its resurfacing by adapting anti-militaristic ideals, Berger concluded.[114]

The bulk of the arguments brought forward by this third generation can be found in an edited volume by Peter Katzenstein entitled the *Culture of National Security*.[115] The departing point of this book, as stated in its introductory chapters, is the shared frustration of the contributors concerning the inability of "all theories of international relations, both mainstream and critical", to explain what John Mueller, when referring to the momentous changes that followed the end of the Cold War, aptly called "a quiet cataclysm".[116] In their view, the failure lies in the absence of culture as an explanatory force within international relations theorising as a whole and especially within the dominant paradigms of neo-realism and neo-liberalism. Their argument holds that the "security environments in which states are embedded are in important part cultural and institutional, rather than just material".[117]

However, the contributions in Katzenstein's edited volume do not build upon an agreed conceptual framework. Nor do they offer an alternative theory of national security. Moreover, their critics have used these drawbacks to dent the credentials of strategic culture as an alternative to the dominant neo-realist paradigm.[118] The differences in the way the different writers of the various chapters approach the issue of culture in international relations theory are apparent; but does this necessarily invalidate their

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[114] However, though faced with symmetrical structural constraints the way Germany and Japan set about their anti-militaristic political-military cultures differed. For a description of the differences see Berger, T. "Norms, Identity and National Security in Germany and Japan" in Katzenstein, P. J. *The Culture of National Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996 pp. 334-8
[115] ibid
[116] Katzenstein, P. J. "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security" in Katzenstein, P. J. ed. *The Culture of National Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, p. 2 with regards to John Mueller's euphemism see Mueller, J. *Quiet Cataclysm: Reflections on the Recent Transformation of World Politics*. New York: Harper Collins, 1995
[117] Jepperson, R., Wendt, A., Katzenstein, P. "Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security" in Katzenstein, P. J. ed. *The Culture of National Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, p. 33
[118] see for example Checkel, J. The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory. *World Politics*, 50, January 1998 and Desch, M. Culture Clash – Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies. International Security, 23 (1), Summer, 1998, especially p. 157

argument? This conundrum raises important questions about the ontology of the strategic culture approach and will be dealt with in depth in a forthcoming section of this chapter.

Third Generation and Beyond?

Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Eastern bloc, the number and range of scholarly works on strategic culture, has proliferated. More attention has been given to the conceptual development of the concept. Yitzhak Klein, for instance, sets himself the task of delimiting a theoretical framework for the study of strategic culture.[119] His work is firmly grounded within the conventional tenets of strategic studies. In order to achieve his goal he narrows the definition of strategic culture. Accordingly, he defines strategic culture as reflecting "the set of attitudes and beliefs held within a military establishment concerning the political objective of war and the most effective of strategy and operational method of achieving it".[120]

He is critical of earlier works on strategic culture for asking what he views, as the wrong questions and focusing on single case studies that offer little scope for comparative analysis. Although he accepts that factors like history, political culture and geography condition the strategic culture of nations in unique ways, he maintains that trying to develop some kind of a priori formula to explain just which factors 'ought' to influence strategic culture, and in what fashion, would be a futile exercise.[121] Instead, he argues that attention should be limited to the analysis of professional military establishments. These military establishments generate ideas with respect to the use of force and it is to these ideas that the concept of strategic culture applies, deciding the way the former is formed, the way they change and the way they are taught and operationalised.[122]

Hence, in contrast with previous writers, he saw strategic culture being the product of conscious design and manipulation by the military establishments, rather than the

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[119] Klein, Y. The Sources of Soviet Strategic Culture. *The Journal of Soviet Military Studies*, 2 (4), December 1989 and by the same author 'A Theory of Strategic Culture'. *Comparative Strategy*, 10 (1), January-March 1991
[120] Klein, Y. A Theory of Strategic Culture. *Comparative Strategy*, 10 (1), January-March 1991, p. 5
[121] ibid
[122] ibid, p. 12

inadvertent product of aforementioned sources like history or geography. In addition, the researcher of strategic culture, Klein concluded, should restrict his/her search for evidence not just to ideas that emanate from these professional military establishments but more specifically to those that are, in point of fact, translated into actual policy, as only these can have a tangible and recognisable effect on strategic culture.[123] Klein's work raises some important issues but overall fails to deliver what his title promised; that is, a theory of strategic culture.

Johnston's product of intellectual labour, on the other hand, comes much closer to achieving this.[124] His strategic culture treatises are the most comprehensive and convoluted ones thus far. Though in agreement with those who criticised neo-realism for the omission of cultural factors in its analysis, he also criticises the lax way culture has been used in cultural interpretations of international relations and strategic studies. He therefore aims at explicating a research strategy that can "credibly measure the effects of culture on the process of making strategic choices".[125]

According to Johnston, such a strategy will have to rest on a two-fold course of action. Both these procedures must yield positive outcomes if any certifiable notion of strategic culture is to be pursued or put forward as an independent variable in the strategic decision making process. Initially, the researcher must ascertain "whether or nor strategic culture exists across time and actors within a society in such a way that it may constitute a dominant variable in decision-making".[126] This achieved, the researcher then has to establish whether strategic culture is related and/or applied to strategic behaviour. For that purpose, he/she has to delve into the roots of a nation's strategic culture and examine its socialisation processes and their impact on the values and assumptions of the key

[123] ibid, p. 14
[124] Johnston, I. A. Thinking About Strategic Culture. *International Security*, 19 (4), Spring, 1995 and by the same author *Cultural Realism – Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998
[125] Johnston, I. A. Thinking About Strategic Culture. *International Security*, 19 (4), Spring, 1995, p. 30
[126] ibid, p. 32

decision makers. This, as Johnston points out, requires the operationalisation of strategic culture or, as a minimum, the delineation of its empirical referents.[127]

Therefore, he suggests, strategic culture is to be seen as a system of symbols that rests on two pivotal cogs. The first cog represents the "basic assumptions about the orderliness of the strategic environment – that is, about the role of war in human affairs (i.e. whether it is aberrant or inevitable), about the nature of the adversary and the threat it poses (i.e. zero-sum or positive sum), and about the efficacy of the use of force (i.e. the ability to control outcomes and eliminate threats about the conditions under which the use of force is useful)".[128] The second cog embodies the operational stratum. It refers to the strategic options that are selected with the ideational input of the first cog. Johnston sees these as "a limited set of grand preferences that are persistent across the object of analysis and persistent across time" that are "unresponsive to non-cultural variables like technology".

Applying his approach to the case study of China, Johnston identifies a typology of grand strategic preferences that rests on two contrasting strategic cultures. The first draws from Confucian–Mencian principles that privilege non-violent strategies and search for solutions that can be based on compromise and accommodation rather than confrontation and conflict. The second of these strategic cultures accepts war and conflict as a relative constant in inter-state affairs and perceives this conflict as a zero-sum struggle that is best fought with the pursuit of dynamic and often offensive strategies that aim at the neutralisation of enemies through military means.[129] Johnston describes this second strategic culture as the 'parabellum paradigm' and in many ways it resembles the, traditionally, Western realpolitik notion of strategy. His conclusion suggests that "strategic culture can exist and it can have nontrivial effects on decision making".[130] The strategic culture approach offered by Johnston seems to supplement rather than supplant existing non-cultural explanations of international relations and strategic studies.

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[127] ibid, p. 37
[128] ibid
[129] ibid, p. 61
[130] ibid, p. 266

This is a stance also maintained by Eric Herring who uses strategic culture in conjunction with other factors. He looks at psychological processes that he maintains act independently to challenge rationality as the sole guiding principle of decision makers in the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union, especially in time of international crises.[131] Strategic culture, Herring argues, can act as a kaleidoscope for decision makers, shaping world realities according to their often narrow and distorted worldview. Mainstream analysis, on the other hand, ignores the intervening factor of culture and assumes that in time of crises, the actors involved behave rationally, and that this rationality is universal in principle and nature.

Herring maintains that although this may be the case in many instances, it is not always so. At times, when independent psychological factors and processes are in operation, or when the assumptions and symbol systems embedded in the strategic culture of decision makers are divergent and conflicting, the presumption of unanimously understood rational action cannot be sustained. This point echoes Ken Booth's note of caution on the dangers of ethnocentrism. Incomprehension of the 'other's' culture as well as one's own can, and often does, interfere with the decision makers' preferred course of action. Strategic culture and its emphasis on cultural relativism can guard against errors of judgement that derive from such misperceptions.

Others have used strategic culture within a framework that reaches conclusions on a regional rather than individual state level. Ball, in particular, navigated through un-chartered scholarly waters when he chose to examine the notion of strategic culture, and its implication for security developments, not in individual states but in the Asia–Pacific region as a whole.[132] His argument proceeds from the assumption that the diversity of the Asia–Pacific region in terms of religion, ethnicity and historical experience, does not preclude the existence of broader cultural traits that can be identified at a regional level.

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[131] Herring, E. *Danger and Opportunity: Explaining International Crisis Outcomes.* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995
[132] Ball, D. Strategic Culture in the Asia–Pacific Region. *Security Studies*, 3 (1), Autumn, 1993, p. 44

Taking this as his cue, he goes on to describe the main features of an Asia–Pacific strategic culture in an analysis that, at his own admission, often involves "bold generalisations".[133] For example, Ball identifies an Asian way of war "which places less emphasis on holding territory, and greater emphasis on the exercise of other forms of military, economic, and cultural element".[134] In addition, the Asia–Pacific strategic culture puts more emphasis on "bilateral rather than multilateral approaches to conflict resolution and security planning" and exhibits a "commitment to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries".[135] Moreover, it promotes styles of policy making that feature "informality of structures and modalities, form and process as much as substance and outcome, consensus rather than majority rule, and pragmatism rather than idealism".[136] Finally, the "principal elements of Asian–Pacific strategic culture includes longer time horizons and policy perspectives than those which characterise Western thinking and planning"[137] and prompts its participants to think of security in broader terms than their Western counterparts.

Ball recognises that these features of the Asian–Pacific strategic culture are not present to the same degree throughout the region and that this variation inevitably leads to state actions that inexorably contravene the common rule. However, he argues, given the volatility of security conditions and perceptions in the Asia–Pacific region, a broader strategic culture approach of the Asian–Pacific region can open windows of opportunity by sensitising Western analysts and policy-makers to Asian cultural preconditions.

The Asia–Pacific region is also the focus of a book edited by Booth and Russell Trood.[138] However, unlike Ball's work, the focus of the various chapters in this volume is on individual states. To that end, the empirical aim of the book, as stated in the preface, is to "develop a profile of the strategic cultures of the states in the region".[139] Empirical gain aside, this scholarly enterprise is also useful for Macmillan and Booth's attempt to

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[133] ibid, p. 66
[134] ibid, p. 46
[135] ibid
[136] ibid
[137] ibid
[138] Booth, K., Trood, R. eds. *Strategic Cultures in the Asia–Pacific Region*. London: Macmillan Press, 1999

provide a framework of analysis for the study of strategic culture.[140] They base their work on the premise that strategic culture "shapes but does not determine behaviour".[141] To that effect they caution against perceiving strategic culture as an all-explanatory factor in strategic analysis. Instead they argue that while it is an element that cannot and should not be ignored, strategic culture is neither the sole, nor the governing factor, in strategic analysis.

Contested Issues in the Study of Strategic Culture

The appeal of a strategic culture over the years has increased, to the extent that it now enjoys widespread attention in the literature of international relations. However, despite the attempts to define the conceptual parameters of the concept and its uses, several contested issues continue to vex its research. Booth, Macmillan and Trood, conveniently sum up the majority of the theoretical and empirical problems relating to the nature and application of strategic culture.[142]

The first of these problems touches on the issue of the referent group for strategic culture. Booth, Macmillan and Trood's argument approaches this issue on a twofold level. On the level of strategy, states as the main domain of structured military forces, ought to be the appropriate referent. On the level of culture, however, "society has a prior claim over State, since they have a more organic relationship," they argue.[143] This is a valid point since in some instances polities organised as states contain more than one nation or cultural group. Determining the dominant cultural grouping as well as shedding light on the different assemblages from which society is formed, is vital in drawing up a strategic culture approach. According to Booth, Macmillan and Trood, the search for the appropriate referent group for strategic culture cannot help but include the military establishments themselves.

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[139] ibid, p. viii
[140] Booth, K., Macmillan, A. "Appendix: Strategic Culture – Framework for Analysis" in Booth, K., Trood, R. eds. *Strategic Cultures in the Asia–Pacific Region*. London: Macmillan, 1999, pp. 363-372
[141] Booth, K., Macmillan, A., Trood, R. "Strategic Culture" in Booth, K., Trood, R. eds. *Strategic Cultures in the Asia–Pacific Region*. London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 12
[142] ibid, pp. 8-13

The issue here is, as they allege, "whether the strategic culture of a state's political and military elite can be distinct from the wider national culture of which it is part".[144] Stephen Rosen's answer to this dilemma is a positive one.[145] His work holds that military organisations formulate and pursue policies on their own accord and that the restraining influence of politician input is a minimal one.

Others fail to appreciate Rosen's point.[146] What is more, they believe that in some instances society and state can coincide, especially within homogenous nation-states. This does not exclude the possible existence of subcultures, indeed their existence is more probable than not, but it does suggest that even when they exist they share common national beliefs, especially in terms of foreign and security policy. Coupled with the absence of internal security concerns, this allows the researcher to focus on strategic culture from an externally oriented perspective.

The second uncertainty identified by Booth, Macmillan and Trood, concerns the roots of strategic culture. They maintain that though analysis has rested on historical, geographical and political factors, little attempt has been made to demonstrate the way these factors interact to produce a strategic culture. This point is also taken up by Johnston who argues that these "variables are different classes of input" and that "each could stand by itself as a separate explanation of strategic choice".[147] If strategic culture, Johnston holds, is perceived as the aggregation of all explanations that can be deemed cultural then the conceptual space left for non-cultural accounts of strategic preferences is minimal. This being the case, he stresses that the concept of strategic culture cannot be falsified and as a result becomes methodologically flawed.

What lies at the heart of these criticisms, Gray claims, is not so much differences in the conceptualisation of a strategic culture approach but rather the critics' understanding of

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[143] ibid, p. 8
[144] ibid
[145] Rosen, S. *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*. New York: Ithaca, 1989
[146] Snyder, J. "The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emptor" in Jacobsen, G. C. ed. *Strategic Power: USA/USSR*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999
[147] Johnston, I. A. Thinking About Strategic Culture. *International Security*, 19 (4), Spring, 1995, p. 37

strategy that Gray deems too narrow. Indeed, Booth, Macmillan and Trood set the

military as their conceptual focus and accordingly define strategy as the military

dimension of security.[148] Gray, on the other hand, judges that "although each dimension

of strategy can be discussed in isolation, all dimensions function synergistically to

constitute the strategy whole".[149]

Robert Osgood corroborates Gray's point of view by stating that, "Military strategy must

now be understood as nothing less than the overall plan for utilising the capacity for

armed coercion – in conjunction with the economic, diplomatic, and psychological

instruments of power – to support foreign policy most effectively by overt, covert and

tacit means."[150] Suitably, Stephen Walt describes the task of the strategist as one that

involves the formulation of a 'theory' that can explain "how a state can ensure its security

and further other interests". [151] And in terms of grand strategy, which is the focus of this

thesis, Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein provide further support for Gray's stance by

arguing that, in modern times, grand strategy has come to mean the adaptation of

domestic and international resources to achieve security for state utilising all the assets at

the disposal of the "nation (not just military ones), and it attempts to array them

effectively to achieve security in both peace and war".[152]

Booth, Macmillan and Trood, revisit the issue of methodology in five further instances:

in their analysis of the areas of contention within strategic culture; in relation to the

important task of identifying the pertinent strategic beliefs and corroborating their

existence; in connection with the difference between culture and policy; in reference to

[148] Booth, K., Macmillan, A., Trood, R. "Strategic Culture" in Booth, K., Trood, R. eds. *Strategic Cultures in the Asia–Pacific Region*. London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 11
[149] Gray, C. S. Strategic Culture as a Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back. *Review of International Studies*, 25 (1), January 1999, p. 55
[150] Osgood, R. *NATO: The Entangling Alliance*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962, p. 5 cited in Baylis, J. *Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy: 1945-1964*. New York: Clarendon Press, 1995, p. 3
[151] Walt, M. S. The Search for a Science of Strategy – A Review Essay. *International Security*, 12, (1), Summer, 1987, p. 141
[152] Rosecrance, R., Stein, A. "Beyond Realism: The Study of Grand Strategy" in Rosecrance, R., Stein, A. *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy*. London: Cornell University Press, 1993, p. 4

the extent to which strategic culture influences or determines actual strategic outcomes; and apropos the impact of change on strategic culture.

The answer to these conundrums varies according to the preferred methodological approach employed by the analyst and the way he/she perceives the interaction between culture and strategy. For Gray, this interaction is a holistic one in which all things strategic have cultural origins and thus "everything a security community does, if not a manifestation of strategic culture, is at least an example of behaviour affected by culturally shaped, or encultured, people, organisations, procedures, and weapons".[153] Hence, according to Gray, strategic culture both causes and determines state action.

His approach identifies strategic culture in the realm of ideas about war and strategy. The context of these ideas is to be found in perceptions affected by physical and political geography, by political or religious philosophies and finally by familiarity with, and preference for, particular military technologies.[154] He sees a cultural dimension to all that human beings think and feel about war and strategy and accordingly claims that strategic culture is "not only 'out there', also it is within us; we, our institutions, and our behaviour, are the context".[155] In his words, "Culture is the context that 'surrounds' and the context that 'weaves together'."[156]

For Johnston on the other hand, "cultural patterns and behaviours patterns are not the same thing".[157] His understanding of strategic culture includes both cultural and non-cultural variables that interact to produce a set of limiting options for action conveying individual or group conceptions of their relationship to their socio-political or organisational environment. Within this context strategic culture may "exist but may not have any measurable behavioural effect," Johnston asserts.[158]

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[153] Gray, C. S. Strategic Culture as a Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back. *Review of International Studies*, 25 (1), January 1999, p. 52
[154] ibid
[155] ibid, p. 53
[156] ibid, p. 59
[157] Johnston, I. A. Thinking About Strategic Culture. *International Security*, 19 (4), Spring, 1995, p. 45

Thus, his effort to discern the elements of strategic culture is eclectic, relying on content examination that is based around cognitive mapping and symbol analysis. [159] He describes cognitive mapping as a modus operandi for bringing to light the associations amid "certain causal axioms and their estimated behavioural effects". [160] This takes place in three successive stages. In the first stage, the researcher focuses on the content of relevant documents in order to identify the cause-effect lines of reasoning within them. Having achieved this task, in stage two he/she can raise issues that may have otherwise remained mute, leading to the examination "of what might be unsaid and undone – the silences in human society that sometimes speak loudest of all". [161] Finally, in stage three the researcher has the opportunity to map out the correlation, if there is one, between anticipated strategic outcomes and the findings of stages one and two across texts.

As for symbol analysis, Johnston draws from anthropology, social psychology and organisational studies for his use of the term, suggesting that symbols are the "vehicles through which shared decisions rules, axioms, and preferences are manifested empirically, so that culture can be communicated, learned, or contested". [162] Strategic culture at a symbolic level, according to Johnston, can be seen as symbols that act as filters through which decision makers make sense of their security environment while at the same time being presented with ways to respond to it. These symbols are to be found in commonly used idioms and truisms that are perceived as legitimate interpretations of a strategic context, key words that carry certain behavioural traits and can be used to rationalise manners of behaviour towards an opponent, and finally analogies and metaphors that define the 'realities' of a strategic environment while providing a range of reactions to them.

On the same issue, Johnston raises an interesting point when he relates the use of symbols to the formation and furtherance of in-group solidarity that is then employed to offset

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[158] ibid, p. 55
[159] ibid, p. 50
[160] ibid, pp. 50-51
[161] Booth, K., Macmillan, A., Trood, R. "Strategic Culture" in Booth, K., Trood, R. eds. *Strategic Cultures in the Asia–Pacific Region*. London: Macmillan, 1999, pp. 9-10
[162] Johnston, I. A. Thinking About Strategic Culture. *International Security*, 19 (4), Spring, 1995, p. 51

potential antagonists. He uses the writings of Ernst Bormann to point out that the precondition for the establishment of a polity is that it first exists as a rhetorical community bound together by shared myths and languages, which underscores the uniqueness of the community.[163] These shared myths and languages, Johnston suggests, distinguish between the values of the inner-group and those of the outer-group, and legitimise actions taken to uphold those values. They are also often used during troubling circumstances as the pretext for actions that contradict the apparent preferences of the group, "renaming objectionable behaviour in ways that are that are linguistically acceptable".[164]

Johnston's point resembles Katzenstein's focus on cultural norms. The latter sees norms operating in two ways. In some situations they define the identity of an actor, therefore having 'constitutive effects' that stipulate the kind of actions that will cause others to recognise a particular identity.[165] In other situations norms define the expected comportment of an already existing identity thus having 'regulative effects'. Together they "establish expectations about who the actors will be in a particular environment and about how these particular actors will behave".[166]

Notwithstanding the above, Johnston identifies a possible limitation in symbol analysis that, according to him, necessitates that it is approached with due consideration. He acknowledges the possibility that the elucidation of "strategic meanings may change from time to time even while the symbols themselves remain constant".[167] Indeed, the impact of change on strategic culture has been a recurrent theme in the writings of people who have contributed to its development. Most would concur with the view that although change occurs and must be taken into account, cultural changes are likely to be

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[163] see Bormann, E. G. "Symbolic Convergence: Organisational Communication and Culture" cited from Johnston, I.A. Thinking About Strategic Culture. *International Security*, 19 (4), Spring, 1995, p. 58
[164] ibid, p. 59
[165] Katzenstein, P. J. "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security" in Katzenstein, P. J. ed. *The Culture of National Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, p. 5
[166] Jepperson, L. J., Wendt, A., Katzenstein, P. J. "Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security" in Katzenstein, P. J. ed. *The Culture of National Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, p. 54
[167] ibid, p. 2

gradual.[168] And as Berger notes, "simple instructional beliefs can be discarded easily" but "more-abstract or emotionally laden beliefs and values that make up the core of a culture are more resistant to change".[169]

A further challenge in the conceptualisation of a strategic culture approach put forward by Michael Desch, is what he terms as the "sui generis problem"; the inherent tendency of the strategic culture approach in this instance is to focus on single case studies, instead of looking for common cultural traits in a number of cases, because they presuppose that each one is unique. [170] This being the case, Desch asserts, generalisation within the context of strategic culture is impractical because the cultural factors used in the analysis of single case studies often produce results that challenge the "unit homogeneity assumption, which holds that cases have enough meaningful similarities to be comparable".[171] Consequently, he concludes, cultural interpretations of strategy have few if any systematic elements upon which they can draw in order to make predictions and without predictions, the validation of conceptual claims is not feasible.[172]

John Duffield, on the other hand, rejects Desch's argumentation. Many elements of culture, he says, "can vary systematically along well-defined dimensions and thus lend themselves to cross-case measurement and comparison."[173] In addition, he continues, there is no innate reason that prohibits sui generis cultures from delivering verifiable strategic forecasts with the proviso that these forecasts have a discernible effect on actual policy. Duffield also rejects Desch's proposition that the sui generis cases in the study

[168] Booth, K., Macmillan, A., Trood, R. "Strategic Culture" in Booth, K., Trood, R. eds. *Strategic Cultures in the Asia–Pacific Region*. London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 12
[169] Berger, T. "Norms, Identity and National Security in Germany and Japan" in Katzenstein, P. ed. *The Culture of National Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, p. 326
[170] Desch, C, M. Culture Clash – Assessing the Importance of Ideas on Security Studies. *International Security*, 23, (1), Summer, 1998, pp. 152-3
[171] ibid, p. 152
[172] ibid, p. 153
[173] Duffield, J., Farrell, T., Price, R., Desch, M. Correspondence: Isms and Schisms: Culturalism versus Realism in Security Studies. *International Security*, 24 (1), Summer, 1999, p. 158

strategic culture cancel out the unit homogeneity hypothesis. What matters, he says, is that "other characteristics of the units under consideration be similar across cases".[174]

Conclusion

Despite the complexities surrounding the application of culture in international relations, there is an emerging consensus that its role in shaping world affairs is worth investigating. At the very least, cultural theories in general and strategic culture more specifically can supplement existing interpretations of international relations in accounting for their inadequacy to explain fully the origins of strategic choice. This view is also endorsed by Desch who, though remaining sceptical of the usefulness of cultural theories as independent explanatory variables in world affairs, concedes three occasions in which their contribution can be of value.[175] To begin with, culture can be used in explaining the "lag between structural change and alterations in state behaviour".[176] Cultural factors can also be used in explaining why states, even when faced with the dire consequences that might result from their actions, choose to adopt stances that defy international constraints. Finally, Desch admits to the possibility of cultural theories having a more independent impact in structurally open-ended situations.

Given these concessions, however, and given that, as Herring indicates,[177] structural factors operate within culturally shaped parameters, the value of cultural theories in explaining international relations should not be overlooked. Hence, the notion of strategic culture accepted in this thesis does not refute the existence of other, notably structural factors, and agrees with Booth in suggesting that culture provides "discerning tendencies

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[174] ibid. For an elaborate discussion of the issues involved here see King, G., Keohane, R. O., Verba, S. eds. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, especially pp. 91-4

[175] Desch, C. M. Culture Clash – Assessing the Importance of Ideas on Security Studies. *International Security*, 23, (1), Summer, 1998, p. 166

[176] ibid

[177] Herring, E. *Nuclear Totem and Taboo: Or How we Learned to Stop Loving the Bomb and Start Worrying*. Paper Presented to the British International Studies Association's Annual Conference, 17 December 1997, p. 11 cited from Poore, E. S. *Strategic Culture and Non-Nuclear Weapons Outcomes: The Cases of Australia, South Africa and Sweden*. PhD Thesis, University of Southampton, 2000, p. 16

not rigid determinants".[178] Moreover, these discerning tendencies come into their own at times of international turbulence during which the cost-benefit analysis that decision makers draw upon for their chosen policies is perplexed by the absence of predetermined rules of international engagement. In these circumstances, Duffield holds, "decision makers can or must more readily fall back on their preexisting world views and notions of the consequences of alternative policies".[179]

Many of the complexities in the study and application of strategic culture stem from the way the relationship between culture and its effect on behaviour is perceived. Commenting on methodological differences within the strategic culture camp itself, Gray suggests that researchers should, if possible, move on to a more creative accommodation of the various approaches.[180]

This thesis will attempt to do just that. It will proceed from the assumption that strategy is the domain of states and their security apparatuses. Yet, it will also acknowledge the existence of broader, global or regional, cultural traits and identify the processes by which states (within the context of this thesis, Greece) internalise and reconstitute them.

In terms of the analytical framework used in this thesis, this has been based on the work of Booth, Trood and Macmillan – as well as that of Gray – with its focus on features such as geography, history and political culture. Thus, the search for Greece's strategic culture will proceed with the examination of the following sources: a) Geography and resources, b) History and experience, c) Greece's Political Culture, and d) Contemporary Greek Grand Strategy. This will allow the identification of particular lasting features of Greek grand strategic thoughts and offer insights into the way these features have manifested

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[178] Booth, K. "The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed" in Jacobsen, G. C. ed. *Strategic Power: USA/USSR*. London: Macmillan, 1987, p. 126 Booth borrows this line of argumentation from Gray, C. *Nuclear Strategy and National Style*. US: Hamilton Press, 1986, p. 35
[179] Duffield, S. J. Political Culture and State Behaviour: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism. *International Organisation*, 53 (4), Autumn, 1999, p. 777
[180] Gray, C. Strategic Culture as a Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back. *Review of International Studies*, 25 (1), January 1999, p. 69

themselves in practice.[181] Moreover, this relatively straightforward structure will also benefit from the symbol analysis suggested by scholars like Johnston and Katzenstein. For the purposes of this thesis, symbol analysis will refer to historical events (for example famous battles or military campaigns) or persons and their diachronic impact on the Greek *psyche*. For as a Chinese philosopher notes:

> In the conduct of foreign affairs, as in social intercourse, there are maxims and precedents that were so constantly quoted that they became clichés and, like political slogans, exerted an influence in the shaping of policy and the making of decisions.[182]

Notwithstanding the above, the analytical framework used in this thesis does not claim to have produced, or to have been based on, a cause and effect theoretical approach. As in most, if not all, scholarly works that have sought to provide explanations using cultural factors, parsimony was abandoned in favour of a more intricate approach that can, nonetheless, provide a better understanding of specific phenomena. As Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba note "Choosing a theory or theoretical approach to explain international relations should be a question of 'maximising leverage' rather than the pursuit of parsimony."[183] With this as a staring point, there is no reason to assume that approaches that fail to comply with the cause and effect criteria, like those employed in Waltz's structural neo-realism for example, will also fail to provide insights to the study of world affairs.

The approach used in this thesis has tried to avoid the temptation of drawing deterministic linkages between strategic culture and behaviour and has found the synthesis of the aforementioned scholarly views to be the best way of achieving this goal. As Stuart Poore observes: "(...) in the absence of a theory with which to explain the

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[181] Booth, K., Macmillan, A. "Appendix: Strategic Culture – A Framework of Analysis" in Booth, K., Trood, R. eds. *Strategic Cultures in the Asia–Pacific Region*. London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 363
[182] Lo, Jung-pang. "Policy Formulation and Decision making on Issues Respecting Peace and War" in Hucker, C. O. ed. *Chinese Ways in Warfare*, US: Cambridge, 1974, p. 51 cited from Johnston, I. A. *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 52

causal mechanisms whereby particular culture and identities arise and determine outcomes, this may be the only way forward."[184]

While this approach might appear to compromise its scientific validity, and indeed if questioned under strict positivist criteria I will readily agree that it does, I maintain that it is still is a valid academic enterprise and a worthy effort to enrich the understanding of the international relations discipline. Its usefulness can be found in that it raises crucial questions – both theoretical and practical (with regards to Greece's grand strategy) – and aids the facilitation of the discussion on the relation between culture and international politics.

[183] King, G., Keohane, O. R., Verba, S. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Influence in Qualitative Research*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, pp. 104-5 cited from Tanya p. 18
[184] Poore, S. What is the Context? A Reply to the Gray-Johnston Debate on Strategic Culture. *Review of International Studies*, 29, 2003, p. 283

Chapter 2

Greece-Sources of Strategic Culture

Introduction

This chapter sets out to examine two of the constitutive sources of Greece's strategic culture: a) geography and resources and b) history and experience. It is an essential task that aims at highlighting the distinct circumstances that have influenced the Greek experience of issues pertaining to war and peace diachronically and have laid the foundations of the country's strategic culture. Analysis will follow a two-step approach.

The first step will be to assess the impact of geography and resources on the security structure of Greece. One of the most pertinent issues to be addressed here is the role that the country's distinct geographical morphology – a mountainous landscape surrounded by an immense coastline and thousands of uninhabited rocky islets – has played in shaping the nation's strategies both in modern and ancient times.[1] It will, in addition, also be shown that Greece's strategic location in the East Mediterranean has intrinsically interwoven the country's policies with the interests of the great powers operating in the region.

The final point to be made in this section is that despite the end of the Cold War, and the subsequent elimination of the communist threat from Greece's northern frontiers, Greek security considerations have persistently focused on the deterrence of the Turkish threat. Moreover, the instability that has characterised the Balkan region since the end of the Cold War has created a host of new problems for Greek decision makers. Firstly, it has led to the emergence of new 'soft-security' problems most closely associated with an influx refugees and economic immigrants. In addition, it has exposed the level of problems and opportunities associated with Greece's unique position as the only Balkan state that is a member of both the European Union and Nato.

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[1] Larrabee, S. et al. *Greece's New Geopolitics*. Santa Monica: Rand, 2001, p. 20

The second step will be to survey Greece's history and experience with the aim of identifying key moments (be they glorious victories or disastrous defeats) and individuals that not only feature heavily on the nation's historiography but also have a significant influence on the way Greeks perceive themselves. For as Carl Degler writes: "If history has any purpose as an intellectual enterprise is that through their conception of the past people gain a sense of who they are through knowing where they have been."[2]

A note of caution has to be offered at this point in that, given Greece's long and eventful history, objections can, and have been raised, about the validity of arguments that centre on the idea of a direct and linear relationship between ancient, medieval and modern Greece. The problem with this idea being that it assumes an unbroken continuity in both the Greek race and its history that obscures the country's long periods of foreign subjugation, most notably to the Romans and the Ottomans.[3]

However, it is not the purpose of this thesis to question the historical self-definition of the Greeks. The task here, as noted above, is to examine Greek history and experiences and the way these have affected collective Greek memories and persuasions about war and peace. Shaped by past struggles, as Consuelo Cruz notes, "and shared historical accidents, collective memory is both a common discriminating experience (this was right, that was wrong) and a 'factual' recollection – a seemingly veridical narrative – of the group's past as it really was".[4]

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[2] Degler, C. *Out of our Past: The Forces that Shaped America*. NY: Harper Colophon, 1984, p. 4

[3] This debate, which has yet to run its full course, dates back to the 19th century and the work of Jacob Fallmerayer in which he refuted the notion of a racial homogenous Greek nation lineally descended from ancient Greece. In the more recent literature see Woodhouse, C. M. *Modern Greece: A Short History*. London: Faber and Faber, 1977, pp. 12-13 see also Fatouros, A. "Political and Institutional Facets of Greece's Integration" in the European Communnity in Psomiades, H. J., Thomadakis, B. S. *Greece, The New Europe and the Changing International Order*. New York: Pella, 1993, pp. 32-5 also Tsoukalas, C. European Modernity and Greek National Identity. *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, 1 (1), 1999

[4] Cruz, Consuelo, Identity and Persuasion – How Nations Remember Their Pasts and Make their Futures. *World Politics*, April 2000, vol. 52, p. 276

2.1 Geography and Resources

Greece is a South-eastern European and Mediterranean country. It is strategically located at the traditional crossing point of many countries and civilisations thus acting as a bridge between the East and the West, the North and the South. With Albania, Macedonia (FYROM) and Bulgaria on the north and Turkey on the east, geography has always played a paramount role in the formulation of foreign and indeed defence policies of the Greek state. Its unique geographical morphology necessitates the defence of not only a mountainous mainland but also that of approximately three thousands islands and rocky islets spread over its 13,676km coastline. In addition and following the 1993 decision by Greece and Cyprus to establish of a Joint Defence Area, Greece's defence planning, has been extended to include the protection of the Cyprus Republic in an area that stretches five hundred miles south-east from the Grecian mainland.

In many ways, as Monteagle Stearns observes, the challenges facing the Greek policy makers are not very different from those faced by their ancestors in antiquity. [5] But while in ancient Greece the venturesome winds and waves of the Aegean Sea in combination with the Greek fleet and the massively fortified Greek cities, proved capable of defeating the invading Persian armies, advances in military technology mean that the country can no longer depend on its natural surroundings for its defence against modern day aggressors. Its land borders, though relatively small in size (725 miles), have facilitated the passing of three invading armies this century alone. Poor interior lines between Greece's strategic body (command centre) and its northern territories add to the frustration of defence policy makers. With an estimated population of 10,683,000 its standing army of 159,170 can hardly be sufficient for the defence of the entire Greek perimeter. [6]

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[5] Stearns, M. "Greek Security Issues" in Allison, Graham T., Nicolaidis, K. eds. *The Greek Paradox.* London: The MIT Press, 1997, p. 61 see also Spiridonakis, B. G. *Essays on the Historical Geography of the Greek World in the Balkans During the Turkokratia.* Thessaloniki, 1977

[6] Source: The Military Balance 2001/2002. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. Oxford University Press see also Vidalis, D. The Modern Geopolitical Environment and our National Policy. Athens: Euroekdotiki, 1988, pp. 223-4 also Dimitrakopoulos, I. *Greece's Land Frontier.* Thessalonika: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1989 (in Greek)

Consequently, the security of modern Greece depended historically not only on the country's military resources but also on the way it defined its relations with the major powers in the international arena.[7] Here, the choices facing Greek strategists has again been shaped by the country's geographical location and has always resulted to the dilemma of whether to "align Greece with the land power dominant on the Balkan peninsula or to the sea power dominant in the Mediterranean".[8] In antiquity, the struggle for the leadership of the Greek world ended with the triumph of the dominant land power (Sparta) over the dominant sea power (Athens). However this was not a pattern to be repeated in modern times. In the mind of successive Greek governments the national interest and the security of the nation were best served by aligning with the dominant sea power in the region. The Crimean War, World War I and II, can all be used as illustrations of the above argument. Britain, with its undisputed supreme naval presence in the Mediterranean, was preferred to both Russia, in the case of the Crimean War, and Germany in the case of World War I and II.

Greece's geo-strategic position also influenced the country's role during the Cold War. The defeat of the Communists in 1949 signalled the nation's entry into NATO three years later, aligning Greece with the Western alliance. Its role was to defend its northern and north-western borders from Communist attack, provide port and communications facilities for the US Sixth Fleet and co-ordinate the air and sea defences of the Aegean and the Dardanelles with Turkey. Nonetheless, due to Greek–Turkish tensions Greek and NATO defence doctrines began to change. Ever since the Turkish invasion and occupation of Northern Cyprus in 1974, after a coup d'état against the Cypriot government supported by the military junta in Greece, no Greek official has seen a threat to Greek security more perilous than the threat perceived from Turkey. As a result higher priority has been given to the eastern (sea) defences than to its northern (land) defences.[9] In view of that, Greek strategists classify the need for "unhindered air and sea communications between the mainland and insular Greece" as being of vital importance

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[7] Ifestos, P., Tsardanides, Ch. *The European Security System and Greek Foreign Policy towards 2000.* Athens: Sideris, 1992, pp. 223-243 (in Greek)

[8] Monteagle, S. "Greek Security Issues" in Allison, Graham T., Nicolaidis, K. eds. *The Greek Paradox.* London: The MIT Press, 1997, p. 62

[9] ibid, p. 63

for the country's security needs. [10] A view that can hardly be seen as an innovation, given Aristotle's proclamation that the people of a country (referring to ancient Greece) in order "to maintain themselves against an enemy, should be easily relieved by sea and land; and even if they are not able to attack by sea and land at once, they will have less difficulties in doing mischief to their assailants on one element, if they themselves can use both."[11]

In that respect the end of the Cold War, following the 1989 transformation of Eastern Europe, had less of an impact on Greek military planning than on other NATO countries. The same, however, cannot be argued about Greece's diplomatic posture. Located in relative isolation from the rest of Western Europe, the only Balkan country with membership to the West's most exclusive clubs – NATO and the European Union – Greece not only failed in its attempts to create a coherent and effective regional policy but to a certain extent became embroiled in the antagonisms that ensued after the collapse of the eastern bloc and the dismantlement of the Former Yugoslavian Republic. [12]

This put Greece in a vacillating position between the EU and toward the US with international press reports giving very negative news on Greek policies and performances. [13] To the extent that the Balkan imbroglio has not, either indirectly or directly, been the result of Greek actions, these criticisms lack justification. [14] It can be argued however, that despite Greece's democratic system and relative prosperity that adequately equipped the county "to deal with the negative Balkan conditions", Athens

[10] The Geo-strategic Position of Greece, Greek Ministry of Defence www.mod.gr/english/index.htm accessed on the 26/05/2002
[11] Everson, S. *Aristotle–The Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 164
[12] Ifantis, K. "Greece and the USA after the Cold War" in Featherstone, K., Ifantis, K. eds. *Greece in a Changing Europe – Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 152
[13] Featherstone, K. "Introduction" in Featherstone, K., Ifantis, K. eds. *Greece in a Changing Europe – Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 4
[14] see Eyal, J. "Greek Balkan Policy – A Western View" in Featherstone, K., Ifantis, K. eds. *Greece in a Changing Europe – Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999, pp. 144-152

allowed itself to be "caught in a vicious cycle of reacting to individual events, rather than understanding, evaluating and being ahead of them".[15]

True as this criticism may hold, development within Greece's Balkan neighbourhood has left the country open to an influx of economic refugees and illegal immigrants from the north and the east, testifying to the fact that Greece occupies the most precarious geographic position among European Union members.[16] Jonathan Eyal graphically highlights this by pointing to the fact that "a Serbian artillery shell cannot explode in London. Therefore London and other Western capitals can prevaricate and negotiate almost at their leisure."[17] For Greece however, Balkan entanglement is an unavoidable fact.

Geography and Balkan proximity has also been seen as curtailing Greece's prospects for further economic growth. Its distance from the heartland of Western Europe's market severely hampers communication with Greece's European partners, whereas access to the markets of the northern Balkan countries has been restricted following the disintegration of former Yugoslavia and the subsequent events that turned the region into a war zone. In addition, Greece's importunate antagonism with Turkey has acted as an "indirect obstacle to economic growth by imposing on the country the necessity of high military expenditures".[18] While participation in the EMU has now been achieved, most commentators agree that if Greece desires to be an equal participant in the European project, its macroeconomic imbalances (budget and balance of payments deficits, inflation and unemployment), will have to be dealt with.

[15] Featherstone, K., Ifantis, K. eds. *Greece in a Changing Europe – Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 153
[16] Veremis, T. "Greece: The Dilemmas of Change" in Larrabee, S. ed. *The Volatile Powder Keg – Balkan Security After the Cold War*. US: Rand – The American University Press, 1994, p. 127
[17] Eyal, J. "Greek Balkan Policy – A Western View" in Featherstone, K., Ifantis, K. eds. *Greece in a Changing Europe – Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 145
[18] Thomadakis, S. B. "The Greek Economy: Performance, Expectations & Paradoxes" in Allison, GrahamT., Nicolaidis, K. eds. *The Greek Paradox*. London: The MIT Press, 1997, p. 43

Indeed, when compared against the economic figures of its partners in the European Union, Greece's economy is found trailing. Balancing Greece's economy against that of its Balkan neighbours, however, tells a different story. Greece enjoys a clear advantage in terms of both Gross National Product (GNP) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) numbers over all of its neighbours. Matthew Nimetz chooses to illustrate this point by matching up Greece's role in the Balkans with that of the US in Central America.[19] Mexico's GNP, he notes, amounts to 15% of USA's GNP and similarly Bulgaria's GNP amount to 15% of the Greek GNP. In fact, Nimetz continues with his argumentation, Greece's GNP is approximately double that of Albania, FYROM (Macedonia), Bulgaria and Rumania put together. By Balkan standards the performance of the Greek economy can be deemed satisfactory. Moreover, as Joseph Nye Jr remarks, Greece's "military alliances, its political system and cultural potency, its historic linkages and democratic traditions, all are enviable advantages over its neighbours".[20]

Why do Greeks, then, feel frustrated by the country's economic performance, as Nimetz suggests?[21] The answer lies in the fact that Greece and the Greek people consider themselves, if not geographically then certainly culturally and politically, part of Western Europe.[22] Being part of Western Europe and its political institutions "appears to represent", for most Greeks, "an escape from the problems of the Balkans, be they in material, political or security terms".[23] Likewise, many in Western Europe accepted Greece into the EU because they "wanted to believe that it was not somehow a 'Balkan'

[19] Nimetz, M. "Post Cold War Challenges" in Pfaltzgraff, R. L. Jr., Kairidis, D., Varvitsiotis, T. eds. *Security in South-eastern Europe and the Greek – American Relations.* Athens: Sideris, 1997, pp. 131-2 (in Greek)

[20] Nye, S. J. Jr. "Greece and the Balkans: A Moment of Opportunity" in Allison, Graham T., Nicolaidis, K. eds. *The Greek Paradox.* London: The MIT Press, 1997, p. 170 on the same issue see also Karamanlis, K. Greece: The EU's Anchor of Stability in a Troubled Region, *The Washington Quarterly,* 23 (2) Spring 2000, p. 7

[21] Nimetz, M. "Post Cold War Challenges" in Pfaltzgraff, R, L, Jr., Kairidis, D., Varvitsiotis, T. eds. *Security in South-eastern Europe and the Greek – American Relations.* Athens: Sideris, 1997, p. 131 (in Greek)

[22] Karamanlis, K. "Greece in the 1990's – Domestic Realities, External Factors, Future Prospects" in Pfaltzgraff, R, L, Jr., Kairidis, D., Varvitsiotis, T. eds. *Security in South-eastern Europe and the Greek – American Relations.* Athens: Sideris, 1997, p. 99 (in Greek)

[23] Eyal, J. "Greek Balkan Policy – A Western View" in Featherstone, K., Ifantis, K. eds. *Greece in a Changing Europe – Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration.* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 144

country".[24] Hence, the turmoil that followed the collapse of the eastern bloc and its subsequent consequences for the Balkan region, served as reminder to all concerned that Greece is indeed in the Balkans; that the EU, and the West in general, could not avoid getting involved there; and that the Greek people could not avoid dealing with the consequences of disorder north of their frontiers.[25]

Notwithstanding the above, the strategy of a state, according to Colin Gray, can bee seen as reflection of a history that is, to a great extent, shaped by the country's geopolitical considerations.[26] Having briefly referred to the geopolitical setting of Greece, analysis will now turn to its historical experiences.

