The acquisition of new members by groups : the role of selection, socialisation, and sanctions
The acquisition of new members by groups : the role of selection, socialisation, and sanctions
Human society is built on a foundation of collaborative endeavours which range from small social groups to multi-national organisations to governments. In order to sustain these systems, many groups will often be required to recruit new members; either to compensate for the loss of exiting members or to allow the group to expand. However, this process is hampered by the fact that new members may compromise the integrity of the system by following their own individual interests rather than those of the group. The aim of this research was to examine how open groups resolve this problem, and acquire new members who will contribute towards collective goals rather than exploit other members for their own ends.
To do this, we draw on previous research from the area of social dilemmas – which shows how cooperation can be elicited from those engaged in a mixed motive situation – and models which view groups as open systems – such as the Group Socialisation model (Moreland & Levine, 1982) – to produce three mechanisms which may facilitate member recruitment in groups: group selection, group socialisation, and group resocialisation via sanctioning. Four empirical studies were then carried out to ascertain the relative effectiveness of these mechanisms in securing candidates for membership, a place within a group’s ranks.
In experiments one (Chapter 3) and two (Chapter 4), participants made membership decisions based on selection information in the form of a candidate’s commitment to the group, and the presence of a sanctioning system which would penalise free-riders. In experiments three (Chapter 5) and four (Chapter 6), the idea of source variance was introduced to examine whether the origin of commitment information would affect its use. Experiment three also examined to what extent the presence of socialisation could affect existing members’ decisions regarding the candidate.
The analysis of these experiments indicates that commitment information is a powerful cue in the recruitment decisions about new members. The presence of a socialisation mechanism was also found to be influential in the recruitment process in that the commitment of candidates mattered less when there was an opportunity to train them. However, the presence of a sanctioning system had no influence on membership decisions. These findings are subsequently discussed in tems of their impact on our understanding of group dynamics, and recommendations are made for future research, which may seek to expand on the ideas outline here in order to build a greater understanding of human cooperation.
University of Southampton
Stiff, Christopher
72eb026c-95f1-4df5-8553-d13be11b0287
2005
Stiff, Christopher
72eb026c-95f1-4df5-8553-d13be11b0287
Stiff, Christopher
(2005)
The acquisition of new members by groups : the role of selection, socialisation, and sanctions.
University of Southampton, Doctoral Thesis.
Record type:
Thesis
(Doctoral)
Abstract
Human society is built on a foundation of collaborative endeavours which range from small social groups to multi-national organisations to governments. In order to sustain these systems, many groups will often be required to recruit new members; either to compensate for the loss of exiting members or to allow the group to expand. However, this process is hampered by the fact that new members may compromise the integrity of the system by following their own individual interests rather than those of the group. The aim of this research was to examine how open groups resolve this problem, and acquire new members who will contribute towards collective goals rather than exploit other members for their own ends.
To do this, we draw on previous research from the area of social dilemmas – which shows how cooperation can be elicited from those engaged in a mixed motive situation – and models which view groups as open systems – such as the Group Socialisation model (Moreland & Levine, 1982) – to produce three mechanisms which may facilitate member recruitment in groups: group selection, group socialisation, and group resocialisation via sanctioning. Four empirical studies were then carried out to ascertain the relative effectiveness of these mechanisms in securing candidates for membership, a place within a group’s ranks.
In experiments one (Chapter 3) and two (Chapter 4), participants made membership decisions based on selection information in the form of a candidate’s commitment to the group, and the presence of a sanctioning system which would penalise free-riders. In experiments three (Chapter 5) and four (Chapter 6), the idea of source variance was introduced to examine whether the origin of commitment information would affect its use. Experiment three also examined to what extent the presence of socialisation could affect existing members’ decisions regarding the candidate.
The analysis of these experiments indicates that commitment information is a powerful cue in the recruitment decisions about new members. The presence of a socialisation mechanism was also found to be influential in the recruitment process in that the commitment of candidates mattered less when there was an opportunity to train them. However, the presence of a sanctioning system had no influence on membership decisions. These findings are subsequently discussed in tems of their impact on our understanding of group dynamics, and recommendations are made for future research, which may seek to expand on the ideas outline here in order to build a greater understanding of human cooperation.
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Published date: 2005
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Local EPrints ID: 465562
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/465562
PURE UUID: 3ed2d3fb-cd09-4a9f-9121-4a26e8c93555
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Date deposited: 05 Jul 2022 01:47
Last modified: 16 Mar 2024 20:15
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Author:
Christopher Stiff
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