2.2 History And Experience

Ancient Greece

With a history that goes back three millennia before the birth of Christ, Greece or Hellas (the country's conventional name is Hellenic Republic) is one of the oldest nations in the world.[27] Greeks have always believed "since ancient times that they were an elect people, whether as in the world of city-states by virtue of the superiority of their language and culture or later as Byzantines in a Christian Empire which alone guarded the true faith[28]. Before 1200 B.C, war and conflict was restrained to boundary skirmishes between neighbouring Greek city-states and tribes. The aim, in most cases, was the destruction or disruption of the enemy's agricultural activities as the means by which political or economic concessions would be exerted. Consequently, and while the fighting could be eminently ferocious with a high ratio of casualties on both opposing sides, the desolation of defeated cities was customarily evaded.

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[24] ibid
[25] ibid
[26] Gray, S. C. *The Geopolitics of Superpower*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1988, p. 43
[27] For an informative analysis see Winnifrith, T., Murray, P. *Greece Old and New*. London: Macmillan Press, 1983 also Browning, R. *The Greek World: Classical, Byzantine and Modern*. London: Thames & Hudson, 1986
[28] Campbell, J. *Modern Greece*. Southampton University – Hartley Library: Imprint, 1968, p. 9

This pattern changed in approximately 1200 B.C. It was then that the Greek city-states united, for the first time in their history, against a foreign enemy and launched an expedition that became known as the Trojan War. Ostensibly, it sought to avenge the abduction of a Greek queen by one of Troy's royal princes. But in reality the cause that gave rise to the Greek actions was to be found in Troy's strategic location at the entrance of the Dardanelle. [29] Commanding the entrance of Asia's trade route to Europe, the Dardanelle appeared an imperative acquisition for the furtherance of the Greek interests in terms of commerce and security. After a prolonged siege, the expedition realised its objective; Troy was sacked and the Greek success left a "profound impression on Greek folk memory". [30]

Homer's epics, *Iliad* and *Odyssey* ensured that the memories of the Trojan War, as he recorded them at the later approximate time of 750-500 B.C, became part of the Greek cultural psyche. The protagonists of the war came to personify the idealised virtues of the Greek warrior for years to come; [31] stalwart and defiant of death in battle, like Achilles[32] but also ingenious enough to overcome any obstacle raised in his way, like Odysseus. [33] The city-state was accepted as the ultimate form of social and political organisation[34] while its defence rested upon the new heroic creed of Greek warriors – the hoplites (free citizens of the city-states that also served as soldiers and guardians of their respective homelands). [35]

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[29] Burn, A. R. *The Penguin History Of Greece*. London: Penguin Books, 1990, p. 55

[30] Crawley, G. W. et al. *A Short History of Greece*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965, p. 6

[31] In the words of Homer, "This is excellence (arete-virtue), this is the finest possession of men, the noblest prize a young man can win. This is a common good for the city and all the people, when a man stands firm and remains unmoved in the front rank and forgets all thoughts of disgraceful flight, steeling his spirit and heart to endure, and with words encourages the man standing beside him. This is the man who is good in war (Odyssey, fragment 12.13-20=9D)

[32] One of the Greek warlords Achilles' unmatched warring abilities, aptly demonstrated in the course of the Trojan War, earned him a reputation of legendary proportions.

[33] Much of the Greek success against Troy has infamously rested with Odysseus' giant 'wooden horse' that was presented to the Trojans as a gift but in reality condemned them to defeat. Its wooden interior concealed several Greek warriors who once in the city opened the gates to the hordes of the Greek army that sacked Troy. Odysseus' ingenuity and cunning has been celebrated ever since.

[34] In the words of Aristotle, "The final association, formed of several villages, is the city or state (polis). For all practical purposes the process in now complete; self-sufficiency has been reached and so, while it started as a means of securing life itself, it is now in a position to secure the good life." Aristotle, Politics, 1252b

[35] see Snodgrass A. M. The Hoplite Reform and History. *Jhs*, 85, p. 110-122

In the years that followed the Trojan War, the map of Greek world was redrawn as a result of a series of tribal movement originating from the north and heading southwards.[36] Prominent among the instigators of these movements, were the Dorians who, once they had displaced the Greeks tribes already established in the North, made their way South to the Peloponnese and defeated the local inhabitants who were then faced with a choice: they could either flee to the surrounding mountains or they could migrate to foreign lands. As a result, Greek settlements were formed throughout the Mediterranean, with Southern Italy and the coast of Asia Minor as the primary destination of the migrants. Initially, the city-states of Asia Minor enjoyed a peaceful coexistence with their Lydian neighbours but the situation changed with the arrival of the Persians.[37] Their triumph over the Lydians was succeeded by the subjugation of the Greek city-states, in the approximate year of 546 B.C.

In the revolt against their Persian overlords (circa 499 B.C.), the Ionian Greek cities turned to their metropolises in the mainland for support. Despite the fact that only Athens and Eretria responded to their request, the effort of the combined Greek forces met with success and the capital of Lydia, by then under the control of the Persians, was pillaged. Nonetheless, their success was short lived and the Persians, after crushing the revolt in Asia Minor, turned their attentions to mainland Greece demanding retribution for the help provided to the insurrectionists.[38]

Many Greek cities succumbed to their demands, but others including Athens and Sparta defied the Persians. When it became clear that a conflict between the insubordinate Greek cities and the Persian Emperor was inevitable, the latter made an attempt to use the antagonistic relations of the Greeks to his own advantage. Hence an invitation was issued to the Athenians to ally themselves with the Persian forces. The negative Athenian response was a clear indication that, despite the egocentric nature of the Greek city-state

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[36] see Murray, O. *Early Greece*. London: Fontana, 1980
[37] see Emlyn-Jones, C. J. *The Ionians and Hellenism*. Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980
[38] see Hill, G. F. *Sources for Greek History Between the Persian and the Peloponnesian Wars*. Southampton University – Hartley Library: Imprint DF227, 1907

system, ancient Greeks shared a strong sense of common identity that distinguished them from the other people and races of their time.[39]

Under the command of their King, Darius, the Persian army landed at the bay of Marathon, (in 490 B.C.) where they were met by the vastly inferior in numbers, Athenian-led, Greek army. [40] The Persians were defeated and having suffered a high ratio of casualties, soon retreated back to Asia. Darius' successor, Xerxes, determined to succeed where his predecessor had failed, sanctioned a second expedition (480 B.C.) against the Greek city-states. The invading Persian army, with its fleet cruising along the Greek coastline, made its way through northern Greece where it encountered virtually no resistance until its advance was halted at the Thermopylae; "a narrow defile between the mountains and the sea on the south coast of the Malian Gulf".[41] There, a small Spartan-led Greek force challenged the mighty Persian army. They fought a heroic battle, but in the end were unable to deter the Persian passage to Attica. Consequently the city of Athens was sacked but the Athenian-led fleet defeated the Persian fleet in the bay of Salamis and in the subsequent year the allied Greek army vanquished the Persian army in Plataea. As a result, the Persian threat was henceforth effectively neutralised. The subject of the Persian wars became "in the Greek eyes, the most important event of their past, the vindication of the freedom of the city-state against oriental despotism".[42]

Having averted the Persian invasion, the Greek world soon returned to the egocentric, rivalling nature of the Greek city-states. The Spartans questioned Athens' bid for dominance and soon Greece was divided into two camps, each led by one of the two adversaries, in a conflict that became known as the Peloponnesian war[43]. The practice of total war, so emphatically present in Greek affairs during their antagonism with the Persians, persisted and became the norm in the relations of the Greek city-states.[44]

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[39] Sealey, R. *A History of the Greek City States*. Berkeley: California University Press, 1976, p. 196
[40] Sowerby, R. *The Greeks – An Introduction to Their Culture*. London: Routledge, 1995, p. 38
[41] Sealey R. A. *History of the Greek City State*. California: California University Press,1976 p. 209
[42] Murray, O. *Early Greece*. London: Fontana Press, 1980, p. 289
[43] Many contemporary scholars see in the 'History of the Peloponnesian War', written by Thucydides who was an actual participant of the war, the roots of the theory of realism and the text was used in numerous occasions in connection with the cold war and the adversity between the USA and the USSR.
[44] Hornblower, S. *The Greek World 479-323 B.C.* London: Methuen, 1984

The war ended with the victory of Sparta and its allies, but their success was ephemeral and the cities of Southern and Central Greece were soon faced with a new challenge. In 359 B.C. Philip II became the King of Macedonia, aspiring to unite the Greek city-states in a Macedonian-led confederation.[45] His aspirations were received with caution throughout Greece. In the case of Athens and Thebes this caution took the form of armed resistance. Their opposition was, however, defeated and Philip II called a conference of all the Greek states in Corinth where he announced his decision to lead a pan-Hellenic expedition against Persia. The proclaimed reasons were the liberation of the city states in Asia Minor, still under Persian rule, and the punishment of the Persians for their former invasions of Greece proper. Nevertheless, Philip II of Macedonia did not live long enough to witness the realisation of his goal. He was assassinated shortly before the expedition begun and was succeeded as King of Macedonia by his twenty-three year old son Alexander who, after having crushed revolts in several Greek cities on the mainland, went on to follow in his father's footsteps and was elected the new general of the Greek confederation.[46]

Alexander was in many ways the product of the philosophic and political legacy of 5th and 4th centuries B.C. Greece. His tutor in his youth was Aristotle, one of the most prominent philosophers of his time with a legacy that extends to the present day. Through him, the ideas of Socrates, Aristotle's teacher, and Plato, were passed on to the young Alexander. It has been suggested that he carried with him a copy of Homer's *Iliad* and that "at the supposed tomb of Achilles at Sigeum he pronounced the Greek hero fortunate in having such a herald of his fame".[47] With regard to the use of power as a way of achieving one's political goals, the views of the Greek philosophers were revealing.

According to Plato: " Nature demonstrates that it is right that the better man should prevail over the worse and the strong over the weaker. The truth of this can been seen in a variety of examples drawn both from the animal world and from the complex communities and races of the human beings; right consists in the superior ruling over the

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[45] for a history on the subject see Cawkwell, G. *Philip of Macedon*. London: Faber, 1977
[46] for an overview see Hammond, N. G. L. *Alexander the Great*. London: Chatto & Windus, 1980
[47] Sowerby, R. *The Greeks – An Introduction to their Culture*. London: Routledge, 1995, p. 71

inferior and having the upper hand."[48] Furthermore and with regard to war Aristotle

wrote: "Neither should men study war with a view to the enslavement of those who do

not deserve to be enslaved; but first of all they should provide against their own

enslavement, and in the second place obtain empire for the good of the governed, and not

for the sake of exercising a general despotism, and in the third place they should seek to

be masters only of those who deserve to be slaves."[49] With regard to the Persians he

wrote: " The natives of Asia are intelligible and inventive, but they are wanting in spirit,

and therefore they are always in state of subjection and slavery."[50] Finally he proclaimed

his belief in the superiority of the Greek race by noting that: "The Hellenic race is the

best governed of any nation and if it could be formed into one state, would be able to rule

the world."[51]

Having been elected as the supreme commander of the confederate Greek forces,

Alexander realised the vision of both his father Philip II and his mentor Aristotle. He

defeated the Persians at the battle of Issus in 333 B.C and thereafter his victorious "march

to Egypt and right across Persia over the Khyber Pass to India itself reads like a

legend".[52] The period that followed Alexander's victories became known as the

Hellenistic period.[53] The Greek forces under his command conquered most of the known

world and the Greek culture was transfused across the entire Near East. Hellas and its

culture became the meeting point of East and West. Alexander the Great of Macedonia,

as he is known, attained mythical status in Greek, and indeed, world historiography.

After his death in 323 B.C., Alexander's vast empire was subdivided amongst his

successors and Greece proper suffered once more a prolonged period of internal conflicts

and competition.[54] Macedonia continued to be the strongest kingdom in mainland Greece

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[48] Plato, Gorgias, 483 cited from Rihll, T. "War, Slavery, and Settlement in Early Greece" in Rich,
J.,Shipley, G. *War And Society In The Greek World.* London: Routledge, 1993, p. 78
[49] Everson, S. *Aristotle – The Politics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 178
[50] ibid, p. 165
[51] ibid
[52] Crawley, C. W., et al. *A Short History of Greece.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965, p. 27
[53] for the interaction of the Greek world with the foreign 'others' see Momigliano, A. *Alien Wisdom – The
Limits of Hellenization.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971
[54] see Grant, M. *From Alexander to Cleopatra – The Hellenistic World.* London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson,
1982 also Walbank, F. W. *The Hellenistic World.* Brighton: Harvester, 1981

until the defeat of the Macedonian king, Philip V, by Roman forces in 197 B.C. From this point on Greece and the Hellenistic world progressively formed part of the Roman Empire.

Rome, Byzantium and the Era of the Ottoman Empire

Under Rome, Greece enjoyed an attenuated period of peace. Fascinated by the achievements of classical Greece, leading Roman figures soon became so indoctrinated into the Greek culture that others were led to "suggest that Rome itself was becoming a Greek city".[55] In the words of a prominent scholar of the field: "Greek genius proved stronger than the Roman sword and eventually the conquered 'conquered their conquerors' and through them influenced others."[56] The fierce warriors of Rome acknowledged "their inferiority and readily derived lessons of introduction from a people unable to resist their arms".[57] Greece attained a privileged status within the Roman Empire and the arts were introduced to the "rustic Latinum".[58]

Peace was only interrupted when Athens sided with rebellious forces from Asia Minor and was subsequently defeated and the town sacked in 86 B.C. However, in the years that followed and with the exception of the two Roman civil wars that were fought on Greek soil, events occurring in the periphery of the Roman Empire left Greece untouched.[59]

In the early period of the Roman Empire's decline two events were of paramount importance with regards to the Greek territory. The first one was St Paul's visit to both Athens and Corinth, signalling the introduction of the new religion – Christianity – to Greece in 54 A.D.; and the second one, the invasion of mainland Greece by northern tribes culminating in the pillaging of Athens, Sparta and Corinth by the Goths in 267 B.C.

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[55] Crawley, G. W. et al. *A Short History of Greece*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965, p. 32 also Alcock, S. E. *Graecia Capta: The Landscapes of Roman Greece*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993
[56] Toynbee, A. J. *Hellenism: The History of a Civilisation*. London: Open University Press, 1959
[57] Finlay, G. A. *History of Greece – vol. 1*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1876, p. 70
[58] Wardman, A. *Rome's Debt to Greece*. London: Paul Elek, 1976, p. 9 (Ix)
[59] The decisive battle between Caesar and Pompey occurred in Thessaly in 48 B.C. whereas Octavian's naval victory against Mark Anthony occurred in Actium in 31 B.C.

The importance of the introduction of Christianity lay in the fact that it "directed Greek thought into new channels"[60] whereas the Gothic raid was a dire forerunner of a series of belligerent, foreign interventions on Greek soil.

With the Roman Empire in administrative and financial chaos and Rome itself in isolation from the eastern provinces, the Roman Emperor Diocletian, decided, in 286 B.C., to divide the empire into two provinces – one in the west and the other in the east. Culturally the Empire was already divided into two; "the provinces from Illyricum to the west spoke Latin as the universal language; in those to the east it was Greek".[61] It soon became clear that in many instances "east and west were openly hostile to each other".[62] The Empire was briefly reunited under Emperor Constantine who, none the less, moved its capital to the east in the old Greek city of Byzantium. He enlarged, renovated and in 330 A.D. renamed the city, calling it the 'New Rome'. As a tribute to him, it became known as Constantinople. Thus, the rise of Constantinople "helped the eastern part of the empire become more Greek and more Christian, and politically and culturally independent".[63]

The changes in the administrative structure of the Empire introduced by Diocletian and continued by Constantine were part of a process that transformed the pagan Roman Empire into the Christian Byzantine Empire.[64] The triumph of Christianity in Byzantium came as no surprise. By allowing and in fact inviting the influence of Greek philosophy, "Christian theology attained an intellectual content that made it acceptable to many of the ablest and most profound thinkers of the time,"[65] and gradually went on to touch the masses as well.

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[60] Crawley, G. W. et al. *A Short History of Greece*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965, p. 34
[61] Runciman, S. *Byzantine Civilisation*, 6th edition. London: Edward Arnold, 1996, p. 16
[62] Treadgold, W. A. *History of the Byzantine State and Society*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997, p. 29
[63] ibid, p. 51
[64] for an overview see Runciman, S. *The Byzantine Theocracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977
[65] Runciman, S. *Byzantine Civilisation*, 6th edition. London: Edward Arnold, p. 18

Christianity's message of hope and deliverance in combination with the Christian Church's energetic and effective organisation soon deemed it one of the most powerful and popular forces within the Empire. Nicol's words eloquently describe this symbiosis: "Church and empire as the two elements of one society, the soul and the body."[66] In his strife for power against his opponents, Constantine identified himself with Christianity, used Christian soldiers and symbols in his military campaigns and when he emerged victorious finally legitimated the Christian movement. Furthermore, and either because of personal convictions or political acuteness, he chose to establish Christianity as Byzantium's official religion and declare the Christian Church as the State's Church with him at its head.

The reunification of the Empire lasted up until 395 B.C., after which the division between the western and eastern parts became more apparent than ever before. In the west, a continuous flow of barbaric invasions devastated the land and brought about the end of the Roman Empire. In the east, however, Byzantium developed as the continuation of the Roman Empire fused by the Greco-Roman tradition blended with Christianity. Constantinople itself was a Greek city, where the Greek arts, literature and language were ever present; but it was also a Roman city with Roman laws and military organisation. Its citizens were characterised as *Romaioi* or *Romioi* and were conscious of their Greco-Roman heritage to the end. Yet, their outlook in life differed from that that of their ancestors, the difference attributed to the influence of the new faith – Christianity.

Although the feeling of continuity in national consciousness was always present in Greece, its pagan past was rejected as incompatible with the new Christian ethos. In the words of a Byzantine:

> Though I am a Hellene by speech, yet I would never say that I was a Hellene, for I
> do not believe as the Hellenes believed. I should like to take my name from my
> faith, and if anyone asked me what I am, answer 'A Christian', and though my

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[66] Nicol, D. M. *Church and Society in the Last Centuries of Byzantium.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, p. 2

father dwelt in Thessaly I do not call myself a Thessalian, but a Byzantine; for I am from Byzantium.[67]

Prosperous as the Byzantine Empire might have been, in contrast to the fate of the Roman Empire in the west, it was not immune to the latter's problems of external interference. In the centuries that followed the death of Constantine in 337 B.C., Byzantium suffered numerous invasion attempts and raids from both its northern and eastern frontiers; some of them were successfully rebuffed but others weren't, bringing chaos and desolation to the regions of the Empire. While "a notional suzerainty was still exercised over much of the peninsula south of the Danube, this was limited in real terms to some coastal settlements and fortresses and littoral strips."[68] Germanic tribes, Goths, Huns, Bulgars and Slavs, each crossed the Danube but they all dispersed westwards in the end, with the exception of the Slavs and the Bulgars.

The incursions of the latter, despite the fortifications set up across the Empire, were assiduous. The Slavs in particular poured into the Byzantine lands in numbers and many were the times that they reached as far as Crete. Unceasingly the opportunistic nature of the Slavic forays took the form of permanent settlements and by the 8th century, Slavic colonies could be found all along the Greek entirety. Correspondingly and alarmed by the Slavic presence, the Byzantine Emperors sanctioned incessant expeditions intending to reduce their numbers and their involvement in the affairs of the Empire. The set aim was met and the Slavs left within Greece were, under the aegis of the Orthodox Church, "absorbed by the pre-existing population" and they adopted the "Greek language and civilisation".[69]

The dangers were no lesser in the east where the Persians were a constant threat to Byzantium. Moreover, the Empire had also found a new challenger in the new eastern religion of Islam: a challenge that in the early periods manifested itself in the form of

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[67] Gennadius, Disputatio Contra Judaeum (ed Jahn) cited in Runciman, S. *Byzantine Civilisation*, 6th edition. 1966, London: Edward Arnold, p. 29
[68] Haldon, J. F. *Byzantium in the Seventh Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 66
[69] Browning, R. *The Byzantine Empire*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980, p. 48

pirate invasions. The consequent consternation in the Empire's foreign affairs was matched by an equally troubled situation domestically. The struggle for power, influence and dominance over the various factions of the palace, the Orthodox Church not excluded, was relentless. Intrigue became the norm in Byzantine politics; emperors and dynasties succeeded one another. Either to fight external threats or settle domestic disputes, mercenaries and foreign armies were invited to the Byzantine regions often not with the desired effect. Seeing more profit in pillaging the lands they were supposed to protect, these mercenary armies contributed to the gradual decline of the Byzantine Empire. By 641 B.C. the Byzantine Empire became confined to the Balkan Peninsula and a few, separate military compounds in Asia Minor, Africa and Sicily. In essence, this produced a Greek-speaking entity fused by Orthodox Christianity under the guidance of the Patriarchate in Constantinople.

Nonetheless, the problems of the Byzantine Empire continued to multiply. The Arabs in the east were pushing their way into Asia Minor and having built a puissant fleet they soon also made their presence known in the Mediterranean. Thereafter, Saracen squadrons would set off, every year, to attack and pillage Byzantine territory from their homelands in Africa and Asia.[70] Their attacks on the Byzantine shores, islands and ships disrupted the trade routes of the empire and placed an additional strain on its deteriorating economy. But they were not the only ones; the Normans, having conquered much of Southern Italy, soon found a new prey in the approximate Byzantine regions. The Byzantines turned to the republican city-state of Venice for help, offering them as reward unrestricted right to trade free of customs dues throughout the empire, except in the Black Sea.[71] Later and out of fear for the growing power of Venice and to counter balance its vast commercial profits, the Byzantine trade routes were opened to other Italian city-states.

In 1054 A.D., disagreements between the eastern and western churches, led to the establishment of two separate Christian authorities, known as the great schism. The efforts made to reconcile the differences between the two churches did not meet with

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[70] Cheetham, N. *Medieval Greece*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981
[71] Browning, R. *The Byzantine Empire*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980, p. 118

success and the situation worsened after the fourth crusade of 1204. The crusades, a popular idea amongst the Franks (Germanic tribes) in France and Germany, set out with the self-proclaimed goal of Jerusalem's liberation from the infidels. However, on Good Friday 1204, the great centre of Christendom "which had resisted every threat of pagan and infidel threat since its foundation, was sacked and looted by Christians who had ostensibly set out to free the Holy Cities of their faith".[72] In the next few years the crusaders conquered most regions of the Byzantine Empire while their administration was passed over to Venice and the Franks.

Various political entities were formed, with the new western conquerors at their head of government, establishing a feudal system in all the afresh-founded states. In Asia the remnants of the Byzantine Empire formed the Greek Empire of Nicaea and in 1261 Constantinople was regained becoming the capital of a revived Byzantine Empire but only a portion of the lost territories was recovered. Byzantium had to face the kingdoms of Serbia and Bulgaria on the north, the Franks in the Greek mainland and by the turn of the 13th century "they were beginning to get a clearer picture of the true nature of their new enemies in Asia Minor, the Ottoman Turks".[73]

Notwithstanding the above, the Ottoman Turks did not stay confined to Asia Minor. By 1356 they were venturing to Europe moving their capital to Adrianople in 1361. They defeated the Serbian and Bulgarian armies and in a matter of a few years were the masters of their lands, as well as most of the Byzantine territories. The Byzantine appealed to the west for assistance against the 'infidels'; their request was denied and on Tuesday 29 May 1453, the Ottoman Turks entered Constantinople and pillaged the city. By 1461 they were the masters of almost all mainland Greece. A century later the Ottomans defeated the Franks and the Italians in the Aegean, annexed the islands under their control and the triumph of the Turks was completed.

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[72] Albot, D. T. R. *The Byzantines*. London: Thames & Hudson: London, 1962, p. 67
[73] Nicol, D. M. *The Last Centuries of Byzantium 1261-1453*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 141

The aftermath of Constantinople's fall was felt across the Christian lands. Soon the Ottoman Turks advanced their armies further into Western Europe, laying siege to Vienna. They were unsuccessful and their advance checked. However, their control of the Balkans secured their presence in Europe for the centuries to come. The conquered lands were divided into *Millets* – administrative units, on the basis of religious beliefs rather than ethnic origin; the Greeks together with most of the other Balkan people were included in the Orthodox *Millet*, the second most populous *Millet* after the dominant Muslim one. Greeks were allowed to retain their churches and in fact the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople was appointed as the head of the Orthodox *Millet*, administrating its authority through the Church hierarchy and thus emphasising the Greeks' paramount role in the *Millet*.

For the Ottomans, religion, and in particular Orthodox Christianity, was seen as the way of ensuring the *Millet*'s loyalty to the empire. Their belief was reinforced by the deep-set antipathy held by the Orthodox Church for western Christendom, the only viable challengers of the Ottoman empire, due to the latter's role in the sacking of Constantinople during the crusades and its refusal to supply Byzantium with military assistance against the Ottoman threat. For the Orthodox Church this meant that its role was not restricted to religious issues. The role of the Orthodox Church's hierarchy was enhanced with the responsibilities and advantages of running the civil administration of the Orthodox lands. Orthodoxy became much more than simply a religion for the faithful population; it became a way of living and being Greek became synonymous with being Orthodox.

On the other hand, the clergy was not immune to the antagonistic nature of politics and the intrigues and rivalries between those who wanted to reach the high offices soon emulated those of the Byzantine Empire.[74] The office of the ecumenical patriarch was seldom held by the same person for a prolonged period of time. Those frequent successions were followed by handsome payments in the form of bribes to the Ottoman

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[74] see Meyendorf, J. *The Byzantine Legacy in the Orthodox Church.* New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1982

authorities. "To recoup the payment the patriarch himself was obliged to accept bribes and the Church thus became enmeshed in the institutionalised rapacity and corruption that was endemic to the Ottoman system of government."[75]

Despite the apparent religious freedom granted to the Orthodox people under the rule of the Ottoman Empire they were, never the less, considered to be inferior to their Muslim conquerors in more ways than one. In Greece, numerous attempts were made at different historic times to extirpate the foreign domination, albeit with little success. In many occasions the revolts were encouraged by a foreign power that was hostile to the Ottoman Empire, Venice or Russia.

A popular folk legend about a race of fair-haired people from the north that would liberate Greece from the hated conquerors reinforced their belief in Russia's crucial role in their fight for liberation. However, that help never amounted to anything that would allow the Greeks to reclaim their lands and it soon became obvious that the Russian involvement was more motivated by their desire to create a counter balance in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire than by a genuine interest in the fate of the Greek population. Yet, although the revolts did not achieve any long-term success, they did demonstrate that the Ottoman forces were not unassailable and contributed to producing the first signs of organised Greek resistance in the form of the Kleftes and the Amartaloi. The Kleftes were irregular groups of armed Greeks who prayed on both fellow Greeks and Turks alike. Their actions wreaked havoc on the Ottoman trade routes and communication lines and resulted in the creation of local Greek militias, the Amartoloi, whose aim was to counter the Klefte threat. In this way a large proportion of the Greek population became accustomed to the particularities of unorthodox, armed conflict.

Until the 18th century the prospect of an independent Greece was far from being an imaginable reality. Under the severe restrictions imposed by their Ottoman overlords the

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[75] Richard, C. *A Concise History of Greece*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 13

Greek masses had lost touch with their history.[76] However, at the same time a Greek mercantile class was forming; a class that drew its power and prosperity from its involvement in the conduct of the Ottoman imperial trade. The newly acquired prosperity of these merchants exposed them, and perhaps more particularly their children, to the western way of life. They, hence, became strongly influenced by the ideas of the Enlightenment and the French revolution. What is more Classical Greece was at the epicentre of these ideas and as a result it was studied in depth within the most prestigious, western, European Universities. Among the students of these universities were the heirs of these prosperous Greek families who through their studies were re-introduced to their glorious past and to the movement of romantic nationalism.

It was through these students that these ideas were brought to the Greek mainland and provided the foundations for the propagation of a Greek intelligentsia with national consciousness and a sense of superiority towards their Ottoman rulers. For many the burden of the Ottoman slavery was unbearable and they were eager to do away with it but on the other hand, those at the high offices of the clergy and a proportion of the rich merchants and provincial politicians wanted to sustain their privileges under Ottoman rule. Thus all the eagerness of the nationalists to awaken the Greek masses and stir them to rebellion met with little success, but the fire was set and it could not easily die down.[77]

Modern Greece

Indeed in 1814 three Greeks (Emmanouil Xanthos, Nikolaos Skoufas and Athanasios Tsakalof) founded the Philiki Etairia (Friendly Society), a closed and secretive organisation that sought to muster that nation's resources in a liberating fight against the Ottoman rule. Their influence soon extended originally to the mercantile class both abroad and at home and later on to member of the clergy and civil administration. Among those who joined the Philiki Etairia were Greek officers at the service of the Russian Tsar and one of them, General Alexander Ypsilantis, was to be the protagonist in the Greek

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[76] see for example Augustinos, G. *The Greeks of Asia Minor: Confession, Community and Ethnicity in the Nineteenth Century*. Ohio: Kent University Press, 1992

[77] see Kofos, E. "War and Insurrection as Means to Greek Unification in the Mid-Nineteenth Century" in Kiraly, B. K. *War and Society in Central Europe. The Crucial Decade: East Central European Society and National Defence 1859-1870*. New York: Social Science Monographs by Brooklyn College Press, 1984

war for independence while Ioannis Capodistrias, the Tsar's joint foreign minister, was to lead the way in the political transformation of Greece in the years that followed.

A series of events in the international scene, namely the insurrections in various places of the Balkans against the Turks and the deterioration of order in many regions of the Ottoman Empire, added to the Greek enthusiasm and created a climate favourable to revolution. Ypsilantis tried to take advantage of the insurrection in the Balkans to promote the Greek cause but faced with the denial of the local Romanian population to side with his cause and the disinclination of many local Greek leaders to join the fight, was defeated by the Turkish forces.[78] In his efforts he "invoked the shades of Epameinondas, Thrasyboulos, Miltiades, Themistocles and of Leonidas in the struggle to bring 'liberty to the classical land of Greece' ".[79] It was not until he managed to outweigh the objections of a large proportions of the Greek notables with the false impression that he was the emissary of a great power that would assist them in their cause, that Greece witnessed the beginning of the war for independence. The 25 March 1821 has since been heralded as the beginning of the Greek war of independence.

The first stages of the revolt laid bare the decadent state of the Ottoman Empire. Involved in endless disputes for power and intrigues the local Ottoman rulers were caught by surprise and were unable to deal with the Greek offensive. Their communications lines were soon disrupted, their armies defeated and Peloponnese freed from the Ottoman armies. The unorthodox warfare of the Kleftes and Amartoloi in combination with the Greek fleet provided by the inhabitants of the islands became an invaluable weapon.[80] In Europe many, in memory of ancient Greece, rejoiced at the news of the Greek War of Independence and were eager to help the Greek cause. A strong Philhellenic[81] wave swept across Western Europe; it was expressed in the form of financial donations and

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[78] Finlay, G. *History of the Greek Revolution and the Reign Of King Otto*. London: Zeno, 1971, pp. 109-138

[79] Richard, C. *A Concise History Of Greece*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 33

[80] see for example Kolokotronis, T. *Memoirs From the Greek War of Independence (1821-1823)*. US: Chicago Argonaut Publishers, 1961

[81] see St. Clair, W. *That Greece Might Still Be Free: The Philhellenes in the War Of Independence*. London: Oxford University Press, 1972

many of those who enlisted in the Greek forces wanted to reproduce the glories of ancient Greece.

Their expectations were not matched by reality. The Greece of the 18th century bore no resemblance to classical Greece, nor were Greeks in any way similar to their ancient forefathers. Their guerrilla tactics displeased many Philhellenes who had been nourished in the heroic descriptions of face to face, to the last man, battles of the Homeric *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Some of them returned to their homelands disillusioned, seeking no further part in the war, but many stayed on offering considerable military and other assistance to the Greek cause.

With the success of the revolution far from being guaranteed, the individualistic nature of Greek notables raised the first obstacles. Seeking the distribution of power in a free Greek state, several factions emerged, each ardent to protect their privileges and attenuate their influence.[82] The major factions represented the interests of the rich landowners, the army, the ship owners and the Phanariots who supported the revolution. They were, in turn, divided between the traditional elite who wanted to keep the old order of things, and the modernisers who sought a metamorphosis of the Greek state into the archetype of the liberal states of Western Europe.

The advance of the Greek forces soon came to a standstill. In the meantime the Ottoman army regrouped and reinforced with forces from the provinces of the Empire started reclaiming the lost territories.[83] The ferocity by which they punished the local population of the recaptured regions was invidious; whole villages were razed to the ground and their population put to death. Greeks had no alternative but to turn to the great powers for assistance. With the Greek cause under serious threat its request for assistance was greeted with a good deal of hesitation by the great powers. Despite their hesitation they finally viewed the Greek request with sympathy as not "only was their trading seriously

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[82]see for example Finlay, G. *History of the Greek Revolution and the Reign Of King Otto*. London :Zeno, 1971, pp. 333-7
[83] see for example Dontas, D. N. *The Last Phase of the War Of Independence in Western Greece*. Thessalonica: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1966, pp. 85-7

affected but each was fearful lest the other might be able to turn the festering conflict to its own political advantage".[84] Deliberations began between Britain and Russia over the form of assistance to be given and concluded in the London Treaty of 1827 with the added signature of France. The provisions of the treaty were materialised in the Battle of Navarino in October 1827 when a combined fleet of British, French and Russian ships destroyed the Ottoman fleet, turning once again the balance of power in favour of the Greeks.[85] Whilst Navarino deemed the establishment of a Greek state unavoidable, its consequences troubled the great powers for the years to come.[86]

In May 1827 the national assembly held in Troezene appointed Ioannis Capodistrias, formerly in the service of the Russian Tsar, president of Greece and following the great powers demand that the new state become a hereditary monarchy, Prince Otto, second son of the Bavarian King Ludwig I, was proclaimed King of Greece at the age of seventeen. Capodistrias' efforts to found an organised state encountered the resistance of the old oligarchies, whose interests were threatened by such a concept.[87] These conflicts of interests culminated with the assassination of Capodistrias on 9 October 1831. They led to a new circle of anarchy for the young state. Only a third of the Greek-speaking population was within the borders of the young Greek state, which included the Peloponnese, south Roumeli and several islands approximating the Greek mainland. What is more this was a population accustomed to the practices of the Ottoman era, unwilling to pledge their allegiance to the new state and trust its bureaucracy choosing the security of existing local networks instead.

In an era of glorification for romantic nationalism across Europe it soon became obvious that what the Greek nation needed was a grand vision. This vision was identified in the concept of the 'Megali Idea' that dominated Greek affairs for the decades to come. The 'Megali Idea' sought to reunite all Greeks in a state that would extend to the boundaries

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[84] Clogg, R. *A Concise History of Greece*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 42
[85] for an accurate account of events see Woodhouse, C.M. *The Battle Of Navarino*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1965
[86] see for example Crawley, C. W. *The Question of Greek Independence: A Study Of British Policy in the Near East (1821-1833)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930
[87] the issues involved are dealt with later on in this chapter

of the Byzantine Empire and restore Constantinople as its capital. In many ways it mirrored the beliefs, legends and desires of the Greeks during the period of Ottoman rule. With such thoughts on their minds, the authorities started planning the new Greek state on the basis of western European *beau ideals*. In an attempt to project Greece's classical past, Athens, with the imposing Acropolis attesting to its glorious past, became the capital. "The fixation on the classical past was reflected in the great emphasis that was laid in the schools and in the University of Athens on the study and culture of ancient Greece and on the 'Katherevousa', or 'purifying' form of the language, a stilted construct that blighted the schooling of generations of children."[88]

But despite the glories promised by the 'Megali Idea', the reality in Greece remained grim. Otto's autocratic policies were denounced by large sections of society who saw in him an imported King not in touch with Greek reality. His constant refusal of a constitution did little to raise his popularity and his Catholic faith was anathema to the long Greek Orthodox tradition. He was forced to give in to the demands for a constitution after a coup d'état on 3 September 1843 and his popularity was temporarily enhanced after he wholeheartedly supported and indeed led the efforts for the materialisation of the 'Megali Idea' during the Crimean Russo-Turkish war. None the less these efforts met with the resistance of the great powers, who by taking control of the port in Athens, ensured Greece's neutrality in the war. The old resentments resurfaced leading to Otto's forced abdication in 1862.

Otto's replacement was found in Prince Christian William Ferdinand Adolphus George of the Danish Glucksburg dynasty; in 1864 he was proclaimed King George I of the Hellenes. His reign lasted for fifty years and did little to change the fluidity of politics in Greece. King George's period also coincided with Britain's handing over of the Ionian Islands in order to ease Greece's irredentist ventures in the Balkans and south-eastern Mediterranean and in the regions of Arta and Thessaly in 1881. Much to the distress of Britain and the other great powers Greeks showed no interest in abandoning the concept of 'Megali Idea'. Indeed nationalism was firing up in the Balkans and Greece found

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[88] Clogg, R. *A Concise History of Greece*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 50

herself in opposition of not only the Ottoman Empire but also Bulgaria and Albania, in pursuit of their own irredentist programmes.

The intervention of the Great powers was once again decisive and aborted Greek plans to exploit Bulgaria's war with Serbia in 1885 but did nothing to thwart the strong Greek expansionist desires with regards to Macedonia, an area inhabited by a mosaic of nationalities and long term object of dispute between the Balkan nations. For the Greeks Macedonia, the births place of Philipos the Macedon and Alexander the Great could be nothing else but Greek. Bulgarian claims on the history and culture of the region further frustrated the Greeks who viewed claims on Macedonia not just as territorial claims but also as claims on their cultural heritage.[89] Accordingly Greek irregular forces would frequently infiltrate Macedonia preparing the way for the coming of the Greek army.[90]

Revolts also broke out in Crete, still under Ottoman occupation, and the government, under pressure from popular demand, had to send supplies and help to the rebels, culminating in the unavoidable clash with Turkey in 1887.[91] Despite general mobilisation Greece met with a humiliating defeat in a period of thirty days and was forced to pay war compensation to the Ottoman Empire whilst Crete attained an autonomous status under Ottoman ruling. The already strained Greek economy suffered a severe blow but above all the defeat had a deep impact on Greek morale and diminished their hopes in the realisation of the 'Megali Idea'. Whatever "the weakness of the Ottoman Empire in its decline, Greece was likely to come off worse in any armed conflict".[92] It was only through the will of the Great Powers that Greece could hope for territorial gains "for

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[89] A Bulgarian-speaking scholar wrote on the issue of Macedonia, "Aristotle, spoke Bulgarian but wrote in Greek in order to educate the southern barbarians whereas Constantine the Great (borned in Nish) was claimed as Bulgarian and more followed; Method and Cyril, Veljko and Karaiskakis and a host of Greek and Serbian heroes" cited from Dakin, D. *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia 1897-1913*. Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessalonica, 1966, p. 13

[90] for an extensive bibliography on the subject see Gounaris, B. C. Reassessing Ninety Years of Greek Historiography on the 'Struggle for Macedonia 1904-1908'. *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 14, 1996

[91] on the subject see Tatsios, T. G. *The Megali Idea and the Greek–Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Revolution on Greek Irredentism, 1866-1897*. New York: East European Monographs by Columbia University Press, 1984

[92] Clogg, R. *A Concise History of Greece*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 71

these were the countries which from time to time according to their interests and circumstances might assist or hinder the Greek pretensions".[93]

However things were to change with the arrival of the Cretan politician Eleftherios Venizelos in 1909 and as a result of the Goudi coup d'état in the same year. Venizelos proved to be a charismatic leader and a shrewd diplomat. He transformed the economy, invested in the reorganisation of the army and promoted modernisation in all aspects of society. The results were soon to become obvious. Taking advantage of Turkey's conflict with Italy over imperial possessions in Northern Africa, in 1912 Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria, despite the objections of the Great Powers, declared war on the Ottoman Empire.[94]

Outnumbered by the combined forces of the three nations the Ottoman Empire was defeated and subsequently the Greek army gained control of Salonika. It did so hours ahead of the Bulgarian forces, both claiming the same territories. The conflicting interests of the allied nations soon led to the collapse of their alliance. In 1913 Serbia and Greece declared war on Bulgaria, and Romania, who had stayed neutral in the previous conflict, soon joined them.[95] Bulgaria was defeated and was forced to accept territorial losses. The island of Crete was finally incorporated into the Greek State and was added to the new territorial gains. The only setback was the failure to incorporate northern Epirous, with its large Greek speaking population, within the boundaries of the Greek State. But the jubilant Greek nation was soon faced with a new crisis.

The outbreak of World War I brought to the light the differences between Venizelos and King Constantine, especially those over dealing with issues of foreign policy. Departing from his father's stance, Constantine favoured closer relations with Germany and on the eve of the first Great War insisted Greece maintain a neutral position. Venizelos, on the other hand, was ideologically inclined towards Britain and France. On a more practical

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[93] Campbell, J., Sherrard, P. *Modern Greece*. London: Ernest Benn Limited, (date?) p. 89
[94] Katsiadakis-Gardikas, H. *Greece and the Balkan Imbroglio*. PhD Thesis, University of London, 1995
[95] see Gerolymatos, A. *The Balkan Wars: Conquest, Revolution and Retribution from the Ottoman Era to the Twentieth Century and Beyond*. London: Basic Books, 2002

level he firmly believed it would only be through Greece's entry into the war on the side of the Entente Powers,[96] according to him the future victors, which could ensure the realisation of the nation's ambitious plans.

Soon the division became so marked that Greece was run by two administrations: one under King Constantine in Athens and the other one in Thessalonica under Venizelos. The situation was resolved when Entente forces that had been stationed in Salonika after Venizelos' invitation marched into the capital. King Constantine was forced to leave the country, Venizelos was restored as the Prime Minister, and Constantine's second son, Alexander, was declared the new King. Subsequently Greece entered the war on the side of the Entente focusing their war efforts on the Macedonia region.[97] The end of the war found Greece on the side of the victors and negotiations for the spoils of the war ensued. Ottoman Turkey was defeated and for the first time the vision of Greek nationalists came close to becoming a reality.[98]

Venizelos' diplomatic skills in combination with the rivalries among the rest of the allies regarding the fate of Ottoman Empire ensured the realisation of a centuries old dream; Greece of the two continents and five seas. On 15 May 1919, a triumphant Greek army landed in Smyrna under allied orders for the protection of the large, if not dominant Greek population.[99] Under the Treaty of Sevres, signed a year later and dealing with the Ottoman Empire, the Smyrna region was to remain under Greek administration for the next five years at the end of which a plebiscite could be requested by the local authorities for the occupied region. The signing of the treaty was hailed with enthusiasm in mainland Greece but the euphoria was not to be long lived.

Two months later, King Alexander died, and the subsequent elections turned into a revived competition between Alexander's father, the exiled Constantine and Venizelos.[100]

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[96] Britain, France and Russia

[97] Leon, G. B. *Greece And The First World War, From Neutrality To Intervention 1917-1918.* Boulder: East European Monographs, 1990

[98] Petsalis-Diomidis, N. *Greece at the Paris Peace Conference 1919.* Thessalonica: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1978

[99] see Solomonidis, V. *Greece in Asia Minor: The Greek Administration of the Vilayet of Aidin, 1919-1922.* PhD Thesis, University of London, 1985

[100] His death was attributed to blood poisoning caused by bite from a monkey

To the surprise of both domestic and foreign observers, Venizelos, the architect of Great Greece, was defeated. The Greek people had grown weary of the prolonged war and the royalists were able to capitalise on their promise of a "small but honourable Greece". The elections were soon followed by a plebiscite that restored Constantine to his throne, a move that infuriated the allies and gave them the pretext they were looking for in order to sign peace treaties with Turkey. In a short period of time the odds seemed to turn against Greece. Royalist officers who, unaware of the rising power of the nationalist movement in Turkey, were convinced that the situation favoured a decisive blow to the perpetual enemy and replaced the military commanders in Asia Minor. They chose to advance deeper into Asia in an effort to capture Ankara but their efforts backfired. The Turkish forces launched a massive offensive catching the Greeks by surprise. With no defensive fortifications to retreat to and cut off from the lines of communications the Greek forces were routed back to the shore. The Greek army, in an ill-disciplined manner, evacuated Smyrna on 8 September and the Greek population was left in the hands of the revenge-seeking Turks. "Amid scenes of indiscernible horror the greater part of the city was sacked and burnt. Only a poor remnant of the Greek population managed to escape."[101] Those who managed to escape tried to make their way to the Greek islands. It was the end of the 'Megali Idea' in the most emphatic and dramatic way.

In Athens the events in Asia Minor were described as a national catastrophe. Venizelists officers gained control of the situation and King Constantine was forced to abdicate. The generals in charge of the Asia Minor campaign were put under trial and executed as traitors to the Greek nation.[102] A peace treaty was signed at Lausanne between the Greek Kingdom and the newly founded Turkish Republic; the treaty nullified all of Greece's gains in the Treaty of Sevres and it also provided for a population exchange between

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[101] Forster, E. S. *A Short History of Modern Greece* (1821-1940). London: Metheun & Co. Ltd, 1941, p. 145
[102] It became known as the 'Trial of the Six'

Greece and Turkey.[103] Accordingly, most Turks living within the Greek territoriality were moved to Turkey and the same applied to Greeks living in Turkey.[104]

Life in Greece during the years that followed was characterised by political and social upheavals that were accentuated by the arrival of the refugees from Asia Minor. The host population accepted them with mistrust and it was not until decades later that their integration into the mainstream occurred.[105] The economic needs of the nation were dealt with by loans from abroad; loans that did little to change the Greek view of their former allies. The view that had been constructed on the basis of the stance held by the foreign powers, and in particular those considered to be their allies, during the Minor Asia campaign. The intervention of the army became common – the rule rather than the exception – in the nation's political life.

In 1936 one of the many military protagonists in the political developments of Greece, General Ioannis Metaxas, used the political stalemate reached in parliament to seize power and impose his dictatorial regime.[106] Despite his authoritarian and fascist way of governing, Metaxas' name was to be remembered in Greek history for a different reason. The news of the events that led to the commencement of new hostilities in Europe was received with considerable trepidation in Greece. Metaxas was eager to preserve Greece's neutrality but both public opinion and his own personal predisposition towards Britain were hard to conceal.[107]

British actions in Greece soon raised a wave of criticism in neighbouring Italy, Germany's ally. Italy's response was the adoption of aggressive behaviour. On 15 August

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[103] see Sarandis, C. "The Ideology and Character of the Metaxas Regime" in Higham, Robin, Veremis, T. *The Metaxas Dictatorship: Aspects of Greece 1936-1946*. Athens: Hellenic Foundation for Defence and Foreign Policy and Vryonis Center for the Study of Hellenism, 1993

[104] Ladas, S. P. *The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece And Turkey*. New York: Macmillan, 1932

[105] see Hirschon, R. *Heirs of the Greek Catastrophe: The Social Life of Asia Minor Refugees in Piraeus*. London: Berghahn Books, 1998

[106] see Close, D. H. "The Power-Base of the Metaxas Dictatorship" in Higham, R., Veremis, T. (Title?)Athens: ELIAMEP and Vryonis Center, 1993, pp. 15-39

[107] for an informative analysis on the point see Barros, J. *Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions: Ethiopia 1935-36*. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1982 also Koliopoulos, J. *Greece and the British Connection 1935-1941*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977

1940, "The Greek light cruiser Helle, which was in the harbour of the island of Tenos to attend the Feast of the Assumption, was torpedoed and sunk by a submarine of whose nationality there was never the slightest doubt."[108] Two months later the Italian ambassador delivered an ultimatum to the Greek authorities demanding free passage for the Italian army. Metaxas "replied with one word-NO- which has become the most famous retort in Greek history since Leonidas at Thermopylae told the Persians to come and get it".[109]

Within hours of the reply Italian troops made their way to Greek ground via the Greek–Albanian borders; Greece's neutrality had ended. Metaxas reply was received with jubilation from the Greek masses, which now had the chance to respond to, as they perceived it, the Italian insult. General mobilisation ensued and in a matter of days the Greek army was on the counter offensive pushing the vastly superior, in numbers and equipment, invaders back to Albanian soil.[110] Much of Southern Albania came under Greek occupation and the success was twofold. Not only was the invader defeated but also Northern Epirous or Southern Albania with its large Greek population was incorporated into the Greek state.

Britain, who at this stage of the war had no other operative ally but Greece, offered to send troops to assist the Greek cause but its offer was rejected, as Metaxas wanted to avoid a direct confrontation with the German forces.[111] However, Metaxas' death at the end of 1941 changed the situation and his successor was quick to welcome the British offer. British forces were deployed along the northern frontier of Greece but they failed to halt the well-orchestrated German attack.[112] German troops attacked the Greek and British positions from both Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and soon forced them into retreat. Chaos and panic prevailed; the Prime Minister committed suicide under the weight of

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[108] Crawley, G. W.et al. *A Short History of Greece*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965, p. 139
[109] ibid, p. 140
[110] see Papagos, A. *The Battle of Greece, 1940-1941*. Athens: J.M. Scazikis- 'Alpha' Editions, 1949
[111] see Macris, B. J. *The Foreign Policy of the Metaxas Regime 1936-1941*. PhD Thesis, Indiana University 1979
[112] see Woodhouse, C. M. The Aliakmon Line: An Anglo-Greek Misunderstanding in 1941. *Balkan Studies*, 26 (1), 1985 also Koliopoulos, J. S. General Papagos and the Anglo-Greek Talks of February 1941. *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, 3 (3&4), Fall-Winter 1980

defeat and a Greek General, named Tsolakoglou, signed a peace treaty with the Germans. The British expeditionary forces along with the Greek army's remnants and the King escaped first to Crete and then to the Middle East where they continued to fight against the Germans.

Occupied Greece was divided between Germany, Italy and Bulgaria.[113] In northern Greece occupation carried an even heavier burden; the Bulgarians were given control of parts of Macedonia and Western Thrace where they tried to establish a substantial presence in the form of Bulgarian immigrants. But defeat did not counter the nation's will to resist.[114] Only days after the symbol of Nazi Germany, the swastika flag, was torn down from the Acropolis and in a short period of time armed resistance groups made their presence felt. In their majority, they were communist led and that added a political tone to their actions. Acts of resistance were followed by fierce reprisals by the Germans, with whole villages burnt to ashes and their inhabitants put to death.[115]

After 1943, and with the tide of war turning against Germany and its allies, a fierce fight for power in post-war Greece erupted. The communist-armed groups were at the epicentre of the conflicts.[116] Their efforts to establish a communist government, and despite the favour they held within a large section of the population, were rejected by the rest of the political world and their bid for power resulted into an all out, bloody, civil war even before Germany's defeat in the war was finalised. The communists challenged the authority of the King and his government in exile in the Middle East prompting Churchill's alarm about a possible communist takeover of Greece.[117] His reaction was to be found in his infamous 'percentages' deal with Stalin in 1944, whereby Greece came under the influence of Britain.

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[113] Hoppe, H. J. Germany, Bulgaria, Greece: Their Relations and Bulgarian Policy in Occupied Greece. *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, 11 (3), Fall 1984
[114] see Gerolymatos, A. *Guerilla Warfare and Espionage In Greece, 1940-1944*. New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1992
[115] Hondros, J. L. *Occupation And Resistance: The Greek Agony, 1941-1944*. New York: Pella, 1983
[116] Sarafis, S. *ELAS–Greek Resistance Army*. London: Merlin Press, 1980
[117] Deakin, W. *British Political and Military Strategy in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe in 1944*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988

The veteran politician George Papandreou, with the backing of the British, assumed the responsibilities of leading the Greek government in exile and upon his return to Greece was burdened with the difficult task of setting up a new government of national unity. An agreement was reached that provided for the communists' participation in government. However, Papandreou insisted on the demobilisation of the communist forces, still under arms but under the national government's orders and the communists resigned from government prompting public demonstrations. British and Greek troops fired upon the demonstrators and a new circle of anarchy prevailed. [118]

An agreement for the end of hostilities was reached early in 1945 whereby the communists would disarm and be granted amnesty and free access to the subsequent elections.[119] But tensions and emotions ran high and the agreement was never realised: fighting resumed in October 1946. Despite the Communist success in the first months of the hostilities the national army reinforced by Britain and, after 1947[120] the USA, was able to prevail and the Communist leadership was forced to declare a transient end of hostilities in October 1949.[121] Henceforth anti-communism became the single preoccupation of successive Greek governments leading to a deep division of the Greek people. Although, political tranquillity ensued, Greece was anything but a model of democracy.

In 1952 Greece, along with Turkey, became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in view of its strategic importance and as recognition of its fight against communism. Tensions between Greece and Turkey had moved into a path of peaceful coexistence due to the Venizelos–Kemal approach and the mutual recognition of the danger posed by the USSR to both countries. But this period of peaceful coexistence was not destined to last for a long time. Disagreements soon emerged regarding Cyprus

[118] see Alexander, G. M. *British Policy in Greece, 1944-47*. PhD Thesis, University of London, 1979
[119] see Richter, H. "The Varkiza Agreement and the Origins of the Civil War" in Iatrides, J. O. *Greece in the 1940's – A Nation in Crisis*. Hanover: University Press of New England, 1981
[120] In 1947 Britain declared that it was no longer able to fulfil its role in the Eastern Mediterranean and called upon the USA to replace her.
[121] see Vukmanovic, S. *How and why the People's Liberation Struggle of Greece Met with Defeat*. London: Merlin, 1985 also Chouliaras, G. A History of Politics versus a Politics of History: Greece 1936-1949. *Journal of Modern Hellenism*, 6, 1989

post-colonial status.[122] A large proportion of the Greek–Cypriot majority on the island were set on achieving their long desired union or 'enosis' with Greece, a notion that was rejected by the Turkish minority and indeed Turkey herself. As relations between Greece and Turkey worsened violent riots directed against the Greek population of Istanbul erupted. The riots took horrifying proportions; thousand of Greeks died at the hands of the infuriated Turkish masses and their businesses and churches were burnt to the ground.

Due to a number of factors, both external and internal, the desired Cyprus 'enosis' with Greece failed to proceed and the island was, as an alternative, given its independence in 1959. The agreed solution provided for power sharing set up between the two communities on the island with the Turkish side enjoying disproportionate participation in the parliament and the police force. Britain, Greece and Turkey, assumed the role of guarantors. However it soon became evident that this solution could not put an end to the island's problems.[123]

In Greece the settlement raised a wave of protests and many accused Prime Minister Karamanlis of having betrayed the Greek cause. This did not stop Karamanlis from negotiating and succeeding in securing an association agreement with the European Communities – a move of paramount importance for the future of Greece. It was however not enough to appease public opinion back home. Anarchy and disarray prevailed in the Greek world once more as politicians struggled for power using any and all means available to them, legal and illegal, constitutional and unconstitutional.

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[122] The Cypriot struggle was initially directed against their British overlords. Cypriot armed groups decision to forego the British presence unleashed a campaign a terror. The British reaction was twofold: they increased security on the island, sending additional troops, and encouraged Turkey to take a more active interest in the faith of the Turkish minority in Cyprus. See Thomas, A. The Greeks Have a Word for It: Enosis, Being a Factual Exposition of the Enosis (Union With Greece) Crisis which threatens to rupture the Relations of Britain and Greece, London, (publisher?)1955

[123] on the subject see Kranidiotis, N. *Cyprus 1960-1974, A State Without Walls, vols. I & II.* Athens: Estia, 1985 (in Greek) also Kranidiotis, N. *Difficult Years – Cyprus 1950-1960.* Athens: Estia, 1981 also Kliridis, G. *My Deposition, vols. I & II.* Cyprus: Alitheia, 1988 (in Greek) also Ignatiou, M. *Rome's Seminar – When Cyprus Fate was Decided.* Athens: Pontiki, 1989 (in Greek) also Averof-Tositsas, E. *History of Lost Opportunities (Cyprus, 1950-1963), vols. I & II.* Athens: Hestia, 1981 (in Greek)

The prevailing anarchy provided the armed forces with the desired pretext for another coup d'etat.[124] On 21 April 1967 Colonels G. Papadopoulos and N. Makarezos, and Brigadier S. Patakos seized power and imposed a dictatorship that lasted for seven years. Papadopoulos was replaced at the end of 1973 by a renewed coup lead by Brigadier Ioannidis, the extreme right wing head of the military police. One of Ioannidis' first acts was to stage a coup against Archbishop Makarios, the leader of the Greek–Cypriot community. The enterprise was a success but Greece's blatant intervention in the affairs of Cyprus gave Turkey the much-awaited pretext it had been waiting for. On 20 July 1974, Turkey launched an invasion of Cyprus and despite the original difficulties managed to occupy the northern part of the island. "Although the Greek Cypriot forces put up some resistance to the invasion it was openly admitted in Athens that the Greek forces of the mainland were in no condition to go to war with Turkey. For this aftermath of Ioannidis' criminal blunders much blame naturally fell on Greece's allies. The British government did nothing to fulfil its obligations under the 1960 treaty and the US government was legitimately suspected of having backed Ioannidis."[125]

War between Greece and Turkey was imminent but the events in Cyprus led to the collapse of the junta and within days Karamanlis was sworn in as Prime Minister in an effort to restore democracy. [126] Aware of the poor condition of the Greek armed forces Karamanlis rejected any military action towards the Cyprus crisis and turned to Greece's traditional allies USA and Britain for support; they both declared their neutrality. Karamanlis reacted by withdrawing Greece from NATO's military flank in protest towards the USA's policy in Cyprus. He then focused his efforts on the European Communities and his efforts were met with success. Greece became an official member of the European Community in 1981 and the nation entered a path of slow but steady recovery.

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[124] Xydis, S. G. Coups and Countercoups in Greece 1967-73. *Political Science Quarterly*, 89 (3), Fall 1974, pp. 507-38
[125] Woodhouse, C. M. *Modern Greece – A Short History*. London: Faber: 1984, p. 305
[126] see Woodhouse, C. M. *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels*. London: Granada Publishing Ltd, 1985

Conclusion

The survey of Greece's geography and resources has provided valuable insights into the sources of Greek strategic culture. Geography has meant that Greece has developed in one of the world's most tumultuous regions. The country's geographical morphology has had an adverse effect on its ability to defend its lines in depth while its strategic positioning has invited numerous invasions by regional rivals. Greece's geographical positioning has also turned the country into the object of the great powers' intervention in their repeated attempts to preserve or change the status quo to their advantage. Added to this, the need to defend Greece have meant that its leaders have had to juggle between sustaining living standards in a relative resource- poor environment and maintaining strong armed forces.

In modern times the additional impact of geography on Greece's geopolitical position is the separation between her socio-economic and political environment – Western Europe – and her geographical – the Balkans. This separation often pervades the rationale behind the nation's foreign policy decisions. It does so by giving rise to a sense of insecurity, "which sometimes turns into a siege mentality, in a country that is, admittedly, surrounded by difficult neighbours", from both the north and the east, "who may easily turn into enemies (they have done so in the fairly recent past), ready to challenge the status quo".[127]

In terms of history and experience, analysis has shown the existence of strong links between Greece's past and present. More specifically, analysis has traced the development and dissemination of a common Greek consciousness in antiquity which was based on two fundamental and intermingled pillars: a) the self-perceived superiority of the Greek civilisation and culture and b) a series of victorious battles and military campaigns that carried the Greek message beyond the boundaries of the ancient world.

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[127] Tsoukalis, L. "Conclusion: Beyond the Greek Paradox" in Allison, Graham T., Nicolaidis, K. eds. *The Greek Paradox*. London: The MIT Press, 1997, p. 171

The Roman conquest put an and to the 'glory that was Greece' but the spirit of the Greek culture and language endured playing a role so dominant in the eastern Roman empire – Byzantium – that the latter is seen as an integral part of the Hellenic socio-political realm.

Developments that occurred within this time framework have attained increased significance because of their diachronic influence on the way the Greeks perceive themselves and 'others'. These developments refer to the continual infringement of the Byzantine territories by Slavic tribes on the Empire's northern frontiers, the Turkish challenge from the east and the unexpected but menacing threat presented by fellow Christian crusaders from the west. The combination of these led to the erosion of Byzantine power and culminated into the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople and the rest of the Greek world.

The fall of Constantinople, in particular, was a momentous event in Greek history. It subjugated the Greek world to an alien oriental socio-political system (Ottoman) and kept it sheltered from key developments, such as the Restoration and the Enlightenment that were fundamental in reshaping the western world. This western world was hated for the influence the crusades had in the decline of the Byzantine authority as well as for the west's failure to assist in the defence of Constantinople against the Ottomans. This hatred contrasted however, with the admiration, which was bestowed upon the western world for the achievements of its civilisation.

When modern Greece emerged as an independent state in the 19[th]century the Greeks looked to their glorious past as the compass to their future. Successive Greek governments and policy makers embarked on a programme of irredentism designed to unite all Greek-speaking populations under a common state that would be able to reproduce the marvels of antiquity. However, while significant territorial gains were made in a series of expansionist wars, the inability to produce an efficient state infrastructure and the burdensome military expenditures incurred produced a sense of frustration among Greeks regarding their nation's performance.

This frustration was heightened when the brief realisation of the "Greece of the five seas and two continents", which emerged at the end of World War I, transformed itself into the national catastrophe of 1921 on the shores of Asia Minor.[128] The Asia Minor catastrophe, as it has become known in the Greek world, was a further landmark in the nation's history because: a) it signified the end of the country's irredentist programme, b) it led to the expulsion of the Greek community from Asia Minor ending thousands of years of Greek presence in the region, and c) it heightened the Greek mistrust towards the role of the great powers who were seen as having betrayed Greece.

Notwithstanding the above, the feeling of self-worth among Greeks was once again exalted by the repulsion of the invading Italian army at the beginning of World War II. Success on the Italian front however, was followed by defeat at the hands of the Nazi invaders. The subsequent years of occupation led to the emergence of a strong Greek resistance movement. During this time, and as a result of Greek resistance towards the Axis forces, the interaction between Greece and the great powers intensified. In a historically repeated pattern, divisions emerged among the Greek ranks- namely between the communists and the pro-westerners.[129]

These divisions reached their apogee with the civil war that broke out in 1944.[130] This war had a number of serious consequences. It deeply divided the Greek populace and led the subsequent discrimination against those of leftist persuasions. It also institutionalised a strong British and post-1946 American presence that aided the consolidation of right wing parties into power.

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[128] see Augustinos, G. *The Greeks of Asia Minor: Confession, Community, and Ethnicity in the Nineteenth Century*. Ohio: Kent University Press, 1992
[129] see Koliopoulos, J. *Plundered Loyalties: Axis Occupation and Civil Strife in Greek West Macedonia, 1941-1949*. NY: C. Hurst & Co, 1999
[130] see Baerentzen, L. et al. eds. *Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War, 1945-49*. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 1994

Following on from the above, any notion of a functioning political system in Greece was eliminated when a group of army colonels seized power in 1967.[131] The military junta that ruled for seven years was also disastrously associated with its support of extreme right wing elements in Cyprus that provided the platform for the 1974 Turkish invasion of the island and the subsequent failure of the junta to defend the interests of Hellenism. The end of the junta's tyrannical rule came in 1974 but its repercussions have been far reaching. Firstly, the Turkish invasion and occupation of northern Cyprus continues to this day. Secondly, the position of American neutrality – if not one of actively aiding and abetting – towards the junta and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, has led to a deep feeling of resentment among a large section of the Greek population towards the USA.

Since 1974, Greece has developed into a modern western state with its democratic institutions consolidated by the country's membership in both the European Union and NATO. Nevertheless, history continues to be pertinent to our understanding of Greek affairs as the nation's continuing antagonism with Turkey and, at times, with its Balkan neighbours shows.

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[131] O'Ballance, E. *Greek Civil War, 1944-49*. London: Faber and Faber, 1996

Chapter 3

Sources of Greek Strategic Culture-Greek Political Culture

Introduction

Any attempt to comprehend the actualities pertaining to the emergence and rise of Greek political culture would have to begin by looking into the War of Independence (1821–1828), and its after effects. It was during this time that the forces formative to the development of a Greek polity began consolidating. They were fused by the waves of nationalism and a belief in the revival of the Greek national identity that swept across the country in the period leading up to its liberation. A variety of approaches as to the best way to develop the newly founded Greek State began to surface. Yet, despite their common fervour for the advancement of Greek interests, these approaches were distinctly incongruent. Soon the cleavage between them crystallised into the form of two antithetical cultures. These contrasting cultures came to be "a central and permanent feature of society which, through continuous accretions and adaptations, has profoundly affected the country's politics down to the present".[1]

In order to understand the character of those two conflicting cultures the next paragraphs will examine the circumstances that paved the way for their emergence. This will be achieved through the analysis of their historical development and the role they played in key phases of Modern Greek history. The investigation into Greek political culture will conclude by using the findings of the study in order to produce an outline of these two rivalling cultures.

Origins of Greek Political Culture

The War of Independence signalled the end of the Ottoman rule for most of southern Greece and parts of the central regions. It did not, however, deliver freedom to the

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[1] Diamandouros, N. "Politics and Culture in Greece, 1974-91: An Interpretation" in Clogg, R. ed. *Greece, 1981-1989: The Populist Decade.* London: Macmillan Press, 1993, p. 2

entirety of Greek inhabited areas. Greece, as it is geographically known today, was the product of a lengthy process, often bloody in character, which influenced and more often was influenced by, a series of regional conflicts and two world wars. Nationalism and the desire for national unification for all Greek populations became the cornerstone of successive Greek governments, eager to do away with the Ottoman past. Despite this common goal, however, the Ottoman heritage of four centuries and its end product did not, and could not, just fade away.

In 1453, with the conquest of Constantinople, Greece became part of an Asiatic and theocratic empire and fell into a state of relative inconsequentiality. The philosophy of the Ottomans vis-à-vis the conquered nations favoured compliance over integration. Religion was seen as the key for obtaining the desired conformity. Appropriately relative religious freedom was sanctioned and the vast empire was divided into administrative units that reflected the religion of their populace; they were known as Millets. Greece together with the other Balkan conquests of the Ottoman Empire formed the Christian Millet.

The Role of the Church in the Ottoman Period

The Orthodox Church became the conciliator between the Ottoman overlords and their subjects in the Balkans. The Orthodox Patriarchate in Constantinople, or Istanbul as it was renamed in 1930, became the administrative hub of the Christian Millet. The role of the Patriarch, restricted before solely to religious issues, extended to include duties pertaining to the administration of the Millet, the organisation of law courts and fiscal services and the issuing of directives on secular politics.[2] Given the fact that the language used by the high clergy was Greek, the Greek language grew to be something of a lingua franca for the Balkans. The Patriarch used "his religious authority to see that the Orthodox accepted the Sultan's authority and abstained from disorders. Though he was not himself the tax-collector for the Sultan he had to see that the taxes were forthcoming."[3] In so far as the sought-after outcome, namely obedience to the Ottoman

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[2] Runciman, S. *The Orthodox Churches and the Secular State.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 29

[3] Runciman, S. *The Great Church in Captivity.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968, p. 175

rule, was attained, the Orthodox Church and its leaders enjoyed the tolerance and patronage of the Ottoman high authorities.

Education, also, came under the auspices of the Church, and the area in which the Patriarchate resided, the Phanar, developed into a centre of higher learning. The didactic institutions confined within this area provided their students with a blend of Byzantine and Ottoman principles; the majority of these students were of Greek origin. They were soon identified as a distinct, privileged group within the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Not only did they serve in the Empire's central administration but they also acted as the high authority, representing the interests of the Ottoman hierarchy, in various posts across the Ottoman regions in the Balkans. Being the seat of power for the Greek world, the Phanar soon attracted the wealthiest members of Greek society whose intention was to influence the decision making process at the Patriarchate so as to benefit their own causes. To that end, they "obtained for their sons positions in the Patriarchal court; and one by one the high offices of the Great Church passed into lay hands".[4]

In the words of an observer of the field, "It was a remarkable, almost paradoxical arrangement, by which the members of the Greek 'Millet' or nation, as the Orthodox were generally identified, with the ecumenical patriarch serving as their *ethnarch,* were merged as 'junior partners' of the Ottoman Empire and by which the Church emerged as a major political, social and cultural institution."[5]

Orthodoxy became, for the majority of the population, the symbol of national identity while at the same time providing a "broader context of world view, a sense of ecumenicity".[6] The views that successive generations of Greek people developed during that period reflected, on the one hand, the influence and effects of the Orthodox Church and on the other, the requirement to conform to the Ottoman directives.

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[4] ibid, p. 362
[5] Stavrou, T. "The Orthodox Church and Political Culture in Modern Greece" in Constas, D., Stavrou, T. G. eds. *Greece Prepares for the Twenty-First Century.* London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1995, p. 42

Greek Society under Ottoman Rule

The economy rested heavily on agriculture with the basis of production being dispersed into small localised production units designed to meet the taxation demands of the Ottoman authorities. Taxes were collected and paid to the Ottomans by a group of Greek people that acted as the representatives of these production units. Through their role, they attained considerable influence and played a prominent role in the political scene of their localities. Public office came to signify power, its acquisition providing the holder with unparalleled power within the local community. Candidates used money in the form of bribes in order to secure the patronage of the local Ottoman governor. In most cases, those holding public offices were also responsible for the implementation of the laws whether Ottoman, Byzantine or localised, in nature.

This practice of bribery, inherent in the day-to-day dealings of the Ottomans, permeated Greek society via the dealings of the high clergy with its Ottoman overlords. It began when an Orthodox Archbishop offered money to the Ottoman high authorities if they would agree to depose the Patriarch in office and appoint him in his place. Although his plan failed, due to the intervention of a third party that matched his offer to the Ottoman high authorities, a precedent was set. Henceforth all Patriarchs-to-be had to pay tribute to the Sultan[7] before their appointment was confirmed. This tribute was known as the 'peshkesh'.[8]

The Greek society that emerged under Ottoman rule worked in relative harmony until the 17th century. However from the "seventeenth century onwards under pressure from expansive western commercial capitalism, precipitated a number of centrifugal forces which not only destroyed the traditional bases for security and protection in the countryside but in addition it brought about conditions of lawlessness, arbitrariness, increasing oppression, and profound uncertainty".[9] These circumstances[10] coupled with

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[6] ibid

[7] term used to denote the ruler of the Ottoman Empire

[8] For a more detailed discussion see Runciman, S. *The Orthodox Churches and the Secular State.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 32

[9] Diamandouros, N. "Greek Political Culture in Transition: Historical Origins, Evolution, Current Trends" in Clogg, R. ed. *Greece in the 1980's.* London: Macmillan Press, 1983, p. 45

the absence of the type of secondary organisations that had begun to develop in Western Europe, lured individuals to the safety of the extended family unit. For all intents and purposes the family's role was far greater than that of a basic social unit. It played the key role in politics and economics alike.

The extended family, with the inclusion of friends and those who looked favourably towards the advancement of its interest and well-being formed the 'inner group'. If the security of the 'inner group' was challenged cohesion, co-operation and loyalty amongst its members were seen as the only line of defence. Depending on the nature of the challenge the inner group would expand to include all those equally endangered or sharing a common predisposition towards that which could be perceived as a threat to their collective well-being and safety. For example, whereas the allegiances of an inhabitant of a typical Greek village at the time lay first and foremost within the members of his/her extended family, s/he would unite with his/her fellow villagers against what could be identified as a common threat from the outside. Threats at this level emanated from central authorities, be they Ottoman or Greek. These forces, which constituted threats to the welfare of the local community or the individual, were identified as the 'outer group'.

In most cases, however, antagonism and non co-operation was the norm in the state of affairs in any given Greek community. The scarcity of natural resources, especially felt in the rural areas, exacerbated the already competitive nature of Greeks. Most Greeks deemed that resources were not only scarce but also insufficient to provide for everyone's needs. This supposition, in addition to reflecting the impoverished condition of the Greek domain, also pointed out the deterministic approach Greeks held towards their future. Their misfortunes were attributed to factors beyond their control. Fate had relegated them to poverty and they no power over destiny or environment.[11]

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[10] Asdrachas, S. Problems of Economic History of the period of Ottoman Domination in Greece. *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, VI (2), Summer 1979, pp. 5-37
[11] Papakosma, S. V. *Politics and Culture in Greece*. USA: The University of Michigan, 1988

Human relations were thus defined in terms of struggle and competition. Struggle to provide for one's welfare - as well as that of one's family- and competition with others over the limited resources available for the attainment of this goal. Fittingly the "prosperity and good fortune of one family or one person, therefore, threatens the continued existence and well being of others".[12] Young Greeks socialised under these conditions grew up to be extremely individualistic. They were brought up to confront a hostile world in which self-interest was the main motivation. Therefore, trust could only be assumed and extended within the limited boundaries of the family. Faced with the calamities of their social surroundings they were expected to "live without compromise, to be strong, masculine, independent and able to meet life's continuing challenge without help from others".[13]

Quite paradoxically though, they could hardly expect to be self-sufficient given that the distribution and allocation of resources was regulated, on the central level by the Ottoman administration and on the local level by the Greek regional, administrative units. The majority of the Greek population, living in rural areas and in relative isolation from the capital and the major cities, had no direct access to these decision-making centres. The only interaction people in these areas had with the authorities was through "the occasional visit of the tax collector or other state official".[14] Moreover, when that occurred it was usually either to impose upon them rules exogenous to the local community and seen as potentially harmful to their interests, or to demand funds in the form of taxes on behalf of the state; a state that, as far as they were concerned, had no practical meaning for them, nor did it offer them anything in return for their contribution. As a result, they perceived the role of any centralised form of government with suspicion and developed a sense of abhorrence and distrust towards it. Any action taken to shirk policies emanating from central authorities or to hinder their effectiveness was greeted

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[12] Legg, K. *Politics in Modern Greece*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969, p. 37
[13] Foster, G. *The Dyadic Contract: A Model for the Social Structure of a Mexican Peasant Village, in the Peasant Society: A Reader*. Boston, 1967, p. 214 cited in Diamandouros, N. *Political Modernisation–Social Conflict and Cultural Cleavage in the Formation of the Modern Greek State: 1821-1828*. PhD Thesis, Columbia University, 1972, p. 29
[14] Diamandouros, N. *Political Modernisation–Social Conflict and Cultural Cleavage in the Formation of the Modern Greek State: 1821-1828*.PhD Thesis, Columbia University, 1972, p. 31

with enthusiasm, to the extent that men persecuted by the Ottoman State for such crimes were heralded as local heroes within the Greek community.

This problem of distrust towards central authorities found its answer in the form of clientage relationships. When problems arose in a local community that involved dealings with the central authorities, a Greek notable[15] from that local community would act as mediator, trying to promote or protect the interests of his own people. This kind of intercession was seen as beneficial for both parties involved. The notable would benefit not only in terms of material goods but also via the recognition of his role and the subsequent enhancement of his eminence within the local community. The people he represented, on the other hand, would benefit by gaining a patron who would look after their interests and provide them with a minimum of security against the threats of the 'outside world'. In that respect, the patron became part of the 'inner group', securing the loyalty and gratitude of its members while at the same time accepting the "obligation to protect the interests of those who entered into this relationship".[16] Thus the beneficiaries of his intercession, or clients, "maintained a certain self- respect".[17]

The War of Independence

When the War of Independence broke out in 1821, several actors came into play within the Greek society. Dominant amongst them were the Church, the 'Klepths', the 'Armatoloi' and 'Kapoi', the merchants and the notables of the rural areas.[18]

The merchants were a small but closely connected group of Greeks who benefited from the unwillingness, due to religious reasons, of the Turks to get directly involved in activities that involved the daily exchange of money and their lack of interest in merchant skills due to their war-like nature. The merchants provided most of the Empire's financial

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[15] Especially on the Greek mainland the Greek notables employed substantial local power. While the Turks owned most of the land (in Peloponessus the Turks owned two-thirds of the land for example) sizeable spreads of rural area were under the rule of Greek notables. In those spreads the notables, also called 'kodjabashis' enjoyed considerable autonomy. They met regularly, in the form of regional assemblies, that dealt with matters pertaining to taxation and other administrative issues.
[16] Legg, K. *Politics in Modern Greece*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969, p. 34
[17] ibid

services,[19] and carried out the largest part of the imperial trade with Europe and the rest of the world. Through their activities, they became familiarised with the ideas of the enlightenment and were consumed by the notions of European nationalism sweeping across the continent at the time.

These Greeks and the Greeks of the Diaspora,[20] disillusioned with the state of the nation under Ottoman rule, were at the forefront of successive, albeit unsuccessful, attempts to liberate Greece. A small nucleus of Greeks drawn from their ranks set up the 'Philike Etaireia',[21] a clandestine association of men for the promotion of Greek nationalism and its eventual emancipation from Ottoman rule. Under the influence of the enlightenment and its focus on reason and rationality, they viewed the Byzantine legacy and the ideas embedded within it, namely the inseparability of religion and state, with suspicion and abhorrence. They believed that the mysticism surrounding religion averted critical thinking and it was this, combined with the decadent and intrigue prone nature of the Byzantine administrative elite, that had led to the Ottoman conquest of Greece. In addition, they loathed the 'Phanariotes' and the high clergy for their attachment to the Ottoman authorities. Their vision was one of a modern, secular Greek State, which would invigorate the glories of the ancient past. Not withstanding the above, the 'Philike Etaireia', in time, turned into an all-inclusive organisation, encompassing all those who opposed the Turkish domination and their influence extended to the entirety of the Greek domain.

The merchants were the backbone of the organisation and accounted for 53.7% of the 'Philike Etairia's' members.[22] However, members were also drawn from the ranks of those who identified themselves as 'professionals' (13.1%), notables (11.7%) and clerics (9.5%). Participants also included men with military experience, gained either in the

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[18] The 'Klepths' and the 'Kapoi' preyed on rich Greeks and Turks alike, living of the swag and pleasures of the occasional hunt. The 'Amartoloi' were local militias formed to counter their activities.
[19] The Financial Services (i.e. banking) of the Ottoman Empire were dominated by Greeks, Jews and Armenians.
[20] Geanakopoulos, D. "The Diaspora Greeks: The Genesis of Modern Greek National Consciousness" in N. Anton, J. et al, Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1976, pp. 59-79
[21] 'Philike Hetaireia' was founded in Odessa, Russia, in 1814. For a detailed analysis see Frangos, D. G. *The Philike Etaireia, 1814-1824: A Social and Historical Analysis.* PhD Thesis, Columbia University, 1971

service of foreign armies or as 'armatoloi'/ 'kapoi' and 'klepths' in the Greek mainland. What these people from such different social backgrounds had in common, by the beginning of the 19th century, was the belief in the "need to overthrow the Ottoman rule".[23] Yet, binding as this cause was for these Greeks, it was not strong enough to force them into abandoning old habits.

Driven by decisions dictated by their own narrow interests, the previously mentioned social grouping could not reach an agreement as to the best way to pursue the cause of liberation. The Church hierarchy, the notables and, to a certain extent, a number of the merchants had personal stakes in the continuation of the Ottoman rule that they were not eager to jeopardise in the name of a national revolt that carried no guarantees for success. The result of this was that though most of them were "willing to join the Philike Hetairia when the prospect of revolt was not immediate, most stubbornly hesitated when actually called upon to act on their formal commitment".[24]

Being unable to agree on the timing and planning of the uprising, before circumstances left them without a choice, the various actors involved in the Greek War of Independence were even less able to agree "on the political entity to be established after liberation".[25] Their interests were diverse in nature and scope and were embedded in notions of individualism and distrust, permanent characteristics, as observed, of the Greek society under Ottoman rule. Fittingly, their political objectives defined by their own ambitions and dictated by the pursuit of their own self-interests were "confused, undefined, or contradictory".[26]Deeply influenced by the practice of politics, as they had witnessed it under the Ottoman rule, they quickly saw the emerging Greek State as "the apple of

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[22]ibid ,p. 288
[23] Koliopoulos, J. *Brigands With a Cause*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, p. 4
[24] Petropoulos, J. Introduction in Diamandouros, N. et al. *Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation (1821-1830)*. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1976, p. 28
[25] Koliopoulos, J. Brigands With a Cause, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, p.4
[26] Petropoulos, J. "Introduction" in Diamandouros, N. et al. *Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation (1821-1830)*. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1976, p. 28

accord, the capture of which would bestow upon the victor the ability to protect his followers from harm and retaliation".[27]

In this Hobbesian state of affairs, "a small but compact, sophisticated and dynamic group of liberal westernised Greeks attempted to graft the rudiments of a western-type state".[28] Some of them were part of the Diaspora Greeks, others had come to be familiarised with the political institutions and their accompanying political ideas, prevalent in Western Europe at the time, through their merchant activities or for reasons pertaining to their education. They envisaged the creation of a state establishment modelled on the archetype of the West European States, governed by a strong central administration operating under the guidance of a constitution. A constitution with provisions for "free press, bill of rights secularism and the rule of law".[29]

Their immediate experience of the workings of the Western European Political Institutions allowed them to gain dominant positions in the state structure of the political entity that ensued the first successful stages of the revolution. Perceiving the Greek society, as this had developed under Ottoman rule, as being fundamentally backward and primitive in nature, they sought to use their control of the state machinery for the advancement of these ideals. Nonetheless, the majority of the population in the periphery of Greece could at best not identify with the ideas of the westernised Greeks and at worst, found them unsettling and threatening to their way of life. For most Greeks in rural areas, the idea of a nation was confined to the boundaries of their village. Law and the rule of law were perceived to be the prerogative of the most powerful. Trust was only extended to members of one's 'inner group' and with the understanding that it would be swiftly revoked if it did not promote or protect ones interests.[30] It was because of these conditions that the westernised Greeks, henceforth referred to as 'modernisers', became

[27] Diamandouros, N. "Greek Political Culture in Transition: Historical Origins, Evolution, Current Trends" in Clogg, R. ed. *Greece in the 1980's*. London: Macmillan Press, 1983, p. 46
[28] ibid, p. 47
[29] Diamandouros, N. *Political Modernisation–Social Conflict and Cultural Cleavage in the Formation of the Modern Greek State: 1821-1828*. PhD Thesis, Columbia University, 1972, p. 160
[30] ibid, p. 171

convinced that the only way to reform the country was through changes from top to bottom.

The actions of the modernisers and their drive for the creation of a centralised state, clashed with the interests of the notables who saw themselves as the de facto "successors to the Turkish authorities".[31] A centralised authority was seen as potentially depriving them of many of the privileges that accompanied their role as local rulers. For them, the denouncement of the Ottoman rule had to coincide with the preservation of their prestige and status in any form of political arrangement to emerge as a result of the War of Independence.

However, the modernisers and the notables were not the only active players in the political scene of Greece at the time. Those Greek men under arms, actually fighting and dying for the realisation of independence felt that they should be included in the distribution of power that would follow. Their leaders were drawn from the ranks of the 'Armatoloi', 'Kapoi' and 'Klepths'. They were men with considerable power in their local regions, harbouring a deep sense of autonomy and disregard for political authorities. The majority of the men however, came from the ranks of the peasants who had rallied to join the revolution. They had had no claim in the power base of the Greek society prior to the revolution. Their participation in the revolutionary armed units, nevertheless, provided them with some form, albeit limited, of cohesion as well as the opportunity to channel their demands for access to ownership of land previously held under the possession of the Turks.[32]

The defining characteristic of the relationship between these various groups was antagonism. Its intensity over of the control of the state to be, threatened to avert the positive course of action observed in the opening stages of the uprising which had resulted in a number of victories against the Ottomans. With much of the state

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[31] Kaldis, W. *John Kapodistrias and the Modern Greek State*. Madison, USA: The Department of History, University of Wisconsin – Logmark Editions, 1963, p. 26

mechanism under their control, the modernisers pushed ahead with their plans for the reform of Greek society. Their attempts met with the resistance of the old elites, that is to say the notables and the military leaders. These groups, henceforth referred to as 'traditionalists', saw the modernisers' reforms as confirmation of the erosion of their own power and reacted by creating numerous semi-autonomous local governments who fell under their immediate control. They formed these units with minimum input from the representatives of the state in central government. These semi-autonomous local governments acted with blatant disregard for the representatives of the central authorities. The 'traditionalists' often openly challenged the policies of the state when those policies infringed upon their interests. Yet more often than not they were unable to effectively resist the implementation of such policies due to their inability both to reach a consensus and to present a united front before the modernisers.

Indeed, it was the conflicts within "the 'archon' class and disputes between that class and other elements of the revolutionary leadership, such as the military, the islanders and Greeks from abroad, that produced the civil wars and anarchy which plagued and nearly brought defeat upon the revolution".[33] Such was the fervour of antagonism between the different factions that in some instances chieftains would commit the ultimate treason and join the ranks of the enemy in the hope of seeing their antagonists crushed and punished.[34] The fact that in doing so they were also crushing the revolution was a matter of secondary importance to them.

With the future of the revolution in doubt, the Greeks saw no other solution than to turn to the foreign powers for assistance. They did so reluctantly as the messages that were coming from the capitals of Europe before and during the first stages of the revolution were discouraging to the Greek cause. After all the major European powers had entered

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[32] see McGrew, W. "The Land Issue in the Greek War of Independence" in Diamandouros, N. et al. *Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation (1821-1830)*. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1976, p. 123
[33] ibid, p. 122
[34] see Petropoulos, J. "Forms of Collaboration With the Enemy during the First Greek War of Liberation" in Diamandouros, N. et al. *Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation (1821-1830)*. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1976, pp. 131-143

an agreement to combine their forces against any instance that would threaten to avert the status quo. Nonetheless, with the Turks reclaiming more and more territory, their choices were limited. Emissaries, who had lived abroad and maintained their ties with the lands they had left to come and fight for the liberation of Greece, were sent to all major powers to request their help. Their familiarity with western ideals and in particular the notion of romantic nationalism and the ideas of enlightenment with its roots in classical Greece, allowed them to incite the popular support of the host countries.

Foreseeing the deterioration of the Ottoman Empire in the Eastern Mediterranean and the power vacuum that this would create, the Great European powers developed a keen interest in the area. Motivated by concerns about their own strategic interests, they were eager to exploit the situation to their advantage. To that extent, Greece and the Greek revolution became part of the power equation in the Mediterranean that involved France, Britain and Russia. The governments of the latter established channels of communication with the revolutionaries and played a key role in the events that led to the creation of the Modern Greek State. In fact, their influence was such that it has been argued that "modern Greece not merely profited by, but to a large extent was the outcome of, the international balance of power in her part of the world".[35]

That Greece emerged as an independent and international sovereign state in 1832, despite the shortcomings experienced by the revolutionaries at the front, was largely owed to the patronage and intervention of the foreign powers.[36] The first attempts towards the foundation of an organised polity in Greece that had begun with the election of Capodistria[37] as the governor of the Greek State, were thwarted by the factionalism of the Greek political world. Capodistrias, a typical example of a moderniser, embarked on an effort to create a Modern Greek State under his own personal guidance.

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[35] Psomiades, H. "The Character of the New Greek State" in Diamandouros, N. et al. *Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation (1821-1830)*. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1976, p. 147
[36] see Woodhouse, C. M. *The Battle of Navarino*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1965
[37] see Woodhouse, C. M. *Capodistria: The Founder of Greek Independence*. London: Oxford University Press, 1973

His plans for those who would lead the state excluded the protagonists of the War of Independence and the local notables. Not withstanding their contribution to the revolution, he believed that their individualistic outlook on politics and their intrigue-prone nature made them inappropriate candidates for high offices within the state mechanism. Recognising their power, though, he tried to appease them by offering them positions in the less important political institution of the senate. This, he thought, was a convenient way of accommodating their lust for prestige while at the same time avoiding their interference in the organisation of the state.

Capodistrias' aims included the creation of a professional army, the establishment of an education system and, through the eventual adaptation of western institutions, the normalisation of Greece's political system and society.[38] He used his contacts with the resident representatives of the foreign powers to ensure their aid in achieving these goals in delivering a liberated Greece. Each of the foreign representatives tried to influence the political outcomes in the country according to its nation's desires.[39] They managed to muster significant bargaining power through the granting of loans to the embryonic Greek State. These loans were essential not only for the continuation of the war but also for the economic development of Greece.[40]

The reign of Capodistrias as the governor of the nation, however, ended with his assassination in 1831, a victim of the undeclared war between the centralisation and decentralisation forces in Greece. His assassins were two notables from the Peleponesse who refused to accept his authority and perceived their exclusion from the state mechanism as a personal offence to their honour. What ensued was another round of civil strife between the various political groups for the control of the state. As mentioned before, normality was restored only with the intervention of the foreign powers.

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[38] see Papageorgiou, S. P. The Army as an Instrument for Territorial Expansion and for Repression by the State: The Capodistria Case. *Journal of Hellenic Diaspora*, 12 (4), 1985, p. 27 also Papageorgiou, S. P. *Capodistria's Military Policy*. Athens: Hestia, 1986

[39] For an example of the way the representatives of the foreign powers, and especially British representatives, viewed the events at the time see Hamilton, G. W. *Correspondence of Commodore Hamilton during the Greek War of Independence*. London: Anglo-Hellenic League, 1930

[40] see Loulis, D. *The Financial and Economic Policies of President Ioannis Capodistrias 1828-1831*. Greece: University of Ioannina, School of Philosophy, 1985

The emergence of the Modern Greek State

On 7 May 7 1832, France, Britain and Russia signed a treaty that recognised Greece as an independent kingdom. The Bavarian prince, Otto, after deliberations between the signatories, was chosen to head the country. The newly independent Greek kingdom was to be under the protection of the above-mentioned foreign powers that, under the treaty, retained the right to intervene in the country's affairs when deemed necessary.

Greece had gained its independence from the Ottoman Empire. However, its political system was not only far from resembling that of its western counterparts but could hardly claim to be self-sufficient. Its dependence on foreign powers deemed it a 'penetrated system', or a system in which "nonmembers of a national society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with the society's members, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilisation of support on behalf of its goals".[41]

The level of the foreign powers involvement in the Greek polity reached its climax with the reorganisation of the political system along the lines of political groupings named after the three guarantor powers. Thus the French, English and Russian parties emerged and "each resident minister to Greece was the patron of its client party".[42] With King Otto as the head of the state and the institutionalised presence of the foreign powers in it, the sovereignty of Greece became a contested issue in the minds of its people. Liberation from the Turks, at least for a part of the Greek inhabited world, was achieved; but the right of Greeks to determine their own national policies was severely limited, if at all present, for the Greeks.

Otto's rule was authoritarian and brought him into opposition with his Greek subjects. This opposition culminated in an armed insurrection within the Greek armed forces. As a result, Otto's authoritarianism was replaced by a liberal constitution that nevertheless

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[41] Rosenau, J. "Pretheories and Theories of Foreign Policy" in Barry, R. B. *Approaches to Comparative International Politics*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966, p. 65
[42] Psomiades, H. "The Character of the New Greek State" in Diamandouros, N. et al. *Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation (1821-1830)*. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1976, p. 149

failed to properly define the nature of the relationship between state and society. Despite the reliance of the new constitution on institutions that were meant to replicate the functions of their counterparts in Western Europe, the project of Greece's modernisation did not yield the anticipated results. For the Western institutions that the Greek modernisers wished to emulate, existed within a social reality that was the product of a lengthy progression towards the formation of capitalist societies with clearly defined social classes.

Greece, on the other hand, lacked a middle class capable of carrying the weight of the desired changes, as they had so persuasively done in the rest of Western Europe. If nothing else the early efforts of the modernisers to create a centralised state added to the mistrust of the general public, present throughout the Ottoman period, against central authorities. They had no reason to support societal changes that had no meaning to them since these had no immediate impact on their lives. No effort was made to make them feel included in the creation of the new state as equal partners whose prosperity depended on that of the state.

For them, central authorities retained the distant role they occupied in the Ottoman period, with all the social and political implications that this role implied. With nothing to gain from a prosperous and all-powerful state that would threaten their way of life and offer little, if anything, in return they saw no viable reason for adhering to the demands of the modernisers.

The failure of the state to reach the masses was exploited to the full by the traditionalists for the fulfilment of their own ambitions. The system of clientage relationships, a dominant feature of the Greek society, provided the traditionalists with a decisive weapon against the forces of centralisation evangelised by the modernisers. Their role as the patrons of their local communities came with a plethora of advantages. In contrast to central authorities, the services they offered to local people under their patronage had a

direct and visible impact on the day-to-day life of the people. Hence, the notables were able to enlist their support against the modernisers' project.

The modernisers, Capodistrias and King Otto, despite their varied approach to the relevant issues, did however share one common idea for the future of Greece. They aspired to the creation of a western like, secular state, ruled by law and strong central authorities that would cater to the needs of the whole population. In spite of the original shortcomings encountered by the modernisers the "penetration of the West in Greece had, for better or worse, been initiated and the administration of Capodistrias and the Bavarians which followed only worked to further it".[43]

However, although they were successful in laying the foundations for a strong state their efforts to reorganise the society along similar lines met with less good fortune. The disparity between state and society, or to put it another way, the disparity of perceptions between the state institutions and the citizens they were supposed to serve, became the defining characteristic of the Greek political culture. A political culture that rested on a host population deeply traditional in its view of the world, still largely influenced by the experiences it had acquired during the Ottoman period. Theirs was a heavily agrarian economy organised around small villages and cities, home to a people that were characterised by intense individualism triggered by the belief that they had to act in a hostile world, driven by self-interest and competition.[44] Accordingly, co-operation and consensus was hard to come by in a society that rejected the notion that, in the spirit of compromise, a deal could be made that would be mutually beneficial.[45]

This reality worked in favour of the traditionalists who, acting as political brokers, made themselves an indispensable part of the political process in Greece. Political parties turned to them for help and assistance in securing the voting power of their clients. Thus

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[43] Diamandouros, N. *Political Modernisation- Social Conflict and Cultural Cleavage in the Formation of the Modern Greek State: 1821-1828*. PhD Thesis, Columbia University, 1972, p. 362
[44] 2,150 small towns and villages see Psomiades, H. "The Character of the New Greek State" in Diamandouros, N. et al. *Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation (1821-1830)*. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1976, p. 150

despite the fact that the advance of the central, bureaucratic state resulted in the partial erosion of the old elite and their total control of their locales, the traditionalists managed to secure their participation in the power structures of the new state with a twofold corollary. Not only did, their utilisation of the patron–client mode of social and political interactions "come to dominate the political process" in Greece[46] but it also ensured that they became the de facto partners of the modernisers in the process of nation building. From then onwards the modernisers and the traditionalists, each with their distinct and antagonistic cultural predisposition, were to be found operating within the same political arena without any one grouping being exclusively associated with a given political party. This outcome has "greatly undermined the capacity of the political parties to serve as effective mechanisms of interest–aggregation and has decisively contributed to the historic incapacity of both cultures to render permanent their temporary ascendancy".[47]

Another factor that undermined the legitimacy of the Greek political parties was their dependence on foreign patrons. Indeed, given the extent of the foreign powers' involvement in the Greek affairs one cannot help but wonder why Greeks would fight to gain their liberty from their Ottoman overlords only to yield willingly a great deal of their sovereignty to the foreign powers in a relationship of dependence, even if a limited one. The answer lays in the fact that the nature of Greece's relationships with the foreign powers reflected, largely, the nation's predisposition towards clientelism.[48] Relations of dependency, in the patron–client form, were a permanent feature in the every day life of the Greek people. Such relations operated on the assumption that they were mutually beneficial for both parties involved and with the understanding that if the patron failed to recompense the client, the latter was free to withdraw his/her allegiance to the former.

Being subordinated to the Turks offered no advantages to the Greeks. It was a subordination that lacked their consensus and could hence be classified as a dependence

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[45] McNeil, W. *The Metamorphosis of Greece since World War II.* Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978, p. 12

[46] Papakosma, S. V. *Politics and Culture in Greece.* USA: The University of Michigan, 1988, p. 4

[47] Diamandouros, N. "Politics and Culture in Greece, 1974-91: An Interpretation" in Clogg, R. ed. *Greece, 1981-1989: The Populist Decade.* London: MacmillanPress, 1993, p. 2

[48] Papakosma, S. V. *Politics and Culture in Greece.* USA: The University of Michigan, 1988, p. 4

relationship of the master–slave type, "where the tie was irrevocable and permanent even when the master no longer had anything substantial to offer his slave".[49] On the other hand, the intervention of the foreign powers on behalf of Greece had turned the balance of power in its favour. Greeks thus, had no reason to object to a dependence relationship that was perceived to be both rewarding and beneficial to them.

Another factor that contributed to the acceptance of the foreign powers tutelage in Greece was the inherent factionalism amongst the ranks of the revolutionaries and the subsequent failure of the political system to deal with the demands of a sovereign national state. When shortcomings in the field of battle pointed to the necessity for outside support in their fight against the Turks the debate as to which foreign power would best serve Greek interests came to the fore of Greek politics. Constantly "shifting configurations of already existing factions or clienteles began to stabilise according to their position on this question".[50]

Unable to reach political and societal consensus and exposed to the military superiority of the Turks those factions turned to the foreign powers seeking not only their aid in the national cause but also their assistance in the consolidation of Greece's political system. Henceforth they became the willing clients in a patron–client relationship, each one being the respective client of the foreign power it favoured. Their motivation for entering such a relationship of dependency was not restricted to the hope for national liberation. The envisaged gains included their patron's buttress in the internal struggle for political dominance. However, they were soon faced with the disadvantages of their dependence as the foreign powers used their status as "a quasi-legal and psychological basis for influence and control".[51]

Nation Building, Irredentism and the Debacle of Asia Minor
Otto's absolutism if nothing else added to "the system of cynicism, the highly politicised administrative machinery, corruption and the absence of civic pride and of vital

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[49] Couloumbis, T. et al. *Foreign Interference in Greek Politics*. NY: Pella, 1976, p. 17
[50] ibid, p. 19
[51] ibid, p. 21

government"[52] that dogged the Greek State ever since its inception. The persistent practice of bribery and the uninterrupted existence of the clientele system in combination with the parochialism of the Greek periphery and the utilisation of the royal prerogative to appoint his favourite candidates in the capital, delivered decisive blows to the legitimacy of representative politics and its institutional expression; the parliament.

This "unstructured or loosely structured character of the non-Western political process encouraged leaders to adopt more clearly defined positions on international issues than on domestic issues".[53] Indeed, Greek politicians found it increasingly easier, and in the short term more beneficial, to rely on issues pertaining to international affairs and specifically those pertaining to the 'Megali Idea', rather than on issues of domestic concern such as economic policy and development.[54] After all, the Greek public was uneducated about, and hence not interested in, the day to day running of the state.

The 'Megali Idea', conversely, captured the fascination of the Greek populace. The liberation of their fellow Greeks who had the misfortune to still be constrained under the Ottoman yoke, was an aspiration that even the most unsophisticated Greek peasant could understand. Furthermore, given Greece's dependence on the foreign powers and by extension their de facto representative in Greece, the King, international politics held a very practical attraction for the nation's politicians. Given the King's dominant position in the country's political system, especially on foreign affairs, those involved in the running of the country's external affairs were more likely to obtain his patronage and thus secure an advantage over those who handled domestic issues. With real power lying at the palace, the reasons to cater for the wider public and its needs were becoming less and less central to the electoral process.

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[52] Psomiades, H. "The Character of the New Greek State" in Diamandouros, N. et al. *Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation (1821-1830)*. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1976, p. 152

[53] Pye, L, W. "The Non-Western Political Process" in Apter, D. *Comparative Politics*. New York, 1964, p. 663

[54] Kofos, E. "War and Insurrection as Means to Greek Unification in the Mid-Nineteenth Century" in Kiraly, B. K. *War and Society in East Central Europe. The Crucial Decade: East Central European Society and National Defence 1859-1870*. New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1984, pp. 338- 51

This intense preoccupation with issues of foreign affairs invariable bred irredentist aspirations that, more often than not, interfered with the interests of the foreign powers for two reasons. To begin with, Greece's irredentism often clashed with the revival of nationalism in the neighbouring Balkan states.[55] Accordingly, the pursuit of the 'Megali Idea' had the potential to develop into a military confrontation between the former and the latter, thus plunging the region into a state of disarray that would disconcert the prevailing order in the area and raise the status quo that had been designed to cater for the strategic needs and political considerations of the foreign powers.

The second reason had to do with the balance of power and rivalry between the foreign powers themselves. In what came to be identified as the 'Eastern Question', pertaining to the future of the vastly deteriorating Ottoman Empire, France, Britain and Russia retained their own particular views that reflected their strategic concerns in the area.[56] For Britain, control of the Aegean and the sustenance of a weak Ottoman Empire was imperative for securing its trade routes to India.[57] For France, the region was a stepping-stone to its colonies in Africa. For Russia, the Ottoman Empire had always been a traditional regional rival. In addition, the control of the Black Sea Straits by the Ottoman Empire blocked Russia's access to the 'hot waters' of the Mediterranean thus restricting its role in the region. At the same time, the continuous presence of the Ottoman Empire acted as a shield against the domination of the Aegean by two of Russia's rivals: the French and the British.[58]

Due to their inherent differences on the 'Eastern Question', the foreign powers rarely agreed on a specific course of action as a response to Greece's policies. Instead, their responses tended to be unilateral and indirect. However, direct action was not altogether excluded. This became clear in their willingness to intervene, or threaten to intervene,

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[55] Dakin, D. *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia 1897-1913*. Greece: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1966
[56] see Rausanne, J A. *The Eastern Question: A Historical Study in European Diplomacy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923 also Smith, A. M. *The Great Powers and the Near East, 1774-1923*. London: Edward Arnold, 1970
[57] Papadopulos, G. S. *England the Near East 1896-1898*.Greece: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1969
[58] Theocharous, R. N. *Charilaos Tricoupes and Greek Territorial Expansion 1862-1882*. PhD Thesis, USA: Indiana University, 1970, p. 24

militarily when Greece's actions fell out of line with and caused a major disruption to their interests.[59]

Domestic political instability and the frustration of Greece's irredentist aspirations coupled with the unsettling role of the monarch in the country's political process[60] produced a "widespread disillusionment with western institutions".[61] The reasons that prompted Greece's acceptance of the client role had started to fade away but the same could not claimed for its legacy. When Greece adopted a more independent international stance and pursued the 'Megali Idea' without due consideration to the counsel of their foreign powers, and consequently without their support, the Greek pursuits suffered a series of setbacks. The culmination of these setbacks came in the form of a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Ottomans in 1897.

This humiliation served, for the Greek population, as an indication of their country's inability to match Turkey's military resources. It also highlighted Greece's dependence on the foreign powers for the realisation of its national goals. With the usefulness of their patrons in doubt, given the continuous setbacks Greece had suffered under their foreign policy and the failure of the Western oriented political processes to produce normality, a large section of the Greek population rejected Western influence and sought a return to the prevalence of the traditional modes of political and societal administration.

Even before the emergence of the Greek state, the Greeks envisioned a country that was to be "large, powerful, developed, civilised, a worthy descendant of its illustrious ancestors, capable of assuming the heavy role of the cross road of civilisation which geographical position had destined for her".[62] In sharp contrast, the Greece of the present was "small, poor, ill-governed and backward".[63] The failure of the Greek State and its

[59] Cofas, J. V. *International and Domestic Politics in Greece During the Crimean War*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980, especially pp. 64-94
[60] see Zaharopulos, G. "The Monarchy and Politics in Modern Greece" in Koumoulides, T. A. ed. *Greece in Transition*, London: Zeno, 1977
[61] Diamandouros, N. "Greek Political Culture in Transition: Historical Origins, Evolution, Current Trends" in Clogg, R. ed. *Greece in the 1980's*. London: Macmillan Press, 1983, p. 49
[62] ibid, p. 50
[63] ibid

institutions to realise the former vision of Greece led to the further erosion of its legitimacy in the eyes of the general public and did nothing for the mending of the pre-existing cleavage between society and state.

The importunate anarchy of Greek politics and the erosion of the functions of the state and by implication its representatives, the King and the politicians, incited the intervention of the armed forces.[64] It took the form of a disruptive takeover of authority from the hands of politicians, putting the military leaders in charge of Greece's affairs. Though their intervention was short lived, it left a deep imprint regarding the military's role in the political process of the country.[65] The military leaders were eager to restore Greece to normality and to that end, they invited the Cretan politician Venizelos to take over, offering him their support.[66]

His period in office was marked by a distinct reversal of roles for the Greek nation. With the backing of the armed forces, at least in the early stages of his involvement in Greek politics, Venizelos' liberal policies contributed significantly to bridging the gap between state and society. By adopting a hard line towards the old oligarchic elite, he managed to reduce drastically their control over the nation's political system. In turn, that allowed for the creation of a functional middle class that could become the herald of the changes in Greek society that transformed its pre-capitalist structures. Indeed those changes were supported and promoted by a vibrant section of the Greek society (the intellectuals, the merchants and the Greeks of the Diaspora) that shared Venizelos' distaste for the corrupt condition of Greece's political system and the nation's insubstantial status in the international arena that was seen as its logical outcome. These "men hoped that Venizelos would restore political stability to Greece, establish conditions necessary to economic growth, and perhaps manage to expand Greece's frontiers. The accomplishment of these

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[64] see Alexander, K. T. "The Changing Language of Political Contention in the Era of King George I" in Carabott, P. ed. *Greek Society in the Making 1863-1913, Realties, Symbols and Visions*. London: Centre for Hellenic Studies, Kings College London and Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997, pp. 202-5
[65] for an extended coverage see Gerozissis, T. *Officers' Corps and their Place Within Modern Greek Society, 1821-1975*. Athens: Dodoni Publications, 1993 (in Greek)
[66] Papacosma, S. V. *The Military in Greek Politics – The 1909 Coup D' Etat*. USA: Kent University Press, 1977

goals, in the opinion of such men, required that Greece imitate more completely the bourgeois states of Europe."[67]

With the influence of the old oligarchic elite constrained by Venizelos, a new breed of political men entered the fore. The recruiting of those men was not restricted to representatives of the upper classes, as had been the accepted norm until then. This gave a more representative tone to the political process and in consequence restored the electorate's faith in the system. In another significant development, with the Greek army emerging victorious in a series of Balkan wars, new territories were ceded to Greece.[68] With a recuperating economy, a strong and victorious army and a new faith in its political system Greece appeared to be close to eliminating the disparity between the country's conflicting images.

The fact that it failed to do so has been attributed to two factors. First the 'National Schism' of 1915 and second the 1921 Minor Asia 'Catastrophe' that proved to be the tombstone of the 'Megali Idea'. The 'National Schism' of 1915 is a term used to denote the split between Venizelos and the Monarch over the preferred Greek stance in the first Great War. Venizelos was a firm supporter of the 'Entente' whereas the King was a fierce supporter of Greece's neutrality. The former believed that Greece's entry into the war, on the 'Entente' side, would ensure new territorial gains for the country. The latter, on the other hand, believed the outcome of the war to be highly contestable and therefore considered Greece's participation on either side a decidedly risky venture. [69]

Despite the electorate's widespread acceptance of Venizelos, who they saw as their legitimate representative, the King was quick to have him replaced following their disagreement over the aforementioned issue. His successor was a man who, though having obtained a limited percentage of the electorate vote, was willing to follow the King's favoured policy, neutrality. By overriding the public will expressed in the election

[67] Joseph, E. W. *The Politics of Westernization: Eleutherios Venizelos' Third Administration of Greece.* June 1917-November 1920. PhD Thesis, USA: University of Pennsylvania, 1980, p. 47
[68] Kerofilias, C. *Eleftherios Venizelos.* London: John Murray, 1915, pp. 75-160

results, the King contributed to the erosion of the political system's legitimacy and brought to the fore, more decisively than ever before, the issue of his constitutional role.[70]

In essence, the disagreement between Venizelos and the King went beyond their personal differences over an issue of foreign policy. It was a disagreement "about the nature of the form of the government and the fate of the race, a difference that existed not only between two political understandings, but also between the moral and the intellectual composition of the combatants, a difference between two political worlds".[71] In these two worlds Venizelos' Liberal party was seen to stand for:[72] a) the circumvention of the old oligarchies with an authority that was drawn from the electorates support and belief in Venizelos abilities and liberal ideas; b) the rejection of the clientele system and the independence of the various public ministries from all parliamentary deputy pressure; c) the implementation of domestic and foreign policy on positivist principles, signalling a turn from the unfeasible romanticism of the past that ignored the country's real needs and mistook form for substance, and, finally, d) the instigation of laws that would cater to the needs of the people.

The King and his followers, on the other hand, were seen as the bearers of the old politics whose actions were determined by their desire to maintain the traditional clientele system of political and social relations as this best suited their interests. By dismissing Venizelos and bringing the army, the church, the bureaucracy of the state and finally the government itself, under his immediate control and patronage, the King's actions threatened to avert the positive course that Greece had taken after 1909. [73]

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[69] see Gibbons, H. A. *Venizelos*. New York: The Riverside Press Cambridge – Houghton Mifflin Company, 1920, pp. 159- 300
[70] ibid, p. 66
[71] Ibid, p. 74
[72] The information used is based on G. Papandreou's "Two Political Worlds" that was published as a political pamphlet on 15 May 1916 and was cited from Joseph, E. W. *The Politics of Westernization: Eleutherios Venizelos' Third Administration of Greece, June 1917- November 1920*. PhD Thesis, USA: University of Pennsylvania, 1980, pp. 74-5
[73] King Constantine's nickname 'Koumbaros' pointed to his affiliation with the old practices of Greece. His symbolic action to call the entire army as godfathers to his daughter signified his understanding of the working of the Greek society and the bond that united those who were connected through family ties.

With help from the French and the British, Venizelos finally defied the King and set up a provisional government in Thessalonica with the intent to bring Greece into the war on the side of the Allies. Greece in 1916 was officially split in two, run by two centres of political power. The King in Athens was in control of the "old Greece" whereas Venizelos with Thessaloniki as his administrative centre ruled in northern Greece and the islands. In the end, and by means of the Allies' intervention and support, Venizelos was able to reclaim power and unite the nation in 1917.

His first actions were to oust the King, while allowing the continuation of the institution of the monarchy with one of his sons as his successor, and to bring Greece into the war on the side of the Allies.[74] Neither of these actions proved popular with the Greek public and in fact they contributed to the erosion of his electoral basis. The King having enjoyed the status of commander in chief during the victorious Balkan Wars and on the virtue of his romantic fascination with the restoration of the Byzantine glories had emerged as a national symbol for the Greeks. His affiliation with the Orthodox religion, in a manner similar to that of the Byzantine Kings, added to his mystic appeal with the public.

With the allies supporting the provisional government of Venizelos[75], the King became an icon of Greece's refusal to once more submit to the demands of the foreign powers even if that was against the country's interests. Conversely, Venizelos, for a large section of the Greek public, assumed the role of the representative of the foreign powers' interests in Greece with all the implications this role carried with it. His subsequent purges of the royal to the King elements from the state machinery and the army, in retribution of similar action taken by the monarch after Venizelos' dismissal from the seat of the prime minister, reverted Greece's political system to a situation of suspicion and fragmentation.

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[74] Leontaritis, G. *Greece and the First World War: From Neutrality to Intervention, 1917-1918.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1990
[75] see Svolopoulos, C. *Greece and Britain during the First World War.* Greece: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1985

And if political instability at home had ignited a renewed legitimacy crisis for the Greek case, the 'Minor Asia' Campaign and its disastrous ending plunged it into deep disarray.[76] Greece under Venizelos managed to come closer to the realisation of the 'Megali Idea' than ever before. As a reward for its participation in the Great War on the side of the allies, Greece was handed control of the Asia Minor shores.[77] For the first time after Byzantium, the Greeks of the mainland were united with their brothers on the other side of the Aegean. Nonetheless, the dream was not to last for long.

Disagreements between the political and military leadership over the preferred course of action were the first visible sign of what was to follow. Despite delivering the 'Megali Idea', Venizelos was voted out of office by a Greek electorate that hadn't forgiven him for ousting the popular King for his role in the 'National Schism' of 1915. With the officers split into two factions, one supporting the King and the other Venizelos, the efficiency of the army was severely hindered.

In addition and under perplexed international circumstances, Allied support of the Greek cause had started to decrease. Though originally in favour of Greece's presence in Asia Minor, the allied stance was moderated on the basis that the Greek forces had not restricted their presence to the shores of Minor Asia, as originally agreed, but had instead extended this presence further inland. This caused the Allies a great deal of discontentment and anxiety. Greece's acclaimed mastery of both sides of the Aegean could have posed a series of problems for countries with vested interests in the region. Italy, for example, would have been faced with a new competitor in the struggle for regional dominance while Greece's control of the Aegean Sea could have endangered the British naval dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean.

When the political defeat of Venizelos signalled the return of the exiled King, the Allies had the excuse they needed in order to discontinue their support of the Greek forces in

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[76] Pollis, A. A. *Greece's Anatolian Venture and After – a Survey of the Diplomatic and Political Aspects of the Greek Expedition to Asia Minor (1915-1922)*, Southampton University – Hartley Library: Imprint DF838, 1937
[77] Diomidis, N. P. *Greece at the Paris Peace Conference*. Greece: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1978

Asia Minor.[78] Overextended, with poor lines of communication and confused by the political situation in the capital, the Greek expeditionary forces met with defeat at the hands of the Turkish nationalists in 1921.[79] The defeat was followed by the forced expulsion of the Greek element from the shores of Asia Minor. This "became the source of profoundly traumatic experiences for contemporary Greek society, replete with a deep sense of loss, disorientation, drift, and alienation coupled with widespread insecurity, moral agony, and despair which inevitably coloured both collective and individual attitudes towards state and politics alike".[80]

The Emergence of the KKE, Civil War and the Junta Years (1967-1974)

The 'National Schism' of 1915 and the 'Asia Minor' debacle brought Greece to its knees. The prevailing antagonistic nature of the Greek political process and its incapacity to reach consensus, even over issues of national interest, provided fresh impetus for the de-legitimisation of the state. The 'Megali Idea', the pursuit of the nationalistic notion that a great part of the Greek society viewed as the prerequisite for the very existence of the Greek State, was no longer to be. Lacking a national vision that could unite all Greeks and with the nation's pursuits in the international realm having come to an abrupt end, the Greek public became eager to point the finger at those it considered responsible for Greece's downfall. It was a process that was to divide Greece's middle class to its core.

The division reflected the difference of opinion on issues pertaining to the 'National Schism' of 1915, Greece's participation in the First Great War on the side of the Entente and the ruinous conclusion to the 'Asia Minor' expedition. At the heart of the disagreement lay the debate over the constitutional role of the King in the political process of the nation, with Greeks positioning themselves in the political arena on the basis of their views on the aforementioned issue.

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[78] Pollis, A . *Greece's Anatolian Venture and After: a Survey of the Diplomatic and Political Aspects of the Greek Expedition to Asia Minor (1915-1922)*. Southampton University – Hartley Library: Imprint DF838, 1937, especially pp. 75-148

[79] the ex Prince Andrew of Greece. *Towards Disaster: the Greek Army in Asia Minor in 1921*. London: J. Murray, 1930

Those who held liberal ideals advocated a political system free from royal intervention with power resting on the representatives of the public will, as this would be expressed in the electoral process. Those loyal to the monarchy, on the other hand, disenchanted by the workings of the political system, wished to bequeath ultimate political power to the monarch. They drew their ranks from sections of the Greek public that a) perceived the King as a symbol of unity that could rise above the petty disagreements of politicians and thus act as a guarantor of the nation's political system and/or b) those who, dispirited by the professed negative role of Greece's allies in Asia Minor, rejected Venizelos' extrovert and cosmopolitan policies and campaigned for a retreat to Greece's traditional values and beliefs, with the King as the defender of the nation in a manner similar to the Byzantine years.

However, the consolidation of Greece's working class and the emergence of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) as the latter's most dynamic segment, changed the situation. This revamped working class acted as a bridge that reunited the country's middle class.[81] For the potential dangers that this new configuration of political and social forces represented for the well-being and interests of the divided middle class were felt at both end of the spectrum in equal measures.

The state and its representatives responded to the emergence of the working class movement with the introduction of a series of suppressive measures aimed at the sustenance of the political and societal status quo. Inexorably those measures came to be highly exclusive in nature, openly restricting the representatives of the working class from gaining access to the political system that was supposed to represent them and cater to their needs. Accordingly, the end result of those processes was the promotion of an exclusive political system that, under the aegis of the restored institution of monarchy dissolved the parliament and under the leadership of a representative of the armed forces, General Metaxas, established a dictatorship on 4 August 1936. The 'reason given was to

[80] Diamandouros, N. "Greek Political Culture in Transition: Historical Origins, Evolution, Current Trends" in Clogg, R. ed. *Greece in the 1980's*. London: Macmillan Press, 1983, p. 49
[81] see Clogg, R. *Parties and Elections in Greece*. London: C. Hurst & Company, 1987, p. 171

prevent a communist revolution or save the country from communism, depending on where it was convenient to place the stress".[82]

Metaxas was still in power at the outbreak of World War II. Under his charge, Greece recorded one of the nation's most celebrated moments in its modern history: the repulsion of the vastly superior Italian forces and the subsequent conquest of an area known as Northern Epirus to the Greeks. This area, with the majority of its population speaking Greek, had been a long-disputed area between Greece and the neighbouring state of Albania. Nonetheless, success was short lived and Greece was soon overrun by the advancing Nazi forces, leaving the nation under the immediate control of Germany and its allies, Bulgaria and Italy.

Though part of the old regime chose to co-operate with the occupying forces in the formation of collaborationist governments, Greece soon witnessed the formation of various resistance groups recruiting members from across the political spectrum. Owing largely to the participation in them of numerous liberal, pro-Venizelist officers, purged from active duty as a direct effect of the exclusionary measures adopted prior to and after Metaxas' dictatorship,[83] these groups enjoyed considerable success against Greece's conquerors. However, success was hindered by the same divisive characteristics that had troubled modern Greece relentlessly since its foundation. Before long the various groups that represented the Greek Communist party came to dominate the resistance movement, causing concern and worry among the conservative, royalist elements.

Despite its uninterrupted presence since 1922, the Greek Communist party had not until then made its presence felt.[84] Its only non-ideational impact on Greece's political system was indirect and was to be used by Metaxas as the justification for the establishment of his dictatorial regime. What "transformed the situation during the resistance period was

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[82] Cliadakis, H. *Greece; 1935-1941: The Metaxas Regime and the Diplomatic Background to World War II*. PhD Thesis, USA: New York University, 1970, p. vii

[83] for a discussion on the matter see Gerolymatos, A. The Role of the Greek Officer Corps in Resistance. *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, XI (3), Fall 1984, pp. 69-79

that the party coupled itself with the Republican military leadership. This conjunction formed the National Liberation Front and its National Peoples Army (EAM-ELAS)."[85] It was a development that shaped Greece's post-war political system.[86]

It soon became clear that the ultimate objective of the EAM-ELAS (National Democratic Party) units was not just the disruption of German activities in Greece. Having been denied the opportunity to participate legitimately in the political system by the creation of an exclusive state, they were hell-bent on bidding for political control of post-war Greece, even by means of armed insurrection.

They were faced with the combined resistance of the right wing, royalist resistance groups, EDES being the most influential amongst them, and that of the 'Security Battalions' organised under the auspices of the Quisling government.[87] Those 'Security Battalions' included professional officers from both the republican and royalist camp in a development of great political significance.

The marginalisation of the republican front and its subsequent position at the fault line between the forces of the left and the right brought to the fore the dilemma facing the pro-Venizelist bloc; either "a common bourgeois front with Anti-Venizelism around the Crown or a common Republican front with the left".[88] In either case, "it was the end of the Liberal project for bourgeois hegemony".[89] Accordingly, the pro-Venizelist forces were divided in their preferences. While the majority of the party hierarchy pledged its allegiance to the forces of the Right, the majority of the grass root followers subscribed to the Communist cause. In doing so, they shifted the level of political strife in Greece along

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[84] For a comprehensive account of the Greek Communist Party see Vlavianos, H. "The Greek Communist Party: In Search of a Revolution" in Judt, T. *Resistance and Revolution in Mediterranean Europe; 1939-1948.* London: Routledge, 1989

[85] Cliadakis, H. *Greece; 1935-1941: The Metaxas Regime and the Diplomatic Background to World War II.* PhD Thesis, USA: New York University, 1970, p. 300

[86] for an elaborate discussion on the relationship between the party and the EAM- ELAS see Loulis, J. *The Greek Communist Party, 1940- 44.* London: Groom Helm

[87] Gerolymatos, A. The Security Battalions and the Civil War. *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora,* XII (1), Spring 1985, pp. 17-27

[88] Mavrogordatos, G. Th. *Stillborn Republic; Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece 1922-1936.* London: University of California Press, 1983, p. 348

[89] ibid, p. 349

social class lines, thus accounting for the participation of liberal officers and soldiers on both fronts.

With the advancement of the allied forces in Europe and the forthcoming defeat of the Nazis, the hostilities between the various resistance groups in Greece over the control of the post-war Greek State intensified.[90] The communists demanded recognition as a legitimate political force; a demand that was met with dynamic opposition from the Royalist/conservative forces, who having secured the backing of Britain, decisively suppressed their demands.[91]

From 1946 until 1949, Greece experienced a bloody civil war that resulted in the defeat of the Communist forces, the devastation of the Greek periphery and the emergence of a state whose ultimate objective was the expulsion and containment of communism in the country.[92] With emphasis on the state placed upon the violent, if necessary, containment of a large part of the Greek public, the armed forces emerged as the guardians of the nation's political system. With the encouragement of the USA, which had by then replaced Britain as Greece's patron, a deeply Royalist military with no time for parliamentary practices had become the driving force of the Greek State and the outspoken representative of the Right.

Having either subsumed it opponents, in the case of the republicans that joined its ranks, or defeated them in battle, in the case of the communists, the Right had managed to complete the commandeering of the state in a process that had been put into motion by the Metaxas dictatorship. Henceforth the state held control of all major activities in the societal, economic and political sphere. It rewarded those who adhered to its principles,

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[90] see Vlavianos, H. *Greece 1941-1949. From Resistance to Civil War.* London: St. Anthony – MacMillan Series, 1992 also Chouliaras, Y. A History of Politics versus a Politics of History: Greece 1936- 1949. *Journal of Modern Hellenism*, 6, 1989, pp. 207-221 also Iatrides, J. *Greece in the 1940's – A nation in crisis.* USA: University Press of New England, 1981 also Close, D. *The Origins of the Greek Civil War.* London: Longman, 1995

[91] see Baerentzen,L. The Demonstration in Syntagma Square on Sunday the 3d of December 1944. *Scandinavian Studies in Modern Greek*, 2, pp. 3-52

[92] see Economides, S. *The International Implications Of The Greek Civil War: The Interaction Of Domestic And External Forces.* PhD Thesis, University of London, 1990 also Vukmanovic, S. *How and Why the People's Liberation Struggle of Greece met with Defeat.* London: Merlin Press, 1985

as these principles were set out by the victors of the civil war, and punished those who challenged its authority, the vanquished of the civil war.

> While this profound social and ideological division which has so indelibly marked post-war Greek reality allows us to speak for a divided political culture consisting of the subculture of the victors and that of the vanquished, the deeper impact of this development upon the national political culture can be seen in the quasi-universal attitudes of extreme suspicion, profound alienation and moral ambivalence towards the state and the political system as a whole which arose from the identification of the state and of the political system, in the eyes of victor and vanquished alike, which particularism and nepotism, corruption, venality and pronounced partisanship. [93]

Indeed, although the Greek economy witnessed a period of seemingly protracted economic growth, especially between 1960 and 1973,[94] the country continued to suffer the consequences of the exclusionary character of its state at both the economic and societal level. The first and most obvious of these consequences was the failure of the Greek economy to "absorb labour as quickly as it was becoming available", which in turn resulted in a large exodus of often skilled workers towards the richer states of Western Europe and North America.[95] Formally excluding, from all state related activities, everyone who directly or indirectly sided with the communist side during the civil war, and due to the "use of explicitly political, nonmeritocratic, and clientelistic criteria for state employment, the Greek civil service and state-controlled enterprises were staffed with personnel often deficient in necessary skills but possessed of powerful connections, rendering them quasi-immune to effective quality control and prone to corruption". [96]

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[93] Diamandouros, N. "Greek Political Culture in Transition: Historical Origins, Evolution, Current Trends" in Clogg, R. ed. *Greece in the 1980's*. London: Macmillan Press, 1983, p. 53
[94] see Thomadakis, S. B. "The Greek Economy: Performance, Expectations, & Paradoxes" in Allison, Graham T., Nicolaidis, K. eds. *The Greek Paradox*. London: The MIT Press, 1997, pp. 42-5
[95] see ibid, p. 45
[96] Diamandouros, N. "Greek Politics and Society in the 1990's" in Allison, Graham T., Nicolaidis, K. eds. *The Greek Paradox*. London: The MIT Press, 1997, p. 26

Moreover, this period of sustained growth was to a large extent achieved with the support of the state. This support was expressed by placing the public sector under its immediate control and by bolstering the economy with strict government regulation of consumer prices, interest rates and credit and investment selection that was directed towards those who enjoyed the approval of the rulers.[97] This practice of selective allocation of benefits, on the basis of political affiliation within the deeply divided post civil war Greek society, further reduced the checks placed upon the state, thereby increasing the independence of the latter in relation to the former.[98]

In the long run, this practice had the four following devastating effects on both the social cohesion and economic efficacy of the country. Firstly, it intensified and decisively asserted the notion of a weak civil society that had not yet convalesced from the traumas of Nazi occupation and the civil war that had ensued. Secondly, it averted the creation of a transparent mechanism of checks and balances that would hold the state accountable for its actions. Thirdly, it actively discouraged the establishment of new arrangements that would be able to bridge the differences between the opposing segments of Greek society. And, finally, it stood as a testament to the exclusionist nature of the state and warranted the feelings of inequality felt among a significant section of Greek society that in turn had a dual result. It led to the de-legitimisation of the post-war political and social system and the market apparatus it produced.[99]

The appropriation of the state by the right reached its apogee during the seven years (1967-1974) military dictatorship of the Colonels.[100] So did the foreign interference in Greece.[101] With the Cold War at its height the USA was eager to ensure Greece's opposition to the Eastern Bloc's powers. By supporting the armed forces' involvement in

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[97] Thomadakis, S, B. "The Greek Economy: Performance, Expectations, & Paradoxes" in Allison, Graham T., Nicolaidis, K. eds. *The Greek Paradox*. London: The MIT Press, 1997, p. 51
[98] Diamandouros, N. "Greek Politics and Society in the 1990's" in Allison, Graham T., Nicolaidis, K. eds. *The Greek Paradox*. London: The MIT Press, 1997, p. 26
[99] see ibid, pp. 26-7
[100] see Woodhouse, C. M. *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels*. London: Granada Publishing Ltd, 1985
[101] see Papandreou, A. Democracy at Gunpoint; The Greek Front, New York, 1970 see also Devallon, B. *United States Foreign Policy Regarding Greece, Turkey and Cyprus: The Rule of Law and American Interests*. Washington D.C.: American Hellenic Institute, 1999 see also Couloumbis, T. et al. *Foreign Interference in Greek Politics*. NY: Pella, 1976

the political affairs of Greece, the USA knowingly created a 'praetorian' state under the control of a military leadership that shared its anti-communist ideas and was both ideologically and materially dependent on it. [102]

The Collapse of the Dictatorship and the Democratisation of the Political System
The end of the junta regime in 1974 brought a watershed of changes to Greek politics. To begin with, it brought the formal end of the exclusionary and divisive legislation that had been in place ever since Metaxas' dictatorship, a system that had afforded the Right unswerving control of the state. Subsequently, the right of free association and political representation was extended to include all sections of Greek society, including those that had previously been denied access to it, namely the communists who were from then on recognised as a legitimate political force. Following a plebiscite, the institution of the monarchy was abolished, thus effectively and positively solving the question over the Monarch's constitutional role, a question that had troubled Greek politics continually throughout the past decades. However, whereas the above mentioned novelties represented a break from the past, the political system that emerged retained the idea that the best form of the constitutional state was the "monocratic system in which the main functions of supreme powers are concentrated in one authority" (in earlier times the King or more recently the leader of the governing party). [103]

Accordingly, under the guidance of the charismatic politician Karamanlis, who headed the interim civilian government ensuring the transition from military rule to democracy, the right was reorganised along democratic lines. By "purging the anti-democratic extremist elements that had come to the forefront during the military dictatorship", [104] this new political formation sought to cover the right of centre space in Greece's political

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[102] on the 'Pretorian State' see Huntington, S. *The Soldier And The State: The Theory And Politics Of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957 also Huntington, S. *Political Order in Developing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968; on the issue of Greek civil-military relations at the time see Veremis, T. *The Military in Greek Politics – From Independence to Democracy*. London: Hurst & Company, 1999 also Veremis, T. *The Greek Army in Politics*. PhD Thesis, Oxford University- Trinity College, 1974 and Veremis, T. "Security Considerations and Civil- Military Relations in Post War Greece" in Clogg, R. ed. *Greece in the 1980's*. London: Macmillan Press, 1983
[103] Wenturis, N. "Political Culture" in Kazakos, P., Ioakimidis, P. C. eds. *Greece and EC Membership Evaluated*. London: Pinter, 1994, p. 229
[104] Clogg, R. *Parties and Elections in Greece*. London: C. Hurst & Company, 1987, p. 154

scene. Karamanlis appropriately named the party 'New Democracy' (Nea Dimokratia).[105] Under his austere leadership the 'New Democracy' party governed the country for the crucial transitory period until it met with electorate defeat at the hands of a political formation that had also emerged after the collapse of the junta regime: The Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK).[106]

Addressing the left to centre space in the Greek political system for the first time after Venizelos, PASOK, under the austere management of another charismatic political leader, Andreas Papandreou, "achieved an extensive renewal of political personnel and brought new ideas and practices to the Greek party-political arena".[107] The party's (or 'movement's' as Papandreou insisted on characterising it) march to power was spectacular and unparalleled in Greek political history. Since its foundation in 1974, with Greece still in the haze of the post-junta atmosphere, PASOK managed to more than triple its share of the electorate vote from 14 per cent in the 1974 elections to 48 per cent of the 1981 electoral triumph. Its rise to power was of momentous importance for Greek politics. It put an end to the Right's control of the state, and by implication their domination over the country's decision-making centres.[108] In doing so, these became accessible to a large section of the population who had hitherto been denied access to them on the basis of their leftist political persuasions.

In a contemporaneous development, only months after PASOK's electoral victory, the country experienced another event of great magnitude. Greece became the tenth member of the European Community following an application process that had been largely instigated and vigorously pursued by Karamanlis' governments. Soon after the restoration of democracy in Greece, and disillusioned by NATO's passivity over the Cyprus debacle in 1974, Karamanlis had made Greece's integration into the European

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[105] see Woodhouse, C. M. *Karamanlis, The Restorer of Greek Democracy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982

[106] Mavrogordatos, G. Th. *Rise of the Green Sun: The Greek Election of 1981*. London: Kings College, 1983

[107] Lyrintzis, C. Political Parties in Post-junta Greece: A case of Bureaucratic Clientelism? *West European Politics*, VII, 1984, p. 110

[108] see Karabelias, G. *Civil–Military Relations: A Comparative Analysis of the Role of the Military in the Political Transformation of Post War Turkey and Greece: 1980-1995*. Final Report Submitted to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in June 1998

Community a national priority for three reasons. Firstly, he was convinced that its entry into the Community would once and for all anchor Greece to the West. Secondly, he believed that the democratic nature of the Community's institutions would have a consolidating effect on their Greek counterparts, still tormented by the practices of the state's not so distant, undemocratic past. And last, but by no means least, he saw the European Community acting as a counterbalance to the overarching influence of the USA and NATO on Greek foreign affairs. In his own words, "entry into the EEC could first and foremost free Greece from all forms of foreign intervention and dependencies".[109]

However, Papandreou's socialists, at least in their political rhetoric, did not share their political rivals' fervour for the European Community. Indeed much of PASOK's pre-1981 political campaigning was based on a platform that saw Greece as a "peripheral country which should be engaged in throwing off the imperialist yoke, not in tightening the bonds to the metropolitan centres of Western Europe"[110] as accession to the EC implied. The electorate support the party enjoyed in the aforementioned period testified to the sizeable popularity this view held among the Greek public.

For Greece was, in many ways, still a country on the periphery of Western Europe. It had a distinct historical past and a political culture that had been profoundly influenced by centuries of Ottoman rule. A direct consequence of this Turkish occupation was that Greece had developed by and large in relative isolation from the events that had historically shaped Western Europe, such as the Renaissance, the Scientific Revolution of the 17th century, the Enlightenment, and the French and Industrial Revolutions.[111] This sense of geographical, political and cultural exclusion from the West, combined with memories of the dominant and seditious role that the latter had played in both the domestic and external affairs of Greece, meant that a large section of Greek society felt nothing but antipathy for the values and ideals of the Community. These feelings of

[109] Kathimerini (Greek Daily), 11 April 1978 cited in Ioakimidis, P. C. The EC and the Greek Political System: an overview in Kazakos, P., Ioakimidis, P. C. *Greece and EC Membership Evaluated*. London: Pinter, 1994, p. 142
[110] Verney, S. "From the 'Special Relationship' to Europeanism: PASOK and the European Community, 1981- 89" in Clogg, R. ed. *Greece in the 1980's*. London: Macmillan Press, 1983, p. 134

antipathy were transformed into odium following what they saw as the West's failure in three crucial areas. Its failure to avert both the establishment of the military dictatorship in Athens in 1967 and the 1974 Turkish occupation of 40 per cent of Cyprus, and finally their inability to provide Greece with unconditional support in a series of bilateral disputes with Turkey. It "was precisely this sense of betrayal and disillusionment that Papandreou was able to harness",[112] and utilise for the benefit of his party.

Not withstanding the above, PASOK's policies had shifted considerably by the time of the 1981 elections. The "issue of the EC had now been completely separated from that of NATO, which had been represented as the Community's alter ego in a famous PASOK slogan of the mid-1970s"[113] and accordingly accession to the former had stopped being a non-issue. Instead, the issues pertaining to the accession process were used to criticise the Nea Democrat government for failing to adequately protect the socio-economic and political interests of the Greek public within the framework of the Community's policies.

This, according to Papandreou, would be best achieved by insisting on obtaining special considerations for Greek demands, alternatively referred to as 'special regulations', and then leaving it to the EC to decide whether it would, in his own words, 'drive us out like naughty children'.[114] It was this critical yet not discarding stance over Greece's accession to the EC that enabled PASOK to address a wider spectrum of the electorate, notably those voters whose political allegiances were closer to the Centre and who had, until this time, felt alienated by PASOK's radical Left approach. These newly found political sympathies contributed significantly to PASOK's triumphant 48 per cent victory in the 1981 elections.

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[111] see Clogg, R. Introduction in Clogg, R. ed. *Greece in the 1980's*. London: Macmillan Press, 1983, p. viii-ix

[112] Clogg, R. Introduction in Clogg, R. ed. *Greece in the 1980's*. London: Macmillan Press, 1983, p. ix

[113] Verney, S. From the 'Special Relationship' to Europeanism: PASOK and the European Community, 1981-89 in Clogg, R. ed. *Greece in the 1980's*. London: Macmillan Press, 1983, p. 135. The mentioned slogan read 'Europe and Nato, the same syndicate', (Europe kai NATO, to idio syndicato).

[114] Eleftherotypia (Greek Daily), 29 November 1980 cited in Verney, S. From the 'Special Relationship' to Europeanism: PASOK and the European Community, 1981-89 in Clogg, R. ed. *Greece in the 1980's*. London: Macmillan Press, 1983, p. 136

Papandreou's rhetoric concerning Greece's place in the European Community was also indicative of his denunciation of the broader European social democratic movement.[115] At a time when socialist parties across south western Europe were playing the leading role in the politics of their respective countries, rallying on the deficiencies of the welfare state adopted by the conservative governments of northern Europe, Papandreou refuted the wisdom of social democracy and its, as he saw it, dependence on conventional economics and bureaucracies. As "an intellectual from an academic background he saw in PASOK a vital source of new ideas for Greek development, a party freed from conventional social democratic attachment to Keynesian type reform".[116]

Keen to implement the policies of its leader, the first PASOK government produced economic and social policies with the intention of benefiting the middle and lower layers of Greek society that had been instrumental in its electoral victory. This was done by "introducing substantial increases in wages and salaries and by the indexing of salaries and pensions".[117] It was this eagerness to satisfy the demands of its electoral base, irrespective of the results these diverse and often conflicting demands could have on the socio-economic cohesion and rationale of the broader society, that has since led many political commentators to brand PASOK's political persona as 'populist'.

In the words of a political analyst, what PASOK termed socialism "proved to be unadulterated populism at its worst".[118] It was a form of populism based on the assumption that the only real conflict in society was that between all 'non-privileged' Greeks and a small 'oligarchy' that consisted of the agents of domestic and foreign 'monopolies'.[119] Nonetheless, by adopting this political strategy, PASOK not only maintained its dominant position within the Greek political scene but it also increased its influence within Greek society. By waving the flag of the 'underdog' they appealed to all

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[115]Kariotis, T. C. "The Rise and Fall of the Green Sun" in Kariotis, T. C. ed. *The Greek Socialist Experiment, Papandreou's Greece 1981-1989.* New York: Pella, 1992, p. 16
[116] ibid, p. 17
[117] Lyrintzis, C. "PASOK in Power: From 'Change' to Disenchantment" in Clogg, R. ed. *Greece in the 1980's.* London: Macmillan Press, 1983, p. 26
[118] Mavrogordatos, G. Th. "Civil Society Under Populism" in Clogg, R. ed. *Greece in the 1980's.* London: Macmillan Press, 1983, p. 47
[119] ibid, p. 48

those who felt neglected by the existing social and political realities, irrespective of their social class.[120]

It was in this way that PASOK gained the support of the vast part of the new middle class, a class that had emerged during Greece's reconstruction after World War II, but which had only been allowed to flourish after the restoration of democracy in 1974. This new middle class included doctors, lawyers, high-ranking public officials, educational entrepreneurs and merchants involved in the new areas of transport and electronics.[121] Through their activities they had been able to amass considerable financial gains but had remained unable to exchange this newly acquired wealth for social recognition and/or political representation. PASOK's ideological platform and political organisation provided them with both of the above and they, thus, became the party's most faithful followers.

Yet, although it depicted itself as the bearer and herald of modernisation, this new middle class acted as an obstacle to the very process it evangelised. The new, "rising middle stratum appropriated wealth in large part through 'windfall gains' in real estate, tourism and related non-productive services".[122] Contrary to the prosperity these new realities brought for a section of the population, the Greek economy was left lingering with no apparent efforts being made to remedy its faults. The reason for this resided in the fact that any attempts made to rationalise the structures of the problematic Greek economy would primarily have had an effect on those who benefited most from the existing realities. Had the desire to address the problems been pragmatic and not restricted to political rhetoric, much of the resources of the floating wealth that this new middle class depended on for its prosperity would have been severely limited, leaving its members dissatisfied. With their needs neglected, they would then, most probably, have withdrawn their support from PASOK's government: a government that had acted as their patron. That they would have reacted in such a way should come as no surprise as, if one

[120] Kariotis, T. C. "The Rise and Fall of the Green Sun" in Kariotis, T. C. ed. *The Greek Socialist Experiment, Papandreou's Greece 1981-1989.* New York: Pella, 1992, p. 19
[121] Petras, J. "The Contradictions of Greek Socialism" in Kariotis, T. C. ed. *The Greek Socialist Experiment, Papandreou's Greece 1981-1989*, New York: Pella, 1992, p. 106

observes Greek history, one is able to see that it is in the very heart of the client–patron relations that once the patron is no longer able to meet his/her client demands, the latter ceases to view their relationship as profitable. He/she thereafter withdraws his/her support, possibly shifting his/her allegiance to a new patron that appears more able and willing to promote his/her interest.

Losing the support of a considerable section of its electorate basis, PASOK would have foregone political predominance, which would have led to its eventual ejection from the governing seat. Its eviction from power would consequently have had serious and, in most cases, adverse repercussions on all those elements within Greek society who had benefited from its existence and had personal stakes in its preservation as the governing political party. It thus becomes clear why the preservation of the status quo was seen as the best strategy for all those who profited from the existing economic realities. Opportunistic wealth was preferred to long term economic efficiency and prosperity. Once again this was a choice that stemmed from a notion deeply rooted in the Greek psyche regarding the limitation of resources within the country, which were often deemed insufficient to provide for everyone's needs. It was also a choice embroiled in the individualistic nature of the Greeks, socialised as they were in the belief that the world is an inherently hostile place; one in which self-interest is the person's main motivation. In such a world, the decision made by parts of Greek society to place short term, personal gains, above the long-term, communal prosperity promised by the rationalisation of the economy, seemed to have a valid, if not less faulty, origin.

The immediate result of the aforementioned practices in the domestic, public and private sector was the further deterioration of Greece's economy. The increased public spending and generous handing out of loans to petitioners who were supposed to develop Greece's industrial base was not followed by an increase in domestic production. Quite the contrary, industrial growth suffered considerable setbacks and unemployment and inflation were on the increase.

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[122] ibid, p. 107

PASOK's answer to the problem was to be found in an extensive programme of securing foreign loans intended to revitalise the Greek economy. Yet again the money was used to appease the electorate and secure PASOK's dominance. This was achieved by the vigorous pursuit of costly social policies, thus averting the propagation of a competitive economic environment, and the unjustified and unwarranted expansion of the public sector. Between 1981 and 1988, "the number of civil servants serving in the central administration increased six times as fast as the number of actively employed in the labour force".[123] It served as a reminder that modern Greeks have "come to expect that as soon as a political party decisively wins the general elections it acquires full control over the state, and remains unchallenged in storming the bureaucracy with its own party personnel and passing legislation in parliament".[124]

In doing so, Papandreou sought to firm up his party's control of Greek society by creating a large social group that would be directly dependent on the state for its existence and therefore dependent on the ruling party, PASOK. This form of dependency became even greater since in many cases the candidates' sole qualification for their position in the state mechanism was their political allegiance to PASOK. It "was a well designed strategy aimed at opening the political system to the middle and lower strata – which traditionally had been excluded from the benefits of power – and at the same time at consolidating the party's electorate clientele".[125]

PASOK's policies were successful in the sense that they kept the party in power for three consecutive elections and created a highly steadfast electorate base, yet were destructive for Greece's economic development. As a commentator on the field put it:
"What passed and still passes as an industrial sector was largely assembly plants with little or no capital equipment and research capability. The debt/capital investment ratio remained one of the highest in the world because industry was directed not by the usual

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[123] cited from Sotiropoulos, D. A. "A Colossus With Feet of Clay: The State in Post-Authoritarian Greece" in Psomiades, H. J., Thomadakis, S. B. *Greece, the New Europe and the Changing International Order*. New York: Pella, 1993, pp. 46-7
[124] ibid, p. 44
[125] Lyrintzis, C. "PASOK in Power: From 'Change' to Disenchantment" in Clogg, R. ed. *Greece in the 1980's*. London: Macmillan Press, 1983, p. 26

kind of entrepreneur but by a highly distinctive stratum of *kleptocrats*."[126] What is more, these practices did more than encourage the creation of a largely non-productive section in the society.[127] They also presented their non-productive values and ideology in a Greek society that was rapidly placing wealth, even if acquired through unlawful and unethical activities, at the forefront of its cultural and ideational hierarchy.

As a result, Greece's economic recession continued even after PASOK was forced to proclaim a programme of economic austerity. With the continuous deferment of a pragmatic and much needed structural adjustment of the economy, just the rhetoric of a proclaimed austerity programme was not enough to avert its impending doom. Nevertheless, it was a significant shift from PASOK's previous economic policies. It came as a result of Papandreou's realisation that his former policies were failing to deliver the desired results.

He, therefore, reverted to more conventional Keynesian measures, long favoured amongst Europe's other socialist parties. This showed his intention not only to bring his party closer to the aforementioned political family, but also to further anchor Greece to the European Community that he now looked upon in a more favourable light. His proclamations of the new economic measures for the betterment of the Greek economy met with the approval of "orthodox economic technocrats in the European Community, OECD, and International Monetary Fund".[128] Appropriately and as a part of the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes designed to aid and bolster the troubled economies of the Mediterranean regions of the European Community, the PASOK government secured a major economic loan and in addition, the Single Act was accepted and ratified by the Greek parliament.[129]

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[126] Petras, J. "The Contradictions of Greek Socialism" in Kariotis, T. C. ed. *The Greek Socialist Experiment, Papandreou's Greece 1981- 1989.* New York: Pella, 1992, p. 109
[127] for an analysis among similar lines see Tsoukalas, C. "Free Riders in Wonderland, or of Greeks in Greece" in Constas, D., Stavrou, T. G. eds. *Greece Prepares for the Twenty-First Century.* London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1995
[128] Couloumbis, T. "Andreas Papandreou: The Style and Substance of Leadership" in Kariotis, T. C. ed. *The Greek Socialist Experiment, Papandreou's Greece 1981-1989.* New York: Pella, 1992, p. 91

Seduced by the economic benefits that participation in the European Community ensured on the one hand, and encouraged by the changed, more positive than ever, rhetoric of the governing political party with regards to Europe on the other, the mood among the Greek public changed accordingly. From the mere 38 per cent who viewed Greece's participation in the European Community as a 'good thing' in autumn 1981, the proportion rose to 58 per cent in the autumn of 1987 and from that to 73 per cent in the autumn of 1991.[130]

Hence, by the mid -1980s Greece had managed to consolidate a strong democratic political system, putting the evils of the junta period in the past. The Socialist victory provided a large section of the population, formerly excluded from the spoils of government, with access to power and the associated wealth and prosperity that accompanied it, albeit, not without considerable harm to the socio-economic fabric of Greece. Participation in the European Community also attached Greece to the democratic traditions of Western Europe. The association of Greek civil servants with their counterparts under the service of the European Commission and/or a series of the European Community's institutions baptised them in the workings of modern organisations. This "modernisation of practices is a process through which a Community dimension gradually becomes an integral part of Greek political culture as a result of Greece's EU membership".[131]

In line with the reasons that initially prompted Konstantinos Karamanlis- the former Greek Prime Minister closely associated with the country's European path- to passionately seek the Greek admission into the European Community, "it is now almost axiomatically accepted by virtually all political forces (with the exception of the KKE)

[129] Featherstone, K. "Political Parties" in Kazakos, P., Ioakimidis, P. C. eds. *Greece and EC Membership Evaluated*. London: Pinter, 1994, p. 155
[130] Source: Eurobarometer, European Commission cited in Featherstone, K. "Political Parties" in Kazakos, P., Ioakimidis, P. C. eds. *Greece and EC Membership Evaluated*. London: Pinter, 1994, p. 155
[131] Moschonas, A. European Integration and Prospects of Modernisation in Greece. *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 15 (2), 1997, p. 332

that participation in the EC constitutes a vital condition for defending Greece's sovereignty, independence, national identity and ever territorial integrity".[132]

Additionally Greece's participation in the European Union was seen as producing an undeniable ally for the modernising forces within Greek society that would slowly but inevitably help "tip the historical balance of forces in their favour"[133] and against the traditionalist lines of argument.

For Greece, having embraced its participation in the European Union, also accepted the "integration of markets and integration of policies and institutions that affect the EU member states, conditioning their process of socio-economic and political development".[134] In terms of economy this translated as Greece's active participation in a process of market modernisation; a process of economic and monetary union aspiring to create a single economic space within the boundaries of the European Union.[135] The prerequisite being, nonetheless, the remedy of Greece's major macroeconomic imbalances; namely that of public deficit and inflation that have dogged its economy for fifteen years.[136]

To that extent the continuation of Nea Dimokratia's pro-European policies and the rise to power of a pro-European technocrat in PASOK, Konstantinos Simitis, following Papandreou's withdrawal from public life and his subsequent death, can be seen to facilitate the realisation that "the modernisation of markets, reinforced by the operation of EU rules, necessarily carries with it the political legitimation of the forces in Greece that in principle support European integration".[137]

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[132] Ioakimidis, P. C. "The EC and the Greek Political System: an Overview" in Kazakos, P., Ioakimidis, P. C. eds. *Greece and EC Membership Evaluated*, London: Pinter, 1994, p. 142
[133] Diamandouros, N. "Politics and Culture in Greece, 1974-91: An Interpretation" in Clogg, R. ed. *Greece, 1981-1989: The Populist Decade.* London: Macmillan Press, 1993, p. 20
[134] Moschonas, A. European Integration and Prospects of Modernisation in Greece. *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 15 (2), 1997, pp. 331-2
[135] for an elaborate conversation see Thomadakis, S. B. "European Economic Integration, the Greek State, and the Challenges of the 1990's" in Psomiades, H. J., Thomadakis, S. B. *Greece, the New Europe and the Changing International Order.* New York: Pella, 1993
[136] Psomiades, H. J., Thomadakis, S. B. "Greece at the Crossroads" in Psomiades, H. J., Thomadakis, S. B. *Greece, the New Europe and the Changing International Order.* New York: Pella, 1993, p. 15
[137] ibid, p. 332

Although these changes seemed to buttress the modernising tendencies among Greek society, many of its traditional characteristics continue to endure. In that respect not much has changed from the time when a scholar of the field noted that, among the Greek nation, one could identify relative "authoritarian family structures; deference in the educational system; the importance of the Church, particularly in village communities; a clash between formal and popular cultures; clientelism in politics; and a strong public sector, though with a weak welfare state".[138]

Notwithstanding the above, and as Simitis commented with regards to the new realities in the international political economy in general, and the process of European integration and its impact on Greece's national strategy more specifically, "these developments will eventually redefine the conditions of international competition in the sense that the international division of labour will be conditioned by the antagonisms of supranational entities. Thus the logic of nation-state will gradually but steadily be replaced by post national arrangements."[139] In that respect, the undeniable change that has occurred is the creation of a new, volatile and highly competitive international economic environment. One that "reinforces social reorganisation and thus produces social and political unrest".[140] Nonetheless, given the fact that both the internationalisation of the market economy and the creation of an integrated European space are on going processes, any attempts to comment on their definitive effect on Greek society would be premature.

The advances of modern technology and the new international economic realities in combination with the pressures for adjustment to the unifying socio-economic, common European space are undoubtedly favouring the forces of modernisation. In spite of the above and although institutions change in name and appearance, it cannot be claimed that the change of their primary functions and character occurs at the same speed. Changes in

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[138] Featherstone, K., Katsoudas, D. eds. *Political Change in Greece – Before and After the Colonels*. London: Groom Helm, 1987, p. 9-10
[139] cited from Moschonas, A. European Integration and Prospects of Modernisation in Greece. *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 15 (2), 1997, p. 331
[140] ibid, p. 332

the latter necessitate changes in broader social attitudes and behaviours that often occur at a very slow pace.[141]

This can be particularly attributed to the resistance felt from all those sections within society, for whom any break from the traditional practices of the past is anathema. Though these social groupings share a common outlook as far as their attitudes to change are concerned, their motivation is not always identical.

On the one hand, one can cite all those within Greek society that distrust change and the effects it could have on their privileges, granted to them by the state itself when it suited the needs of the governing party, whether this was PASOK or Nea Dimokratia. These social groupings include sizeable, traditional layers of the population found within the public sector, among the self-employed and farmers whose activities have over time been sheltered by the state and its policies.[142] They believe that the "privileges, jobs and above all, the chance for upward mobility acquired without planning under the clientelistic system will disappear. People fail to realise that the same lack of institutional protection that made upward social mobility so easy and rapid can just as easily cause the loss of privileges gained without respect for institutional rules."[143]

On the other side of the same spectrum are those who have been socialised in the ideas of nationalism and adherence to the Greek Orthodox Church,[144] concepts that they consider to be the foundations of the Modern Greek State. Their rejection of modernity is based on their belief that the necessary changes that this implies are instigated by forces that are not just uniform in their expression but also exogenous to Greek society and hence incapable of accounting for its historical and social peculiarities. Without the aforementioned understanding, any process of change will, according to them, have devastating effects on the psyche of the Greek nation and result in its eventual

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[141] Sotiropulos, D. A. *Kyriakatiki Eleftherotypia* (Greek Weekly), Sunday 4 February 2001, p. 78
[142] ibid
[143] Panagiotopoulou, R. Greeks in Europe: Antinomies in National Identities. *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 15 (2), 1997, p. 361
[144] ibid

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eradication. The controversy in the year 2000 over the introduction of new identity cards for the Greeks is a prime example of the above position.

This controversy revolved around whether or not the inclusion or not of one's religious affiliation should be included on the new civilian identity cards that the state proposed to introduce. Among other novelties, the new identity cards were intended to eliminate any reference to one's religious affiliations, thus countering what the socialist government perceived to be a discriminatory policy that infringed on the individual's right to privacy and freedom of religion. This, however, was not a view shared by the Church hierarchy whose immediate reaction was the outright rejection of the previously mentioned measure. 'Our faith is the foundation of our identity. If you abolish the one, you abolish the other' was the official position of the Church expressed by its leader, Archbishop Christodoulos.[145] By adopting such a stance, the Greek Church has become the champion for all those who feel they have nothing to gain from the process of globalisation or the costly economic reforms necessitated by the country's impeding inclusion in 'Euroland's' new economic order. In the Church, a commentator wrote, such people see the embodiment of Greece's defensive, national identity as the only bulwark left against the creation of a threatening, multi-ethnic, open society.[146]

Throughout Greek history, no single party has been able to claim sole representation of either of these opposing social groups divided over the discourse of modernisation versus traditionalism, the borders of which is by no means fixed. One example that could substantiate the above view is the attitude of those working within the broader public sector. Although the current socialist government advocates a modernisation process that threatens their privileges, they continue to vote for the former in numbers that in analogy far exceeds that of those working in other sectors of the economy. A second example is the way the representatives of 'big business' support both major political parties and

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[145] Smith, Helena *The Observer*, 21 August 2000
[146] For this point see ibid

eclectically, representatives of both the modernisers and traditionalists sections that coexist within them both.[147]

Greece's participation in the European Union has presented the forces of modernisation with a unique opportunity for the consolidation of their hegemony within Greek society. Indeed the process of Europe's unification and its implications, especially as these are witnessed in the economic sphere with the 'modernisation and rationalisation of markets', has been used as the prime motivation and justification for the modernisation drive in modern Greece. In that sense the legitimatisation of the modernisation project in Greece is closely related to the process of European Unification at large and the success of the European Monetary Union[148] more specifically.

Both Nea Dimokratia and PASOK have considered participation in the latter as a national priority, one that will keep Greece on a par with the highest developed nations in Europe. They have thus directed all national resources towards the accomplishment of this goal. Since May 2001, Greece belongs to the group of the European Union States that formed the EMU in 2002. The target has been met, albeit under a programme of severe economic austerity imposed on the Greek people for more than a decade.

While the modernising forces in Greece have greeted this development with contentment and enthusiasm for the future, the danger of a traditionalist retort is not unlikely. The fear is that the Greek public will perceive participation in the EMU, as the ends rather than the means to economic development and expect Europe to act as their patron and protector in a fashion similar to that of the Greek State in the not so distant past. The reality, however, is that Greece – last in most, if not all, economic indicators among the EU countries – will have to undergo a further period of economic austerity before real adjustment is achieved. Aspiring to create a single European economic space, the EMU has been intensifing and

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[147] for the last two examples see Sotiropulos, D A. *Kyriakatiki Eleftherotypia* (Greek Weekly), Sunday 4 February 2001, p. 78
[148] henceforth referred to as the EMU

promoting competition in all sectors of the European economy. These new economic realities have come as a shock to many in Greek society. As a commentator put it:

> Industrialists whose enterprises thrived on public funds and protection from competition, civil servants accustomed to a cumbersome and inefficient bureaucratic style, banks functioning like government agencies, professionals who systematically failed to declare their income, merchants living on borrowed money and protective government regulation, and politicians accustomed to the role of Santa Claus, have all found adjustment to living in a competitive modern economy and society difficult and unpleasant.[149]

The uncertainty of the future of the European project is exacerbated, on the one hand, by disagreements between members states who seemingly prioritise national interest over the common European future and, on the other, by the feeling of bewilderment felt by large sections of the Greek population as they begin to comprehend fully the social and economic demands that membership to the European Union intrinsically implies. Failure to see the benefits of such a venture may well lead to an increase in the numbers of those who seek a retreat to the familiar, and thus deemed safe, traditional practices of the past.

Conclusion

Using a macro historical perspective, the above written pages have sought to produce a profile of Greece's political culture. The main line of argument has been one that describes Greece's political culture as the result of a continuous struggle between two competing factions of Greek society. The first can be seen as having a "traditionally oriented, indigenously based, inward looking political orientation, hostile to Enlightenment ideas as well as to the institutional arrangements of Western Modernity".[150] Its counterpart, on the other hand, has been described as having a

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[149] Fatouros, A. A. "Political and Institutional Facets of Greece's Integration in the European Community" in Psomiades, H. J., Thomadakis, S. B. eds. *Greece, the New Europe and the Changing International Order*. New York: Pella, 1993, p. 28

[150] Mouzelis, N. "Greece in the Twenty-First Century: Institutions and Political Culture" in Constas, D., Stavrou, T. G. eds. *Greece Prepares for the Twenty- First Century*, London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1995, p. 20

"modernising, outward-looking orientation that rises to 'catch up' with the West by adopting Western Institutions and values as rapidly as possible".[151]

In many ways, these two opposing groups are the by-product of the domestic and international forces and circumstances that gave rise to the War of Independence and its aftermath, the birth of the Modern Greek state. By the 18th century, after having been subjected to more than four centuries of Ottoman control, a broad consensus had emerged among Greeks emphasising the need for liberation and self-rule. However, while the majority of Greeks shared a common passion for a free Greek state, there was no clear agreement over the best way to reach that aim or over the polity that would emerge once the objective of liberation had been achieved. The views that surfaced reflected in part the historical socio-economic experiences of the Greeks under the Ottoman Empire, as these have been described in our analysis, as well as the familiarisation of a section of the Greek population with the ideas and political processes that were prevalent in Western Europe.

Modern Greece developed following the nation-state building process that was dictated by the doctrines of the 18th century European nationalism, but this was a formula that brought to the fore the contradictions within Greece's cultural identity. In Greece, the idealised spirit of classical Hellas,[152] especially as this was reinterpreted in Western Europe, clashed with the enduring characteristics of the Byzantine and Ottoman periods that had socially and politically isolated the nation from the West.

Hence, the first of the two conflicting approaches that have shaped Greece's political culture is deeply influenced by the socio-economic and political norms and structures that emerged during the time of Ottoman occupation and delineated by the rhetoric of the Orthodox Church. Having been assigned the role of both the political and spiritual guide of the nation under the Ottoman administrative system, the Church was highly valued by

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[151] ibid
[152] for an analysis along these lines see Finlay, M. I. *The Legacy of Greece: A New Appraisal*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981 also Knox, B. *The Oldest Dead White European Males*. London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993

the majority of Greeks who saw it as a national symbol. The Church, therefore, came to be a passionate opponent of everything that could lead to the demise of its privileged status within Greek society.

As Patriarch Gregory V put it, expressing his thoughts on the effect of the Enlightenment ideas on the Greek thinkers of the time:

> What is the advantage of having our young people...learning about numbers and algebras and cubes and triangles and triangulated squares and logarithms and calculations with symbols and problems about ellipses and atoms and voids and vortices and forces and attractions and masses and properties of light and the aurora borealis and bits of optics and acoustics...and other prodigies so that they may count up the grains of the sand and the drops of the rain and may move the earth provided only that, like Archimedes, they are given a point on which to stand –and then have them barbarians in their speech, solecists in their writing, ignorant in matters of religion, corrupt in morals, irresponsible in affairs of state and backward in patriotism and unworthy of the ancestral calling?[153]

Accordingly, as a prolific writer on the field has suggested, this approach is characterised by and associated with

> (. . .) introvertedness; a powerful statist orientation coupled by a profound ambivalence concerning capitalism and the market mechanism; a decided preference for paternalism and protection and a lingering adherence to precapitalist practices; a universe of moral sentiments in which parochial and quite often, primordial attachments and the intolerance of the alien which these imply predominate; a latent authoritarian temperament fostered by the structures of Ottoman rule and by the powerful legacy of what Weber so perceptively called 'sultanistic regimes' and a diffident attitude towards innovation.[154]

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[153] cited from Henderson, G. P. *The Revival of Greek Thought: 1620-1830*. Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1971, p. 199

[154] Diamandouros, N. "Politics and Culture in Greece, 1974-91: An Interpretation" in Clogg, R. ed. *Greece, 1981-1989: The Populist Decade*. London: Macmillan Press, 1993, p. 3

Moreover, the interference of foreign powers in the affairs of Greece has historically produced a notion of conditional sovereignty shared by a large part of the Greek public. In contrast to most other West European States, the Greek political system, had to be developed and consolidated under a complex and ceaseless interplay of national and international interests with, in most cases, the latter being subordinated to the demands of the former. Consequently, decisions deciding the nation's fate were often dictated, directly or indirectly from abroad and were perceived as representing the interests of the foreign powers. Hence, the post-independence Greek political system failed to gain the confidence and support of the Greek people. The immediate result of which was the erosion and de-legitimisation of its parliamentarian expression in the years that followed.

Under these conditions, this side of Greece's political culture was developed to express a strong preference for an understated xenophobia coupled with a lack of confidence in other nations, especially west European nations. This in turn led to an inclination for the uncontested acceptance of conspiracy theories that are often seen as orchestrated by non-definable powers.[155] The sequential result is the adaptation of a pronounced ethnocentric view of the world and a refusal ideology that rejects everything that does not comply with the truisms of the Greek tradition. A tradition that is exonerated for the historical shortcomings of the nation that are solely attributed to exogenous factors, perpetually conspiring against the Greek race. In this way, the energy of the nation is directed towards the glorification of its past and the emphatic affirmation of its cultural and ethnic continuity and purity that form the basis of its national identity. This, in turn, is seen as "an essential integrative instrument for the socio-political system".[156]

Consequently, and whereas Western Europe professed its preference for a rational individualism that was perceived as "perfectly compatible with the dominant productivist developmental systems",[157] this political culture approach rejected the rational part of the

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[155] for the argument see Wenturis, N. "Political Culture" in Kazakos, P., Ioakimidis, P. C. eds. *Greece and EC Membership Evaluated*. London: Pinter, 1994, p. 228
[156] ibid
[157] Tsoukalas, C. "National Identity in an Integrated Europe and a Changing World Order" in Psomiades, H. J., Thomadakis, S. B. eds. *Greece, the New Europe and the Changing International Order*. New York: Pella, 1993, p. 58

equation and retained the individualism inherent with and thus compliant to the Greek tradition. While in Western Europe development rested on the Protestant and Calvinist work ethos and commitment to rational enquiry, Greece remained entrenched in the metaphysical character of the Orthodox Church and its preference for mysticism over innovation. In terms of the Greek polity this meant that "Western individualism, expressed as the institutionalised impersonal and collective organisation of society, has been interpreted in Greece as an individual action, obedient to, and identified with, rules formulated through family relationships and governed primarily by personal commitments".[158]

In turn, this connotes a sense of individualism that in many instances borders, if not identifies with, conventional anarchism. Appropriately, personal freedom turns into the alibi of irresponsible and defiant behaviour towards everything that evades the narrow confines of ones immediate social environment. Fittingly, it also leads to the creation of an exclusionary social reality that averts the separation between the society and the state, between political parties and government and between the private and public sphere.[159]

Likewise, for Greeks, the corroboration of their identity comes when they perform the functions traditionally ascribed to their nature. They feel Greek when they "sing, dance, dream, laugh, feel, make love or fight, eventually when they are shrewd and individually successful but never when they compulsively pursue unidimensional, collective, rational goals".[160] They "pride themselves in their aggressive manliness, both literally and metaphorically, in their capacity to live playing by the ear, and in their indomitable will for 'freedom' from any oppression and also from norms, responsibilities, and compulsive behavioural rationality".[161]

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[158] Panagiotopoulou, R. Greeks in Europe: Antinomies in National Identities. *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 15 (2), 1997, p. 354
[159] see ibid, for an analysis along similar lines also see Tsoukalas, C. Enlightened Concepts in the Dark. Power and Freedom, Politics and Society. *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 9 (1), 1991
[160] Tsoukalas, C. "National Identity in an Integrated Europe and a Changing World Order" in Psomiades, H. J., Thomadakis, S B. eds. *Greece, the New Europe and the Changing International Order*. New York: Pella, 1993, p. 74
[161] ibid, pp. 74-5

However, with Modern Greece trailing behind on all markers that stand for political modernisation and economic development in the West, this interpretation of national identity has also produced a sense of cultural inferiority with respect to the Western World. This, has concurrently given rise to a misguided sense of Greece's importance in international affairs. As a result, the devotees of this cultural approach have developed a "clear inclination to identify with other collectivities or individuals (e.g. Arabs and, more particularly, Palestinians, Armenians, and Kurds) perceived to have suffered in the hands of the West".[162]

This attitude prompted a scholar in the field to describe Greece as having a strong 'underdog' culture, which under the aegis of the intellectuals who have vigorously and unrelentingly propagated its merits has subsequently permeated Greek society on all levels. It has developed particularly strong roots within the sections of Greek society who are susceptible to reclusive tendencies caused by their devotion to traditional socio-economic and political practices, thus ultimately reducing their ability to adapt and compete in the changing international economic environment.[163]

The second approach, upon which Modern Greek political culture rests, has its origins in the ideas of the Enlightenment. Appropriately, it displays a strong preference for the rationalisation of markets and the reformation and modernisation of political structures along liberal lines. In view of that, it will, from now on, be referred to a 'reformist' culture. It argues for the creation of a secular, democratic state that will use its authority to promote practices connected to the market mechanism and is thus supportive of innovation. For this reason its conceptualisation of democracy rests on a "distinct and normative preference for the mediated exercise of power, through the establishment and gradual consolidation of modern political institutions suited to that purpose".[164]

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[162] for the quotation and the wider argumentation in the paragraph see Diamandouros, N. "Politics and Culture in Greece, 1974-91: An Interpretation" in Clogg, R. ed. *Greece, 1981-1989: The Populist Decade.* London: Macmillan Press, 1993, p. 4
[163] for the definition and the argumentation see ibid
[164] ibid, p. 5

To that end, the elimination of the patron-client system and the indigenous notion of anarchic-individualism upon which the traditional Greek society rested becomes a necessity. Whist being aware that the costs of a break from tradition would, in the short term, be considerable, the 'reformist' culture is less sceptical about the need to proceed with the required reforms. The long-term prosperity and collective well-being of the Greek society over compensates for the short term unrest the warranted reforms could cause.

In its original form the 'reformist' culture drew its ranks from among those sections of Greek society that: a) due to the nature of their activities, whether social, economic or political, escaped the confines of the Greek domain and came into regular contact with the international community and consequently ideas that were being brought to the international fore and b) those Greeks who having escaped the Ottoman subjugation, lived and worked across Europe prospering on activities that included, but were not limited to, commerce and banking.

Their familiarisation with Western political processes on the one hand, and their connection to both domestic and international markets on the other, shaped the way they perceived their immediate environment and determined their world view. These factors also decided the direction of their actions towards the nation-building process of Modern Greece. They consequently, developed, in sharp contrast to the adherents of 'the underdog culture', developed an understanding about the need for prompt adaptation to changing circumstances, whether domestically or internationally. They also developed a professed tolerance and awareness of the ideological and cultural discourses of Western Europe, while at the same time setting the latter as the desired archetype for Greece's economic and political development. Additionally, they advanced a more elaborated and less segregating association with the foreign 'other'. This in turn nourished their preference for a cosmopolitan view of the world in which, nonetheless, Greece occupied an exalted role. Accordingly, this cosmopolitan view of the world gave rise to a calculating approach to issues pertaining to the nation's international affairs, which often clashed with a discerning realisation of the opportunities, but also limitations, accessible

to a country with Greece's resources and geographical location. Finally, as consequence of all of the above, the 'reformist' culture fostered a strong sense of nationalism that was enhanced by the revisionist character of this approach.[165]

The drive of those who maintained this approach for reform and innovation coupled, as already mentioned elsewhere, with their familiarisation with the Western political process and its institutions, led to their domination of the state mechanism in the Modern Greek State. However, their control of the state failed to win over Greek society. The changes they evangelised and brought forward disturbed the traditional day-to-day life of the Greeks. In the cities, but even more so in the villages, people "were bewildered and resentful at the impact on their lives and on their values of forces and events they did not understand".[166]

Many Greeks, therefore, chose to turn to the traditional bastions of Greek society, namely the Church and their local notables/politicians for support. This allowed the latter to exchange the influence they exerted over their local communities for inclusion in the national political process. That they were able to do so was because the political parties were dependent on their aid and mediation in order to reach all sections of the electorate. The desired effect of such a course of action was to bring about mass participation of Greeks in a political process that would then appear to represent the majority of the people it was supposed to serve thus legitimising the country's political system. The immediate result of the above was that in Greece during the transition from decentralised to more centralised political forms and expressions of political representation, the personalistic/particularistic features of the political system have not been peripheralised as they were in Western Europe but have simply changed form.[167]

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[165] the arguments used were cited from Diamandouros, N. " Politics and Culture in Greece, 1974-91: An Interpretation" in Clogg, R. ed. *Greece, 1981-1989: The Populist Decade.* London: Macmillan Press, 1993, pp. 6-7
[166] Fatouros, A. A. "Political and Institutional Facets of Greece's Integration in the European Community" in Psomiades, H. J., Thomadakis, S. B. eds. *Greece, the New Europe and the Changing International Order.* New York: Pella, 1993, p. 27

Accordingly, the traditional patron – client pattern of social and political relationships, transcended the confines of the local community and entered the national arena, permeating all sections of Greek society, and therefore greatly determining its political behaviour. Sequentially, representatives of both conflicting cultures were to be found working within the same political framework, with neither side being represented by, or representing, any given political party.

In view of the above, despite the antagonist nature of their relationship, the 'underdog' and the 'reformist' cultures have become embroiled in a political system that expresses their perturbed cohabitation and sets the foundation of a distinct Greek political culture. Appropriately, both cultures, as expressed by the actions of their respective factions, have become engaged in an unremitting struggle for the pre-eminence of their particular ideas without any one of them gaining lasting ascendancy over the other. Consequently, ever since the emergence of Modern Greece, "one or the other gains the upper hand – and loses it again – in accordance with the political conjuncture".[168]

In short, based on its cosmopolitan character and its dynamic drive for change, and combined with the pursuit of Greece's irredentist programme of the 'Megali Idea', the 'reformist' culture dominated Greece until the 1930s. At that time, largely due to the debacle of Asia Minor and the parliamentarian crisis that ensued and shook Greece's confidence in representative democracy, it lost its sceptre to the 'underdog culture' that dominated until the end of the colonel's junta in 1974. In the political system that emerged in the post-junta era, which was characterised by the consolidation of democracy and the country's participation in the European Union (then EEC), the 'reformist' side of Greece's political culture seemed to gain the advantage over its 'underdog' alter ego.

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[167] Mouzelis, N. "Greece in the Twenty-First Century: Institutions and Political Culture" in Constas, D., Stavrou, T. G. eds. *Greece Prepares for the Twenty-First Century*. London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1995, p. 19

[168] ibid, p. 20

However, with the Greek people perplexed by the process of European integration and its impact on the country's social, economic and political structures and practices, the 'underdog' culture has "embarked on a period of considerable resurgence that has enabled it gradually to challenge its modernising rival bid for ascendancy during the current phase in the evolution of political life".[169] With the 'reformist' culture largely qualifying its rhetoric on the basis of European integration much depends on the way this process proceeds and the effect it will have on Greek people.

For the time being, the forces of modernisation enjoy a status of hegemony in the realm of ideas in Greek society. However, if the broader societal and economic attitudes and structures do not accelerate to reflect the changes required by the country's participation in the EMU, the voices advocating a return to the traditional practices of the past, will have a fertile ground on which to launch their come back. Such an outcome will not necessarily lead to the withdrawal of Greece's membership from the EU. In fact, this is highly unlikely. What is possible, though, is a reversion to isolationist policies within the EU, which will result in the country's marginalisation in negotiations and in decision-making.[170]

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[169] Diamandouros, N. "Politics and Culture in Greece, 1974-91: An Interpretation" in Clogg, R. ed. *Greece, 1981-1989: The Populist Decade.* London: Macmillan Press, 1993, p. 7

[170] see Kazakos, P. "Greece between Integration and Marginalisation" in Katsoulis, I., Giannitsis, T., Kazakos, P. *Greece towards 2000.* Athens: Papazisis (in Greek), 1988, p. 503

Chapter 4

Contemporary Greek Grand Strategy

Introduction

Having previously examined the sources of the Greek strategic culture, this chapter will now attempt to employ the concept as a tool to understanding elements of both continuity and change in the Greek grand strategy since the end of the Cold War. To this end, analysis will begin by examining the evolution of Greece's grand strategy and proceed by introducing the main issues that have dominated Greece's foreign agenda since the end of the Cold War.

Once this task is achieved, attention will be turned to the examination of the effects of strategic culture on two policy specific issues that had controversial receptions both domestically and abroad and have challenged neo-realist assumptions. These will be, Greece's relations with its northern neighbour FYROM (Macedonia) and the official adaptation of a common defence policy with Cyprus that has extended Greece's defence parameter over five hundred miles away from the south-eastern part of its mainland.

The rationale behind the choice of the post-Cold War era as the chronological framework of analysis lies in Alan Macmillan's observation that "times of great change in external circumstances are useful in searching for the operation of strategic culture".[1] At times of structural stability there arises certain balances of power in the international system, for example the bipolar system of the Cold War, which constrain the repertoire of action within the international system.

Conversely, at times of structural transformation and with the straitjacket of the old system's rules removed, the nature and intensity of inter-state relations both diversifies and multiplies.[2] Within this context, old beliefs and attitudes may be employed to interpret developments in the international arena with the possible outcome of providing distinct national answers to new or persistent problems. This does not mean that the application of these old beliefs and

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[1] Macmillan, A. *Strategic Culture and British Grand Strategy, 1949-1952.* PhD Thesis, University of Wales – Aberystwyth, 1996, p. 170

attitudes is restricted to times of systemic turmoil. On the contrary, their existence must be distinct and lasting otherwise the case for a strategic culture approach is insubstantial. It does however mean that at times of systemic disorder the vigour of their influence, even if this influence is limited, amplifies, making the observation of strategic culture traits less problematic.

Few countries in the western world have been influenced by the end of the Cold War to the same degree as Greece. During the Cold War years Greece was an integral part of NATO's southeast wing serving as a buffer zone against communism. Post-Cold War, the country's northern security environment has witnessed dramatic transformations. The stability in adversity afforded by the bipolar confrontation of the past has been replaced by the perplexities and unrest of ethnic and religious conflicts.[3]

As a result Greece has been presented with a series of new challenges that necessitates the redefinition of its role, as well as an understanding of the nature of the problems, threats and opportunities that lie ahead. As G. Papandreou phrases it, "It is a time of national self-realisation and adjustment to these modern times."[4] This is a demanding task that has to be achieved in concurrence with changes in the operational organization of NATO and the structure of the European Union, in addition to a divergence of opinions about the United States and Europe's role in the region.[5]

Furthermore, Greece's rivalry with Turkey has outlived the end of the Cold War and continues to divert a significant part of the policy makers' attention toward the perceived threat from the east. Probing the role of strategic culture in the formulation of Greece's foreign and security policy during this time of change and uncertainty promises to be an intellectually stimulating exercise.

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[2] Hudson, V. "Culture and Foreign Policy: Developing a Research Agenda" in Hudson, V. *Culture and Foreign Policy*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997, p. 7

[3] Namely the wars that succeeded the break-up of the former Yugoslavian Republic, and the internal turmoil that threatened to dismantle Albania and FYROM (Macedonia)

[4] Papandreou, G. "Greek Politics in the 1990's" in Pfaltzgraff, R. L. Jr., Kairidis, D., Varvitsiotis, T. eds. *Security in South-eastern Europe and the Greek–American Relations*. Athens: Sideris, 1997, p. 91 (in Greek)

[5] Galvin, R. J., Pfaltzgraff, R. L. Jr. "Preface" in Pfaltzgraff, R. L. Jr., Kairidis, D., Varvitsiotis, T. eds. *Security in South-eastern Europe and the Greek–American Relations*. Athens: Sideris, 1997, p. 21 (in Greek)

A Potential Caveat- *'Quo Vandis'* Strategic Culture

Focusing on Greece as the sole state under examination runs the risk of identifying as distinctive, cultural traits that are, most probably, shared at a wider level. Located at the crossroads of three continents (Europe, Africa and Asia), Greece's culture has developed through continuous interaction with its environment and is hence a mixture of an array of influences. Somewhat paradoxically this variety of influences, in combination with the linguistic matchlessness of the Greek language, has led to the perception that the Greek culture, in all its entirety, is unique. This, to paraphrase Alan Macmillan, then becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, for if Greece alone is considered then comparisons with other countries go unseen.[6] Following on from this, there is the danger that by presupposing a unique Greek way in war and peace and studying only Greece to find it, one tautologically confirms one's own original belief.[7]

One way of reducing the risk of this eventuality is the adoption of a comparative approach. Studying a number of case studies can allow the location of cultural traits that are widely shared as well as ones whose existence is restricted to one particular state – in this instance Greece. Having said this, identifying similarities across an assemblage of diverse states is not an easy task either. Additionally, cross-country strategic analysis promises to be a formidable task that for reasons of text economy cannot be undertaken within a doctoral thesis. Instead, the aim of this thesis so far has been to question and unearth the existence of the resilient Greek beliefs and attitudes that have helped shape the Greek strategic culture. Once the case for a Greek strategic culture is firmly constituted, future research can compare the findings with those from other studies in order to determine which cultural traits are unique to the Greek case and which are not.

Strategic culture has an important contribution to make to the future of strategic studies but more work needs to done on the subject. In particular it would be interesting and academically rewarding to examine a group of states under a common framework of analysis. This would yield positive results in two areas: a) it would allow for the further development of a cohesive framework of analysis by revealing a set of investigative factors that can be applied to more than one case study, b) it would provide priceless observations and look for

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[6] Macmillan, A. *Strategic Culture and British Grand Strategy, 1949-1952.* PhD Thesis, University of Wales – Aberystwyth, 1996, p. 175

similarities and differences within regions that have shared, or share, similar historical and/or socio-political standards.

An interesting research project could, for example, examine the strategic cultures of the European Union member-states. Studied under a common framework of analysis and approached comparatively, the strategic culture approach could aid considerably in the understanding of the European integration and its possible effect on the member states' foreign and security strategies. In the case of Greece, a comparative approach could focus on Greece's natural and geographical environment, the Balkans. Or it could have useful contributions to make examining the reasons behind the enduring Greek-Turkish enmity. Unfortunately, space limitations and the lack of case studies that have covered these countries, even if individually, does not permit the tackling of these issues within the constraints of a PhD thesis.

As a result of the above, analysis in this thesis will be limited to an assessment of the influence of strategic culture regarding Greece's relations with its northern neighbour FYROM (Macedonia) and the official adoption of a common defence policy with Cyprus.

A note of caution needs to be offered before beginning this analysis. Although the sources of Greek strategic culture have been examined individually, their roots are interconnected and their presence mutually constituted. It is therefore, their interaction that is crucial in understanding the formation of the Greek strategic culture. Singling them out as individual and alternate explanations risks producing a limited and misleading delineation of Greece's strategic culture.

4.1 Greece's Grand Strategy

The euphoria over the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe has long been over. The bipolar Cold War structure of our world has ceased to exist. Political and international terms, once unquestioned have now lost their meaning. The international system is in transition. In the words of Antonio Gramsci, it seems that the "old is dying but the new cannot be born – in this interregnum there arises a great diversity of morbid symptoms".[8]

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[7] ibid
[8] Gramsci, A. Prison Notebooks cited in Coker, Ch. Britain and the New World Order. *International Affairs*, 68 (3), July 1992

Whilst the threat of a nuclear confrontation or that of a conflict in Central Europe between the Western and Eastern blocs have been minimised, a series of new challenges has been raised for the security of many nations. The possibility of war between rivalling states cannot be eliminated, as was the case during the Cold War years due to the unthinkable and undesirable scenario of superpowers' involvement and confrontation. Security can no longer be defined in strictly military terms; consideration has to be given to social, political, diplomatic and economic factors.

Policy makers are eagerly trying to identify the changes occurring in the international environment, prognosticate the challenges those changes hold for their countries and formulate processes that will adjust to the new realities. Greece's geopolitical location placed it in the midst of the new realities. The Balkans, Greece's immediate environment, has witnessed a resurgence of nationalism, a redrawing of the old frontiers and a series of minority movements[9] in search of nationhood that can be argued to "resemble the state of affairs that prevailed in Europe after the end of the First World War".[10] The Mediterranean is being characterised as a crucial area of contact (a 'fault line') between what is seen by many analysts as the emerging great division of the world: the North and the South;[11] whilst the Middle East continues to be one of the planet's most troubled regions. Accordingly the challenge for Greece, "a medium size, strategically located, and status quo country is to safeguard its territorial integrity and to protect its democratic system and values".[12] Hence Greek Foreign Policy has had two essential objectives[13] and one overriding purpose, the first two being Greece's entry into the European Monetary Union (EMU)- which, since 2001, has been achieved- and the undertaking of a leading role in the building of the foundations for peace and security within the country's region, while the latter can be identified in the need

[9] Constas, D., Tsakonas, P. "The International Environment, Domestic Constraints and the Combination of the Study and Practice of the Greek Foreign Policy" in Constas, D., Tsakonas, P. *Greek Foreign Policy – Domestic and External Parameters*. Athens: Oddyseas, 1994, p. 20 (in Greek)
[10] Veremis, T., Thumann, M. *The Balkans and the CFSP: The views of Greece and Germany*. Centre for European Policy Studies, paper 9, p. 2
[11] Dokos. T. Greek Security Doctrine in the Post Cold War Era. *Thesis: A Journal of Foreign Policy Issues*, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs – www.mfa.gr/Thesis, Summer 1998, p. 1
[12] ibid
[13] Papandreou, George. Greek Foreign Policy: A policy of Stability, Cooperation and Development. *Thesis: A Journal of Foreign Policy Issues*, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs – www.mfa.gr/thesis, Winter 1999, p. 1

for the "maintenance of a sufficient state of military balance in the Greek–Turkish nexus of relations".[14]

Evolution of Greece's Grand Strategy

The evolution of the Greek Strategic Doctrine has traditionally rested on a complex web of interactions between domestic and external influences or circumstances. As a medium size country with limited resources at its disposal, Greece's dependence on the latter was significant if not decisive in the formulation of policy. It was a dependence that reached its apogee whenever power blocs or a bipolar system prevailed (1914-18/1938-60) and diminished whenever the number of the great powers participating in the balance of power increased (1870-1913) or alternatively when a great power's interest in its strategic location lessened (1923-1935).

Historically, "the two persistent concerns of Greek security have been the Turks and the Balkan Slavs".[15] Confrontation with Turkey ensued long after the proclamation of the Modern Greek State in 1830, with the Greeks determined to claim the Greek-speaking territories from the deteriorating Ottoman Empire. But the Greek ventures were not unique in the Balkans; Bulgaria, Serbia, Romania and Albania all laid their claims on the European part of Ottoman Turkey.

Following the separation of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church from the Greek Patriarchate in Constantinople, Macedonia, still under Ottoman control, became the single most contentious issue in the relations of the two neighbouring countries: Greece and Bulgaria. Giving "priority to either of her two major and often conflicting security concerns, i.e. the liberation of Greek territories from Ottoman rule on the one hand and the prevention of the Bulgarians from dominating Macedonia on the other, became the major predicament of Greece's foreign policy". [16]

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[14] Couloumbis, T. Strategic Consensus in Greek Domestic and Foreign Policy since 1974. *Thesis: A Journal of Foreign Policy Issues*, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs – www.mfa.gr/thesis, Winter 1998, p. 2 see also Dokos, Th., Protonotarios, N. *Turkey's Military Might: A Challenge to Greece's Security*, Athens: Konstantinos Touriki, 1997, (in Greek) on the issue of Greece's Defence see also Liberis, Ch. *The Greek Defence Strategy – Forces' Structure and Contemporary Challenges.* Athens: Aihmi, 1993 (in Greek)
[15] Platias, A. "Greece's Strategic Doctrine: In Search of Autonomy and Deterrence" in Constas, D. ed. *The Greek–Turkish Conflict in the 1990's:Domestic and External influences.* London: Macmillan, 1991, p. 92
[16] Veremis, T. *Greek Security Considerations: A Historical Perspective.* Athens: Papazissis, 1982, p. 19

Success in the Balkans Wars (1911-1913) and Greece's participation in World War I on the side of the victors ceded much of the Balkan territories in dispute to the Greek state. Nonetheless, expansion was checked on the Eastern frontier when the Greek expedition in Asia Minor suffered a devastating defeat in the hands of the Turkish Nationalist Forces, leading to the violent expulsion of the Greek element and in effect erecting the gravestone of the Greek irredentist program.

The territorial status quo of the Balkans, as far as Greece is concerned, was settled with the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, with the Macedonian region divided between Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia. Notwithstanding the above, the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty did not satisfy Bulgaria who, with the backing of the Comintern during the Sixth Balkan Communist Conference in 1924, crusaded for "a united and independent Macedonia and Thrace".[17] On the other hand, differences between Greece and Turkey were settled with the signing of the 1930 Accord between Venizelos and Ataturk, enacting a "tacit relationship that lasted longer than any other in the inter-war period in the Balkans".[18] Besides reconciling Greco-Turkish differences the treaty also paved the way for a broader Balkan coalition that included not only Greece and Turkey but also Romania and Yugoslavia.[19] However, despite having created a climate of cooperation in the long troubled Balkans, the news was received with distrust from neighbouring Albania and Bulgaria and anger from the new aspiring regional power Fascist Italy. Accordingly, the treaty was revised in an effort to ease hostile reactions.

Nonetheless this did little to deter Italy's expansionist and aggressive policies and consequently, in the winter of 1940, Greece was forced to fight and finally rebuff the invading Italian army who had made its way into Greek soil through, and with the permission of, Albania.[20] Successful as the Greek forces were facing the Italians, their successes were not repeated when the Germans invaded and in a short period of time, Greece fell under German occupation. German troops retained control of the urban areas in Greece whereas a large number of islands in the Aegean were put under Italian administration and much of

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[17] Veremis, T. *Greek Security: Issues and Politics*. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers, 179, p. 2
[18] ibid
[19] The Balkan Accord was signed on February 1934
[20] Due to Albania's actions during the Italian invasion Greece had viewed Albania as a hostile neighbour retain a 'war' status in the relations between the two countries well into the 1980s

Northern Greece, including the long disputed region of Macedonia, was to be administered by the Bulgarians.

The period of Greece's occupation was marked by the emergence of the Communists as the domestically, dominant resistance movement. They promoted a policy of freedom from the occupation forces but also sought to radically change Greece's political structure. Their efforts, assisted by the neighbouring communist states of Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria, culminated in a bloody civil war that ended with their defeat in 1949. Surrounded by hostile Communist states on the north and having to deal with a strong, even if defeated communist movement, internally, a consensus emerged in Greece beholding communism as the main security threat to the Greek state.

Consequently, the USA, the leader of the anti-communist bloc, became the country's instinctive ally and integration into NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) was seen as the best way of securing its borders. "The orientation of Greece's defence until the mid-1960 was based on the US credo that the main security concern be internal rather than external"[21] and the Greek armed forces "were primarily supplied and organised to face a domestic communist threat".[22] Faced with the common Soviet threat and threatened by the presence of the Fifth Escadra[23] in the Mediterranean, Greece and Turkey embarked on a new era of cooperation. Receiving large sums of aid through the Marshall Plan,[24] they comprised NATO's south-eastern flank.

The old enmities between Greece and Turkey resurfaced in the 1950s and 1960s, due to disagreements concerning Cyprus' postcolonial status. This gave rise to a series of incidents that enflamed the situation and threatened a direct confrontation between the two NATO allies. Indeed, war became imminent, when in 1974 a Greek-sponsored coup d'état[25] against the legitimate political authorities of Cyprus sparked off a Turkish invasion of the island and

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[21] Dokos, T. Greek Security Doctrine in the Post Cold War Era. *Thesis: A Journal of Foreign Policy Issues,* Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs – www.mfa.gr/Thesis, Summer 1998, p. 2

[22] ibid

[23] Part of the Former USSR's fleet, the Fifth Escadra was based at Sebastopol on the Black Sea and deployed in the Mediterranean. See McCormick, G. *Soviet Strategic Aims and Capabilities in the Mediterranean: Part II,* London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers, 229 For an elaborate discussion on USSR's sea presence see also Fairhall, D. *Russia Looks to the Sea: A study of the Expansion of Soviet Maritime Power.* London: Deutsch, 1971

[24] see Hoffman, S., Maier, C. *The Marshall Plan: A Retrospective.* Boulder: Westview, 1984

[25] The coup was sponsored by Colonel's Ioannidis military regime (junta)

the occupation of its northern regions that continues to the present day. The invasion of Cyprus by the Turkish forces and the subsequent questioning of the Aegean status quo[26] on the part of Turkey,[27] led to a radical transformation of the rationale behind the formulation of the Greek strategic doctrine.

The "threat from the North diminished to the point of disappearing, while the threat from the East increased to the point of becoming imminent. As a result, the probability of a war between Greece and Turkey became more likely than the chances of a military exchange with the Warsaw Pact countries."[28] NATO, after all, afforded Greece security "on the basis of strategic deterrence and the balance of nuclear terror"[29] when confronted with the conventionally superior Warsaw Pact forces stationed across its northern borders; but NATO's security guarantees failed to meet the task when Greece was confronted with a threat stemming from a NATO ally, Turkey. Hence, ever since 1974 the Greek strategic doctrine shifted from the north to the east, identifying Turkey as the main threat to the nation's security.[30]

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[26] According to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs Turkish claims are as follows: Turkey disputes the width of the Greek territorial waters (GTW), the delimitation of the continental shelf in the E. Aegean Sea, the Greek National Airspace (GNA), the Athens Flight Information Region (FIR), Greek sovereignty over a number of islands in the E. Aegean Sea and the island of Gavdos (SE of Crete). Furthermore Turkey demands from Greece to demilitarise the island of Limnos and Samothrace in the N. Aegean as well as the four largest islands in the E. Aegean (Lesbos, Ikaria, Chios, and Samos) and the Dodecanese Islands – cited in www.mfa.gr/foreign/bilateral/relations.htm for an overview of the Greek– Turkish Relations see Alexandrakis, M., Theodoropoulos, V., Lagakos, E. *Cyprus 1950-1974 – An Inquiry*. Athens: Euroekdotiki, 1987 (in Greek)

[27] Clogg, R. "Troubled Alliance: Greece and Turkey" in Clogg, R. ed. *Greece in the 1980s*. London: Macmillan Press, 1983, pp. 134-5 see also Birand, Mehmet Ali. *Decision: Invasion*. Athens: Ioannis Floros, 1984 (translated into Greek) also Alexandrakis, M., Theodoropoulos, V., Lagakos, E. *Cyprus 1950-1974 – An Inquiry*. Athens: Euroekdotiki, 1987 (in Greek)

[28] Platias, A. "Greece's Strategic Doctrine: In Search of Autonomy and Deterrence" in Constas, D. *The Greek–Turkish Conflict in the 1990's: Domestic and External influences*. London: Macmillan, 1991, p. 92

[29] Couloumbis, T. Strategic Consensus in Greek Domestic and Foreign Policy since 1974. *Thesis: A Journal of Foreign Policy Issues*, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs – www.mfa.gr/thesis, Winter 1998, p. 4

[30] Accordingly and after 1974 successive Greek governments have taken the following steps:
i) They have reinforced the special forces branches of the Greek armed forces and have placed them under exclusive national command. It is to be noted that the ratio of special forces in the Greek army is the highest amongst NATO countries
ii) The role of both the navy and the air force was dramatically upgraded
iii) Emphasis was also given to the Higher Military Command for internal issues and issues relating to the Islands
iv) There were efforts made for the creation of a Greek military industry that would lessen the dependence on foreign suppliers
Information cited in Ifestos, P., Platias, P. *Greek Deterrence Strategy*. Athens: Papazisi, 1992 (in Greek), pp. 31-2

Correspondingly, Greek–NATO relations deteriorated to the point that Karamanlis, the Prime Minister of the transitory democratic government after the fall of the colonels' regime in 1974, decided to withdraw Greek forces from the military structure of NATO. Greece's policy of external balancing, in so far as NATO was concerned, had been put to the test and had failed to produce the required outcome. In search of new alignments, the administration increasingly turned "to Europe for the kind of economic and political support that earlier Greek governments automatically looked to the United States to provide".[31]

Hence Greece, in 1981, became a member of the European Communities in the hope that, as described by PM Karamanlis, such membership would lift Greece out of its age-long isolation which had exposed it to all manner of dangers and has forced it to seek out protectors.[32] Relations with NATO were formalised when Greece was reintegrated in the military structure of the alliance in 1980. Greek–American relations were set on a different level with the former trying to lessen the latter's influence by using the EC as leverage. Participation in the process of European integration and the intensity of the Greek–Turkish conflict also dictated Greece's policy in the Balkans; a policy of actively promoting multilateral cooperation.[33]

The Post-Cold War Era

The dissolution of the Eastern Bloc and its subsequent effects has provided a series of new challenges to Greek policy makers. Turkey is still perceived as Greece's major security threat but the disintegration of former Yugoslavia, problems in neighbouring Albania and Bulgaria as the two countries forego their communist past, has created new sources of tensions across its northern borders. Tensions that despite their resemblance to the pre-World War I era and due to the fact that the protagonists in the "current Balkan tangle are not proxies of imperialist alliances or of the superpowers"[34], lack the dynamism to be the cause of another global conflict but the same cannot be argued at the local level. For Greece, in particular,

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[31] Stearns, M. "Greek Foreign Policy in the 1990's: Old Signposts – New Roads" in Constas, D., Stavrou, T. eds. *Greece Prepares for the Twenty-first Century.* London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1995, p. 65

[32] Iatrides, J. "Greece and the United States: The Strained Partnership" in Clogg, R. ed. *Greece in the 1980s.* London: Macmillan Press, 1983, p. 150

[33] Constas, D. "Challenges to Greek Foreign Policy: Domestic and External Parameters" in Constas, D., Stavrou, T. eds. *Greece Prepares for the Twenty-first Century.* London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1995, p. 20

[34] Clogg, R. "Greece and the Balkans in the 1990's" in Psomiades, H. J., Thomadakis, S. B. eds. *Greece the New Europe and the Changing International Order.* NY: Pella, 1993, p. 421

these developments "threatened to undo [her] efforts over the previous fifteen years to create a stable environment in the Balkans".[35] In its effort to adjust to these new realities, Greece's policies often clashed with those of its allies in the EU and NATO. On the other hand, these efforts highlighted the fact that Greece, seen by its Balkan neighbours as a beacon of strength in a region marked by weakness,[36] due to its economic vitality, military alliances, political system, cultural potency, historical linkages and democratic traditions, could and ought, according to Greek policy makers and western analysts play a leading role in the efforts for peace and democracy.[37]

Greece in the Balkans

Greece's policy in the Balkans is guided by the principles of maintenance of stability, peace and security as well as of the full respect of human rights, including those relating to minorities. The inviolability of the internationally recognized borders, in accordance with the relevant U.N. and OSCE principles, remains one of the cornerstones of Greece's foreign policy.[38]

Greece and the Former Yugoslavia

The outbreak of the crisis in Yugoslavia during 1991-2, served as a rude awakening for the Greek diplomatic structures who, in the climate of the Cold War, had been satisfied with watching the developments of their northern neighbours from the relative distance of the 'Iron Curtain'. Hence, Greece, and the same can be argued for its partners in the EU and Nato, was extremely ill prepared for the changes in the former communist areas of the region.

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[35] Larrabee, S. "Greece in the Balkans: Implications for Policy" in Allison, G. T., Nicolaidis, K. eds. *The Greek Paradox*. London: The MIT Press, 1997, p. 107
[36] Point cited in Nye, J. S. Jr. "Greece in the Balkans: A Moment of Opportunity" in Allison, Graham T., Nicolaidis, K. eds. *The Greek Paradox*. London: The MIT Press, 1997, p. 113
[37] The Official Greek view on the subject was summarised by FM G. Papandreou in his interview to N. Marakis on the Sunday edition of the Greek weekly 'TO BHMA', Sunday 5 September 1999, "One could say that Greece has matured considerably since our neighbours have changed. We felt part of the Balkan problem, but we realised relatively quickly that we could be part of solution, that we could defence our national interests – and those of our neighbours – by transcending difficulties and creating a regional vision." Similarly USA's President B. Clinton during his 18-19 November visit to Athens stated his view on Greece's role in the Balkans in the following fashion, "The second and most remarkable transformation of Greece into a regional leader with a booming economy, a vibrant democracy; with the ability to help to pull its neighbours together and push them forward into 21st century Europe." Remarks by the President and Prime Minister Simitis in statements to the press, 20 November 1999, The White House Office of the Press Secretary cited in www.mfa.gr-press
[38] *Balkan Affairs*, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs – www.mfa.gr/foreign/balkan_affairs.htm accessed on the 03/05/1999

With the conflict being closer to home than in any other western country, Greece's policies towards Yugoslavia have been as ambiguous as those of both the EU and the US.[39]

The debate over the European Union's stance was brought to a sudden and premature end at the 16-17 December 1991, EPC (European Political Cooperation) meeting of the EU Foreign Ministers. By threatening to act unilaterally if a unanimous decision was not reached, Germany convinced the rest of the EU members to recognise the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. The original Greek hesitations, stemming from worries over regional instability and the possible emergence of an independent Yugoslav Macedonia, were curbed when Germany promised that the latter would not be granted recognition if Greece supported the German proposal for Slovenia and Croatia.[40] Greek Foreign Minister A. Samaras' agreement with his German counterpart, H. D. Genscher, deprived Greece of a strong principled position, in respect of the territorial status quo and a cautious step-by-step approach to all issues concerned, and cost it the entanglement into the 'Macedonian problem'.[41] Consequently Slovenia and Croatia were recognised by the EU as independent states in January 1992. Ensuring that the EU recognition extended to Bosnia–Herzegovina, the USA soon followed suit.

The impact of the Samaras–Genscher Agreement was felt when the EU refused to recognise the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia provided the government in Skopje refused to state clearly that it did not harbour any territorial claims against its neighbours – namely Greece; henceforth, the recognition became an issue in the politics of the European Union. Greece's continuous resistance to recognise the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia as an independent state with the name Macedonia found little sympathy with its EU partners who failed to comprehend Greece's motives. Alienated from its allies and feeling insecure in the emerging Balkan landscape, Greece embarked on a policy of engagement toward its northern neighbour, trying to resolve the contended issues by applying political pressure.

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[39] Veremis, T. "Greek View of Balkan Developments" in Featherstone, K., Ifantis, K. eds. *Greece in a Changing Europe – Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration.* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 133
[40] Veremis, T. *The Balkans and the CFSP: The views of Greece and Germany.* Centre for European Policy Studies, paper 59, p. 5
[41] ibid, p. 8

Under Foreign Minister, A. Samaras, Greece initiated "a period of unsubtle diplomacy in which it tried to portray itself as the godfather of Balkan diplomacy".[42]

Greece's policies towards the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia were further exposed and came under severe international criticism when the latter decided to reapply for UN membership. Deprived of the intra-EU solidarity it could count on within the context of the European Union, Greece was not able to avert FYROM's admission to the UN. However, under Greek pressure, its admission on February 1993 was conceded under the temporary name "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" and it was "denied the right to raise the country's flag at the UN headquarter until a final settlement of the issue was negotiated".[43]

The culmination of this policy was Prime Minister A. Papandreou's decision to impose a commercial blockade on the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia in February 1994. The blockade undermined the viability of FYROM's economy and strained its already weak political system, consequently bringing it to the verge of collapse. Greece's action aggravated its allies in both the EU and the USA, who condemned its actions in every communication and led some to question Greece's true commitment.[44]

To make matters worse, Greece was "tacitly allied to a renegade regime (Serbia) that was perceived throughout the West as the main instigator of the conflict in the Balkans".[45] Greece's historic ties with Serbia and Athens's choice to stay silent in the face of atrocities committed by the Serbian forces during the Yugoslavian conflict, made headlines in the international press and produced a very gloomy picture for Greek diplomacy in the Balkans.

Notwithstanding the above, the picture began to change after Greece agreed to the imposition of sanctions on Serbia,[46] and fell in line with the international community, while at the same

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[42] Glenny, M. "The Temptation of Purgatory" in Allison, Graham T., Nicolaidis, K. eds. *The Greek Paradox*. London: The MIT Press, 1997, p. 74

[43] Yannas, P. Greece's Policies in the Post-Cold War Balkans. *Eurobalkans*, Autumn/Winter 1997, 31, p. 36

[44] Eyal, J. "A Western View of Greece's Balkan Policy" in Featherstone, K., Ifantis, K.eds. *Greece in a Changing Europe-Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration?* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 133

[45] Larrabee, S. "Greece in the Balkans: Implications for Policy" in Allison, Graham T., Nicolaidis, K. eds. *The Greek Paradox*. London: The MIT Press, 1997, p. 108

[46] Greece's losses from the sanctions imposed on Serbia amounted to an estimated 2.6 billion dollars, cited in Kathimerini (Greek newspaper), 2 June 1993 from Yannas, P. Greece's policies in the Post-Cold War Balkans. *Eurobalkans*, Autumn/Winter 1997, 31, p. 32

time offering its services as the West's open line of communication with Former Yugoslavia's President Milocevic. Following the Dayton Agreement that ended the hostilities in Bosnia, Greece committed itself to the reconstruction of the area by offering financial aid in the sum of 10 million dollars and the despatch of Greek peacekeeping troops to the area.[47]

With regard to the dispute over FYROM's name, although a final settlement has yet to be reached, mainly due to nationalist pressures on both sides, steps have been taken to ease tensions with the Interim Agreement signed in September 1995. Driven by the realisation that preserving[48] FYROM as an independent political entity is imperative for the future security of the region[49], and indeed, for the protection of Greece's interests, the Greek government has since welcomed and encouraged measures that would strengthen FYROM's position and make "Athens indispensable to Skopje before anyone else does".[50] Greece rejected any notion of claims against the new state[51] and initiated a period of cooperation. Accordingly, Greek companies have since invested the approximate figure of 80 million dollars, holding the third place among foreign investors. In terms of volume of trade the number is even greater, 186 million dollars in 1997 figures, making Greece FYROM's third largest trading partner.[52]

Greece and Albania

The developments in former Yugoslavia and the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc, caused a relative deterioration in the Greek–Albanian relations. These relatons had undergone a significant improvement in the 1980s as a result of Greece's preference for multilaterism and cooperation with its northern neighbours and Albania's recognition of the need for foreign aid and investment in order to combat its vast economic problems. By 1991, "Albania had

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[47] Pangalos, T. Basic Principles of Greek Foreign Policy. *Thesis: A Journal of Foreign Policy Issues*, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs – www.mfa.gr/Thesis, Spring 1997, p. 3

[48] Even at the time of the embargo PM A. Papandreou was stating: "Skopje is a country that must survive. It is in the interests in Greece that it survives." quoted in "Greece outlines terms for ties", *The Washington Times*, April 26, 1994, sec. A, p. 13 cited in Yannas, P. Greece's policies in the Post-Cold War Balkans. *Eurobalkans*, Autumn/Winter 1997, 31, p. 36

[49] The dissolution of FYROM could possibly mean the commencement of hostilities between its different ethnic groups (Albanian, Turkish, Serbian) triggering the intervention of outside forces and leading to a wider – regional – conflict.

[50] Stearns, M. "Greek Foreign Policy in the 1990's: Old Signposts – New Roads" in Constas, D., Stavrou, T. eds *Greece Prepares for the Twenty-first Century*. London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1995, p. 68

[51] Stephanopoulos, C. "Issues of Greek Foreign Policy" in Allison, Graham T., Nicolaidis, K. eds. *The Greek Paradox*. London: The MIT Press, 1997, p. 139

[52] Information cited *South-eastern Europe: The Greek Perspective*, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs – www.mfa.gr/foreign/year99/southeur110.339.html accessed on the 07/12/2000

accumulated a budget deficit of approximately US $580 million, a balance of payments deficit of US $400 million and a foreign exchange deficit of US $170 million."[53] The formation of a new non-communist dominated government, in 1992, with an agenda for economic reform, failed to change Albania's position as the poorest nation in Europe. Finding it difficult to adjust to the post-Cold War realities and hit by the consequences of the Yugoslavian conflict, the Albanian people embarked on a mass exodus towards their more affluent neighbours, Greece and Italy, in search of a better future.

The huge inflow of refugees from the north found the Greek government unprepared to deal with the situation. Unable to patrol the full extent of the Greek–Albanian frontier, Greece soon became host not only to the ethnic Greeks from Southern Albania and the legal Albanian immigrants but also to a large number of illegal aliens. This situation caused considerable social unrest[54] to which the Greek Government retaliated by mass deportations of illegal immigrants and the strengthening of border controls.

Albania's new government was unable to sustain internal order and its legitimacy was soon put to the test; nationalism and irredentism replaced communism in Albania's weak civil society.[55] Pressure was applied to the large ethnic Greek minority[56] in the Albanian south further frustrating relations between the two neighbours. The expulsion of an Orthodox Priest and a law passed by the Albanian parliament "banning ethnically based groups, such as the ethnic Greek Organisation Omonoia, from participating in the elections"[57] prompted an emotional reaction in Greece. Nationalist forces across parliament demanded that the government apply pressure to Tirana. It was evident that given the "strength of anti-Albanian feeling in Greece over unwanted illegal immigration, it would be difficult for any Athens' government to neglect the interests of the minority in Albania".[58]

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[53] Xhudo, G. Tensions Among Neighbours: Greek Albanian Relations and their Impact on Regional Security and Stability. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 18, 1998, p. 125
[54] Pecham, Shannan J. R. Albanians in Greek Clothing. *The World Today*, 48, April 1992, pp. 58-9 On the issue of the Greek minority see Papondakis, Ph. The Omonoia Five Trial: Democracy, Ethnic Minorities and the Future of Albania, *Sudosteuropa*, 4 (5), 1996
[55] Van Coufoudakis. Greek Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War: Issues and Challenges. *Mediterranean, Quarterly*, 7, 1996, p. 29
[56] see Tsouderou, V. "Greece's Relations with Albania and the Greek Minority" in Constas, D., Tsakonas, P. *Greek Foreign Policy – Domestic and External Parameters*. Athens: Oddyseas, 1994, pp. 103-8 (in Greek)
[57] Bijeral, E. "Albania and the Albanians in the Post-Communist Period" in Larrabee, S. *The Volatile Powder Keg – Balkan Security After the Cold War*. US: RAND – The American University Press, 1994, p. 44

A war of words broke out between the two neighbours and was " accompanied by a campaign of mutual recrimination".[59] The Greek government carried on with its deportation policies, now dubbed 'Operation Broom Sweep' by the Greek press, and the Albanian authorities responded by arguing that the deportations were in violation of the deportees' human rights.[60] Steps were taken by the Greek government to ease tensions by promising economic aid to Albania and the situation began to improve. However, it was not until 1997 and the political breakdown of Albania that a breakthrough in the relations of the two countries occurred. Greece was one of the first countries that offered assistance to Albania and actively participated in the peacekeeping operations that ensued after the crisis. Albania's new political leadership, aware of the country's economical political and social problems, recognised the need for foreign assistance and accordingly viewed cooperation with Greece as essential in their reconstruction efforts.

For its part, Greece was eager to normalise relations with its neighbours for a number of reasons. Among them was the prosperity and well being of the Greek minority, the aversion of Albania's participation in an exclusive system of alliances under the aegis of Turkey and cooperation in immigration issues. Consequently the two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, Good Neighbourliness and Security, reiterating their respect for human rights and established borders and affirming their desire for even closer cooperation in the economic, cultural, political and military fields.[61]

Henceforth there has been a steady and noteworthy improvement in the relations between Athens and Tirana.[62] Aware that the stabilisation of Albania's political system and the propping up of its economy were essential conditions in trying to moderate immigration, the Greek government proceeded with a loan of approximately $80 million US dollars, which the continuing remittances of roughly 300,000 Albanian workers in Greece are estimated to

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[58] Pettifer, J. Greece's Post-Election Dilemmas. *The World Today*, 49, December 1993, p. 227
[59] Zanga, L. *Albanian–Greek Relations Reach a Low Point*. RFE/RL Research Report, 15, 10 April 1992, p. 19
[60] see Austin, R. *Albanian–Greek Relations: The Confrontation Continues*. RFE/RL Research Report, 2, (33), 20 August 1993, pp. 33-4
[61] Information cited in *Greece and the Balkans – General Principles of Greek Foreign Policy in the Balkans – Relations with Albania*, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs
– www.mfa.gr/greek/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/balkans/analysis.html accessed on the 09/06/2002
[62] Albania's FM Paskal Milo stated that the 'Greek–Albanian relations were very important and are continually being strengthened' to the point that 'could be a model for the region in the future'. Information cited in Albania's Milo Touches on various issues with Greek Leadership-Meeting with Alternate FM Kranidiotis (10-7-

be close to $2.5 billions US dollars, comprising no less than 20 per cent of Albania's GDP.[63] On a multilateral level Greece has vowed to promote Albania's integration in international organisations, most particularly NATO and EU, as part of the country's wider Balkan policy, also dubbed the 'mini-Marshall Plan'.[64]

Greece and the rest of the Balkans

In relation to the new political entities that have emerged in the international scene as a result of the former Yugoslavia's break up, Greece maintains that its goal is the establishment of close and friendly relations.[65] Falling in line with its EU partners and the USA, Greece recognised Slovenia and Croatia on 15 January 1992. In the same year, Greece also granted recognition to Bosnia-Herzegovina within its internationally recognised borders, while being among the contributors of its reconstruction.

Greece has historically enjoyed good relations, with Romania that go back to the Ottoman years. The investment of Greek companies in the country after the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc served as a reminder of these ties. Some 1700 Greek companies are estimated to be active in Romania, while 35 per cent of the national telecommunications company (ROMTELECOM) has been bought by its Greek counterpart; an investment worth, on its own, $675 million dollars.[66]

Relations with Bulgaria, a country with a sizeable Turkish minority, have gone a full circle representing mostly the domestic predispositions of the former. Bilateral relations between Greece and Bulgaria in the closing stages of the Cold War, were determined by the latter's fear of isolation and the former's need to secure its northern flank in case of conflict with

99), Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs– www.mfa.gr/altminister/releaseseng/july99/kranmiloeng100799.html accessed on the 07/12/2000

[63] Information cited in Pangalos, T. Basic Principles of Greek Foreign Policy. *Thesis: A Journal of Foreign Policy Issues*, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs – www.mfa.gr/Thesis, Spring 1997, p. 3

[64] The Mini-Marshall Plan rests on three pillars; a pillar of democratisation; a security pillar and a pillar of economic development. Information cited in Secretary of State M. K. Albright and Foreign Minister of Greece George Papandreou, Joint Press Availability, Washington D.C., Office of the Spokesman, US Department of State, 26 May 1999

[65] see *Greece and the Balkans – General Principles of Greek Foreign Policy in the Balkans – Relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs – www.mfa.gr/greek/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/balkans/analysis.html accessed on the 09/06/2002

[66] Information cited in *South-eastern Europe: The Greek Perspective*, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs – www.mfa.gr/foreign/year99/southeur110.339.htm accessed on the 07/12/2000

Turkey.[67] The 1991 Bulgarian elections gave a narrow victory to the Union of Democratic Forces who, being unable to form a government on its own, had no other alternative but to depend on the aid of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (a party that promotes the rights of the Muslim/Turkish minority and receives aid and political guidance from Turkey) thus increasing Turkey's role in Bulgarian Affairs.[68] It was this fact in combination with Bulgaria's decision to recognise, for its own reasons, [69] FYROM's independence under the name 'Macedonia' that brought a freeze to Greek–Bulgarian relations. However that climate of adversity did not last for long and relations have emphatically improved ever since. The 1992 agreement regarding military cooperation and the more cautious attitude toward Macedonia, testified to the this.

Following the marked improvement of the Greek–Bulgarian relations, Greek companies' investments in the Bulgarian Market accounted, with respect to the inflow of Foreign Direct Investment capital, for 77 per cent of all the foreign investments.[70] It was also estimated that by 1994 Greek firms had put forward 421 investment projects[71], while about 700 joint ventures were undertaken by Greek firms with Bulgarian partners.[72] The European Union's programme of Cross Border Cooperation, PHARE-INTERREG II, has been instrumental in producing new border crossings between Greece and Bulgaria and indeed between Greece and Albania. The new North–South trans-European highway connecting St. Petersburg (Russia) with Alexandrapoulis (Greece) and the energy telecommunications highways, like the Burgas–Alexandrapoulis oil pipeline[73], will increase cooperation between the two neighbouring states.

[67] Larabee, F. S. "The Southern Periphery: Greece and Turkey" in Shoup, S. P., Hoffmann, G. W. *Problems of Balkan Security.* Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1990, p. 191 cited in Veremis, T. "Greece: The Dilemmas of Change" in Larrabee, S. ed. *The Volatile Powder Keg – Balkan Security After the Cold War.* US: RAND – The American University Press, 1994, p. 127
[68] ibid
[69] While Bulgaria refuses to accept the existence of a 'Macedonian nation' and insists that the language used by the inhabitants of FYROM is in fact a Bulgarian dialect, (Is there something missing here?) chose to recognise it as an independent state in the view that this would allow 'Sofia to renew traditional claims on this disputed territory at a later time' in Veremis, T. "Greece: The Dilemmas of Change" in Larrabee, S. *The Volatile Powder Keg – Balkan Security After the Cold War.* US: RAND – The American University Press, 1994, p. 127
[70] EIU-Greece: Country Report. London: EIU Fourth Quarter, 1995 1994-95, p. 17 cited in Fakiolas, E. Greece in the New Balkans: A Neo-Realist Approach. *European Security.* 6 (4), Winter 1997, p. 145
[71] East–West Investment News, no 3-4, Geneva: UN for Europe, Autumn–Winter 1994, p .30 cited in Fakiolas E, Greece in the New Balkans: A Neo-Realist Approach. *European Security,* 6 (4), Winter 1997, p. 145
[72] Fakiolas, T. *The Balkans in the European and International Economic Environment: The Case of Albania* in EKEM, Semi-Annual Report for the Balkans, 2, Athens: EKEM. June 1994, p. 72 cited in Fakiolas E, Greece in the New Balkans: A Neo-Realist Approach. *European Security,* 6 (4), Winter 1997, p. 145
[73] Information cited in Pangalos, T. Basic Principles of Greek Foreign Policy. *Thesis: A Journal of Foreign Policy Issues,* Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs – www.mfa.gr/Thesis, Spring 1997, p. 2

Greece and the European Union

When Greece joined the EC in 1981, many believed that membership to the European Union would solve all of the country's chronic problems; security being amongst the top priorities. As a scholar of the field pointed out, "(...) by the late 1980s a broad consensus had emerged to the effect that security links with a robust Western Europe, could provide an answer to Greece's security dilemmas-hence the gratification with Maastricht".[74] Nonetheless, the incoherent policies enacted by individual EU states in Former Yugoslavia and the unwillingness of the European powers to decide on a course of action and to get involved in the Albanian emergency of 1997,[75] provided the impetus for a dialogue concerning the role and importance of the EPC and CFSP for the nation's security. The dialogue was polarised between two competing views.

The first view holds that the answer to the security dilemmas of Greece is to be found in the form of a series of concentric circles.[76] The nucleus of these circles would have to rest on a strong economy that would in turn provide for the sustenance of strong armed forces guaranteeing the balance of power in the country's immediate periphery. Greece's participation in the EU would be reflected in the next circle and it would guarantee its status quo stance in the international scene. If and when the EU initiatives transform into a working reality this will become the next circle, with NATO being at present the outer and significantly influential circle.

Those, on the other hand, who oppose the security model described above, criticise it for not taking the anarchical nature of the international system into account.[77] They argue that despite recent developments (namely globalisation and interdependence) nation states are still the primary actors in international affairs and that therefore, collective security through a system of alliances cannot guarantee or account for the security of Greece. Although

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[74] Tsakaloyannis, P. "Greece: The Limits to Convergence" in Hill, C. ed. *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*. London: Routledge, 1996, p. 194

[75] see Greco, E. New Trends in Peace-keeping: The experience of Operation Alba. *Security Dialogue*, 29 (2), especially pp. 203-5, also Forster, E. Ad Hoc in Albania: Did Europe Fail? *Security Dialogue*, 29 (2), pp. 213-217

[76] Couloumbis, T., Giannas, P. *Greece's Security in the Post Cold War Era*. Athens: Goulandri-Horn Foundation, 1993 (in Greek)

[77] Ifestos, P. et al. *National Strategy*. Athens: Malliaris-Pedia, 1994 (in Greek)

Europe's importance is not completely dismissed they argue that Greece's security interests would be best served by adopting a distinctly national approach to the issues concerned.[78]

The German-driven decision of the EU to recognise the break away republics of the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Croatia was portrayed as the characteristic example of the latter's inability to take into consideration Greece's interests. Germany's determination to achieve its goal, even if that meant acting unilaterally, testified to the primacy of the nation state in international affairs even in collective organisations like the EU. The prolonged tension between Athens and the rest of the European Union member states regarding the recognition of FYROM was used as a platform for the promotion of the ideas of those who favoured a more nationalist approach to security issues. The reference to Alexander the Great as the "cornerstone of the Greek foreign policy not only destroyed the underpinning of what could have been a persuasive Greek stance based on a rational argument about future security threats"[79] but also led to severe international criticism. As an observer noted at the time, "While Greece's stance on Macedonia is self defeating and presented in an infuriatingly emotional manner, the EU's inability to conduct subtle and effective diplomacy in a region where armed conflict remains a distinct possibility is disturbing."[80]

In addition to being criticised for "sponging off EU funds",[81] Greece was presented as "the black sheep of the EU"[82] with regard to its foreign policy in the Balkans. The prevailing view in much of western Europe was that Greece should change its policy regarding FYROM, and fall in line with the rest of its partners because it " is indebted to the EU for financial support

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[78] For example those who subscribe to this view would like to see an increase to the already high military spending, regardless of the cost to the society and Greece's efforts to reform her economy and attain the criteria that would allow her participation in the European Monetary Union. In addition they would favour the creation of alliances and the formulation of policies that are likely to conflict with the interests of Greece's partners in the EU.

[79] Economides, S. "Greece and the New Europe in the 1990's" in Carabott, P. ed. *Greece and Europe in the Modern Period: Aspects of a Troubled Relationship.* London: Centre for Hellenic Studies, King's College, 1995, p. 123

[80] Glenny, M. Heading Off War in the Southern Balkans, *Foreign Affairs,* May-June, 1995, p. 104

[81] Eyal, J. "A Western View of Greece's Balkan Policy" in Featherstone, K., Ifantis, K., eds. *Greece in a Changing Europe – Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration?* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 142

[82] Tsoukalis, L. "Is Greece an Awkward Partner?" in Featherstone, K. Ifantis, K. eds. *Greece in a Changing Europe – Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration?.* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 24

and for attaining a much higher standard of living then would otherwise have been achieved".[83]

It was not until both Greece and its partners in the EU realised the difference in their perspectives and outlook of the events taking place that they started searching for common ground. Greece's partners in the European Union realised the inevitability of their involvement in the Balkan region and the need to deal with the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc, hence the agenda for eastern enlargement. Greece having denounced the "temptation of purgatory",[84] opted for the multilateral option stating that it desired to assist its neighbours in the region to achieve "convergence with the EU to promote a policy for South-eastern Europe within the framework of the Union".[85] Having set Greece's entry into the European Monetary Union as one of the country's two foreign policy essential objectives, [83] Greek leaders have worked towards the reconstruction of the nation's economy and have managed to establish Greece as a member of the European Monetary Union since 2001. Having identified with the federalist cause during the ICG in 1996 Greece is still one of the most outspoken advocates for the establishment of an ESDI – European Security and Defence Identity – as part of a credible CFSP.

Greece and Turkey

Relations between Greece and Turkey have historically been tense. Greek policy makers remain convinced of their belief that, starting with its invasion of Cyprus in 1974, Turkey is actively contesting Greek sovereign rights.

While the Greek–Turkish dispute is not new, it assumed greater importance at the start of the 1990s because of the regional security void that had been troubling the Balkans. Writing in 1994, an informed analyst observed that for as long as the Greek–Turkish differences persist there will always be "a chance that some unforeseen incident could touch off a conflict, which almost occurred in 1987 when Turkey sent an exploration vessel into a disputed part of the Aegean".[86] His observation proved prophetic, as in January 1996 Greece and Turkey

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[83] Pettifer, J. "Greek Political Culture and Foreign Policy" in Featherstone, K., Ifantis, K. eds. *Greece in a Changing Europe – Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration?* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 20

[84] Glenny, M. "The temptation of purgatory" in Allison, G. T., Nicolaidis, K. eds. *The Greek Paradox.* London: The MIT Press, 1997

came close to fighting a war over the status of the Imia/Kardak islets, which both countries claimed as their own.[87] While war was averted after the conciliatory intervention of the United States, relations between the two neighbours deteriorated again when Turkey accused Greece of harbouring the leader of the Turkish–Kurd rebels – Ocalan – in February 1999.[88]

However, in the latter half of 1999 there was a marked improvement in the Greek–Turkish relations. The earthquakes that devastated both nations unleashed an unprecedented level of solidarity between peoples on both side of the Aegean and initiated a policy of diplomatic rapprochement between the two governments.[89] As a result of this détente in Greek–Turkish relations, the government in Athens decided to withdraw its veto on Turkey's application for European Union membership. Moreover, the two sides agreed on the need for promoting and assisting in the initiation of "proximity talks between the leaders of the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus".[90]

Athens has hoped that by drawing Turkey into the European integration process Ankara would be encouraged to play by European rules.[91] In doing so, however, the prospects of the "Greek–Turkish détente and the success of Athens's own policy now depend heavily on the positive evolution of relations between Turkey and the EU." This entails a great deal of risk, for while Turkey has been recognised as an official candidate for European Union membership, given the political cultural and societal differences that separate the two parties, there are no clear signs as to when, or if, the candidature status will be translated to full membership.[92] If membership to the European Union is denied to Turkey, there are no

[85] Papandreou, George. Greek Foreign Policy: A policy of Stability, Cooperation and Development. *Thesis: A Journal of Foreign Policy Issues*, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs – www.mfa.gr/ Thesis, Winter 1999, p. 3
[86] Larrabbee, F. S. "Introduction – Balkan Security After the Cold War: New Dimensions, New Challenges" in Larrabee, S. ed. *The Volatile Powder Keg – Balkan Security after the Cold War*. US: RAND – The American University Press, 1994, p. xvii
[87] Turkish Foreign Policy and Practice as Evidenced by the Recent Turkish Claims to the Imia Rocks cited in the Greek Foreign Ministry (www.mfa.gr) from www.hri.org/news/greek/misc/96_03_27_2.mgr.html see also Conflicts: Brinkmen on the Rocks. *Time International*, 147 (7), 12 February 1996 also EU Foreign Policy Left in Disarray by Balkan and Aegean Bungling. London Times(*The Times ?*), 12 February 1996
[88] see Turkey Sees Ocalan Everywhere. *Eleftherotypia* (Greek daily), 03/02/1999 and Kurdish Fire. *Eleftherotypia* (Greek daily), 16/02/99
[89] Moustakis, F., Sheehan, M. Earthquake Heals Aegean Rift. *Jane's Intelligence Review*, December 1999
[90] Keridis, D., Triantaphyllou, D. "Introduction: Greek–Turkish Relations in the Era of European Integration and Globalization" in Keridis, D., Triantaphyllou, D. eds. *Greek–Turkish Relations in the Era of European Integration and Globalization*. Virginia: Brassey's, 2001, p. xvii
[91] Veremis, T. "The Protracted Crisis" in Keridis, D., Triantaphyllou, D. eds. *Greek–Turkish Relations in the Era of European Integration and Globalization*. Virginia: Brassey's, 2001, p. 42
[92] For an overview of the issues involved see Barchard, D. *Building a Partnership: Turkey and the European Union*. Istanbul: Turkish Economic and Social Foundation, 2000 see also Nicolaidis, C. "Europe's Tainted

guarantees that her influential armed forces will not attempt to create the country's own "pecking order in the region determined by size, military strength and geo-strategic significance".[93] Such an eventuality would surely increase the antagonism between Greece and Turkey with dire consequences.

The EU decision that a settlement between the Greek–Cypriot and Turkish–Cypriot communities would not be a condition for Greek–Cypriot accession to the European Union has created new difficulties not only within the spectrum of Greek–Turkish but also EU–Turkish relations. Turkey has threatened to annex northern Cyprus if the Greek–Cypriot side is accepted as a EU member.[94] The leader of the Turkish–Cypriot Community has stressed that Turkey would rather not be included in the European Union if the price it had to pay was to forego its rights in Cyprus.[95] Greece has responded by threatening to react to any action that threatens Cyprus' vital interests and the EU has warned over actions that violate international law.

In short, while steps have taken to normalise Greek–Turkish relations and the 'seismic diplomacy'[96] has worked to ease tensions, the problems that separate the two countries continue to persist. Greece's endorsement of Turkey's European prospects has provided fresh impetus for the bettering of bilateral relations but it needs to be followed by similar actions of good will on the part of Turkey. Nevertheless, given the "degree of transformation – political and otherwise – required of the Turkish establishment in a period of ongoing instability",[97] no immediate breakthroughs can be expected. Greek–Turkish détente is still at an embryonic phase and needs positive deeds and gestures on both sides in order to be nurtured.

Mirror – Reflection on Turkey's Candidacy after Helsinki" in Keridis, D., Triantaphyllou, D. eds. *Greek–Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization*. Virginia: Brassey's, 2001

[93] Veremis, T. "The Protracted Crisis" in Keridis, D., Triantaphyllou, D. eds. *Greek– Turkish Relations in the Era of European Integration and Globalization*. Virginia: Brassey's, 2001, p. 42 on the same issue also see Elekdag, S. Two and a Half War Strategy. *Perceptions – Journal of International Affairs*, 1 (1), March–May 1996, pp. 33-57

[94] Turks May Annex North Cyprus. *Daily Telegraph*, 17/12/1997

[95] 'Stubborn Rauf'. Vradini (Greek daily), 30/05/2002

[96] Moustakis, F., Sheehan, M. Earthquake Heals Aegean Rift. *Jane's Intelligence Review*, December 1999, p. 13

[97] Triantaphyllou, D. "Further Turmoil Ahead?" in Keridis, D., Triantaphyllou, D. eds. *Greek–Turkish Relations in the Era of European Integration and Globalization*. Virginia: Brassey's, 2001, p. 78

4.2 Greek Strategic Culture in Action?

The 'Macedonia' Imbroglio – The View from Athens

Greece, like most countries, was caught unprepared by the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and its aftermath; namely the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the re-emergence of national hatred and conflict that ensued. Additionally, the pace of these developments threatened to destroy the foundations of Greece's policy in the area, and Greek policy makers were confronted with a series of challenges that demanded their immediate attention. The same held true for the other Western powers who were faced with a "world dominated by political disintegration, nationalism and ethnic war", for which they hadn't envisaged new "ordering principles".[98] However, Greece and its Western partners differed in their perception of the crisis as Greece had become entangled in disputes that were marginal to Western interests. This difference of perception was not confined to issues of presentation alone.[99]

With the European Union unable to coordinate a common response to the crisis, the Greek hopes for a "multilateral security framework, which at one binds Greece into these [the European Union's] institutions, but also involves the West seriously in the handling of the conflicts in the region", were shattered.[100] What prevailed instead was a "scramble for influence and a proliferation of ad-hoc initiatives" from the major Western powers that habitually excluded Greece.[101] This emerging reality was reminiscent, for Greek policy makers and the public alike of history's lessons in which territorial and national security concerns, coupled with the interpenetration of geo-strategic criteria – as defined by the interests of foreign powers – decided domestic possibilities and forged political entities.[102]

The decision of 16 December 1991 by the European Union – which Greece was coerced into endorsing despite its strong reservations – to proceed with the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, thus de facto accepting the break up of Yugoslavia, added frustration and

[98] Woodward, S. L. "Rethinking Security in the Post-Yugoslav Era" in Allison, Graham T., Nicolaidis, K. eds. *The Greek Paradox*. London: The MIT Press, 1997, p. 113
[99] Eyal, J. " A Western View of Greece's Balkan Policy" in Featherstone, K., Ifantis, K. eds. *Greece in a Changing Europe – Between Integration and Balkan Disintegration?* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 143
[100] ibid, p. 144
[101] Tsakaloyannis, P. "Greece: the Limits to Convergence" in Hill, C. ed. *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*. London: Routledge, 1996, p. 95
[102] Woodward, S. L. "Rethinking Security in the Post-Yugoslav Era" in Allison, Graham T., Nicolaidis, K. eds. *The Greek Paradox*. London: The MIT Press, 1997, p. 113

bewilderment to Greek reactions.[103] The events that ensued reawakened Greek fears that the Cold War had obscured for more than thirty years. At the heart of these fears was the emergence of FYROM (Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia) as an independent political entity under the name, Macedonia.

The Background to the 'Macedonia' Imbroglio

Greek people have associated the use of the name Macedonia with territorial claims against Greece that, in modern history, date back to the latter half of the 19th century. It was around this time that the ideas of pan-Slavic nationalism forced their ways into the Balkans and clashed with the Greek interests in the region.[104] This clash of interests lasted for more than three decades and culminated in a bloody confrontation within the, still under Ottoman occupation, Balkan regions.[105]

Subsequent to the Young Turks revolution and the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) a settlement of the issues involved appeared to be within reach. The voluntary exchange of populations between Greece and Bulgaria in 1919 and the re-location of hundreds of thousands of Greek refugees in the country's northern regions, pointed towards such an outcome.[106] However, Bulgaria's revisionist policy and the push of communism in the Balkans, under the auspices of Cominform, posed an immediate danger to Greece's northern frontiers.[107] This danger became a hostile reality during the two-decade period that preceded World War II, with Greeks being convinced that a number of external forces were laying claims to their country's territorial integrity.[108] Their fears were confirmed when the Nazi conquerors of Greece handed over control of eastern Macedonia and western Thrace to their Bulgarian allies.[109] What is more, the Bulgarian forces were given the freedom to pursue their irredentist claims

[103] see Glenny, M. *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War.* London: Penguin, 1992
[104] see for example Maligoudis, F. *The 'Skopje Issue'.* Thessalonica: Vanas, 1994, pp. 19-25 and pp. 35-55 (in Greek)
[105] see Svolopoulos, C. "The Limits of Balkan Cooperation Prior to the Balkan Wars" in Svolopoulos, C. ed. *Greece During the Balkan Wars,* Athens, 1987, pp. 17-24 see also Vakalopoulos, K. *The Macedonian Issue, vol. I (1856-1912).* Thessalonica: Paratiritis, 1989
[106] Ladas, S. P. *The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey.* New York: Macmillan, 1932
[107] see Kofos, E. *Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia.* Thessalonica: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1964
[108] see Svolopoulos, C. Greece and its Neighbours on the Eve of the German Invasion of the Balkans – 1941. *Balkan Studies,* 28, 1987, pp. 355-371
[109] see Kofos, E. *The Balkan Dimension of the Macedonian Issue during the Years of Occupation and Resistance.* Athens, 1989 (in Greek)

by organising paramilitary forces that aimed at annexing the aforementioned territories and forcing the Bulgarian culture onto the Greek population.[110]

The allied victory over the Axis powers put pay to Bulgaria's plans but the problem persisted in the form of renewed Yugoslavian claims. In particular, Marshall Tito in August 1944, declared the wish of Yugoslavia to annex the Greek and Bulgarian sides of the Macedonian region in a united federal republic under the name of Popular Socialist Republic of Macedonia. [111]

Thereafter, Yugoslavia embarked on a revisionist policy that culminated in its covert and overt support of the Greek communist forces during the Greek civil war.[112] With the context of the Cold War weighing decisively against Yugoslavian plans, Tito's attempts for the creation of a greater Macedonian state failed. This however, did not dissuade him from merging the southern regions of Serbia into a new federal region under the name of 'Macedonia'.[113]

Alerted by Bulgarian claims to these territories, Tito was also eager to promote a distinct 'Macedonian' identity for the indigenous populace. Part of this identity became the belief that the Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia would one day form the heartland of a larger state incorporating the regions of the 'Macedonia of Pirin', from Bulgaria and the 'Macedonia of the Aegean' from Greece.[114] Given Tito's break in relations with Stalin and the consequent importance afforded to Yugoslavia by the West, Greece's reaction to the emergence of the Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia was put on hold for the duration of the Cold War.

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[110] Rallis, G. "The Importance of Macedonia for Greece, the E.C. and NATO" in *Greece and the World (1992) – Review of Foreign and Defence Policy*. Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 1993, p. 45 (in Greek)

[111] Papoulias, G. "Elements of Greek Policy" in Pfaltzgraff, R. L. Jr., Kairidis, D., Varvitsiotis, T. eds. *Security in South-eastern Europe and the Greek–American Relations.* Athens: Sideris, 1997, p. 143 (in Greek)

[112] for an overview of the issues involved see Barker, E. *Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Power Politics.* London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950

[113] see the work of Zotiades, George. *The Macedonian Controversy.* Thessalonica: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1954

[114] Rallis, G. "The Importance of Macedonia for Greece, the E.C. and NATO" in *Greece and the World (1992) – Review of Foreign and Defence Policy*. Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 1993, p. 46 (in Greek) see also Veremis, T. "The Trilateral Struggle for Macedonia After the Second World War" in Veremis, T. *The Balkans: From Bipolarity to a New Era.* Athens: Gnosi, 1994

The Making of the 'Macedonia' Imbroglio

Yet, when in 1991 following the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia emerged as an independent state, Greece reacted vehemently.[115] The Athens' government objected to the use of the name 'Macedonia' on the basis that it concealed irredentist aspirations toward the identically named northern-Greek region. Under international pressure the new state, which the Greeks referred to as the Republic of Skopje, was admitted into the United Nations with the provisional name of Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia. The name of this new state became an issue to be decided after negotiations between itself and Greece under the supervision of the international community.

In the meantime, the government of Skopje had revived "propaganda suggesting that it [had] irredentist aspirations on Greece's territory".[116] These aspirations were to be found in Skopje's constitution, declarations by officials and the adaptation of a series of symbols that the Greeks had historically seen as representing their cultural heritage.[117] The Greek government in Athens reacted by negotiating with their European Union partners the provisions for a qualified recognition of FYROM that stipulated a ban on "territorial claims toward a neighbouring Community State, hostile propaganda (and) the use of a denomination that implies territorial claims".[118] In addition, Greece insisted on the abolition of the clause in FYROM's constitution that dated back to 1944 and referred to the "demand to unite the whole of the Macedonian people around the claim of self-determination".[119]

Nonetheless, despite the amendments to the constitution of FYROM, public opinion in Greece, "with a little help from both rightist and leftist politicians, was inflamed by fears that Skopje would monopolise the term 'Macedonia' ".[120] Indeed, a poll conducted in June 1992

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[115] see Veremis, T. "The Revival of the Macedonian Question (1991-1995)" in Mackridge, P., Yannakakis, E. eds. *Ourselves and Others: The Development of a Greek Macedonian Identity Since 1912.* Oxford: Berg, 1997, pp. 227-243

[116] Veremis, T. "Greece: The Dilemmas of Change" in Larrabee, S. ed. *The Volatile Powder Keg – Balkan Security After the Cold War.* US: RAND – The American University Press, 1994, p. 127

[117] see Tzonos, T. *The Legal and Political Status of Skopje.* Athens: Sideris, 1994 (in Greek) see also *Kofos, E. The Vision of 'Greater Macedonia': Remarks on F.Y.R.O.M's New School Textbooks.* Thessalonika: Museum of the Macedonian Struggle, 1994

[118] Declaration on Yugoslavia, Extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting, Brussels. December 16, 1991, EPC Press Release, pp. 129-91

[119] in Valinakis, Y. Greece's Balkan Policy and the Macedonian Issue. *Ebenhausen: Stiftung und Politik,* April 1992, 27

[120] ibid

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revealed that 60.2 per cent of the Greeks viewed the 'Skopje entanglement' as the most pressing problem in the country's foreign affairs.[121] Soon the issues involved became the focus of fierce political debate that cut across the traditional party lines. This was most emphatically demonstrated in the disagreement between Prime Minister Mitsotakis' moderate stance and his Foreign Minister Samaras' hard line with regards to Greek policy in the Athens–Skopje negotiations.[122] Commanding a narrow majority of two seats in the Greek parliament, Mitsotakis found himself in a precarious political position. With the tide of public opinion against him, his room to manoeuvre and desire to pursue a moderate stance was greatly diminished.

Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Samaras, failing to seek the approval of his immediate political superior (the Prime Minister), sanctioned a series of demonstrations in Northern Greece that aimed at informing the world that there is only one 'Macedonia' and that it belongs to Greece.[123] The demonstrations proved a huge success; mobilising millions of Greeks and presenting a paper that defied official Greek policy by de facto rejecting the use of the name Macedonia by Skopje. As a result, Greece's government under Prime Minister Mitsotakis was condemned either to confront public opinion and suffer the political cost of its decision or appease it by agreeing to its demands and pursue a maximalist policy.[124] Unfortunately for Greece, in "an attempt to foster domestic political support", the Greek government opted for the latter.[125]

A crisis in waiting

The results came to the fore when Foreign Minister Samaras, a fierce advocate of a hard-line approach to the issues involved, presented the Greek case at the European Union's Council of Foreign Ministers in Lisbon, in February 1992. His argument concentrated on "symbols of populism and nationalism, rather on the real threats to Greece's future security and territorial integrity that could arise from a neighbouring state which has made provocative statements

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[121] cited from Loulis, Y. "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: 1994 as a Focal Point" in *Greece and the World (1995) – Review of Foreign and Defence Policy*. Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 1995, p. 123 (in Greek)
[122] Sekeris, G. "The Study of Foreign Policy" in Kanellopoulos, A. K., Fragonikopoulos, H. A. eds.*The Present and Future of Greece's Foreign Politics*. Athens: Sideris, p. 329, 1995 (in Greek)
[123] Skilakakis, T. *In the Name of Macedonia*. Athens: Euroekdotiki, 1995, pp. 86-7 (in Greek)
[124] ibid, p. 89
[125] Economides, S. "Greece and the New Europe in the 1990's" in Carabott, P. ed. *Greece and Europe in the Modern Period: Aspects of a Troubled Relationship*. London: Centre for Hellenic Studies, King's College, 1995, p. 123

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and claims and which may be allied to other regional powers with desires against Greece [i.e. Turkey or Bulgaria]".[126]

However, Samaras' continuous references to Alexander the Great as the basis of Greece's policy towards FYROM, failed to resonate with his European Union counterparts.[127] In fact, by basing his argument on historical rights rather than on modern day interests, Samaras failed the Greek cause.[128] Consequently, the Danish and Dutch representatives insisted on the immediate recognition of FYROM under its chosen name. The official response of the Council, however, was more sympathetic and an agreement was reached to resolve the matter by pursuing a solution that would take into account the Greek sensitivities.[129] This was to be achieved with the formulation of a package deal, drafted in consultation with Greece and presented to FYROM as the official European Union policy.

Nonetheless, it became clear that the majority of Greece's partners in the European Union shared a desire for a quick resolution to the matter, even if that entailed a compromise on the part of Greece; in particular, the acceptance of a name for Skopje that would still feature the term 'Macedonia', albeit in a composite form. From their point of view, FYROM was a small, landlocked state encircled by predatory states that harboured territorial claims against it – Serbia, Bulgaria and Albania. With this in mind, and aware of FYROM's esoteric problems relating to the demands for increased autonomy from a formidable ethnic-Albanian minority, no one in the West believed it could pose a serious threat to Greece's security. Thus, Greek fears were dismissed as "the hysterics of the one Balkan and 'Balkanised'

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[126] ibid

[127] see Nikolaidis, K. "Greeks and the Macedonian Problem" in Pfaltzgraff, R. L. Jr., Kairidis, D., Varvitsiotis, T. eds. *Security in South-eastern Europe and the Greek–American Relations*. Athens: Sideris, 1997, p. 151 (in Greek) see also Ioakimidis, P. C. "The European Community in 1992 and the Estranging Greek Politics" in *Greece and the World (1992) – Review of Foreign and Defence Policy*. Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 1993, p. 136 (in Greek)

[128] Andrianopoulos, A. "The Present and Future of Greek Foreign Policy" in Kanellopoulos, A. K., Fragonikopoulos, H. A. *The Present and Future of Greece's Foreign Politics*. Athens: Sideris, 1995, p. 173 (in Greek)

[129] see European Council in Lisbon – The Conclusions, Declaration of the European Council for the Former Yugoslavia, Appendix II cited from Valinakis, Y., Ntalis, S. eds. *The Skopje Question – Official Documents 1990-1996*. Athens: Sideris, 1996, p. 101 (in Greek)

member of the Community".[130] Greece's Western allies appeared to be criticising the "Greeks for not behaving like Scandinavians – and in the Balkans at that!"[131]

The paradox in all of this is that no one within Greece seriously perceived FYROM as a viable threat to Greece's security either. However, the sensitivities of the "inhabitants of Greek Macedonia [and the majority of Greeks elsewhere] to any challenge to their identity [were] acute".[132] As a result, the rift in Greece's relations with its Western partners over the FYROM issue started to widen. Aided by populist politicians and a sensationalist media, the Greek public aligned itself to the syndrome of the "brotherless, friendless, Greek nation".[133] The first enemy to be identified was Holland due to the position held by its representative during the Lisbon Council of Foreign Ministers. Despite the condemnations of the official government, a boycott on all Dutch products called for by a journalist gained the support of the Greek public and the surreptitious endorsement of Foreign Minister Samaras.[134] The Greek government appeared to be split in two and when Mitsotakis sacked Samaras, the latter broke away from the ruling Nea Dimokratia party. This move precipitated the 1993 general elections in which he emerged as the figurehead of a nationalist party that mainly campaigned on the platform of Greece's stance towards Skopje. Specifically, his party rejected any dialogue with Skopje until all of Greece's terms were met.

The Sanctions Fiasco

PASOK capitalised on the populist feeling among the electorate and was elected to power on a platform that promised no compromise with regard to the use of the name Macedonia by Skopje, even if that took the form of a composite name or term. The issue of the name withstanding, PASOK's government, under Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, insisted on the fulfilment of three additional conditions by FYROM before it embarked on any further

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[130] Tsakaloyannis, P. "Greece: The Limits to Convergence" in Hill, C. ed. *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*. London: Routledge, 1996, p. 96
[131] Tsoukalis, L. *Greece: Like Any Other Country?* The Hellenic Observatory: London School of Economics and Political Science – The Trilateral Commission, XXIIIrd European Meeting, Athens, 22-24 October 1999
[132] Veremis, T. "Greece: The Dilemmas of Change" in Larrabee, S. ed. *The Volatile Powder Keg – Balkan Security After the Cold War*. US: RAND – The American University Press, 1994, p. 127 see also Bratsis, P. The Macedonian Question and the Politics of Identity: Resonance, Reproduction – Real Politik. *Journal of Modern Hellenism*, 11, Winter, 1994 see also Raphalides, S. J. Sacred Symbol, Sacred Space: The New Macedonian Issue. *Journal of Modern Hellenism*, 11, Winter, 1994 see also Kofos, E. "National Heritages and National Identity in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Macedonia" in Blinkhorn, M., Veremis, T. eds. *Modern Greece; Nationalism and Nationality*. Athens: Sage–Eliamep, 1990, pp.103-141
[133] Keridis, D. "Domestic Developments and Foreign Policy – Greek Policy Towards Turkey" in Keridis, D. Triantaphyllou, D. eds. *Greek–Turkish Relations in the Era of Gloablization*. Virginia: Brassey's, 2001, p. 12

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negotiations. These conditions pertained to: a) clauses in FYROM's constitution that Greece deemed offensive, b) the elimination of a symbol in Skopje's flag that was used by Philip of Macedon and c) a declaration on the part of Skopje that acknowledged the territorial status quo in the region. The voices of discontent within Greece and the Greek government that called for a more moderate stance were ignored.[135] In so far as the FYROM government had already accepted those three terms in negotiations that took place under the aegis of the United Nations, the stance of the Greek government can only be explained within the framework of Greece's domestic politics. In other words, having used nationalism as the means for the elicitation of the electorate in its pre-election campaign, the government of PASOK became hostage to the forces of populism it advocated.[136] Papandreou's hard line stance adhered to the will of the Greek masses but left no room for compromise to the Skopje government; the 'Macedonia' issue had reached a stalemate.

Papandreou opted to break this stalemate by applying pressure on FYROM under the form of economic sanctions. On 16 February 1994, the Greek government announced its decision to: a) suspend the operations of the Greek consulate in Skopje and b) adjourn all trade movement from and to Skopje with an exemption being made for food and medical supplies.[137] This economic embargo has been described as the most dangerous act of Greece's foreign policy since the 1974 decision to support the toppling of the legitimate Cypriot government.[138] It added frustration to the already feeble economy of FYROM but failed to persuade the government at Skopje to adhere to Greek terms.[139] Moreover, Greece's actions put the country firmly on the road to collision with its partners in the West.[140] As a result, the Greek

[134] Skilakakis, T. *In the Name of Macedonia*. Athens: Euroekdotiki, 1995, p. 96 (in Greek)
[135] see for example the statement of the Greek Alternate Foreign Minister Pangalos in the Le French daily *Le Figaro*, 8 January 1994 see also Angelopoulos, K. The Problematic Position of Greece in the Balkans. *Kathimerini* (Greek daily), 20 March 1994
[136] Loulis, I. "Structures and Means of Foreign Policy" in Konstas, D. K., Tsakonas, P. I. *Greek Foreign Policy – Domestic and External Parameters*. Athens: Oddyseas, 1994, p. 124 (in Greek)
[137] see The Decision of the Council of Ministers for the Suspension of all Trade Movement from and to Skopje, 16 February 1994 cited from Valinakis, Y., Ntalis, S. eds. *The Skopje Question – Official Documents 1990-1996*. Athens: Sideris, 1996, p. 194 (in Greek)
[138] Walden, S. *The Macedonian Issue and the Balkans, 1991-1994*. Athens: Themelio, 1994, p. 49 (in Greek)
[139] for the impact of the Greek sanctions on FYROM see A Year of Economic Sanctions – The Statistics cited from Valinakis, Y., Ntalis, S. eds. *The Skopje Question – Official Documents 1990-1996*. Athens: Sideris, 1996. pp. 329-332 (in Greek) for the FYROM economy see Walden, S. *FYROM's Economy*. Athens: Sakkoulas, 1995 (in Greek)
[140] Couloumbis, T., Ntalis, S. "Disentangling Greece" in Couloumbis. T., Ntalis, S. eds. *Greek Foreign Policy in the Eve of the 21st Century*. Athens: Papazisis, 1997, p. 73 (in Greek) see also Stefanou, K. "Aims in Greece's Foreign Policy" in Konstas, D. K., Tsakonas, P. I. eds. *Greek Foreign Policy – Domestic and External Parameters*.Athens: Oddyseas, 1994, p. 54 (in Greek)

government also had to face mounting pressure from an "international public opinion, almost as often wrong headed as it is impotent, which was quick to castigate Greece for almost everything, from breaches of sanctions against Serbia, to harbouring aggressive designs in the Balkans, not least towards former Yugoslav Macedonia".[141]

PASOK's maximalist policy on the 'FYROM issue' backfired dramatically. It soon became evident that not only had the sanctions alienated Greece from the international public opinion and weakened the nation's standing within the European Union but it had also deprived it of the opportunity to penetrate economically the Balkan hinterland with the multitude of advantages such a penetration held for the country's influence in the region.[142] What is more, it destroyed the credentials of Greece's foreign and security policy in the Balkans, enabling "Turkey to take initiatives to spread its influence in the area, something which Greece was committed to averting".[143] In the words of Dimitris Konstas:

> At a time that Greece is faced with serious problems and has a multitude of unresolved issues pending with regards to its relations with Turkey, the decision to turn Skopje's name into the central axon of our foreign policy was made prior to gaining an understanding of the consequences our [hard line] stance held and prior to achieving a consensus over the range of these consequences.[144]

The end result of the economic sanctions was the destabilisation of FYROM's delicate balance of political powers. Greece's strategy fed the nationalistic feeling and weakened the economic position of the ethnic-Albanian minority by limiting the availability of distribution resources among the various ethnic factions and moderate forces that constituted the government at Skopje.[145] In actual fact, it also destroyed the possibility of a negotiated

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[141] Tsakaloyannis, P. "Greece: The Limits to Convergence" in Hill, C. ed. *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*. London: Routledge, 1996, p. 97
see also Balkan Greece. *The Economist:The World in 1994*. 1994.
[142] see Nye, J. S. Jr. "Greece & the Balkans: A Moment of Opportunity" in Allison, Graham T., Nicolaidis, K. eds. *The Greek Paradox*. London: The MIT Press, 1997, p. 147
[143] Iokimidis, P. C. "Greece, the European Union and South-eastern Europe: Past Failures and Future Prospects" in Psomiades, H. J., Van Coufoudakis., Gerolymatos, A. eds. *Greece and the New Balkans*. New York: Pella, 1999, p. 175
[144] in Constas, D. *Greek and European Politics, 1991-1999*. Athens: Papazisi, 1999, p. 300 (in Greek)
[145] for an overview of the issues involved here see Koppa, M. *A Delicately Poised Democracy – FYROM Between the Past and the Future*. Athens: Papazisis, 1994 (in Greek)

solution, for no Skopje government could afford the political price of being seen to retreat in the face of external threats.[146]

Disentanglement from the 'Macedonia' Imbroglio

With Greece and FYROM at loggerheads, the negotiations between the two sides fell hostage to the populist and nationalistic voices that had come to the forefront.[147] The climate of opposition began to change when Greece, with a growing awareness that the economic sanctions imposed on FYROM had pushed the country into international isolation, decided to moderate its policy. The first step was to drop the three preconditions it had set for the commencement of a dialogue between Skopje and Athens.[148] Accordingly, Papandreou agreed on the need for low-key negotiations, but still objected to the idea of meetings at the highest level before the issue of the name was resolved. Under international pressure, FYROM followed suit, making concessions on the use of symbols and deleting the constitution clauses to which Greece objected.[149] The issue of the name is still unresolved, but as a result of confidence-building measures, relations between the two countries have to a great extent, been, normalised.[150]

However, although since 1995 Greece has approached its relations with its Northern neighbours in a more mature, positively engaged way, the mistakes of its past policy have carried a heavy price. Greece lost valuable time and possibly the "unique historic opportunity to emerge as the leading player in the Balkans".[151]

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[146] see Nikolaidis, K. "Greeks and the Macedonian Problem" in Pfaltzgraff, R. L. Jr., Kairidis, D., Varvitsiotis, T. eds. *Security in South-eastern Europe and the Greek–American Relations.* Athens: Sideris, 1997, p. 164 (in Greek) see also Danforth, L. *The Macedonia Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995

[147] Ioannnou, K. Papathemelis, S. Yes or No to the Agreement with Skopje. *To Vima* (weekly Greek), 24 September 1995 see also Gialouridis, Ch. et al. eds. *A National Strategy.* Athens: Maliaris, 1993-1994, pp.12-14 (in Greek)

[148] see Tarkas, A. *Athens – Skopje – Behind Closed Doors (vol. 1).* Athens: Labyrinthos, 1996 (in Greek)

[149] see Rozakis, Ch. *Political and Legal Dimensions of the Transitional Agreement of New York Between Greece and FYROM.* Athens: Sideris, 1996 (in Greek)

[150] see the Interim Accord Between the Hellenic Republic and FYROM in the *Yearbook (1996) – Institute of International Relations,* Athens: Sideris, 1997 on the issue of confidence building measures see Papakonstantinou, M. Greece and Skopje: Confidence Building Measures. *Epikentra,* 77, January-March, 1994

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The Joint Greek–Cyprus Defence Area / The Doctrine of Extended Deterrence

The November 1993 declaration by Prime Minister Papandreou regarding the establishment of a Joint Defence Area by Greece and Cyprus was official recognition of something that successive Greek governments have privately considered ever since the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974[152] and the subsequent occupation of the island's north side; that is, any further encroachment of Cyprus' territory from Turkey would be perceived in Greece as a *casus belli*. In its essence, this decision aimed at aligning the "military and diplomatic aspects of Greece's strategy in the pursuit of the national interest and a just solution of the Cyprus issue".[153] More specifically, it incorporated the need to defend Cyprus into the wider framework of Greece's deterrence doctrine, which aims at countering and containing the Turkish threat. For this reason, it has also become known as the Doctrine of Extended Deterrence.

Greek foreign policy makers have described it as a corrective measure in the sense that it offers Greek strategy the opportunity to "be proactive rather than reactive in the framework of the Greek-Turkish dispute".[154] The forecast advantages are several. Most importantly, it could bolster the bargaining power of the Greek Cypriots and hence aid the efforts for a solution to the Cyprus problem on the diplomatic front.[155] Or, expressed differently, it could offer the Greek–Cypriot community the military support afforded to its Turkish–Cypriot counterpart by the presence of strong Turkish forces on the island. In doing so, this could bring an equilibrium to the military balance of powers in Cyprus and hence induce the Turkish–Cypriot community, and by extension Turkey, to commit to a viable solution through mutual compromise.[156] Following on from this, a solution of the Cyprus problem could pave the way for an agreement with regards to the greater spectrum of Greek–Turkish

[151] Iokimidis, P. C. "Greece, the European Union and Southeastern Europe: Past Failures and Future Prospects" in Psomiades, H. J., Van Coufoudakis, Gerolymatos, A. eds. *Greece and the New Balkans*. New York: Pella, 1999, p. 174

[152] see Salem, N. ed. *Cyprus – a Regional Conflict and its Resolution*. NY: St. Martin's Press and Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1992 for the Turkish view on the subject see Birand, Mehmet Ali *Decision: Invasion*. Athens: Ioannis Floros, 1984 (translated into Greek)

[153] Arvanitopoulos, C. P. Greek Defence Policy and the Doctrine of Extended Deterrence in www.idis.gr/people/arvan3.doc accessed on the 02/11/2001

[154] ibid

[155] see Yalaourides, Ch. "The Doctrine of Extended Deterrence as a Strategy of Containing Turkish Expansionism" in the *Yearbook of the Institute of International Relations*, Athens: Sideris, 1996 see also Arvanitopoulos, C. P. The Doctrine of Extended Deterrence and Prospects for the Solution of the Cyprus Problem. *Kathimerini* (Greek daily), 30 July 1995

[156] for the military balance on the island see Nikolaou, Y. Cyprus' National Defence. *Eurobalkans*, Autumn 1996, pp. 49- 50

differences.[157] Conversely, if it is accepted that deterring the Turkish threat, in its entirety, presupposes the development of counter attack capabilities aimed at targets of high strategic value for the latter, the doctrine of extended deterrence could help achieve this military objective.[158] The establishment of a strong Greek military presence in Cyprus would widen Greece's strategic depth, while the island's proximity to the heart of the Turkish mainland would offer defence policy makers the opportunity to target valuable Turkish strategic assets. Finally, it could bridge the credibility gap that "existed between the Greek *casus belli* and the willingness of Greece to risk its own forces to defend Cyprus".[159]

Most of these assumptions derive from an approach that sees the Greek–Turkish differences as a conflict that in turn can be viewed as a type of contest that both sides vie to win.[160] This approach employs the thinking of Thomas Schelling to argue that conflict situations are bargaining situations in which the "ability of the participant to gain his end is dependent to an important degree on the choices or decisions that the other participant will make".[161] It is essentially a 'two way-game theory' conceptualisation of the conflict, which perceives the opponents as rational actors who despite their "divergence of interests over the variables in dispute" share a "common interest in reaching an outcome that is not enormously destructive of values of both sides".[162] Understood in this way, deterrence is, as Brams observes: "a policy of threatening retaliation against non-cooperation by an opponent to deter him from choosing non-cooperation in the first place."[163]

However, while it is a widely shared belief within Western academia and foreign and security apparatus that deterrence theory can lay the foundations for a reliable military strategy, the

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[157] ibid
[158] Ifestos, P., Platias, A. *Greek Deterrence Strategy*. Athens: Papazisi, 1992, p. 107 (in Greek)
[159] Arvanitopoulos, C. P. Greek Defence Policy and the Doctrine of Extended Deterrence in www.idis.gr/people/arvan3.doc accessed on the 02/11/2001 see also Lazarides, Ch. Cyprus and Defence. *Ta Nea* (Greek daily), 29 July 1995
[160] Arvanitopoulos, C. P. "The Doctrine of Extended Deterrence and its Role in the Promotion of Cooperation" in Pfaltzgraff, R. L. Jr., Kairidis, D., Varvitsiotis, T. eds. *Security in South-eastern Europe and the Greek–American Relations*. Athens: Sideris, 1997, p. 283 (in Greek)
[161] Scelling, T. C. *The Strategy of Conflict*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960, p. 5 cited from Arvanitopoulos, C. P. Greek Defence Policy and the Doctrine of Extended Deterrence in www.idis.gr/people/arvan3.doc accessed on the 02/11/2001
[162] ibid. For an overview of the issues involved see Axelrod, R. et al. *Perspectives on Deterrence*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989 see also Lebow, R. N., Stein, J. G. Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think Therefore I Deter. *World Politics*, 41, 1989 and also Downs, G. W. The Rational Deterrence Debate. *World Politics*, 41, 1989
[163] Brams, S. J. *Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985, p. 13

same cannot be argued for extended deterrence. The successful implementation of the latter is a difficult task that demands the coordination of a number of often-assorted factors, without ever fulfilling the entire scope of its intended purposes.[164]

With this in mind, I would argue that the official declaration of a common Greek–Cypriot defence space, or the Extended Deterrence Doctrine, fails to meet a number of preconditions that would make it a viable strategic solution. This holds true on account of both its political and military objectives. As a result, it has not only failed to bring Greece any substantial gains but it has, quite to the contrary, further contributed to the erosion of the Greek strategic credibility.

On the political front, the successful implementation of extended deterrence demands that there is an unequivocal understanding of its meaning and context from the parties involved: that is Greece and Cyprus.[165] Following on from this, the political objectives and strategies of Greece and Cyprus would have to merge into one cohesive doctrine, equally accepted and implemented by both sides. However, Greece and Cyprus, despite the common ethnic origin of their populations, are both independent political entities. Given the overwhelming military contribution of Greece to the doctrine of extended deterrence, the unbalanced distribution of responsibilities that this would most probably entail within a common decision-making framework, could have undesirable effects on both the international and national legitimisation of the sovereign status of the Cyprus Republic.[166]

More to the point, the controversies surrounding the Greek role in the toppling of the legitimate Cypriot government in 1974, and the subsequent failure to provide military assistance against the Turkish invasion that ensued, have had adverse psychological connotations for part of the Greek–Cypriot world with regards to the nature of its relations with Greece.[167] These connotations are defined by the antagonism that characterised the relations of Greece with Cyprus prior to 1974 and thus restrict the possibilities of an

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[164] Ifestos, P., Platias, A. *The Greek Deterrence Strategy*. Athens: Papazisi, 1992, p. 108 (in Greek)
[165] Dokos, Th., Protonotarios, N. A. *Turkey's Military Might: A Challenge to Greece's Security*. Athens: Konstantinos Touriki, 1997, p. 194 (in Greek)
[166] ibid
[167] Ifestos, P., Platias, A. *The Greek Deterrence Strategy*. Athens: Papazisi, 1992, pp. 108-9 (in Greek) on the same subject see also Yialouridis, Ch., Tsakonas, P. eds. *The New International Order and Greece, Turkey and the Cyprus Problem*. Athens: Sideris, 1993 (in Greek)

unremitting political consensus between Athens and Leukosia.[168] Moreover, given the personalistic and polarised nature of the Greek and Greek–Cypriot political system, the possibility exists that a reconfiguration of political powers on either side could lead to significant policy changes that would cancel out the doctrine of extended deterrence.[169]

On the military front, the case against the viability of the doctrine of extended deterrence is even more compelling. Dimitrakopoulos, for example, describes Cyprus, within the framework of the Greek–Turkish disputes as the 'Achilles heel' of Greece's security.[170] He goes on to qualify his belief by highlighting the great geographical distance that divides Greece from Cyprus as opposed to Turkey's proximity to the island, which gives the latter invaluable strategic advantages.[171] The proponents of the extended deterrence doctrine hold a different view, arguing that under certain circumstances it can negate Turkey's maximalist policy not only in Cyprus but in the Aegean as well. For if Turkey proceeds with further military action against Cyprus Greece, under the extended deterrence doctrine, threatens not only to support actively the Greek Cypriot forces but also to escalate the conflict to the one or two additional theatre of operations: the Aegean and/or Thrace.[172] Accordingly, Arvanitopoulos argues that:

> The doctrine of extended deterrence links the issue of Cyprus with the rest of the Greek–
> Turkish issues (coupling), thus, creating an environment of iterated conditions which is
> conducive to reciprocal behaviour that may increase the prospects for cooperation between
> Greece and Turkey.[173]

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[168] see Ifestos, P., Tsardanides, Ch. *The European Security System and Greek Foreign Policy towards 2000.* Athens: Sideris, 1992, pp. 274-5 (in Greek)
[169] see for example the thoughts of the leader of the Nea Dimokratia (New Democracy) party Karamanlis, K. Greek Foreign Policy and Cyprus in *Greece and the World (1999) – Review of Foreign and Defence Policy.* Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 1999 (in Greek) see also Skarvelis, D. "The Greek –Turkish Rapprochement: Dangers and Opportunities" in *The Greek–Turkish Relations (1999-200)Review of Foreign and Defence Policy.* Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 2000, p. 25 (in Greek)
[170] Dimitrakopoulos, A. "Greek Security Priorities" in *Greece and the World (1994) – Review of Foreign and Defence Policy.* Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 1994 (in Greek) on the issue of Greek security also see Stathis, Th. *Greece's Defence and its Weakness.* Athens: Nea Sinora, 1992 (in Greek) and Liberis, Ch. *The Greek Defence Strategy – Forces' Structure and Contemporary Challenges.* Athens: Aihmi, 1993 (in Greek)
[171] Dimitrakopoulos, A. "Greek Security Priorities" in *Greece and the World (1994) – Review of Foreign and Defence Policy.* Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 1994 (in Greek)
[172] Dokos, Th., Protonotarios, N. A. *Turkey's Military Might: A Challenge to Greece's Security.* Athens: KonstantinosTouriki, 1997, p. 196 (in Greek)
[173] Arvanitopoulos, C. P. Greek Defence Policy and the Doctrine of Extended Deterrence in www.idis.gr/people/arvan3.doc accessed on 02/11/2001

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Nevertheless, the successful implementation of a deterrence doctrine that will rest on both the threat of denial and the threat of escalated retaliation, calls for a series of measures that, in actual fact, transcends the Greek, and indeed the Greek–Cypriot, defence capabilities. On the part of Cyprus such measures would have to include an intensified arms procurement programme. For reasons of compatibility and coordination, the new military acquisitions would have to have the endorsement and approval of the Greek side. Immediately several problems come to mind.[174] The first pertains to the financial burden of increased military spending on the Cypriot economy. The second concerns the refusal of Western countries to sell weaponry to the Cypriot Republic due to fears of inflaming the Greek–Turkish conflict. The third relates to the Cypriot government's tendency to habitually exclude Greek considerations and input from its weapons procurement programmes. Cypriot leaders have often used this to denote Cyprus' independent will in international affairs.

With reference to Greece, given the great distance that separates the Greek mainland from Cyprus, the choices are limited. Greece would either have to commit to a strong physical presence in Cyprus or consider alternative options that would provide sufficient air and naval cover to the Greek–Cypriot forces. As regards the first part of this military conundrum, demographic considerations means that the number of recruits joining the Greek armed forces is steadily declining. At the same time, with the need to defend Greece's extended frontiers in Thrace and the Aegean remaining the top priority of the country's defence makers, the possibility of transferring Greek forces to the Cypriot arena of operations cannot be considered as a viable solution.[175]

In the second part of this conundrum, the possibilities are twofold. The first would be the acquisition of air-to-air refuelling capabilities for the Greek fighter jets that would increase their operational radius. Given the high cost involved this is not a realistic choice. The second pertains to the foundation of military bases in Cyprus that would permanently host a sufficient number of Greek air and naval forces to provide the necessary cover for the Greek–Cypriot forces. If this is accepted as a viable solution, then arrangements have to be made so that the Greek military assets and personnel are adequately protected from a Turkish attack.

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[174] for the argumentation that follows see Dokos, Th.,Protonotarios, N. A. *Turkey's Military Might: A Challenge to Greece's Security*. Athens: Konstantinos Touriki, 1997, pp. 196-7 (in Greek)

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Moreover, it has to be expected that the continuous presence of Greek military forces on the island will incite some form of Turkish reaction. Whatever form this reaction takes, it is likely to be justified with the portrayal of the Greek and Greek–Cypriot movements as offensive military manoeuvres that aim to bring a change to the island's status quo. As such, the Greek and Greek–Cypriot initiatives are likely to meet with the staunch opposition of the international community. In that case, the military gains that would have been derived from bolstering the Greek–Cypriot defence capabilities will be counteracted by the political cost afforded by a stance that defies the advice of the international community.[176] Moreover, there is no basis for an argument that derives its logic from the assumption that Turkey might decide to advance its forces further into the Greek Cypriot section of the island. With strong forces that guarantee its interests on the island already present in the vicinity, Turkey has no reason to engage in renewed hostilities.[177]

Far from being a 'rational' choice as its advocates hold, the doctrine of extended deterrence is another example of Greece's preference for maximalist policies.[178] Being driven by domestic, political considerations and influenced by factors such as Greece's history, geography and political culture, the doctrine of extended deterrence can be best seen as an example of the influence of Greece's strategic culture in the nation's foreign and security policies

Conclusion

This chapter has set out the defining principles of Greece's grand strategy. Analysis has focused, particularly, on the post-Cold War period and has concluded the following: a) although the communist threat from the north has ceased to exist the country's security environment has been troubled by a series of challenges that have directly resulted from regional instability and the resurgence of Balkan nationalism, b) Greece's enmity with Turkey continues to be paramount in the mind of both Greek public and policy-makers.

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[175] ibid, pp. 198-9

[176] ibid, p. 202

[177] ibid

[178] for works that support this statement see Rallis, G. *Hours of Responsibility*, Athens: Euroekdotiki, 1983 also Kapsis, Y. P. *The Three Days of March*. Athens: Nea Sinora, 1992 also Tsouderou, V. *Foreign Policy: The Great Patient*, Athens: Papazisis, 1995 (in Greek) also Papoulias, G. How we Reached International Isolation. *Oikonomikos Tahidromos*, 8 November 1994. In addition see the interview by George Papandreou in which he admits his paramount role in Greek policy towards Turkey in Eleftherotypia, 12 November 2000

With this is mind, examination proceeded by limiting the foci of inquiry to two specific aspects of Greece's post-Cold War strategy: a) Greek-FYROM relations and b) Greece's adoption of a common defence dogma with Cyprus and its determination to militarily protect the island against any further Turkish intransigence. The proposition put forward here is that the strategic culture approach offers a valid and insightful explanation into the Greek response to the aforementioned issues. Accordingly, the inquiry into these two policy areas provides proof of the existence of a direct strategic culture that influences, but does not determine, state action.

Having said that, attempts have been made, both by Greek policy makers and scholars of international relations, to explicate in neo-realist terms, Greece's stance on these issues. They argue that the structural changes that have occurred in the Balkans, post-Cold War, have reinforced the sub-systemic position of Greece. [179] As such, Greece, given its privileged position in the distribution of power among the Balkan states, has the capability to "(...) mould the strategic environment in which it directly finds itself in such a way as better to promote and protect its nationally-perceived interests".[180]

However, while the argument is persuasive in that Greece's systemic position has, indeed, been reinforced in the Balkans since the end of the Cold War, it nonetheless fails to stand up to closer scrutiny. Greece's reinforced position can be evaluated in terms of economic, diplomatic and military means. In so far as economy and diplomacy is concerned, Greece has greatly benefited from its participation in Western institutions such as the EU and NATO. Membership to these organisations, however, carries adherence to a set of principles and rules of international behaviour. It also means that Greek action has to be negotiated and navigated through an intrinsically complex web of often-conflicting interests, held by the major international powers within these institutions regarding their policy for the Balkan and the east Mediterranean regions. These interests can be seen as systemic constraints that limit the ability of Greek policy-makers to pursue an independent course of action for fear that this might lead to their isolation or expulsion from the very western institutions that ensure Greece's favourable position in the Balkan geo-political landscape.

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[179] Fakiolas, E. Greece in the New Balkans: A Neo-Realist Approach. *European Security*. 6 (4), Winter 1998, p. 130
[180] ibid

Greece's extremist stance, nonetheless, especially during 1992, did alienate it from its partners and allies. It also undermined Greece's relations with the rest of the Balkan countries alerting them to what was perceived by international opinion as Greek ethnocentric paranoia. As an American commentator, Strobe Talbott, put it:

> Greece is reminding the world that it too is a Balkan country, the inhabitant of a region where history often induces hysteria . . . Partly because the Greek position is so preposterous, the suspicion persists that the complaint about the name camouflages a revival of Greece's own age-old expansionistic ambitions.[181]

While relations with FYROM have since been normalised, a resolution regarding the latter's name has yet to be reached and the issues involved continue to trouble Greek policy-makers. At a more practical level, the FYROM issue detracts attention from other important issues on Greece's foreign and security agenda and weakens the country's bargaining power within international institutions. Rather than being a purely neo-realist approach, Greece's position on Macedonia can profit for the supplementary employment of strategic culture analysis. In particular, it can profit by strategic culture's assessment of Greece's distinct historical and geo-political considerations. Such an assessment can be used as an alternative in understanding Greece's response to the 'Macedonia' problem.

In terms of military leverage, the argument that the distribution of power in the Balkans has, since the end of the Cold War, tipped so much in Greece's favour that the country, now possesses the capability to present itself as the regional *hegemon*, appears even more flawed. In this equation not only do the same systemic constraints as the ones mentioned above apply – mainly the obligations inherent in Greece's membership of international institutions – but also, the idea of the country's military superiority has to be juxtaposed against the military power of its rival - Turkey. Indeed, when compared in economic terms, Greece has a clear advantage over Turkey. However, when comparison turns to military and/or geo-political considerations, the distribution of capabilities puts Greece at a disadvantage. As Efstathios Fakiolas points out:

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[181] see Talbot, S. Greece's Defence Seems Just Silly, *Time*, 12 October 1992

In fact, we would contend that Turkey is in a more fortunate position as a result of its geopolitical location and military superiority. In any event, with rare exceptions, Turkey succeeds in selling itself to the great powers as a major strategic asset, serving and promoting their interests in the wider oil-rich Middle East Arena. Comparatively, the strategic importance of Turkey to the great powers appears to be much higher than that of Greece.[182]

This chapter has demonstrated that strategic culture offers a valid explanation as to why Greek policy makers insist upon including Cyprus in the country's defence parameter. To begin with, the concept of 'extended deterrence' is riddled by a host of foundational problems that seriously hamper the potential for its practical implementation. Moreover, as analysis in this thesis has shown, the lack of a multitude of preconditions that could provide hope for positive results once a strategy of 'extended deterrence' is enforced, makes Greece's strategic planning counter-productive.

For once the flaws in the strategy are revealed, and the 'S-300' missile crisis has done much to achieve this, Greece has had to deal, not only with the failures of the specific policy, but also with the detrimental effects created by the loss of credibility in so far as its decisiveness to act on issues of national security is concerned. Much like the FYROM situation, the adoption of a common defence area with Cyprus can only be explained by a supplementary strategic culture analysis that looks at Greece's history and culture in order to uncover what, at a first glance, appears to be an irrational policy choice, i.e. it does not conform to logical arguments given the nature of the threat and the validity of deterrence and weapons systems.

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[182] Fakiolas, E. Greece in the New Balkans: A Neo-Realist Approach. *European Security*, 6 (4), Winter 1997, p.143

Conclusion

This thesis has attempted to examine the usefulness of a strategic culture approach in trying to understand Greece's grand strategic thought and practice. It has also sought to contribute to the conceptual debate surrounding the use of strategic culture by highlighting its intrinsic complexities. Finally, it has put forward the case for utilising strategic culture analysis in supplementing neo-realism.

In terms of the first objective, the examination of Greece's strategic culture has offered valuable insights into the country's grand strategy. Nevertheless, research on this topic, and indeed within international relations theory at a broader level, continues to be dominated by approaches that view policies as rational outcomes of processes that are defined by material factors (neo-realism). This thesis has, instead, sought to shift attention towards the examination of non-material factors. As such it can be seen as an attempt to redress the acute imbalance between the scholarly works that adhere to rational-material modes of examination and those that seek out the less easy to observe and record, ideational-cultural influences.

Despite the increased attention[1] given to ideology, identity and culture in the post-Cold War agenda of international relations theory, theorising about strategic culture remains at an embryonic stage. The various scholars that employ strategic culture in their research fail to reach a consensus over the way the concept is to be defined and studied. It can be argued that this is not surprising given the inherently multifaceted nature of cultural analysis, but it is indicative of the problems and difficulties facing the development of strategic culture methodology. More to the point, the complexity of these problems casts considerable doubt over research attempts that claim to have eradicated their consequences in their entirety. Indeed, cultural analysis is riddled with complicated puzzles whose answers are looked for in those domains of human activity, and interaction, that cannot be ranked and filed in the same way as hard quantifiable data. For as Clifford Geertz notes:

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[1] See for example Lapid, Y. and Kratochwil, F. eds. *The Return of Culture and Identity in International Relations Theory*, London: Rienner, 1996

Cultural analysis is intrinsically incomplete. And, worse than that, the more deeply it goes the less complete it is. It is a strange science whose most telling assertions are its most tremulously based, in which to get somewhere with the matter at hand is to identify the suspicion, both your own and that of others, that you are not quite getting it right.[2]

Thus, the value of this thesis is likely to be greater to those who are less "concerned with the immediacy and neatness of the causal connections than with whether or not they take all the important factors into account".[3] As stated in the introduction, this study has not attempted to resolve the problems that inevitably confront the pursuit of a strategic culture approach. This research can, accordingly, be seen as an effort to lay bare the merits of strategic culture despite its obvious teething troubles. To quote Michael Howard:

The light provided by our knowledge of technological capabilities and our capacity for sophisticated strategic analysis is so dazzling as to be almost hypnotic; but it is in those shadowy regions of human understanding based on our knowledge of social development, cultural diversity and patterns of behaviour that we have to look for the answers.[4]

It is these 'shadowy regions of human understanding' that has been the focus of this study.

This concluding section of the thesis will proceed by summing up the findings of the preceding chapters. The first aim is to abridge the main points that emerge from the study of Greece's strategic culture and assess their contribution to the further understanding of the country's grand strategic thought and practice. The second is to offer a précis about the conceptualisation of strategic culture.

[2] Geertz, C. *The Interpretation of Cultures*. London: Fontana, 1993, p. 29

[3] Booth, K., Macmillan, A., Trood, R. "Strategic Culture" in Booth, K., Trood, R. eds. *Strategic Cultures in the Asia–Pacific Region*. London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 22

[4] Howard, M. The Future of Deterrence. *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute*, 131 (2), June 1986, p. 10 cited from Booth, K., Macmillan, A., Trood, R. "Strategic Culture" in Booth, K., Trood, R. eds. *Strategic Cultures in the Asia–Pacific Region*. London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 22

Insights into Greek Grand Strategic Thought and Practice – A Profile of Greece's Strategic Culture: Constituent Features

Chapters 2 and 3 have offered the opportunity to identify the emergence of certain tendencies within Greek strategic thought and practice. The inquiry has shown that, at their core, these tendencies have persisted throughout the passing of time, albeit in a continuous interaction with the country's domestic and external environment. Although these sources have been examined individually, their roots are interconnected and their presence mutually constituted. Hence, it is their interaction that is crucial in understanding the formation of the Greek strategic culture. Singling them out, as individual and alternate explanations, risks producing a limited and therefore misleading delineation of Greece's grand strategic thought and practice.

A Profile of Greece's Strategic Culture – Constituent Features

Geography

Situated at the most southerly point of the Balkan Peninsula, Greece's geographical morphology is characterised by the great expanse of its northern frontiers (1200 km) and the considerable length of its coastline that incorporates the hundreds of Greek islands.[5] This topography, coupled with Greece's lack of strategic depth, has made the country vulnerable to a host of invading armies that have either originated from, or made their way through, the nation's neighbouring lands.

What is more, although geography has dictated that Greece develop as a modern nation state in the Balkan region, the country's socio-politic and economic affiliations lie with Western Europe. To be more precise, Greece is the only Balkan state that is a member of both the EU and NATO, the cornerstones of the West's prestige and power. It is also the only state that does not share any common borders with its fellow EU members. This state of affairs has not only hindered Greece's access to the market economies of its European partners, but has often led to misperceptions on both sides about the nature of this partnership.

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[5] Dimitrakopoulos, A. "Priorities in Greece's Security" in *Greece and the World (1993-94) – Review of Foreign and Defence Policy*. Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 1994, p. 345 (in Greek)

Greece's Mediterranean dimension, on the other hand, with its strategic proximity to important sea routes – the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, the Indian Ocean to the south and the Black sea to the north – has placed the nation's foreign and security policies under the scrutiny, if not supervision, of those global powers with vital interests in the region (Britain until the first half of the 20th century and subsequently the US).[6]

The accumulative effect of these factors has encouraged a strong awareness of an external threat among Greek policy-makers and public alike. At times of crisis, this awareness wavers between insecurity and a siege mentality.

History and Experience

Modern Greece was built on the ruins of "the glory that was": the cradle of democracy and one of the bedrocks of Western civilisation.[7] The Greek past is called upon to speak for the Greek present. However, due to the inability of Modern Greek history to reconcile the grandeur of the past with the underachievement of the present, the haunting echo of the nation's antique wisdom has, in many ways, proved to be a curse in disguise.[8]

Indeed, history has given the Greek nation a sense of self-importance disproportionate to its size and role in modern world affairs. This notion of self-importance, rooted in the nation's glorious past, fails to take into account that in modern times Greece has enjoyed victories and suffered defeats at an equal rate. Moreover, it has meant that Greek claims in world affairs have been based, not on interests, but on what they, as the founders of Western civilisation, interpret as their rights.[9] Consequently, successive generations of Greek decision makers have encountered difficulties in finding the "right combination of the language of might, right and common interests"

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[6] Skarvelis, D. "The Greek–Turkish Rapprochement: Dangers and Opportunities" in *The Greek–Turkish Relations (1999-2000) – Review of Foreign and Defence Policy*. Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 2000, p. 225 (in Greek)

[7] Stobart, J. C. *The Glory that was Greece*. London: Sidwigwick & Jackson Ltd, 1964 (4th edition)

[8] Nicolaidis, K. "Introduction: What is the Greek Paradox?" in Allison, Graham T., Nicolaidis, K,. eds. *The Greek Paradox*. London: The MIT Press, 1997, p. 3

[9] see Keridis, D. "Domesic Developments and Foreign Policy – Greek Policy Towards Turkey" in Keridis, D., Triantaphyllou, D. eds. *Greek–Turkish Relations in the Era of European Integration and Gloablization*. Virginia: Brassey's, 2001, pp. 12-13

failing to appreciate that "moralising is the privilege of the strong in international relations".[10]

This situation has not only given rise to feelings of frustration among the Greek nation, it has also incited many Greeks to divide the world into two very rigid categories: friend and foe. The criteria for this division are simple. Unconditional support for Greece is synonymous with the ally, while anything short of this falls under the heading of enemy. Unable to enter into the spirit of a two-way relationship this bleak categorisation invariably leaves Greece feeling let down by its allies when the latter fail to see the world "through her own looking glass".[11]

Political Culture

Modern Greece has traditionally seen itself as part of Western society and its political institutions have been built on the archetype of their Western counterparts. However the socio-political process that paved the way for the nation's "transition from the pre-modern to the modern age was sharply distinct from the development of the rest of the continent" and especially the "states of Western Europe with which it claims a cultural, political and economic affinity".[12] While in Western Europe development rested on the Protestant and Calvinist work ethos and commitment to rational enquiry, Greece remained entrenched in the metaphysical character of the Orthodox Church and its preference for mysticism over innovation. This dichotomy has been the main characteristic of Greece's political culture and has had a multitude of effects on the nation's foreign and security policies.

The most significant of these effects has been the projection of the inherent inefficiencies of Greece's political system onto the country's international relations.

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[10] Tsoukalis, L. Greece Like Any Other Country? A speech presented at the Trilateral Commission, XXIII European Meeting, Athens 22-24 October, 1999 accessible via the London School of Economics website at www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/European/hellenic/FGreecelikeanyotherEuropean.html

[11] Tsakaloyannis, P. "Greece: The Limits to Convergence" in Hill, C. ed. *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*. London: Routledge, 1996, p. 201

[12] Economides, S. "Greece and the New Europe in the 1990's" in Carabott, P. ed. *Greece and Europe in the Modern Period: Aspects of a Troubled Relationship*. London: Centre for Hellenic Studies, King's College, 1995, p. 108

The most salient of these inefficiencies pertains to the way "Western individualism, expressed as the institutionalised impersonal and collective organisation of society," has been "interpreted in Greece as individual action, obedient to, and identified with, rules formulated through family relationships and governed primarily by personal commitments".[13] As a result, Greece's political system exhibits a propensity towards intense conflict and polarisation that focuses not on issues of substantive politics, as in most other states, but on superficial issues designed to win over the hearts and minds of the electorate. Coupled with the patron–client system of social and political relations that underpins Greek society at all levels of activity, this interpretation of political reality has a dual effect. Firstly, the "prevailing culture of conflict resolution" in Greek society tends "to privilege zero-sum over positive-sum approaches and therefore impedes consensus-building". [14] As Loukas Tsoukalis observes, "compromise is almost a dirty word in the Greek vocabulary and exaggeration is an in-built element of domestic political discourse".[15] This rejection of dialogue frequently leads to compromise at a "lower threshold than otherwise might have been the case". This forces upon Greek society as a whole a feeling of humiliation that stems from what is perceived as a retreat "in the face of external pressures".[16]Secondly, Greek political discourse has traditionally emphasised the role of personalities, i.e. charismatic leaders, over that of a systemic institutional framework for policy making.

Through the interpretation of the significance of these characteristics for Greece's grand strategic thought and practice one observes policies that are drawn not from a pragmatic assessment of the international realities but from a drive for the attainment of the political parties' domestic, short terms needs;[17] decisions that "frequently

[13] Panagiotopoulou, R. Greeks in Europe: Antinomies in National Identities. *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 15 (2), 1997, p. 354

[14] Diamandouros, N. "Prospects for Democracy in the Balkans: Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives" in Larabee, F. S. ed. *The Volatile Powder Keg – Balkan Security After the Cold War*, Washington: RAND – The American University Press, 1994, p. 10

[15] Tsoukalis, L. "Is Greece an Awkward Partner?" in Featherstone, K., Ifantis, K. eds. *Greece in a Changing Europe – Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration?* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 26

[16] Ioakimidis, P. C. "The Model of Foreign-Policy Making in Greece: Personalities versus Institutions" in Couloumbis, T., et al., *The Foreign Policies of the European Union's Mediterranean States and Applicant Countries in the 1990's*. New York: St. Martin Press, 1999, p. 143

[17] Tsardanidis, H. "The Adjustability of Greece's Foreign Policy" in Kanellopoulos, A. K., Fragonikopoulos, H. A. ed. *The Present and Future of Greece's Foreign Politics*. Athens: Sideris, 1995

reflect personal preferences, rather than being the result of an institutionalised system of policymaking";[18] a reluctance to enter into negotiations that may result in compromise and, as a consequence, the pursuit of maximalist policies that have often cost Greece dearly;[19] finally, a pattern of behaviour with regards to allies that is based on the patron–client form of relations and has been sustained through the timely interaction of external and domestic elements.

What Are The Main Themes That Have Emerged In The Discussion Of Greece's Strategic Culture?

The main themes that have underpinned this research are: a) The evolution, development and transfiguration of Greek nationalism and its impact on the historic formulation and pursuit of the state's successive foreign and security policies. Indeed, its influence was paramount in the creation of modern Greece and played a determinant role in both the domestic and external developments of the young state. The 'Megali Idea', the goal of re-uniting all the Greeks of the Mediterranean and Balkan world in a single state, led Greece to a series of wars for territorial expansion in the 19th and early 20th century and ended with the disastrous defeat of the Minor Asia expedition in 1921.[20]

However, while the defeat of the Greek army in the hands of the Turkish nationalist forces of Kemal Ataturk brought Greece's irredentist pursuits to an end, certain ideational elements within the 'Megali Idea' have, through continuous adaptations and modifications, persisted over time. More specifically, these ideational elements have given rise to a series of questions and debates about what and who is, and/or ought to be, considered Greek. In the realm of foreign affairs this has habitually led to

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p. 25 (in Greek) see also Couloumbis, T. "The Goals of Greece's Foreign Policy in the Balkans" and Loulis, I. "Structures and Ways in Greek Foreign Policy" in Konstas, D., Tsakonas, P. I. eds. *Greek Foreign Policy- Domestic and External Parameters*. Athens: Oddyseas, 1994, p. 88 (in Greek)

[18] Iokimidis, P, C. « Greece, the European Union and Southeastern Europe: Past Failures and Future Prospects" in Psomiades, H, J., Van Coufoudakis., Gerolymatos, A. eds. *Greece and the New Balkans*. New York: Pella, 1999, pp. 179

[19] Andrianopoulos, A." Greek Foreign Policy and Conflict Resolution" in Kanellopoulos, A, K., Fragonikopoulos, H, A.eds. The Present and Future of Greece's Foreign Politics, Athens: Sideris, p. 178 (in Greek) see also Couloumbis, T. "The Goals of Greece's Foreign Policy in the Balkans and Loulis, I. Structures and Ways in Greek Foreign Policy" both in Konstas, D.,Tsakonas, P, I. eds. *Greek Foreign Policy- Domestic and External Parameters*, Athens: Oddyseas, 1994, p. 178-179 (in Greek)

international disputes with Albania over the rights of the Greek minority in northern Epirus, with Yugoslavia and Bulgaria over the much-contested region of Macedonia, and most significantly with Turkey over the Greek minority of Istanbul, the Aegean islands and Cyprus. The fact that not only have these disputes not been pacified in the new post-Cold War environment, but in some instances they have gained renewed prominence in the calendars of Greece's grand strategic policies, provides additional proof of their diachronic nature. A clear example of this is Greece's insistence to hinder the international recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) unless any reference to the term Macedonia was omitted from its official name.

b) Similarly, a persistent theme has been the interminable tension between two schools of thought regarding Greece's foreign and security policy. One that advocates a liberal, internationalist outlook and emphasises the need for Greece's integration within Western structures and institutions and another that takes a sharper view of Greek national interests drawing from a more narrowly defined *realpolitk* approach.[21] This dichotomy within Greece's foreign and security apparatus has customarily been described as a divide between modernizers and traditionalists. For example, while all politicians agreed on the pursuit of the 'Megali Idea', the latter half of the 19th century was defined by competition between the two leading political figures of their time, Trikoupis and Deliyannis. This competition was based on their chosen ways to achieve Greece's irredentist goals. Trikoupis campaigned on a modernising platform that favoured the strengthening of the indigenous economy before embarking on international ventures. Deliyannis, on the other hand, adopted an adventurous stance that sacrificed domestic consideration in the pursuit of territorial gains to be won through military force.

In the post-Cold War era this deliberation over Greece's direction in the realm of foreign and security policy can also be seen as a geo-economics versus geo-politics debate. Those who favour a geo-economics approach argue that under the new international realities and the growing political and economic interdependence that

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[20] see Giannopoulos, G. *Foreign Policy and 'National Issues' from the Defeat of 1897 to the Minor Asia Catastrope*. Athens: Vivliorama, 2001

they impose on states, Greece's main consideration should be the bolstering of its economy, the consolidation of its institutions and a conduct of external relations that is based on co-operation rather than conflict. It is a multilateral approach that sees the country's European perspective and integration as paramount to issues of national concern, "including sensitive questions in the Balkans and the Aegean".[22] Those who favour a geo-politics approach adopt a Machiavellian view of the world that depicts international relations as zero-sum game played by actors (states) pitted against each other with power and survival as the ultimate prize. In such an anarchic international environment, they argue, Greece should be willing and able to pursue unilateral policies, even if these best serve its interests.

c) Another major theme that emerges from our analysis is the particularistic nature of Greece's political culture that is intrinsically bound to both the notion of nationalism that gave birth to the modern Greek state, and the modernizers versus traditionalists debate that is not restricted to the country's international behaviour but extends to domestic political and social considerations. Understanding Greek political culture is essential, for as said before, it sets the background against which the structures that define the nation's foreign and security policy develop and operate.

d) The final theme refers to the question that unavoidably emerges as a result of the aforesaid considerations and asks whether Greece is like any other country, especially those within the Western world to which Greece feels it belongs?[23] Greece is both a European Union partner state and a NATO member but she is also a Balkan state. Have Greek politics and Greek people managed to reconcile these two differing sides of their country's territorial and ideational existence or is it the case that those differences define and guide its course?

Strategic Culture: What Does it Offer?

The review of the strategic culture literature that has been carried out within this thesis has provided further testimony to the disparate way this subject matter has been approached. It has also highlighted the conceptual and methodological problems that

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[21] for the formulation of this point see Larrabee, S. et al. ed. *Greece's New Geopolitics*. Santa Monica: RAND, 2001, p. 109
[22] ibid
[23] see for example Tsoukalis, L. Greece Like Any Other European Country? *The National Interest*, 55, Spring 1999

dog strategic culture. It is now worth revisiting some of the major issues that we talked about in Chapter One to consider how they apply to the Greek case study.

At the core of these issues lies the great conceptual difficulty of defining what constitutes a strategic culture and the way to proceed with its analysis, both on a methodological and conceptual level. Some prefer to avoid this intellectual quagmire by simply ignoring it, using the strategic culture label without elaborating on what they understand it to mean. Others locate their research within mainstream international relations theory. A number of these scholars adhere to the basic tenets of the dominant neo-realist research paradigm but seek to broaden its theoretical confines. They believe, therefore, that strategic culture has a significant contribution to make by elucidating the cultural framework within which states, and their leaders, operate. In doing so, strategic culture can enrich the understanding not only of one's own weaknesses and strengths but also of those of the enemy.

On the other hand, there are those who see a more independent role for strategic culture arguing that its contribution can have significant effects both on inter-state relations and on the international system as a whole. Strategic culture understanding can, for example, create a more stable and peaceful international environment. It can do so by eliminating misperceptions that have the propensity to lead to major unrest and conflict between states. In achieving this aforementioned goal it can ultimately aid in the circumvention of the security dilemma.[24] Moreover, the mutual cultural understanding of the adversary's intention and behaviour can have a pacifying effect on long-standing international disputes.

A number of scholars go even further suggesting that conflict has culturally defined roots.[25] They argue that if the roots are uncovered and replaced with a new set of beliefs and symbols, conflict will cease to be an endemic feature of the international system. The immediate results of such an outcome could cast doubt over the future of a state-centric international system by creating a new environment that will promote

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[24] see for example Ross, H. M. *The Culture of Conflict: Interpretations and Interests in Comparative Perspective*, London: Yale University Press, 1993 and Cohen, R. *Culture and Conflict in Egyptian–Israeli Relations: A Dialogue of the Deaf.* Indianapolis, 1990
[25] for an approach on the issue from a historical perspective see Shy, J. The Cultural Approach to the History of War. *Journal of Military History*, 57 (5), October 1993

co-operation and ostracise force or the threat to use force as an acceptable means of international conduct.

Ultimately, both ontologically and methodologically, the important question asked about the utility of a strategic culture approach is whether it can produce falsifiable propositions that will be able to withstand empirical inquiry. The question here, in other words, is whether strategic culture can be studied within the strict confines of a cause and effect positivist approach or not. The conclusions that were drawn from the strategic culture literature review leave little hope for those who readily offer an affirmative reply to the above conundrum.

On all accounts, this thesis has attempted a synthesis of views and approaches. The aims of the strategic culture approach preferred in this research were modest and did not claim to offer any methodological or conceptual breakthroughs. Methodologically, the view put forward here holds that culture, due to its elusive nature, cannot easily if at all produce the hard empirical evidence required in the positivist line of scientific enquiry. This, however, needs not invalidate the usefulness of strategic culture. Despite its intrinsic difficulties cultural analysis has valuable contributions to make if what is expected of it does not exceed its capabilities. At the very least, strategic culture analysis can contribute by elucidating the "different logics of common senses about what strategic self-help in anarchy entails".[26]

Following on, in terms of ontology, the idea of a holistic relation between strategy and culture, utilised to predict state action and behaviour, has to be refuted. The desired gain, instead, has to be the furthering of the understanding of the "interplay between local and national identities, and those between domestic and international domains" within the framework of Greece's grand strategic thought and practice.[27] For while states "might appear unitary on an official level they are not black boxes" and their

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[26] Booth, K., Macmillan, A., Trood, R. "Strategic Culture" in Booth, K., Trood, R. eds. *Strategic Cultures in the Asia–Pacific Region.* London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 21
[27] Ross, H. M. "The Cultural Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict" in Jacquin-Berdal, D., Oros, A., Verweij, M. eds. *Culture in World Politics.* London: Macmillan Press in association with Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 1998, p. 166

responses can be seen as the "balance of competing domestic interests and external pressures".[28]

Hence, the task in hand is not to offer an alternative or radical new theory. Proceeding from a state-centric perspective this thesis has tried to tease out of the available literature both the explicit and implicit cultural and ideational observations on Greece's grand strategic thought and practice. To that end, this research has delved deep into Greece's historical and formative experiences, the nation's geographic disposition, and its political culture and has looked for persistency across a wide range of symbols, objects and actors over time. It is a historically comprehensive approach that looks for the "fundamental consistencies in a state's long term-strategic conduct".[29]

It has not been an easy task. It required going through a large volume of, an often diverse literature that transcends the traditional barriers dividing the different branches of the social sciences. Due to its interdisciplinary nature, this thesis has looked for ideas not only within political science but also within history, geography, sociology, anthropology and sociology. This laborious analysis, however, has allowed us a closer inspection of "both explicit rules, beliefs, values and symbols, and implicit unrecognised sets of meanings, metaphors, stories, and discourses through which experience is interpreted and which are unconsciously [or consciously] reproduced as part of social life".[30] It has also given us the opportunity to ask whether these features

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[28] Keridis, D. "Domestic Developments and Foreign Policy" in Keridis, D., Triantaphyllou, D. eds. *Greek–Turkish Relations in the Era of European Integration and Globalization*. Virginia: Brassey's, 2001, p. 3

[29] This point was cited from a research paper that uses strategic culture as the originating point for a new form of cultural analysis within strategic studies labelled strategic personality and defined as an 'abstract structure through which to gain insight into the broader historical and cultural patterns that have evolved over very long periods – usually a state's entire history'. Ontologically it seeks 'a comprehensive approach that focuses on the reasoning and motives underlying state conduct and how differences in cognitive orientations can influence state interactions and the direction and stability of the international system'. Though I agree on the need for a broader level of analysis for strategic culture, one that extends beyond the narrow confines of military strategy, I do not see the need for an alternative approach that is concerned with the same issues as strategic culture is. For the quotations and the analysis see Alrich, A., Loustaunau, P., Ziemke, C. F. *Strategic Personality and the Effectiveness of Nuclear Deterrence*. IDA: Institute for Defence Analyses – Defence Threat Reduction Agency, November 2000, p. 5

[30] Duffey, T. A Theoretical Examination of the Role of Conflict in Conflict Resolution with Special Reference to Japan: Implication for Practice and Training, Paper prepared for a conference on Conflict Resolution in the Asia–Pacific Region: Culture, Problem Solving and Peacemaking, Penang - Malaysia, 1994, p. 5 cited from Macmillan, A. *Strategic Culture and British Grand Strategy, 1949-*

have persisted in the passing of generations and if so, to examine the way they have been reconstituted to fit the changing internal and external circumstances. Once more, it has to be remembered that what we are looking for is not firm determinants but insightful propensities.

This way, it is hoped, that strategic culture can enrich strategic analysis by aiding in the understanding of "the 'irrational' thoughts and actions of states".[31] Neo-realism, on the other hand, holds that states operate within an anarchic international environment whose systemic pressures influence and shape their actions. Moreover, with no attention paid to their esoteric constituent elements, states are often seen as undifferentiated parts of a wider structure – the international system – whose actions are rationally motivated to optimise their performance in the fight for either bigger gains or survival. A closer inspection of the above instances has sought to demonstrate that a strategic culture approach can provide a useful analytical tool to elucidate how and why Greece has opted for particular courses of action. This suggests that states do not always act as rational actors.[32] Additionally, as Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff have observed, the strategic culture approach need not necessarily be viewed as an alternative to neo-realist thinking, as it may offer insights that complement it.[33]

In particular, strategic culture analysis can offer invaluable insights into Greece's turbulent relations with neighbouring FYROM (Macedonia). For, to what 'rational' reasons can the Greek commercial embargo, imposed on this landlocked, breakaway Yugoslav republic in February 1994, be attributed? What perceived threat convinced Greek leaders that their country's hard stance was necessary, even if this led to the marginalisation of the country's role within the European Union and risked hindering its relations with its Atlantic allies? How can Greece steadfastly oppose FYROM's

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1952. PhD Thesis, University of Wales – Aberystwyth, 1996, p. 274 on the issue of unspoken assumption and their effect on strategy see also Joll, J. "1914: The Unspoken Assumptions" in Koch, H. W. ed. *The Origins of the First World War: Great Power Rivalry and German War Aims.* London: Macmillan, 1972, pp. 309-12

[31] Booth, K., Macmillan, A., Trood, R. "Strategic Culture" in Booth, K., Trood, R. eds. *Strategic Cultures in the Asia–Pacific Region.* London: Macmillan, 1999, pp. 21-2

[32] for a similar line of argumentation albeit within the realm of military change see Farrell, T., Terriff, T. "Conclusion: Military Change in the New Millenium" in Farrell, T., Terriff, T. eds. *The Sources of Military Change – Culture, Politics, Technology.* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, pp. 273-4

[33] ibid

international recognition under the name Macedonia, while its political leaders stress that for their part FYROM is "not a contested territory and that Greece makes no territorial claim on that entity".[34] A similar question can be asked about Greece's decision to include Cyprus in a strategic doctrine of extended deterrence. A strictly military logic holds that logistically, if for no other reason, the defence of an island thousands of miles away from the Greek mainland, and yet minutes away from the shores of the main adversary (Turkey), is an impossible task. Why then has Greece opted for such a strategy? Chapter Five has sought to answer these questions and has found the concept of strategic culture of great value in this effort.

To conclude, the problems and complexities that dog strategic culture analysis has limited the attention the concept has enjoyed within the wider academic discipline of international relations. While much needs to be done to clarify the theoretical and methodological background upon which strategic culture rests, I believe that the pursuit of such a line of inquiry offers valuable contributions to the furthering of our understanding of international relations. Furthermore I am in agreement with Stuart Poore in believing that "without investigating the cultural context in which decisions are made, we are left with narrow and meaningless insights into strategic behaviour."[35] Poore also suggests "strategic culturalists should now be urged to generate more empirical research into particular strategic cultural cases through the use of thick description. In doing so, many new insights can be gained into cases where previously rationalist materialist explanations have exerted an over-bearing dominance."[36] His thoughts are endorsed by Colin Gray who argues that:

We need empirically thick studies of societies of interest, always remembering that we must filter what we learn through the distorting lens of our own culture. The way forward is well signposted; more empirical investigation of actual beliefs and attitudes (as contrasted with merely presumed beliefs and attitudes);

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[34] Hope, K., Dempsey, J. Balkan Pledge on Macedonia: Greece Seeks to Allay International Concern about its Intentions, *Financial Times*, 13 November 1992, p. 3 cited from Zahariadis, N. Nationalism and Small State Foreign Policy: The Greek Response to the Macedonian Issue. *Political Science Quarterly*, 109 (4), 1994, pp. 647-88
[35] Poore, S. What is Context? A Reply to the Gray-Johnston Debate on Strategic Culture. *Review of International Studies*, 29, 2003, p. 284
[36] ibid

no more drawing of false distinctions between realist and cultural explanations; and a moratorium of noble endeavours to build falsifiable general theory.[37]

It is hoped that in employing strategic culture to provide an assessment of Greece's grand strategic thought and action, that this thesis has made a modest contribution in that direction.

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[37] Gray, C. In Praise of Strategy. Review of International Studies, 29, 2003, p. 294

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